STATE AND LABOUR IN THE U.S.

THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION AND THE AFL-CIO, 1976-1980: POLITICAL STRATEGY AND THE NATIONAL ACCORD

ISABEL D. HARRISON

THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

NUFFIELD COLLEGE
Michaelmas 1988 [ie 1984]

There is one common feature in the development ... of modern trade union organisations in the entire world: it is their drawing closely to and growing together with the state power. This process is equally characteristic of the neutral, the Social-Democratic, the Communist and 'anarchist' trade unions. This fact alone shows that the tendency towards 'growing together' is intrinsic not in this or that doctrine as such but derives from social conditions common for all unions. [Trotsky][1]

[1]Leon Trotsky, *Marxism and the Trade Unions*, 3rd ed., New Park Publications Ltd., London, 1983.

ABSTRACT

STATE AND LABOUR IN THE U.S.
The Carter Administration and the AFL-CIO, 1976-1980:
Political Strategy and the National Accord

The thesis examines the National Accord undertaking between the American central labour federation (AFL-CIO) and the Carter White House, in the light of their respective political strategies. The Accord provides a focal point and a point of departure for the study of the evolving political organization and activity of organized labour nationally, within the changing contours of American national government and politics. The study is placed in the context of broader theories of state-labour relations in the advanced industrialized democracies of the West.

The thesis explains the changing character and role of the AFL-CIO as the broadest level of representative aggregation within the labour sector, and labour's changing ties to the Democratic Party, role in presidential politics and special status within Congress. Also examined are selected characteristics of the Carter presidency and the changing policy-political strategy of the Carter White House toward organized labour, from a relatively isolated mode of policymaking to extensive consultation and policy concessions through the Accord negotiations.

The Accord was a political exchange whereby the labour leadership participated in the wage restraint programme in return for consultative rights and specific *quid pro quo* policies, including countercyclical measures to offset fiscal austerity. The President subsequently sustained a policy of fiscal and monetary restraint despite the approaching election and the increasing protests of organized labour. However, in the face of strong opposition from some of Carter's senior economists, the labour leaders secured significant modifications to the second year of the pay standard. The 1980 presidential election renewed incentives for continuing cooperation when economic policy otherwise jeopardized relations.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am glad to have this opportunity to extend my thanks to those I interviewed about the events and relationships explored in this thesis. Without their invaluable assistance, the study would not have been possible and, without their interest and goodwill, it would certainly have been far less of a pleasure. Acknowledging my debt to all, I wish especially to thank those at AFL-CIO national headquarters for liberal access to people and information, and for an exceptional degree of hospitality. Special thanks also to former Carter aides, Landon Butler, Paul Jensen and Stuart Eizenstat for their especially kind assistance. For diverse remarkable contributions, my thanks to Kathy Holmes, Andrew John, Maeve O'Higgins, Ralph Goldman and Congressman Bruce Morrison.

For academic guidance and support, I acknowledge my great debt and give special thanks to Dr. Colin Crouch, Trinity College, and Dr. David Goldey, Lincoln College, who supervised the arduous final stages of this work. Thanks also to Dr. Lawrence Whitehead and Dr. Byron Shafer for much advice, encouragement and many friendly comments on the contents. For editing suggestions on Chapter 4, thanks are due to Nigel Bowles. I owe thanks also to Yale University Political Science Department, the Fulbright Commission and the Brookings Institution for their support at various junctures. Most particularly, I thank Nuffield College for consistent support, both practical and collegial.

Most especially, for editing, bibliographical and more support, I thank Mark Evans, without whose fortitude neither I nor the thesis would have reached this stage.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract *iii*
Acknowledgements *iv*
Abbreviations *viii*
Chronology *xi*

INTRODUCTION **1**

CHAPTER 1:
GOVERNMENT AND ORGANIZED LABOUR: COOPERATION AND CONFLICT - THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK PROVIDED BY THEORIES OF INTEREST REPRESENTATION. **4**

Dilemmas of Government, Representation and Macroeconomic Management in the 1970s. 4
Post-Pluralist Theories of Interest Representation: Incorporation and Power Bargaining. 6
The State and Socio-Economic Interests: Representation and Political Strategy. 8
State Strategy and Interest Representation. 9
Governments and Corporatist Structures: Decentralization and Political Bargaining. 10
Corporatism, Voluntarism and Social Control. 12
Social Contracts: Social Controls or Power Bargains? 13
Corporatism, Pluralism and Stability. 16
Power Bargaining Analysis and Labour Strategy. 17
Preconditions for Labour's Political Strategy. 17
Labour's Industrial and Political Power Resources. 18
Labour Centralization and Peak Organizations. 19
Labour Strategy, Corporatism and Exceptionalism in the U.S. 21
Historical Developments Underlying Political Attributes. 22
Social Democracy, Party and Worker Mobilization. 23
The Scope and Structure of Government. 25
The Interest Group Sector. 29
Incomes Policy and Corporatism in the U.S. 34

CHAPTER 2:
THE CONTEXT OF LABOUR'S INDUSTRIAL AND POLITICAL STRATEGY IN THE 1970s. **37**

Legal Regulation and Labour Relations. 37
Collective Bargaining and the AFL-CIO. 39
The AFL-CIO and Labour Sector Organization. 43
——Business Sector Organisation In The 1970s. 51
The Business Roundtable. 51
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 52
The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM). 53
——Economic Decline and Labour-Management Conflict. 53

CHAPTER 3:
ORGANIZED LABOUR AND THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY. 58

The AFL-CIO and the Democratic Party. 60
AFL-CIO Electoral Resources. 62
The AFL-CIO Committee for Political Education (COPE). 64
Campaign Finance and Political Action Committees (PACs). 69
Changing Presidential Politics: The Democrats and the AFL-CIO. 72
The Democratic Nomination and Labour Politics. 74
AFL-CIO Legislative Strategy: The Labour Lobby and the National Policy Process. 80
The "Lobby Boom" in the Capitol. 80
Legislative Strategy: Labour Sector Organization. 81
Legislative Strategy: Representation and Mobilization. 83
Agenda Formation and Character, and Coalition Building. 83
The AFL-CIO, President Carter and Legislative Liaison. 85
The AFL-CIO and Politics Within Congress. 91
Interests in Congress: The Special Status of the AFL-CIO Lobby. 91
The Committee System and the Labour Committees. 96
The Labour Committees: Ideology, Partisanship and Performance. 96
Leadership on the Labour Committees. 98
Membership Assignments, Partisanship and Issues. 99
The Decline of the Labour Committees and Legislative Defeat. 102
——Labour Law Reform: Labour and Executive Lobbying. 104

CHAPTER 4:
POLITICS AND POLICY: PRESIDENT CARTER AND THE AFL-CIO - PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY CONSULTATION. 113

Carter's Institutional Strategy and Relations with Organized Labour. 115
Structure and Authority: The Carter Cabinet and White House. 115
Early Consultative Provisions with Labour. 122
The Labor-Management Group. 123
The Secretary and Department of Labor. 124
Decisionmakers, the Anti-Inflation Programme and the National Accord. 127
——The Anti-Inflation Programme before the Accord. 132
The Feasibility of a Voluntary Restraint Programme. 135
The Anti-Inflation Price Provisions. 138
Compliance Provisions. 140
The Real Wage Insurance Scheme. 141
The Rapprochement and the Pay Programme. 143
White House Decisionmaking on Year II and the National Accord. 148
The Reaction of Business Interests and the National Accord. 155

CHAPTER 5:
CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS-BUILDING: AFL-CIO EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP AND THE NATIONAL ACCORD. 158

AFL-CIO Leadership: Representation and Executive Authority. 159
Leadership Transition and the National Accord. 164
The Structure of Government and the National Accord. 167
Negotiating the Accord: Strategy and Consensus. 168

The Rapprochement and Early Accord Negotiations. 169
The AFL-CIO EXCO and Endorsement of the National Accord. 173

CHAPTER 6:
ECONOMIC POLICY POLITICS AFTER ENDORSEMENT OF THE ACCORD. 177

PAYC: Composition and Strategic Functioning. 177
Business and Labour Influence upon the Composition of PAYC. 177
PAYC Jurisdiction and Power: Big Business and Big Labour. 179
Conflict and Compromise: Decisionmaking Politics Over the Year II Programme. 184
The White House and the FRB: Fiscal and Monetary Activity and the Wage/Price Programme. 186
The Wage/Price Programme Until the Election. 203
The Outcome of the Voluntary Restraint Programme. 207

CHAPTER 7:
ORGANIZED LABOUR, JIMMY CARTER AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. 210

Carter, Organized Labour and the 1976 Election. 210
Labour Influence and the 1976 General Election. 216
After the 1976 Election. 218
Carter, Labour and the 1980 Campaign. 219
The 1980 Primaries. 226
The 1980 Convention: Labour Representation, Nomination Politics and Policy Conflict. 229
The Platform Committee and Platform Conflict. 231
Labour and the 1980 General Election. 235
The Outcome in 1980. 238

CONCLUSION. 242

APPENDIX A: The National Accord (text). **253**

APPENDIX B: AFL-CIO Executive Council Members. **255**

APPENDIX C: Members of the Pay Advisory Committee (PAYC). **256**

APPENDIX D: The 1980 Democratic Nomination - List of Unions Endorsing Carter and Kennedy During the 1980 Primaries. **257**

BIBLIOGRAPHY. I

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATIONS IN TEXTUAL REFERENCES

BNA-[+ Suffix]	Bureau of National Affairs: various categories (see Bibliography).
CQ Guide	Congressional Quarterly Guide to Current American Government (biannual series).
CQ (Series)	Congressional Quarterly, Weekly Reports.
NJ	National Journal.
NYT	New York Times.
PR	Press Conferences and Transcripts.
Ua	Unattributable Interview Reference.
WSJ	Wall Street Journal.
[Name Only]	Interviews conducted for the purpose of the thesis; the surname of the interviewee appears in [square] parentheses. A full list appears at the end of the bibliography.

LABOUR ORGANIZATIONS

ACTWU	Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union.
AFL-CIO	American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations [also as AFL or CIO separately].
AFSCME	American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees.
AFT	American Federation of Teachers.
CWA	Communications Workers of America.
COPE	Committee on Political Education, AFL-CIO.
EXCO	Executive Council, AFL-CIO.
IAM	International Association of Machinists.
IBEW	International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.
ILA	International Longshoremen's Association.
ILGWU	International Ladies Garment Workers Union.
IUE	International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers.
NAGE	National Association of Government Employees.
NEA	National Education Association.
OCAW	Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Union.
OFS	Organization & Field Services Department, AFL-CIO.
RWU	Rubber Workers Union.
Steelworkers	United Steelworkers of America.
Teamsters	International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America.
UAW	United Automobile Workers.
UE	United Electrical Workers.
UMW	United Mine Workers.

GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS

CBC	Collective Bargaining Committee (Cabinet-level).
CEA	Council of Economic Advisers.
CISC	Construction Industry Stabilization Committee?
COWPS	Council on Wage & Price Stability.
DPS	Domestic Policy Staff (White House).
EPG	Economic Policy Group (White House).
FMCS	Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.
HLC	House Education and Labor Committee.
LC(s)	Labour Committee(s), House and/or Senate.
NLRB	National Labor Relations Board.
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
OSHA	Occupational Safety & Health Administration.
PAYC	Pay Advisory Committee (under the National Accord).
PRAC	Price Advisory Committee (under the National Accord).
SLC	Senate Committee on Human Resources (Labor Committee).

PARTY ORGANIZATIONS

DNC	Democratic National Committee.

BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS

AGC	Associated General Contractors of America.
ALCOA	Aluminum Company of America.
NAM	National Association of Manufacturers.
Roundtable	Business Roundtable.
(U.S.) Chamber	U.S. Chamber of Commerce.

OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

ADA	Americans for Democratic Action.
FEM	Foreign Exchange Market(s).
FRB	Federal Reserve Board (The Fed).
NAACP	National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.
OPEC	Oil and Petroleum Exporting Countries.

GENERAL

CETA	Comprehensive Employment & Training Act.
COLA	Cost-of-Living Agreement.
CPI	Consumer Price Index.
CSP	Common Situs Picketing.
ERISA	Employment Retirement Income Security Act.
FY	Fiscal Year (eg. FY80).
GNP	Gross National Product.
GOTV	Get-out-the Vote (labour programme).
LGA	Landrum-Griffin Act.

LLR	Labour law reform.
LMRA	Labor-Management Reporting Act.
LMRDA	Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act.
NHI	National Health Insurance.
NLRA	National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act)
PCT	Panama Canal Treaty.
RWI	Real Wage Insurance (White House programme).
THA	Taft-Hartley Act.
Wagner Act	NLRA.

CHRONOLOGY

1977	
April 17	Carter sends energy programme to Congress.
June 22	Labour law reform proposals defeated in Senate.
1978	
Mid-Year	Economy worsens; White House develops voluntary incomes policy and austerity strategy.
October	Congress passes energy packages; White House introduces anti-inflation programme; Break in relations between White House and AFL-CIO.
December	Landon Butler proposes a labour committee to the AFL-CIO, to support Carter's re-election.
1979	
January	White House/AFL-CIO rapprochement; pre-"Accord" committee established; OPEC price increases (first quarter of 1979).
April	White House approaches AFL-CIO for cooperation on pay and price restraint.
June	Butler and Kirkland sketch a "social contract" style agreement.
June 18	Carter and Brezhnev sign SALT II in Vienna; Kirkland announces AFL-CIO support.
July 3-12	Carter cancels energy speech; Camp David III domestic summit.
July 15	"Crisis of confidence/malaise" speech to nation.
July 17	Cabinet changes announced; G.W. Miller appointed as Treasury secretary; National Accord negotiations gain substance;
Late July	Carter/Mondale Labor Committee announced.
September 28	National Accord signed.
October	Accord pay and price boards established; Volcker instigates higher interest rates.
October 17	Carter signs bill creating the Department of Education.
November 4	U.S. Embassy seized in Iran.
November 7	Kennedy announces for 1980.
November 15-20	AFL-CIO convention elects Kirkland as president.
December 4	Carter announces for 1980.
December 27	USSR invades Afghanistan.
1980	
January 21	Primary/caucus season opens with a Carter win in Iowa.
January 23	State of the Union Speech.
February	Inflation rate for January announced at 18%; White House accepts Year II pay range proposed by PAYC.

March 4	Carter announces new anti-inflation proposals, including a balanced budget.
April	Abortive Iran rescue bid.
August	Carter receives Democratic Party nomination; AFL-CIO EXCO endorses Carter for 1980.
September	AFL-CIO General Board endorses Carter for 1980.
November 4	Carter defeated in Election.

For more detailed chronologies, see Carter [1982]; Ranney [1981].

INTRODUCTION

The thesis examines the changing relations between the national government and organized labour nationally during the years of the Carter presidency (1976-80). The thesis contests the assertion of interest group theory that the incentives for organized labour to pursue a specifically *political* strategy are weak in the U.S. The labour movement is demonstrably deeply and extensively involved in the political process in an authoritative manner; government leaders have endorsed, and at times initiated, such activity. Hence, the comparative incentives for weak and strong labour movements to pursue a political strategy are elucidated by our examination of a supposedly weak case, as we explain the conjunction of organized labour's internal characteristics with external political and economic influences, both short and long term.

During the seventies, the political strategy of the U.S. labour central, the American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), was modified. Unique to the Carter period was the formalization of presidential-labour relations through a policy concordat, the National Accord [Appendix A], negotiated by the Carter White House and the AFL-CIO. In a nation where, in theory, corporatist bargaining is highly improbable, if not impossible, the Accord process and agreement bore the hallmarks of corporatism. The Accord was a political exchange whereby the labour leadership participated in the wage restraint programme, in return for extended consultative rights and specific *quid pro quo* policies. This process permitted the development of a working consensus under difficult conditions: between the White House and the AFL-CIO, but also within the executive level

X

evolving political organization and activity of organized labour nationally, within the changing contours of American national government and politics.

The relevance of the study extends beyond the Americanist context. The empirical base tests claims of a theoretical nature concerning state-interest relations, specifically government-labour relations within Western liberal democracies, supplementing and modifying these explanatory theories. Within social science, the thesis explores the intersection of several substantive areas: political economy, industrial relations, political institutions, public policy, and systems of interest representation. Our aim is an integrative analysis explaining the negotiation of the National Accord during a challenging period in U.S. economic and political developments. To this end, the study draws upon a wide range of primary documentation, including government files and reports, internal publications from

labour organizations, primarily the AFL-CIO, and diverse secondary materials. A series of extensive interviews was undertaken with members of the AFL-CIO national leadership and headquarters staff; with senior members of the Carter Administration, including White House principals; with Members of Congress, congressional staff members, academics and others.

The thesis is structured as follows. **Chapter 1** establishes a conceptual framework derived from recent "post-pluralist" expositions of state-labour relations and systems of interest representation. These analyses relegated the U.S. to the academic periphery because of methodological problems of comparison: the U.S. became a simple case of "exceptionalism". However, we take as our starting point the revisionist view of at least one such analyst: "The special features of the American case are conceived as phenomena that have to be explained by the theory, not as barriers to comparison and generalization." [Berger, 1984:4]. Not only does post-pluralism provide a useful analytic agenda for considering state-labour relations in the U.S., but analysis of the National Accord process reveals that some factors thought to inhibit the accommodatory state-labour relations of concern to post-pluralists instead proved conducive to their emergence. Subsequent chapters examine the U.S. case in detail.

Chapter 2 provides a brief introduction to organized labour in the political economy of the U.S. Selected organizational characteristics of the labour sector and business, and rising conflict between them, are outlined. In **Chapter 3**, labour's changing ties to the Democratic Party, role in presidential politics and special status within Congress are discussed. **Chapter 4** explains the changing policy-political strategy of the Carter White House concerning organized labour, from a relatively isolated approach to policymaking to the extensive consultative rights and policy concessions provided through the Accord negotiations. In the process, the White House helped to revivify the AFL-CIO within the organized labour sector, restoring its representative predominance after a period of internal instability. This shift by the presidency occurred in the context of acute problems in macroeconomic management heightened during 1979 by the second OPEC price shock and the Iranian revolution. As well as energy policy, the President's anti-inflation programme included a voluntary incomes policy and fiscal/monetary retrenchment; the White House sought to gain AFL-CIO participation in the former and to mute its opposition to the latter. **Chapter 5** extends the examination of the AFL-CIO, the highest level of representative aggregation within the labour sector, and explains the labour leaders' decision to endorse the Accord. The configuration of decisionmaking and the internal politics surrounding and shaping the Accord illustrate the construction of an operative consensus within the AFL-CIO under prohibitive

conditions. The Accord strategy developed by the White House and AFL-CIO leadership explicitly addressed these needs. Within the AFL-CIO, the undertaking was limited to the leadership level; there was little attempt at broader mobilization by the labour leadership, thus limiting the "social control" possible for the government. **Chapter 6** extends the themes raised to the period following ratification of the Accord. The President sustained his policy of fiscal and monetary restraint despite the approaching election and the increasing protests of organized labour and other liberal interests. However, in the face of strong opposition from some of Carter's senior economists, the labour leaders secured significant modifications to the second year of the pay standard. The politics of this decisionmaking are examined in detail. **Chapter 7** explains the importance of organized labour to President Carter's electoral fortunes in the 1976 and 1980 elections, clarifying the links with policy and consultative concerns. In 1980, even though an incumbent president, Jimmy Carter's renomination by the Democratic Party was seriously challenged by Senator Edward Kennedy, rendering labour support more important and providing greater policy leverage to labour and other liberal constituencies within the Party.

Concluding observations relate the U.S. case to the themes raised in chapter 1. Explaining the National Accord as a *political bargain* requires a comprehensive understanding of authority and mobilization within the organized labour sector, and the respective roles of labour leaders and rank and file unionists. In terms of the formal, structured and explicit mobilization of the latter in support of an authoritative policy bargain (i.e. wage restraint) with government, the AFL-CIO and the National Accord plainly fail to meet the definitional criteria of corporatism. The mobilization involved was nevertheless complex. The strategic importance of organized labour as a Democratic constituency, within Congress, in the politics of presidential nominations and, more generally, in electoral financing and organization, were interactive elements and variable relative to one another in impact. They were sufficient to persuade the President to return consultative relations with the AFL-CIO to the previous Democratic norm. However, Carter's understanding of, and ability to manage, institutional politics ultimately proved inadequate: within the Executive branch, toward Congress, within the Democratic Party and toward organized labour. As a result, his ability to construct a viable governing coalition was injured. These dynamic problems and the constraints of economic circumstance, rather than the structural, historical or normative factors proposed in state-interest theory, both impelled and limited the accommodatory relations with the labour leadership established through the Accord.

CHAPTER 1

GOVERNMENT AND ORGANIZED LABOUR: COOPERATION AND CONFLICT

The Conceptual Framework Provided by Theories of Interest Representation

The recent prominence of questions of state and interest representation in social science stems chiefly from issues of governability: socio-political stability, the legitimacy and efficiency of government and new dilemmas of macroeconomic management. The character and efficacy of national provisions for interest representation have materially affected the fortunes of national governments. Recognition of the shortcomings of the theories of interest representation predominant in the fifties and sixties likewise renewed critical attention: empirical evidence revealed discrepancies between actual interest representation, including the role of the state, and theoretical expositions of the fifties and sixties dominated by liberal critiques of Marxism, notably the *pluralist* school. For convenience, we will term the theorists looking anew at these issues by the 1970s *"post-pluralists"*.

DILEMMAS OF GOVERNMENT, REPRESENTATION AND MACROECONOMIC MANAGEMENT IN THE 1970s

The increased role of national government in the post-War Western world has been accompanied by the rise to predominance of the Executive of government.[1] Greater policy and political activism by private interests, in the context of increased public socio-economic expectations, has increased demands upon government and thus the need for expansion, in an interdependent and often analytically inseparable process of cause and effect.[2] The relative effectiveness of government has diminished in the face of enlarged, more complex responsibilities, despite expanded bureaucracies and a larger share of national resources. By the 1970s, surveys revealed citizen disaffection from the institutions of government, with widespread feelings of remoteness, distrust and personal political inefficacy. Socio-political activities were more loosely integrated with, or occurred beyond, traditional structures of government and party; new interest groupings proliferated and direct action escalated. The policy convergence of the major parties and lack of real voter choice resulting were seen as contributory factors. Voter turnout dwindled, traditional party loyalties weakened and a more volatile electorate cast "protest" votes or voted *against* the party in government rather than *for* an alternative [for a recent review, see Williams, 1984]. Declining national affluence, especially from the late 1960s, also brought the viability of liberal-democratic institutions

---

[1]On the U.S., see Katzenstein [1978:303-4]. More generally, see Dahl [1971:121-2]. On Britain, see Middlemas [1979:309] and on the reaction in Parliament, Budge et al [1983:47].

[2]King [1975]. For a discussion in the context of corporatism, see Coombes & Walkland [1980:3-4; 14]. For a review of the literature describing these trends during the 1960s, see Shaw [1979:404-5].

into question. Changes within the increasingly interdependent world economic order were politically disruptive in the West, especially the impact of the OPEC price shock of the early seventies, and the Western socio-political agenda became preoccupied with macroeconomic issues. Stagflation was acutely problematic for national government leaders, increasingly held accountable for domestic economic performance, stability and growth [on the U.S. presidency, see Wilson, 1982:228], and policy disputes centred frequently on the political trade-off between inflation and unemployment. These phenomena have corollaries manifest in the U.S. by 1976, when Jimmy Carter was elected President. Strategies to secure greater socio-political consensus included the restatement of distinctive identities by parties and/or an emphasis on personality or "image" politics [Pizzorno, 1981:271]. Governments sought modes of policy formulation dealing more effectively with the representation of competing interests and demands. One institutional strategy resulting brought major socio-economic groups into closer relations with national government; another proposed to reduce the sphere of government activity and curtail the disruptive capability of influential interests.

The developments heightened the political importance and public visibility of union movements, due to the government-labour agenda focus on distributional issues, organized labour's strategic location in the economy, and rising levels of industrial action over matters of collective bargaining: wages and benefits and economic/workplace power. Post-War commitments to full employment and other welfare state policies, demanded and defended by organized labour (in the U.S. as elsewhere) and underpinning labour strength, were criticized as the source of poor economic performance. When governments tackled rising inflation by suppressing demand, the downward rigidity in prices and incomes created by unions contributed to a decline in real output and higher unemployment. Meanwhile, unions, especially central federations, had necessarily become increasingly concerned with macroeconomic policy. Labour organizations were the special target of advocates of curtailed government activity, restricted public expenditure and the primacy of a private market economy in which union-related "rigidities" were sharply reduced, if not eliminated. Governments, seeking institutional and political substitutes for declining market efficiency [Goldthorpe, 1984b], frequently resorted to various forms of incomes policy, despite the poor record of these in the 1960s, and often promoted participation in them by organized labour. However, critics complained that labour secured concessions from government while failing to deliver the wage and/or industrial restraint which were its side of the bargain. These conflicts politicized labour activity and cast doubt on previous expectations about the gradual, systematic incorporation of labour interests into a stable political and economic order.

POST-PLURALIST THEORIES OF INTEREST REPRESENTATION: INCORPORATION AND POWER BARGAINING

Post-pluralists have addressed varying explanatory problems: economic performance, including inflation, employment and productivity levels; the performance and reform of political institutions; and the level and character of industrial action. The specific policy areas they consider also vary but economic policy, notably incomes policy, predominates. The variables selected for these multi-causal analyses are those most useful in assessing the organization and influence of organized labour, prominent in many of the studies. In seeking to explain, for example, why national economic planning and wage policy has been more successful and stable in some countries than others, they consider cross-national variations in labour-state relations including their institutional expression: from functional representation in Austria to the so-called pressure group system of the U.S. Post-pluralism differs from preceding analyses in several important respects.

Pluralists[3] had differentiated politico-industrial systems within a single analytic framework and projected a convergence, through the logic of industrialism, large scale production and economic rationality, towards a common state of internal (bargained) consensus (operating through elite leadership and mass response), regardless of socio-political structure. Rejecting the Marxian emphasis on the dynamics of capitalism, class mobilization and conflict, pluralists stressed the homogenizing impact of industrial technology, education and training, geographic mobility and a long-run decline in social inequalities, notably the *embourgeoisement* of the (manual) working class [cf. Goldthorpe, 1968].[4] In contrast, while post-pluralists affirm a common trajectory among Western nations, their analytic focus is upon significant national divergence in socio-political structures and practices, and their implications for policy-political and/or economic outcomes.

The pluralists' view, technologically deterministic or structural-functionalist, expected advanced industrial nations to exhibit "uniquely corresponding forms of social organization", since these interests derived from social and economic structures: when these structures

---

[3]See Goldthorpe [1984b]; Doeringer [1983:10-14]. There are significant differences amongst pluralists. The main approaches focus on political pluralism and interest representation, and/or industrial relations: Daniel Bell, Robert Dahl, the Oxford school (associated particularly with Alan Fox and Hugh Clegg) and the Wisconsin school in the U.S. Two seminal works are C. Kerr et al, *Industrialism and Industrial Man*, Heinemann, London (1962), and A.M. Ross and P.T. Hartman, *Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict*, Wiley & Sons, N.Y. (1960). See also Korpi & Shalev [1980:302-3], who name John Dunlop (closely involved in the negotiations between the AFL-CIO and President Carter), citing his 1958 study: *Working Union-Management Relations*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.

[4]For a critique, see Goldthorpe [1984b], who suggests that the convergence theorists were products of the "post-war affluent society", "conceptually ill-equipped" to perceive the endogenous causes of inflation/stagflation. For a modified "convergence" argument emphasizing the development of solutions to problems common to industrial relations systems (especially through the formal codification of industrial relations), see Doeringer [1983]. Also Korpi & Shalev [1980].

were at a similar stage of development, the interests would also be alike, notwithstanding national differences in political regimes and party systems. They predicted the "end of ideology" [Bell, 1960], the depoliticization of industrial/labour affairs and the modulation of industrial conflict, with strike activity gradually displaced by collective bargaining power. Mature (pragmatic) unions would be *incorporated*, performing the stabilizing systemic role of industrial representation in counterpart to political citizenship but institutionally isolated, thus fragmenting the social bases of dissent. Industrial conflict was thus attributed to the malfunctioning of social institutions. Instead, industrial conflict and socio-political disruption in the post-War period have increased in some countries which, rather than converging, have become more varied. Union movements, while more involved in the policy-political sphere, have continued to represent class interests, often pursuing an industrial strategy fully exploiting market and bargaining potential [Goldthorpe, 1984b].

Post-pluralist approaches view industrial conflict sociologically as collective struggle over the distribution of scarce resources *and* as part of a broader "political contest", or offer a Marxian class conflict analysis again closely relating industrial conflict and political struggle [Korpi & Shalev, 1980:302-3]. This political emphasis, dominating the work of those analysing interest representation and the state by the 1970s/80s, is an important departure from pluralism. Pluralists trivialized political provisions and reduced the state to a passive and/or neutral role, open to an infinite array of competing, relatively equal socio-political interests. A further essential difference lies in the approach to interest organization and representation. Pluralists neglected some key aspects of interest representation: short versus long-term interests; who interprets needs and how choices are made; and the question of latent interests and the unorganized [Offe, 1981:128-9]. They neglected both the "socioeconomic '*opportunity structure*' of society" and those characteristics of interest groups deriving from the political system, but these may produce "vastly different organizational manifestations and practices" [Offe, 1981:124; Berger, 1981b:4-5; 9]. They failed to recognize, far less explain, systemic bias and the selective expression of interests. Societal power resources were assumed to be distributed relatively equally. More specifically, collective bargaining powers would make workers roughly equal to capitalist interests, or at least make the social integration of the working class unproblematic, thereby narrowing broad class conflict to a regulated bargaining game [Korpi & Shalev, 1980:302-5]. Thus, while noting the periodic prominence of some interests, they failed to explain the systematic dominance of, especially, corporate and labour interests - a dominance which characterizes the U.S., once the acclaimed epitomy of pluralism.

Post-pluralists have looked anew at the origins, role and impact of organized interests, stressing the importance of national historical experience, the effect of intra-organizational factors in defining interests (i.e. how decisions are made) and, most especially, the role of the state, including in structuring relations among interests. These national characteristics (especially political) are so important in determining the form of interest expression that they are analytically inseparable from the "real interest" of a group deriving from the socio-economic structures [Berger, 1981b]. Post-pluralists jointly emphasize the politicization of socio-economic groupings and the prevalence of political bargaining between powerful interests and governments, regardless of the institutional form taken. The analytic framework they provide accommodates some institutional diversity among nations and their analyses, though initially exploratory, divergent and of limited comparability,[5] have sufficient internal consistency to permit a selective synthesis providing a directive conceptual agenda for the U.S. case. We then consider the special analytic requirements and obstacles posited by theories of American exceptionalism.

THE STATE AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC INTERESTS: REPRESENTATION AND POLITICAL STRATEGY

Post-pluralists observe that the division of labour among the representational organs of society - government, political parties and interest groups - has become more fluid. The reasons include increased social complexity, shifts within capitalist economies (altering labour-management relations) and increased international interdependence. Some stress especially the role of politics and the state: increased state regulation of society and the economy, the strength/weakness of parliamentary and party institutions, and the nature of coalitions underpinning government and opposition. Trade-offs among these groups produce new "configurations" of activity in which major interest groups perform functions previously the prerogative of government (policy formulation and implementation) and/or parties (selection amongst demands; their aggregation and transmission; possibly their formation). The formation of new interest groups or the adaptation of existing groups (despite internal organizational impediments), may occur in response to new policies or to gain access to new political or policy advantages [Berger, 1981b].

These writers argue that the groups which organize to control societal resources are determined by the uneven distribution of the latter and the significant inequalities of power they create. They explicitly acknowledge that in the industrialized liberal-democracies, labour and capital are less variable and more powerful than other fundamental or "natural" social divisions such as ethnicity or religion. For Korpi & Shalev, the sphere of production

[5]For a discussion of the evolution of post-pluralist ideas, see Schmitter [1982].

(not the market, as for pluralists) primarily determines societal collectivities and classes and underlies social change.[6] Power resources, as the basis of *potential* (rather than realized) power determine the capacity to realize interests. Differences in power shape social institutions. The two basic kinds of resource are *economic* (control of labour power/capital); and *citizenship*, including both political (e.g. voting) and industrial representation and involving differing types of attributes, such as membership scope or numbers (e.g. closed shop provisions), legitimacy (rights and obligations), as well as class ideologies and consciousness. The fewer the economic resources at the group's disposal, the greater the reliance on numbers. Since, despite their advantages, neither labour nor capital prevail predictably in the "political market", additional explanatory factors are sought [Shalev & Korpi, 1980:32; Korpi & Shalev, 1980:305; Pizzorno, 1981; Berger, 1981b:11-13; 18].

State-interest relations are explained by *state strategy*, emphasizing the active and initiative role of government, and/or *power analyses of political bargaining*, stressing the strength (or weakness) of private interests, notably capital and the working class through trade unions. Though analytically separable, the political strategies pursued by organized interests and government are in practice closely interlinked. Whether the state's role is initiative or reactive and these interests passive or forceful policy participants is a question central to evaluating the aims and beneficiaries of such relations.

State Strategy and Interest Representation

State strategy involving organized interests may be dichotomized as either inclusionary or exclusionary [Goldthorpe, 1984b]. Governments pursuing an exclusionary strategy have sought to reduce the power of major interests, notably organized labour; for example, by introducing higher levels of unemployment, tighter monetary policy, and more restrictive labour laws. With an accompanying emphasis on reduced state activitity, this approach constitutes "neo" *laissez-faire* liberalism.[7] Governments have sometimes demonstrated a mix of the two strategies over time but, until the 1970s, inclusion was more prominent in the post-War Western democracies. Inclusion involves the state and major socio-economic groups in an altered political context assigning selected interests a varying, but important, degree of public status and policy access, in return for their accepting some degree of responsibility for policy formation and implementation [Panitch, 1977:65]. Such provisions draw interests within the public policy sphere and foster reciprocal relations with

[6]They acknowledge cross-cutting cleavages, such as occupation, religion, race, ethnicity, language and region, and discuss craft-industrial union cleavages, as well as the impact of immigration [Korpi & Shalev, 1980:306].

[7]On the U.S. and U.K., see Crouch [1982:211]; Goldthorpe [1984b].

government. These relations have been variously categorized as "neo", "liberal", "societal" or "quasi" corporatist, as political bargaining [Panitch], trans-sectoral concertation [Lehmbruch], or super-pluralism (i.e. corporatism within the framework of pluralism) [Pizzorno] - reflecting different priorities among a set of overlapping variables, notably the contingency of political arrangements.[8] The most encompassing view is that ideological, economic and political factors vary relative to one another in their influence upon interest representation at any given time [Offe, 1981:124].

Governments and Corporatist Structures: Decentralization and Political Bargaining

> *Policies* that provide status to interest groups, assign certain semipublic or public functions to them, and regulate the type and scope of their activities are, under conditions of advanced capitalist social and economic structures, far more important factors affecting ongoing change in the system of interest representation than factors that have to do with changes of either *ideological* orientations or *socioeconomic* opportunity structures. Interest representation ... tends to become predominantly a matter of 'political design'... [Offe, 1981:125].

Modern corporatism is traceable at least to wartime and post-War cooperative planning endeavours and is strongly associated with social democracy (most clearly in Sweden) [Korpi & Shalev, 1979; Berger, 1981b]. It has developed both under conditions of affluence and from attempts to redress conflict and crisis under less favourable economic conditions. Affluence permits consensual policy modes to be sustained despite underlying conflicts but fosters increased demands, imbalance in economic consumption and an expanded government workload. Functional incorporation may then transmute into a deliberate "containment" strategy by governments as they seek to influence what problems reach the political agenda [Offe, 1981:127-8; Panitch, 1977:65]. Thus, distributional conflict underlay the shift to corporatism, as governments sought to reinstitutionalize conflict and re-equilibrate the economy [Goldthorpe, 1984b].[9]

Corporatist policymaking occurs through political structures exhibiting two main aspects. The first is *functional decentralization*. Here, governmental responsibilities are delegated to quasi-governmental institutions and interest organizations to relieve the governmental workload and facilitate efficient, consensual public decisionmaking. Moreover, issues are depoliticized by this removal from the immediate governmental sphere: "parademocratic political structures serve to contain and depoliticize conflict in a fragile reconciliation of the functionally required and the politically feasible." [Offe, 1981:146].[10] By

---

[8]For a review, see Panitch [1977:63]; Schmitter [1982:260]; see also Lehmbruch [1982].

[9]For a comparative discussion of "government by consensus" in economic policymaking, see Coombes & Walkland [1980:13-14].

[10]These institutions are formally non-partisan and neutral among interests. In the U.S., the third party on those involving labour and business interests is often a panel of "public" government appointees, not government officials, but their neutrality has sometimes been contested, including on the Accord price board. Regulatory agencies are a common form of delegation in the U.S. See Fritschler [1984:38-45]. On Britain, see Walkland [1981:281-83]; Middlemas [1979:373-75].

reducing legislative scrutiny and public accountability, such provisions raise problems of legitimacy, although a detailed statutory framework generally ensures government some supervisory power, albeit arms-length. Critics object to the blurring of the public-private sector boundary which they consider vital, along with a limited public sector, to the effective functioning of market-based industrial societies.

The second aspect is centripetal rather than centrifugal - a form of *accommodatory* policymaking involving the respective leadership levels, but where interests participate directly within, and gain formal access to, government policy channels. The policy areas in which interest groups are active becomes a political, not an autonomous decision. It is this new mode of political rationality by governments with which we are concerned, emphasizing political *inputs* by interest groups, providing them with formal policy, roles, consultation and meaningful access to the policy process, complemented by "a[n equally] supply-side economic programme" [Offe, 1981:129; 139]. The precise institutional form varies among countries and includes bilateral or multilateral relations between government and external policy interests. Bilateral relations may occur between labour and business groups within an operative framework governmentally defined and directed, or through governmental coordination of interests individually but in concert. Again these provisions may supplement or displace standard policy forums, especially the legislature, shifting "some of the tasks of social coordination, conflict resolution and policy formulation out of the party-parliamentary arena into the domain of interest groups." [Berger, 1981b:11]. Governmental policies more effectively reflect the needs and views of those most affected, but also reduce costly policy conflicts, and make greater compliance likely since interest leaders stand virtual guarantor [Panitch, 1977:78]. It is this last aspect which leads to the view that, not only is the rationale to impose "self-restraint, discipline and responsibility", but that in decentralizing functions to certain autonomous groups, governments treat labour organizations differently by seeking to restrict their power base: they are the target of "the aspect of repressive discipline imposed by corporatist arrangements" [Offe, 1981:139-140]. Post-pluralists have, then, focused both upon modes of interest organization/representation and upon modes of policy formation and implementation, the common theme being the implications of corporatism for conflict and consensus in state-labour relations. Schmitter [1982:263-4] terms these policy modes "concertation", retaining the term "corporatism" for interest *intermediation* which incorporates both interest representation and the possibility of the explicit exploitation of the working class by the state and/or (directly or indirectly) the capitalist class.

CORPORATISM, VOLUNTARISM AND SOCIAL CONTROL

Post-pluralists acknowledge that in liberal-democracies, corporatist relations rely upon reciprocity and are not imposed unilaterally by the state (which may, however, initiate them). The ethics of democratic liberalism limit state coercion, and corporatist relations are undertaken voluntarily by organized interests in response to socioeconomic developments [Panitch, 1977:3; 65; Offe, 1981:127-8]. Elements of social control and voluntarism, however, are by no means readily distinguishable, yet affect which interests are served by corporatist arrangements, the differential impact of state decisions upon interests, and the possibility of a systematic state bias.

Schmitter's typology encompasses the notion of social control, with a prominent state role and voluntarism inherently more ambiguous:

> Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular compulsory, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports. [Schmitter, 1981:292].

Corporatism of the *societal* type associated with liberal-democracies encompasses varying degrees of voluntarism in relations between the state and interests.[11] Societal corporatism is defined as that part of the political process, namely *interest intermediation*, through which the individual interests of group members may be "transferred", "aggregated" or "articulated" at the national policy level. Significantly, it is also "the ways in which interests are taught to, transmitted to, and imposed on members by associations (*social control*)" [Schmitter, 1981:295]. This aspect, and the deliberate state strategy impelling it, limit voluntarism, revealing elements of authoritarian state corporatism. The limits of voluntarism are made explicit in this definition of corporatism by Panitch [1977:66]:

> ... a political structure within advanced capitalism which integrates organized socioeconomic producer groups through a system of representation and cooperative mutual interaction at the leadership level and of mobilization and social control at the mass level.

Programme implementation requires that the interest groups involved behave cooperatively, predictably and reliably. Consequently, the state actively seeks to structure these interests, their goals and demands: their internal characteristics and strategic behaviour no longer emerge simply internally through the interplay of group leaders, activists and ordinary members. Under advanced conditions, the state is involved in the provision of group resources: perhaps making membership compulsory or regulating leader-member relations (for example, through legal measures constraining unconstitutional action) [Offe, 1981:129; 139].

---

[11] It is thereby distinguished from the coercive state corporatism of authoritarian regimes, notably Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. See also Panitch [1977:61-2].

Social Contracts: Social Controls or Power Bargains?

Some policy areas are typically associated with corporatism, for example, incomes and labour market policy; others are not, notably monetary policy [Schmitter, 1982:265]. Incomes policy in particular necessitates union cooperation and, where unions participate in corporatist arrangements, a (tripartite) incomes policy has been a central feature of state economic planning.[12] Governments have mainly relied upon inducements, both general and selective, to voluntary union cooperation in the form of *quid pro quo* policy guarantees, compensatory measures or consultative concessions: policy-political trade-offs to win over the labour leaders and enable them to participate credibly in a wage restraint programme by exhibiting other gains to their members. This bargained *political exchange* (by no means necessarily symmetrical) is the essence of the "social contract" and epitomized the U.S. National Accord.

However, governments have also sought new powers and sanctions to compel compliance with incomes policies, and in response to the "manifest instability of corporatist arrangements." [Panitch, 1977:84]. Such measures have included statutory powers, procurement penalties (the U.S. and Britain), suspension of the right to strike (Sweden), the power to invalidate wage contracts (Netherlands), suspension of settlements pending consideration by incomes boards, and compulsory cooling-off periods during strike action. Where policies include formal sanctions, and especially where government leaders may otherwise unilaterally develop and impose restraint policies, labour leaders may perceive little alternative to cooperation, or justify cooperation (to their members) by so claiming. Labour has received positive encouragement from governments in search of consensus and cooperation to exercise *policy-political* (and sometimes electoral) influence. Demonstrations of *industrial* strength are economically and politically disruptive and even sympathetic governments have sought to counter them, often appealing to the "national interest" as a source of legitimation or taking other measures to make strikes harder. Governments can thereby make it harder for unions to press wage claims, thus utilizing a less direct form of restraint [Crouch, 1982:149; 157].

Under such conditions, the formal voluntarism of incomes policy or other corporatist arrangements is questionable. The element of social control arises from representation within labour organizations, through potential government exploitation of the leader-member

---

[12]For example, in Sweden and the Netherlands. In Britain, incomes policy encouraged the establishment of tripartite economic planning structures, and France exhibited a "closed" planning pattern until incomes policy was on the agenda. However, capital/labour cooperation in Germany and Austria has been attributed to the post-War geopolitical status of those countries [Panitch, 1977:76-8; also England & Weekes, 1981:20].

relationship by influencing the goals labour leaders select in the process of representing and reconciling their members' views. Governments may induce labour leaders to suppress rank and file objections to policy and intervene in internal labour affairs to insulate the leadership from rank and file backlash [Offe, 1981:139]. Labour leaders may lend themselves to this process, seeking organizational power to ensure future benefits and possibly gaining prestige or other personal advantages [Sabel, 1981]. As acknowledged experts, they are expected to *lead* their members and, necessarily involved in interpreting needs, goals and options, exercise an important degree of discretion. With broader and longer-term perspectives on organizational activity and wellbeing, they may be more willing than their members to acknowledge a "national interest" at odds with immediate union goals, and thus to accept wage restraint or other concessions. The pursuit of a longer-term strategy implies working within the existing system and possibly sacrificing short-term goals and is therefore associated with strong organizations and relatively autonomous leaders [Pizzorno, 1981:265].

Lacking equivalent characteristics, employer/investor groups can be induced only to pursue goals they already acknowledge (i.e. profit-oriented): thus, a significant power asymmetry underlies corporatist relations [Offe, 1981:150]. Business interests may, in order to secure wage restraint, accept a degree of state intervention in setting prices, profits and dividends [Panitch, 1977:78], but these are anyway less amenable to management, while enforcement penalties lack legitimacy in a voluntary programme; major business interests may be immune to sanctions owing to their sectoral importance (such that governments depend upon their activity), and small businesses are often exempt. While difficulties arise in conceiving of the state as representing only capitalist interests and some degree of state autonomy must be recognized [Panitch, 1977:78],[13] the state is dependent upon the accumulation process of capital and can only exhort and induce, not command business interests. Capital, not labour, is the stronger party in relations with the state, not through what it can do but through what it can refuse to do, notably by investment power [Offe & Wiesenthal, 1980; Wolfe, 1978; Lindblom, 1977].[14] The business sector is not, however, a monolithic block and wage controls are not always welcomed; for example, where well-established bargaining relations exist with unions and costs are readily passed on to the consumer, or where employers are caught between aggressive union bargaining and government demands, or penalties, against non-compliers.

---

[13]Shalev & Korpi [1980:33] cite provisions for (modern) political democracy and collective bargaining as the consequence of increased working class organization. Others observe that the state may accept compromises and reforms which are (immediately) anti-capitalist, but which are in the *long-term* interests of the *whole* capitalist class [Panitch, 1977:79]. See Lindblom [1977] on the relatively greater hegemony of business interests in the U.S.

[14]On the comparative organizational incentives and relative power positions of labour and capital, and their implications, see Offe & Wiesenthal [1980].

Representation, which admits the possibility of social control, likewise constrains it when the leadership is at odds with rank and file views. Labour leaders "have often had to opt out of corporatist structures, or at least abstain from accommodative behaviour if they were not to be repudiated by their rank and file membership." [Panitch, 1977:68].[15] They must constantly legitimate collective decisions, often where contending interpretations of group interests and differing time horizons exist among leaders (including within central federations), activists and ordinary members.[16] They are sustained by internal constitutional procedures (establishing the organizational power structure), customary practice, and normative commitments to labour solidarity or other overarching beliefs (ideology): that is, by the *collective* nature of union organization. Still, they must avoid appearing to concede unnecessary or unreasonable sacrifices (especially if they are elective officials), or risk delegitimation and even unofficial supplanting [Pizzorno, 1981:261; Sabel, 1981]. For tactical reasons, they may publicly oppose restraint even where they privately support it, or they may seek compulsory, rather than voluntary, restraint measures which do not entail complicity on their part.

Labour organizations have sometimes gone on "political strike" by withholding established forms of cooperation.[17] Rank and file opposition to corporatism and incomes policy has been manifest in higher levels of industrial conflict, especially unofficial strike action (notably where legal and collective bargaining provisions prohibit alternatives), and sometimes directly following nationally-negotiated central wage agreements (even in Sweden, the corporatist ideal-type, in 1974). Further evidence lies in the marked wage drift achieved through local bargaining (as during the British social contract). Internal dissent has sometimes provoked the formation of independent unions outside the established structures, even in highly centralized labour movements and corporatist systems (for example, in the Netherlands in the 1950s) [Panitch, 1977:82-86].

---

[15]See Panitch [1977:82-86 and passim]; and Schmitter [1982:269] on tactical temporary withdrawals by labour leaders. England & Weekes [1980:20] argue that shopfloor organization constrains social control under British incomes policy.

[16]Pizzorno [1981:264-5] discusses these matters in a party political context, especially the differing "criteria of rationality" among organizational leaders, activists and ordinary members (the "interpretation gap"). Also Sabel [1981]; Schmitter [1981].

[17]The two largest (of three) labour centrals in the Netherlands declined to participate in semiannual economic reports produced by the Social and Economic Council after the *Law of Wage Formation* was passed in 1970 (allowing government to invalidate wage contracts considered detrimental to the national economy). During the Heath government in Britain, unions refused to register under the provisions of the *Industrial Relations Act* of 1971 [Panitch, 1977:84-86]. In the U.S., during the Carter Administration, the AFL-CIO president withdrew from Presidential advisory positions over the Year I wage restraint programme.

Corporatism, Pluralism and Stability

It is these obstacles to social control which suggest that corporatism is not a self-equilibrating and stable system but internally contradictory. Post-pluralists differ on whether pluralism and corporatism are discreet systems, either cyclical [Pizzorno, 1981; Sabel, 1981], or historically unilinear and part of a long-term, permanent adaptation promoting national stability [Schmitter, 1979]; whether corporatism may occur within a pluralist framework [Pizzorno, 1981] or is enmeshed in a cycle with state authoritarianism [Panitch, 1977]. Functional-structural explanations posit corporatist policymaking and/or interest representation as the product of the logical imperatives of modern capitalism and planning; i.e. as "a *political structure* that attends, if it is not actually produced by, the emergence of the *advanced capitalist economy*" [Panitch, 1977:64-65]. Government intervention in the economy relies upon the expertise and cooperation of producer groups [cf. Panitch, 1977:80 on Britain], and provides them with greater incentives and opportunities for policy-political activity.

While post-pluralists agree that pluralism is an inherently unstable system of representation,[18] many of the problems identified also arise under corporatist arrangements. For example, as well as leader-member tensions within groups, corporatism enables privileged groups to press excessive demands upon government, while excluding some interests, possibly creating problems of legitimacy, special interest criticisms and challenges from outside the established system, although Schmitter [1982:272] suggests such challenges are unlikely to rival the influence of functional socio-economic cleavages. However, whereas pluralism fails to generate a constantly renewed consensus, corporatism, though inherently *un*stable and cyclical, is not *de*stabilizing but, rather, renegotiable [Goldthorpe, 1984b; Pizzorno, 1981; Sabel, 1981]. Once established, institutional structure and practices are not easily dismissed and, if corporatism fails, the agreement is more likely to be reformulated than simply abandoned. Nevertheless, the internal constraints upon the incorporation of labour leaders also pose the question of why they would select a political strategy involving wage restraint at all, and thus whether corporatist relations reflect the dominance of state strategy or real bargaining gains by labour.

---

[18]For a discussion of the costs, inefficiencies and inherent instability of pluralism, see Pizzorno [1981:260-63; 269-74; 278-79], who argues: some demands and interests are excluded, provoking the formation of new collective identities and generating corporatism; the vast apparatus of mediation required creates artificial conflict; internal delegitimation results when ordinary members believe their leaders have betrayed their interests; overload results when the state seeks to restore order through redistributive measures; pluralism stipulates a commitment to procedure, failing to address the content of demands, and thus failing to induce moderation when necessary.

POWER BARGAINING ANALYSIS AND LABOUR STRATEGY

As opposed to a subordinate role for organized interests under corporatist arrangements, the essentially passive targets of state strategy and social control, some analyses stress their strength and strategic capacity to formulate and pursue goals independently. Schmitter [1982:295] acknowledges the factor of organizational autonomy, which he explicitly relates to issues of representation internal to interest organizations: "The concept 'intermediation' is also meant to convey the likelihood that interests may be generated from within formal associations themselves, independent of member preferences and authoritative commands." He argues persuasively that international evidence refutes claims that corporatism institutionalizes asymmetric benefits to the disadvantage of the incorporated working classes [Schmitter, 1982:269-71]. Lehmbruch, in contrast to other post-pluralists, defines the distinguishing characteristics of liberal corporatism as the constitutional autonomy of, and a high level of voluntary cooperation among, socio-economic groupings *independently* of, and even excluding, the government (as in Sweden) [Lehmbruch, 1984; also Panitch, 1977]. The state may, however, orchestrate their activity - the process Lehmbruch terms *trans-sectoral concertation*. In less consensual societies, cooperation is unlikely without active state intervention, as in the U.S. and Britain, where the free-market system sustains the oppositional character of labour and capital.

The *power bargaining* interpretation of corporatism stresses the organizational, constitutional and behavioural characteristics of groups as key determinants of policy-political influence and their ability to secure gains from the state. For workers, power depends on the "extent and forms of organization for collective action": union movements and party-political systems, and national differences in worker mobilization explain cross-national variations in strategies of class conflict and their outcomes [Korpi & Shalev, 1980:306; Shalev & Korpi, 1980:32-33]. We now briefly review the conditions for effective labour political action.

Pre-Conditions for Labour's Political Strategy

There are political, economic and socio-economic (internal labour characteristics) pre-conditions for labour's pursuit of a political strategy, and thus for the emergence of corporatism. By determining worker power resources, these factors determine the extent and form of manifest industrial conflict and the political contest. Such power resources vary across time within countries and among them [Korpi & Shalev, 1980:307].

Explaining the emergence of liberal corporatism in terms of functional evolution tended to obscure issues of class interests and conflict by ignoring the power relations underlying the

contest of labour and capital, assuming instead their power symmetry and thus their equivalence as bargaining interests. This concept was extended to the political sphere; however, the political equality espoused by liberal-democratic ethics is constrained by differences in market power [Panitch, 1977:66-8; Offe, 1981:145, Korpi & Shalev, 1980:305-7]. The unequal distribution of power resources (in the sphere of production and more widely) compels workers to subordinate themselves by selling their (indivisible) labour power in the labour market; the inequality of the seller/buyer of labour power is self-perpetuating since it reproduces the unequal distribution of power resources [Korpi & Shalev, 1980:305-306; also Offe & Wiesenthal, 1980].

Post-pluralists closely connect economic and political conflict, arguing that labour's ability to pursue a political strategy depends on its industrial and political power resources, particularly the level of working class mobilization. Korpi and Shalev argue that the union movement confronts a fundamental choice between the exercise of market or political power, *logically* prior to the choice among strategies *within* each type. The choice is compelled by cost-benefit considerations, given limited resources, and guided by available opportunities (however, whether it is an either/or choice is surely contestable). In any event, organized labour has an incentive to exploit political power, notwithstanding the underlying influence of the economy on the political process, since "the difference in power resources between employers and employees can be assumed to be smaller in the political than in the industrial arena." [Korpi & Shalev, 1980:308].

Labour's Industrial and Political Power Resources

Each country exhibits a characteristic national pattern of worker mobilization determining the possibility of success within the policy process; it involves a political and an industrial element. The political element pertains to electoral support: financing, electioneering programmes and voting behaviour. The industrial aspect incorporates trade union organization and activity, including membership levels and the characteristics of industrial action. A high level of working class mobilization in any country is associated with the "capture" of government, the introduction of policies favouring worker interests, and the decline of industrial action by organized labour in favour of a political strategy [Korpi and Shalev, 1980; Shalev & Korpi, 1980].

An organized and mobilized social-democratic movement is necessary to ensure sufficient electoral and industrial support to underpin union bargaining power in the political arena. The union sector must be highly organized[19] and strongly solidary, so that the

[19]Most Western democracies demonstrated increased, but varying, levels of unionization by the post-

character of unionization is important. For example, craft unionism has fostered cleavages among categories of wage earners, whereas industrial unionism unifies workers along class lines. Similarly, the concentration of worker power resources is lowered where unions are divided along religious or political lines. Close relations between unions (especially the central confederation) and sympathetic parties are then also important. Electorally, a strong "Left" element in the national electorate (especially a high level of working class voting) determines the strength of Left political parties. Another requirement is centralized government, able to "deliver" policy commitments and sustained, comprehensive control of the Executive/cabinet by the political Left, associated with the pursuit of redistributive and full employment policies. Such policies represent necessary compensation for the working class in exchange for wage restraint and/or lower levels of industrial conflict [Korpi & Shalev, 1980:306-8; Shalev & Korpi, 1980:32]. Countries vary substantially in these matters.

The power of workers depends on the predominance of these conditions, and the greater the labour-capital power difference, the smaller the likelihood of struggle by the weaker party, usually labour. Where labour strength increases, greater conflict results as new strategies and courses of action are possible and interests seek to increase their advantage: "with an improving power position, labor can more effectively utilize political means to affect the distribution of the fruits of production." [Korpi & Shalev, 1980:308]. This interpretation emphasizes the socio-political significance of strike activity. Labour market conditions and political commitments in the post-War period increased the relative strength of union movements. Cross-national differences among countries emerged in the level and character of strike activity, which may be explained partly by political factors (particularly the increased role of government and the character of legal regulation of labour activity), as well as by these other determinants of conflict strategy. Conflict did not decline even with higher economic growth levels [Crouch, 1978a; Pizzorno, 1978], but the form of conflict tended towards "political demonstrations" and *protracted* strikes generally disappeared (not in the U.S.) - a trend reinforced by the increased ability of large firms to pass on cost increases, so that collective bargaining agreements became less central to the allocation of resources [Korpi & Shalev, 1980].

Labour Centralization and Peak Organizations

Shalev & Korpi [1980:32] observe that working class mobilization cannot be understood without considering the strategies of labour leaders, both in internal matters (membership

---

War period, dichotomized as those having half or more of the non-agricultural labour force unionized, and those with less: i.e. the U.S., Japan, Switzerland, Italy and France, where the level is only one-quarter or less [Shalev & Korpi, 1980:32].

and consensus provisions) and interests external to the organization. Labour's organizational efficiency is a pre-condition of its status as a viable public partner and its ability to wrest policy gains from the state, requiring centralized authority within the labour sector; a high degree of internal unity; and thus the ability to mobilize and deliver the support of the membership. The pursuit of a political strategy is the specialized task of the labour central.

The labour central must be an *encompassing* organization [Olson, 1971]. For peak organizations, the process of aggregation (and mobilization) is two-tier, involving first member unions and then rank and file members affiliated through them. The internal authority attributes of peaks, their influence within the labour sector and their ability to tolerate and manage internal diversity and dissent are important. The specialized division of labour between peak organizations and their constituent unions requires that the latter cede some autonomy to exploit fully the potential advantages of their strategic socio-economic location. Commonly, peak authority over member unions is measured partly by the ability to initiate industrial action and to control strike funds, which are sanctions against external interests. Constitutional provisions, operative practice and established labour norms facilitate consensus under otherwise adverse conditions. Sanctions against dissidents amount ultimately to the power to suspend and/or expel unions from membership, and are effective only insofar as they reduce the industrial weight of the dissident union and/or bar it from an effective voice in public policymaking (thus, they are partly dependent upon government to underpin the authority of the peak group). The configuration of decisionmaking and influence within the peak organization involves the structure and functioning of the leadership level, the role of representative conferences, and general communications and mobilization provisions. These provisions enable selection amongst competing strategies and the timely and effective allocation of organizational support. At a second level, order depends upon the ability and willingness of individual union leaders to commit members and control dissidents within their own unions. Representation and consensus for a peak organization therefore has a dual-level character.

However, *effective* rather than formal centralization of authority is important: the ability of groups to *behave* in a unified fashion for the purpose of securing outcomes, achieving a functional or operative substitute for organizational unity. Informal power may derive from the labour leaders themselves, commanding personal allegiance from important labour groups, or labour involvement with government may be prompted by external contingencies: a national crisis, particular issues or policy periods affecting the interests of

labour broadly.[20] Thus, beyond formal provisions, the peak organization may behave as if it had effective authority, and member unions may cooperate to maximize goal achievement. In countries with multiple peak associations, such as Italy, Sweden and the Netherlands, the question is whether they can overcome structural divisions and act in concert when necessary, and at times the answer has been affirmative [Addison, 1981:201-2]. Moreover, Government leaders may promote and work with weaker labour organizations where, for example, there are no preferable instruments through which to achieve particular policy goals.[21] These propositions are crucial to understanding the role played by organized labour in national policy and politics in the U.S.

LABOUR STRATEGY, CORPORATISM AND EXCEPTIONALISM IN THE U.S.

> It is indeed as if there were one set of conceptual maps one social science - for U.S. politics and another for comparative ... politics.[22]
>
> Together with pluralism, neo-corporatism provides a framework for the common study of interests in America and abroad. [Rudolph & Rudolph; 1984]

The discussion so far has identified the principal determinants of state and interest group strategies and the conditions conducive to political bargaining in the socio-economic context of the 1970s. These factors include the internal characteristics of potential bargaining partners and the external imperatives acting upon them. Post-pluralists have explored national divergences within the "common trajectory" of the Western liberal-democracies in these respects. The U.S., an advanced industrial democracy with many elements of this trajectory, has certain national characteristics, of kind or degree, which fit awkwardly within this new framework of propositions derived from the attributes of *other* Western liberal-democracies. Moreover, while redressing the over-generalization of pluralist analysis, the post-pluralist paradigm has allowed the notion of U.S. exceptionalism to inhibit, rather than inform. The premise of U.S. exceptionalism regarding organized labour is that the pre-conditions for a political strategy are lacking and unions must rely upon an industrial conflict strategy [Shalev & Korpi, 1980]. A related proposition contends that relations between government and labour leaders have not - indeed, probably cannot - take specifically a corporatist form [Wilson, 1982; Salisbury; 1979].

These propositions, well-founded in many respects, are nevertheless confounded by the National Accord negotiations and agreement between the Carter presidency and the AFL-

---

[20]For example, Crouch [1978a:210] observes that the weakening effect of the 1973 recession upon Italy's fragmented labour sector drove the unions to participation in collaborative, tripartite discussions. See also Regini [1984].

[21]For a discussion of labour strength and solidarity, including manageability problems due to increases in union size, heterogeneity and agenda, see Offe & Wiesenthal [1980].

[22]Berger [1984] speaks here principally of the American academic community, but the phenomenon has broader validity.

CIO. In subsequent chapters, we establish that the political capability of organized labour is highly developed and heavily institutionalized and examine the circumstances sustaining the choice of a political strategy during the seventies. The special characteristics thought to preclude a political strategy by organized labour, and/or the emergence of corporatism, are ideological, socio-economic and political, encompassing historical, institutional, organizational and socio-cultural elements. However, rather than insurmountable obstacles to cooperation for labour and government leaders, these often prove conditions to which U.S. interests and government have necessarily adapted. The extent of labour's political activity, specifically at the peak level, is remarkable when the labour sector is notoriously weak and the peak organization therefore supposedly of little importance to politicians and political decisionmaking. Moreover, the National Accord process exhibited the political bargaining and exchange associated with modern corporatism, and some factors expected to impede corporatist bargaining proved instead an incentive to their emergence. The explanators of U.S. "exceptionalism" are therefore not wholly convincing. In modifying these assumptions and reassessing state-labour relations, the thesis seeks to restore the U.S. to the comparative fold and extend the explanatory scope of post-pluralist theory.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS UNDERLYING POLITICAL ATTRIBUTES

A number of historical factors have been proposed as inhibiting working class organization and ideology in the U.S. These include the absence of serious conflict between church and state, the lack of a feudal legacy (no nobility or landed gentry), the claim that dominant interests are not represented within any single party (surely a debatable point), and the submergence of functional cleavages by massive immigration. However, these conditions pertain in countries with established social democratic movements, including Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Other proposed inhibitors, such as the effect of slavery and immigration upon the class composition of the U.S., may be of limited, sometimes shorter-term impact. For example, black Americans were slow to organize politically and industrially, and did so by race rather than class, yet constitute a reliable (albeit small) Democratic constituency, while civil rights organizations operate in regular alliance with organized labour. Working class mobilization is thought to have been weakened by the early extension of the franchise (attaining which provided a decisive catalyst elsewhere), but similar circumstances in Australia, for example, have not had a repressive effect [Shalev & Korpi, 1980:47-8; Jong, 1978:14-16].

Historically, labour unions in the U.S. were destroyed during major economic downturns (while worker radicalism may be neutralized during recoveries) [Shalev & Korpi, 1980]. Union organization has succeeded, however, even under adverse economic conditions

when facilitated by government intervention, as during the New Deal period. The *opportunity* thesis[23] explains the lack of a working class movement and socialist ideology in terms of affluence (domestic and comparative): socio-economic opportunities (including the "frontier" ethos and greater upward mobility), labour's integration into the capitalist system (through incentive/profit-sharing schemes and the ostensible ethos of "equal treatment"), a strong industrial economy and the opportunity to exploit cheap, immigrant labour. These are again in many respects contestable claims. The acclaimed rapid economic growth in the U.S. might be seen instead as a source of worker insecurity through "boom and bust" cycles [Hibbs; 1987]. The industrial struggle of workers over workplace control, job security and distribution has not been significantly more successful in the U.S. than elsewhere. The polarisation of wealth in the U.S. is similar to that in other industrialized nations and, while wage levels may be higher, the rate of increase is not - nor are mobility rates [Shalev & Korpi, 1980].

SOCIAL DEMOCRACY, PARTY AND WORKER MOBILIZATION

As noted, there are strong links between social democracy, worker mobilization and corporatism. Wilson [1982:235] claims that the U.S. has not been "driven" to corporatist solutions because, "as Sombart tried to explain, there is no socialism in the United States."[24] More appositely, there is no *consensus* upon the existence of a left-wing or social-democratic ideology, and no labour dominated social-democratic party comparable to counterparts elsewhere [Salisbury, 1979:233]. As Katznelson [1978:77] observes:

> ...if considerations of social democracy, as movement and program, are inherently difficult in the European context, confusions abound when assessments are made of the relevance and meaning of social democracy in the United States ... In part this difficulty is conceptual and linguistic.

An alternative view argues that there is a variant of social democracy in the U.S. [Katznelson, 1978], and that there has, indeed, been a marked general convergence with European politics [Greenstone, 1977:17; Williams, 1984]. Katznelson defines social democracy as a reform strategy ameliorating capitalism through a "substantive historical *process* of modifying and reshaping market patterns", without socialism necessarily as the intended outcome. Associated with government intervention, national planning and constraints upon free market operations, the programmatic stress is on: state planning emphasizing social over market priorities; expanded governmental provision of services; social insurance and other transfer programmes; and macroeconomic policy giving priority to reducing unemployment rather

---

[23]This thesis, particularly associated with Werner Sombart, is treated in Shalev & Korpi [1980] and we draw on their discussion.

[24]Wilson here cites Werner Sombart's work: "Why There is No Socialism in the United States", in P.M. Hocking & C.T. Husbands (translators), Macmillan, London, 1976.

than inflation. The adoption of such policies has been near-universal in the West, and "there have been *no* exceptions to the direction and sustained character of growth in welfare state expenditures since World War II." [Katznelson, 1978:77-8]. The lower *starting* point in the U.S. partly explains the lower *current* level of such provisions. The U.S. is an exception regarding nationalization, where regulation has instead been preferred although, even here, concern with social objectives increased by the 1960s, notably through Democratic initiatives, stimulating greater unity among business opponents. The absence of social democracy in the U.S. is said to explain an avowedly greater tolerance of unemployment and the lower political cost of a deflationary strategy by government [Salisbury, 1979:233-35, Wilson, 1982:233]. In fact, unemployment was a major political controversy by the mid-seventies (although inflation rapidly predominated), the Democratic Party is traditionally associated with programmatic priority on reducing unemployment, and the pursuit of a deflationary strategy may explain Carter's defeat in 1980 [Hibbs; 1987].

However, exceptionalism argues that the U.S. lacks a mobilizing vehicle for social democratic activity since the party system is notably fragmented, the presidential and congressional wings of both major parties have traditionally operated independently, weak national organization has reinforced state/local party independence, and there is generally a lack of ideological polarization and party discipline compared to Western counterparts. The Democratic Party in particular encompasses a wide array of interests without a coherent ideological or class base, and union influence within it is allegedly weak [Wilson, 1982; Salisbury, 1979]. Nevertheless, there are distinctive philosophical and policy differences between the two major parties and their electoral constituencies *(especially* on the economic issues central to corporatist bargaining). The reduction of inequality and redistributive measures by government in the U.S., albeit modest, have been Democratic initiatives [Hibbs, 1987] and the overall policy orientation of the Democratic Party is clearly a "left" variant, while the Republicans are just as clearly on the right. The political capacity of organized labour is far from limited, notwithstanding weaknesses in industrial organization and labour, a core Democratic constituency, has been a strong and influential advocate of the social democratic programme in the post-New Deal period [Hibbs, 1987; Katznelson, 1978; Greenstone, 1977]. Some writers, indeed, consider the Democratic Party a possible functional substitute for pro-labour parties elsewhere [Greenstone, 1977], but: "Crucial differences include divergent levels of class understandings", the unions' low membership in the U.S. and limited political capacity, and "an explicitly procapitalist orientation of the Democratic party." [Katznelson, 1978:79]. Katznelson concludes that "the confusing similarity between the relationship of the Democratic party and the AFL-CIO ... and European social democratic movements" is

superficial, although the similarities he lists hardly seem so: "working class voting behaviour, the role of labor support in electoral policies" and support for (some) welfare state provisions by Democrats and labour [Katznelson, 1978; also Greenstone, 1977:17].

There are undoubtedly a number of problems in evaluating links between the Democratic Party, organized labour and social democracy, but these are discreet and, when allowed for, the underlying extent of comparability with other Western democracies becomes clearer. Thus, regionalism obscures class and ideological patterns and skews the overall picture, but it does not preclude or inhibit the definite links between organized labour and mainstream Democrats (especially at the leadership level). If the impact of Southern Democrats is allowed for, these relations emerge as more stable and institutionalized than we would otherwise expect. The thesis finds little support for the contention that both parties can co-opt the demands and "potential leadership" of labour-based political groups [Katznelson, 1978:48]. More generally, the political agenda of the seventies, notably macroeconomic issues, and changes within the parties sharpened institutionalized partisan cleavages. To explain labour's importance in national policymaking, these factors must also be considered in conjunction with labour's intricate links to the Democratic Party in government.

THE SCOPE AND STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT

The ethos of the limited state and the greater decentralization of authority among the institutions of government in the U.S. compared to Western European nations are further impediments to corporatism. The scope of government and size of the public sector is smaller, even taking into account the plethora of state and local administrations and an expanded federal government. Government spending has risen since WWII (especially since the 1960s), but still accounts for only about one-third of GNP [Katznelson, 1978:84]. While there is strong public support for the increased social activism of federal government (except narrowly-targeted welfare provisions), there is concurrent support for expenditure cuts and reducing governmental waste [Wilson, 1982].

However, the tendency of the electorate to hold these contradictory positions is not unique to the U.S. [Williams, 1984:107]. There is strong public support for both New Deal and Great Society programmes (even during the Reagan Administration) [Navarro, 1986], and others interpret growth trends as evidence that U.S. exceptionalism has *eroded*: "The American state now accounts for about one-third of GNP and about one-fourth of employment, proportions that make it difficult to distinguish it from socialist states in industrial democracies." [Rudolph & Rudolph, 1984]. The "statist aspect", obscured by liberal-pluralist analysis, is revealed by examination of the Executive branch, the state's role in

industrialization and the management of an industrial economy; welfare programmes and national security provisions during the New Deal and WW II periods [Rudolph & Rudolph, 1984] and the Kennedy-Johnson social-welfare programmes. Total government spending as a percentage of national income rose from 12% in 1929 to 42% by 1976, largely in domestic programmes: a significant growth rate, irrespective of the low starting point and thus "relatively emaciated" current position of the U.S. compared to other countries. Although the rate of increase in transfer spending as a percentage of GNP was least except for France among the OECD nations between 1962-75, the fastest growth areas were nevertheless social insurance, public aid, health and educational programmes [Katznelson, 1978:79-84]. Katznelson [1978:81-2; 84] suggests that social-democratic policy advances may have succeeded because they simultaneously sustain capitalism. The state has acted as guarantor in the flawed process of capital accumulation through macroeconomic intervention, planning and welfare state programmes,[25] thereby sustaining the legitimacy and stability of capitalism, and creating the appearance of consensus among conflicting interests. Relatively little changed even during Republican presidencies (at least until Reagan), partly due to the more pragmatic policy milieu of Congress, prolonged Democratic control there, and the limited scope of discretionary funding.

Centralized government is associated with (and shapes) strong, united interests and has been equated with efficiency and economic growth; conversely, the structural decentralization of federalism, and the special interest access it permits, are thought to inhibit them and to preclude corporatism in the U.S. Without a strong, united Executive in the U.S., regulating access to decisionmaking, prospective social partners have no centralized government authority with which to negotiate authoritative policy agreements [Shalev & Korpi, 1980; Wilson, 1982; Salisbury, 1979]. Interest groups have less incentive to adapt behaviourally (to increase their acceptability to decisionmakers) and can succeed independently of one another and sectoral peak organizations [Wilson, 1982].

Bird [1981], however, argues that there is no significant difference in growth rates between federal and unitary systems, including the growth rate of public expenditures.[26] Moreover, it is necessary to modify the configuration of strategic decision loci in the U.S.

---

[25]Gais et al [1986] argue that the greater ideological character of public policy consequent upon welfare state developments led to "a regulatory and redistributive revolution" in the U.S. between 1960 and 1980.

[26]Bird [1981:26, and Table 3] notes that the central government in a federal system may account for a smaller proportion of total government finance than in unitary systems. The percentage of total revenues accounted for by the U.S. federal government has declined since 1950 although central government transfers relative to non-central were twice as high in the 1970/80s as in the 1950/60s; both the Nixon and Reagan concepts of "new federalism" sought to alter this balance.

government from that prominent in recent theory (particularly the argued importance of control over the cabinet by the Left). The non-elective U.S. cabinet does not operate as a collective decisionmaking body; presidents seeking to use it as such have had little success: most recently President Carter's attempt at "cabinet government". Instead, the leadership of both the White House and Congress are most important to labour's strategy, and to policy bargaining and accommodatory relations. The argument of unlimited access neglects a fundamental political reality in the U.S., namely, the pervasive need for coalition building. The fragmented character of U.S. government, intentionally susceptible to veto and obstruction, creates and constantly reinforces this need, which is greater as the issue is broader, more major or more conflictual. Even where major groups have established influence within Congress, they must still seek support from the Administration, especially the White House. The increased prominence of the modern Executive branch has strengthened this need, which is tempered by considerations of partisanship and/or ideology rather than obviated by institutional fragmentation. Similarly, presidents seek to avert opposition by, and gain support from, these groups within Congress. In brief, in a system like the U.S., where outcomes are less certain, policy-political bargaining is a routine undertaking to enhance the participants' prospects of success.

A major interpretation of national policymaking in the U.S. focuses upon relations among departments, their congressional committee counterparts and interest constituencies. The expanded role of government "legitimized" interest group participation in decisionmaking and resulted in "a type of corporate policy making" [Davidson, 1981:105]. By the seventies, these relations blurred government-private sector boundaries "in an entirely new context, both structural and intellectual" [King, 1980b:388]. Wilson [1982:220; 226-7] argues that the "clientelist" case has been exaggerated, even in strong cases (Agriculture and Labor), since party and ideological differences divide the committees controlling departmental budgets, departments have no "independent political base" and their secretaries do not appear to be controlled by their (interest) constituencies. He argues that clientelism is not compatible with corporatism since it is characterized by multiplicity and fragmentation, with bureaucrats dealing with constituent units, not peak associations [but cf. Gais et al, 1986, on subgovernments]. However, the political bargaining characterizing neo-corporatism involves the leadership level of labour, capital and government. It is by no means incompatible with fragmentation and pluralism at other levels, within some policy areas or involving other interests; nor does it preclude a multiplicity of contacts between individual unions and multiple other government units. Even under corporatist arrangements elsewhere, labour influence is expected to be greater where a sympathetic party holds office. Labour

customarily has close relations with Democrats in the White House and in Congress (notably the leadership and labour committee members). Cabinet members are of significance individually for interest groups; the Treasury secretary strongly influences macroeconomic policy and, more generally, the Labor secretary is an important ally for organized labour, notably in Democratic administrations. The thesis corroborates their importance to relations with labour during the Carter presidency.

There is no fully corporatist state among the Western liberal-democracies: they exhibit corporatist tendencies which vary in scope, strength and endurance, and many have demonstrated a mix of strategies of inclusion and exclusion toward major interests [Schmitter, 1982:264-5; Goldthorpe, 1984b]. Moreover, corporatism varies across issue areas [Schmitter, 1982:265], and clientelism is most prevalent especially in domestic distributive policy areas [Davidson, 1981:105], which are those most conducive to corporatism. However, Wilson [1982:220; 227] stipulates that corporatism is "a system of government" in which functional representation is paramount and close consultation (if not agreement) occurs on all major decisions, not economic policy alone; but he also states that it is confined, essentially, to the integration of major economic interests into "some" national plan or set of priorities. In the U.S., corporatism is therefore impeded by weak national planning capabilities, the *ad hoc* nature of industrial policy and fragmented economic policymaking. The government does not control the Federal Reserve Board (the U.S. central bank largely setting monetary policy) and the president and Congress share fiscal authority. The sheer size and unmanageability of the U.S. economy, and the pace, timing and regional unevenness of economic growth also impede corporatism and make central planning difficult [Salisbury, 1979:218-19; Wilson, 1982:231]. While such problems do not prevent a corporatist-style process, they undoubtedly limit corporatist arrangements and notably the degree of incomes control. These limitations, while not unique to the U.S., are more pronounced there. Yet for the Carter White House, as for other presidents and policymakers in the U.S., these obstacles must simply be worked with. In fact, certain aspects of economic policy fragmentation, as well as the lack of national planning or a coherent industrial policy, proved incentives to the White House bargaining with the AFL-CIO and the Accord. Indeed, the prospects for prolonged cooperation between them were arguably limited more by contingent circumstances, including the character of the Carter presidency, leadership changes within the labour sector, and the economic crisis.

THE INTEREST GROUP SECTOR

> American governments are discouraged from attempting corporatist policies because they do not have suitable groups with which to work, but suitable groups do not appear because the government fails to encourage them [Wilson, 1982:230].

The aspects of national government and the party system proposed as inhibiting the emergence of corporatism also interact with weaknesses within the U.S. interest group sector. Corporatism is obstructed because there is not a limited number of peak groups (i.e. organizations of organizations; see Salisbury [1979:214]) with monopolistic (or near-monopolistic) control of their respective sectors, with which government can bargain [Wilson 1982:217]. According to Wilson [1982:222; 235], national government in the U.S., unlike counterparts elsewhere, does not encourage monopolistic peak organizations, and specifically does not wish to encourage a strong union movement able to hinder macroeconomic management (which, he believes, will also prevent the emergence of corporatism in the future). The Carter White House, however, deliberately helped to restore the AFL-CIO's status as a peak group, and sought its participation in the anti-inflation programme, despite less favourable attitudes than previous Democratic presidencies toward policy bargaining with the labour leadership. Peak groups, of course, do *exist* in the U.S., and in the very sectors - organized labour and business - salient in corporatist bargaining in the seventies; these are clearly recognized by national governments and have special consultative status. There are recognizable groups in agriculture and, in other sectors, socio-political organization resembles developments abroad: for example, the emergence of powerful professional groupings. The existence of multiple peak organizations, an objection raised by Wilson in the context of the agricultural sector, does not of itself preclude the emergence of corporatism. In some countries with a labour sector more divided at the peak level than the U.S., corporatist bargaining has been achieved when the peaks have acted in concert, notwithstanding differences of ideology or party-political affiliation [Addison, 1981:201-2].

Nevertheless, other issues remain. In the U.S., peak organizations exhibit representational weaknesses: low membership levels; internal cleavages over organization, ideology and policy-political goals and strategies; and inadequate internal procedures enabling consensus. Nor do they command the selective benefits necessary to attract members, develop centralized authority and avert free-riding. For example, the U.S. system is too fragmented to enable monopoly control over information and, while cost savings accrue from collectivising sectoral information, peak groups have not proven suitably skilled [Wilson, 1982; Salisbury, 1979]. This "information control" argument has some shortcomings. If organized labour has limited control over what information *exists*, it also has specialized capacities for the reliable communication of the immediately relevant. Interests of livelihood are

undeniably compelling and labour organizations explicitly care for worker interests. The AFL-CIO's communications network is extensive, as are electioneering and specialized congressional monitoring and reporting provisions, although advances by rival interests have forcibly demonstrated their limitations. In the case of another selective benefit, the regulation of jurisdictional disputes, Salisbury [1979:224-5] acknowledges that the AFL-CIO offers affiliates important protection against raiding by rival unions, as well as collective support in organizational campaigning.

A mass union base is an argued pre-condition for the pursuit of a political conflict strategy by organized labour [Shalev & Korpi, 1980:51], but unionization levels are low in the U.S. Some commentators attribute the organizational weakness of organized labour to employer power, and the scale of economic enterprise, especially management strategy in powerful enterprises: averting worker conflict through strategic pay increases; offering some degree of (possibly token) representation on company boards; closing "problem" production units, sometimes transferring production to non-unionized areas such as the South or overseas [Shalev & Korpi, 1980:45-7]. More recently, labour-management ("union-busting") consultants have increasingly been employed to avert collective organization by workers, or to de-unionize firms. Thus, employer power resources and associated strategies largely determine worker collective resources, and hence the level of unionization and labour's conflict strategy [Shalev & Korpi, 1980:47]. Other influences include the weakness of worker power due to the speed of technical change, oligopolistic product markets, and the prevailing political environment. The extensive legal codification of industrial relations is also a factor. Strike activity is not high in international terms, but it is notably protracted rather than taking the form of essentially political (brief) demonstrations; Korpi & Shalev deduce that organized labour is so weak in the U.S. that it relies almost exclusively upon a strategy of workplace-based conflict. However, the political contest in the U.S. takes other forms; as the thesis documents, labour's political strategy is extensive and enduring, and a number of recent major power conflicts have been fought out primarily in the political arena.

Wilson [1982:232] claims that the weakness of the union movement enables business interests to achieve their goals without collective organization, while other interests similarly lack incentives to organize. He cites historical developments in other nations, where the emergence of unions prompted the formation of "modern interest group structures", concluding that the lack of a labour challenge in the U.S. explains the comparatively weak organization there. In fact, in WWII, government agencies undertook the task of organizing groups in order to relieve the burden of government and there was a "hitherto unequalled mobilization of group interests of every conceivable kind" [*CQ Guide*, Fall/78:112; McConnell,

1970:4]. In the post-War period, new interest groupings have proliferated: the military-industrial complex; civil rights groups in the 1960s; the rise of the professions; the emergence of new liberalism and single issue groups, followed by the new activism among conservative groups. Business interests have increasingly organized, even when unionization has declined and notwithstanding the internal labour conflicts often cited as evidence of labour's weakness. Most notably, the prestigious Business Roundtable was established in 1974 (during major internal labour disagreement over electoral strategy). Wilson suggests that the proliferation of business political organization and, for example, the expansion of the Chamber of Commerce, resulted from the challenge from public interest groups (especially consumer and environmental groups). In any case, some organized political activity by business during the Carter years was prompted specifically by labour's political strength, despite its declining industrial strength (see later).

Exceptionalists point out that with only limited authority over scantily organized sectors, peak capacity for effective action is limited: they are simply not viable bargaining partners. The industrial and political weakness of organized labour has also been repeatedly identified with several internal cleavages: craft-industrial union tensions; the autonomy of AFL-CIO affiliates; and AFL-CIO limitations as an encompassing and formally authoritative organization. In short, the AFL-CIO cannot mobilize and deliver the support of its (all too scant) membership and, in particular, cannot guarantee rank and file compliance with wage restraint policies. To establish why the White House actively pursued the AFL-CIO as a policy partner through the National Accord, the thesis examines the AFL-CIO leadership's use of constitutional authority and organizational techniques to manage internal and broader labour sector cleavages and construct an operative consensus. We examine the functioning of the Executive Council and other decisionmaking and communications provisions, including those recent occasions when the consequences of internal conflict have been visibly serious; we suggest that their import has been over-generalized and/or their significance distorted. The National Accord process demonstrated that the AFL-CIO did offer selective benefits of recognition and legitimacy and/or expert and increased sector weight in policymaking - stipulations made by Salisbury [1979:224] - including gains for individual unions achievable only through peak level action. The full "package" of these was sufficient to persuade the AFL-CIO Executive Council to endorse the Accord.

Issues of representation and sectoral hegemony influence group legitimacy. U.S. political culture includes an ingrained suspicion of monopolistic interest groups,[27] the ethos of

[27]For an early exposition, see McConnell [1970:4-5]. More recently, Berger & Neuhaus [1977:2-4] claim that "big labour" and other big bureaucracies (including corporations and the organized

individualism and a limited state: these limitations of legitimacy are thought to preclude corporatism. Moreover, the U.S. is unparalleled among democracies in the regulation of group-government interactions, and extensive legal regulation seems to be inversely associated with corporatism [Salisbury, 1979]. However, legal regulation, while reducing the agenda of policy debate, does not necessarily inhibit political activity by interest groups: the introduction of campaign financing legislation in 1974 led to the proliferation of business and other political action committees. Moreover, as Schmitter [1982:266] points out, because of its selective and restrictive attributes, "societal or liberal corporatism is very weakly legitimated by the political cultures in which it is embedded" throughout Western Europe (admittedly especially in North America). Representational problems similarly result in the U.S. from the agenda pursued by group leaders, which may involve issues of "little relevance to the immediate interests of their members and of a highly ideological character"; unions specifically play a "vigorous part in liberal coalitions on issues going far beyond the immediate interests of their members", and corporatism involves a broad policy agenda [Wilson, 1982:223]. Where multiple goals are pursued, Pizzorno [1981] observes that group membership and consent to any one goal may not coincide, and therefore internal provisions for voice are more important to ensure internal legitimacy and consensus. However, he suggests a possible association between the breadth of a group's agenda and the extent to which it is an encompassing organization, while broad goals may foster organizational longevity. Moreover, success reinforces internal organizational legitimacy and organized labour has more success within coalitions on broader issues. Coalition support is by no means lacking on labour issues, and failures have been due to the strength of opposition, rather than narrowness of support [Chapter 3]. Labour possibly has a *more* legitimate image through operating in close cooperation with religious, civil rights and public interest groups; while labour's public image has deteriorated since the sixties [Craver, 1983], along with those of government and business, this trend is not unique to the U.S. Other inhibitory factors, including social diversity and economic and geographic size, which likewise make large scale interest organization difficult in the U.S.,[28] have not prevented the emergence of major organizations, including business organizations, at the peak level or otherwise, and "corporate concentrations of power have emerged, despite the anti-trust laws, in sufficient

---

professions) alienate citizens and generate political crisis.

[28]Cameron [1978:1256-7] argues that small, open economies are associated with high levels of industrial concentration, which in turn facilitates the formation of employers' associations and labour confederations. The labour force is, supposedly, less differentiated and less fragmented, which is conducive to union organization and a prerequisite for enduring leftist governments, and thus an expanded public economy.

proportion to suggest that American heterogeneity can be overcome by skilful entrepreneurs." [Salisbury, 1979:218].[29]

According to Wilson [1982:223], the "broad political role" of "economic" interests results in a tendency towards poorly developed research departments, more lobbyists and fewer technical experts, reducing the credibility of such groups as policy participants (notably in economic policy). Some Carter officials did regard the Federation capability in economics as poor [Carp], and the AFL-CIO a less credible policy participant as a result - the AFL-CIO held a similar view of some Carter economists. Accommodatory policy relations emerged anyway, through the efforts of other Executive branch policy principals and the labour leadership. The AFL-CIO lobby is highly regarded within Congress, the Legislative Department is not so large as to detract from the research and technical capacity, and the lobbying capacity of individual unions is often tiny - perhaps a single, part-time official. While smaller enterprises may well have scant resources individually (further impelling associative activity), the major corporate interests discussed in the thesis manifested no difficulties in technical, research or legal resources, whether single corporations like General Motors or peak organizations like the Business Roundtable. Moreover, although an influential force within Congress, business interests do not find it necessary to establish large formal lobbying capabilities and often do not register their lobbyists on the grounds that they are not fulltime or do not contact legislators directly (this may simply point to a convenient avoidance of legal regulation).

The various limitations described within the interest group sector are said to preclude official, comprehensive government consultation with the major socio-economic interests (i.e. labour, business and agriculture), which are not reputedly invited to designate either sector representatives on governmental advisory bodies or the policy principals dealing with their sector, although the possibility that informal interest group influence may be important is acknowledged [Salisbury, 1979:221]. In any event, we find that the labour leadership is routinely consulted on pertinent appointments [see also Hrebenar & Scott, 1982:154-5]; that, for example, AFL-CIO leaders were members of some governmental advisory committees, according to customary practice,[30] and that labour and business leaders virtually designated the membership of their respective panels on the Accord pay board, again as customary. Most importantly, the National Accord was official recognition of the access and consultation

---

[29]Shalev & Korpi [1980:41-2] discuss conflicting evidence surrounding the question of whether geographic "volatility" prevents class cohesion in the U.S.

[30]Hrebenar & Scott [1982:81] term these arrangements "lobbying on the inside"; some individual unions have as many as 20 such representatives.

which had previously been an informal norm for the labour leadership during friendly presidencies. President Carter's primary policy concern was incomes policy.

INCOMES POLICY AND CORPORATISM IN THE U.S.

Incomes policy poses a thorny problem in the U.S. Presidents have frequently relied upon exhortation ("jawboning") and relatively little formal control,[31] although efforts have been more rigorous than Salisbury [1979:229] allows when he suggests that "there has been almost no serious effort to cultivate consensus or to facilitate the development of labor-management agreements which would hold down inflation." There have been several earlier policy episodes where emergency conditions have prompted developments acclaimed as corporatist. Corporatist *tendencies* emerged at least as early as WWI and again, through wartime planning, including wage and price controls, during WWII. The National Recovery Act of the intervening New Deal period is seen as possibly the high-water mark of corporatist policy [Salisbury, 1979:213; 220; Wilson, 1982:231].

More recently, the modern policy agenda has compelled closer relations between government, business and labour leaders: due to trends in socio-political disruption, the erosion of post-War affluence and U.S. economic dominance (under the stress of an aging domestic industrial sector and foreign competition) with rising levels of inflation, unemployment and lower productivity, and the inflation-stagflation dilemmas of the 1970s (especially the impact of OPEC price increases). President Kennedy first introduced labour-management advisory committees to Executive government "to bring a blue-ribbon group of top-level union and business leadership into a more or less official, continuing, consultative relationship with the government" [Moye, 1980:52]. Precedents for this forum included conferences (of similar "quality of membership and scope of action") addressing mobilization or reconversion at the beginning and end of WWI and WWII [Moye, 1980:52]. There was continuing close collaboration between the White House and the AFL-CIO under President Johnson, when a kind of informal Accord existed, as well as the Kennedy-Johnson incomes guidelines, and labour operated almost as an extension of the White House lobby in Congress. In the early seventies, Barbash [1972:47] mentioned as evidence of corporatist developments (and specifically the incorporation of the labour sector), public policy bargaining through interest group representation both within and outside government (including government posts reserved for unionists, labour advisory committees and tripartite regulation), wherein "[t]he quid pro quo for the government is union consent to public policies that otherwise would be more difficult to pass or enforce." On the issue of whether

[31] For a review see Pencavel [1981]; Moye [1980].

corporatist tendencies represent the incorporation of organized labour or working class gains, he concluded: "For its part, union forbearance under pressure of a compelling national interest becomes more expedient if it is able to negotiate the terms. When the union representation goes into government, then, it becomes simply another forum for power bargaining."

Incomes policies have set president and Congress at odds, as when the latter imposed discretionary controls authority on the (initially) reluctant Richard Nixon. Nixon undertook more detailed tripartite experiments in incomes policy and, in 1969, established the tripartite Construction Industry Collective Bargaining Commission which sought to reform and widen the geographic scope of collective bargaining so that regional and national interests could rationalize craft bargaining in local areas. In 1971, this group became the Construction Industry Collective Bargaining Committee (CISC), with wage control powers intended to suppress the rapid rise in construction wages [Burtt, 1980:204-5]. Nixon introduced comprehensive wage and price controls but abandoned them after most labour representatives withdrew from the pay board, and following his substantial victory in the 1972 election. The developments were heralded as the advent of corporatism, although largely because of the corporate influence involved [Salisbury, 1979:213]. Moye [1980:52] claims that Nixon's more limited and generally administrative bodies interlocked into a *de facto* Kennedy-type committee and mentions the Accord pay advisory board as another such. The withdrawal of labour (and management) cooperation in incomes policy has been attributed partly to the "curious weakness" of their peak organizations [Salisbury, 1979], but the conflict amongst the interests involved and electoral considerations were rather more evident factors.

When President Carter negotiated pay provisions under the Accord, he avoided congressional intervention by using an Executive Order, but the incomes board he inherited from Nixon, the Council on Wage and Price Stability (COWPS), operated under legislative mandate. Wilson reminds us of wide opposition in the U.S. to the "detailed, semi-permanent" forms of incomes policy identified by Lehmbruch [1977] and Panitch [1977] as important in corporatist developments. Lehmbruch and Panitch do also discuss the opposition to these policies, evident even in countries approaching the corporatist ideal type, notably Sweden. The Carter programme was not permanent, although COWPS looked so and restraint measures were planned for beyond 1980. However, COWPS undertook detailed regulation and even intervened directly in collective bargaining. The much-antagonized AFL-CIO was an important influence in securing a congressional veto of the expansion COWPS of sought by the White House. The AFL-CIO also initially opposed the voluntary restraint programme introduced by the Carter presidency, calling - for tactical

reasons - for a comprehensive legislated controls programme instead. Wilson claims also that "the conventional approach to economic management, relying on monetary and fiscal methods rather than on neo-corporatist negotiations" remains possible because the U.S. "has the good fortune not to have a strong labour movement." Despite the emphasis of President Carter and some of his senior economists upon monetary and fiscal policy instruments, they undertook the supplementary strategy of accommodation with the AFL-CIO through the Accord process and concluded that AFL-CIO participation in the second year of the pay restraint programme was essential, despite its limited control over rank and file unionists.

It is important to avoid too narrow a view of government strategy and, as Addison [1981:201-2] has found elsewhere, "a high degree of centralization is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the effectiveness of incomes policy."[32] Incomes policy politics can only be understood in the broader context of policy-political relations between government and labour: the Accord was an unprecedented formalization of those involving the president and AFL-CIO. Ironically, the interest politics and broader institutional relations of President Carter flew in the face of normal Democratic practice: he remained distant from the Democratic Party, had unusually cool relations with the labour leadership and pursued economic policies which departed from traditional Democratic views. While limited, however, the Accord bore the hallmarks of political bargaining and exchange associated with neo-corporatist bargaining, rather than pluralism, and modified the policy activity of the labour leadership - fulfilling the stipulation that it is essential to corporatism that interest group behaviour (as well as the government's) should be altered [Wilson, 1982:220]. The thesis examines the imperatives underlying these developments, which are analytically all the more interesting because of the numerous obstacles to policy bargaining and the serious limits to policy consensus and commitment. Their explication provides an opportunity for restoring the U.S. to the comparative analysis from which it was ejected by the demise of pluralist theory.

---

[32]Addison explores collective bargaining structure constraints on policies seeking to influence bargaining outcomes. He also concludes that incomes policies cannot be readily transferred between collective bargaining contexts. His sample countries are Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands.

CHAPTER 2

THE CONTEXT OF LABOUR'S INDUSTRIAL AND POLITICAL STRATEGY IN THE 1970s

LEGAL REGULATION AND LABOUR RELATIONS

There is a history of bitter and often violent worker-employer conflict in the U.S., while short-lived early attempts at labour organization and collective action were repeatedly constrained by the judiciary or eradicated in economic downturns.[1] Federal intervention greatly improved labour's position; for example, in 1914, the Clayton Act legalized picketing and limited the use of court injunctions in labour disputes, further restricted by the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932. Landmark legislation, the Wagner Act, followed in 1935. Government intervention and labour law (whether positive or injurious) have compelled organized labour to place greater reliance upon a political strategy. Indeed, two short-lived nineteenth century precursors of the American Federation of Labor (AFL, later AFL-CIO), the National Labour Union and the Knights of Labor, both stressed a legislative approach over strike action to achieve worker goals[2] [Edelstein & Warner, 1979:10-12]. Thus, an emphasis on a political strategy by labour leaders is a long tradition in the U.S.

The Great Depression and the New Deal set precedents for state intervention in the economy and introduced social and welfare policy unequalled until the Kennedy-Johnson programmes of the 1960s. The National Labor Relations, or Wagner, Act (NLRA) established the first comprehensive legal framework regulating labour relations, and redressing worker disadvantages relative to employers, through the right to organize, requiring employers to bargain in good faith, and prohibiting unfair labour practices such as the use of company spies, victimisation and bribery [Wilson, 1979:96]. A surge of union organization followed, particularly among unskilled labour, into industrial unions; internal AFL conflict over this led to the separate establishment of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), previously a committee within the AFL. The period was also a

---

[1] For a general discussion of labour history in the U.S., see Cohen [1970]; Burtt [1980]; also: Department of Labor [1978]; AFL-CIO [1981]. Several notorious incidents of violent employer action are given in Busch [1983:17]. See F.R. Dulles [1978] on judicial activity.

[2] See Busch [1983:17-19] on the conflict between the more moderate American Federation of Labor and the rival Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). In contrast, the IWW was a militant radical group established by leading U.S. socialists and others, advocating confrontation with capitalism.

landmark politically. The policies of the Roosevelt administration ensured labour electoral activity on Roosevelt's behalf and forged ties to the Democratic Party; labour became a major component of a new Democratic electoral coalition securing prolonged Democratic control of Congress (and dominance at the state level).

Subsequent amendments to the NLRA proved less favourable to labour interests. The Labor Management Relations, or Taft-Hartley, Act (LMRA) of 1947, a Republican measure passed over President Truman's veto, extended unfair labour practice provisions to unions and had far-reaching political and industrial consequences. The Act shifted the industrial balance of power in management's favour. Secondary boycotts were prohibited, picketing restricted, and the president was granted authority to invoke an 80-day "cooling off" period in disputes. Section 14(b) permitted states to invoke right-to-work provisions (prohibiting closed shops): by 1972, 19 southern and mid-western states had done so [Burtt, 1980:158].[3] Union membership nevertheless continued to rise during the 1950s.[4] Previously, labour activity in policy and electoral politics had not been well organized or sustained. The Act reinforced labour ties to the Democrats and provided a sharp stimulus to labour's political development, and reliance upon national political action, especially since industrial power shifted against labour [Rehmus & McLaughlin, 1967:199; McCulloch & Bornstein, 1974:55].

In 1959, the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure, or Landrum-Griffin, Act (LMRDA) further amended the NLRA. The Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field (McClellan Committee) had uncovered instances of union corruption, such as the misuse of welfare and pension funds and the abuse of electoral procedures. The AFL-CIO's Ethical Practices Committee independently pursued reforms; several unions, notably the Teamsters, were expelled. Nevertheless, six of the seven titles of the LMRDA established government regulation of the internal affairs of unions; the seventh amended the Taft-Hartley Act, extending the regulation of secondary picketing. The Act was a shock to labour, after a decade of political activism, following the Taft-Hartley Act.

---

[3]Congress voted on repeal of 14(b) in 1965. President Johnson favoured repeal but, with the concurrence of the AFL-CIO, delayed action until after the Great Society legislation cleared Congress. A reform bill then passed the House but the Senate version was blocked by a filibuster. Subsequently, the composition of Congress was less propitious until a new wave of liberal Democrats arrived in 1974 [Chapter 3].

[4]Organization was perhaps more difficult in some areas, such as the South and in small towns [Burtt, 1980:131]. Other factors, such as increased organization among employers, also slowed union growth [McCulloch & Bornstein, 1974:56].

Passage of the LMRDA was one of the few occasions when organized labour threatened electoral reprisal in order to influence congressional voting. The labour lobbying effort was apparently poorly coordinated and the strategy of opposing any legislation, rather than supporting the "least bad" alternative, was thought a decisive error [Levitan, 1967:250-1; 256; McCulloch & Bornstein, 1974:63-8; Wilson, 1979:119-20]. In brief, major labour laws during the 20th century profoundly affected the balance of power between business and labour interests and contributed to a virtual legislative contest between them, with a strongly partisan character.[5]

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE AFL-CIO

> More Americans now participate in collective bargaining than in any other organizational activity save religion. [Jessup, 1980:53].

An extensive legal framework regulates relations between employers and workers, codifying their respective rights and responsibilities. Labour-management relations are to some extent on "automatic pilot" and voluntaristic *within* the legal framework administered by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The political nature of appointments to the Board affects its activity. Although both the AFL-CIO and management organizations have routinely been consulted on appointments to it, representative elections were more successful during the Kennedy and Johnson presidencies than during Nixon or Ford's, whose influence carried over into the Carter years [Bok & Dunlop, 1970: 407; 409; Singer, 1977b:378, citing AFL-CIO]. By closely regulating collective activity, labour legislation has influenced the character of collective bargaining. Many major contracts are of three-year duration, with "no strike" clauses and provisions for arbitration by a neutral party:[6] peaceful strikes are permissible if they do not violate existing collective bargaining agreements. The impact of legal regulation helps to explain why the incidence of strikes is not greater (they tend to be protracted), and the relatively low unofficial strike level. The detailed procedures governing collective organization and activity by workers have readily been exploited by employers opposing the establishment of, or seeking to dissolve, unions, or to avoid contract bargaining. The law has been interpreted so as to permit employers to operate during an economic strike including by hiring *permanent*

---

[5]For discussions of U.S. labour law, see Weiler [1984]; U.S. House Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations [1980; 1984a; 1984b; 1984c]; AFL-CIO [1981]; Burtt [1980]; Rehmus et al [1978]; McCulloch & Bornstein [1974]; Levitan [1967]; Edelstein & Warner [1979].

[6]However, this is an expensive proposition for labour unions, which bear half the costs involved [Edelstein & Warner, 1979:22]. In the public sector, arbitration services are the responsibility of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) and its subunit, the Federal Service Impasse Panel, established in 1977 [Burtt, 1980; AFL-CIO Series(a), 1978:14].

replacements, except where an "unfair labor practice" decision is given by the NLRB. The Board can reinstate strikers or at least provide for their preferential consideration for vacancies, but only upon their unconditional request [McCulloch & Bornstein, 1974:155-6]. Indeed, "[n]onpartisan observers agree that statutory remedies for serious unfair labor practices are woefully inadequate." [McCulloch & Bornstein, 1974:180]. The NLRB's small size, the high volume of cases and consequent slow response time on unfair labour practices (which can take years to settle), and weak statutory powers with respect to remedying employer wrongs mean that "[i]n many instances, wrongs committed under the National Labor Relations Act are remedied either so late or so inadequately that statutory rights have been tragically undermined." [McCulloch & Bornstein, 1974:184; also 180-1].

The structure of collective bargaining in the U.S. is decentralized and diverse, with a patchwork of state and local laws covering employment in the public sector at those levels, where union growth has been considerable.[7] In the private sector, collective bargaining often reflects particular company structures. The NLRB determines bargaining units, usually based upon employer, plant, craft or smaller groupings (multi-employer units are permitted if requested). The effect has been to reduce the average size of bargaining units and further decentralize bargaining although, since WWII, there has also been a trend toward national agreements with large (often multi-plant) employers. Where centralized bargaining does exist, it is highly organized.[8] Contract bargaining generally is highly formalized and legally binding, agreements are relatively detailed, and fewer *ad hoc* matters arise during a contract lifetime.[9] It is frequently dual level, with nationally negotiated "master" agreements ratified locally and supplemented by local bargaining, which must remain within the terms of the national agreement and, usually, gain approval at that level (as must strikes over the failure to reach agreement) [Edelstein & Warner, 1979:18-19; 21-2]. In

---

[7]During the sixties, Executive Orders enabled about 10 million federal workers to bargain collectively; some state statutes and local ordinances followed suit, mostly using federal labour law and the NLRB as their model [McCulloch & Bornstein, 1974:177]. The 1978 Civil Service Reform Act established collective bargaining rights for federal employees (with rather more scope than Carter proposed) [AFL-CIO, 1979a:119; Series(a), 1978:10-14].

[8]Compared, for example, to Britain, which has more centralized bargaining overall (but still less so than European counterparts). See Edelstein & Warner [1979:20-1] on these points, on the "Americanisation" of British industrial relations (through a shift to long-term agreements, productivity bargaining, single bargaining jurisdictions and legal regulation), and on convergence in the U.S. through recent incomes policy experiments.

[9]Collective bargaining may cover procedures governing layoffs, transfers, promotions, overtime, incentive standards changes and technical change [Edelstein & Warner, 1979:21].

the seventies, there were some 60,000 bargaining units and 170,000 separate labour agreements, including more than 1,500 *major* agreements (i.e. 1,000 workers or more), usually involving a single union and employer, and covering over 10 million of 23 million organized workers in total in 1975.[10] About 20% of major agreements, or one-third of workers covered, are not with AFL-CIO affiliates; many of these are in the UAW, Teamsters or the NEA. Non-union wages account for fully 65-70% of the national wage bill, although organized labour has some "spillover" effect upon these.

The incidence of coordinated union bargaining increased in the post-War period, with the establishment of permanent structures and periodic national committees, usually targeting a major company to achieve an informal (but influential) standard for similar employers. Negotiating is conducted by national officials,[11] there may be collective determination of the bargaining agenda and a joint strike fund for the target negotiations. The UAW has established periodic national committees in negotiations with Ford, General Motors and the Chrysler Corporation. The Electrical Workers' coordinated effort traces back to 1959. The General Electric and Westinghouse Coordinated Bargaining Committee established in 1965 involves6 the Conference boards of the IUE and the UE in pattern-setting three-year contract bargaining, plus eleven additional unions including the UAW, IAM, Steelworkers and IBEW and the Teamsters [BNA-DER 1979, 128:L-2; Edelstein & Warner, 1979:20; AFL-CIO Series(g), Mar.16/85:6]. More recent efforts include the food industry committee established to engage in "high-level" collective bargaining, and counterparts in health care and the rubber, textile and retail food industries [Bredhoff]. Employers were more averse to these arrangements by the eighties, and the impact of deregulation and competition from imports increased pressures for decentralization.[12]

With primarily a political role, the AFL-CIO has little involvement (or formal authority) in collective bargaining, but its president or his designate sit on some coordinating

---

[10]The figures and information are from COWPS [1976]; Flanagan [1980:43-5]; McCulloch & Bornstein [1974:127].

[11]The involvement of supra-local officers in negotiating local agreements is a common practice. Since the 1960s, there has been an increasing incidence of local rejection of such agreements [Edelstein & Warner, 1979:20-1; 27 (ft.4)], for which, in more centralized systems, wage drift is possibly a functional substitute [Flanagan, 1980:43-4].

[12]The U.S. Steel Coordinated Bargaining Committee began to disintegrate as a result of such pressures and the airline, auto and meatpacking industries were also affected [Bredhoff].

committees or their special policy bodies: for example, Lane Kirkland has chaired the Coordinated Bargaining Committee for General Electric and Westinghouse (since the late 1960s) [Silesky; AFL-CIO Series(g), Mar.16/85:6]. Some Federation departments, including the Metal Trades and Industrial Union Departments, are occasionally signatories to collective bargaining agreements, although such arrangements are not frequent [Silesky]. As a policy forum, the AFL-CIO enables affiliates to develop unified positions on issues of common interest, including bargaining demands; Federation research staff prepare papers on issues germane to these activities [Silesky]. Moreover, the AFL-CIO has inevitably been drawn into the politics of incomes policies as these became more prevalent in the post-War period. Through the AFL-CIO (primarily) organized labour has been able to influence the regulations and procedures of government wage policy, but the Federation's ability to guarantee wage restraint is very uncertain. Federation goals are primarily longer-term: restructuring and reindustrializing the economy rather than wage restraint, as was clear during the Accord process. The lines of communication and authority in collective bargaining do not run directly to (or from) the AFL-CIO, but to national or international union affiliates. The Federation's role in incomes policy therefore depends upon consensus within the Executive Council; these individual union presidents exercise considerable influence over collective bargaining within their organizations, as recognized within the Carter White House [Carp].[13] However, union leaders, as elected officials, are reluctant to endorse unpopular wage restraint measures, especially since such programmes often lack credibility and are regarded in labour circles as inequitable and unworkable, creating distortions in pay structures. In spite of these obstacles, Democratic and Republican presidents, including President Carter, have repeatedly sought the participation of the AFL-CIO (and the Teamsters and UAW) in wage and price programmes [Pencavel, 1981; Moye, 1980]. Such participation is among the imperfect instruments by which to implement incomes policy.

---

[13]Corroborating Carp's view of the constitutional and informal power of these leaders, see Edelstein & Warner [1979:99-109], who state that these leaders operate with considerable independence (for example, from (union) executive council control), and have the power to suspend other elected officers, local unions and their members. Union presidents are, however, elected and therefore accountable: the Landrum-Griffin Act sets a five-year maximum term, although few incumbents are actually unseated (voting is usually at the conventions).

THE AFL-CIO AND LABOUR SECTOR ORGANIZATION

Organized labour's strength and influence varies amongst and within states, from government to government and across policy areas. However, government leaders, both Democrats and Republicans, in Congress and the Executive Branch regard labour as a major political force. For national government the AFL-CIO is the primary policy instrument within the labour sector. The institutional features of the national policy process strongly influence labour activity. The decentralization and fragmentation of government is renowned both for allowing access to organized interests and for complicating the control of policy outcomes. These features are a product of the constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers and system of checks and balances in the U.S. The AFL-CIO has adapted to these basic institutional conditions, and to the increased role and activity of national government, occupying a prominent (though beleaguered) position as a force within national policymaking and within the Democratic Party.

The national AFL-CIO is embedded in a complex communications network reaching rank and file members across the U.S., although the potential of this structure as an instrument of broad mobilization has not been fully realized. There is a large network of 50 state and 700 district or central (local) labour federations [AFL-CIO PR, Feb.20/79:3], each with its own director and/or mini-executive structure and closely linked to the parent organization. Local and state-level unions register directly with them, subscribing regular fees based on the number of members affiliated. In turn, the sub-national AFL-CIO units pay regular national affiliation dues and their charters must be in compliance with the national constitution. These units are key organizational and communications links between the grassroots level and the national leadership, mobilizing broad support and acting as distribution centres.

A number of departments within AFL-CIO national headquarters also perform specialized functions of representation, organization and communication. The nine trade and industrial departments cover specific, limited segments of the membership and manage and finance their own affairs: Building and Construction Trades, Food and Beverage Trades, Industrial Union, Maritime Trades, Metal Trades, Professional Employees, Public Employees, Union Label and Service Trades. Mini-federations in themselves, these exercise considerable autonomy. Other committees are broadly service-oriented and represent the entire membership. They include Legislation, Civil Rights, Political Education (COPE), Ethical Practices, International Affairs, Education, Social Security, Research, Economic Policy, Community Services (CSD), Housing, Public Relations, Safety and Occupational

Health, Veterans Affairs, Organization & Field Services (OFS), and a number of staff departments, such as Information.

The OFS[14] has major potential for coordinating and mobilizing rank and file support. The largest Federation department, it is specified (uniquely) in the constitution; the appointment of its director is ratified by the Executive Council: the only such provision, reflecting the emphasis upon its role when the AFL and CIO merged. The department's network operates through an intermediary level of regional directors and 100 or so field staff (during the Carter years), who liaise with the state AFL-CIOs. State AFL-CIO Legislative departments call upon the OFS during state legislative terms, and field staff are frequently seconded to them to assist for the duration of the terms. OFS field staff are reassigned to work with union locals organizing voter turnout efforts during elections.

The department is directly responsible for coordinating organizational efforts and strike support, but its role has been largely reactive: the insistent autonomy of affiliates has obviated any leadership role - this situation has been altering, partly in response to "considerable pressure by many labor leaders for some time to have the federation become more active in organizing." [Singer, 1977b:378]. Right-to-work provisions,[15] the prohibition of secondary boycotts, delays in, and employer exploitation of, the union recognition process and the increasing activity of labour-management consultants mean that organizational projects which might occupy a month in neighbouring Canada (where many U.S. "international" unions have branches) take *years* in the U.S.[16] During the seventies, labour-management conflict heightened over the resort by employers to increasingly prominent labour-management (or "union-busting") consultants; large corporations sometimes have special departments similarly active. The AFL-CIO recorded 300 such consultants by August 1979, noting their practice of taking over the management of a company during organizational campaigns and their new emphasis on decertification activity. The AFL-CIO Executive Council has pressed for congressional hearings on the role of such consultants and for the enforcement of existing laws, for example, on reporting activity; a special subcommittee on the problem was established, plus a 28-member committee of lawyers (representing 27 unions) working through four subcommittees. The OFS circulates to affiliates some 5,000 copies of its monthly "Report on Union Busters" and other information is widely

---

[14]Unless otherwise indicated, the discussion of the OFS relies upon interviews with its director, Alan Kistler, in 1985.

[15]The National Right-to-Work Committee actually lost 69 of 71 attempts to introduce such legislation over the 20 years to 1979 and is instead attempting to gain compulsory open shop laws in nine states [AFL-CIO Series(d), Feb.23/79].

[16]AFL-CIO affiliates won less than half of all organizing elections held between 1975-78 [AFL-CIO 1979a:123].

disseminated to field organizers, including on consultant links to trade associations and universities (often through management training programmes). Training seminars tailored for individual unions have been organized on neutralizing the consultants' activity [AFL-CIO 1979a:102; 124-5; Series (f), 1981:80].

Other conditions fostering affiliate reliance upon the Federation include higher unemployment, declining union membership, reduced union lobbying capabilities and the like. In January 1977, the Federation established a National Organizing Committee comprising 40 to 50 union organizing directors, operating under the auspices of the OFS and meeting quarterly to improve the coordination of organizational activity; during the intervening periods, the OFS provides direction and support. Further, some efforts are AFL-CIO-led and coordinated. The Houston project, initiated in 1981 by the Harris County central AFL-CIO, involved coordinated organizing (and collective bargaining) by 28 unions and absorbed an Industrial Union department (IUD) project and a number of other efforts; by 1982 a "$1 million war chest" had been gathered [Keller, 1982:2195; Kistler].[17] The Federation, through the OFS, has countered "right-to-work" campaigns, as in Missouri, Louisiana and Idaho. In the Missouri project (in which George Meany was active), the department seconded some 20 headquarters and regional personnel, supplemented by individual, concerned unions: the United Food & Commercial Workers Union assigned 70 personnel and the Steelworkers Union sent 25 [Kistler]. Other projects were similarly organized. More recently, the Federation has established three pilot projects in Idaho, Missouri and Georgia, involving coordinated efforts by the president, secretary-treasurer, Legislative department, COPE, OFS and the Education department to achieve an effective communications network and mobilizing structure [Silesky].

The OFS, along with the CSD and Information departments, coordinates union activity and mobilises rank and file unionists and demonstrators in support of industrial action. In political matters, efforts are coordinated with those of the Legislative Department and/or COPE; techniques include various forms of direct action at the local and national level, from political demonstrations and petitions (by unionists and allied interests) to "grassroots" lobbying (the practice of bombarding Members of Congress with mail from their constituents), as well as massive volunteer efforts during election campaigns. Although the OFS played no role in the Accord (Kistler believed it would have, had Carter been re-elected), the CSD (otherwise providing community advice and strike relief), undertook a nation-wide

[17]State laws covering public sector organization in Texas do not permit collective bargaining rights and employees must rejoin the union annually. During the project's first four years, however, only 15,000 new members were gained (from a City population of 1.5 million).

price-monitoring project in a concerted attempt by the AFL-CIO to force the Carter Administration to place greater emphasis on this element of its incomes policy. The Information department produces a high volume of specialized newsletters, bulletins, "legislative alerts" and "rub sheets" and has direct links to individual union journals. Despite its potential for educative and propoganda activity promoting a broader consensus for policy undertakings, the Department did not seek to mobilize broad support for the Carter pay standards, although other information regarding the Accord was disseminated.

On the eve of the Carter presidency, the organized labour sector was undergoing substantial internal transition, reflected in the composition and leadership of the AFL-CIO and modifying organizational goals and activity. One element was the changing level and character of collective organization. The level of unionization is low in the U.S. Although the number of union members had increased to a peak of nearly 23 million by 1974 (despite soaring unemployment) [Burtt, 1980:118, Table 6-1], growth was slower than the increase in the size of the workforce. Membership density declined[18] due to falling employment in traditional union strongholds in the private sector, such as manufacturing, transportation, mining and utilities. Yet some sectors remain almost fully organized: for example, printing press and rail transportation workers,[19] testifying that unions have not universally lost appeal [AFL-CIO PR, Sept.3/79:6]. There has been high growth in the public sector,[20] including state and local government employment, and in the service industries, where unionization has been slower although increasingly successful (about 90% of all new jobs were in the service occupations in the seventies) [AFL-CIO, 1983:11], but these gains failed to offset losses elsewhere. Moreover, new high-technology industries are not labour intensive and they are more mobile, able to export jobs to low-wage overseas locations. Domestically, new industries and jobs were established in non-union areas of the country; employment grew most rapidly in the West and South: California, Texas and Florida.[21] Other factors included the slower growth of

---

[18]Union density in the private sector peaked at 38% in 1954 but dropped to around 21% by 1980. See Weiler [1985] and sources cited.

[19]For example, after WWII, the Federation had four million members in railroads and related industries. By 1979, the number had fallen below one million, yet the sector remained virtually fully organized [AFL-CIO PR, Oct.18/79:5]. A similar pattern holds in the maritime trades.

[20]Breakthroughs by AFL-CIO affiliates such as the AFT and AFSCME, and the Executive Order passed by President Kennedy in 1962, triggered increases in public sector unionization from one million members in 1960 to nearly 3 million by 1974, or 5.3 million including members in professional associations such as the NEA [Burtt, 1980:121, 163]. Indeed, the growth rate was higher than for the rate of employment in the 1970s [Flanagan, 1980:43].

[21]AFL-CIO president, Lane Kirkland, dismisses the notion of inherent anti-unionism in the South,

unionization among white collar workers, and the growth of jobs predominantly in sectors of the workforce more difficult to organize, especially part-time work and industry, among managerial and semi-managerial salaried employees [AFL-CIO PR, Sept.3/79:5-6]. Automation and the entry of increasing numbers of women, minority members and young workers to the workforce have also depressed unionization levels. In the seventies, increased anti-union activity by employers and higher unemployment levels compounded these problems. During the Carter presidency, between 25%-28% of the non-agricultural workforce was unionized.

The AFL-CIO formally adhered to Meany's stress on strategic, rather than numerical, strength. Meany insisted that it is the organized voice that counts in terms of influence [Holloway, 1979:121-2] and that (presumably once some organizational threshold has been crossed) "a rising tide lifts all ships": i.e. policy gains by organized labour increase the welfare of all workers, diminishing the importance of the unorganized sector. By the end of the seventies, however, unions were actively (if not desperately) seeking ways to consolidate existing membership and organize new sectors of the workforce by improving internal procedures and enhancing organizational appeal: for example, by diversifying services to members and broadening the membership base, shifting toward general unionism.[22]

The weak, and declining, industrial base of U.S. labour limits the political strength of the AFL-CIO, as do established norms and traditions defining its role and strategic capacity: the autonomy of affiliates; limited internal authority over collective bargaining, industrial action or sanctions over dissident affiliates; and conflicts emerging from the heterogeneity of internal interests. These limitations increase the importance of the Federation's internal system of communications and consensus-building techniques, while limited contact with rank and file unionists makes the functioning of the Executive Council of the utmost importance [Chapter 5].[23] However, trends within the union sector leading to greater heterogeneity of

---

commenting that the area was agrarian for longer and that current low membership levels largely reflect the lower starting base. The South was influenced by national anti-labour activity, in the course of which "a Congress subservient to business interests" enacted the restrictive Taft-Hartley Act, section 14(b) of which led to right-to-work laws in the South and elsewhere [AFL-CIO PR, Feb.25/80:2]. In corroboration of the view that unionization is meeting with success in the South, see Weiler [1984:355, ft.10].

[22]In 1982, the AFL-CIO established a special task force, the Committee on the Evolution of Work, which produced two reports on these issues: *The Future of Work* [August 1983] and *The Changing Situation of Workers and Their Unions* [February 1985]. See *Business Week* [1985:96-8]; *U.S. News and World Report* [1985].

[23]The General Board of the Federation is a more fully representative decisionmaking body, comprising the president of each affiliate, but its role is a far less active one.

membership brought new demands to the labour agenda and created new tensions within the AFL-CIO, including political tensions within the leadership level [Chapter 3]. The concerns of public and service sector workers sought expression within an Executive Council whose members, especially the key leadership cohort, although changing, were still overly representative of the older, craft and industrial sectors [Chapter 5].

The Federation is acknowledged by government and party leaders as the primary labour spokesgroup and a national force in policy and electoral politics and, over time, its role and activity as coordinator and policy-political representative for organized labour has strengthened. Since the merger of the rival AFL and CIO in 1955, the Federation has operated without serious challenge as the pinnacle of organized labour's policy and political capability.[24] Membership expulsions have been rare, the notable case being that of the notorious Teamsters in 1957.[25] Since then, the only significant disruption of membership was the voluntary withdrawal of the UAW in 1968, after the politically active Walter Reuther, who clashed frequently with president Meany, resigned from the EXCO. The UAW is markedly more liberal and progressive than the Federation (though not individual affiliates, such as IAM) and was, for example, more dovish over Viet Nam, more active in black politics and has a more internationalist perspective. More than half of rank and file unionists are concentrated in the largest 11 unions in the U.S. At the time of the Carter presidency, the UAW, Teamsters and the NEA were the major labour organizations active beyond AFL-CIO ranks. The level of union affiliation to the AFL-CIO is otherwise high, encompassing (*before* the UAW reaffiliated) 75% of unionized workers in some 96 of 135 unions (13.6 million members in late 1978). Apart from the Teamsters (1,973,000) and UAW (1,545,000), some small unions are not affiliated; of 48 unions listed with 100,000 members or more in 1974, only four others were independent of the AFL-CIO: the Mineworkers (UMW) (220,000),[26] the Electrical Workers (163,000), the National Association

---

[24]The UAW and Teamsters' short-lived "Alliance for Labor Action", to which the Rubber Workers and International Chemical Workers also affiliated, was active in electoral politics, remained "an alliance from above" and failed to gain support among other unions [Edelstein & Warner, 1979:24].

[25]Along with The Bakery & Confectionery Workers and the Laundry Workers, the Teamsters' Union was expelled for corrupt practices. The Teamsters Union is noted for its conservative stances and links to the Republicans.

[26]John Lewis led the UMW out of the CIO in 1940 due to conflict over his support for Wendell Wilkie in the presidential election; Lewis resigned as President of the CIO, which supported Roosevelt.

of Government Employees (NAGE; membership not given) and the Federal Employees (NFFE; 100,000). Of five employee associations similarly categorized, the NEA (1,470,000) was the sole major unit, with the Civil Service union (NYS) next in size (207,000) [Burtt, 1980:169, Table 8-1].

The reaffiliation of the UAW and Teamsters (and the UMW) was actively renegotiated during the Carter years, although only the UAW (later) concluded the attempt, becoming the second largest affiliate and strengthening the AFL-CIO's representative claim and the progressive element within it.[27] Although the Teamsters remained independent, the seniority of the negotiators and the formal institutional provisions emphasized the seriousness of reaffiliation proposals.[28] The Teamsters established a special Executive Board committee of president Fitzsimmons, the secretary-treasurer and five area conference directors; this negotiated reaffiliation with a select group of AFL-CIO leaders including president Kirkland, secretary-treasurer Tom Donaghue and vice-presidents Lyons, Hanley, Bommarito and Wynn. Both the Teamsters and UAW participated in weekly Federation "congressional strategy" meetings (see later). Through Landon Butler and Treasury secretary Miller, the involvement of these two unions in the Accord process was secured without their being directly party to the negotiations, and thus without prejudicing the representative primacy of the Federation. The Administration's institutional nicety and role in facilitating comprehensive labour participation was simply customary practice [Butler]. Although the AFL-CIO was disinclined to promote the direct participation of the two unions in the negotiations, Kirkland confirmed that separate discussions were undertaken with them [AFL-CIO PR, Oct.1/79:3]. The Accord was to be signed by each of the Federation vice-presidents individually and the UAW and Teamsters [Carp], although the eventual signatories were

---

[27]An unsuccessful attempt was made during 1977, after Doug Fraser became UAW president. Eventually, individual local level units were permitted to choose whether or not to rejoin the AFL-CIO, after reaffiliation was accomplished at the national level in July 1981.

[28]The matter involved some fine footwork by the Federation leadership, owing to the notoriety of the union. Questioned in February 1980 on Meany's statement (in 1975) that the Teamsters weren't worthy of being described as a union, and on the latter's ethical standards, Kirkland claimed: "I'm satisfied that the Teamsters are a bona fide trade union ... representing its members, and I am satisfied that it's in the best interests of the American trade union movement to bring about the consolidation of all its legitimate elements." He stated that the basis of the expulsion had not been precisely the question of ethical standards (a matter for the law to decide), but "because they did not accept the constitution." Since 1961, the EXCO has held discretionary authority on the question of reaffiliation, requiring affiliate compliance with the constitution, which with the Teamsters were (now) in compliance: Kirkland stated that the ethical code was not part of the Federation's constitution [AFL-CIO PR, Feb.19/80:5; 30].

simply the Administration and the AFL-CIO *qua* Federation (after endorsement by the Executive Council collectively). Subsequently, the UAW and Teamsters participated with the Federation on the Accord pay board, where the high degree of labour cohesion customary under such arrangements was visible [Tchirkow]. Within the organized labour sector, the Accord arrangements demonstrated both the institutional limits to, and the management of, policy-political cooperation.

The growth of the NEA, the only significant recent labour organization established independently of the Federation, offset tendencies toward centralization. Employee associations such as the NEA, challenged by public sector unionism (especially in the wake of President Kennedy's Executive Order and supporting legal decisions), were compelled to undertake collective bargaining in order to retain their members; the NEA did so in 1967. As a professional association of white collar members, the NEA represented narrower interests than the AFL-CIO and lacked a tradition of unionism, therefore remaining independent - also because of jurisdictional and policy conflicts with its smaller affiliated rival, the American Federation of Teachers (AFT); merger talks with the AFT in 1973-4 failed [AFL-CIO PR, Feb.19/5; Burtt, 1980:163-4]. From time to time, shared membership concerns have linked the NEA institutionally to the AFT and other Federation affiliates at the local level. In 1971, for example, the NEA and AFSCME established the Coalition for American Public Employees. The NEA, politicized especially by Republican vetoes of education bills [Wilson, 1979:48], emerged as a strong political force in the mid-1970s. The Association's preference for autonomy was reinforced by policy successes: notably the establishment of a separate Department of Education by President Carter. The importance of NEA political activism was reinforced by Carter's increasing electoral vulnerability and need for support. However, the NEA frequently complained of the lack of consultation by the Administration [Butler], and gained no equivalent to the Accord process. The NEA participated in the 1980 Labor for Carter-Mondale Committee (nominally independent of the AFL-CIO) and in labour politics at the 1980 Democratic convention, greatly enhancing labour sector political coordination [Chapter 7].

BUSINESS SECTOR ORGANIZATION IN THE 1970s

Although the business sector is not organized into an authoritative hierarchy, leading executives and organizations are recognized by national policymakers and regularly consulted. Business influence is, in any event, far more than a simple matter of organizational structure [see Lindblom, 1977]. Business organizations were politically highly active during the seventies and allied with striking success in opposition to labour interests: in the legislature, in the electoral arena, in labour-management relations and in constituency mobilization. These achievements were more notable during Democratic control of both the White House and Congress between 1976 and 1980. The major business associations in the U.S., primarily representing big business, are the Business Roundtable, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM). The small business sector is extensive, accounting for nearly half the workforce, but generally lacks policy influence, especially in relations with the White House (even under President Carter, a small-town businessman).[29] The National Right-to-Work Committee has been anathema to organized labour, organizing - along with the Associated General Contractors business opposition to the labour law reform attempt during the Carter presidency.[30]

The Business Roundtable

The prestigious Business Roundtable was established in 1972 to provide more encompassing representation for the business sector, especially given the representative shortcomings of the Chamber of Commerce and the NAM. The Roundtable deliberately maintains a low public profile, stating few public positions. In 1977-78, the group consisted of 190 chief executive officers of major American corporations, largely from the Fortune 500 [Wilson, 1981:78-9], including General Motors, General Electric, duPont, IBM, American Telephone & Telegraph, U.S. Steel, ALCOA, Standard Oil of Indiana, Sears, Roebuck and Citibank. Thus, the Roundtable represents a "unique mobilization of the talent and prestige of the nation's top corporate heads", as well as their financial and other resources.

---

[29]The largest small business group is the National Federation of Independent Business, with a membership of 530,000 "business proprietors". The group operates in coalition with the National Small Business Association and National Association of Small Business Investment Companies, to lobby in a more coordinated fashion as the Council of Small and Independent Business Associations [Ornstein & Elder, 1978:42].

[30]The following discussion of business organization draws upon *CQ Guide* [Spr./78:107], Ornstein & Elder [1978:35-42; 134-142], and other sources as indicated.

Chairman Irving S. Shapiro (chairman also of E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.) had extensive access to the Carter White House (including regular consultation by Treasury secretary G.W. Miller on the Accord developments). He has worked closely with the AFL-CIO leadership, including on reindustrialization proposals. The operation of the Roundtable is directed by a 43-member policy committee (participation rotates annually) meeting bimonthly to establish a consensus on issue positions and priorities, supported by about a dozen task forces chaired by committee members. The policy strategy of the Roundtable stresses direct contact with policy principals in the Executive branch and with members of Congress; as for the AFL-CIO in the labour sector, access is substantially greater than for any member-corporation singly [Ornstein & Elder, 1978:39]. Some policy matters bring the Roundtable and labour into alliance, particularly where the latter seeks to avert job losses, for example over the 1977 standards for auto exhaust emissions, and stationary pollution sources.

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce[31]

The constituency-based, or "grassroots", strategy of the Chamber of Commerce complements the Washington-based, direct (leadership) contact strategy of the Business Roundtable. The Chamber is the largest business association. In 1978, its membership included 70,000 business and professional firms and individuals, 2,500 local, state and regional chambers of commerce and 1,000 trade and professional associations. This coalition, including some 18,000 manufacturers, also includes (like the Business Roundtable) most of the Fortune 500[32] whose cooperation was explicitly sought by President Carter during the anti-inflation programme , although relations with the Chamber were generally cool [Butler]. The greater part of the Chamber's annual budget (about $16 million in 1978) is spent on legislative action but, although the Legislative Action department's director and four legislative counsel are registered lobbyists, the organization avoids registering or reporting its activities since it eschews a direct contact approach to Members of Congress. Although lacking labour's direct presence within Congress, the Chamber's grassroots, anti-labour

[31]The Chamber was established in 1912, partly because President Taft sought a single voice for business interests, and prompted also by pre-WWI economic insecurity, passage of the Sherman and Clayton (anti-trust) Acts, vigorous prosecution of trusts (large corporations controlling certain industries), and growing agitation for regulation [Ornstein & Elder, 1978:36].

[32]See Ornstein & Elder [1978:37]. The Chamber's Board of Directors, which meets quarterly, has 65 members and some 30 standing committees and other subunits. Wilson [1981:76] states that 400 of the Fortune 500 are members of the Chamber.

strategy[33] proved so effective that by 1975 it served as a model for other business interests. The Chamber has an extensive national network, reaching downwards through six regional offices to the local level. Its computerized selective mailing capabilities and large array of newsletters and other publications, graduated-urgency alerts to members, and visual aids rival (indeed, surpass) the AFL-CIO's. The Chamber considered merger with the NAM, and had done so in 17 states by 1981 [Wilson, 1981:76].

National Association of Manufacturers (NAM)

The NAM, established in 1895, expanded (particularly from about 1903) after involvement in specifically labour issues, and with the rapid growth of the AFL and heightened labour activity. Reorganization following the Depression brought a shift in membership character from small to big business. Membership has declined (to about 13,000), primarily due to mergers. The group remains a staunch advocate of the open shop and has displayed a growing aggressiveness in political affairs, relocating its headquarters in 1973 from New York to the Capitol, where some 13 fulltime lobbyists are employed.

ECONOMIC DECLINE, LABOUR-MANAGEMENT CONFLICT AND THE CARTER PRESIDENCY

Even in the more affluent sixties, with the highest corporate profits and rate of return in the post-War period, observers commented on the comparatively hostile character of labour relations in the U.S. [McCulloch & Bornstein, 1974:73-4 and sources cited]. In the post-sixties context of declining economic performance and rising inflation, labour-management conflict intensified. The comparative economic performance of the U.S. had declined as its industrial base aged, and because of the rapid growth of competitor economies:[34] U.S. growth rates were consistently below average across the post-war period,[35] although the U.S. retained an advantageous international position in *absolute* terms. In the private non-farm sector, the average annual growth of output (per hour) declined from 2.6% (1948-65) to 2% (1965-73), and then sank below 1.1% [Flanagan, 1980:36]. The manufacturing sector performed better,

[33]Relations with organized labour are hostile. In 1961, the Chamber established a Special Committee to achieve state right-to-work laws [Zon, 1967:217].

[34]Over the 20 years from 1960, the U.S. share of the world market for manufactured goods declined from a quarter to less than a sixth, and the U.S. share of its own domestic market shrank from 95% to 65%. For example, the auto industry lost about 35% of the home market, and the steel industry 22% [AFL-CIO Series(g), Oct.23/82:42].

[35]Comparative data illustrating the comparatively poor performance of the U.S. economy is given in Maddison [1982]; see also Lane [1982:103] for a convenient summary, and McKay and Grant [1983].

but accounted for a declining share of total output: productivity growth averaged 2.4% in the fifties, 3% in the sixties, and 2.4% in the seventies, despite two recessions, increased idle capacity and higher unemployment [AFL-CIO, 1979a:85; Int. Assoc. of Machinists, 1978:4]. By international standards, the U.S. exhibits a meagre level of public subsidy to business, and industrial policy has been *ad hoc* and piecemeal. Rising inflation prompted business demands for government assistance in capital formation. Depreciation allowances on business property were accelerated in 1954, 1962 and 1971; the basic marginal corporate tax rate was reduced from 52% to 48% in 1964 and (after a brief increase between 1968-70) to 46% by the late seventies. The Credit Control Act was passed in 1969. The investment tax credit, favouring capital-intensive enterprises, was increased in 1962, 1964 and 1975 [Hibbs, 1987:104]. Labour unit costs (which account for more than 50% of business costs), previously comparatively high, increased modestly after 1966-67 (the least among major Western economies) [Samuelson, 1978:11], and were well below the Western average by 1975. Between 1970-75, they averaged 6.5%, and 5.8% in 1976, 6.3% in 1977, rising to 8.9% in 1978 [Flanagan, 1980:36; Maddison, 1982; AFL-CIO 1979a:84-5; Lane 1982:103]. Nevertheless, overall, corporate concerns deteriorated and the effective corporate tax rate rose until shortly after Reagan's election in 1980. Both pre-tax and (especially) post-tax profitability declined under the impact of lower economic performance and recession conditions.[36]

The U.S. did not escape the stagflation crisis of the seventies. The OPEC price increases of 1973 severely disrupted the huge, energy-dependent U.S. economy,[37] accelerating inflation already rising in the wake of the Viet Nam War and President Johnson's Great Society programmes. In 1971, the U.S. faced its first balance of payments deficit ($2 billion) of the century [AFL-CIO Series(c), 1972:7], which leaped to $17 billion in 1973 and assumed crisis proportions (domestically) after the 1973 OPEC increases.[38] The inflation rate jumped from 3.4% in 1972 to 8.8% in 1973, and reached 12.2% in 1974. A

---

[36]For a discussion of the positive and negative components of the impact of inflation on corporate profitability see Hibbs [1987:100-105], on which our discussion draws.

[37]In 1976, of total U.S. petroleum imports of 7,313 tb/d. (thousands of barrels per day) fully 6,080 were from OPEC nations. By 1978, the total had risen to 10,844 but the OPEC share dropped to 5,637 (having risen in 1977). By 1980, oil imports were down to 5,177 and those from OPEC nations were down to 4,251 tb/d, accounting for most of the decrease [Lane, 1982:129, "U.S. Petroleum Imports by Source"].

[38]The U.S. dollar was devalued in 1971 and early 1973 but otherwise allowed to float, falling freely until 1977-8.

number of countries demonstrated marked productivity slowdowns after 1973, but deceleration in the U.S. was *proportionately* second largest after Japan[39] and the largest drop in U.S. productivity since WWII [AFL-CIO, 1979a:85]. After 1973, all the Western countries (and Japan) exhibited below-capacity resource use, with output declining more than increases in productivity and employment, and a sharp deceleration in capital formation [Maddison, 1982:1-2]. Governments adopted a "remarkably similar" posture in response to the crisis in macroeconomic management, namely cautious deflation. Although they sought to avert balance of payments crises, all developed national deficits.[40]

The U.S. was no exception to these developments, although faring better than average over the 1973-81 period in terms of the major economic indicators [Maddison, 1982:3; Table 2]. While the inflation rate dropped to 7% in 1975 and 4.8% in 1976, unemployment scaled new heights,[41] reaching a post-Depression peak of 8.5% in 1975 and prompting the establishment of a National Commission on Unemployment Compensation in 1976, with labour representation. There was a large decrease in real disposable earnings after 1973, persisting (though moderating) through 1975. Unionists were more protected than non-unionists, especially those with automatic cost-of-living increases, while executives and professionals received higher percentage increases than the average worker. The buying power of the (after-tax) weekly pay of an average (non-supervisory) worker, which had risen by 6.4% over the period 1967 to 1972, declined by 4.8% for the 1972-1978 period [AFL-CIO Series(d), Feb/79:3-4; Int. Assoc. of Machinists 1978; BNA-DER 1979, 118:L-4].

The impact of Watergate and the recession conditions of the Nixon and Ford presidencies disposed the American voter toward change; Democrat Jimmy Carter campaigned intelligently to exploit this opportunity. The state of the economy was the most important issue identified by the general public: specifically the twin evils of inflation and unemployment. Carter's campaign stances included achieving a balanced budget and

---

[39]As growth had been comparatively slow and steadier in the U.S., it lay fifth in percentage point terms of deceleration [Maddison, 1982:ii].

[40]They failed to break inflationary expectations, there was no increase in investment levels and resource allocation became less efficient. Unlike the 1930s, there was no move to introduce massive trade restrictions (although the U.S. has since moved to a more protectionist stance) [Maddison, 1982:i; 2; 9].

[41]Unemployment averaged 4.8% of the civilian labour force during the sixties, but 6.2% during the seventies.

lowering overall unemployment to 4-4.5% by the end of his first term. For organized labour, unemployment is a higher priority than inflation because of its redistributive impact; business interests place greater emphasis on inflation. In the aftermath of the Republican presidencies of Nixon and Ford, the advent of a Democratic administration after 1976 augured well for labour and the AFL-CIO, but relations with the new President proved cool, especially over the President's anti-inflation programme.

For most of his first two years in office, President Carter pursued a mildly expansionary economic strategy, reducing unemployment and slowing, and then narrowing, the gap between potential and real output [Hibbs, 1987:124]. The unemployment level, already down to 7.7% by 1976, fell to 6% by 1978, declining most sharply among blue collar workers, thus reducing the blue collar-white collar gap.[1] The 1976-78 period brought a slight increase in real disposable income, although still below the levels of 1972 and 1973 and some earlier years; there was a sharp jump in average wage increases in late 1977 and early 1978 [Samuelson, 1978:9]. In line with his balanced budget commitment, the President sought to reduce the $60 billion federal deficit inherited from President Ford. However, by late 1978, the inflation rate had risen more rapidly than expected (from 6.8% in 1977 to 9% for the 1978 calendar year), and the White House began a change of course implying slower growth and higher unemployment. The proximate cause was an international dollar crisis and the need to stabilize the foreign exchange markets. The White House established inflation as its highest domestic priority, and introduced a more stringent fiscal/monetary approach, a voluntary incomes policy and deferred employment targets. The AFL-CIO sought virtually the reverse: the preservation of employment commitments, lower interest rates and a more expansionary fiscal/monetary policy. In this, the labour leadership was closer to traditional Democratic policies than the President. In 1979, unemployment was below 6% during the first half of the year, but then climbed sharply to reach around 10% by 1980, after the second OPEC price shock during the second quarter of 1979. By June 1979, the buying power of the weekly pay of an average non-supervisory worker was 3.5%

[1] Unemployment was not neutral, hitting young workers, ethnic minorities and blue collar workers hardest, especially construction workers, amongst whom unemployment reached 17% in 1976 and 12.9% in 1977 and, having dropped to 10.6% in 1978, began to rise again by 1979. During the 1973-78 period, white collar employment rose by 16.6% and blue collar employment by only 6.4%, as recession conditions hit older industries. Jobs in the service sector increased by 16%.

lower than in June 1978 [Flanagan, 1980:36; AFL-CIO, 1979a:119; 324; Series(d), Aug.79:8; Series(g), Jan.8/83:9; *NYT*, Oct.9/82; Freedman 1984:557; 565]. The trade-off between inflation and unemployment thereafter proved a major source of conflict between the AFL-CIO and the Carter White House.

Apart from economic policy conflict, several major conflicts involving organized labour and business occurred during the Carter presidency. In particular, business interests viewed attempts to pass common situs picketing and labour law reform legislation as the assertion of labour power, given a Democratic administration; White House and labour lobbying activity to secure the reforms ended in surprise defeats for labour. Employer resistance to the relatively modest, but highly symbolic, labour law reform proposals strained relations between the AFL-CIO and its usual corporate allies, contributing to the (temporary) demise of the Labor-Management Group (see later). Kirkland commented on these events (just before endorsing the Accord):

> ... that experience has led me to begin to doubt very seriously whether there is that necessary and desirable degree of consensus on essential American values and the American system of voluntary, constructive action that actually underlies our whole system of collective bargaining in this country, our system of industrial jurisprudence. [AFL-CIO PR, Sept.3/79:4].

Relations were restored partly through the National Accord. Business and labour leaders collaborated on the Accord pay board overseeing the second year of the wage/price programme, and on reindustrialization proposals, where cooperation continued beyond the duration of the Carter presidency. In addition to these various difficulties confronting organized labour (interacting with internal weaknesses), changes within the Democratic Party and Congress modified, and in some respects, diminished labour influence. We first discuss these, before examining in detail relations between the labour leadership and the presidency, formalized as the National Accord.

CHAPTER 3
ORGANIZED LABOUR AND THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

> The widespread assumption that political activity has been relatively absent from the American labor scene stems primarily from the fact that the American labor movement has usually resorted to pressure politics, particularly at the national level, rather than to independent third-party action. [Rehmus et al, 1978:3]
>
> ...there are really four political "parties" operating today, only partly within the confines of the two older parties: business and the New Right on one side, and labor and the Liberal Left on the other [Jessup, 1980:53].

In the post-Depression world, organized labour has been an enduring force in government and politics at the national, state and local levels. From an earlier position of independence from national party politics, eschewing even the possibility of a labour party,[1] labour's political role not only increased but has been strongly partisan in practice, if not in principle. The limitations of modern party structures have reinforced the importance of other electoral forces; labour has been the most prominent of these for Democrats.[2] Indeed, some commentators suggest that the labour movement is the best-equipped institution to perform the intermediary role ascribed to parties [Jessup, 1980:53]. Conversely, influence upon national policy through an effective party structure is limited, strengthening labour's need to work directly with government. In doing so, labour has become considerably more than just another pressure group.

The electoral landscape within which labour is active has been transformed, with varying impact upon labour influence; in particular, Democratic politics during the 1970s reinforced labour incentives to enter the presidential selection process early. The Democrats' partisan advantage among voters has been eroded by the fragmentation of the New Deal coalition of which labour has been a major constituent.[3] The rise in split-ticket voting has facilitated Republican control of the White House. In presidential politics, primarily among Democrats, demands for wider participation, the impact of the primaries and diminished

---

[1]AFL unions were, however, highly active in local party politics, including collaborating with business, and sought local government legislation/laws. Thus, any antipathy was towards national government and parties [McConnell, 1970:85-8; Rogin, 1971:127]. On the variety of political strategies pursued by organized labour, including attempts at establishing a labour party, see Bok & Dunlop [1970:384-403].

[2]There are more groups, but fewer cohesive contributors to the coalition-building essential in U.S. politics, which have become increasingly atomized [King, 1980:390-1]. However, organized labour has preserved a workable degree of cohesion and remains important in coalition-building.

[3]On changes within the Democratic coalition, see Nie et al [1979]; Kirkpatrick [1980]; see Ware [1981] on the end of the New Deal coalition.

party control at the local level and the (altered) nominating convention, impelled formal party reform and eroded the influence held by established bargaining groups like labour under the old system. Some changes helped Jimmy Carter's bid for the presidency in 1976. However, the conflicts and disarray within the Democratic Party, and the recent ideological pre-eminence of the New Right, increased the difficulty of constructing a winning Democratic coalition and helped Carter out of office in 1980. The uncertainty of Carter's electoral fortunes in 1980 reinforced his need for support, especially from labour, to secure the Democratic nomination and contest the general election. The circumstances of his victory in 1976 influenced his defeat in 1980, for his strategy in office and in the 1980 campaign retained too much of the institutional "outsider" to overcome other obstacles to re-election.

Carter's relations with organized labour exemplify this point. As a force in Democratic politics, organized labour's strength has long been evident in campaign financing, in mobilizing voters through registration and turnout drives, in education and communication programmes aimed at affiliated members and more broadly, and as an established interest at the nominating convention. Labour organization, which varies considerably across the nation, is relatively weak in Carter's home state of Georgia and more generally in the South - the linchpin of his success in 1976. Since Carter's experience in government and politics was primarily in Georgia, he was perhaps less alert to labour interests and influence. In 1976, local organized labour was actively involved in Carter's nomination drive in the South and, afterwards, the AFL-CIO and labour as a whole were instrumental in Carter's narrow victory in the general election. Despite campaign commitments on labour law reform and unemployment to secure labour support, Carter entered office with only limited regard for labour's importance - not so much as a Democratic constituency, but as a Democratic institution - and with little sense of gratitude. Thereafter, he developed relations with the national labour leadership fitfully and slowly.

Carter's need for labour support substantially increased before the 1980 election for many reasons, but particularly the challenge for the Democratic nomination pressed by Senator Kennedy, who was well-regarded by the labour movement. By early 1979, the Carter camp was already seeking to limit the Kennedy threat and protect Carter's shaky

public and Party image as the credible Democratic frontrunner - a position which, as incumbent president, should have been secure. The White House repaired relations with the Federation leadership through the National Accord process; an important element of Carter's electoral strategy, not simply his policy programme. While significant gains resulted, Carter established too little, too late to boost his 1980 campaign or to discourage Kennedy's challenge, which instead hindered Carter from building momentum for his general election campaign.

THE AFL-CIO AND THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

> Since the Great Depression, the Democrats have been regarded as the party of labor and associated with government intervention to reduce unemployment. [McWilliams, 1977:151]

Before the New Deal, political commitments within the labour sector were less clear and there were:

> ...a substantial number of open and declared Republicans in the leadership of the trade union movement. A substantial number of members of the old AF of L Executive Council were ... active in Republican affairs (and) there were periods when Republicans had substantial support within the ranks of trade union members and, in fact, supported ... pieces of legislation ... supportive of trade unions. The Norris-LaGuardia Act, as I recall, was a Republican measure. Davis-Bacon was a Republican measure. [Kirkland, 1981:19].

Despite occasional apostasy by the Teamsters, labour is now firmly Democratic, although the AFL-CIO's formal political stance remains bipartisan.[4] Policy recommendations are presented to the national conventions of both parties and a small number of Republican candidates receive electoral support in non-presidential elections. However, the labour movement has never endorsed a Republican presidential candidate [Stephens, 1979:152];[5] more generally, "over the past few decades" more than 90% of all AFL-CIO endorsements have been Democratic [Bok & Dunlop, 1970:396], and more than 90% of labour campaign contributions are directed to Democratic candidates. Moreover, whereas labour regularly participates in the policy platform process and other activity at the Democratic national convention, it has no significant representation, role or influence at Republican conventions.

Labour organizations manifested unofficial and fluctuating support for the Democratic Party as early as the 1906 election, *preceding* the trend in the general electorate (including

---

[4]The TUC in Britain is similarly formally neutral between the major parties, despite close ties to the Labour Party.

[5]The AFL-CIO's first *formal* presidential endorsement was Democrat Adlai Stevenson in 1952 [Jong, 1978:25]. The Teamsters endorsed Nixon in 1972 [Wilson, 1979:123].

unionists) [Jong, 1978:13-25]. The New Deal period extended and consolidated the changes, bringing government intervention favouring worker and union interests (and drawing their support) under economic conditions which made continued labour independence obsolete. By this time, the labour leadership had emphatically rejected the formation of a labour party on the pragmatic grounds that it would be unsuccessful and, by splitting support among pro-labour forces, would result in the election of anti-labour interests [Greenstone, 1977:36-7; Dunlop & Galenson, 1978:51-2; Bok & Dunlop, 1970:389-391]. Consequently, since labour became a "major political force in the 1930s", the unions, particularly "the largest industrial unions", have operated "as a part (and a very large part) of the Democratic Party." [Wilson, 1980:156]. The character and sympathies of the new workers unionized in the wake of the New Deal, the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act and the 1955 merger of the AFL and CIO strengthened the progressive element within the Federation and extended and consolidated ties to the Democratic Party.[6] A compatibility of social values and policy preferences, reinforced by historical developments, have thus created a network of linkages between labour and the Democratic Party, by now underpinned by labour norms and traditions.

AFL-CIO leaders maintain formally that the labour movement must remain independent from political parties to operate effectively in a system of government with a legislature characterized by bipartisan cooperation. Bipartisanship is not, however, the operative norm of labour activity within Congress or party politics. Labour's Democratic affiliation, essentially ideological (rather than partisan), has been over-ridden in limited instances of the endorsement of Republican candidates: notably senior, liberal congressional incumbents who may assist labour interests. In January 1981, after Carter's defeat, Kirkland reiterated that it would be desirable if both parties consciously appealed to workers, commenting that in the 1980 general election campaign the Republicans had made a "deliberate and conspicuous effort" to appeal to workers: "The Reagan forces clearly put forward reassuring propositions that turned away from positions that he had advanced in earlier years." [Kirkland, 1981:19]. While observing that both parties had an inherent interest

[6]The industrial unions have been a source of political activism and progressive aims within the labour movement and within a Federation historically dominated by a more conservative, craft-union based leadership.

in broadening their electoral base, Kirkland said that the problem of "philosophy" with the Republicans, in which the Taft-Hartley conflict was a watershed, was now even stronger.

Although Republicans and Democrats alike may be drawn toward the centre of the ideological spectrum to capture the maximum number of voters, the two major parties (both presidential and congressional wings) have remained significantly distinctive in policy outlook, as are their constituencies. These differences are often described as non-ideological, for parties reflect the values of liberal individualism, accept (varying) welfare-state commitments and contain liberal and conservative elements. However, the centre of gravity of each - "left-liberal" (Democratic) and "right-conservative" (Republican) - is clear, including in Congress. Unlike Republicans, the Democrats are proponents of state intervention and expanded government services; most social and welfare policies have been enacted during Democratic administrations by a Democratic-controlled Congress. The (slight) reduction of socio-economic inequality and mild redistribution of wealth achieved since the Depression are largely Democratic products. Until President Carter, the Democrats were associated with expansionary fiscal and monetary policy, while the Republicans had generally presided over recent recessions. Democrats are more unemployment-averse and Republicans more inflation-averse relative to each other (but unemployment is of lower priority relative to inflation for Republicans than vice versa for Democrats). These priorities distinguish not only Democratic and Republican administrations, but party elites, electoral constituencies and, most of all, the interest constituencies of the two parties, notably labour and business. The differences between the parties increased from the 1960s with the rise of new liberalism among Democrats, changing and diminished Democratic representation in the South,[7] the emergence of the New Right as a Republican force and stronger ideological and issue-oriented tendencies among American voters [Jacob, 1981:120; Hibbs, 1987:213-243; Plotkin, 1977a:47; Wilson, 1980:161; Schneider, 1981:258-262; Shaffer, 1980:65-7].

AFL-CIO ELECTORAL RESOURCES

In electoral politics labour had an advantage unrivalled among organized interests until the surge of "grassroots" activity and political action committees in the latter seventies.

[7]On this change and Republican inroads in the South, see Abramson [1983:v11; 56-9]; Pomper [1981b:91]; Wilson [1980:151].

Labour resources have been placed almost exclusively at the disposal of Democrats (helping to counter Republican advantages of wealth). Conversely, organized labour is recognized as the Democrats' foremost organized Party constituency. Within the organized labour sector, the AFL-CIO exerts considerable influence in electoral matters and commands extensive human and financial resources deployed in an organized and strategic fashion:

> Labor happens naturally to be organized for political action. The AFL-CIO is the nation's dominant labor organization ... a confederation of international unions with many locals in every state and almost every city, including most cities in the South. Computers at the top of labor's house can reach millions of individual union members at the bottom. [Kohlmeier, 1976:1674].

During the Carter years, the AFL-CIO's 13-14 million affiliated unionists constituted a potentially powerful resource. Few unions are organized effectively in every state and the AFL-CIO's national scope is important to the labour movement, and to presidential candidates, who must now contest primaries and caucuses across the country. In concert with the AFL-CIO's Committee on Political Education (COPE), the strongest affiliate in any area undertakes electoral organization and mobilization on behalf of labour interests. Until recently, few other groups could compete effectively. Outside Federation ranks, the notable labour groups were the UAW, NEA and (less so) the Teamsters. The UAW's activity is generally compatible with the Federation's, especially those liberal-progressive affiliates advocating a more open role in Democratic politics. These affiliates joined with the UAW to form the Labor Coalition Clearinghouse (LCC), a brief electoral alliance acting independently of the AFL-CIO from 1972 until Carter's nomination in 1976 (see later). In 1980, the UAW strongly favoured Kennedy but cooperated with the AFL-CIO after Carter gained renomination, expressly to counter the Republican ticket. The NEA's baptism in presidential electoral waters was in the 1976 Democratic campaign on Carter's behalf; by 1980 the Association was a potent force in the Carter/Mondale campaign.[8] Although formally independent, the NEA participated with AFL-CIO affiliates in the Carter/Mondale labour committee. Other non-affiliated unions active electorally were smaller (excepting the Teamsters), and few were influential, although small unions may wield disproportionate influence for such reasons as high levels of organization and strategic activity, ideological coherence, geographic concentration, high visibility and prestige, their strategic location in

[8]The NEA had endorsed some congressional candidates in 1972 and had previous involvement in state elections. [Singer, 1976a:1424; 1428].

the economy, and individually influential labour leaders. An example is the UMW, which was a member of the LCC in 1976 and endorsed Carter in 1980. The high-spending Seafarers union, then led by Meany's ally, Paul Hall, provides a similar example within the AFL-CIO; Hall was a leading figure in Carter's 1980 campaign. The more conservative and pro-Republican Teamsters union, although disproportionately funding Democrats overall, does not participate in Democratic presidential activity and in 1972 endorsed Nixon. No major union backed Ford in 1976, after his veto of the common situs picketing bill, but the Teamsters supported Reagan in 1980.

The AFL-CIO Committee for Political Education (COPE)

The Federation's chief electoral instrument is the influential national COPE, the precursor of other political action committees (PACs). The CIO originally dominated Labor's Non-Partisan League, a group created by John L. Lewis to re-elect Franklin Roosevelt in 1936. Lewis took this unit out of the CIO with him, working against Roosevelt in the 1940 election. The overwhelming defeat of CIO supported candidates in the 1942 elections gave impetus to the establishment of a specialized electoral unit, and the decisive impetus came in 1943, when the Smith-Connally Act amended the 1925 Corrupt Practices Act to outlaw direct political contributions by trade unions (and corporations - already prohibited since 1907). In 1947, the AFL created a counterpart unit, Labor's League for Political Education. The two electoral units worked together frequently and were readily fused in the 1955 AFL-CIO merger (completed at the state level in 1961) [Rehmus et al, 1978c:157-8; Galenson, 1978:161; Zon, 1967:209].

COPE activity includes the education and mobilization of the electorate (chiefly rank and file unionists), and electoral support to candidates. Instructed by the EXCO, COPE endorses presidential and vice-presidential candidates on behalf of the affiliated membership (after formal ratification by the General Board). Other endorsements are delegated to the state and local level COPE units (state COPE's are empowered to veto local endorsements but rarely do so) [Wilson, 1979:23, citing Federation rules]. Individual unions announce their endorsements separately; most major unions have independent, generally small, political units (often a single official). Candidates look to powerful unions in their constituencies (and

nationally) for support, and to the AFL-CIO at the local, state and national level. Like its parent body, COPE is a major force nationally, but its strength varies from state to state.[9] Some of the most effective COPE units are in states controlling large numbers of electoral college votes (key contests for Carter in 1976 and 1980), such as Ohio, Texas, and Michigan (where the COPE and the dominant UAW worked closely together even before reaffiliation). COPE is well-organized in key cities such as Los Angeles and (by 1976) New York. Other states with strong COPE units in 1976 included Tennessee, Louisiana, Iowa and (less so) Minnesota. Labour is well organized in other important states, like Pennsylvania, Illinois and Missouri, Massachusetts and New Jersey [Albert; Wilson, 1979:20; cf.Singer, 1976a:1426-7].

All PACs must be legally distinct entities to comply with campaign finance legislation passed since 1971, but their independence is nominal. Although the national COPE is legally distinct and formally non-partisan, the Federation leadership directs its activity and it is funded by, and housed within, AFL-CIO headquarters (similarly at the state and local levels). COPE activities are also supported by a *per capita* membership levy, also covering education and legislative activities, publications and public relations programmes. The levy is small and largely voluntary (although some funds are procured under union shop and similar agreements) [Caddy, 1974:23; 54-6], but has been increased since 1980, overtaking the collaborative "special fund" drawn from individual unions, thus strengthening central organization [Albert]. State COPEs provide the major share of financial contributions to candidates, receiving some automatic allocations from the national COPE Matching Funds budget. Due to its size, resources and expertise COPE, rather than individual unions, has conducted much electoral activity. The unions' dwindling membership and financial resources in an increasingly difficult industrial and political climate have encouraged this reliance. Moreover, COPE coordinates the channelling of funds to candidates through individual affiliates (such funds do not figure in COPE's budget) [Wilson, 1979:17-23].

The AFL-CIO is one of two chief liberal groups monitoring and evaluating the voting records of Members of Congress as a guide to electoral support and constituency activity (the

---

[9]The President and Secretary/Treasurer of the state AFL-CIO are also the officials of the state COPE [Rehmus and McLaughlin, 1967:204]. The AFL-CIO constitutional convention of 1979 approved a Resolution that every local union should have a fulltime COPE committee, on the premise that these would be closer to rank and file members and particularly effective [AFL-CIO, 1979b:150-1, Resolution 229].

other is Americans for Democratic Action, or "ADA"). Points are awarded for congressional voting across a broad range of issues according to their compatibility with the Federation's stance. State and local groups seldom endorse any candidate with a low COPE rating, even in districts where there is no viable alternative (as in some Southern Democratic strongholds): indeed, occasional "protest" endorsements are made of rival Democrats unlikely to succeed [Zon, 1967:214]. About one-third of issues during 1970-6 were labour/union items specifically [Wilson, 1981:49]. In 1977, COPE separated "labour" from other issues on its scorecard, yet COPE "remains unambiguously an organisation whose political concerns stretch far beyond the self-interest of unions." [Wilson, 1979:26 (quoted); *CQ* (Series), Fall/78:62]. During the Carter presidency, labour law reform was again a major issue, and economic policy was naturally prominent after the onset of recession conditions and high unemployment during the Ford years followed by the energy crisis and higher inflation. In 1976, the General Board endorsed Carter and condemned Ford (and Nixon), referring to COPE ratings to support its position: "Ford's conservative views were well known. His voting record, by labor's tabulations, was 19 "right" and 109 "wrong". On 23 straight labor issues, he had a consistent record - all wrong." [AFL-CIO, 1976b:3; 5]. Carter could not be similarly evaluated, but Mondale's 109 "right" and 9 "wrong" score was also published, and the lengthy analyses and statements were widely distributed by means of the Federation newsletter. The rating system is an essential component of labour's strategic planning capability and of the labour communication and coordination network which crystallizes during the electoral season: Wilson [1979:23] terms it "[b]y far the most important nationalising factor".

Labour expenditures "supposedly" are nonpartisan although "no one even pretends that they are in effect", and "labour played what probably was a decisive role in Carter's victory." [Malbin, 1977a:614]. In 1976, labour groups spent over $11 million on the Carter/Mondale ticket and contributed a total of $8.2 million to congressional candidates, or an average of $17,500 per district; while such financial contributions are dwarfed by the value of electioneering efforts [Malbin, 1977a:412], these efforts may simply compensate for the lower participation rate of the broad labour constituency [Jessup, 1980:31]. In 1976, the national COPE reported 120,000 union volunteers working under its direction, with over

20,000 telephone banks making more than 10 million "get-out-the-vote" (GOTV) calls. Labour distributed more than 80 million pieces of electoral material, letters, leaflets, posters and the like,[10] to unionists and their families, and the AFL-CIO computer operation totalled around $2 million. The Democratic National Committee's (DNC) registration and GOTV programme, its biggest ever, cost $2 million, but labour's was much larger - more than both major parties' combined. There were similar efforts in 1980, when some 300,000 GOTV volunteers were organized and the Federation circulated 13.5 million copies of its special pamphlet explaining why Carter should be supported (and claims that its own studies show labour communications have more impact on unionists than T.V. or general newspapers) [Singer, 1980g:1836-7].

The AFL-CIO constitution specifies COPE's duty to encourage workers to exercise their civil and political rights, and especially to register to vote [Rehmus & McLaughlin, 1967:202]. Formal partisan neutrality in these endeavours was reaffirmed by Kirkland during the 1980 campaign:

> We do not and never have suggested that we had any power to shape a man's mind when he entered the privacy of the voting booth, and it's never been our objective.
>
> Our objective is to increase the extent of participation of our members in the political process ... by helping them to get to the polls and making sure that they do actually vote and are registered and qualified, and by assuring that they are fully informed on the positions of the candidates that are running. I think that is a major contribution to the election process. [AFL-CIO PR, Feb.19/80:3].

Nevertheless, it is expected that COPE activities will mobilize those, whether unionists or not, who lean toward COPE-supported candidates; target groups, especially blacks, have indeed formed a small, but intense and reliable, component of the Democratic vote and COPE has established new programmes to organize and register them. A mobile workforce and the complexity of registration provisions make this task unendingly difficult; regular drives every two years rely heavily upon volunteer efforts [Singer, 1980g:1837]. By 1976, "millions" of voters (including four million in New York and California alone) had been eliminated from the registration rolls because they had not voted in 1972 and 1974 [Singer, 1976a:1427]. By January 1976, 15 states had adopted new provisions for registration by mail, suited to

---

[10]Of $400,558 in AFL-CIO internal communications, $315,982 was spent directly to help Carter, while total labour publications (including the AFL-CIO's) which otherwise contained supportive material ran into many millions of dollars [Malbin, 1977a:414; American Enterprise Institute, 1976:6].

COPE's newly computerized communications system. COPE later estimated that some six million union members (and their families) had been registered through special drives by COPE and allied groups,[11] and perhaps 80% of eligible union members were registered in time for the election, compared to 70% for the general electorate [Albert; Singer, 1976a:1427; 1976c:1656; Hardesty, 1976a:1; 1976d:6]. Labor's registration activity was thought more effective than that of the DNC or black efforts and (along with the last) instrumental in Carter's important electoral college victories in states such as Ohio and Texas (about 43% of all new registrants were in Texas) [Malbin, 1977a:414]. Registration efforts in 1980 added more than four million unionists (and their families) to the rolls; only about half the membership was registered in January, but around 75% were by November [Singer, 1980c:1836-7].

A great deal of activity is also directed into voter turnout programmes, and the turnout rate of "union household" members (the category measuring labour support in election analyses) is somewhat higher (5% in 1976) than for the general electorate [Singer, 1980g:1837]. This category accounts for about one-third of the Democratic vote. The participation rate and Democratic support rate among actual unionists - and more so among Federation members - is higher again, but seldom recorded (blue collar workers exhibit a characteristically low turnout rate). In 1976, turnout among AFL-CIO members specifically was around 65%, compared to 53.3% for all eligible voters - a typical pattern [Albert; Singer, 1976c:1655; Hardesty, 1976d:6].

In 1976, however, some politically active affiliates such as the CWA and AFSCME, criticized inadequacies in the COPE system and in some states conducted registration and GOTV efforts themselves [Singer, 1976a:1425]. Moreover, New Right groups have successfully exploited new technological resources and professional skills to mobilize prospective Republican voters: computerized, selective targeting in constituencies, exploiting the national media (especially costly TV advertising) and political consultancy. Thus, labour's electioneering edge has eroded. The AFL-CIO has sought to improve its capabilities, pressing ahead with a fully-computerized communications system for selective targeting and personalized or "tailored" propoganda. COPE estimated that some 7-8 million members

[11]The AFL-CIO cooperates in registration efforts with organizations such as the A. Philip Randolph Institute (registering blacks) and "Frontlash" (aiming at young voters) [Wilson, 1979:20-1].

(including personal political data) were covered by 1976, 10-12 million by 1980, and virtually all by 1984 [Albert]. However, the Federation still undertook comparatively little direct mailing until after the mid-seventies, catching up with competitors just as the phenomenon lost impact, although contacts with union members by their own organizations might prove especially influential.

COPE has been an effective instrument in Democratic presidential politics, particularly where labour has united behind a candidate: as in 1968, when Humphrey secured the Democratic nomination without winning a single primary partly because "the AFL-CIO structures had delivered to him almost all of Pennsylvania, Maryland, Michigan and Ohio." [Theodore H. White, quoted in Broder et al, 1980:20]. Some 37 national labour political committees were active in addition to COPE and labour spent 92% more than in 1964. The 1968 campaign, however, occurred during the emergence of major changes in presidential politics, and within labour: the UAW withdrew from the AFL-CIO, weakening COPE, and the labour rift in 1972 temporarily lost COPE its most active contributors (see later). Moreover, campaign financing reform during the seventies created more competitive interest group electoral activity.

CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES (PACs)

The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and amending legislation of 1974 and 1976, strengthened reporting and disclosure requirements for campaign funds, established public funding for presidential campaigns and limited contributions by individuals to $1,000 per year to any single candidate in federal elections ($25,000 in total), $20,000 per year to a national party committee and $5,000 to a PAC (each organization may establish one PAC, funding at least five candidates to a maximum of $5,000 each).[12] While COPE's financial contributions were therefore circumscribed, its electioneering activities were unaffected and correspondingly more important. However, where previously labour PACs had few rivals, highly-active, non-labour PACs proliferated.

[12] A useful summary of these provisions is provided in Alexander [1980:163-176, Appendix].

Following the 1974 Act, 608 PACs registered: 201 labour, 89 corporate, and 318 trade linked groups.[13] By the end of 1978, only 263 of 1,591 PACs were labour units; there were more than 1,300 corporate and trade association PACs, and fifteen or more "highly active right-wing committees" active in the 1978 mid-term election [AFL-CIO 1979a:286]. Of the *Fortune* 500 corporations, 202 had PACs active in the 1978 elections, along with 119 of 250 leading non-industrial enterprises [Handler & Mulkern, 1982:4-5; 62-3]. The total number of PACs had more than doubled by 1982 and reached 4,009 by 1984, whereas labour groups reached only 297 in 1980, 378 in 1983, and 394 by 1984. The labour share of PAC spending decreased. By 1980, business PACs alone were outspending labour counterparts in federal elections, contributing $23 million compared to labour's $17.5 million. The top five PACs were sponsored by the National Association of Realtors, the American Medical Association, the UAW, the Machinists and the NEA; COPE was not among the top ten, although it had been in previous years (including 1978) [Abramson, 1983:15, citing E.J. Dionne, Jr., *NYT*, Sept.25/80:B10; Wilson, 1980:200; *NYT*, Jan.19/83; *NJ* 6, Feb.9/85:350; Alexander, 1980:87, Table 4-2; Theiler 1983].

All major PACs allocate over 60% of their funds to incumbents [Wilson, 1980:223]; because of the larger financial resources of the CTPA PACs, nearly 63% of these PAC funds are from these, compared to about 30% from labour groups. As the majority Party in Congress, Democrats occupy most important positions and hold more safe seats - attributes which disproportionately secure PAC support. In 1977-8, Democratic candidates received $18.2 million of $31.9 million total PAC funds, to the Republicans' $13.7 million.[14] Business PACs which seek to change the ideological composition of Congress, however, spend roughly twice as much as those funding incumbents regardless of party; the former more readily support non-incumbent Republicans [Handler & Mulkern, 1982:22], and presumably conservative Democratic incumbents. Fully 61.4% of total funds came from corporate, trade and professional association (CTPA) PACs in 1977-8, and only 29.2% from labour PACs. The Democrats' relative advantage nevertheless depended upon partisan spending by organized

---

[13]Only 2 of 71 corporate PACs pre-dated 1970, although nearly half had programmes over 25 years old for political contributions by employees [Handler & Mulkern, 1982:58]. BIPAC, created by the NAM, dates back to 1963 [Rehmus & McLaughlin, 1967:201].

[14]In 1982, Democrats received 66.8% of PAC funds and the Republicans only 33.2%.

labour.[15] In 1976, 96.5% ($8.1 million) of union contributions to congressional candidates went to Democrats [*CQ Guide*, Fall/78:62]. In 1977-8, while labour PACs accounted for only $9.3 million, they directed fully $8.8 million, or 94.6%, to Democrats, supporting only a few liberal Republicans, such as Senators Jacob Javits and Richard Schweiker, or leadership figures like Robert Michels (R-Ill). In contrast, CTPA PACs, which spent much more ($19.6 million), contributed 41.8% ($8.2 million) to the Democrats and 58.2% ($11.4 million) to Republicans. The situation was similar during 1979-80, when labour groups directed $13.9 million of $14.2 million contributions to Democrats in federal contests [*CQ Weekly*, Nov.21/81:2268].

Inevitably, labour spending as a proportion of Democratic resources diminished as a result of the "PAC explosion". Between 1956 and 1968, labour's contribution to total Democratic spending had risen from 30% to about 60% [Jong, 1978:25]. While labour still funds almost exclusively Democrats, the latter are now almost equally dependent upon non-labour PACs for support; Republicans have no equivalent incentive to consider labour interests. In 1977-8, 48.4% of total PAC funds to Democrats came from labour PACs and 45.1% from CTPA PACs (labour funding may be of greater importance to liberal Democrats if CTPA funds are disproportionately to conservatives); Republicans received 83.2% from CTPA PACs and only 3.7% from labour. For organized labour, electioneering programmes are more important than ever and as Singer [1976a:1425] commented: "...can the votes be delivered? In Congressional races in many highly organized districts, the answer is clearly yes." In the 1976 congressional elections, labour was anxious to re-elect some 75 Democratic freshmen elected in 1974 after Watergate, many from marginal or traditionally Republican districts. Most did succeed; COPE reported a slight overall improvement (at 71.3%)[16] on the previous, post-Watergate, success record (70.5%) achieved in 1974, for candidates endorsed in Senate, House or state legislature contests, and labour seemed to have greater success than business groups in supporting non-incumbents. COPE had concentrated on about 100 close congressional contests in all, seeking to "elect a friend or defeat an enemy"; the labour record was poorer on the latter, who included near-invincibles

---

[15]Even the Teamsters disproportionately fund Democrats; see [Common Cause, 1974:382].

[16]In the House, 262 of 365 COPE-endorsed candidates won, and 19 of 28 in the Senate [*CQ Guide*, Fall/78:61].

like House minority leader John Rhodes (R-Ariz) and Representative John M. Ashbrook (R-Ohio),[17] all re-elected [Singer, 1976a:1425; 1429; 1976c:1656-7; Cohen, 1976:1603; Hardesty, 1976a:6; 1976c:4].

PAC activity does not clearly determine electoral outcomes: there are too many other influences, such as the incumbency factor (in the House especially); PACs tend to fund "safe" candidates anyway.[18] Moreover, despite their swift prominence, PACs account for only about 30% of total campaign funding in federal contests [Theiler, 1983], or $60 million in 1980 and in 1982 (then the highest PAC funding year ever, $80 million, or only 26.7% of the $300 million spent by Senate and House candidates (35% of House funds alone).[19] Despite labour support, the Democratic Party is financially disadvantaged relative to the Republicans, and was still paying off campaign debts from 1968 by 1980. Effective "grassroots" techniques enabled Republican parties (at all levels) to raise $215 million in 1981-2 (more than the $199 million of all PACs combined), fully 80% from direct mail efforts and small contributions, and the Republicans benefit from personal and family financial resources, supplying the greater part of campaign funds and the "only serious threat to the power of the PACs" [Theiler, 1983]. Thus, from any source, "the advantage is clearly in the direction of business wealth" [Jessup, 1980:28-30].

CHANGING PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS: THE DEMOCRATS AND THE AFL-CIO

For organized interests like labour, working through party structures provides only limited influence because of party weakness, while the aggregation of multiple interests within parties dilutes the influence of any particular group. Neither of the major parties has an effective national structure compared to European counterparts. The Democratic Party especially is decentralized and often fragmented; national party weakness reinforced labour participation at the local level [Stephens, 1979:151]: labour's geographic spread and its own decentralized structure facilitates such a role. More recently, party decline at the state and

---

[17]In 1980, however, right-wing groups channelled so-called Independent expenditures into the defeat of senior liberal Democrats in the Senate, including Church, McGovern, Culver, Bayh and Cranston, whose loss was a blow to the Democratic Party and organized labour. In 1982, a repeat attempt signally failed after a public backlash [Abramson, 1983:15; Theiler, 1983; Jacob, 1981:122-3; Jessup, 1980:36-41].

[18]For example, see Zon [1967:214]; Caddy [1974:57-8] on the 1960s and the 1970 election; on the 1974 election, see AFL-CIO, 1975.

[19]*NYT*, January 19, 1983; Post-Election Campaign Spending (Computer Analysis), Reports to the Federal Election Commission.

local level has made labour activity even more prominent. The AFL-CIO has enjoyed relative prominence among Democratic groups, but the composition of the Party changed in ways which did not favour labour.

The Party was deeply riven by conflict during the late 1960s and early 1970s and remained in the mid-seventies in an undisciplined, unstable condition. The Great Depression loomed less large for the increasingly prominent new liberals, who differed from the labour leadership and traditional Democrats on matters of policy and party. The defenders of disadvantaged groups like migrant workers and ghetto-dwellers had less interest than more traditional Democrats in unionized (white) blue-collar workers. In domestic policy, labour continued to stress issues such as anti-poverty legislation and national health insurance, whereas new liberals were concerned with new consumer and environmental issues and the Party became a "battleground" of liberal-labour conflict over issues like busing and law enforcement [Wilson, 1979:39; 41]. Since labour pursues a broad, rather than a narrow "labour" policy agenda, differences were often more of degree than kind, but they were bolstered by foreign policy disagreements, especially over Viet Nam, on which the AFL-CIO leadership was hawkish. While traditional Democrats still comprised the Party's senior stratum, the labour leadership found the Party *milieu* less sympathetic, including in the Democrat-dominated Congress of the seventies. Labour-Party conflict reached a climax in 1972 over McGovern's nomination as the Democratic presidential candidate. Afterwards, AFL-CIO political director, Alexander Barkan, insisted that his department would not become more closely involved in Party affairs because: "We were treated shabbily when we were involved", when "Democratic elected officials" failed to "stand up" especially to "left" elements. Said Barkan: "The party doesn't have anything to offer us other than good candidates and a good program. Our political operation is far superior to the party's." [Singer, 1976c:1655].

Until Carter's narrow victory in 1976, the White House had, since Johnson, been controlled by the Republicans. Carter was not a desirable Democratic contender from labour's perspective, but Barkan maintained that the Federation was unlikely to change its position against involvement in the early stages of the presidential selection process. Such

views were outmoded by changes in electoral and party politics. Moreover, the AFL-CIO was struggling to absorb internal changes at the leadership and membership levels; internal conflict in the early 1970s weakened its effectiveness, especially in a less favourable electoral environment. Barkan, nearing retirement, represented the voice of the "Old Guard" whereas, by 1976, proponents of activism in presidential and party politics were increasingly prominent.

THE DEMOCRATIC NOMINATION AND LABOUR POLITICS

In "many" states, labour filled the vacuum left by party organizations: "For Democrats, the happy result was an increased turnout among the working class, which brought the thin but critical margin of victory." [Pomper, 1977b:63]. The Democratic nomination processes and conflictual conventions of both 1968 and 1972 led to general election defeats. In the 1968 campaign, Lane Kirkland declared that the Federation had to take charge in the presidential election to counter the right-wing challenge of George Wallace because the Democratic Party was "bankrupt intellectually and financially" [Caddy, 1974:61, requoted from Ted White, The Making of the President 1968, New York:Atheneum, 1969]. Plotkin [1977a:39] attributes McGovern's defeat in 1972 to a neglect of "the plight of labor", arguing that "[t]he Democratic commitment to...the poor and laboring classes has been its greatest power at the polls". The Party was nearly paralyzed by conflict over McGovern's candidacy. The AFL-CIO, itself deeply divided, remained aloof.

Labour leaders have long been divided over their role in presidential and party politics, including the implications of primaries for labour influence. As an exponent of the Gomperite tradition of neutrality, Meany opposed early direct COPE involvement, arguing that primaries would increase the influence of middle-class activists, since workers would be less likely to participate, while less able than others to attend caucus meetings. Others disagreed. Local labour leaders testifying to the McGovern-Fraser Commission in Michigan and Ohio felt that the closed system operating prior to 1972 had reduced labour influence. Liberal-progressive leaders from major unions such as AFSCME, the UAW and IAM, who agreed with them, argued that primaries were suited to labour's political machine. These labour leaders felt that if participation in the primaries was tantamount to an admission that

labour operated as part of the Democratic Party, this was simply an honest admission of the truth [Wilson, 1979:41-3].

During the primaries, labour's traditional goal was to elect labour delegates to the Democratic convention. Before the convention, individual unions supported the candidate of their choice; no collective commitment to any single candidate, or formal endorsement, was sought by the AFL-CIO and, as in 1976, several might be considered acceptable. This strategy is not peculiar to the Federation. In 1976, the NEA national leadership urged members simply to become involved (with various candidates); these then shifted support to Carter once his campaign proved promising [Shafer, 1988:4]. The UAW also has a similar tradition, and remarks by Doug Fraser help to clarify the nature of such labour neutrality. In 1980, Fraser stated that the UAW's *collective organizational* resources would be deployed to help Kennedy win the Pennsylvania and Michigan primaries; simultaneously, he espoused the union's policy of encouraging *members* to follow their individual preference until after the party conventions, when a meeting of some 3,100 delegates from union locals would select the nominee by secret ballot. He added: "We will not make individual decisions once the party conventions are behind us." [AFL-CIO PR, Apr.3/80:4]. Such arrangements have two main advantages. They avoid difficulties which could arise from backing a losing contender and possibly alienating the eventual victor. Within the Federation, they accommodate the differing candidate preferences of diverse affiliates at national and sub-national levels, especially when there are several contenders for the labour endorsement, thus containing tension between "mainstream" and liberal-progressive affiliates. During the 1980 nomination campaign, Kirkland reaffirmed this rationale:

> I think it's important and necessary ... because after the shouting and tumult dies it's going to be my responsibility to pull them all together in unity behind one of the candidates, and I think I can be in the best position to play that kind of a role by not being part of the division or split during the primary period... [AFL-CIO PR, Apr.29/80:3].

This formal stance does not imply inertia during the campaign at any point. Labour cannot afford to ignore the politics of the presidential selection process: a lesson drawn by labour leaders after Meany caused the virtual exclusion of the Federation from the 1972 campaign.

Differences over candidate endorsements have rarely resulted in such a rupture within the movement. Damaging conflict at the AFL-CIO leadership level is usually avoided; a

working consensus is aided by procedural provisions, formal neutrality during the primaries, and by the emphasis on labour participation as an end in itself. The national labour leadership has a variety of ways to signal support or opposition for a particular candidate to the broader membership, and coordination among labour groups occurs through local Federation councils. By 1972, however, the AFL-CIO (like the Democratic Party), was in the midst of internal transformation. Conflict partly reflected the historical cleavage between conservative craft unionism and progressive forces, but it was magnified by the emergence of a new generation of labour leaders at the Federation Executive level, with views on policy goals, problems and solutions which differed from Meany and his allies; they urged more explicit and extensive participation in the Party.[20] In 1972, tension crystallized over McGovern's nomination. Meany wielded personal influence to prevent the EXCO from endorsing McGovern;[21] despite strong opposition, 27 members voted with him and only 3 against including Jerry Wurf (AFSCME); 5 were absent.[22] Dissident labour leaders, including Floyd Smith (IAM), exerted influence independently through their unions, where some pursued, or at least sanctioned, McGovern's candidacy. McGovern was eventually endorsed by over 40 unions (not all were AFL-CIO affiliates) [Wilson, 1979:33; Caddy, 1974:83-4]. Some 16 other unions, including the Teamsters, supported Nixon [Singer, 1976a:1424]. Split-level action is a customary method of accommodating disagreement among the labour leaders but, on this occasion, conflict became publicly manifest to an unusual extent when some progressive affiliates and the UAW formed a coalition pursuing electoral activity independently; these gave formal support to McGovern. Although the Federation remained active informally "after its own fashion" [Albert], its restraint and the presence of intense activists in the Democratic selection process permitted McGovern's nomination, which led to defeat in the general election.[23]

---

[20]Similarly, a new leadership generation within the NEA contributed to its having "transformed itself ... into a highly politicized union." [Broder et al, 1980:192].

[21]McGovern had not only voted against repeal of section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, but Meany held him responsible for Party rule changes injurious to labour interests [Caddy, 1974:83, citing *National Observer*, May 5/73].

[22]The Colorado COPE was suspended for continuing to support McGovern. Delegates to the 1973 Biennial Constitutional Convention rejected the state unit's appeal, thereby reinforcing national authority.

[23]After his defeat in the election, McGovern said he wanted to help heal broad Party divisions but: "I would do whatever I could to make sure that the wreckers, like Barkan and Meany, don't come back into a dominant role in the Democratic Party." [Caddy, 1974:108, from the *NYT*, Nov.14/72]. COPE, however, endorsed McGovern for his Senate bid in 1974 [Wilson, 1979:44].

By 1974, the AFL-CIO had resumed its role in Democratic presidential politics but, at the mid-term convention in Kansas, party and labour factions clashed over the McGovern-Fraser Commission (1969-72) recommendations on party structure and delegate selection. Meany and his allies opposed delegate quotas for under-represented groups such as racial minorities, women, youth, protesting that labour representation was not high [Wilson, 1979:46]. However, the dissident unions, acting as an *ad hoc* caucus controlling possibly over half the union-linked delegates, forced a retreat from the abolition of quotas. The Meany grouping had to accept the "Strauss compromise" in the resulting Party Charter (calling for affirmative action and skirting quotas entirely) [Wilson, 1979:47-8]. As well as the UAW, UMW and NEA, the coalition of dissident unions included six Federation affiliates: the CWA, IAM, AFSCME, OCAW, the Graphics Arts International Union and the Electrical Workers. These organized more formally for the 1976 campaign as the Labor Coalition Clearinghouse (LCC), which could not unify behind any single candidate in the primaries; after Carter secured nomination, the LCC lapsed and most members rejoined Federation efforts. Nevertheless, these developments threatened the Federation's credibility, challenged Meany's stance on political/party activity and impelled greater internal acceptance of organized labour's direct role in the Party.[24]

The politics of presidential selection had undergone substantial transformation by the seventies owing to the "nationalization of presidential politics": the increased role of national government, the impact of the mass media on politics, the decline of local parties, and underlying changes in "social forces" which altered both the cast of participants and the behaviour of the electorate [Shafer, 1988]. Affluence had apparently eroded Democratic party ties forged in the 1930s, and issue concerns originating then had lost intensity, especially social-welfare policy. Employment shifted toward the service sector, the proportion of white collar workers rose: better educated, more activist, but also more independent of party and the unions. New coalitions coalesced around consumer and environmental issues, anti-war activity, and newly organized interests which, by the late 1960s, demanded greater participation within the Democratic Party.

---

[24]Wilson [1979:50] comments that in 1972, Meany was able to argue that support for McGovern would prompt a revolt by right-wing unions. Subsequently, he could not risk further alienating these liberal-progressive affiliates.

Meanwhile, nomination politics gradually shifted to the process of delegate selection, pressuring the labour leadership to exert influence earlier in the selection process. The probable nominee was apparent well before the convention, while labour found itself in an increasingly contested party environment:

> Prior to that, there was a very powerful role played by leadership in the states and cities ... a "boss system" ... There were a limited number of primaries. It was a collective bargaining relationship, in effect: the key people involved in the process would discuss with us the acceptability of various candidates. During that period, that was sufficient ... Following 1968, there were changes in the rules and all of these primaries. The entire process had changed *and with it the requirements of effective political action*. [Kirkland, 1981:20; emphasis added].

The growth of primaries multiplied the "bandwagon" effect of a strong candidate performance in the early contests (gaining media exposure and attracting further support). The candidate-based primaries dominant by 1976 attracted groups seeking electoral influence, reinforced by the participation of more independent activists with shorter-term interests and less commitment to the Party compared to traditional interests like labour, or party officials. By 1980, no delegate reached the convention by means of a party-based selection route, while senior party officials, no longer guaranteed convention places, increasingly held back from early involvement, fearing elimination through backing the wrong contender [Shafer, 1988:3]. Damaging Democratic conflicts in 1968 and 1972 spurred formal changes to the convention, but reforms aimed at increasing the participation of ordinary Democrats at the convention instead encouraged new groups of activists, predominantly middle-class and particularly effective (including the NEA). These displaced party officials, who became virtually one interest among many, while "the previously dominant interests in each party, corporate business for the Republicans and organized labour for the Democrats", were now "joined by a much wider array of organizations, especially ones built around a specific constituency or cause" [Shafer, 1988:Concl.]. Party officials treated the convention as an important springboard for the general election - its chief remaining function given the dearth of other institutional mechanisms guiding partisan choice - and they more willingly compromised to forge greater Party unity. The decline of party made coalitions more difficult to construct, less stable and of shorter duration, and convention politics changed. Increasingly, the convention became a launching pad for the campaigns of future aspirants to office and a platform for public agitation by special

interests. Although the AFL-CIO found its territory more contested, as an established Party constituency and important coalition-building force, it continued to benefit from direct representation, extensive contacts and recognition on convention decisionmaking bodies. Among the Democrats: "It was still true that no single organization ... had the breadth and persistence of an AFL-CIO" [Shafer, 1988:Concl.].

Other Party reforms sought to manage conflict with greater success. Moreover, during the 1970s, national organization was strengthened relative to traditionally independent state and local parties, gaining authority over state presidential selection procedures. A national charter formalized these changes, creating "permanent legislative, executive and judicial institutions" and organizational expansion at the DNC level [Pomper, 1977a:7 (quoted); Davis, J., 1983:257-9; Wekkin, 1984:45-6]. The Cousins vs. Wigoda case of 1975 - the notorious convention conflict over the Mayor Daley slate from Cook County - affirmed that national Party rules were generally superior to state laws [Davis, J., 1983:97]. These changes marked the "basic transformation of the Democrats into a truly national association." [Pomper, 1977a:7].

By 1976, the new Compliance Review Commission virtually eliminated credentials conflict at the convention proper and, more generally, negotiating now occurred during committee meetings preceding the convention, shifting conflict out of the limelight and facilitating compromise. Greater conflict over candidates' platform commitments increased the importance of the Platform committee [Davis, J., 1983:49-50; 97; Shafer, 1988:C]. In 1976, the 3-day pre-convention meeting of the full Platform committee helped to ensure a relatively tranquil convention [Pomper, 1977a:6], although facilitated by politics specific to 1976 rather than organizational management, as 1980 demonstrated by contrast, when organized labour actively and successfully battled the Carter forces to achieve economic policy concessions [Chapter 7].

The 1976 and 1980 elections occurred during a transitional phase in labour strategy. In 1976, Federation leaders were anxious to demonstrate that the labour movement, reunited, still packed a political punch. Since the Johnson presidency, the climate had been less favourable to the industrial and political wellbeing of organized labour. After the Nixon

and Ford years, the AFL-CIO needed a strong relationship with a Democratic president to reconsolidate influence within the national policy process. Equally: "The Democrats in 1976 were determined to win back their traditional labour support by taking on the economic policies of the Nixon and Ford administrations." [Plotkin, 1977a:39]. Carter was not, however, a Democrat in the traditional mould, but an "outsider" who succeeded by effectively exploiting opportunity in the form of a divided Democratic field and the new selection process. His campaign strengths proved liabilities in office, and his subsequent poor relations with other Democratic leaders were one factor impelling further reforms restoring higher attendance for elected officials (government and party) at the convention, partly to ensure an effective basis for a governing coalition for any Democratic president in office. Carter's relations with the AFL-CIO were disappointing, and during the first two years, the labour leadership was openly critical of presidential policy, including in Congress, where the labour lobby was an influential but beleaguered force.

AFL-CIO LEGISLATIVE STRATEGY: The Labour Lobby and the National Policy Process

Labour's national political strategy has always encompassed a legislative dimension; since its inception in 1886, the AFL-CIO has maintained a legislative committee. The Legislative department at national headquarters and the lobbyists working within Congress (and collectively termed "the labour lobby") are important instruments of coordination between the Federation, the White House and Congress. The task of the labour lobby has become more complex, and changes within Congress and the broad lobbying sector meant that labour advantages had somewhat eroded by the 1970s. During the Carter years, matters were complicated by the President's weakness in Congress and by the unusually limited degree of cooperation - for a Democratic administration - between the White House and the AFL-CIO.

THE "LOBBY BOOM" IN THE CAPITOL

The interdependent cycle of the increased scope of government, interest organization and demands[25] has meant that Federation lobbyists operate in an increasingly competitive

[25]On the post-WWII surge in lobbying, boosted initially by the growth of the military establishment, see *CQ Guide* [Spr./79:79]. The 1960s was marked by continuing civil rights activity, and waves of organization among women, youths, ethnic groupings such as blacks, issue-based groups such as consumer and environmental interests and anti-war activists. These were followed in the late 1970s, by the New Right and associated groupings, including newly important conservative groups such as Moral Majority, the National Rifle Association and fundamentalist religious groups. Business interests have also increasingly organized [*CQ Guide*, Spr./79:79; Fall/80:89].

policy environment. A study published in 1973 recorded some 8,000 organizations active in lobbying at the state and national levels, with over 1,000 in Washington alone.[26] During the last half of the 1970s, the number of corporation lobbyists rose from 8,000 to 15,000 in Washington [Wilson, 1981:78]. There has been a rapid rise in the number of "foreign agent" lobbyists (those representing overseas clients), reaching 400 in 1978 and 600 in 1979. A growing number of lobbyists (and frequently the "foreign agents") have previously held government office in senior positions within the Executive branch or as Members or senior staff in Congress [*CQ Guide*, Fall/78:113-4; Spr./79:77; Fall/80:89; Fall/81:102-3]. Exemplars of the "revolving door" phenomenon, they have "insider" knowledge and privileged access to government decisionmakers. Many of them are members of law firms and dominate one street in the Capitol, consequently known as the "K-Street Corridor". Federation lobbyists, then, compete in a more crowded lobbying sector where the balance of power has shifted against labour, especially due to the increased organization of business interests. In 1977, organized business opposition led to the surprise defeat of major labour goals in Congress. Within the labour sector, however, AFL-CIO pre-eminence is clear.

LEGISLATIVE STRATEGY: LABOUR SECTOR ORGANIZATION

During the Carter years, the Department was undergoing a significant turnover of leadership, commencing in 1978 with the retirement of director of over 20 years, Andrew Biemiller. Biemiller, a congressman before joining the AFL-CIO, had a sophisticated "insider perspective" on Congress, an intimate understanding of its rules, norms and politics, and extensive contacts. His retirement occurred amidst broader leadership turnover bringing important changes to the Federation's stance on policy and political activity [Chapter 4]. Biemiller was succeeded by his executive assistant, Ken Young. In late 1979, however, Young became executive assistant to the (new) president, Lane Kirkland. Thus, the department lost its two senior leaders in rapid succession. White House legislative aide, Bill Cable, felt that, because of Young's considerable abilities, his promotion left a vacuum at the Department at a critical time. Nevertheless, the impact of the changes was limited by the lengthy experience of the remaining lobbyists: Young's successor, senior departmental lobbyist Ray Denison, had "fifteen to twenty" years' experience as a labour lobbyist [Denison].

The AFL-CIO employs about eight fulltime lobbyists [Fisher]. Major unions generally have one or more lobbyists of their own, and other labour officials lobby at times, as a supplementary part of their work. In support of Federation positions, AFL-CIO lobbyists testify frequently at committee hearings in Congress, perhaps three or four times during any

---

[26]Jerry I. Reitman and Judith Bettelheim (Eds.); *The Directory of Registered Federal and State Lobbyists;* 1st Ed., Academic Press, 1973, cited in Sinclair [1978:1].

week; the leadership may also testify: Denison commented that he "constantly" sent Kirkland or Donaghue before Congress for such purposes. During the Carter presidency, Rudy Oswald, Research director, made frequent appearances to criticize the Administration's economic policy and anti-inflation strategy. The labour lobby is not large (relative to the AFL-CIO's size), but it is influential because of its skilled membership and coalition activity: coordination with union lobbyists and alliances with a wide array of other liberal interest groups (with recognizable core members) sharing a common agenda.

While the autonomy of affiliates remains a basic norm, labour sector decentralization is greater in industrial activity than in national policy matters, where some centralization resulted from the New Deal and from the 1955 merger [Raskin, 1963:345-350]. An increased role for the Federation has accompanied the extended role of the national government:

> Since unions have common interests in getting certain bills passed and certain candidates elected, they naturally look to the Federation for coordination and guidance. It follows that the influence of the AFL-CIO has inevitably grown as the federal government's activities have continued to expand... [Bok & Dunlop, 1970:200]

The Federation, like business counterparts, has greater access to the policy process and more of an "in" with policymakers than individual unions, which are simply too numerous [Denison]. White House aide, Landon Butler, affirmed that after breaking with the AFL-CIO in late 1978, the White House found direct relations with the unions unworkable. Denison affirmed an underlying, long-term trend towards greater recognition of, and reliance upon, the Federation's role by affiliates, although "it takes time for people on the job every day to see such changes."

The main provision for coordinating labour lobbying in Washington is the Legislative department's weekly congressional strategy meeting. Some 50 or so of the 80-100 labour lobbyists in Washington attend any one meeting [Fisher] to review the week's agenda and determine the most effective course of action and division of labour amongst the lobbyists. During the Carter presidency and the Accord negotiations, the independent UAW, Teamsters and the Union of Mineworkers regularly participated, enhancing labour sector policy coordination on issues of mutual concern. Labour lobbyists tend to specialize by policy area - their expertise and web of contacts differ; the meetings settle who will contact which congressional members on selected agenda items, and leadership may vary according to which labour group has the greatest relevant expertise. The Federation provides coordination and general leadership; when individual union lobbyists are not on assignments for their own unions, they frequently work for the Legislative department [*CQ Guide*, Spr./76:107]. When union officials at the state and/or local levels are called upon for assistance (generally through the national office of their union), state and local AFL-CIO units often act

as liaison. Major divisions on issues of broad concern to organized labour are rare but where affiliates do oppose one another (e.g. the Steelworkers and ILGWU over pension reform), coordinated lobbying is less feasible and the Federation may be forced to avoid a formal stance.

LEGISLATIVE STRATEGY: REPRESENTATION AND MOBILIZATION

Provisions for representation (including communication and which interests are permitted "voice") influence group legitimacy. The Legislative department is embedded in a communications network linked to affiliated members across the country. This network extends down through the state and local AFL-CIO units, supplementing links through union presidents on the Executive Council and coordinated legislative strategy. Through this network, the department disseminates a constant series of bulletins, "legislative alerts", and evaluations of issues and the performance of individual congressmen. Constituency pressure is thus mobilized to influence government policymakers. The department is the main such conduit between elections (when COPE predominates).

Pressure groups in the U.S. have turned increasingly to direct mail campaigns to mobilize constituency-level support for their objectives [*CQ Guide*, Fall/78:114; Fall/80:90]. For many years, the AFL-CIO benefited simply from its large membership, but its organizational edge diminished in the 1970s. New techniques were wielded more effectively by business interests and groups on the political right, such as computer-based, direct and selective targeting of potential sympathisers; frequently a pre-printed message is provided for recipients to sign and dispatch to their respective representative or senator. Common situs picketing and labour law reform attempts revealed that the new peak of grassroots mobilization reached by the AFL-CIO was still inadequate. Since 1979/80, the AFL-CIO has established "Legislative Action Committees" - viewed internally as "a major avenue forward" - to improve grassroots lobbying on a decentralized basis across the U.S. [Denison].

AGENDA FORMATION AND CHARACTER, AND COALITION LOBBYING

> What does labour want? ... We want more schoolhouses and less jails; more books and less arsenals; more learning and less vice; more constant work and less crime; more leisure and less greed; more justice and less revenge...[27]

The Federation's legislative agenda emerges from internal labour concerns and in response to the activity of external interests (including government). The president's office and/or the Executive Council determine much of the agenda and approve major items arising

---

[27]Lane Kirkland has identified this statement by Samuel Gompers as the only source from which the famed "More" as the goal of AFL-CIO activity could have originated. See the text of Kirkland's speech, reprinted in AFL-CIO [1982].

from Federation departments [Fisher; Wilson, 1979:75]. Legislative strategy is largely determined within the department, and the exigencies of day-to-day decisionmaking require that the lobbyists exercise some autonomy and discretion [*CQ Guide*, Spr./76:106]. Over the longer term, policy resolutions may be brought to the Federation's biennial convention (now supplemented by annual regional conventions); such initiatives may originate from the union or rank and file levels, but they are brought forward by the EXCO [Fisher]. The lobbyists occasionally seek a formal endorsement from the EXCO or from the convention Floor, where the importance of an issue merits specific collective endorsement.

Agenda items also emerge in response to other liberal interests such as civil rights, consumer, and church groups whose goals are sympathetic to, or allied with, Federation objectives and public interest orientation. The Federation emphasizes "its tradition of advocacy on behalf of the public interest" [Denison, AFL-CIO, 1981:VII] which, in recent decades, has notably encompassed civil rights and social policy, including "Medicare, aid to education, and the antip overty programs of the Great Society" [Butler, 1983:17], and with some success:

> No-one would dispute the contention that organized labor wins its share of arguments in Congress. Much of the civil rights and Great Society legislation of the 1960s is largely the product of its lobbying. [*CQ Guide*, Spr./76:105]

At the AFL-CIO convention in 1979, on the occasion of George Meany's retirement, the Reverend Benjamin Hooks, Executive Director of the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP) commended labour support on issues such as women's rights, the desegregation of schools and "[e]very piece of civil rights legislation in this century":

> ...the Civil Rights Act of 1957, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Fair Housing Act of 1968, and the Equal Opportunity Employment Act of 1972. None of these acts would have become law without the strong and vigorous support not only of George Meany, but of the House of organized labor." [AFL-CIO, 1979b:198].[28]

The Federation has given financial support to civil rights groups, including the NAACP [AFL-CIO Series(e), 1979:Vol.I:199]. Despite limited authority over affiliated unions, the Federation has sometimes overcome internal resistance to liberal initiatives, pressuring affiliates, for example, to eliminate racially discriminatory membership rules deriving from parochial protectionism [Wilson, 1979:72].

---

[28]Wilson [1979:70-1] describes Meany's adamance on continued Federation support for Title VII of what became the Civil Rights Act, 1964 (banning racial discrimination from the personnel policies of any government agency or company receiving federal funds), even when President Kennedy warned that the provision might obstruct passage of the bill in Congress. Evidence of the Federation's broad agenda is confirmed in the platform recommendations presented to the Democratic and Republican national conventions, and its broad legislative agenda and activity.

Organized labour has been criticized for shortcomings and parochialism concerning some liberal objectives, displaying more interest in "social issues" like anti-poverty legislation and national health insurance than in consumer and environmental issues [Greenstone, 1977:xiv; Wilson, 1979:72]. Yet such criticisms are few and partly reflect the new agenda concerns of new liberals. Union leaders (including Meany and Kirkland) have been "hawkish" on defense and foreign policy issues, particularly when union members' jobs are implicated (as in the B1 bomber issue). Such stances weaken the AFL-CIO's standing with congressional liberals and interest groups [Wilson, 1979:40] and create rifts within the labour sector, where unions such as the UAW and IAM hold more liberal views, reflecting the deeply-rooted tension originating with the craft-industrial union divide.

The pursuit of broad or longer-term objectives can be problematic for labour leaders when these conflict with, or are removed from, the more immediate or parochial concerns of rank and file members [Chapter 1]. In 1976, Ken Young (then assistant director of the Legislative Department) remarked: "We work on a broader range of issues than any group in Washington ... in fact, we probably hurt ourselves by being so broad." [*CQ Guide*, Spr./76:104]. On the other hand, labour's policy and lobbying success is best where a broader coalition is active [Ornstein & Elder, 1978:143], and success helps to legitimate an organization to its members. Notwithstanding support from coalition allies, however, during the Carter years, labour suffered defeats on major *labour* issues and could not prevent congressional support for the President's balanced budget proposals early in 1980. For an election year, the marked conflict between liberal interests and a Democratic president and candidate was singularly unpropitious.

THE AFL-CIO, PRESIDENT CARTER AND LEGISLATIVE LIAISON

Below the Executive level of the AFL-CIO, the Legislative department is the major vehicle of Federation policy contact with the executive and legislative branches of the national government. The department maintains relations with both the White House and Congress, lobbying sequentially: the White House first, as the source of most policy/legislative initiatives. Relations with the White House are strongly influenced by partisan factors, although, like the British TUC, as a peak organization with an expressly policy-political role, the AFL-CIO seeks to sustain some degree of cooperation with the Executive regardless of party control. During a Democratic presidency, labour lobby leaders meet regularly with the Office of Congressional Liaison (OCL) at the White House, whereas contact is much reduced during Republican presidencies; Denison contrasted the Johnson and Carter presidencies with the minimal contact during the Nixon, Ford and Reagan years. Yet

the character of Federation relations with the Democratic presidencies of Johnson and Carter differed considerably. In the 1960s, the AFL-CIO lobby became virtually an extension of the White House owing to President Johnson's skill and leadership, his expert congressional liaison team, their interest in working with organized labour and the nature of the Administration's policy agenda [Denison]. During Carter's presidency, relations were more arms-length, in good measure reflecting the sharply different personal relations between Meany and the two presidents, but also Carter's attitude to institutional politics and interest groups in general, and organized labour in particular. He chose not to distinguish between single-issue groups and broader segments of the organized public and asserted that he would confront any special interest, "no matter how benevolent" [quoted in Etzioni, 1980:335-6]. Between elections, however, when the voting public is less influential, presidents must construct support coalitions, especially to win passage of legislative initiatives in Congress. For a Democrat, such a coalition has typically included liberal and labour interests, minority groups and the Southern region.

For the White House, cooperation with the AFL-CIO was desirable because of the initial substantial compatibility of agenda, the competence and influence of the labour lobby and the impact of their opposition to presidential initiatives in Congress. However, the agenda and policy priorities of the Carter White House proved less compatible with labour interests than Johnson's had been and early relations were marked by legislative wrangling until the Accord negotiations prospered. The AFL-CIO was publicly highly critical of the Carter presidency even on foreign policy (including SALT II), where their positions were fairly similar [Butler], and openly opposed the energy programme, the Year I Standards, authorizations for COWPS, the real wage insurance scheme and budgetary initiatives. Viewed in isolation from the other concerns of the labour leaders, the Carter Administration was a less attractive lobbying ally for the Federation than its Democratic predecessor. The importance of these factors was heightened by the internal weaknesses of the White House, which injured the President's relations with Democrats in Congress, already strained by his campaign themes, his electoral performance in 1976, and subsequently by early policy activity and the President's personal approach.

In his 1976 election campaign, Carter's anti-bureaucracy, anti-Washington theme and promises to clean up and rationalize an inefficient and costly national government successfully tapped post-Watergate public sentiment. The impact upon those implicated by such criticism was different: congressional Democrats were often not enthusiastic about the new President. In the election, there were no "presidential coattails" to benefit congressional candidates: Carter barely defeated Ford, and Democrats in every region polled more

strongly and hence felt that any partisan obligation was owed to them by the President, not *vice versa* [Jones, 1981:241; Jacob, 1977:91]. Senator Kennedy's challenge for the Democratic nomination quickly emerged as a further concern, especially given the Senator's strength among organized labour. Moreover, Kennedy, who was on the Senate Labor committee, persistently advocated mandatory wage and price controls, while Carter and his economists resolutely opposed them. The President was anxious to escape congressional action forcing upon him authority to institute controls (as had happened to Nixon). The AFL-CIO, while opposing controls *per se*, claimed to prefer a mandatory version to the President's voluntary scheme. The Carter camp was hard-pressed to avoid labour support gelling in Kennedy's favour around this and other issues, such as the Humphrey-Hawkins full employment commitment and budgetary measures. The threat was largely averted through the National Accord process; the 1980 budget reversal by the White House jeopardised relations but the proximity of the election and the Reagan threat sustained labour support.

Carter could expect to benefit from the legacy of intense conflict between the Republican presidencies of Nixon and Ford and the Democratic-controlled legislature. Most importantly, the new Democratic leadership in Congress welcomed a president of their own Party. The reputation of these leaders rests partly on their gaining passage of a Democratic president's priority legislation; Speaker Tip O'Neill and Senate Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd were experienced, influential Party and congressional figures; O'Neill, then in his first term, made his partisanship and recognition of the President as Party leader explicit [Sinclair, 1983:114; 141], so that: "Unquestionably, a new partnership could have been forged in the 95th Congress between the president and the party leaders in Congress." [Jones, 1981:239].

In the event, relations between Carter and Congress soured quickly for a variety of reasons and he benefited little from the strong Democratic majority.[29] In the post-Watergate era, a resurgent Congress was more problematic for any president and many Democrats with experience only of a Republican presidency carried confrontational attitudes over into the Carter period [Carter, 1982:71; Baker]. Carter's difficulties stemmed equally, or more, from his attempts to introduce extensive changes in policy and structures [Cronin, 1978-79]. According to Fishel [1985:80], "the Carter organization made more concrete promises than any of its predecessors" during the campaign and in office. Some proved notably contentious: Carter's senior lobbyist for the Senate listed the energy package (Carter's top domestic priority), windfall profits tax, the Panama Canal Treaties, labour law reform and the sale of the F5 and F15 to Egypt and Saudi Arabia [Tate]. Speaker O'Neill observed that Carter

[29]In the 95th Congress, the Democrats had 61 Senators and 293 Representatives and the Republicans 38 and 142 respectively.

promised so much in his presidential campaign that the resulting legislative agenda was simply unrealistic; Carter's priorities were unclear, the House Ways and Means Committee became overloaded and the resulting procedural difficulties exacerbated matters [Ornstein, 1983:206-7; Cohen, 1978-79:44-5]. More of Carter's campaign commitments were dependent upon congressional action than was true for his predecessors, while his level of legislative success was relatively low, especially for a Democratic president.[30]

Executive-legislative politics essentially involve coalition-building. The "activist" policy strategy of the Carter White House[31] implied a tougher coalition strategy than did the "veto" strategy of presidents Nixon and Ford, but Carter could count on a Senate support base of only about 42 votes (Nixon had about 50) [Tate]. Carter disliked the bargaining endemic in coalition politics and was seen as aloof and chilly in personal encounters. Although a Southerner, his relations with Southern Democrats in the Senate were especially disappointing; Tate acknowledged that both Johnson and Nixon had greater success. The White House emphasised support within Congress and among interest groups less than had other presidencies, independently seeking the "best technical solution", or appealing directly to the public, and legislative initiatives were often launched in Congress without first securing the necessary supporting coalition [Davis, E., 1983:91; Etzioni, 1980:335-36; Cohen, 1978-79:44]. Congressional leaders pushed for greater consultation (lacking, for example, when Schlesinger developed the April 1977 energy programme); Carter later recalled that he could never satisfy this "insatiable desire for consultation" [Carter, 1982:7]. The President's standing was also injured by early blunders, including errors of protocol, the cancellation of costly water projects already substantially advanced and important to the home-state politics of congressional members, and the surprise cancellation of the President's $50 tax rebate proposal, which embarrassed congressional members from whom it had already received public support.

Carter and many chief advisers had no experience of Congress or Washington.[32] The President was criticized for bringing Georgians from his campaign with him into office, and responsibility for many errors on the Hill was attributed to the inexperience of the OCL. The OCL leader, Frank Moore, was noted for his poor performance, and Fishel [1985:95; 196]

---

[30]For example, average presidential scores for the three-year period after (first) election were: Eisenhower 82%, Kennedy 84.5%, Johnson 84%, Nixon 75% and Carter 77% [Jones, 1981:240, ft.23; also Fishel, 1985].

[31]The AFL-CIO acknowledged Carter as an "activist President" during 1977, before the economic stimulus package was abandoned [AFL-CIO Series(a), 1977:i].

[32]Carter's secretary of Health, Education & Welfare, Joseph Califano [1982:25], supports the claim that the Carter staff were largely naieve and imbued with anti-Washington ideas. For Carter's own account, providing considerable corrobation, see Carter [1982], especially the chapter: "An Outsider in Washington".

emphasizes the importance of Carter's "early mistake" in appointing the "wrong director" to the OCL. To their "outsider" status in Washington must be added the lack of an "insider" status within the White House (in contrast to the Kennedy and Johnson liaison teams), limiting the benefits of closer liaison for the Federation. The AFL-CIO found Carter's team often ill-prepared and their legislative strategy incomplete: "they failed to orchestrate their legislative packages" and "neglected the politics of procedure", such as making certain that they had effective support and leadership on the committees and the Floor, or ensuring the strategic timing of action [Denison]. Some Carter officials did have experience in previous administrations, notably under Kennedy and Johnson, while others had transferred from elsewhere in government (occasionally giving up seniority in doing so): the sub-cabinet level, at least, "was riddled with people recruited from key staff spots on the Hill."[33]

Initially, the President organized the OCL unconventionally along issue lines (despite advice to the contrary), to cater for the issue-oriented Representatives elected in 1974 and 1976, but within six months members had to be reassigned, covering the House and Senate separately [Davis, 1979:288-90]. Personnel with more experience in legislative affairs were added, notably Bill Cable in 1977 as senior liaison for the House [Jones, 1981:237; Cable]. Cable, on the Hill since 1965, had worked with the House Education and Labor Committee from mid-1970 to mid-1975 and had good relations with its members and the labour lobby. He was close to Speaker O'Neill, who influenced his appointment to the White House (marking the occasion by presenting him with a symbolic "two-way traffic" road sign) [Cable]. While Moore was rarely seen, Cable interacted daily with the House leadership [Sinclair, 1983:117; 155]. Other administration principals were despatched to address congressional Democrats "en masse" when the leadership there needed such support [Sinclair, 1983:156-7]. Carter and his liaison unit did improve their performance, but they never overcame their initial poor image and the President needed all the support he could get within Congress.

The need for close cooperation with the reputable labour lobby in congressional coalition-politics was clear - and mutual, for the Executive branch was still "the most pervasive, influential and costly of any of the pressures converging on Capitol Hill" [*CQ Guide*, Spr./79:77]. Both sides "understood the need for a coordinated strategy on the Hill...", the OCL sought to overcome the "chilled relations" between the President and the Federation, and cooperation was facilitated because many policy aims were shared: "It was sense to work together and we did." [Cable]. Both Moore's unit and the Legislative department kept "score-cards" on individual congressmen on issues of concern. The choice of issues and the

[33]Among others, Adams and Bergland (House) and, at a later stage, Muskie (Senate) gave up seniority to join Carter's team [Ornstein, 1981:376; see also Cronin, 1980:254-5].

ratings were very similar - indeed, in the high 90-percent range, provoking some criticism and prompting the President to ask wryly why the White House didn't just use the Federation's count [Cable]. Some Carter officials, however, consciously maintained their distance. Carter's senior lobbyist for the Senate, Dan Tate, sought to do so even where goals were compatible, arguing that closer relations could be detrimental to the President's congressional strategy: "You need some freedom to act, to target items that can be won, not ones predestined for defeat ... you have to be prepared to lose on some things in order to win on others." Tate insisted that he wouldn't share his vote count with any "outside" group; he might reveal his count to the Senate Majority (and sometimes the Minority) leaders, if they supported the President's position. He sought to be seen as "the President's lobbyist", not closely linked to any other interest and would not approach a Senator on an issue in the presence of an interest group lobbyist [Tate].

Liaison between the Federation lobby and the OCL was, however, formally structured and regular.[34] The OCL met every Friday (at 5.30 p.m. in Moore's office) with the AFL-CIO legislative director, one or two senior labour lobbyists and (often) one or more presidents of union affiliates (or their individual legislative directors) attending on a rotating basis, but also according to the expected agenda. These meetings were held to exchange information, but they were also strategy planning sessions. The Carter team held an internal meeting earlier each Friday afternoon with all agency and department heads. The Federation's congressional strategy sessions were on Mondays [Cable; Denison]. This sequential, comprehensive process of communication and coordination enhanced Executive and labour influence upon congressional outcomes.

The National Accord, formally encapsulating improved relations between the presidential and labour leadership, muted open AFL-CIO criticism in Congress, at least until the increasing conservatism of White House economic policy renewed conflict. The Legislative department had no role in these negotiations and the Accord was never presented as a whole in Congress, although policy components were pressed there by the labour lobby. Nevertheless, the Accord was discussed within the department, and at the frequent meetings between the lobbyists, Vice-President Mondale and other White House officials. The labour lobbyists were aware of the Accord developments and their potential significance for a second Carter term; in their view, the Accord helped to establish "the right climate" to foster labour interests and signalled to all government agencies the Administration's favourable attitudes toward organized labour. The labour lobbyists saw the Accord as a new Executive-labour

[34]However, during the Johnson years, the AFL-CIO lobby had "frequently" attended the President's daily meeting with his OCL staff [Denison]. Relations with Carter were never so close.

emphasis within the Federation's political strategy [Denison]. This shift can also be seen partly as an adaptation to changes within Congress and labour's diminished influence there.[35]

THE AFL-CIO AND POLITICS WITHIN CONGRESS

For the AFL-CIO, the Carter years contrasted strongly with the Democratic presidencies of the 1960s, not just because relations with the White House were far cooler. Broader changes in Congress were weakening labour influence upon legislative outcomes: the changing character of Democratic liberalism, the impact of decentralist reforms, the diminishing importance of the labour committees, a more competitive, professionalized lobby sector, and highly mobilized business opposition. Legislative setbacks on common situs picketing and labour law reform suggested labour's declining influence. These developments were an incentive for the AFL-CIO to improve relations with the Carter White House and cooperative relations were fostered through the National Accord process during 1979.

INTERESTS IN CONGRESS: THE SPECIAL STATUS OF THE AFL-CIO LOBBY

Interest groups are deeply enmeshed within the legislative process in the U.S. Major lobbies have traditionally gained access to decisionmaking through the powerful committee system, which dominates the legislature. In the 1970s, lobbyists benefited from reforms opening up the policy process to public scrutiny, especially provisions for open meetings and recorded votes [Schwartz & Shaw, 1976:40; Davidson, 1981:125-6]. Moreover, interest groups are a valuable resource within Congress: they offer information and expertise and contribute to coalition-building. Few groups compare to the AFL-CIO in terms of national structure, breadth of policy concerns and degree of prominence in party and policy politics; the labour lobby is acknowledged as the most sophisticated, "best-organized, most methodical group of lobbyists" on Capitol Hill.[36] Labour is noted for skilled leadership and lobbying, shares many policy goals with the Democratic congressional leadership and maintains favourable relations with major committees. Thus, "[i]n the early 1970s, organized labor, notably the AFL-CIO,

---

[35]The lobbyists didn't discuss the Accord as such explicitly, but Denison believed that the Federation was possibly influenced by such factors in entering upon the Accord process.

[36][Tate, quoted]. See Wilson [1979:59]; Ornstein & Elder [1978:131-2]; Holloway [1979:130, and sources cited]. Thesis interviews corroborated this view. In the context of tax reform, see [*CQ Guide*, Spr./76:104].

came closer than any other major national group to meeting the varied demands of modern lobbying." [Ornstein & Elder, 1978:131].

Observers suggest that party weakness in Congress creates a power vacuum then occupied by organized interests, blurring the division of labour between them. At this extreme, the policy-political role of interest groups is not simply enhanced - they act *as* party. Others argue that alternative sources of power, specifically the congressional leadership and the strong committee system, are influential countervailing forces upon members [see Zeigler, 1964:264, and citations; Katzenstein 1978:311]. The AFL-CIO is more than just a pressure group within Congress, and the labour lobby is a more clearly partisan force than many organized interests. In general, lobbyists work with a relatively consistent pool of "friendly" congressmen, avoiding identification with a single party [Zeigler, 1964:264]. Moreover, on positions held mutually with the Democratic leadership, interest groups usefully "can and do" lobby Republican members for support [Sinclair, 1983:125]. Labour issues, however, are partisan and divisive, and labour lobbyists tend to ignore Republicans.[37] Their contribution to coalition-building is among Democratic members, where they effectively supplement the Democratic whip system. Greenstone [1977:322] records: "Even on certain welfare issues in Congress, labor lobbyists rather than the formal party leaders co-ordinated the Democrats' efforts...", and Sinclair [1983:150] quotes a congressional staffer on the leadership's coalition-building strategy: "To get ————'s vote, you get Kenny Young [AFL-CIO] to call him." Indeed:

> A leadership aide indicated that the lobbyists for the AFL-CIO are highly influential...[they are] "kind of an ad-hoc but nevertheless strong part of the whole Democratic party apparatus and have been for forty years, fifty years...they can generally depend on the Democrats' support. Mainstream Democrats vote labor most of the time. [Sinclair, 1983:122-3]

Not only does labour have "a special place" with the Democratic Party in the House, but "Labor has for years functioned as a kind of informal adjunct of the Democratic leadership..." [Sinclair, 1983:122-3, quoting a "House leader"].

---

[37]Kramer confirmed that this was the case in his experience on the House labour committee. Possible exceptions are liberal Republican sympathisers (such as Richard Schweiker and Jacob Javits on the Senate Committee on Human Resources); their decline in Congress since 1980 has undoubtedly strengthened the pattern. On labour's links to Democrats within committees, see *CQ Guide* [Spr./76:111].

Relations with the congressional leadership are those most important to interest groups. The Democrats were the majority party in Congress between 1952 and 1980, providing the primary leadership level and controlling much legislative activity. While traditional Democratic Party groups "can usually assume that the party leadership shares their policy views", labour has a privileged status; relations are mutually advantageous rather than one-way affairs, as the leadership seeks support for initiatives:[38] "The relationship between the leadership and the traditional Democratic groups, especially labor, thus, is a symbiotic one." [Sinclair, 1983:122-3]. The character of such cooperation depends on the former's level of trust and view of the latter's political sophistication: "Because of their long-term working relationship with the leadership and their reputation for political expertise, the AFL-CIO lobbyists are more likely than the representatives of other groups to be taken into the leadership's confidence." [Sinclair, 1983:124]. This reputation is a product of the labour leaders' and labour lobbyists' detailed knowledge of the workings of Congress, their grasp of the tactics and strategy of getting bills through and the technical and political information they can provide to busy Representatives and Senators[39] - although even the AFL-CIO lobby may err, as on common situs picketing (see later) [Wilson, 1979:59-60; Sinclair, 1983:122-4; *CQ Guide*, Spr./79:12].

Organized labour is an established force in many congressional districts and provides substantial electoral aid to friendly incumbents, predominantly Democrats. Constituency level organization "can provide an important supplement to leadership resources in the coalition-building process. A group with strength in a member's district is often more persuasive than a leadership figure." [Sinclair, 1983:123]. Major business associations tend either to pursue a Washington-based strategy (the Business Roundtable), or to focus on lobbying at the constituency level (the Chamber of Commerce).[40] Labour's emphatic physical

---

[38]Sinclair cites the Panama Canal treaties (involving shippers and maritime unions) and the synthetic fuels legislation, where she describes a "mass" of labour lobbyists waiting at the door for Democrats and business lobbyists for Republicans (all in support of the legislation). She also mentions the AFL-CIO and the Spring 1979 Budget Resolution.

[39]Such expertise may be viewed askance. Sinclair reports a Ways and Means member on the increased influence of interest groups resulting from open mark-ups, where the room is full of interest group representatives "and they are experts, specialists. We aren't, we're general practitioners..." [Sinclair, 1983:125].

[40]Business interests have undoubtedly been strongly influential within Congress. Indeed, a study by the Ralph Nader Congress Project [Nader, 1975:137], concluded that business lobbyists were more privileged than any other, including labour. Ornstein & Elder [1978:131] suggest that labour was a more persuasive influence before the common situs and labour law reform defeats (see later).

presence *within* Congress is thought particularly effective [*CQ Guide*, Spr./76:108], however, its constituency weakness compared to business by the mid-seventies proved an important liability.

Moreover, the relative advantage of the labour lobby within Congress has gradually eroded. Changes since the mid-to-late 1960s led the Federation to resort to a defensive strategy, relying upon the character of Congress as a veto institution; Carter lobbyist, Bill Cable, dates this trend from 1969. In the mid-1960s, labour was "a major player in town", with strong Democratic Party support (including in Congress), and close relations with the president: "They didn't need or ask for much in those days, but they could get what they wanted. Things are tougher now; the dispersion of power in Congress does make things harder." [Feinstein]. Relations between the Kennedy-Johnson presidencies, which pursued social policy goals of strong interest to labour leaders, and the AFL-CIO are cited as the best example of cooperation between White House legislative liaison staff and an interest group; White House staff dealt with Southern, and labour with Northern, Democrats and information was shared with the Democratic leadership [Davis, E., 1983:88]. Relations with the Carter presidency were less close.

Democrats in Congress were less receptive by the mid-seventies. During Carter's term, the House was more liberal than the Senate, except on certain issues, such as busing and abortion [Ornstein, 1981:367; Tate; Baker]. Labour's vulnerability is greater in the Senate, where a small opposing coalition can more easily veto proposals. Labour measures in the House and Senate have frequently been thwarted by Southern Democrats, anomalous for their frequency of cross-party voting, their stance on civil rights and their economic conservatism (including anti-union attitudes). Elected from relatively safe constituencies, they have controlled a disproportionate number of key posts through seniority.[41] Major labour issues sharply divide legislators, votes are often very close and the defection of Southern Democrats frequently tilted outcomes against labour (despite a reverse, but lesser, defection by liberal Republicans).[42] By the 95th and 96th Congresses, 74% of Democrats

[41]By 1973, Southern Democrats constituted 30% of Democrats in Congress but still held 46% of full committee chairs in the House and 53% in the Senate [Davidson, 1981:106].

[42]A switch of 15 votes in the House would have defeated passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act. The 1965 attempt to repeal Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act passed the House on a vote of 221:203 (with only 18 Southern Democrats in support, and 78 opposing), but failed in the

were from the Northern and Border states and only 26% from the South [Sinclair, 1983:143], but the benefits for labour were offset by the character of "new liberals".

New liberals held a less favourable stance toward organized labour. The labour endorsement was less important to them as new issues dominated the political agenda and new sections of the community became politically active: Viet Nam and anti-war activity, environmental and consumer issues, student riots, the women's movement, and black activism. Public opinion reflected distrust of major institutions in general, and the view that unions had gained enough, if not too much, power and policy benefits. New Democrats were less interested in labour issues or assignment to the labour committees, more likely to emphasize reducing inflation than unemployment and gave less support to labour-favoured spending bills.[43] By the mid-to-late 1970s, the prevalence of "media" or "TV" politics meant that congressmen were more "entrepreneurial", using the media to enhance their careers. Given declining party influence, the rise of PACs and the lobby boom, newer Democrats proved less amenable to the influence of party and congressional leaders.[44] These changes were linked to developments in the 1970s dispersing authority more widely among Democrats in Congress,[45] while offsetting influences were more modest.[46] Taken as a whole, the outcome was a congressional environment increasingly volatile, unpredictable and fragmented [Dodd & Oppenheimer, 1985; Patterson, 1985; Ornstein, 1981; Sinclair 1983; Schwartz & Shaw, 1976:37-8; *CQ Guide*, Spr./81:40]. For organized labour, decentralization decreased reliance upon a limited set of relations with relatively powerful and sympathetic leaders, but working with

---

Senate on a vote of 45:47 (with 4 Southern Democrats supporting and 16 opposing it). In 1975, common situs picketing legislation passed the House on a vote of 229:189. It was filibustered in the Senate, where Senator Edward Kennedy succeeded in a cloture attempt, passing the Floor by a vote of 54:43, but President Ford vetoed it. A repeat attempt in 1977 failed in the House on a close vote of 205:217 (with 88 conservative Democrats voting against, including 65 Southerners) [AFL-CIO, Series(a), 1975:82-5; 1977:9-10; Ornstein & Elder, 1978:151].

[43][Cable; Denison; Ratchford; Baker; Feinstein; Geiss & Eisenbrey; Holloway, 1979:131; Wilson, 1979:39-41; 84]. A lone dissenter, former Representative Ken Kramer, considers that "media-hype" has grossly exaggerated any change [Kramer].

[44]Although candidates rely increasingly on national party support and "powerful interest groups" for financial and professional assistance. The DNC sponsors monthly sessions with party strategists and "sympathetic" interest groups, including labour, to exchange information and review individual races [Cohen, 1980:20-22].

[45]They included the enhanced authority and activity of the Steering and Policy Committee and Democratic Caucus, the decline of the seniority system and weakened power of committee chairs, increased sub-committee powers, the curtailed influence of the Ways and Means and Rules committees and the dispersion of senior appointments among Democrats.

[46]The Speaker more directly influences the Rules Committee, including appointments; also, with other Democratic Party leaders, the powerful Steering & Policy Committee. The Party whip capability has been increased and the "Speaker's Cabinet" a subcommittee with a more "forward policy orientation" is influential.

more decisionmakers is costly (in time and staff resources) and generally less manageable. Moreover, newer members were less sympathetic and a more crowded lobby sector (and

+2CenturySBK10i2-P

agenda) divided their attention [Ratchford; Ornstein & Elder, 1978:129]. In shor guarantee success.

THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM AND THE LABOUR COMMITTEES

Access is, however, a necessary component of success. The relative isolation of House and Senate committees from one another (a product of the U.S. system of checks and balances), despite jurisdictional parity, makes the communication and coordination functions of organized interests more important. House committees are the more expert in substantive matters, generally handling legislative proposals first and in greater detail. They are the primary targets for lobbyists, who can more frequently interact with Representatives directly, whereas contact inthe Senate tends to be at the staff level [*CQ Guide*, Spr./76:109]. In House committees: "proponents and opponents of legislation jockey for position - each complementing the activities of their alter egos in lobbies outside...".[47] Indeed, access is so extensive that the separation of state and society is arguably significantly blurred [Katzenstein, 1978:311]. If such a description fits any committees, amongst them would be the House Committee on Education and Labor (HLC) and the Senate Committee on Human Resources (SLC), with substantive jurisdiction over labour issues.

The Labour Committees (LCs): Ideology, Partisanship and Performance

The (comparatively) liberal character of these committees in the 1950s increased after the 1958 mid-term elections [Baker] when Congress as a whole began to liberalize. On the HLC, five new, liberal Democrats reduced the influence of the conservative coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats [Wilson, 1979:64]. The committees attracted liberal Democrats of the "New Deal" generation with views shaped by the Great Depression, including on the role of government and social legislation, often with personal knowledge of the bitter organizational struggles fought by workers in the "robber baron world" before the New Deal [Baker]. These reliably supported organized labour. While Congress experienced continuous, extensive and sometimes dramatic change, the character of the labour

[47] Representative Richard Bolling (D-Mo), *House out of Order*, quoted in *CQ Guide* [Fall/80:91]. He describes some committee tactics to ensure desired legislative outcomes, such as keeping the number of adverse witnesses down, or scheduling them strategically, between prestigious and expert "friendly" witnesses.

committees was sustained until the early eighties by stable membership and the careful selection of new Democratic appointees by the committee and Party leadership. Thus, the HLC, "overloaded as it is with liberal Democrats, is viewed by labor lobbyists as a safe harbour." [Rapoport, 1977:41].

With more "emotional" and divisive subjects (e.g. anti-poverty programmes) and a sharply divided membership, preventing formally unanimous reports, the HLC frequently clashed with the conservative Rules Committee [Baker; Malbin, 1975-6], and experienced problems at the Floor stage, where business and Republican opponents were most active[48] [Feinstein; *CQ Guide*, Spr./76:111; Ornstein & Elder, 1978:153]. In the pre-reform Congress, notably the House, members of substantive committees were treated as experts in their respective jurisdictions. Much activity involved bipartisan cooperation and, once legislative proposals emerged from the committees, passage was reasonably secure, shepherded through the procedural channels by the committee and Party leadership, they were seldom challenged on the Floor. Lobbyists concentrated upon the leadership network and committee allies: the Democrats, with all the chairs and a majority of committee seats in Congress, dominated policy development and outcomes. However, with labour and business as their interest constituencies, the LCs have been more partisan than most, with a "history of turmoil and anger, conflict and partisanship" [Baker, quoted; Ratchford; Kramer]. The Senate committee, if anything, the *less* partisan of the two [Kramer], has been a "hotbed of liberal (not just labour) issues" [Tate] - although by Carter's time, it was less liberal than the HLC, reflecting broader changes in Congress. The partisan nature of LC membership, agenda and interest constituencies explains the labour lobby's departure from bipartisan lobbying norms.[49] Such difficulties intensified in the more uncertain working environment of the post-reform Congress (including for the Carter White House [Tate]) and, by the early seventies, the strongly liberal HLC had developed a reputation for losing [*CQ Guide*, Spr./76:110-1]. That the committees operated successfully at all within an institution whose membership characteristics were increasingly divergent from theirs is attributable to their expert

---

[48]The National Right-to-Work Committee complained that initiatives opposed by labour never get attention on the HLC and hearing schedules are managed so that conservative witnesses are called at quiet periods, after the press has departed etc. [*CQ Guide*, Spr./76:110-1].

[49]Labour interacts with a few Republicans, but in a limited way: there is no "bridge-building activity" [Kramer].

leadership[50] and the support of the Democratic leadership, Speaker O'Neill, reputedly the second most important political figure in the Capitol. These were great assets for the AFL-CIO.

Leadership on the Labour Committees

During the Kennedy and Johnson presidencies, many major domestic policy programmes emerged through the LCs, especially the HLC [Ratchford]. Key committee figures during the 95th and 96th Congresses arrived there then. Carl Perkins (D-Ky), entered the House in 1948; a firm supporter of Johnson's Great Society programmes, he became HLC chairman in 1967.[51] Ranking second on the HLC, Frank Thompson Jr. (D-NJ) chaired the most important subcommittee, Labor-Management, during the Carter years. Thompson was a skilled floor manager [Denison], could "swing issues" and worked closely with organized labour [Feinstein]: indeed, he was the "perennial nemesis" of labour opponents in Congress [Ornstein & Elder, 1978:133]. Both Perkins and Thompson were "in the network" in the House, with support from the leadership. Other long-standing, influential members giving the HLC its residual "traditional Democrat" character were chief Party Whip John Brademas (D-Ind), Phillip Burton (D-Ca), William L. Clay (D-Mo), William D. Ford (D-Mich), John H. Dent (D-Pa) (until 1979) and Augustus F. Hawkins (D-Ca), who became chairman after Perkins. Perkins, Thompson, Burton and Dent are among "New Guard" leaders influencing voting blocs on labour issues (along with anti-labour Republicans Erlenborn and Ashbrook) [Rapoport, 1977:41], while Brademas is another shrewd labour ally [*CQ Guide*, Spr./76:111]. In the Senate, SLC chairman, Harrison Williams (D-NJ), who entered Congress in 1958 (rising through the seniority system), was a consistent labour advocate and experienced floor manager [Denison]. Other Democratic notables included Edward Kennedy (D-Mass), later Carter's rival for the Democratic nomination and labour support, as well as Thomas Eagleton (D-Mo), Gaylord Nelson (D-Wis) and Alan Cranston (D-Ca). Thompson and Williams were among those who lost office over the Abscam affair, an undercover

---

[50]On the decisive importance of committee leaders, see Deering & Smith [1985].

[51]Perkins retained his position through the Caucus activity of 1970/1 and the post-Watergate reforms (indeed, until the year of his death, 1984), challenged by Republican members but not by his own Party colleagues [Baker, Cable and Denison], due to his progressive attitudes [Ratchford]. On the 1974 review of chairmanships, including Perkins, see Malbin [1975-6:5].

government operation to unmask political corruption, along with the HLC's Michael "Ozzie" Myers (D-Pa) [*CQ Guide*, Fall/81:18-19; Keller, 1982:2111].

Labour benefited from skilled Senate and House leaders from the "old union tradition", especially on the Floor. They understood effective legislative strategy and the politics of coalition-building, organized skilled vote counts and repressed proposals unlikely to pass the Floor, and used their influence with powerful colleagues on major procedural and financial committees [Denison; Ratchford; Baker]. For example, during the Carter presidency, the HLC lacked a direct link (from overlapping membership) with the Appropriations Committee, which allocates programme funding and is insulated from direct interest group pressure [see Schick, 1983:297]. Perkins, however, would "lean heavily" on fellow Kentuckian Bill Natcher, a senior Democrat on Appropriations and chair of its Labor, Health, Education & Welfare subcommittee from 1979. Perkins organized strategic lobbying efforts targeting Jamie L. Whitten (D-Ms), senior-ranking Democrat and Appropriations chairman from 1979, bringing interest groups together to construct a package of selected proposals for which all then lobbied: "they often rolled Appropriations this way" [Baker].

Membership Assignments, Partisanship and Issues

Members generally seek committee assignments for which they feel an affinity or which meet their constituency interests:[52]

> ...[it is generally accepted that]...the members of the committees should almost be partisans for the legislation that goes through the committee and for the special interest groups that are affected by it. ... Biased recruitment patterns, reinforced by long-term associations with clienteles outside the workgroups yield decisions heavily pre-disposed toward the very interests under the workgroups' purview.[53]

The labour committees exhibit this tendency. A high proportion of HLC members represent states with large concentrations of union members; in 1978, 12 of the 25 committee Democrats were from just four such states: New York, Pennsylvania, California and Michigan. A few had a union background; for example, Dent had belonged to the United Rubber Workers and Michael (Ozzie) Myers had belonged to the Longshoremen. Liberal Republicans are often similarly from such states [Brownson, 1979-80; Shaffer, 1980:74].

---

[52]See Davidson [1981:101]. For a discussion of the influence of constituency, congressional norms and other factors upon members of Congress, see Dexter [1977]; Mayhew [1974].

[53]U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Committees, *Committee Organization in the House*, 93rd Congress, First Session, Vol.I/73:38; quoted in Davidson [1981:111]. Exceptions include the powerful procedural and financial committees in the House.

Democratic and Republican leaders choose their respective appointees on the basis of pro/anti-labour attitudes [Geiss/Eisenbrey; Kramer]. In the House, HLC chairman Perkins proposed Democratic candidates to the Steering & Policy Committee [Feinstein], on which the leadership is influential. Republican assignments are made by the Select Committee of the Committee on Committees, with the votes weighted by size of state population, so that Westerners often hostile toward unions may "get stuck" on the HLC, especially during their first term [Kramer]. Conservative Republicans can secure financial support for future elections by routinely voting anti-labour on the committee [Tate], whereas moderate Republicans sometimes support proposals sought by labour; for example, Goodling (R-Pa) and Jeffords (R-Vt) of the Economic Opportunities and Employment Opportunities subcommittees, respectively [Kramer]. By the mid-70s, the HLC was more polarized, with the Democratic contingent ideologically more to the left (especially with fewer Southern Democrats on the committee) and the Republicans moving to the right, a development thought to labour's advantage [*CQ Guide*, Spr./76:110-11]. However, major legislative defeats for labour ensued. Two senior, anti-labour Republicans, John M. Ashbrook (R-Ohio) and John N. Erlenborn (R-Ill), on the key Labor-Management Relations subcommittee, led the successful attack on Carter's labour law reform bill (see later).[54]

On the SLC, which reflected a similar pattern, Orrin G. Hatch (R-Utah) and Paul Laxalt (R-Nev) were notably conservative, anti-labour influences, but liberal Republicans Jacob K. Javits (R-NY) and Richard S. Schweiker (R-Pa) helped to defeat anti-labour legislation and moderates Robert Taft, Jr. (R-Ohio), J. Glenn Beall (R-Md) and Robert Stafford (R-Vt) occasionally accepted labour positions. The influence of sympathetic Republicans on the committee (in contrast to the HLC) helped make the SLC a favourable and more stable ally for labour [Ornstein & Elder, 1978:133; *CQ Guide*, Spr./76:111; Wilson, 1979:64].[55] A liberal-conservative stalemate on the SLC by the early 1970s caused difficulties for the labour lobby, but matters worsened with the addition of one member from each party, both of

---

[54]Ashbrook was active throughout the 1970s in attempts to weaken the NLRB and labour law reform proposals. In 1979, he became the ranking Republican member on the HLC, sitting ex-officio on its subcommittees (he and Erlenborn had both been on the Labor Standards subcommittee) [Brownson, 1979-80; see also Rapoport, 1977:41].

[55]Both were members of the Labor subcommittee [Brownson, 1979-80]. Schweiker's ADA rating dropped sharply from 1977-8, after Reagan selected him as his vice-presidential running mate [Shaffer, 1980:336-7].

conservative outlook. The ideological balance tilted right and led, for example, to diminished support for programme funding: where there had been 38-42 "certain" labour votes on government spending issues, by 1976, there were fewer than 30 [*CQ Guide*, Spr./76:104; Shaffer, 1980:65; Goldberg].

Partisanship, however, varies with the issue involved and much activity on the committees is routine and uncontentious; apart from the leaders, HLC members generally specialize in either education or labour [Geiss/Eisenbrey; Ratchford; Karamanos].[56] There has been little bipartisan cooperation on labour matters apart from pensions (ERISA), where consensus was limited, with strong disagreement over multi-employer plan funding [Kramer]. Generally both labour and business (except the Chamber of Commerce) gave support [Baker]. Even on education, partisanship is stronger than on most committees [Kramer], especially where spending or an increased federal role in programmes arises.[57]

The committees' major concern during (and after) the National Accord became the defense of programmes threatened by balanced budget activity. Budget cuts divide most Democrats from Republicans and "rancorous" debate and activity resulted within the LCs, even on the education side, as senior members were expected to dismantle or reduce the Great Society programmes they had crafted [Cable; Feinstein; Ratchford]. While Carter's budget reversal and proposed cuts early in 1980 injured relations with the AFL-CIO and jeopardized the Accord [Chapter 6], institutional fragmentation within Congress permitted the labour lobby to mount a defensive strategy at the committee level. While the White House conducted intensive consultations with senior congressional members from both parties, the HLC, ignoring Carter's budget, sent its "normal" proposals to the Budget Committee [Cable]. Despite the first ever use of the Budget Act reconciliation provisions to force through expenditure cuts, notably on CETA funding [Ratchford], little impact on the spending activity of substantive committees generally resulted.

---

[56]The Bolling Committee proposed a separate labour committee. Biemiller (AFL-CIO), supported the plan and was incensed by its withdrawal to secure other changes. Bolling attributed his defeat on broader jurisdictional reforms to labour opposition (from affiliates rather than the labour lobby). Some labour interests feared too many liberals would be lost from the labour committee, and that it would be sharply divided. The Bolling proposals failed largely because they threatened members' "turf", including major labour allies like Perkins and Thompson, who opposed the proposals. [*CQ Guide*, Spr./76:106; Denison; Cable; Wilson, 1979:77-8].

[57]On the particularly partisan and ideological nature of redistributive issues in Congress, see Kraemer et al. [1978:327]. More generally, see Loewenberg & Patterson [1979:218].

The Decline of the Labour Committees and Legislative Defeat

Despite the "extraordinary" stability of LC membership until the 1980s [Baker], their composition and attractiveness to members began to alter earlier. By the 96th Congress, they were already amongst the most unpopular committee assignments for newer members. On the HLC, members had previously moved for reasons of retirement or promotion, to a senior committee such as Appropriations or elsewhere: to run for the Senate (Jim O'Hara) or a governorship (Hugh Carey became Governor of New York). The number of vacancies now rose and it became increasingly difficult to fill them [Ratchford; Feinstein; Geiss/Eisenbrey]. The Democratic leadership had actively to recruit members and even to push unwilling recruits onto the committee [Ratchford],[58] especially as public criticism of organized labour reduced the likelihood of gaining constituency approval or general PAC funding from such assignments [Denison]. A trend toward temporary assignments emerged (allowing more committee assignments than usual to be held), although some members then stayed [Feinstein]. According to Kramer, reluctant HLC Republicans fell into two categories: new members without the "pull" to gain preferred assignments on other committees, who tended to transfer off as soon as possible, and those interested in the education side of the committee who also get assigned to the labour side. Overall, LC membership shifted towards less enthusiastic, less experienced individuals, making the task of the leadership and the labour lobby more difficult.[59]

The committees were less attractive partly because they focused on more routine matters: the amendment and administration of established programmes and reauthorizations, and on the less contentious education side [Baker; Cable; Denison]. Some members found this agenda sufficiently demanding in the context of a generally increased workload in Congress, and less partisan conflict a welcome respite [Denison]. The political agenda shifted elsewhere: energy, taxation, foreign policy, trade, and even the critical action on budgetary matters, were handled by other committees. Moreover, while pro-labour

---

[58]Ratchford sought an HLC assignment when he entered the House in 1979, but subsequently he found the committee demoralized and relatively inactive.

[59]Inexperience was a wider problem by the Carter years. For example, the leadership had to pull what became the 1977 Hatch Act temporarily when it became apparent that inexperienced Democrats were likely to vote inappropriately, misreading its implications [Sinclair, 1983:167; Malbin, 1977b:38-9].

initiatives and major programmes could still be managed within the committees [Feinstein; Denison], they reached a stand-off relative to Congress as a whole, especially after Democratic losses in the mid-term elections: support could not be mustered to pass major labour proposals, but opponents were unable to undermine existing provisions (for example, the Davis-Bacon Act). The labour committees resorted to a defensive strategy. The House and Senate remained "reasonable" operating environments [Karamanos], and organized labour could "still pull things off" in the former (where the HLC leaders faced "no severe institutional obstacles" to the passage of proposals), but success in the Senate was less likely [Kramer].

A further source of the committees' altered prestige were major legislative defeats. In 1977, a renewed attempt to pass common situs picketing (CSP) legislation produced a major conflict between labour and big business. A bill had passed Congress during the Ford presidency (Ford vetoed it), the new version was substantially similar, and it was expected to pass without much difficulty. President Carter agreed to support the measure, although he was less supportive than his Democratic predecessors and did not press actively for its passage [Ornstein & Elder, 1978:124; 128-30]. Labour wished to pursue CSP before other major agenda items, in part because it was expected to be so straightforward, but also because it was then internally divisive.[60] The ensuing defeat in the House "was a real shocker" [Feinstein]; labour had taken passage of the bill too much for granted. A second blow to the AFL-CIO resulted from the inaccuracy of its own (positive) vote count. The Democratic whips' count indicated failure, yet the leadership failed to pull the bill from the calendar due to pressure from labour: an ironic compliment to the labour lobby's credibility.[61]

The scheduling of legislative initiatives is important to their success; the fact that the common situs defeat preceded labour law reform may well have encouraged opponents. Labour law reform became possibly the most controversial and influential defeat for organized labour and LC Democrats in a period representing a congressional watershed; one source described it as the "absolute test" of labour support in Congress [*CQ Guide*, Spr./78:106].

---

[60]The AFL-CIO Building & Construction Trades Department, and its (then) 17 national craft affiliates were strong proponents (along with the Teamsters) and led lobbying efforts. CSP was supported by the AFL-CIO as a whole, though greater priority was given to the repeal of Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act. After the 1976 election, the AFL-CIO had a "long list" of labour law reforms and left CSP efforts to six or seven Building Trades legislative representatives [Ornstein & Elder, 1978:148; Wilson, 1979:51-2; Sinclair, 1983:124; *CQ Guide*, Spr./79:12; AFL-CIO Series(a), 1975:84-5; Feinstein; Denison]

[61]Sinclair [1983:124] states that interest group vote counts are generally not as reliable as member-to-member counts; however, CSP is the only recent error identified on the AFL-CIO's part. The labour lobby's results are regarded generally as reliable. See *CQ Guide* [Spr./79:12].

The relative status of competing interests contesting legislative outcomes derives partly from their previous record on significant issues in Congress. Along with failures on common situs picketing and consumer protection agency proposals, the labour law reform defeat was seen to signal labour's diminished power [*CQ Guide*, Spr./78:106; Ratchford]. Afterwards, the impact of the labour committees declined and labour was weaker - in Congress and in "balance of power" interest group politics. Ironically, the defeat was arguably not due to labour's diminished influence within Congress, yet its psychological impact, in conjunction with longer-term changes in Congress, made it a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Labour Law Reform: Labour and Executive Lobbying

The labour law reform attempt was a landmark in capital-labour relations in the U.S., illustrating the political and legislative dimension of rising conflict in industrial relations. Major labour issues are ideological and polarizing to a rare degree, producing stereotypical, "emotional rather than rational" behaviour in Congress [Cable], but the reform proposals were especially divisive. Although of limited substance, they were seen by business to alter the balance of power within labour relations, as the assertion of labour's policy and political power, and as its affirmation by government: specifically White House support for reform represented a payoff after the 1976 presidential election to an important Democratic constituency (labour), and an indication of labour's future priority [Feinstein]. Hence, the reform issue had greater symbolic importance than substantive content.

Defeat was a severe blow to the Federation. As "favourite sons" on the issue [Feinstein], organized labour was widely expected to succeed and, in contrast to the National Accord, an almost exclusively leadership agreement with the White House, the Federation's congressional strategy included vigourous efforts at coalition-building and constituency level mobilization. The issue provides insight into: the legislative strategy of the Carter White House; President Carter's personal approach to the bargaining and compromise central to executive-congressional relations; and White House attitudes toward labour issues and organized labour, testifying to their shared agenda but differing priorities.

Coalition-building is endemic to American national policymaking. Business lobbying coalitions typically include the Business Roundtable, NAM, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, National Federation of Independent Businessmen and the Washington representatives of corporations and trade associations. These groups, under the auspices of the Associated General Contractors of America (AGC), established the National Action Committee Against the Secondary Boycott (involving some forty groups) to oppose CSP in an unprecedented

grassroots lobbying effort targeting "swing" votes in the House.[62] Labour law reform similarly provoked a large alliance, the National Committee on Labor and Management Relations [*CQ Guide*, Spr./78:104]. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, National Association of Manufacturers and National Right-to-Work Committee organized a "multi-million dollar campaign against reform" [AFL-CIO Series(a), 1977:2]. Business solidarity was remarkable, overcoming customary small/big business divisions. Small (and medium) businesses most actively opposed the reforms but, despite the efforts of labour and the Administration, no major corporate interest or trade association could be persuaded to express support, even highly unionized firms, such as General Motors and Chrysler, with little to lose [Dunlop; Feinstein; Schultze]. The cleavage between corporate and labour leaders was unusually sharp, seriously disrupting the Labor-Management Group despite attempts to evade the reform issue at its regular meetings [Dunlop].

The AFL-CIO EXCO had decided in February 1977 to make labour law reform the centrepiece of its legislative programme. Special provisions were made for effective management and to mobilize broad support. A special legislative strategy group, the Task Force on Labor Law Reform, coordinated labour's legislative agenda and the key reform issue. The group produced an information package and other materials arguing the case for labour law reform, repeal of Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, a fair minimum wage and other matters. These were widely distributed to members of Congress, unionists, church, consumer, educational, civic and other groups, and the general public; film, TV and radio presentations were made. The Task Force organized coalitions of other interest groups to support reform, including "Americans for Justice on the Job", chaired by Senator Hubert Humphrey and involving religious groups, women's organizations, lawyers, athletes, "fair-minded" employers and others.

Previous rank and file inertia in the constituencies had injured labour influence in Congress, and this striking level of organized activity, especially the AFL-CIO's large-scale use of technological and organizational resources to mobilize unionists, was a substantial achievement. A planning meeting in Washington, D.C., provided for the systematic distribution of information and comprehensive contact at the constituency level through state and central AFL-CIO units, with "several hundred-thousand" union members provided with pre-printed postcards to send to the President and their members of Congress [AFL-CIO 1979a:126-7]. Nevertheless, many rank and file unionists failed to recognize how the reform issue affected them. Congressmen in some areas were clearly influenced by labour's

---

[62]The National Right-to-Work Committee was particularly active. For details of the 1975 and 1977 attempts, especially grassroots activity see Ornstein & Elder [1978:125; 148].

campaign, though not all. The majority of Senators, including some Republicans, remained "lined-up" behind labour's position even in "shaky" states such as Tennessee, often under difficult circumstances [Denison]. As on CSP and the Consumer Protection Agency proposals, however, the anti-union lobby more effectively mobilized support [Ratchford; Denison; Carp; Tate; Baker; Ornstein & Elder, 1978:147-50; *CQ Guide*, Fall/78:112].

The Executive Branch sent the reform bill to Congress in mid-July 1977. As customary, it was introduced first in the House, through the Education and Labor Committee, and managed by Frank Thompson. The bill sought in essence prompter union representation elections and NLRB decisions and a "necessary strengthening" of the NLRB [Feinstein], but no major substantive changes were proposed and many objectives could probably have been achieved within the existing legislative framework [Baker].[63] Attempts to weaken the bill were led by Ashbrook and Erlenborn, co-sponsors of alternative legislation supported by the National Committee on Labor and Management Relations, which considerably extended proposals from a study conducted in 1975 under the auspices of the Business Roundtable. They included an employee "bill of rights" (which tend to weaken union power) and prohibited union contributions to state and local elections and the use of the union-dues check-off for political contributions. The Democrats successfully blocked these attempts: for example, the Rules Committee required amendments to be "germane" to the substance of the bill, and Richard Bolling (D-Mo) successfully introduced a motion ending debate on the Rule, thereby preventing its alteration. The bill passed the House easily, with only minor changes, on a vote of 257:163. Baker ascribed this success to the effective efforts of the labour lobby, the moral and logical strength of the reform argument and the limited substance of the bill. Numerically, as the vote revealed, success in the House was possible because of Democratic strength, making a majority feasible despite determined Republican opposition and the defection of 59 Democrats (many Southerners) from the party leadership line [AFL-CIO Series(a), 1977:2; 4-5; 9-10; 1979a;128; *CQ Guide*, Spr./78:105-6].

Passage of the bill prompted the "most concerted business lobbying campaign ever launched" and "the most bitter filibustering and propoganda blitz ever seen in Congress..." [AFL-CIO Series(d), Oct.31/78, Series(a), 1978:5]. The Senate, where reform politics were delayed until Congress reconvened in January 1978, became the primary target of the pro/anti-reform lobbies. For the SLC, labour law reform was "the major memorable agenda item" during the Carter presidency [Tate]. Business efforts included a "multi-million dollar national

---

[63]The bill increased the Board's membership from five to seven, streamlined procedures and made decisions self-enforcing. For details, see AFL-CIO [Series(a), 1977:1-2; 1978:1-2]. Appointments to the Board made by Nixon and Ford and more general changes, especially growing anti-union sentiment, underlay problems in the Board's performance [Baker].

media campaign", a $100,000 economic study, opinion polling (according to the Federation, the questions were biased), and a massive computer-based mail bombardment involving millions of recipients [AFL-CIO, 1979a:128]. The AFL-CIO's own economic analysis claimed that the bill would have no inflationary or otherwise adverse effect on the economy; labour held rallies in Washington D.C. and key states, featuring what the AFL-CIO [1979a:128-9] described as "a parade of American workers victimized by the shortcomings of the law" and over 2 million pieces of mail in the "heaviest outpouring of mail in labor's history", while union delegations and allied groups lobbied Senators in their constituencies and in Congress.

White House lobbying is more intense in the Senate, where the smaller membership makes it easier to monitor individual vote intentions, target efforts at persuasion and negotiate a limited number of deals which can realistically be expected to affect outcomes. The bill introduced by SLC chairman Williams included modifications which weakened the proposals in order to gain support from moderate Senators for cloture attempts and Floor action [AFL-CIO 1979a:127-9; Series(a), 1978:1-2]. The AFL-CIO [1979a:129] recorded that by February lst "the entire lobbying effort had narrowed to a handful of uncommitted Senators.". Early cloture attempts failed as expected, but by March the Federation concluded that its own "hard count" (reliable support for the final attempt upon the filibuster) included the necessary sixty-plus Senators. The Federation, Senate leaders and the bill managers agreed that cloture could be achieved with a slight margin and a "painstaking recheck was then made as to the specific circumstances in which each Senator's cloture commitment would be made." [AFL-CIO 1979a:129]. Crucially, further action was deferred until mid-May, since the President wished to press forward with his own agenda and the reform issue was highly conflictual; the Panama Canal Treaty (PCT) was then brought with difficulty to successful passage.

Reform politics in the Senate then centred upon a Republican filibuster, lasting from mid-May until late June 1978, and Democratic cloture efforts led by Senate majority leader, Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va). Initial cloture attempts on June 7th and 8th failed (again, as expected), but the Democrats defeated attempts to have the bill recommitted. To increase the possibility of cloture and avert amendment, Byrd removed several provisions unacceptable to business. However, three conservative Republicans, Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) of the SLC, John Tower (R-Tex) and Richard Lugar (R-Ind) introduced almost 1,000 amendments to stall the bill should cloture succeed. Three cloture motions between June 13-15 produced rising support, twice securing a tantalizing 58 votes [AFL-CIO Series(a), 1978:3-4; 1979a:129-130].

After further efforts to negotiate compromises with Senators previously indicating support to the Carter Administration, Federation or congressional leaders, but who had not voted accordingly, it was concluded in meetings involving the White House, Byrd, the bill managers and the Senators in question, that cloture could be achieved; the Federation later stated that these Senators had displayed no "genuine interest". The major attempt was scheduled for June 22 but, late on June 21, one Senator withdrew support; consequently a second Senator (providing the 61st vote) was released from his commitment.[64] The cloture attempt proceeded as a mere formality, resulting in a vote of 53:44. The bill was withdrawn and sent back to the SLC after passage of a "preferential motion" so that it could be brought directly back to the Floor if further hearings, re-drafting and bargaining made success likely. No acceptable compromise was reached by the end of the 95th Congress; by the 96th, the Democrats' numerical strength was lower and the climate in both the House and Senate less favourable [AFL-CIO, 1979a:130-2; Series(a) 1978:4-5; Baker].

Organized labour was sceptical about the extent of White House efforts in the Senate: the President and his congressional liaison team (remarked for their poor performance in Congress) had, after all, succeeded with the difficult PCT. However, the White House political liaison unit oversaw the issue from the beginning, indicating its priority and expected difficulty. As a former Senator, Vice-president Mondale provided informal but experienced leadership and met regularly with the AFL-CIO lobby (including Denison) [Denison]. Congressional liaison for both PCT and labour law reform (LLR) was led by Robert Thompson, Special Assistant for Congressional Liaison in the Senate [Tate]. Moreover, the delay was partly attributable to the fact that the SLC chairman, Harrison Williams, "dillied and dallied", possibly because of advice from an anti-union staff aide (who subsequently moved to Wall Street) and for personal (electoral and other) reasons [Baker].

Ultimately, however, the decision about priorities was the President's to make. The higher scheduling priority on PCT and the four, rancorous months of Senate debate on it, undoubtedly injured the reform outcome [Baker; Feinstein; Denison]. LLR had reached the White House agenda through organized labour, not directly because of interest on the part of the President or his officials [Feinstein]. Expressing uncertainty about Carter's personal commitment, Denison concluded that it was hard to say whether Carter and his staff could have done more to secure the reforms. Baker felt that the Carter team displayed little interest in LLR, and that the President personally could have done more to persuade Senators to support the bill, failing to exploit his patronage resources as President, whereas:

---

[64]Cloture support was obviously difficult for the second Senator and, with the withdrawal of the other's vote, it became pointless for him to draw criticism from anti-reform interests himself.

"[President] Johnson would dole out a bridge or a dam, or cancel one, to get the key votes he needed." [Baker]. Baker, indeed, argued that the White House "ignored Congress, except as something to do what the Executive wanted" - implying a failure to recognize and respond to institutional politics and store up credit.[65] Denison concurred that the President possibly lacked zeal on the issue, thus failing to secure "swing" votes and influence selected Senators (as Reagan later would), remarking that Carter was probably just not the zealous type.

However, the President and White House had lobbied Senators vigourously over PCT, although those persuaded to support the Treaty despite personal political difficulty could not then be pressed on LLR: they could not afford to cast two such unpopular votes in a single Session. For example, minority leader Howard Baker's delinquency on LLR was understood because he had taken a great deal of pressure when supporting the Treaty [Feinstein]. While Carter is known to have disliked bargaining, he did seek the support of likely Senators for LLR by telephone and in person and was kept constantly informed of developments by Frank Moore and Bob Thompson, working from the Vice-Presidential office in Congress: "strenuous efforts were made, despite the outcome" [Tate]. Cable and Tate both argue convincingly that the PCT and LLR issues were different in terms of senatorial politics and coalition-building. Tate argued that LLR was unpropitious in terms of presidential strategy; Carter had "no arrows in his quiver" on LLR: he could not claim it was "vital to the presidency", of over-riding national importance or essential to his foreign policy. In the Senate (and House), vote-coalitions often cross party lines since the liberal and conservative wings of each party are not cohesive (both Chambers are sometimes described as four-party). On PCT, the Democrats voted cohesively and some Republicans voted with them. In contrast, LLR was a classic case of the deep division major labour issues produce among Democrats. LLR strongly affected Senators' home-state interests in a way that the PCT did not; it was "extraordinarily difficult" for Southern Democrats, many of whom are from right-to-work states where organized labour is a weak constituency force compared to business [Tate]. Tate commented: "even in Carter's home state of Georgia, business rules supreme" and suggested that LLR was a "lick-log" issue where Senators' electoral interests helped anti-reform interests. Moreover, grassroots pressure stemming from pro-reform interests (such as local union presidents), may have failed to deter anti-reform Senators confident that labour had no alternative but to support their re-election bids: alternative candidates would never support labour programmes in Congress and they had [Tate]. Thus, while liberal Democrats supported the cloture attempts, few Southern Democrats (and virtually no

[65]The President neglected leisure-activity patronage, such as invitations to functions at the White House, or the use of the presidential box at the Kennedy Center, to influence Members of Congress, far less key congressional staffers (such as Baker).

Republicans) did so. George Meany later commented that the Administration had strongly supported the reform attempt, but "were not effective":

> ...in the final analysis, they didn't have the punch over on Capitol Hill to get us the votes. For instance, in the Southeastern part of the country where Carter won practically every state, we got practically no votes. In his own state, for instance, the two Senators in the State of Georgia --President Carter's home state -- they were consistently against it. [AFL-CIO PR, Feb.23/79].

Carter's narrow victory in 1976 had rested upon support in the South, which he could not afford to alienate over an unpopular issue - and not his priority. Tate also regarded the issue as "a tough proposition" because a support base among Senators of two-thirds is needed, but one-third had already sponsored an opposing motion. Tate commented: "My instincts tell me that this was one of those issues on which the vote would always be one short." That is, among concerned Senators, when one was successfully pressured to vote for reform, another would withdraw support to sustain the aggregate outcome. Congressional politics, then, were also unfavourable to passage of the bill.

The Carter presidency was clearly not pro-business, nor anti-labour, but neither was it actively pro-labour or urgent on its behalf (especially given unfriendly relations between Carter and Meany). Carter's campaign commitment ensured LLR some priority, as shown by the early consideration given to it by the Administration [Cable]. Organized labour is a key Democratic constituency: the White House felt it must not only work hard on LLR but be *seen* to do so [Cable]; observers corroborated that they did so [Feinstein]. However, LLR was a weaker issue in Party terms than, for example, National Health Insurance, which had broader support within the Party, notably from Edward Kennedy [Carp], and LLR was naturally of less concern than presidential priorities such as the Panama Canal Treaty. If the expectation of labour success was mistaken, it was perhaps in the assumption that the Carter White House could, and would, achieve a legislative victory given liaison problems within Congress in 1977, the divisive nature of the issue and the legislative agenda. Tate complained that whereas Carter was blamed for being a vote short on the issue, only the Administration's effort and determination brought matters so dramatically close to success; had the tiny margin been positive, there would have been "thunderous applause" [Tate]. However, the outcome reveals that President Carter either demonstrated a limited sense of long-term coalition building, or chose not to accept the compulsions of institutional politics. This outlook permeated his relations with other Democrats and damaged his re-election prospects.

There remains the matter of effective labour lobbying. Reflecting confidence in the wake of the 1976 elections, the LLR proposals (like CSP) involved a *positive* attempt by

organized labour to influence policy outcomes, rather than typifying the defensive "veto" strategy characterizing much activity within Congress. On both measures, however, labour efforts to secure passage have been criticized,[66] and both Cable and Tate raised questions in this regard. Cable agreed that Carter did not relish congressional bargaining, but suggested that the White House would have approached any additional Senators proposed by the AFL-CIO; assuming any "deals" considered were acceptable, special efforts to obtain their support would have followed: to do so is merely general practice. By implication, then, Cable felt that the AFL-CIO failed to do all it could. Equally, Tate cited as an example Senator Dale Bumpers (also Russell Long) upon whom labour should have demonstrated stronger influence. Bumpers, who "might be called a populist", is from Arkansas where labour is fairly strong, yet he voted against reform [Tate]. Responsibility could not, then, simply be attributed to the White House. The AFL-CIO acknowledged its own shortcomings [Ornstein & Elder, 1978:125]. Moreover, unprecedented efforts to overcome labour limitations in constituency-based lobbying were surpassed by business opposition, and labour's weakness in the constituencies was critical to the defeat, as was the limited commitment of the White House.

However, the LLR defeat was not the symptom of labour's diminished influence within Congress it was taken to be. The bill was successfully managed through the labour committees in both chambers and passed the House with a substantial margin (257:163). In the Senate, the filibuster was lost by only one vote through the eleventh-hour retraction of a single Senator's support. Support for cloture actually increased over time, whereas it more typically declines [Denison] and, as only about one-third of Senators could normally have been expected to support cloture, the votes achieved were actually *high* [Tate]. Had cloture succeeded, there was a majority in support of the legislation itself [Denison; Tate; AFL-CIO 1979a:126-7]. In one sense, this was a procedural, rather than a substantive defeat, testifying to the effectiveness of minority-coalition politics in the Senate. The reform lobby, including the White House, the labour committees and congressional leadership and the AFL-CIO, achieved a great deal. Yet the consequences of defeat may have been more profound than the causes.

Although the AFL-CIO planned to renew the reform attempt in 1979 [Flanagan, 1980:42], no action was taken. There was no reference to the labour law reform in the Accord. The Federation and the White House recognized the decreasing possibility of

---

[66]Significantly, Speaker O'Neill criticized labour for not working hard enough on CSP; the labour lobby had incorrectly insisted there was a (House) majority in favour, failed to lobby some members and under-estimated the intensity of opposition [Ornstein & Elder, 1978:124; 152].

success, especially after Democratic losses in the 1978 mid-term elections, and the "national interest" emphasis of the Accord was not compatible with the controversial, labour-specific reform issue. Labour's advantages eroded within Congress, including as the labour committees became more marginal, representing a diminished, though still important, resource for labour as channels of influence within the national policy process. The AFL-CIO therefore had more reason to bolster relations with the White House. The National Accord negotiations were a remarkable attempt to restore order to the House of Labor in national policymaking.

CHAPTER 4

POLITICS AND POLICY: PRESIDENT CARTER AND THE AFL-CIO
Presidential Leadership, Organization and Policy Consultation

> To find a Democratic President as ideologically conservative as Jimmy Carter, you have to go back nearly a century to Grover Cleveland. [Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., quoted in Bonafede, 1979:1237].

President Carter, a self-labelled fiscal conservative [Carter, 1982:74] with a strong social conscience, had advocated a balanced budget and rejected wage and price controls prior to his election. Although traditional liberal elements within the Democratic Party, including organized labour, had influenced Carter's policy commitments (as they would in the 1980 campaign), Carter believed in the independence of government policymaking from "special interests" of any kind; he disliked policy bargaining and took a technocratic approach to problem-solving. His outlook complicated his relations with Congress and more generally hindered him in building coalitions to support his policies. Accordingly, despite the expectation of reciprocity between organized labour and the Democrats, there was initially unusually limited cooperation between the Carter White House and the AFL-CIO. Still, favourable economic conditions permitted the President to pursue a mildly expansionary economic programme until mid-late 1978, when economic performance deteriorated. Then, with an unemployment level more favourable than projected (at around 6%), higher inflation[1] and the sharp fall of the dollar on foreign exchange markets [Samuelson, 1978:1932; Califano, 1982:405], a reappraisal by the White House altered the relative weighting of economic objectives. Two strands of economic policy emerged: a voluntary incomes policy, and a retrenchment strategy which (given a sluggish economy) meant the deferral of employment targets under the Humphrey-Hawkins Act, as Carter's campaign commitments to full employment and a balanced budget proved increasingly incompatible. Intense disagreement with labour ensued.

We examine the Carter Administration's decision-making process and the interplay of decisionmakers, institutions and events underlying the subsequent emergence and character of the National Accord. Relations with the labour leadership were influenced by the contending views of Carter's policy principals on institutional politics, economic

[1] For the year ending December 1978, the CPI had increased to 9% (2% above the 1977 rate); the annual rate by mid-1978 was 10.8% [COWPS, 1979b:7271; Ranney, 1981:26].

management and priorities, and policy-political concerns, which often resolved into tension between economic goals versus the imperatives of political strategy and explained the AFL-CIO's variable influence in economic policy. Institutional fragmentation within the Administration, the need to improve policy coordination and strategic planning and the approaching 1980 election, impelled the White House to undertake the Accord, which provided a policy "umbrella" for the White House (and the AFL-CIO; see Chapter 5). The Accord process muted AFL-CIO criticism of, and outright opposition to, presidential policy, including budgetary measures. Beyond White House expectations, the AFL-CIO endorsed the energy package and SALT II. Moreover, whereas the AFL-CIO had repeatedly (disingenuously) urged that any controls should be mandatory and comprehensive, the Accord induced an important public shift in the labour leaders' stance. In turn, whereas consultation was lacking on Year I, negotiations on the second year of the pay programme (and broader policies) enabled the AFL-CIO to ensure a significantly modified pay standard. Within the Administration and the AFL-CIO, this process of consultation was seen as a desirable model for executive-labour relations which was expected to flourish during Carter's second term in office. However, while labour influence in the pay policy became substantial and a number of specific policy goals were achieved, the White House continued to frame fiscal/monetary policy with little consultation and few concessions, and disagreement intensified, especially in the wake of the OPEC price increases early in 1979 and the Iranian revolution late in the year. Economic management, including wage/price controls, would undoubtedly have been a high priority during a second Carter term, but the prospects for cooperation diminished. Accordingly, towards the end of Carter's term, joint discussions shifted to the most promising area for sustaining cooperation, namely reindustrialization policy. Cooperation hinged also upon the value of the consultative process to the Federation. For Kirkland,[2] these longer term aspects were of great importance.

[2]Elected AFL-CIO president in late 1979, Kirkland acted in that capacity much earlier as George Meany's health declined.

CARTER'S INSTITUTIONAL STRATEGY AND RELATIONS WITH ORGANIZED LABOUR

STRUCTURE AND AUTHORITY: THE CARTER CABINET AND WHITE HOUSE

In common with other Western democracies, the Executive branch in the U.S. is today regarded as the chief initiator of national policy. Structural fragmentation makes national policymaking complex and recent analyses stress the "illusion of presidential government" and inherent limitations on the power of the office, concluding that the power of the president is large in reserve but not in action [Helmer, 1981:46; Heclo, 1981:13]: the "power to persuade" rather than to command [Neustadt, 1980:10]. Presidential policies stem from many sources: campaign promises, continuing electoral considerations, the policy preferences of the president, his influential White House advisers and aides, key decisionmakers in the cabinet, departments, and advisory bodies/agencies. Non-Executive branch influences include Congress, organized interests and the pressures of contingent circumstance, not least, the state of the economy. A president's need to construct policy support likewise encompasses an internal and external dimension. Policy choices are tempered by the need for support among diverse external interests, including Congress, as well as organized interests, party interests (for example, to secure re-nomination) and the general public. Internally, effective delegation, and the coordination and direction of the fragmented executive decisionmaking structure at the president's disposal is necessary.

Modern presidents must fill thousands of positions to make a new presidency operative; the large scale turnover within the senior decisionmaking stratum also means the periodic attrition of acquired expertise. After the general election, there are only a few months to develop a detailed plan and superimpose it on existing structures and procedures. Carter inherited a vastly expanded, relatively top-heavy structure, including virtually a mirror bureaucracy within the White House.[3] He sought to create an effective decisionmaking network of cabinet officials and White House principals, but his initial institutional strategy and subsequent attempts to improve the performance and public image

[3]White House staff alone numbered nearly 600 after the Nixon/Ford presidencies [Baker, 1981:135]. Helmer [1981:46] notes a reorganization of the White House during 1977 involving "a substantial cut" in personnel and the reassignment of several staff units (which would be compatible with Carter's initial "cabinet" emphasis). He also lists a formal reorganization of the Budget Office (as well as the National Security Council). On the increasing difficulty of Executive administration, presidential policy management and accountability, see Heclo & Salamon [1981], especially Helmer [1981]; also King [1983]; Cronin [1980].

of his presidency proved largely unsuccessful. The National Accord process as an instrument of policy coordination, within the Administration and in relations with organized labour, was one element which did prove fairly productive.

President Carter initially introduced a decentralized "cabinet-model" of government which emphasized the role of the cabinet relative to that of the White House. This arrangement followed from his critique of national policymaking, including the institutional over-centralization of the discredited Nixon Administration. Cabinet members exercised considerable discretion in setting departmental priorities and selecting subordinates and had frequent access to the President [Cronin, 1980:272]. Like Ford, Carter planned to meet weekly with the cabinet and did so for some 18 months, but, after holding over 60 cabinet meetings during his first two years, similarly lost enthusiasm [Porter, 1981:210; Cronin, 1980:254; 272; Califano, 1982:26-7]. Carter's decisionmaking structure was less hierarchical than is typical, combining autonomy and teamwork, and he followed President Kennedy by not appointing a chief of staff at the White House. In contrast to Nixon's isolation and the screening role of Haldeman and Ehrlichman, many lines of decisionmaking ran directly to the President: an arrangement which succeeded for another Democratic president, Franklin D. Roosevelt [Hargrove & Nelson, 1984:95; 104].

For Carter, however, structural factors interacted with his tendency for close involvement in technical detail and poor delegation; he failed to control his policy leaders, complicating the management and coordination difficulties of any presidency. The result was fragmentation rather than controlled decentralization: overlapping and unclear responsibilities, uncertain policy commitments and the coexistence of divergent economic policy strategies, which fuelled criticism of his governance. Typical White House/cabinet tensions grew pronounced as some cabinet members were perceived as abusing their autonomy. Vice-President Walter Mondale referred to a "tidal wave" of leaks (emanating from the White House and cabinet), and "internecine back-biting" provoked the President to compare himself to a referee [Califano, 1982:406; 410; 411]. These problems persuaded the President to alter course. Meetings with the cabinet declined in frequency (to every four to six weeks) [see also Cronin, 1980:273; Porter, 1981:210] and, at a domestic summit at Camp David

in April 1978, "it was decided that the White House would assume more responsibility for providing cohesion and direction to Administration affairs." [Bonafede, 1979a:944].[4] This shift in the balance of power from the cabinet to the White House, again typifying recent presidencies [Cronin, 1980:260-4], was especially marked because of the initial extent of decentralization and cabinet autonomy.

Problems of coordination and fragmentation were nowhere greater than in economic policy. The energy and inflation issues strained organizational capabilities: "High-priority policy areas or crises - inflation, energy, Tehran - naturally multiply policy interactions inside and outside the Executive Office and overpopulate the [decision] networks." [Helmer, 1981:53]. Difficulties undoubtedly arose from the plethora of institutions and individuals sharing responsibility for economic policymaking, often with poorly defined or overlapping jurisdiction.[5] Thus, Califano recalls that McIntyre and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) "floundered along a conservative course while Eizenstat and the Domestic Policy Council steered toward a liberal one" - a symptom of wider difficulties by the end of Carter's first year [Califano, 1982:405]. Institutional fragmentation, however, was merely a symptom of the President's difficulties. Observers commented on the "power vacuum at the heart of the Administration's economic decisionmaking" [Samuelson, 1978:1932], but "the president's success in dealing with economic policy issues is tied to the cohesion of his administration" and he needs "key officials who see their responsibilities in a broad setting and who understand and support his policies." [Porter, 1981:208]. The Carter team lacked coordination partly because obvious candidates like Charles Schultze were reluctant to fill the role [Eizenstat], while the President failed to delegate effectively and found it difficult to over-ride his advisers or refuse their proposals [Schultze].

The absence of a chief of staff was consequently an important weakness within the White House. Most presidents have had at least an informal White House chief, like

---

[4]During 1978, Carter's proposed reforms to the top stratum of officialdom passed Congress as the *Civil Service Reform Act*, giving presidents more flexibility and control. However, it was to be President Reagan who exploited the new opportunities resulting to effect strategic alterations to the configuration and policy orientation of the Administration.

[5]Helmer [1981:55] and Porter [1981:204] refer to a 1978 study counting 132 economic policy units at the executive branch bureau level, many with shared jurisdiction. Some officials were unclear or mistakenly believed that their unit held sole authority. For example, two units claimed sole responsibility for interest rates while five others purported to share such authority.

Theodore Sorenson under Kennedy and Joseph Califano under Johnson. Carter's decision not to appoint one was not, in fact, "because, simply, the President did not want one" [Samuelson, 1978:1937], but due to a precondition made by Schultze in accepting the chairmanship of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) [Porter, 1981:215-6]. Previously, the CEA has provided some coordination, participating in the "many interagency committees", but there is "general agreement among former CEA chairmen" that the Council should avoid administrative responsibilities. The CEA is regarded more as an advocate to the president of the views of professional economists on macroeconomic management, usually "favoring markets and opposing subsidies" [Porter, 1981:209]. Certainly Schultze, initially regarded as the Administration's real economic expert, steered the CEA toward a purely advisory course; the coordination function fell instead to the Treasury secretary.

The Treasury secretary has a strategic position within economic policymaking, as the "pivotal" figure on key cabinet committees (for example, Economic Growth, Balance of Payments, Economic Policy and Price Stability), and within the President's "inner circle" of foreign policy counsellors (due to his authority on international commerce and currency): in these areas, the Treasury is more influential than the CEA or Federal Reserve Board (FRB) [Cronin, 1980:280]. As a member of the "Inner Cabinet", he has greater access to the president and corresponding policy influence. The Treasury secretary is customarily an advocate for financial interests and the Treasury's "special" clientele of major/central bankers has "unusual influence". Not surprisingly, the Treasury is usually more conservative than the rest of a Democratic Administration [Schultze]. Whereas other economic policymakers give comparatively higher priority to domestic considerations, the Treasury is more responsive to international financial interests and foreign exchange markets [Cronin 1980:236; 280][6] - the sectors most able to avoid compromise with labour interests [Crouch, 1982:206]. Treasury policy is consequently often incompatible with labour preferences.

Treasury secretary Michael Blumenthal, formerly an executive of the Bendix corporation, was the most conservative member of Carter's Economic Policy Group (EPG) and spoke for business and international corporate interests. Blumenthal's prominence

[6]For a discussion of the business background of cabinets during Democratic presidencies in general, and Carter's in particular, see Cronin [1980:254-5].

created jurisdictional or "turf" problems among colleagues, and his independent style and assertive, if not abrasive personality, annoyed White House aides.[7] In turn, Blumenthal complained of being by-passed by White House staff aides (as did Transportation secretary Brock Adams). For example, when Carter announced the appointment of Bob Strauss as anti-inflation strategist during 1978, Blumenthal, who had previously been told that no appointment was to be made, was informed only at the last minute. To improve economic policy coordination (and apparently in response to Blumenthal), Carter announced in May 1979 that the Treasury secretary would be chief economic spokesman: a decision commensurate with Carter's commitment to "cabinet government". The role of the EPG steering committee (chaired jointly by Blumenthal and Schultze) was also strengthened, meeting several times weekly instead of once, with greater access to relevant presidential papers. [Bonafede, 1979a:946; 1980:267; Cronin, 1978-9:2; 1979a:1243; Baker, 1981:142; Rubinstein].

The strengthened role for the Treasury secretary was structural, not personal. Blumenthal, and Health and Welfare (HEW) secretary Joseph Califano, were among the cabinet members thought to use autonomy inappropriately. Both men, as well as Brock Adams, have been cited as relatively low-ranking in terms of cabinet loyalty [Cronin, 1980:261], and were regarded by White House aides as obstacles to coordinated policy efforts. Rather than a teamplayer, Blumenthal operated as a "corporate mover", issuing orders and expecting them to be obeyed; he was frustrated by the collegial and consultative environment of government [Rubinstein]. He annoyed White House aides (especially Hamilton Jordan) by taking credit for policy developments: thus, he pre-empted Carter's 1978 State of the Union message on the economy and real wage insurance (and he was thought responsible for an article criticizing Stuart Eizenstat) [Rubinstein; Bonafede, 1979a:1243]. Carter had not "articulated any consistent set of economic values" or appointed an "economic czar", resulting in a "diffusion of power among his subordinates" and an "opportunistic, bureaucratic style of decisionmaking"; senior officials like Blumenthal simply "seized" opportunities "to advance their own proposals." [Bonafede, 1979c:243].[8] Blumenthal's proposals

---

[7]Nixon appointed John Connally as Treasury secretary and chief economic spokesman "an economic czar to whom he could comfortably delegate most economic policy decisions", but later replaced him with the more "collegial" George Schultze [Porter, 1981:212]. Carter's reproduction of the pattern suggests his weak appreciation of institutional politics.

[8]Similar points regarding Carter's lack of leadership and Blumenthal's tendency to act unilaterally

were those least acceptable to organized labour. Energy secretary Schlesinger[9] complained that the President's "message" to cabinet level was often unclear. Blumenthal denied that his loyalty was questionable, arguing that he merely gave advice others didn't like [Califano, 1982:409; 410; 431], and others claimed that: "Although Blumenthal fought doggedly within the Administration for his policies, his public loyalty to Carter was unwavering." [Bonafede, 1979c:243]. However, following the President's call for greater internal coordination, Blumenthal openly advocated piecemeal tax reform despite Carter's public stance in favour of comprehensive measures [Cronin, 1980:273]. To redress personnel and organizational problems and revivify his presidency as the election campaign gained momentum, Carter resorted to an abrupt cabinet shuffle in mid-1979: his most dramatic, but unsuccessful, organizational reform.

In the summer of 1979, the economy was labouring under increased OPEC prices (with petrol shortages entailing lengthy queueing) and rising inflation; the opinion polls reflected growing public dissatisfaction. Carter's reform strategy commenced with the sudden cancellation of his scheduled address to the nation on energy (set for July 5). Instead, he initiated a 12-day domestic "summit" at Camp David, attended in all by about 100 people, including Kirkland; it led to changes within the cabinet and among White House staff. Then, on July 15, 1979, Carter made his noted "malaise" speech to the nation. The initial positive impact on the polls was short-lived, for Carter's "crisis of leadership" [Bonafede, 1979a:1236] resulted in an "unprecedented modern purge" [Cronin, 1980:274] when, following protocol, thirty-four cabinet members and senior White House officials offered their resignations. The President dismissed Blumenthal, Califano, Schlesinger and Adams - although most successors' views did not differ remarkably from theirs.[10] Thus, high profile dissenters were removed, yet not "the incredible array of committed activists in subcabinet

---

are made in Califano's insider, personal account [1982:406; 408 and passim]. Adams had refused to fire his deputy and Schlesinger had persistently criticized the President. Califano failed to support and, at the conference committee stage in Congress, spoke against Carter's plan to establish a separate Department of Education (and thereby diminish HEW) [Cronin, 1980:273]. Califano's abrasive style made him unpopular, including with Rosalynn Carter (who strongly influenced the President), and with Jordan, Jody Powell and Moore [Califano, 1982:435 and passim; Rubinstein]. For another view of these matters, see Califano [1982].

[9]The only Carter principal who had previously been a cabinet member (under Nixon and Ford) [Baker, 1981:121].

[10]At the same time, Attorney-General Griffin Bell fulfilled a longer-standing plan to retire. Pat Harris shifted from Housing and Urban Development to replace Califano.

posts", many with "agendas of their own" [Nathan, 1983:88-9]. Eizenstat and Jordan were given more assertive roles in domestic policy, and Jordan became chief of staff. Thus, the influence of the political strategists was extended in the important pre-election period.

The changes, though limited, generated a wave of criticism, reinforced perceptions of White House disarray, injured Carter's image[11] and, incidentally but influentially, heightened the importance of AFL-CIO public criticism, especially of the anti-inflation programme. Until shortly before the Camp David retreat, Carter maintained a public commitment to "cabinet government" and emphatically praised his cabinet officials [Cronin, 1980:274]. While Califano claims that a "Greek chorus" of cabinet members warned against the proposals [Califano, 1982:430], Carter's White House advisers, including Mondale, apparently urged the measures as part of broader reorganization plans - and against the President's own judgement [Carter, 1982:115-6]. The outcome was unfortunate. His decentralized model of decisionmaking, his personal accessibility and detailed involvement in policy were intended to emphasize the contrast with the Nixon Administration. With these steps, Carter created an unintended parallel between them: after the 1972 election, Nixon had similarly called for the resignation of his cabinet members and introduced organizational changes blurring the separation between cabinet and White House, centralizing power in the latter (and isolating himself). Carter seemed suddenly to be heading in the same direction: "Carter's decision, in effect, has solidified the ranks of the Georgians surrounding him and established a "palace guard" between himself and the Cabinet." [Bonafede, 1979a:1238].[12]

In the midst of the energy and inflation crisis, Carter's attempts to demonstrate decisive national leadership, while dramatic in presentation, were limited to personnel, and procedural or structural, neglecting substantive policy measures: Carter seemed simply to be shifting the blame for his problems. However, the summit was a watershed in relations with organized labour, as the influence of Carter's political strategists increased and Blumenthal was replaced by G. William Miller, whose more consensual decisionmaking style proved

---

[11]Carter's popularity had declined sharply early in his term, improved around the time of the Camp David Middle East Summit in September 1978, but had declined again by the time of these events. The cabinet shuffle quashed the improvement in the polls after the "malaise" speech [Morgan, 1983:1-6; Broder et al, 1980:99-100].

[12]The President's credibility had already been shaken by his reluctance during 1977 to dismiss OMB Director Bert Lance, then implicated in banking law violations; Lance was eventually replaced by Jim McIntyre.

indispensable to the President and to the labour leadership. Miller became Carter's chief architect of the Accord, a somewhat more successful stepping-stone to the 1980 presidential election.

EARLY CONSULTATIVE PROVISIONS WITH LABOUR

For a Democratic presidency, early White House relations with the AFL-CIO were notable for unusually limited consultation provisions. Nor did the President make the customary address (as Nixon had) to the AFL-CIO convention (in December 1977) [*CQ* Series, Fall/78:61]. Personal antagonism between the President and AFL-CIO president Meany, who found "a complete failure to hit if off in their personal meetings" [BNA-DLR 1979, 240:C-1], exacerbated policy conflict, which so intensified that relations were severed in late 1978 for several months - again, remarkable during a Democratic presidency. The proximate causes were the Treasury's tighter monetary and fiscal strategy and the pay standard, two of the main elements in Carter's anti-inflation programme. If early relations were more as the U.S. "exceptionalist" case would predict, however, they were also aberrant. As the importance of labour activity increased for the President, White House aide Landon Butler, and then also Treasury secretary Miller, used the Accord process as a means to coordinate policy and political relations with the labour leadership, bringing them to some extent inside the policy process.

Expecting to deal directly with policy principals, the AFL-CIO did not wish a formal labour liaison official within the White House. However, Butler's *ad hoc* coordination as Jordan's deputy proved indispensable to both sides. Although Butler had no experience in working with organized labour prior to joining the Carter team for the 1976 campaign, he developed good relations with the labour leaders, holding frequent, informal luncheon meetings with Kirkland and Donahue (AFL-CIO treasurer) from the early days of the Administration [Butler]. There were also *ad hoc* meetings between labour leaders and the President or his advisers, regular meetings between the OCL and AFL-CIO, and other Carter officials sometimes dealt directly with the labour leadership on their particular departmental concerns. By late 1978, the Administration sought a centralized mechanism to coordinate these activities, and realized the need for improved consultation with labour [Jensen]. In January 1979, the President established a new cabinet-level group for these purposes, providing the institutional base for the subsequent Accord negotiations. Moreover,

Butler's job was political rather than policy oriented; by early 1979, he sought the systematic coordination of the President's policy and electoral needs (never realistically separable): the Accord negotiations emerged from this strategy [Butler]. Other formal provisions for liaison with the labour leadership included, initially, meetings with the Labor-Management Group (comprising corporate and labour leaders) and customary contact through the Department of Labor.

The Labor-Management Group

The progenitor of the tripartite labour-management group, the "Labor-Management Advisory Committee" established by John F. Kennedy,[13] lapsed under the Johnson Administration, but was revived during the Nixon and Ford presidencies.[14] After the Nixon pay and price boards collapsed in 1972, Nixon established a "Cost of Living Council" headed by John Dunlop, a Harvard industrial relations expert with "demonstrably pro-union sympathies" [Pencavel, 1981:165], and involved in related institutions, notably the Construction Industry Committee. Dunlop persuaded the White House to establish a new labour-management group to assist with economic stabilization policy; this group, which technically lapsed with Nixon's demise, was perpetuated by Ford, again under Dunlop's leadership and other continuity of membership, including Kirkland [Dunlop]. The group was influential in specific policy developments (such as the taxation cuts of 1975), but its main purpose was consensus-building, Dunlop's chief emphasis in industrial relations [Dunlop, 1984]. Appointed as Ford's Secretary of Labor, Dunlop had successfully negotiated a common situs picketing bill (approved by Ford), and resigned after the President unexpectedly vetoed it; the consultative group then became the (purely private sector) "Labor-Management Group" (LMG), which formed the basis for initial trilateral discussions with the Carter Administration.

During his public speech on inflation in October 1977, Carter announced consultative meetings between Meany, Reg Jones (chairman of General Electric, and a Business Roundtable leader) and five members of the cabinet, including Labor secretary F. Ray

---

[13]This group was initiated by the government and addressed a broad range of issues (unlike Eisenhower's provisions); it included the secretaries of Labor and Commerce, five other public members and seven each from labour and management [Moye, 1980:52-3].

[14]For a more detailed discussion of the labour-management forum, see Dunlop [1984:252-9].

Marshall and Treasury secretary Blumenthal, as well as Schultze, chairman of the CEA [Dunlop]. Six or seven meetings between the LMG and these members of the Administration were held between April and October; the joint group received staff support from the LMG, which insisted on retaining private status [Dunlop, 1984:255; Eizenstat]. The trilateral grouping disintegrated after the Attorney-General announced that it contravened the provisions of the Advisory Committees Act, because the meetings were not open to the media and general public [Dunlop, 1984:255], but the earlier joint groupings operated successfully notwithstanding such regulations [Dunlop]. Poor relations with labour possibly made the forum unsatisfactory for the Administration, and there was some ambivalence toward Dunlop. Moreover, the LMG was disrupted by the labour law reform controversy, which set labour and business at odds even though the strongest reform opponents, small business interests, were not represented among LMG members. On the labour side, UAW president, Doug Fraser, concluded a private "neutrality" agreement with General Motors (limiting the impact of the law for the UAW), and withdrew from the LMG without consulting Meany, who, meanwhile, personally avoided participation in the group [Dunlop]. Subsequently, Dunlop engineered tentative private meetings drawing AFL-CIO leaders and corporate leaders (notably Reg Jones and Irving Shapiro) together again. When the National Accord was developed, partly to replace the LMG as a consultative mechanism, the restored "proto" forum provided some basis for the Accord pay board [Miller].[15] In the meantime, in the absence of an alternative forum, consultation was weakened and relations between the White House and Federation leaders languished, although Dunlop provided some mediation between them on specific issues, including the initial wage/price standards [Dunlop].

The Secretary and Department of Labor

Consultation with the AFL-CIO on Administration appointments affecting labour interests is customary, particularly regarding the Department of Labor where "no major position" has been filled "without prior consultation with the AFL-CIO", which has "usually

[15]The LMG revived yet again (as a private consultative group) and, since the end of the Carter presidency, has published a review of "the labour-management climate" [Dunlop, 1984:257] and recommendations on reindustrializing the U.S. economy [Labor-Management Group, 1983]. Dunlop continued to act as group coordinator with Kirkland and Clifton C. Garvin, Chairman of the Exxon Corporation, as co-chairmen, and 8 other AFL-CIO (including Doug Fraser), and 10 management members. Staff coordinators from the AFL-CIO included Rudy Oswald and Ken Young, and there were representatives from General Electric and Exxon.

succeeded" in securing the appointment of "at least a half dozen persons with a union background" to the "key posts" [Bok & Dunlop, 1970:4067]. Democratic presidents especially ensure that the candidate selected as Secretary of Labor is fully acceptable to the labour leadership: the Carter presidency was no exception. Nevertheless, the appointment of Carter's Secretary of Labor was an early source of friction with Federation leaders, adding to tensions over Labor Department and other appointments where, although the AFL-CIO was routinely consulted, Federation recommendations were not accepted [Singer, 1977:293], further souring relations between Carter and Meany.

Claiming to seek simply Carter's assurance of accessibility on issues of special importance to labour, Meany had deliberately refrained from seeking influence over senior Administration appointments - except the Labor secretary position. Shortly after the 1976 election, the White House invited the AFL-CIO to put forward three recommendations for the vacancy: "It was no secret that Meany pushed hard for Dunlop -- and only for Dunlop." [Singer, 1977:293, quoted; Feinstein]. Believing that the President had signalled that Dunlop would be nominated, Meany acknowledged at a press conference that he expected to influence the appointment and commended Dunlop as an "outstanding" candidate. Dunlop was an indisputably strong candidate because of his past experience and policy achievements, and his long history of productive relations with labour and business leaders. Instead, Carter chose Ray Marshall, a labour economist from the University of Texas, with no prior government experience [Baker, 1981:121].

The President may have wished to distance his Administration from Republican predecessors, with whom Dunlop had been associated, and may have had reservations about Dunlop's independent and somewhat abrasive style, which irritated some White House advisers. No doubt the AFL-CIO's assertive response had not helped matters. Also, blacks and women's groups criticized Dunlop's record on equal opportunity matters [Singer, 1977:293]. The chagrined Dunlop rejected several alternative positions, including that of Special Trade Negotiator, and returned to academic life [BNA-DLR 1979, 240:C-2]. The White House was considered by the AFL-CIO and "leading business officials" to have "bushwacked" and embarrassed Meany by neglecting to liaise adequately about Dunlop's rejection and

Marshall's selection. Relations with the labour leadership deteriorated further as a result of this poor diplomacy, but Marshall was one of their "favourite economists" (a rare breed), and they promptly endorsed his appointment. During 1976, the AFL-CIO had offered Marshall a senior AFL-CIO position and (in November 1976) had recommended his appointment as chairman of the CEA [BNA-DLR 1979, 240:C-1; Singer, 1977:293]. Marshall worked successfully with the labour leaders throughout the Carter presidency and provided a much-needed early buffer between the White House and Federation.

During the Carter presidency, cabinet appointees were "generalists" rather than experts in client-linked policy domains, and supposedly less likely to be mouthpieces for special interests.[16] Marshall and Blumenthal were exceptions to this "neutralism", of (contrasting) significance for Carter's relations with labour. The Department of Labor is the customary advocate for organized labour in any Democratic (or friendly Republican) Administration and there has been some movement of officials between the two.[17] Carter Labor officials and Secretary Marshall saw themselves, and were viewed by colleagues, White House principals and others, as labour's institutional ally [Jensen]. However, the institutional importance of the Secretary of Labor varies among presidencies, may fluctuate during an individual presidency and varies according to the incumbent: George Schultz was a dominant policy figure because of his personality (and President Nixon's leadership style), more than formal attributes of office [Cronin, 1980:275]; Dunlop was influential as Ford's Labor secretary especially because of his close relations with business and labour leaders. Within the Carter Administration, however, Marshall was not regarded as a powerful policy figure.

Client-based departments like Labor are generally excluded from macroeconomic decisionmaking; the Labor secretary's jurisdiction encompasses industrial relations and microeconomic policy (such as employment programmes), although Labor's economic planning capability developed into a "mini-CEA" during the 1970s [Porter, 1981:214-5]. Carter's economic experts, Schultze and Blumenthal, were prominent in the development and

---

[16]Cronin [1980:257] cites Polsby on this point, without specific reference.

[17]Tom Donahue had previously been an assistant-secretary at the Department [Heclo & Salamon, Appendix, 1981:342]; Arthur Goldberg, Kennedy's Labor secretary, had been Special Counsel for the AFL-CIO [Moye, 1980:53]; Eisenhower and Nixon had appointed union leaders to the position (Martin Durkin, president of the Plumbers' Union, and Peter Brennan of the New York construction workers, respectively), not always with happy results [Wilson, 1979:99].

implementation of the first year of the anti-inflation strategy, although the President accepted that Marshall should manage relations with labour over collective bargaining and the standards programme. Marshall chaired the cabinet-level Collective Bargaining Committee (CBC) and participated in the steering committee meetings of the EPG: these were responsible for the wage and price component of the programme [Samuelson, 1978]. After January 1979, the CBC's role diminished; also, a new cabinet-level group sustained relations with labour and became the forum for the Accord negotiations led, after July, by the new Treasury secretary G.W. Miller. Miller's prominence reflected his expertise and, equally, his ability to improve coordination - within the Administration, and by fostering cooperation and a working consensus with labour and business constituencies. Both Marshall and Miller were crucial to the President's ability to gain policy and political support from the labour leadership and Marshall later acted as an apostle of Administration policy, playing a valuable role in preserving labour support for the 1980 election campaign.

DECISIONMAKERS, THE ANTI-INFLATION PROGRAMME AND THE NATIONAL ACCORD

Policy principals influencing the anti-inflation programme included CEA chairman Schultze, the initial chairman of COWPS, a member of the EPG and of the negotiation committee for the Accord. Like Carter (and the pre-Accord COWPS Director, Barry Bosworth), Schultze believed that policy should be formulated without influence from special interests. Although Schultze had worked with Dunlop to establish the tripartite food industry committee, he became critical of tripartitism, viewing it as conducive to collaboration between "big business" and "big labour"; for this reason, he opposed the Accord pay board. Schultze and Blumenthal[18] (similarly prone to isolated policymaking, and known for his pro-business orientation) were prominent in the early Accord negotiations but had poor relations with the labour leaders. Carter also appointed a special anti-inflation adviser, a position for which Dunlop was considered and for which his experience during the Nixon and Ford years was directly relevant. However, White House officials, including Schultze, were wary of Dunlop's style of mediation, based on consensus and compromise (rather than a more single-minded pursuit of presidential policy goals). The post was initially held by Bob

[18]These two officials and Bert Lance, Director of OMB, formed the (informal) economic Troika which weakened after Bob McIntyre replaced Lance in late 1977 [Rubinstein].

Strauss and then Fred Kahn but, lacking "institutional moorings" [Eizenstat], was relatively powerless, adding to policy fragmentation rather than coordination.

Kahn succeeded Schultze as chairman of COWPS, the operational unit responsible for the wage and price programme, where he had similarly unproductive relations with the labour leadership. COWPS had been established by the Nixon Administration in 1974, through an Act of Congress. The White House was dependent upon congressional approval for COWPS' operating budget and staffing levels (exceeding 200 by 1979). In April 1977, Biemiller argued before a House committee that COWPS was an ineffective instrument with which to combat inflation, since the real factors were not within its reach. Invoking the Nixon controls programme as evidence, he criticized Council activity as inequitable since prices (which were leading wage increases), in contrast to wages, are not amenable to controls. Biemiller complained that COWPS focused only upon union-negotiated wage increases, ignoring salaries and other forms of income. Calling for the abolition of the Council, he condemned it as "worse than useless", actively anti-union rather than neutral, and serving the "reactionary anti-union and pro-business purposes of those who seek to load responsibility for inflation on the shoulders of America's working people" in an "outrageous perversion of its original purpose." [AFL-CIO, 1977; Series(a), 1977:32]. Individual unions also criticized the Council during the standards programme: the Steelworkers and UAW challenged calculations supporting Council decisions; and the NEA, pointing out that the Nixon restraint programme had excluded public employees from controls, complained that COWPS had no experience in dealing with the public sector. The Council was accused of intervening prior to contract settlement and of creating industrial conflict where unions were prevented from securing gains employers were otherwise prepared to provide, and the AFL-CIO later contributed to the defeat in Congress of proposals to expand it substantially. Experience of the Nixon controls programme (as a public-member alternate) had made Bosworth (and other members of COWPS and the CEA) sceptical of the policy role and influence of organized labour [Bosworth]. That scepticism was entirely reciprocated by labour leaders, with whom Bosworth had persistently poor relations. Later, expressing frustration about the impossibility of operating a successful anti-inflation policy, Bosworth resigned (in August 1979), as the Accord negotiations neared completion and economic policy became

increasingly subject to political considerations. His successor, Robert R. Russell, doubted the potential effectiveness of a "social compact" policy agreement with labour as part of a feasible anti-inflation strategy [Russell].

The absence of strong "ideological" differences among the Carter economists -Schultze described them as "nuances"[19] - offset coordination difficulties; disagreements were instead over the trade-offs between pragmatic politics and economic objectives [Schultze; Russell]. The economists' technocratic and relatively "closed" policy approach and aversion to more consensual, consultative policymaking meant that they were impatient with the negotiating process, even while proceeding on the basis of trade-offs. The complexity of consensus-building and internal constraints within the AFL-CIO were regarded simply in terms of the labour leaders' inability to "deliver", reducing their value as policy participants [Butler]. Accordingly, the Federation had sour, often openly hostile, relations with them. The economists' policy recommendations differed from those of Carter's politicos,[20] Eizenstat and Jordan, whose broader policy and electoral concerns made them more responsive to Democratic constituencies like organized labour, since any viable Democratic presidential contender must secure support from traditional party cohorts. The politicos were necessarily sensitive to (negative) public perceptions of Carter's performance and concerned about the challenge he faced from Kennedy, who had strong support among party liberals and labour. Treasury secretary Miller's approach places him, in these respects, among the politicos. His appointment improved policy coordination and helped to reconcile economic objectives with the demands of pragmatic politics.

Unlike Blumenthal, Miller saw himself as the *President's* economic representative and worked much more closely with the White House (he was easier to get along with). A relatively liberal Democrat with a business background (and chairman of the FRB until joining the Administration), Miller was responsive to both labour and business leaders [Rubinstein]. He was interested in Butler's proposal for more substantial policy negotiations

---

[19]Schultze recalled that Blumenthal and Solomon emphasized the standing of the dollar more than did the CEA and differed also over exchange rates.

[20]In the thesis, the term "politico" identifies principals who were guided by considerations of political strategy, specifically President Carter's public image and electoral fortunes. Regardless of formal roles, the term differentiates those who accepted the National Accord process and the need for positive relations with the AFL-CIO from those with "purist" or narrower policy views.

with the labour leadership and subsequently substantially structured (and named) the Accord. Miller tightened the EPG, whose policy role had been variable, though important because of the lack of an "economic czar" [Schultze]; it subsequently operated principally as a smaller, close-knit group of senior policymakers.

The EPG was concerned more with political strategy than economic analysis, considering individual policies in the context of Carter's broader interests and concerns. The other core members were Eizenstat, Schultze, Mondale, Kahn and McIntyre, and Marshall had also been included; indeed, the CBC was a sub-unit of the EPG. The CBC's membership made it potentially powerful; chaired by Marshall, it included Schultze, Kahn, Bosworth, Gad Horowitz (FMCS), Blumenthal (or his deputy), Butler and Marshall's assistant Paul Jensen. The Administration then directly monitored and influenced wage settlements (in contrast to the independent pay review body operating under the Accord). The CBC was involved in setting the Year I standard and negotiating some major and controversial settlements (including the Teamsters'), working with individual companies and unions sometimes prior to collective bargaining - but without the backlash later caused by COWPS. However, the Committee's activity declined rapidly since there were few major settlements on the bargaining agenda for 1978 [Jensen].

Despite Miller's influence, the EPG never operated effectively, which increased the importance of the Domestic Policy Staff (DPS), whose economic policy role increased substantially as policy management problems became acute, economic conditions deteriorated and White House aides feared Carter's vulnerability on economic policy in the approach to the 1980 election. Under Eizenstat's leadership,[21] the DPS rivalled the EPG which, "with no firm White House base, was seldom a match for the relatively large Domestic Policy Staff - approximately seventy staff members, including twenty-five to thirty professionals" [Porter, 1981:213]. Eizenstat was a plausible candidate for informal chief of staff, acquiring some related responsibilities, although lacking, for some, the authority of some predecessors (such as Califano in the Johnson Administration) [Schultze]. While recent domestic policy advisers had been brokers of ideas, offering the pros and cons of each option, Russell saw Eizenstat more as a protagonist for particular points of view [Russell]. These views, however, reflect

[21] A seasoned political strategist who had been a speechwriter in the Johnson White House, worked on Hubert Humphrey's 1968 campaign, and on Carter's campaign for Governor of Georgia, and his bid for the presidency in 1976, when Eizenstat was issues and policy director [Eizenstat; Califano, 1982:25].

the economists' characteristic tendency to the more uncompromising pursuit of formulated policy goals. As a politico, Eizenstat was concerned about the response of traditional Democratic constituencies to policy, but this by no means made him the protagonist of any and, indeed, he was not among the most enthusiastic proponents of the Accord, which was initiated through yet another White House group.

Cabinet-level groups are commonly established on specific issues because they "demonstrate presidential concern and action", can "soothe the bruised feelings of a specific constituency", and are "inexpensive ways of building political support" [Porter, 1981:214]. In the shift in strategy from which the Accord negotiations emerged, the President established a new, regular (monthly) forum to exchange views with the labour leadership. Commencing in January 1979, the AFL-CIO leadership negotiated directly with a cabinet-level policy group formally chaired by Vice-President Mondale, and with higher status than the CBC. Marshall, Schultze, Blumenthal/Miller, Eizenstat, McIntyre, Butler and Jensen were participants. The labour leaders' unsatisfactory relations with Schultze made his participation "rancorous" [Schultze], while relations with labour undoubtedly improved after Blumenthal's replacement. Jensen and John White (OMB) were the main actors at the operational level, along with Donahue and Oswald (AFL-CIO Research director) on the labour side. Mondale's participation, however, was at times minimal and President Carter was not involved (nor had he attended regular meetings of the CBC, although occasionally requesting meetings with it) [Jensen]. The AFL-CIO had far closer contact with President Johnson; Carter's remoteness testifies to his aloofness from organized interests, his poor relations with Meany and his limited concessions to institutional politics.

Customarily, presidents have relied less on formal institutions and, informally, more on "a trusted adviser or group of advisers, settling many issues bilaterally with the interested parties" (although the demands of modern government have strained such arrangements) [Porter, 1981:215]. This "Accord" Committee was such a device, smoothing the negotiating process, providing sufficient lead time to prevent problems from materializing and resolve serious difficulties with Federation leaders. To achieve a comprehensive, coordinated approach to relations with labour, a number of internal subcommittees and a Joint Committee of senior officials were established, as well as the Administration-labour negotiating committee. In reality, however, the concept and substance of the Accord depended on a smaller grouping of principals disposed to compromise and seeking a working consensus with labour: Marshall, Jensen, Butler and (after July) Miller, as well as Mondale and Eizenstat. Miller and Butler worked closely with Kirkland and other senior labour leaders in the Accord negotiations, contributing greatly to their success. Miller's swift policy

leadership emphasized the primacy of economic policy, the macro-policy character of the Accord, Marshall's more limited influence with the White House and the need for Miller's skills to negotiate a compromise with AFL-CIO leaders on the wage/price programme.

THE ANTI-INFLATION PROGRAMME BEFORE THE ACCORD

> The ideological breadbasket of this "solution" (tightening credit, reducing federal spending) was classic American business ideology, stemming from those old and powerfully rooted fears about the loss of business confidence ... the traditional labor/liberal wing of the Democratic party, whose most cherished solution to inflation was increasing central government control, felt abandoned. [Fishel, 1985:114]

In 1977, the new presidency steered an economic stimulus programme through Congress, despite some difficulties; thereafter, early White House proposals and congressional outcomes were reasonably similar [Schick, 1983:314-5]. Carter favoured private sector job creation; the Humphrey-Hawkins Act public sector initiatives to reduce unemployment had been forced upon him through the 1976 Democratic platform [Carp; Havemann, 1976:1587]. Nevertheless, a Supplemental Appropriations bill for $20.1 billion, under the 1977 Economic Stimulus Appropriations Act, included $8 billion for public sector jobs.[22] The President signed legislation in mid-June 1977 extending CETA for another year,[23] and a national commission to evaluate federal manpower programmes was created [AFL-CIO Series(g), Jan.8/83:8]. The two-year stimulus programme totalled $33 billion, including $22 billion in tax cuts and $11 billion for direct job creation, but the AFL-CIO criticized the proposals, calling for $30 billion in the first year on jobs and training programmes alone [AFL-CIO Series(a), 1977:18-21].

Disagreement escalated after the state of the economy, including the weakness of the dollar, made inflation rather than unemployment the Administration's priority by mid-1978. Rising inflation levels, a sharp increase in average wages from late 1977 and the heavy 1979 and 1980 bargaining calendars prompted the Labor Department assistant secretary of Policy, Evaluation and Research, Arnold Packer, and his deputies to propose a voluntary restraint policy to Marshall in July 1978.[24] There was no opposition within the Administration, including the Treasury, CEA or COWPS, but the plan was supported with varying

---

[22]Over a third of 9.3 million jobs between 1973-8 were created during 1978, many in the service and wholesale/retail trades, although the gains were offset by labour force growth. However, some sectors showed little improvement, including those organized by major unions, e.g. construction, transportation, and federal government employees (state and local employment did increase).

[23]The programme interacted with high interest rates, tripling the anticipated cost [Cable]; reauthorization difficulties in August 1978 forced congressional leaders to pull the bill until a (more modest) compromise was reached [Sinclair, 1983:167].

[24]All nominal measures of wage and other compensation rose more rapidly during 1978 than for 1976 or 1977, although this was partly due to increases in the minimum wage and social security tax increases, as well as tighter labour markets [COWPS, 1979b:7273; 1979c:BNA-DLR 227:E12].

enthusiasm; most importantly, Blumenthal was sceptical. As labour's institutional ally, Marshall's support apparently surprised the economists since organized labour opposed controls and especially a voluntary programme; Carter, however, opposed mandatory controls and Marshall may have felt that a voluntary programme was the "least bad" alternative. The speedily pursued initiative initially dominated economic strategy (partly because of the lack of direction within the EPG), but the apparent consensus was tentative and short-lived [Samuelson, 1978:1934-5].

The chief influences in the rapidly dominant retrenchment strategy were Blumenthal and his under-secretary for Monetary Affairs, Anthony Solomon. The Treasury advocated tight monetary policy to control inflation; Blumenthal and Solomon were already preparing proposals accordingly, in response to activity on the international exchange markets, when the decision to press ahead with the voluntary policy was made in July. For their part, Schultze and Bosworth endorsed the voluntary policy based on the negotiated cooperation and self-restraint of labour and business as a means to dampen expectations, but this support assumed the more restrictive fiscal and monetary policy sought by the Treasury. While, unlike the Treasury, they did not attribute inflation to excess demand, they were concerned to halt the wage/price spiral anticipated given previous growth in the money supply [Samuelson, 1978:1933]. Moreover, with the Nixon programme in mind (and Schultze's scepticism about tripartitism), they preferred to rely less on voluntary cooperation and more on government regulation, advocating a tougher compliance approach than the voluntary programme ultimately entailed.

By late September 1978, although the IMF and OECD were "optimistic" about the U.S. deficit, the continuing decline of the dollar further pressured the White House to reduce inflation. As well as the voluntary policy "pieced together by the Economic Policy Group", an "ultra-secret planning effort" by a "half dozen" Treasury officials, led by Solomon and approved by Blumenthal, prepared "a massive package to undergird the dollar on the exchange markets", so that:

> "...probably unknown even to the President, the Administration's economic policy moved simultaneously along two parallel paths ... That the two plans did not dovetail into one dramatic announcement reflected both the splits within the Administration and the dynamics of its decision-making process." [Samuelson, 1978:1937]

In fact, it is unlikely that the President was ignorant of a major policy proposal, even though Blumenthal tended to work independently. The Treasury strategy was not incompatible with Carter's views, and the President was no advocate of incomes policy: he endorsed the voluntary restraint programme under pressure from some of his economists and other Administration proponents as a supplement to the Treasury strategy, and without notable

interest or enthusiasm [Russell]. After the President's announcement of the voluntary policy on October 24th failed to improve the dollar's performance,[25] the priority of the Treasury strategy was strengthened. The proposals downgraded economic stimulus and employment goals in favour of meeting Carter's pledges to reduce inflation and control the deficit. The FY79 deficit was estimated at $38.9 billion and the FY80 target was set at some $30 billion, implying a lower rate of economic growth, programme cuts, and an unemployment level potentially above 7%, abandoning the 5% target for 1981. Overall, defense spending fared better than public works, housing or social welfare programmes, belying Carter's stated relative priorities. After consultations between the Treasury and Miller (then head of the FRB), support for the dollar was announced, involving higher interest rates and intervention in the foreign exchange markets (Germany and Japan were persuaded to support the dollar and the U.S. borrowed from them and from Switzerland, setting aside a $30 billion fund of foreign currencies). The FRB raised the discount rate by l% (the highest leap since 1930) and commercial bank reserves by $3 billion, signalling a policy of greater monetary restraint; the dollar subsequently strengthened and the foreign exchange markets (FEMs) stabilized [Samuelson, 1978:1933-8]. These developments limited the ability of the White House to meet existing policy commitments and reinforced the economic policy elements most damaging to relations with the labour leaders.

White House opinion was not wholeheartedly behind these measures. Eizenstat criticized the deficit target and he and Jordan were concerned about the damaging political repercussions likely from traditional Democratic constituencies through substantial budget cuts. Carter was concerned on all fronts, including the likely impact on the disadvantaged, and he accepted the FY80 deficit target (and the policy implications) only hours before his State of the Union speech, the austerity package reflected some internal compromises and the measures were never fully implemented [Samuelson, 1978:1938; Schultze; Eizenstat]. The White House, indeed, claimed to stand by its economic and social policy goals. The White Paper released to accompany Carter's speech promised no higher unemployment "than there would otherwise have been" (an elusive commitment reproduced in the text of the National Accord). The Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act, signed by the President in October 1978, set a goal of 4% unemployment by 1983 (3% adult unemployment), while the AFL-CIO sought to maintain the original schedule and extend the funding and coverage of the programme. The White House promised active implementation of the new provisions although some officials doubted that the goals were achievable: they were nevertheless

[25]Samuelson [1978:1933-4] suggests that the anti-inflation package failed to influence international financial interests because of the Carter economists' differences vis-a-vis the monetarist views dominant in the private sector.

"tenaciously fought" for [Cable]. Carter also stated that there was no single solution to inflation: "I will work for a balanced, concerted, and sustained program under which tight budget restraint, private wage and price moderation, and responsible monetary policy support each other." [White House Press Secretary, 1978:6]. He publicly reaffirmed opposition to wage and price controls - "simplistic and familiar" remedies. The White Paper referred to the Nixon controls and warned that mandatory controls, which "soon sow the seeds of their own destruction", were an "extreme approach" to be used only in periods of "national emergency", creating "serious inequities and inefficiencies" [White Paper, 1978:2] - Dunlop and the AFL-CIO held this position regarding all controls. Schultze reaffirmed that mandatory controls or, indeed, the instigation of a recession through stringent fiscal and monetary policy were "economically and politically naive" and not acceptable alternatives to the Administration's programme, but he repeated that budget austerity and a stringent monetary policy would induce a non-inflationary climate,[26] while (voluntary) wage and price restraint would halt the momentum of the wage-price spiral [BNA-DLR 1978:212, p.A-11].

The Feasibility of a Voluntary Restraint Programme

Carter's long public rejection of controls, and Senator Kennedy's advocacy of them, made a voluntary restraint programme the only choice politically, but implementing the policy depended upon support from the major economic constituencies concerned: Carter officials "toured" the countryside like a "travelling roadshow" to gain it [BNA-DLR 1978, 212:A-10]. To the extent that the Treasury's retrenchment strategy departed from traditional Democratic policy, however, it diminished the prospects for an anti-inflation programme involving voluntary pay restraint by organized labour. Moreover, the U.S. economy is notoriously decentralized and national agreements difficult to negotiate. The organized labour sector is limited, the AFL-CIO lacks authority over collective bargaining and the employer sector is internally divided and formally poorly organized.

There were, however, a number of factors which made the programme feasible. The 5.5% "cap" on pay for federal employees provided a ready tool for depressing bargaining expectations and guided many state and local government decisions while, in the private sector, "the unions did go in to bargain knowing that the standards were on the bargaining table" [Murphey]. The programme affected pay and price activity as of October 24, 1978, and the Administration targeted major union bargaining "pacesetters",[27] important since the

---

[26]The Congressional Budget Office later calculated that each $10 billion in expenditure cuts would reduce inflation by only one-tenth of a percentage point [AFL-CIO Series(d), Feb. 19/79:48].

[27]The Kennedy-Johnson guidelines similarly concentrated on major union contracts, with some success if measured by the decreasing union/non-union wage differential [Pencavel, 1981:166-7].

heavy 1979 bargaining year opened a new three-year cycle with contract negotiations covering 3.6 million workers (of 9.6 million under major agreements), with over 1.5 million of these in the auto, construction and trucking industries [COWPS, 1979b:7275]. The main unions involved were the Teamsters, UAW, OCAW, the electrical workers and the rubber unions; these, as customary, would establish patterns for succeeding settlements. Employer incentives to minimize wage costs were expected to dampen wage gains, especially in the extensive small business and unorganized labour sectors, reinforced by a downwards "spillover" effect from major union settlements, to which many non-union contracts are tied [Samuelson, 1975:1935]. It was "expected that competitive market conditions" would translate lower labour costs into "commensurately smaller price increases" [COWPS, 1981:1]. Relations between major unions and large corporate entities, injured by the labour law reform conflict, were less of an obstacle to wage restraint than usual. Moreover, the President used moral suasion, in the form of a personal appeal to the Fortune 500 top industrial firms; 447 firms promised unconditional compliance, with important omissions among those in the worst affected sectors, notably oil and food [BNA-DLR 1979, 74:A-3]. A more compelling compliance measure involved public procurement policy; some 400 firms account for around half of GNP and most hold government contracts, the possible loss of which might induce compliance. For example, with less than 1% of Ford's sales to the government, the contract amount ran to millions of dollars. However, this option proved fruitless (see later).

The Kennedy-Johnson guideposts of 1962-6 were similarly voluntary (by-passing Congress), depended upon exhortation ("jawboning"), and were without penalties other than procurement, but labour cooperation was then more credible since relations with the labour leaders were far better. AFL-CIO criticism of the Carter presidency was already unusually severe, and the late and cursory nature of policy consultation with labour made opposition to the anti-inflation programme more certain. While the EXCO recognized inflation as the foremost economic problem, the labour leaders vehemently criticized both the policy process and the substance of the policy, which they described as "inequitable and unfair", due especially to the lack of controls on dividends, capital gains, commodity speculation, banks and financial institutions' speculation against the dollar, rents and professional fees [AFL-CIO 1979a:74-6]. From early September 1978, just a few weeks before the President publicly announced the programme, a group including Marshall, Schultze, Bosworth and Strauss held meetings to discuss the policy with the AFL-CIO, and with the Teamsters and UAW. The Federation insisted that these were briefings, not consultation: "At no time can you say we were consulted. We were shown bits and pieces, and they said that all these things were tentative..." [Samuelson, 1978:1936]. Meany commented that a statutory programme "enacted

over on Capitol Hill" would at least allow labour "to talk to committees and ... members of Congress and have something to say as to what went into controls." [AFL-CIO PR, Feb.22/79:3]. In August 1979, Kirkland returned to this point when asked whether the Federation was modifying its opposition to mandatory controls:

> ... I presume that any legislated program would afford channels for people to go and present their case ... and receive thoughtful consideration, rather than this arbitrary method of a handful of temporary alumni from the Brookings Institute making those judgements in the abstract and expecting everyone to fall into line [AFL-CIO PR, Aug.8/79:1].

As the White House and Federation were then in the midst of final negotiations over the Accord, Kirkland's remarks were no doubt partly intended to strengthen his hand against the Carter economists, several of whom (notably Schultze and Bosworth) were linked to the Brookings Institution. Meanwhile, Meany argued that "not even Schultze" believed that the inflation problem was caused by wage-push: "Now if wages are not the cause of inflation, how in God's name are we going to stop inflation by controlling wages?" [AFL-CIO PR, Oct.31/78:1]. The AFL-CIO really opposed all controls, but commended mandatory controls as a tactic to defeat the voluntary restraint policy. Meany later quipped: "Don't control a little here and a little there. Control everything. I don't know just how that would work, but it works in Russia." [AFL-CIO PR, Feb.19/79:3].

Further labour criticism concerned the arbitrary and, for labour, unrealistic single-figure pay standard. Marshall's proposed 8% standard was over-ruled (again suggesting his limited influence); the AFL-CIO quoted Strauss as admitting that the 7% proposal "came right out of the air" [Samuelson, 1978:1936; Oswald].[28] The AFL-CIO (and Dunlop) criticized the idea of a single-figure standard, pointing to the resultant distortions in pay structures, especially by undermining relativities, and Kirkland argued that everyone could not be forced into a single, rigid settlement mould.[29] Such factors, compounding broad objections to wage restraint, might provoke workers to reject contracts negotiated within the guidelines and injure union leaders (as elected officials) openly supporting restraint. Few union leaders were willing to do so and some spoke strongly against it, although Marshall considered that some opposition was more strategic than substantive (see later).

Relations between the White House and the AFL-CIO seriously deteriorated. On the verge of the programme announcement, Meany and Kirkland failed in attempts to see Carter, a rebuff unequivocally conveying Carter's annoyance at the level of public (and private) criticism by Meany and his officials. Relations collapsed entirely for the last quarter

---

[28]For details of the pay standard, see PAYC [1982:4-5]; BNA-DLR [1978, 232:A1-6].

[29]Other objections included that there were no provisions to remedy inequities, that the low wage exemption ($4.00) was less in real terms than the $3.50 of the Nixon programme, and that the inclusion of all fringe benefit costs in the standard was impracticable [AFL-CIO 1979a:77].

of 1978, and Kirkland withdrew from his various positions on presidential advisory bodies.[30] This degree of hostility in presidential-Federation relations was remarkable, especially for a Democratic administration. While Vice-President Mondale and others sought to restore contact, the prospects for cooperation were unpromising. Meanwhile, Blumenthal pressed ahead with the austerity proposals, stressing the need for urgent action to Carter; the policy was finalized in late October and immediately launched in Congress. For some observers, "[a]rguably, the Administration's entire character had altered" and the endorsement of such proposals implied pre-election shift of emphasis to foreign policy: "History has a way of playing its tiny jokes ... it may be a Democratic President who officially marks the end of an era of economic optimism." [Samuelson, 1978:1932].

The Anti-Inflation Price Provisions.

> ...a voluntary program ... must impose comparable restrictions on pay and price, since the success of such a program ultimately depends on support from the widest possible range of individuals and organizations" [COWPS, 1981:1].

The labour leaders believed that the price provisions[31] revealed the Administration's real view that the inflationary shock must be absorbed by depressing wages, thus limiting in their eyes the legitimacy of calls for wage restraint. They complained that a single-figure standard was introduced on the pay side while the price side was more flexible. In February 1979, Meany complained that, as during the Nixon programme, prices were not treated seriously, the programme was "one-sided" and "all directed toward wages",[32] and that prices had only been controlled successfully during WWII "where we had a great big bureaucracy [and] rationing for all the necessities." Passing over concerted Federation objections to the expansion of COWPS' resources or role, he continued:

> ... we now have an attempt to control prices with a staff of 100 people ... to monitor ... the 400 largest corporations in America ... The theory is that ... it will filter down the line. But ... Mobil Oil is really 140 corporations -- one of which [Montgomery Ward] sells tens of thousands of items. How one person working on a part-time basis can monitor Mobil Oil and all of its corporations is ... ridiculous.
>
> ... Now on the wage side they have enforcers ... Kahn indicated ... he had been "inundated" [by] ... employers. Every employer becomes an enforcer." [AFL-CIO PR, Feb.22/79:2-3; also Feb.20/79:4]

The labour leaders were essentially correct. The White House did regard pricing as less

---

[30]These included the General Advisory Committee of the Arms Control and Disarmament Administration, and the Women's Issues Committee [Butler].

[31]The pay and price standards had been designed relative to one another to ensure that they "induced no major shifts in the distribution of national income between labor and capital" [COWPS, 1981:2], with the latter assuming price inflation at a rate of 6%. See also PAYC [1982:4]

[32]Labour criticized specific aspects such as the omission of new products (including those resulting from mergers),that companies with large price increases in 1976-7 could obtain further increases and that the method of calculation was unworkable since there were no records of company price histories, making it impossible to tell whether they were in compliance [BNA-DLR 1978, 209:A-2; 232:A-5].

crucial, COWPS' emphasis was on the wage side, and prices were regarded as difficult to monitor, involving too many transactions, whereas with wages "you can target a few, highly visible contracts" [Eizenstat (quoted); Schultze; Murphey; COWPS, 1981:1]. Although most White House officials believed that wages played only a small role in inflation, restraint was expected to take the pressure off interest rates by reassuring the foreign exchanges [Eizenstat; Butler]. The central, but publicly unavowed, goal of the standards programme was therefore that real wages had to decline in response to economic circumstances: "Basically, wages had to rise less than prices; that's all there was to it. It wasn't a drum-tight economy where you repress wages and prices skyrocket." [Schultze].

In early 1979, after Kahn publicly invited broad participation in price monitoring, the AFL-CIO established "Operation Price Watch" - a somewhat tongue-in-cheek attempt to embarrass the White House by exposing the emptiness of the price provisions. Meany told reporters that the Administration lacked the machinery and personnel to monitor prices effectively, and that he had told Kahn that "we had the machinery; that we had a number of central bodies throughout the country with thousands of people who would be very glad to assist in helping him to monitor retail prices." When the President telephoned Meany in late February to request cooperation on the price side of the programme (without broaching the pay side), Meany reported this activity, whereupon the President "said that was very good" and indicated that Vice-President Mondale would liaise further with labour. Meanwhile, Kahn's replied to the effect that "I'll see you in three weeks." Meany telegrammed him: "I'll send Leo Perlis [head of the CSD] up there tomorrow", commenting "I want to get right ahead ... even if he doesn't work out a plan, we may do it anyway." [AFL-CIO PR, Feb.20/79:3]. Further tension between Kahn and the labour leaders arose over Kahn's "expressed concern" about potential "vigilante" groups resulting from invitations to participate in monitoring pricing activity. Meany commented caustically that Kahn felt "a little worry there" because:

> ...one thing Mr. Kahn would never do [is] anything to make the business community unhappy. But ... he wanted help ... and we are offering that help. Now, if he feels that that help is going to develop into vigilante groups, well, then, that's too bad. I'm sure the housewives will be delighted to form vigilante groups. [AFL-CIO PR, Feb.20/79:2].

Labour's view of the price programme was soured also by evidence of a record drive for profits, also affirmed by Marshall [BNA-DLR 1979, 58:A-5]. Meany commented:

> ... 449 major corporations ... had an after-tax average profit of 28% in the last quarter of last year. Well, I would like to see our workers have an after-tax increase of 28%. I read the Wall Street Journal. I read about the 49% increase in profits in building materials; the 37% increase in profits in the chain stores; 37% increase in the petroleum industry... I don't have the same reservations about offending the business community as Mr. Kahn has ... [AFL-CIO PR, Feb.20/79:2].

After seeing Perlis, in fact, Kahn appeared on T.V. and wisely made a point of welcoming

the cooperation offered. When asked later whether "Operation Price Watch" was successful, Kirkland replied: "I think its been successful in exposing the emptiness of the price guidelines. I don't think its been successful in doing anything about it." [AFL-CIO PR, Aug.6/79:3]. However, the project was something of a publicity victory for labour - very likely its main intention. Subsequently, the labour leaders sought a trilateral price board through the Accord negotiations, but without much success.

Compliance Provisions

Companies complained about a number of programme details, especially their accountability (in compliance calculations) for increases in those compensation costs largely beyond their control, and the preferential treatment of unionized employees due to the contract dates used in the calculations, COLA provisions and the rules for each regarding reclassifications, automatic wage provisions and skill-mix changes due to layoffs [BNA-DLR 1978, 231:A8-9].[33] Businesses exploited loopholes in the programme and their strategic strength in the economy, but compliance provisions for both pay and prices were ineffectual. Marshall's initial proposal (and the White Paper) stressed retaliatory measures, including: relaxing trade barriers protecting non-compliers if import competition existed (e.g. the steel industry); requiring regulatory agencies to consider company compliance in their decisions; the review of minimum price/wage levels (where set by administrative regulation); and adverse publicity. In the case of unions, Marshall considered easing industrial regulation, permitting non-union firms to start up more easily [White Paper, 1978]. Such measures were difficult to pursue and unlikely to be effective; for example, some 75% of tariffs and quotas required congressional approval, while the remaining 25% were insignificant [Samuelson, 1978:1935]. Public purchasing, which the Administration claimed to have used previously to achieve "a variety of social ends" [*WSJ*, Nov.14/78], also proved problematic. Only 250 companies (and their subcontractors) with some 2,000 government contracts of $5 million or more crossed the qualifying threshold, requiring them to report pricing activity to COWPS. Purchasing decisions were not controlled by COWPS, which simply passed on offenders' names to the Office of Federal Procurement; some major, highly visible contracts (notably Defense) could not be (or were not) readily withheld; there were justifiable doubts about the legality and effectiveness of the proposal, and the Federation and nine affiliates instigated legal action against them. Labour, and then business leaders, later successfully bargained

[33]In March 1979, Bosworth indicated that the Administration had rejected a shift to a profit-margin standard (e.g. an excess profits tax), as it would tackle relative income rather than price-inflation and "[w]e are not running an incomes program." [BNA-DER 1979, 54:P-5], later stating that many companies vulnerable to uncontrollable cost increases had shifted to a profit-margin standard anyway [BNA-DLR 1979, 91:A-12]. Pencavel [1981:164] states that the Council itself increasingly relied upon this criterion "rather than the price deceleration rule".

with the White House to preclude the use of penalties. On these grounds, the standards programme was criticized for excessively accommodating organized labour and business preferences. By September 1980, Russell commented that adverse publicity (hardly an effective option) was the only weapon left to the Administration, insisting that it would be used actively "to the day that this programme dies" [BNA-DER 1980, 188:L-2].[34] Little compliance action was ever taken; COWPS found its hands virtually tied, and the Year I programme became characterized as "a tight standard administered liberally" [Murphey].

The Real Wage Insurance Scheme

Another compliance provision was the real wage insurance scheme (RWI) initiated by Bosworth [Murphey]. Like the Year I pay standard and the budget process, it was a product of closed economic policymaking and illustrates the problems arising in consequence, the impact of institutional decentralization, and the importance to the White House of AFL-CIO lobbying within Congress - considerations giving impetus to the Accord negotiations. The RWI proposal was kept "under wraps" by the EPG until Carter's 1978 State of the Union address, to ensure maximum impact (legislation was initiated by the Administration only on the day before the speech). Nevertheless, the proposal was leaked, losing any impact it might have had and testifying to the Administration's internal weaknesses: "This sieve-like quality betrayed an economic decision-making process that was far less centralized than it had been in the Nixon and Ford years. No economic "czar" - no one comparable to Treasury Secretary George P. Schultz in the Nixon Administration - had emerged" [Samuelson, 1978:1937].

The AFL-CIO opposed RWI. The scheme was somewhat contra-logical: rather than compensating compliers after inflation reached the stipulated threshold, they were instead entitled to a 1% taxation rebate on the first $20,000 wages for each 1% point by which inflation exceeded 7%, but only to a maximum of $600, which assumed (incorrectly) that inflation was unlikely to rise above 10% (the standards programme was based on an anticipated inflation rate of 6.5% in Year I) [Carp; PAYC, 1982:5]. Meany drew a (somewhat inaccurate) comparison with the British Social Contract in which "wage controls work both ways", including "tax breaks ... They brought prices down and all that but everybody got 6 pounds ... this program ... guarantees nobody 7 percent or even 1 percent." [AFL-CIO PR, 1978:3-4]. The Federation lobbied strenuously against the plan in Congress, where there was some early interest in RWI, but also strong criticism: for example, that the proposals

[34] Although Nixon's comparatively stringent, legislated wage-price freeze of 1971 included civil penalties and criminal fines against violators, the complexity of legal proceedings discouraged resort to these provisions [Pencavel, 1981:169].

covered less than half the workforce, entirely excluding small business, farmers, professionals, the self-employed, and low-earners, and would cost some $15 billion in rebates in 1979 (the Administration estimated $5 billion, based on a lower inflation rate) [BNA-DLR 1978, 237:A-7]. Although Carter was a proponent and had claimed that RWI would be his top legislative priority after Congress reconvened in January, the White House regarded RWI essentially as a good faith effort to help compliers, and not critical to the anti-inflation strategy [BNA-DLR 1978, 212:A-11]. No-one opposed the scheme, but the Treasury was sceptical and the general response lukewarm, partly due to difficulties in implementation [Murphey]. Consequently, the scheme was not urgently pressed in Congress, contributing to its failure there [Murphey; Russell; Samuelson, 1978:1938]. Essentially, the EPG procrastinated, leaving the scheme within congressional subcommittee ostensibly for further study and extensive hearings until the legislative climate should improve.

During January 1979, when formal relations with the Federation were re-stored, early discussions included AFL-CIO support for (or withdrawal of opposition to) RWI in return for White House support for minimum wage legislation in Congress. The AFL-CIO refused, partly because of opposition among affiliates: thus, the Steelworkers opposed the implied acceptance of the guidelines, while the ILGWU insisted that mandatory controls would help its members more. Yet within weeks, as the rapprochement progressed, the AFL-CIO shifted its stance remarkably, although Meany obfuscated: "I don't think we've changed our position. What we said before is that we could not accept the bill." [AFL-CIO PR, Feb. 19/79:2]. In fact, Meany now endorsed the *concept* of RWI while maintaining that the scheme *as proposed* had problems; Ken Young later testified in Congress accordingly.[35] Essentially, the scheme was now acknowledged as compatible with collective bargaining; Meany later affirmed the Federation's support "ever since January 12th, when we had a meeting with the President" [AFL-CIO PR, Feb.20/79:2]. Fraser (UAW) had agreed to support RWI if enacted by Congress, and if the guidelines were flexible; the NEA indicated acceptance in January. The Teamsters affirmed support only given certain modifications, but Meany commented that the scheme would not even reach implementation before the Teamsters' early negotiations [BNA-DER 1979, 35:L-1; AFL-CIO PR, Feb.26/79:1]. The indications of support encouraged the Administration to persevere. In March, Bosworth acknowledged that major unions "could probably do better if they said to hell with all of you, we're just going to go take care of ourselves", but claimed that they would support the scheme for socially responsible motives:

---

[35]Meany argued that the proposed bill was inequitable; for example, for those employees dependent upon their employers to initiate a claim for tax relief on their behalf, which the Steelworkers also criticized [AFL-CIO PR, Feb.19/79:2].

> ...they realize in the longer run ... this is going to lead to a recession, and it is going to lead to a much more severe one than would otherwise occur. And they're concerned about that unemployment prospect and ... they're also concerned about where the country is going as a consequence ... [BNA-DER 1979, 54:P-5].

In Congress, the Ways and Means Committee approved $2.5 billion for the proposal, but the funds were deleted by the Budget Committee, for the full cost was estimated at $8 billion [BNA-DER 1979, 54:P-3]. During the Camp David retreat in July 1979, Carter met with the special Democratic congressional task force he had organized on anti-inflation and recession action, and which resurrected the possibility of such a scheme. Further consideration was given between March and May 1980 but, as passage by Congress remained unlikely, the idea was not strongly promoted even by COWPS. Nevertheless, a tax-based incomes policy was still contemplated for the third year of the programme [Russell; Eizenstat; BNA-DLR 1979, 139:A-2; 1980, 94:A-6].

THE RAPPROCHEMENT AND THE PAY PROGRAMME

Until January 1979, the White House pressed ahead with its policy agenda and dealt directly with the leaders of individual unions, by-passing the AFL-CIO [Butler], whose credibility was endangered by self-exclusion from the Executive policy process. The White House found the arrangement unworkable and, like the AFL-CIO, wished to normalize relations. Reconciliation was assisted by the gradual emergence of Lane Kirkland as effective leader of the Federation as Meany's health deteriorated; Kirkland and Carter had a more amicable relationship. Moreover, deteriorating prospects for the standards programme were worsened after a further round of OPEC oil price increases early in 1979, which made matters critical for the White House.

The Year I standards programme received some early cooperation from employers and unions. In December 1978, two corporate giants, ATT and GM, pledged compliance (urging rejection of mandatory controls), and Chicago City Council modified an (accumulated) 60% pay increase to comply with the standards.[36] In February, the Pennsylvania General Assembly agreed to defer (until 1980) a 15% pay increase for judges and cabinet officers (State legislators gained 8%, and a further 7% for 1980). Business leaders generally stressed the importance of stringent fiscal/monetary policy to counter inflation, a higher priority than dealing with the recession or unemployment. This was the view expressed, for example, by George Hagedorn, chief economist at the NAM [BNA-DLR, 1979, 46:A-4]. Lawrence Roos, president of the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank, argued that the Administration's restraint programme was like "using a peashooter to bag a grizzly bear", and that wage-

[36] Although they received 25% in 1979, the aggregate increase for their management grouping was permissible.

price guidelines (or controls) would simply generate more inflation: only slower money supply growth could solve the problem [BNA-DLR, 1978, 212:A-11]. Nevertheless, survey findings revealed that 90% of employers expected to conform with the price standard, but only 29% expected any decline in their profit margins as a result;[37] less compliance (75%) was expected with the pay standard, allegedly due to anticipated union influence. More importantly, 56% of respondents believed the programme would not successfully deal with inflation and 58% expected mandatory provisions to be introduced [BNA-DLR 1978, 232:A1-5; 241:A-5; 1979, 28:A-5; 36:A-3].

Some union activity showed early compliance, but the AFL-CIO remained hostile and qualified endorsements by the UAW and Teamsters were not felt to justify the President's emphasis on their support [*WSJ*, Nov.14/78]. The UAW was to negotiate new three-year contracts with the three major automakers - major pattern-setters for other unions. Fraser endorsed the anti-inflation programme and guidelines, *if flexible*, but warned that the UAW would be influenced by wage patterns (demonstrating whether or not restraint was working) in trucking, rubber, electrical and other major industries [BNA-DER 1979, 35:L-1]. The Teamsters' leader, Fitzsimmons, affirmed acceptance of the standard, *if adjusted* (by raising the cut-off, excluding fringe benefits and the like); as Meany commented: "I'm sure anybody could live with 7%, if it were adjusted upwards." [AFL-CIO PR, Feb.26/79:1]. Both these unions did prove problematic. Nonetheless, some early pay settlements were favourable. Union contracts breaching the pay standard covered only a few thousand workers, the first major union negotiator, OCAW, settled within the guideline with some 33 agreements (about 325,000 workers) following suit by mid-March, and public sector bargaining was in compliance (e.g. AFSCME members employed by N.Y. State), so that Marshall could state: "In this critical first four months of the program, we have received substantial and general labor compliance with the wage guidelines" [BNA-DLR 1979, 58:A-5, quoted; COWPS 1979b:7275; COWPS, 1981:3].

At this stage, business interests posed more problems by exploiting loopholes and the interpretation of the guidelines [Murphey], with small and medium businesses especially breaching the standard. In Bosworth's view, fiscal/monetary restraint had not yet slowed the economy to create a climate in which the guidelines could be conducive to restraint. The White House indicated that President Carter would take a more visible role in the programme and COWPS intensified its monitoring provisions, expanding the reporting

[37]Russell Reynolds Associates, an executive recruiting firm, surveyed the chief executive officers of 1,000 industrial units, 50 transportation companies, utilities, retailers, banks, insurance companies and financial establishments, during the last half of January [BNA-DLR 1979, 36:a-3].

universe by about 570 firms, halving the annual sales threshold to $250 million, and strengthening other provisions. In April, the Scott Paper Company undertook a price rollback after COWPS dismissed its claim to treatment as an exception. The AVCO Corporation (a defense contractor in Connecticut), claiming to fear penalty action, offered the UAW a three-year contract with a 7% limit on increases in each year, prompting strike action. There was a price rollback by U.S. Steel (possibly for market reasons). The President's 477 promises of unconditional compliance from the Fortune 500 (COWPS published a list of them) significantly excluded 18 major petroleum and food processing companies comparatively exposed to international forces, including Mobil Oil, Amerada Hess, Marathon Oil, Standard Oil of Ohio, Texas Gulf, United Brands, Associated Milk Producers and Kellogg, as well as the steel companies. Only Amerada Hess and Ideal Basic Industries had then been formally cited as non-compliers by COWPS (in July, Amerada Hess moved into compliance on being awarded a $77 million jet fuel contract), but some thirty other food manufacturers and distributors were violating the standard, as were other major Defense contractors.

By March 1979, Administration spokesmen were publicly criticizing these employers. Marshall claimed that they threatened the "fragile compact of trust" between labour and the government, citing double-digit price increases as evidence of a business drive for record profits: business interests pledged support more readily than labour but acted more in self-interest, willing to hold down wages but not prices [BNA-DER 1979, 54:P-1; 75:L-2; 76:L-2; 138:L-3; DLR 1979, 58:A-4-5; 74:A-3; 83:A-4; 134:A-11]. Marshall stated that, as elective officials, union leaders voiced defiance of the restraint policy to ensure support within their memberships, but were privately more responsive to the dangers of inflation (Bredhoff also held this view). Although the unions demonstrated greater compliance, they were blamed for inflation because collective bargaining agreements are highly visible. He rejected the view that the unions had become too strong,[38] arguing that they weren't powerful enough to be effective, while business interests were increasingly organized [BNA-DER 1979, 93:L-1]. Moreover, Marshall also affirmed that the White House would reconsider budgetary proposals offensive to labour, including a $50 million package of cuts in CETA and similar programmes [AFL-CIO PR, Feb.26/79:2].

Opposition from organized labour, however, had also risen, with union convention resolutions against wage restraint [BNA-DLR 1979, 36:A-3; Bredhoff]. In February 1979, the

[38]Opinion polls showed strong public support for collective bargaining, but anti-*union* sentiment. Marshall claimed that a similar dichotomy had contributed to the defeat of the labour law reform proposals in Congress [BNA-DER 1979, 93:L-1].

AFL-CIO announced a test court case against procurement penalty provisions,[39] arguing that they undermined the voluntary nature of the programme and were contrary to collective bargaining rights under the Landrum-Griffin Act. The Carter team image was simply that of "batting for the President", but a characteristically tactless blunder. Bosworth commented that when procurement penalty provisions had been used "years ago" with respect to equal employment opportunities, many labour groups had then supported them [BNA-DER 1979, 54:P-6]. Meany claimed that action was being taken now because "rumblings about using the great powers of the government" and a photograph of Bosworth, Strauss, Kahn and Marshall holding "great big baseball bats ... sort of brought the thing home to us." [AFL-CIO PR, Feb.22/79:4]. Nine Federation affiliates filed suit jointly with the Federation. Labour ultimately lost the court action, but the use of sanctions was undermined, and further negotiations with the labour leadership hindered their use by the White House.

The programme's credibility was seriously shaken by the Teamsters' negotiations for a new National Master Freight Agreement between January and April 1979.[40] Bosworth insisted that no concessions would be made and all actors should be treated equitably - the Teamsters' own stance during development of the programme. The White House was, however, prepared to ease activity on trucking deregulation if the Teamsters settled within the guidelines, but the union prepared to strike selectively for an increase 2% above the standard over three years [BNA-DER 1979, 54:P-3]. The EPG feared that other unions would follow suit and feared the impact on food prices and COLA activity and, indeed, the UAW vowed to follow suit. The White House had little choice but to accept the Teamsters settlement, but sought to avoid the *appearance* of a major breach. Although reported later as 33.2%, the contract was technically valid; COWPS claimed that with valid exclusions, it represented 21-25% over three years - less than the previous settlement in 1976 had been (this was true for total compensation, though not wages). Nevertheless, it was widely reported that the guidelines had been opportunely bent. In May, Bosworth publicly acknowledged that "[w]e have a credibility problem" and that the government had "made a mistake" in allowing several tailored exceptions and permitting the Teamsters to exploit loopholes [BNA-DLR 1979, 91:A-12; Meyer, 1980:220; COWPS, 1981:4].[41]

---

[39]The IEU had taken successful legal action against the Nixon controls in 1973. A statute prohibiting mandatory controls had passed Congress in 1974 and, along with the URW, the union again provided the impetus for a court test [AFL-CIO PR, Feb.22/79:1; 4].

[40]The negotiations involved 250,000 workers directly, about 250,000 Teamsters linked closely through local agreements, and some 250,000 non-union workers in trucking, as well as Teamsters' employees in a number of other industries who use the Agreement as a pattern-setter [COWPS, 1979b:7276].

[41]The Johnson guidepost policy was similarly weakened when the White House accommodated the breach by members and the airline machinists in 1966. The wage and price controls imposed by President Truman were successfully challenged by a coalition of United Mine Workers and employers in 1952 [Pencavel, 1981:160-1], when Kirkland served on the Wage Stabilization

Charges that COWPS interfered improperly before settlements had even been reached[42] came to a head over Rubber union negotiations with Uniroyal. In May, RWU president, Peter Bommarito, sent a telegram to Carter refuting his claim that Marshall, Kahn and Bosworth and the President had no involvement in actual contract negotiations, asserting that they were "up to their necks" in his union's bargaining interests. The URW's new agreement with Uniroyal, including inflation protection and job security measures, exceeded the standard. COWPS "publicly denounced" the settlement and pressured the company, and the three other major rubber companies (Firestone, Goodrich and Goodyear) to resist pay demands, "threatened contract debarment, and otherwise interjected its presence during the bargaining process." [PAYC, 1982:26]. Bommarito charged "hypocrisy" concerning the allegedly voluntary programme, and warned that strike action would commence on May 5th [Bommarito, 1979]: a "lengthy strike ensued" [PAYC, 1982:26], although strike action was a familiar feature of the union's settlement activity [COWPS, 1979b:727]. Intervention by COWPS also prompted strike action during the West Coast paper negotiations during 1979 [BNA-DLR 1980, 42:A-5; Silesky], while the activist Bill Winpisinger (IAM) later similarly criticized intervention in coal, rubber, petroleum and rail negotiations, claiming that a "declaration of class war was the message" [BNA-DLR 1979, 232:A-9; COWPS, 1981:4].

By Spring 1979, support for the standards programme from all sources had seriously eroded. The impact of the new OPEC price increases and increasing inflation in a tight economy, especially given relatively loose restraint provisions, had undermined the credibility of the existing programme, as had increasing conflicts with, and evasions by, business and labour, and certain programme provisions, notably the impact of COLA provisions (on the union/non-union differential), and existing contracts (not subject to the standards). Increases in food and energy prices had spread to industrial prices (as in the 1974 recession); Bosworth stated that uncontrollable cost problems had driven more companies to use the profit-margin standard, to the detriment of consumers. He also argued that there was no alternative to the programme: mandatory controls would have no impact on food, energy and housing prices, credit controls were too clumsy and hard to administer and tighter monetary/fiscal policy would create higher unemployment levels. The White House considered ways to slow the economy and tighten the restraint programme, especially to relieve pressure on interest rates (for example, through an excess profits tax and by prohibiting tax cuts for violators),

---

Board.

[42]On the wage side, the procedure was formally triggered only after the bargaining parties had reached and ratified a collective bargaining agreement. In any event, by strengthening employer resistance to higher settlements, wage standards generally increase the duration of strikes, at least early on [Silesky].

but Bosworth concluded that "inflation may simply not be controllable within the confines of the policies currently available." [BNA-DLR 1979, 91:A-11].

WHITE HOUSE DECISIONMAKING ON YEAR II AND THE NATIONAL ACCORD

During the second quarter of 1979, a further round of OPEC price increases[43] began an acceleration of inflation which peaked a year later, straining economic performance and policy management. A restraint programme remained an economic necessity for Carter, and its voluntary form a political imperative. Clearly, a revised strategy was necessary for Year II of the programme. White House decisions during late spring and summer 1979 were the product of contending internal views on policymaking, the revivification of the anti-inflation strategy and the President's electoral wellbeing. Support from the AFL-CIO was deemed necessary to revive the programme and avert political pressure (including in Congress), especially given Senator Kennedy's likely nomination challenge for the 1980 presidential contest. The economists' insular policy approach had contributed to the hostile relations with the AFL-CIO and its outright opposition to the Year I programme. Kirkland later claimed: "We did not adamantly oppose voluntary wage restraints [but] the enunciation by a group of alumni of Brookings of standards for others to live by", and a "system of no due process and no participation by the parties who were supposed to voluntarily live under those exercises by the better brains of the community." [AFL-CIO PR, Feb.21/80:4]. The White House conceded that consultation over the standards was necessary: "You can't just impose them; you need cooperation." [Eizenstat].

When the White House informally approached the AFL-CIO during April to gain support for the anti-inflation programme, the latter insisted upon consultation and negotiation, declining to support any pay restraint policy without influence in its making and implementation [Butler; Kirkland], and as part of a broader consultative process and "the totality of ... the economic program of this Administration":

> ... not simply on counting numbers, juggling numbers or enforcing some number dreamed up in the micro-economic imagination of some authoritarian academic economist." [AFL-CIO PR, Aug.6/79:3-4].

Wage restraint was no priority for the labour leaders and support for restraint was personally difficult for Kirkland as Meany neared retirement, for others aspiring to the leadership could capitalize on the unpopularity of the policy. The Accord negotiations began to take definite shape, initially through informal discussions between Butler and Kirkland about the possibility of a social contract along British lines.[44] At a luncheon meeting about a

---

[43]From the end of 1978 to the end of 1980, the per-barrel price of oil increased from $15 to $35 [Hibbs, 1987:124].

[44]Meany and Kirkland both expressed interest, although at other times refuting the credibility of the

month before the Camp David retreat of July 1979, they discussed the general terms of an agreement (jotted down by Butler on the back of a laundry slip and subsequently lost) [Butler].

Schultze and Blumenthal expressed interest in the concept, but their poor relations with labour made Butler's role vital during this early stage. Moreover, some officials doubted the value of consultation and the impact of labour participation, especially in the formulation and operation of Year II of the programme; it was feared that the proposed trilateral Accord pay board (PAYC) would weaken the programme. Bosworth encapsulated the economists' view in referring to the "excess baggage" accumulated by government leaders, "political commitments" which hampered objective, non-partisan policy formulation - "the things that potentially could cause a problem". He incidentally supported the AFL-CIO contention that no real consultation had then occurred by suggesting that the White House had, consequently, originally ensured the requisite latitude for COWPS in the development of the standards programme [BNA-DLR 1979, 54:P-1]. Schultze, Bosworth and McIntyre publicly opposed the concept of delegating authority to a non-governmental body, influenced partly by their view of the Nixon programme and other earlier pay boards [BNA-DLR 1979, 178:A-10; 181:A-10; Bosworth]. Nixon's Cost-of-Living Council (chaired by Dunlop) delegated pay issues to a trilateral pay board similar to the proposed PAYC. Bosworth recalled that its labour members had blocked restraint measures, often with business support, while the public representatives became somewhat isolated [Bosworth]. Schultze had worked with Dunlop to promote trilateralism on an industry-by-industry basis, including the tripartite food industry committee (undertaking "super-collective bargaining") and similar committees in other areas, but subsequently felt that tripartitism allowed "big business and big labor to unite to the detriment of the general public" [Tchirkow; Schultze]. However, Kahn, among others, expected the business members on the proposed Board to block total capitulation to labour.

Despite opposition from Schultze and COWPS, the labour leadership eventually successfully negotiated the establishment of the Accord pay board and the terms of its operation. Each of these views then proved to hold some truth. Kirkland later (incidentally) supported Kahn's view by commenting of the pay range: "That was a tripartite process ... If it were a pay committee made up of labor members only, I promise you the figures would have been different." [AFL-CIO PR, Feb.22/80:3]. Murphey (COWPS) believed that the mix of views achieved by making the Board trilateral kept the Year II standard near what COWPS considered reasonable [Murphey]. However, Schultze considered that "big business had come

---

British experiment and its possible application in the U.S. See BNA-FED [1979, 156:2:1596-7].

in with big labor" to maximize what labour could get out of the programme (as when General Motors' lawyers scrutinized the standards regulations and got the UAW a better settlement) [Schultze]. On PAYC, labour/management cooperation countered White House preferences, somewhat justifying the economists' comparisons with the Nixon Board (labour did not, however, withdraw from the Accord pay board despite disagreements with the Administration), as Dunlop, corporate and labour leaders cooperated to make Year II transitional, pressing for a return to free collective bargaining afterwards. Dunlop publicly espoused the view that a wage/price programme, as an economic tool, could have relatively little positive effect on inflation at best and, at worst, have considerably adverse effects [Dunlop, 1979:42].

In May, Dunlop, a frequent visitor at the AFL-CIO and a staunch proponent of consensual and trilateral decisionmaking, strongly rejected the economists' views on policy formulation. Indeed, criticizing COWPS later because it was not tripartite, he suggested that its intervention in bargaining during Year I had been less legitimate as a result [BNA-DLR 1980, 48:E-1]. Dunlop insisted upon the inevitably political nature of the anti-inflation restraint programme: "These are not primarily matters of economic analysis, statistical application or analytical skills. Dealing in this area is fundamentally a matter of the exercise of political leadership and political skills." He stressed the need for tripartite relations if such a programme were to be viable:

> The procedural fundamental of wage and salary stabilization in this country is the sympathetic involvement of labor and management leaders. If you want to get something done procedurally, you've got to involve the parties ... you must bring the parties in and have them play a key role; and substantively you must deal with special problems of distortion both historical and emerging." [Dunlop 1979:42]

Dunlop's views found some echo with Carter's political strategists, whose influence within the White House increased as the presidential campaign process got underway. Political considerations made labour support imperative. In May, Marshall affirmed that economic policy, to be effective, must be a product of participation by the major economic actors [BNA-DER 1979, 93:L-1]. By June, Kahn strategically conceded the need for a consensual approach to the programme and announced increased input for organized labour in the design of the Year II standards, reflecting White House policy deliberations on the broad Accord negotiations. Nevertheless, a pre-emptive bid was made by COWPS to retain control over the standards programme by institutionalizing limited interest access through the establishment of price and pay advisory units at COWPS, simply providing technical advice, rather than having any policy role. Kahn stated these would provide greater input for

interest groups and help to achieve "some measure of consensus" on the programme [*Federal Register* 1979, 44(122):36446; BNA-DLR 1979, 122:A-13].

The AFL-CIO pressed for a formally tripartite structure for the price board (PRAC), proposed under the Accord. Senior economists, notably Schultze, strongly opposed such a board, but it was eventually decided that structural symmetry was politically necessary within the programme [Murphey]. The White House feared that business would hold the reverse of labour's view: namely that the programme was rigid on the price side but weak on the pay side, seeking to alleviate these corporate concerns, rather than establishing the board in response to labour demand. Russell stated that unlike PAYC, the price board had no special constituency to represent and need not be tripartite, but his claim was belied by the repeatedly expressed concerns of the labour leadership, and strong business opposition to the Board. Eizenstat affirmed that the White House was sensitive to the imbalance in the bilateral Accord negotiations; both PAYC and PRAC were, in his view, effectively trilateral, with labour, management and public representation [Eizenstat]. The White House did not formally seek business representation for the Board [*Business Week*, 1979:33-4], which consisted only of six ostensibly neutral, "public" members appointed by the President, possibly as a compromise between labour and business preferences. Labour interests were informally represented on PRAC by Stanley Rutenberg, the AFL-CIO's former director of research, but the chairman was Albert Sommers, chief economist and senior vice-president of the Conference Board [BNA-DLR, 1980, 6:A-2]. Sommers' business associations cast doubt on the Board's neutrality, as did the conflict over an appropriate inflation rate measure [Chapter 6].

The importance of a credible voluntary restraint programme was then reinforced by congressional support for legislating (presidential) discretionary authority to introduce mandatory controls (as during the Nixon period). In July, an unsuccessful attempt was made by Senate Republicans to prohibit procurement penalties, but also to force Carter to abandon the standards programme in favour of the stronger measures [BNA-DER 1979, 138:L-3]. In August, activity followed among the Democrats: Senator McGovern introduced legislation on discretionary authority in the Senate and, in the House, Ted Weiss and 22 co-sponsors put on record similar Caucus support [BNA-DER 1979, 169:L-4]. Kirkland, although denying that congressional support for mandatory controls was growing, added: "as they approach election year and the polls show substantial support for [them] and they are bankrupt of other ideas ... the likelihood will increase." [AFL-CIO PR, Aug.8/79:2, quoted; Aug.7/79:1]. He gave an equally qualified denial of any White House move toward mandatory controls: "the Administration keeps repeating its opposition ... the same way that Richard Nixon [did] up until August 15, 1971 when we had that weekend surprise." [AFL-CIO PR, Aug.8/79:2]. In fact,

Bosworth had raised the possibility of mandatory controls, the first such suggestion by any Administration official, although adding that they were an extreme measure necessary, possibly, if food and energy prices became entrenched in the industrial wage/price structure, and one needing strong public support [BNA-DER 1979, 107:P-1]. Controls were not generally considered feasible within the White House (possibly with the exception of Eizenstat), nor by the President. In the event, no legislation was passed, nor did the White House ever propose mandatory controls.

For the White House, some advantages had already emerged from the Accord negotiations. Most importantly, in June 1979, the AFL-CIO unexpectedly endorsed SALT II and the thrust of the energy programme, and there were some further favourable contract settlements. In July, the GE Conference Boards of the Electrical Workers and UE settled new, national three-year contracts within the 7% guideline (Westinghouse was likely to follow suit). Other major unions on the GE Coordinated Bargaining Committee included important *national* pattern-setters such as the UAW, IAM and IBEW, plus their *local* union agreements were likely to follow suit [BNA-DER 1979, 128:L-2]. Moreover, there was a significant campaign boost for Carter when six Federation affiliates endorsed him on July 30 for the 1980 presidential race, in a notably early move. These were the UFCW (Bill Wynn), CWA (Glenn Watts), ACTW (Murray Finlay), ILGWU (Sol Chaikin), Seafarers (Paul Hall) and Railway Clerks (vice-president Jack Otero) [BNA-DLR 1979, 147:A-9]. These were all EXCO "insiders" responsive to broader AFL-CIO policy and political interests.

The Accord negotiations hinged upon AFL-CIO efforts to alter the single figure pay standard proposed by Schultze and COWPS, to a more flexible pay range. In the meantime, Kirkland publicly maintained that "guidelines are not the proper approach to the resolution of the problem" and that the Federation had declined to make specific recommendations for Year II. Owing to scheduling requirements - and the uncertainty surrounding the Accord - COWPS issued proposed guidelines for Year II on August 7th: had the AFL-CIO rejected them outright, the Accord negotiations would have collapsed. Instead, Kirkland acknowledged that "the procedures of the law" had dictated COWPS' activity: "I think it's still open ... you must not confuse the ritual of bureaucratic procedure with substance." Reiterating that a "thorough discussion and negotiation of the terms of restraint" were essential, Kirkland warned that he would "take a jaundiced view" of guidelines "from circles of economists [of] an authoritarian disposition, who would like to have the power to wave a wand and control our society", and "backed up by clubs of one sort or another" [AFL-CIO PR, Aug.7/79:2; 5]. The AFL-CIO hedged on other areas of conflict with the White House. Throughout the year, the Federation had opposed the Administration's retrenchment

strategy, including within Congress, and the projected recession was now in evidence. Kirkland looked to the White House for remedial "countercyclical" measures; he stated that while interest rates were again as high as during the Nixon presidency, "tight money" was "only one part of the problem" and, under Carter, "offsetting measures ... in the form of jobs programs and tax policies" and commitments under the Humphrey Hawkins Act would limit the impact of Federal Reserve Board activity [AFL-CIO PR, Aug.6/79:5]. Thus, the Accord process kept the door open to political bargaining.

By late August, the EPG had decided, after prolonged consideration, to proceed further with voluntary restraint and labour cooperation, but the viability of the Accord and the broad array of policy and political trade-offs for both sides still hinged upon the Year II standard. For the White House, cooperation on the guidelines programme was a pre-requisite to agreement. In turn, Kirkland was publicly adamant that the AFL-CIO would not participate in the Accord or PAYC without influencing the formulation of the Year II standard, insisting that the White House should not simply accept the COWPS figure and merely allow PAYC to review it. The labour leaders argued that the figure adopted should be flexible enough to allow PAYC to exercise meaningful authority (and avoid being overwhelmed by appeals) [Eizenstat]. Kirkland proposed that further action be deferred until PAYC was established and developed principles upon which to base the standard. This was eventually the course adopted.

In September 1979, when the final play over the Accord, PAYC and the Year II programme took place, the standards programme laboured under increasing opposition. A number of major corporations went on record against the guidelines, arguing that they had failed to combat inflation in Year I (then drawing to an end).[45] On the labour side, the NEA criticized the effects of the pay standard, the AFT wanted the low-wage exemption increased to $6.50 for Year II and AFSCME criticized the looseness of the price side, supporting AFL-CIO calls for a tripartite price body [BNA-DLR 1979, 179:A-14]. A problematically large UAW settlement was seen by the White House as a forerunner of more contract outcomes, further undermining the early pattern of union wage restraint and compliance, and jeopardizing the guidelines.

Relations between the White House and Federation were on a knife-edge. The former's decision to proceed on the basis of the Accord was narrow and last-minute: the President and his principals supported the Accord, and the partnership with labour it

[45]These included Mobil Oil, Union Oil, Phillips Petroleum Co., Getty Oil Co., Texas Instruments, Cities Service Co. and General Telephone & Electronics Corporation [BNA-DLR 1979, 179:A-13]. The petroleum sector was seeking exemption from the standards on the grounds of being hostage to foreign suppliers.

represented, provided restraint was not thereby jeopardized. The White House made some concessions on the standards programme. The mandatory federal employee pay ceiling of 5.5%[46] established in Year I had been criticized by the AFL-CIO on behalf of its public sector members. The White House was concerned about the impact on the deficit of increasing this "cap", but agreed to eliminate the differential and apply the standard uniformly. This concession gained Kirkland support for the endorsement of the Accord from public sector members of the EXCO (such as Blaylock) and no doubt favoured Kirkland and Donahue in their candidacy for the AFL-CIO leadership positions. The Federation also persistently, and with some success, pressed to extend the low-wage exemption made in Year I.[47] The White House was concerned at the labour leaders' insistence that sanctions should not be used on the pay side of the programme (Kirkland could hardly compromise, given his approaching election). The COWPS economists pressed the need for sanctions, hoping to modify the AFL-CIO's stance, but Miller, recognizing the symbolic importance to labour, engineered a compromise private understanding whereby penalties were retained, but not used while labour provided voluntary participation in the standards:

> On the wage side, the procurement sanction was never used to deny a government contract. This can be directly attributed to the national accord between the AFL-CIO and the Administration reached in late September 1979. In return for labor's support for the Administration's anti-inflation programs, the Administration gave an unwritten commitment not to invoke the procurement sanction. [PAYC, 1982:26].

To mitigate the effect of the concession, Russell announced that companies must continue to certify compliance before bidding for government contracts [BNA-FED 1979, 152:2:1559] - an ineffective ploy, for none had been withheld from non-compliers during Year I. White House aides declared publicly that the concessions were subject to revision in the event that voluntary wage and price restraint proved ineffective [*NYT*,Oct.3/79].

The President and White House still contemplated proceeding with the Year II standard developed by COWPS because of concern at the prospect of a pay board whose powerful management and labour members would push for higher wages. COWPS otherwise expected to set a standard similar to Year I [Murphey], but the AFL-CIO insisted upon a pay range of 7.5-9.5%. Schultze proposed that 8.5% be set as a pay norm (including "fringes" but excluding social security), arguing that an unequivocal number was essential to gain

---

[46]The Presidential Advisory Committee on Federal Pay had recommended an 8.4% increase [AFL-CIO, 1979a:119].

[47]In Year I of the programme, the original exemption of $3.50 was strongly criticized; the AFL-CIO argued that higher inflation levels meant an allowance of $5.47 was needed simply to achieve equivalence with the exemption established by Nixon. COWPS exempted *individuals* earning less than $4.00 per hour. For Year II, PAYC extended coverage to *units* where average straight-time hourly earnings were below a fixed amount. PAYC management members unsuccessfully attempted to exempt small firms (which have more low-paid workers) [BNA-DLR 1979, 237:A-21].

employer support. The proposed pay board clearly would not agree to such a figure, and the EPG decided upon a 7% standard for Year II should agreement with labour fail. However, the period was seen as politically critical by Carter and his aides. Indeed, rather than establishing PAYC as a mechanism to influence the union wage sector, in COWPS' view it was a response to labour's political threat [Murphey]. The impact of OPEC price increases (and problematic relations with organized labour) made Carter and his aides reluctant to be associated with a pay board which was "out bashing wages" prior to the election: the tripartite PAYC was established and Dunlop was "brought on board to get rid of the system", as with the Nixon board [Bosworth]. The economists sought to fortify the programme and minimize PAYC's authority, and thus the influence of big business and big labour, and Schultze later commented that the President should have taken a firmer stance in the negotiations [Schultze]. During the ensuing weeks, the EPG continued these deliberations, while Miller and other principals worked to sustain relations and ensure cooperation from the labour leadership. The White House, concluding that agreement with labour was possible and desirable, then decided to pursue the Accord. Policy decisions taken on the standards programme were "holding measures": publication of the Year II proposals was deferred and the Year I standard simply extended until September 30th to avoid jeopardizing the PAYC negotiations and, according to COWPS' new director Bob Russell, to avoid imposing the pay standard provisions on PAYC. The struggle by the economists to establish the single-figure standard was carried forward with PAYC, ending only with the formal adoption of a pay range in March 1980, six months through the programme year.

The Reaction of Business Interests to the National Accord

> Normally, an announcement that the White House has been horse-trading with labor unleashes torrents of angry press releases from one end of corporate America to the other. This time, the denunciations are few ...[about]... what some in Washington called America's version of the British social compact...". [BNA-DER 1979, 195:P-6]

Business was not considered a natural constituency by the Carter White House, although Carter was a "small-town businessman" from Georgia, a non-union state [Eizenstat], whereas organized labour was recognized as a basic Democratic constituency. The President and some senior aides had close relations with leading corporate executives [Chapter 6], but there was difficulty with the small and medium business sector, especially the NAM, and with the Chamber of Commerce, including on the Year I standards programme, where some large enterprises were also flouting the guidelines. Business reaction to the Accord reflected these relations and the ensuing consultative pattern by the White House: business leaders criticized their exclusion from consultation and complained of their ignorance of what "deals were cut" [quoted in *Business Week*, Dec.7/79:33]. Miller affirmed later that he had been careful

throughout to consult with business leaders on the developments [Miller]; the Accord was certainly discussed with some corporate leaders, including Business Roundtable chairman Irving Shapiro, who agreed to support the White House, but possibly only "the influential Business Roundtable" had been formally consulted [BNA-DER 1979, 195:P-6]. Since big business expressed little opposition, business reaction to the Accord and the Year II proposals was reported as uniformly surprisingly mild. However, Republican critics such as Senator Tower (R-Tex), who cited the Nixon Board (and who worked closely with oil interests) and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce complained that the Administration had "caved-in" to organized labour and had failed to consult business interests [BNA-DLR 1979, 189:A-8]. Some business leaders reacted in outrage to the Accord *process* rather than its policy content [Dunlop; Young]; the Chamber of Commerce complained: "An exclusive policy-making club of labor and the Administration is not an appropriate way to make economic policy." [BNA-DER 1979, 195:P-6]. Generally, while business interests expressed a "few" problems with the Accord, they weren't strongly concerned at the bilateral aspect [Schultze].

The White House did have difficulty, however, in securing business participation on the Accord pay and price boards [Chapter 7]. Business leaders felt their own interests were better served by dealing directly with COWPS rather than a pay board which they complained (somewhat disingenuously) would favour organized labour and fail to represent the unorganized majority of workers [Murphey]. Employer resistance to unionization, especially by small and medium-sized businesses, profoundly influences the size of the unorganized and unrepresented sector of U.S. labour; indeed, one attraction of the Accord for some business leaders was that formal labour participation in the guidelines programme meant opposition to restraint could no longer serve as a rallying point in union organizational activity. Along with congressional Republicans, business leaders argued that establishing the pay board/Year II would represent a step toward mandatory controls; the Chamber of Commerce suggested that labour might use the Accord route to force their introduction, commenting also that the Accord had "something in it for everyone, and therefore nothing that can be relied upon." Moreover, the Accord was seen by business as the assertion by labour of influence with the White House and the pay board as the centre-piece of a broad economic agreement and the product of a political exchange, "created as a part of a highly political National Accord between the Carter Administration and organized labor." Business leaders argued that the Accord was a political bargain struck "at a time when the Administration [is] desperate for allies" and containing little new in terms of policy, although the language of the Accord was taken as a warning sign that the White House would soften its stance on fiscal austerity. [BNA-DER 1979, 195:P-6; DLR 1979, 189:A-8; *Business Week*, Dec.17/79:33].

Later, Schultze complained that the Accord enabled organized labour to become established as an official body to be consulted, while the Administration got nothing but "lip-service" on the wage/price programme [Schultze]. On the pay standards component specifically, "the AFL-CIO agreed not to oppose the continuation of the standards program in return for an active role in the formulation and administration of the second year of the pay standards." Considered alone, this arrangement certainly favoured labour, but the White House secured other specific policy gains, notably on the energy programme and SALT II and the wage and price programme, though relaxed, was at least sustainable. Moreover, the Accord process moderated AFL-CIO criticism and active opposition. These gains were important to the White House in view of Carter's weak leadership image [Morgan, 1983:1-4] and poor standing in Congress, as well as the approaching election and Kennedy's nomination challenge within a Democratic Party, including organized labour, with relatively weak ties to the President. We now examine the complex institutional politics shaping the Federation leadership's decisionmaking and producing an operative consensus which secured a number of policy advantages through the Accord.

CHAPTER 5

CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS: AFL-CIO EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP AND THE NATIONAL ACCORD

> The Accord is a complex agreement, both formal and informal in its terms, that is supposed to provide labor with high-level and timely access to Administration policymakers on a broad range of economic and political issues. [BNA-DLR, 1980, 94:A-6].

This chapter explains the AFL-CIO Executive's decision to enter into the National Accord. On the eve of the Carter presidency, the AFL-CIO was undergoing substantial internal transition resulting from the changing configuration of membership and leadership turnover. These changes created a somewhat more activist, progressive Executive Council at the critical point of Meany's retirement and Kirkland's election as president, and brought new views, agenda demands and tensions within its decisionmaking structure, renewing debate on the nature and level of labour's political activity and the appropriate role and powers of the AFL-CIO. Some internal instability resulted while the changes were absorbed, straining the Federation's ability to achieve consensus and mobilize support through the structure of authority, norms and traditions underpinning labour collective action. As a result, the Federation was regarded by some as "moribund", with decisionmaking and action vulnerable to disruption by intense minorities within the Executive level. Meanwhile, the AFL-CIO confronted a denser, more competitive interest group sector and, in the context of economic decline and periodic recession conditions, heightened conflict with business interests. The AFL-CIO was surpassed in grassroots organization and campaign financing, at a time when its traditional position within Democratic Party politics was uncertain and the legislative environment increasingly difficult. Moreover, "neither lobbying strength nor electioneering clout ensures the AFL-CIO a decisive, officially acknowledged, voice on labour questions" [Salisbury, 1979:217]. The AFL-CIO's relationship to the president is perhaps the key element of its national policy standing and its status within the labour sector [Butler]. During the Carter presidency, the AFL-CIO's status within the labour sector was injured by its unusually weak standing with the new Democratic President and White House. These factors underlay the rapprochement of January 1979 and the subsequent Accord negotiations.

The National Accord re-established AFL-CIO pre-eminence as labour spokesgroup in presidential policymaking and within the organized labour sector, also signalling its renewed status more widely. The White House met separately with the Teamsters and UAW, involving them without detracting from the representative primacy of the AFL-CIO, and similarly met separately with some corporate leaders. In policy terms, the Accord constituted a political bargain with the Carter White House whereby the labour leadership

agreed to trade-off Federation participation in the anti-inflation programme - including wage restraint - and broader policy support, in return for consultative rights plus both general and specific policy commitments. The text of the Accord [Appendix A] emphasized the macroeconomic concerns of the White House and the Federation: for the former especially, inflation and wage restraint; of greater priority to labour, unemployment and countercyclical measures. The AFL-CIO leadership needed to articulate a formal response to inflation; some affiliates were critical of the failure to address an issue of such major public concern. Moreover, the labour leaders wished to gain influence over the President's anti-inflation strategy, both the wage and price programme - unilaterally imposed during Year I with some success and budgetary measures. The Accord uniquely formalized corporatist-style consultative relations between the Executive branch and the labour peak organization. Indeed, a double-level, overlapping trade-off occurred between the AFL-CIO and the White House on the one hand, and between the AFL-CIO as a collective and Executive Council (EXCO) members individually, overcoming decentralized authority and institutional fragmentation. The "package" nature of the Accord involved a number of *quid pro quo* policies and direct participation by EXCO members in the negotiating process, achieving a remarkable operative consensus among the labour leaders and reinforcing Kirkland's leadership standing. The Accord was predominantly a leadership strategy; its transmission to rank and file members was limited and largely *post hoc*. In part, this low profile was simply a matter of timing, but also reflected the norms of union autonomy within the AFL-CIO, so that beyond internal newsletters and other publications, and communications downwards through state and local units, much action - including actual bargaining restraint - depended upon the union presidents individually, reinforcing the importance of consensus at the Executive level, but also limiting the elements of social control and mobilization which are thought integral to corporatist exchanges.

AFL-CIO LEADERSHIP: REPRESENTATION AND EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY

> In structure the federation is a mass based democratic organization governed by a constitution, biennial conventions, and elected executive bodies headed by the president. In practice an aging oligarchy dominates. [Holloway, 1979:120]

The biennial convention is, constitutionally, the ultimate source of authority within the Federation: its most representative organ and "supreme governing body" [AFL-CIO 1979c:IV-I]. Thus, only after a majority vote of convention delegates is an affiliate conclusively suspended or expelled from membership. AFL-CIO Executive members are elected by the convention: the president and secretary-treasurer by majority vote, and the others by a plurality. EXCO members attend the convention *ex-officio*, but may vote only when elected as delegates by their respective unions. They nevertheless exercise considerable influence at the convention

through techniques of agenda and floor management, and through their influence within their respective unions and delegations. In reality, as the convention is held only every second year, it exercises simply a retroactive, relatively weak, check upon decisions [AFL-CIO 1979:IV-8; V-3].

The EXCO [Appendix B] is the formal governing body between conventions. The constitution specifies that it must meet at least three times each year (at the president's call) and establishes its composition: the president and secretary-treasurer (designated "the Executive Officers"), along with 33 vice-presidents drawn from among the leaders (generally the presidents) of affiliated unions.[1] Meeting at quarterly intervals, the Council initiates, reviews, authorizes and enforces Federation decisions or actions on behalf of affiliates [AFL-CIO, 1979c:V-1,2; VI-1; VIII-1-3]. Occasionally, the EXCO is summoned in special session, as on September 28, 1979 when, with symbolic simultaneity, Meany's formal announcement of retirement was received and the National Accord was endorsed: a new era of leadership and a new political strategy. The constitution also establishes the General Board, comprising all EXCO members and the principal officer of other affiliated national or international unions, as well as the trade and industrial departments. However, this Board meets only when called[2] and decides only those policy questions referred to it by the Executive (notably ratifying presidential endorsements).

The Accord strategy predominantly involved the leadership level of the AFL-CIO. The negotiations occurred between conventions and hence were constitutionally the responsibility of the Executive; no special convention was required or held. The Accord was endorsed shortly before the Federation's biennial national convention of November 1979, attended by 895 delegates from 95 national/international union affiliates, 9 departments, 51 state bodies, 206 centrals and 8 directly-affiliated local unions and 2 fraternal delegates, one of whom was Lord Allen, of the TUC [AFL-CIO, 1979a:11]. The Accord was discussed in the EXCO report and by President Meany at the convention, but little of its substance was debated there [Oswald]. Delegates were presented essentially with a *fait accompli*, reflecting the tenuous, last-minute nature of the Accord agreement (under pressures arising from the scheduling of the standards programme) and the limited and sensitive nature of the labour leadership's agreement to wage restraint. Collective bargaining and the pay standards were also agenda items at individual union conferences, while key Federation negotiators, including members

---

[1] All of these Federation officers must be members of an affiliated organization. In 1980, the AFL-CIO adopted an official quota for the representation of women and minorities on the EXCO (2 seats each); as few union presidents meet these criteria, the positions may be filled by senior unionists below that level [AFL-CIO PR, Feb.21/80:1-2; Keller, 1982:2189].

[2] The 1955 merger agreement between the AFL and the CIO specified that it should meet at least annually.

of the *ad hoc* Accord committee made public speeches and/or communicated with their respective memberships about the Accord [Oswald]. The timing, circumstances and the limitations, both structural and normative, upon the AFL-CIO's ability (and willingness) to mobilize rank and file unionists meant that little attempt was made to do so. Its low profile within the labour sector contrasts, for example, with the special delegate conferences and explicit, highly visible discussions on the Social Contract by British unions and the TUC.

The EXCO is a large and cumbersome body whose members collectively represent about 75% of affiliated rank and file members [Oswald]. The size, formality and infrequency of EXCO meetings limit its usefulness, and much decisionmaking devolves upon a smaller group within the leadership level: principally the AFL-CIO president. The constitution [VI-1] designates the president as the chief executive officer, with full authority between meetings of the EXCO; only the EXCO or the biennial convention can reverse or alter his decisions [AFL-CIO 1979c:VI-1,2]. The second most influential Executive member, the secretary-treasurer, customarily stands next in line for the presidency. When Meany retired in late 1979, secretary-treasurer Lane Kirkland succeeded him and Tom Donahue was elected to replace Kirkland. Between meetings of the EXCO, the two chief Executive officers call upon other decisionmakers as appropriate, including individual union presidents from the EXCO (see later) and department heads. Thus, Research director, Rudy Oswald, was closely involved in the support and implementation of the National Accord negotiations. The decisions of these small, strategic groupings are naturally influenced by the need to secure majority endorsement at formal meetings of the EXCO; serious or consistent failure to do so would delegitimate their representational roles. They must anticipate and accommodate the internal politics of the organization; indeed, they are frequently selected by the president with this end in view. The National Accord was characteristic of this leadership strategy and gained formally unanimous endorsement by the EXCO, although opinion varied on the desirability and implications of participation in the agreement, and on its individual components.

> There are differences within the union movement ... but conciliatory mechanisms [enable] a remarkable degree of programmatic consistency, at least most of the time. [Jessup, 1980:53].

The diversity of interests and constituencies represented on the EXCO naturally hampers consensus. As in many labour movements, differences exist between public and private sector unions, white and blue collar worker groups - especially between craft and industrial unions, with the former generally more conservative and the latter more progressive and politically active.[3] Such differences are sharpest over defense and foreign

[3]These cohesive craft unions accounted for 12 of the 35 EXCO positions in the late seventies [Wilson,

policy. Thus, while Kirkland co-chaired the Committee on the Present Danger, AFSCME president Jerry Wurf was a member of the counterposed American Committee on U.S.-Soviet Relations (along with members of the UAW) [Singer, 1977:379]. Differences over domestic policy tend to be more parochial and less far-reaching. Moreover, the norms of EXCO decisionmaking facilitate unity. Agenda control and coalition-building techniques work to prevent seriously divisive issues emerging in EXCO meetings and ensure a sufficient consensus *before* the Council meets. Decisions are customarily formally unanimous, strengthening their public legitimacy. The interests of individual members of the EXCO are also protected by these techniques since, accountable to the members of a particular union, each also has narrower interests to represent and pursue. Where a conflict of interest arises, an EXCO member awkwardly placed may simply abstain from voting, or even avoid a meeting if expedient. At a press conference in 1979, President Meany described the delicate balance of real and formal politics:

> There's total agreement on the Executive Council on the statements that we issue, but you must realize that the AFL-CIO is a coordinating organization of 100 and some odd national and international unions ... It's a completely voluntary organization, and any [affiliate] has a right to take an independent view on anything that we do...
>
> ...sometimes ... when the time comes to approve the resolutions there is no indication that they want to formally go on record in opposition ... Sometimes ... a member of the Council would ask that he be recorded as against the proposal. But we proceed ... on what you might call a consensus basis. [AFL-CIO PR, Feb.20/79:1]

Such practices accommodate disagreement without harmful disruption, unless EXCO members actively and intensely oppose proposals.

Serious divisions preventing formal collective action by the Federation are rare (a fact seldom acknowledged by observers), although inherently significant. The AFL-CIO's failure to endorse the Democratic presidential candidate, George McGovern, in 1972 because of disagreement among the labour leaders, is the most notorious "recent" occasion . Internal differences over presidential endorsements are limited to the choice among *Democratic* candidates. Moreover, whether the Federation makes a formal endorsement or not, the informal stance and personal influence of its leaders is important. The Carter/Mondale electoral coalition established by labour leaders who were close allies of Meany's, and undoubtedly with his approval, clearly signalled "mainstream" labour's choice in the 1980 presidential campaign [Chapter 7]. The informal influence of AFL-CIO leaders, especially Kirkland, was important to Carter's nomination prospects in 1980, helping to discourage adherence to the Kennedy campaign despite the Senator's substantial support among unions, and their disillusionment with Carter's policies. The Federation's pre-eminence is signalled

---

1979:15].

less by public acknowledgement than by operative behaviour among Democrats and unions. Strong unions have sufficient resources to operate with considerable independence from the AFL-CIO within the national policy and electoral processes, and do undertake independent programmes in those states or districts where they are strong, although generally coordinating these activities with the Federation. Some affiliates have pursued independent electoral activity of wider scope, notably as the Labour Coalition Clearinghouse after the 1972 split, but this development was temporary and limited: no affiliate proposed withdrawal from membership. Nor was the Progressive Alliance established for the 1980 presidential campaign indicative of any member union's withdrawal, or even a public statement of dissent [Chapter 7]. Likewise, while some 40 of 96 affiliates in the late 1970s had their own legislative and/or COPE unit, they still participated in the weekly AFL-CIO lobbying meetings and collective activities, as did the UAW and Teamsters. The UAW and Teamsters (indirect) involvement in the Accord process and close cooperation with the AFL-CIO on PAYC [Tchirkow], strengthened labour sector coordination, as did the NEA's participation in the Carter/Mondale Coalition and cooperation with the AFL-CIO forces at the 1980 Democratic convention.

Special recognition by the president and White House is critical to the AFL-CIO's standing within the labour sector. Major unions independently maintain routine contacts with the Executive branch through the Department of Labor, and their leaders seek direct relations with, and patronage from, the president and senior White House aides, which bolsters their standing as elective officials within their unions. Government leaders, however, need a central labour voice, and the AFL-CIO carries more weight in national policymaking than any union individually [Butler; Jensen]. Even powerful affiliates with incentives to independence - progressive, politically-active affiliates such as the IAM and AFSCME - remain within the AFL-CIO because of the additional benefits of collective action and national scope. The National Accord was intended to reinforce this tendency. Any Administration must work with labour's institutional character: "You find the right game rules" [Jensen], sustaining the delicate balance between union autonomy and Federation leadership. The Carter Administration accommodated these institutional politics through a dual strategy, channelling much contact with organized labour through the Federation while maintaining limited direct relations with unions on specific matters of individual concern to them. After the break in relations with the AFL-CIO triggered by the wage/price programme, the White House entered into direct relations with some 40 individual union presidents (principally with fewer than a dozen) [Butler; Jensen], some of whom were openly

critical of Meany's hostile conduct.[4] Thus by-passed, the Federation's functional logic was undermined and its representative force weakened. However, the White House found multilateral relations less effective and far more inconvenient [Butler], and there were other incentives to re-establish relations and construct the National Accord. The Accord provided a structure through which policy fragmentation could be alleviated, and it helped to coordinate the labour component of Carter's policy and electoral needs as he prepared for the 1980 presidential election. In pursuing these objectives, the White House contributed to the Federation's revivification within organized labour.

LEADERSHIP TRANSITION AND THE NATIONAL ACCORD

In the interim, however, the Federation was in an untenable situation, particularly Meany,[5] whose personality and style had greatly contributed to the situation, and Kirkland,[6] both lacking the dual power base of the union presidents. Moreover, the AFL-CIO Executive was in the throes of internal leadership transition. As Kirkland stated: "a member of the council cannot stand for re-election beyond the term in which he retired from trade union office--since the adoption of that rule, we've had a very high rate of turnover", so that by early 1980, there were "very few members of the present council who were there five years ago." [AFL-CIO PR, Feb.21/80:2]. Between 1977 and 1982, 25 of the 35 Executive positions had changed hands [Keller, 1982:2189]. One observer noted in 1977 that "in the next few years" the leader of the AFL-CIO would face a "substantially different cast of characters on the policymaking executive council, many of whom will be more independent and outspoken than their predecessors" [Singer, 1977b:379]. Seven of the 35 executive positions were then scheduled to change hands and the new EXCO was expected to include progressive, newly elected union presidents like Winpisinger (IAM) and Fraser (UAW), had the latter succeeded in reaffiliating (as then anticipated). After the changes, only two members would have

---

[4]Sol Chaikin and Glenn Watts called for moderation of criticisms of Carter; Meany acknowledged Watts' remarks but told the press that Chaikin hadn't commented to him directly [AFL-CIO PR, Feb.20/79:2]

[5]Of an earlier labour generation, Meany was an autocratic leader in style and had long dominated the Federation [Holloway, 1979:121]; he was 85 years old when he retired at the end of 1979. He had risen through the ranks of the Plumbers' Union and the N.Y. State Federation of Labor becoming its president in 1934, AFL-CIO secretary-treasurer in 1939, and president in 1952 [Singer, 1977b]. Two of his early achievements included drafting an unemployment insurance system in New York in 1933 and, in 1935, leading "a successful strike against the U.S. Government to persuade the Public Works Administration to abide by prevailing wage laws on public works projects...". Meany managed the 1955 AFL-CIO merger and became the first Federation president thereafter. For a brief review of some of his accomplishments, see Kirkland's address to the 1979 AFL-CIO convention: *George Meany. His Life Works Would Do Honor to a Dozen Men*, reprinted in AFL-CIO Series(e), December 1979.

[6]Kirkland originally belonged to the then International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots. He was never elected to union office, rising instead directly through the Federation bureaucracy [Singer, 1977b:377]. He joined the research department of the old (pre-merger) AFL and became Meany's executive assistant in 1961, gaining the position of secretary-treasurer in 1969.

served more than eight years [Singer, 1977b:381; 379]. Other recently elected leaders of major affiliates included McBride (Steelworkers), Watts (CWA) and Fitzmaurice (IUE). These unions, all participants in the Labor Coalition Clearinghouse, pressed for closer organizational ties to the Democratic Party and were expected to press for other new policies within the Federation. Other relatively new (i.e. since the mid-seventies) and liberal leaders likely to support them included the labour liberals Sidell (Carpenters & Joiners), Finley (ACTW), Chaikin (ILGWU), Turner (IUOE) and Blaylock (AFGE) [Singer, 1977b:380-1]. Meany's impending retirement was an additional factor, for:

> Once Meany retires ... the stresses within the Federation are bound to increase. Old alliances will be questioned and some new ones undoubtedly formed ... the federation will face the fundamental challenge of whether it can accommodate the gathering [internal] storm without being weakened as a legislative and political force in national affairs. [Singer, 1977b:381].

Meany formally announced his retirement only on the eve of the Accord's endorsement, but Kirkland had increasingly assumed his responsibilities during early 1979.[7] The formal leadership change triggered a number of promotions other than Kirkland's, notably Ken Young's move from the Legislative Department to become Kirkland's executive assistant. Along with the retirement of the long-time directors of the two major political departments, Andrew Biemiller (Legislative Department) and Alexander Barkan (COPE), a significant leadership shift and generational change had already taken place by late 1979. However, continuity of some leadership, including the central role of Kirkland, Donahue, Young and Oswald, and Biemiller's lingering influence within the Legislative department, greatly limited the operational impact and potential institutional disarray. Indeed, one observer commented that "unfortunately, there was extraordinary continuity", and that the Federation continued to operate overall as an "incompetent bureaucracy" despite the changes to its "aging oligarchy" [Ua]; little in the way of increased Federation activity, flexibility or willingness to experiment resulted. When asked what new programmes and changes he would introduce upon being elected to the presidency, Kirkland replied:

> Well, you know I'm not a stranger coming into this house. I've been here for quite a while, and I've been part of the policy making structure. Everything ... we have undertaken ... has mine among the fingerprints on it ... I'm [not] going to have ideas of throwing over vast areas of policies or programs that I was partly responsible for... [AFL-CIO PR, Oct.18/79:2]

However, the re-establishment of the Federation's special status with the presidency, and its organizational credibility, was important to Kirkland, especially as heir-apparent within the AFL-CIO. He was the driving labour force behind the negotiation of the National Accord.

Kirkland had risen through the Federation's internal career ladder to the position of

---

[7]He was president in all but name by early 1979, shortly after the rapprochement with the White House [AFL-CIO PR, Oct.25/79:1].

secretary-treasurer, the second-most powerful position and a stepping-stone to the presidency. He could expect support for his election from his (and Meany's) allies on the EXCO and at the Federation convention. Nevertheless, he needed to consolidate his position in the face of potential challengers - and the occasional EXCO critic:

> Survival is the issue for trade unions in America today. I'm not certain Mr. Kirkland is capable of feeling the threat of extinction. His has been the world of intramural politics and sophisticated staff sycophancy. It has not been the real world of survival in local union politics, survival in a dangerous or teeming workplace, survival at the bargaining table, survival on the picket line, or survival in an anti-union society at large.
>
> Literary wit and readiness to compromise are his apparent assets, but those can be feeble weapons in the power struggles of a war for survival. [Winpisinger, BNA-DLR 1979, 232:A-10].

As early as 1977, EXCO members Sidell, Finley, Watts, Chaikin, Ward, Lyons and Hall were all being suggested as possible successors to Meany, there was some support for electing Doug Fraser and, by October 1979, the Engineers' president, J.C. Turner, had laid claim to some four million pledges (or votes) in his challenge for the leadership [Singer, 1977b:381; AFL-CIO PR, Oct.16/79:4; Butler]. There was also competition for the position of secretary-treasurer. The victor, Donahue, was Kirkland's preferred choice, although the latter maintained formal impartiality and indicated (though noticeably without enthusiasm) that an alternative candidate, Marty Ward, would be acceptable if he gained sufficient support. Kirkland stated meaningfully:

> I think a president's views of whom he would work most closely and comfortably with--ought to carry some weight, although it is an elected office, and the view of the members of the Council and the affiliated organizations who are not on the Council ought to have an opportunity to be expressed. [AFL-CIO PR, Oct.16/79:4].

Leadership changes had given the EXCO a more liberal and progressive character overall [Singer, 1977b:376], and reporters speculated that opposition to Kirkland's election was partly "an effort by some liberals within the Federation to try and impress upon you that they view some of your stands in the past as being a little bit conservative"; Kirkland blandly replied: "No, I don't see that in the picture at all. I don't quite accept those labels." [AFL-CIO PR, Oct.16/79:4]. Certainly, Kirkland's attitudes and interests facilitated the restoration of relations with President Carter[8] and the White House, and made the Accord negotiations and agreement feasible. The process, content and timing of agreement had to be managed without jeopardizing his pending election (by exposing him to attack on cooperation with wage restraint): collective endorsement of the Accord by the EXCO was essential in this respect. The Federation's enhanced standing with the White House and the specific policy commitments gained through the National Accord consolidated Kirkland's position with EXCO members, reinforcing his claim to the AFL-CIO presidency.

---

[8]Kirkland is, incidentally, himself a Southerner, from South Carolina [Rathbun, 1979:10].

Quite apart from such considerations, the Accord interested Kirkland for several reasons.[9] He was familiar with previous experiments in the U.S. in bipartite and tripartite cooperation at the national level, such as the War Labor Board in WWII, had participated on a committee of the Wage Stabilization Board during the Korean War, and had long been involved in the Labor-Management Group. At the time of the Accord, a trilateral government, labour and management cabinet-level committee was reconsidering U.S. relations with the International Labor Organization [AFL-CIO PR, Sept.3/79:9]. Tripartite approaches to dispute resolution have long been used in labour-management relations in the U.S., where some sectors of the union movement are strongly oriented toward tripartitism [Bredhoff; Tchirkow]: the Accord was intended to provide a vehicle for tripartite structures at the sectoral level, especially during Carter's expected second term [Kirkland; Jensen]. Kirkland regarded tripartitism and consultative policy relations as the opposite to isolated policymaking, and the "only alternative" to "unilateral diktat" by government "or by Brookings" [Kirkland]. Moreover, Kirkland considered the Accord as the form Executive-Federation relations ought to take - as did the White House [Butler]; however, he observed that a *formal* statement of Executive-labour relations should not be necessary: the unusually poor relations between the Federation and the Carter presidency had created the need. Relations amounting to an informal Accord during previous presidencies were what Kirkland regarded as the norm.[10] The consultative process established through the Accord brought labour appropriately *inside* the policy process, although Kirkland also believes that some matters must *normally* remain outside the scope of such cooperation. Collective bargaining is a matter on which unions remain overwhelmingly averse to government intervention, although the political agenda of the post-War period has repeatedly compelled the labour leadership to confront wage restraint policies. As an AFL-CIO leader, Kirkland emphasized long-term objectives, foremost among which was economic revitalization through the "reindustrialization of America". This theme was increasingly emphasized by the White House and Federation during the National Accord, since it offered some prospect for continuing cooperation between them.

THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT AND THE NATIONAL ACCORD

The U.S. policy system, particularly the legislature, is characteristically negative: more susceptible to veto than conducive to the passage of positive policy initiatives. As the system favours the status quo, much depends upon the prevailing political climate in

---

[9]Unless otherwise specified, the following discussion draws upon an interview with Kirkland.

[10]The Johnson presidency is the strongest example. In fact, Kirkland recalled that a kind of "mini-Accord" had been agreed, centred upon the work stoppage issue at missile construction sites [Kirkland].

determining the balance of forces for and against policy proposals, and shaping coalitions. In pursuing a national policy strategy, the AFL-CIO necessarily seeks influence with the White House, Congress and key parts of the bureaucracy. Kirkland commented on the difficulties posed by this fragmentation of government, in contrast to the negotiation of a social contract in Britain, where the government could more readily meet the commitments undertaken as part of the negotiated exchange:

> Great Britain, like most European countries, has a unitary system of government ... In these circumstances it's possible to reach these arrangements and understandings. I regard it as a constructive method of relating the role and responsibilities of free institutions ... in a democracy with the duties and responsibilities of government.
>
> That's not so easy in this country. You would have a helluva time, even if you were ready, willing and able to do it, finding anybody who could deliver. The founding fathers ... set up a government of divided powers and checks and balances, so who do you negotiate a social contract with? [Kirkland, AFL-CIO PR, Aug.8/79:2].

When questioned further on labour's reasons for entering into the Accord, Kirkland described it as an "American adaptation" of the British social contract, given the separation of powers and lack of party discipline, whereby "no administration can assure performance on a legislative issue." He stressed the special role of the presidency in initiating policy objectives and the need for a coordinated lobbying strategy in order to succeed in Congress, so that:

> We have entered into an accord with the one branch of the government, which hopefully will produce joint action on a variety of issues which ought to enhance our capacity to persuade the Congress that these matters ought to be acted upon favourably. We fully recognize the fact that the legislative branch is an independent entity; however, there's a role for leadership in this country, and that role traditionally and historically and inevitably must fall upon the executive branch.
>
> Historically, whenever any progress has been achieved or programs have been developed, the initiative has come from the executive branch. Without that initiative, very little happens. It is exceedingly difficult to pursue a legislative initiative in the Congress without the concurrence and support of the executive branch. So we are doing the best we can, in an approach that we have never tried before, but that we think warrants a major effort in the light of the circumstances of the American constitutional system [AFL-CIO PR, Sept.28/79:3].

The Accord was an exclusively Executive branch agreement and was pursued in Congress only in the form of its individual components. The Accord, however, emerged primarily from the weakness of relations between President Carter and the labour leadership, not their strength. Policy harmony between them was less evident than under Franklin D. Roosevelt, Kennedy or Johnson, as a result of the emerging political and presidential agenda, the ensuing divergence of their priorities, and the difficulties arising from personality conflicts and institutional politics, as well as the difficulty of constructing an operative consensus among the labour leaders. In pursuing their own objectives, however, each deliberately supported a visibly imperfect bargaining partner.

NEGOTIATING THE ACCORD: STRATEGY AND CONSENSUS

> The National Accord marks the beginning of a whole new era of public policy activism [by labor and] a real shift in attitude, approach, strategy, and tactics [Jensen].

> I think it represents, perhaps for the first time, a formulation of an approach to relations between government and private voluntary groups in this country ... working toward constructive common goals. [Kirkland; AFL-CIO PR, 0511/D:3].

Given presidential aloofness from organized interests and an increasingly unfavourable congressional policy environment, a unified labour voice enhanced the prospects for national policy influence [Jensen] at a time when organized labour was increasingly on the political and industrial defensive. The National Accord, as an institutional strategy, was a means to this end. Kirkland had also to determine an internal labour strategy rendering the Federation a more plausible policy partner under conditions of internal diversity, disagreement and leadership transition. The Accord process and content made possible a workable degree of commitment and consensus among members of the EXCO. Within the labour sector, the Accord demonstrated the advantages the Federation, as a collective, could gain for its affiliates - that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts - helping to restore organizational credibility. When Kirkland was asked what the agreement provided that labour didn't already have, and why the labour leadership would participate in a pay programme with which they did not agree, he emphasized the principle of comprehensive consultation "absolutely missing in the past and it is very important to us" [AFL-CIO PR, Nov.25/79:89]:

> Well, I don't believe that we have ever had a total role--expressed in its proper context and the role of wages, wage negotiations and collective bargaining--linked ... in this way to the total scheme of things, to general economic policy, to trade issues, to all of the other matters that we address, and to the programs that ought to be forthcoming in the event of a deepening recession. All of which ... bear directly upon the question of trade union participation and cooperation with an administration ... it sets forth a sort of charter for that, and I want to emphasize that our participation in the wage committee is ... simply one part--of an integrated whole, and it's premised on the whole, and we expect to be involved and to be consulted and to have a role in this total framework that's described in this accord. [AFL-CIO PR, Sept.28/79:2].

We turn next to an examination of this process of engineering consensus within the EXCO for the negotiation and subsequent "unanimous" endorsement of the Accord.

THE RAPPROCHEMENT AND EARLY ACCORD NEGOTIATIONS

The economic conditions prevailing during Carter's presidency would undoubtedly have strained relations between the labour leaders and the White House under any president. However, matters had been much worsened by the shortcomings of the Carter presidency in coalition-building, and specifically in consultative provisions and access (especially to the President)6 which are a customary element in gaining labour support. Other presidents, like Johnson, more adeptly avoided such errors. The break in relations between the Carter White House and Federation in late 1978 lasted only three months; both sides wished to renew contact and meetings recommenced in January 1979. At a meeting of the President and his advisers with Meany, Kirkland and a subcommittee of the EXCO, the labour leaders:

> ...explored the state of communications and relations with the executive branch and expressed some dissatisfaction with the fact that we were frequently getting surprised by positions taken in areas of very direct concern to us, winding up in battles that could have been avoided with proper advance notice and consultation. [AFL-CIO PR, Oct.16/79:2].

The President affirmed a desire for better relations and policy cooperation, establishing as his institutional mechanism for rapprochement the new cabinet-level group chaired by Vice-President Mondale, to provide for regular meetings and consultation with the AFL-CIO leadership. The President also offered to be "readily available" personally to the Federation leaders for discussions they "wanted to pursue further, beyond that group" [Kirkland, AFL-CIO PR, Oct.16/79:2]. Previously, they (and the other members of the labour-management forum abandoned by the White House) had access to Carter as individuals only, since the President (and White House) lacked "institutional perspective" [Donahue], and had less understanding of "institutional politics" than predecessors such as Johnson [Jensen]. Through the rapprochement and Accord process, however, the White House recognized the need to work with and through *organizations* as such [Donahue]. Yet Carter was not directly involved in the new forum, Mondale's own participation was limited, and early meetings were not harmonious. Kirkland had not yet assumed Meany's responsibilities, and there were difficulties with Schultze and Blumenthal. Relations were sustained through the efforts of Marshall and Butler until Kirkland's gradual prominence and Blumenthal's later replacement by Miller facilitated negotiations. Over time, Federation concern was alleviated "inasmuch as we clarified the question of consultative procedures. I think our access and the extent of the seriousness of our consultations and their nature has been much improved since then." [Kirkland, AFL-CIO PR, Aug.6/79:3].

Even by February 1979, Meany's public stance toward the White House had softened. Although he affirmed that the President hadn't improved upon the "C-minus" rating given him the previous year, he denied that relations might collapse again:

> He's the only President we have. We worked like hell to get him elected ... when we don't agree to everything that he brings up, that doesn't mean that we're approaching a break ... We're dealing with the President--we deal with every President whether he's a Republican or a Democrat. [AFL-CIO PR, Feb.20/79:4].

Meany stated that Carter had sought cooperation only on the price side of the anti-inflation programme, but had not raised the question of wage restraint since: "The whole basic idea is to hold down these high increases in inflation of prices. That's what inflation is all about ... not to hold down the income of the American worker..." [AFL-CIO PR, Feb.20/79:3]. In fact, the Administration's emphasis was on wage restraint, as Meany well knew, and, in the course of the monthly meetings, "it emerged that they were thinking about successor guidelines." [Kirkland, AFL-CIO PR, Oct.16/79:2]. By April, the White House specifically raised the issue of

AFL-CIO support for the voluntary wage restraint provisions. Kirkland responded: "Yes, if we negotiate them", in contrast to the "unilateral ... evolution of your guidelines" [AFL-CIO PR, Oct.16/79:2-3], and that "we'll walk a mile with you, but you have to walk one with us" [Kirkland]. The Accord negotiations established the broader policy context within which the Federation would cooperate with the voluntary wage restraint programme.

However, Kirkland emphasized that the Accord formalized primarily an on-going consultative process, rather than the policy agenda of any presidency: "We would have been ready to enter into such an accord, or such an approach to the role of labor and the total economic and social picture in this country, at any time. We would do the same with any administration." [AFL-CIO PR, Sept.28/79:2]. The lack of consultation was the major complaint made by Federation leaders in repeated meetings with the White House. Thus, Meany, who likewise emphasized the importance of the Accord as a political bargain and exchange between labour and the White House, later remarked: "It is an accord we would have willingly negotiated with the administration a year ago, but there was no real willingness on the part of the administration to treat us as a concerned partner at that time." [AFL-CIO, 1979a:9].

During the course of informal luncheon meetings with Landon Butler, Kirkland introduced the British social contract as a general model for an agreement between the White House and the Federation, involving consultative and specific policy concessions for labour in return for cooperation in the wage programme [Butler]. Wage restraint, the central item on the Carter team's negotiating agenda, was a low priority for the AFL-CIO, which had its own bargaining agenda, as Kirkland later recalled:

> The basis for a cooperative effort must arise out of a negotiated understanding. Negotiations are quite different from being granted an audience, or even being consulted. Negotiations involve the exchange of considerations--relevant considerations. The consideration you seek from us is participation in a program of wage restraints, and we have some considerations, and here's a little list. [AFL-CIO PR, Oct.16/79:2-3].

The Federation emphasized several principles or "key propositions that we deem vital" (in addition to consultation), especially that austerity and self-restraint should be equally shared, with protection for the disadvantaged, so that restraint should not:

> ...simply serve to enhance the rewards and advantages of employers or other elements of society ... We would not regard it as consistent to call upon workers, to call upon the average person to sacrifice and yet offer other elements of society rewards, inducements, financial benefits or incentives in relation to their role. [Kirkland, AFL-CIO PR, Sept.28/79:1].

Subsequently, the labour leadership repeatedly criticized Administration policy for failing in these respects. Specific policy commitments included: a comparable pay guideline for federal and private sector employees, through raising the public sector pay ceiling from 5.5% to 7%

(initially); the Administration's more active enforcement of trade agreements, action on maritime and trade policy and additional funds under the Trade Adjustment Assistance Act (legislation was stalled in the Senate); extended OSHA coverage for federal employees; a "visible commitment" by the Administration to unemployment targets under the Humphrey-Hawkins Act (the White House also agreed to provide an additional 13 weeks unemployment compensation allowance); and a stronger role for public investment over private. Owing to its more controversial nature, assistance with renewed attempts at labour law reform was agreed (a piecemeal approach was thought feasible) but not publicly specified in the Accord. The labour leaders wished to toughen the price programme (the Administration "responded favourably"), and pressed for a tripartite price committee similar to that proposed for the pay side. They also expressed opposition to general (and business) tax cuts and restrictive monetary policy. The White House and OMB had reservations as to the feasibility of achieving the unemployment targets or making commitments to any additional direct expenditures, as on the Trade Adjustment Assistance measures, and the price committee was never formally tripartite, but agreement was reached on most items.[11]

The Accord process provided "lead time" essential for the labour leaders to shift gradually to otherwise awkward policy stances. Miller, Butler and Kirkland generally met some six weeks ahead of scheduled EXCO meetings to share information, plan the mutual agenda and settle current issues and potential conflicts [Butler]. For the White House, apart from AFL-CIO support for the Year II standards programme and macroeconomic policy in general, emphasis was placed upon support for the energy programme proposals and SALT II. Here, results were prompt, surpassing best expectations [Butler]. In June 1979, the AFL-CIO endorsed the "main thrust" of Carter's energy programme (although not the decontrol of oil and gas prices, to which the labour leaders eventually gave tacit approval). Carter aides believed formal AFL-CIO support for SALT II was unlikely, but hoped at least to mute criticism; by August, however, Kirkland released an EXCO statement which "essentially declares our support" for SALT II [AFL-CIO PR, Aug.7/79:1]. This involved a sensitive personal policy shift for Kirkland, who was on record stating that the Treaty wouldn't work; acknowledging his position had "evolved", he declared the Treaty acceptable as part of "a continuing process" of arms reduction.[12] Later, although supporting the boycott of the Moscow Olympics, the AFL-CIO reaffirmed support for SALT II despite the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan [AFL-CIO PR, Feb.18/80:4]. These achievements for the White House would not

---

[11]Sources: AFL-CIO [Series(d), Sept.28/79:2]; AFL-CIO [PR, Sept.28/79]; *NYT*, Oct.3/79; Kirkland; Donahue; Young; Denison; Eizenstat; Butler; Jensen]

[12]Two EXCO members, Winpisinger and Finley, voted against support (primarily in opposition to the link between SALT II and MX, rather than the treaty *per se*).

have been possible without the Accord process, and they helped to persuade at least some policy principals of the Federation's credibility and value as a negotiating partner. Since the principals involved on both sides plan their strategies perhaps twelve or eighteen months ahead, greater cooperative results were expected for a second Carter term through reciprocally "evolving positions" [Butler].

By late summer, however, the Accord negotiations hinged upon White House acceptance of the AFL-CIO stance on the Year II pay standard. When asked whether consultation had been adequate, Kirkland replied: "We've had as much as we want. I think they would like us to have more than we might be prepared to have...". He also reiterated that "[w]e're more concerned with the broader context than with the specific elements of a program relating to wages", and therefore had not "wished to discuss a particular wage guideline program or wage control program in isolation from the whole array of problems that this country faces..." [AFL-CIO PR, Aug. 6/79:3-5]. Even when the White House elected to pursue the Accord, however, securing endorsement by the EXCO was a complex proposition requiring skilled management on Kirkland's part (by then, Meany's ill-health precluded his own active involvement). Nevertheless, following a meeting of the joint Accord committee on September 27, a special EXCO meeting held at short notice on September 28 resulted in the formally unanimous endorsement of the Accord, with 12 members absent [AFL-CIO Series(d), Sept.28/79:1-2; PR, Sept.28/79:2].

THE AFL-CIO EXCO AND ENDORSEMENT OF THE NATIONAL ACCORD

EXCO members were by no means wholly in favour of the Accord. Some doubted that the provisions would counteract inflation or otherwise adequately address economic problems, and were likewise sceptical about White House commitments to countercyclical aid. Moreover, there was little to induce formal commitment to wage restraint if viewed in isolation from broader policy concerns; this was one reason the Accord was constructed as a policy "package", persuading EXCO members to support it as a whole while opposing, or disassociating themselves, from any components damaging to their standing as elected officials or otherwise unacceptable to them. Similarly, such provisions made the Accord more palatable for rank and file members [Kirkland]. The labour leaders could reasonably argue that wage-earners' interests were best represented by seeking to influence the content of a further wage and price policy which would be implemented anyway by the Administration, and they could emphasize the other policy gains: thus, they could subscribe to the voluntary pay standard despite the difficult, public, policy reversal involved. Moreover, the Accord would strengthen AFL-CIO influence relative to COWPS before the

Year II standard was finalized, promising greater opportunity to modify it. After union-COWPS conflict during Year I, AFL-CIO vice-presidents necessarily had an interest in restoring and increasing Federation policy influence and, as Butler commented, "what point has the AFL-CIO if it isn't involved in such programmes?" [Butler]. Policy access through the Accord was at a higher level within the Executive branch than COWPS (which functioned as an operational or line organization, although technically a cabinet-level group, chaired by a senior White House adviser). Since the Accord process involved (and coordinated) a number of senior White House decisionmakers with differing priorities, the economists' more technical approach to the standards programme was necessarily diluted - and the AFL-CIO gained influence over policy at the formative stage, rather than being limited to a weaker, reactive role.

These gains alone, however, would not have secured formal endorsement of the Accord. While the Administration's independent operation of Year I of the programme helped to convince EXCO members that there was no better alternative to participation in the Accord, support for the restraint programme from all sources had by now eroded, the procurement penalty provisions had proven weak and the AFL-CIO had successfully blocked some initiatives, including RWI and the expansion of COWPS, in Congress. The Federation had strategically agitated for mandatory controls in the knowledge that such a policy reversal was politically infeasible for Carter, and contrary to his preferences - and those of Schultze and others. The labour leaders regarded past participation in Nixon's formal restraint programme as an unfavourable precedent for cooperation (as did the Carter officials, for contrary reasons). Some EXCO members were therefore sceptical about the government's promised cooperation and about the role of public members on the proposed pay board, regarded as a weak force on the Nixon Board (and, indeed, subsequently largely by-passed on PAYC). In the event, some EXCO members privately advised their union bargaining officials to punch their weight in collective bargaining.

However, the Accord was seen by EXCO members as part of a general trend in the U.S. toward economic planning, and specifically a coherent national plan; this tied in with Federation interest, vigourously pursued by Kirkland, in reindustrialization policy. The White House did, indeed, consciously move in this direction. Moreover, throughout 1979, the AFL-CIO had criticized the Administration's increasing economic conservatism; through the Accord, the labour leaders hoped to gain greater influence over budgetary policy. There were also hopes that the Accord offered an improved prospect for influencing the composition of the proposed price committee (thus making it potentially more amenable to labour influence), and therefore strengthening the existing price provisions, regarded as token and ineffective.

Although these expectations were to be disappointed [Chapter 6], they contributed to the initial acceptance of the Accord by the labour leaders.

Moreover, the Accord strategy included tailored *quid pro quo* policies intended to bring targeted internal AFL-CIO interests on board where support was otherwise less likely (for example, public sector affiliates), or perhaps to satisfy leadership allies on the EXCO. Indeed, there was an item of interest to each of the main affiliated groupings represented on the EXCO. These concessions were secured from the Carter team by the AFL-CIO negotiators led by Kirkland and Donahue. Thus, the public sector pay ceiling was to be raised from 5.5% to match the 7% guideline for the private sector. Also of direct concern to public sector affiliates was the extension of OSHA provisions covering federal workers; the Labor secretary formally affirmed this policy at the EXCO meeting in February 1980 and an Executive Order subsequently fulfilled the commitment [AFL-CIO Series (d), Feb.18/80:7; PR Feb.19/79:1]. Agreement was also negotiated on a number of other items of long-standing concern; for example, on behalf of the Maritime unions, represented on the EXCO by the influential Paul Hall (a staunch ally of Meany).

Another element of the Accord strategy was the direct "substantial participation" of EXCO members during negotiations with the White House, especially in policy areas of particular interest to them [Kirkland; AFL-CIO Series (d), Sept.28/79:2]. An EXCO subcommittee established on the Accord included Wynn, Chaikin and Ward and, as the negotiations acquired substance, *ad hoc* sub-groups of union presidents from the EXCO met with members of the EPG and Administration department heads in specific policy areas, on a varying but on-going basis [Kirkland; Donahue; Butler]. Since the EXCO meets only quarterly, the Federation groupings reported to Kirkland and Donahue [Donahue]. Involvement in negotiating agreement with the Administration in some policy area arguably induced greater commitment on the part of these labour leaders to the National Accord. Internal labour politics of this kind are little remarked upon in broader discussions of such political exchanges; here they were essential to the gradual emergence of an operative consensus within the Federation, and thus to the feasibility of the Accord.

Beyond these considerations, however, EXCO members also regarded the Accord as an historic development: an unprecedented formal statement of the labour leaders' role in national policymaking, offering a model for Executive-Federation relations and setting an important precedent (so it was then thought) for future Administrations [Donahue; Butler]. They stood to gain from this recognition of their authority by the President, the single policy figure in the U.S. with national standing by virtue of office. The Accord provided a new and

improved footing in formal consultation; early and on-going access to the policy process meant an opportunity to influence agenda formation, as well as improved influence over the content of individual White House policies and readier consideration of the particular policy concerns of the labour leaders. Moreover, in the expectation of a second Carter term, the Accord would signal publicly White House recognition of organized labour as a powerful policy constituency. For such reasons, most EXCO members supported Kirkland's view that the Accord was an important *process*. The Accord, developed when President Carter was dramatizing the energy crisis and inflation (and signed some two months after his "malaise" speech of mid-July 1979), was crafted by the negotiators to emphasize the national interest , rather than labour-specific concerns (although some of these were incorporated in the text). Consequently, the labour leaders gained a rare opportunity to demonstrate their importance in the national policy sphere, put forward positions on the inflation issue, visibly act in the national interest in the eyes of unionists, and legitimate their claim to represent all working people. This was indeed an important opportunity to restore credibility, for the AFL-CIO and organized labour, especially in the wake of the common situs picketing and labour law reform defeats. These were effective incentives for the beleaguered labour leaders; and, in essence, the labour leaders conceded little irretrievably through the Accord. Hence, despite the serious reservations, bargaining difficulties and real limitations recognized by both sides, the Accord was unanimously endorsed by the EXCO. However, notwithstanding substantial consultative and policy gains for the AFL-CIO, by the time the Accord was endorsed, the labour leaders' limited influence over fiscal and monetary decisions by the White House was becoming increasingly evident, subsequently jeopardizing continuing cooperation.

CHAPTER 6
ECONOMIC POLICY POLITICS AFTER ENDORSEMENT OF THE ACCORD

Shortly after the Accord was concluded, Kirkland announced labour participation in the wage/price programme through the pay board (PAYC), established by Executive Order along with the price board (PRAC).[1] Over the following months, the AFL-CIO worked through the Accord process, and cooperated with business leaders on PAYC, to relax the Year II pay standard despite strong opposition from Schultze and COWPS. President Carter finally accepted the pay range proposed when disagreement with labour heightened dramatically over fiscal and monetary policy. However, the labour leaders were unable to dissuade the President and White House from the balanced budget course abruptly introduced in the Spring of 1980. Relations were sustained on both sides chiefly by the advanced stage of Democratic nomination politics and the proximity of the presidential election.

PAYC: COMPOSITION AND STRATEGIC FUNCTIONING

Business and Labour Influence Upon the Composition of PAYC

As the labour leaders had advocated, the pay board was tripartite, with membership divided equally among business, labour and public representatives. The 15 members originally planned were increased to 18 and, formally, these were chosen by Kahn and appointed by Carter. On October 16, 1979, the President announced that Dunlop (a public member) would chair the Board, and released the names of the other members [Appendix C]. There was also a designated alternate for each Committee member: "high level officials of their respective organization" rather than "staff support personnel" as in "previous tripartite organizations" [PAYC, 1982:9; *Business Week*, Dec.17/79:33-4; *Congressional Record*, Senate S11398, 1979; White House Press Secretary, Oct.16/79].

Such appointments in the U.S. are customarily made after consultation with relevant major interests and, in effect, the labour and employer panels were selected by their respective constituencies, as Kirkland explained:

> Well, I never felt I had the right to exercise a veto over whom business designates. I certainly wouldn't accept any assertion of a right to veto the labor representatives, so we'll take whomever they put forward. I think they have come up ... with a list of people who are genuine representatives of employers. There's no question about that. [AFL-CIO PR, Oct.18/79:3].

---

[1] PAYC advocated close coordination of pay and price policy, which was of particular concern to business leaders. There were special provisions for "close consultation between the Chairmen of the respective pay and price committees and with key administration officials." They liaised particularly on the coordination and timing of public policy statements and the question of sanctions in a voluntary programme [PAYC, 1982:2; 16].

The membership of the Board reflected established labour-management relations, overlapping with the membership of past groupings, prefiguring future collaborative efforts and reflecting the preferences of the interest groups more closely than those of some policy principals. Thus, Dunlop negotiated successfully to avoid the appointment of macroeconomists preferred by Schultze on the public panel, while Kirkland influenced the labour panel appointments [Dunlop]: Kirkland and three AFL-CIO vice-presidents, namely Wynn (UFCW), Lyons (Bridge & Ironworkers) and McBride (Steelworkers), as well as Fitzsimmons (Teamsters) and Fraser (UAW). As customary under such arrangements, the labour members all worked closely together as a common interest [Tchirkow].

Business leaders participated on the pay board only reluctantly. Earlier, they had complained of programme asymmetry, since there was no corresponding price committee; they now complained that they had no knowledge of the role agreed for PAYC [*Business Week*, Dec.17/79:33]. The NAM argued against the establishment of another layer of bureaucracy and the possibility that PAYC might become a "kangaroo court", determining claims regarding exceptions. The Business Roundtable was reluctant to become involved in ruling on other firms' contracts (an early source of dissension within PAYC), and argued that the board would highlight the wrong aspects of an anti-inflation strategy: reductions in government regulation and federal spending were more important than pay and price controls. Heath Larry (president, NAM) and Philip M. Hawley (president and chief executive officer, Carter Hawley Hale Stores) emerged as informal leaders of the six PAYC business members. Hawley was on close terms with the President; the NAM was not generally favourably disposed toward the Administration, and the group's views were sometimes at odds with those of the other business interests represented [Dunlop; *Business Week*, Dec.17/79:34; Tchirkow]. The White House later made special concessions to retain business participation.

The White House, beyond a gesture of appeasement, had a "large political bet riding" on Dunlop's performance as chairman [BNA-DLR 1979, 240:C-1 quoted; Miller; Tchirkow]. His appointment, variously proposed by Kirkland, Shapiro and Miller, acknowledged his ability to foster a workable consensus between labour and business leaders despite their currently strained relations and differences in preferences and goals: Dunlop could "keep the players in the game" [Tchirkow, quoted; Carp]. A PAYC staff member, Peter Tchirkow, who had worked with Dunlop on mandatory pay questions during the Nixon programme, felt that the Year II programme offered the first *real* chance for effective voluntary labour participation; the President and White House had real hopes for restraint (at least through influencing major settlements), and so became "more responsive" to Dunlop and the labour leaders.

Notwithstanding such considerations, "President Carter has concealed any enthusiasm he may have about Dunlop's return without noticeable strain." [BNA-DLR 1979, 240:C-1]. Nor was Dunlop's appointment expected to please senior economists like Kahn and Schultze, because of his assertive character and style. However, one (unidentified) vice-president of a large manufacturing company, felt that the real problems with COWPS would occur with members below the top level, "almost none of whom, apart from Sean Sullivan, the pay monitoring director, have a very realistic sense of the wage issues, [and] may try to give Dunlop trouble." [BNA-DLR 1979, 240:C-2]. In fact, the main conflicts were at the senior level, but COWPS personnel generally were demoralized by the prospect of the pay board, which they expected to weaken an already difficult programme [Murphey]. In December, Sullivan announced his resignation, claiming that his decision preceded the announcement of PAYC's establishment.

PAYC Jurisdiction and Power: Big Business and Big Labour

At the time the Accord was endorsed, negotiations over the proposed powers of the pay board and its relationship to COWPS remained unresolved. In mid-October, however, the President announced that PAYC would advise COWPS on the development of policies to encourage anti-inflationary pay behaviour (i.e. bargaining restraint) and lower the inflation rate, and upon the "fair and equitable" distribution of the burden of restraint. The Committee's mandate was to consider modifications to, and recommend interpretations of, the pay standard,[2] with its initial recommendations due virtually immediately, by October 31, thus implying that they would be of a limited nature. The White House agreed in principal to accept PAYC decisions, but reserved judgement in cases of significant disagreement, or those involving the national interest [White House Press Secretary, Oct.16/79; *NYT*, Oct.3/79]. These limitations upon the Committee's policy role, and the more technical jurisdiction proposed by the economists, conflicted with labour's view. While announcing the National Accord, Kirkland had stated publicly that PAYC:

> ... will have the responsibility for the *evolution* of standards governing behaviour of wages for the coming year and ... *provide a system of due process*, which has been so conspicuously lacking in preceding machinery, by which our affiliates can present their case if it is alleged that they have departed from those standards and receive proper consideration where cases for exceptions or inequities can be properly heard and considered ... *We are assured that the committee will play a governing role* in that regard. [AFL-CIO PR, Sept.28/79:1, emphasis added].

Kirkland envisaged a more powerful Board, which could reverse COWPS' decisions where necessary [*Business Week*, Dec.17/79:33-4]. However, when asked whether PAYC had "final

---

[2]Including the basic pay standard, COLA inflation assumptions, the low-wage exemption threshold, policy on increments and tandem relationships, and catch-up provisions for employees without COLAs [PAYC; 1982:8].

authority" to rewrite the pay standard and apply it, Kirkland replied evasively: "I have been assured that the recommendations of the pay committee will be taken very seriously indeed." [AFL-CIO PR, Sept.28/79:2]. In the event, political circumstances rendered PAYC recommendations "virtually mandatory" [Murphey], and the Committee assumed a supervisory or oversight role relative to COWPS [Bosworth].

The Committee first met on October 17, 1979, and mid-monthly thereafter (until November 1980), but actually operated primarily through informal groupings of principals and staff. The Roundtable had complained that the public nature of advisory committees meant they tended to posture; similarly, Dunlop argued that provisions for open meetings and press attendance prevented real negotiation and flouted practice in all other advanced industrial democracies [BNA-DER 1979, 195:P-6; 1980, 48:E-1] - although, as Kirkland acknowledged, the greater the resort to "sunshine" laws, "the more the moles dig deeper" [Kirkland]. Dunlop elaborated his point in testimony before the House Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization, Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, in March 1980:

> Leaders or representatives of groups and organizations basically will not make concessions to other points of view and away from established positions and stated resolutions of their organizations, without having the opportunity in important matters to explain the reasons for changes to their key associates or constituents in their own words--and to state "what they got for it"--rather than have to rely on the explanations, tortured or otherwise, expressed to the press. [PAYC, 1982:22]

Such considerations had, of course, shaped the Accord strategy; the advance negotiating, package nature and *quid pro quo* policies of the Accord similarly addressed "political" needs. In the case of PAYC, the measures taken to permit "real" exchanges included the frequent use of subgroups, staff subcommittees, and informal meetings of the key participants who pre-empted formal Board activity by negotiating privately beforehand. There were also agreed "informal" meetings with Miller and other White House principals. Especially under the initial constraints of time, "[i]t was clearly prudent to use subgroups to initiate the review process, achieve consensus, and draft recommendations", and the method was considered "critical" to success. This strategy, resembling techniques used to construct consensus through the Accord subgroups, also facilitated "efficiency and thoroughness":

> It is ultimately easier for a group of 6-8 representative individuals to meet to examine a policy issue than the entire 18-member Committee. The composition of each subgroup generally reflected the interests and the technical knowledge of the members concerning the issue under review. For example, a subcommittee to suggest modifications to the guideline treatment of increments included members from each of the three sides of the tripartite Committee who had special background and interest in the public sector, where incremental forms of compensation arrangements are more commonly found. [PAYC, 1982:10].

The groups played a key role in "expediting the resolution of difficult issues" and, since the Committee's work "involved what the parties normally view as issues of private negotiation, consensus reaching, and the need for the free exchange of views", the subgroup strategy

helped to avoid problems of public exposure [PAYC, 1982:2; 10]. Thus, "in addition to the regular open meetings, the Committee members met in separate caucuses and private meetings in order to reach a consensus among themselves and then on a tripartite basis..." [PAYC, 1982:22]. Dunlop discussed issues first with key labour and business members; the item would then be considered by the full labour-management grouping, before reaching the full committee. All PAYC decisions were formally unanimous, like the AFL-CIO EXCO, but the 16 recommendations issued between October 1979 and December 1980 "reflected a commonality of interest in seeking solutions which largely echoed the views of the labor and management communities" [PAYC, 1982:2]. Public members complained later that they were largely excluded from significant decisionmaking, but Dunlop's concern was on forging agreements which would be viable in practical (and legislative) terms [Dunlop; Kirkland; Tchirkow; *Business Week*, Dec.17/79:33; PAYC, 1982:2; 8-11; 46; Weintraub, 1980].

Special provisions for labour-management cooperation were rapidly established at the staff level, since "it became clear that the Committee would not utilize a large labor-management staff directly tied to the activities of COWPS and the Pay Committee." [PAYC, 1982:10]. Instead, a "quasi-permanent" joint labour-management staff worked independently on modifications to the pay standard and the coordination of stabilization policy, and acted as a conduit for any issues "perceived as important by the larger labor and management communities." On the labour side, Joint Staff activity was coordinated by Frank Pollara, Kirkland's special assistant, and Rudy Oswald; on the business side, by John Read, director of Employee Relations and Personnel, Cummins Engines (whom Tchirkow recalled as a Business Roundtable staffer). In addition, "skilled members of various business and labour organizations were asked to contribute to the work of the ongoing subcommittees", so that the labour and management communications network was informally far-reaching. The Joint Staff worked to develop consensus: "[w]ith very few exceptions this approach worked and demonstrated the commonality of purpose in the tripartite structure" (but primarily labour-management interests). These arrangements again circumvented the public exposure problem since the meetings "were held in closed session, with the Chairman being kept closely advised of the progress of these deliberations." [PAYC, 1982:11].

During December, however, business and labour members did disagree over whether PAYC or COWPS would function as a court of last resort in bargaining disputes.[3]

---

[3]During the Korean War, President Truman established an "Office of Price Stability" (a government agency) and a tripartite "Wage Stabilization Board" an 18-member board (similar to PAYC) in which Kirkland was involved. Moreover, "in response to trade union pressures, its potential powers were enlarged to include the investigation of management-union disputes". There were "mass resignations" from the Truman Board when the President sanctioned a UMW settlement in the face of a Board decision against it [Pencavel, 1981:160].

Management representatives, unwilling to interfere in the internal affairs of individual companies, pressed for the latter alternative; this reflected a normative tradition of autonomy, not a lack of institutional centralization (which PAYC and COWPS remedied sufficiently). They expressed concern at the costs involved if PAYC undertook such activity. Kirkland insisted that such authority was essential, and Fraser (UAW) argued that it was part of the Accord undertaking. Hawley stated ominously that it was unlikely that the disagreement could be resolved [*Business Week*, Dec.17/79:33]. In the event, Dunlop adopted a strategy used successfully on other occasions to resolve internal differences, referring the issue to the staff level where a compromise was achieved: "Although the Pay Advisory Committee did examine policy issues in specific settlements, it was done after the negotiations had been completed and only with the consent of the parties." [Tchirkow; PAYC, 1982:6]. Characteristically, the public members on PAYC played little part in the dispute or its resolution.

The PAYC report reveals the importance of various selective and private interactions involving the strategic decisionmakers:

> ...an internal procedure was established in which the joint staff and key members of the Committee and the Chairman met privately, in a working dinner session, usually the night preceding the full Committee meetings. This accomplished, in part, finalizing joint staff recommendations and the opportunity to address any remaining issues in dispute; to resolve agenda items and priorities; and plan strategy for anticipating other pay issues that might surface. [PAYC, 1982:11].

These, then, were the real decisionmakers. Their methods of consensus-building and agenda management, characteristic to strategic decisionmaking groups, were reminiscent of decisionmaking at the Executive level of the labour Federation and the consensus-building approach undertaken by the White House through the Accord.

There were yet other organizational means through which PAYC members sought their respective and/or mutual objectives. Provisions for joint support among the business interests illustrate one aspect of customary informal cooperation within the formally decentralized employer sector. The "wage councils, task forces and staff of the four major business associations" agreed to provide coordinated support to the PAYC business panel. The business "joint staff" was drawn from the Chamber of Commerce staff, the NAM Task Force on Wage and Price Stability, the Conference Board Compensation Committee and the Business Roundtable Employee Relations Committee. This group developed recommendations and strategy on general stabilization policy and to meet the "specific requirements" of business members, receiving support and "counsel from companies like General Electric and General Motors and from a number of small business and industry specific groups." [PAYC, 1982:8]. These arrangements suggest the more extensive nature of

informal cooperation, representation and influence underlying purely formal provisions - similar to labour sector coordination.

PAYC was not formally involved in day-to-day decisionmaking activity at COWPS, which nevertheless found it advisable to establish informal advance consultation on proposed rules and guidelines through Dunlop, who would then "sound out" the item with key members of the Committee and the Joint Staff, often producing modifications to Council proposals. Such liaison was assured when (as with previous tripartite programmes) the labour and management groupings based some staff at COWPS; labour's representative, Tchirkow, and his business counterpart, were termed the "PAC staff".[4] The staffers, who "virtually lived at COWPS", had good relations with Council analysts, but rather cooler relations with more senior members [Tchirkow], who expressed concern "that the Pay staff might interject its views into matters outside the Committee's responsibility", so that a procedural agreement was necessary [PAYC, 1982:11]. As these staffers were on COWPS' payroll, they had access to data supplied by companies and unions on specific pay matters and attended all conferences between COWPS and such groups. They enabled PAYC to intervene *before* COWPS publicized specific pay decisions; they advised on the impact on the work force of draft regulations and other COWPS decisions; and they acted as "an informal liaison to assist companies and unions in specific council case matters". They functioned as "informal ombudsmen" with "primary responsibility to the Chairman's office, and the labor and management staff groups", providing an "important link between the COWPS and the tripartite committee particularly on specific pay cases, draft regulations and other administrative matters." [PAYC, 1982:12]. Thus, they significantly contributed to the internal power structure at PAYC connecting Dunlop and labour and business leaders, and the Committee's cognizance of COWPS activity. All of these provisions and the subsequent activity of PAYC explain and verify Schultze's view of tripartitism as an opportunity for business and labour leaders to ally in pursuit of mutually acceptable objectives. Kirkland, indeed, suggested that it is government, rather than business, which labour leaders find an unreliable partner, since "it lies, cheats and breaks promises" [Kirkland]. Such relations, however, had proved renegotiable; similarly, labour-management cooperation on PAYC was eloquent testimony to the endurance of their relations in the wake of the situs picketing and labour law reform conflicts.

---

[4]Tchirkow was then a member of the UFCW, moving later to the American Federation of Government Employees. The business staffer was initially Ileane Rosenthal (NAM), and later Robert Gates (ALCOA).

CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE: DECISIONMAKING POLITICS OVER THE YEAR II PROGRAMME

Wage and price restraint in the U.S. has historically "expressly excluded certain sectors from controls", so that coverage is incomplete even before evasions or breaches of the regulations occur. The Korean War price freeze of January 1951 covered about 65% of the CPI measure; the Kennedy-Johnson guidelines applied to "non-competitive markets", Nixon's policy was comprehensive for just a few months during late 1971 and (to a lesser extent) early 1972 . Carter's price standards excluded "competitive firms" [Pencavel: 1981:166-7]; during the programme, there was conflict over whether the inflation rate measure should encompass food, energy and housing, where prices were volatile due to the OPEC price shock, crop failures and supply shortages. The White House policy was to allow the disputed prices to rise to reflect new international economic conditions. Thus, in April 1979, Kahn had announced that food prices were driven up by "competitive market forces" and government intervention would only worsen matters. In May, attributing rising beef and gas prices to scarcity, he insisted that the Administration could not control or fix these prices [BNA-DLR 1979, 66:A-3; 103:A13-14]. The labour leaders argued that these were the areas it was most necessary to control, to moderate the impact of inflation on the average consumer.

Conflict focused upon the suitability of the CPI as an inflation index, since it included elements such as housing and energy. In November, for example, the CPI rose by an annual rate of 12%, but by only 7.5% when food, energy and housing were excluded. In December 1979, Charles McDonald (chairman, Council of Smaller Enterprises and president, McDonald Equipment Company) advocated using the underlying inflation rate as the measure, instead of the CPI. Donahue (AFL-CIO) retorted sharply that workers didn't live on the underlying rate. In January 1980, Sommers (PRAC) proposed that COWPS develop a new composite price index reflecting the shocks to the economy from OPEC price increases "and government induced inflation", which would "put in a clearer light the competition between business and labor for income shares". PRAC member Carol Schwartz Greenwald, suggested that the index might reveal the CPI to be an inappropriate measure for COLA adjustments: the Carter economists were particularly concerned that these would build exogenous price shocks into the underlying price structure. The proposals were vehemently opposed on PRAC by Stanley Rutenberg, former director of research at the AFL-CIO [BNA-DLR 1979, 237:A-21; 1980, 6:A-2].

Meanwhile, reflecting the consensus among labour and business members and Dunlop, PAYC sought to relax the wage restraint programme. Dunlop stated publicly that the establishment of PAYC signalled a move away from direct involvement in collective

bargaining. The Committee's first policy statement (not issued until January 22, 1980), recommended that 1980 should be a transitional year with a return to free collective bargaining thereafter - a view repeated throughout 1980 (including by PRAC). These views, though unwelcome, could hardly have surprised the White House, for they had been publicized during Nixon's programme [American Enterprise Institute, 1973:8]. While Schultze and COWPS preferred to proceed independently with a single-figure standard in Year II similar to Year I [Schultze], the programme was not thought viable without the participation of labour and business leaders; the arrangements alleviated political pressure for mandatory controls, while relaxing the programme could benefit the President in a pre-election period: bargaining over restraint could (and would) have been renewed more firmly afterwards.

There was conflict between COWPS and PAYC throughout the remainder of the programme. During the first few months, Dunlop claimed that PAYC was acting circumspectly since it was already too late to make substantial changes, but observed that the 12% inflation rate undermined COWPS' credibility and made calls for compliance unrealistic. He argued that the programme should be more voluntary and that the procurement penalty policy was unacceptable. PAYC criticized excessively detailed regulation and the "legalistic" approach to the programme[5] and COWPS' intervention in bargaining, resulting in "deep misunderstandings", "ill will" and the aggravation of work stoppages [PAYC, 1982:1-2]. The Committee addressed the pay standard first, then the COLA evaluation question and changes in COWPS' operating procedures (where the "Notice of Probable Noncompliance" became a "Notice of Inquiry"), and numerous other aspects of the programme.[6] The major conflict, however, involved COWPS and White House policy principals against an alliance of PAYC business and labour members over the continuing issue of whether the Year II pay standard would be single-number or a pay range. These negotiations were prolonged and PAYC's formal recommendation reached Kahn on January 22, 1980. Dunlop claimed again that PAYC had recommended only necessary changes, rather than starting afresh, and commented: "We have had a system of regulations at variance with the real world ... We have moved toward more conventional definitions and more realistic mathematics." [BNA-DLR 1980, 5-AA1]. The White House was internally divided over the issue and delayed acceptance until late February 1980 (Kahn formally accepted the

---

[5]Increasing as the programme evolved so that, as Year II approached, "the Committee was faced with over 50 pages of wage regulations and over 100 Q&A's [questions and answers] intended to provide direction for compliance with the standards [PAYC, 1982:26].

[6]By late November, through PAYC, labour and business gained greater flexibility from COWPS in the case of tandem settlements maintaining historical wage relations (which assisted non-union workers). COWPS also granted increases exceeding the standards through "gross inequity" provisions, and PAYC increased self-administration under the programme, particularly by eliminating "pre-clearance" with COWPS so that fewer settlements required scrutiny [Murphey; BNA-DLR 1979, 232:A-12; *Business Week*, 1979:33].

proposals early in March), when fiscal and monetary policy were jeopardizing relations with the AFL-CIO on the eve of the first presidential primaries, and it was imperative for Carter to minimize conflict. Carter then accepted the pay range and PAYC criteria for its application (with only two minor changes) "despite vehement opposition" from Schultze, Kahn, Russell and others, who argued that it was neither specific nor strong enough [*NYT*, 1980:1; BNA-DLR 1979, 240:C-2; 1980, 43:A-11; 50:A-9; PAYC, 1982:2; 16-18].

The White House and the FRB: Fiscal and Monetary Policy and the Wage/Price Programme

White House decisionmaking on the Year II standard occurred in the context of increasing conflict with the AFL-CIO over fiscal and monetary policy, reaching a climax over the former's abrupt revision of budgetary proposals during February and March 1980. These developments were affected by OPEC price increases during early 1979, reckoned to have driven inflation up by 4-5% during the year, and peaking in Spring 1980; the annual inflation rate, as measured by the CPI, then reached 13% (higher than after the 1973-4 OPEC increase) and the underlying rate (exclusive of volatile food and energy components) reached 8.5%. Another factor was the President's appointment of Paul Volcker to succeed Miller as head of the FRB in August 1979. From late 1979, Volcker pursued a "truly Draconian monetary policy" [Hibbs, 1987:75-6], presiding over steeply rising interest rates which constricted economic activity and magnified the President's austerity strategy.

Although the FRB acts with considerable independence, the FRB chairman, the Treasury and other presidential officials customarily confer on the economic outlook. In late September, 1979, Volcker initiated an unusual degree of advance consultation over his proposal to alter the central bank's policy focus: from manipulation of the federal funds rate, to slowing the growth of the money supply by close control over M1 (a weekly measure of currency in circulation plus private chequing account deposits). This strategy would permit violent shifts in interest rates, and the President, Miller and Schultze all objected. The professional acquaintance of Volcker and Solomon,[7] the Treasury under-secretary who had worked with Blumenthal on the White House austerity package in 1978, no doubt gave the former an ally within the Administration. Solomon had already annoyed White House principals by his over-zealous activity on interest rates. Although Solomon simply suggested to Volcker that he resort to his own scheme if "conventional tightening methods" advocated by the White House failed, Volcker instead pursued it forthwith in response to pressure from central bankers at the IMF conference in Belgrade, as the financial markets erupted and the

[7]Solomon later became President of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, the second-most important position in the Federal Reserve system, and held by Volcker before he became chairman of the central bank. Volcker had been Treasury under-secretary for Monetary Affairs from 1969 to 1974, during the Nixon Administration: the White House ought not to have been taken by surprise by his views.

dollar dropped sharply. Returning "suddenly" from the conference on October 2, Volcker summoned an emergency meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC),[8] the chief operating arm of the Federal Reserve, taking the unusual precaution of lobbying its members in advance, and gaining a grudging but unanimous vote in favour of raising interest rates sharply (FOMC "liberals" insisted that interest rates be allowed to move freely, and thus to fall as well as rise, but there ensued little tendency towards the former). The prime rate (the commercial bank base rate for business loans) jumped 6% over the following six months and the discount rate was raised a full 1% by the Fed on October 6 [*WSJ*, 1984:22; Brummer, 1985; Hibbs, 1987:75].

While the AFL-CIO publicly attacked the FRB's policy, the White House supported the measures, fearing to worsen pressure on the dollar on the foreign exchange markets, but the economic picture was highly unfavourable; the impact of higher interest rates was expected to affect housing badly and cause a steep rise in the CPI. Generally, the EPG was in disarray and without a clear policy course, for the options available to improve economic performance were unpromising. Tighter fiscal and monetary policy would create politically damaging levels of unemployment (already rising). Although Eizenstat was prepared at least to review the possibility of mandatory wage and price controls, the economists remained unanimously opposed, they were generally considered infeasible and the President was opposed; Miller had also the National Accord to consider. Attempts at introducing a tax-based restraint policy had already failed; Kahn still favoured the scheme, but: PAYC would oppose it; the complexity of the standard and catch-up provisions would make it hard to enforce on the pay side; it was not worthwhile introducing it only on the price side; the AFL-CIO was opposed even on the price side, and the scheme remained unlikely to pass Congress. Radical options, such as repealing indexing or the Davis-Bacon Act, were not considered viable, especially for a Democratic president in an election year. The White House considered raising new revenues (through taxation measures), credit controls, price supports, investment measures and "recycling" budgetary allocations among spending heads. Kirkland later publicly rejected this last: "I don't particularly want to be backed into the position of choosing between revenue sharing, let's say, or CETA, or health programs, or foods stamps." [AFL-CIO PR, Apr.29/80:1]. Policy options also included an economic stimulus package and a comprehensive tax strategy. These deliberations continued during late November and December. Although the President considered that the strength of the economy was often under-estimated, productivity levels were unequivocally problematic as real output declined

[8]The FOMC issues an influential "directive" on monetary growth, the federal funds rate and bank reserves, guiding the buying and selling activity of the FRB New York trading desk on the $150 billion portolio of government securities.

and Schultze proposed stimulative tax cuts. Some of the economists argued against any spending concessions and OMB's projections implied no real growth in spending with expenditures at $547 billion in FY80, close to the level authorized by Congress, and a slightly enlarged deficit projection of $33 billion. Tight budgetary policy was projected for FY81, but economic uncertainty precluded any definite decisions [Eizenstat; Miller; Schultze; Butler; Jensen]. Meanwhile, the deficit edged upwards, undermining the President's balanced budget commitment of 1976, and President Carter, eschewing pre-election ploys, found little attractive to offer prospective voters.

The labour leaders expressed concern at monetary development and, through the Accord process, pressed the White House for offsetting budgetary measures. In October, Kirkland was asked whether a recent pledge by Carter not to fight inflation through increased unemployment implied acceptance of AFL-CIO proposals for "job creating programs -- or other aids...to offset the effect of the higher discount rate?". In reply, he referred to general provisions to that end in the Accord and observed that discussion would therefore focus on "concrete programs": "[w]e may have arguments about the degree of practicability of what we have to propose", but "there is a list in the [Accord] of steps in specific areas that we are going to be exploring." Thus, Carter's pledge reflected "his view of the accord -- the importance that he places on it." [AFL-CIO PR, Oct.16/79:2]. In particular, Kirkland stressed that the Administration must demonstrate more than just "lip service" to the Humphrey-Hawkins Act, "one of our main Accord stipulations ... We're apprehensive that it will, unless it is constantly reaffirmed, fall into limbo." [AFL-CIO PR, Oct.16/79:2]. He also argued the need for public investment, on "pragmatic" not "ideological" grounds. The prevention of cuts in public service jobs and social security benefits, a 25% increase in low-income housing provisions and similar initiatives were thought products of the Accord process [Kirschten, 1980a:266].

The AFL-CIO convention in November 1979 ratified the Accord (and settled the internal leadership succession). In fact, by then, the Administration was veering from the national expenditure plans to which the labour leadership had been party through the Accord process, as the policy emphasis shifted to controlling the deficit. During the convention, the labour leaders learned that OMB was altering the budget proposal in the direction of further cuts. Meany, describing the national economy as "a mess", blamed the "shifting, changing economic policies established by the administration" which, "without exception", had "failed because they were ill-advised, ill-considered, ineffective and inequitable." [AFL-CIO, 1979a:9]. Referring to the energy crisis, "unchecked inflation" and "outrageous" profits by oil companies, Meany warned of recession, with "tough days ahead" for American workers. He

acclaimed the concern the Federation was demonstrating for the national interest through the National Accord:

> "Obviously there is need, at this time of economic crisis, for all elements in society to demonstrate their responsibility. We in the AFL-CIO have already done so ... For the national accord ... is a demonstration of labor's willingness to shoulder its share of responsibility on a broad range of national concerns." [AFL-CIO, 1979a:9]

Meanwhile, Kirkland promptly despatched Young and Oswald from the convention to OMB, to monitor and review these developments [Young], while Meany warned:

> "We have the integrity to live up to our end of the bargain. We also have the courage to blow the whistle if the administration fails to fulfill the obligations it has undertaken ... We look for deeds, not rhetoric; programs, not promises. The whole history of this movement is that our word is our bond. We shall keep our word. We expect others to keep theirs." [AFL-CIO, 1979a:9-10]

These developments undermined labour cooperation on the standards programme. Although the labour leaders already participated on PAYC, it was understood on all sides that no major pay decisions by the Committee would be made until after the convention [BNA-DLR 1979, 225:A-2]. It was evident that the consultative process producing the Accord had secured some support for the programme. Thus, the Bakery & Tobacco Workers Union (which held a nine-year no-strike agreement at one company) made job security its top bargaining priority, and expected major contracts negotiated during the winter to be settled within the guidelines. More significantly, Glenn Watts, CWA President, stated that he would support the Administration specifically because his union would have a major voice in the development of the Year II programme, and therefore expected that telephone industry settlements in 1980 would fall within the guidelines [BNA-DLR 1979, 225:A-1].

However, many labour leaders, while endorsing the Accord in principle and as a process, were not willing to give a specific commitment to the guidelines: partly because of politics internal to their unions, but also because they were clearly dissatisfied with the White House and the restraint programme. OCAW's new president, Robert Goss, affirmed the need for the Accord concept, but complained that his union had led Year I bargaining, conformed to the pay standard and then been outdone by major settlements by other unions. OCAW's would be the first major settlement after the establishment of PAYC. Goss warned that his members would not be "sacrificial lambs again"; profit and inflation levels were considered sufficiently favourable and they were prepared to strike to gain an appropriate settlement (and did so) [BNA-DLR 1979, 225:A-1]. The Glass Bottle Blowers president, James Hatfield, warned that support for the Accord did not imply a commitment to the guidelines. The union was to open bargaining with four major glass companies in March 1980 and would follow customary tandem settlement patterns; thus, if these settled above the standard (highly probable, especially since the Teamsters were the main referent), Hatfield's union

would follow suit. Other prominent labour leaders made similar statements, including Finlay (ACTW), Fitzmaurice (IUE), and McBride (Steelworkers) [BNA-DLR 1979, 225:A-1]. The left-wing IAM leader, Bill Winpisinger, who had not attended the special EXCO meeting endorsing the Accord, was a persistent public critic of the standards programme and the Accord [BNA-DLR 1979, 225:A-2; 1980, 33:A-10]. In his view, the Accord offered only:

> ...some loose commitments that the Carter Administration will vaguely discuss some economic and social issues with the AFL-CIO, when and if such issues surface [and in return] the AFL-CIO gets to participate in another voluntary wage and price restraint program... [BNA-DLR 1979, 232:A-9].

Winpisinger alleged that the Carter team merely wished to use the Accord "to flaunt as a sign of trade union support during the campaign", but that:

> On close examination, the AFL-CIO's social contract with the Carter Administration isn't even a serviceable campaign gimmick. If Carter or Kirkland should flaunt it before a bunch of shop stewards, they will be run out of the union hall. [BNA-DLR 1979, 232:A-10]

Subsequently, White House principals met with AFL-CIO leaders in an effort to retain their support, reaffirming the consultative provisions of the Accord and discussing the economy and budgetary proposals. The White House remained undecided about incorporating stimulus provisions in budgetary proposals to Congress, since the recession was expected to be mild (except in housing) with some recovery by the late summer, and thus before the election. Business leaders continued to urge upon the Administration the priority of addressing inflation over the effects of the recession. Inflation was officially projected at high single-digit levels (about 7.5%) for 1980 and 1981; the President and White House were concerned about the impact of inflation, especially on exposed groups including the elderly and blue collar workers, but also acknowledged unemployment as the main concern of less affluent citizens. The AFL-CIO opposed any deliberate economic slowdown given other factors operating independently in that direction, such as the OPEC price increases, and continued to press for countercyclical measures and defend Humphrey-Hawkins Act commitments and CETA provisions established through the Accord, criticizing the concept of a tolerable unemployment level, which could be exploited by those arguing for cuts. [Eizenstat, Jensen; Kirkland; Donahue; Oswald]. Sandwiched by these constituencies and hampered by economic developments, the White House continued the internal debate on appropriate outlay levels, stand-by countercyclical programmes and taxation policy.

Poor economic performance and political pressures posed a dilemma when Carter needed to demonstrate dynamic national leadership prior to the election. Democratic nomination politics were of grave concern to Carter and his political strategists as the critical primaries stage in the presidential campaign commenced. Senator Kennedy was more liberal on economic policy and a "favoured son" among labour interests. He advocated mandatory

controls, which the President opposed and which would involve Congress, with the likelihood of damaging, highly-visible disruption, including a possible Senate filibuster by Republicans. In the event of any breach in relations, the AFL-CIO would undoubtedly have renewed its agitation for controls. Short of that, AFL-CIO influence within Congress remained important for the White House, which needed to avoid strong opposition to its budgetary proposals. Consequently, the budget proposals sent by the White House to Congress in January 1980 offered some compromises to avoid completely alienating labour and other Party constituencies, while still bearing the hallmarks of an austerity package in response to inflation levels and trends and the deficit. The proposals included "marginal increases in most social and economic development programs", a real increase in defense spending [Fishel, 1985:107], and a projected deficit of around $16 billion [Sinclair, 1983:181].

Even this budget, however, meant that the White House *could* not implement the policies agreed with the labour leaders [Young], who were clearly dissatisfied. Kirkland disclaimed any change of view from that expressed for the previous three years about Carter's unsatisfactory performance and criticized the failure to address the "real sources" of inflation. On major Accord provisions outstanding, he stressed the countercyclical stimulus package, and the opportunity to influence its development, expressing serious disappointment with White House deferrals of the goals and timetable of the Humphrey Hawkins Act. However, Kirkland added that concern was mildly alleviated by explicit White House recognition of continuing responsibilities under the Act, attributable to labour's policy influence [AFL-CIO PR, Feb.18/80:1; Feb.19/80:3]. By this time, in fact, it was already too late in the electoral cycle to switch course and endorse Kennedy without great difficulty, while abandoning an incumbent president's campaign was a drastic, if not politically suicidal, proposition for any major Party interest - and tactically unpromising: the resulting Party conflict would undoubtedly help to elect Republican Ronald Reagan. Such a scenario was all too reminiscent of the disasterous 1972 campaign. The leaders of the mainstream labour movement, with some reluctance, continued support for Carter. In consequence, they declared that the budget remained acceptable and that they would support it. Kirkland [AFL-CIO PR, Feb.18/80:2] stated: "We did have an opportunity to ... discuss the budget ... while it was still open to change ... some of our points of view were reflected in some aspects of it--not all, by any means...". He reaffirmed the value of the Accord process and of consultation in sustaining cooperation (and winning some specific labour gains):

> We have ... succeeded in establishing a better basis for ... getting our views effectively before the Administration as a result of the discussions and understandings that led up to the creation of this so-called National Accord ... which both parties entered into in good faith. We

> haven't won all the points that we put forward, but we certainly haven't lost all of them either. It's been a mixed picture, but I think the process, as a process, is working quite well... [AFL-CIO PR, Feb.18/80:2].

The White House for its part recognized that labour was close to abandoning the Accord and PAYC, with politically damaging consequences for Carter, and had to consider which economic policy choices would lead the AFL-CIO to withdraw, and whether their anticipated results carried enough economic and political benefit to offset the impact. More specifically, the White House was uncertain whether to retain the standards programme or dismantle it and rely upon fiscal and monetary policy, fearing public criticism of capitulation to organized labour by accepting the watered down Year II proposals, but media portrayal of irreconcilable conflict with business/labour leaders, if they were rejected. Policy calculations thus encompassed, but extended beyond, the economic implications of establishing a pay range of concern to Schultze and COWPS; essentially, there were no good options. There was little enthusiasm for the programme or for PAYC; a weak standard without credible sanctions was difficult to administer but, if the White House rejected PAYC's recommendations, thereby rupturing relations with labour, a tougher guidelines policy would be needed. Mandatory controls might have justified such a course, but Carter remained unwilling and politically unable to adopt them. His strategists, including Vice-President Mondale, feared their impact prior to the election and Eizenstat felt that restraint would be no greater *without* the pay board. Miller considered that every controls programme (voluntary or mandatory) breaks down eventually; the guidelines had been strained by the sharp increase in inflation and he concluded that the programme should be retained for another year and then dismantled, a view largely compatible with the stance of PAYC business and labour members and Dunlop. [Eizenstat; Miller; Russell; Schultze].

Meanwhile, PAYC management members were expressing concern at the programme's impact on profits, investment and productivity. While the White House could claim that tighter budgetary policy had slowed the economy and put downwards pressure on wages, business leaders were insistent upon the need for explicit cooperation from the labour leaders if the voluntary programme was to be viable. In contrast to labour, management insisted that wages, not prices, were at issue and repeated objections that the guidelines were more liberal on the wage side and labour less constrained; they claimed that the union/non-union inequity would negate the savings gained in Year I, and pressed for pre-notification provisions on wage increases. Although business leaders allied with the labour leaders to seek a return to free collective bargaining and to relax the regulatory provisions of the existing programme, they still pressed for a single-figure pay standard (which the NAM argued was simpler for small business interests). Acceptance of the pay range by the White

House would compel corresponding adjustment of the price standard. Moreover, business leaders were incensed by the informal commitment gained from the White House by the AFL-CIO to refrain from using penalty provisions on the pay side; management members on PAYC insisted that Kahn and Russell talked as though the agreement were "real" (i.e. formal), and their complaint gained force since no move to use sanctions had been visible on the pay side. Arguing that the programme was inequitable, business leaders pressed for redress, choosing a strategic moment to do so. In January 1980, when PAYC was finalizing recommendations for Year II, Hawley and Larry threatened a possible withdrawal from PAYC if the price side were not made more voluntary. It seems probable that they received at least tacit support from Dunlop and the PAYC labour panel. The Hawley/Larry power play led PAYC to adjourn hastily while the two retired to hold private discussions with Miller and Kahn. Miller affirmed that their concerns would be addressed: in fact, Hawley and Larry gained a "mini-Accord" which precluded the use of price sanctions. Although the agreement was to remain private, since the restraint programme would be further jeopardized if the White House publicly announced the sanctions concession, management members later affirmed that they had received a "high-level" private pledge on the sanctions issue. In the meantime, when the PAYC meeting later resumed, the pay range was unanimously agreed upon. [BNA-DER, 1980, 72:L-1; FED 1980, 205, 4:0025-6].

The labour leaders, Dunlop and PAYC public member Fleming had argued that a single-number pay standard was unrealistic and would act as a pay *floor* - although in retrospect the Year I standard appears not to have done so [Meyer, 1980:215-7]. They maintained that such a standard was unworkable, distorting established pay relativities, and warned that accumulated distortions from Year I would fuel rank and file dissatisfaction with the programme. They also claimed that the proposed range (7.5-9.5%) was compatible with the thrust of fiscal and monetary policy and represented a real limitation upon bargaining and an income loss to workers because of the high inflation rate during 1979: a point acknowledged by the President [BNA-DLR, 1979, 235:C-2; 1980, 48:E-1; *Federal Register*, 1979 (44), 243:4; *NYT*, 1980:1-2; Eizenstat]. In contrast, Schultze and COWPS argued that settlements would inevitably cluster around the *ceiling* of a pay range (the evidence proved mixed; see later). Although Schultze urged at least an 8.5% *norm* for Year II, he considered that the problem was not so much the range as its interpretation, including the impact of COLA provisions and tough negotiating by unions like the Teamsters and UAW. OMB considered the cost implications of a range problematic given an inflation rate of 13%, and was especially worried by the COLA provisions favouring unionized workers during Year I - although powerful unions could admittedly achieve their bargaining goals whether or not the

standard was relaxed.[9] Kirkland, although not rejecting outright *some* emphasis on 8.5%, insisted that the range, not its mid-point, was the standard. A White House alternative approach (in the event of acceptance of the pay range) involved requiring *justification* for increases above the average, or establishing 8.5% as a norm (a tacit single-number standard), while requiring simply the *reporting* of higher settlements; this option was thought less likely to trigger a labour walk-out [BNA-DLR 1980, 5:AA-1; Eizenstat; Miller; Schultze; Russell].

A "secret meeting" was held in late January between the EPG, Kirkland, Larry, Dunlop and others. The advisory memorandum afterwards sent to the President by Kahn, Gentry, Schultze and Russell may have signified their divergence from Miller's stance, for the EPG usually reported under Miller's signature. Subsequent memoranda to the President from Schultze and Russell went forward to the cabinet, but Schultze's was retrieved afterwards because it was potentially highly damaging to relations with organized labour [*NYT*, 1980:1-2]. Schultze acknowledged the need to sustain relations with labour but, anticipating a major impact on settlements from the pay range, he emphasized the need to push bargaining with the AFL-CIO to the limit to gain at least the 8.5% norm and justification provisions. However, Kirkland warned publicly that the adoption of regulations conflicting with PAYC principles would result in the dissolution of PAYC and the Accord. The President had apparently assured Kirkland that major companies would not be required to justify settlements; the White House therefore decided to concede the compromise: an 8.5% pay norm, with companies required simply to report increases above that level [BNA-DLR 1980, 43:A-11; 50:A-9-10; PAYC, 1982:15].[10]

However, this tenuous White House-labour agreement was seriously jeopardized by the sudden rise in the CPI in January 1980, sparking panic in Congress and a flurry of White House activity - and stretching labour tolerance for wage restraint. In late February, the annual inflation rate for January was announced at 18% p.a. (the underlying rate rose from 8% to 12%), toppling deficit and economic performance projections: the FY80 deficit was expected to be $32 billion higher as a result ($130 billion higher by FY83). White House economists feared that an "inflation psychology" had become entrenched (with economic activity based upon anticipated inflation). The emphasis by the White House was now clearly upon a balanced budget, through spending cuts alone or in conjunction with increased revenues, and there was similar pressure from Congress. The Accord provisions

---

[9]There was eventually a minor trade-off, whereby labour accepted that the 1% catch-up for non-union workers would apply only to cases of hardship, and the President accepted 7.5% as the assumed inflation rate for COLA calculations (Russell claimed that unionists with COLAs would really gain an 11% limit) [*Federal Register* 1979, 44, 243:4].

[10]COWPS also introduced a new pay exception category to address COLA/non-COLA inequities from Year I [PAYC, 1982:15].

for "real" consultation with labour were not a priority; the President and White House were absorbed in a series of intense meetings with congressional leaders: serious differences over policy, and the apparent fiscal crisis, rendered the Accord process ineffectual when it should have been most important. Throughout the first half of March, an unprecedented series of intensive consultations with frenzied congressmen was held (including Republican leaders), "running around like chickens with their heads cut off - they didn't know what to do" [Rubinstein, quoted; Sinclair, 1983:181]. Congressional Democrats, with partisan interests at stake and concerned at the Republican threat during an election year, urged the President to demonstrate discipline and direction. The White House considered introducing credit controls (and subsequently did so), but continued to reject wage and price controls. Congressional Republicans were prepared to accept passage of a Resolution against controls although, ironically, there was "rising sentiment in the Congress from the left" for them [Reporter (quoted), AFL-CIO PR, Feb.22/80:2].

Kirkland pointed out that the main sources of the CPI increase were energy and the price of money, not labour-intensive cost items: "The real spendable wages for the year are down 6.9%, a further demonstration that wages are clearly not the cause or source of this inflation. The wages of our members are the victims." Under these circumstances, he insisted that the proposed pay range could not reasonably be an issue; moreover, he warned that the AFL-CIO would review support for the guidelines if the high inflation rate continued. While suggesting that Congress should introduce comprehensive controls, Kirkland acknowledged that no controls programme had ever dealt effectively with questions now paramount, especially the cost of imported goods and interest rates: labour support for controls would therefore be contingent upon the specifications. He suggested that such a course would be unproductive in the form simply of a grant of authority to the President, for "the results would [not] be particularly good as long as some of the economic advisers currently around have their way." [AFL-CIO PR, Feb 22/80:2-3; Feb.25/80:2].

Kirkland provided a succinct criticism of economic policy, condemning the Administration's acceptance of higher unemployment and recession conditions while restraint by workers was simply increasing corporate profits, warning that consequently "[t]here are going to be strikes". Singling out oil industry profits, he reiterated the need for price controls on petroleum, a government purchasing agency for oil imports, as well as reduced imports and rationing, calling also for lower interest rates and possibly controls on outflow of capital funds from the U.S. Kirkland directly attacked the stance of the Carter economists, or those "within the Administration ... who advance economic theories and policies that I would

accurately describe as discredited by events," but with a professional "life-long investment in theory to cling to, no matter how often they are proved wrong."

> The history of recent years has been to prove the bankruptcy of every prevailing theory of economic policy that has been tried by our government. And I think the economic advisers, to not only this Administration but previous administrations, ought to go to confession and begin to exercise some richly-earned humility that is not visible now. [AFL-CIO PR, Feb.18/80:2]

He argued that "restraining the supply and increasing the price of money" was seriously damaging to economic activity, especially the price structure and productivity levels: "Productivity doesn't stem from using a bigger whip or getting people to work more or harder. If it did, the rise in productivity would have stopped at the building of the pyramids." [AFL-CIO PR, Feb.18:2; Feb.22/80:2]. Productivity increases depended, rather, upon technological progress and thus upon policies facilitating investment, which required the "relatively cheap and abundant supply" of energy and capital:

> There is no better way to start the Chinese effect of labor substituting for capital, which means lower productivity, than to drive up the price and increase the scarcity of capital. All of this is part of what seems to be a strong line of argument that is used today: that the way to deal with inflation is to create a recession, to reduce economic activity and increase unemployment. It is our contention that that is inflationary. [AFL-CIO PR, Feb.18/80:3]

The White House had failed to maintain its commitments under the Accord in labour's view; Kirkland warned, as "someone who has something to say about the direction of the American trade union movement", that "*the intent and reason and rationale for our participation is withering away*" and labour would not participate in restraint for long "unless some further steps were taken to control the real sources of inflation which are no my[ster]y." [AFL-CIO PR, Feb.22/80:3; emphasis added]. Asked outright whether he was advocating that unions exceed the standards, Kirkland replied unpromisingly that "I'm advocating that unions seek justice at the collective bargaining table", and that "[t]heir case grows stronger". Indeed, he commented that "to present or defend an agreement that exceeds" the pay range was simply "within the understanding which led to the creation of the pay committee."

The Administration was already experiencing difficulty in securing compliance with the pay and price programme, and unions with major contracts up during the heavy 1980 bargaining year included the IAM and the IBEW, whose leaders were unfavourably disposed towards the programme. The Paperworkers' new president, Wayne E. Glenn, complained that the wage programme had "been punctuated with bureaucratic gibberish, weird mathematics and contradictory pronouncements", and that the price side was ineffective. He also complained that the programme had impeded peaceful settlements and that COWPS had caused strikes (he cited the West coast paper negotiations in 1979). Calling for abolition of COWPS, Glenn warned that his union (like the Machinists) would not "volunteer" to comply with the pay side [BNA-DLR 1980, 42:A-5]. The major auto parts companies, including General

Motors, Chrysler and Ford, opened bargaining early in 1980 and the UAW leader, Fraser, was a known Kennedy supporter. During January, COWPS had concluded that the problematic proposed UAW/General Motors settlement could not function in its traditional role as a tandem/pattern-setter. The negotiations had been of concern for months but, while some Carter principals pressed for strict application of the guidelines, it was feared that using sanctions would jeopardize the Accord negotiations. The concern that the UAW settlement would be a precursor of others had provided an additional incentive for making labour a partner in the programme. COWPS indicated that a Notice of Probable Non-Compliance would be issued in the GM case, and in the near-identical negotiations with Ford. Other important bargainers, notably three major farm and construction equipment companies, simultaneously negotiated "pattern" contracts based on the UAW's.[11] By February, COWPS gave ground, suggesting that the UAW *contract* was a problem, but that GM as a company was in compliance, and took no further action [BNA-DLR 1980, 2:A-7; Weintraub, 1980]. The UAW, in fact, drew upon General Motors' lawyers and exploited loopholes in the programme to secure a favourable settlement. General Motors, which was in a favourable economic position, agreed to compensate on the price side of the programme to meet Administration targets: a new form of trade-off, distorting the standards programme in the interests of greater flexibility and allowing all parties to save face. Neither the UAW nor the earlier Teamsters settlement were technically out of compliance, but they visibly bent the standards. The incidents didn't destroy COWPS or the programme, but did undermine their credibility and harmed staff morale; staff members were especially disbelieving about the Teamsters case [Murphey; Schultze]. In March, Ford declined to comply by similarly compensating on the price side but Miller persuaded the company to hold down pay increases for management personnel [COWPS 1981:6]. One or two unions indicated some support for the programme, notably the previously recalcitrant McBride, who indicated that the Steelworkers could work within the guidelines; the White House chose to consider the eventual settlement (about 12%) within the terms of the programme. ACTWU thought settlement within the proposed pay range possible, but depending on members' needs (many were low-wage earners and exempt) [BNA-DLR 1980, 33:A-10; Eizenstat].

The programme was also under considerable pressure from employers on the price side. Since October 1978, COWPS had cited some 34 companies in violation of the standards programme: 12 on the pay side and 22 on the price side. Companies with large federal

---

[11] Deere & Co., Caterpillar Tractor and International Harvester Co. Moreover, Massey-Ferguson and Allis Chalmers were to negotiate late in the year. The UAW set the pattern *directly* for over 750,000 workers. [BNA-DLR 1980, 2:A:7; *Monthly Labor Review*, Dec.'78; COWPS 1979b:7277].

contracts (like Mobil Oil, Amerada Hess and Ford), and thereby potentially more amenable to influence, were generally contractors with the Defense department and so proved immune. During Year I, only two companies were cited and one of them, Amerada Hess, still received a $77 million Defense contract. In March 1980, Carter publicly rebuked Mobil Oil for being out of compliance but, on the same day, the Defense department awarded it a $145 million contract. Both Amerada Hess and Mobil Oil held a monopoly position over supply and were not readily replaceable; they were granted waivers on the grounds of national security, a procedure essentially conducted through Agency heads or by approval from a cabinet official (although COWPS was formally involved). Mobil claimed to be in compliance, but did eventually agree to forego $30 million in price increases. Seeking to bolster the programme, COWPS subsequently proposed lowering the $5 million threshold to one million (although only for future contracts) and the EPG discussed stronger provisions to produce compliance on the part of oil companies (such as action against parent companies and financial penalties) [BNA-DLR 1980, 83:A3-5; DER 1980, 72:L-1-3; 169:L-2-3; FED 1980, 205:4:0025-6]. However, penalty action was successfully blocked by the PAYC management mini-Accord with the White House. Schultze later disclosed that the Administration would "have loved to pull a punch at business" if a suitable target could be found, but lacked "really clear-cut" violators - and the President wasn't firm enough [Schultze]. Only in late August 1980 was a serious attempt made; President Carter then postponed - but didn't cancel - a $12.6 million synthetic fuels contract with W.R. Grace & Company: the first such action taken (the company had exceeded allowable profit limits in the fourth quarter of Year I and rejected COWPS proposals for corrective action).

Meanwhile, White House politicos were increasingly concerned that the Carter/Mondale campaign would suffer if the election focus was economic policy. They needed to forge support from major labour interests for Carter for the nomination campaign and the election, and Miller advocated sustaining the Accord. This position carried the day, and the White House finally endorsed the pay range. Gains from pursuing the single-figure standard, especially half-way through an unpromising programme year, were simply not equivalent to the impact of a labour walk-out. COWPS adopted the standard on March 13 (halfway through the Year II calendar), just as the White House completed revisions to budgetary proposals, entailing significant reductions in programme commitments. Thus, the President's political needs were instrumental in securing policy concessions in the face of a possible breach with labour [Kirkland]. As the White House anticipated, there were complaints that too much had been conceded to labour. For example, Joseph Pechman (another Brookings economist), complained that Carter should have rejected the inflationary

9.5% maximum on pay increases, even if labour abandoned PAYC: "I would have let labor walk out ... We've got to play hard ball. In any event, the unions aren't going to strike against the government." [*Congressional Record* E1442, 1980].

However, belated endorsement of the pay range failed to produce any enthusiasm on the part of the labour leaders for Carter or his policies, and matters worsened dramatically when, in late March, the White House sent its revised, basically balanced budget to Congress, sharply reducing the expenditure levels proposed in January and, indeed, proposing a surplus [Flanagan, 1980:46]. The backlash from labour and other liberal constituencies was concerted. Relations with the AFL-CIO, which viewed these developments as a betrayal of the Accord by the White House, were brought to the brink of collapse. While "not all together happy" with the original FY81 budget, Kirkland commented that the AFL-CIO had at least had "an opportunity to get our viewpoint across at the proper level" and, given that the proposals "would have some tough sailing in the climate that prevails over on Capitol Hill", were willing to defend them. Kirkland complained that the Administration was now "running with the wind", "adopting the tactic ... of controlling events by going along with events" and succumbing to a "competitive budget-cutting exercise at the expense of their own budget". In this, they were "deeply mistaken, both politically and in economic terms" [AFL-CIO PR, Apr.29/801]. Only labour, in his view, had fulfilled the terms of cooperation under the Accord.

Kirkland argued that a balanced budget should be sought through increased revenues rather than cuts, and he blamed the current fiscal imbalance partly on the "unbalanced, inequitable and misguided tax cut" passed by Congress in 1978. Had the President vetoed the bill, as the AFL-CIO had urged, "the 1981 budget would be in balance with his original program." [AFL-CIO PR, Apr.9/80:4]. He criticized the impact of the new proposals on employment, insisting that the Administration could, and should, have sustained the original budgetary targets:

> I have nothing against a balanced budget per se [but it is] counterproductive ... to try to achieve it by undermining the economic strength of this country ... by creating unemployment ... every one percent of unemployment costs the government $20 billion in revenue and increased costs ... at current levels of unemployment, 6 percent, this budget would be in balance in 1981. [AFL-CIO PR, Apr.3/80:2]

The projected level of unemployment, 1.5% higher than the prevailing 6% meant "a cost of 495,000 jobs ... another one-half percent of unemployment just from these cuts alone, plus indirect secondary effects, and a reduction in federal revenues of $10 billion. The labour

---

[12]Even before the Accord, Carter had told the AFL-CIO General Board in 1976 (when soliciting electoral endorsement), that he would work toward a balanced budget only in "normal" economic times. He also made a "full employment" commitment [Carter, 1976:9-12].

leaders attacked the notion that a balanced budget would help inflation, claiming that the source of the problem, the money/credit institutions, were reacting to the CPI and panicking over international rates, not the budget. Warning that Carter had lost credibility with unionists, they argued that he should acknowledge that the balanced budget offered no solution and, even if defeated in the attempt, should stand by the original budget rather than let Congress dictate his strategy.

The President, however, was less interested in making such a stand. The crisis atmosphere in Congress and pressure from Wall Street for a balanced budget reinforced his ability to proceed with a retrenchment policy, especially difficult during the nomination struggle against Kennedy in an election year [Rubinstein; Cable]. The House Budget Committee had earlier given *bipartisan* support for a balanced budget; the Democratic congressional leadership made special efforts to ensure support, including consultations, a special Speaker's luncheon with Democrats on the key House Budget Committee and a "Dear Colleague" letter. The protection of social programmes and countercyclical provisions (to secure votes from liberal Democrats) had to be balanced against the need to gain passage on the Floor; it was hoped that a budgetary "package" strategy and special task force to manage the broadly unpopular proposals would increase the chance of success. The House leadership also met with liberal interest groups, especially the labour lobby, in an effort to avert opposition, but with mixed results: interest group opposition was intense.

The Federation's strategy was to seek sufficient votes in Congress to defeat the budget resolution on the Floor at final passage, since it seemed unlikely that it could be satisfactorily amended. Kirkland declared the proposals a target for those "committed to social and economic progress" and a rallying point for a "broad cross section of our society" to demonstrate that "there is broadly-based constituency in support of progressive government in this country." And indeed, a broad array of liberal groups, including the AFL-CIO, formed a coalition to fight the budget in Congress. With Kirkland, the leaders included Fraser (UAW) and representatives from the National Urban League, National Organization of Women, U.S. Conference of Mayors, League of Women Voters of the U.S., National Council of Senior Citizens, National Urban Coalition, National Conference of Catholic Bishops and U.S. Catholic Conference, Consumer Federation of America, ADA and the NAACP. The coalition's statement denouncing the budget was endorsed by 150 organizations, including some 35 trade unions and the AFL-CIO. They criticized the budget resolution as "based on the erroneous assumption that balancing this budget will curb inflation", denied by economic evidence. The budget would hurt the disadvantaged, and failed to address root causes:

> At best, it is a symbolic gesture designed to alleviate the perceived psychological concerns of the voting public as well as the nation's bond markets ... The Administration's original fiscal 1981 budget -- an austere, barebones budget -- would have been essentially in balance if the unemployment rate remained at six percent of the labor force. [Budget Coalition Statement, AFL-CIO PR, Apr.9/80:1].

The U.S. Conference of Mayors declared they had "swallowed pretty hard" to accept the unpalatable January proposals. Now, after conducting a survey of 100 cities to identify the responses to, and impact of, the revised proposals, they were highly critical, and complained: "We have reason to believe from our conversations with those in the Administration and from some of the midnight sessions of the budget committees in Congress that they really don't understand yet what they are doing...". The White House had neglected to consult adequately, and "there are pieces of it that have never been discussed in any detail with mayors, governors and country people." In the event of failure, Kirkland alluded to the probable influence of the approaching election: "Well I don't give up hope for this; this is one round in the battle. I think that the battle will go on throughout the campaign at both the congressional and national level." [AFL-CIO PR, Apr.3/80:1-4].

Notwithstanding cooperation on the budget from congressional leaders, the White House felt that Congress was largely posturing on anti-inflation activity, unwilling to take unpopular steps during an election year. The House made modest reductions in Carter's defense proposals but restored provisions for jobs, education, health and social service programmes to the budget; these changes were then reversed in the Senate, which increased defense by some $8 billion over the House level while curtailing domestic expenditure levels, in a classic "guns or butter" struggle. When the ensuing Conference report suffered a surprise defeat, however, some $350 million was added back to the social programmes; the defense allocation was left untouched. This version, incorporating some $8.3 billion in expenditure cuts, passed Congress [Sinclair, 1983:175-181; Sundquist, 1982:228-230]. This outcome was objectionable to the AFL-CIO and allied interests. Although hawkish on foreign and defense policy, the labour leadership had declared support for a "strong national defense", including "necessary, demonstrably desirable increases in the defense budget", but "thought that we had an understanding with the Administration" that they should not come from "the domestic budget for the social programs [but] ... increased revenues by taxation or by borrowing through the deficit..." [AFL-CIO PR, Apr.3/80:3]. However, domestic programmes bore the brunt of the cuts.[13]

---

[13]Carter's budget suffered a blow when the impact of inflation and the increasing claimants under the Trade Adjustment Assistance programme added over $1 billion in costs to the budget [Gordon, 1980:765].

The White House had gambled correctly that the AFL-CIO would not withdraw from PAYC and the Accord in spite of these disagreements. Oswald warned publicly in late March that the AFL-CIO was reconsidering its stance on the Accord, but Kirkland denied that the Accord was "now a dead letter", replying to reporters: "This represents an effort on our part to put some substance and blood and force into the terms of that accord. We still strongly support the concepts that were spelled out in that accord and we're trying to defend those..." [AFL-CIO PR, Apr.3/80:1]. It is highly improbable that the labour leadership would have continued support for President Carter but for the advanced stage of the nomination process, the proximity of the election - and the spectre of Ronald Reagan. Since support for Carter was necessary, some modification of the Federation's public stance was inevitable and soon forthcoming, *even* on the issue of Carter's economic advisers. Aasked in April 1980 who was giving the President advice on economic strategy tantamount to fighting inflation through unemployment (as had Nixon), Kirkland replied - in sharp contrast to earlier statements - that no-one in the Administration had put forward such "a simple proposition" as a national policy. He stated that "Charlie Schultze and other advisers" had acknowledged the social and economic costs involved and: "I'm not accusing anyone in the Administration of deliberately taking this position. In fact, the specific terms of the National Accord ... precluded that." [AFL-CIO PR, Apr.29/80:1]. Criticizing FRB activity was a safer course in an election year, and the labour leadership did so repeatedly.[14] Kirkland named high interest rates as the main domestic source of the national deficit and economic disruption:

> We would favor reducing the deficit by doing something about the enormous burden of interest rates on the costs of government both at the federal, state and local level ... One of the best and most productive ways to reduce expenditures is to cut those interest rates down to reasonable levels. This is the most rapidly growing element of expense of government ... and the most represssive on economic enterprise in this country. [AFL-CIO, Apr.9/80:4]

According to Kirkland, Volcker had stated he would bring interest rates down to 5% if the AFL-CIO acted on wage restraint but Volcker had reneged, although the labour leaders believed that they had complied; no doubt Volcker and others might have held a different view but, in any event, the informal bargain is of most interest.

In spreading the blame for economic and budgetary developments, and deflecting criticism away from Carter, Kirkland also stressed interdependence within national government, and specifically the influence of Congress in Carter's budgetary course; he criticized "some of our liberal friends on Capitol Hill", similarly "running with the tide", who had recommended a strategy of negotiation on amendments, rather than comprehensive opposition. Thus, the White House was, in part, demonstrating "a reflective response to

---

[14]Among proposals aired at the 1979 AFL-CIO convention was one to extend FRB membership to representatives of major economic groups, such as organized labour [AFL-CIO 1979a:89].

political conditions that are perceived by the course of events on Capitol Hill", which explained "how some of these policies come into being." [AFL-CIO PR, Apr.29/80:1]. Kirkland condemned such attitudes on partisan and ideological grounds: "we regard that as a loser, as an impossible position and certainly not a proper position for a labor movement, for a liberal political party to be in." [AFL-CIO PR, Apr.29/80:1]. He argued that the budget contravened Democratic values and beliefs which Carter, as a Democratic presidential candidate, should defend, suggesting that "the fight can yield more, at least, than surrender can."

> ... an Administration purporting to represent the constituency that this Administration does -- should be fighting for these programs ... at times, it's the role of leadership to go against those tides and fight for what is right and proper, whether or not it is necessarily a winning fight. [AFL-CIO PR, Apr.29/80:1]

While Kirkland and the AFL-CIO skirted any suggestion that labour might abandon Carter for the election, the labour leaders did warn that he was losing labour support electorally and narrowing the choice between himself and Reagan by pursuing a conservative, balanced budget strategy - a general problem privately acknowledged by the President and his political advisers [Eizenstat].

The Wage/Price Programme Until the Election

While several unions did endorse Kennedy for the 1980 campaign, most unions and the AFL-CIO stayed with Carter [Chapter 7], but conflict over economic policy between the White House and labour continued. By May, unemployment had increased unexpectedly sharply and the recession looked more severe than anticipated, heightening criticism of the revised budget. White House principals continued to meet with Federation leaders, to discuss the budget and affirm their commitment to the consultative policy process. The EPG planned a series of such meetings, and also planned to involve the labour leaders in special working committees on countercyclical measures and reindustrialization policy. Some principals, for example Schultze, were reluctant, fearing that budgetary restraint would be jeopardized, but others, notably Miller and Butler, believed that unreasonable demands from the labour leadership were not likely.

Meanwhile, having accepted the Year II pay range, the White House sought to strengthen the restraint programme through COWPS. In May 1980, COWPS extended monitoring provisions covering hospital costs and physicians fees and accepted a recommendation from PRAC to lower the reporting threshold from $250 million to $100 million in annual sales, increasing the reporting universe from 1,300 to 3,000 companies. In written testimony to the House Banking Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization, Russell defended the restraint programme, claiming that the guidelines encompassed some 64% of

average consumer expenditures - although not food, crude oil or interest rates, where the sharpest increases occurred - whereas the Nixon programme (phases II to IV) had never included above 48% and had been less flexible. COWPS claimed that the pay programme had depressed wage increases by about 2% points in 1979. The subcommittee refrained from forcing upon Carter stand-by authority for mandatory wage and price controls (the President had threatened to veto any such bill). However, White House proposals to expand COWPS were blocked by House Republicans and some Democrats while, in June, the programme received another blow when the Senate (including 20 Democrats) voted against proposals to treble staff levels and increase funding, even though the White House had initially secured sufficient votes to gain passage. The AFL-CIO, provoked by the recent budget conflict, actively sought the defeat and some White House principals and COWPS attributed the outcome to its last-minute lobbying efforts, including letters to Senators to support the Heinz amendment granting only the original authorizations. This conflict was seen as evidence of the fragility of the National Accord "delicately crafted by Secretary of Treasury G. William Miller" [BNA-FED 1980, 206, 4:0029-31]. However, Carter's budgetary turn-around had also angered some members of Congress who viewed subsequent requests unfavourably. Senators espoused the need for fiscal responsibility and the curtailment of "big government", or simply asserted that the programme was ineffective. Kennedy felt sufficiently encouraged to announce his own plan to halve inflation within a year, including a legislated incomes policy (thus distinguishing himself from Carter) - an approach he insisted had worked in WWII (he argued that Nixon's policy hadn't worked because it was set in an expansionary fiscal/monetary context) [BNA-DLR 1980, 89:A11-12; DLR 1980, 26:A-10].

On the price side, Kahn wrote to Sommers in May 1980 agreeing to review and liberalize the programme in response to the relaxation of the pay side (through adoption of the pay range), and cost increases, especially the "explosion" of interest costs. Kahn rejected the "blanket" relaxation proposed by PRAC, especially at the "present critical conjunction of accelerating inflation and apparently incipient recession"; he suggested that a "mid-stream" change would expose the government to criticism. Instead, COWPS would adopt PRAC's principals, apply them when evaluating "exception" requests and subsequently embody them in the Year III programme. Meanwhile, companies/industries could request adjustment to price limitations on the grounds of second year pay-rate increases; consideration of "exceptions" claims by COWPS would similarly acknowledge the pay changes; and a price rather than profit limitation could be substituted. Kahn argued that COWPS was moving further than PRAC by adjusting at the industry level for uncontrollable increases in costs other than wages [BNA-DER 1980, 90:M-1].

The White House was gravely concerned for the FY80 deficit, projected at $37 billion, seemed more likely to reach $61 billion (and did), making the retrenchment strategy developed in March more important. The Year II programme was to expire at the end of September 1980, with Year III commencing on October 1st. Inflation remained high, but support for the programme was virtually non-existent. In June, Kahn had written to Dunlop pointing out that settlements in the unruly construction industry had so risen since early 1979 that many recent agreements had been "substantially above" the Year II pay range. Kahn requested pointedly that PAYC advise COWPS on how to "encourage" business and labour to deliver restraint and comply with the programme [Kahn, 1980], and to supply recommendations for Year III. The July 1980 "Issues" paper published by COWPS revealed a majority of respondents in favour of terminating the programme at the end of September but, in August, Kahn publicly affirmed that a Year III policy would be developed and introduced, despite morale problems and workload constraints at COWPS [BNA-FED 1980, 184:A-11; 215:2:2278]. For his part, Carter stated that the programme could not continue effectively in its current form, and affirmed that consultation with business and labour was necessary to enable a policy to be developed to moderate wage and price increases "in 1981 and subsequent years" [PAYC, 1980; BNA-DLR 1980, 184:A11-12]. By now, electoral concerns dominated policy considerations, including the wage/price programme. PAYC declared on September 16 that "decisions regarding the question of future pay arrangements should not be made during a period when national economic policies are a prime political issue." [PAYC, 1982:18]. Both PAYC and PRAC recommended that the existing guidelines should simply be extended to the end of the year as an interim measure, especially since most wage determination occurs on a calendar basis in the U.S. There was unanimity on this proposal, including from Kahn and other White House principals; Carter, of course, could ill afford conflict, with the presidential election in early November. The Year II programme was therefore simply strategically extended. PAYC argued that the guidelines should lapse at the end of 1980 since inflation continued at high levels anyway, and the programme did not encompass the factors largely responsible, such as food, housing, interest rates, energy and medical costs. The committee argued that the voluntary programme working through detailed regulations - or any programme in the same general form - had "lost its capacity to command effective support". PAYC discussed longer-term economic problems and needs, especially a sectoral approach lacking in the 1978-80 programme, and argued for long-term provisions to achieve economic stabilization through a tripartite group (meeting in private) [PAYC, 1982:2; 16;19].

Internally, the Administration's emphasis on wage restraint continued [Russell] and a Year III incomes policy would undoubtedly have been pursued, auguring future confrontation with labour (and business). The White House decided to commence preparation of the programme for scheduling reasons, but only internally, to avoid controversy. In September, Russell indicated that wage and price guidelines would be either tied to a tax incentives scheme (a TIP, for which RWI had provided a preliminary approach) or a reformulated social compact involving both business and labour. The Administration favoured the TIP scheme; questions were raised as to whether COWPS or the Treasury would be responsible; whether it would be a reward or penalty type, focus on wages or prices, and what the threshold would be. The Administration considered a "more substantive" social compact than the Accord, involving both business and "more of organized labor" with the government "agreeing on some kind of really restrictive set of pay and price standard[s]...", although Russell later regarded the proposition as unworkable, for the Administration would have sought more restraint, while organized labour advocated more spending [Russell; BNA-DER 1980, 188:L2-3].

In the meantime, although some policy leaders, such as Schultze, opposed the whole concept of an industrial policy, the White House and AFL-CIO pinned further cooperation on reindustrialization policy (on which a campaign debate was thought likely). Discussions about central planning and industrial policy had been held for a year or so, and some efforts were already underway, for example, in the Commerce department. The EPG now decided to initiate a multi-departmental study, and labour input was considered essential. The project involved all of the EPG deputies (including the Labor and State departments), leading to proposals for a sectoral policy operated through industrial committees, a reindustrialization board and an industrial development bank. When the President addressed the AFL-CIO General Board meeting (ratifying his endorsement), he declared:

> It is time for our country to accept labor as an equal partner in our economic life. In the last three-and-a-half years we have begun to establish ... such a partnership of government labor and business ... We are involved in nothing less than a redefinition of the way [they] ... work together. [Carter, 1980:10]

The Reindustrialization Board was to be chaired by Shapiro and Kirkland and would advise the president "on the full range of issues", including the establishment of the financing authority "to help mobilize both public and private capital, including employee pension funds, to restore and create jobs in areas affected by economic dislocation [Carter, 1980:10]. Some proposals were sent to Congress, but the White House failed to secure legislative authority and, indeed, met with considerable opposition to aspects of the scheme (especially the bank). The plans were then shelved pending the election [Rubinstein; Jensen; Kirkland; Oswald].

Even though these industrial policy negotiations were expected to create a better climate, Eizenstat commented:

> Basically, market forces were simply driving wages and prices up too strongly. Such policies as the National Accord and industrial policy only help at the margin in such circumstances. You really need to deal with the underlying causes of inflation; without this, an Accord can't work [Eizenstat].

Eizenstat felt that the only options for controlling inflation were wage and price controls or slowing down the economy, which would increase unemployment; neither were acceptable to organized labour. High inflation also made tighter monetary policy a contentious proposition [Russell], yet the economy had to absorb oil and food cost shocks. Eizenstat commented: "If there is a drought, we can't make it rain." Yet the Accord process, to a remarkable extent, had for some time made feasible efforts to sustain sufficient consensus to permit remedial action.

THE OUTCOME OF THE VOLUNTARY RESTRAINT PROGRAMME

The outcome of the standards programme had an economic and a political dimension. In economic terms, COWPS concluded that the programme was a modest success. On the price side, COWPS confirmed that the direct effect of the price standard was insignificant, except insofar as it interacted with the wage side of the programme - hardly surprising since the most volatile factors - energy, food and housing - were largely beyond the scope of the programme and the intention was to absorb these, not insulate against them. Otherwise, the underlying rate of inflation was considered satisfactory relative to the CPI and Producer Price Index measures [COWPS, 1979c:E-1; 1981:10-11; 21].

Overall, the programme held the annual rate of wage inflation down by 1%, even though inflationary conditions were worse than anticipated [cf. Meyers, 1980]. Success was more marked in Year I (albeit with inflation more favourable) when the single-figure standard operated: there was then a slight deceleration of wage inflation despite the rise in the CPI. Total labour compensation (including employment taxes) rose by 8.8%, partly due to the minimum wage increase in January 1979 and increases in social security taxes. A 1.3% decline in hourly output contributed to the 10.2% increase in unit labour costs, thus also rendering otherwise acceptable wage increases too high, even though real wages fell 3.6% (a lagged response to demand conditions) [Meyer, 1980:199-202; COWPS 1979c:E-1; 1981:14]. The evidence of restraint was ambiguous, however; thus, COWPS considered that wage constraint was confirmed by the clustering of settlements below the standard [COWPS, 1981:14], but PAYC declared that "wage increases had not clustered around either end of the range", nor around the 7% standard in Year I [PAYC, 1982:1; 35]. On major collective

bargaining ageements, there was a trend to smaller settlements than in the previous round (generally in 1976), although these tended still to be over the standard *and* above the economy-wide average gain [Meyer, 1980:219]. Major settlements in the rubber, electrical equipment and petroleum sectors showed substantial deceleration, adjusted for real inflation (9%), trucking a slight deceleration, but the autoworkers a slight acceleration. However, COWPS excluded portions of the wage payments from the calculations, and on full wages (alone), trucking and auto settlements in 1979 represented a substantial acceleration over 1976 (33.2% and 35.1% respectively, over life-of-contract). For example, the Teamsters' deceleration (relative to 1976) was in terms of total compensation: namely through benefit provisions, not wages [Meyer, 1980:220, inc.ft.19].

From an average rate of restraint of 1.3% in Year I, the rate dropped by about 0.8% during the operation of PAYC and the Year II pay range, when there was less of a clustering effect, especially for union settlements [COWPS, 1981:14]. The overall rate of settlement (10%) resulted from "slippage" (through exceptions) rather than non-compliance, and through the under-evaluation of COLA increases (evaluated based on an inflation assumption of only 7.5%). COWPS concluded that there was some evidence that settlements would have been higher in the absence of the pay range; wage acceleration occurred largely in the non-union sector, due to catch-up provisions and carry-over allowances from Year I (when unions had secured the maximum permissible); plus there were more non-union than union exceptions during Year II. Again, while Unions had secured a 1%-higher average settlement level than non-unionists in Year I because of front-loading provisions in contracts, in Year II they gained a level only modestly above the second year increases on non-union contracts. Generally, there was a sharp fall-off of settlements after the 9.5% Year II standard maximum; most large unions settled below and the three largest settlements (in steel, aluminium and communications) were all well below on an adjusted basis. Accelerated contracts resulted in three major cases: communications (notwithstanding Watts' anticipated compliance), the Year II OCAW settlement (introduced through a contract re-opener clause) and the Longshoremen (these last two unions did not hold COLAs). Given exceptions and an adjusted inflation rate, COWPS regarded the trucking, rubber and electrical settlements as a large deceleration [COWPS, 1981:11-18; cf. Meyer 1980].

The issue of what inflation measure to use for settlement outcomes aside, major contracts were around the standard despite difficult inflation conditions - and at a time of rising shortages of skilled labour in some sectors [BNA-DLR 1979, 240:C-3], although the White House regarded the economy generally as relatively "loose". It is not possible to know what settlement levels would have looked like without the Year II programme, or had COWPS

unilaterally introduced a single-figure standard. Ultimately, the issue is how far cooperation from the labour leaders altered the bargaining climate in the major contract segment of the workforce, to what extent a few influential contracts perceived as non-compliant, like the Teamsters and UAW, had the reverse effect, and whether any contribution was significant. Notwithstanding COWPS' claimed success, Schultze felt there was little pay restraint in Year II and that the labour leaders failed to appreciate fully the economic situation, despite attempts to reach a mutual understanding: wage restraint was simply not a priority for organized labour [Schultze]. Undoubtedly, however, the White House received more cooperation than without a negotiated understanding, notwithstanding the fact that the labour leaders actively used the Accord process and PAYC to alter the character of the programme, to seek an end to it, and to secure other policy concessions. There were, of course, the political advantages for the White House. The Accord process and PAYC negotiations sustained labour support despite increasing conflict over fiscal and monetary policy until the exigencies of electoral politics virtually precluded its withdrawal. Cooperation on reindustrialization policy and continuing consultation through the Accord process kept the door open to the re-negotiation of a further understanding after the election. Both sides accepted the Accord as a model for future relations and expected negotiations to continue, especially over reindustrialization, and notwithstanding the clear prospect of conflict over a future incomes policy specifically. After Carter was defeated, a "top-level private labor-management group" on economic and social issues emerged partly from the labour-management cooperation achieved by PAYC, and a "number of Committee members provided the nucleus for the reconstituted labor-management group" which published policy recommendations on reindustrialization [PAYC, 1982:3; Labor-Management Group, 1983]. In the meantime, attention focused on electoral politics. White House aides were concerned that, as the labour leaders had complained, there seemed to be little difference between Carter and Reagan on economic policy. Relations with labour on economic policy continued to be strained up until the Democratic convention. Labour electoral support was nevertheless vital to the President's grip on the Democratic presidential nomination, and hence to his ability to contest the election; conflicts with labour and other interests within the Democratic coalition injured his prospects of defeating Ronald Reagan.

CHAPTER 7

ORGANIZED LABOUR, JIMMY CARTER AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Electoral concerns contributed to the decision of President Carter and his political strategists to sustain relations with the labour leadership through the Accord. In 1980, organized labour was crucial to Carter's successful nomination bid at both stages of Senator Kennedy's challenge - during the primaries (especially) and at the Party convention. The price Carter paid during the primaries was acceptance of the pay range proposed by PAYC; during the convention, a labour-Kennedy alliance thrust further economic policy concessions upon him. The labour leaders subsequently proved unable to persuade rank and file unionists to support the President in the general election; instead, they reflected the strong national tide of dissatisfaction and Carter lost even in major labour-Democratic strongholds in the North-East.

Carter's emergence as Democratic contender for the presidential elections of 1976 and 1980 disturbed Party officials and the labour leaders; neither group favoured his candidacy and Carter had demonstrated limited appreciation of their importance to his ability to govern once in office. Broader changes within the Party and the AFL-CIO reinforced these concerns, proving to each the necessity of new provisions for party-political activity with the aim of improving coalition-building and ensuring the emergence of more suitable presidential candidates. In the context of increasing internal pressure to consolidate and formalize existing ties to the Democratic Party, the AFL-CIO pledged formal involvement before and during presidential primaries - an important departure from previous practice.

CARTER, ORGANIZED LABOUR AND THE 1976 ELECTION

An open Democratic field, with no strong Party frontrunner or "consensus candidate", encouraged Carter's bid for the presidency in 1976. Although relatively unknown, Carter had travelled extensively as chairman of the 1974 Democratic campaign committee, "establishing a personal network in every state" [Pomper, 1977a:10] and thus an "advance base" for his campaign [Hardesty, 1976b:4]. After completing his term as Governor of Georgia he was, unlike his opponents, free to concentrate on gaining the nomination. Public funding was available to qualifying candidates for the first time, encouraging those without Party or other support; Carter and his Republican opponent, Gerald Ford, each received $21.8 million in federal matching funds [Wilson, 1980:200-1]. The spread of primaries (especially the candidate primary) to some 30 states enabled Carter, a well-organized Party outsider or "dark horse" candidate, to gain the Democratic nomination. In effect, nomination shifted to

the delegate selection process. Nearly 75% of Democratic delegates were selected in primaries; most were pledged under new national Party rules to vote for specific candidates at the first-vote stage of the convention. State and local party officials thereby lost power, since candidates no longer depended upon their endorsement and the proportional apportionment of delegates among candidates within each state reduced their bargaining opportunities at the convention, where they had previously controlled the transfer of entire delegate blocs. Carter's home state of Georgia introduced primaries in 1976 and the Southern primary states (with 561 delegates) provided him with a solid core of support. While his competitors followed outmoded campaign strategies, Carter exploited the new provisions, organizing for every caucus and all but one primary. Where party organization was still strong, as in Chicago, Carter avoided confrontation; where weak, he forged tactical alliances with other interests, as in Pennsylvania [Hardesty, 1976b:3; Pomper, 1977a:7-17].

These developments reinforced the importance of organized groups since candidates, now entering most contests, needed an "extended national vehicle" of organized groups active in each target state to secure delegates, drawn increasingly from the foremost such groups. These groups exploited "a new--and golden--opportunity to extend their influence" by working directly with favoured contenders, rather than as just another influence through the party: "The triumph of the organized interests ... was the most dramatic product of the demise of the official party" [Shafer, 1988:4]. The AFL-CIO and its affiliates already constituted the best such electioneering network across the U.S. and had established influence in convention decisionmaking, including representation on the DNC where labour is prominent in panels from a number of large states: Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, Massachusetts and California (relative to other groupings). Labour is similarly prominent in state delegations controlling large numbers of votes at the convention and therefore of paramount importance to candidates; in 1976, for example: California (280), New York (274), Pennsylvania (178), Illinois (169), Ohio (152), Michigan (133), Texas (130), New Jersey (108), Massachusetts (104) [Hardesty 1976a:4; Ross/Eisenbrey].

In 1976, however, Carter was little known to organized interests outside Georgia before the primaries and the national labour leadership had little early involvement with his campaign. With no incumbent to rally around and a generally liberal field, the AFL-CIO favoured several other candidates, none of whom prospered during the primaries: Senators Henry M. "Scoop" Jackson (Washington), Hubert Humphrey (Minnesota) and Birch Bayh (Indiana) [Wilson, 1979:52]. Indeed, AFL-CIO officials and some affiliates unsuccessfully supported Jackson to block Carter in the Pennsylvania primary (and helped him to success in Massachusetts and New York) [Singer, 1979a:1252]. In the South, however, where labour's

choice among candidates is limited, Carter was acceptable to local labour [Albert]. Carter was a small-town businessman from Georgia, a state with a hostile labour climate and low levels of unionization; as Governor, his relations with labour were limited but not unfavourable. Federation affiliates, the NEA and the UAW actively supported him, financially and otherwise, albeit often to block the efforts of more conservative candidates like George Wallace [Cronin, 1980:62]. The Labor Coalition Clearinghouse, led by the UAW and a more homogeneous (liberal) union grouping, supported candidates on a state-by-state basis until Carter emerged as the clear frontrunner.

Carter's candidacy was helped by the fragmented Democratic field: around a dozen early "national" candidates made a majority candidate unlikely prior to the convention. Carter was not among the top five in early polls. However, the timing of primaries can be influential: labour "provided crucial support" to Carter in his important early victories in the opening Iowa caucuses and the Florida and Michigan primaries, contributing to his "bandwagon" momentum and public exposure [Singer, 1979a:1252; Hardesty, 1976b:4]. By May, Carter had won nine of eleven contests, establishing an image as the Democratic frontrunner - a pattern he sought to repeat in 1980 - and, although losing nine of the final fifteen contests, most importantly, he steadily gained delegates since selection was based for the first time entirely on proportional allocation [Pomper, 1977a:13; Hardesty, 1977b:1; Davis, 1983:64; Shafer, 1988]. With his "early popular and late delegate momentum", Carter had a clear majority of delegates by the end of the primaries, virtually pre-empting the convention: hence Kennedy's "open convention" bid in 1980 (see later). Carter succeeded in contests in the Great Lakes area, including Indiana and labour strongholds in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan and Illinois, but was weaker in the Party's northern industrial strongholds [Hardesty, 1976b:2]. Thus, he needed to consolidate his mainstream Party support before the 1980 contest and to consolidate his labour backing. He signally failed to do so.

Carter's strategy in 1976 was successful in several other respects. The small and unrepresentative primaries electorate comprises voters with stronger, narrower interests than the average voter in the election. Appealing to their specialised issue concerns may embarrass a candidate as he (typically) moderates his position for the general election. Carter played down his detailed policy and programme positions, emphasizing personal qualities and general themes such as "trust", which permitted him manoeuvrability later without inconsistency, and successfully appealed to voters [Wilson, 1980:160; 176-8; Cronin, 1980:37-8; 42; Pomper, 1977a:10-12]. Carter adopted neutral or compromise positions on divisive issues among Democrats while exploiting those damaging to his Republican opponent, Gerald Ford. In the aftermath of Watergate, he emphasized his personal integrity and promised to

tackle corruption in government and waste and inefficiency in the federal bureaucracy. Both Carter and Ford addressed "issues only to appeal to the organized interest groups that formed the core of their parties' constituencies." [Malbin, 1980a:80].

It was primarily on policy grounds that Carter drew labour support during the campaign; his positions were compatible with dominant labour concerns. NEA support was assured by his advocacy of a separate Department of Education. Labour was incensed by Ford's recent veto of the labour law reform bill, and Carter wisely affirmed support for such measures. He successfully campaigned against the Nixon/Ford unemployment record and endorsed the Party position on full employment, price stability and balanced growth (including labour standards and rights), which aimed to reduce adult unemployment to 3% within four years [National Democratic Party, 1976].[1] Carter was critical of deficit increases under Ford (the deficit doubled during his own presidency), yet advocated an active role for government and assistance for the needy. These positions reassured the national labour leadership. Moreover, Carter's choice of running-mate Walter Mondale achieved a balanced ticket, attracting broad support from a convention of delegates more liberal than himself; Mondale's appeal was greatest where Carter was weakest, among labour, in the big cities and among minorities. [Davis, J., 1983:6-7; 89; AFL-CIO 1976b:5; Bonafede, 1976:1583; Singer, 1980g:1836]. A mainstream Party liberal who had served on the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee, Mondale was well-regarded by organized labour.

The AFL-CIO EXCO and General Board strongly endorsed the Democratic ticket in 1976, stating that the platforms revealed a "classic choice of political philosophy":

> We believe the platforms should and do fairly represent the policies which will prevail if the party's candidates are elected, and we judge the parties accordingly. [AFL-CIO 1976b:1]

While national party platforms are not binding, they are more than simply a coherent statement of collective policy: delegates have increasingly viewed them as a step toward realizing programme goals and have repeatedly gained concessions from nominees seeking to avoid open conflict at the convention. Over time, the policy positions adopted influence party interests more broadly and candidates themselves reflect their influence in seeking to mobilize campaign support. Thus, the platform process contributes to the constant moderation of views and fosters an intricate, partial and shifting consensus. Moreover, most platform pledges are kept [Shafer, 1988:6-53-5; Malbin, 1981a:136-141; Davis, J., 1983:102; and sources cited].

---

[1]The Humphrey-Hawkins initiative had failed to pass the 94th Congress and was an unlikely item for the 95th: Carter possibly expected to face fairly limited proposals (similarly on taxation, where a major initiative passed Congress in 1976 and further substantial action was unlikely in the short term) [Jacob, 1977:104].

During the 1970s, the parties divided most sharply over economic policy, especially the dilemma of simultaneous inflation and unemployment, the main issues of the 1976 campaign. The parties' strategies diverged predictably. The Republicans stressed the role of the private sector in economic recovery, and thus the reduction of federal expenditures (including curbs on Congress), and tax incentives for business investment. The Democrats continued to advocate government intervention, stressing improved efficiency, restructured spending, and a general overhaul of the taxation system, as well as new programmes and lower unemployment. Happily for the Democrats, in 1976 it was the Republicans who manifested sharp conflict at their convention. Unlike 1972, Democratic presidential candidates held largely similar positions on domestic issues policy, there was no divisive foreign policy issue like Viet Nam, and liberal ideologists were largely unsuccessful, for example, with proposals to provide one hour of general platform debate, or that minority reports should require only 15% not 25% support. Carter's huge delegate lead muted conflict, he secured nearly 75% of the votes cast and the Democrats emerged from the 1976 season as "a fairly united party", assisting their credibility, and Carter's, in the election [Plotkin, 1977a; Wilson, 1979:55; Cronin, 1980:38; 42; Pomper, 1977a:16-17; Shafer, 1988].

Carter secured broad endorsement from the labour delegations at the convention, including from the nine LCC unions with some 150 delegates (pledged to various candidates), overshadowing the AFL-CIO's 110 *non*-LCC delegates [Greenstone, 1977:xvi], although Meany and his allies broadly claimed over 300 of the delegate total [Albert]. The NEA, with 172 delegates (and 93 alternates) was the largest *single* labour group and, combined with the UAW and UMW (both in the LCC), made over 300 non-Federation labour delegates. The LCC group would have been most influential in the event of a deadlocked contest but, when Carter instead became the clear frontrunner, the LCC unions swung behind him. Although the AFL-CIO had not backed Carter before the convention, Carter placed "a high value ... on the power of the AFL-CIO's Committee on Political Education to help him become President": "Eager for such support in a campaign which was noticeably short of money, Carter was prepared to court Meany and the AFL-CIO in public and in private..." [Wilson, 1979:53]. The months between the convention and the election are short (reinforcing the wisdom of early involvement), and Meany and the AFL-CIO EXCO endorsed Carter's nomination within days, and then "vigorously" registered union members, encouraged them to vote, and undertook extensive propoganda efforts [Albert; Pomper, 1977b:62]. Once Carter's nomination was secured and the AFL-CIO committed to active support, the LCC disbanded and most

unions rejoined the Federation efforts - evidence that the divisions manifest in 1972 were not irreconcilable [Singer, 1979b:1815; Wilson, 1979:49].

The AFL-CIO established an electoral steering committee of EXCO vice-presidents in Washington (other union presidents could also attend), meeting biweekly, with each assigned responsibility for a specific region to assist the state COPEs. With "full support" from UAW leader Leonard Woodcock, Meany urged the formation of state level "united labor committees" to include all unions (not just affiliates) [Meany, 1976b:8]. Statements by the EXCO and General Board, circulated through the Federation newsletter, commended Carter's performance as Governor of Georgia, including specifically on labour issues, and claimed that he had "worked closely" with the labour movement there, "consulting it frequently" on "a wide range of issues" [AFL-CIO, 1976b:4] - an ironic commendation given later dissatisfaction with Carter's consultative provisions. Carter addressed the General Board meeting in August, repeating his commitment to full employment, working toward a balanced budget only in "normal" economic times, and to reducing the inflation rate to 4% within four years. Referring to the need for cooperation with business and labour leaders in voluntary restraint, Carter praised labour moderation in wage demands in the face of high cost increases during 1973-4 [Carter, 1976:9-12]. The NEA's political unit unanimously recommended the Carter/Mondale ticket in September and 81% of 7,000 members voting endorsed him (Carter and Mondale attended NEA H.Q. for the announcement). The labour endorsement was, indeed, near-unanimous. The only union which had endorsed Ford was the International Conference of Police Associations; no major union endorsed him - even the Teamsters remained aloof. Solid labour support for the Democrats benefited Carter (although not personally popular with the labour movement): "United as perhaps never before, organized labour is going all-out to mobilize its forces to ensure victory for the Carter-Mondale ticket on November 2." [Singer, 1976a:1429; and 1424-28].

> In a presidential election, the AFL-CIO, through its state and local organizations, directs labor's political activities across the country, prepares and distributes campaign materials and, using union volunteers, conducts the crucial registration and get-out-the-vote drives that are even more valuable now that private contributions to the nominees are illegal. [Singer, 1980d:1108]

> ... the flat grant public financial system creates a possibility that never existed before. When labor unites behind one candidate, as it did in 1976, a flat grant system in which private contributions are prohibited leaves it in a position no other groups can match. [Malbin, 1977a:417]

Federal matching funds for presidential campaigns, available for the first time in 1976, diminished candidates' reliance upon some previous funding sources, notably party. However, the associated financial restrictions on candidates and party organizations left them little spare for canvassing, leafleting and the like. In 1976, while Carter could spend

only $10.9 million on his nomination campaign and $21.8 million on the election (plus 20% for fund raising), the electioneering activities of groups like COPE did not count towards his campaign budget. Although the AFL-CIO was involved in Carter's campaign largely after his nomination, COPE alone eventually spent $3 million mainly on the Carter/Mondale ticket, largely on voter registration [Wilson, 1979:20, citing evidence filed by the National Right-to-Work Committee]. The UAW spent a similar amount, the NEA about $1.8 million, the UFCW some $1.2 million and, in all, labour spent an estimated $11 million or more on behalf of the ticket [Albert; Singer, 1979a:1254; Malbin, 1977a:412]. AFL-CIO and other labour officials were so closely involved with the Carter campaign that "it became difficult to distinguish" labour, DNC and Carter efforts. COPE national director Al Barkan sat on the DNC's 42-member steering committee "created to advise Carter", along with Woodcock (UAW) and Floyd Smith (then IAM president). Bill Holayter of the IAM (AFL-CIO) was labour's liaison to Carter's campaign [Wilson, 1979:53], (although the union was led against him in 1980 by its new president, Bill Winpisinger); COPE research director, Mary G. Zon, acted as the Carter campaign-labour liaison (paid partly by both sides), and other union members were similarly funded from the Carter campaign payroll while seconded from labour duties. By September, Landon Butler, then political director of the Carter campaign, applauded labour's "incredible all-out effort for us", commenting: "I don't know of a single thing labor's not doing that it could be doing. If anything, we're not moving fast enough for them [requoted in Singer, 1976a:1424; see 1426; Malbin, 1977a:413]

LABOUR INFLUENCE AND THE 1976 GENERAL ELECTION OUTCOME

Presidential elections in the U.S. are sometimes so close that a shift of a several thousand votes in just a few states could alter the result in the electoral college. Carter's victory was indeed narrow: he received 51% of the national vote to Ford's 49% (40,251,143 to 38,499,272 votes), winning only 24 states, mainly in the South and industrial North, with 297 electoral college votes, while Ford won in 27 largely Western and mid-Western states but gained only 241 college votes. Carter won all but Virginia of the eleven Old Confederacy states, and 118 of their 130 electoral college votes while, outside the South, Ford held a 50,000 margin in the popular vote and 50 more electoral college votes than Carter. Even so, 132 of Carter's college votes were from big Northern states. About 20 states with 299 electoral college votes were decided by less than 5% of the major-party vote; Carter won 8 of these: Louisiana, Missisipi, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas and Wisconsin. A minuscule shift in votes could have reversed the electoral college outcome in Ford's favour: for example, a switch of only about 3,500 and 4,000 votes in Ohio and Hawaii respectively.

Labour was believed to have swung several important close contests in Carter's favour. [Bonafede, 1976:1583; 1979e:1747; Hardesty, 1976d:3; Frank, 1980:1385; Pomper, 1977b:59-60].

Organized labour's geographic distribution gives it strategic influence in a number of key states with large numbers of electoral college votes, and the electoral college system encourages candidates to focus upon such states: a winner requires 270 of the 538 college votes and the 10 largest states together control 239 (just 31 short of the required majority). A number of these states are labour strongholds, especially New York (41 votes), Pennsylvania (27), Illinois (26), Ohio (25) and Michigan (21)), and labour is well-organized in others, such as California (45) and Texas (26). One third of all union members are located in New York, California and Pennsylvania, and adding Illinois, Ohio and Michigan brings the total to fully one-half. Organized labour has historically been a major force in local and state politics in some cases, especially Michigan, where labour (the UAW and, next, COPE) is organizationally more dominant than the Democratic Party. COPE regarded its most significant contributions in 1976 to have been in Pennsylvania, New York, Maryland, Wisconsin, Texas, Missouri and Ohio; Ohio and Wisconsin had gone Republican in six of the eight preceding presidential elections [Wilson, 1979:14; Singer, 1976c:1656; Hardesty, 1976d:5], and Pomper [1977b:62] ascribes victories there, and in Pennsylvania and New York, to labour. More generally, "a united labour movement" going "all-out" for Carter and Mondale was "one of the key reasons the Democrats were returned to the White House ... This is recognized by Carter and by labour leaders..." [Singer, 1976c:1655].

Labour's influence upon voting behaviour is important, albeit limited: it is greatest over union members - relatively active and pro-Democratic [Jong, 1978:63; 85], but constituting a declining proportion of the electorate. The *union household* vote category (used in electoral analyses) accounts for about 40 million eligible voters, or 25-28% of the electorate, and is traditionally mildly but consistently more Democratic, with the high level ranging from 73-80% (the peak was in 1964) and the low (for McGovern) from 40-46%.[2] Historically, support from more than 60% of voting unionists has been necessary for a winning Democratic presidential candidate. Union members (along with blacks) were the most important voting constituency in Carter's victory, with between 60-63% of union household voters supporting Carter (43% or less had voted for McGovern in 1972; 57% voted for Nixon): only in 1960 and 1964 was Carter's performance exceeded. COPE had registered 80% of its affiliated

[2]In comparison, Democratic support nationally reached a high of 61.1% in 1964 and a low of 37.5% in 1972. See "The Fight for the Blue-Collar Vote", Lanouette, [1980b:1833:4], drawn from a study by Michael Traugatt, University of Michigan Centre for Political Studies. The lowest/highest figures are given in Abramson [1983:108, inc. figure 5.3] and, as a specialist, comprehensive study, should have greater reliability. Voter turnout in 1976 was higher than had been expected, although barely above 54% (as in 1980 also).

membership by election day and claimed that 65% actually voted, compared to 53% of the general electorate. Moreover, the AFL-CIO claimed that 70% of voting *unionists* (presumably affiliates) supported Carter. These patterns are persistent across elections.[3] Carter gained 59% of the blue collar vote (which comprises about 17% of the total vote), but only 51% of the white collar vote (Nixon had gained 61% and 63% respectively). The blue-collar vote is "not monolithicly Democratic" and the Republicans had secured sizeable support throughout the fifties and sixties. In presidential elections between 1952 and 1976, the Democratic blue-collar vote varied between 43% and 71%, with the high in 1964 and the low in 1972. Moreover, in 1976, CBS reported that 63% of *unionized* blue collar workers voted for Carter, compared to 54% of non-unionizeds. Carter did well among the large group of late voters, one-fifth of whom were undecided by the last week; he secured 53% of these votes (61% of those deciding on election day): the "vital last-minute edge" which they gave him owed much to the GOTV efforts of the unions (and black groups). The Democratic coalition which brought Carter victory in 1976, while more like the New Deal coalition than that of the 1960s, was a unique demographic alliance [Pomper, 1977b:63-4; 80-1], but the vital support from labour, organizationally and in terms of the union vote, provided a note of continuity. The key question was whether the coalition would endure for the 1980 election: this largely depended on Carter's performance in office. [Singer, 1976c:1655-56; 1980c:1655; Pomper, 1977b:61; Table 3.2; 1981b:88; Jong, 1978:134; Kohlmeier, 1976:1674; Lipset, 1985:28].

AFTER THE 1976 ELECTION

> The course of macroeconomic policies and outcomes during the Carter Administration looks like a stylized political business cycle run backward. [Hibbs, 1987:273]

To neglect to act upon specific, visible campaign commitments would discredit a president [Bonafede, 1980d:1106]. Although presidents have done less well on this score since the late sixties [Davis, J., 1983:102], in office, President Carter fulfilled major campaign promises to organized labour, supporting common situs picketing and labour law reform legislation (albeit without enthusiasm), establishing a separate Education Department (sought by the NEA) and lowering unemployment (until 1979). However, neither Carter's personal style of decisionmaking nor his experience as Governor of Georgia equipped him well for national level institutional politics. His reluctance to compromise and bargain and his dislike of "special interest" politics (reinforced by some senior aides), created difficulties. Carter recognized the need to work with the labour leadership as a pragmatic matter; hence he entered into the rapprochement and the National Accord. Moreover, by January 1979,

---

[3]Thus, in 1984, exit polls recorded that 48% of union-household voters supported Reagan and 52% Mondale, but 61% of Federation members supported Mondale (compared to 41% of the total electorate).

the eve of the primaries, the White House feared that organized labour might abandon en masse the Carter/Mondale ticket for 1980 in favour of Senator Kennedy; this threat provided an effective bargaining asset for labour. Even privately, very few labour leaders indicated support, although those doing so included influential EXCO members like Watts, Wynn, Hall and Chaikin. The influence of the Accord was essential to securing this labour support for Carter.

Carter's tenuous relations with the labour leaders were symptomatic of broader shortcomings in managing institutional politics within the presidency and the Democratic Party (including in Congress):

> For four years, Carter disdained the party and its organizations. He recognized that party loyalties--and especially, loyalties to party organizations--seemed to be attenuating, and he had no interest in reversing the decline. [McWilliams, 1977:175]

He did little to unify Party interests and was never able to construct a successful governing coalition. Although the task was difficult one in the post-Watergate period, his successor, Ronald Reagan, did better despite lacking the partisan advantage in Congress which should have favoured Carter. Moreover, on the domestic front he failed to control inflation or the deficit, or to achieve unemployment targets. His vigourous campaign on these very issues in 1976 then made him more vulnerable to criticism; matters worsened as a result of the second OPEC price hike early in 1979. The consultative process with the AFL-CIO nearly collapsed as the President increasingly departed from the fiscal and monetary course agreed and deferred employment target commitments. As Carter's political advisers feared, economic issues were centre-stage in the 1980 campaign,[4] and the AFL-CIO actively and effectively pursued the attempt to secure renewed commitments from the President into the 1980 convention. The nature of the 1980 presidential race otherwise compelled Carter to shore up relations with the labour leadership.

CARTER, LABOUR AND THE 1980 CAMPAIGN

> ... while the myth persists that incumbent Presidents are always elected to second terms, the fact is that the fragmentation of political power within the party and the tremendous difficulty the modern President faces in finding practical and attractive solutions to this new generation of complex foreign and domestic problems make a serious challenge to an incumbent President much more likely. [Hamilton Jordan's memo to President Carter, January 17/79; quoted in Broder et al, 1980:87-8].

In 1980, Carter's incumbency was his strongest asset among Democrats. The nomination is customarily seen as the preserve of an incumbent president for historical reasons: they have generally won general elections.[5] Yet Carter's position was so insecure

---

[4]Carter's record on the economy was the central target of the Reagan camp campaign strategy [Hunt, 1981:144].

[5]No president has been denied renomination since Chester Arthur in 1884 (although Ford's renomination in 1976 was shaky, he was not an *elected* incumbent) [Pomper, 1977a; 18-19].

that White House strategists expected he would have greater difficulty in securing nomination than in winning the general election. Carter's narrow win in 1976 and his insensitivity to Party limited his support base, and not simply among Party leaders. Despite extensive lobbying and procedural management by the Carter forces, who feared a backlash against the conservative thrust of economic policy, a poll of 800 of the 1,633 delegates at the 1978 Democratic mid-term conference in Memphis found that 40% preferred someone other than Carter for president. Senior Party figures, especially those standing for re-election, feared that Carter's renomination would seriously damage Democratic electoral prospects [Broder et al, 1980:65; Davis, J., 1983:259-261; 281, ft.29].

Compared to other contenders, a president has greater public recognition, national prestige and constant media exposure, but Carter suffered from a persistently poor public image. Unlike 1976, there was not an open Democratic field, and Senator Kennedy was a credible, well-organized opponent with a high public and party profile and broader party support, who led Carter in the polls for much of 1979 [Shafer, 1988, 6]:

> News of Kennedy dominated the newspapers. He was, in a sense, the leading political figure in the country. Year after year he had topped the political popularity readings. In political and journalistic circles he was regarded as a virtually invincible candidate, despite Carter's earlier brave promise to "whip his ass".[6] [Broder et al, 1980:xiv]

Kennedy hoped to revive the traditional Party coalition; his policies were more liberal and traditionally Democratic than Carter's (whom Kennedy called a "Reagan clone"); he had support from a number of eminent Democrats[7] and strong ties to the labour movement, the Party's foremost interest constituency, whose support for Carter was doubtful. Most labour leaders were thought to prefer Kennedy, union polls revealed overwhelming support for him among rank and file members, and organized labour was strongest in those states most likely to favour him (for example, Chaikin's personal ties to Kennedy were reinforced by his union base in the North East, a Kennedy stronghold). Low unionization in Georgia and the South meant that Carter lacked strong "home-based" labour support. [Pomper, 1981a:22; Singer, 1979a:1253-4]. Thus, by securing labour support for his own candidacy, Carter could weaken Kennedy's campaign where it most threatened his own.

Fortunately for Carter, Kennedy announced his candidacy on November 7, 1979, just after the capture of American hostages in Iran, when the President's public image was, briefly, strongest (and the Senator's unhappy interview with Roger Mudd of CBS News was

---

[6]To which, Kennedy pointedly retorted: "I'm sure the President must have been misquoted. I think what he meant to say was that he was going to whip inflation." [Broder et al, 1980:96].

[7]For example, Senators John Culver, Birch Bayh, Henry "Scoop" Jackson and George McGovern. Also, Representatives Morris Udall and Paul Simon (a presidential hopeful in 1988), as well as Governor Hugh Carey of New York and others [Broder et al, 1980:65].

screened).[8] The President's air of calm control contrasted with Kennedy's reaction during the unfortunate events of Chappaquidick in 1969, which Carter's strategists exploited by shifting the advertising focus to Kennedy's character. Kennedy otherwise failed to establish an effective campaign early, whereas Carter's campaign organization drew on the benefits of his incumbency, notwithstanding some early problems - and three different chairmen. During the Iranian incident, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December, the President made much of responsibly remaining "on the job" in Washington rather than campaigning - the "Rose Garden" strategy. Kennedy's campaign lost momentum rapidly. By the time of the opening Iowa caucuses in late January, he was running well behind Carter in the polls; when Carter won the contest handily, it was widely felt that Kennedy's bid had failed, notwithstanding his rousing "Georgetown" speech calling for stern economic measures, including a six-month wage and price freeze and gasoline rationing. Kennedy, however, persisted, first challenging Carter in the primaries and, second, mounting a last-ditch effort at the convention. Led by the AFL-CIO, mainstream organized labour largely withheld support for Kennedy's bid, notwithstanding increasing dissatisfaction with Carter. [Broder et al, 1980:xiv, 40-3; 66; 74-5; 85; 105; 116; Abramson, 1983:20; Pomper, 1981a:8-5; Bonafede, 1980a:11-12].

By January 1979, the labour leaders were developing their electoral strategy for the 1980 presidential campaign. They sought to avoid the internal conflicts of 1972, including any repetition of the LCC division. The AFL-CIO, remaining formally neutral before the Democratic convention as customary, gave an informal lead to the labour movement throughout 1979. The wisdom of supporting an incumbent president and the labour climate created by the Accord process assured support for Carter and ultimately enabled Kirkland to ensure that the AFL-CIO remained, at a minimum, neutral during the primaries and clearly not "neutral for Kennedy". Meany and Kirkland customarily refused to be drawn on their candidate preference, as when Kirkland blandly agreed that Kennedy's candidacy was "interesting" but insisted: "I'm taking great pains to remain completely vertical." [AFL-CIO PR, Oct.18/79:3]. However, when asked whether the Federation would remain uninvolved in the primaries even were labour a deciding factor in whether Kennedy or Carter would be the nominee, Kirkland made an important disclosure:

> Well, I said that we were not going to get officially involved as the AFL-CIO. We think it is very important to maintain the principles that the AFL-CIO is not a wing or instrument of either political party ... Having said that, I would say that we are not fools and if there are

[8]Over November-December, Carter scored the largest short-term increase in presidential popularity Gallup had recorded [Abramson, 1983:23]. Labour support rallied to the President over the incident, while Kennedy's speeches apparently injured his standing with labour (especially the building trades unions) [Wynn].

> things that might be done in an unofficial way that are in the best interests of the trade union movement, we will do them. [AFL-CIO PR, Nov.25/79:6-7].

Early support for Carter was a possible way to discourage Kennedy before his campaign gained momentum [Albert]. In December 1978, Landon Butler had urged union leaders to establish a labour committee to support Carter's re-election. Kirkland revealed the real nature of this standard labour practice in speaking of Hubert Humphrey's 1968 campaign, when such a committee, unofficial and formally independent, was established: "[i]t just so happened that practically every affiliate ... enrolled ... including myself." [Kirkland, 1981:19]. As Kirkland thus intimated, the labour leaders involved *informally* bore the AFL-CIO mantle, an arrangement of great importance to presidential candidates and repeated for the 1980 presidential contest. Paul Hall (Seafarers) then led a (formally independent) coalition of unions, the Labor for Carter-Mondale Committee, which organized well before the primaries and caucuses stage in an extension of LCC strategy in 1976, specifically to elect Carter delegates from amongst their members. Hall led only a small union (80,000 members) but was also president of the AFL-CIO Maritime Trades Department, a well-financed coalition of unions, and he was an acknowledged political force in New York State. The Committee, like the Accord, signalled the decision in Carter's favour among mainstream AFL-CIO labour leaders, amongst whom Hall was a senior figure. As a staunch ally of Meany's, Hall would not have undertaken such activity without an understanding with Meany and Kirkland, whom he kept informed [Albert; Wynn]. Wynn (UFCW) and Watts (CWA) were also active participants. Apart from Watts' personal support for Carter, much support was purely pragmatic. Wynn was involved in a mixed group, the "Progressive Alliance" (which favoured Kennedy), led initially by Fraser (UAW) with support from IAM and several other major unions like ACTW, the ILGWU and the NEA, as well as "all the usual liberal groups - civil rights, women's groups and so on." [Wynn (quoted); Albert]. Constrained by the White House Chrysler rescue package, Fraser invited Wynn (UFCW) to take over the group. Although Wynn declined, the UFCW provided some funds to the Alliance and Wynn attended several early meetings [Wynn], but the group had little impact within the Federation or beyond. Wynn[9] became co-chairman of the Carter/Mondale Committee in March 1979 and, along with the NEA, the UFCW later provided "the backbone" of labour support for Carter in the primaries [Singer, 1980c:640]. The

[9]Wynn had been president of the Retail Clerks for only two years. The union merged with the Meat Cutters union, becoming the largest AFL-CIO affiliate (with 1.3 million members); Carter addressed the merger convention in June 1979, consolidating relations. In the 1980 primaries and general election, the merged union, the UFCW, spent between $1.5-2 million on Carter's behalf (even though neither the Seafarers nor the UFCW had endorsed Carter as *unions* as late as mid-April) [Wynn; Butler; Albert; Singer, 1980c:642].

NEA leadership, with close ties to both Wynn and Fraser [Wynn] also participated in both the Carter/Mondale Committee and the Progressive Alliance initially.

The Carter/Mondale Labor Committee was publicly announced in late July 1979, as the Accord negotiations were fleshed out. Even by then, an impressive line up of 12 major unions, representing nearly 8 million members, were involved. The eleven AFL-CIO affiliates (plus the NEA) included some of "the most powerful and politically active unions", such as the Steelworkers, the UFCW and CWA as well as individual labour leaders such as Chaikin, Finley (an early Carter supporter), and Jack Otero (Railway and Airline Clerks). Not all were committed Carter supporters, but all were prepared to support the prospective Democratic nominee against the Republican threat, and especially against Reagan. Moreover, several unions were beneficiaries of White House policy (as, for example, with the introduction of protection for domestic steel prices against cheap imports, maritime policy, increased educational expenditures and the establishment of the Department of Education). Carter was invited to address the NEA convention in July 1979, where 77% of 9,000 delegates voted to endorse him (slightly lower than 1976); the Association did so during September when his fortunes were otherwise low, on the day he signed into law the bill creating the Education Department [Singer 1979a:1252-4; 1980c:641-3; 1980g:1838; Broder et al, 1980:193].

The Committee's institutional meshing with Carter's campaign was extensive. Indeed, the group, directed by Walter Moore, considered direct affiliation to the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee but, instead, worked through a "labour desk", with some labour staff on the Carter campaign payroll, but avoiding the labour Committee's activity from qualifying as a campaign contribution under campaign finance law. A number of union staff members were loaned to the Presidential Committee and worked closely with Moore and the labour Committee; Moore and Landon Butler kept in close touch and met roughly weekly with the presidents and political directors of the Carter unions. Later, Moore spent one or two weeks "on the spot" for each major primary or caucus, contacting the local and state labour people, as with the early contests in Iowa, New Hampshire, Maine and New York; from October until mid-March, he visited Illinois repeatedly and spent several weeks in Pennsylvania. Meanwhile, Labor secretary Marshall campaigned intensively, often repeatedly, in virtually all the primary states, defending the Administration to labour interests, by whom he was well-liked and respected. Moore helped to organize Marshall's itinerary and ensure that he spoke where most needed, securing a number of valuable endorsements for the President. Other Administration spokesmen, notably Mondale and Butler, undertook similar activities. Kennedy was never organized on the labour side in a like manner and his deputy campaign

chairman, Jim O'Hara, acknowledged that their efforts lacked central direction [Singer, 1980c:643-4; Butler].

By late 1979, Kennedy had secured endorsement by several AFL-CIO affiliates including the Painters & Allied Trades Union and the United Rubber Workers, and it was still thought possible that eventually "most unions will be in the Kennedy camp." [Singer, 1979b:1815]. In addition to private citizens, a few labour leaders joined Winpisinger, who led Kennedy's campaign for labour, to establish an *explicitly* pro-Kennedy group, the "National Call for Kennedy Committee". With the IAM members as the core, there were also members from UAW, NEA, CWA, AFGE, AFSCME, as well as Vic Kamber of the AFL-CIO Building Trades Department [Singer, 1979a:1255], but as private individuals rather than union representatives: there was little *union* weight behind the effort.

In October, shortly after the Accord was signed, Carter was invited to address the AFL-CIO Building & Construction Trades executive council meeting in San Diego. This sort of activity is another understood labour signal and Carter wisely accepted. These labour leaders represent a coalition of some 17 unions (with about 4 million members, primarily Irish-Catholics in the North-East), and the Department had reached new levels of political activity by 1976, including in mobilizing members to assist COPE activities. The unions act fairly cohesively and, although it had been expected that most would support Kennedy, he was not invited to speak. Reporters commented that Carter's speech contained his strongest ever support for labour legislation - common situs picketing, protection of the Davis-Bacon Act (both of special concern to these unions), and labour law reform, and reaffirmed his commitments not to fight inflation by causing greater unemployment, and to expand jobs in the construction sector; this strong appeal to labour was seen as possibly a "turning around" of the Administration [AFL-CIO PR, Oct.16/79:3; May 6/80:4; Singer, 1976a:1428; 1979b:1815]. Asked whether Carter was helping his electoral fortunes by such gestures, including by the National Accord, Kirkland replied:

> Oh, I think so, and I think he's entitled ... to make whatever political use of it [the Accord] that he can ... I think it would serve the advantage of constructive government in this country and of anyone who might emerge as the candidate who cared to embrace it. But it did not represent on our part an endorsement in any form. [AFL-CIO PR, Oct.16/79:3].

Still, a few weeks later, Marty Ward and the Plumbers's union set an important precedent by endorsing the Carter/Mondale ticket - and *after* Kennedy announced his candidacy. A number of major Building Trades unions individually followed suit, including the Operating Engineers, Ironworkers,[10] Carpenters and Electrical Workers. By early 1980, these unions

[10]Later, Lyons stated that the Ironworkers had broken with Kennedy owing to his support for a moratorium on nuclear construction (which threatened employment prospects in some building trades unions) [AFL-CIO PR, Feb.18/80:3].

also provided a consistent base of support across the U.S. for the Carter/Mondale ticket.

However, tension between the White House and labour leaders over economic policy intensified rapidly and labour support was nearly extinguished by Carter's abrupt budget reversal during February and March - although, questioned on "rumors that the AFL-CIO is closer than ever to endorsing a Republican presidential candidate, Kirkland retorted: "My God, where did you get that? That proves that you can find a rumor to fit any proposition." [AFL-CIO PR, Feb. 18/80:3]. Carter's case was helped somewhat through an Executive Order extending OSHA coverage for federal employees - a major objective of the Accord negotiations for labour.[11] However, Kennedy's electoral aspirations looked briefly more promising as the Federation joined a broad coalition of more than 100 groups (including the Progressive Alliance) vehemently opposing the new budget proposals, which Kirkland described as a clone of Republican policies. When asked whether support for a balanced budget would be a "serious enough breach in the party's traditional platform" to threaten labour support for the Democratic ticket, Kirkland replied that candidates were supported on the basis of their individual records, but warned that the issue would be an "important vote in our COPE reckoning..." [AFL-CIO PR, Apr.3/80:3-4]. Later, he acknowledged a closer tie between Party policy commitments and labour's electoral support, giving some candidates:

> ...who historically and traditionally have been interested and have counted upon labor's support some pause and some concern over the degree of enthusiasm with which our efforts might be pursued...clearly not all of the candidates are interested in our support ... All the pressures are the other way, and ... I think we institutionally, ought to be rather unsentimental about ... the political futures of particular individuals ... [AFL-CIO PR, Apr.29/80:3].

Only two major affiliates were so infuriated with Carter that they subsequently endorsed Kennedy: AFSCME, led by Jerry Wurf,[12] and the AFT, led by Al Shanker, but too late to provide any effective lead for other unions. Kennedy's most powerful union supporters throughout were IAM and the UAW, both experienced primary campaigners. Winpisinger (IAM president) had been a consistent Carter critic and strong Kennedy supporter, and had unconditionally rejected support for Carter, quipping: "I don't think Jimmy Carter is a Democrat but a Republican traveling incognito ... I used to say Jimmy Who, but now I say Jimmy Hoover." [quoted in Singer, 1979a:1252-4]. Doug Fraser and most of the UAW Executive supported Kennedy [Singer 1980c:640], although effectively gagged until late January 1980 by the Chrysler aid package. The UAW had then announced in Kennedy's favour, but with little impact, given Carter's win in the opening Iowa caucuses a week later. The Spring

---

[11]On the presidency's general patronage activities during the campaign, notably the opportune distribution of grants to cities and states, see Ware [1981:176]; Polsby [1981:52].

[12]Wurf apparently threatened to support the Republicans or form a third party [Singer, 1979a:1254]; it is unlikely that he was serious, although such remarks do make the nature of his support for Kennedy questionable.

budget reversal reinforced the union's stance, however, and Fraser [AFL-CIO PR, Apr.3/80:4] commented: "I can assure you that when we get to Pennsylvania and Michigan, the UAW will be doing everything that they can to see that Senator Kennedy wins those primaries." Kennedy did.

Clearly labour, faced with an unpopular incumbent and a labour favourite, was more divided than in 1976. When Kennedy had announced his candidacy, his labour coordinator, Jim O'Hara, claimed to have "the easiest job in the Kennedy campaign". Most observers would have agreed, but mistakenly. The Accord negotiations during 1979 were crucial to tipping the scales in Carter's favour. By Spring 1980, it was too late for the labour leadership to change their course, especially to abandon an incumbent president, even though a series of seven AFL-CIO meetings held between March and May involving officials from all 50 states, revealed that most believed that Kennedy, rather than Carter, could carry their state in the general election. Disapproval of Carter proved so strong that the officials had to be warned (by Barkan) to avoid influencing their memberships against Carter since, as the likely nominee, he would have to be supported against the Republicans. With some reluctance, Kirkland and the Executive Council reaffirmed their commitment to the Accord and therefore continuing support for Carter's nomination. By late April, 21 unions and six individual union presidents had announced for Kennedy, while Carter had been endorsed by five presidents and only 15 (but more major) unions [Appendix D]. By the end of the primaries, 17 major unions were active for the Carter ticket [Singer, 1979a:1255; 1980c:640].

THE 1980 PRIMARIES

The earlier the nomination is settled, the less likelihood there is of disruptive conflict at the convention; conflict is most likely where opposition coalesces around one alternative and the rival candidates gain close delegate scores. White House strategists, notably Hamilton Jordan, sought an early display of strength in key contests to discourage Kennedy's challenge. With some success, Jordan developed an alternative delegate selection schedule matching likely wins against probable losses to protect Carter's image and momentum. Some contests could not be shifted, but the Missouri caucuses were moved to offset Kennedy's expected victory in Pennsylvania and Georgia and Alabama were shifted to join Florida on March 11, to establish an early popular and delegate momentum (in a forerunner of "Super Tuesday"); Massachusetts sought unsuccessfully to move its primary ahead to benefit Kennedy. Nonetheless, the infighting which plagued the Republican convention in 1976 proved to be the Democrats' problem in 1980. [Broder et al, 1980:90; 92-3; Wekkin, 1984:51-2; Shafer, 1988].

As in 1976, Carter started well, easily winning the opening Iowa contest with 59%, even though the UAW and (next) the IAM are the largest unions in Iowa and, along with the Bricklayers union,[13] strongly supported Kennedy. Apart from COPE, Carter's main labour help came from the UFCW, the third-largest union in the state, and from the NEA and CWA. Carter then won New Hampshire (with just less than a majority), as well as the three Southern primaries.[14] In the Maine caucuses, Butler later indicated that NEA support alone possibly accounted for Carter's winning edge. The NEA sought to turn out members where the impact could be greatest (especially where turnout would otherwise be low), winning 250 of 377 targeted delegate spots for the *state* contest: more than Carter's winning margin there of 170. The critical test for Kennedy, however, was the Illinois primary in March, offering his ideal coalition of voters (urban, industrial, unionist, heavily ethnic and Catholic); he was endorsed by the Chicago "machine" and had extensive personal contacts. Kennedy relied upon the UAW, IAM, AFT and Railway Clerks, which experienced difficulty in organizing supporters, perhaps because of Kennedy's "morality" problem. In Chicago, Carter relied most upon the CWA and Building Trades unions and, in the rest of Illinois, upon the NEA (some 19 NEA members ran as delegates; 13 succeeded and 5 were selected as alternates). Carter had carried the state in 1976 and now dealt a severe blow to Kennedy's campaign, winning overwhelmingly and gaining 163 delegates to Kennedy's 16: fully one-tenth of those needed for nomination (giving him a quarter in total) [Wynn; Singer, 1980c:641-2; Broder et al, 1980:108; Pomper, 1981a:23-4].[15] With labour's support, the President had established the vital early momentum Jordan had planned.

Results were then more mixed. In the context of the steep rise in inflation, conflict over Carter's balanced budget proposals, and the abortive rescue attempt in Iran, Kennedy gained New York and Connecticut, lost Wisconsin by a 2:1 margin, and narrowly won important contests in Pennsylvania and Michigan. The Pennsylvania primary was held on April 22nd. The heavily industrialized, strongly unionized state was a key test of labour influence at that stage in the primaries, and Butler acknowledged that it included the strongest concerted union opposition to Carter to date. Kennedy relied for support, as

---

[13]A number of unions eventually endorsing Carter were active for the first time in the primaries in 1980, including the NEA and some AFL-CIO affiliates such as the Railway and Airline Clerks and the Bricklayers. The Railway Clerks had endorsed Carter in 1976 but entered the primaries for the first time in 1980, on Kennedy's behalf (although the union's president, Otero, participated in the Carter/Mondale coalition) [Singer, 1980c:640].

[14]Although divided between Carter and Kennedy, organized labour had participated extensively in the Democratic caucuses in Florida, including running "labour" candidate slates in many counties to ensure strong labour representation at the state convention in November 1979 and with considerable success: over 400 of the 879 elected delegates were labour candidates (sending a clear message to the anti-labour state legislature) [Singer, 1979b:1815]

[15]Since the state delegates were chosen by congressional district under a winner-take-all provision (atypical by 1980), Carter's 2:1 edge in the popular vote translated into a massive 12-1 margin in delegates [Pomper, 1981a:24].

elsewhere, upon the IAM, the UAW, and AFSCME and others (including the Electrical and Radio Workers, the Railway Clerks, and the Bricklayers). The neutral stance of the state's largest union, the Steelworkers (250,000 members), though nationally a participant in the Carter/Mondale effort, undoubtedly influenced the outcome. Carter's strongest ally (as in a number of other states) was the NEA, whose Pennsylvania branch was one of its most politically effective affiliates. Several influential AFL-CIO affiliates included the Building Trades, ILGWU, and the UFCW (partly absorbed in its local leader's race for congressional nomination). Despite Kennedy's narrow win, Carter secured *half* of the 185 delegates. With Carter's landslide win in the Missouri caucuses on the same day, his net delegate gain was only one less than Kennedy's best performance day (New York and Connecticut). Despite the Labor Department announcement of trade adjustment assistance awards (affecting some 130,000 Ford and General Motors workers) on the day preceding caucus voting, Kennedy then squeezed his narrow victory in the key labour state of Michigan, where UAW support was his single-most important asset. The UAW (with over 600,000 members) organizes around 60% of the state workforce and tilted the balance against Carter. [Pomper, 1981a:23-5; Singer, 1980c:640-41; Broder et al, 1980:117; Gordon, 1980:76].

During May, Carter won ten of the eleven primaries, including Maryland, Nebraska and Oregon (all of which he lost in 1976), but Kennedy's gains included some major contests in urban-industrial areas where organized labour is prominent, and five of the eight contests held on June 3, the final day of the primaries, including California and New Jersey (both lost by Carter in 1976). Kennedy performed well among union voters in these contests and the North-East generally. In his home state, Massachussetts, his support among unionists was 73%: a large but predictable loss for Carter. Kennedy gained 64% of union voters in New York, where AFSCME's 340,000 members were important and COPE less effective than elsewhere, majorities in New Jersey and California (53% and 52% respectively), and even scraped a plurality in Ohio (49% versus 47%). Carter won handily among union voters (and others) in Wisconsin with 59% (versus 27%). As in 1976, Carter secured the nomination even though suffering a series of late defeats. Kennedy contested all 34 primaries, winning 10, and all 25 state and territorial caucuses, winning five (receiving 38% of all votes cast to Carter's 51%). [Pomper, 1981a:28, Table 1.6; Broder et al, 1980:68; 78; 80; 86; 117]. However, his generally narrow victories failed to propel him ahead in the delegates stakes despite Carter's decelerating progress. In this respect, labour's efforts for Carter were vital.

Despite Carter's 600-delegate lead (300 more than needed for nomination), Kennedy remained sufficiently encouraged by his performance, the support he received (or expected) from various interests and by Carter's declining fortunes in the polls to press his nomination

bid through to the convention. However, he never really developed broad, cohesive labour support and few major unions joined his campaign; nor did expected organized support from liberals, catholics and blacks materialize. The AFL-CIO and most major affiliates remained aloof from Kennedy's call for an "open convention" which would release delegates from their candidate commitments and possibly reverse Carter's grip on the nomination. Some prominent Democrats (including some 50 Congressmen) joined the Kennedy effort - although, symptomatically, most wished neither Kennedy nor Carter as the nominee. Shortly after the primaries, even Kennedy's most influential labour supporter, Doug Fraser, told the White House that he would not support the open convention movement; the UAW withheld support for Kennedy during the summer and invited the President to meet with its Board after the Party convention. Other labour groups indicated support for Carter. For example, shortly before the convention, the Steelworkers' convention in Los Angeles strongly endorsed Carter even though Kennedy flew in to woo the union's Board. Labour's aloofness from the Kennedy campaign reflected the impact of the Accord, the importance of Carter's incumbency and the labour leaders' reluctance to offend the probable nominee and possible president by supporting his rivals. Differences with Carter on policy grounds, however, were far clearer than in 1976 and profoundly influenced convention politics. [Davis, J., 1983:89-90; Shafer, 1988:6; Abramson, 1983:32; Pomper, 1981a:25-7].

THE 1980 CONVENTION: LABOUR REPRESENTATION, NOMINATION POLITICS AND POLICY CONFLICT

> The growth of various interest groups, with their desire for recognition and insistence that their policy goals be integrated into the party platform, has affected not only the content of the platforms but also the drafting process as well. Especially within the Democratic Party, this pressure group activity has produced more platform challenges. [Davis, J., 1983:xviii]

At the nominating convention, although Kennedy finally withdrew his candidacy, he allied with organized labour to extract several major policy concessions from the Carter negotiators. Reflecting recent trends in convention politics, these battles arose during the committee meetings on the platform, before the convention and the presidential ballot. Kennedy's major economic planks were rejected in favour of Carter's "fiscal conservatism", and " [a] confrontation in New York was inevitable." [Broder et al, 1980:195-6]. As the Carter team retained control over the formal arrangements for the convention, including the agenda, the conflicts were contained, although not entirely avoided [Shafer, 1988, 6]. Carter secured nomination, but was unable to launch his general election campaign satisfactorily. Labour influence in these politics was again substantial.

Labour representation reached an all-time high at the convention, where some 29% of delegates held union cards[16] compared to 20% in 1976, with the largest increase among teachers and government employee unions.[17] After the AFL-CIO,[18] the largest single labour interest was the NEA, a major feature of the political map throughout the 1980 campaign. NEA leaders had the authority to endorse Carter and to commit staff and financial resources to his campaign. In the nomination campaign at the national level alone, the NEA employed 50 staff and had an operating budget of half a million dollars; for the general election, its full 1,200 staff concentrated on political activity, coordinated with the AFL-CIO's. With 1,750,000 members, the NEA was second in size only to the Teamsters and one of the few unions with an effective membership of national scope; the geographic dispersion and activism of its white collar membership were valuable assets, with most members already registered to vote and inclined to turnout. As one Pennsylvania branch official commented: "We've never really had to work our members ... They're pretty tuned in to things." [Singer, 1980c:640-1, quoted; 1980g:1837; 1976a:1428; Shafer, 1988]. In many localities, the NEA virtually *was* the Carter campaign. At the convention, the AFL-CIO had 405 delegates and the NEA alone had 302[19] (plus 162 alternates), which was more than all the other *individual* unions combined); the AFT, its smaller AFL-CIO rival (supporting Kennedy), had 85 delegates. Some 269 NEA delegates formed Carter's largest single bloc by far and the second largest bloc at the convention,[20] constituting one-seventh of his delegates, 8% of the total pool, and 16% of those required to gain nomination. Like the AFL-CIO, the Association controlled a number of strategic votes, with 11 of the 158 members on the Platform committee, positions on important subcommittees, plus one of the 11 members of the drafting committee (the initial working committee, on which the AFL-CIO was influential), which proposed sharp increases in education funding. The NEA delegates were well organized, with a complex whip system including uniformed floor monitors and probably the best communication system (electronic). This was a rapid advance from its formal convention debut in 1976, with 172 delegates. Both the NEA and the AFL-CIO's more established convention influence strongly

---

[16]Data from the Washington Post/CBS News suggested 27%. Some 4% of Republican delegates were members of labour unions [Broder et al, 1980:163].

[17]By 1982, union officials claimed 30 of 325 DNC seats, and 4 of 35 on the executive committee [Keller, 1982:2192].

[18]Malbin [1981a:127-8] identifies the AFL-CIO, NEA and National Organization for Women as the most important interest groups at the convention.

[19]In eight states, the NEA held over a fifth of the delegate total and effectively held a veto over the selection of others. At the Oklahoma state convention the NEA had 43% of the state delegates and teachers claimed 14 of 42 national slots and had to give some national slots away to avoid controversy [Broder et al, 1980 :193; Shafer, 1988].

[20]Only the California delegation was larger, with 306 delegates, but the 24-member NEA group *within* the Californian delegation was larger than the *total* delegation in each of 14 other states.

affected Carter's fortunes. [CBS 1980:6; Davis, J., 1983:105; Broder et al, 1980:193; Malbin, 1980b:1390; 1981a:128]

Rules challenges and reforms are often intended to help a particular candidate, and the new delegate selection process in 1980 had favoured Carter in several respects. The Winograd Commission stipulated that delegate selection should be a phased process with only 25% selected in the final third of the season (when nearly 60% had been chosen in 1976). In adopting this procedure, the DNC increased Carter's incumbency advantage and prevented a late, surprise upset. A qualifying threshold of 15-20% of the selection vote before candidates could receive any delegates was probably intended to prevent "marginal" candidates from challenging him. Carter entered the convention with a decisive lead, but Kennedy attempted to eliminate the "faithful delegate" rule binding delegates to their previously stated candidate preference for the first ballot. Kirkland had publicly placed the AFL-CIO in Carter's camp in May on the open convention question. He criticized those aspects of party reform encouraging "divisions and the domination of party procedures by high-intensity, single-issue zealots" rather than "the fundamental purpose" of broadening the party base: "one should be reasonably certain that [the] delegate will perform [vote] as he purported ... Once the initial commitment is fulfilled, then I think the element of free choice enters into it." [AFL-CIO PR, May 7/80:2]. By declining to support the call for an open convention, organized labour, prominent within important state delegations, DNC panels and controlling a number of other key positions, reduced Kennedy's prospects. The Carter camp won the issue comfortably, as expected, in a Rules Committee vote of 1,391:1,936 against the proposal, which the Carter forces, with difficulty, managed to schedule ahead of the platform votes, conceding in return prime time coverage of the economic policy debates and Kennedy's address to the convention. With no further chance of nomination, Kennedy withdrew his candidacy and Carter won the nomination roll-call with a 2:1 majority. In the meantime, however, Kennedy and organized labour had successfully allied to wrest policy concessions from Carter [Wekkin, 1984:58; Wilson, 1980:145; Pomper, 1981a:27; Davis, J., 1983:60; 90-2; Shafer, 1988, 6; 7; Malbin, 1981a:127].

The Platform Committee and Platform Conflict

> ...on one or two of the issues, we... exercise[d] ... direction and leadership in getting practically every trade union delegate at that convention, regardless of which candidate they endorsed, behind the particular issue which was crucial, I think, to the future philosophy and direction of the party. [Kirkland, 1981:19]

Kennedy's nomination strategy to attract delegates (if freed on the first ballot) had included stressing policy disagreements with Carter. In alliance with labour delegates, the Kennedy forces challenged Carter strongly with four Minority Reports on economic policy. The Committee's 158 members were "actively wooed and lobbied" by both sides. Kirkland

pressed all AFL-CIO delegates for unity on the jobs plank and they gave active support, as did the UAW and UMW, forcing a turnaround at the convention. The total number of delegates accountable very broadly to the AFL-CIO numbered over 600, and the 25 Federation Floor whips cooperated with Kennedy's own extensive and effective organization. Moreover, in a meeting with Barkan (COPE) and William D. Ford (chairman of the House Education and Labor subcommittee on Post-Secondary Education), as the debate on the jobs plank began, NEA executive director, Terry E. Herndon, agreed to support the plank, adding the NEA delegates to the effort. Kennedy's supporters demanded that he be allowed to address the convention on the proposals (departing from the customary low profile of nominee-hopefuls before the roll-calls). The Carter negotiators feared such a speech would be conflictual, highly visible and attract support for Kennedy, but once Kennedy withdrew his candidacy, they could no longer object without provoking his supporters further during the nomination proceedings.

The Carter forces outnumbered Kennedy's by 2:1 and Eizenstat had insisted that Carter would reject the $12 billion jobs plank, but labour's position and the enthusiastic 40-minute demonstration following Kennedy's major speech on unemployment (his proposals passed on a simple voice vote) compelled Carter to a platform compromise to avert further open conflict. It included a commitment to the goals of the Humphrey-Hawkins Act, notably the $12 billion countercyclical package promising 800,000 new jobs (aimed at black support), and the (by now standard) Carter commitment not to fight inflation in such a way as to increase unemployment (to appease labour). The Senator gave way on wage and price controls (which were unacceptable to labour anyway). Carter avoided more specific commitments and stressed the need to reduce inflation in order to achieve other goals (although conceding compromises on party procedure, including a major review of the presidential nomination process). Kennedy also forced a change through the Rules Committee requiring presidential candidates to present a written statement indicating where they agreed with, or differed from, the Party platform. After the preceding platform wrangles, Carter's own coalition was strained and his negotiators again reluctantly conceded: Carter afterwards read his statement to the full convention (at a time when he escaped major TV coverage). During his speech, he made an explicit commitment "to strengthen the National Accord with labour." [Carter, 1980a]. Kirkland subsequently publicly endorsed Carter's position, although Kennedy labour delegates, including Wurf (AFSCME) and

---

[21] For a full discussion of the platform politics, see Malbin [1980b:1390; 1981a:116-141]. Also, Plotkin [1981:48, inc.ft.25]; *DNC* [1980:3]; Shafer [1988:6-19/20]; Pomper [1981a:32]; Frank [1980:1387]; Broder et al [1980:199]. Carter also compromised on the wording of planks on abortion, nuclear power and foreign arms sales, and won (surprisingly narrowly) on decelerating the MX missile programme.

Winpisinger (IAM), expressed dissatisfaction. Kennedy endorsed Carter and appeared briefly on the podium with him, but patently without enthusiasm and he openly avoided Carter's symbolic "clasping of arms". The convention conflicts marred Carter's party leadership image, reinforcing the (lingering) Party image of disunity and unfitness to govern (after 1968 and 1972). Conflict and delay hindered Carter from launching the general election campaign; by the end of August his rating rose roughly equal to Reagan's in the polls (Carter 39% and Reagan 38%) - still a relatively weak position for an incumbent. [Malbin, 1980b:1389-90; 1981a:128-131; Broder et al, 1980:196; Bonafede, 1980d:1106; Shafer, 1988:6; 7; Davis, J., 1983:97; Frankovic, 198a:102; Abramson, 1983:38].

Kennedy and organized labour had succeeded in committing Carter to a more traditional Democratic platform, a particular example of a broader pattern of policy compromise by nominees seeking to avoid open conflict at the convention. Kennedy's convention manoeuvres were partly a response to the persistent activism of loyal supporters. This "activist" effect is greatest for established, major candidates like Kennedy, with substantial, intense support, whose delegates may prefer open conflict to acquiescence and persist with particular interests or causes beyond their candidate's own preferences. In 1980, the Democratic and Republican platforms were "strikingly, and consistently, different" on economic policy, social and welfare issues, and foreign and defence policy partly as a result of the Kennedy-labour alliance [Shafer, 1988:5; 6].

To secure policy commitments from Carter considered of the highest priority, organized labour had directly contributed to conflict at the 1980 convention, rather than playing a straightforward coalition-building role. During the primaries, a reporter asked Kirkland how labour expected to "achieve any political leverage" when remaining (formally) uncommitted until after the convention and when "participation in creating the Democratic platform doesn't seem to have done [you] much good the last time...". Kirkland stressed that the campaign period was a time "to raise basic issues" even when doing so "embarrasses candidates ... you're going to have to wind up helping, trying to help to re-elect." In the nomination process, he maintained, "[n]othing is really important ... except the issues and the programs" - thus underscoring how lukewarm labour support was for Carter. However, issues and candidates are inextricably interwoven; the residue of 1972 and success of Carter's candidacy in 1976 persuaded many labour leaders that comprehensive involvement

---

[22]The AFL-CIO supported Party reforms restoring Party officialdom at the convention, notably through provisions for "superdelegates" [Davis, J., 1983:54; 272]. Uncommitted to particular candidates, these consequently represented an element of the open convention after 1980.

[23]The convention was held on August 11, when Carter's public approval rating was very low and Billy Carter's connections with the Libyan government were causing embarrassment, weakening his bargaining position there.

in the primaries or earlier was essential: otherwise, as Kirkland acknowledged, "we will wind up with a series of candidates who are competing for room on the right and I'm not interested in that kind of a choice." [AFL-CIO PR, Apr.29/80:3]. At the EXCO meeting in August 1980, Kirkland expressed concern at the Federation's policy of neutrality during the primaries, recalling later:

> I felt that to play an effective role the AFL-CIO ought to be in a position to assert a position. That, of course, requires a wide degree of consensus among the unions affiliated with the AFL-CIO. I propose to review our entire approach to this nominating process... [Kirkland, 1981:18].

Kirkland suggested, and the EXCO agreed, that the AFL-CIO should "exercise a more forceful leadership role" over issues and the candidates: "we ought to be a part of the process of *developing* those choices" [Kirkland, 1981:18; emphasis added]. He envisaged much earlier endorsements to enable support for "one candidate or one set of [convention] delegates" even where two or more presidential candidates equally had labour support. Acknowledging the difficulty of reaching agreement on one candidate (which requires a two-thirds vote of the General Board), he stressed that it was still necessary to attempt to reach an early consensus. Referring to labour's platform success in 1980, Kirkland claimed that there would be benefits even where labour's choice failed to secure nomination, since there would be a larger number of delegates at the convention.

Although Kirkland eschewed the idea that labour become an integral part of a political party, this was still a notable shift away from the position espoused by the Old Guard. Kirkland created a special, 15-member subcommittee of the EXCO to improve links, ostensibly with both parties, but operatively with the Democrats [Lanouette, 1982:818]. EXCO support for the concept of early endorsement was nearly unanimous [Butler, 1983:18]. For the 1984 contest, the AFL-CIO formally endorsed Walter Mondale's nomination during October 1983, well before the primaries, and later celebrated the early labour unity achieved thereby [NYT, July 20/84:A11] - notwithstanding the ensuing anti-labour publicity ensuing and Reagan's victory. Afterwards, Kirkland insisted that the Federation would not be deterred from making an early endorsement again where there were compelling reasons for so doing [Kirkland; Albert]. Mondale personally urged continuing full participation, stressing that labour's contribution to an early decision would help to avoid "the protracted primary campaign [and] the spectacle of the Democratic candidates tearing each other apart", contribute to "the well-being of the party" and give the nominee a "good fighting chance in the general election" [AFL-CIO PR, Feb.18/85:1]. The new politics of presidential selection, as well as internal labour pressures, thus provided strong incentives for earlier involvement by the AFL-CIO; in this respect, the Carter years were a watershed.

LABOUR AND THE 1980 GENERAL ELECTION

> As he seeks to build labor support, the best thing that President Carter will have going for him this fall will be his Republican opponent - Ronald Reagan.
>
> ...with AFL-CIO headquarters on his side, Carter can probably tolerate the failure of some individual unions to endorse him or to campaign vigorously for him. [Singer, 1980d:1108]

In 1980, however, it was simply "warts and all" with Carter's candidacy, and the EXCO endorsed him promptly after the nomination.[24] Most unions joined the Democratic effort to defeat Reagan, participating actively in GOTV efforts and other electioneering programmes [Singer, 1980g:1837], including pro-Kennedy unions like AFSCME, the AFT, the UAW and the Railway & Airline Clerks. The IAM, whose president, Bill Winpisinger, had led Kennedy's labour campaign remained "neutral" and a few other unions remained aloof, notably the AFGE and the Firefighters. Criticism of Carter was now muted; Kennedy stressed the "economic recovery programme" under consideration by the Administration [AFL-CIO PR, Aug.20/80:1], and Kirkland referred to areas of agreement and Carter's support on labour law reform, the minimum wage and OSHA. He commended labour's opportunity to discuss economic policy under the Accord, claiming the satisfaction of "a full hearing, a full consideration" - and some impact "reflected in many of the positions that the Administration has taken."

> I was critical of the fact that President Carter yielded to pressures that originated not in the White House but in the Congress of the United States ... to balance the budget ... He yielded to that, and I regret it but I understand it. There have been other points of disagreement. There have been strong points of agreement and many, many areas where we have worked closely and cooperatively together. [Kirkland; AFL-CIO PR, Aug.20/80:3].

Kirkland deflected criticism on to the Federal Reserve Board and OPEC, blaming them for high interest rates and/or inflation. During the campaign, Carter similarly criticized FRB policy, even though he had appointed five of its seven Board members, including Volcker [Hunt, 1981:164]. The ultimate target for criticism, however, was Reagan and his anti-labour activities as Governor of California: he had opposed collective bargaining rights for farm workers and teachers and state minimum wage laws, and attacked unemployment benefits, workers' compensation, disability and job safety and other such allowances. Reagan had opposed labour law reform, questioned the need for the OSH Administration, supported the repeal of the Davis-Bacon Act, largely prompted Ford's veto of common situs picketing legislation, and touted the idea that anti-trust laws might usefully be extended to cover trade unions, potentially making most union activities an illegal restraint of trade, according to

---

[24]The meeting was attended by 26 of the 34 EXCO members, of whom 23 voted to endorse Carter. Pro-Kennedy members, O'Donnell and Kroll, abstained and Winpisinger voted against. The EXCO then recommended Carter's candidacy to the General Board, whose members, Kirkland declared, would "participate in the actual endorsement" and not simply rubber-stamp it. Kirkland reported to the press that enthusiasm for Carter was in the mid-range but "mounting" towards the top [AFL-CIO PR, Aug.20/80:1; 3].

COPE [Singer, 1980d:1108]. He modified some of these positions during the campaign (see below)

At the General Board meeting on September 4, when Kirkland formally urged endorsement of Carter, he again played down the President's unsatisfactory record and stressed his differences from Reagan. In commending Carter, he stressed the importance and unique character of the Accord:

> The National Accord is unprecedented. No American president - Democrat or Republican was willing to provide such a structured role for the labor movement, much less through a formal document ... until Jimmy Carter ... [Kirkland, 1980:4].

The subsequent General Board statement similarly praised the Accord and contrasted Carter's policy achievements with Reagan's anti-labour activities [AFL-CIO, 1980:1]. To defuse lingering tension from past conflicts with the President, Kirkland affirmed that Carter was not the captive of any special interest and in pursuing fairness, labour interests had at times been adversely affected. He contrasted this fairness with Reagan, as the captive of strongly anti-labour forces which were "the most narrow special interests in this nation". Kirkland defended the President most strongly in terms of Reagan's faults rather than Carter's achievements. After his endorsement, Carter addressed the General Board, commending labour's contribution on behalf of "all the people", not simply union members, to a "half-century of unprecedented social and economic progress". The President renewed commitments to labour concerns including common situs picketing, labour law reform and the Davis-Bacon Act, the minimum wage, OSHA, the Humphrey-Hawkins Act and full employment goals, national health insurance and maritime industry concerns and other specific labour targets. He also discussed the extension of the Accord process to achieve a "partnership of government, labor and business" and "build a consensus for our economic future", dwelling at length upon the newly established Economic Revitalization Board [Carter, 1980:10]. Thus, he sought to gain active support from the labour leaders in the final stage of the campaign.

> The election could well be won or lost in the big industrial states of the Northeast and Great Lakes, where unions have their most members and most strength, and labor's strong effort for the Democratic ticket could determine the outcome of what is expected to be a very close race.
>
> If organized labor can deliver for Carter in this state [Pennsylvania] and others such as Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, New York and Ohio, he likely will have four more years in the White House. If not, he probably will be on his way back to Plains, Ga. [Singer, 1980g:1836]

In many areas, labour provided the core of the Democratic field effort in the campaign. The percentage of voters who were union members in six important and strongly contested "labour" states in 1980 was: Illinois 31.5%; Michigan 34.6; N.J. 23; N.Y. 39.2; Ohio 29.5; Pennsylvania 34.2 [Lanouette, 1980:1834], more than enough to provide a winning margin.

Individual AFL-CIO affiliates such as the UFCW, CWA, ILGWU and the Building Trades unions were important to the campaign in a number of key states, while labour organizations overall may have had more paid staff active on the Carter/Mondale ticket than the Democratic Party, and labour's financial support was especially important given the increased expense of campaigns and the $29.4 million total spending limit upon presidential candidates accepting federal matching funds. The basic limit of $14,720 for the nomination campaign had already driven candidates to economise and turn to other sources of support. Major unions like the NEA, UFCW and CWA had spent an estimated $500,000 to over $1 million each for the Carter/Mondale ticket in the primaries. COPE worked with the DNC on a joint approach to computerized GOTV efforts estimated to save perhaps $1 million, and labour was thought to have more paid staff on the campaign than the Party. Kennedy supporters, notably the UAW and AFSCME, contributed to the Democratic general election effort, although their electioneering efforts were not enthusiastic. The full labour effort for the Carter/Mondale ticket unofficially reached $12-15 million (rising again to $20-$24 million in 1984). Labour PACs spent a recorded $17.5 million on all federal elections in 1980 (although, for the first time, corporate PACs alone contributed more, namely $23 million) [Butler; Albert; Singer, 1980g:1836-38; Abramson, 1983:143; 15; drawn from the E.J. Dionne, Jr., *NYT*, Sept. 25/80:B10].

Reagan's labour support was limited to one major union, the Teamsters, as well as the AFL-CIO's National Maritime Union (35,000 members) and the newly organized National Association of Police Organizations (100,000), "but none of these unions has ever played much of a role in presidential politics, and none will have much impact in 1980." [Singer, 1980g:1836]. He was also endorsed by the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association and (ironically, in light of later events) PATCO, the Air Traffic Controllers' union, and the President of the Airline Pilots Association (as an individual). In campaigning, Reagan had largely to by-pass hostile union officialdom, seeking local union endorsements instead. To broaden his appeal, Reagan likened himself to Franklin Roosevelt (Carter also invoked him as a source of legitimacy), stressed his past union experience (six years as president of the Screen Actors Guild) and otherwise sought to allay the fears of established Democratic constituencies through policy modifications, like his two-tier minimum wage proposal, reduced benefits for teenagers and the hard-core unemployed, but not the established white worker. Reagan courted the blue collar vote, making frequent campaign appearances in factories, and

circulating a leaflet - "Elect a Former Union president President" - containing assurances that he would not: abolish the OSH Administration; seek a national right-to-work law; repeal Davis-Bacon, or extend anti-trust laws to unions. These positions weakened AFL-CIO efforts to attack him on such grounds. The Republican platform stressed that the federal government - not unions - was the cause of inflation, high taxes and the need for higher wages [Keller, 1982:2116; Lanouette, 1980b:1832-4; McWilliams, 1977:182; Hunt, 1981:158-9; Broder, 1980:170].

The stylized imagery of two-party politics left Carter little room to distinguish himself from Reagan on economic policy, nor to offer a convincing Democratic alternative in view of his austerity strategy; as Hibbs [1987:191] put it: "The macroeconomic history of the Carter administration is a textbook example of how *not* to run an economy to win reelection." Carter's adoption of a more traditional Democratic stance before the election was equally unconvincing [Pomper, 1981b:89]. The impact of labour's contributions was limited by Carter's disadvantages as a candidate; ultimately, electioneering efforts, such as labour GOTV programmes, could not turn the strong tide of dissatisfaction with the President. Carter suffered a resounding defeat.[25]

THE OUTCOME IN 1980

In the event, Carter failed to carry any major union stronghold in 1980. Although Democratic support among union voters is customarily greater than national vote levels, among union voters in 1980, Carter barely improved on his national average whether measured by the two-way or three-way vote [Pomper, 1981b:68-9; 74; Table 3.1]. Carter fared worse among union households and blue collar voters than amongst the remainder of the electorate relative to the support each had given in 1976. Carter's union vote dropped by 16% to 47% in 1980,[26] compared to a drop of 8% among non-union voters (from 43% to 35%).[27] The union household/non-union vote gap shrank to 12% in 1980 - smaller than for any Democrat bar McGovern [Singer, 1976a:1425]. Among blue-collar voters Carter's vote dropped substantially, from 59% in 1976 to 46% in 1980: actually slightly less than Reagan's 47% (Anderson gained 5%) [Peirce & Hagstrom, 1980:1877]. These losses among union

---

[25]Detailed examination of the 1980 election result (not within the scope of the thesis) is provided in Abramson [1983]; Pomper et al [1981]; Peirce & Hagstrom [1980]; Ranney (Ed.) [1981].

[26]Reagan improved on Ford's 1976 level of 39%, gaining 44% in 1980; Anderson gained 7%.

[27]Reagan drew 55%, as Ford had in 1976, and Anderson 8%.

and blue collar voters were sufficient to explain Carter's defeat in important industrial states like Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio and Illinois, notwithstanding his *relatively* favourable performance in the region [Malbin, 1980a:1877].

Union voters were clearly unhappy with the choice of candidates (turnout declined especially in the industrial states of the North-East [Schneider, 1981:223]), as were others: as many as 40% of voters voted primarily against one of the candidates and not in favour of any of them [Frankovic, 1981:103; Singer, 1980g:1839]. Voters in 1980 were more dissatisfied with national government and more inclined to vote against the incumbent, while 59% disapproved of Carter's personal performance as president a notable deterioration from previous presidential ratings. Disapproval of Carter among Democrats was remarkably widespread (greater than for Nixon and Ford). He lost support among all Democrats, and it was this loss, rather than a conservative surge, which won Reagan the election and adversely affected Democratic congressional fortunes. The Republicans gained control of the Senate for the first time since 1952 and won 33 seats in the House (more than halving the Democrats' majority). A number of senior liberal Democrats and House leaders were defeated, including important labour allies like George McGovern, Frank Church, Gaylord Nelson, Birch Bayh, and John Brademas (chief whip and in line to be Speaker) [Jacob, 1981:98; 122-3; Abramson, 1983:138; 168; Pomper, 1981b:86-7].

> Elections are won and lost for many reasons, but none is as critical as the state of the nation's economy. It is as likely as anything else that Jimmy Carter met his Waterloo on Election Day because he had failed to correct three critical aspects of the economy: inflation, unemployment and interest rates ... [Plotkin, 1981:46].

One element of voter dissaffection was economic policy. Since Roosevelt, Democratic presidential nominees have been "clearly and consistently" more liberal than their Republican rivals [Wilson, 1979:38] and, since the Depression, economic issues have generally helped the Democrats electorally. But not in 1980. Of voters motived by issues, 56% named economic issues, with nearly twice as many primarily concerned with inflation as with jobs and unemployment: in 1976, the inflation:unemployment ratio had been 5:4 voters. Moreover, although Carter gained 48% of the 24% of voters identifying jobs/unemployment as a major influence on their vote and Reagan only 42%, in 1976, Carter had gained 66%. Confidence in the ability of the Democratic Party to manage economic issues had declined,

but assessments of Carter personally were worse. The Gallup poll in mid-September 1980 revealed that 41% believed that Reagan would manage unemployment better; only 32% picked Carter. More blue-collar workers thought Reagan would manage the economy better than Carter, although they were sceptical of Reagan's balanced budget plus tax cut proposals; Carter had a clear lead on social issues, but these were less influential. Among union voters, 65% of those who felt their economic position had improved voted for Carter, compared to 48% of non-unionists; among those who felt their position had worsened and were thus most likely to defect, 34% voted for Carter, compared to 22% of non-unionists, although other Democratic categories, such as "liberals", demonstrated considerably greater propensity to vote for him. Yet issues were not notably salient in voting decisions in 1980; nor did Reagan or his policies particularly attract voters. As Frankovic [1981:117] put it: "The new President does not have a mandate for conservative policies; instead he has a mandate to be different from Jimmy Carter." [Abramson, 1983:121; 146-9; 151; Tables 7-2; 7-4; Frankovic, 1981: 110; 115; Peirce & Hagstrom, 1980; Schneider, 1981:230; 231; 237-9, Tables 7-3; 4; Pomper, 1981b:88; Lanouette, 1980b:1835].

Neither the Democratic Party nor its major organized constituency, labour, had convinced their respective memberships to support Carter, testifying in part to the internal weaknesses of each as intermediary structures, but also to Carter's personal failure to develop an effective Democratic coalition prior to the election.

> As Carter apparently saw it, the Democratic party apparatus was simply a collection of more or less parochial interest groups, committed to inflationary policies and the expansion of the federal bureaucracy and tied to outdated patronage politics. It was part of the "establishment" Carter had opposed in 1976 which for the most part had opposed his nomination. He saw little to hope from it, and he preferred to build a personal coalition devoted to policies deemed in the public interest, especially as defined by "good management" rather than politics. [McWilliams, 1977:175; see also Polsby, 1981:39-40].

Carter had succeeded as a Democratic outsider in 1976, and had a limited appreciation of traditional Democratic organizations and coalition-building which persisted in office. However, since he did not lead the Democratic victory in 1976 but, rather, gained his narrow win from it, he needed solid Democratic support in 1980. To some extent, Carter necessarily gave greater recognition to organized Democratic constituencies, notably labour, and sought improved relations with them, as he did with congressional Democrats. Yet he did too little, too late to secure a level of support adequate to overcome institutional obstacles to coalition-building - his heedless early concession of defeat in 1980 was the final evidence of these

limitations, adversely affecting the electoral prospects of other Democrats.

Even so, the labour leadership had significantly enhanced Carter's ability to secure nomination, although many members preferred Kennedy at the nomination stage. Within the Party, labour's organizational base, strategic distribution, financial and electioneering resources, orientation to long-term goals and to party coalition-building, remained valuable assets for Party officials and presidential candidates. However, labour's previous advantages were reduced by the sophisticated political techniques of the political consultants and the impact of T.V., bypassing traditional intermediary structures, as well as increasing business organization and newly organized groups on the Right and within the Democratic Party. By the end of the seventies, the AFL-CIO had compelling reasons for strengthening ties to the Democratic Party and for entering the presidential selection process earlier, to secure greater influence over the emergence of, and choice among, Democratic candidates. Internal institutional factors contributed to this end: a new generation of more progressive, activist union leaders, representing more white collar and public sector interests, diminishing the craft union dominance of the past, emerged within the EXCO; the impact of 1972 and the formation of the LCC, the reaffiliation of the progressive UAW and the activity of the NEA. This process of change, however, is very gradual, while the proportion of the workforce unionized continues to decline. Organizational changes on the part of the Party and organized labour still hold little prospect of producing a candidate capable both of uniting the Party and winning the election. Finally, no amount of organizational change is likely to offset the impact of performance in office. With the highest interest rates, inflation and unemployment since the New Deal, there was little to convince union voters to support Carter. The efforts of the labour leadership may have limited the damage, but they could not, by themselves, provide a motive for voting where none otherwise existed.

CONCLUSION

Our detailed examination of U.S. state-labour relations and national policymaking surrounding the National Accord permits us to address in a concrete context those questions emerging from the discussion in Chapter 1. We have explored the impact of institutional fragmentation within federal government upon labour influence in national policymaking, and upon the emergence of the Accord. The study elucidated, in the U.S. case, the "important and relatively unexplored" relationship between "the organizational characteristics, political resources, and programmatic ambitions of labour movements and the macroeconomic policies of governments." [Cameron, 1984:145]. We examined the attributes and consequent value of organized labour as a prospective policy-bargaining partner, the ideological and partisan character of the labour movement, its expression within national party structures and significance in presidential elections. We established both structural and dynamic factors impelling government leaders to seek cooperative relations with the AFL-CIO, and explaining the latter's recognized public status. The characteristics and conditions of the Carter presidency complemented and reinforced those factors, notwithstanding the unfavourable attitudes of the President and some senior economists toward consultation with special interests. President Carter's provisions for interest representation materially affected his policy and electoral prospects. Our question now is whether labour-state relations during the Carter presidency, and specifically the National Accord, can be accommodated within post-pluralist theory, or simply reaffirm the exceptionalist case.

The National Accord exhibited certain definitive characteristics of neo-corporatism, while simultaneously exhibiting adaptations which accommodated nationally-specific attributes otherwise inhibiting cooperation between the negotiators. It was a product both of state strategy and of political bargaining by the AFL-CIO, modifying the behaviour of, and producing substantial gains for both sides. Strikingly, the Accord was a product of policy-political bargaining between the Executive of government and the labour peak organization, involving a complex set of trade-offs and the classic corporatist exchange, namely agreement by the labour leadership to participate in the wage restraint programme in return for compensatory provisions: general policy consultation and access; commitments on employment measures and counter-recessionary activity; other policies sought by organized labour, including agreed, though unpublicized, further White House support for labour law reform; and items of interest to specific unions. More generally, the labour leadership pressed considerations of fairness in sharing the burden of restraint. The scope of the Accord was broader than counterpart political exchanges elsewhere, with AFL-CIO support for the

White House on matters not formally specified in the agreement, including the high-priority energy programme and the deregulation of oil and gas prices and, unexpectedly, support publicly for SALT II. This (informal) extension of the political bargain to foreign, rather than simply domestic, policy is atypical of "social contract" agreements and reflected the value of labour support deriving in the U.S. from the separation of powers within national government. The Accord generally induced a more positive labour climate and muted open labour criticism of the Administration (especially important within Congress); helped the White House to extend the voluntary incomes policy; and improved Carter's electoral prospects, sustaining labour support for his nomination and general election campaign even after the 1980 budget reversal.

Problems of fragmentation and the need for coordination and coalition-building exist within, and between, the Executive branch and Congress. These conditions, and the prominence of the AFL-CIO in coalition-politics, create mutual interdependence between organized labour and Democrats in government at the *leadership* level, taking such relations beyond pure bargaining. Thus, contrary to the view that institutional fragmentation precludes the value of top level bargaining between government and labour leaders, it is conducive to accommodation - most comprehensively where the White House is controlled by a Democratic President.

Inauspicious early relations between the White House and the AFL-CIO, especially limited consultation over the Year I wage/price programme, most clearly resembled the exceptionalist scenario. The labour leaders were even then routinely consulted on relevant appointments notwithstanding some early tensions surrounding these. The inept handling of Marshall's selection as Secretary of Labor was one of numerous early examples of the poor diplomatic skills and weak coalition-building sense exhibited by the White House. After the rupture in relations in late 1978, consultative relations with the AFL-CIO were renewed several months before the White House even requested cooperation in wage restraint, since dealing individually with unions had been found impractical. Moreover, for any president, inherent difficulties arise from the decentralized structure of the U.S. government, as well as from pervasive problems of scale within the Executive branch (including a greatly expanded White House), and problems deriving from the scope and complexity of the modern national policy agenda. To these were added President Carter's special problems of management and his failure to establish an effective authority structure. His Office of Congressional Liaison was ineffective, his experiment at cabinet government failed, and customary tensions between the cabinet and White House were heightened. The lack of a chief of staff and an economic policy manager, the relative weakness of the post of anti-inflation adviser, disarray

within the Economic Policy Group, and generally unclear lines of authority, undermined economic policy management. The President's shortcomings in directing and integrating his policy machine made such limitations more significant. The National Accord provided an element of coordination for the Administration and for the AFL-CIO: a policy "umbrella" for their multiple interactions. Senior Carter officials were already considering economic planning provisions as part of modern policy needs and the Accord was regarded as an integrative mechanism, including to coordinate the reindustrialization plans under consideration by various departments and the White House. Furthermore, the Carter White House eventually recognized that policy could not simply be imposed. It was concerned by vehement AFL-CIO criticism and opposition to Administration proposals, especially within Congress. These factors, as well as electoral concerns, prompted the Accord negotiations. The inclusionary strategy adopted made the AFL-CIO an "institutional ally" [Donahue]; although it proved limited, it was a remarkable testimony to the President's need for cooperation from the labour leaders, and stands in contrast to the independence and relative isolation of state and labour described in exceptionalist arguments.

As commonly observed, the political influence of the AFL-CIO is weakened by its limited authority over rank and file unionists, but care must be taken not to focus upon this weakness at the expense of labour's strengths. The separation of powers in the U.S. gives an additional (political) dimension to the question of mobilizing labour support. As an organization with a purpose both primarily political and oriented to the longer term, the AFL-CIO stresses broad coalition-building, among allied liberal interest groups and within the Democratic Party. Far more than just a pressure group, the AFL-CIO is a vital element in coalition-building among Democrats, including in Congress. Prolonged Democratic control of Congress in the U.S. is a rather neglected element in discussions of labour-state relations, yet sustains labour influence even during otherwise inauspicious periods. Even when the Senate was controlled by the Republicans, during the Reagan years, the passage of actively anti-labour legislation was not plausible because of the veto-character of Congress and labour support among the Democrats: despite diminishing advantages, labour has remained a major force within Congress and thus the national policy process. The most immediate challenge for any president is to secure passage of his proposals in Congress, where coalition-building is complex and organized labour a notable force whether friendly or hostile. A president on unfriendly terms with labour undoubtedly finds Congress - susceptible to veto activity and dominated by pro-labour, mainstream Democrats - more problematic, and the AFL-CIO may, at least at times, be a decisive influence in congressional outcomes (as in the defeat of Carter's plans to expand COWPS). Also, a Democratic president who, like Carter,

was on poor terms with his own Party in Congress is especially vulnerable to legislative defeat. Any Democratic president pursuing a policy of economic austerity during a recession, as Carter uniquely did, and proposing to cut the very programmes established by senior Democrats in Congress, faces tremendous difficulties in constructing a support coalition. Even when congressional leaders were cooperating with Carter during the balanced budget frenzy in the Spring of 1980, labour was still able to fight the budgetary proposals at the committee level, and new congressional budgetary controls were not sufficiently advanced to preclude a committee-based strategy (despite the Administration's pioneering use of budgetary reconciliation provisions).

The dependency was mutual. For the AFL-CIO, a Democratic presidency offers the best prospect for advancing labour interests. More generally, the AFL-CIO was increasingly disadvantaged in a number of respects, with labour efforts surpassed especially by increased business organization and activity within congressional districts, the PAC explosion, the increase in anti-union activity, the character of new liberalism, and earlier legislative defeats in common situs picketing and labour law reform, as well as declining union membership and rank and file disaffection. This weakening of organized labour's industrial position made the need for political clout more urgent. The Executive branch is always a powerful lobbying force within Congress, and Carter had made specific commitments on common situs picketing, labour law reform, employment targets and other matters of importance to labour. However, though a Southerner, Carter's disappointing influence among congressional Democrats extended to the Southern wing of the Party and was one reason why renewed common situs picketing and labour law reform efforts reproduced the previous pattern of (narrow) defeat.

The Accord, however, far from sealing a *corporatist partnership*, emerged from the President's unusually poor relations with the labour leadership and from the broader difficulties of governing confronting the Carter White House. Initially, policy cooperation with the President was less close than between the AFL-CIO and Democratic predecessors, for the Carter White House was aberrant in its visibly limited recognition of coalition-politics. The National Accord process was one instrument by which such deficiencies could be repaired, specifically with the labour leadership. Carter's marked weaknesses in coalition-building, however, limited accommodatory relations even once their necessity was fully evident, and acknowledged, and notwithstanding the emergent *form* of corporatist relations. Indeed, the informal but substantial cooperation between the labour leadership and President Johnson (and Democrats in Congress) perhaps more closely approached corporatism than did the formalized truce represented by the National Accord. Nonetheless, the Accord was seen

by the Carter White House and the AFL-CIO leadership as a desirable model for future relations and an historic precedent along the path to joint national economic planning.

In the context of economic disequilibrium created by the OPEC price rounds of 1973 and 1979, the interdependence of the presidency and labour leadership heightened, while economic policy disagreement between them simultaneously intensified. The Carter White House sought to adopt an Americanized version of the state strategy common in the West in addressing inflation: tackling downward rigidity in prices and incomes created by unions, in the context of an austerity strategy, despite the low level of unionization and limited central labour authority. Carter's initially isolated approach to programme formulation came under pressure, especially when support for the Year I programme seriously eroded and because of further OPEC price increases early in 1979. He then adopted an altered mode of political rationality restoring the policy status of the AFL-CIO to the norms of previous Democratic presidencies, but under the new and inauspicious circumstance (for a Democrat) of presiding over a recession. Thus, while Carter followed government leaders elsewhere and, indeed, other U.S. presidents in his attempt to re-equilibrate the economy, his particular economic policy course amounted, as Hibbs [1987:273] commented, to a standard political business cycle run backwards, jeopardizing labour cooperation and his re-election prospects.

To accommodate fragmentation within the labour sector, the consultative process was made more encompassing through intra-sectoral concertation undertaken by the White House. The Federation's functional logic had been threatened by early isolated policymaking by the White House, notably over the Year I programme, and seriously undermined by the subsequent break in relations. Apart from the period of rupture, however, where the AFL-CIO's representative primacy was implicated, the Carter White House sought the "right game rules": for example, in relations with the Federation versus individual affiliates, and by keeping the UAW and Teamsters informed of the Accord developments. Thus, the Executive branch recognized and protected the special status of the peak group and, indeed, helped to revivify its leadership role within the labour sector after the internal difficulties of the early 1970s. This state licensing of peak groups, frequently associated with neo-corporatist developments, is again quite contrary to what exceptionalist views suggest and more striking because of the unusually distant relations between the Carter presidency and the AFL-CIO. The White House also undertook trans-sectoral concertation involving business separately (through the Treasury secretary and the Economic Policy Group), notably with the relatively sympathetic and influential Business Roundtable. Labour-business cooperation in the wage/price programme was subsequently institutionalized through PAYC. This sectoral/trans-sectoral coordination and cooperation had definite limits,

but it was nonetheless rather more extensive and more institutionalized then exceptionalist approaches would lead us to expect.

Unlike some counterparts elsewhere, the AFL-CIO has no rival peak to contend with and, notwithstanding a limited industrial base and weak central authority, remains the foremost comprehensively active organized interest group in U.S. politics. Labour influence is generally greatest where the AFL-CIO has support from major non-affiliated unions. At the time of the Carter presidency, the legislative strategy of the UAW and Teamsters was coordinated with the AFL-CIO's, and reaffiliation negotiations were undertaken: successfully with the liberal UAW; inconclusively with the conservative Teamsters. Cooperation between the AFL-CIO, the UAW and the Teamsters is customary and was demonstrated on PAYC. The other major group, the NEA, cooperated closely with the AFL-CIO at the 1980 Democratic Party convention (to gain policy concessions from Carter) and during the election campaign. Moreover, there is otherwise frequent cooperation between the NEA and various AFL-CIO affiliates on issues of joint concern. Although the NEA had tremendous electoral importance for Carter, it gained nothing equivalent to the consultative provisions/access of the AFL-CIO, which included the personal promise of ready access by the President (as during earlier Democratic presidencies) and the formal joint forum which became the Accord group.

The Accord process was, indeed, a "political structure" to integrate organized labour "through a system of representation and cooperative mutual interaction at the leadership level" [Panitch, 1977:66], but lacking the element of social control which is an argued goal of a corporatist state strategy. Exceptionalist arguments stress the U.S. labour leadership's inability to deliver, or guarantee, rank and file compliance with policy undertakings, notably wage restraint. Lacking constitutional authority over collective bargaining (and strike action), the AFL-CIO depends upon consensus among EXCO members and the influence of each within their respective unions. The timing of the Accord, indeed, formally necessitated endorsement only by the AFL-CIO EXCO; there was no constitutional need, and little attempt, to secure a broader commitment (including to wage restraint). Exceptionalist arguments dwell on divisions within the AFL-CIO when conflict has proven uncontainable, although such instances are rare. The norms of EXCO decisionmaking facilitate consensus and the special features of the Accord were intended to secure it: the direct participation of key EXCO members in the Accord negotiations and the *quid pro quo* policies (these successes also helped to consolidate Kirkland's leadership status within the AFL-CIO). Nevertheless, this is a more uncertain mechanism by which to achieve public policy objectives. Moreover, changing membership, especially the increasing prominence of public and service sector

workers and decline of craft-based unionism, brought new demands and reinforced political activism within the AFL-CIO, including at the EXCO level where leadership turnover strengthened progressive elements. Over the short term, these changes exacerbated internal political tensions, heightening conflict specifically over links to the Democratic Party and involvement in presidential campaigns, and rendered an operative consensus generally more difficult. Under Meany and Barkan's influence, the AFL-CIO would have been far less likely to enter into the Accord or to reverse the AFL-CIO's long-standing policy of neutrality during the Democratic primaries but, over the longer term, a new consensus has been emerging, reinforced by changes within the party-political environment.

Although the U.S. clearly does not fit the interpretation of corporatism offered by Schmitter and Panitch, stressing the element of social control associated especially with wage restraint, in pursuing incomes policy, government leaders in the U.S. have nevertheless repeatedly solicited cooperation from the labour leadership (as from business) as one of several imperfect tools available and generally used in conjunction with one another. The alternative is *no* bargaining partner (since no group is more centralized), which is generally infeasible because of the fundamental need for coalition-building (notwithstanding occasional brief exceptions, such as the six-month Nixon pay and price freeze). Hence, the AFL-CIO has been repeatedly involved in the politics of wage restraint. As the Carter programme emphasized, the labour leadership has more to gain by participating than by having a restraint programme unilaterally imposed by government (and employers); moreover, exclusion carries the threat of political impotence (although not necessarily economic). During the Carter years, the labour leaders acknowledged the need to fight inflation and to address the inevitable impact of the OPEC price shocks: they sought to influence *how* this was done. In seeking their cooperation, the Administration sought to contain the major pacesetter contracts, and influence others, through the high visibility and spillover effects of these. Additional means to achieve restraint - through employer cooperation and influence over non-union and public sector pay activity, were also pursued. Within the union sector in the U.S., much bargaining is decentralized; rank and file members may refuse to ratify nationally negotiated agreements although, even in countries where labour is centralized, wage drift has limited the impact of compliance at the leadership level. Like most previous incomes policy experiments in the U.S., the Carter programme lacked compliance power, especially after labour, and then business, leaders prevented the use of procurement penalties. Once the incomes policy was collectively endorsed at the leadership level, however, concerted opposition from the rank and file level was unlikely, partly because compliance was voluntary and contingent; the highly codified nature of industrial relations,

and particularly strict controls over industrial action, may constitute a degree of pre-existing social control. Industrial action did result during a few specific settlements, notably cases where an individual labour leader openly opposed Administration activity. Some union leaders, although privately supporting the programme, publicly denounced it in order to avert rank and file dissatisfaction.

The process of political bargaining producing the Accord probably did lead to some under-utilization of economic power on the part of the major AFL-CIO affiliates, in return for other benefits. Under the prevailing inflationary conditions, settlements could well have been higher in the absence of the collective commitment of the EXCO to the National Accord and the labour leaders' participation in the Year II programme. AFL-CIO participation added legitimacy to the programme, signalled acceptance of restraint to union negotiators, and strengthened business at the bargaining table. The major labour breaches were by the Teamsters and UAW, not AFL-CIO affiliates, with the exception of OCAW, which complied during Year I but not Year II, partly because of the UAW and Teamsters' activity. COWPS concluded that there was a modest degree of bargaining restraint across the life of the standards programme; although this was greatest during Year I (when the AFL-CIO opposed the programme outright), but for reasons not related to compliance: the inflation rate (especially the impact upon COLA entitlements), deferred entitlements, catch-up provisions for non-union workers, and the like.

Undoubtedly, with or without the Accord, President Carter could not rely simply upon the labour leadership to secure restraint, even within the organized sector. He needed to provide both an economic climate and a programme conducive to restraint; to some extent, these needs conflicted. He needed business cooperation on the pay and price side and, because of the weakness of the dollar, to persuade international financial interests that his macroeconomic strategy was credible, which required fiscal retrenchment and monetary restraint. Business leaders were willing to accept some intervention in prices and profits in order to gain wage restraint and economic stabilization, notably through COWPS (where they felt their interests better served); they were reluctant to participate on PAYC with labour (and public) members, although cooperating thereon with labour leaders to ensure a return to free collective bargaining in Year III.

Fiscal and monetary policy are everywhere less frequently admitted into corporatist bargaining with labour by government leaders. Moreover, the White House had only limited influence over monetary developments, under the control of (Carter-appointee) Paul Volcker and the FRB, whose high interest rates adversely affected White House relations with

labour. It was all the more imperative, then, that the President protect relations in other areas of economic policy if he was to retain labour support. It was especially difficult for a Democratic president to pursue a recessionary policy without losing customary sources of support, and the approaching election rendered the austerity strategy introduced in October 1978 an increasingly hazardous course, but Carter's weak relations with labour further lowered the prospect of success - even though he strategically conceded the Year II pay range. The Accord provided for consultation and negotiation over budgetary policy, including commitments by the White House to counter-recessionary measures, but the Administration's course began to diverge almost immediately from the common understanding achieved with the labour leadership. Most seriously, there was little emphasis on consultation with labour during the budget revisions by the White House during Spring 1980. Instead, the White House concentrated on negotiations with congressional leaders, paying the price subsequently in the form of intense opposition by major Democratic constituencies like labour. Ultimately, to persuade labour that the wage/price programme was credible and fair required more comprehensive action and a more expansive fiscal/monetary policy than was compatible with business confidence at home and abroad. All the labour leaders became increasingly dissatisfied with the Administration's handling of economic policy, including the restraint programme, especially as the White House prolonged negotiations over the Year II pay range. The President was also regarded as having betrayed other commitments, especially employment measures. Thus, restraint was not only more difficult to achieve for practical reasons: the labour leaders were not persuaded of the President's good intentions.

Conflict between the AFL-CIO and President Carter arose from the President's, rather than labour's, divergence from mainstream Democratic positions. The Accord process did bridge the gulf between the two sides, however precariously, until electoral considerations assured labour cooperation. Labour participation in the Year II standards programme served to depoliticize the wage restraint issue, limiting agitation within Congress for tougher measures (which would have made the President even more unpopular) and disarming Kennedy's call for mandatory controls (part of his nomination bid). Establishing PAYC removed wage restraint from the political arena, especially since Congress had no direct involvement in the Committee (established by Executive Order). Thus, the Accord provided a means of accommodating, or at least limiting, conflict, thus enhancing stability. Brought to the brink of collapse before the election, the Accord remained a renegotiable bargain, accepted as a long-term model, and offering the prospect of enhanced long-term stability during friendly administrations. Ironically, however, widespread restraint was subsequently

forced upon labour during the more hostile economic, industrial and political climate of the Reagan years, when union bargaining priorities shifted to a far greater emphasis on job security and wage bargaining expectations were widely lowered. Still, notwithstanding Carter's performance on commitments made under the Accord and chilly relations during the Reagan presidency, Kirkland has continued to reaffirm the concept of the Accord including, explicitly, participation in the wage and price programme:

> We have said repeatedly that ... as far as the AFL-CIO is concerned ... We're prepared to enter into the same type of an understanding that we did at the time the National Accord was reached whenever circumstances require it ... and where we have the opportunity to participate in the development of any policies and programs that might flow from it. [*Industrial Policy Study Group*, 1984b:11].

Indeed, through the Accord, the AFL-CIO gained policy access, specific policy commitments not otherwise achievable, as well as other benefits, while conceding relatively little in spite of its theoretically weak political leverage. It is perhaps not surprising that the AFL-CIO remains prepared to deal with government.

The prospects for cooperation with business interests seem even more remote than with government in the U.S., given economic decline, the inflationary shocks of the seventies, rising labour-management conflict, including over labour law reform (temporarily disrupting the Labor-Management Group). Labour entered into the Accord partly to demonstrate greater political influence through an alliance with the White House on economic policy and (privately) labour law reform. Yet the Accord also provided an opportunity to restore customary cooperative relations with some corporate leaders, notably the Business Roundtable, through PAYC. Beyond this, the LMG forum has exhibited an unexpected degree of long-term and relatively stable cooperation between a small circle of business and labour leaders with national standing. PAYC itself reflected the membership and operation of the LMG, and especially the private, informal negotiations involving the kind of "big business and big labour" collaboration criticized by Charles Schultze in the context of tripartitism generally and PAYC specifically. Even though business and labour leaders clearly disagreed at times, as on the appropriate macroeconomic response to inflation, they still cooperated on PAYC to achieve the mutual goal of free collective bargaining, and continued the longer-term cooperation on reindustrialization and industrial policy. Later, labour-management cooperation led to joint studies in these areas (continuing the attempt by the Carter White House), publicly advocating a partnership between government, business and labour leaders. The joint Industrial Policy Study group, based on the LMG and co-chaired by Kirkland, Shapiro and Felix Rohatyn called for such a trilateral partnership; for national economic planning measures; and for a coherent industrial policy, including the

establishment of an Industrial Development Board (to advise the president on policy) and an Industrial Finance Agency (to provide financing), with a focus on coherent sectoral policy (especially manufacturing), to achieve "an appropriate mix of macro and sectoral or micro policies" [*Industrial Policy Group*, 1984:2-3]. This Executive-based planning would precede any recommendations to Congress. Asked whether these moves amounted to a "social contract" and a call on management to accept labor unions, notwithstanding evidence of increased anti-union activity, Shapiro replied:

> [That is something] that responsible business leaders long ago accepted. I concede there are some people whom I would classify as Neanderthals who still think that labor is a public enemy, but that does not reflect the thinking of the business community at large ... So that, yes, it's a social contract ... if this nation is going to get its industrial act together, the leadership of labor ... industry and ... government have got to be working together. [*Industrial Study Policy Group*, 1984b:8].

In the U.S., while "limited-state" beliefs may remain prevalent and the proposed preconditions for the pursuit of a political strategy are often absent or weak, organized labour has long perceived the wisdom of seeking influence with government leaders.[1] The scope and size of the public sector may be less and government more fragmented than in Western counterparts but, in the modern era, public policy exerts a sufficiently profound effect upon labour interests to persuade labour leaders of the need for a comprehensive political strategy - and not just in crises. Where there is such extensive decentralization within national government and within the interest group sector, it is necessary to consider the configuration of interaction in its entirety, and the interdependencies between the points of contact. Only in this way can the choice of a political conflict strategy by organized labour be understood. The thesis clearly reveals that the established web of links between the AFL-CIO (and its labour associates) and the state are both extensive and emphatically Democratic, whether one looks at interaction with the White House, the Labor department, Congress, electoral activity or, indeed, economic and social policy preferences. This integration of the labour movement within the Democratic Party is more comprehensive than exceptionalist analyses allow - and than labour leaders themselves traditionally publicly acknowledge. The National Accord was a remarkable experiment at a social contract between imperfect bargaining partners under unpropitious circumstances and one which can be understood only through a judicious combination of post-pluralism and American exceptionalism. Under these dynamic compulsions explored by theorists of the former, the Accord was deliberately structured - based on operative need rather than theory - to address several of those characteristics identified by the latter as obstacles to accommodatory labour-state relations of the post-pluralist kind.

---

[1]On the simultaneous antipathy to the state and prominent role in state activity on the part of business interests in the U.S. and Britain, see Katzenstein [1978:325].

APPENDIX A

The Administration—American Labor Leadership

A National Accord

- To provide for American labor's involvement and cooperation with the Administration on important national issues.
- To deal effectively with inflation in an equitable manner, consistent with the historic values of our nation.
- To assure that the austerity arising from battling inflation is fairly shared, while protecting those members of society who are least able to bear the burden.
- To pursue our established national goals of full employment, price stability and balanced growth.
- To maintain and enhance the pre-eminence of America at home and abroad.

All Americans share a common commitment to achieve our nation's economic goals of full employment, price stability and balanced growth as set forth in the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978.

Recently, progress has been impaired by high and persistent rates of inflation. Inflation has built up over the past 15 years, and in the last six has been aggravated by extraordinary increases in world petroleum and other energy prices.

The causes of inflation are many. But it is now deeply embedded in our economic structure. Inflation is a clear and present danger. It threatens our ability to achieve full employment; it reduces real incomes and values; it dries up job creating investments; it impedes productivity; it breeds recession; and it falls most heavily on those least able to bear the burden.

The war against inflation must be the top priority of government and of private individuals and institutions. There is no quick or simple solution. The war must be waged through a comprehensive strategy on all fronts on a continuing basis. But it should not mean acceptance of higher than otherwise levels of unemployment.

To accept such levels of unemployment in the name of fighting inflation is inconsistent with the equitable sharing of sacrifice. The pursuit of full employment and balanced growth as set forth in the 1978 act is essential to the ultimate elimination of budget deficits, the achievement of economic stability and the realization of social and economic justice.

It is imperative that we overcome inflation in order to provide adequately for the general welfare and for the national security. It is also essential in order to assure our continued technological, industrial and humanitarian leadership.

To deal effectively with inflation requires discipline and restraints. This will mean a period of austerity for Americans—individual and collective sacrifices for a time so that we may then enjoy the greater bounty of our land in the years to come.

Such austerity must be fairly shared. The burdens need to be distributed equitably. And in the process we must protect those least advantaged in our society, who are not able to bear the costs.

Full involvement and cooperation of the private sector is necessary in order to wring out inflation and to attain our goals of full employment and price stability.

Therefore, this National Accord has been undertaken to evidence and provide for the continued involvement and cooperation of American labor leadership with the Administration for this purpose.

1. General Economic Policies. It is recognized that a disciplined fiscal policy is needed to counter inflation. Close control should be exercised over federal expenditures; and budget deficits should be minimized, giving due regard to the state of the business cycle and the social and economic needs of our society. The revenues required for targeted programs and pressing national needs should not be dissipated by general tax cuts in conflict with the principle of shared austerity. Spending and taxing decisions within this framework must be and can be made consistent with the long-term goals of full employment, price stability and balanced growth.

2. Countercyclical Economic Policies. The current recessionary conditions developed following the large

THIS IS THE TEXT of the agreement between the Carter Administration and the AFL-CIO approved by the Executive Council on Sept. 28, 1979.

increase in world oil prices in the second quarter Policies should be directed toward moderating and reversing the resulting downturn. Established counter-cyclical programs will automatically come into play to help in this regard. Further counter actions need to be approached with care, so as to avoid new inflationary pressures. Nevertheless, if the recession deepens, well balanced responses of appropriate scale should be prepared and ready for action giving due regard to any required congressional approvals, to emphasize actions that have anti-inflation as well as anti-unemployment characteristics, and to practical operational limitations. These include:

—Programs to shelter the poor and needy from the twin ravages of inflation and recession.

—Additional skills training to help remedy structural unemployment.

—Public works that provide jobs while at the same time contributing to anti-inflation objectives, such as public transit projects funded by the proposed oil windfall profits tax.

—Improved implementation and expansion of jobs programs.

—Policies to assure access to capital for the housing industry, with emphasis upon availability of financing, at reasonable cost, to low– and moderate-income families.

—Appropriate tax relief targeted to offset inflation on the one hand while on the other contributing to anti-inflation through job creation, productivity improvement and cost reduction—particularly in areas most severely affected by high unemployment and economic adversity.

3. Pay-Price Policies. An important aspect of the anti-inflation effort is responsible behavior with respect to pay and prices. For the past year, a voluntary program of pay and price restraint has been used.

In the present circumstances, continued constraint is required on the overall levels of price and compensation increases consistent with achieving a reduction in the rate of inflation. After extensive public consultations, the program for the second year has been established with provision for greater public participation, while maintaining the clear objectives of containment and deceleration of inflation.

Direct participation by labor, business and other public representatives will make a major contribution toward a fair and workable program which will achieve the overall goals.

The federal government must continue to show leadership in moderation. Federal pay action for fiscal 1980 has therefore been taken in the context of both fairness and continued restraint.

4. International. International developments in the post war era have led to greater economic interdependence among nations. In this environment, a demonstrated commitment to an effective anti-inflation program and to bringing our current account into balance is necessary in order to avoid adding to domestic inflation and to prevent disturbances in international trade and finance.

We must therefore seek both a reduction in dependence upon imported oil and an expansion of exports. An increase in exports will create additional American jobs. At the same time, all international trade must be fair so that American jobs are not threatened by unfair restrictions on American goods and services or by unfair prices or subsidies for goods and services of other countries.

Where American jobs are impacted by international trade developments, adjustment assistance for American workers needs to be prompt and adequate.

The United States also should pursue maritime policies which will promote a strong merchant marine and assure that expanding American flag shipping services will make a growing contribution to the reduction of our balance of payments deficit.

5. Energy. In view of the availability, location and cost of oil and gas, our nation must reduce its dependence on petroleum as an energy source and particularly its dependence on imported petroleum.

Toward that end, the President has proposed a comprehensive energy program, which includes conservation measures, limitations on oil imports and a windfall profits tax to capture some of the increased revenues from higher oil prices for public purposes. Proceeds from the windfall profits tax will be used to help finance the development of unconventional energy sources, such as synthetic fuels; to carry out projects which conserve overall energy requirements, such as expanded public transit facilities; to provide incentives for greater conservation; and to extend financial relief from higher energy costs for the poor and needy.

These vital features of the President's energy program are of critical importance and should be carried out by congressional and other actions as rapidly as possible.

6. Human Environment. It is also important to continue pursuit of the goal of improving the quality of the human environment. This includes cooperation on programs to assure safe living and working places and to improve health services available to Americans.

7. Other Matters. The specific areas set forth in this Accord are not intended to be exhaustive. There are other matters which currently deserve mutual consideration and others will arise in the future. Those will be part of an ongoing agenda.

8. Continuing Consultations. The essence of this National Accord is involvement and cooperation. The process is by its nature dynamic and evolutionary. It is our purpose to establish procedures for continuing consultations between American labor leadership and the Administration on these and other issues of vital concern to working people, as workers and as citizens.

Reprinted from October 1979
AFL-CIO AMERICAN FEDERATIONIST

APPENDIX B

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOUR-CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS

Executive Council Members as of August 1979 (and sponsoring Unions)

George **Meany**, President of the AFL-CIO; United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada.

Lane **Kirkland**, Secretary-Treasurer, later President, of the AFL-CIO (from 1979); International Longshoremen's Association.

Thomas R. **Donahue**, Service Employees International Union.

Emmet **Andrews**, American Postal Workers Union.

Kenneth T. **Blaylock**, American Federation of Government Employees.

Peter **Bommarito**, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America.

Sol C. **Chaikin**, International Ladies Garment Workers Union.

Al H. **Chesser**, United Transportation Union.

C.L. **Dellums**, United Paperworkers International Union.

Murray H. **Finley**, Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union.

David J. **Fitzmaurice**, International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers.

Angelo **Fosco**, Laborers' International Union of North America.

Thomas W. **Gleason**, International Longshoremen's Association.

A.F. **Grospiron**, Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union.

Matthew **Guinan**, Transport Workers Union of America.

Paul **Hall**, Seafarers International Union of North America.

Edward T. **Hanley**, United Transportation Union.

George **Hardy**, Service Employees International Union.

Alvin E. **Heaps**, Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union.

Fred J. **Kroll**, Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees.

John H. **Lyons**, International Association of Bridge and Structural Iron Workers.

Lloyd **McBride**, United Steelworkers of America.

William H. **McClennan**, International Association of Fire Fighters.

John J. **O'Donnell**, Air Line Pilots Association.

Frederick **O'Neal**, Associated Actors and Artistes of America.

Charles H. **Pillard**, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.

Harry R. **Poole**, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union.

S. Frank **Raftery**, International Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades of the United States and Canada.

Albert **Shanker**, American Federation of Teachers.

William **Sidell**, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America.

J.C. **Turner**, International Union of Operating Engineers.

Martin J. **Ward**, United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada.

Glenn E. **Watts**, Communications Workers of America.

William W. **Winpisinger**, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers Union.

Jerry **Wurf**, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees.

William H. **Wynn**, United Food and Commercial Workers Union.

nb. AFL-CIO Vice-presidents are, in most cases, presidents of a member union. They may also head a Federation Department: for example, Paul Hall (Maritime Trades Department) and Peter Bommarito (Building and Construction Trades Department).

APPENDIX C

MEMBERS OF THE PAY ADVISORY COMMITTEE (PAYC)

PUBLIC MEMBERS

John T. **Dunlop** (Harvard Business School; Secretary of Labor March '75-February '76);

Phyllis **Wallace** (Professor of Industrial Relations, Sloan School of Management, M.I.T.);

Robben W. **Fleming** (President, Corporation for Public Broadcasting; ex-President, University of Michigan);

Arvin **Anderson** (Chair of Collective Bargaining, City of N.Y.);

Lloyd **Ulman** (Professor of Economics, Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, Berkeley);

Robert **Nathan** (Consulting Economist and Chief Executive Officer, Robert R. Nathan & Associates a firm of economic consultants).

LABOUR MEMBERS

Lane **Kirkland** (AFL-CIO);

Bill **Wynn** (UFCW, AFL-CIO);

John **Lyons** (Bridge & Steelworkers, AFL-CIO);

Lloyd **McBride** (Steelworkers, AFL-CIO);

Frank **Fitzsimmons** (Teamsters);

Doug **Fraser** (UAW).

BUSINESS MEMBERS

Heath **Larry** (president, N.A.M.);

Jesse **Hill** (president and CEO, Atlanta Life Insurance Co.);

Charles R. **McDonald** (Chair, Council of Smaller Enterprises; president of McDonald Equipment Company);

John T. **Connor** (chairman of the Board, Allied Chemical Corporation);

Norma **Pace** (senior vice-president, American Paper Institute);

Philip M. **Hawley** (president and CEO, Carter Hawley Hale Stores).

APPENDIX D

THE 1980 DEMOCRATIC NOMINATION: LIST OF UNIONS ENDORSING CARTER AND KENNEDY DURING THE 1980 PRIMARIES

UNION ENDORSEMENTS: CARTER.

International Association of Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers.
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America.
Communications Workers of America.
International Ladies' Garment Workers Union.
International Association of Bridge and Structural Ironworkers.
International Union of Operating Engineers.
Plasterers' and Cement Masons' International Association of the United States and Canada.
United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada.
Tile, Marble, Terrazzo, Finishers and Shopmen International Union.
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.
Office and Professional Employees International Union.
United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers and Allied Workers.

Not AFL-CIO Affiliates:

National Education Association.
National Alliance of Postal and Federal Employees.
United Mine Workers.

Presidents Endorsing Carter (whose unions had not):

Murray H. Finley; Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union.
Paul Hall; Seafarers International Union of North America.
Frederick O'Neal; Associated Actors and Artistes of America.
Richard A. Plumb; Barbers, Hairdressers and Cosmetologists' International Union of America.
William H. Wynn; United Food and Commercial Workers International Union.

UNION ENDORSEMENTS: KENNEDY.

United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America.
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees.
United Farm Workers of America.
Service Employees International Union.
International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers.
United Paperworks International Union.
International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen.
Brotherhood of Railway and Airline Clerks.
International Chemical Workers Union.

International Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades of the United States and Canada.
International Association of Machinists.
International Longshoremen's Association.
American Federation of Teachers.
United Furniture Workers of America.
Glass Bottle Blowers' Association of the United States and Canada.
International Brotherhood of Pottery and Allied Workers.
United Hatters, Cap and Millinery Workers International Union.
American Radio Association.
International Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers.
Amalgamated Transit Union.

Not AFL-CIO Affiliates:

National Treasury Employees Union.

Presidents Endorsing Kennedy (whose unions had not):

Ole M. Berge; Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees.
Arthur Cecilski; Leather Workers International Union of America.
Keith Johnson; International Woodworkers of America.
Edward J. Kiernan; International Union of Police Associations.
W. Howard McClennan; International Association of Firefighters.
Douglas A. Fraser; United Automobile Workers (not affiliated to AFL-CIO).

[Source: National Journal, 4/19/80:642; Interview: Landon Butler; Ben Albert; Bill Wynn.]

INDEX TO BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. PRIMARY SOURCES

I. Labour Publications
II. Government Publications
III. Joint Government-Labour Publications
IV. Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.
V. Miscellaneous

2. SECONDARY SOURCES

3. LIST OF INTERVIEWS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. PRIMARY SOURCES

I. LABOUR PUBLICATIONS

AFL-CIO NEWS/PRESS CONFERENCE TRANSCRIPTS [AFL-CIO PR in thesis text], published by Department of Public Relations, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C.

1. MEANY, George; President, AFL-CIO.

1978

October 31: AFL-CIO Executive Council Meeting, Washington, D.C.

1979

March 2: AFL-CIO Executive Council Meeting, February 19-26, Bal Harbour, Florida.

2. KIRKLAND, Lane; Secretary-Treasurer/President, AFL-CIO.

1979

August 10: AFL-CIO Executive Council Meeting, August 6-8, Chicago, Illinois.

September 3: International Communication Agency, Press Conference U.S.A.

October 1: AFL-CIO Executive Council Meeting, Washington, D.C.

October 18: Open press conference, October 16.

October 25: Interview, A.M. America, ABC.

November 25: Interview, Face The Nation, CBS News.

1980

March 4: AFL-CIO Executive Council Meeting, February 18-25, Bal Harbour, Florida.

April 9: Press conference with leaders of a coalition to oppose Administration and Congress proposals, April 3, Washington, D.C.

April 29: Conference at Capitol Press Club, Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D.C., April 29.

May 9: AFL-CIO Executive Council Meeting, May 6/7, Washington, D.C.

August 27: AFL-CIO Executive Council Meeting, August 20/21, Chicago, Illinois.

August 31: Interview, Meet The Press, NBC.

1981

January 9: Industrial policy conference, Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO, George Meany Labor Studies Center.

July 21: Industrial policy conference, Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO, Baltimore, M.D.

1985

February 24: AFL-CIO Executive Council Meeting, February 18/19/21, Bal Harbour, Florida.

AFL-CIO (series a, to 1979), Labor Looks at Congress: An AFL-CIO Legislative Report (annual), Washington, D.C.

AFL-CIO (series b, from 1979), The People's Lobby: Report on the (Session) Congress (annual), Washington, D.C.

AFL-CIO (series c), The AFL-CIO Platform Proposals Presented to the Democratic and Republican National Conventions (annual), Washington, D.C.

AFL-CIO (series d), Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council, Washington, D.C.

AFL-CIO (series f), Policy Resolutions Adopted by the Constitutional Convention (annual), Washington, D.C.

AFL-CIO (series g), AFL-CIO News.

AFL-CIO (1975), "The COPE Record through the Years", AFL-CIO American Federationist, September.

AFL-CIO (1976a), "The 1976 Presidential Election", Statement by the AFL-CIO Executive Council, July 19, AFL-CIO American Federationist, September.

AFL-CIO (1976b), "To Mobilize Labor's Full Support", Statement of the AFL-CIO General Board, August 31, AFL-CIO American Federationist, September.

AFL-CIO (1976c), "1976 Collective Bargaining Schedule", AFL-CIO American Federationist, March.

AFL-CIO (1976d), "The Continuing Recession", AFL-CIO American Federationist, March.

AFL-CIO (1977), Department of Legislation; Statement of Andrew J. Biemiller, Director, on H.R. 2100 and Other Bills Relating to the Council on

Wage and Price Stability, presented to the Subcommittee on Stabilization, House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., April 22.

AFL-CIO (1979b),
Proceedings of the Thirteenth Constitutional Convention of the AFL-CIO, Vol.I, Washington, D.C.

AFL-CIO (1979a),
Proceedings of the Thirteenth Constitutional Convention of the AFL-CIO, Vol.II, Washington, D.C.

AFL-CIO (1979c),
Constitution of the AFL-CIO, as amended by the 1979 Convention, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C.

AFL-CIO (1980),
"The Choice Is Clear - Re-elect President Carter", statement of the AFL-CIO General Board, AFL-CIO American Federationist, September.

AFL-CIO (1981),
"A Short History of American Labor", adapted from "A Short History of American Labor", prepared for the 1981 Centennial of American Labor, AFL-CIO American Federationist, March.

AFL-CIO (1983),
The Future of Work, Committee on the Evolution of Work, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C., August.

AFL-CIO (1983),
"Rebuilding America: A National Industrial Policy", AFL-CIO American Federationist, October 22.

AFL-CIO (1984),
Deindustrialization and the Two-tier Society: Challenges for an Industrial Policy, Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C.

AFL-CIO (1985),
The Changing Situation of Workers and Their Unions, Committee on the Evolution of Work, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C., February.

ANDERSON, Arne (1981),
"Bargaining '81: On the Treadmill", AFL-CIO American Federationist, March.

BOMMARITO, Peter (1979),
President, United Rubber Workers: Telegram to President Carter, May 2.

BURTON, Fred (1976),
"The Economic Squeeze on the Worker, 1976", AFL-CIO American Federationist, June.

HARDESTY, Rex (1976a),
"1976: The Unique Election", AFL-CIO American Federationist, January.

HARDESTY, Rex (1976b),
"Politics '76: Drawing the Battle Lines", AFL-CIO American Federationist, June.

HARDESTY, Rex (1976c),
"The '76 Elections: A Chance for Progress", AFL-CIO American Federationist, October.

HARDESTY, Rex (1976d),
"The '76 Elections: A Watershed Victory", AFL-CIO American Federationist, December.

HARDESTY, Rex (1980a),
"The '80 Elections: A Distorted Pattern", AFL-CIO American Federationist, March.

HARDESTY, Rex (1980b),
"Election '80: A Pivotal Decision for America", AFL-CIO American Federationist, October.

INTERNATIONAL ASSOC. OF MACHINISTS & AEROSPACE WORKERS (1978),
Research Report, VI (4), Washington, D.C., Fall.

JAQUAY, Joe (1980),
"Bargaining '80: Still Playing Catchup", AFL-CIO American Federationist, March.

KIRKLAND, Lane (1979),
"George Meany: His Life Works Would Do Honor to a Dozen Men", remarks to the Thirteenth Convention (AFL-CIO), reprinted in AFL-CIO American Federationist, December.

KIRKLAND, Lane (1980),
"Labor's Outlook Building on Strength", AFL-CIO American Federationist, March.

KIRKLAND, Lane (1980),
"The Decision is Easy and Straightforward...", AFL-CIO American Federationist, September.

KIRKLAND, Lane (1981),
"Labor and Politics after 1980", AFL-CIO American Federationist, January.

KIRKLAND, Lane (1982),
The Constructive Use of Government, text of a speech by Kirkland, AFL-CIO President, Dartmouth College, Hanover, October 4.

MARSHALL, Ray (1976),
"Full Employment: The Inflation Myth", AFL-CIO American Federationist, August.

MEANY, George (1976a),
"Which Way, America?", AFL-CIO American Federationist, June.

MEANY, George (1976b),
"On All Counts...It's Jimmy Carter", AFL-CIO American Federationist, September.

OSWALD, Rudy (1980),
"Inflation 1980: Tracing the Causes", AFL-CIO American Federationist, May.

ROBERTS, Markley (1976),
"Full Employment: The Next Vital Step", AFL-CIO American Federationist, August.

WEINTRAUB, Norman A. (1980),
Chief Economist, Teamsters: Letter to Frank Pollara, Special Assistant to the President, February 7.

II. GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

ANDREWS, Mary A. and Winston Tillery (1979),
"Heavy bargaining again in 1980", in Department of Labor (series), December.

BOLTON, L.W. (1978),
"Heavy bargaining returns in 1979", in Department of Labor (series), December.

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD,
(1979) SENATE, S8065, June 19, from Washington Post, June 11.
SENATE, S11398, August 2.
(1980) E1442, March 24.

COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY (1976),
1976 Collective Bargaining Negotiations: A Background Paper, Washington, D.C., January.

COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY (1977),
Quarterly Report, Washington, D.C., July.

COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY (1979a),
Memorandum to Pay Advisory Committee, November 27, Washington, D.C.

COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY (1979b),
Report on Inflation Developments During 1978 and early 1979, reprinted in BNA 1979, S31,5:7271.

COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY (1979c),
CWPS Inflation Update Detailing Wage and Trends During First Year of President's Anti-Inflation Program, reprinted in BNA-DLR 1979, 227:E-1.

COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY (1979d),
Charter of the Pay Advisory Committee (National Accord), Washington, D.C.

COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY (1979e),
Charter of the Price Advisory Committee (National Accord), Washington, D.C.

COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY (1981),
Evaluation of the Pay and Price Standards Program, Washington, D.C., January 16.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE (1985),
Statistical Abstract of the United States 1985, National Data Book and Guide to Sources, Bureau of the Census, Washington, D.C.

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (series),
Monthly Labor Review (see under individual entries), Washington, D.C.

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (1967),
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Amended), Code of Federal Regulations, Title 29, IV, Regulations and Interpretative Bulletins, Labor-Management Services Administration, Office of Labor-Management and Welfare-Pension Reports, Washington, D.C.

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (1977),
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, As Amended, Public Law 257, 86th Congress (73 Stat.519-546), as amended by 89th Congress (79 Stat.888) Office of Labor-Management Standards Enforcement, Washington, D.C.

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (1978),
Important Events in American Labor History, 1778-1978, Washington, D.C.

KAHN, Alfred E. (1980),
Chairman of COWPS: Memorandum, to John Dunlop, Chairman of PAYC, June 23, Washington, D.C.

LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT (1947),
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (1978),
A Guide to Basic Law Procedures Under The National Labor Relations Act, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.

PAY ADVISORY COMMITTEE (1980),
Labor Draft Statement, August 14, Washington, D.C.

PAY ADVISORY COMMITTEE (1980),
"Stabilization Policy after December 31, 1980", Draft, November 10, Washington, D.C.

PAY ADVISORY COMMITTEE (1982),
Final Report on the Anti-Inflation Guidelines by the Pay Advisory Committee, 1979-80: A Study Prepared for the Use of the Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.

RUBEN, George (1980),
"Industrial relations in 1979: Inflation still holds spotlight", Department of Labor (series), February.

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS (1980),
Pressures in Today's Workplace, Washington, D.C., December.

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS (1984a),
Staff Report Concerning Enforcement of Consultant and Employer Reporting Provisions of the Landrum-Griffin Act, Washington, D.C., February.

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS (1984b),
The Failure of Labor Law: A Betrayal of American Workers, Washington, D.C., October.

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS (1984c),
The Forgotten Law Disclosure of Consultant and Employer Activity Under the LMRDA, Washington, D.C., December.

WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY, Office of the (1978),
Remarks of the President in his Address to the Nation on Inflation, Washington, D.C., October 24.

WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY, Office of the (1979),
Press Release on the Pay Advisory Committee, Washington, D.C., October 16.

WHITE PAPER (1978),
The President's Anti-Inflation Program, October 24, Washington, D.C.

III. JOINT GOVERNMENT-LABOUR PUBLICATIONS

AFL-CIO and the U.S. EXECUTIVE (1979),
A National Accord, Text of the Agreement between the Carter Administration and the AFL-CIO, reprinted from AFL-CIO American Federationist, October, Washington, D.C.

IV. THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., Washington, D.C., 20037.

Daily Report for Executives (BNA-DER in thesis text):

1978 Business Policies:
October 27, 209:A21.

1979 Economic Analysis:
March 19, 54:P1; June 1, 107:P1; October 5, 195:P6-7.

Economic Developments:
February 20, 35:L1; April 17, 75:L2; April 18, 6:L2-3; May 11, 93:L1; June 18, 118:L4-7; July 2, 128:L2; July 17, 138:L3; August 29, 169:L4.

1980 Economic Developments:
April 11, 72:L1-3; May 5, 88:L7; May 7, 90:M1; August 28, 169:L2-3; September 25, 188:L2-3.

Daily Labor Report (BNA-DLR in thesis text):

1978 Current Developments:
October 27, 209:A3; November 1, 212:A10-11; November 30, 231:A8-9; December 1, 232:A1-6; December 8, 237:A7; December 14, 241:A5.

1979 Analysis:
November 27, 229:C1; December 5, 235:C2; December 12, 240:C1-3.

Current Developments:
February 8, 28:A5; February 21, 36:A3-4; March 7, 46:A4;
March 23, 58:A4-5; April 4, 66:A3; April 16, 74:A3;
April 27, 83:A4; May 9, 91:A11-12; May 25, 103:A13-15;
June 22, 122:A13-14; July 11, 134:A11; July 18, 139:A2-3;
July 30, 147:A9; September 12, 178:A10-11; September 13, 179:A13-14;
September 17, 181:A10-11; September 27, 189:A8; October 16, 201:A12;
November 20, 225:A1-2; November 27, 229:A9; November 30, 232:A9-12;
December 7, 237:A21-22.

1980 Current Developments:
January 3, 2:A7; January 8, 5:A1; January 9, 6:A2; January 15, 10:A7;
February 5, 25:A9-10; February 5, 25:A6; February 15, 33:A10-11;
February 29, 42:A5; March 3, 43:A11-12;
March 10, 48:E1-5; March 13, 50:A9-10; April 28, 83:A3-5;
May 6, 89:A7-12; May 13, 94:A6; June 2, 96:A10; June 16, 117:A7;
August 30, 184:A11-12; October 16, 202:A15; October 20, 204:A7-8.

Miscellaneous

1979 March 15, S31, 5:7271; November 23, 227:E-1;
FED Current Developments, October 24, 152, 2:1559.
FED Current Developments, November 27, 164, 2:1662-4.
1980 FED Analysis, May 30, 205, 4:0025-6.
FED Analysis, June 6, 206, 4:0029-31.
FED Current Developments, August 8, 213, 2:2278.
FED Current Developments, August 13, 214.

V. MISCELLANEOUS

CBS (1980),
Delegate Handbook, Democratic Party Convention.

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY, National Convention Credentials Committee (1976),
Democracy in Action, Report of the Credentials Committee to the
1976 Democratic National Convention, Washington, D.C., July 4.

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY, National Convention Platform Committee (1976),
"The Platform is the Party's Contract with the People",
The National Democratic Party Platform 1976, Washington, D.C. 20036.

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY, National Convention Platform Committee (1980),
The Report of the Platform Committee to the 1980 Democratic
National Convention, Washington, D.C.

2. SECONDARY SOURCES

ABRAMSON, Paul R., et al. (1983),
Change Versus Continuity in the 1980 Elections, revised ed.,
Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington, D.C.

ADDISON, John T. (1981),
"Incomes Policy: The Recent European Experience", in Fallick and Elliott (Eds.).

ALEXANDER, Herbert E. (Ed.), (1979),
"Political Finance", Sage Electoral Studies Yearbook, Vol.5, Sage Publications Inc.,
London and Beverly Hills.

ALEXANDER, Herbert E. (1980),
Financing Politics: Money, Elections and Political Reform, 2nd ed.,
Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington, D.C.

AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (1963),
"The Crisis in the American Trade-Union Movement", Annals, 350,
November, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, London and New Delhi.

AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (1984),
"The Future of American Unionism", Annals, 473, May, Sage
Publications, Beverly Hills, London and New Delhi.

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH (series),
Contemporary Economic Problems, Project Director William Fellner.

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH (1973),
The Economy: Phase IV, A Round Table, Washington, D.C., July 19.

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH (1976),
Regulation of Political Campaigns - How Successful?, A Round Table,
Washington, D.C., November 15.

ARTIS, M.J. (1981),
"Incomes Policies: Some Rationales", in Fallick and Elliott (Eds.).

BAKER, Ross K. (1981),
"The Outlook for the Carter Administration", in Pomper, et al.

BALL, Howard (Ed.), (1984),
Federal Administrative Agencies: Essays on Power and Politics,
Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 070632.

BANNON, Brad (1983),
"NCPAC in the 80s: Action versus Reaction", Campaigns and Elections,
3 (4), Winter.

BARBASH, Jack (Ed.), (1959),
Unions and Union Leadership, Harper and Brothers Publishers, New York.

BARBASH, Jack (1972),
"Labor and the Corporate State in America", Journal of Economic Issues, 1.

BARKER, Anthony (Ed.), (1982),
Quangos in Britain: Government and the Networks of Public Policy-making,
MacMillan Press Ltd., London.

BARKER, Anthony (1982),
"Governmental Bodies and the Networks of Mutual Accountability", in Barker (Ed.).

BARNES, Dennis and Eileen Reid (1980),
Government and Trade Unions: The British Experience, 1964-79,
Policy Studies Institute, Heinemann Educational Books, London.

BARRY, Brian (Ed.), (1976),
Power and Political Theory: Some European Perspectives, John Wiley and Sons Ltd.,
London.

BEER, Samuel H. (1974),
The British Political System, revised ed., Random House Inc., New York.

BELL, Daniel (1960),
End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties,
The Free Press of Illinois, Glencoe.

BERGER, Peter L. and R.J. Neuhaus (1977),
To Empower People: The Role of Mediating Structures in Public Policy,
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C.

BERGER, Suzanne (Ed.), (1981a),
Organizing Interests in Western Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

BERGER, Suzanne (1981b),
"Introduction", in Berger (Ed.).

BERGER, Suzanne (1984),
"Politics: American and Non-American", Political Studies, XVII (3), Summer.

BEYME, Klaus Von (1980),
Challenge to Power: Trade Unions and Industrial Relations in
Capitalist Countries, Sage Publications Ltd., London.

BIBBY, John F., et al. (series),
Vital Statistics on Congress, (annual), The American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C.

BIRD, Richard M. (1984),
"Federal Finance in Comparative Perspective", Working Paper No. 8422,
Department of Economics and Institute for Policy Analysis,
University of Toronto, June.

BIRNBAUM, Pierre (1976),
"Power Divorced From its Sources: A Critique of the Exchange Theory of Power",
in Barry (Ed.).

BOK, Derek and John T. Dunlop (1970),
Labor and the American Community, Simon and Schuster, New York.

BONAFEDE, Dom (1976),
"Carter's Long Journey Ends in Victory on a Long Night", National Journal, November 6.

BONAFEDE, Dom (1979),
"The Ash Council Would Be Proud", National Journal, June 9.

BONAFEDE, Dom (1979a),
"Stuart Eizenstat - Carter's Right-Hand Man", National Journal, June 9.

BONAFEDE, Dom (1979b),
"A Turning Point...", National Journal, July 14.

BONAFEDE, Dom (1979c),
"Carter Turns on the Drama But Can He Lead?", National Journal, July 28.

BONAFEDE, Dom (1979d),
"At the White House, You Can't Tell the Players without a Scorecard", National Journal, October 6.

BONAFEDE, Dom (1979e),
"Charting the General Election, With or Without Jimmy Carter", National Journal, October 20.

BONAFEDE, Dom (1979f),
"The Big Mac of the White House Staff", National Journal, November 10.

BONAFEDE, Dom (1979g),
"The White House's Man for All Seasons", National Journal, November 10.

BONAFEDE, Dom (1979h),
"The Fallout from Camp David - Only Minor White House Changes", National Journal, November 10.

BONAFEDE, Dom (1979i),
"Mondale, the President's Preacher, Spreads the Gospel of Jimmy Carter", National Journal, December 1.

BONAFEDE, Dom (1980a),
"Carter-Mondale Committee, Overcoming Slow Start, Shifts into Second Gear", National Journal, January 5.

BONAFEDE, Dom (1980b),
"Gathering Clouds", National Journal, March 13.

BONAFEDE, Dom (1980c),
"For Kennedy, the June 3 Primaries May Be His Campaign's Last Hurrah", National Journal, May 31.

BONAFEDE, Dom (1980d),
"A Platform To Stand On", National Journal, July 5.

BONAFEDE, Dom (1980e),
"The Democrats: Will Kennedy Help The Man Who 'Whipped His Ass'?",
National Journal, August 23.

BONAFEDE, Dom (1980f),
"Carter and Reagan: They Have a Lot in Common", National Journal, August 23.

BORTHWICK, R.L. (1987),
"The Floor of the House", in Walkland and Ryle (Eds.).

BRADSHAW, Kenneth and David Pring (1981),
Parliament and Congress, Quartet Books Ltd., London.

BRANDON, Henry (1959),
"A Conversation with Walter Reuther", in Barbash (Ed.).

BRITISH STUDY OF PARLIAMENT GROUP (1980),
"Parliament and The Economy in Great Britain", in Coombes and Walkland (Eds.).

BRODER, David, et al. (1980),
The Pursuit of the Presidency, 1980, Washington Post/Berkley Publishing Corp.

BRODY, David (Ed.), (1971),
The American Labor Movement, Harper and Row, New York, N.Y. 10016.

BROWN, Sir Henry Phelps (1983),
The Origins of Trade Union Power, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

BROWNSON, Charles B. (annual series),
Congressional Staff Directory, Washington, D.C.

BRUMMER, Alex (1983),
"Fed Up With the Fed - Sizing Up a Secret Society", Washington Post, May 11.

BUDGE, Ian, et al. (1983),
The New British Political System: Government and Society in the 1980's,
Longman Group Ltd., Harlow.

BURTT, Everett Johnson (1980),
Labour in the American Economy, MacMillan Press Ltd., London.

BUSCH, Gary K. (1983),
The Political Role of International Trades Unions, MacMillan Press Ltd.,
London and Basingstoke.

BUSINESS WEEK (1985), (and specified in text),
"Labor's Bold Pledge to Come Back Swinging", March 11.

BUTLER, Landon (1983),
"Labor Let's Fly", The New Republic, October 10.

CADDY, Douglas (1974),
The Hundred Million Dollar Payoff, Arlington House Publishers, New Rochelle, N.Y.

CAIN, Bruce E., et al. (1984),
"The Constituency Service Basis of the Personal Vote for U.S. Representatives and British Members of Parliament", American Political Science Review, 78 (1), March.

CALIFANO, Joseph A., Jr. (1982),
Governing America: An Insider's Report from the White House and the Cabinet, Simon and Schuster, New York.

CAMERON, David R. (1984),
"Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labour Quiescence, and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society", in Goldthorpe (Ed.).

CAMERON, David R. (1978),
"The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis", American Political Science Review, 72, December.

CARTER, Jimmy (1976),
"We Are Bound Together By Common Purpose", AFL-CIO American Federationist, September.

CARTER, Jimmy (1980),
"Together We Will Win", AFL-CIO American Federationist, September.

CARTER, Jimmy (1980a),
Statement of the President Jimmy Carter on the 1980 Democratic Party Platform, Democratic Party Convention, New York, August 13.

CARTER, Jimmy (1982),
Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President, William Collins Sons and Co. Ltd., London.

CARTWRIGHT, Phillip A. and Charles D. DeLorme, Jnr. (1985),
"The Unemployment-Inflation-Voter Utility Relationship in the Political Business Cycle: Some Evidence", Southern Economic Journal, 51 (3), January.

CHILDS, Harwood Lawrence (1978),
"Voluntarism in Action", in Rehmus, et al. (Eds.).

CLARK, Timothy B. (1979),
"The Reality of Inflation Shapes An Austere Congressional Budget", National Journal, November 24.

CLEGG, H.A. (1975),
"Pluralism in Industrial Relations", British Journal of Industrial Relations, XIII (3).

CLEGG, H.A. (1979),
The Changing System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.

COATES, David (1980),
Labour in Power: A Study of the Labour Government 1974-9, Longman Group Ltd., London.

COATES, Ken and Tony Topham (1980),
Trade Unions in Britain, Spokesman, Nottingham.

COHEN, Richard E. (1976),
"A Look at the Carter Coalition", National Journal, November 6.

COHEN, Richard E. (1978-79),
"The Carter-Congress Rift - Who's Really to Blame?", in Cronin (Ed.).

COHEN, Richard E. (1979),
"Requiem for a Heavyweight", National Journal, November 3.

COHEN, Richard E. (1980),
"The Making of the Congress, 1980 There's a New National Wrinkle This Year", National Journal, January 5.

COHEN, Sanford (1970),
Labor in the United States, Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, Columbus, Ohio.

COMMON CAUSE (1974),
"Interest Groups and Political Parties", Congressional Campaign Finances 1974, Vol.5, The Campaign Finance Monitoring Project, Washington, D.C.

COMMON CAUSE (1976),
"Interest Group and Political Party Contributions to Congressional Candidates", 1976 Federal Campaign Finances, Vol.1, Washington, D.C.

COMMONS, John R. (1978),
"The American Federation of Labor", in Rehmus, et al. (Eds.).

CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY (biannual series), (*CQ Guide* in thesis text),
Congressional Quarterly Guide to Current American Government,
Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington, D.C.

CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY (series), (*CQ* in thesis text),
Weekly Reports, Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington, D.C.

COOMBES, David and S.A. Walkland (Eds.), (1980),
Parliaments and Economic Affairs, in Britain, France, Italy and the Netherlands - The Results of a Survey by the Committee of Cooperation for European Parliamentary Studies, Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., for the European Centre for Political Studies of the Policy Studies Institute, London.

COOMBES, David and S.A. Walkland (1980),
"Part I: General Introduction", in Coombes and Walkland (Eds.).

CRAVER, Charles B. (1983),
"The Future of the American Labor Movement", Futurist, October.

CRONIN, Thomas E. (Ed.), (1978-79),
"The Carter Presidency: The White House at Mid-Term", National Journal Reprint Series, Washington, D.C.

CRONIN, Thomas E. (1978-9),
"The Carter Presidency", in Cronin (Ed.).

CRONIN, Thomas E. (1980),
The State of the Presidency, 2nd ed., Little, Brown and Co., Boston.

CROUCH, Colin and Alessandro Pizzorno (Eds.), (1978),
The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe Since 1968,
Vol.2, MacMillan Press Ltd., London and Basingstoke.

CROUCH, Colin (1978a),
"The Changing Role of the State in Industrial Relations in Western Europe",
in Crouch and Pizzorno (Eds.).

CROUCH, Colin (1978b),
"Inflation and the Political Organization of Economic Interests",
in Hirsch and Goldthorpe (Eds.).

CROUCH, Colin (1982),
The Politics of Industrial Relations, 2nd ed., Fontana Paperbacks, London.

DAHL, Robert A. (1956),
A Preface to Democratic Theory, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London.

DAHL, Robert A. (1970),
After The Revolution? Authority in a Good Society, Yale University Press,
New Haven and London.

DAHL, Robert A. (1971),
Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, Yale University Press,
New Haven and London.

DAVIDSON, Roger H. (1981),
"Subcommittee Government: New Channels for Policy Making", in
Mann and Ornstein (Eds.).

DAVIDSON, Roger H. (1985),
"Senate Leaders: Janitors for an Untidy Chamber?", in Dodd and Oppenheimer
(Eds.).

DAVIES, Anne (1982),
"Patronage and Quasi-Government: Some Proposals for Reform", in Barker (Ed.).

DAVIS, Eric L. (1979),
"Legislative Liaison in the Carter Administration", Political Science Quarterly, 94.

DAVIS, Eric L. (1983),
"Congressional Liaison: The People and the Institutions", in King (Ed.).

DAVIS, James W. (1983),
National Conventions in an Age of Party Reform, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT.

DAVIS, Vincent (Ed.), (1980),
The Post-Imperial Presidency, Praeger Publishers, New York.

DAVIS, Vincent (1980),
"Carter Tries on the World for Size", in Davis (Ed.).

DEAN, Andrew (1981),
"Public and Private Sector Pay and the Economy", in Fallick and Elliott (Eds.).

DECKARD, Barbara (1977),
"State-Party Delegations in the U.S. House of Representatives: A Comparative Study of Group Cohesion", in Peabody and Polsby (Eds.).

DEERING, Christopher J. and Steven S. Smith (1985),
"Subcommittees in Congress", in Dodd and Oppenheimer (Eds.).

DERBER, Milton (1972),
"Wage Stablilization: Then and Now", Labor Law Journal, 23 (8), August.

DEXTER, Lewis Anthony (1977),
"The Representative and His District", in Peabody and Polsby (Eds.).

DODD, Lawrence C. and Bruce I. Oppenheimer (Eds.), (1985),
Congress Reconsidered, 3rd ed., Congressional Quarterly Inc.,
Washington, D.C. 20037.

DODD, Lawrence C. and Bruce I. Oppenheimer (1985),
"The Elusive Congressional Mandate: The 1984 Election and Its Aftermath", Preface in Dodd and Oppenheimer (Eds.).

DODD, Lawrence C. and Bruce I. Oppenheimer (1985),
"The House in Transition: Partisanship and Opposition", in Dodd and Oppenheimer (Eds.).

DOERINGER, Peter B. (Ed.), (1983),
Industrial Relations in International Perspective: Essays on Research and Policy,
MacMillan Press Ltd., London and Basingstoke.

DOERINGER, Peter B. (1983),
"Industrial Relations Research in International Perspective", in Doeringer (Ed.).

DOIG, Alan (1983),
"Watergate, Poulson and the Reform of Standards of Conduct",
Parliamentary Affairs, 36 (3), Summer.

DORFMAN, Gerald A. (1983),
British Trade Unionism Against the Trades Union Congress,
MacMillan Press Ltd., London and Basingstoke.

DREWRY, Gavin (1981),
"Legislation", in Walkland and Ryle (Eds.).

DULLES, Foster Rhea (1978),
"The La Follette Campaign of 1924", in Rehmus, et al. (Eds.).

DUNLEAVY, Patrick (1982),
"Quasi-Governmental Sector Professionalism: Some Implications for Public Policy-Making in Britain", in Barker (Ed.).

DUNLOP, John T. (1979),
"Commentary: Inherent Flaws Will Soon Force Recasting of Wage-Price Controls", Financier, May.

DUNLOP, John T. (1984),
Dispute Resolution: Negotiation and Consensus Building, Auburn House, Dover (Mass.) and London.

DUNLOP, John T. and Walter Galenson (Eds.), (1978),
Labor in the Twentieth Century, Academic Press Inc., New York.

EDELSTEIN, J. David and Malcolm Warner (1979),
Comparative Union Democracy: Organisation and Opposition in British and American Unions, Transaction Inc., New Brunswick, N.J. 08903.

ELLIOTT, John (1978),
Conflict or Cooperation: The Growth of Industrial Democracy, Kogan Page Ltd., London.

ELLIOTT, R.F. and J.L. Fallick (1981b),
"Incomes Policies, Inflation and Relative Pay: An Overview", in Fallick and Elliott (Eds.).

ELLWOOD, John W. (1985),
"The Great Exception: The Congressional Budget Process in an Age of Decentralization", in Dodd and Oppenheimer (Eds.).

ENGLAND, Joe and Brian Weekes (1981),
"Trade Unions and the State: A Review of the Crisis", Industrial Relations Journal, 12 (1), January/February.

ENGLISH, Carey W. (1985),
"'Return to Basics' for the Nation's Unions", U.S. News and World Report, March 4.

EPSTEIN, Leon D. (1984),
"Cutting Across the Institutional Grain: The Study of Political Parties", Political Studies, XVII (3), Summer.

ETZIONI, Amitai (1980),
"The Lack of Leadership: We Found It - In Us", National Journal, August 23.

FALLICK, J.L. and R.F. Elliott (Eds.), (1981),
Incomes Policies, Inflation and Relative Pay, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London.

FALLICK, J.L. and R.F. Elliott (1981a),
"Incomes Policy and the Public Sector", in Fallick and Elliott (Eds.).

FALLOWS, James (1979),
"The Passionless Presidency", Atlantic, May-June.

FARBER, Henry S. (1984),
"The Analysis of Union Behaviour", Working Paper No.1502 (series),
National Bureau of Economic Research Inc., Washington, D.C., November.

FEDERAL REGISTER,
1979 June 22, Notices, 44; 122:36446.
December 17, 243.
1980 March 31, 45; 63:20991-2.
April 1, Notices, 63:21330.
June 3, Notices, 108:37472.

FENNO, Richard F. Jnr. (Ed.), (1975-76),
"Congress", National Journal Reprint Series, Washington, D.C.

FENNO, Richard F. Jnr. (1977),
"The Appropriations Committee as a Political System", in Peabody and Polsby (Eds.).

FINK, Gary M. (1978),
"The Rejection of Voluntarism", in Rehmus, et al. (Eds.).

FISHEL, Jeff (1985),
Presidents and Promises, Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington, D.C.

FLANAGAN, Robert J. (1980),
"The National Accord as a Social Contract", Industrial and Labor Relations Review,
34 (1), October.

FORBES (1979),
"Talkin' Union", November 26.

FOX, Alan (1974),
Man Mismanagement, Hutchinson and Co. (Publishers) Ltd., London.

FRANK, Richard S. (1980),
"Don't Count Carter Out - At Least Not Yet", National Journal, August 23.

FRANKOVIC, Kathleen A. (1981),
"Public Opinion Trends", in Pomper, et al.

FREEDMAN, David (1984),
"Employment and Unemployment in the 1980s: Economic Dilemmas and
Socio-Political Challenges", International Labour Review, 123 (5).

FREEMAN, Richard B. and James Medoff (1985),
"A Review Symposium: What Do Unions Do?", Industrial and Labor Relations
Review, 38 (2), January.

FRITSCHLER, A. Lee (1984),
"The Changing Face of Government Regulation", in Ball (Ed.).

GAIS, Thomas L., et al. (1986),
"Interest Groups, from Triangles and Representative Institutions
In American National Government", British Journal of Political Science, 14.

GALENSON, Walter (1978),
"Labor and New Deal Politics: 1936-40", in Rehmus, et al. (Eds.).

GLEN, Maxwell (1979),
"Carter's Wage-Price Program No Longer a Do-It-Yourself Scheme",
National Journal, June 2.

GLEN, Maxwell (1980),
"In the States, the GOP Sets the Stage For More Gains in the House in 1982",
National Journal, November 8.

GOLDTHORPE, John H., et al. (1968),
The Affluent Worker: Political Attitudes and Behaviour, Cambridge University
Press.

GOLDTHORPE, John H. (1978),
"The Current Inflation: Towards a Sociological Account", in Hirsch
and Goldthorpe (Eds.).

GOLDTHORPE, John H. (1981),
Problems of Political Economy After the End of the Post-War Period, Paper prepared
for the Committee on Western Europe of the American Social Science Research
Council, and American Council of Learned Societies, Nuffield College, Oxford.

GOLDTHORPE, John H. (Ed.) (1984a),
Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism, Oxford University Press, New York.

GOLDTHORPE, John H. (1984b),
"The End of Convergence: Corporative and Dualist Tendencies in
Modern Western Societies", in Goldthorpe (Ed.).

GOMPERS, Samuel (1978),
"Should a Labor Party Be Formed?", in Rehmus, et al. (Eds.).

GORDON, Michael R. (1980),
"Trade Adjustment Assistance Program: May Be Too Big For His Own Good",
National Journal, May 10.

GREENSTONE, J. David (1977),
Labor in American Politics, 2nd ed., University of Chicago Press,
Chicago and London.

GRIFFITH, J.A.G. (1981),
"Standing Committees in the House of Commons", in Walkland and Ryle (Eds.).

GROB, Gerald N. (1978),
"Populists and Socialists", in Rehmus, et al. (Eds.).

GROB, Gerald N. (1971),
"Knights of Labor versus American Federation of Labor", in Brody (Ed.).

HABERLER, Gottfried (1971),
Incomes Policies and Inflation: An Analysis of Basic Principles
(with a prologue on the New Economic Policy of August 1971),
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C.

HABERLER, Gottfried (1978),
"Reflections on the U.S. Trade Deficit and the Floating Dollar",
in American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (series).

HABERLER, Gottfried (1979),
"The Present Economic Malaise", in American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research (series).

HABERLER, Gottfried (1980),
"The Dollar in the World Economy: Present Developments in Perspective",
in American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (series).

HAGENS, John B. and R. Robert Russell (1985),
"Testing for the Effectiveness of Wage-Price Controls: An Application of
the Carter Program", American Economic Review, March.

HAMILTON, Alexander, et al.(1961),
The Federalist Papers, New American Library of World Literature Inc., New York.

HANDLER, Edward and John R. Mulkern (1982),
Business in Politics: Campaign Strategies of Corporate Political Action Committees,
Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Co., Lexington, Mass. and Toronto.

HARGROVE, Erwin C. and Michael Nelson (1984),
Presidents, Politics and Policy, Johns Hopkins University Press,
Baltimore and London.

HARRISON, Reginald J. (1980),
Pluralism and Corporatism: The Political Evolution of Modern Democracies,
George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London.

HAVEMANN, Joel (1976),
"And Now For Something Completely Different", National Journal, December 6.

HECLO, Hugh (1980),
"Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment", in King (Ed.).

HECLO, Hugh and Lester M. Salamon (1981),
The Illusion of Presidential Government, Westview Press Inc.,
Colorado (in cooperation with the National Academy of Public Administration).

HECLO, Hugh (1981),
"Introduction: The Presidential Illusion", in Heclo and Salamon.

HELMER, John (1981),
"The Presidential Office: Velvet Fist in an Iron Glove", in Heclo and Salamon.

HIBBS, Douglas A. (1977),
"Macroeconomic Policy and Political Parties", American Political Science Review, 71 (4), December.

HIBBS, Douglas A., Jnr. (1987),
The American Political Economy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.

HILLS, Stephen M. (1985),
"The Attitudes of Union and Non-union Male Workers Toward Union Representation", Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 38 (2), January.

HIRSCH, Fred and John H. Goldthorpe (Eds.), (1978),
The Political Economy of Inflation, Martin Robertson and Co. Ltd., London.

HOLLOWAY, Harry (1979),
"Interest Groups in the Post-Partisan Era: The Political Machine of the AFL-CIO", Political Science Quarterly, 94 (1), Spring.

HOOD, Christopher (1982),
"Governmental Bodies and Government Growth", in Barker (Ed.).

HOOK, Janet (1984),
"Organized Labor Braces for 'Four More Years'", Congressional Quarterly (series), December 29.

HREBENAR, Ronald J. and Ruth K. Scott (1982),
Interest Group Politics in America, Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 07632.

HUDSON, William E. (1985),
"The Feasibility of a Comprehensive U.S. Policy", Political Science Quarterly, 100 (3).

HUNT, Albert R. (1981),
"The Campaign and the Issues", in Ranney (Ed.).

HYMAN, Richard (1971),
Marxism and the Sociology of Trade Unionism, Pluto Press Ltd., London.

HYMAN, Richard (1975),
Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction, MacMillan Press Ltd., London and Basingstoke.

INDUSTRIAL POLICY STUDY GROUP (1984a),
"Restoring American Competitiveness: Proposals for an Industrial Policy", Alternatives for the 1980's, 11, report of study group, Center for National Policy, Washington, D.C.

INDUSTRIAL POLICY STUDY GROUP (1984b),
Industrial Policy Study News Conference; January 16, Sheraton-Carlton Hotel, Washington, D.C., with Lane Kirkland, Felix Rohatyn and Irving Shapiro; Center for National Policy.

INGHAM, M. (1981),
"Incomes Policies: A Short History", Appendix in Fallick and Elliott (Eds.).

JACKSON, Dudley and T.G. Sweet (1978),
"The World Strike Wave 1969 to 1976: Causes and Structure",
University of Aston Management Centre, Working Paper Series, No. 119, December.

JACOB, Herbert and Kenneth N. Vines (Eds.), (1971),
Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis, 2nd ed.,
Little, Brown and Co., Boston.

JACOB, Herbert and Kenneth N. Vines (1971),
"The Study of State Politics", in Jacob and Vines (Eds.).

JACOB, Charles E. (1977),
"The Congressional Elections and Outlook", in Pomper, et al.

JACOB, Charles E. (1981),
"The Congressional Elections", in Pomper, et al.

JASINOWSKI, The Hon. Jerry J. (1981-82),
A Report on U.S. Industrial Policies, Draft Paper distributed at the
Industrial Policy Seminar, Yale University, May 9, 1980.

JEFFREYS, Steve (1979),
"Striking into the 80s - Modern British Trade Unionism, its Limits and Potential",
International Socialism, 2 (5), Summer.

JESSUP, David (1980),
"Can Political Influence Be Democratized? A Labor Perspective", in Malbin (Ed.).

JONES, Charles O. (1981),
"Congress and the Presidency", in Mann and Ornstein (Eds.).

JONG, Oh Ra (1978),
Labor at the Polls: Union Voting in Presidential Elections, 1952-1976,
University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst.

JORDAN, Hamilton (1982),
Crisis: The Last Year of the Carter Presidency, Michael Joseph Ltd., London.

KATZENSTEIN, Peter J. (Ed.), (1978),
"Conclusion: Domestic Structures and Strategies of Foreign Economic Policy",
Between Power and Plenty, University of Wisconsin Press.

KATZNELSON, Ira (1978),
"Considerations on Social Democracy in the United States", Comparative Politics,
October.

KELLER, Bill (1982),
"The State of the Unions: Organized Labor's Vital Signs Show Waning
Political Clout; But Numbers Don't Tell All", Congressional Quarterly (series),
August 28.

KELLER, Bill (1982a),
"Once a Washington Power, Labor Now Plays Catch-Up In Lobbying Politics",
Congressional Quarterly (series), September 4.

KEOHANE, Robert O. (1984),
"The World Political Economy and the Crisis of Embedded Liberalism",
in Goldthorpe (Ed.).

KING, Anthony (Ed.), (1980),
The New American Political System, revised ed., American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C.

KING, Anthony (1980),
"The American Polity in the Late 1970s: Building Coalitions in the Sand",
in King (Ed.).

KING, Anthony (1981),
"How Not to Select Presidential Candidates: A View from Europe", in Ranney (Ed.).

KING, Anthony (Ed.), (1983),
Both Ends of the Avenue: The Presidency, The Executive Branch and Congress in
the 1980's, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,
Washington, D.C. and London.

KIRKPATRICK, Jeane J. (1980),
"Changing Patterns of Electoral Competition", in King (Ed.).

KIRSCHTEN, Dick (1980a),
"Guns at the Ready, Carter Trims His Sails In Preparation for His Election Battle",
National Journal, February 16.

KIRSCHTEN, Dick (1980b),
"Carter's Latest Anti-Inflation Plan - Waiting for the Verdict to Come In",
National Journal, March 22.

KIRSCHTEN, Dick (1980c),
"No Matter What Jordan's Title, His Goal Is Carter's Reelection",
National Journal, June 14.

KIRSCHTEN, Dick (1980d),
"Carter's Anti-Inflation Strategy - Will It Be Good Politics or Bad?",
National Journal, July 12.

KIRSCHTEN, Dick (1980e),
"Carter's Plans for a Second Term - More Progress on Familiar Problems",
National Journal, August 16.

KIRSCHTEN, Dick (1980f),
"Cabinet Government Really Does Work - On the Presidential Campaign Trail",
National Journal, October 25.

KOHLMEIER, Louis M. (1976),
"Business's Election Year Drubbing", National Journal, November 20.

KORPI, Walter and Michael Shalev (1979),
"Strikes, Industrial Relations and Class Conflict in Capitalist Societies",
British Journal of Sociology, 30 (2), June.

KORPI, Walter and Michael Shalev (1980),
"Strikes, Power and Politics in the Western Nations, 1900-1976",
Political Power and Social Theory, 1.

KOSTERS, Marvin H. (1975),
Controls and Inflation: The Economic Stabilization Program in Retrospect,
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C.

KOSTERS, Marvin H. (1977),
"Wage and Price Behaviour: Prospects and Policies", in American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research (series).

KOSTERS, Marvin H. (1978),
"Wage Behaviour and Inflation in the 1970s", in American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research (series).

KOSTERS, Marvin H. (1979),
"Wage Standards and Interdependence of Wages in the Labor Market",
in American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (series).

KRAEMER, Richard H., et al. (1978),
American Democracy: The Third Century, West Publishing Company,
St. Paul, Minnesota.

KRUGMAN, Paul (1980),
Foreign Experience with Industrial Policy: A Critical Review,
Draft Paper distributed at the Industrial Policy Seminar, Yale University, July 5.

LABOR-MANAGEMENT GROUP (1983),
A Consensus on Rebuilding America's Vital Public Facilities:
Highways, Bridges, Urban Water Supply, Wastewater Treatment, October,
Washington, D.C.

LADD, Everett C. and C.D. Hadley (1975),
Transformations of the American Party System: Political Coalitions from the
New Deal to the 1970s, W.W. Norton and Co. Inc., New York.

LANE, Hana Umlauf (Ed.), (1981),
The World Almanac and Book of Facts, 1982, Newspaper Enterprise Association
Inc., New York, N.Y. 10166.

LANGE, Peter (1984),
"Unions, Workers, and Wage-Regulation: the Rational Bases of Consent",
in Goldthorpe (Ed.).

LANOUETTE, William J. (1979),
"Jerry Brown's 'Insurgent' Campaign - 'There's Room for Somebody Else'",
National Journal, November 24.

LANOUETTE, William J. (1980a),
"The Democrats: Will Carter Drag Down Congressional Candidates?",
National Journal, August 23.

LANOUETTE, William J. (1980b),
"Turning Out the Vote - Reagan Seeks Larger Share of Blue-Collar Vote",
National Journal, November 1.

LANOUETTE, William J. (1980c),
"Changing of the Guard: Senate Braces For Massive Shuffling of Its Staff",
National Journal, November 29.

LANOUETTE, William J. (1982),
"Labor Beginning Earlier to Press for Democratic Victories in November",
National Journal, May 8.

LASLETT, John H.M. and Seymour Martin Lipset (Eds.), (1984),
Failure of a Dream? Essays in the History of American Socialism, revised ed.,
University of California Press, Berkeley.

LEES, John D. and Malcolm Shaw (Eds.), (1979),
Committees in Legislatures: A Comparative Analysis, Duke University Press,
Durham, N.C.

LEES, John D. (1979),
"Committees in the United States Congress", in Lees and Shaw (Eds.).

LEHMBRUCH, Gerhard and Philippe C. Schmitter (Eds.), (1982),
Patterns of Corporatist Policymaking, Sage Publications Ltd., London.

LEHMBRUCH, Gerhard (1982),
"Introduction: Neo-Corporatism in Comparative Perspective", in
Lehmbruch and Schmitter (Eds.).

LEHMBRUCH, Gerhard (1984),
"Concertation and the Structure of Corporatist Networks",in Goldthorpe (Ed.).

LEVITAN, Sar A. (1967),
"Union Lobbyists' Contributions to Tough Labor Legislation", in
Rehmus and McLaughlin (Eds.).

LINDBLOM, Charles E. (1977),
Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems,
Basic Books Inc., New York.

LIPSET, S. M. (1985),
"The Elections, The Economy and Public Opinion: 1984", Political Studies,
XVIII (1), Winter.

LIVELY, Jack (1976),
"The Limits of Exchange Theory", in Barry (Ed.).

LOEWENBERG, Gerhard and Samuel G. Patterson (1979),
Comparing Legislatures, Little, Brown and Co., Boston and Toronto.

LOEWENBERG, Gerhard (1984),
"The Division of Political Science Into American and Non-American Politics: The Case of Legislatures", Political Studies, XVII (3), Summer.

LUKES, Steven (1974),
Power: A Radical View, Studies in Sociology, British Sociological Association, MacMillan Press Ltd., London and Basingstoke.

McCONNELL, Grant (1970),
Private Power and American Democracy, revised ed., Vintage Books, New York.

McCULLOCH, Frank W. and Tim Bornstein (1974),
The National Labor Relations Board, Praeger Publishers Inc., New York and Washington.

McKAY, David (1983),
American Politics and Society, Martin Robertson and Co. Ltd., Oxford.

McKAY, David (1983),
"Industrial Policy and Non-Policy in the United States", Journal of Public Policy, 3 (1).

McKAY, David and Wyn Grant (1983),
"Industrial Policies in OECD Countries: An Overview", Journal of Public Policy, 3 (1).

McWILLIAMS, Wilson Carey (1977),
"The Meaning of the Election", in Pomper, et al.

MADISON, James (1961),
Paper No. 10, in Hamilton, et al.

MADDISON, Angus (1982),
Comparative Analysis of the Productivity Situation in the Advanced Capitalist Countries, Conference on International Comparisons of Productivity and Causes of the Slowdown, Sep.30-Oct.1, The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C.

MAIER, Charles S. (1978),
"The Politics of Inflation in the Twentieth Century", in Hirsch and Goldthorpe (Eds.).

MAIER, Charles S. (1981),
"Fictitious Bonds... of Wealth and Law: On the Theory and Practice of Interest Representation", in Berger (Ed.).

MALBIN, Michael J. (1975-6),
"Congress Report: New Democratic Procedures Affect Distribution of Power", in Fenno (Ed.).

MALBIN, Michael J. (1977a),
"Labor, Business and Money - A Post-Election Analysis",
National Journal, March 19.

MALBIN, Michael J. (1977b),
"New Democrats Don't See Eye to Eye with These Senior Comrades",
National Journal, September 7.

MALBIN, Michael J. (Ed.), (1980),
Parties, Interest Groups, and Campaign Finance Laws, a Conference
Sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,
Washington, D.C.

MALBIN, Michael J. (1980a),
"Big Government or Small Government - The Candidates Give Their Views",
National Journal, January 26.

MALBIN, Michael J. (1980b),
"The Democrats: A Platform That Carter May Find Awkward to Stand On",
National Journal, August 23.

MALBIN, Michael J. (1980c),
"Democratic Party Rules Are Made To Be Broken", National Journal, August 23.

MALBIN, Michael J. (1981),
"Delegation, Deliberation and the New Role of Congressional Staff",
in Mann and Ornstein (Eds.).

MALBIN, Michael J. (1981a),
"The Conventions, Platforms and Issue Activists", in Ranney (Ed.).

MALBIN, Michael J. (1983),
"Rhetoric and Leadership: A Look Backward at the Carter National Energy Plan",
in King (Ed.).

MANN, Thomas E. and Norman J. Ornstein (Eds.), (1981),
The New Congress, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,
Washington and London.

MANN, Thomas E. and Norman J. Ornstein (1981),
"Elections and Change in Congress", in Mann and Ornstein (Eds.).

MARTIN, Roderick (1977),
The Sociology of Power, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London, Henley, Boston.

MARTIN, Roderick (1978),
"The Effects of Recent Changes in Industrial Conflict on the Internal Politics of Trade
Unions: Britain and Germany", in Crouch and Pizzorno (Eds.).

MARTIN, Ross M. (1980),
TUC: The Growth of a Pressure Group, 1868-1978, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

MAYHEW, David R. (1974),
Congress: The Electoral Connection, Yale University Press, New Haven and London.

MAYHEW, David R. (1977),
"Congressional Elections", in Peabody and Polsby (Eds.).

MAYHEW, Ken (1981),
"Incomes Policy and the Private Sector", in Fallick and Elliott (Eds.).

MEYER, Jack A. (1980),
"Wage and Benefit Trends Under the Carter Administration Guidelines",
in American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (series).

MIDDLEMAS, Keith (1979),
Politics in Industrial Society: The Experience of the British System Since 1911,
Andre Deutsche Ltd., London.

MILIBAND, Ralph (1961),
Parliamentary Socialism: A Study in the Politics of Labour,
George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London.

MILIBAND, Ralph, et al. (1986),
Socialist Register 1985/86: Social Democracy and After, Merlin Press Ltd., London.

MINKIN, Lewis (1978),
The Labour Party Conference: A Study in the Politics of Intra-Party Democracy,
Allen Lane, Penguin Books Ltd., London.

MINKIN, Lewis (1978),
"The Party Connection: Divergence and Convergence in the British Labour
Movement", Government and Opposition: Trade Unions and Political Parties,
13 (4), Autumn.

MOORE, Geoffrey H. (1977),
"Lessons of the 1973-1976 Recession and Recovery", in American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research (series).

MORGAN, David (1983),
"The Fall, Rise and Fall of Jimmy Carter: Journalism and Presidential Reputations",
Workpapers in American Politics, 3, American Politics Group, British Political
Science Association, University of Bristol.

MOYE, William T. (1980),
"Presidential Labor-Management Committees: Productive Failures",
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 34 (1), October.

MULLEN, William F. (1976),
Presidential Power and Politics, St. Martin's Press Inc., New York.

NADER, Ralph (1975),
"The Revenue Committees: A Study of the House Ways and Means and Senate
Finance Committees and the House and Senate Appropriations Committees",
The Ralph Nader Congress Project, Grossman Publishers, New York.

NAGEL, Jack H. (1975),
The Descriptive Analysis of Power, Yale University Press, New Haven.

The Descriptive Analysis of Power, Yale University Press, New Haven.

NASAR, Sylvia (1985),
"Why Wages Won't Take Off", Fortune, III (9), April 29.

NATHAN, Richard P. (1983),
The Administrative Presidency, John Wiley and Sons Inc., New York.

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF DEMOCRATIC MAYORS (1976),
We, The People of Urban America.

NATIONAL JOURNAL (series), (**NJ** in thesis text; and under individual authors):
1979
"What to Expect From Carter's New Cabinet", Executive Report, July 28.

"Washington Update", August 11.

"Jordan's New Role Signals An End to 'Cabinet Government'", August 18.

1980
"A Raft of New Faces at the AFL-CIO", March 15.

"Has Carter Locked up the Nomination?", June 7.

NAVARRO, Vicente (1986),
"The 1980 and 1984 Elections and The New Deal: An Alternative Interpretation", in Miliband, et al.

NEUFELD, Maurice F. (1963),
"The Historical Relationship of Liberals and Intellectuals to Organized Labor in the United States", in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 350.

NEUSTADT, Richard E. (1980),
Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership From FDR to Carter,
John Wiley and Sons Inc., New York.

NEW YORK TIMES (*NYT* in thesis text; and under individual authors),
1979
"Labor Cites Guideline Concessions", October 3.

1980
"Pay-Raise Guidelines May Ease", February 4.

NEWMAN, Otto (1981),
The Challenge of Corporatism, MacMillan Press Ltd., London and Basingstoke.

NEWTON, Maxwell (1983),
The FED: Inside the Federal Reserve, The Secret Power Centre that Controls the American Economy, Times Books, New York Times Book Co. Inc., New York.

NIE, Norman H. et al. (1979),
The Changing American Voter, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Mass. and London.

NORTON, Philip (1982),
The Constitution in Flux, Martin Robertson and Co. Ltd., Oxford.

OFFE, Claus and Helmut Wiesenthal (1980),
"Two Logics of Collective Action: Theoretical Notes on Social Class and Organizational Form", Political Power and Social Theory, Vol.I.

OFFE, Claus (1981),
"The Functioning of Interest Groups", in Berger (Ed.).

OLSON, Mancur (1971),
The Logic of Collective Action; Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, 2nd ed., Harvard Economic Studies, Vol.CXXIV, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. and London.

ORNSTEIN, Norman J. (Ed.), (1978-79),
"The New Congress: People and Process on Capitol Hill", National Journal Reprint Series, Washington, D.C.

ORNSTEIN, Norman J. (1981),
"The House and the Senate in a New Congress", in Mann and Ornstein (Eds.).

ORNSTEIN, Norman J. (1983),
"The Open Congress Meets the President", in King (Ed.).

ORNSTEIN, Norman J. and David W. Rhode (1977),
"Shifting Forces, Changing Rules, and Political Outcomes: The Impact of Congressional Change on Four House Committees", in Peabody and Polsby (Eds.).

ORNSTEIN, Norman J. and Shirley Elder (1978),
Interest Groups, Lobbying and Policymaking, Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington, D.C.

OSBERG, Lars (1984),
Economic Inequality in the United States, M.E. Shapiro Inc., Armonk, N.Y.

OSBORNE, David (1985),
"Registration Boomerang", The New Republic, 3 (658), February 25.

PANITCH, Leo (1977),
"The Development of Corporatism in Liberal Democracies", Comparative Political Studies, 10 (1), April.

PATTERSON, Samuel C. (1980),
"The Semi-Sovereign Congress", in King (Ed.).

PATTERSON, Samuel C. (1985),
Are There Political Parties in Congress?, Address to the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., March 14.

PEABODY, Robert L. and Nelson W. Polsby (Eds.), (1977),
New Perspectives on the House of Representatives, 3rd ed., Rand McNally College

Publishing Company, Chicago.

PEABODY, Robert L. (1977),
"Party Leadership Change in the United States House of Representatives",
in Peabody and Polsby (Eds.).

PEABODY, Robert L. (1985),
"House Party Leadership: Stability and Change", in Dodd and Oppenheimer (Eds.).

PEAR, Robert (1984),
"Labor Leaders Play It Low Key At Convention: But They Are Pleased With Role in Results", New York Times, July 20.

PECHMAN, Joseph A. (1985),
"Who Paid the Taxes, 1966-85?", Studies of Government Finance,
The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.

PEIRCE, Neal R. and Jerry Hagstrom (1980),
"The Voters Send Carter a Message: Time For a Change - to Reagan",
National Journal, November 8.

PENCAVEL, John H. (1981),
"The American Experience with Incomes Policy", in Fallick and Elliott (Eds.).

PIZZORNO, Alessandro (1978),
"Political Exchange and Collective Identity in Industrial Conflict",
in Crouch and Pizzorno (Eds.).

PIZZORNO, Alessandro (1981),
"Interests and Parties in Pluralism", in Berger (Ed.).

PLOTKIN, Henry A. (1977a),
"Issues in the 1976 Presidential Campaign", in Pomper, et al.

PLOTKIN, Henry A. (1977b),
"State and Local Elections", in Pomper, et al.

PLOTKIN, Henry A. (1981),
"Issues in the Presidential Campaign", in Pomper, et al.

POLSBY, Nelson W. (1971),
Congress and the Presidency, 2nd ed., Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J.

POLSBY, Nelson W. (1981),
"The Democratic Nomination", in Ranney (Ed.).

POMPER, Gerald M., et al. (1977),
The Election of 1976: Reports and Interpretations, Longman Inc., New York.

POMPER, Gerald M. (1977a),
"The Nominating Contexts", in Pomper, et al.

POMPER, Gerald M. (1977b),
"The Presidential Election", in Pomper, et al.

POMPER, Gerald M., et al. (1981),
The Election of 1980: Reports and Interpretations, Chatham House Publishers Inc., N.J. 07928.

POMPER, Gerald M. (1981a),
"The Nominating Contexts", in Pomper, et al.

POMPER, Gerald M. (1981b),
"The Presidential Election", in Pomper, et al.

PORTER, Roger B. (1981),
"The President and Economic Policy: Problems, Patterns and Alternatives", in Heclo and Salamon.

PRICE, David E. (1985),
"Congressional Committees in the Policy Process", in Dodd and Oppenheimer (Eds.).

RANNEY, Austin (1971),
"Parties in State Politics", in Jacob and Vines (Eds.).

RANNEY, Austin (1980),
"The Political Parties: Reform and Decline", in King (Ed.).

RANNEY, Austin (Ed.), (1981),
The American Elections of 1980, Studies in Political and Social Processes, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington and London.

RANNEY, Austin (1981),
"The Carter Administration", in Ranney (Ed.).

RAPOPORT, Daniel (1977),
"A New Old Guard Has Come Forward in the House", National Journal Reprint Series, August 13.

RASKIN, A.H. (1963),
"AFL-CIO: A Confederation or Federation? Which Road for the Future?", in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 350.

RASKIN, A.H. (1986),
"Big Labor Tries to End Its Nightmare", New York Times, May 4.

RATHBUN, Ben (1980),
"Reports and Comments. Organized Labor: Changing of the Guard", Atlantic, March.

REGINI, Marino (1984),
"The Conditions for Political Exchange: How Concertation Emerged and Collapsed in Italy and Great Britain", in Goldthorpe (Ed.).

REHMUS, Charles M. and Doris B. McLaughlin (Eds.), (1967),
Labor and American Politics: A Book of Readings, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.

REHMUS, Charles M., et al. (Eds.), (1978),
Labor and American Politics: A Book of Readings, reprinted from AFL-CIO American Federationist XXVI, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.

REHMUS, Charles M. (1978),
"Labor as a Pressure Group", in Rehmus, et al. (Eds.).

REHMUS, Charles M., et al. (1978),
"The U.S. Labor Movement: Its Ideological Orientation", in Rehmus, et al. (Eds.).

REHMUS, Charles M., et al. (1978a),
"The Committee on Political Education", in Rehmus, et al. (Eds.).

REHMUS, Charles M., et al. (1978b),
"What is COPE?", in Rehmus, et al. (Eds.).

REHMUS, Charles M., et al. (1978c),
"The Change in Labor's Political Role", in Rehmus, et al. (Eds.).

REHMUS, Charles M. and Frederick H. Nesbitt (1978),
"Epilogue", in Rehmus, et al. (Eds.).

RICHTER, Irving (1973),
Political Purpose in Trade Unions, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London.

ROBINSON, Michael J. (1981),
"Three Faces of Congressional Media", in Mann and Ornstein (Eds.).

ROGIN, Michael (1971),
"Voluntarism: The Political Functions of an Anti-Political Doctrine", in Brody (Ed.).

ROHDE, David W. and Kenneth A. Shepsle (1977),
"Committee Assignments", in Peabody and Polsby (Eds.).

ROSE, Richard (1983),
"Still the Era of Party Government", Parliamentary Affairs, 36 (3), Summer.

RUDOLPH, Susanne Hoeber and Lloyd I. Rudolph (1984),
"How Can We Get There From Here? Thoughts on the Integration of American and Comparative Politics", Political Studies, XVII (3), Summer.

RYLE, Michael (1981),
"The Commons Today - A General Survey", in Walkland and Ryle (Eds.).

SABEL, Charles F. (1981),
"The Internal Politics of Trade Unions", in Berger (Ed.).

SALISBURY, Robert H. (1979),
"Why No Corporatism in America?", in Schmitter and Lehmbruch (Eds.).

SAMUELSON, Robert J. (1976),
"The Productivity-Labor Puzzle", National Journal, November 20.

SAMUELSON, Robert J. (1977),
"Old Wine in New Bottles", National Journal, March 12.

SAMUELSON, Robert J. (1978),
"Economic Policy - Is the Administration In Control?", National Journal, December 2.

SAMUELSON, Robert J. (1979a),
"Guidelines Politics", National Journal, April 21.

SAMUELSON, Robert J. (1979b),
"...Or an Empty Charade?", National Journal, July 14.

SAMUELSON, Robert J. (1979c),
"The Inflation Paradox", National Journal, October 20.

SAMUELSON, Robert J. (1980a),
"Back to the Drawing Board", National Journal, January 19.

SAMUELSON, Robert J. (1980b),
"Economists Needn't Apply", National Journal, May 24.

SAMUELSON, Robert J. (1980c),
"Should We Blame the Unions?", National Journal, June 28.

SAMUELSON, Robert J. (1980d),
"Good Work, Doug", National Journal, July 19.

SAMUELSON, Robert J. (1980e),
"A Schizophrenic Party", National Journal, August 23.

SAUNDERS, Peter (1984),
"No.11: Evidence on Income Redistribution by Governments", Working Papers, OECD Economics and Statistics Department, Growth Studies Division, January.

SCHICK, Allen (1981),
"The Three-Ring Budget Process: The Appropriations, Tax and Budget Committees in Congress", in Mann and Ornstein (Eds.).

SCHICK, Allen (Ed.), (1983),
Making Economic Policy in Congress, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C.

SCHICK, Allen (1983),
"The Distributive Congress", in Schick (Ed.).

SCHLESINGER, Arthur Jr. (1978),
"Labor's New Role: The 1936 Election", in Rehmus, et al. (Eds.).

SCHMIDT, Manfred G. (1982),
"Does Corporatism Matter? Economic Crisis, Politics and Rates of Unemployment in Capitalist Democracies in the 1970s", in Lehmbruch and Schmitter (Eds.).

SCHMITTER, Philippe C. and Gerhard Lehmbruch (Eds.), (1979),
Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation, Sage Publications Ltd.,
London and Beverley Hills.

SCHMITTER, Philippe C. (1979),
"Still the Century of Corporatism?", in Schmitter and Lehmbruch (Eds.).

SCHMITTER, Philippe C. (1981),
"Interest Intermediation and Regime Governability in Contemporary
Western Europe and North America", in Berger (Ed.).

SCHMITTER, Philippe C. (1982),
"Reflections on Where The Theory of Neo-Corporatism Has Gone and Where The
Praxis of Neo-Corporatism May Be Going", in Lehmbruch and Schmitter (Eds.).

SCHNEIDER, William (1981),
"The November 4 Vote for President: What Did It Mean?", in Ranney (Ed.).

SCHULTZ, George P. and Kenneth W. Dam (1978),
Economic Policy Beyond The Headlines, W.W. Norton and Co. Inc., New York.

SCHWARZ, John E. and L. Earl Shaw (1976),
The United States Congress in Comparative Perspective, Dryden Press,
Hinsdale, Illinois.

SHAFER, Byron E. (1988),
Bifurcated Politics: Evolution and Reform in the National Party Convention,
A Russell Sage Foundation Study, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.

SHAFFER, William R. (1980),
Party and Ideology in the United States Congress, University Press of America Inc.,
Lanham, MD 20801.

SHALEV, Michael and Walter Korpi (1980),
"Working Class Mobilization and American Exceptionalism",
Economic and Industrial Democracy, Vol.I.

SHAW, Malcolm (1979),
"Conclusion", in Lees and Shaw (Eds.).

SINCLAIR, Barbara (1981),
"Coping with Uncertainty: Building Coalitions in the House and the Senate",
in Mann and Ornstein (Eds.).

SINCLAIR, Barbara (1983),
Majority Leadership in the U.S. House, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.

SINCLAIR, Barbara (1985),
"Agenda, Policy, and Alignment Change from Coolidge to Reagan", in
Dodd and Oppenheimer (Eds.).

SINCLAIR, John E. (1978),
Interest Groups in America, General Learning Press, 250 James Street,
Morristown, N.J. 07960.

SINGER, James W. (1976a),
"Labor is Pulling Out All the Stops for November", National Journal, October 9.

SINGER, James W. (1976c),
"Election Victories Mean Labor Can Come in from the Cold",
National Journal, November 20.

SINGER, James W. (1977a),
"Already Crying the Blues", National Journal, February 2.

SINGER James W. (1977b),
"Organized Labor - Speaking in Accents Other Than the One From the Bronx",
National Journal, December 3.

SINGER, James W. (1979a),
"Carter in 1980 - Not Ideal, But Maybe Labor's Best Hope",
National Journal, July 28.

SINGER, James W. (1979b),
"Courting the Labor Vote", National Journal, October 27.

SINGER, James W. (1980a),
"Faithful Servant", National Journal, January 19.

SINGER, James W. (1980b),
"Labour Lobbyists Go on the Defensive As Political Environment Turns Hostile",
National Journal, March 15.

SINGER, James W. (1980c),
"Choosing Sides - Labor Unions Work For Kennedy and Carter in Pennsylvania",
National Journal, April 19.

SINGER, James W. (1980d),
"Closing Ranks Behind Carter", National Journal, July 5.

SINGER, James W. (1980f),
"A Man for All Unions", National Journal, September 27.

SINGER, James W. (1980g),
"Unions Hard at Work For Carter's Reelection", National Journal, November 1.

SINGER, James W. (1980h),
"Minimizing Its Losses", National Journal, December 20.

SMITH, James D. (1984),
"Trends in the Concentration of Personal Wealth in the United States",
The Review of Income and Wealth, 30 (4), December.

STANFIELD, Rochelle L. (1980),
"Don't Call It Economic Stimulus, Call It Long-Term Economic Renewal",
National Journal, September 6.

STEPHENS, John D. (1979),
The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism, New Studies in Sociology, MacMillan Press Ltd., London and Basingstoke.

STURMTHAL, Adolph (1984),
"Comment 1" (Reply to Werner Sombart: "American Capitalism's Economic Rewards"), in Laslett and Lipset (Eds.).

SUNDQUIST, James L. (1982),
The Decline and Resurgence of Congress, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.

TAYLOR, John B. (1984),
"Improvements in Macroeconomic Stability: The Role of Wages and Prices", Working Paper No.1491 (series), National Bureau of Economic Research Inc., Washington, D.C., November.

TAYLOR, Robert (1978a),
"Labour and the Social Contract", Fabian Society, Tract 458.

TAYLOR, Robert (1978b),
The Fifth Estate: Britain's Unions in the Seventies, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.

TAYLOR, Robert (1980),
The Fifth Estate: Britain's Unions in the Modern World, revised ed., Pan Books Ltd., London.

TESH, Sylvia (1984),
"In Support of 'Single-Issue' Politics", Political Quarterly, 99 (1), Spring.

THEILER, Patricia (1983),
"PACs Scored High in the Pre-Season Games - Now its Time for the Capitol Bowl", Common Cause, January/February.

TOTH, Charles W. (1965),
"The Pan American Federation of Labor: Its Political Nature", Western Political Quarterly, XVIII (3), September.

VERKUIL, Paul A. (1984),
"The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure", in Ball (Ed.).

VISCUSI, W. Kip (1983),
"Presidential Oversight: Controlling the Regulators", Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 2 (2).

WALKLAND, S.A. (1979),
"Committees in the British House of Commons", in Lees and Shaw (Eds).

WALKLAND, S.A. and Michael Ryle (Eds.), (1981),
The Commons Today, revised ed., Study of Parliament Group, Fontana Paperbacks, London.

WALKLAND, S.A. (1981),
"Whither the Commons?", in Walkland and Ryle (Eds.).

WALL STREET JOURNAL (1984), (and specified in text),
"Monetary Zeal: How the Fed Under Volcker Prevailed", Wall Street Journal, December 7.

WALTERS, Alan (1983),
"The British Renaissance 1979-?", The Francis Boyer Lectures on Public Policy, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C.

WARE, Alan (1981),
"The 1980 U.S. Elections: Party Revival or Continuing Party Decline?", Parliamentary Affairs, XXXIV (1), Winter.

WASSENBERG, Arthur F.P. (1982),
"Neo-Corporatism and the Quest for Control: The Cuckoo Game", in Lehmbruch and Schmitter (Eds.).

WEILER, Paul (1984),
"Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and The Prospects for Union Representation", Harvard Law Review, 98.

WEKKIN, Gary D. (1984),
"National-State Party Relations: The Democrats' New Federal Structure", Political Science Quarterly, 99 (1), Spring.

WESTEFIELD, Louis P. (1977),
"Leadership and the Committee System", in Peabody and Polsby (Eds.).

WILDAVSKY, Aaron (1981),
"The Party of Government, the Party of Opposition, and the Party of Balance: An American View of the Consequences of the 1980 Election", in Ranney (Ed.).

WILDING, Richard (1982),
"A Triangular Affair: Quangos, Ministers and M.P.s", in Barker (Ed.).

WILLIAMS, Philip (1984),
"Review Article: Party Realignment in the United States and Britain", British Journal of Political Science, 15 (1).

WILSON, Graham K. (1979),
Unions in American National Politics, MacMillan Press Ltd., London and Basingstoke.

WILSON, Graham K. (1981),
Interest Groups in the United States, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

WILSON, Graham K. (1982),
"Why Is There No Corporatism in the United States?", in Lehmbruch and Schmitter (Eds.).

WILSON, James Q. (1980),
American Government: Institutions and Policies, D.C. Heath and Co., Lexington, Mass.

WILSON, James Q. (1984),
"The Origins of Regulation", in Ball (Ed.).

WINKLER, J.T. (1976),
"Corporatism", European Journal of Sociology, XVII (1).

WOLFE, Alan (1978),
"Has Social Democracy a Future?", Comparative Politics, October.

WOLFE, Alan (1985),
"Born and Died in Northern Europe, a Victim of Success: The Death of Social Democracy", The New Republic, 3 (658), February 25.

ZEIGLER, Harmon (1964),
Interest Groups in American Society, Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J.

ZEIGLER, L. Harmon and Hendrik van Dalen (1971),
"Interest Groups in the States", in Jacob and Vines (Eds.).

ZON, Mary Goddard (1967),
"Contemporary COPE Activities", in Rehmus and McLaughlin (Eds.).

3. LIST OF INTERVIEWS

ALBERT, Ben; Committee on Political Education, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C.

BAKER, Don; Chief of Staff, Education and Labor Committee, U.S. House of Representatives.

BOSWORTH, Barry; Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution; former Director, COWPS.

BREDHOFF, Elliott; Bredhoff and Kaiser, Washington, D.C.; former member, Price Advisory Committee (National Accord).

BUTLER, Landon; former Deputy Assistant to Hamilton Jordan and White House Labor Liaison.

CABLE, William H; former Deputy Assistant for Congressional Liaison (House), White House.

CARP, Bert; former Deputy Assistant, White House Domestic Policy Staff.

CARRANO, Frank; President, AFL-CIO local central, New Haven, CT.

DENISON, Ray; Director, Legislative Department, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C.

DONAHUE, Tom; Secretary-Treasurer, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C.

DUBROW, Evelyn; Director, Legislative Department, International Ladies' Garment Workers Union.

DUNLOP, John; Professor, Harvard University; former Chairman, Pay Advisory Committee (National Accord); Coordinator, Labor-Management Group.

EISENBREY, Ross; Legislative Assistant (Labor) to Representative William D. Ford, U.S. House of Representatives (including Education and Labor Committee).

EIZENSTAT, Stuart; former Domestic Policy Adviser to President Carter.

FEINSTEIN, Fred; Legal Counsel, Education and Labor Committee, U.S. House of Representatives.

FISHER, Craig; Information Department, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C.

FORD, Bill; Member (D-Mich), U.S. House of Representatives (including Education and Labor Committee).

GEISS, David; Administrative Assistant to William D. Ford.

GILBERT, Wayne; Executive Vice-President, IAM, Connecticut.

GOLDBERG, Mike; Labor Standards Sub-Committee, Education and Labor Committee, U.S. House of Representatives.

GOULD, Warren; District Labor Liaison for Bruce Morrison; former Director, Political Education, AFL-CIO, New Haven.

HARDESTY, Rex; Assistant Director, Public Relations Division, Department of Information, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C.

JENSEN, Paul; former Deputy/Executive Assistant to Secretary of Labor.

KARAMANOS, Terry; Legislative Assistant to Mario Biaggi, Member (D-NY), U.S. House of Representatives (including Education and Labor Committee).

KIRKLAND, Lane; President, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C.

KISTLER, Alan; Director, Organization and Field Services, AFL-CIO., Washington, D.C

KRAMER, Ken; Member (R-Co), U.S. House of Representatives (including Education and Labor Committee).

MILLER, G. William; former Treasury-Secretary, Carter Administration; former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board.

MORRISON, Bruce; Member (D-Ct), U.S. House of Representatives.

MURPHY, Janice; Department of Labor, Evaluation and Research Office (Bureau of Labor Statistics).

OSWALD, Rudy; Director, Research Department, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C.

RATCHFORD, Bill; Member (D-CT), U.S. House of Representatives (including Education and Labor Committee).

RUBINSTEIN, David; former Deputy Assistant, White House Domestic Policy Staff.

RUSSELL, R. Robert; former Director, COWPS.

SCHULTZE, Charles; Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution, former Chairman of the CEA; former Chairman, COWPS.

SILBIGER, Stephen; Legislative Lobbyist, AFSCME, Washington, D.C.

SILESKY, John; Assistant on Collective Bargaining, Research Department, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C.

TATE, Dan C.; former Deputy Assistant for Congressional Liaison (Senate), White House.

TCHIRKOW, Peter; American Federation of Government Employees; former staff member, Pay Advisory Committee (National Accord).

WYNN, Bill; President, UFCW and Vice-President, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C.

YOUNG, Ken; Executive Assistant to Lane Kirkland, President, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C..