

# Shepherds of Men: A Reassessment of the Athenian *strategoï* in the Classical period

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>ABSTRACT</b>	<b>III</b>
<b>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</b>	<b>V</b>
<b>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</b>	<b>VII</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>1. THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE ATHENIAN STRATEGIA</b>	<b>15</b>
THE EVOLUTION OF THE <i>STRATEGIA</i>	16
THE <i>STRATEGOI'S</i> MANDATE	20
THE <i>STRATEGOI'S</i> POWERS	30
RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE <i>ECCLESIA</i>	37
ACCOUNTABILITY	46
CONCLUSION	61
<b>2. EXTRA-LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ITS ROLE IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF POWER</b>	<b>64</b>
EXTRA-LEGAL MEANS OF AUTHORITY IN THE SCHOLARSHIP	65
<i>Charis</i>	65
Reputation	71
Eloquence	84
LARGER THAN LIFE	88
AN UNDEFINABLE SOURCE OF AUTHORITY	113
MODERN CHARISMA AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE ANCIENT WORLD	128
ANCIENT GREEK CHARISMATIC AUTHORITY (?)	145
CONCLUSION	167
<b>3. THE <i>STRATEGOI</i> ON THE BATTLEFIELD</b>	<b>171</b>
WARFARE IN ANCIENT GREECE: A SCHOLARLY DEBATE	173
THE EVOLUTION OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP	183
THE ROLE OF THE COMMANDER ON THE BATTLEFIELD	196
Planning the fight	197
Deploying the army	202
Executing the plan	212
Discipline	214
The commander as a fighter	226
Communication	229
Hierarchical structure	234

Training and experience	239
CONCLUSION	244
<b>4. COMMANDERS AND MORALE</b>	<b>246</b>
MORALE IN ANCIENT GREEK ARMIES	247
MANAGING MORALE IN THE CLASSICAL AGE	250
The commander's example	250
Speeches	253
Control of information	262
Religious beliefs and practices and their exploitation	263
Mood	268
Cohesion	270
Dealing with the enemy's emotions	274
CONCLUSION	278
<b>5. <i>STRATEGOI</i> AND <i>OIKONOMOI</i>: THE MANAGEMENT OF A MILITARY CAMPAIGN</b>	<b>279</b>
ORGANISING THE ARMY	280
SUPPLYING THE EXPEDITION	288
MOVEMENTS AND TRANSPORTATION	295
FINANCIAL MATTERS	300
CONCLUSION	312
<b>CONCLUSION</b>	<b>313</b>
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b>	<b>321</b>
PRIMARY SOURCES: EDITIONS AND TRANSLATIONS USED	321
SCHOLARLY LITERATURE	326

## ABSTRACT

This thesis analyses the Athenian *strategoi* in the fifth and fourth centuries BC. The work critically engages with existing literature on the matter and proposes a different reconstruction of the *strategoi*. Instead of being weak officers with limited powers, this work argues that the *strategoi* had substantial independence and authority within the limits of their mandate, which was often quite loose. The office accountability limited erratic behaviour and open insubordination, but did not totally hinder every commander's independence; some commanders acted more boldly than others, probably trusting that by achieving a positive outcome in battle they would avoid harsh repercussions for any misbehaviour.

The *strategoi*'s authority is also discussed in extra-legal terms. The personal authority of the *strategoi* is discussed, on the one hand, engaging with existing scholarship on non-institutional ways to exercise power. On the other hand, the phenomenon is studied in terms of charismatic authority. The formulation of 'synergic charisma' is here adopted to explain the most extreme cases of extra-legal authority and offers a sociologically sound explanation for its numerous examples.

The second part of the thesis focuses on the more practical aspects of the *strategia*. It is proposed that the *strategoi* had some control over their men, even amateur citizen-soldiers, which allowed them to execute basic tactics already in the fifth century. The trend of the professionalisation of the *strategoi* is here questioned in favour of a mellower development.

The major changes are due to fourth century Athens' socio-economic conditions more than this alleged professionalisation, of which the evidence is limited.

Lastly, the *strategoí*'s role in the campaign's morale management and organisation is discussed to demonstrate their considerable set of responsibilities, which suggests a considerable degree of independence.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIO	<i>Attic Inscriptions Online</i>
APF	Davies, J.K. (1971) <i>Athenian Propertied Families 600-300 B.C</i> (Oxford).
BNJ	<i>Brill's New Jacoby</i> , Worthington I. (ed.) (Leiden-Online).
Commentary	Hornblower, S. (1991-2006), <i>A Commentary on Thucydides</i> , Vol. 3 (Oxford).
PCG	Kassel, R. & Austin, C. (1983~), <i>Poetae Comici Graeci</i> , Vols. 8 (Berlin & New York).
FGrHist	Jacoby, F. (1926-1930), <i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i> (Berlin).
GHI	Tod, M.N. (1933-1948) <i>A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions</i> , Vol. 2 (Oxford).
HCT	Gomme A.W., Andrewes, A., and Dover, K.J. (1945-1981), <i>Historical Commentary to Thucydides</i> , Vol. 5 (Oxford).
IG	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i> , Various eds. (1873~) (Berlin).
Generals	Hamel, D. (1998), <i>Athenian Generals: Military Authority in the Classical Period</i> (Leiden)
GSW	Pritchett, W.K. (1971-1991) <i>The Greek State at War</i> , Vol. 5 (Berkeley)
OLD	Glare, P.G.W. (1982), <i>Oxford Latin Dictionary</i> (Oxford).
LSJ	Liddell, H. G., Scott, R., Jones, H.S., & McKenzie, R. (2011), <i>The online Liddell-Scott-Jones Greek-English lexicon</i> .
M&L	Meiggs, R. & Lewis, D. (1989), <i>A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Firth Century B.C.</i> , [1969] (New York).
O&R	OSBORNE, R. & RHODES, P. J. (2017 <sup>2</sup> ), <i>Greek Historical Inscriptions 478-404 BC</i> (Oxford). OSBORNE, R. & RHODES, P. J. (2003), <i>Greek Historical Inscriptions 404-323 BC</i> (Oxford).
PA	Kirchner, J. (1901-1903), <i>Prosopographia Attica</i> , Vol. 2 (Berlin).
Psychology	Crowley, J. (2012), <i>The Psychology of the Athenian Hoplite</i> (Cambridge).
SEG	<i>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum</i>
Tactics	Konijnendijk, R. (2018), <i>Classical Greek Tactics. A Cultural History</i> (Leiden).
Warfare	van Wees, H. (2004), <i>Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities</i> (London).

The abbreviations of the primary sources follow the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, or, if missing, the *LSJ*. The journal abbreviations, instead, follow *L'Année Philologique*. The latinised form of Greek names has been preferred, when available.

## INTRODUCTION

One day, when he met a man who had been chosen general, Socrates asked him: “For what reason, think you, is Agamemnon dubbed ‘*shepherd of men*’ (ποιμένα λαῶν)’ by Homer?<sup>1</sup> Is it because a shepherd must see that his sheep are safe and are fed (ὅπως σῶαί τε ἔσονται αἱ οἶες καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἔξουσιν), and that the object for which they are kept is attained, and a general must see that his men are safe and are fed, and that the object for which they fight is attained (οὐ ἔνεκα στρατεύονται, τοῦτο ἔσται), or, in other words, that victory over the enemy may add to their happiness (εὐδαίμονέστεροι ᾧσιν)? (trans. Marchant, my italics).<sup>2</sup>

In this passage of the *Memorabilia*, Xenophon relies on a Homeric image, the ‘shepherd of men’, to fully encapsulate his idea of leadership. The commander had to guide his ‘flock’ of soldiers in battle, but his duty did not end there. He had to provide food and shelter for the soldier, elicit in them the right emotional state, make them disciplined and ready. Like a shepherd with his sheep, Xenophon's commander was meant to be nurturing but firm and empower his men through his command – making them achieve what they could not by themselves.<sup>3</sup>

The ‘shepherd of men’ is a powerful image, and perfectly epitomises the complexity of the figure of the ancient commander. It therefore seemed a fitting title for a study of the Athenian στρατηγοὶ. This dissertation discusses the powers and responsibilities of Athenian commanders in the fifth and fourth centuries BC, from the battle of Marathon (490 BC) to the end of the Lamian war (322 BC). It aims to provide the most complete picture of the *strategoí* as military leaders as possible – analysing their legal status, how they exercised

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<sup>1</sup> Hom. *Il.* 2.243.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. *Mem.* 3.2.1.

<sup>3</sup> E.g. Newell (1983) 895; Hutchinson (2000) 53-54; Brock (2004) 249-250.

their authority and the impact they had on a campaign. Only two issues have been left aside: the political and religious role of the *strategoï*. These are crucial aspects of the *strategia*, especially in the fifth century, but the decision was made to focus exclusively on the military role of the *strategoï*. While the discussion of the *strategoï* as military leaders is often insufficient or controversial, many excellent scholarly contributions already exist on the political and religious aspects of the *strategoï* – especially in the fifth century.<sup>4</sup> This study, thus, refers to these excellent works when necessary.

This work continues a long scholarly tradition researching this field. The investigation of the *strategia* as an institution, discussing the *strategoï*'s legal status, powers, and the procedures of election and accountability has produced over the years many excellent works.<sup>5</sup> Fornara provides an exceptional study on the powers and evolution of the institution in the fifth century,<sup>6</sup> and Hansen carefully reconstructs the mechanism of how the *strategoï* were elected, and their relationships with the Assembly in the fifth and fourth centuries.<sup>7</sup> Hamel's book on the fifth-century *strategoï* is also worth mentioning.<sup>8</sup> Hamel aims to reconstruct the legal framework and limits of the *strategia* – offering her readers a coherent picture of the *strategoï* as weak officers, limited in their powers and agency and terrified by the accountability of their actions.

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<sup>4</sup> Political role: Connor (1971); Ober (1989); Hansen (1975); (1991). Religious role: Pritchett (1979); Goodman & Holladay (1986); Jameson (1991); Mikalson (2016) esp. 66-68, 220-224; Nevin (2017).

<sup>5</sup> E.g. Jameson (1955); Dover (1960); Hammond (1969); Badian (1971); Salmond (1996).

<sup>6</sup> Fornara (1971).

<sup>7</sup> Esp. Hansen (1987); (1988); (1991).

<sup>8</sup> *Generals*.

Paradoxically, the *strategoi*'s role in battle has been not widely explored in the latest scholarship on ancient Greek warfare. The last two generations of military historians have been deeply influenced by Keegan's 'face of the battle' approach, which urges scholars to focus less on tactics and more on the actual battle experience.<sup>9</sup> This approach has been fundamental for the study of the emotional aspects of combat and counteracting the excessive reliance on tactical reconstructions of previous military historians. However, it also downplays the role of military leaders and tactics to focus more on battle experience.<sup>10</sup> Hanson only wrote a short chapter on the commanders, where he mostly discusses the importance of their influence on the soldiers' morale, whilst van Wees and Crowley only dedicate a few pages to the commanders.<sup>11</sup> More recently, Konijnendijk seems to be more aware of the role of the commander on the battlefield by focusing on battle tactics, but commanders' influence and responsibilities are still not clearly delineated.<sup>12</sup>

Over the last 40 years, four scholars have discussed military leaders in the Classical period extensively: Lengauer, Wheeler, Boëldieu-Trevet, and Barley. Lengauer applies to Greek commanders the same trend of progressive professionalisation which many scholars recognise in Greek armies since the Peloponnesian War.<sup>13</sup> This phenomenon would reach its full maturity in the fourth century, when these commanders, who were leading bands of mercenaries, were almost independent from the *poleis*. However, Lengauer seems to rely on

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<sup>9</sup> Keegan (1978) 13-76, esp. 35-52. Cf. Kagan (2006) 7-12, 18-22 and Wheeler (2011) esp. 64-69 for two critical analyses of this historiographical trend and its limits.

<sup>10</sup> Keegan (1976) esp. 51; Kagan (2006) 8-10. Keegan (1987) discusses leaders and leadership, but without the acumen of his previous book.

<sup>11</sup> Hanson (1989) 107-116; *Warfare* 102-112; *Psychology* 121-125.

<sup>12</sup> Konijnendijk (2018).

<sup>13</sup> Lengauer (1979).

this theory too much, and overly emphasises the independence of the fourth-century commanders.<sup>14</sup>

In two excellent book chapters, Wheeler provides a more nuanced analysis of Greek commanders on the battlefield.<sup>15</sup> Wheeler suggests that the increasing sophistication of warfare since the Peloponnesian War pushed commanders to abandon the traditional war *ethos* and rely more on deception, surprise, and complex tactics. As always, Wheeler makes some acute observations, and his work remains a pillar of the study of ancient leadership. However, it is undeniable that Krentz and Dayton's critiques of the alleged Archaic war *ethos* considerably weaken Wheeler's analysis.<sup>16</sup>

Boëldieu-Trevet discusses the fifth-century Athenian *strategoï* in great detail, substantially reconfirming the scholarly consensus on the professionalisation of the *strategoï*, but in a more nuanced formulation.<sup>17</sup> Her book presents a study of the evolution of the lexicon of Athenian military officers', but she neglects important matters such as morale management and, especially, logistics.

Finally, Barley's unpublished PhD dissertation (Swansea University) attempts to highlight the role of the commanders in battle, providing a revisionist reconstruction of Greek warfare.<sup>18</sup> If the purpose of the dissertation is to praise the commanders, Barley is too eager to jump to conclusions, which leads him to overemphasise the commanders' influence on the field, as well as their control of the soldiers in battle.

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<sup>14</sup> Cf. GSW 2.59-116. See Chapter Three 183-196 for further discussion.

<sup>15</sup> Wheeler (1991); (2007).

<sup>16</sup> Krentz (2002); Dayton (2006).

<sup>17</sup> Boëldieu-Trevet (2007).

<sup>18</sup> Barley (2012).

No one can claim that Greek military leadership has been understudied. So, is further research on this topic necessary? As the title suggests, this dissertation is, first and foremost, a reassessment of the *strategia* and the *strategoï*. The excellent scholarly work undertaken in the past is critically engaged here to test the solidity of this widely accepted reconstruction of the Athenian commanders. Fundamental assumptions, such as the limited powers of the *strategoï*, their concern for their accountability, and the progressive professionalisation of military leaders since the late fifth century are discussed here once more with a new, more comprehensive angle. Instead of focusing on one or two aspects of the *strategia*, this thesis aims to give a comprehensive picture of Athenian military leaders. The objective of this thesis is to abandon a one-dimensional picture of the *strategoï* and highlight the various responsibilities that they had in military campaigns – from planning for battle to pastoral care.

This approach has two advantages. On the one hand, it completes the previous scholarship on Athenian *strategoï*, which has often neglected an appropriate study of the essential responsibilities of the *strategoï*, such as morale management and the administration of funds. Although both topics have been studied as general phenomena,<sup>19</sup> the *strategoï*'s role in them has not been appropriately discussed, leaving the analysis of their duties incomplete. On the other hand, this broader perspective of the *strategoï* is beneficial for appreciating the *strategoï*'s impact on warfare and Athenian society. Enlarging the scope to

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<sup>19</sup> Morale: Hanson (1989) 80, 172-178, 188; *Tactics* esp. 101, 114-115. Management of funds: Pritchett (1971), (1991); Kallet-Marx (1993); Kallet (2001); Gabrielsen (1994); Pritchard (2019) 158-179.

their different fields of intervention allows for a fairer assessment of their powers, responsibilities, and image.

Another innovative aspect of this work is the great importance given to the sociological and psychological aspects of the *strategoí's* activities. A purely legalistic approach is abandoned here in order to study the influence of social and psychological dynamics on the authority of the *strategoí*.<sup>20</sup> Extra-legal authority has been studied in the past, especially from a political point of view<sup>21</sup> or concerning Xenophon's theory of leadership,<sup>22</sup> but it has never been fully applied to the Athenian *strategos* before. In this work, this line of investigation is explored to underline the complex integration of both legal and extra-legal sources of authority – giving power to the *strategoí*.

The combination of these two innovative lines of enquiry results in a very original portrait of the Athenian *strategoí*. Despite the work's enormous debt to previous scholarship, the analysis of the *strategoí's* activities in their different fields moves this thesis in a different direction. The numerous responsibilities and the broad powers that the *strategoí* had during a military campaign suggests that they were far from being as weak as past scholarship has represented them to be. The *strategoí* seem to have been substantially autonomous in their execution of their assigned mission; the Assembly took care that they did not overspend, misbehave, or pursue selfish agendas, but there is no evidence that it micromanaged all aspects of every military campaign. If it is true that they had to stay within their mandate

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<sup>20</sup> Cf. Canevaro (2019) 487-489, 514-515 on the limits of an 'Old Institutional approach'.

<sup>21</sup> Dover (1960); Davies (1981); Ober (1989).

<sup>22</sup> Wood (1964); Anderson (1970) 67-83; Hutchinson (2000); Buxton (2017); Azoulay (2018).

and that the systems of accountability in the office limited erratic behaviours, there was ample room for the *strategoï* to act as they saw fit.

This autonomy made the *strategoï*'s individuality matter considerably; their skills, personality, and personal agendas would profoundly influence their term in office in a way that cannot be explained purely through legal arguments. The consequences of this working theory are explored in Chapter Two, where it is suggested that the personal, extra-legal authority of the *strategoï* could have played an important role in the management of men and their relationship with the *demos*.

However, these innovative views on the *strategia* should not give the reader the wrong impression. This work does not intend to create a rupture with previous scholarship, but rather to reassess it. Important concepts presented in previous works are fully accepted, like the procedural aspects of the *strategia* and its institutional development. Other aspects, like the *strategoï*'s limited power on the battlefield, are downsized, but substantially accepted. This is particularly evident with the progressive development of the *strategia*. Far from denying that an evolution occurred in the office, this thesis argues for a requalification of the usual paradigm of professionalisation towards a more nuanced process based on social changes and the progressive downsizing of the *strategoï*'s powers. A reassessment, not a rupture.

A few words should be spent on the methodology adopted in this work. Military historians tend to discuss Greek warfare and culture in general terms.<sup>23</sup> This thesis will

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<sup>23</sup> With notable exceptions: e.g. Lazenby (1985), Boëldieu-Trevet (2007); Crowley (2012).

rather follow the example of the works on the institutional and political roles of the *strategoí* – focusing only on the Athenian commanders. This choice aims to strengthen the methodological soundness of the results, limiting the possibility of misunderstanding. Since most of our sources were written by Athenians, reconstructing the Athenian leadership and battle experience is relatively easy. Restricting the scope of this work to Athenian contexts limits the superimposition of Athenian aspects on other Greek experiences.<sup>24</sup> When the evidence is insufficient, examples from other Greeks will be included, but this is only for purposes of comparison.

This work uses a vast range of literary sources, which range from historical accounts, oratory, philosophical works and, to a lesser extent, poetry and tragedy. Differences in genre and the authors' agendas are considered, but this dissertation adopts a mostly conservative approach, believing that working from the largest possible pool of information will be the best way to unravel hidden dynamics. This stance can be observed with later sources particularly. Although they can often be imprecise, misleading or even incorrect, authors such as Diodorus and Plutarch provide essential information, and this material has to be taken into consideration.<sup>25</sup> However, later sources are not accepted without question. These sources will often be discussed, and, on several occasions, the reader will be warned that this tradition is only tentatively accepted because it is impossible to be confirmed by contemporary sources.

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<sup>24</sup> Cf. Sanders (2012) 164.

<sup>25</sup> Nevin (2017) 3-4.

When possible, sources contemporary to the events are given preference, especially those written by authors with experience as military leaders. Indeed, the time range of this dissertation has been dictated by the availability of good sources that report sufficient details to allow for the discussion of the *strategoí's* numerous duties. Xenophon's keen interest in leaders and leadership has particularly been an essential asset for this research. Xenophon discusses leadership throughout all of his work, and left us the *Cavalry Commander*, which is literally a handbook for the good Athenian *hipparchos*, and the *Cyropaedia*, which is often recognised as a manifesto of good leadership.<sup>26</sup>

It is not surprising that this research will rely heavily on Xenophon's thought and works, but this imbalance in favour of Xenophon may be methodologically concerning. On the one hand, Xenophon describes Greek culture, but it was also his personal opinion on leadership. Although he makes several similar points to Plato and Isocrates,<sup>27</sup> we cannot arbitrarily assume that Xenophon records the ideas and practices of his time without acknowledging his personal input.

On the other hand, Xenophon wrote about his time and experiences. His work is representative of the first half of the fourth century, and the Spartans are particularly prominent. Appreciating how to apply this rich material in an analysis of the Athenian *strategos* is at times challenging. Fortunately, Xenophon dedicates some works specifically to the discussion of military leadership in Athens: the *Cavalry Commander* and the first part

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<sup>26</sup> Newell (1988) 111; Hutchinson (2000) 37; Christesen (2006) 48-50; ; Nicolai (2016) 83; Buxton (2017) 325-326. Cf. Carlier (2010) 328 on the didactic purpose of the *Cyropaedia*.

<sup>27</sup> Howland (2000) 876-877; Tuplin (2018) esp. 41.

of Book Three of the *Memorabilia*. Furthermore, Xenophon's belief in a universal theory of leadership allows some liberty in applying his ideas to Athenian commanders too.<sup>28</sup> Even so, there is a risk of basing ideas about Greek leadership from Xenophon's interpretations.

To counteract this risk, this dissertation will look for the dynamics that Xenophon discusses in greater detail in other sources when possible. Similar to the comparativist approach that was discussed above, through recognising key features, the presence of similar phenomena and patterns in other authors will be suggested. In this way, it is at least possible to imply and discuss these phenomena, although on a more hypothetical ground.

Epigraphical sources are used throughout this work, and in particular for discussing the *strategoí's* mandates, exploring the dynamics regulating reputation, and the administration of funds. However, the essential areas of investigation of this thesis, such as tactics, morale management, and extra-legal authority must rely mostly on literary accounts. Whenever possible, epigraphical sources are used to anchor the historical events and discuss further details, but these cases are substantially limited.

To achieve a better understanding of the *strategoí's* extra-legal authority, modern sociological concepts – especially the theory of 'synergic charisma' – will be used to interpret some examples of extraordinary personal authority recorded in the ancient sources.<sup>29</sup> Modern theoretical frameworks and the main characteristics of charismatic authority are viewed as reading keys to interpreting the ancient sources. In this way, it is possible to recognise the dynamics that are present in the sources, but are hidden in plain sight.

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<sup>28</sup> E.g. Brock (2004) 248; Johnstone (2010) 153-154; Nicolai (2014) 72-73; Buxton (2017).

<sup>29</sup> Schweitzer (1982).

Undoubtedly, this framework helps us considerably in appreciating ancient phenomena through modern sensibilities, thus enhancing our understanding of the social relationships and dynamics of ancient Greece.<sup>30</sup> However, this approach is undoubtedly controversial. Although an increasing number of scholars feel confident in applying modern sociological and psychological theories to explain the ancient world,<sup>31</sup> there are substantial methodological problems with this approach.<sup>32</sup> The cultural differences and the idiosyncratic features of each culture make this comparison challenging, and it is extremely difficult to appreciate to what degree it is possible to pursue this investigation without incurring unconscious superimpositions.

The controversy of this comparativist approach is best exemplified by the scholarly debate about emotions and the applicability of modern labels and psychological analyses to the classics. Ekman and Friesen suggest that six basic emotions exist in any human culture.<sup>33</sup> Based on these findings, the 'universalist' approach argues that, to some degree, simple emotional dynamics can be recognised in different contexts.<sup>34</sup> These findings encouraged some scholars to recognise complex psychological phenomena in the ancient sources, occasionally with very bold ideas and formulations.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Cf. Loraux (2005), esp. 128-129, 133, 137-138 on the usefulness of what she defines 'anachronisms' (i.e. modern ideas, categories, and problems associated with the ancient world).

<sup>31</sup> Sociology: Hatscher (2000); Canevaro (2014). Psychology: Shay (1994); Tritle (2004); Crowley (2012); Lauwers et al. (2018).

<sup>32</sup> See e.g. Crowley (2014) 115-117. Pritchard (2007) 336-245 underlines the challenges but also the substantial benefits of this comparativist approach.

<sup>33</sup> Ekman & Friesen (1971). Cf. Wierzbicka (1986) for an interesting point on the difficulty in verbally describing, and thus communicating, emotions.

<sup>34</sup> Ekman (1980) 78; Chaniotis (2012) 16; Theodoropoulou (2012) 434-435; Moscoso (2015) 16; Lauwers et al. (2018) 2. Cf. the effective summary of the two positions in Lloyd (2007) 2-8.

<sup>35</sup> E.g. Tritle (2002), (2004).

However, not all scholars agree with Ekman and Friesen. The socio-constructivist and relativist schools argue that emotions are expressions of a specific culture, and, thus, the psychological phenomena should not be studied outside of their original contexts.<sup>36</sup> If the latter viewpoint is correct, the application of modern definitions to ancient phenomena is just a superimposition that is without value.

Without the pretence of solving this scholarly debate, this dissertation follows a moderate middle ground between these positions.<sup>37</sup> On the one hand, a certain interlap between ancient and modern emotions will be acknowledged, but it is deemed necessary to explore it to fully understand the social and emotional dynamics of the ancient world.<sup>38</sup> Psychology and sociology did not exist in ancient Greece, but this does not mean that the phenomena that are familiar to modern scholars did not exist in any form either. In this regard, an effort to fully appreciate the emotional elements of Greek culture, which are widely recognised as being extremely important, seems essential.<sup>39</sup>

On the other hand, the methodological problems of applying modern theories and labels to the ancient sources will be fully acknowledged, and a rigorous methodology will be elaborated on to limit unconscious superimpositions. Modern theories are not just

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<sup>36</sup> E.g. Wierzbicka (1986); Cassaniti (2017). Levine (2017) reaches the same conclusion, but the results of his experiments are ambiguous. Levine applied Piaget's model of child development, elaborated in Switzerland, to a Hausa community in Nigeria. Levine duly notes some cultural idiosyncrasies, in particular, the more critical role of maternal grandmothers, but substantially confirms Piaget's findings – the development of consciousness from an egoistic to a relativistic point of view, followed by left-right reversibility – in an utterly different cultural context.

<sup>37</sup> See also Llyod (2007) 7-8.

<sup>38</sup> Loraux (2005) 128-129; Cairn & Fulkerson (2015) 8-10.

<sup>39</sup> E.g. *charis*: Davies (1981); Azoulay (2018). Reputation: Dover (1960); Hunter (1990). Cf. Lauwers et al. (2018) 2-3.

applied to the ancient sources, but they are used as a hermeneutical instrument of analysis.<sup>40</sup> This dissertation will look for features of modern phenomena or theories in the ancient sources, but it refrains from superimposing modern phenomena which are not clearly attested in the sources. The modern dynamics will not just be assumed; only if the key characteristics and general patterns match the modern description is the phenomenon tentatively recognised in the ancient sources.

The pursuit of these foci and the application of this method results in an original and comprehensive picture of the Athenian *strategoí* as military leaders. In Chapter One, the institutional aspects of the *strategia* will be discussed, with a particular emphasis on the *strategoí*'s powers and the accountability of the office. Contrary to what was expected, the *strategoí* seem to have enjoyed substantial autonomy within the mandate that was assigned to them by the Assembly, which, most of the time, seems to have been quite vague. In this reconstruction, the accountability mechanisms were not meant as instruments to enforce the application of the mandate as much as they were ways to limit blatant abuses of power.

The picture of the *strategoí*'s authority will be completed in Chapter Two, which will focus on and discuss their personal authority and its features. To the research of well-studied phenomena such as *charis*, reputation, and eloquence, the discussion of another form of extra-legal authority is added, which stems from the perception of the leader in larger-than-life terms. Through a comparison with the modern sociological theory of charismatic authority, it is noted that this authoritative phenomenon has much in common

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<sup>40</sup> Cf. Canevaro (2018) for an excellent example of the potential of this approach.

with Schweizer's theory of 'synergic charisma', which also suggests a similar dynamic in Greek leadership.

Chapter Three focuses on fighting. This chapter will discuss the role of the *strategoí* in planning for battle and tactics and suggests that, despite the difficulties of managing an army in ancient times, the *strategoí* were already able to apply rudimentary tactics – and, at times, more sophisticated plans – with citizen-soldiers.

Chapter Four is dedicated to how the commanders managed their soldiers' morale through analysing the different means that they used to influence the emotions of their troops. After a brief definition of the phenomenon, the chapter aims to investigate the commanders' understanding of morale through the means they applied to control the emotions of their soldiers.

Finally, Chapter Five discusses the organisational responsibilities of the *strategoí*. From the mustering of the citizen-soldiers to the administration *in loco* of the allocated funds, the *strategoí*'s roles in organising campaigns will be appropriately highlighted.

# 1. THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE ATHENIAN STRATEGIA

The first step in our quest for a re-evaluation of the Athenian *strategoi* brings us to discuss the legal aspects of the *strategia*. ‘Legal aspects’ is a broad and general denomination, which, in this study, includes all of the constitutional definitions and limitations of the *strategia*, as well as the laws which regulated its interactions with other institutions. After an introductory section on the evolution of the *strategia* as an institution over the centuries, on the following pages we will discuss in detail what powers the *strategoi* were granted by law, how much freedom of action they had in executing their tasks, and what kind of relationship the *strategoi* had with the Assembly, the sovereign institution in Classical Athens. Lastly, we will focus on the *strategoi*’s accountability, in other words the legal measures in place to keep military leaders in check during their office.

The institutional, procedural, and legal aspects are probably the most studied aspects of the *strategia*. The works of Hammond, Fornara, Rhodes, Hansen, and Hamel, just to mention the most ground-breaking contributions, explore the development of the *strategia*, the procedures for electing officers, and the relationships between the *strategoi* and Assembly in great detail.<sup>1</sup> While these excellent contributions have enriched our understanding of procedural aspects, our reading of the available sources moves away from the traditional interpretation of the *strategoi*, and advocates for a more flexible model of *strategia*.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Hammond (1969); Fornara (1971); Rhodes (1981); Hansen (1987), (1991); *Generals*.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. esp. *Generals*

## THE EVOLUTION OF THE STRATEGIA

The *strategoï* were a board of ten magistrates, elected annually.<sup>3</sup> Although they had a substantial political role in the fifth century, the *strategoï* were principally military leaders. The *Ecclesia* assigned them tasks and men to manage, and their actions were accountable. Although in many regards the fifth century *strategoï* were not so different from their successors, the *strategia* changed quite considerably during those two centuries.

Fornara suggests that the *strategoï*, intended as elected military leaders, were introduced by Clisthenes' reform of c. 501/0 BC, replacing the hereditary leadership of tribal war-chiefs.<sup>4</sup> Initially, the *strategoï* operated under the ἄρχων πολέμαρχος, who had also held absolute military power since before the democratic regime.<sup>5</sup> However, already by the early fifth century, the *polemarchos* seemed to exercise only a loose control over the *strategoï*, which Hammond suggests constituted a merely honorary position, without an effective procedural power over the *strategoï*.<sup>6</sup> The reform of 487/6 BC downsized the powers of the *archontes* even more, whose office became chosen by lot.<sup>7</sup> Fornara does not exclude that the reform of 487/6 BC could also have removed the *polemarchos* from practical military life,

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<sup>3</sup> [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 61.2.

<sup>4</sup> Fornara (1971) 5-8.

<sup>5</sup> [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 22.5. Cf. Bicknell (1979) 427-428; Wheeler (1993) 134; *Generals* 79-80.

<sup>6</sup> Hammond (1969) 114-115, 117, 120. Fornara (1971) 3-4, 6, 12-13. Hamel *Generals* 81-82 correctly underlines that there was probably not a clear division between the area of competence of the *polemarchos* and the *strategoï*. Bicknell (1970) 431 makes a comparison between the *strategoï* of the early fifth century and the *taxiarchoi* of the late fifth century to exemplify the relationship with the *polemarchos*.

<sup>7</sup> [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 22.5. Stockton (1990) 105; Wheeler (1991) 134. Herodotus (6.109.2) states that the *polemarchos* was appointed by lot already in 490 BC, but a major part of the scholarship accepts ps.Aristotle as a preferable source. Plutarch (*Arist.* 1.7-8) and Pausanias (1.15.3) support the *Constitution's* claim. Badian (1971) 24-26; Hansen (1990) 60-61. Rhodes (1981) *ad* 22.5 proposes a compromise. He argues that the *archontes* were elected, but the precise office (*basileus*, *polemarchos*, etc.) was extracted by lot.

reserving for the office some ceremonial and religious duties, which were later also absorbed by the *strategoí*.<sup>8</sup>

Once the *polemarchoi* were out of the picture, the *strategia* became the most important military office in Athens. This development not only increased the power and influence of the *strategoí*, but also allowed influential members of the elite to monopolise the office. Unlike an *archon*, who after one year in office became a member of the *Areopagus*, there was no limit to the re-election of a *strategos*.<sup>9</sup>

The *strategia* was peculiar for another reason. Whilst most of the magistrates in Athens were selected by lot, the Assembly elected *strategoí* and *taxiarchoi* by the raising of hands (*χειροτονία*).<sup>10</sup> This practice remained unparalleled until the fourth century, when a few elective offices, mostly technical, were introduced.<sup>11</sup>

The ancient sources record a reform of the electoral mechanism of the *strategia*. Initially, the *strategoí* were elected *κατὰ φυλάς*; each *strategos* represented a tribe, and the tribe itself voted for its *strategos*.<sup>12</sup> However, in the fourth century the *strategoí* were elected by the whole Assembly. Fornara recognises a window for this reform between 469/8 and 460/59 BC, concluding that the most plausible moment would be during the so-called

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<sup>8</sup> Fornara (1971) 10-12. Cf. Hammond (1969) 117-118; *Generals* 79.

<sup>9</sup> [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1.3; *Dem.* 23.11; [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 41.1, 43.1. On the counting of hands and how *prytaneis* and *proedroi* could influence the Assembly through this practice, see Hansen (1987) 38-43; *Generals* 6; Canevaro (2018) 112, 126-129, 135. Cf. MacDowell (1983) 148, on a case of abuse of power in the *Acharnians*.

<sup>10</sup> Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.9; [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 22.5, 43.1, 47.1, 52.1, 54.3. Sinclair (1988) 17-18; Hansen (1990) 60-61; Harrison (1998) 2.31; *Generals* 23. Allen (2000) 44-45 suggests that being elected gave the *strategoí* a special status, thus authority.

<sup>11</sup> [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 54, 61.

<sup>12</sup> [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 61.1.

Ephialtes' reform in 462/1 BC.<sup>13</sup> This reform considerably reduced the powers of the *archontes* and Areopagus, thus it is possible that it also filled the consequential void of power by requalifying the *strategoí* from tribal officers to magistrates elected by the whole citizenship.<sup>14</sup>

Some aspects of the electoral process remain unclear. Taking inspiration from Plato's *Laws*, Hansen proposes an election in several phases.<sup>15</sup> The *Ecclesia* voted for the *strategoí*, either tribe by tribe, or all together, one at the time. When someone was chosen, another candidate might challenge him.<sup>16</sup> However, this reading has limits, as Hansen himself admits. In the *Laws*, Plato describes an ideal city, which does not necessarily represent Athenian practices. Indeed, in Plato's system, the *nomophulakes* selected the candidates preliminarily, a duty unattested in historical practice.

The ancient sources do not mention another institutional reform of the *strategia*. However, there are some discrepancies between the *strategoí*'s powers of the late fifth and fourth centuries. The *Constitution of the Athenians* records four 'specialisations': the *strategos èπὶ τοὺς ὀπλίτας*,<sup>17</sup> who dealt with leading the hoplites and plausibly the other troops in campaign in foreign territory; one *èπὶ τὴν χώραν*,<sup>18</sup> who was concerned with the defence of Attica; two *èπὶ τὸν Πειραιέα*, who protected the Pireus from Mounichia and the Akté; and

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<sup>13</sup> Fornara (1971) 23-26; Rhodes (1979) 104; Harrison (1998) 2.31. On the reform, see [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 25.1-2, 28.2. Sinclair (1988) 80; Hanson (1996) 302; Hansen (1987) 11; (1988) 69. Hansen (1988) 69-70 and Mitchell (2000) 346-347, less convincingly, propose a much later date. Cf. *Generals* 86.

<sup>14</sup> Hammond (1969) 139-143; Fornara (1971) 19-27; Lengauer (1979) 22-23; Sinclair (1988) 19.

<sup>15</sup> Hansen (1987) 46. Cf. *Pl. Leg.* 755c.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Piérart (1974) 130, 139-142.

<sup>17</sup> *Generals* 194.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. *IG II<sup>3</sup>* 292, ll. 19-20. Ober (1985) 89-90.

one ἐπὶ τὰς συμμορίας, who dealt with the *trierarchoi*.<sup>19</sup> The date of this development is debated, but the first evidence mentioning the development is dated mid-fourth century.<sup>20</sup>

The introduction of the ταμίας στρατιωτικῶν and the age-class system in the fourth century could be associated with the developments mentioned, hinting at an unattested reform which downsized the *strategoí's* powers.<sup>21</sup> Unfortunately, there is insufficient evidence to confirm or deny this eventuality, but the fact that the *Constitution of the Athenians* does not report this reform, which would have been relatively close to its time, seems to suggest a slower and more gradual process.

However, it could be significant that from the second half of the fifth century some important social and political changes could have involved the *strategoí*. If the aristocratic *gene* and prominent families pretty much monopolised the *strategia*, since Pericles' times a more inclusive attitude started to emerge; non-aristocratic members of the elite started to become more prominent and were elected *strategoí*.<sup>22</sup> Connor associates this trend with a sharp change in the way of conducting politics, disincentivising personal ties and networks for a more inclusive and *demos*-centred approach.<sup>23</sup> However, he also notes that members of the elite, even if they came from 'new money', were the protagonists.<sup>24</sup> In the fourth century,

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<sup>19</sup> [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 61.1. Cf. Dem. 18.38. Sinclair (1988) 48. Piérart (1974) 145 recognises two phases in the process, separating the election from the assignment of the 'specialisation'.

<sup>20</sup> Rhodes (1981) *ad.* 61.1; Ober (1985) 89-90; *Generals* 15-16. For alternative dating: Hammond (1969) 115-117, since the Persian Wars; Hansen (1991) 238, since the fifth century reform of the *strategia*; Fornara (1971) 79-80, since the late fifth century.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Chapter Five esp. 284-285, 301-303.

<sup>22</sup> E.g. Davies (1981) 116-117.

<sup>23</sup> Connor (1971) 141-150. See also Rhodes (1981) *ad.* 26.1, 28.1; Wheeler (1991) 136; Pritchard (2007) 329. Cf. Mann (2007) 105-108, 140-141 suggests a change in the rhetoric and political image rather than a real break with traditional networks.

<sup>24</sup> Connor (1971) 151-161; Davies (1981) 43-44; Ober (1989) 116-118; Todd (1993) 293. Cf. Azoulay (2014a) 29.

people like Iphicrates were able to rise to the *strategia* from an even humbler background, suggesting a trend of the progressive opening up of Athenian society, at least relating to the *strategia*. As we will comment in Chapter Three, this trend is undeniable, but it should not be overemphasised: *stratego*i like Iphicrates and Charidemus were still a minority.<sup>25</sup>

Another significant development is the fourth century *stratego*i's reduced political influence. By Aristotle's time, the *stratego*i had become mostly supporting figures in the political scene.<sup>26</sup> Although some scholars compellingly demonstrate that the sources overemphasise the separation of the *stratego*i from politics,<sup>27</sup> this evaluation still holds true: the *rheto*res became the protagonists of Athenian politics, and a gap grew between political and military careers.<sup>28</sup>

## THE STRATEGOI'S MANDATE

The *stratego*i received their instructions from the *Ecclesia*, which voted on the mission, who to assign it to, and the allocated resources. In this study, the tasks that the Assembly assigned to the elected *stratego*i are referred to as "mandates". Mandates could be extremely various. For instance, *stratego*i might be asked to verify that the allies had sworn the oath as requested, to swear an oath on behalf of the *demos*,<sup>29</sup> to extract money from the allies,<sup>30</sup> or

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<sup>25</sup> Chapter Three 189-190. Cf. Mann (2007) 126-127.

<sup>26</sup> Ar. *Pol.* 1305a10-15. Cf. Isoc. 8.54-55. Connor (1971) 144; Lengauer (1979) 39, 89-91; Hansen (1987) 53-54; (1991) 270; Sinclair (1988) 138; Todd (1993) 292-293; Bettalli (2013) 101.

<sup>27</sup> Tritle (1992); Hamel (1995).

<sup>28</sup> Hamel (1995) 31.

<sup>29</sup> E.g. IG I<sup>3</sup> 11, 40; II<sup>3</sup> 399.

<sup>30</sup> E.g. Thuc. 3.19, 4.50.1; Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.8, 1.4.8. For discussion, Kallet-Marx (1993) 134-138. See Chapter Five 309-310.

even to supervise the inscription of important decrees on stone.<sup>31</sup> Mostly, the mandates were military-related. When the *demos* approved a military campaign, it assigned either one or, more frequently, several *strategoí* to it, voting on the number of men to muster and the financial resources assigned.<sup>32</sup>

This was an essential power of the *Ecclesia* and one that the *demos* felt strongly about. In the early 390s BC, Demainetos, who perhaps was a *strategos*, made a secret agreement with the *Boule* to be sent with a single ship to meet Conon, who was fighting the Spartans in exile.<sup>33</sup> Once the *demos* found out, the well-to-do Athenians were indignant of this abuse of power, and the *Boule* gave the full blame to Demainetos.<sup>34</sup> Even if the whole situation is not utterly clear, it is evident that the *Ecclesia* demanded that they approve every military operation.

In reason of the decisional power of the *Ecclesia* in military matters, there is a wide consensus in recognising that the *strategoí* had limited decisive power over a military campaign.<sup>35</sup> In particular, Hamel points out how the Assembly's instructions could be, at times, extremely precise.<sup>36</sup> After analysing an ample set of literary sources, isolating explicit

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<sup>31</sup> E.g. *IG I<sup>3</sup>* 118.

<sup>32</sup> Jameson (1955) 64; *Generals* 5, 14-15, 23, 40-44; Christ (2001) 399; *Psychology* 27; Nevin (2017) 15.

<sup>33</sup> *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia BNJ* 66 F6 IX.1-2 = McKeachie & Kern VI.1-2. Develin (1989) 206 dates the event to the 397/96 BC. Cf. Simonsen (2009) 283. More cautiously, Billows (2016) *AIO ad loc.* remarks that Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.1.10-12, 26) recalled Demainetos twice as *strategos*, in 388 and 387 BC.

<sup>34</sup> Simonsen (2009) 284-286 believes that Demainetos stole the ship in league with the sympathisers of Conon in Athens. This hypothesis seems openly denied by the passage, which implies that the *Boule* only pretended their lack of involvement (οὐδὲν προσποιούμενοι μετεσχηκέναι τοῦ πράγματος).

<sup>35</sup> Fornara (1971) 37; *GSW* 2.42-45, 55-56, 55-56; Sinclair (1988) 82, 146; *Generals* 158-159; Nevin (2017) 15.

<sup>36</sup> *Generals* 1, 115-117, 158-159.

and implicit orders of the Assembly,<sup>37</sup> she concludes that the *strategoi* only had control over “limited military action”, while the Assembly made the major decisions of the campaign.<sup>38</sup>

Hamel’s hypothesis at first glance seems extremely convincing, but by examining her examples more closely her conclusions appear less solid. Of the 22 passages of ‘explicit orders’ that she advocates in support of her hypothesis, only six report precise rules of engagement.<sup>39</sup> The others indicate short-to-long term objectives, usually focusing on the area of action,<sup>40</sup> and only occasionally giving more information on the missions’ objectives.<sup>41</sup> Finally, a last group consists of instances in which the *strategoi* were recalled after signing a peace treaty, or redeployed for more urgent strategical targets.<sup>42</sup>

Undeniably, mandates could be detailed, but there is reason to believe that precise mandates were issued only in exceptional circumstances. The case of the Athenian

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<sup>37</sup> *Generals* 1, 40-44, 115-117. As O&R 171 point out, the *strategoi*’s mandate were rarely inscribed. Only matters of great public interest, or decrees with long-lasting effects had an inscription dedicated to it. Some examples are IG I<sup>3</sup> 93, which records the resources allocated to the Sicilian campaign, and IG II<sup>3</sup> 309, which is specified because it was linked to an alliance.

<sup>38</sup> *Generals* 40-41, 97. It is not obvious what the difference between small and major matters was. For example, Hamel herself admits that the *strategoi* could decide whether to make a truce with the enemy, which is an important decision in a campaign. Cf. Thuc. 3.4.2-4.

<sup>39</sup> Thuc. 1.45.3-49.4; 1.57.6; 3.3.3-4, 35-36 ff.; 7.20. About the Sicilian campaign of 415 BC Diodorus (13.2.6, 30.3) stated that the *strategoi* first received instructions from the *Boule* in a secret meeting on the objective of the campaign, whilst they simultaneously received orders from the Assembly about the treatment of prisoners. This inconsistency makes this tradition dubious, and Rhodes (1972) 41 highlights how Thucydides did not record anything of the sort, thus rejecting the passage.

<sup>40</sup> Thuc. 2.85.5-6, 3.91, 4.2.3, 2.39, 7.21.1, 7.29; Diod. 12.44.1, 65.1-2. Hansen (1975) no. 90 argues that Dem. 23.104 implies a mandate issued by the Assembly. Hansen is correct, but Demosthenes did not record precise terms. The vagueness of Thuc. 6.8.2 is particularly noticeable. Thucydides recorded three objectives: supporting Selinus, re-founding Leontini, if possible, “and in general they should take all such measures in Sicily as they judged in the best interests of the Athenians (trans. Hammond)(καὶ τὰλλα τὰ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ προᾶξαι ὅπη ἂν γινώσκωσιν ἄριστα Ἀθηναίους).”

<sup>41</sup> E.g. Thuc. 2.26.1, 4.2.3; Diod. 12.81.2; Dem. 15.9. Hamel *Generals* 115 implies Thucydides’ reference (3.86.4) to stopping the export of grain toward the Peloponnese as a precise order. However, it cannot be excluded that these were Thucydides’ comments on the real, undisclosed intentions of the Athenians, and not the *strategoi*’s mandate. Cf. *Contra* Kallet-Marx (1993) 153 n.1.

<sup>42</sup> Thuc. 3.91; Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.2, 4.1, 7.4.1.

expedition in aid of Corcyra in 433 BC, one of Hamel's best examples, is telling.<sup>43</sup> The Athenians decided to help the Corcyreans, principally to keep their powerful fleet in the Athenian orbit, but were wary of initiating a battle with the Corinthians, who were allies of Sparta. Consequently, the *strategoi* received specific instructions: they should not engage the enemy unless in defence of the Corcyreans.<sup>44</sup> The precise instructions given to the *strategoi* seem to reflect more the delicate political situation in which they had to act than an example of the usual mandate.<sup>45</sup>

The same concern for not breaking treaties is attested in the fourth century too. Both Timotheus and Iphicrates were ordered to return home immediately after the signing of a peace treaty.<sup>46</sup> It is easy to see the reason behind it; the actions of the *strategos* could jeopardise the treaty, as indeed Timotheus' behaviour did. Demosthenes confirms this pattern, reporting how the same Timotheus, twelve years later, received clear instructions to help Ariobarzarnes, but not at the cost of jeopardising the peace with Persia.<sup>47</sup> In these delicate circumstances, a particular carefulness and attention to detail seem utterly justifiable.

Consequently, more precise instructions were plausibly only issued in delicate situations. A series of examples of vague mandates support this hypothesis. On several

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<sup>43</sup> *Generals* 115-117.

<sup>44</sup> Thuc. 1.45.2-3, 49.4, 53.4. Hornblower *Commentary ad* 1.45.3 *ad* 53.4 and (2011) 114-115 believes that the sending of the second contingent presupposed a more aggressive stance. However, Plutarch (*Per.* 29.1-2) states that Lacedaimonius did not have many ships with him, making a request for reinforcements plausible. Thucydides (1.54.1) implies that the Athenians did not intend to break their treaty with Corinth, and that the Corinthians were satisfied with the parlay.

<sup>45</sup> *Generals* 18 implicitly acknowledges the particularity of the situation. Hamel suggests that Lacedaimonius was chosen for this mandate for political reasons, considering his philo-Laonism. See Ste Croix (1972) 76-77.

<sup>46</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.2, 4.1. *Generals* 40-44; Hornblower (2011) 192.

<sup>47</sup> Dem. 15.9.

occasions, the mandate indicated an area in which they were expected to operate,<sup>48</sup> an ally to help,<sup>49</sup> or a specific enemy to pursue were indicated to the *strategoi* in charge.<sup>50</sup> Admittedly, the vagueness of the mandates that we have available to us could be a problem of our sources,<sup>51</sup> but it is a fact that they are generally far from detailed.<sup>52</sup>

The idea of generally vague mandates suits another observable trend well: several *strategoi* enjoyed substantial freedom of action. In 432 BC, Archestratus, son of Lycomedes, and his colleagues were assigned to Macedonia, but, once the Athenians had heard of Potidaea's revolt, they changed their minds. Before they left, the Athenians sent the *strategoi* there with precise instructions: to take hostages, to destroy the walls, and to prevent the rebellion of neighbouring cities.<sup>53</sup> Nonetheless, when the commanders evaluated the situation on the ground, they believed that it was impossible to storm the city, and then they returned to their original plan, attacking Perdiccas' troops in Macedonia.<sup>54</sup> Even when a second contingent was sent from Athens, Archestratus and his colleagues stayed in Pydna, besieging the city until they reached an agreement with the city and Perdiccas himself.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> E.g. Bottieia and Thracian Chalcidice: Thuc. 2.79.1; Thrace: Thuc. 5.2, 8.64.2; 'on the other side of the Peloponnese': Thuc. 3.94.3.

<sup>49</sup> E.g. The king of Egypt: Thuc. 1.112.2; Selinus: Thuc. 6.8.2; Evangoras: Xen. *Hell.* 5.10.

<sup>50</sup> E.g. Teleutias: Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.25; Philip II: Dem. 12.16: "saying to everybody that you ordered him to fight [me] (πολεμῆν αὐτῷ προστάττετε), if there was the chance (ἂν καιρὸν λάβῃ)."

<sup>51</sup> Boëldieu-Trevet (2007) 55-56.

<sup>52</sup> Hammond (1969) 127 talks of "general lines".

<sup>53</sup> Thuc. 1.57.6. de Ste Croix (1972) 79-85. It is interesting to note the lacuna in the text about the number of military officials sent with Archestratus. Hornblower *Commentary ad loc.* hypothesises that the original number was δύο, the most reasonable *lectio* that could be confused with δέκα. Cf. Ehrenberg (1945) 118.

<sup>54</sup> Thuc. 1.59. Diodorus' confusion is noteworthy. In Diod. 12.34.3, he merged the two mandates, implying that Potidaea was in Macedonia.

<sup>55</sup> Thuc. 1.61.2.

Thucydides never specifies that the latter mandate cancelled the former, but it is evident that the *demos* saw in the repression of Potidaea's revolt the most pressing matter.<sup>56</sup> However, this did not hinder Archestratus' tactical considerations on the field, and there are no hints at all about the prosecution of the commanders after this campaign. Far from proving Hamel's theory, the example of Archestratus seems to indicate that the *stratego*i of the second half of the fifth century had a certain freedom within their mandate.

A second example is even more evident. Initially, Athens supported the Thebans against the Spartans in the so-called Theban Spartan War.<sup>57</sup> The *Ecclesia* sent Timotheus to western Greece to distract the Peloponnesians from the mainland.<sup>58</sup> The effort, though, was soon considered too ambitious, and in 374 BC a treaty was signed by Sparta and Athens.<sup>59</sup> The Athenians, thus, immediately ordered Timotheus to return home.<sup>60</sup> Timotheus received the order, but he decided to stop in Zakynthos regardless to support the cause of the exiles, which resulted in breaking the treaty.<sup>61</sup>

Not only does this instance not demonstrate at all that the mandate issued by the *Ecclesia* was very precise, but, instead, it confirms the impression that the *stratego*i had a

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<sup>56</sup> Gomme (1941) 59, 64 argues that IG I<sup>3</sup> 365a, in which Macedonia and Potidaea are initially mentioned separately, is an inscription related to the episode. He argues that the mention of Potidaea was added in a second moment, and, at the bottom of the stone, Macedonia and Potidaea are mentioned together, suggesting a double mandate. However, Macedonia and Potidaea are mentioned together only in the reconstructed lines, thus not fully supporting Gomme's point. Cf. Hornblower *Commentary ad.* 1.57.6 on the doubts in associating this inscription with the expedition of 432/431 BC. Much more reliable is Kallet-Marx (1993) 79, recognising the objective of the expedition – thus, plausibly, its mandate – in stopping the rebellions in the area. Consequently, we can hypothesise a quite vague mandate, focused more on the area than on precise details.

<sup>57</sup> Hornblower (2011) 245-247.

<sup>58</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.62-66.

<sup>59</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.1.

<sup>60</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.2.

<sup>61</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.3-4.

considerable freedom of action when in charge.<sup>62</sup> Indeed, Timotheus' actions could even be seen as open insubordination, and had severe consequences for the state. One would expect to see the whole weight of accountability falling upon the disobedient commander. Nevertheless, nothing of the sort happened, to our knowledge. Timotheus was even reconfirmed as *strategos* for the following year.<sup>63</sup>

There are several passages supporting this reading.<sup>64</sup> So not to bore the reader, we will focus only on one further example. In 414 BC, once Nicias' letter had arrived in Athens, and had – plausibly – been read in the Assembly, the *demos* immediately voted to send him reinforcements. While Demosthenes was appointed to lead the main contingent, Eurymedon was chosen to bring an emergency expedition of men and money to Sicily.<sup>65</sup> Apparently, this passage confirms Hamel's hypothesis: the Assembly gave both Eurymedon and Demosthenes clear instructions, although, admittedly, not in great detail.

The most interesting part, though, occurred only later, when Eurymedon reached Demosthenes near Corcyra.<sup>66</sup> Conon, who was managing the Athenian base in Naupactos, knowing that Demosthenes was in the area, asked him for help against a Corinthian fleet.<sup>67</sup> Demosthenes sent troops and ships to Conon, while Eurymedon even went to Corcyra to muster additional troops and ships and spent some time commanding the fleet together

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<sup>62</sup> Cf. Westlake (1975) 110, which recognises Paches' personal initiatives when in charge of Mytilene (Thuc. 3.28.3, 35.2) as being in the boundaries of the *strategos*' powers.

<sup>63</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.11; [Dem.] 49.6, 47; Diod. 15.47.2. Cf. PA 13700.

<sup>64</sup> Thuc. 1.112.2-4, 2.31, 7.16.4-5, 31.3; Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.25, 5.10, 6.2.2. Lengauer (1979) 47 arrives at the same conclusion when discussing Brasidas, and he admits that there are similarities between Brasidas and Demosthenes.

<sup>65</sup> Thuc. 7.16.2-17.1.

<sup>66</sup> Thuc. 7.31.3-5.

<sup>67</sup> Thuc. 7.31.4. Asmonti (2008) 88.

with Demosthenes.<sup>68</sup> Both Demosthenes and Eurymedon clearly acted beyond the limits of their mandate: to bring troops to Sicily.

As for Arcestratus, there is no suggestion of a change in the instructions communicated to him and his colleagues. Indeed, it would be highly improbable that Conon was able to ask Athens for permission to stop Demosthenes before he crossed the Ionian Sea. Unfortunately, both commanders fell in Sicily in the same year, so it is impossible to comment upon the *demos'* reaction to their behaviour. However, it could be argued that Eurymedon was quite sensitive to the issue. In 424 BC he was close to losing his life in the accountability trials after the previous campaign in Sicily.<sup>69</sup> That he was willing to risk his life by challenging the *demos* only ten years later is significant. It could indicate that a similar conduct was not seen as inappropriate for a commander.

The most reasonable reading of the sources is that the *demos* assigned to their commanders some areas of competence or objectives, and even tolerated a certain degree of independence, as long as the commanders pursued the polis' interests. This was surely the case for Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus during the Second Sicilian campaign (415-413 BC). Thucydides reports that:

“They voted to send sixty ships to Sicily and appointed as *strategoi autocratores*, with absolute discretionary power, Alcibiades the son of Cleinias, Nicias the son of Niceratus, and Lamachus the son of Xenophanes. They were to help Egesta against Selinus; if campaigning conditions allowed, they should also assist in the re-establishment of Leontini; and in general they should take all

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<sup>68</sup> Thuc. 7.31.5.

<sup>69</sup> Thuc. 4.65; Diod. 12.54.

such measures in Sicily as they judged in the best interests of the Athenians".<sup>70</sup> (trans. Hammond, my italics).

The mandate identified some main objectives, but left considerable freedom to the *strategoï*, possibly because they were *autocratores*.<sup>71</sup> What is particularly interesting is how the *strategoï* interpreted this mandate. Thucydides writes that the three *strategoï* disagreed on what strategy to adopt in the campaign. Nicias proposed a cautious plan, which covered the main objective of the mandate: the protection of Egesta.<sup>72</sup> The detail of Nicias' concern for the expenditure of the campaign seems to indicate that he was already thinking about his *euthunai*, as we might expect of this timid character. Alcibiades and Lamachus, though, were different. Alcibiades proposed creating an advanced base at Messene, so as to attack Selinus and Syracuse from an advantageous position.<sup>73</sup> Egesta has already disappeared from the picture. Lamachus was even bolder: he proposed taking Syracuse by surprise, and destroying the greatest threat immediately.<sup>74</sup> Evidently, the *demos* did not leave instructions to be followed by the letter, and the *strategoï* were quite free to deliberate and choose the strategy that they believed most effective to attain their objective.<sup>75</sup>

A similar scenario is attested for an unnamed fourth century *strategos*. In 356 BC, the Athenians broke their promise not to garrison the territories of the members of the Second

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<sup>70</sup> Thuc. 6.8.2.

<sup>71</sup> Fornara (1971) 13-14, 31, Pritchett GSW 2.42, and Hamel *Generals* 201-203 recognise greater independence as deriving from this title. Particular value has Hamel's point on the decision of the size of the contingent, which usually was prerogative of the Assembly.

<sup>72</sup> Thuc. 6.47.

<sup>73</sup> Thuc. 6.48.

<sup>74</sup> Thuc. 6.49.

<sup>75</sup> Cf. Bloedow (1973) 10-11.

Naval league by sending a *strategos* to Andros to ‘take care’ of the island.<sup>76</sup> This is one of the rare instances of an inscribed decree, and the terms of engagement are vague, although admittedly the stone is broken. Nevertheless, it is fascinating that the decree is more detailed about the financial aspects of the expedition than on the limits of the *strategos*’ agency. The same trend can be observed in the inscription about the campaign in Corcyra of 433 BC, suggesting that the *demos* believed the economic aspect of the military campaign more important than limiting the *stratego*i.<sup>77</sup>

Another notable case of an imprecise mandate can be dated back to 489 BC. Miltiades was able to convince the *Ecclesia* to assign a fleet to him, without specifying his objective, by the promise of a great booty.<sup>78</sup> Having attained the fleet, Miltiades led the Athenians against Paros, but he failed and was consequently put on trial.<sup>79</sup> Several scholars doubt Herodotus’ reliability on this event.<sup>80</sup> Boëldieu-Trevet deduces from this episode that the mandate of the commander, albeit less precise than in the late fifth century, was usually clear too. Miltiades was an exception to the pattern, and he was punished because of that.<sup>81</sup> Her reading, though, is not convincing. Herodotus reported the charge against Miltiades-ἀπάτη

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<sup>76</sup> *GHI* no. 156.

<sup>77</sup> O&R 148.

<sup>78</sup> Hdt. 6.132. Cf. Scott (2005) *ad loc.*

<sup>79</sup> Hdt. 6.133-134.

<sup>80</sup> Casson (1915) 79, 84; *Generals* 168-170; Boëldieu-Trevet (2007) 83.

<sup>81</sup> Boëldieu-Trevet (2007) 83.

δήμου, which is well attested in cases of *eisaggelia*.<sup>82</sup> The problem was not his unusual position and powers, but the fact that he did not deliver what he promised.<sup>83</sup>

In conclusion, the examples adduced seem to consistently point out that for the entire fifth century the Athenian *stratego*i acted on a mandate approved by the *Ecclesia*, but it was not extremely precise, apart from in some extreme cases, and the military leaders had considerable independence within these boundaries. The same could be said for the fourth century too, although we have much less evidence to corroborate this hypothesis.

### THE STRATEGOI'S POWERS

If the *stratego*i's mandate was only rarely precise, the *stratego*i consequently had a considerable power over the soldiers assigned to him when out campaigning. Fourth century sources corroborate this reading. In general terms, Plato in the *Gorgias* openly acknowledges the great power of magistrates, who he did not hesitate to place in the same category as kings, tyrants, and despots.<sup>84</sup> This is an oversimplification which the philosopher corrects in another dialogue, the *Politicus*. Young Socrates agrees with the

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<sup>82</sup> Harrison (1998) 2.60-61; *Generals* 168-170. Blösel (2001) 192 suggests that the charge could be of corruption, like many *stratego*i who failed. Cf. Roberts (2001) 241-242. This hypothesis is possible, although there is not really a reason to doubt Herodotus' tradition. Blösel's argument that the defence of Miltiades had sense only in case of corruption is weak. Reminding the jurors of previous achievements and services to the city is typical of judicial oratory.

<sup>83</sup> Develin (1977) 573. Nenci (1998) *ad* 6.133.1 recognises the position of Herodotus as biased against Miltiades and Themistocles. He would have avoided reporting the victories of Miltiades attained before the siege of Paros, as instead in Ephorus (*FGrHist* 70 F63). How and Wells (1961) *ad loc.* only stress the comparison between the two traditions, stating – not incorrectly – that it is highly probable that Ephorus only tried to rationalise Herodotus' version.

<sup>84</sup> Pl. *Gorg.* 525d-526b. That Plato also includes the *stratego*i in this category is evident from the example he makes in the following section, on the rare leaders who were morally good: Aristides the Just, the *strategos* at Platea (479 BC).

Stranger that the *strategos* did not exercise the same power as a king, but their objection is focused on the faculty to decide whom to wage war with.<sup>85</sup>

If it was the *Ecclesia* that decided where and against whom to wage war, the *strategoí's* power was plausibly limited to the management of the campaign and its execution. In the *First Philippic* Demosthenes advocates the creation of a permanent army, which would be able to swiftly respond to Philip's actions in the Northern Aegean.<sup>86</sup> Demosthenes describes the decisional power of the commander with these words:

“Then, he who is appointed by you as having the power (κύριος) will decide, depending on the specific occasion (παρὰ τὸν καιρὸν), in which places and when he will use this force.”<sup>87</sup>

Demosthenes' proposal was too radical, and it was not approved. However, one wonders where the novelty of this scheme lay. Undoubtedly, the idea of a permanent army was a new idea, but the commander's exercise of authority seems coherent with other, practical, examples.<sup>88</sup> Moreover, Demosthenes did not ask for greater control of the commanders than usual, only that the Athenians took care to enforce existing safeguards.<sup>89</sup> Consequently, it seems reasonable to conclude that the novelty of Demosthenes' proposal was in the mixed permanent army, operating over a long period of time.

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<sup>85</sup> Pl. *Plt.* 305a.

<sup>86</sup> Dem. 4.31-32.

<sup>87</sup> Dem. 4.33.

<sup>88</sup> Dem. 2.28; [Dem.] 10.22, 13.15, 19. On the obedience due to the *strategoí*, see Chapter Three 219-221.

<sup>89</sup> Cf. the summary made by Wooten (2008) *ad* 4.33, and how the alleged special powers of the commander do not appear on the list.

The word κύριος denotes a great degree of control; it was used to indicate legal guardians, owners, and fathers.<sup>90</sup> And fathers were 'like kings for their sons'.<sup>91</sup> Demosthenes was not the only one to use this term in relation to the *strategoí*. The *Constitution of the Athenians* uses κύριος too, when writing about the *strategos'* powers of enforcing their orders.

Whenever they lead (ὅταν ἡγῶνται), [the *strategoí*] are κύριοι to imprison (δῆσαι), remove (ἐκκηρῦξαι), and fine (ἐπιβολὴν ἐπιβάλλειν) the one who neglects his duty (τὸν ἀτακτοῦντα).<sup>92</sup>

The term κύριος indicates a precise legal status of the *strategoí* during a campaign (ὅταν ἡγῶνται), which allowed them to enforce their authority with means which would be illegal in a civil environment.

Unfortunately, similarly explicit evidence for the fifth century is not available, and we are thus forced to rely on scraps of information or dubious traditions instead.<sup>93</sup> However, there are a few fifth century examples of *strategoí's* exercising their authority over the soldiers under them. During the siege of Sestos (479/8 BC), the Athenians wanted to return home, and demanded the *strategoí* to stop the siege, a request that the *strategoí* flatly refused.<sup>94</sup> Herodotus records that the *strategoí* had the authority to issue orders, and the willingness of the soldiers did not inhibit this power.

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<sup>90</sup> Harrison (1998) 1.104-105, 115-121; Roisman (2005) 26-27. Todd (1993) 207-210 notes that the powers of the *kurios* were not as extensive as those of the Roman *pater familias*.

<sup>91</sup> Ar. *Pol.* 1259b-1260a; *Eth. Eud.* 1238b, 1241b-1242a. Golden (1990) 101-103; Stevenson (1993) 428; Strauss (1993) 8, 21, 33, 46-49, 62-64; Griffith (1999) 30-31.

<sup>92</sup> [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 61.2.

<sup>93</sup> Chapter Three 222-226.

<sup>94</sup> Hdt. 9.117.

The same prerogative is attested in the late fifth century. The oligarchic coup of 411 BC had left the fleet in Samos *de facto* independent, and Alcibiades – as a result of the agency of the legitimate *strategos* Theramenes – took advantage of the occasion to be reintegrated into the civic community, and even take charge of the army.<sup>95</sup> Indeed, after a passionate speech, Alcibiades was elected *strategos*, and Thucydides specifies that he had a special licence for dealing with ‘all the [public] affairs’.<sup>96</sup> Being an exile until a short while ago, and being newly elected in office, one would expect Alcibiades to have been grateful and open to agreeing with the soldiers’ demands. What Thucydides reports is different:

From what they were told they conceived an immediate disdain for the enemy close at hand (παρόντας πολεμίους ἐκ τῶν λεχθέντων καταφρονεῖν), and were ready to sail straight for the Piraeus (πλεῖν ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ). Despite popular pressure for this course (πολλῶν ἐπειγομένων), Alcibiades flatly refused to let them sail against the Piraeus, and turn their backs on the nearer enemy. He said that since he had been elected *strategos* (ἐπειδὴ καὶ στρατηγὸς ἦρητο) he must first sail to Tissaphernes and discuss with him the conduct of the war. (trans. Hammond).<sup>97</sup>

Alcibiades did not take into consideration the will of the people who just elected him, because he appreciated the strategical problems that attacking the Piraeus would have caused in the eastern Aegean. However, what is more important in this case is that he had the power to go against the soldiers’ will.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> Thuc. 8.81-82.1.

<sup>96</sup> Lengauer (1979) 70-71 remarks on the exceptionality of this measure, and connects it, correctly, with Alcibiades’ reputation and the trust of the people in him.

<sup>97</sup> Thuc. 8.82.1-2.

<sup>98</sup> [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 27.1 and [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1.2 recognised the navy as a concrete display of the *demos*. Cf. Hanson (2001) 10.

As a final example, a passage of Xenophon demonstrates how this power was similar in other high military offices too. During the civil strife of 403 BC, the *hipparchos* Lysimachus led a squad of cavalymen to disturb the raids undertaken by the democratic faction, located in the Piraeus.<sup>99</sup> Lysimachus gave the order to kill some inhabitants of the Attic *demos* Aexone, who were tending their fields, plausibly because of their support of the Piraeus faction.<sup>100</sup> The *hippeis* protested, and even begged Lysimachus to change his mind, but ultimately they had to obey the *hipparchos*.<sup>101</sup> These kinds of unpleasant incidents are not uncommon in civil war and undoubtedly the circumstances were exceptional, however, Xenophon very clearly implies that the horsemen were obligated to obey the *hipparchos*. With this passage, Xenophon seems willing to discharge all blame for the incident to the evil Lysimachus, thus protecting the reputations of his fellow *hippeis*.<sup>102</sup> It should be noted that Xenophon's argument would not stand if it was not consistent with common Athenian practice. If the Athenian horsemen were able to obey a direct order, they would have been culpable as well, but Xenophon suggests otherwise.

The power of the *strategoí* was substantial, but not unmatched. The collegiality of the office offered some guarantees against individualistic behaviours.<sup>103</sup> Only rarely was a

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<sup>99</sup> The ἵππαρχος was a subordinate of the *strategos* (cf. e.g. Dem. 21.164), but they were elected, and enjoyed considerable authority. [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1.3; [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 31.3, 44.4, 61.4-5. Indeed, Hutchinson (2000) 187 compellingly points out how the leadership skills that Xenophon recognised in the *hipparchos* were not dissimilar to those of the *strategos*. Cf. Larsen (1946) 92; Spence (1993) 94; Dillery (2017) 210; Payen (2018) 158.

<sup>100</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.26. The democratic faction retaliated, suggesting that the people of Aexone were helping the Athenians in the Piraeus.

<sup>101</sup> Cf. Lys. 13.79; Dem. 4.19. On Xenophon's disapproval of these actions, see Krentz (1995) *ad loc.*

<sup>102</sup> Cf. Lee (2017) 25.

<sup>103</sup> Fornara (1971) 8; Sinclair (1988) 79; Hansen (1991) 237-239; *Generals* 84, 158; Harris (2010) 407. Cf. Strauss (1983) 31, which discusses the limits of collegiality in terms of a (lack of) trust between the colleagues.

*strategos* assigned to a mandate on his own, and most of these cases predominantly involved undertaking administrative tasks, such as the collection of funds from the allies.<sup>104</sup>

The dynamics between colleague *strategoi* are not always easy to assess. At the beginning of the democracy, the *polemarchos* was left as *hegemon* of the *strategoi*.<sup>105</sup> However, Herodotus presents the *polemarchos*' authority as already being loose in the early fifth century.<sup>106</sup> Once the *polemarch* was out of the picture, the *strategoi* had to work with their colleagues to arrive at a communal line of action.

A possible solution is the rotation of supreme power. In the account of the battle of Marathon, Herodotus reports that each of the *strategoi* held full power over the entire army for a day.<sup>107</sup> At the end of their 'mandate', they passed this power to another colleague, and so on. Interestingly, Diodorus records a similar process in the battle of Arginusae islands, in 406 BC, and that of Aegospotami, in 405 BC.<sup>108</sup> Aside from Hammond and Payen,<sup>109</sup> most of the scholarship tends to exclude rotation as a possible solution for the dynamics of leadership.<sup>110</sup>

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<sup>104</sup> Thuc. 3.19, 4.50.1, 75.1; Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.2-4. There are few exceptions, e.g. Thuc. 2.69. Cf. Hansen (1991) 237-238. Hammond (1969) 126, 128 argues that Thucydides does not fail to report the colleagues, as Dover (1960) 64 guesses, but that there were many more cases of single commands. However, there is not enough evidence to confirm Hammond's hypothesis, while epigraphical evidence supports Dover's theory.

<sup>105</sup> Fornara (1971) 12.

<sup>106</sup> Fornara (1971) 3-4, 6; *Generals* 81-82; Johnstone (2011) 113-114.

<sup>107</sup> Hdt. 6.110. Cf. Plut. *Arist.* 5.2. Scott (2005) *ad loc.* suggests that the rotation was necessary because all ten *strategoi* were present, a quite unusual scenario.

<sup>108</sup> Diod. 13.97.6, 106.1.

<sup>109</sup> Hammond (1969) 123-125; Payen (2018) 158-159. Cf. Badian (1971) 26; Nenci (1998) *ad* 6.111.

<sup>110</sup> Jameson (1955) 79-82; Dover (1960) 71-72; Harris (2010) 410. Cf. more generally Todd (1993) 292. Hamel *Generals* 81, 94-95 recognises it as Herodotus' misunderstanding. Cf. Fornara (1971) 72-73; Hornblower (2011) 148.

There are some references to a council of *strategoi*, *taxiarchoi*, and *trierarchoi*.<sup>111</sup> Major decisions, such as on strategy and tactics, are presented as a discussion between colleagues.<sup>112</sup> Johnston argues that the Athenian boards aimed to reach a consensus between members, and only when this was not possible was the decision made by majority vote.<sup>113</sup>

However, some *strategoi* seem to have been more influential than others.<sup>114</sup> Previously, scholarship has argued that some *strategoi*, and Pericles in particular, had a special legal status.<sup>115</sup> When the *strategoi* were still elected tribe by tribe, a single *strategos* would have been elected ἐξ ἁπάντων, granting him more authority.<sup>116</sup> Other scholars focus on the periphrases δέκατος αὐτός. Used twice in association with Pericles, it has been argued that it was legal jargon, which implied a legal superiority over the council of the *strategoi*.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>111</sup> Thuc. 7.60; 8.25-27. Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.30 reports a similar scenario in the Syracusan fleet. Hornblower (2004) 246 points out how Thuc. 7.48.1 is also generally interpreted as a war-council. Olson (2002) 221-222 correctly points out that *taxiarchoi* and *strategoi* are often mentioned together, as in *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 334, ll. 13-14. Possibly, they were involved in the war council too. For a parallel, see Nussbaum (1967) 34-39 on the role of the *lochagoi* in the Ten Thousand.

<sup>112</sup> Thuc. 6.50.1. Cf. Plut. *Nic.* 20.6-7, which Hamel *Generals* 99 sees as a proof of the majority criterion for a decision, because Menandrus and Euthydemus forced Nicias to fight.

<sup>113</sup> Johnstone (2011) 118-121. On majority vote, Hansen (1991) 237; *Generals* 95-96; Harris (2010) 410. Cf. Nussbaum (1967) 44-48, 97 on a similar hypothesis in the management of the Ten Thousand.

<sup>114</sup> E.g. Pericles: Hammond (1969) 127, 129-130; Bloedow (1987) 24-27. Nicias: Plut. *Nic.* 14.4. Hamel *Generals* 97-99 reads the phenomenon as a matter of 'motivation' of one of the *strategoi*, who persuaded the others to follow his will.

<sup>115</sup> E.g. Bloedow (1987). More generally on the equivalent power of the *strategoi*, see Westlake (1956); Lengauer (1979) 22-23; Hansen (1991) 237; Boëldieu-Trevet (2007) 71-72.

<sup>116</sup> Ehrenberg (1945) 113-115; Jameson (1955) 64-65, 71-72; Westlake (1956) 112-116; Jouanna (2007) 46.

<sup>117</sup> Thuc. 1.116.1; 2.13.1. Bloedow (1987) esp. 17-26.

Both hypotheses are not sustainable.<sup>118</sup> There is no evidence of a legal superiority of one *strategos* over his colleagues.<sup>119</sup> However, the situation might be different when considering informal authority. Dover and Fornara suggest that the expression ‘numeral plus αὐτός’ just indicates a group of *strategoï*; Thucydides recorded the name of the most ‘memorable’ of them, thus suggesting an informal pre-eminence.<sup>120</sup> Social dynamics such as reputation, political influence, and charisma plausibly had a substantial impact on the institutions, and should be taken into consideration.<sup>121</sup> In the next Chapter, this hypothesis will be duly discussed, and taken as the starting point for a discussion on a type of authority unrelated to the legal status of the commanders.

#### RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE *ECCLESIA*

As we have discussed above, it is reasonable to believe that the *strategoï* had substantial power in their hands. However, it is undeniable that the *strategoï* remained subject to the control of the *Ecclesia* at every moment; it assigned them tasks, checked their progress, and could recall a *strategos*.<sup>122</sup> This power dynamic obliged the *strategoï* to deal with the Assembly continuously, and from a position of inferiority.<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> Dover (1960) 61, 71-75, Fornara (1971) 28 n. 2, 36-37. See also *Generals* 92-93.

<sup>119</sup> Fornara (1971) 19-27. See also Hammond (1969) 120-130. *Contra* Bloedow (1987) attacks both Dover’s and Fornara’s reconstructions, but his counterarguments are not very convincing, still lacking proof that δέκατος αὐτός and ἐξ ἀπάντων were titles involving a special authority.

<sup>120</sup> Dover (1960) 69-76; Fornara (1971) 36. Cf. Hornblower (2011) 148. The difference between literary and epigraphical sources in the case of the 431/30 BC *strategia* is indeed a solid argument. Thucydides (2.23.2) uses a different order than the institutional one, as reported in *IG I<sup>3</sup>* 365. Consequently, it is safe to assume that Thucydides did not privilege the ‘official’ order of the *strategoï*. Cf. Hammond (1969) 125; Fornara (1971) 34; *Generals* 87-88. *Contra* Bloedow (1987) 19-22.

<sup>121</sup> Cf. Canevaro (2019) 487-490. Cautiously, Johnstone (2011) 124.

<sup>122</sup> E.g. Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.10-13. *Generals* 40; Scafuro (2018) 199, 201.

<sup>123</sup> *Generals* 14, 19, 21-23.

The *strategoï* were possibly involved in the summoning of the *Ecclesia*. The *Constitution of the Athenians* does not report this prerogative, but it is variously attested in different sources.<sup>124</sup> However, this prerogative did not give them additional power.<sup>125</sup> Like any other public figure, the *strategoï* in the fifth and fourth centuries were involved in the debates of the *Ecclesia*, especially discussing military expeditions.<sup>126</sup> Plato states that military experience was taken into special consideration in the discussions of war scenarios.<sup>127</sup> Plato does not explicitly name Athens in the passage, but it is plausible that he was referring to the practice of the Assembly he was used to in making this example. Hamel acknowledges the relevance of the *strategoï* in swaying the public opinion, but correctly warns us of overstating the *strategoï*'s influence.<sup>128</sup> The example of Nicias' caution before the Sicilian campaign is emblematic: his reasonable objections were ignored by the *demos*, who were captivated by the dream of conquest proposed by Alcibiades.<sup>129</sup>

Interestingly, the *strategoï* had importance in the Assembly also in the fourth century. Considering the progressive depoliticisation of the *strategoï*,<sup>130</sup> this notion appears odd, but Demosthenes is pretty clear in implying that the *strategoï* were expected to speak in the Assembly, backing up the points made by some *rhetoires* with similar views.<sup>131</sup> More than

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<sup>124</sup> Thuc. 2.22.1, 4.118.1-4; *IG I<sup>3</sup>* 93c, ll. 20-21; Dem. 18.37, 73. Rhodes (1972) 45; *Generals* 7-8, with some scepticism at p. 12. *Contra* Hansen (1987) 19, 22-26; (1993) 152. *IG I<sup>3</sup>* 61, ll. 51-56 implies that the *strategoï* could add a new item to the assembly agenda, probably in cases of military emergency.

<sup>125</sup> *Generals* 6-12.

<sup>126</sup> E.g. *IG I<sup>3</sup>* 118; R&O 162; Thuc. 2.59.3ff, 6.9ff; Pl. *Gorg.* 455b-c; Isoc. 5.81; Dem. 18.170; Din. 3.19. Hansen (1991) 269-270.

<sup>127</sup> Pl. *Gorg.* 455b-c. Plato uses the adjective *στρατηγικός* to refer to the military 'experts'. That the *strategoï* were included in this category is plausible.

<sup>128</sup> *Generals* 12-14, 26.

<sup>129</sup> Thuc. 6.9-24.

<sup>130</sup> Hamel (1995) 31.

<sup>131</sup> Dem. 18.170, 178. Hansen (1991) 280-283.

one *rhetor* advised the Athenians not to listen to the *strategoi*, which implies that they had a certain influence over the masses.<sup>132</sup>

Understandably, the *strategoi* were involved in the proposals and discussions of mandates.<sup>133</sup> The proposer of an expedition was typically appointed to it. This is the case of Cleon, who asked to be sent to Thrace in 424 BC,<sup>134</sup> and Alcibiades for the Sicilian campaign.<sup>135</sup>

Nevertheless, the *strategoi* could be appointed for other reasons too.<sup>136</sup> Knowledge of the area and local contacts might have had a role in the appointment.<sup>137</sup> Some commanders were consistently sent to the same areas when possible, such as Demosthenes to Acarnania and other areas inhabited by Messenians,<sup>138</sup> or where they were more familiar, such as Thucydides to Thracian Chersonese.<sup>139</sup>

If there was not a *strategos* acquainted with the area, the personal record of the commander at times influenced the Assembly.<sup>140</sup> Experienced and successful commanders plausibly would be preferred for delicate missions.<sup>141</sup> Nicias was chosen for the Sicilian

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<sup>132</sup> E.g. Aeschin 3.7; Din. 1.112, 3.19.

<sup>133</sup> *Generals* 12-14.

<sup>134</sup> Thuc. 5.2.1.

<sup>135</sup> Thuc. 6.8.2; Diod. 12.83-84. Cf. Hdt. 6.132. Thucydides never ascribes Alcibiades as the proposer of the expedition. However, his role in the debate could denote his implication in the proposal. Alcibiades' political effort in this campaign is underlined in Nicias' speech (Thuc. 6.13.1), when Nicias describes Alcibiades and his *philoï* as seated together in the Assembly, probably to make an impression on the *demos*.

<sup>136</sup> E.g. Thuc. 4.122.6. In 424 BC Cleon proposed an expedition against Scione, but he did not lead it. *Generals* 19-20. Cf. Thuc. 6.8; Lys. 18.1-3; Plut. *Nic.* 12.4, 14.1.

<sup>137</sup> *Generals* 17-19; Mitchell (2000) 348; Hornblower (2011) 149; Bettalli (2013) 91-92.

<sup>138</sup> Thuc. 3.91.1, 4.3.1-2.

<sup>139</sup> Thuc. 4.104-105. *Generals* 16-17. Cf. Trevett (1995) 247.

<sup>140</sup> Tritle (1988) 108-109; *Generals* 19.

<sup>141</sup> E.g. Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.39. On experience as a criterion for choosing the commanders, see Connor (1971) 10; Piérart (1974) 127-128; Lengauer (1979) 43-44; Ober (1989) 92; *Generals* 16; *Psychology* 124-125.

expedition because he was cautious, thus a perfect counterpart for the daring Alcibiades.<sup>142</sup> Nevertheless, there are several exceptions. For instance, Paches was sent to Mytilene without having been *strategos* before,<sup>143</sup> Cleon was sent to Pylos with limited military experience, only because he was obliged to by his own political game,<sup>144</sup> and Hippocrates was left alone in Boeotia with the army even if he had been *strategos* just once before.<sup>145</sup>

The *strategos* did not have the option to refuse a mandate. Once the *Ecclesia* had appointed somebody, he had to lead the expedition, whether he was elected or not. The case of Nicias is the most famous example, but Cleon also confirms the same pattern, when he was sent to Pylos in 425 BC.<sup>146</sup>

Unfortunately, we have little information about the involvement of the *strategoï* in the discussions of mandates. The only two occurrences with enough detail – Pericles' 'island strategy' at the beginning of the Archidamian War and the Sicilian expedition – both took place in exceptional circumstances.<sup>147</sup> In the former case, Pericles presented his strategy of non-intervention in Attica to the Assembly. This unusual and controversial strategy went

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<sup>142</sup> Thuc. 6.24.2; Plut. *Nic.* 12.4. Lengauer (1979) 40-41. Cf. Trevett (1995), who suggests that Nicias was an expert on Sicily, and had political links with people in Syracuse.

<sup>143</sup> *PA* 11746. Westlake (1975) 107-108.

<sup>144</sup> Thuc. 4.27-28; Plut. *Nic.* 7.4. Piccirilli (1997) 3-4 suggests that Nicias found a way to remit his *strategia* because he believed the assault of Sphacteria was too long, complicated, and dangerous. Cf. Flower (1992) 42-43. Wylie (1993) 24, instead, suggests that Cleon could have been in agreement with Demosthenes, thus voluntarily trying to take the command away from Nicias. Cleon chose Demosthenes as his colleague, but Nicias' remittal of the *strategia* was a highly irregular procedure. It is improbable that Cleon would have aimed for this; trying to impeach Nicias would have been a safer option.

<sup>145</sup> *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 369.3; Thuc. 4.66.3, 67, 77.1; Diod. 12.66, 69; Plut. *Nic.* 6; Xen. *Mem.* 3.5.4. Cf. *PA* 7640; Develin (1989) 126-128, 132-133.

<sup>146</sup> Thuc. 4.27-28. Cf. Plut. *Cim.* 18.5. *Generals* 20-21. Diodorus (14.92) states that Iphicrates resigned from his position because of a disagreement with the demos during the Corinthian War. The reliability of the passage is debatable, but Iphicrates was certainly not a *strategos*, as Diodorus seems to imply. *Contra* Develin (1989) 210-211.

<sup>147</sup> Thuc. 1.140-144, 6.9-23. On the 'island' strategy and its innovative aspects, see e.g. de Ste Croix (1972) 207; Kelly (1982) esp. 36-38; Ober (1992) 66; Platias (2002) 379; Asmonti (2008) 85-86 Kagan (2010) 51-53.

against the Athenians' expectations of defending their land, and negatively impacted on Pericles' image.<sup>148</sup> Perhaps Pericles expected this outcome, and proposed his strategy to the Assembly to protect himself.<sup>149</sup> Thucydides reports that Pericles' defence against the dissatisfaction derived from his strategy relied heavily on the fact that the Athenians had approved his plan, thus sharing the responsibility. Perhaps Thucydides emphasises Pericles' role on this occasion, and does not record any discussion of the matter. However, it cannot be excluded that the *strategoï* might have had an important role in the definition of the mandate.

The latter example is not so different. Two *strategoï* monopolised the debate, and the *demos* ultimately voted to leave the essential matters of the number of soldiers and the amount of financial resources to the *strategoï* themselves.<sup>150</sup>

Once the mandate was assigned, the *Ecclesia* still had power over the *strategoï*. In the fourth century, a vote by raise of hands took place every month to confirm the *strategoï* in office.<sup>151</sup> If the magistrate did not pass the vote, he was formally dismissed, and put on trial.<sup>152</sup>

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<sup>148</sup> Thuc. 2.21; Aristoph. *Acharn.* 223-237. Cf. MacDowell (1983) 148; Holladay (1987) 183.

<sup>149</sup> Thuc. 2.59-65.

<sup>150</sup> Thuc. 6.8-26.

<sup>151</sup> Lys. 30.5; [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 43.4, 48.3, 61.2. GSW 2.28-29; Rhodes (1979) 110; Roberts (1982) 15-17, 21; Hansen (1987) 26; Sinclair (1988) 157; Stadter (1989) *ad.* 35.4; *Generals* 122.

<sup>152</sup> Thuc. 6.61.5; Plut. *Alc.* 22. Rhodes (1979) 103; Harrison (1998) 2.59. Scafuro (2018) 201-203 points out how before 362 BC the *strategoï* failing the vote were judged by the Assembly, whilst the *Constitution of the Athenians* mentions the *dikasteria*.

To allow the *Ecclesia* to judge the matter the *strategoi* probably sent regular reports. This practise is attested in the fourth century,<sup>153</sup> but there are fifth century examples too.<sup>154</sup> The most detailed example is the letter reported by Thucydides in Book Seven.<sup>155</sup> The content of the letter is well-known: Nicias highlighted the precarious position of the Athenian contingent, their latest defeats due to Gylippus, and several other problems. On this occasion, Thucydides' introduction to the letter serves our focus more than the rest. He wrote:

It had been his [Nicias'] practice to send regular dispatches with a detailed account of events (ἔπεμπε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἀγγέλλων πολλάκις), but this time he went into particular detail, as he thought the situation was critical, and all would be lost (οὐδεμίαν εἶναι σωτηρίαν), if the Athenians did not take immediate action either to recall the expedition or to send out considerable reinforcements. Concerned that his message might be distorted by his emissaries, through incompetence at public speaking (κατὰ τὴν τοῦ λέγειν ἀδυνασίαν), failure of memory (μνήμης ἐλλιπεῖς), or adjustments to suit the moods of the masses, he put his dispatch in writing, thinking this the best way to guarantee that the Athenians heard his personal opinion undiluted in the transmission, and could make their decision on the true facts of the case (νομίζων οὕτως ἂν μάλιστα τὴν αὐτοῦ γνώμην μηδὲν ἐν τῷ ἀγγέλῳ ἀφανισθεῖσαν μαθόντας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους βουλευσασθαι περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας). (trans. Hammond).<sup>156</sup>

With his report, Nicias presented an alternative to the Athenians: either to send another army of equal size to the first contingent, or to allow them to retreat.<sup>157</sup> Nicias

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<sup>153</sup> IG II<sup>3</sup> 1 229, 339, and, possibly IG II<sup>2</sup> 110, 187; Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.4; Isoc. 7.81; Aeschin. 2.90, 134; Dem. 4.33, 8.47, 18.73, 23.151, 183; [Dem.] 10.22; Diod. 16.21.4. Pritchett GSW 2.46-47.

<sup>154</sup> Thuc. 4.27.3-4, 7.8-9.

<sup>155</sup> The 'letter' was probably entirely written by Thucydides' hand. Lengauer (1979) 42; Zadorojnyi (1998) 299-300. However, it is also plausible that Thucydides aimed to represent a realistic practice. For a fourth century example of a commander's letter, see Aeschin. 2.90; Diod. 16.21.4.

<sup>156</sup> Thuc. 7.8.1-2. Cf. Diod. 13.8.6; Plut. *Nic.* 20.1-2.

<sup>157</sup> Kallet (2001) 152.

evidently tried to use the same trick that he used in the discussion of the original mission in 415 BC: to ask for a massive amount of resources to force the Assembly to stop the project.<sup>158</sup> As in the past, this strategy did not work, and the Athenians granted him more colleagues, troops, and supplies.

Nicias' letter was an extreme case, but other *strategoï* are attested to have made requests to the *Ecclesia*. Usually, the commander asked for more troops or money, to accomplish their tasks more effectively.<sup>159</sup> The Assembly had the faculty to accept or deny the commanders' requests. The *Ecclesia* voted these demands, probably after hearing the report or its summary, as in the case of Nicias' letter.<sup>160</sup>

Occasionally, the *Ecclesia* could send new instructions to the commanders through this line of communication. As noted above, the *strategoï* could either be redeployed or recalled according to changes in the diplomatic picture,<sup>161</sup> but the *Ecclesia* could also issue more precise instructions, especially concerning the handling of war prisoners.<sup>162</sup> Occasionally, precise instructions on these matters were issued with the original mandate. Xenophon reports an Athenian decree, approved just before the battle of Aegospotamoi (405 BC), which ordered the *strategoï* to cut off the right hand of every prisoner.<sup>163</sup> Less

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<sup>158</sup> Thuc. 6.19.2. Hutchinson (2006) 122-123. Zadorojnyi (1998) 300-301 finds in the letter strong references to the *Iliad*. His observation is convincing, but his conclusion – that Nicias did not want to retreat, but to have more resources from Athens – seems to go too far. Cf. Lateiner (1985) 202. The Homeric echoes only attest to the rhetorical composition of the passage.

<sup>159</sup> E.g. Thuc. 6.93.4, 94.4; Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.8, 5.4.66. Flower (1992) 44 hypothesises the same for Demosthenes at Pylos (425 BC).

<sup>160</sup> Thuc. 7.16.

<sup>161</sup> Chapter One 22, n. 42.

<sup>162</sup> Diod. 14.92.2. On prisoners: Thuc. 3.28, 4.46-47, 54.2; Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.2, 2.1.31-32.

<sup>163</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.31-32.

compellingly, Hamel argues that the Spartans were captured at Sphacteria (425 BC) in accordance with the instructions of the *Ecclesia*, who had accepted Cleon's proposal.<sup>164</sup>

Hamel concludes that the *strategoï* had limited power in the matter and deferred the decision to the *demos*.<sup>165</sup> Mytilene's surrender (427 BC) is taken as an example of the usual practice: after having agreed a truce with the Athenian *strategos* Paches, Mytilene sent ambassadors to Athens to discuss the terms of surrender, and the Athenians decided the destiny of the Mytileneans.<sup>166</sup>

However, the picture is not as neat as Hamel suggests. If it is true that there are several examples of prisoners sent to Athens, on several occasions *strategoï* sold, enslaved, freed, or even killed prisoners.<sup>167</sup> That the *strategoï* were always authorised by the Assembly is unsupported by evidence. Indeed, some instances imply a decision *ad personam*, like when Conon and his colleagues took pity on Dorieus, a commander of Turi with a pending death sentence in Athens, and let him go.<sup>168</sup> Furthermore, prisoners could be shipped to Athens for many other reasons than the deliberation of the *Ecclesia*, such as waiting for a ransom, or to be used as political pawns, like the Spartans captured in 425 BC.<sup>169</sup>

The *strategoï*'s authority to agree terms with other *poleis* should be discussed here too.

It is generally assumed that the *strategoï* did not have the authority to negotiate and accept

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<sup>164</sup> *Generals* 42-43, 51-53. It should be noted that there is no evidence to support Hamel's reading. If anything, Thucydides stresses that the Athenians did not expect to capture the Spartans alive, which makes it improbable that Cleon had this order. On the surprise, see Rood (1998) 36-37; Nevin (2017) 136; *Tactics* 101.

<sup>165</sup> *Generals* 51. E.g. Thuc. 2.103.1; 3.35.1; Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.12-13, 3.21-22.

<sup>166</sup> Thuc. 3.28-50.

<sup>167</sup> Ransomed on site: Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.36. Freeing prisoners: Plut. *Alc.* 29; *Phoc.* 13. Killing: Hdt. 9.119; Thuc. 2.92.2, 6.61.3; Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.13. Selling: Thuc. 6.62.3-4. More doubtful is the human sacrifice attested in Plut. *Them.* 13.2; *Arist.* 9.2.

<sup>168</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.19. Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.12-13.

<sup>169</sup> Thuc. 1.113.3, 2.102 4.108, 5.15.1. Cf. Thuc. 2.103.1, for the exchange of prisoners.

terms, even from a surrendering enemy. Three fifth century episodes might support this reading: the aforementioned closure of Mytilene's revolt, the surrender of Potidaea (429 BC) and the treaty that ended the first Sicilian campaign (424 BC).<sup>170</sup> If Paches played by the book, the other *strategoï* took more liberty, and accepted the terms proposed to them without consulting the Assembly. In the first instance, the Athenians grumbled, but did not recall the *strategoï* Xenophon, Hestiodorus, and Phanomachos, who died in battle the same year at Spartolos.<sup>171</sup> Pythodorus, Sophocles, and Eurymedon, the *strategoï* returning from Sicily, were less fortunate: the former two were condemned to death, and the latter was fined.<sup>172</sup>

Hamel argues that these instances involved an abuse of power by the *strategoï*: only the *Ecclesia* had the authority to agree to treaties.<sup>173</sup> Technically, she is right: what the *strategoï* negotiated on the field had to be ratified by the Assembly, which had the faculty to reject the agreements reached.<sup>174</sup> However, once again, the picture is not clear-cut. Nicias was able to promise the inhabitants of Cythera that the Athenians would not pursue a death sentence if they surrendered.<sup>175</sup> Alcibiades agreed and signed many alliances between 410 and 408 BC, and the Athenians apparently ratified them without problem.<sup>176</sup> Indeed, in all these occurrences the *strategoï* demonstrated that they had the faculty to agree terms in the name of *polis*, although this probably depended on the Assembly's ratification.

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<sup>170</sup> Thuc. 2.70.2-7; 4.65.2.

<sup>171</sup> Thuc. 2.79.

<sup>172</sup> Thuc. 4.65.3-4.

<sup>173</sup> *General* 40-44.

<sup>174</sup> E.g. Dem. 23.167, 171-172.

<sup>175</sup> Thuc. 4.54.2.

<sup>176</sup> O&R 185.

Consequently, it is possible to conclude that the case of Paches at Mytilene was not necessarily the rule. Thucydides specifies with great detail the terms of the truce, even presenting an example of Paches' good faith, suggesting something unusual.<sup>177</sup> Paches has been seen by some scholars as overzealous because he was overly concerned about how he would be kept accountable.<sup>178</sup> The dissatisfaction for the outcome of the siege of Potidaea scared him, and he tried as hard as possible to give more space to the Assembly.

The contradictory nature of the evidence does not allow us to be certain that the *Ecclesia* had to authorise every move of the *strategoï*, even in these specific matters. The Assembly had the authority to issue precise instructions to the *strategoï*, and, on occasion, it did so. However, there is not enough evidence to recognise these isolated cases as the norm, especially as they are openly contradicted by other passages.

## ACCOUNTABILITY

All Athenian magistrates were personally accountable for their actions, and the *strategoï* were no exception. However, it is difficult to appreciate the extent to which the fifth century procedure differed from the better attested fourth century one.<sup>179</sup>

The *Constitution of the Athenians* records three main tools that the Athenians used to control the *strategoï*'s operate and limit their powers: the ἀποχειροτονία, the εἰσαγγελία, and the εὐθύνα. As mentioned in the last Section, every *prytany* the *Ecclesia* voted to reconfirm the *strategoï*. If the *strategoï* passed the vote (ἐπιχειροτονία), they continued their

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<sup>177</sup> Thuc. 3.28.1.

<sup>178</sup> Meiggs (1972) 313; Westlake (1975) 110; *Commentary ad.* 3.28.2.

<sup>179</sup> *Generals* 124; Scafuro (2018) 204.

office.<sup>180</sup> Alternatively, if they failed the vote (ἀποχειροτονία), they were formally deposed of their authority.

A charge of *eisaggelia* could be filed for severe misconduct, with charges such as treason, endangering the constitution, or even severe religious offences.<sup>181</sup> The *Boule* had the faculty of judging any case with a fine under 500 drachmas.<sup>182</sup> Otherwise, the case was either deferred to a jury, or the *Ecclesia*.<sup>183</sup> The matter was probably voted on by raising of hands. A ballot vote is reported in the case of the Arginusae, but there is no reference to a quorum in the *eisaggelia* trial.<sup>184</sup> If acquitted, the *strategos* recovered his office until the end of its natural term.<sup>185</sup>

The *euthuna* was a review to judge the actions of the magistrates once they had concluded their office.<sup>186</sup> In the fourth century, this examination consisted of two parts: a check of the accounts, and an evaluation of the *strategos'* actions. Each commander's accounts

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<sup>180</sup> [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 43.4, 61.2. Frölich (2004) 312. The first known instance of the ἀποχειροτονία is Timotheus, in 373 BC ([Dem.] 49.9, 12), but a similar process had existed from at least the 430s BC (Thuc. 2.65.3; Diod. 12.43.4; Plut. *Per.* 35.4). Cf. *Generals* 123-124.

<sup>181</sup> Hyp. 4.7-8. Todd (1993) 114-115; Harrison (1998) 2.53-54. However, Rhodes (1979) 107 underlines that the range was probably even greater and included 'petty crimes'.

<sup>182</sup> Hansen (1975) 21-28, 112-120; Frölich (2004) 312-313. Rhodes (1979) 106-107, 113-114, (1981) *ad.* 45.2 and Roberts (1982) 22 stress how the most serious offences were left to the judgment of the Assembly or a jury. *Contra* Hansen (1975) 21-28, who suggests that the criteria for choosing the two procedures were not strictly defined.

<sup>183</sup> The whole process could have been dealt with by the Assembly, although there is only one attested case, the controversial process of the *stratego*i involved in the battle of the Arginusae (Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.9, 22). Harrison (1998) 2.57-58. Hansen (1991) 159 points out that this competence was plausibly stripped from the *demos* by a reform of the *eisaggelia* between the 362 and the 355 BC. Cf. Todd (1993) 114-115. Roberts (1982) 22-23 notes that the *eisaggelias* in front of the *Ecclesia* were more frequent.

<sup>184</sup> Harrison (1998) 2.58. Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.12, 20-23. See Pritchett GSW 2.13-14 and Rhodes (1979) 111 on the many irregularities of this trial, and Hall Sternberg (1999) 195 and Szawiel (2009) 275 on the exceptionality of the case. Roberts (1977) 108-109 hypothesises a political motive for this trial.

<sup>185</sup> *Generals* 122-123. Scafuro (2018) 206-209 underlines how unclear is the procedure for reinstatement in office, which could have involved a trial as well as a simpler petition to the Assembly.

<sup>186</sup> Lys. 30.5; [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 48.3; Aeschin. 3.23; Dem. 18.117. Sinclair (1988) 79.

were checked every prytany by a commission of ten *logistai* and ten *sunegoroi*, and for a final time after 30 days from when they deposed of their authority.<sup>187</sup> Whether they found something of concern or not, every *strategos* was brought separately in front of a jury of 501 members, which could acquit the commander or remit him to another court for a trial. In this trial, not only the *logistai*, but anyone could make an accusation. After this first stage, over the next three days any Athenian citizen could denounce any non-financial misconduct to the *euthunoi*, a board of ten magistrates, one for each tribe, who evaluated the reliability of the accusation. In any case, where they believed it necessary, the *euthunoi* referred the accusation either to the *thesmothetes* for public charges, or the Forty, the fourth century development of the traveling judges introduced in the sixth century, for private arguments.<sup>188</sup>

In addition to these forms of accountability, Roberts underlines that other proceedings could be initiated against a magistrate, such as a δίκη δώρων or a δίκη προδοσίας.<sup>189</sup> However, Hansen reasonably points out that these charges were rare, suggesting that the *eisaggelia* was the preferred form of procedure.<sup>190</sup>

There was a concrete chance that the *stratego*i would be brought to trial during or after their office. Hamel calculates that a *strategos'* chance of facing a trial was 10.7-11.8%

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<sup>187</sup> Lys. 30.5; [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 48.3-5, 54. GSW 2.28; Todd (1993) 112-113; Harrison (1998) 2.208-211. Frölich (2004) 79, 306 underlines the difference between these two commissions, despite both being made of *logistai*.

<sup>188</sup> Harrison (1998) 2.211 for the quotation. See also Roberts (1982) 18; Frölich (2004) 102-06, 331-335. Scafuro (2018) 212 compellingly suggests that the *thesmothetes* could be involved only in the *stratego*i's *euthunai*.

<sup>189</sup> [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 59.3; [Dem.] 46.26; Poll. 8.40. Roberts (1982) 18-19. See also Rhodes (1979) 105; Frölich (2004) 315. More in general, see Scufaro (2018) 201.

<sup>190</sup> Hansen (1975) 9-11, 37-50.

for the Peloponnesian War, and 17.2-19.4% for the successive half-century.<sup>191</sup> The ratio of *strategoï* put on trial for *eisaggelia* ranged from 11.7% to 13.5%,<sup>192</sup> and the impeached *strategoï* were 4.3%, rising to 7% for *strategoï* prominent in the sources.<sup>193</sup> The *strategoï*'s trials deriving from the *euthunai* are poorly attested. Only two fifth century instances are recorded in the available sources,<sup>194</sup> possibly because the other forms of accountability were more commonly used.<sup>195</sup>

Hamel's reconstruction is quite grim. On average, one *strategos* out of ten during the Peloponnesian War, and two out of ten in the following fifty years were prosecuted every year. Furthermore, the sentences seem to have mostly been severe.<sup>196</sup> The death sentence and hefty fines are well represented in the available sources.<sup>197</sup>

The ancient sources support the idea that the *strategos* was a dangerous office. In the *Republic*, Plato comments on how the *strategoï* were vexed by sycophants all the time,<sup>198</sup> but Aeschines reminds us that the *rhetoires* were the real agents in these proceedings,

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<sup>191</sup> *Generals* 130-132.

<sup>192</sup> *Generals* 136-138. Cf. p. 124 on the limits of this quantitative approach due to the incomplete data.

<sup>193</sup> *Generals* 122-126. See Roberts (1982) 21.

<sup>194</sup> Schol. Aristoph. *Pax* 348 e, f; Androtion *FGrHist* 342 F8; Plut. *Arist.* 26.5; *Nic.* 6.1. GSW 2.13; Roberts (1982) 24.

<sup>195</sup> Roberts (1982) 24-25; *Generals* 129-130. Todd (1993) 113 suggests that the trials after the *euthunai* were quite frequent in the fifth century, but were replaced by a greater reliance on the *eisaggelia* in the following century.

<sup>196</sup> GSW 2.18-19; Hansen (1991) 216; *Generals* 133-136.

<sup>197</sup> These are the sentences related to the Peloponnesian War: Exile: Thuc. 4.65.3, 5.26.4. Death: Lys. 13.34-35; Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.1; Lyc. 1.115. However, fines are attested too: Thuc. 2.65.3, 4.65.3; Androtion *FGrHist* 324 F8. The data for the fourth century are similar.

<sup>198</sup> Pl. *Rep.* 553a-c. Ober (1989) 174. Lysias (13.30, 32, 53) provides us with a practical example of a sycophant, the sketchy Agorathus. Because Agorathus was the main object of Lysias' speech, we have to be careful in evaluating this information.

occasionally even blackmailing the commanders – or so he said.<sup>199</sup> More explicit is

Theopompus' formulation, as reported by Athenaeus:

[Chabrias] was unable to live in the city partly because of his licentiousness and his extravagant lifestyle, and partly because of the Athenians, for they were hard on all (ἄπασι γὰρ εἰσι χαλεποὶ). (trans. Morison).<sup>200</sup>

In such a framework, it is not surprising to find references to the concern, or even fear felt by the Athenian commanders of being held accountable, a phenomenon which extends back to the fifth century.<sup>201</sup> Pericles famously avoided the gathering of the Assembly during the first year of the Peloponnesian War, because he was aware of their discontent with him.<sup>202</sup> In the end, the situation became so critical that he had to address the Athenians, and was able to convince them to trust him, at least for the time being.<sup>203</sup> However, after the substantial failure of the first raid in the Peloponnese, Pericles was fined.<sup>204</sup>

Similarly, Plutarch represents Alcibiades' concerns in emphatic terms. Accused of the Eleusinian mysteries' parody, Alcibiades did not have much trust in the Athenians' judgment. Plutarch writes:

When someone recognised him and asked, “Can you not trust your country (τῆ πατρίδι), Alcibiades?” “In all else,” he said, “but in the matter of life I

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<sup>199</sup> Aeschin. 3.145-146. Being an accusation brought against Demosthenes, this statement must be approached carefully, but it is undeniable that this scenario fits the picture presented by other sources.

<sup>200</sup> Theopompus *FGrHist* 115 F105 = Ath. 12.532a-b Olson. Cf. Harris (1989) 270-271, who associates the passage with the harshness of the Athenians in the accountability trials.

<sup>201</sup> E.g. Hdt. 9.117; Thuc. 1.49.4, 3.98.5.

<sup>202</sup> Thuc. 2.21.2-22.1.

<sup>203</sup> Thuc. 2.59-65. Hamel *Generals* 11-12 emphasises Pericles' fear of the *demos*, arguing that it demonstrates that the statesman did not have special powers. Hamel is right from a legal point of view, but it is undeniable that Pericles' grasp on the Athenians allowed him more freedom of action. Indeed, he was able to save himself thanks to his influence and eloquence.

<sup>204</sup> Thuc. 2.65.2-3; Diod. 12.45.4; Plut. *Per.* 35.3-4. Stadter (1989) *ad loc.*

wouldn't trust even my own mother not to mistake a black for a white ballot when she cast her vote ( μήπως ἀγνοήσασα τὴν μέλαιναν ἀντὶ τῆς λευκῆς ἐπενέγκη ψῆφον).” (trans. Perrin).<sup>205</sup>

The anecdote is probably fanciful, but it well encapsulates the concern surrounding the trials. Indeed, Alcibiades ran away when formally charged, as did many others.<sup>206</sup>

Nicias is the most blatant example of the effect that the fear for their accountability might have on the *strategoï*. When he was sent to Sparta as an ambassador, and he could not convince the Spartans to agree to the Athenian conditions, Thucydides describes Nicias as fearful of the *demos*' reaction.<sup>207</sup> In the discussion of the best strategy to adopt in Sicily (415 BC), Nicias paid attention to containing the campaign's expenses, which might indicate his concern for the incoming *euthuna*.<sup>208</sup> The third example is even more telling. After Demosthenes' disastrous night attack on the Epipole, Nicias was adamant in refusing to retreat from Syracuse without a direct order from the Assembly.<sup>209</sup> Thucydides frames this concern in terms of accountability; Nicias feared the Athenians' reaction.

Nicias is often taken as an example of the effects of the accountability trials on the *strategoï*. Hamel, correctly, points out that the harshness of the accountability process made

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<sup>205</sup> Plut. *Alc.* 22.2.

<sup>206</sup> Thuc. 6.61.6-7. E.g. Thuc. 3.98.5. Knox (1985) 136. Roberts (1983) 253 states that the *Ecclesia* did not remove a magistrate because he was doing a lousy job, but it happened only when a severe legal reason was adduced. This reading is simplistic. Often a pretext was adduced to persecute an unsuccessful commander, especially the spectre of corruption. Cf. Aristoph. *Vesp.* 100-102; Diod. 16.21.1-4. On the general terms of this charge, GSW 2.11, 17; Tritle (2010) 95.

<sup>207</sup> Thuc. 5.46.4; Plut. *Nic.* 10.8-9. Knox (1985) 150-151; Piccirilli (1997), 1-2, 4.

<sup>208</sup> Thuc. 6.47-8, 48.3. Cf. above, pp. 27-28 on the particularly loose mandate of Nicias and his colleagues. Hutchinson (2006) 124-125 underlines the financial advantages of Nicias' strategy. Trevett (1995) 247 suggests that Nicias was close to Syracuse, and that this made him more suspicious in the Athenians' eyes. This reading makes sense, but it should be noted that Nicias also showed the same scruples in dealing with Sparta.

<sup>209</sup> E.g. Thuc. 7.47.1-49.4. Cf. *HCT ad* 8.27.1. Hornblower *Commentary ad loc.* stresses the role of the Athenian army in the decisional process, but does not comment much on how Nicias' stance contradicted the will of the soldiers present.

the *strategoi* wary about not following the orders of the Assembly to the letter.<sup>210</sup> However, as argued above, the issue of precise instructions seemed to have been relatively rare.<sup>211</sup> Furthermore, we have already commented how the mandate of Nicias and his colleagues was particularly loose, and how the three original *strategoi* – Nicias, Alcibiades and Lamachus – discussed three quite different strategies.<sup>212</sup> From the beginning, Nicias seemed paralysed by his fear of being held accountable, whilst his colleagues proposed bolder and freer interpretations of their mission.

The same could be observed in Nicias' latter colleagues. Demosthenes and Eurymedon insisted on retreating twice, without mentioning any concern for the reaction of the Athenians.<sup>213</sup> They accepted Nicias' decision only for military and religious reasons, and they did not seem to share his concern for the reaction of the Athenians.

Nicias' colleagues were not the only ones to behave as such. Only a year later Phrynichus, one of the commanders of the fleet in Miletus,<sup>214</sup> convinced his colleagues not to face the incoming Spartan fleet, of which they did not know the number.<sup>215</sup> Undoubtedly, they did not wait for the Assembly's approval, and Thucydides does not record any concern for the Athenians' reaction; Phrynichus is, instead, praised for his tactical acumen.

In the fourth century, this trend radicalises, although it might be due to our sources' different literary genre. We have already mentioned how Timotheus, who helped with

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<sup>210</sup> *Generals* 117-118.

<sup>211</sup> See above, pp. 24-30.

<sup>212</sup> Thuc. 6.47-49.

<sup>213</sup> Thuc. 7.49-50.

<sup>214</sup> Thuc. 8.25.

<sup>215</sup> Thuc. 8.27.

Zakynthos' exile, was very close to acting against the Assembly orders.<sup>216</sup> In the *Second Olynthiac*, Demosthenes explicitly mentions how some *strategoí* were less concerned than others in following the *demos'* instructions.<sup>217</sup> In the *First Philippic*, he even states that many *strategoí* preferred to be cowards and stand trial than to risk dying in battle.<sup>218</sup> And accountability trials were no less harsh than in the previous century.<sup>219</sup> Perhaps, Demosthenes exaggerates the picture for rhetorical purposes, but it is undeniable that he presented some *strategoí* as being not too worried about standing trial. Indeed, he even states that many *strategoí* faced and survived the trial several times, and Chares' career gives some credit to this statement.<sup>220</sup> To this category, we might add *strategoí* who were not afraid to use – and at times abuse – their powers over the citizen-soldiers under them.<sup>221</sup>

This discrepancy is exceptionally significant. Nicias' subservient and timid style as *strategos* is coherent with the behaviour of some *strategoí*, such as Lacedaimonius and Paches, but it did not represent the totality of the Athenian *strategoí*. *Strategoí* like Demosthenes, Eurymedon, Alcibiades, or Timotheus were not paralysed by their fear of the *demos* and their being accountable, and exercised their authority more forcefully. This consideration raises a fundamental question: what did the Athenians do in these instances?

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<sup>216</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.3-4. Cf. above, p. 25.

<sup>217</sup> Dem. 2.28-29.

<sup>218</sup> Dem. 4.47. Hansen (1991) 216-217 cautiously accepts the passage, acknowledging some exaggeration. Nevertheless, he still argues that the *eisaggelíai* trials typically ended with a death sentence (Cf. Hansen (1975) 63-4), a statement which is explicitly contradicted by Demosthenes. Similarly, Roberts (1982) 20.

<sup>219</sup> E.g. Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.11-13; Dem. 20.79; [Dem.] 49.8-10. GSW 2.16.

<sup>220</sup> Dem. 4.47. We know that Chares was put on trial several times, but this did not hinder his career: Dem. 19.332; Aeschin 2.70-71; Ar. *Rhet.* 1376a. Cf. Bianco (2002) 19, esp. n. 92.

<sup>221</sup> E.g. [Lys.] 9.5-10; [Dem.] 50.43. Hamel *Generals* 25 dismisses the evident case of abuse of power represented in ps. Lysias as unimportant. Admittedly, *For the Soldier* reports only a single case of abuse of power, but we cannot comment on the frequency of such abuses; it is just evident that they existed.

The most significant constant in the known instances of *strategoï*'s prosecution seems to have been the *demos*' dissatisfaction. This dissatisfaction might derive from the *strategoï* overstepping the boundaries of their mandates, but other variables were in play, such as the results attained, and their comparison with the Athenians' expectations. Consequently, some *strategoï* might have exercised their authority to a fuller extent, confident that this would have produced better results, making the Athenians happier and in a more forgiving mood.

There are several examples of successful *strategoï* pardoned for their previous blunders. After his *debacle* in Aetolia, Demosthenes remained in Acarnania until he could boast of a *demos*' victory.<sup>222</sup> Only then, loaded with booty, did he return home, and there is no reference to a trial.<sup>223</sup> Indeed, he was sent with Eurymedon and Sophocles, and had some vague power on their ships.<sup>224</sup> Conon returned to Athens twelve years after Aegospotamoi, after his brilliant victory at Cnidus, bringing with him the support and resources of Pharnabazus and Persia.<sup>225</sup> Alcibiades is probably the most blatant example of this pattern. Even if he was condemned to death *in absentia* and cursed for his role in the Eleusinian mysteries' parody, and even after years spent fighting for Sparta, Alcibiades triumphally

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<sup>222</sup> Thuc. 3.114.1. Lengauer (1979) 35. Hansen (1975) 35-36 argues that *strategoï* like Demosthenes chose to go into exile because a death sentence had been issued against them at home. This reading seems unlikely. How could Demosthenes have returned to Athens only a year later, if this was the case?

<sup>223</sup> Roisman (1993) 35; Tritle (2010) 78-80. Pritchett GSW 2.19-20 suggests that Demosthenes waited until "the initial impact of his defeat had worn off" before returning. This reading has its value, but the return soon after his victory suggests a correlation between these events. Harris (1989) 266-267 frames the issue as a search for military talent.

<sup>224</sup> Thuc. 4.2.4.

<sup>225</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.11-12.

returned to Athens in 407 BC.<sup>226</sup> Not only was he fully pardoned, but he was also elected *strategos* with special powers on the spot.

At the other end of the spectrum, the Athenians did not welcome failing *strategoi*. Often *strategoi* became scapegoats for these failures, and they were charged with treason, or corruption.<sup>227</sup> Thucydides was condemned to exile in 424 BC, when he could not stop Brasidas' advance and keep Amphipolis – or so he claims.<sup>228</sup> The case of Alcibiades after Notium (407 BC) is emblematic. Although Antiochus was in charge and disobeyed the direct order not to engage the enemy, Alcibiades was held responsible for the defeat.<sup>229</sup>

In more general terms, fourth century sources confirm this picture. In the *Gorgias*, Plato comments upon the Athenians' tendency to praise past leaders, but to treat their current leaders harshly in times of crisis.<sup>230</sup> Demosthenes reaffirms the same pattern on two different occasions. In the *Third Olynthiac*, he states that the soldiers would accuse anybody but themselves in case of defeat, including their commander.<sup>231</sup> In the *Third Philippic*, Demosthenes complains more generally of how the *strategoi* tended to be held responsible

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<sup>226</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.13, 20; Diod. 13.69.3; Nep. *Alc.* 6.2. Cf. Chapter Two 156-159 for a full discussion of the episode.

<sup>227</sup> E.g. Dem. 20.79; Diod. 16.21.3-4; Nep. *Tim.* 3.5. GSW 2.18; Tritle (2010) 95. More in general, see Develin (1977) 572-573; Blösel (2001) 192; Roberts (2001) 241-242; Robinson (2014) 12.

<sup>228</sup> Thuc. 5.26.5. Westlake (1961) 277-278 argues that Thucydides does not report a full account of the episode and the charges against him because he had poorly managed the situation. However, the evidence is insufficient to reach this conclusion. Cf. Roberts (1982) 118-120; *Commentary* 2.38-39.

<sup>229</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.16-17. Plut. *Alc.* 35.2-3. Knox (1985) 147. Pritchett GSW 2.11 correctly points out how no clear charges were addressed to Alcibiades. The Athenians were just 'being harsh' (χαλεπῶς εἶχον). *Contra* Roberts (1982) 120-123 emphasises the role of negative feedback from the allies of Cyme and Thrasybulus (Diod. 13.73.3-6, 74.1) in Alcibiades' condemnation, suggesting that the Athenians might have had some doubts about Alcibiades even before the defeat. More credibly, Bloedow (1992) 154-155 and Hutchinson (2006) 191-196 underline that Alcibiades irresponsibly left a friend in charge of the fleet. Cf. Chapter Two 158.

<sup>230</sup> Pl. *Gorg.* 519a-c.

<sup>231</sup> Dem. 3.17. Cf. Thuc. 7.48.3-4; Plut. *Phoc.* 9.3. More in general, see GSW 2.20.

for the defeat, even if it was the fault of the *rhetores*.<sup>232</sup> Timotheus was charged and condemned to an excessive fine of 100 talents after the battle of Embata (355 BC), accused of treason by his colleague Chares.<sup>233</sup>

Many chose not to return home after a defeat.<sup>234</sup> In the case of Demosthenes, Thucydides specified that it was for fear of the *demos*, suggesting a direct correlation between defeat and harsh punishments.<sup>235</sup>

As Plato epitomises, the first objective and responsibility of the *stratego*i was seen as victory on the battlefield.<sup>236</sup> Consequently, some *stratego*i might have prioritised the achievement of strategical and tactical necessities before any implicit desires of the *demos*. Returning to the example of Nicias and his colleagues in Syracuse in 413 BC, Demosthenes and Eurymedon knew, correctly, that staying where they were was a huge mistake. Nicias was worried that the *demos* would not accept his retreat after having sent substantial reinforcements and funds, but this narrow-mindedness condemned his chances to achieve any result in Sicily, and caused the death of himself and many other Athenians. Plausibly, Demosthenes and Eurymedon wanted to live and fight another day; by bringing something to the *demos*, the failure at Syracuse might have even been overlooked.

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<sup>232</sup> Dem. 9.147, 334-335.

<sup>233</sup> Isoc. 15.129; Din. 3.17; Diod. 16.21.3-4; Nep. *Tim.* 3.5.

<sup>234</sup> Demosthenes: Thuc. 3.98.5; Alcibiades: Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.16-17; Promachos and Aristogenes: Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.2. Timotheus: [Dem.] 49.25-28; Leosthenes (and others): Hyp. 4.1-2. Fornara (1971) 38; GSW 2.16; Harris (1989) 264, 269-70; Hansen (1991) 217.

<sup>235</sup> Thuc. 3.98.5. There is no evidence that Demosthenes overstepped the boundaries of his mandate. Cf. Thuc. 3.91, 94.

<sup>236</sup> Pl. *Euthyph.* 13d-14a.

However, it should be noted that the picture was not so straightforward. Victorious *strategoi* were generally treated better than losing ones, but a victory did not always ensure that a *strategos* would pass through the accountability process safely. The Athenians demanded a lot from their commanders, and they were not often easily satisfied. The inhabitants of Potidaea surrendered to the Athenians besieging their town (429 BC). The *strategoi* preferred to accept the terms proposed for the surrender than to bear the rigours and expense of another winter.<sup>237</sup> The Athenians were not happy at all about this decision. Thucydides wrote that:

But the Athenians blamed (ἐπιητιάσαντο) the *strategoi* for agreeing to terms without them (ἄνευ αὐτῶν). Indeed, they believed that [they] could overcome the city, if they wanted to (ἂν κρατῆσαι τῆς πόλεως ἢ ἐβούλοντο).<sup>238</sup>

As discussed above, Hamel argues that the *strategoi* overstep the boundaries of their authority in accepting Potidaea's surrender, and the Athenians were upset because of this abuse of power.<sup>239</sup> Nevertheless, Thucydides underlined that the Athenians expected the commanders to take the city by force. Pritchett and Kallet-Marx read in this detail that the Athenians expected something more from the conquest of Potidaea, such as revenge, or a greater economic return.<sup>240</sup> If Hamel is right, the fact that the *strategoi* disobeyed the procedure would have been enough to justify a trial. A trial which, apparently, never

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<sup>237</sup> Thuc. 2.70.1-3. On the cost of sieges, see Brun (1999) 271.

<sup>238</sup> Thuc. 2.70.4.

<sup>239</sup> *Generals* 40-44.

<sup>240</sup> GSW 2.47; Kallet-Marx (1993) 120-123.

happened. The same *strategoī* were in service in Bottiaea the following summer, thus they were not recalled.<sup>241</sup>

The same pattern is presented in another much more dramatic case of fifth century accountability. Once they had returned home from Sicily, the *strategoī* Pythodorus and Sophocles were exiled, while Eurymedon was able to be saved from the same destiny by paying a hefty fine.<sup>242</sup> The reason for this punishment was once again having agreed to the terms of surrender proposed by the enemy, and subscribed by the Athenians' allies. Thucydides' words on these episodes are particularly noteworthy:

When the *strategoī* returned, the Athenians at home imposed the punishment of exile on two of them (φυγῆ ἐζημίωσαν), Pythodorus and Sophocles, and a monetary fine on the third (χρήματα ἐπράξαντο), Eurymedon, thinking that they had been bribed to withdraw when they could have taken control of Sicily (ὡς ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς τὰ ἐν Σικελίᾳ καταστρέψασθαι... πεισθέντες). This was indicative of their attitude in view of their current good fortune (οὕτω τῆ [τε] παρούσῃ εὐτυχίᾳ χρώμενοι ἠξίουσιν): they expected no reverse, but achievement alike of the possible and the near-impossible, irrespective of the forces deployed, whether large or barely adequate (ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ ἐν ἴσῳ καὶ τὰ ἀπορώτερα μεγάλη τε ὁμοίως καὶ ἐνδεεστέρα παρασκευῆ κατεργάζεσθαι). The reason was the success, beyond any rational prediction, of most of their operations, and this had fuelled their hope (αἰτία δ' ἦν ἡ παρὰ λόγον τῶν πλεόνων εὐπραγία αὐτοῖς ὑποτιθεῖσα ἰσχὺν τῆς ἐλπίδος). (trans. Hammond, my italics).<sup>243</sup>

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<sup>241</sup> Thuc. 2.79. Unfortunately, all three *strategoī* died at Spartolos (429 BC). It would have been fascinating to know if they would have been persecuted once they had returned to Athens.

<sup>242</sup> Thuc. 4.65. Roberts (1982) 116-117 argues that Eurymedon and Sophocles were effectively culpable. He argues that their negligence in keeping an eye on the Peloponnesian fleet in Zacynthus caused a considerable delay, and jeopardised the diplomatic work of Pythodorus in Sicily. The argument is sophisticated, but disagrees with what Thucydides said about the judgment. Furthermore, if the fault was Sophocles' and Eurymedon's, why was Pythodorus exiled whilst Eurymedon was only fined? Cf. Knox (1985) 145-146.

<sup>243</sup> Thuc. 4.65.3-4.

Thucydides points out the unrealistic expectations of the *demos* and how these influenced the *strategoí*'s evaluation.<sup>244</sup>

We can agree that Thucydides was not impartial on this point, and, consequently, this passage could be biased,<sup>245</sup> but his analysis would economically explain several cases of successful commanders being harshly prosecuted without any indication of overstepping their instructions.<sup>246</sup> Sent to Thasos to stop the revolt against Athens (465 BC), Cimon was accused because he did not try to gain a position in Macedonia.<sup>247</sup> There is no evidence that the *demos* ever gave him such an order; being in the area and having the occasion, it was expected of him anyway. The case of Paches, who killed himself during his *euthuna*, could be read in similar terms.<sup>248</sup> Westlake argues that Paches was charged in 427 BC, despite conquering Mytilene as tasked and being attentive in following the *demos*' indications, because he did not pursue the Spartan fleet led by Alcidas.<sup>249</sup> The trial of the *strategoí* involved in the battle of the Arginusae (405 BC) suits this trend.<sup>250</sup> Stirred by Theramenes,

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<sup>244</sup> GSW 2.11, 19-20, 25-26; Bloedow (2000) 303. On Thucydides' silence on his accountability, see Westlake (1962) 278; Roberts (1982) 118-120.

<sup>245</sup> Roberts (1982) 124-125.

<sup>246</sup> GSW 2.18, 20, 24; Westlake (1975) 110-111; Knox (1985) 145. On the ingratitude of the *demos* in Plutarch, see Knox (1985) 132.

<sup>247</sup> [Ar.] 27.1; Plut. *Cim.* 14.2. Lengauer (1979) 43 remarks on the Athenians' expectations in the late fifth century, advocating it as an argument in favour of the professionalisation of commanders. However, the example of Cimon – if we can trust Plutarch – retro-dates this phenomenon by a considerable amount of time, thus contradicting Lengauer's picture. Mann (2007) 117-118 ascribes the trial to the suspicion surrounding the aristocratic network. However, as Mann himself notes, there is no evidence that Cimon was either *philos*, or *xenos* with Alexander I, thus weakening this reading.

<sup>248</sup> Plut. *Nic.* 6.1; *Arist.* 26.5.

<sup>249</sup> Thuc. 3.33.3. Westlake (1975) 110-113; Tritle (2010) 71. Westlake's theory is solid, and the point that he makes on the *demos*' expectations is agreeable, but it cannot be excluded that Paches was caught stealing. The *euthuna* was, in the first instance, a check of the finances of the campaign, and Paches dealt with the presumably rich booty of Mytilene. Thucydides seemed to have been quite close with Paches, but he abruptly stopped mentioning him, leaving many unanswered questions.

<sup>250</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.

the Athenians condemned their commanders not because they betrayed the *demos'* instructions, but because they did not risk their ship to bring back the corpses of the fallen Athenians, as was expected of them.<sup>251</sup>

The notion of unmet expectations would also explain a couple of examples in which the commanders felt pressure from their own men for not giving battle.<sup>252</sup> The *strategoï* had the faculty to give battle when and where they thought best.<sup>253</sup> However, the average Athenian did not appreciate the subtleties of tactics, and just expected to fight the enemy before him. During the first invasion of Attica (431 BC), the Athenians became unreasonably angry at Pericles, although the people voted for this strategy.<sup>254</sup> Pericles' example shows clearly how adherence to the mandate cannot explain by itself the dynamics of how the *strategoï* were held accountable.

The high ratio of accountability trials and condemnations is coherent with this reading. The Athenians were difficult to satisfy, and they did not hesitate to prosecute their *strategoï* if they felt they either underachieved or disappointed the *demos* in any way. The *strategoï* had to cope with the constant threat of being held accountable, which urged them to stick to their mandate, especially if it was very precise. However, when the instructions were vaguer, and it is argued that this was a fairly common scenario, not every *strategos* behaved in the same way. Some, perhaps many, felt as Nicias did and tried to stick as much

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<sup>251</sup> Hall Sternberg (1999) 194-195 notes how the number of casualties impacted the *strategoï's* accountability. Cf. GSW 2.5-10.

<sup>252</sup> Thuc. 5.7.2, 64.5-6.

<sup>253</sup> E.g. Thuc. 8.25-27.

<sup>254</sup> Thuc. 2.21.2-3.

as possible to their instructions and interpret the Assembly's will.<sup>255</sup> However, both in the fifth and fourth century, other *strategoï*, like Demosthenes, acted more forcefully, notwithstanding never going explicitly against their mandate. Probably, these *strategoï* were still concerned of being accountable, but not so much to be paralysed by it. Furthermore, it is plausible that they pursued a tactical or strategical advantage with their controversial actions, which would enhance their chances of returning to Athens victorious, with better chances of facing a satisfied *demos*.

## CONCLUSION

After this overview of the most relevant legal aspects inherent to the *strategia*, it is time to draw some conclusions. First of all, we can agree with the previous scholarship that the *demos* never ceased to be sovereign. The Assembly isolated and assigned the objectives, and could recall and persecute the *strategoï* who stepped out of line. The accountability of the office worried the *strategoï*, who were particularly attentive to comply with the *demos*' requests.

However, it is essential to stress that not every *strategos* behaved in the same way. Whilst discussing both mandate and accountability, it emerges that some *strategoï* were bolder than others. This substantial discrepancy should warn us about our chances to reconstruct a rigid legal framework, like Hamel's. The sources suggest a much looser and more flexible picture, which gave space to the *strategoï*'s individuality, ability, and the specific circumstances of the campaign.

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<sup>255</sup> E.g. *Generals* 41, 45.

Two aspects of the *strategoí*'s legal status deserve highlighting. First, the *strategoí* had the authority to act independently. When campaigning, they had control over the assigned troops; they were *κύριοι*. This terminology suggests that the *strategoí* were invested with legal authority, which allowed them to issue controversial orders, and even granted them limited enforcement measures, like being able to imprison or fine soldiers.

Secondly, the *strategoí* enjoyed greater independence than many scholars are ready to admit. Their relative freedom in choosing how to attain their objectives suggests that the mandate was usually quite vague, often including only an area of action or an objective. The Athenians wanted results; as long as the *strategos* did not attain them in an utterly shameful way, or, more plausibly, fell short of the *demos*' expectations, the average Athenian was probably content. At times, as in the case of Arginusae's *strategoí*, a victory was not even enough; the Athenians' mood and expectations influenced them in prosecuting their commanders. Procedural aspects or adherence to a specific mandate was evidently less important. This reading would also better explain the existence of so many limiting measures for the *strategoí*' powers, like the collegiality of the office and the accountability procedures. The *strategoí* had substantial power, which had to be curbed and continuously checked.

The *strategia*'s evolution as an institution is evident in its procedural aspects, especially those concerning the election to office. The downsizing of the *polemarchos* and the passage from the tribal to the Assembly election empowered the *strategoí*, who played an essential role in Athenian public life in the fifth century. This process is reversed in the fourth century, possibly from the reintroduction of democracy in 403 BC. The *strategoí* lost

their political importance, and their powers were limited in several fields.<sup>256</sup> However, even within stricter mandates, the *strategoï* seem to have maintained a certain independence, and several fourth century *strategoï* were accused of pursuing personalistic agendas.<sup>257</sup>

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<sup>256</sup> Cf. Chapter Five and Conclusion.

<sup>257</sup> Garland (1989) 152. Cf. Chapter Three 183-185.

## 2. EXTRA-LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ITS ROLE IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF POWER

At the end of the previous Chapter, a provocative idea subtly emerged: that some *strategoi* were different from their colleagues, and their behaviour reflected this individuality. However, from a legal point of view, the ten *strategoi* had the same authority and power. To solve this aporia we should, then, go beyond the legal authority and power of the Athenian *strategoi*, and investigate other sources of authority and influence.

This Chapter will address the question of that authority which transcended the purely legal arguments. These dynamics are defined from now on as 'extra-legal'. This working definition refers to all the forces which strengthened or created the authority of a subject, but that cannot be explained in purely legal terms. Mostly, these are social dynamics typical of Greek and Athenian culture, which maintained a role even in the legal state of democratic Athens and interacted in conjunction with legal power.

After a brief summary of the most widely acknowledged extra-legal features of ancient leadership, this Chapter will propose a different and more comprehensive view of extra-legal authority, introducing to the discussion the 'larger than life' perception of the leader, and reassessing the notion of personal authority. Indeed, this concept will be compared to and associated with the sociological theory of charismatic authority, which could provide some answers in the assessment of extra-legal authority.

## EXTRA-LEGAL MEANS OF AUTHORITY IN THE SCHOLARSHIP

As is often the case in the field of ancient history, the exploration of extra-legal means of authority is not uncharted territory. Several scholars in the past have appreciated how a purely legal approach cannot satisfactorily explain the dynamics of authority in ancient Athens alone.<sup>1</sup> In this first Section of the Chapter, the most relevant contributions to the topic – *charis*, reputation, and eloquence – will be discussed and commented upon.

### *Charis*

The Greek word *χάρις* is a polysemic term, which encapsulates the very essence of elite values, ranging from physical grace (of movements and physical attractiveness) to pleasure.<sup>2</sup> Whilst in Homer the charming and seductive aspect was stressed,<sup>3</sup> over the centuries the meaning of the word evolved to identify an act of benevolence, a gift, or other types of “reciprocal social pleasures”.<sup>4</sup>

Modern historians use this term mostly to identify the moral credit generated by an act of euergetism or successful public service. Starting as an aristocratic phenomenon meant to create stable relationships with clients and peers through the practice of gift-giving, from the mid-fifth century *charis* acquired a more public dimension.<sup>5</sup> Providing a service for the community, both by being a successful magistrate and by contributing to the *polis'* expenses

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<sup>1</sup> Eg. Dover (1960) 61-63; Fornara (1971) 20-33.

<sup>2</sup> Kurke (1991) 59, 103-107, 154-159; Potts (2009) 12.

<sup>3</sup> E.g. Hom. *Od.* 6.229-235).

<sup>4</sup> Azoulay (2018) 11. Cf. von Reden (1995) 83-89; Hénaff (2010) 247-248.

<sup>5</sup> Ober (1989) 228-230; Steiner (2005) 418-419. Azoulay (2018) 14, 44-45 describes it as an asymmetrical relationship.

through voluntary donations and compulsory liturgies, was taken into grand consideration.<sup>6</sup> Many members of the Athenian elite boasted about these acts of past 'benevolence', looking for leniency in court or support in the Assembly;<sup>7</sup> they expected the Athenians to reward them for their and their families' active efforts for the community.<sup>8</sup> Even when the Athenian elite became less willing to contribute their money to public life, *charis* remained an important dynamic.<sup>9</sup>

Davies interprets this dynamic in a prosaic way. He recognises *charis* as an investment that rich Athenians made to aid their political aspirations.<sup>10</sup> Azoulay emphasises the anthropological value of *charis* more. Starting from Mauss' theory of the reciprocity of gift-giving as an anthropological constant, Azoulay concludes:

While it is crucial that the appearances of freedom in the exchange be respected, transactions are rigorously obligatory at heart. In this respect, the gift is always a vector of authority, even if it is not explicitly asserted as such.<sup>11</sup>

The theory of *charis* is widely accepted, and undeniably there is significant evidence related to the Athenian *strategoï*.<sup>12</sup> Aside from the euergetism of many *strategoï*, who in the

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<sup>6</sup> On liturgies and donations, see e.g. Dem. 18.99, 257, 21.154-157. Whitehead (1983) 64; Hansen (1987) 65-66; Ober (1989) 231; Hornblower (2011) 139; Wilson (2011) 34. Liturgies could be a heavy burden on richer Athenians, and members of the elite like Xenophon often complained about them. E.g. Xen. *Symp.* 4.45; *Oec.* 2.5-6. Anderson (1974) 41-42.

<sup>7</sup> E.g. Lys. 25.12-13; Isoc. 18.58. Ober (1989) 231-4; Thomas (1989) 108; von Reden (1995) 84; Azoulay (2018) 46-47.

<sup>8</sup> Davies (1981) 92-99; Herman (1987) on ritualised friendship 41-8, 108, 129, 135; Ober (1989) 226-232; Thomas (1989) 113; Guizzi (1998), 91; Millet (2001) 123-6; Azoulay (2018) 12-13, 46-47.

<sup>9</sup> Hornblower (2011) 273-274.

<sup>10</sup> Davies (1981) 92-97. Cf. Lys. 21.15; Isae. 6.61. Sinclair (1988) 57-58; Ober (1989) 227-229; Kurke (1991) 170-174; Lawrence (2005) 18-19, 28-30; Mikalson (2016) 242-248.

<sup>11</sup> Azoulay (2018) 13. Cf. Guizzi (1998) 77-78; Potts (2009) 13-14. On Mauss' theories and more anthropological views of gift giving, see von Reden (1995) 79-81.

<sup>12</sup> E.g. Cimon: public buildings (Diod. 4.62.4; Plut. *Cim.* 7.5-7; *Thes.* 35.6-36.4; Paus. 1.17.2, 6. Cf. Biraschi (1989) 59-60), free meals ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 27.3; Plut. *Cim.* 10.1), donation of clothes (Plut. *Cim.* 10.2-3); Themistocles:

fifth century were also the protagonists of Athenian political life, serving as *strategos* in itself elicited *charis*, especially if the *strategos* was successful. For instance, Miltiades' defence after the fiasco in Paros (489 BC) was based on reminding the Athenians of the victories at Lemnos and Marathon. This argument was strong enough for Miltiades to avoid death, but not to spare him of the crippling fine of 50 talents.<sup>13</sup> This trend did not change over time. In the early fourth century, a nephew of Nicias spent the first twelve chapters of his defence speech reminding the jury of the achievements of his family, giving particular attention to Nicias' service as *strategos* in Sicily, even if Nicias was against the expedition.<sup>14</sup>

Death in action was similarly presented as an act which generated *charis*, even for the simple soldier. In *Against Leptines*, Demosthenes speaks at length about the military deeds of Chabrias.<sup>15</sup> Chabrias died while fighting as a hoplite, demonstrating daring and self-sacrifice which clashed with his careful style of military leadership,<sup>16</sup> and Demosthenes urged the Athenians not to overlook this blatant example of abnegation.

*Charis* was a fundamental social dynamic in Athens, but it was similarly significant in other contexts. Azoulay points out that *charis* is central in Xenophon's writings, and it was presented as the main agent in creating a bond between commanders and soldiers.<sup>17</sup>

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*choregia* and painting (Plut. *Them.* 5.3-7); Pericles: *choregia* (IG II<sup>2</sup> 2318. Cf. Olson et al. (2012) 7.8, 52), public building (IG I<sup>3</sup> 49); Conon: the Long Walls (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.9-10; Dem. 20.74; O&R 9; Camp (2001) 138-139). Cf. Sinclair (1988) 38-39.

<sup>13</sup> Hdt. 6.136.1-3. How & Wells (1961) *ad loc* suggest that Miltiades' φίλοι settled on a fine to avoid a death sentence. It should be noted that the enormous value of the fine denotes a heavy sentence anyway. Cf. *Warfare* 38 on exploiting war memories for political purposes.

<sup>14</sup> Lys. 18.1-12, esp. 1-3. On the dating, see Todd (2000) 192.

<sup>15</sup> Dem. 20.82-83. Kremmidas (2012) *ad loc* points out that Demosthenes redirected Chabrias' *philotimia* to the most noble patriotism.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Dem. 20.68, 74, 80-81, 84. Kremmidas (2012) *ad* 20.82-83. Canevaro (2016) *ad* 20.82 remarks on how Chabrias' carefulness was not universally praised. Cf. Plut. *Phoc.* 2-3.

<sup>17</sup> Xen. *Ages.* 4.2; *Cyr.* 8.2.12. Azoulay (2018) 31-32.

The gratitude and respect of the soldiers for their leader, combined with the hope of attaining further benefits from him, kept the men loyal. Past merits and acts of benevolence demonstrated the commander's ability and care for his men, which elicited their trust in him; they knew that the commander's orders were for their own good too. There was undoubtedly an extremely personal relationship between commander and soldiers, in which the *polis* was in the background. Perhaps it is not casual that Xenophon gives so much space to *charis*, considering the development of warfare during his lifetime.<sup>18</sup>

The importance of *charis* in military contexts is unquestionable, but the extent to which a commander could rely on *charis* alone should be thoroughly assessed. A good commander should have *charis* to manage the troops, but even so his authority and status could be questioned. Xenophon himself is a perfect example of this trend. During his service as one of the *stratego*i of the Ten Thousand, Xenophon was publicly accused during a mass-trial for having beaten up some soldiers. Having justified his actions by the stress and urgency of the situations, Xenophon concludes his defence with an appeal to his *charis*:

"I am indeed surprised that, if I was ever hated (*ἀπηχθόμην*) by any of you, you remember it and you are not silent about it. But, if I helped during a storm, or kept an enemy away from any of you, or if I helped to provide for someone sick or in need, nobody remembers it. And neither if I praised someone for something well done, nor if I honoured – as much as I could – a man for being courageous (*ὄντα ἀγαθόν*). Yet, it is just nice and fair (*καλόν τε καὶ δίκαιον*), even more righteous and sweet, to remember the good things better than the bad." After that, the soldiers stood up and remembered [episodes of Xenophon's good will].<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Chapter Three 179-182.

<sup>19</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 5.8.25-26.

As expected, Xenophon underlined his *charis* and elicited a positive response from the mercenaries, who, in the end, acknowledged Xenophon's past benefits and absolved him from the charges. However, Xenophon introduces an extremely interesting concept: the soldiers remembered the negative experiences more than they did the positive. It could also be added that they ignored the context of the situations, thus oversimplifying their analysis of Xenophon's actions – or so Xenophon claims. One had to constantly remind others of his own *charis*, and, although it was a powerful argument, it did not stop people from being ungrateful. Indeed, this was not the only occasion on which Xenophon's leadership was questioned and he had to invoke his past *charis*.<sup>20</sup>

The same phenomenon could be observed in politics too. Plutarch points out how the Athenians mistreated their leaders. For instance, Themistocles had to face the discontentment of the Athenians, which had apparently arisen out of 'boredom'.<sup>21</sup> Plutarch is even more explicit in describing this trend in the ostracism of Aristides. During the vote, Aristides helped a citizen who did not know how to write. Hearing his name, Aristides asked the other man why he wanted Aristides ostracised. The man's answer, in Plutarch's words, was such:

“Nothing”, he said, “and I neither know the man, but I am annoyed (ἐνοχλοῦμαι) of hearing of ‘the Just’ everywhere.”<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 7.5.4-7.

<sup>21</sup> Plut. *Them.* 22.1.

<sup>22</sup> Plut. *Arist.* 7.5-6, cit. 6. Cf. Nep. *Arist.* 1.3-4.

The anecdote is evidently fictional.<sup>23</sup> Plutarch accuses the Athenian *demos* of arrogance and pettiness, demonstrating the same anti-democratic prejudice of Plato.<sup>24</sup> Either Plutarch or one of his sources probably invented this story to make a point against democratic regimes.<sup>25</sup> Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that a similar behavioural pattern in the electorate is attested in modern politics. After a phase of intense support and faith in the chosen candidate, which can hinder an objective evaluation of his/her actions, voters later tend to reject the same candidate. In political science jargon, these phases are denominated the 'honeymoon' and 'hangover' effects.<sup>26</sup> Undoubtedly, the Athenian democracy was extremely different from modern democracies, but it is reassuring that the phenomenon described by Plutarch is, at the very least, plausible.

This reading shows *charis* from a different perspective as a powerful source of authority and influence, which could be undermined by the selfishness, pettiness, and ungratefulness of the listeners. Leaders and commanders relied heavily on *charis* to create a strong bond and elicit loyalty in their followers, but often this was not enough to attain complete obedience of the soldiers.<sup>27</sup> Admittedly, Xenophon's example is not very representative of the Athenian practice since he led a band of mercenaries and this was in unusual and dramatic circumstances. Yet, the fact that Plutarch recognised a similar dynamic in Athenian politics suggests that Xenophon's experience with the Ten Thousand

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<sup>23</sup> Cf. Kallet-Marx (1993) 51.

<sup>24</sup> Plut. *Arist.* 7.6. Whitehead (1983) 56-57, 59; Porciani (2011) 118.

<sup>25</sup> Bicknell (1979) 433-436 solidly points out that Aristides was accused of medism, perhaps because of his connections with the Alcmaeonids. Cf. *SEG* 19.36a. A purely political cause for his ostracism should be considered too.

<sup>26</sup> Beck et al. (2012) 934-935.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Davies (1981) 130 on the limits of wealth's influence.

might exemplify usual leadership dynamics. *Charis* seems to have been an essential means for attaining authority in the ancient world, but it was neither the only, nor the most powerful way.

### **Reputation**

Although it stemmed from the aristocratic ethos of the (late) Archaic age, the concern for personal reputation was felt by all social strata of Greek society.<sup>28</sup> Several scholars in the past have linked the importance given to reputation to the so-called 'agonistic' spirit of the Greeks, a perennial urge to compete with and overpower others.<sup>29</sup> In very general – perhaps overly general – terms, this stance seems defensible. In a highly competitive society, reputation was a way to impose oneself on others and, consequently, one's power.

Nevertheless, the Athenian democracy could not accept this aristocratic ethos as it was. The elite's desire for a good reputation evolved into a more urbane form, which limited its excesses and requalified it in a productive way for the whole community. The ambition and hunger for reputation in a democratic context had to be subdued to the state's objectives and not cross the boundaries set by the institutions to survive. A change in lexicon highlights the process: φιλοτιμία took the place of the Homeric κλέος. This development is

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<sup>28</sup> Burkert (1985) 105; Cairns (1993) 178-179; Dawson (1996) 53; *Warfare* 162-163; (2008) 286; Lawrence (2005) 18-19; Robinson (2006) 4-5, 11; Gray (2010) 145.

<sup>29</sup> E.g. Ober (1989) 10, 84-85, 242-243, 250-251; Boëldieu-Trevet (2007) 59; Van Wees (2007) 281; (2011) 1-6; Angeli Bernardini (2011) 88. Wood (1964) 54 remarks how Xenophon suggests taking advantage of this competitive spirit between soldiers – thus average men – to motivate them. Cf. Lendon (2005) 45-47, 76.

well represented in Sophocles' *Ajax*, where the adherence to the Homeric ethos is criticised, although never completely rejected.<sup>30</sup>

The desire for self-affirmation and the community's need to keep the most prominent members of the community in line could create tension,<sup>31</sup> but *philotimia* could also be a resource for the city, especially from an elitist perspective. Both Plato and Xenophon recognise a certain value in it because it spurred people to get involved in the city's public life.<sup>32</sup> The desire for reputation and self-affirmation was now brought into the *polis*, which could better control eventual excesses, but, more importantly, the city could benefit from the advantages of such displays: liturgies, donatives, and the availability of public servants.

An excellent starting point for understanding how reputation worked is Hunter's study of gossip in Athens. Hunter isolates eight main themes regulating gossip in Athens: liturgies; military service; treatment of parents and relatives; estate and money management; acquaintances; private and sexual life; citizenship status; and criminal

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<sup>30</sup> Gasti (1992) 82, 85; Cairns (1993) 228-229, 231-232; Lawrence (2005) 20-27; Robinson (2006) 12. Partially *contra* Finglass (2011) 44-45, who recognises the scholarly emphasis on the differences between Homer and Sophocles' *Ajax* as excessive. On the general trend to 'democratise' traditional values, see Ober (1989) 289-292; Guizzi (1998) 76; Balot (2014) 184-185.

<sup>31</sup> Thuc. 3.82.8; Isoc. 3.18. It is important to note that, in the other two references to *philotimia* in his work (Thuc. 2.65.7, 8.89.3), Thucydides associates it with the adjective ἰδιος, stressing the private nature of *philotimia*. Both these references are indeed critiques of the exploitation of private and personal interest in the city-state policy, with disastrous consequences. Cf. Whitehead (1983) 58-60; Sinclair (1988) 188; Ober (1989) 231-233.

<sup>32</sup> Pl. *Rep.* 8.554d-555a; Xen. *Ier.* 9.6. Newell (1983) 889-890; Gray (2010) 145. More in general, see Canevaro (2016) 78-79. Cf. Gauthier (1985) 12, 27 on honours as invitations to emulate patriotic deeds. On Xenophon's and Plato's prejudices against democracy, see Anderson (1974) 40-42; Whitehead (1983) 56-57, 59; Strauss (1996) 318; Porciani (2011) 118.

records.<sup>33</sup> To have a positive reputation regarding these categories implied that someone was a good citizen, and thus suitable for public service.<sup>34</sup>

In particular, two of these topics seem particularly relevant for the *strategoi*: previous military service and families. Courageous acts in battle were doubtless celebrated in fifth and fourth century Athens, and this included those of some commanders.<sup>35</sup> To understand the extent to which this angle was a literary trope derived from epic or real-life experiences is difficult to assess.<sup>36</sup> Wheeler underlines how the chief-warrior is more reflective of a pre-state society than Athenian society, but he admits that the Homeric ethos still exercised a great influence over the Athenians.<sup>37</sup> Boëldieu-Trevet recognises a more explicit connection between the commanders in tragedy and the Athenian *strategoi*. In her reading, military leaders still followed a marked Homeric model of heroism in battle, although fighting in the phalanx, and this same heroism would emerge in plays too.<sup>38</sup>

The literary evidence corroborates Boëldieu-Trevet's reading, although admittedly only for the first half of the fifth century. Herodotus mentioned that Sophanes of Decelea distinguished himself twice on the field. The first time, during the first invasion of Aegina, he killed Eurybates, Olympic winner and great warrior, who led the Argive contingent.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Hunter (1990) 310. Cf. Thomas (1989) 61-62.

<sup>34</sup> It is telling that the *strategoi*'s piety, especially towards the dead, was checked before the office (Xen. *Mem.* 2.2.13; Din. 1.71). Cf. Ober (1989) 119.

<sup>35</sup> Lengauer (1979) 37-38; Roisman (2003) 128.

<sup>36</sup> On the influence of battle experience in tragedy, see Hutchinson (1985) xxxiii. Nonetheless, the debt of the playwrights to epic is enormous. Goldhill (1986) 138-167; Finglass (2011) 58.

<sup>37</sup> Wheeler (1991) 126, 131-132. Cf. Dayton (2006) 43; Lendon (2005) 84-85.

<sup>38</sup> Boëldieu-Trevet (2007) 19-21, 97-100, 106-107. Harrison (1971) 20 argues that the monument of Callimachus was more likely dedicated in celebration of his personal virtue as a fighter rather than his ability as a military leader. Cf. Tritle (1992) 126 on the importance of military prowess for the election of fifth century *strategoi*.

<sup>39</sup> Hdt. 6.92.2-3, 9.75.

The second time he is mentioned, Sophanes is described as the most valorous Athenian at Plataea.<sup>40</sup> His courage was so memorable and widely acknowledged that even legendary rumours spread about his performance, involving an iron anchor which Sophanes allegedly would have used so as not to be pushed away from his position.<sup>41</sup> Little more is known about Sophanes, but we do know that he became *strategos*. In 465 BC he led the expedition against the Edones, in which he died.<sup>42</sup>

Plutarch reported a similar pattern also for Aristides, Themistocles, Cimon, and Pericles.<sup>43</sup> Concerning Cimon, Plutarch comments on the positive reputation that the soon-to-be *strategos* gained by fighting in Salamis, and specified that it was the start of his political career.<sup>44</sup> This information suits Sophanes' example, but it is indeed dubious that only Plutarch acknowledged this tradition, especially considering his habit of exalting important figures and associating with them the most important deeds of their times.

Although courage in battle was still celebrated in both the late fifth and fourth centuries,<sup>45</sup> from the mid-fifth century there is less emphasis on the personal prowess of the

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<sup>40</sup> Hdt. 9.73.1.

<sup>41</sup> Hdt. 9.74.1. Herodotus reports a second version of the story, in which Sophanes had an anchor as the emblem on his shield. Balot (2014) 191 recognises it as a symbol of the collaboration between hoplites and rowers, but it could have just been an emblem which generated a fanciful tradition.

<sup>42</sup> Hdt. 9.75; Thuc. 1.100. Kirchener (*PA* 2.13409) believes that Sophanes is the Sochaes remembered by Plutarch, who negated the request for honour made by Miltiades after Marathon (Plut. *Cim.* 8). Cf. Scott (2005) *ad.* 6.92.3.

<sup>43</sup> Plut. *Arist.* 5.3; *Cim.* 5.1-4; *Per.* 7.1. Plutarch reports that Aristides and Themistocles fought at Marathon as *strategoí*. No other source reports this information, which does not allow us to have the confidence that Develin (1989) 56 shows for Aristides' *strategia*. Cf. Bicknell (1970) 436. More cautiously, Fornara (1971) 41. Cf. Badian (1971) 7, 12-13, who argues how the Aristides at Marathon could have been a homonym of 'the Just'.

<sup>44</sup> Plut. *Cim.* 5.1-4, esp. 4.

<sup>45</sup> For the end of the fifth century: Pl. *Symp.* 220d-e; Plut. *Alc.* 7.2-3; Isoc. 16.29. For the fourth century: e.g. *IG* II<sup>3</sup> 1 418, 4 278, 280, 319. Dem. 20.82 speaks of the heroic courage of the *strategos* Chabrias, who died in battle at Naxos (357 BC). Kremmydas (2012) *ad loc.* accepts the view that Chabrias was not a *strategos* on that occasion, but it should be stressed that this reading is not unquestioned. Cf. Develin (1989) 275.

*strategoï*, and greater emphasis on their success.<sup>46</sup> This development could suggest either an increasing attention to the practical aspects of the *strategia*, instead of focusing on their ‘heroic’ skills as warriors, or a literary trope, which exalted *a posteriori* the heroic aspects of successful commanders.<sup>47</sup> However, it should be stressed that by 489 BC previous successes were central for the reputation and *charis* of a commander. Herodotus explicitly remarks how Miltiades’ defence after the fiasco of Paros relied on his previous successes, and plausibly the conquest of Lemnos helped him at the trial of 493 BC too, when he was accused of being a tyrant.<sup>48</sup> Previous successes were the basis of the reputation of public figures, such as that of Tolmides, thanks to his periplus of the Peloponnese (455 BC), and that of Pericles, thanks to his victory in Samos (439 BC).<sup>49</sup>

The second of Hunter's categories worth a closer look is the *strategoï*'s families. The *Constitution of the Athenians* acknowledges that the *strategoï* of the 460s were chosen not for their experience, but for their familial connections.<sup>50</sup> However, family history is widely accepted as a source of *charis*, and it was often exploited in the fourth century.<sup>51</sup> Although every Athenian likely had a relative who served and/or died for the state, the honour of having an ancestor who was an Olympic winner, a successful *strategos*, or even a semi-

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<sup>46</sup> Xen. *Eq. Mag.* 8.7.

<sup>47</sup> On the conventional aspects of the representation of the commanders in the sources, see Wheeler (1993), 138; *Warfare* 77, 109-110; Hau (2008) 121.

<sup>48</sup> Hdt. 6.104, 136-137. McCulloch (1982) 39-40. Although Herodotus mentions a conflictual relationship between Miltiades’ ancestors and the Pisistratids (Hdt. 6.35, 103), a collaboration is more likely. The fact that the tyrants of Athens had the agency to send a tyrant to the Chersonese (Hdt. 6.39) implies that they still had control of the area, and that Miltiades’ family worked for them. See Biraschi (1989) 52. *Contra* Davies (*APF* 8410 VI) suggest a phase of conflict after the 540s.

<sup>49</sup> Tolmides: Thuc. 1.108.5; Plut. *Per.* 18.2, *Mor.* 345 d; Aristodemos *FGrHist* 104 F 1 12-15. Pericles: Thuc. 1.116-117; Plut. *Per.* 24-28. Sinclair (1988) 37.

<sup>50</sup> [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 26.1.

<sup>51</sup> Thomas (1989) 111.

heroised ancestor – like Harmodius or Aristogeiton – was attainable only by a certain number of families, typically aristocratic or elite.

Reputation derived from family history was, in the Athenians' mind, worthy of election to an office.<sup>52</sup> Davies compellingly argues that “*de facto* a hereditary caste” monopolised a good portion of the highest military offices; undeniably, an impressive number of the *strategoï* were well-off and some families ‘specialised’ in military careers, fourth century included.<sup>53</sup> It is not even possible to exclude the possibility that the Athenians believed in a ‘genetic’ predisposition of some families to warfare and leadership. Intellectuals like Aristotle refused this theory, but the fact that they made their opposition to this notion explicit could suggest that it was a popular belief.<sup>54</sup>

The *strategoï*'s reputations could also be reinforced by the existence of physical tokens commemorating previous deeds and familial glory. There are several examples of public honours granted to successful fifth century commanders.<sup>55</sup> Some examples are the right to dine in the Prytaneum granted to Cleon (σίτησις),<sup>56</sup> the cleruchy and stipend granted to the

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<sup>52</sup> Davies (1981) 127-128 hypothesises that the obedience to a social superior was more acceptable in the Athenian mentality, thus explaining why a considerable number of military officials were members of the elite.

<sup>53</sup> Davies (1981) 122-124. Cf. Connor (1971) 76-79, 91-98, 134-136; Mitchell (2000) 351; Boëldieu-Trevet (2007) 75.

<sup>54</sup> Ar. *Rhet.* 1390b. Cf. Pl. *Men.* 93b-94d. Cf. Sinclair (1988) 35; Ober (1989) 249-250, 256; Roscalia (2004) 117; Nevin (2017) 64. Strauss (1993) 86-88 correctly underlines that there were also exceptions to this pattern, like Cimon and Timotheus.

<sup>55</sup> Gauthier (1985) 28-29, but he notes the rarity of these honours. Domingo Gyax (2006) 495-496 suggests that this trend could have been introduced during the time of Cleon's political activity. There is a possible antecedent: the herms granted to Cimon and his colleagues for the conquest of Eion (Aeschin. 3.183-185; Plut. *Cim.* 7.4-6). However, the *strategoï* were not named in the epigrams, suggesting a celebration of the city rather than the commanders, in agreement with contemporary democratic ideology.

<sup>56</sup> Aristoph. *Eq.* 763-766; *Schol. In Dem.* 21.62. Possibly even a crown was granted to Cleon: Aristoph. *Eq.* 1224-1225. Gauthier (1985) 95-96; Domingo Gyax (2006) 491.

sons of Aristides,<sup>57</sup> a crown allegedly donated to Pericles,<sup>58</sup> and the golden crown granted to Thrasybulus and the others involved in the restoration of the democracy after the regime of the Four Hundred.<sup>59</sup> More in general, Andocides states that the *strategoï* were usually welcomed home by the *demos* and honoured with crowns.<sup>60</sup> On some occasions, public honours were granted to simple soldiers too, like the set of armour and crown awarded to Alcibiades,<sup>61</sup> and the money and olive crowns given to those who fought the Thirty Tyrants.<sup>62</sup> Gauthier suggests that this change of practice was due to the Peloponnesian war, which made the Athenians more open to honouring successful *strategoï* and public figures.<sup>63</sup>

In the fourth century, public honours became more frequent.<sup>64</sup> There are several mentions of inscriptions,<sup>65</sup> crowns (often gilded or made of gold),<sup>66</sup> and the *siteseis* (a daily meal offered in the Prytaneum with the *Bouleutai* for exceptional merits),<sup>67</sup> but, on occasion, the honour became even grander. For instance, the Athenians voted for a bronze statue of Conon in the *agora*,<sup>68</sup> an unprecedented honour which would be soon matched by a statue

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<sup>57</sup> Dem. 20.115. Kremmydas (2012) *ad loc.* remarks on the magnitude of this grant, far superior to any other reward attested. He believes that this exaggerated generosity is suspicious, and concludes that this decree was likely a mid-fourth century falsification. Cf. Canevaro (2016) *ad loc.*

<sup>58</sup> Lyc. F 9.2; Val. Max. 2.6.5.

<sup>59</sup> IG I<sup>3</sup> 102.

<sup>60</sup> Andoc. 2.18. This statement is controversial as best, as we noticed in Chapter One 48-49. Cf. Gauthier (1985) 27.

<sup>61</sup> Pl. *Symp.* 220d-e; Isoc. 16.29; Plut. *Alc.* 7.2-3.

<sup>62</sup> Aeschin. 3.187. von Reden (1995) 98; *Warfare* 194.

<sup>63</sup> Gauthier (1985) 28-29, 94-95.

<sup>64</sup> E.g. Mikalson (2016) 247-248; Keesling (2017) 33-34. Low (2007) 244 recognises this trend as represented not only in Athens, but in several other *poleis*.

<sup>65</sup> E.g. IG I<sup>3</sup> 511. Andocides (1.38) recalled a statue and inscription of 'the general' (μεταξὺ τοῦ κίονος καὶ τῆς στήλης ἐφ' ἣ ὁ στρατηγός ἐστιν ὁ χαλκοῦς). Cf. Keesling (2003) 196.

<sup>66</sup> E.g. Aeschin. 3.10-12.

<sup>67</sup> E.g. IG I<sup>3</sup> 131; Aristoph. *Eq.* 763-766; Dem. 23.130.

<sup>68</sup> Dem. 20.70.

to Iphicrates and Timotheus, Conon's son.<sup>69</sup> Both Demosthenes and Aeschines recognise this phenomenon as negative, and underline the differences from the earlier days (i.e. the first half of the fifth century). They complain that their contemporaries were granted great honours for trivial deeds, whilst their ancestors refused the celebration of individual *strategoi* even to Miltiades, Themistocles, and Cimon.<sup>70</sup>

However, what the *demos* refused could be attained in a lesser form, such as a private monument in a public place.<sup>71</sup> Mostly celebrating great statesmen posthumously, these portraits exalted familial reputation and, in some cases, influenced the public memory of these men. Callimachus, the *polemarchos* of Marathon, was named in an inscription in archaic lettering on the Acropolis, probably on the base of a statue of Nike or Iris.<sup>72</sup> Shefton hypothesises that a previous inscription, likely for a victory at the Panathenaic festival, was posthumously modified to indicate the role of the military leader at Marathon.<sup>73</sup>

Miltiades was represented in the *Stoa Poikile* in Athens and in the Athenian monument at Delphi, both recognised as the efforts of his son Cimon.<sup>74</sup> Within the same family, an inscription dated between 450 and 430 BC bears the signs of an offering of Lacedaemonius, son of Cimon, and his fellow *hipparchoi*: Xenophon and Pronapes.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> Aeschin. 3.243; Dem. 23.130; Nep. *Tim.* 2.3, *Chab.* 1.2-3; Diod. 15.33.4; Paus. 1.3.2. Gauthier (1985) 97-103. Other statues are mentioned in e.g. And. 1.38; Isae. 5.41; Dem. 13.20-22, 20.70.

<sup>70</sup> Aeschin. 3.183-186; Dem. 13.22-25, 20.112-115, 23.196-198. Cf. Hdt. 8.123.2; Pl. *Gorg.* 516d-e; Thomas (1989) 88; *Warfare* 193-194. Gauthier (1985) 94 n. 49 notes the discrepancy with Dem. 20.112-116.

<sup>71</sup> Keesling (2003) 196.

<sup>72</sup> IG I<sup>3</sup> 784; M&L 18. Harrison (1971) 6-7 argues convincingly that a statue of Nike would better suit the context. See Evans (1993) 304. *Contra* Raubitschek (1965) 512; M&L *ibidem*.

<sup>73</sup> Shefton (1950). Cf. Harrison (1971) 5. Sekunda (2005) 11 does not exclude that the monument celebrated the victory at Marathon. However, this reading would make Callimachus' monument an early example of a practice explicitly denied until the fourth century.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. below, pp. 103-108 for further discussion.

<sup>75</sup> IG I<sup>3</sup> 511. Cf. de Lisle *AIO ad loc*, accessed 29/10/2019.

Late sources reported a series of private monuments representing great leaders of the second half of the fifth century. Pausanias in the second century AD saw two statues of Pericles on the Acropolis, of which one was undoubtedly an offering (ἀναθήμα).<sup>76</sup> Plutarch also records a dubious tradition concerning a portrait of Pericles, which Phidias is said to have inserted into the shield of the Athena Promachos.<sup>77</sup> Pliny mentions a statue of Alcibiades, which was probably made during the Hellenistic period.<sup>78</sup> Nevertheless, Plutarch writes of a contemporary portrait of Alcibiades for his victory at the Nemean games.<sup>79</sup> Some of these portraits were retrospective representations of great men of the past,<sup>80</sup> but others were either contemporary, or dedicated shortly after the subject's death. Consequently, it is possible that the relatives of the dead tried to exploit his reputation through a visible form of honour which reflected on themselves.

To return to a more grounded tradition, in the fourth century the number of dedications increased considerably, and petty officers and even the instructor of the *epheboi* were celebrated, probably owing to private expenses, for their contribution to the city.<sup>81</sup>

The monument of the fallen *hippeis* at Nemea and Coronea, separate to the *demosion sema*, is also worth mentioning.<sup>82</sup> They were private donatives, in addition to the public

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<sup>76</sup> Paus. 1.25, 28.2. Domingo Gygax (2006) 495. Richter (1970) 178-179 hypothesises that the first of these is the statue of 'Pericles the Olympian' of Cresilas, described by Pliny (*NH* 34.74). If she is right, the statue must date between 450 and 430 BC, when Cresilas was active. Cf. Robertson (1975) 336-337; Azoulay (2014a) 8, 33-34. Keesling (2003) 193-195; (2017) 128-129 accepts the link, possibly confirmed by *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 884, but argues that the statue was probably dedicated by Pericles the Younger after Pericles the Elder's death.

<sup>77</sup> Plut. *Per.* 31.4. Richter (1970) 169.

<sup>78</sup> Pliny *NH* 34.19.80. On the dating of Pyromachus, the sculptor, see Robertson (1975) 532-533.

<sup>79</sup> Plut. *Alc.* 16.5.

<sup>80</sup> Keesling (2017) 163, 171-173.

<sup>81</sup> E.g. *IG* II<sup>3</sup> 4 341, 336, 352.

<sup>82</sup> *GHI* no. 104.

monument, which celebrated the fallen Athenians together as a group.<sup>83</sup> The *hippeis'* monument stressed a separate group within the city, isolating the *hippeis* and celebrating their deeds above those of the ordinary citizens. Even more interestingly, the funerary monument of the horseman Dexileos demonstrates how democracy did not – or could not – ultimately remove the desire for personal glorification.<sup>84</sup>

Public honours and private dedications gave visibility to the honouree and his family, plausibly contributing to the spreading of a positive reputation. Particularly in the first half of the fifth century, private monuments were the only form in which Athenian elite could celebrate themselves within the strict democratic ethos, and with considerable limitations too.<sup>85</sup> The constant reminders of the *strategoí's* greatest successes plausibly consolidated the memories of these events in the popular tradition, and anchored the commanders to the glorification of important historical events.<sup>86</sup> Through these physical objects, *strategoí* and other members of the elite could bring positive attention to themselves and their deeds. Plato corroborates this reading when he sarcastically argues that the acknowledgement of the proposer's name of an Assembly decree could be seen as self-promoting.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> Spence (1993) 219; Camp (2001) 137-138; Hurwit (2007) 35-36. Bugh (1988) 136-139 believes that the monument was erected for the dead of Acamantis alone, but he is rightly bemused by the lack of reference to the tribe.

<sup>84</sup> Athens National Museum 2744. Hurwit (2007) 39-40.

<sup>85</sup> Cf. Aeschin 3.183, 186.

<sup>86</sup> Thomas (1989) 50-51, 90, 199 n. 48; Keesling (2003) 198.

<sup>87</sup> Pl. *Phdr.* 257e-258-c. Canevaro (2016) 84. See Yunis (1996) 185-188 on Plato's playfulness in the passage, and his criticism of democracy.

Now that the most evident intersections between military leadership and reputation have been highlighted, it is now time to focus on the effects of reputation on the *strategia*. To acquire a reputation was not only an objective in itself, but also a means to exercise authority. Thucydides, Isocrates, and Plutarch believed that personal reputation was one of the marks of a successful politician, especially in the case of Pericles.<sup>88</sup> The sources represent many *stratego*i as benefitting from their reputation, which put them in a particular light in front of others, which, in several cases, resulted in a superior authority.<sup>89</sup>

Reputation was important for the election to the office itself. We have already seen how personal and familial *charis* for past military deeds and the reputation associated with them could be traced for several Athenian *stratego*i. Lengauer recognises in the playwright Sophocles an ulterior proof of the importance of reputation.<sup>90</sup> The poet Ion of Chios describes a funny episode about Sophocles.<sup>91</sup> When he was *strategos* for the campaign of Samos, Sophocles participated in a symposium in Chios. During the party, he stole a kiss from a young cupbearer with a trick, claiming that he was training for his *strategia*. Even worse, he admits that Pericles chided him for his lack of skill and experience. Associating Ion's anecdote with the dubious information reported in the *Life of Sophocles* that Sophocles

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<sup>88</sup> Thuc. 2.65.8; Isoc. 15.308. Plut. *Per.* 7.1, 15.5. Cf. Crane (1989) 112; Hunter (1990) 306.

<sup>89</sup> E.g. Alcibiades: Thuc. 6.16, cf. Section 6. Conon: Dem. 20.68-70. Agesilaus: Xen. *Ages.* 1.19, 10.4. Cyrus the Younger: Xen. *Anab.* 6.4.8. Stronk (1995) *ad loc.* correctly comments upon the idealisation of the Ten Thousand operated by Xenophon. However, his argument that Xenophon divided the army into three groups (the *philo*i of Cyrus, the 'sponsors' of Cyrus' campaign, and the mercenaries) seems an exaggeration. Aside from – allegedly – Xenophon and a few others, all of the Ten Thousand were there for the money, booty and rewards. Cf. Azoulay (2018) 116-117, who does not, however, comment on the size of the groups. Nonetheless, this does not contradict the passage; Cyrus' reputation could have been another argument in favour of joining his army.

<sup>90</sup> Lengauer (1979) 15-22.

<sup>91</sup> Ion *FGrHist* 392 F6. Fornara (1971) 49-50 accepts this evidence. Westlake (1956) 111, curiously, sees the anecdote as a positive characterisation of Sophocles. Sommerstein (2017) 274, more cautiously, acknowledges the episode as evidence of Sophocles' *strategia*, but does not give much importance to it.

was elected to the *strategia* thanks to the success of the *Antigone*,<sup>92</sup> Lengauer concludes that until the 440s the *stratego*i were complete amateurs, chosen only for their popularity – a much weaker and superficial dynamic than reputation, and based more on the likability of the subject than on the qualities necessary for the office.<sup>93</sup>

There are many problems with Lengauer's reading. First of all, Lengauer bases his argument on an unreliable source – the *Life of Sophocles*. Even if we were to accept this problematic source, Lengauer completely misunderstands the tone of the episode.<sup>94</sup> An innocent joke, which underlines the importance of cunning for military leaders, is raised as an example of tactical ineptitude, which is prejudicial and unproven. Pericles' remark, which we do not know whether it was true or part of Sophocles' joke, has another possible reading. If Pericles lamented Sophocles' lack of skill, this presupposes that a *strategos* was required to have such capability, that only Sophocles did not have. Yet, Lengauer assumes that this example was the general rule for the election to the office.

Furthermore, Sophocles was an active public figure in mid-fifth century Athens. He was *hellenotamias* – treasurer of the Delian League – in 443 BC<sup>95</sup> and he was elected *strategos* three times.<sup>96</sup> That he was a complete amateur is simply untrue.

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<sup>92</sup> Aristoph. *Byz. Arg. I Soph.* Ehrenberg (1954) 120, 135 rejects the tradition as fantastical. Westlake (1956) 110 remarks on the many imprecisions of the *Life*. Cf. Podlecki (1966) 367. Marincola (2001) 20 raises a similar point about Herodotus' biography.

<sup>93</sup> See Boudon & Bourricaud (1989) 70 on the limits of 'popularity'.

<sup>94</sup> Azoulay (2014a) 30-31 sees it as proof of Sophocles' incapability to separate private and public life, as Plutarch's Pericles, instead, was able to do. Neither was Alcibiades, but he was considered a good *strategos* anyway. Cf. Jouanna (2007) 34-36, who stresses the humour of Sophocles' rebuttal.

<sup>95</sup> IG I<sup>3</sup> 269. Jameson (1955) 70-71; Jouanna (2007) 23-27; Sommerstein (2017) 273.

<sup>96</sup> Androtion *FGrHist* 324 F 38. Jameson (1955); Tyrrell (2006) 87-89; Jouanna (2007) 27-28, 38-39, 43-51.

Lastly, Miltiades, Cimon, Myronides, Tolmides, and Pericles were hardly elected just because they were “popular”.<sup>97</sup> As we have commented on above, several fifth century *strategoi* had previous military experience, like Miltiades, or the reputation of being good warriors. Experience is widely recognised as the most important criterion for the choice of the *strategoi*,<sup>98</sup> and Rhodes argues that:

[W]e have no reason to suppose that the men elected were either more or less experienced in the earlier period than in the later [i.e. the last third of the fourth century].<sup>99</sup>

Rhodes is perhaps overly confident, but he is substantially right. Dismissing the successful fifth century *strategoi* as complete amateurs is a gross oversimplification. It should be noted that such a banalisation suits Lengauer’s agenda; he argues for a progressive increase in the professionalisation of *strategoi* from the Peloponnesian War, culminating with the fourth century *condottieri*.<sup>100</sup> However, as we will discuss in the following Chapter, this development is not as stark as previous scholars argue.<sup>101</sup>

Lengauer’s reading of Ion’s anecdote about Sophocles is biased, and the emphasis that he puts on the lack of experience of early and mid-fifth century commanders is

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<sup>97</sup> Azoulay (2014a) 30 on Myronides and Phormio as ‘specialised’ *strategoi*. It should be noted that there is no proof of any ‘specialisation’ of these commanders, other than their success, which could be ascribed to personal skills, as for Miltiades, and Cimon.

<sup>98</sup> Connor (1971) 10; Lengauer (1979) 43-44; Ober (1989) 92; Thomas (1989) 112-113; *Psychology* 124-125. Tompkins (1981) 154-155 admits that experience was essential, but also remarks on the necessity of displaying personal talent. He argues that without the latter, it would be impossible to be elected and gain the former. As we will discuss, this reading is simplistic; many different dynamics regulated the elections. Nussbaum (1967) 100 acknowledges an emotional dynamic in addition to the practical evaluation. The ‘exceptional’ qualities of some individuals elicited trust, thus pushing them ahead to a position of power.

<sup>99</sup> Rhodes (1989) *ad.* 26.1. Cf. Tritle (1992) 126.

<sup>100</sup> Lengauer (1979) 32-39. Cf. Sinclair (1988) 45-46, 138; *Psychology* 121-124. *Contra* Hunt (2007) 128. Cf. GSW 2.61-62 for the term *condottieri* associated with fourth century *strategoi*.

<sup>101</sup> Chapter Three 183-196.

exaggerated. However, there is reason to believe that personal reputation played a substantial role in the election and authority of the Athenian commanders.

It could be added that the boundary between reputation and *charis* is often blurry. The achievement of great deeds was often presented as a benefit for the whole community, thus a manifestation of *charis*. Undeniably, while *charis* denotes a relationship between who have it and those who receive the gift, reputation is more centred on a single individual emphasising his positive and negative traits. The reputation of a commander gave him visibility, a platform to strengthen and magnify his personal talent and *charis*, and there is little room for doubt in hypothesising that this dynamic gave them influence over the Athenians.

### Eloquence

The ability to speak to the Assembly and persuade the people to vote accordingly was undeniably crucial for a political leader in a democracy.<sup>102</sup> Considering the political role of *stratego*i in the fifth century, it is not surprising that several *stratego*i were recognised as excellent speakers. Themistocles is a good example,<sup>103</sup> and Pericles' influence was ascribed to his reputation as well as his eloquence (λέγειν τε καὶ πράσσειν δυνατώτατος).<sup>104</sup> Alcibiades had an idiosyncratic pronunciation which made him more appealing to the

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<sup>102</sup> Rhodes (1972) 44-46; Hansen (1987) 52-59; Stockton (1990) 118-119. Ober (1989) 113-114 writes: "Skill in public address was *sine qua* not for the politician. This meant not only skills at putting words together but also in putting them across". Cf. Yunis (1996) 12-14; Héneff (2010) 250-251.

<sup>103</sup> Hdt. 8.108-109. Asheri (2003) *ad loc.* remarks on the ambiguous representation of Themistocles, who exploited rhetorical and religious tropes to strengthen his point.

<sup>104</sup> Thuc. 1.139.4. Cf. Isoc. 15.308; Plut. *Per.* 8; *Nic.* 3.1. Thompson (1981) 154; Sinclair (1981) 39; Ober (1989) 87-91. Hamel *Generals* 12-14 remarks that *stratego*i did not hold any special power in the Assembly but relied on persuasion like everyone else.

audience,<sup>105</sup> but he was also an excellent speaker and took advantage of the people's emotional state.<sup>106</sup> One of Nicias' many limits as a commander was his inability to speak clearly, which would explain his lack of persuasiveness in the *Ecclesia*.<sup>107</sup>

However, eloquence was a useful tool to persuade the soldiers to behave as requested, and to induce in them the right emotional state.<sup>108</sup> The *Anabasis* offers us a practical instance of the potential of eloquence in a military context. The Ten Thousand revolted twice against Cyrus the Younger, on both occasions because they found out that the objective of their mission was not what their employer – and their leaders – said it was. During the first revolt, in Tarsus, Clearchus initially tried to force the mercenaries under his command to follow Cyrus, with little success.<sup>109</sup> Then, he tricked them. With a fake heartfelt speech, Clearchus proclaimed his utter loyalty to the soldiers, saying that he would have abandoned Cyrus if they had decided so.<sup>110</sup> He stressed the sacrifice that he had made and was making for them, to exploit *charis* and reinforce his pretence. Later on, Clearchus spread doubt in the minds of his men, who decided to reinstate him to his command and to follow Cyrus.<sup>111</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> Aristoph. *Vesp.* 44ff; Archippus F 48 PCG = Plut. *Alc.* 1.

<sup>106</sup> Dem. 21.145; Plut. *Alc.* 10, 14.4.

<sup>107</sup> Tompkins (1972) 181, 185-188, 194-196; Lateiner (1985) 202. Allison (1997) 228 believes that Nicias was not attentive enough to dynamics within the Assembly. Cf. Yunis (1996) 103. However, it is telling that Thucydides made Nicias' speeches complex and hard to follow. Plato represents Nicias in the same colours when Laches struggles to follow Nicias' speech (Pl. *Lac.* 194e-195a).

<sup>108</sup> Wood (1964) 53-54; Yelling (2008) 7; Rood (2018) 189. Cf. Campbell (2012) 167 on the importance of eloquence and persuasion in modern military contexts. See Chapter Four 253-261 for further discussion.

<sup>109</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 1.3.1. *Contra* Diod. 14.20.5. Laforse (2000) 77-78 argues that Clearchus exploited Panhellenic rhetoric to elicit a positive response in the mercenaries.

<sup>110</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 1.3.2-6.

<sup>111</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 1.3.8-21. Nussbaum (1967) 139-140; Rood (2018) 184-185. Cf. Laforse (2000) 77-79 for this episode as a negative characterisation of Clearchus. However, this reading is unconvincing. Xenophon recurred to

Clearchus was a harsh disciplinarian,<sup>112</sup> but he had to act like a *demagogos*, as Roisman points out, to calm his soldiers down.<sup>113</sup> This episode shows the potential of the commander's eloquence. The ability to elicit the right emotions in the soldiers and persuade them to follow orders without compulsion is an essential trait for military leaders.

Eloquence was an invaluable resource for a commander, but it should not be reduced to rationalistic arguments. Although the soundness of the orders and proposed plan mattered, the ancient sources stressed the trust in the commander, his exceptional skills, and his *charis* much more. Both the examples of Clearchus and Xenophon demonstrate how commanders used their eloquence to elicit strong positive emotions towards them within their subordinates.<sup>114</sup> The soundness of the plan was important, but it was neither the main, nor the only argument.

The same pattern is recorded in Athenian contexts too. Themistocles was able to restrain the Athenians, who wanted to pursue Xerxes to the Hellespont after Salamis, with a speech.<sup>115</sup> Interestingly, Herodotus focuses much more on how Themistocles was perceived than on his words, as we will discuss in Section Three. It was the respect for the intelligence of the speaker and the trust placed in him and his goodwill that persuaded the Athenians.

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deception in challenging situations too (Xen. *Anab.* 3.3.12-20; 7.1.18-30). Cf. Rood (2004) 327; Whitby (2004) 240.

<sup>112</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 2.6.12-13. Laforse (2000) 76.

<sup>113</sup> Roisman (1985/88) 31, 35-37.

<sup>114</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 5.8.25-26.

<sup>115</sup> Hdt. 8.108-109. Asheri (2003) *ad loc.* remarks on the ambiguous representation of Themistocles, who exploited rhetorical and religious tropes to strengthen his point.

A passage of the *Cavalry Commander* supports this reading.<sup>116</sup> Commenting on how the *hipparchos* should attain the obedience of his subordinates, Xenophon writes that:

It is necessary that [the *hipparchos*] is adequate in saying and putting into practice (λέγειν αὐτὸν ἰκανὸν εἶναι καὶ ποιεῖν) the things which his subordinates (οἱ ἀρχόμενοι) will understand are good to obey (τό πείθεσθαι): to follow [the leader] (τὸ ἔπεσθαι), to stick to the battleplan (lit. to assault the enemy all in the same place (τὸ ὁμόσε ἐλαύνειν τοῖς πολεμίοις). [Those words and actions from which the subordinates] will crave to receive praise for some action (τοῦ καλόν τι ἀκούειν), and will be empowered to endure anything which is not unexpected (ἃ ἄν γνῶσιν).<sup>117</sup>

The ability to clearly explain instructions and their importance was fundamental for being obeyed, but the commander's oratory should be followed through by his personal example.<sup>118</sup> One might even add that, as in the case of Themistocles, the commander's reputation – the belief that he would be able to achieve what he had planned and ordered to do – was similarly important for empowering eloquence. Certainly, the exhortations of Aeschines and Dinarcus not to blindly follow the suggestions of *stratego*i and not to make any decisions based on the personal reputation of the speakers are emblematic of ancient democracy.<sup>119</sup> Hansen believes that this implies a certain influence intrinsic to the office,<sup>120</sup> but it could be argued that it was the people who held the office that had this influence.

Consequently, eloquence seems to have been an important means of persuasion for a *strategos*, but it is impossible to separate it from the other extra-legal dynamics. Indeed, the

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<sup>116</sup> See Tuplin (2018) 31 on the didactic intention of the work.

<sup>117</sup> Xen. *Eq. Mag.* 8.22.

<sup>118</sup> Cf. Watson (1980) 119-120 for a modern parallel.

<sup>119</sup> Aeschin. 1.132, 135; Din. 3.19.

<sup>120</sup> Hansen (1987) 51.

advantages of a good orator seem to have laid more in the ability to stress effectively and persuasively not only the soundness of the proposed plan, but also the personal qualities and *charis* of the leader, while eliciting an emotional response in the audience.

Undoubtedly, *charis*, reputation, and eloquence were essential features of public life in Classical Athens and shaped the relationship between public figures and common citizen-soldiers. *Charis* in particular is a well-attested and significant phenomenon, but it seems a mistake to focus on *charis* alone. The reader has undoubtedly noted how the boundary between *charis* and reputation is often blurry, and how eloquence enhanced, yet also relied upon, both of them. Consequently, these dynamics should be studied together to fully appreciate the impact of extra-legal aspects on Athenian leadership.

Indeed, the scope of the analysis of extra-legal authority should be enlarged further. Only when the picture of extra-legal authority is complete, will it be possible to fully appreciate the impact of each of these dynamics, and their combined influence over the authority of Athenian leaders.

## LARGER THAN LIFE

Alongside *charis*, eloquence, and reputation, as described in the previous Section, another dynamic emerges in the ancient sources in relation to many fifth and fourth century *strategoï*: that they were perceived as exceptional. Above average ability and talent are often ascribed to the most successful *strategoï*, so much so that in some cases they are described as

‘larger than life’.<sup>121</sup> In this work, ‘larger than life’ is intended to describe the perception of a historical figure in emphatic terms, acknowledging his merits beyond measure and even giving the impression that he transcended the limits of an ordinary human being.

Little attention has been given to this aspect of ancient leaders, probably because it is strictly connected with the dynamics discussed in the previous Section. Nevertheless, the perception of the most successful *strategoi* as exceptional and ‘larger than life’ is presented in the sources as a meaningful phenomenon, which, thus, deserves more attention from modern scholarship.

The most effective way to appreciate the concept of ‘larger than life’ is by presenting some examples of how successful *strategoi* were depicted in the sources. Herodotus’ Miltiades demonstrated not only a remarkable ability in taking advantage of his familial connections and reputation, but also an uncommon sensibility for tactics and analytical skills. Herodotus does not call him exceptional, but from his account it is easy to conclude that he was; the victory in Marathon,<sup>122</sup> the cunning shown in the resolution of the oracle related to the conquest of Lemnos,<sup>123</sup> his *hubris* and transgression in Paros<sup>124</sup> are elements typical of the heroic – and potentially tyrannical – tradition.<sup>125</sup>

The same could be said for Themistocles. Thucydides describes Themistocles as standing out from the mass (διαφερόντως τι ἐς αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ἑτέρου), as well as being

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<sup>121</sup> Dover (1960) 75-76.

<sup>122</sup> Hdt. 6.104.

<sup>123</sup> Hdt. 6.139-140.

<sup>124</sup> Hdt. 6.134. Cf. Nevin (2017) 49-59.

<sup>125</sup> Catenacci (1996) 79-102, 194-199. Cf. Roberts (2001) 239; Nevin (2017) 30-32, 49-52, 58-63. The same could also be said for Alcibiades, in addition to his exaggerated sexuality. See Wohl (1999) 351-352, 360-361.

visible for his strength of character (φύσεως ἰσχὺν δηλώσας) and worthy of admiration (ἄξιος θαυμάσαι).<sup>126</sup>

Pericles was described in emphatic terms too. Thucydides recognises ability, and in particular intelligence (τῆ γνῶμη), and reputation (τῷ τε ἀξιώματι) as the sources of Pericles' influence.<sup>127</sup> The writer makes a sharp distinction between Pericles, who had died some years before, and his successors, who were unable to wear his shoes.<sup>128</sup>

What is particularly interesting in Pericles' case is that contemporary playwrights seem to jokingly acknowledge his exceptionality. Cratinus addresses Pericles as Zeus twice, in the *Cheirons* and the *Nemesis*.<sup>129</sup> Obviously, we should be wary of taking this comparison too literally. The Athenians neither believed that Pericles was a god, nor a tyrant, as Cratinus implies.<sup>130</sup> Yet, this powerful image should not be dismissed: references in comedy often exaggerate rumours, public opinions, or the characteristics of the people shamed on the stage. Plutarch explains that these references were mostly due to the 'thundering' oratory of Pericles, an explanation which seems overly simplistic and autoschediastic.<sup>131</sup> Cratinus

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<sup>126</sup> Thuc. 1.138.3. Cf. Hdt. 8.110.1. Bloedow (1992) 140-141 on ξύνησις as an uncommon and positive attribute in Thucydides' work. Detienne & Vernant (1974) 17 acknowledge this passage as an example of *pronoia* referred by Thucydides to Themistocles.

<sup>127</sup> Thuc. 2.65.8. Cf. Lengauer (1979) 19; Whitehead (1983) 60; Roisman (2003) 128-129. The same pattern is also confirmed by [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 26.1.

<sup>128</sup> Thuc. 2.65.7-10. Connor (1971) 127-136 and *Commentary ad loc.* remark how the differences between Pericles and his successors were exaggerated by Thucydides. This might be true, especially considering how Thucydides presents Pericles' political successors. However, Pericles' exceptional control over the Athenians is difficult to deny, and contemporary sources hint at a similar evaluation to Thucydides'.

<sup>129</sup> Cratinus F 118, 328 *PCG* = Plut. *Per.* 3.3. Cf. MacDowell (1983) 153.

<sup>130</sup> Strauss (1993) 131 recognises this characterisation of Pericles as paternal. Zeus, being the father of the gods and, putatively, of men, would represent a positive image of power and care. Nonetheless, the term τύραννος seems to point the reader more to an image of strength and power, which is not necessarily beneficial to the subjects.

<sup>131</sup> Plut. *Per.* 8.3. Cf. Azoulay (2014a) 43, 118.

makes an extremely bold and powerful association and the humorous context does not completely defuse the strength of the parallel. It should be noted that associating a mortal being with the gods in such an explicit way was extremely exceptional in this period, when the divine and human spheres were kept well separated.<sup>132</sup> Furthermore, Zeus was not only a god, but he was also a paradigm of absolute, undemocratic power.<sup>133</sup> Consequently, it is possible that Cratinus used this parallel to hint that Pericles' influence was highly exceptional and uncommon, not dissimilarly to later sources such as Thucydides and Isocrates. Accepting this reading would anchor the perception of Pericles as exceptional to when he was already alive, giving credit to Thucydides' eulogy of the statesman.<sup>134</sup>

Several *strategoï* were honoured with statues and other *timai* in the fourth century, upon which we have already commented.<sup>135</sup> Whilst the concessions of these honours became common in time,<sup>136</sup> the first instances of this practice were highly exceptional and might denote an enhanced perception of these *strategoï*. Conon in particular, the first *strategos* to have a public statue dedicated to him in the *agora*, seems to have been exalted in almost heroic terms.<sup>137</sup>

A pretty consistent trend in the *strategoï*'s representation is, thus, delineated throughout the fifth and fourth centuries. However, the meaning of this recurrent theme

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<sup>132</sup> Burkert (1985) 206; Currie (2002), 38; Simonton (2018) 6-7

<sup>133</sup> Stevenson (1992) 432-434; Griffith (1999) 28-30.

<sup>134</sup> Thuc. 2.65.8-10.

<sup>135</sup> E.g. Isoc. 8.149; Din. 1.75-76; Dem. 20.68-84. On the statues, see Ma (2013) 6, 104, 118. Wood (1964) 53 stresses the necessity for the commander to convince his men of his exceptionality. On Chabrias' statue, see also Anderson (1963).

<sup>136</sup> Ma (2013) 133.

<sup>137</sup> Dem. 20.68, 84. Ma (2013) 6, 104, 118.

should be investigated. Undeniably, the fact that only literary texts report this pattern could instil the doubt that we are facing a literary trope, superimposed by the ancient authors in their representation of the historical leaders. That many *strategoï*, especially of the early fifth century, are emphatically celebrated only posthumously strengthens this critical evaluation, remarking on a significant discrepancy in the reception of the commanders by their contemporaries and their successors.<sup>138</sup> However, this hypothesis seems overly critical. We have seen how contemporary evidence, such as comedies and substantial public honours, acknowledged a certain degree of exceptionality for some *strategoï*. If literary tropes really were applied to historical leaders, these seem to reflect the Athenian society, and how leaders were seen in that culture.

After this due disclaimer, we can now focus on discussing through what means this perception of exceptionality was generated. Despite referring more generally to leaders, military as well as political, a passage of Isocrates' *Antidosis* is extremely useful for appreciating the relationship between authority and perceived exceptionality. He writes:

For you will find if you review the career of each of these [Clisthenes, Miltiades, Themistocles, and Pericles], that it was not those who lived *as a sycophant* or negligently, nor those who did not stand out from the multitude (οὐδὲ τοὺς τοῖς πολλοῖς ὁμοίους ὄντας) who accomplished these things, but that it was men who were superior and pre-eminent (τοὺς διαφέροντας καὶ προέχοντας), not only in birth and reputation (ταῖς εὐγενείαις καὶ ταῖς δόξαις), but in wisdom and eloquence (τῷ φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν), who have been the authors of all our blessings. (trans. Norlin, my italics).<sup>139</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> Pl. *Gorg.* 519a. Szawiel (2009) 277-278.

<sup>139</sup> Isoc. 15.308. Interestingly, Isocrates described Agamemnon and Nestor in very similar terms, suggesting a connection between the heroes and the early fifth century leaders (cf. Isoc. 12.71-81).

Isocrates distinguishes between “being superior and pre-eminent”, which in this work is referred to as being exceptional, and the extra-legal dynamics discussed above. In this passage, Isocrates implies that exceptional status stemmed from birth (which could be seen as an example of *charis*), reputation, and eloquence. In addition to this, Isocrates remarks upon the importance of wisdom, which we can interpret here as intelligence, but also more generally as a synecdoche for personal skills.<sup>140</sup>

Isocrates’ passage is an excellent starting point to discuss how and from where the perception of some *strategoï* as exceptional beings originated. However, the picture is much more complicated than it initially seems. Personal talent and other extra-legal dynamics had a role in the perception of a leader as exceptional, but other elements were also at play.

The most evident catalyst for an enhanced perception was success in battle. Victory on the field, especially in an important battle or after a series of unsuccessful actions conveyed an idea of power and greatness.<sup>141</sup> Democratic rhetoric tended to ascribe the success to the whole city, minimising the role of the commanders in the action as much as possible.<sup>142</sup> However, military leaders were often personally recognised as the source of the

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<sup>140</sup> Too (2008) *ad* 150 and 308 takes a much more literal value, emphasising Isocrates’ evaluation of rhetoric. However, in this passage eloquence is separated from wisdom, which is a much more widespread and variegated concept. In Greek culture, wisdom and intelligence are often recognised as exceptional qualities, characterising the hero but also the leader – especially the king. Cf. Detienne & Vernant (1979) 1-4, 11-15; Catenacci (1993) 190-195, 202, 223.

<sup>141</sup> E.g. Dover (1960) 75-76; Lengauer (1979) 122; Wallach (2012) 184-185, 188, 192-195. Azoulay (2014a) 32 frames the concept in political terms, but acknowledges the importance of past victories. Asmonti (2008) 89-90 makes a sound observation, pointing out that a commander’s number of victories was not the only criterion for his election or appointment. However, Asmonti neither underlines the importance of reputation enough, nor the link between victories and reputation.

<sup>142</sup> E.g. Dem. 13.22; 23.198. Thomas (1989) 205; Wheeler (1993) 138-139. Cartledge (1987) 84-86 makes the same point about Sparta, though also acknowledging Athenian examples, like Conon.

success anyway.<sup>143</sup> As we have commented on above, this trend was plausibly more pronounced in the fourth century, but it is reasonable to ascribe it to the fifth century too. The idea that the *strategoï* ‘stole’ the victory from the common soldiers is a trope which emerges several times in the ancient sources. The most powerful and clear formulation is in Euripides’ *Andromache*. Coming to save Andromache and his great-grandson from Menelaus, Peleus makes a monologue against the Spartan king, and even speaks some words against *strategoï* in general:

How senseless are the customs in Greece (καθ’ Ἑλλάδ’ ὡς κακῶς νομίζεται). When armies raise their trophies over foes the crowd forgets the ordinary soldiers who did the work and suffered (οὐ τῶν πονούντων τοῦργον ἡγοῦνται τόδε). Instead, the general gets the laurels (ὁ στρατηγὸς τὴν δόκησιν ἄρτυται). He brandished his one spear among countless thousands, did one man’s work – no more – and gets the praise. Those self-important officials of the city, though nobodies themselves, look down on other men. (trans. Stewart & Smith).<sup>144</sup>

The context is, obviously, mythical, and it is undoubtedly attractive that this critique is addressed to a Spartan military leader in a play dated to the middle of the Archidamian War.<sup>145</sup> However, Peleus talks about Greece generally, not only Sparta.<sup>146</sup> Euripides plausibly refers here to a trope about ancient commanders in general, even Athenian

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<sup>143</sup> Aeschin. 3.181-187; Isoc. 9.53-54, 15.308; Pl. *Gorg.* 514c; Ar. *Rhet.* 1411a10; Plut. *Mor.* 628 d-f; *Arist.* 3.1. Miltiades is the most evident example. The tradition of the “Miltiades’ decree”, ratifying an immediate mobilisation on the eve of the battle of Marathon demonstrates how the public opinion agreed on the role of Miltiades in the victory. The fact that it was a fourth century forgery does not contradict this conclusion. Cf. Rhodes (1971) 17, n.4; Nenci (1998) *ad* 6.103.

<sup>144</sup> Eur. *Andr.* 693-700. Hornblower (2004) 259-260; Domingo Gygax (2006) 496.

<sup>145</sup> Stevens (1974) *ad* 693-702; Tritle (2010) 59-60.

<sup>146</sup> See Stevens (1974) *ad loc.*; Hesk (2000) 82. *Contra* Lloyd (1994) *ad loc.* justifies deleting this section of text because of the clumsiness of the Greek and, more importantly, because he considers the reference to contemporary politics ‘irrelevant’.

*strategoí*.<sup>147</sup> Tragedy was much more subtle than comedy in making references to contemporary issues, and often a mythical setting allowed the critique of current problems, by partially hiding them by their placement in this world.<sup>148</sup>

Interestingly, the same trope is addressed in non-fictional works too. In the *Anabasis*, Xenophon reported how the same stereotype circulated in a different context to Athens: a late fifth century pan-Hellenic mercenary band. The Arcadians in the army of the Ten Thousand decided to mutiny against Xenophon and Cheirisophus, the commanders of the army. They reasoned that the two leaders did not contribute to the preservation of the army, whilst the Peloponnesian hoplites, who did all the work, were deprived of their reward.<sup>149</sup> The passage did not specify who had stolen the Arcadians' money, but the finger seems to have been implicitly pointed at Xenophon and Cheirisophus.

This episode is fascinating, because it can also be read as a commander's reply to this trope. The Arcadians and Achaeans abandoned the Ten Thousand, only to be surrounded and trapped by Thracian cavalrymen.<sup>150</sup> Xenophon had to rescue them.<sup>151</sup> This anecdote could be interpreted as a passive-aggressive reply of a commander to the Arcadians' accusations, fully adhering to apologetic agenda of the *Anabasis*.<sup>152</sup> Xenophon demonstrates

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<sup>147</sup> Hesk (2000) 82. See also [Dem.] 13.19; Nep. *Tras.* 1.4. This theme emerges even from before the Peloponnesian war. Gasti (1992) 82-85 remarks how the conflict between the ideal of self-affirmation and aristocratic competition clashed with the hoplitic ideal, and was perceived in the 440s as an example of *hubris*.

<sup>148</sup> Easterling (1984) 33-34, 39-41; Hesk (2000) 82; Morwood (2009) 356; Burian (2011) 100-101; Chou (2010) 291-292, 308; Atack (2012) 1-3. Cf. Sourvinou-Inwood (1989) 136, 142-144, for a more subtle analysis.

<sup>149</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 6.2.10.

<sup>150</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 6.3.1-9.

<sup>151</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 6.3.10-16. Stronk (1995) *ad* 6.3.10 points out that Xenophon in this passage perhaps attacked Cheirisophos, who did not care about the Arcadians.

<sup>152</sup> Lengauer (1979) 77, 150-151; Cawkwell (2004) 49, 60-61, 67; Rood (2004) 322; Whitby (2007) 61-62. Sears (2013) 279 points how this passage exalts Xenophon's leadership skills.

the importance of having a caring and competent leader in charge, and he presents himself in these terms. For this Chapter's purpose, the most important element of the passage is that it places the same anti-leadership rhetoric of the *Andromache* in a real-life context. In these terms, Euripides' passage could be seen as reporting an example of real-life military experience, which the original Athenian audience could relate to.

This conclusion could be corroborated by a passage of Hyperides. After spending no less than six paragraphs describing the deeds of the fallen general Leosthenes,<sup>153</sup> whom he presents as the hero of the Lamian war, Hyperides feels the need to add a disclaimer to his audience:

Let no one think that I did not spend a single word on the other citizens, but I praised him alone. Indeed, the commendation of Leosthenes for these battles is a praise to the other citizens too. The commander is responsible for a good plan (τοῦ μὲν γὰρ βουλευέσθαι καλῶς ὁ στρατηγὸς αἴτιος), but those who want to risk their lives in battle [are responsible] for victory. So, when I commend the victory attained, I will praise the excellence (ἀρετὴν) of the others together with Leosthenes' leadership (ἡγεμονία).<sup>154</sup>

Thomas frames the matter in terms of conventions of the *epitaphios logos*.<sup>155</sup> From the other examples of this genre, we gathered that referring to the commander was highly unusual, thus Hyperides had to apologise for it. He wrote this speech in the last quarter of the fourth century, so the conventions of democratic speeches and the attitude towards military leaders could have changed from the previous period.

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<sup>153</sup> Hyp. 6.9-14.

<sup>154</sup> Hyp. 6.15.

<sup>155</sup> Thomas (1989) 215.

However, the attention given to the commander is not a total novelty, even in democratic contexts. The examples of Miltiades and Alcibiades are blatant in this regard. Consequently, it is also possible that Hyperides appreciated that the trope of commanders stealing the soldiers' glory circulated among the Athenians. He had to make it explicit that the praise of the commander should not (and did not) prevent the glory of common citizen-soldiers, which seems extremely appropriate for the democratic rhetoric of an *epitaphios logos*.<sup>156</sup>

Victorious commanders not only took the greatest share of the merits, but often those alleged merits allowed them to be perceived in a different light. Xenophon is explicit in this regard: a military victory granted more personal prestige than athletic successes, which were highly valued in Greek society.<sup>157</sup> It was not rare for victorious athletes, especially those of the Pan-Hellenic games, to be treated with a special regard, and their exceptional status was recognised by the erection of statues and other benefits, in some cases even with an heroic cult.<sup>158</sup> To conclude that some successful commanders were perceived as exceptional, similarly to victorious athletes, does not seem to contradict the sources. Indeed, that Brasidas was welcomed and cheered on by the citizens of Scione as an athlete could confirm this assumption.<sup>159</sup>

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<sup>156</sup> On the democratic ideology of public oratory, see Hanson (1996) 289.

<sup>157</sup> Xen. *Eq. Mag.* 8.7. Poliakoff (1987) 129; Smith (2007) 87-88, 95-97; Hornblower (2011) 163. On the strong link between war and sport, see Smith (2007) 111, Angeli Bernardini (2011) 92.

<sup>158</sup> Poliakoff (1987) 9, 129; Currie (2002) 25; Smith (2007) 100. On the comparison of athletes to heroes, see Boedecker (1998) 234; Keesling (2017) 48, 54124-125. Reid (2012) 285 argues for a connection between the ideal of beauty and body harmony, typical of the ideal representation of victorious athletes in Greek statuary, and the divine.

<sup>159</sup> Thuc. 4.121.1. Domingo Gyax (2006) 492-493; Parker (2011) 122. On the religious dimension of this celebration, see Currie (2005) 168.

Xenophon's statement is surely bold, but how Miltiades is presented by Herodotus might support this reading. After the battle of Marathon, Miltiades' authority grew exponentially. Herodotus writes that:

After the defeat of the Persians at Marathon, Miltiades' already high reputation (εὐδοκιμίων) in Athens was raised even further. So when he asked the Athenians for seventy ships, an army, and funds, without supporting his request by telling them which *land* he was planning to attack – in fact, without telling them anything except that they would get rich if they followed him (οὐ φράσας σφί ἐπ' ἣν ἐπιστρατεύσεται χώραν, ἀλλὰ φὰς αὐτοὺς καταπλουτιεῖν ἣν οἱ ἔπωνται), because he would take them to a *land* where there was gold in abundance to be had – the Athenians *raising up* (ἐπαερθέντες) had him have it. (trans. Waterfield, my italics).<sup>160</sup>

In this significant passage, Herodotus explicitly recognises that the victory in Marathon affected how Miltiades was perceived. Although Herodotus uses the term εὐδοκιμίων, the unparalleled trust that the Athenian *demos* granted to the *strategos* hints at something much stronger than just 'reputation'.<sup>161</sup>

A second dynamic worth a closer look in discussing the perception of commanders as exceptional beings is the notion of the military leader as an instrument of safety. People feel the urge to be saved from a dangerous situation.<sup>162</sup> Understandably, feeling that they have a good chance of survival is essential for the soldiers, and several military leaders are presented in the sources as means of safety. For instance, Themistocles' reputation strictly depended on his role as 'saviour' of the Greeks (ἐνδοξότατον ἐπὶ σωτηρία κοινῇ ποιῶν

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<sup>160</sup> Hdt. 6.132.

<sup>161</sup> See below, pp. 115-117.

<sup>162</sup> Allison (1997) 55-61, esp. 61. Cf. Brelich (1963) 39; Kearns (1990) 324; Nevin (2017) 65. Hutchinson (2000) 46 stresses how religious displays were more common in stressful situations.

τὸν ἔχθιστον).<sup>163</sup> Plutarch reports that Pericles used to promise his soldiers that they would not die under his command.<sup>164</sup> Canevaro suggests that Demosthenes was doing the same in stressing the prudence of Chabrias (ἀσφαλέστατος στρατηγὸς ἀπάντων).<sup>165</sup>

In more explicit terms, Xenophon acknowledged the same pattern also in the case of Agesilaus. Xenophon reported what the people said of Agesilaus:

By his relatives he was described as “devoted to his family (φιλοκηδεμόνα),” by his intimates as “an unfailing friend (ἀπροφάσιστον),” by those who served him as “unforgetting (μνήμονα),” by the oppressed as “a champion (ἐπίκουρον),” by his comrades in danger as “a saviour second to the gods (μετὰ θεοὺς σωτήρα). (trans. Brownson).<sup>166</sup>

Σωτήρ is a strong epithet, often used for gods, and was associated with several Hellenistic rulers.<sup>167</sup> Whoever was able to act as a saviour was likely seen as exceptional in some way, because s/he supplemented the action of the gods.<sup>168</sup>

It seems reasonable that in situations of danger those who showed confidence, had some sort of plan, and granted some hope of survival could be seen as exceptional.<sup>169</sup> We

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<sup>163</sup> Plut. *Arist.* 8.1.

<sup>164</sup> Plut. *Per.* 18.1. Allison (1997) 59-61 notes that Pericles is the only person associated with *soteria* by Thucydides (Thuc. 2.604, 61.4).

<sup>165</sup> Dem. 20.82. Canevaro (2016) *ad loc.*

<sup>166</sup> Xen. *Ages.* 11.13. Cf. Xen. *Anab.* 6.5.14. Hall Sternberg (1999) 199-201 correctly stresses the importance that Xenophon gave to taking care of the health of the soldiers, especially when sick or injured. Plausibly, this was a means to attain *charis*.

<sup>167</sup> Brelich (1963) 38-39; *Commentary ad.* 5.11.1; Mikalson (1998) 79-84; Parker (2004) 183; Jones (2009) 26; Angeli Bernardini (2011) 95; Habicht (2017) 119-120. The scholarship recognises the existence of a strong urge to be saved from the end of the fifth century. See Mikalson (1983) 70; Sabbatucci (1992) 66, 137.

<sup>168</sup> Kearns (1990) 327, 330. On divine help, see Parker (2004) 131; Nevin (2017) 82-84. Allison (1997) 58 on the expectation of *soteria* from the gods in Thuc. 7.71.8. For a parallel with the Roman Republic, Hatscher (2000) 85 recognised saving a city, especially if it was the leader’s city, from some danger as one of the main elements of the idea of *soter*.

<sup>169</sup> The same trend is observable in the evolution of the divine ruler in Rome. During the Late Republic, the Hellenistic/oriental notion of the *soter* merged with the concept of *pater patriae*. Although still far from having a fully divine status, some leaders such as C. Marius attained a larger-than-life status. See Price (1984); Hatscher (2000) 88.

can confirm this claim with the example of Clearchus. In the obituary of the Spartan leader of the Ten Thousand, Xenophon underlines how harshness, which in times of peace did not inspire loyalty, in times of emergency radically changed the troops' perception of Clearchus.

He writes:

In the midst of dangers, therefore, the troops were ready to obey him *completely* (ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀκούειν σφόδρα) and would choose no other *to command them*; for they said that at such times his *being sullen* (τὸ στυγνὸν) appeared to be brightness (φαιδρὸν), and his severity (τὸ χαλεπὸν) seemed to be resolution against the enemy (ἔρρωμένον πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους), so that it appeared to betoken safety (σωτήριον) and to be no longer severity. (trans. Brownson, my italics).<sup>170</sup>

During a fight, Clearchus represented a beam of safety and hope for his men, and this momentarily modified how Clearchus was perceived.

Consequently, successful commanders tended to be exalted posthumously, but in some cases this trend can be traced close to the event. Although it is plausible that this enhanced perception became stronger further from the historical events, the sources suggest that contemporaries could share the same or a similarly emphatic perception of the leader in question.

The most blatant example is the Spartan commander Brasidas. Brasidas received a heroic cult after his death whilst defending Amphipolis against the Athenians (423 BC).<sup>171</sup>

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<sup>170</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 2.6.11. Rood (2018) 183-186 sees a marked difference between Clearchus' characterisation in the first two Books of the *Anabasis* and his obituary, which is much more critical. Undoubtedly, there are some shadows in Clearchus' representation, both in and outside of the obituary, but this passage seems an evident celebration of Clearchus' martial virtue, and his ability as commander on the field.

<sup>171</sup> Thuc. 5.11.1. Cf. Cartledge (1987) 85 on the exceptionality of Brasidas' honours.

The most cynical of historians recognise this cult as a political manoeuvre.<sup>172</sup> However, that it was an attempt to ingratiate themselves with the Spartans is unlikely. The parallel of Lysander, who received divine honour in Samos, demonstrates how the Spartan elite would certainly not take pleasure in a similar gesture.<sup>173</sup> Simonton proposes a better argument stating that Brasidas and Lysander's cults were used by the locals as a means to reinforce and aggregate people in a new political regime.<sup>174</sup> Amphipolis would have shifted from a democratic to an oligarchic regime, and Brasidas' cult would have provided the aggregative force to keep the *demos* united, thus almost acting as a *oikistes*.<sup>175</sup>

Although perhaps encouraged by political calculation, the gratitude and wonder of the people of Amphipolis for Brasidas could have been genuine.<sup>176</sup> Thucydides underlines that Brasidas was considered a *σωτήρ*,<sup>177</sup> fact that Simonton ignores. Plausibly, Brasidas' deed made him larger than life because he was able – as either a god or a hero – to save people.<sup>178</sup>

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<sup>172</sup> Jones (2009) 25; Simonton (2018) 6. More in general, see Poliakoff (1987), 128. More generally on the political reasons to set a cult, see Visser (1982) 423. Price (1984) 23-25, 29-30 acknowledges the political causes of cults of human beings, but also remarks that reducing the phenomenon only to politics is a simplification.

<sup>173</sup> Plut. *Lys.* 18.5-6. On the concern of Agesilaus for Lysander's influence: Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.29-30, 3.4.7-9. Cf. Cartledge (1987) 78-79, 82-83; Krentz (1995) *ad loc.* Contra Habicht (2017) 131-132 doubts the episode's historicity. Simonton (2018) 8 stresses that the people of Amphipolis did not involve Sparta in the setting of Brasidas' cult. If it was so, there is even more reason to believe that it was not created for political reasons.

<sup>174</sup> Simonton (2018) 7-8.

<sup>175</sup> Simonton (2018) 18-24.

<sup>176</sup> Kearns (1990) 328. Burkert (1985) 208 argues that a man had to show extraordinary qualities in life to be recognised as a hero. Cf. Habicht (2017) 117-121 for a later parallel with the Hellenistic practice.

<sup>177</sup> Hoffmann (2000) 370-371; Nevin (2017) 148-149. Dunbar (1995) *ad.* 545 stresses how in the fifth century this title was usually reserved for those able to save the state or a city from the enemy.

<sup>178</sup> Habicht (2017) 122. He also highlights the same phenomenon in Hellenistic divine cults at p. 119. Cf. Parker (2011) 108, more in general. Nonetheless, Mikalson (1983) 19-20, 53, 58 points out how success was often interpreted as 'gods' favour', thus making the successful man close to the gods. Flower (1988) 129-130 stresses how receiving 'great benefits' was the basis of the cult of Agesilaus and Lysander. Burkert (1985) 206-208 acknowledges that a heroic cult could be the consequence a display of power, often in battle context, and that there was a close link of heroic status and exceptionality. Cf. Visser (1982) 426. Kearns (1990) 328 makes a fair

Brasidas' cult is an exceptional example, but it shows a significant connection to the perception of some commanders as exceptional and almost heroic. Brasidas is the only known commander to attain heroic honours in the fifth century, and it is significant that he did so only after he had died, taking the place of the rightful *oikistes* Hagnon.<sup>179</sup> However, there are other fifth and fourth century examples of living men to whom a cult was offered.<sup>180</sup> Plutarch records that Lysander was celebrated with altars and sacrifices in several *poleis*, and the Samians re-named the festival they held for Hera after him.<sup>181</sup> There is a tradition about the Thasians offering a cult to Agesilaus, which the Spartan king refused because it was impious.<sup>182</sup> Finally, Diodorus mentions a cult of the tyrant Dionysius the First in Syracuse, and Plutarch recalls one for the tyrant Dion.<sup>183</sup> It is significant that all of these men had successful military deeds under their belt when these cults were established. Like Brasidas, political calculation was surely part of the reason for the setting up of these cults, but we cannot exclude the possibility that their extra-legal authority and perception as exceptional being, which we can confirm for Agesilaus, played a role too.

Undeniably, these examples of heroised commanders were exceptions to the norm. Cults of historical human beings were rare before Alexander.<sup>184</sup> However, it is not rare to find military leaders described in almost heroic terms, especially posthumously.

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point in underlining Brasidas' death in action. The hero cult involved a tomb or a dead hero, and Brasidas' death could have helped the association with the heroic world.

<sup>179</sup> Currie (2005) 164-166.

<sup>180</sup> For more examples, see Currie (2005) 158-200.

<sup>181</sup> Plut. *Lys.* 18.3-6. Price (1984) 26; Currie (2005) 159-160.

<sup>182</sup> Plut. *Ages.* 25; *Mor.* 210d. Flower (1988) 123-127.

<sup>183</sup> Diod 16.20.6; Plut. *Dion* 46.1. Sanders (1991) 280-282; Currie (2005) 163, 185-186.

<sup>184</sup> Lonis (1979) 310-311; Price (1984) 26; Burkert (1985) 206; Currie (2002) 38. Simonton (2018) 6-7, esp. nn. 14 and 15 for a list of similar cases.

Miltiades is a perfect example of this phenomenon. In the fourth century, Miltiades was widely recognised as the ‘deliverer’ of Marathon.<sup>185</sup> However, an enhanced presentation of Miltiades could be traced back to his well-known portraits from the first half of the fifth century. The *Stoa Poikile*, or *Stoa* of Peisianax,<sup>186</sup> was donated and built by Peisianax, Cimon’s father-in-law, in the first half of the fifth century.<sup>187</sup> The decoration consisted of four paintings: Theseus against the Amazons, the trial of Ajax Oileus from Cassandra’s rape, the battle of Oinoe, and the battle of Marathon.<sup>188</sup> This decorative cycle is usually ascribed to Cimon.<sup>189</sup>

Whether or not the decoration of the *Stoa* is part of Cimonian propaganda is controversial. Part of the scholarship recognises the pictorial cycle as democratic propaganda.<sup>190</sup> However, scholars such as Biraschi recognise a subtle but persistent glorification of the Cimonids.<sup>191</sup> The presence of a picture of the Battle of Oinoe is surely

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<sup>185</sup> Isoc. 15.308; Pl. *Gorg.* 514c, 516e; Aeschin. 3.181-187; Ar. *Rhet.* 1411a; Plut. *Mor.* 628 d-f; *Arist.* 3.1. Cf. Harrison (1971) 20; McCullogh (1982) 42, n.17; Evans (1993) 284-285, 303; Nevin (2017) 56. *Contra* Dem. 23.198 and [Dem.] 13.22 exalted the Athenians altogether, re-dimensioning Miltiades’ role.

<sup>186</sup> Schol. *Aesch. ad* 3.186. This was its original name, but Camp (2005) 97 remarks how already since the fourth century it was mostly referred to as the ‘Painted’ *Stoa*. Evans (1993) 306 interestingly remarks on the Alcmaeonid origin of Peisianax, which could suggest that the *Stoa* was a ‘bipartisan’ project. In this way, the scholar explains the presence of Callimachus. Cf. Zaccarini (2017) 290-291 on the Peisianax’s role in the dedication.

<sup>187</sup> IG I<sup>3</sup> 1243. Cf. *PA* 2.11775; *APF* 9688 VIII; Bicknell (1971). On the dating, Camp (2005) 96-97 argues for a date between 475 and 460 BC; Zaccarini (2017) 290-291 argues for 490/89 BC.

<sup>188</sup> Paus. 1.15. See Robertson (1975) 243-245. Stansbury-O’Donnell (2005) 74 interestingly points out that some decoration probably existed or was planned from the construction of the *Stoa*, as the bench on the north side suggests.

<sup>189</sup> Diog. Laert. 7.5. Stansbury-O’Donnell (2005) 74.

<sup>190</sup> Sinclair (1988) 5; Zaccarini (2017) 294.

<sup>191</sup> Bicknell (1970) 429-430; Podlecki (1971) 142; Biraschi (1989) 60-66; Stansbury-O’Donnell (2005) 81. See Strauss (1993) 107 on the links between the Amazonomachia and Cimon. Cf. Huxley (1964) 117, n. 2 and Viviers (1987) for discussion on Cimonid propaganda. In this work, ‘Cimonids’ identify the linear family of Miltiades and Cimon, which is often referred to as the Philaids. As Parker (1996) 316-317 remarked, though, it is neither clear whether the Philaids were effectively a *genos*, nor what the relationship was between them and Cimonids (e.g. where they a part, or the whole *genos*?).

peculiar, considering the philo-laconic line adopted by Cimon.<sup>192</sup> However, this picture could be explained as a later addition, as a way for Cimon to avoid accusations of personal propaganda.<sup>193</sup> It is even possible that Cimon wanted to celebrate the Athenian alliance with the Argives; it is peculiar that the statues in Delphi celebrating Miltiades and Marathon were close to the statues that the Argives had erected with the booty of the battle of Oinoe.<sup>194</sup>

Furthermore, the figure of Theseus, who appeared in two pictures, has been recognised as an indirect reference to Cimon's retrieval of the hero's bones in Scyros, and the building of the Theseion in Athens to contain them.<sup>195</sup> Furthermore, Plutarch states that Cimon's sister, Elpinice, was depicted in Trojan scene.<sup>196</sup> Plutarch mentions an affair between Elpinice and the painter Polygnotus, which he takes as the explanation for the portrait, but Bicknell stresses how this cameo celebrated the family, which could suggest a Cimonian project.<sup>197</sup>

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<sup>192</sup> Francis & Vickers (1985) 99-113 suggests that Pausanias mistook the Argive Oinoe for the Attic Oinoe, and that the picture depicted the arrival of the Plataeans at Marathon. This reading has been criticised by many; Biraschi (1989) 62; Stansbury-O'Donnell (2005) 79-80; Zaccarini (2017) 292-294. More convincingly, Taylor (1998) argues that the picture represented the battle of 431 BC between the Spartans and Athenians in Attica's Oinoe. Taylor hypothesises that this was an addition to the decorative programme of the *Stoa* made by Cleon to draw a connection between his victory at Sphacteria and Pericles' strategy and success at the very beginning of the war. This hypothesis would also explain the presence of the shield of Sphacteria (Paus. 1.15.4).

<sup>193</sup> Stansbury-O'Donnell (2005) 75, 78.

<sup>194</sup> Paus. 10.10.4.

<sup>195</sup> Plut. *Cim.* 7.5-7; *Thes.* 35.6-36.4; Diod 4.62.4. Paus. 1.17.2, 6. Bicknell (1979) 429; Podlecki (1971) 143; Biraschi (1989) 59-60; Nenci (1998) *ad* 109-117; Camp (2001) 65-66; Zaccarini (2015) 180, 191; Nevin (2017) 66-69. The figure of Theseus had a revival in the 470s, not necessarily linked to Cimon. Kearns (1989) 45-46; Strauss (1993) 106; Parker (2011) 120. Mitchell (2008) 10-15 defines Theseus as a 'malleable figure', who could be adapted for various agendas. On the political importance of possessing the bones, see Antonaccio (1994) 404.

<sup>196</sup> Plut. *Cim.* 4.5.

<sup>197</sup> Bicknell (1970) 429. Nevin (2017) 56. *Contra* Zaccarini (2013) 221-222 doubts this detail. Podlecki (1971) 143 suggests that the emphasis on Marathon and the lack of emphasis of Salamis could be contextual to a downsizing of Themistocles. Cf. Nenci (1998) *ad* 109-117; Boëldieu-Trevet (2007) 36.

This alleged Cimonian programme culminated with the picture of the battle of Marathon.<sup>198</sup> Pausanias recognises two humans in the pictures: the *polemarchos* Callimachus fighting, and Miltiades encouraging the soldiers.<sup>199</sup> In the same painting, Athena, Theseus, Heracles, and the heroes Marathon and Echetlus were represented too.<sup>200</sup> The *Marathonomachoi* acquired an ideological importance early on in Athens,<sup>201</sup> but, even in this excellent group, Callimachus and Miltiades stood out, having the same prominence in the painting as the heroes and gods. This choice confirms the religious significance of success in battle, which was believed as granted by the gods (and heroes),<sup>202</sup> but could also suggest the application of a subtle epic colouring to Callimachus and, especially, Miltiades.<sup>203</sup> Exhorting the soldiers was one of the responsibilities of the commander. Already in the *Iliad* there are many references to the heroes urging their men.<sup>204</sup> Then, Miltiades, and not the *polemarchos* Callimachus, was depicted as having the most significant role in the victory of Marathon.

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<sup>198</sup> Stansbury-O'Donnell (2005) 76 argues that the picture of the battle of Marathon was considerably bigger than the others to fit the three distinct scenes and more characters. However, this evaluation is hypothetical at best.

<sup>199</sup> Paus. 1.15.3. For Callimachus, see Hdt. 6.110; Nep. *Milt.* 6.3. The *strategoi's* names were not inscribed (Aeschin. 3.186; Dem. 13.22-25, 20.112-115, 23.196-198). However, Pausanias often relied on local oral tradition (Cf. Habicht (1985) 144-145; Veyne (1988) 3, 13-15; Currie (2002) 27), which could be the sources of his identification in this case too.

<sup>200</sup> Plutarch wrote that many people saw Theseus on the field the day of Marathon (Plut. *Thes.* 35). Currie (2002) 39 points out correctly that many believed in these epiphanies. Herodotus, as Kearns (1989) 46 notes, does not talk about Theseus, but reports another hallucination: the giant that blinded Epizelus (Hdt. 6.117.2-3). Cf. GSW 3.39; Nevin (2017) 82-83. See Mikalson (1998) 235 on the role ascribed to Athena in the victory against the Persians. Crowley *Psychology* 99 recognises Athena as a symbol of the Athenian militarism.

<sup>201</sup> E.g. Bettalli (1990) 38; Parker (1996) 137, n. 57; Nenci (1998) *ad* 109-117; Boedecker (2001) 159.

<sup>202</sup> Kearns (1990) 327, 330; Dillery (1995) 183; Nevin (2017) 82-84.

<sup>203</sup> On the association with heroes as a means to self-exaltation, see Azoulay (2014a) 32-34. For a precedent, Pisistratus tried to associate himself with Athena and Heracles. Cf. Hdt. 1.60.3-5; Boardman (1984), esp. 240, 245-246. Connor (2000) 64-65 compellingly underlines how successful people declared a special connection with the gods to convey the ideas of power and being favoured by the gods.

<sup>204</sup> E.g. Hom. *Il.* 4.285-291, 5.529-532, 528-532, 10.190-193, 15.484-499, 539-543, 20.354-363.

As it is described in our sources, the painting of Marathon in the Stoa Poikile exalted Miltiades without crossing the strict boundaries of the Athenian democratic *ethos*. The Athenians accepted the role of Miltiades in the battle and his somewhat heroic prominence, suggesting that they recognised Miltiades' exceptionalism to some degree.<sup>205</sup>

If we can trust Pausanias, the statuary group at the beginning of the Sacred Way in Delphi was even more explicit in the exaltation of Miltiades, the only human being in the group otherwise composed of gods and heroes.<sup>206</sup> Vatin claims that a mid-fifth century inscription giving credit to Pausanias' account was found reused in a house of the Christian period during building works at the complex of the École Française at Delphi. According to Vatin, Miltiades' name appears in the inscription in Hellenistic lettering; Vatin thus concludes that the original inscription faded away, and was inscribed at a later date.<sup>207</sup> However, there is a major problem with this evidence. Vatin is the only scholar who mentions these inscriptions, and he has no photographic evidence. As Davidson wisely points out, this unusual situation does not inspire much trust, thus Vatin's conclusions can only be accepted as his personal opinion on the matter until the inscriptions have had ulterior validation.<sup>208</sup>

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<sup>205</sup> Aeschin. 3.186. Schol. *ad* Aristid. 46 Hypoth, Milt. ll. 16-22 states that the Athenians voted on the decoration of the *Stoa* in the early fifth century. Zaccarini (2017) 290-291. If this information is accepted, we could conclude that the Athenians accepted Miltiades' role in the battle and in the painting.

<sup>206</sup> Paus. 10.10.1-2. Keesling (2017) 103-104. Bultrighini & Torelli (2017) *ad* 10.10.2 points out how these statues denote a greater degree of celebration of the Athenian aristocracy than the public monument in Athens. Cf. Parker (1996) 120, n. 64; Hornblower (2011) 19.

<sup>207</sup> Vatin (1991) 165-183. Unfortunately, the monument is completely lost, except for a tentative reconstruction of the plinth. See Bommelaer *et al.* (1998) 538-542, esp. 539. Vatin's inscription would confirm that the last hero mentioned by Pausanias was Φιλαῖος, as Vidal-Naquet (1986) 304-305 argued before it was found.

<sup>208</sup> Davidson (2013) 307-307, nn. 846, 851.

The same is valid for Vatin's conclusions on the Treasury of the Athenians. The base of the monument is well studied, and states that the Treasury was also financed by the booty of Marathon.<sup>209</sup> Vatin comments upon two other fragments of inscriptions, of the mid-fifth and fourth century respectively, which record the names of Miltiades and Cimon alongside the Athenian eponymous heroes.<sup>210</sup> He concludes that the presence of Miltiades and Cimon was a sign of the reconciliation of Pericles and Athens with Cimon, who was indeed recalled from ostracism in 457 BC.<sup>211</sup> Once again, these pieces of evidence would be extraordinary for corroborating Pausanias' account and anchoring the exceptional perception of Miltiades to the mid fifth century, but without an independent examination of the inscriptions it is not possible to confidently rely on them. The available evidence suggests a progressive enhancement of how Miltiades was perceived over time.<sup>212</sup> The importance of Marathon in Athenian ideology, and the role of Herodotus' accounts and perhaps Cimon's alleged propaganda, brought the Athenians to see Miltiades in almost heroic terms. Miltiades could be seen as an example of this trend; once dead, and possibly for some time, his failures and shortcomings were forgotten, while ideology and propaganda exalted his memory. Pausanias also recorded a cult of Miltiades in Marathon, of which a contemporary dating is unlikely.<sup>213</sup>

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<sup>209</sup> M&L 19; Vatin (1991) 185-187. Zaccarini (2017) 297 suggests that the statues originally belonged to the terrace of the treasure, but were later moved.

<sup>210</sup> Vatin (1991) 206, 223 suggests that the statue of Cimon was contemporary to Miltiades'. The name of the sculptor, Sotadas, dates the statue to the mid-fifth century.

<sup>211</sup> Plut. *Cim.* 17.8.

<sup>212</sup> Evans (1993) 303. Cf. Harrison (1971) 20-24 on Callimachus, and Proietti (2015a) on the development of Marathon's tradition.

<sup>213</sup> Paus. 1.32.3-4.

Nevertheless, Miltiades' example suggests that this phenomenon could have started from the exceptional perception that contemporaries had of the leader in question. Herodotus unequivocally states that Miltiades enjoyed a special status in the eyes of the Athenians after Marathon, and this seems coherent with his posthumous exaltation. As we mentioned before, the Athenians accepted the representation of Miltiades in the Stoa, thus recognising his exceptionality, only a generation after the events, when some of the *Marathonomachoi* were still alive.<sup>214</sup>

This conclusion could seem bold for early fifth century Athens. We have already commented how fourth century sources recognised this period as being strongly opposed to individualistic celebration. However, two important points should be raised. First, that the celebration of great commanders, either dead or alive, in epic terms is attested in the period. Simonides in his Plateia elegy made a strong parallel between historical figures and Homeric heroes, from what is known from the fragments available.<sup>215</sup> Pausanias is not only explicitly named, but greatly exalted in Simonides' elegy.<sup>216</sup> The treatment of Leonidas in Herodotus is perhaps less explicit, but Vannicelli acknowledges a strong Homeric influence in the passage.<sup>217</sup> Non-Athenian commanders were also associated with epic heroes fairly shortly after the events, suggesting that the exceptionality of the skills and achievements of

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<sup>214</sup> Badian (1971) 23.

<sup>215</sup> Aloni (1994) 15; Boedecker (1998) 232-234; (2001) 154-155. As an antecedent, Podlecki (1969) 77 remarks how Alcaeus exalted himself and his friends in the same way. Cf. Isocrates (4.84), who did not hesitate to call those who fought in Platea worthy of the cults and honour of gods and demi-gods.

<sup>216</sup> Simon. F 11.34. Boedecker (2001) 154; Catenacci (2001) 129; Currie (2005) 198; Rawles (2018) 84-86.

<sup>217</sup> Vannicelli (2007) 96-98; (2017) *ad.* 7.223-225. Cf. Krentz (2002) 37; Lendon (2005) 66; Boëldieu-Trevet (2007) 106-107; Brouwers (2013) 2. More generally, see Smith (2007) 111 on a certain overlap of athletes, warriors, and heroes in art and literature of the early fifth century.

these leaders could be seen, perhaps with a little help from the commanders themselves, or their relatives and friends, as being close to heroes, and 'larger than life' beings.<sup>218</sup>

Secondly, the exaltation of Miltiades pushed but did not exceed the limits of the democratic *ethos*. Miltiades was not explicitly named, and he was associated with heroes, but not explicitly called one as such, only after his death. Possibly, this was enough for the Athenians.<sup>219</sup>

Miltiades is surely the most evident and detailed example, but he was not the only Athenian *strategos* to be associated with a hero. Themistocles allegedly dedicated the temple of Artemis *Aristoboule*, which was perceived by the Athenians as autoreferential, and a statue representing him as a hero existed.<sup>220</sup> However, only Plutarch records this tradition, which raises some doubts about it.

Much more robust is the tradition on Pericles. Contemporary and almost contemporary sources associate Pericles with the heroic world. Herodotus acknowledged a prophetic dream that Agariste, Pericles' mother, would have had when she was expecting her son.<sup>221</sup> The lion is a symbol of power, and especially in the Near East it was associated with royalty, but in Greek literature it is also a metaphor for violence, wildness, and savage

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<sup>218</sup> Currie (2002) 36-38 insists on recognising a proactive role of the person honoured with a heroic or divine cult in historical times. This conclusion seems applicable also to less explicit cases as the matter under enquiry.

<sup>219</sup> Cf. Smith (2007), esp. 93-94, 135-136 on the negotiation between honouree/patrons and communities in the celebration of athletes.

<sup>220</sup> Plut. *Them.* 22.2-3.

<sup>221</sup> Hdt. 6.131.2; Plut. *Per.* 3.3.

power.<sup>222</sup> What is even more important is that the prophetic dream/sign before birth is a common element in the stories of tyrants and heroes.<sup>223</sup>

In the *Symposium*, Alcibiades associates Pericles with Nestor, and Brasidas with Achilles.<sup>224</sup> Alcibiades' tone is undoubtedly light, and there is a chance that he used the heroes to represent different styles of leadership. Nestor, the wise adviser, could represent a more cautious and indirect leader, while Achilles epitomises a man of action and daring assault.<sup>225</sup> However, the fact that Pericles and Brasidas are associated with epic heroes, even jokingly, still seems quite evocative of the perception of these leaders as extraordinary men.<sup>226</sup> The point of the passage was exactly that: Brasidas and Pericles were amazing because they were similar to Homeric heroes, but Socrates was much more of a hero than them because he was the first of his kind.<sup>227</sup> Plato implied that these men were somehow far

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<sup>222</sup> Catenacci (1996) 38-39, 78; Koziak (1999) 1081; Andò (2011) 80, 83.

<sup>223</sup> Catenacci (1996) 49-67, esp. 66; Azoulay (2014a) 18-19. On the negative aspects of this dream, see McCulloch (1982) 46, Thomas (1989) 271, Azoulay (2014b) 177.

<sup>224</sup> Pl. *Symp.* 221c-d. Boëldieu-Trevet (2007) 111. Hoffmann (2000) 374 briefly comments upon this passage, stressing how it was an example of how Brasidas was recognised as exceptional in antiquity. Zadorojnyi (1998) 302 suggest that it could a reference to contemporary rhetoric and, even, historiography.

<sup>225</sup> Wheeler (1993) 121, 128; (2010) 74-75. Cf. Boedecker (1998) 237.

<sup>226</sup> Rood (1998) 77 suggests that this characterisation was reasonably realistic for the citizens of Skione (Thuc. 4.121.1). Cf. *Commentary* 2.38-61; Habicht (2017) 146-147. Curries (2005) 116-118 points out how the comparison between contemporary men – especially war dead – and heroes was common in fifth and fourth centuries. Cf. Parker (1996) 135-137. Although in a different context, Aloni (1994) 19-20 underlines how in early fifth century elegy the association of real-life figures with Homeric heroes was strong. Similarly, Boedecker (1998) 238-239, 242 argues that Achilles in Simodides' Platean elegy was the paradigm of a heroic warrior, which underlines, by comparison, the glory and bravery of mortal soldiers. Burkert (1985) 204, more generally, underlines the pride of linking the *polis* or a specific family with an epic hero. Following the same logic, the parallel of a single person with an epic hero could be significant too.

<sup>227</sup> Szawiel (2009) 280-281.

above the average man.<sup>228</sup> That Brasidas had a proper heroic cult in Amphipolis should not be undervalued.<sup>229</sup>

A last passage on Pericles is worth noting. Plutarch reports a tradition, ascribed to Ion of Chios, about Pericles comparing himself to the epic hero Agamemnon after the conquest of Samos.<sup>230</sup> Pericles would have boasted that he was able to take the most important city of Ionia in just nine months, instead of the ten years needed to conquer Troy. Ion was certainly not a supporter of Pericles, as is well demonstrated by other caustic fragments against the statesman.<sup>231</sup> Consequently, Plutarch might have reported the tradition correctly, but how to treat this tradition is difficult to say. The chance that it was a wholly forged slur against Pericles must be considered. In any case, the comparison of Pericles with another Homeric hero is surely telling. Whether a sign of (aristocratic) arrogance, or conscious self-promotion, the reference to Agamemnon hints at the exceptionality of Pericles, who bested the supreme commander of the Achaeans.

Interestingly, another successful commander who seemingly wanted to stress the link between himself and the leader of the Achaeans was Agesilaus II of Sparta. Xenophon reported that Agesilaus wanted to perform a sacrifice at Aulis before leaving for Asia, so to

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<sup>228</sup> See Parker (2011) 104 on exceptionality as a quality distinctive of heroes. Cf. Currie (2005) 158-200 on various examples of fifth century men considered to be extraordinary, and their religious significance.

<sup>229</sup> Thuc. 5.11.1. There is, obviously, a considerable difference between the heroes of epics and those of hero-cults, although, admittedly, cross-over existed. Cf. Antonaccio (1994) 396, Snodgrass (2000) 180-182; Parker (2011) 107-108. Nonetheless, both types of heroes encapsulate the ideal of men who transcend the limits of their condition as human beings. Cf. Ar. *Pol.* 7.1332b. Brelich (1956) 90, 225.

<sup>230</sup> Ion *BNJ* 392 F 16 = Plut. *Per.* 28.5-6.

<sup>231</sup> Ion *BNJ* 392 F 15. Cf. Katsaros (2009) *ad loc.*

emulate the king of Mycenae.<sup>232</sup> Nevin is convincing in pointing out that Agesilaus wanted to make a parallel with the epic; he wanted to be seen as Agamemnon.<sup>233</sup>

To return to Athens, the tradition about Alcibiades also reports figurative examples, which were much more explicit than the *Stoa Poikile*. Plutarch writes that, after having won at the Nemean games, Alcibiades paid for a portrait of himself on the lap of the goddess Nemea.<sup>234</sup> Again, we cannot be sure how reliable this anecdote is. The rich sources contemporary to the event fail to report this episode, although it must be noted that such gossip differs from the usual topics and themes of Thucydides and Xenophon. If true, a similar depiction would imply a special relationship, even intimacy, between the goddess and Alcibiades, which would put him on a different level to the ordinary human being. It is no surprise that it was considered scandalous.

As commented on above, Conon was granted a public statue in the *agora*.<sup>235</sup> He was the first since the Tyrannicides, which is telling of how he was perceived by his contemporaries.<sup>236</sup> However, after Conon, the trail of somewhat heroised *strategoï* gets cold. Some fourth century *strategoï* were undeniably described in positive terms after their deaths, but missed the heroic colouring of their fifth century predecessors.<sup>237</sup> The causes of this trend could be several. For instance, since the granting of public statues and honours became far

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<sup>232</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.4.

<sup>233</sup> Nevin (2017) 152. Cf. Currie (2005) 135-136.

<sup>234</sup> Plut. *Alc.* 16.5. Azoulay (2014a) 117 underlines how associating oneself with a god/goddess was considered a sign of tyrannical behaviour in Athens.

<sup>235</sup> Dem. 20.70. cf. Isoc. 9.57; Paus. 1.3.2. Sinclair (1988) 2-3; Keesling (2003) 196; Kremmydas (2012) *ad.* 20.70; Canevaro (2016) *ad.* 20.70.

<sup>236</sup> On the honours for the Tyrannicides, see Gauthier (1985) 92-95.

<sup>237</sup> E.g. Conon: Dem. 20.68-70, 22.72, 24.18; Isoc. 9.56-57. Timotheus: Isoc. 15. 108-117. Chabrias: Dem. 20.75-76, 82.84.

more common in the later fourth century, this trend might have reduced the effects that these honours had on the honouree's perception.<sup>238</sup> It should also be remarked that the fourth century *strategoï*, although competent, generally achieved much less than men such as Miltiades or Pericles. However, the significant number of honours that they attained in life denotes an enhanced perception.

The posthumous association of successful commanders with heroes is a fascinating phenomenon, which probably hints at a re-elaboration and exaltation of the past, even recent, in extraordinary terms. However, the examples of contemporary enhancements suggest that this trend might be more than just a peculiarity of oral and literary traditions. Indeed, several examples suggest that great leaders might have been perceived in 'larger than life terms' even during their lifetime. In time, these figures acquired a grander stature in the tradition, but the Athenians who knew and fought for these *strategoï* admitted this rhetoric, suggesting that a 'larger than life' perception was acceptable and accepted.

#### AN UNDEFINABLE SOURCE OF AUTHORITY

Now that we have outlined the essential dynamics underlying extra-legal authority, it is time to discuss extra-legal authority by itself, assessing its potential as an instrument of control for ancient commanders. Previous scholarship recognised *charis* as the paramount force for extra-legal authority.<sup>239</sup> The commander/political leader relied heavily on his moral credit to attain the loyalty and obedience of his supporters, and repeatedly remarked on his

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<sup>238</sup> Ma (2013) 133 suggests a similar dynamic for Hellenistic Athens.

<sup>239</sup> Esp. Azoulay (2018) 14, 44-45. Cf. above, pp. 65-69.

*charis* when he was in trouble. However, we have already commented how the justifiable focus on *charis* does not give enough emphasis to the other dynamics of extra-legal authority. Reputation and a 'larger than life' perception also had an important role in regulating extra-legal authority, and eloquence was a necessary skill to persuade people, and also to stress the *charis*, reputation, and alleged exceptionality of the speaker.<sup>240</sup>

The focus on *charis* alone does not seem sufficient to explain the whole phenomenon. Consequently, it seems a more fruitful approach to discuss extra-legal authority as a multifaceted phenomenon, which included all the dynamics mentioned above, including the 'larger than life' perception. As a working definition, we will refer to the phenomenon as 'personal authority', and this Section will be dedicated to outlining it and assessing its potential.

How Miltiades is represented in the ancient sources is an excellent starting point for investigating personal authority. During the Marathon campaign (490 BC), the *polemarchos* Callimachus led ten *strategoi* and the Athenian army to stop the Persians, but disagreement arose between the commanders. Miltiades, then, urged Callimachus to take a stance in favour of staying in Marathon and fighting the enemy, which the *polemarchos* did, *de facto* giving authority to Miltiades to command the army.<sup>241</sup>

In regard to the dynamics of power, Herodotus' account is not entirely satisfying. Herodotus phrases Miltiades' authority over the whole army in legalistic terms, advocating

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<sup>240</sup> Cf. Guizzi (1998) 92-94.

<sup>241</sup> Obviously, there is the chance that Miltiades' role has been over-emphasised over the years. Cf. Evans (1993) 286-287, 303. However, as discussed above, it could be argued that already in the first half of the fifth century the Athenians accepted Miltiades' role in the battle as paramount.

a ‘presidency of the day’ (προϋτανηίη τῆς ἡμέρας), which is otherwise poorly attested.<sup>242</sup> Furthermore, the superiority of the *polemarchos* over the *strategoi* does not fit with this reconstruction.<sup>243</sup> Callimachus, and not Miltiades, should have had the most important role in the battle, as the holder of the supreme power.

If Miltiades’ authority cannot be explained satisfactorily by legal arguments, extra-legal dynamics could provide the answer, as the Roman biographer Nepos explicitly stresses. Already before Marathon, Miltiades would have attained the willing obedience of the people who ruled in the Chersonese,<sup>244</sup> and his great authority (*magna auctoritas*) was one of his most distinctive features.<sup>245</sup> Nepos acknowledges Miltiades’ *auctoritas* as fundamental for the Marathon campaign too. He wrote:

Then, pushed by his [Miltiades’] authority (*auctoritas*) the Athenians led the army to a suitable place, and camped there.<sup>246</sup>

Nepos believes *auctoritas* to be a sufficient explanation for Miltiades’ authority. This Latin term has a polysemic nature, which ranges from ‘reputation’ to ‘power’, but could also indicate a position of superiority, either granted by law or otherwise.<sup>247</sup> Authors other than Nepos refer to *auctoritas* in the sense of ‘personal authority’, stemming from formal and

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<sup>242</sup> Hdt. 6.110. Cf. Diod 13.97.2; Plut. *Arist.* 5.2. For further discussion, see Chapter One 35-36.

<sup>243</sup> Hammond (1969) 116-120; Fornara (1971) 72-73. Cf. Jameson (1955) 79.

<sup>244</sup> Nep. *Mil.* 2.3. Nepos confuses Miltiades the Elder for the *strategos* at Marathon. Casson (1915) 69-70; Titchener (2003) 88. However, the mistake seems circumscribed to the first chapter of the *Life*.

<sup>245</sup> Nep. *Mil.* 8.4.

<sup>246</sup> Nep. *Mil.* 5.2. Cf. Hdt. 6.132, in which a similar influence is ascribed to Miltiades after the battle. Casson (1915) 85 underlines the similarities between Nepos and Ephorus (*BNJ* 70 F 63) in some details of the Paros campaign, suggesting that Ephorus was Nepos’ main source for the *Life of Miltiades*.

<sup>247</sup> Galinsky (1996) 12-14 remarks on the polysemic nature of the term. Cf. D’Ors (1984); Domingo (1996).

informal means.<sup>248</sup> Augustus' exceptional authority easily represents the ambivalence of *auctoritas*. Many scholars recognise the reference to *auctoritas* in the *Res Gestae* as a form of informal influence exercised by Augustus.<sup>249</sup> However, to recognise his authority as either exclusively personal or political would be a mistake. Augustus is an extreme example, and few men enjoyed a similar degree of authority. However, the overlap between personal and legal authority well exemplifies the notion of *auctoritas*, which, in lesser measure, was applied to other people.

“*Auctoritas*” was a crucial concept for Roman culture.<sup>250</sup> Domingo even argues that a precise translation of *auctoritas* in Greek did not exist.<sup>251</sup> Usually translated as ἀξίωμα,<sup>252</sup> the complex meaning of *auctoritas* was not fully rendered, which caused some embarrassment for imperial Greek authors such as Cassius Dio.<sup>253</sup> Nepos, thus, filtered the events of Marathon with the sensibility of a Late Republican Roman, and ascribed the influence of Miltiades to this very Roman phenomenon.

Nepos superimposes a Roman term and sensibility in reporting the events of 490 BC, but it seems that he was not totally off target in doing so. Indeed, the concept of *auctoritas* – which encapsulates authority, personal influence, and reputation – seems a productive concept to describe the extra-legal authority discussed in this Chapter. Indeed, even if Greek

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<sup>248</sup> Rowe (2013) 5. Cf. D’Ors (1986) 378; Cooley (2009) *ad* 34.3.

<sup>249</sup> RG 34.4. Galinsky (1996) 10-41; Cooley (2009) *ad* 34.3. D’Ors (1984) 375-376 remarks how under Augustus *auctoritas* partially overlapped both *dignitas* and *potestas*. *Contra* Rowe (2013) 11-15 argues that that, in the case of the *Res Gestae*, *auctoritas* meant the prerogative of *princeps senatus*, thus a political authority. Certainly, Rowe’s hypothesis does not suit Miltiades’ case. He was a *strategos* as were nine other men, and his title does not justify his prominence in the account.

<sup>250</sup> D’Ors (1984) 375.

<sup>251</sup> Domingo (1996) 1-2. cf. D’Ors (1984) 375.

<sup>252</sup> The Greek version of the *Res Gestae* (34.3) uses this word. Rowe (2013) 12-13.

<sup>253</sup> E.g. Cass. Dio 55.3.4-5.

terminology is much less telling, the ancient sources seemed to appreciate a phenomenon similar to what Nepos seemed to imply with *auctoritas*.

An episode relating to Alcibiades shows the same dynamic. After the defeat at Notium (407 BC), Alcibiades lived in voluntary exile, but once he heard that the Athenian fleet was assembling in Aegospotami (404 BC), he went there to offer his tactical expertise. Xenophon reported that he tried to warn the Athenians that their position was too dangerous and exposed, and suggested that they retreat and regroup in Sestos.<sup>254</sup> The *strategoï* in charge did not appreciate his efforts. Xenophon reports the following:

But the *strategoï*, especially Tydeus and Menander, commanded him to go away. They said that they were in charge at that moment, and he was not.<sup>255</sup>

The *strategoï*'s reaction is understandable considering that Alcibiades was an exile and not a fellow officer. However, this did not stop the *strategoï* in Samos in 411 BC from collaborating with Alcibiades, who had recently fought for the Spartans.<sup>256</sup> Admittedly, the possibility that Alcibiades did not have any sympathisers on the *strategoï*'s board of 404 BC should be considered, but the deaf ear to his wise suggestion is still worthy of discussion: why did they not listen to a more expert and successful commander, who also promised reinforcements?<sup>257</sup> Nepos expands on this last line of enquiry with these words:

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<sup>254</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.25.

<sup>255</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.26. Cf. Plut. *Alc.* 36.4-37.1. Krentz (1989) *ad loc.* suggests that Alcibiades was also bringing troops with him, as reported by Diodorus (13.105.3-4), Nepos (*Alc.* 8.2-5), and Plutarch (*Alc.* 36.6-37.3). If true, this would make the *strategoï*'s refusal even more meaningful. *Contra* Hutchinson (2006) 207 argues that the troops were a hollow promise of Alcibiades.

<sup>256</sup> Esp. Thuc. 8.47-49, 81.

<sup>257</sup> It is remarkable that, except for Conon and Adeimantus (*PA* 14517), the *strategoï* of the year 405/4 BC were quite inexperienced. Tydeus (*PA* 13884), Cephisodotus (*PA* 8312), and Philocles (*PA* 14517) were in their first *strategia*. Euchres (*PA* 5757) had been *strategos* once, and Menandros (*PA* 9857), had only a small role in the

Philocles believed that what was said [by Alcibiades] was true, but he did not want to do what he suggested. He thought that, if Alcibiades was accepted back, he would no longer have an ascendance on the army (*nullius momenti apud exercitum*). And, if something positive had happened, he would not have had any share of it, but, if, alternatively, something bad had happened, he would have been considered the only culprit.<sup>258</sup>

To assess the reliability of this tradition is extremely challenging. Nepos offers a rational, economic explanation, perfectly coherent with Xenophon's account, but this could stem from his – or his sources – reading of the events.<sup>259</sup> Consequently, this tradition must be approached with great caution, because it is not necessarily representative of the historical events as much as it is Nepos' interpretation of them. However, it should be underlined that Nepos here proposes a sensible reading, which is extremely well-suited to what we know about Alcibiades. Alcibiades had exceptional influence over the Athenians, and this could have jeopardised the position of the legally elected *strategoi*.<sup>260</sup> For instance, in 411 BC, Phrynichus became caught up in Alcibiades' political game and was recalled by the *demos* because he had opposed Alcibiades.<sup>261</sup> That the inexperienced Philocles was concerned about the presence of the flamboyant, authoritative, and experienced Alcibiades makes perfect sense.

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Sicilian campaign, acting as *strategos*. The limited experience could have increased the fear of Alcibiades' personal authority. However, the *strategoi* more opposed to Alcibiades were the ones with a tie to the Sicilian campaign: Lamachus' son Tydeus and the acting *strategos* Menandros. Cf. Strauss (1983) 29-30. Personal motivation could, though, have played some role in their hostility.

<sup>258</sup> Nep. *Alc.* 8.4. Cf. Diod. 13.105.4.

<sup>259</sup> Titchener (2003) 88-90 stresses that there is no reason to believe that Nepos did not rely on primary sources instead of Hellenistic summaries for his *Lives*.

<sup>260</sup> See below, pp. 153-160.

<sup>261</sup> Thuc. 8.56.2.

Nepos takes two other examples of this pattern, Chabrias and Epameinondas. Both of these successful commanders were described as exercising a greater influence than the elected *strategoï*, because the soldiers trusted their authority more.<sup>262</sup> Xenophon confirms Epameinondas' personal authority in a different occurrence. Just before describing the battle of Mantinea (362 BC), Xenophon notes the extraordinary obedience of Epameinondas' men, who followed their commander even given that their supplies were short.<sup>263</sup> The trend is the same: some leaders, and not necessarily those elected to office, had an extraordinary influence over other men, which gave them influence and power.

Sources other than Nepos and Xenophon ascribe the same pattern to other commanders. For instance, Herodotus states that Aristides led the assault in Psyttaleia during the battle of Salamis.<sup>264</sup> Proietti compellingly points out the limits of Herodotus' account of the battle.<sup>265</sup> Proietti underlines how the tradition lost importance during the *acme* of Athenian imperialism, generating the tradition of a hoplitic battle, as now in Herodotus. However, she also stresses how the association with Aristides kept the memory of the battle alive.<sup>266</sup> Consequently, despite the doubts over Herodotus' account, the discussion of Aristides' powers at Psyttaleia could still be productive to discuss personal authority. At the very least, this tradition shows what was believed to have been a reasonably realistic power dynamic between a leader and soldiers.

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<sup>262</sup> Nep. *Chab.* 4.1, *Ep.* 7.1-2.

<sup>263</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.18-19. See Chapter Four 268-270 for further discussion.

<sup>264</sup> Hdt. 8.95. Fornara (1966) sees the episode of Psyttaleia as an exaltation of the hoplites, who were otherwise marginal at Salamis. However, even if vague, the account of the battle is plausible. See Dayton (2006) 54-55. More in general on leading without a formal title, see Lengauer (1979) 37.

<sup>265</sup> Proietti (2015b) 47-50.

<sup>266</sup> Proietti (2015b) 52-53.

Aristides could not have been elected *strategos*. In 480 BC, he was not even in Athens, because he had been ostracised.<sup>267</sup> Only the general amnesty of the exiled allowed him to be welcomed into the Athenian ranks. That Aristides was elected on this occasion seems doubtful.<sup>268</sup> Aside from the contingency of the situation, which made the scenario of a vote unlikely, it would have been peculiar that both Herodotus and Plutarch do not acknowledge such an important detail. Aristides was able to exercise his command over the Athenian hoplites thanks to means other than legal authority. To imply that Aristides capitalised on the influence and authority derived from his personal and familial reputation seems plausible.<sup>269</sup> But his *charis* and reputation had to be strong enough to generate trust in the Athenian hoplites. Indeed, without any legal authority, and presumably limited political support Aristides had only his *auctoritas* to rely on.<sup>270</sup>

A potential parallel could be found in Demosthenes' peculiar position in Pylos (425 BC). After his triumphal return from Acarnania, Demosthenes was granted by the Assembly some vaguely formulated powers over Eurymedon and Sophocles' fleet, which was leaving towards Sicily, for operations in the area of the Peloponnese.<sup>271</sup> Once the fleet had reached Pylos, Demosthenes asked Eurymedon and Sophocles to stop there, and help him create a fortified base from which to raid Laconia.<sup>272</sup> Eurymedon and Sophocles flatly refused

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<sup>267</sup> Hdt. 8.79.1; Plut. *Arist.* 8.1.

<sup>268</sup> Fornara (1966) 51.

<sup>269</sup> Plutarch (*Arist.* 1.7, 7.2-5) correctly underlines how ostracism was a sign of political influence in fifth century Athens, so much so that this influence was perceived as dangerous. See also Sinclair (1988) 170-171; Forsdyke (2000) 232-233, 253-254.

<sup>270</sup> Davies (1971) 127-128 hypothesises that the obedience to a social superior was more acceptable in the Athenian mentality, thus explaining why a considerable number of military officials were members of the elite.

<sup>271</sup> Thuc. 4.2.4.

<sup>272</sup> Thuc. 4.3-4.

Demosthenes' request, but the bad weather obliged them to stop at Pylos anyway. Demosthenes, then, asked the *strategoí* again for their support in fortifying Pylos, but first the *strategoí*, and then the *taxiarchoí* and the soldiers refused once more. It was only the prolonged inactivity that made the soldiers reconsider their position, and accept the hard work that Demosthenes was proposing.

As it is, the passage is bemusing. Demosthenes did not have clear formal authority; Thucydides defines him as an ἰδιότης, and this obliged him to beg for the support of Eurymedon and Sophocles. Gomme and Hornblower argue that Demosthenes was not *strategos* in that moment, but had been elected for the following spring.<sup>273</sup> This hypothesis solves the legal problem, but Demosthenes had no men assigned to him, only some loose power over a fleet that was meant to sail to Sicily as soon as possible.<sup>274</sup> Strasser suggests that Demosthenes might have received a secret mission, which he disclosed to the *strategoí* only while sailing.<sup>275</sup> This reconstruction makes sense, although it should be noted that there is only one solid example of a 'secret mission' issued by the *Boule*, and it almost ended in a riot.<sup>276</sup> Yet, Demosthenes did not have the power to issue orders over Eurymedon and Sophocles' men, which limited his authority enormously.

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<sup>273</sup> *HCT ad 3.102.3; Commentary ad 3.102.3, 4.2.4.* Cf. Fornara (1971) 57; Develin (1989) 127; Roisman (1993) 34; Wylie (1993) 22.

<sup>274</sup> Thuc. 4.2.2-3. Cf. Westlake (1961) 280-281, who comments how unlikely it was for a *strategos* to be sent without a contingent.

<sup>275</sup> Strasser (1990) 110-112. Rood (1998) 27-28, more convincingly, talks of a plan elaborated while sailing with the fleet, but based on previous intelligence.

<sup>276</sup> Demaenetus taking a trireme to Conon in 395 BC. *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia BNJ 66 F6 IX.1-2* = McKeachie & Kern VI.1-2. On the reliability of the only other known example (Diod. 13.2.6), see Chapter One 22 n. 39.

The precarious and unusual position of Demosthenes obliged him to rely purely on his ability to persuade the soldiers and his personal authority. This could be read as an example of the democratic nature of the Athenian institutions, army included: the soldiers decided, against the advice of their leaders, to support Demosthenes' endeavour. However, this line of enquiry should not be taken too far. Demosthenes had some authority, although vague, granted by the Assembly and Thucydides underlines his central role in the development and execution of the project. Furthermore, after initial resistance, the soldiers, forcibly idle because of the lousy weather, listened to Demosthenes and started building the fort.<sup>277</sup> Thucydides does not underline Demosthenes' persuasiveness. Instead, he says that an 'impulse' (ὄρμη) took the men. Plausibly, boredom played a role in this sudden decision, but Thucydides seemed to imply here that Demosthenes somewhat inspired the simple soldiers to act as he wanted, without formal authority.<sup>278</sup> Furthermore, it should be underlined how the soldiers did not choose how to conduct the operation; at best, they exercised indirect pressure on their commanders thanks to their accountability.<sup>279</sup> Undeniably, Thucydides' account of the event that occurred in Pylos is odd. Luck has a prominent role in the narrative, as if Thucydides wanted to deprive Demosthenes of the merit of his excellent plan.<sup>280</sup> For the purpose of this work, what is more important is that

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<sup>277</sup> Thuc. 4.4.1. Wylie (1993) 23. Weil (1988) 130 believes that the reference to the soldiers should be read as a characterisation of Demosthenes as a demagogue. This reading, though, does not seem to be supported by other passages representing Demosthenes in this light.

<sup>278</sup> Roisman (1993) 35; Rood (1998) 29.

<sup>279</sup> See above 30-37 and Chapter Three, .

<sup>280</sup> Thuc. 4.2, 4.27.1-2. Wilson (1979) 62; Flower (1992) 48-49; Heilke (2004) 134; Barley (2012) 99; Nevin (2017) 38-39 . *Contra* Roisman (1993) 33; Wylie (1993) 23. However, that Demosthenes 'planned in advance' to build a fort in Pylos is not corroborated by Thucydides (4.3), as Roisman claims.

Thucydides recognises an impulse which motivated the soldiers to obey a leader who did not have legal authority over them as plausible.

Aristides and Demosthenes were apparently able to exercise their personal authority even outside of their office, inspiring men with their *charis*, reputation, eloquence, and, plausibly, their enhanced perception too. However, the lack of detail in these episodes is frustrating, as they do not allow us to understand how these leaders exercised their personal authority. Fortunately, Xenophon paid great attention to leadership in his work, and also outlined the characteristic of personal authority.<sup>281</sup> In the *Oeconomicus*, Ischomachus describes the ideal general with these words:

When a commander's followers (οἱ ἐπόμενοι) have a relationship of that kind [*the willing obedience of the soldiers*] with him, it's these men, I assure you, who become the strongest commanders (ἐρρωμένοι γε ἄρχοντες) – not, by Zeus, those whose soldiers have the best physiques or are the best with javelin and bow and have the most skilled cavalry so that they are in the forefront of danger because they are the best possible cavalry or peltasts, but those who can inspire in their soldiers the notion that they must follow them through every danger and even through fire (οἱ ἂν δύνωνται ἐμποιῆσαι τοῖς στρατιώταις ἀκολουθητέον εἶναι). (trans. Pomeroy, my italics).<sup>282</sup>

Xenophon stresses that the appointment of the leader alone was not enough. In the *Memorabilia*, he explicitly states that the true leader had to possess a particular aptitude to command: he must know how to lead men.<sup>283</sup> What exactly Xenophon intends by this expression, unfortunately, has been left to the imagination of the reader. To assume that he

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<sup>281</sup> E.g. Dillery (1995) 198; Nicolai (2016) 83; Buxton (2017).

<sup>282</sup> Xen. *Oec.* 21.7. Cf. Hutchinson (2000) 52; Johnstone (2010) 150; Nicolai (2014) 73, 78; Buxton (2017) 323-325, 334.

<sup>283</sup> Xen. *Mem.* 3.9.10. Brock (2004) 248; Nicolai (2014) 73. Lenaguer (1979) 38-39 argues that Thucydides arrives at the same conclusion. Nevertheless, Thucydides is never as explicit as Xenophon.

is referring to the ability to motivate, guide, and care for the soldiers seems reasonable. These traits are, indeed, exalted in the figure of Agamemnon, named in a previous chapter,<sup>284</sup> and it is easy to understand why.

Xenophon elaborates this concept further with the notion of ‘willing obedience’.<sup>285</sup> Xenophon introduces this concept in the *Cyropaedia*, during the long dialogue between Cambyses and his son Cyrus, who was leaving to fight against the Assyrians.<sup>286</sup> This dialogue presents many essential themes of leadership, and how to ensure the obedience of men was, obviously, a major concern. Cyrus reveals to his father his thoughts on the matter, relying on a system of prizes and punishments.<sup>287</sup> However, Cambyses suggests a different approach. He says:

This, my son, is the road to compulsory obedience (τὸ ἀνάγκη ἔπεισθαι), indeed, but there is another road, a short cut, to what is much better – namely, to willing obedience (τὸ ἐκόντας πείθεσθαι). For people are only too glad to obey the man who they believe takes wiser thought for their interests than they themselves do (ὄν γὰρ ἂν ἠγήσωνται περὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος ἑαυτοῖς φρονιμώτερον ἑαυτῶν εἶναι, τούτῳ οἱ ἄνθρωποι ὑπερηδέως πείθονται). (trans. Miller).<sup>288</sup>

Several scholars recognise willing obedience as a dynamic due to the *charis* of the commander, which elicited a positive response in the soldiers and was much more effective

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<sup>284</sup> Xen. *Mem.* 3.2.1-2.

<sup>285</sup> E.g. Delebecque (1973) *ad.* 6.1; Dillery (1995) 165-172; Hutchinson (2000) 190-192; Brock (2004) 248, 250; Buxton (2018) 323-325. Cf. Nussbaum (1967) 140-144 on the selfless mission of the good commander.

<sup>286</sup> The *Cyropaedia* is a work of historical fiction, but it was also Xenophon’s manifesto on good leadership. Cf. Newell (1988) 111; Hutchinson (2000) 37; Nicolai (2016) 83; Buxton (2017) 325-326. Christesen (2006) 48-50 suggests recognising in the work a proposal for reform in Sparta. This reading is probably excessive, but Christesen underlines the important question of how much the *Cyropaedia* reflected real issues of fourth century leadership.

<sup>287</sup> Xen. *Cyr.* 1.6.20.

<sup>288</sup> Xen. *Cyr.* 1.6.21. Due (1989) 92-96 recognises the passage as programmatic for Xenophon’s leadership.

than compelling them to obey by the threat of punishment.<sup>289</sup> However, *charis* is not mentioned in this passage at all; indeed, Xenophon covers the theme earlier in the dialogue, expressing how *charis* stems only from gift and rewards.<sup>290</sup> Cyrus uses the same lexicon (τιμή/τιμάω) in referring to the prizes which could generate *charis*, suggesting that compulsory and unwilling obedience was related to *charis*. Instead, Cambyses focuses on the reputation and enhanced perception of the commander. The *Oeconomicus* supports this conclusion. Ischomachus uses the example of a good commander to describe how the subordinates could be inspired by their leader to follow orders, dynamics which Ischomachus ascribes to the leader's personal authority and 'the greatest divine [gift]'.<sup>291</sup>

*Charis* is better integrated with willing obedience in the *Cavalry Commander*. Xenophon acknowledges the importance of *charis* and a caring attitude for an excellent *hipparchos*, but, once again, he stressed the importance of the perception of the commander as sensible, smart, and more capable than the soldiers themselves.<sup>292</sup> Xenophon even advises his readers to reinforce their authority with eloquence, persuading their subordinates of the benefits of obeying orders.<sup>293</sup>

Xenophon's reflections on leadership support our conclusion on personal authority as stemming from all the extra-legal dynamics acknowledged above. In particular, Xenophon seems to have stressed the exceptional gifts and perception of the leader by the

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<sup>289</sup> Buxton (2017); Azoulay (2018) esp. 12-13, 21-23, 26-27, 58-61, 129-132.

<sup>290</sup> Xen. *Cyr.* 1.6.11.

<sup>291</sup> Xen. *Oec.* 21.6, 11. Wood (1964) 53; Nussbaum (1967) 100; Hutchinson (2000) 60-61, 227-228; Brock (2004) 248-249; Carlier (2010) 342; Buxton (2017) 327. On the importance of the leader's education: Due (1989) 149-152.

<sup>292</sup> Xen. *Eq. Mag.* 6.

<sup>293</sup> Xen. *Eq. Mag.* 1.24, 8.22.

soldiers, as much as he stressed the importance of *charis* for attaining authority, which points out how this neglected dynamic was, indeed, crucial to attaining a superior personal authority.

However, these dynamics of leadership antedated Xenophon, who evidently wrote down and refined a model of authority which can be traced back to Herodotus. After the council of Greek commanders voted not to rush to the Hellespont to destroy Xerxes' bridge, Themistocles had to explain to the Athenian soldiers, who were keen to go, to stay with the allies. Herodotus, after Themistocles' speech, comments:

[S]ince [Themistocles], who also before had seemed to be wise (σοφός), appeared to be truthfully wise and sensible (ἀληθέως σοφός τε καὶ εὐβουλος), [the Athenians] were ready to obey his words wholly (πάντως...πείθεσθαι).<sup>294</sup>

Herodotus does not stress the arguments adduced by Themistocles, which were initially adduced by Eurybiades or Aristides,<sup>295</sup> but instead focuses on Themistocles' reputation and how the soldiers perceived him at that moment.<sup>296</sup> Undoubtedly, Themistocles' speech had an important role in reaffirming his reputation and perception, but it is significant that Herodotus, like Xenophon later, stresses mainly the *strategos'* enhanced perception.

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<sup>294</sup> Hdt. 8.110.1. See Detienne & Vernant (1974) 3-4, 11, 17, 20-21, 313-314 for a discussion on cunning as a heroic quality, and more specific references to Themistocles. Cf. Evans (1983) 14; Holladay (1987).

<sup>295</sup> Hdt. 8. 108.2-4; Plut. *Arist.* 9.3-4.

<sup>296</sup> Holladay (1987) argues that Themistocles not only appreciated the importance of an adequate navy to stop the Persian invasion, but that he also manipulated Delphi and the other Greeks to fight the main battle in Salamis, where he had the advantage. If Holladay is right, this surely would explain Themistocles' reputation as *sophos* and the Athenians' enhanced perception of him.

Consequently, the dominant characteristic of personal authority was the alleged exceptionality of the leader. Whether real or not, the skill of the leader – perceived as extraordinary – inspired trust and obedience in the subordinates who acknowledged them as such. Both *charis* and eloquence were crucial aspects of extra-legal authority, and were undoubtedly strictly connected to the enhanced perception of the leader, as well as his reputation. It is reasonable to hypothesise that these extra-legal dynamics helped in establishing the enhanced perception of the leader, strengthening his position, and reaffirming his authority in moments of crisis. It is beyond doubt that Xenophon valued *charis* highly.

However, these passages suggest that Xenophon recognises a difference between *charis* and the leader's enhanced perception, and that the latter was essential for willing obedience. The clear separation that Xenophon acknowledges in the *Cyropaedia* between 'willing' and 'compulsory' obedience is telling of how these dynamics were perceived as different from each other.<sup>297</sup> Nevertheless, Cambyses never contradicts Cyrus' statements; he just acknowledges another way. Consequently, it is possible to argue that Xenophon accepts both types of leadership to some degree, a reading which would reduce the inconsistency of Xenophon's thought, especially concerning the praise for acts of *charis* and various rewards. Nonetheless, if we recognise that the phenomenon that we call personal authority is what Xenophon defines as 'willing obedience', we must accept that the

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<sup>297</sup> Wood (1964) 51- 54. The scholarship's interpretation of this passage is quite controversial. Although a neat difference is accepted, most previous commentators on this passage accept *charis* as a means of willing obedience. E.g. Hutchinson (2000) 51-62, 189-192; Azoulay (2014b) 181-182; Buxton (2017).

perception of the leader as extraordinary was somehow more important than the other extra-legal dynamics.

## MODERN CHARISMA AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE ANCIENT WORLD

Personal authority was, thus, an emotional phenomenon based on the perception of the leader as exceptional, and plausibly reinforced by the leader's past reputation, *charis*, and eloquence. The emotional nature of this kind of authority, elicited rather than imposed, and the emphasis on the perception of the leader, reminds us of a controversial sociological theory: charismatic authority. Over the next few pages, we will explore the similarities and differences between personal and charismatic authority, in the hope that the modern theory would help us to understand how extra-legal authority worked in antiquity.

However, before doing so, it is imperative to define charismatic authority. In the current Section, the main aspects of the theory of charismatic authority, its development, and its reception will be outlined. The applicability of this concept in historical research, often contested by modern and ancient historians, will be discussed in detail, showing how the objections to this concept are not sufficiently strong.

The theory of charismatic authority was initially developed by Max Weber. Weber worked on charisma during many stages of his life, focusing at times more or less on different characteristics of the dynamics.<sup>298</sup> In 1905, Weber printed *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, a work in which he named the concept of charisma for the first time.<sup>299</sup>

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<sup>298</sup> Cavalli (1981) 69; Finley (2000) 89; Pombeni (2008) 37.

<sup>299</sup> Weber (2001) 121. Cavalli (1981) 11.

Some aspects of charismatic authority were already delineated (e.g. the tripartition of leader-elite-mass, the innovative charge of charisma), but were still in a very involuted form.

A second phase in his thought must be acknowledged in the writing of *Economy and Society*, Weber's monumental work published posthumously in 1922, but started in 1911.<sup>300</sup> Here, Weber more clearly opposed charismatic authority against more rational forms of power.<sup>301</sup>

Adair-Totefff recognises a third phase, in the later 1910s.<sup>302</sup> After the death of his father, which had a significant impact on him, Weber started appreciating much more and being less critical towards irrational forces, thus partially re-evaluating and modifying his views on charisma.<sup>303</sup> Some pages of *Economy and Society* and *Politics as a Vocation* testify to the sociologist's less critical approach to this issue.

Weber never elaborated a fully developed theory of charisma,<sup>304</sup> but passages scattered throughout his work allow us to reconstruct its main features.<sup>305</sup> The inevitable starting point is his theory of three *Herrschaften*. In *Economy and Society*, Weber recognises and discusses three ways of exercising power legitimately: one justified by tradition, one by law, and one by the personal charisma of the leader.<sup>306</sup> While the first two *Herrschaften* tend to legitimise and maintain contemporary institutions and order, charismatic leadership

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<sup>300</sup> Cavalli (1981) 12. Cf. Weber (1968a) 1112 on the development of Weber's thought on a more universalistic and laic dimension.

<sup>301</sup> Dow (1978) 85-87, 90.

<sup>302</sup> Adair-Totefff (2005) 191-192. Cf. Parsons (1947) 16-17; Cavalli (1981) 25-26.

<sup>303</sup> For charisma as an irrational phenomenon, see Castelnovo et al. (2017) 544.

<sup>304</sup> Parsons (1947) 3; Lindholm (1990) 24; Pombeni (2008) 37.

<sup>305</sup> Cavalli (1981) 8-11.

<sup>306</sup> Weber (1968a) 212-301. Dow (1978) 91-92; Adair-Totefff (2005) 189-190; Pombeni (2008) 40.

emerges in moments of turmoil, and introduces new values, social changes, and a new political order.<sup>307</sup>

Charismatic authority has a strong personal component. It is centred on a leader, who offers a vision of social development to which the followers can relate, and that they were not able to conceptualise by themselves.<sup>308</sup> The vision promises tangible advantages to the followers, but rational calculation is not the main reason why the vision is appealing; the leader has a true calling to serve for the achievement of the vision.<sup>309</sup> The masses entrust a person to lead them, more than the ideas that s/he conveys.<sup>310</sup> The charismatic leader, then, becomes the personification of this mission.<sup>311</sup>

The followers recognise the leader's natural superiority, which gives to him/her the right to demand the obedience of the followers.<sup>312</sup> The pure charismatic leader neither needs legal authority, nor to compel his followers into obedience.<sup>313</sup> A bond of asymmetrical affection develops between leader and followers;<sup>314</sup> they fully trust and admire the leader, and they feel the duty to obey the person who they recognise as a charismatic leader.<sup>315</sup>

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<sup>307</sup> Weber (1968a) 1111-1115. Cf. Dow (1978) 83, 86; Cavalli (1981) 7, 28, 78; Adair-Totef (2005) 196-198; Pombeni (2008) 39; Garbo & van Vugt (2016) 401.

<sup>308</sup> Weber (1968a) 1113, 1117. Cavalli (1981) 25-28, 46, 77, 96, 208, 223; Lindholm (1990) 130-132; Pombeni (2008) 45. On the lack of self-interest in the charismatic leader's endeavours, see Weber (1968a) 1113; (1968b) 482; Cavalli (1981) 18, 29, 71, 104; Castelnovo et al. (2017) 547; Müller (2017) 25.

<sup>309</sup> Cavalli (1981) 209; Eisenstadt (1968) xix; Schweitzer (1984) 33-34; Pombeni (2008) 40.

<sup>310</sup> Cavalli (1981) 26-27, 126, 244-245; Lindholm (1990) 25; Garbo & van Vugt (2016) 401. Weber (1968a) 1112, 1115, 1125 is quite blunt in his description of the followers' obedience as a moral duty imposed by the leader. This conclusion disagrees with the emphasis given to the constant proving of the exceptional qualities of the leader, implicitly demanded by the followers. The matter, thus, should be phrased in less harsh terms, as an authority emanating from exceptional qualities recognised in the leader.

<sup>311</sup> Weber (1968a) 1117. Cavalli (1981) 73-74; Boudon & Bourricaud (1989) 70-71.

<sup>312</sup> Weber (1968a) 1113, 1122; (1968b) 483. Boudon & Bourricaud (1989) 69.

<sup>313</sup> Weber (1968a) 1117. Cf. Cavalli (1981) 24; Lindholm (1990) 24-26; Adair-Totef (2005) 193-194.

<sup>314</sup> Cavalli (1981) 18.

<sup>315</sup> Weber (1968a) 1122. Campbell (2012) 166 argues that the trust in the leader, especially during a stressful situation, reduces the scruples and indecision of the people involved. Garbo & van Vugt (2016) 399 underline

Weber also believes that the support of the charismatic leader galvanises his/her followers, freeing the potential vital spirit withheld within the followers themselves by law and tradition.<sup>316</sup> Turner even argues that the authority of the charismatic leader derived from the *metanoia* of his/her followers.<sup>317</sup> The bold initiative of the charismatic leader brings his/her followers to reassess their notion of risk. This metanoia allows a social change, if the rest of the society does not resist the development too much. Turner takes the singer Madonna as an example. Pop icon in the 80s and 90s, Madonna radically changed the habits and style of her fans, who imitated her in many ways. Turner points out that Madonna did not have any real power, nor did she pretend to oblige any of her followers to do anything in particular.<sup>318</sup> The fans just imitated their 'leader', thus unconsciously changing the customs of 1980s Western world.

Madonna is a weak example. First, that Madonna was charismatic has to be proven. The fact that she was popular and imitated by her fans does not necessarily imply that she had charisma. Secondly, Madonna never pretended to be a (charismatic) leader. Even if she had charisma, she never actively tried to use her alleged power to achieve a particular mission, with which she identified. Finally, other cases demonstrate how a conscious and

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how the 'shadow of future' drives followers to endure short-to-mid-term sacrifices. Cf. Lindholm (1990) 25; Castelnovo et al. (2017) 543-546.

<sup>316</sup> Weber (1968a) 1116. Cf. Dow (1978) 83-4, 86; Cavalli (1981) 29; Lindholm (1990) 120, 132. Beck et al. (2012) 936 structure their argument on less emphatic terms than Weber. They remark how the charismatic leader tends to stress positive emotions, eliciting these in the followers. Consequently, the followers are tendentially more satisfied. Cf. Garbo & van Vugt (2016) 401.

<sup>317</sup> Turner S. (2003) 14-17. Cf. Weber (1968a) 1116-1117. For a practical example, see Lindholm (1990) 126, on Manson's 'deprogramming'.

<sup>318</sup> Turner S. (2003) 15-16.

motivated charismatic leader could direct his/her followers. The example of Charles Manson, who ran a sect and inspired a series of homicides, is emblematic in this regard.<sup>319</sup>

To attain this degree of trust and affection, the leader him/herself has to be recognised as an exceptional human being. In the most extreme cases, Weber's charismatic leader even has superhuman traits, or a special connection with the divine.<sup>320</sup> Weber speaks of 'miracles' and 'heroic acts', referring to the authority of the Jewish and early Christian prophets.<sup>321</sup> Surely, Weber referred to true miracles, such as divine and extraordinary acts performed by the prophets, but to imply that he therefore only meant supernatural acts is misleading. However, Weber also acknowledges more mundane displays of the exceptional nature of the charismatic leader.<sup>322</sup> War-heroes are a perfect example of this pattern, as Weber himself recognises.<sup>323</sup> Until very recently, victorious commanders were extremely popular, and are often believed to possess a strong charisma.<sup>324</sup> Their achievements were often deemed outstanding, and perceived to be the result of the leaders' exceptional skills.<sup>325</sup>

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<sup>319</sup> E.g. Nielsen (1984) 119-223; Lindholm (1990) 123-136.

<sup>320</sup> Weber (1968a) 241, 1112; (1968b) 481. Weber's initial formulation of charisma derived from an analysis of religious authority and mysticism, but Adair-Totef (2005) 197 seems right in pointing out that the interest of Weber was mostly political. Cf. Cavalli (1981) 70-71; Lindholm (1990) 25, 129-130; Pombeni (2008) 39-40.

<sup>321</sup> Weber (1963) 46-47; (1968a) 1115. Spinrad (1991) 296; Pombeni (2008) 48; Castelnovo et al. (2017) 543.

<sup>322</sup> Weber (1968a) 1116, 1133-1135. Cavalli (1981) 70; Nielsen (1984) 320-322; Turner B. (2003) 98; Pombeni (2008) 48. Cf. Lindholm (1990) 124-125, on the identification of the past experiences of the leader as exemplary and an inspiration for the followers.

<sup>323</sup> Weber (1968a) 1112, 1114, 1115, 1118; (1968b) 483. Weber often mentions 'war-chiefs', the leaders who emerge in reaction to a threat, usually war. He does not make many specific examples, except for Napoleon I. Cf. Cavalli (1981) 73-74, 189; Spinrad (1991) 297; Turner B. (2003) 99.

<sup>324</sup> Garbo & van Vugt (2016) 400; Müller (2017) 33. Moerk (1998) 453-468, esp. 453, 467 recalls that in the past military victories grandly enhanced personal reputation. Cf. Royle (2010) 169; Roberts (2001) 238, 255-256. Gilbert (1968) 298 stresses how his role in the Second World War granted Gen. Eisenhower exceptional popular support, which allowed him to win the election for the U.S. presidency. Only by the end of the 1960s had this rhetoric lost some of its power. Cf. Shay (1994) 7. However, in other parts of the world, this narrative is still very vital. For instance, see Robertson & Greene (2017) 95-96 on Russia.

<sup>325</sup> A practical example of this trend could be found in Gen. Montgomery's leadership. See Buckley (2013) 25-26.

Weber refers to practical, exceptional acts performed by the leader, but also frames this issue in terms of how followers perceive the leader.<sup>326</sup> The followers must recognise a potential charismatic leader's virtues, and trust him to lead them towards a better self and future.<sup>327</sup> When the leader is not deemed exceptional anymore, s/he loses his exceptional status, as well as his influence on the followers.<sup>328</sup> Consequently, charismatic authority is substantially unstable, and the charismatic leader has to constantly demonstrate his exceptionality through his successes and 'miracles', so to preserve his influence.<sup>329</sup>

Charismatic leadership tends to emerge in situations of crisis.<sup>330</sup> The need for a revolutionary solution to a present negative situation addressed a specific group of people to trust and empower somebody whom they saw as exceptional.<sup>331</sup> Nevertheless, once the crisis is over, the need for a charismatic leader is less urgent, while the desire for a stable

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<sup>326</sup> Weber (1963) 25-26; (1968a) 242, 1112-1113, 1121, 1125; (1968b) 483. Dow (1978) 83; Cavalli (1981) 7; Lindholm (1990) 76-77; Spinrad (1991) 296-297. The psychoanalytic school of sociology addresses charisma as an unconscious process within the followers. See Castelnovo et al. (2017) 543. Gurov and Zankina (2013) 6 convincingly propose a correction to Weber's model. Instead of relying purely on the followers' perception, they suggest that the leader's proactivity could be a variable. Cf. Conger and Kanungo (1998) 38-39, 48.

<sup>327</sup> Weber (1968a) 1117: "The bearer of charisma enjoys loyalty and authority in virtue of a mission believed to be embodied in him" (trans. Roth & Wittich). Cf. Weber (1968a) 1121; Cavalli (1981) 46.

<sup>328</sup> Weber (1968a) 242, 1112, 1114-1115, 1125; (1968b) 482. Cf. Cavalli (1981) 72, 123; Lindholm (1990) 25; Roberts (2001) 238, 247; Turner S. (2003) 7, 9; Adair-Totef (2005) 194-195, 198; Pombeni (2008) 48; Campbell (2010) 166. Spinrad (1991) 297-298 argues that a close connection between the charismatic leader and the follower is necessary, but this point seems questionable. Cf. Müller (2017) 33-36. However, public image and personal reputation have a crucial role in building personal charisma, and it does not necessarily derive from direct interaction.

<sup>329</sup> Weber (1968a) 1113-1114; (1968b) 484 cit.: "Ist ihm Erfolg versagt [to the charismatic leader], so wankt siene Herrschaft." Cf. Cavalli (1981) 95-96, 99-100.

<sup>330</sup> Weber (1968a) 1111-1112, 1117. Cavalli (1981) 7, 28; Hatscher (2000) 30; Turner S. (2003) 8-9; Castelnovo et al. (2017) 544. Cf. Campbell (2012) 159 for a parallel on the increased need for a strong leader in stressful environments on a psychological level. Cf. Conger and Kanungo (1998) 41-43 on the influence of context on leadership.

<sup>331</sup> Weber (1968a) 1134 argues that the crisis 'activates' the latent charisma of the soon-to-be leader.

routine increases.<sup>332</sup> Consequently, the charismatic leader, having attained his/her objective, can often struggle to keep their power.<sup>333</sup> Personal authority changes, and shifts towards one of the other legitimate types of leadership.<sup>334</sup> Weber also investigates how the single agent could transfer personal charismatic power to a new institution.<sup>335</sup> This process, known as routinisation or normalisation, implies that the exceptional authority 'passes' from the charismatic leader to his institutional role.<sup>336</sup> In this way, the next person to perform this role – whether formally or informally – would benefit from an appropriate authority, even if not necessarily charismatic him/herself.

The theory of the 'charisma of office', as it is often denominated, is a development of the introduction of massive social changes.<sup>337</sup> If this trend could be considered for the most dramatic occurrences of charismatic leadership, it does not appear in the more average and low-scale examples.<sup>338</sup>

Finally, a distinction has to be made between the leader's immediate circle and the 'common' followers. While both groups have faith in the leader, the former plays an important role in channelling and controlling of the interaction between the leader and the

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<sup>332</sup> Weber (1968a) 1142, 1146-1147. Gurov & Zunkina (2013) 7 use the emphatic, but not exaggerated, term of 'salvation narrative'. Müller (2017) 42-43 underlines how populist leaders, once in power, use real or invented crises as a mean of legitimisation.

<sup>333</sup> Weber (1968a) 1113-1114, 1121. Pombeni (2008) 47 remarks that this aspect is purely theoretical, derived by the theoretical nature of Weber's formulation.

<sup>334</sup> Weber (1968a) 1135-1141. Cavalli (1981) 123.

<sup>335</sup> Weber (1968a) 1121-1123. Cavalli (1981) 90.

<sup>336</sup> Dow (1978) 85. Beck et al. (2012) 936-938 believe that what they call "emotional rhetoric" could help in slowing the process. Cf. Schweitzer (1984) 19-20 for criticisms of Weber's routinisation. Schweitzer's idea to shift the cycle of charisma on the leader more than on institutions is compelling.

<sup>337</sup> Weber (1968a) 1124.

<sup>338</sup> See the objections of Turner S. (2003) 10-13.

people.<sup>339</sup> They could even act as practical support for the leader, creating a pseudo-bureaucratic layer.<sup>340</sup>

Weber's theory of charisma had a significant impact on sociology, but it is also quite controversial and problematic. This reticence is not only theoretical, but also has historical reasons. After an initial phase of mild acceptance,<sup>341</sup> charismatic authority was seen to be too similar to the ideology of the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century. Often recognised as a way to justify fascism and, especially, National Socialism, scholars treated Weber's charisma with contempt after the Second World War.<sup>342</sup> Furthermore, from the 1960s, the Marxist approach to history and sociology, especially French, switched the historical focus from great individuals to common people.<sup>343</sup> These scholarly currents had considerable consequences for the theoretical framework adopted, and Weber's theory was not taken into much consideration. After a more accepting phase in the 1980s, in the 1990s the focus of sociology on social psychology relegated charisma to the niche of leadership studies.<sup>344</sup>

These ideological and historical biases say little about the scientific validity of Weber's theory, and reminds us how scholars and scientific debate are influenced by their historical period.

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<sup>339</sup> Weber (1968a) 243, 1119; Cavalli (1981) 7, 11.

<sup>340</sup> Cavalli (1981) 28, 99-100.

<sup>341</sup> Eisenstadt (1968) xi names Barnes and Becker, Salomon, Shils.

<sup>342</sup> See the summary of scholarship presented by Cavalli (1981) 9-10 and Schweitzer (1984) 45-46. Cf. Pombeni (2008) 44 remarks how the similarities with fascist regimes were emphasised, and often wrongly. To underline that Weber did not live to see the rise of National Socialism is always useful. Later scholars have made this association.

<sup>343</sup> Cavalli (1981) 10.

<sup>344</sup> Turner S. (2003) 7. Cf. Potts (2009) 196-201 for a summary of the scholarship.

More importantly, sociologists and political scientists underline two main problems with this theory: the lack of a precise formulation, and its applicability to real events. Weber's definition of charisma is ambiguous at many points, and lacks the synthesis of a separate and final formulation.<sup>345</sup> The problem exists, but it is not insurmountable. Cavalli underlines how sociologists have felt the need to deal with Weber's theory – whether positively or negatively, but only a few have made a proper effort to reconstruct Weber's thought, scattered as it is in many different works.<sup>346</sup> Through this work of research and collection, it is possible to attain a coherent formulation of charismatic authority, perhaps ambiguous at times, but substantially clear.

Much more serious is the objection concerning the applicability of charismatic authority to real-life events. Weber elaborated a rigid model, the aim of which was to understand history and society more effectively, in a rational, objective way.<sup>347</sup> The dynamics discussed are necessarily general and trans-historical.<sup>348</sup> Consequently, Pombeni remarks, the application of this model to reality risks schematising and oversimplifying the ongoing dynamics.<sup>349</sup> Furthermore, Weber characterises charisma as a revolutionary force.<sup>350</sup> He explicitly acknowledges charisma as a phenomenon antithetic to traditional and bureaucratic authority, thus institutions as we know them.<sup>351</sup> This statement creates an aporia in applying charismatic authority in the framework of pre-existing institutions, as

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<sup>345</sup> Dow (1978) 90-91; Schwetizer (1984) 31.

<sup>346</sup> Cavalli (1981) 8.

<sup>347</sup> Parsons (1947) 12-13, 28; Eisenstadt (1968) xiv; Lindholm (1990) 23-24.

<sup>348</sup> Parsons (1947) 18-20; Cavalli (1981) 14-18; Finely (2000) 94; Turner S. (2003) 8.

<sup>349</sup> Pombeni (2008) 37, 46. Cf. Potts (2009) 22.

<sup>350</sup> Weber (1968a) 244, 1121; Schweitzer (1984) 18-19.

<sup>351</sup> Weber (1968a) 244, 1133, 1148-1149.

long as the charismatic leader does not try to subvert them.<sup>352</sup> Lastly, Weber introduces the notion of charismatic authority within his discussion of legitimate forms of state authority. It is arguable whether the same theory could be applied outside this framework.

Nevertheless, Weber's thought is much more complex and flexible than some statements in *Economy and Society* let us suppose. He admits that there are exceptions to the patterns that he delineates.<sup>353</sup> This plurality of positions remarks once again on the unfinished nature of Weber's reflection, but could also suggest that Weber himself was at times leaning towards acknowledging a more flexible model.

This is exactly the direction towards which several scholars have been pushing charisma: a notion of charisma separated from the discussion of the legitimate *Herrschaften*, and that takes into consideration the interplay of charismatic and non-charismatic aspects of leadership. Schweitzer believes that charismatic and non-charismatic features could coexist in historical politicians, and that the interaction of the two dynamics could strengthen the authority of the leader.<sup>354</sup> Schweitzer notes how Weber acknowledged this synergy, but only for a brief period, but Schweitzer challenges this limitation.<sup>355</sup> 'Synergic charisma' demonstrates how Weber's theory could – and probably should – be adapted to the circumstances of the events taken into consideration, while providing a sensible explanation of the exceptional personal authority that some individuals seem to exercise

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<sup>352</sup> Cf. Schweitzer (1984) 326-332, who criticises Weber's model, and proposes a more flexible solution.

<sup>353</sup> E.g. Weber (1968a) 1117 acknowledges that the missions do not always need to be revolutionary; at 1114 he admits that the charismatic leader and his followers do not necessarily have to keep themselves apart from the rest of the world.

<sup>354</sup> Schweitzer (1984) 19, 25-29, 241, 312-320. Cf. Eisenstadt (1968) xx, li-lv; Turner S. (2003) 9; Gurov & Zankina (2013) 6-7.

<sup>355</sup> Schweitzer (1984) esp. 50-56.

over their peers. In this way, charisma could even be recognised as a means to build political consensus.<sup>356</sup> The more adaptable and practical synergic charisma seems the best approach for discussing charismatic authority in particular contexts, rather than in universalistic terms, and it is the theoretical approach adopted in this study.

This leaves us with the final aspect of the problem with Weber's model's applicability: its use in historical analysis. Spinrad believes that many historians exploit charisma as a smokescreen to justify complex phenomena with a simple answer.<sup>357</sup> Spinrad's criticism is not out of place. Outside of sociological contexts – and, it is worth noting, often this means in studies of history – a simplified conceptualisation of charisma is improperly used.<sup>358</sup> Popularly, charisma is intended as an irrational, often described as being similar to magnetism, that a person cannot acquire, but only possess.<sup>359</sup> This formulation is a gross oversimplification of the matter. Even more dangerous is how charisma has often been used as a superficial answer to justify complex situations, without a proper discussion of the issue.<sup>360</sup>

Nonetheless, the solution is not to reject the theory of charismatic leadership *in toto*, but to advocate for a more rigorous, but sensible, application of the concept. If, as Schweitzer does, the theory of charismatic authority is applied with consideration of the context and

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<sup>356</sup> Cavalli (1981) 73-74, 104; Turner S. (2003) 14; Gurov & Zankina (2013) 4, 7. From this angle, the harsh phrasing of Weber (1968a) 1112 could be more appropriate.

<sup>357</sup> Spinrad (1991) 298-304, 307, 310, who makes a sharp distinction between charismatic leadership and the conscious usage of symbols for political purposes. He argues that these symbols elicit loyalty to a party, the entity behind the leaders. This conclusion is questionable in modern contexts – there are several examples of loyalty to leaders and not to a party (e.g. T. Roosevelt; Eisenhower). However, it is even less sound for antiquity, when political parties did not exist at all. Cf. Parsons (1947) 28; Turner S. (2003) 9-10.

<sup>358</sup> Cavalli (1981) 7-8; Hatscher (2000) 19-20; Spinrad (1991) 295; Turner S. (2003) 6-8.

<sup>359</sup> Boudon & Bourricaud (1989) 70; Potts (2009) 182-188.

<sup>360</sup> Spinrad (1991) 296.

pre-existing dynamics, it could be a very productive concept to explain otherwise challenging scenarios.

The same conclusion seems applicable to ancient history too. Weber aims to build a universal model. Consequently, the application of his theory to antiquity does not betray the original purpose of his work.<sup>361</sup> Weber's constant reliance on historical examples confirms this statement. In *Economy and Society*, Weber uses Pericles as an example of a charismatic leader, implying the applicability of this dynamic to the ancient world.<sup>362</sup> In *Wissenschaftlere*, he even argues that demagogues, whom he takes as charismatic leaders, were necessary for the smooth running of democracy, and explicitly names Cleon as an instance of a charismatic leader.<sup>363</sup>

In theory, the application of the theory of charismatic authority to the ancient world should not create many problems. Indeed, this approach has been occasionally tried, not without many controversies. Like social science, the reception of charisma in the study of ancient Greek history has also had different phases. After some sporadic interest in the 1920s and 1930s,<sup>364</sup> charisma did not have much appeal after the Second World War. Only in the 1960s, was Weberian charisma rediscovered, although little attention was paid to its methodology.<sup>365</sup> These inconsistencies led to harsh criticism of this theory. For instance, Andrewes rejects the notion that emotional and charismatic appeal was crucial for one's

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<sup>361</sup> Pombeni (2008) 49, more generally, acknowledges the relevance of Weber's theory as a retroactive instrument to analyse and understand history.

<sup>362</sup> Weber (1968a) 1126-1127; (1968b) 483. Roberts (2001) 238-239.

<sup>363</sup> Weber (1968b) 483. Cf. Eisenstadt (1968) xx; Finley (2000) 94; Roberts (2001) 238-239.

<sup>364</sup> Finley (2000) 88-89.

<sup>365</sup> Finley (2000) 88.

appointment to office, arguing that it was due to a rational calculation of the skill of the candidate.<sup>366</sup>

In the 1980s, this critical phase was surpassed, and charisma in history was discussed once again.<sup>367</sup> However, only in the early 2000s did charisma begin to be applied more scientifically to ancient history. Hatscher's study on the charisma of Late Republican Roman leaders is worth mentioning. The application of Weber's model economically explains the imposition of a 'new' figure of successful military leaders in the Roman political scene, in a situation of crisis.<sup>368</sup>

Still today there is some resistance to applying charisma to ancient history. Like contemporary sociologists, Azoulay complains about the indefiniteness of the theoretical concept of charisma, which in his opinion is too theoretical and vague to represent the historical picture represented by the ancient sources.<sup>369</sup> Much more noteworthy are Finley's objections to charisma, with specific reference to fifth century Athens.<sup>370</sup> In an article entirely dedicated to the application of Weber's theories to ancient history, Finley makes four main objections against the theory of charismatic authority and its application to Athens: that Athens was too peculiar to be seen as an example of the 'typical' Greek polis; that demagogues were not omnipresent in Athenian history; that the irrational and uninterested

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<sup>366</sup> Andrewes (1962) 83. Thompson (1981) 154 compellingly proves that Andrewes is wrong.

<sup>367</sup> E.g. Thompson (1981). See Hatscher (2000) 25 and Azoulay (2014b) 170-171 for a summary of the scholarship.

<sup>368</sup> Hatscher (2000) 14-17.

<sup>369</sup> Azoulay (2018) 10-11. The scholar, though, admits the power of the leaders' 'heroic mission', which assured the loyalty of the followers in extra-legal terms.

<sup>370</sup> Finley (2000) 94-98.

mass theorised by Weber is absent in Athens; and that the position of the demagogues was precarious, and after their failure it is impossible to speak of charisma anymore.

All these arguments are debatable. Undoubtedly, Athens was an exceptional *polis*, but Weber's universal model hints only at a general pattern. If the synergic charisma theory is accepted, this model should be compared to the idiosyncratic characteristics of the historical context under examination. The result – and on this point Finley is right – is unique to that specific context. Consequently, the application of these data to other settings should either be made only on a highly hypothetical basis, if some core elements of the dynamics are shared in both contexts, or avoided. Nonetheless, there is no reason to reject the general pattern altogether.

Finley's point on the 'gaps' in the sequence of demagogues is even more controversial.<sup>371</sup> It is utterly evident that Weber was not referring to the post-Pericles public figures accused of flattering the *demos*, but more generally to influential leaders with wide popular support. Within these, not enumerating Pisistratus, Miltiades, Cimon, and Alcibiades, as Finley does, seems preposterous. Furthermore, Finley does not refer only to them, because he accepts Solon as a valid example. Consequently, Finley seems to apply an arbitrary criterion in deciding whom to consider in his discussion of charismatic authority, avoiding meaningful examples.

On Finley's third objection, we can open a debate worthy of its own dissertation. Several scholars share Finley's opinion on the Athenian citizens' high level of motivation

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<sup>371</sup> Finley (2000) 95-96.

and participation in politics, arguing for an outstanding involvement and participation in the Assembly.<sup>372</sup> Other scholars, in my opinion correctly, are more cautious and realistic.<sup>373</sup> Moreover, Ober compellingly underlines how Finley argues for an overly rational picture of Athenian politics.<sup>374</sup>

However, the main objection to Finley's point is that charismatic authority does not necessarily imply the passivity of the followers. The followers are emotionally involved in the vision and the leader, and they are often asked to be active, even daring, in their support. Weber speaks of moral duty in describing obedience to the charismatic leader, but the model of synergic charisma attenuates the harshness of this statement, focusing more on the people's trust in the leader and the enthusiasm that s/he generates in the masses.<sup>375</sup>

The last of Finley's objections, that once a leader lost his charismatic authority he could not retrieve it, raises some doubt too. First, that the followers were the majority in the city is often false. Most of the time, their vision is directed at a particular group of people.<sup>376</sup> Consequently, a charismatic leader could lose his institutional position for reasons other than the failure of his charisma. Secondly, modern studies underline how charisma has a strong effect on the followers, attenuating the effects of rational arguments against their trusted leader.<sup>377</sup> This dynamic could be hypothetically applied to the ancient world too, although only tentatively. Schweitzer even argues that, on the condition that the charismatic

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<sup>372</sup> *HCT ad.* 2.65.2; Hansen (1983a) 7-16; (1987) 14-19; (1991) 130-132.

<sup>373</sup> Rhodes (1972) 79; Whitehorne (2005) 36. The Athenian's lack of interest in politics is attested in several *loci*. Aristoph. *Acha.* esp. 17-22; F 102 *PCG*; Ar. *Pol.* 4.1292b25ff, 6.1318b 9ff. See Osborne (1985) 71.

<sup>374</sup> Ober (1989) 124-125. Ober argues for a middle ground between Weber and Finley.

<sup>375</sup> Schweitzer (1984) 33-34, 36. More cautiously, Boudon & Bourricaud (1989) 70.

<sup>376</sup> Schweitzer (1984) 38-39.

<sup>377</sup> Beck et al. (2012) 934-938.

leader does not rely exclusively on a single type of charisma, his authority could be revived after a moment of disillusion, especially when facing a new crisis.<sup>378</sup>

On one point, Finley seems absolutely right. When the leader's halo of exceptionality crumbles, his authority falls too. However, this case presupposes a significant failure that seriously questions the capabilities of the leaders. Losing an election or being charged with a fine could arguably destroy the reputation of an exceptional leader completely. The example of Pericles is paramount. The Athenians were unsatisfied with his strategy; thus, they fined him and stripped him of the *strategia*.<sup>379</sup> This reaction was dictated by their anger and frustration, which affected them only for a brief period.<sup>380</sup> It did not ruin the image of Pericles as a saviour and victorious leader, thus his re-election the year after is not surprising.<sup>381</sup> We know for certain that his policies were not popular at the time, so we should conclude that the Athenians re-elected him because they still perceived him as a saviour and exceptional man, despite his recent failures.

To summarise, Finley's objections against the application of the theory of charismatic leadership to ancient history are too weak to be entirely convincing. Although we can concur that Weber's original formulation is too rigid to represent the particularities of Greek culture and society,<sup>382</sup> the notion of synergic charisma suits the task much better, and allows

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<sup>378</sup> Schweitzer (1984) 325.

<sup>379</sup> Thuc. 2.65.2-3.

<sup>380</sup> GSW 2.12.

<sup>381</sup> Thuc. 2.65.4.

<sup>382</sup> Cf. Azoulay (2014b) 173. Hatscher (2000) 17 perceives the matter as a conflict between the narrative of 'great men' and the attitude to microhistory. Nonetheless, the problem is more severe than that. The application of the theory of charismatic authority to antiquity involves the application of a modern formulation to the ancient world, an operation that is always controversial and challenging to achieve without falling into involuntary anachronism.

us a theoretical instrument to understand crucial aspects of ancient authority, otherwise without a proper explanation.

The discrepancies and differences in terminology between the modern sociological concept and the ancient sources present an additional challenge. Obviously, Weber's terms and categories are unattested in ancient sources.<sup>383</sup> Yet, even if disguised by other names or, more often, oversimplified in extremely general categories, the ancient sources report episodes and patterns which could be recognised in this framework of charisma. As discussed in the Introduction, this study accepts the application of modern labels and categories to phenomena which show substantial correspondence with their alleged modern counterpart.

This theory has to be applied carefully. Charisma is not, and must not be treated as, an easy answer to solve the problem of ancient leadership without effort. The illuminating work of past scholars on what we have named "extra-legal" means of authority must be taken into consideration and integrated with the theory of charisma. Only in this way can the purely theoretical model formalised by Weber be applied to practical contexts. In other words, the theoretical model of charisma applied in this study is Schweitzer's synergic charisma, which takes into particular consideration the leaders' *charis*, reputation, and eloquence. The purpose is to explain the phenomenon of personal authority which, as we have commented above, was interwoven with, but different from, the other extra-legal dynamics. The theory of synergic charisma could offer a valuable solution for this problem,

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<sup>383</sup> Hatscher (2000) 32, 70-74.

while simultaneously explaining the emphasis of the ancient sources on the perception of the commander as exceptional.

#### ANCIENT GREEK CHARISMATIC AUTHORITY (?)

After this sociological excursus, we now have the instruments required to comment upon charismatic authority in antiquity. In this Section, we will discuss a series of examples of 'personal authority', which we will tentatively interpret in light of Schweitzer's theory of synergic charisma. The aim here is to verify whether the main features of charismatic authority are represented in the historical accounts, thus providing a reasonable explanation for this form of authority.

In accordance with the topic of this dissertation, we will discuss military leaders, and in particular the Athenian *strategoí*. This focus is also useful because it will ease the burden of discussing whether our examples were contextual to a crisis. Military leaders were more authoritative in times of war, or close to the beginning of a war. Consequently, we can see all our examples as contextual to a crisis scenario.

Three exemplary leaders from Xenophon's *Hellenica* are taken as case studies for this comparison, in reason of the richness of detail. These are Hermocrates, Teleutias, and Alcibiades. The Syracusan Hermocrates and his colleagues were leading the Syracusan fleet in the Deceleian War, as an ally of Sparta (411/410 BC). While the commanders were fighting

in the Aegean Sea, the Syracusan Assembly impeached them, ordering them to return to Syracuse at once.<sup>384</sup> However, Xenophon writes:

The men, however, and particularly the *trierarchoi*, *epibatai*, and steersmen, set up a shout at this and bade the *strategoí* remain in command. The *strategoí* replied that they ought not to indulge in partisan opposition to their own government. "But if anyone," they said, "has any charge to bring against us, you should give us a hearing, remembering how many naval battles you have won and how many ships you have captured when fighting by yourselves, and how often, when associated with others, you have proved yourselves invincible under our leadership (ἡμῶν ἡγουμένων), occupying the most honourable post in the line of battle on account of our skill (ἡμετέραν ἀρετήν) and your own good spirit (ὑμετέραν προθυμίαν), exhibited both on land and sea." But when no one brought any charge against them, at the request of the troops they remained until their successors arrived (δεομένων ἔμειναν ἕως ἀφίκοντο οἱ ἀντ' ἐκείνων στρατηγοί),— Demarchus, the son of Epicydes, Myskon, the son of Menecrates, and Potamis, the son of Gnosis. Then, after most of the *trierarchoi* had taken oath that, when they returned to Syracuse, they would bring their *strategoí* back from exile, they sped them on their ways, commending them all (πάντας ἐπαινοῦντες). (trans. Brownson, my italics).<sup>385</sup>

This passage shows many characteristics of charismatic authority. First and foremost, Hermocrates and his colleagues stressed their exceptional skills as commanders. They acknowledged the role of the soldiers, but, not dissimilarly from Hyperides' celebration of Leosthenes discussed above, they claimed for themselves a role in the previous successes.<sup>386</sup> As is typical when on trial, the *strategoí* reminded the men of their *charis* to strengthen their position.<sup>387</sup> However, the emphasis on the personal *arete* of the commanders suggests

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<sup>384</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.27. Westlake (1969) 192-193. Delebecque (1957) 30 sees in Hermocrates' unjust exile a reference to Xenophon's personal experience. Kallet (2001) 273-274 underlines that the tensions between Hermocrates and Tissaphernes (Thuc. 8.85.3) might have played a role in Hermocrates' exile. Cf. Westlake (1968) 306-307.

<sup>385</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.28-29.

<sup>386</sup> Hyp. 6.15. Westlake (1969) 201. Cf. above, pp. 96-97.

<sup>387</sup> Cf. above, pp. 66-69.

something more than just an acknowledgement of past benefits. Through their talent, they empowered the soldiers and sailors to achieve victory and command the respect of their allies.

The Syracusan *strategoi* did not present an innovative vision to the troops, but they offered them victory and good reputation among their allies, a good enough objective to be recognised as ‘vision’.<sup>388</sup> The *strategoi*’s role in the mission was crucial. It was their talent that motivated the Syracusans. Krentz points out how the Syracusans lacked their previous enthusiasm in the later siege of Cyzicus.<sup>389</sup> Consequently, it could be argued that Hermocrates and his colleagues embodied their vision of victory, at least to some degree.

The Syracusans apparently accepted this picture of their leaders, implicitly acknowledging their superiority.<sup>390</sup> Xenophon does not acknowledge any objections; the sub-officers of the *strategoi* even offered to vouch for them once they had returned home. The more active roles of *trierarchoi*, steersmen, and *epibatai* closely resembles the two-layer structure typical of charismatic leaders. Indeed, even Hermocrates’ colleagues, who are inconspicuous in the sources, could be recognised as being in this group. It was this group that met with Hermocrates daily to discuss strategy and to be instructed on the orders.<sup>391</sup>

The reader has surely noted how this passage of the *Hellenica* shows many of the most representative features of charismatic authority. Only the change in the way of thinking of

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<sup>388</sup> Cf. Krentz (1989) *ad.* 1.1.28, 30. Gray (1989) 152 underlines especially Hermocrates’ patriotism and sense of duty. Cf. Hornblower (2011) 175. Nevertheless, Hermocrates’ military virtues are evidently central in this passage too. On the promise of victory as ‘vision’, see Weber (1968a) 1112-1115, 1118.

<sup>389</sup> Krentz (1989) *ad.* 1.1.30

<sup>390</sup> Cf. Krentz (1989) *ad.* 1.1.28 on the support of the ordinary soldiers.

<sup>391</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.30.

the followers, the *metanoia*, is not well represented by Xenophon, although their readiness to support Hermocrates against the Assembly's will could be partially recognised as such. Unsurprisingly, Hermocrates' men demonstrated loyalty and readiness to obey him and his colleagues which transcends the legal means of authority and compulsion, and, indeed, goes against them.<sup>392</sup>

There is no good reason to doubt the episode and the dynamic that Xenophon underlined.<sup>393</sup> Pritchett argues that Hermocrates was not so great leader as Xenophon states, but it is peculiar that Thucydides too presents a favourable picture of Hermocrates' acumen and tactical wisdom.<sup>394</sup> Furthermore, there is no reason to assume that Xenophon was biased in favour of Hermocrates as he was, for instance, for either himself or Agesilaus.

The second example worth a more thorough discussion is Teleutias' command of the fleet in Aegina. In 388 BC, the Spartan fleet in Aegina refused to obey their appointed commander, Eteonicus.<sup>395</sup> The Spartans had just survived an ambush organised by Chabrias, but Xenophon recognised that the main problem was that the soldiers had not been paid. A similar reaction was fairly common in this period, and suggests a rational calculation of the crews: they were on 'strike' because they were not paid, a phenomenon which is coherent with the increasing reliance on mercenaries.<sup>396</sup>

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<sup>392</sup> Cf. Westlake (1969) 194-195, esp. n. 41.

<sup>393</sup> Westlake (1969) 195.

<sup>394</sup> GSW 2.13. On Thucydides' evaluation of Hermocrates: Westlake (1969) 198-200; Lengauer (1979) 49-50; Bloedow (2000) 306.

<sup>395</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.13.

<sup>396</sup> E.g. Thuc. 8.84.2; Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.4-7, 5.1.13, 6.2.16; Hellenica Oxyrhynchia *FGrHist* 66 F 9.22.2. Cf. GSW 1.25-26; Hirschfeld (2009) 389. See Chapter Five 303-306, 311.

Nevertheless, this reading does not fully explain the soldiers' behaviour. When Teleutias relieved Eteonicus of the command of the fleet, the men were willing to fight for him.<sup>397</sup> Following the words of Xenophon, Teleutias specified that he had neither money nor food with him; he only promised to attain these through raids.<sup>398</sup> Why, then, did the men obey him?

The crews obeyed Teleutias because of his personal authority. Nothing else changed except the presence of the commander. Once more, we can easily recognise several essential features of charismatic authority. Teleutias was 'not without *charis*',<sup>399</sup> and he certainly exploited patriotic rhetoric in addressing the soldiers, but he was also perceived as exceptional by the crews in Aegina. Not only was Teleutias the brother of Agesilaus, and thus a descendant of Heracles and a prince,<sup>400</sup> but he was also the previous commander of the men and had effectively repelled an Athenian attack on the island not long before.<sup>401</sup> These events probably corroborated – or even created – an enhanced perception of Teleutias in the eyes of the crews in Aegina, as the men's behaviour in reaction to Teleutias' departure demonstrates. Xenophon writes:

And he took over the fleet, while Teleutias, under the very happiest of circumstances, set sail for home. For when he was going down to the sea as he set out for home, there was no one among the soldiers who did not grasp his hand (οὐδεὶς ἐκεῖνον τῶν στρατιωτῶν ὃς οὐκ ἔδεξιώσατο), and one decked him with a garland (ἔστεφάνωσεν), another with a *headband* (ἔταινίωσεν), and others who came too late, nevertheless, even though he was now underway,

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<sup>397</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.18. Azoulay (2018) 126.

<sup>398</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.14, 16.

<sup>399</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.37.

<sup>400</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.19. Cartledge (1987) 21, 115; Moore (2013) 459.

<sup>401</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.2.

threw garlands into the sea and prayed for many blessings upon him (καὶ ἤρχοντο αὐτῷ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ). (trans. Brownson, my italics).<sup>402</sup>

The grant of garlands (στέφανοι) and headbands (ταινίαι) were honours typical of victorious athletes, whose exceptional status has been already commented upon.<sup>403</sup> Indeed, Currie suggests that this honour could “reveal a religious significance” due to the parallel practice of crowning victorious heroes in myth.<sup>404</sup> Regardless of whether or not this is correct, there is no doubt that the act was highly significant, and hints at an enhanced perception of Teleutias. It is telling that the other commanders similarly honoured were Pericles after the victory over Samos (439 BC), Brasidas when he entered Scione (423 BC), and Alcibiades upon returning to Athens (408 BC), about which we will discuss below.<sup>405</sup> Xenophon appreciates the importance of the soldiers’ behaviour too, for he stops his narration to focus the readers’ attention on how Teleutias generated such feelings.<sup>406</sup> Consequently, it is reasonable to argue that Xenophon recognises this detail as important to sketch Teleutias and, probably, to explain his influence on the soldiers.<sup>407</sup>

On top of this exceptional perception, Teleutias gave the crews a vision, of which he took charge personally. Teleutias says:

“Yet if God be willing and you perform your part zealously (ὕμεις συμπροθυμῆσθε), I shall endeavour to supply you with provisions in the greatest abundance (πειράσομαι τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ὑμῖν ὡς πλεῖστα πορίζειν).

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<sup>402</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.3. Gray (1989) 8 points out how the main element of this passage is Teleutias’ ability to win the troops’ support.

<sup>403</sup> Reid (2012) 282; Azoulay (2014a) 33. Cf. above, pp. 96-97.

<sup>404</sup> Currie (2005) 141-142.

<sup>405</sup> Thuc. 4.121.1; Plut. *Per.* 28.4-5; *Alc.* 32.3. Cf. Stadter (1989) *ad loc.*

<sup>406</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.4. Hutchinson (2000) 132-133. On the possible Xenophon’s bias: Westlake (1969) 208-209.

<sup>407</sup> Dillery (1995) 197-198 stresses how this passage focuses the reader’s attention on Teleutias, as a man as well as an exemplary leader.

And be well assured that, whenever I am in command of you (ἐγὼ ὅταν ὑμῶν ἄρχω), I pray just as earnestly for your lives as for my own. (trans. Brownson)<sup>408</sup>

Teleutias' claims are perhaps cautious, but there is no doubt that he put himself at the centre of this vision. The trust that the soldiers had in Teleutias' (exceptional) talent and his vision elicited a radical change in them. The soldiers' trust in Teleutias' words was so extensive that they waived their rational concern for their pay, with which they also bought their food. The mutinous crews hailed Teleutias' words, asking him to order them to do whatever was necessary.<sup>409</sup> Teleutias urged the troops to have a radical change of heart too. From a grain-oriented perspective, he advocated for the return to the traditional ethos and values of the citizen-soldiers.

The men's obedience to Teleutias was extraordinary too. Hirschfeld points out how Teleutias was able to convince the rowers to take turns so not to stop the ships, something that they were not accustomed to.<sup>410</sup> His hold over the crews allowed him to pull off a bold raid of the Piraeus, which resulted in the gain of food and money. It could be even said that, through his authority, courage, and smart thinking, Teleutias empowered these men to achieve the proposed vision.

Although it lacks the double-layered structure, Teleutias' episode shows all the other characteristics of charismatic authority: the exceptional perception of the leader, the moment of crisis, extraordinary personal authority, the embodiment of the vision, the

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<sup>408</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.14.

<sup>409</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.18.

<sup>410</sup> Hirschfeld (2009) 388. Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.19. Cf. Xen. *Eq. Mag.* 3.5.

empowerment of the followers, and, perhaps, even a mild *metanoia*, in the passage from a utilitarian to a more trusting perspective of the crews. Consequently, it seems reasonable to conclude that there is enough overlap to recognise Teleutias' authority as charismatic too.

However, it is essential to notice that Teleutias' authority also relied on other, non-charismatic dynamics. As Anderson points out, Teleutias presented himself as approachable and fair, sharing the scant resources with the men.<sup>411</sup> This attitude could be recognised as a boost for Teleutias' reputation and *charis*, which Xenophon acknowledges later on, although not in this passage, which focused on the future, on the vision.<sup>412</sup>

Furthermore, Teleutias relied on ideological claims, such as his own example, the normative comparison with the forefathers, and the claim of Greekness and manliness.<sup>413</sup> Recurring to this rhetoric, Teleutias is presented as eloquent and well aware of the dynamics regulating soldiers' morale.<sup>414</sup>

Lastly, Teleutias kept his promise, proving that the soldiers were right to trust him. As soon as he had the money, Teleutias paid the soldiers and the sailors, who, in exchange, obeyed Teleutias 'quickly and with pleasure'.<sup>415</sup> Undoubtedly, a rational component should be acknowledged in the soldiers' reaction to receiving payment, but it should not be over-emphasised. The soldiers' obeyed Teleutias long before they received payment. By keeping

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<sup>411</sup> Anderson (1979) 54-55. Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.37. Azoulay (2018) 126. More in general, see Cawkwell (2004) 59.

<sup>412</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.37.

<sup>413</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 5.15-17.

<sup>414</sup> Cf. Chapter Four 260-261.

<sup>415</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.24: ἡδέως καὶ ταχέως. Anderson (1970) 54-55 remarks on how the 'cheerfulness' was a direct consequence of the success of the action in the Pireus. The scholar is not wrong, but the reaction to Teleutias' speech indicates that other dynamics were also at play. Teleutias' presence was enough to give to the men, and Xenophon found this detail worth noticing. Cf. Hauser (1980) 190 for a modern parallel.

his word, Teleutias demonstrated to the soldiers that he was worthy of their trust, while the successful raid stressed his perception as an exceptional leader. Probably, the two dynamics were equally responsible for the soldiers' obedience.

In conclusion, there are sufficient elements to allow us to recognise Teleutias' authority as an example of 'synergic charisma'. Xenophon represents his version of charismatic authority as interwoven with non-charismatic elements, both pertinent to the dynamics of legal and extra-legal authority. Only synergic charisma could explain this complex balance of different forces.

To a lesser extent, Hermocrates' example also shows this characteristic interplay of different dynamics. If legal authority is evidently out of the picture, it has been underlined that *charis*, reputation, and the perception of the leader as exceptional often have thin, blurred boundaries. Hermocrates used his *charis* to boost his virtue and exceptionality too, and relied on his eloquence to persuade his followers. The different dynamics of extra-legal authority operated synergically, reinforcing the authority of the leaders.

Alcibiades' authority and influence over the Athenians corroborate this reading. Undeniably, Alcibiades had *charis* over the Athenians. Alcibiades was related to the powerful *genos* of the Alcmeonids on his mother's side.<sup>416</sup> His father was a public figure and distinguished himself in the battle of Cape Artemision (480 BC) and died in battle at

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<sup>416</sup> Thuc. 5.43; Isoc. 16.25; Plut. *Alc.* 104a-c. *PA* 1.43 (600); *APF* 600; Thomas (1989) 127-132, 145-153, 262-277; Mitchell (2008) 22; Azoulay (2014a) 5. Thomas stresses how the tradition was not entirely positive towards the Alcmeonids, but, unquestionably, they were one of the most prominent families in Athenian history.

Coronea (447 BC),<sup>417</sup> and Alcibiades was later adopted by Pericles.<sup>418</sup> Alcibiades was active in athletic competitions. Thucydides remarked how Alcibiades became famous for his *hippotrophia* and the victories he obtained through sponsoring chariot races.<sup>419</sup> Moreover, Alcibiades had distinguished himself on the battlefield from a young age. Plato and Isocrates mention how Alcibiades was rewarded for his courage in the battle of Potidaea (431 BC).<sup>420</sup>

These sources of *charis* and reputation, together with uncommon eloquence and good looks,<sup>421</sup> explain how Alcibiades was able to abruptly enter the Athenian political arena as a protagonist, as Thucydides explicitly acknowledges.<sup>422</sup> However, Alcibiades' influence went much further. The debate about the second Sicilian expedition hints at Alcibiades' charismatic authority too. In response to Nicias' attacks, Alcibiades did not miss the occasion to underline his exceptional nature.<sup>423</sup> Indeed, Thucydides puts the following words in Alcibiades' mouth:

“Athenians, not only does the command suit me more than others (προσῄκει μοι μᾶλλον ἑτέρων) (I have to start with this point, since Nicias has impugned my

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<sup>417</sup> Hdt. 8.17; Plut. *Alc.* 1. PA 600, 8510. *Contra* Davies *APF* 600.VI argues that the Kleinias mentioned by Herodotus was homonymous of Alcibiades' father.

<sup>418</sup> Pl. *Alc.* I 104b; *Protag.* 320a; Plut. *Alc.* 1.3.

<sup>419</sup> Thuc. 6.12.2, 15.3, 16.2-3. Cf. Plut. *Alc.* 16.1-2. Ober (1989) 93-94. Kallet (2001) 150-151, 291 recognises a certain criticism of Thucydides about Alcibiades' financial habits. She argues that Thucydides saw Alcibiades as an effective military leader, but unable to manage funds properly. On *Hippotrophia* see Kurke (1991) 147-159.

<sup>420</sup> Pl. *Symp.* 220d-e; Isoc. 16.29; Plut. *Alc.* 7.2-3. However, there is a discrepancy on the reward; Plato mentions only a panoply while Isocrates acknowledges a crown too. Konstan (2014) 82 argues that male beauty was contrasted with military prowess, with only a few exceptions in reason of young age, such as Achilles. However, this paradigm is contradicted by Alcibiades.

<sup>421</sup> Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.24; Pl. *Alc.* I 104a; Nep. *Alc.* 1.2; Plut. *Alc.* 1.3-4, 10.2. Garbo & van Vugt (2016) 400 suggests that physical appearance could be involved in developing charisma too.

<sup>422</sup> Thuc. 5.43.2. Bloedow (1973) 3-8.

<sup>423</sup> MacLeod (1983) 70 points out how conventional was to reply to the opponents' accusations, implying their envy, in rhetorical practice.

credentials), but I also think I deserve it (ἄξιός ἄμα νομίζω εἶναι). These pursuits for which I am criticised bring me personal fame (δόξαν), as they did my family before me, but they also bring benefit to my country.” (trans. Hammond, *my italics*).<sup>424</sup>

With the arrogance for which he was notorious,<sup>425</sup> Alcibiades here used his and his family's *charis* to strengthen his claim of exceptionality,<sup>426</sup> colouring it with his "youthful folly", as Allison calls it,<sup>427</sup> a vibrant energy which gave a sense of power and confidence to the listeners. Indeed, the Athenians seemed to accept Alcibiades' boasting. They were enthusiastic about Alcibiades' proposal, and appointed him to the campaign.<sup>428</sup> The fear of the soldiers' reaction when Alcibiades was recalled to Athens confirms the support that he enjoyed, probably not only political.<sup>429</sup> When Xenophon writes about Alcibiades' 'easy superiority' in politics, he does not seem to have exaggerated the picture too much.<sup>430</sup>

Moreover, Alcibiades offered a 'vision' to the Athenians: the long-held dream of conquering Sicily and an expansion of their dominion without limits.<sup>431</sup> This pattern was reiterated in 411 BC, when he presented himself to the fleet in Samos. He "brought them not little hopes for the future, while he was talking of many things about the state (περὶ τῶν

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<sup>424</sup> Thuc. 6.16.1. Cf. Ar. *Pol.* 1283a for a similar argument.

<sup>425</sup> E.g. Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.12-16, 24-25.

<sup>426</sup> Davies (1981) 97-98. Roberts (2001) 257 recognises many of these characteristics (family pedigree, eloquence, charm, good looks, mystical aura) as typical of the American general MacArthur, who enjoyed considerable popular support like Alcibiades. On Alcibiades' exploitation of *charis*: Domingo Gygax (2006) 496.

<sup>427</sup> Allison (1997) 80-81.

<sup>428</sup> Thuc. 6.24, 30.2. Tritle (2010) 196.

<sup>429</sup> Thuc. 6.29.3, 61.5

<sup>430</sup> Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.24. Cf. Brock (2004) 251.

<sup>431</sup> Plut. *Alc.* 17.3; *Per.* 20.3. Cf. Thuc. 3.86.4. Bloedow (2000) 300-304; Sidebottom (2004) 67; Jouanna (2007) 44. Kallet (2001) 40-41 remarks on the lexical similarities with Pericles speech (Thuc. 2.62.1-2). Tompkins (1972) 204-205 underlines how Alcibiades' speech implies that he proposed the expedition. Hanson (2001) 9 is right in stressing that the Athenians' dreams of conquest were a reflection of their society, but he deeply undervalues the role of the individual politicians who made the Athenians believe that it was possible to achieve these results.

πολιτικῶν πολλὰ εἰπῶν ἐς ἐλπίδας τε αὐτοῦς οὐ σμικρὰς τῶν μελλόντων καθίστη)”, and he even promised that, with him in charge, Tissaphernes would have provided supplies, money, and a fleet.<sup>432</sup> On both occasions, Alcibiades did not only propose a line of action, but he put himself in charge of it. Stressing his exceptional qualities and position, superior to others, Alcibiades became the embodiment of the mission itself. The episode of 411 BC is particularly telling: he was the only one that could convince Tissaphernes. Without him, this vision was impossible.

Alcibiades’ successes in 411-408 BC confirmed the enhanced perception that the Athenians had of him. Even if he was not able to keep his promise about Tissaphernes, Alcibiades’ halo of victory elicited a great enthusiasm in the Athenians, and resulted in Alcibiades’ greater authority.<sup>433</sup> This dynamic is utterly clear in the scene of the return of Alcibiades to Athens in 408 BC. Probably present at the scene,<sup>434</sup> Xenophon describes the event with these words:

When he sailed in, the common crowd of *the* Piraeus and of the city gathered to his ships, filled with wonder and desiring to see the famous Alcibiades (θαυμάζοντες καὶ ἰδεῖν βουλόμενοι τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην). Some of them said that he was the best of the citizens (λέγοντες ὅτι οἱ μὲν ὡς κράτιστος εἶη τῶν πολιτῶν); that he alone was banished without just cause, but rather because he was plotted against by those who had less power than he and spoke less well and ordered their political doings with a view to their own private gain, whereas he was always advancing the common *good* (ἐκείνου ἀεὶ τὸ κοινὸν αὐξωντος), both by his own means and by the power of the state. [...] And after he had spoken in his own defence before the Council and the Assembly, saying that he had not committed sacrilege and that he had been unjustly treated, and

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<sup>432</sup> Thuc. 8.81.2-3. Kallet (2001) 262-263 stresses the promise of financial gain over any other argument.

<sup>433</sup> De Romilly (1995) 191-196.

<sup>434</sup> Nep. *Alc.* 6.2. Lengauer (1979) 77; Strauss (1983) 32, n. 28; de Romilly (1995) 197-198.

after more of the same sort had been said, with no one speaking in opposition because the Assembly would not have tolerated it (οὐδενὸς ἀντειπόντος διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀνασχέσθαι ἄν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν), he was proclaimed general-in-chief (ἡγεμῶν ἀυτοκράτωρ), the people thinking that he was the man to recover for the state its former power (ὡς οἷός τε ὦν σῶσαι τὴν προτέραν τῆς πόλεως δύναμιν). (trans. Brownson, my italics).<sup>435</sup>

The exceptional support that Alcibiades received from the Athenians cannot be explained in rational terms. Xenophon emphasises the Athenians' marvel for Alcibiades, and how they were relying on a distorted perception of Alcibiades' past. As his detractors pointed out, Alcibiades collaborated with Sparta for years against Athens, and the suspicion of his involvement in the parody of the mysteries was still standing.<sup>436</sup> The Athenians simply did not want to hear these objections; they had already chosen Alcibiades, and wanted to believe in him and his decision, a phenomenon recognised in modern politics and often associated with charismatic politicians.<sup>437</sup>

If we can trust Nepos and Plutarch, Alcibiades also received crowns and ribbons from the crowd, a scene that we have already commented on for Teleutias.<sup>438</sup> Furthermore, Nepos also states that Alcibiades received all of the crowd's attention, while his colleagues were ignored. He writes:

I do not know how, because nobody surpassed his virtues (*uirtutibus*), but many surpassed [Thrasybulus] in birth (*nobilitatem*).<sup>439</sup> First, during the Peloponnesian war, he alone accomplished many [deeds] without Alcibiades,

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<sup>435</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.13, 20. Cf. Diod. 13.69.3.

<sup>436</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.17.

<sup>437</sup> Beck et al. (2012), esp. 934-935.

<sup>438</sup> Nep. *Alc.* 6.3; Plut. *Alc.* 32.4.-33. On the silence of Xenophon, see Domingo Gyax (2006), esp. 489. Cf. Lys. 14.31; Isoc. 16.11.

<sup>439</sup> *Nobilitas* also had the meaning of 'nobility', but also 'renown' and 'illustriousness'. See *OLD ad loc.*

and [Alcibiades] nothing without him. However, he [Alcibiades] took advantage of all of them thanks to some innate quality (*naturali quodam bono*).<sup>440</sup>

Obviously, we cannot blindly trust Nepos' account, which is derived from unknown Greek historians, but it is telling that Xenophon does not mention Alcibiades' colleagues at all. Alcibiades was the centre of the Athenians' attention in Xenophon's account too.<sup>441</sup>

Alcibiades was a war hero, the saviour of Athens, but the Athenians' reaction to his return denotes something more than just gratitude.<sup>442</sup> Indeed, other sources describe the Athenians' feelings toward Alcibiades in terms of an amorous desire. In the *Frogs*, Aristophanes uses the verb *ποθέω*, typical of erotic literature,<sup>443</sup> while Thucydides relies on the word *ἔρως* to describe the desire of the Athenians to sail to Sicily, a term that Yunis recognises as a sign of the irrationality of the Athenians' decision.<sup>444</sup> Indeed, the Athenians seemed deeply in love with Alcibiades and his vision, and their desire made them forgive Alcibiades' transgressions and grant him greater power and influence than usual.<sup>445</sup>

The love for Alcibiades is wild and 'effeminate'; the Athenians lacked the self-control and virility that Pericles implicitly acknowledged by calling them the *erastai* of the *polis*.<sup>446</sup> The balance of this ideal relationship and community values are subverted in the case of Alcibiades. He was simultaneously the object of an unnaturally strong desire, thus *eromenos*,

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<sup>440</sup> Nep. *Thr.* 1.3.

<sup>441</sup> de Romilly (1995) 198-199 suggests that the theatrical elements recorded by Plutarch suit Alcibiades well, which carefully staged his triumphant return.

<sup>442</sup> Cf. Lengauer (1979) 68; Whitehead (1983) 99-100.

<sup>443</sup> Aristoph. *Ran.* 1425. Wohl (1999) 369-370. On the Sicilian expedition, MacLeod (1983) 70-71.

<sup>444</sup> Thuc. 6.24.2. Bloedow (1992) 146-7. On *eros* in the passage: Yunis (1996) 108. Cf. Xen. *Hier.* 11.11 stresses a difference in intensity between *φιλέω* and *ἐράω*, using both about a political leader. Kallet (2001) 164 stresses how *ἔρως* implied strong emotions, usually connected with hope.

<sup>445</sup> Wohl (1999) 370-373; Konstan (2014) 74-82.

<sup>446</sup> Thuc. 2.43.1. See Monoson (1994) for discussion.

but also an active, leading partner: the *erastes* of the *demos*.<sup>447</sup> This extremely uncommon representation underlines the unicity and great impression that Alcibiades made on his contemporaries, and well represents the strong emotional character of his influence.

A final detail of this episode is worth noticing: the role of Alcibiades' *philoï*. Xenophon writes that Alcibiades waited to see his *philoï* in the crowd before disembarking, and they protected him.<sup>448</sup> Azoulay recognises the reference of Alcibiades looking in the crowd for his friends as a hint at their role in Alcibiades' return.<sup>449</sup> Azoulay seems to undervalue the crowd's enthusiasm,<sup>450</sup> but the reference to the *philoï* is indeed fascinating. Not only does this place Alcibiades within a traditional aristocratic framework, but it might also hint at the two-layered structure typical of charismatic authority.

The hypothesis about Alcibiades' charismatic authority can also be corroborated by the fact that Alcibiades lost his influence over the *demos*. After having survived a political scandal and years of exile, Alcibiades lost his influence after losing a battle.<sup>451</sup> When Alcibiades lost at Notium (406 BC), only then did his perception as exceptional crumble, and he utterly lost his popular support. Plutarch states that Alcibiades was so highly considered that the Athenians refused the notion of him being defeated unwillingly, and

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<sup>447</sup> Pl. *Alc.* 132a. Wohl (1999) 364-366, 373. See Monoson (1994) 265-269 on the risk of abuse as implicit in Pericles' metaphor.

<sup>448</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.18-19.

<sup>449</sup> Azoulay (2014a) 90-91, (2018) 182. Cf. Bloedow (1973) 67-71. Krentz (1989) *ad.* 1.4.18 suggests an alternative explanation. Alcibiades stayed on the ship longer than necessary because he enjoyed the cheering crowd. This reading, although not supported by evidence, seems coherent with how the ancient sources describe Alcibiades. Furthermore, it agrees with the tradition reported by Duris of an attentive and luxurious staging of the triumphal return of Alcibiades. Plutarch (*Alc.* 32.3) rejects this tradition, but Krentz's point raises reasonable doubt.

<sup>450</sup> On the crowd's enthusiasm, see de Romilly (1995) 199, 201; Domingo Gygas (2006) 490.

<sup>451</sup> *Contra* Asmonti (2008) 90 argues that Alcibiades was deprived of his power for political reasons. Nonetheless, Asmonti does not engage with the tradition about the dissatisfaction of the *demos* at all.

suspected a betrayal.<sup>452</sup> Plutarch effectively stressed the ‘larger than life’ perception of Alcibiades circulating in Athens, but Xenophon provides a more plausible solution. Alcibiades was accused of having been careless and weak (ἀμέλειάν τε καὶ ἀκρότειαν).<sup>453</sup> The illusion of exceptional talent and Alcibiades’ role as the saviour of Athens was crushed, and Alcibiades abruptly lost his support, suggesting the reliance of his authority on his perception. Like other charismatic leaders, lacking the ability to confirm his exceptional status, he could no longer exercise the same authority over his followers.

In conclusion, there is ample margin to recognise Alcibiades as another example of Greek synergic charisma. Alcibiades' example not only confirms the conclusion reached with the examples of Hermocrates and Teleutias, but also places this phenomenon in late fifth century Athens. Even more importantly, Thucydides seems aware of the essential feature of this kind of authority. If it is true that the most explicit passage is from the *Hellenica*, Thucydides underlines Alcibiades’ claim of exceptionality, and his ability to elicit dreams and hopes in the Athenians. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that Thucydides, like Xenophon, appreciated charismatic authority to some degree.

Pericles’ example supports this hypothesis. In his notorious eulogy of the statesman, Thucydides describes Pericles’ authority in emphatic terms. He writes:

The reason was that Pericles, since he was strong in both repute and intellect (δυνατὸς ὢν τῷ τε ἀξιώματι καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ) and was consciously incorruptible, held the masses on a light rein, and led them rather than let them lead him. This was because he did not have to adapt what he said in order to please the hearers, in an attempt to gain power by improper means, but his

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<sup>452</sup> Plut. *Alc.* 35.2-3.

<sup>453</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.16.

standing allowed him even to speak against them and provoke their anger (ἀλλ' ἔχων ἐπ' ἀξιώσει καὶ πρὸς ὀργήν τι ἀντειπεῖν). Whenever he saw that they were arrogant and undeservingly confident, he would speak to strike terror into them; and when saw them unreasonably afraid he would restore their confidence once more. The result was in theory democracy but in fact rule by the first man (ἐγίγνετό τε λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή). The leaders who followed Pericles were more on a level with one another, and as each strove to become first they tended to abandon affairs to the people to gratify their whims. (trans. Rhodes).<sup>454</sup>

More than one scholar argues that Thucydides exaggerates Pericles' authority over the Athenians,<sup>455</sup> but it should be noted that contemporary sources, especially comedians, confirm Thucydides' picture.<sup>456</sup> Thucydides focuses on what Dover defines as 'exceptional moral authority' that allowed Pericles his influence,<sup>457</sup> without acknowledging the political and technical savvy necessary for his political role.<sup>458</sup> The theory of 'synergic charisma' reduces, if not eradicates, the tension between the two poles, not only offering a fuller explanation of Pericles' influence, but also reconciling the ancient sources and modern scholars.

Thucydides' emphasis on Pericles' reputation and skill is noteworthy. As we have commented above, Isocrates recognises the same characteristics in Pericles' authority, suggesting that Pericles could not only rely on eloquence, reputation, and *charis*, but on his

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<sup>454</sup> Thuc. 2.65.8-10. Cf. Thuc. 1.139.4, in which Pericles is defined 'first of the citizens'. Yunis (1996) 68-96 views Pericles' eloquence as the only mean of controlling the *demos*. However, this reading seems to be simplistic, and does not consider other legal and extra-legal dynamics.

<sup>455</sup> Andrewes (1962) 83-84; Sinclair (1988) 39; Ober (1989) 89; *Commentary ad* 2.65.8; Azoulay (2014a) 1-3; (2014b) 176.

<sup>456</sup> Plut. *Per.* 16.1-2. See Stadter (1989) *ad loc.* On Thucydides' opinions about democracy: Yunis (1996) 59; Zambrini (2011) 129. Azoulay (2014a) 9-11, 139 remarks the hostility of most of the contemporary sources, but he acknowledges that a contemporary 'cult of personality' existed for Pericles. Cf. Azoulay (2014b) 175, 177.

<sup>457</sup> Dover (1960) 61, 76. On the importance of reputation, see Hunter (1990) 309.

<sup>458</sup> Azoulay (2014b) 176-177.

'excellence' too.<sup>459</sup> Indeed, Thucydides' wording could be hinting at the 'larger than life' perception that the Athenians had of Pericles, which is attested in contemporary sources too.<sup>460</sup> The comparison between Pericles and his immediate successors also strengthens the impression of his exceptionalism.

Undoubtedly, this is how Plutarch interprets the passage. He writes:

Now Pericles led the city by virtue of his *true* excellence (ἀρετῆς ἀληθινῆς) and powerful eloquence (λόγου δυνάμειως), and had no need to assume any persuasive mannerisms with the multitude. (trans. Perrin, my italics).<sup>461</sup>

Excellence (ἀρετή), not reputation (δόξα), was the most fitting term to describe Pericles' means of authority.<sup>462</sup>

Even if we cannot adequately comment on Pericles' career as a whole, due to the lack of detailed evidence, Pericles undeniably offered a vision to the Athenians at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War.<sup>463</sup> Significantly, two of the three speeches ascribed to Pericles by Thucydides involve his 'island' strategy, a plan to take advantage of Athens' strength to win the Peloponnesian War.<sup>464</sup> Hanson and Kagan underline how the Athenians did not fully realise the consequences of Pericles' plan: they just trusted him.<sup>465</sup> Pericles is strictly linked to his 'vision' too. When the Spartan invasion started to impose harshness on the Athenians,

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<sup>459</sup> See above, pp. 92-93.

<sup>460</sup> Cf. above, pp. 92-93.

<sup>461</sup> Plut. *Nic.* 3.1.

<sup>462</sup> Wallach (2011) 188-189 remarks on how ἀρετή was strictly associated with the exercise of power, but under a democratic regime was getting more and more distant from the aristocratic paradigm. Cf. Szawiel (2009) 287.

<sup>463</sup> See also Hanson (1996) 302-303 and Kagan (2010) 31 on the well-being generated by Pericles' policies.

<sup>464</sup> See Chapter One 40, n. 149.

<sup>465</sup> Hanson (1996) 298; Kagan (2010) 53.

Pericles was personally attacked, suggesting that Pericles might have been seen as embodying his strategy.

How much Pericles' influence depended on his perception is difficult to assess. Azoulay suggests that Pericles consciously boosted his image with heroic comparisons and terms to make his influence more stable, taking advantage of his "Olympian" eloquence.<sup>466</sup> Pericles was able to arouse the masses, as later Alcibiades.<sup>467</sup> The Athenians started to have doubts about Pericles once they appreciated the harshness that his strategy involved.<sup>468</sup> There were practical reasons for the Athenian's resentment, and the worsening of the plague did not help Pericles. Nevertheless, the contemporaneous difficulties probably tainted the record and enhanced the perception that they had of Pericles. The infallible leader failed, and the trust they granted him without a second thought was now questioned. It is telling that Pericles decided to finally address the Assembly only after the meagre results of his expedition against Epidaurus.<sup>469</sup> Perhaps, having lost his aura of success, he felt the need to do something to reinforce his personal authority, thanks to his eloquence, *charis*, but also stressing his exceptionality.<sup>470</sup>

Is Thucydides describing Pericles in terms of charismatic authority? The matter is controversial. Admittedly, the information about Pericles' authority is much inferior to Xenophon's examples, and does not allow for a comprehensive analysis of Pericles' authority. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that Thucydides highlights three essential elements

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<sup>466</sup> Azoulay (2014a) 32-34, 40-44.

<sup>467</sup> Azoulay (2014a) 95-98.

<sup>468</sup> Bloedow (1987) 9; Platias (2002) 387-388; Whitby (2007) 67.

<sup>469</sup> Thuc. 1.56, 59.

<sup>470</sup> Thuc. 2.61-62, esp. 60.5. *HCT ad loc.*; Bloedow (2000) 299.

of charismatic authority: the perception of the leader, his vision and embodiment, and the relationship between success and authority.<sup>471</sup> These elements are contextual to Pericles' exceptional influence over the Athenians, and Thucydides draws a connection between these elements in Pericles' obituary. Consequently, although with less certainty than the previous examples, there is enough reason to argue that Thucydides represents Pericles in terms of charismatic authority.

It is now time to draw some conclusions from this analysis. As we have pointed out, there is reason to recognise Hermocrates, Teleutias, Alcibiades, and, possibly, Pericles as examples of charismatic authority, and, more precisely, of synergic charisma. The evident interplay with other extra-legal dynamics, especially *charis*, is evident, and explains Xenophon's emphasis on the matter.<sup>472</sup> However, there is ample reason to recognise charismatic authority as a proper dynamic, based on an enhanced perception of the leader in a moment of emotional stress, and eliciting enthusiasm and obedience that *charis* rarely elicited.

It should be noted that our examples rely heavily on speeches, the historicity of which is arguable.<sup>473</sup> This could be perceived as weakening the proposed reconstruction, reducing the historical phenomenon to an authorial hypothesis. Undeniably, speeches are more of a window on the author's ideas than a faithful report of what was said and done on a

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<sup>471</sup> Kagan (2010) 47-50 argues that Pericles tried to change the Athenians, de-emphasising the expansionistic urge and militaristic element. If Kagan is right, this trend could be recognised as a form of *metanoia*. However, Kagan's conclusions are questionable. Bloedow (2000) 298-303 notes Pericles' care in avoiding any reference to expansionism in his reported speeches because the Athenians still indulged in that dream.

<sup>472</sup> Azoulay (2018).

<sup>473</sup> See Chapter Four 253-258.

particular occasion. Nevertheless, ancient authors aimed to be realistic; the speech might never have been uttered in this exact form, but it records what our source believed was a reliable depiction of what happened. Consequently, it seems reasonable to accept the dynamic described as a realistic phenomenon of ancient leadership.

Undeniably, Xenophon represents charismatic authority much better and in more detail than any other ancient author. Consequently, it is tempting to recognise ancient charismatic authority as a phenomenon particularly strong in the first half of the fourth century. The fourth century commanders, relying more on mercenaries, had a much more personal relationship with their soldiers. The mercenaries developed a relationship of *philia* with their commander, who provided them with work, food, and booty.<sup>474</sup> Their loyalty, if they had any, was to their leader, and not to the *polis* they were born into, nor the one they were serving at that moment. Conversely, the commanders felt a responsibility for their men, taking care of them and for their interests as much as for their own. In this environment, *charis* was more easily generated; indeed, the successful commander, the provider of pay and booty, could have been easily seen in 'larger than life' terms, for as long as he continued to project the image of a winner.

However, Xenophon himself warns us that his 'willing obedience' was not a phenomenon contextual to mercenary leaders, applying the same lesson to the Athenian *hipparchos*.<sup>475</sup> Indeed, Xenophon believed in a universal theory of leadership, which he applies to all contexts: leaders of mercenaries or citizen-soldiers, elected or appointed,

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<sup>474</sup> E.g. Lengauer (1979) 116-117; Trundle (2004) 146-163.

<sup>475</sup> Xen. *Eq. Mag.* 6.

associated with a *polis* or independent, even military and non-military were considered alike by Xenophon in terms of leadership.<sup>476</sup> Could we, then, also ascribe charismatic authority to previous leaders, operating in the institutional framework of the *polis*? The examples of Alcibiades and, especially, Pericles back up this assumption, and suggest that charismatic authority was a phenomenon active and appreciated at least from the second half of the fifth century.

This conclusion opens a new approach to engaging with the phenomenon that we named 'personal authority'. As discussed above, alongside Alcibiades, there are two early fifth century examples of exceptional extra-legal authority stemming from the leaders' enhanced perception: Miltiades and Themistocles. If we conclude that Xenophon was describing what he believed to be a general pattern, we could include the dynamic sketched by Herodotus as examples of charismatic authority. The reading is tempting, and the logic behind it is undeniable. However, to preserve the methodological soundness of our analysis, we cannot formulate this thought if not in a hypothetical form. Miltiades and Themistocles are evidently described in seemingly charismatic terms, but we simply do not have enough elements to recognise with certainty their authority as charismatic. Consequently, it seems more appropriate to keep the working definition of 'personal authority' for these early fifth century leaders, underlining the similarities of the authority with later, more detailed examples, but keeping them in a separate, quasi-charismatic category.

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<sup>476</sup> Newell (1988) 116-117; Brock (2004) 248; Johnstone (2010) 153-154; Nicolai (2014) 72-73; Dillery (2017) 210. On the originality of this stance, see Wood (1964) 44-46. Cf. Pl. *Pol.* 259a-c.

A final matter remains unaddressed: why are Xenophon's examples more detailed, if it was not a phenomenon specific to his time? This objection could be easily dismissed by thinking about Xenophon's agenda. It is widely acknowledged that describing leadership was one of the foci of Xenophon's work,<sup>477</sup> and his military experience probably helped him to recognise and give the right emphasis to significant details.<sup>478</sup> Undoubtedly, Xenophon demonstrates a greater understanding of charismatic leadership than his contemporaries, but limiting the phenomenon to his writings does not give the proper consideration to his antecedents.

## CONCLUSION

In consideration of this evidence, there is reason to believe that a form of charismatic authority existed in fifth and fourth century Greece. Noticing the astounding similarities between an ancient phenomenon and a modern sociological theory is fascinating, but *cui prodest?* How does this thesis contribute to the understanding of the exercise of extra-legal authority in Classical Greek military leadership?

The parallel with the sociological theory of charismatic authority gives substance to Xenophon's otherwise vague formulation of the phenomenon. Although he re-proposed a definition of willing obedience in two different contexts,<sup>479</sup> it is evident that Xenophon appreciated the dynamic, but was not fully aware of all of its features. The modern theory has been an excellent reading key with which to identify significant characteristics in the

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<sup>477</sup> Dillery (1995) 164-172; Hutchinson (2000) 18, 21, 180; Boëldieu-Trevet (2007) 14; Buxton (2017) 323-338.

<sup>478</sup> On Xenophon's experience, see e.g. Westlake (1969) 194; Lee (2009) 391.

<sup>479</sup> Xen. *Eq. Ma.* 6; *Cyr.* 1.6.20.

ancient accounts. In this way, it has been possible to understand the mechanisms underlying Xenophon's 'willing obedience', and in terms familiar to sociologists and political scientists. What is just a theory in Xenophon's writing becomes more historically reliable with this parallel, and the dynamics regulating the acquisition and loss of this authority are now more evident.

However, there remains a substantial problem to solve: how does ancient charismatic authority fit within the broader picture of extra-legal authority? As stated in Section One, extra-legal authority was a complex, multifaceted phenomenon, which cannot be explained by just one dynamic, no matter how significant. This work does not intend to impose charismatic authority over *charis*, reputation, eloquence, and larger-than-life perception; undoubtedly, all of these phenomena are still deemed essential mechanisms of extra-legal authority. The application of charismatic authority aims to complement them, providing a tool to interpret the most extreme cases of extra-legal authority, which, like in less blatant examples, still relied on the same dynamics. In other words, charismatic authority could be seen as the strongest possible form of extra-legal authority, which neither denies nor substitutes the most traditional dynamics.

This statement can be easily demonstrated by showing the correlation between *charis* and charismatic authority. A passage of the *Cavalry Commander* is particularly useful for the task:

However, no man can mould anything to his mind unless the stuff in which he proposes to work lies ready to obey the artist's will (ὡς πείθεσθαι τῇ τοῦ χειροτέχνου γνώμῃ). No more can you make anything of men, unless, by God's help, they are ready to regard their commander with friendly feelings

(φιλικῶς) and to think him wiser than themselves (φρονιμώτερον σφῶν αὐτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι) in the conduct of operations against the enemy. (trans. Marchant).<sup>480</sup>

Xenophon here fully acknowledges the horsemen's 'friendliness' and the enhanced perception of the leader as a prerequisite for (willing) obedience. The two aspects are separate, and equally important. While the latter needs no further comment, it will be useful to highlight that the former should be identified in term of *charis*. Azoulay compellingly points out how *philia* hinted at a relationship regulated by *charis*, in which the idea of friendship conceals an asymmetrical relationship.<sup>481</sup> The different dynamics of extra-legal authority were, thus, strictly interwoven and all contributed to the enhancement of the leader's personal authority.

In conclusion, charismatic authority is an economic and grounded explanation for the extraordinary influence and authority that some military leaders were able to achieve. This kind of authority should not be seen as antithetic to the *strategoí's* institutional powers, although a relationship between these two types of authority was not always necessary.<sup>482</sup> There is reason to believe that extra-legal authority empowered and strengthened the legal authority of the military leaders, making soldiers more disciplined, reactive to orders, and loyal to their commander. Schweitzer's synergic charisma seems the best formulation to

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<sup>480</sup> Xen. *Eq. Ma.* 6.1. Cf. Delebecque (1973) *ad loc.*

<sup>481</sup> Azoulay (2018) 173-191, esp. 175-176, 183-184, 187-188. Cf. the chorus in Sophocles' *Ajax*. They are Ajax's soldiers, but they are addressed as φίλοι. Blundell (1989) 72-81; Burton (1981) 6; Sommerstein (2017) 275. However, it should be noted that *philia* represented symmetrical relationship too, like the fraternity of the Athenian citizens (Loraux (1986) 183-184; Azoulay (2018) 169-173), or reciprocity in inter-state relationships (Low (2007) 43, 46).

<sup>482</sup> See above, pp. 119-123.

underline this relationship between rational and irrational kinds of authority, making his model the most suited to historical research.

However, charismatic authority does not epitomise all kinds of extra-legal authority. The other dynamics not only contributed to the creation and continuation of charismatic authority, but they also produced, to a lesser degree, emotional attachment and authority. Charismatic and non-charismatic leaders relied heavily on *charis*, reputation, and eloquence to reinforce their personal authority. These dynamics should always be central in the discussion of ancient authority, and to the same extent as charismatic authority.

Extra-legal authority was, thus, a personal relationship between commander and soldiers, but there is no strong evidence acknowledging it as a development of the fourth century mercenary armies. If it is true that these dynamics are better attested in the fourth century, this could be explained by the agendas of ancient writers, especially Xenophon, rather than being a radical development of the period. The fact that both Herodotus and Thucydides describe a similar phenomenon in fewer details, and that there are no good examples of charismatic leadership after Xenophon, confirms this assessment.

### 3. THE *STRATEGOI* ON THE BATTLEFIELD

Above all, the *strategia* was a military office. The *strategoi* led the Athenians in battle and were personally responsible for the organisation and success of the campaigns assigned to them. This Chapter investigates the duties and impact of the Athenian *strategoi* as military leaders on the battlefield, assessing how much they could influence the outcome of a fight. To achieve this goal, we will discuss the *strategoi*'s role in formulating plans and executing them in battles and forms of combat (e.g. ambushes), and how these responsibilities evolved over time.

As discussed in the Introduction, military historians tend to focus more on the nature of Greek warfare and its development than on generalship and leaders.<sup>1</sup> However, the study of Greek military leadership has not been completely neglected: this Chapter is indebted to Lengauer, Wheeler, and Boëldieu-Trevet's works, which constituted the starting point for this research.<sup>2</sup>

Two other contributions deserve a special mention. Barley's acknowledgement of the impact of the commander on warfare is commendable, although he perhaps overemphasises the commanders' ability to control the soldiers in battle.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, he implicitly assumes, notwithstanding some isolated reminders of the cultural differences, that the Spartan standard could be applied to the whole of Greek warfare. Konijnendijk's position on the limitations due to the amateurism of the hoplites seems much more

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<sup>1</sup> See Introduction 2.

<sup>2</sup> Lengauer (1979); Wheeler (1991); (2007); Boëldieu-Trevet (2007).

<sup>3</sup> Barley (2012).

measured.<sup>4</sup> However, Konijnendijk is excessively negative in his analysis. His evaluation of battle planning and tactical options for non-Spartan warfare seems too limited. Being the most recent and complete work on Classical Greek tactics, Konijnendijk's book has often been taken as the starting point for discussing essential aspects of Greek warfare.

After an initial introductory Section summarising the most recent scholarship on Greek warfare, the Chapter will discuss the role of the commander and his actions on the field. The scope is restricted to Athenian commanders as much as possible, but the lack of detail often urges us to rely on other Greek military experiences; in these cases, the non-Athenian examples should be seen as parallels, potentially showing practices similar to the Athenian ones.

Similarly, an attempt has been made in this thesis to discuss pitched battle and other types of combat separately. As Wheeler correctly points out,<sup>5</sup> these kinds of fights are substantially different, despite some shared elements such as the planning of the action; analysing them separately allows us to avoid misconceptions and oversimplifications. Naval warfare has not been included for the same reason. However, at times the evidence is not substantial enough to allow for a proper discussion of land warfare in separate categories, and the reader should be aware of this occasional simplification.

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<sup>4</sup> Konijnendijk (2018).

<sup>5</sup> Wheeler (2020) 40-41.

## WARFARE IN ANCIENT GREECE: A SCHOLARLY DEBATE

A summary of the latest studies on Greek warfare cannot avoid mentioning the lively debate on the phalanx. Since the 1980s, the scholarship has been divided into two currents, referred to as the 'orthodoxy' and the 'revisionist', each advocating for a different conceptualisation of how the phalanx worked.<sup>6</sup>

The orthodoxy proposes the traditional reconstruction of the phalanx as a tightly packed formation of heavy infantrymen, the *hoplites*, fighting less than half a meter apart.<sup>7</sup> The phalanx was usually organised in eight ranks, but could range from six to fifty,<sup>8</sup> creating a solid barrier against the enemy and allowing the amateur hoplites to perform well on the battlefield without training, owing to the protection provided by the close formation.<sup>9</sup> After the initial charge, which was often decisive against unmotivated troops,<sup>10</sup> two opposing phalanxes 'pushed' against each other.<sup>11</sup> Line by line, the hoplites exercised pressure on their comrades in front of them, with the intent to break the enemy phalanx (ὄθισμός) with a mix of this incredible pressure of shields and spear blows.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> On the names of the currents, see Holladay (1982) and Cawkwell (1989) 375-376.

<sup>7</sup> Holladay (1984) 94-7; GSW 1.144, 4.40, 72-73; Culham (1989) 194; Hanson (1989) 121; (2001) 5-7; Lazenby (1991) 89-96; Luginbill (1994) 60-61; Schwartz (2009) 141-169. This theory has been circulating since the second half of the nineteenth century. See *Tactics* 7-38 for a detailed summary of the main contributions to this theoretical model.

<sup>8</sup> Holladay (1982) 94-95; Cawkwell (1983) 390; Hanson (1989) 171; Lazenby (1991) 89; Hutchinson (2000) 26-27; Lee (2006) 483; (2010) 150; Wheeler (2007) 206. Cf. *Tactics* 8-9, 127 on the origin of this idea and its problems.

<sup>9</sup> Hanson (1989) 76; Wheeler (2007) 205. Cf. *Warfare* 89-92.

<sup>10</sup> Hutchinson (2000) 27; Hanson (1989) 152-159, Luginbill (1994) 57-58; Eckstein (2005) 481-482. More cautious, GSW 4.55-57.

<sup>11</sup> E.g. GSW 4.65-73; Sidebottom (2004) 84.

<sup>12</sup> Culham (1989) 197-198; Hanson (1989) 172-179; Spence (1993) 48; Payen (2018) 115-117. Wheeler (2007) 209-211 accepts this reading, but warns against reducing the *othismos* to a pushing contest.

The revisionist scholars have grown wary of the orthodox paradigm, presenting a series of objections against this reconstruction. Several scholars cast doubt on the fact that the hoplites presented a solid shield-wall against the enemy. A tightly packed formation would have limited the space and footwork required to deal a blow strong enough to pierce a wooden shield and armour.<sup>13</sup> Admittedly, only the richest hoplites could afford armour, but the shield still remained a fairly formidable obstacle and only a strong blow could pierce through it while keeping enough momentum to hurt the opponent.<sup>14</sup> One of the strongest pieces of evidence in support of the orthodox thesis is a passage of the battle of Mantinea (418 BC), in which Thucydides describes how phalanxes tended to bend to their right, due to the hoplites' desire to be protected by their comrades' shields.<sup>15</sup> However, Thucydides uses the adverbial *ὡς μάλιστα* in describing the proximity of the hoplites, which could be interpreted in many ways. For instance, Krentz proposes that a distance of 1.8 metres, the range of a spear, is sufficient to satisfy Thucydides' passage.<sup>16</sup> Other scholars, such as

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<sup>13</sup> Cawkwell (1989) 380-382. Cf. Krentz (1985) 52-53. *Contra* Schwartz (2009) 160, despite acknowledging the effectiveness of armour and shields 30, 79-81. Cf. Hanson (1989) 82-83. See also Lee (2010) 149-150 on the shields' effectiveness in individual combat. Holladay (1982) 95 recognises in Thuc. 4.126.5 proof that hoplites were supposed to stay in close order. In this speech, Brasidas despised the hit-and-run tactics of the Illyrians, implying that the Greeks fought differently. Holladay neither considers that the Illyrians might have been different kinds of troops, nor that Brasidas was attempting to strengthen the morale of his men. Furthermore, open order does not necessarily mean the adoption of a 'Homeric' fighting technique, but only that there was more space between the hoplites. Cf. *Tactics* 97-99.

<sup>14</sup> On the importance of the shield: Hanson (1989) 58-59; Schwartz (2009) 27. See van Wees (2004) 52-53 on the cost of body armour and its role as a status symbol.

<sup>15</sup> Thuc. 5.71.2. Hanson (1989) 160-170; Lendon (2005) 69; Schwartz (2009) 172.

<sup>16</sup> Krentz (1985) 51-54. See also *Warfare* 185; Goldsworthy (1997) 16-17 proposes a middle ground of three feet (90 cm), like Roman soldiers in a *legion*.

Cawkwell, suggest that both a close and an open order existed, the former allowing the troops to get close to the enemy, the latter to fight.<sup>17</sup>

Cawkwell makes also two strong objections to the orthodox reading of the *othismos*. First, a continuous push was unsustainable over a long period of time.<sup>18</sup> Admittedly, the length of pitched battles is a debated topic too. The ancient sources are not very clear on how long a battle endured, often relying on vague phraseology such as “πολὸν χρόνον”.<sup>19</sup> Some scholars argue that most battles lasted less than an hour, quashing Cawkwell’s objection.<sup>20</sup> However, the few examples of battles continuing for an entire day casts doubt on this reconstruction.<sup>21</sup> Schwartz dismisses these passages as either rhetorical exaggeration, or exceptional circumstances, but his argument is not completely convincing.<sup>22</sup> If it is generally agreed that Herodotus and Diodorus might have embellished their accounts, it seems unlikely that they could have depicted day-long battles as realistic enough to be believed, if fights typically only lasted a matter of minutes. Furthermore, it should be stressed that Schwartz’s hypothesis is neither supported by strong evidence. With such ambiguous evidence, a clear answer is unattainable, and the possibility that a battle could last several hours should not be overlooked, making Cawkwell’s objection still valid.

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<sup>17</sup> Cawkwell (1989) 379; Matthew (2009) 406-413. *Contra* Luginbill (1994) 54-55 and Crowley *Psychology* 54 argue that this change of formation would be too complicated for untrained troops, and it is not clear who would have ordered the new formation.

<sup>18</sup> Cawkwell (1989) 376-379.

<sup>19</sup> E.g. Thuc. 4.35.4, 6.70.1. GSW 4.47-51; Schwartz (2009) 202.

<sup>20</sup> Schwartz (2009) 201-208.

<sup>21</sup> Sphacteria: Thuc. 4.34-35; Pelousion: Diod. 11.83.1, 16.46.9.

<sup>22</sup> Schwartz (2009) 201-222.

As second objection, Cawkwell points out that the hoplite should have been coming in from the side to push effectively, with his shield touching his shoulders. Admittedly, there is iconographical evidence of flat shields and hoplites in line, but there are also several examples of hoplites holding their shields oblique.<sup>23</sup> Consequently, it is believed that the 'push' was a possible scenario in hard-fought battles, and attested on rare occasions with the expression ὠθισμός ἀσπίδων.<sup>24</sup>

In addition to Cawkwell's objections, van Wees underlines how the pressure of their comrades would have crushed the hoplites in the middle of the phalanx, and how a narrower formation was able to resist a deeper phalanx, which seems impossible if it was a contest of mere strength.<sup>25</sup>

One final point of concern about the orthodox reconstruction is the reliance of orthodox scholars on Hellenistic sources, especially Asclepiodotus, in elaborating their model has been highlighted.<sup>26</sup> Diodorus made a clear distinction between the Classical and Macedonian phalanx, finding in the *Iliad* inspiration for the latter.<sup>27</sup> Consequently, the degree to which these sources could be used to study the Classical phalanx is controversial.

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<sup>23</sup> Cawkwell (1989) 382. Cf. *Warfare* 168-170, 189. Krentz (1985) 52, who collected many pieces of iconographical evidence of both types of shield handling, demonstrating the ambiguity of the orthodox argument. Schwartz (2009) 36-37, 192 acknowledges the 'striding stance', but does not see it as a problem for the traditional paradigm. Cf. Luginbill (1994) 54. Krentz (1985) 53 and Lee (2010) 149-150 point out that the *aspis* could also have been beneficial for individual fighting, something that Schwartz (2009) 38-42 explicitly denies. Cf. Hanson (1989) 65-71.

<sup>24</sup> Krentz (1985) 55-56; Matthew (2009) 397-398. Cawkwell (1989) 376 sees the *othismos* as a sign of exhaustion. More open to the traditional reading are Echeverria (2011) 64-65 and Crowley *Psychology* 55-57.

<sup>25</sup> *Warfare* 189-190. See also *Tactics* 132-134.

<sup>26</sup> Cawkwell (1989) 383-384. Cf. Krentz (1985) 51. *Contra* Wheeler (2011) 79. Matthew (2009) 406, n. 49 argues that Asclepiodotus' picture is more suited to the classical than the Hellenistic phalanx. Cf. *Tactics* 110. However, why Asclepiodotus does not describe the contemporary Hellenistic phalanx too, if this is the case, is not explained.

<sup>27</sup> Diod. 16.3.2. Krentz (1985) 51.

Both currents acknowledge a development in Greek warfare during the fifth and fourth centuries, but there is a plurality of opinion over what this evolution involved. Past scholarship postulated a dramatic change from fair, highly-ritualised phalanx warfare to a dirtier and more pragmatic way of fighting since the Peloponnesian War. Many scholars have advocated for the existence of a set of traditional rules regulating Greek battles in the Archaic and early Classical period.<sup>28</sup> Non-hoplitic fighters were excluded from pitched battles, and temples, sanctuaries, and civilians were not involved.<sup>29</sup> Warfare was an ethical affair: a series of pitched battles between peers, on flat ground, without any exploitation of tactics, strategy, or deception.<sup>30</sup> The references in the ancient sources to war as an *agon* are often considered to be further evidence of this paradigm of warfare.<sup>31</sup>

More recently this alleged battle etiquette has been questioned. Krentz compellingly points out that the evidence in support of these 'unwritten laws' is both weak and controversial.<sup>32</sup> Cunning and deception were traits emphasised and praised in myth and

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<sup>28</sup> GSW 2.14; Lonis (1979) 25-29; Hanson (2001) 5-6; Culham (1989) 194; Gasti (1992) 84; Wylie (1993) 24; Lee (2004) 309; Wheeler (2007) 203; Nevin (2008) 101-104; (2017) 12, 47. Cf. Dayton (2006) 8-29 for an exhaustive summary of the literature on the agonistic spirit of Greek warfare.

<sup>29</sup> GSW 2.147-155; Hanson (1989) 36-37; Nevin (2008) 101. Lanni (2008) 485 argues that the set of laws did not involve tactical matters. He believes that the apparent 'code of war' in tactical matters was only a side-effect of phalanx warfare.

<sup>30</sup> Ober (1992) 53-71, esp. 56 who enumerated a list of 12 rules. Cf. Ilari (1980) 58-59; Cartledge (1987) 207; Dawson (1996) 52-53, 56.

<sup>31</sup> Dawson (1996) 49; Lendon (2005) 64-65; Wheeler (2007) 189; Angeli-Bernardini (2011), esp. 92-93; Mann (2013) 77.

<sup>32</sup> Krentz (2002); (2007) 147. See also *Warfare* 115-117; Lendon (2005) 81-82; Dayton (2006) 40-53; Hornblower (2007) 22. Lendon (2005) 82-83 argues for a middle ground, admitting some discrepancies with the hoplitic code of conduct, but affirming that a standard model of behaviour existed. Cf. Wheeler (1987), who compellingly proves how the alleged ban of arrows in the Lelantine War (Strab. 10.1.2), one of the best arguments in support of the Archaic ethic code, was probably fictional.

epic, and references in the sources to a 'fair' style of warfare in antiquity are more plausibly historiographical distortions.<sup>33</sup>

This interpretative problem can be especially observed in Mardonius' notorious speech in Herodotus. Trying to convince Xerxes to start a second expedition against Greece, Mardonius describes Greek warfare in the following way:

Beside, from all I hear, the Greeks usually wage war in an extremely stupid fashion (ἑώθασι ... ἀβουλότατα πολέμους ἴστασθαι) *just because of senseless pride (ἀγνωμοσύνης) and stupidity (σκαιότητος)*. When they declare war on one another they seek out the best, most level piece of land, and that's where they go and fight (τὸ κάλλιστον χωρίον καὶ λειότατον). The upshot is that the victors leave the battlefield with massive losses (ὥστε σὺν κακῷ μεγάλῳ), not to mention the losers, who are completely wiped out (ἐξώλεες). (trans. Waterfield, my italics).<sup>34</sup>

From this passage, it has been concluded that 'fair' battles were organised through heralds on a flat terrain; surprise attacks and non-hoplitic warfare were simply not

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<sup>33</sup> E.g. Dem. 9.47-51. *Warfare* 115-117; Hornblower (2007) 22, 25; Sheldon (2012) 48-53; Konijnendijk (2016) 2. Dayton (2006) 5 points out that there is no clear correlation between the agonistic lexicon used by ancient authors in war contexts and fair-play.

<sup>34</sup> Hdt. 7.9b.1. Wheeler (1991) 136 argues that there is no proof that the battle of Marathon was fought on a plain from the start. Different scholars appreciate the problems with Mardonius' statements. Dayton (2006), 52-5; Krentz (2007) 147; Rawlings (2007) 64. Moggi (1994) 329-332 has rightly stressed that Mardonius' judgement is flawed at the most fundamental level in its assumption that all Greeks waged war in the same way. Lee (2010) 139-140.

considered.<sup>35</sup> However, Herodotus reports through the words of the Persian commander an idealised and mostly fictional image of Greek warfare.<sup>36</sup> Konijnendijk convincingly suggests that Mardonius could have been represented as a bad advisor here, twisting the truth to persuade Xerxes.<sup>37</sup> There is wide consensus in accepting the death toll of phalanx warfare as generally low, thus openly contradicting Mardonius/Herodotus, despite accepting the rest of the passage without question.<sup>38</sup>

Furthermore, light troops were part of archaic phalanxes, as represented in Tyrtaeus, but also suggested in Herodotus' account of the battle of Plataea (479 BC).<sup>39</sup> Consequently, the development of a phalanx comprised solely of hoplites could be seen as an innovation of the fifth century.<sup>40</sup>

If the agonal battle seems more of a historiographical and literal illusion than historical reality, it is undeniable that the sources represent warfare from the last third of the fifth century as an increasingly sophisticated and complex phenomenon.<sup>41</sup> Although it should be highlighted that the sources seem to acknowledge tactical thinking as existing before the Peloponnesian War,<sup>42</sup> in the second half of the fifth century non-hoplitic troops

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<sup>35</sup> On the dependence of this theory on Mardonius' passage, Moggi (1994) 321; Dawson (1996) 47-49, 55; Dayton (2006) 52-53; Wheeler 2007 190; Konijnendijk (2016) 2. See Sheldon (2012) 42-43 on the existence of different types of warfare to pitched battle, and Lee (2010) 152 on the lack of attention to sieges. Cf. Echeverría (2011) 47-48. Ober (1992) 69 argues that the hoplites' ethics hindered the development of other types of warfare, especially sieges.

<sup>36</sup> Krentz (2000); Dayton (2005) 52-55, 127-36, 146, 148, 151-3; Sheldon (2012), 49-50; Konijnendijk (2018) 72-73; Payen (2018) 120. More cautiously, Ilari (1980) 58-59.

<sup>37</sup> Konijnendijk (2016) 4-7, 11-12, *Tactics* 73-76. Cf. Moggi (1994) 325-326; Wheeler (2007) 191 n. 20.

<sup>38</sup> Holladay (1982) 97; Hanson (1989) 35-36; Dayton (2006) 81-102; Lanni (2008) 485-488. Cf. Konijnendijk (2018) 73.

<sup>39</sup> Tyrt. F 11; Hdt. 9.10.1-2., 29. van Wees (1994a); (2004) 181-183; Krentz (2013) 137, 139, 147-148.

<sup>40</sup> *Warfare* 172-174, 181-182; Krentz (2013) 137.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. below, pp. 190-196.

<sup>42</sup> See below, pp. 208-211.

were implemented and organised in semi-independent corps, making coordination and collaboration with the phalanx more effective and complex than in the past.<sup>43</sup> This allowed for the valorisation of non-hoplite troops, in particular of peltasts and cavalry, which led to a greater variety of tactical options, often in coordination with the phalanx.<sup>44</sup>

Due to the development of different corps, more than one scholar has ascribed the introduction of tactics to Greek warfare to the end of the fifth and the fourth century.<sup>45</sup> As discussed below, this position sufficiently acknowledges neither tactical thinking, nor the cooperation of different kinds of troops, which the sources ascribe to the early and mid fifth century.<sup>46</sup> Nonetheless, fourth century commanders displayed an attitude of experimenting with new tactical solutions when facing difficult situations and reached a degree of tactical complexity, which denotes the interiorisation of the fifth century experience of warfare.<sup>47</sup> Consequently, rather than being a radical innovation, fourth century tactics appear to be a slow evolution.<sup>48</sup>

Undeniably, war changed from the Peloponnesian War. Pitched battle became less resolute and, aside from a few exceptions, such as Leuctra (371 BC) or Mantinea (362 BC),

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<sup>43</sup> Sphacteria (Thuc. 4.33-34) and Lachaeum (Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.11-17) are exemplary of this trend. Organised in semi-independent squads, light infantrymen in the first instance and peltasts in the second were able to create havoc among the enemy hoplites, while the friendly phalanx protected them and delivered the final blow.

<sup>44</sup> Peltasts: Best (1969) 17-35; Bettalli (2013) 66, 425. *Contra* Anderson (1970) 113-114 and Payen (2018) 121 believes that peltasts became important only after the Peloponnesian War. Cavalry: Bugh (1988) 39, 79-81; Spence (1993) 9-19; Worley (1994) 68-70, 171; Pritchard (2018) 441-442.

<sup>45</sup> E.g. Anderson (1970) 94-96; Devine (1983) 208; Culham (1989) 192-194; Dawson (1996) 49, 61-62; Hutchinson (2000) 181; Hanson (2001) 6; *Warfare* 110-112; Moore (2013) 458-459, 463. Chrissanthos (2013) 316-317 writes about the 'greater complexity' of Greek warfare since the Peloponnesian War.

<sup>46</sup> See below 208-211.

<sup>47</sup> Best (1969) 139; Hanson (1988) 196; Hutchinson (2000) 181; Echeverría (2011) 66; Sears (2013) 277; Konijnendijk (2014) 88; *Tactics* 34-39, 172. *Contra* Lendon (2005) 93, 107 still argues for a radical change, although he admits the limited innovation of the battle of Leuctra.

<sup>48</sup> See esp. *Tactics* 34-39, 172.

rarely ended a conflict. Instead, war was conducted by means of smaller and continuous actions, aiming to weaken and vex the enemy, progressively de-emphasising pitched battles. This new type of warfare, and the tendency to keep several fronts open, put great pressure on the *poleis*, which had to deploy substantial numbers of troops for long periods of time.<sup>49</sup>

Furthermore, the increased reliance on selected troops and mercenaries would have granted the commander the chance to effectively control the manoeuvres of the army.<sup>50</sup> Greek soldiers had been hired as mercenaries since the archaic age, but their employment in mainland Greece is recognised as a fundamental change.<sup>51</sup> These expendable soldiers were hired at will, often paid with booty, and solved the shortage of men which had emerged since the Peloponnesian War.<sup>52</sup> Citizen-soldiers were never totally replaced, but Athens undeniably made great use of hired sailors, rowers, and infantrymen, especially peltasts.<sup>53</sup>

Many scholars believe that mercenaries were more proficient than average citizen-soldiers.<sup>54</sup> A passage of the *Nicomachean Ethics* supports this idea, but also warns that

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<sup>49</sup> Delbrück (1975) 135-136; Hanson (1989) 4-5; Bettalli (2013) 81; Payen (2018) 74-75, 122.

<sup>50</sup> *Tactics* 153-160. Cf. *GSW* 3.244; *Warfare* 89, 108-112; Eckstein (2005) 483-484; Lendon (2005) 108-113; *Psychology* 107, 125; Bettalli (2013) 184.

<sup>51</sup> Lengauer (1979) 13, 89; Ilari (1980) 58, 62-64; Lazenby (1985) 39-40; Culham (1989) 192; Bettalli (1995) 24, 123; Hutchinson (2000) 30; Trundle (2004) 44-46; Lendon (2005) 111-113; Dayton (2006) 137; Hunt (2007) 133; Wheeler (2007), 223-224; Moore (2013) 460-461. On Archaic mercenaries, see Cartledge (1987) 316; Bettalli (1995); (2013) 27-50.

<sup>52</sup> Payen (2018) 123-124. See Chapter Five 308-309.

<sup>53</sup> On citizen-soldiers: Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.49; Dem. 1.20-24, 4.19-22, 19.266; Plut. *Phoc.* 13.4-5. In Dem. 3.4-5 a force of citizen troops was initially proposed. *GSW* 2.68-69; Tritle (1988) 76-77; Sears (2013) 286; Bettalli (2013) 80.

<sup>54</sup> E.g. Lee (2006) 493; Bettalli (2013) 80, 430; *Tactics* 41. Bettalli (1990) *ad loc.* and (2018) 170 recognises Aen. Tact. 12.1-2 as an appreciation of the superiority of mercenaries over citizen-soldiers because Aeneas advises having many more citizen-soldiers than mercenaries at any time. Bettalli's reading is debatable. The passage clearly

mercenaries, being less motivated than citizen-soldiers, tended to run away more easily in situations of disadvantage.<sup>55</sup> Indeed, the sources attest to a negative bias against mercenaries, who were considered less dependable than citizen-soldiers.<sup>56</sup> Their advantage was in their greater experience of warfare, which was achievable, if not achieved, by some citizen-soldiers too.<sup>57</sup> Consequently, although having more experience made mercenaries more proficient troops, the increased usage of mercenaries did not necessarily result in a sharp development in tactics.<sup>58</sup>

The same should be said for tactical cooperation among different corps. In the following Sections a different scenario will be proposed: skilled fifth century commanders were able to exploit the resources they had, even unreliable citizen-soldiers, to put simple battle plans in place. The increasing reliance on mercenaries and selected troops enhanced the chances of achieving a positive outcome of the battle plan, but to conclude that, before these innovations, tactics did not exist in Greek warfare seems an excessively negative reading, which does not concur with the ancient sources.

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equates the risk of strong mercenary and allied contingents. The suggestion was not intended to comment on the quality of citizen-soldiers, but to offer a practical way to deter a coup.

<sup>55</sup> Ar. *NE* 1116b.

<sup>56</sup> Thuc. 7.48.5; Aen. Tact. 12.1-3; Philochorus *FGrHist* 328 F 51; Polyb. 11.13.5-7.

<sup>57</sup> Bettalli (2013) 431-432, with some *caveats*. Cf. *Psychology* 49-52.

<sup>58</sup> Bettalli (2013) 82-83, 103-107 argues that the line between citizen-soldier and mercenary could be quite fluid.

## THE EVOLUTION OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP

Alongside the development of Greek warfare, many scholars recognise an increasing professionalisation among military leaders.<sup>59</sup> The increasing complexity of warfare required appropriate skills, which were expected of commanders.<sup>60</sup>

This trend is well attested in Athens since the middle of the fifth century. The *Constitution of the Athenians* marks a sharp difference between the *strategoí*'s appointment in the first half of the fifth century and the time the text was written:

In those days the expeditionary force was raised from a *muster roll* (ἐκ καταλόγου), and was commanded by generals with no experience of war (ἀπειρῶν μὲν τοῦ πολεμεῖν) but *appointed* on account of their family reputations (τιμωμένων δὲ διὰ τὰς πατρικὰς δόξας), so that it was always happening that the troops on an expedition suffered as many as two or three thousand casualties, making a drain on the numbers of the respectable members both of the people and of the wealthy. (Trans. Rackham, my italics).<sup>61</sup>

This passage implies that the situation at the time of the *Constitution* was different, suggesting that the *strategoí* were elected for different reasons. A passage of Isocrates' *Antidosis* indicates that one of these criteria was previous experience in battle, especially in foreign countries.<sup>62</sup> Losing their political role and having their powers downsized, the fourth century *strategoí* became more military centred, and their skills in that area were highly valued.

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<sup>59</sup> E.g. Delbrück (1975) 149; Lengauer (1979) 37-39; Lee (2009) 393; Hornblower (2011) 196.

<sup>60</sup> Wheeler (2007) 214; Sheldon (2012) 106-107; Moore (2013) 460.

<sup>61</sup> [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 26.1. Rhodes (1981) *ad loc.* has some doubts about the reliability of the passage. Cf Chapter Two 82-83. Indeed, the argument that mustering *via katalogos* would have decimated the well-to-do Athenians is not corroborated by other evidence and seems doubtful.

<sup>62</sup> Isoc. 15.116-117. It should be noted that Isocrates says this in a critical tone, evaluating other skills as more important. Cf. Bettalli (2013) 96 on the stereotypical nature of this piece.

This trend is recognised from the last third of the fifth century. Wheeler suggests that Sophocles' *Philoctetes* might reflect two leadership models: the heroic/traditional Philoctetes, and the disenchanting Odysseus.<sup>63</sup> Agreeing with the 'orthodox' ideal of a war *ethos*, Wheeler believes that Odysseus represents the new leaders, who were more 'professional' and rejected the traditional rules of engagement. Lengauer recognises Phormio, Demosthenes, and Lamachus as early examples of this trend, but he acknowledges the fourth century as being when the phenomenon had fully matured.<sup>64</sup>

Iphicrates is often recognised as the most representative of this new type of 'professional' *strategoi*. Allegedly the son of a shoemaker,<sup>65</sup> Iphicrates started as a commander of mercenaries during the Corinthian war.<sup>66</sup> The splendid victory at Lecheum (391 BC) gave great visibility to Iphicrates, who was then elected *strategos* several times.<sup>67</sup> Like many of his colleagues, Iphicrates continued to lead mercenaries in private enterprises, when he was not elected *strategos*.<sup>68</sup> A staunch disciplinarian, Iphicrates is deemed a talented commander who focused on training and light infantry, and who understood the importance of coordination and tactical movements.<sup>69</sup> Iphicrates' skill allowed him to rise to

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<sup>63</sup> Wheeler (1991) esp. 122-123, 126, 137. Cf. Brouwers (2013) 62 for the hero as leader of the army, and not only individual warrior. For Achilles as an epitome of the epic heroic ideal, see *Warfare* 164. Bowie (1997) 56-62 argues that the play might be a reference to Alcibiades.

<sup>64</sup> Lengauer (1979), 43-45, 59-62, 111. Cf. Payen (2018) 160-162. See also Moore (2013) 458 on the lack of specialisation of the commander before the Peloponnesian War.

<sup>65</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 187a; Paus. 9.14.6; Suda *ad.* Ἰφικράτης. Cf. Ar. *Rhet.* 1367b. Davies *APT* 7737 gives credit to this tradition.

<sup>66</sup> Wheeler (2007) 216.

<sup>67</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.11-17, esp. 13. Iphicrates' title suggests that he was not an elected *strategos*. Sears (2013) 120 suggests that Iphicrates was appointed as a leader of mercenaries by Conon, after Iphicrates' exploit in the battle of Cnidus (394 BC) (Plut. *Mor.* 187a). Cf. Rop (2019) 105.

<sup>68</sup> GSW 2.64-69.

<sup>69</sup> Wheeler (2007) 220-221 argues for this development in generalship making the example of Iphicrates, whose "[...] emphasis on training and discipline represent the increasing specialisation and professionalisation of

the *strategia* from a modest socio-economical position, which suggests an ulterior progression in the opening up of the *strategia*.<sup>70</sup> Iphicrates' role as a mercenary leader and his private enterprises, features which he shared with many of his colleagues, suggest a more personal relationship with his men and substantial independence from Athens.<sup>71</sup>

Undeniably, Athenian military leadership changed during the Classical age. However, this development appears less revolutionary than previous scholars have supposed. Already Pritchett argues against recognising a total independence of the commanders from their *polis*.<sup>72</sup> Even when leading mercenaries in the pursuit of private enterprises, Athenian military leaders were still responsive to the Athenian Assembly and pursued Athenian interests. Pritchett's reading is excessively optimistic; some figures like Iphicrates and Charidemus pursued their own agenda most of the time.<sup>73</sup> However, Pritchett is right in highlighting that the personalistic attitude and independence of these commanders has been overemphasised.<sup>74</sup> Fifth century *strategoï* pursued their private interests too, and often had ties of friendship with Greek and foreign communities.<sup>75</sup>

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warfare." Cf. Anderson (1970) 121; Sears (2013) 280-285. There are at least two objections to this statement. First, Xenophon advocated for training and competent leaders too, but he also believed in non-professional, 'gentlemen' *strategoï*, as we will see below. Secondly, training and discipline are associated with Iphicrates' troops and, maybe, Chabrias'. Cf. Anderson (1963). To assume that all mercenaries had the same proficiency is unsupported by the sources.

<sup>70</sup> Cf. Chapter One 19-20.

<sup>71</sup> Sheldon (2012) 106-107; Sears (2013) 121-122. More generally, see Garlan (1989) 152.

<sup>72</sup> GSW 2.59-116. Cf. Sheldon (2012) 106; Bettalli (2013) 91-103; Sears (2013) 128-130, 167-169.

<sup>73</sup> Harris (1989); Bettalli (2013) 374-376; Sears (2013) 123-127, 135-136, 290-291.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. Rop (2019) 19.

<sup>75</sup> E.g. Miltiades and Cimon with Thracians (Plut. *Cim.* 4.1); Phormio with the Acharnians (Thuc. 3.7.1); Demosthenes with the Messenians (Thuc. 3.91.1, 4.3.1-2). Cf. Alcibiades' personal motives, his ambition, to advocate the Sicilian campaign (Thuc. 6.15.2, 90.1-4). Bloedow (1992) 155-156; Hutchinson (2006) 121-122.

Fighting for these 'friends' in an almost independent fashion was a radical innovation of the fourth century, but one which stemmed from traditional practices.<sup>76</sup>

Furthermore, some commanders could become leaders of mercenaries for the sake of their *polis*. Faraguna points out that Leosthenes hired mercenaries in 324 BC, but he was probably sent to do so by Athenian authorities.<sup>77</sup> The need for good mercenaries compelled these commanders into continuous activity; without pay, mercenaries would have found another employer, and their expertise would have been lost.<sup>78</sup>

However, serving as mercenaries could also have been the chosen way of living for these talented military leaders. Since the Archaic age, serving as a mercenary was a way for exiles or impoverished men to earn a living.<sup>79</sup> The fourth century was no different; it is telling how Timotheus decided to become a mercenary when he had run out of money, many years after his first *strategia*.<sup>80</sup>

Moreover, sending mercenaries was an important diplomatic tool in the fourth century.<sup>81</sup> Consequently, in addition to their personal agenda, it is possible that some *stratego*i were sent as mercenary leaders as a diplomatic gift. For instance, Pritchett believes that Iphicrates tied himself to the Odyrisians not only for personal reasons, but also as a pro-Athenian diplomatic move.<sup>82</sup> The fact that, even when hired by foreign king and warlords,

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<sup>76</sup> See Trundle (2004) 42-43 and Rop (2019) 116 on the importance of *philia* in the service of the commanders as mercenaries.

<sup>77</sup> Faraguna (2003) 129-130. Cf. Sekunda (2018) 65-66 on the modalities of recruiting mercenaries.

<sup>78</sup> GSW 1.26; Trundle (2004) 90-91, 99-101; Sears (2013) 118, 282, 290; Hornblower (2011) 273.

<sup>79</sup> Bettalli (1995) 108, 123. Cf. Trundle (2004) 41, 148. GSW 2.103-104, n. 240, Trundle (2004) 63-64, and Sheldon (2012) 104-105 argue that serving as mercenaries was lucrative in Egypt and Asia, but not in Greece.

<sup>80</sup> [Dem.] 49.25. Cf. Xen. *Anab.* 1.9.17; Isoc. 4.168; Aeschin. 2.147.

<sup>81</sup> Trundle (2004) 157-159. Cf. Sears (2013) 129; Rop (2019) 19-22, 26.

<sup>82</sup> GSW 2.64-67. *Contra* Harris (1989). Cf. Rop (2019) 101-102 about Iphicrates and Chabrias in Egypt, and Sears (2013) 167-169 on Timotheus

Athenian leaders were reactive to the inputs of the Athenian Assembly is telling of their priorities.

The professionalisation of the *strategoï* is often associated with the development of warfare as a *techne*.<sup>83</sup> The emergence of the *hoplomachoi* – sophists specialised in teaching tactics and combat techniques – denotes the demand for a more scientific treatment of warfare, but the hostile reception of these ‘teachers of warfare’ warns us against the value of their lessons.<sup>84</sup> Similarly, technical treatises on warfare appeared in the first half of the fourth century, corroborating the notion of a progressive formalisation and development of the art of war.<sup>85</sup> Additionally, serving as mercenaries would have enhanced their competence with considerable practical experience, a feature which Xenophon and Aeneas concur was better than theoretical knowledge.<sup>86</sup> Consequently, one would expect fourth century leaders demonstrated much greater skill than ‘non-professional’ military leaders.<sup>87</sup>

However, the evidence in support of this assumption is scarce at best. Iphicrates’ success at Lecheum (391 BC) was undeniably a tactical masterpiece, but its main structure is not too dissimilar from the tactics adopted by Demosthenes at Sphacteria (425 BC).<sup>88</sup> The reliance on deception and surprise attacks is not a radical innovation of the fourth century.<sup>89</sup> As Konijnendijk points out, the greater awareness of the fourth century *strategoï* did not

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<sup>83</sup> Whitehead (1990) 36-34-36; Wheeler (1991) 137-138.

<sup>84</sup> Wheeler (1982); Whitehead (1990) 35-36; Konijnendijk (2018) 44-45, 66-68. On the criticism see Pl. *Euthyd.* 273c; Xen. *Mem.* 3.1, esp. 2-3.

<sup>85</sup> Bettalli (1990) 13-15; (2018) 172; Whitehead (1990) 35-36; Shipley (2018) 58-59.

<sup>86</sup> Whitehead (1990) 37; Shipley (2018) 59.

<sup>87</sup> Wheeler (2007) 214; Sheldon (2012) 106-107, 123; Moore (2013) 460.

<sup>88</sup> Thuc. 4.29-38; Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.11-17. Lazenby (1985) 148; Sears (2013) 276-277; Konijnendijk (2014) 85, 88; Rees (2016) 151-155, 97-101. On the similarities of the two battles, see Hutchinson (2006) 53-64; Sheldon (2012) 109-110.

<sup>89</sup> E.g. Hdt. 6.79. Cf. above 177-179.

cause any great leap ahead in Greek tactics, which is telling of the effective impact of the *strategoí's* 'professionalisation'.<sup>90</sup> Indeed, even the tactical manuals seemed to formalise and consolidate notions on warfare rather than proposing innovative solutions.<sup>91</sup> The idea that *strategoí* must know these precepts is better attested in fourth century sources, but this does not necessarily mean that previous commanders were always unaware of this *techné*.<sup>92</sup>

The distinction between professional and amateur military leaders does not clearly emerge in the ancient sources. In the *Memorabilia*, Xenophon discusses the theme of the experience and 'professionalisation' of the *strategoí*.<sup>93</sup> Socrates' position – thus Xenophon's too – was in favour of Antisthenes, the inexperienced gentleman, and not Nicomachides, who, instead, had been both *lochagos* and *taxiarchos*.<sup>94</sup> Even more interestingly, in this narrative the Athenians voted for the former, rather than the latter. This reactionary position suits Xenophon's agenda well, but it should also make us question how the *strategoí's* professional experience was perceived.<sup>95</sup> Undeniably, Xenophon gives great emphasis to soldiers' training, tactics, and the cooperation of different corps, but he also believes that amateur commanders could attain good results too. Ultimately, Xenophon was a young Athenian with limited experience as a commander when he was elected leader of Proxenos'

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<sup>90</sup> *Tactics* esp. 34-36, 172.

<sup>91</sup> Bettalli (1990) 34-35, *ad* 15. Already Delbrück (1975) 151 notes this point, although he ascribes the improvement to superior discipline.

<sup>92</sup> E.g. *Pl. Char.* 173b-c; *Lach.* 182b; *Ion* 540c; *Xen. Cyr.* 1.6.12-14, 22-23; *Mem.* 3.1.2-3. Tritle (1992) 126.

<sup>93</sup> *Xen. Mem.* 3.4.

<sup>94</sup> Salmond (1996) 46. Cf. *Isoc.* 15.116-117. See also Lengauer (1979) 157-158; Wheeler (1991) 121-122; Nevin (2017) 145.

<sup>95</sup> Salmond (1996) 44-45 believes that the passage reflects historical practice.

mercenary band in 401 BC, however, his lack of leadership experience did not hold him back.<sup>96</sup>

This passage of the *Memorabilia* also demonstrates how a proper *cursus honorum* did not exist in Athens. Boëldieu-Trevet argues that the Athenians chose their *strategoï* from those who had covered minor military offices.<sup>97</sup> If it is true that Lacedaemonius was effectively *hipparchos* before being *strategos*,<sup>98</sup> and Phormio and Lamachus had probably been *taxiarchoi*,<sup>99</sup> Antisthenes is preferred to an experienced officer for his qualities as a leader.

Furthermore, the notion that fourth century *strategoï* were chosen only for their skills, thus allowing for more social mobility, should be drastically reconsidered. Several prominent fourth century *strategoï* came from well-to-do families. Chabrias' father was *trierarchos* and participated in the chariot race of the Pythic games of 374/3 BC, not dissimilarly from Alcibiades;<sup>100</sup> Timotheus inherited properties worth 17 talents from his father Conon;<sup>101</sup> Phocion had the reputation of living modestly, but Tritle compellingly demonstrates that he was still a member of the elite, and he was *trierarchos*.<sup>102</sup> Chares' example is less straightforward, but Bianco suggests that he had already been *trierarchos* by

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<sup>96</sup> Xenophon defines himself as νεώτατος in comparison with the other *strategoï* in 401 (*Anab.* 3.2.37. Cf. Xen. *Anab.* 2.1.12–13; *Mem.* 1.2.36.). Lee (2017) 16–17 stresses how this statement might indicate that Xenophon was in his thirties. If this is true, Xenophon could not have had much, if any, leadership experience.

<sup>97</sup> Boëldieu-Trevet (2007) 103. Cf. Connor (1971) 10. *Contra* Hansen (1983c) 152.

<sup>98</sup> IG I<sup>3</sup> 511. Bugh (1988) 46.

<sup>99</sup> Aristoph. *Acarn.* 1073. Lengauer (1979) 58. Olson (2002) 221–222 points out how Lamachus' position is ambiguous in the play, hinting both at a *strategos* and a *taxiarchos*. Cf. Larsen (1946) 92, who believes the *taxiarchia* to be more probable.

<sup>100</sup> Dem. 59.33; [Dem.] 40.24. APF 15086.

<sup>101</sup> Lys. 19.38–40. APF 13700.

<sup>102</sup> Tritle (1988) 18–55, esp. 41. APF 15076.

366/5 BC, implying that his family became rich before his first *strategia*.<sup>103</sup> Iphicrates, Charidemus, and other military officers to whom Athenian citizenship was granted demonstrated that social mobility for talented mercenaries was possible, but this trend did not replace the traditional dynamics of the *strategoí*'s election.<sup>104</sup> The fact that Iphicrates, Chabrias, and Chares' sons all became *strategoí* also implies that *charis* was still important in Athenian elections, even when the political power of the *strategoí* became much less substantial.<sup>105</sup>

It is extremely telling that the representation of the most important qualities of a *strategos* did not change between the fifth and the fourth centuries. Cunning and intelligence were appreciated in military leaders since way before the late fifth century. Already in myth and in Homer, this quality is often associated with military leaders.<sup>106</sup> Historical leaders were presented in the same light. The ancient sources tell us that Miltiades was smart enough to solve the riddle of the oracle about Lemnos,<sup>107</sup> and that he was the one who figured out how to defeat the Persians.<sup>108</sup> Plutarch reports how Cimon took advantage of the allies' simplicity, allowing them to take the whole booty after having taken Byzantium, for Athens to make much more money from the ransom of war prisoners.<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> Bianco (2002) 3-4. Cf. Salmond (1996) 45-46. *Contra* Davies *APF* 15292 sees Chares as a *homo novus*.

<sup>104</sup> Sekunda (2018) 69-80.

<sup>105</sup> Cf. Davies (1981) 122-124.

<sup>106</sup> Detienne & Vernant (1974), 16-22, 227-228; Catenacci (1996), 45, 190-203; Krentz (2000) 172-174, 177-178; (2002) 27-28; Boëldieu-Trevet (2007) 42. See Sheldon (2012) 47-49 specifically on ambushes. Cf. Bowie (1997) 61 on the influence of the Homeric hero's cunning for a positive interpretation of Odysseus in Sophocles' *Philoctetes*.

<sup>107</sup> Hdt. 6.41.1-2, 139-140. Catenacci (1996) 72-73.

<sup>108</sup> See below, pp. 208-211.

<sup>109</sup> Plut. *Cim.* 9.3-5. Cf. 5.1, 11 on Cimon's cunning. Cf. Polyæn. 1.34.1-2.

These traits could be seen especially in Themistocles, a real-life Odysseus.<sup>110</sup> More importantly, when mentioning the merits of the Athenians in the Persian Wars, Themistocles' cunning was acknowledged as a contribution equal to the number of the ships and the courage demonstrated in battle.<sup>111</sup> Thucydides confirms this positive evaluation later on, in Themistocles' eulogy. He writes that:

For Themistocles was a man who disclosed most securely his natural strength (βεβαιότατα δὴ φύσεως ἰσχὺν δηλώσας), and in that regard was more than others exceptionally worthy of admiration (μᾶλλον ἑτέρου ἄξιος θαυμάσαι). For with his in-born intelligence (οἰκεία γὰρ ξυνέσει), not buttressing it with anything learned before or after, he was the strongest at understanding the immediate situation with a minimum of deliberation, and the best at estimating over the greatest extent what likely to happen in the future (τῶν τε παραχρῆμα δι' ἐλαχίστης βουλῆς κράτιστος γνώμων καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐπὶ πλεῖστον τοῦ γενησομένου ἄριστος εἰκαστής). *He gave the best orders (ἐξηγήσασθαι) of the things that he had experience of, and what he lacked experience of he did not fail to judge sufficiently (ἄπειρος εἶη, κρῖναι ἱκανῶς οὐκ ἀπήλλακτο); he was best at foreseeing the better and the worse in what was still not evident (τό τε ἄμεινον ἢ χεῖρον ἐν τῷ ἀφανεῖ ἔτι προεώρα μάλιστα).* To sum up, in the power of his nature and the brevity of his practicing he was the strongest at improvising what was needed (φύσεως μὲν δυνάμει, μελέτης δὲ βραχύτητι). (Trans. Rhodes, my italics).<sup>112</sup>

Thucydides recognises in an early fifth century *strategos* many of the qualities praised in later commanders. Themistocles' ability to act on the spot and understand the situation is well exemplified by the term φρόνησις, the ability of "knowing what to say and do".<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>110</sup> Thuc. Thuc. 1.90-91. Cf. Hdt. 8.75, 109-110, 124.1; Plut. *Them.* 2.1, 9, 10.1-2, 14.

<sup>111</sup> Thuc. 1.74.1.

<sup>112</sup> Thuc. 1.138.3. See also Holladay (1987) 184.

<sup>113</sup> [Pl.] *Alc. Min.* 140e for a definition of φρόνιμος. The dialogue is considered spurious, but a similar phrasing was also used by Xenophon (*Eq. Mag.* 1.1: "πρῶτον μὲν θύοντα χρὴ αἰτεῖσθαι θεοὺς ταῦτα διδόναι καὶ νοεῖν καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν"), although without mentioning φρόνησις. Szawiel (2009) 289 suggests a different perspective: φρόνησις would be knowledge in a specific situation, a sort of practical wisdom. Cf. Hutchinson (2000) 202-204 on the importance that Xenophon gave to the analysis of the situation in war contexts.

This trait has been universally praised in fourth century sources,<sup>114</sup> drawing a clear parallel between these leaders and Themistocles.

Another passage of Xenophon corroborates this conclusion. After enumerating several stratagems to mislead the enemy, Xenophon warns his reader:

A little effort is enough to learn these stratagems. However, the *hipparchos* always needs to consider the present situation (ἐννοεῖν δὲ τὸ παρατυγχάνον αὐτῷ ἀεὶ δεῖ), and gain an advantage by looking at the circumstances (καὶ πρὸς τὸ παριστάμενον σκοποῦντα τὸ συμφέρον ἐκπονεῖν).<sup>115</sup>

To know and ‘copy’ a stratagem was not enough for Xenophon. The military leader was supposed to analyse and understand the circumstances which he was in, and then act, applying and adapting the most suitable course of action.<sup>116</sup>

The same could be said for another essential characteristic of good military leaders: the capability to anticipate the enemy.<sup>117</sup> Again, anticipating the enemy was associated with Themistocles,<sup>118</sup> but also with Callias, who was able to frustrate Aristaeus’ plan in Potidaea

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<sup>114</sup> E.g. Aen. Tact. 1.7; Xen. Eq. Mag. 7.1; Apol. 20; Anab. 1.10.9; Ar. Pol. 1277b. *Phronesis* was considered so highly that even sub-officers were supposed to demonstrate this trait. Aen. Tact. 1.4, 3.4; Xen. Eq. Mag. 2.3; Bettalli (2018) 171. Cf. Cartledge (1987) 206-207, who makes a similar point for commanders’ σοφία, but he believes that this exaltation is a new phenomenon, in contrast to the hoplitic ethic. Boëldieu-Trevet (2007) 41-42 points out how φρόνησις was a characteristic appreciated in the Homeric heroes too.

<sup>115</sup> Xen. Eq. Mag. 9.1.

<sup>116</sup> Cf. Xen. Cyr. 8.5.15-16. Lengauer (1979) 154; Hutchinson (2000) 201. The same necessity is found in a few passages of the *Iliad* (e.g. 13.545). Cf. Detienne & Vernant (1974) 15-17.

<sup>117</sup> E.g. Xen. Cyr. 5.2.6, 6.3.20. Hutchinson (2000) 205-209. Culham (1989) 201 traces this concept in Polybius (9.12) and Onasander (6). Culham’s tendency to reduce sources from different contexts and time into one single model of ‘warfare’ should be discouraged. However, it is reasonable to conclude that anticipating the enemy was effectively a recurrent theme, most likely for its universal importance in any type of warfare, and not only that of ancient civilisations.

<sup>118</sup> Plut. Them. 3.5, 14.3.

(432 BC), and with Phormio, who foresaw the Peloponnesian formation and its consequences in the naval battle near Naupactus (428 BC).<sup>119</sup>

The vocabulary referring to this particular trait of the commander varies. Plato uses the word προμήθεια. In the *Laches*, while commenting on the role of seers and oracles in warfare, Socrates affirms in front of the two *strategoi* Nicias and Laches that:

Perhaps, you could testify to these statements about warfare: the *strategia* makes the most valid forecasts about the future (ή στρατηγία κάλλιστα προμηθεῖται τά τε ἄλλα καὶ περὶ τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι).<sup>120</sup>

The most common term is πρόνοια, literally 'thinking in advance'. Once the commander had prudently evaluated the situation – thus being *phronimos* – he had to anticipate the moves of the enemies, so to find the best countermeasures.<sup>121</sup> In addition to thinking fast, the commanders had to act rapidly as well. They were expected to recognise the mistakes of their opponents, and act accordingly.<sup>122</sup>

Aeneas Tacticus presents a good example of this attitude. To reduce the risks of a siege, Aeneas suggests elaborating an emergency plan, in case of invasion, to react immediately to the attack and to use the enemy's predictable behaviours – such as scattering while raiding for booty – to drive him into a position advantageous for the defendant.<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>119</sup> Thuc. 1.62.4, 2.83-84.

<sup>120</sup> Pl. *Lach.* 198e.

<sup>121</sup> E.g. Xen. *Eq. Mag.* 7.5; Aen. Tact. 9.1. As Hutchinson (2000) 78 puts it, a good leader has to think of any eventual outcome of his and the enemy's actions.

<sup>122</sup> Thuc. 1.84.4, 5.9.4, 8.105.2-3; Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.11-17; *Eq. Mag.* 5.3, 7.8-10. Cartledge (1987) 203.

<sup>123</sup> Aen. Tact. 3.4-6, 15.2-3, 16.4-6, 19. Cf. Bettalli (1990) esp. *ad.* 16.19. On Aeneas' concern for order and discipline, see Whitehead (1990) *ad.* 15.2.

The emphasis on the commanders' mental qualities is perhaps better represented in the fourth century, but it shows continuity more than development, and earlier *strategoi* are described in similar terms. Now that Krentz has compellingly demonstrated how the supposed moral standards of Greek warfare are a historiographical myth,<sup>124</sup> the dichotomy between Achillean (represented by Philoctetes in the eponymous play) and Odyssean commanders should be overcome by a more blurred and multifaceted image of military leadership, which includes elements of both.

This reading would explain some fourth century examples exalting the fair-play and heroism of the commanders. After the first phase of the battle of Coronea (394 BC), Agesilaus ordered the troops to attack the Thebans directly, who had pierced through Agesilaus' left wing, instead of letting them retreat and attacking their rear.<sup>125</sup> Xenophon openly disapproves of this line of action, but he tries to cover up Agesilaus' recklessness by presenting it as a sign of courage. Agesilaus was plausibly motivated by reasons other than honour, such as his deep hatred of the Thebans, but it is telling that Xenophon believed that presenting Agesilaus as a courageous warrior in the 360s could constitute as some justification for his lack of tactical acumen.<sup>126</sup>

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<sup>124</sup> Cf. above, pp. 172-173, nn. 19, 20.

<sup>125</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.19; *Ages.* 2.12. Lazenby (1985) 146. Cf. Konijnendijk *Tactics* 89, who is too extreme in stating that the concept of honour was alien in tactical decisions. However, it should be noted that this is the only clear case of this phenomenon.

<sup>126</sup> On Agesilaus' choices and hate for Thebes, see Cartledge (1987) 212, 221. More in general, see Lendon (2005) 85, 87.

Demosthenes makes a similar observation about Conon. Defending the benefits inherited by Chabrias' sons, Demosthenes made a bold assertion comparing Conon and Themistocles:

Now I assert – and I earnestly appeal to you, Athenians, not to take offence at what is coming, but to consider whether it is true – I assert that in proportion as openness is better than secrecy (ὅσω τὸ φανερώς τοῦ λάθρα κρείττον), and it is more honorable to gain one's end by victory than by trickery (τὸ νικῶντας τοῦ παρακρουσαμένους πράττειν ὀτιοῦν ἐντιμότερον), so Conon deserves more credit than Themistocles for building the walls. For the latter achieved it by evading those who would have prevented it, but the former by beating them in battle. (trans. Vince).<sup>127</sup>

Demosthenes' point demonstrates how this heroising rhetoric was still alive in the mid-fourth century,<sup>128</sup> and could be exploited for rhetorical purposes.<sup>129</sup> Demosthenes' care in attacking Themistocles suggests that the point he was making was somewhat controversial,<sup>130</sup> but the fact that he was able to make it proves that this sensibility did not disappear in the fourth century either. This reading is confirmed by another passage, in which Philip's successes are somehow diminished because they had not been attained in a regular pitched battle.<sup>131</sup> As Krentz summarises, the disdain for deception was quite a hollow stance, which did not have any practical effect on one's action.<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>127</sup> Dem. 20.74.

<sup>128</sup> Krentz (2000) 168; Bettalli (2013) 76. Canevaro (2016) 9-10 accepts the date of 355/4 BC, as reported by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Ad Ammaeum I* 4.5-9).

<sup>129</sup> Lendon (2005) 86, 88-89. Konijnendijk (2016) 2, commenting upon Dem. 9.47-51 and Polyb. 13.3.2-8 underlines how the idea of fair warfare was just an idealisation of a past too distant to be correctly remembered. Generally, his objection is agreeable, but Dem. 20.74 shows that the picture was more complicated. Hesk (2000) 45-49 and Canevaro (2016) *ad loc.* suggests that Demosthenes played on the aversion of the Athenians to deception, which seems an excessive reading.

<sup>130</sup> Cf. Hesk (2000) 46-47 on Themistocles' positive image in Athens.

<sup>131</sup> Dem. 9.49.

<sup>132</sup> Krentz (2000) 174. More cautiously, Hesk (2000) 102-107.

Consequently, it seems reasonable to tone down the traditional idea of a change in generalship in the fourth century.<sup>133</sup> The ancient sources report similarities more than discrepancies between fifth and fourth century *strategoï*.<sup>134</sup> Obviously, it is not being argued that the *strategia* did not change at all in this period. As we have commented above, important institutional and social developments interested the *strategia* in this period. However, these phenomena are not necessarily connected with the alleged professionalisation of the *strategoï*. Easier access to politics for non-aristocratic Athenians is well attested from the mid-fifth century,<sup>135</sup> and neglecting the military relevance and skill of fifth century *strategoï*, blinded by their political prominence, is a mistake.<sup>136</sup>

#### THE ROLE OF THE COMMANDER ON THE BATTLEFIELD

Now that the position of extant scholarship on Greek warfare and military leaders has been summarised and commented upon, it is time to focus on what Greek commanders, and the Athenian *strategoï* in particular, were expected and able to do on the battlefield. This Section aims to demonstrate that tactical thinking was not only widely acknowledged as an essential part of warfare, but that it was put in practice notwithstanding the objective limitations underlined by the past scholarship. Thus, the analysis will be divided into three sub-Sections, discussing the planning that took place before a fight, the consequential deployment of the army, and the development of the battle.

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<sup>133</sup> Cf. Bettalli (2013) 101-102.

<sup>134</sup> Tritle (1992). As Sears (2013) 120 epitomises: "Iphicrates acted more like a condottiere than Pritchett [GSW 2.54-62, 72] allows, but he did not represent a new type of Athenian commander for the fourth century. He was perfectly in line with the preceding century and a half of Athenian Thrace-hunters."

<sup>135</sup> Cf. Chapter One 19-20.

<sup>136</sup> Tritle (1992) 126-128.

## Planning the fight

The commanders had the responsibility of deciding where, when, and especially how to fight the enemy assigned to them by the *Ecclesia*.<sup>137</sup> ‘Irregular’ fights, such as sorties, sallies, or ambushes, in particular required careful planning.<sup>138</sup> At Amphipolis (422 BC), Brasidas attacked when he saw the Athenians in disorder, during their retreat toward Eion.<sup>139</sup> And, even more interestingly, Thucydides implies that this was Brasidas’ plan from the beginning. As Brasidas puts it:

These are the tricks of war (τὰ κλέμματα) and win great acclaim (καλλίστην δόξαν) when the enemy is completely fooled to the maximum benefit of one’s own side (τοὺς φίλους μέγιστ’ ἂν ὠφελήσειεν). So while they are still unprepared and *daring* (ἀπαράσκευοι θαρσοῦσι), and, from what I can see, more inclined to withdraw than to stay in position (τοῦ ὑπαπιέναι πλέον ἢ τοῦ μένοντος), before their present vagueness of intent sharpens into some firm purpose I shall take my section and forestall them (τῷ ἀνειμένῳ αὐτῶν τῆς γνώμῃ πρὶν ξυνταθῆναι μᾶλλον τὴν δόξαν), if I can, with an attack at the run on the very centre of their army (προσπεσοῦμαι δρόμῳ κατὰ μέσον τὸ στράτευμα ἐγὼ μὲν ἔχων τοὺς μετ’ ἑμαυτοῦ καὶ φθάσας). And then, Clearidas, the next move is up to you. As soon as you see me fall on them (ὅταν ἐμὲ ὄρας ἤδη προσκείμενον), which I hope and expect will cause panic, you must suddenly open the gates and charge out with the Amphipolitans and the other allies under your command, running as fast as you can to engage (ἐπεκθεῖν καὶ ἐπείγασθαι ὡς τάχιστα ξυμμεῖξαι). (trans. Hammond, my italics).<sup>140</sup>

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<sup>137</sup> Echeverria (2011) 48-49.

<sup>138</sup> E.g. Thuc. 4.110-114, 6.101-102; Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.47.

<sup>139</sup> Anderson (1965) 3 stresses how the disorganisation of Cleon, who gave several orders at once, was the main cause of the debacle. However, Rees (2016) 35-36 notes how the terrain of the area is “rugged and hilly”, which might have hindered the coordination of the Athenians. On Brasidas’ ability to quickly analyse the situation and act consequentially, see Wylie (1992) 86, 92.

<sup>140</sup> Thuc. 5.9.5-7. See Powell (1989) 178-179 and Lendon (2005) 82-83 on the proverbial tendency of the Spartans to rely on deception.

Thucydides portrays Brasidas as giving clear, direct orders to the soldiers under him, and even organising two separate contingents to suit his plan.<sup>141</sup> While Brasidas led a small contingent of selected troops, aiming to increase the disorder within the Athenian ranks, Clearchus had to pay attention to the fight to start his movement in time to engage the Athenians when they were more disordered.<sup>142</sup> The plan worked in the end, although the Athenian right wing, which was in a strong position and still in formation at the time of the attack, resisted tenaciously.<sup>143</sup>

Brasidas was a talented commander, but he was not the only one to reach a similar degree of planning.<sup>144</sup> The Athenian sortie to take control of Megara and Nisaea (425 BC) demonstrated planning in an Athenian context too. Demosthenes and Hippocrates divided their troops into three contingents. While Hippocrates hid his 600 hoplites in a clay pit close to Megara, Demosthenes with a contingent of light troops stationed around the temple of Enyalios.<sup>145</sup> Some Megarians helped the Athenians and left the gates open for them, so that the Athenians swiftly overcame the Peloponnesian garrison and took control of the walls going from Megara to Nisaea while the greatest part of the army was arriving from Eleusis.<sup>146</sup> In the end, the plan failed. The plot was discovered, and the people of Megara

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<sup>141</sup> Thuc. 5.8.4.

<sup>142</sup> Wheeler (2007) 219 underlines this aspect about the timing of engagement of tactical reserves. Cf. below, pp. 202-204.

<sup>143</sup> Thuc. 5.10.9

<sup>144</sup> On Brasidas talent, see Westlake (1961) 278-279. Wylie (1992) 92-93 argues that Brasidas was skilled in small scale operations, but he was not able to lead hoplites in pitched battles, but this statement is not adequately proven.

<sup>145</sup> Thuc. 4.67.1-2.

<sup>146</sup> Thuc. 4.68.1-5.

rose *en masse* against the prospect of an Athenian occupation. Interestingly, the Athenian *strategoï* noticed the delay, and changed their plan by starting besieging Nisaea.<sup>147</sup>

In 403 BC, Thrasybulus successfully delivered a devastating surprise attack against the mixed force of Spartan infantry and Athenian cavalry, which the Thirty Tyrants had sent to limit the raid of the democratic party in Phyle.<sup>148</sup> Thrasybulus made the troops march at night, and once they had arrived close to the enemy camp they rested until the crack of dawn. When their opponents were busy completing their daily activities at the camp, Thrasybulus launched the attack, killing more than 120 men.

It is noticeable that these fifth century examples do not differ substantially from the Athenian *strategoï*'s practice in the fourth century. During the Corcyra campaign of 373/2 BC, Iphicrates staged a perfect ambush against the ships of Dionysius of Syracuse, an ally of Sparta.<sup>149</sup> Having personally inspected the area and organised sentries to warn him when it was the right moment to attack, Iphicrates organised a striking raid with 20 ships, taking the Syracusans by surprise and capturing all their ships and crews without a fight. Iphicrates applied the same wit to land warfare too. When he was fighting in the Hellespont during the War of Corinth (489 BC), Iphicrates was able to deceive the Spartan commander Anaxibios.<sup>150</sup> Iphicrates sent his triremes away to give Anaxibios the impression that he was extracting money in the Thracian Chersonese, whilst he was actually setting an ambush in a rugged spot of the road between Atarneus and Abydos. Confident that Iphicrates was

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<sup>147</sup> Thuc. 4.69.1.

<sup>148</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.4-7. Krentz (1995) *ad loc.* underlines Xenophon's admiration of similar stratagems.

<sup>149</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.33-35.

<sup>150</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.35-39.

going to Proconnesus, Anaxibios fell into Iphicrates' trap, which damaged the Spartan army greatly.

The same attitude towards planning can be found in some pitched battles too. The best example is, once again, non-Athenian. Aristeus led a contingent of Corinthians and Potidaeans to fight against the Athenian force sent to stop the revolt of Potidaea in 432 BC, and came up with this plan:

Aristeus' *plan* (γνώμη) was to keep his own troops camped on the isthmus in readiness for an Athenian attack, while the Chalcidians, the allies from outside the peninsula, and the two hundred cavalry sent by Perdiccas stayed in Olynthus: then, when the Athenians attacked on the isthmus (ὅταν ... ἐπὶ σφᾶς χωρῶσι), these other troops would come in support from the rear (κατὰ νότου βοηθοῦντας), pinning the enemy between two forces (ἐν μέσῳ ποιεῖν αὐτῶν τοὺς πολεμίους). (trans. Hammond, my italics).<sup>151</sup>

Thucydides acknowledges Aristeus as the mastermind behind this plan. His incidental reference to this seems to indicate that it was not unusual for a *strategos* to propose something similar, even if it was relatively elaborated. The action required of the different contingent was neither detailed, nor overly complex, but it was likely to have been decided and communicated beforehand to the troops.<sup>152</sup>

Aristeus' plan failed. The Athenian *strategoí* outsmarted him, leaving some cavalry behind to hinder any more troops coming from Olynthus.<sup>153</sup> Furthermore, although the

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<sup>151</sup> Thuc. 1.62.3.

<sup>152</sup> On the manoeuvres as part of a battle plan explained before the fight, see Anderson (1965) 2; Lendon (2005) 81-83; Rawlings (2007) 90-91; Wheeler (2007) 215-219; Echeverría (2011) 45-47; *Tactics* 162-163.

<sup>153</sup> Thuc. 1.62.4. Westlake (1961) 278 remarks on how Thucydides emphasised: "[...] the foresight of opposing leaders in framing offensive or defensive strategy and their skill and determination in implementing their plans and frustrating those of the enemy".

selected troops deployed with Aristeus defeated the enemy in front of them, the other wing lost, leaving Aristeus and the soldiers under his direct command isolated.<sup>154</sup> Callias and his colleagues might have received some intelligence on Aristaeus' intentions. Still, it cannot be overlooked that they expected a similar plan from their enemies, implying that a comparable degree of planning was not uncommon.

Indeed, some Athenian *strategoï* showed a degree of tactical thinking not dissimilar to Aristaeus. The battle of Olpae (426 BC) is a perfect example. In his self-exile in Acarnania after a military debacle, Demosthenes accepted becoming the leader of an army of Acarnanians and Messenians directed against the people of Ambracia and their Spartan allies.<sup>155</sup> The two coalition armies met at Olpae, in Amphilochia, but for several days they limited themselves to studying each other. The irregular terrain between the two camps scared both armies enough that they were extremely cautious about waging battle.<sup>156</sup> After five days, the Spartan commander Eurylochos decided to take action. He deployed himself with the other Spartans on the left wing, probably with the intention to disrupt Demosthenes' sector as soon as possible.<sup>157</sup>

Eurylochos' tactics suit Konijnendijk's reconstruction well, but once we shift to Demosthenes the picture is more complicated. Demosthenes either noticed, was somehow informed, or even anticipated Eurylochos' thinking.<sup>158</sup> To counteract Eurylochos' plan,

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<sup>154</sup> Thuc. 1.63.1.

<sup>155</sup> Thuc. 3.105.3ff.

<sup>156</sup> Thuc. 3.107.3. Rees (2016) 9.

<sup>157</sup> Thuc. 3.107.3-4. Konijnendijk *Tactics* 162, 175-176 recognises Eurylochos' as one of the two standard tactics of Greek warfare. Barley (2012) 75 suggests that the objective was to kill the commander so to spread confusion.

<sup>158</sup> Rees (2016) 11-13 does not consider the eventuality that Demosthenes anticipated Eurylochos. He argues that the ambush was set to empower the outnumbered right wing of Demosthenes.

Demosthenes predisposed a contingent of 400 Acarnanians, who had been hiding in a ravine close by.<sup>159</sup> He gave them precise instructions to attack the Spartans from behind once they had engaged the Athenians. Demosthenes' plan was more sophisticated than Konijnendijk's general reconstruction admits: Demosthenes took advantage of the terrain to elaborate a unique battle plan, which perfectly suited the circumstances of that particular battle.

Demosthenes' tactics also weaken Lendon's argument that the majority Greek tactics hinge on the assumption that the enemy would have followed a canonical model of action.<sup>160</sup> Demosthenes correctly interpreted that Eurylochos would attack from the left, and not from the right as usual, and based his tactics on this uncanonical detail. The same could be said for Callias, who, as discussed above, completely anticipated and defused Aristeus' tactics.<sup>161</sup>

### **Deploying the army**

Once the plan was elaborated, the ancient commanders' next step was to deploy the army accordingly. In antiquity, deployment was considered the most essential duty of commanders, a notion that Xenophon agreed with despite its simplistic nature.<sup>162</sup> Orthodox scholars propose a standardised rectangular formation, with the best troops on the right wing, which at most varied only in the number of ranks of the phalanx.<sup>163</sup> The commander had the responsibility of deploying the soldiers in an orderly fashion, and this was the extent

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<sup>159</sup> Thuc. 3.107.3. Konijnendijk *Tactics* 156 is right in pointing out that Demosthenes likely selected the best the most suitable troops for this purpose.

<sup>160</sup> Lendon (2005) 83.

<sup>161</sup> Thuc. 1.62.4. Cf. n. 148.

<sup>162</sup> Xen. *Mem.* 3.1. Wheeler (2007) 214.

<sup>163</sup> See above, p. 173. On the variable depth, see Delbrück (1975) 53-54; Wheeler (2007) 306; (2011) 73; Matthew (2012) 176.

of his tactical contribution to the battle.<sup>164</sup> However, this reconstruction is extremely reductive, and does not account for the many examples of commanders deploying their armies with the best troops on the left or in the centre.<sup>165</sup> Konijnendijk compellingly recognises the army's deployment as an expression of the commander's agency, and the terrain as a fundamental variable in his choices.<sup>166</sup>

An example from the *Anabasis* demonstrates this correlation particularly well. To reach the Black Sea, the Ten Thousand had to defeat an army of Colchoi, deployed in a strong position on the side of a steep mountain. Initially, the Greeks thought about rushing ahead and trying their luck, but Xenophon came up with a better idea: to deploy the *lochoi* in distanced columns, with contingents of light infantry in between.<sup>167</sup> In this way, the surface exposed to the enemy's bolts was reduced, while avoiding the risks of being outflanked that would come from a deep formation.<sup>168</sup> Xenophon not only validates the supposition that terrain and battle circumstances influenced the formation, but that commanders discussed it, and could propose radical ideas in that sense.<sup>169</sup>

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<sup>164</sup> Cartledge (1977) 15-16; Hanson (1991) 4-5. See *Tactics* 107 for a summary of the bibliography on the issue.

<sup>165</sup> E.g. Thuc. 3.105, 107.4, 5.72.4; Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.12, 7.5.20-27. See Lazenby (1985) 26; Spence (1993) 107-110; *Tactics* 116-125. This feature has been noted and commented on especially in relation to the battle of Leuctra. Cf. Cawkwell (1972) 260-261; Holladay (1982) 96; Devine (1983) 205-210.

<sup>166</sup> *Tactics* 79, 86-91, 99-100, 123-130, 142-148. Cf. Echeverría (2011) 54.

<sup>167</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 4.8.9-13. Lee (2004) 290, (2010) 150 denies the value of the *lochoi* as tactical units, except in the Spartan Army. Cf. Nussbaum (1967) 33. Lee is right to be cautious, but passages like the one above clearly hint at least to semi-independent action. The commander could only brief the soldiers beforehand and give simple signals during the fight, allowing the *lochoi* to act semi-independently.

<sup>168</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 4.8.10-13. Hanson (1988) 192-193; Echeverría (2011) 57-58.

<sup>169</sup> Cf. Whitby (2004) 233, 237-238. Lee (2010) 141 points out the correlation between a fight and the topography of its location. His considerations stem from his analysis of urban warfare, but they could be reasonably applied to every type of warfare. *Tactics* 113-114.

The adaptation of the formation to the terrain is particularly evident for some examples of the 'deep phalanx'. Thucydides states that the Syracusans adopted a deep formation, blocking the Athenians' retreat to the Sicilian inland because of the narrow terrain.<sup>170</sup> Similarly, the pro-oligarch army deployed their soldiers in 50 ranks for their assault to the hill of Mounichia (403 BC), where the Athenian democratic partisans welcomed them with ten ranks of hoplites protecting the light infantry.<sup>171</sup> Houses surrounded the chosen battlefield; consequently the main road was probably the only space available to fight, and this could have conditioned the oligarchs' choice.<sup>172</sup> As we have seen above, the problem of a deep phalanx was the vulnerability of the flanks.

However, Konijnendijk warns against overemphasising the commanders' tactical options. He argues that the commanders only had a loose control of the amateur hoplites, so they could only rely on relatively small groups of more reliable troops, led mostly by the commanders themselves.<sup>173</sup> Konijnendijk's caution is commendable, but he seems overly critical of the ability of citizen-soldiers, who could be reasonably seasoned, and the risks that some commanders were willing to take.

Sphacteria is a perfect example. After the landing of the two contingents from Pylos, the Athenians rapidly took control of the first Spartan fort on Sphacteria by surprise.<sup>174</sup>

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<sup>170</sup> Thuc. 7.79.1.

<sup>171</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.11-12, 15. See Krentz (1995) *ad loc.* and Lee (2010) 153 on the unusually deep formation. Konijnendijk *Tactics* 86 n. 41 points out the strong position of the democrats. The oligarchs either felt the need to crush the opposition as soon as possible, or they felt confident that their numerical superiority was a sufficient advantage to counteract the democrats' position.

<sup>172</sup> Echeverría (2011) 57.

<sup>173</sup> *Tactics* 162-177.

<sup>174</sup> Thuc. 4.30-32.1.

Demosthenes divided his light infantry into groups of 200 men, with the idea of attacking the enemy not only from one side, but from many.<sup>175</sup> The peculiar circumstances of the terrain (Sphacteria was a wooded island, and an accidental fire burned part of the woods before the start of the battle),<sup>176</sup> and the situation (the Spartans did not have light infantry with them) could be exploited by smart commanders to their advantage. Demosthenes could not control these contingents,<sup>177</sup> which presumably operated semi-independently,<sup>178</sup> led by a sub-officer, as we have seen in Brasidas' sortie.<sup>179</sup>

Ten years after Sphacteria, Nicias and Lamachus tried to surprise the Syracusans with a peculiar formation in the first battle of the Sicilian campaign, fighting close to the Syracusan Olympieion.<sup>180</sup> The Athenians divided their army into two units. The first half was deployed in 12 ranks, but with the Athenians in the centre rather than on the right. Most importantly, the second half of the army was left behind, deployed in a *plaision*, to guard the supplies and the camp, but with the order to intervene when the battle was at its most crucial moment and the fight was harder. Unfortunately, Thucydides does not describe the

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<sup>175</sup> Thuc. 4.33.2-3. Konijnendijk *Tactics* 100 suggests that this kind of deployment was usual for light infantry. He is right, but the complexity achieved at Sphacteria is unmatched until Lechaeum (390 BC), hinting at a coherent plan.

<sup>176</sup> Lazenby (1985) 120. Wylie (1993) 24 suggests that the fire was not accidental. Demosthenes would have started it to remove any possible cover of the Spartans. See also Best (1969) 21-25; Roisman (1993) 38-41; Barley (2012) 99 n. 283; Rees (2016) 152.

<sup>177</sup> Wheeler (2007) 219. *Contra* Barley (2012) 99-100 argues that Demosthenes did not fight at Sphacteria himself, but coordinated the action of the different squads. This reading is not supported by Thucydides' account, and is hard to believe. The constant movement of the light infantrymen would have made communication close to impossible.

<sup>178</sup> See Sheldon (2012) 107, on ambushes and light infantry actions. Cartledge (1987) 224 underlines the independence of light infantry groups, while commenting on Iphicrates' success in the raid of Lecheum (390 BC). However, Cartledge presents it as an innovation, although Sphacteria is described in similar terms.

<sup>179</sup> On the semi-independence of officers, see *Tactics* 146-148.

<sup>180</sup> Thuc. 6.67-70, esp. 67.1. Konijnendijk *Tactics* 99 stresses how the terrain influenced the Athenian *strategoí* in their deployment of the light infantry, but he does not acknowledge the peculiar formation of the hoplites.

second contingent's engagement, so it is impossible to assess how much the plan contributed to the Argive and Athenian victory. Nonetheless, this deployment demonstrates the level of complexity that battle plans and formations could reach, even in an amateur army. Indeed, even if Thucydides openly acknowledges the greater experience of the Athenian coalition, it is beyond doubt that they were neither professional, nor ἐπίλεκτοι, nor even selected troops.<sup>181</sup> Evidently, their experience as soldiers in previous campaigns and marching with their actual comrades gave Athenian hoplites enough skill to perform simple manoeuvres.

Nicias and Lamachus adopted two fairly complex tactical features, even combining them. The first, the *πλαίσιον*, was a hollow square formation, with had at its centre either light infantrymen or vulnerable members of the army, such as the wagon transporting food or the slaves.<sup>182</sup> The *plaision* is mentioned several times, in different contexts.<sup>183</sup> The degree of coordination necessary for a similar formation seems quite high, but Thucydides mentions it twice in his account of the Sicilian campaign.<sup>184</sup>

The second notable feature is the function of the *plaision* in the battle of the Olympieion as a 'tactical reserve', which, in current tactical jargon, denotes a considerable degree of planning and tactical consideration.<sup>185</sup> Some men were left out of the first phase of

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<sup>181</sup> Cf. Thuc. 6.43 on the number of mercenaries in the expedition. Bettalli (2013) 61-62, 65.

<sup>182</sup> Hutchinson (2000) 44-45.

<sup>183</sup> Thuc. 4.125.2; Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.3; *Anab* 3.3.34-5, 4.19. See Whitby (2004) 230-231 on the necessity of discipline and a good leader to adopt this formation.

<sup>184</sup> Thuc. 6.67.1, 7.78.2. Konijnendijk *Tactics* 55-57 notes a difference between the two episodes, because the latter involved keeping the formation while marching. He argues that only at the end of the campaign were the Athenians able to do so. This confirms that the major difference between citizen-soldiers and mercenaries was actual experience. Some citizen-soldiers had extensive experience from previous campaigns.

<sup>185</sup> Hanson (2001) 6 denies the adoption of tactical reserves before the fourth century. For fourth century examples, see Anderson (1974) 208-209, 402-403 and Devine (1983) 208.

combat, so that they could intervene later on in the crucial moments of the fight, rested and energetic, to deliver the final blow to the enemy.

Echeverría and Konijnendijk recognise a good number of examples of tactical reserves, including instances of troops stationed as garrisons, or ambushing.<sup>186</sup> These instances share some aspects with tactical reserves, but the absence of references on the intentionality of the delay in action makes this association potentially problematic. An example from the *Anabasis* confirms that this idea was circulating at the end of the fifth century. While crossing Phrygia, Xenophon and the Ten Thousand find before them a Persian army deployed in a favourable position, dominating a narrow dale.<sup>187</sup> Xenophon, then, had a brilliant idea, which he proposed to the council of officers:

“Fellow *strategoi*, it seems to me [a good idea] to deploy behind (ἐπιτάξασθαι) the *phalanx*<sup>188</sup> some *lochoi* of reserve (λόχους φύλακας), so that, wherever there would be a need, they could be of help to the main contingent (ἐπιβοηθήσοντες τῇ φάλαγγι), and that the enemy, having lost his order, would attack troops well deployed and fresh (τεταγμένους καὶ ἀκεραίους).”<sup>189</sup>

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<sup>186</sup> Echeverría (2011) 67; *Tactics* 114, 135-136, 146-147, 162-164, 188-189. Wheeler (2020) 42 urges caution in identifying tactical reserves. See Devine (1983) esp. 207-208 who suggests that the Thebans' ἔμβολον at Leuktra (371 BC) involved a tactical reserve too. While the Sacred Band fought at the front, the sides of the wedge could intervene at the crucial moment. Cf. Cawkwell (1972) 261, who suggested something similar about the last lines of the Thebans. *Contra* Holladay (1982) 96, n.13; Hanson (1988) 196-197.

<sup>187</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 6.5.7-8.

<sup>188</sup> It should be noted that *phalanx*, in this case, also includes light infantrymen.

<sup>189</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 6.5.9. *Contra* Cawkwell (1972) 261 recognises the first application of tactical reserves at Leuctra, thus some 30 years later than Xenophon. Cf. Hanson (1988) 197-198.

This passage dismisses any eventual doubt. Xenophon shows a full understanding of the concept of tactical reserve.<sup>190</sup> He placed these contingents reasonably close to the primary formation, but his intent reveals the appreciation of these sophisticated battle tactics. Indeed, he describes the same feature in the battle of Thymbara, between Croesus and Cyrus the Elder, which could be recognised as a model of tactics and combat for the first half of the fourth century.<sup>191</sup>

We can, thus, conclude that army formations were strictly connected with battle plans. Fourth century sources are particularly emphatic on the analysis of the terrain and its exploitation, but the same scenario is well suited to fifth century scenarios too, which denotes a progressive development and awareness of existing tactical concepts.<sup>192</sup>

The battle of Marathon is an important piece of evidence in verifying the solidity of this statement. Several scholars recognise signs of tactical thinking and planning in the tradition of the battle, which relies mostly on Herodotus' account.<sup>193</sup> However, this battle soon became a pillar of Athenian democratic ideology, and it is extremely difficult to appreciate the degree to which Herodotus' account reflects the historical battle.<sup>194</sup> Even despite these objective problems with the available tradition, Herodotus' account is still of great interest, and deserves some discussion. If Herodotus ascribed tactical thinking to the

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<sup>190</sup> Whitby (2004) 240. Hutchinson (2000) 89 recognises this as an example of tactical reserve and ascribed the invention of this concept to Xenophon. However, he does not comment on the other examples. On Xenophon's tactical innovations, see Wood (1964) 39-40.

<sup>191</sup> Xen. *Cyr.* 6.3.20-4.18, esp. 3.24-26. Anderson (1970) 185-187; Hutchinson (2000) 212-213; Wheeler (2007) 219.

<sup>192</sup> E.g. Aen. *Tact.* 16.1-9; Xen. *Eq. Mag.* 4.13-14. Bettalli (1990) *ad.* 15.

<sup>193</sup> Evans (1993) 285-287; Krentz (2010) 143, 158-160. *Contra* Lazenby (1993) 250; *Tactics* 163.

<sup>194</sup> Bicknell (1970) 429-431; McCulloch (1982) 42, n.17; Evans (1993) 284-285, 303; Sekunda (2005) 10; Krentz (2010) 157-159; Sears (2013) 239; Nevin (2017) 56. Catenacci (2001) 117, more generally, points out how the exaltation of the Persian Wars started soon after the historical events. Proietti (2015a) convincingly argues that the tradition of Marathon was developed in the 470s.

battle of Marathon, this would suggest that tactics were already an important characteristic of warfare in Herodotus' time and that such features were considered old enough to be ascribed to the Persian Wars. In other words, it would date the introduction of tactics in Greek warfare to significantly earlier than the Peloponnesian War. In the pages following, the most important elements of Marathon's tradition will be briefly discussed to evaluate whether it is possible to talk of tactics in the early fifth century, focusing mostly on the battle formation.

Herodotus narrates that the Athenians waited for several days before attacking the Persians, an unheroic detail which makes Evans believe that the Athenians were waiting for the right moment.<sup>195</sup> Using information from the Suda,<sup>196</sup> Evans argues that Miltiades waited for the Persian cavalry to be far away, raiding Attica, to face 'just' the numerically superior Persian infantry.<sup>197</sup> Marathon was, indeed, a suitable territory for cavalry, and it was chosen precisely for that reason.<sup>198</sup> This hypothesis would explain the absence of Persian cavalry in Herodotus' account, although we should be cautious about using such late sources.

Moreover, few scholars have commented upon an essential detail of the Athenians' formation. Herodotus writes:

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<sup>195</sup> Hdt. 6.110. Krentz (2010) 142-143; Barley (2012) 143. Konijnendijk *Tactics* 81-91 points out compellingly how also in the fifth century the Greeks waited until they attained an advantage, or, at least, were not at a disadvantage.

<sup>196</sup> Suda *ad.* χωρίς Ιππέεις. Evans (1993) 293-299. On the absence of cavalry in Marathon, see Hammond (1968) 39-40, McCulloch (1982) 38-39, n. 9. *Contra* Krentz (2010) 139-142 who does not accept this tradition.

<sup>197</sup> Holliday (1987) 186 talks of 'protocol' as an explanation for the waiting, but there is no parallel to this alleged practice. Rees (2016) 195 proposes a different hypothesis. Miltiades would have waited few days to study the Persians' habits. He would have, then, attacked in the moment in which the Persian brought the horses away to drink, before deploying. See n. 22 for further bibliography.

<sup>198</sup> McCulloch (1982) 38.

To make the army the same in length to the Persians', the centre was a few lines deep in the weakest spot of the army (ταύτη ἦν ἀσθενέστατον τὸ στρατόπεδον). On the other hand, both the wings were strong in numbers [of soldiers] (ὁ δὲ κέρως ἐκάτερον ἔρωτο πλήθει).<sup>199</sup>

This formation is unparalleled in Greek history.<sup>200</sup> Krentz suggests that the Athenians adopted this formation to protect their flanks.<sup>201</sup> They stretched their line as much as possible so to avoid being outflanked. This hypothesis would explain why Herodotus stated that the Athenians matched the Persian formation in length, but it is odd that Miltiades weakened only the centre, and not the whole army more evenly.

A more suitable explanation can be found in another passage of Herodotus:

After having fought for a long time, the barbarians won in the centre (τὸ μὲν μέσον), where the Persians and Sacai were deployed; for they broke [the ranks of the Greeks], they were pursuing them to the interior [of Attica]. However, the Athenians and the Plataeans were winning on each wing (κέρως ἐκάτερον ἐνίκων). After they won, they let the barbarians run away (νικῶντες δὲ τὸ μὲν τετραμμένον τῶν βαρβάρων φεύγειν ἔων), and both wings, working together, fought in the centre against those who broke [the Athenian formation] (τοῖσι δὲ τὸ μέσον ῥήξασι αὐτῶν συναγαγόντες τὰ κέρως ἀμφοτέρω ἐμάχοντο), and the Athenians won.<sup>202</sup>

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<sup>199</sup> Hdt. 6.111.3.

<sup>200</sup> Konijnendijk *Tactics* 132 argues that this was due to the defeat of the Athenian centre. Such a formation was unbalanced and too dangerous to be repeated. Culham (1989) 196 remarks on the importance given to 'concentrating force on a key point'.

<sup>201</sup> Scott (2005) *ad.* 6.111.3; Sears (2013) 247. More generally about the importance of protecting the flanks of the phalanx, see Bagnall (2006) 57; Echeverría (2011) 56-58, 68, 75; *Tactics* 132-136.

<sup>202</sup> Hdt. 6.113

The Greek soldiers often made the mistake of pursuing the routing enemy too far, inhibiting their ability to help their comrades.<sup>203</sup> Herodotus denies this eventuality in Marathon. Indeed, there is the impression that all of these elements were part of a coherent battle plan. As soon as the Persian wings, which were tendentially the weakest part of the Persian army,<sup>204</sup> were routed, the Athenian wings stopped, re-formed their ranks, and attacked the enemy from the rear.<sup>205</sup> This hypothesis would explain the unusual formation too: the thicker wings had to pierce through the enemy counterpart, before hitting the real target.<sup>206</sup> The charge of the Athenians, which Herodotus claims to have been the first of its kind, could probably be explained as a way to minimise the effect of the Persian archers.<sup>207</sup>

Herodotus' account makes sense and implies an effective tactical plan, exploiting the knowledge of the Persians' military habits. Nothing too difficult was demanded from the Athenian hoplites and the proposed reconstruction would solve the considerable problem

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<sup>203</sup> Echeverría (2011) 72-73. Van Wees *Warfare* 191 recognises the pursuing of the enemy as a sign of low discipline. Cf. Dayton (2006) 71-76. On pursuing, see also Krentz (2002) 30-31; Schwartz (2009) 214-215; Echeverría (2011) 72-73; *Tactics* 187-191.

<sup>204</sup> Evans (1993) 285. On the Persian habit to deploy the best troops in the centre, see Xen. *Anab.* 1.8.22, Arr. *Anab.* 2.8.11, and Charles (2011) 126 n. 50. Sekunda (2005) 25 argues that Datis might have had some Persian *arstibara*, elite spearmen, but Charles (2011) 126 urges caution in this hypothesis.

<sup>205</sup> Krentz (2010) 158. Against this reconstruction, it could be argued that the battle of Coronea (394 BC), described as being different from any other (Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.16), involved the re-grouping and deployment of a second phalanx too. Nevertheless, this similarity is more formal than factual. Agesilaus explicitly refused to attack the Theban rear, preferring, instead, to re-group and attack 'honourably'. See above, p. 194. Furthermore, the second fight was not part of a conscious strategy, but occurred because of the defeat of the respective left wings of both armies. Finally, Xenophon's statement could be referring to the many peculiar characteristics of the battle, such as the approaching armies' silence (Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.17), or Agesialus' peculiar (lack) of tactical thinking. I thank Jason Crowley for raising this point.

<sup>206</sup> Brouwers (2013) 122 suggests a similar reading, although more simplified.

<sup>207</sup> Delbrück (1975) 79; Hanson (1989) 140; Sekunda (2005) 64-65; Barley (2012) 142-143; Sears (2013) 245-246. Konijnendijk *Tactics* 96-97 presents later *comparanda* (Xen. *Anab.* 1.8.18; Diod. 14.23.1; Polyæn. 2.2.3) reporting the same tactics against Persian archers. *Contra* Krentz (2010) 141-142, 152 argues that the run mostly prevented the action of the Persian cavalry. Proietti (2015a) 69-70 argues that the run was a symbol of the courage and proactivity of the Athenian hoplites, but Herodotus here is clearly writing about a tactical device.

of postulating an *anastrophe* performed by citizen-soldiers with limited experience. Even more importantly, this reading suggests that by Herodotus' times tactics were such an established element of warfare that they influenced the reception of Marathon at the very least, if not the battle itself. Formations were important also outside pitched battles. This is particularly true for troops' movements in hostile terrain. Ambushes and skirmishes were a substantial risk for Greek armies, and a good commander had to be ready for them. Moving rapidly and unnoticed was a perfect solution but, when it was impossible, the army had to march in formation.

As commented above, the *plaision* was adopted in these circumstances from the last quarter of the fifth century.<sup>208</sup> However, this formation took a lot of space, and was unsuited to rough terrain. In such a situation, Xenophon came up with a different tactical solution: he re-organised the army by leaving only six *lochoi* in the centre, while the two wings were ordered to march in columns and spread out only in case of attack.<sup>209</sup> Once again, the main pattern emerges clearly. Good commanders were supposed to adapt to the present circumstances and fourth century leaders, especially Xenophon, seemed particularly keen to develop a tactical solution which they were familiar with.

### **Executing the plan**

As we have seen, there is reason to believe that ancient Greek commanders, including those from Athens, carefully planned their fights, as much as it was possible. However,

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<sup>208</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 3.2.36. Hutchinson (2000) 63-64; Whitby (2004) 230-232. Cf. Thuc. 4.125.1, 7.78.2. The author of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia BNJ 66 F 7 15.1.2* criticised Agesilaus for not using the *plaision*.

<sup>209</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 3.4.21-23.

there is a considerable gap between thinking of a plan and executing it. In the most recent work on the issue, Konijnendijk amply discusses the limitations of the agency of ancient commanders: the soldiers' lack of discipline and training; the position of the commander in the front line; the lack of good means of communication; and the absence of a sufficient army hierarchy.<sup>210</sup> Konijnendijk concludes that these undeniable problems were so substantial that the commanders' tactical potential was severely limited. He believes that in the fifth century commanders already had a deep understanding of tactics, but they were only able to put into practice the most straightforward battle plans.<sup>211</sup>

To contrast to these limits, Konijnendijk recognises that the increasing usage of mercenaries and selected troops had an important role.<sup>212</sup> These more reliable troops granted the commanders higher chances of executing their plan correctly, when operating in small units led personally by the commander.<sup>213</sup> In this way, they had more control, because they could promptly communicate their orders even whilst in battle.

Konijnendijk's reconstruction is compelling. Undeniably, the problems he highlights were considerable, and had an impact on Greek tactics. Furthermore, his points about the preference for seasoned and proficient troops, satisfied in particular by mercenaries, makes perfect sense.<sup>214</sup> Nevertheless, there is the underlying impression that these undeniable limitations and the proficiency of mercenary troops are over-emphasised. In this next

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<sup>210</sup> Konijnendijk (2018). E.g. Discipline: 47-50, 144-146. Communication: 139-140. Training: 51-52, 70- 71, 141-142 214-217.

<sup>211</sup> *Tactics* 139-150, 163-177. Cf. Tritle (1988) 95.

<sup>212</sup> *Tactics* 44-50, 153-162, 172-176, 214-215. Cf. Bettalli (2013) 184.

<sup>213</sup> GSW 2.221-225; Lazenby (1985) 54-55; Hutchinson (2000) 100-101; *Warfare* 144-145; Hunt (2007) 144-145; Wheeler (2007) 220-221; Barley (2012) 91-114.

<sup>214</sup> *Tactics* 70-71, 143, 152, 214-217. Lendon (2005) 108; Wheeler (2007) 220.

section, the limits found by Konijnendijk in ancient tactics will be critically analysed to assess the extent to which they affected commanders' tactical options.

### *Discipline*

It is widely assumed that the Athenian troops had little discipline. Hornblower argues that seeing discipline as necessary in an army is a modern approach to warfare, which is not necessarily reflected in an ancient Greek context.<sup>215</sup> The democratic value of equality and associations of obedience with a servile status would have made the Athenians adverse to figures of authority.<sup>216</sup>

This assumption relies on surprisingly few passages, in which the ancient authors complain about the difficulty of managing Athenian troops. The most explicit passage is Thucydides' account of Nicias' letter to the Assembly.<sup>217</sup> Nicias enumerated many problems of the campaign, complaining particularly about the status of his crews, which he had to replenish with slaves. He then gave his strong opinion about the Athenians as a whole:

“This letter is addressed to people who are as well aware as I am that a crew is only at its peak for a short while (βραχεῖα ἀκμὴ πληρώματος), and that the key sailors are the few who know how to start a ship and keep the rowing together (ὀλίγοι τῶν ναυτῶν οἱ ἐξορμῶντές τε ναῦν καὶ ξυνέχοντες τὴν εἰρεσίαν). *However, your nature is harsh to command, and this is what hinders my command more than anything else* (τούτων δὲ πάντων ἀπορώτατον τό τε μὴ οἶόν τε εἶναι ταῦτα ἔμοι κωλύσαι τῷ στρατηγῷ (χαλεπαὶ γὰρ αἱ ὑμέτεραι φύσεις ἄρξαι). *Furthermore, we have no source of replacement crew to fill the*

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<sup>215</sup> Hornblower (2004) 243-244, 250. See also, more in general, Tritle (1988) 82-83; *Warfare* 110; Lendon (2005) 73; Eckstein (2005) 483-484; Chrissanthos (2013) 315-317.

<sup>216</sup> GSW 2.244; Strauss (1996) 319; *Generals* 62; *Warfare* 109-110; Lendon (2005) 76. This objection is directed particularly against physical punishments, which are widely recognised as non-existing out of Spartan contexts. Cf. Hornblower (2007) 35; *Psychology* 107. Pritchard (2007) 337-338 underlines how this is a widely assumed axiom, which is, though, contradicted by modern democracies.

<sup>217</sup> Thuc. 7.11-16, esp. 14.

ships, in contrast to the enemy's abundant supply." (trans. Hammond, my italics).<sup>218</sup>

Nicias' statement is quite vague, and should be contextualised. Nicias had previously sought to abort the Sicilian campaign, and he had expressed his wish to be recalled home in the same letter as well. That he was either exaggerating the situation, as he did in the second speech in Book Six, or excusing his poor leadership is plausible.

The second passage could help us to better understand Nicias' situation. In the *Memorabilia*, Xenophon records a dialogue between Socrates and Pericles the Younger, the son of the great statesman, about the status of the Athenian army. The insubordination of the soldiers comes up several times. Pericles is critical about the discipline of the *hoplites* and cavalrymen:

"When will they obey the commander in the same way [of the Spartans]? They take pride in looking down upon their leaders. (πότε δὲ οὕτω πείσονται τοῖς ἀρχουσιν, οἱ καὶ ἀγάλλονται ἐπὶ τῷ καταφρονεῖν τῶν ἀρχόντων)."

"This is wonderful, he said, that those men [the sailors] obey he who is in charge (πειθαρχεῖν τοῖς ἐφεστῶσι), but hoplites and cavalrymen, who seem to be distinguished for *kalokagathia* among the citizens (οἱ δοκοῦσι καλοκαγαθία προκεκρίσθαι τῶν πολιτῶν), are the least obedient (ἀπειθεστάτους) of all."

"But in the military matters (στρατιωτικοῖς), more than anything, it is necessary to show self-control (σωφρονεῖν), to be in good order (εὐτακτεῖν), and to obey (πειθαρχεῖν). And they did not pay attention to any of it (οὐδενὶ τούτων προσέχουσιν)".<sup>219</sup>

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<sup>218</sup> Thuc. 7.14.1-2.

<sup>219</sup> Xen. *Mem.* 3.5.16, 19, 21.

Pericles' statements confirm Nicias' judgement: the Athenians could be unruly and insubordinate. However, the passage does not stop here. Socrates replies to Pericles and presents a less grim picture. He argues that the Athenian sailors were a positive example of obedience, as well as, quite surprisingly, the Areopagus.<sup>220</sup> Most importantly, Socrates makes a substantial objection to Pericles' generalisation:

"Probably, [this is because] those who know less are in charge (ἴσως γάρ [...] ἐν τούτοις οἱ ἥκιστα ἐπιστάμενοι ἄρχουσιν αὐτῶν). Don't you see that no one tries to lead players of *kithara*, or choristers, or dancers without knowing how to do it (ἐπιχειρεῖ ἄρχειν μὴ ἐπιστάμενος)? And that they do the same with wrestlers, or fighters of *pancratium*? Their leaders can show their experience to the subordinates. The major part of the *strategoī* extemporises (τῶν δὲ στρατηγῶν οἱ πλεῖστοι αὐτοσχεδιάζουσιν)."<sup>221</sup>

In coherence with his theory of 'willing obedience', Xenophon recognises the soldiers' trust in their leader as the main source of discipline and obedience.<sup>222</sup> A competent commander could exercise greater control over the soldiers, and it was his responsibility to achieve their trust. The same idea is echoed in another passage of the *Memorabilia*. Enumerating the responsibilities of the *strategoī*, Socrates mentions the attainment of obedience as ἔργον of the commander, as well as of the landowner.<sup>223</sup>

This situation suits Nicias' leadership in Sicily. Thucydides and Plutarch describe Nicias as a decent man, but not as a great commander.<sup>224</sup> Admittedly, the challenges of such

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<sup>220</sup> Xen. *Mem.* 3.5.18, 20.

<sup>221</sup> Xen. *Mem.* 3.5.21. Cf. Plut. *Phoc.* 26.1, in which the Greeks' disobedience had been linked to the commanders, who were ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ νέους. *Contra* Konijnendijk *Tactics* 145 emphasises the insubordination *per se*.

<sup>222</sup> See Chapter Two 124-128.

<sup>223</sup> Xen. *Mem.* 3.4.8.

<sup>224</sup> E.g. Nevin (2017) 106.

large and complex expeditions were enormous and Nicias had been underlining them since the discussion of the campaign; this exceptional situation surely contributed to Nicias' mediocre leadership. Yet, it is evident that he was overly cautious, lacking in proactivity, and obsessed by his own accountability. This consideration does not aim to deny that the Athenians had a certain aversion to authority, but rather to remark how competent and respected *strategoí* could overcome this aversion through their personal authority.

Another aspect which should be noted is that, apart from these general remarks, the ancient sources report only a limited number of episodes of insubordination. Unsurprisingly, the most blatant example involves Nicias. During the Sicilian campaign, after a substantial naval defeat which topped months of failures, the troops refused Nicias' order to fight the Syracusans again.<sup>225</sup> However, rather than being an expression of the 'usual' Athenian attitude to power, this episode should be seen in relation to the emotional and psychological state of the Athenians. They had just lost a battle, after a long and mostly unsuccessful campaign. Modern studies demonstrate that there is a correlation between low morale and insubordination.<sup>226</sup> This data should be applied only tentatively to antiquity, but it is undeniable that Xenophon found a correlation between proficiency, obedience, and soldiers' emotional status, as we will discuss in the next Chapter.<sup>227</sup> Consequently, the emotional context of the soldiers on a specific occasion should be taken into consideration before making a general statement on Athenian discipline.<sup>228</sup>

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<sup>225</sup> Thuc. 7.72.3-4.

<sup>226</sup> Baynes (1967) 95; McGruck & Castro (2010) 173; Cohen (2015) 61-65.

<sup>227</sup> Cf. Chapter Four 247.

<sup>228</sup> Cf. Diod. 16.35.2, in which there is unrest and mutiny amongst Philip II's troops after Onomachus' victory over their leader.

In two instances, the soldiers exercised pressure over their commander to attack the enemy. Cleon led an army against Amphipolis in 422 BC. While idly waiting for Brasidas to engage in battle, Cleon was obliged by his own men to retreat. Thucydides writes:

But Cleon remained quiet for a while, and then was compelled to do what Brasidas was expecting. For the soldiers were impatient at sitting there (ἀχθομένων μὲν τῇ ἔδρᾳ), reckoning up his leadership and contrasting the experience (ἐμπειρίαν) and daring (τόλμαν) on the other side with the *absence of skill* (ἀνεπιστημοσύνης) and cowardice (μαλακίας) on his, and how they had been reluctant to come from home with him. Cleon discovered their grumbling (αἰσθόμενος τὸν θροῦν) and because they weighed down by sitting one place, despite his unwillingness he took them and led them forth. (trans. Rhodes, my italics).<sup>229</sup>

The picture described by Thucydides fits perfectly with Xenophon's statements. Cleon felt compelled to take action to avoid a mutiny triggered by the dissatisfaction of the soldiers under him with his leadership and offered his flank – literally – to Brasidas.<sup>230</sup> The second instance is similar: at Mantinea (418 BC), the commanders of the anti-Spartan coalition deployed the army on the plain after the grumbling of the soldiers.<sup>231</sup> Unfortunately, we do not have as much detail as we do about Cleon's demise. Nevertheless, it could be hypothesised that the *strategoí* felt to be in a similarly weak position and complied to the soldiers' pressure for this reason.

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<sup>229</sup> Thuc. 5.7.1-2. Rhodes (1998) *ad loc.* comments on how Thucydides' judgement of Cleon is probably exaggeratedly harsh. Cf. *HCT ad loc.*

<sup>230</sup> *HCT ad.* 5.7.2; Rees (2016) 37. Hamel *Generals* 70-73, 119-120 argues that Cleon was concerned with being held accountable.

<sup>231</sup> Thuc. 5.65.5. Rees (2016) 48. Eckstein (2005) 483-484 suggests that the army could act as an assembly, thus issuing orders to the commanders. This reading is incorrect, as demonstrated by the examples below.

Stronger *strategoï*, if the circumstances allowed it, could exercise greater control over their men. During the siege of Sestos (479/78 BC), the Athenians explicitly asked the *strategoï* to go home, and the commanders flatly refused.<sup>232</sup> Even a notoriously weak commander like Nicias had this authority. After the failure of the nocturnal attack on Epipole, Demosthenes and Eurymedon advocated a retreat from Syracuse.<sup>233</sup> Thucydides reports that the Athenian soldiers shared the same desire: to go home. Nicias, the same Nicias who complained about the unruliness of his soldiers, simply refused this option, with his famous statement about needing the Assembly's permission, which we have already discussed.<sup>234</sup>

The Athenian *ethos* incentivised obedience to institutional power. Several scholars have noted how personal honour and a patriotic sense of duty motivated the soldiers to fight for their *polis*.<sup>235</sup> Something similar probably existed regarding the obedience to their commanders too.<sup>236</sup> There are several passages attesting how commanders demanded obedience, and how this was considered normal. In the *Ajax*, Sophocles has his main character declare, meekly, before his suicide:

For the rest of my life, I will know better to yield (εἶκειν) to the gods, and I will learn to honour (σέβειν) the Atreids. They are the commanders, so it is necessary to yield to them (ἄρχοντές εἰσιν, ὥσθ' ὑπεικτέον).<sup>237</sup>

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<sup>232</sup> Hdt. 9.117.

<sup>233</sup> Thuc. 7.47-48.

<sup>234</sup> Cf. Chapter One 50-52.

<sup>235</sup> Sinclair (1988) 55; Hanson (1989) 80; Lazenby (1991) 105; *Warfare* 108, 162-164; Hunt (2007) 132; Wheeler (2007) 213; Lee (2010) 150; *Psychology* 109-112. Spence (1993) 67-68 argues that the *esprit de corps* of the Athenian horsemen prevented them from being insubordinate. Nonetheless, a line has to be drawn between the urge to protect and fight for the comrades, and the obedience to the commanders. Hornblower *Commentary ad.* 1.85.2 convincingly relate courage to discipline/moderation, individuating the role of *aidos* as a medium between the two poles.

<sup>236</sup> Siewert (1977).

<sup>237</sup> Soph. *Aj.* 666-669. At the beginning of the play (Soph. *Aj.* 166-177, 1243), Ajax acts as an independent warrior who refuses to obey his superiors. Cf. Boëldieu-Trevet (2007) 100-101; Finglass (2011) 58. The choice of ending

Scholarship believes that the main point of the *Ajax* is the conflict between the heroic model of conduct, fixed and endorsed by epic, and the social expectations of the *polis*, which could be ungrateful to its 'heroes'.<sup>238</sup> Ajax has to bend to social conventions, which included obeying the lesser men in charge. This point is re-affirmed vehemently by Menelaus, one of the leaders, later on: he who does not obey is an evil man and the decree of the commander should be unquestioned.<sup>239</sup>

Sophocles may have made a similar point in the *Antigone*: leaders are not always good men, but they demand obedience nonetheless.<sup>240</sup> In his speech in the third episode, Creon warns his son Haemon of the risks of anarchy, referring to the military sphere.<sup>241</sup>

How much tragedy, a genre of fiction based on myth, reflected contemporary society is extremely controversial.<sup>242</sup> Fortunately, in this case, we can confirm the same ideal in historical contexts too. Aside from the controversial Oath of Plataea,<sup>243</sup> which is probably a later fabrication, a passage of Lysias attests how the soldiers were compelled to obey their commander.<sup>244</sup> Describing the contempt that the Athenians at Phyle felt for Agoratus, who

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his life must be linked to Ajax's humiliation, but also to his realisation that he could not escape the social hierarchy. Cf. Zanker (1992) 22-24; Lawrence (2005), 26-27.

<sup>238</sup> Lawrence (2005) 20-27; Zanker (1992) 21-24.

<sup>239</sup> Soph. *Aj.* 1047-1050, 1071-1072. Finglass (2011) 43, 442 makes two interesting observations. First, that Ajax's disobedience is criticised in the play. Secondly, that Menelaus was a caricature of a Spartan leader. The second point is less convincing than the first. Menelaus is king of Sparta, but the references to Sparta in the play are neglectable.

<sup>240</sup> Siewert (1977) 103-104, 106. Plescia (1976) 136 recognises this statement as the central theme of the *Antigone*.

<sup>241</sup> Soph. *Ant.* 672-676. Konijnendijk *Tactics* 48 accepts this passage as reflecting fifth century society.

<sup>242</sup> The scholarship is divided on this matter. Easterling (1984) 39-41 and Hesk (2000) 82 recognise in tragedy references to contemporary society, while Holt (1999) 689-690 stress the setting as separated from the contemporaneity. Cf. the middle position of Griffith (1999) 21-22 and Ober & Strauss (1990) 248, n. 30

<sup>243</sup> O&R 88; Fornara (1977) 57.

<sup>244</sup> Konijnendijk *Tactics* 49 argues that a passage of Plato (*Leg.* 942a-945b) should be interpreted as a 'rant', thus denoting the unbearable lack of discipline of the Athenians. However, the passage, which describes the ideal military organisation, clearly mixes elements of the contemporary Athenian army (e.g. prizes and

acted as sycophant for the Thirty Tyrants, Lysias reported that only Anytus' order hindered the soldiers from lynching Agoratus.<sup>245</sup> Lysias concludes by summarising that:

By saying this, Anytus was responsible for the defendant's escape at Phyle, for they had to listen to a man who held the generalship ἀνάγκη δὲ ἦν στρατηγοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀκροᾶσθαι), if they wanted to *be safe* (εἶπερ ἔμελλον σωθήσεσθαι) (Trans. Todd, my italics).<sup>246</sup>

Lysias presents obedience to the commander as a duty of Athenian citizens, possibly referring to the trope of the *strategos* as a bringer of safety.<sup>247</sup> Yet, a darker reading cannot be excluded; Lysias might be referring to the punitive powers of the *strategoι*.

The *Constitution of the Athenians* records that the *strategoι* had power to punish misbehaving soldiers with fines, imprisonment, or dismissing the soldier from the army.<sup>248</sup> Furthermore, the *strategoι* were also involved in the trials related to military service. Athenian law prosecuted three major offences related to the army: ἀστρατεία (refusal to answer the mustering), λιποταξία (abandoning the army), and δειλία (cowardice).<sup>249</sup> The *strategoι* could charge any soldiers and chaired the jury of comrades who judicated the cases.<sup>250</sup>

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punishments. Cf. Aeschin. 3.187) with more theoretical elements. Consequently, to argue that the picture of discipline advocated by Plato is totally different from historical Athens seems arbitrary. Plausibly, Plato advocates for an improvement, but it is difficult to assess how far he goes from contemporary Athens.

<sup>245</sup> Lys. 13.78-79.

<sup>246</sup> Lys. 13.79.

<sup>247</sup> Cf. Chapter Two 98-102.

<sup>248</sup> [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 61.2. MacDowell (1994) 156.

<sup>249</sup> GSW 2.233; *Psychology* 106, with various examples.

<sup>250</sup> Lys. 15.1. GSW 2.234; *Generals* 60-62; Eckstein (2005) 483-484; Lendon (2005) 77. On the legal deterrent, see Lys. 14.14-15; Aeschin. 3.175.

A passage of the *Hellenica* offers a detailed example of how a *strategos* could use this power. Having control of a fleet and an army to send to Corcyra (372 BC), Iphicrates was extremely clear with the *trierarchoi* before the first battle:

He also selected (προσέταξεν) twenty of the trierarchs who were to follow him when the herald made the appropriate announcement (οὐς δεήσοι, ἐπεὶ κηρύξειεν, ἀκολουθεῖν). He warned them that anyone who failed to follow him must not find fault with the punishment that would be inflicted upon him (εἰ δέ τις μὴ ἀκολουθήσοι, προεῖπε μὴ μέμψεσθαι τὴν δίκην). (trans. Marincola).<sup>251</sup>

Iphicrates threatened to bring the *trierarchoi* to trial if they did not follow his orders.<sup>252</sup>

Reporting the episode, Xenophon does not seem to find anything wrong with this behaviour. Indeed, he praises Iphicrates for how he handled the troops in the Corcyra campaign, making special mention of the emphasis Iphicrates placed on training and troop management.<sup>253</sup>

Iphicrates' behaviour suggests that *strategoí* could rely on their limited powers, or even just the threat of using them, to enforce their orders. Yet, several scholars doubt that the *strategoí* relied very much on these enforcing powers.<sup>254</sup> Van Wees argues that Demosthenes' *Against Conon* demonstrates the passivity of the Athenian *strategoí*.<sup>255</sup> Being unlucky enough to have his tent located near that of Conon's sons, the speaker reports the abuse that this unruly inflicted on the speaker's and his friends' slaves.<sup>256</sup> The *strategos* was

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<sup>251</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.33–34. Pritchett GSW 2.242 finds some irony in the passage, but it is honestly hard to see.

<sup>252</sup> Δίκη could also imply a more general punishment. This reading cannot be totally excluded, but a trial suits the rest of the available evidence better.

<sup>253</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.28–30. Lengauer (1979) 113; Pritchett (1994b) 123. It should be stressed that Xenophon (*Mem.* 3.4.8), while describing the duties of the *strategos*, acknowledged the administration of punishment too.

<sup>254</sup> *Generals* 59, 61; Nevin (2017) 15.

<sup>255</sup> *Warfare* 110. More in general, see MacDowell (1978) 161.

<sup>256</sup> Dem. 54.4–5.

called to stop the nonsense, and also intervened with the *taxiarchos* to subdue the subsequent brawl. Van Wees notes that no punishment is recorded and concludes that the Athenian *strategoí* were too concerned about the troops and their accountability to use their limited powers to impose discipline.

However, one wonders whether this reading of the passage is too literal. Demosthenes does not mention a punishment, but this does not mean that one was not exacted. The whole point was to demonstrate the grudge that Conon and his sons had against the plaintiff, a scenario which would be better justified if the *strategos'* actions had consequences.

Alternatively, the *strategos* of *Against Conon* might have been particularly concerned with his accountability, but this does not mean that every *strategos* felt the same.<sup>257</sup> Like the aforementioned Iphicrates, there are examples of *strategoí* using their powers. The speaker of Ps.Lysias' *For the Soldier* was incarcerated and fined;<sup>258</sup> Apollodorus feared being incarcerated too;<sup>259</sup> Simon was sent away from the army, a risible punishment by today's standards, but likely a severe blow to Simon's manliness and civic honour.<sup>260</sup> Admittedly, the examples of disciplinary measures are only few, but this could be due to the relative frequency of these cases. The ancient authors tended to skip details well known to their original audience, unless they were useful for their agenda.<sup>261</sup> It should be noted that not

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<sup>257</sup> See Chapter One, 51-53.

<sup>258</sup> [Lys.] 9.5-10.

<sup>259</sup> [Dem.] 50.51.

<sup>260</sup> Lys. 3.45. *Warfare* 109.

<sup>261</sup> E.g. Lazenby (1985) 5; Worley (1994) 86; *Warfare* 152; Whitby (2007) 65. Cf. GSW 2.243 n. 50 on the lack of references to disciplinary measures in Caesar's *De Bello Gallico*, despite being common in the Roman army.

once do the sources manifest surprise at these measures or their application. We know that fines were quite rare, and yet we have two explicit instances of this practice; this brings us to ask, how frequent were other measures?

Lastly, a few words should be spent on the *strategoi*'s power to kill the soldiers under his command. There are four passages which refer to this prerogative, but there is reason to dismiss all of them. Three of the passages depict a *strategos* killing or threatening to kill non-citizens. Lysias reports that Lamachus had Agoratus' brother cudgelled to death because he was caught signalling to the enemy,<sup>262</sup> but Agoratus was born a slave and thus his brother was plausibly not a citizen when he died.<sup>263</sup> Before the battle of Cyzycus, Alcibiades threatened the sailors in the harbour of Proconnesus that he would kill whoever attempted to reach the Spartans, spoiling the planned surprise attack.<sup>264</sup> Xenophon does not specify whether the Athenian sailors were included in the threat, however, he neatly divides the threat from the pre-battle speech, which is stated to have been delivered in front of the Athenians the section before,<sup>265</sup> which is also marked by the different verbal tenses.<sup>266</sup> Consequently, it seems reasonable to recognise the threat as being directed at the non-Athenians present in Proconnesus.<sup>267</sup> Lastly, Frontinus reports that Iphicrates killed a sentry

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<sup>262</sup> Lys. 13.67. Cf. MacDowell (1978) 160. *Generals* 60-62; Hornblower (2007) 34 stresses that this was a measure only administered in the case of deserters.

<sup>263</sup> Todd (2010) 609 n. 6; *Psychology* 106 nn. 12, 13.

<sup>264</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.15.

<sup>265</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.14.

<sup>266</sup> I thank Jason Crowley for this argument, and their feedback for this whole section. Cf. also Todd (2010) 609 n. 6.

<sup>267</sup> *Contra GSW* 2.240, Krentz (1989) *ad* 1.1.15; *Generals* 60.

who he had found sleeping during the Corinthian War, when he was the commander of a group of mercenaries.<sup>268</sup>

Only the last example involves Athenian citizens, but its reliability is very debatable; the source, Polyaeus, is late and often imprecise. Polyaeus claims that Alcibiades would have threatened all the sentries who did not respond to his fire signal overnight with death.<sup>269</sup> However, the episode took place during the Spartan siege of Athens, thus when Alcibiades was already in self-exile. Either Polyaeus misinterpreted his source, mistaking the defence against the raids from Decelea for a proper siege, or the episode is false. In both cases, we cannot rely on this passage alone to prove the *strategoí*'s power to kill a citizen. Consequently, it is reasonable to conclude that the *strategoí* did not have such power, as suggested by the *Constitution of the Athenians*.<sup>270</sup>

Athenian discipline was admittedly loose compared to modern standards, but both fifth and fourth century *strategoí* had some formal and informal power over their men. As institutional figures, they had the legal power to issue orders and expect to see them executed. More realistically, only the most respected and strongest leaders had some control over their troops,<sup>271</sup> but the sources tell us that it was possible, and that some commanders imposed their authority more proactively too. It could even be argued that wilful leaders were the only ones confident enough to use these methods on the soldiers assigned to them, without thinking too much about the possible legal consequences in the accountability

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<sup>268</sup> Front. *Str.* 3.12.2.

<sup>269</sup> Polyaeus. 1.40.3. See also Front. 3.12.1.

<sup>270</sup> MacDowell (1978) 160-161. Pritchett GSW 2.238 and, more cautiously, Hornblower (2004) 255; (2007) 34-35 recognise this discrepancy as a reduction of the *strategoí*'s powers.

<sup>271</sup> *Tactics* 218, stressing mostly the 'inspiration' of an influential leader.

process. It is widely accepted that Athenian officers feared the soldiers under them because of the upcoming *euthuna* and re-election.<sup>272</sup> However, as discussed in Chapter One, the effects of the accountability threat on a commander's action depended on how much the commander himself feared it. Some *strategoï* surely preferred a light touch, but not necessarily did they all behave in the same way.

Consequently, it seems reasonable to argue that discipline only partially limited the tactical options of a commander. Inevitably, a commander would trust some troops more or less in different contexts, but there is reason enough to believe that, when he issued an order, he expected to be obeyed. Insubordination seems more the exception than the rule.

#### *The commander as a fighter*

Military historians underline the role of the military leader as a fighter above any other function on the battlefield. Once they had deployed their armies, the commanders took their place in the phalanx and fought as hoplites.<sup>273</sup> A substantial number of references to military leaders getting injured<sup>274</sup> or killed in action<sup>275</sup> has made some scholars suppose that military leaders fought in the first line.<sup>276</sup> The reasoning behind this is quite

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<sup>272</sup> GSW 2.243; Tritle (1988) 82; *Generals* 60-62; Hornblower (2004).

<sup>273</sup> E.g. Adcock (1957) 6-7; Cawkwell (1972) 261; Cartledge (1977) 15-16; Hanson (1989) 107-111; Pritchett (1994b) 111, 130-131; Wheeler (1991) 121-123; (2007) 217; Sidebottom (2004) 106; Schwartz (2009) 180-181; Echeverría (2011) 46; Mann (2013) 8; *Tactics* 142.

<sup>274</sup> E.g. Thuc. 4.12.1, 5.10.8; Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.20, 7.4.24-25. Curiously, all these examples involve Spartan commanders.

<sup>275</sup> IG I<sup>3</sup> 1147, 1162 = O&R 109, 129; Hdt. 6.114.1; Thuc. 1.63.3, 6.101.6-102.1; Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.38-39, 5.3.6, 4.41 6.4.13, 7.5.25. See Pritchett (1994b) 128-132 and Schwartz (2009) 181-182 for a useful collection of these occurrences. On the frequency, see also Wheeler (1991) 124, 146-147; Debidour (2002) 44; *Tactics* 143-144.

<sup>276</sup> GSW 2.206; (1994b) 130-131; Hanson (1989) 107-108, 111-114; Lee (2004) 311-312; Boëldieu-Trevet (2007) 112-113; Schwartz (2009) 180-183; *Tactics* 142-143. Cf. Lengauer (1979) 152, Pritchett (1994b) 113, Brouwers (2013) 118 on the participation of the commander to the fight. Sidebottom (2004) 106-107 recognises the position of the commander in the front line as a demonstration of the lack of tactics in Greek warfare. Cf. *Tactics* 142.

straightforward; in this way, the commander would have set an example for the troops and had more control over the vector of the assault.

Undeniably, the commander was supposed to fight alongside the soldiers.<sup>277</sup> In the *Anabasis*, when replying to Seuthes' question on why he had dismounted his horse, the *strategos* Xenophon said:

“The hoplites will run faster and more willingly, if I lead them as an infantryman (οἱ δὲ ὀπλίται θᾶπτον δραμοῦνται καὶ ἥδιον, ἐὰν καὶ ἐγὼ πεζὸς ἡγῶμαι).”<sup>278</sup>

Xenophon frames the question in terms of morale rather than tactical necessity.<sup>279</sup> Indeed, Seuthes' curiosity implies that the commanders did not always deploy themselves in the first line, although at times they chose to do so.

Indeed, the *strategos'* position in the front line is not as well attested as one may think from the wide scholarly support of this stance.<sup>280</sup> There is no causal link between the death of the commander and his position in battle, nor should we conclude that only the first ranks suffered casualties. As Barley compelling points out, the relatively frequent mentions of dead commanders offer a distorted picture of this phenomenon.<sup>281</sup> Most of the time, we

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<sup>277</sup> Hanson (1989) 110-112; Lee (2004) 311-312; Hutchinson (2000) 180; Boëldieu-Trevet (2007) 112-113. *Contra* Pritchett (1994b) 113-115.

<sup>278</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 7.3.45.

<sup>279</sup> Pritchett (1994b) 114; Wheeler (2007) 217. Cf. Chapter Four 261 for further discussion.

<sup>280</sup> Brouwers (2013) 118. Wheeler (1991) 147-148 points out how the commander could deploy himself in different positions, as well as that, from the early fourth century, it is not clear whether the leader fought with the soldiers. Barley (2012) 57-66, 72 argues that there are some references to commanders fighting in the first line, although infrequent (Hdt. 6.111; Thuc. 3.107, Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.30, 4.2.18-19, 4.3.16, 6.4.13, Plut. *Pel.* 23). However, these passages do not specify the position of the commander; they only say that he led a sector of the army, leaving space for interpretation.

<sup>281</sup> Barley (2012) 62-69. *Contra* Pritchett (1994b) 133-134, 138-141.

neither know where the commander fought, nor how many infantrymen died in the same battle. Moreover, Barley also underlines that most commanders died when their army lost, suggesting a correlation between routing and the commander's death.<sup>282</sup>

Furthermore, the examples of commanders leading the main assault, also in victorious action, do not demonstrate that they were in the first line either. Konijnendijk stresses how the Spartan officers were deployed in the first line to lead and guide the movements of the army.<sup>283</sup> Each of the Spartan soldiers just had to follow whoever was in front of him, who presumably was following the officer. However, if this is true for the sub-officers of the Spartan army, it does not seem necessarily the case for the chief commander, especially if he was a king. Konijnendijk also acknowledges that bodyguards surrounded Agis at Mantinea (418 BC) and Cleombrotus at Leuctra (371 BC), and it is unlikely that they fought in the first line.<sup>284</sup> It is worth remembering that Cleombrotus died at Leuctra too. Wheeler compellingly argues that the examples of commanders sending orders during battle suggest that not every commander deployed himself in the first line; some chose to do so in hope of attaining glory, but this was an individual choice and not an unwritten rule.<sup>285</sup>

Even if the commander was not in the front line, he did not have access to a complete picture of the fight.<sup>286</sup> This considerable limit was never overcome in Classical Greece. In the

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<sup>282</sup> Cf. Wheeler (1991) 147-151, who underlines how commanders mostly died either pursuing the enemy, or when they lost the battle.

<sup>283</sup> *Tactics* 46. Cf. Xen. *Lac. Pol.* 11.4-6.

<sup>284</sup> *Tactics* 143. Cf. Wheeler (1991) 148-150. Barley (2012) 58 proposes a similar argument for Cleon too, during the fight in front of Amphipolis.

<sup>285</sup> Wheeler (1991) 138-151.

<sup>286</sup> E.g. Thuc. 1.50.1-2, 3.108.3, 7.44.1, 8.105.2. *Tactics* 142.

fictional *Cyropaedia*, Xenophon arrives close by theorising the separation of the commander from the soldiers. In the battle of Thymbara, Xenophon places Cyrus on a tower, from where he had a good vision of the battlefield.<sup>287</sup> Nevertheless, there is not a similar example in a real-life context.<sup>288</sup>

### *Communication*

During battle, the commander is assumed to have only been able to communicate with the soldiers around him.<sup>289</sup> This hypothesis has some logic, but it is contradicted by at least two fifth century episodes. The first battle of Mantinea (418 BC) demonstrates how some military leaders could issue orders even during a battle.<sup>290</sup> When he noticed that the enemy was threatening to outflank his left wing, Agis commanded the Sciritae and the Braseidoi, on the far left, to move to their left to be in line with the Mantineans in front of them.<sup>291</sup> Similarly, he ordered the *polemarchoi* Aristocles and Hipponidas to move into the gap created by the movement of the Sciritae.<sup>292</sup> All of this was presumably done while the two opposing phalanxes were getting closer. As Barley points out, Agis was also informed

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<sup>287</sup> Xen. *Cyr.* 7.1.39. On the *Cyropaedia* as an ideal of good leadership, see Newell (1988) 111; Hutchinson (2000) 37; Nicolai (2016) 83; Buxton (2017) 325-326. Cf. Christesen (2006) 48-50, who believes the novel was a proposal to reform the Spartan state.

<sup>288</sup> Pritchett (1994b) 111 finds a parallel only in Hellenistic warfare.

<sup>289</sup> Rawlings (2007) 91; *Tactics* 150.

<sup>290</sup> Barley (2012) 43-45.

<sup>291</sup> Thuc. 5.71.3.

<sup>292</sup> Thuc. 5.72.3. Tritle (2010) 125 n.38 suggests that Aristocles and Hipponidas were scapegoats for Agis' lack of tactical skill, and that there might have been a political motive for attacking Aristocles, who was perhaps the brother of the other king Pleistoanax.

– or noticed – that his orders were not being followed, and was able to issue new orders to reduce the disadvantage.<sup>293</sup>

A second example demonstrates that non-Spartan armies could achieve similar results, although probably with more difficulty. During the battle of Delium (424 BC), the Theban *beotarchos* Pagondas was also able to send his cavalry to save his left wing.<sup>294</sup> When he comments on the battle, Barley argues that a commander could abandon the front of the phalanx to send messages and evaluate the situation, but this scenario seems unlikely.<sup>295</sup> Seeing the commander going away could easily be interpreted as him fleeing, thus creating panic.<sup>296</sup>

These passages demonstrate that a commander could send orders during battle, although with some difficulty.<sup>297</sup> Konijnendijk is not wrong in underlining that commanders exercise greater control over the soldiers deployed around them, but these examples demonstrate that communication with other sectors of the army was possible.<sup>298</sup>

Indeed, we also have some information on how these orders were conveyed. The ancient manuals of tactics report three means of communication in military contexts: verbal, visual, and aural, and all these are attested in the fifth century too.<sup>299</sup> The most basic form of

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<sup>293</sup> Thuc. 5.72. Barley (2012) 46. Barley also suggests that Agis' order was given too late to be executed. This reading depends much on the position of the *polemarchoi*, which is not known. However, it is telling that the Sciritae and the Braseidoi had time to execute Agis' first order.

<sup>294</sup> Pritchett (1994b) 116-117 argues that Pagondas gave a pre-arranged signal from the first line. However, Barley's interpretation suits Thucydides' account better. Rees (2016) 23 notes the importance of Pagondas' order, but he does not say anything about the means of transmitting this order.

<sup>295</sup> Barley (2012) 42-43.

<sup>296</sup> Cf. Polyb. 29.17, 3-4, 18, in which the Macedonia king Perseus is criticised for abandoning the army to its destiny to 'sacrifice to Heracles', when Perseus was most likely just running away.

<sup>297</sup> Anderson (1970) 71-83. On Aeneas' special interest in the matter, see Bettalli (2018) 173-175.

<sup>298</sup> *Tactics* 150.

<sup>299</sup> Asclep. 12.10; Arr. *Tact.* 27; Ael. *Tact.* 35.2. Krentz (1991) 110; Pritchett (1994b) 124.

order transmission, by word of mouth or through a messenger, was the preferred choice for Xenophon.<sup>300</sup> In the *Cavalry Commander*, Xenophon explains that orders via voice are the clearest, but the most likely to be overheard by the enemy.<sup>301</sup> Addressing the matter some six centuries later, Arrian concurs with Xenophon that orders via voice are more transparent, but are less easily heard in battle.<sup>302</sup>

A passage of the *Cyropaedia* gives us some insight into how this could have worked. Xenophon describes Cyrus deployed with his infantrymen. During the initial charge, Cyrus shouted some words of encouragement, which the men around him promptly repeated to their comrades.<sup>303</sup> If the encouragements could be conveyed in this way, simple orders might have also followed the same route.<sup>304</sup> Orders were conveyed in the Spartan army through this system, through one officer to another.<sup>305</sup>

Another possible solution was using messengers.<sup>306</sup> The sources report several instances in which great armies, formed by different contingents, communicated via messengers.<sup>307</sup> During Masistius' assault, before the battle of Plataea (479 BC), Herodotus stated that the Megarians sent word to their allies to ask them for their help in repelling

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<sup>300</sup> Anderson (1965) 2; (1970) 70-73.

<sup>301</sup> Xen. *Eq. Mag.* 4.9; *Cyr.* 5.3.54. Hutchinson (2000) 193.

<sup>302</sup> Arr. *Tact.* 27. Hewitt (1919) 243 correctly points out the delay between the order and its reception and execution. Cf. *Tactics* 140, who mentions that a developed hierarchy was anyway necessary for the transmission of orders (cf. Onas. 25.1-2), and that the *lochoi* were too big for this purpose.

<sup>303</sup> Xen. *Cyr.* 3.3.62-63. Cf. Polyæn. 2.3.2, 4.3.8.

<sup>304</sup> Barley (2012) 51-52.

<sup>305</sup> Thuc. 5.66.3-4; Xen. *Lac. Pol.* 13.8-9. *Tactics* 148 argues that effective communication in battle was a characteristic belonging only to the Spartan army. Barley (2012) 51-2 takes the death of Epameinondas at Mantinea (362 BC) as proof of the rapidity with which information could circulate in the army. This example should be treated carefully. There is a substantial difference between a direct order and shocking news such as 'the commander is dead!'

<sup>306</sup> Barley (2012) 41.

<sup>307</sup> Hdt. 9.21; Xen. *Anab.* 1.8.12.

Masistius' assault, in a skirmish before the main battle.<sup>308</sup> Barley suggests that at Delium Pagondas used a system of messengers to convey his orders to the cavalrymen.<sup>309</sup> Cyrus sent orders to Clearchus through a herald, but Clearchus was able to send his reply with the same means.<sup>310</sup>

Visual signals could be used in battle too. We have already encountered an example of a banner used as a signal in the episode of Aristeus at Potidaea. Again, the signal was contextual to the commander's plan. A banner communicated to the troops in Olynthus when to attack and, once removed, when to retreat.<sup>311</sup> Thucydides ascribes the confusion of Demosthenes' nocturnal assault of the Epipole (413 BC) to the impossibility of recognising signals and emblems in the darkness.<sup>312</sup> Xenophon mentions a signal made with a shield in the battle of Aegospotamoi, to warn Lysander that the Athenians were scattered around.<sup>313</sup> In the *Cyropaedia*, Croesus is said to have given a signal to his wings to stop the advance, although he was deployed with his infantrymen in the centre.<sup>314</sup> Diodorus mentions signs

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<sup>308</sup> Hdt. 9.21.1-2. Barley (2012) 40.

<sup>309</sup> Barley (2012) 42-43. His hypothesis is sound, but we do not have any evidence of this important feature of an army, which is very odd. It is more likely that this alleged system was more informal; the commander chose some men on the spot to convey messages.

<sup>310</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 1.8.12-13.

<sup>311</sup> Pritchett (1994b) 122.

<sup>312</sup> Thuc. 7.44.4.

<sup>313</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.27. Strauss (1983) 26 defines the detail as 'fanciful'. Nonetheless, Pritchett (1994b) 122 accepts the story. Indeed, Diodorus reports the signal made with a shield on two separate occasions: a naval fight in the Hellespont in 407 BC (Diod. 13.50.3), and one dated 307 BC (Diod. 20.51.1). Furthermore, there was a rumour circulating against the Alcmaeonids about some signal made to the Persians after the battle of Marathon with a shield (Hdt. 6.124.2).

<sup>314</sup> Xen. *Cyr.* 7.1.23. Cf. Xen. *Cyr.* 6.3.4, 8.5.13 for the importance given to banners in communicating orders. Pritchett (1994b) 118-119, n. 11 reports some later historical examples of this practice.

on several occasions.<sup>315</sup> Agesilaus would have used a sign to give the order to start an ambush against the Persians in 396 BC.<sup>316</sup>

The function of these visual signals is fairly evident. The commander used them to indicate to different sectors of the army the right moment to start a pre-arranged manoeuvre. In this form, visual signals were utterly dependent on the main battle plan; they were just a way for the commander to keep more control over his subordinates.

The same function could be ascribed to aural signals too. In the chaos and noise of battle, the human voice is not easy to hear, especially when wearing a metallic helmet.<sup>317</sup> This problem was partially solved using musical instruments to convey simple orders. The *salpinx*, a reed instrument, is frequently mentioned in military contexts.<sup>318</sup> In his insightful study of the *salpinx* and its use, Krentz argues that this musical instrument had a narrow range of notes and could be heard over a short-to-middle range.<sup>319</sup> Consequently, he concludes that this instrument could convey only basic orders.<sup>320</sup>

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<sup>315</sup> Diod. 11.21.5-22.1, 13.67.3, 19.30.1, 41.3.

<sup>316</sup> Diod. 14.80.3.

<sup>317</sup> Sidebottom (2004) 84 and Konijnendijk *Tactics* 140-141 stress the sensorial impairment due to the condition of battle (i.e. dust, shouts, various noises). Schwartz (2009) 62-63 argues that while wearing a Corinthian helmet even musical instruments were difficult to hear.

<sup>318</sup> Ascl. 12.10; Ael. *Tact.* 34. Aen. *Tact.* 22.3 suggested that the *salpinx* player was always close to the commander, implying that it was the quickest and preferred means to issue emergency orders. Cf. Gasti (1992) 85 recognises the *salpinx* mentioned in Sophocles' *Ajax* (291) as a symbol of order in military contexts. Krentz (1991) 112 raises doubt on the fact that the *salpinx* was a reed instrument, arguing that a trumpet-like instrument would have suited its function on the battlefield better.

<sup>319</sup> Krentz (1991) 112-116, 118. Poll. 4.85-88 stated a range of 50 *stadia* – c. nine kilometres. Cf. Krentz (1991) 112-113; Pritchett (1994b) 124, n. 22.

<sup>320</sup> Especially the order 'attack'. E.g. Xen. *Anab.* 3.4.4. Barley (2012) 39-40; Brouwers (2013) 109.

Anderson suggests that a proper code for those signals existed, which was somewhat universal.<sup>321</sup> However, Krentz admits that, on occasion, the commanders could assign a specific sound or sequence of notes to an arbitrary order.<sup>322</sup> This scenario has not received enough credit. It could have considerable impact on the ability of the military leader to manage his plan, thus having greater control on the battlefield. For instance, Xenophon used the *salpinx* to advise the soldiers to start a complicated action, which he planned to grant the safe crossing of a river patrolled by the enemies.<sup>323</sup> It seems reasonable that visual and aural communication was mostly used for set orders (i.e. 'charge', 'stop', 'retreat'), or to signal critical moments of the battle plan (e.g. starting an ambush).

This emphasis on the means of communication gives us a good impression of the importance of commanders' orders, even during battle. As an integration to the battle plan, or as a reaction to changes on the field, the commanders' orders were an important feature of Greek warfare from at least the late fifth century.

### *Hierarchical structure*

Undeniably, the hierarchical structure of the Athenian army was simple. Under the ten *strategoï*, only two layers of officers existed. Ten *taxiarchoi* were elected too, probably with the *strategoï*.<sup>324</sup> We know little about the *taxiarchoi* apart from that they had a role in

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<sup>321</sup> Anderson (1965) 1-2. This is especially true for the most basic order: attack. Cf. Aesch. *Pers.* 395; Andoc. 1.45. See Pritchett (1994b) 119.

<sup>322</sup> Krentz (1991) 116. Cf. Anderson (1965) 1. *Contra Tactics* 140.

<sup>323</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 4.3.27-34. Cf. Xen. *Anab.* 4.1.5, 6.5.25. Anderson (1965) 2. Barley (2012) 40 underlines how Xenophon 'reversed' the usual meaning of the sequence of notes. Whitby (2004) 235-236 comments upon the complexity and flawless execution of Xenophon's plan.

<sup>324</sup> [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 61.3. Fornara (1971) 1-39. More generally of Athenian officers, see Anderson (1965) 3.

mustering troops and organising the army.<sup>325</sup> They might have had some responsibility in deploying and keeping order in the ranks of their *taxeis*.<sup>326</sup>

The *lochagoi* are even more mysterious.<sup>327</sup> The *Constitution of the Athenians* states that the *taxiarchoi* chose these officers to command a *lochos*, a ‘company’, whose number was not predetermined, as it was in the case of the *taxeis*.<sup>328</sup> The ancient sources report little about their function in the army. From a completely different context, the organisation of the Ten Thousand, we could assume that most of the military operations and manoeuvres were *lochoi*-based.<sup>329</sup> A passage of Xenophon, describing Thrasyllus’ actions around Pygela (409 BC), corroborates this reconstruction, presenting two *lochoi* coming to help the Athenian light infantry.<sup>330</sup> Consequently, *lochagoi* plausibly had the responsibility for executing the orders of the *strategoï* on the field.

The cavalry was organised independently. Two elected *hipparchoi* were in charge of five tribes of horsemen each.<sup>331</sup> To help them out, ten *phylarchoi* were elected too.

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<sup>325</sup> Pritchett GSW 2.63, n. 17 remarks on the substantial responsibilities of the *taxiarchoi*. See Chapter Five 281-282.

<sup>326</sup> Lys. 13.79; Dem. 14.23. A possible example of this is in Thuc. 2.89.3, where some *taxeis* were left behind to defend the camp.

<sup>327</sup> *Psychology* 36-37. On this figure in Athens, see e.g. Xen. *Mem.* 3.4.1; Isoc. 15.116; Isae. 9.14. Cf. Soph. *Ant.* 141 and Eur. *Supp.* 598; *Phoen.* 123, 132, 148, 749 for the use of the term in Athens, although in non-Athenian contexts.

<sup>328</sup> [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 61.3. Scafuro (2018) 200; Sekunda (2018) 68. Crowley *Psychology* 39 underlines how the *lochagoi* appointed were not a fixed quota, concluding that this might hint at some flexibility of the *lochoi*, *taxeis*, and phalanx’s organisation. On the *lochoi* see Anderson (1970) 97-98; Bettalli (1990) *ad.* 1.5; Crowley (2014) 114 n. 109; Lee (2009) 392.

<sup>329</sup> E.g. Xen. *Anab.* 1.2.25-26, 4.2.11, 3.26, 5.1.17. Cf. Aen. *Tact.* 1.5, 15.2-3. Whitehead (1990) *ad.* 1.5; *Psychology* 42.

<sup>330</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.3. *Psychology* 37. Partial confirmation can be found in Isocrates (15.116), in which he suggests that warlike and physically imposing men should be chosen as *taxiarchoi* and *lochagoi*, rather than as *strategoï*.

<sup>331</sup> [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 61.4-5.

Lastly, some special officers are occasionally mentioned as leaders of mercenary or light-infantry contingents.<sup>332</sup>

In comparison with the Spartan army as described by Thucydides and Xenophon, the Athenian hierarchy seems, indeed, overly simple.<sup>333</sup> There is no doubt that part of the Spartan success on the field was due to this hierarchy; the Spartan hoplites knew whom they had to obey and follow, thus minimising confusion and the insurgence of doubt. However, it should be questioned whether the unflattering comparison with the Spartan organisation is a sufficient argument to prove that it was close to impossible for Athenian commanders to control levy troops.

Two objections are worth noticing. First, that no known attempt to change the Athenian army hierarchy is attested in the ancient sources. At some point in the fourth century, the Athenian military system was completely revolutionised.<sup>334</sup> Spartan-like age-classes and the *ephebia*, a two-year training period, were introduced.<sup>335</sup> The army hierarchy did not suffer a similarly radical innovation, suggesting that the main problem was found in the Athenians' lack of training. The institution of a company of ἐπίλεκτοι in Athens in the mid-fourth century confirms this conclusion.<sup>336</sup> However, the officers' ranks were not

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<sup>332</sup> E.g. Thuc. 3.98.1; Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.13. Barley (2012) 103.

<sup>333</sup> Thuc. 5.66.3-4; Xen. *Lac. Pol.* 11. Lazenby (1985) 5; Lendon (2005) 74; Barley (2012) 83, 137-138; Moore (2013) 459; Rees (2016) 46-47. On Thucydides' admiration for the Spartan army, see Anderson (1965) 3; Barley (2012) 49-50. Smith (1990) 151-153 believes that a strong identity was sufficient to coordinate the hoplites. However, Smith does not take into consideration the mentions of the officers in fifth century Greek armies. The ancient sources disagree on the precise structure of the Spartan army and its hierarchy, causing a scholarly debate on the structure and re-organisation(s) of the Spartan army. e.g. Cartledge (1987) 427-430; Lazenby (1985) 5-10, 41-58; *Warfare* 243-249.

<sup>334</sup> See Chapter Five 284-285.

<sup>335</sup> Lendon (2005) 109; Chankowski (2010) 114-126.

<sup>336</sup> Tritle (1988) 77-78.

improved, which implies that the Athenians did not recognise a substantial problem with them.

A potential exception could be found in Xenophon. Openly philo-Laconian and familiar with Spartan hierarchy, Xenophon surely appreciated the importance of a ramified hierarchy, so much so that he applied it to the fictional army of Cyrus the Elder. Konijnendijk suggests that the same notion might have been applied by Xenophon to the Athenian cavalry too. In the *Cavalry Commander*, Xenophon presented his opinion about the importance of choosing δεκάδαρχοι and rear-leaders.<sup>337</sup> Konijnendijk interprets these otherwise unattested cavalry officers as a proposal to reform the cavalry hierarchy, inspired by the Spartan system. This hypothesis makes sense; Xenophon indicates that it was his personal opinion (ἐγὼ φημι χρῆναι πρῶτον), and it is evident that the term did not exist in Athenian contexts before the mid-fourth century.

How we should use this personal opinion is more difficult to say. Konijnendijk uses it to make a point on the limits of Athenian officers, but Xenophon is alone in stressing this need.<sup>338</sup> Furthermore, Xenophon does not go as far as proposing a constitutional reform. He simply states his personal opinion on the importance of creating unofficial officers, to ease the manoeuvres of the horsemen. This passage seems to imply that the *hipparchos* had the freedom of agency to informally nominate ulterior 'officers' to the ones officially recognised.<sup>339</sup> The fact that Xenophon does not find a name for the file-closers, even if a

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<sup>337</sup> Xen. *Eq. Mag.* 2.2-4.

<sup>338</sup> *Tactics* 185-186.

<sup>339</sup> *Contra* Konijnendijk *Tactics* 186 believes that the absence of an official hierarchy under the *lochagos* hinted at the Athenian dislike for officers.

homologous existed in infantry armies,<sup>340</sup> is telling of the informal nature of these alleged reforms.<sup>341</sup> Consequently, Xenophon might have been remarking on a *de facto* power of the *hipparchos*, to which he gave particular importance.<sup>342</sup> This reading would explain the *πρωτων*. Xenophon focuses on the creation of sub-officers as the first and foremost act of the *hipparchos*; it is absolutely possible that his personal opinion was not a radical innovation, but rather that he considered this to be a particularly important feature of the command that the *hipparchos* had to prioritise.

A parallel of this practice could be recognised in the appointment of the *lochagoi*, which seems to suggest that the superior officers could choose trusted men to act as sub-officers, without the formal authority of the institutions. A similar power is mentioned by Aeneas Tacticus too, when he suggests nominating 'street leaders' in advance to defend the city in case of attack.<sup>343</sup>

This hypothesis would help us to build a second major objection: how the Spartan army functioned is undoubtedly an example of good practice, but it does not express the only way in which an ancient army could work. There is no question that their system allowed the Spartan army to be more reactive, ordered, and better in manoeuvring; they were able to perform reasonably complex evolutions in the field with ease.<sup>344</sup> The Spartans'

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<sup>340</sup> The *οὐραγός*. Cf. Xen. *Anab.* 4.3.26, 29. Matthew (2009) 398.

<sup>341</sup> Xenophon also mentions the *πεμπάδαρχοι* (*Eq. Mag.* 4.9, 10; *Cyr.* 2.1.22-23, 27), but he is the only one to use this term except for the late lexicographer Pollux. Consequently, rather than being an official military rank this term seems to indicate an informal division made by Xenophon.

<sup>342</sup> *Contra Konijnendijk Tactics* 184 argues that the *οὐραγός* was an official rank. This might be true for the Ten Thousand, but there is no evidence that any other classical army had the same figure officially appointed.

<sup>343</sup> *Aen. Tact.* 3.1, 4-6. Barley (2012) 87.

<sup>344</sup> Lazenby 81985) 4-10, 24-28; Barley (2012) 108.

skill does not imply that other armies could only attain similar results with more difficulty, time, and considerably less precision. While the Spartan soldiers knew their place most of the time, the Athenian soldiers just went with the flow, plausibly keeping their *lochagos* and *taxiarchos* in sight as much as possible.<sup>345</sup> It is telling that the *taxiarchoi*, in particular, are described as having characteristic helmets with plumes;<sup>346</sup> this convention could have helped in distinguishing them on the field. The Athenians neither had the same proficiency as the Spartans to re-form their ranks in moments of distress, nor did they have the same skill in executing complex manoeuvres. However, there is no proof that the Athenian hierarchy was insufficient for the army to function well enough to allow for simpler tactical movements.

### *Training and experience*

The real problem with Athenian troops seems to have been the lack of training, both regarding individual ability with weapons and communal drills.<sup>347</sup> Konijnendijk is right in stressing how this lack of training made the citizen-soldier hoplites a liability for complex movements.<sup>348</sup> Xenophon strongly advocates for the importance of training, praising the

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<sup>345</sup> Wheeler (2007) 219 points out how, on the field, *taxiarchoi* and *lochagoi* had much more control than the *strategoï*.

<sup>346</sup> Aristoph. *Ach.* 572-75; *Pax* 1171-1190. Wheeler (1991) 120-141.

<sup>347</sup> E.g. Xen. *Mem.* 3.12.5. Sidebottom (2004) 84. Krentz (1985) 57 correctly remarks on the emphasis on individual training at the beginning of Plato's *Laches* (183c-184a). However, Xenophon (*Mem.* 3.5.15) stated that the average Athenian ridiculed individual training. It is possible to reconcile the two positions by arguing that only the Athenian elite bothered with individual exercise, for social, athletic, and leadership purposes.

<sup>348</sup> *Tactics* 39-47. See also Cartledge (1977) 16-17; Krentz (1985) 59; Wheeler (2007) 220; Mann (2013) 11-12; Moore (2013) 458. Holladay (1982) 94 argues that the lack of training implied the inexistence of individual combat, which needed more exercise than fighting in the phalanx. The other way round seems much more likely. To coordinate thousands of men had to have been extremely challenging without communal drills.

commanders who spent time and effort preparing the soldiers for battle, and stressing how the military leader should push their soldiers to exercise.<sup>349</sup> Significantly, this was the only field in which the Athenians made an effort in improving the quality of their levy troops.

Undoubtedly, the comparison with the Spartans and certain mercenaries was unflattering for the average citizen-soldier, but this gap in ability should not be overemphasised.<sup>350</sup> Aside from special circumstances, such as the mercenary band of Jason of Pherae,<sup>351</sup> there is little evidence of a training programme for mercenaries.<sup>352</sup> Everyone could aspire to be a mercenary, as long as he had the weapons and was willing to risk his life. The advantage of mercenary troops was their greater experience, at times as a coherent unit, and the fact that they were all the right age.<sup>353</sup> Citizen-soldiers, especially after the introduction of the age-classes, might include men who were too young and green or too old and weak to be of use. Differently, years of fighting made mercenaries seasoned, reliable, and skilled. In lesser measure, the same could be said for levy troops, especially in fifth century Athens. Serving in several campaigns, especially if lengthy, surely improved

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<sup>349</sup> E.g. Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.32; *Eq. Mag.* 1.9-12, 3.7; *Cyr.* 2.1.21, 26-9, 2.6-10, 3.3.9. *Tactics* 45-46, 174. Cf. Pl. *Resp.* 374d; *Leg.* 806a-b.

<sup>350</sup> Cf. *Tactics* 159-160.

<sup>351</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.27-28. Lendon (2005) 102-103. However, Lendon is right in stressing how the bulk of Jason's cavalry was likely composed of Thessalian aristocrats, who needed to be persuaded to train by prizes and stirring their competitive spirit.

<sup>352</sup> Jason's troops are taken as a standard of the typical mercenaries. Cf. e.g. Bettalli (2013) 130, 175; *Tactics* 41. This seems a mistake. Xenophon clearly gives emphasis to Jason's standards in mercenaries, which suggests something noteworthy and endorsed by Xenophon. The only other explicit instance is Diod. 16.5.4. More questionable is Nep. *Iphic.* 2.

<sup>353</sup> See e.g. Isoc. 4.146, 168 on the Ten Thousand. Cf. Ar. *Eth. Nic.* 1116b. Bettalli (2013) 403-404, 430-432.

soldiers' individual skill and coordination. The *strategoí's* tendency to choose veterans, when they had the power to do so, could be read in these terms too.<sup>354</sup>

The example of the Thebans at Mantinea (362 BC) should also be noted. As Konijnendijk observes, Xenophon uses technical jargon (*παράγω*) to describe the Theban manoeuvre, which echoes a Spartan evolution.<sup>355</sup> Konijnendijk dismisses the passage as exceptional, arguing that Xenophon did not use the verb for its technical meaning: to wheel from a column to a line, thus encircling the enemy. This hypothesis makes sense, but the other possibility should not be overlooked. The experience of the Theban troops, who had fought in several campaigns since Leuctra, might have allowed them to perform this manoeuvre, although plausibly less proficiently than the Spartans.

The same could be said for the Athenian soldiers in front of Amphipolis (422 BC). To speed up their retreat, Cleon ordered the Athenian right wing to wheel. The lack of coordination between the wings, probably caused by the delay in the circulation of the orders, created confusion, and only the left half of the army executed the order when Brasidas attacked.<sup>356</sup> Konijnendijk believes that this example implies that the Athenians were not able to wheel.<sup>357</sup> However, if this was the case, why did Cleon order a manoeuvre that was destined to fail in front of an enemy which he knew was about to pounce? The fact that Thucydides reports that Cleon had the best of the Athenians, Imbrians, and Lemnians

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<sup>354</sup> *Psychology* 34, 49-52. Cf. Chapter Five 282-284. Even Konijnendijk *Tactics* 152 acknowledges that veterans were considered better than ordinary levy troops.

<sup>355</sup> *Xen. Hell.* 7.5.22. *Tactics* 54-55.

<sup>356</sup> *Thuc.* 5.10. Anderson (1965), esp. 1-2; *Psychology* 49.

<sup>357</sup> *Tactics* 54.

with him seems interesting in this regard.<sup>358</sup> If Thucydides is referring to experience on the field, the picture could corroborate the link between experience and ability to perform manoeuvres on the field.

In conclusion, there is reason to believe that the Athenian *strategoï* could execute simple battle plans notwithstanding these objective limitations. These were mostly basic manoeuvres, coordinated assaults against a specific sector of the enemy line, which could even be performed by amateur soldiers in a loose hierarchical framework. The result was probably messier and less effective than what trained troops could accomplish, but there is no reason not to see it as an execution of the commander's tactics.

Occasionally, some *strategoï* risked performing more sophisticated formations and manoeuvres, like Cleon at Amphipolis and Nicias in the battle of the Olympieion.<sup>359</sup> Plausibly, this greater confidence derived from the availability of more seasoned troops, which increased the chances of these tactics succeeding. Konijnendijk's hypothesis that the commanders relied mostly on little groups of their best troops, and personally led the main action, remains sound.<sup>360</sup> Nonetheless, it simply does not explain all the tactical scenarios presented in the ancient sources. It was the most reliable and effective way to execute the battle plan, but by no means the only one.

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<sup>358</sup> Thuc. 5.8.2.

<sup>359</sup> Barley (2012) 118-119, 124. Rawlings (2007) 90 and Konijnendijk *Tactics* 164-167 argue that Greek commanders appreciated tactics, but they were not able to put in practice the same manoeuvres of the Spartans. This statement is true, as long as the 'manoeuvres' were the tactical evolutions described in the *Constitution of the Lacedaemonians*, and not simpler coordinated movements.

<sup>360</sup> *Tactics* 149-150, 175-176.

The limitations discussed above encouraged the commanders to keep the battle-plan as simple as possible to reduce the chances of error.<sup>361</sup> Nevertheless, it is telling that some commanders adopted more complex battle-plans, especially if they were confident in the experience of their troops. The result was probably messier than that attained from properly trained troops, but it was evidently effective enough to take this considerable risk on the battlefield.

However, the commander's influence over his troops is another variable to take into consideration. The soldiers' obedience was ἔργον of the commander; if the *strategos* had the soldiers' trust, he could attempt innovative tactics. Describing a new riding style that he advised the adoption of for the Panathenaic review, Xenophon states that:

"I know that our cavalymen are not accustomed to these movements: but I am sure that they are desirable and beautiful, and will delight the spectators. I am aware, too, that the cavalymen have exhibited other novel feats of skill (ἄλλα ἀγωνίσματα τοὺς ἰππέας κεκαινοϋρηκότας) in days when the cavalry commanders had sufficient influence to get their wishes carried out (ἐπειδὴ οἱ ἵππαρχοὶ ἱκανοὶ ἐγένοντο πείσαι ἃ ἐβουλήθησαν)." (Trans. Marchant).<sup>362</sup>

Ἰκανός is fastidiously generic, but knowing Xenophon's theory of leadership, to conclude that he was referring to the *hipparchoi*'s personal authority is plausible. Xenophon implies a direct correlation between the introduction of new tactics and the ability of a commander to impose his will. Consequently, trusted commanders, especially when exercising personal or charismatic authority, plausibly had greater control over their soldiers. This phenomenon would explain how pseudo-charismatic leaders, such as

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<sup>361</sup> Konijnendijk (2018) 70, 146.

<sup>362</sup> Xen. *Eq. Mag.* 3.5.

Miltiades, Themistocles, and, to a certain degree, Demosthenes, were able to elaborate and execute fairly complex battle plans by relying on amateur soldiers.

This trend was probably stronger in the fourth century. The increasing reliance on mercenary and selected troops undoubtedly enhanced the chances of a successful battle-plan. However, closer relationships between commanders and their soldiers helped the commanders to create strong emotional relationships, which in the best cases improved the discipline and confidence of the soldiers, in both their commander and themselves. If we can trust Xenophon, this also implies a greater degree of tactical flexibility.

## CONCLUSION

The *strategoï* had many roles on the battlefield. They fought alongside the soldiers to be an example for them, and, as we will discuss in the next Chapter, they were responsible for the morale of their soldiers. Elaborating effective tactics for upcoming fights was evidently a priority for Greek commanders, including those of the fifth century. Indeed, the analysis of the battle of Marathon proposed here suggests that tactical thinking was ascribed even to the early fifth century commanders.

Undeniably, the objective limitations underlined by Konijnendijk made this task a real challenge. Plausibly, the Athenian *strategoï* limited the manoeuvres of citizen-soldiers to simple actions, indicating where and how to fight, and possibly adding simple orders. Although not as sophisticated as that of Sparta, the slim hierarchy of Athenian armies allowed officers to have loose control over their troops, which helped in the execution of straightforward battle plans. If more seasoned troops were on hand, both citizen-soldiers or

not, the *strategos* could risk using more sophisticated tactics, as the above examples of Demosthenes, Cleon, and Nicias demonstrate.

This alternative reconstruction does not intend to deny the development of Greek warfare and even leadership in the fourth century, but it seems reasonable to tone down the conclusions proposed by previous scholars. The fourth century saw neither a revolution in tactics, nor military leadership, but instead a slow development of ideas experimented with in the past. Fourth century *strategoï* were more aware of tactical subtleties and had a more personal relationship with the soldiers than their predecessors, but they relied on planning and executing the fights in a similar matter to late fifth century *strategoï*.

The obstacles to the correct execution of a battle plan did not disappear after the Peloponnesian War. The availability of seasoned and even trained troops, such as mercenary contingents and selected citizen-soldiers, improved the odds of a positive outcome in the execution of the plan, but numerous fifth century examples suggest that this was not a *conditio sine qua non* for the execution of tactically wise battle plans. Indeed, fourth century *strategoï* integrated and perfected the military knowledge of fifth century commanders.

## 4. COMMANDERS AND MORALE

Without doubt, emotions play a fundamental role in the battle experience, both ancient and modern. Several ancient historians appreciate the importance of soldiers' emotions in the ancient combat experience and recognise morale as an essential element of ancient warfare.<sup>1</sup> A comprehensive study of the emotional aspects of the ancient Greek fighting experience transcends the aims of this Chapter, which focuses on the role of commanders in handling the soldiers' emotions, their morale.<sup>2</sup> The objective is to highlight how and how much Greek commanders were able to manage their soldiers' emotions.

After an introductory Section which briefly defines and summarises the main characteristics of Greek morale, this Chapter discusses the various means the commanders relied on, both consciously and unconsciously, to condition the emotions of allies and enemies. Whilst past scholarship focused mostly on the commander's example, we will discuss in more detail: speech delivery, control of information, and exploitation of religious practices. Lastly, the commanders' exploitation and comprehension of two components of the modern understanding of morale, mood and cohesion, will be critically analysed.

Unfortunately, the eventual idiosyncrasies of the Athenian *strategoí* in handling morale cannot be discussed as the evidence is too sparse. Consequently, a certain degree of approximation in the result of this Chapter should be acknowledged. However, the

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<sup>1</sup> Hanson (1989) 80, 172-178, 188; Wheeler (2007) 209; *Psychology* esp. 66-67, 110-112; Konijnendijk (2012) 15-16; *Tactics* esp. 101, 114-115.

<sup>2</sup> A serious monographic study of Greek morale is long due. To my knowledge, my Master's thesis (Morassi 2016) is the only effort in this regard. It is my intention to continue investigating morale in a more comprehensive and sophisticated study in my further research.

practices of Athenian commanders, when attested, do not seem to diverge from the general pattern.

## MORALE IN ANCIENT GREEK ARMIES

Before starting the analysis, it would be useful to define what morale is. Morale represents the collective emotions of a group and has substantial effects on the performance and discipline of the members of such a group.<sup>3</sup> Yellin recognises combat morale as what “holds the team together and keeps it going in face of the terrifying and dispiriting things that occur in war”.<sup>4</sup> More scientifically, Manning individuates three major catalysts of emotions that are related to morale: the cohesion of the group, the confidence in attaining the goal (and staying alive) and the appreciation of the goal’s importance (motivation).<sup>5</sup> Boff’s discussion of ‘spirit’ and ‘mood’ seems a significant addition to Manning’s formulation. Analysing the experience of First World War soldiers, Boff remarks that some events had a more long-lasting effect on the soldiers than others.<sup>6</sup> Consequently, he accepts a difference between ‘spirit’ – a prolonged emotional state induced by ideals but fading over time – and ‘mood’ – a shorter emotional episode, usually connected with external causes (e.g. being upset because of continuous bad weather).<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Du Picq (1914) 74, 114-121; Baynes (1967) 93-94; Wesbrook (1980) 43-49; Taylor (1995) 188; McGuck & Castro (2010) 175; Jones et al. (2012) 56. Cf. Marshall (2000) 38-39, 56, and his criticism on the approximation of the concept at pp. 157-158.

<sup>4</sup> Yellin (2008) 10.

<sup>5</sup> See Manning (1991) esp. 456, 458-461. Cf. Gal & Manning (1987) 382. Cf. Marshall (2000) 124, 138, 141 on cohesion, and 165 on motivation. Watson (1980) 141-141 on confidence.

<sup>6</sup> Boff (2014) 865.

<sup>7</sup> For some examples, see Baynes (1967) 101, 218-230; Fuller (1991) 37; Manning (1991) 459; Moss (2001) 27-29; Wilcox (2014) 833. Cf. Shay (1994) 17-18 and Boff (2014) 860 on low morale because of insufficient equipment, and Marshall (2000) 153-4, 161-5 on the importance of ideals and a cause, even if he acknowledges that it is not enough to drive the men to fight on the field.

Modern morale is, thus, a complex emotional phenomenon, which interacts with several sociological and psychological dynamics. Since the nineteenth century, scholars have acknowledged the important role of morale in ancient warfare but without proper examination of how much the ancient phenomenon resembles the modern one.<sup>8</sup> Preliminary research on the matter indicates that the crucial elements of modern morale are well-represented in ancient sources, suggesting that similar emotional dynamics were in place.<sup>9</sup>

However, a precise definition of morale did not exist in antiquity. Even authors that were interested in and aware of this phenomenon, such as Thucydides and Xenophon,<sup>10</sup> lacked specific terminology. When they talked about soldiers' emotions, the ancient writers mostly framed the matter in terms of simple emotions: courage, fear, lack of enthusiasm. In particular, they relied on the compounds of θυμός and θαρσέω, drawing a link with boldness and courage.<sup>11</sup>

The lack of a precise definition of morale sheds some doubt on the appreciation of this concept in antiquity. However, ancient writers gave great importance to emotions in war scenarios.<sup>12</sup> For instance, Thucydides believes that the most severe consequence of the plague of 430–429 BC was its effect on the Athenians' spirit, and he acknowledged the effect

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<sup>8</sup> Du Picq (1914) esp. 65-67, 74, 114-121; Pritchett (1994a) 111-114, 130; Cartledge (1987) 206; Hanson (1989) 117-125; Lazenby (1993) 104; Wheeler (2007) 209; Whitby (2004) 240-241; *Psychology* 78-79, 105; Konijnendijk (2012) 15-16; *Tactics* 101, 114-115, 186. To my knowledge, only Wheeler (2011) 69-78 moves some objections, and only on a methodological ground. He stresses that the sources frame the matter rather in willing against compulsory obedience, and that the application of modern theories to the ancient world is anachronistic and inappropriate.

<sup>9</sup> Morassi (2016).

<sup>10</sup> Whitby (2004) 241; (2007) 62.

<sup>11</sup> E.g. Thuc. 2.87.8, 114, 4.11.3, 6.69.1; Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.20; Aen. Tact. 26.7-8.

<sup>12</sup> E.g. Thuc. 4.96.5, 125.1, 5.9.2; Xen. *Anab.* 3.1.3, 39-40; *Hell.* 6.2.19; Diod. 11.9.3, 13.106.5.

of emotions during battle, especially panic and rage.<sup>13</sup> *Athumia* was considered reason enough not to pursue an attack.<sup>14</sup> Commanders unsure of the soldiers' emotional status refused battle,<sup>15</sup> or even modified their plans to shelter their emotions.<sup>16</sup>

Xenophon manifested his appreciation for morale in the first person in the *Anabasis*. After the murder of Clearchus and the other commanders, Xenophon urged the surviving officers to do something to raise the morale of the troops:

“Once you have appointed as many leaders (ἄρχοντας) as is necessary, I believe that it would be the right time (ὕμᾱς πάνυ ἐν καιρῷ ποιῆσαι) for you to gather the rest of the soldiers and encourage them (παραθαρρύνητε). Now, you notice in the same way I do how they picked up their weapons without spirit, how without spirit they stood in their turn of guard (ὡς ἀθύμως μὲν ἦλθον ἐπὶ τὰ ὄπλα, ἀθύμως δὲ πρὸς τὰς φυλακάς). I do not know how one would make good use of them being them in this state (οὐκ οἶδα ὅ τι ἂν τις χρήσαιτο αὐτοῖς), if he needed them either by day or night.”<sup>17</sup>

Xenophon put the question in emphatic terms. Dangerously low morale inhibited the usual activity of an army, so much so that the soldiers were considered useless in this emotional state. This harsh judgement seems to presuppose the appreciation of the link between morale and performance, which has been scientifically demonstrated in modern contexts.<sup>18</sup> With this statement and through his whole work more generally, Xenophon demonstrates his appreciation of the importance of morale and some of its fundamental

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<sup>13</sup> Thuc. 2.12.4, 51.4-5.

<sup>14</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.23-24, 6.4.15.

<sup>15</sup> Thuc. 3.5.2.

<sup>16</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 2.2.16; *Hell.* 6.5.20-21.

<sup>17</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 3.1.39-40. Cf. Hodkinson (2000) 42, 44; Howland (2000) 880; Tamiolaki (2013) 32.

<sup>18</sup> Hutchinson (2000) 191; Wheeler (2011) 69. For recent data, see Wesbrook (1980) 43-49; Jones et al. (2012) 56.

characteristics, which suggests that by the first half of the fourth century morale was acknowledged and understood, at least to some degree.

## MANAGING MORALE IN THE CLASSICAL AGE

Morale was a concept familiar at the very least to some commanders in the period under examination. However, how Greek commanders dealt with morale is an understudied matter. In the following pages, various means recorded in the ancient sources to manage the soldiers' emotions will be discussed, separating them thematically. The variety of these means suggests a fairly sophisticated understanding of this complex dynamic, which the ancient authors ascribed to a substantial number of fifth and fourth century commanders.

### **The commander's example**

The commander was looked upon by his men, and his behaviour had a great deal of influence over his soldiers.<sup>19</sup> One passage of the *Anabasis* is particularly illuminating in this regard. After the murder of Clearchus, the Ten Thousand were desperate, and Xenophon urged the surviving officers and newly elected commanders to make a speech and raise the spirits of the men. However, he also added:

“For all our soldiers here are looking to you (πρὸς ὑμᾶς βλέπουσι); if they see that you are faint-hearted (ἀθύμους), all of them will be cowards (πάντες κακοὶ ἔσονται); but if you not only show that you are making preparations

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<sup>19</sup> Wood (1964) 53; Hanson (1989) 107-116; Pritchett (1994b) 111; Wheeler (1993) 124; Hutchinson (2000) 54-55, 60, 185; *Tactics* 142-143. Lee (2004) 311-312 recognises the same pattern also for the sub-officers, as the *lochagoi*. For a modern parallel, see Marshall (2000) 50, 53, 61-63, 105, 163; Holmes (2003) 341-342; Yellin (2008) 65.

yourselves against the enemy, but call upon the rest to do likewise, be well assured (εὖ ἴστε) that they will follow you and will try to imitate you (ἐψονται ὑμῖν καὶ πειράσονται μιμεῖσθαι).” (trans. Brownson).<sup>20</sup>

Xenophon recognised a direct correlation between the commander’s attitude and actions and that of his soldiers.<sup>21</sup> This phenomenon explains the importance that Xenophon gave to commanders’ self-control and resistance: they set an example for their soldiers. The dynamic is made explicit in the case of Agesilaus. Xenophon claims that Agesilaus consciously worked harder than anyone to inspire the army.<sup>22</sup> Furthermore, Agesilaus’ enthusiasm and proactivity on the eve of his campaign in Asia Minor motivated the soldiers.<sup>23</sup>

Similarly, Xenophon also emphasises virtuous resilience. Both Jason of Pherae and Agesilaus, two of the most idealised figures in Xenophon’s works, were praised for their resistance to vice and pleasures.<sup>24</sup> Discussing the *strategos* in his ideal city, Plato remarks on the importance of sobriety and resilience as fundamental qualities for the commander.<sup>25</sup>

For the same reason, the commander needed to fight alongside the soldiers in battle.<sup>26</sup> Facing the risks of battle as any other soldier, the commander set an example of conduct and likely elicited an emotional reaction. As discussed in the previous Chapter, many

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<sup>20</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 3.1.36.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Xen. *Anab.* 2.3.11-12. Wood (1964) 59-60. In more general terms, Lengauer (1979) 87, 148 remarks on the importance that Xenophon gave to the personal courage of the commander.

<sup>22</sup> Xen. *Ages.* 5.3.

<sup>23</sup> Xen. *Ages.* 1.8.

<sup>24</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.15-16; *Ages.* 5.2-4. On the idealisation of Jason, see Lengauer (1979) 100, 104; Due (1989) 186-187. On Agesilaus, Flower (1988) 126; Cartledge (1987) 55-56; Hutchinson (2000) 181; Tamiolaki (2013) 569. Cf. Plut. *Nic.* 26.4 for a similar evaluation of Nicias’ effort to participate to the fights even if ill.

<sup>25</sup> Pl. *Leg.* 640b, 671d.

<sup>26</sup> E.g. Thuc. 4.9.2-3, 5.8.4, 10.6, 8; Plut. *Arist.* 9.1-2; *Nic.* 18.1; *Alc.* 30.

scholars believe that the commander was the in the first line, where he was more visible, leading the men to the assault.<sup>27</sup> Undoubtedly, there was an emotional component in the commander's participation.<sup>28</sup>

In the fictional *Cyropaedia*, Xenophon represented Cyrus participating in the assault and marking his actions with a few motivational words.<sup>29</sup> In the *Anabasis*, he repeated this concept several times.<sup>30</sup> As discussed in Chapter Three, when Seuthes asked him why he had dismounted to fight with his mercenaries, Xenophon replied to the king that they would perform better (οἱ δὲ ὀπλιῖται θᾶπτον δραμοῦνται καὶ ἥδιον).<sup>31</sup> The same conclusion is confirmed by Demosthenes' speech before the Spartan assault to the Athenian fort in Pylos. To motivate his soldiers, Thucydides' Demosthenes underlined that he was there, fighting with his men.<sup>32</sup>

Another element that should be considered when discussing the effects of commanders' participation in the fight is their exceptionality. Some commanders could be perceived as exceptional due to their previous successes or their role as 'saviours'.<sup>33</sup> This perceived image not only affected the authority of the commander, but probably also the emotions of the soldiers before battle. Speaking of Agesilaus' ability as a commander and tactician, Xenophon concludes that:

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<sup>27</sup> Chapter Three 226-227.

<sup>28</sup> Pritchett (1994b) 114; Wheeler (2007) 217. Cf. Keegan (1978) 188-189 and Marshall (2000) 61-63, 105 for modern comparisons.

<sup>29</sup> Xen. *Cyr.* 3.3.61-63.

<sup>30</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 3.1.36, 4.48. Cf. Marshall (2000) 138-142 on the importance of communication during an action, especially from the commander to the soldiers.

<sup>31</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 7.3.45. Interestingly, the same phenomenon is attested in modern armies too. See Pail's experiment, reported in in Castelnovo et al. (2017) 547.

<sup>32</sup> Thuc. 4.10.1.

<sup>33</sup> Chapter Two 98-102.

Accordingly, because he was able to do these things, he was frightening (δεινός) for the enemies, but infused courage and strength (θάρρος και ὥμην) in the allies.<sup>34</sup>

## Speeches

In 429 BC, the Athenian seamen anchored near Naupactos were extremely concerned. Although they had won an impressive victory against the Peloponnesian fleet, the enemy received reinforcements whilst the Athenians were still waiting for theirs.<sup>35</sup> The Athenians voiced their concerns in little groups, but their whisperings arrived at the ears of the commander Phormio, who reacted immediately.<sup>36</sup>

Then, seeing that the soldiers were without spirit (ἀθυμοῦντας) at the sight in front of them, [Phormio] wanted to remind them of being confident (ὑπόμνησιν ποιήσασθαι τοῦ θαρσεῖν). After having gathered the Athenians, he said the following.<sup>37</sup>

Thucydides draws a connection between the common practice of pre-battle harangues and the handling of soldiers' emotions.<sup>38</sup> The passage does not leave doubt that

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<sup>34</sup> Xen. *Ages.* 6.8.

<sup>35</sup> Thuc. 2.85.3.

<sup>36</sup> Thuc. 2.88.2. Strauss (1996) 319 sees this autonomous organisation in groups as a democratic prerogative. Organising themselves in groups and discussing the situation was natural for the Athenians, and their voices pushed the commander to act. This interpretation seems excessive. The sailors did not decide the course of action; Phormio just reassured them. To voice fears and concerns to the people around us, especially friends and neighbours, seems reasonable, and not necessarily a democratic feature.

<sup>37</sup> Thuc. 2.88.3. Hornblower *Commentary ad loc.* correctly highlights the dubious authenticity of the speech. Phormio rebutted the arguments that Brasidas used to encourage the Peloponnesians (2.87), which suggests that Thucydides probably made these two speeches up. However, these set pieces are still useful for appreciating how commanders were supposed to behave and what they were supposed to say in front of the troops.

<sup>38</sup> On the frequency of the practice, see e.g. Hdt. 8.22, 83; Thuc. 2.87, 4.92, 6.68, 7.66; Xen. *Anab.* 1.7.3ff, 3.1.15, 25; *Hell.* 3.4.11; Diod. 11.16.2, 15.56.2. Cartledge (1987) 207; Lazenby (1993) 90; Mitchell (1996) 100.

these speeches were meant to reassure the soldiers and prepare them for battle.<sup>39</sup> Furthermore, Thucydides implies that pre-battle harangues worked. After the short harangue delivered by Demosthenes before the Spartan attack on the Athenian fort in Pylos (425 BC), Thucydides states that:

Once Demosthenes had exhorted (παράκελευσάμενους) them with so many arguments, the Athenians became more confident (ἐθάρρησάν τε μᾶλλον), and deployed themselves along the coast.<sup>40</sup>

This passage gives us an idea of the potential of commanders' speeches.<sup>41</sup> Even a few words could influence the soldiers' spirit and attitude. Xenophon confirms Thucydides' conclusions in the *Cavalry Commander*, pointing out how a *hipparchos*' words would inflame the cavalrymen's spirits.<sup>42</sup>

Many scholars tend to dismiss harangues as a historiographical convention.<sup>43</sup> Hansen argues that it was physically impossible to deliver a speech to a whole army and be listened to.<sup>44</sup> He concludes that the commander delivered a few words before the battle, probably walking while checking the good order of the soldiers and stopping in front of a different

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<sup>39</sup> Lazenby (1993) 90; Taylor (1995) 28; Bassi (2003) 48; *Warfare* 192; Hornblower (2007) 40.

<sup>40</sup> Thuc. 4.11.1.

<sup>41</sup> Anderson (1970) 76-78 exaggerates recognising Xen. *Cyr.* 5.3.46-50 as a statement against the speeches, which were 'futile'. Xenophon's point could be recognised in acknowledging the limits of what a speech could do. Cf. *Tactics* 182-183. On the importance of communication in modern armies, both between soldiers and between commanders and soldiers, see Marshall (2000) 128-139.

<sup>42</sup> Xen. *Eq. Mag.* 8.22. Cf. Xen. *Oec.* 5.14-16.

<sup>43</sup> Keegan (1987) 55; Yunis (1996) 61-63; Hornblower (2007) 35; Whitby (2007) 58, 64. Westlake (1962) 276 argues that Thucydides inserted his own opinions in the speeches he wrote.

<sup>44</sup> Hansen (1993) 172-173. Cf. Keegan (1987) 54-55; Whitby (2007) 58-59.

section of the army at different points in his speech.<sup>45</sup> It is even possible that the speeches were used by the ancient writers to express their own ideas with more freedom.<sup>46</sup>

Hansen's reading is very influential but not immune to objections. Anson highlights nineteenth-century examples which demonstrate that a speech was somewhat understood and audible to a great mass of people, even before amplification.<sup>47</sup> Furthermore, Hansen does not pay enough attention to the fact that the soldiers could pass the commander's speech on via word of mouth. In the *Cyropaedia*, Xenophon described this process during battle: the encouragements yelled by Cyrus during the charge are passed on by the soldiers' shouting.<sup>48</sup> We know that the officers in the Spartan army had a role in passing on the orders of the commanders to each man.<sup>49</sup> Plausibly, the same word-of-mouth chain also conveyed encouragement.<sup>50</sup> The Spartan system was surely much more complex than the Athenian one, but it is possible that officers (e.g. *lochagoi* or *taxiarchoi*) and possibly even simple soldiers had the same role in both. The *strategoï* are described addressing their soldiers in

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<sup>45</sup> Hansen (1993) 178. Cf. Xen. *Anab.* 3.4.46; Pol. 15.10; 11.6-12, 18.23. Pagondas summoned one *lochos* at the time to address the men before the battle of Delium (424 BC, Thuc. 4.91). Ehrhardt (1995) 120 recognises an example of this practice in Thuc. 7.60.5, 69.2. Yellin (2008) 81-85 reports the example of Colonel Morgan, who did something similar during the American Revolution. This eighteenth century example suggests that the practice was possible, and could have been used, at least hypothetically, also by Greek commanders.

<sup>46</sup> Yunis (1996) 60. Heilke (2004) 123 comments that Thucydides' attitude to realism emerges mostly in the speeches. Nevin (2017) 2 points out how speeches and rhetorical elements were used by the ancient authors to guide the reader through a moral or causal interpretation. Research on modern and contemporary age speeches demonstrate that gestures, tone, and behaviour of the speakers are even more important than the content for the followers of a leader. See Castelnovo et al. (2017) 548.

<sup>47</sup> Hansen (1993) 169; Anson (2010) 305-307. Plausibly to avoid similar problems, Napoleon preferred to rely on printed encouragement in his 'orders of the day' and proclaims. Cf. Hughes (2012) 26-30. Nonetheless, it is important to note that he addressed the soldiers with oral harangues too. For instance, de Vreese (1904) prints a 627 word speech delivered in person by Napoleon after the battle of Cherasco (26<sup>th</sup> of April 1796).

<sup>48</sup> Xen. *Cyr.* 3.3.62-63.

<sup>49</sup> Xen. *Lac. Pol.* 13.9. Anderson (1970) 78-80. Cf. Xen. *Cyr.* 3.3.59.

<sup>50</sup> A similar function was covered by the officials of Napoleon too. Cf. Huges (2012) 213-214; Bamford (2013) 45, 60-61.

the last naval battle in Syracuse harbour (413 BC). Thucydides states that they urged the men who were retreating to go back and fight.<sup>51</sup>

Hansen also has some objections to the content of these speeches. He argues that the recurrence of themes and tropes demonstrates the rhetorical and literary composition of these pieces, which seems overly critical. Even today, rhetorical arguments in political speeches are rarely original, and the same tropes are continuously re-used.<sup>52</sup> There is no reason to deny that tropes were the backbone of historical harangues and were reported by the ancient sources exactly for this reason.<sup>53</sup>

This hypothesis is backed up in a passage by Thucydides. In one of the last speeches of Nicias before the dramatic end of the Sicilian campaign, Thucydides writes that the Athenian *strategos*:

[... Nicias] said those things that men would say when they are in a similar situation [of crisis] (ὅσα ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ ἤδη τοῦ καιροῦ), and they do not care to seem banal (οὐ πρός τὸ δοκεῖν τινὶ ἀρχαιολογεῖν φυλαξάμενοι).<sup>54</sup> Arguments very similar to each other (ὑπὲρ ἀπάντων παραπλήσια) – the appeals to wives, children, and gods of the fathers – but that the men call upon

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<sup>51</sup> Thuc. 7.70.7.

<sup>52</sup> Reid Gold (1988) 160-161, 168-169.

<sup>53</sup> Marincola (2001) 82; Sidebottom (2004) 106. Pritchett (1994a) 52 remarks that 'rhetorical' does not mean 'unrealistic'. Cf. Yellin (2008) 22-23, but at 37-38 acknowledges more explicitly the limits of the tradition. Dawson (1996) 86 wisely underlines how it is impossible to distinguish historical events from the ancient sources' rhetoric completely. Whitby (2007) 57 makes an extremely intelligent observation. As historians, we should focus more on the plausibility than the 'truth', which is an ideal objective, but too ambitious. He was commenting on the events described in the ancient sources, but this approach also seems valuable in this context.

<sup>54</sup> The *LSJ* translates ἀρχαιολογεῖν as 'use an old-fashioned style'. Indeed, both Hornblower *Commentary ad loc* and Hammond (2009) *ad* 7.69.2 adopt this meaning. However, the context of the passage – especially the following ὑπὲρ ἀπάντων παραπλήσια – could imply the sense adopted in my translation too. Cf. Crawley (1910) *ad loc.* who uses 'common-place' and Canfora (1996) *ad loc.* 'vecchi discorsi triti e ritriti'. Lateiner (1985) 205-206; Zadorojnyi (1998) 301.

in aid (ἐπιβοῶνται) in the present fear (ἐπὶ τῇ παρουσίᾳ ἐκπλήξει), believing that they are useful (ὠφέλιμα νομίζοντες).<sup>55</sup>

Thucydides confirms that tropes were effectively used in pre-battle harangues with little variation, but he presents it as a choice of the commanders.<sup>56</sup> Consequently, he infers that speeches were an instrument acknowledged and used by the ancient commanders, who relied on tropes and commonplaces in historical practice.

That said, it is undeniable that the speeches, as reported in ancient sources, are later re-elaborations. In his famous methodological premise, Thucydides openly admits the difficulty of reproducing the exact words from actual speeches, depending on the listeners' memory.<sup>57</sup> However, Thucydides does not say that he simply wrote what he believed was appropriate for the situation, but claims to have adapted his re-elaboration as much as possible to the argument and themes reported by his sources.<sup>58</sup> It is reasonable to believe,

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<sup>55</sup> Thuc. 7.69.2. Lateiner (1985) 203-204 argues that ὠφέλιμα νομίζοντες implies that Thucydides believed that these tropes were useless. This reading is excessively harsh; the text simply reports a common practice. Hansen (1993) 172 gives great value to a passage of Plutarch (*Mor.* 803b), in which Ephorus', Theopompus', and Anaximenes' pre-battle speeches are criticised as 'foolish' (μωραίνω). Two observations should be made. First, we do not have enough material to effectively judge, if not in general terms, the differences between Thucydides' and Xenophon's speeches, and these later authors. Applying the same criticism to all pre-battle speeches seems unjustified. Secondly, Plutarch judges long and overly rhetoric speeches before a battle as 'foolish'. He does not openly criticise the reliance on tropes in general.

<sup>56</sup> Pritchett (1994a) 101-106. Parker (2004) 140 recognises another example of this trend in Xenophon's address to the soldiers in the Third book of the *Anabasis*. *Contra* Lateiner (1985) 202-203 recognises in this practice Thucydides' criticisms. He argues that Thucydides would have expected a plan, but Nicias could only produce old-fashioned tropes. Cf. Zadorojnyi (1998) 301. Lateiner and Zadorojnyi do not stress a crucial part of Thucydides' assessment: that this practice was usual. Perhaps, Thucydides characterises Nicias as failing to wear the shoes of an epic hero, as the scholars claim. However, he could have also implied that Homeric echoes could be exploited by commander in the attempt to motivate the soldiers, as Plato (*Ion* 540 d) states too.

<sup>57</sup> Thuc. 1.22.1. On the historians' critical stances about this statement, see *Commentary ad loc.*; Marincola (2001) 78. As Whitby (2007) 60-61 reminds us, often even those who participated in a specific battle had a partial memory of the events, to which the fading memory and the selection made by the speaker also has to be added. Cf. Thomas (1989) 12-13.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. Yunis (1996) 62-63, who argues that Thucydides only claimed this to give more credibility to his completely invented speeches. Pritchett (1994a) 50-51 remarks on how the Greeks probably had a different

considering the military experience of authors such as Thucydides and Xenophon,<sup>59</sup> that the themes, style, and content of pre-battle harangues were, if not exact, at the very least realistic.<sup>60</sup> Consequently, although we cannot be sure that the speech records the exact words used on that precise occasion, the images it conveys are still valuable for a general analysis of morale.

Consideration should be also given to how literature could influence real life. Some scholars argue that the speeches recorded in literary works inspired real-life commanders to deliver similar harangues in real-life contexts.<sup>61</sup> There is no doubt that literature inspired historical commanders, but assessing to what degree is impossible.<sup>62</sup> However, even accepting this reading, the same conclusion can be reached: the tropes presented in historiographical speech reflected, in one way or another, real-life speeches. There is no reason to doubt that the ancient sources recognised these speeches as beneficial for morale.

Consequently, the tropes of commanders' speeches are an invaluable window into how the ancient Greeks conceptualised and understood morale. On closer examination, these tropes can be organised into two categories: arguments used to raise and consolidate the soldiers' confidence and appeals to their motivation.

Confidence boosters are much more varied and frequent than the second group. Usually, the speaker stressed the tactical advantage over the enemy (e.g. in experience,

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concept of 'verbatim' from us. Cf. Thomas (1989) 47, 91. Cf. Nicolai (2014) 63 on Thucydides' lack of interest in showing his rhetorical skill.

<sup>59</sup> Hansen (1993) 173; Pritchett (1994a) 41-42; Tuplin (2018) 26.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. Marincola (2001) 79-82.

<sup>61</sup> *Psychology* 115; Nicolai (2014) 67-68; Sidebottom (2004) 116. Cf. Yelling (2008) 22-23 for the example of Napoleon, who openly imitated Caesar' speeches.

<sup>62</sup> E.g. Pl. *Ion* 540 d; Xen. *Sym.* 3.5, 4.6-7.

terrain),<sup>63</sup> or recalled past victories against the enemy, especially if it was the same contingent.<sup>64</sup> Related to this group, there was a habit of denying the reasons for fearing the enemy.<sup>65</sup> Occasionally, commanders referred to rationalistic arguments to contrast irrational emotions. Before a naval battle around Rhion in the Corinthian Gulf (429 BC), Brasidas explained to the sailors why they had lost the previous fight, and remarked on how the situation would be different this time.<sup>66</sup> On a second occasion, Brasidas explained to the soldiers how their fear of the Thracians was irrational, due only to their inexperience in fighting barbarians.<sup>67</sup> In both instances, the same pattern emerges. When the soldiers showed fear and insecurity, a good commander soothed his men, stressing their chance of attaining victory.

Similarly, the mention of the number of either allies or enemies is frequent.<sup>68</sup> A numerically superior enemy concerned an army, to which the commander usually responded with examples of small contingents being victorious against larger ones.<sup>69</sup> Lastly, arguments such as divine favour,<sup>70</sup> superior courage,<sup>71</sup> or even a natural predisposition could be adduced.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> Thuc. 2.89.2-3, 4.10.3-5, 6.68.2, 7.62.1-4, 67.2; Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.15-16.

<sup>64</sup> Thuc. 2.89.5, 11, 7.66.1-2; Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.13.

<sup>65</sup> Thuc. 2.89.5, 5.9.8.

<sup>66</sup> Thuc. 2.87.1-2.

<sup>67</sup> Thuc. 4.126.3-6. Cf. Holmes (2003) 139-140 on the fear of the unknown in modern armies.

<sup>68</sup> E.g. Thuc. 2.87.6, 6.68. Patera (2013) 112.

<sup>69</sup> Thuc. 3.87.6, 89.1-2, 4.10.2, 7.61.2; Diod. 9.30.1.

<sup>70</sup> Thuc. 4.29.6-7; Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.14. Cf. Dillery (1995) 185-189.

<sup>71</sup> Thuc. 2.87.4.

<sup>72</sup> Thuc. 5.9.1. Rood (2004) 314.

The second category is related to igniting the soldiers' passion for the cause for which they were fighting.<sup>73</sup> It is possible to divide the arguments into two sub-categories: the effects of the outcome, and the appeal to adhere to a normative standard. In the former category, by far the most common, the speaker stressed the importance of the battle's result. Attaining a victory on the field was presented as achieving increased freedom,<sup>74</sup> protecting the fatherland,<sup>75</sup> impeding a dangerous enemy,<sup>76</sup> gaining a reputation,<sup>77</sup> and even increasing the personal safety of the soldiers.<sup>78</sup> The purpose of these arguments seems easy to understand. Giving some context to the soldiers, the speaker urged them to think about the positive and negative consequences of the battle. In this way, the fighters would arguably be more personally invested and fight harder.

Similarly, the speaker might invoke a behavioural model and ask the soldiers to adhere to it.<sup>79</sup> The term αἰδώς conveys this concept precisely: the shame of not fulfilling social expectations.<sup>80</sup> This pattern was well-attested since Homer, and it played an important role in motivating soldiers to fight and fight well.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> For a modern parallel, Marshall (2000) 153-154, 160-162, 164; Campbell (2010) 167.

<sup>74</sup> Thuc. 4.95.2, 5.9.10, 69.1 7.68.3; Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.17.

<sup>75</sup> Thuc. 5. 69.1, 7.68.3, 71.7. Rood (2004) 310; *Warfare* 165. LaForse (2000) 77-78 recognises this argument in Xen. *Anab.* 1.3.1-4, but his point is quite weak. Clearchus emphasised the good odds of the Greeks, who already proved themselves against the 'barbarians', and the future earnings.

<sup>76</sup> Thuc. 2.89.10, 4.92.1-2.

<sup>77</sup> Thuc. 7.68.2. *Warfare* 162-164.

<sup>78</sup> Thuc. 6.68.3, 7.61.1.

<sup>79</sup> Rademaker (2003) 119; Roisman (2003) 127-128; *Psychology* 113-121.

<sup>80</sup> Cairns (1993) 68-70; Koziak (1999) 1079-1081; *Warfare* 193; (2007) 286. On Clearchus' reliance on soldiers' shame, see Howland (2000) 879.

<sup>81</sup> Sinclair (1988) 55; Hanson (1989) 80; Lazenby (1993) 105; *Warfare* 108, 162-164; Hunt (2007) 132; Wheeler (2007) 213; Lee (2010) 150; *Psychology* 105-106.

Nonetheless, the *aidos* mentioned in the commanders' speeches is considerably more nuanced than the one found in poetry.<sup>82</sup> Non-fictional commanders occasionally appealed to the soldiers not to disgrace themselves, but mostly took a more positive approach, urging them to act like 'real' men.<sup>83</sup> The military leaders asked the troops to adhere to the standard of manly virtue.<sup>84</sup> Koziak makes a fair point, stressing the influence of the Homeric poems in this regard.<sup>85</sup> However, more precise references were made to emulating the example of the forefathers<sup>86</sup> as well as a generic appeal to demonstrate their *arete* in battle or to be 'good men' (ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί).<sup>87</sup> Xenophon even tickled the ambition of his soldiers:

"It will surely be sweet (ἡδύ), through some manly and noble thing (ἀνδρειῶν τι καὶ καλὸν) which one may say or do to-day, to keep himself in remembrance (μνήμην) among those whom he wishes to remember him (ἐν οἷς ἐθέλει παρέχειν ἑαυτοῦ)." (trans. Brownson).<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> Mactoux (1993) 271; Balot (2014) 244-246, 249-250. Patera (2013) 115 stresses how *aidos* was used as a motivational argument against fear.

<sup>83</sup> A marked polarity between men and women existed in the Greek thought. If a male failed to act manly – thus to stick to the social standard of manliness – he was considered to be like a woman, which was shameful for an ancient Greek. Cf. Hom. *Il.* 8.163-164; Hdt. 8.88.4; 9.20. Loraux (1984) 34; Cartledge (1998) 60-62; Fox (1998) 7-13; Rademaker (2003) 122; Penrose (2006) 38.

<sup>84</sup> Koziak (1999) 1069. See also Wheeler (1991) 123; Roisman (2005) 110-113. *Contra* Nussbaum (1967) 34 sees a difference between the ethos of the officers and the simple soldiers, especially concerning the spirit of competition.

<sup>85</sup> Koziak (1999) 1085. See also Aristoph. *Ran.* 1034-1039; Boëldieu-Trevet (2007) 31-32.

<sup>86</sup> Thuc. 2. 43.4, 89.9, 4.95.3, 6.68.4, 7.68.2; Xen. *Mem.* 3.5.7-8; Hyp. 6.40; Lyc. 1.83. Rood (2004) 310; Robinson (2006) 12-14; Balot (2014) esp. 193. Cf. Roisman (2003) 132 on the exaltation of war dead.

<sup>87</sup> Hdt. 8.88.4; 9.17.4, 20; Thuc. 4.92.7, 95.1, 126.2, 7.61.2, 68.2, 77.4; Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.27. Cf. Aeschin. 3.152; Hyp 6.8, for the characterisation of war dead as 'good men'. Bassi (2003) 33; Rademaker (2003) 119; Lendon (2005) 50; Roisman (2005) 67-71, 110-113. On *time* in Classical warfare ideology, see also van Wees (2007), 286-288, 293. Mitchell (1996) 99-100 underlines, though, the great emphasis on the sense of community.

<sup>88</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 6.5.24. The same appeal has been used by colonel Morgan, during the battle of Cowpens (1781). Cf. Yellin (2008) 81-84.

## Control of information

Good or bad news had a great impact on soldiers' emotions. The commanders were, thus, in a position to influence morale by circulating or censoring information about other fights, reinforcements or the present circumstances. Several sources stress the importance of controlling the information accessible to soldiers.<sup>89</sup>

There are several examples of this practice in ancient sources. Before the battle of Mycale (479 BC), the Spartan king, Leothychides, spread the rumour about a Greek victory at Plataea to raise morale.<sup>90</sup> Tradition reports that the two battles were fought the same day and it was therefore impossible that Leothychides knew about the victory in time.<sup>91</sup> Herodotus presents it as a miracle, but Diodorus' rationalised version that Leothychides lied makes more sense.<sup>92</sup>

Similarly, in his harangue to the Ten Thousand soon after Clearchus' murder, Xenophon minimised the importance of cavalry and dismissed the soldiers' concerns or their lack thereof.<sup>93</sup> As Whitby convincingly argues, Xenophon was consciously and blatantly lying to the mercenaries, plausibly to raise their morale.<sup>94</sup>

A less controversial example is that of Agesilaus. When he had learnt of the Spartans' defeat in Cnidus and the death of the commander Peisander, Agesilaus decided not to

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<sup>89</sup> E.g. Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.17; Front. *Str.* 2.4.11, 3.8.2; On. 23.1.

<sup>90</sup> Diod.11.35.2-3; Polyæn. 1.33.

<sup>91</sup> On the historiographical motif of clustering important battles in the same day, see How & Wells (1961) *ad loc.*

<sup>92</sup> Hdt. 9.100; Diod. 11.35.2-3. A similar stratagem is reported on other *loci*. e.g. Polyæn. 1.35.1; Front. *Str.* 2.4.11. On the problem of this tradition, see Pritchett (1994b) 116.

<sup>93</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 3.2.18-20.

<sup>94</sup> Whitby (2004) 240. Rood (2004) 314. Cf. Hutchinson (2000) 54, 228, less strong in his formulation.

disclose the information to the soldiers. Instead, he lied, saying that the Spartans had won because he did not want to damage the combat spirit of the troops.<sup>95</sup> The link that Xenophon draws between Agesilaus' lie and the soldiers' morale helps us appreciate the reason for this behaviour. In controlling the information about certain situations, commanders attempted to boost the motivation of the soldiers with a false sense of safety, not dissimilar to the tropes discussed above.

### **Religious beliefs and practices and their exploitation**

Religion permeated every aspect of Greek culture, and warfare was no different. Indeed, there is reason to believe that the danger and stress of a military campaign would have increased the men's religious anxiety.<sup>96</sup> Unsurprisingly, several religious practices are associated with war contexts. Thucydides, not without a critical undertone, remarked how oracular pronouncements, predictions and prophetic signs multiplied in wartime.<sup>97</sup>

Natural phenomena were regularly interpreted as signs of the gods, often negatively.<sup>98</sup> Nicias' lunar eclipse is the most famous example,<sup>99</sup> but there are several similar cases in the ancient sources. In particular, earthquakes stopped a military campaign more than once.<sup>100</sup> Occasionally, natural events could be interpreted as positive. For instance, local

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<sup>95</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.10-14. Grey (1989) 150-152; Nevin (2017) 126.

<sup>96</sup> See more in general Holmes (2003) 28, 238-240 on the importance of rituals in modern armies.

<sup>97</sup> Thuc. 2.8.2, 21.3, 54, 5.26.3-4, 8.1.1-2. GSW 3.4, 7, 304, 318-319. It is important to remark that Thucydides was much more critical on traditional religion than his contemporaries. Dillery (1995) 180; Nevin (2017) 171.

<sup>98</sup> Nevin (2017) 86. Goodman & Holliday (1986) 152 point out how the impression of absence of divine favour elicited fear in the soldiers.

<sup>99</sup> Thuc. 7.50.4; Plut. *Nic.* 23-24.

<sup>100</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.23-24; 4.7.3-4. In the last example, the Spartan king Agesipolis tried to propose a positive reading of the sign, but he failed after one of the soldiers was struck by lightning. Cf. Goodman & Holliday (1986) 155.

inhabitants hailed Cyrus the Younger as blessed by the gods when he crossed the Euphrates because an exceptional drought lowered the water level of the river, making its crossing easier.<sup>101</sup>

Predictions were undoubtedly important in war contexts. Commanders and soldiers were often anxious to confirm the soundness of their strategy through divine means.<sup>102</sup> This trend tended to encourage soldiers to look for divine signs, and their confidence was strictly connected to a positive response.<sup>103</sup>

Some commanders exploited religious practices to influence the soldiers' emotions.<sup>104</sup> Themistocles was famously creative with the Delphic oracle about the fate of Athens in the Second Persian War. Against the opinion of the *chresmologoi*, Themistocles persuaded the Athenians that the 'wooden wall' of the oracle was the ships, and that victory would come at Salamis.<sup>105</sup> The story is likely anecdotal. Evans has solid objections against this episode, underlining the mythical and folkloric motifs, and the factual inconsistencies with Delphi's activity.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 1.4.17-18.

<sup>102</sup> E.g. Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.18-19; *Anab.* 1.8.15; 4.3.17-19; Hellenika Oxyrhynchia *BNJ* 66 F7 XV.4. Hutchinson (2000) 50; Struck (2003) 167. More in general on the importance of oracles, see *GSW* 3.48; Parker (2004) 133-134; Giordano-Zecharya (2006) 67. Goodman & Holladay (1986) 152 are maybe too extreme in seeing in the divine favour a 'tactics' of the commanders.

<sup>103</sup> Lonis (1979) 117-124; *GSW* 2.105-108; Hutchinson (2000) 46-47, 188-189; Parker (2004) 142.

<sup>104</sup> Anderson (1974) 34-35; Hutchinson (2000) 46-47; Struck (2003) 171, 182; Parker (2004) 144-147; Nevin (2017) 14. On the exploitation of religious norms in general, see Lanni (2008) 488. *GSW* 3.58-60 acknowledges the potential of oracles as a morale booster, but he also remarks as a negative outcome could be devastating for the troops' feelings. Cf. Jameson (1993) 198-199.

<sup>105</sup> *Hdt.* 7.140-143. Cf. *Plut. Them.* 13.2-5. Struck (2003) 182-183. Tuci (2006) 51-52 hypothesises that the second oracle was utterly invented by Themistocles, with the only intent to back up his strategy.

<sup>106</sup> Evans (1983).

Yet, the story is consistent with the liberty that some commanders took in interpreting other kinds of divine signs.<sup>107</sup> Holladay suggests that the Athenian delegation to Delphi ‘pushed’ the Pythia to name Salamis because Themistocles already had a strategy in mind, which would denote a different, more invasive type of control over forecasting practices.<sup>108</sup> While Xenophon was delivering a motivational speech to build the confidence of the depressed Ten Thousand after the murder of their previous leaders, one soldier sneezed. The reaction to this natural occurrence was disproportionate and exemplifies the Greeks’ anxiety caused by divine signs in moments of stress. Xenophon writes that:

When he said so, a man sneezed (πτάρνυται). Once they heard [this], all the soldiers had an impulse (μῆ ὄρμη) to worship the god, and Xenophon said: “Men, since an omen of Zeus Soter (οἰωνὸς τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ σωτήρος) appeared, when we were talking about [our] survival, it seems to me appropriate to vow a sacrifice to this god for the safety (εὐξασθαι τῷ θεῷ τούτῳ θύσειν σωτήρια) as first thing we do when we arrive in a friendly country [...]”. Therefore, they vowed this, and they sang the *paean* (ἐπαιάνισαν).<sup>109</sup>

No one would doubt Xenophon’s piety, but it is evident how, even with the best intentions and morals, quick-thinking commanders could take advantage of the situation to improve the morale of their soldiers.<sup>110</sup> The ‘miracle’ and Xenophon’s speech put the Ten Thousand in a different spirit, making them ready for action, as opposed to being ‘useless’.<sup>111</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 4.7.4. See also Diod. 15.52.3-4, 80.2-3; Front. *Str.* 1.12.11; Plut. *Per.* 35.1 for attempts of defusing the negative result of similar predictions.

<sup>108</sup> Holladay (1987) 184-186.

<sup>109</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 3.2.9. It seems peculiar, but a sneeze is recognised as divine sign in the *Odyssey* (17.541-550) too, giving more credibility to Xenophon’s tale.

<sup>110</sup> Hutchinson (2000) 45-46; Parker (2004) 141.

<sup>111</sup> Cf. above, p. 249.

In this framework of religious anxiety, the importance of religious manifestations is evident. The quotation above also offers an example of this practice. After the 'divine sign', a vow and singing the *paeon* were performed, likely to increase the men's confidence and sense of community.<sup>112</sup> The *paeon* was a hymn usually sung immediately before battle, during the march towards the enemy or more rarely when assaulting the enemy lines or celebrating a victory.<sup>113</sup> Singing the *paeon* had a strong emotional component. Aeschylus represented Eteocles in the *Seven against Thebes* using a *paeon* to combat the soldiers' fear.<sup>114</sup> Aeneas Tacticus suggests the same stratagem as a way of counteracting panic in his manual on how to defend a city.<sup>115</sup> Pritchett recognises that the use of tunes, singing and music immediately before battle could have had a psychological effect, raising the morale of the soldiers before the clash.<sup>116</sup> The ancient sources did not acknowledge this function of music played on the field, but Pritchett's hypothesis seems convincing.<sup>117</sup>

It is not surprising that a religious hymn was the preferred solution against panic.

Panic was believed to have a divine origin, and was associated with Pan, Dionysius, or the

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<sup>112</sup> Dillery (1995) 183-189. Nevin (2017) 110 correctly points out that pre-battle sacrifices were much more common than those performed post-battle. However, she fails to acknowledge vows. On the practice, see GSW 3.230-239; Jameson (1993) 198. Giordano-Zecharya (2006) 68-70 recognises the vow of Eteocles as described in Aeschylus' *Seven against Thebes* as an example of the typical Athenian religious practice.

<sup>113</sup> Thuc. 1.50.5, 2.91.2, 4.42.3, 46.1, 7.44.6; Xen. *Anab.* 1.8.17, 10.9-10, 4.3.19, 8.15, 5.2.14-16; *Hell.* 2.4.17. Krentz (2013) 141. Parker (2004) 141 recognises the *paeon* as a morale booster.

<sup>114</sup> Aesch. *Sept.* 264-270. Cf. Aeschylus *Pers.* 393. Krentz (2007) 34 notes that the *paeon* is not mentioned in the Homeric poems and suggests that its introduction was a fifth century innovation. If Krentz is right, we should conclude that Aeschylus took inspiration from the contemporary war experience for his plays. On Eteocles as a positive example of leader in the first part of the play, see Hutchinson (1985) xxxv; Giordano-Zecharya (2006) 55-56; von Fritz (2007) 165. On Aeschylus experience in war, Andò (2011) 83. Partially *contra* Lendon (2005) 66 acknowledges the tendency of playwright to describe the fighting of the heroes in 'hoplitic' terms.

<sup>115</sup> Aen. Tact. 27.3-4. *Tactics* 182.

<sup>116</sup> GSW 1.105-108. Cf. Yellin (2008) 30-31; Krentz (2013) 140-141. On the Spartans' war-songs, see Pl. *Leg.* 629a, 667; Lazenby (1991) 87, 90.

<sup>117</sup> As Hanson (1989) 182 remarks, a passage of Aeschylus (*Sept.* 270) backs up this interpretation.

son of Ares Phobos.<sup>118</sup> Panic was sudden, spread fast, and often happened for no specific reason.<sup>119</sup> Often a panicked army just dissolved in front of the enemy.<sup>120</sup> It is not difficult to understand the reason for this association, and how religious practices helped in managing the stress of an oncoming battle.

After the *paean*, many Greeks simply uttered a war-cry while assaulting the enemy, which probably boosted their resolution and helped them cope with the stress of the incoming carnage.<sup>121</sup>

Pre-battle sacrifices likely had a similar function. The Spartans had a formalised and elaborate ritual of several sacrifices before battle, but other Greeks showed the same scruples.<sup>122</sup> In his account of the battle of Plataea, Herodotus states that without a favourable sacrifice, the Spartans could not fight;<sup>123</sup> the Ten Thousand demonstrated similar scruples 79 years later.<sup>124</sup> This practice was plausibly present in some form in every Greek army, although less attested than in Spartan contexts.<sup>125</sup> Their confidence in the help of the gods

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<sup>118</sup> E.g. Eur. *Bacch.* 302-4. Cf. Hom. *Il.* 17.593-600. Cf. Koziak (1999) 1076, 1081 on the divine nature of emotions in Homer. Parker (2005) 401 remarks on the likely connection between *πανικόν* and the god Pan. Cf. GSW 3.45. A cult of Phobos at Sparta. Plut. *Cleom.* 8.3, 9.17; Mactoux (1993) 261; Patera (2013) 112-115.

<sup>119</sup> E.g. Thuc. 4.125.1; Aen. Tact. 27.4. For a modern parallel, see Marshall (2000) 145-148; Holmes (2003) 229.

<sup>120</sup> Hanson (1989) 184-188; Lazenby (1993) 91; Echeverría (2011) 72. On a more general ground, see Patera (2013) 112.

<sup>121</sup> E.g. Thuc. 2.92.1, 4.112.1; Xen. *Anab.* 1.2.17, 1.8.18, 4.3.19; Ages. 2.10-11. *Warfare* 192; Yellin (2008) 27.

<sup>122</sup> Xen. *Lac. Pol.* 13.3. GSW 3.83-90; Jameson (1993) 197; Nevin (2017) 80, 82. Pritchett GSW 3.68-70 makes a distinction between *ἱερά*, divinatory sacrifices, and *σφάγια*, propitiatory sacrifices. Lonis (1979) 107-108 recognises a similar distinction highlighted by the active and middle usage of *θύω*. However, Jameson (1991) 200-201 warns against sharply distinguishing between the two.

<sup>123</sup> Hdt. 9.61.3-62.1.

<sup>124</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 4.3.17-18, 6.4.12. Anderson (1974) 34; Hutchinson (2000) 50. *Contra* Pritchett GSW 2.110 is quite sceptical about the possibility that these sacrifices could hinder the attack. However, Pritchett GSW 3.78-83 later acknowledges the importance of pre-battle predictions.

<sup>125</sup> E.g. Thuc. 6.69. Cf. Lonis (1979) 95-100; GSW 3.109-110, 113-116; Nevin (2017) 102.

and favourable omens likely improved the confidence of the soldiers. Indeed, the argument 'the gods are with us' motivated the soldiers and is a common theme in ancient sources.<sup>126</sup>

## Mood

As commented above, Boff defines mood as the momentary effect that external causes had on the soldiers' morale.<sup>127</sup> This phenomenon is sufficiently described in the ancient sources to argue for its existence in Classical Greek armies. Both Thucydides and Xenophon report how bad weather had a negative impact on the soldiers, causing panic or exasperation.<sup>128</sup> The same could be said for particularly stressful and difficult situations. For instance, the Peloponnesians were upset on the eve of the battle of Salamis because they wanted to be closer to their homes.<sup>129</sup> Other examples can be found in the Athenians' unhappiness due to the lack of water and space during the Spartan siege of Pylos,<sup>130</sup> the depressed Athenians leaving their camp in front of Syracuse, plagued by illnesses and leaving behind dead and sick comrades,<sup>131</sup> or the demoralised Ten Thousand after Clearchus' death.<sup>132</sup>

In particular, the lack of food was problematic. Xenophon remarks on the importance of feeding the troops. Having regular meals, especially after hard times, made the soldiers

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<sup>126</sup> E.g. Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.9-13; *Anab.* 3.2.4-6, 10; *Symp.* 4.48. Cf. GSW 3.15; Goodman & Holladay (1986) 151-152; Jameson (1993) 198; Parker (2004) 131; von Fritz (2007) 163-164; *Psychology* 96-100; Nevin (2017) 28, 97-100.

<sup>127</sup> Boff (2014) 865. Cf. Holmes (2003) 125-129.

<sup>128</sup> Thuc. 6.70.1; Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.2-3, *Anab.* 4.4.11-12. Cf. Hdt 8.12-14, in which the same pattern is referred to the Persians. More generally, see Crowley (2014), 107 n. 23.

<sup>129</sup> Hdt. 8.74.

<sup>130</sup> Thuc. 4.26.3-4.

<sup>131</sup> Thuc. 7.75.2-3, 6-7; Plut. *Nic.* 26.3.

<sup>132</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 3.1.

content, whilst the prospective lack of food had serious negative effects.<sup>133</sup> Hungry soldiers were not only unhappy, but they were also unruly and riotous. More than once, soldiers revolted because of the lack of food and pay.<sup>134</sup> This trend was so strongly felt by Xenophon that he pointed out his surprise at Epameinondas' men, who followed their commander in the last phases of the Second Peloponnesian Invasion (362 BC) even when the supplies ran low.<sup>135</sup>

A good commander was supposed to consider their soldiers' mood. If nothing could be done about stressful scenarios, bad weather, and illness, Xenophon unequivocally states that commanders were expected to tend to the needs of their soldiers.<sup>136</sup> As discussed in Chapter Two, the commander's care for his men was the cornerstone of 'willing obedience'.<sup>137</sup> Undoubtedly, there was a strong emotional component in this phenomenon, which could be more generally ascribed to morale.

Similarly, the emphasis that Xenophon puts on supply organisation could be recognised as an effort to keep the soldiers' mood favourable.<sup>138</sup> Teleutias' speech to the revolting soldiers in Aegina supports this theory. His first act as leader of the army was to provide food for the soldiers, promising that he would share everything that he had with them.<sup>139</sup> Before asserting his (charismatic) authority, Teleutias needed to tend to the needs

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<sup>133</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 3.5.3, 4.3.2. Cf. Thuc. 7.60.5, where the lack of food is acknowledged as one of the causes of the Athenians' low morale.

<sup>134</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.1-5, 5.1.

<sup>135</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.18.

<sup>136</sup> Xen. *Cyr.* 1.6.9; *Eq. Mag.* 6.2; *Mem.* 3.1.6. Lengauer (1979) 77; Howland (2000) 884; Hutchinson (2000) 53, 55, 189; Azoulay (2018) 61-64.

<sup>137</sup> Chapter Two 121-125.

<sup>138</sup> Cf. Chapter Five 290-191.

<sup>139</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.14.15.

of his soldiers, but only when they were in an appropriate emotional state was he able to assert his authority.

### **Cohesion**

Troops' cohesion is fundamental in battle. In modern armies, the soldiers' will to fight and endure tough conditions is often ascribed to the presence of comrades and group dynamics.<sup>140</sup> Small clusters of soldiers can develop primary groups, which are basic social units formed by a small group of people who live closely together for a certain amount of time.<sup>141</sup> Soldiers feel the need to be accepted and respected by the primary group, adhering to its internal values and defending the group and its members.<sup>142</sup> This mission drives soldiers to fight for their 'buddies', to endure hardship for the good of the group and even accept self-sacrifice.<sup>143</sup>

In his very influential book, Crowley suggests that primary groups were at the core of the Athenians' will to fight. After demonstrating that the Athenians tended to fight close

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<sup>140</sup> E.g. Marshall (2000) 59-60, 68-72. See Holmes (2003) 20-28 for a summary of the most relevant scholarly positions on groups dynamics.

<sup>141</sup> Shils & Janowitz (1948) 286-297; Watson (1980) 89-104; *Psychology* 7-18. Cf. the simpler formulation of Marshall (2000), esp. 41-42, 65.

<sup>142</sup> Holmes (2003) 316-319.

<sup>143</sup> Shils & Janowitz (1948) 284-285, 289-291; Watson (1980) 89-104. Hauser (1980) 191 describes military units as a surrogate family, and Yellin (2008), 45, 50-59 who frames the question in less scientific terms. Cf. *Psychology* 7-11 for an excellent summary of the theory and further bibliography.

to their fellow demesmen,<sup>144</sup> Crowley argues that the bond with these neighbours and friends was the main reason for which the Athenians fought when mustered.<sup>145</sup>

Larger groups should be taken into consideration too. The Athenian soldiers were organised in tribal contingents, as the casualty lists exemplify,<sup>146</sup> and tribal comradeship is well attested in civil contexts.<sup>147</sup> There is even evidence of tribal competitions, such as that of the dithyrambs in the city of Dionysia.<sup>148</sup> Consequently, it is possible that the tribal *τάξεις* generated some feelings of comradeship as well.<sup>149</sup> However, Crowley argues against this reading, suggesting that the evidence of tribal solidarity is not strong enough, and that the existence of demotic affiliation hindered the creation of a strong tribal spirit.<sup>150</sup> Crowley's objection is worth noticing, but it does not completely waive the idea of a strong tribal unity that generated cohesion. If it is true that most examples of tribal solidarity involve the elite, this might be due to the biased scope of the surviving evidence.<sup>151</sup> Recognising the demotic

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<sup>144</sup> Lys. 20.23. Cf. Lys. 16.14, Pl. *Lach.* 187 d-e on demesmen's solidarity. Whitehead (1986) 125-126; Lazenby (1991) 89; *Warfare* 195; Eckstein (2005) 482-483, 485. Cf. Xen. *Cyr.* 6.4.15. Hunt (2007) 130 argues that the *lochoi* were formed by people of the same geographical areas. Demes had a proper sense of community. See Sinclair (1988) 51-52; Wheeler (2011) 71-72. For instance, Lysias (23.3) mentions a point of rendezvous in Athens for the people of Decelea, so to be together even in the big city. Cf. *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1237. For a modern age parallel, Forrest (2002) 136 underlines how the similar origin and upbringing facilitated the creation of a strong bond between comrades in Napoleonic armies.

<sup>145</sup> *Psychology* 40-48, 105; Crowley (2014) 112-113. Cf. Holmes (2003) 297 on the importance of small groups in ancient and modern armies. However, van Wees *Warfare* 109 stresses how primary groups were not necessarily reflected by the army's organisation. He makes the examples of Alcibiades and Socrates at Potidaea, who dined together as members of different tribes (Pl. *Symp.* 219e; Plut. *Alc.* 7). However, it should be noted that Alcibiades and Socrates somehow ended fighting together.

<sup>146</sup> Sinclair (1988) 52; *Psychology* 71; Humphrey (2018) 735. On the casualty lists, see e.g. *IG I<sup>3</sup>* 1144;1147 = O&R 109.

<sup>147</sup> Sinclair (1988) 4, 52-53; Whitehead (1986) 224-225. Connor (2000) 59 remembers the communal cults and celebrations, which likely strengthened the sense of community of the tribe.

<sup>148</sup> Humphreys (2018) 748-750. Cf. Xen. *Eq. Mag.* 1.26.

<sup>149</sup> Hanson (1989) 117-125.

<sup>150</sup> *Psychology* 74-79.

<sup>151</sup> Cf. Ober (1989) 113 on the surviving orations.

groups as the main associative structure is agreeable, but primary groups and other dynamics generating cohesion (e.g. secondary groups, *esprit de corps*) do not necessarily exclude each other.<sup>152</sup>

Indeed, there is reason to argue that groups larger than primary were thought in antiquity to have strong cohesion. As discussed below, the men with Alcibiades in 409 BC developed a strong *esprit de corps*.<sup>153</sup> In the *Cyropaedia*, Cyrus appreciates the importance of cohesion, but based his efforts in this regard on *taxeis* of 100 men, who were forced to live together in a gigantic tent.<sup>154</sup> Sekunda compellingly argues that mercenary armies were assembled in distinct *lochoi*, and that the soldiers felt a personal attachment to the *lochagos*.<sup>155</sup> This suggests that the *lochoi* were cohesive units. In the *Anabasis*, the Arcadians and Peloponnesians grouped together when the army split, in reason of their communal origin.<sup>156</sup> Consequently, it is plausible that larger groups were thought to contribute to men's cohesion in parallel to the primary groups, and probably they did so; the Athenian tribes might be an example of this trend, although, admittedly, we do not have explicit evidence of this in combat.

In addition to tribes, there is evidence of other groups in Athens. The *hippeis* were strongly distinguished for the particular nature of their service – they were selected from a

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<sup>152</sup> For discussion of this dynamic in modern armies, see e.g. Hauser (1980) 194; Marshall (2000) 165; Holmes (2003) 307-315

<sup>153</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.15, Plut. *Alc.* 29.1.

<sup>154</sup> Xen. *Cyr.* 2.1.25-28. Cf. Wood (1964) 56; Smith (1990) 154-155. Van Wees *Warfare* 109 correctly points out the fancifulness of these tents, which are evidently a fantastic detail. Cf. Sekunda (2018) 84. Yet, this passage tells us that Xenophon thought in terms of larger groups than primary groups.

<sup>155</sup> Sekunda (2018), esp. 66, 73, 83-86. Nussbaum (1967) 33; Lee (2004) 307; Trundle (2004) 109.

<sup>156</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 6.2.9-12, 15.

separate list than the *hoplites* –<sup>157</sup> and coming from the elite of Athens, they could identify themselves as a separate group, which probably had consequences for their combative spirit.<sup>158</sup> The funerary monument for the dead cavalymen in the 394/3 BC, which stood close to the official *demosion sema*, demonstrates the strong identity of the *hippeis*.<sup>159</sup>

Cohesion seems to have played a substantial role in ancient morale, but not every commander appreciated this phenomenon. The cohesive rhetoric focused mostly on ethnicity: Greeks vs. Barbarians, Athenians vs. Spartans.<sup>160</sup> In other words, the commanders focused more on the whole army rather than on smaller primary and secondary groups.

A passage of Xenophon's *Hellenica* confirms this conclusion. Alcibiades, during his campaign in Asia Minor, re-grouped two different armies under his command. However, his men did not like their Athenian comrades:

When Alcibiades draw together (συντάττοντος) the army in Lampsacus, the soldiers [who were with him] beforehand did not want to be together (οὐκ ἐβούλοντο...συντάττεσθαι) with those under Thrasyllus (τοις μετὰ Θρασύλλου), because they were unbeaten (ἀήττητοι), whilst the others had been defeated (ήττημένοι ἦκοιεν). However, all of them passed the winter [together] fortifying (τειχίζοντες) Lampsacus. (trans. Brownson).<sup>161</sup>

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<sup>157</sup> Lys. 16.13. Bugh (1988) 11, 286-187. See Chapter Five 285-286.

<sup>158</sup> Spence (1993) 81, 199-202.

<sup>159</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 5222. Hurwit (2007) 35-40; Spence (1993) 67-68. Bugh (1988) 139-140, Spence (1993) 219, and O&R 7 recognise this monument as an attempt to restore the image of the *hippeis* after the parenthesis of the Thirty Tyrants, without acknowledging the monument role in attesting the *hippeis'* identity.

<sup>160</sup> Smith (1990) 153-155; Rood (2004) 309, 314; *Psychology* 44-46; Sanders (2012) 152. Cf. Low (2007) 55-58. On the theme of special qualities of the Athenians, see Sinclair (1988) 13-14; Ober (1989) 261-166; Lendon (2005) 254-256.

<sup>161</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.15. Cf. Plut. *Alc.* 29.1. Cf. the critique of Marshall (2000) 42 of a similar operation in the Second World War American army, and the similar case reported by Holmes (2003) 327 on the protest following the disbandment of an Australian battalion in 1918.

This passage implies that the soldiers identified with their contingent, even if it was ephemeral, and its commander. Furthermore, Alcibiades did not show any concern for the cohesion of the troops. He just adopted the most practical solution in organisational terms. The same could be said for Spartan commanders. The Spartans sent men selected by lot from each *loch* to patrol the island of Sphacteria in 425 BC.<sup>162</sup> Consequently, Xenophon might have reached a greater insight than his contemporaries in the understanding of how cohesion works.

### **Dealing with the enemy's emotions**

Greek commanders paid attention to their enemy's emotions too, trying to demoralise and destabilise opposing troops.<sup>163</sup> Examples of this practice can be seen from the Persian Wars. Herodotus reports that Themistocles had a message written at each watering spot on the Euboean coast, inviting the Ionians to rebel against the Persians and join the other Greeks.<sup>164</sup> The intent of Themistocles was twofold: on the one hand, he tried sincerely to make the Ionians change sides, but, on the other hand, he also wanted to increase the Persians' suspicions against the Ionians.<sup>165</sup>

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<sup>162</sup> Thuc. 4.8.9.

<sup>163</sup> Whitby (2004) 231.

<sup>164</sup> Hdt. 8.19, 22. Cf. Plut. *Them.* 9.1-2, 4.

<sup>165</sup> Hdt. 8.22.3; Plut. *Them.* 9; Polyæn. 1.30.7. On Themistocles' cunning, Detienne & Vernant (1974) 3-4, 11, 17, 20-21, 313-314; Evans (1982) 24; Kallet-Marx (1993) 39. Interestingly, the stratagem is duplicated. The second time (Hdt. 9.98.3) the stratagem was associated with the Spartan king Leotychidas, before the battle of Mycale (479 BC).

The Peloponnesian War offers several examples of how enemies' emotions were exploited for tactics and strategy. Thucydides states that the Spartan king Archidamus attacked Acharnae in 431 BC because:

The Acharnians, who with three thousand hoplites formed a large part of the citizen body, would not stand by to see the destruction of their own property (οὐ περιόψεσθαι ἐδόκουν τὰ σφέτερα διαφθαρέντα), but would incite the rest of the city to join them in battle. (trans. Hammond).<sup>166</sup>

Archidamus correctly believed that the Acharnians would want to stop the ravaging of their land or, at the very least, would afterwards refuse to fight to save others' goods.<sup>167</sup> The attack created much dissent in the city.<sup>168</sup> Platias goes even further, hypothesising that Archidamus intended to exploit the Acharnians' dissatisfaction as a diplomatic weapon to conclude the war quickly.<sup>169</sup>

The same pattern is also acknowledged among Athenian leaders, corroborating the reliability of the practice in contemporary warfare. As seen in Chapter One, at the beginning of the Sicilian expedition, the three *strategoi autocratores* debated over how to organise the attack. Nicias suggested an indirect line.<sup>170</sup> While Segesta would be protected from Selinus

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<sup>166</sup> Thuc. 2.20.4. Whitehorne (2005) 44 recognises the references to the people of Acharnae in Aristophanes' *Acharnians* as emblematic of the great support that still, at the time of the play, existed for the war. Cf. *Commentary ad loc.* on the numbers of the Acharnians.

<sup>167</sup> Echeverría (2011) 51-53. On the traditional importance of defending the fatherland, Hanson (1996) 302-303; Mitchell (1996) 97-8. On the self-interest of the Athenians, see e.g. Hau (2008) 127-128. Dawson (1996) 50 is right in pointing out that the economic impact on an invasion was substantially limited, but the short-term consequences for the smaller household should be considered more.

<sup>168</sup> Thuc. 2.21.2-3; Aristoph. *Acharn.* 223-237. Cf. MacDowell (1983) 148. Kagan (2010) 53 underlines the rationality of Pericles' plan, and how only an exceptionally influential leader could have persuaded the Athenians to engage in such a radical strategy.

<sup>169</sup> Platias (2002) 384-387. Cf. *Tactics* 181. Kallet-Marx (1993) 84-85 on Archidamus characterisation as a smart commander in Thucydides.

<sup>170</sup> Thuc. 6.47.

and Syracuse, the fleet would move towards Syracuse to instil fear in the enemy pushing towards a diplomatic solution. Instead, Alcibiades proposed creating a base in Catane, from which they could attack Syracuse directly.<sup>171</sup> Lamachus wanted to attack Syracuse directly.<sup>172</sup> It is evident from Thucydides' account that both Nicias and Lamachus considered the psychological aspects when planning their attack. In particular, the arguments put forward by Lamachus in favour of his plan are fascinating:

Every army, he said, inspires the greatest terror (δεινότατον εἶναι) at the very beginning: but if its appearance is long delayed, people recover their courage and are far from impressed at the eventual sight of it (τῇ γνώμῃ ἀναθαρσοῦντας ἀνθρώπους). But if the Athenians made a sudden attack, while the enemy were still in fearful suspense, they would have the best chance of victory ((μάλιστ' ἂν σφεῖς περιγενέσθαι καὶ κατὰ πάντα ἂν αὐτοὺς ἐκφοβῆσαι): all would combine to spread panic — the sight of them (they would never seem so numerous as on that first view), the dread of the consequences, and above all the immediate danger of battle. (trans. Hammond).<sup>173</sup>

Not only has Lamachus presented an analysis of the situation with impressive acumen and tactical insight,<sup>174</sup> but he also demonstrates a great appreciation of the emotional dynamics of morale. He seemed to appreciate the effect of surprise on soldiers' emotions, as well as what fear can do to an army.<sup>175</sup> Most importantly, he consciously exploited these emotions in elaborating his strategy.

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<sup>171</sup> Thuc. 6.48.

<sup>172</sup> Thuc. 6.49.

<sup>173</sup> Thuc. 6.49.2. Cf. Plut. *Nic.* 14.3-4.

<sup>174</sup> See the consideration of the citizens living in the *chora*, who are then cut out of the action, at Thuc. 6.49.3.

<sup>175</sup> Cf. Xen. *Eq. Mag.* 8.19-20 on the influence of surprise. *Tactics* 181. Boegehold (1979) 150 underlines how the surprise effect was substantial in ancient tactics. The scholar focuses on Brasidas, but this statement could be applied to every Greek commander. For a modern parallel, see Campbell (2012) 160-161, on the psychological impact of the perception of a menace.

The ancient sources report other means of intimidating the opponent. For instance, the discipline and physical state of the soldiers could be displayed to allies and enemies. Clearchus paid great attention to deploying the Ten Thousand in a martial fashion when they went before Philinos, the Greek counsellor of Artaxerxes. He wanted to impress Philinos to discourage a Persian attack and, possibly, to attain a new employer.<sup>176</sup> Agesilaus performed another famous stunt during his campaign in Asia Minor (396/394 BC) when he ordered his troops to strip some Persian prisoners to show their pale flesh and bad physical shape to motivate the fitter Greeks.<sup>177</sup>

Alongside surprise, the ancient sources proposed that numerical superiority was the most common source of emotional response in an army.<sup>178</sup> Being numerically superior to the enemy gave the soldiers confidence to the extent that, on many occasions, the commander had to remind a numerically inferior army that numbers were not everything.<sup>179</sup> The Phliasians appreciated this, and during their revolt against Sparta (381 BC), they repeatedly showed the Spartans their army lined up outside the city to stress their numerical advantage.<sup>180</sup>

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<sup>176</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 2.3.3-4.

<sup>177</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.19; Ages. 1.28. For the dates, see Cartledge (1987) 192-194. Krentz (1995) *ad loc.* argues that Xenophon disapproved of Agesilaus' methods because undervaluing the enemy was dangerous. However, this reading does not agree with e.g. *Anab.* 3.2.10-16.

<sup>178</sup> E.g. Thuc. 6.68.1, 2.87.6; Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.11, 4.3.11-12; Hellenika Oxyrhynchia *BNJ* 66 F7 XIV.1; Diod. 11.33.4; 13.50.4. Patera (2013) 112. Cf. du Picq (1914) 65-67 and Shay (1994) 8 on the psychological grounds of the numbers, especially for mass military formations.

<sup>179</sup> E.g. Thuc. 5.102, 7.63, 3, 67.3. Devine (1983) 209 suggests that something similar could have happened at Leuctra. Epameinondas' ἔμβολον, if Devine's reconstruction is right, appeared to the Spartan much more solid and manned than it really was.

<sup>180</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.13-17.

## CONCLUSION

The commander's role in managing morale seems an important aspect of Greek military leadership. Xenophon was clear in this regard, and Thucydides' attention to emotional phenomena seems to corroborate this conclusion.

Having examined this overview of emotional episodes in ancient war contexts, we can now conclude that the ancient Greek commanders had a good grasp of morale and how it works. The attention given to the commander's example on the field is surely justified, but this narrow focus does not rightfully credit the commander's efforts and knowledge of morale. The plurality of means that they used to elicit the required emotional response in friends and enemies denotes attention and understanding, and it is extremely fascinating to note how these means exploited motivation, confidence, spirit, and mood.

Cohesion deserves separate mention. The importance of this dynamic in Greek morale is not under question, but some Greek commanders demonstrated that they did not fully appreciate how this phenomenon worked. Possibly as an unconscious corrective, the idealistic arguments are particularly well represented in the ancient sources, especially in speeches.<sup>181</sup> If part of this rhetoric is due to the re-elaboration of these pieces, the possibility that real-life commanders indulged in these themes should be considered.

Xenophon, on the other hand, seemed to have understood cohesion well, and it is challenging to assess whether this was more of a reflection of his personal research, or of the advancement of military science.

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<sup>181</sup> Cf. Xen. *Mem.* 3.5.7-11.

## 5. STRATEGOI AND OIKONOMOI: THE MANAGEMENT OF A MILITARY CAMPAIGN

The *strategoí* had control over all aspects of a military campaign. This involved much more than just tactics and fighting. Xenophon is extremely clear in this regard. In the *Memorabilia*, Socrates asks a young Athenian who was taught by the *hoplomachos* Dionysodorus – a teacher of warfare and combat – what he learnt from him. When the youth confessed that Dionysodorus only taught him about deploying an army, Socrates replies:

“But this is only a part (μέρος) of the *strategia*, and not the most important (πολλοστόν)! It is necessary that the *strategos* is skilled in providing (παρασκευαστικόν) what is needed for the war, able to supply (ποριστικόν) the necessary goods (τῶν ἐπιτηδείων) for the soldiers, resourceful (μηχανικόν) and industrious (ἐργαστικόν), full of care (ἐπιμελῆ) and able to endure and witty (καρτερικόν καὶ ἀγχίνου). He needs to be generous (φιλόφρονά) but also severe (ὠμόν), frank (ἀπλοῦν) but also treacherous (ἐπίβουλον), able to defend (φυλακτικόν) but also rapacious (κλέπτην); one who gives and takes (προετικόν καὶ ἄρπαγα), who gives gifts and takes what is due to him (φιλόδωρον καὶ πλεονέκτην), cautious but ready to attack (ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἐπιθετικόν). And much more needs to be acquired, both from nature and instruction, for the one who is a good *strategos* (καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ φύσει καὶ ἐπιστήμη δεῖ τὸν εὖ στρατηγήσοντα ἔχειν).”<sup>1</sup>

Xenophon recognises in the good *strategos* many things, one of which is a manager.

The focus of this chapter is investigating this aspect of the Athenian *strategoí* and other Greek military leaders.

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<sup>1</sup> Xen. *Mem.* 3.1.6.

There is no doubt that the organisation of a military campaign was extremely important. Previous scholarship has widely acknowledged this,<sup>2</sup> and has produced many excellent studies analysing the administration of war funds, and, in lesser measure, the provisioning and logistics of Greek campaigns.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, the *strategoí*'s role in the administration of these matters is still poorly defined. In this chapter, we will question how much agency the *strategoí* had in the organisation of a campaign, and their responsibilities in this matter will be highlighted. What we have defined as 'organisational matters' has been split into four categories – the mustering of troops, the preparation of supplies, the transportation of men and goods to the target area, and the administration of the allotted funds – with a Section dedicated to each of them.

## ORGANISING THE ARMY

The Assembly's deliberation could be considered the first act of a campaign. The *demos* appointed one or more *strategoí* for the mission and deliberated over the funds and number of men allotted.<sup>4</sup>

The fifth and early fourth century procedure for mustering the citizen-soldiers is fairly clear. The citizen-soldiers were drawn from the *κατάλογος*, a list of citizens physically and financially able to fight as hoplites.<sup>5</sup> In the past, it has been argued that a central registry

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<sup>2</sup> Dawson (1996) 81; Asmonti (2008) 92-93. See Moore (2013) 460 on the increasing importance of logistics after the Persian wars.

<sup>3</sup> Funds management: GSW 1.3-84; Garland (1989); Kallet-Marx (1993); Kallet (2001). Logistics: Engels (1978); (2013); Gabrielli (1995). Provisions: GSW 1.30-52.

<sup>4</sup> *Generals* 24-26. See Chapter One 21.

<sup>5</sup> Thuc. 6.31.3; Arist. *Pol.* 1303a 8; [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 26.1. Cf. The verbal form *καταλέγω*: Aristoph. *Ach.* 1065; Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.34, 4.21; Lys. 14.6; [Lys.] 9.15; Diod. 11.81.4, 84.4, 15.26.2.

of hoplites existed in Classical Athens,<sup>6</sup> but the hypothesis of the existence of a temporary register is today widely preferred.<sup>7</sup> This temporary κατάλογος would have been drawn from the deme's lists,<sup>8</sup> however the Athenians served in tribal units.<sup>9</sup> Consequently, Christ believes that a list for each tribe was created as needed.<sup>10</sup> This hypothesis also explains why muster rolls are mentioned in the plural in several references.<sup>11</sup>

Once the list(s) were drawn up, the *stratego*i had the power to call up soldiers from them.<sup>12</sup> A public list of the Athenians who had to serve in a specific campaign was displayed in the *agora*, where everybody could read it.<sup>13</sup> In addition to this, a messenger or σαλπικτής was sent to call up the soldiers deme by deme, in case they did not read the list in the *agora*.<sup>14</sup>

The *taxiarchoi*, the elected officers of the tribal armies, were undoubtedly involved in the mustering.<sup>15</sup> Plausibly, the *taxiarchoi* managed the mustering on a tribal level, helping to

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<sup>6</sup> E.g. *HCT ad.* 6.26.2. O&R 109 argues that, before the reforms of 464 BC, the precision in the lists was considerably inferior, as *IG I<sup>3</sup> 1144* demonstrates. Cf. Sinclair (1988) 52-53; *Generals* 24-26.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 26.1. Hansen (1985) 83-89; Sinclair (1988) 52; *Commentary ad.* 2.13.7, (2007) 28-29; Strauss (1996) 313; *Generals* 24, n.67; Christ (2001) 400; *Psychology* 22-23, 27-31. In general, Thomas (1989) 40 underlines how the archives and documents were still rudimentary in the fifth century. Cf. Christ (2001) 401.

<sup>8</sup> *IG I<sup>3</sup> 138*; [Dem.] 50.6. Hansen (1985) 85; Sekunda (1992) 324; Christ (2001) 401; *Psychology* 28-29; Pritchard (2007) 342-343. Andrewes (1981) 1 correctly points out how κατάλογος was used both for the complete 'list' of Athenian hoplites and the list compiled for a specific campaign.

<sup>9</sup> Christ (2001) 398-399; Hornblower (2007) 28-29; Hunt (2007) 129-130; *Psychology* 28-29, 36, 70-71; Humphrey (2018) 735. On tribal contingents, see *Hdt.* 6.111.1, *Thuc.* 6.98.4, 101.5, *Lys.* 16.15. It does not seem accidental that the lists of the war dead were organised by tribe. E.g. *IG I<sup>3</sup> 1144*. Cf. *Thuc.* 2.33.3.

<sup>10</sup> Christ (2001) 402.

<sup>11</sup> *Thuc.* 6.26.2, 31.3; *Diod.* 11.84.4.

<sup>12</sup> *Thuc.* 4.90.1; *Xen. Hell.* 1.1.34; *Lys.* 14.6; [Lys.] 9.4, 15; *Diod.* 11.81.4, 84.4 MacDowell (1978) 160; *Generals* 24; *Psychology* 28.

<sup>13</sup> *Aristoph. Av.* 448-450. Christ (2001) 403.

<sup>14</sup> *And.* 1.45; *Aristoph. Pax* 311-12; *Achar.* 1083; *Plut. Phoc.* 24.4. *Psychology* 30. Christ (2001) 404 argues that the σαλπικτής was in charge in cases of emergency. However, this was not always the case: cf. *Aristoph. Pax* 1171-90.

<sup>15</sup> *Aristoph. Pax* 1171-84; *Poll.* 8.115. Andrewes (1981) 1-2; Ober (1985) 96; Wheeler (1991) 134; Christ (2001) 400, 407.

compile the lists and check the physical status of the hoplites, while the *strategoi* supervised the *taxiarchoi*'s operate.

The extent to which the *strategoi* were involved in the process is debatable. Hamel believes that the *strategoi*'s control of the process was marginal.<sup>16</sup> She argues that mustering was quite 'mechanical', thus limiting the agency of the *strategos* in the matter.

Nevertheless, the sources stress the role of the *strategoi* and *taxiarchoi* in the process, and not that of the Assembly.<sup>17</sup> In the early fourth century,<sup>18</sup> a soldier, perhaps named Polyaeus, accused the *strategos* Ctesicles of misconduct, because he was enrolled, despite already having served recently.<sup>19</sup> Polyaeus asked Ctesicles and his staff to be excused, but his request was denied. Furthermore, the *strategos*' entourage fined Polyaeus, allegedly because Polyaeus insulted the *strategos* in a public place.<sup>20</sup> Ps.Lysias implies that the *strategos* held responsibility for the lists. He was the one who selected the men, and who had the control of eventual dismissals.<sup>21</sup> However, Hamel notes that the *strategoi* were bound by

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<sup>16</sup> *Generals* 24-25.

<sup>17</sup> E.g. Thuc. 7.16.2; Lys. 29.3; Dem. 39.8. Andrewes (1981) 2; Garlan (1989) 148; Wheeler (1991) 143; Christ (2001) 398, 401; *Psychology* 28.

<sup>18</sup> Todd (2007) 581-585 acknowledges the speech as spurious, but dates it to the first half of the fourth century anyway.

<sup>19</sup> [Lys]. 9.4-6. MacLeod (1994) 154-155 suggests that Polyaeus might have been serving as a mercenary, explaining why he was mustered again. However, it seems doubtful that serving as a mercenary was counted as service for the city army.

<sup>20</sup> Christ (2001) 400 sees in this passage proof that the compilation of the list was a group effort. Nonetheless, the details are too scarce to understand who οἱ δὲ μετὰ Κτησικλέους τοῦ ἄρχοντος were. They could effectively have been Ctesicles' colleagues, although it is odd that they were not named if this was the case. Even if they were his colleagues, they were not necessarily the whole board of the *strategoi*; they could have been the *strategoi* assigned to the same mandate as Ctesicles. Cf. Dreher (1994) 166. However, they could have been the *strategos*' secretaries, as MacDowell (1994) 157-160 suggests.

<sup>21</sup> Christ (2001) 399-401, 404-406, 408-409.

an oath to muster the citizen-soldiers by dividing military service fairly among the citizens.

Consequently, she concludes that:

Occasional infractions do not imply that Athens' generals regularly disregarded their oath. We may believe that, at least from the early fourth century, generals were constrained to a considerable degree in their selection of troops by their need to consider the service records of those they were drafting.<sup>22</sup>

Hamel's statement is only acceptable to some extent. The existence of an oath presupposes that the *strategoï* should have taken into consideration the past service and complaints of prospective soldiers. Indeed, they also tended to assign lighter duties to the youngest hoplites, the *neotatoi*, and those over forty, like patrolling and garrisoning Attica.<sup>23</sup> However, the evident abuse of power reported by Ps.Lysias demonstrates that the *strategoï* *de facto* had the power to muster the men they wanted.<sup>24</sup> This was not the only case of a similar abuse.<sup>25</sup> For instance, Aristophanes implied that the hoplites selected from the list could be transferred to lighter duties,<sup>26</sup> plausibly by an officer, and Ps.Demosthenes reported the case of a *trierarchos* who was unjustly kept in service for over a year.<sup>27</sup> To conclude that the *strategoï* were "constrained to a considerable degree" simply does not sufficiently acknowledge the complexity of the picture presented by the ancient sources.

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<sup>22</sup> *Generals* 24. The oath is mentioned in [Lys.] 9.15. MacDowell (1994) 155; Christ (2001) 407.

<sup>23</sup> *Warfare* 241-243; *Psychology* 26.

<sup>24</sup> Andrewes (1981) 2; *Warfare* 103; *Psychology* 32.

<sup>25</sup> *Psychology* 27. Cf. Dem. 57.58, who enumerates several cases of abuse and misconduct in his deme.

<sup>26</sup> Aristoph. *Eq.* 1370-1371. Cf. Lys. 29.3.

<sup>27</sup> [Dem.] 50.43.

There is not a similarly explicit reference for the fifth century, but Aristophanes' farmers in the *Peace* accuse the *taxiarchoi* of calling them continuously.<sup>28</sup> The powers of the military officers, thus, resembled those described in *For the Soldier*.

This supposition is partially confirmed by another phenomenon related to the mustering: volunteers.<sup>29</sup> Some Athenians had to be called up or forced to serve,<sup>30</sup> but others were quite keen to fight.<sup>31</sup> The ancient sources record several examples in both the fifth and fourth centuries.<sup>32</sup>

This mustering procedure worked for a century and a half, without any sign of reform. However, before the middle of the fourth century,<sup>33</sup> Athens approved a massive reform of infantry mustering. Similarly, to the Spartan constitution,<sup>34</sup> they created 42 age-classes (ἡλικία), each identified by an eponymous hero.<sup>35</sup> Furthermore, the ἐφηβεία, a two-years period of training, was also introduced to prepare the young citizen-soldiers.<sup>36</sup> The

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<sup>28</sup> Aristoph. *Pax* 1172-1190, esp. 1179-1181. Cf. Aristoph. *Eq.* 1369-71 on the favouritism given to some hoplites, plausibly by the *strategoí* or the *taxiarchoi*.

<sup>29</sup> E.g. Diod 13.2.2; Plut. *Per.* 18.2. Cf. Thuc. 1.60.1. de Ste Croix (1972) 83; *Warfare* 100. Volunteers are attested for oarsmen too. [Dem.] 50-16; Rosivach (1985) 41, n.3, 53-57; Gabrielsen (1994) 106-107; Strauss (1996) 317.

<sup>30</sup> There are several references to Athenians who tried to avoid fighting: Isoc. 18.47; Lyc. 1.43. Cf. Pl. *Leg.* 944e; Aristoph. *Pax* 1130-1139.

<sup>31</sup> Delbrück (1975) 145; GSW 2.110-112; Andrewes (1981) 2; Krentz (2007) 148. Cautiousness on the matter is commendable. As Christ (2001) 399 underlines, even in appealing expeditions like the Sicilian campaign (415 BC), conscription was necessary.

<sup>32</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 505; Diod. 11.84.2-5; Plut. *Per.* 18.2. Cf. Stadter (1989) *ad loc.* on the problem with this tradition. Isae. 2.6 might be interpreted as another example, but it could also refer to mercenary service. GSW 2.110-112; Bettalli (2013) 103-107.

<sup>33</sup> There is a consensus in dating the reform to the second quarter of the fourth century: Andrewes (1981) 1-2; Ober (1985) 87, 96 (350s BC); Christ (2001) 412-416 and Chankowski (2010) 125 (*ante* 366 BC). *Contra* Rhodes (1981) *ad.* 53.4, who argues for the 335/4 BC. Hansen (1985) 88-89 argues that the two systems overlapped for a while. Cf. *Warfare* 103-104. *Contra* *Generals* 27, n. 75.

<sup>34</sup> Lazenby (1985) 7, 12.

<sup>35</sup> Aeschin. 2.168-169; [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 53.4, 7. *Generals* 27-28.

<sup>36</sup> Chankowski (2010) 114-128 suggests that the *ephebeia* had existed from the 370s BC. Cf. Gauthier (1976) *ad.* 4.51-52; Ober (1985) 93; *Tactics* 42-44. *Contra* Hansen (1991) 88-89 and van Wees *Warfare* 94-95 date the introduction of a compulsory *ephebeia* to after 338 BC.

*Boule* checked the new entries to the *deme's* lists,<sup>37</sup> and, if there were no objections, they accepted the 18 year old Athenians as *epheboi*, who would train for a year before undertaking a public examination. If they passed the revision, they served for another year as border patrol in Attica.<sup>38</sup>

The fourth century procedure limited the agency of the *strategoï*, who could now only count on the number of classes the Assembly called up.<sup>39</sup> Ober argues that this reform was intended to speed up the process of mustering.<sup>40</sup> However, it cannot be excluded that it was meant to limit the *strategoï's* powers in the matter, thus limiting abuses.

If the information on infantry mustering is scanty, for other corps it is even more incomplete. The *Constitution of the Athenians* reports that a list of cavalrymen able to serve in the army existed.<sup>41</sup> The *hipparchos* had the responsibility of checking and updating the list, so that the number of mustering cavalrymen was not depleted.<sup>42</sup> In this operation, he was probably helped by ten *phularchoi*.<sup>43</sup> Xenophon makes clear in the *Cavalry Commander* that the *hipparchos* did not have the power to coerce citizens to serve under his lead, but that he

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<sup>37</sup> [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 42. Ober (1985) 91-92; Rhodes (1988) 271; Christ (2001) 410; *Psychology* 25-26.

<sup>38</sup> Siewert (1977) suggests that a less formalised form of *ephebeia* existed from the late fifth century. However, evidence on the matter is scarce, and, if any, the proto-*ephebeia* was a voluntary programme. Cf. *Psychology* 25-26.

<sup>39</sup> Dem. 3.4-5; Aeschin. 2.133; Diod. 18.10.2. Christ (2001) 410-411 comments on how all these examples describe the mobilisation of many soldiers, which was likely exceptional. Some authors argue that this new system decreased the quality of Athenian armies. See e.g. Tritle (1989) 56; *Psychology* 27. *Contra* Christ (2001) 417-418; *Tactics* 152-153, n. 40.

<sup>40</sup> Ober (1985) 96.

<sup>41</sup> [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 49.2. Bugh (1988) 53-57; Pritchard (2018) 440-441.

<sup>42</sup> Xen. *Eq. Mag.* 1.2. MacDowell (1978) 160. The *Constitution of the Athenians* (49.2) records some officers, the *καταλογεῖς*, deputed to compile the lists of horsemen.

<sup>43</sup> Lys. 16.6-7; Poll. 8.94. Christ (2001) 400, n. 8; Pritchard (2018) 440. Certainly, the *phularchoi* had the responsibility of checking the mounts and the equipment of the horsemen. Xen. *Eq. Mag.* 1.8, 22-23. Cf. Bugh (1988) 53-54, 169-173.

could refer them to trial, if he failed to persuade them.<sup>44</sup> However, he also made it very clear that it was a *hipparchos'* responsibility to keep the number of his squad up so as to meet the legal requirements.<sup>45</sup>

Rowers' and sailors' enlistment followed more or less the same lines. Rosivach believes that rowers in the fifth century were mostly volunteers, both professional seamen and farmers taking advantage of the quieter months to earn extra income.<sup>46</sup> The soldiers assigned to each ship, *epibatai* and archers, might have either been volunteers too, or regularly mustered as infantrymen.<sup>47</sup> However, in situations of emergency citizens could be mustered as rowers too.<sup>48</sup> Apparently, the mustering of citizens was the usual procedure in the 350s, but it is noteworthy that Apollodorus, the speaker of *Against Polycles*, preferred to hire more competent men at his own expense.<sup>49</sup> Attention to the crews' quality is ascribed to Conon too, who carefully selected the best rowers for his ships.<sup>50</sup>

Both *trierarchoi* and *stratego*i were involved in the process. Timotheus was impeached and prosecuted in 373 BC because unable to man the ships assigned to him (ὁ δ' οὐ δυνάμενος αὐτόθεν τὰς ναῦς πληρῶσαι).<sup>51</sup> This episode suggests that the *stratego*i were responsible for the *trierarchoi*, who personally hired the crews.<sup>52</sup> It is telling that Iphicrates,

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<sup>44</sup> Xen. *Eq. Mag.* 1.9-12. Delebecque (1973) *ad* 1.9 points out Xenophon's concern for the lack of motivation of the Athenians for the military service. Pritchard (2018) 442-443 concludes that volunteers were common.

<sup>45</sup> Xen. *Eq. Mag.* 1.2.

<sup>46</sup> Rosivach (1985) 51-52.

<sup>47</sup> IG I<sup>3</sup> 60; Thuc. 8.24.2; Gabrielsen (1994) 106-107.

<sup>48</sup> E.g. Thuc. 3.16.1; Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.24-25.

<sup>49</sup> [Dem.] 50.6-7, 16. Strauss (1996) 313 points out how the *thetes* were excluded by the demotic registers in the fifth century, which might imply that a list for sailors did not exist.

<sup>50</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.16.

<sup>51</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.12.

<sup>52</sup> Thuc. 6.31.3; [Dem.] 50.9-10, 50. Steiner (2005) 410. The *trierarchoi*'s main responsibility was to provide funds for building and repairing the war-ships. Cf. Thuc. 6.31, 7.38.2; Arist. *Eq.* 912-918. Harrison (2003) 78.

taking Timotheus' place, made immediately clear to the *trierarchoi* who was in charge.

Xenophon writes:

When [Iphicrates] was appointed *strategos*, he manned the ship quickly (ὄξέως τὰς ναῦς ἐπληροῦτο), and got the *trierarchoi* in line (τρηράρχους ἠνάγκαζε).<sup>53</sup>

This conclusion is coherent with the importance given to the *trierarchoi* and their appointment. Until the first half of the fourth century, the *strategoí* chose the *trierarchoi* in active service from the pool of those who were appointed to the liturgy that year.<sup>54</sup> At the time of the *Constitution of the Athenians*, the *strategos ἐπὶ τὰς συμμορίας* was the one involved in these matters. Indeed, a massive reform of the liturgy of *trierarchia* is attested in 358 BC, the so-called reform of Periandros. Instead of relying on a relatively small group of rich Athenians, the burden of paying for the ships was divided between administrative units, the *summoríai*.<sup>55</sup> The *strategos ἐπὶ τὰς συμμορίας* was probably responsible for inscribing citizens to a *summoría*, as well as tending to any eventual *antidosis* trials.<sup>56</sup> Similarly, the *strategos ἐπὶ τὰς συμμορίας* probably selected which members of the *summoría* would act as *trierarchos* on the field, thus personally commanding one or more

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<sup>53</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.14. Jordan (1975) 119 recognises Iphicrates' more personal involvement on this occasion, but there is no evidence in support of this reading.

<sup>54</sup> Lys. 29.3; Dem. 39.8; [Dem.] 35.48. Gabrielsen (1994) 70, 73-74. Gabrielsen correctly suggests that too much credit has been given to Aristoph. *Eq.* 912-918, where Paphalgon threatens to appoint Sausage-Seller as *trierarchos* of a bad ship. Cf. *Generals* 29-30.

<sup>55</sup> Dem. 14.16, 35.48. Jordan (1975) 73-83; Gabrielsen (1994) 74-75, 182-198; Brun (1999) 276-277; Payen (2018) 144-145.

<sup>56</sup> Dem. 39.8; [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 61.1; IG II<sup>3</sup> 370, ll. 41-21, 204-213. *Generals* 29.

ships. At this point, the link between the *trierarchoi* and those who paid for the ships was much looser than before.<sup>57</sup>

## SUPPLYING THE EXPEDITION

Once the men were mustered, the *strategoí* were meant to organise the supplies for the campaign. As mentioned above, in the *Memorabilia* and *Cavalry commander* Xenophon explicitly acknowledges these organisational matters as a fundamental part of military leadership.<sup>58</sup> On two distinct occasions, Isocrates states the need to be ‘warlike’ (πολεμικός) in the setting up of a military campaign (ταῖς παρασκευαῖς).<sup>59</sup> Although what he was trying to say is not totally clear, Isocrates underlines connection between martial virtues and organisational skills.

The same trend seems applicable to the fifth century too. Nicias reported to the Assembly what he believed was necessary for the expedition in Sicily. As reported by Thucydides, Nicias stressed the great number of soldiers, but also the importance of supplies.<sup>60</sup>

“These then are what I consider the requirements: [...] sufficient ships for overwhelming naval superiority, so there is no extra problem in bringing in supplies (ἵνα καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ῥᾶον ἐσκομιζώμεθα); merchant ships to transport the grain, wheat and roasted barley, we shall also need from home; master-bakers conscripted under hire in fair proportion from our mills, so that our forces will still have food if we are detained by adverse sailing conditions

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<sup>57</sup> *Generals* 28. On the traditional role of the *trierarchos* see Gabrielsen (1994) 37-39.

<sup>58</sup> *Xen. Mem.* 3.1.6; *Eq. Mag.* 6.2. Lee (2009) 394 recognises the attention paid to logistics as an effect of the professionalisation of the commander. However, he does not question how these needs were fulfilled in fifth century campaigns.

<sup>59</sup> *Isoc.* 2.24, 8.136.

<sup>60</sup> *Thuc.* 6.20-21.

(ἦν που ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας ἀπολαμβάνομεθα), as few cities will be able to cater for such a large army. Generally, we must equip ourselves as completely as possible, and not leave anything dependent on others (ἀ τε ἄλλα ὅσον δυνατὸν ἐτοιμάσασθαι, καὶ μὴ ἐπὶ ἑτέροις γίγνεσθαι).” (trans. Hammond).<sup>61</sup>

From this passage, it is possible to deduce that the *strategoï* exposed in the *Ecclesia* what they believed was necessary for the expedition, presumably letting the *demos* deliberate on the list. However, the outcome of Nicias’ speech suggests something different. The *demos* believed that Nicias was on top of things and gave him and his colleagues the authority to decide for themselves the number of soldiers and funds for the campaign.<sup>62</sup> Nicias’ list is not mentioned further, and there is no reason to believe that the Athenians deliberated upon it. Undeniably, the Sicilian expedition was an exceptional case, and the *strategoï* had the extraordinary power of allocating resources for the expedition themselves. However, it should be noted that there is no evidence to indicate that the *Ecclesia* discussed how the allocated funds should be spent. The Assembly certainly deliberated on how many men and funds to allot to a specific objective, but there is no reason to believe that it was more involved than that in the preparation of a campaign.

The preparation for Demosthenes’ expedition at the end of 414 BC supports this reading.<sup>63</sup> Demosthenes received his mandate from the *Ecclesia*, to muster citizens and allies in support of Nicias, but he was personally in charge of the organisation.<sup>64</sup> Probably, the Assembly allocated a budget to Demosthenes as usual, which Thucydides does not record,

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<sup>61</sup> Thuc. 6.22. Cf. Plut. *Alc.* 20.1.

<sup>62</sup> Thuc. 6.26. Anderson (1970) 48 underlines how the preparations for the Sicilian Campaign were exceptional. However, the sources do not explain in what way they were exceptional, whether it was in the carefulness or extent of the preparation, or just the fact that there was some preparation at all.

<sup>63</sup> Thuc. 7.16-17.1

<sup>64</sup> Thuc. 7.17.1: “ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης ὑπομένων παρεσκευάζετο τὸν ἔκπλουν”.

and there is no reason to doubt that it was up to Demosthenes to decide how to spend this money.

The *strategoï* seemed to have substantial agency over the allocated funds, but they had some fixed items to take care of. The *Cavalry commander* reports a useful list of things that the *hipparchoi* had to handle. The *hipparchoi* were in charge of supplying fodder for the horses,<sup>65</sup> tents, water, firewood, and “other useful things”(ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων).<sup>66</sup> Considering that the *hipparchoi* had similar duties and powers to the *strategoï*, it is reasonable to believe that the latter tended to similar needs to the former, but for the whole army.<sup>67</sup>

Τὰ ἐπιτήδεια is quite generic, but more often than not indicates food, which is noticeably absent in Xenophon’s list.<sup>68</sup> Food was certainly a concern for Greek commanders. Campaigns could fail due to a lack of food, which is what happened in Cyprus (450 BC).<sup>69</sup> The position of Demosthenes in Pylos (425 BC) was considered very weak because the supplies were insufficient.<sup>70</sup> Xenophon even arrives at the conclusion that without an appropriate flow of provisions a commander would not be able to exercise his authority.<sup>71</sup> Thus, it is unsurprising that military leaders gave great attention to gathering and

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<sup>65</sup> Xen. *Eq. Mag.* 1.3. The same was valid for pack animals. Hammond (1983) 29; Gabrielli (1995) 119-120; Engels (2013) 356, 359.

<sup>66</sup> Xen. *Eq. Mag.* 6.3. Cf. Xen. *Cyr.* 6.2.23. Hutchinson (2000) 194-195. Van Wees *Warfare* 104 n. 11 sees in this passage a list of things that the *hipparchos* must attain during the campaign, and not prepare beforehand and bring with them. If his argument stands for most of these items, the tents suggest otherwise.

<sup>67</sup> Cf. Chapter One 34, n. 101.

<sup>68</sup> E.g. Xen. *Cyr.* 6.2.30. Hutchinson (2000) 56, 190. Cf. Aristoph. *Ach.* 541-554 for the typical food gathered: garlic, onions, olives, dried fish, wine and water. See also Jordan (1975) 109. Xen. *Cyr.* 6.2.31 mentions salted meat.

<sup>69</sup> Thuc. 1.112.4: Κίμωνος δὲ ἀποθανόντος καὶ λιμοῦ γενομένου ἀπεχώρησαν ἀπὸ Κιτίου.

<sup>70</sup> Thuc. 4.8.8.

<sup>71</sup> Xen. *Cyr.* 1.6.9. Cf. Xen. *Anab.* 2.2.14-16; *Hell.* 1.3.19; *Eq. Mag.* 6.2. GSW 1.30; Hutchinson (2000) 228; Bassett (2002) 449; Engels (2013) 351. For a modern parallel, see Manning (1991) 459; Shay (1994) 17-18; Boff (2014) 860.

controlling the access to food. At Plataea (479 BC), the Greeks wanted to move the army onto an island created by the rivers near the Cithaeron because the Persians had cut their access to water and provisions.<sup>72</sup> The Corinthian Aristaeus, the leading *strategos* of the besieged Potidaea in 432 BC, considered compelling the major part of his troops to escape, because he was concerned by the situation regarding supplies.<sup>73</sup> In 413 BC, the Spartan commander Gylippus, who was in charge of the Syracusan troops, led an assault on the Athenian stronghold at Plemmyrium, which was likely to hinder the Athenian logistics.<sup>74</sup> Later, in 376 BC, a Spartan fleet was left patrolling the area between Aegina, Cos, and Andros to stop the ships bringing grain to Athens.<sup>75</sup>

Food was the most crucial provision, but τὰ ἐπιτήδεια could include other things. Unfortunately, the ancient sources are quite limited in detail on this. In the *Cyropaedia* Xenophon enumerates the equipment in the expedition against Croesus: health supplies, straps, lumber for repairing the wagons, and tools.<sup>76</sup> Pritchett sees this passage as a standard enumeration of the τὰ ἐπιτήδεια, but it is not possible to exclude that different campaigns had different needs.<sup>77</sup> Furthermore, Xenophon proposes a sophisticated army structure, with a corps of engineers and artisans to tend to the roads and needs of the army. There is

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<sup>72</sup> Hdt. 9.25.2, 50-51.1. Engels (2013) 355-356. Engels suggests that possibly part of Themistocles' concern to fight at Salamis was for logistical reasons. Cf. Pritchett *GSW* 1.40. Wallace (1982) 183-185 underlines that the island mentioned by Herodotus does not exist, a detail which raises doubt about the account. Cf. Flower & Marincola (2002) *ad* 9.51.1. Undeniably, Herodotus misunderstood his source on this detail, but the episode is still of interest. Herodotus implies that logistics were a concern in the last quarter of the fifth century, and a practice old enough to be ascribed to 479 BC.

<sup>73</sup> Thuc. 1.65.1-2.

<sup>74</sup> Thuc. 7.23-24, esp. 24.3. *GSW* 1.44-45.

<sup>75</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.61.

<sup>76</sup> Xen. *Cyr.* 6.2.32-34.

<sup>77</sup> *GSW* 1.41.

no evidence that this structure existed outside of the *Cyropaedia*, thus one wonders how much Cyrus' army reflected the usual practices of Greek armies. Tools could be useful in many contexts. Thucydides, describing Demosthenes' fortification of Pylos (425 BC), points out that he did not bring the right tools – probably implying masonry tools.<sup>78</sup>

Undoubtedly, the arrangement of provisions was an essential step in organising a campaign. However, how and when provisions were handed down to the soldiers is not totally clear. In the passage reported above, Nicias focused mostly on the trip to Sicily. The extra provisions were meant to counteract possible delays due to bad weather.<sup>79</sup> Consequently, it seems reasonable to believe that the provisions of the *strategoï* were meant, first of all, to cover the soldiers' needs during the journey to the target area.<sup>80</sup> The same concept is expressed by the term ἐφόδια. Although the *ephodia* were sometimes expressed as a monetary value,<sup>81</sup> Trundle makes a convincing point by arguing that it mostly intended the food and expenses necessary for the journey to the target area.<sup>82</sup>

This hypothesis works well with what we know of the practices of summoning citizens-soldiers in Athens. The Athenian citizen-soldiers were asked to provide their own equipment and a few days of provisions, usually three.<sup>83</sup> If it is true that campaigns were

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<sup>78</sup> Thuc. 4.2, 4.27.1-2. Wilson (1979) 62.

<sup>79</sup> Thuc. 6.22. Cf. [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 2.4-6 for the ability of triremes to stay at sea for days. See Jordan (1975) 107-109.

<sup>80</sup> Jordan (1975) 106-107. Cf. Xen. *Cyr.* 6.2.25.

<sup>81</sup> Aristoph. *Ach.* 53; Dem. 19.158; Plut *Ages.* 10.5. Cf. for *ephodia* from private citizens Aeschin. 1.172; Dem. 25.5653.8,

<sup>82</sup> Trundle (2004) 89-90. Cf. Olson (2002) *ad.* 53.

<sup>83</sup> Thuc. 7.43.2; Aristoph. *Ach.* 197, 1097-1101; *Vesp.* 242-243; *Pax* 311-313; Eub. F 19 *PCG*; Plut. *Phoc.* 24.4. Cf. Thuc. 1.27.1, on the Corinthian army. Cf. Lee (2009) 394. Pritchett *GSW* 1.32-34 correctly points out that rations for longer periods could be required, but it should be noted that these examples are quite rare and not related to Athens. On the equipment, see Whitehead (1991) 109-113. Cf. Aen. *Tact.* 10, 7, 9, 29-30; Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.5-7.

shorter and closer to the motherland before the Peloponnesian War,<sup>84</sup> it is undeniable that more than three days were necessary to reach most destinations. Pritchett, then, argues that the preparation of substantial supplies in Athens before the expedition was a practice reserved only for larger expeditions.<sup>85</sup> Pritchett is right in noticing that the only other mentions of these preparations are for the campaign of Plataea (479 BC) and Tanagra (457 BC). However, it should be noted that Herodotus and Diodorus mention the baggage train only when it was attacked by enemy horsemen.<sup>86</sup> Plausibly, some provisions were brought from home in every military expedition, and this practice goes largely unmentioned as it was an entirely mundane part of the expedition.

The *strategoï* were in charge of planning and organising the initial supplies, and to keep the flow of provisions constant throughout the campaign, in any way they believed necessary.<sup>87</sup> It seems unlikely that *strategoï* were able to prepare enough supplies to satisfy the needs of a whole campaign in advance, even for a short one. Starting from modern studies on the daily food requirements of adult males, Gabrielsen provides a rough estimation of the daily needs of a trireme manned with 200 people of 265-300 kg of food.<sup>88</sup> Even considering that food rations were sub-standard, and that the foot soldiers ate less than the sailors as they were using less energy, it is utterly evident that just bringing the resources needed for the trip was a logistical nightmare.<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> van Wees (2007) 293.

<sup>85</sup> GSW 1.44-45.

<sup>86</sup> Hdt. 9.39; Diod. 11.80.3.

<sup>87</sup> Trundle (2004) 88-89.

<sup>88</sup> Gabrielsen (1994) 118-122.

<sup>89</sup> GSW 1.44-45.

Consequently, once they had arrived in the region, the *strategoï* had to attain supplies. Pritchett is confident that by the fifth century *strategoï* already relied on the *siteresion*, a monetary compensation for the food ration.<sup>90</sup> Soldiers bought food with this money independently, either from local markets, or the merchant following the expedition.<sup>91</sup> However, this did not relieve the *strategoï* from the necessity of regularly making food accessible for the troops.<sup>92</sup> The mutiny of the Spartan fleet at Aegina (388 BC), which was discussed in Chapter Two, is a perfect example of how things could go badly if food was insufficient.<sup>93</sup> Xenophon states that the soldiers protested over the lack of *misthos*, but from Teleutias' speech the most pressing problem seemed to be the lack of rations and ration-money. Only Teleutias' charismatic authority was able to solve the situation, by convincing the soldiers to help him to acquire food and money through a bold raid of the Piraeus.

Raids into enemy territory were a good way to gather provisions.<sup>94</sup> Many expeditions, especially the Spartan invasions of Attica during the Archidamian War, started when "the wheat was mature", and finished when the food ran out, suggesting a reliance on raiding.<sup>95</sup>

Another viable option was to rely on allies *in loco*. The allies could either be asked to organise a market for the purchase of supplies,<sup>96</sup> or to contribute with food and money –

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<sup>90</sup> GSW 1.3-29, 35-38, 40-41. Cf. Jordan (1975) 110; Trundle (2004) 88-89. See below, pp. 304-305.

<sup>91</sup> Thuc. 6.31.5; Lys. 16.14. *Warfare* 105-106.

<sup>92</sup> Jordan (1975) 107, 110-111.

<sup>93</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.13-24. GSW 1.48.

<sup>94</sup> GSW 1.39; Jordan (1975) 111.

<sup>95</sup> E.g. Thuc. 2.23.3, 79.1, 3.1, 26.4, 4.6.1-2; Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.4. Cf. Thuc. 2.79, Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.27. GSW 1.39; Lee (2009) 394; Engels (2013) 356-357.

<sup>96</sup> Thuc. 6.44.3, 50.1, 88.48.95.4. Jordan (1975) 110. The same practice could be inferred at Aegospotamoi (405 BC). Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.25-27; Plut. *Alc.* 36.5. GSW 1.45-46; Strauss (1983) 27-28.

willingly or unwillingly.<sup>97</sup> Otherwise, private merchants were involved. At times merchants followed military expeditions, but they could be found *in loco* too.<sup>98</sup>

## MOVEMENTS AND TRANSPORTATION

Once the preparations were ready, the military leader had to move the army and their supplies to the target area. The most immediate way to move troops was by foot.<sup>99</sup> The soldiers were asked to march or ride, while the military leader planned the way carefully. Xenophon reports that a good *hipparchos* had to consider the best route to follow, ensuring to schedule stops and rest breaks.<sup>100</sup> Probably, the *strategoï* did the same, on a larger scale; Xenophon describes some of the military leaders supervising the order and march of the men.<sup>101</sup> To be able to plan to such a degree, the military leader needed good intelligence on the territory and movements of the enemy.<sup>102</sup> Confirming this assumption, Xenophon states that, if the *hipparchos* did not have access to this information, he should ask the most expert of the contingent.<sup>103</sup>

Military leaders had to consider the best deployment for the march too. Marching in columns is attested in difficult terrain.<sup>104</sup> In this way, the soldiers' feet created a more stable track for the wagons to follow. However, tactical needs could modify this pattern of behaviour. For instance, Agesilaus, marching from the Hellespont towards Boeotia in 394

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<sup>97</sup> Dem. 4.32, 8.24; Diod. 13.69.5; Plut. *Phoc.* 11. GSW 1.39-40.

<sup>98</sup> Thuc. 6.44, 7.24; Xen. *Anab.* 1.5.6; *Cyr.* 6.2. 38. Gabrielli (1995) 115; *Warfare* 105.

<sup>99</sup> E.g. Thuc. 4.125.2, 6.67.1, 7.78.2.

<sup>100</sup> Xen. *Eq. Mag.* 4.1, 6.2.

<sup>101</sup> Xen. *Cyr.* 5.3.52-55.

<sup>102</sup> Engels (2013) 357.

<sup>103</sup> Xen. *Eq. Mag.* 4.6.

<sup>104</sup> Lendle (1986) *ad* 4.1.16; Gabrielli (1995) 113.

BC, predisposed a much more complex order.<sup>105</sup> Conscious of the risks of a cavalry attack, Agesilaus organised a *plaision*, plausibly to protect the supply trains, and ordered his cavalry to be deployed at the front and rear of the formation. Later, he even moved all the cavalrymen to the rear, when he understood from where the Thessalian horsemen were attacking.

The supplies were carried by the hoplites' attendants, or brought on wagons and beasts of burden. The *σκευοφόροι* are well attested, and there is reason to believe that each hoplite had either a slave or younger relative bringing his weapons, goods, and share of provisions.<sup>106</sup> Engels argues that wagons and beasts of burden were suboptimal for this purpose because they would have slowed down the expedition considerably.<sup>107</sup> Yet, wagons, donkeys, and mules are attested in several passages, suggesting that they were fairly common.<sup>108</sup>

The *strategoí* seemed to have followed the same criteria for ship transportation too. When the Sicilian expedition left Athens, it was not immediately directed to Segesta. The first stop was the friendly Corcyra, where there was a *rendezvous* with the allies, and the *strategoí* took the opportunity to check the state of the army. Thucydides writes:

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<sup>105</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.3-4.

<sup>106</sup> E.g. Hdt. 7.22, 40; Xen. *Anab.* 4.2.21; *Hell.* 3.4.52. For Athenian examples, see Thuc. 3.17.3, 4.110, 7.75.5, Isae. 5.11. GSW 1.49-50; (1991) 157; Engels (1978) 12, 22; Hammond (1983) 27; Garlan (1989) 145.

<sup>107</sup> Engels (1978) 14-18; (2013) 356, 359. Cf. Hammond (1983) 28.

<sup>108</sup> Hdt. 9.39.2, 80; Thuc. 4.67.3-4; 5.72.3; Xen. *Anab.* 1.5.7-8, 7.20, 10.18, 3.2.27-28, 4.2.10-11; Diod. 16.9.5. Cf. Gabrielli (1995) 116; GSW 5.158; Hall Sternberg (1999) 194, 119-120. Hammond (1982) 27-30 accepts this evidence but suggests that wagons were preferred to pack animals. Anderson (1970) 45, 58 and van Wees *Warfare* 104-105 argue that, like with the *skuephoroi*, the animals were brought by the citizen-soldiers autonomously.

As the first thing, the *strategoí* made a review (ἐπεξέτασιν) and arrayed the army in battle order (ξύνταξιν), in the same way in which they were going to bring [the ships] into a harbour and make camp. They assigned by lot (ἐκλήρωσαν) to each other one third of the army, after that they divided it (τρία μέρη νείμαντες), because, once they were sailing at the same time, they were not without of water, harbours, and what was necessary for the landings. Furthermore, because [they believed that] the [Athenians] were more disciplined, and easier to command (εὐκοσμότεροι καὶ ῥάους ἄρχειν), they assigned them to a group under a [single] *strategos*.<sup>109</sup>

The commander decided to create three unofficial units, to preserve the order of the army as much as possible and, especially, to facilitate the acquisition of water and food. Splitting the army into three parts and giving each *strategos* the responsibility for one of these, evidently helped with the control and the communication of the orders.<sup>110</sup>

The practice of moving troops and supplies by ship seems to have been the most common solution, at least for infantrymen. Thucydides in a handful of passages reports an otherwise unattested term for troop-transport: ὀπλιταγωγός.<sup>111</sup> If this was a technical term referring to a specific type of ship, predisposed only to the transport of troops, is difficult to assess. The imperial lexicographer Pollux simply ascribed the ὀπλιταγωγός as one of the transport ships, the ‘heavy ships (βαρεῖαι νῆες)’, without acknowledging any difference

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<sup>109</sup> Thuc. 6.42.1. Hornblower *Commentary ad loc.* comments on how the same prerogative, also attested in Thuc. 8.30.1, is surprising for *strategoí* who were not *autokratores*. The comparison of the two passages demonstrates that this was not an exceptional power.

<sup>110</sup> Interestingly enough, a similar scenario is attested for the fleet of Corcyra in the battle of Sibota (432 BC). The fleet was divided into three sections, each lead by a *strategos*. Thuc. 1.48.3. Hammond (1969) 124-125 recognises in this episode an example of how the colleagues could exercise their power without the necessity of a chairman. However, it should be noted that such division is not otherwise attested in the account of the campaign.

<sup>111</sup> Thuc. 6.25.2, 31.3, 8.25.1, 8.30.2. Steiner (2005) 409 suggests that hoplites were used as oarsmen for the initial trip of the Sicilian expedition because Thucydides mentions the ὀπλιταγωγοί being among the empty ships paid by the state funds. Nevertheless, Thucydides evidently implies that the *trierarchoi* had to provide for the crews with their own money alone, and nothing else. Otherwise, who would row the ‘fast ships’, which are acknowledged amidst the empty ships too? Cf. Gabrielsen (1994) 108.

with the most common term: στρατιῶτις (ναῦς).<sup>112</sup> The fact that Thucydides used both terms, even while referring to the same expedition, confirms this equivalence.<sup>113</sup> Instead, a difference was felt between warships (lit. the 'fast ships' ταχεῖαι νῆες) and ships used for transport.<sup>114</sup> The warships had to be light, fast, and manoeuvrable; the weight derived from the soldiers and equipment slowed them considerably.<sup>115</sup>

A few more words should be spent on the transport of horses by ship. The first mention of the ἵππαγωγοί, ships specifically adapted for transporting horses, in Athens is contextual to Pericles' unsuccessful raid in the Peloponnese (430 BC).<sup>116</sup> Herodotus ascribes the invention of this type of ship to the Persians. Herodotus writes that in Ionia Darius had some horse transport built for the first invasion of Greece in 490 BC.<sup>117</sup> However, there are a couple of references to this transport ships in Athenian contexts, suggesting that they were unusual but not unheard of.<sup>118</sup>

The case of Nicias is particularly interesting. He demanded some cavalry for his campaign in Sicily.<sup>119</sup> However, from the overview that Thucydides provided of the

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<sup>112</sup> Poll. 1.83.

<sup>113</sup> E.g. Thuc. 6.43.1.

<sup>114</sup> Thuc. 1.116.1, 6.43.1, 8.62.2, 74.2, 86.9; Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.36; Diod. 13.71.1; Ael. *Tact.* 1.4. Both types of ships needed regular maintenance and repairs. Harrison (2003) 78 points out how some sources ([Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1.2; *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1951 ll.101-102) mention a ναυπηγός as being part of the crew. Certainly, Thucydides (6.104.2, 7.38.2, 8.43.2, 107.1; Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.2) describes some repairs during a campaign, both in Athenians and Peloponnesian contexts.

<sup>115</sup> Cf. Thuc. 7.62.2. Engels (2013) 353 acknowledges this problem. However, instead of commenting on the transport ships which accompanied the triremes in their expeditions, a scenario not only likely for most campaigns but attested on more than one occasion, he focuses exclusively on raiding and looking for provisions.

<sup>116</sup> Thuc. 2.56.2. Cf. Worley (1994) 88.

<sup>117</sup> Hdt. 6.48.7, 95.1,

<sup>118</sup> *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1627, ll. 241; Thuc. 4.42.1, 6.43.1; Aristoph. *Eq.* 599; Dem. 4.16, 21.

<sup>119</sup> Thuc. 6.21.2, 43. On the importance of cavalry, especially in Thucydides, see *Tactics* 97.

Athenian contingent leaving Corcyra, it seems that Nicias had only 30 horses with him, a tenth of the horsemen with Pericles in 430 BC. Bugh comments on the risks of bringing horses via ship.<sup>120</sup> The animals suffered, took up space, and ate a lot, making them a substantial logistical problem. Conscious of this obstacle, Nicias probably avoided the transportation of many horses, preferring to either buy or acquire them.

The Sicilian campaign also allows us to make a final point on transport and logistics: the complexity of distant expeditions. The more distant and isolated the war was, the more difficult it would have been to keep a viable line of communication with Athens and thus keep the logistics efficient. Nicias seemed fully aware of this problem and aimed to be as independent as possible in his last campaign.<sup>121</sup> Once he understood that this was impossible, he tried to secure a line of communication with Athens, by fortifying the Plemmyrion.<sup>122</sup>

Thucydides fully appreciated the importance of effective logistics. Commenting on the Achaean expedition against Troy, Thucydides stresses that the length of the campaign had to be imputed to the absence of good logistics, which obliged the Achaeans to scatter, farm, and raid continuously.<sup>123</sup> Thucydides applies contemporary thoughts of military leadership and organisation to a mythical account, perpetuating an unconscious

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<sup>120</sup> Bugh (1988) 102. Sidnell (2006) 24 calculates that a fully-equipped horseman cost as much as four hoplites. The number of available horsemen, thus, had to be proportionally lower. Cf. Bugh (1988) 67; Worley (1994) 71; Bagnall (2006) 49. Pritchett GSW 5.198 euphemistically speaks of this as a 'little problem'.

<sup>121</sup> Thuc. 6.21.2, 23.2.

<sup>122</sup> Thuc. 7.4.4. GSW 1.44-45; (1991) 158.

<sup>123</sup> Thuc. 1.11. Kallet-Marx (1993) 29-30, 57-58 recognises Thucydides' χρήματα as money, thus stressing the importance of finance. Her evaluation is agreeable, but she does not acknowledge the importance of Thucydides' reference to raiding and farming. Thucydides acknowledged the importance of money, but it was instrumental in providing the supplies for the army.

anachronism.<sup>124</sup> However, his judgment is still valuable for the analysis of warfare contemporary to him: it is evident that for Thucydides an important part of military leadership was the ability to deal with money and logistics.<sup>125</sup>

## FINANCIAL MATTERS

The financial aspect of warfare is a topic as fascinating as it is complex. With the advent of large armies, fleets, and an increasing number of mercenaries, the *strategoï* collected and managed substantial amounts of money and tried to make every obol count. Fortunately, previous scholarship has studied the matter of public finances in war extensively.<sup>126</sup> This Section pursues a different focus from these excellent works, investigating in more detail the agency of the *strategoï* in managing the campaign finances.

As mentioned above, the financial resources allotted for a military campaign were decided by the *Ecclesia*. In the fifth century, the *demos* had extensive powers in the matter. The Assembly's deliberation was communicated to the *tamiai* of Athena or the *tamiai* of the Other Gods, and the money and required sum was borrowed with interest.<sup>127</sup> The *hellenotamiai* might provide the funds too, or act as middlemen between the treasurers and the *strategoï*.<sup>128</sup>

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<sup>124</sup> Thucydides, like his contemporaries, treated the Trojan War as a historical event. Cf. e.g. Kallet-Marx (1993) 27-28.

<sup>125</sup> Kallet-Marx (1993) 21-22; Kallet (2001) 100-101.

<sup>126</sup> Pritchett (1971), (1991); Gabrielsen (1981), (1994); Kallet-Marx (1993); Kallet (2001).

<sup>127</sup> E.g. IG I<sup>3</sup> 369, 370, ll. 5-9. Rhodes (1972) 102; Kallet-Marx (1993) 196-197; Papazarkadas (2011) 90-92; Mikalson (2016) 192-193; Pritchard (2019) 159-166. Cf. Ferguson (1932) 156, 161-162; Millett (2001) 91-108.

<sup>128</sup> IG I<sup>3</sup> 370. The *hellenotamiai* managed the League's funds, and, on request of the Assembly gave money to the *strategoï*. Meiggs (1972) 234-239; Rhodes (1972) 102-103; (2013) 213; Brun (1999) 269-270; Pritchard (2019) 159-163. See Ferguson (1932) 157-159, 161-162 for the relationship between *hellenotamiai* and the *tamiai* of Athena Polias.

In the last years of the fifth century, the central public treasury started to move towards being split into a series of separate funds, which were either attached to the most important institutions, or allocated to recurrent expenditures.<sup>129</sup> The *apodektai* collected all the money due to the state, and divided it among the different funds following criteria imposed by the *merismos*, the law regulating the division.<sup>130</sup> A fund for military expenses was established by 374/3 BC, and the ταμίας στρατιωτικῶν was introduced.<sup>131</sup> The *Constitution of the Athenians* states that the *tamias stratiotikon* was elective, like the most powerful offices, and that it held a role in deciding the prize for the Panathenaea and in the erection of Nikai.<sup>132</sup> However, it seems plausible that he handed the funds to the *strategoï* in agreement with the *merismos*.

From the second quarter of the fourth century, other *tamiai* are occasionally named in military campaigns, and were often prosecuted with the *strategoï*.<sup>133</sup> Demosthenes states that both *tamias* and public slaves are an example of good practice in checking the military expenses, thus implying that this was an additional form of control over the *strategoï*'s

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<sup>129</sup> [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 48.1-2.

<sup>130</sup> Rhodes (1972) 98-103; (2013) 217-218; Papazarkadas (2011) 83-86, 98; Canevaro (2019) 498-499. The *apodektai* are attested since the last quarter of the fifth century. See Rhodes (2013) 211.

<sup>131</sup> [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 43.1. Ober (1985) 99 dates the reform to 378/7 BC and sees it as contextual to the introduction of the *eisphorai*. The first mention is *SEG* 47.96 = O&R 26. Cf. Brun (1999) 280-281; Rhodes (2013) 219; Canevaro (2019) 478. However, Papazarkadas (2011) 85 believes that the mention of the *apodektai* in *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 84 might suggest the existence of 'proto-*merismos*' since 418/17 BC. Payen (2018) 145 argues that the *tamias* might have been introduced later, contextually with Periandros' reform (356 BC).

<sup>132</sup> [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 49.3. On the importance of these officers, see Hansen (1983c) 157.

<sup>133</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.10-13; [Dem.] 49.8-11 Cf. Lys. 29.3; Aeschin 1.56. *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 93 l. 34 = M&L 78 is often recognised as a fifth century example of a *tamias* in a military expedition. However, the inscription is lacunose, and it could be integrated as '[Ἑλλενοτ]αμίαν', as in contemporary documents (*IG* I<sup>3</sup> 369, 370). Cf. Jordan (1975) 137-138 for discussion.

finances.<sup>134</sup> Nevertheless, it is difficult to say whether these figures were *tamiai stratiotikon* or members of the *strategoï*'s entourage.

Indeed, the *strategoï* seemed to have had great control over the allotted funds, especially in the fifth century.<sup>135</sup> Commenting on the Sicilian campaign, Thucydides writes that the *strategoï* had the funds 'in their hands', which implies that the *strategoï* physically had the money in their hands but might also suggest that they had full control over it.<sup>136</sup> Similarly, the name of one or several *strategoï* appeared on the inscriptions that recorded the loans from the treasure of Athena Polias.<sup>137</sup> This might suggest that the *strategoï* were free to handle these funds however they believed appropriate. The fourth century practice of relying on private funds for campaigns implies the limited resources of the city, but also suggests a blurry line between private and public funds – once they were in the *strategoï*'s hands.<sup>138</sup> This reading would explain how Chares would have been able to abuse the military funds assigned to him, by using them on frivolous expenses such as prostitutes, feasts, and even bribing citizens.<sup>139</sup> Despite the questionable reliability of this tradition, Theopompus' claims presuppose that Chares had the freedom to use the money assigned to him as he pleased; he had to account for it in his *euthuna*, but this apparently did not scare him much. If this hypothesis is correct, the constant control of the *strategoï*'s accounts, which

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<sup>134</sup> Dem. 8.47. Cf. [Dem.] 10.22. Cf. GSW 2.38-39, (1991) 403-404; Wooten (2008) *ad.* 4.33.

<sup>135</sup> *Contra* Pritchard (2019) 177-178. However, Pritchard focuses exclusively on the Assembly's prerogative to allot funds and the *strategoï*'s duty to give back any surplus, without engaging with the matter of the funds' control during the campaign.

<sup>136</sup> Thuc. 6.31.5. Jordan (1975) 138.

<sup>137</sup> E.g. IG I<sup>3</sup> 365, 369, 370.

<sup>138</sup> On the private funds, often attained through borrowing from privates: Dem. 8.26; [Dem.] 49.6-8, 11-12, 14, 44; Salmond (1996) 45-47. Cf. on the *trierarchoi* Gabrielsen (1994) 117; Trundle (2004) 81.

<sup>139</sup> Theopompus *FGrHist* 115 F 213, 249.

was done every *prytany* by the *logistai*,<sup>140</sup> and the introduction of the *tamiai* and the *tamias strationikon*, could be easily explained as an attempt to limit this extensive power.

Fifth and fourth century *strategoï* had to be financially minded. For instance, Nicias considered financial reasons when discussing what strategy to use in Sicily.<sup>141</sup> Nicias was not the only Athenian *strategos* showing a similar concern. Xenophon, Hestiodorus, and Phanomachos, the *strategoï* handling the siege of Potidaea in 430 BC, took the expenses sustained into consideration, as well as the changing seasons, when they accepted the terms of the Potidaeans.<sup>142</sup> Sophocles and Eurymedon initially opposed Demosthenes' plan to fortify Pylos partially for financial reasons. Thucydides states that:

They said that there are many deserted headlands (ἄκρας ἐρήμους) in the Peloponnese, if Demosthenes wanted to compel the city to waste money (lit. to spend καταλαμβάνων τὴν πόλιν δαπανᾶν).<sup>143</sup>

This understanding of basic financial management was imperative for dealing with the everyday costs of the army, first and foremost the acquisition of supplies and transportation.

Another financial burden for the *strategoï* was managing the soldiers' pay. Both mercenaries and Athenian citizen-soldiers received pay (μισθός). The introduction of the

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<sup>140</sup> E.g. Lys. 30.5; Aeschin. 3.23; Dem. 18.117; [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 48.3. *Generals* 119-120, 130-134. Cf. Chapter One 46-48.

<sup>141</sup> Thuc. 6.47. *HCT ad* 7.48.6; Kallet (2001) 151-152, 156. Cf. Thuc. 7.47.4.

<sup>142</sup> Thuc. 2.70.2. Sieges were extremely costly. Cf. the financial considerations of the Spartans at Plateia (Thuc. Thuc 2.77.2).

<sup>143</sup> Thuc. 4.3.3.

citizen-soldiers' pay can be traced back to before the start of the Peloponnesian War,<sup>144</sup> and this development might be related to the introduction of the juries' salary.<sup>145</sup>

Alongside the *misthos*, there is the problem of food rations. The ancient sources referred to the daily rations of the soldiers as 'nourishment' (τροφή) or 'wheat' (σίτος). Pritchett believes that, especially in Thucydides, *trophe* and *sitos* implied the money handed to the soldiers for buying themselves their own rations.<sup>146</sup> The *strategoí* were responsible for ensuring that food was accessible, even bringing provisions with them, but they did not provide cooked meals for the soldiers as in most modern armies.<sup>147</sup> This daily quota of money was named σιτηρέσιον in the fourth century, but Trundle notes the rarity of the term, which does not appear before the *Anabasis*.<sup>148</sup>

There is a strong consensus in recognising these terms as homologous.<sup>149</sup> In several contexts, the *siteresion* was even included in the *misthos*.<sup>150</sup> Nevertheless, Trundle is right in making an essential distinction between terms indicating food (τροφή, σίτος), even if at

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<sup>144</sup> [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1.13; [Ar.] *Ath. Pol.* 24.1, 27.2; Plut. *Per.* 11.4. See Larsen (1946) 91; Jordan (1975) 101-102, 111-112; Sidebottom (2004) 74; Bettalli (2013) 83.

<sup>145</sup> GSW 1.12-24, 23. The *misthos* ranged between three obols to a drachma. Cf. also Jordan (1975) 114-116; Gabrielsen (1981) 71; Rosivach (1985) 52-53; Trundle (2004) 91-94.

<sup>146</sup> GSW 1.14-24.

<sup>147</sup> Trundle (2004) 88. Pritchett GSW 1.36-37 makes an interesting parallel with the South Vietnamese army at the end of the 1960s, which used a similar system.

<sup>148</sup> Trundle (2004) 88. On the term, see Bettalli (2013) 415-416.

<sup>149</sup> GSW 1.3-6; Gabrielsen (1981) 67-81, 151-155; (1994) 110; Trundle (2004) 85; Bettalli (2013) 413-415. Pritchett and Trundle believe that in the fourth century these terms acquired a more precise meaning, but Gabrielsen convincingly demonstrates how the interplay of these terms never ceased.

<sup>150</sup> E.g. Dem. 4.28; [Ar.] *Oec.* 1350a-b. Gabrielsen (1981) 155; (1994) 110-111; Trundle (2004) 88-89.

times it was described in monetary terms, and the soldier's money quota.<sup>151</sup> The *siteresion* was used when the provisions ran out, in this way explaining the rarity of the term.<sup>152</sup>

However, Trundle seems overly confident in the ability of the ancient commander to accumulate and continuously replenish the provisions of the army, creating an enormous logistical problem. Pritchett is perhaps too eager to recognise the reliance on the *siteresion*, and taking a middle way between the two positions is instead advisable. Once the supplies had run out, it is reasonable to suppose that the commanders handed down money to their soldiers to purchase food, a scenario which seems to be described at Aegospotamoi (405 BC), without any indication of a *siteresion*.<sup>153</sup>

Another considerable problem is to assess how often citizen-soldiers and mercenaries were paid. If the *misthos* included the *siteresion*, it is reasonable to believe that the pay was given periodically. However, the instalments were erratic at best; the pay was mostly liquidated at the end of campaigns.<sup>154</sup> This situation was not ideal but was mostly accepted for the wage part of the *misthos*, but it could not be sustained for long periods if this included the *siteresion*.<sup>155</sup> The distinction between *misthos* and *siteresion* is not unheard of; in his proposal for a standing army against Philip, Demosthenes explicitly contrasted the two expenses, stressing the necessity of handing out the *siteresion* more regularly.<sup>156</sup>

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<sup>151</sup> Trundle (2004) 86-89. Cf. Kallet-Marx (1993) 29 n.23. Gabrielsen (1981) 67, 72 argues that these terms could indicate both "monetary payments and remuneration in kind".

<sup>152</sup> Pritchard (2019) 172 correctly stresses how the triremes had a limited loading space. However, it should be noted that cargo ships could be attached to a contingent, as demonstrated by the bigger expeditions.

<sup>153</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.15, 27; Plut. *Alc.* 36.5. Cf. GSW 1.45, 5.193.

<sup>154</sup> Trundle (2004) 80. Cf. Bettalli (2013) 414, 417.

<sup>155</sup> GSW 1.48-49.

<sup>156</sup> Dem. 4.28.

Consequently, it is reasonable to recognise a distinction between rations and wages, both in a physical and monetary sense, even if it is not well attested in the ancient sources.

The commander provided funds and goods, and this created a strong bond of *philia* between commanders and mercenaries,<sup>157</sup> but it could also be counterproductive. If the commander gave the impression to the soldiers that he was neither able to acquire supplies, nor willing to pay them, the troops might desert or, more rarely, revolt.<sup>158</sup> There are several examples of soldiers' protesting over the lack of pay, which suggests that the commander was expected, at least when it was known that he had the funds, to periodically hand down pay to the soldiers.<sup>159</sup>

A constant flow of funds was necessary to counteract these constant expenses. The *strategoï* implemented several strategies to achieve this result. If the routes to Athens were still open, a viable option was for more men and money to be sent from home.<sup>160</sup> The Sicilian expedition illuminates the process. The *strategos* sent a request to the *Ecclesia* with a report and formal request for more resources.<sup>161</sup> The Assembly voted, and, from the references in the sources, it seems that the *demos* generally complied with the requests.<sup>162</sup>

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<sup>157</sup> Trundle (2004) 82, 94, 111-117.

<sup>158</sup> E.g. Thuc. 8.83.1-3; Xen. *Anab.* 7.6.4-5; [Dem.] 50.48-50. Gabrielsen (1994) 121-122; Stronk (1995) *ad loc.*; Pritchard (2019) 172. Trundle (2004) 98, 102, 110-111 acknowledges the phenomenon, but downsizes it considerably. He argues that the mercenaries showed dissent mostly concerning the target of their mission. Trundle is right to be cautious about the ancient prejudices against mercenaries, but the evidence speaks loudly.

<sup>159</sup> E.g. Thuc 8.83.1-2; Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.24, 2.1.11.12, 2.1.15, 6.2.16; [Dem.] 50.11-12. On the importance of regular pay, see Lengauer (1979) 80-81; Hanson (2001) 15.

<sup>160</sup> E.g. *IG I<sup>3</sup>* 364; Thuc. 1.51.4, 6.74, 7.16.2; Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.66.

<sup>161</sup> Thuc. 7.8.2, 11-15.

<sup>162</sup> E.g. Thuc. 1.64, 2.85.4-6, 6.94, 4.

However, this kind of request was somewhat frowned upon. Not without irony, Thucydides makes Nicias state before the *demos* how shameful it would be to either retire from the campaign or ask for reinforcements.<sup>163</sup> This critical attitude towards requests for additional funds was even stronger in the fourth century. Demosthenes ferociously reproaches Charidemus for his opportunistic request for help, after having pursued his own interests against Athens, and for being inactive in the raiding of enemy territory.<sup>164</sup>

This increased harshness can be explained by the more precarious state of Athenian finances in the fourth century, which did not allow for the previous century's easing in the handling of funds.<sup>165</sup> The *stratego*i were, thus, encouraged to find a solution for their financial problems; this became proverbial, and many stratagems on collecting money are ascribed to famous commanders.<sup>166</sup> Isocrates records that Timotheus received only 13 talents for the expedition to Corcyra in 375 BC, and praised him extensively for being able to be financially independent from Athens in the siege of Samos (366 BC).<sup>167</sup> According to Demosthenes, Dipeithes did not receive any funds from Athens for his campaign in the north Aegean sea.<sup>168</sup> Chares arrived at the conclusion that he needed to serve Artabazos, a rebel satrap, to save Athens the bill of the mercenaries under his command.<sup>169</sup> Pritchett suggests that the

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<sup>163</sup> Thuc. 6.21.2.

<sup>164</sup> Dem. 23.155-6. On Charidemus' past, see also Ferone (1997) 102-103.

<sup>165</sup> GSW 1.33, 5.459-465; Hansen (1991) 260; Gabrielsen (1994) 114-117; Bettalli (2013) 83-84.

<sup>166</sup> GSW 1.102, 5.155, 380-382, 393-394; Gabrielsen (1994) 111; Trundle (2004) 81. More in general, Garlan (1989) 58-62.

<sup>167</sup> Isoc. 15.109, 111. GSW 1.89. Cf. [Ar.] *Oec.* 1350b-1351b for more examples.

<sup>168</sup> Dem. 8.21. Ferone (1997) 102.

<sup>169</sup> Diod. 16.22.1-2. Hornblower (2011) 272. Pritchett GSW 5.282-283 n. 547 argues that there is no evidence that Chares was authorised by the *Ecclesia*, but he was 'forgiven' because of his success. Nevertheless, there is no evidence in support of Pritchett's reading either. Cf. Bianco (2002) 12-13.

*polis* used its funds to equip the expedition, while the *strategoï* had the responsibility of finding money to maintain their soldiers.<sup>170</sup>

Raids were an easy solution to acquire funds and goods, while damaging the enemy.<sup>171</sup> Greek commanders were encouraged to raid enemy territory as much as they could, but they might be blamed for stealing resources from friendly regions.<sup>172</sup> Thrasybulus' campaign in Lesbos (390/389 BC) is a perfect example of good practice. The *strategos* extracted as many funds as possible from friendly cities, while taking care to raid the enemy territory extensively.<sup>173</sup> However, as Salmond correctly underlines, the *demos* often turned a blind eye to *strategoï* pillaging or extracting funds from allies.<sup>174</sup>

The plunder derived from raids, pitched battles, and the seizing of cities was the best source of additional funds. Commanders often relied on booty plundered from such endeavours to finance most of the campaign.<sup>175</sup> It has been suggested that the wages and bonuses due to mercenaries and citizen-soldiers were paid mostly by the booty.<sup>176</sup> Although keeping part of the money due could have been a stratagem to deter desertion,<sup>177</sup> Greek commanders often lacked funds, which would explain why they had to wait until they had

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<sup>170</sup> GSW 5.381.

<sup>171</sup> GSW 2.50-52; Gabrielsen (1994) 117; Sears (2013) 282; Pritchard (2019) 177-178. Ferone (1997) 48-54 argues that *ληστεία* indicated a distinct type of warfare, typical of light infantry. This reading seems excessive; raids were an essential part of any military campaign, and different types of troops participated in them.

<sup>172</sup> E.g. Dem. 24.11-15. GSW 5.383-384; Ferone (1997) 72, 93-95.

<sup>173</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.25-30. Pritchett GSW 5.391-393 suggests that Thrasybulus changed his objective, which initially was Rhodes, for the need of money.

<sup>174</sup> Salmond (1996) 49.

<sup>175</sup> GSW 1.77-78, 82-85; Trundle (2004) 99-100; Bettalli (2013) 85. Pritchett GSW 5.424-425 also suggests that this was an increasing phenomenon since the Deceleian war. Dem. 51.13 and *schol.* Dem. 21.173 implies that the commander could even take the profits of the raids for himself. See Ferone (1997) 53, 76-9.

<sup>176</sup> E.g. Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.19, 4.8.30; Diod. 13.69.5, 15.47.7; Polyæn. 3.10.9.

<sup>177</sup> Polyæn. 3.9.51. GSW 1.24-25. Gabrielsen (1994) 112-113 recognises in Aristoph. *Eq.* 1366-1367 an example of the withholding of half the pay.

acquired sufficient booty before paying the soldiers. The goods plundered were various, from precious objects to cattle.<sup>178</sup> War prisoners were a valuable economic resource, but not in the short term.<sup>179</sup> Only very occasionally did the *strategoï* have the time to either sell the prisoners, or wait for their ransom *in loco*.<sup>180</sup> As discussed in Chapter One, the *Ecclesia* liked to have a say in how to deal with prisoners, and often the prisoners were sent to Athens, although not always.<sup>181</sup> The *strategoï* seemed to have had a special dispensation for self-funding the expedition; in these cases, they were allowed to either keep or sell part of the booty.<sup>182</sup> The most effective solution was selling the plundered goods at the earliest convenience.<sup>183</sup> However, it cannot be excluded that the prisoners were kept in the baggage train, like the prisoners of the Ten Thousand.<sup>184</sup>

Another way to extract funds was to ask the allies.<sup>185</sup> One of the most common missions for a commander was to collect funds from the allies of the Delian League for the city.<sup>186</sup> Kallet-Marx argues that these extractions were not the annual *phoros*, but other forms of money collection, which were possibly even forceful.<sup>187</sup> The *strategoï* could ask the allies to provide men and funds, even without a decree of the *Ecclesia*.<sup>188</sup> A passage of Lysias hints

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<sup>178</sup> GSW 5.152-202.

<sup>179</sup> GSW 5.242-297.

<sup>180</sup> Thuc. 6.62.3-4; Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.36.

<sup>181</sup> Chapter One 43-4. GSW 1.85; 5.235-237, 418-424; *Generals* 51-53.

<sup>182</sup> GSW 1.85, 88-89.

<sup>183</sup> GSW 1.87-91; 5.198, 424-35, 400-404, 433-438; Trundle (2004) 100-101.

<sup>184</sup> Xen. *Anab.* 6.5.3, 7.8.16. Cf. Dem. 19.305-309.

<sup>185</sup> E.g. Thuc. 6.90.4. Kallet (2001) 150.

<sup>186</sup> Thuc. 2.69, 3.19, 4.50.1, 75, 6.62; Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.8.

<sup>187</sup> Kallet-Marx (1993) 137-138, 154, 200-201, esp. 160-164. Pritchard (2019) 177-178.

<sup>188</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.8; Plut. *Alc.* 35.4. Possibly, these kinds of extraordinary extractions could be recognised alongside the domestic revenues in the 'other' revenues mentioned by Thucydides (2.13.3-6). Cf. Kallet-Marx (1993) 99-100.

at the informal nature of these extractions. Trying to prove a point about the circulation of rumours in Athens, Lysias makes an example of Alcibiades, and reminds the jury of his latest *strategiai* with these words:

For I believe that you know that Alcibiades was *strategos* continuously for four or five years, having the control after having won over the Lacedaemonians. And [you also know that] the [allied] cities thought fit to give to him (ἡξιούσιν αἱ πόλεις δίδοναι) twice as much as any other *strategos* (ἄλλω τινὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν), so much so that some believed that he had more than 100 talents.<sup>189</sup>

Lysias' passage does not say it explicitly, but it is possible to connect it with references to Alcibiades requiring money from the allies, reported in different sources.<sup>190</sup> The personal nature of these contributions suggests that the *demos* was not involved; the allies decided to comply with the requests of the *strategoí*, either willingly, or out of fear for the repercussions. Demosthenes is very explicit in pointing out how these requests were offers the allies could not refuse: apparently, the fourth century *strategoí* subtly threatened the allies' merchants by offering them εὐνοία, what we today would call 'protection'.<sup>191</sup>

If acquiring new funds was not possible, the *strategoí* had to cut their expenses, even essential ones. More often than not, this meant that the commanders suspended the soldiers' pay.<sup>192</sup> This was an extremely unpopular decision, which was evidently the last resort of

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<sup>189</sup> Lys. 19.52.

<sup>190</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.8; Plut. *Alc.* 35.4.

<sup>191</sup> Dem. 8.25. GSW 5.400 n.572; Pritchard (2019) 177. Kallet-Marx (1993) 160-164, 200-202 is perhaps overemphatic in calling this practice "state piracy". The role of Athens in these extractions is not clear; Diopieithes was publicly blamed for relying on these methods. On *eunoia* as a diplomatic term, see Low (2007) 51-54.

<sup>192</sup> Engels (1978) 18 correctly points out that prolonged periods of malnutrition would impact an army's fighting ability.

desperate commanders. In similar cases, commanders tried their best to preserve the loyalty of the soldiers with other means. In Chapter Two, we extensively discussed how Teleutias relied on his personal, charismatic authority to keep the troops' loyalty.<sup>193</sup> Teleutias was not the only one to try this route. In charge of the Persian fleet during the so-called Rhodian War (396-394 BC), Conon was able to keep the mercenaries serving under him active and obedient even without paying them for 15 months.<sup>194</sup> The soldiers' trust in him and, possibly, his personal authority, helped Conon in this incredible achievement, but were not sufficient to avoid the revolt of the Cypriots, which ended in bloodshed.<sup>195</sup>

The suspension of payment had to be a temporary solution, and there is reason to believe that only trusted and respected commanders had enough influence over the troops to make this emergency measure possible. Nevertheless, Polyaeus reports that Iphicrates kept a quarter of his soldiers' pay to avoid desertions.<sup>196</sup> Iphicrates' alleged stratagem was considered by Tissaphernes too.<sup>197</sup> Indeed, taunting the soldiers like that could have been very risky. Mnasippus, the Spartan commander in Corcyra (373 BC), clearly missed the mark by mistreating his mercenaries and suspending their pay to save money.<sup>198</sup> The mercenaries abandoned him during the ensuing battle, in which Mnasippus lost his life.

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<sup>193</sup> Chapter Two 149-153. Trundle (2004) 40-79.

<sup>194</sup> Isoc. 4.142.

<sup>195</sup> *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* BNJ 66 F9 23. GSW 1.26.

<sup>196</sup> Polyaeus. 3.9.51.

<sup>197</sup> Thuc. 8.45.2, 78.1.

<sup>198</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.15-22, esp. 16, 19.

## CONCLUSION

The managerial duties of the Athenian *strategoi* were various and pressing. The most significant part of the organisational, logistical, and financial responsibilities in managing a campaign fell on the *strategoi*. The *Ecclesia* assigned a precise number of soldiers and funds to the *strategoi*, both at the start of the campaign and as reinforcements, and periodically checked the *strategoi*'s accounts to avoid embezzlement and unwise expenses. As for the mandate, the *strategoi* seemed to have had considerable autonomy within these limits. There is no reason to doubt that they personally decided how to spend the allotted money to tend to the needs of the campaign. Indeed, the *euthuna* and monthly checks of the *strategoi*'s finances acquire more sense by accepting this reading.

The differences between the fifth and fourth century are quite noteworthy. Although the organisational duties remained constant throughout the Classical period, the fourth century *strategoi* were more limited in their powers. The class-age reform severely reduced the *strategoi*'s ability to pick whoever they wanted for a campaign, which we know could lead to abuses of power. Similarly, the management of funds was more strictly and directly controlled through the introduction of the separate *stratitotika* fund, and the *tamiai*. These innovations suggest that the Athenians claimed greater control over their *strategoi*, hinting that the *strategoi*'s powers in the fifth century were recognised as too extensive.

Still, the *strategoi* retained some independence, especially in the acquisition of funds. The depressing state of the Athenian revenues in the fourth century obliged the *strategoi* to be inventive, and even to rely on personal funds to finance the *polis*' expeditions.

## CONCLUSION

From the beginning this thesis has proposed a reassessment of the Athenian *strategoí*. This promise has been kept. In the preceding pages we have analysed and discussed the most essential aspects of the *strategia* as a military office, identifying the *strategoí*'s duties, responsibilities, and powers across different fields. The rich scholarly work on the *strategia* has been critically engaged, commenting upon their strengths and weaknesses, and new readings of a vast range of primary sources have been proposed. The result is an original and at times controversial picture of the Athenian *strategoí* as magistrates with substantial power and independence, although always operating under the strict control and restrictions of the Assembly.

In the Introduction, three main themes for discussion were identified: the diachronic development of the *strategia*, the *strategoí*'s autonomy, and the importance of their individuality. The discussion of these themes has escorted us throughout this work and helped us to reach some of this thesis' bolder hypotheses. Now that we are at the end of this journey through the world of the Athenian *strategoí*, these themes will be extremely useful in summarising the main points of the present research.

Undeniably, the *strategia* had evolved constantly since its introduction at the beginning of Athenian democracy. In Chapter One, we summarised and discussed the excellent scholarly work undertaken on the evolution of the *strategia* in the early fifth century.<sup>1</sup> This trend of the progressive empowerment of the *strategoí* became reversed from

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<sup>1</sup> Chapter One 16-20.

the restoration of democracy in 403 BC, when the *strategoï* saw their powers become increasingly limited. Unfortunately, we can neither date these innovations precisely nor know whether the *strategia* endured a substantial but unattested institutional reform, or, instead, underwent several smaller changes. What is clear, however, is that by the time of the *Constitution of the Athenians*, the *strategoï* were controlled more closely in terms of funds administration, thanks to the introduction of the *tamiai* and the *tamias strationikon*; the age-classes system limited their control over the mustering of the army; their disciplinary powers were requalified and probably reduced; and that specialised functions were associated with some of the *strategoï* from their election.

Alongside this development, the *strategia* underwent some less formal changes. First of all, what was a substantially aristocratic office in the first half of the fifth century, opened to non-aristocratic members of the elite such as Cleon, and, then, to people of a lesser social status, such as Iphicrates.<sup>2</sup> Secondly, the *strategoï* lost most of the political influence that they enjoyed in the fifth century to the *rhetoïres*.

These developments in the *strategia* made a strong impression on previous scholarship, which argues for the existence of a radical process of professionalisation of the *strategoï*, a process active from the last quarter of the fifth century.<sup>3</sup> This widely accepted theory can be summarised in a few main points. The increasing complexity of warfare demanded great skill, that only a 'professional' commander had. Since the last third of the fifth century some commanders were chosen for their expertise in warfare, and not for their

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<sup>2</sup> Chapter One 19-20 and Chapter Three 183-196.

<sup>3</sup> Esp. Lengauer (1979); Wheeler (1991); (2007).

political ties. Then, this trend developed further in the fourth century, when the *strategoi* were mostly military men, and often real professionals; many also led mercenaries for foreign rulers on the side.

This reconstruction is widely accepted, but this work sheds some doubts over it. In Chapter Three, the striking similarities between the representation of the early fifth century and later *strategoi* have been noted, which seems to indicate continuity rather than a sharp development.<sup>4</sup> The idea of a radical change in war *ethos* from the Peloponnesian War is a theory compellingly opposed by Krentz and Dayton,<sup>5</sup> and the effects of their critique on our understanding of ancient Greek military leaders should be fully acknowledged. If it is true that the *strategia* lost most of its political influence over time, this neither means that the *strategoi* were chosen only for their military experience,<sup>6</sup> nor that skills in the matter did not influence the election of earlier *strategoi*. As demonstrated in Chapter Two, there is a consistent pattern of aristocratic *strategoi* with considerable military talent, who are represented as good warriors, something quite similar to what Isocrates says about the fourth century *strategoi*.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, Davies notes how *charis* continued to play an important role in military offices during the fourth century.<sup>8</sup> The previous service of a family member in these offices made the election of the candidate much more likely.

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<sup>4</sup> Chapter Three 183-196.

<sup>5</sup> Krentz (2000); (2002); (2007) 147; Dayton (2006) esp. 40-53.

<sup>6</sup> Xen. *Mem.* 3.4.

<sup>7</sup> Isoc. 15.116-117. See Chapter Two 73-75.

<sup>8</sup> Davies (1981) 122-124. Cf. Connor (1971) 76-79; Mitchell (2000) 351.

Furthermore, the ancient sources do not acknowledge a tactical revolution, but rather a slow consolidation process which started in the fifth century.<sup>9</sup> Consequently, the alleged professionalisation of the *strategoï* seemed to have had little effect on tactics. It should also be noted how one of the most celebrated commanders of the period, the *beotarchos* Epameinondas, was not a professional mercenary leader.<sup>10</sup>

However, Greek warfare undeniably changed in some way, and this had an effect on generalship. As Konijnendijk points out, the increasing reliance on seasoned troops, such as *epilektoi* and mercenaries, allowed Greek commanders to execute complex tactics more precisely.<sup>11</sup> Nonetheless, this does not mean that tactics did not exist before this innovation, only that commanders had better opportunities to put their plans into practice. New ideas on the art of war, such as the creation of separate corps, circulated since the mid-fifth century, and were progressively, but slowly adopted.

Consequently, it seems reasonable to tone down the idea of radical change in the militaristic component of the fourth century *strategia*. The progressive downsizing of the *strategoï*'s powers, the increasing institutional control of the office, and the rise of certain talented people of humble origins are significant phenomena, all of which hint at the development of the *strategia*. However, in contrast with the office's political aspects, which changed radically, this development was much slower and more nuanced concerning the office's military elements.

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<sup>9</sup> *Tactics* esp. 34-36, 172.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Payen (2018) 162.

<sup>11</sup> *Tactics* 153-160.

The second noteworthy phenomenon which regularly emerges in this study is the *strategoï's* autonomy. There is a general consensus on Hamel's representation of the *strategoï* as substantially weak magistrates, totally dependent on the *demos* and terrorised by the office's accountability. Nonetheless, the picture recorded in the ancient sources is more complex and varied. As discussed in Chapters Three, Four, and Five, most of the responsibilities of organising and executing the military campaign fell on the *strategoï*, who were personally responsible for the said campaign's outcome. These duties included mustering the soldiers, organising provisions and logistics, administering the funds, elaborating and executing battle plans, and even some duties of pastoral care of the soldiers, at least regarding their emotional state. The ancient sources ascribe these responsibilities to the *strategoï*, and there is no evidence that the Assembly's role in these matters was somehow misrepresented. These multifaceted responsibilities hint at much more autonomy than the "decision-making of a more banal sort" that Hamel acknowledges;<sup>12</sup> they suggest that the *strategoï* had close to complete control over their army for the length of the campaign.

This reading seems to be confirmed by the conclusions reached about the *strategoï's* mandate. Hamel argues, correctly, that some mandates issued by the *Ecclesia* were extremely precise.<sup>13</sup> However, analysis of the *strategoï's* behaviours suggests that the mandates were usually fairly vague, indicating either a goal or an area of action. Consequently, it seems reasonable to conclude that the *Ecclesia* could effectively issue exact orders, but these were usually reserved for delicate diplomatic situations, such as the battle

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<sup>12</sup> *Generals* 40.

<sup>13</sup> *Generals* 1, 115-117, 158-159.

of Sibota (433 BC).<sup>14</sup> In normal circumstances, the *strategoi* had the faculty to decide how to pursue their objectives, thus dictating the strategy, prioritising some goals over others, and even making riskier decisions, such as arranging a truce or accepting the enemy's terms of surrender. The war council, formed by the *strategoi* and other higher officers (e.g. *taxiarchoi*, *trierarchoi*, and plausibly the *hipparchoi* too, if present), probably discussed and made decisions about strategy and tactics on the field.<sup>15</sup>

Rather than limiting the *strategoi* with strict mandates, the Athenians' power lay in issuing the mandate itself, thus deciding the main goal and the resources allocated, and the ability to impeach and prosecute a *strategos* at any moment. Through this instrument of control, the *demos* could remove *strategoi* who were incompetent, or were abusing their substantial power. In this regard, the *Ecclesia's* power was absolute, and there is a strong impression that the Athenians often prosecuted the *strategoi* when their high expectations were somehow betrayed, even if the *strategoi* did not necessarily do anything wrong.

The reflection on the *strategoi's* accountability brings us to the third significant theme of this original reconstruction of the Athenian *strategoi*: the importance of the individuality of the *strategoi*. Hamel aims to deduce Athenian law from the historical accounts of the *strategoi* in different campaigns, but it should be noted that every *strategos* did not necessarily act in the same way.<sup>16</sup> Some were more talented than others, some were reckless, some were timid, and some seemed less concerned than others by their accountability.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Thuc. 1.45.2-3, 49.4, 53.4. See Chapter One 22-25.

<sup>15</sup> E.g. Thuc. 7.60. See Chapter One 36-37.

<sup>16</sup> *Generals* 1.

<sup>17</sup> Chapter One, 52-61.

Abuses of powers and even occasional acts of defiance are attested in the ancient sources, which suggests that some *strategoi* acted more freely than others, probably because they either thought that the Athenians would forgive their bolder behaviour if they were successful, or believed they had enough political support to survive the subsequent trials.<sup>18</sup>

This reconstruction does not deny the importance of accountability as a deterrent and instrument of control over the *strategoi* but urges us to focus more on the individual *strategos*. Undoubtedly, many *strategoi* were probably as scared as Nicias was about being held accountable, but others were bolder in pursuing the agenda they believed to be best for Athens and, in some cases, for themselves. In other words, the human variable, the individuality of the *strategos*, must be considered to achieve a realistic picture of ancient generalship.

Indeed, it is blatant that some *strategoi* were more influential than others. As has already been pointed out, this 'superiority' could not be explained in legal terms. Instead of dismissing it, this work embraces this notion and accounts for it in the analysis of the *strategoi's* authority, despite it being ill-defined in the ancient sources. In Chapter Two, we discussed various types of extra-legal authority that the Athenian *strategoi* show in the ancient sources. Alongside well-studied phenomena, such as *charis*, reputation, and eloquence, a different and superior type of extra-legal authority has been recognised, which closely recalls the modern concept of charismatic authority as delineated by Schweitzer.<sup>19</sup> This kind of authority, associated with the phenomenon that Xenophon called 'willing

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<sup>18</sup> Chapter One, 53-61.

<sup>19</sup> Schweitzer (1984).

obedience', was strictly integrated with other forms of extra-legal authority and based on an enhanced perception of the leader.

The recurrence of the most detailed examples in Xenophon's work could be interpreted as an indication that this phenomenon was typical of the first half of the fourth century. The increase in the usage of mercenaries puts the commanders in a different position than in the previous century, in which they could more easily create a personal relationship of trust with the soldiers, especially if fighting together for long periods. However, it should be considered that Xenophon had antecedents in Herodotus and Thucydides, who, more vaguely, hinted at what seems to be forms of charismatic authority. Moreover, it cannot be excluded that Xenophon is unusually detailed about this dynamic not because it was something new, but something in which he was particularly interested.

In conclusion, the Athenian *strategoí* seemed to have enjoyed much greater power and freedom of action than previous scholarship has acknowledged, empowered both by their legal and extra-legal authority. Within their mandate, they had the power and responsibility to tend to all aspects of the campaign, deciding on strategy, tactics, and resource allocation. The *Ecclesia* attentively controlled the *strategoí* probably because of this substantial power, which could easily generate abuse. From the fourth century, the *strategoí*'s powers were progressively limited on institutional grounds, probably to limit this power even more. However, the *strategia* did not change radically from a military point of view; the real revolution was in the office's informal aspects, drastically reducing the political influence of the *strategoí* and enlarging the social base of potential candidates for the office.

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