REFUGEES AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF BARUNDI REFUGEES IN TANZANIA

Patricia Daley
St. Antony’s College

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(Approximately 93,250 words)
Using an empirical study of the Barundi refugee settlements of Ulyankulu, Mishamo, and particularly Katumba in Western Tanzania, this study argues that the causes and consequences of the African refugee problem must be examined outside the normative humanitarian framework. It postulates that the refugee problem can be understood only in the historical context of the integration of African communities into the capitalist system and their resultant underdevelopment. Furthermore, that the neo-colonial state, its class character, and ethnic divisions, aggravated by economic crisis, fosters a climate of repression - prompting forced migration.

The unequal relationship between western capital and Tanzania is exemplified in the microcosm of the refugee phenomenon, where international/ regional policy, legislation, security considerations, and aid not only demobilize a potential political force, but usurp the authority of the national and local state. Donor/state/refugee relationships are further discussed in the context of the settlements.

The schemes, located in remote areas and with tight restrictions on mobility, while providing a humanitarian solution, act as mechanisms for the control of the Barundi refugees. Utilization of their labour is intentionally part
of Tanzania's development strategy. Settlement and integration are discussed in relation to the contribution of Barundi people to the development of commodity production in Tanzania both historically and with regard to their current potential. While dismissing the notion of an undifferentiated mass of refugees, this study reveals how donor activities and the objective material conditions of the rural areas contribute to commodity production and mercantilist activities with increasing inequalities.

It concludes that large groups of refugees in rural areas will inevitably heighten local tensions, and that only through greater 'political liberalization' - removal of restrictions on mobility and political representation, will Barundi refugees gain control of their lives, and Tanzania's long-standing goal of the liberation of African peoples be realized.
Acknowledgements

This thesis is dedicated to my grandmother, Mrs Edwina Johnson, who in her modest appearance, concealed her multiple roles of mother, peasant, housewife, pillar of the church, and who was able to instil in me at an early age all the determination needed to complete this study.

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<td>UNDP</td>
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<td>UNECA</td>
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INTRODUCTION

This study concerns the causes and consequences of the forced migration of 154,000 political refugees from Burundi and their settlement in Western Tanzania. In 1988, Barundi refugees constituted some 57.8 percent of Tanzania's refugee population, but only a small fraction of the 3.9 million refugees on the continent of Africa. Of the continental figure, about 15 percent resulted from the destabilization policies of the apartheid regime in South Africa, the rest, the outcome of seemingly interminable civil wars, political repression and natural disasters which have beset independent African states.

For the majority of refugees facing irresolvable ethnic discrimination and protracted civil war, the prospect of returning home in the immediate future remains increasingly remote. This is the position of Barundi refugees, who, after 16 years in exile, are faced with the inevitability of settlement in their first country of asylum. Since the 1960s, host states, like Tanzania, have evolved a common policy of incorporating refugees into their territory, namely by settling them in organized rural settlement schemes. However, an indeterminate, but significant proportion of refugees still prefer to settle independently among the local population in rural or urban areas. As underdeveloped host states lack the necessary material and financial resources to assist a large influx of destitute people, they have to rely heavily on external assistance from international humanitarian agencies, mainly the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) who has, since the 1960s, established an elaborate bureaucratic structure to deal with emergency and long-term assistance to refugees.

Central to my study is a consideration of refugees within the context of underdeveloped social formations. I begin with the assumption that the operation of structural forces are behind such forms of forced migration, and that inevitably such large-scale movements of people will have spatial as well as structural implications for the source and receiving societies. Thus the conflicts producing forced migration, and issues concerning the settlement of refugees within the country of asylum are discussed in the context of the political economy of the Burundi and Tanzanian states. However, the refugee question in post-colonial Africa was not constructed independently by individual African states, but through their involvement in a wider world system. It for this reason that the root causes of the refugee problem cannot be found solely in the specific historical and actual circumstances of any one African state, but through an understanding of its evolution and incorporation into a global system, namely the historical specificities of the expansion of capitalism and imperialism throughout the continent.

The experience of Barundi refugee peasant communities, particularly in Katumba settlement, Mpanda district (Figures 3 & 4) provides the empirical framework for an understanding not only of their spatial impact on the district, but also of how the fundamental relationship between the political,
economic and social conditions of the Tanzanian society governs its response to the refugee influx, and the way in which refugees are incorporated.

Furthermore, the inextricable linkages between the Tanzanian state, its rural communities and the external powers are epitomized by the state/donor/refugee relationship within the settlement. In essence an understanding of the condition of the exiled refugee communities is placed within the context of the penetration of the capitalist mode of production and its alignment with the newly-independent states. The characteristics of such an alliance—spatial inequalities, spatial reorganization, commoditization, labour migration and differentiation, are discussed with reference to the refugee community.

My study involves the integration of several scales of analysis: global, regional, national and local. I argue that a holistic perspective is vital for an adequate understanding of the dynamics of the refugee situation. It is the interplay between these scales which determines who become refugees, what structures they encounter, and their future prospects.

Geographers and refugee study

The study of refugees has been for some time on the margin of the social sciences, not least geography. Forced movement of refugees is often seen as a peculiar aspect of migration. Although classified in typologies of migration, these irregular and often unpredictable patterns of movement, coupled with the scale of the flows, fit uneasily
with the positivist models of migration as utilized in geographical analysis. Furthermore the involuntary nature of the movement obscures the differing individual attributes so relevant to behavioural studies. The notion that political factors lie behind most refugee migration is perhaps the major explanatory factor for the exclusion of refugees from geographical studies, where the emphasis is still firmly rooted in sociological, economic and ecological perspectives (Prothero & Chapman 1985, Lewis 1982, White and Woods 1980). An understanding of the political configurations of states, and their failure to protect their people is seen as of little or no geographic relevance.

Even with the revival of political geography, stimulated by the adoption of a structuralist approach (Taylor 1985), and developments in the analysis of the spatial mobility of labour, the few social and population geographers who have studied refugees in contemporary Africa concentrate essentially on the spatial impact of refugees on the receiving societies1, avoiding a political-economy dimension, which is essential for a deeper understanding of geo-political conflicts and tensions (Abdel-Malek 1977).

Geographers have continued to describe the spatial dimensions of refugee migration, in terms of a descriptive analysis of its scale, patterns of movement, and settlement, with an underlying and uncritical acceptance of the existing political structures, and with no attempt to relate conflicts within states to an economic base. Many rely on

the existing structures to determine the research area and provide the source materials. By doing so, they are in danger of upholding the structures of oppression and exploitation (Harvey 1984).

Refugee studies is primarily an area of multidisciplinary study, and an eclectic human geography, through its combination of political, social, and economic perspectives, is well-placed to initiate developments in this field and equal the burgeoning contribution of social anthropologists and political scientists. A study of any particular refugee group does require a holistic approach. Structuralist geography with an understanding of spatial structures, linking superstructural elements of territoriaility, nationalism and ethnicity to mode of production can not only highlight the tragic conditions of refugees, but provide explanations and point to possible solutions.

The research area

Refugees from Burundi arrived in Tanzania during 1972 and 1973, and either settled in Kigoma region or on organized schemes in Mpanda and Urambo districts, in the western regions of Rukwa and Tabora respectively. Remote and sparsely populated Mpanda district has a recent history of government-planned refugee in-migration. From the late 1950s, four refugee settlement schemes were located in the district, for Kikuyu at Katuma in 1959, Banyarwanda at Mwesi in 1964, and the Barundi at Katumba in 1973 and Mishamo in 1979 (Figure 3). In 1972, the first group of Barundi
refugees were settled at Ulyankulu, in adjoining Urambo district (Figure 3).

The settlements were administered jointly by UNHCR through its local implementing agency, Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service (TCRS), a branch of the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), and the Tanzanian government. Available literature on the settlements was of diverse quality and quantity. Ulyankulu was the subject of a detailed research report by Hanne Christensen (1985). Mishamo, the most recent settlement, is well-documented by Armstrong (1984 & 1985). In contrast Katumba, the largest refugee settlement in Africa, with over 60,000 settlers, has had no documentation since the mid-1970s.

The literature discussed above emanated mainly from TCRS or UNHCR in the form of annual reports or occasional papers. TCRS reports provided sketchy, jargonistic and non-analytical accounts of projects within the settlement. Since TCRS relied on UNHCR for the bulk of its funds (UNHCR contributed 49 percent of TCRS' capital expenditure for projects during 1986), pure self-interest ensured that reports tended to be self-congratulatory, and project-biased. Little is known of the actual refugee communities, their livelihood or social organization within or outside the structures imposed by the donors and the state. Pre-migration characteristics were rarely alluded to. Indeed the voice of the refugee is never heard.

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2 See TCRS, Annual Report (1986), TCRS’s funding comes mainly from its parent organization the Lutheran World Federation. It also receives a substantial amount of donated goods for its refugee work, which in monetary terms comes to a third of its income per annum.
Although UNHCR representatives regularly visit the settlements, they rely principally on information supplied by their implementing partners. In the course of my field work it became apparent that TCRS felt the settlements to be their domain; foreigners including UNHCR officials were not supposed to visit unless TCRS was first informed. Outside consultants are periodically invited to evaluate specific projects using Rapid Rural Appraisal methods. Most of the reports are only circulated internally and are biased toward supporting the donors' perspectives. In the final analysis, it is essential for all parties that the settlements are seen to be successful; the Tanzanian government has received international acclaim for its treatment of refugees - adverse reports have to be avoided.

In these circumstances independent research is needed to provide greater insight into the refugee situation. The researcher has to relate to all the principal protagonists, and more importantly solicit the attitudes and views of the refugee community. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) doing 'good' are often reluctant to allow outsiders to evaluate their programme; hostility frequently pervades their initial contact with the researcher. In most cases the fear is soon overcome as the researcher, often coming from the West, has a certain empathy with the agency staff. New faces to fill the narrow social circles are normally welcomed. In a climate of underdevelopment, Western aid

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3 During the 1970s evaluation of settlement projects were carried out by Tristram Betts (1975), and Chambers (1977). Allan Armstrong did most of the official research on Mishamo in 1982 and in 1987 a team of consultants reported on Katumba (Antoniou et al. 1987).
organizations tend to have the more reliable communication links and greater access to scarce resources. Therefore, it is almost imperative for poorly-resourced researchers to maintain good relationships with aid agencies.

In order to obtain an unofficial perspective, it was crucial for me to spend an extended period within the settlements, using a variety of research techniques: participatory observation in the refugee community; structured and unstructured interviews and archival search. The result is a combination of quantitative and qualitative data.

At the time of my fieldwork, there was some debate in refugee studies as to the relevance of studying refugee communities in isolation from surrounding host communities, using what Barbara Harrell-Bond (1985) describes as a 'refugee-centric' approach. The whole notion of refugee-centrism arose from concern with agency involvement in refugee research. Agencies are primarily interested in their project, therefore the focus of reports tends to centre solely on refugee communities. I believe the approach must depend on the research problem, the methodology employed, and the time-frame. If, as in this study, a political economy approach is adopted, there is no doubt that the refugee community has to be studied in the context of its host country.

Researchers frequently confront ethical problems when doing surveys among destitute people such as refugees or famine victims (de Waal 1988). This issue was not central in Katumba, as the refugees were, by 1986, beyond the emergency
stage. However, inequalities between the researcher and the researched, in terms of access to resources, were still apparent - especially since foreign exchange could help to procure fuel and scarce medical supplies and food stuffs.

Data Reliability

Most of the data on refugees in Tanzania are derived from official sources, either that of the UNHCR, LWF/TCRS or the state. The quantity and type of data collection has depended on the level of donor activity within the settlement. Yet, refugee data are still affected by the general problems associated with data collection in African environments. A large proportion of data is still derived from estimates of unknown populations. The data on self-settled refugees are of those type, and are less accurate than those for organized settlements.

At the time of my fieldwork, Mishamo settlement was well-documented, following donor-sponsored population and agricultural surveys. However, data on Katumba and Ulyankulu were poor and unreliable, as over-estimations were widespread in the predicted demographic and agricultural data, based on the last comprehensive survey in 1978. For Katumba, in some instances, there are large discrepancies between the official data and those gathered in my survey. Similarly, a census carried out in Katumba in mid-1987 obtained a total population of 66,885, about 34,000 less than that estimated by the donors and the state.
The Fieldwork

The fieldwork involved a period of one year in Tanzania between October 1986 and September 1987. The first month was spent completing procedures for research clearance and immigration and making contacts with the section of the Ministry of Home Affairs responsible for refugee matters and with UNHCR and TCRS representatives. The Ministry for Home Affairs gave permission for my entry into the settlements, and provided letters of introduction to regional, district and settlement officials. I had no previous experience of the obstructive behaviour from state administrators commonly faced by refugee researchers. UNHCR officials, although not openly hostile, were initially evasive and unhelpful. This reaction reached manic proportions in TCRS; field staff were instructed not to provide me with any assistance whatsoever. Nevertheless, TCRS archives, though totally lacking in organization and carefully screened, contained some sketchy background information on various refugee settlements from the 1960s, as well as correspondence between LWF headquarters in Geneva, the Dar es Salaam Branch Office and the field offices.

In the University of Dar es Salaam library I was able to explore previously unencountered literature on Rukwa region. The Rukwa Water Master Plan contained substantial information on socio-economic history as well as on current
development initiatives. Unpublished theses written by University of Dar es Salaam students supplied further background information.5

Two visits were made to the settlements; the first for one month in November 1986, and the second for a period of eight months between January and August 1987. By the second visit, I had confirmed my initial plan to concentrate on Katumba with brief visits to Mishamo and Mwesi settlements.

The preliminary visit enabled me to gain some familiarity with the problem before proceeding with the fieldwork. The logistics of getting to the settlement were complex, since Katumba is located some 1900 kilometres from the capital. Travel within the district was constrained by the rainy season. Nevertheless, I was able to make introductory visits to district officials in Mpanda town and spend two weeks in Katumba and Mishamo settlements. Initial contacts were made with the refugees through the leadership structure - settlement commandant, village chairmen and heads of churches. I was able to explain my proposed research and get to know the district, the refugee community, and the aid programme. A draft questionnaire was constructed based on information on food production, community organization and agency activities (Appendix G).

4 The Rukwa Water Master Plan (1982) is an extensive hydrological survey of Rukwa region by the Norwegian government as part of their contribution to the Rukwa Regional Integrated Development Programme (RIDEP), a development strategy of the Tanzanian state. RWMP contained useful sections on the social and economic characteristics of the region (NORAD/NORCONSULT).

5 Particularly useful were Lemba’s (1975) and Tambila’s (1981) theses.
Selecting a Sample

My plan was to conduct probability sampling of households using the database of the settlement office. As it transpired, no contemporary records were available on population size, number of households or settlement area. Therefore, I devised a suitable sample frame, using the plot as a means of reaching the household.

Katumba is laid out in a grid-like pattern. It contains 27 contiguous village areas, covering over 1,000 square kilometres with individual plots laid out at one kilometre intervals along feeder roads (Figure 4). From the village chairmen, I was able to obtain a rough estimate of the number of plots within each village. First, I selected six villages out of the 27, applying certain selection criteria in order to obtain a cross-section of the refugee community. Differences in environment, relief, soil type, commerce and cash crop production, but within reasonable travelling distance from my home, were utilized. A second stage sample of plots followed. Plots were laid out in parallel fashion on numbered feeder roads at 70 metre intervals (Plates 1 & 2). It was useful to cross-check the number of plots before sampling. Several inaccuracies were discovered in the numbering of plots. Most occupants could not recollect their number, or gave numbers which did not follow logically.

Noting these errors, a random sample, using a random number table was drawn from each village. Forty plots were selected from the first four villages; Mwenge, Msaginya, Mnyaki and Tambazi, and twenty each from Ndurumo and Ivungwe. Sample size was not determined scientifically, and bore no relation
Plate 1  Feeder road in Katumba

Plate 2  Plot and dwellings with cultivation of beans and maize in the foreground
to the total number of plots in each village. As it later became clear, some plots contained multiple households; this was noted in the survey, but attention was concentrated on the plot owner’s household.

Systematic sampling of traders in the market place and casual workers at places of employment formed smaller samples. In retrospect, the sample size of 201 plots was too large, making it difficult to establish sufficient rapport with the refugee community, and thus affecting the information gathered on migration history and cultural dynamics.

The survey

The survey consisted of structured questionnaires administered to the sampled plots, traders and workers; unstructured interviews were carried out with church officials and village chairmen. The questionnaire was compiled in Dar es Salaam after the preliminary visit, and translated into Kiswahili, the second language of the refugees, the first being Kirundi. Some of the precautions suggested by Margaret Peil (1982), were taken into account, for example, on questionnaire length, type of question, and on framing enquires into education, age, farming and other employment.

Interviews took place on the plot, place of business or work. A refugee assistant - a secondary school leaver, accompanied me during the interviews for the purposes of interpreting. Although I started to learn Kiswahili before travelling to Tanzania, it took some time before I became
sufficiently fluent to grasp all that was being said. For the main survey two visits were made to each household; the first introductory, the second for the full interview. Household heads or their partners were interviewed. Normally all members of the household were present. The best time for the interviews was the rainy season when people were mainly working on their plots. During the dry season it was difficult to find heads of households at home, as they migrated for casual work or cultivated the riverine areas some distance from their homes.

The interview began with an explanation of the research purpose and the procedure for plot selection. Respondents were advised that they were at liberty to refuse to answer any question. The questionnaire took an average of 45 minutes to complete, followed by open-ended conversation. During the first set of interviews, it was noticeable that although people agreed to use the tape-recorder, a significant proportion were inhibited, so I stopped using it after the first village.

The extensive layout of the settlement proved disadvantageous to participatory observation methods, except at selected centres like the market place, the church or at village meetings. Unfortunately, my presence at such events tended to attract a certain degree of unwelcome attention.

Responses to the survey

Among the refugees, there was a general atmosphere of suspicion regarding my survey. Most people were initially more interested in my background; how had a black Caribbean
woman became interested in them? They found it unusual that I wanted to spend so much time in the settlement. Most visitors rarely spent more than a few days there and were able to converse with refugees only on guided tours.

One of the major problems facing researchers on refugees, is how to gain acceptance by the refugees and establish one's independent status from the government and the donor agencies (Harrell-Bond 1986). Although there was no attempt to co-opt me by the state or the agencies, refugees approached me with apprehension. Being black, most thought me a government agent, others believed I was from TCRS. Although every effort was made to minimize my association with government and agency personnel, contact was still needed for the purposes of communication with the refugees. There was a general attitude of mistrust towards government officials, even though many refugees acknowledged their gratitude to the Tanzanian government and people for allowing them to remain peacefully in Tanzania. However, there was a more favourable attitude to agency personnel, and many identified me with TCRS and hoped that I would have some influence over the distribution of resources. Because of the high agency profile of LWF/TCRS, most settlers had no idea about UNHCR and its role in relation to refugees in the settlements.

My student status also produced both negative and positive side-effects. Once it was recognized that I was not influential, some male refugee leaders chose to ignore me, thereby allowing me more time to talk to women. Indeed, some people withheld information or gave information which could
not be corroborated - a reflection of their general insecurity. Most refugees were reluctant to talk in depth about their relationship with local Tanzanians, their attitude to life in Tanzania, or even future plans. At one stage the people thought my survey was to determine what proportion wanted to repatriate. They feared that a repatriation programme or a citizenship decree was imminent. Questions which involved recall data also posed difficulties. Some people for obvious reasons, refused to discuss the 1972 events in Burundi. Others focused on the more gruesome details.

Some data were more likely to be withheld than others. Frequent state attack on refugees as destabilizers of the economy through smuggling and black marketeering, coupled with restrictions on mobility, made refugees more secretive about economic activities such as yields, non-agricultural employment and income. Some questions on these subjects were eventually dispensed with.

Gathering data on crop acreage was problematic, as most farmers practised intercropping. Although combinations of different crops may affect yield, I restricted my questioning to the major food and cash crops: maize, beans, cassava and tobacco. Most households could not give accurate data on yields, particularly on the cassava harvest, primarily because cassava is used mainly for domestic consumption and is harvested throughout the year. Cassava sales for most households are negligible.

People were quite disturbed by the fact that I had selected a sample. Most sought detailed explanation of my
sampling procedure. Important people like road chairmen or
ten-cell leaders were dismissive if they were not included
in the sample. Some village chairmen wanted to select the
sample. For expediency the chairmen’s plots were always
included.

Women could not be interviewed easily. Initially, if
their husbands were away, they either refused or requested
the presence of a male neighbour. This affected the depth of
the interview. Many women particularly those who were not
schooled in Tanzania, knew no Kiswahili, so I became totally
reliant on my assistant during the interviews.

Certainly, gender played a significant role in
determining the type of information gathered and my
relationship with the people. Easterday et al (1982) notes
certain behaviour triggered off by women researchers,
involving elements of protection and patronage from male
respondents. Being an unmarried woman affected my
relationship with some of the older members of the
community, who often failed to take my work seriously. Men
generally became patronizing, often referring to me as
msichana (girl) or dada (sister). They disapproved of me
riding a motorbike. In certain instances I had to limit the
range of my data collection, especially in the district and
regional towns, as male informants insisted I meet them
outside working hours.

Finally, towards the end of the research, people
generally thanked me for coming to speak to them. They were
anxious that my research findings would be available to them
so that their Tanzania-born children should know their history.

Data transformation

Firstly, the questionnaires were summarized on easily handled sheets, to give a general impression of patterns within the data, after which questions were coded on to coding sheets. Codes were assigned to open questions, after a survey of all the possible answers and consideration as to their use in the write-up. Peil's (1982) codes on occupation were most useful. However, it was still difficult to classify people with multiple occupations. Data were coded for each household and transferred to the mainframe, Vax/Vms computer, after which they were analyzed using the SAS statistical package.

Although the fieldwork centred on the survey, I later felt that a quantitative analysis was not vital for a grasp of the refugee situation, as dominant structural factors could not be easily measured. Therefore, the qualitative and archival data gathered purposively or incidentally are given more emphasis. The analysis of agricultural production and labour relations lend themselves more to quantitative techniques, for which there are a number of alternative approaches, many of which were tried on the data. However, knowing the conditions under which the data were collected, it is doubtful whether I can conclusively provide adequate explanations for all of the observed patterns. Thus the quantitative data are used to indicate possible trends, not outright facts.
The Structure of the thesis

Chapter One discusses the various theoretical approaches to the study of refugees arising mainly from migration studies - from typologies of migration to models of migrant incorporation into host societies. Cost-benefit functionalist models, as well as theories of assimilation, are dismissed as of limited explanatory value in the African situation. Studies which include concepts like the international division of labour, split/segmented labour market and core-periphery lend themselves more to refugee studies, but are still limited because of their emphasis on core areas. Recently political scientists have called for a greater awareness of the political dimensions of the refugee problem (Zolberg 1983, 1985, Zolberg et al 1986). Applying the classical theories of state formation, they argue that conflict is a natural phenomenon and is therefore intrinsic to nation-state formation - the balancing out of competing forces. This functionalist outlook is implicit in modernization approaches to development. I then attempt to develop the idea that a neo-Marxist political economy approach using concepts of world-system, core-periphery and class relations can convey a better understanding of the conflicts which give rise to forced migration and its persistence and growth on the African continent. However, it is necessary to incorporate into this approach a level of empiricism based on the experiences of refugees at a particular locality.
Chapter Two begins the discussion of Barundi refugees by focusing briefly upon the arena of the conflict - the territory of the Burundi state. It summarises the nature and role of the state, especially its class and ethnic character, through an historical analysis of the development of ethnic identity and polarization during and since the colonial period. Noting the rise of ethnic nationalism within Burundi society, I argue that ethnicity is too narrow an explanation for the conflict, but it is significant as it continues to be an important facet of post-colonial Burundi society. Furthermore, Barundi's incorporation into an imperialist system helped to perpetuate divisions in the society.

Chapter Three moves to the territory of asylum - to Tanzania, where I analyse the origin and components of Tanzania's refugee policy. I argue that Tanzania's response to refugees, such as the Barundi, is the outcome of influential forces operating at three scales, the global, regional and national. At the global and regional levels, the threat posed by conflicting ideologies within the newly-recognized sovereign African states, as well as the saliency of borders, necessitated a mechanism to control, monitor and effectively de-mobilize stateless people. In the event international pressures from the West forced African states at the regional and national levels to enact legislation to counteract political instability. Refugee aid is seen as one of such mechanisms of control.

Chapter Four elaborates the discussion of the spatial patterns of Barundi refugee settlement within Western
Tanzania through a historical-materialist analysis of the development of spatial differentiation within Tanzania society, noting the development of Western Tanzania as peripheral to the core areas of capitalist agricultural development. The essential position of Western Tanzania as a contributor of labour to the core is discussed within a framework which includes labour migration from Burundi. This historical - and more recent potential- contribution of Barundi migrants to the Tanzanian economy provides the basis for the analysis of state attempts to incorporate Barundi refugees into contemporary Tanzanian society as semi-proletarianized direct producers and labour migrants. The chapter ends with a description of the arrival and distinct settlement pattern of the refugees.

Chapter Five is based on the premise that the mode of incorporation adopted by the Tanzanian state for rural refugee groups must depend on how the state has incorporated its own peasantry into the dominant political and economic structures. Thus organized settlement schemes for refugees are firstly conceptualized as part of the development strategy of the Tanzanian state, and its history of altering the rural spatial and social organization of its people is charted. How this is manifested in the refugee settlements is elucidated in a discussion of the internal structure of Katumba settlement. The complementary and sometimes conflicting roles of the donors, state and refugees and their unequal relationships are analyzed under the sub-headings of restrictions on mobility, social welfare provisions, and bureaucratization of the settlement process.
Chapter Six develops the theme of an enforced economic structure through an analysis of the organization of production within Katumba settlement. Dismissing the notion of a humanitarian purpose behind settlement schemes, I develop the idea that they are seen explicitly by the state, and implicitly by the donors, as vehicles for the exploitation of peripheral areas. However, the conflicting objectives of donor, state and refugees as to the nature of production, as well as the objective conditions of reproduction within the district, placed severe limitations on productivity. The impact of demographic, ecological, environmental and economic constraints on household production are considered and related to the penetration of the capitalist mode of production into Tanzania rural areas and the current economic crises of the late 1970s and 1980s.

Chapter Seven considers the prospect of refugee-stimulated social transformation within the district. This is achieved by analysing the social relations of production within the settlement, questioning the popular perception of refugees as an undifferentiated mass, and examining the emerging social differentiation among the refugee population. Lenin's differentiation schema, organized around land and labour, has limitations when applied to the study area. Differentiation in the refugee community is partially explained using organization around labour as the distinguishing criterion. Nevertheless, the centrality of petty mercantilist activities in the settlement community is noted, but further research is required to assess its importance to the differentiation process. The chapters end
with a discussion of the effects of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)-Sponsored Structural Adjustment Programme and its package of economic reforms on the refugee community.

I conclude with a discussion as to whether tangible changes are possible for Katumba's settlers, whether of a political kind as refugees, or of a developmental/economic type as peasants, without greater democratization of the settlement process - in effect political liberalization.
FIGURE 1
BURUNDI: ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS 1972

LEGEND

- Regional boundary 1972
- International boundary
- Capital City
- Regional Town
- Local Town

15 30Km
FIGURE 2

REFUGEE MOVEMENTS & AREAS OF CONCENTRATION
Figure 2b  Tanzania Rural: density by division, 1967

Source: Moore, J. E in Egero, B. and Henin, R. (1973)
Figure 3
THE LOCATION OF REFUGEE SETTLEMENTS IN MPANDA DISTRICT, RUKWA REGION

LEGEND

Road
Railway
Regional boundary
International boundary
Refugee Settlement
District boundary

SCALE 1:2 000 000
FIGURE 4
KATUMBA
REFUGEE
SETTLEMENT:
LOCATION,
INTERNAL STRUCTURE

LEGEND
Legend:
- Ujamaa Villages
- Road in Katumba
- School
- Market
- HQ Headquarters
- Church
- Dispensary
- Railway Station

Msima Game Controlled Area

Mpanda
Forest Reserve

Kasakale

Mpanda
Town

Msaginya
Forest
Reserve

Katumba
Refugee Settlement:
Location, Internal Structure
CHAPTER ONE

IN SEARCH OF AN APPROPRIATE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction

The paucity of specific theories for the study of refugees in contemporary Africa has resulted in the predominance of empirical studies which perpetuate the myth of the exceptional nature of refugee migration. This approach is further supported by a conceptual base arising from international humanitarian organizations and their legislation. It is because of the need to conceptualize the refugee phenomenon beyond these narrow boundaries that this chapter searches for an appropriate theoretical framework. Firstly, I discuss the concept of the refugee as outlined in international and regional legislation, then I survey the various approaches in migration theories which have been used to explain refugee migration and incorporation in western societies. Questioning their relevance to Africa, I employ aspects of theories of underdevelopment, of the state, and of imperialism to produce a framework which provides explanations for the emergence and persistence of the refugee phenomenon in post-colonial Africa, and with which to understand the solutions which have been used to 'deal' with the problem in asylum countries.

Defining the Refugee

The common perception of a refugee is of a fugitive forced to flee his or her country of origin because of life-threatening events, and having to seek refuge in another
territory. This view arises from the international legal
definition of refugees which provides the framework for
current discourse on the refugee issue. International laws
evolving from concepts of national sovereignty, territorial
legitimacy, and humanitarian principles, have dominated the
world's attitude to forced migrants. Although, historically,
people have been forced to seek sanctuary away from their
homes, legal distinctions now exist which determine who
among these people receives protection and assistance. The
1951 United Nations Convention, along with the 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, have in fact created a
distinct category of people, a new phenomenon within modern
societies, by defining the refugee as

...any person who, owing to well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
and is unable, or owing to such fears for reasons of
personal convenience is unwilling to, avail himself of
the protection of that country (My emphasis). ¹

The definition is applicable only for a limited number of
forced migrants. It is in theory confined to those described
as 'political refugees', and in practice to those who seek
assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR). Numerous refugees, including those
displaced by drought, famine and other natural disasters are
therefore not covered by the protection or assistance of the
Convention.

The international and regional legal conventions have
been criticized for the ambiguity of their language and for
allowing an element of subjectivity in determining status.
Thus the emphasis on territorial displacement excludes a

host of people facing the same fate as those designated
refugees (Karadawi 1983, Melander and Nobel 1978). Karadawi
has pointed out the 'danger and ambiguity' in the subjective
use of terms like 'fear', and 'well-founded'. These failings
are heightened by the fact that 'asylum has never been
established as an individual human right. It has always
remained as the sovereign right of the hosts' (Karadawi
1983, p.3). Although regional organizations like the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) have instituted their
own refugee law, that of the United Nations (UN) is most
widely accepted. A whole new nomenclature has evolved to
distinguish 'convention' refugees, (those who fall under the
UN convention and statute) from 'economic refugees',
'internal refugees', 'displaced people' and 'returnees'. In
practice these terms are used interchangeably, depending on
the political orientation of the user and his or her
relationship with the refugee group. The OAU has, since
1964, made a distinction between supporters of anti-colonial
liberation movements (freedom fighters) and refugees from
independent African states. Freedom fighters, those fighting
white-minority rule, were placed under the auspices of the
OAU Liberation Committee. In 1969, the OAU passed its own

2 The OAU and Tanzanian definitions and their implications
for the Barundi refugee group are discussed further in
Chapter Three.
3 The OAU Liberation Committee was established in 1964 to
provide material support for freedom fighters. Detailed
explanations of the origin and operations of the Committee
can be found in articles by Emanuel Dube and Frank Minja in
M.M. Shamuyaria (ed) (1975) Essays on the Liberation of
Southern Africa, Tanzania Publishing House, Dar es Salaam,
and in E.J. Kisanga (1981) 'Tanzania and the Organization of
Foreign Policy of Tanzania: A Reader, Tanzania Publishing
House, Dar es Salaam, pp.97-122.
Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee problems in 
Africa, in which it recognized the specific character of 
African refugee groups.

According to the OAU Convention, the term refugee 
should also apply to:

...every person who, owing to external aggression, 
occupation, foreign domination or events seriously 
disturbing public order in either or part or the whole of 
his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to 
leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek 
refuge in another place outside his country of origin or 
nationality.

Thus the OAU definition encapsulates its policy on the 
liberation of southern Africa, by affirming its support for 
refugees who are members of liberation movements fighting 
white-minority rule. In addition, by not stipulating 
specific events which may cause displacement of people, the 
convention therefore covers refugees fleeing natural 
disasters. These are the only progressive aspects of the 
OAU’s convention, which contains a number of caveats in the 
granting of asylum.

Some have questioned the relevance of the term 
‘refugee’ in the African context, where a peculiar feature 
has invariably been the existence of kinsfolk on the other 
side of arbitrary borders. Linguistic and cultural 
similarities often make identifying ‘refugees’ a difficult 
task. However, the Pan-Africanist vision of freedom of 
movement in Africa remains illusory in the current 
atmosphere of hysteria as the ruling classes try to retain 
control over externally-created entities. Nevertheless, the 
porosity of borders has forced African states to adopt a 
benign approach to the refugee problem, with leaders playing
the role of bountiful donors, while at the same time implementing policies which serve to expel their own citizens.

Inherent in the various refugee definitions is the dominance of the concept of the state system over the human rights of individuals. People seek refuge because the state is unable or unwilling to exercise its duty to protect its citizens. In such situations guaranteeing human rights is considered threatening to the state structure. Therefore, recognizing the right of refugees to asylum becomes the prerogative of the receiving state. Refugee status is given only under conditions where refugees pose no immediate threat to the host state, and refugees recognize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of their home state.

Thus the internationally-accepted legal definition of the refugee recognizes the political nature of the causes of refugee situations, meanwhile rendering the concept of refugees sterile by advocating an apolitical solution to the problem. Recommended solutions concentrate on alleviating the immediate hardships, through seemingly humanitarian actions which address the symptoms of the problem within the host country.

However, the concept of a refugee is not entirely a legal construct. Empirical analysis identifies its association with the aid programmes provided by donors. Where assistance is given, the label refugee connotes certain behavioural patterns on the part of the receiver and
the giver (Mazur 1986, Zetter 1986). In some instances the forced migrant may have the option, whether or not to 'become a refugee' through avoidance of the aid programme (Harrell-Bond 1986). With refugees now spending decades in exile, they form a specific category of people within Africa: stateless, having a precarious existence, their future largely dependent on their being able to organize themselves as an interest group based on their common experience of exile.

The international definitions may be superseded by national definitions, a particular group of forced migrants can be subjected to a variety of labels, and their reasons for migrating open to diverse interpretations. The term refugee, then, as defined by the UN convention has proved problematic for scholars and for some governments which have endeavoured to widen its meaning to include people internally displaced by wars as in Mozambique, Sudan or Chad. Some scholars have however, sought to maintain this narrow definition to ensure the protection afforded by the convention, for those most in danger from acts perpetrated by their government.

For the social scientist the concept of the 'refugee' must have a wider definition, to include all those displaced by a particular event whether internally or externally. Zolberg et al (1986) posit that a 'well-founded fear of violence' should be used to distinguish refugees from other

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Wood (1985) has considered the centrality of labelling and labels in development policy discourse, and has noted the immense power exercised by those who create and impose labels. In most cases, labels are part of a disorganizing strategy, to incapacitate the poor and the weak.
migrants living outside their country. This violence must be initiated by a ‘recognizable internal agent and directed at a specified target group’ (p. 153). It is clear that such a definition suffers from the same failings as the legal definition, in addition to which it excludes situations where individuals rather than groups face violence. Alternatively, it should refer to all who are forced to reside outside their country of birth, and who cannot avail themselves of the protection of their home state. To geographers, refugee migration implies substantial spatial reorganization of people, whether within or between territorial space.

For the purposes of this study, I have retained the narrow legal definition out of convenience, since it has already been used to categorize the group in my study. Therefore, the term refugees refers to a group of people forced to leave their country of birth due to events from which the state could offer no protection, and who because of their material circumstances have been drawn into an assistance programme, organized by members of the host or international community.

**Theorizing in Refugee Studies**

Refugee studies is handicapped by the absence of an accepted general theoretical framework with which to analyse refugee situations. Research is inclined to be ad hoc, responding to specific refugee situations, treating each as a unique event. Subsequently, comparative analyses are difficult, because researchers coming from diverse
disciplines bring to the subject a wide variety of approaches into which they try to fit the refugee problematic. Most studies have attempted to develop the forced migration aspect of the refugee phenomenon, and thereby incorporate it into migration theories.

One major approach to refugee migration emphasizes selected variables, such as the nature of the movement, the decision to move, or the choice of destination, as being important for an understanding of refugee situations (Kunz 1973, Eichenbaum 1975, Petersen 1958). Another seeks to address the modes of incorporation into the host society (Richmond & Goldlust 1974, Richmond & Verma 1978, Portes & Bach 1985, Bulcha 1988). More recently, an argument has been put forward for the adoption of a perspective which emphasizes the influence of political factors on refugee migration (Ferris 1985, Zolberg et al 1985, Zolberg 1983). The significance of this approach relates to the seemingly intractable problem of Third World refugees. In essence the trend is to move away from a micro to a macro-analytical approach, that is from a focus on individuals to national and global systems (Zolberg et al 1985). Elizabeth Ferris (1985) envisages an even wider framework. She asserts:

'...the study of refugee movements presents fascinating opportunities for understanding the interplay between political, social, economic, cultural and psychological phenomena' (p.1).

So far it is in the area of migration that most theorizing about refugees has taken place.

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5 Such studies have tended to be empirical concentrating essentially on Third World communities in North America: Cubans, Haitians, Indo-Chinese and European.
Relevance of Migration Theories

Migration can be defined as the permanent or semi-permanent movement of a group of people or an individual from one geographical location to another (Mangalam 1968). The cross-border spatial relocation of refugees can on this basis fall under the umbrella of migration. Studies dealing with migration tend to follow two types. The first is concerned empirically or theoretically with the causes of migration, which can be economic, social, cultural, demographic, environmental or technological. The second essentially concentrates on the economic and social consequences of migration for host and sending areas.  

Traditionally, both types of migration studies were micro-analytical and each identified a set of variables to determine propensity to migrate, and adaptation to the receiving society. These variables are either essentially spatial, as in the distance between socio-economic areas, or behavioural - linking the individual attributes of migrants to an assumed rational behaviour. In contrast the more recent structuralist approach is macro-analytical; using Marxist historical materialist methodology, it emphasizes structural factors as having greater influence over the migration process. Migration is then conceived as responding to spatial inequalities caused by the unequal development of capitalism within and between countries, and its ability to appropriate labour and resources. Studies of labour

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6 Discussion of the various theoretical approaches to migration can be found in Bach and Schraml (1982), Wood (1982) and Portes and Bach (1985). White and Woods (1980) look specifically at models for explaining spatial patterns of migration.
migration in underdeveloped societies find the
behaviouralist approach of insufficient explanatory value,
and instead favour the structuralist perspective (Standing &
Peek 1983, Wayne 1975, Plange 1979). In the following
sections, I will attempt to show how refugee migration has
been tackled in the behaviouralist school, and then discuss
how the historical-structural approach can give a deeper
understanding of African refugee migration.

Typologies of migration

Of the first type, neo-classical approaches such as
those of the modernization school interpret migration as the
inevitable outcome of rational decisions made by people with
adequate knowledge of two contrasting socio-economic
environments, spatially distributed on a national, regional
or international scale. This approach is often
conceptualized in the push/pull model of migration.
Migration is interpreted as concerning 'voluntary' changes
of residence.

Studies of forced or 'involuntary' migration have been
confined to European emigration in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries or in the case of Africa, to forced
resettlement of people due to dam construction, disease
eradication, and agricultural schemes (Colson 1971, Chambers
1970). Such studies have tended to be empirical, and have
contributed little theoretically. However, efforts have been
made to combine the more crude push/pull theory of migration
with the concept of individual choice in order to theorize
refugee migration. Consequently in typologies of migration,
refugees fall into a category of their own. In their case, the 'push' factor dominates, so that refugees are defined as forced, involuntary or impelled migrants, with the differentiating factor being the virtual or relative lack of individual decision-making in activating their movement. In his general typology of migration, Petersen (1958) made a distinction between forced and impelled migration. In both cases the activating agent is the state or some functionally equivalent social institution; impelled migration occurs when the migrant retains some power to decide whether or not to leave, and forced migration when he/she does not have this power. This passive component of the migratory process is further developed in the work of Kunz (1973, 1981). Kunz, utilizing the law of physics to explain the dynamics of refugee movement, contends that refugees are subjected to overwhelming and concentrated externally induced push factors, over which they exercise no control as to the timing or direction of movement.

Their progress more often than not resembles the movement of the billiard ball: devoid of inner direction their path is governed by the kinetic factors of inertia, friction and the vectors of outward forces applied on them (Kunz 1973, p.131).

Kunz (1973) then classified refugees into two kinetic types; anticipatory or acute, depending on the time of flight in relation to the event. Anticipatory migration implies moving slightly before the event and acute infers a direct reaction to the force. Kunz (1981) later divided these types into sub-categories based on their social relationship with their countries of origin.
Eichenbaum (1975) elaborated this theme by emphasizing the amount of volition as crucial in distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary migrants. He interprets migration as a function of volition which in itself incorporates two decisions; firstly the decision to move from place of initial residence or origin, and secondly the decision resulting in the selection of a new residence or destination. In refugee situations, the first decision is wholly determined for the individual by outside agencies, and the decision to settle is overwhelmingly influenced by the receptivity of the host society.

Even though such typologies may help us to differentiate between population movements and provide a framework within which to place the refugee, they are nevertheless limited in scope. Being descriptive they are unable to explain why certain events produce refugees and others do not, and why some people of a particular refugee group choose to remain behind when conditions are unfavourable to their well-being. Furthermore, it has long been recognized that migrants, even refugees, do not behave like a pile of iron filings or billiard balls; empirical studies of refugee groups have shown that decisions are made when to leave and where to go (Portes & Bach 1985, Harrell-Bond 1985, Bulcha 1988). However, because of the enormous influence of external factors over migration, some scholars now question the suitability of 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' categories for subdividing migration (Richmond 1988).
Economic Factors

Many of the more explanatory studies of migration have been concerned with labour transfers between dual sectors of an economy, between low and high productivity areas. Societies, particularly those in the Third World, are perceived to comprise a backward traditional sector juxtaposed with a developing modern sector. Migration is conceived as arising from rational decision-making based on the expected wage differentials between these two sectors.

This principle is embodied in the Harris/Todaro model, which is used to explain internal migration in the Third World between dichotomous, traditional rural sectors and modern urban sectors (Todaro 1976). Such neo-classical, equilibrium approaches allude to the beneficial effects of migration, for the source and for the receiving areas, by overemphasizing the possibilities of utilizing surplus labour and the return of remittances (Berg 1965, Skinner 1965). This econometric paradigm has in essence dominated migration studies, ignoring the operation of structural factors which historically have exerted enormous influence on decisions to move, directions of movement and destinations.

Critics of this paradigm contend that it is primarily ahistorical, failing to provide any underlying reasons for the uneven spatial distribution of capital or to discuss the relationship between different socio-economic areas (Slater 1977). In addition, it assumes that spatial inequalities can be adjusted by migration. Moreover, it fails to consider the effect on migration of colonialism and imperialism. Non-
economic reasons like coercion are not taken into account; Third World rural areas are not de-populated; cases exist where people resist migration or alternatively are prevented from migrating (Standing & Peek 1983). In order to fill these lacunae, Marxists have argued for an alternative approach which combines an analysis of superstructural elements with that of the modes of production, which incorporates class analysis, addresses the social relations of production within rural societies, and the role of the state in initiating and regulating migration flows. Others have focused on the circulation of capital and on the inter-relationships between dependent and developed economies, by 'linking migration to the larger social processes more common in historical-structural theories of development. ...and the application to migration of such essential concepts as imperialism, [core-periphery] reserve army, international division of labour, world labour market and split or dual labour markets' (Bach & Schraml 1982, p.323-324).

Studies by Standing et al (1983) in Latin America, Plange (1979) and Amin (1974) on West Africa, Wayne (1975) and Rodney et al (1983) for Tanzania, have demonstrated historically the link between changes in the economic structure and the nature of the state. Since the beginning of the colonial period 'extra-economic mechanisms' have been employed either to uproot peasants from the land or to keep them on the land.

...within a colonized economic system, decisions are made to mobilize and allocate labour in largely the same way as they are taken in relation to the extraction of other resources. Thus analytically various mechanisms are
available to the decision-making body, including a range of physical controls— which may eventually involve force— especially taxation (Flange 1979, p. 658).

The pattern of migration became international in scope as pressures were placed on Africans to cross colonial frontiers to centres of European economic activity, for example to the mines of Southern Africa, and to the plantations of East and West Africa. Cross border movements provided refuge for those escaping taxation, forced labour, drought or political instability.

However, it was the incidence of international labour migration between developed and developing countries which provided the basis for a sustained attack on the prevailing migration orthodoxy, and which drew attention to refugee migration. Using a historical-materialist perspective, labour migration was shown to result from the uneven distribution of capital and resource development between core and peripheral areas, caused by the integration of pre-capitalist social formations into the capitalist system (Castles & Kosack 1985). This thesis has been developed into theories of the split labour market, dual economy and international division of labour.

With the danger of both the individualist and the political economy approaches becoming tautological and over-simplified, some researchers have sought to develop the latter’s limitations by introducing a further micro-analytical element, that of the household as a more realistic unit of analysis at the local level. Wood (1982) conceives household behaviour as dynamic, with the individual household employing a host of 'sustenance
strategies' to fit its consumption needs to the labour power at its disposal. Such strategies are flexible in that they depend not just on life cycle changes but on the influence of factors internal and external to the household: its demographic characteristics, job opportunities, taxes, commodity prices, and inflation as well as the legal and political institutions which determine access to production and resources. In response, households may intensify production, participate in non-agricultural activities, 'alter the sexual division of labour, reallocate calorific consumption among its members, change the level of fertility of its members, or engage in short-term or long-term migration' (Wood 1982, p.314).

When the household is unable to maintain the desired level of income despite the strategies adopted, or when viable alternatives to improve its conditions exist elsewhere (net cost of migration), permanent movement is likely to occur (Wood 1982, p.314).

According to Bach and Schraml (1982), such studies are confronted with the familiar problem of defining the household unit, and, with their emphasis on 'collective income pool', are in danger of reiterating neo-classical cost-benefit analysis.

Although they are of little direct significance for the periphery to periphery movements of most Third World refugees, existing structuralist theories on migration do offer a perspective on the possible modes of incorporation of refugees selected for resettlement in core societies. Labour market studies identify several features of the core labour market which affect the inclusion of immigrant groups. Being stratified and segmented, incoming groups are
heterogeneously incorporated. Migrants belonging to a particular ethnic group may enter the labour market at the bottom as cheap wage labour, but others may occupy a particular economic niche as middlemen (Bonacich 1983). Some may even be subjected to gross exploitation, and non-unionized, unorganized migrants may be used as a tool by capitalist enterprises to undercut domestic workers (Bonacich 1976). This approach has more explanatory power in contemporary societies than those provided by the more neo-classical theories of immigrant incorporation, namely assimilation theory.

**Immigrant adaptation: assimilation theory**

A radical perspective on immigrant adaptation in the host society interprets the formation of ethnic enclaves and the emergence of ethnicity as a response to the 'gradual awareness of exploitation and an increased dissatisfaction with a subordinate role in the cultural division of labour' (Portes & Bach 1985, p.27).

In contrast, the prevailing ideology of refugee adaptation involves the application of conventional functionalist concepts like assimilation or integration in national and international discourse and policies. Both concepts originated from a body of neo-classical migration theories which historically had associations with certain political ideologies in the United States during the mass migration of East Europeans in the 1920s, and the ethnocentric demand to preserve a distinct Anglo-Saxon American identity (Bach and Schraml 1982). The recent
The resurgence of the assimilation concept has been fuelled by the current restrictionist immigration policies and the presence of racially distinct Third World migrants in Western societies (Strand & Woodrow-Jones 1985, Banton 1985, Wong 1978, Van den Berghe 1980).

Theoretically, assimilation explains the process of adaptation which occurs when two distinct groups interact within a common social structure. Minority immigrant groups are frequently conceived as passing through

...a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups, and by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life (Burgess & Park (1927) quoted in Gordon, M. M. (1964) p.62).

thus leading to the acquisition of the socio-cultural characteristics of the dominant group and becoming absorbed into the host society (Burgess & Park 1927, Gordon 1964). Due to the difficulties of measuring assimilation, Gordon (1964, 1975) identified seven components, which would indicate the degree of assimilation: cultural, structural, marital, identificational, attitude receptional (absence of prejudice), behaviour receptional (absence of discrimination) and civic (absence of value and power conflict). Assimilationists themselves admit that it is unlikely that in any given society an incoming group can succeed in all these dimensions.

Assimilation incorporates certain underlying assumptions about society; that there is consensus as to the nature of society in addition to cultural homogeneity and equality of opportunity. It further assumes societies to be in equilibrium, and conflict to be an integral part of any
interaction between cultures unless newcomers are absorbed into the dominant society. Again, individual choice is given prominence as a factor determining assimilation. Those opposing assimilation resort to a corporate identity based on ethnicity, race or religion, which is considered by functionalists as potentially conflictive (Glazier & Moniyhan 1963, Gordon 1964). Criticisms have been levelled at its negative aspects such as ethnocentrism and cultural domination, and its failure to consider the attitude of the receiving society as a determining factor. In some instances the host society may be opposed to integration, fearing the pollution of their cultural and social institutions, or competition for limited resources. Incoming groups therefore occupy marginal positions in all areas of society. To a large extent assimilation is now viewed purely as a theoretical construct.

However, assimilation is perceived differently when applied to non-western societies, particularly in Africa, where the multi-ethnic composition of most states militates against the advocation of the cultural domination of one ethnic group over others. Usually the post-independence concern is to foster national and spatial integration through the equal incorporation of a diversity of ethnic groups and administrative units into the new national entity (Paden 1980). In such a situation assimilation forms an integral part of the modernization phenomenon. Assimilation can, however, become an acceptable ideology where recent immigrant groups are involved. It is used to prevent the congregation of politically-active groups, and accords with
the post-independence ideology of national integration. African governments may recognize the existence of their indigenous collectivities, but they try to prevent the formation of new, independent and competing ones within their boundaries.

**Assimilation and refugees**

Notions of compliance and acceptance make assimilation a readily usable concept for international organizations dealing with the predicament of refugees. Assimilation as a policy option is embodied in the statute and convention of UNHCR; the High Commissioner may 'seek permanent solutions' by 'facilitating the voluntary repatriation of such refugees or their assimilation within new national communities' (quoted in Holborn 1975, p.88). Louise Holborn (1975), chief analyst of UNHCR's activities during the 1960s, notes that for UNHCR; '...assimilation means the legal and economic absorption of refugees by the country in which they have sought asylum or by some other country in the hope that eventually they will become naturalized citizens of that country' (p.88).

State control over migrants has led to greater selectivity from source areas to suit the economic requirements of the host countries and to fashion the mode of incorporation. Displaced people, more than any other migrant group, will discover that the process of settlement in a new society does not involve decision-making for the majority. Bureaucratization of the settlement process limits the avenues for self-determination. This is a feature both
in Western countries and increasingly in the Third World, where international assistance is given. Although assimilation is seen by some as a process of mutual accommodation, efforts are still being made to force displaced people to conform, to acculturate. The hypothesis that the more widely dispersed a group is, the more likely they are to assimilate, has led to numerous programs dispersing refugees in the new society.\(^7\) Needless to say, as individual choice becomes an option the refugees begin to regroup.

African governments receiving refugees lack the selectivity of their western counterparts, because in most instances refugees unpredictably migrate en masse across obscure borders. The policies devised by international organizations and African states foster segregation followed by state-controlled integration rather than dispersal; both have direct implications for assimilation. Yet settling in a local community is possible, since a significant proportion of African refugees are still able to disappear into rural communities evading government attention.

The assimilation concept initially provided a convenient conceptual framework for academics confronted with the problem of refugees. Characteristics like race, ethnicity, gender and cultural institutions were used to explain differing rates of adaptation by African refugees to the demands of the new environment (Spring 1981, Hansen

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\(^7\) This is a strategy used by the United States and British governments in their settlement of Indo-Chinese refugees. See Tapp. N. (1985) 'The Re-creation of culture: Hmong refugees from Laos', Refugee Studies Programme (RSP) Refugee Issues, Vol. 1. No.5 (Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford)
1979, Sokiri 1972). In the West, socio-economic characteristics like education, class and motivation were more appropriate criteria (Wong 1978, Thompson 1979, Goldlust and Richmond 1974). On the whole, studies of African refugees have perceived them as an aggregate mass, or differentiate only between urban and rural areas of origin. Clearly, in this view labour conditions and the limited resources in Africa reduce the necessity for a concern with individual behaviour. Like neo-classical theories of migration, assimilation theory takes no account of structural factors and how they may impinge on integration.

Refugees: A structuralist approach

A cursory glance at the nature of the African refugee situation highlights the existence of a direct relationship between certain social formations and refugees. Therefore, my investigation begins by exploring the implication of certain historical and structural factors on refugee migration. To understand the full impact of structural factors on the Barundi as a specific refugee group, it became necessary to include some empirical work at the micro-level of the household and the community.

Circumstances generating refugees are diverse and are commonly associated with war, famine, drought, political repression, material deprivation, revolution, terrorism, ethnic or religious conflicts, irredentism and revanchism. It is possible to classify these causes into three broad analytical categories. Firstly, those which are associated
with direct violence perpetrated by elements of the state (state terrorism) or by certain groups upon another with the sanction of the state (ethnic conflict). Such disputes are often intensified by the control of one group over the machinery of the state and or with the support of external powers. Secondly, those resulting directly from external aggression. Thirdly, those arising from the de-stabilizing activities of guerrilla movements often supported by external powers. All these categories are directly or indirectly the result of underdevelopment and can be linked to the political and fiscal crises which now beset the continent. Moreover, they force us to question the ability of African states to secure the civil rights of their people, since the majority of Africa's refugees are displaced because of internal conflict, not from direct external aggression.

Consequently an analysis which is historical-structural in content, such as Marxist political economy places the refugee squarely within the contextual framework of national and international political arenas. It can also be used to examine the response of the economic structure to large-scale spatial re-organization of people/labour. More meaningful questions can be asked, such as: why are there so many refugees from Third World countries? What linkages exist between refugees and the underdeveloped political and economic structures of these states? How do political and socio-economic conditions in the host societies determine the way in which immigrants/refugees are perceived and incorporated by their hosts? How can underdeveloped
economies absorb an influx of population on the scale of current refugee flows?

Important for the understanding of the refugee problem is the need to focus on several structural issues within Africa, that of the nature and role of the state, the conditions of underdevelopment, nation-building or the national question, political stability and national/regional security. These issues are inter-related, and cast doubts on the legitimacy of the state within Africa and its international linkages.

The notion of the state implies the existence of a territorial entity, over which there is sovereignty. As Taylor (1985) observes, geographers have for some time been concerned with territorial integration and the organization of territory, while other social scientists have adopted a less benign perspective towards the state. Several theories of the state now exist, with greater or lesser emphasis placed on the relative autonomy of the state from the mode of production, and the degree of separation of political classes from economic classes. Liberal pluralist theories conceptualize the state as a 'neutral' moderator of society, balancing out the 'competing interests' of different classes and groups. In contrast, Marxist theories with instrumentalist or structuralist perspectives see the state either as comprising institutions which are dominated by or recruit directly from the ruling class, or as explicitly 'capitalist because it operates within a capitalist mode of production' (Taylor 1985 p.119). According to Johnston (1985) the state therefore acts as a 'promoter of
accumulation' and a 'legitimator of capitalism'. Not only does it foster policies which ensure the reproduction of capital, by 'governing the rules' between capitalists and between capital and labour, but in its welfare role, assists in the reproduction of the labour force to the benefit of capital. Using Marx's original concept that the ruling ideas in a society are those of the ruling class, some Marxists have concentrated on emphasizing the hegemonic character of the state. State apparatuses—coercive and ideological (political, judiciary, media, education and religion), are used to extend the dominance of the hegemony (Clark and Dear 1984). Most of the debates on the configuration and role of the state centre on the state in developed capitalist societies. Taylor (1985), using a world systems approach, gives us a useful formula for understanding state forms in the underdeveloped world. He differentiates between state forms in core and peripheral states. Core states are stable because 'a process of social imperialism' whereby surplus is passed onto the labour force ensures that consensus is achieved '(Taylor 1985, p.123), for the required social control. Meanwhile, at the other extreme, peripheral states are characterized by instability as there is no surplus to pass on to labour, which then has to be coerced into submission' (Taylor 1985 p.123-124). In sum, the actual configuration of states is dependent on their historical specificity. The present character of peripheral states in Africa is derived from their colonial origin, and their particular experience of incorporation into the world capitalist system.
The concept of underdevelopment refers essentially to the uneven economic development experienced by pre-capitalist societies when integrated into the world capitalist system. According to Rodney (1972), this simply means the exploitation of one country by another. The notion of underdevelopment is conceptualized in the various Marxist theories of imperialism, especially those which draw attention to the cumulative differences between 'dependent' or 'peripheral capitalist' countries and those with developed capitalist economies. In the processes of trade or unequal exchange, 'core' areas exploit 'peripheral' areas, through the appropriation of surplus. A combination of several factors contribute to the lack of surplus invested in the periphery, resulting in 'blocked development', or what dependency theorists such as Andre Gunder Frank and Samir Amin refer to as the development of underdevelopment. Underdeveloped countries have certain structural features which distinguish them from 'developed' countries. Amin (1976) identifies four main characteristics of peripheral capitalist formations: the predominance of agrarian capitalism; the presence of a local, mainly commercial bourgeoisie; incomplete proletarianization; and a peculiar, 'over-developed' bureaucracy. Slater (1977), quoting Mamdani, focuses on the subordination of the economic structure to the accumulation of metropolitan capital. In the colonial period, such countries became suppliers of labour or food to the core areas, as the colonial state

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8 See A. G. Frank (1969) and S. Amin (1976).
actively destroyed local industry and transformed agriculture.

Capital investment meant the growth of institutions within Africa to facilitate production and distribution and to ensure the free outward flow of surplus. Over the course of the colonial period, increasingly large sectors of African resources came to be utilized primarily in the interest of foreign capital. Now patterns of domestic demand and consumption became evident while class distinctions became sharper and socially more significant in many parts of the African continent. It is widely acknowledged that these colonial economic processes constituted a phase of dependency and underdevelopment (Rodney 1983, p.4).

The dominant social class which emerged from colonialism has a material interest in the reproduction of the existing structures. Shivji (1976) charts the historical development of this class in Tanzania, where he argues that the external and internal production relations together ensure the reproduction of underdevelopment. Changing these structures would require a socio-political struggle against existing social relations. He argues that it is misleading to separate state power from class relations, since political struggle is in fact 'waged against the instrument of political power of one class over another' (Shivji 1976, p.7). Conflicts can be interpreted as the direct outcome of this political and economic stranglehold by factions of the ruling class and their international allies over the people.

Important for newly-independent African states is the role of the state as a social engineer, fostering social cohesion, by ensuring 'distributive justice' and 'redress[ing] socio-economic imbalances and maintain[ing] fairness for disadvantaged groups' (Clark and Dear 1984, P.20). Where divisive colonial economic and political policies created socio-spatial inequalities, the state was
expected to fulfil its nationalist promise to foster national unity, and to remove inequity. This was partially attempted in some of the post-independence development strategies.

Due to the conditions of underdevelopment outlined earlier, African states exhibit certain attributes which limit their capacity to act on behalf of their people. Without dwelling for any length on their specificities, it is worth noting that states in Africa constitute relatively new social formations, described sometimes as weak, neo-colonial and interventionist (Goulbourne 1987). They arise from a specific historical experience (colonialism) in which external rulers determined the people's role in the new entities by limiting their contribution to the supply of labour and commodities, and by creating a set of institutions which would ensure this continuity.

The relationship between the state and the dominant class in Africa is still a matter of contention. There has been considerable debate as to whether classes, as defined in terms of their relationship to means of production, exist in Africa, let alone whether the political elite actually constitutes a class or whether the bourgeois class has control of the state machinery. Shivji (1976) argues that the post-colonial Tanzanian state is in the control of a 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie', which uses a 'liberal ideology' to obscure its class interest, thus identifying its own class interest as that of the nation. Clearly, in the era of neo-colonialism and imperialism, Marxists see the African state as the domain of the mainly indigenous bourgeoisie.
Because of the underdeveloped character of African states, access to state machinery through political positions, or bureaucratic posts, has become one of the principle routes to accumulation by the ruling class in post-colonial Africa (Mamdani 1987, Shivji 1976, 1985, Howard 1986).

A political position does not simply reinforce a preexisting economic base or open up new opportunities where old ones already existed, it is in fact the very foundation of economic prosperity (Mamdani 1987, pp.88-89).

With no substantial economic base, the ruling class 'manipulates the state in its interests', and state control over the people, particularly the peasantry, is essential for the reproduction of this state-dominated class, described as 'bureaucratic' or 'parasitic' (Shivji 1976). Thus competition between factions of the bourgeoisie for control of the state is intensified - class solidarity results in the exclusion of the masses from the organs of the state, through de-mobilization and anti-democratic practices (Shivji 1985). Marxists ignore, however, the significance of other social characteristics, such as ethnic groups and communities within Africa, which have come to play a fundamental part in determining access to power. Most states are therefore unable to foster cohesion, or implement development policies which would ensure the civil rights of the masses.

According to Howard (1986), underdevelopment of the capitalist sector 'limits the resources that can be distributed and exaggerates the desire of the ruling class to control as many resources as possible' (p.43). Underdevelopment then, 'must be viewed as a serious obstacle
to human rights', as the 'ruling class manipulates the state in its own interests' (Howard 1986, pp.43-45). This had led to a denial of civil and political rights by the state, and its virtual monopoly over all aspects of human rights. In most cases this class resorts to force in order to intensify its exploitation of other social classes such as the peasantry. Hence extreme practices like forced cropping, sedentarization, de-stocking and resettlement, coupled with state terrorism, are possible only in un-democratic situations, where the people can resort neither to passive resistance nor to violent conflict. The ruling elite, in order to preserve its position, becomes more authoritarian and repressive.

The National Question

There exists a prevailing assumption in the West that conflict of a tribal nature is endemic in African societies. It is often attributed to the arbitrary divisions of pre-colonial communities by colonial borders, as the 'scramble for Africa' took no regard of existing realities. Asiwaju (1984) documented 103 situations where African cultural formations were split by colonial borders. Conflict between ethnic groups adds substance to the notion that Africans cannot co-exist in a modern polity, that multi-ethnicity breeds instability, and self-governance is impractical. There is even an underlying tendency in some discourse which implies that it was the colonial government which restrained the spread of barbarous and inhumane practices among Africans. The reaction to the August 1988 massacre in
Burundi lends credence to this false hypothesis (Sunday Telegraph Sept. 1988).\(^9\)

On the whole, African inheritors of the colonial entities have tried peacefully to maintain them intact and to forge modern nations from these internationally-accepted units. This principle was outlined in the OAU charter, which endorsed the inviolability of African borders, thereby recognizing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the inherited units. Nevertheless the OAU has been criticized for its adherence to these alien entities often against the valid claims of minorities for self-determination, as in the Morocco/Western Sahara conflict and Ethiopia/Eriteria. This contradiction poses problems for the OAU which must find a balance between maintaining internal stability and recognizing the territorial integrity of former sovereign states. An opposing opinion views these examples of ethnic nationalism as divisive and therefore secessionist.\(^10\)

Nzongola-Ntalaja (1987) sees the national question as a salient factor of regional instability and civil strife in Africa’ (p.55). The problem for the modern state, therefore, is how to create a unified nation out of communities with diverse socio-cultural backgrounds. Multi-ethnicity in itself does not cause conflict. Tanzania, for example, has

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\(^9\) Peregrine Worsthorne, editor of the Sunday Telegraph called for European recolonization of Africa to prevent the barbarous tribal actions of the native (Daily Telegraph 1988).

\(^10\) Certainly access to the Red Sea was central to Ethiopia’s annexation of Eriteria. The armed conflicts which have ensued from this struggle for self-determination, and the other challenges to Ethiopia’s cultural and economic domination have in turn resulted in the displacement of up to one-half of the refugees currently in Africa. Similarly, in Southern Sudan, the nation-wide introduction of Islamic Shar‘ia law only intensified the civil war.
managed to achieve a high level of social cohesion with numerous ethnic groups co-existing peacefully.

One explanation for the emergence of ethnicity in certain states has been the unequal distribution of resources between ethnic groups in the post-independence period. This is often linked to the creation of 'tribal' communities and their unequal promotion by the colonial powers. Self-rule in an independent state introduced one dominant political structure which was answerable to all the people irrespective of their ethnic background.

Marxists like Archie Mafeje (1971) sees 'tribalism' as an ideology promoted by colonial administrators and anthropologists and manipulated by the African elite to secure their relative positions of authority vis à vis the masses. Mafege argues that tribes as pre-colonial social and economic organizations do not exist in contemporary Africa, where societies have been penetrated by capital and drawn into a monetary economy.

If we discount the existence of 'tribes' as viable social and political formations in contemporary societies, we must recognize that the modern nation, whether real or 'imagined', is still in the process of formation, and that allegiances still exist based on religious, cultural or spatial lines (Anderson 1983). Modernization theorists link the development of the nation to capitalist development. They argue that primordial ties like kinship and religion are unsuited to the development of the productive forces, a pre-condition for the entrenchment of capitalism.

11 John Iliffe (1979) Chapter 10 demonstrates how Europeans created tribal communities in Tanzania (pp.318-334).
Subsequently, Goran Hyden (1980) describes African society as being trapped in an 'economy of affection' which grew out of the peasant mode of production and which must be weakened and subordinated to capital. What Hyden fails to consider is the extent to which the kind of peripheral capitalism evident in Africa, has intensified contradictions within the societies. His 'economy of affection' (clientelism) is promoted by the very force which seeks to destroy it.

Orthodox Marxists, using Stalin's ideas, also see the nation as the product of capitalism. One of the chief limitations of Stalin's definition is its failure to explain the presence of nations outside the capitalist system. Nzongola-Ntalaja (1987) argues that the nation as a social phenomenon

...is not necessarily or exclusively a product of the capitalist mode of production. It may appear at every stage of history as a particular unit of reproduction of social relations in class societies based on modes of production which require a centralization of economic organization and political authority (Nzongola-Ntalaja 1987, P.58).

Nzongola goes on to identify several nations in pre-colonial Africa.

In general the state in Africa is unable to foster unity and precipitate genuine national construction. Whereas in Tanzania linguistic, cultural and social differences in the post-colonial period have been overcome through the unifying influence of Kiswahili as a national language and

\[12\] J. Stalin defined the nation as; '...a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture'. Essentially Stalin envisaged the nation as a product of the epoch of rising capitalism, caused by centralization of economic or national culture and the existence of national markets (Stalin 1954, p348-371).
through strategies directed at reducing the dominance of any ethnic group in the political or economic sphere, by counteracting the divisive promotional policies of the colonial era, in other parts of Africa ethnicity has flourished unabated.

Diverse communities within colonial borders were able to present a united front during the liberation struggles because of their common historical experience of economic exploitation and political repression under external rule. Nationalism was the dominant ideology of the independence movement. However, it later amounted to no more than a cry for self-rule. Independence from colonial rule gave control of the state to elements of the ruling class which have continued to use the smoke-screen of ‘national unity’ to obscure petty bourgeois considerations (Goulbourne 1987).

Authoritarian practices by organs of the state in the name of nation-building, have led many commentators on Africa to view the concept of nation-building as a modernization phenomenon which in reality calls for obedience to the ruling elite. Local affiliations or even opposition to the government by a leader of another ethnic group can be decried as tribalism (Howard 1986), and as threatening to the political and social order of the new nation. Clearly Cabral’s assertion that ethnicity or religion can be mobilized as part of the ‘oppositional attitudes, generally on the part of de-tribalized individuals or groups’ holds true (Cabral 1969, P.104).

The Kenyan government’s interpretation of Ngugi’s criticism of compradorial activities as sentiments bordering on Kikuyu nationalism is just one such example.
Competition for the resources of the state may serve to exclude one faction of the ruling class or a whole social class from participation; justified on the basis of ethnicity, religion or race. In order to mask this reality, the Burundi state under President Bagaza attempted to deny the existence of ethnic groups within the country, even though ethnic affiliations had by the 1970s acquired a degree of saliency not found elsewhere in Africa.

Undoubtedly, it is conflict of an ethnic nature, or political opposition to a group whose membership is based on race, religion, nationality or locality that causes the bulk of refugee movements on the continent (Zolberg 1985). The force of ascription to that group can be heightened by exile; forced migrants are known for their conservatism in the early period of exile. Refugee communities formed in exile have a tendency to regroup around pre-migration allegiances, whether religion as in Sudan (Hunley 1985), ethnic group, or in response to demands made by the new socio-political environment.

Considering the present character of the African state, conflicts, particularly internal ones, can rarely be resolved without radical transformation of society. Even so, in the majority of cases repatriation of refugees as a solution to the current impasse is not viable so long as the political and economic structures remain intact. Burundi refugees, after 16 years in exile, found that in August 1988 an identical conflict to the pattern of the 1972 genocide destroyed any immediate prospects of returning home.
Political stability requires a working democratic structure. Consequently, it has not been forthcoming in most African countries, simply because the state, being unable to fulfil the aspirations of the people, systematically acts to exclude them from democratic electoral processes, substituting instead one-party states and rule by presidential decrees. Facing a crisis of legitimacy, the state becomes highly unstable. The military, whose role has always been to maintain internal security often intervenes in government, supposedly on behalf of the people, but instead to secure national security through the repression of popular forces. African populations have experienced coups and counter-coups as elite factions have sought access to the resources of the state.

The West has continued to favour the form of stability achieved under 'presidentialism' (Goulbourne 1987), even if such a political form proves detrimental to the people. It is evident, as shown by 'stable' states like Malawi, Kenya or Zaire, that totalitarianism does not foster development, or hinder the flow of refugees.

However, for the bulk of the refugees it was the possibility of extreme violence and personal insecurity which gave rise to their departure. The majority hold no strong ideologically opposing views to the state, only its specific character. Nevertheless, refugees are a fraction of an electorate which, barred from any legal form of representation, chose to vote with their feet. Their widespread refusal to return home, even after decades in
exile, often suggests the persistence of anti-democratic forces within the state.

External Intervention

In most instances of armed conflict within the continent, the struggle would not have been so protracted without the involvement of the western powers, which have provided either direct military support of equipment or personnel or indirect support through the provision of loans or aid to the various regimes. In addition the sovereignty of African states is used to protect them from external criticism. President Museveni of Uganda criticized OAU members for refusing to intervene in Uganda's affairs during the massacre under Obote's second regime (Museveni 1985).

Clearly it is in the interest of western states to preserve the political and economic status quo in western-oriented states. External involvement helps to keep weak regimes in power and hinders the historical processes of conflict and democratic resolution.

Therefore, it is essential for the external powers and comprador regimes to gain some control over refugee movements which often contain the most disaffected and aggrieved citizens, who if allowed to organize militarily, could engage in subversive actions and possibly overthrow such governments. Refugees inevitably pose a significant threat to national security and the stability of states. Sending states are inclined to close their borders in a

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14 Examples are the French in Chad, the Americans in Congo (Zaire) and the Russians in Ethiopia and Somalia.
defensive strategy to prevent people from leaving. If that fails, international and national refugee law, coupled with refugee aid in the receiving countries are used effectively to de-politicize such movements.

In all cases except for those fighting white minority rule, refugees are segregated from their national liberation movements. National and international restrictions prevent the formation of governments or military units in exile. Certain criteria relating to non-aggression and non-promotion of their causes are laid down before refugee aid can be distributed. Partly for this reason the international community takes particular interest in the settlement of refugees in their host countries.

States can, however, by-pass international legislation depending on their relationship with the sending state. Changes in the political colour of either state may mean changes for the refugee group in terms of their definition and entitlements, and ability to return home. Refugees can be manipulated by the ruling elite to act against the host population as in the case of the Banyarwanda under Amin in Uganda, and their subsequent persecution under the succeeding regime of Obote (Clay 1984). African states can commit acts of genocide and still retain international support. This is evident in the case of Burundi; its aid package remained intact even after the August 1988 massacre of Bahutu by government forces (Africa Business 1988).
Developmentalism

In a previous section I argued that the specific character of the neo-colonial state renders it unresponsive to the needs of the populace. African leaders brought to power as a result of independence struggles were obliged to pander to the people's demand for progress by including development in the programme of national construction. This led to what Shivji (1985) describes as developmentalism, which since independence has become the dominant ideology of the ruling class. All political and economic acts, whether forced relocation, forced cropping, or imprisonment of dissidents, are carried out in the name of development and national unity. What transpires is the notion that development necessitates a denial of human rights, lack of civilian control and greater state domination over the productive sectors, in effect the maintenance of existing political and economic structures.

Therefore, it is not surprising that refugees and development have been on the agenda of the UNHCR since the 1960s. Concern was couched in terms which focused on the underdeveloped character of refugee receiving countries and the possibilities of incorporating aid to refugees within a wider framework, to draw in the poorer sections of the host community.

More recently, at the conceptual level, the validity of understanding the root causes of the refugee situation without dealing with the question of development has been raised; particularly since the link between underdevelopment and international migration has already been expressed.
Furthermore, African Marxists have identified a definite correlation between an absence of democracy, political repression, refugee migration and deteriorating socio-economic conditions (Anyang'Nyongo 1987). Not only do these factors contribute to the forced large-scale emigration of African population, but since host states cannot even provide the basic facilities for their own population, an influx of thousands of refugees adds tremendous strain on the limited resources. In the long term, refugee incorporation into the host society must partially depend on the strategies employed by the host state to integrate its own population into the dominant mode of production.

Development in Africa has long been interpreted as economic growth. In the post-colonial period, African states were expected to follow the western model in their transition from underdeveloped to developed economies. Import-substitution industrialization together with the continuation of export crop production became the main development strategies of the post-colonial era. Numerous rural development initiatives reflected the demands more of a resource-extraction economy, and were aimed primarily at deepening commoditization. Lack of popular participation in the conception and organization of schemes have contributed

to the inevitable collapse of various ill-conceived state or externally-initiated projects (Chambers 1969).

Post-colonial states like Tanzania have adopted a more welfare-oriented approach, seeking to supply basic welfare services to the population. With no industrial base to finance these projects, foreign exchange for essential manufactured goods had to come from the extraction of an agricultural surplus from the predominant peasant population. During the 1970s, under the label of Ujamaa, the state undertook a massive re-organization of rural areas, the purpose of which was to intensify production (Von Freyold 1979, Coulson 1978, 1982, Bernstein 1981, Bryceson 1982, Mapolu 1985).

African peasants have nevertheless attempted to reduce their reliance on the organs of the state and external markets to meet basic needs. With the path to active resistance blocked in most states, peasants have given new meaning to the notion of passive resistance - by withdrawing from state-controlled markets, through greater use of open market channels, reducing acreage of cash crops, and crop burning. But crossing an African border does not substantially alter the pressures placed on the cultivator or pastoralist. The prescription for the current economic problems has become uniform under the directives of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Historically, rural development projects were responsible for substantial displacement of communities as in the cases of dams and irrigation schemes (Colson 1971, Hansen & Oliver-Smith 1983). Most African states find the
present distribution of population within their country unacceptable, yet state-enforced population redistribution strategies are politically unpopular. However, certain state policies are aimed at the spatial re-organization of the population. The sedentarization of pastoralists, removal of urban unemployed and other land settlement schemes are in fact attempting to 'deepen the penetration of a specific mode of production in regions that have been little more than geographical appendages' (Standing & Peek 1982, P.7). Forced removals of nationals by the state and the need to adapt to a new environment bear certain similarities to the refugee experience.

**African Refugees: The displaced peasantry**

African refugees are predominantly rural to rural migrants. Refugees, in their economic role as intellectuals, urban proletarians, or peasants share similar experiences to those of the indigenous population. Therefore their incorporation into the host society must depend upon how the host state has incorporated its own people into the dominant political and economic structures. Because of the peripheral capitalist nature of African economies, refugees will certainly be drawn into the dominant capitalist mode of production where the opportunity exists. Their effective incorporation will be crystallized by the imposition of new 'authority structures and power relationships', which according to Jane Guyer (1981) involves the elimination of local institutions and associations and the dominance of
national, as opposed to customary law on land, the family and marriage.

The peasant background of most refugee groups is often accentuated by the host state and the international community, mainly because the primary mode of incorporation involves labour participation in the agricultural sphere. Demand for cheap agricultural labour is paramount where productivity depends not on advanced technology but on a large, subservient labour force. With the exception of extreme cases of high population densities, whenever states or donors gain control over a refugee population, they are located in areas where they can be of maximum benefit to local capital. A process of commoditization begins where peasants either work as wage labourers or bring unused land into production. This entails control over mobility - segregation policies are enacted until the demands of local capital are sufficiently fixed into the newcomer’s cycle of reproduction. This has always been justified under the guise of allowing refugees to become self-sufficient. Since very few households in Africa can claim to be self-sufficient, such a proposition lacks empirical foundation. In a climate of oppression, refugee resistance is confined within the boundaries of peasant resistance. Nevertheless, their vulnerability and insecurity increases their passivity to the imposed structures.

Studies of rural economics tend to begin at the level of the household - as the basic decision-making unit of

16 The settlement of refugees in Sudan follow this pattern. Refugee settlements at Es Suki and Khasm el Girba are located close to irrigation schemes which have a high demand for casual labourers.
production and consumption. By analysing household behaviour, it is possible to assess the impact of international and national economic policies. Studies of African households, however, all begin by indicating the numerous difficulties encountered in defining the household, where there is often constant mobility of household members, and varied household forms (Guyer 1981, Guyer & Peters 1987). These contribute to the difficulty of developing a normative model. It is clear that the migratory process causes changes in household structure, in the allocation of labour, duties, and obligations between generations and gender. In refugee migration, all household members in the country of origin may migrate intact. On the other hand, individuals from different households may migrate separately and converge in the place of settlement to form a new household. In such instances, kinship ties become central to household formation in the new setting. In fact in refugee situations, households may operate more as a collectivity, pooling resources, and employing numerous economic strategies.

In areas where capital has penetrated rural communities, differentiation takes place. It is likely that over time, qualitative differences in the material conditions of refugees will become apparent. Such inequalities between households have been given a demographic explanation (Chayanov 1966), or point to class formation (Lenin 1960). However, the way in which they arose and are maintained in rural areas have serious implications for the long-term economic and social structure within the
refugee community, and the well-being of its members (Guyer 1981).

World recession during the 1970s and 1980s adversely affected the weaker and more dependent economies. African states, faced with declining terms of trade for export crops, high fuel prices and low industrial and agricultural output, and the inevitable trade and balance of payment deficits, had to submit their economies to the policing of the international credit agencies - the IMF and the World Bank. External borrowing and the burden of debt servicing have placed Africans at the mercy of the austerity measures of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). It is unlikely that Sub-Saharan Africa will ever be in a position to repay the 102 billion US dollars owed in 1988 (World Bank 1988). This precarious situation is further compounded by drought, food shortages and famine, coupled with a high population growth rate, which in some countries have increasingly led to greater dependency on imported food and food aid. Meanwhile forecasts for the 1990s and beyond remain pessimistic.

Africa's problems have been blamed either on the interventionist role of the state in the economy or on unfavourable terms of exchange in the world markets for primary produce. In fact, the former perspective is propounded by the World Bank and the IMF, which have called for a restructuring of African economies as pre-conditions for loans. In Tanzania, the 1986 IMF agreement meant the liberalization of the economy. According to Stein (1988) agreements included; exchange rate adjustments, liberalizing
price controls, reducing budgetary support to parastatals, reducing food and some social welfare subsidies, and raising petroleum prices.\textsuperscript{17} The full impact of liberalization is the decline in living standards, as the purchasing power of the minimum wage was radically reduced. Stein (1988) notes that 'at the minimum wage in May 1988, in Dar es Salaam, a worker could only purchase 1.3 Kilogrammes of maize meal/day while totally exhausting their monthly income' (p.8). Although peasants have seen an increase in producer prices, Stein (1988) has pointed out that they will in fact receive a lower percentage of the world market prices, and are faced with higher prices for inputs. Thus productivity, rather than increasing has declined, leading to increased impoverishment of the peasantry.

Liberalization therefore has important implications for socio-political tensions.\textsuperscript{18} Consequently, proponents of alternative economic paths are silenced, imprisoned by their respective governments or in exile. This is also apparent in the growing intolerance of Marxist critics, even by states which espouse socialist rhetoric.\textsuperscript{19}

In the final analysis, it is clear that the political and economic structures which are a legacy of the colonial period are unfit to undertake development for the people. The current crisis of the peripheral capitalist state is its

\textsuperscript{17} Stein's (1988) argument is that liberalization did not spell radical changes in Tanzanian economic policy, since over the last decade, Tanzania has been moving toward economic liberalization.

\textsuperscript{18} This is indicated by the anti-IMF riots in Zambia (1987) and Nigeria (1988).

failure to effect a transformation of society. According to Anyang’Nyongo:

What is being observed in Africa today is that - given its class content, historical heritage and the global context of its current operation - the state is losing or has lost both the ability and the capacity to undertake the socio-economic programmes necessary for continued reproduction of the capitalist mode of production (p.17). This points to increased authoritarianism by the state and intensification of the refugee problem.

Conclusion

I have shown that a study of Africa’s refugee problem can be approached through an understanding of the sequential historical and contemporary realities of the colonial and neo-colonial eras. In effect, the rising number of displaced people on the continent reflects the deepening fiscal and political crises of the continent, coupled with the failure of the state as a vehicle to transform the colonial legacy and to protect and satisfy the aspirations of its people. The mode of incorporation of peasant refugee communities largely depends on how the state has incorporated its own population into the dominant economic and political structures. Undoubtedly, the economic role of refugees is of prime importance, where the current development strategy is to increase the commoditization of rural areas and appropriate an even larger surplus from the peasantry. The effects of this strategy can be understood through an analysis of household economic activities, and the emerging pattern of inequalities.

The underdeveloped and dependent character of African economies reinforces their inadequacy to supply the
resources needed for the successful absorption of unplanned masses of immigrants in the host state. External response to the problem belies the propensity of host states to protect their people. External assistance, though unavoidable in certain situations, nevertheless, extends the dimensions of the problem beyond the domestic sphere to include elements of international politics.

Thus, the refugee issue becomes immensely important in highlighting the insecurity of African states, in revealing the effects of the rule of the comprador class at the expense of the masses, and in exposing the backing of external powers in attempts to de-mobilize large sections of the African population by retarding their participation in the struggle for full national liberation. It is in this context that I will analyse the forced migration of people from Burundi, and their acquisition of refugee status in Tanzania.
CHAPTER TWO

ETHNICITY AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN BURUNDI: A BACKGROUND TO THE REFUGEE CRISIS

Introduction

The small Central African state of Burundi represents one of the few nation-states in Africa which from the outset possessed some of the basic elements for national unity in the post-colonial period. Unlike the majority of African states, its people share a common socio-cultural and linguistic heritage. Since independence however, Burundi has been highly unstable with six governments between 1962-1966, the abolition of the monarchy (1966), and three coup d'etats (1965, 1976, 1987). Moreover, Burundi has witnessed a degree of violence unprecedented elsewhere in independent Africa; an estimated 200,000 people were killed in 1972 and a further 20,000 in August 1988, with over 200,000 refugees seeking sanctuary in neighbouring states.

Conflict in Burundi is frequently described simply as the outcome of 'tribalism' or 'ethnic fighting' between the two major ethnic groups of Bahutu and Batutsi. Indeed this explanation has dominated journalistic reports of the conflicts. Scholarly works while not dismissing ethnicity, try to determine why a marginal feature of pre-colonial society became a central component of post-colonial Burundi

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1 The people of Burundi are Barundi, and are divided into three main ethnic groups: Bahutu comprising 85 percent of the population, Batutsi 14 percent and Batwa 1 percent. The abbreviations Tutsi, Hutu and Twa were first used for convenience in the colonial period. This thesis adopts the terms used by recent scholars from Burundi. Those Bahutu in Tanzania are referred to by their Kiswahili name of Wahutu (pl), Muhutu (s).
Concentration on the problem of ethnicity has helped to deflect serious analysis of the specific character of social differentiation in the post-colonial era, and the extent to which social classes have been progressively identified with ethnic groupings in the post-independence period. In pre-colonial Burundi, the elites controlled the state, but were not exclusively of one ethnic group or clan. There were marked divisions of labour, however, as different politico-economic functions were carried out by different stratum in the social structure (Keyes 1981). With the breakdown of traditional socio-cultural structures and the integration of Burundi society into the capitalist system, a new social formation emerged which has displaced the traditional elites and replaced them with a bourgeois class linked to international capital. It is therefore necessary to examine the composition of the social base of the new elites, their role vis-à-vis the state and their involvement in ethnic nationalism.

The history of Burundi has been well-documented by Lemarchand (1970, 1974, 1977), Kay (1987) and Kuper (1977). For many writers, Burundi provides a classic example of a state in which the manipulatory character of ethnicity has been used by elites and counter-elites to ensure access to political and economic power both during the colonial and post-colonial periods, to the extent that ethnic violence is perceived as the only solution to bring about an alteration of status differences (Lemarchand 1972, Kuper 1977). From a review of the literature, it is clear that the recent
manifestation of ethnic violence has to be placed in an historical context, and in the Burundi case, must include the question of democracy and popular participation in the neo-colonial era.

Three contrasting definitions of ethnicity are of relevance here. In the first, ethnicity is defined as the outcome of primordial affinities, of genetic or cultural descent, and thus is largely a pre-modern phenomenon (Glazer & Moynihan 1975, Van den Berghe 1981, Keyes 1981). The second focuses on inter-ethnic relationships where people's perception of ethnicity is relevant to their behaviour with each other. According to one of its proponents, Clyde Mitchell (1987), ethnicity is the 'attribution of meanings to cultural signs and cues operates as social perception and is part of the process of social cognition' (p.183). Thirdly, the structuralist perspective conceptualizes ethnicity as communal consciousness arising from situations of common interest and goals. Such an ethnically defined group may be dynamic or ephemeral in nature, as ethnic identity may be acquired or imposed. In the political and economic conditions of modern African states, ethnicity tends to be conflictive, particularly where it is associated with political groups which control access to wealth and power in conditions of scarce resources (Cohen 1980). To early colonial anthropologists, travellers and missionaries, the primordial definition appeared more salient in Africa, as groups seemed relatively endogamous, diacritical features pronounced and territoriality evident. Thus the advent of the Europeans marked the beginning of a full-scale
demarcation of ethnic groups within Africa. Ethnic groups were often seen as synonymous with tribes, however, the second definition may be more appropriate in contemporary situations, where alignments based on clan, kinship or class occur and take on a tribal character. During the colonial epoch, tribes provided a suitable mechanism for the classification and standardization of unknown numbers of African people, vital for effective colonial administration (Iliffe 1979).

**Ethnicity and Colonial rule in Burundi, 1897-1962**

Ethnic antagonism in Burundi can be traced back to the colonial period. The contention of this section is not whether Europeans or Africans created 'tribes'; more importantly it is concerned with the promotion of tribes by the colonial power to the extent that it instils people with false consciousness as to the origin of their oppression, so much so that according to Linden (1977), ethnicity became the dominant ideology of the colonial period.

In reality what had once been a fluid **ethnic** boundary between two socio-economic groups hardened under Belgian rule into an unchangeable barrier between [Baj]hutu and [Baj]tutsi defining access to the political class (Linden 1977, p.4, My emphasis).

Burundi, until its independence in 1962, was part of the German colony of Ruanda-Urundi (1897-1916) and was later placed under Belgian trusteeship (1916-1962), after the Germans were defeated in the First World War. The Germans and later the Belgians entered Burundi with entrenched preconceptions of racial superiority and class distinctions,
and could therefore relate to the hierarchical political and economic structures of a tribute-paying society.

Samir Amin (1976) has defined a tribute-paying society as the advanced stage of the communal mode of production. Labour is organized in a nuclear family as well as on a collective basis. Land is collectively owned, and is conferred on community members. The distribution of the product is determined by kinship organization. In the tribute-paying social formation, society, is marked by the separation of society into two main classes: the peasantry, organized in communities, and the ruling class, which monopolizes the functions of the given society's political organization and exact a tribute (not in commodity form) from the rural communities. This mode of production, when it assumes an advanced form, almost always tends to become feudal—that is, the ruling class ousts the community from dominium eminens of the soil (Amin 1976, pp.14-15).

Burundi in the immediate pre-colonial period exhibited characteristics of a tribute-paying society (Berger 1981). If class is defined as applicable to pre-capitalist social formations, referring to a group of people having the same relationships to the mode of production, the Bahutu constituted a class in as much as they were direct agricultural producers in a tribute-paying mode of production.

The Batutsi, a pastoral group, whose appearance resembled North Africans, were considered genetically superior to the Bahutu cultivators, and the Batwa hunters and gatherers. This stratification was reinforced by the existence of a clientelist system (ubugabire), based on the unequal distribution of cattle and wealth between the
patrons (Batutsi) and the clients (Bahutu). What has been termed the ‘hamitic hypothesis’ was used to justify European support for the Batutsi as natural leaders under the policy of indirect rule.

Le gouvernement Belge est convaincu, qu’il doit s’efforcer de maintenir et de consolider le cadre traditionnel de la classe dirigeante des Batutsi, à cause des grandes qualités de celle-ci, de son indéniable supériorité intellectuelle et de son potentiel de commandent (Official proclamation of 1938, quoted in de Heusch, Luc 1964).

Pre-colonial collectives based largely on economic specialization, which Berger (1981) describes as approximating social classes were ascribed genetic interpretation. In practice, the Batutsi oligarchy was not absolute, political power was divided between the monarch (mwami) and noble families of royal descent (ganwa), who as deputies, administered the provinces. This elite constitutes the bulk of the expropriating class in this communal mode of production. In some areas, particularly those with small Batutsi populations wealthy Bahutu joined this group (Trouborwst 1965). Poor Batutsi herdsmen (Batutsi-hima) were present and also entered patron-client relationships.

In essence the monarch was a symbol of national unity, with the Crown acting as a nexus for the various

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2 The client (garagu) would seek the patronage of the lord (shebuga), who would bestowed him cattle, over which the client had usufruct rights, and was then expected to repay the lord in the form of tribute labour and agricultural dues. Cattle were the main form of wealth used in marriage transactions. The clientelist system is described for Rwanda in Maquet (1961) and for Burundi in Lemarchand (1970).

3 The ‘hamitic hypothesis’ is racist in content. Early Europeans in Africa, believed that most of the rulers in Bantu Africa, originated from North Africa, were Hamites, not negroid, and therefore superior.
collectives. Both Batutsi and Bahutu functionaries were active at court. Ganwa families were not a monolithic group but were divided into clans, originating from earlier kings. Of the dominant clans the Batare came from Mwami Ntare, and the Bezi from Mwezi II, King of Gisabo. Regional distinctions were also made between the Batutsi-Abanyabururi (southerners) and the Batutsi-Abanyaruguru (northerners), although Lemarchand (1977) argues that it is a mistake to associate these groups too closely with one region, since the Abanyaruguru were dispersed throughout the country (Figure 1). Nevertheless, the Abanyabururi and the Abanyaruguru were associated with the Bezi and the Batare respectively. The Bahutu could also be divided into several clans. In summary, the hegemony of the Batutsi was not total in the pre-colonial society, as social mobility of the Bahutu was possible; many were appointed to positions as sub-chiefs and became ennobled. Although wealthy Bahutu maintained some economic independence under colonial rule, access to political power was effectively altered in favour of the Batutsi. However, Berger argued that

> Far from negating the importance of class distinctions, however, this limited social mobility reinforced the identification of pastoralism with political, social and economic power, so that despite the possibility of individual status change, economic and social categories remained vigorously determined and divided (Berger 1981, p.9).

Colonial policies -political, education and religious—combined to produce rigid ethnic boundaries, and the consolidation of power by one group over the other. In their

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4 For further details of the social structure of pre-colonial Burundi, see Lemarchand (1977) & (1970), Chapters 1,10- and Gahama (1983).
integration of traditional power structures into the colonial administration, the Belgians selected and imposed their own Batutsi chiefs. These chiefs being directly responsible to the colonial authorities were highly-bureaucratic, and it was their duty to introduce a host of new obligations, which meant further exploitation of peasant labour, through forced labour (ubeletwa), and compulsory cropping of coffee, cassava and sweet potatoes. As salaried employees of the colonial state, the chiefs lacked the benevolence of the former chiefs who had to rely on their relationship with their subjects for their livelihood. These chiefs prospered in the new cash crop economy, being able to gain control of large tracts of land and labour through ubugabire: many became 'coffee-kings', lived in 'castles', and adopted western tastes (Lemarchand 1970).

The introduction of native courts (tribunaux indigènes), in 1943, resulted in a further burden for the Bahutu. The courts were Batutsi controlled, and required the payment of fees which were beyond the reach of the Bahutu, who subsequently could not compete successfully in such courts. This was compounded by the loss of past forms of appeal to one of the various chiefs.

The role of the church mission in augmenting 'ethnic' differentiation has been well-documented for Rwanda by Ian Linden (1977). A comparable situation existed in Burundi where the Catholic Church, in compliance with the state, after the 1930s actively encouraged the conversion of Batutsi nobles to the Christian faith, which had previously
been restricted to the poorer, mainly Bahutu communities. This was followed by the enrolment of the children of the aristocracy in mission schools, which increasingly preferred to educate the children of the elite. According to Linden (1977) schools were segregated and streamed in a system which 'guaranteed the Batutsi were given a superior education, and [were] the means by which the Belgians were able to impose an ethnic definition of eligibility on the new political class' (p.164). The distribution of pupils in the prestigious Groupe Scolaire d'Astrida (Butare) confirmed the ethnic basis for selection (Table 2.1).

Table 2.1

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<td>95</td>
<td>68</td>
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<tr>
<td>Batwa</td>
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Note: The table covers Bahutu and Batutsi both from Rwanda and Burundi.

Source: Adapted from Lemarchand (1974, p.9), and Gahama (1983, p.258).

The principal aim of the school was to create a new social class and to provide trained manpower for the new administration, thus priority was given to the education of sons of chiefs.

Gahama (1983) in Chapter One, Part 3, discusses the christianization of Burundi society, and the dominance of Catholic and Protestant Missions in the educational sphere. Although he excludes data on the ethnic composition of converts during the colonial period, Table 31, p.219, still shows a dramatic increase in the number of converts from 45,111 in 1930 to 365,000 in 1940.
The Church colluded with the colonial administration in its effort to gain greater control over local leaders. In the 1930s, Mgr. Classe, who at one time was head of the local Catholic Church warned the Belgian administration to retain the traditional hegemony of the Batutsi:

> We have no chiefs who are better qualified, more intelligent, more capable of appreciating progress and more fully accepted by the people than the Batutsi (P.M.C. 19th session 1930, quoted in Lemarchand 1970, p.43).

Missionaries and local catechists were involved in writing a history of Burundi which perpetuated the myth of the Batutsi as divine rulers (Linden 1977).

By giving access to political power only to the Batutsi, the Belgians helped to consolidate their domination over the Bahutu. In the new economic system, prosperity and social status became dependent on one’s relationship with the colonial authorities. This situation proved rife for the mobilization of kin and ethnic solidarities. The Bahutu became conscious of their subordination and exclusion as a group from power by the colonial administration and the Batutsi elite. In fact, the structural changes brought about by the imposition of colonial rule led not just to conflict between ethnic groups, but also to intra-group strife, as Batutsi clans competed with each other fuelled by the persistence of nepotism as a vehicle for social mobility.

**Intra-elite Factionalism**

Because of the heterogeneity of the Batutsi group, its dynastic families, and the variety of social bases for inter-ethnic relations, Lemarchand dismissed a purely ethnic
explanation for the later internecine disputes. He interprets the conflicts to some extent as the expression of factionalism among old rivalries in the Batutsi aristocracy, between the Bezi and the Batare clans (Lemarchand, 1970, 1977).

The basic parameters of the system were not fundamentally altered by the establishment of colonial rule. Ganwa rivalries, whether intra or inter-dynastic, continued as before to form the axis around which the political life of the kingdom evolved (Lemarchand 1977 p.101).

As the Mwami was far from despotic, the ganwa had sufficient latitude to establish relatively autonomous chiefdoms. On entering Burundi, the Germans found ready allies among the Batare who were estranged from the Bezi-related King. Mwami Mwezi Gisabo's initial resistance to German rule earned the crown great popularity with the masses, which it was able to manipulate towards the end of the colonial period. Once the Belgians recognized the legitimacy of the crown, the Mwami's supporters - the Bezi, began to 'consolidate their power over the country'. Lemarchand (1970) also noted the prevalence after 1940 of inter-dynastic competition between the older generation of royalists and the younger mission-educated, westernized elite. This new factor in ganwa politics was to heighten instability during the 1960s and in the struggle for self-rule.

Factionalism was carried over into the nationalist movements of the independence struggle. Although the overwhelming effort was directed towards self-rule, considerable jostling occurred to determine which faction would take control of the state. During this period, a political elite with no material base was also emerging.
Social mobility depended to a large extent on patronage. Throughout the period 1957-66, tension existed between the leading ganwa dynasties and the monarchy. The ganwa dominated the two leading political parties: UPRONA (Parti de l'unité at du Progress National) formed by members of the Bezi aristocracy, and unofficially headed by the Mwami's son, Prince Rwagasore, and the Batare-controlled PDC (Parti Démocrate Chrétien). Because of UPRONA's nationalist rhetoric, its opposition to colonial rule and its alignment with the Crown, it had widespread Bahutu support, and easily won the legislative elections of 1961. Due to the charismatic leadership of Rwagasore, UPRONA was able to unite Bahutu and Batutsi anti-colonialists under the slogan 'unity and progress'. It was the threat of a mass-based party which led the Belgian administration to brand Rwagasore a communist, and lend its support to the less radical PDC, which was not in favour of immediate self-rule. Rwagasore's murder on the 13 October 1961 supposedly planned by the PDC leadership, led to the dissolution of the party and the Batare as a competing political force (Observer 1.7.1962). Bahutu parties like Parti du Peuple, lacked a traditional power base to mobilize, and therefore could not compete with the ganwa-backed parties. Furthermore within UPRONA brought intra-party struggles to the fore, as the old royalists and the newly-emergent elite vied for power, and it acutely highlighted the differences between the aspirations of the Bahutu and Batutsi leaders.

As Barundi moved in to fill the posts created by the new state bureaucracy, the discriminatory repercussions of
colonial education policies were apparent as the plethora of new government posts were filled mainly by the better-educated Batutsi. In contrast, the imposition of a constitutional democracy, the hallmark of a modern state, highlighted the advantages the Bahutu majority would have in terms of political representation.

Bahutu awareness of their potential power was also sharpened by the 1962 uprising in Rwanda, and the establishment of a Bahutu republic. Ethnic polarization became more acute, as Banyarwanda refugees (Batutsi) entered Burundi, anxious for revenge and seeking solidarity from the Batutsi elite. These refugees were actively involved in Burundi politics, and contributed to the further deterioration in ethnic relations in the 1960s.6

Mwami Mwambutsa acted in support of the status quo, by appointing a Mututsi, Andrea Muhirwa, as Prime Minister, after Rwagasore’s death, even though eminent Bahutu such as Paul Mirerekano, the executive secretary of UPRONA, and Petro Ngendandumwe, the deputy Prime Minister, were logical successors. A Bahutu youth movement, Jeunesse Nationaliste Rwagasore (JNR), became associated with ethnic violence, as early as 1962, when its Batutsi members attacked Bahutu

6 Lemarchand (1970, Chapter 15) documented the involvement of Banyarwanda refugees in Burundi politics, focusing on the 1964 plan to resettle 10,000 Banyarwanda refugees from the Murore area in Burundi to the Mwesi highlands in Tanzania. This plan was aborted due to changes in the ethnic composition of the Burundi government during 1964. The resettlement plans began under the government of the Muhutu Prime Minister Ngendandumwe, and an agreement was reached with UNHCR and the Tanzanian state, however, the coming to power of a predominantly Batutsi government, under the leadership of Albain Nyamoya, led to a reversal of the decision, with the refugees receiving political and military support in their struggle against the Bahutu government in Rwanda.
trade union leaders in Bujumbura. The JNR was later to be in the forefront of the 1972 massacre.

The rise and demise of the monarchy

Lemarchand (1977) has argued that due to the threat of political instability, and the absence of a credible leader, the Crown was forced to take control, leading to a period of absolute monarchy (1962-65), as the powers of the government, the army, and provincial governors were steadily eroded by Mwambutsa. The Mwami's inability to come to terms with the new constitution, and the demands of competing social forces, led to his appointment of six successive governments with alternating Muhutu and Mututsi Prime Ministers between 1963-65, whilst strengthening the position of the older ganwa elements by appointing them to key posts in the expanding Batutsi-dominated bureaucracy. As a consequence, the legitimacy of the Crown was open to challenge by the Bahutu as well as by the alienated westernized elite of the Bezi faction, each group in turn mobilizing already irreversible ethnic sentiments to support their claims on the state.

The May 1965 democratic election was the last of its kind in Burundi, in which the Bahutu majority were able to elect candidates of their choice. Whereas 50 seats were won by the Bahutu, compared to 14 for the Batutsi, the Mwami faced with the threat of a Bahutu take-over, once again appointed a Mututsi Leopold Bihagumugani (Biha) as Prime Minister. This rebuff forced the already disenchanted Bahutu army officers and civilian elite to turn against the
monarch, and to stage an abortive coup on the 18 October 1965, which caused the Mwami to flee to Switzerland. For a period of nine months, while the Mwami convalesced in Switzerland, the country was controlled by the army, the Bezi and the Jeunesse. In acts of reprisal an estimated 86 Bahutu politicians, officials and army personnel were murdered (Guardian 15.1.1966). Even though Mwami Mwambutsa was ousted by his son Charles Ndizeye (Ntare V) in July 1966, it was by then clear that the Crown was no longer indispensable. Ntare V had the support of the younger Ganwa elements and the army. Four months later, on 28 November 1966, Ntare V was overthrown by his Prime Minister Michel Michombero, in a coup supported by the military and the newly-emergent Bezi elite. Burundi was declared a republic. Clearly, by the 1960s the monarchy had become anachronistic, stripped of its symbols by the colonial power and mass support, it became susceptible to the more powerful of the new social forces - the military.

A catalogue of violence

The 1965 attempted coup made the prospect of Bahutu rule clearly imminent, either via parliamentary democracy or social revolution. As a minority, the Batutsi elite could only ensure their control over the state through greater repressive measures and undemocratic practices. The army would eventually come to serve their end. This has meant the systematic exclusion of Bahutu from political office and recurrent violence aimed at keeping them in check and any uprisings at bay. Following the 1965 attempted coup,
Michombero, who was then principal secretary in the Ministry of Defence, ordered the killing of 86 highly-placed Bahutu in UPRONA and the army, including Paul Mirerekano (Member of parliament), Joseph Bamina (Senator and Chairman of Uprona), Emile Buchumi (Speaker of parliament), and S. Miburo (Regional commissioner). Similarly, in September 1969, the alleged discovery of a Bahutu-planned coup justified further purges of the armed forces and civilian leaders. Twenty-five prominent Bahutu were arrested, twenty-three of whom were killed including Barabe Kanyaruguru (Former planning Minister), Gregorie Nicimbikye (Former first secretary of the Barundi embassy in Washington) and Captain Bitariho Ferdinando (Military Officer) (Times 18.12.1969). Only three Bahutu were left in Michombero’s Cabinet of 1969, holding the less important ministries of Sports and Culture, Broadcasting and Information, and Works and Labour.

Intra-Batutsi competition was still evident during the First Republic. Michombero who was of Hima origin relied on Abanyabururi support. An attempted coup against him in 1970 was the pretext for an attack on Abanyaruguru leaders. The plotters, included Albert Shebura (Army commandant and Minister for Internal Affairs), Yanda Andrea (Minister of Justice), Gisimare Francois (Minister for National Education), and Artemon Simbananiye (Minister in the President’s office & Chief Protocol). Lemarchand (1974) argues that, like the attack against Bahutu, the aim was to eliminate all Abanyaruguru elements of any standing in the Army and government. Although the plotters were first given the death sentence with much publicity, it was later
commuted because of international pressure. Michombero's regime began a period of organized discrimination against Bahutu, to the extent that by 1972 the military was purged of Bahutu and only a few held government posts.

The 1972 conflict

Some commentators contend that the 1972 'selective genocide' of Bahutu by government forces was planned by Michombero's regime as a 'final solution to the Bahutu problem'. Another view is that the state used the pretext of a peasant uprising to carry out acts of revenge and subjugation. There is a general consensus that the conflict began when 400 Bahutu and Mulelists (Zairean rebels), with bases in Tanzania, launched an attack on the Batutsi mainly in the Bururi, Nyanza-lac and Rumonge areas, killing an estimated 2,000 people. However, all reports of the conflicts noted that the counter-attacks carried out by government forces were excessive. The army and the JNR coordinated their efforts systematically to eliminate Bahutu leaders and intelligentsia, especially those in the university, secondary schools, hospitals and the church. The école normale at Ngaragara near Bujumbura lost 100 of a total of 314 students. One-third of the students at the University of Bujumbura were reported missing. Four Bahutu ministers in the last government were immediately executed (Le Monde 1.6.1972). Missionaries, journalists, visitors, describe situations where Bahutu children were taken out of classrooms, loaded on to trucks and clubbed to death. At night, trucks loaded with corpses left Bujumbura (Le Monde
1.6.1972, Times 9.6.1972). Twelve Bahutu Protestant pastors and 14 Roman Catholic priests were reported killed (Guardian 4.6.1972 & 27.5.1972). Ostensibly the plan was to destroy all present and future members of the Bahutu elite. Ordinary peasants and workers were also under threat as villages were burnt and crops destroyed, and about 500,000 people were made homeless (Daily Telegraph 9.6.1972, The Financial Times, 20 July 1972). An estimated 200,000 Bahutu were killed in the violence lasting from April to August; over 150,000 fled to neighbouring countries. Because the reprisals were directed at the educated Bahutu, peasants were better able to flee the country and thus constituted the bulk of the refugee population.

The extent to which the uprising was supported by local Bahutu remains unclear. However, there is some conjecture that Michombero may well have had knowledge of the attack, since he dismissed his cabinet on the same day, 29 April 1972, and for the first two months of the conflict, was probably ruling by presidential decree (Lemarchand and Martin 1974, Aupens 1973). The Burundi government accused a former Minister of Communication, Pascal Bubiriza of organizing the uprising in league with ultra-left wing groups (Sunday Times 4.6.1972, Daily Telegraph 23.6.1972). Radio broadcasts of genocidal acts against the Batutsi, must certainly have intensified anti-Bahutu sentiments and provoked retribution. Discrimination in the distribution of relief aid forced the International Red Cross to cease its operation in Burundi (Bowen, Freeman & Miller 1972).
An estimated 200,000 Barundi, mainly Bahutu, fled the country between 1972 and 1973, and sought refuge in the neighbouring territories of Tanzania, Rwanda and Zaire. Their presence close to the Burundi border has posed a significant threat to successive Burundi governments, who have tried through direct military or diplomatic means to neutralize them. The hostility of the Barundi state towards their exiles resulted in the killing of repatriated refugees in Nyanza-lac in 1975 - one year after their return. The continued violation of human rights in Burundi has forced most of the 1972 refugees to opt for a life in exile, increasing the insecurity of the Burundi state.

After the 1972 conflict, a major part of Burundi's budget was spent on equipping and enlarging the army. A minor uprising in June 1973 also provoked attacks by the army (Guardian 15.5.1973). Intra-Batutsi disputes continued with Michombero dismissing his Abanyaruguru Prime Minister, Albain Nyamoga in June 1973, and taking personal control of the most important ministries. Kay also (1987) documents the state-sponsored execution of 100 Batutsi at Gitega during the 1972 conflict.

Manoeuvres and nation-building

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s with strict controls over the media, and a general suspicion of foreigners, the Burundi state has been able to generate propaganda showing a united nation which has solved its ethnic problems. However, as a Batutsi-dominated state it is still unable to rid itself of the spectre of the 1972 massacre and the threat of
a Bahutu coup. The latter became a pretext for the tightening-up of security and the imprisonment and murder of hundreds of Bahutu. The fact that Michombero’s government was tainted with blood, was one reason given for his overthrow by his cousin Jean-Baptiste Bagaza on 21 November 1976. In turn, Bagaza also found it necessary to suppress Bahutu dissent, nevertheless, he persisted in affirming:


The Catholic Church, which provided a mouthpiece, a meeting place and an organizational structure for the Bahutu, was placed under severe pressure through restrictions on church activities, imprisonment of church leaders, expulsion of foreign missionaries and a ban on church literature (Amnesty International 1984). Even though 50 percent of Barundi are Christians, in March 1984, the government banned all church meetings except on Saturday afternoons and Sundays. A serious consequence for the mass of Barundi was the closure of Catholic literacy groups which taught over 300,000 people. President Bagaza gave his reasons: ‘d’abord, il existe un jour destine au culte: c’est le dimanche pour les Catholiques. Le samedi, et lui seul est prevu pour travaux communautaries et les reunions du parti’(Press Conference 1979). Too many church activities were said to obstruct development. The demands of development and nation-building were used to obscure ethnic-related policies.
Villagization (Ibigwati) was adopted as a development strategy by Congress in 1979, and by 1983, 102 villages of between 50-200 families had been formed in the south of the country. It is possible that the underlying reason was to ensure greater control over the population, rather than for the easy delivery of services and dissemination of development ideas, -the 1972 uprising emanated from the south. A pass law governing population movements was enacted, supposedly as a conservation measure, to prevent unofficial relocation of people in what is the most densely-populated country in Africa. The removal of the pass law in 1988, was due to pressure from the World Bank/IMF for a social climate suitable to a free market economy (Africa Business 1988).

Even though the Burundi government, in what is described as 'a conspiracy of silence', persists in denying the existence of regional, ethnic, or clan affiliations, a cursory glance at the ethnic composition of the army or government shows a remarkable predominance of Batutsi. The army in 1985 was 96 percent Batutsi; two-thirds of the University of Bujumbura students were Batutsi; Bahutu held four ministries out of the twenty-two in government, comprised seven out of 65 deputies in the National Assembly, no Bahutu were among the 15 provincial governors, and only one in the 45-member national committee of UPRONA (BIIB 1985, Kay 1987).

A constant flow of educated Bahutu seeking refuge in neighbouring territories, points to the persistence of minor outbursts of violence, arbitrary detentions, and obstacles
to the democratic introduction of political and civil rights. In 1979 and 1984, during the UPRONA national conference, hundreds of Bahutu were reported murdered. UPRONA, as the only legal political party, had in 1984 up to 65 percent of Burundi voters as members, and had successfully integrated women, workers and youth movements, the latter through the transformation of the JNR to the Union de la Jeunesse Revolutionnaire Burundaise (URJB). It is clear from the high level of party membership that the vast majority of Barundi prefer to comply with the requirements of the state (Kay 1987).

Thus opposition is left to those in exile. Since 1972 over 10 opposition political parties have been formed in exile, six in Tanzania, three in Rwanda and one in Belgium. However, because of OAU legislation and bilateral agreements between the Burundi state and its neighbours, these political movements become ineffective as they have to operate covertly within the continent, particularly in neighbouring territories.7

Buyoya and the August 1988 conflict

Due to the excesses of the Bagaza regime, particularly in relation to the Catholic Church and Bagaza’s growing unpopularity overseas, he was displaced by a member of his clan, Pierre Buyoya, in a coup d'état on 3 September 1987, while attending a summit of French-speaking African leaders

7 The policy of non-interference in the affairs of member states is embodied in the OAU charter, and the OAU Refugee Convention (discussed in Chapter Three), strictly prohibits member states from promoting political movements other than those fighting white-minority rule on the continent.
in Canada. Pierre Buyoya is reported to have accused former President Bagaza of 'constant violation of the constitution'. To rectify the situation, Buyoya lifted some of the more restrictive measures relating to the Church, thus placating foreign aid donors, however, he maintained discriminatory practices with regard to the Bahutu when he appointed 30 Batutsi soldiers to the newly-formed National Council of Redemption.

It was therefore surprising that in August 1988, a minor skirmish between local Bahutu and Batutsi in the Ntega commune of Kirundo province resulted in a full-scale military operation against the Bahutu (Independent 22.8.1988). About 1,000 Batutsi and an estimated 20,000 Bahutu were killed in the villages of Gashikanwa and Kiremba and the towns of Ntega and Ngarangara in Kirundo province (Observer 28.8.1988). The area which had a population of 150,000, with 98 percent Bahutu, was deserted by the end of August as people fled to neighbouring Rwanda or to other parts of the country.

The Burundi government has carefully controlled information disseminating from the province. However, refugees in Rwanda testified to the atrocities directed at the Bahutu population. Call for an independent investigation by UN officials was rejected by the government, which was also hostile to foreign aid agencies working in the area (Le Monde 20.10.1988). It is assumed that several Bahutu intellectuals who protested have been arrested (Observer 9.10.1988).
External Involvement

The Burundi government while highly critical of foreign powers, relies heavily on aid in order to implement its development policies. Burundi is among the 39 low-income economies of the world. With a population of 5.1 million in 1988 and an estimated population growth rate of 3.1 percent per annum, its density of 183.23 per sq. km. is one of the highest in Africa (World Bank 1988). About 93 percent of its population are employed in agriculture. With its economy dependent on the export of cash crops, mainly coffee, Burundi suffered from the worldwide economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, experiencing not just a decline in the world price for its commodities, but also a decline in agricultural and industrial output, and an external debt of 551 million dollars. Unlike many African countries, Burundi since the 1970s, has been able to maintain a working relationship with the IMF and the World Bank, becoming the highest per capita recipient of their low-interest loans, and receiving over $153 million dollars of the Bank's International Development Agency (IDA) credits in the 1988 fiscal year (Africa Business 1988). This dependence on western aid aggravates rather than facilitates improvements in the human rights record of the Burundi state, as the capital is used to consolidate the hegemony of the Batutsi economically and militarily.

Western and African governments have been criticized for their failure to protest to the Burundi government over the 1972 conflict (Weinstein 1974, Bowen et al 1972,

8 These loans have lower interest rates and longer repayment periods than the IMF SDR loans.
Greenland 1974). In fact, France, Zaire, Uganda and Libya supplied either military advisers or equipment to quell the uprising. Although Belgium, as the former colonial power, described the conflict as 'veritable genocide', its leverage was insignificant, particularly since ethnic divisions had been attributed to the policies of the Belgian colonial state. In addition, Belgium's influence in Burundi has been usurped by the French, in their quest to expand France's sphere of influence in the region. During the 1960s and 1970s, Burundi was being courted by communist and Western countries, and as their welcome fluctuated with the political colour of the government, many were unwilling to criticize the regime.

In October 1988 the Burundi government sought $1.03 billion dollars to fund its 1988-1992 Five-year Development plan, amidst criticisms of state terrorism. It is possible that donor reluctance may have influenced President Buyoya's decision radically to alter the ethnic composition of his government. On 19 October 1988, Buyoya nominated Bahutu to eleven of the 22 ministerial posts, however, Batutsi maintained control of the key defence, foreign affairs and interior ministries (Le Monde 21.10.1988). It is doubtful whether such representation will signal any radical change in the decision-making apparatus in favour of positive discrimination for the Bahutu. As one Muhutu refugee notes, it is the army which controls the country, not parliament (Le Monde 21.10.1988).

Finally it is apparent that the hegemony of the Batutsi provides the sort of political stability favoured by western
donors. The coups and countercoups have done little to alter the social structure of the society, resulting only in further repressive and authoritarian measures to hinder the development of popular forces.

**Conclusion**

I have shown that ethnicity is a relatively recent, but nonetheless significant phenomenon in Burundi history, emerging from the divisive policies of colonial rule. The saliency of ethnic groups has increased during the post-colonial period as social classes compete for the meagre resources of the state. Since access to the state ensures greater control of the means of production, the exclusion or inclusion of groups in the political sphere results in the activation of group solidarity. The case for Burundi is succinctly put by Ndayahoze:

> We can affirm that it is in the leisured class that the virus of tribalism is to be found. What happens is that evil comes down from the top. It is the undeserving administrative staff who, in order to maintain their rank or rise to a post they covet, need 'connections', craftiness, and guile. It is the insatiable people in responsible positions who make a political strategy out of ethnic division in order to further their shameful ambitions. Thus if they are Tutsi they denounce a Hutu peril which must be countered. If they are Hutu they unveil a Tutsi apartheid which must be combatted (Martin Ndayahoze, Tutsi officer killed by the military in 1972, quoted in Greenland 1977, p.119).

Burundi's political elites are clearly in control of the economy and the state, and it is their compradorial character which guarantees them continuing support from external powers. Thus the need for parliamentary democracy or other concessions to the masses are not stressed by western supporters of the Barundi state, as Burundi becomes
fully integrated into the world capitalist system - sophisticated weaponry is only available to those in power.

The immediate consequences for refugees is uncertain. Many will face persecution, even death on their return to Burundi. Recent forced repatriation by the Tanzanian government or by UNHCR, violates the basic law under which refugees' rights are supposedly safeguarded, and highlights the acceptance of western donors of the undemocratic practices of the Burundi state. In sum, the Barundi refugee faces an indeterminate period in exile.

9 In April 1987, the Tanzanian government forcibly repatriated Barundi refugees living in Kigoma region, on the basis that they were economic migrants not refugees (Daily News, April 1987).
10 Refugees who fled Burundi during the 1988 massacre were forcibly repatriated by UNHCR, supposedly because of the dense population of their host country Rwanda (Guardian 16.11.1988 & 7.12.1988).
CHAPTER THREE

TANZANIA’S REFUGEE POLICY, EVOLUTION AND PRACTICE

Introduction

Tanzania’s refugee policy is derived from a number of sources; firstly, the commitment of the ruling party (TANU/CCM) to the liberation struggle against colonial and white-minority rule on the continent. This is reinforced by its geo-political situation in which its own independence has continued to be threatened by white repressive regime(s). Secondly, Tanzania’s allegiance to other African states in the OAU has forced it to adopt a policy which safeguards the prevailing political status quo. Both these determinants are linked to the third influential force, the international community. United Nations legislation based mainly on the security considerations of western powers, has been the major factor influencing regional/OAU and national refugee policies.

In the final analysis, the actual approaches adopted by individual African states, when refugees cross their borders, are the outcome of policies drawn up by the United Nations. Because of Tanzania’s neo-colonial and underdeveloped character, external forces dominate the national response to the refugee problem, to the extent that Tanzania’s refugee law owes its content to the colonial period, and the popular settlement scheme approach, as a long-term solution, is wholly dependent on external financing and cooperation.
International Aid and OAU Refugee Policy

Before an analysis of Tanzania's refugee policy, it is necessary to glance at the evolution of regional refugee policies and legislation, particularly since Tanzania's refugees policy was not devised independently by the Tanzanian state, in the light of the political sensitivity of refugees, their implications for regional security, and the stability of the post-World War Two political order assigned to the world by the victorious nations.

During the 1960s, while independent Tanzania was confronted for the first time with a refugee problem, various international, humanitarian organizations and western governments were also expressing their concern about the new wave of refugees on the continent. Political instability arising from the decolonization process was causing concern among western observers, who feared the possibility of dissidents forming alliances with communist groups. It became necessary for this new African reality speedily to be included in the internationally-recognized legal conventions in order to monitor, control and direct the movement, and so prevent such alignments.

Three major international conferences, one in 1966 and two in 1967, addressed the issue, and were influential in

1 In 1963-64 the first refugee groups from Rwanda and Zaire sought refuge in Tanzania.
2 a) The most influential was the conference on the legal, Economic and Social Aspects of the African Refugee problems, 9-18 October 1967. Sponsored by UNHCR, ECA, Dag Hammarskjold Foundation and the OAU. Also in November, a similar conference was held at St. John's University, New York. In 1966, SIAS Uppsala, organized the first international conference on African refugees, looking at 'Refugee problems in Southern and Central Africa', sponsored by the Swedish government.
that their recommendations were later incorporated into the 1969 OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee problems in Africa. Earlier, in January 1967, the UN had adopted its protocol which enabled the 1951 convention to cover the whole world.

The internationalization of the African refugee problem meant that refugees could no longer move undetected into neighbouring states. Humanitarian aid, given through the UNHCR became a strategy to control them. The activities of the UN and its refugee organ, UNHCR, was described in 1967 as providing;

Obscure moral support for liberation, while at the same time pursuing programs which encourage a posture of rehabilitation with the promise of a new life, serving free Africa, and not the cause of the liberation for which they seek support (Metclaff 1967 in Brooks & El Ayouty 1970 p.74).

The UN was well-aware of the negative and self-destructive effects of asylum on refugees. Estrangement from the liberation struggle leads to indifference, despondency and a confusion of identity and purpose.

African states did not have to be coerced into enforcing policies which depoliticize refugees, separating them from their cause, and generally maintaining the political status quo within the region. With their own legitimacy open to question, Africa’s ruling elite found it beneficial to have such an approach universally accepted. This would, however, be under the guidance of the UN system:

Since the states of asylum in Africa are not generally equipped to handle the economic and political problems for refugees alone, this work of the United Nations is important. By channelling the problem of refugee settlement through the UN, a multi-lateral solution can be financed and executed in the overall interests of maintaining international order in the face of potential

To obtain aid from UNHCR, three criteria have to be satisfied. Firstly, African governments must officially request assistance; secondly the problem must be of such a magnitude that it cannot be solved by the government; and, finally and more importantly, the solutions proposed by the host government for the refugees should be practical and based on humanitarian and social considerations, thus removing the problem from its political context (Holborn 1975,).

African states were in favour of such a condition. In a speech to the 1967 conference, Diallo Telli, then the Administrative Secretary of the OAU, described the refugee problem as an international problem, because of 'the potential threats which it holds to stability, peace and security in Africa and the world.' On that basis, he proceeded to praise the work of UNHCR and to beg for further material assistance, considering the enormous 'sacrifices' which African states had hitherto made. This position was reiterated in 1979 by President Nyerere.

Our resources are very limited, and the demands made upon us are very large. But I do not believe that dealing with the problems of 3.5 million people and giving them a chance to rebuild their dignity and their lives, is an impossible task for 46 nations and 350 million inhabitants (Nyerere May 1979).

This reliance on external aid has compelled African states to rely on western-derived solutions, primarily those embodied in the 13 recommendations of the 1967 conference.3

An analysis of the recommendations shows that the 1967 conference was the major forerunner for subsequent refugee policies and practices. Recommendation One introduces the concept of voluntary repatriation, as the best solution to refugee problems. In its absence, land settlement, through long-term refugee programmes and projects, would be the next best solution.

Wherever possible such programmes should not be aimed merely at enabling refugees to lead a life of subsistence, and should be integrated into national development plans without influencing the choice of voluntary development plans (Af. Ref. Conf. 1967, p.92).

Recommendation Two proposes that the African refugee definition takes into account the specific aspects of the African refugee situation. Tanzania, Congo (Kinshasa), Burundi and Senegal were to be selected as pilot countries in which there would be a concentration and rationalization of aid. Other recommendations relate to the issues of voluntary repatriation, travel documents, social rights of the refugees, emergency aid, land settlement, zonal planning for integration, education, training, placement and manpower requirements, resettlement and placement of individuals.

The recommendations of the 1967 conference were used to revise the draft text of the OAU convention in 1967. The OAU was encouraged to recognize the specific nature of the African refugee situation, where physical disasters like drought, flood, famine, disease or poverty have caused people to cross an international border. After modifications the OAU Convention was adopted in September 1969 by the Assembly of Heads of State. However, it was a further five 4 UNHCR was very much involved in this revision, providing a technical adviser for drafting.
years before it was ratified by one-third of the OAU member states, and could come into force. The progressiveness of the OAU’s definition does not obscure its more restrictive codes on freedom of movement. According to Peter Nobel the OAU convention takes away human and political rights from refugees (Nobel 1986).

Ayok (1985) criticizes the OAU for failing to evolve any refugee law of its own, describing the 1969 convention as a polygot of the 1951 convention and the 1967 recommendations. Moreover, Article viii of the OAU convention clearly calls upon member states to co-operate with UNHCR. The agreement provides for, ‘consultation, exchange of technical and informational documents, and reciprocal presence at each others meetings.’ African states were soon after rewarded with an increase in the UNHCR budget to Africa to $5.6 million (Amate 1986).

According to Pitterman (1984), between 1964-1981, UNHCR spent some $241 million on African refugees, ranging from $10.4 per capita in 1964 to $104.75 in 1984. Most of this went to the establishment of organized rural settlements. This reliance on external aid has compelled African states to rely on western-derived solutions.

Because of aid, the policies behind flight have been conveniently transformed into a problem necessitating a ‘humanitarian’ solution. However, what constitutes humanitarian concern can be subject to different interpretations, depending on the ideological persuasion of the host and source states. Refugee policies initially tend to reflect the prevailing ideology of the host state and its
political alignment in the international arena. Although many states may have ratified the various international legislation on refugee issues, when it comes to the actual determination of refugee status, many utilize their own national laws. This legal problem is compounded by the fact that states do not have to ratify all sections of the UN conventions and protocol. In the West, refugees fleeing communist regimes can automatically acquire refugee status. This is in contrast to the more restrictive policy towards those escaping from right-wing dictatorships. A classic case is illustrated by Gil Loescher and John Scanlan in their study of American foreign policy choices and refugee immigration to the United States.5

Increasingly domestic policy has begun to influence Western governments’ reaction to refugees. The 1980’s has seen a revival of ethnocentrism, racism and fascism in the West, with the election of right-wing governments in the United states, United Kingdom and Germany, and the growth of fascist national parties in France and Holland. In the uncertain economic climate of the 1980’s, migrants, Third World people, are potential scapegoats for numerous economic

5 See Gil Loescher & John Scanlan, (1986) Calculated Kindness: Refugees and America’s half-open door 1945 to the present. The Free Press, (Macmillian, New York, London). Loescher and Scanlan note the differences in the attitude of successive US governments to the main refugee groups. They conclude that ‘foreign policy choices ordinarily have played the key role in determining which refugees will be permitted to enter the United States’ (p. xvii). Hence the entry of the Hungarians in 1956, Cubans between 1960-66 and the Indochinese refugees from Saigon in 1975, was favoured by the Department of State. ‘Conversely, over the last two decades the United States has closed its borders to virtually every refugee fleeing persecution at the hands of authoritarian regimes’ (p.xviii).
and social ills. Governments utilize restrictive immigration laws to appease voters, thus fostering notions of racial superiority and dominance among the indigenous people. Europe has in effect closed its doors to non-whites.

What of the situation in Africa? Many analysts of the African political arena argue that African states have no coherent foreign policy (Claude Ake 1987, Howard 1987). With the majority of African states taking a non-aligned stance, many commentators have interpreted this as a strategy of the national bourgeoise and their leaders to obtain aid from all quarters.

Detailed analysis of the refugee policy of some states show how ideological differences can affect response to refugee groups (Karadawi, 1988). Refugees become vulnerable to instability within their host state as successive governments may have different attitudes to the same refugee group. Economic crisis within Africa has also produced scapegoats. Refugees are labelled as economic saboteurs, their position becoming increasingly precarious.

Regionalism, agreements between neighbouring states, also has an effect on refugee policy. The OAU has been described by some observers as a club of leaders enacting policies aimed at maintaining their own survival. East African states have signed a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements on the subject of refugees.

In the final analysis, Africa’s refugee policy is not really a reflection of foreign policy choices or even of domestic policy, but of the prevailing interest of the major donors to the United Nations. It is therefore not surprising
that in a neo-colonial age, African states have no independent refugee policy.

**Tanzania and African Liberation**

Tanzania remains one of the few African states whose commitment to African liberation movements has been realised in a high level of material assistance, particularly in the use of its territory for military purposes, thus placing it in the direct firing line of their oppressors.

Support for liberation movements was embodied in the Arusha declaration, which espoused a quasi-socialist doctrine based on principles such as equality, majority rule and human rights. President Nyerere, in his address to the TANU national conference of 1967, declared:

> The total liberation of Africa must be a continuing concern of every independent African state...The freedom that we seek must be for the peoples of Africa without distinction of race, colour or religion. Racialist minority governments cannot be acknowledged because they are a negation of the very basis of our existence. Coexistence is impossible; for if the African peoples of South Africa and Rhodesia have no human right to govern themselves, then what is the basis of Tanzania’s existence, of Zambia’s, of Kenya’s, and so on? (Nyerere 1967, p.238).

Since independence Tanzania has lent its support to several Southern African Liberation movements, FRELIMO, ZANU, SWAPO, ANC and PAC, and has provided a base for the oppressed people of the continent. Former President, Julius Nyerere, and the Tanzanian people have received several commendations for their tireless effort for peace in southern Africa.

Tanzanians throughout the country, including peasants, workers and bureaucrats, have assimilated the party’s
position on liberation movements. This commitment has been severely tested in the 1980s, particularly in 1986/87, with the intensification of the war in Mozambique, which called for full participation of Tanzanian troops, occurring at the same time as severe setbacks in the home economy. At that time, attempts by pro-IMF forces to disentangle the state from the liberation struggles, on the basis of the expense to the nation, were foiled by the loyalty of the peasantry. Peasants, first of all in Mwanza region, began spontaneously to contribute thousands of shillings to the liberation movement. Clearly this response was a massive reflection of earlier political support of the state. Indeed, state reaction more recently, was to demobilize the population through careful control of the nation’s response to such news as the death of Samora Machel. Spontaneous response was to be dissipated by the party. Revolutionary movements, often in line with party policies, particularly on the university campus, have been restrained, or banned. African states, including Tanzania have always feared that discourse on liberation, and the articulation of struggles against imperialism, colonialism and racism, may take a different turn, placing the focus firmly on the internal contradictions within their own society.

In accordance with the OAU definition of refugees, members of southern African liberation movements are ‘freedom fighters’ and are subjected to a slightly different refugee policy than those from other territories.

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Challenging the injustice of white racism, they are exempted from the various restrictive measures taken against refugees. During the second debate in Parliament on the Bill for the control of refugees, the then second vice-president, Rashid Kawawa, outlined the reasoning behind the policy towards freedom fighters.

Tanzania government is convinced that her independence is incomplete, before the whole of Africa becomes free. We shall neither give up nor lag behind in supporting the refugees ... The help promised here is that which will enable them to live peacefully. We cannot help those who run away to seek a luxurious life. We will help those who want to free their countries (quoted in Minja 1975, p.90).

Asylum seekers from countries under white-minority rule are channelled to the respective liberation movements and the offer of refuge is dependent on their acceptance by the movement. Refugees from South Africa, who are not members of the recognized liberation movements may find themselves forced to seek asylum in another country or subjected to harassment and imprisonment. A number of cases have been documented by Ayok (1985).

Refugees from Independent African states

In the euphoria of the 1960s independence period, Batutsi from Rwanda were the first Africans from an independent African state who sought refuge in Tanzania, and in the neighbouring countries of Zaire and Burundi. These Eastern African countries also became host to a wave of refugees from Zaire, Sudan and Mozambique. The problem of refugees from independent African states was brought to the attention of the OAU council of Ministers in February 1964, and a Commission of Ten, was established to investigate the
problem. But it was the dispute between Rwanda and Burundi over the insurgence by Batutsi refugees, and further conflicts between Congo-Brazzaville and Zaire, which forced the OAU to adopt the policy of maintaining 'good-neighbourly relations', and to utilize the method of personal intervention by leaders of member states to solve such disputes.

The instability created by the Banyarwanda refugees, had great repercussions in Tanzania, as the refugees were reluctant to accept the solutions proposed by their host. Their intransigence forced the Tanzanian government hurriedly to enact a refugee law in 1966, containing several caveats to control their movements and activities. In his introduction to the Bill, the Second Vice-President, Rashidi Kawawa stated:

Of recent years refugees have entered Tanganyika from neighbouring territories and it is considered that the numbers involved required that provision be made for their control and administration (December 1965).

Three writers have analyzed Tanzania's refugee law, and the common feature documented by all is its close

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7 The Commission of Ten was composed of representatives from Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, Cameroon, Nigeria, Sudan, Ghana and Senegal.
adherence to colonial legislation for the control of war refugees and evacuees during the Second World war. Like any other neo-colonial state, Tanzania resorted to a colonial solution to the problem, which is itself at variance with the more liberal international conventions based on the fundamental principles of human rights.

The Refugee (Control) Act was derived from the Defence Regulations Act of 1946 and the Refugee (Control) and (Expulsion) Ordinance No.3 1949. The first gave the Governor the power to expel refugees from the territory, whilst the second was centred on restricting the mobility of refugees. The Ordinance aimed at:

the proper control of certain persons who have been permitted to enter the territory during the war without observance of the immigration laws and for the expulsion of such persons in the event of their refusal to leave the territory after due notice.

A refugee was defined as:

Any person who entered any part of East Africa during the war in pursuance of an arrangement made by any government in East Africa for the reception of persons evacuated from war areas, and has been permitted to enter the territory, without observance of the immigration laws.

It was the Defence (War Evacuees) Regulations of 1946 which according to Ayok (1985), 'laid down the basic tenets of law as we find it in the present day Refugee (Control) Act.' War Evacuees were to reside in areas specified by the Governor and the post of Camp Commandant was created, the equivalent of the present-day Settlement Commandant.\(^{10}\)

The main feature of the 1966 act was the facility for a general classification of whole populations as refugees by

\(^{10}\) The Settlement Commandant is the representative of the Minister of Home Affairs in the current refugee settlements, and is in overall control.
the Minister of Home Affairs based on the occurrence of
refugee-producing events during a specified period of time.
Nevertheless, in May 1972, at the time when Burundi refugees
were crossing the border, the Minister of Home Affairs (MHA)
warned: 'those found not to be genuine refugees will be sent
back to Burundi' (5 May 1972, Daily News) Widespread powers
were given to various people, mainly the ubiquitous
'authorized officer' or the 'competent authority', to
restrict the movement of refugees.¹¹

The 'competent authority' had the right to direct 'any
refugee entering or leaving Tanganyika by specified routes
at specified places' (section 5a). Of course the practical
implications were different. In relation to freedom of
movement, Ayok (1985) argues that the act gave excessive
powers to the law-enforcing organs and even to
administrative officers; such powers do not exist in any
other laws in Tanzania, not even in the Criminal Procedure
Code and the Penal code.

The act also legalized the settlement scheme approach
for refugees. Section 12, (1a) empowers numerous local
officials to force refugees within their jurisdiction to
reside within a reception area or refugee settlement. It
continues if a refugee;

Having arrived at a reception area or a refugee
settlement in pursuance of such order, leaves or attempts
to leave such area or settlement except in pursuance of
some other order made under this section; unless in

¹¹ An 'authorized officer' refers to an administrative
officer, a settlement Commandant, a police officer, a
prisons officer or a member of the Tanzania People's Defence
forces.
A 'competent authority' refers to an Area or Regional
Commissioner.
possession of a permit issued in that behalf...be guilty of an offence against this act,
which can lead to imprisonment. The settlement commandant is given extensive powers under section 13 (2) of the act. His duties are described as:

a) to ensure the settlement is administered in an orderly and efficient manner;
b) to ensure the performance of any work or duty necessary for the maintenance of essential services in the settlement or for the general welfare of the refugee therein;
c) to ensure that all proper precautions are taken to preserve the health and well-being of the refugee therein;
d) to preserve orderly conduct and discipline in the settlement.

Tanzania passed a series of acts between 1965-9, the Extraditions Act (1965), Tanzania Statutes (1965), and the Fugitive Offenders Act (1969), all of which have a bearing on the rights and obligations of refugees. The Extraditions Act 1965, governs the involuntary repatriation of refugees, and under the terms of the Act refutes repatriation of those who are being sought by states for political offences, and gives the fugitive the rights of appeal to the high court of Tanzania (Ayok 1985). In individual cases of asylum decisions are made by an eligibility committee, consisting of members of MHA, UNHCR and the Ministry of Justice.

Modification of Tanzania's Refugee law

Ayok (1985) has shown that UNHCR, since opening its Dar es Salaam office in 1967, has pushed for reform of the act.

12 Ernest Mwipopo, (1987) also considers in detail the position of refugees in the Union Constitution and other laws of Tanzania.
Basically, its punitive aspects place it outside internationally accepted legislation, the 1951 UN Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Ayok quotes the Director of the Legal division of UNHCR, as stating:

"...When the United Republic of Tanzania has been a party to the UN convention relating to the status of refugees of 1951 and to the protocol of 1967, since May 1964 and September 1968 respectively, the present legislations and administrative practice dealing with refugee matters in the country are at variance on a number of points with commitments undertaken by Tanzania... (Ayok 1985, p.6).

Ayok, however, over-emphasized UNHCR's pressure to amend the act, by stating that UNHCR are the drafters, with a minor role played by MHA and the Attorney General's Chambers. Albeit a draft proposal has been agreed, but until 1987 it was not available for general circulation. The act has been under review since 1967, but this was not admitted by the government until November 1980, when the Daily News reported that the act with its emphasis on settlement on agricultural schemes, fails to take care of the types of refugees who now seek asylum in the country, namely freedom fighters, soldiers, fugitives, intellectuals and educated refugees.

Amendments to the Tanzanian refugee law will try to incorporate facets of other refugee laws such as the OAU 1969 protocol from which the definition of the refugee will be taken. Mwipopo (1987) suggests the inclusion of more specific guidelines on the work of the refugee eligibility committee, and higher bodies of appeal, the issuing of permits, voluntary repatriation and resettlement to a third
country of asylum, and allowing economic enterprises, and representation at district levels.

The Refugee (Control) Act restrictions on mobility inhibit the employment opportunities of refugees, which is in contradiction of Article 17 of the 1951 convention.

The contracting state shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory the most favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country in the same circumstances, as regards the right to engage in wage-earning employment (para 1).

Bavu and Tibeshogosha contend that in reviving colonial legislation, there was no fundamental change in policy. However, there were changes in objectives or slight shifts of policy on refugee questions. They argue that these shifts were the result of the country's open-door policy, and culminated in what they refer to as 'the integrative policy decisions', aimed at 'integrating the refugees into Tanzania's political and socio-economic system', as manifested in the widespread use of settlement scheme approach after the 1970s.

Bavu and Tibeshogosha (1987) attribute the policy shifts to the increased refugee population after 1967, the ideology of the Arusha declaration, and pressure from UNHCR to reform the law and to bring it into line with international instruments. In contrast, my analysis shows that the supposed policy shifts identified by Bavu and Tibeshogosha did not occur. Because of its material poverty, the newly-independent Tanzanian state had to accept the policies proposed by the donors. During the 1960s, eight settlement schemes were established for Banyarwanda and Mozambican refugees, all with the specific purpose of
'integrated' development. By the 1970s, and the arrival of 100,000 Barundi refugees, the settlement policy which was already consolidated, was quickly enforced. According to the UNHCR Branch office in Dar es Salaam, integration, implying the free movement of refugees, would contravene the security law of the country.\(^\text{13}\) Widespread use of the term in the Tanzanian context amounts to rhetoric, originating from an external source, namely western donors in the form of UNHCR.

**Regional security**

Fundamental to the OAU's refugee policy is the element of regional security. The OAU has been criticized for having a policy as outlined in its charter, in which its main concern is to guarantee the sovereign and territorial integrity of member states (Howard 1987). The essential principles outlined from as early as February 1964 in Lagos were a) voluntary repatriation, b) the settlement of refugees as far as possible from the border (later defined as 50 mile or kilometre limit) and c) the prevention of subversion against the country of origin. Member states demanded:

Refugees must in no case be allowed to attack their country of origin, either through the media of press, or radio, or by the use of arms. In the same way, the countries of origin must not consider the harbouring of refugees as an unfriendly gesture; and refugees must desist from any attack on the countries of origin through the media of press or radio or by resorting to arms.\(^\text{14}\)

Furthermore:

\(^{13}\) Discussion with the Representative, UNHCR Branch Office, Dar es Salaam, September 1987.

\(^{14}\) OAU principles contained in the speech of Diallo Telli, Administrative Secretary-General to the 1967 conference.
Countries involved in a refugee problem must begin or continue, bilateral negotiations with a view to solving all those difficulties likely to arise, by peaceful means and in accordance with the principles and objectives of the OAU. These principles were encapsulated in the 1969 convention, and member states have tirelessly tried to adhere to them as pose a greater threat to their own existence. Regional security dominated the Tanzanian national refugee legislation, and has continued to be the prime focus of the state, when dealing with the refugee problem, even though, in 1969 the OAU found it imperative to assure member countries that:

...the granting of asylum is a peaceful and humanitarian act and shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act by a member state (Article II, Asylum 2). In the Tanzanian case bilateral relationships with the countries of origin of the numerous refugee groups has been emphasized by former President Nyerere. Frequent exchanges of presidential, ministerial, and trade missions have occurred between Tanzania and Rwanda and Burundi, the independent countries with the largest refugee groups in Tanzania. Nyerere on a visit to Rwanda in 1978 stressed: 'We are determined to combine our efforts in order to reinforce our common policy of good neighbourliness' (Quoted in Daily News 1978).

Increased regionalism among East African leaders has been reflected in their attitude towards refugees. A number of pacts have been signed between the leaders of Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, specifically on the

16 Taken from the 1969 OAU Convention governing the Specific aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.
subject of refugees, aimed primarily at restricting their movement and freedom. Enaharo (1984) refers to an East African leader who said an agreement was reached to make the region a ‘refugee-free zone’. The term ‘dissidents’ would then apply to those fleeing political persecution. President Museveni’s historic speech to the OAU criticizing their myopia towards the near genocide committed under the Obote regime in Uganda, had no impact and rang hollow, when Uganda under his presidency joined ranks with the other East African leaders (Museveni 1985). In November 1986 at a summit meeting in Kigali, the leaders of Tanzania, Kenya, Burundi, Zaire, Uganda, Sudan, agreed to create border buffer zones separating refugees from their countries of origin, to disarm and to prohibit them from forming military units. The Communique stated:

The states are committed to stop refugees from engaging in political, military or propaganda activities which could harm the good relations between the host country and the country of origin...any armed person seeking refugee status should immediately be disarmed. The weapons, as well as any military equipment in such persons possession, should be returned to the country of origin (Daily News 29.11.1986).

Fear over the free movement of refugees in the East African region has forced leaders systematically andconcertedly to round-up refugees in their respective countries, and either repatriate them or confine them to settlements. Such an exercise occurred in Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya during April 1987. Foreign nationals, aliens and refugees were rounded-up in Tanzania’s major towns of Morogoro, Mwanza, Tabora and Kigoma, and repatriated or in the case of a few Barundi refugees, returned to the settlement (Daily News, 6.4.1987). The cumulative effect of
such actions, was to generate considerable insecurity among
the refugee population, those in Katumba and Mishamo
settlements were not allowed to travel beyond the local town
of Mpanda.

Tanzania's willingness to repatriate refugees by force
is in stark contrast to its open-handed approach once
refugees enter its territory. Tanzania has shown by the
exchange of 20-30 refugees with Kenya, in mid-November 1983,
as a pre-condition for the re-opening of the border, that
refugees whenever necessary can be used for bargaining
(Daily Telegraph, 19.1.1984).17

Tanzania has repeatedly cautioned refugees about the
effect of subversion on its relationship with Burundi.18
Such warnings are probably prompted by pressure from the
Burundi government to keep the refugees under control.
Throughout the period of crisis in Burundi, along with the
fact that Tanzania bore the brunt of the Barundi refugee
problem, the Tanzanian state has never publicly expressed
concern about the situation in Burundi. Even after Burundi
troops in pursuit of refugees, bombed Tanzania border
villages, in March-June 1973, killing 52 Tanzanian citizens,

17 During personal communication with Zairean refugees, I
was informed that Zaireans were also forcibly repatriated in
1975.
18 In 1984, the then Prime Minister was reported to have
warned Burundi refugees against engaging in the politics of
their original country whilst in residence in Tanzania.
(Daily News 7 July 1984). In 1985, President Nyerere
speaking at Ulyankulu cautioned refugees not to involve in
activities to overthrow the Burundi government (Daily News,
18 June 1985). Also in 1985, the Minister for Home Affairs,
told Parliament that refugees behaviour will not be allowed
to strain existing good relationships between Tanzania and
neighbouring countries (Daily News, 12 July 1985). Finally
in July 1986, the Minister of Home Affairs warned against
destabilization (Daily News 11 April 1986).
and the resultant dock workers boycott of goods destined for Burundi, President Nyerere was having 'good-neighbourly' talks with Presidents Micombero and Mobutu (Daily News 23 July 1973). Nyerere affirmed the absence of conflict between Tanzania and Burundi, and that there was no need for outside mediation (Daily News 17 July 1973). Consequently, Burundi agreed to pay 3.4 million shillings compensation to Tanzania. The matter was closed by the following year (Africa Contemporary Record 1974/75).

During 1973, several delegations between the two countries discussed areas of co-operation which included improvement of routes around Lake Tanganyika and a railway link between the two countries. Since the 1960s there have been several agreements on the setting up of the Kagera Basin authority. In 1974 Tanzania and Burundi agreed to combat smuggling, and to allow people on either side of the border to visit each other without passports (Daily News, 23 August 1974).

Although Tanzania's progressive stance in supporting freedom fighters is directed primarily at those Africans involved in anti-colonial struggles, this posture has attracted Africans from independent states seeking support from oppressive regimes. This was accentuated by the presence of pro-Milton Obote forces in Tanzania during the Amin regime in Uganda, and the subsequent invasion of Uganda by Tanzanian troops in 1979. The Uganda war demonstrates that in some cases, especially when the state is threatened, Tanzania may intervene in the internal affairs of OAU member states. This incident was the precursor for several
agreements by East African leaders on restricting military and propaganda activities by refugees in neighbouring states. Africans fighting tyrannical, notably right-wing regimes, can no longer be assured of support from the more liberal governments. In the light of the OAU non-interference clause, what follows therefore, is the widespread de-mobilization of African peoples.

The bestowal of citizenship

Tanzania was one of the first African nations to extend citizenship to a whole refugee group. October 1980 saw the Banyarwanda refugees, amounting to about 36,000, being universally granted Tanzanian citizenship. This decree was seen by the international community as humanitarian in origin and an example of the generosity of the Tanzanian state. On close scrutiny, it is in no way revolutionary, since under the immigration Act of 1972, Banyarwanda refugees already had the right of application after residing for more than seven years in the country. Moreover, the Daily News reported, two years earlier, on 20 September 1978, that over 15,000 people of Banyarwanda origin in Ngara and Karagwe districts, had already applied for citizenship.

Soon after the Presidential decree, the Daily News reported that a further 4,943 refugees in Karagwe district had applied, out of which 2,308 were granted citizenship. This was essentially a political act by President Nyerere, which bore no relation to reality. Banyarwanda refugees had to go through the same procedure as before, and many were refused citizenship for no apparent reason. Since local and
regional party officials are influential in the application process, acquisition of citizenship may depend more on local contacts than inherent rights. A substantial number of refugees refused to naturalize, and have not been treated favourably by Tanzanian officials. The proclamation did however, force UNHCR to cover the now 1000/- TShs fee needed for each application. In UNHCR's report of 1983/84, the naturalization process was said to be slower than expected; 20,000 were still awaiting naturalization, and over $80,000 was allocated from the 1984 budget to deploy two councillors to the Banyarwanda settlements, to help process the applications. Over $400,000 was proposed in the 1985 budget to cover registration. Ayok (1985) shows how UNHCR was requested by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) to cover the costs of publicity and registration. In May 1982, UNHCR protested about the high costs of naturalization with: 'the estimated budget is just too much for completing an already on-going process, that is 1,396,900 Tanzanian Shillings for the naturalization of only 3,900' (Quoted in Ayok 1985, p.25). In 1980 the registration fee was 40/- per person.

Refugees at Mwesi have been concerned that since the registration procedure began they have been forgotten by the outside world. Registration of the Banyarwanda must have been undertaken with the approval of the Rwanda government, which with its high population density, has discouraged the return of refugees. In fact Rwanda has had discussions with Tanzania on exporting Banyarwanda to its sparsely-populated
south-western regions (South China Morning Post 17.1.1986). 19

Under the Tanzanian Immigration Act of 1972 Barundi refugees after seven years residence are eligible to apply for citizenship, without the necessity of a presidential decree. Very few have taken up this option. The question of citizenship is well-illustrated by the Mozambican case. After Mozambique's independence in June 1975, many refugees chose to remain in Tanzania, and of those less than 10 families have sought or accepted Tanzanian citizenship.

The Origin of the 'Three Durable Solutions'

The emphasis on settlement schemes as a solution to the refugee problem is not unique to Tanzania. This approach initially comprised one of the three major solutions to the refugee problem proposed in the 1967 conference: voluntary repatriation, resettlement in a second country of asylum, or land settlement in the first country of asylum. These solutions have become the foundation of international policies on refugees, each attributed different emphasis at different periods since the 1960s. In the 1960s and 1970s, land settlement was seen as the major device by which states could exercise control over refugees. However, the high capital outlay involved in establishing and maintaining settlement schemes forced UNHCR to rethink its approach, resulting in the promotion of voluntary repatriation to countries with no apparent change in the political status quo. Land settlement was strongly recommended for African

19 This was also mentioned by K. Tambila in an interview at the University of Dar es Salaam, 1987.
refugees. It consisted of two types, spontaneous settlement and organized or systematic settlement schemes.

Spontaneous settlement was defined as:

A process whereby a group of refugees settles down in the country of asylum either in existing villages or by establishing new villages, in or near the area of arrival, which is usually inhabited by a population of similar ethnic origin, by arrangement with the local chiefs and other leaders of the local population, as well as with representatives of the central government, but only with ancillary material assistance from the outside (Af. Ref. Conf 1967 p.14).

It was estimated at the 1967 conference that about 60 percent of African refugees were settled in this way. A more recent estimate has not been made. Since the 1960s debate has centred on the long-term viability of spontaneous settlement and on its impact on the limited resources of poor rural areas. The most useful evidence in favour of self-settlement is provided by Art Hansen (1979) for Angolan refugees in Zambia. Hansen argues that 'self-settlement', an alternative terminology to spontaneous settlement, in a familiar ethnic social environment, minimizes the losses and anxiety which accompany flight, and refugees are able to resume normal village life immediately. Chiefs sought refugees as followers in order to widen their own constituency. Harrell-Bond (1986) in Southern Sudan discovered that it was those people who were unable to generate sufficient contacts at the local level, who moved to the settlements. Factors other than the presence of kin relations, which assist spontaneous settlement, vary significantly for example, the time of arrival, with first-comers having greater access to more resources, such as
land, and the prevailing environmental and economic conditions.

Both Harrell-Bond and Hansen underestimate the impact of refugees on the host community. This point has been treated by Robert Chambers (1979) and Giam Kibreab (1983), who focusing on the adverse effects, try to expose what they describe as the myths of spontaneous integration and traditional hospitality. Both suggest that rural refugees suffer greater periods of impoverishment and exploitation and not all are likely to cross into areas populated by their own ethnic group. Kibreab suggests that the notion of traditional hospitality comes from those of tribes and ethnicity, which are still prevalent in European perception of African societies. He contends that hospitality is a function of resource availability, therefore, in poverty-stricken areas of Africa, the presence of newcomers may produce hostility and cause conflict over limited resources.

Fewer refugees are outside the agency net in Tanzania than elsewhere in Africa. The Tanzanian government's attitude has always been to discourage spontaneous settlement (Holborn 1975), while at the same time encouraging refugee-related projects in the affected regions. In more recent years, Zairean and Barundi refugees settled in Kigoma, have been subjected to frequent harassment by the local and the national state, and several attempts have been made to relocate them to refugee settlements. As recently as April 1986, the Regional Commissioner for Kigoma warned refugees to vacate unauthorized villages (Daily News,
6 April 1987). The forced repatriation of some 2,800 Barundi nationals residing mainly in Kigoma region, during the month of April 1987, included a significant number of refugees who had spontaneously-settled in the border region. One refugee family visiting relations in Kigoma reported most Barundi peasants had fled their homes for the bush, leaving their property to Tanzanian raiders (Daily News, 6 April 1987). Spontaneously-settled refugee traders became suspect under the anti-economic saboteurs act of 1983; many had their licences revoked and new applications denied (Yukitasi 1987).

In direct contrast to the adverse actions by the state, since 1982, UNHCR and LWF/TCRS, with the agreement of the government, have established infrastructural projects to assist 22 villages in Kigoma region; each village containing a refugee population of over 200. The budget for the period 1982-1985 was US$ 6,855,100. This form of settlement was coined 'assisted spontaneous settlement', however, it contained one proviso, an estimated 5,030 refugees living in villages less than 50 kilometres from the border were not included. Instead the government sought their forced relocation to other villages. In such a situation, the spontaneity of settlement will have been destroyed.20

The 1967 conference also discussed the subject of organized settlement schemes for refugees, and recommended that spontaneous land settlement should only be encouraged as a viable solution;

Whenever it is compatible with the policy of the government of the country of asylum, not only from an economic and social point of view, but also with respect

20 Details are contained in Tanzania-reformulation of Kigoma project, UNHCR ref: 81/AP/LS/TAN/MAP, unpublished.
for international relations (Recommendation 8, Af.ref. Conf. 1967 p.106).

It should be accompanied by material support from the agencies. However, the conference strongly advocated the preferred solution of organized (systematic) land settlement, located away from the border to reduce tensions. Organized settlement was defined as:

A deliberate and coherent package of administrative and technical measures whereby a group of refugees is enabled to settle on land, usually in an uninhabited or sparsely-populated area, with a view to creating new self-supporting rural communities that ultimately will form part of the economic and social system of the area (Af. ref. conf. 1967, p.15).

The use of foreign Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) as implementing agencies was also advocated, and was legitimized with the pretext that there was a general shortage of African administrative and technical staff skilled in development. Such an agency should be of 'neutral character', guaranteeing a non-partisan, non-political approach to the refugee problem (Recommendation 8, Af. ref. Conf. 1967). This proposal deprived African states of any significant control over the international aid policy. Funds from western donors have to be channelled through inter-governmental or international voluntary agencies which assume the primary responsibility for implementing aid programmes in the field. Barbara Harrell-Bond et al (1988) contend that the approach which gives external agencies control over the administration of funds is legitimized on the basis that African states lack the administrative capacity to cope with a disaster and that emergency programmes are particularly prone to financial mismanagement
- a euphemism for the perception that all 'Third World governments are corrupt' (Harrell-Bond et al 1988, p.5).

In Tanzania, the experience has led to the dominance after 1964/5 of the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), through its local agent, the Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service (TCRS). A premise was set which persists until today, whereby external aid was conceived as fundamental to the success of any refugee project. A series of tripartite agreements between the Tanzanian government, UNHCR and LWF/TCRS were instituted to cover the establishment of all nine major refugee projects in the country21 (Table 5.2 and Appendix A).

It is generally the case that during the initial period of a refugee influx, local voluntary agencies such as the Tanzania Red Cross provide basic necessities like food and clothing. It is only after the signing of a tripartite agreement that the refugees become an international problem, and are supplied with food, medicine and transport through the United Nations agencies such as the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations International Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF) under the co-ordination of UNHCR. The terms of the agreement normally require the government to provide the land, an officer to take charge of the settlement, basic tools and cooking equipment, and to allow duty-free importation of goods. LWF/TCRS's role is to register refugees and provide the staff, plus educational,

medical, social and agricultural services. UNHCR arranges for the movement of the refugees, finances the project and provides liaison between the partners.

Gasarasi (1984) has written extensively on the partnership, attributing its success to the burden-sharing of assistance by the partners, and recommends its imitation by other countries, because of the advantage of 'deploying a single agency's accumulated experience' and the 'harmonising and rationalizing aspect of project planning and implementation that is accrued with experience' (Gasarasi 1987, p.112). While the Tanzanian situation contrasts favourably with that in the Sudan where a plethora of agencies vie for projects, TCRS has a virtual monopoly over resources allocated for refugees, and exhibits a protectionist attitude where other agencies are concerned. This monopoly ensures that they have considerable power over some government officials and the refugees in their care.

Integrated zonal development: a further solution

The 1967 conference also recommended the promotion of zonal integrated development schemes, which would enable the integration of refugee communities into the social and economic structure of the host society. Both the refugee community and the local population would therefore, share in the benefits accruing from the new financial investments in the area, thus avoiding friction between the two groups. Integrated zonal development is in fact a development strategy propounded by the modernization school. It refers to the implementation of 'multi-sectoral development
projects’, aimed at ‘strengthening infrastructural projects and services in education, training, health and agriculture’ (Betts 1984, p.13).

In the Tanzanian context, integrated rural development is one of the regional development strategies adopted for nationals (Kleemeier 1984). This approach was first proposed for the settlement of Banyarwanda at Mwesi in 1966. The objective was to develop subsistence cultivation on 100,000 acres of Mwesi highlands; the refugees would participate in a pilot scheme of 300 small holdings on 10,000 acres, of which 150 would be refugee families and 50 nationals (OXFAM 1968). The project was abandoned despite an eight-month feasibility study by the Agricultural Development Service of the World Bank. At the time of its proposal, the Tanzanian leadership and the main political party were rethinking their approach to rural development. New strategies like Ujamaa and communal production were being introduced. Oxfam, which provided the capital for the feasibility study, refers to the government’s lukewarm approach to the project, and reluctance towards encouraging the economic and social betterment of the refugee. UNHCR was also unwilling to be involved in the plan, unless there was inter-agency cooperation. The Director of the African Division saw the plan as purely agricultural, and therefore

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22 This approach to rural development will be discussed further in Chapter 5 in relation to the Barundi refugee settlements.

23 Expressed in a letter to Oxfam, Oxford, from the Field Director, East Africa. 22 March 1968, Oxfam archives, Oxford.
outside UNHCR's concern. LWF/TCRS were willing to act as the managing agency.

Similar rural development projects were unsuccessfully carried out in the 1960s for Banyarwanda refugees in the Cankuzo-Mosso area of Burundi, funded by UNDP/FAO/ILO, and implemented by UNHCR/AIDR (Betts 1984). Plagued with high capitalization, out-migration, and administrative problems, the Burundi government wanted the project extended to cover a larger population, and the UN were afraid of centralized state control (Van der Meeren 1970).

Donors were unwilling to initiate projects on zonal integrated development in the 1970s, due to the worldwide economic crisis, and in the Tanzanian case, to the high capital outlay and widespread failure of such schemes. UNHCR emphasized the 'non-operational' component of its statute, which excludes its direct involvement in development activities. Yet UNHCR's implementing agency, LWF/TCRS, has always been keen to get involved in what Brian Neldner described as a 'general development programme'.

It was not until the early 1980s that zonal integration as a refugee policy was rejuvenated (Betts 1984). UNHCR and the donors, in trying to avoid long-term maintenance of refugees on schemes, revived the discourse on integration into the host society. Having discovered the capital-intensive nature of schemes, the donors promoted the

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24 Letter from G. Jaeger, Director, Africa Division & Asia Division (UNHCR) to acting Resident in Tanzania (MA/TAN/GEN 1/3/12/TAN/69/LS/TAN 4), dated 28 August 1968. Jaeger quotes UNHCR representative at the conference in 1968: 'We do not perpetuate our presence, we move in, solve the problem and then pull out.'

25 Telex from LWF, Geneva to TCRS, Dar es Salaam, dated 3 June 1975, TCRS archives.
proliferation of the concept of 'self-sufficiency' in refugee literature/terminology. At the same time, the notion of the 'dependency syndrome' was promulgated. Lance Clark (1986) describes refugee dependency syndrome:

As a term used by non-refugees, by those in the international assistance system and by host and donor country officials, to describe the personality characteristics of refugees. Refugees are often described as unmotivated, lacking in initiative, as being unappreciative of the kind of assistance given, to them, looking to others to solve their problems (Clark, Refugee Magazine, May 1986, p.35).

Refugees were said to be over-reliant on the donors, and especially on donated food. Sydney Waldron's (1987) article, entitled 'Blaming the refugee', tried to explain the origin of this stereotype by applying the concept of the 'total institution' to understand the structures of administration of camps/settlements and to provide insights into the management and perception of expatriate bureaucrats, from whom such negative statements about refugees originate. Waldron concludes that refugee settlements;

are institutionally structured residential populations which are ruled from top down. Life is planned and scheduled by those in control of the basic resources of the population; the domain of the residential community is coincident with the domain of control; and the boundaries of social and economic action are formally circumscribed....[therefore], the common denominator of refugee behaviour is learned or spontaneously developed in situ as involuntary migrants become exposed upon entry to the social, psychological and economic order of the refugee camp... [thus] the tendency to stereotype 'inmates'... results from a repetitive handling of a mass number of 'cases', where individual differences are hidden and the commonality which produces stereotypes derives from the bureaucratically derived definition which structures role behaviour between 'staff' and 'inmate' (Waldron 1987, pp. 2-3).

The persistence of aid to refugees in Tanzania has also been attributed to the presence of 'dependency' among the
refugee population. This stereotype is in contrast to that of the hardworking, industrious refugees, which is used at the same time to describe refugees, particularly the Barundi. Furthermore, there are significant qualitative and quantitative differences between the aid requested by settlers and that provided by the donors. Recent requests for a secondary school by Barundi refugees have been ignored, while aid has been made available for the construction of twelve community development centres. The whole process of applying for aid is complex, and is at the discretion of the Tanzanian state. Aid applications have to be approved, processed and formally requested by the Ministry of Home Affairs. In most instances, the Tanzanian state actually lacks this power as the donors autonomously select their own projects, and seek only final approval from the government. Individual appeals from refugees are rarely considered, except in the early years of the settlements, when, for example, applications to UNHCR/TCRS for roofing materials for churches were approved. Subsequent requests from church leaders have been declined by LWF/TCRS.26

Concurrent with the development of ideas about integration, African governments reinforced their call for further assistance to cope with the rapidly increasing number of refugees. In 1979 an African-inspired conference was convened in Arusha, Tanzania, to address this issue. African states noting the disparity between the levels of

26 The Building Engineer, Katumba informed me that it was because TCRS would have to use foreign exchange to import the materials, and the refugees could only repay in local currency, which TCRS already had in surplus (Interview, January 1987).
assistance to Asia and Africa, demanded more aid, while at the same time making some concessions on human rights, detention, imprisonment and forced repatriation. Burden-sharing among African states, as espoused in the 1967 conference failed to materialize.

The notion of 'burden-sharing' was originally used by the OAU to encourage member countries with few refugees to assist those with a large refugee population. By the late 1970s, as a reaction to their restrictive immigration policies, western countries began to promote African-based solutions to the African refugee problem. African states have insisted that the West share the burden by providing material assistance. Their position was succinctly put by President Nyerere in 1983.

We recognize that Africa’s refugees are primarily an African problem and responsibility. Yet we have no false modesty which requires us to reject outside help. Indeed we feel that we have some right to claim it. Quite apart from the common humanity of mankind, there can be few refugee situations in Africa which have not been in some way worsened by the political, commercial, or military activities of more powerful and wealthy nations in the world (Nyerere 1983 p.8).27

Thus by 1987, Barry Stein could define the concept of burden-sharing as 'international assistance given to a heavily burdened refugee asylum country to lighten its load' (Stein 1987, p.48).

UNHCR responded with The First International Conference on Assistance to African Refugees (ICARA I) in 1981 and ICARA II in 1984. The former was, according to the

27 President J.K. Nyerere, Speech at Geneva, 3 October 1983, when receiving the Nansen medal for services to the cause of refugees. Nansen was the Commissioner for refugees in the League of Nations, the forerunner of UNHCR, following the First World War. He introduced the concept of travel documents for refugees.
organizers, to draw public attention to the scale of the refugee problem in Africa. ICARA II was primarily concerned with the impact of refugees on the host communities and with creating practical links between assistance and [infrastructural] development, which would constitute what UNHCR described as a 'new and important concept' (Refugee Magazine, May 1984). As shown earlier, the idea of linking refugee aid with development dates back to the 1967 conference, in addition to the 'durable' solutions. In the context of ICARA II,

A durable solution means helping the refugees to become self-sufficient, and enabling them to integrate and participate fully in the social and economic life of their new country or of their homelands, if they repatriate (Stein 1987, p.48).

ICARA II was an attempt to get other UN bodies; FAO, ILO, UNDP, UNFP, to participate in development-related refugee assistance. Betts (1984) outlines some of the planning procedures for such forms of assistance. Although suggesting that such projects should be integrated into national and local development plans, he conceives that they would often mean a revision of the government's rural development approaches within the affected area. This is at variance with the proposal of the 1967 conference where the plans were to be drawn up and executed by host governments. In practice, UNHCR not only provide the financial assistance, but is influential in the selection and execution of the plans. Pierre Coat outlines UNHCR'S policy:

28 Durable solutions refer to the three suggested in the recommendations of the 1967 conference, voluntary repatriation, resettlement in a second country of asylum or systematic land settlement in the first country of asylum.
Clearly the host country enjoyed full sovereignty and UNHCR would not impose the settlement site, but to what extent should it resist a bad choice? UNHCR should avoid placing itself in a position of confrontation and should negotiate and insist on independent technical advice. Should that fail, UNHCR should refuse to sponsor such projects while promoting other alternatives (Coat 1978, quoted in Betts 1984, p.14).

Betts (1984) also advocated the use of 'neutral' implementing agencies as opposed to government ministries, in order to overcome problems arising from changes in government. Clearly both the above proposals have implications for sovereignty, and reflect the weak and ineffectual character of the neo-colonial African state.

Fourteen African countries submitted projects for funding to ICARA II. Tanzania had eight such projects (Appendix B). Not surprisingly, those projects for which aid has been forthcoming are confined to activities within the existing settlements, and do not involve the local people. They include improvements of water supply, construction of rural development and community centres at Katumba, Ulyankulu, Kigwa and Pangale settlements, and rural (marketing) co-operatives at Katumba. UNHCR suggests that the Tanzanian government is not particularly interested in refugee development projects which extend to nationals, since they believe their own development plans are adequate.29

In the Tanzanian context, polemics on integration pervade the donor and agency literature on the settlements. Only the Banyarwanda refugees have been fully integrated into Tanzanian society by acquiring citizenship; they have

29 Interview with UNHCR representative, Dar es Salaam office, August 1987.
achieved those political and civil rights available to nationals. For other refugee groups, integration refers to their economic incorporation into the capitalist economic system as direct producers or wage labourers. No other aspect of this multi-faceted term has been given serious consideration, while restrictions on movement and political participation prevent refugees who pay tax from having any part in activities central to their existence. In fact, there has been no change in Tanzania's policy since the 1960s. Holborn (1975) quotes a government statement in 1967 which points out:

The policy of the Tanzanian government is not directed so much towards the immediate integration of refugees amongst the local population, but towards their integration through the establishment of rural settlements for refugees (p.1150).

The Tanzanian state has accommodated the policy of organized rural settlements, since it serves its purpose of containment and is in accordance with donor requirements/policy as outlined in the 1967 conference. At the same time, refugees provide a valuable labour source for commodity production in previously under-exploited rural areas. This mode of thought was succinctly put by the Minister for Home Affairs, as follows: 'Our aim is to make refugee settlements keep the same pace or even be slightly ahead of our own villages in terms of attaining rural development goals.'

30 Opening address by the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Mr J.M.M. Matiko to workshop on Managing rural settlements for refugees in Africa. Arusha, September 1981.
Conclusion

In the rapidly expanding fora for debates on refugee issues, numerous nomenclatures abound, their meanings dependent solely on the interpretations placed on them by donors, host states and humanitarian agencies. Such terminologies are often manipulated to suit the political persuasion of these organizations, and should be treated with caution - as conveyed in my approach in seeking a definition of the refugee, and in analysing the conceptual framework within which African refugees are considered.

That a 'political refugee' has to satisfy the requirements of three interested parties - the United Nations, the OAU and the Tanzanian state, is mere semantics. As this chapter has shown, international organizations have not only been dominant at the monetary level, but also at the conceptual. Forced migrants in Africa today are bound by law and legislation which often arise beyond the boundaries of the continent and totally outside their immediate control. Forced migrants or refugees are caught up in terminologies which exist essentially to de-mobilize a politically threatening force, and to harness their productive capacity.

The refugee law and policy of a host state, such as Tanzania, is based on obtaining maximum control over the refugee population. The following chapters look at how this has been insidiously translated into the adoption of land settlement (the settlement scheme approach) for those,

\[31\] UNHCR has recently published a refugee Thesaurus in order to standardize the language used in refugee discourse.
particularly the Barundi, forced to seek refuge in Tanzanian territory.
CHAPTER FOUR

BARUNDI MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES: ARRIVAL IN WESTERN TANZANIA

Introduction

The spatial distribution of refugees in Tanzania tends to alternate between the country's western and southern frontiers.¹ The latter, during the 1960s and 1970s, was the scene of an influx of 45,000 Mozambican refugees, who were settled in five refugee camps in the southern regions of Lindi and Ruvuma. When most were repatriated in 1974, after Mozambique gained its independence, the zone of concentration shifted to the western regions which shared a common border with Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Zaire and Zambia² (Figure 2). From the 1950s internal conflicts within four of these neighbouring states have periodically forced a considerable number of refugees to seek sanctuary in Tanzania. By 1987, about 90 percent of Tanzania's refugees were concentrated in the regions of Kigoma, Tabora and Rukwa (Table 4.1).³ These regions which for the purpose of

¹ The name Tanganyika will be used for the period up to 1964, when after the union with Zanzibar the country changed its name to Tanzania.
² More recently in 1987, attacks on civilians by the South African backed RENAMO have caused thousands of Mozambicans once again to move into Southern Tanzania. In 1988 UNHCR estimated that they amounted to 72,000 people.
³ I have excluded Kagera (formerly West Lake) region which was the home of 30,000 Banyarwanda refugees. Since 1981, many have had the opportunity to apply for Tanzanian citizenship, and have therefore lost their refugee status. Some refugees from Uganda have since 1982 settled in the region. Nevertheless, it is beyond the scope of this thesis in its historical or contemporary analyses to cover Western Tanzania in its entirety; consequently emphasis will be placed on those regions or districts containing Barundi refugees.
Table 4.1

Distribution of census population and refugee population in Western Tanzania 1978-79.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kigoma R.</td>
<td>648,941</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>870,500</td>
<td>28,300*</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasulu</td>
<td>255,649</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>342,400</td>
<td>7,700*</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kibondo</td>
<td>139,991</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>787,000</td>
<td>12,000*</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kigoma</td>
<td>253,301</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>339,200</td>
<td>8,700*</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tabora R.</td>
<td>818,049</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>1,067,000</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urambo</td>
<td>141,104</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>171,000</td>
<td>28,998</td>
<td>_</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nzega</td>
<td>255,027</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igunga</td>
<td>189,486</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tabora</td>
<td>187,063</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rukwa R.</td>
<td>451,897</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>642,500</td>
<td>101,442</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpanda</td>
<td>146,32</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>233,200</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumbawanga</td>
<td>194,5</td>
<td>11.32</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nkansi</td>
<td>82,01</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpanda Town</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>32,800</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* estimates

1978 Census data at the national annual growth rate of 3.3 percent.
1987 Census of the refugee population in settlements (UNHCR, Geneva)
this chapter are known collectively as Western Tanzania or Western Province when referring to the British colonial period, have received refugees from Zaire (1964-), Rwanda (1959-64), Burundi (1972-) and Uganda (1971-1985), amounting to an estimated 200,500 people. With the exception of a small number of repatriated Zaireans and Ugandans most have remained in this zone since arrival. Following the organized rural settlement policy of the 1970s, Barundi refugees became concentrated in Rukwa region, comprising in 1987 an estimated 15.7 percent of the region’s population, located mainly in Mpanda district, where together with other refugee groups they constitute 43 percent of its population (Table 4.1).^4

Western Tanzania, due to certain ecological and demographic features, was in the pre-colonial era a haven for refugee-seekers and pioneer settlers. However, it emerged from the colonial period as a backward, underdeveloped area relative to other parts of the country. The cumulative effect of its integration into the world capitalist system was a massive reduction in its population and a stagnation of its economy, as Africans were coerced into labour migration, became subjected to forced labour, and succumbed to new diseases. The zone took on the character of a labour reserve, supplying labour to the more accessible coastal and northern plantation sectors. Its peripheral position persisted into the independence period, owing to entrenched regional differentiation and the operation of economic policies which perpetuated underdevelopment. As part of its

^4 Mpanda district and its region, Rukwa, will be given more emphasis in this treatment of Western Tanzania.
rural development strategy, the independent state discouraged labour migration, and adopted policies aimed at intensifying commodity production within the dominant peasant domestic unit. Although the zone has a plentiful supply of underutilized land, immediate economic benefits were hindered by the extensive areas of low population density and enormous ecological constraints (Figure 2b).

This chapter addresses those features of Western Tanzania which are pertinent to an understanding of its relatively low population, and its underdeveloped character which combine to make the zone an attractive area for state and donor-sponsored settlement of refugees. Later, links are drawn between the in-migration and settlement of Barundi refugees, and the Barundi people's role in the social and economic history of the region and the country at large, through an analysis of their involvement in earlier migrant labour flows and settler populations. Finally this chapter presents a survey of the arrival and spatial distribution of the post-1960 refugee waves into what is essentially a zone of influx, placing the Barundi refugees in a broader historical and regional context.

Demographic features

The main features of the demography of Western Tanzania have been the unevenness of its population distribution, its low population density and its relative de-population during the colonial period. It is difficult to get a distinct picture of the population size before the 1948 census. Although demographic data were available from 1913, their
reliability has been questioned, as district officers and missionaries, acting as enumerators, were prone to overestimation, when using expected sex ratios and tax registers to determine total population size. The difficulties in assessing population were aggravated by the sparsely dispersed population in areas like Mpanda district. Frequent re-organization of administrative units at the district level created further problems. For example, Mpanda district, formed in 1946 from areas in Ufipa, Tabora and Kigoma districts, was as an administrative unit included in Kigoma and Tabora regions before becoming part of the newly formed Rukwa region in 1973.

Kuczynski (1949), the colonial demographer, noted significant discrepancies in the recorded numbers of people in different parts of Tanganyika from the 1910s to the 1930s. The 1931 census, which was regarded by Kuczynski as reasonably accurate, gave Western Province a total population of 846,778 in 102,900 square miles, with an overall density of 8.2 per sq. mile, much lower than that of Eastern (20.3), Lake (32.0) or Tanga (32.0) Provinces. Colonial anthropologists and missionaries were, in the early part of the twentieth century, classifying Africans into ethnic groups (tribes). Estimations of the size of these groups and their location can provide a base for deducing the actual population distribution within the zone. The 1948 census provided probably the first most reliable

5 See East African Statistical Dept. Census of the Native population 1931 pp.11-13. In Gillman’s (1936), population map of Tanganyika, apart from the Uha and Nzega districts, most of Western Tanganyika was considered to have widely scattered settlements or was virtually uninhabited.
comprehensive provincial data on ethnic groups, even though Hirst (1970) suggests that there was under-enumeration in the 1948 census of between 1.9-3.6 percent.

The largest ethnic groups were the Waha (286,112), and the Wafipa (78,252), inhabiting the environmentally hospitable highland areas of Kigoma and Sumbawanga respectively, and the Wanyamwesi (362,829) in most of Tabora region. Between the main ethnic groups were a number of scattered numerically small communities living mainly in the area immediately east of Lake Tanganyika and in the plains of Lake Rukwa. In the area of Mpanda district, the ethnic groups were described as Wavinza (3,593), Watongwe (8,513), Baholoholo or Basowa (4,410), Wabende (4,700), Wapimbwe (6,192), Wakonongo (10,444), Warungwa (5,372) and Wamambwe (13,111) (East African Stats. Dept. 1950). Western Province then had a total ethnic population of 946,234.

Kuczynski argued that considerable reductions had occurred in the population between 1913 and 1925 other than those related to statistical errors. The European misconception that colonial rule halted population decline and created stable conditions for an increase in population was disputed by Kuczynski (1949) and later Kjekshus (1977), both supporting the hypothesis that the slave trade and internecine warfare had a minimal impact on population. Alternatively, Kuczynski wrote; 'There is no evidence that population decreases essentially in the decades preceding the advent of the British... There can, however, be no doubt

6 I have excluded the smaller ethnic groups in the Northern districts of Tabora and Kigoma regions.
that the population in 1895-1920 was decreasing’ (Kuczynski 1949, II: 122-123, quoted in Kjekshus 1977, p.17).

Using the 1921 and 1931 census as relatively accurate counts, one can deduce that within the decade Ufipa’s population had actually decreased from 93,600 to 78,501. Unlike the northern and coastal parts of Tanganyika, Western province was relatively under-populated; Ufipa which now covers most of Rukwa region, had a 1948 population density of 12 per sq. mile. By 1967 it had declined to eleven. Tabora region’s population density, in 1948, was 3.1 per square mile, with the least-populated area being Mpanda district with 0.8 per square mile. Kigoma region, although having some sparsely-populated areas, had an overall density of nine per square mile.

It was not until the 1960s that the population of these regions showed a marked increase, although not significant enough to alter the pattern of decades of stagnation. Table 4.1 shows the uneven distribution of population in today’s regions. The greatest densities in 1987 are still found in the former Ufipa, Buha, and Unyamwesi areas now Sumbawanga, Kigoma and Tabora regions respectively. Mpanda district continues to have a relatively low density (1.3 per sq. km. (1960), 3.2 per sq. km. (1978), even though there was a rapid increase in its population during the 1950’s. This is attributed to net migration following the discovery of minerals and the development of associated economic activities. Hirst (1970) noted that Mpanda had the highest percentage increase in the territory - 32.5 percent between the years 1948-57, at an annual growth rate of 3.2 percent.
Between the intercensal years 1957 and 1967, the annual growth rate had slowed to 1.9 percent. In 1967 Mpanda district was said to have a population of 60,803, a percentage increase of 34.6 between 1957-67 (Henin & Egero 1971). Mpanda town, which began in the 1940s as a trading post, had an African population of 4,250 in 1948 and by 1967, 24,000 inhabitants.

At this juncture it is necessary to try to account for the population decrease experienced by Western Province, and its failure to attract immigrants before the mid-1960s. The colonial administrators attributed the low population density to endemic diseases and inhospitable environments, noting the prevalence of the tsetse fly and its accompanying cattle and human diseases, throughout the province, and the extensive coverage of bush. John Iliffe (1970) also commented:

The peripheral areas experienced stagnation or involution. One form of this was depopulation. Parts of Tabora and Kigoma regions, for example, seem to have entered a vicious circle of labour migration and the expansion of the tsetse fly, the absence of the men reducing the labour available to clear the bush and thereby allowing the fly to advance and make the area totally uninhabitable (Iliffe 1971, p.32).

A consideration of the physical features/ecology of the zone might highlight the exact role they have played in affecting aspects of demography.

**Ecological and physical Features**

The distribution of population in Tanzania is partly related to altitude, topography, soil fertility and rainfall. Western Tanzania is bounded by the Malagarasi river to the north-west, which forms the border with
Burundi; to the west by Lake Tanganyika and Zaire; and to the south-west by the Zambian border. Lying within the East African rift-valley system it contains a mixture of north-east - south-west trending highland areas of between 1,500- to 2,300 metres. To the east of the highlands is the western extension of the Tanzanian central plateau covering most of Tabora region. The highland zones and the plateau tends, throughout the northern areas, to create two distinct ecological areas separated by a transition zone.

The heavily-populated highland zone in Kigoma region is associated with the Waha ethnic group. It extends southwards, parallel to Lake Tanganyika, at an altitude of between 1,500 and 2,300 m. South of Kigoma town it becomes sparsely-populated with most of the inhabitants residing close to the Mpanda to Kigoma road. Further south, in Mpanda district, it forms the Mwesi highland area. At elevations above 1500 metres, it is a series of gently-rolling hills with good, reliable rainfall. Between Lake Rukwa and Lake Tanganyika is the southernmost extension of the highland area, known as the Ufipa plateau in Sumbawanga; with an average altitude of 1700m, it reaches a maximum of 2461 metres at Malonje, producing an undulating landscape with moderate rainfall, and a good mixture of soils (Univ. Dar es Salaam, IRA 1984). Its history of high population density and craft industries have helped to explain the clearance of much of the area's woodland cover. Soil types are well-drained dark-red to reddish brown sandy clay loams. Vegetation is predominantly grassland and because it is
above the tsetse fly zone, a mixed economy of cattle integrated with cultivation is practised.

The western extension of the central plateau covers most of Tabora region and Mpanda district. It has an average altitude of 1,100m. The landscape is a mixture of gently-undulating hills, with well-drained sandy-clay loam soils on the upper slopes and dark-grey and black clays in the depressions. Apart from a few closely-settled pockets, the major part of the central plateau is relatively empty miombo woodland, infested with tsetse flies. Most of the miombo woodland is designated as forest reserves. In small pockets free from tsetse, slash and burn subsistence agriculture dominates, with the emphasis on staple crops like sorghum, cassava, maize and beans. Honey-collecting is also a major activity. Around Lake Tanganyika is a long strip of narrow coastal plain bordered by steep, rocky slopes. The alluvial soils on the plain are suitable for crops. Lake Rukwa valley is an extensive area of swampy lacustrine flats with fairly low density population. Although it is suitable for a variety of farm types, the presence of the tsetse limits it immediate potential. Between the highland zone and the central plateau is an intermediate zone which ranges from 1000m to 1200m. Soils are moderately fertile. However the settlement pattern is dispersed due to the presence of tsetse flies. Part of Mpanda district containing the settlements fall into this zone.

Miombo is a single-storey woodland with a light closed canopy, dominated by trees of the Genera Brachystega type and Julbernardia type, which may vary in height from 4 metres to about 15 metres. There are a few scattered shrubs under the canopy (Mansfield et al 1976, quoted in King (1977) p.3-4).
Western Tanzania has two distinct seasons, one dry and one rainy with the latter falling between mid-November and mid-May, and with the average annual rainfall ranging from 1000-1600 mm in the highland zones to 1000-1300 mm in the miombo zone and an exceptional low of 500-900 mm in the Rukwa valley.

**Tsetse and Sleeping Sickness**

From the above discussion of the physical features, it is clear that the distribution of population within the zone is strongly influenced by the presence of the tsetse fly which tends to be prevalent in the miombo woodlands. The highlands, therefore, offer more favourable conditions for a mixed economy and protection from trypanosomiasis and other diseases, for example malaria. In 1955 about 20,000 sq. km. of Western Province was estimated to be covered by miombo woodland and 60 percent of the land area infested by tsetse (Hill 1955). Woodland occupied 80 percent of Rukwa region in 1981, in contrast to the 12 percent covered by grasslands.

Instead of a linear relationship between the presence of the fly and population decrease or concentration, an inverse situation may have occurred in Western Tanzania, where reductions in population and changes in its spatial organization may have aggravated the incidence of the fly, and the growth of the forest. As early as 1936, Gillman had stated:

There can be no doubt that against an extending or stationary human population dense enough to keep down the harbouring vegetation, the fly has no chance of surviving. On the other hand, where human pressure relaxes and a suitable secondary vegetation is allowed to capture or re-capture the land, the fly immediately
follows in its wake. We must divorce ourselves from the view, still widely held that the fly drives man away. It is man who recedes generally after having exhausted soil and shallow underground water, and leaves the wasteland to the tsetse (p.354).

There is sufficient historical evidence to suggest a smaller area of fly domination and forest reserves in the pre-colonial period, and by definition the presence of a larger, more dispersed population. Kjekshus (1977) cites travelogues of the explorers Burton and Speke which document the existence of extensive cattle/crop complexes in Ufipa, Uha, Unyamwezi, and Ukimbu in the mid-nineteenth century. In the 1870s, it was possible to move cattle from Tabora to Karema on the lake Tanganyika coast without fear of the fly (Kjekshus 1977, p.64). Kjekshus links the spread of the tsetse and the re-generation of the forest to the removal of people to form Katavi, Ugalla and Lake Rukwa game reserves in the 1930s. Extension of Lake Rukwa game reserve in 1937 enclosed 10,000 people ensuring a constant battle between people and wildlife (Kjekshus 1977, p.78, 177). The rinderpest outbreak of the 1890s was responsible for the decimation of cattle in the province, enabling the spread of the tsetse as people retreated to more agriculturally-amenable areas. The Provincial Commissioner in 1932 reported the collapse of the cattle trade in Tabora and Kigoma regions. Most of Western Province, south of Kigoma and Tabora town was described as:

A wilderness of 10,000 square miles of fly-infested bush containing scattered inhabitants at the rate of a family to every three square miles. There are four native administrations of which only the smallest, based on the settlement around Karema mission, is worth much. The others Tongwe, Baholoholo, and Ubende, always backward, have made no progress. Owing to the lack of communications, they can be visited only on foot, and the
people are so scattered that during a long tour it is impossible to see more than a fraction of them. The innumerable petty headmen have little control, and cannot assemble more than a few people at any centre, no matter what notice is given... eventually the tribes will disappear. There is only one remedy, but only one! (Western Prov. Annual report, 1932, p.16-17).

The remedy was the forced movement of people into sleeping sickness concentrations. The colonial authorities, following the Swynnerton survey of 1926, thought they could control the disease by reducing human contact with the flies. Concentrations were therefore surrounded by a 1000 yard sanitation zone. 14.5 percent of the population of Tabora district, 12.5 percent of Uha’s and 10.5 percent of Ufipa’s were resettled (Tambila 1981). In Mpanda district from 1926, about 24,000 people were concentrated in the main settlement of Inyonga, Uruwira, Rungwa, Mpimbwe, Ilunde, Usevya, Mamba and Manga (Tambila 1981, p.243). Tambila also notes that to avoid the settlements many people voluntarily relocated themselves close to the European mission at Karema, which was on the edge of the fly zone. In Tabora region, concentrations were predominantly in Tabora, Kahama, and Nzega districts. Kjekshus provides entomological evidence to show how the concentration of people, rather than reducing the spread of the fly and halting the spread of the disease, acted only to aggravate them. He concluded ‘besides keeping much land uncultivated and ungrazed, the removal of the population turned vast tracts of land over to the inevitable invasion of bush, wildlife and tsetse, causing in a number of instances, a need for second and third concentrations to be undertaken’ (Kjekshus 1977).

8 See also McHenry (1979), for details of concentrations for the territory, 1920s-1940s, p.25.
p.172). In fact sleeping sickness concentrations accrued more benefits to the colonial state than to the Africans they were intended to protect.

Towards the end of the British period, population concentration had clearly taken on a developmental rationale. Health reasons continued to be quoted when people were forcefully being moved, but assorted other motives such as administrative expediency, labour recruitment, soil preservation, and game concentration explain why the concentration measures retained their popularity among administrators. Throughout the 1940s, therefore, the concentration measure was positively advocated as an administrative device to be pursued for reasons of ‘development’ (Kjekshus 1977, p.178).

Chachage (1987) also contends that sleeping sickness concentration was essentially a pretext for facilitating the collection of taxes, which along with the visibility of more consumer goods, forced young men into labour migration.

There is evidence to suggest that the incidence of trypanosomiasis caused as many deaths as the diseases newly-introduced to the area. Thousands of people perished in the 1939-1943 outbreak of cerebro-spinal meningitis in Western Province (Western Province, Annual Reports 1939-45). About 2300 cases were reported annually with a mortality rate of about 18 percent (Kuczynski 1945). The influenza epidemic of 1918-19 which caused the deaths of 50,000-80,000 in Tanganyika, may have had some impact in the Province. Certainly venereal diseases such as only gonnorhoea caused whole villages to become sterile. A quarter of the male population of Tongwe and Baholoholo was, in 1934, reported to be suffering from venereal diseases and an estimated 46 percent of the married men were childless (Western Prov. Annual Report 1934). Kuczynski noted a particularly severe outbreak in Ufipa during the 1940s. Kuczynski referred to
the Assistant Political Officer whose data on Ufipa showed that 'the average number of wives per man was 2.5, the number of children born per wife was 3.42' (p.392). Of these 48.2 percent survived, i.e., grew up. Reduced fertility and high infant mortality rates had a serious effect on population size. The Wabende were, according to the colonial authorities, on the verge of extinction on account of 'the high death rate' (Kuczynski 1948 p.393). This correlates with the conventional model that sterility/ venereal diseases causes an increase in polygyny, and a decrease in fertility among women. Tambila also attributed the decrease in birth rate to the migration of young men, increase in concubinage/ polygyny and sterility among women.

By all accounts, the early twentieth century and more precisely the colonial period saw the decrease and spatial reorganization of the population in most areas of Western Tanzania. Furthermore, it represents an era where the local people lost control over the environment, and marked the beginning of the development of underdevelopment. Some scholars attribute the economic backwardness to direct colonial policies, including labour recruitment which accelerated de-population, taxation, conscription during the First World War and the destruction of traditional industry (Tambila 1981, Wayne 1975, Rodney 1983).

**Impact of colonial rule**

Western Province since the time of European colonization was integrated into the capitalist system as a supplier of wage labour to the plantations and mining
concerns of the territory. In the colonial economy its chief function was that of a labour reserve. While settler agriculture and peasant commodity production expanded in coastal and northern regions of Tanganyika territory, Western Province’s isolation from the main ports made it unprofitable to encourage export-activities (Orde-Browne 1946).

Walter Rodney (1983) clarifies this point when he writes that:

any portion of Tanganyika territory which was not the locus of large-scale capitalist investment or whose people did not generate local products for cash sale automatically became a labour reserve tied to an agro-industrial centre or occasionally to a mining centre or more infrequently still to a core of African cash crops (p.8).

In order to create the conditions for a large wage-labour force, the colonial administration had to destroy traditional societies. Through the policy of indirect rule, the British were able to penetrate African societies, by strengthening those sections of the traditional elite who supported them, and by replacing those who refused. The new chiefs provided a vehicle through which the colonial state could have greater control over the African population. Where the settlement pattern was dispersed the authorities tried to re-organize the population into nucleated settlements. Up to 1934, the Mpanda area was administered through the indirect rule of four native administrations, Tongwe, Baholoholo, Ubende and Uvinza. Due to the difficulty of controlling these administrations the colonial authorities amalgamated them under one leader. In 1934 the

9 For further accounts of this policy in Kigoma, see Wayne (1975).
Tongwe administration and Uvinza federations, comprising 17 independent chiefs and 3500 families were placed under a single chief, a Nyamwezi from Kahama, whose misuse of power forced the administration to dismiss him in 1936 (Western Province Annual Report 1934,1936).

Accounts of the pre-colonial economy highlight areas of flourishing mixed farming (Ufipa), fishing (around lakes Tanganyika, Rukwa and Ugalla River), and iron-smelting (Ufipa and Ukonongo), weaving (Rukwa valley) and salt mining at Uvinza. The provincial government nationalized the salt mines in 1922, after which it accumulated most of its revenue from salt sales. In 1927 Uvinza salt mine produced 4774 tons of salt worth £28,644 (Western Province, Annual Report, 1928). Iron-smelting and cotton-making were prohibited by the British in 1947, destroying the production of local hoes, as replacements made in England were introduced (Lemba 1975). Traditional trading of salt and cattle, encompassing the intralacustrine area, was broken once the salt mines were nationalized and the Belgians and the British established custom barriers.

Only half-hearted attempts were made to develop export crops, particularly during the depression. In the 1920s and 1930s experimentation with cotton in sleeping sickness settlements in Mpanda area and in Nzega and Kahama, as well as with coffee and groundnuts in Buha, all failed to develop commercially. So did the 1940s wheat and potatoes experiments in Ufipa. Cassava was the only colonial-promoted

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10 The salt mine was run by Nyanza Salt Mines Ltd, a company in which the government controlled 50 percent of the shares (Mines Dept. Annual Report, 1930).
food crop to be adopted successfully by local farmers, as it required little effort and could grow on less fertile land. Labour migration resulted in a shortage of labour in Ufipa particularly during the 'last three months of the year' - the beginning of the rainy season.

The economic potential of local resources became apparent as early as 1937 with the discovery of minerals: gold at Ukonongo; lead, copper, and silver at Uruwira. This resulted in a sudden reversal in colonial policy as the local infrastructure was improved, and attempts were made to attract local labour to the mines. In 1939 the first road in the area linking Uvinza to Mpanda mine was opened to transport the minerals, and a mineral line was completed in 1950, connecting the mine with the central railway line at Kaliua between Tabora and Uvinza. That year also saw the start of lead concentrate production, and in 1951 its export value amounted to over £400,000. In the same year, ore reserves were estimated by the consultant company of Southern Minerals Ltd at three million tons. Over one and a half million dollars were negotiated with the US government Defence Materials Procurement Agency to expand the plant capacity, and four different mining companies were operating in the mines (Hill 1955). However, the output from the mines did not reach the projected level, and the mines became uneconomic and were closed in the early 1960s. Unregulated gold mining has continued in the area by private prospectors.

The mining companies were Bushveld ltd, Uruwira Minerals ltd, Union Cooperation ltd and Central Mineral Exploration ltd.
The increased economic activities in the area led the colonial authorities in 1945 to establish a new administrative unit, Mpanda district, covering 17,400 sq. miles. During the 1940s the mines suffered from a shortage of labour, attracting not more than 1,000 workers. In 1948 Uruwira Minerals Ltd were granted a permit to recruit 100 labourers from Mambwe chiefdom, Ufipa, for work in Mpanda mine (Stubbings, Ufipa Annual Report 1948). Although the district officer acknowledged that men from the district worked for short spells in Mpanda mine, no actual figure was available. However, many of the local people had already established a tradition of migrating for work to the coastal sisal estates, so that a large proportion of the workers came from outside the area. In 1956 the ethnic composition of the Uruwira labour force was:

Table 4.2 Ethnic composition of Uruwira mine labour force 1956

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Number in mine Workforce</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Waha, Warundi, Wanyarwanda</td>
<td>824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavinza, Wakebwe, Washingo</td>
<td>824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wafipa</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wapimbwe, Warungwa, Wagongwe</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wawemba, Warungu, Wanambwe</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wabende, Wakonongo</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wagalla, Wanyamwezi</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total workforce 1,774

Source: Mpanda District book, TNR/ Rhodes House MF.42.

By 1958, Mpanda mines employed about 75 Europeans and between 15-16,000 African workers (Western Province Annual Report 1959). As a solution to this problem the colonial
state even sought to dissolve the sleeping sickness concentration in the Mpanda area to mobilize labour:

It appears that from an economic point of view and for the prosperity of the mine, such concentrations of population would be of great advantage to Messrs. Uruwira Minerals, both from the provision of local source of native-grown food and a nearby pool of casual labour (Letter 16.7.48, TNA 23892 II, from Director of Medical services to the Member for Agriculture and Natural resources, quoted in Kjekshus 1977, p.176).

Western Province as a Labour reserve

The development and promotion of settler plantation agriculture and the tolerance of African commodity production in the more accessible areas of the territory created a demand for labour which exceeded local supply. However, the potential local labour force was either small or unwilling to leave their traditional occupation, since the work on European plantations was arduous and poorly paid with unsatisfactory conditions of employment. The kipande system, whereby workers were allocated a series of tasks to complete within a specified period of time, before receiving payment, discouraged local workers. Recruits were penalized and subjected to fines, corporal punishment or imprisonment if they failed to complete their contracts. Under such terms of employment desertion was the most popular form of resistance employed by the workers.

Thus the colonial administration was faced with a major problem, how to secure labour from the peasantry, not just for agricultural concerns but for government construction programmes. As Orde-Browne explained:

Various attempts were therefore made to introduce governmental pressure in some form, so that to the self-sufficing life of the village should be added some
requirements which could only be met by work for an employer. This might take various forms ... a levy as a form of tax in kind, or a proportion of the able-bodied might be forced through their chiefs to go to work with private employers or heavy taxation might be imposed as a stimulus... or tribal obligations like marriages...(or even)... the desire for imported goods...(not forgetting) forced labour (which) was ...resorted to freely by almost all the various administrations (Orde-Browne 1933, p.29).

In 1926 the Tanganyika administration set up a labour department specifically to recruit labour for government work and for the estates, even though labour recruitment had begun as early as 1907 in Rukwa for work on caravans and in railway construction (Tambila 1981). The introduction of poll and hut taxes, which could only be paid in cash, linked with developments in transport, forced many workers to "sell themselves for wages". Taxation was used as the best method of securing labour. After the British took over Western Tanganyika from the Belgians in 1921, a poll tax was systematically collected. In Kigoma area the tax was fixed at six shillings in 1921, reduced to one shilling in 1922 and increased to six shillings in 1926/7. The difficulty of payment forced it down to four shillings in 1938 (Sago 1983). In the areas of Ubende and Tongwe, tax was four shillings in town and two shillings in rural areas in 1921/2, but was raised to eight shillings in 1928/9 (Tambila 1981). The increase in taxation between 1926/8 was such that a maximum number of people would seek work. Orde-Browne in 1933 stated that 'pressure by taxation provided forced labour in a much less obvious way than outright slavery' (Orde-Browne 1933 p.30). Forced labour for the construction of roads and administrative buildings also compelled many to opt for labour migration. Sago (1983) notes that in Buha
local chiefs were instrumental in persuading villagers to migrate. From the 1930s to the 1960s the Waha were among the most prominent migrant labour groups (Sago 1983, Rodney 1983). After the depression of the 1930s the colonial authorities saw only active labour recruiting as solving the problem of wage labour scarcity:

[Since] workers now in peasant agriculture will stick to it unless, conditions, such as drought or a collapse of prices, force them out of it, or the wage-paying industries offer them such terms as will attract them to abandon it (Western Prov. Annual Report 1935 p.1).

In 1936 the number of recruiters in the province was 21, even though attempts were made in the 1930s to limit their number to two main firms in order to halt the spread of sleeping sickness. Such was the need to earn wages that people travelled to other areas to be recruited (Tambila 1981).

Many of the labourers were on contracts of between 18 months and three years. One of the consequences of such long absences was that among the Wanyamwezi in 1934 there were about 10,000 adult women without husbands forming a distinct stratum in their ethnic group, known as "hawala" or concubines (Western Prov. Report 1934). In 1938, 26 percent of Kahama’s taxpayers - some 16,000 - were absent from their homes (Western Prov. Annual report 1938).

The formation of SILABU (Labour Bureau of the Tanganyika Sisal Growers Association) in 1944 and later the

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12 Government notice No.132 of 19 May 1933 permitted recruiting of up to 300 Wafipa and Waha monthly in Kigoma district, provided certain strict regulations regarding quarantine were fulfilled.

13 See Sago (1983) for details of recruitment in Western Province, especially on the total number of labourers recruited between 1928-1964 (p.67).
Labour Supply Corporation, signified a deliberate attempt to capture labour, especially 'distance labour'. Proposals by Orde-Browne in 1926 for the establishment of rest camps along the routes in order to supervise the labour were finally carried out in 1946. One was located in Kahama and another in Nzega district. By this time migrants from Ruanda-Urundi formed a significant component of local recruitment.

Pre-colonial migration from Burundi

Due to its proximity to the high density states of Rwanda and Burundi to the north and its separation by the lake from the Zairean kingdoms of Northern Zambia, Western Tanzania has traditionally been an area of in-migration or refuge. People from the present-day states of Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi have historically migrated into the area and have been incorporated into the history of the area. Barundi people were present in Western Tanzania long before the advent of labour migration.

Migrants of Tutsi or Tusi background were said to have originated from Rwanda and Burundi, migrated into Western Tanganyika over 200 years ago, and some eventually dominated the peoples of Buha, Uvinza and Ufipa between 1700 & 1921 (Wayne 1975). In the Kasulu and Kigoma districts of Kigoma region, the Tutsi hegemony survived the colonial period.

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14 The term 'distance labour' refers to labour migrants travelling long distances to the plantations, for example, from Western and Southern Tanzania, as well as Rwanda and Burundi.
being bolstered by the colonial state until 1962 when chieftainship was abolished by the newly-independent Tanganyika. This was to have favourable ramifications for the in-coming Wahutu refugees in 1972.\textsuperscript{16}

In Ufipa, the Tusi established circa 1850 the Twa dynasty, creating a centralized structure under a chief and numerous sub-chiefs. This chiefdom was later divided into two chiefdoms, Nkansi and Lyangile.\textsuperscript{17} The area without Tusi domination corresponded to the boundaries of Mpanda district, and its small fragmentary ethnic groups were said to have originated from the eastern side of Lake Tanganyika, especially from Ganza, Mulonge or Itana in Zaire. Their ruling clans were descendants of Congolese dynasties. Those settled around Karema and Utinta also migrated there in the nineteenth century from an area north of the Malagarasi River, possibly Burundi. Their chieftains also claimed to have descended from Burundi (Lamb 1948, Mpanda District Book).

During the colonial period Barundi peasants migrated to Tanganyika and settled among the dispersed Buha. Colonial officers had difficulty detecting the newcomers since they shared a common language and had similar physical features to the Waha. This made distinguishing between the people on

\textsuperscript{16} Ernest Maganya (1987) argues that the demise of the Tutsi aristocracy meant that the Wahutu refugees entering Kigoma area were well-received by the locals.  
\textsuperscript{17} Fr. Lemba (1975) provides most of the historical material on Rukwa region particularly the Sumbawanga area. Also Roy Willis (1981) A State in the Making: Myth, History and Social Transformation in pre-colonial Ufipa (Indiana University Press, Bloomington), and Marcia Wright (1975) Integration and Isolation: regional history south of Lake Rukwa to 1960, paper presented to University of Dar es Salaam, History Dept. Seminar, mimeo.
either side of the Malagarasi, Ruvubu and Kagera rivers virtually impossible. Families became divided by territorial boundaries after the border between the mandated territories of Ruanda-Urundi and Tanganyika was finally designated in 1922, however, interaction in the form of cross-border trade and marital unions persists up to today. To date, most of the Barundi refugee families living in Tanzania have non-refugee relations in Kigoma region. Trading networks also existed between Tanganyika and Burundi. The Waha traded Uvinza salt, which, until it was nationalized by the British in 1932, was exchanged for livestock, often cattle and goats which were much needed for dowry payments (Wayne 1975). In the post-colonial period, cross-border trade, legal and illegal, continues to dominate the economy of the region.

Labour migration from Burundi

Labour migration from Ruanda-Urundi during the 20th century was a direct response to the presence of the colonial state in Eastern and Central Africa. There was no scope for settler agricultural development in Ruanda-Urundi where all cultivable land was heavily-populated. Isolation in terms of distance from the world market, poor internal communication plus the tight control exerted over their subjects and the economies by the local rulers, hampered for a considerable period of time any attempt by the Belgians to develop a colonial cash economy. In contrast, neighbouring British territories had seen, during the period of German

18 This is exemplified in 1972, when the Tanzanian Member of Parliament for Manyovu-Kasulu got caught up in the conflict and was killed whilst visiting relations on the other side of the border (Daily News, May 1972).
colonization (1895-1918), development of settler plantation agriculture with sisal and coffee in Tanganyika and peasant cash crop production, cotton & coffee in Uganda and coffee in Tanganyika. British territories were generally sparsely-populated with labour tied to peasant agriculture. A survey by the U.N Trusteeship Council (1955) showed that the population density of Ruanda-Urundi was 81.2 per sq. Km., exceeding that of ‘all African territories under United Nations Trusteeship as well as neighbouring countries.’ In contrast, Tanganyika had a population density of 5 per sq. km.

From the 1920s ‘distance labour’ from Ruanda-Urundi contributed significantly to the labour market in Tanganyika, Uganda and the Belgian Congo. During the 1940s tea plantations in Kenya were requesting permission to recruit labour from Ruanda-Urundi (Orde-Browne 1946). By 1950 the Belgians estimated that over 675,000 migrants from Belgian territory were in Uganda and Tanganyika, of which 157,000 were in Tanganyika (UN Trusteeship Council 1946). However, the exact magnitude of the labour force migrating to Tanganyika was difficult to determine due to the uncontrolled nature of the flow and confusion with resident Barundi and Banyaruanda. As labour contractors were operating from the 1920s in the border regions, it is likely that the Barundi were among the first migrants.

The British, having divided the people of the territory into ethnic groups, then tried to distinguish between Tanganyikans and those from neighbouring territories. In
colonial documents, Africans from Ruanda-Urundi\textsuperscript{19} were described as Rundi, Banyaruanda or Ruanda. Knowing the class composition of Ruanda-Urundi, one can assume that the majority of them were Bahutu.\textsuperscript{20} In the 1948 census, Banyaruanda accounted for about 0.2 percent of the territory's total population, numbering 20,263 and Rundi were 1.2 percent or 90,312. In Kigoma district, the Rundi were the largest ethnic group, comprising about 28 percent of the population (16,831). They were generally scattered throughout the Northern and Western regions with a sizeable group of 5,833 in Tanga Province, testifying to their role as labour migrants. In the Baholoholo area of Mpanda district, 482 Rundi were recorded in 1948, 383 of whom were men and 99 women. These people might have been labour migrants working in the Mpanda mines. Between the 1948-1957 census years the Barundi recorded the highest percentage increase (35.3) of any group in Tanganyika. About 70 percent were recorded in Western Tanzania. According to the colonial authorities the Barundi had no defined tribal area and their rapid increase could be attributed to immigration from Ruanda-Urundi (East Afr. Stats. Dept. 1963). By 1967, after independence the Barundi population had declined to 114,605 (Table 4.3 and 4.31).

\textsuperscript{19} Ruanda-Urundi was the colonial name for the kingdoms of Rwanda and Burundi. They were amalgamated by the Belgians and governed as one.

\textsuperscript{20} It was unlikely that the Batutsi who were part of the elite group would have migrated in large numbers.
### Table 4.3

**Distribution of Population of Barundi Origin by District, 1948-1957**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>1948</th>
<th>Percentage of Dist. pop.</th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>Percentage of Dist. pop.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bukoba</td>
<td>5,112</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>8,424</td>
<td>2.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biharamulo</td>
<td>2,752</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1,786</td>
<td>4.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kigoma</td>
<td>16,831</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>22,425</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buha</td>
<td>46,221</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kibondo</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>49,680</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasulu</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10,702</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tabora</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,159</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngara</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4,032</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shinyanga</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kahama</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpanda</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morogoro</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,203</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moshi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,711</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arusha</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>879</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pare</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>828</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kisarawe</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>798</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilosa</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,653</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanga (rural)</td>
<td>5,833</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7,708</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanga (urban)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bagamoya</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 4.34

**Percentage Distribution of Barundi by Province, 1957**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Total Number</th>
<th>Percentage of Barundi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>4,891</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>2,785</td>
<td>2.3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>84,428</td>
<td>69.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lake</td>
<td>16,015</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>1,980</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Pop.</td>
<td>122,233</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Belgian colonial state policies and labour migration

When the Belgians entered Rwanda and Burundi, labour was tied in various clientele systems, whereby chiefs and sub-chiefs restricted mobility and appropriated surplus from the people in the form of tribute labour and tithes. The Belgians, in an attempt to extract government labour and develop economic crops, abolished the offices of district sub-chiefs in 1926 and combined their functions into one, supposedly in the interest of administrative efficiency. This had far-reaching effects on the Bahutu since Bahutu chiefs were replaced by newly-educated Batutsi. Forced labour (ubeletwa) was required by the authorities for road construction and the building of government properties. It was the responsibility of the new chiefs to obtain such labour and to introduce cash cropping. Ordinances required peasants to cultivate specific acreage, to grow groundnuts, potatoes, cassava and a fixed number of coffee trees. After the new chiefs were installed coffee production showed a dramatic rise. The position of the Mwami was such that it was not until they deposed him in 1931 and crowned his mission-educated son, that they could gain total access to the people and the land. Of course this must have contributed to the development of seasonal migration on a large scale to neighbouring territories.

The prolonged famines of 1928-29 and 1941-44 in Ruanda-Urundi were added incentives to migrants to travel distances of up to 900 miles to find work. During the 1930s an estimated 50,000 migrants were travelling to Uganda (Powesland 1954). Richards (1954) suggests that Banyaruanda
and Barundi preferred waged labour in British territories to forced labour under the Belgians. J.R. Elliot's report in 1937 on labour in the colonies after a visit to Ruanda-Urundi said that the massive out-migration was due to the need to obtain money for payment of taxes and to escape the unpaid labour which the inhabitants were obliged to undertake for the administration (1937). A survey of 200 women and 200 men crossing into Uganda in 1950 showed that 59 percent of the sample said that they had left their homes to get money to pay taxes and 19 percent were seeking to acquire dowries. Migrants were quoted as saying, ‘our money is only enough for taxes. It causes people to be half-naked and their wives too’ and ‘there is no source of money for a man without cattle unless he can get to Usumbura’ (now Bujumbura). A number of migrants complained of the amount of labour-time appropriated by their chiefs/ Clearly a large proportion of communal labour was for the colonial authorities but carried out under the auspices of the chiefs.

If, according to the British, the Belgian authorities encouraged emigration in order to relieve population pressure, it is ironic that at the same time the Belgians expressed concern about the shortage of available labour within their own territories for government work (Richards 1954). In fact British authorities in Tanganyika, being well aware of the labour demands of their territory, where possible encouraged the flow of migrants, except that the physical condition of workers coming from Ruanda-Urundi was of special concern. They were described as a 'miserably poor
lot', dressed in rags and prone to suffer from malaria, relapsing fever and enteritis. Ruanda migrants especially were said to have a poor physique, whilst the Rundi had the highest reputation as labourers (Richards 1954). During the 1930s, the colonial authorities placed restrictions on recruitment in areas near the borders in order to prevent the spread of sleeping sickness. However, by 1946 the demand for labour led Orde-Browne to recommend the channelling of migrants from Ruanda-Urundi into well-defined routes, and their maintenance for two weeks in reception camps with medical facilities. Reception centres were already established at the main crossing points into Uganda. This was achieved with the cooperation of the Belgian authorities (Manpower Committee report 1951). By 1955 labour recruiters from British territories were actively engaged in Ruanda-Urundi.

Patterns of labour migration into Tanganyika.

The movement of labour migrants from Ruanda-Urundi into Tanganyika is not well-charted. No study covering this particular movement appears to exist. One can assume that the majority entered the territory through Western province which was in itself a labour reserve. Labour agents were operating in the Province from the 1920s. It was however, difficult to determine what proportion of the recruited labour, especially in Buha district, were Rundi or Ruanda who had crossed the border voluntarily. Most of the labour from the province migrated independently to the estates. This pattern may have been followed by the majority of Rundi and Ruanda. In 1935, 50 percent of the 2361 recruited in
Kigoma area were from Belgian territory. Similarly in 1946, the majority of the 3600 men recruited privately in the Kigoma area were Africans from Urundi (Western Province Annual Report 1942).

As regards the points of entry into Tanganyika territory, many travelled into Kahama and Uvinza on the central railway or across Biharamulo district to the Mwanza-Tabora railway. In the 1930s reports, a provincial commissioner suggested that about 50 percent of the recruits in each year were immigrants from Belgian territory. One commissioner in 1936 wrote that "many who are supposed to have come from this province are really strangers from across the border" (Tanganyika Territory 1936, p.2). This implies that a significant number of migrants may have reactivated local contacts or were well-informed of opportunities. According to the UN Trusteeship Report (1955) an estimated 28,113 Rundi were travelling to British territories as labour migrants. Temporary migrants to Tanganyika and Uganda rose from 7,100 in 1930 to 56,400 in 1938 (Kuczynski 1949, quoted in Egero, 1979).

Sisal estates of Tanga, Coast and Dar es Salaam districts were the main destinations. From the 1920s to the 1960s, the sisal industry was the largest employer of labour in Tanganyika, with over 386,000 workers in 1956, of which, 52,000 were from other territories. Migrants from Ruanda-Urundi and the furthest provinces of Tanganyika were "distance labour" and were therefore provided with free housing. Working conditions on the estates were generally poor, and resulted in high labour turnover and absenteeism.
In 1956, 48 percent of recruited and volunteered labour deserted. Estate owners were aware of the importance of immigrant labour from Belgian and Portuguese territories, since 21 percent of them worked as cutters, the most arduous task on the estates (Guillebaud 1958). The colonial administration had attempted to obtain improved conditions on the estates in order to stabilize the workforce in close proximity to the estates, but to no avail.

Little information is available on the settlement and social integration of labour migrants from Ruanda-Urundi into host societies except that carried out by Richards (1954) in the former kingdom of Buganda, Uganda, and those migrants mentioned in the Bugerere diary of Robertson (1978). The colonial state had little control over the incorporation of migrants who were predominantly employed by indigenous Ganda farmers. It was the traditional social structure of the Ganda which determined how strangers were incorporated. Migrants were integrated into the economy as labourers or serfs. Many took on the role of customary tenants and had the rights of Ganda peasants. Although they were of a similar culture to the Ganda, they were despised by the Ganda because of their poverty. No immigrant village existed as the migrants were scattered on Ganda estates. In Tanganyika, in contrast, the colonial administration tried to stabilize the workforce by providing accommodation on the estates and encouraging the migration of families. In consideration of the labour demands of its territory the British colonial administration encouraged the flow of labour migrants from Rwanda and Burundi, and where possible
attempted to improve the quality of labour through greater supervision.

The sisal plantations continued to be the major employer of immigrant labour in the post-independence period. However, the collapse in the price of sisal, mechanization, stabilization of the workforce, and immigration restrictions had effectively reduced migrant labour. The socialist ideology of the independent Tanzanian state in the 1960s had an adverse impact on the wage labour market. As Raikes (1983) points out, the state 'officially disapproved' of labour hiring, as being 'inconsistent with its policies' (p.288).

In recent years the working conditions of the labourers from Ruanda-Urundi appeared to have improved very little since the 1920s. Raikes (1983) also notes that Banyarwanda and Barundi who are normally denied access to land in Tanzania, are among the worst paid and most badly treated labour force in the country. It seems that the stigma attached to sisal workers, particularly the Waha, also extended to the Barundi. However, the next wave of Barundi entered independent Tanzania not as labour migrants but as refugees.

The in-migration of refugees

The Barundi were not the first refugees to settle in Western Tanzania during the colonial and post-colonial period. Refugees who fulfilled the requirements for refugee status under international law first started entering Western Tanzania in the 1960s. However, as early as the
Second World War, European refugees, who in December 1943 numbered 9261 (3015 Italians, 5727 Poles and 519 Greeks) were placed in camps throughout Tanganyika, some of which were located in Tabora region (Kuczynski 1948, Western Prov. Annual Report 1941). Africans moving between the territories of colonial Africa were not at that time accorded refugee status but were considered fugitives. Numerous Africans fled their territory to avoid conscription during the Second World War, but the colonial government enacted fugitive laws whereby they could be pursued and repatriated.\(^2\)

In 1962, after the Mau Mau uprisings in Kenya the British relocated about 2,000 Wakikuyu in Katuma on the Mwesi-Mpanda Road, some 40 miles east of the district headquarters. An unspecified number were also moved to the Sumbawanga area. This was certainly an anti-resistance strategy to move the most rebellious of their subjects to the most remote part of the East African territory.

**Banyarwanda and Zairean Refugees**

The Banyarwanda were the first group of refugees from a post-colonial state to seek refuge in independent Tanzania. Over 10,000 refugees crossed the border into the North-Western districts of Ngara and Karagwe. Not being signatory to any international conventions, the warm reception extended to the refugees by the Tanzania government/party was not purely the result of political sympathies with the Batutu movement as an anti-colonial liberation struggle,

\(^2\) For example, the Fugitive Offenders (Pursuit) Uganda Order of 1947, whereby the police from Uganda could pursue fugitives in Tanganyika territory up to a distance of 50 miles.
but was the expression of a traditional attitude towards
refuge-seekers, particularly, in this instance, where kin
relations and friends live on the other side of the border.
The Banyarwanda or Barundi were already renowned in the
territory for their involvement in labour migration. It was
therefore, not surprising, that several districts offered to
take refugees; Bukoba 3,500, Karagwe 1,600 and Biharamulo
1,300, all being labour-intensive coffee-growing areas

The historical alignment of the refugee group with one
particular ethnic group in Ngara district, resulted in their
acceptance by that group and rejection by others. According to Yeld (1965) the Washubi thought the refugees
would boost their numbers and subsequently their
representation on local councils, and help to eradicate the
tsetse fly. Moreover, the government was aware of the
potential agricultural contribution the refugees could make
to the region. Initially the Tanzanian government policy was
first to disperse the refugees, among the local population
of the border districts.

Certainly the tradition of labour migration from
Ruanda-Urundi into Tanganyika affected the way in which the
refugees were perceived by the authorities and the people.
The authorities distributed some refugees as casual
labourers among Wahaya families in Bukoba district. Gasarasi
(1976) said this was a humiliating experience for the

In Ngara district, the Bugufi chiefdom was hostile to the
Batutsi refugees who had past links with the Tusi rulers of
their enemies, the Washubi. The Washubi, along with the
Wanyambo, because of historical connection welcomed the
refugees and gave them land (Yeld 1965).
refugees; former pastoralists and lords under [Ubughake] were forced to work on banana and coffee plantations, and most Wahaya saw the refugees as free labour. Bukoba district was already a destination for seasonal labour from Burundi to work as coffee pickers. Migrant labour was held in low esteem by the locals and the refugees were treated with contempt. Destitute refugees could expect no hospitality when moving into areas of labour shortage. Nevertheless, the prospect of wage labour was attractive. A study which focused on the defection of Banyarwanda refugees from settlement schemes in Burundi to neighbouring East African countries included, among the reasons for flight, the greater possibility of obtaining wage labour in Tanganyika territory (Van der Meeren 1970).

Because of pressure from the Rwanda government and the OAU, which was at that time establishing its commission on refugees and trying to implement its principle of non-interference in the affairs of member states, the Tanganyika government was forced to enact policies which curtailed the movement of refugees. Many of the refugees were supporters of the Inyenzi guerrilla group, which had made repeated incursions into Rwanda from bases in Uganda and Tanganyika. A settlement scheme programme was finally launched in 1962, against the wishes of the Banyarwanda, at Muyenzi in Ngara district, 50 miles from the border and 180 miles from the

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23 Clientage system in Rwanda. The client, often a Bahutu, would seek cattle from his lord, a Batutsi. The Bahutu would have usufruct rights over the cattle, but would be tied in a series of obligations and duties to the lord, similar to serfdom. Discussed in Rene Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi (London: 1970) and Jacques Maquet, The premise of inequality in Rwanda (Oxford: O.U.P. 1961, reprint 1962).
regional headquarters.\textsuperscript{24} The isolation of Muyenzi, along with the inadequacy of water supplies and the presence of large-scale wildlife, all contributed to the problem of converting pastoralists into cultivators. Inequalities within the refugee group meant that rich refugees could establish a sound economic base by reverting to cattle-rearing. Cattle were obtained from Sukumaland and Burundi. In 1976 at the time of Gasarasi’s survey, only 3,000 of the original 10,000 refugees remained at Muyenzi. Many fled the settlements for Burundi during the villagization programmes of 1974, when they were requested to move into ujamaa villages (Gasarasi 1976).

In 1964-1965, a further 3,000 Banyarwanda were resettled from Goma in Kivu Province, Zaire, to Mwesi in Mpanda district (The Standard 4.9.1964 & 23.10.1964). Mwesi is a remote highland area, some 130 km (75) miles from the district headquarters of Mpanda town (Figure 3). It is a relatively under-populated area, which unlike most parts of the district is free from the tsetse fly at the higher altitudes. With a temperate climate and moderately fertile soils, Mwesi was earmarked as a potential development area, but its location in a peripheral traditional labour migration district made it a low priority area in terms of development funds, until the resettlement of the refugees.

Initially, Mwesi was designed to resettle 10,000 Banyarwanda refugees from Burundi. LWF/TCRS began site

\textsuperscript{24} Aid came mainly from the League of Red Cross, UNHCR and voluntary agencies: the British Red Cross, OXFAM, the Swedish Churches, TCRS and the World Council of Churches. An estimated $100,000 was needed: OXFAM gave $32,900, UNHCR $33,600 and the US government gave food aid.
preparation soon after the agreement was signed (Appendix A). It included opening up 64 km of road to Mpanda, surveying village sites, opening up a 650 yard-long airstrip; and the construction of reception centres to house an initial group of 1000 refugees. The work was supervised by an expatriate project coordinator and the regional surveyor, with over 64 Wakikuyu refugees employed in road construction.

When, after six months, it became apparent that the refugees from Burundi were not going to arrive, the agency was instructed by the government to continue with the expansion of the settlement.

If the original refugees do not arrive, there is a strong possibility that others from different parts of Africa may arrive (Letter from Ministry of Agriculture, Forest and Wildlife to TCRS, Dar es Salaam, October 1964).

The 10,000 Barundi refugees were replaced by 3,000 refugees from Kivu province in Zaire. Just over half moved between early November and late December 1964, and the second group of 1,300 moved between 19 May and 18 June 1965. The first group of refugees was described by the Regional Commissioner as

a rather sophisticated group from Goma, where they had lived in towns. Well-dressed, well-behaved, almost all speaking French and Kiswahili even the children. Regional Commissioner seeing these people for the first time claimed that they were not refugees at all, and he personally examined all their luggage (J. Norredam, Field Officer's diary -Mwesi, extract dated November 1964).

It is apparent that a significant proportion of the refugee group was urbanized, while those from rural areas were predominantly pastoralist. Mwesi highlands are environmentally similar to their homeland and enabled the Banyarwanda to establish their traditional occupation of
pastoralism along with the cultivation of grains. In 1986, a livestock survey found 5,864 cows and goats within the settlement, and some 28 herds in the surrounding area. Extensive grain cultivation is developing with the presence of a Munyarwanda-owned tractor for hire. In 1986, Mwesi contributed 10 and 11 percent of the district co-operative's maize and beans respectively.

The settlers were eventually accommodated in six villages. Until 1972 services were provided by the implementing agency. These included a six-room dispensary, with an in-patient ward of 25 beds, an operating theatre with an X-ray unit, three primary schools and a community centre. The standard of the services caused some dispute between the donors and the Tanzanians. With donor contributions, classroom spaces could be provided for most of the refugee children, whereas less than 50 percent of the local children had the opportunity to attend school. In some cases the government, fearing such imbalances, refused to sanction donations for specific projects (Gasarasi 1984).

Nonetheless, the facilities in Mwesi attracted substantial numbers of local people to the settlement area. By 1966, 500 local people and 200 Wakikuyu from Katuma had moved into the area. There was also a plan to move 700 local people from the nearby Busongola village to the settlement. The largest migrant group was the Wachagga from Moshi, in the Kilimanjaro region. It was government policy in 1968, as expressed in the Second Five-year Plan, to resettle 2000 landless Wachagga in Mpanda district under the supervision of the Ministry of Lands and Settlement. In August 1968, a
subcommittee of the Kilimanjaro regional development committee, after visiting Mpanda and Mwesi, proposed the resettlement of 1,500 Wachagga to Mwesi and 500 to Mpanda to work in flue-cured tobacco production at a cost of 622,000 Shillings. Village sites and farming plots were surveyed by the land planning unit of Tabora region, and for the purposes of agricultural development, Mwesi was designated a sub-district of the Mpanda district with its own five-man agricultural team of government field officers. In mid-June 1969, the Wachagga, comprising over 500 heads of households, arrived at Mwesi and a further 220 at Mpanda Ndogo to become tobacco growers (TCRS Annual Report 1969).

Mwesi’s refugee population decreased to 2,290 in 1975 following considerable out-migration to Burundi or to other parts of Tanzania, namely Kigoma (Betts Field Notes 1966). A large proportion had left members of their family behind in Zaire and the difficulties encountered when attempting reunions caused them to leave the settlement. Family reunions are still continuing: Muhiga, a secondary school teacher, and his nurse wife left their jobs in Bukavu, Zaire to join relatives in Mwesi in 1983. His wife was able to find work at Mwesi Health centre and he started up a small shop. There is generally an exodus of educated Wanyarwanda to the nearby towns of Sumbawanga, Mpanda and Tabora. The blanket granting of citizenship by the Tanzanian government has meant that the Banyarwanda are no longer considered

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refugees, and Mwesi has ceased to be a refugee settlement. Some Banyarwanda took this opportunity to leave the settlement for local towns. They now account for 35 percent (2,786) of Mwesi's population, 1,829 of whom had obtained citizenship. The proportion of Banyarwanda at Mwesi has fallen from about 50 percent of the total population to 28 percent, with the in-migration of Wafipa and Wapimbwe. In terms of distribution within the settlement area, the Mwesi ward is predominantly Banyarwanda but in the other two wards, Lwega and Lugonesi, the people live in ethnically-segregated areas, even when living on the same hill.

Banyarwanda refugees previously settled in Uganda were forced to migrate into Tanzania during the Amin regime. An estimated 14,000 entered Tanzania in 1982, and were temporarily settled at Byamtemba village in Kagera region (Daily News, 8 September 1984). Initially, the Tanzanian government sought to repatriate them to Uganda (Reuter, 10 August 1984, Daily News 9 June 1984). But during 1985 an agreement was reached between UNHCR and the government to start a new settlement for some 2,000 at Burigi in Muleba, Kagera region. Considerable progress had been made with site preparation and construction when, in 1986, it was admitted that the refugees who were pastoralists were reluctant to settle on a permanent site and the viability of Burigi settlement was in doubt (UNHCR: Branch office, Dar es Salaam 1987). Repatriation was once again an option (Daily News 9 May 1987).

Survey carried out by village chairmen in 1987 in the three wards of Mwesi, Lwega and Lugonesi.
Zaireans of the Bembe ethnic group formed the second wave of refugees into Western Tanzania, arriving in 1964 as a result of the civil war in Zaire. Many, like their forefathers before them, settled among the local population fairly close to the border along Lake Tanganyika in Kigoma and Rukwa regions, without the assistance of the state or international organizations. No comprehensive survey of the distribution of Zairean refugees has been undertaken, with the exception of the 600 who were placed in the settlement of Pangale near Tabora town. A limited survey in 1983 estimated a total Zairean refugee population of about 15,900 in Kigoma region and 1,287 in Rukwa region. Many were concentrated in the coastal villages along Lake Tanganyika (Nindi et al 1983). In contrast in the 1978 census 4,410 Zaireans were recorded in Kigoma and Rukwa regions, with between 20 and 75 percent residing in the villages of Kirando, Karago, Zashe, Sunuka, Igalula, Mtanga and Buhingu. The discrepancy is quite great and it is unlikely that many Zaireans were repatriated after the clemency offered by President Mobutu in 1983. A large number may have been recorded as Tanzanians.

During 1987, the Tanzanian government, still concerned with the self-settled un-supervised Zaireans, was seeking funds to extend Kigwa settlement near Tabora in which to resettle the Zairean population (Figure 3). UNHCR had agreed an initial sum of $100,000 to cover transport costs, subsistence and shelter (UNHCR, Geneva 1986).
Barundi refugees: patterns of migration, demographic and ethnic characteristics

Refugees first started fleeing Burundi as early as October 1965, after the failed Bahutu coup, and later in 1969 after the threat of a coup resulted in reprisals by the state on the Bahutu majority. However, the majority of the refugees fled after the fourth of May 1972, when, following another unsuccessful coup, further reprisals by the Batutsi-controlled government culminated in 200,000 people being murdered and over 150,000 fleeing to the neighbouring countries of Rwanda to the north, Tanzania to the east, and Zaire to the west. At the end of 1973, some 90,000 Barundi nationals were in exile, 50,000 in Tanzania, 30,000 in Zaire and 10,000 in Rwanda (UNHCR 1974).

Forced migrants from Burundi form the largest refugee group in Tanzania. On the 8 May 1972, over 6,000 Barundi were reported to have crossed the border into Kigoma (Daily News 8/9. 5. 1972), and by the 30 May about 9,400 were registered by local officials (Daily News 10/12.5.1972). In June, the number had risen to 12,000 (Daily News, 12/13/14.7.1972). Most refugees, however, crossed between May and August 1972. During the month of July, the Tanzanians were estimating that between 50&500 refugees were crossing daily. By the end of July 1972, over 40,000 refugees were in the country (Daily News 30.5.1972). From May to July 1973, as a result of increased hostility in Burundi, refugees were said to be crossing the border at the rate of 100 per day. At the end of 1973 the total number of Barundi refugees in Tanzania had risen to 100,000. It is
difficult to discover exactly when all the refugees crossed the frontier; there was obviously a long delay in their registration. The fact that a large proportion were familiar with the border areas meant that many remained unregistered. The refugees originated mainly in the southern districts of Burundi where in 1972 the fighting was particularly intense. Lugusha (1980) in his study of spontaneously settled refugees in the Kigoma region, found that 54 percent (1,830) of those interviewed came between 1972 and 1974, and 37 percent (1,261) before 1972. Approximately 78 percent of his sample came from eight districts in Burundi: Makamba, Ruyigi, Bururi, Mabanda, Lutana, Rumonge, Gitega and Vugizo (Figure 1). My survey of refugees in Katumba settlement shows that all the heads of households (201) interviewed came between 1972-74 as a direct result of the conflict. Originating in the southern districts of Rumonge (38%), Makamba (23%), Nyanza-lac, Mabanda (9%), Rutana, Vugizo, Nyanza-lac and Mareka, most travelled between three and four days to reach the border, and crossings were made at 29 different entry points, with 76 percent reported arriving through Kagunga in Kigoma district, and Mnanila, Manyovu, Kibande and Mnyame in Kasulu district. Direct migration to Tanzania was the norm, avoiding the more obvious border crossings. Only two percent of the refugees surveyed took a less direct route via Rwanda. They were mainly single males who managed later to rendezvous with their families in the settlement.

From reports of the first arrival it is clear that most of those who fled Burundi in the first week of the crisis
were from the Batutsi ethnic group (*Sunday News*, 7 May 1972). Later as the reprisals in Burundi took on the character of genocide the flow became totally Bahutu. Those Batutsi may have returned to Burundi after the situation normalized.

The refugees travelled in family groups of an average size of 7.38 individuals; in one case up to 60 members of the extended family migrated together. It appears that whole communities uprooted themselves and migrated, and to a certain extent resettled relatively en masse. Within the settlements the clustering of people from former villages is apparent. Most of the refugees interviewed in Katumba settlement either travelled with their parents or with their children. Family reunification was important in the early period of exile. Some people returned to Burundi to collect members of their families left behind in the initial rush.

The predominance of women over men is not as apparent as in most African refugee groups. There was a high proportion of widows who fled with their children but always in the company of other relatives.\(^{28}\) There is no evidence in the composition of the settlement population of any significant dominance of females over males which would be indicative of an imbalance in the sex ratio of the refugee flow. In 1976, the first comprehensive census of the refugee population at Katumba showed a sex ratio of 103.5 (Table 4.4).

\(^{28}\) In contrast to groups like the Eritrean refugees in Sudan, the absence of any organized Bahutu guerrilla group ensured that most males were able to travel with their families.
Table 4.4

Katumba: Population for 15 villages (Feb. 1976)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Newborns sex not specified</th>
<th>Total village population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Katumba</td>
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<td>1,483</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3,049</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tambazi</td>
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<td>2,047</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>4,166</td>
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<td>Nduwi</td>
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<td>1,697</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaminula</td>
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<td>2,071</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4,131</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kambuzi</td>
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<td>2,554</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ivungwe</td>
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<td>2,061</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>4,179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalungu</td>
<td>1,774</td>
<td>1,373</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3,162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iwimbi</td>
<td>1,122</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>1,781*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nzaga</td>
<td>1,009</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>1,648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Msaginya</td>
<td>1,823</td>
<td>2,120</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3,976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mnyaki</td>
<td>2,094</td>
<td>2,444</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>4,538*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ndurumo</td>
<td>2,249</td>
<td>2,154</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>4,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ikolongo</td>
<td>2,463</td>
<td>2,530</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>5,035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaburonge A</td>
<td>1,943</td>
<td>1,739</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>3,716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaburonge B</td>
<td>1,439</td>
<td>1,479</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2,944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>27,940</strong></td>
<td><strong>26,992</strong></td>
<td><strong>508</strong></td>
<td><strong>55,440</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Incomplete data

Source: TCRS Archives, Dar es Salaam.
The existence of past interaction with the Waha resulted initially in what has been termed traditional African hospitality in refugee literature. The scarcity of resources in Africa's rural areas and the integration of African peasant communities into the capitalist system have meant that today the myth of traditional hospitality can be used as a disguise for exploitation of refugee labour. Alternatively, in conditions of extreme poverty and scarce resources it may even result in the deterioration of the living conditions of the hosts (Chambers 1979, Kibreab 1983, Yeld 1965).

The speed of the flight meant that over one-half of the refugees left Burundi with few of their possessions. Only 45 percent of sampled households claimed to have brought some possessions to Tanzania (Table 4.5).

Table 4.5 Possessions brought to Tanzania by sampled households

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of goods</th>
<th>Frequency of goods reported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clothes (extra)</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money</td>
<td>15 (B.Franc average=35,303 US $403)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooking implements</td>
<td>19 (aluminium cooking pots)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock</td>
<td>3 (goats, chickens, cows)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tools (artisan)</td>
<td>2 (carpenters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicycles</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewing machines</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural tools</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watches</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boats/Canoes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Books</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nothing</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=201

These were essentially craftsmen who settled initially in Kigoma region.
When the Barundi first crossed the border, the earliest arrivals did have relatives in the adjacent areas who took initial responsibility for them. This is indicated by the fact that over 5,000 of the 8,696 refugees registered by 13 May 1972 were collected by relatives living in the Kigoma area (Daily News 13 May 1972). By 12 June 1972 an estimated 8,000 refugees were staying with relatives, more than twice the number in the government camp at Pangale which was 420 Km from the border and 25 km south of Tabora town. Many refugees may have escaped registration by moving direct to the homes of their relatives, especially those with some familiarity with the territory. Over 12 percent of sampled households had visited relatives in Tanzania prior to migrating as refugees. My survey in Katumba settlement included two families who had lived among relatives in Kigoma for two and four years before moving to the settlement. Several families in the Kambuzi villages (Figure 4) also moved to the settlement in 1976.

Although refugees were allocated land by the local people, their situation remained precarious until the 1980s. The government policy of settling refugees on organized schemes frequently caused them to be rooted out by the authorities and forcibly moved. The border village of Kagunga which received the refugees was only accessible by waterborne vehicles. Thus to facilitate their movement, the government commissioned boats and canoes to move them to the transit camp at Kibitizi, outside Kigoma town. Most were collected by trucks from Manyovu and other border villages connected by road (Daily News 11 May 1972). Even if
'traditional hospitality' existed among the Waha, in this case national considerations over-ruled local sentiments and kinship. Some Waha even took advantage of the provision of services and the captive market within the settlements to relocate their businesses.

Every effort was made to enforce the government policy, in accordance with the OAU recommendations, that refugees be moved over 50 km. from the border. An Oxfam field director noted in July 1973, that '...agencies are not encouraged to assist the refugees to resettle near the frontier. There was a Catholic Mission which attempted to do so, and they got into trouble with the government' (Gooch 1973). The existence of Pangale, a former settlement for Zairean refugees, proved useful in that it was immediately available as a temporary camp for the Barundi. The journey from Kigoma to Pangale was by train and bus, and lasted about 14 hours. Some refugees were from the outset sent straight to Pangale. Local police and TANU officials sought out refugees in border areas, and directed them to collection points, where they were taken to Kigoma and later by train to Tabora. The refugees were informed that the move was to ensure their security. This was reinforced in 1973 when the Burundi government bombed several border villages containing refugees. Nevertheless, border villages are still preferred by Barundi refugees. Many have remained in the area despite pressure from the Tanzanian state to move further inland. A survey in Kigoma region found that 51 percent of the 35 villages containing

refugees were within 10 km. of the border, 80 percent within 40 km. and all within 50 km (UNHCR 1981 Ref:81/AP/LS/TAN MA3).

The movement of refugees inland was also the outcome of bilateral agreements between the Tanzania and the Burundi governments. The former, throughout the crisis, lent its support to Michombero's government. President Nyerere of Tanzania tried to affirm, even during the border attacks, that there was no dispute between Burundi and Tanzania (Daily News 17 July 1973). Tanzania never questioned the reasons for the influx into its territory.

The conditions of the refugees on arrival in Kigoma was particularly poor. Many required medical treatment, and since there was no shelter, they had to sleep under the mango trees. A Tanzanian medical assistant in the Pangale settlement related to me the appalling physical and mental condition of the refugees, and the efforts by relief agencies to help with their recovery. He spoke particularly about the high death rate of the children.30

For the first month of the influx, the local authorities organized emergency assistance. The National Milling Corporation donated 564 bags of maize, and the Tanzanian Red Cross provided tents, blankets and clothing. As the scale of the influx became apparent, the Tanzanian government requested assistance from international organizations. Representatives from UNHCR, LWF and WFP surveyed the scene a week after the influx, and a tripartite

30 Personal communication with the Medical Assistant who was at Pangale camp in 1972, now living in Sikonge village, Tabora region. (November 1986)
agreement was signed between the UNHCR, LWF/TCRS and the Tanzanian government for the establishment of emergency reception centres, transport, purchase and handling of food and health services. UNHCR allocated US $275,000 (from the emergency fund), LWF $155,000 and UNICEF US $20,000 for emergency relief. WFP provided daily food rations of 400gms of maize, 100gms of sorghum, 40gms of salad oil and occasionally 40gms of beans per individual (TCRS Annual Report 1972/3).

**Forced settlement: the move to Ulyankulu, Katumba and Mishamo**

The origin of the settlement solution to the refugee problem has been discussed in Chapter Three. In the context of the spatial reorganization of rural dwellers in Western Tanzania, it was in essence the old colonial strategy of settlement schemes located in areas where the tsetse dominates. The refugees, once provided with basic services, were to become pioneers and developers of the periphery.

When in August 1972 the refugee population had reached 18,000, under a tripartite agreement, the state and the donors selected a site for their settlement at Ulyankulu, some 85 km. from Tabora town in the direction of Urambo (Figure 2). A feasibility study was carried out by FAO, UNHCR, WHO and the Tanzania government, as the result of which an area of 750 sq. km was considered suitable for an estimated refugee population of 18,000 (Daily News, 28 August 1972). Ulyankulu, situated within the miombo woodland area, contained swamps, was infested with tsetse flies and therefore sparsely-populated. Most of its original
population was forcibly moved to sleeping sickness settlements during the colonial period. The area was designated in 1965 by the World Bank for the development of a tobacco complex aimed at establishing 15,000 Tanzanians as cooperative tobacco growers. The local Member of Parliament was keen to have the refugee population, not only to boost the members of his constituency, but also to provide cheap labour for local farmers, as well as to increase the cash crop output of the area (Betts 1976).

In September 1972 refugees began moving to the settlement in groups of 500 per day, where they were registered and allocated plots of 3.5 hectares per household, on which they they were expected to construct their homes and cultivate (TCRS, Annual Report 1973). Simple farming implements were provided. By the end of 1972, 3,215 plots had been surveyed and 250 sq. km of additional land was made available.

The attack by the Burundi airforce on the border villages in March/ May 1973, forced many spontaneously-settled to move to Ulyankulu (Daily News, 22 March 1973). On 30th June 1973, Barundi troops raided the border villages of Mubalazi, Mutambala and Kitibu in Kigoma region killing seven Tanzanians and causing 3.4 million shillings worth of damage to property (Daily News, 1973). The official Burundi explanation was that they were responding to attacks by rebels in Nyanza-lac and Mabanda districts. The renewed fighting between the troops and the rebels, forced more people to leave the country.
A rapid increase in Ulyankulu's population ensued: by mid-May 1973 over 13,000 refugees were transferred to Ulyankulu, on 20th June 1973 the population was 26,000, during July it had risen to 34,000. Large-scale movements from the border during the months of February to June raised the population to 46,500 (TCRS Annual Report 1974).

In August 1973 a second site was chosen at Katumba in Mpanda district for some 10,000 refugees (Figure 2). Katumba was selected from 5 sites chosen by the government. It is situated in miombo woodland some 400 km from the border and 25km north-east of Mpanda town, on the branch railway line between Kaliua and Mpanda, and therefore accessible to other regions. The settlement site was also an area earmarked by the government for tobacco production. In May 1973 some 3,000 refugees were moved to Katumba. To avoid settling at such a distance from Burundi, many refugees fled from the authorities, while on route from Tabora to Katumba. During the month of October 1975, TCRS reported that '41 refugees jumped off the train as they were travelling to Katumba' (Telex to Geneva 18.10.1975). At the end of the year Katumba had a population of 7,513, by July 1974 its population had increased to 45,130 (Daily News 18.10.1974, TCRS Annual Report 1974).

The sudden rise in the settlement's refugee population was the result of the villagization policy of the Tanzanian government. During 1974, Operation Kigoma forced many self-settled refugees to move from the border regions into the settlements. TCRS estimated that at times some 3,000 refugees were arriving per week. In 1975, over 51,000
refugees were in Katumba, an increase of 6,000 in 1975 (TCRS Annual Report 1975), and by 1976 the settlement had attained a population of 54,440 (Table 4.4). As early as 1974 a survey by the tripartite partners and various UN agencies showed that the settlements could be expanded to support a viable population of 45,000 refugees each (Oxfam 1975).

However, Ulyankulu continued to experience overpopulation. At the end of 1976 its population was 59,000, living in 13 villages, almost 200 percent beyond its estimated carrying capacity. Ulyankulu was then the fourth largest population concentration in the country. As a consequence, in May 1975, a viability study recommended the relocation of 30,000 people (UNHCR 1975). Again under the tripartite agreement, a further site was selected at Mishamo in Mpanda district. Mishamo is located on the Mpanda-Uvinza road at a distance of 130 km from the border, 125 km from Mpanda town, and 80 km from the nearest village (Figures 2 & 3). Prior to the settlement of refugees the area was relatively unpopulated since most of the peasants scattered across the area were resettled in the village of Mpanda Ndogo during the villagization programme of 1974.

Mishamo covers an area of 2050 sq. km. and was planned to take an estimated population of 25,000 from Ulyankulu and 10-20,000 from Kigoma region. Refugees were first moved to the settlement in 1978, and by December 1979 the settlement contained some 25,000 from Ulyankulu and 2,169 from Kigoma (TCRS Annual Report 1979). The smaller than expected population from Kigoma region reflected the resistance of the refugees in the border area to resettlement.
A significant number of Barundi refugees are still dispersed throughout the border villages in Kigoma, Kasulu and Kibondo districts. Many squatted in peri-urban areas of Kamara/Bangwe and Kibitizi villages of Kigoma-Ujiji urban area. A survey in 1981 estimated that about 21,827 Barundi refugees were concentrated in over 97 villages, with about 23 percent in Kasulu district, 33 percent in Kibondo district and 44 percent in Kigoma district (Lugusha 1981). They highlight the difficulty of distinguishing between Bahutu refugees and the Waha in some villages. Of those who made themselves visible, in the majority of the villages they represent between 20-26 percent of the village population and in one village surveyed, Rusaba, Barundi refugees constitute 43 percent of the population (Lugusha 1980).

**Refugees and development policy in the periphery**

Because of state-controlled organized settlement, the spatial distribution of refugee groups in Western Tanzania is such that most are settled over 100 km from their respective borders. Even with the relative porosity of the border and the difficult terrain of the border regions, the government has managed to place 82 percent of the Barundi refugee population in organized settlements, whose total population is estimated to be around 154,400 (Table 4.6). Mpanda district in particular has a disproportionate amount of refugees. In 1967 the district’s population was just over 60,000; thus the 1970s in-migration of the refugees doubled its population in the space of eight years. By the 1978
Census refugees comprised 43 percent of Mpanda population and 6.6 percent of the population of the newly-formed Rukwa region (Table 4.1). Today Katumba, with a population of 66,885, is by far the largest concentration of rural dwellers in Western Tanzania (Table 4.6).

With the fall in the world price of raw materials (especially sisal) in the 1960s, the promotion of Western Tanzania as a labour reserve subsided. However, these peripheral areas still retained their remote and impoverished character, low levels of infrastructural development— and contributed little to the export-oriented market of the national economy. In the 1970s the massive reorganization of the rural population into 'development' villages was indicative of the state's determination to control the peasantry and monetarize the rural sector. The failure of the Tanzanian state to further the expansion of peasant cash crop production was linked to its inability to cater for the welfare needs of the rural populace.

Consequently, donor-financed rural integrated development projects (RIDEPs) were conceived in the early 1970s, whereby the country was divided amongst western countries. Each region was to receive a team of experts from the foster country, whose task was to concentrate aid in multi-sectoral projects. The rationale put forward by

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Rukwa region was formed in 1974, from the amalgamation of Mpanda district from Tabora region. In 1978, Ufipa district was subdivided to form two administrative units, Sumbawanga and Nkansi districts. Rukwa covers 37,000 sq. km. - the fourth largest region in the country.

Each of the 32 regions in the country was assigned either to a developed country in the western or eastern block, or to the World Bank and United Nations organizations like FAO and UNDP.
organizations such as the World Bank was that increased services would encourage farmers to participate further in cash-cropping. Foreign experts were needed because of the inefficiency of local organizations. According to Kleemeier (1984), for integrated development to succeed, 'recipient governments had to pursue certain economic and political policies' - those prescribed by the donors.

The activities encompassed in an integrated project, were supposed to give donors direct control over the rural development process. In other words donors could help poor people gain a stake in the system without the need for land reform or other changes which would threaten the interests of the ruling class (Kleemeier 1984, p.86).

The creation of Rukwa region in 1974 was part of this nation-wide attempt by the independent state to attract development aid to peripheral areas. Rukwa was adopted by the Norwegians, who described the region as 'potentially the greatest remaining agricultural zone in Africa' (NORAD/NORCONSULT 1982). Rukwa is certainly representative of the low density high potential regions of Tanzania. A 1976 BRALUP report identified the peasants as 'the strongest productive force in the region with 97 percent of the cropped area and most of the livestock' (Sandberg 1976, p.77). Yet only three percent of the land area is cultivated, while 40 percent is considered suitable for agriculture. Intensification of peasant production has been seen as the most viable means of extracting a surplus; 'a mere four percent increase of the productivity of existing peasant fields would more than off-set the entire production

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33 See Kleemeier (1984) for a detailed evaluation of RIDEPs.
34 BRALUP refers to the former Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning of the University of Dar es Salaam, now Institute of Resource Assessment.
from the state farm and ranches' (Sandberg 1976 p.77). BRALUP (1976) identified two major roles for the region, one as a region of food surplus in deficit areas, secondly as a region of in-migration for the settlement of populations from regions of land shortage. Not surprisingly, from as early as the 1960s the state has tried to attract population from high density areas like Kilimanjaro and Mwanza to these peripheral regions. The unenthusiastic response from Tanzanians made the arrival of some 100,000 refugees a blessing in disguise. Furthermore, in 1981, the Tanzanian state was considering the settlement of some 300,000 Banyarwanda refugees/immigrants in Rukwa region, the bulk of whom were to be located in Mpanda district (NORAD/NORCONSULT 1982).

Conclusion

Western Tanzania, refuge for the majority of Barundi refugees, has been characterized by low population density, infrastructural impoverishment and economic backwardness. These characteristics owe their origin partially to the colonial period when economic and settlement policies forced people into labour migration and sleeping sickness concentrations, thus contributing to de-population, increasing loss of ecological control, and low levels of agricultural development.

Migrants, whether moving as settlers or for labour, have been an essential feature of the history of Western Tanzania. The establishment of independent political units altered the dominant character of cross-border migration,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlement Dist/region</th>
<th>Date of Arrival</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Distance From the border (km)</th>
<th>Settlement Area in sq. km</th>
<th>Census Pop. 1987</th>
<th>%age of refugee pop.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Katumba, Mpanda</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Barundi</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>66,885</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mishamo, Mpanda</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Barundi</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>2,050</td>
<td>34,557</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulyankulu, Urambo</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Barundi</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>29,998</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mwese, Mpanda</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Banyarwanda</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muyenzi, Ngara</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Banyarwanda</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimuli, Karagwe</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Banyarwanda</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kigwa &amp; Pangale, Tabora</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Zaireans, Ugandans &amp; Others</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burigi, Muleba</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Banyarwanda/Ugandan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,047</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total refugee population 142,927

Source: TCRS documentation 1964-1987
and those fleeing political persecution could be drawn under the new humanitarian umbrella. Moreover, with accorded refugee status came an increased awareness of the rights of refugees to externally-derived material assistance, which has meant that the patterns of their distribution within the host countries is well-coordinated and may even be linked to the labour requirements of the hosts. In this respect Barundi refugees can be placed at the end of a continuum of labour migrants to Tanzania.

One can conclude that the distribution of refugees within Western Tanzania has been largely controlled by the Tanzanian state with the assistance of international organizations. Whether for security, or social and economic reasons, the result has been the concentration of 142,927 aliens in eight settlement schemes (Table 4.6).

As settlement schemes have been seen by the colonial and post-colonial states as the best method of gaining control over the productive capacity of the peasantry; from sleeping sickness concentrations to ujamaa villages, it is not surprising that refugee schemes might function as part of the development strategy of the Tanzania state. The following chapter analyses further the rationale behind organized settlement schemes for Barundi refugees. It examines their organizational structure, and discusses the relationship between the refugees, the state and the donors, and exposes the implications of settlements for gaining control over these communities whether as refugees or as peasants.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE SETTLEMENTS: ORGANIZING FOR CONTROL

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the refugee schemes in Mpanda district. Firstly, in a review of the literature, I examine the rationale behind settlement schemes as a vehicle for rural development, as expressed in modernization ideology, in which the essential element is to gain control over the productive capacity of the settler population. I then outline the experience of the Tanzanian state using settlement schemes as strategies of rural development for its nationals, and chart the evolution of the settlement approach to the refugee problem in Tanzania. Parallels are drawn between settlement schemes for nationals and those established for refugees by placing the latter squarely within a developmental framework.

Earlier, I postulated that refugee settlements in Tanzania have served two specific functions; firstly to ensure regional security, through containment, thus preventing insurrection; secondly, and more importantly, to utilize the labour resource of a "captive" peasantry to increase the exploitation of peripheral areas of the country - in this case Mpanda district. Focusing on the principal protagonists - the donors (represented by UNHCR and LWF/TCRS), the host government, and the refugees, my contention is that the persistent conflict of interests and the actual strategies employed in the settlement process serve to stifle development within the schemes. Refugee
schemes, are in the long-term incapable of attaining their stated objectives of developing self-sufficient communities, due to the unequal relationships inherent in any current externally-derived strategy. This chapter will examine the structure of the settlements, particularly those strategies for control utilized by the donors and the state in terms of the internal organization: the imposed community structure, the rights and duties imposed on the refugee community, and aspects of their resistance. I discuss the appropriateness of refugee-related projects in the settlements fifteen or more years after flight, the creation of bureaucrats, and the role of international aid agencies.

**Settlement schemes in development ideology**

Settlement schemes or land settlements have been described in the literature as comprising some form of population movement (whether voluntary or involuntary) in an organized manner to establish people upon the land (Chambers 1969). Implicit in such movements is an economic dimension which today is more eloquently espoused in the rural development literature. The World Bank, perhaps the most ardent supporter of settlement schemes, defines them as:

The planned or spontaneous movement of people to areas of underutilized agricultural potential, both rainfed and irrigated. Planned movement indicates that an organizational entity controls the movement and assists in various degrees, the efforts of settler participants (IBRD 1978, p.5).

Land settlement schemes have been popular as a development strategy throughout the Third World. In many countries, they are legacies of the colonial period, conveniently adopted by independent governments. Their
stated objectives have been varied and range from population redistribution, sedentarization of nomads, sleeping sickness prevention, relief of urban and youth unemployment, land relocation, provision of social services, increasing food or export crop production, assisting the rural poor and the settlement of disaster victims, which include refugees.

Schemes have, however, been executed by states of varying ideological persuasion. Often they are said to be more a political device to divert public attention away from the need for land reforms (IBRD 1978, Hulme 1987). Experience in Africa has shown that the colonial state initiated settlement schemes for Africans when pressure from white settlers' encroachment threatened or precipitated uprisings against the state.

In the context of the penetration of capital into African rural areas, the settlement schemes become a strategy to increase control over peasant production, to facilitate commoditization and to accelerate differentiation in rural areas (Barnett 1978). Thus, in Africa, settlement schemes have been linked with cash, namely export crop production (Mapolu 1985, Bernstein 1979).

According to the World Bank (1978), the annual rate of settlement of new lands around the world is four to five million hectares, 75 percent of which is cleared spontaneously and 25 percent by organized schemes, spatially-distributed throughout the Third World. Settlement schemes are capital-intensive enterprises which normally require the involvement of international aid donors like the World Bank, and are expected to provide financial returns to
cover capital outlay and running costs. This form of organized movement of people necessitates what Apthorpe (1967) describes as 'social discipline' on the part of the farmers, who are expected to cooperate fully with management.

It is generally accepted that settlement schemes have failed to achieve their planned objectives. Chambers (1969), following a survey of settlement schemes in Africa, concludes:

In social and economic terms, however, the record of past schemes has been discouraging. Not only have many given rise to many problems, but outright failures and collapses have been common (p.7).

More than 17 years later, and after many more schemes, the World Bank also drew a similar conclusion:

The more complex and costly government-assisted settlement projects are no more likely to succeed than largely spontaneous settlements ... typically, evaluation of settlement projects three to five years after the start of implementation shows economic rates of return at least 50 percent below those in project appraisal documents (IBRD 1978, p.5).

Apthorpe (1967) points out that during the colonial period such failures were attributed to 'unsuitable social or cultural values at the receiving end' (p.6). Moving away from the stance which attributes failure to the uncooperativeness of the settlers, many academics have, on evaluation of projects, placed the blame on the lack of a social science input at the planning stage when the socio-cultural environment of the settlers has not been taken into consideration. Chambers (1969) argues for a holistic approach to the analysis of settlements where not only the developers and the developed are examined but also 'land, climate, infrastructure, economic processes, and the social,
political and economic environments in which they are found' (p. 9). Therefore improved planning, pilot schemes and continuous assessment are needed.

A survey of schemes in the 1980s reveals that those which incorporate social analysis have higher rates of economic returns (Cernea 1985). The writer contends that among development planners there was a 'major misunderstanding of the settlement process, and the incorporation of social science expertise was vital for the success of these projects' (p. 121-122). The type or nature of the schemes was not seen as decisive. Schemes were acceptable methods for rural development. The author then went on to catalogue the positive multiplier effects of new land settlements as growth poles in underdeveloped regions.

Unlike other schemes where economic returns govern the activities of participants, refugee schemes tend to have political or humanitarian factors affecting their formulation, with social and economic factors being disregarded until much later in the settlement history. This does not necessarily hold true for all schemes; national and regional politics as well as the availability of resources (land, capital) all govern the approach taken in response to a refugee influx.

Tanzania's experience with settlement schemes

Chapter Four has already shown that during the colonial period there was substantial forced spatial re-organization of population in Western Tanganyika, the most disruptive of which were attributed to sleeping sickness eradication. McHenry (1979) estimates that by 1945 there were some 64
settlements in existence throughout Tanzania, 38 were in Western Tanganyika with a total population of 115,612, although he points out that several unplanned and peripheral village settlements and concentrations were never included in the official statistics. Implicit in the concentration policy was the need to have greater control over the lives of the peasants, to draw them into the capitalist economy through labour migration and the development of export crop production. Schemes like the nine established by the American Tobacco company had more explicit commercial goals. Tobacco villages have been seen as an extreme form of state control over the peasantry. The technicalities of production require concentrated extension work, therefore reducing peasant control over the production process and over the product of their labour (Mapolu 1985, p.121-122). Such schemes were mainly in the western districts of Tanzania in Tabora and Mpanda (Cliffe & Cunningham 1972).

In 1961, the World Bank advocated the implementation of settlement schemes as part of Tanganyika's rural development strategy (IBRD 1961). The Bank contended that, in order to make the most productive use of the land to improve yield, to retain soil fertility and to 'secure the adoption of new methods and forms of organization', a 'transformation' approach was needed. African peasants had to be forced out of their traditional 'backward' ways. Furthermore, a government with an elected majority could carry out such an action if peasants were coerced into supervised settlement schemes. Transformation could 'secure quicker and higher returns on investment and effort by using selected, sparsely
populated areas for planned settlement schemes and cattle
ranches' (p.131). The rationale was:

When people move to new areas, they are likely to be more
prepared for and receptive of change than where they
remain in their familiar surroundings. And where people
are under pressure to move or see the advantage of doing
so, they can be required to abide by the rules and to
adopt new practices as a condition of receiving land. The
Mission concludes that quicker progress towards these
ends is likely to be made, within the limitations of the
resources available for government action, by planned
settlement of empty areas than through exclusive
concentration on improvement of methods in settled areas
(IBRD 1961, p.131).

The transformation approach had its roots in modernization
ideology, which envisaged the only way forward for Africans
as a complete break with the past and the superimposition of
western social, economic and technological systems.

In 1962, despite the political changes in the country,
the independent Tanganyikan government uncritically accepted
the World Bank’s proposals for rural development (Rweyemanu
1966, Mapolu 1985, Payer 1983). The first five-year plan
incorporated all the World Bank’s suggestions for the
development of rural Tanzania. In volume 1 the government
echoes the World Bank with:

The transformation approach will rely on securing higher
returns on investments and effort by the controlled use
of as yet sparsely-populated areas, having a high
potential, where planned and managed village settlement
will be located (United Republic of Tanganyika 1965,
p.21).

The plan proposed to settle about half a million people
on 69 schemes at a cost of over $12 million (or 13.5 percent
of the total development budget) by 1969. Cliffe and
Cunningham (1972) suggest that one of the reasons the
Tanzanian government adopted a colonial-inspired policy was
because they wanted rapid and spectacular achievements, and
inherent in settlement ideology was the assumption that this form of rural organization would facilitate the provision of services and the introduction of mechanized agriculture. This perspective was substantiated by President Nyerere in 1962 when, in a speech to Parliament, he stated that:

...before we can bring any benefits of modern development to the farmers of Tanganyika the very first step is to make it possible for them to start living in village communities (p.184).

There was a marked absence of a socialist ideology behind the various schemes. Schemes continued to promote the traditional cash crops of cotton, tobacco and coffee. McHenry (1979) identifies some 24 schemes which were in existence by 1965. They were plagued by the difficulty of getting people to work together, small returns on large investments, and desertion. This failure was interpreted by some academics and donor agencies as an administrative one (Rweyemanu 1966, Oxfam 1965). In 1968, President Nyerere stressed the absence of consultation with the people as the prime cause.

When we tried to promote rural development in the past, we sometimes spent huge sums of money on establishing a settlement, and supplying it with modern equipment and social services, as well as often providing it with a management hierarchy ....We persuaded people to go to new settlements by promising them they could quickly grow rich there, or that government would give them services and equipment which they could not hope to receive either in towns or in their traditional farming places ...we acted on the assumption that there was a short cut to development in these rural areas (Nyerere 1962,p.32).

Tanzania’s experience with settlement schemes has been well-documented and analyzed (Cliffe & Cunningham 1972, McHenry 1979, Van Freyold 1979). Although settlement schemes were finally abandoned in April 1966, Tanzania’s subsequent rural development policies have all concentrated on the
reorganisation of the rural population. Ujamaa Vijijini or rural socialism was essentially a reformulation of earlier policies under the rubric of the socialist ideology outlined in the Arusha Declaration of 1967. It signalled the move from a capital-intensive to a labour-intensive approach to rural development. Ujamaa Vijijini was to provide the mechanism by which state bureaucrats could gain greater control over production and foster a process of accumulation in the rural areas (Mapolu 1985, Leonard 1976, Shivji 1976, Boesen 1976).

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to dwell on the impact of Ujamaa Vijijini which was transformed into the villagization programme of the 1970s, when the emphasis was firmly placed on communal production and cooperative marketing (Nyerere 1972). Between 1973&5 about nine million peasants were relocated in the rural areas with the creation of some 5,000 villages. As a corollary, agricultural production declined in the immediate years following relocation, to the extent that the country suffered severe food shortages (Coulson 1979); the 'strategies used to raise agricultural production proved to be the very fetters of this development' (Mapolu 1985, p.118).

The state and community development

Inherent in the transformation approach is the view that traditional communities by nature contain reactionary forces opposed to the changes necessary for development. To some, the destruction of the community is the inevitable and logical outcome of the penetration of capitalism.
In areas where capitalism has penetrated pre-capitalist formations, where the state has played an active role in introducing commodity relations, the whole notion of community, like 'tribe' becomes susceptible to political manipulation. In the successful formation of new states from diverse peoples, it is essential that the state imparts new rules and values which are universal, and which bind people together as a cohesive whole. This in essence is the creation of a national identity. Development as embodied in modernization theories provides the justifiable basis for this action. The state expected that the community, while cherishing some worthwhile traditions, should become dynamic, progressive and receptive of centrally-conceived ideas - becoming amenable to policy directives from state bureaucrats. This link between the community and development has been actively pursued by the Tanzanian state.

Concepts of development, like Ujamaa, were based on the principle of there being characteristics within African communities which would be amenable for development. The peasant mode of production was said to embody the spirit of the community (Bell 1986). Nyerere unearthed and utilized 'traditional African values' of respect, communal ownership and obligation to work, as the foundation for an evolving modern society. He did, however, draw our attention to some deficiencies in traditional society, namely inequalities of economy and gender (Nyerere 1968).

Community development became synonymous with the transformation approach discussed earlier. Using modernization ideology, the state, as Coulson notes, made
use of the idea of community development 'to soften up traditional communities who were resisting the cash economy' (Coulson 1982 p.257), and to complement the agricultural extension and co-operative policies. The First Five-Year plan advocated:

Community development techniques will be concentrated in areas wherein a change in individual attitudes of peasant farmers has to be brought about in order to gain response to technical advice.

Especially in rural areas, even greater reliance will be placed on community development staff to prepare the ground for the reception of the advice and instruction of the technical services by, for example, overcoming apathy and attachment to out-dated practices (U.R.T, First Five Year Plan 1964-69 Vol.1, p.34).

Von Freyold's findings also expose the aim of community development to foster among peasants a desire for a higher standard of living. As part of modernization ideology it was to introduce western ideas about child-care, nutrition and sanitation, 'to struggle against ignorance and disease of traditional communities' (Von Freyold 1979, quoted in Coulson p.39-40).

In the field of development, particularly in resettlement schemes, emphasis has been placed on the importance of anthropological or sociological studies of the community for policy formation (Colson 1971). Few studies of refugees have focused on this form of social organization, with the exception of the work of Hunley (1987), in which he tries to construct a conceptual framework within which to analyse the refugee community in the Sudan (Hunley 1987). Using an ecological approach, he defines the community as arising from 'a shared response to the environment' (p.246). He advances the notion of a community of social control,
based on access to development resources. A structure is established by the providers which regulates competition, assesses resource acquisition strategies, distributes resources, and administers community sanctions. My contention is that it is highly doubtful whether the structure of aid and power distribution in a refugee settlement implies that the essential elements of a community - its culture, norms and values - can be imposed by the donors and the state.

Migrant groups have been found to be fervent traditionalists when faced with the challenge of adopting an alien culture. Refugees bring to their host societies cultural traits/markers which shape their initial preferences and orientations, and which distinguish them from their host, except where they form part of an existing ethnic group. Refugees entering 'heterogeneous' societies may be able to retain their socio-cultural characteristics whilst participating in common socio-political institutions. In any case cultural domination is never complete, even when conscious decisions are made to deny the culture of the oppressed group (Cabral 1970).

Refugee groups can resist by preserving aspects of their former culture, while portraying an accommodative stance with the aid programmes and host politics. Re-socialization, when it occurs, refers to the adaptation to unfamiliar social relations and the acquisition of a new identity within new power structures: a process which can be more traumatic than the upheaval of migration (Edwards 1985).
Refugee settlements /camps seem to be the antithesis of community; they are often perceived as a temporary, artificial, unstructured outcome of the breakdown of existing communities. Given the control over resources exercised by the state and the donors (and the power relationships which ensue), the social structure of the settlement must to some extent depend on the rules laid down by the authorities as well as on the new social relations of production inherent in the process of settlement.

The community, as defined, functions only partially within this structure, since the refugees as a new social group, and as an estranged ethnic group share common characteristics which are peculiar to them.

Refugee settlement schemes in Tanzania 1964-1972

By 1972, eight settlements were already in existence (Table 5.1). It is necessary to discuss briefly the main characteristics of these schemes since they marked the consolidation of the settlement approach which was swiftly applied to the Barundi on arrival. As shown in Table 5.1, the early refugee settlements for Banyarwanda refugees at Muyenzi (1963) in Kagera (formerly West Lake) region and at Mwesi (1964) in Mpanda district, and in 1965 for Mozambicans at Rutamba, Lindi region, were established during the period of the village settlement policy but were outside the control of the VSA. Although the refugee schemes differed from those for nationals because of the specific

1 VSA was the Village Settlement Agency set up in 1964 to oversee the organization of schemes. It was made ineffectual and later dissolved in 1966.
### Table 5.1 Expenditure of UNHCR/LWF sponsored refugee settlements in Tanzania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlement</th>
<th>Date Started-to handover</th>
<th>Origin of Refugees</th>
<th>Average Population</th>
<th>Number of Villages</th>
<th>Amount allocated by UNHCR US $</th>
<th>Amount allocated by LWF/TCRS US $</th>
<th>Total US $</th>
<th>Per Capita US $</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mwesi</td>
<td>1964-1971</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>393,850</td>
<td>542,068</td>
<td>935,918</td>
<td>311.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rutamba</td>
<td>1965-1972</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>9,800</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>541,850</td>
<td>460,059</td>
<td>1,001,909</td>
<td>102.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lundo</td>
<td>1966-1975</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>4,300</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>619,195</td>
<td>374,719</td>
<td>993,914</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhukuru</td>
<td>1967-1974</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>924,301</td>
<td>531,226</td>
<td>1,455,527</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mputa</td>
<td>1969-1976</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>12,280</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,110,850</td>
<td>721,239</td>
<td>1,832,089</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matekwe</td>
<td>1969-1975</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>7,300</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>662,142</td>
<td>377,782</td>
<td>1,039,924</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karagwe</td>
<td>1964-1969</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muyenzi</td>
<td>1963-1969</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>247,009</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kigwa</td>
<td>1974-1979</td>
<td>(Various)</td>
<td>2,875</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>375,107</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pangale</td>
<td>1964-</td>
<td>(Various)</td>
<td>2,875</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulyankulu</td>
<td>1972-1980</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>45,400</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9,436,300</td>
<td>2,668,973</td>
<td>12,105,273</td>
<td>266.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katumba</td>
<td>1973-1978</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>48,916</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>8,989,643</td>
<td>2,154,386</td>
<td>11,144,029</td>
<td>225.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mishamo</td>
<td>1978-1985</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22,000,000</td>
<td>7,377,580</td>
<td>29,377,580</td>
<td>1,049.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources**
characteristics of the settler population, they incorporated some of the structural features of the village settlement schemes. A very different feature however, was the involvement of humanitarian organizations, both local and international, providing relief and supervision. In the case of the Banyarwanda refugees, national and local government officials and a plethora of agencies were involved in the assistance programme.\(^2\)

Muyenzi, Rutamba and Mwesi settlements marked the beginning of settlement schemes with the minimum of local government input, and also with direct involvement from national government, firstly the Office of the Second Vice-President in Dar es Salaam and, after 1972, the Ministry of Home Affairs. They also marked the ending of local initiatives through the evolution of the tripartite agreement which gave donors virtual control over the settlement.

The approaches adopted for the settlement of the Banyarwanda and Mozambicans reflect the rapid adjustments in the policy of the newly-formed state to accommodate those of the international organizations. This was consolidated by legislation - after the passing of the essentially punitive Refugee (Control) Act in 1965, a uniform settlement policy was evolved for all refugee groups, and sections of the

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\(^2\) The League of Red Cross, Oxfam, Young Men’s Christian Association had representatives present and financial aid was provided by UNHCR, UNICEF, the African Medical and Research Foundation, the British Red Cross, Oxfam, the Swedish Churches, the World Council of Churches, the Lutheran World Federation and the United Nations Association. For the Mozambicans, UNHCR, Oxfam, the Red Cross & TCRS were active in providing emergency assistance. In both situations food aid was contributed by WFP.
Colonial Refugee Ordinance of 1946 were incorporated to incarcerate refugees in settlements.

The state's policy regarding Banyarwanda refugees was characterized by confusion and differing aims. The Banyarwanda were relocated twice in 1962; initially they were grouped in 29 villages and then later dispersed throughout the Bushubi area at the directives of the agricultural department. The aim was to provide casual labour to Bukoba coffee growers and to develop the tsetse-infested bush. The state's attempt to impose control on the activities of the Banyarwanda inevitably led to conflict with the refugee group. The state responded to their intransigence with various coercive measures - from the withdrawal of rations and imprisonment of leaders to advocating the use of the field force as a potential threat. The climax was a mass exodus towards Burundi, which was halted at the border by Barundi troops (Yeld 1965, Gasarasi 1979).

UNHCR also confronted the refugees with a more highly organized settlement programme. Faced with the problem of an uncontrollable refugee group, even after spending $86,000, UNHCR recruited the League of Red Cross Societies (LRCS) to implement an eleven-month settlement programme. An agreement was reached with the Tanzanian government whereby LRCS would take over administration of the refugee settlement for a designated period, during which there would be no political interference from the local authorities (Yeld 1965). UNHCR

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3 The case of the Banyarwanda is well documented by Yeld (1965) and Gasarasi (1979). Gasarasi wrote extensively about the relationship between the refugees and representatives of the state at Muyenzi settlement.
proposed to 'succeed where in fact the government of the country had failed' (Betts undated). With a modified plan, which satisfied both refugees and the authorities, the Red Cross took control of the settlement until May 1964 when TCRS, created in January of that year, was contracted to provide further assistance and to formalize and complete the settlement project.

In contrast, the establishment of Rutamba settlement for Mozambican refugees in Southern Tanzania was the initiative of the local authorities, responding to the appalling material conditions of the refugees. In 1965, a workshop convened by the District and Regional Commissioners to discuss proposals for the settlement site was attended by representatives from various government departments and international aid organizations. The District Agricultural Officer had selected a site and the District Surveyor was to allocate plots. However, once again, local action was superseded by a tripartite agreement between the Tanzanian government at the national level, UNHCR and LWF/TCRS.

Mwesi settlement, which was established in 1964, was based on a more formal agreement between the state and the donors, since it involved, from the beginning, the resettlement of refugees from their first country of asylum to a sparsely populated area some 330 kilometres from the border (Appendix A). The government was to provide the land, a settlement officer, basic tools and cooking equipment, and to allow duty-free importation of goods; the LWF/TCRS agreed to register refugees and to provide staff, educational, medical, social and agricultural services; and UNHCR was to
arrange for the movement of the refugees, to finance the project and to provide liaison between the partners.

Following the 1967 conference⁴, refugee settlements came to have two specific economic functions. The international donors wanted the refugees to be self-reliant within the shortest possible time through the cultivation of subsistence crops for food needs, as well as cash crops to fulfil tax requirements, and to provide their own services. The national government at the same time saw the possibility of increasing agricultural production through the use of refugee labour. According to the 1967 conference recommendations, refugees were to be converted into ‘active elements of economic and social development’, and their presence in the various countries will thereby be transformed, as the High Commissioner put it, from ‘...a liability into assets of the economic and social balance of the (host) countries’ development.’ In 1975, Holborn wrote:

The government of Tanzania has also seen refugees as a human resource whose settlement in sparsely-populated regions could be instrumental in sparking future economic development. In this dual spirit of humanitarian concern and pragmatic self-interest, Tanzania has offered settlement opportunities to thousands of refugees (Vol.2, p. 1145).

Agricultural production was to be based on mechanization and communal farming. In the settlements, block farming⁵ had the same lack of success as in Tanzanian

⁴ The conference on the Legal, Economic and Social Aspects of African Refugee Problems, 9-18 October, 1967. Addis Ababa. Sponsored by UNHCR, ECA, Dag Hammarskjold Foundation & the OAU. Specific details of the conference, including its recommendations and impact on African refugee policies are discussed in Chapter Three.

⁵ Block farming refers to the cultivation of individual strips of land within a larger communally prepared and harvested unit.
villages (Gasarasi 1976, Feldman 1971). The donors were constantly frustrated by the reluctance of refugees to participate in cash crop production. Often this was due to inappropriate cash crops and technology. In Rutamba, for example, cashew nuts demanded considerably more labour time and required three-four years before harvesting. Land clearance by tractors scraped away the top soil and had deleterious effects on soil fertility, reducing the carrying capacity of the land available within the settlement boundaries; it could only support one-third of the population. At Muyenzi, communal farms producing groundnuts were seen by the refugees as benefiting only camp officials. This unpopular regime resulted in a high rate of out-migration, between 1961-1971 the number of villages fell from 29 to 10, and the settlement population from 10,000 to 3,000 people (Gasarasi 1976).

Similarly, at Mwesi, no allowance was made for the differing occupational roles within the refugee group (Table 5.2). It was not surprising that the refugees were reluctant to become farmers and the TCRS representative could state: 'I believe the answer to the refugee problem here is agriculture for self-support, and meat production for cash' (Norredam diary, July 1964). In addition, it was not until June 1966, that the government approved a proposed cattle scheme, and not until the early 1970s before cattle were introduced to Mwesi.

In the 1970s, there was a greater awareness of the possibility of generating hostility between the locals and inhabitants of well-equipped settlements, if such schemes
Table 5.2

Pre-migration occupation of refugees at Mwesi (1965)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Number of refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailors</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoemakers</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurses</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drivers</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakers</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture-makers</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masons</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judges</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typewriter Mechanic</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopkeepers/assistants</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming Instructors</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Painters</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photographers</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houseboys</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooks</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brickmakers</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishermen</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roadmen</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanics</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Norredam, J. Field Officer’s diary, Mwesi, entry January 1965.
were situated in deprived rural areas; along with the drive to reduce costs, the emphasis was placed on providing services to refugees at an equivalent standard to that found in neighbouring rural areas. Technologically this meant abandoning mechanization and the promotion of rudimentary farm implements. Refugee settlements were also to follow official guidelines relating to district crop programmes and health and education provision, even though the optimal standard was beyond that which existed in Tanzanian villages.

Critics of the early settlements have catalogued the inadequacies of the administrative structure to deal with the refugees. Poor planning resulted in the selection of unsuitable sites, lack of clearly-defined goals (causing confusion in the agricultural policy), settler dissatisfaction, and authoritarian administrative structures (Feldman 1971, Sokiri 1972). Some even blamed insufficient knowledge of the social and cultural characteristics of the refugee group (Yeld 1965). In terms of costs refugee schemes were cheaper to implement than those for nationals; it was estimated that costs per capita in Rutamba was £150 compared to £200 under VSA which was also uneconomic (Betts 1966).

The curtailment of the policy of village settlement schemes because of the high costs incurred, did not extend to refugee settlements. Political considerations, such as national security, were an overriding factor in the persistence of the schemes after 1966. The Refugee (Control) Act authorized refugees to accept settlement or return to their country of origin. Those who avoided such stipulations
were liable for prosecution. It is clear that the Tanzanian state saw no danger from refugees organizing politically within a controlled area 50 or more kilometres from the border.

Certainly a premise was established in 1964/65 which persists today. Control over the material well-being of the refugees became the preserve of the donors, who were involved in the selection of sites, and in most instances carried out the necessary feasibility studies. The internal organization of the settlements was under the sole authority of the implementing agency TCRS, whose officials have always been keen to point out that they are following government guidelines. Between 1966-1969, four further settlements were established for Mozambicans, and between 1972&78, four settlements for the Barundi (Table 5.1).6

Mishamo is the most recent settlement and was established under a tripartite agreement, in which considerable emphasis was placed on project management and control over expenditure. As the settlement was conceived in order to accommodate overspill refugees from the existing settlement of Ulyankulu, sufficient time was available for more elaborate planning procedures than an emergency situation would facilitate. An estimated 28,000 refugees were moved to the settlement between 1978 and 1981, and grouped into 16 nucleated villages. Mishamo became a model

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settlement both for the Tanzanian state and for the donor, to the extent that in 1981, three years after implementation, its share of UNHCR's Tanzanian budget was 88 percent (Armstrong 1988). Mishamo obtained the highest per capita expenditure (1,049.1) of any refugee settlement in Tanzania (Table 5.1). As the organization of Mishamo settlement is similar to the other Barundi settlement of Katumba which will be discussed extensively later, I will briefly look at those characteristics which are peculiar to Mishamo.

Four years after the refugees were settled, it became apparent that the soil and water surveys carried out during the planning stage were inadequate or misleading. Soil conditions in Mishamo were generally poor, requiring substantial inputs of fertilizers after only a few years of cultivation. Refugees were allocated five ha. plots which took no account of soil conditions or land suitability for intensive production of the donor/state-preferred tobacco, maize and beans. The aim of the nucleated village pattern was to foster the sense of community so lacking in earlier settlements, however, refugees found the extensive layout problematic, as some villages were up to 40 km from the offices and health centre of headquarters. This was compounded by the lack of an internal transport system. Even the authorities found the settlement 'too large in area and population, making it difficult to administer,'

7 The bulk of which went on building, which were more elaborately designed and equipped than in previous settlements. In fact such was the haste to create a showpiece that wooden furniture was imported from Scandinavia!
coordinate and control' (Armstrong 1988 p.20). Finally, even with all the polemics on refugee participation, a donor-employed evaluation team noted that 'refugee representatives did not participate in the planning of the settlement (UNHCR Mishamo Mid-term Review 1982, p.15). Although Mishamo may have incorporated some of the more recent approaches to organized settlement, the results are very similar to those of the earlier settlement of Katumba.

UNHCR: shaking off the responsibilities: the quest for self-sufficiency

Handover is a concept widely-used in the field of refugee resettlement. It refers to the cessation of international (UNHCR) assistance to the refugees, and with all the costs, operational and maintenance, subsequently being borne by the host government (UNHCR 1977a).

The implementing agency in Tanzania outlines three main criteria for 'handover':

The first criterion for handover in Tanzania has usually been that the refugee settlers have reached a stage of complete self-reliance in food production, that they have some extras basically in cash crops which will enable them to buy additional food such as salt, tea and sugar. They should also be able to buy goods such as clothing, agricultural tools, household utensils, blankets etc. The second criterion is that the settlement has the necessary basic facilities, such as health services, education, water and communication (TCRS/Nilssen 1981).

The third includes the establishment and working of a democratic system of community representation. Concepts of refugee self-sufficiency/self-reliance and integration are used by agencies as the main objectives in establishing settlements, irrespective of the wishes of individual refugee groups. Moreover the poverty and deprivation
experienced by most African rural dwellers in marginal areas adjacent to refugee settlements, make it extremely difficult to find workable definitions.

In the context of Ujamaa, self-reliance (Kujitegemea) is conceptualized as a feature of a communally-organized society with less dependency on external forces. In the context of an underdeveloped neo-colonial state, Nyerere's discourse on self-reliance remains somewhat polemical. Self-reliance is however, a fundamental part of any development process, if development is conceived as the outcome of people's ability to improve their situation through finding their own solutions. This is only achievable through popular participation which increases their capacity to deal jointly with the environment. Rodney (1972) argues against the approach which interprets development as a purely economic affair. Development must be seen as an 'overall social process' which leads to changes in the modes of production and in the 'superstructure' of the society. Any understanding of economic development within a community is meaningless without consideration of the social relations of production into which refugees are incorporated in what, in historical materialist terms, is a peripheral capitalist state. Frequent publications of agricultural output, and, as in the Tanzanian case, crops sold to parastatals, say little about the development of the settlement but much about the expectations of the refugee community.

The undemocratic structure of refugee assistance which entails a hierarchy of subordinate relationships in the order donors: state; refugees, makes the goal of self-
sufficiency unrealizable. From the time refugees enter into the settlement process, they enter a dependent relationship with little or no control over the forces of their own reproduction. The refugee experienced what Rodney describes as a psychological crisis whereby ‘...the African himself has doubts about his capacity to transform and develop his natural environment’ (Rodney 1972, p.30).

The tendency in the literature to view settlement schemes as self-contained units clothed in humanitarianism, ensures that almost no account is taken of prevailing socio-economic and political conditions in the immediate district or in the country as a whole. Settlements are often conceived and established independently of local political forces. Not only are there environmental constraints to 'self-sufficiency', but the refugee status of the settlers means that they lack the mechanisms needed to exert control over the various external institutional forces in order to effect any improvements in their condition (Hunley 1987).

The concept of 'handover' is still attractive to the donors, particularly UNHCR, which, before the advent of African refugees had only catered for refugees during emergency periods. Concern with material provision, to the extent of establishing rural communities, has been seen as being beyond their brief, and UNHCR has always been reluctant to accept long-term responsibilities for refugees. In fact,

whatever material assistance UNHCR could be reluctantly allowed to provide could not be construed as implying any direct responsibility for the material welfare of the refugees (Coat 1979, p.4).
Pitterman (1984) has analyzed UNHCR's expenditure on Africa and identified three periods, 1963-71, 1972-76 and 1977-81 which marked significant increases. The second period saw a doubling of aid compared with the first. Also over '60 percent of UNHCR general operations expenditures in Africa since 1963 was spent between 1977 and 1981'. During this time the activities of UNHCR began to reflect United States' foreign policy. '...Between 1976 and 1981 the recipients of UNHCR aid accounted for 89 percent and 69 percent of US and NATO military transfers to Africa' (Pitterman 1984, p.34 in footnote).

The bulk of UNHCR's assistance was to local integration through organized settlement. Of the 51 organized settlements identified, 36 were established before 1971 and only 17 had been handed-over to the government, 12 of which were in Tanzania. A further 14 were still receiving assistance after self-sufficiency was supposedly achieved. In 1978, Diegues estimated that the number of refugees in UNHCR-financed rural settlements worldwide had grown from 227,000 to 354,000, representing a 56 percent increase in 10 years. Per capita expenditure also increased by 117 percent from $28 to $612 (Diegues 1978).

The crisis in the world economy during the 1970s placed considerable pressure on UNHCR to reduce costs and withdraw financial support from some long-established schemes. In 1979, UNHCR published two policy documents on settlement schemes; Planning rural settlement for refugees and Project
Management Systems (PMS). Both were concerned with the improvement of project design to determine, at the planning stage, the level of development to be achieved before 'handover' to local government administration. PMS had as its specific function to 'improve project management through performance and financial marketing.' Efforts were to be made to define the parameters of self-sufficiency. Since it was to be linked with cost-effectiveness, emphasis was to be placed on greater refugee participation and the level of infrastructure based on the ability of the local government to maintain it over time. Furthermore, concepts like viability were to be defined and programmed into the operation.

UNHCR's requirements such as speedy implementation, cost-effective projects, and agreement of 'handover' date in the project plan often result in poor planning especially those factors which could support food self-sufficiency - knowledge of soil fertility, water availability, appropriate farming systems, and technology.

As a consequence, Diegues notes, 'UNHCR involvement in certain settlements initially expected to last three to four years had to be continued for much longer' (Diegues 1978b, p.2). Of the nine schemes established in Tanzania, the average length of time taken before 'handover' is six years. Even after the formal signing of the 'handover' papers and its accompanying speeches and ceremonies, agency involvement

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8 These were documents directed at field officers as guides to establishing refugees settlements and procedures for applications. See UNHCR (1979a) Planning rural settlements for Refugees: Consideration and Ideas (UNHCR, Geneva) and (1979b) Project Management System (PMS) Handbook (UNHCR, Geneva)
continues. In the Tanzanian context schemes have been established with running costs beyond the conceivable annual budget allocations of local authorities. Table 5.1 outlines UNHCR and LWF/TCRS expenditure on settlement schemes in Tanzania between 1964-1985. The first and last schemes implemented have been the most expensive. Mishamo’s expenditure exceeded that of Katumba by 200 percent, with only one-half of Katumba’s population. Mishamo was conceived as a model settlement with no account taken of its heavy running costs after ‘handover’. The MHA has been quite concerned about the ‘costly socio-economic structure in the settlement (which) required sound management’, especially after the deterioration of services in Katumba following handover. Ulyankulu and Katumba required four and five million shillings, respectively, to meet recurrent annual expenditure, which of course their districts were unable to meet. Tanzania’s declining economic situation has meant that services in Mishamo can only be effectively maintained with the continued presence of the donors in the settlement. However, the importance to the local state of the survival of the settlement is less than its importance to the international voluntary organizations.

Katumba settlement: internal structure

Katumba was one of five sites allocated by the government in 1973. The site was selected by representatives of the Ministry of Home Affairs, TCRS and UNHCR, after which a further survey was carried out between 11 and 13 July 1973 by the same team but with greater UN, regional and district
representation, as well as the involvement of parastatals like the Tobacco Authority of Tanzania (TAT), now TTMPB.

Located between the Mtambo and Msaginya rivers, Katumba is drained by their perennial tributaries (Figure 4). Vegetation cover was originally miombo woodland with tsetse infestation. Before the settlement, an estimated 600 people lived in the area. Initially 320 sq.km was assigned to the settlement, but the increased refugee flow necessitated the addition of a further 680 sq. km.

The layout of the settlement was adopted primarily for administrative efficiency. Using the nuclear family as the basic unit of operation, the agency created a linear-grid pattern, resembling an urban structure (Figure 4). The main roads were laid out with feeder-roads at one kilometre intervals; individual plots of 3.5 ha were demarcated every 70 metres along the feeder roads, where refugees were expected to build their dwellings on the side facing the road. In sum, the settlement pattern was largely alien to African rural environments.

The designation of village areas did not arise from any community sentiments, but to comply with the Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act of 1975. It was hoped that if the villages within the settlement obtained village status under the act, they would have access to the credit facilities and agricultural inputs available to Tanzanian villages. A village could be so defined if it contained a minimum population of 250 families, if its organization consisted of a village assembly and a village council, but more fundamentally if there was a high degree of communal
production (McHenry 1979). In fact, the settlement was planned in such a way that almost no land was available for communal production except on its fringes. As the settlement population grew, villages were further sub-divided resulting in amorphous village areas, to satisfy the regulations on a purely statistical basis. Therefore, a number of villages like Mnyaki, Tambazi and Ivungwe, were divided into A and B. Katumba villages contained between 250-450 families, with an average of 400 plots per village (Figure 4).

By 1978, 22 villages were registered under the act; and since then a further five villages have been demarcated. Plans to extend the settlement area to accommodate its increasing population prompted surveys in 1986, which showed that the extra 500 sq. km. requested by the donors was already within the original designated 1000 sq. km. The actual area covered by the 22 villages was estimated in 1987 to be about 568 sq. km., giving a population density of 133 per sq. km.

The size of a refugee population is a highly contested issue in refugee assistance, where population size determines the extent of funding. The earliest population census was in 1976, details of which are outlined in Table 4.4. Katumba’s population is estimated by UNHCR to be rising at a rate of 3.5 to 4.5 percent per annum. During the mid-1980s, the state and TCRS were estimating a population of 100,000, which would necessitate the input of significantly more funds. In response, in 1986, UNHCR and UNFPA launched a family planning programme in the
settlement. However, the recent 1987 census\(^9\) recorded a total population of 66,885, thus giving an average annual growth rate of 4.4 percent per annum. This is in contrast to the estimated national growth rate of 3.5% per annum. Even with the higher than average annual growth rate, Katumba’s population is still below donor and state estimates. One can therefore assume, that over the years, there has been significant over-estimation of Katumba’s population. On the basis of the 1987 refugee census, Katumba’s villages have an average population of 2,477. Of the 1540 people recorded in my sample, 54 percent were under the age of 18, and the overall dependency ratio was 1.3.

Because of the estimated increase in the settlement’s population, two further villages, Burembo and Kabuga, were proposed, and are currently under construction - both to the north of Kanoge (Figure 4). As yet it is unclear whether the villages are to accommodate Katumba overspill or spontaneously settled refugees forced out of Kigoma region. Initially, two main commercial areas were established at Tambazi and Mnyaki. Both act as village centres with primary schools and as settlement-wide focal points for churches and other community activities. Three subsidiary market centres are situated at Kanoge, Kalungu, and at the headquarters, which has offices, a health centre and a multi-purpose co-operative (Figure 4).

\(^9\) This census was carried out by UNHCR and the Tanzanian government- the full details of which are not yet available.
**Katumba: provision of services**

In most societies, it is generally recognized that governments should provide services for their inhabitants. This responsibility has been assumed by the Tanzanian government for its population and has provided the bait to make villagization policies acceptable. Villagers could expect to obtain essential infrastructure like water, schools and dispensaries if they complied with government directives. The state did not however, have the capacity to carry out such an extensive programme. Consequently, even though buildings may have been established, the quality of services has remained poor.

Under the tripartite agreement, the provision of services to refugee settlements has been entrusted to the donors, who undertake 'in consultation with the various regional officers and departments to provide such supplementary, educational, medical, social and agricultural services as are deemed necessary' (UNHCR, Tripartite agreement, 1973). With their access to ready capital, donors have been able to provide services conforming to government guidelines for rural areas. Chambers (1975) criticizes the donors for their preoccupation with high-cost buildings which are easy to administer and inspect. At the same time, local schools in Tabora region were built at $20,000 per school, whilst $80,000 was used on refugee schools (Chambers 1975). In Katumba by 1978, there were 15 permanent schools with 85 classrooms and 20 teachers' houses, one 20-bed health centre (Plate 3), five dispensaries and 106 day-care centres, of which only 13 were in operation in 1986. Mishamo
Plate 3  Health Centre, Katumba

Plate 4  Anglican Church, Mishamo
had a more elaborate building programme, which included a stadium and a rural training centre.

In terms of basic amenities, there is a clear gradation in the quality of services provided as one moves down the social hierarchy. Electricity and piped water are mainly for settlement headquarters, for expatriates and government officials. Their houses are built and furnished by the donors. Settlements thus have a planned social stratification, differentiating the staff from the settlers.

In providing services, donors usurp the responsibility of the local authorities and the villagers. Little consideration is given to how the services are to be provided and maintained after handover, which is often accompanied by a marked qualitative change. For example, the electricity and water services to the health centre in Katumba ceased; the settlement had to depend on the more limited supply of drugs available from the regional authorities under the Essential Drugs Programme; buildings fell into disrepair and some were abandoned.

Normally, buildings are constructed with no accompanying guidance as to their functions. The Dutch government recently, under the ICARA 11 programme, gave contributions for the construction of 14 community development centres in Katumba. At the time of my research, one centre in Kanoge was still not in use a year after completion. The explanation was that the building was awaiting inspection from the District Inspector before it

\textsuperscript{10} The Essential Drug Programme is a UNICEF sponsored project which provide monthly drug kits to dispensaries and hospitals.
could be handed over to the refugees. However, one such building, in Tambazi, was already in use, but only for meetings held by the Settlement Development Committee. No one had discussed with the villagers the functions of the buildings, nor did the villages feel responsible for their maintenance.

It is the inability of the authorities to provide services to the settlements which is often used to justify the perpetuation of donor activities. In 1982, five years after 'handover', TCRS expanded its activities in Katumba settlement to construct a further seven primary schools. This regeneration of donor activities in Katumba is now justified by the new funds available under ICARA II. For western governments, foreign exchange must be channelled through an expatriate organization, thus maintaining the dependent relationship between donors and refugees. Renewed donor involvement confirms to the refugees the superior position of the donors in catering for their needs, and the subordination of the Tanzanian state. The ICARA II projects in Katumba require the construction of a health centre in Kanoge, two dispensaries, mother and child clinics added to existing dispensaries, seven primary schools and teachers houses, assistance to the multi-purpose cooperative, the drilling of 27 boreholes, as well as the construction of 14

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11 With a tripartite agreement (Project no. 84/AP/TAN/MA/4) UNHCR allocated US $886,000 of the $975,344, required for the construction of seven primary schools, to extend education to a further 12,000 primary school pupils. Schools were built to serve the following villages: Kajeje, Katumba/Ivungwe, Kaburonge/Kambuzi, Ikolongo/Ndurumo, Kalungu/Ivungwe, and Kaminula/Mnyaki.
rural development centres sponsored by the Danish government.

Administering the settlements

Settlement administration exhibits three major features: firstly, it is hierarchically organized; secondly, there is an unequal division of labour between the donor and the government representatives; and thirdly, there is no refugee participation in decision-making. Distinct differences exist between staff and refugees in housing and related amenities, in language, remunerations and in roles and duties. This is substantiated in studies by Morsink (1972) in Mozambican settlements in Southern Tanzania, and by Abel and Alfred (1987) in Mishamo. As Morsink (1972) points out staff have the right to 'coordinate' and to 'oversee'. Refugees are subordinate to all members of staff.

Any staff member has the right or authority to 'check' on (a refugee) or to implement control. Thus every settler knows that controls can be clamped on or linked to, an enormously wide variety of items of conduct and behaviour. Their main concern is to stay out of trouble (Morsink 1972,p.13).

Formal village organization within the settlement takes the shape outlined in the 1975 Act. From the Village Assembly (consisting of all villagers over the age of 18), a Village Council is elected which itself elects a Village Chairman every three years. UNHCR describes the arrangement.

Each village has its village chairman who is democratically elected and who then presides over the village development committee (which consists of locally-elected "ten-cell leaders" and "road chairman" with village development extension staff and advisors) Each village chairman then represent his village on the settlement-wide Settlement Development Committee (SDC), chaired by the Government Settlement Commandant. In turn, the Settlement Commandant sits on the District
Development Committee and reports back to the settlement the latest government policies and directives (UNHCR 1977, p.8).

Excluded in the above quotation is any reference to the role of the donor organization and their representatives in the settlement, even though the donor organizations' responsibilities include the implementation and management of the schemes. Donor staff within the settlements includes the project co-ordinator who is responsible for:

a) Expenditure incurred in the settlement and local supply purchases.

b) Close relations with the district and regional authorities.

c) Supervision of the local sectoral departments.

d) Engagement of all TCRS staff employed except for international staff.

e) Providing the Settlement Commandant with vehicles for the delivery of World Food Programme rations.

f) Ensuring that stores records are properly kept and that 'immediate needs' materials are distributed promptly, since TCRS is, in addition to funds, providing donated commodities valued at several hundred thousand dollars.

g) Checking the sound working of garage and workshop and the economical use of fuel.

h) To ensure efficient reporting and monitoring, study of the proposed work/time schedule and visits to projects in the field with Project Officers (TCRS/Nilssen 1981, p.6).

During the early period of the settlements the bulk of the staff, including the Project Co-ordinator and Agricultural Officers, were expatriates and this continues to be true in the most recent settlement of Mishamo. At the time of handover, the agency employed the following senior staff in Katumba: a project co-ordinator, an administrative officer, two agricultural officers, a project engineer, a rural medical assistant, a community development officer, a
co-operative assistant, and a co-operative general manager, as well as numerous teachers and junior assistants, totalling 251 employees. After handover, education, health, agriculture, community development, road maintenance, and water came under the settlement commandant and respective government departments. Within Katumba, TCRS now employs a building engineer/project co-ordinator, an assistant building engineer, a special project officer (co-operatives), and numerous semi-skilled and manual workers. TCRS maintains an office, carpentry workshop, garage and store.

Some refugees have complained about the social hierarchy of the staff employed by the donors in the descending order: expatriates, Tanzanians and refugees (Abel and Alfred 1987). This is a common feature of settlement schemes in general. Chambers notes for Mwea settlement that social and cultural differences between staff members limit their contact to areas of mutual interest. Harrell-Bond (1982) also draws attention to the actual status differences based on salary differences which affect working relationships. Agency workers gain more control over local institutions and undermine the contributions made by local authorities. A similar situation exists within Katumba resulting in misunderstanding and antagonism all round.¹² Chambers adds, 'their different cultures, purposes,

¹² This was clearly illustrated in 1987, when an insensitive and dogmatic expatriate found himself imprisoned for a minor misdemeanour. Two years of misunderstandings between the expatriate and the Tanzania staff resulted in the latter seizing the opportunity to spread malicious gossip about the expatriate being a South African spy, forcing the local authorities to incarcerate him until intervention from Dar es Salaam.
permanence and roles predisposed them to misunderstand one another and to disagree' (Chambers 1969, p.162). Gasarasi (1984) has documented areas of conflict between Settlement Commandants and Project Co-ordinators. Such disputes tend to be recurrent and revolve around control of expenditure or budgetary accountability within the settlements. The agency responding to head office pressure replied:

if TCRS is the executive agency for the whole programme, then its Coordinator must also have the final say in deciding the expenditure within the budget ... otherwise, we shall have a situation where the government officer may wish to incur expenditure which our project coordinator does not agree with and in relation to the UNHCR we bear the responsibility for the funds spent (quoted in Gasarasi 1984, p.30).

Much concern was expressed at the siphoning-off of funds and equipment by the settlement commandants for private ventures. Unable to get funds direct from the agencies and with a limited government budget, there have been occasions when settlement commandants have tended indirectly to appropriate cash or materials allocated to the refugees. In Katumba, a former settlement commandant misappropriated thousands of shillings from the multi-purpose cooperative. Putting aside corrupt practices, settlement commandants have no power over the expatriate staff, or even over a large proportion of the workforce within the settlement. The donors tend to employ the majority of the wage-earners, for example, of the 343 employees at Ulyankulu in 1981, only 35 were directly under the control of the Ministry of Home Affairs (Gasarasi 1984). Lack of sufficient funds and limited resources often leave
the commandants reliant on the donors for transport, even to carry out essential duties.  

The authoritarian character of settlement administration normally describes the relationship between settlers and the government staff, whose role is to mediate and provide the link between refugees, government and donors. Requests for assistance from donors, travel permits, further education and trading licences have to be sanctioned by the Settlement Commandant, thus permitting ample opportunity for exploitation. Refugees are arrested and fined for minor charges and personal property, such as bicycles and radios, may be confiscated. Morsink (1972) observed a similar situation in Southern Tanzanian settlements.

The settlement commandants have an unusual latitude of action and interference. The Commandant is in charge of an area which is isolated physically and socially. He has a police force and a lock-up at his disposal and is very autonomous from an administrative point of view. He is dealing with a population which can be "caught", if the Commandant so wishes, on an endless variety of items of misbehaviour (Morsink 1972,p.13).

In Katumba, this is exemplified by the refugees' obsequiousness in the presence of the Commandant.

The powerlessness of the refugees is apparent in their inability to participate in the decision-making process of the settlement. Despite the abundance of printed matter on participation, the absence of refugee involvement at crucial decision-making levels continues. Too often refugee participation refers to their willingness to provide

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13 Even after handover, the agency still believe that they are in control of the settlements. One agency staff member expressed her indignation to me, at UNHCR visiting the settlement without informing the agency.
unremunerated labour, euphemistically termed 'self-help'.

The perception of refugees as dependent is given more
justification in the Barundi case, where donors and the
state tend to reinforce their subordinate position by
referring back to the traditional patron-client relationship
forced on the Bahutu in Burundi. An expatriate nurse
commented in conversation: "these people are used to being
told what to do; they are not used to thinking for
themselves back in Burundi." The lack of communication
between expatriates and refugees poses a major problem in
the settlement.14 Although village chairmen are represented
on the village Settlement Development Committee (SDC),
meetings are held irregularly and only after major decisions
have been made by the higher Settlement Development Planning
Committee (SDPC).15 Consequently, SDC operates essentially
to pass on directives from government to refugees.

Harrell-Bond (1986) describes 'participation as being
about empowering the poor to take control of their own
lives' (p.4). It therefore follows that lack of
participation is crucial to the control of the refugees’
lives. Methods of organization and communication are devised
so that they 'reach down to, activate and control settlers' (Chambers 1969, p.163).

14 It was not until 1982 that expatriate staff working for
the agency were allowed to attend Kiswahili classes. The
Director of the agency has worked in Tanzania for about 22
years and is still unable even to greet people in Kiswahili.
15 SDPC comprises the settlement commandant, project
coordinator, assistant settlement commandant, sectional
heads such as agriculture, construction, education, health,
transport, rural development and water, manpower officer,
accounts officer, stores officer, reports and monitoring
officer. In reality this body is just as ineffective as the
SDC, since all the important decisions are made in Dar es Salaam.
Creating a community

Fundamentally, the community development approach promoted by the donors in Katumba centred on organizing peasant agricultural production in order to achieve rapid self-reliance. The assumption was that this could proceed faster if a rural community was reconstructed with some traditional values and the implantation of communal infrastructure such as schools, health centres, churches, roads, stadiums, football pitches, market areas and other appropriate modern facilities. Although the donors could provide the buildings and equipment, the people lacked the appropriate education or the means to utilize them fully. A team of community development officers was hired to impart the necessary knowledge.

A vigorous community development programme was pursued while TCRS was administering the settlement, and has subsequently been taken over by the government's maendeleo (development) department, with a much reduced staff and budget, and with no greater effectiveness than under TCRS. The following account of the community development programme documents the approach taken from the period of inception up to 'handover' in 1978.

A top-down approach was sanctioned by academics and government officials alike. Chambers visiting the settlement in 1975 attributed the apparent 'success' of the settlement to the 'vigorously agricultural extension and community development programmes.' In fact the basis of the community development programme was to gently, but effectively, coerce...
refugees to participate in euphemistically termed 'self-help' activities. Through the officers, 'voluntary' work parties were organized for the construction of schools, dispensaries, day-care centres and roads. Each household was expected to contribute labour for site clearance, brick-burning and road maintenance. The recent construction of two new villages and a new health centre on the northern fringe of Katumba, required 'self-help' contributions from households in neighbouring villages for site preparation. TCRS then hired contractors to complete the work. Such tasks took no account of household labour constraints or seasonality. Women in Tambazi village reported that such forms of 'voluntary' labour always fell disproportionately on them. Many had to carry out weekly road maintenance.

A second major function of community development in the settlement was to impart the skills required by the community to a few selected members. Such skills were gender-defined; women were allocated 'western' cultural roles, and were confined to sewing groups or vegetable production. A few women received courses on the operations of the Tanzanian Women's Union, (Ushirika wa Wanawake ya Tanzania, (UWT) and on child care. Men received training in shop management, tobacco farming, co-operative skills, teaching and crafts (TCRS, Community development Report 1977). Paradoxically, the rural development staff (Bibi Maendeleo) comprised six women or 'motivation officers' whose roles were never clearly defined, except to disseminate western knowledge on child-rearing. Adult literacy classes were used not just to orientate the
refugees in their new surroundings, but because knowledge of Kiswahili was necessary to understand state directives. Education became a vehicle to introduce community development programmes. Commenting on the community development course, a TCRS representative wrote:

It has proved to be a way by which people of a community form new groups to meet the new needs, produce good leaders and learn with the settlement development authorities voluntarily for their common interest. It has also proved to be one of the first ways by which the agents of the new programmes have been able to reach the people through literacy classes when they want to introduce community development programmes (Notes in TCRS archives, dated 28.3.1977).

The community was expected to become a resource centre materially endowed in labour and service institutions. Understanding the community was equated with being in possession of certain factual information. The community development officer of TCRS recounts an incident where Ulyankulu settlement failed to obtain a tobacco processing plant supposedly because the refugee leaders could not impress the TAT officials, due to their lack of some basic factual information about the settlement. If the TAT was seriously considering the plant, such factual data would have been obtainable from the representative of the Ministry of Home Affairs or TCRS. In fact, the refugee status of Ulyankulu’s residents ensured that they were not in a position to compete with local people when it came to employment opportunities.

TCRS taught skills to a small proportion of the refugee population. Only training for those skills which might be of

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direct benefit to the operation of the agency's project were financially supported by the voluntary organizations, such as TCRS or Christian Council of Tanzania (CCT). Young people were granted scholarships to study typing, electricity, motor mechanics, catering, nursing, agriculture, hotel management or community development. TCRS also stipulated the location of appropriate institutions, excluding those in Dar es Salaam, where costs were higher. In some instances, this has severe implications for the quality of education. The skills commonly in demand by the community ranged from trading, bicycle-making and repairing, butchering, bread-making, tailoring, watch-repairing, shoe-making, accounting and construction. Established craftsmen often learnt their skills in Burundi or outside the settlement.

**Patrolling the community**

To achieve transformation of rural areas and greater control over the rural populace, it was necessary for the state to impose a structure of social organization which would ensure co-operation from the villagers and effective maintenance of control in rural areas. Tanzanian villages soon lost their autonomy to a state-sponsored bureaucratic elite (Shivji 1976).

Villages were equipped with new administrative machinery which would have control over production and over the labour of each household within the administrative area. Villages were divided into discrete residential areas, with groups of ten households forming a ten-cell house system (kumi-kumi) under the guidance of an elected leader
(balozi). Katherine Levine has already given a comprehensive account of the stated aims, functions and formations of the ten-cell system (Levine 1975). Recent formations of the system have been discussed in a monograph edited by Abrahams (1985). In Levine's investigation, the role of the cell leader was to 'act as a mobilizing agent for self-help and other development schemes. He was the vital link in the communication chain connecting the people with their leaders' (Levine 1975, p.330).

A similar role could be attributed to the ten-cell leaders and road leaders of Katumba (each road also had a leader, balozi ya barabara), whose duties were to ensure that top-down initiatives on crop programmes reach the farmers. They were effective in mobilizing and supervising each household's contribution to compulsory 'self-help' communal activities. Thiele documents a similar situation in Dodoma villages.

...the performance of compulsory labour service depended upon a system of surveillance and policing internal to the village...In all the villages it was the division of the villages into discrete residential areas which made surveillance by the village administration possible. The cell leaders constituted the most basic level of surveillance. They were responsible for ensuring the members of their cells worked (Theile 1985 pp.93-94).

Such an elaborate structure where the cell membership defined each household and their labour in the village structure, was appropriate for Katumba, except that the absence of communal production reduced the demand of the administration on the labour-time of individual households. 'Self-help' work was nevertheless entered into involuntarily, and was therefore unpopular with the people. The distinct division between refugees and nationals
operates in favour of the Mabalozi, who were seen as unwilling agents of the state. Their identification with the farmers, through their common predicament, protected the peasants from any direct sanctions imposed by the state, and the Mabalozi from the enmity of the people. For nationals, Theile noted that only in the village, where the people’s militia was used to enforce attendance, were sanctions effectively imposed (p.96-97).

In rural Africa, the basic economic and social unit is the village. In Katumba, the ujamaa village structure was imposed on the people as elsewhere in Tanzania. The settlement was divided into contiguous residential areas, which were conveniently registered as villages. However, the functions of village administration, as empowered by the Villages Act of 1975, were never extended to the refugee villages, but remained centrally-controlled, and on hand-over were transferred from the external agency, TCRS, to the Ministry of Home Affairs. There was no local autonomy, for the Settlement Commandant’s office controlled production, education, commercial activities and law and order, including the imposition of penalties. Villages were convenient administrative units for the state. Village Officers were responsible for the collection of development levy (kodi ya maendeleo), the running of the village shop, and the collection of crops for marketing co-operatives.

Do villages operate as social entities? A village council (halmashauri ya kijiji), composed of elected members, acted as the corporate body in charge of the main village institutions. Village councils had a tendency to
function independently of the state. Even with their limited authority, they had extensive control over the settling of minor disputes and other matters, ensuring that villagers maintained relative autonomy over their problems. However, I was not able to determine the extent to which people made use of their services. The young-age composition of one village council suggests that villagers may not take their activities seriously. People often find it more beneficial to seek financial and marital advice from church leaders or close relations.

The church represents the most independent organization of refugees in the settlement, although some churches, such as the Roman Catholic is headed by a Tanzanian (Plate 4). Church activities are not normally affected by the state unless they impinge directly on administrative policies. To a large extent, Katumba’s churches have been co-opted by the state and are used to disseminate information and directives to the refugees.

The community structure, as imposed by donors and the state, functioned only at an official level. The village chairman, however ineffective, acquired substantial importance because of his role as intermediary between the settlers and the officials of the state. His co-operation was therefore vital to obtain state concessions. The criteria for chairmanship vary from one village to another. In the seven villages surveyed, two chairmen were secondary school leavers in Burundi, two were businessmen who had accumulated wealth in the settlement, one was a church elder and the other a recent primary school leaver with no prior
leadership experience. One of these village leaders was not proficient in Kiswahili and relied on his clerk for interactions with the state. The election of young men as leaders indicated the relative unimportance that some villages attach to the office. Village chairmen who combine their office with an authoritative position in the church command greater authority and are more influential.

The extent to which Katumba villages have appeared as cohesive and viable social units is debatable. Settlement-wide social activities which involve village units were organized by the state or the donors, (for example, intervillage football matches). Since it was the people and not the territory which constituted a village, the placing together of people from diverse locations, even after 15 years, could not lead to cohesive units.

The 201 peasant households in my sample originated from some 106 different villages and towns in Burundi. In Mwenge village, the 45 sampled households came from some 36 different villages. In effect, most people on arrival were settled next to complete strangers. Disputes between neighbouring households were common in the first few years of the settlement. Statements bearing witness to this were frequently voiced by women who through their normal household duties, in having to find paths to waterholes and firewood, often traversed the plots of unknown neighbours. Frequent illnesses from the alien environment were often ascribed to witchcraft. By 1987, this stage of distrust has passed, and genuine friendly relationships have developed among the population, a possible catalyst being the church.
A whole network of unofficial interconnecting tracks and paths traverse the settlement, running from one plot to another, linking villages and farmers to the market.

Flight involved the displacement of the bulk of the population of selected Burundi villages. Therefore, for most people, kin relations are scattered throughout the settlement, and provide a sense of social security. Visiting relations may involve travelling considerable distances by foot. This dispersed pattern of kin was not confined to Katumba. Seventy-six percent of the sampled households had relatives in other parts of Tanzania, namely in the settlements of Ulyankulu, and Mishamo or in Kigoma region. When asked their relationship to those outside Katumba, 32, 31 and 22 percent had immediate family members in Kigoma, Mishamo, and Ulyankulu respectively. Between 10&14 percent had extended family members in all three locations. Returning to Katumba, the community structure imposed by the state has been superseded by links which are not spatially-defined. Alignments among the population are based on interest groups, whether religious, as with the churches, or class as with the businessmen, or on areas of origin or political involvement with the struggle in Burundi.

The government's attitude has been to publicly play down the refugee status of the Barundi. Throughout their stay they have been described by the state as 'guests', 'settlers', 'residents' or 'Wahutu' living in Tanzania. President Nyerere, addressing the refugees at Katumba settlement in 1976, declared: 'You are Wahutu living in Tanzania; you are just one more tribe in our country' (Daily
News April 1976). On the 20 April 1976 the donor agency was advised by the MHA no longer to refer to the Barundi as refugees but as 'settlers', 'villagers' or 'farmers'. However, these proclamations have tended to remain at the level of rhetoric with no actual change in policy. In my various conversations and interviews with government officials the term refugee was always used in reference to the Barundi. In my survey of 201 refugees in Katumba settlement, 81 percent said that first and foremost they felt like guests, 14 percent as refugees and two percent as Barundi, but all of them identified as Wahutu, and there was no significant variation according to age or sex. The response of one elderly Katumba refugee to the state attempts to de-politicize them by redefining their status is 'I am not a guest, I am a refugee, if I was a guest, I would not have to work so hard, I would get food and other things ...I would have my freedom'.

Restrictions on movements

As shown in Chapter Three, Tanzania’s refugee policy is based on control, on restricting mobility within the country. According to the Refugee (Control) Act 1965:

Any refugee who without the permit issued under section 12, leaves or attempts to leave a refugee settlement in which he has been ordered to reside...shall be deemed to have committed a disciplinary offence (Section 13 (3a)).

In order to leave the settlement refugees have to obtain a permit (kibali) from the settlement commandant's office. The procedure is as follows: the village chairman

Letter from MHA to Project Coordinator TCRS 20 April 1976, TCRS Archives.
writes a letter explaining the destination, the purpose and the duration of the travel; the refugee then queues outside the Commandant’s office. Each refugee is interviewed in turn. If approved, the settlement commandant stamps the letter which is passed on to the secretary who enters the refugee’s name in a log book. On average about 50 refugees are seen each day, and requests may include such needs as trips for medical treatment, to attend marriages, to purchase goods and to fish. Failure to obtain a permit can result in a maximum of six-months imprisonment. In contrast the borders of the settlement are open and refugees may travel short distances outside without a permit. The presence of a gate near the headquarters is used mainly to control vehicles entering the settlement. Some observers regard its function as purely symbolic, but discussions with traders in Mpanda town reveal that with the gate access to the settlement markets can be restricted if certain goods and services are not provided on demand to the settlement authorities.

Restrictions on mobility have serious implications for employment opportunities. Permission has to be obtained from the Ministry of Home Affairs if a refugee seeks employment outside the settlement. The state exercises greater force against those refugees who undertake commercial activities in neighbouring urban centres. Annually, refugees residing in Mpanda or Tabora towns, are rounded-up and sent back to the settlements. The most recent documented occurrence took

18 In July 1987 a sixteen year-old boy was sentenced to six months imprisonment after being caught in Mpanda town without a permit.
place in May 1986, when 33 Burundi refugees, living in Tabora town, were ordered back to the settlements. The explanation was that they were involved in criminal activities (African Concord 8 May 1986, Daily News 12.7.1985 and 9.7.1986).

Refugee resistance to settlement

More recently studies of resistance among refugee populations have moved away from concern with collective action, in the form of large-scale uprisings, to focus on the daily struggles which have been interpreted as passive acceptance of the status quo, and which according to Scott (1986) include defiant action 'between revolts'.

Attempts by state and donors to de-politicize the refugee issue has left us with the image of passive participants in the assistance programmes. Stripped of political and civil rights, they are expected to conform and accept the directives emanating from state and donor representatives, to whom they are immensely obligated (Yeld 1965, Gasarasi 1976, Hansen 1981). A survey of the literature will not unearth any organized revolts, instead a number of small, often individual acts of resistance can be detected. Resistance may be a response to diverse situations, but often it has the objective to maintain the struggle back home via liberation movements. After 15 years in asylum, Barundi refugees still hope to return to Burundi, either militarily or by peaceful means. Since 1972, over 10 political groups have been formed in exile, three in Rwanda,
and seven in Tanzania. A statement issued in 1984 by a group of Wahutu residing in Tanzania went as follows:

We believe that many countries and many peace-loving leaders the world over abhor discrimination and tribalism, will listen to us and hear the voice of the oppressed because there is no single tribe which was created to suffer or to be driven out of its country, or be killed like an ass, or to be oppressed and be denied their rights like our brothers in South Africa and Namibia and Latin America. All these sufferings are being inflicted upon a major tribe in Burundi of about 4,680,000 according to the 1984 census.

Thus the Wahutu of Burundi have decided to awaken and come out of the slavery into which we were put by the Watutsi and the Colonialists. We should be firm, let’s unite and fight strongly against tribalism in Burundi, the country of our fathers and forefathers. (authors names withheld)

Undoubtedly the continued oppression of Wahutu in Burundi fuels the desire of refugees to return home. Unfortunately, most refugees believe that the UN and the OAU are capable of finding a solution to their problem because of its injustice. Although 97 percent of the refugees interviewed expressed a wish to return to Burundi, many however, stipulated political change in Burundi as an essential requirement of any repatriation exercise. One respondent declared, ‘if I hear there is a Muhutu president in Burundi, I would return today.’ My interviews invariably ended with appeals to the UN and the OAU to press for political change in Burundi.

Settlement, involving construction of homes and the taking up of cultivation, signifies an acceptance of exile and abandonment of one’s homeland. Resistance may be against the actual structures imposed in the settlements; the carrying of permits, the cultivation of specific crops, communal farming or compulsory marketing channels. Such
resistance does not take the form of direct confrontation with the host state, but could be referred to as 'everyday forms of peasant resistance' (Scott, 1986). Whether such forms of resistance constitute 'real' resistance depends on whether one characterizes the peasantry as a revolutionary force. Undoubtedly, refugee peasants, through their politicization constitute a potential revolutionary force, but only in relation to their country of origin. In the settlements, the strategies of resistance employed are essentially to ensure survival and do not constitute a threat to the settlement as such or to the Tanzanian state. Nevertheless, in terms of affecting development policies, individual acts of footdragging and evasion, reinforced often by a vulnerable popular culture of resistance and multiplied many-thousand fold may, in the end, make an utter shambles of the policies dreamed-up by their would-be superiors in the capital (Scott 1986 p.8).

- or in the refugees' case, Geneva. Resistance to settlement can take many forms. The most common is evasion. Despite state pressure to relocate to settlements, over 23,000 Barundi refugees have remained in the border areas. Although resistance within settlements has always been linked to the degree of permanency which the very act of settlement imposes on the refugee, there is little evidence to suggest that refugees who enter the settlements do not want a degree of stability or a base from which to operate. What they often resist are the excessive attempts by the state and the donors to control their activities and movements. At Mwesi, in 1967, conflict between government and refugees ensued over the issue of identity cards. About 50 percent of the refugees refused the cards. The government
responded with force, and jailed 60 heads of households in Mpanda without trial. Some remained in prison for seven to eight years, even with UNHCR’s intervention (Holborn 1972, Tunga 1987). Coupled with this were efforts by a representative of the Second Vice-President’s office to have the refugees expelled from Mwesi and Tanzania (Letter to Oxfam, dated 22 March 1968, from Nairobi field office, and in letter to Oxfam 4th May 1968). However, resistance to permits took on the common form of refusal to cultivate. In Mwesi too, the agricultural programme of the implementing agency was disrupted when one-half of the refugee population refused to accept seeds, or participate in communal farming. The expatriate agricultural officer complained that ‘refugees had opted out of the programme’ (Mwesi, Agricultural report (1968) from Mwesi to TCRS, ref:2020/6, TCRS archives, Dar es Salaam).

Refugees from different socio-economic backgrounds were reluctant to adapt to the new forms of production in Tanzania. Resistance to Ujamaa Vijijini, cash cropping and farming practices will be further discussed in the following chapter. The donors’ response has always been the withdrawal of rations which has had devastating effects in Mwesi, culminating in a famine named ‘Rwangemera’ after the settlement commandant (Tunga 1987).

Compliance does not necessarily mean acceptance, and refugees, as soon as the pressure has ceased, have relinquished those tasks which have been forced upon them. Subsequent out-migration from settlements is a common feature of this resistance. Populations at Mwesi, Muyenzi
and Cankuzu-Mosso in Burundi, declined drastically (Gasarasi 1976, Van der Meeren 1970). In order to coerce refugees into self-help activities, the donors have used strategies like ‘Food for Work’ or ‘Clothes for Work’ which have themselves proved ineffective, since refugees interpret communal production as working for the authorities (Gasarasi 1976).

Other forms of resistance, now common in Katumba, are evasion of taxes and avoidance of government marketing channels. The introduction of a development levy on all adults over 18 years in 1984 has placed severe pressure on the refugee population whose primary means of obtaining cash is through the sale of agricultural surplus. Petty trade and the parallel market provide the main source of cash income. Such activities are not readily classifiable as resistance, more as survival strategies.

**Bureaucratization and the survival of settlements**

Barbara Harrell-Bond (1986) has drawn attention to the role played by aid agencies in relief work, particularly their negative impact on the ability of refugees to find their own solutions. Media images of refugees as victims add substance to appeals for donations. Attention has also been drawn to the plethora of agencies in some African countries, and the competition for contracts strengthened by contacts in Geneva. Recently there has been a trend in development planning to focus on NGOs as more appropriate vehicles through which western governments can channel aid.

Most of the pledges for ICARA II have been tied to NGO participation. In 1984 the British government decided to
channel all of its ICARA aid to Third World countries through British-based NGOs. A debate as to whether NGOs can effectively reach the poorest of the poor is beyond the scope of this thesis, but using the donor agency in the settlement as an example, there is no evidence to support the current notion that NGOs are more able to gain local participation than the host government. In fact, the power/position of local government is eroded by the NGOs. In Mpanda district, TCRS with its fleet of Landrovers, drilling machines, road graders and access to foreign exchange, possesses materials beyond the capacity of the district authorities, which in the 1980s had to rely on TCRS to import four much-needed Landrovers. In competition with aid agencies, local NGOs suffer numerous constraints. Lacking the resources and the political clout of international NGOs, they become as ineffective as some government departments.

Hulme’s (1987) hypothesis that settlement schemes may be supported by bureaucrats particularly those in various government departments because of the availability of the larger budgets generated by foreign assistance does not hold true in Tanzania. In 1972 the responsibility for refugee matters was transferred from the Second-Vice President’s Office to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), which is predominantly responsible for internal security, thus making co-ordination between government departments extremely difficult. The principal secretary for refugee issues in the MHA is in charge of every facet of settlement life. Such officials often have no experience of refugee matters or are former settlement commandants forced out through illegal
practices. The small office and staff is overstretched and cannot deal effectively with all aspects of refugee affairs. Even though local bureaucrats, particularly settlement commandants, are reluctant to relinquish their posts it is doubtful whether they have any significant influence on policy decisions.

International bureaucrats in the form of TCRS have more reasons for prolonging the assistance period. Why in 1984 was it necessary to introduce 'food for work' programmes in Katumba, seven years after WFP food rations had ceased and without any drastic change in food production? Only those refugees working for the donors were paid partly in food donations. 'Food for work' should have been extended to those refugees coerced out of their own subsistence production to do 'self-help' work, for which actual wages could have been paid.

How much credence is there in the hypothesis that settlement schemes are designed to fail? Services continue to be provided at such a high standard that after handover the local authorities cannot maintain them. The supply of electricity and piped water to the settlement headquarters tend to benefit the Tanzanian officials and the expatriates, such services requiring diesel can only be maintained with the presence of the donors in the settlement. As in the case of Mpanda district authority's inability to meet the demand for diesel in Mishamo settlement, supplies have to be brought directly from MHA in Dar es Salaam.

The donors (TCRS) have developed a patron-client relationship with government officials, thus obtaining
requests for an increasing number of projects. This is exemplified by the case of Burigi settlement in Ngara district, where an attempt was made to settle 2000 Banyarwanda pastoralists who had fled Uganda in 1982. An elaborate programme was religiously followed, even when it became clear that the refugees opposed sedentarization, and a massive out-migration of the 1500 inhabitants was occurring.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has considered settlement schemes for refugees in the context of the rural development strategies of the Tanzanian state. Settlement schemes with all their features of control, became an appropriate vehicle to intensify agricultural production in underdeveloped rural areas, which due to the nature of the economy and the resultant regional differentiation, have not attracted development funds. The following chapter will show how refugees and refugee aid provide the labour and the capital needed to increase the commoditization of the district and its region, as Tanzania has struggled to feed its population, and to generate foreign exchange through marketable commodities.

From my discussion of the internal organization, it is clear that settlement schemes are the result of unequal relationships between the Tanzanian state, donors, and refugees. In keeping with the national rural development strategy, donors usurp the role of the local authorities, and refugees are subordinated to the representatives of the
state and the donors. Settlements are essentially donor-controlled enclaves, which cannot participate effectively in the wider political and social spheres. In fact, the schemes have achieved one of their principal aims, which is to provide the organizational framework by which the state can gain and maintain control over the refugee population.

As with non-refugee schemes, there has been a marked absence of social analysis at the planning stage, even after the emergency situation; all social activities are directly perceived in their relation to economic activities and regional politics, resulting in draconian measures to retain refugees in the settlements. Moreover, the subordinate and insecure status of the refugees restricts their resistance to the settlements themselves.
CHAPTER SIX

ORGANIZING PRODUCTION IN KATUMBA SETTLEMENT

Introduction

My intention in this chapter is to focus on the conceptualization of refugee settlement schemes as vehicles for the exploitation of peripheral areas. In such schemes refugees are viewed dominantly in their role as peasants and with experiences identical to those of the Tanzanian peasantry. By analysing the organization of production within Katumba, it is possible to determine the extent to which refugees have been mobilized by the state to intensify the commoditization of marginal areas. In this chapter and the next, I will attempt to interpret the specificities of this mode of incorporation; more precisely the nature of the commodity relations enforced on the refugee population, conceptualized as 'peasants', and its implications for the emerging social relations within the settlement.

Conflicting areas of interest between the main protagonists in the administrative and political machinery of the settlements have been discussed. However, this antithetical relationship is inevitable, since, even on the subject of commodity production, state, donors, and refugees appear in constant conflict as to the exact form it should take within the settlement. What transpires is intervention by the state and donors to control, and subsequently, impose commodity relations on a vulnerable population, which in turn places considerable pressure on the refugee farmers,
forcing them to adopt a host of alternative strategies to withstand the pressure.

Because of restrictions on mobility and the authoritarian character of settlement administration, refugee schemes may appear to be isolated examples of extreme forms of state control over the peasantry. This should not deter one from analysing peasant/state relationships within settlements, particularly since the settlement scheme approach has always been considered an appropriate strategy for transforming peasant agriculture.

Katumba settlement contains several features common to Tanzanian villages. It was established during a period of crisis in the national economy, especially in the agricultural sector, with food shortages and famine in several regions. Its nucleated settlement pattern was the characteristic outcome of the spatial reorganization of the peasant population under Ujamaa and villagization policies of the 1960s and 1970s. Linearity, particularly in the organization of dwellings, was a common feature of Tanzanian rural areas. Katumba has been integrated into the national agricultural policy; from the very beginning parastatals, crop programmes and co-operatives all operated within the settlement.

Strategies relating to the socio-economic organization of villages - to reflect collective responsibilities over production and marketing in order to avoid exploitation and the development of peasant differentiation - featured in the proposals for the refugee population and some have been imposed in the settlement. Discussion of settlement
organization in Chapter Five has shown that the state and the donors exercised a great degree of control over the population, which made local decision-making bodies ineffective, if not redundant. This is not uncommon in Tanzanian villages. Referring to village development committees in general, Bryceson notes how 'the interventionist position of the state in a proliferation of functions directly acting on all aspects of village production actually leaves little autonomy or self-determination to the village council' (Bryceson 1982, p.557).

State/ Peasants and commodity production

Bryceson (1982) has argued that since independence, expansion of peasant commodity production has been the only option open to the state by which to earn scarce foreign exchange for development projects. Production and export of cash crops such as tobacco, cotton, coffee, cashew-nuts were to fuel development. People in rural areas were also encouraged to provide food for the rapidly increasing urban population, thus preventing the diversion of foreign exchange to fund food importation. In addition, severe food shortages in the 1970s forced the state to emphasize food self-sufficiency. Peasants were required to produce famine crops such as cassava in addition to cash crops for export. Minimum crop acreage was introduced for major crops, as the state acted to maintain a balance between food as commodity for national consumption and commodities for the external market.
Since the post-colonial state lacked both physical and monetary apparatus to reorganize production completely, the existence of large tracts of land 'which can absorb population growth, allowed it to maximize production by merely extending the traditional subsistence economy without changing its structures' (Amin 1976, p.337).

Recent analyses of peasant/state relationships within the Tanzanian context can be divided into two main approaches. Firstly, the approach propounded by Göran Hyden contends that capital has failed to penetrate and transform the peasant mode of production, even after state intervention through various rural development strategies. Hyden argues that in spite of Ujamaa, peasants operate in autonomous production units which allow them to opt out of the state-controlled system. They therefore remain 'uncaptured' and 'unexploited' by the state (Hyden 1980, 1983).

The failure of the state and the market to effect a transformation of agriculture has led some commentators to declare that the present crisis in agriculture results from the state's inability to capture the productive forces (Hyden 1980, Bryceson 1988), without which capitalist and eventually socialist transformation of agriculture cannot be realized. Bryceson (1988) argues that the peasant household has been a stronger and more 'pivotal social institution', than the state assumed. 'Its pre-capitalist productive forces and survival ethic' have set the pace for socio-economic change in post-colonial Tanzania, whereby the logic of the peasant household and clientele networks hold sway
over the 'logic' of the state and the market (Bryceson 1988, p. ).

Secondly, neo-marxists such as Bernstein (1977) have produced a theoretical framework within which to understand the contemporary situation of the Tanzanian peasantry. Bernstein suggests that the capitalist mode of production has penetrated rural areas, and has forced peasants, out of economic necessity, into commodity production and into developing commodity relationships with the state (Bernstein 1977). From the colonial period, pre-capitalist modes of production like the peasant mode, have been destroyed or subsumed by capital with state compliance. Various economic and political strategies, from settlement schemes to Ujamaa Vijijini and from decentralization to specific crop promotion, have been used by the state to transform peasant agriculture, 'to standardize and rationalize peasant production of commodities for the domestic and international market' (Bernstein 1977, p.428).

Although differences in the level of intensification have resulted in regional differentiation, peasants even in the most remote areas historically have been drawn into market relationships, whether as sellers of labour power to the colonial economy or as sellers of produce to state marketing channels. Bryceson (1987) in a discussion on the performance of the National Milling Corporation (NMC) describes how the poor infrastructure of rural Tanzania deters private enterprise, leaving peasants no option but to rely on parastatals for marketing of crops, even with their
deteriorating terms of trade and appalling performance record (Bryceson 1987).

The demands of an historical materialist approach have, in Chapter Four, necessitated a consideration of the impact of colonialism and capitalist relations on Western Tanzania in the creation of a labour reserve economy. Political and economic measures forced peasants out of use-value into greater reliance on exchange-value production as labour migrants or commodity producers. In areas like Mpanda district, the low level of local commoditization throughout the colonial period corresponded to its role as a supplier of wage labour to centres of economic activity.

On the other hand, Bryceson argues that historically there is no clear dichotomy in the transition from subsistence to cash crop production. Peasants, she notes, participated in exchange-value production before colonial rule. What the latter accomplished, was the stabilization of peasant commodity production by creating the conditions for the 'realization of peasants's subsistence' through famine relief - a necessary requirement of capital. Nevertheless, peasants, in an attempt to satisfy basic needs, are drawn into commodity production. This becomes so internalized as part of necessary production, in the simple reproduction cycle, that it cannot operate independently of commodity relations (Bernstein 1977). Simple commodity production can be described as designating:

A form of production, the 'logic' of which is subsistence in the broad sense of the simple reproduction of the producers and the unit of reproduction (descriptively the household)... The needs of simple commodity production are satisfied through commodity relations: the production of commodities as means of exchange to acquire elements
of necessary consumption, and on the other side the incorporation of commodity in the cycle of reproduction as items of productive consumption (for example: tools, seeds, fertilizers) and individual consumption (for example: food, clothing, building materials, kerosene, domestic utensils) (pp.425-429).

Bernstein further argues that under such conditions, simple commodity production can be distinguished from capitalist commodity production, primarily by the 'logic' of 'subsistence as opposed to the logic of the appropriation and realization of surplus-value and the accumulation of capital' (Bernstein 1977, p.425). In addition, since peasants retain control over the means of production, it becomes difficult to classify them as proletarians in the orthodox sense. Bryceson (1982) also suggests that 'the state's attempt to effectively coordinate peasant production cannot be made synonymous with control' (p.558). Therefore, in cases of simple commodity production peasants are not subsumed so completely under the control of state and capital as are the proletarians.

In the refugee context unlike other peasant communities, the cycle of reproduction is initially realized through the provision of donated foodstuffs, and other necessary materials for domestic consumption. As this food (charity) is provided freely without the creation of any surplus value for the donors,\(^1\) it then becomes imperative that refugees are speedily placed in a position where they can meet the

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\(^1\) Donors are often critical of refugees who exchange their food on the market for money or other goods. The refugees are not perceived as obtaining other items for necessary consumption, but as gaining surplus-value. This could be given the interpretation that the donors were ready to dictate exactly what was needed for individual reproduction - donated unpalatable foodstuffs distributed in one or two kilograms, a blanket and traditional farming implements.
costs of their own reproduction where they are returned to the simple reproduction cycle - conceived by donors as 'self-sufficiency'. In the process of settlement, refugees are given just enough land and tools considered by the donors to be necessary for production. In effect they gain limited control over the means of production, and produce use-value or exchange value commodities to meet their subsistence needs. Thus refugees are converted to peasants with one major difference, their lack of customary/legal rights to the land. In the final analysis, their capacity to cover the costs of reproduction is wholly dependent on the discretion of the state. In such circumstances where the state is well-developed, it is likely that the refugees will have no alternative but to follow its dictates. Having a definite need to produce a surplus to re-acquire materials for production and consumer goods, the refugees are 'captured' by the state, and become semi-proletarians in the rural areas.

Recently, Mamdani (1987) has dichotomized the character of peasant exploitation into voluntary and involuntary forms, on the basis of the objective circumstances in which peasants find themselves. He points out:

This context, this 'dull compulsion of market forces', is why certain peasant household enter into unequal relations, even from a position of disadvantage, simply to reproduce themselves, while this same context allows better-off households to enter these same unequal relations from a position of advantage. This compulsion is indirect.

On the other hand, the exploitation of peasant households is also the result of pressures imposed on them directly and from above. This compulsion is extra-economic, so that peasants entry into these relations of exploitation has an immediately involuntary character' (pp. 198/199).
Mamdani (1987) further contends that extra-economic coercion is the 'key to understanding the variety of labour controls in the countryside: manifested in forced labour, forced land enclosures, forced contributions, forced crops and forced sales - all amounting to a systematic devalorization of labour and its product' (p.222). Involuntariness is itself a major component of the process of refugee migration and settlement.

Intensification of commodity relations in environmentally marginal rural areas can adversely affect the material and technical basis of peasant production. Peasant households, due to the low level of the productive forces, can quickly become 'susceptible to failure in the material elements of production, climate, crop, diseases, soil deterioration, animal disease, morbidity and mortality within the family' (Bernstein 1977, p.428). Signs of stress can be associated with reduced fallow periods, soil exhaustion, and lower yields. This 'simple reproduction squeeze' occurs where 'the effects of commodity relations on the economy of peasant households can be summarized in terms of increasing costs of production/decreasing returns to labour' (Bernstein 1977, p.427). This is increasingly a feature of peasant communities in contemporary Tanzania.

**Food rations and agricultural promotion**

Distribution of food rations in refugee settlements has a tendency to be a contentious issue in emergency assistance. It is generally assumed by aid personnel that food rations hinder food production efforts. In addition,
refugees are frequently subjected to severe criticism from donors for disposal of rations in the market place, often where it may be exchanged for more essential goods. Critics accuse refugees of employing trickery to obtain extra rations and depriving their offspring. In fact, aid agencies often fail to understand camp/settlement economy or even the basic fact that food rations may constitute a substantial and unsatisfactory dietary change (Waldron 1987, Harrell-Bond 1986).

In Katumba, World Food Programme (WFP) food rations were distributed until 1977. Each refugee received a daily ration of 400 grams of maize, 100 grams of sorghum, 40g of salad oil and occasionally 40g of beans. Pregnant women and children received an additional 25g of milk powder (TCRS, Annual Report, 1974). Food was not well-distributed as Chambers (1975) indicates:

The sad fact is that during the periods of food issues to refugees it has apparently been very much the exception rather than the rule for the full ration scale as intended to be supplied to refugees... At the time of my visit, all that was being issued was maize (most of which happened to be rotten) and cooking oil, apart from soya bean milk to the children of recent arrivals' (p.8).

As a consequence concerted efforts were made to cultivate enough food in Katumba, as well as in Ulyankulu to meet their respective food requirements after one planting season (TCRS, Annual Report 1973).

It is difficult to reconcile the above statement with another written by Chambers in the same text, when he warned ...‘care must be taken not to have too much food actually at a settlement, since this may discourage refugees’s efforts towards self-sufficiency in food’ (Chambers 1975, p.8). After an analysis of past and present dietary habits, it is difficult to attribute refusal to cultivate to the
availability of rations. Throughout the early years of settlement, refugees suffered from inadequate rations. As early as September 1973, three months after Katumba was established, it became apparent that WFP could not meet the normal requirements to cover the 'usual' 15 to 18 months emergency period, extra food had to be bought on the local market.

There is further evidence for insufficient food aid in Katumba. The Daily News reported in October 1974 that refugees were complaining of insufficient rations; a similar story was printed in the Kenyan Sunday Nation. Although this was refuted by the Principal Secretary for refugee matters, additional food had to be acquired from internal sources, the National Milling Corporation (TCRS Annual Report 1974). Knowing the difficulties in supplying sufficient food to the refugees, it seems odd that as late as 1977 a UNHCR viability team reported that continued distribution of WFP rations might have had a depressing effect on farmers' efficiency (UNHCR, Viability Team Report, 1977).

Distribution of rations has been used by donors as an effective tool to counter refugee intransigence, and to encourage involvement in commodity production.

Some constraints on the data

Certain fundamental problems are associated with data collection among refugees, based on questions of objectivity, credibility and security. Collecting agricultural data can be problematic, in situations where

2 Some of these problems were discussed earlier in the Introduction.
the disposal of surplus is a contentious issue. My survey gathered data from 201 households on the cultivated area of major food and cash crops, output from the previous two harvests, marketed surplus sold to parastatals and labour conditions. Plot size, soil type and fertility were not necessarily uniform throughout the settlement as assumed by settlements authorities, and the implementing agencies.

Furthermore, the basic assumption of 'one man – one plot' masked the varying nature of land use within the settlement. It became clear in the course of the survey that one household may cultivate two or more plots located within or outside the settlement boundary. The crop acreage mostly given by the refugees, refers only to their officially designated plot. Even so, many refugees understated the size of the cultivated area, for fear of breaking the legislation on crop cultivation, and to cover up evidence of accumulation. I eventually classified these responses as missing data.

The data on harvests are also unreliable, since most farmers preferred to disclose only the surplus sold to the parastatals, discounting domestic consumption and the large proportion of crops sold on the open market.\^{}\textsuperscript{3} Crop statistics from village and district cooperative unions tend to differ, but the discrepancies are not sufficiently great to render them useless. The data gathered are useful in clarifying assumptions about the general organization of

\^{}\textsuperscript{3} Formerly known as the parallel or black market, now due to official recognition the term open market has become acceptable.
production within the settlement, and provide an insight into micro-level features of household production.

Household forms in a refugee setting

The concept of the household, based on co-residence, pooling of resources and altruism, becomes problematic in dynamic situations such as those experienced by refugees. Actual composition, organizational structure and pattern of plot occupancy is more complex and diverse reflecting new responses of family units to external factors. The term ‘household’ is used here more for convenience than to refer to any discrete entity, thus allowing flexibility to include members of the extended family, where older relations, widowed sisters or even orphans are added to the nuclear family unit. Thus, in effect, it refers to a decision-making unit residing on a plot.

Family reunions were still occurring in Katumba, some 14 years after the initial migration. For most people, kin relations are scattered throughout the settlement, and provide a sense of social security. This dispersed pattern of kin was not confined to Katumba. Seventy-six percent of the sampled households had relatives in other parts of Tanzania, namely in the settlements of Ulyankulu and Mishamo, or in Kigoma region. 32, 31 and 22 percent had immediate family members in Kigoma, Mishamo and Ulyankulu respectively. Between 10-14 percent had extended family members in all three locations.

New forms of decision-making units have evolved to cope with the frustrations of exile, changes in resource
distribution, agricultural systems, and new legislation. All-male households were fairly common in the early years of the settlement as cash for dowry payments could not easily be obtained. In refugee situations, former households in the country of origin may have been severely disrupted or destroyed in the process of flight; surviving members may reunite in the settlements only over time. But most households in my survey arrived with most of their members intact; 84 percent of respondents migrated with members of their immediate family, with parents or spouses and their children. In this respect, the average size on entry was 7.3 members. Four percent entered Tanzania with relatives other than immediate family and 12 percent on their own.

In my sample, the average age of heads of households or their spouses was 39 years (Table 6.1). The median age group of the married people interviewed was 35-44 years. If age was correctly assessed, it does appear that a significant proportion of heads of households were married in the early years of settlement, or had just formed marital unions before leaving Burundi.

**Table 6.1 Heads of Households: marital status by age group**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Married</th>
<th>Single</th>
<th>Widow</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-24</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-64</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65-74</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>90.53</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=201
A cursory survey carried out in the dry-season in Katumba settlement may overestimate the incidence of female-headed households as most men migrate to find employment. My survey classifies single, divorced, widowed or abandoned women as forming female-headed households and includes those whose husbands are lame or irresponsible and therefore unable or unwilling to contribute to the family’s welfare. Using these criteria only eight percent of Katumba’s households were female-headed, and were either widowed or divorced. The incidence of female-headed households has been used to indicate absolute levels of deprivation and poverty in rural communities. This is basically because gender bias tends to restrict women’s occupational and physical mobility.

My sample also contained both monogynous and polygynous marital relationships. Only 5.4 percent of respondents were in polygynous unions - all had survived dislocation. In terms of plot occupancy, wives in polygynous households were either living together on the same plot, or occupied their own plots at varying distances from each other. Residence depended on the preferences of the husband. As plot allocation was based on one man or family to each plot, second wives who posed as widows gained access to their own plots, thus giving the husband control over twice the allotted acreage. However, wives, on their individual plots, tend to operate independently of each other, and in my reckoning were involved in separate households.

The basic unit of production within the settlement as defined by the donors was the nuclear family. Each adult man
was perceived by the donors as head of a family, and was offered land for dwellings and cultivation, based on the assumption that self-sufficiency could only be achieved if each family took responsibility for the cost of its reproduction.4

Each family was expected to cultivate according to established government guidelines. The family would have usufruct land rights, and was expected to remain on the plots allocated. Since the land was alienated by the Ministry of Home Affairs for the purpose of refugee settlement, the settlers had no recourse to the rights existing under the Land Tenure (village settlement) Act 1965, which outlined the rights and duties of nationals on village settlement schemes.5 However, refugees having usufruct rights under customary laws of inheritance, could nominate sons to succeed them. This has created an unforeseen problem in the form of land fragmentation within the settlement, as rights to land only applied within the designated settlement boundary.

The number of dwellings on an individual plot is often used to indicate the presence of one or more household on a plot, and therefore, the extent of population pressure on individual plots. In Katumba, this can be misleading especially since the refugees in trying to accommodate

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4 A clear distinction operated between men and women. Single adult men could be allocated land, while women of the same age were not extended the same rights.
5 Discussed in R.W. James, Land Tenure Policy in Tanzania. East African Literature Bureau. 1971. Under the act cooperatives were empowered to 'prescribe rules for the general development of the settlement and plots thereon.' or even under the Village and Ujamaa Village Act of 1975 where total control of land was given to the village council.
themselves to the alien imposed settlement pattern, have ignored the norm whereby each household is expected to construct their dwellings on their own plot and instead have built their dwellings close together. For example, in my sample two brothers with their families resided on the same plot, but had access to individually-allocated plots for cultivation. In Msaginya village, clear examples exist where families have grouped their dwellings together for social reasons. This can create some difficulties when trying to determine production levels, acreage under cultivation or evidence of land pressure, if one assumes that all cultivation takes place on the immediate plot of residence. In the 1980s multiple-households were often the result of married offspring residing on the same plot. Table 6.2 shows the number of married couples per plot used here as an indicator of multiple plot occupancy.

Table 6.2 Married Couples per plot

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of married couples</th>
<th>Number in sample</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>67.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=198

\[ X^2 = 0.0001 \text{ at d.f}=2 \]

Seven percent of households had no married couples and consisted predominantly of widowed heads of households. A regression analysis between number of married couples and household size shows a significant relationship (p<0.0001):

Household size = 4.42 + 2.8 Couples

\( (10.7) \ (19.8) \ R^2=0.32 \)
However, there were more occurrences of multiple households in Mishamo than in Katumba. Armstrong found 92 percent of sampled plots containing multiple households—occupied by more than one married couple, yet only 26 percent was discovered by my survey in Katumba. Multiple households were a reflection of land shortage in the close-settled area, as family members preferred to live in close proximity, even though land was available on the edge of the settlement, beyond the villages of Kanoge and Kaburonge (Figure 4). Distances of up to 30 km were unacceptable to families already divided by migration. In terms of multiple ownership of plots, only three percent of respondents claim to own more than one plot compared to 6.2 percent in Mishamo (Armstrong 1985). The mean population per plot was 7.96, and was much higher than Armstrong’s (1983) findings of 5.7 for Mishamo. Over 39 percent of sampled plots had a population of between 10-17 people (Figure 5).

Recent discourse on households debates the conventional conceptualization of households as generic social units or as a response to social processes in which they operate. Guyer and Peters (1987) propose that ‘the key conceptual problems concern the relationship between domestic units and the wider social field’ (p.205). Approaches which focus on the peasant household as a unit within the peasant mode of production tend to concentrate on the social relations within the household producing unit, while overlooking the social relations of production external to the household.

In the refugee context, the distinct presence of the donors and the state within the settlement, controls and
Figure 5
Frequency distribution of household size among sampled households
limits access to resources. In fact, the crucial question is not directed at the internal organization of households, but at how households can help to explain production and consumption patterns and the relations of production and accumulation operating within the settlement.

Promoting Commodity Production

Commoditization of agricultural production within Katumba was explicit in the planning and implementation of its programme. The original purpose of agricultural settlements for refugees was:

To bring the new communities to a stage of economic viability, enabling the refugees not only to become self-reliant in respect of self-grown food, but also to earn some cash in order to afford elementary day to day expenses.  

Implicit in the above statement, from the perspective of the Tanzanian state, was the need to extract an agricultural surplus from the refugee population.

In accordance with the national policy, collectivization or communal production of cash crops was included by the state and donors in the agricultural programme (Chambers 1975). The disagreement in the 1970s between donors, such as the World Bank and the state, over communal versus individualized production was avoided in the case of Katumba, where the division of the land into parallel plots of 3.5ha (70m by 500m) left no land for communal production, or even for block farming, which was then being promoted by the government. In fact, the pattern

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6 This explanation is contained in Recommendation VIII of the conference on The Legal, Economic and Social Aspects of African Refugee Problems, 9-18 October 1967, Addis Ababa — discussed in Chapter Two.
of individualized household production replicated the then current 'development villages', except for communal production of rice on mbuga land. The strategy for individualized production was reinforced in the settlement when LWF/TCRS interpreted the refusal of refugees to cultivate as resistance to Ujamaa and communal production. Coulson (1982), noting the demise of the government efforts to enforce communal production for nationals, suggested:

The main hope lay in the packages of improved seeds and fertilizers which characterized the large agricultural World Bank projects of the 1970s, which were on the face of things consistent with villagization, since they implied rather intensive cultivation of small areas by large numbers of individual farmers (p.257).

The rationale behind the 3.5 hectare plots allocated to refugees, was that through cultivation each household would become self-sufficient in food requirements within one or two seasons after settlement. Rudimentary tools, such as the jembe (hoe) and the panga (machete) were provided, and the settlers were expected to clear the miombo woodland themselves. One of the many problems cited by the refugees was the clearing of trees from agricultural land causing widespread use of slash and burn techniques. Miombo woodland is somewhat difficult to clear using traditional tools.

Agricultural inputs like seeds and fertilizers were distributed free for the first two planting seasons. The donors promoted maize, cassava, sweet potatoes and beans as food crops, and tobacco and soya beans as cash crops. Each

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7 'Development village' was another term for Ujamaa villages, where communal farming was encouraged.
8 An mbuga is a shallow, seasonally waterlogged depression found at the headwaters of rivers and is used mainly for dry-season cultivation. In Mpanda the term refers mainly to floodplain areas.
plot received one banana sucker and some vegetable seeds. The decisions on suitable crop types and methods of cultivation were made by two expatriates and several Tanzanian Agricultural Officers, who then instructed their field assistants to educate the refugees. Since inception, the operation of the extension service has been plagued with inefficiency, promoting crops and techniques unsuited for the soils and therefore unattractive to the peasants. Fortunately, the 1974 agricultural report noted that only a few farmers were actually reached by the 100 or so field assistants.

The farmers immediately began to take advantage of mbuga areas to grow onions, tomatoes, mchicha (spinach) and fresh beans. Various fruit trees were requested for the settlement, and coconuts, lemons, oranges, pineapple suckers, and pawpaws were tried in the settlement nursery.

Locating the settlements close to the tobacco schemes pre-supposed that tobacco would be the main commodity crop. However, the 1970s saw a crisis in Tanzanian agriculture, and a shift in emphasis to food self-sufficiency. At the same time, the World Bank supported a number of crop promotion schemes, their aim according to Von Freyold (1979) being to control the expansion of food crops like maize, to the benefit of export crops. However, the opening-up of new lands in Mpanda district meant an expansion of the hectareage in food crops. State-sponsored crop programmes were extended to the district; in 1974, for example, the National Cassava Improvement Programme was introduced in Mpanda.
More important for the settlers was the selection in 1975 of Rukwa and Tabora as two of twelve regions for the National Maize Project (NMP). In the assessment of the proposed Rukwa Integrated Development Project (RIDEP), it was calculated that over 70,000 hectares of Mpanda’s miombo woodland was suitable for maize cultivation (BRALUP/Sandberg 1976). Sponsored by the World Bank and USAID, NMP was financed by money channelled through the Tanzanian Rural Development Bank (TRDB), to provide improved seeds and fertilizers. The Ministry of Agriculture issued directives to ensure the inclusion of refugees from Katumba and Ulyankulu in the project, with the proviso that the costs should not be met through the TRDB. A formal request was made by the then Prime Minister Kawawa for LWF/TCRS to supply seeds, fertilizers and insecticides in the same manner to the refugees (Telex to LWF, Geneva to TCRS, Dar es Salaam, dated 19th May 1975, TCRS archives). Tanzanian farmers would receive a 75 percent subsidy on fertilizers and 64 percent subsidy on seeds. This was also to apply to refugees. Peasants in Mpanda district, according to government stipulation, were to cultivate 5000 hectares of maize, of which the District Development Director (DDD) allocated 3000 hectares to Katumba, to be divided among 4,500 plots, giving each plot 0.6 hectare. Hybrid maize, using monocropping farming methods, was already grown by LWF/TCRS on demonstration plots. In 1974 it was estimated that each family would cultivate between two and three acres (Letter from Project Coordinator, Katumba to Headquarters -  

TCRS offered to meet 25% of costs for fertilizers which were to be borne by the farmers, but the Ministry declined.
dated 10 October 1974, TCRS archives). Families were requested to cultivate for the 1974 and 1975 agricultural seasons as outlined in Table 6.3 below.

**Table 6.3**
**Proposed minimum hectareage per plot for the 1974, 1975 and 1987 agricultural seasons**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Hectare</th>
<th>Hectare</th>
<th>Hectare</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1987*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundnuts</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorghum</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pigeon Peas</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cow peas</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cassava</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Although the donors sought self-sufficiency in food production as first priority, no consideration was given to the dietary preferences of the settlers. Barundi peasants were accustomed to cassava as their main staple, along with bananas and sweet potatoes; yet until 1975, refugees were encouraged to devote only 0.2 hectare to cassava cultivation. Maize, which was to meet national food requirements, was given the largest hectareage. Maize promotion continues today, with no change in the recommended minimum area. At the start of the 1986/87 agricultural season the DDD instructed the peasants to grow 0.8 ha of maize, and 0.4 ha of cassava (Table 6.3). He asserted that such directives on crop spacings and demonstration plots were to be followed otherwise 'action would be taken by the
authorities.' A marketable agricultural surplus in maize and some pulses was achieved in the 1976/77 farming season, two years after cultivation began.

**Persuading church-goers to grow tobacco**

Nsimbo tobacco complex began during the period of the independent state's first five-year plan (1962-69) under the sponsorship of the World Bank, concentrating mainly in the villages around Inyonga and Mpanda town (Figure 3). At that time the miombo woodlands of Tabora, Kigoma and Rukwa were considered highly suitable, providing fuel for curing, low nutrient sandy soils, and an annual rainfall of between 900-1000mm which was considered sufficient even though flue-cured tobacco normally requires between 1,000 - 1,400mm. of rainfall per annum (Atlas of Rukwa 1984). Expansion of tobacco production in miombo-woodland areas was also proposed by the Rukwa Integrated Rural Development Project (RIDEP) of the 1970s. During the second five-year plan (1969-1974), crop priorities for Mpanda were: groundnuts, flue-cured tobacco, paddy, pulses, maize, sesame, sunflower, millets, vegetables and citrus fruit. Tobacco was to be the main crop in Northern Mpanda, with groundnuts as a secondary crop. In 1971, the government disclosed plans to expand tobacco production in the country with the creation of tobacco complexes in the districts of Chunya, Tabora and Mpanda. It was proposed that 150,000 farmers would be settled in ujamaa villages with 100 farmers per village and 10 villages in each complex (Marshalla 1986).

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10 DDD Meeting with refugee representatives in Katumba settlement, November 1986.
Two tobacco nurseries were established at Katumba and Ndurumo villages by TCRS. This action was given government approval when in January 1975, while on a visit to the settlement, the Vice-President supported LWF/TCRS' proposal to introduce Virginia Tobacco as a cash crop. Katumba was soon after assessed by the DDD as a suitable site for tobacco production (Letter to Project Coordinator, Katumba from TAT, Mpanda, dated 24 January 1975). Tobacco was to be phased in over a period of five years beginning with the 1975/76 season. In the first year, each family was expected to grow 0.2 hectare or less, increasing to 0.6-0.8 ha after the second and third years respectively, and thereafter up to 0.8 ha depending on family labour. The Tobacco Authority of Tanzania [now the Tanzania Tobacco Marketing and Produce Board (TTMPB)] advised that crops were to be grown in blocks as opposed to single plots and machines used for land clearance, cultivation, harrowing and ridging. TCRS was requested to insert the initial capital of some 70,000/- and to procure inputs such as fertilizers and seed packs.

The scale of the project with its labour demands conflicted with the donor's immediate programme of achieving food self-sufficiency among the refugees. Under the scheme food self-sufficiency would be delayed for about one-sixth of the refugee population. For the first season, the plan was to involve 1000 families growing 200 hectares of tobacco and 800 hectares of maize in the first five years. Donor opposition forced a revision of the plan in June 1975, which reduced the number of farmers to 500, cultivating 0.2 to 0.4 ha of tobacco and 0.8 ha of maize. Capital inputs were to be
subsidized by the World Bank, via the TRDB, and farmers were expected to cover 200/- worth of costs. Administration of the project was shifted from TCRS to the adjacent Nsimbo cooperative society, which, in 1977, posted five tobacco extension workers to the settlement.

The projected figure of 1000 tobacco farmers was never realized, mainly due to the unpopularity of the crop among the Pentecostalists who form the largest religious group in the settlement (Table 6.12). The state reacted by replacing those religious leaders and village chairmen who opposed tobacco cultivation. A Ministry of Home Affairs official described the problem:

We experienced some problems with tobacco-growing. The Pentecostal church leaders, who have the biggest following, were dissuading their faithful from growing tobacco on the grounds that it did not conform with the Word of God. The government could not tolerate this type of preaching. Corrective measures were hurriedly taken and the situation came under control. Since 1977 we have not experienced any problems of this kind (UNHCR 1981, Tanzania country paper, p.26).

It was not only the socio-cultural characteristics of the refugee community which were ignored by the donors and the state, no account was taken of former agricultural practices.

Pre-migration and current cropping practices

Originating from two distinct Burundi environments, the southern highland areas of Bututsi and Buragane and the lowlands or lacustrine areas of Nyanza-lac, for most of the

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11 The Pentecostal Church in Katumba has an estimated congregation of 30,000, compared to the Roman Catholic with 10,000. 71 percent of my sample were Pentecostalists.
12 The ruling that village chairmen should be literate in Kiswahili may have been one way of ridding the settlement of natural leaders who may be labelled religious fanatics.
refugee population migration to Tanzania involved changes in physical, ecological and climatic conditions. Altitude differences and exposure to malaria had devastating effects on the morbidity and mortality rates of the population in the years immediately following flight. Unfortunately, no reliable records exist of mortality rates for Katumba. Agencies whose main role was to save lives were not easily ready to record adverse statistics. Neither are refugees willing to report deaths.13

In Burundi, crop cultivation is combined with another economic activity, pastoralism or fishing. Altitude greatly determines the type of cultivation practised. In the savanna lowlands of Ruzizi, cassava is the basic staple crop, cultivated with maize, sorghum and beer banana. Fishing is a secondary activity. Over 1550m, finger millet and wheat predominate, and over 1800m, pastoralism is dominant. Significant climatic differences exist between the miombo woodland of Tanzania/ Mpanda and Burundi. Burundi has a bi-modal rainfall pattern, with a long rainy season (urushana) between February and May, and a short one (agatasi) between September and December, allowing two cropping seasons. This is in contrast to the one rainy season (masika) from November to April in the Mpanda area (Jones & Egli 1984).

By the time of out-migration, the traditional feudal mode of production in Burundi had been distorted by the introduction of commodity relations under colonial rule.13

In 1985 the death rate for Katumba was estimated at between 20-25 per thousand. Harrell-Bond (1986) found at least 1.55 deaths per sampled household among Ugandan refugees in Sudan, with an overall death rate of 285 per thousand over a period of twelve months compared with the national average of 20-25 per 1000.
Peasants were encouraged to grow coffee (arabica), pyrethrum, tea and chichona. Population densities of over 90 per square kilometre resulted in state-enforced conservation methods such as ridging, terracing and tree-planting.

Integration of cattle with crop cultivation had enriched the household diet. Women in Katumba frequently bewailed the lack of milk as supplementary food for young children in the settlement. Equally, cattle manure was used to maintain fertility in areas lacking the more fertile volcanic soils.

In Tanzania, Barundi peasants wherever possible have retained their traditional methods of cultivation or have adopted those of the local people, rather than those promulgated by the extension services, which are less suitable to the soil conditions. In miombo woodlands, traditional methods of land preparation ensure that plant debris is retained within ridges to act as fertilizer. Ridging, which was already practised by the settlers, was officially recommended by the donors in 1973, on discovering the low-water-holding capacity of the soils. Clearly, widespread application of mechanical farming, as carried out by TCRS on demonstration plots, would have had deleterious effects on the sandy-loam soils.

Monocropping, especially of maize, was severely resisted by the settlers. Although LWF/TCRS established a demonstration plot, peasants refused to follow their directives. Chambers, while visiting the area in 1975, recommended the setting up of demonstration plots on feeder roads with trials for intercropping. By 1977 the policy
shifted from the total discouragement of intercropping to the improvement of intercropping techniques by reducing the number of crops grown together and selection of suitable combinations (Hedt 1977). This was in opposition to the UNHCR viability team report (1977) which proposed single cropping of maize and the introduction of soya beans as a rotation crop to improve soil fertility and structure (Para.149). Eight hundred hectares were planned for the 1977/78 agricultural season. This was later opposed by district authorities as no market was available for soya beans within the country.

Intercropping has been described by Paul Richards (1983) as 'one of the great glories of African science'. He referred to the numerous benefits accruing to the farmer who plants several different species and varieties of species in the same farm. Intercropping minimizes soil erosion and the spread of pests and diseases, suppresses weeds, involves differential use of soil nutrients and maximization of sunlight by different plant species, and most importantly reduces the risk of crop failures. Richards has reviewed several studies undertaken in the 1970s which accentuate its beneficial contribution to productivity and maintenance of fragile tropical agricultural systems. Coulson (1982) has also cited several references testifying to the value of intercropping in Tanzanian agricultural systems and has criticized the persistence of extension workers in recommending farmers to plant their crops in pure stands (p.154). Barundi peasants have persisted with intercropping for greater crop security, more efficient use of fertilizers
and a diversified diet, which many refugees consider to be poorer and more precarious in the miombo zone.

**Division of labour**

With the attention focused on women's role in agriculture in development discourse, and the demands of male labour for construction and plantation work, the donors sought to direct extension work to women through the recruitment of female extension workers. At the same time, the conditions of tenancy required male heads of households to have control over the labour of women and children. Settlement schemes are reputed to have planned adverse conditions for women, as men obtained near monopoly over land and cash crops.\(^\text{14}\)

While the settlement was under the administration of the donors, gender distinction was promoted in the production of cash crops. Men were encouraged to grow tobacco, but women were expected to complement their husbands' labour in maize production, on the assumption that household income was equitably distributed. Yet women's labour has been an important contributory factor for the extension of agricultural production in Katumba, as male participation in labour migration did not lessen attempts to intensify production on the family plots. In Katumba, gender distinction in farm work is not as dichotomous as described by several consultancy reports. Albert (1971) has suggested

\(^{14}\) Gavin Williams (1988) cites several references which demonstrate the relationship between the intensification of women's labour and the increase in commodity production during the colonial period. Also see Brain (1968) on women on settlement schemes in Tanzania.
that in traditional Barundi society, women were considered more suited to manual labour than men, who were rarely at home due to labour migration, military service or business ventures. Women had to perform every aspect of farm work.

My observations in Katumba show a more equitable distribution of labour. Men and women share farming, except in conditions where men participate in non-agricultural income-generating activities, in which case women may have a disproportionate work load, since they themselves have no access to off-farm wage labour. Rich peasants and very old women hire male labour to release women from the more arduous tasks. Over the farm year men clear and weed the land, while both men and women participate in sowing and harvesting. At the onset of the dry season, women's farm activities increase on the homestead plot, as men either cultivate mbuga land, or become involved in casual labour migration.

Preparation for storage and sale is the work primarily of women and children, especially where men have access to some form of dry-season work. Vegetable production on mbuga can be shared by both sexes, and for most women it was the only source for obtaining a cash income through the marketing of fresh vegetables, such as tomatoes, spinach, onions, nyanya mshumaa (bitter tomato) and cabbage. Twenty seven percent of women in sampled households are involved in the sale of subsistence surplus. As vegetable sales are more lucrative in the dry season, women are forced to extend the agricultural year.

\[15\] This is with the exception of the few typists and other clerical staff working for the donors.
Cropping Patterns and Productivity

According to official statistics, in 1974, 6,639 plots were allocated to settlers, who were said to be cultivating 6,640 hectares or one hectare per plot. By 1978, the number of households had reached 8,200, farming 15,504 hectares or 1.9 ha per family (Table 6.4). The increase in the number of households reflected not only in-migration during the 1974-78 period, but also the creation of new households as single people were reported to have married much earlier than in Burundi.16 By 1985, 9,703 plots had been formally allocated to settlers, with an estimated cultivated area of 18,679 hectares or 1.9 ha per family. After 1978 migration to the settlement was minimal, and the 1,503 further plots officially registered between 1978-1985 consisted of not only newly-formed households, but also those relocated from agriculturally marginal areas of the settlement, from the villages of Kambuzi and Mwenge to Kanoge and Kaburonge B (Figure 4).

In terms of total cultivated area, a rapid rural survey in 1987 estimated an annually cropped area of between 360 to 400 km² (36,000 to 40,000 ha), (Antoniou, Shorter and Sweetman 1987). However, official estimates for 1986/87 was 25,532 ha of crops between 10,052 plots, an average of 2.54 hectares per plot. These statistics do not provide a useful base for analysing current level of cultivation, as they

16 Respondents report that girls married at 14 or 15 years; much earlier than they would have done in Burundi. In 1987, the average age at marriage for girls was 18 years.
### Table 6.4 Katumba: Total Area of Major food and cash crops cultivated 1974-87

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of plots</th>
<th>Ha cultivated</th>
<th>Hectare per plot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974/75</td>
<td>6,639</td>
<td>6,640</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976/77</td>
<td>8,468</td>
<td>14,335</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977/78</td>
<td>8,200</td>
<td>15,504</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982/83</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>19,498</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983/84</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>24,845</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984/85</td>
<td>9,086</td>
<td>18,679</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985/86</td>
<td>9,703</td>
<td>21,535</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986/87</td>
<td>10,052</td>
<td>25,532</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TCRS reports and Ministry of Home Affairs reports

### Table 6.5 Katumba: Hectares cultivated by selected crops 1976-78 and 1984-86

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>1976/77</th>
<th>1977/8</th>
<th>1984/5</th>
<th>1985/6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>5,600</td>
<td>5,250</td>
<td>5,601</td>
<td>7,691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>3,667</td>
<td>6,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cassava</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>3,750</td>
<td>4,552</td>
<td>4,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundnuts</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millet</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pigeon peas</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soya beans</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sim sim</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweet potatoes</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,452</td>
<td>1,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cowpeas</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunflower seeds</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paddy</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>430</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 14,200 15,000 16,202 21,321

Source: TCRS and Settlement Commandant’s Agricultural Reports.
Table 6.6 Mean cultivated area, yield and surplus for major food crops

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Hectare for sampled plots, Katumba 1987</th>
<th>Average Yield Katumba 1977/78 (kg/ha)**</th>
<th>Mean marketed surplus Katumba 1986 (kgs)</th>
<th>Average income Katumba 1985/86 (TShs)</th>
<th>Miombo Woodland Av. Plot size Ha/household*</th>
<th>Miombo Av. yield* (kg/ha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>1,350</td>
<td>591.2</td>
<td>3104.2</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>235.7</td>
<td>2829.0</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cassava</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>183.0</td>
<td>549.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>7555.0</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Katumba n=201

In the agricultural year 1977/78 yields were substantially higher as fertilizers were provided by the donors.
refer to total cropped area, ignoring the fact that peasants practise intercropping. If this is taken into account the estimated cultivated area for the settlement, as a whole, would be nearer 17,892 hectares. In my sample of 199 households surveyed across six villages, peasants cultivated a total cropped area (major food and cash crops), of 511 hectares, an average of 2.5 hectares of crops per plot. Since maize and beans were intercropped, the actual area cultivated overall was reduced to 354.2 ha, an average of 1.78 per plot, or only 50 percent of the area allocated to each plot (Table 6.7). Therefore, even with fallowing, just under one-third of the land was left idle. Similarly, Armstrong has estimated a mean cultivated area of 2.07 hectare for Mishamo farmers, or less than 50 percent of the 5 hectare plot allocated to each household.

Table 6.7
Amount of Plot cultivated (% of household)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hectares</th>
<th>Katumba (1985)</th>
<th>Mishamo*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Households</td>
<td>% of sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>58.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Maize, intercropped with beans, has continued to be the main commodity crop. Table 6.5 contains available data on maize hectareage for selected years since 1976/77, the year of 'real' agricultural surplus, when Katumba farmers sold a
considerable amount of crops to the marketing board (Table 6.8). Maize cultivation rose by 37 percent between 1976-85, brought about mainly by the expansion and creation of villages to the north, and the bringing of new land under cultivation, rather than by an increase in productivity on existing plots.

Using official data (Table 6.5), it is clear that there has been a marked stagnation in maize production, while bean hectareage has increased by almost 200 percent since 1986. Cassava maintained a steady increase. Shortfalls in production from 1981 to 1983 led to increased productivity during the first good season 1984/45, as farmers tried to recoup the losses of previous years, but 1985/86 saw a drop to former production levels.

In trying to assess levels of productivity, data on output per hectare were first used. Miombo woodlands could produce maize with yields from a few bags to 40 per hectare, if one year's cultivation is followed by three year's fallow. Table 6.6 shows the average kilogrammes per hectare obtained in Katumba for selected years and for miombo woodlands, placed against data for marketed surplus for the sampled population: even with declining output and domestic consumption a sizeable proportion must have been diverted to the open market. From the data one can either assume that Katumba farmers might be selling far less of their maize harvest to the marketing boards, or due to the lack of adequate supplies of fertilisers, are experiencing declining output, and are obtaining yields close to the average for miombo woodlands.
### Table 6.8 NMC & RURECU Official Crop Purchases from Katumba 1976 -1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>1,313.5</td>
<td>1,549.9</td>
<td>1,941.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>557.2</td>
<td>209.2</td>
<td>248.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cassava</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>575.9</td>
<td>2,195.6</td>
<td>2,240.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millet</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paddy</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>179.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pigeon peas</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>1,260</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cow peas</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundnuts</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>280.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soya beans</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sim sim</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunflower seeds</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barley</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,046.7</td>
<td>2,466.3</td>
<td>4,002.2</td>
<td>3,867.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LWF/TCRS: Annual Reports
The advantages of cultivating beans—higher producer prices compared to maize—outweigh the disadvantages of its susceptibility to pests and variations in weather (Appendix C). In 1985/86 farmers, selling to the marketing boards, received the official price of 12/- for a kilo of beans compared to 5.25/- for the equivalent of maize.

In fact, the real income of maize producers has declined by 26 percent since 1975, as a result of centrally fixed prices. An official survey of returns to labour where maize is intercropped with beans estimated net returns to labour per day as 75/- for the 1985/86 season from official sales and 110/- from sales on the open market (Marketing Development Board 1986). Kilimo (Department of Agriculture), estimated that during the 1987/88 season two-thirds of marketed maize went through the open market.

The official price of a bag of maize in September 1986 was 472/- compared to the 800 to 1000 shillings available on the parallel market in urban centres along the central railway line (Appendix D). Maize producers in Katumba were restrained by the lower open market prices in Mpanda and Sumbawanga, mainly due to the glut in the region.

Bean producers benefitted from higher open market prices. Refugee settlements contained the largest producers of beans in the district. Nevertheless, farmers were cautious about bean sales, most selling in small quantities within the settlement boundaries to Mpanda traders.\footnote{The high bean sales to the marketing boards, and within the settlement may be attributed to the variety of beans grown in Katumba. Traders complain that the beans introduced to the refugees by TCRS, are too small, and take longer to cook than other varieties. Therefore, it was difficult to sell them in Mpanda town.}
if a significant amount of crop surplus was sold unofficially, the majority of farmers lacked transport to take their crops to market, and were thus forced to rely on official channels, rather than accept lower prices from local merchants. However, many were compelled to trade privately as the inefficiencies of the co-operatives left them without capital for several months. Inadequate transport facilities meant that private trading of main staples was not well-developed in the district. The trend in 1987 was that aggregate open market prices for maize were lower than official prices. This was also indicative of the enormous proportion of maize being sold on the open market.

Cassava is the staple food crop. Expansion of cassava hectareage and increased marketed surplus can be used as a partial indicator of unfavourable conditions for other crops. In fact, cassava sales can become a source of cash income for poor and rich households alike, particularly with the high differentials between official and open market prices. Open market prices for cassava during June 1986 in Mpanda were 400 percent higher than the official price, and 1900 percent higher in Tabora! (Appendix D). In relatively fertile parts of Katumba, where harvest of other crops continued to be satisfactory, for example in Ivungwe, peasants sold greater surpluses of cassava to the marketing board and a small percentage on the parallel market.

Usually, productivity estimates for the whole settlement were extrapolated by the donors and the state from data available in 1978 or were annually compiled by the Settlement Commandant’s office. The data used to gauge
levels of productivity were the records of the amount of surplus sold through official marketing channels. Peasants started to produce a sizeable marketed surplus in 1976. This corresponded to the increases in producer prices for maize, beans and cassava in the following year (Appendix C). The consequent sudden rise in marketed surplus began a continuing trend in district and regional purchases. That year also coincided with the extension of the National Maize Project to Rukwa, and vigorous crop purchasing activities by the National Milling Corporation in the region (Table 6.8 and 6.9 showing available crop data for purchases from Katumba between 1976-1986). Cassava sales usually exceeded maize and beans during times of limited productivity as in 1976 and in 1978/79, the first year after the settlement was handed over to the government. Drought and poor rains reduced sales for the years between 1981-84. Maize and beans are particularly susceptible to vagaries of climate and inputs. Limited availability of fertilizers and insecticides adversely affected the maize harvest of 1986 and 1987.

As can be expected, there was considerable spatial variation in productivity within the settlement. Figure 6 showing surplus sold to NMC in the agricultural year 1985/6, through the primary co-operatives, indicates the more recently-settled villages of Kajeje, Ikolongo and Kanoge as the more productive, with output in the long-settled areas of Tambazi and Mnyaki declining or stagnant. Farmers in Ivungwe, who cultivate a slightly more fertile and well-watered land, could still match the marketed surplus of the more recently established villages. However, my survey gives
Figure 6

Official Purchases of Major Food Crops
Katumba Primary Co-operatives 1985-86

Legend

Villages
- Tonbozi A & B & Ndwi
- Katumba, Msaginya, Kzoga, Mwenge
- Lwiribi & Kalungu
- Lvungwe A & B & Mtambu
- Nwezi A & B
- Ndumo A & B
- Ikanga A & B, Kabunbe A & B
- Kajuge A & B, Kanoge A & B
- Kambuzi A & B, Kaminula

Official Co-operative Name
- TANDUWI
- KASANZA
- KALIWI
- LVUNGIWE
- NNYAKI
- NDUGUMO
- IKOKA
- KANJENGE
- KAMBULA

Tonnage

Cooperative
- PRODUCE maize
- beans
- cassava

Source: Rukwa Regional Co-operative Union: Mpanda Branch Office
Table 6.9 Katumba: Harvest and official marketed surplus for 1984-1986 for selected Crops (in tonnes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>7,926</td>
<td>3,659.0</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>8,691</td>
<td>3,137.9</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
<td>3,667</td>
<td>120.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>6,460</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cassava</td>
<td>13,566</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>14,250</td>
<td>545.4</td>
<td>3.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paddy</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>7,945</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>7,350</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundnuts</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Agricultural Reports, TCRS & Ministry of Home Affairs
a slightly different result when the mean hectareages of the major crops are analyzed across villages, the most striking result being the higher hectareage cultivated by respondents in Mnyaki village (Figure 7), with a cropped area of 2.93 hectares and a total cultivated area of 2.03 hectares, 14 percent above the average for the total sample. For each crop, an analysis of variance test was carried out to determine the effect of location on variations in crop hectareage. In the case of maize, beans, and tobacco, location was highly significant, all below the 1 percent level (Maize: F=3.20, df=5, p<0.0085, R²=0.076), (Beans: F=3.31 df=5 p<0.0069, R²=0.07), (Tobacco: F=3.16, df=5, P<0.0092, R²=0.075). In all cases over 7 percent of variations in hectareage could be explained by location. The localised production of tobacco is clearly illustrated.

In terms of the distribution of marketed surplus by location, it is clear that Mnyaki village, has by far the largest harvest (Figure 8), followed by Ndurumo and Ivungwe. The discrepancies between surplus sold to the co-operatives and marketed surplus for Mnyaki village in particular can be explained by the presence of the major settlement markets in Mnyaki and its proximity to Ndurumo (Figure 8). It is therefore possible to assume that a significant proportion of surplus is sold on the Mnyaki market. The same can not be said of Tambazi village, where farmers, although cultivating a lower hectareage, actually sold a higher percentage of crops. Here, the problem of declining fertility appears to be more acute. The lower sales of food crops in the villages of Msaginya and Mwenge can be attributed to the unpopularity
Mean Hectares of Major Food and Cash Crops by sampled village

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>FREQ</th>
<th>HECTARES SUM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tambazi</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mnyaki</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mwenge</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Msaginya</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivungwe</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ndurumo</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.863</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 7**

- **TYPE**: maize, beans, cassava, tobacco
- **HECTARES SUM**
- **FREQ**: frequency of each village
Figure 8
Mean quantity of marketed surplus by sampled village
of tobacco cultivation, as an alternative source of cash income.

An analysis of variance test of marketed surplus between villages shows that, as a factor, location is very significant in determining the amount of surplus sold; for maize at the 1.3 percent level \((F=2.98, df=5, p<0.0132, R^2=0.07)\), while over 16 percent of the variation in bean sales can be explained by village \((F=6.10, df=5, p<0.0001, R^2=0.16)\). Similarly, for differences in cassava, which were not significant in terms of hectareage across the villages, 23 percent of variation in surplus sold can be explained by location \((F=11.05, df=5, p<0.0001, R^2=0.23)\). However, only six percent of variations in tobacco sales can be attributed to differences in location \((F=2.67, df=5, p<0.023)\).

Cultivation of mbuga land reduces the seasonality of agricultural activities and provides added insurance of cash income during the dry season. Unfortunately, mbuga land is only available to farmers in villages with close proximity to riverine areas, particularly those in Msaginya, Mtambo and Mwenge (Figure 4). Of my sample, 85 households (43 percent) participated in mbuga cultivation of vegetables (Tables 6.10). They were predominantly in the villages of Msaginya, Mwenge and Ivungwe.

Table 6.11 compares the marketed staples of the current and former refugee settlements of Mishamo, Katumba and Mwesi with that of Mpanda district. The dominant role played by the immigrant population in the district's economy is clear, as in the 1985/86 season refugees produced more than 88 percent of marketed maize, 99 percent of beans and 99
Table 6.10  Dry season activity by village

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Tambazi</th>
<th>Mnyaki</th>
<th>Msaginya</th>
<th>Mwenge</th>
<th>Ivungwe</th>
<th>Ndurumo</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prepare Shamba on homestead</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plot/weed cassava</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-agricultural activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm mbuga</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sell crops</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm tobacco</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvest crops</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nothing</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.11 RURECU Major food crop purchases from primary cooperatives in the refugee settlements 1985-86.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cooperative</th>
<th>Maize</th>
<th>Beans</th>
<th>Cassava</th>
<th>Soyabeans</th>
<th>Paddy</th>
<th>Coffee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mishamo</td>
<td>420,414</td>
<td>256,530</td>
<td>641,584</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>2,572</td>
<td>_</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mwese</td>
<td>161,820</td>
<td>40,119</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>12,288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Lugonesi)</td>
<td>300,150</td>
<td>147,927</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Lwega)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katumba</td>
<td>3,137,950</td>
<td>1,138,613</td>
<td>563,405</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>_</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,020,334</td>
<td>1,583,189</td>
<td>1,204,989</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>12,288</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage of District Total
- 88
- 99
- 99
- 100

District Total
- 4,536,818
- 1,584,268
- 1,208,920
- n/a
- n/a
- 12,288

Source: RURECU, Mpanda Branch office.
percent of cassava. In the same year, the settlements produced 88 percent of the district's maize purchases, 99 percent of cassava and 99 percent of beans (Table 6.11).

**Tobacco Production**

Commodity production of flue-cured tobacco has continued to be marginal in Katumba. Changes in religious leadership have had no impact on the spread of tobacco production among the settlers. Resistance to its cultivation has persisted, and the main cultivators have continued to be Catholics. A similar situation was noted by Boesen & Mohele (1979) for Ulyankulu settlement, where refugees were major producers of maize rather than tobacco, which they were reluctant to cultivate. Katumba's tobacco growers are concentrated in the villages of Ivungwe, Msaginya, Ndurumo, Katumba and Ikolongo. In my sample, the 14 tobacco growers surveyed were in the villages of Msaginya and Mwenge (Figure 7). The absence of tobacco cultivation in Tambazi and Mnyaki villages, was not just the result of religious beliefs, but could be related to the absence of firewood for curing. Firewood for domestic use was becoming an increasing problem in the central area of the settlement.

Looking at overall production, I tried to combine data for the settlement as a whole with that of my 201 sampled households. Table 6.12 charts the history of tobacco production in Katumba. In 1975/76 when tobacco at 7/- per kilo could provide higher revenues than food crops, only 1.9 percent of farmers grew tobacco. Most preferred to realize household consumption through food crop production. In the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agricultural Year</th>
<th>Number of Farmers</th>
<th>Hectares Cultivated</th>
<th>Marketed Production (kgs)</th>
<th>Total Income (TShs)</th>
<th>Income Per Capita (TShs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>24,715</td>
<td>213,824</td>
<td>1,644.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>81,000</td>
<td>567,000</td>
<td>2,054.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>62,089</td>
<td>518,990</td>
<td>1,206.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-79</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>134,502</td>
<td>1,116,520</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-81</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-82</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-83</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>154.3</td>
<td>102,180</td>
<td>1,886,704</td>
<td>6,185.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-84</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>202.2</td>
<td>86,571</td>
<td>2,243,469</td>
<td>5,169.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-85</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>147,000</td>
<td>3,791,882</td>
<td>8,050.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-86</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>180,360</td>
<td>8,376,935</td>
<td>15,258.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-87</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>351,000</td>
<td>16,321,500</td>
<td>29,675.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TCRS Agricultural reports
Settlement Commandants reports.
Table 6.13
Tobacco sales to TTPMB 1985-87 for refugee settlements in the district.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlement</th>
<th>1984-85 kg</th>
<th>1984-85 value (TShs)</th>
<th>Agricultural Year</th>
<th>1985-86 kg</th>
<th>1985-86 value</th>
<th>1986-87* kg</th>
<th>1986-87* value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Katumba</td>
<td>114,786</td>
<td>4,319,861</td>
<td></td>
<td>180,360</td>
<td>8,376,935</td>
<td>110,214</td>
<td>6,928,144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mishamo</td>
<td>227,045</td>
<td>7,361,290</td>
<td></td>
<td>203,295</td>
<td>8,804,186</td>
<td>348,000</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inyonga</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>97,474</td>
<td>6,403,878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nsimbo</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>84,294</td>
<td>5,360,835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpanda-Kati</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>79,734</td>
<td>4,658,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpanda Ndogo</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1,621</td>
<td>976</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Refugee Settlements 341,831 11,681,151 383,655 17,181,121 458,214 n/a

Percentage of District Total

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1985-86</th>
<th>1986-87*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Year</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total District</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: John M. Kakulu, Leaf Account TTPMB (Mpanda)
* Incomplete data
1985/86 season only 549 farmers in the whole of Katumba planted tobacco; less than 6 percent of plot holders.

In my sample 6.9 percent of farmers cultivated tobacco during 1985/86; the average area cultivated was 0.61 hectare with an average marketed surplus of 199.38 kg, with a standard deviation of 210.9 kg. Looking at tobacco production over the two sampled agricultural seasons, it is clear that productivity tends to be greater during more favourable agricultural seasons when sufficient quantities of food crops were assured as in 1984/85. On the whole Katumba’s farmers gradually reduced land under tobacco from an average of 0.54 hectare per plot in 1984/85 to 0.37 in 1985/86.

Tobacco is by far the most lucrative agricultural commodity in the settlement, providing an overall average income from official crop sales of 15,258/- to farmers in 1985-86 (Table 6.13), compared to 3000/- for maize and beans producers. My sampled households fared better in terms of food crop sales to the marketing boards, earning on average of 5417.38 per annum for the 1985/86 season. Tobacco growers earned 7,555/- from tobacco sale to the TTMPB and 5226/- from food crop sales.

Production is carried out on individual plots, often worked communally by kin-related households or with hired labour. Households growing tobacco rely heavily either on family labour, or on communal labour between households within the extended family. Tobacco growers had an average household size of 9.8, almost 1.7 above average for the sample. Only two of the sampled 14 tobacco farmers hired
labour. Curing was another communal activity, taking place in one or two places in a village; usually several farmers construct the kilns, provide firewood, and rent their use to other villagers.

Farmers participating in tobacco production might appear to benefit from a more reliable supply of inputs than maize cultivators, since they are still provided by the TRDB and the TTMPB. In practice, tobacco farmers experience the same problems as other cultivators. Many interviewed in Ivungwe village mentioned insufficient quantities of fertilizer, delays in inputs and payment. In the middle of the 1986/7 season, the TTMPB in Mpanda still owed farmers in Ivungwe some two million shillings from the previous season’s sales.

Tobacco growers have only one buyer, the state marketing board - TTMPB, whose inadequacies equalled those of the NMC and the Co-operative unions. Table 6.12 shows marketed tobacco for the settlement since the 1975/76 season. What is apparent is the fluctuation over the years of marketed output. Raised producer prices, such as the 20 percent increase during the 1986/87 season, are not likely to encourage greater productivity, unless coupled with greater inputs to farmers. Furthermore, in real terms producer prices for flue-cured tobacco have declined by over 34 percent since 1975/76 (Appendix C). Although tobacco production was below projected output, Katumba and Mishamo contributed a significant proportion of the district’s total (Table 6.13).
Constraints on Productivity

The increased sale of district’s crop surpluses to the NMC resulted from expansion in the cultivated area, caused by increased population, rather than intensification of production. Lack of inputs, namely improved seeds and fertilizers, delays in payment, and procurement problems, acted as disincentives to farmers. Specific crop acreage had not been substantially augmented. The assumption by UNHCR that land shortage is a growing phenomenon appears to be misdirected. The feeling among sampled households was that the land supply was adequate; only 51 percent of the allocated area was under cultivation in 1987. This was largely the result of declining soil fertility combined with the lack of sufficient quantities of fertilizer, causing falling yields.

It is apparent that a large proportion of Katumba’s households are unable to satisfy domestic needs. Of central concern to peasants in the sample was the poor harvest. The returns from agriculture were considered so low that many households preferred to sell their labour rather than expand cultivation. Over 28 percent of sampled plots contained peasants who entered the casual labour market, of this group, 85 percent lived on plots with six or more people.

The Fertilizer problem

As early as 1973, an FAO report on soils and land use in the Katumba area recommended the application of fertilizers due to the low quality of the soil (Coelus 1973). LWF/TCRS demonstration plots also showed that
fertilizers were essential to maintain long-term cultivation. From the outset, the donors in Geneva opposed fertilizer distribution to refugees, conflicting with the views of the project coordinator who saw its distribution as the only way to meet self-sufficiency (Letter to TCRS, Dar es Salaam, to Project Coordinator, Katumba - dated 24th July 1974). Chambers (1975) also questioned the issuing of free fertilizer to refugees in case it gave the settlement:

An appearance of fertility and self-sufficiency which may prove illusory if the fertilizers are withdrawn ... the danger is that after handover and without fertilizers, refugees might find themselves rapidly exhausting the low fertility soils, especially at Katumba and Ulyankulu, and facing a marginal existence with low returns to labour and low yields per acre (p.12).

In the 1974/5 agricultural season, TCRS allocated one bag of fertilizer to each family. Fertilizers were to be ordered through the Katumba multi-purpose co-operative (KMPC), which would arrange their distribution to farmers. The ordering, purchasing and delivering of fertilizer from Tanzania Fertilizer Company (TFC) to Katumba farmers have been plagued with difficulties. In the 1977/78 season, the region could not meet the settlement's requirements of 1000 tons; instead only 15 tons were allocated by the Regional Agricultural Development Officer (Letter from Project Coordinator, Katumba, to TCRS, Dar es Salaam - dated 15th March 1977).

For some time Katumba's refugees, with no initial capital or registered co-operative, could not order directly or purchase fertilizer from TFC. Fertilizer orders necessitated advance payment, and the National Milling Corporation which should normally provide inputs for
farmers, was short of funds. At the same time refugee farmers were not eligible for TRDB loans. The rationale was that Katumba villages did not have the official village status necessary to obtain loans, as they were registered only under the 1969 Co-operative Act, which was replaced by the Villages and Ujamaa villages Act of 1975 (Telex to LWF, Geneva, from TCRS- dated 4th October 1977). The donors then tried to get the multi-purpose co-operative integrated into the district and regional co-operative structures with respect to fertilizers, which were more easily available to nationals under the National Maize project. Even though Katumba's full incorporation into regional and district plans for the National Maize Project was approved at a meeting of the Mpanda District Development and Planning Committee, refugees still had to pay 281,000/- for 239 tons of fertilizers in 1978, and an estimated 192,800/- was spent by LWF/TCRS (Letter to TCRS, Dar es Salaam, from Project Coordinator, Katumba - dated 6th December 1977).

During the period of intense crop promotion, supply of inputs to refugee settlements was handicapped by bureaucratic red tape. This is further illustrated by the Urambo Tobacco Authority's refusal in the 1970s to fund some two million shillings input for tobacco, because Ulyankulu settlement was not an official village.

To overcome post-handover supply problems, UNHCR set up a revolving fund which was backed by the Ministry of Home Affairs, to order and purchase fertilizers annually direct from TFC. This fund was still operating in 1987, but fertilizer needs have never been sufficiently met (Table
Table 6.14  
Fertilizer Supplied to Katumba through Official Channels 1981-86

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Type of Fertilizer</th>
<th>Quantity requested (Bags)</th>
<th>Tonnes obtained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981/2</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>777.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982/3</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1080.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983/4</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>22,843</td>
<td>1142.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984/5</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>5,543</td>
<td>287.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985/6</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>6,265</td>
<td>314.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAN</td>
<td>1,287</td>
<td>64.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TSP</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NPK</td>
<td>1,904</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986/7</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>4,689</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAN</td>
<td>5,090</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NPK</td>
<td>641</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UREA</td>
<td>811</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: SA= Sulphate of Ammonia  
TSP= Triple Super Phosphate

Source: TCRS and Ministry of Home Affairs reports.
In 1985/86 season, Rukwa Regional Co-operative Union (RURECU) supplied 1030 bags of fertilizers to the three villages which made up Ivungwe primary co-operative; each plot required at least 10 bags, but could only receive half a bag from the allocation. Co-operative staff had to purchase privately from traders in Mpanda and Tabora to supplement supplies. Most farmers had no alternative but to utilize numerous private sources, which were plentiful, as local merchants kept large stocks.

**Land pressure and ecological crisis**

Intensification of production can lead to increased dependency on the use of fertilizers, declining yields, reduction or abandonment of fallow periods. This crisis in the agricultural sector, described by Bernstein as the 'simple reproduction squeeze', 'involves a greater expenditure of labour-time on poorer or more distant soils to produce the same output of crops, thereby increasing the costs of production and reducing the returns to labour' (Bernstein 1977, p. 427-428).

It is to be expected that Katumba with its high population growth rate of between 3.5&4 percent per annum, high density of 115.3 per sq. km., and its well-defined boundary would progressively experience population pressure. The carrying capacity, measured by the amount of people each plot can sustain is likely to have been exceeded. With insufficient data to measure carrying capacity quantitatively, my aim initially was to look for evidence of stress in the settlement, and analyse the adjustments and
adaptations made by the settlers. Several indicators of population pressure were used; relocation and abandonment of plots, sub-division of plots, declining yields, reduction in fallow period, and sale of labour.

Firstly the grid-layout of the settlement ignored minor variations in soil type, slope angle, and access to water supply, forcing some of the settlers in areas highly unsuitable for cultivation to abandon their plots. This was often done by the more able and more resourceful households. In the course of my survey, I noted an estimated 20 abandoned plots on roads three and four in Mwenge village; similar situations were discovered on road 4B, Msaginya, and in Kambuzi A and B (Figure 4). It is evident that most of the original owners still tried to retain usufruct rights through cassava cultivation. Other plots have been sold and used also for cassava. Voluntary relocation has been mainly to the fertile areas to the north of the close-settled area, to the newer villages of Kanoge, Kajeje and beyond. In some cases, as in Kambuzi and Msaginya, movement might be officially directed - for example, on road three, Msaginya, where many people were moved due to persistent flooding in the rainy season. Relocations were not just confined to a few critical areas of the settlement; the official number of plots on some roads showed considerable annual variations. Unofficial movements have occurred mainly on the fringe of the settlement where they can not be easily detected.

Commoditization of agriculture within the settlement has meant that peasants have tended to devote most agricultural land to commodity production, which is their
main source of obtaining cash income. This constant mining of the soils has resulted not only in reducing the fallow period, but has also meant the substitution of cassava-fallowing for bush-fallowing.

Ecological factors have partly contributed to the declining yields. Katumba soils are in miombo woodlands (Brachystegia Julbernadia). Soils are deep dark-grey sandy-loams, with dark-greyish-brown sandy-clays in the depressions (mbuga). Soils in Katumba were assessed by the FAO in 1973, whose report noted their low fertility, and recommended the use of fertilizers after several years of cultivation (Coelus 1973). Allan (1965) has suggested that soils associated with these woodlands are unproductive and of low human carrying capacity. Moore (1971) estimated a carrying capacity ratio for the Mpanda district area of 15.11 per sq. km on cultivable land. This has been exceeded in Katumba by over 400 percent! It is clear that miombo woodland cannot support high densities of people over time without artificial inputs.

Sufficient longitudinal data on ecological deterioration, at village level, are absent. My survey suggests that the long-settled village of Tambazi has experienced considerable decline in output. At the time of the survey, most households were able to provide only for subsistence, with less surplus sold to parastatals. The areas with the highest output and sales were those on the fringe of the settlement, newly-formed or located close to mbuga land, as in Ivungwe’s case.
Although declining rates of return were evident in the long-settled zones, this crisis was offset in areas where farmers have access to mbuga for rainy season cultivation of rice and dry-season cultivation of maize and vegetables. During the early years of the settlement, TCRS with World Bank sponsorship planned to develop irrigated farming along river valleys. Over 400 hectares were demarcated in the villages: Msaginya (110), Iwimbi (20), Kaminula (50), Nzaga (30) Ivungwe (30), Kaburonge (30), Kajeje (30), and Mtambo (50). Surprisingly the UNHCR viability team in 1977 noted a marked absence of mbuga in the settlement area!

Even though the donor project was never implemented, farmers in those villages have had access to fertile land and the possibility of a more diversified agriculture. The effects of the simple reproduction squeeze - widespread deprivation among settlers - was offset by the presence of mbuga. Villages, like Mnyaki, Tambazi and Ndurumo, where farmers complained most of declining yields, had no access to mbuga land (Figure 4).

The compact settlement pattern meant that there was little land available within villages for future expansion. Young married men had to be accommodated on their parents’ plots. Multiple occupancy did not always imply sub-division of plots; such households cultivated on two or more sites. Some fathers with foresight have purchased plots close to their own, in readiness for their sons. The recent creation of two new villages, Burembo and Kabuga (Figure 4), to take overspill, has been greeted with apprehension by the
settlers, mainly because of the distances from kin-relations, and rumours about poor soil conditions.

The demand for firewood in tobacco production has had deleterious effects on wood stocks, as tobacco competes with domestic use (Marshalla 1986). Large areas of Mwenge and Msaginya have been stripped of wood cover. Villages at the edge of the settlement have been less affected as farmers have encroached into the forest reserves surrounding the settlement. Cautionary measures have already been promulgated, as noted in the recent Atlas of Rukwa:

Since wood is the only source available for tobacco curing, effective tobacco cultivation can devastate woodland and compete with firewood for domestic users. Experience in the woodlands of Tabora region, where serious deforestation threatens not only the tobacco industry but also the supply of domestic fuelwood, has led planners to realize that re-afforestation must accompany cultivation (IRA, UDSM, Atlas of Rukwa 1986, p.40).

As yet, proposals for afforestation are not directed at tobacco growing.

Co-operatives: Administering production?

The chequered history of co-operatives in the settlement during the 1970s, and current attempts at their rejuvenation are a reflection of the fluctuating demise and rise of the co-operative movement within the country.

Historically co-operatives in Tanzania were African initiated, but offered the colonial authorities a suitable mechanism for controlling commodity production, and as a corollary, the economic and political aspirations of the indigenous people. Registration of co-operatives allowed the state considerable leverage over their activities, through
the appointment of inspectors and cadres who would ensure members' cooperation with the state (Coulson 1982).

In the post-independence period, co-operatives became compulsory marketing institutions, acting as intermediaries between the crop marketing boards and the farmers, thus supplanting the Asian traders. The socialist ideology of the 1960s justified the promotion of co-operatives nationwide, from highly export-crop oriented areas of Mwanza, Bukoba and Kilimanjaro, to remote areas of the country. Alterations in the Co-operative Societies Ordinance in 1963, paved the way for a massive increase in the number of co-operatives, from 857 in 1961 to 1,533 at the end of 1966. A three-tiered structure emerged: primary societies at village level, regional co-operative unions, and at its head the national co-operative union of Tanzania. This led to what Coulson describes as 'inefficient, corrupt and undemocratic co-operatives' (p.150). Committee members exploited the availability of funds, and co-operatives became one of the main vehicles for capitalist exploitation in the rural areas, allowing large-scale farmers to attract funds, expand acreage and make use of mechanization.

Bryceson (1982) outlines three criticisms of the co-operative movement in the 1960s.

Firstly the co-operative movement was primarily functioning to service the more commercially involved 'progressive farmers', or rich peasants, in particular parts of the country. Second, the co-operative movement had strong tendencies towards mismanagement and corruption. Third, co-operative organizations were fairly inefficient, making crop handling costs extremely high. All of these factors contributed to the undermining of incentives for increased commodity production by middle and poor peasants living in marginal cash crop producing areas (p.559).
State intervention into the co-operative movement began with a special committee of enquiry which exposed substantial losses within the unions. The enquiry criticized the absence of trained manpower, inefficiency, corruption and lack of growers’ involvement in their operation. The Co-operative Societies Act of 1968 enabled direct government inspection into co-operative operations. In 1972, on the recommendation of the Pratt Commission, the Rural Development Division and Co-operative Division, were combined to form the Ujamaa and Co-operative Division to assist in the transformation of primary marketing co-operative societies into production-oriented co-operatives, and to mobilize and guide the development of villages into fully-fledged, registered co-operative societies. Later under the Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act of 1975, villages became ‘development units’ taking over all the functions of the primary societies, crop marketing and credit functions in the form of multi-purpose co-operatives.

John Saul (1978) has dated the development of the multi-purpose co-operative concept to the period of the Arusha Declaration and the creation of Ujamaa villages. They were conceived of essentially as production-based, combining responsibilities for marketing with credit provisions, distribution of inputs, organization of subsidiary rural craft activities, processing at village-level, and organization of voluntary work for village population. The change in ideology led to the abolition of the regional co-operative unions in 1976. Their functions were taken over by

18 Presidential Special Committee of Enquiry into Cooperative Movement and Marketing Boards of 1967.
the parastatal crop authorities, which then provided a single marketing channel down to village level, undertaking activities like input distribution, extension services, financing, licensing, grading, processing, and wholesaling (Bryceson 1982).

Generally, co-operatives in Tanzania have been associated with increased differentiation, promoting the rise of a social class of wealthy, capitalist farmers, and more recently bureaucrats (overlords) in the rural areas. Marxists, since Engels published his Peasant Question in France and Germany, have seen co-operatives as appropriate institutions to safeguard the position of small-holding peasants against the 'overwhelming power of capitalist production', by 'effecting their transition from private enterprise and private possessions to co-operative ones' (Engels p.393-4). Engels acknowledges that this would be a difficult process, much depending on the circumstances of each case and the conditions under which power is captured. Within socialist Tanzania, the co-operative movement has been deemed important for social transformation of rural areas (Nyerere 1968, Saul 1978). Nyerere associated co-operative activities with communal and traditional, 'ujamaa' principles. He explains:

...many criticisms have been made of the workings of our co-operative societies; much practical improvement is necessary if they are really to serve the farmers and not to replace the exploitation of man by man by the exploitation of inefficiency and bureaucratic dishonesty... In criticizing the working of existing co-operative societies, we must not make the mistake of blaming the principles of co-operation ...Although marketing co-operatives are socialist in the sense that they represent the joint activities of producers, they could be socialist institutions serving capitalism if the basic organization of agricultural production is
It is only if the agricultural production itself is organized on a socialist pattern that co-operative marketing societies are serving socialism (Nyerere 1968, p. 116/117).

Parastatals became plagued with inefficient organizational capacity, and failed to supply sufficient transport to ensure timely collection of crops. Payment to farmers was slow. In 1982, the new Co-operative Act led to the re-establishment of the 'three-tier system' by the government, with village primary co-operative societies, regional co-operative unions, and the role of the National Milling Corporation confined to the marketing of export crops.

Pan-territorial uniform pricing for various crops was introduced in 1973/4, equalizing producer prices irrespective of location. Ellis has suggested (1988) that the strategy behind pan-territorial pricing was to integrate the more remote regions, such as Rukwa and Ruvuma, into the national economy. The introduction of dual-pricing in 1981-82 for maize and rice, ensured that those regions producing high outputs obtained the premium price. This led to less accessible regions, like Rukwa and Ruvuma, increasing productivity, while the marketing authorities bore the increased transport costs (United Republic of Tanzania 1982). Figures 9 and 10 show the dramatic increase in official purchases of food crops in Rukwa, and the region's increasing share of the national food staples market.

Rukwa's current position as a major food-producing region cannot be attributed solely to a growth in production in the region, but must also be related to the undeveloped state of the open market, due to the region's isolation from major
FIGURE 9
OFFICIAL PURCHASE OF MAJOR FOOD CROPS
RUKWA REGION

YEAR

BEANS
CASSAVA
MAIZE

CROP

source: MPB statistical abstracts 1982 and 1984

tonnes
30000
20000
10000
0

Figure 10

RUKWA REGION - PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL CROP SALES FOR MAJOR FOOD CROPS

source: MPB statistical abstracts 1982 and 1984
centres of food consumption. According to Ellis (1988) the high transport costs levelled out open market prices, making them closer to the official price, thus making it just as profitable for farmers to sell to the co-operatives.

Co-operatives in Katumba: multi-purpose and marketing

Within the settlement, it was necessary to make a distinction between emerging forms of grassroots cooperation among the settlers, which were manifested in communal activities (Ushirika), and the more official state and donor-sponsored co-operatives.

After the first year of settlement, groups of refugees established small-scale co-operative initiatives and sought initial funding from LWF/TCRS for numerous trading ventures, such as consumer shops, charcoal burning, carpentry, and timber-cutting. These small-scale, raw material collection and processing units, have continued to flourish irrespective of changes in the fate of the official co-operatives.

State and donor-sponsored crop marketing and producer co-operatives were integrated into the economic structure of Katumba, at the time when the concept of the co-operative as a multi-purpose entity was being promoted. Katumba Multi-purpose Cooperative (KMPC) was formed by the donors on the 2nd October 1974, and was officially registered in 1976 under the 1968 act. It provided a settlement-wide umbrella

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19 The multi-purpose cooperative was to provide all the needs of a rural community, combining the provision of agricultural inputs to farmers, such as credit, fertilizers, with crop-purchasing and provision of non-agricultural consumer goods to villagers.
organization, with about 2,500 initial members, each contributing 2/- for membership.

On paper KMPC duties included purchasing, storage of crops, provision of farm inputs, organization of a communal block farm and the operation of a number of small production units under the guidance of TCRS. In practice, most of the crop services, especially the provision of inputs, were still carried out by the agricultural officers of TCRS. KMPC’s committee of refugees was ineffective, and restricted to crop procurement, storage, and sale to NMC. By 1978 KMPC extended its services to 22 villages and had eight godowns built by TCRS on village sites. Its cash turnover in May 1978 amounted to 721,504/-. Most of the income arising from non-agricultural undertakings came from small-scale industries like tailoring, butchery, timber-cutting, carpentry, brick-making, charcoal burning, grain milling, trading of consumer goods, hide and skin processing and catering (TCRS Handing-over report 1978). At ‘handover’ in 1978 these activities were passed on to a staff, inexperienced in management, finance, and business acumen. According to TCRS several pieces of agricultural machinery were also transferred to KMPC, as well as vehicles, sewing machines, milling machines, buildings and poultry.

Formerly, agricultural machinery was used only on demonstration plots. Their projected effective utilization on individual peasant plots is speculative. The steep gradient over most of Katumba in the escarpment areas would

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20 Agricultural machinery included a Ford tractor, a chisel plough, a light cultivator, 3 disc-plough furrows, an offset disc, a ridger, and a disc -harrow.
have restricted machinery to the low-lying villages (Figure 4). However, there is no evidence to suggest any pre- or post-handover usage of machinery by Katumba farmers. Since no detailed strategy was worked out for their communal use, coupled with the difficulty in acquiring fuel and spare-parts, many machines were left idle and corroded. Mismanagement resulted in the decline of most of the co-operative activities by 1984. The poultry and piggery units inherited from LWF/TCRS were quickly struck by disease and abandoned. The tailoring block, hotel and co-operative shops in Tambazi village were closed down, and the equipment, such as sewing machines, were sold, while the hotel building was rented out. A carpentry workshop built by LWF/TCRS in 1982 in Tambazi operated intermittently, but often only during the visits of UNHCR representatives.

With the removal of crop marketing from KMPC in 1982, the co-operative contracted to only one site - its headquarters where it operated one poorly-stocked shop, a hotel, an Isuzu lorry, a bus, a tractor and a garage workshop. Its successes were confined to two milling machines in the villages of Msaginya and Ikolongo, and a revolving fund for the purchase of fertilizers. UNHCR and TCRS have continued to subsidize most of the co-operative activities. Under ICARA II, 580,000 US dollars were obtained to help rejuvenate KMPC. Between 1976-86, a bus was acquired for 1,315,201/- and an Isuzu lorry for 362,668/-. In 1987 the lorry was hired to villagers to transport raw materials; for example, twice-weekly local butchers transported cattle from Isevya cattle market to the settlement. Intermittently,
during 1986 and 1987, the bus was making scheduled journeys between Mishamo, Mpanda, Katumba and Ulyankulu. The bus and lorry were operational only for limited periods due to frequent breakdowns and lack of spare-parts.

Table 6.15 Income and expenditure for KMPC, 1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Tanzanian Shillings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balance from previous year</td>
<td>172,699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>233,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure</td>
<td>310,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income from rental of: Lorry</td>
<td>148,542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hotel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11,837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Milling Machines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>46,245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: KMPC (Katumba).

Not all the problems of KMPC could be attributed to inexperienced management. Two main characteristics distinguish it from other co-operative organizations for nationals. Primarily, grassroot support is lacking. The co-operative is like many settlement structures, imposed from above by donors and the government. Until 1978, refugees had very little control over its operations, and were subordinate to TCRS and Tanzanian Agricultural Officers. Their role was essentially to implement decisions made by the agency and the state. Most of the small-scale industries established reflected the demands of the donors for construction works, and corresponded to their concept of relevant rural industries.

Secondly, any corruption or undemocratic practices on the part of committee members were surpassed by the Settlement Commandant, who at times commandeered machinery
and vehicles and embezzled capital for his own personal use. The agency also maintained its own overseer, in the form of a Co-operative Officer, who supervised and inspected, and who under ICARA II planned to remodel KMPC, and have greater control over its operations.

KMPC assisted in the growth of a rural social class among the settlers, creating a salaried bureaucratic stratum of committee men. It began with 18 committee men from each registered village, but later expanded to 253 villagers on the board, 11 from each of the now 23 registered villages. The four unregistered ones were not included. The committee meets at two monthly intervals. It has been the policy since 1982 to move from individual membership to village membership. However, board members have been able to maintain some control over membership, by using tactics which weeded out the poorer farmers. For example, only those who could contribute 50/- for the purchase of a lorry and 100/- for the bus retained membership, resulting in a reduction in its membership from 3,000 to a few hundred. KMPC's workforce was reduced from 65 in 1977 to 31 in 1987. The multi-purpose co-operative is to date the most ineffectual community organization in the settlement.

Marketing: Primary Co-operatives

The re-organization of the national co-operative structure in 1982 led to the formation of Rukwa Regional Co-operative Union (RURECU) in 1984, with its headquarters in Sumbawanga, and district branch in Mpanda. Katumba's villages had to re-register under the Act to gain co-
operative status. The District Co-operative officer has proposed nine primary co-operatives for the 27 villages. In accordance with the act, a village could only be registered as a co-operative if it could produce 500 tonnes of any crop, and had 50,000/- as initial capital. Registration would then take a period of three months on submission of economic viability reports to the registrar in Dodoma. Katumba’s nine co-operatives formed in 1984 were still unregistered in 1987. The District Agricultural Officer could provide no explanation for the delay in registration. On receiving official co-operative status RURECU would have to supply inputs and credit. Whether the delay has been intentional or not, refugee farmers have been deprived of vital inputs and donor support has had to be maintained.

Village chairmen and clerks were appointed the new co-operative officers, none of whom had any experience of crop marketing. Their duties include crop purchasing and storing, and paying farmers on behalf of RURECU. Efficiency depends to a large extent on the competence of the managers, and sufficient godowns to store crops in the designated village. It is not unusual for the co-operative office to be located in villages with no godown space, and rivalry between villages prevents sharing of the limited resources. For most farmers, the distance from plots to collection points is enormous; for example, from parts of Msaginya village to the Katumba village collection point is 8 kilometres, and no transport is available. The amount of food and cash crops marketed by the co-operatives is shown in Figure 6. Sales to co-operatives appear to increase proportionately with
distance from the settlement markets - a result of the absence of internal transport.

Since the late 1970s, the marketed surplus of the Barundi refugees has contributed significantly to the increasing importance of Rukwa region in the national economy. Rukwa has been transformed from a peripheral area, to one of the 'big four' food-producing regions. This observation is supported by the Regional Agricultural Officer, who, noting the expansion in land under cultivation, from 55,200 hectares in 1976 to 88,360 in 1985, commented:

With the arrival of the 150,000 refugees at Mwesi, Katumba and Mishamo, the production of crops, especially maize has greatly increased in the region (Daily News 1.7.1985).

Conclusion

The semi-proletarian character of Katumba peasants was accentuated as state and donors determined the appropriate level of basic needs necessary for reproduction in the refugee population. Barundi refugees were forcibly relocated to schemes supplied with the means of production: tools, jembe and panga, and land, over which they obtained usufruct rights as long as they remained in the settlement.

The allocation of plots to households, on what appeared to be an equitable basis, allowed the peasant a degree of autonomy which expressed itself in resistance to certain patterns of cropping, in non-compliance with minimum hectareage requirements, and in utilization of parallel marketing facilities. Nevertheless, this autonomy was maintained because of the inability of the state apparatus,
local or national, effectively to control each individual household.

Commodity production was, as for the African peasantry in general, soon internalized as part of necessary production, and subsequently formed part of the survival strategy of the refugee households. The deprivation which normally accompanies refugee situations, the fervent attachment to cultural baggage, and the necessity to adopt to new environments and new agricultural methods militated against the adoption of pure cash crop commodities like tobacco. Instead, refugees have tried to secure household food supplies primarily through food crop production. As the 'squeeze' intensified, peasants' food crop production has stabilized and in some cases diverted to the famine crop, cassava.

Certainly the presence of the refugees has contributed to the expansion of the cultivated area in Mpanda and Rukwa district, with the latter now forming one of the 'big four' food-producing regions. But increased levels of productivity within the settlement have been unsustainable under prevailing cropping and marketing policies. With inputs like fertilizers and credit denied to the refugee farmers, and low producer prices, plots are under-utilized and peasants seek alternative marketing channels. The long-term effects of the 'squeeze' are visible in the spatial variations in productivity throughout the settlement. Continuing restrictions on internal and external mobility will only aggravate the problem.
In the final analysis, neither the state, nor donor’s control over production nor peasant resistance, are responsible for the failure of commercial agriculture to develop a momentum of its own in Katumba. Rather the objective conditions of commodity production within Mpanda are unfavourable to wealth accumulation on a significant scale.
CHAPTER SEVEN

COMMODITY PRODUCTION: LIMITS TO DIFFERENTIATION

Introduction

My aim in this chapter is to interpret the specificities of the mode of incorporation, more precisely the nature of the commodity relations enforced on the refugee population, conceptualized as 'peasants', and its implications for the emerging social relations within the settlement. This involves tracing the development of class differentiation in a population which due to the circumstances of migration, one has hitherto assumed to be relatively homogeneous in its material condition.

An effect of the intensification of commodity production is the internal differentiation of the peasantry, with the development of a social class of capitalist and progressive farmers and the proletarianization of the mass of the peasantry. I will attempt to consider the conditions under which wealth has been generated and reproduced within the refugee settlement, and where appropriate, try to apply Lenin's classification of the peasantry into poor, middle, and rich peasants, in terms of their relationship to the means of production, using the exchange of labour as the basis for peasant differentiation.
Theories of Differentiation

Studies of differentiation in rural Africa have attributed inequalities to two principal forms of accumulation: firstly those which are generated through commodity relations, described as accumulation from below; and secondly those created by direct accumulation through the coercive forces of the state (Mapolu 1985, Shivji 1976, Mamdani 1987).

Investigations among rural dwellers indicate the existence of qualitative differences in the material conditions of the peasantry. The causes of such differences have been intensely debated in Russia, between proponents of either a demographic (Chayanovian) or a class (Leninist) explanation for the relative differences in wealth among the peasantry and for inequalities in the distribution of land holdings and income. Several studies have attempted to determine the applicability of Lenin’s ideas, (Patnaik 1976, Deere & de Janvry 1981, Rahman 1986), or the demographic, Chayanovian school (Hunt 1979, Rahman 1986) to Third World peasants.

Scholars of Tanzania have tended to adopt Lenin’s classification of the peasantry. Lenin envisaged the dissolution of the ‘old patriarchal peasantry’ and the creation of new types of rural inhabitants: a rural bourgeoisie of rich peasants, accumulating through commodity production or in combination with the merchant enterprises; a middle peasantry, engaged in mainly precarious subsistence agriculture, whose dependence on tenuous conditions may force them to join the third category - the rural
proletariat - a mass of landless, or near landless wage labourers, who eventually become dependent on the market for personal consumption thus aiding capitalist relations in rural areas (Lenin 1960). The African peasantry did not conform to these distinct discrete categories, even though the capitalist mode of production had become entrenched in rural areas. While social differentiation was occurring, it was apparent that proletarianization was not proceeding at the level expounded by Lenin for the 19th century Russian peasantry. In fact, due to certain historical and social particularities, capitalist relations were said to have penetrated rural areas without the corresponding de-peasantization and the creation of a rural proletariat. Of course, an agrarian bourgeoisie could be detected, but its means of accumulation differed significantly from that pertaining in 19th century Russia. In situations where land is plentiful, differentiation is unlikely to be predicated on the emergence of property inequality - the concentration of land holdings - but may develop around other elements of the production process, such as labour or its implements, as shown by Mamdani (1987), who appropriately identifies for Uganda several different routes to differentiation.

Undue emphasis has been given to social differentiation in the case of Tanzania, as successive state directives have increasingly imposed structures on the peasantry through rural development policies, the dynamics of which inevitably led to class formation and the integration of peasants into the world capitalist system. Elements of the bourgeoisie were said to have utilized centralized bureaucratic
structures to consolidate power over direct producers and to accumulate resources in the rural areas (Shivji 1976, Coulson 1982). Furthermore, the predominance of state control over aspects of production and marketing in rural areas ensured that access to the state became a pre-requisite for the development and reproduction of an agrarian bourgeoisie (Shivji 1976, Mamdani 1987).

**Differentiation in settlement schemes**

In general, settlement schemes present an alternative route to differentiation: through state compliance, international capital is able to subjugate peasants to its requirements. Raikes (1977) has noted that schemes in Tanzania provided a useful strategy for the separation of peasants from ‘control over the means of production and labour-process.’ Peasants therefore ‘became proletarianized even while they continue to own the land on which they cultivate’ (p.280). Initially, export crop producing schemes were dependent on the selection of progressive farmers, which would inevitably lead to differentiation and the emergence of a group of rich peasants in rural areas. When such schemes failed to reach expected production levels, this led to projects without careful selection of members, often where production of specific crops, like tobacco, has been forced on the peasants within a specified area. All pre-existing social strata of village societies are absorbed and in such cases differentiation occurs through access to the state, whose role becomes fundamental in the acquisition
of farm inputs (seeds, fertilizers, insecticides, pesticides, credit) and marketing channels.

Nevertheless, some scholars of the Tanzanian peasantry have argued that on such schemes peasants cannot be classified as proletarian as they still maintain some control over the means of production and therefore some control over the cost of their reproduction (Bernstein 1979, Raikes 1977, Bryceson 1979). However, that it was the policy of the state to standardize and supervise the reproduction of peasant farmers, (what Bernstein (1979) describes as the phenomenon of vertical concentration), was clearly apparent in the settlement process.

Schemes represent direct forms of labour appropriation by the state. In Chapter Six I showed how the state tried to use refugee settlers to intensify commodity production in an area traditionally unprofitable for capital. In other refugee situations as in Sudan, schemes were located in rural areas where wage labourers were needed for cotton cultivation. Inequalities inherent within the settlement process have in fact taken on a class character, and elements of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie can directly appropriate labour, or the products of labour, from the refugee population. Such forms of appropriation in Katumba can only be achieved through coercive methods. Although I have insufficient evidence to determine its extent, it is worth noting that sections of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie were totally divorced from the land and were dependent on direct appropriation of the products of refugee labour.

However, this chapter is more concerned with the emerging
forms of accumulation among the refugee population and the routes through which differentiation has been occurring, that is, the processes by which wealth has been generated and reproduced.

**Not all refugees are poor**

No study has so far considered the importance of class in relation to the settlement and adjustment of the refugee population in their host societies. The political origin and group classification of this form of migration tend to centre discussion on religious and ethnic affiliations or ideological associations. Many refugees, with the compliance of host governments, have managed to manipulate ideological tendencies in order to achieve higher class positions in their countries of asylum. Some studies have considered the individual attributes of refugees; for example, education or language proficiency which enable them to adopt survival strategies, beyond the narrow boundaries of those open to the bulk of the refugee population (Goldlust & Richmond 1974). It is also widely known that in most refugee situations, members of an international bourgeoisie are also displaced. They are readily absorbed into the local bourgeoisie, received socially and rarely enter state-sponsored settlement schemes. In Africa the heterogeneity of refugee groups in terms of social class, has been occasionally stressed (Harrell-Bond 1986), as coups and counter-coups and ethnic conflicts oust and eject political leaders and members of the elite. Such migrants are often

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1 Examples are Cubans in the United States or refugees fleeing communism in Russia or Eastern Europe.
able to retain sufficient assets to maintain their class position in their country of asylum. The selective, genocidal nature of the Barundi conflict did result in the elimination of large sections of the Bahutu elite, so much so that the Barundi refugee population has been assumed to lack class groupings.

This viewpoint is also echoed in the assumptions of donors and the host states that all African refugees are peasants and farmers with similar levels of deprivation. This assumption can be attributed to economics rather than to any empirical understanding. It is more convenient to deal with an undifferentiated group of peasants who are likely to make fewer demands and are therefore more controllable. For the host state it is better politics to have a large alien population isolated and confined to the more unattractive peasant agriculture than to have them placing pressure on the urban market. The Tanzanian position on refugees was clearly outlined in a speech by former President Nyerere:

Tanzania's policy to all types of refugees is basically the same...because ours is an agricultural country, providing refugees with a livelihood mostly means giving them an opportunity to work on the land. To fleeing peasants we are providing what they want at least for themselves...A skilled or professional refugee can often be provided with the appropriate work...the unqualified urban worker, and even the pastoralists create more difficulty; for us and themselves. They have to be taught to become farmers, although this life is strange and possibly unattractive to them (Nyerere 1983).\(^2\)

However, such an axiom ignores the class composition of the Barundi refugee population. The hierarchical social

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\(^2\) Julius K. Nyerere, President of Tanzania in his speech on 3 October 1983, when receiving the Nansen medal for services to the cause of refugees reprinted in the Daily News. 15 October 1983, Dar es Salaam.
structure of Burundi confined the Bahutu to a lower status both socially and economically. Spatial dislocation freed them from numerous obligations which dominated their social relations with the ruling elite.

Even though various constraints existed, which prevented Wahutu from changing their class positions, nonetheless on arrival in Tanzania the group was not homogeneous. Due to the ethnic nature of the conflict, those Bahutu who fled the country were from different social classes, with politicians, military personnel, educationists, religious leaders, craftsmen/ artisans and peasants all seeking asylum together. A section of Table 7.1 shows the pre-migration occupation of the sampled refugee population. As this is confined to those placed within the settlement, it confirms the limited social diversity of the refugee group, but remnants of a petty bourgeoisie are apparent. However, displacement pushed surviving elements of the Barundi bourgeoisie into the lower stratum of the peasantry, for example, former teachers and students, due to language differences, could not easily find employment in the settlement or continue their education. This was compounded by UNHCR’s policy not to support academic pursuits outside the country of first asylum. One example, is that of Philbert, a former law student at the University of Bujumbura, who fled to Tanzania after his father and two brothers were killed. A year later, his mother joined him in Katumba. After some unsuccessful attempts to continue his education, he resigned himself to farming, and caring for his mother.
Table 7.1 Former and current occupations of sampled Refugees (Number of respondents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Burundi</th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pupil</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisherman</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailor</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenter</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Builder</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrician</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leader</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watchman</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldier</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical worker</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural officer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government worker</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village administration</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of equal significance was the inability of humanitarian agencies to accommodate refugee intellectuals. Many prefer young inexperienced expatriates to knowledgeable refugees. Aid agencies tend to fear intellectuals as they are capable of articulating an informed and questioning attitude to the aid programme. They are treated as misfits - criticized for not being able to adjust smoothly to rural life, but at the same time are called on to be translators for visiting UN missions. An inventory of skills among the refugee group was requested by UNHCR, prompted by Chambers survey of 1975. The TCRS director, at the time of the survey, was critical of this project, which he understood was to 'encourage the employment of the refugees'. He was concerned that 'TCRS
should stress that the survey does not mean that we will provide employment or assist the skilled refugees in seeking employment outside the settlement' (Letter from Director to Project Coordinator (Katumba), 11. 12. 1975).

From the table it is also possible to see how the settlement structure has created a new stratum of salaried workers - the clerical and administrative staff, adding to the already established rural bourgeoisie. The material poverty of the refugee population along with its concentration in a relatively remote part of Tanzania fostered conditions which favoured the emergence of a petty bourgeoisie and a process of accumulation internal to the refugee group. Abject deprivation instantly created a rural consumer market, originating not as Lenin propounded from a dispossessed and wage-earning labour force, but from a displaced, alien population.

**A source of cheap labour**

Vulnerable, unorganized refugee groups are a potential source of cheap labour wherever conditions permit. In most cases, donors and the host state have significant control over the movement of labour outside the boundaries of the settlement, and over commodity production, and total control over the allocation of the means of production. Settlement schemes have been located adjacent to labour shortage agricultural areas, while in some cases an absence of agricultural land is incorporated in the planning stage, as in schemes known as wage-earning settlements. An example is
Es Suki in Eastern Sudan, where an initial population of 8,000 was expected to find wage labour on the nearby irrigated schemes of New Halfa, Es Suki and the Rahad (Kibreab 1987).

In Tanzania, the migrant labour hypothesis was reinforced by the siting of Ulyankulu in Tabora, within the constituency of the then Minister for Home Affairs, an area designated in 1965 by the Village Settlement Authority for tobacco production. Ulyankulu’s proximity to the Urambo Tobacco complex predetermined the refugees role as an alternative source of seasonal labour for tobacco farms, replacing earlier labour migrants, after the independent state imposed restrictions on interregional movements. Boesen & Mohele (1979), analysing the growth of tobacco production on the Urambo scheme, record that 43 percent of the 10,000 tobacco farms hired labour, which in 1965 totalled 5,000 workers.

The location of Katumba near the Nsimbo tobacco complex also indicates some underlying assumptions regarding local labour demands. Employment opportunities to meet cash needs were rare within the settlement, with TCRS providing work for a few skilled workers, the bulk of whom were Tanzanians. Refugees therefore had to seek work as vibarua (casual labourers) on local farms. The saturation of the labour market had adverse effects on local wage levels. Although Betts (1975) and Chambers (1975) noted the decline in daily wage rates from 5/- to 2/- per day, this was the rate paid by the agencies; refugees could obtain close to the statutory minimum daily wage of 14.60/- in the local area.
This practice of underpayment was strongly opposed by the refugees. In 1975 refugees complained about deductions from their salaries for food rations. One refugee wrote:

Refugees who are working in the settlement, they are not being paid their salaries according to the work they are doing. Everyday they work from 7.30 to 2.30pm, and receive at the end of the month 45/-, 60/- and some 90/- (TCRS, Dar es Salaam, January 1975, from Chairman Tita Abel, TCRS archives).

The statutory minimum average monthly wage should have been 350/-. TCRS replied with:

It seems that refugees do not understand that the work they are paid pocket money for doing, they do for their own benefit, only they should not even be paid pocket money (Letter from TCRS, Dar es Salaam to Project Coordinator, Katumba - dated 13 January 1975).

Table 7.2 shows casual labour participation outside the settlement between 1972-1987 for the sample heads of households. A total of 54, or 27%, had since 1972 worked outside Katumba. However, the local Mpanda area only received 16% of the casual labour. Between 1972&1975, most refugees employed within the district were involved in agricultural labour. By the 1980s their activities had become more diversified and enterprising, ranging from charcoal burning to brick-making, as they secured a niche in the local economy.

Casual labour opportunities were greater beyond the district’s boundaries. The state has tried to get the refugees to participate in more coordinated labour migration to plantations, as state-owned plantations have been permitted directly to recruit labour in the settlements. Ayok (1985) reports that the Tanzanian Sisal Industry recruited over 1,000 men from Mishamo to work on the estates. However, 300 returned in less than six months due
Table 7.2

Destination of casual labour outside Katumba by type of activity, for sampled households, 1972-1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Agricultural</th>
<th>Fishing</th>
<th>Commerce</th>
<th>Crafts</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kigoma</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpanda</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumbawanga</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanga</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morogoro</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mishamo</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruwira</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dar es Salaam</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moshi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaliua</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tabora Town</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mwanza</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage of total sample
to the harsh conditions (Ayok 1985, pp. 37-38). Similar recruitment exercises were carried out in Katumba settlement, between 1973&75. Lwoga (1986) discussing the issue of labour shortages in the sisal industry after the Arusha Declaration, also remarked on the renewed state-sponsored recruitment drive in the traditional labour reserve areas in the 1980s, including the refugee settlements. Direct recruitment was carried out under the auspices of the Ministry of Labour and Manpower Development in the former labour reserves of Western Tanzania. It was to this end that during 1982 the Ministry undertook a survey of labour demands in the settlement.

Historically the refugee group has participated in labour migration to Tanzania (see Chapter 3). Fifteen percent of the sample heads of households had worked on Tanzanian sisal or cotton plantations before becoming refugees. However, since migrating as refugees, only three percent had worked on the estates in Tanga and Morogoro (Table 7.2). Analysis by year of casual labour participation showed that between 1975&1979, 10 percent migrated every year to find employment on the estates, mainly undertaking the more arduous tasks of cutting. Most worked for brief periods, and only one respondent had worked for the duration of one year.

In 1986 the Tea Authority recruited some 600 Katumba men to work on plantations in Mbeya region. Again many deserted and returned to the settlement before their contracts expired. Labour shortages on plantations and the recent state concessions to large-scale agriculture imply
that recruitment will increase in former labour reserves like Mpanda district. Refugees, with restrictions on their independent search for employment outside the settlement, may be drawn to employment which is sanctioned by the state.

Although 27 percent of the refugees interviewed regularly sought wage employment outside the settlement, the majority preferred locally-based individual small-scale enterprises which often required a secondary skill. Combinations of fishing and farming, or tailoring and farming were particularly lucrative. Fishing attracted the highest proportion of migrants; 18 percent went to Kigoma and Sumbawanga/Nkanshi districts during the dry season, to catch dagaa and other fish in Lake Tanganyika (Table 7.2).

**Indicators of differentiation**

Quantitative assessment of household assets, (for example, livestock, farming implements and furniture), is used by some social scientists as a differentiating element among rural producers. Such surveys are employed particularly by those whose analysis deals specifically with the peasant mode of production, focusing on internal organization and relations of production within the peasant household. In established, long-settled rural communities, ownership of livestock, farming implements and consumer goods provide useful indicators of wealth accumulation. This mode of analysis was not deemed appropriate for the refugee situation, however. As refugees crossed the border in family groups, often on foot, and had relations in Tanzania, material goods, like radios and bicycles could easily be
brought into exile (Table 4.5). My survey of bicycle ownership among the sample groups showed 52.9 percent of sampled households owning one or more bicycles, yet only 3.9 percent brought bicycles from Burundi. Even the 1976/77 Household Budget survey showed 14 percent of Rukwa's households with bicycles, three percent below the national average.

Donors have often been critical of the marked absence of livestock within the settlement. Cattle, which in Burundi acted as the chief differentiator, were conspicuous by their absence. A livestock census in 1985 enumerated some 403 heads of cattle, 500 goats, 1,700 sheep, 325 pigs and 12,700 head of poultry. In 1987 all the cattle belonged to two herds. One cattle-owner reported that he owned 50 head of cattle. After conferring with other refugees I estimated the herd to be more than 200, although the owner was very much involved in the transporting to and marketing of cattle in Rukwa region. Wasukuma herdsmen, because of their familiarity with the local woodlands, were hired to tend the cattle. Barundi peasants were not involved in the traditional forms of patron-client relationships based on cattle. Explanations for the absence of cattle varied from the lack of capital, to the presence of tsetse-flies and the lack of grazing land. The latter appeared valid as the two cattle-owners lived on the fringes of the settlement. However, peasants were more ready to keep goats for milk, chickens, and pigeons for ready cash sales within the settlement. The donors made no attempt to introduce cattle-keeping as an economic activity, as with the Banyarwanda at
Mwesi. The Bahutu were placed in their traditional role as cultivators, even though in Burundi cattle were an integral part of the crop complex. There were no modern farm implements in Katumba, apart from during a brief period when the agencies cultivated demonstration plots. The machinery which was left to the multi-purpose co-operative was never fully utilized. All households cultivate with jembe (hoe) and pangas (machetes), which in fact are more suited to the soil conditions.

With the initially equitable distribution of the means of production - land, tools - it is possible to argue that any differentiation must be linked to the demographic characteristics of the households, not in this case to the life cycle of the household as propounded by the Chayanovian school, but to the actual size of the households, namely the relative number of survivors who through kinship links congregate to form the new household. Such a household could employ multiple strategies, from the cultivation of a substantial hectareage to wage labour employment and trading.

In a newly-settled environment, the opportunities for craftsmen and traders are significantly greater, and their activities are central to rural communities. In Katumba those refugees with the skills needed by TCRS easily acquired wage labour on arrival. During the dry season a significant proportion of the peasantry either had to participate in wage labour migration outside the settlement or saw their surplus labour-time appropriated into 'self-help' activities like land clearance, construction, road-
building, breaking stones and making bricks. Without wage labour peasants could not meet the total costs of their reproduction. Unfamiliarity with the land, crops and climate delayed the possibility of commodity production meeting household requirements. Wages became a fundamental part of the cycle of reproduction. Labour has therefore always been a feature of the settlement economy, but has proved a suitable indicator of differentiation as elements of the refugee population became major employers of wage labour, both agricultural and non-agricultural. A sharp distinction existed between those refugees employed by the donors and state and those employed by other refugees, in terms of class position and ability to accumulate wealth.

In Katumba, labour (quality) and trade (business) were the principal routes to differentiation. Since commodity production tends to generate unequal relationships, it is necessary to look at the constraints which hinder this form of accumulation within the settlement.

**Vibarua (Wage Labourers)**

Significant qualitative differences were noted between households involved in off-farm income-generating activities and those who were not, and between both these groups and households which were able to hire farm labour for cultivation. It was apparent that commodity production provided only a fraction of household incomes. As one refugee put it; ‘without trade you cannot make any money here’. During the 1980s more cash was needed for basic consumer goods as scarcity became common and prices
rocketed. In 1986, the price of a bar of soap in Katumba rose to 120/-, almost triple that of the minimum daily wage. Furthermore, monetary demands from the state, such as the payment of a development levy, introduced in 1983, and at 300/- per adult forced an increasing number of people to move into wage labour on a seasonal or permanent basis. Households were forced to invest more labour in activities which produced higher return. A survey of the major sources of household income (Table 7.3) for the sample group shows the diversity of sources used for Katumba’s households, the bulk of which gain income from the sale of major cash and food crops like maize and beans. The comparative data for Mishamo settlement highlight the predominance of commodity production in an area where soil fertility is greater, non-agricultural employment activities more limited, and commercial centres less developed than in Katumba.

To some extent the sources of income for Katumba’s households conform with those for nationals. Tanzanian Household Budget Surveys in the last two decades show significant changes in the composition of rural incomes. In 1983, 17.5 percent of rural incomes came from farm crop sales as opposed to 25.4 percent in 1969. Non-farm earnings rose to 32.7 percent with business increasing its percentage from 15.6 to 26.3 percent. Incomes declined in real value by 19.2 percent. Since the 1976-77 Household Budget Survey rural real incomes have declined by 3.9 percent per annum. However, wages and business contributions have steadily increased their share of real income (Bevan, Collier, Bigsten 1988) (Table 7.3).
Table 7.3 Percentage of households deriving income from major sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cassava</td>
<td>23.88</td>
<td>86.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>81.59</td>
<td>80.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
<td>72.63</td>
<td>82.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables, Millets &amp; Groundnuts</td>
<td>16.41</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pombe</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooked food</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>3.98</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processed oil &amp; drinks</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaried wages</td>
<td>15.42</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural employment</td>
<td>9.45</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>10.46</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=201                          n=all households

My survey, in considering the relations of production and the objective conditions in Katumba, used controls over labour as the basis of differentiation within the refugee community. Data were collected from the sampled households on labour hiring and renting out of labour, and were used in conjunction with other variables like household size, hectareage under cultivation, and surplus sold to parastatals.

The relationship between household size and total cultivated hectareage appears to be significant. A regression analysis produces a significance level of \( p<0.0017 \).

\[
\text{Total hectare} = 1.325 + 0.057 \text{ Household size} \\
(8.479) (3.174) \quad R^2=0.048.
\]

An analysis of variance test was carried out to determine the relationship between household size and the hectareage of the major food and cash crops cultivated. Household size was only significant in the case of tobacco, where 20 percent of tobacco cultivation \( (R^2=0.20) \) could be explained by variations in household size \( (F=2.86 \ df=16 \ p<0.0003) \).

This confirms the earlier findings that tobacco cultivation is largely dependent on family labour.

The survey showed 28 percent of sampled households involved in off-farm income-generating activities, 94.7 percent of whom were wage labourers within Katumba (Table 7.4). Wage labourers could be divided into three main groups according to the nature of employment and type of work. In group A (31 percent) they were in salaried employment on a permanent basis, working either for the donors or the state,
Table 7.4 Households with members in wage labour by type of activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Number in sample</th>
<th>Percentage of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group A</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typist</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village admin &amp; co-op</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road clerk</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenter</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts clerk</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watchman</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-total</strong></td>
<td><strong>25</strong></td>
<td><strong>43.85</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group B</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural labourers</td>
<td>20</td>
<td><strong>35.08</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group C</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leader</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brickmaking</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailor</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palm oil processing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>sub-total</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
<td><strong>19.29</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
<td><strong>1.75</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>57</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage of total sample = 28.3
Casual = 43.8 %  Salaried = 31.5%
as clerks, teachers and administrative officers. Wide
differentials in income were apparent due to the variable
status of the employers. Highest salaries were paid by donor
agencies, perhaps double that paid by refugee employers. For
example a clerk in a government office earned an average of
800/- per month in 1987, while TCRS paid their clerks
2,000/-. The Ryder-Cheshire Mission and TCRS paid the
majority of their workers the statutory minimum wage. It was
the reliability of this wage, rather than its overall
amount, that led to significant differences in the material
condition of donor wage-labourers and non-donor employees.
However, there existed a sharp gradation down the social
scale.

Most wage labourers were in Group B, 43.8 percent of
whom were vibarua (casual labourers), mainly seasonal farm
workers (35 %). Periods of peak labour demand occurred with
the start of the rainy season and during harvest. A small
proportion worked throughout the year, receiving payment on
a daily basis or pro rata. Daily wage rates for the 1986/87
season ranged from between 20-25/- for weeding, and 40-70/-
for cultivating. Often a fixed price was paid for tilling an
acre, 300/-600/- for preparation. In the miombo woodlands
of Tabora district, in 1986, the going rate for an acre was
around 1000/-.

Group C consisted of skilled labourers (19.4%), who may
even work on a casual, piecework basis as tailors,

---

3 About 160 workers were on permanent or semi-permanent
contracts with LWF/TCRS and the Ryder Cheshire Mission,
while the state employed up to 1000 workers. The Ryder
Cheshire is a voluntary, which started a project for the
handicapped in 1985.
carpenters and brickmakers, but whose income was greater and labour demand perennial (not affected by seasonality).

A positive relationship existed between households participating in the labour markets and household size. Households renting out labour had a mean household size of 9.6, 1.7 above the mean for the sample. Regression analysis shows a significant relationship between household size and involvement in off-farm wage labour activities, with a significance level of p<0.0001. It appears that for every extra member in the household, beyond the mean of 7.3, an extra two persons are involved in wage labour activities.

\[ \text{Wage labour} = 2.259 + 7.319 \times \text{Household size} \]

\[(4.341) \quad (26.40) \quad R^2=0.08\]

This greater household size was common to both agricultural and non-agricultural workers. It appeared that the existence of significant bottlenecks in commodity production made it uneconomic for larger households to expand production of food and cash crops.

Households hiring labour

In Lenin's schema, labour-hiring is often the prerogative of households with a regular surplus, which through commodity production or merchant's capital, can expand production to levels necessitating a labour force larger than that of the family unit. It was with this classification in mind that I proceeded to consider the characteristics of this labour-hiring segment of the refugee population. Table 7.5 breaks down sampled households in terms of their relationship to production. Four social
strata can be identified according to whether they hire labour to supplement household labour in agriculture or sell their labour. 23.8 percent hired casual labourers during the year, of which 47.9 percent were themselves involved in non-farm income-generating activities; 31 percent sold their labour directly for cash incomes, the rest were businessmen. Households hiring labour (24%) had a slightly lower than average household size of 7.5 members. However, a regression analysis of household size and labour hire shows no significant relationship between the two variables.

Table 7.5 Distribution of social strata according to relationship to labour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number in stratum</th>
<th>Percentage of total sample</th>
<th>Mean household size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wage Labour</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hire &amp; wage Labour</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hire Labour</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Labour</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>55.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=201

It was clear that households occupied more than one stratum. Therefore, the groups were further subdivided, and a further four stratum emerged (Table 7.6). In both classifications, households relying on family labour formed the largest group (55 %) of the sample. Those hiring agricultural labour were predominantly commodity producers (16.4 %). The self-employed stratum consisted of those households involved in non-agricultural activities like trading, carpentry and fishing. Three of these households hired labour to cultivate the family plots. Five percent of households were involved in non-agricultural activities such
Table 7.6  Distribution of sampled households according to social strata

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Stratum</th>
<th>Number in sample</th>
<th>Percentage of total sample</th>
<th>Mean household size</th>
<th>Mean cultivated Area (ha)</th>
<th>Average Income (TShs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hire agric. Labour</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>9154.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hire agric. &amp; sell non-agric.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>9137.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed (non-agric.)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>3538.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed &amp; hire agric. labour</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>6232.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Labour</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>5483.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sell non-agric.</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>4733.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sell Agric.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>1818.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sell agric. &amp; hire agric.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>6232.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=201
as donor/state employees and hiring labour, while 10 percent of households sold their labour in this way, but did not hire labour. Stratum seven consists of those households in which members sell their labour for agricultural work (8.5%), and finally only two households sell and hire labour. These were households with female heads or aged members, which because of the need for immediate cash income sold their labour, meanwhile having to hire labour to cultivate their own plots. A regression analysis between household size and social strata shows a significant relationship (p<0.0116).

The next step was to discover whether there were any crucial differences between households hiring labour and those renting out in terms of hectareage cultivated and surplus sold to parastatals (Table 7.5, 7.6, 7.7 and Figures 11 & 12). Households employing labour cultivated a greater than average area of 2.02 ha with a standard deviation of 0.80 ha. However, total hectareage appears to be only partly affected by the amount of labour hired (Table 7.7).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of labour hired</th>
<th>Frequency for household</th>
<th>Mean hectare cultivated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>1.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=201

Households dependent on family labour cultivated a slightly lower hectareage, of 1.68 ha. (Table 7.6). A sharp distinction was discovered between non-agricultural and
Figure 11

Mean Hectares of Major Cash and Food Crops by Social Strata

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strata</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>maize</th>
<th>beans</th>
<th>cassava</th>
<th>tobacco</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FREQ</th>
<th>HECTARES SUM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 12

Mean Quantity of Marketed surplus by Social Strata

strata
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

KILOS SUM

TYPE
•••• maize
•••• beans
•••••••• cassava
•••••••• tobacco
agricultural wage workers. The mean hectares of major food and cash crops are shown diagrammatically in Figure 11. In terms of the total hectareage cultivated, social strata is highly significant (P<0.0001). The effect of social strata on the hectareage of individual crops is variable, and at the 10 percent level is only significant in the case of maize (F=2.05 df=7 p<0.05 R^2=0.69).

In order to strengthen the categories based on relations of production, and without data on assets or other elements of differentiation, I attempted to use income earned from reported crop surplus to assess agricultural income. Data were collected from the sampled population on the sale of major cash crops - maize, beans, cassava and tobacco. Using nominal producer prices for the 1985/86 agricultural year, estimates were made of the distribution of income within the major social strata and between strata (Table 7.6). The data are used with extreme caution, as reported marketed surplus may have been under-enumerated by sampled households. No data were gathered on the diverse sources of family household incomes or surplus sold on the open market.

Figure 12 shows the mean kilograms of crops sold by social strata. Even though variations in hectareage is not significantly marked between the groups, in terms of marketed surplus, social strata 1 and 2 tend to sell more food crops. Furthermore, as one moves down the strata, crop sales decrease substantially.

An analysis of variance test was carried out to determine the significance of marketed surplus of different
crops by social strata. The qualitative data is substantiated by the ANOVA test. Maize, beans and cassava sales show highly significant variations with social strata: maize at the 1 percent level ($F=4.17$, $df=7$, $p<0.0003$). Social strata explain 14 percent of variation in maize sales ($R^2=0.145$). Beans are significant only at the five percent level ($F=2.23$, $df=7$, $p<0.04$), and only 9 percent of variation ($R^2=0.09$) could be explained by differences in social strata. Cassava is highly significant ($F=4.40$, $df=5$, $p<0.0002$, $R^2=0.145$). Labour hire is highly significant in relation to the quantity of maize, beans and cassava sold: 22 percent of maize sales could be explained by labour hire ($F=5.34$, $df=5$, $p<0.0001$), 24 percent of beans ($F=7.44$, $df=5$, $p<0.0001$), 24 percent of cassava ($F=8.98$, $df=5$, $p<0.0001$).

Since income is obtained from quantity of marketed surplus, again, similar results would be obtainable for social strata and income for selected crops. A regression between total income and strata gives the result:

\[
\text{total income} = 3.46 - 0.0006 \times \text{Strata} \\
(25.97-4.24) \quad R^2=0.07
\]

A clear distinction was evident between agricultural and non-agricultural workers in terms of surplus sold to parastatals. A large proportion of the harvest for agricultural wage workers had to meet household consumption. Salaried workers sold larger surpluses because of their supplementary income. Households hiring labour had the advantage of being able to sell a larger surplus and thus have higher incomes. Households which hire and rent labour tended to be relatively more prosperous in that they
Table 7.8  Classification of sampled households according to social strata by sampled village

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social stratum</th>
<th>Village</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tambazi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hire agric. labour</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hire agric. &amp; sell non-agric.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed (non-agric)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed &amp; Hire agric. labour</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family labour</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sell non-agric.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sell agric.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sell agric. &amp; hire agric.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=201
depended to a large extent on salaried income. A typical clerk could earn up to 24,000/- per annum. Self-sufficient households sold equally large amounts of their harvest, since they had to rely more heavily on farm sales. This group was possibly the most vulnerable to unfavourable terms of trade in the marketplace.

Finally, I attempted to see whether there was any spatial variation between social strata across villages. An analysis of variance test shows no significant relationship, and confirms the data shown in Table 7.8, where only the presence of 12 households (36 percent) of social strata 1, in Mnyaki, is prominent. However, further investigation might have shown that several of these households may have been involved in off-farm income-generating activities.

Emerging social classes

From this survey it was possible to distinguish emergent social classes within the refugee group (Table 7.9).

Table 7.9 Emerging classes and social strata in Katumba

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agrarian bourgeoisie</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle peasants</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor peasants</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>49.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land labourers</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=201

Firstly a group of agricultural labourers could be identified, who were forced to seek wage employment to supplement their cash income through pressure on the household by an extra member or cash demands. Over 9.4
percent of my sample fell into this category. Input constraints and other inequalities left households less able to obtain fertilizers, necessary because of declining yields. Wage labourers were not yet dispossessed of subsistence production, as women and children continued in their role as direct producers when men moved into wage labour.

Poor peasants (49.7 percent) constituted the bulk of sampled households dependent on family labour. Many were susceptible to vagaries of climate, parastatal inefficiencies and marketing problems. They included some wage hirers, such as widows or the elderly, physically incapable of cultivating their plots. Middle peasants include subsistence farmers using independent household labour, with income above the mean of 7,000/-, and some non-agricultural casual wage labourers, who may be in semi-skilled positions. Distinct from this group was the 'rich' peasant whose power lay not in the control of land, but in numerous non-agricultural activities. Merchants from Burundi, representatives of international capital, were able, through a ready market for consumer goods to re-establish themselves soon after arrival, and did not participate in extensive commodity production.

The agrarian bourgeoisie consisted of commodity producers and merchants, but also of high income wage-earners involved in petty accumulation. The latter group depended on state or donor bureaucracy to accumulate wealth. Issa Shivji, as early as 1976, drew our attention to the notion that kulaks in most rural areas were also wage-
earners who invest in diverse activities; trade, transport and commodity production. For most farmers, surplus capital gained through agriculture was directly invested in business enterprises which provided more immediate returns to farmers. Over 66.7 percent of businessmen, interviewed in Mnyaki and Tambazi markets, obtained their initial capital through commodity production. Nevertheless it is the state/donor bureaucrats who are best able to exploit their advantageous position in the marketing of commodities whether on the official market or the open market. The agrarian bourgeoisie are less dependent on subsistence crops like cassava to meet domestic consumption, hence their higher sales of cassava (Figure 12).

Table 7.10 Commercial enterprises: sources of initial capital

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farming</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-migration savings</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craft</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailoring</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>39</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=39

It seems that Mamdani’s (1987) assessment of two paths to capital accumulation holds true for the settlement. Gaining access to donor - or state-created positions enabled petty exploitation of labour and less restrictions on business ventures fostering petty accumulation. There were also those kulaks who rose through the process of commodity production
and who, through small investments in the non-agricultural sector, could hire labour to provide their food needs and produce a saleable surplus.

With the exception of TCRS and the government the kulaks were the next major source of employment, particularly in the areas of agricultural labourers, shop assistants and skilled artisans (fundi). They rented premises in the market places to aspiring artisans or to establish small-scale industries. One such businessman (mfanya biashara) owned three premises in Mnyaki marketplace, two of which were equipped with sewing machines for hire to tailors.

Disparities within the refugee population, accentuated by the rise of the merchant class, were bound to cause internal inequalities. A clear example of how this class fosters further social differentiation by drawing poorer refugees into unequal relationships, is outlined below.

The need for capital to cover medical expenses, travel costs and court fines may force poorer households to seek loans from wealthy businessmen, leading to long-term indebtedness, which places the borrower under constant obligation to perform certain tasks in order to repay the loan. This case can be illustrated by one of several observations in Mpanda District Court. Refugees in contact with the law were often disadvantaged by their status, as punitive measures tended to be more severe than for nationals. One wealthy mfanya biashara from Katumba, frequented the local court in order to bail refugees with no finances. This seeming act of goodwill placed the clients
under certain obligations to the benefactor, which were fulfilled by the appropriation of their labour for one of the businessman’s many ventures.

Certainly in African rural areas the agrarian capitalist or ‘kulak’ is a more complex individual than is implied in recent definitions. Bernstein (1979) drew our attention to the original Russian definition which may be more applicable in the Katumba context. He described the kulak as ‘an economic agent who not only operates as a commercial farmer employing labour-power but also rents out farm machinery, acts as a local merchant and money-lending capitalist, investing in crop husbandry, retail business, transport and credit, and as a productive capital establishing small-scale processing and manufacturing enterprises’ (Bernstein p.431). There were an estimated 356 kulaks/businessmen in Katumba.

One such kulak owned a shop, an hotel, a Landrover, and an indeterminate number of plots. Peasants were forced to enter into exploitative relationships with him in the patron-client sense, as he acted as an intermediary between the donors, the Tanzanians and the refugees. Debts owed to the patron were collected through labour-service.

Prospects for differentiation via commodity production

Inequalities among primary producers are inherent in commodity production where certain sectors of the peasantry are better-equipped in terms of land, implements or labour to exploit the opportunities offered. Unlike the situation outlined by Mamdani (1987) for Ugandan rural areas,
landlordism was not developed among the refugees, although there was evidence of the beginning of land concentration. Sales of land occur when households leave the settlement or move internally to more fertile parts. Land acquired by this method is not necessarily fertile, and returns are limited since it is generally suitable only for cassava cultivation.

State and donor control over land appropriation, inputs and marketing leave little room for refugee farmers to take advantage of any inequalities within the system, as had been possible elsewhere in Tanzania. Co-operatives which were for some time the arm of the progressive capitalist farmers have played only a minor role in wealth accumulation among refugees.

Landlordism and tenancy relations are not likely to increase substantially because of official restrictions on the size of holdings and on the possibilities of extending cultivation beyond the boundaries of the settlement. It is likely that a landless group of wage labourers will develop unless there is constant expansion of settlement boundaries or their total dissolution, coupled with the development of non-farm wage-earning opportunities.

In terms of commodity production, rich peasants cultivate roughly the same acreage of crops, slightly greater for maize, and sell more of their harvest as surplus. They can afford the delays in payment by the NMC; no doubt considerable amounts of maize are sold on the open market. On the other hand, middle and poor peasants cultivate more of the higher-risk crops like beans and groundnuts as producer prices are higher and they can be
sold on the local market during the dry season at between 25-45/- per plate, almost twice the official producer price. In the final analysis, the readiness of refugee households to participate in trading activities highlights the relatively negative perception of commercial agriculture as a viable long-term source of capital.

Prospects for increased productivity may occur with higher producer prices and more reliable procuring and marketing channels. However, devaluation in 1986, after agreement with the IMF, has not only provided the facility for the state to increase producer prices, but has caused an increase in the prices of agricultural inputs and consumer goods. Trade liberalization may reduce income-earning activities if consumer goods decline in price and become more widespread in rural areas. Some petty businessmen may be forced to revert to agriculture.

Trading

Trading is the most accessible route to wealth accumulation in remote areas like Mpanda district, made easy by the huge captive market of the refugee population, isolated from the major urban centres of the country. Aspiring *wafanya biashara* (businessmen) either fish or sell their labour outside the settlement, from which they derive the cash for investments in retailing (Table 7.10). State control over the distribution of consumer goods up to 1988, coupled with a drop in imports, created an open market in the region as people sought access to basic commodities like soap, sugar, milk and matches.
Table 7.11 Commercial enterprises: year business started in Katumba

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year started</th>
<th>Number of businesses</th>
<th>Percentage of sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972-75</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-80</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-84</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-87</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=39

Importing consumer goods from Tabora, Mwanza and Dar es Salaam is particularly lucrative. Most of Katumba’s commercial activities are confined to the two main markets of Tambazi and Mnyaki (Plates 5 & 6), chosen by TCRS for their central location: operating on alternative days of the week, they provide the major trading centres for Mpanda district and the neighbouring district of Tabora (Figure 4). In 1987 there were over 60 private general stores in Tambazi and 80 in Mnyaki, in addition to establishments for more specialized activities, including 11 hotelis (restaurants) and guesthouses (Table 7.12).

Commodities sold are distributed according to the gender of the traders (Table 7.13). Those requiring travel beyond the settlement boundaries are dominated by men. The running of general stores and selling of meat, second-hand clothing and dried-fish are male activities. Women concentrate on such processed food as mandazi (cakes), bread rolls, and lowi (cooked cassava), plus the sale of subsistence surplus, like beans, dried cassava, vegetables, beer millet and bananas. Customers are mainly the residents
Table 7.12 Number and type of commercial enterprises in Tambazi and Mnyaki markets, June 1987.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of Business</th>
<th>Market</th>
<th>Tambazi</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Mnyaki</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General stores</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butchers</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoe-maker</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoe-repairers</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicycle-repairers</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicycle makers</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guest house</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotelis/Restuarant</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milling machine</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church stores</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-operative shops</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photographers</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village shops</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.13 Gender and commodities in Katumbu’s markets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodities</th>
<th>Market</th>
<th>Tambazi</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Mnyaki</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Locally Produced</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fresh vegetables</td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruits</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dried farm produce</td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooked food</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chickens</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcoholic drinks</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pottery/mats</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palm oil</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dried Fish</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soaps/Matches/Batteries</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td></td>
<td>53</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of Mpanda town, with Asian businessmen running a regular Landrover service for shoppers.

Starting a shop necessitates substantial ready capital (Table 7.10). Sources of capital may be farming, sale of livestock or fishing. The licensing fee for a general store ranges from 3,500-4,000/- per annum; a stall 1000/- per annum, and a local brewhouse 1,750-2,500/-. Casual sellers pay the daily rate of 8 or 10/-. Shopkeepers require travel permits from the authorities, who often demand substantial payments to the Commandant. Furthermore, they are frequently requested to contribute a significant amount, sometimes up to 1000/-, for the entertainment costs of government guests.

For most merchants, agriculture is not a satisfactory way of reproducing capital, although they are able to corner the fertilizer market (farm inputs) from the state. The price of consumer goods often increases two-fold in Katumba markets. Until 1987, regulations on the movement of crops between regions reduced the development of mercantile activities based on the transportation of crops to food deficit areas of the country. Furthermore, transport difficulties deter private capital from widespread involvement in crop marketing. Katumba’s merchants are more fortunate. With two train stations within the settlement, crops can be more easily transported to urban centres like Tabora and Mwanza (Plate 8).

De-regulations of marketing and the lifting of restrictions on movement of goods, as well as official acceptance of the open market, mean that illegally imported Zambian sugar, Zairean cloth, Kenyan goods and Burundi
bicycle parts can be openly traded in the markets. Traders of fish, meat, mitumba (secondhand clothes) and salt, are organized into small co-operative groups. Consumer goods, like matches, batteries, soap, watches and milk powder, are imported in small quantities by petty traders.

Twenty-eight percent of commercial ventures are the initiatives of several members of a household or kinship group, who pool their resources to form ushirika (co-operatives) of between 2 to 6 partners. The communal nature of these enterprises are essential to cope with the travelling distances necessary to procure goods, which may require several days away from Katumba, and to staff the shop on a day to day basis.

Table 7.14 Commercial enterprises: type of ownership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Ownership</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single-owner</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>61.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ushirika</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=39

The only clear element of landlordism relates to the renting of commercial property. Long-established merchants were able, during the 1980s, to construct shop units which were then rented to petty traders. Alternatively some shop units were equipped with implements like sewing machines which were rented to tailors. My survey of businessmen came up with two such landlords, although many were known to exist.
Plate 7 Female Trader, Mnyaki Market

Plate 8 Traders and Travellers at Katumba railway station
Differentiation and Gender

Migration and organized schemes are reputed to have deleterious effects on the status of women (Brain 1968). In periods of crises or in new socio-economic environments patriarchy tends to intensify, and women are said to assume lower profiles. Often women like children, are ascribed passive roles as victims, ill-equipped to cope with new and demanding situations. This negative perception of women’s capacity for change is compounded by the male bias inherent in refugee and state-sponsored development programmes. Distribution of resources, whether land, food or clothing are all conferred through the male representative of the household (Harrell-Bond 1986). In Chapter Six, I have already discussed divisions in household production, the assumption that men have total control over women’s labour, and the disadvantages faced by female-heads of household in the allocation of resources in the initial years of settlement.

In Katumba, refugee women felt that they were more disadvantaged in comparison with their Tanzanian counterparts, who through increased proletarianization had greater opportunities to participate in wage-labour (Bryceson 1980). Refugee women, even the educated, found that their sphere of mobility was limited to the settlement area. 67 percent of refugee women in the sampled households could not speak Kiswahili compared to 26 percent of men, and of those who spoke the language, only two percent claimed to
speak it well. Most learn Kiswahili while dealing with traders on the market.

Harrell-Bond (1985) argues that for most refugee women, displacement does not affect their social status as they immediately resume their domestic role once the household is established. But discussion with Katumba’s women demonstrated that adjustment to new environments can be traumatic for village women. When asked whether life in Tanzania was significantly different from in Burundi, twenty six percent saw no noticeable difference, as occupational continuity had been maintained. In contrast, 61 percent cited major differences in agricultural practices, particularly new crops and therefore new diet, the impact of the single rainy season on productivity and family survival, poor soil quality, and the necessity for fertilizer application. Women, generally, cited an increase in work load, with unsatisfactory declining returns to labour.

Of equal significance is the fact that for about five percent of women displacement contributed to a loss in private methods of capital accumulation. Former business or employed women were unable, unlike their male counterparts, to resume their occupations. Many attributed this failure to their efforts in re-establishing a home and the unfamiliar economic and physical environment of a new country. McCall (1987) has shown that villagization in Tanzania, has in fact increased women’s labour but decreased their capacity to control their environment (McCall 1987). In Burundi some of the women were involved in semi-autonomous cash cropping
through ownership of tree crops, mainly coffee and palm and had sole rights over the proceeds from their sale.

While the settlement was under the administration of the donors, gender distinction was promoted in the production of cash crops. Men were encouraged to grow tobacco, while women were expected to complement their husbands' labour in maize production, under the assumption that household income would be equitably distributed. Certain pocket-money type income-generating activities were targeted at women: sewing, handicrafts - basket-making. The latter had no local market, and were only viable if TCRS exported the products to the tourist market in Dar es Salaam. Women now have no access to sewing machines as tailoring has become a male preserve.

Today, none of the female-headed households in my sample cultivate tobacco. An analysis of variance test was carried out to determine the extent to which the sex of the head of household affects hectareage and marketed surplus. In terms of hectareage cultivated, maize was significant at the 5 percent level \((F=5.56 \text{ df}=1 \ p<0.019 \ R^2=0.027)\) and beans at the 10 percent level \((F=2.81 \text{ df}=1 \ p<0.095 \ R^2=0.014)\). In relation to marketed surplus the sex of the head of household was not significant for any of the major cash and food crops.

Women's participation in vegetable production and marketing is often an indicator of the relative poverty level of the household. In one female-headed household with two sons at technical secondary school in Mpanda, the mother and her daughter have taken on all the responsibilities of
farming, harvesting and marketing. The mother spent on average three days a week at the market, in addition to cultivating the main plot, and vegetables in mbuga during the dry season. Twenty seven percent of the sampled women were involved in the sale of subsistence surplus.

My survey of the Tambazi and Mnyaki markets shows that women constituted the bulk of petty traders. 53 and 46 percent of stall-holders in Tambazi and Mnyaki markets, respectively, were women: 26 percent visited the markets twice weekly, while 38 percent more than three times per week (Table 7.13 & Plate 7). Apart from the sale of agricultural surplus, women were involved in the production and sale of cakes (mandazi), bread (mkate), non-alcoholic drinks and the sale of salt and palm oil. Bread-making in clay ovens involved having extensive networks and capital to obtain wheat flour which was a scarce commodity in Tanzania, and had to be purchased in Arusha, over 1,200 km. away. Therefore, most mkate and mandazi-makers employed middlemen to make frequent journeys to Arusha to purchase the popular pure white flour. Some women had regular contracts to supply the hotelis (restaurants) of the settlement.

Salt and palm-oil sellers purchased the commodities from middlemen who imported the goods from Uvinza and Kigoma, respectively, and sold them at a marginally increased price. Women bought these commodities in bulk, then sold them by the glass or bottle. From the nature of women’s income-earning activities, it is plausible to assume that their economic role will become increasingly diversified as returns from agriculture become lower.
Furthermore, the introduction of the development levy (poll tax) in 1983, has forced women to engage actively in cash-generating activities.

One of the most disturbing consequences of the limited opportunities within the settlement is the exploitation of women by state bureaucrats and agency personnel. It was reported that several refugee women, particularly secondary school leavers, have been forced into prostitution or similar compromising situations with donor personnel in Dar es Salaam. However, it is the assumed wider participation of refugees in numerous illegal activities which has been given more attention.

Refugees as 'economic saboteurs'

As a corollary to the current economic crisis in Tanzania, the state launched a punitive attack against magendo, (black marketing), in 1983. Although few refugees were prosecuted under the anti-economic sabotage acts, many have been labelled economic saboteurs by national and local bureaucrats. Barundi refugees have been targeted as scapegoats and are accused of undermining the economy. In 1986 the Minister of Home Affairs commented that

... refugees had turned into poachers, robbers and smugglers of government trophies and other commodities out of the country ... and were therefore undermining the Tanzanian economy (Minister of Home Affairs, quoted in Daily News, 11.10.1986).

During 1983-1984, state action against 'economic saboteurs' resulted in the Minister of Industries and Trade issuing a circular that non-Tanzanians would not be allowed trading licences. Yakutasi (1987) notes that in Kigoma, the
licensing board subjectively assessed applicants, and when in doubt of their nationality, they were branded refugees, a term used as a 'euphemism for racketeers'. This notion of refugees as economic saboteurs has reached the level of academic discourse. Nindi (1987) attributes the reduction in game in the Katavi Game reserve to poaching by refugees. Ayok (1985) cites two court cases of refugees caught in possession of government trophies, one with 26 elephant tusks valued at Tshs 51.80/- in Ugalla. In the other case two refugees from Mishamo were in possession of 20 kg of buffalo meat valued at Tshs 200/- and 10 kg of Warthog meat valued at Tshs 100/- on Mishamo market. With the lack of personal security among refugees, it is doubtful whether their role, if any, extends beyond that of middlemen and porters because of their knowledge of the border terrain and familiarity with the languages. Ayok goes on to suggest that well-armed Tanzanians are the actual poachers, and describes the process:

The Tanzanian poacher kills the elephant and uses the Wahutu refugees as porters to travel on foot between Mpanda and Burundi carrying the elephant tusks. A Burundi Tutsi or a Tanzanian businessman awaits the loot in Burundi and sells it in the local market. He then buys clothes, watches etc, which he either ships by boat or flies by air to Tanzania (p.38).

This illegal trade has made Burundi, a country with no elephants, one of the chief exporters of ivory in Africa. During my stay in Katumba, two cases came to my attention regarding illegal activities. One refugee was arrested for being in possession of five fish without a fishing licence, the other for selling chickens on Mpanda market again without the appropriate licence. The latter had
his bicycle and chickens confiscated and was required to pay a fine of 10,000/- for its return.

It appears that the minor role of the refugees in the illegal export of commodities does not justify the concerted attack by the state, when even casual conversation, in the district, suggest that the Wakubwa or 'big men' were behind the illegal trafficking of gold and other commodities. Generally the state had adopted a laissez-faire approach to illegal trading. Under the policy of liberalization the state is encouraged not to interfere in the unregulated parallel gold market, as gold from Mpanda is used to buy much needed foreign exchange in Burundi and Zaire (NORAD/Norconsult, 1982).

In the short-term, there appears to be some benefits accruing to the local bureaucrats and the state in maintaining such large concentrations of refugees, providing easy scapegoats for shortfalls in marketed goods, corrupt practices and mismanagement.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has provided evidence of incipient class formation among the refugee group, based on the relations of production pertaining within the settlement. However, there is no evidence to suggest any large-scale accumulation through involvement in agriculture. In fact most people occupy more than one class position. Income earned through commodity production, or other sources has been invested in more profitable enterprises - in craft or trading, which provide immediate and higher returns to revenue. The
settlement structure itself has inbuilt stratification and fosters differentiation between donor and state bureaucrats, and the refugee group. The presence of the donors and state as major employers of refugees within the settlement has helped to accelerate the process of differentiation, through the creation of a category of workers who are more able to accumulate capital through their own wage labour involvement, since their disposable income is higher than that obtainable in the surrounding area. These workers, through investments in commercial activities, form part of the merchant class, now so highly developed in Katumba. The squeeze on farmers as described in Chapter Six has generated a small group of agricultural labourers who are placed at the disposition of the bureaucratic and merchant class.

Bureaucratic controls over marketing, pricing policies and inputs, coupled with the powerlessness of the refugee group as a social force within the district and the objective material conditions within Mpanda district, have hindered accumulation through agriculture on any significant scale.
CONCLUSION

This study has addressed issues relating to the causes and consequences of the forced migration of refugees from Burundi and their distinct pattern of settlement in Tanzania. Most Barundi refugees have been in exile for 16 years and their settlement in Tanzania epitomizes the plight of refugees in several African states. In an attempt to place Barundi refugees in the context of a wider continental trend in population movement, the thesis began by drawing attention to the immense scale and the rapid growth of the refugee problem in Africa, linking it to the de-colonization period of the 1960s and the formation of new political units.

Throughout the thesis I have advocated a causal relationship between the social structure of independent African states and refugee migration. In so doing it was necessary to address the issues at several levels of analysis, firstly by identifying the structural attributes of those states which caused forced migration, those which may affect settlement within a host country, and finally those which govern the relationship between the donors, the recipient countries and the refugees. Secondly, and of equal significance, is the empirical analysis of the specific characteristics of the problem which affect Barundi refugees within their chosen refuge of Tanzania.

Chapter One deals with some of the theoretical issues relating to the study of refugees, and argues that the functionalist, economistic and behavioural schools which
have dominated migration studies have provided no clear theoretical framework which can explain the main features of contemporary African refugees. There is sufficient justification for placing refugee studies within the general field of migration, but the methodology commonly used in the refugee context is inappropriate for Tanzania. Likewise, the concept of assimilation is of little use in explaining the state-controlled incorporation of thousands of refugees. These concepts have become part of state ideology, and are manipulated in the refugee context to gain control and acquiescence from a displaced and often submissive population.

Although the political refugee fits uncomfortably in most migration-theoretical frameworks, one approach has proved more useful in providing suitable explanations for the contemporary situation on the continent. Some Marxists recognize that migration is the product of the uneven distribution of capital and resource development between core and peripheral areas, caused by the integration of pre-capitalist social formations into the capitalist system. Therefore, they use an historical-materialist methodology to examine the impact of capitalism on labour mobility. Departing from the predominant cost-benefit models, they include in their analysis non-economic pressures for migration, the role of the state in mobilizing labour, the social relations of production within rural or sending areas and their linkage to the world system. Since refugee migration can be partially explained in this way, this necessitates an emphasis on the social relations of
production of the source country. Because the refugee movement within this study occurred between two underdeveloped societies with similar external relationships, any analysis of the social relations of production must also include that pertaining in the host state, in order to understand the structures influencing incorporation. My study demonstrates that the distinctions between Barundi refugees, economic migrants and peasant communities are sufficiently blurred to enable the incorporation of such refugee groups into the same theoretical framework for explaining labour migration and rural societies.

Noting that some studies have already highlighted the importance of political factors to refugee studies, I contend that an approach which considers superstructural elements, such as state, territory and ethnic nationalism, and relates them to an economic base - modes of production and their corresponding social relations, such as neo-marxist political economy, is a more useful framework with which to understand the apparent link between underdevelopment and refugees. Moreover, solutions to the refugee problem must be envisaged within the context of underdeveloped political and economic forms, and their external relationship to the world capitalist system.

Internal conflict being the dominant cause of refugee movements, I considered the factors which determine the ability of the Burundi and Tanzania states to protect the human rights of their people. Describing Burundi as having the characteristics of a weak, neo-colonial peripheral
capitalist social formation, it follows that the state has limited capacity to act on behalf of the majority of its people. The state is the domain of the ruling class. Internal conflict is directly related to factionalism within the ruling class, aggravated by competition between social classes based on ethnic alliances. The brief historical account of the 1972 and subsequent conflicts in Burundi illustrates this intra-class conflict thesis. Moreover, my discussion dispels the popular tribal explanation for the Burundi conflict, by showing that ethnicity was not part of the primordial inheritance of Barundi society, but emerged from the colonial period as social classes were differentially incorporated into the emerging state structure. The control of the state by a small elite has ensured the persistence of undemocratic practices, supported by state machinery in alliance with external powers.

The prevailing assumption that refugees are the inevitable outcome of the formation of nation-states is usually associated with the modernization school, where a unified nation is seen as a prerequisite for development. This position was adopted by the Barundi ruling class, who used nationalist rhetoric to obtain compliance and the acceptance of coercive and undemocratic practices. Again the specific characteristics of the state prevented it from fostering unity and national construction. However, neither the causes of the refugee problem, nor the solutions envisaged, can be tackled without reference to underdevelopment.
External intervention, whether by states or humanitarian non-governmental groups, is an important aspect of the refugee problem. Chapter One draws attention to the fundamental role of external forces in African conflicts, often in the guise of maintaining stability through economic or military interventions. In fact, external intervention in the form of military and financial support for the ruling elite, or relief and long-term aid to refugees, performs a decisive role in the generation and persistence of tensions in Burundi society. Throughout the thesis, I contend that humanitarian aid is not free from political ideology, and is often linked to the strategic and or economic considerations of donors. It is with this premise that the role of UNHCR and other refugee-support organizations are considered in the Tanzanian context.

Chapter Three demonstrates the importance of international organizations in the formulation and development of regional refugee legislation, and in determining the necessary forms of assistance. Tanzania's national refugee law is itself a product of the colonial period, containing some of the more restrictive, authoritarian practices of the colonial regime. However, Tanzania, which has become a haven for refugees, operates a dichotomous refugee policy which reflects its distinct foreign policy choices, while at the same time complying with regional legislation and the demands of western donors. As a supporter of anti-colonial struggles on the continent, Tanzania has been able to fulfil its obligations to liberation movements, while stifling the activities of
potential revolutionaries. In practice this results in the freedom of liberation movements to organize under the aegis of the Dar es Salaam O.A.U liberation committee, while strict controls are applied to the activities of refugees from independent African states. Under OAU and Tanzanian refugee legislation, Barundi refugees are required to reside in specially-located state-run schemes and refrain from destabilizing actions against Burundi. Once in the schemes, a new social structure is imposed by the Tanzanian state, with numerous restrictions on mobility and political and economic activities. About 14 percent of the refugees have settled independently among local Tanzanians in the Kigoma region. Self-settled refugees in border areas pose more of a threat to the status quo than those in organized settlements, where, even though the possibilities of mobilization are greater, they are ineffective being at some distance from the border. Of course, those in organized interior settlements pose no immediate danger to the host state.

Barundi refugees: their role in the periphery

Regional security considerations and a tradition of gaining control over the rural populace through spatial reorganization into nucleated settlements, underlie Tanzania’s emphasis on organized settlement schemes as the official and sole solution to its refugee problem. Moreover, the specific location of these rural agricultural settlements reflects the development priorities of the
Tanzanian state, and the role which refugees are expected to fulfil within it.

Thus refugee settlements for Barundi refugees are located in the Western Tanzanian regions of Rukwa and Tabora. Rukwa, typical of the peripheral regions of Tanzania, has low population density and enormous ecological and environmental constraints on productivity, and as Chapter Four demonstrates colonial economic and labour policies aggravated its impoverishment. As part of the colonial administrative area of Western Province, the region, from as early as the 1920s, took on the character of a labour reserve, persisting in this role into the post-colonial period. Barundi refugees are shown to be following in the footsteps of their forefathers, who formed a significant proportion of the labour migratory flow to the sisal, tea and coffee plantations of colonial Tanganyika. This continuum appeared unbroken in the 1960s, when attempts were made by local capital to utilize refugees from Rwanda and Burundi as cheap labour. I have developed this idea with regard to the 1972 refugee influx, where in a more organized fashion, the Tanzania state attempted to capture the productive capacity of Barundi refugees. As rural-to-rural migrants, they supplied the labour needed to expand peasant commodity production in previously under-utilized areas of Mpanda and Urambo districts, and to provide a cheap source of wage labour. However, I conclude that the effective utilization of refugee peasant communities only became possible with the infusion of western aid and the co-ordinated activities of state and international agencies.
The effects of refugee policy: aid, development and integration

Aid to refugees serves several purposes in this context. Firstly, refugee aid is an effective weapon in the depoliticization and de-mobilization of a potentially revolutionary force. This is illustrated by the insistence on western-derived solutions as a major component of the aid package of UNHCR and voluntary agencies. UNHCR stipulates that in order for refugees to obtain assistance, they must refrain from political activities. Assistance to self-settled refugees in Kigoma region is the result of the expansion of the bureaucratic structure, as TCRS expands its jurisdiction and carves a new niche within Tanzania. Secondly, aid removes any control refugees have over their own future, rendering them powerless. In sociological terms certain behavioural patterns are expected both from the receiver and the giver of aid. Refugees are expected to adopt a dependent identity, commonly known as a 'dependency syndrome', and donors a parental role. Among the Barundi, the combination of the protection afforded by refugee status, the availability of aid, and the specific experience of 'becoming a refugee', creates a distinct identity and in essence a new social category. Its survival depends on its organization as an interest group in order to gain access to financial assistance and political power.

Although the aid package can be criticized, it would be injurious to argue for its abolition in the refugee context, where the exigencies of the situation require the provision of fund to help alleviate initial hardships. However, the
aid programme, with its own rhetoric and anti-participatory structure, does tend to obscure the realities, and to prevent real solutions from being found. This is illustrated by an analysis of two explicit aims of the aid programme - development and integration.

Theoretically, development and integration are interdependent. Any genuine development process should include the increasing ability of the masses to exercise social, civil and political rights through popular participation. In the refugee context, integration should imply the extension of these human rights by the host state. It follows that since in most underdeveloped societies the state does not extend these rights to its own citizens, any attempt at integration must depend on the contribution which the masses are expected to make to the 'development process', as defined by the state. Since independence, development in Tanzania has been equated with economic growth, and the provision of minimal social welfare services, what Shivji (1985) describes as an ideology of 'developmentalism'. Consequently, for TCRS, the concept of development in the refugee context means the provision of welfare services beyond the relief stage, which, on the other hand, UNHCR (1983) conceptualizes as the process by which refugees and locals are encouraged to participate in economically-productive activities.

Chapter Five focuses on the refugee settlements in Mpanda district, particularly on Katumba settlement. It exposes the contradictory dialectic between the expected developmental role of the settlement and its anti-
development social structure. The tripartite agreement between the Tanzania state, UNHCR and LWF/TCRS, which governs the provision of aid, ensures that the state and the refugees have been subordinated to the donors, especially in the early years of the settlement. By and large, Katumba has been a donor-controlled enclave in Mpanda district, with donors having in effect total authority over resource-allocation in a centralized and hierarchical settlement structure.

For TCRS, the top-down provision of services, schools, health centres, hotels or community centres, is synonymous with the achievement of development. And since refugees have been self-supporting in terms of food supplies since 1978, in this narrow sense the donors boast that they have achieved development and integration. Such concentration of 'development projects' in settlement enclaves is in marked contrast to its absence in the surrounding district. This highlights the vulnerability of those projects to the vagaries of the external economy.

It is apparent that the prolongation of the refugee problem in Tanzania, coupled with the frequent tripartite aid agreements, has resulted in the growth of accompanying, highly-organized donor and state bureaucracies. These bureaucracies benefit from the continuation of refugee 'status', so that new projects are sought after, in order to extend their influence. Even after 'handover', TCRS periodically returns to the settlement to carry out development projects, because the weak economic base of the national and local state is unable to replicate or even
sustain donor-projects. Therefore, as aid is withdrawn, settlement projects revert to a level in keeping with the poverty of the local environment. In the final analysis, refugee aid, like other forms of aid, when given in conditions of underdevelopment, whether at the national or local level, instead of ameliorating local conditions tends, in the long-term, to deepen the existing unequal relationship in rural areas between recipients and donors. In an area poor in infrastructure like Mpanda district, the donors have inevitably undermined the power of the local state.

The powerlessness of the refugee population is shown by their lack of participation in the settlement process. Although the state has imposed the national village administrative structure, it is clear that for the refugees it does not represent true democratic participation - no power is attached to the structure. Refugees are then subordinated to the representatives of the donors and the state. Whether in Burundi or in Tanzania, Barundi peasants have been faced with non-democratic rural policies, which are anti-participatory in their ideology. Furthermore, the current rural development strategies promoted by the World Bank and the IMF necessitate strong-arm or coercive tactics on the part of implementing governments.

The concept of integration as used by the donors and the host states, refers to economic integration, or more precisely the process by which refugees become self-supporting and through their economic activities contribute to the development of their host country. In relation to
Barundi refugees, this can be redefined as the absorption of refugee peasants into the economic structure of the country through their participation in commodity production either on small-scale peasant holdings or as cheap wage labour to the large-scale plantation sector. Accordingly, organized schemes provide the spatial pattern via which the state can have maximum control over the productive capacity of a cheap labour source, while the donors ensure their reproduction through the provision of social welfare services.

Chapters Five and Six illustrate how the realization of these goals of economic integration affect Barundi refugees in Katumba settlement. With the need for commodity production already existing in a materially-deprived refugee population, and as strategies for increasing commodity production were focused on the direct producers in 1973, the state and the donors attempted to create a scheme which put into practice all the prevailing modernization ideas on rural development. Peasants, given adequate land, implements, extension service and incentives, in association with close supervision, are expected to respond favourably to market forces. In Katumba, even under supposedly ideal conditions, this expected result did not materialize. Furthermore, the assumed prosperity of the settlers, as shown by official crop statistics and featured in consultancy reports, is illusory and masks the inequalities within the community and the increased impoverishment of many peasant households. By analysing factors commonly used in studies of the Tanzanian peasantry, for example, the implications of the social relations of production,
demography, gender and ecology within the settlement, all in the context of the economic crisis of the 1980s, I have been able to identify numerous constraints on productivity and to locate Barundi refugees in the debate on the development of capitalist agriculture and social transformation in Tanzania.

In Tanzania's rural areas, the peasant household is seen as the basic unit of production and productivity is to some extent related to household composition. Because of the disrupting effects of migration, the refugee household is likely to differ from the normative household model in terms of size and sex composition. In contrast, Katumba's households show little signs of widespread disruption. Most households migrated more or less intact, and estranged members were eventually re-united with their families. The latter occurred without the support of the donors. At the time of arrival, as in the present, household size—particularly the number of adult males—appears to be a significant factor determining the diversity of survival strategies utilized in the settlement, and on processes of petty accumulation.

The importance of ecology in productivity is rarely considered in evaluations of the settlement programme, even though pedological surveys of the 1970s drew attention to the low fertility of the soils, and the future need for heavy inputs of fertilizer, the absence of which points to declining yields and impoverishment among refugee households. This is aggravated by multiple plot occupancy, where fathers subdivide their plots to accommodate their
sons in the absence of surplus land within the close-settled zone. My survey also draws attention to the increasing importance of mbuga cultivation as a supplement to household domestic food supplies and settlement economy.

The precariousness of the rural environment forces peasants to concentrate on food crop production in the face of efforts by the state to enforce tobacco as the dominant cash crop. Religious beliefs only partly explain the reluctance of households to cultivate the higher-priced tobacco. Katumba peasants tend to be cautious, for fear of jeopardizing domestic food supplies. Tobacco producers will only expand production during favourable planting seasons. Although flue-cured tobacco producers have seen an increase in producer prices in the 1980s relative to food crops, the corresponding growth in the number of producers and output, as shown by official figures, is not replicated by my sample, even taking into account spatial variations across the settlement. The main problem faced by tobacco farmers is the unreliability of inputs - fertilizers and insecticides.

The impact of the economic crisis and structural adjustment

Some scholars have argued that constraints on productivity are the result of low producer prices and the dominance of inefficient state marketing agencies, like the former National Milling corporation. This is essentially the viewpoint of the international credit agencies of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. With agriculture constituting between 35-50 percent of the GDP, there is a
new emphasis on agriculture particularly cash crops in the Economic Recovery Programmes (ERP) of the mid-1980s.

While noting the inadequacies of the NMC and the regional co-operative unions, the objective conditions of production and distribution in the Mpanda area have not only affected surplus appropriation by the state, but have also limited the development of a vigorous parallel market trade in food commodities. In fact Katumba farmers - as refugees - are compelled to sell through official channels rather than face lower prices on the open market in Mpanda. In contrast, a vigorous market has developed in a small-range of non-food commodities - like mitumba (second-hand clothing).

Tanzania's agreement with the IMF required a substantial restructuring of the economy in the form of economic liberalization. The 1986 IMF agreement includes: exchange rate adjustment, liberalizing price controls, reducing budgetary supports to parastatals, reducing food and some welfare subsidies and raising petroleum prices. The cumulative effect of SAP on rural areas is further deprivation of rural communities.

The effects of structural adjustment and trade liberalization on refugees differs only slightly from its effects on nationals. With the pressure on peasants to produce more commodities, at the same time as the state retreats from its commitment to provide basic services, questions have been raised as to the justification for the continued flow of scarce foreign exchange to refugee settlements or even to integrated rural development projects (RIDEPs) for nationals. A recent UNHCR consultancy report
suggests that refugees should no longer be reliant on the state or foreign donors, even in a situation where they contribute some 6 million shillings in annual taxation to the local coffers. Recently, both UNHCR and LWF/TCRS have announced plans to withdraw from the settlements (Interviews with UNHCR, Dar es Salaam, and B. Neldner, LWF representative).

As the focus of donors and the state shifts to those sectors of the economy which contribute to export-earning, greater pressure will be placed on the refugee population either to expand production of tobacco or another cash crop, or to participate as wage labour to the newly-expanding large-scale farms. This would complement UNHCR’s policy of refugees contributing to the development of their host country. This change in policy was reinforced by a recent consultancy report, according to which,

Small-holder producers - not least amongst the Barundi refugees need now to be vigorously encouraged to set about producing export-crops for disposal through official marketing channels (Antoniou et al, 1987, p.29).

It is unlikely that the Tanzanian state will encourage labour market flexibility among refugees for fear of competition with nationals and an exodus from the remote settlement areas. Such fears have not been confirmed in the case of the Banyarwanda at Mwesi, many of whom have remained in Mwesi after obtaining citizenship. The restrictions on employment have been indirectly supported by TCRS and UNHCR, who, rather than challenge policies which are at variance with the refugee convention, use them to justify the limited vocational training and further education they offer to Barundi refugees.
Similarly, the entrepreneurial skills of the refugee business community will be further confined to the settlement. In this climate of economic liberalization, they pose a significant threat to local businessmen, who with the backing of party officials have already forced the removal of some refugee enterprises from local urban centres.\(^1\) Refugee businessmen may be further encouraged to concentrate investments within the settlement, therefore subsidizing any further infrastructural development. As state investment is directed only to those sectors which directly increase foreign-exchange earnings, more emphasis will be placed on self-help activities in terms of the provision of services.

It emerges that the refugee community in Katumba is not as undifferentiated as the literature on rural refugee population tends to assume. Chapter Seven discusses this issue through an analysis of the social relations of production and using labour as an index of differentiation. The purpose was to determine the extent to which the refugee population could provide a vehicle for agricultural expansion in Mpanda district - in effect stimulating the development of capitalist agriculture. Within the context of Katumba, refugees become semi-proletarianized, as the relationship between the state and the refugees is similar to that of landlord/tenant. Extra-economic pressures ensure that commodity production becomes the only realizable survival strategy of the community. A significant surplus is

\(^1\) Refugees are frequently accused by local capitalists and state bureaucrats for conducting business activities in urban centres, especially Tabora town. In some instances, legitimate businesses have been closed down, and the refugees forced back to the settlements (Daily News, 12.7.1985, 25.5.1986 and 9.7.1986).
appropriated by the state either legally through co-operative unions or illegally through the corrupt practices of the bureaucratic class within the settlement and the district.

Within the refugee community, there are emerging signs of differentiation. This is not based on accumulation through involvement in agriculture but via mercantile activities or through non-agricultural wage labour activities. Using Lenin's differentiation schema, I estimated that 51 percent of the refugee population falls into the middle peasant category, relying essentially on family labour, and living a precarious existence. The squeeze on production makes the possibility of future impoverishment real. It is this squeeze which has forced households into the lowest of wage-earning activities as agricultural labourers on the holdings of other refugees. Chapter Seven concludes that the presence of the TCRS/Ryder Cheshire Mission as major employers in the settlement fosters an elite group of workers, with implications for differentiation. It is doubtful whether salaried refugees, considering the insecurity of their status, are prepared to invest in long-term projects like agriculture: most have opted for retail activities - for short-term maximization of revenue.

Changes in the situation of Barundi refugees cannot occur in a vacuum, and they require a certain degree of political liberalization not yet apparent in Tanzania. Taking into account the fact that thousands of Barundi refugees will not be able to return to their country of
origin, even with political change in Burundi, Tanzania's approach with all its short-comings does indeed provide a partial short-term solution to the problem. However, the state must now come to terms with the inevitable permanent presence of Barundi refugees within its territory, and enact policies to facilitate their social as well as political incorporation into Tanzania. The extension of the right to freedom of movement and political representation would not only recognize the contribution of refugees to the economy, but show a far greater commitment to the human rights of African peoples.
APPENDIX A

Agreement under the Programme of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Agency: The Lutheran World Federation/ Project: 71/LS/TAN.4
Tanganyika Christian Refugee Type of Project: Rural
Service settlement of Rwandese Refugees at Mwesi

An AGREEMENT made between the GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA (hereinafter called "the Government") of the first part, the LUTHERAN WORLD FEDERATION/TANGANYIKA CHRISTIAN REFUGEE SERVICE (HEREINAFTER CALLED "LWF/TCRS") of the second part and the UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (HEREINAFTER CALLED "The High Commissioner") of the third part;

Whereas
1. The Government has appealed to the High Commissioner for financial assistance in settling some 3,000 Rwandese refugees at Mwesi, Mpanda District in Tanzania;
2. The Government has proposed that the Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service be the Executive agency for the implementation of the project described herein and for the disbursement of funds made available by the High Commissioner;
3. The Department of World Service of the Lutheran World Federation, being the agency operating the Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service, has agreed to participate in the project at the request of the government and of the High Commissioner subject to availability of funds;

AND WHEREAS
the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme in its twenty-first session, on the basis of the understanding the High Commissioner reached with the Tanzanian Government on the future of the Mwesi settlement as outlined in document A/AC.96/429, paragraphs 169-173, has authorized the High Commissioner (Document A/AC.96/447, paragraph 136) to render further assistance;

AND WHEREAS
the High Commissioner has agreed to make available US $ 89,800 (eighty nine thousand eight hundred dollars) to meet the needs specified in Table IV of document A/AC.96/429 (Section XIX) as well as the additional requirements for the consolidation of the health and education facilities at the settlement;

IT IS NOW HEREBY AGREED as follows:

PART 1

1. The Government shall:
(i) make available, free of any charge to the High Commissioner and to LWF/TCRS, adequate land as may be required for the agricultural development of land by the refugees;

(ii) ensure that the refugees are extended the same rights and terms as to the use of such lands as are given to nationals living in the district;

(iii) provide free of charge such administrative services as are necessary for the implementation of the project;

(iv) provide the services of a Settlement Commandant, whose function will be to facilitate the implementation of the project in conformity with the agreed plans and the Government policy and to ensure effective cooperation and liaison with the Government departments and services concerned;

(v) make arrangements with the LWF/TCRS for the duty free importation of supplies and equipment contributed by bilateral or international arrangements or by private donors (including inter alia, food, clothing, medical and agricultural commodities) and any other equipment including vehicles imported by the LWF/TCRS for the services to be rendered in terms of Parts II & III of this agreement and for such other services as agencies may render to meet these refugees' needs in Tanzania;

(vi) exempt the LWF/TCRS (TCRS international staff (other than nationals of Tanzania) from personal tax, development levy and income tax and permit such staff to import, in addition to the importations permitted by the Customs Tariff Ordinance, not more than one motor vehicle each provided such vehicle shall not be sold within two years of importation;

(vii) with effect from 1 July 1971 assume the administrative and financial responsibility for the continuation of the public services established for the refugees in the settlement (such as inter alia medical services and primary schools currently operated with international assistance, and will retain the services of refugee already employed in medical and educational facilities and other community services.

PART II

2. The LWF/TCRS shall:
   (i) be responsible for the co-ordination of all efforts towards the implementation of the project in accordance with the plans agreed upon by the parties hitherto;

   (ii) provide the necessary staff under the direction of the Director of the LWF/TCRS, which staff shall include, inter alia, a Project Co-ordinator;
(iii) provide for services, supplies and equipment in kind or in cash relating to its contribution as shown in the relevant budget estimates in Schedule "A" hereto; it being understood that the contribution is governed by the availability of funds;

(iv) be authorized to make variations not exceeding ten percent between the budget items, provided that the total allocation is not overspent. Any changes exceeding ten percent, which might prove to be necessary for the effective implementation of the project as well as any use to be made of the Contingency Reserve referred to in Schedule "A" hereto will be subject to prior consultations with the government and the High Commissioner;

(v) collect and keep readily accessible information and documentation on the progress of the implementation of the project and maintain an inventory of certain field equipment providing details mutually agreed upon between the High Commissioner and LWF/TCRS.

3. By 30 September 1971, LWF/TCRS shall submit to the High Commissioner:

(i) a narrative report covering the period under (ii);

(ii) a financial statement showing the use made of the High Commissioner's contribution for the period 1 January 1971 to 30 June 1971, providing details mutually agreed upon. It is understood that all funds made available during the above period by the High Commissioner's Office to LWF/TCRS for this project, whether part of the originally-agreed-upon budget or extra budgetary contributions, will be reflected in this financial statement;

(iii) a summary presentation of the cash contributions other than those listed above under point (ii), applied to the project by LWF/TCRS. The extent to which details are furnished in this item is left to the Lutheran World Federation/ Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service;

(iv) indications as to the estimated value of contributed goods facilitated by LWF/TCRS or applied to the project during the reporting period.

4. (i) Any part of the High Commissioner's contribution remaining unspent or uncommitted by LWF/TCRS on 30 June 1971 will be reimbursed to the High Commissioner within one month of the presentation of the final financial statement;

(ii) LWF/TCRS shall upon liquidation of all commitments, submit an account for such liquidation as may be outstanding on or after 30 June 1971.

5. It is expressly agreed that LWF/TCRS shall have no reporting responsibility in respect of contributions made by the government of the United Republic of Tanzania, either in cash or in kind or procured for the project by the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, unless such contributions are reflected in the accounts of LWF/TCRS.
PART III

6. The High Commissioner shall:
(i) assist the Government with the agricultural settlement project by making available the advisory service of his staff and providing to the LWF/TCRS, the grant which the High Commissioner will make available for the project referred to in Schedule "A" hereto;

(ii) endeavour to obtain additional support in cash or in kind for this project, particularly for such aspects as cannot be financed from the High Commissioner's grant;

(iii) upon return of the Agreement duly signed by all parties, the High Commissioner shall pay an amount of US $89,000 to the Lutheran World Federation's account with the First National City Bank in Geneva.

PART IV

7. IT IS HEREBY EXPRESSLY AGREED AS FOLLOWS;

(i) The Government and the LWF/TCRS agree to facilitate the audit and inspection of the project on behalf of the United Nations; should they at any time wish to do so, the United Nations Board of Auditors may carry out an audit of the project;

(ii) The Government will not at any time dispose of any vehicles or any other equipment purchased out of the High Commissioner's contributions in respect of the settlement at Mwesi, nor use them for any purpose outside the project without the prior agreement of the High Commissioner or his Representative;

(iii) a) No party shall be liable to indemnification by any other party in respect of any claim, debt, damage or demand arising out of the implementation of this Agreement;

b) Where an employee of any party to this Agreement is injured, disabled or killed in the course of his employment under the project, the party employing him shall be solely responsible in respect of all claims that may arise therefrom;

(iv) This agreement shall be deemed to have commenced on 1 January 1971 and the project thereunder shall continue until 30 June 1971.

IN WITNESS THEREOF the undersigned being duly authorized thereto have on behalf of the parties hereto signed this Agreement at the places and on the day and year below written.

For The Government of the United Republic of Tanzania
Name             Signature             Date
For Lutheran World Federation/Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service
Name             Signature             Date
For The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Name             Signature             Date
Source: Gasarasi (1984)
Appendix B

Infrastructural projects submitted to ICARA II by the United Republic of Tanzania

1. Road construction, Rukwa and Tabora regions (230 kilometres of trunk roads and access roads).


4. Expansion and improvement of health delivery services, Mpanda and Urambo districts.

5. Expansion of two Ministry of Agricultural Training Institutions, Tumbi (Tabora region) and Mubondo (Kigoma region).

6. Construction of equipment of rural-development community centres and related buildings, Katumba, Ulyankulu, Kigwa and Pangale settlements and construction of day-care centres at 44 refugee-affected villages.

7. Assistance to enhance rural marketing co-ops at one of the three refugee settlements.

8. Establishment of a sub-station of the Kyole agricultural research centre, Mishamo settlement (Rukwa region).

Source: UNHCR (1984) Submission to ICARA II by African Governments
# Appendix C

## Producer Prices for Major Cash crops 1975/76 to date

**Current Prices Sh. per Kg.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Maize</th>
<th>Beans</th>
<th>Cassava</th>
<th>Tobacco (Flue-cured)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975/76</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976/77</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>7.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977/78</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>7.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978/79</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>7.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979/80</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980/81</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>8.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981/82</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>12.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982/83</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>18.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983/84</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>18.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984/85</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>25.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985/86</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>37.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986/87</td>
<td>6.30</td>
<td>14.40</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>49.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987/88</td>
<td>8.20</td>
<td>21.60</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>63.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Constant prices: 1986/87=100**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Maize</th>
<th>Beans</th>
<th>Cassava</th>
<th>Tobacco (Flue-cured)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975/76</td>
<td>8.72</td>
<td>16.34</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>76.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976/77</td>
<td>7.98</td>
<td>19.96</td>
<td>4.99</td>
<td>73.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977/78</td>
<td>7.60</td>
<td>31.30</td>
<td>5.37</td>
<td>66.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978/79</td>
<td>6.55</td>
<td>26.98</td>
<td>5.01</td>
<td>57.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980/81</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>16.76</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>50.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981/82</td>
<td>5.76</td>
<td>13.43</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>48.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982/83</td>
<td>5.01</td>
<td>10.02</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>51.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983/84</td>
<td>5.20</td>
<td>11.82</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>42.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984/85</td>
<td>6.80</td>
<td>13.59</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>42.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985/86</td>
<td>6.95</td>
<td>15.89</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>50.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986/87</td>
<td>6.30</td>
<td>14.40</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>49.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987/88</td>
<td>6.56</td>
<td>17.28</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>50.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Tanzania Economic Trend* Vol.1 No.1 Economic Research Bureau
University of Dar es Salaam & Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs and Planning
Appendix D

Open Market Producer Prices in selected urban centres for dried grain and tuber.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban Centre</th>
<th>Maize (Shillings per kg.)</th>
<th>Cassava (Shillings per kg.)</th>
<th>Beans (Shillings per kg.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sumbawanga</td>
<td>4.51</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>4.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpanda</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tabora</td>
<td>6.80</td>
<td>6.11</td>
<td>8.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mwanza</td>
<td>10.27</td>
<td>7.22</td>
<td>8.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dar es Salaam</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11.66</td>
<td>11.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average

for Tanzania | 7.74 | 8.70 | 8.83 | 8.25 | 13.80 | 11.03 | 28.05 | 30.05 | 29.11 |
Minimum      | 4.05 | 3.88 | 4.70 | 4.00 | 3.75 | 7.00 | 16.75 | 17.25 | 16.63 |
Maximum      | 15.27 | 16.25 | 16.02 | 18.75 | 62.50 | 17.50 | 42.50 | 62.50 | 65.00 |

Appendix E

Katumba: primary co-operatives: Income from Major food crops for the agricultural year 1985-86 (Tanzanian Shillings)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cooperative</th>
<th>Maize</th>
<th>Beans</th>
<th>Cassava</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kaliwi</td>
<td>2,292,921</td>
<td>1,107,250</td>
<td>194,994</td>
<td>3,595,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mnyaki</td>
<td>934,914</td>
<td>914,455</td>
<td>16,380</td>
<td>1,865,749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ndurumo</td>
<td>2,024,798</td>
<td>1,586,489</td>
<td>152,943</td>
<td>3,764,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanduwi</td>
<td>1,826,626</td>
<td>782,489</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,609,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kajenge</td>
<td>1,964,318</td>
<td>404,707</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,369,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivungwe</td>
<td>2,321,040</td>
<td>2,275,989</td>
<td>984,240</td>
<td>5,581,269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasanja</td>
<td>1,652,306</td>
<td>1,147,520</td>
<td>69,840</td>
<td>2,869,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ikoka</td>
<td>2,138,537</td>
<td>2,133,057</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4,271,594</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sub-total   District  15,155,460  10,351,956  1,223,597  26,925,913

Percentage of District Total  63  51  33  56

Total  23,855,575  20,276,152  3,646,760  47,778,487

Source: RURECU Branch Office, Mpanda
**Appendix F  Official Marketing of Major cash crops in Rukwa Region**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Farm Year</th>
<th>Maize (tonne)</th>
<th>Percentage of National total</th>
<th>Cassava (tonne)</th>
<th>Percentage of National total</th>
<th>Beans (tonne)</th>
<th>Percentage of National total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977/78</td>
<td>9,882</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3,565</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978/79</td>
<td>5,123</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2,264</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2,056</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979/80</td>
<td>15,864</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>1,324</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>7,793</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980/81</td>
<td>17,818</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>1,324</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>3,065</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981/82</td>
<td>15,956</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>1,453</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>2,875</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982/83</td>
<td>17,645</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>1,451</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>2,977</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983/84</td>
<td>10,143</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>2,677</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>2,731</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984/85</td>
<td>16,563</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>2,632</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>2,545</td>
<td>70.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985/86</td>
<td>29,338</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>1,460</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>3,232</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986/87</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>2,110</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>2,210</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**National Totals**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Maize</th>
<th>Cassava</th>
<th>Beans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977/78</td>
<td>213,128</td>
<td>36,937</td>
<td>31,668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978/79</td>
<td>222,304</td>
<td>63,719</td>
<td>27,916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979/80</td>
<td>161,190</td>
<td>44,214</td>
<td>34,323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980/81</td>
<td>104,943</td>
<td>14,285</td>
<td>22,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981/82</td>
<td>89,440</td>
<td>9,233</td>
<td>14,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982/83</td>
<td>85,961</td>
<td>18,764</td>
<td>11,288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983/84</td>
<td>70,961</td>
<td>30,687</td>
<td>8,273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984/85</td>
<td>89,996</td>
<td>19,875</td>
<td>3,567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985/86</td>
<td>178,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986/87</td>
<td>198,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix G

Survey of Refugee Households: Questions to Heads of Households (Translated from Kiswahili)

1. a) Village  
   b) Road  
   c) House number
3. Number of dwellings on the plot
4. Age
5. Sex
6. How many languages can you speak?
7. Which of them do you speak well - speak a little?
8. Where do you come from in Burundi? Village, District, Region.
9. When did you come to Tanzania?
10. When you came to Tanzania where did you enter the country?
11. How many members of your family accompanied you to Tanzania? How were they related to you?
12. Did you visit Tanzania before becoming a refugee? If Yes, Where did you visit? For what reasons?
13. Marital Status: Married, Widow, Divorced, Single? If married, from which village did your wife or husband come from?
14. Have you any children who are married? If yes, Where do they live, village, road?
15. How many people live on your plot? How are they related to you? What are their ages?
16. How many years were you at school? Primary, Secondary, College, Technical/craft
17. What work did you do in Burundi?
18. What things did you bring with you when you came to Tanzania? Money, Tools, Personal effects-clothes, Nothing?
19. Did you hold any position of authority in Burundi?

Questions on livelihood
20. What is your occupation?
21. List all the things you did last week
22. What work do you do during the dry season?
23. How many acres (ekari) of the following crops do you cultivate? Maize, Beans, Cassava, Tobacco?
24. How many bags of maize, beans, cassava and tobacco did you harvest: last year (1984/85), this year (1985/86)
25. Do you hire people to work on your plot? If yes, how many? When? To do what?
26. Do you or anyone on you plot work for someone else? If yes, name of employer, kind of work, when, how much are you/they paid?
27. Have you ever worked outside Katumba? If yes, when, where?
28. How many bicycles are there in your household?
29. Does your family sell things on the market? If yes, what? When? Which markets?
30. What things do you normally buy on the market?
31. Do you ever buy things outside Katumba? If yes where?
32. What sort of things do you normally travel to Mpanda town for?
33. How often do you normally travel to a) Mishamo
b) Ulyankulu  c) Kigoma?
34. What is your religion?
35. Do you do any work for the Church? If yes, What? How often?
36. If you have a problem with life in the settlement, who you discuss it with? a) Settlement Commandant b) church leader c) someone else, who?
37. What do you normally visit the headquarters for? And how often?
38. Do you have relatives who live elsewhere in Tanzania? Where? How are they related to you?
39. What plans do you have for your children when they finish primary education?
40. Do you have any children at secondary school in Tanzania, If yes, How many? where?
41. What problems did you face when you began living in Katumba?
42. Do you think life here is better than in Burundi? Why?
43. Which of these things concern you most?
   a) Education for your children
   b) Getting more land to cultivate
   c) To find more food for your family
   d) Money
   e) To improve your farming techniques
   f) Other Why?
44. What do you think the local Tanzanians think about the refugees in the settlement?
45. How many Tanzanian friends have you got?
46. Would you be prepared to leave the settlement – to return to Burundi?
47. What do you think is happening in Burundi these days?
48. What are the major problems here?
49. How has TCRS helped the refugees here?
50. How do you feel here? like a Burundi, ike a guest, like a Tanzanian or like a immigrant?
51. Have you got anything you would like to discuss further?

Survey of women in sampled households - questions

Preliminary questions were asked on age, education and language competency, as well as on the following:
1. Is there much difference between your work in Burundi and your workload here?
2. Do you sell goods on the market? If yes, what?
3. If married, how old were you when you were married?
4. How many children have you had? How many are alive? dead?
5. Do people here want many or few children? Why?
6. How many children do you want? Why?
7. Have you ever attended any classes for women, in Katumba? If yes, when? On what subject?
8. How many times during the week do you work on your plot?
9. How do you think your life as a refugee differs from that of a Tanzanian woman?
10. Have you anything else to say?
Survey of Businessmen -questions

Location of Business
Village of origin in Katumba
Preliminary questions were asked on education, languages spoken and competency, date of arrival in Tanzania, place of entry, occupation in Burundi, as in the questions for heads of households, as well as the following:
1. What things did you bring to Tanzania?
2. When did you begin doing business in Katumba?
3. Where did you get the money to start your business?
4. Is your business your own or are you part of a co-operative? If co-operative, how many people are involved?
5. Do you employ people? How many? doing what?
10. Have you ever worked outside Katumba? If yes, where, doing what?
11. Do you buy goods outside Katumba? If yes, where? What type of goods?
12. How often do you visit Mpanda town, and what do you go for?
13. Have you relatives living elsewhere in Tanzania? If yes, where? How are they related to you?
14. Describe some of the problems you faced when you began living in Katumba.
15. Do you think life in Katumba is better than in Burundi?
16. How many Tanzanian friends have you got?
17. How do you feel here? a) like a Barundi b) like a guest c) like a Tanzanian d) Like an immigrant.

Survey of workers in the settlement -questions

Preliminary questions were asked on education, village of origin in Katumba or elsewhere in Tanzania, languages spoken and competency, as well as on the following:
1. How long have you worked for your present employer?
2. What is your job?
3. Have you worked outside Katumba? If yes, where?, When? doing what?
4. If applicable, what work did you do in Burundi?
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