The Origins of Subnational Democracy:

How Colonial Legacies and Labor Incorporation Shaped Regime Heterogeneity *within* Latin American Countries

Javier Pérez Sandoval

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A thesis submitted for the degree of
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Abstract

Despite recent contributions, subnational democratic variation has received little systematic attention in comparative politics and continues to be a *grave omission* (Dahl 1971, 12) in the literature on democratization. Moreover, current explanations are at fault of ignoring the intricacies of time. Consequently, our understanding of the regime heterogeneity observed within countries has hitherto remained *ahistorical*. To overcome this and other limitations, using evidence from the largest federations of Latin America, I put forth the first comparative, and historically grounded explanation of the origins of subnational democracy.

The project tackles the following question: What explains subnational democratic variation across Latin America? In other words, why is it that some provinces within countries are more democratic than others? I contend that economic development is at the core of the puzzle. More specifically, building on the work of Mahoney (2010) and Collier and Collier (1991), I articulate a two-step argument contending that, across the region, the subnational unevenness observed today was configured by territorially distinct development trajectories which were triggered during colonization and that, once set, conditioned the timing of local labor incorporation.

My two-step, path-dependent argument is bound by a probabilistic notion of causality. Empirically, I adopt a mixed methods approach. Weaving together quantitative and qualitative evidence, I present original data for all the subnational units of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. In addition, I track the experiences of Jalisco, Rio Grande do Sul, Guerrero, and Salta, as cases that illustrate the processes at play. I conclude this project by exploring the portability of my argument to the Indian case. My cross-national, longitudinal, and historical exploration of the origins of subnational democracy contributes to the discipline by contextualizing *all* other existing explanations of subnational regime variation.

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To my family, to my friends,
and to the boy with the eager eyes.

This river is wild!

Acknowledgements

Life is shaped by the unfolding of a myriad of path-dependent choices, and while a few years back I critically self-selected into a DPhil, successfully completing it required the intervention of several remarkable individuals who helped, encouraged, and inspired me along the way. I am honored to thank them and openly recognize that the achievements of this dissertation are a reflection of their influence, and that any mistakes are, of course, my own.

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Abstract

Despite recent contributions, subnational democratic variation has received little systematic attention in comparative politics and continues to be a *grave omission* (Dahl 1971, 12) in the literature on democratization. Moreover, current explanations are at fault of ignoring the intricacies of time. Consequently, our understanding of the regime heterogeneity observed within countries has hitherto remained *ahistorical*. To overcome this and other limitations, using evidence from the largest federations of Latin America, I put forth the first comparative, and historically grounded explanation of the origins of subnational democracy.

The project tackles the following question: What explains subnational democratic variation across Latin America? In other words, why is it that some provinces within countries are more democratic than others? I contend that economic development is at the core of the puzzle. More specifically, building on the work of Mahoney (2010) and Collier and Collier (1991), I articulate a two-step argument contending that, across the region, the subnational unevenness observed today was configured by territorially distinct development trajectories which were triggered during colonization and that, once set, conditioned the timing of local labor incorporation.

My two-step, path-dependent argument is bound by a probabilistic notion of causality. Empirically, I adopt a mixed methods approach. Weaving together quantitative and qualitative evidence, I present original data for all the subnational units of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. In addition, I track the experiences of Jalisco, Rio Grande do Sul, Guerrero, and Salta, as cases that illustrate the processes at play. I conclude this project by exploring the portability of my argument to the Indian case. My cross-national, longitudinal, and historical exploration of the origins of subnational democracy contributes to the discipline by contextualizing *all* other existing explanations of subnational regime variation.

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List of Abbreviations

ACG . . . . . . Asociación Cívica Guerrerense

CAOLJ . . . . Confederación de Agrupaciones Obreras de Jalisco

CGT . . . . . . Confederación General del Trabajo

CHA . . . . . . Comparative Historical Analysis

CIDAC . . . . Centro de Investigación para el Desarrollo, A.C.

CIS . . . . Complex Indigenous Society

COJ . . . . . . Confederación Obrera de Jalisco

CPO . . . . . . Causal Process Observation

CROM . . . . Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana

CTM . . . . . Confederación de Trabajadores de México

CUT . . . . . . Confederación Única de Trabajadores

EGP . . . . . . Ejército Guerrillero del Pueblo

ENP . . . . . . Effective Number of Parties

FFT . . . . . . Federal Fiscal Transfers

FORGS . . . . Federação Operária do Rio Grande do Sul

FROC . . . . . Federación Revolucionaria de Obreros y Campesinos

FTJ . . . . . . Federación de Trabajadores de Jalisco

GDP . . . . . . Gross Domestic Product

IBGE . . . . . Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística

ICP . . . . . . International Comparison Program

IIEG . . . . . . Instituto de Información Estadística y Geográfica de Jalisco

ILO . . . . . . International Labor Organization

IMF . . . . . . International Monetary Fund

INDEC . . . . Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos

INEGI . . . . . Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía

IPEA . . . . . Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada
LEIs . . . . . . Large Estate Institutions
MAUP . . . . Modifiable Areal Unit Problem
MOR's . . . . Market Oriented Reforms
NOA . . . . . . Noroeste Argentino
OECD . . . . . Organisation for Economic Co-operation and development
PAN . . . . . . Partido Acción Nacional
PCM . . . . . Partido Comunista Mexicano
PCSE . . . . . Panel Corrected Standard Errors
PJ . . . . Partido Justicialista
PNR . . . . . . Partido Nacional Revolucionario
PPP . . . . . . Purchasing Power Parity
PRI . . . . . . Partido Revolucionario Institucional
PRM . . . . . Partido de la Revolución Méxicana
PRR . . . . . . Partido Republicano Riograndense
RA . . . . Resource Abundance
RBI . . . . . . Reserve Bank of India
SDI . . . . . . Subnational Democracy Index
SDV . . . . . . Subnational Democratic Variation
SO . . . . Standard Oil US
SOE . . . . . . State-owned Enterprise
SRH . . . . . . Subnational Regime Heterogeneity
SUR . . . . . . Subnational Undemocratic Regime
TSE . . . . . . Tribunal Superior Eleitoral
TST . . . . . . Tribunal Superior do Trabalho
VIF . . . . . . Variance Inflation Factor
WB . . . . . . World Bank
YPF . . . . . . Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales


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"'Clearly,' the Time Traveller proceeded, 'any real body must have extension in four directions: it must have Length, Breadth, Thickness, and—Duration [. . .] There are really four dimensions, three which we call the three planes of Space, and a fourth, Time. There is, however, a tendency to draw an unreal distinction between the former three dimensions and the latter, because it happens that our consciousness moves intermittently in one direction along the latter from the beginning to the end of our lives [...] There is no difference between Time and any of the three dimensions of Space except that our consciousness moves along it' [. . .]

'Scientific people,' proceeded the Time Traveller, after the pause required for the proper assimilation of this, 'know very well that Time is only a kind *of Space".*

— H. G. Wells (1895)

1 Introduction

What explains subnational variation in democracy[1]? Half a century ago, Robert Dahl (1971) acknowledged that leaving this dimension of democracy unexplored was a *grave omission* across the democratization literature. To a great extent, it still is. In spite of recent contributions, political science in general and comparative politics in particular have failed to fully answer the question at the core of this dissertation. By *scaling down* (Snyder 2001) and moving past the discipline-dominant *whole-nation bias* (Lijphart 1975), this project puts forth a new theory and presents supporting evidence interwoven by a sound mix-methods approach.

In line with a long scholarly tradition, I argue that socio-economic development stands at the core of the puzzle. Simply put, I contend that subnationally heterogeneous development trajectories shaped the *territorial unevenness of democracy*. More specifically, I argue that the subnational unevenness observed today was configured by territorially distinct development trajectories that were triggered during colonization and that, once set, conditioned the timing of local labor incorporation in the first half of the twentieth century. To support my claim,

[1] I use the term subnational to refer to the government level immediately below the federation. This pertains to Argentinian *provincias*, Brazilian *unidades federativas* and Mexican *entidades*. Throughout the thesis I use subnational, local, and provincial interchangeably. In a similar vein, to refer to countries as a whole, I use nation and country-level. Lastly, I capitalize *State* to distinguish the abstract-Weberian notion from *state*, which in this project alludes specifically to the subnational units analyzed.

I capitalize on the explanatory leverage of three major Latin American democracies — Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. The enduring legacies of colonialism and labor incorporation coloured the subnational political landscape of these large Latin American federations.

To account for regime heterogeneity in and beyond the capital, the project articulates a structural roadmap by standing on the shoulders of giants. On the one hand, the theory and empirics of this thesis follow the *structural rationale* set by authors such as Lipset (1959), Moore (1966), Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens [RSS] (1992), Collier and Collier (1991), as well as Mahoney (2010). On the other hand, it innovates by capitalizing the explanatory leverage of subnational heterogeneity (Giraudy, Monacada and Snyder 2019) and the complementarity of both quantitative and comparative-historical analyses. In so doing, I aim to further our understanding of subnational democratic variation in Latin America and beyond.

In pursuing this project I am driven by scholarly and normative concerns. While the former are addressed throughout the thesis, I here briefly discuss the latter. A quick survey of recently published work reveals an alarming trope: democracies —as well as the liberal and electoral tenets that underpin them— are under threat (Runciman 2018, Deneen 2018). Although twenty years ago O'Donnell (1993) already highlighted that *brown areas* colored the map of many transitioning regimes, populism and inequality are the conventional contemporary culprits (Mounk 2018, Stiglitz 2013). These factors are argued to respectively be the symptom and the cause of the diminishing social support for open, participatory and contested politics (Foa and Mounk 2016).

Dissatisfaction, however, stems not only from faulty national institutions, but also from the *unevenness* of democracy within countries. Subnational democratic heterogeneity has allowed some citizens to reap the benefits of electoral competition, while excluding others from even having a contested political arena. Consequently, understanding how and why democracy varies within countries is a paramount task to boost confidence in open and competitive regimes worldwide. Hence, from a normative stand point, in addition to its theoretical and methodological orientation, this thesis aims to help us move past the current pessimistic scenario by providing a better understanding of the processes shaping regime-dynamics at the local level.

1.1 What We Know and What We Don't

To what extent has the literature dealt with subnational democratic variation? So far, studies have highlighted how this phenomenon is shaped by either agentic or structural factors. Scholars in the agentic camp have emphasized intergovernmental relations, specifically, they have highlighted the linkages between governors, presidents and the local opposition (Gibson 2005, Giraudy 2015). The first vie to remain entrenched, the second enable or resist these efforts depending on partisan or policy objectives and lastly, local opponents try to open up enclaves by gaining the support of the center.

For their part, structural accounts have highlighted the salience of economic autonomy (McMann 2006) and have also identified that unearned resources or *rents* negatively influence democracy at the subnational level by providing incumbents with the means to secure their hold on power (Gervasoni 2018, Bianchi 2013). In sum, from this first generation of studies we know that governors and local incumbents entrench their persona in local political networks, circumvent the institutional frameworks set to limit the extent of their power and are consequently able to close their territorial boundaries.

One of the core problems with these 'first generation explanations' is that they are static. That is, they provide a useful *ex post* framework for how local autocrats resist democratizing pressures, but, for example, they have nothing to say in regards to how subnational enclaves are maintained. In an attempt to address this issue, a second wave of studies has recently pointed to the relevance of labor coalitions (Griffis 2019) as well as economic diversification and campaign funding (Mera 2016). Labor support and money politics have certainly introduced a much needed dynamism to our understanding of local democracy.

While this second generation of studies has taken some steps in the right direction, they share a common fundamental flaw with their first generation counterparts:

they fail to explain when and how the territorial unevenness observed today first emerged. In that sense, my main point of contention with the literature is that *existing research accounts only for an already determined equilibrium.*

To put it differently, existing explanations operate in a historical vacuum. Within the extant literature, the timing and sequencing of crucial historical political events are irrelevant. In the best cases, history is assumed away, in the worse, it is blatantly ignored. As a result, we still lack a clear understanding of when and why states were set on distinct paths. That is, we do not know when and why states and provinces were set onto distinct socio-economic and political trajectories. Similarly, we also do not know if these historical differences had critical implications for the shaping of the subnational political arena, and if they did, we lack a clear notion of when and how they influenced our outcome of interest.

Last but not least, the trademark of existing research has been its case-specific orientation. While this is not intrinsically a weakness, the dominant small-n approach, in combination with the lack of a thorough temporal and historical consideration, have halted contemporary efforts from articulating a generalizable and satisfactory explanation (Van Evera 1997). To overcome these gaps, I follow Pierson (2004) and Hall (2016) in *taking history seriously.* Similarly, I follow Behrend and Whitehead's advice (2016) by taking a step back in an effort to re-evaluate what we know and what we don't in light of cross-country, cross-regional, and historical evidence.

1.2 The Research: The Problem and The Objectives

To understand subnational democratic variation we need to take time and history seriously precisely because the observed territorial heterogeneity is a very *sticky* outcome. The uneven patterns observed today were not configured last year. Subnational democratic variation is an outcome quintessentially structured in space through time. To briefly exemplify this point we can think of the Mexican state of Hidalgo, Santiago del Estero in Argentina or Bahia in Brazil. These provinces have been identified as post-Third Wave (Huntington 1991) democratic underperformers. That is, Bahia, Santiago del Estero and Hidalgo have been, on average, less democratic than their provincial counterparts for roughly the last 30 years.

The problem at the core of my contention with the extant literature's ahistoricism is that the equilibrium observed for the past three decades actually goes further back in time. Bahia, Santiago del Estero and Hidalgo underperformed *even before* the Third Wave[2]. As Figure 1.1 shows, for all 83 subnational units of the countries under consideration, post-Third Wave electoral scores of competition and participation are strongly linked to patterns of competition and participation that date back to the early and mid 20$^{\text{th}}$ century, with a significant Pearson correlation coefficient of roughly 0.5.

That this equilibrium has survived for roughly a century casts doubts on the explanatory power of accounts emphasizing subnational rentierism —which stems from fiscal arrangements established in the 1980s— and those theories highlighting circadian boundary managing strategies. Subnational democratic variation is a sticky, slow moving political outcome, in desperate need of a historically oriented explanation.

Figure 1.1 shows that subnational democratic variation (SDV) is sticky in at least three ways. First, states that are more(less) democratic today, are also states that already were more(less) democratic by the early and mid 20$^{\text{th}}$ century. That is, the democratic differences between states have been considerably stable over time. Second, both before and after the Third Wave, Argentinian provinces have been more democratic than Brazilian *unidades federativas* and similarly, the latter have been more democratic than Mexican states. In other words, the differences between subnational units across countries have also been persistent. Lastly, the graph also shows how patterns of competition and participation have endured

[2]Throughout this project I use Huntington's (1991) Third Wave *only* as a temporal heuristic to emphasize the historical nature of the phenomenon under investigation. That is, when I say that certain provinces democratically over or underperformed even before the Third Wave, I am not asserting any causal salience to the wave itself. I am only highlighting that subnational democratic variation was configured before the period around which most of the scholarly work on national and subnational democracy in Latin America has recently focused.



Figure 1.1: Subnational Democratic Variation: A Sticky Outcome

Measures on both the x and y axis are averages based on Vanhanen's Index of Democracy (Vanhanen 2000). To estimate the pre-Third Wave score (shown on the x-axis), I used the most reliable and earliest available data. For Argentina and Mexico that corresponds to data on presidential elections for the 1916-1973 and 1964-1976 periods respectively. For the Brazilian subnational pre-Third Wave score I used federal congressional elections for the 1945-1962 period. To estimate the post-Third Wave score (shown on the y-axis), I used gubernatorial electoral records for the following periods: 1983-2019 for Argentinian provinces, 1985-2018 for Brazilian units and 1988-2019 for Mexican states. Additional details on the sources and estimation precedures are given in Chapter 3. The key containing the labels given to each province can be found in Section A.1 of Appendix A.

within each subnational unit. None of the existing explanations satisfactorily deal with the three-tier stickiness of SDV.

Over the past two decades, *scaling down* has pushed the comparative agenda further. While fully overcoming the problem outlined above will most likely require a joint disciplinary effort, in pursuing this dissertation I intend for the *historical turn* (Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010) to bolster the subnational research agenda. To articulate a spatially and temporally tractable answer, the core of this dissertation thoroughly explores the trajectories of subnational units across Latin America's federal democracies. The main objective is then twofold: First, to present a historically grounded empirical assessment of the relation between socio-economic development and subnational democracy. Second, to unpack the mechanisms through which the cause exerts its effect.

Consequently, the specific objectives of this dissertation are: I) To assess the linkage between development and subnational regime variation in Latin America's federal democracies across time and space; II) articulate a convincing narrative that accounts for the posited relation, and III) present and discuss the main theoretical implications of the findings as well as pointing towards new areas of inquiry.

1.3 The Question and The Argument in Brief

The research question motivating this project stems naturally from the empirical and theoretical problem outlined in the previous section: What explains subnational democratic variation? I argue that the contemporary heterogeneity observed across Latin American federal democracies was configured by territorially distinct development trajectories which were triggered during colonization and that, once set, conditioned the timing of local labor incorporation. States that played a central role during the early Habsburg stages of the colonial era experienced a reversal of economic fortune, delaying the emergence of labor which ultimately had deleterious consequences for the local political arena.

Contrarily, territories which were late-Bourbon colonial nodes saw the comparatively early emergence of organized labor, warranting a response from local officials which predated the incorporation dynamics led by Perón, Vargas or Cárdenas. A preceding local State-labor connection then set a more advantageous environment for subnational democracy. Rooted in national as well as local historiography, my claim draws from the insights of several research agendas: literature on regime change, scholarship on historical institutionalism, as well as neo-institutional work on post-colonial economic development and state formation.

In locating distinct socio-economic development trajectories at the core of subnational democratic variation, I follow a bottom-up approach —that is, I emphasize the role of the *demand for democracy*— and frame a theory that unfolds in two steps. First, it unpacks the historical conditions that set the distinct trajectories fostering or deterring development. Building on that framework, I then elaborate on their path-dependent implications, tracing the political consequences of development, via local labor dynamics, back to subnational democracy.

To explore the historical conditions which set off distinct subnational development trajectories, I build on the outstanding work of James Mahoney (2010). In so doing, I identify the timing of colonization —itself conditioned by the presence of a complex indigenous society and the availability of easily extractable resources (in the form of mining or plantation-based economies)— as the key causal factor catalyzing variation at inception.

The author of *Colonialism and Postcolonial Development* (2010), however, remains agnostic about the political implications of his framework[3]. Guided by the classic structural insights of Moore (1966), Collier and Collier (1991), and Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992), as well as by those in the more recent work of Kurtz (2013) and Soifer (2015), I move beyond Mahoney by zeroing-in on the dynamics of labor incorporation as the factor linking the economic structure with our political outcome of interest.

Standing on the shoulders of Collier and Collier (1991), my second theoretical move is then to a) disentangle the nationally distinct local responses to labor and to b) show how, in states where labor emerged early, *vis-à-vis* a country-wide labor movement, the subnational arena became a comparatively salient locus of political contention, bargaining and participation. Figure 1.3 displays the theory's causal diagram at its most abstract and general level. For simplicity, it only portrays positive associations. To exemplify how the argument unfolds, a brief overview of the Brazilian experience is in order.

[3]To this purpose, Mahoney (2010) suggests only that the political consequences of post-colonial development must be found "with the varying power configurations that were originally put in place during colonialism" (Mahoney 2010, 227).



Figure 1.3: Explaining Subnational Democratic Variation: A Schematic Representation

Exposition of the Argument

Observers of Brazil will readily acknowledge the marked distinctions between Northeastern and Southeastern states. Based on Mahoney's (2010) work, I show that this split can be explained by the timing of colonization. Northeastern territories like Bahia or Pernambuco, played a central role during the early mercantilist stages of colonialism. Southeastern states like São Paulo or Rio de Janeiro, on the contrary, remained peripheral during the 16th century, and gained salience only in the reformist 1700s, which in light of the Pombaline Reforms, was a comparatively more liberal era[4]. As a consequence of this reversal, organized labor emerged first in the Brazilian Southeast. New bottom-up pressures increasingly required State mediation that was initially provided by subnational governments. Although Vargas and the politics of the Brazilian *Estado Novo* considerably centralized labor-State relations, the initial local arrangement between elites and workers created an advantageous environment for democracy by hightening the salience of the subnational arena as a relevant locus of political engagement.

By way of contrast, in Brazilian Northeastern states, organized labor emerged comparatively later on. In Pernambuco and Bahia for example, organized labor gained considerable strength only as a direct result of the industry-promoting

[4]There is contention among economic historians and theoreticians (see for example Neal and Cameron 2016 or Whittaker 1960) regarding the extent to which the label 'mercantilism' can clearly and consistently designate the set of ideas, practices and policies which shaped the economies of European powers throughout the *Age of Discovery* (Love 2006), which lasted roughly from the early 15th century to the first years of the 1800s. Following Mahoney (2010), what I call mercantilism, understood as a mix of nationalist and non-laissez-faire policies, can be thought of as "classical mercantilism" and what I call "liberalism" could be recast as "enlightened mercantilism".

policies of the 1960s. Consequently, no early local bargain occurred. In those units, State-labor relations were shaped during or after country-wide incorporation, and as a result, the national arena dislodged the subnational one.

In sum, I first connect the historic legacies of colonialism with distinct economic development trajectories. The timing of subnational responses to the emergence of labor then bridges our main independent variable with the outcome of interest. While the reader might be familiar with explanations that link democracy and development via the unfolding of labor relations, it is important to highlight that one of the novelties in this approach lies in arguing that the dynamics connecting these two factors are subnationally heterogeneous. This consequently implies not only that some states will be more democratic than others, but also that democracy moves at different speeds within countries. The latter point is commonly overlooked by most of the existing literature.

1.4 The Research: Cases and Design

Although subsequent sections thoroughly discuss the methodological approach and the case selection strategy, I here offer a brief overview. Method-wise, to balance parsimony and causal complexity, while at the same time presenting a convincing theory backed by robust evidence, at the core of this thesis I pursue a mixed-methods approach (Berg-Schlosser 2012). Quantitative tools are used to assess the relation between development and subnational democracy. Qualitatively, to explore the processes involved, a comparative historical analysis is articulated. That is, I identify development as a cause of subnational democracy by isolating and estimating its effect. I also unpack the historical dynamics through which causality unfolds.

As Section 4.4 of Chapter 4 clarifies, this project is governed by a *bounded* notion of causality. More specifically, a cause raises the likelihood of an outcome or effect, without ever fully (or necessarily) guaranteeing it. In this sense, although I articulate a path-dependent claim, this is not a deterministic one. The paths and processes I describe in this thesis certainly made some regime outcomes more likely than others. In light of the overdetermined, equifinal nature of development and democracy, however, I start this project by recognizing that neither colonial roles, nor local labor incorporation were dynamics that sealed provincial destinies.

In light of the nature of my dependent variable, I follow a two-level case selection strategy. Country-wise, the project's core discussion is centered around subnational variation in democratic Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. The "ABRAMEX triad of regional hegemons" (Gibson 2004,1) has the advantage of being relevant to the literature while at the same time offering a sound balance between variance and comparability. Subnationally, I follow Gerring's (2017) and Goertz's (2017) advice, and analyze Jalisco, Rio Grande do Sul, Salta and Guerrero as *in-line* cases in order to document my argument's *empirical existence proof.*

1.5 Limitations, Future Research, Contributions, and Implications

The project advances a novel argument and backs it with robust evidence, as well as a sound mixed methods strategy. Nonetheless, as explored in Chapter 7, the project has certain important limitations. First, the temporal and spatial scope of this thesis is bounded to Latin America. Second, although I rely on the identification of colonial institutions and roles, I do not explore the specific mechanisms through which these specific paths endure and reproduce through time. Third, while I distinguish between mercantilist and liberal ideal-type trajectories, I do not tackle the myriad of potentially observable subtypes. Fourth, even though I trace the activities of the working class, and use statistical evidence of labor unrest, I do not explore the specificity of their *meaning.* Fifth, in an attempt to maximize extension and empirical coverage, this project nonetheless overlooks the unique arena of country capitals: A specificity that stems from the fact that the national and subnational political arenas coexist within the boundaries of these unique territories. Lastly, the sixth limitation of this project is that it does not conceptualize or encompass processes and distinctions below the state level. Further 'scaling down' remains possible.

These limitations are in turn fertile ground for future research. Critically, future scholars can 1) test the theory in other Latin American countries and beyond; 2) trace and detail the mechanisms through which local colonial institutions survive, and 3) distinguish between, for example, *varieties of subnational liberalism.* Similarly, future studies can 4) provide detailed accounts of the meaning of the protests and activities of the working class; they can also 5) examine in detail the political dynamics within country capitals. Lastly, forthcoming academic work can pursue a reductionist strategy and explore whether or not the processes and distinctions made in this project hold across municipalities or cities.

In spite of its limitations, the project makes important contributions and has relevant implications. Critically, using Mahoney, Kimball and Koivu's (2009) method of sequence elaboration, the concluding chapter of this thesis shows that the implication of my argument —that the subnational regime heterogeneity observed today across Latin America was shaped by distinct colonial roles and the timing of local labor incorporation— is to *contextualize* all other existing explanations of subnational regime outcomes. Likewise, as I expound in the conclusion of this thesis, the most relevant implication of this project is that it can serve as the stepping stone which crystallizes the study of *subnational political economies.*

1.6 Signposting

The dissertation is structured as follows: In the remainder of the introduction I go over the analytical and methodological priors shaping analyses of democracy at the subnational level. In the second chapter I review the literature. For clarity purposes, the overview of extant scholarship looks first at country-level regime change explanations and then maps out scholarship on subnational regime heterogeneity. From there, I build my case for historical causation in Chapter 3. Afterwards, the theory, outlined in Section 1.4, is fully unpacked in the following chapter.

In Chapter 5 I expand on my first theoretical pillar. In this chapter I first present a primer on colonial and post-colonial development. I then map the early colonial roles of Argentinian, Brazilian, and Mexican provinces, and conclude by providing quantitative and qualitative evidence of a *reversal of subnational fortunes*. In Chapter 6 I then examine the second pillar of my claim, illustrating the differences in the timing and sequencing of the subnational pressures for incorporation. There I track the cases of Jalisco, Rio Grande do Sul, Guerrero, and Salta first, to then look at statistical evidence of *labor unrest* which suggests that provinces on the late-Bourbon *liberal path* are indeed more likely to be the loci of political engagement.

The thesis then concludes with Chapter 7, in which I offer a thorough recap of the findings, pinpoint the project's core limitations, implications, and contributions. Critically, in the the final chapter I test the portability and generalizability of my claim beyond the Latin American context by probing the case of India.

1.7 Analytic and Conceptual Priors

The study of subnational democracy is traversed by methodological and meta-theoretical priors which configure the cornerstone of subnational analysis as a legitimate research enterprise. Consequently, before we move further into the discussion, it is important to briefly address them, for they provide the ontological and epistemological grounding for the data, theory, methods and findings of this project.

1.7.1 Scaling Down

Scholars and graduate students in search of an innovative take on long-standing or traditional research problems in comparative politics can greatly benefit from scaling down. Snyder (2001) and Tillin (2013) point out that subnational analysis offers at least three methodological advantages: I) It alleviates the "small-N" problem by increasing the number of observations. Scaling down also II) strengthens coding and classifying by necessitating a much closer disaggregated examination of cases. Lastly, III) adopting a subnational perspective helps researchers to construct fine-grained measures by reducing the distance between concepts and observations. This in turn enhances inference and theory building exercises.

I wish to take a stand in regard to scaling down as an analytical strategy by adding a fourth contribution of subnational analysis to comparative politics.

Namely, scaling down IV) enhances our understanding of the historical unfolding of political processes. That is, a subnational perspective, for example, pushes scholars to disentangle correspondences and discrepancies between local and national socio-political processes. In this sense, scaling down refines theory and empirics further by fostering a fine-grained and increasingly accurate reading of history. In that sense, the work I present in the following pages constitutes an effort to strengthen subnational research in general and to invigorate the comparative analysis of subnational regimes in particular.

1.7.2 Macrosocial Units and the Scale vs Depth Trade-Off

The *raison d'être* of subnational research is the acknowledgement that across different governmental tiers, the interaction of actors and the effect of factors do not necessarily mirror those at the center. This recognition stems from the acceptance that subnational units are a space wherein, to varying degrees, an autonomous set of formal and informal institutions exist. Within these spaces, that is, within their own territories and legal boundaries, the set of institutions condition the access, exercise and distribution of power. As such, it is both theoretically and empirically valid to examine regimes at a subnational scale.

Consequently, following Ragin (1987), subnational units have to be recognized as *macrosocial units*: sociopolitical entities that can be both explanandums and explanans: Entities to be explained and to be used in explanations. This distinction, our first meta-theoretical commitment and the second prior, traverses —implicitly or explicitly— research on subnational politics.

Once cognizant of their status as macrosocial units, it follows that it is also theoretically and empirically valid to assess and explore subnational political regimes. One interesting issue to note, however, is that the extent to which scholars can scale-down the analysis is restricted both by their conceptual framework and the concrete —legal or material— limitations of actors and factors in the subnational arena.

For instance, more substantive or complete definitions of democracy are less likely to adequately travel down the territorial scale. Similarly, the strategies available to both politicians and social actors are scale dependent or, more precisely, *scale restricted.* The third prior is then this trade-off between scale and depth. On the one hand, it is a consequence of how complex the traits of a full democracy are. Rule of law and accountability, for example, involve cross-cutting interactions between governmental tiers, which cannot be fully evaluated solely at the local level. On the other hand, it also portrays how strategies like expropriations, use of the military and revolutionary threats, are potentially out of the scope of the subnational arena.

For example, ignoring this scale restriction undermines the claim made by Griffis (2019). His argument linking subnational democracy to changing labor coalitions is theoretically sound. When empirically evaluating his claim, however, he uses data from the third governmental tier in Mexico and, in spite of having a considerably large-N, fails to find theoretically predicted and statistically significant results. His *faux pas* stems from the fact that Mexican municipalities have little to no sway in terms of wage bargaining, arbitration, or any other form of labor-related policy. A more careful consideration of the scale-vs-depth trade-off would have pushed Griffis (2019) to refine the territorial scope of both his theory and empirics.

1.7.3 Level of Analysis

The trade-off between the territorial scale and the conceptual depth outlined above points towards and is clearly linked to the choice of level of analysis —the space that anchors the phenomena of interest (Harbers and Ingram 2019, Gerring 2012, 2017). In this regard, one can find multiple sources of advice. King, Keohane and Verba (1994), for example, suggest specifying theory first and advise selecting the corresponding *resolution* of the analysis on the basis of explanatory factors. Harbers and Ingram (2019) put forth a fivefold framework[5] which is intended to balance concerns of explanatory leverage, comparability and data availability. Soifer (2019), in a more skeptical tone, concludes that "the only satisfying solution [to the level

[5]According to Harbers and Ingram (2019) the level of analysis should: 1) Maximize the number of observations (n), it should be the 2) lowest possible level that still allows for spatial contiguity between units; the chosen level of analysis should also 3) maximize comparability (between cases and with existing literature), as well as 4) maximize boundary stability over time. Lastly, they suggest researchers should 5) aim for lowest level with reliable and available data.

of analysis conundrum] is to identify a compelling *a priori* reason to conduct our analysis with only one particular set of data, measured at a certain resolution and using a certain, precisely defined set of borders among units" (Soifer 2019, 95) [6].

Soifer's conclusion is derived from recognizing that both jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional territorial boundaries (i.e. counties and neighborhoods) change over time and may even be endogenous to the outcome of interest. He consequently advocates explicitly spelling out the plausible range of levels at which a theory might operate and puts forward a tripartite typology of theories: those which are 1) level-independent, that is, theories in which the mechanisms at play could operate at any level or scale of analysis. Theories that are 2) level-specific, for which the mechanism unfolds only within the explicit boundaries of the chosen scale. Lastly, theories that are 3) level-limiting, for which the posited causal relation works only in some but not all units of the same scale.

In this regard I first want to append Soifer's theory-typology and then clarify my choice of level of analysis. In claiming that subnational democratic variation is partly shaped by the temporal congruence or divergence between provincial and national labor relations, I locate the interplay among scales showing that there is a fourth category: theories that are 4) level-interdependent. Theories for which the posited mechanism necessitates a form of connection between scales. My argument and Gibson's (2012) fit into this fourth category.

For this thesis, in terms of level of analysis, I adhere to the jurisdictional boundaries of the second-tier governmental level. In doing so I balance the scale and depth trade-off, use boundaries that have been the most consistent over time and which consequently have considerable historical relevance[7]. Lastly, although the mechanism could potentially be scaled down —i.e. to argue that municipalities in which labor emerged early *vis-à-vis* the rest of the provincial units are now more

[6]In articulating his conclusion and suggestions, Soifer (2019) is mostly addressing the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (MAUP). The MAUP stems from the fact that changing the 'resolution' or the scale at which of the observations are aggregated will affect the results. His discussion of the MAUP is mostly framed from a statistical-quantitative standpoint with the objective of ensuring and calibrating the measurement of a *treatment* effect.

[7]For example, across Latin America, and in our country-cases, provincial and second-tier jurisdictional boundaries have historic roots which can be traced back to colonial arrangements.

democratic than other municipal units— before we can do so successfully, it is necessary to grapple with how the argument unfolds at the provincial level first.

1.7.4 Democracy

Finally, a full disclosure of my priors would be incomplete without addressing my understanding of democracy and my take on the nature of political regimes, both long-standing debates in the study of politics (Abellán 2011, Whitehead 2002). In this regard, in an effort to equilibrate conceptual clarity, methodological fit and practical concerns, I adhere to Dahl's (1971) conceptualization of democracy, which emphasizes participation and competition as the two core dimensions of democracy.

Prior beliefs regarding the nature of political regimes have pushed scholars to operationalize Dahl's as well as other conceptual frameworks in several ways. There are scholars for whom the empirical nature of regimes is binary (Álvarez et.al. 1996 or Boix, Miller and Rosato 2013) and researchers who favor a continuous or a graded understanding (Vanhanen 2000 or Coppedge, Álvarez and Maldonado 2008). The categorization of existing measures of democracy as binary, ordinal, or interval (Skaaning, Gerring and Bartusevicius 2015) is a clear reflection of these distinct beliefs.

I wish to take a stand in this debate and argue in favour of a continuous understanding. First, taking the territorial variation of democracy seriously highlights the insufficiency and reductionist stance of a binary approach. An 'either or' logic is ill fitted to deal with the multiple dimensions and the manifold spaces in which democratic features can be found. Second, while an ordinal perspective can accommodate territorial variation, it is unclear which set of subjective criteria determines the 'ranking' of the identified conditions for classifying a case as democratic.

In this respect, a gradated or continuous understanding offers significant advantages. It is less restrictive and more flexible in dealing with dimensions, spaces and argued features of democracies[8]. Consequently, it enables a more objective

[8]For further takes on this particular debate see Wedeen (2004) as well as Coppedge (2012).

assessment of political reality. In addition, empirically speaking, continuous operationalizations of democracy are commonly considered more replicable and transparent than their counterparts.

In sum, a continuous understanding of political regimes and democracy more cogently accommodates the coexistence of variation across temporal, cross-national and subnational domains. As a consequence, it more readily incorporates a subnational perspective to country measures of democracy and similarly, it can more naturally be applied to assess democracy across states and provinces. On this basis, when measuring democracy, I follow the easily portable framework articulated by Tatu Vanhanen (2000).

With these priors in mind, I am inclined to identify the phenomena under examination as subnational democratic variation or subnational regime heterogeneity, focused specifically at the state or provincial (second-tier) level. This is a much more flexible —less theoretically and empirically demanding— framework than, for example, Gibson's (2012) whose regime juxtaposition, *in extremis*, necessitates the existence of a fully authoritarian subnational unit within a fully democratic country or vice versa.

Albeit brief, the above discussion calls attention to how transparent researchers should be with their assumptions and methodological decisions when looking at subnational democracy. This is particularly relevant for operationalizing democracy, selecting cases, interpreting estimates and identifying causal mechanisms. The following chapters set out the design and the theory of this project with these considerations in mind.

"[T]he essential aim will not be to determine whether these discursive productions [...] lead one to formulate the truth [...] but rather to bring out the 'will to knowledge' ".

— Michel Foucault (1998, 12)

2 Literature Review

The introduction outlined the main camps and problems within the existing scholarly work on subnational democratic variation. To identify the scholarship I engage with and to locate my theoretical contribution within the discipline, this chapter examines what we do and do not know about the core subject of this thesis.

To do so I first track the emergence of the debate on subnational democracy through a review of the literature on regime change. To create a compelling *research space* for my thesis (Thomson and Kamler 2013), I then review and critique scholarship specifically related to my outcome of interest. In the third and final section I spell out the tenets and debates of the structural rationale in democratization studies, which bridges this literature review with the theory and the evidence unpacked in following chapters.

2.1 A Genealogy of Regime Change Knowledge

Why is it that some countries become democracies while others do not? What are the historic, socio-economic and political conditions that nurture democracy? At the country-level, the vast literature on regime change can be split into two prominent approaches: democratization has been argued to be either a) the result of variation among structural factors or b) the outcome of strategic bargains between relevant social and political actors. Scholars in the former camp understand democracy as a consequence of a broader historical *modernization* process, while researchers in the latter emphasize uncertainty and the dynamics unfolding during *transitions*. Historically, the strategic approach emerged as a critique of the determinism of structural explanations.

At the *macro* level, scholars in the structural camp emphasize that certain material or social conditions are necessary for democracy. As mentioned above, this tradition understands democratization as an aspect of modernization, a broader societal transformation involving industrialization, urbanization, as well as increasing levels of education and income (Lipset 1959; Boix and Stokes 2003).

At the *micro* level, structuralists assume that "[the material environment] dictates a certain range of conceivable strategies [and that] individuals choose their actions as a direct function of [those] material constraints" (Parsons 2007). From a structural perspective, democracy is then forged through the emergence, struggle and accommodation of various social groups: be it the *bourgeoisie* (Moore 1966), the working class (Collier and Collier 1991; Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992) or through a collective shift in cultural values and preferences (Inglehart 2006).

Arguing that structural explanations were simply too deterministic and that they gave little to no space for both contingency and human agency[1], researchers turned their focus towards the strategic interactions and the short-term *dynamics* of regime transitions (Rustow 1970). Scholars emphasising agency consequently stress that, regardless of social or material conditions, the key to democratization lies in building and breaking coalitions among elite members (Linz 1978) or between *hardliners* and *softliners* (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986).

Consequently, for the agentic camp, macro-level factors are less causally salient. At the micro-level, however, this group of scholars recognize that individuals may act according to distinct *kinds of rationality.* Other than following purely material interests, ideological, religious, and normative preferences are claimed to motivate individual and collective political engagement (Parsons 2007). This heavy emphasis

[1] For a classic discussion on these issues see Evans and Stephens (1988).

on agency and individual choice has nonetheless been critiqued on the basis of its apparent 'voluntaristic' bias and for using explanatory factors that are rather too close to the outcome they aim to explain (Teorell 2010).

Several scholarly efforts have been made to move past the structure vs agency split. One approach which initially merged these two classic perspectives emphasized the impact of external shocks on democratization. These explanations highlight that —in addition to the domestic (pre)conditions— the international context, via direct foreign intervention or economic pressures, can influence both the structure and the individual-level incentives leading to regime change (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Whitehead 2001). Moreover, researchers in this tradition have noted the existence of a "demonstration" or diffusion effect by which the likelihood of a democratic shift increases when neighboring countries in a region democratize (Gasiorowski 1995; Huntington 1991).

Further caveats were added to theory-building exercises by taking into consideration the distinction between early and late democratizers. Carefully accounting for and distinguishing between the long-haul processes experienced by most Western European countries in contrast to the more recent and rapid changes faced by regions such as Latin America, the Middle East or African countries was critical for distinctly weighing up the causal salience of structure and agency (Collier 1999; Geddes 2009).

More recently, scholars are combining insights from both the structural and the *agentic* accounts in an attempt to maximize the strengths and overcome the limitations they each have on their own. The hypotheses put forth by Boix (2003), Acemoğlu and Robinson (2006) as well as by Ansell and Samuels (2014), configure what Teorell (2010) has identified as the economic or mixed approach in democratization studies[2]. Although the specifics of their assumptions, game-theoretic settings, and mechanisms vary, in these explanations structural factors

[2]These studies emerged as a response to the work by Przeworski and Limongi (1997) and by Przeworski et.al. (2000), research that distinguished between an *endogenous* and an *exogenous* effect of development on democracy. The authors of *Democracy and Development* argue in favour of an exogenous effect —asserting that development only improves the chances of democratic survival but it does not increase the likelihood of democratic transition. Scholars of the mixed approach have provided robust evidence for the endogenous effect, that is, they have shown the distinct ways in which development does *cause* democracy.

condition individual and collective preferences which then frame strategic action. More specifically, inequality, capital mobility, the threat of revolution, the costs of redistribution, and the ability to strike a *credible commitment*, inform and set the stage for the bargaining process between the masses and the elites.

Following these increasingly nuanced theoretical contributions, Albertus and Menaldo (2018) have added further caveats to the discussion. While scholars of the mixed approach debate the direction and magnitude of the effect of several structural factors, the authors of *Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy* cleverly suggest that various types of socio-economic factors will differently impact *distinct kinds of transition.* Consequently, they argue that inequality and redistributive conflicts are more salient for transitions to *popular* —fully-fledged— democracies. Interestingly enough, they contend that development —measured as wealth, education and urbanization— allows departing authoritarian elites to "more predictably orchestrate and subsequently manage a transition favorable to their interests" (Albertus and Menaldo 2018, 56), ultimately leading to what they identify as an *elite-biased* democracy.

Parallel to the emergence of recent work on democratic transitions, scholars have also taken an increased interest in authoritarian endurance and regime hybridity. In relation to the former, researchers have argued that non-democratic incumbents manage to survive because of a) cohesive parties, b) favorable material conditions (i.e. either the lack of economic crises or resource availability), or because c) a set of historical factors have either enhanced the permanence of an authoritarian clique or weakened the demand for democratic change (Levitsky and Way 2015).

Lastly, key to the emergence of research on subnational democracy, is the recognition of regime hybridity. In any of its distinct flavours, the regime change literature generally assumed that democracy, once achieved, entails a new equilibrium; one in which free, fair and contested elections become "the only game in town" (Przeworksi 1991; Linz and Stepan 1996). However, the hybridity approach insists that some systems successfully combine democratic and authoritarian elements.

Collier and Levitsky (1997), Levitsky and Way (2011), Pepinsky (2009), Morlino (2009) and Schedler (2002) have all contributed to show that the democratic game can be formally played, while informally and rather (un)subtlety, authoritarian traits permeate its dynamics. *Regime hybridity* made clear that democratization does not imply "a cut and dried one step shift to a new equilibrium" (Whitehead 2002, 246). Consequently, "there has been a growing interest in the remarkable variation and the spatially uneven nature of democracy" (Behrend 2011, 151). What exactly do we know about this variation?

2.1.1 Subnational Democracy: Existing Explanations

Recognizing that countries are neither fully nor evenly democratic pushed scholars to identify internal sources of variation. This discernment echoed that of O'Donnell (1993), who roughly three decades ago raised concerns about the ability of local incumbents to build up power circuits that antagonize laws and practices set at the country level. Along with O'Donnell's focus on *brown areas*, Dahl (1971) and Fox (1994) were pioneers in pointing out that one of the most important sources of democratic variation was embedded in a country's subnational territorial arrangement.

Interestingly enough, although not surprisingly, research concerning subnational regime heterogeneity has focused on countries and regions which can be considered "late-and-faulty democratizers": the former Soviet Union, Latin America and India. As with national explanations, the literature on subnational democracy can be broadly split between structural and strategic accounts. The former have underscored two key factors: economic development and federal fiscal transfers. The latter have focused on intergovernmental relations.

Following a structural approach McMann and Petrov (2000) argue that in former Soviet countries subnational democracy is significantly correlated with economic development. Further refining this argument, McMann (2006) asserts that subnational democracy is conditioned by personal and environmental economic autonomy from the State[3]. For Latin America, the relation between economic development and subnational democracy has been echoed by Montero (2007) in his analysis of Brazilian states[4].

Closely linked to economic development, the other key structural factor argued to impact subnational regime heterogeneity is federal fiscal transfers (FFT)[5]. The main proponent of this relation is Carlos Gervasoni (2010) who, seconded by Bianchi (2013), contends that FFT are an unearned income which constitute a *rent* that local incumbents enjoy without the costs of taxation. Local political elites can then use these transfers to "pay high salaries to many civil servants, award hefty procurement contracts, finance extensive clientelism, and dominate the media advertising market [decreasing] the incentive for social actors to oppose the incumbent" (Gervasoni 2010, 307). The *rent-effect*, Gervasoni argues, hampers subnational democracy by eroding the taxation-representation linkage and by increasing the incumbents' ability to finance a coercive apparatus.

Recent developments pertaining to the structural approach have identified that social heterogeneity —understood as increased economic and ethnolinguistic disparities— might deter the articulation of effective political opposition in places as varied as India (Tudor and Ziegfeld 2016) and Mexico (Herrmann 2016). Overall, structural explanations of subnational regime heterogeneity follow a *modernization-like* logic and can be summed up as follows: economic development increases citizens' autonomy from subnational elites. At the same time, improved economic conditions make it harder for the latter to finance their hold on the levers of local power. These factors then increase the likelihood of democracy within a subnational unit.

[3]McMann (2006) defines personal economic autonomy as an individual's ability to earn a living independent of the State. On a similar note, she defines environmental autonomy as the opportunities in a province to earn income beyond the reach of local authorities.

[4]Hernández (2000) along with Ortega and Somuano (2011) provide some evidence of the correlation between development and democracy for Mexican states. However, they both conflate their independent and dependent variables, severely limiting the comparability and causal strength of their assessment.

[5]Gervasoni (2018) refines further the concept and defines fiscal rents as "[i]ncome accruing to a state from an external source on a regular basis, that far exceeds the cost incurred to obtain it, and that involves the production effort of a very small proportion of the state's population" (Gervasoni 2018, 132).

Strategic accounts, while not explicitly rejecting the structural mechanism, explain subnational regime heterogeneity by examining intergovernmental interactions (Gibson 2005; Behrend 2011). In a setting in which completely repressing the opposition is prohibitively costly[6], the degree to which local incumbents are able to secure their political dominance depends on their ability to elude federal intervention.

The degree to which subnational incumbents can avoid central interference, the argument goes, is in turn conditioned by the political leverage local incumbents have *vis-à-vis* the federal government (i.e. gubernatorial influence on legislation, agenda-setting through the Senate or via vote mobilization). In that sense, the agentic approach highlights that subnational elites have an interest in keeping political dynamics within the local arena, while the opposition aims to externalize them. The more local incumbents are able to exert a "boundary control" over their territories, the less likely it is for a subnational unit to be democratic.

Giraudy (2015) and Saikkonen (2016), have contextualized this explanation by suggesting that the preferences of federal or central political elites do not always converge with democratic values. Occasionally, policy and partisan objectives trump pro-democracy efforts. Consequently, they contend, rather than solely opening authoritarian enclaves, intervention from the centre can sometimes perpetuate subnational patterns of dominance or even lead to subnational democratic backsliding[7].

More recent studies have put forward mid-level institutional explanatory variables such as political parties and social policies. Borges (2016), for example, has suggested that the *nationalization* of political parties furthered democracy in Brazilian states. Once local parties started competing for votes on a national scale, they were pressured to acquiesce to national democratic standards. Similarly, in his study of Indian *panchayats*, Bohlken (2016) argues that subnational democracy was introduced from above in order to increase internal party cohesion by *outsourcing*

[6]Given the temporal scope of existing accounts, subnational units are taken to be embedded in a national democratic regime.

[7]Giraudy (2015) further highlights that the outcome of the interaction between local and national executives hinges on the 'instruments' of executive power. She identifies that presidents and governors have a distinct set of tools —fiscal, partisan and institutional— which are relevant in shaping the end result of intergovernmental bargains and skirmishes.

to voters the costs of monitoring and disciplining local candidates. Additionally, Souza (2016) posits that the introduction of universal social policies in Latin America curbed the capabilities of local political elites to serve as *resource brokers*. As a result, governors then lost public and private clienteles while voters gained political and economic independence.

In assessing and synthesizing our current understanding of subnational democratic variation, Behrend and Whitehead (2016) emphasize an overarching concern with *political illiberalism* and highlight three different pathways for subnational democratic change[8]. By adopting a bottom-up perspective and a broad notion of democracy, they emphasize the role both structure and institutions play in enabling or obstructing the emergence of political contestation across subnational units. However, by identifying *political illiberalism* with various elements, from elite family connections to local party machines and provincial patriotism, their theoretical contribution gains extension but loses intension (Sartori 1970).

Lastly, arguing from a structural perspective and critiquing extant scholarship for failing to dynamically account for the maintenance of closed subnational regimes, a second generation of studies has pointed to the relevance of labor coalitions (Griffis 2019) as well as the salience of economic diversification and campaign funding (Mera 2016). For Griffis (2019) "[t]he survival of subnational autocrats ultimately depends on the strength and persistence of the *original* [state-labor] coalition" (Griffis 2019, 16; emphasis added). As per Griffis' (2019) doctoral thesis, the political opening of subnational units stems from the disintegration of state-labor coalitions triggered

[8]These three distinct mechanisms are: a) control/conditionality, b) contagion and c) activation. The first entails a two-way linkage between different government levels which *in extremis*, leads to federal intervention, but more frequently implies a bargain in which "the center must be able to offer powerful incentives to induce component units of a federation to work together" (Behrend and Whitehead 2016, 208). The *contagion* pathway resembles Huntington's (1991) snowball effect, which in the context of subnational politics can be sparked by: *i)* the electoral success of opposition forces in a neighboring states, *ii)* social mass mobilizations and *iii)* the replication of institutional reforms. Lastly, Behrend and Whitehead (2016) argue that subnational democratization might sometimes only require the *activation* of dormant institutions. This, they suggest, can be achieved by court rulings, media, local activism or through a shift in political alliances. Behrend's and Whitehead's contribution is perhaps the first cogent attempt to articulate a synthesis among explanations of subnational democratization which is why it escapes the structural - institutional - *agentic* divide presented in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1: Literature on Subnational Democracy: An Overview

Approach	Argument/Mechanism	Authors
Structural	Economic development enhances subnational democracy.	McMann and Petrov (2000)
		Montero (2007)
	Economic autonomy drives subnational democracy.	McMann (2006)
	Fiscal transfers from federal/central government deter subnational democracy.	Gervasoni (2010, 2018)
		Bianchi (2013)
	Multisectoral economies foster political competition via the private financing of campaigns and parties.	Mera (2016)
	Labor flexibilization reforms open subnational regimes by breaking the original local labor-state coalition.	Griffis (2019)
Strategic	Subnational incumbents enter a competing dynamic with opposition forces to set the stage of conflict.	Gibson (2012)
		Behrend (2011)
	The democratic impetus of the center is mediated by executive power, policy and partisan incentives.	Giraudy (2015)
		Saikkonen(2016)
Institutional	Nationalization of electoral competition pressures parties to acquiesce to democratic standards.	Borges (2016)
	Parties outsource monitoring and disciplining candidates via subnational competitive elections.	Bohlken (2016)
	Universalization of social policies limits the patronage capabilities of local elites, enhancing citizens' economic and political autonomy.	Souza (2016)

by the adoption of labor flexibilization and market oriented reforms (MoR's). In the absence of MoR's, the *original closed coalition* endures.

For Mera (2016), the diversity of economic sectors in a given province is key. Multisectoral local economies are more likely to have a multiplicity of campaign contributors and as a result, political opponents are readily financed, generating more electoral competition. According to Mera's (2016) thesis, economic diversification generates inter-capitalist competition which is transferred to the political arena through the private financing of campaigns and political parties. In Table 2.1 I present a schematic overview of the literature on subnational democratic variation. The following section critiques it by highlighting its main shortcomings.

2.1.2 The Shortcomings of Conventional Wisdom

Undoubtedly, the literature has made significant theoretical and empirical progress. Not only is subnational democracy a more familiar topic within comparative politics, but there is now a set of identified factors, variables and data that have been used to answer and problematize the territorial unevenness of democracy. Notwithstanding these recent efforts, I want to assert three core critiques that underscore several theoretical and empirical shortcomings of existing research.

First, subnational heterogeneity accentuates a pressing need to recast our understanding of regime change. On the one hand, it asks scholars to be mindful of 'the subnational' as a relevant dimension for theoretical and empirical purposes. That is, future country-level research should aim to better integrate local actors, institutions and the uneven territorial dimension of democratization. On the other hand, it invites a revision of the conventional wisdom examined in the previous section. For our purposes, a subnational perspective calls for a reappraisal of the argument put forth by Moore (1966) and by Collier and Collier (1991).

Barrington Moore and the Colliers were concerned with the political implications caused by the (re)balancing and coalescence of distinct social classes. However, they worked under the imprecise assumption that social classes emerged evenly across a country's territory. To the author of *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, a subnational perspective would respond that the routes shaped by the interplay between development and democracy varied not only between, but also within countries.

To the authors of *Shaping the Political Arena*, the response is twofold: To begin with, a subnational lens underscores that incorporation differed inside countries, with critical implications not only for the national, but also for the subnational political arena. In addition, zeroing-in territorially sheds new light on the incremental, rather than critical nature of the incorporation dynamic. Using the language of historical institutionalism, a subnational lens casts labor incorporation as a incremental process rather than a punctuated one (Mahoney, Mohamedali and Nguyen 2016).

Second, in relation to the structure vs agency debate, in light of the mounting available evidence, I want to assert that scholars in the latter camp cannot and should not dismiss or assume away structural factors from their explanations. For example, from the outset of her work, and with no robust statistical testing, Giraudy (2015) discards the idea that the endurance of closed subnational regimes has anything to do with "geographic location, cultural heritage and levels of socioeconomic development" (Giraudy 2015, 11). However, research from several regions across the globe has shown that it is no coincidence that 'local autocrats' more commonly emerge and survive in the least developed and most marginalized regions of a country.

Third, subnational studies from all approaches have been lax if not negligent in their consideration of time and history. To put it briefly, existing explanations seem to operate in a historical vacuum. For example, Griffis (2019) references so-called *original* coalitions but does not discuss when nor where they were first formed. Similarly, Mera (2016) describes and measures 'sectoral diversity' but remains theoretically silent in regards to its origin. In a similar vein, for McMann (2006) the origins of distinct provincial levels of environmental economic autonomy are assumed but not thoroughly discussed or incorporated in her theoretical corpus.

Gervasoni's (2010) and Bianchi's (2013) *subnational rentierism* relies on the Argentinian federal fiscal pact which was emplaced only after the Third Wave transition to democracy. However, studies on the origins of fiscal pacts (Grafe and Irigoin 2006) have shown that these arrangements reflect regional disparities with deep historical roots. That the fiscal arrangements reflect preceding local imbalances is not trivial and should not be ignored as this points to the salience of an anteceding historical cause.

For their part, agency-based accounts also fail to carefully ponder time and history. When reflecting on strategic intergovernmental linkages, scholars in the *agentic* camp should not ignore that the 'instruments' and tools available to governors and local elites, particularly those enshrined in national and provincial constitutions, reflect historical conflicts and enduring power imbalances.

Furthermore, it stands to reason that boundary-closing strategies generate increasing returns. That is, once a governor succeeds in controlling the scope of a provincial conflict, it might be easier for subsequent local executives to do the same. Following Pierson (2004), it then also stands to reason that the result of past struggles can place subnational units onto distinct tracks, making contemporary intergovernmental dynamics almost epiphenomenal with regards to subnational democratic variation. I agree with Gibson's (2012) claim that "any theory of subnational democratization must be rooted in theories of territorial politics" (Gibson 2012, 6). Equally important, however, is for theories to take time and history seriously.

By requiring the constant conjunction of both the cause and the outcome of interest, scholars have limited their search to post-Third Wave factors and dynamics. In essence, my main point of contention with the literature is that *existing research accounts only for an already determined equilibrium.* We do not know when and why states and provinces were set onto distinct socio-economic and political trajectories. We also do not know if these historical differences had critical implications for the shaping of the subnational political arena. Lastly, if they did, we lack a clear notion of when and how they influenced subnational democratic variation. To put it simply, existing explanations are unsatisfactory because they omit one crucial explanatory dimension: time.

Lastly, methods-wise, most of the existing research on subnational democracy has been built around case studies. Even structural and quantitative approaches have, for the most part, narrowed down their focus to a single country. Restricted comparisons limit our ability to broaden the scope of cases accounted for by the discipline. In addition, by inhibiting comparative historical analyses this methodological bias has also obscured the temporal scope of existing accounts. To overcome these gaps, in terms of methods, I explore multiple cases with a mixed toolkit; in terms of theory, I draw insights from further research which I briefly explore below.

2.2 Beyond Regime Change: Leveraging Subnational Variation

In addition to the growing literature exploring subnational regimes, there is an increasingly broader set of research agendas that, in the search for more nuanced and powerful explanations, have *scaled down* their theoretical and empirical scope. Ranging from sustainable development (see Bruyninckx, Happaerts, Brande & Van den Brande 2012) to gender (see Escobar-Lemmon and Funk 2018), scholars exploiting subnational heterogeneity keep shedding light onto well-established as well as relatively new issues. While providing an in-depth analysis of all this scholarship is beyond the scope of this review, in what follows I briefly discuss those research topics which are complementary to the core subject of this project.

2.2.1 Federalism, Decentralization and Subnational Democracy

Research on federalism and decentralization has analyzed the political underpinnings of the dynamics linked to the ample political, social and economic autonomy subnational units have gained over the past thirty to forty years (Eaton 2006; Sidel 2014; Falleti 2010). On the one hand, scholars of federalism argue that democratization has had an *activating* effect on federal institutions[9]. On the other hand, researchers on decentralization have examined the authority and the autonomy local or state-level governments have relative to the center. In doing so, among international factors and economic reforms, increased subnational electoral competition has been identified as one of the key causal mechanisms through which further decentralization is achieved (Montero and Samuels 2004).

While these approaches do not aim to explain subnational democracy, they do offer valuable insights. First, subnational regime heterogeneity is understood as the result of political decentralization, in which both formal and informal institutions shape the incentives of federal and local incumbents. Second, these studies emphasize how crucial it is to identify who controls the political career of regional incumbents in order to account for within and cross-country variation. Third, these studies assert a link between increased autonomy, policy-faculty devolution, and state-level electoral competition. Lastly, they have shown that subnational politics are heavily conditioned by the power relations set by the territorial and the constitutional arrangements of each country.

[9]The aforementioned activation has reshaped relations between center and periphery. It has additionally increased efficiency in the provision of goods and services via intergovernmental competition and it has also emphasized local governance and accountability (Gibson 2004).

2.2.2 State Capacity: National Outcomes and Subnational Variation

Studies on State capacity can be grouped into three categories. First, work focusing on the configuration of the modern State, mostly built around the classic *bellicist* arguments put forth by Hintze (1975) and Tilly (1975). Second, the set of studies exploring why State-trajectories in particular regions differed from those that emerged in Western Europe (Herbst (2000) and Centeno (2002)). Lastly, the third set of studies have directed their focus to explain intra-regional variation. This last category of studies on State capacity and infrastructural power has recently taken a *subnational turn*.

To account for intra-regional divergence, this research agenda has scaled down its theoretical scope. Kurtz (2013), for example, articulates a narrative that emphasizes the role of social forces in configuring the *institutional order* in Latin America. Following Moore (1966), he suggests that the nature of rural labor relations in the post-independence era heavily conditioned the launching of a State-building project. The success of which, he subsequently contends, hinges on the emergence and the timing of the *social issue* —i.e. whether or not mass enfranchisement was adopted before or after the Great Depression. In a similar vein, but following a top-down logic instead, Soifer (2015) argues that a State's infrastructural outcome depends on whether the articulation of the bureaucratic apparatus was either *deployed* or *delegated*. In doing so, he highlights —as did Kurtz (2013)— that factors relevant for national outcomes can be territorially heterogeneous.

While the purpose of this research agenda is not to account for a subnational phenomenon —as their dependent variable (State capacity) operates at a national level— these approaches offer two valuable lessons: 1) They emphasize that historical processes need not be homogeneous country-wide and that the dynamics shaping relevant political outcomes are, more often than not, subnationally heterogenous. Critically, these studies also showed that 2) the timing and sequencing of territorially uneven processes have long lasting political legacies.

2.2.3 Paths towards Development: Local and Regional Economies

Research exploring economic development is legion[10]. At the country-level the main competing arguments highlight either geography (Diamond 2013), factor endowments (Engerman and Sokoloff 2000) or institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2013)[11]. Engaging with this scholarship, Mahoney (2010) has put forth one of the most convincing explanations of postcolonial development. His account carefully combines biogeographic resources —mineral wealth and complex native societies— with a nuanced temporal distinction of the institutional identity of the colonizing power. Although he does not explore the political implications of his argument, I use and further expound Mahoney's (2010) framework in subsequent chapters.

At the subnational level, research on economic development has recently taken a turn towards historical institutionalism. For instance, academics interested in local economic variation in Africa have traced it to differences in pre-colonial ethnic characteristics (Gennaioli and Rainer 2005). Similarly, for example, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2014) found that current levels of development in Africa are significantly higher in regions that had more centralized-hierarchical forms of organization during the pre-colonial era. For India, Banerjee and Iyer (2005) provide a pioneering analysis.

For Latin American cases, Bonet and Roca (2006), Naritomi, Soares and Assunçao (2009), Dell (2010), and Flores Peregrina (2016) provide an analysis for Colombia, Brazil, Peru and Mexico respectively. This scholarship has underscored

[10] Just for Latin America we can identify an early wave of studies which comparatively assessed national economic trajectories: Bulmer-Thomas (2014), Coatsworth & Taylor (1998) and Haber[coord.] (1997). Some examples of early studies looking at local or regional development are: For the Mexican case, Bassols Batalla (1983), Cardoso (1981) as well as Esquivel and Messmacher (2002), track the economic paths experienced by distinct states. For Argentinian *provincias* a similar analysis can be found in Manzanal and Rofman (1989), Manzanal (1999) and Campi (2000). Lastly, Nasser (2000) and Thomas Vinod (2006) offer a clear and cogent account of Brazilian regions. Coming mostly from historic and economic scholarship, however, these studies either hesitate to explore causation or overlook the political implications of varying subnational economic configurations.

[11] It is important to highlight that in addition to their main explanatory factor, these approaches not only have a strong path dependence component, but, in an effort to escape determinism, they also give causal leverage to contingency across different stages or dimensions of the causal chain. For example, while for Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) the results of violent confrontations are contingent, for Diamond (2013) diseases and natural livestock availability are considered to be random.

that distinct colonial large estate institutions (LEIs) —such as *haciendas*, *fazendas*, and *estancias*— shaped local economies. By concentrating political power, LEIs determined the extent to which property rights can be effectively enforced across a territory, at that, in turn, conditioned regional levels of development. These studies, however, do not provide a reasoning as to why LEIs emerged in some regions but not others, and they only explain variation within single country cases.

To the best of my knowledge, the work of Maloney and Caicedo (2016) and that of Bruhn and Gallego (2012), are the only two papers that comparatively and robustly explore the historical determinants of subnational economic development. Nonetheless, in spite of their strong quantitative assessment, these two studies offer unconvincing explanations[12] and contradicting empirical conclusions; the former suggesting a persistence of subnational fortunes and the latter arguing for a reversal. In spite of their limitations, exploring this scholarly work proved critical to understand the debates, factors, and main features of local and regional economies.

2.3 The Structural *Rationale*

In order to create a research space for my thesis, the previous sections outlined what we do and do not know about subnational democracy. To delineate the theoretical terrain I navigate throughout the project, in this section I briefly discuss and take a stance in relation to the core assumptions and debates which make up the rationale of structural explanations.

The most cogent synthesis of the structural approach to democratization is found in Lipset's (1959)[13] *original* suggestion that "the more-well-to-do a nation, the

[12]Maloney and Caicedo (2016) show that regions with high pre-Columbian indigenous population are highly developed today. However, I could not replicate their findings even when using their data. Furthermore, the authors remain agnostic as to which specific mechanism could explain their finding. Bruhn and Gallego (2012) classify each province as having 'good', 'bad', 'ugly' or no colonial economic activity. My main problem with this second contribution is the circularity of its explanation: regions that had *bad* colonial economic activities have bad economic outcomes today. It is unclear, however, why certain types of activies were adopted in some regions and not others.

[13]I am aware that Lerner (1958) had already identified a relation between urbanization, education and an individual's political transformation as evidenced by an increase in public engagement. While his influence is evident, Lipset was the first one to establish theoretical and empirical "connections between micro-level modernization and macro-level democracy" (Wucherpfennig and Deutsch, 2009).

greater the chance that it will sustain democracy" (Lipset 1959, 75). Although this assertion has been challenged[14], the evidence speaking in favor of a positive relation between development and democracy is so compelling that it is considered one of the strongest empirical generalizations in the field (Boix 2003; Epstein et.al. 2006; and Geddes 1999). "[The] effect of modernization on democracy is perhaps less doubted than ever among scholars.[...] Democracy does not come about randomly[...] since it is the socio-economic conditions which create and maintain an environment for stable and enduring democracies" (Wucherpfennig and Deutsch 2009).

From a structural perspective "the prospect of democratic change is embedded in the architecture of the social system" (Ajagbe 2016, 85). This *architecture* —the features of the social and economic conditions in a given polity[15]— transforms over a long-haul process, modifying not only the material environment but also, concomitantly, altering social dynamics, values and culture. In other words, in a structural argument, changes within the material architecture of social reality stimulate democratic change.

The literature's overall rationale is that socio-economic development[16] makes it easier for individuals to demand, acquire and exercise political rights and freedoms. At the same time, development makes it harder for autocrats to buy-off the opposition, build *clientelistic* networks, coerce or outright repress the population. This core logic is common to all structural explanations of democratization. However,

[14]In assessing the existence of a positive relationship between development and democracy, some early studies found one (Inglehart 1988; Vanhanen 1990; 1997; Barro 1999) while others did not (Arat 1988; Hadenius 1992). At the turn of the century, the landscape of the debate was transformed by the work of Przeworski and Limongi (1997) when they further disaggregated Lipset's proposition to distinguish between an *endogenous* and an *exogenous* effect of development on democratization. If democratic change is endogenous to development, then the former is brought about by the latter. From an exogenous perspective, however, development helps only to sustain democracy but does nothing to promote its emergence. While Przeworski et.al.(2000) find evidence only for the exogenous effect, Boix and Stokes (2003) —expanding the time horizon of the examined sample—concluded that development does increase the likelihood of transition. In other words, they find evidence for both the exogenous *and* the endogenous relation.

[15]For more on the discussion of what constitutes structure and an overview of the structural approach within comparative politics see Parsons (2007) and Lichbach and Zuckerman (2009).

[16]Amartya Sen defines development as "the expansion of the 'capabilities' of people to lead the kind of lives they value" (Sen 1999, 18). For a brief but thorough discussion on alternative definitions and dimensions of development see Goldin (2018).

I wish to highlight and take a stance in relation to three core areas in which structural accounts tend to differ.

1. *Development: A double-sided coin.* Scholars have emphasized the causal salience of two broad dimensions of development. On the one hand, there are those highlighting the 'generative' feature of development. Prominence in this perspective is given to the aggregate, constructive and productive material transformations most commonly associated with *progress*. From the generative viewpoint, democracy is a ripple effect triggered by the power of prosperity[17]. On the other hand, there are studies emphasizing the 'distributive' aspect associated with said progress. These studies accentuate how the new material conditions brought about by development are uneven and asymmetrically distributed. According to this perspective, inequality, land tenure, and asset specificity are the prominent side-effects through which development activates political contention and brings about democracy.

   In this regard, my approach is dual: On the one hand, by focusing on distinct economic trajectories and the emergence of the working class, my theory underscores the *generative* aspect of development. On the other hand, by observing how uneven these factors were spread across subnational units, my research is also concerned with the *distributive* feature of development.

2. *Structure, Regimes and Agency: Making the black-box transparent.* Within the structural approach, scholars have managed to elucidate bottom-up and top-down dynamics by building stronger ties between factors operating at the macro level, and actors operating at the meso and micro levels. The internal debate centers on whom or what exactly is translating change from the material realm to the political arena.

   Most commonly, individual and collective action is claimed to be triggered by either the formation or the break-up of a social group, class or coalition.

[17]By prosperity I mean, single or joint increases in the levels of education, industrialization, urbanization, income, health as well as the advancement of information and connectivity technologies.

Underlying these distinctions is an assumption regarding individual agency. Broadly speaking, there are *weak* and *strong* structural claims; the former allow some flexibility for actors to escape purely material rationality, while the latter do not.

In this regard, I firmly stand on the more flexible side with two core assumptions: First, individual preferences cannot be reduced to their structural position. Nonetheless, socioeconomic factors heavily affect their political stance and their capacity to influence politics[18]. Second, individuals are relevant social, political and economic actors; regimes, however, result from the historic accommodation of grouped interests and collective forces[19].

3. *Endogenous, but... The search for Primary Causes.* To the best of my knowledge, for roughly the last two decades no work has robustly challenged the endogenous connection between democracy and development. Recent theoretical and empirical advancements have been made through a two-fold methodological move. First, there has been an increasing turn to mixed methods. In this regard the structural approach is particularly amicable to both quantitative and qualitative techniques. On one side, regression analyses can assess competing hypotheses and allow identifying the *effect of causes* (Przeworski 2009). On the other, comparative historical analysis can track down the processes and the dynamics which *cause* the positive *effect* of development on democracy.

   Second, structural accounts of democratization have turned to historical institutionalism. In an effort to stop "wondering what causes the cause" (Van Evera 1997, 19), the most convincing and satisfactory structural explanations have included considerations pertaining to the role of time in influencing

[18]For example, within regime change studies it is almost a truism that landed elites are less likely to favour redistribution. Similarly, the extent to which an individual is able to change their environment is heavily a function of the resources —economic, social, organizational, etc...— available to them.

[19]Regime outcomes are rarely *completely*, *uniquely*, and *immediately* shaped by an individual. Rather, regimes are better understood as a (more or less) dynamic equilibrium, sustained by the periodic (re)accommodation of subnational, national, and international factors.

the origin and change of distal causes which shaped contemporary economic and political outcomes (see Fioretos, Falleti and Sheingate (2016), as well as Capoccia and Ziblatt (2010)).

While in subsequent chapters I follow these two trends, here I want to highlight that taking time seriously has three implications: First, past events matter. Second, change, and more specifically sociopolitical change, is usually slow and costly to achieve. Third, contingency is relevant insofar as it sets or triggers the *change-enabling* conditions which coetaneous actors are able to exploit and which contemporary researchers —with hindsight— analyze as either *punctuated* or *incremental* change.

Lastly, in this regard I want to explicitly assert that my account is one of *subnational endogenous* democratization. That is, my argument is one that shows how subnational political regimes are shaped as a consequence of the local dynamics of economic development. In a similar vein, this fact stresses that, within countries, regimes not only vary spatially, but they also do so temporally. Not only are some provinces more democratic than others, but also, some provinces will have more open and contested political arenas before others.

Being conscious of the strengths and weaknesses of the extant literature *brings out the will to know* more about our outcome of interest. Armed with this determination and aware of the core tenets of a structural approach to democratization —that is, standing on the shoulders of these *structuralist giants*— we are in a better position to lay out a satisfactory explanation of subnational democracy. This is precisely the task I tackle in the next chapters.

“Democracy is a historical phenomenon".

— Adam Przeworski (2019,16)

3 Subnational Regime Heterogeneity: A Case for Historical Causation

In previous chapters I have forcefully claimed that subnational democratic variation is a sticky political outcome and that consequently, we are in need of a structural explanation which encompasses long-run temporal horizons. A sharp reader may nonetheless question or doubt that there is such a need. To that purpose, my objective in this chapter is to convince pundits and skeptics of two things: First, that subnational regime variation is a *historical outcome*, and second, that economic development is the *historical cause* at the core of the puzzle.

While in the subsequent chapters I unpack my theory, my analytical strategy and the corresponding evidence, my aim here is mostly descriptive. Using quantitative evidence I explore regime variation within countries through time and empirically assess whether or not the observed heterogeneity is robustly linked to the economy. Summarily put, in this chapter I ask two questions: First, is territorial democratic unevenness deeply rooted in history? And second, can economic development account for the territorial variation observed? Leveraging data from the subnational boundaries of the three largest Latin American countries, the answers I advance to both queries are straightforward: *It is* and *it can.*

To persuasively achieve these goals, the chapter is divided in four sections. In the first one I outline my empirical strategy to measure regime outcomes within countries. Using Huntington's (1991) wave as a temporal heuristic, the second section presents an empirical assessment of the territorial unevenness of democracy in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico *after* the Third Wave. Anchored in the validity of scaling down Vanhanen's (2000) measurement framework, in the third part of this chapter I extend this analysis to the *pre*-Third Wave period. Building on these results, the fourth and last section concludes this chapter by exploring how the historical patterns observed have configured a relatively stable equilibrium over time.

3.1 Measuring Regime Outcomes *Within* Countries

According to W. B. Gallie, democracy is one of the best examples of an *essentially contested* concept for it invites disputes that, "although not resolvable by argument of any kind, are nevertheless sustained by perfectly respectable arguments and evidence" (Gallie 1956, 169). Although there are indeed a plethora of *respectable* definitions (see Abellán (2011) and Held (2006)), following Dahl (1971), "we can think of [democracy] as made up of at least two dimensions: public contestation and the right to participate [...] [consequently] a regime may be located, theoretically, anywhere in the space bounded by these two dimensions" (Dahl 1971, 5-6).

Summarily put, contestation signals the extent to which citizens' preferences are weighed in the conduct of government. Inclusiveness, for its part, signals the share of the population entitled to take part in the system of public contestation. In other words, it reflects the breadth to which citizens can control and contest the conduct of the government (Dahl 1971, 4). While Coppedge, Álvarez and Maldonado (2008) have empirically shown that contestation and inclusiveness are indeed the *two persistent dimensions of democracy*, several approaches have been put forth to empirically capture them[1].

[1] See, among others, Teorell et. al. (2019) or Coppedge and Reinicke's (1990) *Polyarchy Scale*. For a thorough, general discussion on measuring and conceptualizing democracy see Munck and Verkuilen (2002). Gervasoni (2012) and Pérez Sandoval (2017) offer a similar revision with a

Critically, most of these approaches aim to directly or indirectly capture the rights and freedoms which underpin the liberal notion of democracy. In this regard, empirical proxies never fully capture regime outcomes. Rather, measures normally aggregate different indicators of the outputs of a regime's institutional scaffolding. As a consequence, one approach to measure subnational democracy would be to assess the extent to which citizens fully enjoy the eight institutional guarantees identified by Dahl (1971)[2]. However, doing so would severely limit my ability to conduct a comparative and longitudinal assessment of subnational regimes. For this reason, I side with the scholarly tradition that looks at electoral outcomes as indirect proxies for this set of institutions.

Rather than directly capturing the presence or absence of any given right, by focusing on electoral outcomes, one assumes that elections are underpinned by Dahl's (1971) liberal institutional scaffolding. If elections are contested and highly participatory, the logic goes, it must be because —to a considerable extent— citizens are free to form and join political organizations, and they have the right to vote and be voted. Contrarily, if elections are not contested and show low levels of participation, it must be because —to a considerable degree— the rights and freedoms of citizens have been significantly curtailed.

I operationalize Dahl's (1971) democratic pillars using the framework articulated by Tatu Vanhanen (2000), in which contestation is captured by electoral competition and inclusiveness is proxied by electoral participation. Within this framework then, "[t]he competition variable is calculated by substracting the percentage of votes won by the largest party from 100[. . .] [and] The participation variable is calculated as [the share of voters] from the total population" (Vanhanen 2000, 253). Formally, the index is estimated as follows:

$$IoD_{it} = \frac{Participation_{it} \times Competition_{it}}{100}$$

subnational emphasis.

[2]Dahl (1971) lists eight institutional guarantees: 1) Freedom to form and join organizations, 2) freedom of expression, 3) right to vote, 4) eligibility for public office, 5) right of political leaders to compete for support, 6) alternative sources of information, 7) free and fair elections, and 8) institutions to make government policies depend on citizens' preferences.

Where

$$Competition_{it} = 100 - Winner\ Party\ Vote\ Share_{it}$$

and

$$Participation_{it} = \frac{Effective\ Number\ of\ Votes_{it}}{Total\ Population_{it}} \times 100$$

To be clear, I am not claiming that the electoral components for competition and participation are the sole constitutive elements of democracy. What I am asserting, however, is that jointly, Dahl's and Vanhanen's framework are, conceptually and empirically, most useful when scaling down regime outcome analyses. To clarify my position, Figure 3.1 captures the two components of Vanhanen's index, their ontological link to the two dimensions of democracy, and their relation to Dahl's procedural-institutional underpinnings. The diagram shows that, while there might be additional elements to a democracy, electoral competition and participation are fundamental. For this reason, while the dashed rectangles do not fully overlap with contestation and inclusiveness, they occupy a sizeable amount of their area.

The diagram similarly shows that, in terms of abstraction (left-downwards arrow), competition and participation are meso-level concepts, and that, within the framework of non-direct rule (right upwards arrow), they constitute the output of a complex institutional scaffolding. The intersection of contestation and inclusiveness shows that they jointly, ontologically, configure democracy as an outcome. Lastly, the dashed double-headed arrow at the bottom emphasizes that each and every one of the components and dimensions can be experienced, and measured, to different degrees.

Conceptually, the electoral components are extremely salient because they more readily capture the effective political implications of changes in civil rights and freedoms. For example, a higher *competition* score, that is, a more contested election, reflects the absence of a dominant or hegemonic political force, thus signaling a more balanced weighing of individual preferences. Similarly, a higher participation



Figure 3.1: A *Dahlian* Approach to Subnational Democracy

score, that is, higher levels of electoral turnout (weighed by the population), reflects ample levels of political engagement and that a multiplicity of voices are able to signify and express their political preferences.

When inspecting this approach to conceptualization and measurement, comparativists might readily accept the necessity of a competition component —it has, after all, a more straightforward interpretation and has been the focus of most measurements and indexes of democracy (Coppedge, Álvarez and Maldonado 2008). However, skeptical readers might suggest adding an 'alternation in power' proxy to the competition component, and they might additionally find it hard to believe that low levels of participation necessarily mean less democracy. After all, apathy or lack of engagement with the political process is *part and parcel* of *normal* democratic politics (Almond and Verba 1963). Moreover, a similarly critic scholar might point out that, given that provinces are embedded in national regimes, legal barriers to participation —such as suffrage exclusions— are unlikely if not implausible.

These observations might have some basis, and critics would be right to raise these concerns. There are, however, strong reasons to adopt, rather than adapt, Dahl's two dimensions and Vanhanen's electoral operationalization of the former.

First, while occasional apathy might not threaten democracy, and suffrage exclusion is indeed generally outside the purview of subnational jurisdictions, a *systematically low* participation score can signal *informal* barriers to participation such as voter intimidation, co-optation and other forms of *soft* repression.

In addition, inclusiveness and contestation, along with the two electoral components of the index, are of particular prominence precisely because they can be *scaled-down* to capture territorially distinct regime outcomes within countries without sacrificing conceptual or empirical accuracy. More specifically, the two dimensions (and hence the two measurable components), more neatly *travel down* across subnational boundaries and minimize the scale vs depth trade-off reviewed in the introduction.

For instance, other factors or conditions sometimes included in subnational measures do not solely belong to the territorial boundaries of the units under scrutiny. For example, executive alternation or local executive constraints are important for subnational democracy, but it is unclear whether or not they always have a defining, ontological connection to it. After all, local alternations can be forced from above, and as the literature has shown, this does not always mean democratic change. Similarly, any assessment about governance, effective number of parties, or constraints on the executive, are bound to depend on country-level *systemness.* The functioning of the courts or the interaction between local and national party branches are factors that do not have clear spatial boundaries. This territorial conflation warns against including such factors when conceptualizing and measuring subnational regimes.

A skeptic reader might rightly rebut that local elections and campaigns are, for that matter, clearly and highly influenced by national events. In this regard my response is two-fold: First, the coattails effect would mostly influence the competition value of the index only during election years and consequently, any potential noise can be taken into account during the statistical analysis. Moreover, that local elections and campaigns are influenced by national ones does not invalidate the ontological association between the two dimensions of democracy and their corresponding electoral indicators. They scale down neatly because they are the features of subnational democracy least systematically dependent on or influenced by other governmental tiers. Second, in addition to capturing the extent to which citizens can control and contest the conduct of the government, both components, but more so the participation one, bind the index onto the territory and the jurisdiction of the units under analysis. By using local electoral results and weighing the extent of participation by the total number of inhabitants in a given unit, the components attach the measure to a specific space.

Overall, my joint use of Dahl's and Vanhanen's framework offers four solid advantages: 1) it captures two relevant theoretical dimensions of democracy, 2) it allows these dimensions and their measures to neatly travel down the territorial scale, 3) it uses objective and accessible electoral data and 4) it has a transparent mathematical aggregation procedure. Consequently, in adopting it, I balance conceptual clarity, methodological transparency, and practical concerns (Munck and Verkuilen 2002).

The Vanhanen index is an interval level measure bounded between zero and a hundred. Its interpretation is intuitive: higher scores correspond to open, democratic polities, and lower ones signal closed, autocratic regimes. By using multiplication as an aggregation mechanism, the index ensures that both participation and competition are equally weighed. This implies, for example, that high levels in one component do not make up for low values in the other.

In spite of its merits, Vanhanen's index has been critiqued for being *extremely* parsimonious and for penalizing majoritarian electoral systems[3]. While the qualitative component of this project provides the space for a more substantive assessment of subnational regimes, quantitatively, the former point is rather inescapable: as discussed above, the index uses electoral data and consequently best captures that aspect of democracy. To put it clearly, following Vanhanen (1989; 1990; 1997;

[3]Majoritarian electoral systems *maximize* the share of votes received by the winning party. As a consequence, the competition component is systematically lower. Given the multiplicative aggregation mechanism, when Vanhanen's framework is used to measure majoritarian democracies, the index is naturally biased downwards.

2000) I argue that, operationalized in this way, other aspects of democracy such as civil and political liberties are only indirectly measured. This assumes, for example, that increased electoral competition is only possible with political and civil rights. Similarly, participation is assumed to indirectly tap into the existence of individual and political freedoms.

To guard against critiques of penalizing majoritarian electoral systems, I specifically look at first-round gubernatorial elections after the Third Wave transition to democracy. I focus on gubernatorial elections for two particular reasons: First, governors in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico occupy a prime role in subnational politics. In all three countries, within each province, governors enjoy ample political powers. In Brazil they have been called the "barons of the federation" (Abrucio 1994) while in Mexico they have been compared to kings and sultans (Woldenberg 2013). Moreover, the increased relevance and influence of subnational politics within these three countries has been thoroughly documented (Samuels and Abrucio 2000; Montero 2007; Hiskey and Bowler 2005). Second, I look at gubernatorial elections to maximize comparability across cases, as well as comparability between my research and the extant scholarly work on subnational democratic variation.

Electoral data for Argentina mostly comes from Andy Tow's Electoral Atlas. For Brazilian units, electoral results mostly come from the Superior Electoral Court (TSE). For Mexican states, I obtained the corresponding data from the Centre of Research for Development (CIDAC). When necessary, I complemented and verified the information with national and local electoral institutes. Local population values to build the participation component where obtained from national statistics agencies INDEC, IBGE and INEGI. When necessary, I linearly interpolated the population values. Overall, the resulting dataset is an unbalanced short panel with 83 groups and a total of 641 province-year observations[4]. Table 3.1 summarily presents this information disaggregated by country[5].

[4]A balanced panel is one in which all observations have the same time frame. The unbalanced nature of the data stems from the fact that subnational units have distinct electoral cycles. A short panel is one in which the cross-sectional (n) dimension —i.e. subnational units— is larger than the temporal one (t). My dataset has n=83 and t=37. In a long panel, n<t.

[5]While for Argentina and Brazil the literature offers a clear-cut temporal distinction, Mexican

Table 3.1: Post-Third Wave Panel Structure

Country	Subnational Units	Starting Year	Last Year	Gubernatorial Cycles	Number of Observations
Argentina	24	1983	2019	9	232
Brazil	27	1985	2018	8	239
Mexico	32	1988	2019	5	170
Total	83			22	641

Source: Compiled by the author.

The *scaled-down* version of the index captures territorially distinct regime outcomes within countries and it successfully addresses two fundamental measurement concerns: reliability and validity. The former alludes to consistency in measurement while the latter refers to the degree to which said measure accurately captures the phenomena under investigation. The ultimate test for replicability is intercoder reliability: if several scholars code the same case in the same way, that measure is deemed to be reliable. Conversely, the conventional strategy to test for validity is through the correlation with another measure of the same or a similar concept.

Relying on objective, publicly available data and a simple arithmetic aggregation procedure maximizes reliability; validity, however, remains an issue. In order to test the extent to which the SDI ‘taps into’ the democratic dimension of subnational regimes, I first contrasted my index with Giraudy’s (2015) *subnational undemocratic regime* (SUR) scores. Giraudy’s (2015) SUR scores measure subnational regime outcomes considering three features: 1) the extent to which elections in a province are contested, 2) the extent to which elections are *clean*, and 3) the *actual* chances for alternation, that is, whether or not the opposition has a real chance of accessing the local executive office. Giraudy’s data for Argentina covers the period between 1983 and 2009. For Mexico, her dataset covers the period between 1997 and 2009.

observers and astute readers might object that setting 1988 as the temporal cut-off point is a questionable choice. There is no clear consensus on exactly *when* democratic change occurred in Mexico. I follow Córdova (n.d.) and Ai Camp (2012) in choosing 1988 as the year which marked "a break in [Mexican] electoral history" (Córdova n.d., 660) and the year that marked the end of Mexico’s pre-democratic era. For robustness and completeness I tried setting the cut-off both in 1996 and 2000. Given that shifting cut-off points only entails moving one or two electoral cycles, the main findings of this chapter hold regardless.



Figure 3.2: Assessing Validity: My Subnational Democracy Index vs Giraudy's SUR Score

Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of original data and Giraudy (2015). The provincial label key is in Section A.1 of Appendix A.

This allowed me to compare the Argentinian and Mexican yearly (left) and average scores (right) for the post-Third Wave period. The top panel of Figure 3.2 graphically displays the correlation for Argentina and the bottom panel plots the association for Mexican states. Although there are some distinctions, the connection is patently sound. The Pearson correlation coefficients for both the Argentinian and Mexican cases are positive and significant at conventional levels.

Differences in yearly values are to be expected. Interestingly enough, however, there are marked contrasts in the overall average scores. For Argentina, La Pampa and Entre Ríos noticeably diverge. For the Mexican case, Jalisco and Yucatán stand out. A closer inspection of these differences reveals that they mostly stem from the fact that, although when compared to their peers these provinces have had comparatively higher levels of electoral competition and participation, within the time frame of Giraudy's sample (ending in 2009), she penalized these provinces for lacking political alternation and for having intense and durable post-electoral conflicts.

Based on a subjective evaluation of local newspapers, Giraudy (2015) regards the intensity and durability of post-electoral conflicts as a proxy for having *clean* elections. According to the author of *Democrats and Autocrats*, the more severe the conflict, the less clean the election. In addition to the non-replicability of the scores, this logic, however, is not straightforward. It could well be the case that an intense post-electoral conflict actually reflects *higher* rather than lower levels of political contestation and participation. After all, these demonstrations generally involve the activation of the courts and high levels of public political engagement. In any case, judgement of post-electoral conflicts can only be articulated after the fact and we should not impose any interpretation *a priori* by including them in the conceptualization or measurement of regime outcomes.

In relation to the alternation component, La Pampa and Yucatán are illustrative examples. La Pampa has been governed by the Peronist Party (PJ) since 1983. Similarly, Yucatán, up until 2001, had only been governed by the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI). The question is then, can we expect the high levels of electoral engagement to effectively or *meaningfully* reflect the chances for political alternation? The case of Yucatán, a state now under *Partido Acción Nacional* (PAN) rule, shows that we can. The same, for example, goes for the case of Jalisco, a state penalized by Giraudy's alternation component for having three consecutive gubernatorial terms of PAN rule. Jalisco, however, has had comparatively contested and participatory elections, which have resulted not only in one but three gubernatorial alternations, the first in 1995, the second one in 2013 and the last and most recent one in 2018.

As if further heeding my previous warning regarding alternation, Giraudy herself identifies an inconsistency with this component of her SUR score. When briefly discussing the Argentine cases, she highlights that, just as La Pampa, "highly democratic provinces [. . .] have also been ruled by the PJ for many consecutive years, [suggesting that, excluding the cases she identifies as SUR's] there is not a clear correlation between levels of subnational democracy and [gubernatorial] partisanship" (Giraudy 2015, 42).

To further assess the validity of my measure across all country-cases I built an *alternative index* of subnational democracy by normalizing (between zero and one) three other indicators previously used by Beer (2004), Gervasoni (2010) and Montero (2007). Gervasoni's index combines objective electoral data with results from an expert survey to score each provincial regime in Argentina. For Brazilian units, Montero's measure combines the effective number of parties (ENP) and the number of police homicides as a proxy for democratic governance. Lastly, for Mexico, Beer similarly uses Vanhanen's framework but takes results from local Congressional elections instead of gubernatorial ones to compute her values.

Figure 3.4 plots all the coinciding observations and displays the relation between these alternate scores and my dependent variable. Given their different methodological underpinnings, thoroughly discussing divergent cases is not a straightforward endeavor. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that La Rioja (RIOJ) and Tamaulipas (TAM) are units that noticeably differ between measures. In spite of these differences, the relation is patently strong, with a statistically significant Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.5. A standard OLS bivariate regression of the alternative index and my own generates a positive and significant coefficient of 0.014, evidencing almost a one-to-one correspondence.

Considering that it is well known that pooled analyses can occasionally be driven by a small number of influential observations (Van der Meer et. al. 2010), in a more technical check, I verify the sensitivity of my measure against extreme



Figure 3.4: Assessing Validity: An Alternative Index of Subnational Democracy

Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of original data as well as Beer (2004), Gervasoni (2010), and Montero (2007). The provincial label key is in Section A.1 of Appendix A.

(diverging) values. *Jackknifing* addresses this issue by successively deleting one unit at a time, re-estimating the correlation coefficient and adjusting the standard errors for the potential (additional) variation between models[6]. Using this technique, the core substantive findings hold, which I take as further evidence of my index's validity. As will become apparent in the next sections, the fact that it provides support for some of the things we know about contemporary subnational democracy further supports this claim.

In sum, like all interval or continuous measurement strategies, Vanhanen's framework assumes that regimes are distributed across two ends of a single political continuum. At one end stand open and democratic polities, while closed, authoritarian ones are located at the other. "In between these two 'ideal types',

[6]For more on Jackknifing see Wu (1986).

political systems can be [identified] by their *degree of democraticness*" (Jaggers and Gurr 1995, 469; emphasis added).

I am aware that every effort to measure regime outcomes comes with theoretical and empirical trade-offs. Rooted in Dahl's (1971) and Vanhanen's (2000) framework, the dependent variable of this study is quantitatively captured by a measure that has been tried and tested at the national[7] and subnational levels (see Beer and Mitchel 2004). It is a parsimonious index that is "reliable, objective [and] comparable across cases" (Gervasoni 2012, 1). Last but not least, by adopting a minimal procedural framework I avoid issues of conflation and consequently maximize the chances of 'cleanly' exploring the linkages between regime outcomes and economic factors. Assessing that connection is precisely the task of the following sections.

3.2 Subnational Democratic Variation in Latin America *after* the Third Wave

How have the subnational units of the three largest countries in Latin America performed over the last three decades? Figure 3.6 shows the average provincial score for the competition (y-axis) and participation (x-axis) components of my index. With the dotted lines set at the overall mean value for each component, the graph sends a clear message: On average, Argentinian *provincias* (deep blue circles) have had higher scores. Brazilian states (dark green triangles) come second, and Mexican units (red squares) come last. Guerrero, Estado de México, Hidalgo, and Coahuila have the lowest average scores of the whole sample.

Interestingly enough, for all the countries under consideration, capitals achieve considerably higher scores than other states. In Argentina, the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires$_{(\text{CBA})}$ clearly stands out. In Brazil, Distrito Federal$_{(\text{DF})}$ is only outperformed by Rio Grande do Sul$_{(\text{RS})}$, and Mexico City$_{(\text{CDMX})}$ noticeably outflanks the rest of the Mexican states. Beyond the capitals, for the Argentine Republic,

[7]Vanhanen's index is commonly used to evaluate the performance of new measures of democracy. When regressed on the Polity IV score, for example, Vanhanen's score accounts for 55% of its overall variation, and performs even better when looking only at post-Third Wave data, accounting for 71% of the Polity score variation during that period.



Figure 3.6: Subnational Democracies in Federal Latin America after the Third Wave

Lines on the y and x axis are set at the pooled average value.

Source: Compiled by the author. Data sources for each country are found in text and detailed in Section A.2 of Appendix A. The provincial label key is in Section A.1 of Appendix A.

Catamarca(CAT), Salta(SALT), Santiago del Estero(SEST) and Formosa(FOR) are the underperforming provinces. San Juan(SNJN), Santa Fe(STFE) and Buenos Aires(BUA) are their democratic counterparts. In Brazil, Santa Catarina(SC), Rio de Janeiro(RJ), and Rio Grande do Sul(RS) overperform, while Alagoas(AL), Pernambuco(PE) and Bahia(BA) obtain contrasting results. For the Mexican case, Jalisco(JAL) and Zacatecas(ZAC) achieve markedly higher scores than, for example, Estado de México(EMEX), Guerrero(GRO), Hidalgo(HID) or Puebla(PUEB).

Following convention on panel data analysis, Figure 3.8 unpacks the cross-sectional and temporal variation captured by the index. Graphs on the left-hand side show variation between subnational units and graphs on the right-hand side display variation over time. The plots offer three main takeaways: 1) there is within-unit and within-year variation —*inside countries*, across time and space,



Figure 3.8: Cross-sectional and Temporal Variation after the Third Wave

Source: Compiled by the author. Data sources for each country are found in text and detailed in Section A.2 of Appendix A.

democracy is not homogeneous; 2) within countries, there is between-unit and across-year change; and, critically, 3) subnational democracy varies more between states than through time, as evidenced by the different patterns tracked by the left and right-hand side lines.

What might explain the pattern observed? In searching for a cause, "[t]he instinct is to start with the economy" (Przeworski 2019, 103). Consequently, I collected subnational data on the usual structural suspects of democratization,

Table 3.2: Subnational Democracy and Development After the Third Wave

	1	2	3	4	5
GDP per capita (log)	2.771***	2.796***	2.456**	4.233***	4.139***
	(0.88)	(0.79)	(1.08)	(1.20)	(1.20)
Total Population (log)		0.944*	0.634	0.413	0.185
		(0.48)	(0.58)	(0.59)	(0.59)
Federal Fiscal Transfers (log)			-0.511	-0.730*	-0.792*
			(0.36)	(0.44)	(0.44)
Gini Coefficient				-15.293	-19.001
				(15.62)	(16.33)
Habituation (years)					0.531*
					(0.27)
Diffusion					0.105
					(0.11)
Observations	412	412	315	130	122
Groups	83	83	81	69	64
R-Squared	0.379	0.393	0.345	0.355	0.358

Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. All models include country and year dummies. Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses.
The number of observations drop in Models 4 and 5 because of missing data on inequality and because of the nature of the diffusion variable. A full discussion of model specifications is presented in Section A.3 of Appendix A.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

namely: GDP per capita, population, inequality, fiscal transfers, habituation, and diffusion[8]. While descriptive statistics are presented in Section A.4 of Appendix A, Table 3.2 presents unstandardized regression coefficients with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) in parentheses (Beck and Katz 1995). All estimations include country and year fixed effects.

A few things stand out when examining the regression results: First, the coefficients for GDP per capita are the only ones that are consistently statistically significant across model specifications. Second, while all other coefficients have the expected signs, they are rarely distinguishable from zero. Third, on average, the models roughly explain 37% of the variance, with Model 3 reporting the lowest R-Squared value and Model 2 the highest one. Lastly, this first empirical assessment

[8]Most data come from national statistical institutes and government agencies. To transform currencies, I used the GDP per capita (PPP) World Bank series which is in current international dollars based on the 2011 round of the International Comparison Program (ICP). Diffusion is measured as the lagged average score of the dependent variable for the neighboring states. Conversely, habituation corresponds to the number of years that have passed since national democratic change in the Third Wave. Data sources, descriptive statistics, and modeling alternatives for panel data are found in Appendix A.

Table 3.3: Subnat. Regime Heterogeneity and Development: Robustness Checks

	Jackknife	Bootstrap	FE	RE	Lagged DV
GDP per capita (log)	4.139***	4.139***	8.523	3.750**	1.879*
	(-1.43)	(-1.17)	(-17.5)	(-1.49)	(-1.03)
Total Population (log)	0.185	0.185	-39.119**	0.379	-0.051
	(-0.65)	(-0.72)	(-18.49)	(-0.78)	(-0.47)
Fiscal Transfers (log)	-0.792	-0.792	0.846	-0.783	-0.49
	(-0.5)	(-0.63)	(-6.53)	(-0.81)	(-0.31)
Gini Coefficient	-19.001	-19.001	-38.066	-19.036	-12.328
	(-18.32)	(-18.41)	(-29.56)	(-19.21)	(-13.88)
Habituation	0.531	0.531*	0.564	0.519	0.527**
	(-0.35)	(-0.29)	(-1.13)	(-0.32)	(-0.25)
Diffusion	0.105	0.105	0.14	0.088	0.092
	(-0.13)	(-0.13)	(-0.19)	(-0.11)	(-0.09)
Lagged DV					0.426***
					(-0.07)
Observations	122	122	122	122	122
Groups	64	64	64	64	64
R-Sqaured	0.358	0.358	0.495	0.355	0.488

Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
All columns include year and country dummies.
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

provides face value evidence confirming that economic development stands at the core of contemporary subnational democratic variation.

Substantively, across specifications, economic development has the largest positive effect. Using the estimates of Model 5, one standard deviation change in GDP per capita drives an increase of one third of the DV's standard deviation. As a further robustness check, in addition to using jackknifing, I also re-estimated Model 5 using non-parametric bootstrapping[9]. Similarly, while keeping country and year dummies, I replaced subnational unit random effects[10] with fixed ones (i.e. I included a dummy for provinces.). Lastly, for completeness, I additionaly included a model with a temporal lag of the dependent variable as a control. As the coefficients in Table 3.3 show, while the levels of statistical significance vary, the substantive results hold.

[9]Non-parametric bootstrapping remains agnostic about the form of distribution and to estimate uncertainty it re-samples from within the existing set of observations. For the purposes of this estimation, I conducted 100 bootstrap samples. For more on this technique see Wu (1986) and Li and Wang (1998).

[10]I briefly discuss the trade-offs between fixed and random effects in Section A.3 of Appendix A. Simply put, it comes down to a decision between *bias* and *efficiency*.



Figure 3.10: Contemporary Subnational Democratic Variation and Development

Source: Compiled by the author. Data sources for each country are found in text and detailed in Section A.2 of Appendix A.



Figure 3.12: V-Dem Experts Assessment of Contemporary Subnational Democratic Variation and Development

Figures 3.10 and 3.12 graphically zero-in on the linkages between development and subnational democracy. Figure 3.10 displays the observed relation between GDP per capita (PPP USD) and my index of subnational democracy. As expected, we observe a strong positive and significant connection. To complement this information, Figure 3.12 presents two strip plots built using data from the eighth iteration of the Varieties of Democracy project (V-Dem v8 Coppedge et.al. 2018). The plot captures the main *features* of subnational units in which elections are either more or less free and fair.

In Figure 3.12, the graph on the left-hand side shows the response of country experts to the following question: 'How would you describe the areas of the country in which elections are significantly *less* free and fair?'. The graph on the right-hand side shows the response of country experts to the question: 'How would you describe the areas of the country in which elections are significantly *more* free and fair?[11]

Country expert data from the V-Dem project further validates our preliminary regression results: elections are not only more contested but also are freer and fairer in more economically developed subnational units. Interestingly enough, although not surprisingly, these units are also predominantly urban. Conversely, subnational units in which elections are less free and less fair are outside the capital, less economically developed and predominantly rural. In sum, Figures 3.10 and 3.12 further confirm that Lipset's (1959) original intuition can be scaled-down: the more well-to-do a *subnational unit*, the greater the chance that it will sustain democracy.

[11] Three clarifications regarding the Varieties of Democracy data (v8) are in order. First, it is important to highlight that the V-Dem project does not distinguish between second and third-tier government levels (i.e. it does not offer a separate measure for provincial and municipal levels). It treats these tiers uniformly as part of 'the subnational' domain. Second, the questionnaire allows country experts to qualify the features of subnational units by selecting from a list of 20 different features. Here I present the 10 that I considered most relevant. Among the categories not presented here are: 'Areas of civil unrest', 'Areas where illicit activity is widespread', 'Areas that are remote', 'Areas where the national ruling party or group is strong', 'Areas where the national ruling party or group is weak', 'Areas that were subject to a longer period of foreign rule', 'Areas that were recently subject to foreign rule', and 'Areas that have not recently been subject to foreign'. Lastly, using the mean for cross-coder aggregation, the scores reported within the V-Dem dataset merge multiple expert responses into a single point-estimate. This implies that what we are observing —the small hollow circles in the strip plot— are not distinct expert responses but different country-year average estimates. For more on how the V-Dem scores are obtained see Coppedge et. al. (2018), for more on how to handle expert responses as measurement tools see Maestas (2018).

An astute observer might correctly point out that while the scatter plot of Figure 3.10 reports the observed relation between GDP and subnational democracy *after* the Third Wave, the strip plots of Figure 3.12 report data going back to 1980. This is intentional because, as I show in the next section of this chapter, the patterns identified above *pre-date* the Third Wave. In fact, as we will see, they go back at least to the 19$^{\text{th}}$ century.

3.3 Subnational Regime Variation in Latin America *before* the Third Wave

To address the concerns of a sharp critic, I start this third section by tackling the elephant in the room: how best to capture regime variation within countries throughout a period marred by authoritarianism and democratic breakdown. The risks are, *ad minimum*, threefold: First, elections could less accurately reflect *true* competition or participation. Second, censorship and repression might alter the nature of the connections between institutions, the State and society. Third, authoritarianism could limit the possibility for subnational variation —by, for example, cancelling local elections, naming governors or by directly intervening in the provinces. Overall, the attempt to find pre-Third Wave variation within our country cases runs counter to the conventional wisdom on Latin American democratization.

With these cautionary considerations in mind, I contend we can still use Vanhanen's (2000) measure to capture subnational unevenness before the Third Wave. First, local elections occurred intermittently throughout the period. The further back in time we are able to go, that is, the more electoral cycles we can observe, the more we can capture the degree of *democraticness* (or lack thereof) in any given unit. Second, if the authoritarian experience precluded or hampered subnational variation, it should be more difficult to observe territorial heterogeneity, let alone find historical patterns. The third and last point driving my exploration is a logical one: if we can observe authoritarian enclaves today, it should be possible to observe democratic ones in the past.

Table 3.4: Pre-Third Wave Panel Structure

Country	Subnational Units	Starting Year	Last Year	Number of Observations
Argentina	24	1916	1973	184
Brazil	27	1945	1962	162
Mexico	32	1964	1976	94
Total	83			440

Source: Compiled by the author.

In researching these data, the most significant obstacle was that local records for gubernatorial elections are either poorly archived by local authorities, not readable, not digitized, and in some cases, to the best of my knowledge, simply non-existent. To curb the difficulty of accessing gubernatorial results, I captured the local vote share and the local levels of participation for national level elections[12]. Overall, using local results for presidential elections I obtained both components of Vanhanen's (2000) index for Argentina and Mexico. In the case of Brazil, I used local results of national Congressional elections and the index is estimated using the participation component *only*.

To compute the index for this period, I collected the necessary electoral results mostly from Brazil's *Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada* (IPEA), Rosendo Fraga's and Malacrida's (1989) *Argentina en las Urnas*, and from Mexican electoral records kept in Castellanos Hernández et. al. (1997). When necessary, I complemented the information with the material available in Nohlen's (2005) *Elections in the Americas* handbook. To estimate the participation component of the index I collected census data from national statistical institutes, and when necessary, I linearly interpolated the value of population.

To close this preliminary discussion, it is important to mention that by using local results of national level elections, I could be measuring aspects that better capture dynamics at the centre. That is, here national politics could be overriding

[12] An example can be illustrative of the procedure. In Nuevo León, during the 1970 Mexican presidential election, PRI candidate Luis Acheverría Álvarez obtained 360,328 out of 430,740 total local votes. With a population of roughly 1.7 million inhabitants, this means that for that year, Nuevo León's competition score is 16.35, the participation score is 25.34 and the overall Vanhanen index value for that state in that year is 4.14 (out of 100 possible points).

subnational issues. While we should be mindful of this point, any measurement error introduced by using local variances of national level elections should bias the evidence against noteworthy findings. I begin the analysis for the pre-Third Wave period reporting that the resulting dataset is a second unbalanced and short panel with 83 groups with a total of 440 province-year observations[13]. Table 3.4 summarily presents this information disaggregated by country.

The best way to address the concerns raised above is to anchor the pre-Third Wave measure with the subnational scores analyzed in the previous section of this chapter. Figure 3.13 follows Miller's (2015) *democratic pieces* and jointly explores pre and post-Third Wave values. The graph is subdivided into six zones, each corresponding to a distinct *regime type*. On deciding where to draw the thresholds for each component I adopt both a substantive and a data-driven approach: To be more demanding or stringent with the classification, I used only post-Third Wave data to estimate each component's average value. I then set the boundaries at one standard deviation away from the corresponding mean.

The interpretation is fairly intuitive: democracies, located in the first (top-right) zone, have high levels of competition and participation. The second zone (top-left) shows competitive oligarchies, which have similar levels of competition but restrict participation. Electoral authoritarian regimes, displayed in the third zone (middle-right), show mid-levels of competition and higher degrees of participation. Electoral oligarchies, located in the fourth zone (mid-left), restrict participation even further. Lastly, the fifth and sixth zone display cases of plebiscitary (bottom-right) and closed authoritarianism (bottom-left) respectively.

The first clear message sent by the graph in Figure 3.13 is that pre-Third Wave competition and participation scores (represented as small hollow diamonds) tend to be noticeably lower than those observed after national transitions (represented as small hollow circles). Interestingly enough, we do observe a considerable

[13]To select the temporal framework for this period I used three criteria: First, data reliability. I assessed the credibility of the source and cross-referenced values to verify them when in doubt. The second standard was that of comparability. This applies not only to the quality of the data but also to the relevance of the elections. The third and last criteria was a practical one: availability.



Lines on the y and x axis are set one standard deviation away from the pooled Third Wave average value.
Key: I) Democracies, II) Competitive Oligarchies, III) Electoral Authoritarianisms, IV) Electoral Oligarchies, V) Plebiscitary Authoritarianisms, VI) Closed Authoritarianisms.

Figure 3.13: Subnational Regime Classification *à la* Miller

Sources: Compiled by the author, inspired by Miller (2015).

level of variation before the Third Wave. Relatedly, the heterogeneity observed shows that regime hybridity rather than the exception, has been the norm at the subnational level across Latin America's largest federations. Table 3.5 summarizes the information by country and period.

It is worth noting that the Brazilian cases marked as pre-Third Wave subnational democracies correspond to Mato Grosso in the different electoral cycles between 1950 and 1962, a period in which Mato Grosso encompassed the present-day states of Rôndonia and Mato Grosso do Sul[14]. The fifteen Argentinian cases similarly identified as democracies are mostly driven by the 1963 general election in which UCRP's Arturo Illia was elected. While the spectre of a coup and military intervention lurked, the "[e]lections were carried out in a peaceful and,

[14]Something similar occurs when looking at the northern Mexican states of Baja California and Baja California Sur. This territorial overlap advises caution when interpreting the scores for these states.

Table 3.5: Subnational Regime Classification

	Pre-Third Wave				Post-Third Wave			
Regime Type	Argentina	Brazil	Mexico	Total	Argentina	Brazil	Mexico	Total
Democracy	8.2%	2.5%	0%	4.3%	14.7%	9.6%	10.6%	11.7%
	15	4	0	19	34	23	18	75
Competitive Oligarchy	7.1%	97.5%	0%	38.9%	0%	0.4%	0.6%	0.3%
	13	158	0	171	0	1	1	2
Electoral Authoritarianism	20.1%	0%	0%	8.4%	75.4%	63.6%	45.9%	63.2%
	37	0	0	37	175	152	78	405
Electoral Oligarchy	36.4%	0%	0%	15.2%	0.4%	8.8%	27.1%	10.6%
	67	0	0	67	1	21	46	68
Plebiscitary Authoritarianism	15.8%	0%	16.0%	10.0%	9.1%	11.7%	1.8%	8.1%
	29	0	15	44	21	28	3	52
Closed Authoritarianism	12.5%	0%	84.0%	23.2%	0.4%	5.9%	14.1%	6.1%
	23	0	79	102	1	14	24	39
Observations	184	162	94	440	232	239	170	641

it is generally agreed, honest manner" (Snow 1965, 25). It is noticeable that while the emphasis was on the executive race, in 1963 Argentinian voters were choosing not only electors for the presidency, but also deputies and a large number of subnational and local officials[15].

Figure 3.15 plots the yearly average for each country. The light-gray lines correspond to the trajectories of individual provinces while the solid dark lines track the yearly country average. The first three plots correspond to Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. The graph on the bottom right panel jointly contrasts our country cases displaying the smoothed average through time. A close inspection of the information reveals a familiar pattern. First, for the two periods under examination, that is, before and after the Third Wave, Argentinian provinces systematically achieve higher scores. Contrarily, Mexican states are consistently at the opposite end of the spectrum, with Brazilian units occupying the middle ground.

While individually, the highest scores for this period are achieved by Santa Fe, Mato Grosso, and Mexico City and the lowest by Mendoza, Amapá, and Tlaxcala, the task at hand is to examine the cross-sectional and longitudinal heterogeneity

[15] Snow (1965) estimates that in addition to the 192 national deputies, Argentinians voted for 1,128 gubernatorial electors, approximately 1,000 provincial legislators and a plethora of city council members.



Figure 3.15: Subnational Regime Variation through Time

Sources: Compiled by the author.

captured. Mirroring the previous section, Figure 3.17 plots variation between states on the left, and variation over time on the right. Once again, the graphs reveal familiar takeaways: even before the Third Wave, regimes within countries have not been homogeneous. Critically, as the patterns tracked by the solid lines show, subnational units have varied more between them than through time.

To explain the patterns observed in this period, the instinct is to start *once more* with the economy. To do so, using multiple sources, I estimated a measure of subnational economic development. I calculated the indicator using Talassino's (2015; 2017) data for Argentina. For Brazil the figures come from IBGE, and for Mexico, the material comes from Aguilar-Retureta (2015). Considering the different nature of the sources[16], to make them comparable, I transformed the scores between

[16]Talassino (2015; 2017) and Aguilar-Retureta (2015) report provincial GDP per capita as a share of the national one. IBGE reports absolute values of GDP in current prices. Where possible and necessary, when working with their data, I complemented and validated information using official statistical records (*anuarios estadísticos*). To fill temporal gaps, I linearly interpolated the series.



Figure 3.17: Cross-sectional and Temporal Variation *before* the Third Wave

Sources: Compiled by the author.

zero and one[17]. While for theoretical and practical reasons it would be misguided to add *usual* covariates[18], Table 3.6 presents the results for a simple bivariate regression controlling for population and adding country and year fixed effects.

[17]The transformation uses the maximum values for each country-year spell as a reference. Formally, this transformation is achieved by: $z_{ict} = x_{ict}/max(x_{ct})$. Where x_{it} is the original GDP per capita score of state i in country c and time t, and z_{ict} is the resulting score which now varies only between zero and one. For more on data transformation and relativization see McCune and Grace (2002), specifically Chapter 9.

[18]On a theoretical level, we have no reason to expect that mechanisms behind, for example, fiscal transfers, habituation or diffusion could be at work. On a practical level, the data, where available, is hardly reliable.

Table 3.6: Development and Subnational Regime Variation *before* the Third Wave

	PCSE	Jackknife	Boostrap	FE	RE	Lagged-DV
Economic Development	11.986**	11.986	11.986*	8.195**	9.214**	0.494
	(5.97)	(7.38)	(6.34)	(3.92)	(4.34)	(1.83)
Total Population (log)	1.099	1.099	1.099	-1.730	1.463**	-1.248
	(0.79)	(0.96)	(0.76)	(2.04)	(0.65)	(0.79)
Lagged DV						0.902***
						(0.07)
Observations	298	298	298	298	298	285
Groups	80	80	80	80	90	80
R-Squared	0.691	0.691	0.691	0.768	0.685	0.899

Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
All columns include year and country dummies.
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, p<0.1

The results are strikingly familiar and robust to multiple specification alternatives. Aside from the jack-knifed and lagged models, the coefficients for economic development remain positive and statistically significant. On average, the models account for 74% of the variation. Substantively, using the values of the fixed effects estimation, one standard deviation change in economic development triggers a movement of 2 points along Vanhanen's index — a shift of roughly 1/5 of the dependent variable's standard deviation.

Figure 3.19 and Figure 3.21 display the linkages between economic development and regime unevenness within countries before the Third Wave. Figure 3.19 shows the observed relation between the normalized score for economic development and my index for subnational regimes. Once more, we observe a strong positive connection. Just as in the previous section, using V-Dem v8 data, the bottom panel presents two strip plots capturing the main features of units where elections are either less (left) or more (right) free and fair.

This time Figure 3.21 covers the period between 1900 and 1980. The graph confirms that for the first eight decades of the 20^{th} century, elections have been significantly freer and fairer in more economically developed and urban subnational units. Contrarily, the electoral underpinnings of democracy have been weaker in less developed areas, which tend to be rural and outside the



Figure 3.19: Subnational Democratic Variation and Development *before* the Third Wave

Sources: Compiled by the author.



Figure 3.21: V-Dem Experts Assessment of Subnational Democratic Variation and Development *before* the Third Wave

capital. In the last part of this chapter I explore the extent to which the observed pre- and post-Third Wave patterns are linked to each other.

3.4 Subnational Variation: Assessing a *pre-determined* Equilibrium

In the previous two sections of this chapter, I have shown that the territorial unevenness of democracy within countries is clearly connected to economic development and that this association has been present both before and after the Third Wave. In this fourth and last section I show that the patterns observed across periods are clearly linked. In doing so I contend that they configure an equilibrium which has been considerably stable over time. In other words, what this section shows is that the economic and democratic *relative positions* of subnational units across the three largest Latin American countries have displayed a remarkable temporal endurance.

To begin with, Figure 3.22 plots the relationship between the average post-Third Wave democracy index and the pre-Third Wave electoral score. The top panel displays the correlation for the Argentinian units, the mid panel shows Brazilian states and the bottom graph exhibits the association for Mexican *entidades*. It is important to note that the association for the Argentinian and Mexican cases is strong and significant. The plot for Brazil shows that Mato Grosso is a clear outlier. Upon closer inspection, this likely reflects that up until 1977 and 1982 Mato Grosso encompassed the territory and population of the contemporary states of Mato Grosso do Sul and Rondônia respectively. Removing the score for this outlying observation boosts the Pearson correlation coefficient for the Brazilian units to a significant 0.36 positive value.

With an average Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.4, the link is patently and significantly strong within each country. For all the subnational units across the countries under consideration, the post-Third Wave democracy index is strongly linked to the electoral score which dates back to the early and mid 20$^{\text{th}}$ century. The implication is fairly intuitive: provinces that are more democratic today are also the ones which experienced more contested and participatory elections in the past.



Figure 3.22: Pre and Post Third Wave Subnational Regime Outcomes by Country



Figure 3.23: Pooled Pre and Post Third Wave Subnational Regime Outcomes

Closely related, Figure 3.23 —first seen in the introductory chapter— shows that when pooling the cases together, the relationship observed holds. The correlation coefficient is significant and remarkably close to 0.5. If we remove the outlying case of Mato Grosso, the overall correlation value goes to a strikingly high 0.61. The figure sends a clear and striking message: across the largest countries in Latin America, the subnational democratic variation observed today has deep historical roots.

Reflecting on plausible explanations, in previous sections I have insisted and shown that economic development stands at the core of the puzzle. If the outcome of interest shows relative stability through time, we should also expect the cause to be similarly sticky. Using the collected data on economic development, Figure 3.24 reflects this equilibrium.



Figure 3.24: The Endurance of Relative Levels of Subnational Economic Development

For all countries under consideration, and even when pooling the observations together, the correlations are significant and substantive. For observers of Latin America it should come as no surprise that the subnational units that have economically overperformed over the last three decades are also the ones which were already more developed by the early and mid 20$^{\text{th}}$ century.

Following this rationale, an attentive reader might ask: Is it actually the case that past levels of economic development are connected to contemporary subnational regime outcomes? To answer that question, Figure 3.25 shows the correlation between the level of economic development along the early and mid 20$^{\text{th}}$ century and the post-Third Wave values of the subnational index of democracy. Since we are comparing present and past jurisdictional boundaries, we have to ensure that



Figure 3.25: Past Levels of Economic Development and Contemporary Subnational Heterogeneity

the values correspond to the same units. To do so, I exclude units whose territories previously encompassed those of other contemporary states[19].

Interestingly enough, the Pearson correlation coefficients for Mexico and for the pooled observations, while positive, are smaller than the rest and they do not reach conventional levels of significance. To explore further this relationship, Table 3.7 reports results of several regression specifications. However, before continuing with their interpretation, it is important to highlight that in this analysis I cannot match past and present province-year spells. This means, to begin with, that the

[19]This means, for example, that in this case I am excluding Mato Grosso from the Brazilian graph and Baja California from the Mexican one. When including these states, the correlation coefficients for all countries remain positive and are marginally not significant at conventional levels.

Table 3.7: Past Economic Development and Contemporary Regime Variation

	PCSE			Jackknife	Bootstrap
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Past Economic Development (mean)	8.021***		6.945***	6.945***	6.945***
	(1.91)		(2.02)	(2.18)	(2.00)
Pre-Third Wave Regime Score (mean)		0.253**	0.104	0.104	0.104
		(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Observations	79	78	77	77	77
R-Squared	0.603	0.552	0.590	0.590	0.590

Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. All models include country fixed effects. Models 1 through 4 report PCSE in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

data no longer have a panel structure, but only a cross-sectional one. Additionally, since I am using averages as regressands and regressors, caution is warranted (Machado and Santos 2006). In situations such as this one, identification can be affected by endogeneity across covariates and between them and the number of groups. Lastly, using averages condenses the heterogeneity of the data, increasing the risks of multicollinearity, reducing variance and additionally decreasing the number of observations.

Preliminary diagnostics of a fully saturated model revealed that such an approach is indeed highly susceptible to multicollinearity[20]. To circumvent this issue and considering that the purpose here is to assess the association between contemporary democracy and our pre-Third Wave regime and development measures, Models 1 and 2 present simple bivariate regressions.

As expected, individually, the coefficients for past economic development and pre-Third Wave regime outcomes are positive and significant. Interestingly enough, Models 3 through 5 of Table 3.7 show that the coefficient of past economic development remains significant even when both variables are included in the analysis. Caution warns against interpreting these results in a strict or deterministic causal manner. Nonetheless, the coefficients —along with the rest of the evidence laid out in this chapter— do provide ample evidence that historically, economic development configured the subnational democratic heterogeneity observed today.

[20]In this instance the values of the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for the covariates of population, GDP per capita, Fiscal Transfers, Habituation, and Diffusion were all above 50. For reference, best econometric practices recommend the VIF values to be between 2 and 4.

Throughout this chapter I have asserted a patently strong relation between economic development and subnational regime heterogeneity. We now know that the territorial regime variation within countries was not configured by chance, but that it was closely shaped by economic structure. However robust this preliminary quantitative assessment, there are still three issues that need careful consideration if we are to articulate a more satisfying explanation of our outcome of interest.

First, issues of endogeneity still lurk behind the regressions presented above. Even when comparing pre- and post-Third Wave data, it could still be the case that provinces in which politics were relatively more open and contested at the turn of the 20th century developed stronger economies by the 1930s and 1950s. Opting for a mechanical or technical statistical solution, such as using the inverse of a covariate as an instrument, could quantitatively sort this issue but would still leave a theoretical gap.

The second issue is closely linked to this last point, and is specifically concerned with mechanisms. Economic development, here mostly proxied by GDP per capita, is clearly connected to more participatory and contested subnational elections. Using V-Dem data, we have also learnt that political contestation tends to be freer and fairer in more developed and urban settings. However, this robust statistical association is agnostic as to what process or dynamic exactly produces it. In other words, this chapter has asserted the effect of a cause. The next logical step is to address the cause of the effect.

The last issue to be carefully considered is that of temporality: at which point in time should a theory on regime variation within countries begin? At one end of the spectrum, the problem is *infinite regress*. At the other end, not going sufficiently back in time, however, risks leaving potentially relevant factors and events out of the analysis. The choice of temporality is critical for it can help us tackle the points on endogeneity and mechanisms discussed above. So far, we have seen that development and the territorial unevenness of democracy have been connected since at least the early and mid-twentieth century. To give a hint of what is to come, as the last exhibit in my case for historical causation, using V-Dem data,



Figure 3.26: Temporal Hints: Subnational Heterogeneity and Development in the 19$^{\text{th}}$ century

Figure 3.26 zooms into an even earlier period and shows that for the three countries under consideration, experts hint that the equilibrium between development and subnational democracy was already there by the turn of the 20^{th} century.

It is noteworthy that a closer look at the V-Dem scores reveals that the further back in time we explore, the salience of capital cities fades. However, during this earlier period, we once again find very familiar inklings. For Argentina, the extent of economic development is the sole feature unequivocally highlighted by country experts. In the case of Brazil, in addition to economic differences, experts already identify the north-south divide so characteristic of Brazil's pattern of development. Lastly, the bottom panel shows that Mexican country experts also acknowledge the relevance of economic development and hint at the north vs south divide which still prevails in Mexico.

To paraphrase the opening quote by Adam Przeworski, *subnational* democracy is a historical phenomenon. Provinces which have been more democratic over the last three decades are also more likely to have been provinces in which elections were already more contested, participatory, free and fair throughout the entirety of the 20^{th} century. This political stability is closely connected to a similarly stable economic balance: politics have been more contested and inclusive across more economically developed subnational units. Rather than focusing on behaviours and dynamics that occur once this balance has been established, we need to ask: how and when was this equilibrium asserted?

Armed with this knowledge and a robust understanding of the research question, the task at hand is to lay out a theory that balances complexity and parsimony. When thinking about which factors and events should be brought to the fore to build a satisfying explanation, we should aim for those which concomitantly are historically sufficiently common to the countries under consideration but still allow considerable levels of within-country variation. On the basis of Mahoney (2010) and Collier and Collier (1991), the next chapter does precisely this by laying out colonial roles and subnational labor incorporation as the two pillars of my argument.

"All intelligent thoughts have already been thought; what is necessary is only to try to think them again".

— Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1829)

4 Theory and Method

In my critique of the literature, guided by the logic of increasing returns, I highlighted that past events can place subnational units onto distinct paths. Using the Third Wave as a historical heuristic, based on quantitative evidence, in the following chapter I then showed that these trajectories have indeed been relatively stable over time: Provinces in which elections have been more contested and inclusive *after* the Third Wave were also more likely to be the historical democratic over-performers during the pre-Third Wave period. In fact, there is evidence that this equilibrium goes back at least to the 19th century.

That this historical dimension has been ignored by existing accounts casts serious doubts on their explanatory power. Rather than focusing on dynamics that are quasi epiphenomenal to an already determined equilibrium, to advance our understanding of subnational democratic variation we need to ask how and when was this relative balance between provinces asserted? Put differently, why is it that democracy has been more likely to emerge in some states and not others? That is, we need to explore the *origins* of subnational democracy and its territorial variation. In this chapter I discuss my theoretical claim at length and outline my methodological strategy.

I argue that the subnational regime heterogeneity observed today across Latin American countries was configured by territorially distinct development trajectories. These divergent paths were set up during colonization and, once in place, they



Figure 4.1: A Theory of Subnational Democratic Variation

conditioned the sequencing of labor incorporation. In other words, as I expound below, the legacies of colonialism and the timing of local labor incorporation jointly coloured the territorial unevenness of democracy across Latin America.

To assert that heterogeneous development trajectories shaped the territorial variation of democracy, my argument unfolds in two steps: First, on the basis of Mahoney (2010), I contend that the rise of territories as either early mercantilist or late liberal colonial nodes was critical in setting off divergent economic paths. The mercantilist route more commonly led states to economic adversity while the comparatively liberal path more frequently ushered in better prospects for local fortunes.

Second, guided by the intuition of Collier and Collier (1991), I posit that in states poised for economic prosperity, an organized working class emerged early *vis-à-vis* a country-wide labor movement. In these units, the subnational arena became a comparatively salient locus of political contention, bargaining, and participation. Contrarily, in provinces along the mercantilist path, State-labor relations were more likely shaped after country-wide incorporation. In these instances, the national arena dislodged the subnational one as the locus for political engagement.

Figure 4.1 presents a color-coded diagram of my argument at its most abstract level. It shows my two theoretical steps, and their logical ordering in relation to the outcome of interest. While each empirical chapter offers a refresher on its corresponding theoretical tenet, the following sections unpack each one of the explanatory components of this project. In what follows, I first connect colonial legacies with the offset of divergent economic development trajectories. I then bridge the main independent variable with the outcome of interest via the distinct timing of subnational responses to labor emergence. After further discussing some fine-grained theoretical issues, the fourth and last section of this chapter then reflects on methodology and presents my analytic strategy. In doing so, to the best of my knowledge, I articulate the first historically grounded theory of subnational democratic variation.

4.1 Step One: Colonial Roles and the onset of Divergent Development Trajectories

In Section 3.4 of the previous chapter, I showed that the political equilibrium between units can be traced back to the beginning of the 20th century. Moreover, using data from the V-Dem project, I also showed that country experts readily identify that economic development and subnational political openness have actually been connected at least from the 1850's onwards. The origins of subnational democracy are deeply rooted in history. Guided by this knowledge and by Mahoney's (2010) work, as I expound below, the exegesis of country and region-specific historiography reveals that a territory's colonial role was crucial to set states onto divergent development trajectories.

After Columbus stumbled upon the Caribbean in 1492, Iberian conquistadors were quick to exploit grievances between indigenous groups. Unintendedly aided by their bio-arsenal, they swiftly took over most of the New World by defeating the Aztec and Inca empires, as well as the Tupí-Guaraní tribes of South America. The early colonial crucible in the Americas was marked by the Iberian Union —the dynastic integration of the Spanish and Portuguese crowns under the Habsburgs[1]— and the mercantilist[2] tenor of the 16th and 17th centuries, which revolved around the

[1] Birmingham (2018) suggests that the administrative similarities between the Spanish and Portuguese kingdoms pre-date the Iberian Union, with Portuguese King Manuel I (1469-1521) adopting "new Spanish-style measures to keep the rising bourgeoisie in [...] subservience" (Birmingham 2018, 31). The Iberian Union lasted roughly 60 years, starting in 1580 and ending in 1640, although Spain recognized Portugal's independence only until 1668. In spite of the separation of the Portuguese and Spanish kingdoms, Birmingham (2018) suggests that in Portugal, the Habsburg style administration continued after 1640 under the influence of Francisco de Lucena.

[2] According to Allen (1991) mercantilism was the economic component of State-building during the 16th and the 18th centuries. Its policies and precepts promoted order and protection for the expansion of economic activity, which included the monopolistic subsidization of the economy

extraction of commodities such as gold and cash crops. Although pre-Columbian native civilizations fell to Iberian powers surprisingly fast, the dominance of the new colonial masters was asserted protractedly throughout the Americas. Some regions gained centrality right away, while others played a relatively peripheral role during the early stages of the colonial experience.

The core driving factors of early mercantilist colonization were resource availability —mostly in the form of mineral wealth— and the presence of complex indigenous societies through which the Iberian conquerors secured a cheap workforce. The new Iberian masters sought and promptly occupied regions where these two elements were abundant. Conversely, regions in which resources and indigenous labor were scant, remained mostly peripheral to Spanish and Portuguese interests.

The formal and informal rules Iberian overlords brought and implanted onto the New World were, during this early stage, mercantilist in nature. Mercantilism during the first century of the colonial crucible was marked by highly restrictive and protectionist policies. Both at home and across the New World, Spanish and Portuguese rulers shielded monopolies and encroached economic activity with a wide and strict set of controls, restrictions and prohibitions. For example, intracolonial trade was discouraged, foreigners were not allowed to settle in the Americas, and merchants were obliged to land their homeward-bound cargoes in specific cities across the Iberian Peninsula.

The venality of public offices, high tariffs, costly licensing permits and the Royal Fifth are additional examples of mercantilist policies. To put it formally, the early mercantilist colonial experience featured a political economy in which the accumulation strategy focused on short-run gains and self-sufficiency. It contoured

from the crown. Governments, for their part, aimed at "consolidating domestic administrative authority and military strength for foreign excursions and colonization" (Allen 1991, 441). Under a mercantilist view, wealth accumulation was crucial to —and resulted from— power. Extracting and amassing bullion was thus vital under mercantilism, as it signaled not only economic prosperity, but political might. However, there is contention among economic historians regarding the extent to which the label 'mercantilism' can clearly designate the set of policies adopted by European powers from the early 1500s to the early 1800s. As such, following Mahoney (2010), what I call mercantilism, understood as a mix of nationalist and non-laissez-faire policies, can be thought of as "classical mercantilism", and what I call "liberalism" can be recast as "enlightened mercantilism".

a regulatory framework which restricted economic participation and it fostered a patrimonial and hierarchical social stratification system (Mahoney 2010).

While this economic approach momentarily boosted Iberian incomes, the policies of the mercantilist-Habsburg era proved to be self-defeating (Neal and Cameron 2016). Not only did the Iberian economies become highly dependent on the rampant extraction of the New World, but the restrictive policies also stifled any form of entrepreneurship. Spain and Portugal's downturn were driven further by domestic strifes[3] and by the changes in the European scenario induced by the rise of the British and the Dutch Empires[4]. In time, the ebbing of their primacy became increasingly noticeable and as of the second-half of the 17th century, Iberian powers were in full decline (Williams 1970). Although Spanish and Portuguese officials made several attempts at introducing revitalizing adjustments[5], only by the turn of the 18th century, would these reform efforts achieve modicum results.

In 1700, a fortuitous event catalyzed the opportunity for successful change. Having produced no heir, the death of Charles II (1665-1700) —the last Habsburg monarch— allowed the "embers of Spanish greatness [to be] once more —and for the last time— blown into the semblance of a blaze by the new Bourbon dynasty" (Williams 1970, 122). This dynastic shift echoed across Iberian territories. Most importantly, the Habsburg crisis rippled through the peninsula, setting the stage for the House of Braganza to attain the Portuguese crown. The Lusitanic movement towards a more liberal arrangement began with Dom Pedro II (1648-1706), moderately continued under John V (1706-1750) and peaked under Joseph I (1750-1777). In Spanish and Portuguese historiography the shifts pursued under

[3]For example, in 1609 Spain struggled with the expulsion of the Moriscos, and later in 1639, the Spanish crown faced a revolt from Catalonia (Phillips Jr. and Phillips 2016). Portugal for its part, experienced revolution in 1640, which started the Portuguese Restoration War (Birmingham 2018).

[4]The downturn of Spain and Portugal can be further observed in the international, military sphere. In 1581, Spain lost its hold over the Dutch, and a few years later Spain's *Invincible Armada*, for example, was defeated by the British navy in 1588. Portugal's decline, for its part, can be exemplified by the loss of its Indian trade monopoly to the Dutch in the later decades of the 16th century.

[5]Among examples of failed reformers Castelo Melhor, António Vieira, and the Count of Ericeira stand out. These thinkers "tried to change the structure of the Portuguese economy in the second half of the seventeenth century" (Birmingham 2018, 61).

this new liberal impetus are summarily and respectively referred to as the Bourbon and the Pombaline Reforms.

With both royal houses now under Bourbon influence, the policies enacted by the Iberian sovereigns during this later stage of the colonial crucible, particularly those implemented after the turn of the 18th century, were comparatively more liberal. Both Spain and Portugal increased and centralized their administrative-bureaucratic capabilities, allowed a relatively more dynamic movement of people, and, critically, they increasingly opened up trade among the colonies and between them and the British and the Dutch empire[6]. As Bulmer-Thomas (2014) puts it, "the combined effects of the Bourbon and Pombaline reforms and the subsequent decline in Spanish and Portuguese authority had already given Latin America many of the advantages of free trade even before independence was attained" (Bulmer-Thomas 2014; 30).

Although challenged at home, and conservative in relation to the policies implemented by Britain and the Dutch, in contrast to their mercantilist predecessors, the measures taken had a "tendency towards free-enterprise" (Williams 1970, 131). As the 18th century progressed, the formal and informal rules that *peninsulares* —as Iberian newcomers were called— brought and implanted onto the Americas were more liberal and market-oriented in nature.

That is, the policies of the late-Bourbon era configured a political economy which featured a long-term accumulation strategy focused on exploiting comparative advantages, and set a less restrictive regulatory framework. These changes fostered the emergence of market-like dynamics across Iberian colonies and territories (Mahoney 2010). The new impetus drove *peninsulares* to seek and occupy territories that would allow them to take advantage of the comparatively liberal economic scenario. Henceforth, newcomers sought and settled in spaces which enhanced the creation of and access to emerging markets. The liberal economic shift came with a geographic trade-off: Regions that hitherto had remained peripheral could now

[6]For instance, with the introduction of the *navío de permiso* the Spanish crown allowed its American colonies to engage in trade with England. Although British trade was limited to only one ship per year, this policy not only reflects a slight opening of the economy, but also —critically— it allowed and fostered contraband along with other trading activities.

gain centrality. Conversely, those central under the Habsburgs waned in salience and usually became fallen colonial cores.

This succinct historical account serves as the scaffolding for three clarifications. First, by distinguishing between the early-mercantilist Habsburg colonial crucible, and the late-liberal Bourbon experience, I am positing that the identity of the colonizing powers is not fixed. In other words, I am asserting that the institutions brought and implanted by Spanish and Portuguese *peninsulares* to the New World differed between these two distinct periods. Since *peninsulares* conquered some regions first, and settled in others later, the set of institutions they brought and implanted into American territories varied accordingly.

Second, I purport that colonial institutions —in both their mercantilist and liberal variants— have long lasting consequences, each triggering a distinct path dependent development trajectory. In turn, the use of path dependency calls attention to how these institutions reproduce over time. While developing a specific theory of how these patterns survive is not the objective of this project, the historical analysis of my subnational cases clearly hints at the existence of a *longue-dureé*, reinforcing feedback loop (Pierson 2004).

Third, economist, historians, and Latin American pundits will be quick to highlight that there was not such a clean, temporal, and institutional cut in the unfolding of the colonial crucible. To deal with this issue, I make a simplifying assumption: Early peripheries are the only regions that could become 'pure' liberal centers. On this basis, I contend that to understand why certain provinces economically developed while others did not, *ad minimum*, we need to ascertain if their trajectories were 'kicked off' during the early Habsburg mercantilist era. The implication is that being a mercantilist center was a sufficient condition for contemporary provincial economic underdevelopment[7]. In addition to detailing the empirical strategy and presenting the corresponding evidence, Chapter 5 offers

[7]As I will further detail in Chapter 5, this assertion of sufficiency is based on two simplifying assumptions: 1) Early peripheries are unlikely to be liberal carryovers; 2) early peripheries are the only regions that can become 'pure' liberal centers.



CIS: Complex Indigenous Society, RA: Resource Abundance

Figure 4.2: Colonial Roles and Divergent Development Trajectories: A Model

further clarifications on this first component of my argument. For transparency, Figure 4.2 breaks down the rationale outlined so far.

What are the implications of my claim? In other words, had the mercantilist and liberal split outlined above occurred, what should we expect to observe? First, we should see and be able to capture variation in the salience of territories during the colonial era. Specifically, some units ought to be relatively central while others ought to remain peripheral early on. Critically, we should observe subnational units experiencing a reversal of economic fortunes: By virtue of their mercantilist political economy, the territories which were central during the early extractivist efforts should have gone from riches to rags. Contrarily, areas that remained peripheral early on should have more successfully adopted liberal practices and turned their fortunes around.

In sum, the first pillar of my theory accounts for the primary cause behind divergent subnational economic trajectories. That is, it elucidates the historic reasons underpinning the different structural settings in which more or less open and contested political regimes would emerge. This first component then configures the background or *antecedent conditions* of our outcome of interest. The second pillar of my argument —outlined in the following section— explores the political implications of colonial roles and the reversal of subnational economic fortunes by zeroing in on State-labor dynamics.

4.2 Step Two: Subnational Labor Incorporation

While remaining agnostic about their political fates, I have so far contended that the early mercantilist and late liberal split played a critical role in shaping provincial economic fortunes. Looking specifically at the political or regime level consequences of these paths, my second theoretical step follows from the first: that their colonial role set provinces onto different development trajectories led to the spatially and temporally heterogeneous emergence of labor. The early emergence of an organized working class was more likely in 'late-liberal' provinces. In these cases, the initial State effort for political incorporation came from subnational and local governments. Contrarily, in the mercantilist 'fallen colonial cores', labor emerged protractedly and the first State response came primarily from the central government, during or after the national incorporation process (Collier and Collier 1991).

Consequently, in provinces where labor emerged early, the subnational arena became a comparatively salient domain for political contention, bargaining, and participation. In contrast, in cases of late labor emergence, the national arena displaced the subnational one. To put it bluntly, the timing of subnational labor incorporation conditioned the articulation of the subnational arena as a relevant locus for political engagement.

The legacies of the distinct development trajectories were apparent during the first decades of the 1800s, and became increasingly manifest throughout the second-half of the 19$^{\text{th}}$ century. Between 1850 and 1900, as Wright (2017) puts it "Latin America underwent a profound physical transformation" (Wright 2017, 87). While change was multidimensional and intricate, key to our purposes is that, by midcentury, export-led growth boosted urban expansion, protoindustrialization[8]

[8]Protoindustrialization was first discussed by Mendels (1972) to describe the first phase of industrialization, or pre-industrial industry. That is, the "traditionally organized but market-oriented, principally rural industry" (Mendels 1972, 241). The application of this concept to the Latin American experience has been contested. While Bulmer-Thomas (2014) asserts that the origins of modern manufacturing in Latin America cannot be traced to protoindustrialization,

and proletarianization[9]. While these processes languished in fallen colonial cores, they were more intensely experienced in late-liberal centers.

To paraphrase Collier and Collier (1991), the emergence of worker organization and protest grew out of the expansion of local economies that occurred in response to a remarkable export-led growth between approximately the middle of the 19th century and the beginning of World War I. In provinces poised to benefit from this economic expansion, the working class was in a position at an earlier point to make its demands felt and to pose what came to be known as the "social question" (Collier and Collier 1991, 59).

That is, in rising peripheries —provinces which followed the late-liberal path— trade, small cottage factories, and a nascent industry promoted the expansion of wage-labor and stimulated an increase in the number of city-dwelling workers. These processes were accompanied by the formation of multiple *sociedades de ayuda mútua* (mutual aid societies) and, in time, a growing number of labor unions. Faced with demands coming from this new and mounting social group, local authorities were the State first-responders. In these cases, subnational governments, not national ones, were the first ones to deal with the pressures of labor incorporation.

Contrarily, in fallen mercantilist cores, the emergence of industry and the incorporation of labor was a long-drawn-out process mostly led from the center. In these instances, the State's response to labor came from the national, not the subnational government. The locus of political engagement was consequently centralized. Bargaining was less likely to be driven by the interest of local actors

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he also asserts that studies of protoindustrialization in Latin America are still in their infancy. Other scholars like Miño (1989) do use it for the region. I think using the concept is appropriate for two reasons: 1) There is research applying it to explore Mexico (Ouweneel (1989) and Riojas (2013)) and Brazil (see Libby (1991). 2) These studies along with Mendels original paper had a regional-subnational connotation.

[9]Sociologist and economist use the term proletarianization to allude to the transformation of labor that occurs in the later or advanced stages of capitalism. This change usually refers to the shift from self-employment to wage labor as well as the alteration of settings within society and the economy in which this wage-labor relation exists (Wright and Singelmann 1982). To the best of my knowledge, the use of proletarianization to describe the Latin American experience has been less contested than the use of protoindustrialization. The volume edited by Amin and van der Linden (1997) offers a nuanced review of the proletarianization process in Latin America and South Asia.



Figure 4.3: Labor Incorporation and Subnational Regime Outcomes

and institutional openings were less likely to be created at the local level. Figure 4.3 outlines the reasoning delineated above.

What are the implications of my second theoretical step? In other words, what would we expect to observe had the timing of labor incorporation been subnationally uneven? First, within provinces, we should see signs of bargains, regulations and provincial bureaucratic reactions to labor. Second, between provinces, we should observe these efforts to materialize early on across units on the liberal path. Conversely, we should observe protracted attempts elsewhere. Third, we should be able to capture a cross-national difference. From the first and second implications, it follows that countries with more liberal nodes should have comparatively stronger vested interests at the subnational level. Consequently, in these cases, we would expect the national incorporation process to require higher levels of compromise between governmental tiers.

To put it differently, we should observe the build-up of State-labor relations to take place first at the subnational level across units on the liberal path. In these cases, the formal and informal institutions shaping State-labor relations should be entrenched or engrained locally. Opening the space for labor to engage with government and policy increases the number of actors entitled to partake of the local political arena. That is, it enhances the inclusiveness of these provinces. Similarly, locally engrained State-labor arrangements and institutions confer and increase the value or appeal of the local arena. This heightened salience, in turn, should incite comparatively greater levels of political contestation. Finally, provinces on this track should be more likely and better suited to withstand the centralizing initiatives carried out between the 1920s and the 1950s.

Following the same logic, in those units under the mercantilist route we should more likely observe that labor emerges protractedly and generally under the auspices of a nationally led effort. We should consequently expect the institutions, bargains and arrangements which shape State-labor relations to be more centralized. That is, the local political arena in these cases is more likely to be supplanted by the centre. The political locus in these instances is shifted. Competition and participation, while keeping some local elements, are more likely to be effectively driven by or at the centre. For these cases we should expect national State-labor dynamics to override local ones. With no subnational scaffolding to accommodate social interests, conflict and public engagement is more likely to overflow local institutions and could more easily escalate into violence.

From these two scenarios, it logically follows that countries with more liberal nodes should have a more robust set of institutions at the subnational arena. Contrarily, in countries with a high concentration of mercantilist cores we should observe a vulnerable and (through time) waning subnational dimension, with State-labor institutions highly concentrated at the centre.

Jointly, the two pillars explored above and their corresponding implications account for a more robust and satisfying historical explanation of contemporary subnational democratic variation across Latin America. Armed with the *core* outlook of my argument, the following subsections address issues and details that require further, fine-grained elaboration.

4.2.1 A Word on Political Incorporation

Considering that the timing and dynamics of labor incorporation tie my independent and dependent variables together, a few clarifications on the concept are indispensable. First, I understand political incorporation as a process through which the claims of a previously marginalized popular sector are recognized by the State through the —sustained and partially effective— creation of formal and informal rules aimed at regulating their participation, and links to the policy process[10]. Second, for further transparency, the distinct components of the definition are understood as follows:

1. ‘Political incorporation is a process’ that unfolds over time and that is likely to be incremental rather than a one-off output.

2. The definition refers to ‘claims of a previously marginalized group’ —that is, a hitherto excluded group (from either the social, the political or the economic domain)— which is able to articulate at least partially consistent demands and to generate enough *bottom-up* pressure —by either intensive or extensive means[11]— so as to warrant public attention.

3. Tending to this mounting social pressure, the State —the Weberian multitiered and complex matrix of bureaucratic and legal institutions and the incumbents who occupy those offices— recognizes and responds formally and/or informally to the demands raised. This response is normally sustained over a period of time and usually achieves a modicum of success[12].

[10]In building this definition I draw on the following core conceptualizations. First, the Colliers define the ‘initial’ incorporation of labor as the “first sustained and at least partially successful attempt by the state to legitimate and shape an institutionalized labor movement” (Collier and Collier 1991, 783). Second, Castillo and Barrenechea (2016) define ‘political incorporation’ as “a process through which a previously marginalized actor acquieres policy benefits and (new) forms of representation in the [S]tate” (Castillo and Barrenechea 2016, 4). Lastly, Silva and Rossi (2018) define the concept as “the recognition of the claims of politically active popular sectors, the creation or adaption of formal and informal rules that regulate their participation in politics and their links to the policy process” (Silva and Rossi 2018, 7). In drawing from these definitions I intend to cast a wider net, which is why I move up (instead of down) the ladder of abstraction (Sartori 1970).

[11]On the one hand, by *intensive* I mean one individual or a small group of actors who display constant and/or zealous public activity. On the other hand, by *extensive* I refer to the number and proportion of the marginalized group relative to the rest of the population. That is, to a given proportion or membership threshold after which actions become numerically and publicly significant.

[12]For example, success here can entail: 1) The majority —or the most representative organizations— of the formerly excluded group has been incorporated, and 2) bottom-up social pressures (as exemplified by the intensity and number of protests, movements and strikes) decreases.

4. The emerging formal or informal framework enables the previously marginalized group to legitimately partake in politics and to gain access to (or a greater degree of influence in) policy decision spaces. In other words, the newly incorporated group secures policy benefits that normally accrue to either individuals, the collective organization(s), or a broader set of citizens[13].

5. The widening of the policy space creates an opening in which ties or linkages between the State and the incorporated group are formed. Historically, these linkages have been either 'corporatist', 'partisan' or 'personalistic' in nature[14].

With these attributes, my definition of political incorporation is similar to previous ones in that it "entails the expansion of representation [within a polity][...][O]nce incorporation occurs, representation can be expanded, contested, and followed by successive processes of [further inclusion or] exclusion" (Castillo and Barrenechea 2016, 5). However, my definition is distinct in four key ways: 1) It balances bottom-up pressures and top-down reactions. Contrary to the Colliers', 2) it is not labor-specific, but refers broadly to a group within the 'popular sector'. Moreover, 3) it expands the scope of State responses by including both formal and informal institutions, as well as distinct types of linkage strategies. Lastly, 4) my definition emphasizes the State as a multitiered entity, opening up the space for subnational analysis[15].

[13]For example, for individuals, benefits could consists of the enforcement of wages or contracts. At the collective level, a previously marginalized group can secure legal recognition and obtain particular prerogatives for their organizations. Lastly, social benefits are those that originally pertain to specific organization or class, but have positive externalities or spillovers to the rest of society. Here, the protection of child labor, resting weekends, the right of assembly, voting, and ultimately other socio-political rights come to mind.

[14]Corporatism usually entails a degree of direct integration and exchange between organizations representing specific societal interests and State agencies. Molina and Rhodes (2002) present a thorough review of the intricacies of this concept. Partisan linkages allude to a similar dynamic of integration and exchange but channeled through or fostered by a specific political party. For a thorough assessment of party-society linkages in Latin America, see Roberts (2002). Lastly, personalistic associations also involve a degree of integration and exchange; however, here these dynamics can occur between two individuals (i.e. the leader of a union and a specific politician) or between an individual and an organized group (i.e. a politician and a given union). Kitschelt (2000) provides what is perhaps one of the most novel and thorough examinations of citizen-politician linkages.

[15]These last two points stem from and have implications for studies exploring the second wave of political incorporation see Rossi(2017) and Silva and Rossi (2018).

In light of this conceptualization and the historical scope of my argument, the final consideration regarding political incorporation relates to my theoretical expectations. Given that my account begins in the formative stages of modern political institutions, I expect most incorporation efforts and linkages to be personalistic, and to display a mix of formal and informal arrangements. This means, for example, that I anticipate the configuration of local party ties and local linkage strategies to occur later on. That is, I expect them to be crystallized (if at all) through time after a first, much more informal, State-labor relation is in place.

A perceptive and experienced reader has by now noticed that so far, my discussion on the organized working class and their political incorporation has not delved onto issues of 'labor strength' or 'labor autonomy'. In this regard, a positive association between late liberal nodes and these features would seem intuitive. However, I remain theoretically agnostic about this *qualifying* characteristics of the labor movement and only reflect back on them after presenting and analysing the evidence. In that sense, a critic specially interested in these issues will find the discussion of Chapter 6 and the theoretical reflections of the concluding chapter particularly illuminating. For now, there are additional issues that I must address in order to clarify the full theoretical scope of this project.

4.3 Further Theoretical Clarifications: Addressing some *Frequently Asked Questions*

Colonial roles and labor incorporation are the two pillars that jointly account for the origins of subnational democracy. That is, they describe the process through which the relative equilibrium observed in Chapter 3 was determined and by doing so, they expand our understanding of how different subnational regime outcomes were configured. Some territories were central to the early mercantilist colonial crucible and some others only gained prominence during a more economically liberal epoch. The institutions implanted by Iberian conquistadors differed accordingly. Late liberal nodes were poised for economic prosperity and labor emerged comparatively early on in these units, which caused the dynamics for incorporation to be led by and at the local level. Contrarily, in units along the mercantilist path, that is, units that went from riches to rags, labor emerged later on and the incorporation process was driven by and at the centre.

Between provinces, this implied that for units along the liberal path, the local political arena became a salient locus for public engagement, while for units on the mercantilist route it was dislodged or shifted towards the centre. Cross-nationally, this means that countries with more liberal nodes should have a comparatively more robust —inclusive and competitive— subnational political arena. Armed with a much more sound understanding of my argument and a detailed discussion of what I mean by incorporation, the reader might still raise five additional and important questions:

I. Why is it 'better' to have colonial roles and labor incorporation as two theoretical pillars? Wouldn't a more parsimonious account focus on and emphasize a single component?

   At the core of this question lies a valid concern for parsimony[16]. Political scientists in general and comparativists, in particular, strive to balance a preference for the simplest possible explanation and completeness in their research. When exploring outcomes which are likely to be overdetermined (such as democracy), this balancing act requires, on the one hand, weighing up and exploiting the leverage of a carefully selected set of factors. On the other hand, it calls for weaving hypotheses and evidence together into a logically and empirically coherent whole.

   In looking at subnational democratic variation, a zealous emphasis on parsimony would demand selecting and exploring perhaps only one of my two pillars. However, doing so would be misguided as it would hamper the development of a fully fledged theory. If we were to exclusively examine the implications of colonial roles, we would just be able to account for distinct

[16]This concern, in turn, stems from Merton's *middle-range* approach which for more than half a century has been the dominant approach for theorizing across the social sciences(see Merton (1957) and Boudon (1991)).

levels of subnational development. Conversely, a theory that emphasized only labor dynamics would be deprived of critical antecedent conditions. That is, separately, each pillar would paint an incomplete picture.

Only by jointly —theoretically and empirically— weaving these pillars together can we offer a more satisfying account of the outcome of interest. By keeping colonial roles and labor incorporation as the two tenets of my theory, I contend that they were jointly sufficient processes for the configuration of subnational regime heterogeneity across Latin America.

II. Conceding that we need both pillars, why focus on the Habsburg *vs* Bourbon/Pombaline divide? Why not draw attention to latifundia or slavery?

A quick survey of the regional and country-specific historiography would almost immediately reveal that large estate institutions (LEIs), such as *latifundia*, *haciendas*, *encomiendas* or *mitas*, played a considerable role in shaping economic fortunes in Latin America. Similarly, Brazilian historians and observers have repeatedly emphasized the role of slavery in shaping regional disparities. While latifundia and slavery are the factors highlighted by the conventional wisdom on the legacies of Iberian rule, I nonetheless assign causal primacy to colonial roles. The reason is fairly intuitive: they offer more robust and clear-cut explanatory leverage. Virtually all Iberian territories in the Americas had LEIs and slaves. Only by looking at the temporal change in the regulatory framework within which they operated can we account for subnational variation.

More specifically, the problem with LEIs and slavery is two-fold: First, even if we concede for heterogeneity across LEIs and slavery, it is unclear how we are to interpret this cross-sectional variation. Should provinces that had a higher number of haciendas or slaves be 'penalized'? Should we look qualitatively at the 'severity' of LEIs and slavery across states? Should states with haciendas but no encomiendas be 'rewarded'? Or should we expect territories with indigenous but no transatlantic African slavery to have 'better' economic outcomes?

Even if we could thoroughly and objectively conduct these types of assessments, we would still need to face the second issue: *Why* did certain territories have more LEIs or slaves? And why were these *institutions* more severe in certain states and laxer in others? For instance, why is it that (although criticized) Brazilian historians often reflect on a *softer* form of slavery —less repressive and smaller in magnitude— in Brazil's south? My point is that we cannot answer these questions unless we look at how the 'identity of the colonizer' shifted in time and how the corresponding implanted institutions changed accordingly.

By prioritizing this temporal difference —that is, distinguishing between early Habsburg mercantilist centers and late liberal nodes— we are in a better position to gauge the nature of the institutions implanted across different territories within countries.

III. If colonial roles played such a pivotal role, why is it not a narrative stylized *à la* Moore? Or conversely, why center the attention on labor and not landowners or the bourgeoisie?

Scholars of democracy and Latin American observers may justifiably ask why I identify labor as the special agent of democracy. After all, given the restrictive nature of mercantilism, we would expect *terratenientes* (landed upper classes) to be stronger in early Habsburg centers and we would also expect a commercial bourgeoisie to more easily emerge in late liberal nodes. In that sense, articulating a *Moorian* bourgeoisie-centered narrative would seem like the more intuitive choice.

However, in the Latin American colonial and post-colonial experience, capital and land were intimately knotted together. Moreover, this tie was traversed by race and nationality, a fact that makes clearly distinguishing between the upper classes a fuzzy endeavor. In addition, even when a distinct merchant class did emerge, it was not necessarily a pro-democratic force, as it mostly aimed to secure property as well as its trading privileges. First *peninsulares* and later on the creole elites, the colonial and post-colonial upper classes kept a tight control of land, capital and the accompanying political power. This fact warns against identifying them as a neat or clear-cut democratic force[17]. Ultimately, an analysis centered on the interplay between the landed elites and the bourgeoisie would be better suited to account for the subnational varieties of capitalism, not democracy.

Even when conceding the points raised above: why labor? Why focus on the timing of the emergence of labor? A keen reader could swiftly highlight that labor's role as a pro-democratic force in Latin America has been underestimated (Collier 1999) at best and, at worst, it has been heavily called into question (Levitsky and Mainwaring 2006). The salience my theory assigns to the dynamics associated with the organized working class and their incorporation into the political arena (that is, my emphasis on the political importance of labor echoes Collier and Collier (1991)) operates in two ways: First, by recognizing its capacity for collective action and second, by acknowledging its *special significance vis-à-vis* the State's legitimacy .

In terms of its capacity for collective action, "the location of many unionized workers in spatially concentrated, large-scale centers of productions and/or their strategic position at critical points in the economy or the polity gives them an unusual capacity to disrupt the economic and political system" (Collier and Collier 1991, 41). That is, on the one hand, spatial and day-to-day proximity lessens their costs for collective action. On the other hand, the position of the working class *vis-à-vis* the economy and society, gives labor a comparatively higher capacity to exert socio-political change.

[17] The Colliers further highlight that a similar distinction was made by Leon Trotsky when he observed that "inasmuch as the chief role in backward countries (with semi-colonial economies) is not played by national but foreign capitalism, the national bourgeoisie occupies a much minor position[and consequently][. . .] [t]he national proletariat begins playing the most important role in the life of the country" (Trotsky (1968); cited in Collier and Collier (1991, 43)).

The second issue stems from acknowledging that (when compared to the European experience) across Latin America, social or popular elements granting legitimacy to the configuration of the State were absent or incomplete. Under these circumstances, the organized working class played a crucial role in compensating for this deficiency[18]. To paraphrase O'Donnell (1982), labor *mediated* between the state and society by embodying *lo popular*. They pushed for their "recognition as members of the nation [...] through their demands for substantive justice, which they posed not as oppressed classes, but as victims of [...] governmental indifference" (O'Donnell 1982, 23). In sum, the role of labor "can be 'constantly unsettling' because [it] not only has the substantial capacity for collective action [but also because] its collective action touches on larger, underlying issues of Latin American politics" (Collier and Collier 1991, 44).

Lastly, beyond the Latin American experience, my emphasis on the political salience of labor also rests on a broader tradition within comparative politics which includes, but is not limited to, the contribution of Collier and Collier (1991). Going all the way back to Therborn's (1977) analysis of the European working class, within the discipline, this school of thought encompasses the classic argument put forth by Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992), as well as the more recent work by Carles Boix (2003). In that sense, my work

[18]Latin American observers might highlight that across the region, the *organized* peasantry was also key in embodying *el pueblo*. After all, during the late 19th and early 20th century, "the transition away from coerced labor led not to a [neatly defined] wage labor system, [...] but rather to a system of wage laborers who were also peasants" (Petras and Veltmeyer 2002, 48). In spite of this, three crucial considerations drive my emphasis of labor over the peasantry. First, it is unclear the extent to which the peasantry can be seen as a *new* social actor whose interests need to be accommodated. Sadly, their repression and marginalization can be traced back to the colonial times and endured even after independence. Rather, Latin American historiography reveals a tight political —mostly repressive— knot between peasants and the landed upper classes. Second, this dominance, in combination with their spatially scattered nature weakens their organizational capacity and enhances 'unionization from above' relatively more. Third and last, but perhaps most importantly, their demands have been heavily oriented towards land redistribution. Labor demands, generally focused on wages, union recognition, working rights and civil prerogatives have a broader scope and are more likely to translate onto openness, contestation and participation in the political arena.

builds on leading scholars who have also identified labor as the special agent of democratic politics.

IV. Accepting that we need the two pillars of the theory and conceding labor's political salience, one might ask how these two theoretical tenets are connected to subnational democracy. In other words, how can colonial roles and labor incorporation coexist comfortably within a theory of *subnational* regime outcomes?

Throughout this and other chapters I have hinted and stated the logical association between my explanatory pillars and my outcome of interest. For transparency, and to enhance the cogency connecting each link of the proposed causal chain, I offer new elements and reiterate some others in an effort to maximize the clarity of my exposition. First, as I asserted above, the colonial legacies configure the background or antecedent conditions explaining distinct levels of provincial economic development. However, as we saw in the literature review, this latter factor has been argued to exert its influence over political outcomes through a variety of ways. From expanding moderation across the population, to increasing the number of media and information sources in a given territory. In that sense, the link between economic development and subnational regime outcomes is a black-box in need of an unfolding —and illuminating— mechanism.

In this chapter (and throughout the remainder of the thesis) I contend that labor dynamics in general, and the sequencing of subnational labor incorporation in particular, are the key factors and processes shedding light on the political consequences of development. Hence, while colonial roles set the stage by triggering the two *ideal type* paths identified, the second pillar is responsible for the properly political implications of my argument.

To be clear, there are two *connective tissues* linking the trajectories set by colonial roles and my second theoretical step. The first one is a rather direct one, and it is the timing of the emergence of the working class. Provinces on the liberal (mercantilist) path were more likely to industrialize at an earlier (later) time, and hence, the working class was also more likely to emerge first (late) across these units. The second connective tissue is a consequence of the first, and it suggests that, in those provinces that became urban and industrial early on, the working class grew and gained social and political relevance years before it did so in provinces along the mercantilist route. The question then becomes: How exactly are the dynamics and timing of local labor incorporation linked to subnational regime outcomes?

The answer to this question has two interconnected components: On the one hand, a 'symbolic-representative' dimension and, on the other hand a 'spatial-institutional' one. For completeness, below I briefly address each one.

Symbolic-Representative Dimension Based on the work of Castillo and Barrenechea (2016) I have previously suggested that incorporation entails the expansion of representation within a polity and that this newly enlarged representation can then be contested and extended. That is, when the organized working class emerges as a new social and political actor a new set of preferences and interests need to be represented and accommodated within the political arena. From a *bottom-up* perspective, this calls for the expansion of inclusiveness: one of the Dahl's (1971) defining democratic pillars. From a *top-down* point of view, the question then becomes who gets to represent these interests and through which mechanisms should these representatives be (s)elected. The emergence of labor not only increases the number of politically relevant players, but by triggering the 'who gets to represent them?' question, it also drives political contestation (Dahl's (1971) second democratic dimension) up.

Spatial-Institutional Dimension While the dimension discussed above stems from the emergence of the working class as a political actor, the sequencing of their incorporation is relevant because it heavily influences whether the national or the subnational political arena is dominant. That is, it determines the location at which bargaining and institutional spaces, linkages, roles, or offices are created and maintained. In late liberal nodes, bargaining, political mediation, and bureaucratic openings surrounding the establishment of State-labor relations occur locally first. These institutions, offices, and agreements occupy and concern the provincial space. Both social and State actors have higher interests vested in local politics. Conversely, in provinces along the mercantilist route, the local political arena is more likely to be void of this early dynamism. The dislodging alluded to throughout this chapter refers to the fact that in these provinces bargaining, bureaucratic reactions, offices and agreements are more likely to be spatially displaced towards the centre. Consequently, in provinces along the mercantilist path, both top-down and bottom-up forces have low incentives to engage in the local arena.

Once these political patterns and dynamics are in place, they become self-reinforcing. That is, once patterns of political representation are set and the main spatial locus of political engagement is defined, they are hard to modify. This does not discard the possibility that inclusiveness and contestation might increase (or decrease) in any given province, but it does suggest that breaking the relative positional equilibrium between subnational units is a way more difficult endeavor.

V. Last but not least, even if we accept the reasoning outlined in the four preceding points, what happens with other factors, variables and processes? What about independence, the Mexican revolution, droughts or immigration? Are they not relevant?

The short and only truthful answer to this question is a sound: *yes*. I am by no means claiming that colonial roles and labor dynamics have a deterministic effect. As I will clarify in the next section, my take on causality is a probabilistic one. My two theoretical tenets heavily influenced the likelihood and the chances for subnational democracy and they shaped, to a great extent, the territorial unevenness of regimes within countries. They, however, do not represent *destiny*.

There are cases that deviate from the patterns and trajectories discussed above. For example, the Mexican state of Tamaulipas had a much more robust labor movement than northern states. Similarly, during the late 16th century north-eastern areas in Brazil were shortly controlled by the Dutch; and, lastly, Mexico City is one of the few units in Latin America that successfully transited from a 'mercantilist' to a 'liberal' node. On the one hand, these are the few exceptions that prove the rule. On the other hand, being mindful of these limitations strengthened my drive to articulate and present my evidence in a careful and thorough fashion.

Acknowledging the causal complexity of social reality drives me to recognize the accompanying restrictions on the scope of my claim, and to acknowledge that other variables might be relevant. In a rather *Orwellian* turn, however, I do contend that some factors and processes are more important than others. Moreover, a variable's salience is ultimately set by its relation to the outcome of interest under consideration. In that sense, while factors such as immigration, droughts, and fiscal resources might explain why in certain moments local politics are more competitive than others, I assert that my argument provides a more thorough, historically grounded, understanding of the subnational variation of democracy observed across Latin America.

Ultimately, the cogency of my argument rests not only on the logical transparency of my theory, but it also relies on the robustness of my analytic strategy. To that purpose, the following section concludes this chapter by presenting the methodological underpinnings of this project.

4.4 Method and Analytic Strategy

To empirically support my claim that colonial roles and labor dynamics shaped the territorial unevenness of democracy across Latin America, I need to erect a solid methodological scaffolding. To lay out my research design in a consistent fashion, I first go over my reasoning for case selection. After presenting why I specifically examine a set of provinces within a defined number of countries, I then discuss my empirical approach playing close attention to the analytic toolkit, the sources used, and my take on causality.

4.4.1 Case Selection Strategy

Subnational research by its very nature requires a *multilevel* case selection strategy. It demands the researcher to articulate a justification for each of the governmental or territorial domains traversed to get to the unit at which analysis is conducted. For this project, that entails justifying my focus on specific countries first. In this respect, as I expound below, to control for national background conditions, I follow a most-similar case approach and select Argentina, Brazil and Mexico as my country cases. As a second step, I present my basis for choosing to study specific provinces. In this regard, to assess the plausibility of my argument, I put forth my rationale for selecting Salta, Guerrero, Rio Grande do Sul, and Jalisco as *pathway cases*.

4.4.1.1 Country Cases: Argentina, Brazil and Mexico

Argentina, Brazil and Mexico have spear-headed economic, social, and political changes in Latin America. They are the *sine qua non* reference for politicians, journalists, scholars, and students wishing to understand patterns, challenges, and changes across the region. In comparative terms, these countries offer theoretical and methodological advantages while remaining relevant for *real*-world politics. Therefore, examining subnational variation across these countries provides strong explanatory leverage and naturally aligns with the objectives of this thesis.

Within comparative politics, this regional hegemonic triad is remarkably important. There is a vast and compelling literature exploring the intricacies of their democratization processes (Munck 2007; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013), as well as the set of conditions that determine the dynamics of their political systems (Casar 2010; Montero 2014). Moreover, area studies and research from other regions around the world commonly explore the experiences of any one of these countries to either contrast or draw overarching conclusions from them. In sum, a quick overview of published scholarly work quickly reveals that Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico have a significant theoretical value within comparative democratization studies and beyond.

In addition to their relevance within the discipline, methods-wise, at the country level, they present a ripe opportunity to follow a *most similar case* design (Seawright and Gerring 2008). Despite specific differences, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico are comparable in key aspects. Most importantly, they all share a resemblance in terms of their administrative, federal, and gubernatorial structure. To put it briefly, they allow me to balance representativeness, outcome variation, and feasibility while at the same time enhancing the generalizability of my conclusions.

At the national level, these countries share institutional features: they all have a presidential system, a relatively similar judicial and legislative configuration, and a fairly equal footing on the regional and international arena. Further similarities in terms of relevant historical socio-economic and political patterns are captured by the distinct plots in Figure 4.4.

As of 2020, approximately 60% of Latin Americans lived within the borders of my country cases. While the size of their population does differ, the top-left panel of Figure 4.4 shows that the number of inhabitants in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico has grown at relatively similar rates. During the period observed, these countries have experienced an average demographic expansion of roughly 2% each year. Looking closer, we can observe a small but steady growth up until the mid 20^{th} century, followed by a similarly constant decline in the last five decades.

Economically speaking, during 2019, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico generated roughly 70% of the Latin American Gross Domestic Product. While the *size of the pie* has clearly increased through time, and some years have indeed been better than others, the top-right panel of Figure 4.4 shows that in these countries, the economic output per person has observed a remarkably similar pattern. For the period under consideration, the yearly growth rate of per capita GDP has hovered around 0.02%.



Figure 4.4: Economic, Social and Political Similarities between Argentina, Brazil and Mexico

Source: V-Dem project v.8. Description of the composites measures of corruption and democracy are found in-text.

In the political realm, there are also some important similarities. While the intricacies of their democratization processes vary, the bottom-left plot of Figure 4.4 shows that Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico have followed a similar trend in this regard, with a marked authoritarian past and a movement towards democracy[19] which began in the last decades of the 20^{th} century. Similarly, the plot on the bottom right-hand side shows that a considerable level of corruption[20] permeates my country cases. With an overall average value of 0.65, we can observe recently declining trends in Brazil and Mexico while Argentina has started to moved in the opposite direction.

Lastly, beyond regime and corruption level similarities, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico present additional political parallelisms. These *large federations* share a relatively similar number of subnational units: 24 for Argentina, 27 for Brazil, and 32 for Mexico. All of these have directly elected governors and at least a unicameral congress. In all three countries, within each state or *provincia*, governors enjoy ample political powers (Abrucio 1994; Woldenberg 2013). Moreover, the salience and influence of subnational politics within these three countries has been thoroughly documented (Samuels and Abrucio 2000; Montero 2007; Hiskey and Bowler 2005).

In sum, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico are the best possible country-level choices to follow a most-similar-cases approach. This methodological decision should in turn enhance my ability to *control* for potential confounders or unobserved factors present at the national level. With clarity on the first tier or domain, in the next section I move on to the second stage of my case selection strategy: the subnational space.

4.4.1.2 Choosing Subnational Cases

Relying on country-level similarities, the crux of case selection for subnational research additionally requires choosing and justifying two dimensions: First, we need to determine the spatial level of analysis. After delimiting what constitutes

[19] The 'Composite Democracy Score' displayed in the plot is the simple average of the liberal, electoral, and participatory measures of democracy reported in the V-Dem project dataset.

[20] I calculated the 'Composite Corruption Measure' reported in the plot by obtaining the simple average of the regime and political corruption indices reported in the V-Dem project dataset. The former captures corruption along specific 'offices' or 'institutions' such as the executive and the legislature. The latter is intended to proxy for the pervasiveness of corruption in the 'public sphere'.

Table 4.1: Choosing the Level of Analysis

Potential 'Subnational Spaces'	Criteria	Chosen Level of Analysis
a) Provincial (second-tier) b) Municipal (third-tier) c) Electoral District d) Automatic Grid	1. Maximizing the number of observations (n). 2. Lowest possible level allowing for spatial contiguity between units. 3. Maximize comparability (between cases and with existing literature). 4. Maximize boundary stability over time. 5. Lowest level with reliable and available data. 6. Balance scale vs depth trade-off.	a) Provincial (second-tier)

Source: Built by the author on the basis of Harbers and Ingram (2019), as well as Soifer (2019).

the 'subnational space', in the second stage we then select the specific cases to be examined. In Section 1.7 of the Introduction I partially addressed the first task. In this subsection I offer further details on my reasoning for selecting a specific level of analysis and then provide the rationale for selecting particular subnational cases.

To choose a level of analysis, I started by listing the potential ways in which I could define the 'subnational space' (shown here in the first column of Table 4.1). Then, following Harbers and Ingram (2019), Soifer (2019), and my own discussion of the scale vs depth trade-off, I ran through each one of the relevant criteria (listed in the mid column of Table 4.1). Here, the balancing act required pondering the advantages of maximizing the number of observations by, for example, using electoral districts or municipalities against the fact that: I) these boundaries have not been stable over time; II) they do not maximize comparability with extant research; and that III) it seems less plausible for the proposed mechanism to operate at these levels. Consequently, as the third and last column of Table 4.1 shows, my chosen level of analysis corresponds to second-tier provincial or state units.

With the assessment set at the provincial or state-level, the next task is to decide which specific units to examine. Given the mixed-methods nature of this project, I started the selection process recognizing that my thesis constitutes what Lieberman (2015) refers to as a *nested analysis*. That is, the qualitative case-study units are also within the quantitative dataset. Following Gerring (2017), and considering

Table 4.2: Case Selection Strategy: Stratified Random Sampling

		Subnational Democracy (Vanhanen Index)	
		Low	High
Economic Development (GDP per capita)	Low	CAT, CHA, FOR, JUJ, MIS, ***SALT***, SEST, TUC, AC, AL, BA, CE, MA, PA, PB, PE, PI, SE, TO, CHP, EMEX, ***GRO***, GTO, HID, OAX, PUEB, SIN	ER, SNJN, AP, RN, RO, COL, MICH, NAY, SLP, TLAX, VER, YUC, ZAC
	High	CHU, CRTS, RIOJ, RNEG, SNLS, STCR, AM, ES, GO, MS, MT, AGS, BC, CHI, COH, NL, QROO, QUER, SON, TAB, TAM	BUA, CBA, MEND, NEU, PAMP, STFE, TFGO, DF, MG, PR, RJ, RR, ***RS***, SC, SP, BCS, CAM, CDMX, DUR, ***JAL***, MOR

the empirical exploration conducted in the previous chapter, the second step is to acknowledge that we know in advance the level of democracy and economic development attained by each unit. Similarly, we already know the value of other factors highlighted by the extant literature as theoretically relevant.

In situations in which the values of the outcome (y), independent variable (x), and most theoretically relevant factors (z) are known, and given that historical research works retrospectively (King, Keohane and Verba 1994) [KKV], selecting on the dependent variable is an unavoidable issue. To escape the risks of an indeterminate design, "selection should [nonetheless] allow the possibility of at least some variation on the dependent variable" (King, Keohane and Verba 1994, 130). To do so I used *stratified random sampling* (Koivu and Hinze 2017).

Stratified random sampling works in two stages: First, it calls for splitting cases into different strata. In the second stage, the researcher then randomly draws from within these subgroups. Table 4.2 is a two-by-two which splits potential cases into four brackets. The rows and columns divide high and low levels of economic development and democracy[21]. The question then becomes: from which quadrants should we sample our cases? Given that we know x and y, and considering that my main goal is to provide evidence of the plausibility of my argument, I need to select units that Goertz (2017) calls 'empirical existence proofs'. In the words of Gerring (2017) these are *pathway* cases. This strategy is particularly useful for our purposes because "by showing that the theory fits the chosen case, the study

[21]To set the difference, I used the country median of subnational GDP per capita and the country averages of the subnational democracy index presented and used in Chapter 3.

illustrates the contents of the theory and demonstrates its plausibility. If it works here, the logic goes, it may apply elsewhere" (Gerring 2017, 105).

In Table 4.2 path-way cases lie in the first (*low-low*), and fourth (*high-high*) shaded quadrants. Working within these two subgroups, I assigned each unit a random number between 0 and 1. Using the highest value as reference, I then selected two units per quadrant. As a result, the cases I follow throughout the qualitative component of this project are Salta (Argentina), Guerrero (Mexico) —both from the *low-low* segment— as well as Rio Grande do Sul (Brazil) and Jalisco (Mexico) [both from the *high-high* quadrant].

4.4.2 The Empirical Approach

Knowing which cases to analyse is half the methodological battle. Design-wise, the second half is choosing and carefully using the tools to handle and draw conclusion from the data. In consequence, for completeness, I briefly clarify my mixed-methods approach by exploring the complementarities between comparative historical analysis (CHA) and quantitative techniques.

The empirical backbone of my argument is grounded on evidence analysed with quantitative and qualitative tools. I use the former to assert the magnitude of causal effects, determine the strength of associations between variables, and to summarize patterns. I use the latter to articulate historically grounded narratives through which the observed trends emerged. That is, I use them to trace and describe how, when, and why certain processes unfolded the way they did, linking them to my outcome of interest.

My drive to pursue a mixed-methods strategy comes from a firm conviction that robust statistical findings need to be accompanied by an account of the mechanisms which led to their configuration, not by "intriguing but untested assumptions about causal processes" (Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010, 936). In addition, mixing robust statistics with CHA further synergizes the subnational design of this project. As Capoccia and Ziblatt (2010), as well as Lucan and Way (2015) argue, CHA strengthens our ability to: a) go beyond the unit homogeneity assumption, b) pay closer attention to micro-foundations and to c) clarify the direction of causality.

Going beyond unit homogeneity is particularly fruitful for subnational analyses because by doing so we acknowledge that causal factors and outcomes can have distinct linkages in different spatial or temporal settings. That is, it allows us to assess causal heterogeneity across time and across space, moving past the statistical assumption of constant conjunction. Providing a space for agency and further clarifying the steps in the causal chain are further advantages of mixing CHA with statistics.

The explanatory power of my analysis then stems from careful *identification* and from thorough historical research. In an effort to maintain the reader's attention, I discuss the technical aspects of regression analysis only in Section A.3 of Appendix A. Here, however, it is important to underscore that there are "considerable synergies between CHA and quantitative analysis" (Thelen and Mahoney 2015, 5). Specifically, these approaches complement each other when discussing 'aggregate cases' (units of analysis that go beyond the individual level) and when handling 'causal packages' (the extent to which different factors relate to each other in order to generate the outcome of interest). In that sense, while Chapter 3 set the stage using only quantitative tools, in the remaining theory-testing chapters, I do my best to balance and exploit the complementarities between these approaches.

In terms of sources, handling quantitative data in a consistent and transparent manner is relatively straight forward: once has to report the source, explain the decisions behind data transformation and follow the best econometric practice for model selection. To the best of my abilities, I try and follow these same principles when handling and presenting historical evidence. Nonetheless, dealing with uncertainty and managing the level of confidence around the conclusions derived from examining the relevant historiography requires careful consideration.

Taking into account that the qualitative component of the project relies in my exegesis of a plethora of secondary sources through desk research, my first objective is to read history with the relevant counter-factual in mind. Moreover, as a Latin

American, and as a citizen of one of the countries under consideration, seriously engaging with historic evidence demands not only thoroughness, but also —and equally importantly— it asks that I remain critical in my assessment of the material.

To that regard, following best historiographic recommendations (Christ and Rössner 2020), in drawing lessons from history through secondary sources, I abide by four different standards: I) I pay close attention to the *textual information*, that is, I do my best to understand who the author is and what the author is explicitly saying. I also constantly pushed my II) *subtext awareness*, which requires paying close attention to *how* things are said and which others are omitted. I additionally tried to take notice of the III) *opus background*, that is, reflecting on the specific (academic, social or political) needs the work addressed at the time of publication. Lastly, I also guide my engagement with history by being consistently conscious of the local, national, regional and international IV) *broader context* in which the work is embedded.

A Word on Causality. Social scientists in general and comparativists in particular care about causality (Kellstedt and Whitten 2009; Shively 2013). Consequently, an outline of my methodology and analytic strategy would be incomplete without addressing such a contested issue. We engage in comparison because we are either after the effect of causes or after the causes of effects (Przeworski 2009). The inescapable quest for causality is a cross-cutting methodological concern comparativists from all scholarly traditions have to face. Under an experimental framework, researchers aim to isolate the effect of a specific cause known as *treatment*. Observational studies strive for examining the significance of the constant conjunction of an array of dependent and independent variables. Comparative historical analysts search for the *smoking gun* that unequivocally led to the phenomena under investigation.

Most of the literature on research methodology agrees that one of the main objectives of social inquiry in general, and comparative political inquiry in particular, is to generate inferences. These inferences can be either descriptive or explanatory in nature (Przeworski and Teune 1970; Little 1991; Ragin 1987; King, Keohane

Table 4.3: The Empirical Approach: A Summary

Methodological Approach	Leading Features	Chief Tools Used	Main Sources	Careful consideration of:	Approach to Causality
Quantitative	Observational statistical study. Effect of cause.	Different flavours of regression analysis.	V-Dem project, World Bank, ECLAC, national statistical institutes.	Model assumptions Regression Diagnostics	Bounded or Probabilistic
Qualitative	Comparative Historical Analysis Cause of Effect.	Pathway, confirmatory case study. Desk Research	Secondary sources: national and provincial history books, governmental reports, social science research.	Awareness of text, subtext, opus background, and broader context.	

and Verba 1994; Collier et.al. 2010; Mahoney 2008) but they always, implicitly or explicitly, imply causation (Okasha 2002).

In the midst of contemporary science, stating and demonstrating a causal relation is, at best, a complicated endeavor (Mumford and Anjum 2013). However, to say that causal claims are possible to articulate is not to say that these statements are empirically determinate. Causality is best conceived in a probabilistic way. In this sense, "[a] cause, then, could be something that raises the probability of an effect, and sometimes successfully produces it, but without ever ensuring it" (Mumford and Anjum 2013, 49-50). This *bounded* notion of causality permeates and shapes my methodological decisions as well as my understanding of the findings.

Table 4.3 concisely presents the core elements of the empirical approach underpinning this investigation. Having discussed at length both my theory and my methods, the next chapters put my contentions to the test. Chapter 5 explores colonial roles and the reversal of subnational fortunes. Chapter 6 then examines the subnational pressures for incorporation. In the conclusion, I recap my findings, pinpoint the implications and contributions of my research and test the portability of my framework by probing the origins of subnational democracy in India.

"There is no doubt that a large number of negative structural features of economic underdevelopment have historical roots going back to European colonization".

— Paul Bairoch (1993, 88)

5
The Reversal of Subnational Fortunes

In line with a long scholarly tradition, this chapter shows that Iberian colonial rule in the Americas shaped the economic trajectories of Argentinian, Brazilian and Mexican states and provinces. Standing on the shoulders of Mahoney (2010), I argue that subnational units experienced an economic *reversal of fortune*. Territories that played a central role during the early mercantilist stages of colonialism experienced deleterious economic consequences in the long run. Contrarily, an environment which enhanced economic prosperity was configured in regions which gained primacy only after the comparatively liberal Bourbon-Pombaline Reforms of the 18$^{\text{th}}$ century. In sum, the rise of regions and territories as either *early mercantilist* or *late liberal* colonial nodes was critical in setting off divergent paths of subnational economic development.

To empirically unpack this reversal, I condense and triangulate historical and quantitative data. On that basis, I present a new score that classifies each subnational unit as either a *periphery*, a *semi-periphery* or as an early colonial *center*. Regression analyses and a differences-in-differences approach isolate their effect and ascertain their causal role. To illuminate the dynamics at play, I then explore the trajectories of Guerrero, Salta, Jalisco, and Rio Grande do Sul. Overall, there is strong evidence that colonial legacies heavily influenced which subnational units developed economically. This in turn —as I explore in the next chapter— conditioned the emergence of organized labor and the build-up of subnational regimes.

For clarity of exposition, I first briefly revisit the literature and the core theoretical tenets behind this discussion. Second, to enhance the correspondence between national and subnational historical accounts, and to contextualize my scoring procedure, in the following section I provide an overview of the historical factors relevant for the analysis. I then unpack the quantitative evidence. Lastly, in the fourth section I discuss the cases. In the conclusion of this chapter I succinctly review the main findings. In so doing, I highlight the resulting subnational heterogeneity and bring the discussion *back to politics*.

5.1 A Primer on Colonialism & Post-Cololnial Development

As discussed in Section 2.2.3 of the literature review, historians, economists, and political scientists alike have disparate opinions on the extent to which colonial economic and institutional arrangements can cause contemporary socio-political outcomes. For the most part, prominent work on the impact of colonialism has centered around the size of the indigenous population, environmental factors, resource endowments and the identity of the colonizing power[1].

After North (1990; 2005), the three most influential works in this debate are the contributions by La Porta et al. (1997), Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) (ES) and that of Açemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) (AJR). For La Porta et al. (1997), present economic divergence is explained by differences in the colonizers' legal system —which counterposes British common law to Roman civil law. For ES, territorial *factor endowments* pushed colonizers to engage in various economic activities, each with a distinct potential to form economies of scale. This ultimately enabled the build-up of institutions that either lessened or promoted inequality and economic advancement. For AJR, economic trajectories hinged on the chances of European

[1]Nunn (2009) offers a very thorough review of the literature linking colonialism and historical events to contemporary economic development.

settlement. In turn, settlement opportunities depended on environmental conditions linked to disease and mortality. Europeans settled in *healthy* territories, and the consequent build up of ‘inclusive’ —or alternatively ‘extractive’— institutions shaped long run economic outcomes.

The literature exploring the historic links between colonialism and contemporary development has started to probe and exploit subnational variation[2]. While burgeoning, this scholarly work has mostly focused on the territorial heterogeneity of single countries. To the best of my knowledge, the work by Bruhn and Gallego (2012), and that by Maloney and Caicedo (2016), are the only two papers that comparatively and robustly explore the effect of historical legacies on subnational economic development.

While powerful, these approaches have some critical deficiencies. First, La Porta’s et al. (1997) framework is hardly portable to the subnational level, since distinct provinces share the same legal colonial origin. Second, they contradict each other. For example, AJR show that Europeans didn’t settle in areas with net mortality. ES point out, however, that in the New World colonies Europeans often more heavily settled in areas with adverse mortality conditions. Similarly, while Maloney and Caicedo (2016) argue for a persistance of subnational fortune, Bruhn and Gallego (2012) provide evidence of a reversal. Third, the channels through which colonial legacies survive are relatively murky and obscure[3].

Lastly, and most importantly, they all assume that the colonizers’ identity remains *fixed* in time. They assume, for example, that both 16$^{\text{th}}$ and 18$^{\text{th}}$ century Spain operated with the same set of institutions. An overview of Spanish history quickly reveals, however, that the decline of the House of Habsburg by the 1700s, triggered a set of reforms and changes that reconfigured Iberian rule.

In Mahoney’s (2010) more recent contribution, the identity of the colonizer is relevant but not fixed. It is determined not by nationality but rather by temporality.

[2]Bonet and Roca (2006), Naritomi, Soares and Assunçao (2009), Dell (2010), and Banerjee and Iyer (2005) provide an analysis for Colombia, Brazil, Peru and India respectively.

[3]Przeworski(2004), for example, has said that AJR’s concept of ‘secure property rights’ ‘is just a muddle” (Przeworski 2004, 173)

Table 5.1: Temporal Distinction of Colonial Political Economies

	Mercantilist Habsburg (1400s-1600s)	Liberal Bourbon - Pombaline (Post-1700s)
Accumulation	Self-suficiency Short Run	Long-run Investment Exploit comparative Advantages
Regulation	Restrictive economic participation	Less restrictive trade, ownership and economic involvement
Stratification	Patrimonial and hierarchical Symbiotic political and economic elite.	More market-like dynamics Differentiated economic elite.

Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of Mahoney (2010, 21)

That is, what matters most is not *where* the colonizer comes from but rather *when* colonization took place. The logic behind this temporal reasoning is based precisely on the recognition that throughout the 18th century, and especially after the 1750's, a set of *liberalizing* changes swept Europe. For the Iberian Peninsula, that is for Spain and Portugal, these shifts are summarily and respectively referred to as the Bourbon and the Pombaline Reforms.

A full exploration of the European dynamics linked to these changes can be found in Kuethe and Andrien (2014) and in Maxwell (1995). Brading (1984) and Mansuy-Diniz (1984) offer the classic account of how these reforms unfolded in Brazil and Spanish America respectively[4]. For our purposes, what is critical to highlight is that these changes (re)configured distinct economic institutional arrangements. Specifically, as Table 5.1 shows, they reoriented the accumulation strategy, the scope of regulation and the dynamics of stratification.

In this sense, for example, the distinction between Spanish and Portuguese matters comparatively less than the differentiation between early mercantilist Spanish conquistadors and late liberal Spanish colonizers. Similarly, the intensity or density of European settlement is driven by the way this temporal split shifted the economic primacy of certain natural endowments.

Resources and population enter the framework as complementary components responsible for conditioning whether early colonizing efforts were carried out and

[4]Pinto and Sánchez (2016) provide a more recent overview of the impact these reforms had in Latin America.

deepened. These biogeographic resources —specifically the availability of minerals or cash crops and the 'level of complexity' of pre-colonial societies— were only key drivers of the early (pre 1700s) colonial effort[5]. After the liberalizing Bourbon-Pombaline changes, emphasis on trade would situate transportation and seaports at the centre stage of colonizing efforts. To quote Mahoney *in extenso*:

> "European colonizers[...] especially before 1700 featured a mercantilist political economy, whereby institutions were arranged to promote [...] the accumulation of precious resources and corporatist social arrangements [...] [A]fter 1700, [colonizing nations] featured a liberal political economy [...] whereby institutions were designed to stimulate long-run accumulation through investment and trade for profit in competitive markets" (Mahoney 2010, 254).

To understand why certain provinces economically developed while others did not, *ad minimum*, we need to know their pre-colonial biogeographic configuration, and we need to ascertain whether their trajectories were 'kicked off' during the early Habsburg mercantilist era. For transparency and completeness, below I present Mahoney's (2010) logical formulations, discuss their implications and clarify how they influenced the set-up of my score.

$$\text{Mercantilist Center } (\mathbf{M})\text{: A \& (B v C)} \longrightarrow \text{M}$$

$$\text{Liberal Center } (\mathbf{L})\text{: (D \& E) v (F \& G)} \longrightarrow \text{L}$$

$$\text{Contemporary Econ. Dev. } (\mathbf{Y})\text{: } \sim M \;\&\; L \longrightarrow \text{Y}$$

Where the "&" symbol stands for the logical AND, the "v" for the logical OR, the "∼" is the logical NOT and the arrow signals causal sufficiency. In the notation for a mercantilist center, A is complex pre-colonial society, B is mineral wealth and C denotes proximity to an indigenous empire. In the notation for liberal centers, D stands for a native society of low complexity or a small population of African slaves and E indicates a salient trading port. F represents mercantilist colonial center and G is new mineral wealth.

[5] Throughout the chapter and for the purpose of the analysis, the label 'early colonial life' refers precisely to the period up until the year 1699.



Figure 5.1: Colonial Roles and Plausible Trajectories

P: periphery, SP: Semi-Periphery. M_c and L_c are mercantilist and liberal centers respectively. r_1 sustained SP, r_2 mercantilist carryover, r_3 fallen core, r_4 sustained P, r_5 rising periphery.

What immediately stands out from this framework, especially when looking at the notation for contemporary economic development (Y), is a theoretically predicted subnational reversal of fortune. Early colonial mercantilist centers are anticipated to become the present-day economic underperforming provinces. To further explore the implications of these logical formulae, Figure 5.1 graphically displays the dimensions configuring all plausible colonial roles[6]. Here, there are four features to be underscored:

i. Uniqueness: The framework uniquely identifies three potential categories of colonial roles: centers, peripheries and semi-peripheries.

ii. Equifinality: There are multiple combinations that allow the emergence of semi-peripheries (SP), two routes to both liberal centrality (L_c) and peripheral status (P), but only one combination for early colonial centrality (M_c).

[6]For simplicity the 'Resource Availability' axis captures not only mineral resources or cash crops (B), but also presence of a trading port (E). Similarly, the 'Indigenous Complexity' axis captures not only factors A and D, but also proximity to indigenous empire (C).

iii. Routes: The solid arrows mark some of the plausible 'historical trajectories'. For example, r_1 and r_4 respectively exemplify the continuation of semi-peripheral and peripheral status. Similarly, r_2 and r_3 show the respective routes for mercantilist carryovers and fallen colonial cores. Lastly, r_5 tracks the route of a rising periphery.

iv. Route 'imbalance' or Path Dependence: Lastly, while the trajectories described above are plausible, it is important to highlight that once a specific configuration is set, certain trajectories become more unlikely.

Taking these elements into account, and considering the relatively large number of units under consideration (83), in building my score I focus on identifying the three colonial roles during the early colonial period. In so doing, I make two simplifying assumptions: 1) Early peripheries are more likely to become liberal centers and mercantilist centers are less likely to be liberal carryovers; 2) early peripheries are the only regions that can become 'pure' liberal centers. The claim is then that being a mercantilist center was a sufficient condition of contemporary economic *underdevelopment* ($\mathrm{M} \longrightarrow \sim Y$).

Since the score does not track whether early peripheries effectively became liberal centers, the decision to focus on the pre-1700 period should err on the conservative side. That is, it should bias downwards any estimate of the effect of early colonial roles on current levels of development. In the next section I contextualize the main factors identified above and, in the process, clarify my scoring procedure.

5.2 Mapping the Early Colonial Role of Subnational Units

Research exploring the dynamics and expansion of Spanish and Portuguese colonial rule in America is legion[7]. Historians, however, agree that after their campaigns in

[7] My core understanding of the social and economic dynamics of colonial life in the region comes from Burkholder and Johnson's (2018) *Colonial Latin America* and Restall and Lane's (2019) *Latin America in Colonial Times*. For an account of European expansion at the dawn of the 16$^{\text{th}}$ century see O'Brien (2006). Lockhart and Schwartz (1983) as well as Mills Kenneth et.

the Caribbean, Spaniards and Portuguese alike furthered their exploration of the New World. Once they arrived to the continental landmass, conquistadors exploited local grievances to form alliances with indigenous groups. Having measles, smallpox and other diseases as part of their unintended bio-arsenal —which decimated the native population— Iberians conquered most of America marching south.

Upon defeating the Aztec Empire, the Viceroyalty of New Spain was quickly established in 1535. Seven years later, approximately 3,000 miles south, the Viceroyalty of Peru was founded and, although the Viceroyalty of the River Plate would be established almost two centuries later, by 1580 Juan de Garay had already founded the city of Buenos Aires. During this time, the Portuguese also made headway south, and almost 2,000 miles east of the River Plate, by 1549 Tomé de Sousa had already been appointed by the Portuguese Crown to oversee a dozen *capitanias* as Brazil's first Royal Governor[8].

The early colonial crucible in the Americas was marked by a perennial struggle to secure land and labor. The profitability of the conquest campaigns revolved around the extraction of gold, silver, and cash crops such as sugar; commodities for which demand in the European market was large. For these reasons, the core driving factors of early colonization were: a) resource availability (i.e. mineral wealth) and b) the presence of complex indigenous societies. On the one hand, Iberian conquerors were avid to secure an economic return for their endeavors.

al.(2002) offer a thorough account of early colonial life in Spanish America. Bethell (1987) and Prado Junior (1967) provide the classic interpretations of colonial Brazil. Lastly, Metcalf (2005) articulates a captivating narrative of 'go-betweeners', individuals who facilitated first contacts between Europeans and America natives. My core understanding of national colonial experiences comes from Luna(1982; 1992; 2000) and Yankelevich (2014) for Argentina, Fausto and Fausto (2014) for Brazil and Kuntz (2015) and Velázquez et al. (2010) for Mexico. I complemented this scholarship with a myriad of secondary historical sources focusing on subnational historical narratives which are listed in Appendix B. In this regard, for example, the series *Historias Breves de la República Mexicana* edited by *El Colegio de México* for Mexican states and the *Colección Historia de Nuestras Provincias* edited by *Plus Ultra* for Argentinian provinces, were particularly valuable sources.

[8]For more on the process of Latin America's Spanish conquest see Wachtel (1984). For a specific account of Argentina see Giovanetti (2005). For Mexico the work of León Portilla (2006) stands out. Lastly, Gadelha (2002) offers a relatively recent account of the Portuguese conquest of the Amazon.

On the other hand, by exploiting native networks and indigenous rivalries, they secured military dominance and labor.

In the case of Mexico, for example, Spaniards were quick to settle not only in Tenochtitlán — where contemporary Mexico City is located— but also across several cities along the Pacific coastal line, as well as in the once Mayan-dominated Yucatán peninsula[9]. In Argentina, the initial Spaniard push came mostly from Upper Peru (contemporary Bolivia), permeating the north, the north-west, and the Cuyo regions.

In Brazil, the Portuguese first settled in Salvador, Bahia, which served as a political and administrative capital during the early colonial experience, giving way to the southern Rio de Janeiro in the midst of the 18th century. The map in Figure 5.3 presents a map of the major territorial divisions circa 1650.

These overarching regional and national narratives served as the starting point for my classification. The review of colonial and national historical accounts quickly revealed that, indeed, certain territories, like Pernambuco or Bahia in Brazil, and Jujuy in Argentina had a comparatively prominent role during early colonial life. On this basis, I initially grouped states into three 'preliminary sets'. I assigned peripheries a score of 0, semi-peripheries a score of 0.5, and I gave early colonial centers a value of 1. To check and, if necessary, refine and calibrate my score, I then looked for historical evidence specific to the factors identified in Mahoney's (2010) framework: early mining activities and the complexity of indigenous societies inhabiting the territories.

5.2.1 Mineral Wealth

In *The True History of the Conquest of New Spain*, Bernal Díaz del Castillo reports that, to boost morale among his troops in the midst of his conquest campaign, Hernán Cortés said that they "were in a land where they could serve God and His Majesty and become rich" (Díaz del Castillo 2012, 304). More recently, Eduardo Galeano (1997) captured this colonial Iberian drive in an elegiac way, writing that

[9]The evidence of permanently active and dense settlements in some of these regions is contentious. Nonetheless, what is key to understand is that comparatively —that is, relative to other areas— these territories experienced more colonial activity early on.



Figure 5.3: Territorial Divisions of Colonial Latin America circa 1650

The map shows the major territorial divisions circa 1650. Sources: Burkholder and Leonard (2010, 24).

'[t]he epic of the Spaniards and Portuguese in America combined propagation of the Christian Faith with usurpation and plunder of native wealth" (Galeano 1997, 14).

To assess how this early extractivist effort varied territorially, I scored each subnational unit. I assigned a score of 0 if no significant record or mention of early mineral extraction for the corresponding state was found. I assigned a score of 0.5 in cases where I found evidence of minor mining activity and a score of 1 in cases where it was clear that early mineral extraction occurred to a considerable extent[10].

The Mexican state of Zacatecas serves as an illustrative example. Olague et al. (2010) claim that "the state's mineral riches [. . .] were exploited even before conquest and some of its contemporary mines date back to the mid 16th century" (Olague et al. 2010, 8). Canudas Sandoval (2005) makes a very similar assessment. Contrarily, for example, no evidence of mining was found in the consulted historical record of the territory of states such as Formosa, in Argentina. Consequently, Zacatecas received a score of 1 and Formosa was assigned a zero.

5.2.2 Pre-Columbian Demographic Configuration

The complexity of pre-Columbian indigenous groups was another crucial factor linked to the pattern of early Iberian territorial expansion. Although complexity is in itself a composite concept, there is relative consensus[11] that complex indigenous civilizations were a) permanently settled, b) their members lived in built-in communities and perhaps most importantly, they c) relied on permanent, comparatively intensive agriculture. On a first dimension, these factors distinguish the extent to which indigenous groups were either nomads, semi-nomads or sedentary. On a second dimension, they enable the distinction between tribes —nomadic, decentralized groups— on one end of the spectrum, and 'proto-states'—societies with a marked centralized authority and a considerable division of labor.

[10] The full details and further evidence of the scoring process are unpacked in Appendix B.

[11] Love (1991), for example, discusses the distinction made by archaeologists and anthropologists between *style* and *complexity*. For a thorough examination of complexity in Mesoamerica, see Nelson (1995) and the volume edited by Fowler Jr. (1991), specially chapters 1 and 7. Similarly, Barreto (2014) explores Amerindian complexity with the Brazilian lowlands as a case study. For Argentina, Acuto (2008) explores the implications of Inca-influence over the Argentinian northwest.

Across pre-colonial and colonial historiography it is almost a truism that the complexity of indigenous groups played a relevant role in the patterns of and reactions to Iberian territorial expansion. Although upon initial contact with European conquerors indigenous societies were abated by disease and war, Iberian conquerors more easily secured their domain in areas with a comparatively complex native population.

Contrarily, in territories where pre-Columbian societies were less complex, colonizers were challenged and their territorial control over several decades was comparatively more precarious. In sum, the more complex, hierarchical civilizations facilitated Iberian dominion. As Elman Service puts it, "[t]he more alike the conquerors and conquered, the more simple and easy the adjustment" (Service 1955, 416). Figure 5.5 maps the patterns of Iberian conquest and the location of the major pre-colonial indigenous groups.

To assign a score for this factor across subnational units, I followed a three-step process. First, for each province, I identified up to five native groups which are acknowledged by historians to have inhabited or heavily controlled the corresponding territory around the time of contact with European conquerors. Second, on the basis of Steward (1959), Francis and Leonard (2010) as well as complementary sources[12], I classified each group as either sedentary, semi-sedentary or nomadic.

In the third and final step, on the basis of the previous scores[13], I classified each unit as 0 for cases of low pre-Columbian complexity, 0.5 for intermediate levels, and 1 for cases of high complexity. For this factor, territories inhabited or closely influenced by the Aztec, Mayas and Incas, for example, were assigned a score of one. Territories under the control of the Tupí-Guaraní language group were scored with 0.5 or 0 depending on the prominence of some form of agriculture over hunting and gathering activities.

[12] Here, for example, when cases proved hard to classify either for lack of explicit or matching evidence, I consulted the corresponding volumes and chapters of *The Cambridge History of the Native Peoples of the Americas.*

[13] As shown in Appendix B, I tried both logical and quantitative scoring mechanisms. In the former instance, I took the maximun value of the previous step. In the latter instance, I took the average value. While the results hold regardless of which procedure is followed, the final scores presented here are based on averages.

Figure 5.5: Patterns of the Iberian Conquest of America

1. Mexico's Central Valley, 2. The Yucatán Peninsula, 3. The city of Potosí, 4. Bahia in Brazil and 5. Buenos Aires.

Sources: Compiled by the author on the basis of Restall and Lane (2019), Dockrill's (n.d.) map, De Zwart, & Van Zanden (2018), and LaRosa and Mejía (2018).

5.2.3 Subnational Colonial Roles

After completing the process of scoring each factor for individual provinces, using the FSQCA software I computed an 'expected colonial role score' on the basis of Mahoney's (2010) logical formulations outlined above. I then contrasted this logically predicted outcome with the 'preliminary sets' built on the overarching national and regional colonial narratives. The correspondence between these two approaches was of roughly 92% with only 7 cases differing between the preliminary and the expected role[14].

Rather than solving or decanting the discrepancies by merging the scores, I tested the analysis using both values. All the relevant and significant results that follow hold regardless of which score is used. In the rest of this chapter I use the one obtained from the 'preliminary set'. Lastly, it is very important to stress that in the construction of either one of these scores only historical information was

[14]The differences occurred for Chiapas, Oaxaca, Querétaro, Quintana Roo, Tlaxcala, Amazonas and Acre. These discrepancies occurred only between the middle category —semi-periphery— and either center or peripheral roles, but never between the latter. In other words, and most importantly, both the preliminary and the predicted sets clearly identified colonial centers and colonial peripheries.

Table 5.2: Subnational Roles in Early Colonial Life

	Total	Share		Total	Share		Total	Share
Periphery (0)	43	51.81%	**Semi-Periphery (0.5)**	22	26.51%	**Center (1)**	18	21.69%
	Buenos Aires	0		Acre	0		Aguascalientes	0.5
	Buenos Aires (CA)	0		Alagoas	0.5		Baja California	0
	Catamarca	1		Amapá	0		Caja California Sur	0
	Chaco	0		Amazonas	0		Campeche	1
	Chubut	0		Bahia	1		Chiapas	0
	Córdoba	0.5		Ceará	0.5		Chihuahua	0
	Corrientes	0		DF	0		Ciudad de México	1
	Entre Ríos	0		Espírito Santo	0.5		Coahuila	0
	Formosa	0		Goiás	0		Colima	0.5
Argentina	Jujuy	1	**Brazil**	Maranhão	0	**Mexico**	Durango	0.5
	La Pampa	0		Mato Grosso	0		Estado de México	1
Mode	La Rioja	0.5	Mode	Mato Grosso do Sul	0	Mode	Guanajuato	1
0	Mendoza	0	0	Minas Gerais	0	0.5	Guerrero	1
	Misiones	0		Pará	0		Hidalgo	1
Periphery	Neuquén	0	Periphery	Parana	0	Periphery	Jalisco	0.5
66.67%	Río Negro	0	62.96%	Paraíba	0.5	31.25%	Michoacán	0.5
	Salta	1		Pernambuco	1		Morelos	1
Semi-Periphery	San Juan	0.5	Semi-Periphery	Piauí	0.5	Semi-Periphery	Nayarit	0
12.50%	San Luis	0	29.63%	Rio de Janeiro	0.5	34.38%	Nuevo León	0
	Santa Cruz	0		Rio Grande do Norte	0.5		Oaxaca	0.5
Center	Santa Fe	0	Center	Rio Grande do Sul	0	Center	Puebla	1
20.83%	Santiago del Estero	1	7.41%	Rondonia	0	34.38%	Querétaro	0.5
	Tierra del Fuego	0		Roraima	0		Quintana Roo	0.5
	Tucumán	1		Santa Catarina	0		San Luis Potosí	0.5
				São Paulo	0		Sinaloa	0
				Sergipe	0.5		Sonora	0
				Tocantins	0		Tabasco	0.5
							Tamaulipas	0
							Tlaxcala	0.5
							Veracruz	1
							Yucatán	1
							Zacatecas	1

My identification of colonial roles is based on the exegesis of secondary sources exploring the history of the countries and the provinces under analysis. No contemporary information or data were used to perform the assessment. The process and sources for the identification of colonial roles is detailed further in Appendix B.

used. No contemporary socio-demographic or socio-economic estimates were used or considered in this classification. Table 5.2 presents the individual scores for each subnational unit as well as some descriptive statistics by role and by country.

A preliminary overview grants face validity to the roles assigned to each unit. On the one hand, as expected, Mexico concentrates the largest share of provinces identified as colonial centers and semi-peripheries. Similarly, occupying roughly 67% of its national territory, Argentina concentrates the largest share of early colonial peripheries. A considerable number of Brazilian states are also classified as colonial peripheries but the amount of units classified as semi-peripheries, in accord with historical records, is higher than in Argentina and lower than in Mexico. Interestingly enough, clustered in the north and north-west, Argentina registers more colonial centers than Brazil. This is mostly due to Inca influence and the proximity to Upper Peru and the mining city of Potosí.

To further assess the validity of my classification and to explore whether alternative factors can account for the scores, Table 5.3 presents the results of three regression models. They each use a dummy indicator for the corresponding colonial role as a dependent variable. As controls I include:

i. The estimated density of the indigenous population circa 1492[15].

ii. A malaria ecology index as summarized by Maloney and Caicedo (2016) and originally reported by Kiszewski et al. (2004)[16].

iii. Temperature, rainfall, area, ruggedness, inverse distance to coast, landlock and rivers as a vector of geographical controls[17].

Going into the analysis, my expectations were for geographic factors to have little to no effect on the likelihood of being assigned a colonial role. Contrarily, I expected the density of the pre-colonial native population to strongly predict the role. What the results show is that none of the geographic controls are consistently statistically significant across models. Except for temperature and altitude, none of the geographic controls impact the likelihood of more than one category. Interestingly enough, these two factors are inversely linked to peripheries and semi-peripheries. Similarly, the density of rivers as a share of land area is the only geographic control negatively linked to central status. That geographic controls do not capture the chances of being assigned an early colonial role can be explained by the fact that the classification exercise mostly follows a temporal criterion.

[15] The original estimates mostly come from Denevan (1992). Here I use the expanded data from Bruhn and Gallego (2012).

[16] Kiszewski et al. (2004) report that their index "depicts the regional resiliency of malaria perpetuation [and that it captures] the effects of ambient temperature on the force of transmission of malaria" (Kiszewski et al., 491). Hence, as long as we assume that regional climatological conditions have remained stable over time, we can interpret this index as the composite measure of infectiousness and transmission upon colonization.

[17] All but area come from Bruhn and Gallego (2012) and Maloney and Caicedo (2016). Temperature is the yearly average in Celsius. Rainfall is the total yearly rainfall in millimeters (mm). Altitude is the elevation of the capital city of the state in km. Ruggedness captures terrain irregularity first reported by Nunn and Puga (2012). Area is territorial surface of each subnational unit measured in km^2. Lastly, rivers captures the river density as a share of total area. The mean values for all control variables are presented in Section A. 4 of Appendix A.

Table 5.3: Colonial Roles and Geographic Determinants

	DV: Periphery	DV: Semi-Periphery	DV: Center
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Density of Native Pop. circa 1492 (log)	-0.193	-0.277	0.470***
	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.12)
Malaria	0.00696	0.0610	-0.0680**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Inv. Distance to Coast	-1.409	1.912**	-0.503
	(1.01)	(0.91)	(0.79)
Average Temperature (°C)	-0.0630***	0.0440***	0.0189
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Altitude (km)	-0.553***	0.327***	0.226
	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.14)
Rainfall (mm/year)	-0.000183	-0.136	0.136
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Ruggedness	0.000428	-0.00123	0.000802
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Area (km2 log)	0.0284	-0.0517	0.0233
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Landlock Dummy	-0.0142	-0.0501	0.0643
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.17)
Rivers	0.124	0.0136	-0.138*
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Constant	2.240	-1.624	0.384
	(1.48)	(1.29)	(1.01)
N	83	83	83
R-Squared	0.374	0.183	0.151

The Dep.Var. for each model is a dummy for each corresponding colonial role. Entries are unstandardized logit regression coefficients. Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses. All models reported include country fixed effects.

It is noteworthy that the incidence of malaria is negatively linked to central status. The estimates of this factor for the other roles, although not significant, also have the theoretically expected signs. Lastly, the density of the native population at the time of colonization strongly predicts being classified as a center, and while the coefficient fails to achieve conventional levels of statistical significance, the estimates of this factor for peripheral and semi-peripheral status also have the expected signs.

As a last exercise to explore the validity of my classification score, Figure 5.7 plots, on the top, the predicted probabilities of being assigned either a peripheral or a central role as native population increases, holding everything else at their mean values. The bottom panel graphs the predicted probability of having economic activities during colonial times[18] as we change from peripheral to central status. The provinces identified by Bruhn and Gallego (2012) as being inactive during colonial

[18] Bruhn and Gallego's (2012) build a dummy indicator to register whether or not subnational units experienced economic activity during colonial times.



Figure 5.7: Assessing the Validity of Subnational Colonial Roles

The top figure stems from the logistic regression: Pr(Colonial Role|Native pop. density). The bottom figure is generated from the logistic regression: Pr(Colonial Econ. Activity| Colonial Role), both with the same controls as those in Table 5.3.

times match with my peripheral and semi-peripheral classification. Similarly, the early colonial centers identified by my score match Bruhn and Gallego's (2012) activity dummy. I take these two facts as additional signs of validity. Ultimately, the true test of my classification lies in its ability to capture the effects of colonialism on contemporary economic outcomes. That is precisely the task of the next section.

5.3 Subnational Reversal

Sections 5.1 and 5.2 have argued that in comparison to areas that were peripheral or semi-peripheral, regions which were early mercantilist colonial centers should have lower levels of economic development today. Did the mercantilist centers of the 16$^{\text{th}}$ and 17$^{\text{th}}$ century have lower levels of development, for example, by the turn of the 21$^{\text{st}}$? Figure 5.9 plots the answer to this question. The top left panel shows data for Argentina, the panel on the top right corner displays it for Brazil and the one on the bottom left portrays the Mexican case. Roughly one hundred and eighty years after the end of colonization, for all countries under consideration, at the turn of the 21$^{\text{st}}$ century, early mercantilist centers had a lower GDP per capita than their peripheral counterparts.

The differences are most dramatic in Argentina and less so in Mexico, with Brazil occupying a middle ground. It is interesting to observe that Mexican mercantilist centers have the highest per capita mean value[19]. The bottom-right panel of Figure 5.9 shows that the pattern holds even when we 'pool' all the cases together. Just how big can these differences be? Bahia, a colonial center in northern Brazil, reached the 21$^{\text{st}}$ century with a per capita income of $4,759 dollars. In contrast, São Paulo reached it with an income of $13,826 USD, roughly three times as much. Similarly, in Argentina, Buenos Aires, a backwater area during early colonial life, entered the 2000s with an income per capita two-and-a-half times that of Salta or Jujuy, two of the early mercantilist nodes in the north-west.

Using averages to explore these differences through time moderates but does not eliminate these contrasts. Looking at the average subnational per capita income between 1983 and 2017, early mercantilist centers register roughly $4,361, while early peripheral regions record a mean of $7,128 USD dollars (PPP). That is, on average for the past three decades, we can expect centers and peripheries to have a yearly income difference of roughly $2,800 US dollars. Can we expect these

[19] A close inspection of the data reveals that this is mostly driven by Mexico City. Judging by values of colonial and post-colonial economic development it seems that Mexico's capital is the only potential case of the mercantilist carryover route.



Figure 5.9: Colonial Roles and Economic Fortunes by the Turn of the 21st Century

differences to hold *ceteris paribus*? And can we say that having been a center or a periphery during the early mercantilist stages of colonialism impacted development? To answer these questions, I start with the following model:

$$y_{ij} = \alpha + \delta R_{ij} + \beta_1 Z'_{ij} + \beta_2 X'_{ij} + \gamma_j + e_{ij}$$

Where y_{ij} is a measure of economic development for subnational unit i in country j, R is my score for colonial role, Z' is a vector of historical variables, X' a vector of additional geographical controls, γ is a country fixed effects and e is the error term. The set of historical controls consists of Bruhn and Gallego (2012) 'good', 'bad' and 'ugly' colonial economic activities as well as the density of the native population circa 1492. The vector of geographical controls are the same we saw in Table 5.3 of the previous section. According to the earlier discussion the expectation is that, when compared to peripheries, the coefficient for early colonial centers should be negative. I expect this result to be robust and override the inclusion of variables accounting for alternative historical explanations. Models 1 through 4 use the 2000 GDP per capita value as a dependent variable, models 5 through 8 use the 1983-2017 mean value. Table 5.4 presents the regression results.

Using income per capita at the turn of the 21$^{\text{st}}$ century as DV, in models 1 through 4, Bruhn and Gallego's (2012) classification of 'bad' and 'ugly' colonial economic activities have negative signs and achieve statistical significance. The estimates for the density of the indigenous population and for malaria are not consistently statistically significant and are indistinguishable from zero in the full model (4). Similarly, in these models, the only significant geographic factors are rainfall and territorial ruggedness.

Surprisingly, for the regressions that used the mean per capita income as a DV, Bruhn and Gallego's (2012) dummy for 'good' colonial economic activities has a negative sign, a fact that runs counter to what their argument would suggest. Similarly, the coefficients for their two other categories are not consistently significant and are not considerably different from zero in the full model (8). Temperature, ruggedness, malaria, area and rivers achieve statistical significance at various levels.

Table 5.4: Colonial Roles and Current Levels of Economic Development.

	Dep. Var: GDP per capita 2000(USD PPP log)				Dep. Var: Average GDP per capita (USD PPP log)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Semi-Periphery	-0.284***	-0.248**	-0.241**	-0.347***	-0.439***	-0.392**	-0.382**	-0.567***
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.14)
Early Colonial Center	-0.369***	-0.287***	-0.338***	-0.355***	-0.539***	-0.428**	-0.544***	-0.648***
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.15)
'Good' Econ. Activities		-0.0374	-0.0357	0.123		-0.544**	-0.538***	0.0813
		(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.19)
'Bad' Econ. Activities		-0.373***	-0.448***	-0.331**		-0.408*	-0.556**	-0.0290
		(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.14)		(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.20)
'Ugly' Econ. Activities		-0.168	-0.242*	-0.259**		0.270	0.120	-0.0158
		(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.12)		(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.18)
Density of Native Pop. circa 1492 (log)			0.205*	0.0455			0.487	-0.00350
			(0.12)	(0.16)			(0.30)	(0.27)
Malaria			-0.106***	-0.0490			-0.207***	-0.123**
			(0.04)	(0.05)			(0.06)	(0.05)
Inv. Distance to Coast				0.574				-1.809
				(0.86)				(1.17)
Average Temperature				-0.00400				-0.0477**
				(0.02)				(0.02)
Altitude				0.0727				-0.0132
				(0.11)				(0.14)
Rainfall				-0.142*				-0.0519
				(0.07)				(0.09)
Ruggedness				-0.0128***				-0.0192***
				(0.00)				(0.01)
Area (km2 log)				-0.0501				-0.227***
				(0.04)				(0.05)
Landlock Dummy				0.103				0.0150
				(0.13)				(0.19)
Rivers				-0.0735				-0.351***
				(0.10)				(0.10)
Constant	9.224***	9.323***	9.369***	9.838***	8.708***	8.442***	8.533***	14.57***
	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(1.44)	(0.12)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(1.57)
N	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83
R-squared	0.018	0.401	0.472	0.541	-0.010	0.483	0.577	0.749

Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses. The reference category for colonial role is 'Periphery'. Models 1 through 4 have the 2000 subnational GDP per capita in USD PPP as DV and report coefficients of a 'pooled' model. Models 5 through 8 have states' average GDP per capita as DV and report 'between effects'. All estimations include country fixed effects.
Controls come from Bruhn and Gallego (2012) as well as Maloney and Caicedo (2016).
Summary statistics are presented in Section A.4 of Appendix A.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Most importantly, however, and crucially for the argument under consideration, the only consistently statistically significant coefficients are those corresponding to colonial roles. Being a semi-periphery or an early mercantilist colonial center, as opposed to being a peripheral region, had a robust, negative effect on current levels of economic development. To graphically assess this effect, based on model 8, Figure 5.10 plots the predicted per capita GDP. The predicted average per capita income for a colonial node is $3,912 dollars, while peripheries almost double this with a predicted value of roughly $7,500 USD PPP. The patterns previously identified using descriptive data only hold strongly throughout regression analyses.



Figure 5.10: Colonial Roles and their Predicted GDP per capita

Predicted values obtained from Model 8 of Table 5.4. Confidence Intervals at conventional levels.

5.3.1 The ultimate *what if?*

The previous section showed that early colonial mercantilist nodes reached much lower levels of economic development. Early colonial backwater areas, contrarily, had higher per capita incomes by the turn of the new millennium. While results are robust to regressions with geographic and other historical controls, a skeptical reader might ask the ultimate 'what if' question: 'what if peripheral areas were already more developed *before* colonization?' or, alternatively, 'what if, in pre-Columbian times, some unobserved factor had already conditioned the economic underperformance of colonial centers?' Is it actually the case that distinct colonial roles *caused* or triggered distinct development trajectories?

On the basis of Mahoney (2010), I claim that they did and if that is the case, if early colonial roles did alter the economic fortunes of subnational units, it follows that, before colonization, regions that eventually became colonial centers should not have been worse off than other areas. If the territories of future early colonial nodes were worse off than other areas even before colonization, then something other than their role must be explaining these differences.

To test this we then need to compare pre- and post-colonial levels of development. Unfortunately, to the best of my knowledge there are no subnational estimates of GDP for the pre-Columbian era. However, I follow Bruhn and Gallego (2012) in using the Back Bone of History health index (Steckel, Sciulli and Rose 2002) as a proxy for pre-colonial development. Built on the archaeological analysis of skeletal remains, this index ranges from 0 to a 100 and is a composite measure of 'biological well-being'[20]. Interestingly, and particularly useful for our purposes, the authors describe their index as one capturing 'quality of life while living'. The data, however, comes from several burial sites, each with a different time span. Consequently, to mitigate issues of data quality, I control for the average year the recovered bodies are estimated to have lived.

To contrast the pre-colonial health index and per capita GDP I then standardized both variables by subtracting the corresponding mean from individual observations and then dividing those values by their standard deviation. This procedure then yields a comparable measure of pre- and post-colonial development. Then recall that in the differences-in-differences framework:

$$y_{ijt} = \alpha + \beta R_{ij} + \gamma P_t + \delta(R_{ij} * P_t) + e_{ijt}$$

Where y_{ijt} the standardized measure of economic development for subnational unit i of country j at time t, R_{ij} is colonial role and P_t is a dummy which indicates post colonization. That is, here β captures the effect of colonial roles before colonization, and δ captures the change in this effect for the post colonial era[21]. To put it simply, according to my theoretical argument, the coefficients for the interactions $P_t * R_{ij}$ should be negative and significant. *Ad minimum*, the estimates for the pre-colonial period β should not be negative. For completeness in the analysis I also included and interacted the vector of historical and geographic controls Z' and X' which were introduced previously. Table 5.5 presents the results of the diff-in-diff regression.

Recall, the outcome variable is a standardized measure of development composed by the precolonial health index and GDP per capita in PPP USD . Models 1 through

[20]The index is built on the assessment of stature, dental health, infections, the prevalence of degenerative joint disease and other life and physical health indicators derived from skeletons found at distinct burial sites across the Americas.

[21]For a description on the alternative interpretations and underlying assumptions of diff-in-diff estimators for cross-sectional and panel data see Lee and Kang (2006).

Table 5.5: Colonial Role, Pre-Colonial and Post-Colonial Development

	Dep. Var.: Standardized Measure of Econ. Development			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Semi-Periphery (Pre)	0.675	0.390**	0.425**	0.457**
	(0.47)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.18)
Semi-Periphery x Post Dummy	-1.433	-1.270***	-1.373***	-1.357***
	(1.28)	(0.39)	(0.36)	(0.27)
Early Colonial Center (Pre)	0.133	0.134	0.0495	0.122
	(0.33)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.19)
Early Colonial Center x Post Dummy	-0.834	-1.112***	-0.920**	-1.071***
	(0.80)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.34)
Density of Native Pop. circa 1492 (Pre)	0.589	0.256	0.294	0.174
	(0.56)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Density Native Pop. circa 1492 x Post Dummy	0.284	-0.0671	-0.157	-0.0176
	(1.39)	(0.47)	(0.42)	(0.44)
'Bad' Econ. Activity (Pre)			0.416	0.286
			(0.27)	(0.28)
'Bad' Econ. Activity x Post Dummy			-1.296***	-0.300
			(0.45)	(0.40)
'Good' Econ. Activity (Pre)			0.263	0.314
			(0.24)	(0.24)
'Good' Econ. Activity x Post Dummy			-0.141	-0.404
			(0.41)	(0.40)
'Ugly' Econ. Activity (Pre)			-0.303	-0.461**
			(0.22)	(0.22)
'Ugly' Econ. Activity x Post Dummy			-0.0333	0.839**
			(0.36)	(0.36)
Constant	-8.635	-0.645	1.434	1.124
	(5.21)	(3.35)	(3.55)	(3.69)
N	58	166	166	166
R-squared	0.517	0.544	0.610	0.709

Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses. The outcome variable is a standardized measure of development composed by the precolonial health index and GDP per capita in USD PPP. Models 1 through 3 use the 2000 subnational GDP per capita for standardization and Model 4 uses the average value. Similarly, Models 2 through 4 use a health index inputted using the Amelia II program. All models reported include the geographic controls, country fixed effects and the post colonization dummy. * $p<0.1$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$

3 use the 2000 subnational GDP per capita for standardization and Model 4 uses the average value. In Model 1 the coefficients for colonial roles fail to achieve conventional levels of significance but have the expected signs. Surprisingly, the estimates for the pre-colonial period are positive. This suggests that prior to colonization, would be centers effectively were more developed than other areas.

The core issue with Model 1, however, is missingness. The pre-Columbian health index is not available for all units under analysis. In an effort to mitigate this problem, using the Amelia II algorithm[22], I inputted the missing health index values. Models 2 through 4 report results using these inputted scores. It is

[22]For a specific discussion of the Amelia II and its implementation in R see Honaker, King and Blackwell (2011). For more on the debate surrounding missingness see King and Honaker (2010).

important to note that the colonial role coefficients remain consistent in their direction and, with enough observations, they reach conventional levels of statistical significance. The pre-colonial estimates are always positive and those for the post-colonial period are always negative and significant. This is the *end game* response to the *ultimate* 'what if'.

Interestingly enough, in Model 3 the coefficient for Bruhn and Gallego's (2012) 'bad' classification remains negative and significant. In Model 4, nonetheless, this effect vanishes. Strikingly, the coeffcients for their 'ugly' category imply that those regions were underdeveloped before colonization and that 'ugly' colonial economic activities had a positive long run effect, something that evidently runs against their theoretical claim.

In sum, the statistical tests performed provide thorough and robust evidence for my argument. Similarly, while other studies had previously observed the shift in subnational trajectories, the tests performed above also show the primacy and consistency of the temporal interpretation I implemented on the basis of Mahoney (2010). To put it simply: Playing a central role during the early mercantilist stages of colonization had deleterious consequences for the economic future of subnational units. Central or peripheral status under the House of Habsburg launched Argentinian, Brazilian, and Mexican provinces on distinct development trajectories. This is the critical juncture that ultimately triggered the reversal of subnational fortunes.

5.4 Cases

To further explore and substantiate the way in which provinces across Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico were set on distinct development trajectories, in this section I briefly trace how this process unfolded. To do so, I rely on the experiences of my four subnational cases. In order to enhance the clarity and the cogency of my exposition, I first examine Guerrero and Salta as two instances of early Habsburg mercantilist centers. I then survey Jalisco, and Rio Grande do Sul as examples of early peripheries which gained prominence only at the turn of the 18^{th}

century. Albeit brief, these cases sufficiently illustrate and lend further credence to the statistical findings discussed above.

5.4.1 Guerrero

Located on the Southwest coast of Mexico, throughout the pre-Columbian era the territory of contemporary Guerrero was home to a panoply of native groups, among which the Olmecs, Teotihuacans and Toltecs stand out[23]. By the second decade of the 15th century the *Triple Alliance*[24] had effectively assimilated Guerrero's territory and *nahuas* groups into its domain. Although, some *señoríos* like the Yopes and Cuitlatecos remained autonomous, the southern territory of the Aztec Empire experienced a relative boom in migration and trade during this period. Surprisingly, in spite the massive number of deaths caused by conflict and the spread of disease during the conquest period, relative to other regions, colonial Guerrero maintained a high concentration of indigenous population, which was clustered particularly in its mountainous areas.

Exploiting native *mexica* networks of dominance, Spaniards secured labor, which, combined with fertile lands for extensive agriculture, easy-access mining, and a domitable coast, made of this southern territory an important asset during the early stages of colonial life. Guerrero's territory became so salient that out of the 38 initial tributary and administrative zones established by 1521, some six of these —that is roughly 16%— were located within its boundaries.

The port of Acapulco, the mineral wealth of Taxco and the production of maize, cotton and cocoa enriched the coffers of the Vice Royalty of New Spain. Even before the riches on northwestern Zacatecas were discovered, across the Southern territory Spaniards secured the extraction of copious amounts of silver, copper and gold. The access to the Pacific facilitated the establishment of a trade network

[23] Guerrero's territory was not the epicentre of these three native groups, but belonged to their sphere of influence throughout the preclassic, classic and postclassic period respectively. Although focused on the 19th century, Arrieta (2006) explores in detail the shifts and traditions of the various indigenous groups which inhabited Guerrero.

[24] This refers to the alliance between Tenochtitlán, Texcoco and Tlacopan which configured the Aztec Empire. For a contemporary examination of the politics and economics of the Aztecs see Nichols, Berdan and Smith (2017).



Figure 5.12: Guerrero's Location and Main Regions

Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of Arrieta (1994) and Illades (2011)
The dotted lines mark the main geological, climate, 'natural regions' within the state. They do not correspond to administrative divisions.

with Asia via the Philippines. Throughout the first two hundred years of colonial life, Guerrero became a central economic node of the newly established vice royalty and saw its landscape and demography transformed.

Two issues that rapidly gained salience among peninsulares, creoles and the nascent mestizo population, were securing a working force and the distribution of land. Guerrero experienced the establishment of the *encomienda* system and its later replacement with *repartimientos* and *intendencias*[25]. These changes increasingly concentrated land and wealth in Spanish hands and also enabled the exploitation of indigenous and slave labor[26] across its territory.

[25]Alarcón (1993) shows how that encomiendas mapped the initial native territorial organization. For an exploration of how haciendas then emerged and evolve, the work by Ortega et.al. (1990) is useful.

[26]Bennett (2009) provides an overview of slavery in colonial Mexico. Richmond (2001) complements this with an analysis of *colonial blackness* at the intersection of mestizaje and colonial social, political and economic arrangements. For a more specific reflection on the African and *afromestiza* population of Guerrero see Laviña (1994).

In a similar fashion to what occurred in other colonial centers, in the southern territory, Spaniards and creoles increasingly concentrated rents and titles. The population within the territory became, to an extent, segregated. Indigenous groups inhabited the sierras, mulatos and African slaves occupied the coastal areas, while the privileged elite settled in along the Real de Minas area in Taxco. Conventionally downplayed by Mexican historiography, African and indigenous slavery were the backbone of southern economic output. Along with Michoacán, Chiapas and the Yucatán Peninsula, Guerrero's colonial economy heavily relied on slave and indigenous exploitation.

Having swiftly replaced the native hierarchy, Spaniards faced no credible challenge from the indigenous population. *Peninsulares* secured tight political and economic dominance in the south. This in turn allowed the established southern elites to resist most of the royal pressures from the centre. In combination with the preponderance of the (in)famous "obedézcase pero no se cumpla" (abide, but do not comply) approach derived from Spanish law, elites south of Mexico City managed to circumvent most of the central regulatory pressures which contravened their interests, particularly in the economic arena. For example, once the Crown started to move away from slave labor throughout the late 18th century, having a shielded, entrenched elite proved particularly deleterious. Contrary to what occurred in the capital or in northwestern states, during the first years of the 19th century, in the predominant haciendas of Guerrero, "the sons of slaves who had arrived a century ago were still servants" (Illades 2011, 37).

18th - 19th Century Guerrero

Throughout the tumultuous 19th century, the country expanded north. The independence struggle lay waste to the local economy, especially through the boycotting of mining centers. Similarly, the international scenario forced a shift in commercial partners from Asia to Europe. Especially attractive were both the British and the US markets. These national and international shifts pushed Guerrero to slowly lose its position as a central economic unit. Ports in the

Atlantic —such as Veracruz and Tamaulipas—gained commercial relevance and new trade routes —in Puebla and the Bajío region— provided faster and cheaper access to Mexico City's market.

Three facts illustrate clearly Guerrero's shift from colonial centre to periphery. 1) As early as 1803, the port of Veracruz —with its link to US and European markets via the Gulf of Mexico— received between 400 to 500 ships on an annual basis. During that same year Acapulco received an estimate of only 10. 2) The struggles for national consolidation destroyed banking in the south. Throughout this period, "Chiapas, Oaxaca, Guerrero, Tabasco and Morelos lost all [their] banks" (Haber, Razo and Maurer 2003, 113). In post-independence Mexico, banking and access to credit became hitherto geographically restricted. Lastly, 3) while the commercial route traversing the city of Iguala in north Guerrero served as a trade link between the capital and the state for almost 250 years, the first decade of the 19th century the route saw its traffic significantly reduced. Puebla and the Bajío provided more cost-effective commercial linkages between the capital and the US-European markets.

In an attempt to rein-in the changes and secure their hold over their fused political and economic roles, as part of the struggles that shaped independent Mexico, southern elites pushed for the creation and the definition of what is today the state of Guerrero. In 1849 they succeeded. Nonetheless, by the time its contemporary legal boundaries were established in 1849, "the state [of Guerrero] and its regional economies kept backwards living conditions, similar to those found during the early colonial period" (Arrieta 1994, 15). As we will see below, Argentinian historians, when exploring the legacies of colonialism normally describe societies northwest of the Pampas as 'feudal'. In that regard, Guerrero's experience is quite similar. Guerrero and the Mexican southeast are fallen colonial cores. They became peripheral regions in the midst of the 18th century. Independence did not alter their path but rather reaffirmed it. Sadly, that is a position which southern Mexican states like Guerrero have yet to overcome.

5.4.2 Salta

When accounting for the trajectories of the north-eastern territories of contemporary Argentina, economic historians normally refer to this region as the former Peruvian space. Along with Jujuy, Tucumán and the northern regions of Catamarca and Santiago del Estero, the economic and political life of Salta's territory was —until the 18th century— heavily shaped by the Viceroyalty of Peru.

Spaniards in the region were quick to take advantage of the distinct networks established between native groups among which the Atacamas, Matacos, Calchaquies and the Diaguitas were the most prominent. Although indigenous groups were not as complex or as densely populated as those of central and southern Mexico, these cultures were within the sphere of influence of the mid and late Inca empire[27].

After the establishment of 'Nuestra Señora de Talavera del Esteco' in 1566 —the first city in Salta's territory— a dual economy shaped the life of the region for the first two hundred years of colonial life: On the one hand, the region developed a self-sustaining agriculture while it simultaneously supplied labor and mules to the mining activities of Potosí (in contemporary Bolivia). On the other hand, Salta was also at the crux of a three-way commercial route. It connected mining activities in Upper Peru with markets in Chile and Buenos Aires, which between the mid 16th and mid 18th century remained a backwater region sustained primarily by contraband and illegal trade.

Like other northwestern provinces such as Jujuy and Santiago del Estero, throughout the pre-Bourbon era, Salta became an economic node, in which three core productive activities converged: 1) mineral extraction, 2) sugar, legume and mule trade, along with 3) an incipient cattle ranching. These activities provided sustenance and allowed for the emergence of a growing intra-regional trade. Although to a lesser extent than in southern Mexico, the backbone of this mode of production was a comparatively considerable use of indigenous and slave

[27]For a very long time, Argentine historiography downplayed and to a large extent blatantly ignored the role played by both indigenous and African populations. For a brief discussion on this historiographic *discomfort* see Mandrini (2007). For an overall account of the indigenous and native inhabitants in pre-Columbian Argentina see, for example, Mandrini (2008). Krapovickas (1983) and Yacobaccio (1996) offer an overview specific to the Argentinian northwest.



Figure 5.14: Saltas's Location and Main Regions

Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of Guardia de Ponté (n.d.)
The dotted lines mark the main geological, climate, 'natural regions' within the state. They do not correspond to administrative divisions.

labor. This in turn allowed an impressive accumulation of wealth in the hands of a few peninsulares and creoles.

While Argentinian historiography has for the most part neglected the salience of slavery in the configuration of the country's early life, recent accounts have highlighted that African slaves were not only relevant to man the military efforts of the 19th century, but also to shape different economies across the Argentinian regions. There is scant data on the exact number and distribution of slaves throughout the Argentinian territory. However, the available information suggests that the population of African slaves was particularly large in Northern territories[28].

[28] Rebagliati (2014) presents a critical overview on the Argentine historiography of slavery. Crespi (2000; 2000a) discusses *rioplatense* slave trade in the 17th century and Borucki (2016) discusses the topic for the 18th century.

18th - 19th century Salta

In 1778, only two years after the creation of the Viceroyalty of the River Plate —with the concomitant establishment of the Intendencia de Salta de Tucumán— a census conducted by Juán José de Vertiz y Salcedo (Buenos Aires' former governor and the River Plate's second Viceroy), identified that in Salta, slaves constituted 46% of the adult population. In regions such as Santiago del Estero, the estimates go as high as 54% (Massone and Muñiz 2017).

Over the forty years as a viceroyalty (1776-1786), there were hardly any immediate significant adjustments to Salta's local economic arrangement. Similarly, the rest of the northwestern economies remained relatively fixed. The Bourbon administrative reforms, by unlocking Atlantic trade, catalyzed what had been until then a gradual territorial shift towards the River Plate basin and the Pampas. Increased trade combined with a steady surge in European migration pushed provinces like Buenos Aires and Santa Fe from their peripheral roles to the national center stage. While the northwestern provinces waned, Buenos Aires and the Pampas were en route to consolidate their roles as the powerhouses of the Argentinian economy.

Independence, along with the unitary *vs* federalist struggle, did not bode well for Salta and the northern economies for three particular reasons: 1) Potosí mining collapsed. In addition, 2) regional trade was disrupted, specially the routes linking Chile and Upper Peru. Lastly, 3) the taxes levied as well as the tariffs imposed to finance these conflicts were disproportionately concentrated in Buenos Aires and made the acquisition of imported goods like Brazilian sugar cheaper[29]. Combined, these factors expunged Salta and the north of its traditional economic comparative advantages.

This change was also promoted and deepened by the increased preponderance of European commercial interests —especially British— in the region. As part of these external factors, in the late 19th and early 20th century Argentina would see a

[29]Mata (2016), for example, explores how the military campaigns of the early 19th century in Salta also increased uncertainty and catalyzed tensions linked to land tenure and property rights.

migration upsurge. Internal movements towards the capital were accompanied by an influx of European immigrants who mostly stayed in the capital and Pampean area. While a significant proportion of Middle Eastern émigrés settled in Salta and other northern provincias, the region became a net workforce exporter.

In an attempt to adapt to the tectonic economic shift, from the late 19th century onwards Salta's elite turned the focus of the local economy eastwards. Oran and the Chaco salteño offered at least three distinct advantages: 1) Proximity to sugarcane[30] *ingenios* (which were particularly vigorous in neighboring Jujuy). The east also offered 2) an increased availability of labor via proximity to the native populations of the Chaco region[31]. Lastly, it offered 3) the possibility to exploit trade with Buenos Aires via land and the Bermejo river[32]. As we will explore in the next chapter, this eastbound move later consolidated an internal development split within the province.

Although the province's east later became a relatively forward economic enclave, Salta's story, like that of Guerrero, is that of a fallen colonial core. Historians agree that in the consolidation of the Argentine nation, economically speaking 'the interior', lost. This is particularly true of the northern provinces. In the newly independent Argentina, Salta and the former Peruvian Space would remain, as some analysts have highlighted, "feudal provinces" (Pérez Esquivel, 2004).

5.4.3 Jalisco

Located in the western pacific coast of Mexico, Jalisco's early colonial life, as well as its experience of the changes taking place by the turn of the 19th century, heavily contrasts those of both Salta and Guerrero. For instance, upon arrival, as with many of the northern territories, Spaniards faced not a highly hierarchical, organized

[30] Justiniano (2005; 2008) offers an account of the political and economic dynamics linked to sugar production in late 19th century Salta.

[31] Michel et. al. (2010), for example, highlight that the Chaco, and Salta's east gained economic and political salience given the availability of both land and labor.

[32] Barba (1958), for example, presents and analyses a petition letter written in 1852 by the *Junta General de Comerciantes de la Provincia de Salta* to the province's governor. In the letter, the signatories raise the need to bolster riverine navigation and trade via the Bermejo and the Salado rivers.

Figure 5.16: Jalisco's Location and Main Regions

Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of IIEG (accessed November 2019)
The dotted lines mark the main geological, climate, 'natural regions' within the state. They do not correspond to administrative divisions.

indigenous civilization, nor a group under heavy Aztec influence. Rather, in northern and northwestern territory, Spanish colonizers faced a multiplicity of native *señoríos*.

For over fifty years, tecuexes, cazcanes, tecuales, coras and totomares heavily and violently opposed Iberian rule. Among these revolts and confrontations, the Mixtón Rebellion (1541-1542) was perhaps the bloodiest encounter. Although, by the early 1600s most *calzontins* —native leaders— had been defeated, throughout its first two hundred years of colonial rule the then Kingdom of New Galicia experienced multiple indigenous uprisings[33]. Given that many indigenous communities remained either autonomous or in open rebellion, even after the fall of Tenochtitlán, in order to lessen the intensity and the frequency of confrontations, not being able to subdue them, Spaniards increasingly granted de facto political autonomy and

[33] Yánez (2001) dedicates a full volume of the *Historia de los Pueblos Indígenas de México* series to articulate a very detailed account of the 'western' indigenous experience in colonial times.

exempted the majority of natives from paying the tribute commonly levied by econdomenderos and hacendados.

Contrary to what took place in northern Argentina or southern Mexico, the fact that the peninsulares were early and constantly challenged curtailed the extent to which Spanish hands concentrated and secured land and indigenous labor. As Shadow (2002) suggests, in the west and northwestern territories of New Spain while "the administration [...] was in the hands of the Governors appointed by the Viceroy [...] at the local level every 'pueblo' [...] (s)elected their own mayors and sheriffs" (Shadow 2002, 59). Consequently, contrary to the experience of other states such as Guerrero, "encomenderos, hacendados and other [Spanish landowners] never fully became intermediaries between the colonial government and indigenous societies [which ultimately] kept effective control of their lands" (Shadow 2002, 61).

That the early patterns of land holding and labor relations of Jalisco were quite distinct from those of southern Mexico is not a contentious point among historians. However, there is more contention on the role of slavery and coerced indigenous labor for the eastern and northern colonial local economies. Early accounts seem to ignore or downplay its salience, while contemporary scholarship traces its role more carefully[34].

The picture that emerges from the more recent and nuanced historical accounts is that, while slaves were present in small numbers both in New Galicia and then later on in the Intendencia de Guadalajara, they were rather quickly assimilated or incorporated into society through mestizaje. A count by the early 17th century registers the presence of only five hundred slaves in the region. By the 1750's, in a vivid description of the region, José Antonio Villa Señor portrays a conglomerate of towns in which mulatos —not slaves or 'Indians'— were the predominant active members of colonial society (Cornejo Franco 1993).

[34]In this regard Aguirre's (1972) *La población negra de México* is *the* classic study on African slavery in New Spain and its demographic-sociological implications for Mexico. For a more contemporary discussion centered around Jalisco, see Fernández (1991) and Sanguinés (2003).

18th - 19th century Jalisco

As we have seen, contrarily to what occured in Guerrero or Salta, and similarly to what took place in Rio Grande do Sul, early colonial life in Jalisco's territory was marked by a comparatively small extraction of minerals and a protracted access and control of indigenous or slave labor. This inhibited the formation of a symbiotic landowning and commercial elite; and, up until the late 18th century, these factors relegated Jalisco to a peripheral colonial role. The introduction of Bourbon Reforms and the consequent shifts in international trade ultimately brought Jalisco to the fore, placing it as the gateway between Mexico City and Mexican as well as US northern markets.

Relatively early in the 19th century, native groups and mestizos in Jalisco became economically free agents. When compared to individuals in other Mexican latitudes, inhabitants of the northern and northwestern territories had comparatively more control of their land and their labor. The changes introduced by the independence process had their greatest impact in two key dimensions: First, they allowed the territorial expansion of political and administrative control. Second, this increase in land availability facilitated a further transfer and division of land, giving rise to small and medium landholders[35].

Furthermore, in 1888 railroads connected Guadalajara to Mexico City, poising the region to benefit from the capital's market and new commercial routes to the north. Similarly, as pointed out by Haber, Razo and Maurer (2003), —contrary to what happened in Guerrero and the south— "[n]orthern banks [. . .] disproportionately survived [civil conflicts] and new entrants concentrated in Mexico City and the [northern] Tamaulipas area" (Haber, Razo and Maurer 2003, 113). Proximity to

[35]A key mechanism underpinning and connecting these two factors was military enrollment and conscription. Local native and black individuals were enlisted to fight both for the royalists and the liberal forces. After the struggle, individuals were frequently rewarded not with wages or money, but with land. This was impossible in either Guerrero or Salta. For example, Martín Miguel de Güemes enlisted indigenous groups to fight Spanish royalists in Upper Peru. Once the conflict subdued, he announced land repayment. Large estate landowners in Salta, however, drastically opposed the measure. In 1821, they successfully conspired to have Güemes assassinated.

banking would enhance the reconfiguration of Northern and Central Mexico, as it made access to credit more readily available.

Ultimately, by the turn of the 20^{th} century, a mixed economy emerged in Jalisco. Small landowners heavily invested in manufactured goods or "mercancias". Hacendados directed their efforts towards agroindustry and exports. Indigenous communities used communal lands, focusing primarily on goods for internal and intra-regional consumption. Lastly, commerce and trade would continue to receive a boost by exploiting the state's proximity to the port of San Blas in northern Nayarit.

In sum, contrary to what territories in southern Mexico or northwestern Argentina experienced, Jalisco was a colonial periphery. With no significant mineral wealth and indigenous antagonism, the regional elite remained comparatively weak and economic activity more responsive to the liberalizing Bourbon push. While in Guerrero and Salta a 'feudal' symbiotic relation between large landowners and merchants heavily resisted market-like dynamics, Jalisco and other northern Mexican provinces were, by the mid 1800s, already poised to benefit from the new economic scenario. As we will see below, similar to Jalisco, Rio Grande do Sul in Brazil is also a case of a rising periphery.

5.4.4 Rio Grande do Sul

Between 1498 and the 1520s, Spanish explorations coming from the Caribbean basin and Colombia probed the north-eastern and central-eastern regions of the South American cone. However, the former efforts ebbed as New Spain consolidated, while the latter similarly waned as Spaniards cemented their hold over Peruvian land. Pioneers in the establishment of global trade networks and colonizing efforts across coastal Africa and Asia, the Portuguese quickly followed suit in scouting and claiming territories in the Americas. Aiming to divide the newly discovered lands, in 1494 the two Iberian kingdoms signed the Tordesillas Treaty. Territories 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde islands belonged to Castille, whilst terriories to the east were to be

Figure 5.18: Rio Grande do Sul's Location and Main Regions

Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of De Souza (2017)
The dotted lines mark the main geological, climate, 'natural regions' within the state. They do not correspond to administrative divisions.

Lusitanic. Located in the southernmost region of contemporary Brazil, the territory of today's Rio Grande do Sul (RGS) was initially a backwater of Spanish America[36].

After arriving in Bahia in 1500, the Portuguese established large sugar plantations powered by indigenous but increasingly African slave labor. For the first one hundred years, *lusos* extracted wood and sugar along the coastal areas of the northeast —in the territories of contemporary Bahia, Creará and Pernambuco. Although throughout the 16^{th} century Portugal's interests were more heavily vested in Africa, these northern Luso-Brazilian territories were comparatively more economically

[36]For a more thorough account of Brazilian colonization Metcalf's (2005) and Bethell's (1987) work are again very illuminating. For a very early reflection on the implications of the Tordesillas treaty on the establishment of the Brasilian-Argentine borders see Wilhelmine (1922). Using a regression discontinuity design (RDD), Fujiwara, Laudares and Valencia (2019) explore the links between slavery and inequality across contemporary Brazil.

central than their southern counterparts. While sugar is certainly not gold, silver or copper, its increased popularity in the expanding European markets made it an incredibly central and valuable commodity[37]. By 1600 Brazil had become Europe's chief source of sugar[38]. It is estimated that that same year Brazil had approximately two hundred sugar mills, 50% of which were distributed between Bahia and Pernambuco (Klein and Luna 2009, 25).

During this early period, in a continuous attempt to find mineral wealth and secure slave labor for northern sugar *engenhos*, southern lands were probed through *bandeiras* and *entradas*[39]. While these efforts fostered the establishment of some towns and villas around Espírito Santo and São Paulo, bluntly put, during early colonial life, northeastern settlements were Portugal's pivotal American possessions. Just like the River Plate basin, southern territories with no mineral wealth and no hierarchically complex native civilization remained colonial peripheries.

In a similar vein to what occurred in northwestern New Spain, expeditions and conflict with *guaraní* tribes marked 16$^{\text{th}}$ and 17$^{\text{th}}$ life across the *Banda Oriental*[40]. Up until the last quarter of the 1600s the south existed in a delicate balance between a subsistence economy and scant inter-regional trade. Cattle farming and *charqueadas* —the production of dried, salted meat— became the main source of income for the region.

[37]As Ebert(2003) highlights, Brazilian-Dutch trade was the gateway to European markets. For more on how sugar shaped Brazilian economy throughout the early 16$^{\text{th}}$ and mid 17$^{\text{th}}$ century see Schwartz (2005). Similarly, with Bahia as an exemplary case, Schwartz (1985) is the go-to reference to explore how sugar plantations shaped the northern territories.

[38]Sugar became so important that securing labor for plantations ultimately altered Portuguese interests in Africa; these slowly changed from extracting gold and ivory, to capturing and trading slaves. Klein and Luna (2009) —specifically in the first two chapters— offer a succinct account of this shift. Freire, Lains and Münch (2016) —especially the second and third chapters— look at this switch from a Portugal-oriented viewpoint.

[39]Historians offer two distinctions between these expeditionary efforts: the first one distinguishes them according to their geographic origin, the second one differentiates them by their funding. In that sense, according to the first geographical criteria, bandeiras were distinctly *paulistas*, that is, they originated exclusively from the southern Capitania of São Vicente, while entradas could set off from any other capitania. According to the second criteria, bandeiras and entradas were financed by private and royal funds respectively. For a didactic and succinct exploration on this topic see Albuquerque and Cunha (2009).

[40]Banda Oriental was the Spanish name given to the territories east of the Uruguay River and north of the River Plate basin.

A Word on Slavery

Like Jalisco, RGS early colonial life was protracted and peripheral. However similar, the phenomenon that made the Brazilian colonial crucible distinct was the scale of slavery. In this regard, the extent to which southern colonial economies relied on slave labor is a contentious issue among historians. On the one hand, early accounts offer a rather romanticized version of a benevolent, quasi slave-free gaúcho south[41]. On the other hand, modern historiography —ushered in by John M. Monteiro's *Negros da terra* (2018) — contends that this was not necessarily the case. One key distinction is that while regions like Pernambuco and Bahia relied primarily on African slave labor, São Paulo and southern economies depended on a mix of indigenous and African slavery. This exacerbated a contradiction between the explicit illegality of indian slavery and the *regime of personal service* (Monteiro 2018).

While, as Monteiro himself asserts, "these contradictions were never resolved" (Monteiro 2018, 142), they nonetheless created conditions which enabled integration between Indian *administrados* (wards), African slaves and Portuguese masters[42]. In relation to this amalgamation process, Klein and Luna (2009) point out that "[p]robably in no other region of the Americas had Indian slaves and Indian and mestiço free workers been so fully integrated into a white-dominated colonial regime" (Klein and Luna 2009, 57).

The picture that emerges from these accounts, and key to our purpose, is that the economies of the Brazilian south relied on slavery comparatively less than their north and north-eastern counterparts. Although documented evidence is scant, the share of the slave population in the late 18$^{\text{th}}$ century along the Bahia and Pernambuco area is estimated to have been between 40% and 60% respectively.

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[41] The early work by Alfredo Ellis (1926) and Myriam Ellis (1960) are examples of this argumentative line, now considered outdated and racist. Woodard (2018) offers a succint but thorough discussion on the historiographic progress on this topic.

[42] Monteiro (2018) —specifically Chapter Five, *Masters and Indians*— offers an interesting account of how religious practices fostered integration. He highlights, for example, the *compadrio* ritual in which "[m]asters[...][chose] to be godfathers to their slaves, but not in cases where it would mean becoming a coparent with a male slave. They thereby avoided creating bond of equality or solidarity with their slaves, while allowing the godfather-child relationship to reinforce the paternalistic ethos of slave mastery" (Monteiro 2018, 154).

On the other hand, estimates for southern states like Rio Grande do Sul range around 25% to 30% of the total adult population.

18$^{\text{th}}$ - 19$^{\text{th}}$ Rio Grande do Sul

While marginal during early colonial life, from the 1750's onwards, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Rio Grande do Sul became progressively important from a military and commercial strategic perspective. Four reasons gradually raised the primacy of southern territories:

i. During the early 1700s, the ever growing demand for indigenous labor drove further *entradas* and *bandeiras*, increasing tensions between Luso colonizers, Spaniards and native groups. Specifically, the Eastern Bank or Banda Oriental became the main point of contention. As a result, on the one hand, by mid-18$^{\text{th}}$ century, the Madrid Treaty revised the Portuguese-Spanish borders in America. On the other hand, Iberian confrontations with the native population continued and peaked with the Guarani War (17544-1756).

ii. Secondly, Luso explorers also pushed south in their quest to find and secure mineral extraction. The discovery of gold in the 1690's shifted the focus of economic activity towards the southeast; specifically towards the territory of contemporary Minas Gerais. This coincided with a 'bust' in Brazilian sugar markets, as the Dutch occupation and the subsequent growth of the West Indies sugar industry caused local prices to collapse, "the golden age of [sugar] profitability had passed" (Klein and Luna 2009, 35).

iii. As we have seen above, the Bourbon Reforms enabled a trade liberalizing boost for Spanish America. The Pombaline Reforms had a similar effect for the Luso-Brazilian economy. In the north they marginally boosted sugar and catalyzed cotton production. Most importantly, however, they heightened the salience of southern ports. Imports, exports and tariffs became increasingly centered across the south and south-eastern territories.

iv. Lastly, the gradual Spaniard shift from Lima towards the River Plate, pushed the Portuguese to respond in a similar fashion. To withstand Spanish territorial pressure, the Portuguese founded Colonia del Sacramento in what is today Uruguayan territory. In this regard for example, in years to come, 'Rio Grande de São Pedro', as RGS was known back then, would play a crucial role in solidifying Portugal's hold in the south.

5.5 Conclusion

The image that emerges after exploring the antecedent conditions is one in which the early timing and pattern of conquest influenced which territories and regions would emerge as early extractivist economic nodes. Given that conquistadors could more easily exploit native networks and natural resources in Guerrero and Salta, these regions became central to the colonial economy, the former hosting agricultural, mining and portuary activities, while the latter provided food and manpower to Potosi, while connecting Upper Peru with the River Plate. Just like the Portuguese in northern Brazil, the Spaniards were able to quickly secure and extract land and labor across these regions.

Contrarily, early colonial dominance was challenged in southern Brazil as well as in Northern and Western Mexico. The Mixtón and the Guaraní conflicts, for example, would impede the consolidation of these areas as early extractivist centres. Similarly, the relative salience and intensity of slavery varied considerably. While in southern Mexico and the Peruvian space economic production relied more heavily on slave and indigenous exploitation, this was much less so in the Brazilian south, the Argentinian pampa and the Mexican north.

Similarly, early peripheries experienced a growth boom with the turn of the 18th century. These hitherto backwater regions became attractive to national and foreign capital, and their crescent economic potential fostered urban migration. In economic terms, this implied that the readiness, intensity and ease with which regions were able to pursue industrialization varied considerably. In term of social structure, this meant that the working class emerged and gained salience at different points in time



Figure 5.20: Subnational Political Divergence since the 19th Century

Source: Varieties of Democracy v8. The score displayed is built using the items v2clrgunev and v2elsnlsff, which respectively ask experts to score if the respect of civil liberties or the *freeness* and fairness of elections varies across subnational units. The estimation procedure is described in footnote 43.

across space. Politically speaking, this in turn meant that the pressures for inclusion were also territorially distinct. To put it bluntly, *contra* the assumption made by Collier and Collier (1991), the political implications of this historic divergence is that the dynamics of labor incorporation did not unfold uniformly across the national territory. Rather, they unfolded in a subnational and temporally staggered fashion.

That provinces experienced an economic divergence so early on had important political implications. As the graph in Figure 5.20 shows[43], the political heterogeneity between subnational units in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico began to escalate by the

[43]Using data from the Varieties of democracy Project v8, the score displayed is built using the items *v2clrgunev* and *v2elsnlsff* which respectively ask experts to score if the respect of civil liberties or the *freeness* and fairness of elections varies across subnational units. I first add both variables and then obtain their year-country mean. Afterwards, to measure heterogeneity instead of homogeneity, I transform the observed value by taking its inverse. Mathematically, the score can be stated as: $1/mean_{ct}(v2clrgunev + v2elsnlsff)$.

turn of the 1800s, with the trend only shifting towards harmonization or homogeneity after the 1950s. The second tenet of my argument contends that the most significant driver of this political heterogeneity is linked to the emergence of the working class and the unfolding of local pressures for incorporation, which either entrenched or dislodged subnational arenas as valued loci for political engagement. The dynamics shaping this process are the subject of the following chapter.

"The politics of labor incorporation founded [...] two political arenas of popular participation, and 'shaped' those arenas by creating structures in each that were sticky and would endure".

— Ruth Berins Collier (2021, xxviii)

6
Subnational Pressures for Incorporation

Through a critical review of both literature and evidence, Chapters 2 and 3 showed that subnational democracy is a historical phenomenon. Observing that provinces which have had more open and contested elections over the last three decades were also the democratic overperformers throughout the entirety of the 20th century, and noting that open subnational politics have been more likely across more developed subnational units, I posited that a satisfying explanation of subnational democracy needs to account for the timing and the process through which this stable equilibrium was first emplaced.

The origins of subnational democracy, and the ensuing territorial regime variation observed today across Latin American countries were configured by territorially distinct development trajectories which were set during colonization. Once in place, these trajectories conditioned the sequencing of labor incorporation. As I outlined in Chapter 4, according to my two-step argument, the legacies of colonialism and the timing of local labor incorporation jointly coloured the subnational regime heterogeneity across Latin America.

Leveraging subnational historiography, and combining quantitative and qualitative analysis, in Chapter 5 I unpacked the evidence underpinning the first tenet of my argument. I first identified whether the territories of Argentinian, Brazilian, and Mexican provinces were central or peripheral during the early colonial era. Using regression and a difference-in-differences design, I then isolated the causal effect of colonial roles. Following the cases of Jalisco, Rio Grande do Sul, Guerrero, and Salta, I concluded the previous chapter by expounding how this effect unfolded through time and space.

In this chapter I elaborate on the second pillar of my theory. Building on Collier and Collier (1991), I show that the processes for incorporation varied across subnational units. More specifically, I contend that provinces on different development trajectories experienced a temporal and spatially uneven emergence of labor. The early emergence of an organized working class was more likely in provinces on the late-liberal path. In these cases, the initial State effort for political incorporation came from local governments and consequently, the subnational arena became a comparatively salient domain of political contention, bargaining and participation. Contrarily, across provinces on the mercantilist path (fallen colonial cores), labor emerged protractedly. In these instances, the State's first response came from the central government, dislodging the subnational arena in favour of the national one. In sum, this chapter shows that the timing of subnational labor incorporation conditioned the configuration of the subnational arena as a relevant locus for political engagement.

By showing that the dynamics of labor incorporation did not unfold in national unison, but rather unfolded in a subnational, and temporally staggered fashion, this chapter elaborates and critiques the conventional wisdom on the role of the working class. On the one hand, by focusing on formal labor, I acknowledge their importance for shaping political regime outcomes. On the other hand, the analyses presented here highlights that most of the scholarship on labor incorporation and labor movements has suffered from the 'whole-nation bias' (Lijphart 1975). In other words, one of my main contributions in this chapter is to show that labor politics *remains* important. However, the novelty of my approach also underscores that in order to refine our understanding of State-labor relations —and gain more clarity about the ways in which the working class influenced regime outcomes— we need to change the level of analysis by adopting a subnational approach.

The chapter is structured as follows: In the following section I offer a brief discussion aimed at refreshing, clarifying, and deepening the theoretical salience of the working class and their political incorporation. I then discuss and explore our subnational cases. While in Chapter 5 I introduced the narratives of early mercantilist centers first, in this chapter I invert the order. Thus, I first examine the experience of Jalisco and Rio Grande do Sul, to then move on to Guerrero and Salta. In an effort to generalize our case findings, in the third section of this chapter I then offer quantitative evidence of working-class activity or 'labor unrest'. Specifically, I show that provinces on the liberal path have had more bottom-up pressures from labor than those on the mercantilist route. Similarly, I present the positive and significant correlations that exist between labor unrest, development, and subnational democracy. In the last section I offer some concluding remarks which pave the way for the discussion presented in the final chapter of this project.

6.1 A Refresher on Labor Politics

Scholarly work on labor is legion. For Latin America, the classic studies by Alba (1964) and Spalding (1977) shaped historiography on the issues surrounding the working class within the region. Specifically, they were the first to highlight the sociopolitical prominence of the working class and shaped what historians and social scientist now call labor politics. That is, the exploration of the relationship between the trade union movements and the State. For our country cases, the work by Sabato and Romero (1992), Fausto (1976), and Bolio (1997) provide insights on the early stages of working-class formation in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico respectively. Similarly, the classic account of the populist Peronist, Getulist, and Cardenist experiences can be found in James's (1988) *Resistance and Integration*, John French's (1992) *The Brazilian Worker*, and Anguiano's (1975) *El Estado y la Política Obrera del Cardenismo*[1].

[1]For a full review of the historiography of Latin American labor see French (2000), Wolfe (2002), and Brennan (2011).

While within political science the international salience of labor has been underscored by the contribution of Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992) and the more recent work by Carles Boix (2003), for Latin America, the work by Collier and Collier (1991) is, to this day, the go-to reference for scholars aiming to understand how labor politics shaped regime dynamics across the region. To clarify the theoretical lenses through which I assess the evidence in this chapter, in what follows I briefly discuss the Colliers' causal mechanism and highlight how my contribution maps onto this classic piece of scholarly work.

At the core of the Colliers' argument lies a concern for the distinct elite strategies for inducing and constraining the emerging Latin-American working class. They argue that through either mobilization or control, political systems in the region were configured from the top, diachronically and on a national scale. More specifically, they contend that governing elites had distinct incentives to react and accommodate the mounting pressures of the organized working class. Although the strategies adopted and the period through which these dynamics unfolded varied, the process of incorporation shared similar characteristics across countries in the region, as it involved efforts to shape and institutionalize the labor movement within each country's political system. This process, Collier and Collier (1991) contend, had a sticky, long lasting impact specifically in the shape of the party system.

Relevant to our country-cases, the Colliers contend that Argentina and Mexico experienced a 'party-led' incorporation, while Brazil went through a 'controlled' one during the Vargas era. As a consequence, the former were cases of stalemated and one-party systems respectively, while the latter was a case of increased polarization. Table 6.1 summarizes the key details of the Colliers' analysis for the ABRAMEX triad.

This chapters follows on the footsteps of the Colliers, while at the same time it highlights a set of elements which were overlooked by their framework. Critical for the purposes of this project is the recognition that their evidence, examples and conclusions were mostly drawn not only from a few urban areas, but heavily on country capitals. Building on the analysis of the antecedent conditions, the

Table 6.1: The National Process of Incorporation in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico: An Overview

	Argentina	Brazil	Mexico
Type of Incorporation	Party-Led	Controlled	Party-Led
Onset of Incorporation	1943	1930	1917
End of Incorporation	1955	1945	1940
Main National Figure	Juan Domingo Perón	Getúlio Vargas	Lázaro Cárdenas
Key Popular Sectors	Urban Labor	Urban Labor	Urban and Rural Working Class
Evidence drawn from	Capital cities and main urban centers.		

Source: Built by the author on the basis of Collier and Collier (1991).

core contention of this chapter is that the pressures for incorporation were not homogeneous —in timing, type, and intensity— across subnational units. As we have seen, the colonial experience set states onto divergent economic trajectories. In turn, these paths heavily conditioned when, where, and to what extent the pressures for incorporation emerged. Consequently, it follows that labor's incorporation was not only territorially uneven, but also temporally distinct.

As we will see below, for example, while industry and the related pressures exerted by the working class were experienced early on in states like Jalisco and Rio Grande do Sul, the trajectories of states like Salta and Guerrero were marked by delayed and protracted labor pressures. As Figure 6.1 exemplifies, the subnational dynamics I describe below occurred before, during, and after the national processes explored by the Colliers. Similarly, the red solid line in Figure 6.1 draws attention to the fact that the emphasis here is on the initial push for subnational incorporation and not on stages similar to what the Colliers have called *aftermath* and *legacy*. Consequently, I cannot classify distinct types of subnational incorporation, nor do I elaborate on the specific buildup of local party ties or linkages.

Finally, before detailing case narratives, it is important to recall that given its capacity for collective action, as well as its *special significance vis-à-vis* the State's legitimacy, I focus my analysis on formal, organized labor. Beyond its theoretical relevance, empirically and methodologically speaking, organized labor is a common factor across countries, but it holds interesting and relevant variation



Figure 6.1: Subnational Pressures for Incorporation *vis-à-vis* National Dynamics

across subnational units and through time. Having described the national context, offered an overview of the core argument and expectations of this chapter, as well as having outlined the features of labor I focus on, drawing from distinct secondary historical sources, the next section lays out the narratives for Jalisco, Rio Grande do Sul, Guerrero, and Salta.

6.2 Cases

To substantiate the claim that the bottom-up pressures of labor unfolded in a staggered fashion, in this section I trace and compare the experiences of my four subnational cases. To enhance the clarity and the cogency of my exposition, I first examine Jalisco and Rio Grande do Sul. In these provinces, labor emerged relatively early on, and exerted a response from local officials which anteceded national incorporation dynamics. Afterwards, I survey Guerrero and Salta. Their historical account reveals how the working class within these provinces emerged protractedly and comparatively at a later stage. Once they did, the national, centralizing processes described by Collier and Collier (1991) were well on their way, which had deleterious consequences for the political arena of these once mercantilist centers. These cases set the stage for the statistical analysis of labor unrest in the following section. Taken together, the qualitative CHA and the quantitative components of this chapter illustrate and lend credence to the second tenet of my argument.

6.2.1 Jalisco

In Chapter 5 we saw that, throughout the 16th and 17th centuries, the absence of complex indigenous societies and readily available resources made of Jalisco's territory —then part of the Kingdom of New Galicia— a colonial periphery. Nonetheless, the economic outlook of this hitherto backwater region began to shift in the midst of the 1700s. Fearing incursions from competing colonizing powers such as the British and the French, with the aim of strengthening their hold over their American possessions, as part of the Bourbon Reforms, the Spanish crown sold vast swathes of land in what today is north-western Mexico. Specifically, territories were purchased along the peninsula of Baja California, and along contemporary Nayarit, and Sinaloa.

The privatization of these areas, in addition to the 1774 approval of intercolonial trade, triggered Jalisco's dramatic demographic and economic activation. The region left behind the marginal role it had occupied during the fifteen and sixteen hundreds, to turn into a strategic commercial node throughout the second half of the 18th century. From that point forward, people and products on their way to or from Spain, Mexico City and the Mexican north-west had to go through Jalisco (Muriá 1991, 43). In addition, as the size of its population increased, so did the local demand for goods, food, and services. In turn, this triggered a rise in the consumption, production, and trade of meat and grains. Historians agree that the privatization of land in conjunction with the growth of local demand and economic activity gave way to the rise of an *agro-commercial elite* (Lindley 1987, 33).

Noting its burgeoning economy, the Iberian metropoli designed and implemented several strategies in an attempt to regulate and benefit from neo-Galician markets[2]. However, "the government in Guadalajara never managed to *really* control trade [in Jalisco] and its management was left to particulars" (Ascencio 2006, 53). This resistance to government encroachment can be considered an example of the *liberal* ethos which permeated the local agro-commercial elite. Indeed, throughout the

[2]Among these efforts to increase taxation and market regulation, the *pósito*, *calicata* and *alhondiga* are perhaps the most salient ones. For more on these policies and strategies see van Young (1979), Fernández Castillo (2012), and Challú (2013).

tumultuous 19th century "Jalisco was a bastion of liberal thought and of the defence of federalism" (Alonso 2001, 251).

In Mexico, the first years of independent life were marked by Agustín de Iturbide's attempt to centralize power under his wing. Facing resistance from multiple insurgent and local leaders, Iturbide failed and was ultimately forced to abdicate on March of 1823. As part of the germinal arrangements shaping the nation, in June of that same year Jalisco was recognised as a member state of the Republic. Although the struggles of the early 19th century had a non-negligible cost for the state[3], they did not significantly alter neither Jalisco's economic structure, nor did they deter its liberal spirit. For example, in 1856, then governor Gregorio Ávila adamantly pursued the application of Lerdo's Law[4]; and later, during the electoral round of 1867, the only two strong political forces contending locally were the 'liberales puros' (pure or radical liberals) and the 'liberales moderados' (moderate liberals)[5].

Jalisco's role as a commercial node was catalyzed by the inauguration of the Mexico-Guadalajara railway line in 1888. Faster and less costly access to both the capital and other relevant local economies in the north boosted Jalisco's commercial activity and incentivized further capital investments in the state. This, in turn, solidified Jalisco's wide regional market, and strengthened the diversity and capability of local production. While historians contend the extent to which industry fully consolidated in the mid-to-late 19th century, they agree that, over the 1870-1920 period, the region experienced an unprecedented industrial and urban boom.

The processes of industrialization and urbanization were accompanied by signs of the early emergence of organized labor. For example, Jalisco was the cradle of

[3]For example, in addition to the human and material costs caused by the battles held within Jalisco, the territorial boundaries of the state themselves were modified as a result of conflict. On the one hand, Jalisco's statehood was recognized. On the other hand, in an attempt to weaken the Jalisciense elite, the center managed to excise a sizeable portion of land from the newly formed unit. In time, the severed territory became contemporary Nayarit.

[4]Formally known as the 'Law for the Confiscation of Rural and Urban Fincas belonging to the Civil and Religious Corporations of Mexico', Lerdo's Law was part of the so-called *Leyes de Reforma*, a combination of anticlerical and secularizing laws enacted in Mexico between 1855 and 1863.

[5]In the midst of 19th century, Mexican political forces were split between conservatives, moderate, and pure liberals. In that sense the divisions within Jalisco and other states reflected those at the national stage. However, I here pinpoint it to underscore the strength and the endurance of pro-liberal and pro-federal ideas in Jalisco.

Mexico's first class-based organization, the *Sociedad de Artesanos de Guadalajara*, which was created in 1850. Moreover, that same year, *jalisciense* textile workers led the first strike of post-independent Mexico. Historians agree that early on, labor organizations in Jalisco had a very combative spirit, influenced by either religious (particularly catholic) or communist ideologies. Considering their feistiness, small numbers, feeble organization, and the lack of a regulatory framework, the State normally replied to these nascent pressures from labor in a punitive fashion. Nonetheless, during the Porfiriato, and even after the 1917 Revolution, the province saw its urban area doubled, and it also experienced a significant extension of its infrastructure, especially in terms of electricity, water and transport.

Given its commercial impetus and landholding patterns[6]—contrary to what occurred in northern states— in Jalisco, the first industries adopted the form of small to medium size family factories and cottage production. Capitalizing on its already established commercial and industrial activities, the increased domestic and international economic pressures of the Great War (1914-1918) fostered the emergence of a dynamic industrial sector —with its characteristic large factories[7]. Although the capital city of Guadalajara remained the main commercial and industrial hub, as highlighted by Patricia Arias (1980), the geographical pattern of this deepening round of industrialization allowed small local factories to color distinct *ayuntamientos* and cities across the state.

In the first decades of the 20$^{\text{th}}$ century the growth of industry was accompanied by the increase in number and cohesiveness of the working class. In Jalisco their early social and political salience is reflected by the 1914 approval of the state's mandatory rest law, and the 1916 state labor code. Under the wing of then governor

[6]Recall that throughout the colonial era, the elite was constantly challenged by competing indigenous groups. As a result, in Jalisco, the elite's connection to land was comparatively —if not weak— at least more contested. The landed elite was further challenged by the Mexican Revolution and the ensuing agrarian reform, implemented first by President Álvaro Obregón, and later fully extended by President Lázaro Cárdenas.

[7]Another way to characterize Jalisco's industrialization pattern would be to say that production of consumer goods emerged first, fostering horizontal or sectoral diversity and that only later would a limited dynamic industry emerge. For example, the distinction here is the early emergence of industries linked to food packaging and textiles, and the later growth of industrial activity into metallurgy, cement and electronics.

Manuel Aguirre Berlanga, the 1916 local regulation "deserves the title of the first (proper) *labor law* of the constitutionalist Revolution" (Tello 2007, 123).

Here it is important to acknowledge that between 1911 and 1917, historians and legal scholars acknowledge the existence of a national and subnational boom regarding labor regulation[8]. However, the extent and the substance of Jalsico's early efforts can only be fully understood when contrasted against the backdrop of its industrial and commercial structure, and in relation to the salience that the working class had gained locally. In that same vein, that this local regulatory boom occurred across the country strongly suggests that subnational governments were indeed the first responders to the social, political and economic *issues* raised by the emergence of labor[9].

In parallel fashion, during those early decades, as the dust from the revolutionary struggled settled, local leaderships aligned or opposed the strong military leaders who outlived the conflict. Of particular salience was the tug of war between those loyal to Álvaro Obregón, and those who supported Plutarco Elías Calles, who ultimately emerged victorious after Obregón's murder in 1928. The growth of industry and the working class, as well as the quarrels between *Obregonistas* and *Callistas* rippled through Jalisco.

On the one hand, labor was split in three broad sectors: There were (1)'white unions' aligned with the Catholic Church (*sindicalismo blanco*). Jalisco also had (2) 'yellow unions', which had strong ties to the national capital and the center via the *Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana* (CROM). There were also 'red unions', which were heavily influenced by anarcho-syndicalism. Throughout the 1920s these three strands of organized labor were continuously pitted against each

[8]For example, between 1911 and 1916, states like San Luis Potosí, Puebla, Veracruz, Aguascalientes, and Coahuila enacted regulation regarding weekly resting days, sanitary conditions in the work place, and working hours. Moreover, the original text of the 1917 Mexican Constitution stipulated that "the national congress *and* state legislatures ought to enact labor laws based on the needs of each specific region" (Mexico 1917 Constitution. Art. 123; emphasis added). Under this constitutional framework, between 1918 and 1929, a total of 25 Mexican states issued subnational labor laws.

[9]At the time, the 1857 constitution treated work related items as 'civil' matters. Additional examples of early local regulatory responses are the Workplace Accident Law issued in Estado de México and Nuevo León in 1904 and 1906 respectively.

other, vying for influence and bargaining power with both the State and the industrialists (Carranza 2019, 97)[10].

On the other hand, in 1923 the then Carrancista governor Manuel M. Diéguez[11] was replaced by José Guadalupe Zuno Hernández, who campaigned under the banner of the *Liberal Jaliscience Party* and openly supported departing president Obregón. Zuno's obregonismo, however, quickly put him in the cross-hairs of incoming president Plutarco Elias Calles. As we will see below, the juncture of labor's split with the animosity between Calles and Zuno set off a pattern of interactions that helped shaped Jalisco's political arena. While in its nascent stages the working class was a civil concern to be dealt with punitively, Zuno saw in Jalisco's comparatively more robust and salient labor movement a potential political ally.

More specifically, this situation would bring Zuno and red unions closer together, as they both faced pressures on three distinct fronts. For his part, Zuno was pressured by 1) the church which kept pushing really hard against the secularization of public life[12]. Zuno also faced resistance from 2) local landowners who opposed the implementation of the agrarian reform and the continued expansion of workers' rights. Lastly, the governor also faced 3) challenges and pressures from the center, specifically from president Plutarco Elias Calles and his Secretary for Industry, Commerce, Labor and Trade, Mr. Luis N. Morones.

Red unionism for its part faced resistance from a) Catholic and clerical organizations which were also trying to shape, organize and represent the working class — that is, they faced competition from 'sindicalismo blanco' (white sindicalism). An additional challenge was posed by b) the increasing growth of national and foreign private capital within the state, a situation which threatened to deter or tip the power balance in favor of business and the economic elite. Lastly, specifically red unionism

[10]In Mexico, historians and labor scholars tend to color code labor (i.e. allude to white, yellow, and red unions) to signal its ideological orientation and highlight its political alignments. I am aware that this color coding system has distinct connotations in other countries in Latin America (i.e. *sindicalismo branco* in Brazil). However, I prefer to use it here in order to enhance the clarity of exposition of this particular case.

[11]Manuel M. Diéguez took arms against Obregón, but was quickly defeated in 1924.

[12]A pattern that started in the mid 19th century with the *Leyes de Reforma*, but that was reinvigorated during Carranza's government and the enactment of the 1917 Constitution.

faced pressures from c) competing and increasingly robust 'yellow unions', which they saw as distant socialists who heavily benefited from their ties with the center.

Under this scenario, a Zuno-Rojos alliance emerged. Zuno granted official union recognition and the accompanying benefits —such as favorable arbitration— to red labor in Jalisco. In exchange, the organized red unions of Jalisco would offer support and 'muscle'. This allowed Zuno to enforce reforms and gave him some maneuverability to better resist the center. This early alliance shaped the enactment of the state's second labor law decreed in 1923, as well as the creation of the *Confederación de Agrupaciones Obreras de Jalisco* (CAOLJ) the following year.

Throughout his three brief years in office Zuno sided with labor time and time again. He promoted collective bargaining (*contratos colectivos de trabajo*), pressured local labor courts (*Consejos Locales de Conciliación y Arbitraje*) to rule wages disputes in favor of workers and he constantly pushed for an overall improvement of working conditions. Aiming to discipline business, and resist the center, along with CAOLJ's Secretary General, Esteban Loera, governor Zuno incentivized and coordinated strategic worker demonstrations in crucial sectors for both the local and national economy. Similarly, both the CAOLJ and the local government made significant joint efforts to expunge clerical and religious influence from both governmental organizations and workers' unions.

The Zuno-Rojos alliance proved beneficial for both actors. Critical to our purposes is to highlight that I) it is highly unlikely that this association would have been possible (or necessary for those involved) had Jalisco's labor been any smaller, less robust or less plural. As we will see in the cases of both Salta and Guerrero, when an organized working class was absent during the early politically formative stages, subnational labor-State bargains neither shaped nor occupied the local arena. Similarly, it is important to recognize that 2) up until the end of Obregon's presidency "the task of labor mediation [was left] to state governors" (Collier and Collier 1991, 208), and that, consequently, these subnational mediations preceded the formation of the PNR, the PRM, and the CTM. That is, they predate the interplay of Mexico's full-blown, party-led, national political incorporation.

Although beneficial, the Zuno-Rojos alliance was not, however, cost-free. Zuno made a powerful enemy in president Calles (1924-1928). For their part, the Rojos were ostracized from the Mexican Communist Party (PCM), being heavily criticized for their pragmatism and their close (and allegedly) unnecessary cooperation with a local government. Ultimately, Zuno was caught in a bind. He could either escalate conflict with the center, risking federal intervention; or he could subdue to the new central leadership, risking to wash down his political stance in Jalisco. In a bid to protect his legacy and his life, Governor Zuno resigned in 1926[13].

Zuno's resignation triggered a set of reactions within the CAOLJ that extended for over a decade. In 1927 the CAOLJ first became the *Confederación Obrera de Jalisco* (COJ) and by 1940, it later turned into the *Federación de Trabajadores de Jalisco* (FTJ). These two changes crystallized a) swings between internal splits among red unionists[14], as well as b) the role and relationship that Jalisco's workers had *vis-à-vis* central labor organizations like the *Confederación de Trabajadores de México* (CTM) created in 1936.

The swings within the FTJ throughout this period occurred concomitantly with changes at the center. Specifically, they coincided with the creation of the PNR and its later corporativist rearrangement into the *Partido de la Revolución Mexicana* (PRM) in 1929. Along with the CTM, these changes increased the threat of central influence in the state both from the federal government and from labors central organizations. Nonetheless, although the centralizing bids of Calles and Cárdenas were relatively powerful, their hold over Jalisco was never neither direct nor absolute. For instance, for the 1935 gubernatorial election, president Lázaro Cárdenas preferred Silvano Barba González to be the the candidate. Nonetheless, local politician Everardo Topete[15] beat the president's favourite. Although evidence

[13]Here it is important to mention that Zuno's resignation was also heavily determined by his conflict with religious organizations.

[14]For instance, there were leaders, such as David Alfaro Siqueiros, who favoured the formation of local sectoral federations, commonly referred to as 'unificadores' or unifiers. At the same time, other prominent figures of red unionism, like Esteban Loera, opposed the articulation of such federations and were dubbed 'divisionistas'.

[15]Topete was a military coronel who had previously served as 'presidente municipal' (municipal president) and as a member of the national congress prior to his election as Jalisco's governor.

from his governorship is scant, the available accounts suggest that he managed to strategically mediate with labor (splits) in order to foster capital investment and resist the centralizing forces of Cardenismo[16] (Navarro 2003; Arias 1983). This offers some evidence that, in Jalisco, the tactic of establishing and using subnational labor ties became a pattern that outlived the Zuno-Rojos alliance.

In 1940 Jalisco, two labor figures emerged from the ranks of the local working class: Francisco Silva Romero and Heliodoro Hernández Loza. Romero, who was backed by leftist Vicente Lombardo Toledano, contended for the FTJ's leadership against Loza, who was back by the more pragmatic Fidel Velázquez[17]. Romero came from the FTJ's wing which supported extending the allegiance with the local government. In contrast, Loza favoured a closer association with the federal government and the CTM. Both factions were equally matched and tensions ultimately led to the split of the FTJ in 1945. Hernández Loza led the 'centrist' "FTJ Leal" (Loyalist FTJ) , while Silva Romero became the head of the 'locally-oriented and radical' "FTJ Auténtica" (Authentic FTJ).

The CTM reacted to this split by recognizing only the loyal branch of the FTJ. However, 'FTJ auténtica' managed to remain operational and two years later, backed by Jalisco's governor Marcelino García Barragán, the authentic faction constituted itself as the *Confederación Única de Trabajadores* (CUT). With the support of the local government the CUT hosted and sponsored the formation of new unions, later becoming the "Revolutionary Federation of Workers and Peasants" (FROC). The Barragán-CUT collaboration shows, once more, an example in which the association of local labor organizations with subnational political elites allows the former to survive and gives the latter some healthy distance, or autonomy from the center.

[16] It cannot be said that Everardo Topete had a pro-labor stance. If anything, he seemed to favor capital and business interests. However, for our purposes, what is critical is that once more, Jalisco's political arena was the locus of State-labor relations, and that these interactions of inducement and constraint did not fully comply or follow those imposed at the center.

[17] Vicente Lombardo Toledano and Fidel Velázqez were both part of the initial renewed State-labor mediation boost pushed by president Cárdenas. However, given Toledano's more ideological stance, and Velázquez pragmatic proclivities, their visions and priorities quickly diverged. In his last years as the leader of the CTM, Toledano became increasingly focused in building and leading an international worker confederation in Latin America. In time, Velázquez became the leader of the CTM, a position he held until 1997.

Throughout the late 1940s and the early 1960s—the period in which Jalisco's industry most intensely diversified and expanded— both Romero's FROC and Loza's FTJ rivalled each other for the filiation and creation of new unions in distinct industrial sectors within the province. However, under the backdrop of a buoyant local economy, by the 1960s the two union leaders realized that increased membership strengthened their leverage[18] *vis-à-vis* party-elites both at the local and national level. The evidence suggests that prioritizing exacting benefits from the State allowed Romero and Loza to reach a (rather informal) mutual understanding, which ultimately explains why through time their disputes significantly declined.

For over 50 years, as the leaders of Jalisco's two largest union federations, Romero and Loza were in a strong position to bargain with political and economic elites, securing access to local and national offices and advocating comparatively favorable conditions for the working class. Among these substantive gains, the primacy of collective wage bargaining and access to healthcare stand out in the case of Jalisco.

In Jalisco the early emergence of organized labor, the similarly early effort to regulate it, the Zuno-Rojos alliance, governor Topete's strategic stance, along with governor Barragan's renewed association with the CUT, are all examples that in this former colonial periphery —and *contra* Collier and Collier (1991)— the initial responses to the 'social issue' raised by labor were provided by subnational governments. The pattern of local bargains and alliances also shows that at different points in time, before and during the national process of incorporation, Jalisco's political arena was a valuable locus for political engagement.

6.2.2 Rio Grande do Sul

Like Jalisco —and contrary to its northern Brazilian counterparts such as Bahia or Pernambuco— Rio Grande do Sul (RGS) remained a peripheral region throughout much of the Iberian colonial era. Considered a 'região de fronteira' (Osório 2005) the Riograndense economy increasingly gained prominence in the wake of Brazilian

[18]For Romero and Loza, leverage came mostly from increased membership, and the corresponding increased collection of quotas. That is, their weight *vis-à-vis* party-elites was based on the number of members, as well as the accompanying financial resources they each held sway over.

independence. By 1803, the southern region of the state was distributed among roughly 500 landowners, and in 1824, in an effort to attract European migration, the Imperial Government of Dom Pedro I continued to divide and grant land in northern RGS.

These efforts triggered economic activity in the region, giving the southern Riograndense agriculture a commercial twist, and boosting a nascent industry in the north of the state. While historians highlight a myriad of factors accounting for the changes observed in RGS[19], they all agree that the Riograndense economy experienced its capitalist transition between 1890 and 1930. Starting in the mid-19th century, driven by an increasing national and international demand of local exports, the state's gaúcho agricultural and commercial activity furthered a considerable industrial growth. Specifically, it fostered the buoyancy of the textile, the chemical, the construction, and the metallurgy industries.

The expansion and diversification of the Sul-Riograndense economy concomitantly triggered the emergence of new cities which later became industrial nodes across the state. Among some of those urban concentrations, the city of Rio Grande, Porto Alegre, Pelotas, and Caixas stand out. Likewise, economic changes were accompanied by conflict. Throughout most of the second half of the 19th century, RGS was immersed in violent confrontations among which the Ragamuffin War (1835-1945), the Paraguayan War (1864-1870), and the Federalist Riograndense Revolution (1893-1895) stand out[20]. This last confrontation led to the prominence of the *Partido Republicano Riograndense* (PRR) —Riogranendense Republican Party— under the leadership of then governor Júlio de Castilhos.

Although economic dynamism and growth were most intense in states like São Paulo and Minas Gerais, despite conflict, industrialization and urbanization

[19] Pesavento (1985), for example, identifies at least four different relevant factors: 1) The increased availability of commercial capital; 2) a slow but steady change from crafts to manufacturing; 3) the availability of credit and financial capital, and lastly, 4) the entrepreneurship of incoming bourgeois European migrants.

[20] The Ragamuffin War, commonly referred to as the *Revolução Farroupilha* is considered to be one if not the most long-drawn secession conflict of post-independence Brazil. The Paraguayan War confronted Paraguay with Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, and it is considered to be the deadliest inter-state war in South American history. Lastly, the Federalist revolution of 1893 confronted Riograndense elites. For more on these conflicts see Maestri (2010).

also enhanced labor activism as well as the early articulation of unions across distinct sectors of the *gaúcho* economy. As Pereira and Davide (2019) highlight, it was in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Rio Grande do Sul where unions and the working class gained social salience and political strength first. For example, in RGS a Socialist Worker Party was founded in 1890, and in 1892, the state saw Brazil's first celebration of the International Workers' Day (*Primeiro de Maio*). These early, subnational expressions of labor's political salience occurred against the backdrop of Castilho's 1891 state constitution which "represented the first [Brazilian] manifestation of commitment to address *the social issue*" (Machado da Costa 2004, 3; emphasis added.).

After the Federalist revolt, Castilho needed to stimulate economic growth at the same time that he abated social and political unrest. Following his positivist inclination, and the social theses of his PRR party[21], Castilho and the following two PRR governors — Borges de Medeiros and Getúlio Vargas— took a proactive (subnational) State effort which "guaranteed the *incorporation* of the working class into the modern [Riograndense] capitalist society" (Hortsmann 2018, 99; emphasis added.).

Here it is important to clarify that neither Castilho, nor Medeiros had a purely pro-labor stance. Certainly, they frequently relied on repression and their regulatory approach has been qualified by historians as paternalistic. Nonetheless, in their effort to preserve *order* so as to promote *progress*, they built a subnational response to the early bottom-up pressures of labor, which preceded the 1930 Revolution, and which occurred long before the peak of Vargas' national *Estado Novo*[22]. Positivist *castilhismo*[23], not only inspired de 1891 state constitution, but also the local Act

[21]The PRR social theses advocated for the creation of a labor arbitration tribunal, they stipulated establishing 8-hour shifts, and advocated the right of workers to strike in search of wage increases. For more on the PRR see Mirabelli (2016) and Corte de Oliveira (2018).

[22]Like in the Mexican case, between the last decades of the 19th century and the first three of the 1900s, several subnational efforts were made to regulate and shape labor. Among these, the 1894 sanitary code of São Paulo, and the 1911 code of Rio de Janeiro stand out. The former regulated night shifts, limited child labor, and called for better sanitary conditions in the workplace. The latter specifically dealt with the legal number of working hours within the province.

[23]Faced with the realities of governance, Castilho's positivism was far from orthodox. However, "the principle of positivist philosophy that most imposed itself on Castilhos was the conciliation between liberty and authority" (Pereira 2006, 120). In this regard, for our purposes it is important

no.31 of 1897 which reduced working hours, introduced shift-breaks, overtime, as well as the right of workers to be compensated in case of accidents, health inability, and in case of dismissal. In a similar vein, decree number 119, issued in 1898, regulated 'public work'. It stipulated that both public and private companies working for the local government had to keep clear records regarding their employees' contracts and salaries. These mix of subnational inducements and constraints kept labor within the PRR's fold.

Before the 1930 Revolution that would bring Vargas to the national executive, specifically in southern states like RGS, unionism was not only occupationally diverse, but it was also plural in terms of its ideological orientation. Throughout the first two decades of the 20th century, RGS saw the emergence of anarchists, socialists, Catholic, and communist labor organizations. Although the schism with the church was not as intense as it was in the Mexican case, unions still vied for increased membership and influence *vis-à-vis* the local government. When necessary, however, workers from distinct ideational backgrounds managed to cooperate. In 1906 Porto Alegre, RGS experienced its first general strike in which for over 21 days, anarchist and socialist workers demanded the reduction of the workday to eight hours. As a result of the protest, and in a bid to better coordinate their efforts, the strike also led to the creation of the *Federação Operária do Rio Grande do Sul* (FORGS) —the Workers' Federation of Rio Grande do Sul.

Although slavery and race were less prominent issues in Argentina and Mexico, it is important to recall that the period of rising industrialization and unionism occurred in the context of post-abolition Brazil. While targeted movements and organizations emerged to specifically voice the racial concerns of Afro-Brazilians in RGS— such as *Frente Negra Pelotense* in 1933— working class unions, along with federations such as as the FORGS, also served as a relevant socio-political

to discuss the contrasting notions held by liberalism and positivism. The former calls for what Isaiah Berlin (1958) identified as *negative liberty*. That is, liberalism extols the principle of non-intervention. For its part, positivism highlights what Berlin (1958) calls *positive freedom*, that is, the idea that true freedom can only be attained through self-control, something which, as *castilhismo* held, can only be achieved via the mediation of social and State institutions. For more on the ideological debates between liberalism and positivism in the particular context of Rio Grande do Sul, see Pereira (2006) and Medina (2004).

vehicles for the afro-descendent Riograndense community, as race "played a major role in union organization and popular struggles, being found in all union trends and party colours" (Ana Loner 2005, 8).

The end of the First World War and the onset of the Great Depression, triggered the deceleration of industrial expansion, and threatened workers' wages and employment. Consequently, the period between the late 1920s and the mid 1930s saw an upsurge in local labor unrest and activity. These were defensive struggles aimed at sustaining previously gained salaries and rights (Loner 2005). Amidst this unrest, and after securing the country's presidency through the 1930 coup, the former castilhista governor of RGS, Getúlio Vargas, became the dominant political figure in Brazil.

While many works deal with the intricacies of Vargas' *Estado Novo*[24], for our purposes it is important to highlight that Brazilian labor historiography analyzing the Vargas era can be split in three distinct waves. The first one, coinciding mostly with the analysis of Collier and Collier (1991), depicts a weak labor movement and interprets Vargas' policies as preemptive 'concessions' from above: Concessions that were purportedly aimed at guaranteeing political dominance over labor and its subsequent discipline[25].

The second wave similarly takes a top-down perspective. However, instead of conceptualizing policies as a concession, this wave interprets reform as a response to *previous* labor activity. The policies of *Estado Novo* are an ex-post State reaction to previous pressures from the working class. Under this interpretation, reforms followed a preemptive logic, and were intended to avoid a further radicalization of the working class. Lastly, the third and most recent historiographic wave highlights a persistent labor movement. That is, these studies underscore the continuation and, in some cases, even expansion of labor pressures and resistance *during Estado Novo*. Reform and legislation promoted by the national State were neither conceded in a vacuum, nor were they only a response to previous pressures, but they were the result of ongoing tensions between the State and labor.

[24]For more on this period see Fausto and Fausto (2014), as well as D'Araújo (2000).
[25]For a classic text defending this interpretation see, for example, Vianna (1978)

While not downplaying the extent of repression and control, this more nuanced and contemporary account emphasizes how labor adapted to a new political environment in order to mount continued resistance. Interestingly, while acknowledging the disappearance of elected governors and the centralizing tendencies of *varguismo*, recent historiography has emphasized that labor's continued resistance was exerted through the State's bureaucratic apparatus and that, critically, it varied across distinct subnational units. We have seen how in RGS the local government accommodated labor before the national process of incorporation. Below I will briefly explore how workers from RGS will very distinctly, personally appeal to their former governor in order to exert pressure throughout this period.

As Collier and Collier (1991) suggest, national labor incorporation in Brazil was indeed controlled from above. However, the process was also shaped by pressures from below, and it was so to a greater extent in the more industrialized southern states. Ramos Konrad (2006) provides an impressive and immersive account of how the working class, across multiple sectors of the Riograndense economy organized —to various degrees of 'success'— in an effort that balanced avoiding the elimination of their rights, at the same time that it aimed for their expansion. Railway workers, trade unionists, as well as the organized personnel working at the docks illuminate and exemplify resistance throughout this period.

Trade unionists, for example, mobilized around the adoption of the 'semana inglesa'[26]. In 1939, Ismael Valandro, leader of the *Associação Comercial de Santa Maria* in Porto Alegre, contacted President Vargas directly, asking him to support the measure. João Busa Netto and Raul Pont, union leaders in Caixas and Uruguaiana respectively, also directly expressed to president Vargas the need to encompass the adoption of *semana inglesa* with improved retirement and pension benefits (Ramos Konrad 2006). Later that year, in the First National Congress for Trade Union Employees (*Congresso Nacional de Empregados no Comércio Sindicalizado*), along with issues pertaining to minimum wage and the defense of women's working

[26]'Semana inglesa' calls for a Monday to Friday work schedule, with 8 hour shifts and the recognition of Saturday and Sunday as resting days.

rights voiced by the *Associação Feminina dos Comerciários*, the issues of pensions, retirement, and the *semana inglesa* were raised again.

Direct contact with Vargas proved effective, for in 1940 the Labor Ministry started working on the modification to the corresponding statutes (Lei No 62/35). Riograndense representatives of both trade and railways workers drafted and exchanged alternative bills with the Ministry. Ultimately, minor changes were introduced and the newly approved framework conditioned benefits on a reintegration procedure targeted at those workers who had been employed for over a decade.

Between 1940 and 1945, the organized railway workers of RGS launched three challenges. In the first one they struggled for recognition and registration as a labor union. The 1931 Decreto-Lei No.19.770 did not clearly distinguish between workers (*operarios* or *trabalhadores*) and employees (*empregados*), which led rail-workers to be classified as public servants. The *Sindicato do Ferroviários do Rio Grande do Sul* took the issue to the Ministry of Labor, aiming to secure access to the benefits and rights available to the working class. In the second challenge, railway workers also questioned the 1940 Lei No. 2.474, which set 60 as the minimum retirement age. Workers from two southern states, RGS and São Paulo wrote a joint letter addressed again directly to Vargas. In it, union leader Pedro Vieira Pinto argued that while they were all 'servants of the nation', sixty year was still a lot. Lastly, in 1945, the *ferroviários* also protested increasing meat prices, arguing that malnourishment would ultimately negatively impact production.

Similarly, throughout this period, port workers in Rio Grande do Sul protested various issues via appeals directed to either the *interventor estadual* or the Ministry of Labor. For example, they resisted working Saturdays, arguing that they were among the only sector required to work over the weekend. They also raised concerns about the lack of medical assistance in ships and cargo boats. Lastly, they also manifested discomfort with forced retirement and unjustified dismissals. Trade unionists, *ferroviários*, and port workers, using the prerogatives and organizational capacities they had locally built managed to directly appeal to their former governor and to exploit the national and subnational bureaucratic channels available to them.

In sum, workers kept "questioning the application of their rights [which were] linked to their working conditions [...] in spite of the obstacles set by the [S]tate, [and] even during the Estado Novo, [particularly in RGS] examples of everyday struggle can be found throughout the period"(Ramos Konrad 2006, 150).

While most of the demands outlined above were not directly or straightforwardly granted, a few things stand out: First, the fact that Vargas' policies during *Estado Novo* have been considered by some the national application of *castilhismo*, which as we have seen, was first set in motion in RGS. Second, in spite of increased State repression and centralization —which raised the costs of strikes and public demonstrations as a viable strategy— organized workers across the gaúcho economy used the tools at their disposal to voice their concerns. This process of adaptation shaped bureaucratic resistance, which entailed the use of formal-institutional channels as well as the press[27] to raise labor issues and bring their demands to the fore. Third, it stands out that the incentive and the capacity of Riograndense workers to raise their concerns were anchored on the robustness labor had achieved in the province before 1930[28].

Identifying that during the Vargas era, organized labor did not vanish and that it was not completely subservient to the State, specifically in RGS and other southern provinces, helps us to understand the upsurge in labor activity during the 1946-1964 period. These subnational examples of labor activity shed light on the otherwise paradoxical conclusion that "the legacy of the most control-oriented pattern of labor incorporation [in Latin America] was an important degree of

[27]At the time, in Rio Grande do Sul there were several local newspapers through which workers and unions voiced their concerns and protests, among them, *Correio do Povo* stands out. Founded in 1895, the local diary aimed to promote democracy and objective —non-partisan— journalism. *Correio do Povo* can still be found today in RGS and across all of Brazil.

[28]Looking at the timing and way in which RGS labor raised bottom up pressures, we can subdivide Estado Novo onto three phases. In the first phase, in correspondence to Collier and Collier (1991), labor law was nationalized. The reform accommodated labor and workers pressured to ensure the corresponding legislation still addressed their concerns. In a second phase, workers struggled to ensure the 'correct' or proper enforcement and execution of the existing framework. To do so, they used the bureaucratic apparatus of the central state. In a similar sense to what occurred in Mexico when workers invoked the 1917 revolution to contextualize their claims, workers across Brazilian states took ownership of Vargas' Estado Novo dominant narrative to articulate a counternarrative. In the last phase, as pressures stemming from the Second World War debilitated the center, an increasingly mobilized labor re-surged.

political autonomy" (Collier and Collier 1991, 554-555). The Colliers' analysis of Brazil's incorporation ends by suggesting that the increased polarization of the 1946-1964 period ultimately was a relevant factor in triggering the coup that brought the military junta to power. In what follows I extend the analysis to briefly explore labor in RGS under military rule.

The context of the coup and the subsequent military dictatorship has been thoroughly explored elsewhere (Fausto and Fausto 2014). For our purposes it is important to highlight three things: I) Although the narrative built around communism throughout the inter-war period (roughly between the 1920s and 1940s) was aimed at keeping the 'foreign foe' out, at the onset of the Cold War its emphasis was geared towards the 'internal enemy' that 'plagued' specifically leftist organizations. Amidst national and international polarization, II) labor experienced a marked split in terms of their ideological orientations, and the issue of State-labor cooperation became increasingly contentious. The State growingly relied on both physical and administrative control. When compared to the Vargas era, III) the Brazilian military dictatorship was marked by an escalation of armed repression, particularly after unions were formally disbanded by the Ato Institucional No. 5 (AI-5) of 1968.

Faced with the prospects of individual and collective annihilation, sustained or periodic labor protests and mobilizations stopped being a viable strategy. The dominant alternatives for survival were either compliance and cooperation or increased frontal, violent confrontation. In a bid to avoid repression and benefit from the spoils of the Brazilian Miracle (1967-1974), compared to their northern counterparts, labor and popular sectors in south-southeastern industrial nodes mostly opted for accommodation within the regimes framework. As exemplified below by the analysis of Guerrero, and Salta, violent conflict was comparatively more frequent and intense in rural areas. As Dos Santos (1995) underscores, the Brazilian military regime heavily repressed "the students, labor and peasant movements [. . .] specially [in cases] where a 'rural proletariat' was present, such as in the sugar-cane plantations of [northern] Pernambuco" (Dos Santos 1995, 78).

The fact that southern industrial nodes were able to more easily opt for their accommodation is owed not only to the experiences of bureaucratic resistance of their recent past, but also to the legacies of their earlier organization and incorporation promoted by *castilhismo* and PRR governors in the 1890-1930 period. After the 1971 financial bust, the regime had to balance "the need for [a degree of] institutional openness —enough to enable the functioning of the economy— and the need to stop free expressions of popular interests [...] given this tension, [through the 1964-1985 period] every [re]opening was followed by a wave of repression"(Dos Santos 1995, 75). Contrary to what occurred in Salta or Guerrero, the legacies and robustness of labor-State relations within Rio Grande do Sul, made of this, and other southern subnational political arenas, a salient and valuable locus for political engagement.

6.2.3 Guerrero

As we saw in the previous chapter, Guerrero's rise during the early stages of the colonial crucible allowed the consolidation of a robust landed elite, whose power base was boosted by their control of port cities, most importantly Acapulco. In addition, mining and the extensive agricultural production of maize, cotton, and cocoa further cemented the consolidation of a robust Guerrerense elite. Family names such as the Álvarez and the Jiménez used both the independence and the revolutionary struggles as vehicles to solve rifts within the local elite, as well as to settle differences with figures of national prominence.

As a legacy of its mercantilist route, the dominance of these landed elites is the starting point to understand Guerro's comparatively delayed and weak industrialization. By the end of the 19th century, economic elites heavily resisted any attempt to 'open-up' the economy. Specifically, they resisted attempts to build infrastructure to, for example, link Acapulco with Mexico City. In an effort to protect their standing, they also curbed attempts to open new trade companies within Guerrero's ports. Family-owned companies like 'Fernandez y Compañía', 'Oroñuela y Compañía' and the 'Alzuyeta y Compañía' "owned a small fleet, transporting goods between Manzanillo and Salina Cruz, [...][they]also controlled land transportation, [buying] local harvest and centralizing supplies of local shops[...][they] had a strong influence in designating local and federal port authorities[and lastly, they] also financed local police forces"(Illades 2011).

Contrary to what happened in Jalisco or Rio Grande do Sul, that a few individuals concentrated most of the sources of income and wealth disincentivized the inflow of both public and private capital investments in Guerrero. It also reinforced a pattern —initiated during Juarísmo and continued during the Porfiriato— in which the center, most specifically the president, would remove Guerrero's governor as a way of securing the implementation of federal policies and agenda. Contrary to what happened in Jalisco, for example, an alliance with a nascent and organized working class was not a viable strategy for political elites to counter centripetal forces.

For local politicians in Guerrero, an alliance with the peasantry was not be possible either, since the Mexican Revolution had nationalized the conflict, and the agrarian reform had linked the rural population directly with the federal executive. In addition, Guerrero's limited and delayed industry a) timed the emergence of Guerrero's 'social question' in the midst of what Eric Hobsbawm identified as the 'age of extremes' (Hobsbawm 1995). This distinct timing also b) enabled a consolidated center to dominate local labor expressions. The lack of alternatives for building alliances and political bargaining, ultimately created a political impasse, with conflict peaking in the 1960s and 1970s. The outcome of this failure to ascertain and accommodate labor and its political interests, has been recognized by historian Salvador Román Román as the origin of an "impossible democracy" in the southern Mexican state (Román Román 2003).

The first significant push to bolster Guerrero's economy came during the presidency of Manuel Ávila Camacho (1940-1946) and was later expanded by Miguel Alemán Valdés (1946-1952) and his successor Adolfo Ruíz Cortínez (1958-1964). Throughout this period the center would adopt several strategies —'invasive' to various degrees—to guarantee national and foreign investment in the state. Most of these resources were a) foreign in origin and they were b) destined heavily towards the promotion and expansion of tourism. While the economic sectors such as services, construction, lumber, and mining experienced a boost from these center-driven investments, by 1955, only 0.2% of Mexico's industrial output came from Guerrero and by 1960, 80% of the Guerrerense economy still hinged on agricultural activities.

To secure investments and to guarantee that the 'misión presidencial' (presidential mission) was adequately implemented in Guerrero, in 1957 Luis Raúl Caballero was (s)elected governor of the state. Prior to his arrival in the state's capital as the new head of the local executive, Caballero had lived 30 years outside Guerrero. With no local support network —he was neither linked to the local economic elite nor did he have robust local societal connections— the ex-military officer relied heavily on personal appointees and his political clique back in Mexico City[29].

In sum, three factors shaped the Guerrerense political landscape by the dawn of the 1950s: First, a weak industry, one heavily skewed towards the services and tourist sector, and mostly dominated by non-local investment. Second, a peasantry loyal to the center and an emerging working class dominated by centralized organizations. Third, a subnational executive void of any local support network. Under this scenario, emerging labor organizations were too weak —or simply did not need— to extract anything from the local government, which was at the same time to fragile and center-dependent to be able to oblige. Rather than cooperation between local actors, reliance on the center became a preferred strategy for both local labor and the local executive.

Intending to bolster Guerrero's economy, Caballero centralized the state's administration, increasing state-level taxation and constraining municipal fiscal resources. He extended tax benefits to business in Acapulco, including tax exemptions and facilitating access to land, to the detriment of *comunidades ejidales*. Combined with his nepotism, considered by some an expression which rewarded grassroots members of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), Caballero's action would trigger the creation of the "Asociación Cívica Guerrerense"(ACG) in 1959.

[29]It could be argued that Caballero's nepotism and his centre-based support reflected a personal failure to articulate an alliance with local forces. This approach would emphasize perhaps his lack of leadership and short sightedness. What is also true, however, is that Guerrero's socio-economic structure, skewed and constrained Caballero's set of plausible moves.

Throughout its first year of existence, several social and political demands converged in the ACG. For their part, peasants raised issues regarding both the price of coffee and the formalization of their land tenure. Municipal officers stressed their inability to provide public services in light of resource constrains. At the time, working class issues also converged within the ACG, with both teachers' and workers' local unions pushing for the recognition of their autonomy and self-selected leaderships respectively.

ACG quickly mobilized throughout the southern state's territory. Caballero reacted by taking increasingly repressive measures. Both the 'cívicos' —as ACG members were called— and Caballero engaged in dynamics that resembled a game of chicken, neither willing to yield nor to de-escalate. That both sides were heavily reliant on the center is revealed by the fact that both the ACG and Caballero would write to and request presidential mediation.

At the time, the individual overseeing the center's involvement in Guerrero was the then Minister of the Interior (*Secretario de Gobernación*) Gustavo Díaz Ordaz. In the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution and in midst of the Cold War, as Secretario de Gobernación, Ordaz's mandate was to contain the emergence of 'subversive' political groups across the country. Taming Guerrero became a personal mission for Ordaz, as doing so bolstered his chances of being (s)elected for the national executive office. As such, Ordaz backed Caballero's *mano dura* approach.

Conflict quickly escalated, reaching its peak in October of 1960, when an ACG-teachers' protest was brutally repressed by a mix of local police forces and the federal military. This violent encounter attracted the attention of national media, and in an attempt to restore peace and wanting to show that *anticaballerismo* had been heard, president López Mateos disbanded Guerrero's state government, and backed Raymundo Abarca Calderón.

As the newly (s)elected governor, Calderón, however, would not fare well as violence and conflict did not stop. It is against this backdrop that one of contemporary Mexico's first and most (in)famous guerrilla leader emerged: Lucio

Cabañas. A rural *normalista*[30] from Ayotzinapa, Cabañas had been leading teachers' mobilization in Guerrero since the 1950s. He had briefly coalesced with the ACG in order to push for Caballero's ousting. After accomplishing that goal, and having experienced first-hand the repression of the Ordaz-Caballero duo, he radicalized his discourse and increased his efforts for mobilization and protest.

Only seven years after Caballero's dismissal, while protesting against the exploitation of Guerrerense territory carried out by the lumber industry, police and military forces dressed as civilians tried to arrest him. Among the quarrel, Cabañas managed to escape but 11 civilians died during the brawl. Cabañas fled to the sierras of Guerrero and ignited a guerrilla movement. There he fostered the creation of a rebel group called 'Partido de los Pobres' (Party of the Poor) which would continue to influence guerrilla movements long after his death in 1974. Today, guerrilla movements in the state of Guerrero like "Tendencia Democrática Revolucionaria-Ejército del Pueblo" and the "Ejército Popular Revolucionario", directly link their strategy and appeal to the movement started by Cabañas.

These experiences weakened conflict resolution via formal or informal, peaceful channels, showing that violence was a viable alternative to settle political difference in Guerrero. As Estrada Castañón puts it, "[the 1950-1980] period reveals an ascending spiral of conflict in which coercion, as an engrained response of the political system, would drive social actors to radicalize their claims" (Estrada Castañón 1994, 48).

The lack of a local, strong labor movement and the presence of a robust peasantry, mixed with deployed rule from the center blocked bargaining as a political mechanism. Given that labor emerged comparatively late, the threat of communism and the narrative that linked the Cuban Revolution with the unfulfilled promises of the Mexican one catalyzed confrontation. Jointly, these factors severely weakened

[30] In Mexico, *normalistas* are politically active collectives that date back to the Mexican Revolution. These groups are normally made up of rural students and professional teachers. Across the political spectrum, *normalistas* are usually combative left-of-center organizations. Mexico's most (in)famous *normalista* school 'Escuela Normal Rural de Ayotzinapa' is located in central Guerrero.

the formation of local institutional channels through which social demands and aspirations could be articulated and incorporated into Guerrero's political system.

In sharp contrast to what occurred in Jalisco or in Rio Grande do Sul, Guerrero's political arena was dislodged by the center. That the national government played such a pivotal role, along with the heightened level of confrontation, shows that the political arena of the Southern Mexican state was not the main locus of (peaceful) institutional political engagement for either the local political elite, or for the activists and leaders on the side of labor. In this regard, as we will see below, Guerrero bears more resemblance to Salta.

6.2.4 Salta

Exploring the dynamics of the Argentina labor movement is a thorny task. The country consolidated the basis of the agro-export economy in the last half of the 19th century and already by the 1930s Argentina's labor movement was the "strongest and best organized" (Collier and Collier 1991, 336) across Latin America. Early historiographical accounts have been periodically revised, with each wave of studies contesting previous ones and bringing new elements, factors and perspectives to the fore[31]. Similarly, these distinct waves have differently portrayed the subtleties and the distinction between Buenos Aires and other regions and provinces across the country. With this in mind, in what follows, I explore the main traits of the Salteño labor movement.

The history of Salta's labor is one of splits and divisions. As discussed in the previous section, in Guerrero there was both a geographic and sectoral split between the tourism and services— heavily concentrated in Acapulco— and the rest of the local economy. In Salta, as we will explore below, sectoral and geographical factors will interact with ideological and organizational elements to create a rather complex matrix of labor divisions. On the one hand, the geographic and sectoral split, as explored in the previous chapter, was a consequence of a West vs East

[31] For a recent, thorough, and historical overview of the Argentinian labor movement see Díaz (2010). For a classic assessment of the historiographic debates behind the study of Argentine labor, see Romero and Gutiérrez (1991).

provincial divide. On the other hand, this primal gap allowed for and catalysed differentiations in terms of the extent to which unions were part of the political project of local and national elites, whether or not they opposed or cooperated with central worker organizations, as well as the extent to which workers became radical political actors. While in Guerrero the key factor was the delayed salience of labor as a political force, in Salta this was further entangled by the sectoral and spatial fractured nature of labor which weakened its inclusion in the local political arena.

As I hinted in Section 5.4.2 of Chapter 5, for historical and geographical reasons, Salta became economically split between east and west[32]. The former was initially shaped by the growth of sugar and wood and, later on, it was propelled by the oil industry —along with the accompanying linkages to national and international markets. This set-up made of the eastern region a comparatively more fertile ground for labor activity. The west, however, remained economically backwards. Consequently, workers in this region more acutely and for an extended period of time continued to experience what historians identify as a more traditional, less autonomous and more repressive labor organization. This was also marked by a strong influence of the Catholic church.

The west area of the province, marked by its proximity to the Andes and the multiplicity of ecosystems comprised by the Puna region, remained linked to Peru, Chilean and Bolivian markets. Contrarily, the east would benefit from the growth of the porteño economy. Geographical proximity to neighboring active markets, along with the introduction of railroads crica 1876 in the nearby province of Tucumán, increased the profitability of sugarcane plantations (ingenious azucareros) and wood exploitation. This east-bound reorientation quickly made of the Saltean east the economic node of the province. The discovery and later exploitation of oil deposits would only reinforce this pattern.

[32]Recall, for example, that post-colonial Salta had three main commercial routes: The first one connected the north of the province to Bolivia and the market of Upper Peru. The second route linked Salta to Chilean markets. Finally, the third and east-bound route linked Salta to Buenos Aires and the Pampean region.

The extent to which organised labor was able to emerge varied according to this first east vs west divide. In exploring the strength and the characteristics of pre-Peronist Saltean labor, Benclowicz (2012) readily acknowledges this split. While conventional historiographical accounts sustained that in relation to Buenos Aires and the Pampas, the Argentine North-West (NOA) had a comparatively weak working class, Benclowicz (2012) shows evidence of a relatively organized and autonomous labor movement in Salta's capital and eastern department of Orán. It is mostly [if not only] in the eastern regions of Salta in which "there is a clear development of an independent labor movement previous to the rise of Peronism" (Benclowicz 2012, 9). In the west, as Correa and Abraham (2006) point out, "the attempts towards autonomy were suffocated by political subordination and the [consequent] impossibility of labor organization [. . .] over a mass of rural workers [who were] dispersed and subsumed under ancién labor relations" (Correa and Abraham 2006, 7).

Between 1890 and 1925 the provincial economic east-bound shift was deepened by the discovery of oil in the eastern Tartagal area. Very early on, the U.S. company Standard Oil heavily invested in this region, the railway was expanded north from Tucumán to Salta. Following this expansion, several factories were set up in the surrounding areas. Although NOA provinces like Salta, Jujuy, and Tucumán have historically accounted for a minor share of the national industrial output, in less than forty years the east was transformed to Salta's industrial hub. By 1935, the department of Oran alone accounted for 76.8% of Salta's industrial output and while it only accommodated roughly 9% of the province's total population, it concentrated over 50% of Salta's industrial workers (Benclowicz 2011).

Salta's first labor split was geographical, the second one was sectoral. Workers linked to the industrial sector —particularly those working for US Standard Oil— emerged as a privileged group of workers. At the other end of the spectrum, workers in sugarcane mills –in spite of receiving relatively high wages— could not completely shake off traditional and hierarchical labor relations. As Campi (2009) suggests "among workers themselves distinctions were not minor [...] they were split in a complex hierarchical network which they zealously defended" (Campi 2009, 266).

It is important to highlight that the oil sector —first led by US Standard Oil and later by the then State-owned enterprise (SOE) Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF)[33]—configured a 'State within a state'. That is, oil companies, whether public or private, replaced the State to a considerable degree, directly providing or financing policing, schools and hospitals in the province. In this regard, Salta's experience closely resembles the path followed by fellow oil producing provinces in the Mexican South-East such as Tabasco, Campeche, and Veracruz.

Similarly, it is important to underscore that what emerged then was a fragmented working class: A modern core linked to oil and several backward groups, scattered not only in eastern non-industrial activities, but also in the predominantly rural west. On the one hand, these groups (eastern oil-industry workers) did not need to coalesce with the local political elites. On the other hand, workers in the west of Salta were just too fragmented and weak to do so. In addition, the relevance of local political elites waned as Perón became the dominant political figure in Argentina.

Peron's incorporation relied on and further deepened these chasms. YPF's workers and to an extent those linked to the local bureaucracy were the only ones who by virtue of the extent of their organization were jointly workers and citizens. From a socio-political standpoint, only these two sectors were ascribed with a dual 'citizen-worker' role (Benclowicz 2011). In Salta, Peron's wave of incorporation predominantly relied on workers from the oil industry and the local bureaucracy, which, in relation to the provincial economy, were the sectors with the most robust labor movement. In the sugar and other rural sectors, the policies pursued by Perón "[only] ended in [or were directed towards] coercion" (Benclowicz 2011, 23). Consequently, neither Peronism nor local officials were able to fully incorporate workers from these other marginal sectors of the economy. Their relative weakness,

[33]U.S. Standard Oil led oil extraction in Argentina until 1939. For almost a decade SO and YPF contended for primacy in the sector. However, by the late 1940s Peron's nationalization efforts in the energy sector allowed YPF to become the dominant player in Salta. In 1951 Standard Oil's role was marginal and it eventually left the province.

their fragmentation, along with the neglect of local and national officials, deterred the enhancement of their political situation.

Moreover, unlike Jalisco or Rio Grande do Sul, unions in Salta —even those in oil and industrial activities— could hardly resist pressures from the centre. That is, they could hardly resist Perón. Given the province's marginal industrial output *vis-à-vis* the nation, their leverage was marginal. Like most unions and worker centrals in the Argentinian North West, even the most robust labor organizations in Salta were highly dependent on national union structures (Laufer 2017).

The 1955 coup that toppled Perón triggered a nation-wide conservative reaction that even fostered Argentina's de-industrialization in an attempt to weaken labor. In light of the increasingly closed and repressive nature of the regime, union and workers sought to protect the headway made under Perón. In this context, the Confederación General del Trabajo (CGT) —Argentina's largest national trade union originally created in 1930— experienced a three-fold split: The combative 'CGT de los Argentinos', the pro-bargaining 'CGT azopardo' and the pro-government 'CGT participativa'. This split was roughly mirrored locally. What distinguished the NOA and Salta from Buenos Aires and the Pampas was that, in addition to the fractionalization of labor, the experience of a fractured or incomplete incorporation opened up the possibility for a considerable degree of polarization to emerge.

The 1969 Cordobazo is a well-known example of a bottom-up reaction from the working class to the deindustrialization and labor weakening policies implemented by the military government led by Uriburu. What is perhaps less salient is the fact that five years before —in an uncanny resemblance to the experience of Guerrero— a guerrilla movement was organized in Oran, Salta. Between 1963 and 1964 the Ejército Guerrillero del Pueblo (EGP) attempted to make of Salta a revolutionary *foco* (node). Although less successful than analogue movements in Guerrero or Chiapas, almost by all accounts, just like in those cases, they signalled the preponderance of violence as a politically viable strategy and the consequent rejection of institutionalised party and electoral politics.

In sum, in Salta the working class emerged protractedly, having geographic and sectoral splits. For a time, both the local and national State was replaced by oil companies. Critically, however, bottom-up pressures from labor were brought to the fore during the peak of Peronism, and the centralizing bid was too strong to resist. Unlike the experiences of Jalisco and Rio Grande do Sul, Salta's subnational arena did not become a relatively valuable locus of political engagement. Like the case of Guerrero, there is some evidence suggesting that once the local arena was dislodged, societal pressures escaped towards increased polarization and conflict. Using several sources to capture labor unrest, in the following section I test whether the rationale of this chapter can be generalized to the full set of subnational units under investigation.

6.3 Exploring Subnational Working-Class Pressures Beyond Our Cases

The four cases explored above illustrated how the timing of labor's emergence conditioned whether their initial incorporation was brought about around either the national or the subnational arena. We saw how in the cases of Jalisco and Rio Grande do Sul —both colonial peripheries set on the liberal path— the organized working class emerged at a comparatively early point in time, excising responses from governor Zuno and governor Castilho. In these provinces, subnational governments, not national ones, were the first one to deal with the pressures of labor incorporation. Similarly, although these early linkages were mostly personalistic, we briefly observed how for these provinces, the pattern of local engagement and bargaining endured. This in turn provided evidence that in Jalisco and Rio Grande do Sul, these early State-labor bargains entrenched the subnational political arena. That is, they turned these spaces into a comparatively valued locus of political engagement.

Contrarily, following the cases of Guerrero and Salta —both provinces being early mercantilist centers— we observed how the protracted emergence of industry and the working class impeded or delayed local State-labor bargaining processes. Dynamics which in these states occurred during or after the national push for incorporation. That is, we saw how in Guerrero and Salta subnational governments were not the first responders to local pressures for incorporation and how, consequently, the national political arena displaced the subnational one. In these provinces, the center dislodged the local arena as a valuable locus for political engagement.

While these four cases do color the core logic behind the second pilar of my argument, a critical reader might still raise two important questions: First, how are the distinct subnational labor pressures transferred to local electoral arenas? Second, how can we know that the patterns observed within these four cases are representative of the dynamics across the rest of Argentinian, Brazilian, and Mexican provinces? These are valid and important concerns. On the one hand, as hinted in Section 4.3 of Chapter 4, it is important to recall that through labor's accommodation a new social actor enters the political arena. As such, the process calls for the expansion of political inclusiveness. In a similar vein, as leaders, parties, and organizations seek to represent working-class interests, the process also drives an increase in political contestation. On the other hand, a subset of four cases poses significant challenges for the generalizability of this second tenet not only for the countries considered here, but also for those other in Latin America and beyond.

To fully address these queries would require tracing and detailing the build-up of local party linkages in Jalisco, Rio Grande do Sul, Guerrero, and Salta, as well as carrying out in-depth explorations of a much broader set of provinces. I nonetheless contend that we can circumvent this issue, and partially address both challenges simultaneously, by looking at working class activity or unrest. More specifically, we can interpret labor's unrest as a sign of bottom-up pressures which excise top-down responses. In that sense, when we observe working class activity or unrest, we can infer it is linked (directly or indirectly) to issues of inclusiveness and representation. In provinces in which these issues are more salient —that is, where labor unrest is higher— we can expect political participation and contestation to be more salient. Lastly, using an indicator of working-class activity allows for the cross-sectional and longitudinal comparison of all the subnational units in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.

The theoretical expectation is then to observe higher levels of labor unrest in provinces that, just like Jalisco, and Rio Grande do Sul, were peripheral during the early colonial crucible. Conversely, we should expect provinces set on the mercantilist path, such as Guerrero and Salta, to show lower levels of working-class activity. Backed by an educated assumption and this theoretical expectation, we can then turn to discussing which proxy would best capture working-class activity. Ideally, we would want a variable that captures both the frequency of unrest and the *strength* with which said dissatisfactions is portrayed. With this in mind, we would ideally need provincial data on strikes, union density, and either number of workers involved, or the number of days which were lost to the protest. To the best of my knowledge, there are no systematically collected subnational data —governmental or otherwise— on union density, workers involved, or the number of days lost to protest. Relatedly, although I managed to obtain data on strikes for Argentina, and Mexico, I could not find comparable, reliable data on strikes for Brazilian provinces.

In that sense, to capture labor's unrest in Argentinian states from 1930 to 2020, I use data on strikes. For Brazil, I use the number of procedures received by the regional offices of the Superior Labor Court, which covers the years 1941 to 2021. To cover working-class activity in Mexico, I use data on strikes which spans from 1918 to 2020[34]. Given the heterogeneity of the data, I first grouped it into a specific number of periods by country[35] (5 for Argentina, 8 for Brazil, and 11 for Mexico). I then also estimated the share of strikes observed in each provinces *vis-à-vis* each period's national total. In sum, the variable I will work with on this section can be written formally as: $LU_{it} = (\sum S_{it} / \sum CT_t) * 100$, where LU_{it} is labor unrest in province i during period t, S is the sum of strikes or legal proceedings, and CT is the country total.

Using this proxy for labor unrest, what I present below are plotted, predicted scores obtained from regressing our variable of interest on the colonial role score introduced in Chapter 5, controlling for population size, country and time fixed

[34]The data on strikes for Argentinian provinces comes from Pegoraro (1979), Korzeniewicz (1993), McGuire (1996), and Argentina's Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security (MTEySS). Data for Brazilian units covers legal proceedings *recebidos e julgados* by the *Tribunal Superior do Trabalho* (TST). The data for Mexico comes from INEGI's statistical yearbooks, the newsletters (*boletines*) from the now extinct Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Labor (*Secretaría de Industría, Comercio y Trabajo*), and the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare (STPS).

[35]To maximize comparability across data, each period roughly corresponds to a decade.







Figure 6.2: Subnational Labor Unrest Throughout the 20th Century in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico



Figure 6.3: Subnational Labor Unrest Throughout the 20th Century in Latin America

effects[36]. The top graph of Figure 6.2 shows that in Argentina between 1930 and 2020, working-class, bottom-up pressures were indeed more likely in provinces along the liberal path. The middle graph of Figure 6.2 displays data on Brazil, and while the differences in this instance fail to reach conventional levels of statistical significance, we still observe a similar trend, with labor unrest being more likely in those units which, like Rio Grande do Sul, were early peripheries during the colonial crucible. Lastly, the bottom plot of Figure 6.2 portrays the pattern of Mexican states. Interestingly enough, although we do observed a higher expected concentration of unrest in late liberal nodes, provinces which were early mercantilist centers in Mexico have also seen a considerable amount of working-class action[37].

Pooling all 476 observations from the 80 provinces of the 3 countries under analysis, in Figure 6.3 we can observe that, although the estimate for semi-peripheries does not reach conventional levels of significance, the overall pattern holds. Across the three largest countries of Latin America, throughout the 20th century, provinces

[36]The regression tables for these results are presented in Section A.5 of Appendix A.

[37]The pattern observed in the Mexican case might be due to the high concentration of provinces along the mercantilist path. However, the trend observed here survives even when we weight the score by this concentration, and even when we remove Mexico City and Estado de México from the sample.



Figure 6.4: Subnational Labor Unrest, Economic Development and Democracy in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico

on the liberal path have been more likely to have —on average— greater bottom-up pressures from labor, than provinces on the mercantilist route.

A close reader might press further and ask for a *full picture* assessment. That is, an exploration which connects our proxy of labor unrest with provincial levels of economic development and subnational democracy. Using the index of subnational democracy, as well as the data on GDP per capita which were introduced in Chapter 3, the graphs in Figure 6.4 show the relevant overall correlations. More specifically, the top panel displays a positive association between economic development and labor unrest. In that same vein, the bottom panel shows a positive link between labor unrest and subnational democracy.

One might observe that, with an average Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.24, the associations displayed are not particularly strong. I qualify this claim in two ways. First, I interpret the size of the correlations as evidence that my two-step theory is probabilistic rather than deterministic. Second, although small, the correlations are consistently positive, and statistically significant. The observed associations are not determined by chance and the signs of the coefficients go in the direction expected given the argument I have defended in this thesis. Colonial roles and local labor incorporation were the permissive conditions shaping the origins of subnational democracy in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. In the final section of this chapter, I present some final considerations regarding labor, clarify the connections between my theoretical pillars, and set the stage for the concluding discussion of this project.

6.4 Conclusion

In this chapter I followed the unfolding of local labor pressures in my four subnational cases. I also showed that these bottom-up pressures varied according to the development trajectories set by provincial colonial roles. In addition, I documented a positive association not only between economic development and working-class activity, but also between the latter and subnational democracy. Taken together, this evidence illustrates and lends credence to the second tenet of my argument. While so far the study of working-class movements have been biased towards assessing countries as a uniform whole, this chapter shows that local labor dynamics matter for subnational democracy.

Before moving on to the concluding chapter, I wish to reassert how colonial roles and local labor incorporation are empirically and logically intertwined. Empirically, as suggested in Section 4.3 of Chapter 4 and illustrated above, there are two connective tissues linking the trajectories set by colonial roles and my second theoretical move. The first one is the timing of the emergence of the working class. As we have seen provinces on the mercantilist (liberal) path were more likely to industrialize at a later (earlier) time. Consequently, the working class was also more likely to emerge late (first) across these units. The second connective tissue follows from the first, for in the early industrial and urban provinces, the growth in size and socio-political relevance of labor followed suit.

Logically, the first step of my argument is (partially) sufficient for the second one, and the latter is similarly (partially) sufficient for subnational regime outcomes. Under the probabilistic, bounded notion of causality underpinning my argument, the path-dependent claim I have articulated is not deterministic: Colonial roles and local labor incorporation are not destiny.

In this sense, each step in the causal chain is only (partially) sufficient. That is, they increase the likelihood of the subsequent step, but —given the equifinal and continuous nature of economic development and political regimes— they can never fully guarantee them. Using Mahoney, Mohamedali and Nguyen (2016) set theoretic language, Figure 6.5 visually displays the logical connections of the two tenets of my argument.

Where X_1 represents the mercantilist colonial role and $\sim X_1$ specifically stands for the peripheral one. Similarly, X_2 stands for the liberal economic development trajectory, and $\sim X_2$ represents the mercantilist one. Consequently, X_3 represents the dynamics of early local labor incorporation, and $\sim X_3$ signals a later or protracted subnational labor process. Distinguished by the plus and minus signs, Y stands for the level of democracy in a given province, with this continuum jointly configuring the subnational regime heterogeneity within a given country. To be



Figure 6.5: The Origins of Subnational Democracy: The Logical Underpinnings of a Causal Chain

clear then , in Figure 6.5 ∼ stands for the temporal absence or the logical negation of a factor, a fact which is also distinguished by the difference between solid and dashed lines. To signal sufficiency, each preceding vertical line fits within —i.e. is a subset of— the following one. To hint at equifinality, Z stands for alternate factors or routes that might still generate the observed outcome. Lastly, the horizontal lines mark the temporal duration of each of the processes analysed in this project.

In the concluding chapter I deal with the scholarly implications of the (partial) sufficiency of my argument and pin point its main scholarly contribution. Similarly, to probe the portability of the claims defended throughout this project, I use my framework to briefly explore the origins of subnational democracy in India.

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"No book can ever be finished. While working on it we learn just enough to find it immature the moment we turn away from it."

— Karl Popper (1971)

'End? No, the journey doesn't end here. [The end] is just another path. One that we all must take."

— J.R.R. Tolkien, The Return of the King

7 Conclusion

Half a century ago Robert Dahl warned that failing to conceptualize or explore the subnational dimension of democracy was a *grave* omission in political science (Dahl 1971, 12). In the five decades since the publication of Dahl's *Polyarchy*, the discipline in general, and comparative politics in particular, have pushed the subnational agenda further. More specifically, publications such as O'Donnell (1993) and Cornelius, Eisenstadt and Hindley (1999) inspired scholars to grapple with the issue of subnational regime heterogeneity from a theoretical and empirical standpoint. At the turn of the 21st century, Edward Gibson (2005) took territoriality seriously and, by outlining the dynamics of *boundary control*, he put the spotlight on the salience of democratic variation and the endurance of authoritarian enclaves *within countries*.

Perhaps not surprisingly, scholars looking at late and faulty democratizing regions —such as Latin America and Eastern Europe— either expanded or contested Gibson's (2005) framework. This first wave of studies put forth a myriad of explanations to account for the territorial variation of democracy. Gervasoni's (2010) fiscal transfers, Giraudy's (2015) emphasis on intergovernmental relations and executive-institutional capacity, McMann's (2006) economic autonomy and Behrend's (2011) emphasis on political dynasties can now be considered classics shaping the conventional wisdom on subnational regime variation.

Interestingly enough, the salience of this heterogeneity has also gained prominence beyond Latin America and former Soviet states. For example, scholars looking at intricate cases such as India have also underscored regime variation within the boundaries of the subcontinent (Bohlken 2016; Harbers, Bartman and van Wingerden 2019). Similarly, with Mickey's (2015) *Paths Out of Dixie* and Nicholson-Crotty's (2015) *Governors, Grants and Elections*, the discussion on subnational variation has circled back to the United States 'solid south', one of Edward Gibson's (2005; 2012) original exemplary cases. Relatedly, while European studies have mostly focused on the intricacies of multi-level governance (Pazos-Vidal 2019), comparativists have certainly stepped up throughout the last two decades to fill the omission first identified by Dahl (1971).

Despite these efforts, most of the extant literature focuses solely on a-temporal factors. That is, they offer explanations based on the *constant conjunction* of the corresponding dependent and independent variable. To use Kreuzer's (forthcoming) *grammar of time*, existing accounts have frozen history. More specifically, a) they assume that the purported mechanism works not only regardless of which subnational unit we analyse, but also —and rather critically— b) they assume that the mechanisms described are at play regardless of the time, period, or epoch one seeks to analyse. The extant scholarship has taken territoriality rather too seriously, developing a form of workshop blindness which has obscured temporal and historical insights from the burgeoning work on subnational variation. This project intended to offer the first systematic, historically grounded corrective to the literature.

In this conclusion I provide a synthetic overview of my core argument, crucial ideas, and the main evidence presented throughout each of the previous chapters. I then complement my theoretical and empirical recap by highlighting the key implications and contributions of this dissertation. Section 3 underscores its most salient limitations by presenting them as areas for future research. After pinpointing the strengths and weaknesses of this project, I then probe its portability to other settings. Critically, I show that my analytic framework and argument travel relatively well to other contexts. To do so, I briefly explore the case of India. Finally, I end this chapter by offering some *tentative conclusions about subnational democracies*.

7.1 The Road Taken and the Lessons Learnt

In the introduction I provided a synthetic overview of the project, summarily presenting the research question, the argument, and the case selection strategy. More substantively, however, the introductory chapter of this thesis also outlined my understanding of democracy as a continuous phenomenon and it characterized subnational units as socio-political entities that can be both explanandums and explanans. That is, it recognized them as macrosocial units (Ragin 1987) political scientists can engage with theoretically and empirically. Similarly, in the first chapter I discussed the trade-off between the scale of analysis and the depth of conceptualizations and mechanisms, and by discussing my chosen level of analysis, I appended Soifer's (2019) typology of subnational theories by suggesting *level-interdependent* theories as a fourth category.

In the following chapter, I reviewed the literature. There I paid close attention to identify the past, present and future of research on subnational regime heterogeneity. This overview clearly identified what we know and what we did not know about our outcome of interest. Critically, in the second chapter I critiqued extant scholarship for only addressing an already determined equilibrium, highlighting that my main contention with current scholarly work is that it is ahistorical. Building on this critique, I articulated the core tenets of the *structural rationale* and built the space for my theory.

After articulating a theoretical space for my research, I carved an empirical one in Chapter 3. Here, I first fully unpacked the conceptualization, measurement strategy, and validity of my dependent variable. On this basis, I then showed that pre and post Third Wave subnational patterns of competition and participation are strongly and significantly correlated with each other. In a similar vein, I presented descriptive evidence which suggested that the linkages between subnational democratic variation and economic development are also firmly rooted in history. With both a theoretical and an empirical gap identified, in the following four chapters I then unpacked my argument along with its empirical backbone.

Chapter 4 expounded my theory and illuminated the conceptual and logical components of my main contention: that the contemporary subnational regime heterogeneity observed across Latin American federal democracies was configured by territorially distinct development paths which were triggered during colonization. In turn, these liberal or mercantilist trajectories conditioned the timing of local labor incorporation. The chapter consequently identified (1) 'colonial roles and the onset of divergent economic trajectories' along with (2) the 'sequencing of subnational labor incorporation' as the two core tenets of my argument.

Building on the work by Mahoney (2010) and Collier and Collier (1991), Chapter 4 elucidated the logical, temporal, and conceptual elements of my theory. Equally important, the chapter delineated the mechanisms through which I expected the cause to exert its effect. I concluded that chapter by formally outlining my analytical strategy, presenting my rationale for case selection, my mixed methods approach, as well as the chief analytical tools and sources used. Lastly, the final sections of that chapter also clarified the probabilistic notion of causality that permeates this project.

The reasoning and evidence linked to colonial roles and the onset of divergent economic trajectories were further explored in Chapter 5. Here I presented a novel score which classified the provinces of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico according to their central, semi-peripheral, and peripheral role during the mercantilist period of the early colonial crucible. I provocatively claimed that being a colonial mercantilist centre was a sufficient condition for contemporary economic underdevelopment. Introducing quantitative evidence first and qualitative case analysis later, the chapter identified a *reversal of subnational* fortunes. On average, early mercantilist centres were more likely to go from riches to rags, while territories with an early peripheral status were more likely to move in the opposite direction.

After showing that colonial roles set territories and provinces onto alternate paths —of which I conceptualized the mercantilist and the liberal one as two ideal forms— the sixth chapter explored their implications for the timing and sequencing of labor incorporation. Tracking our cases first and exploring quantitative evidence on 'labor conflicts' later, in this chapter I showed that in some provinces —early colonial peripheries or liberal nodes— subnational officials were the State's first respondents. In other provinces —early colonial mercantilist cores— labor emerged protractedly and later on. In these latter instances, consequently, the centre was the more consequential stage of political incorporation. The timing —whether a (relatively) organized working class emerged either early or late— as well as the sequence of incorporation —whether the subnational process anteceded the national one or vice versa— heavily conditioned the articulation of the subnational arena as a relevant locus for political engagement.

In sum, Chapters 3, 5, and 6 represent the core empirical chapters of this thesis. Chapter 3 set the empirical puzzle, while Chapters 5 and 6 unpacked the key empirical implications of my argument. Using the casual process observation (CPO) argot put forth by Mahoney (2010a), Chapters 5 and 6 can each be thought of as distinct types of CPOs. In asserting the causal power of colonial roles, Chapter 5 constitutes an *independent variable CPO*, as it presents evidence that backs the existence and the effect of my posited cause. For its part, Chapter 6 can be viewed as a *mechanism CPO*, for it identifies the timing and sequencing of subnational labor incorporation as the intervening processes along my posited causal chain. Table 7.1 presents a schematic overview of the main findings of this project.

7.2 Underlining the Scholarly Implication: Contextualizing *All* Competing Explanations

While previous explanations were ahistorical and focused only on a predetermined equilibrium, in this project I have documented that the origins of subnational democracy are rooted in history. Triangulating evidence and tracking the unfolding of Jalisco, Rio Grande do Sul, Guerrero, and Salta, I showed that the former two provinces rose from backwardness to economic prominence. We saw that Jalisco and Rio Grande do Sul experienced a relatively early emergence of labor and how, facing this bottom-up pressure for political incorporation, these provinces had their

Table 7.1: Main Findings: A Summary

Question	Chapter	Role	Main Findings
What explains subnational variation in democracy across Latin America?	SRH: A Case for Historical Causation (Chap. 3)	Carve an empirical space for the argument	1. Subnational regime outcomes can be adequately captured by Vanhanen's (2000) electoral index of democracy. 2. Subnational regime outcomes are strongly associated with levels of economic development. 3. Democracy varies more within each province than between them. 4. For at least the past seven decades, Argentinian provinces have democratically outperformed Mexican ones, with Brazilian units occupying the middle ground. 5. Critically, in terms of their regime outcomes and level of economic development, the relative position of provinces has been remarkably stable for at least the last century.
	The Reversal of Subnational Fortunes (Chap. 5)	Critical Juncture and Independent Variable CPO	1. Mahoney's (2010) framework can be successfully scaled down to identify the role provincial territories played during the early colonial crucible. 2. In Latin America, some territories were central, peripheral, and semi-peripheral during the early, mercantilist, Iberian colonial crucible. 3. These early provincial colonial roles hinged on biogeographic resources, such as complex indigenous societies and the availability of cash crops or mineral wealth. 4. The evidence suggests that early mercantilist centers went from riches to rags, while early peripheries experienced economic prosperity later on. 5. This reversal of subnational fortunes had long-lasting consequences, setting provinces onto different development trajectories.
	Subnational Pressures for Incorporation (Chap. 6)	Structural Persistence and Mechanism CPO	1. The political incorporation of the working class did not unfold in national unison, but rather it varied in space and time within countries. 2. In provinces along the liberal dev. trajectory —like Jalisco and Rio Grande do Sul— the working class was more likely to emerge and gain salience early on. 3. In provinces along the mercantilist dev. path —like Guerrero and Salta— labor was more likely to emerge later on. 4. In cases where the local accommodation of labor anteceded the national, centralizing bids of the mid-20th century, the subnational arena became an important locus for political engagement. 5. In cases where the local accommodation of labor overlapped or followed national incorporation dynamics, the subnational arena was dislodged. 6. Across all units, and countries under consideration, bottom-up pressures from the working class have been more likely in provinces along the liberal path, than they are among units on the mercantilist route.

political arena entrenched as a valuable locus for political engagement. Conversely, we also observed that Guerrero and Salta experienced economic decline, and we traced how, in these states, labor emergence dragged out, dislodging the local political arena in favor of the central one. Devoid of valuable incentives that would drive political participation and competition, in these latter states local electoral engagement remains low and the likelihood of conflict outside formal and informal channels continues to be to this day, comparatively high.

To provocatively discuss the implications of my argument in relation to the relevant literature, I will use Mahoney, Kimball and Koivu's (2009) *method of sequence elaboration*[1] which builds on set theoretic logic and "allows one to assess the relative importance of [competing or complementary] causes located at different points in time" (Mahoney, Kimball and Koivu 2009, 128). In doing so, in this section I contend that my theory contextualizes *all* competing accounts.

To assert the stance of my argument *vis-à-vis* the conventional wisdom, I focus on my two theoretical pillars and I make one pair of assumptions: First, none of the factors highlighted by the existing literature on subnational regime heterogeneity are individually necessary for the outcome. This, in turn, allows me to treat them at least as sufficient conditions[2]. Second, given that my argument temporally antecedes all existing explanations, and conceding the complexity of existing accounts, I will assume a relationship of sufficiency between my two pillars

[1]Originally put forth by Paul Lazarsfeld (see Kendall (1982)), the method of sequence elaboration evaluates the implications that newly established causal historical arguments have on the importance of existing explanations or alternative causal factors. Mahoney, Kimball and Kouivu (2009) extend and elaborate on this method. They conclude that there are only two logically plausible implications: *contextualization* and *diminishment*. On the one hand, for a new factor to diminish an existing causal relationship it has to be of the same causal type (either necessary or sufficient) and be 'more important'. On the other hand, a new historical explanation contextualizes an existing one when they are of the same causal type but they are 'less important'. Critically, the importance of a cause hinges on the type of causal link identified and the temporal proximity to the outcome of interest.

[2]This is logically, theoretically and empirically plausible. Scholars of subnational democracy rarely explicitly assess the extent to which their underscored factors are either necessary nor sufficient. Nonetheless, assuming sufficiency recognizes that subnational regime outcomes are likely a) overdetermined and b) equifinal outcomes. That is, it is a lax or flexible assumption which acknowledges that there are multiple factors at play and that there are likely a variety of routes and causal configurations which could potentially lead to the same outcome.



Figure 7.1: The Set Theoretic Configuration of the Colonial and Labor Origins of Subnational Democracy

and those factors purported in competing explanations[3]. I start my application of the method of sequence elaboration by representing my causal model in Figure 7.1, where the → stands for a causal connection, and the letter "s" characterizes this relation as one of sufficiency. "CR" stands for 'colonial roles', "LI" represents subnational labor incorporation and "Y" stands for the regime outcomes observed at the subnational level.

Under this setting, the relation of my argument with other accounts can be modelled as in Figure 7.2. Here "X" stands for any other factor highlighted in current theories accounting for subnational regime outcomes. Portrayed in this fashion, it is more intuitive to see that my explanation contextualizes all of the existing scholarship on the subject. Recalling the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, we can, for example, take McMann's (2006) structural argument, and replace X with environmental economic autonomy. Doing so helps us to understand and assess the logical and empirical validity represented in Figure 7.2. This means that, knowing whether a province follows either the mercantilist or the liberal development trajectory goes a long way in helping us predict whether environmental economic autonomy will emerge in a given subnational unit.

Similarly, we could replace the X in Figure 7.2 with Gervasoni's (2010; 2018) fiscal transfers and appreciate how the two tenets of my arguments contextualize his

[3]Ultimately, what is needed to sort this relationship out is an enquiry onto the links between my two theoretical tenets —colonial roles and subnational labor incorporation—and the factors put forth by other explanations of subnational regime outcomes.



Figure 7.2: Sequential Elaboration: My Argument *vis-à-vis* Existing Explanations

findings. We should expect subnational fiscal rentierism to be more common among former mercantilist centers. Additionally, one could also replace the X in Figure 7.2 with the Colliers' (1991) national political incorporation and my contextualization of their theory would hold nonetheless. It suggest that national labor dynamics were antecedent by local ones, which shaped multiple subnational political arenas.

I conclude this brief application of the method of sequence elaboration by highlighting that the suggestion that my argument only contextualizes other explanations is a rather conservative one. It is so because it assumes that the link between my contribution and other explanations is one of sufficiency. If, however, one were to further investigate these connections and conclude that the link was one of necessity, my argument has the potential to *diminish* the salience of competing accounts. In and of itself, this constitutes a new and different puzzle, requiring research on how colonial roles and subnational labor incorporation are associated, for example, with fiscal transfers, environmental economic autonomy, or the endurance of local political dynasties.

In sum, the contextualization of all existing explanations of subnational regime heterogeneity is perhaps the most significant disciplinary implication of this project. That said, as the next section clarifies, reflecting on the *contribution* of this project to comparative politics and subnational analyses, I argue that the ideas and empirics of this thesis crystallize an agenda for research on *subnational political economy.*

7.3 Setting the Agenda: Towards a *Subnational Political Economy* and Overcoming Remaining Limitations

Thirty years ago, in *Union of Parts*, Kathleen Thelen (1991) analyzed the intricate linkages between labor relations and rapid political and economic change in Germany. From Esping-Andersen's (1990) *Three Worlds of Welfare*, Hall and Soskice's (2001) *Varieties of Capitalism*, to Thelen's (2004) own *How Institutions Evolve*, the rich scholarly debate on the political economy of advanced industrial democracies continues to be a fertile ground for research to this day[4]. Nonetheless, academic work looking comparatively at the political economy of the developing world, such as Africa (Nölke and Claar 2013) or Latin America (Schrank 2009; Schneider 2009), has struggled to move past typologizing arrangements in these regions as either state-permeated or hierarchical market economies (SMEs and HMEs respectively).

Relatedly, as briefly commented on Section 2.2 of the literature review, in the search for more nuanced and powerful explanations, scholars have scaled down their theoretical and empirical scope. The subnational lens has permeated security studies (Trejo and Ley 2017; Hilgers and Macdonald 2017), economic development (Dell 2010; Flores Peregrina 2016), sustainable development (Bruyninckx et al. 2012), gender (Escobar-Lemmon and Funk 2018), and welfare (Dobbs et. al. 2018; Tillin 2021). However, these have been scattered efforts that have, for the most part, talked past each other[5]. In addition to lacking a unified framework of reference, these efforts have also overlooked the genetics or origins of the differences between subnational units.

Just as Thelen's (2004) discussion on guilds and the impact that the *Handicraft Protection Law* of 1897 had for Germany's vocational training system, my aspiration

[4]For a thorough overview and discussion of political economy research, both in its comparative and international branches, see Clift (2021).

[5]The efforts by Giraudy, Moncada and Snyder (2019) in conceptualizing a *Subnational Research* (SNR) agenda are laudable and deserve recognition. Similarly, the recent efforts by Giraudy and Niedzwiecki (2021) to combine SNR with the multi-level governance framework are commendable as well. However, these accomplishments have been mostly focused on the methodological challenges of conducting comparative analyses while scaling down. My call for the articulation of an agenda focused on *subnational political economies* is a call to concentrate our efforts on the origins, history, and interconnection of substantive outcomes that are of interest to political scientists and the general public.

is that the elements I have put forth throughout this project — such as colonial roles, economic trajectories, and subnational labor incorporation— contribute to the field by serving as a stepping stone to move towards a more complete understanding of the distinct ways in which the tensions between politics and economics have unfolded along countries and across subnational units within the developing world. A renewed focus, more specifically a subnational historical focus, on issues like local labor markets, local industrial relations, and local welfare provision, has the potential to substantively contribute to enhance our knowledge of the political economy of Latin America and beyond.

More specifically, there are two immediate or preliminary tasks at hand: First, we need to extend —both in specificity and case-coverage— our assessment of the historical origins of subnational political arrangements. Second, we need to push for the articulation of a common language, a unified theoretical framework which scholars from distinct regions of the world can use to build up our knowledge on the political economy of states and provinces. While tackling the second task requires a joint disciplinary effort, after highlighting the limitations of this project, in the following subsection I also point towards fertile avenues for future research. For its part, Section 4 of this conclusion expands the horizons of my argument by exploring its portability to India.

7.3.1 Overcoming Remaining Limitations

Contextualizing all previous explanations and crystallizing a call for the study of subnational political economies are, respectively, the two most significant implications and contributions of my dissertation. Nonetheless, this project certainly has limitations as it also opened up several questions which —since they are not tackled here— will need to be addressed by future research. I briefly explore the most salient remaining tasks below.

Extension within Latin America. Future research can further validate the Latin American scope of my argument by probing it in different countries across the region. In this regard, extending my argument to the Venezuelan case seems the most intuitive pathway forward, as this is the only other federal, presidential, large republic, and former Iberian colony of the region not included in this study. More broadly, however, future research can extend the analysis to unitary countries such as Colombia, Chile, Uruguay, and Peru. These explorations have the potential to contribute not only by testing, but also by refining the hypotheses I articulated in this thesis.

Detail the mechanisms of path endurance. While in Chapter 5 I identified the roles provinces played during the early stages of colonial life, I do not discuss the specific mechanisms through which colonial institutions endure and reproduce through time. How is it that both mercantilist and liberal colonial institutions survive? Even though I do suggest that their persistence is linked to positive feedback loops and the logic of increasing returns, future research needs to trace the specific processes which account for their longevity and reproduction. Similarly, it would be of particular interest here to explore how and under which circumstances we could expect distinct forms of institutional change —layering, drift, conversion or displacement (Conran and Thelen 2016)— to occur. For example, a case analysis of Mexico City would be well suited to trace not only how early mercantilist institutions survived, but also the extent to which the liberal era forced or pushed changes within the capital.

Problematize the varieties of liberalism. In his work on Central America, Mahoney (2001) identified three distinct ways in which liberalism was introduced in the region by the 19th century Latin American liberal elites: a radical path, a reformist one, and an aborted trajectory. Future scholars can refine the identification of colonial roles by carefully distinguishing alternative subtypes of both mercantilist and liberal arrangements. The roles identified here can serve as a starting point, but the calibration of the typology of colonial roles will demand an in-depth comparative analysis of just two or four subnational units at a time. It could very well be the case that a more refined identification of colonial roles better matches and explains the differences observed across provinces. For instance, distinguishing between the types of liberalism implanted early on could prove beneficial to scholars trying to understand the distinct subnational reactions to trade liberalization and the heterogeneous impacts of market-oriented reforms.

In-depth analysis of labor dynamics. With the intention of zeroing-in on the locus of political engagement, in Chapter 6, I used strikes, number of unions, as well as the number of labor court filings as proxies of 'labor unrest'. While this allowed me to identify where (i.e., in which provinces) bottom-up pressure was exerted, further analysis is necessary to unpack exactly how these demands and struggles unfolded. That is, case studies could further identify the meaning of unrest in each province. Asserting more refined qualitative or substantive differences in labor activities is important for two specific reasons: 1) It would contribute to refine our understanding of the back-and-forth tensions between the national and subnational arenas which were at play during the process of labor's political incorporation. Moreover, 2) it would shed light onto the relationship between the processes of subnational labor incorporation and its implications *vis-à-vis* the linkages established with local branches of political parties.

Examine national capitals closely. For the most part, in this project I treated all provinces as equal units of observation. However, capital states or cities are unique spaces in which both the local and national political arenas converge. To more thoroughly gauge our understanding of the implications of this spatial and political intersection, future research can move past the unit homogeneity assumption and look at how the processes described in this project unfold specifically in places like Brazil's moving capitals, Buenos Aires, and Mexico City.

Scale further down. In this project I limited my analysis to the jurisdictional boundaries of the second-tier governmental level. As reviewed in Section 4.4 of Chapter 4, this decision enhanced the theoretical, conceptual and empirical consistence of the project, while at the same time, it maximized comparability with existing scholarly work. Nonetheless, future studies can potentially keep scaling down, exploring the distinct trajectories of municipalities or electoral districts. For example, in addition to in-depth analysis of a few cases, researchers could build up a field experiment comparing municipalities in an early mercantilist core which

Table 7.2: Implications, Contributions, and Limitations of this Study

Implication	The project contextualizes all other existing explanations of subnational regime outcomes.
Contribution	The thesis provides the building blocks and crystallizes a call for the study of subnational political economies.
Limitations	Future research can: - Test the theory in other Latin American countries and beyond. - Detail the mechanism of path endurance and reproduction. - Problematize distinct subtypes of colonial roles (i.e radical, reformist, and aborted liberalism). - Provide in-depth analysis on the meaning of labor activities. - Closely examine political dynamics within the capitals. - Scale further down the territorial scale.

borders a liberal node. To scale further down, researchers would behove from access to local historical records, from field work and a solid on the ground experience.

Finally, future researchers can also expand the analysis beyond Latin America. Technically, or at least, *a priori*, the framework put forth in this thesis can guide the exploration of subnational regime variation in former colonies. Testing the argument as a whole, or one of the two tenets independently, in other regional contexts is perhaps one of the most promising avenues for future enquiries. To facilitate and incentivize the debate, Table 7.2 summarizes the implications, contributions and limitations of this project and Section 4 explores the portability of my framework by examining the case of India.

7.4 Expanding the Scope: Assessing the Origins of Subnational Regime Heterogeneity in India

For scholars of economic and political development, India has represented both a theoretical and empirical challenge, as well as an incredibly fertile case to ground, formulate and test hypotheses. The subcontinent holds roughly 20% of the world's population, being the second most inhabited country in the world, surpassed only by China. When compared to Latin America, India alone roughly doubles the population of the combined regional total. Economically speaking, using 2020 World Bank USD (PPP) estimates, the Gross Domestic Product of the South Asian giant was roughly 1.5 times that of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico put together.

India is not only heavily populated and the 6th largest economy worldwide, but the country also holds one of the world's most heterogeneous societies, hosting a myriad of ethnicities, languages, and religions. Using Okediji's (2005) Index of Social Diversity[6], India scores 0.98 on a scale of 0 to 1, occupying the nineteenth position out of the 133 countries evaluated. For reference, Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina are ranked in the 94th, 100th, and 116th position respectively, averaging a score of 0.61 points on the scale.

India's social diversity and long-drawn historical trajectory permeate and shape how social and political processes unfold at the national and the subnational level. Researchers on its democratic transition have identified India as a 'deviant case' (McMillan 2008), while academics aiming to explain its economic trajectory have pointed at a multiplicity of relevant structural (Iyer 2003; Banerjee and Iyer 2005) as well as agentic factors (Ahluwalia 2002). Moreover, while the provincial boundaries of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico have remained relatively stable through time, the same cannot be said about the subnational borders within the Asian subcontinent[7]. In recognition of this complexity, I take the brief analysis that follows as a preliminary step, as an invitation for future scholars to conduct a more robust and in-depth test of the extent to which my argument accounts for variation along Indian provinces.

To enhance the clarity of my exposition, I present the evidence following the same order laid out throughout the thesis. In that sense, I first assess the validity of my measure of subnational democracy when applied to Indian states. I then link it to provincial levels of economic development. The third part of this analysis builds a short case for historical causation, while the fourth and fifth segment of my examination of India hint respectively at both the colonial and labor origins of the subnational political arena inside the South Asian giant.

[6]Okediji's (2005) Index of Social Diversity is a measurement of social diversity which goes beyond the distinction of language groups by taking into consideration racial, ethno-linguistic, and religious identities as constitutive dimensions or forms of human diversity.

[7]Indian subnational boundaries have been redrawn in multiple occasions. They were modified before and immediately after independence, and critically, extensive changes were introduced through the 1956 *States Reorganization Act*. Importantly, this Act restructured provincial boundaries along linguistic lines, eliminated the distinction between Part A and Part B states, and introduced the 'Union Territory' to reclassify former Part C or Part D states. For a thorough discussion on the rationale and consequences of the 1956 Act, see Sarangi and Pai (2016).

Table 7.3: Panel Structure for Data on India

Country	Subnational Units	Starting Year	Last Year	No. Electoral Cycles (mean)	Number of Observations
India	30	1977	2015	7	201

Measuring Subnational Regime Variation in India. To capture subnational regime heterogeneity within the subcontinent, I use Bhavnani's (2014) data which contains information on state legislative elections from 1977 to 2015. Using population data from the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), I estimated my index of subnational democracy which is based on Vanhanen's (2000) work and captures the extent of electoral competition and participation for a given electoral round in any specific province (this measurement strategy was more thoroughly discussed in Section 3.1 of Chapter 3). I also collected data on fiscal revenues and GDP using several volumes of the RBI's Handbook of Statistics on Indian States. Table 7.3 summarizes the structure of the resulting dataset which is a short panel, with 201 observations, 30 groups, and an average of 7 electoral cycles observed per province.

To gauge the validity of my index, I contrast it with the one recently put forth by Harbers, Bartman and van Wingerden (2019). Figure 7.3 shows that both measures are positive and significantly linked. Considering that Harbers, Bartman and van Wingerden (2019) use Giraudy's (2015) framework, it is interesting to note that the correlation coefficient displayed here is quite similar to the one shown in Figure 3.2 of Chapter 3. While my measure overestimates the cases of Tripura and Meghalaya[8], both scores coincide in identifying Puducherry, Goa, and Kerala as the democratic overperformers.

Subnational Democracy and Development in India. As outlined in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3, Figure 7.5 shows a strong, positive and significant association between democracy and economic development at the subnational level in India. While we do observe Bihar as a clear deviant case, just as their Argentinian, Brazilian and Mexican counterparts, elections in more prosperous Indian provinces tend to be more participatory and contested. Interestingly enough,

[8]Both of these provinces are only measured for two electoral cycles in my dataset.



Figure 7.3: Assessing Validity: Harbers, Bartman and van Wingerden's Score

Harbers, Bartman and van Wingerden's (2019) score is based on Giraudy's (2015) work and measures four dimensions of democracy at the subnational level: turnover, contestation, autonomy, and clean elections.

when compared to the Pearson correlation coefficient of the joint relationship for our Latin American cases (shown in Figure 3.10 of Chapter 3), the association between local economic development and democracy is stronger in India. Surprisingly, for example, we do not observe units with a high GDP per capita (x-axis) which at the same time have low democratic scores (y-axis).

The Case for Historical Causation. In Sections 3.3 and 3.4 of Chapter 3, I showed that the relative economic and political positions occupied by Argentinian, Brazilian, and Mexican provinces have been considerably stable for roughly a century. That is, I showed that the observed provincial economic and political equilibrium precedes the Third Wave and that logically, it also predates most if not all of the explanatory factors purported by the literature. The plots in Figure 7.7 aim to convey a similar message for the Indian case; subnational democratic variation within the subcontinent is also a historical outcome in need of a historical



Figure 7.5: Subnational Democratic Variation and Development in India

Source: GDP per capita is estimated in USD 2011 using data from the World Bank and the Reserve Bank of India.

cause. The top panel compares pre and post 1990 levels of economic development[9]. The bottom panel contrasts levels of subnational democracy for Indian provinces across the same time period.

Both graphs display a strong and significant association which hints at the stickiness of the distinct paths or trajectories followed by Indian provinces. Contrasting the strength of the association with that observed for either Argentina, Brazil or Mexico, perhaps (un)surprisingly, the correlation between past and present levels of democracy and economic development is higher in India than for any of the

[9]India belongs not to the Third, but to the *Second* Wave of democratization. The decision to take 1990 as the temporal threshold stems from one theoretical and one practical reason. On the latter side, this division better balanced the number of observations in each temporal group. On the former, more formal reasoning, the early 1990s mark the period through which India introduced market-oriented reforms aiming to liberalize its economy.



Figure 7.7: Pre and Post 1990 Subnational Economic and Political Equilibrium in India

individual or pooled analysis of our Latin American cases. While this might be due to the limited temporal span of my data on the South Asian giant, these linkages are still strong enough to warrant a historically oriented explanation.

The Colonial Onset of Diverging Trajectories. Using Mahoney's (2010) framework, in Chapter 5 I distinguished between territories which were either central, peripheral or semi-peripheral during the early stages of mercantilist Iberian colonialism. The key intuition —as discussed in Section 4.1 and 5.1 of Chapter 4 and 5 respectively— is that the institutional identity of the colonizing power changes with time. Consequently, we should observe divergent outcomes between provinces which were central during the early mercantilist stages of the colonial crucible and those that gained primacy during the later, comparatively more liberal stage of colonialism. To clearly and cogently unpack the application of my framework to the Indian case, I first briefly —and very broadly— sketch the way colonialism unfolded in the subcontinent[10].

India's ancient history is as long as it is complex. From the Mauryan Empire (320-200 BC), which was the first to stretch from coast to coast, the Gupta Empire of the third century, to the Mughal Empire (1526-1857), the political, social and economic interactions of the subcontinent had been intricate and vibrant long before the arrival of European invaders. However, just as in the case of Latin America, native pre-colonial dynamics would be heavily disrupted by the intricacies of colonization.

After Vasco da Gama's 1488 incursion into Asia during the late 15th century, European trade companies set up operations across distinct ports along the western and eastern coasts of India. Prior to 1757, Portuguese, Dutch, Swedish, Danish, British, and Austrian trade companies operated in the region. While there is debate around the extent to which these early trading companies altered local Indian institutions (Gaikwad 2020), there is more historiographical and scholarly consensus pointing at 1757 as the year in which the 'colonial experience' began in full; for in that year the British defeated the Nawab of Bengal (and their French allies) at the Battle of Plassey, granting them control of a large swath of the eastern Indian subcontinent.

[10] My understanding of Indian history is shaped by Keay (2010), Kulke and Rothermund (2016), as well as Roy (2020) and Robb (2011).

British dominion over India was, to put it mildly, intricate. Between 1757 and 1857 the British extended their authority over Indian territory in distinct ways. Some areas —normally referred to as Princely States— were allowed to maintain administrative autonomy while others were kept under the direct control of British authorities. As the century progressed, British authority became more centralized, and as Iyer (2003) puts it, it moved from a 'ring-fence' period — in which indirect rule was preferred — to one of 'union', in which the British were more adamant about direct control and intervention. That different modes of administrative control coexisted has allowed scholars and historians to classify India as a case of 'hybrid' colonialism.

Nonetheless, just as with Iberian colonization of the Americas, "[D]ifferent parts of [India] came under British rule in different periods" (Banerjee and Iyer 2005, 1192). Moreover, beyond acknowledging the distinct temporal unfolding of British control over the subcontinent, critical to our purposes is the recognition that "Britain was never as mercantilist in orientation as Spain [or Portugal], even in the 17th century [...] Moreover, the vast majority of British colonialism occurred after the mid 18th century, by which time Britain was characterized by a liberal economic model that explicitly advocated free trade and that conceptualized the [S]tate as a tool for ensuring law and order" (Lange, Mahoney and vom Hau 2006, 1421).

To further substantiate these claims, we can recall, for example, that Charles I convened parliament in 1640, that the 'Glorious Revolution' of 1688-1689 introduced constraints to royal authority; and that the Bank of England, created as early as 1694, provided credit to merchants, already promoting commercial agriculture by the turn of the 18th century. These series of "uncoordinated institutional rearrangements facilitated England's 'commercial revolution' of mid and late 17th century" (Mahoney 2010, 231). Critically, in stark contrast to Habsburg rulers, "the British never restricted colonial trade to one or more specific ports [and neither did they] impose restrictions on inter colonial trade" (Mahoney 2010, 232).

In exploring the portability of my framework to assess British colonial influence in determining Indian subnational outcomes, I heed the discussion of Mahoney

(2010) as well as that of Lange, Mahoney, and vom Hau (2006), who suggest that faced with the same indigenous biogeographic factors —complex indigenous societies (CIS) and resource availability— British liberal colonizers reacted differently than their Iberian mercantilist counterparts. While the latter were quick to occupy resource abundant regions with CIS, the former avoided such areas in favour of scarcely populated pre-colonial backwater territories.

Gaikwad (2020) provides evidence of how the British liberal raiders reacted to native biogeographic factors. In exploring the rationale that guided 'early' incursions of the British East India Company (EIC), his study shows that in choosing where to establish operations, the EIC prioritised areas that discouraged contestation or attacks from either local or competing European forces. In this sense, the EIC "sought territories that were unattractive targets for conquest because they were either [located in a defensible position] or unprosperous to begin with" (Gaikwad 2020, 27).

To be clear, both Iberian mercantilist and British liberal colonialism reversed subnational fortunes. However, they reversed them in opposite directions. Iberian mercantilism flourished in rich pre-colonial regions, subsequently cursing them to underdevelopment. To the contrary, in India, British liberalism flourished in pre-colonial backwater areas, setting them on a path of comparatively higher prosperity.

Developing a 'colonial role score' similar to the one used in Chapter 5 is beyond the scope of this conclusion. Nonetheless, to explore that the colonial crucible set Indian provinces onto distinct development trajectories, I rely on data from Banerjee and Iyer (2005) and Iyer (2010). Specifically, I take their 'Brit' dummy variable which signals whether or not a specific Indian district was part of British India[11]. Considering that this variable is measured at the district level, to facilitate comparison with the analyses of preceding chapters, I aggregate their dummy to the state level. To do this, I calculate the share of districts that were part of British India for each province. On the basis of this value, I then classify each subnational

[11] The cutoff date for their dummy variable is 1947. That is, Banerjee and Iyer (2005) assigned districts a value of 1 if by 1947 they were part of British India and a 0 otherwise.



Figure 7.8: The Colonial Roles of Indian Provinces and their Predicted GDP per capita

unit as being under 'full', 'hybrid' or 'incomplete' British liberal influence[12]. As a result, I classify 32.9% of Indian provinces as incomplete, 22.6% as instances of hybridity, and 44.5% as cases of full British influence.

While regressing contemporary levels of economic development (GDP per capita USD 2011) on these 'colonial scores' generates coefficients that fail to reach conventional levels of statistical significance[13], Figure 7.8 closely tracks our theoretical expectations, with the sign or direction of the coefficient lending some credence to the idea that British liberal influence did in fact set Indian territories and provinces onto distinct development trajectories.

Shaping the Indian Subnational Political Arena. Just as complex as mapping the first tenet of my argument onto the colonial experience of the subcontinent, identifying whether the timing and sequence of the political incorporation of labor generated entrenched or dislodged subnational arenas is a complex task. Chiefly, India's working class has been traditionally weak, both in terms of

[12]To classify each province, I use the following cut-off values: When +70% of districts within a state were part of British India, that province is classified as a case of 'full' British influence. States in which the share of districts pertaining to British India was below 45% were classified as 'incomplete' cases. 'Hybridity' is then a residual category which contains provinces for which the share of liberal districts was between 45% and 70%.

[13]Regressions include geographic factors, total population and a score of fiscal autonomy as controls. The results are reported in table format in Section A.5 of Appendix A.

numbers and in terms of its organizational capacity (Chibber 2005). Hence, while (proto)industrialization augmented the political salience of the Latin American working class, it is less clear that labor occupied or played a similar role in India's political trajectory. Parallelly, although further inquiries onto the pre-independence period are necessary, according to Chibber (2005), all relevant [national] labor institutions were set in place between 1947 and 1951, with the Indian constitution fully enfranchising the working class as early as 1950.

These are probably the reasons why the political consequences of the unfolding of State-labor relations throughout the late-19th century and early 1900s have been scarcely explored by either political scientists or sociologists. As a result, interestingly enough, I could not find research like that by Collier and Collier (1991) which would hint at a national-level process against which to assess subnational narratives. Nonetheless, critical for our purposes here is the Industrial Disputes Act issued in 1947.

While it might be the case that India's labor institutions at the country level were set between 1947 and 1951, the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 accords some credence to the idea that labor is key to understand divergent political outcomes across India's subnational units. Critically, this piece of legislation I) allowed provincial governments to claim jurisdiction over industrial sectors by declaring any industry a public utility, and II) gave state legislatures the prerogative to issue amendments in order to better tend to local needs.

With these two rules in place, the Act boosted the political salience of the subnational arena. Although more research is needed to fully understand its causes and consequences, it is interesting to note that in India, "one of the most pro-labor bodies of legislation is comprised of state-level amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 [...][with] most scholars view[ing] this large body of labor legislation as an attempt by meddling political parties to shift disputes from the collective bargaining arena to a state-controlled [...] mechanism for co-opting organized labor" (Teitelbaum 2011, 409-410).



Figure 7.9: The Colonial Roles of Indian Provinces and Labor Unrest

Even when regressing the number of labor conflicts (strikes) on the 'colonial scores' introduced above generates coefficients that fail to reach conventional levels of statistical significance[14], Figure 7.9 closely tracks our theoretical expectations and the direction of the coefficient again lends some credence to the idea that labor politics are in fact relevant to the democratic configuration of Indian provinces. Future research can interrogate the dynamics underpinning these state-level amendments to clarify if they indeed have helped to dislodge or entrench the political arenas of subnational units within the subcontinent.

7.5 *Tentative* Conclusions About *Subnational* Democracies

Reflecting on the analysis of India, it is clear that more research is needed. Historical and sociological accounts of the intricacies of labor movements at the subnational level are scarce. In addition, political scientists have also seldom investigated the implications that working-class, bottom-up pressures had for the configuration

[14]Data on strikes for Indian provinces comes from the Ministry of Labor and Employment for the years between 2012 and 2016. To this purpose, it is important to acknowledge that Teitelbaum (2006) highlights that in India, officially published labor data is hardly reliable. In spite of this recognition, regression results are reported in table format in Section A.5 of Appendix A.

of subnational political arenas within the subcontinent. Thorough archival and historical research can strengthen the coding used in the previous section. Delving deeper into the past can also expand the number of years examined. That is, more subnational research on India can increase the number and the accuracy of our observations. I am confident that a more in-depth qualitative and quantitative assessment of the Indian case can yield more powerful and robust statistical tests, as well as more detailed narratives which unpack the mechanisms and processes at play. In sum, more multi-disciplinary research is bound to extend the scope of this framework beyond Latin America and prove useful in refining our understanding of subnational democracies around the globe.

Thinking back on our Latin American cases, and pondering the specificities of the Indian experience, in particular the fact that its 1950 Constitution —which fully enfranchised the adult population— was signed after the end of World War II, draws attention to the potential influences exerted on the subnational arena by international factors. Specifically, it draws attention to the joint effects of time, ideology and polarization. While I have sustained that what matters for subnational regime outcomes are colonial roles and the timing of local incorporation *vis-à-vis* the national level process, the Indian case hints at the fact that the timing of subnational pressures *vis-à-vis* the international ideological scenario could be relevant as well.

Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2013) have shown that "international actors disseminate new beliefs about the desirability (or lack thereof) of different kinds of political regimes and policies [. . .][Moreover] they provide resources to empower some domestic [national and international] regime coalitions" (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013, 17). In a similar vein, Eaton (2017) has shown that ideological differences between governmental tiers heavily influence social and political interaction across the territorial scale of any given country. In this sense, for instance, it could very well be the case that local incorporation was less costly in states where labor pressures emerged before liberal/capitalist and communist ideologies became radically polarized internationally. Contrarily, this would imply that in subnational units where labor emerged in the wake of, for example, the Cold War, local incorporation represented more of a conundrum given the high levels of polarization and open prosecution of organizations espousing communist or socialist ideologies.

Scholars aiming to dig deeper into this subject need to start by delineating lines of demarcation that clearly differentiate between opposing ideologies. In a similar vein to the ideological mapping performed by Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2013), they would need to find a way to codify the orientations and preferences of individual actors such as governors, presidents, and labor union leaders. To adequately document the influences of international ideational struggles on subnational regime outcomes, researchers would need to specify the channels and mechanisms through which global influences enter the national, and subnational spheres. Sidelining the salience of international ideational configurations is perhaps another omission of this project which future scholars can help to overcome.

In addition to identifying the need to further multi-disciplinary research, and highlighting the potential causal role of ideological polarization, pondering on the experiences of India, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico invites us to reflect on the policy implications of my argument. What can politicians and decision makers take away from this project? On a preliminary level, I claim there are two important implications for 'real world' politics. The first one touches on regional inequalities. The second one speaks to the relevance of the working class for the strengthening of democracy.

This research has contributed to show that subnational economic and political trajectories are path-dependent outcomes. The differences between rich and poor provinces, as well as the disparities between politically contested and closed states, are enduring. The key message here is that in order to improve the fortunes of citizens in developing democracies, it is important to double-down efforts aimed at decreasing inter-regional inequalities. Critically, this thesis —along with Gervasoni's (2010; 2018) work— casts serious doubts on fiscal transfers as an effective and reliable policy. On the one hand, their implementation has not managed to disrupt the equilibria set between provinces during the colonial era. On the other hand, they have financed the survival of local autocrats. It seems that, consequently, *fiscal* *transfers are an economic and political trap.* Bold and innovative policy making is necessary to reshape the territorial equilibrium in countries like Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and India.

Writing on the challenges of democratic deepening, back in 1992 Phillippe Schmitter wrote that "[o]rganized class, sectoral, and professional interests can have an impact on the consolidation process" (Schmitter 1992, 433). The second policy implication of this project is that, for democracies to escape their current crises of representation, the economic and political role of the organized working class needs to be strengthened.

I began this thesis suggesting that around the globe, citizens in liberal democracies are disappointed with the (in)action and performance of their democratically elected governments. As the graphs in Figure 7.10 suggest, the increased dissatisfaction with democracy has coincided with the decreased strength and salience of unions and working-class organizations in at least 104 countries around the world[15]. Lobbying along with the private funding of political campaigns have tipped the political balance in favour of capital for far too long. For national and subnational democracies to advance, the working class has to reclaim *lo popular* and, just as they did in the first half of the 20^{th} across Latin America, they need to politically engage with parties and governments to excise better representation and better outcomes.

On a related note, in the first pages on this project I hinted that contemporary scholarship has identified populism as both a symptom and a cause of democratic erosion. In this regard, I think it important to remember that populism can serve as a democratic corrective to ossified, stagnant power (Mudde and Rovira

[15] Countries in the sample are: Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Bermuda, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hong Kong, China, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Republic of Montenegro, Myanmar, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, North Macedonia, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, China, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.



Figure 7.10: Dissatisfaction with Democracy and Union Density Around the World (2000-2016)

Sources: Data on union density comes from the International Labor Organization (ILO). Data on dissatisfaction with democracy comes from Klassen's (2018) HUMAN understanding project.

Kaltwasser 2013; Laclau 2018; Mouffe 2019). Unlike the leaders of the mid 1900s, what populist leaders lack today is a concrete link of representation with specific popular sectors. The catch-all nature of electoral competition has washed away any kind of proactive, sector-specific, programmatic content or appeal, leaving populism in the vacuum of *anti-politics* (Schedler 1997). Consequently, to once more endow political action and democratic representation with substance, it would behove activists and politicians alike to reconnect with labor.

Similarly, colonial roles, development trajectories, and the local labor dynamics of the early 1900s influenced but did not fix political destinies. Strengthening labor and popular inclusion has the potential to be the breakthrough democratic underperforming provinces need. In fact, it might be their only way out.

In the final volume to their *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* series, O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) suggest that democratization is like multi-layered or 3D chess. Their simile readily conveys the complexity and uncertainty of such an intricate process. In keeping with their tradition, as a final commentary, here I would like to make a slight adjustment to their analogy by suggesting that taking territoriality and time seriously makes of democratization —and regime change more broadly— a game of kung-fu, rhombic, and multi-layered chess. It is not only that multiple layers or political arenas exist, but that each one —each provincial setting— has its own complex set of interactions (rhombic). On top of that, it's a process in which there are no turns, and no clocks (kung-fu), with each of the players involved moving freely at their own pace and tempo. As such, activists and scholars cannot continue to down play the importance of time and space when advocating and researching the dynamics of strengthening open, contested, free, and fair elections.

Being an original examination of the origins of subnational regime variation, this project leaves ample space for future research. In providing an answer to the question motivating this project, I also laid out numerous propositions and queries for engaging scholars. Paraphrasing Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2013), I started this dissertation looking to understand what shaped subnational democracy in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. I end my thesis by pondering the challenges involved in understanding and pushing for the deepening of national and subnational democracies in Latin America and beyond.

Appendices

"I am a brain, Watson. The rest of me is a mere appendix ".

— Arthur Conan Doyle (1921)

A
Appendix A

These appendices incorporate complementary material to the analyses presented throughout this project. The information and data featured here were not included in the corpus of the project to facilitate and strengthen the flow of the discussion. Nonetheless, for completeness and transparency, in this first appendix I include:

I *Label Key*

To facilitate identifying cases throughout the graphs and figures displayed, I present the labels used to reference each one of the subnational units of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and India.

II *Main Variables and Institutional Data Sources by Country*

While throughout each of the chapters I was careful to clarify the operationalization of my variables, and to identify my references and data sources, for transparency, I list the national, subnational, and international institutional sources used to obtain information and data.

III *Regression Analyses and Complementary Quantitative Results*

Here I also discuss the main estimations techniques underpinning the quantitative component of the project. In addition, I present an overview of the software and the commands used to generate my estimates and assess my models. Although the individual outcomes of each assessment are not included, they are —along with the rest of my code— available upon request. Given that in Chapter 5 I used the Amelia II package in R (Honaker, King and Blackwell 2011) to account for missing data via multiple imputation (MI), I also offer a short discussion on the rationale behind this procedure.

IV *Summary Statistics and Additional Quantitative Results*

Considering that throughout the project I worked with several datasets, I here present *conventional* summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, range and number of data points) of the key variables used in the corpus of the project. To do so, I disaggregate them by country, period, and distinguish among the overall, the between, and the within variation. I additionally present the regression results behind the labor unrest graphs of Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.

A.1 Label Key

Table A.1: Dataset Labels for Subnational Units Analyzed

Argentina	
Label	Province
BUA	Buenos Aires
CAT	Catamarca
CBA	Capital (BA)
CHA	Chaco
CHU	Chubut
COR	Córdoba
CRTS	Corrientes
ER	Entre Ríos
FOR	Formosa
JUJ	Jujuy
MEND	Mendoza
MIS	Misiones
NEU	Neuquén
PAMP	La Pampa
RIOJ	La Rioja
RNEG	Río Negro
SALT	Salta
SEST	Santiago del Estero
SNJN	San Juan
SNLS	San Luis
STCR	Santa Cruz
STFE	Santa Fe
TFGO	Tierra del Fuego
TUC	Tucumán

Brazil	
Label	Province
AC	Acre
AL	Alagoas
AM	Amazonas
AP	Amapá
BA	Bahia
CE	Ceará
DF	Distrito Federal
ES	Espírito Santo
GO	Goiás
MA	Maranhão
MG	Minas Gerais
MS	Mato Grosso do Sul
MT	Mato Grosso
PA	Pará
PB	Paraíba
PE	Pernambuco
PI	Piauí
PR	Paraná
RJ	Rio de Janeiro
RN	Rio Grande Do Norte
RO	Rondônia
RR	Roraima
RS	Rio Grande do Sul
SC	Santa Catarina
SE	Sergipe
SP	São Paulo
TO	Tocantins

Mexico	
Label	Province
AGS	Aguascalientes
BC	Baja California
BCS	Baja California Sur
CAM	Campeche
CDMX	Ciudad de México
CHI	Chihuahua
CHP	Chiapas
COH	Coahuila
COL	Colima
DUR	Durango
EMEX	Estado de México
GRO	Guerrero
GTO	Guanajuato
HID	Hidalgo
JAL	Jalisco
MICH	Michoacán
MOR	Morelos
NAY	Nayarit
NL	Nuevo Léon
OAX	Oaxaca
PUEB	Puebla
QROO	Quintana Roo
QUER	Querétaro
SIN	Sinaloa
SLP	San Luis Potosí
SON	Sonora
TAB	Tabasco
TAM	Tamaulipas
TLAX	Tlaxcala
VER	Veracruz
YUC	Yucatán
ZAC	Zacatecas

India	
Label	Province
AP	Andhra Pradesh
AR	Arunachal Pradesh
AS	Assam
BR	Bihar
CT	Chhattisgarh
DL	Delhi
GA	Goa
GJ	Gujarat
HP	Himachal Pradesh
HR	Haryana
JH	Jharkhand
JK	Jammu and Kashmir
KA	Karnataka
KL	Kerala
MH	Maharashtra
ML	Meghalaya
MN	Manipur
MP	Madhya Pradesh
MZ	Mizoram
NL	Nagaland
OR	Odisha
PB	Punjab
PY	Puducherry
RJ	Rajasthan
SK	Sikkim
TN	Tamil Nadu
TR	Tripura
UP	Uttar Pradesh
UT	Uttarakhand
WB	West Bengal

A.2 Main Institutional Data Sources by Country

The operationalizations and institutional data sources of the main variables used in the analyses presented in Chapters 3, 5, 6, and 7 are outlined below. All academic sources are correctly identified in the corpus of the thesis and listed in the references section. Most of the institutional information is publicly available online. In some instances, however, I had to file information requests to get access to or be able to find data.

Table A.2: Main Variables, Operationalization, and Sources

	Dependent Variable	Main Independent Variable	Main Intervening Variable	Controls
	Subnational Democracy	GDP per capita	Labor Unrest	Population Size
Operationalization	Vanhanen's Index of Democracy	Log of GDP per capita in USD PPP	Yearly share of either strikes or labor court proceedings	Log of total population
	Sources			
Argentina	Dirección Nacional Electoral and Andy Tow's Electoral Atlas	Ministry of Production, Ministry of the Interior, INDEC and CIAP	Ministry of Labor, Pegoraro (1979), Korzeniewicz (1993), and McGuire (1996)	INDEC, ECLAL, RedFIE and Knoema Data
Brazil	Superior Electoral Court and IPEA	IBGE and IPEA	Superior Labor Court	IPEA and IBGE
Mexico	National and local electoral institutes and CIDAC	INEGI, CONAPO, CEFP	INEGI, STPyS	INEGI and CONAPO
	Controls			
	Inequality	Intergovernmental Transfers	Habituation	Diffusion
Operationalization	Gini Coefficient	Log of FFT per capita in USD PPP	Time elapsed since national democratic transition (years)	Lagged average of the democracy index of neighbouring states
	Sources			
Argentina	Ministry of the Interior and Fossati (2002)	Ministry of Economy	Compiled by the author on the basis of the dependent variable	Compiled by the author on the basis of the dependent variable
Brazil	IPEA	Ministry of the Economy and IBGE		
Mexico	CONEVAL, CONAPO, and IMCO	INEGI and SHCP		

Table A.3: Main Institutional Sources of Data

Argentina	Brazil	Mexico	India	International	Academic
Centro de Investigación en Administración Pública de la Universidad de Buenos Aires (CIAP)	Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE)	Centro de Estudios de Finanzas Públicas de la Cámara de Diputados (CEFP)	Reserve Bank of India (RBI)	Economic Commision for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)	Varieties of Democracy Project
Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INDEC)	Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA)	Centro de Investigación para el Desarrollo, A.C. (CIDAC)		International Monetary Fund (IMF)	HUMAN Survey Project
Andy Tow's Electoral Atlas	Ministerio de Fazenda	Consejo Nacional de Población (CONAPO)		World Bank (WB)	Polity IV Project
Ministerio de Finanzas	Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE)	Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social (CONEVAL)		International Labor Organization (ILO)	The Maddison Historical Statistics Project
Red Federal de Información Educativa (RedFIE)	Tribunal Superior do Trabalho (TST)	Instituto Nacional Electoral (INE)			
Ministerio de Producción		Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI)			
Ministerio del Interior, Obras Públicas y Vivienda		Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (SHCP)			
Ministerio del Trabajo, Empleo, y Seguridad Social (MTEySS)		Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social (STyPS)			

A.3 The Quantitative Empirical Approach

This section discusses the quantitative empirical approach of the research in three stages. First, I discuss the model and the estimation strategy. I then present an overview of the commands used to conduct and assess the regression analyses presented in this thesis. Third, I briefly discuss multiple imputation and present a missingness map of the main dataset of this project. This appendix then concludes by showing the descriptive statistics of the core variables of the thesis, as well as by displaying the tables of the regression results for Chapter 6 and 7.

A.3.1 Model Selection

Most of the datasets used in this project have an *unbalanced short panel* structure, with multiple observations for each subnational unit nested into their corresponding countries. Following best econometric practice, my starting point is always a simple linear model. Formally, let subnational democracy of state i in time t be the outcome of interest D_{it} and let $X_n^{'}$ be the vector of covariates set out as independent variables. The linear model can then be described as:

$$D_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_n x_n^{'} + e_{it}$$

In this set up the intercept α_i is an unobserved "unit effect", β_n are the set of estimands for each covariate and e_{it} is the error term. The three most common approaches for panel data analysis are: *Pooled* analysis, Random, and Fixed effects. Selecting which model to use implies balancing the consistency and efficiency of estimates. The former alludes to bias, that is, the accuracy or the degree to which the estimate approaches the *true* value. The latter entails the extent to which the estimate is efficient across samples —i.e. how much it would vary if the same analysis were conducted using a different sample of the same population.

Statisticians and econometricians alike have different preferences regarding this variance *vs* bias trade-off and consequently advice on this matter while abundant, is in some instances contradictory[1]. In what follows I briefly try to clarify the conundrum. The *pooled* model assumes that the unit effect is identical for all cases and treats them as pertaining to a single population. Formally this implies that $\alpha_i = \alpha \forall i$. This assumption can be problematic in the context of this project given that the units under examination are provinces from different countries. Moreover, Clark and Linzer (2015) show that, when compared to their random and fixed effects counter parts, pooled models usually underperform in both consistency and efficiency.

The unit effects are said to be "random" when assumed to be drawn from a distribution with mean μ_α and overall variance σ_α^2 such that $\alpha_i \sim N(\mu_\alpha, \sigma_\alpha^2)$. This overall variance can in turn be interpreted as a weigh of both *within* and *between* group variation such that $\sigma_\alpha^2 \approx \sigma_w^2 + \sigma_b^2$. Thus, Random Effects (RE) models assume not that the unit effects are equal given a single population, but rather that they are drawn from a similar distribution which is itself estimated from the data.

For its part, the Fixed Effects (FE) approach uses a different α_i for each unit. That is, it adds a dummy-variable for each i. In contrast with RE, this implies that the unit effect varies across groups but not within them. It also implies that these effects are "unmodeled" (Bafumi and Gelman 2007) given that they are assumed to follow a distribution such that $\alpha_i \sim N(\mu_\alpha, \infty)$. From this discussion, it should be evident that in the case of the pooled model, the variance of α is assumed to be zero.

In sum, to clearly distinguish between these models and to stress how they differ in their treatment of the unobserved unit specific effect in its relation to the error term, in Table A.4 I rearrange the linear equation in three different ways.

A close observation of the equations suggests that if t is sufficiently large, random effects converge to their fixed counterpart[2]. The equations also clarify the key distinction between the random and the fixed approach: the former assumes that there is no correlation between the unit specific effect and the covariates while the latter does not (Greene 2012). One of the main consequences is that the random

[1] The discussion presented below is informed by the work of Beck and Katz (1995), Discroll and Kraay (1998), Beck (2001), Wooldridge (2002), Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004), Hoechle (2007), Allison (2009), Angrist and Pischke (2009), Clark and Linzer (2015), Bell and Jones (2015), Gailmard (2014) and King and Roberts (2015).

[2] Increased observations of units through time cause $\sigma_\alpha^2 \to \infty$

Table A.4: Model Alternatives for Panel Data

Model	Equation	Unit Effect Distribution
Pooled:	$D_{it} = \alpha + \beta_n x_{it}^{'} + e_{it}$	$\sigma_\alpha^2 = 0$
Random Effects	$D_{it} = \beta_n x_{it}^{'} + (\alpha_i + e_{it})$	$\alpha_i \sim N(\mu_\alpha, \sigma_\alpha^2)$ where $\sigma_\alpha^2 \approx \sigma_w^2 + \sigma_b^2$
Fixed Effects	$D_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_n x_{it}^{'} + e_{it}$	$\alpha_i \sim N(\mu_\alpha, \infty)$

effect approach implies no confounding due to omitted variable w. In the fixed effect framework, any such w is absorbed by the i dummies as long as it is time invariant[3].

In addition to dealing with the unobserved unit effect, identifying how best to estimate the standard errors of the coefficients is a key step of model specification. In conventional regression analysis, the error terms are assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d). This assumption is seldom satisfied, particularly in panel data contexts. The most common issues are heteroskedasticity and various forms of error term correlation. In order to account for these issues, scholars suggest the use of robust and clustered standard errors[4].

Just as with model selection, King and Roberts (2015) highlight the importance of discussing differences in results obtained from using any given approach to standard error estimation. Given the myriad of alternatives, for completeness, when presenting regression analyses —whether within the main project or in this appendix— I always strive to show the results from different specification alternatives.

A.3.2 Difference in Differences

In Chapter 5 I used difference-in-differences to ascertain the causal effect of colonial roles. Here, I expound the rationale and the assumptions behind diff-in-diff. Borrowing the notation from Lee and Kang (2006), to introduce diff-in-diff we can think of two regions $r = 0$ or $r = 1$ only one of which is given treatment at some

[3]It should also be evident that, when using fixed effects, coefficients for time invariant variables cannot be estimated for they are perfectly collinear with the unit dummies.

[4]Cameron and Miller (2015) argue that estimated this way, "errors in different time periods for a given individual (e.g., person or firm) may be correlated, while model errors for different individuals are assumed to be uncorrelated" (Cameron and Miller 2015, 318). In the context of this research clustering occurs at the state level.

point between time a and time b. The responses or outcomes for any individual i can then be expressed as y_{ia} and y_{ib}. Under this context, the temporal effects can be estimated by $E(y_{ib} - y_{ia}|r = 0)$. Similarly, $E(y_{ib} - y_{ia}|r = 1)$ would include both the time and the treatment effects. Then, the diff-in-diff estimate is:

$$E(y_b|r = 1) - E(y_a|r = 1) - E(y_b|r = 0) - E(y_b|r = 0)$$

In the first difference we eliminate the unit-specific effect, and then we difference the differences to get our estimate of treatment. For simplicity, note that here the subscript i has been omitted under the *iid* assumption.

Estimates in difference in differences rely on three core assumptions: First, the allocation of treatment should not be determined by the outcome. Second, the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA), which entails that "each unit received the same size dose [of treatment], [with] no spillovers" (Cunningham 2021,140). Third, diff-in-diff estimates rely on the the parallel trends assumption.

Given the historical scope of treatment in this context, it is hard to see how outcomes —contemporary levels of economic development— could have influenced the assignment of treatment —playing either a central, peripheral, or semi—peripheral role during the early Iberian colonial crucible. Empirically, it is safe to say that this assumption is satisfied. In practice, however, perhaps the only way in which this assumption could be violated is if I had consciously (or unconsciously) let my understanding of current provincial fortunes influence my scoring procedure. However, as stated in Chapter 5, I only used historical sources to generate my score, and while doing so, I consciously and judiciously avoided introducing any subjective bias into my assessment. Ultimately, the *true* test here would be replication.

SUTVA, for its part, entails two things: On the one hand, it asks that units receive a homogeneous dose of treatment. On the other hand, it implies no treatment externalities. This second component of SUTVA is less problematic than the first. Given the technology and communications available at the time, and considering the nature of the terrain, I argue it is safe to say that historically, this second component of SUTVA is (at least partially) satisfied.



Figure A.1: Hypothetical Parallel Trends: An Example with Simulated Data

Nonetheless, when it comes to the first component, in the context of this project it is hard to measure and assess the *homogeneity* of treatment itself. On the one hand, for example, we could attempt to obtain estimates for the number of Spaniards and Portuguese conquistadors that colonized and inhabited each province early on. However, even if we were to do so, a critical observer could still highlight that colonizers from distinct regions of the Iberian peninsula had each a distinct take on mercantilism. Alternatively, another sharp reader might suggest that there are considerable differences in the nature of colonization even within the period I here consider the 'early colonial crucible' (1500-1699). In this sense, we cannot say that this second component of SUTVA can be either empirically or logically satisfied.

Lastly, as Angrist and Pischke (2015) put it, the *fate* of diff-in-diff estimates hinges on another, rather more critical assumption: parallel trends. This assumption can be summed as the informed belief "that in the absence of treatment, treatment and control group outcomes would indeed move in parallel" (Angrist and Pischke 2015, 204). In the context of this project the parallel trends assumption means that prior to 1700, the provinces of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico had relatively similar patterns of economic development. Ideally, we would want to observe something close to what is portrayed in Figure A.1. Here, I simulated data to purposefully show what parallel trends between units before the divergence of the 1700s would hypothetically look like. Sadly, to the best of my knowledge, there is no data available that would allow us to do a thorough assessment of this assumption.

Although the coefficients displayed in Chapter 5 show the expected theoretical signs, and do achieve significance once we used imputed data, that both the SUTVA and the parallel trends assumptions are not thoroughly satisfied —mostly because we do not have the data to adequately address them— warns against interpreting the results from the diff-in-diff estimation in a deterministic fashion. For further transparency, in the next section I present the key software and commands used to generate and assess my regression analyses.

A.3.3 Estimation Commands and Regression Diagnostics

Before discussing the logic behind multiple imputation, here I present the software and the corresponding commands used to produce and assess the quantitative results presented throughout this project.

Software and Commands Used to Generate Estimates and Visuals

Step	Description	Software	Command
Estimation	OLS regression	Stata 17	regress
			xtpcse
	Random Effects		xtreg, re robust cluster
	Fixed Effects		xtreg, fe robust cluster
			xtscc, fe
	Jackknife		jknife
	Bootstrap		bootstrap, rep() seed()
Graphs	Predicted Probabilities		margins
			marginsplot
	Rest of Graphs	R	ggplot
Figures	Diagrams	draw.io	n/a

Different Commands Used to Guide Statistical Analyses

Step		Description	Hypothesis	Test	Software	Command
Regression (OLS) Diagnostics	Omitted Variables	Examines if there are omitted, non-linear, variables missing in the regression model using non-linear combinatios of the independent variables (ovtest) or the predicted values (linktest).	H_o = Model has no omitted variables	Ramsey (1969) Pregibon (1980)		ovtest linktest
	Multicollinearity	Assess whether or not two or more variables are highly correlated. The VIF can be interpreted as the multiplicative effect of a variable on the variance.	If $VIF_{X'} > 4$ regressor are collinear	Variance Inflation Factor		vif
	Linearity and Functional Form	Visual examination of the function describing the relationship between the covariates and the dependent variable.		Visual assessment		acprplot
	Outliers	Visual examination of observations with leverage and large errors.		Visual assessment	Stata 17	lvr2plot dfbeta
	Normality of Residuals	Examines if OLS residuals are normally distributed.	H_o = Residuals are normally distributed	Visual assessment Shapiro-Wilk (1965)		qnorm swilk
	Heteroskedasticity	Test whether residuals are differently distributed for different values of the dependent variable.	H_o = Variance of residuals is constant.	Breusch-Pagan (1979)		hettest
Selecting Estimation Procedure	Variance of Unit Effect	Check if the variance of the unit effect is constant across cases.	H_o = Variance of unit effect is constant.	Breusch-Pagan (1980)	Stata 17	xttest0
	Unit Effect: Random or Fixed	Performs Hausman's (1978) test to examine if the unobserved unit effect is best modeled as random or fixed. This test can also be interpreted as I) a check on whether the within or the between variance dominates the data or II) a check on whether the consistency-efficiency trade-off is significant.	H_o = RE estimates are consistent.	Hausman (1978)		hausman
	Over Identification of RE	Tests if the regressors are uncorrelated with the error term.	H_o = RE estimates are consistent.	Sargan (1958)-Hansen (1982)		xtoverid
	Time Fixed Effects	Examine if the coefficient for the year dummies are jointly zero.	$H_o = \sum \beta Year_t = 0$			testparm
Examining residuals when using FE model	Serial Correlation	Examines if residuals are correlated through time.	H_o = No serial correlation.	Breusch (1979)-Godfrey (1978)	R	pbgtest
	Cross-Sectional Dependence	Checks whether the residuals are correlated within and between groups.	H_o = No cross-sectional dependence.	Breusch-Pagan (1980)	R	pcdtest
	Heteroskedasticity	Test whether residuals are differently distributed for different values of the dependent variable.	H_o = Variance of residuals is constant.		Stata 17	xttest3
	Stationarity	Examines whether *schocks* —i.e. Extreme values of the DV—- change its overall trend or if the process is stationary, meaning that after shocks, it reverts to its mean —i.e. Its equilibrium.	H_o = Data is not stationary.	Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test (1979)	R	adf.test

A.3.4 Multiple Imputation

Collecting the independent variables for the states and provinces of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico proved to be particularly challenging. As Honaker, King and Blackwell (2011) underscore, "[m]issing data is a ubiquitous problem in social science" (Honaker, King and Blackwell 2011, 1) and this project is no exception. In the context of regression analysis, *listwise* deletion accentuates the *missingness* issue.

To try and circumvent the problem, I used the Amelia II R package. Under the assumption that data is *missing at random*, Amelia uses a boostrapped expectation maximization algorithm (EMB) to estimate *m* complete data sets. Each imputed value is drawn from a distribution that is conditioned by observed data.

Borrowing the notation from King et.al. (2001), formally: Let β_i be the estimand of the variable of interest i and q_j the coefficient obtained of running a regression $j = 1 \ldots m$ times. Then: $\beta_i = \frac{\sum q_j}{m}$. To *diagnose missingness* I map the core datasets used in this project. I then show figures that visually explore the performance of the multiple imputation of the pre-colonial health index used in Chapter 5.

More specifically, Figures A.2 and A.3 display the missingness maps of the main datasets used in this thesis. Then, looking specifically at the pre-colonial health index used in Chapter 5, the top graph of Figure A.4 shows the density of the imputed and the observed data. For its part, the graph on the bottom of Figure A.4 plots the predicted vs the observed values of this variable. Points closer to the 45 degree line indicate *good fit*.



Figure A.2: Missingness Map of Main Control Variables of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico



Figure A.3: Missingness Maps for Key Data Used in Chapter 5 and 7



Figure A.4: Pre-Colonial Health Index: Observed vs Imputed Values

A.4 Summary Statistics

Below I present: First, the descriptive statistics for the main variables used in this project. For completeness, the summary tables are followed by the ones that fully unpack the panel structure of the data by displaying the within, between, and overall variation.

Table A.5: Descriptive Stats. for Main Subnat. Vars. of Chapters 3, 5, and 6

Variable		Argentina		Brazil		Mexico		India	
		Pre-Third Wave	Post-Third Wave	Pre-Third Wave	Post-Third Wave	Pre-Third Wave	Post-Third Wave	Pre-1990	Post-1990
Year	Mean	1946	2002	1953	2002	1970	2004	1982	2003
	Std. Dev.	18.01	11.42	6	10.22	4.88	8.92	3.93	7.67
	Min	1916	1983	1945	1985	1964	1988	1977	1990
	Max	1973	2019	1962	2018	1976	2019	1989	2015
	No. Obvs.	184	232	162	239	94	170	68	133
Participation	Mean	22.01	51.81	11.58	42.85	28.02	34.88	33.58	42.49
	Std. Dev.	13.68	7.59	9.53	8.08	5.43	8.86	6.59	7.27
	Min	1.14	13.95	0	22.47	16.91	13.46	12.02	14.53
	Max	54.59	68.28	50.88	58.77	40.42	71.97	46.14	58.43
Contestation	Mean	46.47	52.78	NA	48.18	8.09	49.08	54.93	61.17
	Std. Dev.	14.38	12.41	NA	12.1	7.07	11.8	15.33	11.44
	Min	13.4	14.54	NA	16.92	0.01	4.9	0	0
	Max	79.6	96.46	NA	95.7	33.33	77.62	80.65	79.82
Subnational Democracy Index	Mean	10.88	27.38	11.58	20.89	2.19	17.72	18.64	26.08
	Std. Dev.	8.7	7.49	9.53	7.01	2.05	7.24	7.06	6.23
	Min	0.57	6.72	0	4.28	0.01	0.92	0	0
	Max	38.08	54.87	50.88	40.57	11.59	44.88	34.7	38.17
Total Population (log)	Mean	12.71	13.52	13.21	15.12	13.14	14.65	16.52	16.77
	Std. Dev.	1.33	1.03	1.7	1.1	1.24	0.78	1.7	1.59
	Min	9	11.15	6.22	12.23	8.8	12.77	12.5	13.01
	Max	15.97	16.63	17.03	17.6	16.03	16.55	18.66	19.13
Econ. Dev. [Either GDP per capita (log) or Alt. Econ. Dev. Measure]	Mean	0.24	7.79	0.27	8.71	0.33	9.1	5.85	6.82
	Std. Dev.	0.29	1.97	0.27	0.61	0.2	0.48	0.3	0.65
	Min	0	3.76	0	7.42	0.06	8.22	5.24	5.42
	Max	1	10.5	1	10.63	1	10.51	6.6	8.49

Table A.6: Descriptive Stats. for Main Subnat. Vars. of Chapters 3 and 7

Variable		Argentina	Brazil	Mexico		India	
Labor Unrest (yearly mean share)	Mean	4.25	6.53	3.3	Labor Unrest (yearly mean share)	Mean	3.94
	Std. Dev.	5.04	8.38	6.14		Std. Dev.	7.95
	Min	0	0.03	0		Min	0.01
	Max	28.6	44.85	53.6		Max	39.54
Alternative Index of Subnat. Democracy	Mean	0.48	0.31	0.48	Alternative Index of Subnat. Democracy	Mean	0.98
	Std. Dev.	0.19	0.17	0.3		Std. Dev.	0.71
	Min	0	0	0		Min	0
	Max	1	1	1		Max	2
Federal Fiscal Transfers (log)	Mean	6.86	4.25	7.84	Coast Dummy	Mean	0.15
	Std. Dev.	0.77	1.68	0.98		Std. Dev.	0.23
	Min	4.29	0.64	5.31		Min	0
	Max	8.32	7.33	9.42		Max	0.79
Gini Coefficient	Mean	0.43	0.56	0.47	Mean Temperature	Mean	24.97
	Std. Dev.	0.04	0.05	0.06		Std. Dev.	3.09
	Min	0.35	0.42	0.35		Min	17.08
	Max	0.57	0.67	0.62		Max	30.15
Habituation (years)	Mean	16.23	16.23	15.35	Mean Area (log)	Mean	11.68
	Std. Dev.	10.27	9.07	8.28		Std. Dev.	1.14
	Min	0.06	1.95	0.49		Min	7.31
	Max	32.08	29.97	28.51		Max	13
Diffusion	Mean	26.83	19.59	17.13	Mean Rainfall (log)	Mean	7.12
	Std. Dev.	5.16	4.97	5.97		Std. Dev.	0.44
	Min	15.02	8.27	5.13		Min	6.41
	Max	54.87	34.67	40.39		Max	8.01

Table A.7: Descriptive Statistics for Main Subnat. Variables of Chapter 5

Variable	No. Obvs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
Colonial Roles	58	0.59	0.38	0	1
Standardized Econ. Dev. Measure	58	0	0.99	0	1.51
Density of Native Population (log)	58	0.19	0.35	0.01	1.59
Good Econ. Activity	58	0.52	0.5	0	1
Bad Econ. Activity	58	0.45	0.5	0	1
Ugly Income Activity	58	0.45	0.5	0	1
Malaria	58	1.73	1.87	0	5.66
Inv. Distance to Coast	58	0.89	0.07	0.74	0.97
Average Temperature (Celsius)	58	21.84	4.5	12.2	26.95
Altitude (km)	58	0.83	0.91	0	2.4
Rainfall	58	1.46	0.81	0.46	3.75
Ruggedness	58	10.75	10.47	0.43	36.43
Area (log)	58	10.77	1.48	7.31	14.04
Landlock Dummy	58	0.31	0.47	0	1
Rivers	58	3.14	0.68	1.24	4.18

Argentina Post-Third Wave Data: Panel Summary

Argentina Post-Third Wave Data						
Variable		Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max	Observations
Year	overall	2001	11	1983	2019.0	N = 232
	between		1.62	1998.75	2007.3	n = 24
	within		11.33	1982.98	2019.4	T-bar = 9.66667
Contestation	overall	52.78	12.41	14.54	96.5	N = 232
	between		5.01	38.92	66.8	n = 24
	within		11.37	21.86	98.3	T-bar = 9.66667
Participation	overall	51.81	7.59	13.95	68.3	N = 232
	between		4.99	44.13	63.2	n = 24
	within		5.89	21.63	67.3	T-bar = 9.66667
Subnational Democracy Index	overall	27.37	7.49	6.72	54.9	N = 232
	between		4.38	17.89	38.3	n = 24
	within		6.17	6.71	48.8	T-bar = 9.66667
Total Population (log)	overall	13.52	1.03	11.15	16.6	N = 208
	between		1.05	11.55	16.4	n = 24
	within		0.19	13.08	14.6	T-bar = 8.66667
GDP per capita (log)	overall	7.79	1.97	3.76	10.5	N = 136
	between		0.92	6.75	10.4	n = 24
	within		1.80	4.42	10.0	T = 5.66667
Federal Fiscal Transfers (log)	overall	6.86	0.77	4.29	8.3	N = 92
	between		0.67	4.93	8.1	n = 23
	within		0.34	6.18	7.6	T = 4
Gini Coefficient	overall	0.43	0.04	0.35	0.6	N = 92
	between		0.02	0.39	0.5	n = 24
	within		0.04	0.36	0.5	T-bar = 3.83333
Diffusion	overall	26.83	5.16	15.02	54.9	N = 171
	between		3.74	20.85	38.0	n = 24
	within		3.56	16.16	43.7	T-bar = 7.125
Habituation (years)	overall	16.23	10.27	0.06	32.1	N = 208
	between		1.68	13.21	22.4	n = 24
	within		10.17	0.22	33.1	T-bar = 8.66667
Alternative Index of Subnat. Democracy	overall	0.48	0.19	0.00	1.0	N = 129
	between		0.15	0.13	0.8	n = 24
	within		0.13	0.05	0.8	T = 5.375
Labor Unrest (yearly mean share)	overall	4.25	5.04	0.00	28.6	N = 102
	between		4.11	0.86	15.3	n = 24
	within		2.82	-4.08	20.6	T-bar = 4.25

Brazil Post-Third Wave Data: Panel Summary

Brazil Post-Third Wave						
Variable		Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max	Observations
Year	overall	2002	10.22	1986	2018	N = 239
	between		0.72	2002.00	2004.00	n = 27
	within		10.20	1986.27	2018.27	T-bar = 8.85185
Contestation	overall	48.18	12.10	16.92	95.70	N = 239
	between		6.82	38.93	66.95	n = 27
	within		10.08	21.35	76.93	T-bar = 8.85185
Participation	overall	42.85	8.08	22.47	58.77	N = 239
	between		4.78	34.06	52.51	n = 27
	within		6.57	26.44	53.60	T-bar = 8.85185
Subnational Democracy Index	overall	20.89	7.01	4.28	40.57	N = 239
	between		4.43	14.63	30.08	n = 27
	within		5.50	5.76	34.00	T-bar = 8.85185
Total Population (log)	overall	15.12	1.10	12.23	17.60	N = 212
	between		1.11	12.71	17.41	n = 27
	within		0.18	14.56	15.55	T-bar = 7.85185
GDP per capita (log)	overall	8.71	0.61	7.42	10.63	N = 185
	between		0.53	7.91	10.25	n = 27
	within		0.34	7.99	9.46	T = 6.85185
Federal Fiscal Transfers (log)	overall	4.25	1.67	-0.64	7.33	N = 135
	between		1.31	1.05	6.50	n = 27
	within		1.06	0.72	5.98	T = 5
Gini Coefficient	overall	0.56	0.05	0.42	0.67	N = 157
	between		0.03	0.49	0.61	n = 27
	within		0.04	0.46	0.63	T-bar = 5.81481
Diffusion	overall	19.59	4.97	8.27	34.67	N = 185
	between		2.68	15.71	26.55	n = 27
	within		4.20	8.54	33.14	T-bar = 6.85185
Habituation (years)	overall	16.23	9.07	1.95	29.97	N = 212
	between		0.72	15.96	17.97	n = 27
	within		9.05	2.22	30.24	T-bar = 7.85185
Alternative Index of Subnat. Democracy	overall	0.31	0.17	0.00	1.00	N = 185
	between		0.10	0.20	0.58	n = 27
	within		0.14	0.02	0.77	T = 6.85185
Labor Unrest (yearly mean share)	overall	6.53	8.38	0.03	44.85	N = 124
	between		6.74	0.70	29.10	n = 24
	within		3.53	-5.54	22.29	T-bar = 5.16667

Mexico Post-Third Wave Data: Panel Summary

Mexico Post-Third Wave						
Variable		Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max	Observations
Year	overall	2004	8.9	1988	2019	N = 170
	between		1.0	2003.0	2006.6	n = 32
	within		8.9	1988.9	2019.1	T-bar = 5.3125
Contestation	overall	49.08	11.8	4.9	77.6	N = 170
	between		3.9	41.3	59.0	n = 32
	within		11.1	10.4	72.3	T-bar = 5.3125
Participation	overall	34.87	8.9	13.5	72.0	N = 170
	between		5.3	25.5	52.8	n = 32
	within		7.2	12.5	62.3	T-bar = 5.3125
Subnational Democracy Index	overall	17.72	7.2	0.9	44.9	N = 170
	between		3.3	12.7	27.7	n = 32
	within		6.5	0.2	40.1	T-bar = 5.3125
Total Population (log)	overall	14.65	0.8	12.8	16.5	N = 156
	between		0.8	13.2	16.4	n = 32
	within		0.2	14.1	15.1	T-bar = 4.875
GDP per capita (log)	overall	9.10	0.5	8.2	10.5	N = 91
	between		0.4	8.5	10.2	n = 32
	within		0.3	8.5	10.2	T-bar = 2.84375
Federal Fiscal Transfers (log)	overall	7.84	1.0	5.3	9.4	N = 88
	between		0.3	7.1	8.3	n = 31
	within		0.9	5.9	9.8	T-bar = 2.83871
Gini Coefficient	overall	0.47	0.1	0.3	0.6	N = 45
	between		0.0	0.3	0.5	n = 32
	within		0.0	0.4	0.6	T-bar = 1.40625
Diffusion	overall	17.13	6.0	5.1	40.4	N = 82
	between		4.6	9.2	30.1	n = 25
	within		4.5	6.4	33.1	T-bar = 3.28
Habituation (years)	overall	15.35	8.3	0.5	28.5	N = 156
	between		1.5	12.5	17.1	n = 32
	within		8.2	3.1	27.4	T-bar = 4.875
Alternative Index of Subnat. Democracy	overall	0.48	0.3	0.0	1.0	N = 39
	between		0.3	0.0	1.0	n = 31
	within		0.1	0.2	0.8	T = 1.25806
Labor Unrest (yearly mean share)	overall	3.30	6.1	0.0	53.6	N = 248
	between		4.3	0.2	20.9	n = 32
	within		4.4	-14.8	36.0	T-bar = 7.75

India Post-1990 Data: Panel Summary

India Post-1990						
Variable		Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max	Observations
Year	overall	2003	7.67	1990	2015	N = 133
	between		3.90	2000.00	2011.00	n = 30
	within		7.04	1991.03	2015.20	T-bar = 4.43333
Contestation	overall	61.17	11.44	0.00	79.82	N = 133
	between		8.22	38.49	75.00	n = 30
	within		8.11	22.68	99.70	T-bar = 4.43333
Participation	overall	42.49	7.27	14.52	58.43	N = 133
	between		6.59	30.77	56.21	n = 30
	within		4.78	17.16	53.80	T-bar = 4.43333
Subnational	overall	26.08	6.23	0.00	38.17	N = 133
Democracy	between		5.20	13.45	38.17	n = 30
Index	within		4.16	9.98	40.61	T-bar = 4.43333
Alternative Index	overall	0.98	0.71	0.00	2.00	N = 171
of Subnat.	between		0.42	0.00	1.75	n = 30
Democracy	within		0.60	-0.51	2.33	T-bar = 5.7
Total	overall	16.77	1.59	13.01	19.13	N = 133
Population	between		1.65	13.21	18.90	n = 30
(log)	within		0.13	16.43	17.05	T-bar = 4.43333
GDP per capita (log)	overall	6.82	0.65	5.42	8.49	N = 114
	between		0.53	5.56	8.23	n = 30
	within		0.42	6.06	7.89	T-bar = 3.8
Labor Unrest yearly mean share)	overall	3.94	7.95	0.01	39.54	N = 28
	between		9.17	0.14	39.54	n = 20
	within		0.83	1.93	5.94	T-bar = 1.4
Tax	overall	0.83	0.49	0.00	2.21	N = 133
Autonomy	between		0.48	0.05	1.77	n = 30
Ratio	within		0.10	0.36	1.26	T-bar = 4.43333

Argentina and Brazil Pre-Third Wave Data: Panel Summary

Argentina Pre-Third Wave Data						
Variable		Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max	Observations
Year	overall	1946	18.01	1916	1973	N = 184
	between		9.66	1939.11	1964.67	n = 24
	within		16.30	1919.47	1976.47	T = 7.66667
Contestation	overall	46.47	14.38	13.40	79.60	N = 184
	between		4.54	33.43	52.47	n = 24
	within		13.66	11.99	75.72	T = 7.66667
Participation	overall	22.01	13.68	1.14	54.69	N = 184
	between		7.04	9.92	42.58	n = 22
	within		12.62	0.72	54.38	T = 6.22727
Subnational Democracy Index	overall	10.88	8.70	0.57	38.08	N = 184
	between		4.22	5.12	25.08	n = 22
	within		8.09	-0.13	35.47	T = 6.22727
Total Population (log)	overall	12.71	1.33	9.00	15.97	N = 576
	between		1.35	9.29	15.64	n = 24
	within		0.17	11.64	13.11	T = 24
Alt. Econ. Dev. Measure	overall	0.24	0.29	0.00	1.00	N = 576
	between		0.18	0.08	0.77	n = 24
	within		0.23	-1.80	1.16	T = 24

Brazil Pre-Third Wave						
Variable		Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max	Observations
Year	overall	1953	6.01	1945	1962	N = 162
	between		0.00	1952.67	1952.67	n = 27
	within		6.01	1945.00	1962.00	T = 6
Contestation	overall	.	.	.	.	N = 0
	between		.	.	.	n = 0
	within		.	.	.	T = .
Participation	overall	11.58	9.53	0.00	50.88	N = 162
	between		7.90	0.00	37.78	n = 27
	within		5.50	-8.25	24.67	T = 6
Subnational Democracy Index	overall	11.58	9.53	0.00	50.88	N = 162
	between		7.90	0.00	37.78	n = 27
	within		5.50	-8.25	24.67	T = 6
Total Population (log)	overall	13.21	1.70	6.22	17.03	N = 2843
	between		1.52	9.71	15.55	n = 27
	within		0.81	9.72	15.69	T-bar = 105.296
Alt. Econ. Dev. Measure	overall	0.27	0.27	0.00	1.00	N = 676
	between		0.26	0.01	0.93	n = 26
	within		0.10	-0.43	1.10	T = 26

Mexico and India Pre-Third Wave and Pre-1990 Data: Panel Summary

Mexico Pre-Third Wave						
Variable		Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max	Observations
Year	overall	1970	4.90	1964	1976	N = 94
	between		0.74	1970.00	1973.00	n = 32
	within		4.86	1964.13	1976.13	T = 2.9375
Contestation	overall	8.09	7.07	0.01	33.33	N = 94
	between		5.84	0.68	25.40	n = 32
	within		4.05	-3.79	18.34	T = 2.9375
Participation	overall	28.02	5.43	16.91	40.41	N = 94
	between		3.91	20.56	36.27	n = 32
	within		3.77	18.60	41.09	T = 2.9375
Subnational Democracy Index	overall	2.19	2.05	0.00	11.59	N = 94
	between		1.69	0.19	8.11	n = 32
	within		1.17	-0.83	5.68	T = 2.9375
Total Population (log)	overall	13.14	1.23	8.79	16.03	N = 2976
	between		1.05	10.23	14.57	n = 32
	within		0.68	10.38	15.84	T = 93
Alt. Econ. Dev. Measure	overall	0.33	0.20	0.06	1.00	N = 2848
	between		0.18	0.12	0.94	n = 32
	within		0.10	-0.10	0.98	T = 89

India Pre-1990 & Geographic Variables						
Variable		Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max	Observations
Year	overall	1982	3.93	1977	1989	N = 68
	between		1.24	1980.00	1984.33	n = 21
	within		3.74	1976.25	1988.50	T = 3.2381
Contestation	overall	54.93	15.33	0.00	80.65	N = 68
	between		14.28	0.00	77.26	n = 21
	within		6.56	35.12	78.14	T = 3.2381
Participation	overall	33.58	6.59	12.02	46.14	N = 68
	between		5.61	24.14	41.07	n = 21
	within		3.70	18.97	44.45	T = 3.2381
Subnational Democracy Index	overall	18.64	7.06	0.00	34.70	N = 68
	between		6.54	0.00	30.50	n = 21
	within		2.97	9.65	26.58	T = 3.2381
Total Population (log)	overall	16.52	1.70	12.59	18.66	N = 68
	between		1.66	12.74	18.52	n = 21
	within		0.09	16.33	16.71	T = 3.2381
GDP per capita (log)	overall	5.85	0.30	5.24	6.60	N = 61
	between		0.29	5.31	6.50	n = 20
	within		0.12	5.53	6.19	T = 3.05
Direct British Colony	overall	1.11	0.88	0.00	2.00	N = 57
	between		0.90	0.00	2.00	n = 18
	within		0.00	1.11	1.11	T = 3.16667
Coast Dummy	overall	0.15	0.23	0.00	0.79	N = 57
	between		0.22	0.00	0.79	n = 18
	within		0.00	0.15	0.15	T = 3.16667
Mean Temperature (C)	overall	24.97	3.09	17.08	30.15	N = 57
	between		3.16	17.08	30.15	n = 18
	within		0.00	24.97	24.97	T = 3.16667
Mean Area (log)	overall	11.68	1.14	7.30	13.00233	N = 57
	between		1.32	7.30	13.00233	n = 18
	within		0.00	11.68	11.67717	T = 3.16667
Mean Rainfall (log)	overall	7.12	0.44	6.40	8.011604	N = 57
	between		0.46	6.40	8.011604	n = 18
	within		0.00	7.12	7.120132	T = 3.16667

A.5 Ancillary Regression Results

In the quantitative component of Chapter 6, I presented an analysis of labor unrest across Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. Here, the regression results are presented in full in Table A.8. Similarly, when exploring the Indian case in Chapter 7, I presented two figures mapping the effect of colonial roles on subnational levels of economic development and labor unrest in the South East Asian giant. Here, the regression results are presented in full in Table A.9 and Table A.10. As mentioned in the main analyses, although most of the coefficients fail to reach conventional levels of significance, in each instance they do have the expected sign. Further research, as well as more and better data, is needed to thoroughly explore causality in this regard.

Table A.8: Chap. 6 Regression Results: Colonial Roles and Labor Unrest

DV: Labor Unrest	Argentina	Brazil	Mexico	Pooled
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Semi-Periphery	-0.931	0.330	-2.353**	-2.000
	(1.07)	(7.44)	(1.13)	(1.82)
Mercantilist Centers	-1.593	-7.546	-0.684	-1.894
	(0.99)	(6.33)	(1.34)	(1.43)
Population Period Mean (log)	3.343***	3.566	0.00000240***	0.00000214***
	(0.77)	(13.47)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-36.69***	0	0	4.941***
	(9.12)	(.)	(.)	(1.31)
N	102	29	152	283
R-squared	0.52	0.3	0.35	0.3

All models include country and period fixed effects.
Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses.
The reference category for colonial role is early peripheries.
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Table A.9: Chap. 7 Regression Results: Colonial Roles and Economic Dev. in India

DV: GDP	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Hybrid British Control	0.164	0.0128	0.0583	0.0305	-0.0384	-0.0287
	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Direct British Control	0.104	0.167	0.357**	0.287	0.260	0.215
	(0.22)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.26)	(0.23)	(0.24)
Population (log)		-0.233**	-0.273***	-0.221	-0.170	-0.191
		(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.12)
Coast Dummy			0.669**	0.558	0.756**	0.520
			(0.30)	(0.45)	(0.39)	(0.46)
Area (mean)				-0.000000466	-0.00000110	-0.00000110
				(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Rain mm (mean)					-0.000349***	-0.000299***
					(0.00)	(0.00)
Avg. Temperature						0.0224
						(0.02)
Constant	5.679***	9.591***	10.11***	9.350***	9.073***	8.866***
	(0.10)	(1.75)	(1.47)	(2.40)	(1.86)	(1.87)
N	139	139	139	139	139	139
R-squared	0.75	0.8	0.83	0.83	0.89	0.89

All models include year fixed effects. Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses.
The reference category for colonial role is incomplete British control.
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01

Table A.10: Chap. 7 Regression Results: Colonial Roles and Labor Unrest in India

DV: Labor Unrest	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Hybrid British Control	2.560	4.575	9.218	5.456	5.735
	(7.66)	(8.14)	(20.73)	(21.30)	(21.20)
Direct British Control	5.237	4.271	11.86	5.122	5.778
	(8.29)	(7.83)	(28.92)	(31.10)	(30.97)
Population (log)		2.798	1.848	4.875	4.538
		(2.67)	(2.31)	(5.01)	(5.44)
Coast Dummy			10.99	1.540	3.088
			(37.02)	(41.27)	(40.56)
Area (mean)				-0.0000228	-0.0000232
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Rain mm (mean)					-0.00166
					(0.01)
Constant	0.314**	-49.99	-33.28	-80.08	-72.31
	(0.15)	(48.08)	(40.88)	(83.87)	(93.22)
N	23	23	23	23	23
R-squared	0.63	0.65	0.66	0.67	0.68

All models include year fixed effects.
Th reference category for colonial role is incomplete British control.
Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses.
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

"Science is the systematic classification of experience".

— George Henry Lewes (1877)

B
Appendix B

The identification of the role each Argentinian, Brazilian, and Mexican province played during the early mercantilist stages of the Iberian colonial crucible is perhaps one of the most important empirical contributions of this thesis. Moreover, the classification of colonial roles lies at the core of both the quantitative and qualitative analyses presented throughout this project. For these reasons, in this second appendix I further unpack the scoring procedure.

To do so, I start by revisiting my theoretical starting point and the simplifying assumptions I make to facilitate the classification of the 83 subnational units of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. I then reintroduce the ('preliminary') colonial role score used in the corpus of this project. This time, I not only display the numerical scores, but also map them so as to allow the reader to conduct a quick visual examination. I then list the main sources used to generate this score.

Afterwards, in the third section of this appendix I unpack the assessment of the two relevant biogeographic factors: mineral wealth and resource extraction as well as the pre-Columbian demographic configuration of each province. In the fourth section I show the 'expected' colonial role obtained through Mahoney's (2010) logical formulations using FSQCA. Here, I compare that 'expected' set with the 'preliminary' one introduced earlier. The appendix concludes with the complementary regression results showing that the main findings of Chapter 5 hold regardless of which colonial role score is used.

As mentioned in the concluding chapter of this thesis, there is still plenty of space to expand and refine the classification presented and used in this project. My expectation is that scholars find this appendix both clarifying and engaging.

B.1 Revisiting and Mapping Subnational Colonial Roles

In Chapter 5 I unpacked the distinct colonial roles highlighted by Mahoney's (2010) framework and I contributed by exploring the distinct routes leading to each one of them. Critically, I highlighted that while for other colonial roles there are multiple combinations or paths, there is only one plausible combination of factors leading to centrality under the mercantilist ethos of the pre-1700 Iberian colonial crucible. In this sense, I acknowledged that, *ad minimum*, we need to ascertain whether provincial trajectories were 'kicked off' during the early Habsburg mercantilist era. Importantly, I claimed that being a mercantilist center was a sufficient condition of contemporary economic underdevelopment.

There are two assumptions underpinning these propositions:

1. Early peripheries are more likely to become liberal centers. Alternatively, mercantilist centers are less likely to be liberal carryovers.

   Crucially,

2. Early peripheries are the only regions that can become 'pure' liberal nodes.

Armed with these theoretical underpinnings, and on the basis of national and subnational secondary historical sources, I built a 'preliminary' classification of mercantilist colonial roles. Here, Table B.1 reproduces the results presented first in Table 5.1 of Chapter 5. Recall, I assigned peripheries a 0, semi-peripheries were given a value of 0.5, and colonial centers are identified with a 1.

Table B.1: Subnational Roles in Early Colonial Life

	Total	Share		Total	Share		Total	Share
Periphery (0)	43	51.81%	**Semi-Periphery (0.5)**	22	26.51%	**Center (1)**	18	21.69%
	Buenos Aires	0		Acre	0		Aguascalientes	0.5
	Buenos Aires (CA)	0		Alagoas	0.5		Baja California	0
	Catamarca	1		Amapá	0		Caja California Sur	0
	Chaco	0		Amazonas	0		Campeche	1
	Chubut	0		Bahia	1		Chiapas	0
	Córdoba	0.5		Ceara	0.5		Chihuahua	0
	Corrientes	0		DF	0		Ciudad de México	1
	Entre Ríos	0		Espírito Santo	0.5		Coahuila	0
	Formosa	0		Goias	0		Colima	0.5
Argentina	Jujuy	1	**Brazil**	Maranhao	0	**Mexico**	Durango	0.5
	La Pampa	0		Mato Grosso	0		Estado de México	1
Mode	La Rioja	0.5	Mode	Mato Grosso do Sul	0	Mode	Guanajuato	1
0	Mendoza	0	0	Minas Gerais	0	0.5	Guerrero	1
	Misiones	0		Para	0		Hidalgo	1
Periphery	Neuquén	0	Periphery	Parana	0	Periphery	Jalisco	0.5
66.67%	Río Negro	0	62.96%	Paríba	0.5	31.25%	Michoacán	0.5
	Salta	1		Pernambuco	1		Morelos	1
Semi-Periphery	San Juan	0.5	Semi-Periphery	Piaui	0.5	Semi-Periphery	Nayarit	0
12.50%	San Luis	0	29.63%	Rio de Janeiro	0.5	34.38%	Nuevo León	0
	Santa Cruz	0		Rio Grande do Norte	0.5		Oaxaca	0.5
Center	Santa Fe	0	Center	Rio Grande do Sul	0	Center	Puebla	1
20.83%	Santiago del Estero	1	7.41%	Rondonia	0	34.38%	Querétaro	0.5
	Tierra del Fuego	0		Roraima	0		Quintana Roo	0.5
	Tucumán	1		Santa Catarina	0		San Luis Potosí	0.5
				São Paulo	0		Sinaloa	0
				Sergipe	0.5		Sonora	0
				Tocantins	0		Tabasco	0.5
							Tamaulipas	0
							Tlaxcala	0.5
							Veracruz	1
							Yucatán	1
							Zacatecas	1

My identification of colonial roles is based on the exegesis of secondary sources exploring the history of the countries and the provinces under analysis. No contemporary information or data were used to perform the assessment.
Key: 0 - peripheral role, 0.5 - semi-periphery, 1 - central role.

To enhance the assessment of this score, below I present three choropleth maps, one for each of the countries under examination. In the top panel of Figure B.1 we can see that, for the Argentinian cases, colonial centers are heavily concentrated around the northwest, a territory considered to have been under a comparatively higher influence of the Incas first, and of the Spanish crown second via its connection to Upper Peru and the mining conducted in Potosí. The mid panel of Figure B.1 shows that for Brazil, Bahia and Pernambuco are the two centers, with other coastal states marked as semi-peripheries. For the South American giant, the inland and southern regions are identified as peripheries. Lastly, the bottom panel of Figure B.1 shows that in the Mexican case, colonial centrality concentrates in the geographical center of the country, in and around Tenochtitlán, the capital of the then Aztec Empire. In contrast, most of the the Mexican north is identified as peripheral.



Figure B.1: Mapping Early Mercantilist Colonial Roles

B.1.1 Identifying the Sources

As highlighted in Chapter 5, to identify provincial colonial roles, I relied on the exegesis of secondary historical sources. For transparency, I here list the most important ones used per province by country. When conducting historical analysis, it is quite common for scholars to distinguish between references and the specific bibliography used as historical secondary sources. Following this convention, it is important to note that while some of the sources listed here are also included in the references, others are not. Specifically, I included in the references *only* that material which I directly quote or which is directly alluded to in the corpus of this thesis. The rest of the materials listed here can be considered *background* sources which is why they are *only* and *separately* listed here.

Table B.2: Main Regional and National Secondary Historical Sources

Latin American Colonial Experience	- Burkholder, Mark A, and Lyman L Johnson. (2018). *Colonial Latin America.* 10th ed. Cambridge University Press. - Restall, Mathew, and Kris Lane. (2019). *Latin America in Colonial Times.* Cambridge University Press. - Adams, R. and M. MacLeod (eds.) (2000). *The Cambridge History of the Native Peoples of the Americas.* Cambridge University Press.
National Colonial Experiences	
Argentina	- Luna, Félix. (1982). *Buenos Aires y el país.* Stockero. - Luna, Félix. (1992). *Fracturas y continuidades en la historia Argentina.* Stockero. - Luna, Félix. (2000). *A Short History of the Argentinians.* Santiago del Estero: Booket.
Brazil	- Fausto, Boris, and Sergio Fausto. (2014). *A Concise History of Brazil.* Cambridge University Press.
Mexico	- Kuntz, Sandra, ed. (2015). *Historia mínima de la economía Mexicana 1519-2010.* Mexico City: El Colegio de México. - Velázquez García, Erik, Enrique Nalda, Pablo Escalante Gonzalbo, et al. (2010). *Nueva historia general de México.* México: El Colegio de México.

Table B.3: Main Subnational Secondary Historical Sources for Argentina

Buenos Aires	Ortega, Exequiel C. (1978). *Historia de Buenos Aires: su panorama de 460 años 1516-1978.* Plus Ultra.
Catamarca	Bazán, Armando R. (1996). *Historia de Catamarca.* Plus Ultra.
Chaco	Maeder, Ernesto J.A. (1996). *Historia del Chaco.* Plus Ultra.
Chubut	Dumrauf, Clemente (1992). *Historia de Chubut.* Plus Ultra.
Córdoba	Bischoff, Efrain U. (1977). *Historia de Córdoba*: *Cuatro Siglos.* Plus Ultra.
Corrientes	Castello, Antonio E. (1984). *Historia de Corrientes.* Plus Ultra.
Entre Ríos	Bosch, Beatriz (1978). *Historia de Entre Rios 1520-1969.* Plus Ultra.
Formosa	Maeder, Ernesto J.A. (1996). *Historia del Chaco.* Plus Ultra.
Jujuy	Bidondo, Emilio A. (1980). *Historia de Jujuy (1535-1950).* Plus Ultra.
La Pampa	Gaignard, Romain (1989). *La Pampa Argentina: ocupación, poblamiento, explotación: de la conquista a la crisis mundial (1550-1930).* Ediciones Solar.
La Rioja	Bazán, Armando (1979). *Historia de La Rioja.* Plus Ultra.
Mendoza	Martínez Santos, Pedro (1979). *Historia de Mendoza.* Plus Ultra.
Misiones	Barreyro, Julio G. (1979). *Breve Historia de Misiones.* Plus Ultra.
Neuquén	Bandieri, F, Favaro, O and Morinelli, M. (1992). *Historia de Neuquén.* Plus Ultra.
Río Negro	Floria Navarro, Pedro, Nicoletti, Maria A. (2001). *Río Negro: mil voces en una historia.* Manuscritos Libros.
Salta	Figueroa, Fernando R. (1977). *Historia y geografía de Salta: tierra gaucha.* Plus Ultra.
San Juan	Videla, Horacio (1984). *Historia de San Juan: (1551-1982).* Plus Ultra.
San Luis	Nuñez, Urbano (1980). *Historia de San Luis.* Plus Ultra.
Santa Cruz	Topcic, Osvaldo D. (1998). *Historia de la provincia de Santa Cruz: Desde el retiro de los hielos patagónicos hasta el ocaso de los Tehuelches.* Centro de Estudios Históricos.
Santa Fe	Gianello, Leoncio (1978). *Historia de Santa Fe.* Plus Ultra.
Santiago del Estero	Lascano Alen, Luis C. (1992). *Historia de Santiago del Estero.* Plus Ultra.
Tierra del Fuego	Canclini, Arnoldo (1981). *Historia de Tierra del Fuego.* Plus Ultra.
Tucumán	Páez de la Torre, Carlos (1987). *Historia de Tucumán.* Plus Ultra.

As mentioned in Chapter 5, most of these sources belong to the special collection *Colección Historia de Nuestras Provincias* edited by Plus Ultra.

Table B.4: Main Subnational Secondary Historical Sources for Brazil

Acre	Stokes, Charles E Jr. (1968). *The Background and History of the Independent State of Acre 1899-1900.* Master thesis. University of Texas. (Avaliable online).
Alagoas	Brandão, Moreno (1909). *Historia de Alagôas.* Artes Graphicas e pautaçao. (Avaliable online).
Amapá	Filocreão, Antonio Sérgio (2015). *Amapá.* Serie Estudos Estados Brasileiros. Fundaçao Perseu Abramo.
Amazonas	Loureiro, Antonio José Souto (1978). *Síntese da história do Amazonas.* Impr. Oficial do Estado do Amazonas.
Bahia	Tavares, Luís Henrique Dias (2001). *História da Bahia.* UFBA-Unesp.
Ceará	Girão, Raimundo (1962). *Pequena história do Ceará.* Instituto do Ceará.
DF	Miragaya, Júlio (2014). *Distrito Federal.* Serie Estudos Estados Brasileiros. Fundaçao Perseu Abramo.
Espírito Santo	Teixeira de Oliveira, José (1975). *Historia do Estado do Espírito Santo.* SERGRAF do IBGE.
Goias	Assis, Wilson Rocha Fernandes (2018). *Estudos de História de Goiás.* Palvrear Livros.
Maranhao	Studart Filho, Carlos (1960). *O antigo Estado do Maranhão e suas capitanias* feudais. Imprensa Universitaria do Ceará.
Mato Grosso	De Jesus, Maria Nauk (2012). A capitania do Mato Grosso: história, historiografia e fontes. *Revista Territórios & Fronteiras* 5(2), 93-113.
Mato Grosso do Sul	Couto de Oliveira, Benícia (ed.). (2013). *Histórias que (re)contam história: análise do povoamento, colonizaçao e reforma agrária do sul de Mato Grosso do Sul.* UFDG.
Minas Gerais	Bergad, Laird W. (1999). *Slavery and the Demographic and Economic History of Minas Gerais, Brazil 1720-1888.* Cambridge University Press.
Pará	Petit, Pere (1999). História regional, política, economia e territorio no Estado do Pará. *Páginas de Historia* 3(1).
Paraná	Priori, Angelo, Pomari, L.R., Amâncio, S.M. and Veronica K. Ipólito (2012). *História do Paraná: séculos XIX e XX.* UEM-Scielo. (Available online).
Paraíba	Freire de Carvalho e Silva (2014). *Paraíba.* Serie Estudos Estados Brasileiros. Fundaçao Perseu Abramo.
Pernambuco	Monteiro Neto, Aristides and R. de Oliveira Vergolino (2014). *Pernambuco.* Serie Estudos Estados Brasileiros. Fundaçao Perseu Abramo.
Piauí	Medeiros, Antonio José (2014). *Piauí.* Serie Estudos Estados Brasileiros. Fundaçao Perseu Abramo.
Rio de Janeiro	Enders, Armelle (2015). *A história do Rio de Janeiro.* Gryphus.
Rio Grande do Norte	Pombo, Rocha (2019). *História do estado do Rio Grande do Norte.* UFRN. (Available online).
Rio Grande do Sul	Pesavento, Sandra Jatahy (1985). *História Do Rio Grande Do Sul.* Porto Alegre: Mercado Aberto. Maestri, Mário (2010). *Breve História Do Rio Grande Do Sul: Da Pré-História Aos Dias Atuais.* Editora da Universidade de Passo Fundo.
Rondônia	Moret, Artur de Souza (2014). *Rondônia.* Serie Estudos Estados Brasileiros. Fundaçao Perseu Abramo.
Roraima	Galdino Almeida, Lúcio Keury, da Silva E.V. and Adryane, Gorayeb (2017). Espaço e tempo na amazônia setentrional: a gênese da formaçao territorial do estado de Roraima. *Revista Internacional de Direito Ambiental e Políticas Públicas* 9, 133-146.
Santa Catarina	Sachet, Celestino (1997). *Santa Catarina: 100 años de história.* Século Catarinense.
São Paulo	Luna, Francisco and H. Klein (2018). *An Economic and demographic History of São Paulo 1850-1950.* Standford University Press.
Sergipe	Passos Subrinho, Josue M. (1983). *História econômica de Sergipe: 1850-1930.* Master thesis. Universidad Estadual de Campinas.
Tocantins	Pereira de Brito, Eliseu (2011). A dualidade da economia regional: um estudo aplicado no estado do Tocantis, Brasil. *Revista geográfica de América Central* II Semestre, 1-12.

While some of the sources listed here belong to the series *Serie Estudos Estados Brasileiros* edited by the *Fundaçao Perseu Abramo*, to explore the history of Brazilian units I had to draw on more varied and heterogeneous material than the one I used for the analysis of Argentinian and Mexican provinces.

Table B.5: Main Subnational Secondary Historical Sources for Mexico

Aguascalientes	Gómez Serrano, Jesús and F.J. Delgado (2011). *Aguascalientes: Historia breve.* El Colegio de México.
Baja California	León-Portilla, Miguel and M. Piñera Ramírez (2011). *Baja California: Historia breve.* El Colegio de México.
Caja California Sur	Río, Ignacio del and M.E. Altable Fernández (2010). *Baja California Sur: Historia breve.* El Colegio de México.
Campeche	Inurreta Gantús, F., Ferraéz, Alcalá C., and L. Villanueva (2011). *Campeche: Historia breve.* El Colegio de México.
Chiapas	Zebadúa, Emilio (2010). *Chiapas: Historia breve.* El Colegio de México.
Chihuahua	Aguilar Aboites, Luis (2010). *Chihuahua: Historia breve.* El Colegio de México.
Ciudad de México	Gruzinski, Serge (2004). *La Ciudad de México: una historia.* México: FCE.
Coahuila	Rodríguez, Martha, Santoscoy M. E., Gutiérrez, L. E. and F. J. Cepeda (2010). *Coahuila: Historia breve.* El Colegio de México.
Colima	Romero de Solís, José Miguel and P. Machuca Chávez (2011). *Colima: Historia breve.* El Colegio de México.
Durango	Pacheco Rojas, José de la Cruz (2010). *Durango: Historia Breve.* El Colegio de México.
Estado de México	Ortega Jarquín, María Teresa, Grijalva Miño, Manuel and C. Cadena Inostroza (2010). *Estado de México: Historia breve.* El Colegio de México.
Guanajuato	Blanco, Mónica, Parra, A., E. Ruiz Medrano (2010). *Guanajuato: Historia breve.* El Colegio de México.
Guerrero	Illades, Carlos (2011). *Guerrero: Historia breve.* El Colegio de México.
Hidalgo	Ruiz de la Barrera, Rocío (2011). *Hidalgo: Historia breve.* El Colegio de México.
Jalisco	Muría, José María (2011). *Jalisco: Historia breve.* El Colegio de México.
Michoacán	Serrnao Ochoa, Álvaro and G. Sánchez Díaz (2012). *Michoacán: Historia breve.* El Colegio de México.
Morelos	Chávez Hernández, Alicia (2011). *Morelos: Historia breve.* El Colegio de México.
Nayarit	Valdez Contreras, Mario (2011). *Nayarit: Historia breve.* El Colegio de México.
Nuevo León	Garza Cavazos, Israel and I. Ortega Ridaura (2010). *Nuevo León: Historia breve.* El Colegio de México.
Oaxaca	Romero, María de los Ángeles, Sánchez, C., Mendoza, J.E., and J. Bailón, et al. (2011). *Oaxaca: Historia breve.* El Colegio de México.
Puebla	Vanegas Lomelí, Leonardo (2011). *Puebla: Historia breve.* El Colegio de México.
Querétaro	Ugarte García, Marta Eugenia (2010). *Querétaro: Historia breve.* El Colegio de México.
Quintana Roo	Viliesid Careaga, Lorena and A. Higuera Bonfil (2010). *Quintana Roo: Historia breve. El Colegio de México.*
San Luis Potosí	Monroy, María Isabel and T.C. Unna (2011). *San Luis Potosí: Historia breve.* El Colegio de México.
Sinaloa	Noriega Ortega, Sergio (2010). *Sinaloa: Historia breve.* El Colegio de México.
Sonora	Bay Almada, Ignacio (2010). *Sonora: Historia breve.* El Colegio de México.
Tabasco	Assad Martínez, Carlos (2011). *Tabasco: Historia breve.* El Colegio de México.
Tamaulipas	Pérez Herrera, Octavio (2010). *Tamaulipas: Historia breve.* El Colegio de México.
Tlaxcala	Garcini Rendón, Ricardo (2010). *Tlaxcala: Historia breve.* El Colegio de México.
Veracruz	Domínguez Blázquez, Carmen, Nández, Y.C. and J.M. Velasco Toro (2010). *Veracruz: Historia breve.* El Colegio de México.
Yucatán	Quezada, Sergio (2011). *Yucatán: Historia breve.* El Colegio de México.
Zacatecas	Olague, Jesús Flores, Vega Mercedes de, Ficker Kuntz, Sandra and L. del Alizal (2010). *Zacatecas: Historia breve.* El Colegio de México.

The 'preliminary' classification of colonial roles is generated directly from my interpretation and comparative assessment of the historical secondary sources listed above. For transparency and completeness, I also recorded scores for each one of the relevant biogeographic factors. In Section B.2, Table B.6 presents the scores assigned to each province corresponding to mineral wealth and resource extraction for the pre-1700 period. In Section B.3, Tables B.7 through B.9 show the scores corresponding to the pre-Columbian demographic configuration of each subnational unit.

B.2 Identifying Mineral Wealth and Resource Extraction

Table B.6: Mineral and Resource Extraction in Argentinian, Brazilian, and Mexican Subnational Units During the Early Colonial Crucible

Argentina		Brazil	(a)	(b)	Mexico	
Buenos Aires	0	Acre	0	0	Aguascalientes	0
Catamarca	0	Alagoas	0	0.5	Baja California	0
Chaco	0	Amapá	0	0	Baja California Sur	0
Chubut	0	Amazonas	0	0	Campeche	0
Córdoba	0	Bahia	0	1	Chiapas	0
Corrientes	0	Ceará	0	0.5	Chihuahua	0
Entre Ríos	0	Distrito Federal	0	0	Ciudad de México	0
Formosa	0	Espírito Santo	0	0.5	Coahuila	0
Jujuy	1	Goiás	0	0	Colima	0.5
La Pampa	0	Maranhão	0	0	Durango	0.5
La Rioja	0.5	Mato Grosso	0	0	Estado de México	1
Mendoza	0	Mato Grosso do Sul	0	0	Guanajuato	1
Misiones	0	Minas Gerais	0	0	Guerrero	1
Neuquén	0	Pará	0	0	Hidalgo	1
Río Negro	0	Paraíba	0	0.5	Jalisco	0
Salta	0	Paraná	0	0	Michoacán	0
San Juan	0	Pernambuco	0	1	Morelos	0
San Luis	0	Piauí	0	0.5	Nayarit	0
Santa Cruz	0	Rio de Janerio	0	0.5	Nuevo León	0
Santa Fe	0	Rio Grande do Norte	0	0.5	Oaxaca	1
Santiago del Estero	0	Rio Grande do Sul	0	0	Puebla	0
Tierra del Fuego	0	Rondônia	0	0	Querétaro	0
Tucumán	0	Roraima	0	0	Quintana Roo	0
		Santa Catarina	0	0	San Luis Potosí	0.5
		São Paulo	0	0	Sinaloa	0
		Sergipe	0	0.5	Sonora	0
		Tocantins	0	0	Tabasco	0
					Tamaulipas	0
					Tlaxcala	0
					Veracruz	0
					Yucatán	0
					Zacatecas	1

Scores refer specifically to the mining of gold, silver, or copper during the pre-1700 period.
For Brazil, the score in column (b) reflects sugarcane mills rather than mining.
No clear record of significant resource extraction found — 0.
Moderate resource extraction activity — 0.5
Abundant resource extraction activity — 1.

B.3 Identifying Pre-Columbian Demographic Configuration

Table B.7: Argentina's Subnational Pre-Columbian Demographic Configuration

State	G1_name	G1_score	G2_name	G2_score	G3_name	G3_score	G4_name	G4_score	G5_name	G5_score	Indigenous Mean Score	Indigenous Logical Score	Proximity
Buenos Aires	Guaranies	0.5	Quilmes	0.5	Acalianes	0.5	Querandies	0.25	Chanas	0.25	0.40	0.5	0
Catamarca	Diaguita	0.5	Kolla	0.5							0.50	0.5	1
Chaco	Mocovi	0.25	Toba	0.25	Lules	0.5					0.33	0.5	0
Chubut	Mapuche	0.5	Tehuelches	0.25							0.38	0.5	0
Córdoba	Comechingones	0.5									0.50	0.5	0.5
Corrientes	Guaranies	0.5	Guaycurues	0.25	Chanas	0.25					0.33	0.5	0
Entre Ríos	Guaranies	0.5	Charrua	0.25	Chanas	0.25					0.33	0.5	0
Formosa	Toba	0.25	Wichi	0.25							0.25	0.25	0
Jujuy	Chichas	0.5	Apatamas	0.5	Omaguacas	0.5	Kolla	0.5	Diaguita	0.5	0.50	0.5	1
La Pampa	Rankulche	0.25									0.25	0.25	0
La Rioja	Capayanes	0.5	Diaguita	0.5	Kolla	0.5					0.50	0.5	0.5
Mendoza	Agrelo	0.5	Pehuenches	0.25							0.38	0.5	0
Misiones	Guaranies	0.5									0.50	0.5	0
Neuquén	Pehuenches	0.25	Mapuche	0.5							0.38	0.5	0
Río Negro	Poyas	0.25	Puelches	0.25							0.25	0.25	0
Salta	Pulares Inca	0.5	Calchaquies	0.5	Diaguita	0.5	Kolla	0.5	Atacama	0.5	0.50	0.5	1
San Juan	Capayanes	0.5									0.50	0.5	0.5
San Luis	Comechigones	0.5	Capayanes	0.5							0.50	0.5	0
Santa Cruz	Tehuelches	0.25	Mapuche	0.5							0.38	0.5	0
Santa Fe	Chanas	0.25	Mbeguas	0.25	Mocovi	0.25					0.25	0.25	0
Santiago del Estero	Tonokotés	0.5	Diaguita	0.5	Juríes Inca	0.5	Lules	0.5			0.50	0.5	1
Tierra del Fuego	Tehuelches	0.25	Yámanas	0.25	alacalufes	0.25					0.25	0.25	0
Tucumán	Diaguita	0.5	Tonokotés	0.5	Lules	0.5					0.50	0.5	1

The 'Indigenous Mean Score' is estimated with the average value for each state. The 'Indigenous Logical Score' is the maximum value obtained by any of the identified indigenous groups. The 'Proximity' indicator signals whether the territory of the corresponding province was under the influence of a mayor complex indigenous society.

Table B.8: Brazil's Subnational Pre-Columbian Demographic Configuration

State	G1_name	G1_score	G2_name	G2_score	G3_name	G3_score	G4_name	G4_score	Indigenous Mean Score	Indigenous Logical Score	Proximity
Acre	Arawak Pano	0.25	Manchineri	0.25	Jaminawa	0.25			0.25	0.25	0
Alagoas	Caete	0.5							0.50	0.5	0
Amapá	Tupi	0.5	Karib	0.25					0.38	0.5	0
Amazonas	Arawak Pano	0.25							0.25	0.25	0
Bahia	Tupi	0.5	Tupiniquim	0.5	Puri-corcado	0.25	Caigang	0.25	0.38	0.5	0
Ceará	Potiguara	0.25	Tapeba	0.5					0.38	0.5	0
Distrito Federal	Guato	0.25	Bororo	0.25	Cayapo	0.25	Jê	0.5	0.31	0.5	0
Espírito Santo	Botocudo	0.25	Camacán	0.5					0.38	0.5	0
Goiás	Guato	0.25	Bororo	0.25	Cayapo	0.25	Jê	0.5	0.31	0.5	0
Maranhão	Potiguara	0.25	Jê	0.5					0.38	0.5	0
Mato Grosso	Guato	0.25	Bororo	0.25	Cayapo	0.25	Jê	0.5	0.31	0.5	0
Mato Grosso do Sul	Guayaki	0.25	Jê	0.5					0.38	0.5	0
Minas Gerais	Caigang	0.25	Cayapo	0.25					0.25	0.25	0
Pará	Tupi	0.5	Tremembe	0.25	Karib	0.25			0.33	0.5	0
Paraíba	Potiguara	0.25	Guato	0.25	Bororo	0.25	Cayapo	0.25	0.25	0.25	0
Paraná	Tupiniquim	0.5	Caigang	0.25					0.38	0.5	0
Pernambuco	Caete	0.5							0.50	0.5	0
Piauí	Potiguara	0.25							0.25	0.25	0
Rio de Janerio	Tupi	0.5							0.50	0.5	0
Rio Grande do Norte	Potiguara	0.25	Tapeba	0.5					0.38	0.5	0
Rio Grande do Sul	Caigang	0.25	Guarani	0.5	Charrua	0.25			0.33	0.5	0
Rondônia	Tupi	0.5	Guato	0.25	Guayaki	0.25			0.33	0.5	0
Roraima	Tupi	0.5	Karib	0.25					0.38	0.5	0
Santa Catarina	Carijo	0.5	Caigang	0.25	Guarani	0.5	Charrua	0.25	0.38	0.5	0
São Paulo	Tamoio	0.5	Tupiniquim	0.5	Caigang	0.25			0.42	0.5	0
Sergipe	Caete	0.5	Tupi	0.5					0.50	0.5	0
Tocantins	Guayaki	0.25	Jê	0.5					0.38	0.5	0

The 'Indigenous Mean Score' is estimated with the average value for each state. The 'Indigenous Logical Score' is the maximum value obtained by any of the identified indigenous groups. The 'Proximity' indicator signals whether the territory of the corresponding province was under the influence of a mayor complex indigenous society.

Table B.9: Mexico's Subnational Pre-Columbian Demographic Configuration

State	G1_name	G1_score	G2_name	G2_score	G3_name	G3_score	G4_name	G4_score	G5_name	G5_score	Indigenous Mean Score	Indigenous Logical Score	Proximity
Aguascalientes	Chichimecas	0.25	Guamares	0.25	Caxcanes	0.25	Zacatecos	0.25			0.25	0.25	0.5
Baja California	Cucapás	0.25	Kumiais	0.25	Paipais	0.25	Kiliwas	0.25			0.25	0.25	0
Baja California Sur	Guaycuras	0.25	Pericúes	0.25	Paipais	0.25	Kiliwas	0.25			0.25	0.25	0
Campeche	Mayas	0.75	Olmecas	1	Mayas	0.75					0.83	1	1
Chiapas	Tzeltales Maya	0.75	Chol Maya	0.75							0.75	0.75	0.5
Chihuahua	Paquimés	0.25									0.25	0.25	0
Ciudad de México	Aztec/Mexica	1									1.00	1	1
Coahuila	Bobosarigames	0.25	Chichimecas	0.25	Borrados	0.25					0.25	0.25	0
Colima	Tarascos	0.75	Tlaxcaltecas	0.75	Purepechas	0.25					0.58	0.75	0.5
Durango	Chalchihuita	0.25	Tepehuanes	0.25	Tarahumaras	0.25	Tobosos	0.25			0.25	0.25	0
Estado de México	Otomí	0.75	Mazapa	0.75	Tlatizapan	0.75	Aztec/Mexica	1			0.81	1	1
Guanajuato	Chupicuaro	0.25	Chichimecas	0.5	Chichimecas	0.25	Tarascos	0.75	Aztec/Mexica	1	0.55	0.75	0.5
Guerrero	Olmecas	1	Aztec/Mexica	1	Zapotecas	0.75					0.92	1	1
Hidalgo	Teotihuacanos	1	Toltecas	1	Aztec/Mexica	1					1.00	1	1
Jalisco	Purepechas	0.25									0.25	0.25	0.5
Michoacán	Cuaucomecas	0.5	Nahuas	0.5	Chontales	0.5	Tarascos	0.75			0.56	0.75	0.5
Morelos	Nahuas	0.5	Tlahuicas	0.75	Xochimilcas	0.75	Aztec/Mexica	1			0.75	1	1
Nayarit	Purepechas	0.25	Aztatlan	0.5							0.38	0.5	0
Nuevo León	Chichimecas	0.25	Alazapas	0.25	Huachichiles	0.25					0.25	0.25	0
Oaxaca	Zapotecas	0.75	Mixtecos	0.75	Aztec/Mexica	1					0.83	1	0.5
Puebla	Olmecas	1	Toltecas	1	Aztec/Mexica	1					1.00	1	1
Querétaro	Chichimecas	0.25	Aztec/Mexica	1	Pames	0.25	Otomí	0.75			0.56	1	1
Quintana Roo	Mayas	0.75									0.75	0.75	1
San Luis Potosí	Chichimecas	0.25	Huastecos	0.5	Pames	0.25	Guachichiles	0.25	Guamares	0.25	0.30	0.25	0.5
Sinaloa	Totorames	0.5	Tahues	0.5	Cahitas	0.25	Guasaves	0.25			0.38	0.5	0
Sonora	Patayan	0.5	Huatabampo	0.5	Tarahumaras	0.25	Seris	0.25			0.38	0.5	0
Tabasco	Mayas	0.75									0.75	0.75	0.5
Tamaulipas	Huastecos	0.5	Chichimecas	0.25	Janambres	0.25	Palahuesques	0.25			0.33	0.5	0
Tlaxcala	Olmecas	1	Otomí	0.75	Chichimecas	0.5	Tlaxcaltecas	0.75			0.83	1	1
Veracruz	Huastecos	0.5	Tepehuanes	0.25	Otomí	0.75	Totonacas	1			0.58	1	1
Yucatán	Mayas	0.75									0.75	0.75	1
Zacatecas	Chalchihuites	0.5	Chichimecas	0.25							0.38	0.5	0.5

The 'Indigenous Mean Score' is estimated with the average value for each state. The 'Indigenous Logical Score' is the maximum value obtained by any of the identified indigenous groups.
The 'Proximity' indicator signals whether the territory of the corresponding province was under the influence of a mayor complex indigenous society.

Table B.10: Assessing the Complexity of Pre-Columbian Indigenous Groups

Native Societies			Score
Concentrated Sedentary	Permanently settled, members live in built communities, rely on permanent, intensive agriculture.	Inca, Mexica, Tarascans, Cakchiquel, Quiché	1
Segmented Sedentary	Same as concentrated but no empires or large network of polities at the time of encounter.	Muisca (North Inca), Zapotecs, Mixtecs, Maya (Late period)	0.75
Semi-Sedentary	Partially relied on agriculture, they required hunt and forage. Periodic movement.	Tupi and Taino	0.5
Nomadic	Highly mobile, hunting bands or groups.	Tehuelche (South Argentina)	0.25
None	No identified native group or society		0

Classification built on the basis of Steward (1959) and Francis and Leonard (2010).

As mentioned in Chapter 5, each of the identified indigenous groups was assigned a score according to its 'complexity'. Table B.10 summarizes and exemplifies the rationale behind this scoring exercise.

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B.4 Alternative Classification of Colonial Roles and Complementary Regression Results

Using the scores of the biogeographic resources, I computed an expected 'logical' colonial role classification on the basis of the formulations presented in Section 5.1 of Chapter 5. The results are presented here in Table B.11. As mentioned in the corpus of this thesis, the only discrepancies occur for Chiapas, Oaxaca, Querétaro, Quintana Roo, Tlaxcala, Amazonas, and Acre. These differences are always between semi-peripheries and either centers or peripheries, but never between peripheral and central status. That is, mercantilist centers and peripheries are always clearly identified.

To show that the results of Chapter 5 hold even when using the logically predicted colonial roles, Table B.12 replicates the regression results of Table 5.4. Figure B.2 mimics Figure 5.10 and lastly, Table B.13 echoes the difference-in-differences estimates of Table 5.5.

Table B.11: Comparing Colonial Role Classifications

		'Preliminary Score'	'Logical Score'			'Preliminary Score'	'Logical Score'			'Preliminary Score'	'Logical Score'
	Buenos Aires	0	0		Acre	0	0.5		Aguascalientes	0.5	0.5
	Buenos Aires (CA)	0	0		Alagoas	0.5	0.5		Baja California	0	0
	Catamarca	1	1		Amapá	0	0		Baja California Sur	0	0
	Chaco	0	0		Amazonas	0	0.5		Campeche	1	1
	Chubut	0	0		Bahia	1	1		Chiapas	0	0.5
	Córdoba	0.5	0.5		Ceará	0.5	0.5		Chihuahua	0	0
	Corrientes	0	0		Distrito Federal	0	0		Ciudad de Mexico	1	1
	Entre Ríos	0	0		Espírito Santo	0.5	0.5		Coahuila	0	0
	Formosa	0	0		Goiás	0	0		Colima	0.5	0.5
Argentina	Jujuy	1	1	Brazil	Maranhão	0	0	Mexico	Durango	0.5	0.5
	La Pampa	0	0		Mato Grosso	0	0		Estado de Mexico	1	1
	La Rioja	0.5	0.5		Mato Grosso do Sul	0	0		Guanajuato	1	1
	Mendoza	0	0		Minas Gerais	0	0		Guerrero	1	1
	Misiones	0	0		Pará	0	0		Hidalgo	1	1
	Neuquén	0	0		Paraíba	0.5	0.5		Jalisco	0.5	0.5
	Río Negro	0	0		Paraná	0	0		Michoacan	0.5	0.5
	Salta	1	1		Pernambuco	1	1		Morelos	1	1
	San Juan	0.5	0.5		Piauí	0.5	0.5		Nayarit	0	0
	San Luis	0	0		Rio de Janerio	0.5	0.5		Nuevo Leon	0	0
	Santa Cruz	0	0		Rio Grande do Norte	0.5	0.5		Oaxaca	0.5	1
	Santa Fe	0	0		Rio Grande do Sul	0	0		Puebla	1	1
	Santiago del Estero	1	1		Rondônia	0	0		Queretaro	0.5	1
	Tierra del Fuego	0	0		Roraima	0	0		Quintana Roo	0.5	1
	Tucumán	1	1		Santa Catarina	0	0		San Luis Potosi	0.5	0.5
					São Paulo	0	0		Sinaloa	0	0
					Sergipe	0.5	0.5		Sonora	0	0
					Tocantins	0	0		Tabasco	0.5	0.5
									Tamaulipas	0	0
									Tlaxcala	0.5	1
									Veracruz	1	1
									Yucatan	1	1
									Zacatecas	1	1



Figure B.2: Alternative Colonial Roles and Predicted GDP per capita

Table B.12: Alternative Colonial Roles and Levels of Economic Development

	Dep. Var: GDP per capita 2000 (USD PPP log)				Dep. Var: Average GDP per capita (USD PPP log)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Semi-Periphery	-0.352***	-0.335***	-0.286***	-0.355***	-0.182	-0.442***	-0.340**	-0.412***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.22)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.14)
Early Colonial Center	-0.397***	-0.346***	-0.393***	-0.390***	-0.163	-0.486***	-0.590***	-0.617***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.21)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.14)
'Good' Econ. Activities		-0.0245	-0.0333	0.104		-0.539**	-0.557***	0.0234
		(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)		(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.19)
'Bad' Econ. Activities		-0.387***	-0.469***	-0.386***		-0.446**	-0.618***	-0.136
		(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.12)		(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.20)
'Ugly' Econ. Activities		-0.175	-0.250*	-0.286**		0.247	0.0859	-0.0662
		(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)		(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.19)
Density of Native. Pop. Circa 1492 (log)			0.231**	0.0659			0.521*	0.0270
			(0.10)	(0.15)			(0.29)	(0.27)
Malaria			-0.0952**	-0.0374			-0.198***	-0.120**
			(0.04)	(0.05)			(0.06)	(0.06)
Inv. Distance to Coast				0.819				-1.723
				(0.82)				(1.21)
Average Temperature				-0.00524				-0.0552***
				(0.02)				(0.02)
Altitude				0.0501				-0.0972
				(0.10)				(0.14)
Rainfall (mm)				-0.105				0.00796
				(0.07)				(0.09)
Ruggedness				-0.0109***				-0.0166**
				(0.00)				(0.01)
Area (km2 log)				-0.0432				-0.215***
				(0.04)				(0.05)
Lnadlock Dummy				0.156				0.0806
				(0.13)				(0.19)
Rivers				-0.0589				-0.320***
				(0.09)				(0.10)
Constant	9.301***	9.338***	9.382***	9.469***	8.719***	8.460***	8.553***	14.29***
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(1.37)	(0.13)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(1.63)
N	83	83	83	83	83	83	83	83
R-squared	0.387	0.459	0.516	0.568	-0.013	0.503	0.588	0.734

Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses. The reference category for colonial role is 'Periphery'. Models 1 through 4 have the 2000 subnational GDP per capita in USD PPP as DV and report coefficients of a 'pooled' model. Models 5 through 8 have states' average GDP per capita as DV and report 'between' effects.
All estimations include country fixed effects.
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Table B.13: Alternative Colonial Roles, Pre- and Post-Colonial Development.

Dep. Var: Standardized Measure of Econ. Development		
	(A)	(B)
Semi-Periphery (Pre)	-0.0585	0.267
	(0.48)	(0.17)
Semi-Periphery x Post Dummy	-0.687	-0.926***
	(1.27)	(0.28)
Early Colonial Center (Pre)	-0.391	0.104
	(0.43)	(0.19)
Early Colonial Center x Post Dummy	-0.0649	-0.990***
	(1.06)	(0.34)
Density of Native Pop. Circa 1492 (Pre)	0.314	0.0886
	(0.59)	(0.19)
Density of Native Pop. Circa 1492 x Post Dummy	0.307	0.137
	(1.45)	(0.48)
‘Bad’ Econ. Activity (Pre)		0.285
		(0.29)
‘Bad’ Econ. Activity x Post Dummy		-0.471
		(0.45)
‘Good’ Econ. Activity (Pre)		0.348
		(0.27)
‘Good’ Econ. Activity x Post Dummy		-0.572
		(0.45)
‘Ugly’ Econ. Activity (Pre)		-0.487**
		(0.22)
‘Ugly’ Econ. Activity x Post Dummy		0.872**
		(0.37)
Constant	-8.653	0.958
	(6.80)	(3.80)
N	58	166
R-Squared	0.491	0.679

Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses.
The outcome variable is the standardized measure of development described in Chapter 5.
All models include the geographic controls reported in Table 5.3.
Models also include country-fixed effects and the post-colonization dummy.
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

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