Colonizing the Port City Pusan in Korea: A study of the process of Japanese domination in the urban space of Pusan during the open-port period (1876-1910)

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To my parents
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Note on Romanization Systems

The McCune-Reischauer system is used for Korean; Hepburn system for Japanese; and Pinyin system for Chinese.
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Abstract

This dissertation aims to analyze the transformation of Pusan by examining the social, political, economic, and cultural changes during the open-port period (1876-1910). Prior to annexation, Pusan, as the first open port in Korea, reflected features of the colonial urban development in which alien power achieved and sustained a hegemonic domination on socio-cultural-economic dimensions of people’s lives.

Colonial history in Korea has been divided and moving on parallel lines. The ‘nationalist school’ and the ‘socioeconomic school’ have failed to come together and move us into a deeper understanding of the Japanese colonial period. In order to narrow the gap between the two schools of thought, this thesis suggests looking at ‘colonial modernity’ through the analytical lens of the colonial city of Pusan. The approach examines changes in the social, economic, and cultural life of people rather than through the traditional binary construction of ‘victim versus victimizer’ or ‘colonial repression versus national resistance.’

In particular, I pay close attention to the fact that colonization is a process of imperial expansion by means of colonialists. In the end, the process of colonization in Pusan was a process by which the Japanese settlers expanded in wealth, population, influence, and power. The cluster of factors – enlargement of settlement (living space), the expansion of the economy (economic opportunity), improvement of public enterprises, such as transportation infrastructure, water supply and hygiene
(improving quality of life) – were catalysts for the Japanese settlers to take up
residence in Pusan. Based on the transformation of the urban space of Pusan at this
micro level, I discuss a hierarchy of power relations within the spatial boundary of
Pusan. In other words, I focus on human aspects of these changes rather than on
systemic changes. I attempt to demonstrate how studying a city can offer a useful
category of analysis for the question of ‘modernity’ in Korea.
Introduction: Urbanization of Pusan vs. Colonization of Pusan

Even those who studied only in elementary school for a month know that Pusan is the best port in Chosŏn and more significantly the first open door of Chosŏn. Thus if you have seen Pusan, you have seen the whole of Chosŏn…In this time, I was abruptly surprised as I entered into a street in Pusan. I felt that I have seen the reality of Chosŏn.

Yŏm (first published in 1923) 1987, p. 77. [emphasis added]

After ports were opened in 1876, Korea experienced tremendous changes, such as growth of markets, expansion of urban space, growth of population, establishment of infrastructure, and improvement of life quality and the environment. Since the majority of Japanese settled in cities of Korea, a study of a city is a tool to understand those changes. Moreover, according to King (1976), all social behaviour ‘occurs in space’, often that of a city and ‘physical-spatial variables in the city and the perceptions of them are assumed to have importance for social behaviour’ (p. 3). Thus, in order to crystallize much social behaviour in the past and present, it is crucial to grasp the ‘city’ as a modern form of ‘space.’

Pusan stood at the front line of those changes as the first open port, because Pusan is located on the southeastern coast of the Korean peninsula, close to Japan. Its strategic location was an important factor that propelled the Japanese to settle there in great numbers. One distinctive characteristic of Japanese imperialism was to establish colonies in geographically close areas, like Taiwan and Korea, for defensive reasons, rather than in distant countries for the extraction of primary resources, like the European models. Pusan, together with other open ports, such as Wŏnsan and Inch’ŏn, was also strategic for Japanese economic advantage. Looking from the Korean peninsula, Pusan’s development is a classic example of a colonial city that underwent a transition into
modernity under the impact of foreign settlers. As Hiroshi Hashiya points out, the urbanization in Pusan took place in a colonial context (Hiroshi 2004, pp. 14-15). Though urbanization in Pusan began in the pre-colonial period, the rapid urbanization of Pusan was paralleled by a massive settlement of Japanese. Putting urban space in Pusan at the centre of analysis is necessary to understand those important changes during the open-port period. The study of a city is a study of the focal point of economic, cultural, and political life, because a city is intertwined with the geo-politico-economic-cultural aspects of spaces that are comprehensible in immediate human terms.

Considering these changes, it was not an exaggeration to say that ‘if you have seen Pusan, you have seen the whole of Chosŏn’, as Yŏm Sang-sŏb describes the pivotal position of Pusan after the open-port period. The construction of urban space in Pusan was clearly a process of enormous development; at the same time, its process was initiated by and for the Japanese settlers. For this reason, Pusan’s transformation into a modern city during this period was also a history of colonizing Korea, and Pusan reflected Korea’s ambivalent reception of ‘modernity’. Interestingly, prior to the opening of Korea, Pusan was the only place where Tsushima Japanese could reside in Korea. All diplomatic relations between Tokugawa Japan (and later Meiji Japan) and Chosŏn Korea was via Pusan. Thus, Pusan is an optimum place to examine how the relations of power shifted between Tsushima Japanese and Koreans and between Japanese settlers and Koreans. At the grass-roots level, many Koreans in Pusan witnessed a change of relations with the Japanese or, in other words, they came face-to-face with an ambivalent ‘modernity’.
Within this distinctive trajectory of urbanization in Pusan, I will attempt to delineate relations between Korean and the Japanese settlers at the micro level. This study is not merely an urban history of Korea. Rather, it focuses on power relations in the process of diplomatic-political changes between Japan and Korea in the context of the colonial city Pusan. To examine power relations in an urban space, it is crucial to investigate them from a political perspective, which reflects the changes of the social, economic, and cultural structures. From the political functions in a single city, we can grasp the interrelations between colonizers and the colonized in connection with actual practice. For this reason, it is better to stay at a distance from the political centre of the colony. The economic or commercial centre is a useful space for the analysis of power relations, but too much emphasis on national politics in historical writings leaves us knowing little of the lives of ordinary men and women. We need a balanced view to avoid rendering a ‘people without history’, as Eric Wolf called it. In order to reach an empirical understanding of power relations in a colonial urban space, the colonial city Pusan, which was a commercial centre for Japanese colonialism, offers excellent examples of how power relations were established and evolved. Accordingly, I will examine the ‘visible’ and ‘invisible’ development of the colonial urban space of Pusan in terms of hierarchical power relations within the spatial boundary of Pusan. In doing so, I attempt to demonstrate how studying a city can offer a useful category of analysis for the question of ‘modernity’ in Korea.
I-1. Statement of the Problem

In recent years, there has been a growing interest in ‘modern’ and ‘modernity’ with the advent of ‘post-modernism.’ In order to clarify the theoretical dispute on ‘modernity’ in the Korean context, it is necessary to define ‘modern’ and ‘modernity.’ The question of ‘when modern Korean history began’ cannot be easily answered. Rather, this kind of question has no absolute answer. Any answer would depend on the definition and interpretation of the concept of ‘modern’ and ‘modernity.’ Indeed, there are various interpretations, but most do not fit into the development and civilization of East Asia because, unlike European countries, the process of historical development did not autonomously shift from ancien régime into an industrial society. Rather it was forced from the outside through colonization or semi-colonization.

In general, the concept of modernity was developed in Europe and is often described as meaning the ‘modes of social life or organization which emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards and which subsequently became more or less worldwide in their influence’ (Giddens 1990, p. 1). Giddens (1990) outlines three distinctive characteristics of ‘modernity’ in The Consequences of Modernity: 1) ‘the existence of time separate from space’; 2) ‘social relations removed from immediate contexts’; and 3) ‘a new reflexive approach to knowledge’ (p. 53). Earlier Western thinkers, such as Weber, believed that modernity was uniquely invented in Europe. In recent decades, Western theorists have linked ‘modernity’ to colonialisation. For instance, Balibar emphasizes the role of ‘historical capitalism’ and argues that ‘every modern nation is a product of colonization: it has always been to some degree colonized or colonizing, and sometimes both at the same time’ (1991, p. 89).
However, with the advent of post-modernism, as historians in the West attempted to find a new approach, they have become interested in peripheries or subaltern studies in response to Euro-centric historiography, which traditionally provided theoretical support for ethno-centric historiography. Edward Said’s *Orientalism* (1978), for instance, challenges the Euro-centric view of ‘Orientalism.’ He argues that Orientalism is ‘fundamentally a political doctrine willed over the Orient because the Orient was weaker than the West, which elided the Orient’s difference with its weakness’ (p. 204). Said was concerned with Islamic cultures, but Paul Cohen (1984) took a similar line on East Asia and argues that the Euro-American or Western-centric definition of ‘modernity’ carries with it ‘intellectual imperialism,’ because the underlying belief that the modern began with the opening to the west (or Japan in the case of Korea) also indicates that the tradition and culture of East Asia were backward and uncivilized before their ‘opening’. In other words, Western scholarship has underestimated East Asian civilization, because the underlying definition of ‘modernity’ is Western-centered. Cohen (1984) has attempted to rediscover a China-centric history of China in order to overcome ‘intellectual imperialism.’ Although his attempt has its own bias, his approach challenges the traditional view on history in East Asia. The historiography of ‘post-colonial’ and subaltern studies have played a valuable role in creating new perspectives, solidifying national identities, and cultivating patriotic sentiments among those accused of having been ‘traditional’ or otherwise backward; yet, the problem of this approach lies

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1 Cohen (1984) examines the mainstream English-language historiographies on China, and argues that their approaches: ‘impact-response framework,’ ‘tradition and modernity framework,’ and ‘imperialism framework’ were distorted by ‘the intellectual imperialism of American historians.’ Thus, he attempts to discover an alternative perspective of Chinese history. He argues for an ethnocentric historiography which is a ‘China-centered approach.’
in the obvious fact that it commits the same crime: it ignores or limits the evidence and contains the danger of monolithic or egoistic historiography.

In a similar fashion, Korean scholarship on Korea has constantly attempted to discover an indigenous path to modernization in the history of Korea. This was accepted like a consuetudinary because nationalistic historians would not accept colonialism as a stage of ‘modernity.’ Nationalistic scholarship in Korea developed historical writing in response to interpretations that emerged from the 1930s to justify colonialism by the Japanese. As a result, nationalist historical writing on the colonial period before the early 1980s fixed on a binary view of victim-victimizer. Since liberation, historians re-wrote Korean history in terms of nation-centric history to overcome the legacy of colonial history as well as colonialist historiography. Nationalist scholarship has emphasized the dichotomy between oppressive Japanese imperial power and oppressed Korean national resistance. The key focus of the nationalist school is ‘exploitation’ not ‘modernity’. Therefore, there are roughly two arguments raised by Korean nationalist historians to define the inception of ‘modern’ and ‘modernity’ in Korea: the Practical Learning scholars and the Taehan Empire.

Firstly, nationalist historians argue that the inception of modernization in Korea derives from Practical Learning (Silhak, 實學). Nationalist scholars were required to

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2 Yi U-sŏng’s (1973) article entitled ‘Silhak yŏn’gu sŏsŏl’ (實學研究序說, A Preface to a study of the Practical Learning) categorized different schools of thought within Silhak, based on the periodical stages of Silhak thoughts. According to Yi, there are three stages: first, the school of Administration and Practical Usage (經世致用學派) was originated of Yi Ik (李珥, 1681-1763) in the first half of the eighteenth century; second, the School of Profitable Usage and Benefiting the People (利用厚生學派) was advocated by Pak Chi-wŏn (朴趾源, 1737-1805) in the second half of the eighteenth century; third, the School
provide intellectual basis for the origins of Korean capitalism in the late Chosŏn period, which was advocated by nationalist socio-economic scholars in the 1960s, the so-called capitalist sprout school (chabonjuŭi maengaron). There were two main arguments in the heated discussion on ‘modern’ characteristics of Silhak embodied in the 1960s: some scholars, such as Han U-gūn, and Chŏn Hae-jŏng, argued that Silhak should be considered an extent of neo-Confucianism (Sŏngnihak, 性理學, the study of the nature and principle) while others, including Yi U-sŏng, evaluated Silhak as ‘modern’ forms of reform. In the 1960s, there was a great desire to overcome the legacy of colonial past. Hereafter, Silhak has been dominantly studied as ‘modern’ intellectual current in the late Chosŏn (Kalton 1975, p. 35; Kim 1978, p. 33). The ground of these intellectuals is on a ‘progressive’ and ‘modernistic’ view of Silhak that went toward overcoming the limitations of Confucianism (Cho 1989; Cho 1973; Kang 1973; Ban 1998, pp. 193-195). Cho Tong-gŏl argues that Practical Learning needs to be considered as the period of ‘Korean enlightenment’, because of the discussions on politics, economics, and social reform on the basis of pragmatic governance (kyŏngse ch’iyong, 經世致用), economic enrichment (yiyong husaeng, 利用厚生), learning the truth on the basis of fact (shilsa kushi, 實事求是). The improvement of agricultural technology and management and the development of the commercial and mining industries provide clues about a force for modernity (Cho 1989, p. 21). Moreover, Ban Ch’ang-hwa argues that there are indirect connections between Practical Learning and modernity because the modernization faction after 1876 (the Kaehwap’a 開化派), such as Kim Ok-kyun, Hong Yŏng-sik, and Yu Kil-

of Seeking Evidence (實事求是學派) was based on ideas of Kim Chŏng-hŭi (金正喜, 1786-1856) in the first half of the nineteenth century (Kalton 1975, p. 35).
Jun, gathered to study equalitarianism (*pyŏngdŭng*, 平等) and economic enrichment, based on the collected works of Park Chi-wŏn (*Yŏnamjip*, 燕巖集) in the late eighteenth century. Moreover, there were many members of the modernization faction, such as Ō Yūn-jung and Pak Ên-sik, who studied Chŏng Yakyong (丁若镛), the Practical Learning scholar from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (Ban 1998, p. 193).

Secondly, the Taehan Empire was the beginning of the ‘modern’ in Korea (Lee et al. 2005; Yi 2000). They focus on the modern characteristics of the Great Korean Empire (the Empire of Taehan) and the last emperor, Kojong, in the process of modernization. Emperor Kojong had a reputation for lack of leadership in comparison to his father, the Taewŏn’gun, or even his wife, Queen Min (Palais 1975, p. 260). In particular, after the murder of Queen Min by the Japanese (*Ŭlmi sabyŏn*, 乙未事變), the king’s relocation to the Russian legation (*Agwan p’ach’ŏn*, 俄館播遷) damaged the image of the King. However, Yi (2000) argues that the negative image of Kojong has been distorted by the Japanese. He believes that King Kojong was a progressive ruler (*Kaemyŏng kunju*, 開明君主) who attempted to modernize Korea. Thus, according to Yi (2000), the Taehan Empire fell, not because of its inability or its lack of the will to modernize, but rather because of its demonstration of potential development, which led Meiji Japan to execute an early exterminatory policy. Yi argues that, although the *Kwangmu* reform (*kwangmu kaehyŏk*, 光武改革) in the Taehan Empire period eventually failed as a result of Japanese intervention, its achievement and potential for further development to create a modern state was significant.

These views have been challenged by ‘revisionist scholars,’ who emphasize positive, quantitative evidence to examine colonial history. The revisionist scholars
attempt to discover the origin of Korean economic development with iconoclastic vigour. They conclude that colonialism could be a stage of modern development, namely ‘colonial modernity,’ so that the origin of Korean economic development can be traced back to the Japanese colonial period. The revisionists do not support nor do they justify ‘Japanese colonialism,’ but they have eventually concluded on a ‘modernity’ in a colonial form as they have investigated the origins of Korean modernity in recent centuries. The revisionists are mostly economists or historians, who are relatively free from the views of nationalism. In particular, the Naksŏngdae Research Institute in Korea began producing significant works on ‘colonial modernity’ from the 1980s.

The revisionist scholars have attempted to analyze colonial history in terms of positive evidence, such as quantitative developments and outcomes. They argue that the first encounter with ‘modernity’ in Korea was the rapid transformation of Korean society during the colonial period. Moreover, the revisionist scholars argue that nationalistic historical writings undermined pluralism in historical studies by not considering positive evidence. In particular, Pak Chi-hyang et al. (eds) (2006) published a book entitled *Haebang Chŏnhusa ŭi chae inshik* 1 (해방전후사의 재인식, New Perspectives on Korean history in the pre- and postwar eras, vol. 1), which suggested a new perspective on Korean ‘modern’ history as an alternative historical perspective. In the preface of this book, the writers clearly point out that the reason for publishing the book is to challenge the dominate view as encapsulated in the representative text on ‘modern’ Korean history entitled *Haebang Ch’ŏnhusa ŭi inshik* 1-8 (解放前後史의 認識, Perspectives on Korean

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3 The most representative scholars of this institute are An Pyŏng-jik, Yi Yŏnghun, Kim Nak-Nyeon, Lee Hŏn-Chang, Cha Myung-Soo, and Pak Sub. Although surnames are given first, the romanisation is that found in the authors’ writings.
history in the pre- and postwar eras vol. 1-8) (pp. 11-15). By directly challenging the dominant interpretive consensus, Pak and his co-authors have ignited a debate on the issue of ‘modernity’ in Korean history. The writers argue that the perspective of Korean ‘modern’ history, dominated as it is by a monolithic nationalistic view, has undermined Korean scholarship and prevented it from having broader perspectives on the past.

The revisionists are not only in Korea. There have been many scholars from outside of Korea who also challenged nationalistic views on Korean history. According to Carter Eckert (1999), nationalistic historical writings have failed to capture ‘the multidimensional quality of human life and societies, including the existence of such diversity and contradiction even within a single life,’ because they are confined to a ‘myopic nationalist view’ based on black-and-white interpretations, which pit imperialist power against a struggle for liberation in order to emphasize anti-imperial viewpoints (p. 371).

Andrew Schmid argues that nationalist historiography has polarised research to the point of politicising it. In the ferocity of their critique, the nationalists have inadvertently rejected most historical research done by Japanese or in Japan without engaging with it. This has meant that a good bit of Japanese historiography has been left to its own devices. Although Korean nationalists since the 1990s have found less and less in Japanese scholarship to attack, the time lag that exists between work being done in Japan and that work being transmitted or introduced into English-language history on Japan in the United States and Europe has resulted in a delay in coming to grips with post-modern critiques of studies on Japanese imperialism and colonialism. For example, in a review article entitled ‘Colonialism and the “Korea Problem” in the Historiography of Modern Japan,’ Schmid (2000) points out that the historiography of Japanese colonial relations
between the Japanese metropole and the imperial periphery has been distorted because of its metropole-centred tendency. He argues that, although Japanese history in English-language should be ‘contextualized within Japan’s deepening colonial engagements,’ scholarship on Japan in the West has neglected to examine Japan’s historical relationship with Korea and other colonies, and they have been ‘largely written out of Japanese history’ (p. 951). He states that there is a risk that the colonies will be ‘objectified as little more than the stomping grounds of Japanese colonizers’ if the colonized are neglected in colonial history (p. 972). He suggests that relations with Korea and other colonies should be integrated into the main narrative of Japanese history and that this is critical to understand modernity in East Asia, especially in Korea (p. 973). Schmid’s argument points out the lack of engagement in English-language literature with the sites of Japanese colonialism. At the same time, the implication is that, if Korean historiography had been less self-obsessed with and engaged more with Japanese post-war work, it is likely that sensitivity to the colonized would have entered studies of the colonizer at an earlier time.

In response, by the end of the twentieth century, as historiographical methods have diversified with the advent of postmodern theory, some scholars have attempted to sublate the extreme bipolar approaches of either ‘exploitation’ or ‘development’ in Korean history. In order to pursue a more balanced approach, Shin and Robinson’s edited volume, *Colonial Modernity in Korea*, reflects some of this thinking in the Korean academy by bringing it into English and provides an important theoretical framework in understanding colonial modernity in Korea (pp. 5-6). They attempt to approach colonial modernity through a multidimensional interaction among colonialism, modernity, and
nationalism. They try to include many different facets of colonial history, such as the concerns and intentions of the colonizer, the meaning of ‘modernity’ to both colonizer and colonized, and the well-springs of nationalism in order to capture the multiple dimensions of colonial history: ‘colonial modernity,’ ‘cultural hegemony,’ and ‘the formation of non-national identity.’ They argue that the study of colonial history can move beyond either-or extreme perspectives by purposely taking into account interacting conceptions of colonialism, modernity, and nationalism (Shin and Robinson 1999, pp. 6-7). Indeed, the implementation of postmodernist approaches in historical writings serves to ‘debunk ideology, which is understood as any general mode of representation aimed at reinforcing the dominance of particular interests’ (Gottdiener 1993, p. 656). On the basis of a combination of different elements with a postmodern approach, scholarship on Korean history can embrace history in multi-dimensional ways, such as space, gender, and class. For instance, Yun Hae-dong’s *Shingminji ūi hoesaek chidae*（식민지의 회색지대, The Colonial Grey Zone, 2003) points out that there are areas that cannot be determined by black-and-white classifications. He calls these areas the ‘grey zone of colonial history’. Yun is explicit in rejecting the traditional binary approach of the nationalists. Kong Che-uk and Chông Kŭn-sik (2006) (eds) *Shingminji ūi Ilsang, Chibae wa Kyun’yŏl*（식민지의 일상, 지배와 균열, Everyday life in the colony, controls and fissures) attempt to embrace the everyday lives of people who lived in that particular period of time. Through these attempts, scholars are beginning to chart ways to reveal the multi-dimensional reality of colonial history.

In short, I agree that even if there is no universal ‘modernity,’ modernity is generally understood as a historical phenomenon, which has components of ‘capitalism
(or industrialization), state-building, and for many Westernization’ (Hwang 2004, p. 5). ‘Modernity’ in Korea was learned from the model of the West as mediated by the Japanese. This is the reason why most scholars believe that the ‘Modern Period’ in Korean history began with the opening of Korea to Japan (Myers and Peattie 1984; Duus 1984, 1995; Cumings 1984, 1981; Nahm 1988; Eckert 1991; McNamara 1990, 1996). Therefore, in order to explore ‘modern’ and ‘modernity’ in the context of Korea, I will trace the first encounter with ‘modernity,’ which appeared in the form of colonialism. I will review and evaluate the experience of modernity in an urban form within a colonized space, because the city is a place where the economic, cultural, and political conflicts of the past and the present leave their marks most deeply. The reason is because urban space intertwines the largest number of politico-economic-cultural aspects of life.

The study of a city is relevant to this new trend. There have already been many attempts to evaluate the overall colonial experience in Korea for the whole country or to examine colonial experience at the micro-level of a commercial enterprise or individual people. While these are valuable, national views have been held hostage to the binary confrontation of ‘exploitation’ or ‘development’ and individual enterprises or people offer only fragments. All levels can only capture distorted and fragmented views of colonial life. Therefore, I suggest an intermediate historical approach as a new way of thinking about the issue of ‘colonial modernity’; namely, an exploration of the multiple fragments of urban centres. This paper suggests looking at ‘colonial modernity’ through the analytical lens of the colonial city of Pusan. An urban approach would examine changes in the social, economic, and cultural life of people rather than through the traditional binary construction of ‘victim versus victimizer’ or ‘colonial repression versus
national resistance.’ Pusan can be particularly revealing of more ordinary, daily-life concerns, because it was a commercial centre and not a political centre. Searching for colonial history through the lens of the city of Pusan can contribute to a better understanding of ‘colonial modernity,’ without passing moral judgment or losing the ‘human face’ of history.

Understanding urban space requires transdisciplinary approaches, which include such subjects as sociology, economics, politics, and history. In fact, the space of modernity, cities, ‘act as generators of economic development, itself dependent on a larger and more comprehensive process of “modernization”’ (King 1976, p. 3). In this study, I will deploy an analytical framework that relies on identifying and analyzing asymmetrical power relations in a colonial port city (Pusan) by presenting the colonial urban space as an arena of colonial power manifested in everyday life. The view has to be vertical as well as horizontal. I will have to review and examine political and economic power relations between Korea and Japan at the macro-level—the vertical view—and then see how those relations were manifested in and connected to the everyday life interactions between Japanese and Koreans in Pusan—the horizontal view at ground-level. By scanning upwards politically and economically and then looking laterally in space, I can hopefully reveal the multiple complexities of the port city of Pusan, Imperial Japan’s first step on the peninsula and the continent.
I-2. Review of Previous Studies

The study of urban history is embodied in theories of sociology, such as ‘the destructive forces unleashed by the development of capitalist production’ (Marx), ‘the growth of calculative rationalities’ (Weber), and ‘the disintegration of moral cohesion’ (Durkheim). Urban sociology emerged with the rapid growth of cities in the context of ‘advanced capitalist societies’ in the early twentieth century in order to analyze ‘the nature of urban life’ and ‘urban problems’ of ‘unemployment, poverty, social unrest, rootlessness, congestion and so forth’ (Saunders 1981, p. 12; Savage and Warde 1993, pp. 8-9). All three doyens of sociology focused on the changing basis of social relations in accordance with the development of capitalism, rather than on the city itself. They analyzed the city as a historically important object in ‘the transition from feudalism to capitalism’ in Western Europe (Saunders 1981, pp. 12-13), but all three writers understood that the city is a by-product of ‘the development of fundamental social processes generated within capitalist societies’ (Saunders 1981, p. 13).

By the Second World War, urban sociology had divided into two major schools of thought: the Chicago School in America and the School of British urban sociology in the U.K. In America, the Chicago School focused on three interconnected substantive elements: socialization, its changing modes within modernity, and social reform. Meanwhile, the School of British urban sociology was rather slower to develop academic urban sociology. They were preoccupied with ‘the nature, causes and consequences of

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4 The School subsequently produced works of ‘the ecological mapping of the “natural areas” of Chicago’ and ‘a series of ethnographies of diverse social groups in the city’ (Savage and Warde 1993, p. 9). In particular, the Chicago School attempted to ‘delineate the basic patterns of social segregation in modern cities,’ which is called ‘Burgess’s model of urban form’ (Savage and Warde 1993, p. 9).
“urban problems and issues” (Savage and Warde 1993, p. 9-18). In other words, whereas the Chicago School diversified towards causes and effects, British academic sociology focused on symptoms at the expense of underlying structures. In the post-war years, urban sociology diversified into different areas of studies on urban conditions, such as mass immigration, poverty, social pathologies, conflict groups, and social bonding (Savage and Warde 1993, p. 22).

Moreover, there has been a growing interest in cities in a global context (King 1990, 1991). If cities epitomize capitalist society and capitalist societies have sought colonies, then cities have been linked to colonization. Moreover, according to King (1990 b), ‘the development of the world-economy’ and ‘the world system in general’ were by-products of ‘the emergence of modern industrial colonialism’ (p. 8). Thus, urban sociology is ‘the necessary prerequisite for understanding the development of cities as “directly linked to the world economy”’ (King 1990 b, p. 8). For this reason, modernization of non-Western cities on the basis of urban sociological understanding has been studied together with colonialism in a global context (King 1976; Ross and Telkamp 1985).

The first question that could be raised concerns the physical-spatial segregation of the urban population according to ‘race, culture, occupation, and socio-economic status,’ which determined the quality of environments based on social relationships (King 1990, p. 36). King (1990), in Urbanism, Colonialism, and the World Economy, points out six characteristics of physical-spatial segregation. The first is that the spatial and built environment was formed as a result of industrialization and the development of a class system although there was no rigid spatial segregation rule. Another characteristic is that the spatial segregation in the colonial city was affected by the practices of the indigenous
community as well as those of the colonizers. The third is that spatial segregation is influenced by the circumstances and motives of colonization. The fourth characteristic is that the nature of social and spatial segregation changed for various reasons and in different ways, such as security, health, racial prejudice, cultural preference, social status, and wealth. The fifth is that spatial segregation is by ‘race, nationality, or culture.’ The last point is that spatial segregation became ‘an index and expression of social stratification’ (King 1990, pp. 36-37).

The second question that could be addressed is how colonial cities were shaped as a reflection of dominant cultural, social, or economic structures. For this, Yeoh, in *Contesting Space* (1996), provides three approaches of dominant cultural, social, or economic distribution. The first approach to understanding the morphological development of colonial cities is to identify a dualistic economic structure with the traditional and the modern in a ‘modernization paradigm.’ Yeoh argues that the colonial city comprised a dual economic structure between ‘modernized space’ and space containing the ‘remnants of the pre-colonial era.’ In other words, the colonial city is constructed of two different types of economic structures: the commercial centre of Western capitalistic forms and ‘a lower circuit or “bazaar” economy with pre-industrial and semi-capitalistic forms of economic organization’ (p. 4). The second approach to explaining the characteristic of colonial cities is to identify aspects of ‘cultural duality’ or ‘cultural hybrid.’ From this perspective, traditional indigenous culture and modern exotic culture practiced by colonized and colonizer coexisted in the colonial cities. Yeoh’s approach has brought about the ‘culture-contact’/ ‘dominance-dependence’ metaphor, which is used to explain the colonial urban experience as one of ‘cultural hegemony’ in
which the traditional indigenous culture is marginalized by the modern exotic culture in colonial space (pp. 5-7). Lastly, the third approach to the structure of colonial cities is to see colonial cities as a ‘function of dependent peripheral capitalism’ (p. 7). In the context of the global system, colonial cities functioned not only as a colonial economy itself, but as a part of the world economic system. In other words, through colonial cities the colony has become and operates as a part of the world economy. However, the world system/dependency approach was criticized by ‘urban praxis theorists’ for its ignorance of class conflict (pp. 7-9).

This study takes a similar direction in using sociological knowledge as discussed above. The main difference is the context to which such knowledge is applied. Regrettably, the study of urban history was neglected by Korean scholarship until the 1990s. Only a few scholars have examined the urban history of cities and these scholars have usually been local historians. For instance, the most prominent scholar on urban development in Korea is Son Chŏng-mok (1977, 1979, 1982a, 1982b, 1992), who has written an enormous number of works in this field. He has attempted to analyze the formation of concessions and cities in connection with socio-economic changes (population, housing, transportation, religion) from the Kanghwa Treaty of 1876 through the Japanese colonial period up to 1945. In the case of Pusan, most works on Pusan have been done by local historians, such as Pak Wŏn-pyo (1965, 1966, 1967) and Kim Õi-hwan (1963, 1964, 1966, 1973). Pak and Kim represent the main characteristics of local history or of urban history contented solely with a chronological or biographical history of the city. However, these studies have been in the same vein as the nationalist paradigm, meaning that ‘modern’ urban development, which was imposed on Korea by Japanese
colonialism, has been examined in Korean scholarship in terms of the ‘exploitative’ aspects of urban development rather than the economic and social structures of urban development.

There have been challenges to the usual approaches to colonial urbanization. Rather than focusing on the binary dispute between exploitation and modernity, scholars have begun to pay attention to the culture and identity of the colonial settler community. For example, according to Lynn Hyung Gu, the reason that settlers were neglected in studies of Japanese colonialism was because Japanese settlers did not form ‘a large percentage of the total population’ (Lynn 2005, p. 25). In the case of Korea, the total number of Japanese did not exceed ‘much more than three percent of the total population during any year’ of Japanese colonial rule (Lynn 2005, p. 25). In Japan, Kimura Kenji’s pioneering work entitled Zaichō Nihonjin no shakaishi (在朝日本人の社会史, Social History of the Japanese Settlers in Korea, 1989) provides information on the social facets of Japanese settlers in Korea by examining social backgrounds of Japanese settlers in Korea. Takasaki Sōji provides various accounts of Japanese settlers in his book entitled Shokuminchi Chōsen no Nihonjin (殖民地朝鮮の日本人, The Japanese of Colonial Korea, 2002). Takasaki approaches Japanese colonialism from the grassroots, so that he focuses on narratives of ordinary people. Both works attempt to analyze Japanese colonialism from the ‘bottom-up’, rather than ‘top-down’. Moreover, the approaches of urban studies for the colonial period have diversified. For instance, Peter Duus’s the Abacus and the Sword (1994) was an important early work that examines diplomatic as well as economic history from the 1870s to 1910. As the title of the book makes clear, the book provides a comprehensive analysis of the realities and complexities of Japanese
history in Korea by examining two sides of the colonial world: the sword is the
diplomatic history of Korea-Japan relations and the abacus is the Japanese domination of
the Korean market.

Uchida Jun’s study of settlers in Korea, entitled ‘Brokers of Empire’: Japanese
Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1910-1937, views Japanese colonial settlers and the
relationships between colonizer and colonized as ambivalent. As she focuses on Japanese
business elites, merchants, journalists, and entrepreneurs, she points out that the
ontological condition of being neither completely ‘the ruler’ nor ‘the ruled’ created a
‘hybridity of settler power’ in the political centre of Keijō (Seoul) (Uchida 2005, p. 18).
Todd Henry analyzes interaction between the diverse residents in the transnational site of
Keijō in his dissertation entitled ‘Keijo: Japanese and Korean constructions of colonial
Seoul and the history of its lived spaces, 1910—1937’ (Henry 2006).

In Korea, revisionist scholars (Kim 2007; Hŏ 2005; Ko 2005) also argue that most
existing studies tend to be superficial and reductionist in character, because of the
hegemonic interpretation that emphasizes ‘colonial exploitation’. In reaction, they have
attempted to find positive as well as negative aspects of colonial urbanization. For
example, Kim Tong-no evaluated urban planning based on the ‘Chosŏn Planning
Ordinance for Urban Areas’ under Japanese colonial rule. He points out that, despite
there being negative aspects of urbanization forced on Korea by the colonial power,
urban planning in Korea was embedded in ‘modern’ characteristics, such as ‘rational
urban planning,’ or in the use of ‘scientific methodology,’ standardization, and the
adoption of ‘modern’ methods to plan urban settings’ (Kim 2007, pp. 163-165). For
instance, Kim Paek-yŏng’s study on Seoul (Keijō) (2005, 2009) provided a new
perspective to understand urban space as he analyzed the urban space of Keijō in terms of how colonial power influenced and shaped the urban space of Keijō. Moreover, Ko Sŏk-kyu’s study on Mokp’o (2004) focuses on the cultural aspects of urban development in Mokp’o during the colonial period, while he describes the cultural landscape of the city.

In the case of Pusan, recent scholarship has begun to study Pusan based on a multi-dimensional analysis. For instance, Hong Sun-kwŏn, together with other members of the Sŏkdang Academy, began to produce works on the Japanesesettler community and infrastructures in Pusan, because he noticed that Japanese settlers in Pusan have not been studied in Korea (2004, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2010). The Korean Studies Centre at Pusan University has produced enormous amounts of materials on modern Pusan in the *Journal of Korean Studies* (*Han’guk minjok munhwa*, 韓國民族文化) from the perspective of locality and the people within it by connecting the ‘structure of modernity’ and the diversity of its local understandings within the conceptual framework of modernity. In particular, Ch’a Ch’ŏl-uk has written extensively about the urban history of Pusan.

Moreover, the *Journal of the Port City Pusan* (*Hangdo Pusan*, 港都釜山), which has been published since 1962, also diversified topics and methods and covered various issues on the history of the city. Cho Yŏng-hwan’s dissertation entitled ‘Kindai no Kankoku Fusan ni okeru shigaichi no hensen ni kansuru kenkyū’ (近代の韓国・釜山における市街地の変遷に関する研究, A study on changes to the urban area of Pusan in modern Korea, 2005) examined structural changes in Pusan.

Building on these previous studies, the present study will explore the port city of Pusan in terms of how change in political-diplomatic power relations affected the relations between the Japanese settlers and the local population. Although Pusan was not the political centre of Japanese imperialism, it was the most important commercial centre in relation to Japan and became the second largest city of Korea as a result of Japanese imperialism. In other words, Pusan was not the cockpit of political change, but all changes were deeply linked to the social impact of the Japanese residents and saw application through negotiation with the local Korean populace. In short, while I examine the political and, to a certain extent, the economic formation of the colonial city of Pusan, I will examine changes in its social life.

I-3. Theoretical Considerations - Power Relations

This thesis is aimed at the ways in which ‘colonial modernity’ could be embraced in terms of the hierarchy in ‘power relations’ between Japanese and Koreans. My study is mainly devoted to the period of 1876 to 1910, which was the period of time during which most changes were made. I will focus on micro-historical developments of the transformation of a city during this period. My thesis delineates Korea’s experience of modernity through the lens of the port city of Pusan during the open port period (1876-1910) vis-à-vis narratives, newspapers, and other multiple voices in urban space. To approach issues of modernity in the urban space of Pusan requires the ‘synchronous’ analysis of ‘modernity’ and ‘urbanization’ as a form of ‘colonialism’ and its influence on
the formation of the city. To avoid a teleological and monolithic understanding of ‘modernity’, I will attempt to find an alternative narrative that goes beyond the conventional understanding of Korean modernity.

**Modernity, Urbanization, and Everyday life**

‘Modernity’, the first inquiry, has brought a large range of profound changes in human life, such as industrialization, capitalization, urbanization, and rationalization. All these changes were driven by ‘enlightenment’ as creating a scientific reforming of society. In this view, a city is a space of ‘modernity,’ and, at the same time, urbanization is an expression of ‘modernity’ as well as a result of ‘modernity.’

Space should not be considered as a “thing in itself” with an existence independent of matter. Space should be viewed as a ‘relationship between objects which exists only because objects exist and relate to each other,’ namely ‘relational space’ (Harvey 1973, p. 13). For this reason, physical-spatial transformation and urbanization should accompany social, cultural, political, and economic transformation. In this sense, it is important to observe the social process of modernization, because space is a place in which ‘all social behaviour occurs’ and ‘physical-spatial variables in the city and the perceptions of them are assumed to have importance for social behaviour’ (King 1976, p. 3).

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5 To analyze ‘modern’ experience in urban space, there are two approaches: ‘diachronic’ and ‘synchronic’. The first chronologically analyzes the transition of ‘premodern’ or ‘pre-industrial’ cities into ‘modern’ cities, which is usually applied to examine Western cities in some kind of autonomous setting. The second conceptualizes how the confrontation with the colonial power had an impact on the ‘traditional’ or ‘unmodern’ societies, which is used to analyze non-Western cities (King 1990, p. 9). See King, Anthony D. 1990, *Global cities: post-imperialism and the internationalization of London*, London and New York: Routledge.
It is important to acknowledge the fact that all spaces are ‘not a scientific object removed from ideology or politics; [they have] always been political and strategic’ as Henri Lefebvre points out (1977, p. 341). In other words, all spaces are shaped and moulded by political processes. Of course, the space of a city is not an exception. Therefore, it is possible to investigate the various layers of socio-cultural interaction and exchange in an urban space in its intricate connections with political relations.

Moreover, examining ‘everyday life’ can reinvigorate the understanding of ‘modernity’ and its representations. Lefebvre begins Everyday Life in the Modern World by delineating more precisely what he means by ‘everyday life’. Drawing on Nietzsche’s concept of ‘eternal recurrence’, he suggests that everyday life is highly diffuse, inchoate, and marked by ‘repetition’--endless, undulating cycles of birth and death, remembrance and recapitulation, ebb and flow. As he observes, ‘cyclical time underlies all quotidian and cosmic duration’ (1984, p. 6). In order to explore the internal dynamics of social changes, everyday life can provide fundamental insights into changes in the urban space of Pusan

Colonialism and power relations

The second inquiry is ‘power relations’ in the context of urban space. Space, at the same time, is ‘fundamental in any exercise of power’ (Huxley 2007, p. 190). In order to clarify the view of ‘power,’ different understandings of power should be distinguished based on Marx’s concept of ‘the class nature of power’ and ‘Weber’s individual definition of power’ (Simmie 1981, p. 9). The dominant view of power indicated ‘the
nature of man and society which stress the self-seeking, egocentric aspect of social behavior’ (Simmie 1981, p. 11). However, power in the context of ‘urban space’ should come under Karl Marx’s ‘the class nature of power,’ which divided people into the ruling class and the ruled. At the same time, power should be thought of as ‘transformative capacity,’ that is, ‘the capability to intervene in a given set of events so as in some ways to alter them’ (Yeoh 1996, p. 11).

King (1985) identifies three main characteristics of relations between colonizer and colonized as exercised in colonial cities: 1) ‘that power (economic, political, and social) is principally in the hands of a non-indigenous minority’; 2) ‘that this minority is superior in terms of military, technological and economic resources – and, as a result, in terms of social organization’; and 3) ‘that the colonized majority are racially (or ethnically), culturally, and religiously different from the colonizers’ (p. 9). Relations of uneven ‘power’ emerge as a result of the powerful dominating the powerless. Indeed, the asymmetrical ‘power’ relations between colonizer and colonized is manifested in the colonizing spaces of modernity, colonial cities.

As Mary Louise Pratt points out,

By using the term ‘contact,’ I aim to foreground the interactive, improvisational dimensions of colonial encounters so easily ignored or suppressed by diffusionist accounts of conquest or domination. A ‘contact’ perspective emphasizes how subjects are constituted in and by their relations to each other. It treats relations among colonizers and colonized, or travellers and travelees, not in terms of separateness or apartheid, but in terms of copresence, interaction, and interlocking understandings and practices, often within radically asymmetrical relations of power.

Pratt 1992, p. 7. [emphasis added]

The relation between colonizers and colonized was not necessarily ‘forced’ separateness or apartheid; rather, contact was played out in asymmetrical relations of power. The first
and important concept to understand in the context of ‘power’ in colonizing space is that diplomatic relations were a source of power relations formed through contact between different states. In East Asia, the traditional form of international relations was determined by the Chinese tributary system, but those traditional power relations were shattered not by direct domination extended from Western imperialism, but by the phenomenon of cultural influence played by an East Asian country, Japan. Diplomatic relations in East Asia were concluded on the basis of a modern form of colonialism as well as semi-colonialism, and it is important to analyze invisible power relations at the individual level in the context of the diplomatic-political system of colonialism.

In order to pursue this line of analysis, the present thesis is indebted to a general framework of sociological inquiry on imperialism, which created a two-tier structure within the capitalist world economy (Wallerstein, 1976, 2004), that is, the relation between dominance (core) and dependence (periphery). Antonio Gramsci’s analysis of power in his Prison Notebooks, ‘hegemony’, to a certain extent, can be applicable to analyzing power relations. I use the concept of ‘hegemony’ to explore how the Japanese settlers and Koreans negotiated and manipulated the establishment of the urban space of Pusan. In fact, the process of Japanese expansion and exercise of power in Pusan was stitched up between ‘force’ and ‘consent’.

Participation in the ‘modern sphere’

In Jürgen Habermas’ well-known work entitled The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989), he suggests two conditions of participation, which is linked to the emergence of ‘bourgeois society’ in European societies since the early sixteenth
century: ‘property’ and ‘education’. Based on the Habermasian notion of the ‘public sphere’ and public space, I will attempt to discuss what pre-conditions were required to participate in the ‘modern sphere’ of the colonial city of Pusan. However, the term ‘public sphere’ will not be used in the same sense in which Habermas employed it. Rather, I will use it to refer to the development of urban space and participation in the ‘modern sphere’. Habermas’s conditions of participation are important, but first, the degree of participation must be determined.

After opening of Korea, Pusan was the first open port, which brought about changes in the local community. A radical reshaping of relationship between Japanese settlers and Koreans was inevitable, precisely because the restraints on trade and immigration in Pusan had suddenly and irreversibly been removed. The anxious Korean government sought to engineer local community, yet extraterritoriality and the entire set of ‘unequal treaties’ did not allow any room for its intervention. Thus, ‘modern’ urban space with ‘modern’ infrastructure was created in the open port Pusan. In ‘modern’ society, the traditional form of fixed social stratification based on birth was dissolved and participation in the ‘modern sphere’ was determined by economic strength. Therefore, the degree to which there was access to the benefits of ‘modern’ infrastructure, and to the convenience, technology and, health begs close examination. In fact, access to public space and public sphere are linked to asymmetric ways for different people. On a day-to-day basis, some people have more access to its benefit than others. The urbanization of

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For further discussion on public sphere in East Asian context, see Yun, Hae-dong and Hwang Pyŏng-ju (윤해동, 황병주) eds. 2010, *Singminji konggongsŏng (식민지공공성)*, Ch’aek kwa hamkke, Seoul (책과함께, 서울) and Yun, Hae-dong (윤해동) 2010, *Kŭndae yŏksahak üi hwanghon (근대역사학의 황혼)*, Ch’aek kwa hamkke, Seoul (책과함께, 서울).
Pusan was driven by and for the Japanese. By applying Habermas’s concept, I will examine to what extent ethnicity would be an important factor to determine participation in the ‘modern sphere.’ While an overemphasis on ethnicity can obscure relations in the complexity of the colonial urban space of Pusan, other factors, such as class, will be important independent variables to analyse relations between Japanese and Koreans. Therefore, in this sense, I will explore the formation of class and participation in the modern sphere on the basis of power relations established in urban Pusan.

On the basis of these definitions of ‘modernity’, ‘power relations’ (colonial context), and ‘participation in the modern sphere’, this study examines a four-fold structure. The first will examine the transformation of a traditional city into a ‘modern’ city. The second will analyse the impact of urbanization on the lives of ordinary people. The third will map hierarchical power relations in an urban space. The fourth will take note of the distribution of ‘social capital’.

The underlying common features in colonial cities are uneven development of physical-spatial, social, cultural, political, and economic circumstances between the colonizer and the colonized as a result of uneven power relations. Uneven development occurs despite the fact that urbanization profoundly contributes to the formation of modernity in non-modern societies. Therefore, this thesis will examine how power relations operated in the socio-spatial system of a port city in the process of modernization and colonization.

I will seek to establish a theoretical framework for understanding a facet of ‘power relations’ in the urban space of Pusan. During the open port period, power relations in Pusan were created by the production and use of urban space. The production and use of
urban space and the power relations that come from that constituted the central ‘modern’ experience for the people of Pusan, both Koreans and Japanese.

I-4. Methodology and Structure

This thesis is a study of urban space in Pusan to map out ‘power relations’ from a bottom-up perspective between Japanese and Koreans prior to the annexation of Korea in 1910. I will focus on the micro-history of the transformation of a city during this period. My method will be to examine ‘power relations’ in a colonial urban space, which illustrates socio-economic-cultural-political relations between the Japanese settlers and the local population. In order to achieve this, I will employ a wide variety of primary documents, such as travelogues, narratives, newspapers, and novels, together with government documents. The most crucial sources that I will examine are newspapers published at the time, such as Fusan nippô (釜山日報), Chôsen jihô (朝鮮時報), Hwangsông shinmun (皇城新聞), Tongnip shinmun (독립신문), the Independent, and the North China Herald. I will also explore documents published by the representative body of settlers, the Settlers’ Association, and the local Chamber of Commerce as preserved in the local archives of the Pusan Metropolitan Public Library (釜山廣域市市民圖書館), the Library of Pusan National University (釜山國立大學校圖書館), and the Pusan Modern History Museum (釜山近代歷史館). Other primary document collections, such as government documents, can be found and examined at the National Library of Korea (國立中央圖書館) and the National Assembly Library (國會圖書館).
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter One, this chapter, has introduced a research approach as to how urban studies can be a useful instrument to understand pre-colonial as well as colonial modernity in Korea. By reviewing various previous works on colonial history as well as urban studies, I have attempted to differentiate my research. For this purpose, I have suggested certain theoretical foundations on which this study will be built.

Chapter Two explores the spatial transformations of Pusan. In the context of urbanization caused by the massive immigration of Japanese people, I will discuss the transition from the Japan House (Waegwan) to a full-fledged concession in Pusan. Moreover, I will examine power relations by examining the main industries pursued by the Japanese and the relevant occupational structures. Additionally, I will describe other foreign settlements in Pusan and their relationship with Koreans and Japanese.

Chapter Three demonstrates the main motivations that triggered the Japanese settlers to immigrate to Pusan by discussing maritime trade and the local economy. In particular, I will highlight the transition of economic structures from the pre-open-port period to the open-port period and also focus on trade mechanisms that operated in the open-port.

Chapter Four and Five are devoted to transportation infrastructure and how they had an impact on the local community in Pusan from 1876 to 1910. Chapter Four discusses railroads and Chapter Five explores regular shipping routes. During the open-port period, trains and ships were the most crucial means of transportation. Both means of transportation in Pusan were built by the Japanese and maintained by the Japanese.
The main issue with which I deal in these chapters is social capital as related to participation in ‘modern’ means of transportation.

Chapter Six outlines how the Japanese settlers laid the foundation for a water supply system in Pusan and what significance water had for the quality of life in the city. Three stages of construction sought to improve water supply in the new urban space of Pusan. I will examine where the water works were established and who benefited from them. Moreover, water was a critical resource and the key to health. During the open port period, various epidemics broke out. I will trace the traditional response to epidemics and how responses changed after the implement of sanitation policies in the new urban space. In this connection, I will examine the first medical facility, the Saisei Clinic, in Pusan.

Finally, Chapter Seven briefly summarizes the main points of the thesis and discusses remaining issues.
Chapter Two: Transformation of the Japan House (Waegwan) to a Japanese Settlement and other Foreign Settlements in Pusan, 1876-1910

[Pusan] is a fairly good-looking Japanese town, somewhat packed between the hills and the sea, with wide streets of Japanese shops and various Anglo-Japanese buildings, among which the Consulate and a Bank are the most important.

Bishop 1897, p. 23. [emphasis added]

The town itself, that is the modern town, is almost wholly Japanese, with pretty streets and cleanly houses, looking bright in the distance, and a familiar policeman…Four miles from Fusan is old Fusan, which is rather like old Harbin in Manchuria; the skeleton and bones of a former brisk life with nothing worth seeing at the present moment.

Putnam 1905, p. 487 and p. 494. [emphasis added]

From 1876 to 1910, changes in foreign settlements reflected conflicting power relations in Korea. Before Japan became hegemonic from 1905, Korea was not formally colonized by a single imperialist, but its internal and external affairs were interfered by multiple imperialists, who were interested. The main players were China and Japan. Japan first imposed ‘unequal treaties’ on Korea, but after 1876 and the ‘opening’ of Korea it was not Japan, but China, Korea’s traditional hegemon, who initiated Korea’s diplomatic relations with the Euro-American powers. The ‘Military Incident in the Imo Year’ (Imo Kullan 壬午軍亂, July 1882) was ‘instrumental in bringing Qing troops to Korea’ (Larsen 2008, p. 167), and Chinese troops significantly escalated tensions between China and Japan for domination over Korea. The failure of the Kapshin coup (Kapshin chŏngbyŏn 甲申政變, December 1884) was an opportunity for Qing China to consolidate its interests in Korea, while Meiji Japan’s position in Korea weakened by its involvement in the coup (Larsen 2008, p. 167; Tabohashi 1940, pp. 859-877). The confrontation resulted in the Convention of Tianjin in 1885, which allowed Chinese
dominance in Korea, yet the power relation between China and Japan over Korea was almost symmetrical, because the Convention concluded with the agreement that both countries would ‘withdraw their troops from Korea and notify the other before sending them back’ (Reischauer and Craig 1989, p. 185; Tabohashi 1940, p. 859). Korea was excluded from the process of the convention, not because Korea was neutral but because it was weak. Yet, in 1885, no external power directly exercised dominance over Korea. Japan’s victory, a decade later, in the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 took Japan a step closer to dominance.

In the meantime, the encroachment of Russia into Korea was a source of growing concern, not only for Korea, but also for China and Japan. The strategy of the two rival powers (China and Japan) was ‘to persuade Korea to enter into treaty relations with Western powers to check Russian designs on the peninsula.’ Even Koreans believed that the most serious danger for Korea was from Russia (Kim 1980, p. 293). In this process, China played an important role advising Korea about modern diplomatic relations. Li Hung-chang’s suggested strategy was the ‘balance of power’ principle, which is ‘practiced by Western nations whereby a country threatened by a powerful neighbor would ally itself with other countries in order to create a balance of power’ (Kim 1980, p. 294; Tabohashi 1940, pp. 872-873). As a result, Korea accommodated multilateral relations with outside powers from 1876 onwards. Korea was never able to become neutral, and it became an informal colony of various powers at various times, often simultaneously. The balance of power over the peninsula continued until Japan became the clear hegemon following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5.
Pusan’s situation, however, was somewhat different. Pusan was neither a political nor an economic centre, neither significant nor attractive, except to the Japanese. For the Japanese, Pusan had always been located favorably. At the mouth of the Naktong River, with a good harbor, and close to the islands, Pusan offered good communications and transport between the peninsula and the islands. Long before Pusan became an open port for the Japanese in the modern era, the Tsushima-Japanese were allowed entry and residence at a small Japanese settlement, namely the Japan House (Waegwan倭館). It was not surprising, then, that many Japanese in the early years of Japanese penetration into Korea settled down in Pusan, and, in particular, settled in the area of the Waegwan, where Japanese had lived since the early Chosôn period. The new Japanese settlement ‘initially covered the area of the old Japanese House’ (Deuchler 1977, p. 72).

Before the opening of the port of Pusan, the county magistrate sat in Tongnae, which was the centre of political administration as well as of the kaekchu(客主) or inland market brokers and commerce in the Pusan area. The Japan House was located in a convenient spot for maritime trade but a peripheral spot in regards to the political centre of Tongnae county and of the entire country. Tongnae, the political centre of Pusan, was at a considerable distance from the Japanese settlement. Yet, with the Kanghwa Treaty of 1876, a massive Japanese population began to arrive and the centre of Pusan shifted towards the area of the Ch’oryang Japan House.

The urbanization of Pusan was driven by the Japanese settlement and the decisions of the Japanese government to develop a residential area for the increasing number of Japanese immigrants. The Japanese government at first rented the site of the Pusan settlement under the ‘Agreement Concerning the Japanese settlement at Fusan’
(January 1877), and the rent was fixed at fifty yen per year. Payments started from the first day of the eleventh month, or in the Georgian calendar, from 16 December 1877 (Deuchler 1977, p. 71). Eventually, Japanese in Pusan acquired extraterritorial rights and other concessions, and the population increased considerably. As a result, the Japanese settlement in Pusan came to be the largest Japanese community in Korea and Pusan became Japan’s gateway for imperial expansion.

*The inception of the Japanese settlement*

The Japan Gazette extracts the following letter from the *Choya Shimbun*; it was sent to the latter paper by the Okura Trading Company in Fusan; Corea: The Japanese Settlement in Fusan is not very extensive, but it is almost entirely a business Settlement. The streets are divided into two, one is named Bentendori (弁天) and the other Honcho-dori (本町). Many godowns are built in a line on the shore side of the Settlement, and shops are built behind every godown. The Kanri-kencho, or local Japanese office, is situated in Honcho-dori, which is on a beautiful position, facing the harbour of Fusan. Fine pine forests are on the left and right sides. Foreign, home, and police affairs, are all transacted at the Kanri-kencho, where, however, the officials have not any very great tax upon their time. Last spring the river in the Settlement was dredged and cleaned out, and the streets were also repaired by order of Kondo, Superintendent of the Japanese Police. A small hill lies on the coast, on which he wishes to make a garden for our residents, and the work has been commenced. Omura, a large village, lies at a distance of 30 Corean miles from the Japanese Settlement.

*North China Herald*, 28 July 1877. [emphasis added]

With the conclusion of the Kanghwa treaty (26 February 1876), Japanese settlers in the open ports were guaranteed protection behind extraterritorial rights. Through the Kanghwa treaty, Ch’oryang village and port in Pusan, where an ‘official establishment of

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Japan was situated’ was opened for commercial intercourse with Japan and Japanese subjects (Article IV); Japanese residents gained ‘the right to lease land and to erect buildings thereon, and to rent buildings, the property of subjects of Corea’ (Article IV); any Japanese mariner was allowed to ‘survey said coasts’ in Korea (Article VII); the government of Japan appointed an officer ‘to reside at each of the open ports of Corea for the protection of Japanese merchants’ (Article VIII); Japanese residents were permitted to ‘carry on their business without any interference from the authorities of either Government and neither restriction nor prohibition shall be made on trade’ (Article IX); and when Japanese residents ‘commit any offence against a subject of Corea, he shall be tried by the Japanese Authorities’ (Article X) (Treaties, Regulations, ETC., between Corea and other Powers 1891, pp. 1-4). After treaty rights and protections, the most urgent task of the Japanese government was to provide the means for the Japanese community to settle in Pusan, and that meant the acquisition of land. The Korean government signed ‘Additional Articles with trade regulations appended to the Treaty of Kanghwa’ (24 August 1876) with Korea to enlarge the right for the Japanese residents in Korea (Treaties, Regulations, ETC., between Corea and other Powers 1891, pp. 7-12). For instance, Article III of the additional articles states:

Japanese subjects may, at the ports of Corea open to them, lease land for the purpose of erecting residences thereon, the rent to be fixed by mutual agreement between the lessee and the owner; and lands belonging to the Corean Government may be rented by a Japanese on his paying the same rent thereon as a Corean subject would pay to his Government.

Treaties, Regulations, ETC., between Corea and other Powers 1891, p. 8

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2 K. Cho-Il suho chokyu purok or J. Ni-cho shiyōkō jiyōki furoku,朝日修好條約附錄 or 日朝修好條約附錄
On 30 January 1877, the ‘Agreement Concerning the Japanese Settlement at Fusan’ was signed by the Foreign Office official, Kondō Masuki (近藤真鋤), and the Magistrate of Tongnae, Hong U-ch’ang (洪祐昌). Kondō and Hong agreed:

In conformity with the provisions laid down in Article III of the Additional Articles appended to the Treaty of Amity and Friendship [the Treaty of Kanghwa], approved by the commissioners of the two countries, agreed that henceforth a sum of fifty yen shall be paid at the close of each year for the ensuing year, as rent for the site of the Settlement.

Son Chŏng-mok argues that despite the fact that the Additional Articles agreed on the establishment of a settlement by land leases between Korean landowners and Japanese settlers and by payment of rent to local authorities, the situation degenerated into a ‘concession’ (Son 1982a, p. 92, 95).

Son’s argument highlights the ‘unequal’ aspect of the agreements, but political power disparity in interstate relations does not always mean working disparities on the ground. Although Koreans had inequalities imposed on them, such as extraterritorial rights and other concessions, the Korean government attempted to control the Japanese settlement in the beginning of the opening ports period. The Korean concern was the rapid expansion of the settlement population. In the early years following 1876, living conditions were not conducive to immigration, but later treaties attracted settlers from Japan.

From the beginning, there was no attempt by the Japanese government to create a dual city in Pusan by segregating Koreans from Japanese. Rather, it was the Korean government that imposed strict controls over the Japanese settlement. Historically this

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3 K. Pusan-hang kōryūji ch’aire yaksŏ or J. Fusan-kō kyoryūchi sashiire yakujō, 釜山港居留地差入略書
had been the case, and this policy continued after 1876 and the opening of Pusan. In 1877, for example, three Korean women were discovered illicitly entering the Japanese settlement. For this case, all three were decapitated, and the Magistrate of Tongnae, Hong U-ch’ang, and the Pusan Garrison Commander, Im Paek-hyŏn (林白鉉), were dismissed from their posts (Deuchler 1977, pp. 72-73). The heavy punishment in this case made clear the strong intentions of the Korean government to segregate Koreans from Japanese.  

Ever since the Waegwan was established in the early fifteenth century, Japanese residents at the Waegwan were segregated from local Koreans and kept under surveillance by the Korean government. In fact, the purpose for the establishment of the Waegwan was to control the Japanese merchants who wished to trade with Chosŏn (Tashiro 2002, pp. 10-15). This conciliatory measure to appease the Japanese pirates was adopted from Koryŏ’s foreign policy towards the Jurchens in the northern region. To the north encompassed the three northern provinces (Hwanghae, North and South Hamgyŏng, and North and South P’yŏngan) along the Tumen (K. Tuman, 豆滿) River and the Yalu (K. Amnok, 鴨綠) River, the Chosŏn court implemented a similar two-pronged policy in the early fifteenth century in order to restore the territory in the northeast frontier area and improve defensive measure while maintaining the sade (事大, serving the great) policy towards Ming. The Chosŏn court subjugated the Jurchens by sending Ch’oe Yun-dŏk and Yi Ch’ŏn and built four outposts (sagun, 四郡) along the upper Yalu, at Yŏnyŏn, Chasŏng, Much’ang, and Uye and six garrisons (yukchin, 六鎭) in the north east, at Chongsŏng, Onsŏng, Hoeryŏng, Kyŏngwŏn, Kyŏnghŭng, and Puyŏng (Robinson

\[4\] For similar historical incidents before 1876, see Lewis 2003, pp. 192-209.
Moreover, the government enacted the *samin* policy (*samin chŏngch’ae*, 徙民政策), which transferred the people from the Three Southern Provinces (Ch’ungch’ŏng, Cholla, and Kyŏngsang provinces) to the northern border. Though there was practical and emotional resistance against the government policy, the government encouraged (even pushed for some people) relocation of the people by providing moving expenses and tax breaks, and even offering opportunities for local ranks and titles (*t’ogwanjik*) (Yi 2001). At the same time, the Chosŏn government established a trade post at Kyŏngwŏn in the far northeast and the second market at Kyŏngsŏng, to the south allowing Jurchens to engage in trade with Koreans for salt, iron, oxen, and horses (Clark 1998, p. 287).

Let us turn our attention back to the Japan House. The government attempted to control the illegal activities of the Japanese, such as prostitution and smuggling, and Japanese violations of spatial boundaries. Pak Wŏn-p’yo provides the testimony of Ōike Tadasuke to illustrate illegal activities at the Waegwan. For instance, Ōike mentions that the Chosŏn government allowed official trade during the day, but the ‘private trade’ (smuggling) at night was more lucrative. He could get nearly twenty to thirty percent more profit in smuggling, and he preferred to work at night (Pak 1966, pp. 12-13). Smuggling was frequent, but the prostitution of Korean women at the Waegwan was considered an even more serious crime for the Chosŏn government. The 1711 Agreement between Korea and Tsushima, which was concerned with sexual relations between Korean and Japanese, reflected an official recognition of the illegality of Korean-Japanese sexual relations.

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5 *Shinmyo yakcho*, 辛卯約條
There were two important reasons for the restriction of contact between Japanese male and Korean females. On the one hand, Kim Ùi-hwan and Son Sŭng-ch’ŏl emphasize ‘Confucian morality’ as a fundamental value in Korean society. Illicit relations were not only an issue of man-woman relations but a threat to the foundation of society, Confucian morality. On the other hand, James Lewis suggests the reason for strong restrictions on sexual relations between Japanese and Koreans was much more than a moral issue. It was a political issue in connection with national security. He argues that the concern for illicit sexual relations transferred from the memory of Hideyoshi’s invading hordes having been guided by half-breed Japanese-Koreans. In other words, the dubious loyalty of half-breed Japanese-Koreans could have been a threat to national security (Lewis 2003, pp. 205-207). However, despite the efforts of the Korean government, since the Waegwan was a ‘town of men’ (otoko no machi 男の町), as Kazui Tashiro (2002) describes it, illicit sexual relations between Korean women and Japanese men were bound to occur (Tashiro 2002, pp. 145-157).

Despite the earlier concerns, after the opening of Korea from 1876, the segregation efforts of the Korean government to control the Waegwan naturally disappeared altogether as the growth of the Japanese residents in Pusan created opportunities for the Korean population. The attraction of the Japanese settlement can be understood by examining demographic changes in the Korean populace.
TABLE 1. Demographic Changes in Korean Residents in Pusan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year (Right after the opening of Pusan)</th>
<th>1876</th>
<th>1905</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ch’oryang</td>
<td></td>
<td>100 households</td>
<td>400 households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kugwan (舊館) or Kogwan (古館) or old Japan House (Tumop’o waegwan)</td>
<td></td>
<td>150 households</td>
<td>200 households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pusan Garrison or Pusan-jin</td>
<td></td>
<td>400 households</td>
<td>300 households</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: This table is based on the data given by Kim Úi-hwan 1979, pp. 158-159.

As Table 1 indicates, the most distinctive demographic shifts after the opening of Pusan were made from other parts of the harbor to the Ch’oryang area, where the Japan House had been since 1678 and was becoming the core of a new Japanese settlement. The expansion of the Japanese settlement enlarged the city, and more opportunities for jobs pulled Koreans into that area. The Japanese settlement shaped the demographic make-up of Pusan. The expanding Japanese populace sparked the creation of a number of organizations to aid merchants and even immigrants.

Exclusive organizations for Japanese residents were established with a strong awareness of self-protection. The Chamber of Commerce in Pusan was established by Japanese merchants at the Ch’oryang Waegwan (the Japan House), and its power and role increased as the settler population grew. The first local Japanese ‘Chamber of Commerce’ in Pusan (Fusan shōkō kaigisho 釜山商工會議所) was organized in 1879 modeled after the ‘Chamber of Commerce’ in Osaka. The Chamber of Commerce in Osaka played an important role in supporting the Japanese settlement. The Osaka organization encouraged immigration to Korea by publishing a comprehensive report (Kankoku
sangyō shisatsu hōkokusho 韓國產業視察報告書) in 1904, which included commercial information on transportation, commerce, currency, agriculture, labour, and other detailed information (language, education, and housing conditions), to attract businesses (Osaka shōkō kaigisho 大阪商工會議所 1879).

Meanwhile, a representative group of Japanese settlers was formed to protect their own rights. In the beginning, it was organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which appointed an official (shutchōkan, 出張官) as the chief keeper (hochō, 保長) amongst the settlers in 1873 in order to arrange business affairs and settle issues amongst the Japanese in the community. After the opening of Pusan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a superintendent to overlook affairs in the settlement, and at the same time, had the chief keeper lead a committee of the settlers (J. Kaigisho 會議所) under the supervision of the superintendent. The Japanese consul appointed a representative (J. Sōdai yakusho, 總代役所) to deal with works of registration, construction, sanitation, education, Shinto shrines, and the other works related to the settlers in 1881. The title of representative kept changing several times. The settlers came to call their representative body the Kyoryūmin sōdai (居留民總代 ) in 1887. The Japanese government, together with the representative body of settlers, continued to solidify its influence in Pusan by promulgating ‘regulations for the Japanese settlement’ in 1891 to protect the Japanese residents and provide efficient administrative services for them. The representative body of settlers was replaced by a representative office (J. Kyoryūmin yakusho, 居留民役所) in 1905. After the victory of Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese settlers exercised dominant influence in Pusan and the Japanese residents themselves established the
Settlers’ Association (J. Kyōryū mindan 居留民団) in Pusan in 1906 (Yī 1967, p. 5-6). Its area of jurisdiction covered Chŏlyŏng-do (絶影島, former name for Yŏng-do 影島), Pusan-jin (釜山鎭 Pusan Garrison), and Kugwan or Kogwan (舊館 or 古館 location of the Japan House before 1678) areas where most Japanese residents settled. The Settler’s Association was an exclusive organization, which reflected and reinforced separate relations between the Japanese settlers and the local population. The Administrative Bureau for Japanese Residents (J. Rijichō K. Isach’ŏng, 理事廳) was established in 1906 to protect the Japanese residents in Pusan and to provide administrative services for them. The Pusan ‘Chamber of Prosperity’ (J. Fusan han’eikai, 釜山繁榮會), established in 1906, was originally organized as a social group, yet it functioned as a political pressure group to protect economic interests and to press the demands of the Japanese merchants and settlers (Kim 2003, pp. 48-50).

The Spatial Structure of the Japanese Settlement in Pusan: the morphology of the city

[Pusan] has not been in the least affected by [the Koreans]: it is still Japan. Nor have the Koreans, in their turn, been leavened by it. The natives of the neighborhood, impelled by the desire to trade, and more by the curiosity for foreign sights, visit it by day, but they return at night to their own town (Lowell 1886, p. 36).

As the first port to be opened in Korea, Pusan carried characteristics of being a concession obtained through coercion, rather than a pre-colonial settlement. There had been the Japan House (Waegwan), but with the conclusion of the Treaty of Kanghwa, the Japanese settlement expanded beyond the confines of the Japan House. From 1877, the
Japanese government attempted to stabilize the settlement in Pusan by establishing an Agreement concerning the Japanese settlement at Pusan.\(^6\)

According to the 1877 Agreement, the Japanese had limited privileges in conformity with the centuries of control that had kept the Japanese in Ch’oryang in the Japan House. However, with the Treaty of Seoul (Great Britain, 1883), British subjects became able to ‘rent or purchase land or houses beyond the limits of the Foreign settlements, and within a distance of ten Corean \(r\)\(^7\) from the same.’ All most-favored-nations were automatically granted any special concessions or privileges acquired by others, so Japan came to have this privilege as well (*Treaties, Regulations, ETC., between Corea and other Powers* 1891, p. 136). Japan had early on gained most-favored nation status: ‘any right, privilege, or favour which the Corean Government has actually granted, or may hereafter grant, to the Government or subjects of any other State shall be extended without delay to the Government or subjects of Japan’ (*Treaties, Regulations, ETC., between Corea and other Powers* 1891, p. 103). A noticeable change from 1883 was the expansion of early Japanese residence in Pusan. With demographic pressure from the influx of Japanese, the rapid physical expansion of the Japanese settlement became a necessity. The Japanese government sought to create stable conditions for the settlement of Japanese residents to attract more Japanese immigrants to settle in Korea.

Land in Pusan around the Japanese settlement was quickly transferred to the Japanese. Min Yŏng-don, the Magistrate of Tongnae, became aware of these activities. On 23 September 1896 he warned the Korean government: ‘two hundred patches of rice and dry fields and nine houses in Yongsŏn-dong were purchased by the Japanese in this

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\(^6\) K. *Pusanhang kŏryuji ch’ap yaksŏ, J. Fusankō kyōryūchi kariire yakusho*, 釜山港居留地借入約書

\(^7\) One \(r\) equals about 0.4 km.
If the government does not ban Japanese land purchasing, all the land will be taken by the Japanese’ (Yi 2005, p. 37). The Korean government did not take any action to control Japanese land acquisitions.

In 1900, the Korean government ordered an investigation of landownership on Yŏng-do (J. Bokushi-shima 牧之道), the large island in Pusan harbor opposite the site of the Japan House, in order to establish settlements for foreign countries by using nine hundred thousand square metres on the northeastern part of Yŏng-do. The Korean government quickly realized the seriousness of a massive transfer of landownership in this area and commanded the Magistrate of Tongnae to stop the sale of land. According to the Magistrate’s report of 7 August 1900, however, extensive lands had already been purchased by the Japanese. Even though the Korean government attempted to repurchase the land, the Japanese residents refused to sell these lands back to the Korean government (Yi 2005, p. 38).

One issue regarding the Japanese settlement was the landownership of the Japan House. The construction of the Japan House in 1678 and its maintenance and repair thereafter had been the responsibilities of the Korean government; accordingly ownership of the Japan House lay with the Korean government (Chang 2004, p. 140). While the Waegwan was perceived by the Korean government as land that the Japanese had borrowed from olden times, the Japanese government sought express ownership in the ‘Agreement Concerning the Japanese Settlement at Pusan’: the Japan House was a place where ‘from old times Japanese officials and people have been allowed to settle’. The implication was that the site was a place where Japanese rights were exercised from long ago. Chang Sun-sun refers to this subtle shift as ‘illegal exploitation’ (Chang 2004, p.
Chang’s characterization is emotive, but we can note that the Japanese were, in fact, exploiting either Korean inattentiveness or ignorance in shifting ownership to themselves. As a result, the Japanese settlers at the Japan House acted as if the site were theirs to treat with as they pleased, because de facto ownership was legitimized by the Agreement.

The rapid transfer of land to the Japanese in Pusan was not particularly exploitive or illegal, although, as I will point out below, the Japanese did seize land in Pusan before Annexation in at least one case, and this can be viewed as ‘illegal’. The expansion of the Japanese settlement was the result of the growing demand by the Japanese to satisfy the needs of a growing Japanese population. Japanese ownership of land began to expand around the port area of Pusan with land that did not appeal to the local Korean population. The result was that a new type of city, different from the traditional county centre in Tongnae, arose in Pusan with the Japan House at its centre. The expansion of the Japanese settlement in Pusan came in four ways: perpetual leasehold, purchase of land, seizure of land by the Japanese government, and land reclamation.

The first method of expanding Japanese holdings was ‘perpetual leasehold’ (yŏngdae ch’aji 永代借地). From the early period of settlement (1876), the area around the Japan House was recognized as the Japanese settlement, because it was held on ‘perpetual leasehold.’ The right to lease (without compensation), donate, and dispose of land was given to the Japanese settlers. Perpetual leasehold gave the settlers a secure base, which they then sought to expand. The spatial expansion of the boundary for Japanese settlers’ activities (kanhaeng ijŏng 間行里程) allowed them to travel and conduct business further and further from the site of the Japan House.
TABLE 2. The Spatial Expansion of the Boundary for Japanese Settlers’ Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treaties</th>
<th>Spatial boundary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Additional articles, with trade regulations, appended to the Kanghwa Treaty (Cho-Il suho chokyu purok 朝日修好條約附錄) (24 August 1876)</td>
<td>Pusan-jin (Garrison)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amendments, with permission for the boundary of Japanese activities in Korea (Ŭijŏng Chosŏn’guk kanhaeng ijŏng yakjo 議訂朝鮮國間行里程約條) (25 July 1883)</td>
<td>East: Kichang; West: Kimhae; South: My’ŏngho; North: Yangsan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional articles, with permission for the boundary of Japanese activities in Korea (Chosŏn’guk kanhaeng ijŏng yakjo purok 朝鮮國間行里程約條附錄) (29 November 1884)</td>
<td>East: Namch’ang; West: Ch’angwŏn; Masan, Samnangjin North: Ŭnyang; South: Ch’ŏnsŏng Island (Kadŏk Island)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kim, Eui-hwan 1970, p. 157; Tabohashi 1940, pp. 823-828

As Table 2 shows, the spatial boundary for Japanese settlers’ activities was expanded by a series of amendments and additional articles to the Kanghwa Treaty.

The second way was expansion of land holdings by purchase. The negotiation between the Japanese Consul and the Tongnae Magistrate to expand the Japanese settlement areas began in 1880 by addressing a large area of the northern coast of Mt. Yongmi (龍尾山). Land transactions were permitted for the Japanese in 1880 as a result of ‘Regulations for Land Lease’. The Japanese were first interested in mountains and islands, which were considered to be not necessarily significant for the Korean government. In 1882, for example, a Japanese graveyard of 15,000 p’yŏng on Mt. Pokpyŏng that had been there from the early seventeenth century was transferred to the Japanese settlement. The Japanese consul acquired a leased territory (租借地) in Yong-

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8 Chiso imdo kyuch’ik, 地所賃渡規則
9 坪; one p’yŏng equals about 3.954 square yards or 3.3058 square metres.
do (J. Bokushi-shima 牧之道) to store coal for the Japanese navy in 1885 (Yi 2005, p. 28), and land sales from Koreans to Japanese accelerated in the early 1900s. Large-size land areas in Pusan, such as Taech’ŏng-jŏng (大廳町 J. Ōchō-machi) and Posu-jŏng (寶水町 J. Hōsui-machi) in the west and Yŏngju-jŏng (瀛州町 J. Eishū-machi), Sujŏng-jŏng (水晶町 J. Akira-machi), Chwach’ŏn-jŏng (佐川町 J. Sagawa-machi), and Pŏmil-jŏng (凡一町 J. Tsunehito-machi) in the east, were sold by small and mid-size Korean owners to the Japanese. In 1901, it was no wonder that the names of administrative districts around the Japanese settlement, such as Taech’ŏng-jŏng (大廳町 J. Ōchō-machi), Posu-jŏng (寶水町 J. Hōsui-machi), and Pup’yŏng-jŏng (富平町 J. Tomihei-machi), took on Japanese style names. In 1908, the Japanese settlement in Pusan came to be regulated by ‘Regulations for exclusive jurisdictional settlement through perpetual lease to Japanese settlers’. The regulations permitted land in the Japanese settlement to be leased or transferred exclusively to the Japanese. This statute nearly turned the Japanese settlement into ‘Japanese territory’ in Korea (Kim 1970, p. 158). In the open-port period, many Japanese were interested in ‘immovable property,’ which created a number of land potentates among the Japanese settlers, such as the afore-mentioned Ōike. Moreover, in 1911, the Regulation of Land Acquisition Law, which allowed for the Japanese to acquire land in Korea for military, economic, and political use, reflects the legalization of these kinds of land acquisitions (Kim 1970, p. 159).

10 For a relevant discussion of significance of street-names and place-names, see Brenda Yeoh’s book entitled Contesting Space in Colonial Singapore: Power Relations and the Urban Built Environment.
11 Pusan Ilbon cheguk chon’gwan koryūji yōntaech’aji e kwanhan chiso taedo kyuch’ik, 釜山日本帝國専管居留地 永代借地에 관한 地所貸渡 規則
12 K. T’oji suyongryŏng, J. Tochi shūyōrei, 土地收用令
The third way that the Japanese acquired land was through land seized by the Japanese government in the course of their imperial rivalry in Pusan. Japan expanded its influence in Korea by victories in two important wars: the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Japan’s political dominance in Korea offered good opportunities for the Japanese settlers to expand their influence. The Japanese residents took advantage of this circumstance by purchasing land given to foreign consulates. Foreign settlements, including German, Russian, Chinese, British, American, Italian, and Austrian, were officially abolished in 1914, yet some consulates closed earlier. In Pusan, even before annexation, foreign settlements as well as consulates were slowly dismantled (Kim 2003, p.55). For instance, the British consulate in Pusan was established in 1883 as a consequence of the trade treaty between Korea and Britain.13 Japan became the dominate power on the peninsula after victory in the Russo-Japanese war, and the British did not trade in Pusan. The Japanese government needed land around the British consulate in connection with the flattening of Mount Yŏngsŏn (營繕山鑿平工事). Consequently, the British consulate was closed in 1909, and its land was taken over by the Japanese without compensation to the Korean government (Kim 1976, pp. 48-49; Kim 2003, p. 43-47). These kinds of transfers were even more common after the abolishment of foreign settlements in Korea in 1914.

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13 Han-Yŏng t'ongsang choyak, 韓英通商條約
TABLE 3. Total Square Metres of Foreign Settlements by Port (Unit: square metre)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Port</th>
<th>leased land</th>
<th>Unauctioned land</th>
<th>other</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inch’ŏn(仁川)</td>
<td>388,924</td>
<td>57,795</td>
<td>200,388</td>
<td>647,107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinnamp’o (鎮南浦)</td>
<td>606,885</td>
<td>1,190</td>
<td>168,385</td>
<td>776,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunsan (群山)</td>
<td>404,596</td>
<td>7,262</td>
<td>160,142</td>
<td>572,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mokp’o (木浦)</td>
<td>769,379</td>
<td>6,225</td>
<td>190,472</td>
<td>966,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masan (馬山)</td>
<td>278,697</td>
<td>85,598</td>
<td>176,557</td>
<td>540,852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sŏngjin (城津)</td>
<td>89,458</td>
<td>318,627</td>
<td>171,915</td>
<td>580,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,537,939</strong></td>
<td><strong>476,697</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,067,859</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,082,495</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As Table 3 points out, the total square metres of foreign settlements was about four million square metres. After Japan annexed Korea in 1910, remaining large pieces of land that had been foreign settlements in major port cities were acquired by the Japanese (Kim 2003, p. 56). In 1914, all foreign settlements in Korea came under the administration (fu府) of the Japanese Government-General of Korea.

The fourth and final way Japanese acquired land in Pusan was by land reclaimed from the northern coast of Mt. Yongmi (龍尾山). A large-scale reclamation project was launched to expand the Japanese settlement. The Japanese established the Pusan reclamation joint-stock company (K. Pusan maechuk chusik hoesa, J. Fusan umechiku kabushiki kaisha 釜山埋築株式會社) in 1898 to reclaim the northern coastal area and expand its settlement in Pusan. For the Japanese residents, land reclamation offered a solution for the spatial shortage. Through the first and second reclamations (1902-1909),

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14 Public land was legally auctioned, while unauctioned land remained public.
the Japanese acquired 41,374 p’yong, or about 12,530 square metres (Kim 1973, pp. 55-57).

It is important to characterize the four methods outlined above (lease, purchase, seizure, reclamation) into top-down and bottom-up approaches towards land acquisition. Lease and purchase were initiated by Japanese settlers with the diplomatic and financial help of the Japanese government, and seizure and reclamation were initiated by the political and economic power of the Japanese government. The rapid land acquisition of the Japanese settlers was a result of both individual initiative and systematic efforts to expand influence by the Japanese authority. The problem in analysis of land acquisitions has been that the focus of analysis has been fixed on political power while neglecting interaction between Koreans and Japanese settlers.

Despite the fact that there was no noticeable illegal land acquisition by the Japanese, why do historians argue that Japan’s land acquisition was ‘exploitive’? Aside from the usual arguments that power relations were inherently favorable to the Japanese and that the Koreans could not resist, a salient argument has been posed by Takasaki Sōji (2002). Takasaki links Japanese money-lending merchants and pawnbrokers offering loans at high rates of interest in the settlement with land acquisition.\footnote{A close examination of these practices is offered in chapter two.} Unfortunately, there is no statistical data indicating how many Japanese engaged in money-lending, but anecdotal evidence suggests that it was widespread. Takasaki points out that the early Japanese settlers accumulated wealth as well as land through moneylending at high interest rates. The basic method was that the Japanese moneylender loaned money to Korean farmers on land as security, and when, because of the high interest rates (rates were usually ten percent per ten days), the poor borrowers defaulted, the land was taken
by the moneylender. Takasaki (2002) provides an anecdote of Hayashi Shōjo (林省三).

Hayashi, who worked as an officer of the Salvation Army, decided to come to Korea and engage in agriculture. When he arrived in Pusan in 1911, he was looking for land to cultivate in the Pusan garrison area. He found that most Japanese were landowners who did not cultivate themselves. One suggested that ‘Well, you’d better not hurry. I will give you a good tip. [Just] loan money to Koreans, and wait for a couple of years. Although you won’t get the money back, you will get paddy and dry land instead’ (pp. 121-122).

The reason for the establishment of the Dai-Ichi Bank in 1878 was to support the money-lending activities of the Japanese by providing capital. The scale of the money-lending is hard to determine. The occupations of Japanese residents in Pusan in 1912 lists ‘pawnbroker’ less than 2.3 per cent of the total occupational structure, while ‘money-lending’ was not even in the list of occupations of Japanese residents (Fusan Yōran 1912, pp. 12-13). In other words, usurious money-lending cannot be calculated in statistics, yet anecdotal narrative suggests that half of the residents were engaged in it alongside other jobs. Many Japanese, who became rich in Pusan, accumulated money and property by usurious money-lending throughout the colonial period (Takasaki 2002, pp. 31-34). For instance, Ōike Tadasuke (大池忠助), a native of Tsushima, became one of the richest men in the city through trade. Ōike engaged in various businesses, such as the import and export trade, marine transportation, and rice-polishing business, but he accumulated the bulk of his wealth by moneylending and real estate investment (Pak 1966, p. 27).
Japanese Settlement in Pusan: shifting from Sojourners to Residents

I [Ôike] came to Pusan at the age of twenty on 28 February 1875. At that time, only Japanese from Tsushima were allowed to sail for Korea… [Yet] after the abolition of restriction of migration from Japan as a result of the Kanghwa Treaty, many Japanese from other parts of Japan began to come here [to Pusan] Pak 1966, pp.12 - 14. [testimony from the Japanese settler Ôike Tadasuke.]

The first and most noticeable change that occurred in Pusan was the increase in Japanese migrants. As the population grew, the Japanese settlement developed. The Japanese settlement grew out of the Japan House (Waegwan). In 1876, there were only 82 Japanese, yet by 1910, the number topped 20,000. The growth is clearly shown in Table 4, and Figure 1.

TABLE 4. The Increasing Japanese Population in Pusan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Households</th>
<th>Individuals</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Households</th>
<th>Individuals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>1895</td>
<td>952</td>
<td>4,953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>1896</td>
<td>986</td>
<td>5,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>2,066</td>
<td>1897</td>
<td>1,026</td>
<td>6,065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>1,925</td>
<td>1898</td>
<td>1,055</td>
<td>6,242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>1,519</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>6,326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>1,780</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>1,082</td>
<td>6,067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>1901</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>7,029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>1,896</td>
<td>1902</td>
<td>1,352</td>
<td>9,691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>1,957</td>
<td>1903</td>
<td>1,582</td>
<td>11,711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,006</td>
<td>1904</td>
<td>1,891</td>
<td>11,996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,131</td>
<td>1905</td>
<td>2,363</td>
<td>13,364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>3,033</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>2,981</td>
<td>15,989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>4,344</td>
<td>1907</td>
<td>3,423</td>
<td>18,481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>914</td>
<td>5,254</td>
<td>1908</td>
<td>4,508</td>
<td>21,292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>938</td>
<td>5,110</td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>4,213</td>
<td>21,697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>993</td>
<td>4,750</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>4,284</td>
<td>21,928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>906</td>
<td>4,028</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Figure 1 shows, there were four main waves of Japanese immigration to Korea prior to annexation in 1910. The first wave came between 1876 and 1880, when the population soared from 82 to 2,066. The Japanese government established a steamship line from Nagasaki to Pusan via Gotō (五島) and Tsushima (對馬) to encourage Japanese immigration to Korea as well as trade with Korea (Pak 2007, p. 59). Except for a slight decrease in the period from 1881 to 1882, the number of Japanese immigrants to Korea climbed to around 2,000 and held steady to 1887.

The temporary decrease between 1881 and 1884 could have two causes: the opening of other ports and the 1882 Imo incident. In 1881, Wŏnsan port was opened. The Japanese government encouraged migration to Wŏnsan, rather than Pusan. More significant may have been political disturbances. The 1882 Imo Soldiers’ Mutiny (*Imo Kullan*, 23 July 1882) broke out when the Korean court failed to pay its soldiers and several hundred unpaid and unfed Korean troops protested against the Japanese presence.
in Seoul. In the course of the mutiny, the head of the Japanese legation, Hanabusa Yoshimoto (花房善質), managed to escape to an offshore Japanese warship, but some twenty Japanese soldiers, including the army instructor Horimoto Reizō (堀本禮造), were killed and the Japanese legation building was burned (Dudden 2005, p. 46). The Japanese consulate in Pusan reported that exaggerated rumors of the mutiny were spread by word of mouth. Korean customers, who usually visited the Japanese settlement in numbers, noticeably decreased, so that the Japanese stores were closed almost eighty days (Takasaki 2002, p. 6). The resulting economic slump may have driven Japanese away, but they were also afraid. The Japanese settlers did not feel safe even in Pusan (Takasaki 2006, p. 6).

The second large wave of immigration occurred from 1887 to 1893. It was caused by the Japanese government’s encouragement of emigration to Korea by a relaxation of restrictions on Japanese migrating abroad. For example, in 1889, there was a considerable increase in the same year that Fukuzawa Yukichi (福澤諭吉) began to promote emigration. Coincidentally, in 1889, a regular shipping line from Osaka to Pusan was established and the amount of trade jumped (Pak 2007, p. 61). Also, the Korean government relaxed its policy on Japanese activities in Pusan, and the range of Japanese movement away from the settlement expanded from fifty ri to one hundred ri. What made the new shipping capability economically viable was a new agreement permitting expanded warehousing and construction. The ‘Commercial Treaty of Amity between Chosŏn and Britain’16 was signed on November 1883. The British, and Japan as a most-favored nation, were permitted ‘to rent or to purchase land or houses, and to erect

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16 Cho-Yông suho t’ongsang choyak, 朝英修好通商條約
dwellings, warehouses, and factories’ (Treaties, Regulations, ETC., between Corea and other Powers 1891, p. 135) at the ports of Chemulpo (Inch’ŏn), Wŏnsan, and Pusan in addition to Seoul. All these factors pushed the influx of Japanese residents in Pusan up to well over 4,000 by 1893.

The third wave began to build after 1895 after the Sino-Japanese war of 1895 and shot up after 1900. There was a slight decrease from 1891 to 1894, which could have been caused by peasant uprisings from 1894, including the uprisings of the Tonghak peasant army, and the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. Peasant revolts and the war showed the Japanese that Korea was not stable and secure. Even though the permitted boundary of Japanese activities had been expanded, and shipping had expanded, Japanese immigration to Pusan decreased as the situation in Korea seemed unstable. Nevertheless, after the Japanese victory in the Sino-Japanese War and the suppression of peasant uprisings, there was an almost explosive increase of immigration in the late 1890s. It was clear that the decline in the early 1890s was just temporary.

The fourth wave is noteworthy as a massive increase of Japanese migration to Pusan began even during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. During the war, Japan consolidated its power and dominance over Korea, and we can imagine that Japanese settlers felt secure (Pak 2007, p. 61). With Japan’s victory, Japan became the dominant power over the Korean peninsula. Japanese Cabinet discussions constantly stressed the desire to ‘settle as large a number of our [Japanese] countrymen inside Korea as possible, deepening the foundation of our power and at the same time bringing closer economic relations between Korea and Japan’ (Duus 1995, p. 295). The war resulted in a Japanese protectorate and this meant that Korea had become a de facto colony of Japan. The
government shifted their view and desired ‘settlers in Korea to be “colonialists” (shokumin 植民), not “emigrants” (imin 移民)’ (Duus 1995, p. 295). The establishment of the Oriental Development Company in 1908 began a big push to open up the possibilities for Japanese to migrate to Korea. Its strategy was to send ‘skilled Japanese farmers to Korea to reclaim the considerable extent of arable lands now lying in waste there’ (Millard Sep. 1909, p. 187).

**TABLE 5. Growth of the Number of Japanese Residents in Chosŏn Korea by City**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>1890</th>
<th>1900</th>
<th>1910</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pusan</td>
<td>4,344</td>
<td>5,758</td>
<td>24,936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wŏnsan</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>1,578</td>
<td>4,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>2,115</td>
<td>38,397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inch’ŏn</td>
<td>1,612</td>
<td>4,208</td>
<td>11,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mokpo</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>3,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinnampo</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>4,199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunsan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>3,737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>7,081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P’yŏngyang</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>6,917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taegu</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6,492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinŭiju</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch’ŏngjin</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,182</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As Table 5 indicates, the increasing number of Japanese settlers in Pusan was significant in comparison with other cities in Korea. Although Seoul was the political centre of Korea, it is clear that Pusan attracted the most Japanese until after 1900. Because Japanese migration to Pusan was for commercial interests, rather than political
interests, the disparity indicates the importance of commerce as an attraction and the focus on commercial interests.

TABLE 6. A Comparison of Japanese and Korean Populations in Pusan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Korean</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>total</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>household</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>household</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>4,284</td>
<td>12,293</td>
<td>9,404</td>
<td>21,697</td>
<td>4,317</td>
<td>10,503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>4,508</td>
<td>12,194</td>
<td>9,734</td>
<td>21,928</td>
<td>4,276</td>
<td>10,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>5,583</td>
<td>13,983</td>
<td>11,269</td>
<td>25,252</td>
<td>4,639</td>
<td>11,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 6 compares the numbers of Japanese to Koreans and indicates that Japanese generally outnumbered Koreans. Although the data are sketchy, it is clear that the significance of the Japanese settlement in Pusan is distinctive not because Pusan was the largest Japanese settlement in Korea, but because Japanese settlers outnumbered the indigenous Korean population. In most colonial cases, the colonial settlers were the minority in the colonized space, and the colonial minority experienced insecurity, because their security was determined by the condition and the activities of the colonized. For this reason, most European settlers in various colonies experienced ‘fear, arrogance by anxiety, disdain by suspicion’ toward the local population (Kennedy 1987, p. 187). However, in the case of Pusan, Japanese settlers need not have experienced feelings of insecurity, because Japanese residents were not a minority, but a majority. For this reason, Carles (1888) states that ‘Fusan, though in Corea, was a purely Japanese town, in which no Coreans resided’ (pp. 81-82).

It does not follow that there was no conflict between the settlers and the local population. Conflict was an inevitable result. However, the historiography of local
history has often been in light of nationalist perspective. For example, the very first recorded conflict was the Hōshō indicant, which took place on 26 April 1876. The battleship Hōshōkan (鳳翔艦)\(^{17}\) came to Pusan with troops and translators to investigate the port. At the time, Pusan was an open port, but the boundary of Japanese activities was still limited to ten ri from the Japan House or as far as the Pusan Garrison. The Magistrate of Tongnae protested the illegality of port surveys conducted around the harbor area and even inland. This was reported to the local population in the Tongnae area. A mass rally of agitated Koreans gathered at the south gate of the Tongnae county office, and the crowd threw stones at Japanese troops as a sign of protest. Eventually, the Japanese retreated (Pusan minju undongsa pyŏn 1998, p. 28). The Hōshōkan incident was regarded as the first resistance to the Japanese imperialism, but it is unlikely. In the early open-port period, it is not clear that the Japanese government had an intention to take over Korea. Rather, the Hōshōkan incident was more likely to be a conflict of transition. Prior to opening of Pusan, there were a small number of Japanese residents, Tsushima-Japanese, who were confined in the Japan House. The conflict probably occurred in lack of information regarding the Treaty. Since the local populations were more accustomed to traditional system and the Magistrate of Tongnae accused the Japanese of violating the agreement, the mass protested against the Japanese.

Moreover, as a result of the Treaty of Kanghwa, and following the Additional Articles with Trade Regulations, appended to the Treaty of Kanghwa, Japanese merchants were at liberty to trade without tariff in Korea (Treaties, Regulations, ETC.,

\(^{17}\) The activities of the battleship Hōshōkan (鳳翔艦) is also appeared in Sillok: The battleship Hōshōkan was escorting a Japanese steamship, Takao-maru (高雄丸) on which the head of the Japanese legation, Hanabusa Yoshitada (花房義質) investigated water level around Chŏlla province and Ch’ungch’ŏng province. (Kojong sillok nineteenth day fourth month 1879).
between Corea and other Powers, 1876-1889, p. 12). Naturally, Korean domestic industries, such as handicrafts and small manufacturing, which were relatively fragile, were almost dismantled. For example, the North China Herald reported a conflict, which caused by trade between Koreans and the Japanese settlers.

The Japan Herald learns from the Mainichi Shimbun of a serious riot at Fusan, arising originally from the change in value from the Japanese paper currency and Corean coins. Trade had nearly come to a standstill, and what was done was in the form of barter for rice and other grain. The Corean Government issued a notification forbidding the export of these, which stopped trade entirely, and cause much distress among the Japanese…the [Japanese] Consul went up to the capital [Seoul] and held negotiations which resulted in the removal of the prohibition of trade in and the export of rice and other cereals.

The North China Herald, 29 June 1880

As described above, conflicts between Koreans and the Japanese settlers was often occurred around trade and barter, because trade activity in Pusan was in transition from traditional to extraterritorial trade system. The local population sometimes became explosive, and although resistance by the local population was not always directed toward the Japanese settlers, there were occasional anti-foreign outbursts. There were constant incidents between the Japanese settlers and the local population in Pusan, but none of these resulted in large-scale violence, riots, or massacres.

We must also keep in mind that the Korean government faced a situation in which extraterritoriality had been guaranteed by treaty and agreements for the Japanese. The Korean government was not able to punish Japanese misconduct under Korean law; rather, the Japanese exercised their own jurisdictional rights. For instance, in August 1881, in the outskirts of the treaty port of Pusan at Kup’o (龜浦 Ku harbour), a dispute erupted between the Tsushima-Japanese wholesale rice traders and local Koreans. Koreans attacked and struck the Japanese wholesalers, beating them but not too severely.
Thereafter, dozens of Japanese settlers gathered and demanded that the Japanese police arrest the Koreans involved. Twenty Koreans were arrested and presented to the Korean authorities with demands for punishment; three were eventually executed (Takasaki 2006, p. 24). After the opening of Pusan, Japanese residents were protected, but the local population was more severely punished than would have been the case if Japanese were not involved. Preferential jurisdictional rights for the Japanese effectively discriminated against the local Koreans, which deterred Koreans from mounting resistance towards the Japanese.

**Motivations of migration and results of demographic changes**

From 1876 to 1910, neither internal nor external migration of the Japanese was a new phenomenon in Japan. As the previous legal restraints on ‘physical movement, choice of occupation, and sale and purchase of land’ were removed or relaxed by the Meiji government, urban migration made rapid progress in Japan (White 1978, pp. 82-84). White (1978) argues that it is not surprising to find cityward migration in Japan during this period: by the late Tokugawa, already as much as ‘15 percent of the population resided in urban communities, and the volume of population movement was also high’ (p. 82). Needless to say, relaxations on movement, occupations, and the alienation of land in combination with government policies promoting industrialization also drove the rise in urban population (White 1978, p. 82).

With internal migration to urban areas, migration overseas also increased from the Meiji restoration onwards. Duus (1995) points out that there were considerable numbers of emigrants to other countries. During this time, the Meiji government had a clear
distinction between ‘colonialists’ and ‘emigrants’. According to Itagaki Taisuke (板垣退助), the colonialist was ‘one who goes abroad to develop land and cultivate production with the intention that his heirs will live there permanently’, and the emigrant was ‘a poor person who moves away from home, whether inside the country or outside, and contracts his labor to a powerful capitalist’ (Duus 1995, p. 295). Since the motto of the Meiji government was ‘enriching the country, strengthening the military’ (fūkoku kyōhei 富國強兵), migration was promoted as one of the most important government policies. For instance, in the 1890s, a number of public figures in Japan, such as Enomoto Takeaki (榎本武揚), Itagaki Taisuke (板垣退助), and Taguchi Ukichi (田口卯吉) encouraged migration abroad to strengthen the nation. In 1891, Taguchi Ukichi pointed out that two urgent tasks for the nation were ‘to expand foreign trade and increase our national wealth’ and ‘to transplant our people abroad and erect a bulwark for our state’ (Duus 1995, p. 298). In particular, many influential officials ‘viewed emigration as a means of contributing to Japan’s security against Chinese and Russian encroachments in Northeast Asia’ (Gragert 1994, p. 56).
As shown in Table 7, there were limited places to migrate until 1890, yet the destinations for possible overseas immigration were diversified. Although there were possible destinations, Korea became the leader by far with more than 30 percent of total migration by 1910. There are some explanations for this phenomenon. First is Korea’s location, which is relatively close, and the second was probably the accessibility of information from early Japanese migrants. Moreover, its soil, climate, and natural recourses are very similar to Japan’s. Lastly, and most importantly, the increasing number of Japanese migrants to Pusan in particular was caused by the changes of socio-political relations between Japan and Korea during this period.

The increasing flow of Japanese to Korea can be understood as the result of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors. Migrants were pushed by famine, flood, and impoverishment and...
pulled by opportunities and self-motivation, such as a better life or a better job. Duus (1995) emphasizes ‘pull’ factors, rather than ‘push’ factors in regards to Japanese migration to Korea between 1894 and 1910. He believes that Japanese emigration to Korea was motivated by the desire to find ‘new opportunities for employment’ in Korea (Duus 1995, p. 312). Moreover, the dynamic of ‘chain migration,’ led by ‘the flow of information’ from early migrants, was an important factor to consider (Duus 1995, pp. 314-316). In Pusan, there were already some Tsushima-Japanese, and as socio-political circumstances changed, early Japanese migrants from Tsushima enjoyed economic prosperity. They reported back to other Japanese about opportunities for business and employment, and their family members, relatives, and friends felt attracted to follow them. Pusan, in particular, was close to ‘the rich and fertile rice-growing regions of the south’ and was one of the major ports for ‘the rice export trade’ (Duus 1995, p. 271). Indeed, for Japanese merchants in the early decades of the opening of Korea, the rice trade was a lucrative business.
TABLE 8. Price of Rice in Pusan, Inch’ŏn, and Osaka, 1877-1904 (unit: yen/koku)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Inch’ŏn</th>
<th>Pusan</th>
<th>Osaka</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1877</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>5.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>5.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>7.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.31</td>
<td>9.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.99</td>
<td>9.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.90</td>
<td>7.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>6.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>4.86</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>5.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>5.52</td>
<td>4.85</td>
<td>5.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>6.90</td>
<td>5.18</td>
<td>5.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887</td>
<td>5.55</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>4.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>4.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>5.55</td>
<td>5.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>5.95</td>
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<td>1892</td>
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<td>7.48</td>
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<td>1893</td>
<td>5.40</td>
<td>6.06</td>
<td>7.27</td>
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<td>1894</td>
<td>6.32</td>
<td>7.85</td>
<td>8.40</td>
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<td>5.80</td>
<td>7.24</td>
<td>9.00</td>
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<td>1896</td>
<td>6.49</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>9.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>7.41</td>
<td>9.12</td>
<td>11.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>9.47</td>
<td>12.12</td>
<td>11.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>6.99</td>
<td>8.36</td>
<td>9.71</td>
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<td>1900</td>
<td>7.17</td>
<td>9.17</td>
<td>10.79</td>
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<td>1901</td>
<td>7.37</td>
<td>8.13</td>
<td>11.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>9.81</td>
<td>9.36</td>
<td>12.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>11.43</td>
<td>13.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>9.92</td>
<td>12.88</td>
<td>13.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 8 and Figure 2 show, the price of rice in Korea was more than 20 percent cheaper than in Osaka during this period (1877-1907). In 1880 and 1881, the spread widened to make the price of rice in Korea as much as 45 percent cheaper than in Osaka. Moreover, even in comparison with the price of rice in Inch’ŏn, Pusan was cheaper than Inch’ŏn until 1891. In other words, Pusan was an attractive place to do business and offered a strong ‘pull’ factor. Moreover, the fact that Japanese banks, such as the Dai-Ichi Bank, the Eighteenth Bank, and the Fifty-Eighth Bank, supported the rice traders, because the trade was relatively stable and profitable clearly demonstrates a great deal of opportunity for Japanese settlers in Pusan (Duus 1995, p. 271). The origin of Japanese residents gives a clear picture of the ‘chain migration’ that also pulled people to Pusan.
### TABLE 9. The Origin of Japanese Residents in Pusan, 1910

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prefecture</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Prefecture</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yamaguchi</td>
<td>2,519</td>
<td>2,247</td>
<td>4,766</td>
<td>Tōkyō</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagasaki</td>
<td>1,751</td>
<td>1,478</td>
<td>3,229</td>
<td>Kagoshima</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukuoka</td>
<td>1,098</td>
<td>933</td>
<td>2,031</td>
<td>Kyōto</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiroshima</td>
<td>1,047</td>
<td>871</td>
<td>1,918</td>
<td>Tsu</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ōita</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>1,441</td>
<td>Wakayama</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osaka</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>993</td>
<td>Aichi</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saga</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>Tokushima</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ehime</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>931</td>
<td>Tottori</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okayama</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>910</td>
<td>Ishikawa</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumamoto</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>844</td>
<td>Fukui</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyōgo</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>Shiga</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kagawa</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>Other 23 prefectures</td>
<td>1,276</td>
<td>892</td>
<td>2,168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shimane</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14,235</td>
<td>11,406</td>
<td>25,641</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fusan Shōkō Kaigisho(釜山商工會議所)1912, Fusan Yōran (釜山要覽), p. 10 (reorganized by the number of immigrants)

There were also ‘push’ factors. As Table 9 indicates, the origin of Japanese residents in Pusan lay predominantly in western Japan and northern Kyūshū. In general, western Honshū and Kyūshū supplied many migrants abroad. Specifically, immigrants consisted mainly of people from Yamaguchi and Hiroshima in Western Japan and Nagasaki (Tsushima), Fukuoka, Ōita, and Saga in Kyushū. Most of the migrants to other countries were ‘destitute farmers from northern Kyūshū and south western Honshū- areas that had not benefited from the industry and commerce growth of the Meiji years’ (Gragert 1994, p. 55). These areas were considered to be the most economically backward areas in Japan at the time. Myers and Peattie point out:

Japanese immigrants to Korea were tinkers, peddlers, failed shopkeepers, rough adventurers, they represented the marginal elements of Japanese society and, far from being hardy pioneers of the soil, willing to till the Korean hillsides into paddy land, they were profit-seekers who naturally gravitated to the cities, or buying up land already cultivated, eventually became the new landlords of Korea.
Lynn (2005) links Japanese migration with the Japanese government policy to solve social issues on the basis of its adoption of the Malthusian argument that unemployment and rural impoverishment in Japan could be controlled by migration in order to deal with surplus population (p. 27). Indeed, the Japanese economy suffered ‘several recessions during the period 1894-1910,’ yet production and employment in the modern sector expanded steadily (p. 313). She argues that, by the early 1900s, the Japanese government came to view Korea ‘as the solution to perceived population pressures’ (pp. 28-29). Japanese migration to Korea was actively pushed by policies of the Japanese government. Lynn (2005) points out the role of organizations, such as the Oriental Association (Tōyō kyōkai 東洋協會) and the Oriental Development Company (Tōyō takushoku kabushiki kaisha 東洋拓殖株式會社; hereafter, ODC). These pushed the further increase of Japanese immigrants to Korea, because they subsidized immigration (p. 26). People do not move to other places for a single reason. Both ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors prompted migrations to Korea. As a result, the number of Japanese residents in Pusan increased more than 267 fold from the opening of the port in 1876 to the annexation of Korea in 1910.

**The Occupational Structures of Japanese Settlers and Koreans in Pusan**

There are at present more than two thousand five hundred Japanese, inhabiting about four hundred houses, in the settlement. There are only some sixty firms actually engaged in commerce between Japan and Corea, recognised substantial traders, while about one hundred and seventy are Nakagai Sho (commission merchants or brokers) possessed of neither funds nor capital. Then we have one hundred retailers, and the balance of tenements about one hundred are restaurants, or the shops and residences of artisans, workmen, and coolies. Even the retail-dealers and restaurateurs, when their legitimate business is dull act as brokers.
In order to begin revealing the power relations surrounding the early Japanese settlement, we need to examine the occupational structure of the Japanese settlers in comparison to that of the Koreans. The earliest available record regarding occupational structures of Japanese settlers in Pusan comes from 1881.

**TABLE 10. Occupations of the Japanese Residents in Pusan in December 1881**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Household</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Household</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle man</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>Pawnbroker</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Trade</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Moneylender</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenter</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Customs clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grocer</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Bank employee</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food &amp; Drink Shop</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Bargeman</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hired hand (<em>hiyatol-nin</em>)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Public entertainer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restaurant</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Inn Keeper</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groceries</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gaimushō kiroku kyoku hen (外務省記錄局編) 1881, ‘Tsūshō kihen’ (通商彙編); Re-quoted from Sakamoto and Kimura 2007, p 23

Table 10 shows that more than half of early settlers were either middle men or foreign traders. Middlemen brokered trade goods from interior areas into and out of the port and foreign traders shipped goods to and from Japan. Corroborating records for passport issuances to Japanese to visit Korea can be found in the *Teikoku tōkei nenpō* (帝國統計年報) for 1880. According to this record, 350 were for trade; 332 for other occupations; 174 for officials; 73 for hired hand; five for study. Most Japanese, who sailed to Korea, engaged in foreign trade with Japan (Sakamoto and Kimura 2007, pp. 22-23). They were people who thought that Korea offered business opportunities.
As Table 11 indicates, there were various occupations that the Japanese settlers had, yet apart from government official and semi-officials, most Japanese settlers were engaged in service and commerce. There were large numbers of rice merchants, and none of the Japanese residents engaged in farming. Rice was one of the most important trade items during this period, but the Japanese settlers were not producers; they were traders. Another noticeable occupation group was entertainment, including restaurants, inns, boarding houses, and bath houses. Pusan was a major gateway to the Korean market and a centre for rice trade as well as a temporary post for new arrivals. Clearly, a major function of the Japanese settlement in Pusan was to take advantage of the trade in cheap Korean rice and to accommodate temporary residents on their way to inland Korea.
Duus (1995) points out that the new arrivals ‘did not have to deal with Koreans at all, except to get his bags to the inn’ (p. 329).

By contrast, the data on the Korean occupational structure from 1876 to 1910 is not available, so it is hard to know anything for certain. Nevertheless, we can surmise the Korean occupational structure in Pusan by examining long-term changes in Korea before and after the opening of Korea. The Korean occupational structure before the opening of Korea can be assessed on the basis of ‘local products’ recorded in the Revised and Agumented Gazetteer of Korea (Sinjŭng tongguk yŏji sŭngnam 新增東國輿地勝覽) from the mid-sixteenth century. The main products in Tongnae (Pusan) were marine, such as codfish, herring, skate, ear shells, sea mussels, and sea-weed. The main handicrafts were china, clayware, and bamboo arrows (Sinjŭng tongguk yŏji sŭngram 新增東國輿地勝覽 1958, pp. 387-388). Because the national gazetteer does not mention demographic change or private trade, we have to include these from elsewhere.

Demographic changes for Pusan harbour in Tongnae County can help us infer changes in occupational structure. James Lewis has noted the dramatic growth in Tongnae’s population from the fifteenth century to the mid-eighteenth century, and in particular from the eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries. Between 1759 and 1832, across Kyŏngsang province the population of some 27 counties declined, but Ulsan, Tongnae, Kŏje, and whichever county had Che harbor (Kimhae or Ungch’ŏng from c. 1450) increased. Lewis concludes that the most likely reason for population concentration in Kŏje and Ungch’ŏng was ‘the attraction of fishing and economies heavily dependent on marine products’ (Lewis 2003, p. 71). The unusual relative growth of population in Tongnae during this time was for the same reason. In other words,
demographic changes in these coastal areas were caused by changes in the occupational structure as Koreans in Tongnae shifted from inland farming to marine products. This explains the sea slugs, seaweed, and other marine products in Table 12 below.

But, Tongnae was different for other reasons as well, and those were related to the international trade in connection with the Japan House. Since Pusan harbour in Tongnae County was the only point of contact that Korea opened to Japan after 1600, part of the demographic changes derived from the trade at the Waegwan, and the trade linked directly to changes in the area’s occupational structure. Lewis examined Tongnae’s demographic changes as revealed in the County Gazetteers (東萊府誌) of 1740, 1789, and 1867, and concluded that the unusual concentration of population in Tongnae was a result of the fact that ‘the men were concentrated for trade or administration connected with the Japanese’ (Lewis 2003, pp. 72-80). The Waegwan was the hub of diplomatic and commercial activities between Korea and Japan. There were four forms of trade: tribute trade, official trade, private trade, and illegal trade (smuggling). Tribute and official trade employed people for government activities and do not help us to see occupational structure. To help clarify the traditional occupational structure before the end of the nineteenth century, we should consider the private trade and its partner, smuggling. Because there is almost no information on smuggling, we should examine the changes in the private trade that was conducted from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth century.

Pusan was the site of extensive entrepôt trade from the seventeenth century into the mid to late eighteenth century. Chinese silk and Korean ginseng were exported in exchange for Japanese silver, copper, tin, and Southeast Asian pharmaceuticals. Massive
amounts of Japanese silver flowed through Pusan on its way to China and massive amounts of Chinese silks returned destined for Japan (Lewis 2003, pp. 87-101). Pusan was also tied into an extensive regional trading sphere. Pusan, as the port in Tongnae, and together with Masan port in Ch’angwŏn County, and Ch’ilsŏng port in Kimhae County, was one of the three major ports for Kyŏngsang Province. Pusan, as the commercial hub of the region, was linked to nearby ports, such as Kŏje, Ulsan, Kimhae, Kamdong-ch’ang in Yangsan, and Chini in Yangsan, as well as to distant ports north along the eastern coast, such as Kunch’uksan in Yŏnghae (Kyŏngsang Province) and even further north into Kangwŏn Province. Along the southern coast, Pusan was linked to ports such as Sach’ŏn, Konyang, and T’ong’yŏng (Kim 2004, pp. 26-27). Its geographical location at the pivot between the east and southern coasts easily made Pusan critical in coastal shipping as well as in moving goods from inland to sea. There were many traditional Korean peddlers (kaekchu 客主) from around the country operating in these trading networks, and the Japan House sat at the crossroads.

At the Japan House, there were four different markets: the officially managed market in the Great Hall of the Waegwan (開市 or 大廳開市 kaeshi or taech’ŏng kaeshi) that handled the important bulk trade (silk, ginseng, silver, etc.) between Korea and Japan, the morning market (choshi 朝市) that supplied the Japanese with daily necessities, the five-day market (o-il kaeshi 五日開市) that brought in other Korean commodities, and the special open market (pyŏl kaesi 別開市) that came to be the site for the cotton-rice trade. Because of these markets, the local population developed an economy that centred on the Waegwan. Local Koreans exchanged agricultural goods and handicrafts with the Japanese, and itinerant Korean peddlers (kaekchu) connected the Japanese both legally
and illegally with inland production (Lewis 2003, p. 87). The entrepôt trade declined by the mid-eighteenth century, with the Japanese cultivation of ginseng, domestic silks, and bans on exporting silver. The Korean connection also faced competition from increased direct trade between China and Japan in Nagasaki.

Pusan was historically pre-disposed to be an important trading focus both within the country and internationally, and naturally that affected the occupational structure of the port. The structure of trade in Pusan shifted from Korean ginseng and Chinese silks to local products, such as ox hides and sea slugs in exchange for Japanese copper during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Kim 2004, pp. 9-16). As a result, the change of trade items explains the ox hides in Table 12, and the change in goods had an impact on the occupational structure in Pusan. Local Tongnae merchants increasingly replaced the representatives of Kaesŏng merchants and the kaekchu, although it is often difficult to distinguish actual Tongnae merchants from the local representatives of the great merchants of Kaesŏng, Seoul, and P’yŏngyang.

The dominant structural characteristics of trade around the Japan House after 1876 were basically a continuation of the traditional practices developed for the trade with Japan. As the impact of a growing number of Japanese settlers came to be felt, the impact on the Korean occupational structures in Pusan began with these traditional connections and expanded and changed. As a result of the growth of Japanese settlers commerce expanded continuously and played an increasing part in the local economy. In particular, considering the fact that the Korean population was even smaller than the Japanese population, the activities of Japanese settlers must have brought a considerable impact to the occupational structure of the local population.
TABLE 12. Chief Export Products in Pusan, 1877-1895 (top three and others)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1877</td>
<td>cowhide (44.0)</td>
<td>sea slug (12.3)</td>
<td>seaweed (5.1)</td>
<td>raw silk, oxen and horses bone, soybean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>rice (27.8)</td>
<td>cowhide (24.8)</td>
<td>soybean (13.8)</td>
<td>silk, oxen and horses bones, raw silk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>rice (57.4)</td>
<td>soybean (16.1)</td>
<td>cowhide (9.7)</td>
<td>seaweed, sea slug, dry anchovy, oxen and horses bones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>rice (32.8)</td>
<td>cowhide (15.1)</td>
<td>soybean (14.3)</td>
<td>seaweed, gold, raw silk, ginseng, sea slug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>soybean (25.1)</td>
<td>cowhide (16.4)</td>
<td>cotton (9.0)</td>
<td>sea slug, seaweed, gold, ginseng, gallnut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td>soybean (24.6)</td>
<td>cowhide (21.2)</td>
<td>gold (7.7)</td>
<td>cotton, raw cotton, rice, seaweed, sea slug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>cowhide (31.9)</td>
<td>gold (23.7)</td>
<td>soybean (17.9)</td>
<td>rice, seaweed, sea slug, raw cotton, shark’s fin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>cowhide (54.0)</td>
<td>soybean (12.4)</td>
<td>seaweed (8.5)</td>
<td>rice, sea slug, shark’s fin, raw silk, drug stuffs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>cowhide (52.9)</td>
<td>soybean (24.3)</td>
<td>rice (5.8)</td>
<td>seaweed, sea slug, shark’s fin, drug stuffs, gallnut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887</td>
<td>soybean (44.2)</td>
<td>cowhide (28.5)</td>
<td>rice (15.5)</td>
<td>seaweed, sea slug, shark’s fin, drug stuffs, fish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>soybean (44.2)</td>
<td>cowhide (23.3)</td>
<td>fish (7.3)</td>
<td>seaweed, rice, shark’s fin, wheat, raw silk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>soybean (45.3)</td>
<td>cowhide (14.4)</td>
<td>rice (8.1)</td>
<td>fish, wheat, seaweed, cotton, sea slug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>rice (61.7)</td>
<td>soybean (20.8)</td>
<td>fish (3.0)</td>
<td>cowhide, wheat, barley, seaweed, cotton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>rice (61.2)</td>
<td>soybean (19.5)</td>
<td>cowhide (4.7)</td>
<td>barley, seaweed, fish, cotton, shark’s fin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>rice (41.2)</td>
<td>soybean (32.9)</td>
<td>cowhide (9.4)</td>
<td>barley, seaweed, fish, cotton, shark’s fin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>soybean (39.1)</td>
<td>cowhide (17.5)</td>
<td>fish (13.5)</td>
<td>rice, seaweed, sea slug, sesame, Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>rice (19.4)</td>
<td>cowhide (15.1)</td>
<td>anchovy (10.0)</td>
<td>soybeans, seaweed, sea slug, red bean, ox</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>cowhide (39.9)</td>
<td>soybean (23.5)</td>
<td>rice (18.9)</td>
<td>seaweed, sea slug, paper, wheat, red bean</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hong Sun-kwŏn 1994, p.107
As Table 12 shows, from 1877 to 1895 the chief export products were rice, soybeans, and cowhides, which were agricultural or livestock products. Apart from the top three, there were fish products, such as anchovy, seaweed, sea slugs, and shark’s fin. In particular, rice and soybeans occupied about 80 percent of the total export products from 1890 to 1892 (Hong 1994, pp. 105-6). In other words, it might appear that the main occupations for Koreans in Pusan were farming and fishing, but we have to consider that many of these agricultural goods were sourced elsewhere.

The Japanese traders necessarily relied on Korean commodity brokers for the inland market (kaekchu) and on coastal trade brokers (yŏgak 旅閣) for goods that could be sourced by shipping. Because the Japanese were initially restricted in their movements, the role of the Korean brokers became increasingly prominent as mediators (Lee 1984, p. 228). Pusan was located near the mouth of the Naktong River, down which many goods could be transported from the rich hinterland of Kyŏngsang Province. At Pusan, many agricultural or livestock products destined for export were transported by river from the interior of Kyŏngsang Province. The transformation of Pusan into a commercial and international trading centre in modern times can be traced in its historical connection with the Japan House trade. In other words, after 1876, Pusan became the central point of domestic as well as international trade, not because the development of a marketing structure after the opening of the port, but because Pusan already sat in the midst of existing structures for local, national, and international trade.

Until the early 1900s, most Japanese merchants traded Korean grains through kaekchu in Pusan, because the Japanese merchants were restricted in their range of motion (Ha 2008, p. 100). There were various ways in which the Japanese merchants
obtained supplies: ‘sometimes they bought from Korean wholesalers in the treaty ports who were connected to local wholesalers in the interior by their own networks of intermediaries’; ‘sometimes they sent their own buyers directly into the interior’; and ‘sometimes they bought rice from independent Japanese traders working in the interior’ (Ha 2008, pp. 98-100).

One noticeable change was that the Korean wholesale merchants began to organize ‘modern’ merchant associations, which reflected the growth of trade. Wŏnsan saw the first establishment of this type of organization in 1883, followed by Seoul in 1884, and Pusan in 1889 (Hong 1994, p. 35).

Native merchants of Fusan have formed a Board of trade, or Commercial Society. The Chang-wan kamni, Mr. Hyen Hak-chuk, has been elected president, and the Tong Nai kamni, Mr. Yi Moo-yung, is made director of the society. Hulbert 1905, The Korea Review, p. 271.

According to the report of the Korea Review above, it was organized by a provincial governor (kamni, 監理), rather than the merchants themselves. It is questionable how effective the organization operated. However, the reason for establishment of merchant associations was that the activities of Korean brokers were traditionally based on private capital, but as they handled large quantities of goods in trade with the Japanese, they faced the problem of a lack of capital. Organization of Korean merchants was also motivated by a desire to control trade with foreign merchants and to protect the domestic market from domination by foreign merchants. The most significant contribution of the Korean merchant association was their effort to standardize weights and measures, which sometimes caused problems in foreign as well as domestic trade (P’yo 1996, p. 245). Moreover, after the 1890s, many brokers began to transform
from simple middlemen between the Korean producer and the Japanese merchants to independent traders with the Japanese merchants (P’yo 1996, p. 249).

TABLE 13. Korean Occupational Structure in Pusan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>1909</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1911</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gov’t. official</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literati (Yangban)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confucian scholar (yusaeng 儒生)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>1,367</td>
<td>1,442</td>
<td>1,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>1,088</td>
<td>1,059</td>
<td>1,424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishery</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hired hand (hiyato 日雇)</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>861</td>
<td>871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,317</td>
<td>4,276</td>
<td>4,639</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As Table 12 shows, most Koreans were engaged in commerce, farming, day labourer, or fishing. On the basis of the available data from 1909 to 1911, it is noticeable that this data reveal about a 10 per cent increase in the Korean population over two years. Farming and fishing were the major occupations in Pusan and this was a natural result of traditional backbone industries being in ever-greater demand as population and trade increased. However, one clear change is that those who were engaged in commerce in Pusan were about as many as those in agriculture and fisheries. The large relative number of Korean merchants reflected the importance of Pusan. Considering that the most important factor to determine Korean occupational structures was the Japanese connection, what we see after 1876 was growth derived from the opening of the port to near-unrestricted Japanese trade. Restraints had been imposed on the Japanese since the
establishment of the Japan House in Pusan, but we can see that as soon as restraints were lifted with the opening of Pusan, the volume of the local economy expanded as the Japanese population expanded. Consequently, the number of unemployed declined, and this may indicate job creation. As the Japanese settlement became the centre of Pusan, the Korean occupational structure in Pusan was shaped accordingly.

**Chinese settlement in Pusan: The ‘Dexinghao Incident’** (德興號 事件)

A few Chinese had of late found their way thither [in the area of the Japanese neighborhood], and had opened shops, but these had been closed by the Japanese authorities

Putnam 1905, p. 82.

There are two theories on the establishment of the Chinese settlement in Pusan. One theory was put forward by Kim Úi-hwan and Kim Yong-hun in 1974 that the establishment of the Chinese settlement was launched with the appointment of the Qing consul Chen Shutang in 1884. The other theory, argued by Tam Yong-sŏng in 1976, is that the Chinese settlement was established by Yuan Shikai (袁世凱), because the effort of the Qing consul Chen Shutang (胡惟德) was not successful (Son 1982b, p. 109). The process of establishing a Chinese settlement in Pusan offers a glimpse of the power struggle in Korea between the Japanese and the Chinese, although the Chinese settlement was never as big as that of the Japanese. In particular, it is noticeable how the Chinese authorities took actions not to lose their influence under the dominance of Japanese settlers in Pusan.
TABLE 14. Changes in the Chinese Resident Population in Pusan in Comparison with the Japanese

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4,028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>5,914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>7,029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>21,928</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chōsen ni okeru Shinajin, Chōsen ni okeru naichijin (朝鮮における支那人, 朝鮮における內地人) in Fusanfushi genkō(釜山府史原稿) Dai 14 ken Dai 6 shō (第14卷第6章); Re-quoted from Yun Chin-suk 1990, p. 16.

As Table 14 shows, in comparison to the number of Japanese residents, Chinese residents in Pusan remained fewer than 2 percent of the Japanese from the opening of the port to the Annexation. There were several reasons why Chinese had been in a minority during this period. First, for the Chinese, Pusan was less important than Inch’ŏn, because of its location and production. Indeed, Pusan was not only ‘the closest open port to Japan,’ but also ‘the port closest to the most productive agricultural regions of Korea,’ which was attractive for the Japanese rice merchants to export cheap Korean rice from Korea to Japan. On the other hand, ‘since there was little demand in China for Korean rice,’ Pusan was not attractive to Chinese merchants (Larsen 2008, p. 228).

Unlike the Japanese settlement, the Chinese settlement in Pusan was likely to be motivated as much by ‘symbolic concerns’ as by opportunities for Chinese commerce (Larsen 2008, pp. 113-114). The Qing minister Li Shuchang, for instance, argued that ‘Pusan is an open port. All those who have a treaty with Korea can come there to trade. How is it, then, that Chinese merchants are not allowed to do business there? This makes no sense!’ (Larsen 2008, p. 112). Li attempted to promote Chinese migration to Pusan so
as to stretch China’s dominance over it. Despite Li’s exhortations, it was not a sufficient reason to motivate Chinese to move to Pusan.

The Dexinghao Incident, which occurred in 1883, reflected the dominant power of Japanese in Pusan as well as the Japanese fear of Chinese merchants expanding their influence. Despite the long existence of a Japanese presence in Pusan, in the beginning of the open-port period, the challenge for Japanese traders was to compete against the Chinese traders. Ōkura Kihachiro (大倉喜八郞, 1837-1928) reflected that ‘I could be no match for the Chinese merchants, who continuously held genuine power in commerce’ (Pak 1966, p. 19). This competition with powerful Chinese merchants became open in 1883 with the Dexinghao Incident. The incident occurred when two Guangdong merchants, Zheng Yizhi and Zheng Weisheng, who were sent by a trade commissioner, Chen Shutang, attempted to open a shop under the name Dexinghao in Pusan. The local Japanese merchant community opposed it and hindered it (Larsen 2008, pp. 111-112).

Although a single event, in a larger context, the incident illustrates the change of hegemony between China and Japan in Korea and clearly shows that Pusan was one more theatre of international power rivalry. Individuals took international confrontations seriously as a part of everyday life. It is said that Chinese merchants were often arrogant towards Koreans because the Chinese thought of themselves as ‘taeguk saram’ (大國사람) or ‘people from the great country’ at least until the Sino-Japanese war was concluded with the victory of Japan (Pak 1967, pp. 45-47).
Russian presence in Pusan

The Russian concession: The Russian demand for a concession for military purposes at Fusan has created something of a stir. At the entrance to the beautiful harbour of Fusan lies Deer Island. Two years ago it was intended to include it in the foreign concession at the port, and Plans were in consideration to lay it out for residence when the murder of the Queen put everything into confusion and the matter fell through. Fusan is largely Japanese and the water on the mainland being very bad, While that on the island was good, the springs on the latter have been connected by pipes laid under the sea with the mainland. Japan also has had for some years a small coal godown on the island. This past summer Russian men-of-war had been constantly at Pusan and now Russia makes a demand for twenty acres of land on Deer Island, exactly facing the Japanese Settlement, for coal godowns. The large tract demanded has given rise to all sorts of suspicions. "Naval rendezvous," "Southern terminus of the Trans-Siberian Railroad," and other things have been suggested. Twenty acres of coal godowns, of course, is not much, but then coal godowns are not built by the acre. Russia, however, is sure of getting it and an attaché has already been despatched to survey the proposed site. In the meantime a mild protest has been lodged against the concession by two of the governments represented at Seoul, neither one of which is Japan.

The North China Herald, 24 September 1897.

Russia played a significant role in the competition for dominance in East Asia and was often seeking a warm-water port in Korea. After Russia agreed commercial and diplomatic relations with Chosŏn in July 1884, the Czar’s government constantly attempted to expand its influence on the Korean peninsula. During these early years after 1876, Russia obtained ‘considerable concessions from the Korean government to exploit Korea’s mineral and timber resources’ (Gragert 1994, p. 56). Kim (1980) points out that from the 1880s to 1904 Japan’s aims in Korea were ‘to expand its influence in the peninsula’ and ‘to forestall Russian encroachment’ (p. 292). For this, Japan was even ‘willing to bring Western powers into Korea as a means of checking Russian ambition there’ (Kim 1980, pp. 292-293).

In 1896, the Russian government diplomatically appealed to the Korean government to allow a Russian settlement in Pusan in the area of Yong-do (J. Bokushi-
shima) where the Japanese navy had set up a coaling station in 1885. However, Russia
failed to establish a settlement in Pusan adjacent to the Japanese coaling station, because
other Western powers’ objected. Russia eventually settled on putting a naval base in
Masan, to the west of Pusan, instead. Although Masan was the site, whenever Russian
ships were dispatched to Masan, on which Russia obtained a lease, they were anchored in
the port of Pusan (Pak 1966, pp. 39-41). Koreans, as well as the Japanese, were afraid of
the appearance of Russian navy vessels. The display of power was serious enough, but
the Russian sailors were ignorant and violent when on shore. For example, when there
was news that Russian ships had appeared off the Oryuk islands (五六島)\textsuperscript{18} in the mouth
of Pusan port, all the stores in the Japanese quarter closed. Ordinary Japanese merchants
felt intimidated by Russian power until the Russo-Japanese war concluded with the

The Japanese victory changed the whole order in East Asia. From 1905, the
Japanese government completely consolidated its domination in Korea. At the same time,
Japanese in Pusan apparently internalized this event: the victory of Japan, as a nonwhite
nation, reinforced Japanese identification of themselves as the protectors of Korea, even
of all East Asia. The conclusion of the Russo-Japanese war was a turning point for
Japanese imperialism and for the Japanese settlement in Pusan. Thereafter, its future was
secure in Japanese hands and could be fashioned accordingly. In the context of Pusan,
Russia was neither a dominate power nor a commercial rival. Rather, it was a constant
threat that had been suppressed by 1905. As a result of Japanese victory, Japanese
migration to Pusan again leapt upwards.

\textsuperscript{18} The Oryuk islands refers to one island and four islets (Usakdo, Suri-sŏm, Songok-sŏm, Kulsŏm, and Tŭndaesŏm), which were located in the mouth of Pusan port.
**Summation**

As a result of the Treaty of Kanghwa, Korea agreed to open the port of Pusan. With a series of treaties, Japan continued to expand its influence over Korea. Japan’s victories in the Sino-Japanese war and the Russo-Japanese war eliminated the other two rivals over Korea and legitimized Japanese domination. Throughout these changes in the political structures that governed contact, the most noticeable change in the micro-level community in Pusan was an increased demographic flow of Japanese immigrants. The increase of Japanese residents corresponded directly with the growing economic power of Japan. Japanese political power over Korea slowly translated into economic power. Japanese residents in Pusan out-numbered other nationals and their settlements. The Japanese residents exercised and strengthened their power by acquiring land centred on the Japan House and establishing economic clusters.

As a port, Pusan did not abandon its traditional role of trading with the Japanese and providing agricultural and marine products for the Japanese; rather, Pusan resurrected its old role as a trading focus and expanded its trade with Japan. The Japanese merchants took advantage of new trading opportunities offered by the political, economic, and demographic changes surrounding Pusan. These changes were not only an opportunity for the Japanese, but also for Korean merchants. The numbers of Korean merchants increased with the expansion of domestic as well as international trade in the port of Pusan. The next chapter examines trade more closely and isolated its ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ characteristics.
Chapter Three: Maritime Trade and Local Economy in Pusan

[After the 1678 Agreement concerning the Japanese settlement at Pusan,] the Japan House was established and enclosed with walls like a lizard. The main gate was guarded, but [the Japan House] no longer needs to be like a fortification following the Kanghwa treaty…. Trade was initiated by the [Korean] magistrate (official trade) and they did not allow private trade. Thus they [the Korean government] suppressed illegal trade and smuggling. According to Great Administrative Code (1865, Taejŏn hoet’ong 大典會通), illegal merchants and smugglers were put to death. But now all four gates are open all day to create a market. As the righteous [Japanese] government is overflowing, isn’t it delightful!

Ishibata Sada 石畳貞 1878, Chōsen Kikō Yoroku 朝鮮歸好餘錄; Re-quoted from Hŏ 2010, pp. 61-62.

Both official and private trade had been conducted with Japan at the Japan House in Pusan via Tsushima prior to 1876, though trade was restricted and limited. With the conclusion of the Kanghwa Treaty in 1876, Pusan became the first port of Korea open to Japan for trade in the modern era. A Japanese poet, Ishibata Sada, described above the opening of Korea by reflecting on the opening of the four gates of the Japan House and the creation of a market in Pusan. The eventual construction of transport infrastructure, such as the Seoul-Pusan railway, and the creation of a regular shipping line between Pusan and Shimonoseki allowed Pusan to become a great market-place for trade and commerce, thereby providing fast and convenient transportation for passengers and freight. And yet, as much as transport infrastructure has an important influence on commercial activity, commercial trade markets rely almost entirely upon the input of human and financial resources. Since Pusan was the centre of trade with Japan long before its opening in 1876, Pusan was equipped with plenty of human and financial resources. In other words, in order to understand the significance of Pusan in the open-port period, we need to examine how the human and financial aspects of the Korea-Japan trade in Pusan changed from a traditional style to a modern style. In this chapter I will first discuss the transition from traditional trade to that of the open-port period between Korea and Japan. Then I will focus on changes to the taxation
system and the creation of the Pusan Maritime Customs as illustrative of the Chosŏn government trying to cope with the changes. Finally, I will examine a key element of the changes in the system of private trade between the Japanese and the Koreans by examining the practice of money-lending. The following opens the story on the transformation of Pusan from a traditional city to a modern city. In this and later chapters, I will examine Pusan as the first and most important foothold of Japanese imperialism on the peninsula and eventually the continent.

Transition from traditional to open-port period contact and trade between Korea and Japan

After December 16, the fact that both guarded gates were widely opened stimulated the spirit [of contact and trade] both inside and outside the residences of the Japan House. I have heard that thereafter there were as many as three to four hundred people coming and going to Korean residential areas every day to look around or do business and there were even some people coming from afar. By this time the newly opened stores, such as Tōkyō store and Ōkura association, were receiving about 50 won a day in sales. Recently, there were a couple of people who go inside of Korean residential areas with goods and even arranged [to sell] goods by the street. The perception of old customs has changed.  

Nihon gaikō bunsho Volume 9, chapter 5, p. 336 – Kondō Masuki (the trade superintendent at Pusan)’s report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan on 25 December 1876; Re-quoted from Pak 1985, p. 16.

The export trade of Korea is almost entirely in the hands of the Japanese…. The Korean farmer will receive no part of the increment of value resulting from the removal of export duty. He knows nothing about the rice market in Japan nor what is a fair price for his goods.  

Hulbert 1907, p. 36.

According to the report of the trade superintendent at Pusan, Kondō Masuki (近藤真鋤), the town seemed to have undergone drastic changes and to have brought huge benefits to the new stores within approximately ten months after Pusan’s opening. There was no doubt that Pusan went through significant changes after its opening, but it had a significant position
as a treaty port long before 1876. Throughout its history, Pusan functioned not only as a treaty port but also as a diplomatic base through which Korea and Japan communicated.

Let us first examine the pre-modern trade connection between Korea and Japan via Pusan and how the Japan House came into existence. The kingdom of Chosŏn, newly established in 1392, was aware of the danger of piracy brought about by the raids of the waegu (or J. wakō), which were increasing in frequency and scale in the thirteenth century and created huge problems in Koryŏ. In the early Chosŏn, having witnessed the failure of central government-level relations to maintain border security during the Koryŏ dynasty, the Chosŏn court began to use the regional powers of western Japan, various shugo of Honshū, the Ōuchi family, and the leader of Tsushima, the Sō family. This program was initiated by the decision to exchange envoys between the Chosŏn government and Tsushima. Having obtained a temporary respite from piracy and pillage, the Chosŏn court began to permit contact and trade along the coastal areas, thus encouraging commercial activities. In sum, raids began to decrease from 1398, thereby increasing commercial activities. A reoccurrence of raids prompted King Sejong in 1419 to command Yi Chŏng-mu to conduct a series of campaigns against Tsushima, from which the Japanese pirates had based and launched raids for centuries. After the subjugation of Tsushima, diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan were cut off. Diplomatic relations were resumed by the request of the Sō family of Tsushima shortly thereafter, though (Robinson 1992, p. 102-103; Robinson 1996, p. 30).

Kenneth Robinson and James Lewis have argued that the reason for the Chosŏn court’s decision to permit controlled contact with the Japanese was a desire to placate piracy by legalizing trade with Tsushima in the early fifteenth century, even though the exchange of tribute via Tsushima was more likely to be a loss to the Korean government. In other words,

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1 In the case of Northern regions, protecting the area from attack of the Jurchen, the foreign policy of the Chosŏn court to sustain peace and security in the early Chosŏn dynasty was not different from that of establishing the Japan House in the south in Kyŏngsang province. In the same way, regulating trade with the Jurchen was the most effective means of sustaining peace (Robinson 1992, pp. 97-101).
the motivation of trade was political, rather than economic. The Korean government’s intention was to turn pirates into respectable traders. There were two important reasons for the efforts of the Korean government. The first was that the cost of preventing piracy at the border was higher than allowing the Japanese to trade with Korea. Moreover, the Korean court, as a more civilized and advanced state, felt obliged to help the less fortunate denizens of Tsushima (Lewis 2003, pp. 107-145; Lewis and Sesay 2002, pp. 109-111; Hellyer 2010, p. 120).

In this context, the Japan House was installed as a symbol of contact and trade between Korea and Japan. There were three kinds of Japan Houses: the Hall of Eastern Peace at Seoul, Japan Houses at the ports, and inland warehouses (waemulgo 倭物庫). The origin of the Japan House is still debated, but it is generally agreed that the Hall of Eastern Peace for Japanese envoys at Hanyang (Seoul) was first established in the early fifteenth century for use as a reception and lodging house for Japanese envoys (Chang 2001, pp. 19-21). Along with the travel permit to cross into Korea, the Japanese came to be restricted to living in the compound of the Japan House. Nonetheless, it was a window for communication between Korea and Japan.

Table 1. Vicissitudes of the Chosŏn-period Japan Houses (Waegwans)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Site(s)</th>
<th>Year established</th>
<th>Number of years in or out of operation</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Waegwans</td>
<td>Pusanp’o and Chep’o (or Naeip’o)</td>
<td>T’aejong 8 (1408)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First closure</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sejong 1 to 8 (1419-1426)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Attack on Tsushima to suppress piracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Waegwans</td>
<td>Pusanp’o (from 1423 and Chep’o, and Yŏmp’o (1423)</td>
<td>Seong 8 (1426)</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>Period of Three Ports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second closure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Japanese Revolt in the three Ports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Chep’o</td>
<td>Chungjong 7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Imshin yakcho (壬申約條)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waegwan</td>
<td>(1512)</td>
<td>(1512)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Waegwans</td>
<td>Pusan’o (from 1521) added to Chep’o</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Closure</td>
<td>Chungjong 39 (1544)-Myõngjong 2 (1547)</td>
<td>4 Chep’o closed permanently as result of 1544 incident</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Waegwan</td>
<td>Pusan’o</td>
<td>Myõngjong 2 (1547)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth closure</td>
<td>Sônjo 25 to 34 (1592-1601)</td>
<td>10 Imjin Waeran (Hideyoshi invasion)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Waegwan</td>
<td>Temporary Waegwan on Chôlyõng Island in Pusan Harbour</td>
<td>Sônjo 34 to 40 (1601-1607)</td>
<td>7 To negotiate normalization of relations between Chosôn and Tokugawa.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pusan Tumöp’o (Old Waegwan)</td>
<td>Sônjo 40 (1607)</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pusan Ch’oryang (New Waegwan)</td>
<td>Sukjong 4 (1678)</td>
<td>199</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abolition</td>
<td>Pusan Ch’oryang Japanese Concession</td>
<td>Kojong 13 (1876)</td>
<td>Kanghwa Treaty (Chosôn-Meiji Japan)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As Table 1 shows, the Chosôn court continued to repeat the pattern of opening, expanding the number, and closing the Japan Houses at ports according to its diplomatic relations with Japan. From establishment to abolition, the vicissitudes of the Japan House in the Chosôn period could be roughly divided into five periods between closures. The first period was the beginning of the establishment of the Japan House from 1408 to 1418. In this period, the Japan House was understandably not strongly established as a residence of the Japanese. In 1407 Kang Man-dök (姜萬德), the Military Commander of Kyŏngsang province, sent an official letter to the King of Chosôn to obtain improvements to the facility at the ports in Kyŏngsang province, suggesting that Pusan’o and Naeip’o (or Chep’o), which were the area of responsibility of the Tomanho (都萬戶), the Left and Right District Commander of Kyŏngsang province, should be open to Japanese merchants. Kang Man-dök’s suggestion was accepted by the Chosôn court, so that two Japan Houses were
established at Pusan’o and Naeip’o. However, the Japan Houses were closed when King Sejong campaigned to subjugate Tsushima in 1419. After the subjugation, the Japan House reopened in 1423. The Three Ports period lasted for eighty-five years before the second closure due to the Japanese Revolt of the Three Ports in 1510. This period before 1510 was the peak of peaceful contact and trade (Chang 2001, p. 47).

With the conclusion of the 1512 Agreement (*Imshin yakcho* 壬申約條), the Japan House reopened at Chep’o first. However, to minimize the harmful effect of the Japanese only entering via Chep’o, the Japan House at Pusan’o was established. In 1544, as a result of the *Saryangjin waebyon* (蛇梁鎭倭變) or *Saryang waebyon* (蛇梁倭變), in which twenty Japanese ships raid ed the fortress of Saryang in Kyŏngsang province, the Japan House at Chep’o was permanently closed, but the Japan House at Pusan’o opened from 1547. It is noticeable that the Japan House at Pusan’o was not closed even after the *Sarayangjin waebyon* 2 (Chang 2001, p. 48). The reason for the closure of the Japan House at Chep’o and the survival of the Japan House at Pusan’o was due to the military strategic importance of the latter. While it is difficult to control the Japanese around Chep’o, where there were many islands, the area of Pusan’o was relatively easier to control. Thereafter, control of the Japan House became even stricter and the Japan House at Pusan remained as the single Japan House until the Kanghwa treaty was signed in 1876, although the Sŏ family of Tsushima continued to request the opening of Japan Houses elsewhere (Chang 2001, pp. 47-48). Just before the Hideyoshi invasion (1592-1598), only two Japan Houses remained in Korea: one was the Hall of Eastern Peace for Japanese envoys (*Tongpyŏng gwan* 東平館) at Seoul and the other was at Pusan-jin. Here there were still severe restrictions on Japanese traders, with the aim of controlling and formalizing trade. The Japan House at Pusan-jin was closed for the fourth time due to the Hideyoshi invasion.

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2 Though the Chosŏn court allowed Japanese to enter Korea via Pusan-p’o, regulations for the Japanese entry became strict after the *Sarayangjin waebyon*. 90
After the Hideyoshi invasion, the restoration of relations between Korea and Japan proved difficult, not only because of continuing resentment toward the Japanese and the necessity to repatriate Korean prisoners of war from Japan, but also because of the presence of Ming officers in Korea, who advised the Korean court to delay the negotiations (Toby 1984, pp. 26-27). In this process of peace negotiations, the Sō clan of Tsushima played a key role, having been entrusted with the task by Ieyasu. In fact, Tsushima was most ardent to re-establish relations with Korea because its livelihood was dependent on the entrepôt trade with Korea. For Tsushima, the restoration of kyorin (交隣) relations between Korea and Japan was not just a matter of restoring peaceful relations of diplomacy but a matter of survival (Toby 1984, p. 76).

The Chŏlyŏng-do Waegwan (the temporary Japan House at Chŏlyŏng island) (1599-1607) was established to negotiate the normalisation of diplomatic relations. The Tsushima Japanese at the Japan House continued to request the transfer of the Japan House to Pusan-jin, but it was instead installed in Pusan bay at Tumop’o in 1607.

Eventually, the 1609 Agreement (Kiyu yakcho,己酉約條) was signed to normalize diplomatic relations between Korea and Tsushima. The Japan House remained in Tumop’o for over seventy years afterwards despite the fact that the Tsushima Japanese repeatedly requested the Chosŏn court that they move it to Pusan-jin. In response to these requests, the Chosŏn court permitted it to move to Ch’oryang-bu in 1678, which was about 10 li from Pusan-jin (Chang 2001, p. 54). The Japan House at Ch’oryang remained as the only trading post in contact with the Japanese via Tsushima until the Kanghwa treaty was signed. In comparison with the Chinese community of Nagasaki (Tŏjin-yashiki 唐人屋敷) (approximately ten thousand tsubo\(^3\)) and the Residence of Dutch traders in Nagasaki at Dejima (approximately four thousand tsubo), the Japan House in Pusan, at one hundred

\(^3\) tsubo 坪 = approximately 3.3 m\(^2\)
thousand tsubo, was considerably larger (Kang 1997, p. 147). At this time, the Japan House at Ch’oryang was the only installation through which diplomatic as well as commercial communication was allowed between Korea and Japan (Lewis 2003, pp. 21-22). In addition, only the Tsushima Japanese were permitted to engage in trade with Korea. Though the Japan House was not stable, market trade between Korea and Japan flourished via Tsushima following the establishment of the Japan House at Pusan. Let us examine specific figures indicating the size of the private market trade at the Japan House.
### Table 2. Volume and Profit in the Private Market Trade (1684-1710)

Unit: *kanme* (貫目)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Volume of exports (<em>kanme</em>)</th>
<th>Volume of imports (B)</th>
<th>Total volume of trade (A+B)</th>
<th>Total trade Balance (A-B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japanese product (a)</td>
<td>Silver (b)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1684</td>
<td>843.435</td>
<td>1,937.925</td>
<td>2,781.360</td>
<td>1,405.875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1685</td>
<td>1,043.931</td>
<td>2,007.250</td>
<td>3,051.181</td>
<td>2,474.401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1686</td>
<td>1,286.512</td>
<td>2,887.345</td>
<td>4,173.857</td>
<td>3,929.204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1687</td>
<td>1,393.659</td>
<td>2,044.121</td>
<td>3,437.780</td>
<td>5,108.215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1688</td>
<td>1,402.046</td>
<td>2,487.226</td>
<td>3,899.272</td>
<td>3,357.602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1689</td>
<td>1,989.491</td>
<td>1,994.749</td>
<td>3,984.240</td>
<td>2,454.598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1690</td>
<td>2,495.286</td>
<td>2,231.140</td>
<td>4,726.426</td>
<td>4,510.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1691</td>
<td>2,968.593</td>
<td>2,730.630</td>
<td>5,699.223</td>
<td>4,275.467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1692</td>
<td>2,169.006</td>
<td>2,437.242</td>
<td>4,606.248</td>
<td>3,954.458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1693</td>
<td>3,147.188</td>
<td>2,274.247</td>
<td>5,421.425</td>
<td>3,827.444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1694</td>
<td>2,928.890</td>
<td>2,579.050</td>
<td>5,507.940</td>
<td>5,941.276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1695</td>
<td>2,724.681</td>
<td>2,449.373</td>
<td>5,174.276</td>
<td>3,008.897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1696</td>
<td>2,477.877</td>
<td>2,439.998</td>
<td>4,917.876</td>
<td>3,778.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1697</td>
<td>3,320.080</td>
<td>2,584.295</td>
<td>5,904.375</td>
<td>2,752.642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1698</td>
<td>1,169.588</td>
<td>1,400.000</td>
<td>2,569.588</td>
<td>2,804.502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1699</td>
<td>908.681</td>
<td>1,980.000</td>
<td>2,888.681</td>
<td>901.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1700</td>
<td>17.322</td>
<td>1,565.000</td>
<td>1,582.322</td>
<td>665.504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1701</td>
<td>985.620</td>
<td>2,730.630</td>
<td>3,715.620</td>
<td>2,587.849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1702</td>
<td>572.239</td>
<td>1,806.960</td>
<td>2,379.199</td>
<td>2,230.204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1703</td>
<td>275.969</td>
<td>730.000</td>
<td>1,005.969</td>
<td>1,844.413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1704</td>
<td>493.403</td>
<td>1,350.000</td>
<td>1,843.403</td>
<td>1,843.403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1705</td>
<td>210.061</td>
<td>1,077.500</td>
<td>1,287.561</td>
<td>2,098.122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1706</td>
<td>676.885</td>
<td>1,300.000</td>
<td>1,976.885</td>
<td>2,253.664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1707</td>
<td>551.285</td>
<td>971.900</td>
<td>1,523.185</td>
<td>1,066.969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1708</td>
<td>427.811</td>
<td>980.000</td>
<td>1,407.811</td>
<td>1,323.510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1709</td>
<td>642.600</td>
<td>940.000</td>
<td>1,582.600</td>
<td>1,197.743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1710</td>
<td>647.865</td>
<td>620.000</td>
<td>1,267.865</td>
<td>789.245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37,870.004</td>
<td>50,535.951</td>
<td>88,405.955</td>
<td>72,067.464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yearly average</td>
<td>1,402.593</td>
<td>1,871.702</td>
<td>3,274.295</td>
<td>2,669.165</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Tsushima Sō-ke monjo* (對馬島宗家文書) from the National Diet Archive of Japan, Tashiro 1981, p. 271; re-quoted from Chŏng Sŏng-il 1999, ‘Hanil samuyŏk nonjaeng – 1684-1710 nyŏn’gan Taema-pŏn ŭi muyŏk suji wa muyŏk iyun’, *Kyŏngje sahak*, vol. 27, p. 60. *Kanme* (貫目) was a denomination of silver currency: 10 毛 = 1 厘; 10 厘 = 1 分; 10 分 = 1 厘; 1000 厘 = 1 貫目.
As Table 2 and Figure 1 show, the total volume of private trade from 1684 to 1710 averaged 5,943,460 kanme (annual volume of export plus annual volume of import). The annual volume reached its peak of 11,449,216 kanme in 1694. The official restriction imposed by the bakufu on Tsushima exports in 1687 was only 1,080 kanme, which was far exceeded by the reality. In fact, Tsushima carried on trade with Korea far beyond its restrictions during 1687 to 1697 (Tashiro 1976, pp. 90-92). The Sō family of Tsushima appointed a special official (Shōbai-gakari 商買掛) from 1684 to 1711 to separate out official trade and private or market trade. The private market trade at Pusan was sizeable and the Japan House was the centre of its commerce.

To judge the significance of the trade, we might consider its relative size to other trade at the time. In terms of private trade between Korea and Japan via Tsushima, there are two extensive, but contradictory, studies by Tashiro Kazui (田代和生) and Nakamura Tadashi (中村哲) in Japan. Both Tashiro and Nakamura examined the Tsushima Sō-ke monjo (對馬島宗家文書), but the result of calculation was different. The reason for this
disagreement derives from the fact that Tashiro and Nakamura used different copies of the same source, which were written for different purposes. Tashiro’s study used a copy of *Tsushima Sō-ke monjo* from the National Diet Archive of Japan. On the other hand, Nakamura used a copy of *Tsushima Sō-ke monjo* from the National Institute of Japanese History at Tokyo University. Moreover, Nakamura challenged Tashiro’s calculation of the volume of private trade from 1684 to 1711 based solely on a case study from 1695. Tashiro argues that the total amount of silver exported to Korea via Tsushima far exceeded exports through Nagasaki to the Chinese and to the Dutch. (Chŏng 1999, pp. 53-55). Chŏng Sŏng-il argues that Tashiro overestimated the total volume of private trade via Tsushima. He concluded that the annual volume of private trade was 6,000 *kanme* (貫) (22,500 kg.) between 1687 and 1710, counting exports and imports. In comparison, the silver export at Dejima to the Dutch was 3,000 *kanme* (11,250 kg.) and the silver export to the Chinese was as much as 6,000 *kanme* (22,500 kg.). The silver value of the whole private trade at the Japan House was considerable; it was twice the silver export at Dejima and comparable to the silver export to the Chinese (Lewis 2003, p. 97; Chŏng 1999, pp. 53-55). Setting aside the controversy over the volume of trade and considering the profits that Tsushima made on the private trade, we find even more difficulties. Owing to a paucity of materials, it is difficult to measure accurately the profit of the private trade. Despite the rough estimates of volume and the disagreement on profits, one thing that we can be sure of was that the trade at Pusan was not only a vital element to the finances of the Tsushima *han*, but was also significant within the economies of Japan and Korea.

In order to explain the significance, let us first take a close look at the import and export items privately traded between Korea and Japan at the Japan House. Private trade reached its height in 1694. The following table shows import and export items at the Japan House in Pusan for that year.
### Table 3. Market Trade (Private trade) between Chosŏn Korea and Tokugawa Japan via Tsushima in 1694

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Silver paid</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exports from Tsushima to Korea</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver</td>
<td>(credit sales carried over from the previous year)</td>
<td>716,802 kanme</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver</td>
<td>(handed over to the <em>daikan</em> 代官)</td>
<td>10,679 kanme</td>
<td>0.19 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keichō silver</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,579,049 kanme</td>
<td>46.73 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blistter copper</td>
<td>468,852 kin</td>
<td>797,050 kanme</td>
<td>14.44 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bar &amp; plate copper</td>
<td>223,501 kin</td>
<td>483,752 kanme</td>
<td>8.76 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tin</td>
<td>19,886 kin</td>
<td>235,329 kanme</td>
<td>4.26 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brass</td>
<td>157,500 kin</td>
<td>472,500 kanme</td>
<td>8.56 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tin plate</td>
<td>45,549 kin</td>
<td>274,204 kanme</td>
<td>4.96 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coptis japonica</td>
<td>300 kin</td>
<td>12,600 kanme</td>
<td>0.22 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pepper</td>
<td>945 kin</td>
<td>2,362 kanme</td>
<td>0.04 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alum</td>
<td>1,890 kin</td>
<td>2,835 kanme</td>
<td>0.05 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sappan wood</td>
<td>945 kin</td>
<td>1,260 kanme</td>
<td>0.02 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buffalo horn</td>
<td>4,346</td>
<td>183,946 kanme</td>
<td>3.33 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fur (badger, fox, martem, otter)</td>
<td>18,783</td>
<td>164,908 kanme</td>
<td>2.99 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clocks</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>655 monme</td>
<td>0.01 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>400 kin</td>
<td>1,257 kanme</td>
<td>0.02 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather baskets</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>578 monme</td>
<td>0.01 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td></td>
<td>15,649 kanme</td>
<td>0.28 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton [from official trade and re-exported]</td>
<td>500 soku</td>
<td>280,000 kanme</td>
<td>5.07 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total of silver</strong></td>
<td>3,306,530 kanme</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total of goods other than silver</strong></td>
<td>= 2,928,885 kanme</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yonwari-tsubushi 四割潰</strong></td>
<td>2,092,060 kanme</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total exports</strong></td>
<td>= 5,398,590 kanme</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imports from Korea to Tsushima</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ginseng</td>
<td>6,678 kin</td>
<td>2,146,790 kanme</td>
<td>36.13 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White raw silk thread</td>
<td>14,382 kin</td>
<td>3,535,848 kanme</td>
<td>59.51 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silk fabrics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figured cloth</td>
<td>848 tan</td>
<td>48,204 kanme</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twill</td>
<td>1,776 tan</td>
<td>45,065 kanme</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crepe</td>
<td>1,994 tan</td>
<td>62,126 kanme</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damask</td>
<td>130 bolts</td>
<td>19,320 kanme</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold &amp; silk brocade</td>
<td>17 bolts</td>
<td>5,650 kanme</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brocade</td>
<td>2 bolts</td>
<td>520 monme</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pongee</td>
<td>51 bolts</td>
<td>4,950 kanme</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauze</td>
<td>35 bolts</td>
<td>7,725 kanme</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauze</td>
<td>160 tan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfigured cloth</td>
<td>893 tan</td>
<td>26,430 kanme</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silk floss</td>
<td>5,384 kin</td>
<td>38,641 kanme</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total import</strong></td>
<td>= 5,941,271 kanme</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Balance = Credit purchase \(\text{④}\) total export - \(\text{③}\) total import = 542,681 kanme

Note: *Yonwari-tsubushi* was an internal calculation of unclear meaning

1 kanme (貫) = 1,000 monme (匁) = 3.75 kg.
From Table 3 we can see what items were handled between Korea and Japan. On the Japanese side, the mineral resources, such as silver, copper, and brass were 87.71 per cent of total exports. The most noticeable export was silver at 46.73 per cent. Japan was known in East Asia as an island of rich mineral resources (particularly silver and gold) in the late sixteenth and throughout the seventeenth century (Tashiro 1982, p. 294). On the other hand, the main exports of Chosŏn Korea were ginseng and white raw silk thread, which accounted for 95.64 per cent of total exports, with white raw silk thread from China accounting for 59.51 per cent. Chosŏn played a role as the centre of the entrepôt trade between China and Japan. In particular, Pusan was the exclusive market for the Tsushima Japanese.

Oh Doo Hwan used Tashiro’s sources to examine the amount of silver flowing from Japan to Korea in Korean-Japanese trade (Oh 2004, p. 93). The annual export of Japanese silver averaged 45,000 kanme from 1600 to the late 1630s; 14,500 kanme from the 1640s to the late 1660s; and about 5,900 kanme from the 1670s to 1684. The Japanese imposed a prohibition on all silver exports from Nagasaki in 1668, but the embargo on silver export to China was taken off in 1671. However, due to the outflow of silver, the Japanese government limited the exports of silver to keep more silver in Japan and eventually ordered a complete restriction on trade with silver. Even after the complete prohibition on silver export, copper became a substitute for silver and soon became a major export item. Japan became the leading producer of copper in North East Asia as well as the rest of the world (Tashiro 1982, pp. 294-295). However, the open market at the Japan House gradually declined as the bakufu placed further and further restrictions on the export of metals, as the Japanese developed import substitution of Japanese ginseng for Korean ginseng, and as
direct trade with China developed at Nagasaki (Chŏng 2000, pp. 235-251). As a result, the market at the Japan House (kwanshi 館市) remained in name only and private trade items gradually became limited to oxhides and marine products.

What about private trade immediately prior to 1876? Nakamura argued that private trade ceased and only official trade existed after 1775 on the basis of Tsushima Sō-ke monjo. However, his argument has been challenged by Chŏng Sŏng-il. He argues that though private trade between Korea and Japan was weakened, it continued until 1876. The reason that Tsushima Sō-ke monjo appears to show that private trade had ceased was that this document was drawn up to appeal to the Tokugawa authority for financial support (Chŏng 1999, p. 71; Tashiro 1989, pp.301-321). Let us examine trade in Pusan immediately prior to 1876.

Table 4 Trade in Pusan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Export Amount (yen)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Import Amount (yen)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1873</td>
<td>52,382</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>59,664</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>112,946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>55,935</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>57,522</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>113,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>59,787</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>68,930</td>
<td>84.7</td>
<td>128,719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>82,572</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>81,374</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>163,946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>1,944,731</td>
<td>2,280.0</td>
<td>1,882,659</td>
<td>2,389.9</td>
<td>3,827,394</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kankoku shi (韓國誌)1905, pp. 112-113.

As Table 4 shows, even prior to 1876, private trade reached 70 to 80 per cent of the 1876 value (taken at 100). Basically, the data show a gradual increase, if not a stable trade, up until 1876, and then a massive leap of more than twenty times in 1881 as a result of the 1876 treaty made between Japan and Korea. Since Pusan was the only open port until 1879, the data show not simply Pusan’s trade, but the whole country’s trade with Japan. In addition, until 1880 Korea was not open to other foreign traders; therefore, the trade data from 1876 to 1880 was solely Korean-Japanese trade and the sum of Korea’s foreign private trade. This does not mean that there were no western imports into Korea; rather, the western imports came to Korea via Japan. In other words, foreign imports flooded into Korea through Pusan.
In order to promote trade with Pusan, the Home Minister Ōkubo Toshimichi (大久保利通) personally appealed to Ōkura Kihachirō and, as a result, the Ōkura association (Ōkura-gumi 大倉祖) began trading with Pusan (Deuchler 1977, p. 71). By way of support and assistance, the Japanese government sent a superintendent of trade to Pusan in late October 1876. The reason for the government support was reflected in Prime Minister Ōkuma’s statement in 1898: ‘Foreign trade is of the greatest significance for a country’s national interests. It is so important that success or failure in foreign trade establishes a nation’s success or failure’ (Duus 1995, p. 249).

The early arrivals in Pusan enjoyed a monopoly on Korea’s foreign trade until the early 1880s. During this period, a massive number of Japanese migrated to Korea. No other country had a trade treaty with Korea, nor were there any foreigners but Japanese at Pusan, and as we have seen the Japanese government sent a trade superintendent (Kanrikan 管理官) to Pusan. This combination of geographical closeness, a large number of Japanese settlers, and the presence of the Japanese trade superintendent made Pusan an ideal place for trade, which in turn attracted more Japanese merchants to come and begin trading in Pusan.

Under the terms of the trade regulations the Japanese could conduct commerce under the same set of rules as at home: they paid no tariffs, they could use their own currency, they could travel to and from Pusan as they pleased, and they were subject to their own law, not Korean law. Pusan was the port ‘closest to the most productive agricultural regions of Korea’ as well as ‘the closest open port to Japan’ (Larsen 2008, p. 228). Pusan attracted a great influx of traders from Japan. Through their activities the port city of Pusan clearly served as the central link between Japan and the Korean interior.

Pusan became dominated by the Japanese during the open port period, even after the Imo Mutiny (Immo kullan 午午軍亂) of 1882 when China, having encamped military forces as a show of military strength, had concluded the China-Korea Treaty of Communication and
Commerce. This treaty reinforced China’s political, military, and economic influence on Korea, but Pusan remained a Japanese preserve. The economic influence of the Japanese merchants was pervasive. Many associations for Japanese merchants were established. The most prominent organisations were the Pusan Rice Export Association (head of the association: Hajama Hotarō) and the Pusan Grain Trader Associations (head of the association: Ōike Tadasuke), which were under the umbrella organisation of the Chamber of Commerce in Pusan. They were the most active in recording the rice harvest since the main export from Pusan was rice. After Wŏnsan was opened as a second trading port in 1880, Pusan’s role as the only commercial port had to be split with the port of Wŏnsan. Yet Pusan still enjoyed its position as the main port through which many Japanese came to Korea.

Moreover, since there were growing numbers of Japanese settlers in the Japan House, it became a ‘foothold for the new “civilized” set of institutions through which the Japanese intended to conduct their formal relations with Korea’ (Duus 1995, p. 37). Kagawa Gentarō described the market situation in Pusan in a book entitled Kankoku annai (Introduction to Korea). According to Kagawa,

The trade market situation in Korea was that there was neither order nor standardized prices. For instance, at the same price, one [trader] could purchase four tu (斗) and eight sŏng (升) per bag of soya beans; yet another [trader] could purchase five tu and two sŏng per bag of soya beans. In particular, some took advantage of the fact that there were no standardized weights and measures. Shrewd Japanese merchants used all possible means to make excessive profits; some even used two sets of measuring cups (masu 杯 = toryō 斗量).

Re-quoted from Pak 1985, p. 30.

In 1907, the Chamber of Commerce in Pusan standardized the weights and measures used in the grain trade, at the request of the Pusan Transportation Association or Pusan Mediator Association (釜山海陸運搬業組合-仲任) (Ch’a 2004, p. 221). Needless to say, the standardization of weights and measures made the grain trade much easier.
Furthermore, considerable numbers of Koreans travelled to Pusan to find a job in what was a growing and vibrant city and to search for possibilities in the ‘modern country’, Japan. In other words, Pusan played a role in connecting Korea and Japan. Ch’oe Ch’-an-sik, in his depiction of Seoul, portrayed the railway station as being vibrant with people wanting to go to Pusan.

_Fusan, Fusun, Fusun, oidemasenka?_ (釜山、釜山、釜山お出でませんか？, Pusan, Pusan, Pusan, aren’t you going there? ) at the Yŏngdŭng’o (Seoul) station. Ch’oe, Ch’-an-sik 1912; Re-quoted from Cho Kap-sang (eds.) 1998, p. 52.

There is no surviving record indicating the number of merchants, _kaekchu_ (or inland market brokers), and middle jobbers in the early open port period and the kinds of work they were engaged in. However, on the basis of various Korean sources, such as _Tongnaebŏ_ (東萊報), _Tongnaehang poch’ŏp_ (東萊港報榻), _Naechŏn_ (來電), and _Hullyŏng chohoe chon’an_ (訓令照會存案), which provide the level of business taxes, Oh Mi-il calculated the number of Korean merchants who were being taxed by the Korean government as forty-four in 1889, two hundred and thirty-seven in 1897, and one hundred in 1900, showing an increase in numbers of Korean merchants from 1889 to 1897. In particular, the Korean merchants in 1897 were probably significantly larger in number than in 1900, because of the increased demands during the Sino-Japanese war (1894-1895). Moreover, considering the fact that there were many unlicensed _kaekchu_ merchants, who were not taxed and yet conducting business, actual numbers of Korean merchants probably reached several hundred. Japanese records, such as _Fusan yŏran_, also suggest this, putting the number of Korean merchants in Pusan at approximately one hundred and fifty to one hundred and sixty in 1889 and even reaching 1,367 in 1909 (Oh 2008, pp. 47-52).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Export to Japan (A)</th>
<th>Import from Japan (B)</th>
<th>Total (Trade) A+B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Calico</td>
<td>Cotton cloth</td>
<td>Cotton yam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>13,420</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan.-Nov</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec.-1877</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>181,000</td>
<td>57.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>612,174</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>1,157,858</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>1,151,310</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>783,654</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>253,148</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>184,474</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>206,621</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>393,977</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>382,626</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>627,085</td>
<td>61.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>1,907,831</td>
<td>61.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>1,786,271</td>
<td>41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>1,281,983</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>854,438</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>684,805</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>880,805</td>
<td>63.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>2,908,370</td>
<td>67.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>4,829,482</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>2,849,948</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>1,976,041</td>
<td>48.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>3,458,190</td>
<td>52.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>3,119,660</td>
<td>49.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>1,984,318</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>6,469,158</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>2,095,523</td>
<td>8,219,338</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>2,957,055</td>
<td>7,938,034</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>4,409,493</td>
<td>8,723,805</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>4,476,319</td>
<td>9,258,088</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>5,155,983</td>
<td>8,308,944</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>6,049,834</td>
<td>9,836,178</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>5,864,745</td>
<td>12,457,801</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As revealed in the statistics above, trade at Pusan enormously expanded over a very short time span after the opening of Pusan. There were three main increases in trade. The first came after the victory of the Sino-Japanese war in 1895, illustrating that Japan took the advantageous position first to dominate the Korean market. Secondly, the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5 was concluded with advantage to Japan, leading to another increase in trade. Thirdly, after the protectorate treaty, more Japanese merchants expanded trade as Japan politically secured dominance over Korea. But regardless of political or military issues, Japanese economic growth and expansion from the 1880s sought ‘a ready market nearby’ (Jansen 1995, pp.305-306). Whereupon, the total amount of trade (¥18,322,546) in 1911 increased approximately forty-two times from the total amount after the opening of Pusan (¥438,835) in 1876.

The increase of imports and exports can be found in the statistics. Then let us examine the main imports and exports items via Pusan from 1876 to 1911 in order to get a clearer view of how trade between Korea and Japan had an impact on the lives of ordinary people in Pusan. Rice exports to Japan, as revealed in the table, were not significant in the
1880s due to continuous bad harvests in Korea. In addition, the Matsukata deflation (松方デフレ), which coincided with the world economic slump in the 1880s, led to a sudden fall in Japanese rice prices, which also damaged the trade between Korea and Japan (Duus 1995, p. 255). Rice prices in Osaka, which was the major rice-consuming market in Japan, were slightly higher than in Pusan; yet the export from Pusan decreased as rice prices there rose due to bad harvests in Korea. In fact, nearly ten people a day were reported to have starved to death in Pusan during the severe drought of 1883-1885 (Ha 2006, p. 155). Nevertheless, the export of grains from Korea to Japan continued despite famine conditions in Korea, whereupon the Korean government instituted a prohibition on exports in January, 1888. However, the following year, the prohibition was removed following the protest of Minister Kondō at Seoul. On top of this, the Japanese government claimed an indemnity of 140,626 yen, 95 sen, 7 rin (at first and later 141,000 yen) as recompense for Japanese merchants for eight months’ worth of lost trade. Eventually, the Korean government provided 62,400 yen, but it was not satisfactory to the Japanese (Conroy 1960, pp. 189-190).

Larger economic developments were also changing the circumstances of trade in the port. Political and social instability caused by the Imo Mutiny in 1882 and the Kapsin coup of 1884 were other factors that contributed to the appreciation of the Korean currency by forty seven per cent. The sudden appreciation of the Korean currency against the Japanese currency brought the price of rice up and lowered the profit from which Japanese merchants could benefit. As a result, trade between Korea and Japan declined. In particular, since the rice trade was almost solely dependent on Korea via Pusan, Japanese merchants experienced a recession and some business magnates were forced to cease trading. Only petty merchants who did business with others’ capital remained (Ha 2006, p. 155).

Why did the Japanese merchants rely on Korean rice? Were there any other alternative sources of rice from other countries? In Japan, rice from other countries, such as
Nankin rice (南京米 Chinese rice), and Vietnam (柴棍米 Sâi Gòn) rice was usually considered to consist of smaller grains of inferior quality, whilst it was known that Korean rice was of high quality, and comparable to Japanese rice (Tsūshō isan, 通商彙報 104, Fusun fukin ni okeru mugisaku nami ni sōshū jōkyō 釜山附近ニ於ケル麦作ヲ挿種状況 1898; Re-quoted from Ha 2006, pp. 158-159). It was known that Japanese merchants purchased Korean rice at the price of forty to forty-five sen and sold it at the price of six to eight yen (Pak 1985, p.32). In other words, they made a profit of 1,000-2,000 per cent.

Apart from rice, there were other exports, which also flowed into Japan from Korea. Beans were another important exported item. Beans are not affected by climate as much as rice, and in Japan, a considerable amount of beans was consumed for soy source and condiments. Korean beans were cheap for Japanese and of such good quality that Japan substituted domestic production of beans with Korean beans. Even the Japanese merchants began to re-export Korean beans to other countries. Consequently, the export of beans continued to increase. Another increasing export was cowhides, used in the defence industry for items such as military boots (Ha 2002, pp. 155-156). Until around 1902, Pusan, unlike other open ports, had a trade surplus.

Not only did exports grow fast, but there was also a rapid growth in imports, meaning that there was increasing purchasing power among Koreans. In particular, after 1903, there developed a gap between imports and exports and imports came to dominate exports. Was it merely caused by supplying the needs of the Russo-Japanese War? If so, how would we explain the increase of imports after the war? Though we should not ignore the significance of the Russo-Japanese war, there was another reason, and that is, the growing Korean consuming power. For example, the Japanese-Korean product exhibition, held in Pusan in 1906, could possibly be seen as a reflection of this. At this time, Japan was attempting to

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4 Although not clear, the currency could well be yen, but the point is the scale of the profit margin.
expand its influence over Korea as part of its search for new markets after the victory in the Russo-Japanese war. Even before the exhibition, Japanese merchants had established a commercial museum of Japanese products (釜山日本商品陳列館) in January 1902. The purpose of this museum was not only to advertise Japanese products, but also to enlighten the traditional and ‘uncivilized’ Korean women, who were reluctant even to go out, as part of the Naisen Yūwa (內鮮融和) or harmony between Japan and Korea (Tanaka Reisui 田中麗水 1935, Zenkan shōkō kaigisho hattatsushi 全韓商工会議所發達史; Re-quoted from Ch’a 2004, p. 222-223). It can be said that the exhibition was an extension of the commercial museum. This was demonstrated most clearly when the director of the commercial museum, Matsumae Saisuke (松前才助), also became the director of the exhibition (Ch’a 2004, p. 223). Who attended the exhibition? Let us examine the numbers and composition of attendees.

**Table 6.** The number of attendance at the Japanese-Korean Product Exhibition in Pusan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Koreans</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>56,538</td>
<td>30,690</td>
<td>87,707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>50,993</td>
<td>59,823</td>
<td>112,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>30,458</td>
<td>17,261</td>
<td>58,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>25,046</td>
<td>14,728</td>
<td>39,990</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: This table is based on the information given by Cha, Ch’ol-uk 2004, p. 223.

The exhibition attracted large numbers of attendees. In particular, it is noticeable that Korean attendees outnumbered Japanese as the Japanese merchants intended. What, then, were the causes of the increasing Korean consuming power in Pusan? The primary cause was the increased number of Koreans in Pusan, in turn driven by the demand for labour for large infrastructure projects, such as the reclamation of the north-side port construction, the construction of the Seoul-Pusan railway line, the establishment of the Shimonoseki-Pusan shipping lines, and the demand for middlemen for the increasing rice export.
On the basis of a population survey in December 1905, the number of Japanese households was 167 and the population was 537. As large infrastructure projects, such as railways, land reclamation, and other construction, were started, many migrants moved to the area of Pusan. Koreans in Pusan-jin in 1903 were only 15,000 to 16,000, but the number reached 37,000 to 38,000 in 1906.

_Fusanfu shi genkō_ (釜山府史原稿) vol. 6 1937, p. 645; Re-quoted from Ch’a 2007, pp. 251-252.

On top of the growing Korean consumption, many Japanese settlers became financially stable from the profits gained from trade, loan interests, and land rents, and the consuming power of the Japanese settlers increased (Ch’a 2007, p. 253). In other words, Pusan became a commercial hub in the open port period, which presented a great opportunity not only to the Japanese but also to Koreans.

**Changes to the Taxation system and the creation of the Pusan Maritime Customs**

One of the most important and most prominent departments of the Korean government is and for many years has been, the Maritime Customs. It has been the battle ground of more than one international quarrel, the sweetest nut to crack in the entire basket. The interest which it inspires is doubtless based upon the fact that it represents ready money, on-the-spot cash; and that is the most attractive form which the god of wealth ever assumes.

Hulbert 1907, p. 4.

With the Treaty of Kanghwa as a critical turning point, the years following laid the institutional basis of the Japanese settlements. According to the ‘Regulations under which Japanese Trade is to be Conducted in Corea and Import and Export Tariff of Corea’ of 1883, the process of entering and leaving Pusan for all Japanese ships was simplified, allowing them merely to report to the Japanese consulate and not the Korean government. (Treaties, Regulations, ETC., between Corea and other Powers, 1876-1889, pp. 82-119; Kim 1976, p. 55).

Unlike the earlier system that closely controlled trade with Tsushima, the Korean government now lost the power to control Japanese ships. Prior to 1876, incoming and outgoing vessels from Japan were under the supervision of army officers In Pusan-jin with special expertise in Japanese matters (Ch’ŏmsa 領使). Furthermore, the army officers in Pusan reported to the
Magistrate of Tongnae, who oversaw local administrative works, such as treating Japanese envoys, controlling the Japan House, and supervising trade with Japan in Tongnae County, which included Pusan (Yang 2008, pp. 18-26). However, between 1876 and 1905 Korea experienced the harsh realities of unequal treaties. The Korean government attempted to renegotiate the treaty to enable them to embargo the export of rice, barley, and soya beans (Duus 1995, p. 258). Yet, Korea’s sovereignty in Pusan was diminished as extraterritorial jurisdiction was implemented to protect the Japanese settlers’ business and property. In particular, there was no way in which the Korean government could intervene to prevent illegal trade, such as smuggling. As illicit trade or smuggling was increasingly prevalent, it was a serious concern for the Korean government. Consequently, they dispatched Yi Man-sik, a secret inspector (amhaeng ᄂosa 暗行御史), to the western side of Kyŏngsang province to investigate the open port. Though there was illicit trade in grains before the opening of Pusan, it got out of hand after the opening and led to a massive rise in grain exports (Ha 1985, p. 89).

With the explosive increase of grain exports to Japan, Pusan became a hub of this trade. In the case of beans, 84 per cent in 1881, 92 per cent in 1882, and 69 per cent in 1883 were exported via Pusan port. Most rice was exported from Pusan port (Ha 1985, p. 91). The concentration of grain exports created an imbalance of supply and demand in the interior. In particular, in Hamgyŏng province, which received supply from Kangwŏn province and Kyŏngsang province, the supply of rice and other grains became insecure. As a result of the shortage of foods, many farmers became ‘wandering’ people and migrated to Manchuria (Ha 1985, p. 92).

Eventually, to stop ‘the evil of secret dealings and smuggling’ and to balance the supply and demand of grains to the interior, the Korean government set up the Maritime Customs Service at Tumo-p’o port (豆毛鎭) in Pusan on 28 September 1878, near the
quarters of the inspector of the treaty port (p’anch’algwan 省察官), and instituted a tariff tax of fifteen per cent *ad valorem* on exports and twenty percent *ad valorem* on imports, though it was limited to Korean merchants to avoid conflicts with the Japanese government (Deuchler 1977, p. 76). Most Korean merchants, who were unable to offer such large sums in taxes, decided to stop providing Korean products to the Japanese settlement. In other words, the tariff resulted in considerably restricting the trade. In response to this, the Japanese trade superintendent, Yamanoshiro Sukenaga (山之城祐長), accused the Korean government of violating the treaty and threatened the government with a claim that rejection of Japanese demands might bring about war. The Tongnae Magistrate, Yun Ch’i-hwa (尹致和), argued that tax on the Korean merchants was not a concern of the treaty. Yet, this issue did not simply disappear; rather, it developed in two ways. First, the Japanese merchants in Pusan were so outraged at the Tongnae Magistrate that they marched to the barriers at Tumo-jin on 9 October and to the magistrate’s office the next day. As a result, the Korean authorities agreed not to tax goods already being contracted. Second, the Japanese government became embroiled in the argument. Hanabusa Yoshimoto (花房義質), the Japanese *chargé d’affaires*, was dispatched in order to protest fiercely about this affair to the prefect of Tongnae, accusing the Korean government of a violation of the treaty. However, the negotiation did not go as he wished. He sent two groups of soldiers to the vicinity of Tumo-jin and stationed them there on 4 December (Deuchler 1977, pp. 76-77; Kim 1980, pp. 268-269). With a Japanese military threat looming, Li Hung-zhang intervened as the mediator in this conflict, which resulted in abolishing the Pusan Maritime Customs Service in Tumo-jin on 26 November in the following year (Yun and Kim 2006, p. 201). In other words, the Maritime Customs Service established by the Korean government only lasted for less than two months.

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5 The name of the government post Hundo was changed to *P’anch’algwan*.
6 These types of public demonstrations had been practiced for centuries. Lewis 2003, pp. 177-191.
However, the government did not give up on the establishment of a Korean Maritime Customs Service; rather, it sought diplomatic channels to amend the treaty. With the support of Qing China, the government managed to attain an amendment of the agreement concerning commerce in 1882, enabling them to establish a tax of ten per cent *ad valorem* on imports. After the Military Mutiny or Imo Mutiny in July 1882, the Qing court began to intervene actively in Korea’s international relations (Yi 2007, p. 144). Chinese merchants and officials were aware of the Japanese domination of shipping through the subsidy of a regular shipping line between Korea and Japan and were concerned about losing their commercial advantage in Korea because of the lack of a regular shipping line between China and Korea. As a result, the 1882 Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade between China and Korea (*Chao-qing shangmin shuilu tongshang zhangcheng* 朝清商民水陸通商章程) was signed to re-establish the commercial relations in a modern form.

The Korean Maritime Customs Service was installed and trade superintendent officials (*Kwalligwan 管官*) were dispatched to three ports, including Pusan, on 27 August 1883, approximately seven years after the opening of Pusan in accordance with the Kanghwa treaty. The new Maritime Customs Service’s structure was similar to the system in China, where the administration of the Service was composed of a superintendent of customs and a foreign commissioner appointed by the inspector-general. In particular, the foreign commissioner was more important than the superintendent of customs. From the beginning, the Maritime Customs Service in Korea was engineered to copy the same service in Qing China. Paul Georg von Möllendorff, who came to China as an assistant secretary in the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs (CIMC), became the first commissioner of the Maritime Customs Service in Korea. In the name of free trade and the law of nations, Korea was compelled to open more and more of its territory to foreign powers and merchants, mostly the Japanese in Pusan, but now a tax could be levied on imports from Tsushima to Pusan. Rather
than concern himself solely with his duties, Von Möllendorff tried to act as something of a Korean foreign minister and sought to bring Russia into Korea as a means of balancing the other great powers, such as China, Japan, and Britain. The policies von Möllendorff attempted to implement to secure a secret alliance with Russia were as follows: first, Korea should remain neutral with the support of Russia, China, and Japan, like Belgium in Europe; secondly, Russia should grant military aid to Korea and ally with Korea. Finally, Korea should be a protectorate of Russia. Since the Korean Maritime Customs Service was under the influence of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, von Möllendorff’s policies were not acceptable for the Chinese strategy for Korea. As a result, Viceroy Li Hongzhang dismissed von Möllendorff and appointed Henry F. Merrill as the Chief Commissioner of Customs for Korea in 1886 (Neff and Cheong 2009, pp. 21-22; Lee 1988 pp. 93-101). When Li appointed Henry F. Merrill to replace von Möllendorff, he emphasized that ‘You are the suzerain’s man and must keep the tributary rights as far as in your power’ (Larson 2008, p. 142). Clearly, Li Hongzhang meant to maintain traditional Chinese relations with Korea.

The Pusan Customs Service was established in the Honmachi (本町, present Tongkwangtong 東光洞) area of Pusan on 3 July 1883 (Kim 2003, p. 6). The Briton William Nelson Lovatt, who worked with the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs Service in Hankow and Tientsin, was appointed as the first commissioner of the Pusan Customs Service from 1883. However, at first after its opening, there were not many ships coming into Pusan according to Lovatt’s letter to his daughter in 1885:

This [Pusan] is not a very lively place at the best of times, but we have been without a steamer for a fortnight, which means no news from home, and no news from the world of light, life, and civilization, you can imagine it is a trifle dull living in Corea. Lovatt’s Letter to his daughter Nellie, Original April 21 1885; Re-quoted from Kim 2003, p.11.

Lovatt’s career as the commissioner of the Pusan Customs Service was finished by Li Hongzhang in the same manner as Möllendorff’s, on account of his attempts to free Korea.
from Chinese influence. The French Theophile Piry took over the position from 1886 to 1888 and Hunt (Korean name: Ha Mun-dŏk 何文德) became the third commissioner in the Pusan Customs Service for ten years from 1888 to 1897. According to Yun Kwang-un and Kim Chae-sūng’s study on Pusanhang ipku suse silsu sŏngch’aek (釜山港入口收稅實數成冊), a record detailing customs collections in the nineteen months from the tenth lunar month of 1883 to the sixth lunar month of 1885, the salary of the foreign commissioner as a proportion of the total tax on exports and imports ranged from about 35 per cent to 87 per cent, and averaged 41.43 per cent. In other words, personnel expenses for the foreign commissioner, which represented the majority of operating expenses, were extremely high, reflecting the difficulty of management in the early Customs Service at Pusan (Yun and Kim 2006, pp. 211-212).

After the Sino-Japanese war of 1895, the Korean Customs Service was taken over by the Briton John McLeavy Brown, who was given personnel affairs of the Custom Service; however, as he implemented pro-British and pro-Japanese policies, those policies provided the foundation for Japan to penetrate Korea. Since Britain was relatively less interested in Korea, the security of the Korean peninsula was vital for Britain to suppress the expansion of Russia’s desire to obtain ice-free port. John Gubbins recorded the tactics of McLeavy Brown:

The importance of the retention of Mr. Brown as Chief Commissioner is, I venture to suggest, greater for Japan than for us; for, apart from the fact that she is the only Power with large commercial interests in this country, the retention of the present Chief Commissioner constitutes a modus vivendi between the rival interest of Russia and Japan, which it would be difficult to disturb without detriment to present international relations.

Nish 2001, p. 95.

Isabella Bird Bishop also made a hopeful statement about having British Chief Commissioners in the capital and at the treaty ports in Korea.
So long as he [Mr McLeavy Brown] is in control at the capital, and such upright and able men as Mr Hunt [at Pusan], Mr Olesen, and Mr Osborne are Commissioners at the Treaty Port, so long will England be commercially important in Korean estimations.

Nish 2001, p. 94.

McLeavy Brown observed the problems Korea faced through British eyes. In fact, most of the appointed commissioners at the Korean Maritime Customs were either assistants to the commissioners at the Chinese Maritime Customs or foreign diplomats to China. As a result, the Korean Maritime Customs was under the influence of the Chinese and other great powers. This pattern continued. When Yamaoka Yoshigorō (山岡義五郎) was appointed as the commissioner in 1905 after the conclusion of the Protectorate Treaty, the Maritime Customs Service was taken over by the Japanese government. The port administrative office was replaced by the Pusan Office for the Regulation of Affairs (J. *rijichō* or K. *isach’ŏng* 理事廳) on 1 February 1906 (Yi 1975, pp. 37-47).

What about the Korean government? Was the Korean government merely a bystander or the victim of great powers? The Korean government also sent a local port superintendent (*kamni* 監理) and established a local port administration (*kamniso* 監理署) to unify management and the supervision of foreign relations, which was dealt with by county magistrates at the open ports. However, there are no records that indicate the competency of the administration. Fortunately, we do have one record, the *Haeŭm ilgi* (海隱日錄), which Min Kŏn-Ho wrote while working at the local port administration in Pusan from 1883 to 1884, though not enough information is presented about his role in the office. On the basis of the information given, we can see that the Koreans’ role was merely a supportive one. Their function was always limited to Korean affairs and related to the foreign consuls. As the function of the port administration was extended, it also established a police commissioner to maintain public order at the open port.
System of trade between the Japanese and Koreans and money-lending: Transition from traditional trade to modern trade

The numerical preponderance of these latter has interfered with the merchants in their dealings as, generally, no purchases could be effected without their intermediation. However, since last year two or three traders have made great efforts to put a stop to these abuses, and to carry on a direct trade with the Coreans. In that intent, they entered into a mutual agreement, and have managed to establish a small direct trade at the expense of the Nakagai-sho (仲買商).

North China Herald, September 09, 1881.

Debt is the most efficient means ever created to take relations that are fundamentally based on violence and violent inequality and to make them seem right and moral to everyone concerned

There is no doubt that the expansion of trade between Korea and Japan via Pusan was explosive and had a profound impact on the community of Pusan at the local level. However, assessing the result is quite different from describing the impact. The key issue that has been raised is the concept of ‘exploitation’—did the Japanese ‘exploit’ the Koreans or not?—which has been controversial for a long time. Two mistakes have often been made in the debate. First, the nationalist school often indulges in a binary interpretation of ‘colonial exploitation versus national development’ and depicts the colonial system as a system of exploitation (wŏnshijŏk sut’allon 原始的 收奪論), which did not contribute to development. Their weakness is that they fail to elaborate this argument as a coherent theory with sufficient evidence. Second, the socio-economic school, or the positivist school, argues that the characteristic of Japanese colonialism was ‘development and exploitation.’ They agree that there was an element of inevitable exploitation; yet, it was a process of adopting a modern economic system and part of development, even though it was costly. Their weakness is that they tend to understate the negative side of ‘modernity’ and ‘development’ and ignore collective memory created as a result of it. We need to move beyond this old controversy
about whether the opening of Korea was a way of introducing a modern form of market economy and commercial agriculture or merely a way of exploiting cheap Korean grains for Japanese industrialization.

For this we should examine the accounts and narratives of local people to see how trade practices changed over the transition from traditional arrangements to the open-port system. How did these practices change and what impact did they have on the lives of people in the local area. Only by assessing how trade was conducted on the ground can we offer a better understanding of how the market mechanism operated in the open-port period. Pusan represents a good example of how the commercial system at the port shifted from a traditional to a modern form, because Pusan, and particularly the Japan House, was the only trade post between Japan and Korea, and Pusan was the first open port in the early open-port period. Everything new was first tested in Pusan. For this reason, Pusan could be a representative case study clearly demonstrating how the system of colonial commerce and trade developed and at the same time illustrating the problematic aspects of the new system.

There was a sharp distinction between the activities of the Koreans and of the Japanese, deriving from their different perceptions of the opening of Pusan. The Korean merchants carried on traditional trading customs, whereas the Japanese merchants quickly adopted the changes and took advantage of all possibilities to accumulate wealth, such as holding secure notes of credit.

After the opening of Pusan in 1876, due to the border regulations on Japanese settlers’ activities (kanhaeng ijông), Korean kaekchu and yŏgak acted as wholesalers to connect peasant-farmers via Korean jobbers to Japanese export merchants in the treaty port (Duus 1995, p. 274). The Kankoku shi (韓國誌 Opisanie Korei) or the Journal of Korea, which was written as background for Korean policy formation by a Russian officer, described
the role of Korean *kaekchu*, *yŏgak*, and jobbers as middlemen in the ports in the following way:

There are several classes of indigenous Korean jobbers in Korea. They [Korean merchants] are aware of commercial practice, so that they are in a more convenient position than foreigners. The supply of most foreign products [to the interior] and the purchase of most interior products [for foreigners] were undertaken by this kind of route. Trade between consumers and producers is limited to the area of settlement.  
*Kankoku shi* 1905, p. 127.

Basically, indigenous Korean jobbers (middlemen) played a mediating role between producers in the interior and merchants at the open ports. However, most of those engaged in the trade were petty merchants, who did not have huge capital. In other words, they relied on loan brokers, mostly Japanese merchants, to circulate money as they mediated between producers and merchants. However, the Japanese Suenaga Junichirō (末永純一郎) has described this usury practice as characteristic of Korean attitudes:

Koreans are so improvident and irresponsible that they show a propensity of not paying for a loan; but, they are so greedy for money that they borrow money from anyone. So some wicked settlers lend money on secure mortgages, such as on real estate, and jewellery, at surprisingly high interest rates. In some cases, an interest rate is ten per cent per ten days. Over three months, money-lenders can make as much as the principal from the interest. Moreover, when the deadline that is set for the loan arrives, the settlement of the mortgage is mercilessly exacted. There is then a wrangle over the issue. Since this is on the basis of the contract, it always ends in the victory of the money-lenders. As a result, the mortgaged property, such as land, is inevitably transferred despite the Koreans’ grievances. At the request of the consulate the harmful effect of usury is considerably reduced; yet, the practice of money-lending to Koreans has not been diminished.  
*Chōsen ihō* (朝鮮彙報), pp. 174-175; Re-quoted from Pak 1985, pp. 42-43.

There were many records indicating that money-lending created socioeconomic problems that had an impact on the community. Suenaga depicts the Korean willingness to take on ruinous loans as related to some kind of national trait, but it seems clear that his description derived from a colonial bias to despise Koreans as uncivilized. A comparison of traditional and modern or pre-1876 and post-1876 trading customs reveals the origin of the Korean behavior as based on traditional practices.
Japanese traders were originally allowed entry into Korea for political reasons, and foreign trade in East Asia had always been highly politicized and controlled by governments. In 1407, the Chosŏn court allowed traders into Che-p’o (齊浦) in Ungch’ŏn County and Pusan-p’o (東萊浦) in Tongnae County in order to prevent piracy and maritime criminal activities on the peninsula.

After the Kiyu Agreement (Kiyu yakcho or Kiyū yakujō 己酉約條) was signed in 1609, relations between Korea and Japan continued in Pusan until the Kanghwa (Kanghwado choyak 江華島條約) treaty in 1876. As for Japan, by the 1640s, the Tokugawa authority banned western ships except the Dutch from entering Japan for internal security reasons. After 1639, Tokugawa Japan expelled the Portuguese and implemented the seclusion policy (sakoku 鎖国 or kaikin 海禁), which not only prohibited Japanese from travelling overseas, but also prohibited the building of ships with a capacity of over five hundred koku (Toby 1984, p. 4). However, trade with Korea at the Japan House by Tsushima Japanese was still active even after the sakoku or kaikin policy was implemented. Indeed, as described above, the Tongnae Waegwan (Japan House) in Pusan was the hub of trade between Korea and Japan from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century (Kim 2004, p. 10).

Though the economy of Chosŏn sought self-sufficiency, Chosŏn accumulated commercial capital due to its position as a part of the entrepôt trade between China and Japan. Basically, Chosŏn bought Chinese raw silk from China with Korean ginseng and Japanese silver and sold Chinese silk and Korean ginseng to the Japanese for silver. However, as direct trade between China and Japan became established from the end of the seventeenth century, Chosŏn’s entrepôt role began to wane after the 1720s (Kim 2004, pp. 16-21).

Needless to say, foreign trade was significant for local society. The category of ‘Tongnae merchants’ not only refers to the domestic and foreign trade merchants in the Tongnae area, but also to the ‘privileged merchants monopolizing the Open Market foreign
trade’ as well as the ‘black marketeers engaged in smuggling’ (Kim 2004, p. 30). I attempted to find a correlation between the Tongnae merchants and the kaekchu and yōgak merchants in order to discover whether or not the main players in trade with Japan remained the same over the transition from before 1876 to after 1876. Since trade with Japan was limited to the Japan House in Pusan, we can hypothesize that those who were able to speak Japanese and understand the customs of trade would easily have been able to make the transition from before to after the opening of Korea and continue trading with the Japanese. Moreover, we can see the resemblance between the Tongnae merchants and the kaekchu and yōgak in terms of the trade in which they engaged.

The question begs for more comprehensive evidence, because we know little about the Tongnae merchants, their numbers, identities, and business. According to previous studies, the Tongnae merchants were a limited number of people who were licensed to conduct trade in the Chosŏn Great Hall within the Japan House compound. In other words, private trade was strictly regulated by the Korean officials (Lewis 2003, p. 102).

Chŏng Sŏng-il’s study on the volume and activities of private trade with the Japanese provided a list and a number of Korean merchants (tojung 都中) who engaged in the trade with the Japanese. According to Chŏng’s study of Oda Ikugorō (小田幾五郎)’s Chōryo washū (草栄話集) of 1796, he points out that there were four to five regular Korean merchants who were given access to the Japan House for private trade. In addition, drawing on the Sŏ family documents, he examined the list of Korean merchants and their numbers in 1817, 1830, and 1837. The number of Korean merchants in each year varied: seven in 1817, eighteen in 1830, and six in 1837. From 1844 to 1850, there were fixed numbers of Korean merchants: six in 1844 and seven in all the other years, yet the Korea merchants in the list

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7 Large and small Korean merchant houses in the Japan House market.
were not necessarily the same people. In fact, except Cha-pŏm (子範), none of the merchants repeatedly appeared in the list of people who were engaged in private trade during the six years from 1830 to 1837. As Chŏng examined the case of Cha-pŏm, a son of Chŏng Yun-jung (鄭允中), who was also engaged in private trade with the Japanese, he discovered that the status of the Korean merchants at the Japan House could be inherited (Chŏng 2000, pp. 145-173; Lewis 2003, pp. 103-104).

Furthermore, Kim Tong-ch’ŏl provided even more detailed information on the Korean merchants based on Korean documents. Kim demonstrated the continuation of traditional Tongnae merchants after 1876 by examining Tongnaebu sanggoan (東萊府商賈案 Tongnae Merchant Register) and Muim sonsaeng’an (武任先生案 Military Officer Register). The fourth chapter of the Tongnae Merchant Register was ‘Sanggo’ (商賈 Merchants) and ‘Chŏnin’an’ (儒人案 Register of Market Traders). Kim also examined the record of the Tongnae Kiyŏnhoe (東萊耆英會 Tongnae Council of Venerable Seniors).

Many of the Tongnae merchants (tojung sanggo 郡中 商賈) took up military or hyangni offices (petty offices) in the Tongnae Magistracy (Kim 2004, p. 32-34). The merchant names that appeared in Tongnaebu sanggoan are not individual names but a household and to some extent, it would have been a corporate body or a trading house (tojung), including servants and assistants belonging to the household (Lewis 2003, p. 104). Seventy-nine names for merchants of agar-agar between 1866 and 1875 continued to be listed in the Sanggoan. Though the time period might be too short to affirm whether their position was continuous, we can conclude that the Tongnae merchants were a licensed group of people if we limit ourselves to the given documents (Kim 1993, p. 141-143). Furthermore, although we know that the Board of Taxation in the Korean government administered taxes

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8 According to Chŏng’s study, he was a son of Yun-jung 尤中, whose surname was Chŏng 鄭.
9 The old names were kiyŏngye 貴英械 and noingye 老人械.
on private trade in the great market, we still know little about taxes on private trade due to a lack of extant documentation (Lewis 2003, pp.102-103).

As for trade between Koreans and Japanese at the Japan House, illicit trade was also an important issue. Im Ŭi-paek, the Tongnae Magistrate, together with the Master of the Japan House (kanshu 館守), promulgated regulations regarding illicit trade (Kŭmsan ipgakpang yakcho 禁散入各房約條, a prohibition against entering the rooms of Tsushima people) in 1653 so as to prevent illicit trade from spreading in Pusan. The fourth chapter of an administrative handbook on Japanese relations compiled in 1802 (Chŭngjŏng kyorinji 增正交麟志) recorded the full text of the regulation. According to the regulation, money-lending by the Japanese was strictly prohibited. This does not mean that all loans between Korean and Japanese merchants were prohibited. In fact, Tsushima-han allocated silver to the Korean merchants that they might actively purchase specific commodities, such as ginseng and raw thread in advance in order to sustain the supply of those imports and fix the price of those from Korea (Yun 2005, pp. 128-129). However, the reason for the prohibition of the loans called nobuse (路浮稅) or waechae (倭債) was that the Korean merchants received loans without the knowledge of Korean authorities, and this was considered a type of smuggling. The increase in illicit trade undermined the volume of legal trade in the market, which resulted in decreasing commercial tax revenues over time for the Tongnae Magistrate and the Board of Taxation. Moreover, the accumulated debts created by the loans led to stagnation in the market. As a result, the Chosŏn court placed a military officer from the Tongnae Magistracy and an army officer of Pusan at the gate of the Japan House, allowing entry only to officials and licensed merchants. The system of trade after the Japanese authority banned silver continued with copper in exchange for the four most important exports—those were ox hides, ox horns, skullcap plants, and dried sea slugs (Yun 2005, p. 129).
Though illicit private trade was strictly prohibited, illicit loans and smuggling were prevalent at the Japan House, thereby increasing the debt of Tongnae merchants and decreasing the commercial tax revenue going to the Ministry of Taxation and to Tongnae County. According to the Waein sŏ’nap yakjo (倭人書納約條) in the fourth chapter (yakcho 約條, Agreement section) of the Chŏngjŏng kyorinji (增正交隸志), items of private trade were only limited to fish, vegetables, and rice in the morning and evening. The Waein Kŭmcho (倭人禁條) in the Pyŏllye chipyo (邊例集要 Collection of Border Precedents) noted that ‘weapons and prohibited items were banned from being traded’. If anyone who traded illicit items was discovered, he was punished by flogging, the severity of which was determined according to the gravity of the offense. Furthermore, merchants were not allowed to use loan funds for trade.

The way in which the nobuse system worked at the Japan House was that Tsushima merchants made a payment to the Tongnae merchants in advance and received the commodities at the contracted time. Credit was at the heart of its contract that facilitated trade, because the Tongnae merchants were an exclusive group and inheritable family business, which enabled the Japanese merchants to pay in advance and expect the commodities later. In other words, the nobuse system was operated on credit. If the Tongnae merchants failed to meet the deadline of the agreement for any reason, the payment that the Japanese merchants made became a debt. According to Waein changna tŭngnok (倭人作擘擧錄), there were several incidents related to money-lending that were in violation of the regulation regarding illicit trade. Osa Masanori provided a case of this illicit trade using loans, which illustrated how seriously the Korean court took such cases, in accordance with the second article of the 1443 Agreement (Kaehae yakcho 癸亥約條). The case was as follows: four Tongnae merchants, Son Ok, Kim Chong-il, Ch’u Sŏn-pong, and Pak Chŏng-sŏn, used nobuse (waechae) loans to purchase fifty sŏk of rice for the Japan House. This was
discovered by the military officer Kim Chin-uk (金震堈) of the Tongnae Magistracy. Furthermore, according to the investigation, it was discovered that six local officials, Saengni (色吏 inspector) Pae Tūk-gil, the military officers at the Japan House, Cho In-man, An Yu-jŏng, and Kim Sŏk-ŭl, and the petty commanders Pak Sŏng-jun and Ch’oe Gwi-tong, received bribes from Son Ok and the others to help them. The verdict was severe: the principal offenders, Son Ok, Kim Chong-il, and Ch’u Sŏn-pong, were beheaded and their heads were placed on poles. In addition, the hundo (訓導 a liaison/interpreter official, Jr. 9) and the pyŏlch’a (別差 an assistant liaison/interpreter for the Japanese, no rank) were suspected of complicity, with the result that they were brought into the court under investigation. On the Japanese side, as nobuse was prohibited by the 1443 Agreement, a rumour spread amongst the Japanese at the Japan House that not only was nobuse prohibited but that also all sale on credit (urikake 売掛) and purchase on credit (kaigakari 買掛) was prohibited, even though there were legal ways of contracting loans at the Market (Kaeshi 開市) (Osa 1970, pp. 64-66; Osa 1971, pp. 7-11; Tashiro 1989, pp. 300-301, p. 320).

As Osa points out, using nobuse or waechae was considered a serious offense, so that its penalty was also heavy. Then why were the Japanese and Korean merchants willing to risk using nobuse? The Japanese merchants were severely restricted and not allowed to trade outside of the Japan House. Granting permission for private trade to the Japanese was a way of legalizing trade by placating Japanese pirates, but the Japanese merchants could not move beyond the confines of the Japan House and needed Korean merchants and jobbers to obtain goods from the interior. To obtain the goods, the Korean merchants needed capital. Moreover, the reason for the Japanese merchants taking the high risk of losing their money was the lure of collecting large profits.

After the conclusion of the Kanghwa treaty, the traditional legal institutions were not
capable of regulating contracted trade on security when all prohibition on nobuse or waechae was automatically taken away. Moreover, some of the reasons for its existence remained. On the one hand, the expansion of the volume of trade provided a great opportunity for the Korean merchants. They took advantage of their privileged position to trade with the Japanese merchants who were still constrained even by new regulations on Japanese settlers’ activities. On the other hand, the Korean merchants whose financial base was weak had to risk using nobuse or waechae for its convenience as a source of trading capital. As a result, most Korean merchants who engaged in trade with the Japanese merchants were easily enticed to use loans in the open-port period. They had been used before 1876, and they were still needed after 1876. However, what was different after 1876 was that loans required collateral, usually houses or lands, for security. The following two newspaper articles demonstrate how money loans were spreading at Pusan.

Those Japanese businesses that trade in a cash sale are mostly small stores. [Small retail cash sales] are conducted by only three to four people out of ten. The rest are Japanese merchants who loan several thousand won worth of goods to Koreans with the pledge that [the loan] is returned with Korean goods in three to four months. The Korean merchants bring the [Korean] goods. But they are hardly brought in time. They have often been delayed for one year or eighteen months. However, there are no cases that Koreans actually break the promise of payment. Thus, there are many companies or associations (Kumi 組) involved in money-lending. Even if those companies make [an initial] loss, they will be able to make profits [with their money-lending business] in four to five years.

Chōya shinbun (朝野新聞), 4 December 1878; Re-quoted from Ai 2006, p. 31.

There is a customary practice that Japanese merchants who live in Korea do, namely, Japanese merchants lend a small quantity of goods to Koreans. Then, those Koreans bring Korean goods [to the Japanese merchants] every three to four months. The Japanese were sometimes left with losses if the Korean merchant died or was wrecked on his way.

Osaka nippō (大阪日報), 18 March 1880; Re-quoted from Ai 2006, p. 31.

Both passages reflect the same basic story, that the money-lending practice in the open-port period resembled the traditional ways of money-leading or nobuse from before
1876. The main difference between them was that the traditional practice of sale and purchase on credit was based on trust and credit, but money-lending in the open-port period was based on mortgage and collateral for security. Collateral was the innovation. Before the opening of Pusan, Tsushima Japanese were not allowed to hold land in Korea; rather they stayed in a restricted area, the Japan House. As a result, Koreans did not fear losing their property by taking a loan. If the Korean merchants who were paid in advance by the Japanese to purchase and return products later ran away, there was no regulation to protect the Japanese merchants to get their money back. The Japanese at the Japan House were not only unable to claim their rights, but also there was no legal enforcement to protect their right of private property, because not only was the nobuse or waeche system an illegal activity, but the Korean government did not concern itself with private trade.

However, after the opening of Pusan, the Japanese were able to claim their property rights. The new system came to favour the Japanese merchants. In other words, the property rights established at the concession of Pusan provided the Japanese merchants a great incentive and motivation to engage in money-lending. There was an interface of two different systems: whereas Japanese merchants aggressively enforced their property rights under the new treaty, Korean merchants were naïve and carried on the traditional loan system, nobuse or waeche. Ch’oe described the way in which Kanoto Masao (神戶正雄) acquired lands in Korea depicted in Chōsen Shisatsudan (朝鮮視察談).

[I] lent 150 won on a mortgage of a farm and land worth approximately one thousand won … his father begged [me] to return the farm and land at three times the value of the loan at 450 won. It has to go to a lawsuit. This kind of case is usually solved before it appears publicly.

Ch’oe Ho-jin, 1943, Kindai Chōsen Keizaishi (近代朝鮮経済史), p. 230; Re-quoted from Pak 1985, p. 47.

As the narrative above describes, the Japanese money-lenders were happy to loan large amounts of money in the port, because now they held collateral on farms and land in
exchange for the cash. Ōike Tadasuke provided the reason why he became involved with money-lending in the first place.

[In 1876,] many Japanese made a lot of profit from private trade (smuggling), but it is always necessary to cooperate with Koreans for trade [due to the restriction on Japanese settlers’ activities (kanhaeng ijŏng)], so that there were some cases in which I needed to loan money to them. [However,] those who were lent money did not pay it back within the period of the loan. I had to climb over the wall of the Japanese settlement and go to the area of Ch’oryang and Pusan-jin to press Korean debtors for the payment of the debt.

Pak 1966, p.13. [Testimony from the Japanese settler Ōike Tadasuke, emphasis added]

The most important factor reflected in Ōike’s narrative was that the boundary of Japanese settlers was limited to the Japan House due to the regulation of the boundary for Japanese settlers’ activities (kanhaeng ijŏng), and this continuation of spatial controls on Japanese movement was probably the reason Korean merchants seemed to be naïve in taking Japanese loans.

Unlike other Japanese merchants who would have protected private property rights by lawful enforcement, Ōike, who resided in the Japan House as a Tsushima Japanese before the opening of Pusan, also seemed to not be aware of changes. He had to risk personal safety to collect the loan by climbing over the wall of the settlement, rather than using any legal reinforcement to collect the loan. Even the Japanese settlers, in particular Japanese from Tsushima, were more familiar with the traditional way of trading in the beginning of the open-port trade. In fact, although the traditional trade regulation was abolished by the 1877 agreement of Fusan kyoryūchi kariire yakusho (釜山居留地借入約書), the customary system of trade between Korean and Japanese merchants continued to be conducted in the same form (Ai 2006, p 30).

An important question is still not answered, that is, even though there was many difficulties, why was Japanese money-lending prevalent at Pusan? The reason is made clear in the following narrative:
Money-lending to Koreans was safe. Even if you lend the money on mortgage and hypothecation, there is no danger of a loss. There is no concern for the circulation of money because there are always jobbers at the port who are engaged in the mortgage trade.

*Kankoku Sōran* (韓國總覧) 1907, p. 1150-1151

Not only was it lucrative to loan money at high interest or on collateral, but also there was no danger of a loss in which Korean merchants could flee without paying back the loaned money. As a result, money-lending by the Japanese settlers sprang up everywhere at Pusan. Moreover, it is reasonable to say most Japanese who migrated to Pusan engaged in money lending.

Where there were Japanese, everyone [all Japanese] was engaged in this [usury], whether as a part-time or a full-time job.

*Kankoku tochi nōsan chōsa hōkoku*, Keiki-dō, Chūsei-dō, Ehara-dō, pp. 483-484; Re-quoted from Pak 1985, p. 44.

In fact, many historical accounts point out that money-lending in this period was widely prevalent around the open port areas. In order to understand the mechanism and reason for money-lending, it is important to examine the system of trade between the Japanese and Koreans established in Pusan. Fortunately, there is detailed information recorded regarding the loans.

The *Ryōmin kōshō saian* (兩民交涉債案 Debt register between Koreans and Japanese) is a collection of complaints filed by the Japanese merchants. Basically, it was compiled by the Japanese counsel and comprehensively records important data, such as dates, creditors, debtors, pledges, and loans in Kyōngsang Province and Pusan. Since Pusan was the first port open to the Japanese, there were many merchants who appeared in the *Ryōmin kōshō saian* in Pusan. Let us examine the *Ryōmin kōshō saian*, which can help us understand the system of trade in Pusan in a more concrete manner.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Creditor</th>
<th>Debtor</th>
<th>The loan (Unit: yang)</th>
<th>Amount claimed</th>
<th>Pledges</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Interests</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 1886. 9.10</td>
<td>Miyahara Chûgorô</td>
<td>An Chong-Sôn (Pusan)</td>
<td>250</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mortgage-House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1886. 9.10</td>
<td>Miyahara Chûgorô</td>
<td>An Chong-Sôn (Pusan)</td>
<td>205</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mortgage-House and Barley field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 1886. 9.10</td>
<td>Miyahara Chûgorô</td>
<td>An Chong-Sôn (Pusan)</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Yi Myông- Sô Fusan-port (kaekcha)</td>
<td>Mortgage- w.praecox (a type of tree) and guide ropes at the edge of a fishing net</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 1886. 11.2</td>
<td>Iwata Jûzaemon, Representative Of Tomida Ichibee</td>
<td>Ôm Sông-pu (Tongnae)</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>146.88</td>
<td>242.88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 1886. 11.2</td>
<td>Iwata Jûzaemon, Representative of Tomida Ichibee</td>
<td>Ha Yu-hôe (Pusan/ Ch’oryang)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 1890/ 25&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; 10&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; M lunar</td>
<td>Saitô Haroshigorô</td>
<td>Kim Sin-il (shipowner) (Tongnae)</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>Chông Tôk- Ön (surety) / Yi Kuk-Wi (pledge) (1893.10) Repaid 150 yang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 1890/ 28&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; 12&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; M lunar</td>
<td>Saitô Taigorô</td>
<td>Kim Sin-il (shipowner) (Tongnae)</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>(1893.9) Repaid in the following year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 1890/ 15&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; 10&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; M lunar</td>
<td>Sakino Shôtarô</td>
<td>Kim Ch’i-Mun (Tongnae)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,800 (5 % per month)</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>Kim Sang-Jin (pledge) (1893.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 1891.4</td>
<td>Saitô Taigorô</td>
<td>Yun Pong-O (Tongnae)</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>(1893.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 1891/ 2&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; 8&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; M lunar</td>
<td>Iwata Jûzaemon</td>
<td>Pak Ae-hwa (Ch’oryang)</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>Ha Sông-yak (witness)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 1894/ 28&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; 11&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; M lunar</td>
<td>Komiya Manjirô</td>
<td>Yi Nak-Sô (Pusan)</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1899.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 1896/ 2.15 10&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;, 1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; M lunar</td>
<td>Komiya Manjirô</td>
<td>Yi Sôn-Ok (Pusan)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>Yi Sun-Nyô (1899.5) For purchase of necessary articles/ Return with 760 yang worth of hemp cloth and other commodity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>8th M lunar</td>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>Amount 1</td>
<td>Amount 2</td>
<td>Comment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>1894.9.24 / 25th</td>
<td>Komiya Manjirō</td>
<td>Pak Ch'ông-yak (Pusan)</td>
<td>961</td>
<td>(3 % per month)</td>
<td>(1899.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25th</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>1897.9.11th / 7th</td>
<td>Guangzhou Kikujirō</td>
<td>Ch’oi Kyōng-yŏn (Tongnae / Hadan)</td>
<td>122.17</td>
<td>128.27 (21) (4 % per month)</td>
<td>250.44 Pyo Kuk-Sŏn (witness who wrote the bond) (1899.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7th</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>1897.9.23rd / 8th</td>
<td>Kokura Takayoshi</td>
<td>Yi Mun-il (Hadan)</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>830 (20) (2 % per month)</td>
<td>2,830 (1899.5) Press for the repayment or transfer of house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8th</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>1899.1.6th / 25th</td>
<td>Ishii Hōjūrō</td>
<td>Kim Tŏk-sŏn (Tongane/ Ch'olyŏng)</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>225 (5 % per month)</td>
<td>1,125 (1899.5) The lawsuit was filed to transfer the property in security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25th</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>1899.11th / 26th</td>
<td>Moritakeyoshi</td>
<td>Pak Kyŏng-Uk (Tongane/ Ch'oryang)</td>
<td>3,074.7 3</td>
<td>750 3,824.7 3</td>
<td>(1899.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26th</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>1899.3.8th / 14th</td>
<td>Naruo Kiyotarō</td>
<td>Kim Pong-Sŏ (Hadan)</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>78 (4) 668</td>
<td>(1899.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14th</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>1899.6.6th / 6th</td>
<td>Kondō Sagorō</td>
<td>Kim Yun-Myŏng (Ch'oryang)</td>
<td>20 Yen</td>
<td>20 Yen</td>
<td>(1899.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6th</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>1899.6.7</td>
<td>Rikitake Zensichichi (representative of Rikitake Harayatsu)</td>
<td>Yi Hyŏng-ok (Pusan-p’ŏ /Taeshinni)</td>
<td>250 Yen</td>
<td>100Yen</td>
<td>Yi Chi-Sil (pledge) (1902.4) The lawsuit was filed to transfer the property in security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>1899.10.28</td>
<td>Rikitake Zensichichi (representative of Rikitake Harayatsu)</td>
<td>Yi Hyŏng-Ok (Pusan-p’ŏ /Taeshinni)</td>
<td>200 won</td>
<td>300 Won (1 Yen/ 5 Ch’en)</td>
<td>500 Won Ryu P’il-sŏn (pledge) (1902.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10.28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>1902.14th / 3rd</td>
<td>Ono Aiji</td>
<td>Kim Sŏk-Sŏng (Pusan)</td>
<td>8,646</td>
<td>8,646</td>
<td>Cho In-ch’il (1902.5) The principal loan on 3.12.1901 is 6,000 yang / the interest is 2,646 yang. The lawsuit for the total amount is filed to press the repayment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: This table was created on the basis of information in the appendix given by Ha Chi-Yŏng (2002) from the Ryōmin kōshō saian, pp. 45-1 - 45-18.
As the *Ryōmin kōshō saian* reveals, we can easily draw a picture of what kind of relationship between the Japanese and Koreans was established in the early open-port period. It is noticeable that this record began in 1886, which is already ten years after Pusan was opened to Japan, and, as we have already seen in our analysis of the background of the Japanese migrants in the previous chapter, all the Japanese who migrated to Pusan did not bring wealth with them. However, over the ten years after the opening of Pusan, many Japanese managed to accumulate and expand their wealth by money-lending. The record indicates that the total number of money-lending cases was 273 from 1881 to 1902. Based on the given record, money-lending had significantly increased by 1890 (Ha 2008, pp. 105-106).

The period of the loan was usually short-term, a period ranging from one to three months. There are some cases of periods of even less than one month. Such a short period resembles the traditional trade practice. No exception was made for circumstances beyond human control, such as natural disasters, rainfall, typhoon, and flood, meaning that the debtor was in a disadvantageous position. It must have been difficult to solve the cases in which debtors delayed paying back their loan due to Acts of God. As the *Ryōmin kōshō saian* indicates, there were many lawsuits filed relating to money-lending against the Korean merchants. The general expansion of trade encouraged Korean merchants to borrow a considerable amount of money from Japanese merchants. With an excessive demand and high interest rates prevailing, Korean merchants were vulnerable to the Japanese, and this situation created the market system whereby Korean merchants became subordinated to Japanese merchants.10 In Lenin’s words, ‘Finance capital does not want liberty, it wants domination’ (Lenin 1966, p. 234). The system of ‘colonial economic structure’, as Frantz Fanon described, was created. In the colonial context: the world was divided into two compartments and inhabited by two different ethnic groups. The cause is the consequence;

10 For a relevant discussion of barter and credit theories of money, see David Graeber’s book entitled *Debt, the First 5,000 years*. 
you are rich because you are Japanese, you are Japanese because you are rich (Fanon 1963, pp. 30-31).

We should not generalize this narrative to represent the whole or disqualify all other narratives, but the closer we can get to the ground, the clearer is the nature of the new trading relationship between Koreans and Japanese. As mentioned above, the two schools of interpretation, the nationalist school and the socio-economic school, run on parallel tracks. The key argument for both schools is ‘exploitation.’ The following narrative provides a clear example of ‘exploitation’ within a legal boundary.

Even if you legally purchase land, you can do so for its scrap value. In Chōsen, it is possible to possess land in the most convenient way and at a dirt cheap price, that is, using security-loss. [Money-lending] with security, together with holding property on security, is a most prominent business in Chōsen. It [money-lending with holding land and house on security] is the most convenient way to acquire land and property for those who have some extra money, because it has a comparatively high advantage with low risk. Any Koreans who need money at the risk of losing property on security would not even think of getting back the mortgage, and it is normal for eight or nine out of ten money-lenders to enrich themselves by doing security-loss business. Money-lenders expected to transfer the security property right away at the end of the term of the loan, so that he received the bill of sale in advance while he loaned one third of the intrinsic value amount. The loan is usually short-term, within six months to three months. In the area of Pusan, the interest rate for lower than 150 kanmon (1 kanmon is equal to 1 wŏn and half) is at the rate of five per cent per month; for more than 200 kanmon, three per cent per month. In the strictest case, lower than 10 kanmon is two per cent per five days. In this way, money-lending was at a high rate of interest, so that land that had been held on security would not be returned to its original owner.

Jitsuri no Chōsen (実利の朝鮮) 1904, Chōsen kigyō annai (朝鮮企業案内), pp. 70-71; Re-quoted from Pak 1985, pp. 47-48.

As the report suggests, some Japanese settlers were anxious to accumulate wealth through money-lending in Pusan.

Another piece of empirical evidence, which supports this, is the emergence of ‘rich usurers’. In Pusan, those who became rich were trade merchants and real-estate businessmen. It was known that there were only three Japanese plutocrats in colonial Pusan: Hajama Hotarō of Yamaguchi, Ōike Tadasuke of Tsushima, and Kashii Gentarō of Fukuoka. These
three plutocrats came to Pusan empty-handed, yet became the richest men in Pusan and extended their wealth into Kyōngsang Province. Inoue Kiyomaro (井上 清麿) who was a Japanese settler at the time, criticized the way in which these three plutocrats accumulated their wealth. Inoue pointed out that not only did they accumulate their wealth by lending money at high interest, thereby depriving Korean debtors of their mortgaged properties, but they also manipulated the county magistrate to take trade rights and misappropriated the county’s fund to take out interest-free loans for usury at high interest and to purchase rice. Not satisfied with usury or embezzlement, they became even richer as a result of obtaining road taxes that charged for various privileges, such as indigenous product rights, shipping rights, fishery rights, and exclusive sales rights (Pak 1966, pp. 25-27). In particular, Hajama Hotarō owned one third of the land in the Japanese settlement after he came to take a post as the manager at the Pusan branch of Osaka Ihoi Shōten (大阪五百井商店). He began to purchase land in Pusan from 1892 (Takasaki 2002, p. 33). Apart from these three plutocrats, there were many Japanese settlers who became rich and prominent in Pusan.

Table 9. Notable shops and people in Pusan, 1878

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tsushima</th>
<th>Fukui and Kagoshima, later Osaka</th>
<th>Tokyo</th>
<th>Elsewhere</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Risshin Shokai – Ōike Tadasuke</td>
<td>Sumitomo/ Kubo Moriaiki (Osaka)</td>
<td>Ōkura-gumi – Takahashi</td>
<td>Ikeda-gumi (Kobe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyakumi National Bank</td>
<td>Horiguchi Shōten/ Horiguchi Kaemon (Fuku)</td>
<td>Mitsubishi Kisen</td>
<td>Kajiyama Shisuke (Yamaguchi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamada Chujirō</td>
<td>Hamada Tatsunosuke (Kagoshima)</td>
<td>Daiichi National Bank</td>
<td>Kyōdō Shokai Takasu (Yamaguchi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukuda Masubei</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kyōdō shokai (Nagasaki)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoke Sadahachi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gotō Yosiemon (not known)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamaya Soemon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shinesei Shokai</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takagi Masatarō</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miyata Tsuneji</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: This table is created on the basis of data provided by Kimura (2001). Business in Korea became the central part of their business. For example, Ōike moved its headquarters for all operations from Tsushima to Pusan (Kimura 2001, p. 42).
As the table suggests, there were many Japanese settlers who were from different parts of Japan. The financial foundation of the Korean merchants was fragile and there was no unifying organization, such as a bank or merchant association, through which Korean merchants could help each other. On the other hand, the Japanese merchants in Pusan quickly established an Association and a Chamber of Commerce to promote trade, and the trade superintendent sent by the Japanese government played an important role in amending the trade policy and providing a hospitable environment for Japanese merchants.

The financial situation of the Japanese merchants was far better than that of the Korean merchants. In response to the challenges encountered, the Korean merchants began to seek and organize a unifying body to compete with that of the Japanese, as petty merchants accumulated wealth in the early stage of the open-port period. However, we should not jump to the conclusion that there was no governmental effort whatsoever to support the merchants. In fact, it was known that regional commercial interest groups at Kaesŏng and Ŭiju provided organizational and financial resources for foreign trade and the domestic production process. In addition, the government also provided loans for the merchants to circulate funds. For instance, the Korean government implemented the 1888 edict oehoek (外割), which enabled the local government to provide credit to reliable merchants without interest and to avoid the costs of transporting heavy copper coinage (P’yo 2005, p. 248; Miller 2006, pp. 20-21).

The number of kaekchu in Pusan was estimated at about 150 to 160 in 1889, but their numbers decreased. Since 1890, the number of kaekchu remained around 60. However, kaekchu were active considering the number of kaekchu was twice as many as at Inch’ŏn or Wonsan. Eventually, Korean merchants organized a unifying body, that is, the Kaekchu Merchants Association (Kaekchusang hoesa 客主商會社) in Pusan in 1883, renamed the Pusan Merchants Association (Pusansang hoeso 釜山商會所) in 1887. Thereafter, the
Korean merchants organizations continued to be established in Pusan; these were: Tonghang Company (東航會社, 1887), Sangbŏp Company (商法會社, 1889), Kyundŭng Company (均等會社, 1889), Tonggye Company (同契社, 1893), Kyunhŭng Merchants Association Company (均興商會社, 1893), and the Chamber of Commerce (商務會議所, 1894).

Furthermore, despite the pressure from the Japanese settler organization and the Japanese government, the Korean government attempted to protect the right to collect commission on monopolized goods for kaekchu and kaekchu merchants associations by stating that it was customary [in Korea] for the merchants to trade [collect commission on monopolized goods] (商販之有口文 通行之慣例). However, From the Kabo Reforms of 1894, the Korean government inevitably surrendered the kaekchu's right to collect monopolized goods with the rise of pressure from the Japanese government. In other words, although Korean merchants were able to expand their businesses with the help of the Japanese merchants, they were nonetheless subordinate to them (Hong 1994, p. 127-43).

**Summation**

Pusan went through rapid changes in the open-port period. The expansion of trade had a great impact on the local society. Not only did trade expand, but also the system of trade changed. Geographical closeness was an important factor for initial contacts, but it was not the only factor. Tsushima merchants at the Japan House who were present prior to the opening had been at the centre of the traditional trade with Japan, which provided a convenient environment to establish a new trade system in the open-port period.

Moreover, the Japanese settlers who came to Pusan after its opening were unified in the Japanese settler organisations at Pusan to bolster trade between Korea and Japan in such a way that the Japanese settlers could benefit. For this, the Japanese government made every effort to assist them by concluding trade agreements with Korea. In particular, after the
conclusion of the Kanghwa treaty, no tariff policy was applied on both imports and exports between Japan and Korea, which created numerous conflicts between Japan and Korea of varied severity on the issue of taxation at the open port. The Pusan Maritime Customs Service was installed to manage the trade and derive duties that could be used by the Korean government, and yet even this was engineered by the Chinese Maritime Customs Service. As a result, by and large, Pusan, as a treaty port, was dramatically changed, and yet its change was driven by other great powers.

Whereas the volume of trade expanded at Pusan, the financial base for the Koreans was weak. A traditional practice of money-lending, which was strictly banned, continued to operate in the market at Pusan. Since all restrictions were lifted after the port opening, except the boundary of the Japanese merchants’ activities, the nobuse or waechae type of money loan was easily expanded. The Japanese merchants provided funds for the Korean merchants and received products from them. What was new after the opening of the port was that the loans were secured with deeds to property. This form of money-loan became a system of trade with the Japanese merchants at Pusan. Moreover, this system of trade subjected the Korean merchants to high interest rates and the risk of losing their collateral. In spite of the danger, money loans from the Japanese merchants dominated the economy. As a result, Korean merchants became financially subordinated to the Japanese merchants in the open-port period.
Chapter Four: The Development of transportation Infrastructure in Pusan, 1876-1910: Building the railroad

The roads along which the traveler rides or trudges, at a pace, in either case, of 3 miles an hour, are simply infamous. There are few made roads, and those which exist are deep in dust in summer and in mud in winter, where they are not polished tracks over irregular surfaces and ledges of rock. In most cases they are merely paths worn by the passage of animals and men into some degree of legibility.

Bird 1897, p. 128.

The impact of transportation infrastructure changed common concepts of time and space in the modern world. People became aware of time through train schedules, and the limit of spatial boundaries dissolved as transportation infrastructure developed. Korea, in the transition from the traditional period to the open ports period, experienced a rapid change of spatial boundaries as new types of transportation were introduced.

With the opening of railway and regular shipping lines, the timetables for trains and ships began to appear in newspapers (Pusan kūndae yŏksakwan 2004, p. 36). There were two main means of transportation for most people: walking overland and water transportation via water channels. As for overland means of transportation, besides walking, horses for men, palanquins for women, wagons pulled by oxen, and goods carried by people were the only ways to transport people and goods overland. The traditional form of trade depended on ‘thousands of peddlers, who travelled throughout the country on foot with packs on their backs and peddled their goods from house to house for centuries’ (Hulbert 1906, p. 281). In fact, itinerant merchants or peddlers (popusang, 補負商) in traditional Korea used to play an important role in connecting different areas of the peninsula. Hulbert argues that the wandering peddlers ‘covered the
country as a network, and one could very often communicate through them with distant friends’ (Hulbert 1906, p. 268). Though the condition of the road system from Pusan (Tongnae 東萊) to Seoul was slightly better than others, because there was a main road, called the Tongnae-ro (東萊路), the road system was still backward. Before the opening of Pusan, Tongnae-ro passed through Munkyŏng (聞慶), Sangju (尙州), Nakwŏn (洛源), Naktongjin (洛東津), Kumi (龜尾), Ch’ilgok (漆谷), Taegu (大邱), Ch’ŏngdo (清道), Milyang (密陽), Yangsan (梁山), and ended at Tongnae. Aside from ordinary travel it also functioned as a route for the Chosŏn T’ongshinsa (朝鮮通信使) in their progress to Japan. It was also the route used by the Japanese army to advance into Seoul during the Hideyoshi invasions. In other words, Tongnae-ro was an international route built to connect Hansŏng or Seoul in Korea to Japan by the shortest means possible (Hŏ and Hiroshi 2007, pp. 34-35).

Furthermore, in terms of water transportation networks, since Korea is a peninsula surrounded by water on three sides and there were many water channels connected to seven rivers across the inland, water transportation via water channels was vital means of transportation. In particular, inland water transport played an important role in expanding intra-regional trade. Kup’o (龜浦), which was located along the Naktong river was a typical example of which an inland port became the centre of local trade in Korea. However, it limited to inland trade, not overseas trade.

The development of land and water transportation network—railways and steamships— brought about greater mobility and a greater concentration of urban populations, which changed the face of cities. The journey from Seoul to Pusan typically took about fourteen days by cow and horse, but with the establishment of railway lines,
travel time dropped to just eleven hours. It was reported that the average time ‘between Seoul and Fusan was twenty miles an hour’ (The North China Herald, 10 March 1905).

As Hulbert (1906) testified, the establishment of steamship lines and the building of railroads were ‘working wonderful changes in the Korean’s ability to communicate with distant sections of the country’ (p. 268). In order to understand those changes, I will focus on railway development from the point of view of the local community and its people in Pusan. When viewed through the lens of local community concerns, railways had a large impact on the development of cities in Korea. Ko Sŏk-kyu (2004) states that all big cities in Korea are either open ports or cities newly created by the development of railways (pp. 10-11). He points out that there was special treatment for newly-created cities, including the open ports, but poor treatment for traditional cities. This chapter concerns the construction of the railroad and its impact on the local community, mainly in Pusan. The next chapter will consider shipping.

The Creation of the Railroad and the Local Community, 1876-1910

[I] took the hwaryunch’a (the locomotive, literally translated as ‘fire wheeled car’) from Yokohama to Shinbashi. [I was told] that the vehicle was already waiting in front of the station, yet it was obscured even though [I] passed by scores of units. There are [only] long servants’ quarters, which were forty to fifty units. [I] asked where the vehicle is [and was told that the unit before me] is the vehicle. What I saw, which was I thought of as [servants’] quarters, was a vehicle, not living quarters… It ran like thunder and lightning, moving like a rainstorm, running three to four hundred li per hour, yet the inside of the vehicle was peaceful, not shaking at all…While I had a smoke, [we] arrived in Shinbashi, which was as far as ninety li distant.

Kim Ki-su (originally published in 1877) 1958, ‘Il tong kiyu’ (日東記遊, Record of a journey to Japan), pp. 16-17.
The locomotive was a symbol and an achievement of ‘modernity’, which required massive investment, advanced technology, and intensive labour. The arrival of the railway was ‘in itself a revolutionary symbol and achievement, since the forging of the globe into a single interacting economy was in many ways the most far-reaching and certainly the most spectacular aspect of industrialization’ (Hobsbawm 1962, p. 40). In Europe, most countries, except Britain, developed a railway network by active government planning and investment. For the Japanese in the Meiji period, the steam engine was a popular iconographical symbol of ‘civilization’ (Gluck 1985, p. 101). The example of a railway network for the Meiji government was Prussia, which was ‘a mixed approach of direct investments and subsidies plus overall planning and control of private lines’ (Hirschmeier 1964, p. 137).

From the beginning, the development of the railway in Korea was not primarily by Korea’s own effort, but by outside forces through concessions. Railways appeared as the darling of the age and the hero of progress in Korea, but the Korean railway served the Japanese colonial power, and enabled it to attain and maintain control over Korea and beyond. That is why the formation of the railway in Korea stood at the centre of the paradox of ‘colonial modernity’. Railways occupied the ground between colonialism and resistance; control and assimilation; development and exploitation; and oppression and growth (Chŏng 1999, p. 4).

The first Korean who encountered trains and wrote of his impressions was Kim Ki-su (金綺秀), the ambassador in the ‘Special Envoy’ or Sushinsa (修信使) dispatched to Japan a couple of months after the signing of the Kanghwa Treaty in 1876. He called the train a hwaryunch’a (火輪車) or ‘fire wheeled car’ and he had so little idea of the
train that he mistook the train carriages as ‘long servants’ quarters’. He described the train and railway with curiosity and amusement— it did not shake at all even though it ran as fast as thunder and lightning. Kim and his party were greatly impressed these men initiated the first attempts to build a railway with Korean capital. The most prominent figure was Pak Ki-jong (朴琪淙), who was dispatched with the ‘Special Envoy’ in 1876 and Kim Hong-jip (金弘集) in 1880 as a translator or yokkwan (譯官) (Cho 1973, pp. 90-91). In particular, Pusan was the centre from which the desire of establishing the railway was started.

Certain Korean merchants of Fusan intend to build a railway between Fusan and Hadanpo, a distance of five English miles. They have applied to the Public Works Department for permission and received the Government sanction for the enterprise. Hadanpo is situated in Tongnai district and is West of Fusan. It is said to be a prosperous port and considerable export trade is carried on at that point. A capital of $100,000 is said to have been raised among the wealthy Koreans in Fusan and Hadanpo, and the principal leader of the scheme is a Korean named Pak Kijong.

*The Independent*, 16 October 1897.

As the *Independent* described above, Pak Ki-jong, together with other businessmen in Pusan, established the Pusan and Southwest Perimeter Railway Company (*Puha ch’öldo hoesa* 釜下鐵道會社) in 1898 to build a six kilometre-long light railway from Pusan to the port of Hadan (下端), the so-called Hadan Railway. This was not merely motivated by the hope of a Korean-owned railway, but by economic and commercial considerations. Hadan was a port located at the mouth of the Naktong River. Not only was it an important transit route for rice shipments coming down the Naktong River, but it also possessed the largest salt farms in Korea. These qualities made Hadan one of the most prosperous trade ports in the region, perhaps even in the country. Since there was no
proper transportation system on land, the expenses and problems were greater for inland traffic than the waterways.

The first project in the construction of the Seoul-Pusan line began with a short section in the Pusan area from Ch’oryang (at the harbour) to Kup’o, which was a centre for various products linking the Naktong River and Tongnae. Kup’o was also known as a place where the five-day market convened six times a month on days with a three and an eight, and attracted peddlers, producers, and consumers from Kimhae and Yangsan (Kim 2004, p. 14; Han’guk minjok munhwa taebaekkwa sajŏn 한국민족문화대백과사전, vol 3., p. 571). As soon as the Ch’oryang-Ku-p’o line began operations, however, rice from the Naktong River basin was sent to Ku-p’o, rather than Hadan, so that Hadan began to decline as a trading port (Pak 1967, pp. 34-35). As a result, the attempt to build a Korean-owned railway ended in failure. According to Cho Ki-jun (1973), the reason for the failure of the Pusan-Hadan line was: 1) Pak Ki-jong contributed private property to establish the line, yet from the beginning it continued to suffer from a shortage of capital; 2) the line was not carefully considered in terms of profitability; and 3) with the beginning of the Ch’oryang-Ku-p’o line, the Pusan-Hadan line became obsolete (pp. 98-99). Cho Ki-jun argues that Pak’s attempt to build the line was significant for Koreans in spite of its failure, because he demonstrated Koreans’ desire to build their own infrastructure and stimulated the Korean government and other Koreans to take on other ‘modern’ projects. Later, Pak attempted to gain the right to build the Seoul-Ŭiju line after a French company, Fives-Lille lost its concession, but it also ended in failure due to lack of financing (Cho 1973, p. 99).
Concession for the Seoul-Pusan line

The establishment of railroads in Korea was not motivated and achieved by curiosity and amusement, as seen in Kim Ki-su’s ‘Record of a journey to Japan’; rather, railroads were constructed by foreign powers penetrating Korea through concessions. However, railways were not constructed by force and were constructed with the involvement of the Korean government. On 2 July 1896, when the concession of the Seoul-Inch’ŏn line was taken over by American interests, the editorial in The Independent captured a great expectation and hope for the railway:

The introduction of railways in a country like Korea will have a twofold benefit to the people. The Koreans have heard many wonderful things of Western civilization, but they have not yet seen the reality of the wonders. When they see a locomotive that puffs out great volumes of smoke, and blows long, sharp, and sonorous whistles, and pulls away carloads of people and merchandise at the rate of thirty or forty miles an hour, it will surely wake up their slumbers of several centuries old; and their ideas of modern civilization will undergo a material change. It is one of the best instruments for the education of the conservative people. As to the development of commerce and industry there is no better means than railways. It will cheapen the prices of the necessities of life for consumers, and it will enable the producers to dispose of their goods at higher rates in shorter time; in other words they will have a market for their articles.

We rejoice with many others in the prospect of having the much needed railway between the Capital and the port in the course of twelve or fifteen months. When the road is completed we will see some wonderful changes in Korea. In fact, we consider the opening of the railway traffic between the two points to be the beginning of a new era for the commercial and industrial development of Korea. Also, it will be in a great measure the instrument of stirring up new ambitions in the hearts of Korean people.

We believe that the Korean Government never did a better stroke of policy than granting the railway concession to the enterprising, energetic and large minded American, who promptly secured all the necessary funds for the building of the road, and with equal promptness took the necessary steps in making other arrangements. The surveyors have been sent to work between the termini, and the work is almost completed. We have no doubt that the company will soon begin the building of the bridges across the river, and rails will be laid as soon as the grading work is finished.

In connection with the opening of the railway traffic in this country there is another important fact which must not be ignored. That is the foreign capitalists
As the *Independent* reported, even though the Korean government was not able to build railways by Korean initiative alone because they had ‘neither the capital nor the technical expertise to build railway lines’, the Korean government wished to fulfil their expectation and hope in establishing railways via concession. This was an indirect way in which the Korean government invited foreign powers to invest. The Korean government hoped to grant concessions to almost anyone but the Japanese, yet the Japanese government was most interested in obtaining railway concessions in Korea (Duus 1995, p. 139). The intention of the Japanese government to have railway concessions in Korea could be understood from two points of view: military and economic. These two views were not mutually exclusive; rather they pointed to the same objective, which was ‘the making of a sphere of influence’ (Beasley 1987, p. 74). The military concern was clearly expressed in 1892 by Kawakami Sōroku (川上操六), Assistant Chief of the Army General Staff:

In case of an emergency, when Japan has to take control, everybody agrees that transportation to the south of the peninsula from the middle [of the peninsula] is necessary. If the Seoul-Pusan line fell into the hands of a foreign country, trade
between Japan and Korea would not only [become] disadvantageous, but the greater issue is that it could be a threat to the existence of our nation. *Chōsen tetsudōshi* 朝鮮鐵道史 1925, p. 9.

Although the military concern loomed large, the link to economic benefit and the utility of having economic interests was not far behind. For instance, Inoue Kaoru’s rationale to provide a loan and build the railway is ‘a classic example of economic imperialism’ (Beasley 1987, p. 51), a textbook case on how to establish economic interests that would require political expansion.

If we [Japan] wish to solidify our position in Korea and establish a pretext for intervention in its internal affairs, we must obtain real interests there, whether through the railroad or through loans, and by financial means create pretexts for extending our [Japanese] intervention to other kinds of relationships.

*Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru* (井上馨)
*Nihon gaikō bunsho* (日本外交文章), 27.1, p. 477;
Re-quoted from Duus 1995, p. 92. [emphasis added]

Nevertheless, Japanese intentions changed over time. Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese War put the Japanese in a better position on the Korean peninsula through the Treaty of Shimonoseki (*Shimonoseki Jōyaku* 下關條約). As Japan was ceded the territories of Formosa and the Pescadores and most of the Liaotung Peninsula (including Port Arthur and Niuzhuang), Japan became a rising power in Asia between 1895 and 1900. In particular, the reason for securing control of Port Arthur and Niuzhuang (which is known as Yinkou now) was to prevent Russia from expanding its influence in China after the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway and to forestall Russian access to an ice-free port (Storry 1979, p. 27). However, the Triple Intervention of Russia, France, and Germany temporarily stifled this rising power in Asia. These three powers pressed Japan to return Liaotung to China, which was achieved by 1895. Shortly afterwards, in the early months of 1898, the three main actors of the Triple Intervention acquired
various Chinese cities through leases: Port Arthur and Talienwan (Dalian) for Russia (twenty-five year lease), Tsingtao for Germany (ninety-nine year lease), and Kwangchow Bay for France (ninety-nine year lease) (Storry 1979, p. 31). The fact that the Liaotung Peninsula was occupied by Russia, an overt threat to Japan, was sufficient to provoke Japanese suspicions of Russian intentions. Russo-Japanese rivalry then began to manifest in the form of a struggle for concessions in Korea. Korea became a battle ground, which Japan could not afford to lose. In order to turn the situation to Japan’s advantage, a Japanese official, Miura Gorō conspired to murder the pro-Russian Queen Min (the so-called ŭlmi sabyŏn 乙未事變), but this plot resulted in the removal of the throne to the Russian legation (Agwan p’ach’ŏn 俄館播遷) in February 1896, a disastrous failure of policy from the Japanese point of view.

In the meantime, on 2 March 1896, the pro-Russian foreign minister, Yi Wan-yong (李完用), and the minister of Agriculture, Commerce, and Industry, Cho Pyŏng-jik (趙秉稷), granted construction rights for the Seoul-Inch’ŏn line¹ to James R. Morse, an American businessman who enjoyed the support of the American minister, Horace Allan (Chôsen tetsudōshi 1937, pp. 43-49). With support from the Russian minister Karl Waeber, France, as a Russian ally, began to negotiate the rights to build a Seoul-Ŭiju line with a grant to a French company, Fives-Lille² (Chôsen tetsudōshi 1937, pp. 49-50). In

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¹ The concession for the Seoul-Inch’ŏn railway was given to the American businessman, James Morse. However, he found that it was not easy to attract the necessary capital to finance the railway project. Knowing that Japan was interested in the concession, he used a series of political maneuvers to get the Japanese government to buy the concession. Morse initially brought the Russians into the bid to secure better prices. However, after the Russians secured the unfrozen Port Arthur, the Russians lost interest in the line. Morse then decided to sell the line to the Japanese in May 1899, and its construction was completed in July 1900 (Duus 1995, pp. 142-146).

² The Seoul-Ŭiju railway concession was granted to a French company, Fives-Lille (concessionaire: M. Grille) in 1896. The Fives-Lille launched its construction from 1902. However, M. Grille failed to attract capital for the construction. He attempted to interest a group of Japanese investors, but that effort ended in
the face of expanding Russian influence, the Japanese saw railways serving as a useful barrier. In 1898, Maejima Hisoka (前島密), director of several companies in Japan, stated:

It is a matter of the greatest emergency to gain as soon as possible the rights for building a railway through the heart of Korea. Not only is this railway in itself of vital importance in the future for our trade and immigration, but it will be a control and a barrier to Russian encroachment and invasion, and must inevitably be a most important factor in the preservation of peace within our country and in East Asia.


Russian interest in obtaining the Seoul-Pusan concession was discovered by the Japanese in February 1898 and events began to move rapidly. The Nishi-Rosen Agreement in April 1898 concluded between Japan and Russia recognized Korean independence and sovereignty and stipulated that both countries would ‘refrain from direct interference in internal affairs of Korea’ (Kim and Kim 1967, p. 96). The Agreement was not as simple as it looked; rather, the complexities of a diplomatic exchange were hidden beneath the surface. Historians commonly refer to the Mankan-kōkan (満韓交換, Trading Manchuria for Korea) policy in which Japan would ‘recognize Russia’s dominant interests in Manchuria in return for Russia’s acknowledging her own dominant interest in Korea’ (Hunter 1977, pp. 583-584). As a result, the April 1898 Agreement put the Japanese in a better position in Korea without the interference of Russia.

failure. As a result, he lost the concession. A group of Korean investors led by Pak Ki-jong who established the Taehan Railway company (Taehan ch’ŏldo hoesa, 大韓鐵道會社) in 1899 took over the concession. Nonetheless, they also failed due to a lack of capital. Following this, the Japanese government was interested to acquire the concession, but negotiations failed. It was only when the Russo-Japanese war began that the Japanese army quick got permission from the Korean government to build the Seoul-Ŭiju line as a military line. As a result, Japan obtained full control of the railway system in Korea (Duus 1995, p. 154-157).
Marquis Itō Hirobumi (伊藤博文) made a visit in Seoul in August 1898 on his return from a trip to China and began pressing the Korean government hard for a railway concession. Prior to Marquis Itō’s visit, Shibusawa, the Japanese banker, came to Korea.\(^3\)

The object of Mr. Shibusawa’s visit to Korea is said to be not only seeking to establish a Japan-Korea bank, but also to obtain the concession for the construction of a railway from Fusan to Seoul. Mr. Shibusawa is said to have borrowed ten million yen of the silver from the Japanese treasury as a fund for constructing the railway. The line itself and the customs, it is proposed, shall be given as security.

*The Independent*, 7 May 1898

Shibusawa paved the way for Marquis Itō, and the visit of Itō pushed the Korean government towards concession. The government finally agreed that the Seoul-Pusan railway concession would be granted to a Japanese syndicate. The Japanese Minister in Seoul, Katō Masuo (加藤增進), who negotiated for the concession, persuaded the Koreans to grant the concession to Japan ‘as a token of “harmony between Japan and Korea”’ (*Chōsen tetsudōshi* 1937, pp. 89-90; Duus 1995, p. 147). The same vision was reflected in an article in *the Independent*.

While urging the Korean Government to speedily grant a charter to the Japanese projectors of the Seoul-Fusan Railway since the enterprise is intended, observed the Osaka Asahi, to unite Japan and Korea in *more intimate relations commercially and socially*, the same paper advises Japanese capitalists to adopt a wider range in the pursuit of their enterprise and to project a similar undertaking in China.

*The Independent*, 26 June 1897. [emphasis added]

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\(^3\) An interesting rumor was also reported during Shibusawa’s visit as follows: ‘Mr. Shibusawa, the prominent Japanese banker who is now visiting Seoul, has decided to give $1,000 to the poor of Seoul as a relief.’ (*The Independent*, 7 May 1898)
In September 1898, the Korean government eventually signed the ‘Agreement concerning the Seoul-Pusan line’ with Sasaki Kiyomaro (佐佐木清麿) and Hoshinaga Jirō (乾長次郎), who were the representative of the Seoul-Pusan Railway Company (Kojong sillok eighth day ninth month 1898; Duus 1995, p. 147).

Of course, even in Japan there was internal opposition against the construction of the Korean railway. Specifically, many Japanese politicians believed that, while the threat from Russia still existed in Korea, it was impracticable to push ahead with an overseas railway project, because it required vast investment. Even Itō Hirobumi, who was the Resident-General of Korea, expressed concern that attempting to manage the railway in Korea could be considered an act of provocation to Russia (Chōsen Tetsudō Yonju-nen Ryaku-shi 1940, p. 82).

However, then Prime Minister Yamagata Aritomo (山縣有朋), and Ōkuma Shigenobu (大隈重信), a leading genrō (元老), considered the Seoul-Pusan line as the trade artery of Korea, which would reinforce capacity for trade and immigration from Japan. In February 1900, the House of Representatives and the House of Peers passed the ‘Proposal concerning the speedy construction of the Seoul-Pusan line in Korea’ (京釜鐵道速成案), which included the following statement:

The Japanese government should manage the Seoul-Pusan line so as to improve trading interests between Korea and Japan, because this line would pass through the three southern provinces where there are plenty of natural resources and would link the capital Keijō (Seoul) to the biggest trading port Fusan.

Nihonkoku (日本國) Kanpō (官報) gōgai(號外) 7 February 1900 and Shibusawa Eiichi denki shiryō (渕澤榮一傳記資料) vol. 16, p. 396; Re-quoted from Chŏng 1999, p. 65.

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4 K. Kyŏngpu Ch’ŏldo hapdong or J. Keifu Tetsudo Godō 京釜鐵道合同.
Not only businessmen, but most politicians seemed to agree that the railway could possibly bring about business prosperity. For this reason, the ubiquitous Shibusawa Eiichi (藤澤栄一), together with a group of businessmen, established the Seoul-Pusan Company in 1901. In this process, the government also played an important role by promising a state subsidy. As a matter of fact, the company was semi-governmental, closely associated with the Japanese government. This characteristic of the company was expressed at the ceremony of opening the Seoul-Pusan railway by those who were present.

At the ceremony of opening the Kei-Fu Railway [Keijō-Fusan railway] there were present from the Japanese House of Peers, Count Ohgimachi, Count Matenakoji, viscounts Juonye, Tsutsumi, Akabe, Torii, Joiye, Matsudaira, Makino and others to the number of twenty-eight, and from the House of Commons there were Mesars. Yebarar, Sugita, Morimato, Hoselbe, Ogino, Asano, Honai, Ando, Fuknoka, Takenchi, Iwamato, Tsunada, Nagai, Ishida, Terada, Kimura, Haseawa, Matsumoto and others to the number of one hundred and seventy five, besides, bankers, editors, shareholders, contractors and railway managers. This distinguished company very strongly impressed the Korean officials and the foreigners of various nationalities in Korea with the substantial character behind Japanese commercial enterprises in Korea.

The Korea Review 1905, p. 192.

In other words, the company kept distance from the government in principle to avoid diplomatic difficulties with Korea, but at the same time, the company closely worked with the Japanese government to get subsidies from it. Furthermore, The Japanese government provided technical assistance for the company. For example, the Japanese government sent a survey team to Korea to investigate possible routes of the Seoul-Pusan line five times from 1892 to 1903 (Chōsen tetsudōshi 1937, pp. 163-195; Chōng 1999, p. 51), and a report on the comprehensive field survey of possible routes for the Seoul-Pusan line clearly highlighted profitability projections.
Table 1 Assumption of profit in the Seoul-Pusan line

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year since operation</th>
<th>Operating income (yen)</th>
<th>Operating Cost (yen)</th>
<th>Net profit (yen)</th>
<th>Profit ratio of capital (%)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,020,000</td>
<td>702,000</td>
<td>318,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,102,000</td>
<td>727,000</td>
<td>375,000</td>
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<td>1,190,000</td>
<td>754,000</td>
<td>436,000</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1,285,000</td>
<td>783,000</td>
<td>502,000</td>
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<td>1,388,000</td>
<td>815,000</td>
<td>573,000</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
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<td>1,499,000</td>
<td>849,000</td>
<td>650,000</td>
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<td>1,619,000</td>
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<td>969,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>2,997,000</td>
<td>1,310,000</td>
<td>1,687,000</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As Table 1 shows, the Seoul-Pusan line carried high expectations of annual profit.

The Japanese government expected to profit right after the launching of the line, and by the fourteenth and fifteenth years of management, the Seoul-Pusan line was projected to return a six to seven percent net profit. Projections were based on expected trade between Korea and Japan. Referring to the prospect of the Seoul-Pusan line, Ozaki Saburō (尾崎三良), the director of the company, said:

The Seoul-Pusan line is going through Taegu (大邱) and Pusan (釜山), which are the largest rice transporting areas of Kyŏngsang province. Now the freight rate of rice between Taegu and Pusan is 2 yen per koku, but by railway it would only cost 50 sen, which is one fourth of the traditional freight rate for rice. Reducing the freight price would bring the market price down and push exports to one million koku in one year.

From the beginning, the Seoul-Pusan line was not considered simply a railway, but a link from the southern tip of the peninsula across the continent. This intention became clear in the process of choosing a railway track gauge. Shibusawa Eiichi, strongly advocated that, even though the company has to bear the financial burden to adopt the standard gauge, the line should be built with the standard gauge (75 pounds of weight gauge), the same as the Chinese railway, because the line should connect to the continental railways. In other words, despite the difficulty of importing materials from the United States, this line should connect Korea to China and eventually across the continent to Europe (Chōsen Tetsudō Yonju-nen Ryaku-shi 朝鮮鐵道四十年略史 1940, p. 47). For this, Chŏng Chae-jŏng points out that the Seoul-Pusan line was not merely a colonial railway; it was Japan’s gateway to the continent (Chŏng 1999, p. 60).

Finally, military objectives became the major reason to build a railway in Korea. As early as March 1890, Yamagata Aritomo (山縣有朋), the founder of the modern Japanese army, made a speech on foreign policy in the Diet that defined Japan’s geopolitical interests. Japan’s ‘line of sovereignty’ was Japanese national territory, the home islands, and its ‘line of advantage or interest’ was Korea (Jansen 1984, p. 67; Gluck 1985, p. 118). The Korean peninsula was a buffer zone and crucial for the security of Japan. Moreover, the reason why Yamagata advocated the building of a line from Pusan through Seoul to Ŭiju on the Manchurian border was that he considered railways not only as a way in which Japan could secure itself but also as a way in which Japan would be
able to exercise hegemony in East Asia. According to Yamagata, the rationale for the controlling transportation in Korea from Pusan to Ŭiju (‘Weiju’ below) is as follows,

We should control transportation in Korea. Once something happens in the Far East, we should take this chance and should not lose the opportunity. In order to do this, the most important thing is the railway between Pusan and Weiju. Although we have a secret agreement over the concession of the Seoul-Pusan Line, if we cannot extend this line to Weiju, I cannot but feel depressed, because the line from Pusan to Weiju is the main route to the East Asian continent...In the longer term, this line will make up for the expense and add value for Japan.

_Yamagata Aritomo Ikensho_ (山縣有朋意見書) 1967, pp. 224-225; Re-quoted from Shinohara 1990, p. 35.

Therefore, as ‘the beginning of a great thoroughfare across the Asian continent,’ railways were necessary for defending Japan and also for strengthening it (Duus 1984, p. 139).

Within four years of Yamagata’s speech, the Sino-Japanese war was fought in and around the Korean peninsula. At the time of the war, no railways had been constructed that could provide logistical support to battlefields in Korea and China. The Japanese army experienced difficulties in transporting troops and equipment. For example, Japan moved two main forces swiftly by shipping them through the Yellow Sea from the port of Ujina in Hiroshima to Inch’on in Korea from the middle of June 1894, even before the declaration of war between China and Japan on 1 August 1894. From 1 to 8 August, Japan dispatched a third force to Korea to secure land supply lines for the army from Pusan to Seoul, but it took almost a month to complete the operation or until 29 August 1894 (Sakamoto and Kimura 2007, pp.156-157). The length of time for the deployment provided the Japanese government with an object lesson in the importance of ground transport from port to field. Therefore, the Meiji government quickly employed political pressure to secure its right to build the Seoul-Pusan line and the Seoul-Inch’on line as
specified in the Korea-Japan Provisional Agreements of 1894 (Chōsen Tetsudō Shi 1937, pp. 70-73).

With strong backing from the Japanese government, the Seoul-Pusan Railway Company managed to construct 150 kilometres of track in two years (September 1901 to December 1903). At the end of 1903, the Meiji government engaged directly in the venture to establish the Seoul-Pusan Railway. Financing the venture was the most challenging part of the project, but this challenge was solved with 'patriotism.' Indeed, in this period, an ‘impressive show of patriotism’ emanated from the settler merchants in the form of massive personal investments (Uchida 2005, p. 45). Despite the risk of losing all their capital if the railway was not successful, Japanese investors willingly placed their funds in the railway construction in Korea (Hunter 1977, pp. 590-591). For the private sector, spatial expansion held up prospects of business expansion; for the Meiji government, spatial expansion held up prospects of rapid military reach. The establishment of the railway resulted from the combination of public and private sector interests (Chŏng 1999, p.74). In this process, there was no negotiation with the Korean government. At the time the Japanese government financed, subsidized, and even nationalized major transport industries such as railways, ship building, and harbor construction, because private companies lacked capital, so the Seoul-Pusan railway was not an unusual combination.

Tension heightened as relations between Japan and Russia deteriorated, and the probability of war with Russia became a certainty. Japan chose to ally with Britain in 1902, because the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance reflected the ‘logical outcome of

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5 Cho-Il chamjŏng Haptong chogwan or Ni-Chō zentei gōdō jōkan 朝日暫定合同條款 or 日朝暫定合同條款.
British concern over Russian tensions regarding the British spheres of interest in China proper and of the Japanese fear of the Russian menaces directed against Korea’ (Kim and Kim 1967, p. 100). By the end of 1903, all Japanese were aware of a growing threat from Russia. In the Tōkyō Keizai Zasshi (東京経済雑誌), one article stated its concern over the threat from ‘the North’, that is, from Russia:

In Korea there is one great force which acts as an obstacle to the progress of our [Japanese] benefit...This force [Russia] will try and get a third power to step in and take our right to construct this railway, and will hinder its progress, secretly or openly.

Nakajima Tetsuya (中島哲哉), ‘Keifu Tetsudō Kaisha no Shasai Bōshū ni tsuite’ (京釜鉄道会社の社債防臭に就いて) in Tōkyō Keizai Zasshi (東京経済雑誌), No. 1181, pp. 18-19; Re-quoted from Hunter 1977, p. 593.

In December 1903, the Japanese government took a decisive measure ‘for the speedy completion of the Seoul-Pusan railway’ or Kei-Fu Tetsudō sokusei meirei (京釜鐵道速成命令) in Japanese. Executives in the Seoul-Pusan Railway Company were replaced by government bureaucrats, even including the President of the company, Furuichi Kōi (Ericson 1996, p. 269). The Japanese government was threatened by the extension of Russian influence in Manchuria and in the Korean peninsula. In 1898 the Russian government took control of the construction in the Chinese Eastern Railway, which branched from the Trans-Siberian Railway and stretched across Manchuria reaching Lüshun and Darian in Shantung Province. This line would provide Russia with the capability to mobilize troops in Manchuria and overcome any disadvantages of distance (Sakamoto and Kimura 2007, p. 157).

For the speedy mobilization of Japanese troops, construction of the Seoul-Pusan line was a necessary project. The Seoul-Pusan and Seoul-Ŭiju lines became a ‘military
necessity for Japan’s prosecution of the Russo-Japanese War and for that reason Japan pushed through their construction with great urgency’ (Lee 1984, p. 322). By the eve of the Russo-Japanese War, the Seoul-Pusan Railway was no longer mere transportation; the life and death of Japan depended on it (Sakamoto and Kimura 2007, p. 157). Therefore, the Seoul-Pusan concession ‘shifted out of the hands of private entrepreneurs into the hands of the government’ to prepare for the war against Russia (Duus 1995, p. 154).

After the takeover of the Seoul-Pusan line by the Japanese government, the pressure was on for rapid completion to provide for military supply. The Privy Council, in December 1903, made extensive financial and technical assistance available for the railway line.

The meeting of the Privy Council was reported as follows.

The Privy Council: An extraordinary meeting yesterday forenoon was attended by all the Cabinet Ministers. Marquises Itō and Yamagata and Count Matsukata were present simultaneously for the first time since their recent appointment to the councillorship. They all decided on the extraordinary measures necessary for meeting pressing State engagements, including possible war funds and the speedy completion of the Seoul-Fusan Railway.

_The North China Herald_, 08 January 1904.

As the decision was made, Vice-Minister of Communication Den Kenjirō (田健治郎) contributed resources for the rapid completion of the Seoul-Pusan line and pushed for further railway nationalisation (Ericson 1996, p. 268).

What about the Koreans? With greater Japanese governmental involvement in the railway project, did the Koreans have any concerns about their own sovereignty, especially when the Japanese government attempted to take over the management of the Seoul-Pusan Railway Company? Chŏng points out that the Korean government was powerless to prevent the nationalization of the Seoul-Pusan Railway Company because of war clouds hanging over the peninsula. After Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905, the
Korean government lost ground to negotiate with the Japanese government on the Seoul-Pusan railway, because the Korean government made the ‘Agreement concerning the Seoul-Pusan line’ not with the Japanese government, but with the company. The dismantlement of the company and nationalization of the railway made the Agreement a scrap of paper (Chŏng 1999, pp. 49-50).

*Land acquisition for the Seoul-Pusan line*

[The Korean government] undertook the establishment of the Seoul-Pusan railway. In order for the Japanese government to accede to the repurchase demand of the Korean government for the railway after fifteen years, the Korean government agreed to provide land for the railway line, land for stations, with no strings attached according to the special agreement. In other words, the Korean government inevitably purchases private lands and offers to the Seoul-Pusan railway. Nonetheless, the budget of the Korean government not sufficiently provides the capital. [The Korean government] decided to establish the IlHan Bank (日韓銀行).

*Hwangsŏng shinmun* 1 March 1899.

Building the railway required large parcels of land with right-of-way. The process of land acquisition for the Seoul-Pusan line is sensitive and has drawn the attention of scholars. The centre of the discourse is the ‘exploitative’ nature of land acquisition. The concession for the rights to build the Seoul-Pusan was signed over to the Japanese. Yet the ‘Agreement concerning the Seoul-Pusan line’ on 8 September 1898 was signed not between two countries; rather, it was between the Korean government and the Seoul-Pusan Railway Company (*Chōsen Tetsudōshi* 1937, pp. 90-96). The land use for railway was clearly stated in article III:

*The Korean government grants all the necessary land to conveniently build the railway, not only pieces of land for the railway line, but also land for stations,*

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6 K. Kyŏngpu Ch’ŏl’do hapdong or J. Keifu Tetsudō Godō 京釜鐵道合同.
7 K. Kyŏngpu Ch’ŏl’do Hoesa or J. Keifu Tetsudō Kaisha 京釜鐵道會社.
warehouses, storage yards, arsenals, flanges, and the side line. And the Korean government permits the Seoul-Pusan railway company to keep the land associated with the railway until the Korean government purchases back the railway from the company.  
*Chōsen Tetsudōshi* 1937, p. 92.

Chŏng Chae-jŏng (1994) argues that, because Japanese interests and power dominated Korean decisions to grant the concession and management rights of the land for the railway and for the railroad itself, the Agreement was ‘a typical exploitative treaty’. This was essentially true in spite of the fact that there were some people who considered the Seoul-Pusan line as a joint venture at the time (Chŏng 1994, pp. 502-503). Yet one question regarding this agreement remains if giving up the right to manage the railway and granting the land for the railway is to be considered ‘exploitative’. Exploitation can be understood in a relative sense. ‘Exploitative’ is a loaded word and begs examination, particularly for something as complicated as a major infrastructure investment. Let us consider the question first in a comparative way and then from the point of view of compensation for land taken to provide right-of-way.

Let us first take a look at other railway concessions in comparison to the Seoul-Pusan line. It is helpful to begin by examining other agreements regarding railways in Korea. The Agreement regarding the Seoul-Inch’ŏn line and the Seoul-Ŭiju line reveals that the Agreement for the Seoul-Pusan line was an extension of the Agreements for the Seoul-Inch’ŏn line concession (with the American businessman Morse) and the Seoul-Ŭiju line concession (with the Fives-Lille company of France) (Chŏng 1999, p. 79). Some comparison with the land concessions for railway construction in China helps to contextualize the matter. For example, China and Russia signed an agreement as part of a secret alliance in 1896 between Li Hung-chang on the Chinese side and Count Witte on
the Russian side to extend the Trans-Siberian Railway across Manchuria to Vladivostok.

The three principles that Witte and Li agreed on were as follows:

First, China would grant to Russia permission to construct a railway from Chita to Vladivostok, which would be operated by a private [Russian] firm – the Chinese Eastern Railway Corporation. Second, China would cede a strip of land sufficient for the building and operation of the railway, within which the corporation would have complete authority, including the right to maintain police. The railway might be redeemed by China after thirty-six years at 700 million roubles, but would pass free to her after eighty years. Third, China and Russia agreed to defend each other against any Japanese attack on China, Korea or Russian possessions in East Asia.

Hsu 1976, pp. 111-112.

The third principle was an agreement to ‘defend each other against any Japanese attack on China, Korea or Russian possessions in East Asia’, because the Agreement was signed one year after China’s complete defeat in the Sino-Japanese war (Hsu 1976, p. 112). Aside from this historical anomaly, the first and second principles resembled the ‘Agreement regarding the Seoul-Pusan line’ of September 1898. The wording was so similar, in fact, that the Agreement for the Seoul-Pusan line could have been modeled on the Agreement for the Trans-Siberian Railway. In other words, the Seoul-Pusan Agreement was following international custom and, as such, was not any better or worse than other agreements.

The Korean government granted to Japanese interests the right to manage the Seoul-Pusan line and to provide the land for the railway construction, because it was not able itself to finance the construction of the railway. However, the Korean government still kept open the possibility of purchasing back the railway company as the agreement included conditions on what to do in case of government re-purchase. For this purpose,
the Korean government included Article XII in the ‘Agreement concerning the Seoul-
Pusan line’: 

Fifteen years after completion of the construction of the Seoul-Pusan line the 
Korean government could purchase back the line. But it could be only purchased 
back by Japanese or Korean nationals [no other nationals were allowed to 
purchase it]. If no price was agreed on, the concession would be extended by 
another ten years. 

*Chōsen Tetsudō Shi* 1937, p. 95.

At the same time, the Korean government made it possible for people to hold 
shares in the railway company. According to Article XIV of the Agreement, a Korean 
company or private person could buy stock in the Seoul-Pusan railway company (*Chōsen 
Tetsudō Shi* 1937, p. 95). In other words, Koreans were allowed financial participation in 
the management of the company. In the beginning, the Korean royal family was the 
second largest shareholder with 2,000 shares after the Japanese royal family, who became 
the largest shareholder with 5,000 shares at the price of fifty wŏn per share. Chŏng (1994) 
argues that the railway company used both the Japanese and Korean royal families as part 
of a propaganda campaign to attract investment from ordinary people (p. 518), but the 
fact that the Korean royal family was the second largest shareholder could also be 
understood as a strong statement of the Korean government’s intention to purchase back 
the railway line in the future.

Another issue related to the ‘exploitative’ nature of the Agreement is the question 
of compensation for land acquired for right-of-way. Specifically, land acquisition for the 
railway undervalued Korean-owned lands in comparison to land owned by other 
nationals. For example, while Japanese-owned land was compensated at the price of 0.7
to 1.2 yen per *p'yŏng*\(^8\) and American or British-owned land was compensated at the price of 17.8 yen per *p'yŏng*. Korean-owned land was compensated at the average price of 0.07 yen per *p'yŏng*. The argument is that Korean-owned land was undervalued and consequently, Korean land owners were ‘exploited’, because their property was compensated at a lower price (Chŏng 1994, p. 330). One might expect that if land is taken for public use by the government, the owner must be fairly compensated. In other words, no land should be taken without proper compensation; the owner should be compensated for the actual value of the land; and the compensation may be negotiated between the owner and the government. If compensation was decided on the basis of the owner’s nationality, as it was in the Seoul-Pusan railway case, then it should be considered a case of discrimination or possibly ‘exploitation’. Yet if the Korean government was the agent who purchased and granted land for the railway line, then the intentions behind purchasing the Korean-owned land comparably cheaply might not be ‘exploitative.’ We may be able to find similar cases in different contexts. For instance, in the Kyŏngsŏng textile company, which was known to be a Korean company under Japanese rule, women labourers were paid ‘at most only about one-half the corresponding rate in Japan’ (Eckert 1991, p. 197). One reason why Korean women labour endured the financial ill-treatment was that the Kyŏngsŏng textile company appealed to nationalist sentiment as a Korean company. In purchasing railway right-of-way, the Korean government sought to pay the lowest compensation possible to its own people and excused this as a patriotic sacrifice.

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\(^8\)坪 1 *p'yŏng* equals 3.3 square metres.
Moreover, the reason that the land owned by Koreans for the railway construction at the time was devalued could be found among Koreans themselves. On 3 May 1907, an editorial entitled ‘Ilbon nongbudůlirinara e onŭn kŏt’ (일본농부들이 우리나라에 오는 것, The coming of Japanese farmers to our country) in the Taehan maeil shinbo (大韓每日申報, Korean Daily News) stated that:

There are already many Japanese farmers, who have come to our country. [They] wanted to purchase lands in Kyŏngsang and Chŏlla provinces, and areas close to the Seoul-Pusan railway and Seoul-Ŭiju railway. There were many Korean farmers who approached those Japanese to ask them to buy their land, so that it was easy for those Japanese to buy land, and they even paid whatever they wanted.

*Taehan maeil shinbo* (大韓每日申報), 3 May 1907.

Although no specific reasons are given, the editorial refers to Korean farmers who were willing to sell their land to anybody and at almost any price. As the supply of land increased, the price dropped. Clearly, Korean-owned land being acquired for the railways was undervalued because there were many Koreans who wanted to sell their land at cheap prices. In some cases, the Japanese farmers offered better prices than the Korean government for Korean farmers’ land.

Let us examine the portion of the cost of land acquisition in the total cost of construction of the Seoul-Pusan line.
Table 2 List of land acquisitions and cost of construction of the Seoul-Pusan line

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total length</td>
<td>273.6 miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of stations</td>
<td>44 stations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total land area</td>
<td>4,845.741 p’yŏng</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(land use for track)</td>
<td>3,191,910 p’yŏng</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(land use for stations)</td>
<td>1,273,122 p’yŏng</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(land use for the remainder)</td>
<td>380,709 p’yŏng</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average land use per station</td>
<td>28,935 p’yŏng</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total cost of construction</td>
<td>28,780,000 yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average cost of construction per mile</td>
<td>106,000 yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total cost of land acquisition (including cost for relocation of houses and graves)</td>
<td>276,000 yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of the cost of land acquisition to the total cost of construction</td>
<td>0.9 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tōkan kanbō bunshoka (統監官房文書課) 1908, Dainiji tōkanfu tōkei nenpō (第二次統監府統計年報); Chōsen sōtokufu tetsudō kyoku (朝鮮總督府鐵道局) 1929, Chōsen tetsudōshi (朝鮮鐵道史), pp. 163-164; Re-quoted from Chŏng, Chae-jŏng 1999, p. 275.

As Table 2 shows, the ratio of the cost of land acquisition to the total cost of construction was less than one percent. However, the cost of land acquisition was given to the Korean government as a loan at six per cent annual interest, which means that the Japanese did not pay for the land at all. But, this is not all. The grounds for ‘exploitation’ put forward by Korean scholars such as Chŏng Chae-jŏng, Kim Min-yong, and Kim Yang-kyu is the low rate of compensation. In fact, compensation for land seized in the process of building the Seoul-Pusan line was not duly paid. The Korean government did not give the landowners compensation until the completion of the line. The reason for this was that the Japanese fiscal adviser, Megata Tanetarō (目賀田種太郎) had enough control over the Korean fiscal administration to insist on a moratorium for the compensation of railway land in Korea until project completion. It is doubtful whether ordinary Koreans understood the financial complexities of the mechanism needed to
build the railway, nor would it have mattered to ordinary Koreans that the financial system was dominated by the Japanese. The problem was that Koreans were losing their houses and lands for the railway. During the construction of the Seoul-Pusan line, land was acquired as ‘confiscation without compensation’ (Chŏng 1999, p. 276).

It was the Korean government that lowered the value of land in order to cut the compensation budget for the railway. Moreover, such a large-scale land transfer was so unusual that probably there were many Koreans who became victims of fraud in relation to their land, and while exploitative, fraud was actually criminal. For example, Murakami Mitsuo (村上三男), forged an official document from the railway company to buy land from Korean farmers at a giveaway price in Yangsan (梁山). As a consequence of the low prices, late payments, and cases of fraud, there were many Korean farmers who blamed the Korean Government for losing their land (Taehan Maeil Shinbo 大韓每日申報, 23 February 1906).

Lastly there is the question of whether land seizures were culturally offensive. Article III stipulated matters of land for graves: ‘In the case of there being a grave in the line, it should make a detour around the grave and should not violate it’ (Chōsen Tetsudō Shi 1937, pp. 262-264). For the Japanese, the reason for this article to be included in the Agreement was to avoid any conflicts in concluding the Agreement, rather than a cultural consideration. This can be shown by how the Japanese conducted the construction of the Seoul-Pusan railway. Hwang Hyŏn’s memoirs, the Maech’ŏn yarok (梅泉野錄) in 1907, states,

Houses were removed and graves were dug up to build the line from To-dong of Nandaemun gate (Great South Gate) to the Han River. Three yen was given for each grave moved. But those who had to move their ancestor’s grave were afraid
of changing their ancestor’s grave again (K. *ijang* 移葬), so people often chose to cremate [corpses].


This reflected Japanese attitudes in contrast to Korean attitudes. Whereas the Japanese did not pay any attention to the geomantic position of the grave, but rather cared more about an efficient direct line, geomancy was a widely accepted belief for Koreans:

‘topography can dictate one’s fortunes’ (Ch’oe, Lee and de Bary 1997, p. 242).

Geomantic belief was an old tradition that died hard. It was even considered to be a social abuse needing reform. For instance, Chŏng Sang-gi, a Shirhak scholar in the eighteenth century, pointed out in *Nongp’o mundap* (農圃問答, Dialogue on Agriculture):

Almost without exception, people tend to believe that the fate of life and death, wealth and poverty, long and short lives, and the highs and lows [of almost everything] depends on *feng shui*… Even after the burial, people are easily deceived by professional *feng shui* consultants⁹ who tell people to move the burial ground to bring auspicious fortune… People don’t stop with moving their ancestor’s tomb once or twice, but [might] even [do this] four or five times…This [tendency] not only damages morality, violates loyalty, but harms reformation, and destroys folkways.

Re-quoted from Pak 2003, pp. 52-53.

Chŏng Sang-gi’s words reflected how deeply rooted the practice of grave removal was, rather than the rightness or wrongness of the practice. Nevertheless, Pak (2003) argues that the Japanese violently dismantled popular beliefs in *feng shui* in the process of constructing railways (pp. 52-53).

Did the Japanese purposefully dismantle the belief in *feng shui* in the process of railway construction? Let us consider another example. On 1 January 1905, the Seoul-Pusan line opened with the Ch’oryang station in Pusan linked to the Yŏngdŭngp’o station

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⁹ *Chisa* 地師
in Seoul. The distance from the Ch’oryang station to Pusan-jin is only about 1.6 kilometers; yet, this short distance was a tough bit of construction necessitating digging a tunnel through a mountain and reclaiming land from the sea. In order to link the port of Pusan with inland Korea, it was important to facilitate the link from the Ch’oryang station to Pusan-jin. If they could construct a tunnel through Mt. Yōngsŏn, which had an altitude of fifty meters, it was obvious that the route would be much shortened, but the tunnel took four years to finish (May 1909-March 1913) (Kim 1973, p. 66; Chōsen Tetsudō Shi 1937, pp. 274-276). Clearly, the Japanese were only interested in an efficient and direct line and were willing to sacrifice time and resources for that. It seems, then, that there was no Japanese intention behind moving the graves other than to acquire a direct line.

In summation, in the process of land acquisition, ‘exploitation’ by the Japanese government would be too simple a description of the agreement for the Seoul-Pusan railway line. Rather it was a multilateral decision between two governments that showed an exploitation by the upper classes rather than exploitation by a more powerful government. Japan may have been in a dominant position over Korea, and was able to unilaterally exercise maximum legal control over acquisition of land for the railway. However, the Korean government also benefitted financially from this agreement through loans made out by the Japanese for land transfers.

Also, though land may have been taken by the Japanese, to the Korean government it was a worthwhile concession since they could repurchase the land with a built railway line in the future. If there was exploitation going on, it was of the Korean farmers who were culturally violated by the enforced moving of their ancestors’ graves.
and the unfair compensation for their inherited land. In this sense, exploitation was present, but it was an exploitation of the poor and weak by the rich and powerful, both Japanese and Korean.

**Labour use for the construction of the Seoul-Pusan line**

The Yang Chung prefect says the Japanese railway authorities have demanded of him five hundred men to work thirty days each on the railway line. He finds it difficult to get fifty men for ten days, during this season of the year, and thinks the people should not be robbed of their time for plowing and weeding their fields. *The Korea Review*, 1905, p. 192.

The employment and deployment of labour in the construction of the railway is another issue that lends itself to debates over whether there was exploitation. The question revolves around whether the process of recruiting manpower was coercive and compulsive. According to Article VI in the ‘Agreement concerning the Seoul-Pusan line,’ up to ninety percent of the workforce for the construction was to be Korean (*Chōsen Tetsudō Shi* 1937, pp. 93). As promised, the Korean government provided regulations on the labour policy. Korean labourers were not directly conscripted by the Japanese. Rather, when the Japanese *chargé d’affairs* in Korea put requests to the Korean government (the Ministry of Domestic and Foreign Affairs), the Korean government directed provincial officials to supply the labour requirements. Commands were delivered to each county magistrate, township head, and village headman. The chief official of the Ministry of Domestic Affairs commanded the provincial governors and county magistrates of Kyŏnggi, Ch’ungch’ŏng, Chŏlla, and Kyŏngsang provinces to actively cooperate with the construction company, such as the Ōkura Association or Ōkuragumi (大倉組). The total number of Korean workers supplied in this way for both the Seoul-
Pusan railway and the Seoul-Ŭiju has been estimated to range from a minimum of about 50,000,000 (12,434,900×4 [years of construction] = 49,739,600) to a maximum of about 150,000,000 (12,434,900×4 [years of construction] × 3 [length of construction in comparison to the Andong-Fengtien line] = 149,218,800)\(^{10}\) (Chŏng 1999, p. 306).

However, it is doubtful that the exact number of workers can be estimated. Most Koreans who engaged in the railway construction were predominantly hired by smaller sub-contracting companies and in many cases they were hired as day labourers (hiyato 雇), making it difficult to estimate the number of workers in the way Chŏng Chae-jŏng calculated. There seems to be an over-estimation of labour needs, and in so doing, Chŏng attempts to emphasize the role of Koreans (Chŏng 1999, p. 306). However, it is clear that the construction of the railway took a large number of labours.

Labour use for the construction of the Seoul-Pusan line has traditionally been divided into three different periods (Chŏng 1999, p. 307). The first and second periods are of main concern here, because they preceded the concerns of the Russo-Japanese War, where there were increasing tensions between Japan and Russia. The third period (1905-February 1911) fell under war-time pressures to construct and reconstruct connections extensively to meet tactical and strategic concerns for troop and material deployment. In short, the first and second periods are significantly different from the third (Chŏng 1999, p. 307).

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\(^{10}\) The number of workers Chŏng Che-jŏng presented was estimated based on data that the number of workers to construct the Andong-Fengtien line (260 kilometres) was 12,434,900 in two years (1909. 10-1911. 10). (Minami Manshū Tetsudō Kabushiki Kaisha 南滿洲鐵道株式會社 1913, Minami Manshū Tetsudō An-Hōsen kiyō 南滿洲鐵道安奉線紀要, p. 194; Chŏng 1999, p. 306). Chŏng also refers to the number of workers (51 0,000) to construct the 3,098 feet of the Yalu (Ammokkang) iron bridge in two years (1909. 8-1911. 10) (Keijō nippō 京城日報, 12 November 1930).
The first period began with the launch of construction in 1901 and ended with a growing tension between Japan and Russia by 1903. In this period, the construction of the Seoul-Pusan line was run according to the Agreement made by the Korean government and the Seoul-Pusan Railway Company. In this process, many Korean engineering and construction companies were established to recruit labour for railroad construction. With the ground-breaking construction of the Seoul-Pusan railway, many contract companies were created to meet construction demands of labour and resources. Of the various companies that provided labour and delivered construction materials for building the Seoul-Pusan railway, the Korea-Japan Industrial Association, the Pusan Civil Engineering Joint-stock Company (釜山土木合資會社) and the Ōkura Association were construction contracting companies, which took part in building the section starting from Ch’oryang (Pusan) (Chŏng 1999, pp. 193-208).

The second period began with growing diplomatic tensions between Japan and Russia. The construction of the Seoul-Pusan line now underwent unusual circumstances as the possibility of a Russo-Japanese War was imminent. In response, the Japanese government urged the completion of the railway by 1904, which was far ahead of the ten-year schedule that they had originally planned for. Forced labour became the unavoidable choice if the Japanese wished to complete the project so rapidly. In particular, the enormous difficulties of transporting troops and war supplies during the Sino-Japanese War still lingered in the minds of the Japanese in the Imperial Army. In other words, the second period (January 1904 - March 1905) was marked by a Japanese government urgently building the Seoul-Pusan line to prepare for a possible Russo-
Japanese War. During this phase, more than one hundred million labourers were mobilized to complete the line in a little over one year (Chŏng 1999, pp. 310).

In this urgent situation, it was inevitable for the Japanese government to demand excessive numbers of labourers from the central as well as the local government. The Korean government faced enormous pressure to supply sufficient Korean labour to meet the high labour-demands of the Japanese government. When a fraud case\textsuperscript{11} was discovered, the Korean government wanted to stop recruiting at the provincial level to prevent further fraud arising from the unorganised system of mobilising labour. In response, the Japanese government protested that this policy was a violation of previous agreements. The Japanese Minister in Korea, Hayashi Gonsuke (林権助), protested that this policy obstructed the railway construction and argued that if the Korean government did not remove a ban on the mobilization of labour at the provincial level, he would bring in Japanese labour to continue its construction. The Korean government did not want this issue to ignite a diplomatic dispute, which would place Korea in an unfavourable position (Chŏng 1999, p. 309). Consequently, even though the demand for Korean labour was excessive, the Korean government took the bilateral agreement as binding and chose to exercise the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* (agreements must be kept).

With the rapid construction of the railway underway, problems with labour conscription became acute, particularly in the second period of railway construction. Labour problems were severe during this time because the Japanese government was motivated by military considerations and military logic became a guiding policy for

\textsuperscript{11} In 5 May 1900, the *Hwangsŏng shinmun*, reported that a Kim In-Sik, who was a resident of Namdaemun, impersonated a member of the Korean domestic railway delivery company with the intent to defraud several hundred *ryang* in exchange for selling positions as ‘officer of thousands’ and ‘officer of hundreds’.  

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railway construction. Let us consider how ordinary Koreans experienced the massive conscription of labour in the second period.

Firstly, the employment structure took a form of contingent employment as a result of subcontracting. The labour was provided on the basis of subcontracts under the Seoul-Pusan Railway Company. The system of subcontracting offers efficiency and flexibility, which is important when recruiting a temporary labour force. However, Dobb (1928) warns of the potential for abuse inherent in such a system: "subcontracting, which being the key system to supply labour for the railway construction, became a source of labour abuses, such as ill-treatment and violence (Dobb 1928, pp. 70-71). Moreover, subcontracting made the Korean labour force temporary and supplementary, rather than stable and permanent. In other words, large numbers of Korean workers became disposable.

Considering the large number of construction workers employed under the Seoul-Pusan railway company, the railway was no doubt a large-scale industry that created a large number of employment opportunities. In fact, Korean labour in these companies became so dedicated that it impressed the Japanese engineers onsite. According to Hwang Hyŏn’s memoirs from 1864 to 1910, the Maech’ŏn yarok,

Japanese also recruited our people with good pay, yet those who neglected their duty were beaten to death and laid in the land flat after being thrown into a pit. It is sad, but there are still people who apply for the job [in railway construction].


Even though there was ill-treatment, many Koreans continued working for the railway because of the ‘good pay’ (Hwang Hyŏn 1907). Most of those who participated in the

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12 Under this system, a system of payment ‘may hold the door open to numerous methods of exploitation’ because ‘there is more chance of advantage being taken of the worker’s ignorance and weakness’ unless ‘carefully hedged with numerous safeguards’ (Dobb 1928, p. 70-72).
construction were day labourers, destitute farmers, or part-time petty merchant and part-time petty farmers who volunteered for work (Chŏng 1999, pp. 307-10).

Conflicts between Koreans and Japanese grew as the Japanese construction companies penetrated the labour market from early 1903. Compared to the Japanese companies, Korean construction companies were fragile because of a lack of capital and technology. The Japanese railway companies quickly dominated the Korean companies (Chŏng 1999, pp. 309-310). As a result, a type of colonial economic structure or dual economic structure was created with a clear distinction between Japanese capitalist managers and Korean labourers.

Additionally, the working conditions of Korean labourers were poor compared to workers from other nationalities. Japanese managers tended to place Korean workers in dangerous and hazardous positions, such as evacuating tunnels and constructing bridges. On the Seoul-Pusan line, up to 80 per cent of Korean workers working on bridges and in tunnels and the other 20 per cent were stonemasons. Japanese workers, however, were recruited for relatively safer jobs, such as woodworking. Not surprisingly many Koreans were killed or seriously injured in several serious incidents that occurred during this second period of construction (Chŏng 1999, pp. 327-329).

Moreover, after haste was imposed in the second period, labour came under military control. On the eve of the Russo-Japanese war, military logic, which focused on war preparation at all cost, was applied to construction. As reported in the 9 August 1904 edition of the Hwangso Shimmun, ‘if there is anyone who hinders the railway construction, he will be punished according to military law’. The Japanese military authority, which desperately wanted to build the railway line, pushed Korean workers to
work faster. At every construction site, Japanese managers were armed with a cudgel and pistol, and tardy workers would be kicked and cudgelled without exception (*Hwangsŏng Shimmun*, 9 August 1904). In fact, there were frequent incidents of violence at the construction sites. Yi Ki-yŏng’s novel *Tuman’gang* (豆満江) captures the emotions of Korean labourers suffering at the hands of the Japanese:

> We, the farmers, were dragged to the railway construction for corvée labour every day, even though [we had to] put aside our cultivation and harvest at the busiest season. Should we have to be beaten [by the Japanese]? What an indignity!... Because we were silent and docile, they [the Japanese] oppressed us as they underestimated us! From now on let us not do corvée labour… If we fight against them with unified minds and will, we will be freed from oppression.


In response to the abuse, acts of resistance against the oppressive Japanese frequently flared. According to the report from the provincial governor of Tongnae to the bureau of commercial affairs in 1903, there was a high-handedness that is typical of how [Japanese] employers treated their [Korean] employees (*Kaksa tŭngnok* 各司職錄). Reports of managerial violence are particularly poignant. On 27 January 1904, Hashiuchi Genjirō (橋內源次郎) fired a gun at stonemason Chŏn Han-bong (田漢奉) and seriously injured him in Chŏnŭi prefecture, Chungnam Province. On the same site the Japanese manager Ninomiya Itsuki (二宮厳) shot at the Korean labourer Yi Chae-gwan in July 9 in the same year (Chŏng 1999, pp. 327-328). Pak Ch’ŏn-hong (2002) also provides a testimony by a Japanese high school student, who travelled around railway construction sites in 1906. He stated that:

> In the construction of the Seoul-Pusan line, apart from a few Japanese engineers, all labourers [in the field] were Korean. Since the Korean labourers worked in extremely dangerous undertakings under the surveillance of Japanese engineers,
lives were sacrificed… [Yet] I heard that most of those who were killed [in the field] were killed by being beaten by Japanese engineers with a cudgel. Pak 2003, pp. 89-90.

As rumours of violence on the construction site spread, it not only created anti-Japanese and anti-railway sentiments but also made it difficult for the railway company to further recruit Korean labourers. Even current employees were quitting work because of the threat of death (Chŏng 1999, pp. 312-313). As fewer Koreans worked on the railway construction, the Japanese government became more desperate since the Seoul-Pusan railway was, for the Japanese government, a necessary project to strategically secure Japanese territory.

The Korean government, the Japanese government, and the railway company were trapped in a dilemma: the Korean government had to recruit Korean workers for the Japanese railway company, but there was no one who wanted to work. The only way left for the Japanese railway company to supply labour demands was to recruit workers through ‘pressing’. The Korean government then assigned each local magistrate a quota of conscripts they must meet. There was at least one case where the Japanese army directly conscripted workers in Kapyŏng County; however, in most cases the conscription process was rather systematic. For instance, the Japanese army and government threatened the local magistrates in the areas along the railway to conscript workers. The Japanese army forced the local magistrates to report on the number of households, the number of horses and cows, and the quantity of grain on hand. On the basis of the report, the Japanese army demanded that local magistrates provide accommodation and food for the company workers. In other words, though there were no direct kidnappings or forced labour conscriptions, Korean workers were nevertheless systemically press-ganged.
through the Korean central and local governments to provide local resources lest they be confiscated (Chŏng 1999, p. 314).

It is important to differentiate between temporary or supplementary workers and permanent workers in the course of railway construction and its operation, and the nationalities they possess. The permanent employees of the Seoul-Pusan railway company, which was later the Bureau of Railway Management under the Japanese Residency-General in Korea—as all railway companies in Korea became nationalized by Japan—were largely transferred from the Japanese railway companies, rather than hired from subcontracting companies. Despite the transfers of Japanese staff, the Seoul-Pusan railway company was relatively more diverse. It hired Korean workers in similar numbers as Japanese workers. Nevertheless, many of its staff were transferred from Japanese railway companies, such as the Kyūshū Railway Company. For instance, the Seoul-Inch’ŏn Joint-Railway Company (May 1897-October 1903), which was founded by investment from Japanese politicians and merchants, employed mostly Japanese who were former employees of the Japan Railway Stock Company or Nihon Tetsudō Kabushiki Kaisha (日本鐵道株式會社) and the Kyūshū Railway Stock Company or Kyūshū Tetsudō Kabushiki Kaisha (九州鐵道株式會社). One of the reasons could be that when Adachi Tarō (足立太郎), who was the vice-president of the Japan Railway Stock Company, became the president of the Seoul-Inch’ŏn Company, he wanted to have experienced staff. Thus a large number of staff from Japanese railway companies were transferred with benefits. And for the military railway, such as the Seoul-Ŭiju line and the Ch’angwŏn-Samryangjin line, the Japanese government only hired Japanese staff, from top to bottom. Koreans were only hired to fill the lower rank of labourers.
The reason many construction companies based in Pusan hired relatively equal numbers of Japanese and Koreans was because those companies were formed as jointly syndicated between Japanese and Korean. The Pusan Civil Engineering Joint-stock Company, for instance, was jointly owned by the Korean magistrate of Tongnae, Hyŏn Myŏng-un (玄明運), and the Japanese merchant Fukuda Zōbeei (福田増兵衛), which was founded in 1901 to provide labour and construction materials to build the section from Ch’oryang in Pusan. From the very beginning, the Seoul-Pusan line hired a large number of Koreans in subordinated companies, which contracted with the Japanese (Chŏng 1999, p. 511). Moreover, there were also companies founded by Korean government officials, such as the Korea Domestic Railway Delivery Company (大韓國內鐵道用達會社); it also hired Japanese engineers, such as Uchida Rok’yū (内田錄雄). However, the largest number of Korean workers involved in the railways was a disposable labour force, because they were hired for construction and not operation, where the number of permanent positions was limited.

Most of those who were hired on a permanent basis were Japanese. The Seoul-Pusan Railway Company (incorporated in June 1901 and dissolved in June 1906) began by hiring 134 people as permanent staff for the Keijō station in Seoul. This included, the Kyŏngpu branch to oversee the line from the capital to Pusan, the Yŏngtŭngp’o construction office, and the Ch’oryang construction office in Pusan. The company enlarged the number of permanent employees, reaching 1,886 people right before the Seoul-Pusan line was transferred to the Japanese Residency-General in Korea at the end

13 The Hwangsŏng shinmun (皇城新聞, Imperial Capital Gazette) reported that Seoul was referred to as Kyŏngsŏng or Keijō in 11 April 1905 even before Hansŏng, which was the old name for Seoul. It was later officially renamed as Kyŏngsŏng on 1 October 1910. The name Kyŏngsŏng seems to have been widely used by both Japanese and Koreans before the official change.
of June 1906. Afterwards, the number rapidly increased, so that it reached over seven thousand in 1907. Numbers stood at 7,152 in 1908 but dropped to 6,875 in 1909 (Chŏng 1999, pp. 504-505).

A related social phenomenon was the ‘cratering’ effect on agriculture as mass conscription from rural areas for railway construction took men out of the villages. This had a large effect on agriculture, damaging a traditional agricultural form of life. In particular, farming villages along the railway line saw crop failures, because the men missed the farming season. For instance, large parcels of land were left idle because there was no one left to work in the fields as everyone in the village was conscripted in railway construction. In some cases, crops in the field were not harvested as there were few people left to do it (Chŏng 1999, pp. 333-334).

The Taehan maeil shinbo (大韓每日申報) or Korean Daily News captured the confusion of ordinary Koreans by this sudden dislocation.

That peasant farmer wishes to cultivate [the land] with shovel-plough, yet he has to do corvée labour because of [the railway]. [It is like] becoming a servant [after] [his] land has been taken. Because [he] remained unemployed in farming for a year, he took to wandering and begging with tears.

*Taehan maeil shinbo*, 7 February 1908.

Korea was a largely agriculture-based society, and the pace of the process in which the traditional socio-economic structure gave way to the demands of railway construction was too rapid and abrupt to allow Korean farmers to adapt. In other words, the rapid socio-economic structural change put Korean farmers in a desperate situation where they lost the opportunity of cultivating their own land in return for temporary jobs on railway construction sites.
Finally, there was the problem of fair wages. Wages were systematically reduced to a minimum as a result of subcontracting in the beginning, and wages were often not paid after rapid construction began because of the systemic failure of the promissory notes issued as Korean money. Further, the average working hours per day were far higher than the eight to twelve hours per day indicated by contracts, and wage discrimination was widespread. The average daily wage for labour, which was estimated at about twenty sen, was relatively small, and this will be addressed below. Customarily, middle managers in the construction companies took from two to five sen as kick-backs and this resulted in resentment from the labourers. There are reports of conflicts for higher wages (Chŏng 1999, p. 310). First, let us consider wage discrimination.

Table 3 The system of daily wages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Railway worker</th>
<th>Day labour along the railroad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Skilled worker</td>
<td>Stonemason</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As table 3 shows, the system of wages shows a clear distinction between Korean and Japanese workers by differentiating wages according to nationality. The wages of skilled workers and stonemasons were remarkably high compared to other workers. There is no specific information on what constitutes ‘skilled’ and no graduated scale for stonemasons. The most noticeable point is that wages for the same occupation for Korean and Japanese workers were considerably different. At least one reason for the
wage difference was practical necessity. For instance, to attract Japanese workers to transfer from the Japanese railway companies, the Seoul-Pusan railway company had to provide preferential treatment to those who were experienced in the same field. Those who were transferred from Japanese railway companies were promoted to a rank one level higher with differences in salary, and they were given three per cent benefits (ten per cent since December 1903) for working in Korea. In general, the salary of the Japanese workers in the company was at least 40 per cent higher than those of the Korean workers. No additional agreement between the Korean government and the Japanese government to reduce the wages for Korean workers has yet come to light; but, comparatively, Korean wages were less than a half or a third of the wages of Japanese workers.

We might consider whether it was possible to live on the wages paid to Korean workers. Comparing wages to a basket of consumables and living costs, we can see that Korean wages were far below the average cost of living. For example, in 1904, the basic living cost for one family of four in Seoul was about sixty-seven sen per day (rice at 42 sen, firewood at 10 sen, side dishes providing protein and minerals at 10 sen, and house rental at 5 sen: $42 + 10 + 10 + 5 = 67$) (Chŏng 1999, p. 330). A Korean day-labourer making 40 to 50 sen per day could not have supported a family in the capital city. Even considering that costs outside the capital would have been lower, a family of four would have been hard-pressed to survive on only the man’s income.

To complicate matters even more, wages were not paid to the Korean employee immediately and wages were not paid in cash. The wages were paid with a ‘promissory note for Korean money’ (Hanchŏn chūngp’yo 韓錢證票), which was issued by the
contracted companies. The payment system was not necessarily a sign of labour abuse, but rather one of convenience. The Japanese paid their railway construction workers daily. Money in circulation at the time consisted of four kinds of Korean coins made of silver, red copper, nickel, and brass, and the Japanese Daiichi Bank Notes. As construction advanced into the interior, Korean coins became difficult to transport. If twenty yen of Japanese money was exchanged for Korean coins, needed for purchases in the Korean markets, then the labourers needed to have a horse to carry them. The solution was a promissory note for Korean money, and this was widely used to pay the construction workers, particularly those who worked in the Pusan to Taegu section of the track. There were no reported problems in using promissory notes for everyday purchases (Chŏng 1999, pp. 330-332).

However, the problem with the promissory note for Korean money was that over-issuance of the notes became a cause of high inflation, which eroded the living standard of Korean workers. Moreover, the promissory note commanded a ten to twenty percent higher exchange rate than did cash, and this produced an additional burden for workers. But then, the situation went from bad to worse. Many of those recruited for the Seoul-Pusan line after 1903 were forced to take part in the speedy construction for war preparation and during this period the Japanese halted the circulation of promissory notes declared the end of the notes as legal tender. In other words, the promissory note for Korean money became ‘mere scraps of paper’.

In summation, even though the legal aspects of labour use for the railway construction had been agreed on, many Korean labourers inevitably suffered from the seemingly insatiable Japanese demand for labour and a disruption to their own
livelihoods. Firstly, the system of subcontracting put Korean workers in extreme conditions where they were mistreated. Secondly, the excessive demand of labour drained farming labour from the villages, not only disrupting traditional ways of living, but also sacrificing the opportunity costs of lost harvests. Thirdly, the wages were minimal, even below living costs, and were often left unpaid.

**Korean participation in the modern sphere**

The completion of the Seoul-Fusan Railway marks an epoch in the material progress of Korea. It is a great work and deserving of praise though in the construction of it the Koreans have been made to fear that the Japanese people have small respect for their rights. This feeling may wear away as the Koreans come to see the great benefits that it may bring them if rightly used.


With the establishment of the railway the traditional forms of transportation on land, i.e., back-packing, horses and oxen, for people as well as goods, were quickly replaced by the train. Creating the railway meant not just creating a new transport, but creating a modern space, which potentially did not have strong social stratification.

Ch’oe Nam-sŏn praised the train and the railway in *Kyŏngpu ch’ŏltoga* (京釜鐵道歌; its original title was *Kyŏngpu yodo norae* 경부요도노래) as a means of creating a ‘small new world’:

> [In the train,] ‘the old and the young sat together; Koreans and foreigners travelled together; men and women lived with a relative degree of intimacy. This [train] created a whole small new world.’

Ch’oe, Nam sŏn 1908, *Kyŏngpu ch’ŏltoga*, sinmungwan, 67th line

Before the opening of this ‘small new world’, Korean society was hierarchical with limited mobility. Chosŏn society was controlled by a rigid caste system. The class-based sumptuary laws were adhered to by society as a way of maintaining hierarchy, and
this included in transportation practices (Pak 2003, pp. 346-347; Chŏng 1998, pp. 177-208).

However, taking the train as a means of participating in the ‘modern sphere’ was no longer determined by gender, class, age, and nationality; rather, it was determined by the ability to afford different classes of travel on the train. Railway tickets were issued anonymously, indicating no pre-requisite for passengers other than having the money to buy the ticket. No one would be at least outwardly discriminated against. The fact that no records were kept that indicate the gender, age, class, and nationality among passengers makes it difficult to analyze whether train travel meant Koreans were engaging in the emerging modern sphere. However, there were some factors other than financial affordability involved in taking the train. Let us get a glimpse of the reality of train travel by turning to unconventional sources, such as autobiographical narratives, news reports, and by calculating the rough, relative costs of tickets. The first factor was change of ‘metropolis’.

Opening of the Seoul-Fusan railway (27 November), Tokio: The Seoul-Fusan railway has been provisionally opened to through traffic. The trains from Seoul to Fusan are called up-trains, as Tokio is regarded as the centre.

_The North China Herald_, 02 December 1904.

As _the North China Herald_ indicates, after the establishment of the Seoul-Pusan railway, Tokyo was regarded as the centre, and Seoul became a periphery, though Pusan could be held in high regard as a foothold.

The second factor is fare and the name of places.

The fares are payable in Japanese currency, and the names of places are pronounced in the Japanese style.-Our own correspondent

_The North China Herald_, 02 December 1904.
As the North China Herald reported, the fares should be paid in Japanese currency, and the stations were announced in Japanese. Paying the fares in Japanese currency and announcing the name of places in Japanese pronunciation was more than things themselves. Rather, those were acts of losing of Korean’s subjectivity in daily life to use ‘modern’ transportation. In other words, the Japanese deliberately forced Koreans to participate in ‘modern’ transportation with Japanese currency and Japanized station names, while Koreans unconsciously accepted without question the conditions for such participation.

The third and last factor is reflected in daily language use and change of the time standard, which clearly indicated the relations between Japan and Korea in the train. Taking note of this the Taehan maeil shinbo (大韓每日申報) reported as follows under the title ‘Japanese influence on Korea’ (한국에 일본세력) as follows:

The Seoul-Pusan railway will have an opening ceremony on January 1 next year. The locomotive going from Seoul to Pusan is called descending and [in the same way] the locomotive coming from Pusan to Seoul is called ascending. The reason for calling [the lines] this way is from the viewpoint of Tōkyō as the centre. The name of the station will be announced in Japanese. [Furthermore,] one month ago the Seoul-Pusan railway company decided that the timetable is set on the time in Japan. The clock will be moved thirty-five minutes ahead [of the time in Korea].

Taehan maeil shinbo, 20 December 1904.

As the Taehan maeil shinbo reflected, Japan was the centre in daily use of language the centre and even train time was set on the Japan local time. In other words, ‘a whole small new world’, as Ch’oe Namsŏn described, was centered on the Naichi (內地, inner land, which refers to Japan) and made Korea the Gaichi (外地, outer land). In the train, Japan became the imperial metropolis and Korea was the periphery of Japan. Without
consciousness, Koreans were imposed to accept a spatial, material and temporal sense of hierarchic relations in daily life as the condition to participate in ‘modern’ space.

As for the price of railway ticket, fares could be calculated by different parameters and method, such as distance-based fare, zone-based fare, and flat fare. The fare policy of the Seoul-Pusan railway line in the early period was as follows.

Table 4 Price of the Seoul-Pusan line in the early period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mile</th>
<th>3rd class</th>
<th>2nd class</th>
<th>1st class</th>
<th>Rates system</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50-100</td>
<td>101-200</td>
<td>201-300</td>
<td>301</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905.1.1</td>
<td>293.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>Twice the price of 3rd class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908.4.1</td>
<td>642.6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.75 times the price of 3rd class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912.4.1</td>
<td>642.6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.75 times the price of 3rd class</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unit for price: sen

Table 4 shows that the ticket prices were set at 1 sen 8 rin for third class, and that diminished every fifty miles. For instance, if one wanted to travel 154 miles, the fare could be calculated as follows: 

\[(50 \times 1.8) + (50 \times 1.6) + (54 \times 1.4) = 245.6 \text{ (sen)}\]

The fares on the early Korean railway, including the Seoul-Pusan line, diminished at a high rate per mile.

Since 80 percent of passengers were short-distance passengers (less than fifty miles) during 1905-1907, the price system, including a high basic rate, high rate for
short-distance travel, and a low rate for long-distance travel, put short distance passengers (who were reported to be mostly Koreans) to pay relatively higher price for traveling by train. These high prices on the Korean railway attracted criticism from both the Korean and the Japanese merchants in Korea. They complained that high ticket prices undermined economic growth and markets in a number of ways. This opinion was prevalent not only among the Koreans, but among the Japanese in Korea. For example, the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Korea stated that a move to lower ticket prices on the Korean railway is ‘of urgent necessity for the Japanese economic world in Korea in spite of the myriad of difficulties’ (Chŏng 1999, pp. 393-395). Nishino Keinosuke (西野恵之助), the traffic manager of the Sanyō Railway Company, who came to investigate the possibility of establishing communicative transportation on the Seoul-Pusan line, stated that the high ticket prices on the Seoul-Pusan line were not simply difficult for Koreans, but actually excluded Koreans from the railway. He suggested that the line should reduce the ticket prices for Koreans to attract them—that just as the British railway in India established a special fourth class for Indians at the half rate of third class, so the Seoul-Pusan line should provide a fourth class \( (Jiji Shimpō\) 時事新報 1905.1.9; re-quoted from Chŏng 1999, pp. 393-395).

A newspaper article in \( Jiji Shimpō\), which represented colonialist opinion in Japan at the time, even criticized the high rate of the train ticket pricing system for its undermining of Japanese immigration to Korea and economic penetration in Korea. Since the Seoul-Pusan line was managed by the Japanese, the ticket price system was determined by the Japanese and should be scaled to Japanese advantage (Chŏng 1999, p. 395). If this benefited Koreans as well, then that was an added bonus.
### Table 5 Commodity prices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Price</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>High: 15 sen, medium: 14 sen, low: 13.5 sen (per toe-0.6 litres)</td>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>30 sen per month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soy bean</td>
<td>High: 14 sen, medium: 14 sen, low: 12 sen</td>
<td>Bath</td>
<td>2.5 sen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>6 sen</td>
<td>Chicken</td>
<td>50 sen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soy sauce</td>
<td>High: 40 sen, medium: 30 sen, low: 25 sen</td>
<td>Charcoal</td>
<td>A bundle for 64 sen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese rice wine</td>
<td>50 sen</td>
<td>Radish</td>
<td>A bundle for 2 sen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean rice wine</td>
<td>50 sen</td>
<td>Green onion</td>
<td>1 gun (600 g) for 6 sen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bean oil</td>
<td>90 sen</td>
<td>Beef</td>
<td>1 gun (600 g) for 25 sen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum</td>
<td>20 sen</td>
<td>Milk</td>
<td>1 hop (≒60ml) for 6 sen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese soybean paste (miso)</td>
<td>1 gun (600 g) for 7 sen</td>
<td>Cigarettes</td>
<td>20 for 5.5 sen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>1 gun (600 g) for 14 sen</td>
<td>Cookies (high quality)</td>
<td>1 gun (600 g) for 18 sen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tofu</td>
<td>10 block for 4 sen</td>
<td>Room rate (per day)</td>
<td>High: 2 sen, medium: 1.70 sen, low: 1.30 sen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egg</td>
<td>Each 2 sen</td>
<td>Boarding house</td>
<td>15 sen for a month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hair cut</td>
<td>25 sen</td>
<td>Shoe polish</td>
<td>3 sen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shave</td>
<td>10 sen</td>
<td>Laundry</td>
<td>Dress shirt for 6 sen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: gun (斤) = 600 g; hop (斛) ≒ 60 ml (From 1418 to 1905, a hop was 60 ml. (Afterwords, it became 180 ml). Source: table created with data given by Kim 1976, pp. 97-98.

With no records of ticket purchases across nationality, there is no way to examine how many Koreans took the train, yet we can speculate on whether the train fares were affordable for a Korean by comparing its relative cost to a basket of commodities and consumables. Average travel distance per person by train in both the Seoul-Inch’ŏn line and the Seoul-Pusan line was 87 miles for a first class passenger, 58 miles for a second class passenger, and 38 miles for a third class passenger (Chŏng 1999, p. 393). We will focus on third class passengers, since anecdotal evidence suggests that Koreans predominantly travelled by third class. We can evaluate the price of the average
travel distance per person by using the following simple formula: \((38 \text{ miles} \times \text{the ticket multiplier 1.8}) = 64.4 \text{ sen}\) as the ticket price. This distance of 38 miles is about 61 km, which is about the distance from Pusan to Ulsan (about 61 km) or London to Oxford (about 64 km). On the basis of the average price of a third class passenger (the option ordinary Koreans seemed to have preferred), we can compare the price of using the railway with prices for basic staples such as rice. As Table 7 shows, with 64.4 sen it was possible to purchase 4.3 toe \((	ext{斗}; 6.66 \text{ kilograms})\) of high quality rice. There is limited data on the daily consumption of rice, so I used an assumption that Park and Yang (2005) provided as the rice consumption in the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries. Park and Yang (2005) calculates the monthly requirement of food for one adult at 3 mal\(^{14}\) or 18 litres (about 15.45 kilograms) (p. 18); the daily requirement for 1 adult would be about 0.515 kilograms of rice (or grain). Thus 6.66 kilograms would be about equal to about thirteen days’ worth of food for one adult. In order to take the train from Pusan to Ulsan, it would cost the same as about thirteen days of staple food. In other words, the price of the railway in Korea for a third-class ticket was high in comparison to the price of basic commodities. How many people travelled by the train in spite of the high prices?

---

\(^{14}\) 1 \text{ mal (斗)} = 6 \text{ liters (before 1902)} \text{ or about 6 kilograms.}
Table 6 Number of departures (D) and arrivals (A) in Pusan and Ch’oryang station

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Months</th>
<th>1909</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1911</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pusan station</td>
<td>Ch’oryang station</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>7,449</td>
<td>566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>9,703</td>
<td>6,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>5,775</td>
<td>4,353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>7,856</td>
<td>4,768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>9,756</td>
<td>5,092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>9,242</td>
<td>5,973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>7,779</td>
<td>5,359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>10,887</td>
<td>5,481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>9,411</td>
<td>5,795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>9,763</td>
<td>5,837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>8,123</td>
<td>5,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>10,537</td>
<td>5,581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>7,463</td>
<td>5,494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>9,200</td>
<td>5,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>8,209</td>
<td>5,506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>12,085</td>
<td>5,867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>8,026</td>
<td>5,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>10,007</td>
<td>6,035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>8,148</td>
<td>5,409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>9,958</td>
<td>5,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>7,309</td>
<td>5,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>11,347</td>
<td>6,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>9,880</td>
<td>5,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>10,253</td>
<td>5,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>97,320</td>
<td>63,258</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fusan Yōran (釜山要覧) 1912, pp. 114-115. (D = Departures and A = Arrivals)

Table 6 shows a steady increase in the number of passengers over three years. Unfortunately, there is no information on passengers according to different classes of travel. However, with the limited data we can estimate the size of the transient population in Pusan. Considering the total population in Pusan (total: 42,265 in 1909 [Japanese 21,697 and Korean 20,568]; total: 42,918 in 1910 [Japanese 21,928 and Korean 20,990]; total: 47,862 in 1911 [Japanese 21,928 and Korean 20,990]), the average number of departures and arrivals would have made up 30 to 40 percent of the total population [D. 31%, A. 37% in 1909; D. 45%, A. 40% in 1910; D. 40%, A. 37% in 1911].
In other words, there was a large transient population in Pusan. There is no doubt that the large transient population had a big impact on society. According to Chosen jinbō (朝鮮新報), the traffic manager of the Seoul-Pusan line reported that Koreans would have formed 60 percent of the seven thousand passengers per day. Thus, about 4,200 passengers on the Seoul-Pusan line were Korean (Chŏng 1999, p. 396). In other words, a large number of Koreans participated in a modern means of transportation, the train, despite its high relative cost. Horace Allen (1908) provided his account of the reasons why Koreans took the railway in spite of the high prices.

Even for the pedestrian travelling is expensive, for shoes must be bought even if they are but straw sandals, while food by the way must be paid for before being eaten. All this makes the railway very popular. A man would walk the twenty-five miles from Seoul to Chemulpo [Inch’ŏn], do his errand, and return the next day. He would require at least four meals while away, which would cost forty cents. He could go down and back in one day by the cars at little more cost and carry with him a considerable load, the third class having been made very reasonable.

Allen 1908, p. 88.

This account explains the motivation Koreans have for taking the Seoul-Inch’ŏn line. This could also explain why Koreans were willing to take the Seoul-Pusan line because the average distance of travel on this line was just about 1.5 times (38 miles) the average distance of the Seoul-Inch’ŏn line (25 miles). Comparing the general travel cost by foot, the cost of travelling by railway was not too much higher.

Next, we consider the quality of the experience of this modern form of transport—what was it like for Koreans to travel on the train? The railway policy in Korea was no tangible discrimination against Koreans. However, there was the obvious economic division in the three distinct classes of travel, with the costs for upgrade considerably large. As a result, many Koreans were generally excluded from the first and
second classes. Being relegated largely to the third class, Korean passengers were commonly mistreated, even by third class standards. As a Japanese student who came to Korea for field work noticed:

Almost all Koreans were the third class passengers, but the service for them was actually that of a fourth class passenger (if there had been a fourth class).

*Sasayama Shin’ichi* (笹山真一) *Ryokyaku toshite no Kanjin* (旅客トシテノ韓人); Re-quoted from Chŏng 1999, p. 398.

Anecdotal evidence report that third class Korean passengers were treated like dogs or pigs, or even like baggage. It is important to observe the condition under which third class Korean passengers traveled. Even the prominent Japanese nationalist newspaper *Jiji shimpō* (時事新報) expressed concerns that the treatment of Korean passengers by the Japanese passengers and crew was so harsh that it may invoke anti-Japanese sentiment among Koreans.

It was reported that the Korean passengers were treated like pieces of baggage. This is wrong not only because the Korean passengers were greater in number than the Japanese, but because [we] fear that ignorant Koreans may cause disturbances, such as obstruct the railway tracks and disconnect the electronic wires, if they are continuously treated like pieces of baggage.

*The Jiji shimpō*, 25 April 1905. ‘keifu tetsudō to kanjin’ (京釜鉄道と韓人); Re-quoted from Chŏng 1999, p. 398.

The *Jiji shimpō* hints at how badly the Japanese treated Korean passengers. In other words, the experience of train travel for Koreans was limited ‘modern’ experience, which was nothing more than experience of being carried from place to place. Moreover, during their travel, the third class Korean passengers experienced bad treatment in participating in the ‘modern’ sphere and aware of being third class passenger though they were entitled at least to be treated with dignity.
Yi Kwang-su explained in his autobiographical account that, for the first time, he became aware of himself as a third-class citizen within Korea, *Na üi kobaek* (나의 고백 My confession).

At that time (1910), when I was about to get on the train at Pusan station, a station official came to me to take another section of the train. When I asked the reason for it, [he said that] the section on which I was getting was a section for Koreans. Since I was wearing a suit, [he mistook me for a Japanese] and directed that I should go to a section for the Japanese. I was furious. I got on the section for Koreans protesting that, ‘I am Korean.’


In the meantime, increasing numbers of Japanese came over to Korea and travelled from the ports to the interior via railway. The *Chōsen shimpo* (朝鮮新報) referred to a Seoul correspondent of the French Newspaper *Le Matin*, who reported, ‘the Japanese settlers flowed into Korea like a tide. At the port of Pusan and Inch’on every ship was continuously filled with the Japanese. But they left from the ports to the interior…In the future it will bring Japan an element of colonial prosperity along the railway lines in Korea and Manchuria’ (Pak 2003, p. 97). The article also reported that the opening of the Seoul-Pusan line coincided with the end of the Russo-Japanese War, bolstering the size of exports and opened the possibility for Japanese merchants to access the markets in the interior.

The Japanese syndicates began to control the trade. In particular, Japanese merchants in Pusan accumulated significant capital and began expanding their business into the interior of the Korean peninsula. With enlargement of Pusan’s port and the establishment of the railway, Pusan became an even more important trading centre for grain. As the volume of trade increased, illegal trade also increased substantially. In order to control illegal trade, the Japanese Consulate and the Chamber of Commerce in
Pusan devised measures to prevent them. By the initiation of the Fusan Rice Export Trader Association and the Fusan Grain Trader Association, the Pusan Grain Market was established with the approval of the Administrative Bureau for Japanese residents (rijichō 理事廳) (Kim 2006, p. 61). Kim Tong-ch’ŏl argues that the establishment of the Pusan grain market was the first step in protecting the exclusive interests of prominent rice export traders, wholesale rice traders, and rice-milling business men, such as Hajama Hotarō (迫間房太郎) and Ōike Tadasuke (大池忠助) (Kim 2006, pp. 61-63).
As Table 7 shows, the data is too thin for a comprehensive analysis, yet we can see the various items being transported by rail. Comparing incoming goods into Pusan with outgoing goods from Pusan, the quantity of incoming goods was far larger, suggesting that these goods were most likely exported to Japan. As a result, markets around Pusan station became some of the fastest growing in Korea. This was further facilitated by the completion of the Masan (馬山)-Samryang-jin (三浪津) railway.
line which connected with the Seoul-Pusan line, giving merchants in Pusan the ability to invest in Masan and Samyang-jin. For example, Ioi Shōten (五百井商店, president: Hajama) opened a branch office in Masan and appointed Kō Seizaburō as a manager. As a result, the traditional markets declined rapidly while newly developed cities along the railway became new market places (Kim 2006, p. 44).

Table 8 Grains being transported by shipping at Hadan port (in comparison to the ratio of grains being transported by rail as 100%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>1909</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1911</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quantity</td>
<td>ratio</td>
<td>quantity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>31,988</td>
<td>122%</td>
<td>30,993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
<td>63,568</td>
<td>250%</td>
<td>54,839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grains</td>
<td>7,051</td>
<td>121%</td>
<td>11,726</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: this is created based on data from Fusan Yōran (釜山要覧) 1912, pp.150-151

Hadan-port was a large traditional port in Pusan where dozens of kaekchu (market brokers) dealt with grain. Pak Wŏn-pyo (1967) points out that there were many Korean brokers who accumulated wealth by mediating between Korean farmers and Japanese merchants or rice mills (p. 34). As Table 5 indicates, Hadan port continued to operate and grow after the Seoul-Pusan railway was finished. The ratio of items being transported by train demonstrates that Hadan-port was an even bigger place to trade after the railway was finished. The traditional trade port did not fall into disuse even after the new means of transportation was established. Rather, many Koreans still liked to use that traditional market as well as the new transportation. Or perhaps, Hadan’s continued prosperity implied a segmented country-based market within the city of Pusan: Hadan port for Koreans and Pusan port for Japanese. However, Hadan-port did slowly become obsolete as new centres for trade developed around the railway stations.
Finally, aside from the main Seoul-Pusan trunk line, we should consider the spatial change caused by the construction of a local light railway within Pusan. The local light railway clearly showed the spatial embodiment of ‘power relations’ in Pusan and relates directly to the establishment of hot springs resorts in Tongnae. The light railway connected Pusan-jin to the hot springs in Tongnae. The Chamber of Commerce in Pusan played an important role in its creation. The Japanese became aware of hot springs in Tongnae from 1883. From that time, the Japanese settler council appointed Yatōji Naoyoshi (八頭司直吉), a freight operator from Nagasaki, to manage a portion of the hot springs. As Japanese capital went into Tongnae for resort development, the lodging industry also rapidly developed. For instance, Toyoda Fukutarō (豊田福太郎) set up an inn, the Harai kan (春來館) in 1907 and Ōike Tadasuke (大池忠助) followed by opening the Ōike Inn or Ōike Ryōkan (大池旅館) in 1912. By this time, Japanese households increased rapidly to 30 households in Tongnae. Along with the increasing Japanese population and resort business, came demand for transportation, which prompted the Chamber of Commerce in Pusan to build a light railway line. In the Chōsen Industrial Exhibition in Keijō in October 1915, the Chamber of Commerce used the Pusan-jin to Tongnae light railway to showcase how the Japanese empire seeks to mediate between Korea and the modern world. The Pusan Chamber of Commerce pushed ahead with the plan despite opposition from the Head Office of the Chōsen Gasu Kabushiki Kaisha (朝鮮ガス株式會社) in Tōkyō (Oh 2008, pp. 38-39; Ch’a 2006, p. 17). The Pusan Light Railway Company or Fusan Kidō Kabushiki Kaisha (釜山軌道株式會社), which was established on 15 August 1909 by members of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Pusan, such as Ōike Tadasuke and Hazama Fusatarō (迫間房太郎), was licensed by
the Ministry of Home Affairs on 29 June 1909. As soon as the Pusan Light Railway Company completed its registration, it launched construction and finished that by the end of November 1909. The line ran from Pusan-jin to the western gate of Tongnae (about 6.7 kilometers) and began operations on the second of December 1909. The line was extended from the western gate of Tongnae to Tongnae hot springs (2.82 kilometers) and began to run on 19 December 1909 (P’yo 2009, p. 57). Thereafter, the Korean Gas & Electric Company (Kankoku Gasu Denki Kaisha 韓國瓦斯電氣會社), which was initiated by Matsudaira Masanao (松平正直) on 24 April 1910, received permission to take over the Pusan Light Railway Company from the Administrative Bureau for Japanese Residents in Pusan. The company continued to grow as it participated in the railway construction between Ulsan and Taegu via Kyŏngju in 1911.

The Pusan Light Railway Company developed Tongnae hot springs into a resort. This was a change of a traditional space where hot springs were used for treatment to a modern space that functioned for recreation and leisure. The Chosŏn wangjo sillok records a case involving Tongnae’s hot springs in relation to the Minister-without-Portfolio Kim Chong-jik in 1492.

In 1489, Kim was appointed … yet he had signs of paralysis due to a stroke… He asked if he could travel to Tongnae hot springs to treat the illness with hot baths, and returned to his hometown, Miryang. He submitted a resignation, but the King [Sŏngjong] bestowed a letter of disallowance in person. Later, he passed away.

Sŏngjong sillok, nineteenth day eighth month 1492.

There were a number of such records, and they all indicate that the hot springs were a place for treatments. The development of the hot springs in Tongnae was designed to attract Japanese visitors for the hot springs and for the sightseeing in nearby Mt. Kŭnjŏng (P’yo 2009, p. 56). In other words, prosperous Japanese settlers in Pusan
wanted to create a leisure spot. The creation of leisure spots reflected the emergence and expansion of a bourgeoisie or leisure class. Interestingly, the Tongnae development preceded the 1930s hot spring boom in Japan itself (Sekido 1995, p. 142, 173). The rise of a Japanese bourgeoisie and leisure class in Pusan created demand for a leisure resort, which transformed a traditional place of treatment into a modern resort. As a result, a modern space was constructed to benefit the Japanese settlers, while most Koreans were naturally excluded because they did not have the same level of financial wealth.

**Summation: railway and Koreans’ participation of modern sphere**

In this chapter I mainly focused on the process of construction, which took place in the open-port period. The Korean government under King Kojong saw the potential for modernization, but they probably underestimated the investment involved in such enterprises. Korea’s geo-political location was attractive to the Great Powers that surrounded the Korean peninsula, and when political pressure was brought to bear on the Korean government, granting concessions for large infrastructural projects was a convenient way to dissipate pressure. For this reason, although Korea avoided giving concessions to Japan, it became inevitable. The Korean government’s desire to achieve ‘modern’ infrastructure by concession resulted in the signing of the ‘Agreement Concerning the Seoul-Pusan line’ with Japan. In other words, the Korean government allowed the Japanese government to construct the railway, yet reserved the right to repurchase the line, which never took place. As a result, the Korean government did not play as the main agent to build railways within the Korean peninsula. The way in which
Koreans participated in the construction of infrastructure was limited to passive roles, like providing land and labour.

The process of establishing the Seoul-Pusan railway was a way in which the Korean government attracted foreign investment into Korea, and the Japanese were the most interested in this project. However, the establishment of the Seoul-Pusan line did provide limited improvement to the lifestyles of ordinary Koreans and expanded accessibility within the country. While most ordinary Koreans were not able to experience an extensively expanded spatial boundary, the Seoul-Pusan railway expanded the boundaries and influence of the Japanese. Korean merchants still preferred to use the traditional transit through Hadan port and ordinary Koreans only travelled short distances on the railway. As a result, the Seoul-Pusan railway became an instrument for the expansion of Japanese spatial boundaries and allowed the expansion of their socio-economic influence in Korea. In other words, the Seoul-Pusan Railway redefined the spatial boundaries of Pusan, but its benefit to local Koreans was minimal. Furthermore, the Seoul-Pusan railway implicitly taught Koreans that the pre-requisite of using modern infrastructure was money and social standing, whilst subservience to the Japanese became a necessary, and more fundamental, concession. Public space had been reconstructed by the Japanese to their benefit and Koreans were excluded and marginalized from the emerging public spaces. Moreover, Koreans were imposed to accept the condition that Japan is the imperial metropolis and Korea was the periphery of Japan in order to participate in ‘modern’ space. The next chapter will consider shipping and port expansion with a similar concern for spatial and social power relations.
Chapter Five: The Development of transportation Infrastructure in Pusan, 1876-1910:

The Expansion of Shipping

In Chosŏn, ships are not connected to other countries and carts cannot travel throughout the country. Thus all goods appear here and are consumed here. 

Hŏsaengjŏn (許生傳) or Tale of Hŏsaeng in Yŏlha ilgi (熱河日記) or Yŏlha diary; Re-quoted from Yi 2009, p. 140.

The Settlers’ Association and Chamber of Commerce in Pusan held a celebration for the establishment of Pusan station. On that day, Japanese settlers in Pusan closed the stores and companies; and, they pitched tents, lit the lantern hanging outside, and put up the flag of the rising sun (Japanese national flag) to celebrate the opening of Pusan station… With the declaration of opening, Hajama [Hotarō], the president of the Pusan Chamber of Commerce, gave an opening address. Various stages were set up in the city centre and there were various performances there. The whole city was filled with joy…. This was the day that not only the Pusan-Shimonoseki shipping route was expanded to schedule to be every other day, but also a direct line from Pusan to Shinŭiju was established. [Thus], people were even more pleased by the celebration… As the dark came, the communication ship the Tsushima-maru lit the light, which heightened excitement, and not long after, a night train to Shinŭiju began to operate for the first time.

Tetsudō jihō (鉄道時報), 1908.4.18; Saitō, Tetsuo, Shimonoseki-eki monogatari (下関駅物語), pp. 124-127; Re-quoted from Pak 2007, pp. 76-77.

While railroads connected Pusan to the interior, steamships were the most important channel of connection between Korea and Japan. With the establishment of a regular shipping route, the Korean economy experienced a turning point and became part of Japan’s economic trajectory (Chu 1994, pp. 299-300). With the establishment of the Pusan-Shimonoseki shipping line, together with the completion of the Seoul-Pusan railway line in 1904 as well as the Seoul-Shinŭiju railway line in 1906, the Japanese were able to travel from Shimonoseki to Pusan via direct shipping line and from Pusan to Shinŭiju via railway line. The development of a new means of communications from Japan across the Korean peninsula was a great opportunity for both Japanese and Korean merchants to expand their business in Korea. In particular, for the Japanese, the railway and shipping lines provided an easy and fast way to penetrate the Korean market. It is not surprising that the celebration of the opening of Pusan station connecting Shimonoseki to Shinŭiju via Pusan was welcomed by the Japanese merchants’ organizations.
The president of the Pusan Chamber of Commerce even gave the opening address for the celebration. What was the meaning of opening the Pusan station? Pusan was an ideal foothold to step onto the peninsula; the demands of Japanese government policy and Japanese commercial interests were clearly met in the case of Pusan. As a result, the Settlers’ Association and the Chamber of Commerce in Pusan closely worked with the Japanese government to improve its communications on land from peninsula to the continent. The establishment of a regular shipping route allowed the Japanese to rapidly expand their business over the Korean peninsula. As a result, some Japanese who were successful moved to other cities, such as Inch’ŏn, Wŏnsan, and Seoul, and expanded their business, whereas others who failed came back to Pusan to seek a second chance.

What about Koreans in Pusan? Were all Koreans in Pusan merely either victims or bystanders? As Pusan became a centre of commerce with opportunities for Koreans to engage in trade-related jobs, many Koreans came to Pusan to search for a job and to seek the opportunity to go to Japan, which was considered more civilized. Moreover, since there were large projects under construction, including reclamation work, labour was in demand in Pusan. Most Koreans, who did not have capital, skill and organisation, could only engage in manual work though some Koreans managed to succeed in business with the Japanese merchants.

The most notable indication that Pusan had become a centre of commerce was the emergence of successful Korean merchants in Pusan, who were intimately related to trade with the Japanese. In other words, the expansion of shipping routes had a socio-economic impact on the society of Pusan. This chapter turns to examine the expansion of shipping routes in Pusan, which created a demand for the expansion of the port capacity, which in turn required reclamation and the flattening of Mount Yŏngsŏn.
The expansion of shipping routes in Pusan

There is something with rising thick black smoke moving toward the port from the outside of Chŏlyŏng island like an arrow in the boundless ocean under heaven; that is a steamship.

Yi, In-jik 1907, *Hyŏng ŭi nu* (혈의이의); Re-quoted from Cho Kap-sang, eds. 1998, p. 13. [emphasis added]

The ship docked at the wharf of Pusan... Amongst the labours who heaved on the ropes, there were some Korean workers who were wearing a yellowish top jacket on white trousers. I felt so glad and relieved to have returned home... [However,] when I descended the stairs [from the ship], I tried my best to act nonchalant by ignoring them [Japanese police and Japanese military police], wishing that they see me as a Japanese, because if they recognize you as either a Korean student in Japan or as a Korean, you will be detained and investigated. My nonchalance was the nonchalance of the ox as he steps into a slaughterhouse.

Yŏm, Sang-sŏp, *Mansejŏn* (萬歲前) 1987 (originally published in 1923) p. 73-74. [emphasis added]

Shipping routes are key elements in trade and provide logistic infrastructure. Ports have always been the gateways though which foreign merchants penetrate markets; their focus on imports and exports establishes the importance of shipping. Pusan was (and is) significant as a natural port, and Tsushima Japanese had resided in Pusan from long before the opening of Pusan as the first modern Korean port.

Pusan, as a part of the administrative region of Tongnae county, had long been significant as a military base, and as the main site of the trading connection with Japan. The newly established kingdom of Chosŏn in 1392 was aware of the danger that the raids of the *waegu* or *wakō* in the thirteenth century had created for Koryŏ. King Sejong sent Yi Chŏng-mu on a campaign against Tsushima in 1419 to suppress piracy. Despite the strike against pirates, Chosŏn policy was to turn pirates into traders by licensing Tsushima Japanese to trade. Because exchange was more likely to be a loss to Korea, the motivation of trade was political, rather than economic. Moreover, the Korean court took on the obligation of being a more civilized and advanced state to help the less fortunate denizens of Tsushima (Lewis 2003, pp. 107-145; Lewis and Sesay 2002, pp. 109-111; Hellyer 2010, p. 120). After the
Hideyoshi invasion, Pusan was the only place through which diplomatic as well as commercial communication was allowed between Korea and Japan.

In premodern times, the Tsushima Japanese sent a variety of ships. There were three different kinds of ships: the regular annual ships or *segyŏnsŏn* (歳遣船), the regular special ships or *tûksongsŏn* (特送船), and the irregular ships or *ch’awae* (差倭). The regular numbers of trade ships were set by the agreements between Korea and Japan, and the irregular ships were not set but usually tolerated by the Korean side.

Table 4. The number of regular ships in a year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreements</th>
<th>Number of ships in a year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The 1443 Agreement (Kyehae yakcho, 癸亥約條)</td>
<td>50 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1512 Agreement (Imshin yakcho, 壬申約條)</td>
<td>25 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1557 Agreement (Chŏngsa yakcho, 丁巳約條)</td>
<td>30 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1609 Agreement (Kiyu yakcho, 己酉約條)</td>
<td>20 ships</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: This table is created on the basis of information provided by Kazui, Tashiro 2002, pp. 18-19.

As table 4 suggests, the political relations between Korea and Tsushima were the determining factors in how many trade ships were allowed to come into Korea. There were two significant events that decreased the number of trade ships, that is, the Riot of the Three Ports (Pusanp’o, Naeip’o, and Yŏmp’o) of 1510 and the Hideyoshi invasions beginning in 1592. In particular, after the Hideyoshi invasion, the Korean court strictly limited the number of regular ships coming into Korea, while the Tsushima Japanese steadily sought to increase the numbers of irregular ships. By 1707, Tsushima made efforts to increase the overall numbers, and the number of ships reached as many as 84 (Kazui 2002, pp. 18-19).

After 1876, it was convenient for the Japanese newcomers to come into Pusan and settle there, because human capital and infrastructures had already been developed by the Tsushima-Japanese over several hundred years. It is no wonder then that Japanese flowed into Pusan and settled there when Pusan was opened to the Japanese. However, the size of
the influx of Japanese migrants demanded better ways and means of transport and communication facilities between Korea and Japan. Moreover, the increasing volume of trade accelerated the need to develop infrastructure for transportation.

In this context, it is necessary to examine the establishment of a regular steamship route between Pusan and Shimonoseki. The increasing numbers of ships between Korea and Japan that called in Pusan had a significant impact on the city. With the development of connecting lines between Korea and Japan via Pusan, the Meiji government was able to expand its influence over the Korean peninsula after the Korean government signed the treaty of Kanghwa with Japan in May 1876. For the Kuroda Kiyotaka-Inoue Kaoru mission, which was sent to negotiate with the Korean government for an indemnity for the Unyo incident (雲揚號事件) in late January 1876, the Mitsubishi Steamer Navigation Company provided transport ships. Mitsubishi was chosen because it was the first private company to establish a weekly shipping service between Yokohama and Shanghai in February 1875. Through close connections with the Meiji government, ¥5,000 of annual subsidy was provided to establish regular shipping service of the steamship Naniwa-maru (浪華丸) between Nagasaki and Pusan via Tsushima (Kimura 1987, p. 111; Duus 1995, p. 250; Tolentino 2000, p. 183). As the number of open ports increased, the Mitsubishi line, which was subsidized with an annual subsidy of ¥10,000, established shipping lines between Nagasaki and Wŏnsan in 1880 and with Inch’ŏn in 1883. It also established the North China line via Pusan in 1885. Mitsubishi enjoyed a monopoly from 1882-1883 until the government-sponsored Union Transport Company (hereafter, K.U.K; Kyōdō Un’yu Kaisha 協同運輸会社) was established. Other lines went to Korea, but not to Pusan. The Japan National Mail Steamship Company (hereafter, N.Y.K: Nippon Yūsen Kaisha 日本郵船会社) also set up a regular connection from Nagasaki to Vladivostok via Wŏnsan in February 1881. Shortly thereafter, the Osaka Commercial Shipping Company (hereafter, O.S.K: Osaka Shōsen Kaisha 大阪商船會社)
was established as a larger company by amalgamating small local shipowners (Wray 1984, p. 187), and launched regular sailings between Korea and Japan. Generally, there were two patterns through which early Japanese firms were established in Pusan. The first pattern was that firms were founded by businesses already operating in Japan, and the second pattern was that Japanese firms were newly established in Pusan without having a headquarters in Japan (Kimura 2001, pp. 39-40).

Looking at the emerging shipping companies connecting to Korea, it might lead one to believe that foreign shipping lines to Korea were lucrative as more and more companies set up regular lines. The reality was somewhat different. Shipping companies were often initiated by the Japanese government. The government supported the shipping companies by providing subsidies to finance unprofitable lines, in particular, overseas routes. Annual government subsidies might yield the total profit of the company. Otherwise, companies would continuously be in deficit.

At the time, many shipping routes expanded not only to trading ports in Korea, but also to China and elsewhere, including the United States and Europe. And yet the financing structure of shipping companies was that the domestic routes were the most profitable to the company (about 73.5 per cent of total income), whereas overseas routes operated at a deficit in 1888 (Wray 1984, pp.110-111). For example, when Mitsubishi launched the first shipping route to Pusan, it was an immature enterprise with financial difficulties, which was not financially sustainable without government financing. The early source of profits for Mitsubishi was ‘government funds and monopoly profits’ (Wray 1984, p. 108). The establishment of shipping lines from Japan to Pusan was not lucrative in the beginning. However, the Sumitomo Trading Company (Sumitomo Kaisha 住友会社) launched a newly built ship to set up a service for freight and passengers to Pusan without government financing in 1878 after the test shipment of 10,000 kin (13,200 pounds) of copper ore from
the Besshi mines (Duus 1995, p. 252). The Sumitomo launched the Annei-maru (安寧丸) in September 1880 as an irregular ship and then established a steamship connection from Nagasaki to Inch’ŏn (Chemulp’ô) via Pusan port once a month. In other words, from the beginning, the establishment of regular shipping lines from Japan to Korea was motivated by the need of the Japanese government to expand its influence and it sought this expansion through the provision of subsidies, which allowed the shipping companies to meet deficits.

Table 1. Numbers of ships and Tonnages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Co</th>
<th>Steamers</th>
<th>Sailing</th>
<th>Traditional Japanese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ships</td>
<td>Tonnage</td>
<td>Ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>281,655</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>357,769</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A/B</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>78.7</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>226,295</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>339,416</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A/B</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>136,969</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>372,352</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A/B</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>394,444</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>463,261</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A/B</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>415,994</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>546,546</td>
<td>572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A/B</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>59.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>448,476</td>
<td>512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>1,164</td>
<td>586,892</td>
<td>990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A/B</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>51.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>1,179</td>
<td>604,150</td>
<td>442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>1,666</td>
<td>746,020</td>
<td>969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A/B</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>1,458</td>
<td>639,067</td>
<td>463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>2,097</td>
<td>769,928</td>
<td>1,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A/B</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>1,796</td>
<td>746,174</td>
<td>569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>2,439</td>
<td>902,936</td>
<td>1,305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A/B</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>1,904</td>
<td>877,193</td>
<td>590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>2,902</td>
<td>1,160,895</td>
<td>1,288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A/B</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>2,507</td>
<td>1,295,223</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Total Ships</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Total Ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>2,481</td>
<td>707,751</td>
<td>3,796</td>
<td>1,294,581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>3,721</td>
<td>1,272,809</td>
<td>5,244</td>
<td>1,888,051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>4,594</td>
<td>2,186,185</td>
<td>5,549</td>
<td>1,661,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>4,741</td>
<td>2,569,647</td>
<td>5,605</td>
<td>2,965,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>3,510</td>
<td>2,602,451</td>
<td>3,750</td>
<td>2,884,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>3,601</td>
<td>2,747,803</td>
<td>3,803</td>
<td>2,957,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>4,132</td>
<td>3,143,321</td>
<td>4,169</td>
<td>3,211,350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: A= Japanese ships, B= total ships (Korea, Chinese, Japan and others)

Fig. 1. Number of ships

J = Japanese/ T= Total
Table 1 and Figure 1 show that the total number of ships, which came into Pusan, was driven by the increasing number of Japanese ships. In particular, the increasing numbers of steamers was the most noticeable change. Considering the fact that Pusan was the only open port until 1879, the number of incoming ships indicated the total number of ships to Korea. When it came to the time when Japan annexed Korea, Japanese steamers and sailing ships dominated the transport scene with more than 90 per cent of the total shipping. We should also note the shift of Japanese ships from traditional ships to steamers. The shift suggests that Japanese industrialization was accelerating with enhanced ship building and the development of a shipping industry, which also provided a catalyst to establish more shipping lines.

In Pusan, shipping is flourishing with three to four sailings a month from Shimonoseki, five to six from Nagasaki. [You can even] receive mail from Hakadana or Tsushima every other day. *Chōsen ihō* (朝鮮新聞) November 1893, Tōhō Kyōkai hen (東方協会編); Re-quoted from Kim 2003, p. 4.

Regular shipping routes were established first in Pusan and then expanded to other open ports in Korea. Pusan, as the first open port in Korea, enjoyed a monopoly on foreign trade until the opening of other ports. Pusan’s entrepôt role slightly diminished in the 1880s with the opening of Wonsan (1879) and Inch’ŏn (1880). (Duus 1995, p. 254; Kimura 1987, pp.111-112).
Table 2. Japanese Traders and their Vessels in Pusan, 1889

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Birth Place</th>
<th>Type of Business</th>
<th>Capital (yen)</th>
<th>Vessels (number)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fukuda Masubei</td>
<td>Tsushima</td>
<td>Trader</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>W/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurihara Shigefuyu</td>
<td>Niigata</td>
<td>General Trader</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>J/2, W/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okinaga Kichigoro</td>
<td>Yamaguchi</td>
<td>General Trader</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>W/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoke Sadahachi</td>
<td>Tsushima</td>
<td>Trader</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>W/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ueda Shinzo</td>
<td>Yamaguchi</td>
<td>Trader, Fancy Goods</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>J/2, W/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamiya Sannosuke</td>
<td>Ehime</td>
<td>Trader</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>J/2, W/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohe Manzo</td>
<td>Yamaguchi</td>
<td>General Trader</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>J/1, W/1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from Kimura, Kenji 2001, p. 46; originally from Pusan consular reports, 2 February 1889.

Note: J stands for Japanese-style vessels and W for Western-style vessels.

Not only did large-scale Japanese merchants and companies engage in trade with Korea in Pusan with their own ships, but also small and middle-scale merchants served crucial roles in the expansion of Japanese trade in Pusan. As Table 2 shows, Japanese merchants in Pusan had a widely different range of capital structure in which ¥7,000 was a maximum and ¥1,000 a minimum. Even small-scale merchants with small amounts of capital owned vessels to transport goods.

The establishment of a more regular shipping line was necessary as the number of people and goods increased. The Kisogawa-maru (木曾川丸) at 645 tons was launched between Inch’ŏn and Osaka via Moji port, Fukuoka in 1893. The Sumidagawa-maru (隅田川丸) at 746 tons had a regular route to Wŏnsan and Osaka and Wŏnsan and Moji port from 1902. These two routes were not only the inception of a modern form of regular shipping between Korea and Japan, but also a stepping stone to establish the Shimonoseki-Pusan line (Hong 2007, p. 17). The Iki maru (壱岐丸) at 1680 tons, named after an island in the straits between Korea and Japan, was launched in 1904. The Tsushima maru (対馬丸) at 1676 tons, named after Tsushima island, was launched in November 1905.
The Iki Maru and Tsushima Maru, sister-ships, built at Nagasaki for the Sanyo Railway Co., to run between Shimonoseki and Fusan, have now been launched, and will be rapidly ready for service. The Iki Maru’s contract speed is 13 knots but she made 14 on her, official trial on the 26th ultimo.

_North China Herald, 1 September 1905_

As travel to Korea increased, travel books also began to be published to help travelers and included detailed information on budget inns and instructions on how to find a place to sleep in Korea.

Traveling in Korea is very convenient and one-hundred times cheaper in comparison to exploring civilized countries, like traveling in Europe and America. Inns, which are called _chumak_ (酒幕), can always be found in more than one spot within 1 or 2 _li_ when you travel. If there is no inn, you can ask an elder in the town for a place to sleep. Ordinary people in Korea usually are willing to offer a place to sleep. The rate for rooms ranges from about 50 _mun_ to 100 _mun_, which is equivalent to 7 or 8 _sen_ to 12 or 13 _sen_. This is only the price of a meal, [because] there are no rates for rooms… If [you] hire a servant for travel, you will pay 30 _sen_ per day. Hiring a horse is about 15 or 16 _sen_ per _li_.


The Shimonoseki-Pusan regular line was called the Shimonoseki-Pusan renrakusen or the ‘connecting ferry’. The term _renrakusen_ (連絡船) was used to refer to the establishment of a main shipping line between Japan and Pusan that ultimately connected to to Sinŭiju via Seoul by the Pusan-Seoul rail line and the Seoul-Sinŭiju rail line. These became operational from 1905. Another regular shipping route, called the Shimonoseki-Pusan Railway Ferry, was established by the San’yō Railway Company in 1905. The railway ferry connected the main Japanese railway with the Seoul-Pusan line, which was opened in the same year (Yu 2007, p. 84). The connecting ferry from Shimonoseki to Pusan had a passenger capacity of 317 (18 first-class passengers, 64 second-class passengers, and 235 third-class passengers); available cargo capacity was three hundred tons; and the speed was 15 knots. It took 11 hours from Shimonoseki to Pusan. According to information advertising the connecting ferry in

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1 _Pugwan yöllaksôn or Kanfurenrakusen_ (釜関連絡船 or 関釜連絡船).
Tetsudō jihō (鐵道時報), a trade magazine, on 12 May 1906, the regular service was offered once a day both from Pusan and from Shimonoseki (Hong 2007, p. 19). The Shimonoseki-Pusan line was connected to the San’yō, Kyūshū, and Tōkaidō lines in Japan and to the Seoul-Pusan line. The establishment of the Pusan-Shimonoseki line was so significant that it was widely reported in the newspapers:

The expansion of a connecting shipping line: As the connecting shipping line between Pusan and Shimonoseki [has been expanded] to twice a day (day and night) from the beginning of May, the Japan Mail Steamship Company newly purchased the Satsuma maru.

*Taehan Maeil Shinpo* (大韓每日申報), 1 April 1908

How many people actually used the Pusan-Shimonoseki line?

Table 3. Pusan-Shimonoseki cross-channel liner

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Shimonoseki to Pusan Total passengers</th>
<th>Pusan to Shimonoseki Total passengers</th>
<th>Total passengers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39,956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>98,446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>55,019</td>
<td>56,077</td>
<td>111,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>62,616</td>
<td>56,298</td>
<td>118,914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>63,618</td>
<td>56,718</td>
<td>120,336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1,080</td>
<td>80,546</td>
<td>67,451</td>
<td>147,997</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: This table is taken from Hong 2007, p. 31.

After nationalizing the line in 1907, passenger numbers on the Seoul-Pusan line reached 111,096. To meet the increasing demand, the Egeyama-maru (會下山丸) at 1,458 tons was launched in August 1907 and the Satsuma-maru (薩摩丸) at 1,679 tons was borrowed from a private company and placed in service to increase transport capacity. As Table 3 shows, after the establishment of the Pusan-Shimonoseki line, the number of people who used it more than doubled and continued to grow. First-hand accounts confirm the swelling numbers. For example, Hisayama Ryūhō (久山龍步) depicted the scene as follows.

At 5.16 on February 25, going through the gate under the railway, [I encountered] a huge crowd at the harbour of the Shimonoseki-Pusan ferry line who wished to go to Korea. The enthusiastic crowd was intertwined each other, trying not to be late for
the ferry. Eventually, I managed to reach to Iki-maru (壹岐丸). Then, I wondered why people try to go [to Korea], whether those people hope for a big break from the early spring...[Or] whether they seek interests from treaties between Japan and China, and Japan and Korea. They all spilled into Korea and Manchuria. However, not everybody could take the ferry. Even that day, hundreds of people remained outside unable to get on.

Hisayama Ryūhō (久山龍峯)’s Mankan kikō (満韓紀行) in Taiyō (太陽) 1906.4.1. pp. 203-204; Re-quoted from Yun 2007, p. 2.

After the establishment of the Shimonoseki-Pusan line, traveling to Korea also became more and more popular and at the same time, easier. Needless to say, with the connecting ferry, Pusan became the commercial centre and the port became Japan’s foothold on the peninsula and the continent.

Koreans were often merely bystanders or passive agents in this process, but not entirely without their own agency. Similar to the Qing government, the Korean government established an Office for Extraordinary State Affairs (T’ongni kimu amun 統理機務衙門) in 1880, and that changed into the Board for General Control of Diplomatic and Commercial Matters (T’ongni kyosŏp t’ongsang samu amun 統理交涉通商事務衙門) in 1883. Moreover, there was a bureau with responsibility for maritime shipping (Chŏn’un’guk 轉運局), which pushed to establish shipping firms in Korea. In Pusan, for example, the Chŏnch’al Company (電察會社) was launched with a small steamer in 1887, doing business in ports around the Naktong River basin, such as Pusan and Taegu, and in local centres, such as Kijang, Ulsan, Kyŏngju, Changgi, Ch’angwŏn, T’ongyŏng, Chinju, and Sunch’ŏn. This company was renamed the Namyŏn Company (南沿會社) and established a strategic alliance with Osaka Shipping Company (Osaka Shosen Kaisha 大阪商船會社). The Namyŏn Company was renamed the Kisŏn company (汽船會社) and benefited from the Korean government with the issuance of Regulations for the Kisŏn Company (汽船會社章程). Unfortunately, even this Korean company relied on Japanese sailors to operate the ships, because there were no experienced sailors in Korea. Its connection with the Osaka Shipping Company was not on
an equal level of collaboration; rather the Japanese partner benefited more from the alliance than did the Korean partner (*Pusan hangsa* 1991, p. 209).

Afterwards, the Korean government continued to make efforts to build more shipping firms, such as the Korea Joint Mail Steamship Company (*Taehan hyŏptong usŏn chushik hoesa* 大韓協同郵船會社), which was founded in February 1899 to deliver goods and mail. And yet, the Korea Joint Mail Steamship Company did not differ greatly from the Kisŏn Company. All sailors, including the captain, were Japanese. In other words, Korean shipping firms were Korean in name only. In reality, those companies were dominated by the Japanese. Even these nominal Korean companies were eventually dissolved under the domination of stronger Japanese firms.

The Korean government attempted to establish shipping firms to resist the domination of Japanese shipping firms and realize the benefits of shipping; and yet the Korean government neglected to build modern ships, whereas the Japanese government made efforts to build modern ships, as well as expand shipping routes. As a result, the total tonnage of Korean steamships and sailships did not even reach ten per cent of the total tonnage operated by the Japanese until 1892.

Considerable numbers of Koreans traveled to Pusan to find a job in the emerging city or to seek the possibility of using the new shipping lines to go to the ‘modern country, Japan’. The railway to Pusan was vibrant with people who wanted to go to the growing city. Shipping was being developed to connect people and freight between Korea and Japan and that required better port facility.

*The enlarging capacity of Pusan Port: Reclamations and the flattening of Mount Yŏngsŏn*

Pusan port is a fine harbour and its location is also a proper place for trade… Yet the shortcoming of this area [as a trading port] is that the sea-coast and shore of Pusan-jin, which is connected to hill and mountain, is narrow where ships are anchored. [Moreover], there is no more room for settlers in the city of the Japanese settlement…
Pusan port can be the east gate of [Japan’s] trade with Korea, which will be not difficult to connect with the Seoul-Pusan line in the future.

‘釜山海岸埋立工事ニ関スル件’, ‘釜山海岸埋立工事ノ一件’ by Satō Junzō (佐藤潤象) and Takashima Yoshitada (高嶋義)，in January 1900 reported to Hayashi Gonsuke (権助); Kawai, Zenjirō (河相全次郎) 1971, *Konoe Atsumarō niki* (近衛篤麿日記), pp. 259-260; Re-quoted from Ch’a 2006, pp. 3-4.

The construction of port reclamations at Pusan and the flattening of Mount Yōnsŏn was an important part of a modernizing port structure project. Not only was the port reclamation project and the flattening of Mt. Yōnsŏn able to enlarge the space related to railway, road, and port facility for transportation, but also it made possible an expansion of the living space the post-office and various companies.

As expected, however, the reclamation construction was a large project, which cost a large amount of capital. Thus, the decision for the reclamation construction required determination and investment. Considering the construction of reclamation, Ch’a Ch’ul-uk provides an introduction of two invaluable historical sources: *Fusan Kaigan Umetate Kōji no Ichiken* (釜山海岸埋立工事ノ一件) and *Fusan Umochiku Kaisha* (釜山埋築会社) (Ch’a 2006, pp. 223-311). The first source contains the decision-making process of the reclamation construction in 1902 and the second one includes a discussion of the reclaimed land after the construction in 1908 (Ch’a 2006, p. 244). The reclamation work was undertaken by a triangular partnership amongst the Pusan Reclamation Company, the Settler’s Association, and the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Moreover, the construction of the north side of Pusan port was a project conducted between the Korean government and the Japanese, but also between the Japanese settlers in Pusan and the Seoul-Pusan Railway Company. It was necessary to improve the port facilities, though Pusan was a natural port, because the Japanese settlement in the vicinity of Mount Yongdu was close to the sea with only a narrow coastal area (Kim 1973, p. 55).
The reclamation stimulated not only an expansion of land for the Japanese settlement, but also an improvement of the harbour at Pusan. The development of the port of Pusan was a necessary and strategic bit of infrastructure for the Japanese to secure a channel to extend trade and bolster ties with Japan. For this, the Ministry of Finance published a long term project plan to construct port facilities in Pusan at the request of the Japanese settlers. The draft of the plan to connect facilities between land and sea in Pusan (Fusan kairiku renraku setsubi keikakusho 釜山海陸聯絡設備計劃書), which was published by the temporary Bureau of Construction in the Ministry of Finance (Ōkurashō rinji kenchikubu 大蔵省臨時建築部) in 1912 indicates that the Japanese government was aware of the strategic importance of Pusan port (Ch’a 2010, pp.399-400).

The port reclamation work in the northern coastal area was let out to the Pusan branch of the Pusan Reclamation Joint-stock Company (K. Pusan maechuk chusik hoesa, J. Fusan umechiku kabushiki kaisha) by the Korean government in July, 1902. The construction was contracted with the Ōkura-gumi based in Pusan and sub-contracted with the Kōndo-gumi in Shimonoseki (Kim 1973, p. 55-57). The construction of the north side of Pusan was underwritten with capital from Ōkura Kihachirō (大倉喜八郎), who came to Pusan and began trade between Korea and Japan from the very beginning in 1876 at the request of Ōkubo Toshimichi, the home minister. Eventually, the first and second reclamation projects were launched.

The first reclamation project (1902.7.19-1905.12) was completed with 32,771 p’yǒng of reclaimed land, which was slightly larger than originally planned (31,635 p’yǒng). During the construction, there were as many as 900 Korean workers and 2,000 Japanese workers who were employed on a daily basis, though the Japanese consulate estimated the number of workers for the construction at 50 Japanese and 600-700 Korean (Ch’a 2006, p. 10). We can imagine how large the reclamation project was. Before the second reclamation in October
1906, the Chamber of Commerce at Pusan requested preservation of the modified anchorage facility established by the first reclamation works. The Korean Ministry of Finance accepted the request and halted the construction. The Korean government halted the construction for the agreed condition of repurchasing the land by the government at the time of permission for the reclamation.

The Pusan Reclamation Joint-stock Company attempted to contact the Director of Commerce in Korea, Sugiyama Takashimarō, to bring influence on the Resident-General of Korea (Itō Hirobumi) and and advisor to the Ministry of Finance in Korea (Megata Jūntarō). Megata and the reclamation company began to negotiate an amendment. Eventually, they agreed on the reduction of the scale of the second reclamation construction. The second reclamation construction (1907.4-1909.8) was completed with 6,665 or 8,747 (reports vary) pyŏng of reclaimed land, which was originally planned to have been 17,219 pyŏng (Ch’a 2006, pp. 10-11).

Fig.2 Map of Pusan Harbour and immediate urban area circa 1911

Source: Prof. Ch’a Ch’ŏl-uk. Square added: The squared area is reclaimed land after the first and second reclamations: The outer square was created by the first reclamation and the inner square was created by the second reclamation.

With the completion of both reclamations in the northern part of the port in 1909, the reclaimed land, on which Chwapyŏng chŏng (Satō machi 佐藤町), Taech’ang chŏng (Ôkura
machi 大倉町), Chung chŏng (Naka machi 中町), Ampon chŏng(Iwamo machi 岩本町), Kojo chŏng (Takashima machi 高島町), Kyŏngpu chŏng (Keifu machi 京釜町), and the Customs House were established, was dominated by the Japanese settlers (Kim 1973, p. 47; Cho 2005, p. 47).

The population of Pusan significantly increased from the beginning of the first port reclamation in 1902 (Cho 2005, p. 53). By the time the second port reclamation ended, the population, as well as the number of households in Pusan, had increased more than three-fold (Cho 2005, p. 53). There were two main parts of the Waegwan or the Japan House, which contained Mt. Yongdu (龍頭山) at its centre. One part was located on the east side and was called the Tonggwan (東館) or East House and the other part was located on the west side and was called the Sŏgwan (西館) or West House. The Japanese established the trading and commercial centre of Pusan in the area of the old Tongwan, and the central area of the city was established in the area of the Sŏgwan (Cho 2005, p. 43).

Before the construction of the first and second port reclamations, there were only six companies set up in the entire central area that had been the Waegwan. From the time the construction was closed to the completion in 1907 to 1912, thirteen companies, such as the Daiichi Bank (第一銀行), Fukudamata Shōten (福田又商店), the Daigo Jũhachi Bank (第五十八銀行), and Ŭkura Shōsen (大倉商船) in Honmachi (本町) and Ŭsaka Shōsen (大阪商船) and Kokusai tsūun (國際通運) in Ŭkura machi (大倉町), Marukin shuzō (丸金酒造) and Chōsen gasu denki (朝鮮瓦斯電気) in Pokpy’ŏng-jŏng (Tomihei machi 富平町), and Fusan inryŏsha (釜山飲料社), and Chōsen Bank (朝鮮銀行) in Taech’ŏngjŏng ( Ôchô-machi 大廳町) were established (Cho 2005, p. 54; Fusan fusei yōran 釜山府政要覽 1932, pp. 191-217). Moreover, from 1903 to 1912, thirty-eight factories were newly established.
There were trade related companies on the east side and factories on the west side (Cho 2005, p. 56).

The area around the port was hilly, so flat land was limited. The reclamation was one way to expand the living space at Pusan and the other way was to turn hilly lands into flat land by flattening mountains. With the first and second reclamations completed, the Japanese government launched a project to flatten Mount Yŏngsŏn in 1908 and this was completed by 1913. The flattening construction was initially planned at 30,490 p’yŏng but was extended by an additional 14,290 p’yŏng (Kim 1973, pp. 66-74; Cho 2005, pp. 49-52). By the reclamations and the flattening of Mt. Yŏngsŏn, a total 86,154 p’yŏng were made available. As a result, the function of Pusan port was improved by the fact that not only was the available Japanese settlement extended, but also the available land for commerce and logistics was extended. The port reclamation expanded the spatial boundary for the Japanese settlers, and it bolstered the establishment of new companies. In other words, the reclamation construction had a significant impact on the economic development in Pusan. Merchants at Inch’ŏn ‘complained that much-needed harbor improvements were deliberately stalled so as to facilitate trade in Japan-dominated Pusan’ (Larsen 2008, p. 276).

**Summation**

Pusan had the big advantage of being located close to Japan. It was a traditional treaty port with an existing Japanese population and was a natural port that had attracted trade from Japan. And yet, these conditions were not completely satisfactory for the Japanese settlers who came to Pusan after the opening. The Japanese settler organisations attempted to make Pusan more desirable and hospitable to bolster trade between Korea and Japan. The important point is that the changes were achieved by the grass-roots penetration of economic encroachment from Japanese settlers but, more importantly, the changes would not have been
possible without the financial support of the Japanese government. The Japanese government provided subsidies to private companies to initiate the shipping routes, and later the Japanese government nationalized the shipping to consolidate the connections.

The development of transportation infrastructure in Pusan—such as the Seoul-Pusan line and its extension to Shinŭiju, the improvement of the harbour, and the creation of direct shipping lines—carried close links with the Japanese government in the form of direct investments subsidies, and the stirring up of a sense of patriotism in investors, and Japanese private industry. Private merchant associations and government officials worked hand in hand to carry out the projects. Likewise, the Pusan port reclamations and the flattening of Mount Yŏngsŏn was also enabled by an alliance of private and government interests.
There are six main causes of disease: food, air, climate, lifestyle, hereditary transmission, and infection. In regards to food, having unseasonable food or excessive [alcoholic] drinking will be enough to cause a myriad of diseases. These are already well-known by the people. [But], selecting drinking water is often neglected by many. The way in which we drink water should be the following: water should be clear and if there are any impurities in the water, the root cause for a myriad of diseases comes from that.

Hansŏng Sunbo (漢城旬報), 5 May 1884. [emphasis added]

Access to potable water is often taken for granted as an aspect of everyday life in the modern world, but a single water-faucet requires complex knowledge to build and a mechanical system of various structures behind it, such as a dam, enclosed masonry, conduits, embankments, and a reservoir. Moreover, access to pure water is the basis for sustainable development and ‘an intrinsically important indicator for human progress’ (Watkins et al, 2006, p. 27). The issue of urban water supply is not only important for securing convenient supplies of drinking water, but also for meeting the public health concerns of a ‘modern’ state. The supply of water is one of the most visible manifestations of ‘modern’ technological change. Thus, clean water and sanitation can ‘make or break human development’ (Watkins et al 2006, p.27).

Water is also ‘sine qua non of the city…whether for sustenance, sanitation, firefighting or industrial use, water was the original public utility and historically the first urban problem’ (Hassan 1998, p. 10). Due to the hilly geographical features in Pusan, the adequacy and the safety of drinking water supplies was always a serious issue for inhabitants. The provision of traditional water sources, such as wells and streams from valleys, were not only inadequate, but also unsafe. Pusan is geographically a natural port, but it has always suffered from an insufficient water supply, because the land beyond the contour of the coastline is closed off by mountains, offering little hinterland from which to source water. Tongnae and its hot springs were located beyond the hills that ring the harbour. Though inland Tongnae
county had water sources, the harbour, where the Waegwan was located, lacked it. Shortage of water was the most crucial problem in Pusan (Kim 2009, p. 240). It was probably inevitable that Pusan was the first place in which modern waterworks in Korea were established, and so the fact that the establishment of waterworks in Pusan took place even thirteen years earlier than in Seoul, the capital city, in 1908, is not surprising. It is noteworthy that the construction of a series of waterworks was initiated and funded by the Japanese settlers in Pusan after the opening of Pusan (Son 1982a, p. 149).

Furthermore, amongst the Japanese settlers who experienced epidemics and knew of ‘modern’ sanitation, public health anxieties became paramount. To a certain extent, diseases, particularly epidemics such as cholera, typhoid, and malaria, were the major concerns of the colonial settlers. In the case of Europeans, high rates of mortality were considered to be the cost of profit in their early expansion; yet, from the nineteenth century onwards European colonists’ concerns about health rapidly rose together with the rapid growth of medical science (King 1990, pp. 40-41). With the Japanese pouring into Pusan came similar concerns for health. To ease public health concerns, the installation of a water supply system was planned and carried out during the early period of settlement in Pusan.

In this chapter, I will first examine the construction of waterworks that spanned three phrases in the open-port period. I will then discuss the management of the waterworks and identify who benefitted from the water supply. In short, I will outline the creation of ‘modern’ sanitation and health in Pusan. In terms of sanitation and health concerns, I will narrow my focus to epidemics and the environment. Amongst epidemics, I will examine cholera in particular. I will track the shifting attitudes towards cholera, which ranged from viewing the disease as a result of fate to understanding it as a germ and trying to prevent its spread. Finally, I will discuss the first ‘modern’ clinic in Korea, the Saisei Inn, established in Pusan in 1877.
The construction of waterworks to 1910: the first, second, and third construction phases

(Pusan water supply) To raise funds for and to finalise the proposal to establish a waterworks in the Japanese settlement in Pusan, Mr. Ota Torajirō, representative of the Japanese settlers in Pusan, is currently in Tokyo. [from the] Nihon hō (日本報). Hwangsong sinmun (皇城新聞), 14 Feburary 1900

The most important principle regarding hygiene: In the cities of civilised countries in the world, [urban planners] design their cities to have good quality drinking water, so that water supply facilities follow [urban development]. Even in small towns where there is no water supply facility, the water in each well is checked to determine its safety. If a well’s water is not of good quality, people are prevented from drinking from that well. Thus, [the authorities] take steps for the health and well-being of the people.

Hwangsong sinmun (皇城新聞), 13 November 1906

After the opening of Pusan in 1876, the issue of water shortage became acute with the increase in the number of Japanese settlers and the coming of larger ships, such as ferries, passenger ships, and freighters. With limited sources of water from the wells and streams flowing from the mountains and hills in Pusan, it was impossible to meet the water needs of the increasing number of Japanese settlers. Until the 1870s, in fact, the chief source of water for the Japan House at Ch’oryang was two wells, which were dug for the Tsushima-Japanese merchants residing at the Japan House for trade. There were six other wells around the county magistrate’s offices at úpsŏng (邑城) and three wells at the Left Naval Headquarters for Kyŏngsang Province (chwasuyŏng-sŏng 左水營城) in Tongnae county (Tongnae-bu chi 東萊府誌 1740, republished 1995, pp. 111-112; Tongnae-bu chi 東萊府誌 1832, pp. 255-258).¹ The numbers of wells must be considered in light of the number of Koreans in Tongnae county circa 1740: 21,241 people (9,616 males, 230 monks, and 11,625 females) and 5,641 households in úpsŏng (Tongnae-bu chi 1995, pp. 123-124). Approximately, every 940 households shared one well. Even if wells in the Naval Headquarters are included, every

¹ The Tongnae-bu chi (東萊府誌) for 1759 does not mention three wells at the Left Naval Headquarters for Kyŏngsang Province; instead it states that there is one well on Mt. Chŏng (井山) (pp. 207-209).
627 households (2,360 people) shared one well. It is probable that the main source of water for most Koreans in Tongane County was not wells, but the Naktong River. When drought occurred due to lack of rainfall, usually in winter, people suffered greatly from the shortage of water.

Both Koreans and Japanese suffered from a shortage of water sources in Pusan. Koreans in Tongnae County had access to natural water sources from various mountains and hills, while Japanese residents in Pusan were bound to the Japan House; they had limited access to water sources. Though the number of the Tsushima Japanese (82 in 1876) was relatively small, two wells for the Japan House was still not sufficient to supply drinking water (*Nitchō tsūkōshi* 1916, p 205).

The Japanese settlers were very aware of the water shortage issue in the early open-port period, and they attempted to secure water resources by building a water supply facility for the Japanese settlement but first there were attempts to deal with the given situation. The Japanese Settlers’ Association created the Administrative Bureau for Japanese Residents, which promulgated Regulations for the Control of Communal Shallow Wells in the Settlement (*Kyoryūchi kyōdō horiido torishimari kisoku*, 居留地共同堀戸取締規則) on December 1887. This was the first ‘modern’ regulation on drinking water in Korea. The Regulations for the Control of Communal Shallow Wells in the Settlement had six articles that aimed to control wells by preventing the water source from being damaged or polluted (*Fusan rījichō hōki ruishū* 1909, pp. 155-156). However, this regulation was limited. It is safe to say that it was rather passive, sought to maintain the *status quo*, and would not satisfy the needs of the Japanese settlers. In particular, with the increase in the number of settlers and business relations, the Japanese settlers were united in their expression of a desire to secure water sources through the assembly (*Kaigisho* 会議所; an earlier form of the Settlers’ Association) of the settlers and the Chamber of Commerce (founded in 1879) in Pusan. To
respond to the increasing demand for water sources, a series of water supply projects was launched from 1894.

In the meantime, as an indication of the seriousness of the matter, there appeared a rumour alleging that Koreans poisoned Japanese wells in Pusan.

A grave charge which we can scarcely credit is made against Koreans in Fusan that they are poisoning Japanese wells. When one of the culprits is caught, tried and convicted then it will be time to publish such a report but to circulate such a rumor without any confirmation can do no good and can only reflect upon those who invented it.

_The Independent_ 16 April 1896

_The Independent_ urged those who invented and spread the rumour to stop until the rumour was confirmed. Once such a rumour begins, it would have been hard to stop it. No one can be sure how many Japanese read _The Independent_, yet such a rumour would have spread rather quickly in the settler society long before appearing in _The Independent_. The scare probably catalysed the Japanese settlers to build a waterworks.

The first water supply system, which imported water from Posuch’ŏn (J. Hŏsuikawa, 寶水川) was created using a bamboo pipe in 1880, and that was replaced by a wooden pipe in 1886. Securing water sources from the stream to the settlement was the main goal of constructing this water supply system. Even then, the water source was not enough to provide sufficient drinking water for the Japanese settlers. There were no regulations for this water supply facility.

What we might recognise as a ‘modern’ water supply system was constructed in Pusan from 1894. Considering that the first modern water supply system in Japan was constructed in Yokohama by the British military engineer, H. S. Palmer in October 1887, the Pusan system was relatively early. Of course, it was the first in all of Korea. After the first construction, water supply in Pusan continued to expand. The dates of construction are as follows:
Table 1. Water supply construction in Pusan in the open port period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>start</th>
<th>End</th>
<th>Cost (Wôn)</th>
<th>reservoir</th>
<th>Method of water flow</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st construction</td>
<td>June 1894</td>
<td>February 1895</td>
<td>25,451</td>
<td>Posuch’ŏn (J. Hōsuikawa, 宝水川)</td>
<td>Nonpressure flow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd construction</td>
<td>January 1900</td>
<td>January 1902</td>
<td>116,378</td>
<td>Mt. Omkwang (嚴光山, J. Takatōmi, 高遠見)</td>
<td>Nonpressure flow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd construction</td>
<td>April 1907</td>
<td>September 1910</td>
<td>1,116,351</td>
<td>Sŏngjigok (聖知谷 J. Seshiru-tani)</td>
<td>Nonpressure flow</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Pusan sangsudo paldalsa* (부산상수도발달사) 1997, p. 162.

As Table 1 shows, construction of the water supply came in three phases from 1894 to 1910, about every five years. The continuing expansion of the water supply was deeply linked to the increase in the number of Japanese settlers in Pusan. Note that the method of water flow was non-pressure flow.
Note: The black circle in the map is the area in which Japanese settlement took place, and the rectangles on the map are the places where water reservoirs were located. The one close to the settled area on the lower left is Posuch’ŏn; the second in the middle of the mountains is Mt. Ŭmkwang; and the last one was located in the far north (Sŏngjigok) and is not shown on this map.

Three major areas served by water supply facilities were as follows: the first area was the Old Settlement (古館) in Pusan-jin and Ch’oryang (草梁); the second was in the area of reclaimed land (埋積地) and a newly established district; and the last was the newly developed area (新市街). Needless to say, those three areas were located in the circular area on the map and identified the expanding Japanese settlement. The three steps in the system were built from 1894 to 1910 in such a way that water pipelines were laid from mountains to
urban concentrations in order to draw water from natural sources. The water supply system in Pusan was the very first water supply system in Korea, built more than ten years earlier than any in Seoul. The first water supply system in Seoul was built at Ttuksohm, namely the first Ttukdo Water Reservoir (K. Ttukto suwönji, che il chôngsujông, 蘆島水源地 第一淨水場, later the Keijô Water-Pump Factory, J. Keijô suidô yõsui köjô, 京城水道揚水工場). It was constructed by the Collbran-Bostwick company, which began construction on August 1906 and finished on August 1908 (Son 1982, pp. 145-149; Hong 2006, p. 309). The system of non-pressure flow was not as advanced as later water supply systems using pressure flow, but it presented a sensational change in the quality of life.

Let us examine each phase of construction in detail. The first phase was initiated by the Japanese settlers. The construction established a catchment area from which the upper stream of the Posuch’on river could be used as the primary source of water for the Japanese settlement as well as for large ships coming to Pusan. The first construction, which was built at a total cost of 25,000 yen, was solely financed by the representatives of the settlers from June 1894 to January 1895. In the beginning, the estimated time for construction was about 100 days: to install a catchment area, reservoir, pipelines, and drainage, along with a public water faucet, fire hydrant, and water control valve (Kim 1973, pp. 41-42). However, its construction was delayed more than seven months due to rising wages associated with the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895. Difficulties in supplying manpower and a shortage of shipping to supply construction materials also contributed to the costs. The construction included establishing a dam as the catchment area with a natural filtration device at the Posuch’on River and establishing a reservoir at the Taech’ongjong (J. Ōchômachi, 大廳町), which was a higher site in the settlement area. In other words, this construction was built to supply water solely to the Japanese settlement. The water was delivered from the catchment

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2 The word ‘faucet’ here refers not to a ‘modern day’ faucet; rather, it is simply a standpipe.
area to the reservoir via a 6 ch’on (寸) diameter (≒5.71 centimeter) clay pipe and then delivered via iron pipes from the reservoir to 70 public water faucets established in the Japanese settlement. The details on the facility are as follows:

Table 2. Water supply in 1895 (Posuch’ŏn reservoir)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Note</th>
<th>Natural filter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reservoir</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewage</td>
<td>length of 36 ch’ŏk (10.9 metres) / width of 24 ch’ŏk (≒7.3 metres) / depth of 10 ch’ŏk (3.03 metres)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water supply</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water pipe</td>
<td>Clay pipe – diameter 6 inch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drain pipe</td>
<td>Cast iron – diameter 6 inch, 5 inch, 3 inch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire hydrants</td>
<td>diameter 2.5 inch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>water control valve</td>
<td>diameter 6 inch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>drain control valves</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public water faucets for common use</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: unit 1 ch’ŏk = about 0.303 m.
Source: *Pusan sangsudo paldalsa* (부산상수도 발달사) 1997, p. 163.

As Table 2 shows, the facility of the water supply in 1895 was small by modern standards, but it was sufficient to supply the population of 4,000 Japanese settlers who benefited from this facility. At the time, there was no charge for the water supply. The expenses of managing the facility were paid by contributions from the Japanese settlers and from charging fishing ships. The Japanese consulate promulgated a regulation for the water supply (水道取締規則, *J. Suidō torishimari kisoku*) to protect faucet water, the water supply facility, and to prevent people from abusing the water supply. This was the first known regulation of the water supply in Korea.

I. In the area of the catchment areas and reservoirs the following is prohibited:
   1. Bringing animals or taking a bath and doing laundry.
   2. Littering or throwing stones and polluting the water source.
II. It is prohibited to dig up the water pipe and waterworks facilities and any other activities that may cause an interruption to the waterworks.
III. Public water faucets, fire hydrants, and other related facilities should not be abused or neglected.
IV. Cows or horses should not be chained at the public water faucet and nothing should be set on top of the public water faucet.

V. It is prohibited to litter or throw stones and other pollutants in the flowing area of the public water faucet. It is prohibited to set up [any structures] in the area of the public water faucet. No materials should be washed at the site.

VI. Those who violate Article I and II will be forced to carry out cleaning and refurbishing according to the fourth clause of Article 426 in the Criminal Law; and those who violate Article III, IV, and V will be sentenced according to Article V of the minor offenses in the regulations of the settlement.

VII. For the use of public faucets the following is prohibited:
1. Abusing the public water faucet by drinking water [directly] or taking a bath or doing laundry [at the site].
2. Leaving the public water faucet on without turning it off after use.

VIII. Those who violate regulations in Article VII will be sentenced to more than one day detention, or they will be fined between 5 sen and 1 yen 95 sen. (Pusan ri ji chōhō kuruishū 釜山理事會法規類集 1909, pp. 181-182).

After the Sino-Japanese war of 1895, the demand for waterworks continued to rise as a result of the increase of Japanese residents in the Pusan settlement. The expansion of the water supply system was indispensable. Therefore, the Japanese settlers established a reservoir in 1895 in a valley under Mt. Ōmkwang (厳光山, or Mt. Takatōmi, 高遠視, as it was known to the Japanese). The reservoir had a 2,602,600 cubic foot reservoir capacity.

The representative body of settlers (Kyoryūmin sōdai 居留民總代, an earlier form of the Settlers’ Association) worked with the Japanese superintendent (K. kwalli kwan, J. kanri kan 管理官) residing in Pusan. The representative body of settlers hired an engineer, Tatsumura Yōkichi (達邑容吉), for a site investigation and decided to build the waterworks according to the following plan. The first step was to construct a reservoir in the valley under Mt. Ōmkwang and provide two filter basins of 80 kan (間) each.³ The second step was to add an extension for another reservoir, so that 1,500 square metres of water, which could be daily consumed by the population of 6,000, could be stored. The third was that the same shape of reservoir should be added for every increase of the population by 3,000 people. The fourth step was to mend and use as a supplementary water source the reservoir, which was built in

³ One kan (間) is a unit for the space enclosed by four pillars, which is a length of 1.82 metres or 181.82 centimetres.
the first construction. The fifth step was that clay pipes and iron pipes, which were built in
the first construction, should be replaced by new pipes (Pusan rijichō hōki ruishū
釜山理事廳法規類集 1909, pp.8-25). This plan not only enlarged the capacity of the water
system to provide water for home use, but also provided a larger possibility of extending
capacity in the future, though this plan was complicated and technically demanding.

The above outline for expansion for the water supply facility was beneficial for the
following reasons. First, in case of emergency, existing fire hydrants could extinguish fires
not only for a second story building but also for a third story building in several critical
places in the city. Second, apart from drinking water for daily use, the water system could
provide an additional supply for ships, engine locomotives, and factories, because Pusan
functioned as a port and was developing manufacturing. By levying fees for usage, funds
could be raised to repair the water supply facility. Third, if the quantity of water was
sufficient, the water supply could help clean sewage and roads to prevent the ruination of
goods in the stores by dirt or dust. In other words, the water facility was not only beneficial
to the quality of life but also aided the expansion of business. Because of the decision-
making process, the Chamber of Commerce in Pusan also engaged in the construction of
water supply facilities from an early stage and continued to be engaged throughout its
development and management. On the basis of the plan, the second construction was
launched at Mt. Ōmkwang (Pusan riji chōhō kiruishū 釜山理事廳法規類集 1909, pp. 19-25).

The second construction required more advanced technology to build this ‘modern’
water supply structure, with a catchment and a reservoir. For this construction, the Nagasaki
Civil Engineering Stock Company (長崎土木株式會社) was selected by bid in open
competition. The company began the construction in January 1901 and the celebration of the
opening of the waterworks was held in January 1902. For the second construction, the
settlers attempted to meet the average daily consumption per person in comparison to major cities of the world, such as London (31 gallons), Paris (36 gallons), Berlin (18 gallons), North America (60 gallons), as well as major cities of Japan, such as Tōkyō (25 gallons), Yokohama (18 gallons), Hakodate (15 gallons), Nagasaki (20 gallons), Ōsaka (19 gallons), and Kōbe (14.5 gallons). In Pusan, the estimated daily consumption of water was on average 15 gallons, which is comparable to major cities in Japan (Fusan josuidō shōshi 釜山上水道小志 1914, pp. 9-13).

There were many differences between the first and the second construction phases. The first noticeable change was filtration control. The method of the first construction was natural filtration; and the second facilitated filtration by building a catchment area. The capacity of the reservoir was incomparably enlarged. Another noticeable change in the second construction was that all the pipes for both the supply and drainage of water were made of iron. The length of the pipes also became longer (Fusan josuidō shōshi 釜山上水道小志 1914, p. 5, p. 41).

The establishment of water supply facilities in the first and second construction was intended to meet the needs of public use. In fact, water faucets were considered to be public property so that there was no fee for the Japanese settlers. A small levy on water was collected from foreign ships. The charge for water supply was fixed per faucet, rather than charges based on metred use.

**Transition in the concept of water: tension between basic needs and commodity**

One odd change resulting from the second water supply construction was that the number of public water faucets for common use was reduced from 70 to 12. Since the distribution of the water supply in Pusan was limited, the best way to expand the distribution rate was to establish more faucets for public use. Yet the policy went the other way around.
In other words, the reduction in faucets demonstrates a change in the fundamental definition of water. In short, ‘water’ turned from a basic essential need into a commodity, along the trajectories of commodification. The commodification of water transformed the definition of water from a source of life for the public good to merely something to be purchased. In other words, in Pusan, a clash between protecting a commodity and maintaining life was bound to occur.

Since the construction of the water supply system cost a large amount of money, a charge on the water supply as a form of taxation was indispensable. As a result, water became no longer a public good for everyone to consume, but began to be considered as a tradable commodity to sell. The taxpayers, or the Japanese settlers, acquired a right to claim use of water in Pusan. At the same time, it was their responsibility to take the financial burden. There was no subsidy from the Japanese government. The local representatives needed to secure a source of revenue. In fact, Sahara Jun’ichi (佐原純一), on behalf of the Representative Body of Settlers (kyoryūmin sōdai 居留民總代), had to take a loan to meet the budget, which was estimated at 87,000 yen. This was for the second construction of water supply facilities and carried a low interest rate (1% per year) from the Japanese bank branches in Pusan. The budget for the construction was met by a loan of 60,000 yen from the Daiichi Bank (第一銀行) and a loan of 13,500 yen each from the Daijūhachi Bank (第十八銀行) and the Daigojūhachi Bank (第五十八銀行). In other words, the total amount of 87,000 yen was borrowed for the construction. The loan was to be paid back in instalments over a seven-year period from 1901 to 1907 (Fusan josuidō shōshi 釜山上水道小誌 1914, p. 30-31).

In the presence of the Japanese consul, the representative of the Association, Ōta Hidetarō (大田秀太郎), and Chairman of the Association, Takafuji Shoichirō (高藤昇一郎),
and the Pusan branch chief of the Daiichi Bank, Arai Eizō (荒井栄造), signed the contract on 20 August 1900. The contract they signed was as follows:

I. From the day of the signing of the contract to the completion of the construction, the Daiichi Bank in Pusan should give a loan to the settlement of up to 60,000 yen.

II. The total amount of the loan is the same as above in Article I. The debt can be written over the signatures of the representative body of the Association and Chairman of the Association. The amounts of the loan [to be taken out] should be informed to the bank ten days before the claim.

III. For Article I, the interest for the loan is 1% per year.

IV. The loan in Article I should be paid back in instalments over a seven-year period from 25 December 1901 to 25 August 1907.

V. The method of repayment will not be reduced from the agreement above under any circumstance. However, if the settlement association has a surplus in their budget, the terms of repayment can be reduced by adding up the amortized costs after a mutual agreement has been reached.

(Fusan josuidō shōshi 釜山上水道小誌 1914, pp. 36-38)

Though the loan was made to the representative body, the budget was not sufficient due to the appreciation of land values, so that the representative body had to make up a revised supplementary budget of 20,000 yen. The budget for the construction was four times bigger than the budget for the first construction. The following table was the budget to be raised from estimated tax revenues.
Table 3. Supplementary budget for repair of the water supply in 1900

Unit: yen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>ratio</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taxation on Water supply improvement</td>
<td>12,724</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charge on per person basis</td>
<td>8,127</td>
<td>32.21</td>
<td>Over 4 years old to under 70 years old, 15 sen (actual rate of about 15.133 sen) for a month per person will be charged, with a total population of 4,515 for twelve months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing ship charges</td>
<td>1,425</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>30 sen per person Estimated number of 4,750 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sake brewing charges</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1 koku is 1 yen 50 sen estimated for 600 koku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imported wine charges</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>1 bottle is 50 sen estimated for 4,000 bottles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soy sources charges</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 koku is 40 sen estimated for 200 koku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imported soy sources charge</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 bottle is 15 sen estimated for 800 bottles (0.15 yen x 800 = 120)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25,448</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Fusan josuidō shōshi* (釜山上水道小誌), 1914, p. 30.

As table 3 shows, most revenue for this supplementary budget was collected from taxation on water supply improvement and charges levied on a per person basis. The plan to return the loan was also based on the collection of taxes. Charges per person amounted to a little over 30 per cent of the total budget. For the construction, the representative body began to impose public governance. In other words, the representative body began to provide public services (water supply in this case) on the basis of taxation, meaning that the representative body became a ‘government’ for the inhabitants of Pusan.
Table 4. Type of water supply and number of faucets on June 1905.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of water faucets</th>
<th>Number of faucets</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private water faucet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water faucets to special</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>8.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>places (i.e., government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>office, local office)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>faucets to single</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>68.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>households</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public water faucet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>faucets to more than</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>8.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>two households</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public faucets</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire hydrants</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>11.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water supply for ships</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire hydrants and supply</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fusan kōsei ippan (釜山港勢一班), 1905, pp. 175-176.

As Table 4 shows, public faucet use (3.01 per cent) came to be far overshadowed by faucets to single households (68.09 per cent), which reached to almost seventy per cent of the total. The commodification of water was now taken over by the privatization of water. Then, on what basis was the fee for the water supply charged and what was the amount of the fee?

Table 5. Type of water supply and charge on the water supply in 1907

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Different charges</th>
<th>Standard</th>
<th>For one month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fixed charge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private use</td>
<td>1-5 persons</td>
<td>1.5 yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10 persons</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private for common use</td>
<td>1 faucet</td>
<td>40 sen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public for common use</td>
<td>1 faucet</td>
<td>20 sen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charge base on consumption</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business use</td>
<td>1 koku</td>
<td>2 sen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary use</td>
<td>1 koku</td>
<td>1 sen 5 rin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bath house</td>
<td>1 koku</td>
<td>1 sen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ship</td>
<td>1 ship</td>
<td>Within 20 sen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private fire hydrants</td>
<td>1 time</td>
<td>1 yen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fusan suidō kyunui kisoku (釜山水道給水規則); re-quoted from Pusan sangsudo paldalsa, 1997, p. 182.

As Table 5 shows, the fee for the water supply in Pusan was mainly on a fixed charge basis, based on the number of households and water faucets. Water prices were not actually
set based on consumption, but were calculated per faucet. The price of water for private use was charged per faucet: a single faucet for a household (less than five family members) was charged at 1 yen 50 sen per month; a single faucet for a household (over six, but less than ten family members) was charged at 2 yen per month; and, in case of over ten family members, 10 sen per month was added per person. The price of private use was also charged per faucet: over five households (six households and above) using one water faucet was 2 yen per month. It increased 40 sen per households (Fusan josuidō shōshi 釜山上水道小誌 1914, pp.115-117). For example, if there was one water faucet, which was used by eight households, then they have to pay 2 yen and 80 sen for use of faucet.

Those for business use were charged differently, based on the consumption level. The main reason for this was the convenience for taxation and the fact that it was cheaper to avoid using a water metre. The fee for the water supply was charged on a monthly basis. Owners of cattle and horses needed to report the number of livestock, because cattle and horses were taxed per head. Private and public faucets for common use were not open to the public. Rather, they were limited to those who paid more than 25 yen in annual tax. For those who paid taxes on the business use of water, faucets were limited to those who paid a monthly rent of 25 yen. Those households in arrears for two months of taxes on water would be cut off (Pusan sangsudio paldalsa 1997, pp. 182-183).

The third construction from 1907 to 1910: Sŏngchigok (聖知谷)

Opening of the Pusan Waterworks: The waterworks construction in Pusan under Pusan internal jurisdiction has been completed, and the opening ceremony has been set for the coming 20th day of the month. 
Hwangsŏng sinmun (皇城新聞), 9 September 1910

After the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905, Japan gained control of Korea with the support of America and with Britain, China, and Russia giving their consent. Political
stability and post-war prosperity attracted more Japanese to migrate to Korea. Since there was already a well-settled community, more and more Japanese came to settle in Pusan. The rapid growth of Japanese settlers begged for an expansion of the water supply system. It was inconvenient for the Japanese settlers to wait for a long time in queues at communal water faucets, and the Settlers’ Association (Kyoryū mindan, 居留民團) was formed to demand satisfaction of the needs of the settlers in Pusan. By 1905, the demand for water had surpassed the capacity of the supply facilities.

Moreover, the Settlers’ Association had to restrict hours for water supply from communal faucets in order to control the use of water, because capacity was limited. It is not surprising that there was sometimes quarrelling amongst those who waited in queues. The shortage of water again became an important concern for the Settlers’ Association.

The Settlers’ Association launched a survey of possible reservoir sites for the water supply system, which was entrusted to the engineer of domestic affairs at the settlement, Kurashige Tetsuzō (蔵重哲三). Kurashige, together with Sakade Narumi (坂出鳴海) surveyed sites and decided to plan the construction of water supply structures. However, the main issue was finance. Without a doubt, the third construction should be launched on a large scale. In fact, the cost was to be about ten times bigger than the second construction. The Settlers’ Association in Pusan was aware that they would not be able to finance the entire cost of the construction. Their burdens were numerous. After the protectorate was established, the Settlers’ Association exercised power as a self-governing body by promulgating laws in 1905, making Pusan a completely self-governing territory of the Japanese. With its increasing governance functions, the Settlers’ Association also launched various other construction projects, such as taking on the financial burden of providing a port facility, refurbishing the urban area, and making some order out of newly created districts (Kim and Kim 2006, p. 191).
Ishihara Han’ishiemon (石原半石衛門), who was Chief of the Pusan Settlers’ Association, appealed for financial assistance from the Resident-General of Korea, Itō Hirobumi (伊藤博文), at the same time as applying for a subsidy from the inland Japanese government. However, at that time, the Japanese government was financially drained with outstanding loans from overseas as well as a trade imbalance resulting from the Russo-Japanese War. Moreover, in the aftermath of the victory in the Russo-Japanese War, reparations were not provided, unlike the Sino-Japanese War. The Settlers’ Association turned elsewhere and filed a petition for financial support from the Korean government via the Pusan the Administrative Bureau for Japanese Residents in Pusan. Kanyū Yoshiyaki (官有吉明), as a representative of the Japanese settlers, delivered the petition to Megata Tanetarō (目賀田種太郎), who was the Japanese advisor to the Finance Ministry of Korea. The Korean government agreed to provide 350,000 yen. The remaining cost (1,170,000 yen) was borrowed from Nippon Kōgyō Ginko (日本興業銀行). The Korean government stood as surety for the loan. As a result, the Korean government (of the Great Han Empire) and the Japanese Settlers’ Association in Pusan made an agreement on 11 August 1906 to manage water supply facilities in Pusan. The following is the agreement submitted to the Settlers’ Association.

Agreement on Water Supply Management Between Korea and Japan (J. Kannichi kyōdō jōsuidō keiyaku, 韓日共同上水道契約)

I. Water supply in Pusan will be managed jointly by the Korean government and the Japanese Settlers Association.

II. The Korean government will invest 350,000 yen of the total cost of water supply facilities, or 1,520,000 yen, over eight years.

III. Profits from water supply will be distributed in proportion to the amount

4 According to the agreement on the invitation to Megata, Megata did not merely advise the Ministry of Finance in Korea, but also had authority to administer all affairs related to finances in Korea. Without his approval, no project could be implemented (Yi 1999, p. 115).
of investment.

IV. The population using water will be thirty thousand people on the completion, forty thousand people three years after the completion, and fifty-five thousand people ten years after the completion.

V. The loan should be paid by all settlers [in Pusan], except Koreans. Foreign settlers [in Pusan] will be charged per water faucet installation no more than 1 yen per person in a year.

VI. Koreans should also pay for the water supply, but the amount should be reduced compared to foreigners.

VII. The Korean Treasury will subsidize the water supply for six years, but the total amount should be within thirty-five thousand yen.

VIII. The loan should start returning from the fifth year. All loans should be paid off in 15 years.

IX. [In case the loan is not paid off after 16 years from the beginning of construction] From the 16th year, the loan has to be paid up with the [expected] surplus of 170,000 yen [from the management of the water supply]. From this [16th] year, the price of the water will be reduced, so that the surplus should remain within 100,000 yen.

X. With the surplus stated in the previous article, the subsidy from the Korean government should be paid back.

XI. The goal of managing the water supply is to collect taxes from all residents [both Korean and the Japanese] on a per person basis. However, if it is not convenient, then tax will be collected from the Japanese. This regulation is made because of the need for financial assistance from the Korean government.

XII. In the construction, the loan could be reduced about 70,000 yen of office expenses if the Water Supply Bureau under the Takjibu (Ministry of Finance) takes over the construction.

One may be surprised to see that there were some advantageous clauses for Koreans in the contract. For example, in clause V, Koreans in Pusan were exempted from a levy on the water supply to pay up the loan. In clause VI, though the water supply charge should be collected from Koreans, the collected amount should be reduced compared to others. These were indications that the Korean government’s participation was necessary to complete the project.

On the basis of the contract, eventually an official agreement was made. The agreement for the management of the water system in Pusan: Pusan sangsudo kyōng’yōng kongdong kyeyak or J. Fusan josuidō keiei kyōdō keiyaku (釜山上水道經營共同契約) was concluded on 11 August 1906, and its provisions are as follows:
1. Pusan’s water supply will be managed by both the Korean government and the Japanese Settlers’ Association in Pusan.

2. In the beginning, the Korean government will be investing 350,000 won of the total cost of construction [which is projected to be] 1,520,000 won.

3. The revenue from the water supply will be divided equally in proportion to the amount of investment made.

4. After the completion of the water supply construction, maintenance and repairs will be handled by the Korean government in the interest of the Korean government and Koreans.

5. In the future, the Korean government should transfer shares in the waterworks to the local government in case the local government will be established as the influence of Korea grows. In this case the Korean government guarantees that the local government will inherit shares in the waterworks.

[Signed by] Chief of the Water Supply Bureau in the Ministry of Finance of Korea, Yi Kôn-yŏng (李健榮) and Chief of the Japanese Settlers’ Association, Ishihara Han’i shiemon (石原半石衛門).

The Korean government worked together with the Settlers’ Association in Pusan to construct and manage the water supply system in Pusan. Let us examine how much the Korean government contributed to the third phase of the construction. According to Kwanpo (官報), the Korean government not only provided a financial investment but also sent technical officials, such as engineers (kisa 技師), clerks (chusa 主師), and lower engineer officials (kisu, 技手), for the construction of the water supply in Pusan (Kwanpo 13, 15 July 1908; Sunjong sillok 1908, sixth month, eleventh day).

Why did the Korean government invest so much of its capital? Construction was cheaper than expected. Even though it was only 13 per cent of the total budget (the actual financial ratio of total contribution was 12.8%), 200,000 won was a considerable amount of money. Was the government’s funding for Pusan an exception? The government began to build water supply systems from 1906 onwards, starting from Seoul. The first Seoul Tukto Catchment Water Supply Facility was established in 1906; and the water supply in Mokp’o was established in 1909, with financial assistance. In P’yŏngyang, the construction of the water supply system was launched in January 1907 and completed in July 1910. The water
supply system in Inch’ŏn was competed in October 1910. In the case of Seoul, the Korean government initiated and funded the construction of the system, because it planned to construct water systems in other regions. And yet, other regions were basically established via financial assistance. The Korean government could conveniently achieve its goals by providing financial assistance to the Settlers’ Association for the construction of the water system while the Settlers’ Association desperately sought to enlarge the water supply in their own region. In other words, such cooperative projects were only possible when the needs of the Korean government and those of the Settlers' Association merged. The settlers took the lead and the Korean government followed.

Moreover, the Korean government also engaged in persuading landowners to sell their lands for public use, that is, for the construction of the water supply facility. The Administrative Bureau for Japanese Residents (J. rijichō 理事廳) also participated in this process; and the Magistrate of Tongnae county and the Ministry of Finance were active in purchasing the lands. As the land price was a cause of rising costs for the second construction, the upward trend of land values undermined the buying and selling of land around the reservoirs. Although the third construction was a collaboration between the Korean government and the Japanese autonomous authority in Pusan, most Koreans who did not directly benefit from the water supply were reluctant to give up land for the water supply construction. Furthermore, most Koreans still lived from agriculture. Some three thousand agricultural workers resisted the fact that the irrigation water source in Pusan was taken over by the Japanese. After much persuasion, Korean land owners agreed that the compensation for land would be made after the completion of the construction (Fusan josuidō

shōshi 釜山上水道小誌, 1914, pp. 87-88).

To manage the water supply, the Chief of the Bureau of Water Supply, Sano Tōjirō (佐野藤次郎), decided on the technicalities regarding the distribution of responsibilities
between the Settlers’ Association and the Korean government. The Korean government had
the Bureau of Water Supply, under the Ministry of Finance, take charge of the water supply
in November 1906. It was decided that the office would be run by the Korean government.
The general office was established at Sŏsanhajŏng (Nishiyamashita-machi, 西山下町) in
1907. Asami Chūjirō (浅見忠次郎) was invited to act as a superintendent to oversee the
construction.

Table 6  Water supply in comparison between the third construction at Sŏngjigok (J. Seshiru-
tani) and the second construction at Mt. Ômkwang (J. Mt. Takatōmi)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sŏngjigok or Seshiru-tani (the 3rd construction)</th>
<th>Mt. Ômkwang or Mt. Takatōmi (the 2nd construction)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catchment</td>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,358,000 cubic ch’ŏk (150 days for 45,000)</td>
<td>2,520,000 cubic ch’ŏk (90 days for 10,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>88 ch’ŏk</td>
<td>30 ch’ŏk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filled to the brim</td>
<td>310 ch’ŏk</td>
<td>208 ch’ŏk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting pond</td>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>384,000 cubic ch’ŏk (40 hours for 45,000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filled to the brim</td>
<td>315 ch’ŏk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filter basin</td>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19,000 cubic ch’ŏk</td>
<td>40,440 cubic ch’ŏk. Filter distribution 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed</td>
<td>Day and night 8 ch’ŏk</td>
<td>Day and night 8 ch’ŏk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>distribution</td>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,100 cubic ch’ŏk</td>
<td>12,432 cubic ch’ŏk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35,200 cubic ch’ŏk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filled to the brim</td>
<td>249 ch’ŏk</td>
<td>166 ch’ŏk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>180 ch’ŏk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source water</td>
<td>Length</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13,700 m</td>
<td>7,560 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inside diameter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>350 mm (14 inch)</td>
<td>7 ch’ŏn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drainage</td>
<td>Length</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18,980 m</td>
<td>7,390 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inside diameter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Between 100 mm and 416 ch’ŏn 7 types</td>
<td>3.5 inch, quantity 7 inch 4 types</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1 ch’ŏk equals about 30 cm.; 1 ch’ŏn equals 0.1 ch’ŏk.
Source: Fusan nippō (釜山日報), 1910. 2. 19, and Chōsen Jihō (朝鮮時報) 1910. 9. 25; Re-
The third construction was intended to supply 55,000 people in ten years. After the completion of the third construction, the catchment area in Sŏngjigok was able to provide enough water for 150 days for 45,000 people. Comparing the catchment in Mt. Ômkwang, which was capable of holding water for 90 days for 10,000 people, the third construction provided a more stable water source for the growing city of Pusan.

*Everyday life and modern water*

There were some saving customs that had served to render many of the people more or less immune to the disease germs that were so widely distributed through these wells. Cold water, for instance, was not the most common beverage as it is with us. The most frequently used drink was prepared from the part of the boiled rice that adhered to the inside of the iron pots in which the rice had been cooked. The adhering rice, which had been partly caramelized, was softened and partly dissolved in the added water, producing a liquid that was completely sterile, very palatable and a good substitute for the tea used in other countries.

Avison 1940, p. 353.

The water system in Pusan brought about a change in the quality of life, even though the accessibility of the water supply was limited. As expected, those who first benefitted were the Japanese settlers. The first and second constructions were financed and designed to supply water to the Japanese settlement. What about the result of the third phase of construction? After the completion of the third phase in Pusan, Koreans also benefitted from the ‘modern’ technology of the water supply system.

Table 7 Number of faucets, wells, and rivers in December 1911

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total households</th>
<th>Number of faucets in use</th>
<th>Wells or rivers</th>
<th>Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>household</td>
<td>population</td>
<td>4,508 (41.4 % coverage)</td>
<td>6,391 (5,944 rivers in use + 447 wells in use)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Both Korean and Japanese were included in the data of total households
Source: Jōsui kyōgikai nenhen (上水協議会年輪) 1914, Dai 10-kai jōsudō kyōgikai gijiroku (第十回上水道協議会議事録), p. 321; Re-quoted from Kim Sung 2009, p. 44.
Based on data given in table 7, the number of faucets in use remained at about 41.4 per cent coverage or about 2.42 households per faucet, even after the completion of these water supply projects in Pusan. The rest of the households, which was 58.6 per cent of the total population, was still not able to benefit from the waterworks. Most of those who did not benefit from the water supply received all or most of their drinking water from the river, rather than from wells. Although still limited, the distribution rate in Pusan was even higher than Seoul, which had a coverage of 32 percent in 1912. The main difference between Seoul and Pusan was distribution by ethnicity.

Table 8 Distribution of water supply based on ethnic groups in Seoul in 1912

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Water supply</th>
<th>Household</th>
<th>Ratio (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>10,013</td>
<td></td>
<td>55.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>7,981</td>
<td></td>
<td>44.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rest (other foreigners)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18,033 (of total households 56,148)</td>
<td>100 (32.1 % of total household)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Son 1986b, p. 146.

As Table 8 shows, Koreans benefited more than Japanese from the water supply. The water supply system in Seoul was built by the Korean government via an American company, the Collbran-Bostwick. Because of this, Kim Yŏng-mi argues, based on a case study of Kyŏngsŏng (京城 J. Keijō), that the policy focused on the establishment of water supply systems and neglected maintaining wells and natural water sources, such as the river. If they considered water as a public good, the extension of the water supply system to secure drinking water was not the only solution to meet the public needs; rather, managing and maintaining natural water sources was a more urgent need at the time (Kim 2010, p. 288). The basis of her argument is that the accessibility to water is social capital. The income of residents determined the accessibility of the water supply. While being a temporary expedient,
the policies to extend the supply system would not solve the fundamental issue of water access and supply.

In the case of Pusan, the data tells a different story. Due to a paucity of sources, it is impossible to find a direct correlation between the ethnicity of households and the number of households supplied with water, but we can get a rough idea by comparing Japanese households with households supplied with water.

Table 9 Correlation of Japanese households and water supplied households

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japanese households (A)</th>
<th>Water supplied households (B)</th>
<th>Ratio (B/A)</th>
<th>Fee for Water supply</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>1,352</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>38.75</td>
<td>6,441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>1,582</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>38.49</td>
<td>7,638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>1,890 (1,891)</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>32.32 (32.31)</td>
<td>7,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>2,363</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>32.32</td>
<td>10,351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>2,987 (2,981)</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>27.95 (28.01)</td>
<td>11,721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>3,423</td>
<td>1,278</td>
<td>37.33</td>
<td>18,277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>4,213 (4,508)</td>
<td>1,568</td>
<td>37.21 (34.78)</td>
<td>20,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>4,284 (4,213)</td>
<td>1,804</td>
<td>42.11 (42.81)</td>
<td>26,207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>4,508</td>
<td>3,379 (3,378)</td>
<td>74.93 (74.93)</td>
<td>34,722 (35,578)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>5,583</td>
<td>4,153 (4,054)</td>
<td>74.38 (72.61)</td>
<td>44,751 (62,094)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fusani yōran (釜山要覧) 1912, pp. 8-10, pp. 88-89.

Fig. 1. Japanese households and water-supplied households
As the table and figure show, a correlation between Japanese households and water supplied households can be found. This is clearer as we examine the area in which the water supply could be reached. Fortunately, we have a source that tells us where Japanese households were mainly located.

Table 10 Japanese household and population in Pusan in 1910

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Households</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Percentage of total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pusanjin 釜山鎮</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch’oryang 草粱</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>2,603</td>
<td>12.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kogwan 古館</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>2.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>917</td>
<td>3,648</td>
<td>17.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reclaimed land</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>2.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement 居留地</td>
<td>1,722</td>
<td>9,942</td>
<td>45.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New district</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>5,846</td>
<td>26.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>1,949</td>
<td>16,278</td>
<td>74.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bokushi-shima 牧之島 (Yông-do 影島)</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>1,060</td>
<td>4.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chugap (Suzaki) 洲岬5</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>942</td>
<td>4.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>2,002</td>
<td>9.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,381</td>
<td>21,928</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Fusan nippō* (釜山日報), 25 September 1910; reprinted from Kim 2009, p. 266.

As table 10 shows, the number of the Japanese settlers who resided in Pusan exceeded twenty thousand. More than 80 per cent of the Japanese settlers resided in the areas of the settlement (45.33 %), New district (26.65 %), and the former Japan House area in Ch’oryang (12.87%). Let us turn our attention to a correlation between the location of the faucets and Japanese households. The table below reflects the situation after the completion of the third construction in Pusan.

---

5 Chugap (Suzaki) is a name of area in Bokushi-shima (Yông-do).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>faucets</th>
<th>Ratio of faucet to total</th>
<th>households</th>
<th>Ratio of households to total</th>
<th>Place names with the numbers of faucets to households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Excluisve faucets</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed charge</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>48.02</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>14.27</td>
<td>Bokushi-shima (Yŏng-do) 8, Ch’oryang Fusan-jin 8, new district 16, the rest in the administrative district 479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charge based on consumption level</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>14.94</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>Bokushi-shima (Yŏng-do) 8, Ch’oryang Fusan-jin 6, new district 3, the rest in the administrative district 105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Special</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>359</td>
<td>10.02</td>
<td>Bokushi-shima (Yŏng-do) 56, Ch’oryang Fusan-jin 25, new district 21, the rest in the administrative district 257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>670</td>
<td>62.97</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>27.71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private faucet for public use</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>23.22</td>
<td>719</td>
<td>20.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public faucet for public use</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>1,868</td>
<td>52.17</td>
<td>Bokushi-shima (Yŏng-do) 408, Ch’oryang Fusan-jin 454, new district 78, the rest in the administrative district 928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>238</td>
<td>22.37</td>
<td>2,587</td>
<td>72.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ships</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fire hydrants</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>14.56</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,064</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3,580</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: ‘administrative district’ refers to Reclaimed land, Settlement and New District in

---

6 Due to a paucity of resources, I will apply 1910 data for the total number of household to 1911 data for the location of the number of faucets in order to analyse the distribution of faucets in Pusan (the total number of households in 1910 was 3381 while that in 1911 was 3580).
As the far right column of Table 11 shows, most exclusive faucets were located in three areas, Yŏng-do (Bokushi-shima), new district, and the rest in the administrative district (Reclaimed land, Settlement, and New District in Table 10) while a considerably small number (8) of exclusive faucets were located in Ch’oryang (草梁) and Pusanjin (釜山鎭) where Koreans resided at the time. The distribution of faucets could demonstrate who had access to water supply in Pusan. Correlating data in Table 10 and 11, the distribution of water supply can be analysed to show the inequality in the distribution of faucets per households.

The distribution of exclusive faucets in Pusan was 0.68 faucets per households (670 faucets/992 households = 0.68), meaning that about seventy percent of household had access to exclusive faucets (private faucets). However, if we look into the distribution of exclusive faucets by locations, it tells a different story. Only 39 exclusive faucets (8+6+25) were used by 917 households in Pusan-jin, Kogwan, and Ch’oryang while 881 exclusive faucets (16+479+3+105+21+257=881) were used by 1949 households in the settlement, in reclaimed land, and in the new district. In other words, exclusive faucets were shared at a rate of 0.042 faucets per household (39 faucets/917 households=0.042) in Pusan-jin, Kogwan, and Ch’oryang and 0.45 faucets were available per household (881 faucets/1,949 households=0.45) in the settlement, in reclaimed land, and in the new district. The distribution of faucets located in Japanese residential areas was more than ten times as many as that in the area where Koreans resided.

In the case of public and private faucets for public use, the number of faucets between Korean residential areas and the Japanese residential areas was comparable. While the proportion of faucets in Korean residential areas (454 for Ch’oryang and Fusan-jin) was 0.53 faucets per households (454 faucets /917 households = 0.53), that in Japanese residential areas (new district and administrative district) was 0.52 faucets per households.
(1,006[faucets]/1,949[households]=0.52). It was comparable only because large proportions of households in the Japanese residential areas already had access to exclusive faucets (private faucets). In other words, the water supply was heavily concentrated in the reclaimed land, settlement, and new district or administrative district where Japanese settlers resided. Moreover, fire hydrants were necessary in case of fire, so they were usually set up in commercial areas. The majority (124) of the fire hydrants were located in the administrative district, which included Honmachi (本町), Haengjŏng (J. Sayamachi 幸町), reclaimed land, Posujŏng (J. Hŏsuimachi 寶水町), Haengjŏngt’ong (J. Saya’machitsū 幸町通), and Piyŏngwŏn (J. Higyŏin 避病院). It is difficult to say that Koreans benefitted from the water supply.

Additionally, it is interesting that Yŏng-do (影島, Bokushi-shima 牧之道), which is an island located 360 m southeast of Pusan, was included as a place to be supplied. It was not originally included in the plan of the third construction, but the island was an area in which about two thousand Japanese were settled, mainly because the Japanese settlers sought to avoid the spatial limitation on Japanese settlers’ activities (kanhaeng ijŏng). There was no specific regulation to apply the kanhaeng ijŏng boundary on the island, thus, a large number of Japanese settled in Yong-do. During the third construction, water supply to Yŏngdo was installed with the surplus money from the budget. In other words, the Japanese settlers attempted to supply as many Japanese as possible with the third construction. Faucets in Yŏng-do(Bokushi-shima) were available to 94 percent of household, because 483 faucets (both exclusive faucets [72] and public faucets [408] plus fire hydrants [3]) was used by 515 households (483[faucets]/ 515[households] = 0.94). Japanese settlers predominated on the island. As a result, the construction of the water supply was planned and established in the area in which the Japanese settlers resided. This can be supported with an eyewitness account:
There are three Fusans: The old walled city of Fusan; then, a settlement of Chinese, then a settlement of Japanese… The Japanese town looks very quiet indeed compared to the Korean town as does China town. In the Japanese Fusan, the streets are wide and clean … The other day was to get rid of germs of the plague. Much a dusting and swirling!… The sight [of the Japanese settlement] is very foreign to barren Korea, but a delightful one.

A memo from Richard H. Sidebotham in 1900; Re-quoted from *Pusan Kŭndae yöksagan* 2009, p. 81.

A memo from the missionary Sidebotham tells us not only the surface appearance of the city of Pusan but also that the cleanliness of a part of the city was determined by the ethnicity of the inhabitants.

In summation, the water supply system in Pusan was the first water supply system in Korea. However, this first water supply system was built by, and for, the Japanese settlers. In the third construction phase, the Korean government participated in the project from construction to management; yet, in reality, Koreans did not receive much benefit from the water supply, though Koreans had advantages recognised under regulations. The water supply system was built into the Japanese settlement, which created a spatial difference between the Japanese and Koreans in Pusan. Moreover, the key change that resulted from the water supply system was the commodification of water. Water transformed from a basic good for life to a commodity. As a result, the distribution of the water supply also created hierarchical social distinctions between rich and poor (those who can afford to have water as a commodity) and between cleanness and uncleanness (hygiene as a ‘modern’ experience).

*Hygienic modernity in Pusan: A study of the waterborne disease cholera, the first modern clinic Saisei Iin in Pusan, and power relations in hygienic modernity*

Another saving factor was the partial immunity that constant infection gradually produced in some of the people so that many of those who had not succumbed in childhood lived to a ripe old age. The destructive death rate was found in the first few years of life.

Avison 1940 p. 353.
Notice: Cholera is not caused by an evil spirit. It is caused by a very small particle of living matter called a germ. When this living germ gets into your stomach, it multiplies rapidly and causes the disease. You do not have to take cholera if you do not want it. All you have to do is to kill the germ by cooking your food thoroughly and eating it before it can become contaminated again. Drink freshly-made rice water. If you drink plain water, boil it and keep it in clean bottles. As you may have come in contact with the germ without knowing it, always wash your hands and mouth thoroughly before eating anything. If you do these things you will not have cholera.

Avison 1940, p. 128.

The arrival of cholera in Pusan coincided with the explosive increase of Japanese residents after its opening in 1876. Though the Japanese settlers launched hygienic infrastructure projects, including waterworks and a clinic, the pace of establishing hygienic infrastructures was inadequate to catch up with the growth of the population in Pusan. Pusan soon became a densely populated city, which created an environment favourable for an epidemic. Moreover, as the port became an important trading centre, Pusan was always exposed to the danger of new epidemics, because epidemics could be transported in the holds of ships.

Among the reasons for Japanese construction of water supply facilities was the prevention of infectious diseases such as cholera. Japanese settlers at Pusan brought with them a strong concern for hygiene or eisei (衛生) because many of those who migrated to Korea witnessed at least seven terrible epidemics in Japan between 1858 and 1902. For example, during the Ansei (安政) outbreak of 1858-60, which struck the Japanese port city of Nagasaki first in June 1858 after the opening of Japanese ports to the Western powers, nearly 250,000 people were killed in Edo alone (Kohn, 2008, p. 207). Against this background, Bird (1897) provided a description of the reason for the construction of the water supply facility in Pusan:

Since the [Sino-Japanese] war, waterworks have been constructed by a rate of 100 cash levied on each house, and it is hoped that the present abundant supply of pure water will make an end of the frequent epidemics of cholera.

Bird 1897, p. 24.
The Japanese settlers desired a sanitary community because they learned that modern medicine and public sanitation could free them from the horror of epidemics. On the other hand, Korea began to be aware of epidemics relatively late. In the open ports, the two most horrific epidemics were smallpox and cholera. I will highlight the waterborne disease cholera, which was the most dreaded disease at the time, by discussing a shifting Korean attitude towards cholera before and after the open-port period. Moreover, I will sketch the establishment and discuss the impact and meaning of the first ‘modern’ clinic in Pusan, Saisei Iin. Finally, I will delineate policies for sanitation and epidemics and discuss these policies as a reflection of hierarchical power relations established in Pusan.

**Shifting attitude towards cholera (‘tiger disease’): traditional powerlessness before fate**

Cholera is a typical waterborne disease transmitted through contaminated water or food. Cholera’s progress is frightening because patients usually experience bouts of nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, and violent cramps in the muscles of the legs. A sudden death can come to a healthy person in hours. Given the horrible suffering inflicted on patients, cholera provoked great fear. Though Korea experienced other epidemics, cholera was foreign and alien to the Koreans until the nineteenth century.

The first known outbreak of cholera in 1821-1822 was part of worldwide epidemics stemming from India (Ackerknecht 1965, p. 24). When cholera first erupted in Korea, it was called *koejil* (怪疾) or ‘strange malady’ or *yunjung* (輪症) or epidemic. It was also widely called the ‘tiger disease’, because when it struck, it felt as if ‘one had been bitten by a tiger’ (Jun, Lewis, and Kang 2008, p. 263). Koreans did not have knowledge of cholera or its treatment at the time just like anywhere else in the world. Though having the fear of the unknown added great confusion was not unique to Korean experience, it is worth examining
how Korean experienced cholera and responded to it. The first encounter with cholera is
clear in the statement below.

A ‘strange malady’ is prevailing inside and outside of P’yŏngyang-pu from the end of
last month. Those suffering from vomiting, diarrhoea, and stomach pains, died in no
time. Their number reached thousands of people in ten days. There was no way for
[the government] to provide [sufficient] relief and even medicines [brought by the
government] were no use. It is truly terrible [and I witnessed this] with my very eyes.
There was a rumour that the people wanted to pray for relief. Even prayer may be
useful… The court commanded Kim Pyŏng-mun, governor of Seoul, to sincerely
pray to the main mountain in the castle first. In spite of his efforts, the epidemic
showed no sign of abating and even still rampaged toward other towns and even
neighbouring provinces. Therefore, I, as a subject, myself am attempting to pray at a
place known to have miraculous virtue. We are now helping those who are poor, those
having no one to help them, and those receiving no medical attention though they are
in need. We are even helping those who cannot have a funeral though they are
already died. [We] will inform you of the number of dead and the situation of the
epidemic [in due course].

Sunjo Sillok, thirteenth day eighth month 1821. [emphasis added]

According to the Sunjo sillok, the Korean government was eager to provide relief and
medicine. However, the government recognized that all efforts were futile and that they were
powerless before this strange malady. Eventually, the government commanded the local
magistrate to perform rituals and, at the same time, the government attempted to help those
who were not able to receive medical attention, to take care of the dead, and to calculate the
number of dead.

The sense of horror of living during an unknown epidemic is conveyed by the
‘Tendong ŏmi hwajŏn’ga’ (덴동어미 花薔歌) of Kyubang kasa (閨房歌辭) or ‘The lady’s
kaza’. The following excerpt from ‘Tendong ŏmi’ describes the situation after the outbreak
of epidemic.

In the pyŏngsul year [1886] a strange malady came. Around thirty [people] inside and
outside the town [to whom I had loaned money] became infected. After three days I
woke up [after illness]. Everyone else was dead; the master and I were the only
survivors. Thousands people in town were all dead and only a few survived. There is
no tragedy comparable to this between heaven and earth… [Addressing her husband
who is unconscious] Let us die if you die and live if you live.
‘Tendong ōmi hwajōnga’: re-quoted from Yi 2010, pp. 43-44.

As ‘Tendong ōmi’ describes, she witnessed a great disaster after having lost her senses for a few days. She does not know what the epidemic was. All she could do was to complain to heaven about the terrible situation she was in. Both the government documents and this lady’s kasa point to the same frustration. When epidemics came to Korea, no doctor or medicine was of any use. The government responded to it by performing rituals, whereas an individual could only complain about the horror. Koreans at the time could find no cause but fate.

The only way in which fate could be changed was to appeal to the supernatural powers that rule over diseases. When Koreans frequently experienced the outbreak of various epidemics, called yŏkpyŏng (疫病), shamanic rituals or kut (굿) were performed to rid the people of an epidemic spirit by appeasing it, to expel the spirit by frightening it, and even to command the spirit to leave by using a higher spirit (Sin 1989, p. 69). In other words, Koreans believed that the cause of epidemics was the work of evil spirits, and that the shaman could cure the sick by communicating with the spirits. Bishop witnessed Koreans who ‘attributed every ill by which they are afflicted to demonical influence…exorcism in sickness which is believed to be the work of an unclean daemon may be taken’ (Bird 1898, p. 405). According to Bishop, Koreans believed that epidemics and indeed every illness were the work of spirits. Bishop referred to Landis who classified Korean demons into 36 categories. Among these spirits, there were those who ‘cause men to die by cholera’ (Bird 1898, pp. 421-422). These were beliefs shared by the populace and the officials. Though the foundation of Chosŏn was known to be based on neo-Confucianism, shamanic rituals were performed for epidemics also at the court.

The Pip’yŏnsa (備邊司) or Border Defence Command reported on information coming in from governors in provincial offices stating that an unknown disease is vigorously spreading daily. In ten days the number of deaths reached one thousand.
And there is a rumour that the same kind of disease is prevalent in many counties in Hwanghae Province. It is truly terrible that the lives of poor people are being consumed as if they were living in flames and that we dare not to expect to save their lives in the near future. Respectfully, considering the kimi year (己未 1799) in the reign of previous king (23th year of King Chŏngjo), when an unknown disease prevailed in Seoul and other regions, [King Sŏnjo] commanded rituals to prevent epidemics and to comfort the spirit, and commanded governors to conduct rituals to prevent epidemics where that disease has appeared. In each county, the magistrate of the county should build an altar and utter invocations with sacrifices. Incense and a written ritual prayer should be sent to places where the governors perform the rituals. At this time, the prevailing disease in Hwanghae Province and P’yŏng’an Province is more severe than that in the kimi year (1799). There is a reason for offering sacrifice to various gods in all directions, so that [we] should offer sacrifice. [You, i.e., the King] should command the governors of Hwanghae Province and P’yŏng’an Province to perform rituals with sincerity according to the example of the kimi year and immediately provide incense and a written ritual prayer from the Board of Personnel (吏曹) according to the example of the kimi year.

Sunjo Shillok fourteenth day eighth month 1821. [emphasis added]

In two years, from 1821 to 1822, the death rate was several hundred thousand; yet, the actual number of dead was probably much more than recorded (Sin 1989, p. 58). Considering the fact that the total number of the recorded population in Korea was about 7,000,000 at the time, this mortality number was a massive disaster. It seems that the government was powerless to prevent the unknown epidemic. The only way in which the government responded was by performing rituals in the most affected areas. The purpose of rituals organized by the government was twofold. On the surface, their purpose was to lay a vengeful spirit to rest, but the true intention was to comfort the people who were fearful of epidemics. In other words, the cholera narratives were characterized primarily by individual and communal anxieties relating to infection of the disease and individual and communal response to cholera was limited to superstition or status quo.

Four decades later, the response to an epidemic had changed. According to the Kojong shillok, the Korean government was still not capable of responding to the issue of
cholera, but there was less concern with appeasing rituals. The following excerpt is King Kojong’s command regarding the cholera epidemic in Korea.

The King commanded, ‘Nowadays, there are often concerns amidst rumours due to epidemics. As I care for a myriad of people, I have many sleepless nights without even realizing it. Command the capital and the provinces to perform rituals immediately without discussing the date [with the Board of Personnel]. People from poor families are concerned for the living even in the ordinary times of a good harvest, how much more should they be concerned with funerals for the dead in [this] time. There should be no delays. In Seoul, send an official to ask what they need and command the Office of Relief Works or Chinhyulch’ŏng (賑恤廳) to help carefully. In the eight provinces [Kangwŏn, Kyŏnggi, Kyŏngsang, Chŏlla, Ch’ungchŏng, P’yon’gan, Hamgyŏng, and Hwanghae] and the four magistracies [Kaesŏng, Kwangju, Suwŏn, and Kanghwa], inform the Myodang (廟堂) [Border Defense Command] to distribute the collected revenues from the government offices in Seoul to the people who are most in need and do not have a means to appeal through each provincial and regional governor.

_Kojong Sillok_, ninth day fifth month 1867.

King Kojong was concerned for his people, but was in reality ineffectual and incompetent. The king commanded the Office of Relief Works, or Chinhyulch’ŏng, to help the poor ‘carefully’ and distribute tax revenue to support the people. Ritual practice, however, continued after the opening of the port in Pusan. For example, Avison reports that,

A short distance from the section thus protected I saw a platform some five feet above the ground, with some animals on it and a number of court officials who had been sent into that part of the city by the King to offer those animals in sacrifice to the Cholera Spirit and thus placate it in order to gain protection for that neighborhood.

Avison 1940, p. 129.

As Avison depicts, the Korean government sent officials to supervise rituals at an altar. There was no medical treatment or hygienic response to cholera. At the micro level, for the most part, the Koreans were ignorant of hygiene. The people believed that cholera was the work of an evil spirit. William E. Griffis depicted the way in which Koreans perceived cholera as follows.
Cholera was called “the rat disease.” The theory held by the native was that the rodents entered the body and by running up and down the legs got into the vitals and caused frightful cramps in the lower part of the body. Hence, to cure the rat malady, they hung up on doors and walls the picture of a cat on paper, or, during the cramps, they rubbed the patient’s abdomen with a cat skin!

Griffis 22 August 1886; Re-quoted from Uden 2003, p. 234.

As I walked through the streets of the city I frequently saw the picture of a cat pasted on the outer side of the main entrance to the house. When I asked the reason for this I was told that, as the disease was caused by the Rat Spirit, they hoped the cat would catch the rat. People everywhere do foolish things like this because of ignorance and how could ignorance be avoided under conditions prevailing in Korea in that day?

Avison 1940, p.129

As described, a picture of a cat was hung on doors to expel the evil spirit of cholera. This practice was based on a traditional remedy in which when a person was bit by a rat, they rubbed cat excrement or cat whiskers on the wound. In line with this tradition, people put a picture of a cat on doors (Sin 2004, p. 27).

**Korean traditional medicine: aetiological knowledge of a ‘strange malady’**

The popular opinion on the ‘strange malady’ was that no doctors and medicines worked. In fact, though Korean traditional doctors attempted to cure for cholera with knowledge and materials, such as herbs, acupuncture, and moxibustion, traditional medicine was powerless in the face of new diseases, including cholera. However, there were some suggestions for the ‘strange malady’. Chŏng Yak-yong (丁若鏞) described it as an intestinal convulsion that was caused by humidity and heat. The suggested treatment follows that in *T’osa kwangyŏk* (吐瀉關格證) (Sin 2004, p. 29).

Cho Wŏn-jun and Yi Sŏn-a cite the traditional medical doctor Hwang Toyŏn’s Ŭijong son’ik (醫宗損益) and Pangyang happ’ŏn (方藥合編) as case studies of how Korean medical doctors responded to the outbreak of cholera in Chosŏn in the nineteenth century (Cho and Yi
The rainy season continued for two months, and a ‘violent disease’ or $p’okpyŏng$ (暴病) broke out widely from the first day of autumn, according to the lunar calendar. Hwang Toyŏn pointed out that the wet-heat environment damaged the ‘energy force’ (元気) of the gastrointestinal system. Cholera was imported from China; but the rainy season and the scorching heat provided a hospitable environment for cholera germs to spread in Korea (Cho and Yi 2007, p. 38; Jun, Lewis, and Kang 2008, p. 263). It took a long time for Koreans to understand the paradigmatic changes from a neo-Confucian view that emphasized preservation of one’s body inherited from parents to the ‘modern’ view that posited protection of the nation by preventing disease and even achieving national prosperity and military strength by protecting its own people (Pak 2003, pp. 32-38; Baker 1979-80, pp. 1-44). The efficacy of maintaining hygienic conditions to control and prevent cholera was first demonstrated in Pusan. In other words, Korea’s contact with the world beyond its borders by sea transferred epidemic diseases, including cholera, and knowledge to prevent and cure. Discussions of national prosperity and military strength would follow, but that is another story.

*Saisei Iin: the first ‘modern’ medical clinic*

Whereas Koreans were ignorant of ‘modern’ hygiene, Japanese settlers were sensitive about medicine and hygiene and desired to have ‘modern’ medical service. With the opening of Pusan, Japanese doctors also came to Pusan with other settlers. In the Chosŏn dynasty, the Japanese considered Korean traditional medicine as advanced and superior to that of the Japanese, so that those who needed medical attention at the Japan House sought a Korean doctor to provide treatment to them. The Japanese even requested the Korean court to send doctors to Tsushima or Edo (Sŏ 2011, p. 240).

However, those who came to Korea after 1876 had a different perception of Korean medicine. They generally thought of Korea as a savage land. Newly opened areas in Korea
were not always healthy, so that diseases, such as intermittent fevers and rheumatic diseases, were prevalent. Diseases, particularly endemic diseases, were expected. The Japanese settlers believed that there were no sanitary facilities in Korea and that Koreans’ understanding of sanitation was silly and foolish. There were widespread rumours that, if you see Koreans dwelling together, an epidemic outbreak could be expected at any time.

Two main concerns for Japanese settlers in Korea were that the climate of Korea is different from that of Japan and medical treatment based on western medicine does not exist (Pak 2001, pp. 181-182). Therefore, the establishment of hospitals or clinics was a priority task for the Settlers’ Association in the open ports. In the case of Pusan, a Japanese doctor called Takada Eisaku (高田英策), who was trained in German medicine, came to reside in the Japan House at Ch’oryang as a doctor. It was not clear whether there was another doctor, but there is a record indicating that, from 1872, Nakarai Tōsui (半井桃水), a correspondent in Pusan, worked as an assistant under his father who was a physician at the Japan House (Sō 2011, pp. 242-243).

The establishment of a medical facility was discussed when the Kanghwa treaty was concluded. When the special envoy (Sushinsa 修信使) Kim Ki-su (金綺秀) was dispatched to Japan in April 1876, medical officers, such as Shimada Shūkai (鳥田修海), Saneyoshi Azumi (實吉安純), and Yano Yotōru (矢野義徹)7 were with the envoy and its party. Yano accompanied the special envoy and sent a written report (Fusan ni kanrikan oyobi iin wo oku no gi, 釜山ニ管理官及医員ヲ置クノ議) to the chief administrative officer in Pusan, or the Rijikan (理事官) Miyamoto Koichi (宮本小一), about placing a superintendent (kanrikan) and doctor at Pusan. Sending a special envoy generated momentum for establishing a clinic.

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7 Dr. Yano later became the founder of the first clinic at Wŏnsan, called the Seisei Iin 生生醫院 in 1880.
Miyamoto agreed with Yano’s suggestion, so he officially sent a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Terashima Munenori (寺島宗則). The pertinent bits of the letter that the Rijikan Miyamoto sent are as follows:

[We] should place a [western style] medical doctor in Pusan. There is no doctor, because Pusan is a backwoods part of their country. The Japanese outnumber [Koreans] at present, and their number is expected to increase. Patients will increase accordingly. Doctor Takada Eisaku is insufficient, so [we should establish] a small clinic and maintain an appropriate medical staff by rotating them every six months. On the surface, the clinic is for the Japanese settlers, and yet actually the existence of the clinic provides the impression of consoling and comforting Koreans, which stimulates their heart to *adore Japan and depend on the Japanese*. Furthermore, this is the best way to *civilize* Korea.

*Fusanfusi genkō* (釜山府史原稿), vol. 10, pp. 161-162; Re-quoted from Sŏ 2011, p. 244-245. [emphasis added]

As Minister of Foreign Affairs, Terashima Munenori sent a report entitled *Sŏryŏ kōkan iin ichimei sashi okararetaku mōshiage* (草梁公館醫員一名被差置度上申) to Prime Minister [Dajō Daijin (太政大臣)] Sanjŏ Sanetsumu (三條實萬). According to this report, placing a medical doctor at Ch’oryang in Pusan was useful for ‘the protection of its officials and people’ and ‘the extension of controlling an important place and giving Korea the inducement of development from Japan’. This appeal was approved by the Japanese government, so that the prototype of what later was to become the Pusan Prefecture Hospital, Saisei Iin, was established (*Fusan furitsu byōin shōshi* 釜山府立病院小史 1936, p. 1). In other words, the first western-style clinic established in Korea was not for Koreans or by Koreans, but for and by Japanese. Not surprisingly, it was not necessarily exceptional experience for Korean, since the first western-style medical centres at open ports in China and Japan were not for the local, but for the foreign settlers. However, the uneven distribution of benefit of medical service in local community needed to be addressed. In obtaining governmental approval for the establishment of the Saisei Clinic, medical treatment was politically motivated to
propagate Japan’s early adoption of western civilization and sanitation whether or not the medical doctor Yano had this intention in the first place.

The Saisei Iin (K. Chesaeng Úiwŏn 济生医院) was established on 11 February 1877. The Saisei Iin (or Saisei Clinic) was the first ‘modern’ or western-style clinic in Pusan as well as in Korea. The Saisei Clinic is often neglected, because, as expected, it was designed to treat Japanese settlers, not Koreans. However, Koreans were neither completely ignored nor dismissed from the Saisei Iin. For instance, according to Koike Masanao (小池正直) in the Keirin Ishi (雞林醫事), the clinic was designed not only for the Japanese, but also for Koreans.

The clinic is located on the Benten machi (弁天町) at the western foot of Mt. Yongdu in the settlement… Koreans are usually afraid of cold, so it is difficult to persuade Koreans to stay long in the hospital. [Thus,] one room in the second ward [of two wards] was converted into ondol, which is the Korean system of heating [while the rest of the rooms were Japanese tatami (畳)]

Koike 1887, Keirin Ishi (雞林醫事), p. 1; Re-quoted from Sŏ 2011, p. 255.

In this clinic there are about 279 types of drugs as a medical supply and about 44 types of medical equipment, so that it is possible to do minor operations. Yet, it is difficult to handle major operations or delicate operations. Moreover, there is a library to induce Korean traditional doctors to partake of civilisation. There are translated books of medicine, such as Benjamin Hobson (1816-1873)’s five medical books.

Koike 1887, Keirin Ishi (雞林醫事), p.2; Re-quoted from Sŏ 2011, p. 255.

Though the Saisei Clinic was located in the settlement, the clinic built an ondol room for Korean patients. Moreover, the library of the clinic provided translated medical books in Korean to train Korean doctors. In fact, the first Korean medical doctor, Chi Sŏk-yŏng

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8 According to two documents, the Saisei Iin was recorded to have been founded in 1876 (Fusan shōgyō Kaigisho 釜山商業會議所 1912, Fusan yōran 釜山要覧, p. 132; Fusan kōinkai 釜山甲寅会 1916, Ni-Chō tsūkōshi, p. 200). The fact is that the Saisei Iin was not founded in 1877, but the decision to set it up was made in 1876.
(池錫永), who contributed to the improvement of public health by implementing vaccination against smallpox, was trained in the Saisei Clinic.

The principles of the Saisei Clinic also need to be highlighted in order to understand how the clinic was operated.

Notice: 3 Principles of the Saisei Clinic
1. Treatment will begin from 9 AM until 11 AM. There will be a break for an hour. The clinic will reopen from 12 PM and close at 2 PM. The opening of [Saisei Clinic] is on 11th day of this month [February]. The clinic will close one day a week.
2. The daily price of drugs will range from 3 pun to 20 pun of Korean money. However, there are rich and poor. For those who cannot afford the expense, they are permitted to delay the payment. Japanese [settlers] should pay from 6 sen.
3. Vaccinations will be offered on the fifteenth day of every month and will be free.

The Saisei Clinic at Pusan port in Korea, director Yano Yotōru

Sada, Ishihata(石幡貞) 1878, Saisei Iin kokujii(濟生醫院告示); Re-quoted from Fusan furitsu byōin shōshi (釜山府立病院小史) 1936, p. 2.

The first article indicates the opening hours of the Saisei Clinic. The second article indicates the price of drugs. The price of drugs for Koreans and Japanese was different. It is surprising that the price of drugs for Koreans was set at a lower price than that for the Japanese. This fact contradicts the general perception. For example, in a famous novel Arirang by Cho Chǒng-nae, the price of drugs was so high that ordinary Koreans were not able to afford the cost. The scene in Arirang is as follows:

Three women politely asked, ‘Excuse us. We have a favour to ask, that is, not anything else, but could you share some kūmgyerap [, which is another name for quinine, a malaria drug], because our sons suffer from hakchil [malaria].’ … ‘Do you own paddy fields?’ Yi Tong-man said. These three women were astonished and wondered why he asked. Yi Tong-man arrogantly continued, ‘well, I am asking how many majigi [patches of rice paddy] you farm.’ A woman blushed with shame and answered, ‘we all are living by doing tenant farming’. Yi said, ‘kūmgyerap should not be given to anybody recklessly…if you do not have money to afford kūmgyerap, you should let the mosquitoes bite your kids. Get out of my way! I am busy.’

Cho Chǒng-nae 2002, Arirang (아리랑); Re-quoted from Pusan kündae yōksagwan 2004, p. 48.
As this scene describes, Koreans were attracted to new medicines as rumours spread regarding their effectiveness. However, even if many Koreans were aware of the effectiveness of the drugs, their price could be burdensome. Considering the economic structure of Korea at the time, ordinary Koreans would have had difficulty to purchase any drug due to high prices. In this context the Saisei Clinic should have had wide-ranging opportunities for popularizing western medicine and drugs, although it intended from its establishment to provide medical care for Japanese and then for Koreans to propagate the ‘modern’ civilization that Japan had adopted. Moreover, the second article clearly states that those who could not afford the drug could be permitted to delay the payment, although we do not know how this principle was enacted.

Moreover, the third article regarding vaccination also attracts interest. People were inoculated free of charge every month. The Saisei Clinic publicly announced vaccinations on the fifteenth day of every month. To gain public trust, the Saisei Clinic first invited Korean officials. Chapter Five of the Chōsen kikō yoroku (朝鮮歸好餘錄),\(^9\) which was written by Ishihata Sada (石幡貞) to promote friendly relations between Korea and Japan, describes the surprise of Korean officials as follows.

The Saisei Clinic was opened on 18 February. On that day, the Pyŏnch’algwan Hyŏn Sŏk-un (辨察官: 玄普運) and the Yŏkhak Yi Chun-su (譯學: 李濬秀) and Five Military Commanders were invited. They were surprised as the doctor demonstrated the use of an electronic stethoscope and machinery with which he performed auscultation and autopsies by cutting bones. [They also marveled at] various drugs, detailed [anatomical] pictures, and marvelous machines.

Ishihata Sada, 1878, ‘Iin shisetsu’ (醫院始設) in Chōsen kikō yoroku (朝鮮歸好餘錄); Re-quoted from Sŏ 2011, p. 247.

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\(^9\) Saisei iin kokaji (濟生醫院告示) and Chongdu Chorye (種痘條例).
Needless to say, the Saisei Clinic was established to provide medical service for the Japanese settlers; yet it was open to Koreans. The following table enumerates patients based on ethnicity.

Table 12 Number of patients at the Saisei Clinic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>Korean</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1877.2-1877.12</td>
<td>3,813</td>
<td>2,533</td>
<td>6,346</td>
<td><em>Nihon nenpō</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880.1-1880.12</td>
<td>2,998</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>3,727</td>
<td><em>Hansōng sunbo</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881.1-1881.12</td>
<td>2,838</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>3,513</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883.4-1884.3</td>
<td>1,235 (M-876/F-359)</td>
<td>843 (M-697/F-146)</td>
<td>2,078</td>
<td><em>Nihon nenpō</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884.4-1885.3</td>
<td>1,078 (M-709/F-369)</td>
<td>521 (M-428/F-93)</td>
<td>1,599</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11,962</td>
<td>5,301</td>
<td>17,263</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Fusan furitsu byōin shōshi* (釜山府立病院小史) 1936, p.2.

As shown in this table, Koreans were not excluded from treatment. Considerable numbers of Koreans were treated. Moreover, ‘from the opening day, Koreans who wished to have a checkup persistently appeared’ (*Fusan furitsu byōin shōshi* 釜山府立病院小史 1936, p. 2). William E. Griffis also mentioned the Saisei Iin in his book entitled *Corea: The Hermit Nation*: ‘a hospital, under the care of Dr. Yano, in which, up to 1882, four thousand Coreans and many Japanese have been treated’ (Griffis 1907, p. 425).

Based on the numbers of Korean patients, we might assume that Koreans were introduced to the new medicine through the Saisei clinic, and they welcomed Western
medicine without any resistance, but such statistical evidence could be misleading. The following historical documents suggest an alternative view on how Korean’s first encounter with Western medicine was. Song Hŏn-bin, for example, who was an envoy to Japan after the opening of Korea, visited a museum, a zoo, the Mint Bureau, and western-style hospitals. He recorded his impressions of Japan in *Tonggyŏng Ilgi* (東京日記). In particular, he described his first encounter with western medicine.

In a hospital, there is a long corridor on the left and the right. Those who wanted treatment numbered several hundred and there are doctors as well. There were many medical instruments which helped peel away [skin], lance [boils], and pierce blockages. For example, in cases of dyspepsia, [the doctor] pierces [the body] with a long thread from mouth to bottom; in cases of constipation, [the doctor] inserts a small block [suppository] into the rectum. Those who died had their internal organs and lungs dissected to figure out the cause of disease. [Their] skill is very sophisticated, but it is truly brutal. How could it be a work of medicine? It is bizarre and surprising.

*Tonggyŏng Ilgi* 1881; re-quoted from Sin 2004, p. 223.

As we see, the first Korean who encountered western medicine responded in a negative way. Though Song Hŏ-bin agreed that the skill seemed sophisticated, the western medicine that the Japanese adopted was simply ‘brutal…bizarre and surprising’. Yu Kiljun’s *Sŏyu kyŏnmun* (新西游見聞) was more sympathetic to the rationale behind autopsies: ‘some say that to autopsy a corpse is a brutal treatment, but the brutality delivered to a dead body can bring about happiness to the generations to come’ (Sin 2004, pp. 223-224). In other words, in general even sympathetic observers considered western medicine to be unpleasant, although necessary.

If social elites felt doubts, then how much more would this have been for ordinary people. From foreign missionaries’ records, we can deduce the perception of ordinary Koreans towards new medicines.
The majority of natives are not willing to go to hospitals, and it would have been dangerous to try to force them, while many will not permit foreign doctors to treat them even in their homes, or else use Korean medicines with ours.

Underwood 1904, p. 138.

This difficulty could have been surmounted by the repairing of the rooms [in the hospital], but a still more serious matter was the prejudice of the people on account of some previous associations connected with the building not known to us when we chose it.

Avison 1895, p. 341.

Two foreign missionaries, both Underwood and Avison, worked as missionaries as well as medical doctors in Seoul. They report that ordinary people resisted their ministrations. Despite the fact that amongst Koreans there was resistance against foreign medical facilities, many Koreans were treated by western-style methods at the Saisei Clinic. Moreover, the annual number of people who underwent vaccination was over five hundred. Was there more acceptance to foreign methods at the Saisei Clinic? Koike described Korean patients as follows,

For Korean patients there is no way in which we can figure out the ratio of patients in the population and the ratio of dead and cured or uncured, because they often just come and go and appear out of nowhere. Also, women never come to [the clinic] or never ask for a home visit by a doctor. Those who ask for treatment are only male patients who do not have difficulty in walking. There are many patients who send lists of symptoms from far away to ask for drugs. Even if they write their symptoms, this is without substance or filled with empty words, unreliable, and baseless. The even worse thing is that some make a diagnosis of themselves and write a letter to seek prescription. Or some ask someone else to come and describe a single symptom for a prescription of drugs. If I categorized Korean patients into three types, they would be: 1) some who come themselves to seek diagnosis; 2) some who send lists of symptoms; and 3) some who send just their written diagnosis. In other words, the diagnosis of one third is certain and that of the rest [two thirds] comes from mere assumption.


The majority of patients who simply sent either a letter of symptoms or had people deliver descriptions of symptoms were ignorant or only familiar with a traditional way of using
medical facilities. Based on the statistics given in Fusan furitsu byōin shōshi (釜山府立病院小史), Koike tends to exaggerate his impression of Korean patients. For example, although he states that Korean women never come to get treatment at the Saisei Clinic, from 1883 through 1885, an average of 100 female patients were treated each year. It is hard to tell how reliable his narrative is; yet, there probably was some truth in saying that few women came to the clinic. The proportion of Korean female patients was considerably smaller in comparison with Japanese female patients or with Korean male patients. Sending a letter of symptoms or sending a person to deliver a description of the symptoms was a traditional custom to maintain a woman’s dignity. Many Koreans simply thought of the Saisei Clinic in the same terms and followed the traditional way, although sending a written letter of symptoms would have been done by members of the educated class, the yangban, and sending a person to deliver a description of the symptoms would have been the practice of middle or lower class people (Yi 2010, p. 349).

One might think that the unwillingness of Koreans to attend the clinics run by western missionaries and their willingness to attend the Japanese clinic might be attributable to their greater familiarity with the Japanese, but this was probably not the case. The following article suggests that the motivation was not familiarity.

*This dislike may arise from their own ancient quarrels* [i.e., Hideyoshi’s invasion of Korea]; for the Koreans charge the Japanese with having destroyed all that was old and venerable in Korea in their last invasion of the country, and from this Korea has never thoroughly recovered. *The envy and dislike may also arise from the comfort and freedom of the Japanese, as well as from their haughty manners and overbearing ways.* For without a shadow of a doubt the Japanese are, at times, rude and rough in their intercourse with the natives… The Koreans are very conservative, more so, I think, than Chinese, and have a strong objection to some of the social manners and customs of the Japanese, whose Orderly Settlement, clean streets, bath-houses, pure water, nice shops, neat well-matted rooms in comfortable houses, and well-managed sanitary arrangements, are in striking contrast to the towns and villages of Korea, one visit to which will last the visitor for a life-time.
The North China Herald mentioned Hideyoshi’s invasion of Korea to describe a negative impression the Koreans had of the Japanese. After the opening of Korea, Koreans seemed to hate the fact that the Japanese enjoyed comfort and freedom in Korea. In fact, there was continuous conflict between Koreans and Japanese settlers in Pusan. For example, the tax collection incident in Pusan, or *Pusan hae’gwan suse sagôn* (釜山海關收稅事件), created a quarrel between the Koreans and the Japanese settlers in Pusan in 1878 (*Pusan sisa I*, pp. 894-897). Still, what attracted Koreans to be treated by the Japanese at the Saisei Clinic?

The first reason is that surgical operations at the Saisei Clinic were new to Koreans, but were known to be effective. In traditional medicine, there is no surgical operation, yet in some cases surgical operations are helpful to relieve pain. For instance, a navy doctor who worked at the Saisei Clinic mentioned that ‘there was a Korean patient whose tumors were spread all over his face and even neck and caused by abscesses. The patient was not able to eat for several days. Thereafter, the navy doctor visited the patient at home to treat him by removing the tumors. A rumour spread all over the place’ (*Danshaku Koike Masanao den* 男爵小池正直傳, 1940, p. 33; Re-quoted from Pak 2005, p. 62). Secondly, as Korean traditional medicine was powerless to fight epidemics, including cholera, the Saisei Clinic provided vaccination against small pox and successfully treated cholera patients. During the epidemics, the Saisei Clinic provided proper medical treatment as well as medical supervision. Having witnessed the difference of mortality rates between the Japanese settlement and Korean areas, Koreans began to change their perception of western medicine as practiced by the Japanese. At the governmental level, the Japanese government intended to gain favours from the general public in Pusan by providing ‘modern’ medical treatment and the Korean government resisted Japan’s attempt to widen its sphere of influence. However,

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10 Dr. Yano was a doctor for the Navy based in Pusan.
at the personal level, the Saisei Clinic provided better medical service. Many Koreans received treatment without appreciating its underlying political sensitivity.

Due to the rapid growth of patients, along with the increase of Japanese settlers, the Saisei Clinic required a bigger facility. Its director Yano suggested the establishment of a new hospital in 1879 and built a new hospital at Benten machi (弁天町) in the settlement and moved there in 1880. Navy doctors, such as Matsumae Yuuru (松前譲), Tozuka Zumisai (戸塚積斎), and Kajiki Keisuke (加治木敬介), took turns to take charge of the Saisei Clinic as director (Fusan furitsu byōin shōshi 釜山府立病院小史 1936, pp. 2-3). In 1883, the Ministry of Foreign affairs decided to abolish it and establish a bigger facility in light of the increase of Japanese settlers. Moreover, due to inflation and financial challenges after the Satsuma Rebellion, or Seinan Sensō (西南戦争), the Japanese government suffered financial pressure. To reduce the burden of financial stress, the Japanese government attempted to close down governmental hospitals in port cities. At the time, the Japanese government provided an annual subsidy of 5,000 yen to the Saisei Clinic. As a step to abolish the clinic, its control was transferred from Navy to Army and Koike Masanao (小池正直) became the director. Eventually, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan declared the abolition of the Saisei Clinic on 30 April 1885.

In October 1885, a cooperative hospital was established, and it turned into a public hospital in September 1893, namely the Fusan Nihon kyōritsu byōin (釜山日本共立病院). This hospital became a Settlers’ Association hospital in December 1906 and eventually became a prefectural hospital (Yi 1994, p. 40). The reason why the Japanese government turned the Saisei Clinic into a public hospital was because the increase in settler numbers enabled the establishment of self-governing organizations.
At the same time, there were increasing numbers of private practices (Koike 1887, p. 60; re-quoted from Sŏ 2011, p. 263) and increases in the numbers of medical doctors and nurses. Doctors and nurses associations appeared. In 1906, the Pusan Medical Doctors Association (Fusan ishikai 釜山医師会) was organised by licensed medical doctors in the Japanese settlement. The number of members in the Association was about ten, but with the increase of clinics its members increased to 32 in 1912. The Pusan Nurses Association was formed by Moriaki Tomiko (森脇富子) in 1909. The Pusan Midwife Association was organized by Fujii Sekiko (藤井セキ子) (Pak 2005, pp. 180-181; Fusan yōran 釜山要覧 1912, pp. 82-86). It is clear that the number of patients increased at the prefectural hospital (Fusan furitsu byōin shōshi 釜山府立病院小史 1936, p. 16), but due to a paucity of sources, we do not know how many Koreans or Japanese received medical treatment from the prefectural hospital or private clinics. However, it is doubtful that the establishment of the prefectural hospital and the increase of private practices benefited the general public, especially Koreans, because those medical facilities had to pursue profits, whereas the Saisei Clinic had received a subsidy from the Japanese government and operated something of a subsidized outreach programme for Koreans.

**Epidemics and power relations**

Owing to the terrible famine, the Coreans are in extreme poverty. We (Japanese residents) observe the poor natives everywhere starving to death; while crowds of beggars are wandering about in search of food… In addition to the horrors of starvation, the poor Coreans are afflicted by pestilence. No house in any town or village is exempt from the ravages of the terrible disease, which has commenced to penetrate our Settlement. Some of our traders have already been seized by it, but fortunately owing to good treatment in the hospital, none of our names are registered yet in the kuwako-cho (a record kept in Buddhist temples, of the names of the dead.) Dr. Yano, Superintendent of the hospital, said that the pestilence was caused by impurity. Dead bodies are sometimes found lying in the streets where they are left for
many days. Since the opening of the hospital, many natives sought relief, and about 350 have already been there from the 11th February to the 30th March.

*North China Herald*, 9 June 1877.

The *North China Herald*, which was published in Shanghai from around 1842 to the 1940s, describes the outbreak of pestilence, not necessarily cholera, in Pusan in 1877 as affecting Koreans and Japanese differently. While many Koreans were killed by famine and pestilence, the Japanese were protected. Even though some Japanese became infected, they were treated well in the hospital (Saisei Clinic). As a result, none of the registered Japanese settlers was killed. This was a recurring phenomenon in Pusan.

After the original introduction of cholera to Korea during 1821, 1822, and 1859, more intriguing was the outbreak of cholera in October 1877. Cholera in 1877 was generally considered to have been brought by the Japanese. After the war to suppress Satsuma (January to September 1877), the returning Imperial troops were infected with the cholera virus that had originally arrived from Xiamen, China, in the same year. The Imperial troops brought it with them back to other parts of Japan, so that cholera spread nationally (Kim 2008, p. 94). After widespread cholera outbreaks in Japan, cholera eventually came to Korea via Pusan in 1877. The 1877 outbreak was relatively small and is not mentioned in many documents. However, *chinjil* (珍疾, cholera) was brought to Pusan again from Japan in June 1879. This produced a great outbreak. In the veritable records of King Kojong, an account of cholera is as follows.

The King commanded, ‘It concerns me. I heard that there was a high death toll as a virulent disease is raging across Seoul and other regions. Command the Ministry of Rites or Yejo (禮曹) to perform immediate special rituals without discussing the date.’ And also, he commanded, ‘I heard that now a virulent disease is prevalent. Each province and office has released prisoners, except those who committed a grave charge. Some sinners who coveted public goods could be released on bail. Yet, send them to prison without waiting for further commands to collect the bail after the contagious disease passes. Do not neglect even in the slightest exercising surveillance over them even though they have already been released.
During the great outbreak of cholera that occurred in Korea in 1879, the Korean government did not have any understanding how the pathogen was transmitted and how that transmission could be prevented. Rather, the Korean government based its actions on the common sense of the time and *a priori* assumptions; that is, it engaged in special rituals and the release of prisoners.

By contrast, the Magistrate of Tongnae, along with the Japanese settlers’ organization, took a different tack from the Korean government. The Magistrate of Tongnae, Yun Ch’ihwa (君致和), gave permission to establish a *cordon sanitaire*, a quarantine station, and an isolation hospital at the request of Maeda Kenkichi (前田獻吉), superintendent at Pusan on behalf of 2,000 Japanese residents (*Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi* 承政院日記, 19-20 June 1879; *Ilsŏngrok* 日省錄 19-20 June 1879).

It appears that the establishment of a *cordon sanitaire* and a quarantine station was driven by considerations of public health, but there was a political dimension. During the outbreak, the Japanese government’s attempt to impose a *cordon sanitaire* and a quarantine station at Yong-do Island (J. Bokushi-shima) was motivated by the expansion of influence in Pusan. Since the Japanese settlers were bound by the regulation of the boundary for Japanese settlers’ activities (*kanhaeng ijŏng*), the Japanese government attempted to use ‘hygienic modernity’ as a means of expanding the Japanese settlers’ sphere of activities in Pusan. Though Yong-do Island was separated from the mainland where the Japanese settlement was, it was located within close distance to the Japanese settlement and was at ‘the throat of’ Pusan. For this reason the Japanese government was interested in using the area, whereas the Korean government was cautious to yield control over the island (Sin 1989, p. 74). Thus, a
cordon sanitaire and a quarantine station at Yong-do Island was immediately closed after its use in 1877, and yet, it was reopened by the Japanese when epidemic spread in Pusan in 1879.

In 1880, Yi Kŭnp’il (李根弼), Governor of Kyŏngsang Province, summoned Han U-hwan (韓友煥) to discuss establishing a cordon sanitaire and a quarantine station at Yong-do Island. Yi requested the Chosŏn court to dismiss him from his position and punish him for the responsibility of permitting the Japanese to operate beyond the limits that the Kanghwa treaty allowed (Ilsŏngnok, June 19, 1876; Sin 1989, p 74).

The main reason for the opposition to the Japanese establishment of a cordon sanitaire and a quarantine station was not only because the Korean government interpreted Japan’s intention as expansion, but also because the Korean government was ignorant of what constituted a cordon sanitaire. Let us examine the Korean government’s general policies towards cholera.

[It was proposed that] …various diseases were raging inside and outside of the capital. Urchins who were wandering from place to place were the first people to be infected… Some of them could not get medical attention for the disease and even could not be buried after death. All corpses were scattered around and even piled up [in the streets]. How could this be possible under the virtuous rule? We should order the Chinhyluch’ŏng (賑恤廳 or Office of Relief Works) to send Nangwan (郎官, 6 Junior rank) officials to investigate the situation. Thus the patients should be given food and segregated in a tent and the dead should be sent to the outside of the city for burial. For those who were not infected but cannot return to their home villages, they should be selected and reported to the relevant Ministry amongst the Five Ministries. The Ministry should collect them in a large square and provide sufficient food and clothes. Furthermore, it should comfort them with the virtue of the state and teach them to return to their home villages to engage in farming.’ The King approved this policy. At that time, a ‘strange malady’ was spreading.

Sunjo Sillok, twenty-eighth day fourth month 1822.

After the great cholera epidemic in 1821-22, the Korean government learned that the ‘strange malady’ epidemic was facilitated by human contact. The government imposed a simple cordon sanitaire policy to keep the ‘strange malady’ patients from the general public and prevent the disease from spreading. However, its support was limited and segregation was
not as thorough as establishing quarantine stations. The best advice on cholera was ‘flee immediately, to a great distance’. Though the Korean government vaguely recognised the cause of cholera and attempted to respond as best it could, its efforts were limited. Avison gives us an example of how the segregation policy was put into action as follows.

Going through another section of the city one evening, I noticed a straw cord stretched around a group of houses on which were hung pieces of paper with writing on them. In answer to my questions I learned that the houses so encircled were as yet free from cholera, and that those living there had stretched this cord around the houses and hung on it written prayers to the cholera spirit exhorting it not to come within the boundary line. A short distance from the section thus protected I saw a platform some five feet above the ground, with some animals on it and a number of court officials who had been sent into that part of the city by the King to offer those animals in sacrifice to the Cholera Spirit and thus placate it in order to gain protection for that neighborhood.

Avison 1940, p. 129.

Avison witnessed a taboo rope that differentiated uninfected areas from others. Even segregation was not for medical reasons, but for expelling evil spirits. Thereafter, Avison established a quarantine station in Seoul.

Early in August it was decided, as the plague seemed on the increase, to fill the “Shelter” with cholera patients, and Dr. Avison assigned to Dr. Wells, Mr. Underwood and myself [Mrs. Underwood] the supervision and care of this place. The “Shelter” situated on a good high site outside the walls, with a number of comfortable rooms, with the possibility of hot floors (which proved an unspeakable benefit to the poor cold, pulseless sick), seemed an ideal place for the purpose.

Underwood 1904, p. 140.

Though the Korean government provided quarantine stations to treat the patients and to prevent epidemics from spreading, the condition of those quarantine stations was less than desirable in Avison’s view. Avison described the condition of a quarantine station as follows.

There were no walls to the rooms and there was time to put in only rough board floors, but as they would be used only temporarily and the weather was warm, these were scarcely thought to be drawbacks; however they proved to be not only serious hindrances but almost complete obstacles to success, for the rainy season set in and the weather was raw and cold and it was impossible to keep the patients warm, a most serious matter when we consider the great need of external heat for patients already
cold, blue and pulseless with such a disease. As a result in spite of as faithful work as was ever done by doctors and nurses the majority of the patients died… After 135 patients had been treated, with a death rate of 75% the place was closed.

Avison, Oliver R. 1895, p. 341.

In theory, the role of quarantine stations as a public health resource should not merely be the segregation of patients but the provision of a better environment for patients to be properly treated. However, as Avison saw it, the reality was far different from that which is anticipated in theory. Avison stated that despite the work of faithful doctors and nurses, the majority of the patients ended up dead. In other words, the Korean government was not aware of the importance of quarantine. After the establishment of the House of Universal Helpfulness, or Chejungwŏn (濟樂院), on 26 April 1885 by Horace Allen, the Korean government instituted quarantine. The government promulgated regulations for inspecting epidemics coming from ports, or Hyŏnū pulhŏ onyŏk chinhang chamsŏl changjŏng (現議不許瘟疫進港暫設章程), on 20 July 1886. The government attempted to inspect crews and passengers of incoming ships by placing medical doctors and inspectors at ports of entry. It is noticeable that the regulation was similar to the way that the Japanese responded to the first cholera epidemic which came to Pusan in 1877.

On the other hand, in the case of Pusan, western-trained medical doctors resided in the settlement from the beginning of its opening. They had a sense of quarantine, cordon sanitaire, and isolation hospitals. Thus, when cholera came to Korea for the first time in 1877, a patient ill of cholera amongst crewmen was found on the Takao-maru (高雄丸) out of Nagasaki. Dr. Yano, the director of the Saisei Clinic, immediately sent the patient to Yong-do Island after giving emergency treatment. At the time, the ferry became a temporary

11 The Kwanghyewŏn (廣惠院) or Office of Abundant Favour under the Board for General Control of Diplomatic and Commercial Matters (T’ongni kyonjip t’ongsang samuamun, 統理交涉通商事務衙門), which was advised by von Möllendorff, on 10 April 1885 was known as Korea’s first modern medical institution because it was the first western hospital that was granted royal permission to operate by King Kojong. It was renamed the Chejungwŏn (濟樂院) on 26 April 1885 (Pratt and Rutt 1999, pp. 252-253).
shelter for the treatment; but the patient died and thereafter two more patients amongst crewmen were infected (Kim 2008, p. 94). Though the first patient who was discovered died, the response to cholera was organized and efficient. The other two were properly treated and the Saisei Clinic managed to prevent cholera from spreading to the settlement. Let us turn attention to the patients during the outbreak of cholera in 1879.

Table 13 Number of patients from 1 August to 18 August in Pusan in 1879

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pusan-jin (釜山鎭)</th>
<th>Ko’gwan (旧館)</th>
<th>Ch’oryang (草梁)</th>
<th>Tongnaepu (東萊府)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>3900</td>
<td>1150</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patients</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatality rate</td>
<td>58 %</td>
<td>53.6 %</td>
<td>45.8 %</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gaimushō 12 ki (外務省 12 期), 1949; adopted and modified from Kim 2008, p. 94.

As Table 13 shows, the outbreak of cholera was dreadful, especially for Koreans. More than half of patients on average died. The highest fatality rate was in Pusan-jin where there was a dense population. However, we can also get a different picture from documents that the Japanese settlers kept. The mortality of cholera patients in the total Japanese population of 840\(^{12}\) in Pusan was 8 in 24 (a fatality rate of 33 per cent). The Korean fatality rate was nearly twice that. The main reasons for such a significant gap between Koreans and the Japanese in Pusan were their immune systems and the availability of medical supplies. However, when cholera was raging in Pusan, Maeda Kenkichi (前田獻吉), superintendent at Pusan, sent a report entitled ‘Honkō korera byōkeikyō ni tsuki mōshiage no ken’ (本港コレラ病況に付上申の件) to Terashima Munenori (寺島宗則), Minister of Foreign Affairs. According to this report, Maeda pointed out that Koreans in Pusan were usually filthy and frequently entered the Japanese settlement. In order to protect the settlers from infection, it is

\(^{12}\) Fusan okatsugu mono (釜山お担ぐ物) records a population of 700.
better temporarily to bar access to the settlement by Koreans (Kim 2008, p. 96). This report suggests that the Japanese settlers did not intend to promote public health in general and protect Koreans from epidemic. Rather, the Japanese intended to protect the Japanese settlers and to promote ‘modern’ civilization to impress the Koreans. The Japanese settlers established the Saisei Clinic, and a number of Koreans benefitted from it. However, the political intention to propagate Japan’s advanced civilization by providing Japanese medical care for Koreans was revealed in the midst of the cholera outbreak. In other words, the outbreak of cholera in 1879 made ‘invisible power relations’ visible.

**Public health policies: internal development vs. external impact**

During the open-port period, sanitation policies in Pusan were initiated and implemented by the representative body of the Japanese settlers and for the well-being of the Japanese settlers, while the Korean government was ignorant of ‘modern’ sanitation systems. The Korean government began its ‘modern’ sanitation system with the launch of the Kabo Reforms, or *Kabo kyŏngjang* (甲午更張), in 1894. The Bureau of Sanitation (衛生局) was established under the Offices of Domestic Affairs (內務衙門) while dismantling three medical offices, i.e., the Office for Helping the People or *Hyeminsŏ* (惠民署), the Palace Medical Office or *Chŏnŭi-gam* (典醫監), and the Palace Pharmacy or *Naeŭiwŏn* (內醫院). In general, the Korean government pursued a top-down and centralizing approach.

As a nationalist line of argument, Shin Tong-wŏn (2009) argued that there were two myths dominating the history of Korean medicine, that is, the Allen myth and the Chi Sŏk-yŏng myth. The Allen myth depicts Allen and western Christian missionaries bringing ‘modern medicine’ to Korea and the Chi Sŏk-yŏng depicts a Japanese-trained Korean doctor paving the way to ‘modern’ medicine. Shin Tong-wŏn labeled both those two myths as either external or forced modernization and argued that they are derived from an ‘exaggeration of
individual heroic action’, a ‘depreciation of the role of the Chosŏn government’, and an
‘ignorance of imperialistic motives of America and Japan’ (Shin 2009, p. 19). He went even
further and stated that there is a third way of looking at ‘hygienic modernity’ in Korea, that is,
as it appeared as a voluntary sanitation movement of the Tonghaks (東學) and Ch’ŏndogyo
(天道教). For example, during the outbreak of cholera in 1886, two principles that the
second Ch’ŏndogyo leader Ch’oe Shi-hyon (崔時亨) suggested was to ‘double religious
practice and keep the mental equilibrium to receive the energy’ and ‘to chant the incantation
and pray with pure water’. Those, which still relied on religious practice, do not seem like
hygienic and sanitary practices; yet, Ch’oe’s suggestion included some practical principles:
first, do not mix new rice with old rice; second, when you eat old food, you should boil it;
third, do not spit. If you have to spit, you should cover it with soil; fourth, dig a hole and bury
excrement; fifth, do not disembogue dirty water into the creek; sixth, clean the house twice a
day. As a result, in the midst of disaster, none of the Tonghak believers and none of the
neighbouring 40 households were infected with cholera (Shin 2009, pp. 22-24). Though
those practical principles are rudimentary, they constitute a fundamental sanitation policy.
For this reason, Shin argues that the voluntary sanction movement by the Tonghaks and
Ch’ŏndogyo was a foundation of modern sanitation knowledge.

On the other hand, some scholars find motivations for health and hygiene policies as
indicating a desire for ‘nation building’ (Burn 2000; Rogaski 2004; Sin 1997; Pak 2005).
Without a doubt ‘nation building’ rhetoric was prevalent at the time, but the main concern of
the government was to curtail the spread of contagious diseases. In fact, the Korean
government promulgated a regulation regarding quarantine in 1895 when there was a
formidable challenge to public health as more than 60,000 were killed in North P’yŏng’an
Province (平安北道) alone. After the outbreak of cholera on 4 July 1895, the Regulation
Regarding Quarantine or Kŏmyŏk kyuchik (檢疫規則) was promulgated as follows.
I. To prevent cholera and other epidemics from prevailing, a quarantine site and anchored ship must be designated at the necessary ports for both sea and land according to the regulations suggested below.

II. The port areas in which the quarantine site or anchored ship is implemented is regularly designated by ordinance of the Home Minister.

III. An infected area will be designated by the Home Minister based on the situation.

IV. Detailed regulations should be made by an ordinance of the Home Minister.

V. Those who violate the regulations and ordinance will be fined up to 200 won or confined for 180 days. Or a fine and a confinement will both be imposed.

VI. This regulation will be strictly enforced on the day of promulgation.

Signed by His Majesty with the Royal Seal, 12 May 1895
Prime Minster of the Cabinet: Pak Chŏng-yang (朴守陽)
rank 1A of the Ministry of Home affairs: Pak Yŏng-hyo (朴泳孝)
and Minister of Finance: Ô Yun-jung (魚允中)

Thereafter, the Korean government aggressively pursued improving public health. The Korean government provided an outline of a way to improve public health. For example, in the Independent, there were 10 detailed principles for improvement of public health and hope for a sanitary city as follows.

We earnestly hope the authorities will take proper steps to look into the sanitary matters of the city. Two more suspected cases of cholera have been reported, and prompt and energetic measures of prevention of the dreadful epidemic are absolutely necessary. Before doing anything else clean out the gutters so that the filth can flow out; prevent the accumulation or deposition of garbage on the street corners; stop the washing of green vegetables in the waters of the gutters; and last but not least the children must not run about in the hot sun without clothes. We beg the Chiefs of the Police and the Sanitary Departments to take some vigorous action in regard to these few matters right now, and let top-knots and yangban questions rest for a while. The people would not die off like flies even if the police should go about without top-knots, or if some lower class people should receive respectful treatment from yangbans.

The Independent, 27 June 1896.

Furthermore, the Independent published editorials regarding new epidemic (cholera) and public health as follows.

It is not improbable that the cholera may visit the city of Seoul again this summer. To be sure the severe epidemic of cholera in 1886 was not followed by another in 1887, but of course the inherent probability was greater than if there had been none the preceding year. A few sporadic cases have made their appearance, which, though not
cholera proper, perhaps, show marked similarity to that already disease. If anything is
to be done to fight it this year, a beginning must be made immediately, if indeed it is
not already too late.

It is such a simple thing to say, “keep the sewers open and clean, prevent the
accumulation of garbage, look out for contamination of wells, make people drink
boiled water and stop their washing vegetables in the gutters,” but the carrying out of
these simple directions means a revolution in Korean methods of life and in their
time-honoured customs. If my father washed his cabbage in this ditch, it is good
enough for me to wash mine in.

The Koreans have a proverb which says; “In trying to take a short cut across
lots he fell in with thieves”, which means that the man who goes around by the old
time-honoured road will do better than the one who tries some new-fangled method.
There is a ponderous inertia in these Eastern peoples, and a stolid indifference to the
channels through which disease is contracted, however much they dread the disease
itself. It amounts almost to fatalism. A few object lessons on Korean well water
through a compound microscope would open their eyes.

It is of no avail to talk about what might be under different circumstances, but
we must ask the question, what can now be done, taking all obstacles into
consideration, to prevent the coming of cholera or to check its spread if it does come.

*The Independent*, 20 June 1896.

The continuous news articles concerned with new epidemics and public health threat
undoubtedly reflected public concern and opinion in Korea. Accordingly, a series of
ordinances for cholera\(^{13}\) were promulgated as follows: *Hoyŏlcha sodok kyuch’ik* (虎列刺消毒規則) on 29 July 1895, and *Hoyŏlchabyŏng yebang kwa sodok kyuch’ik* (虎列刺病豫防消毒規則) on 31 July 1895. However, the sanitation system for local areas was not fully
organized yet, so that doctors had to report directly to the local magistrate and the police
station. The procedure for diagnosis of cholera was the following: the doctor who diagnosed
a patient with a contagious disease should report it to the local magistrate and police station
(Pak 2004, p. 538). Moreover, a list of nationally notifiable communicable diseases under the
Taehan Empire included cholera, dysentery, typhus, diphtheria, smallpox, and typhoid fever
(scarlet fever, paratyphoid fever, and bubonic plague) in 1899.

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\(^{13}\) The term *hoyŏlcha* (虎列刺) (‘tiger-recurrent-pierce’ or ‘struck by cholera’) was first used in 1895 in
regulations on the Prevention Ordinance for cholera.
As shown above, the Taehan Empire made efforts to implement sanitation policies in Korea. However, it would be hard to presume that a modern sanitation consciousness arose from internal awareness. It is probably best to set aside the over-simplified framework of ‘Western (or Japanese) impact and Korean response’. Rather, it would be best to bring attention to the process of changes that occurred during the open-port period. For instance, Korea’s sanitation policies on cholera were modeled after the Japanese Densenbyō yobō kisoku (伝染病予防規則) of 1880 (Pak 2004, pp. 540-541). Before Chi Sŏk-yŏng, who contributed to the dissemination of smallpox vaccinations in Korea, went to get medical training in Japan, he was trained in the Saisei Clinic in Pusan. Though the representative body of Japanese settlers in port cities established sanitation policies for their own good, those changes still had an impact on the general public as well as on local government. It is clear that the trend of sanitation promotion was brought from the outside. In the case of Pusan, sanitation coverage began from the Japanese settlement.

After the protectorate was established in 1905, the Korean government had only a limited role to play in sanitation policies. Based on ethnic differences between Koreans and Japanese, different sanitary policies were applied. For instance, while the regulation to prevent cholera, or Hoyŏlcha yebang kyuch’ik (虎列刺病豫防規則), implemented by the Korean government, only applied to Koreans, the Japanese were controlled under a local regulation, that is, Taikyū rijichōrei (大邱理事廳令 or The Taegu Administrative Bureau for Japanese residents’ ordinances) and Keijō14 rijichōrei (京城理事廳令 or The Keijō

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14 Keijō was a customary name for Hansŏng even before Japan officially made Hansŏng into Keijō as a name of administrative district. Ch’oe provides several good examples from which it was derived. For example, Taejo shillok (eighth month and the first day, 1393) stated the government was mobilizing people from six different provinces to build a fortress at Keijō (Hansŏng). Kojong shillok (1884) also stated that the incident (Kapsin Coup) at Kyŏngsŏng (Keijō) is not a small issue, so Inoue Kaoru (井上馨) was sent to deal with the treaty of Hansŏng (漢城條約), which resulted from the aftermath of the Kapsin Coup (Kapsin chŏngbyŏn, 甲申政變). Ch’oe argues that the reason for the Japanese government to choose the customary name Keijō instead of creating a new name is two-fold: the first is to propagate the fact that the capital Hansŏng was no longer the capital but merely one administrative district of many in Kŏnggi province; and the second was to manipulate
Administrative Bureau for Japanese residents’ ordinances). The outbreak of cholera in 1907 and 1909 was an opportunity for the Japanese to settle jurisdictional disputes regarding the enforcement of sanitation policy in Korea by the Japanese. Sanitation policy was then completely taken over by the Japanese after the annexation. The regulations for preventing epidemics was consolidated into the Densenbyō yobōrei (伝染病豫防領), promulgated in 1915 (Pak 2004, pp. 542-543). As a result, the effort to achieve ‘hygienic modernity’ by the Taehan Empire was stopped short by the Japanese annexation.

**Summation: water and sanitation**

Public sanitation distinguished cleanness from uncleanness by valuing cleanness as civilisation in Tōkyō; thus, uncleanness was censored and excluded through which the spatial and hierarchical boundaries of uncleanness were created.

*Chōya (朝野)* 2 September 1877; Re-quoted from Narita 2003, p. 53.

Water and sanitation are crucial to human lives. The relations between water and sanitation cannot be separated. The establishment of waterworks was the entry point for sanitation and hygienic ‘modernity’ into Korea. The way by which a sense of hygiene was adopted for Pusan was unique. Pusan was a window through which Koreans experienced the Japanese concept of ‘hygienic modernity’. Even the Japanese sanitation policy, such as lazaretos, *cordon sanitaire*, and quarantine, was implemented in Pusan far before the Korean government implemented similar measures. While the Korean government was concerned about the expansion of Japanese influence, the general Korean public in Pusan received the Koreans into thinking that the urban space of Hansŏng was a part of Japan (Ch’oe 2009, pp. 6-7). See Ch’oe Wŏn-o (崔元午) 2009, ‘Hansŏng, Kyŏngsŏng, Seoul ū yŏksajŏk pyŏngch’ŏn e ttarûn konggan inshik kwa ‘Seoul’ saram ū t’ansaeng: yatam, chaetam, kusul charyo t’ung ūl chungshim ūro’ (한성, 경성, 서울의 역사적 변천에 따른 공간 인식과 ‘서울’ 사람의 탄생: 야담, 재담, 구술 자료 등을 중심으로, Changes of spatial perception according to historical changes of Hansŏng, Kyŏngsŏng, and Seoul and the genesis of ‘Seoulite’; A study of documents mainly from unofficial historical tales, jokes, and narratives), paper presented at HK seminar of Koryŏ taehakkyo Asea Munje Yŏn’guso (고려대학교 아세아 문제연구소).
relative benefits of a medical facility that the Japanese settlers brought. The development of the water supply and the promotion of sanitation reflected not merely expansion of the sphere of interest for Japanese settlers but also an expansion of the sphere of influence over physical urban space as well as the human body. Cholera, which erupted often in Korea during the open port period, was considered the ‘poor man’s plague’ because cholera is most dangerous to those with weak immune systems. During the outbreak of epidemics in Pusan, the most vulnerable people were Koreans. ‘Hygienic modernity’ was, therefore, an instrument for the stronger Japanese to exercise their influence over a weaker Korea. While it is necessary to recognize the contribution of the Japanese efforts to bring the concept of ‘sanitation’ to Pusan, there nevertheless emerged a distinct ‘power relation’ between Koreans and the Japanese settlers.
Conclusion

To those who remember the port of Fusan as it was only a few years ago its transformation to what it is to-day is remarkable. It is a fine illustration of what a Government will do when it fully realises the strategic and commercial importance of a place and sets itself to work to reap the full advantages of the position.

The new railway depot that has been constructed and the handsome new railway hotel are both a credit to the State railways and are as good, if not better than anything in Japan or Korea. …Not content by any means with the improvements that have been made, the authorities consider that they have only just begun; for they have decided to extend and deepen the harbour to such an extent that it has been found necessary to allot a huge sum of money, to be spread over a term of years, for that purpose. There is little doubt that the money expended will be a good investment, as the advancement of Fusan has yearly been going up in leaps and bounds. Its foreign trade for last year, both imports and exports, was close on three times as much as it was ten years ago the figures for 1910 standing at Yen 15,885,000. The ships that arrived at the Port last year show an increase in tonnage of nearly a million tons to that of 1900. The passenger traffic across the Straits has increased enormously, which in turn, has brought about an era of prosperity to the town itself. Local industries have gone ahead; the population has leapt into big figures; six different banks have instituted branches, bringing Fusan second to Seoul; whilst those who are in a position to speak with authority are of opinion that this prosperity is only in its infancy. Should the past few years be any criterion, the optimism of these prophets is likely to be fully justified.

The North China Herald, 22 April 1911. [emphasis added]

In this thesis I have attempted to demonstrate how studying a city can offer a useful arena of analysis for the question of ‘colonial modernity’ in Korea. At the same time, I explained how the framework of ‘colonial modernity’ is a useful tool to understand the development of a city. By combining the concerns of the two main schools of interpretation of modern Korean history, the nationalist school and the socio-economic school, we can arrive at a more complete picture of the urban experience in the open-port space in the open-port period. Traditional nationalist history helps to place individual experience in context and the socioeconomic school provides new theoretical and quantitative understandings. The debate between nationalists and the proponents of ‘colonial modernity’ provides more facets on colonialism and invites a mutual understanding of different foci of consideration. This leads towards a more balanced and comprehensive view. Rather than focusing on
conventional approaches, I attempted to discuss everyday political and economic power relations between Koreans and the Japanese settlers in the urban space of Pusan. Though I limit myself to cover only the open-port period or ‘pre-colonial’ period, during which Pusan prospered on account of trade in the early period, the city reflected features of colonial urban development in which an alien power achieved and sustained a hegemonic domination of the socio-cultural-economic dimensions of people’s lives.

In the ‘pre-colonial’ period from 1876 to 1910, Pusan represented features of colonial cities, because it underwent radical changes during this period. During the open-port period, port cities in Korea such as Pusan, Inch’ŏn, Wŏnsan, Kunsan, and Mokp’o developed much faster than the interior because all the treaties with the Great Powers were intended to establish commercial or supply ports for trade. Among the port cities of Korea, Pusan is perhaps the most informative for study, because it was the first open port. Pusan was a funnel for trade with Japan and a foothold for the Japanese to step onto the continent. Pusan, formerly a quiet fishing village, became the most dynamic city in the country by the time of annexation.

The thesis outlines a framework within which questions of power relations in colonial urban spaces could be addressed, such as how the process of colonization took place in the urban space of Pusan and what kinds of power relations operated in an urban environment at the micro level. In the end, colonization is a process of imperial expansion carried forward by colonialists, by people. The process of colonization in Pusan was a process by which the Japanese settlers expanded their wealth, population, influence, and power. Their acquisition of wealth, that is, the opening of economic possibilities, had a large impact on society and people’s lives changed significantly after the opening of Pusan. The second process was an expansion of population; that is, a massive Japanese population moved into the urban space of Pusan in pursuit of economic gain and expanded the Japanese
settlement, creating in many ways a Japanese city. The third process was influence; that is, the expansion of spatial boundaries and the expansion of an influence that moved beyond Pusan by developing transportation infrastructure. And lastly, the fourth process of colonization was power; that is, Japanese settlers began to exercise their power to improve the quality of life in the city.

The market growth in Pusan exacerbated the increase of Japanese settlers. The Japanese government considered Pusan as a foothold of Japanese expansion, so that considerable investment was made in Pusan. Pusan as a market was significant for its geographical closeness to Japan. Japanese were the majority of trade partners in which rudimentary infrastructures, human resources, and methods of trade existed before the opening of Korea in 1876. Based on trade regulations between Korea and Japan, the Japanese enjoyed the privilege of not being subjected to customs tariffs. The Japanese settlers took advantage of existing infrastructure; at the same time, they enforced new regulations through which trade relations between the Japanese settlers and Korean were established in the open port. Pusan was the only city in which exports were larger than imports. However, due to trade mechanisms that operated in Pusan, the growth of the economy pushed Korean merchants into Japanese debt. The prosperous trade attracted many Japanese to migrate to Pusan. The Japanese settlers began to set up a representative body. The explosion of Japanese settlers resulted in the expansion of spatial boundaries for the Japanese settlers, which laid the foundation of urbanization. The Japan House turned into a full-fledged concession. Many lands on which Korean livelihood depended were taken over by the Japanese. The urban centre of Pusan was a ‘Japanese town’ almost entirely built by the Japanese without colonialisation and the local economy was dominated by trade with the Japanese. The population reached 22,000 Japanese and 21,000 Koreans in 1910. The urbanization of Pusan can be chiefly understood in relation to the growth of the settler society—the Japanese. The
spatial boundary for the Japanese continued to expand. The concession expanded with the Japanese expansion of land holdings. Many Japanese aggressively occupied lands mainly by transferring ownership through purchasing, using ‘perpetual leaseholds’ (yŏngdae ch’aji, 永代借地), and the seizure of land by the Japanese government. At the same time, Japanese settlers expanded their spatial boundary by reclamation of the port. The four methods (lease, purchase, seizure, and reclamation) were both top-down and bottom-up approaches towards land acquisition. Lease and purchase were initiated by Japanese settlers with the help of the Japanese government, and seizure and reclamation were initiated by the political and economic power of the Japanese government. Japanese money-lending merchants and pawnbrokers offered loans at high rates of interest, loans which were often settled with land acquisition. The Japanese settlers began to build modern facilities, such as Japanese administrative offices, business districts, transportation infrastructure, and clinics, which the Japanese purchased. Soon the Japanese settlement became the centre of Pusan. Thus, the purchasing of land in Pusan meant not only the expansion of spatial boundaries but also the expansion of influence. Even before the Japanese government officially annexed Korea, the process of colonization had already been started on the ground by Japanese settlers. The Japanese settlement (formerly the Japan House) became the economic, cultural, and social centre of Pusan. Ironically, the settlement that the Korean government established to confine the Japanese became the centre, and the centre of the traditional society of Pusan, Tongnae, became a periphery. There was a clear division that was not necessarily drawn by the Japanese, but the boundary imposed hegemony, and the hegemonic presence kept expanding.

Many Japanese merchants moved to other cities, such as Inch’ŏn and Wŏnsan, to expand their businesses. Throughout these changes in the political structures that governed contact, the most noticeable change in the micro-level community in Pusan was an increased demographic flow of Japanese immigrants. The increase of Japanese residents corresponded
directly with the growing economic power of Japan. Japanese political power over Korea slowly translated into economic power. Japanese residents in Pusan outnumbered other nationals and their settlements. Japanese residents exercised and strengthened their power by acquiring land centred on the Japan House and establishing economic clusters through which the Japanese exercised their power in the urban space of Pusan.

The establishment of transportation infrastructure was an important instrument to expand the Japanese sphere of influence even beyond Pusan. For Japanese settlers, transportation infrastructure was crucial to connect Japan to the continent via the Korean peninsula. Land transport by railway was important for the Japanese settlers to expand their businesses to other parts of the peninsula and even the Asian mainland. Sea transport by regular shipping lines was important to bridge the distance from Japan to Korea. The establishment of transportation infrastructure was not merely motivated by economics but also by politics. For the Japanese to counter the expansion of Russia via the Trans-Siberian railway necessitated building a railway within a limited time frame. In other words, Japan needed to secure control over Korea in the midst of fierce expansionist competition amongst Russia, China, Japan, and even Great Britain. Needless to say, all infrastructure was centred on Japanese settlements. Without a doubt, the railway was a symbol of civilization, which enabled people, commodities, and even culture to be transported to far-flung areas. However, building ‘a symbol of civilization’ was costly. Its effectiveness was excellent but it was done at the cost of blood and lives of Koreans. Moreover, after the completion of the railway, there was a clear division in the use of trains. The fares should be paid in Japanese currency, and the stations are pronounced in Japanese. In other words, the Japanese deliberately forced the condition of participating in ‘modern’ transportation train with Japanese currency and Japanized station names while Koreans unconsciously accepted without question the conditions for such participation. The division was not based on ethnicity, but financial
capability. Nevertheless, empirical evidence suggests the presence of a class division that strongly correlates with ethnicity. The ordinary Korean was not able to experience the expansion of spatial boundaries; rather, the Seoul-Pusan railway resulted in expanding the spatial boundaries of the Japanese as well as the influence of the Japanese. The establishment of the Seoul-Pusan railway also changed the face of market activities. Korean merchants still preferred to use traditional transit to the Hadan port where there was a traditional market. However, new markets along the railway road quickly replaced the traditional market. As a result, the Korean merchants became subordinate to the Japanese.

Establishment of the connecting shipping route and improvement of the harbour saw close links develop between the Japanese government (direct investments and subsidies) and a stirring of patriotic sentiment among private investors. Private Japanese merchant associations and Japanese government agents worked hand in hand to carry out these projects. The port reclamation and the flattening of Mount Yŏngsŏn were further projects that made it easier for the Japanese to land in Pusan and link to the Seoul-Pusan railway.

Finally, the water supply system in Pusan, as physical infrastructure and as social capital, was built by and for the Japanese settlers. The water supply system as a sanitation facility was established to improve the lives of all people, but there was a huge gap between theory and reality. Whether or not it was intended, Pusan was divided into several sections based on ethnicity: Japanese, Chinese, and Korean. The water supply system was built in the Japanese settlement, which created a spatial difference between the Japanese and the Koreans, the two largest groups. The key change that resulted from the water supply system was the commodification of water. Water was transformed from a basic good for life to a commodity. As a result, the distribution of the water supply also created hierarchical social distinctions between rich and poor (those who could afford to pay for water) and between cleanliness and uncleanness. Hygiene appeared as a ‘modern’ experience. The division of urban space
between Koreans and Japanese also created a division of ‘hygiene’ between cleanliness as civilized and uncleanness as uncivilized.

Given that power relations based on ethnicity began to include class and economic capabilities, the change of power relations was represented clearly in the urban space of Pusan as well. A cluster of factors – the enlargement of the settlement (living space), the expansion of the economy (economic opportunity, the erosion of tariffs, and securing property rights), the improvement of public enterprises such as transportation infrastructure, water supply, and hygiene (quality of life) – were catalysts for the Japanese settlers to settle in Pusan. The expansion of Japanese settlers’ influence in Pusan overlapped with the process of colonizing Pusan as well as all of Korea. Therefore, I focused on the hierarchy of power relations based on ethnicity within the spatial boundaries of Pusan. I focused on human – rather than systemic – aspects of these changes.

Pusan is a window through which the process of colonization in Korea can be seen. After the Japanese government annexed Korea, the Japanese settlement and its self-governing organizations were no longer needed. Interestingly, the Japanese settlers rose up in major opposition against the annexation. When the Japanese government formally annexed Korea, the self-governing organizations, such as the Settlers’ Association, petitioned against the move. Their opposition may have been partly because they saw a loss of autonomy and partly because they were benefiting from an overlap with Korean government interests. The Korean government often contributed to the establishment of Japanese infrastructure projects. While Japanese settlers established infrastructure for their own good, the Korean government provided land, financial aid, even labour, along with technocrats, out of hope for ‘modernization’.

Going back to the question raised in the beginning, did the Japanese ‘modernize’ Korea or exploit it? Both ‘modernization’ and ‘exploitation’ are loaded words that are subject
to many different meanings and interpretations. Neither can fully describe the changes in Pusan. Trying to fit the rapid transformation of Pusan into one or the other concept makes it impossible to acquire a deeper understanding of the currents of the time. Rather, portraying the multidimensional realities of Korean lives in this period, and their relationship with the Japanese settlers sheds new light and offers new perspectives. A close examination of colonization at a human level can contribute to revealing the radical transformation of Korea and the Japanese impact on the port city of Pusan during the open-port period. The scope of this research is limited to only one ‘colonial city’, but I have tried to view it in the round and consider the process of colonization within a human-sized space. As the *North China Herald* stated, the Japanese authorities ‘consider that they have only just begun’ establishing the ‘modern city Pusan’. Further study is needed to elucidate the changes of the port city throughout the entire colonial period and see where the project went from these beginnings.
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