

## British Muslim Youth and Religious Fundamentalism: A Quantitative Investigation

### Abstract:

Much attention in popular discourse and academic, qualitative research has focused on strengthening 'fundamentalist' religiosity among Muslim youth in Britain, and its impact on engendering politicized religious identities and conservative social attitudes. We use new survey data to empirically examine how Muslim youth differ from older Muslims and non-Muslim British peers on religiosity, Islam-specific and broader social attitudes. We find that young Muslims attribute a greater salience to Islam for their personal identity, even though they pray and read scripture less, and support plural interpretations of Islam more than their elders. Like other youth, Muslim youth show liberalizing social attitudes across generations on gay marriage and legal abortion. Notably, like Christian youth, Muslim youth express stronger support for including religion in public debates than their elders. Overall, Muslim youth religiosity although uniquely expressed, influences moral and social attitudes for Muslims similarly to that of Christian or other religious youth.

Key words: Muslim youth, Islam, Britain, Religion, Attitudes, Immigrants

## **Introduction**

Muslim youth in Britain have been the subject of recurring media and academic scrutiny since the 1990s following landmark public events such as the book burning of Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses*, 'riots' in northern English towns in 2001, and the 2005 London bombings. Sensationalist media accounts of Muslim youth, particularly young Muslim men, have fused "over-determined religio-culturalist identities" with "notions of social exclusion and alienation" such that this group has become "the new Asian folk devil" in British public imagination (Alexander 2004, 532). Central to the moral panic and implicit in policy discourse surrounding British Muslim youth has been concern about a growing religious fundamentalism, politicization of religious identities, and alienation from mainstream British society (Archer 2009; Alexander 2004; Bleich 2009; Mirza et al. 2007; Ouseley 2001). In response, literature has emerged that critiques such stereotypical constructions of Muslim youth and problematizes the conflation of radical political Islam with quotidian religious practices, behaviors and beliefs of Muslim communities (Alexander 2004; Abbas 2005; Dwyer et al. 2008; Dwyer and Shah 2009; Hopkins 2006).

Nevertheless, several scholars have noted a visible growth of religiosity, or a 'new' Islam centered on a fundamentalist model of Muslim identity, among second- and third-generation Muslim migrant youth in Britain and other parts of Western Europe (Jacobson 1997; Archer 2001; Mandaville 2001; Glynn 2002; Roy 2004; Kibria 2008). This revivalist Islam, it is argued, is characterized by a disassociation of Islam from particular ethnic cultures, and oriented towards reconstructing a global Muslim community based on explicit, 'pure' tenets of religion (Roy 2004; Sutton and Vertigans 2005).

A few quantitative investigations of Muslim religiosity, beliefs, and social attitudes have been undertaken by think tanks or news channels (GFK NOP Social Research ND; Mirza et al.

2007; Gallup 2009). These surveys have often picked up on religious traditionalism and conservatism among Muslim youth (usually 16-24 year olds) when compared to older British Muslims. Issues highlighted include support for Islamic schooling, the veil and Sharia law. Reporting on its survey of Muslim religiosity and attitudes, authors from Policy Exchange indicate that “religiosity amongst younger Muslims is not about their parents’ cultural traditions” but is “more politicized.” This is expressed by a “greater stress on asserting one’s identity in the public space, such as by wearing a *Hijab*” (Mirza et al. 2007, 5). These polls have garnered much media coverage, sustaining public discourse of religious fundamentalism and socio-political alienation surrounding Muslim youth (see for example: Caldwell 2007). The results from these polls, however, are limited in several ways. In addition to a lack of clarity in data collection methodologies, analyses are largely descriptive and do not consider relevant controls. Crucially, these data often do not provide comparisons against other religious Britons, thereby limiting our ability to understand how Muslim youth religiosity and attitudes compare to other social groups.

Are British Muslim youth more religiously fundamentalist and socially conservative than older Muslims as popular, and even academic, discourse suggests? This study addresses these questions through quantitative examination of the religiosity, beliefs about religion and public life, and social attitudes of British Muslim youth using new survey data. We investigate whether Muslim youth show more fundamentalist religiosity, religious beliefs, and traditional social attitudes as compared to older Muslim Britons, controlling for relevant socio-economic characteristics. Furthermore, we examine how Muslim youth compare with other religiously observant youth on these matters. To our knowledge, this paper presents the first systematic, quantitative analysis of Muslim youth religiosity, Islam-specific attitudes, and social attitudes. In

addition, we speak to a broader question: Is Muslim youth religiosity distinctive against wider trends of religious change among younger generations in Europe?

The paper is organized as follows: we first present a brief demographic profile of the British Muslim youth, following which we situate this paper within existing questions, themes, and methodologies in the literature on Muslim religiosity and social attitudes in Europe. In the second half of the paper, we describe our data and variables and present results from our analysis of religiosity and attitudes. We aim to understand how young Muslims compared to their elders as well as how young Muslims compared to their Christian and non-religious youth counterparts. Our findings suggest that although religious identity among Muslim youth remains strong, it is increasingly individualized. Young Muslims, moreover, are not immune to generational decline in religious practice (witnessed across all religious groups in Britain, including Christians) or the general trend of liberalizing social attitudes across generations. Religious identity remains an important influence on more conservative moral and social attitudes for all religious groups, and our data suggest that in this way Islam is no different than Christianity.

### **Demographic Profile of British Muslim Youth<sup>1</sup>**

The Census of 2001 provided the first comprehensive, demographic data on faith groups in Britain.<sup>2</sup> While these data are useful in determining a picture of the socio-economic profile of Muslim youth, the census does not collect any specific data on religiosity, beliefs and social attitudes. Census data reveal that Muslims in Britain have the youngest age structure of all faith

---

<sup>1</sup> The Census of 2001 data presented in this section were compiled using standard census tables available on the NOMIS Labor Market Statistics website: <https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/home/census2001.asp>

<sup>2</sup> Data on religion were collected through different questions in England and Wales, Scotland and Ireland. The question in England and Wales focused on determining the size of the non-Judeo-Christian faiths. As the number of religious minorities outside of England and Wales is relatively small, the questions in Scotland and Northern Ireland focused on denominational differences (Peach 2006).

groups in England and Wales, with 62 percent of the population under age 30. Among Muslims, 16-29 year olds comprised 28 percent of the population, while for the whole population the same age category was 17 percent. Muslim men under 25 face higher levels of unemployment compared to Christian men in the same age group. The data for educational qualifications for Muslims follow a bimodal pattern: Muslims have the highest proportion of those with no qualifications of any faith group, even as figures for those with a first degree or more are the same among Muslims and the population as a whole. This pattern holds true for Muslim youth (16-24 years) with 22 percent of Muslims possessing ‘no qualifications’ compared with the national average of 16 percent. While presenting an overall socioeconomic portrait of the Muslim population, Census data cannot speak to questions of religiosity or social attitudes. For this, we must turn to other research.

### **Muslim Youth Religiosity**

The academic literature on Muslim youth religiosity, social and political attitudes, and civic engagement in Britain largely consists of qualitative micro-studies conducted across urban settlements in England and Scotland. Several ethnographic studies since the late 1990s have noted a growth in religiosity among British Muslim youth compared to Muslims of their parents’ generations. This suggestion of heightened religiosity among Muslim youth is particularly intriguing in light of wider secularizing trends in British society that show a steady generational decline in religiosity over the course of the twentieth century, as measured by religious affiliation, attendance and belief (Crockett and Voas 2006). While some commentators have argued that the steady decline of institutionalized religion has enabled new types of ‘subjectivized’ religious

belief and spirituality to flourish (Heelas and Woodhead 2005; Davie et al. 2003), others do not find evidence for this hypothesis for youth in Britain (Voas 2010).

Preliminary evidence suggests that the overall pattern of generational decline in religiosity exists among ethnic minorities in Britain as well. Using the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities (1993-94), Crockett and Voas (2006) also found that religiosity of ethnic minorities had registered a significant decline across two cohorts – 1934-43 and 1964-73 – even though the generational rate of loss was lower for Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Indians (groups most likely to be Muslim) than the white or Afro-Caribbean population. Nevertheless, the authors note although their data did not allow them to empirically test the hypothesis, it is possible that young Muslims have returned to religious practice in the past decade.

The growth of Muslim youth religiosity in recent decades, although unexamined using survey data, has been highlighted by various ethnographic studies. These studies draw attention to differences in the nature of religious affiliation and belonging between young, second- or third-generation Muslims ages 16-29, and their parents.<sup>3</sup> In qualitative fieldwork among young British Pakistanis in London, Jacobson found that these youth made a “fundamental distinction” between religion and ethnicity as sources of identity, with religion articulated as a more significant source of social identity (Jacobson 1997). This distinction was underpinned by the assumption that while ethnicity was particular to a place and region, Islam had universal relevance; by positioning themselves as Muslims, youth were identifying with a global community of believers, the *ummah*. In work on Bangladeshi communities in East London, Glynn (2002) and Kibria (2008) both

---

<sup>3</sup>The category youth is defined broadly and varyingly across these studies. While some have focused on, or included, young Muslims in secondary schools (14-17 year olds) (Saeed et al. 1999; Dwyer et al. 2008; Hopkins 2006) most have generally defined youth as between the late teens to the mid- to late-twenties. Here, we employ a definition of youth to be between 17-29 years. We also test for differences within the twenties, by breaking the twenties into an early- and late- category. In the event that there are no significant differences observed, we resort to the standard categorization of youth as 17-29 year olds.

describe how second- and third-generation Muslim youth tend to be critical of deep-rooted presence of ‘local’ Bengali folk traditions in contrast to ‘pure’ Islam which emphasizes the unity of Islam and Muslim community over diversity. Youth religious affiliation is predicated on a greater concern for “scripturalism and totalism, a return to basic principles and an emphasis on the significance of Islamic thought for all aspects of life,” suggesting a more fundamentalist orientation in Muslim youth religiosity (Kibria 2008, pp. 244).

Several field studies note a high personal use of religion in identity assertion among Muslim youth. In interviews with relatively ‘educationally successful’ young Muslim men in Bradford and Slough, Dwyer et al. found that religious identity shaped personal decision-making, particularly educational and career aspirations (Dwyer et al. 2008). The same study by Dwyer, as well others of Muslim males in Glasgow, Scotland, and Archer’s study of Muslim males in Milltown in northern England, emphasize how young Muslim men clearly used religion as a reference point in developing and articulating their masculinity (Dwyer et al. 2008; Hopkins 2006; Archer 2009). Religious identities are deployed in articulating their future visions of their role as breadwinners as well as in reinforcing patriarchal stereotypes about women and their role in the private sphere.

Scholars theorize that the changing manifestations of Muslim youth religiosity in European secular democracies reflect responses to globalization and secularization. Muslim migrants in Europe confront a context where the “relative harmony between religious, social, and national identity” cannot be presumed, thereby unleashing the potential for voluntary, self-constructed religious choice and diverse Muslim identities (Cesari 2004, 45). An increased emphasis on religious identity, use of religious identity in personal decision-making, and reconstruction of Muslim identity based on explicit tenets of religion reflect the individualization

of religious choice for Muslim youth, wherein religiosity is a “personal experience” not a “legacy” (Roy 2004). The argument about the ‘individualization’ of religious identity for Muslim youth corresponds with wider trends of religiosity in the west, which Davie succinctly characterizes as having shifted from “obligation” to “consumption” (Davie 2004). Nevertheless, although religion becomes less imposed or inherited and more adaptable to personal choice, Davie cautions against interpreting the loosening hold of conventional religious institutional structures as necessarily implying a privatization of religion. Indeed, those who remain religious in this new context “will want to make their views heard in public as well as private debate” (Davie 2004, pp. 80). Consequently, in a politically charged context in which Islam is often cast in terms of ‘clash of civilizations’, the opportunity to reshape and personalize religious identity and experience may result in a more fundamentalist orientation that embraces “Islam as a global system of resistance to Western political and cultural imperialism” (Buijs and Rath 2002, pp. 17).

### **Muslim Youth Social Attitudes**

Quantitative investigations of British Muslim youth or British Muslims more generally on themes of religiosity, attitudes or integration measures have come from surveys that are media-commissioned (Channel 4 *Dispatches* or YouGov polls) or carried out by think tanks (such as the Policy Exchange). Findings from these surveys on Muslim youth support for Sharia law, the Hijab, and Islamic schooling have been widely publicized in journalistic and academic accounts of religious fundamentalism, social disengagement, and radicalization among Muslim youth (eg. Caldwell 2007; Wilson 2007; Joppke 2009).<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> We use both terms – fundamentalism and traditionalism – intentionally here. In much of the literature on Muslims in Europe, fundamentalism is used as a religious category, describing a form of Islam that stresses a totalizing influence of religious customs on the believer’s life, rigid interpretation of the Qu’ran and a strong focus on Sharia. We use traditionalism or conservatism to refer to broader social values or attitudes that may

i) *Schooling*: In the Policy Exchange survey, a higher proportion of Muslims in the age range 16-24 reported a preference to send their children to Islamic schools (37 percent) compared to 45-54 year olds (25 percent) and 55+ year olds (19 percent). The majority of Muslims, however, preferred to send their children to a mixed state school (60 percent).

ii) *Sharia Law*: The Policy Exchange, NOP 2006 survey and ICM-Omnibus 2008 survey (both conducted for Channel 4 *Dispatches*) found that younger Muslims were more likely than older Muslims to prefer to live under Sharia law. According to the Policy Exchange survey, 37 percent of 16-24 year old Muslims reported a preference for Sharia law, compared to 17 percent of 55+ year olds. Similar numbers in the GfK NOP survey were reported – Muslims aged 18-24 and 25-44 were more likely to say they would prefer to live under Sharia law than their older counterparts (34 percent and 32 percent compared to 23 percent).

iii) *Hijab*: The biggest differences across age groups in the Policy Exchange survey were reported on this question. 74 percent of 16-24 year olds claimed they would prefer Muslim women to choose to wear the veil, compared to 28 percent 55+ year olds.

## **Research Gap**

Despite sustained media and academic interest in British Muslim youth as a social group, scholarship on Muslim youth has been predominantly ethnographic or theoretical. Quantitative academic investigations have largely focused on gaining a better picture of the socio-economic profile of Muslim youth using data from the Census. Moreover, existing works on youth religiosity, integration, beliefs and attitudes from media-sponsored polls and think tank surveys have several limitations. These polls do not clearly describe their survey methodologies, raising

---

be influenced by religion, or one's religiosity – such as those surrounding issues of gender, sexuality, or schooling,

concerns about representativeness of the data, nor do they provide a complete picture of the socioeconomic characteristics of the sample or the source data to facilitate further exploration of the data. In addition, these age-differentiated descriptive analyses do not attempt to disentangle socioeconomic or religious determinants of youth ‘fundamentalism’. Finally, existing work does not compare British Muslim youth with British youth of Christian or other faiths to examine whether generational or age-based differences are common across faiths. This is an important consideration, given previous literature on religion in the United States has shown that levels of religiosity, rather than particular religious tradition, predict socially conservative attitudes (Putnam and Campbell 2010).

This paper contributes to the literature substantively and methodologically by presenting a quantitative examination of Muslim youth religiosity, attitudes about religion in public life, and attitudes on social issues such as Sharia, homosexuality, and abortion. Using new survey data on British Muslims, we examine youth attitudes on themes for which data have not been previously widely available such as the interplay of religion in public life. These data enable us to examine religiosity across a diverse sample of British Muslims. Furthermore, our data facilitate important comparisons between Muslim youth and other groups including older Muslims, non-Muslim religious youth, and non-religious youth. These comparisons allow us to disentangle if, and specifically how, Muslim youth are distinctive from other social groups in their religiosity, and if that distinctiveness has an impact on social attitudes around the interplay of religion in public life, homosexuality, abortion.

## **Data and Methods**

We use new survey data on British Muslims collected by researchers at the University of Manchester, Harvard University, and the University of Notre Dame. The survey Faith Matters: British Muslims (FMBM) aimed to collect a large enough sample of British Muslims to conduct multivariate analysis. Because Muslims are a small minority in Britain, only geographic areas with higher concentrations of Muslims were sampled in order to achieve a large enough sample in a cost-effective manner. From the 2001 Census, Super Output Areas (OAs) containing 10% or more Muslim residents were identified. Overall, the sampled areas contain 67.5% of the Muslim population of Great Britain as reported in the 2001 Census.

Between January and May 2009, face-to-face interviews were conducted. When a person came to the door, the interviewer asked a set of screening questions including if any Muslims lived in the household. The survey was translated into both Punjabi Urdu and Sylheti; only six respondents answered the survey in a language other than English. A total of 480 interviews were completed. The survey had an overall high rate of non-response at 79 percent. This includes households that did not complete the screening questions, in which case we cannot tell if any Muslims lived in the household. Thus, the overall non-response rate likely somewhat overstates the response rate for eligible households, given that Muslims account for a minority of homes even in OAs with 10 percent or more Muslims.

It is difficult to assess how non-response and sampling impact our sample of Muslims because few national studies of Muslims exist. The last national statistics on British Muslims are from the 2001 Census; the length of time intervening between the census and the FMBM survey may render comparison inaccurate. The Citizenship Survey conducted oversamples of Muslims in 2008-2009, but this survey also used a sampling strategy based on higher concentration Muslim areas. Finally, the British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey of 2009 includes 104 Muslim

respondents as part of the full random sample, but only conducted interviews in English. Despite the drawbacks, the FMBM data were assessed in comparison to these three surveys; the assessment suggests that the FMBM data underrepresent Muslims that are both the least integrated (evidenced by underrepresentation of low educated and few interviews outside English) and most integrated (highly educated and mixed race Muslims are underrepresented).

The FMBM survey also collected a sample of 191 non-Muslims to compare how the survey methodology might influence results. We compared descriptively this sample of non-Muslims to the British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey. The same team of researchers that fielded the FMBM survey also included a module of largely identical questions to the FMBM survey on the BSA 2009. This gives us a large comparison group of non-Muslim Britons: 2,457 Britons with a non-Muslim religious affiliation (95 percent Christian and 5 percent other faiths) and 1,903 Britons who claim no religious affiliation. By comparing the 191 non-Muslim respondents on the FMBM survey to the 2009 BSA, we can determine how much survey firm house effects and survey design may influence results. Examination shows that the BSA and FMBM produce similar descriptive results for the non-Muslim population on demographic characteristics, indicating the data are comparable for our purposes. We use the BSA data in our analysis to compare our Muslim oversample to Britons of other faiths.

### *Dependent Variables*

We aim to examine how British Muslim youth differ from both older Muslims and non-Muslim youth. Table 1 provides information on our measures. We first examine several aspects of religiosity: religious practice, belief, and salience. Specifically, religious practice includes attendance at services, personal prayer, and personal scripture reading. We next examine how

strongly respondents say they believe in God. Finally, we examine religious salience: importance of religion in daily life, to sense of self, in political decisions, and in family and career decisions. Through these outcomes we can gain a sense of how Muslim youth are expressing religiosity differently than their Muslim elders, as well as from other British youth.

We next examine several Islam-specific attitudes and practices among only Muslims. These include the practices of fasting during Ramadan and wearing the headscarf, as well as attitudes toward the introduction of Sharia law and if there is only one true way to interpret Islam. Notably, the question on Sharia law specifically asks if Sharia law should be introduced to resolve *civil cases* between Muslims in Britain. Respondents are given three options: do not introduce Sharia law, introduce it only if the penalties do not conflict with British law, and introduce it in all cases between Muslims.

Finally, we examine several social attitudes. If one group were particularly conservative or traditional, we would expect their attitudes on social and moral issues to be concomitant with conservative religious attitudes. To test this, we examine attitudes on the morality of sex and homosexuality as well as the policy issues of legal abortion and gay marriage. Finally, we examine some attitudes regarding the role of religion in public life, including if religion is private and should be kept out of public debates, as well as if respondents think it is perfectly proper for religious leaders to try to influence voting.

Overall, examining a wide range of religious practice, religious salience, moral attitudes, and social policy attitudes paint a picture of if and how Muslim youth differ not only from their elders but also from British youth of other religions and of no religion.

*Independent variables*

The key independent variables in this analysis are age and religion. In particular, we are interested in comparing youth to their elders as well as Muslims to Britons of other religions and Britons of no religion. While this could be done by using interaction effects, we have opted to create a categorical age-religion variable so as to make the regression results simpler to interpret for the reader. We have defined youth as those ages 17-29; we tested specifying youth in other age ranges (such as 17-25 or 20-29), but the exact age cutoff does not substantively change results. We create six age-religion groups: young nones (claiming no religion identification), older nones, young Christians and other faiths, older Christians and other faiths, young Muslims, and older Muslims.

As a note, because this is cross-sectional analysis we cannot distinguish between the effects of age and cohort. For example, if youth tend to be different from their elders, we cannot determine if this is due to a life course effect, or due to the fact that this generation of youth is different from the older generation (and these differences will persist over age). We thus use the words age and generation interchangeably, but further work should examine to what extent effects are age-effects versus cohort effects.

Because Muslims are demographically different from non-Muslims, it is important that we also take into account a set of control variables so that we can parse out the effects of Islam separate from the effects of low educational attainment, for example. We include controls for gender, marital and parental status, education, work status, if the respondent owns or rents his or her place of residence, and ethnicity.

## **Results**

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for measures of religious belief, practice and salience; Islam-specific attitudes and practice; attitudes toward social and moral issues; and attitudes toward religion and public life. The morality questions were asked as part of a split questionnaire and therefore have many fewer respondents. In addition, the Islam-specific attitudes and practices were only asked on the FMBM survey, and thus have fewer respondents. We regressed each outcome variable on the generation-religion categorical variables as well as the control variables. Because coefficients from ordered logit and logistic regression models do not have an intuitive interpretation, we also ran simulations to calculate predicted probabilities for each of the age-religion groups holding all control variables at their means. We have graphed relevant predicted probabilities to facilitate ease in interpretation of the magnitude of generational and religious tradition effects. To create these predicted probabilities, we have set all other variables to their means; this produces probabilities for the population based on the sample distribution of each variable (i.e. the probabilities are correctly weighted for men and women, by education level, etc.).

We start by examining religious practice and belief (regression results in Table 2 and predicted probabilities in Figure 1). Not surprisingly, those who claim no religious affiliation ('nones') are less religious on all religiosity outcomes. Christians and Muslims of both age groups attend religious services at similar levels, whereas Muslims more often pray and read scriptures. There are some generational effects: older Christians and Muslims are more likely than youth of the same religion to engage in each of these behaviors. The same pattern holds for religious belief: Muslims more strongly believe in God than Christians, but in each religion the older generation is more religious than the younger. There is no evidence that Muslim youth are a

remarkable group on these measures—like their elders, they are more religious than their Christian counterparts, but like other youth, they are less religious than the older.

We next examine religious salience, including the importance of religion in everyday life, to one's sense of self, to political decisions, and to family and career decisions (regression results in Table 3, predicted probabilities in Figure 2). Again, secular nones are the least religious. Muslims express that religion is more important in their daily lives than Christians, with small generational effects of older generations being more religious. Other measures of religious salience, however, show a different story. Notably, Muslims are much more likely to say religion is important to their sense of self, but it is young Muslims that are the most likely. Whereas Christians show the same generational pattern of youth being less religious, Muslim youth report high salience of religion to their identity. In addition, Muslim youth are the most likely of all groups to say religion is important to their family and career decisions. Examining political decisions, Christians overall report more salience of religion to political decisions, and Muslim youth look identical to Christian youth statistically. Overall, Muslim youth do look unique in how religion is important to their lives; in particular, they stand out in the importance of religion to their sense of self and their personal decisions. Whereas Christian youth exhibit less salience than their elders, Muslim youth report higher salience in these areas than their elders.

Next, we examine Islam-specific attitudes and practices to see if Muslim youth differ (regression results in Table 4, predicted probabilities in Figure 3), including the practices of fasting during Ramadan and wearing a headscarf, as well as attitudes on Sharia law, women and men in Mosques, and if there is only one true way to interpret Islam. Here, we examine only Muslims, as these questions are relevant only to that group. Overall, the only major difference is that youth are more likely to have fasted during the last Ramadan. This may be more of an elderly

effect than a youth effect—those who are sick are not required to fast, and the elderly are much more likely to be infirm. There are also some near-significant youth effects on Sharia law attitudes, with youth being somewhat more supportive (although significant only at  $p < 0.10$ ). There are no statistically significant differences between Muslim youth and their elders on attitudes toward women and men in Mosques; if there is only one true way to interpret Islam; or in the practice of wearing a headscarf.

Finally, we turn to some social and moral attitudes as outcomes (Table 5 and Figure 4). We start by examining attitudes on religion and public life. First, on the question of if religion is a private matter and should be kept out of public debates, Christian and Muslim youth alike are the least supportive. Muslim youth indeed are more supportive of bringing religion into public debates than older Muslims, but so are young Christians. Looking to if it is okay for religious leaders to try to sway voting, it is older nones and Muslims who are the most opposed, whereas Muslim youth look similar to Christians (young and old) and young seculars. There is no clear evidence of Muslim youth being particularly supportive of bringing religion into the public sphere, at least when examined in light of young Christians as well. Religious Britons hold more conservative attitudes on the morality of both premarital sex and homosexuality, and Muslims tend to be more conservative than Christians on these questions. The same is true for elective abortion and gay marriage – Britons identifying with a religious tradition are less likely to support legal abortion (in more elective cases) and legalizing gay marriage. Notably, Muslim youth are the most conservative when it comes to the morality of homosexuality, falling even slightly more conservative than their elders. However, when it comes to the public policy question of gay marriage, a majority (74 percent) support legalizing either same-sex marriage or same-sex civil unions.

Given that much of the discourse about Muslim youth has focused on males, we examined how gender impacted the various models. Across both Islam and Christianity, women tend to be more religious than men. We ran interactions of gender with the age-religion variables to examine if gender had any unique impact among all Muslims or young Muslims. On measures of religiosity and religious importance, the only difference between Muslims and others is that Muslim women are less likely to attend religious services outside the home, despite being more likely than Muslim men to personally practice religion and express that religion is very important to their personal lives. Turning to other attitudes, the only models that showed any statistically significant interactions were on gay marriage and Sharia law, in somewhat contradicting directions. Young Muslim men are more supportive of gay marriage than any other Muslim age-gender group; at the same time, they are more supportive of Sharia law than any other age-gender group. In sum, there are few outcomes on which there are pronounced gender differences among Muslims or Muslim youth in particular.

Overall, then, there are only a few outcomes on which Muslim youth as a whole are unique. In general, Muslims are more religious than Christians, and older generations are more religious than younger generations. However, breaking this pattern, Muslim youth express that religion is more important to their sense of self than any other group and also express that religion is more important in their personal decisions. They do not, however, show any unique patterns on religious practice or belief. Although the effect is marginal, Muslim youth do appear to be more supportive of introducing Sharia law in civil cases between Muslims, which may suggest a more fundamentalist orientation of religious identity. In contrast, Muslim youth are no different from older Muslims with the majority denying there is a singular interpretation of Islam.

Finally, as strong religious believers, Muslim youth tend to be more morally conservative than both non-believers as well as Christian Britons, though there is little evidence to suggest that the Muslim youth express more conservative social and political attitudes across the board. Muslims in general are more morally conservative than Christian Britons, who in turn are more conservative than non-religiously affiliated Britons. Muslims are also sometimes more conservative on moral policy attitudes, such as abortion and gay marriage. However, there is little evidence that Muslim youth are particularly conservative on these issues.

## **Conclusions**

We used new data to examine empirically how Muslim youth are unique compared to older Muslims as well as their non-Muslim youth peers. While several ethnographic studies have examined Muslim youth religiosity, few studies have quantitatively examined claims of Muslim youth fundamentalism in religiosity and social-political attitudes. We do find evidence to suggest that Muslim youth engage with their religious identities uniquely. In particular, as compared to older Muslims and Christian peers Muslim youth are not any more religious in terms of practice, but religion is salient to their sense of self and for personal decision-making. This expression of religious identity among Muslim youth likely represents a “more personal form of Islam” in which a strong identification with Islam does not entail strict observance but carries ethical, cultural, or emotional connotations (Cesari 2004, pp. 45-46). These findings suggest empirical grounding for wider theoretical accounts of the ‘individualization’ of religious choice taking place among young Muslims in Europe in which religious values are adapted to youth needs and circumstances (Cesari 2004; Roy 2004). This finding underscores a common theme that has

emerged from several qualitative studies discussed earlier about the importance of religion for personal identity and the high personal use of religion for young Muslims.

Similar to previous studies, our data do indicate the relative tenacity of Muslim youths' religious belief, the impact of these beliefs in shaping conservative moral and social attitudes, and their marginally stronger support for Sharia law as compared to older Muslims. These findings may appear to echo findings from previous qualitative studies that report high levels of "scripturalism and totalism" and a strong influence of Islamic thought on all aspects of life. Moreover, it is exactly these aspects of Muslim youth religiosity when viewed against an increasingly secularizing Britain that can facilitate the widespread association of Muslim youth with fundamentalism.

Nevertheless, we believe that a more holistic interpretation of the issue entails a comparative assessment to tease out whether Muslim youth are unique in their religious expression when viewed against older generations as well as other religious youth. From this perspective, the generational patterns of religious behavior are quite similar across religious traditions. Muslim youth are not attending services more, reading the Qur'an more, or praying more than older Muslims. Like Christian youth, they are slightly *less* religious in practice than their elders. In addition, it does not appear that Muslim youths' strong personal identification with Islam has carried over into more traditional social and moral attitudes than their elders. Youth values appear to be changing in concert with generational shifts in social attitudes across the British population. While Muslim youth are more conservative than Christian youth (who are more conservative than non-religious youth) on moral attitudes, like Christian youth they are more liberal than their elders on questions of legal abortion and gay marriage. For example, despite Muslim youth overwhelmingly disapproving of homosexuality, these same youth largely

support legal recognition of same-sex relationships. We interpret this as an attempt by Muslim youth to separate their personal moral convictions from attitudes on public policy.

Our data do suggest some reason for concern for groups that receive the most attention, such as young, unemployed Muslim men with low levels of education. Our data confirm that this group is particularly religious and conservative across the set of social attitudes, more so than the average young Muslim or average Briton. However, our multivariate models suggest that a large portion of the religiosity and conservatism of this group is a result of their socioeconomic status, particularly their low levels of education and unemployment. For all Britons, higher levels of education and employment are related to lower religiosity and more liberal social attitudes. Hence, our results suggest that concern (or panic) about young, unemployed Muslim men is better viewed as an issue of low education and unemployment, rather than religion.

Our study has some important limitations. First, as mentioned before, the data used here are cross-sectional. As a result, we cannot distinguish whether differences between those who are young and those who are old are cohort effects or age effects. This is an important distinction. If the differences between youth and their elders is an age or lifecycle effect, we would expect that current youth as they age will come to look more like their elders. If, however, differences are a cohort effect, we would expect current youth to remain unique throughout their lifetimes. Unfortunately, longitudinal data would be necessary to draw out the distinction of age versus cohort effects, and no such data exist. Second, these data cannot reveal the underlying reasons or pathways explaining these differences in youth religiosity and attitudes. For instance, we cannot say why both Christian and Muslim youth are more likely to support the inclusion of religion in public debates. Although outside the scope of our data, we hope these findings will trigger further research on questions of youth religiosity and its impact on social attitudes more generally.

This work was motivated in part by the charged public discourse on the issue of Muslim youth religious fundamentalism. Moreover, within a secular British context where religious attendance and belief decline with each generation, the strong commitment to faith retained by the Muslim minority has stirred much public consternation about the ‘illiberal’ impact of religiosity in shaping the social and political attitudes. These concerns are exemplified in an opinion piece in *The Telegraph* on the growth of the British Muslim population: “How will the rapid growth of a conservative religion affect British social attitudes towards women’s rights, marriage, divorce, homosexuality and abortion? . . . I suspect that nothing politicians do will, in chattering terminology, “set back” social attitudes as drastically as the growth *among young people* of a faith [Islam] that, even in its moderate incarnations, is resolutely non-liberal on many moral issues’ (Thompson 2010). In many such characterizations, British Muslim youth are portrayed as distinctive in their heightened religiosity that is totalizing in its capacity to shape their moral and social attitudes, as well as broader public policy preferences.

These discussions neglect to examine if and how Muslim religiosity is distinctively experienced by younger Muslim Britons compared to older Muslims, and whether religiosity operates similarly for Muslim youth as with other youth. These comparisons are theoretically important for understanding age-based or generational differences in experiences of religiosity and engagement with religion against wider processes of societal secularization. Contrary to assertions of a ‘politicized’ religious identity among Muslim youth alone, our research suggests certain common attitudes about the inclusion of religion in the public debates and the interplay of religion and politics among religious youth in general as compared to older generations. As the number of believers and religiously affiliated declines, this finding suggests a call for the strengthening of public religion by younger generations who remain religious. We suggest that

while Muslim youth may be the most visible symbols of a politicized religious identity in media and public perception, their experiences and concerns are not unique but are shared in part by other religious youth. This finding is consistent with recent work that argues that religious decline and privatization, two key dimensions of secularization, operate dialectically, with believers less likely to accept the relegation of religion to the private sphere in return for religious freedom (Casanova 1994; Achterberg et al. 2009).

Muslim youth support for Sharia law as indicated by public opinion polls has been used as a key factor to support of claims surrounding the politicization of, or fundamentalism of youth Muslim identities. Our question specifically concerns the use of Sharia law in civil cases, and we find marginally stronger support for Sharia law among youth. While we cannot say definitely explain the finding, this tendency may be related to de-ethnicization of Islam and identification with a more globally oriented Islam alluded to earlier. While this question may be seen as a marker of a fundamentalist Islam among Muslim youth, we are inclined to view support for Sharia in conjunction with the stronger support for flexible interpretations of Islam among Muslim youth, who are marginally less likely than older generations to believe there is ‘there is only one true interpretation of Islam’. According to Jorgen Nielsen, an Islamic Studies professor “it is virtually impossible to conduct a debate about how Muslims should live in any given context without at least partially conducting it in Sharia terms.” Sharia, thus, can be used “to justify a modernist, pluralist and flexible approach to being a Muslim as it can an obscurantist, backward-looking and violent approach.” (Nielsen quoted in Klausen 2005, pp. 159).

By systematically analyzing survey data that are largely representative of Muslims in Britain and comparing trends among Muslim youth to non-religious and Christian youth, we have highlighted generational differences and patterns that have often been sketched out in

ethnographic works but not assessed from a macro-perspective. We hope this paper provides further impetus for multi-method research that empirically examines the changing significance of religion across different young people of faith in different Western contexts. Furthermore, future research on how youth draw a distinction between religiously influenced moral and social attitudes and wider public policy preferences remains much needed.

## REFERENCES

- ABBAS, TAHIR 2005 *Muslim Britain: communities under pressure*, New York: Zed Books.
- ACHTERBERG, PETER et al. 'A Christian cancellation of the secularist truce? Waning Christian religiosity and waxing religious deprivatization in the West', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, vol. 48, no. 4, pp. 687-701.
- ALEXANDER, CLAIRE 2004 'Imagining the Asian gang: Ethnicity, Masculinity and youth after 'the Riots'', *Critical Social Policy*, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 526-549.
- ANSARI, HUMAYUN 2004 *The infidel within: Muslims in Britain since 1800*, London: Hurst & Co.
- ARCHER, LOUISE 2009 'Race, 'face', and masculinity: the identities and local geographies of Muslim boys' in Peter Hopkins and Richard Gale (eds), *Muslims in Britain: race, place and identities*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 74-91.
- ARCHER, LOUISE 2001 'Muslim Brothers, Black Lads, Traditional Asians': British Muslim Young Men's Constructions of Race, Religion and Masculinity', *Feminism and Psychology*, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 79-105.
- BATES, STEPHEN 2006 'Devout Poles show Britain how to keep the faith', *The Guardian*, vol. Religious Affairs.
- BLEICH, ERIK 2009 (a) 'Where do Muslims stand on ethno-racial hierarchies in Britain and France? Evidence from public opinion surveys, 1988-2008', *Patterns of Prejudice*, vol. 43, no. 3-4, pp. 379-400.
- BLEICH, ERIK 2009 (b) 'State Responses to 'Muslim' Violence: A Comparison of Six West European Countries' in *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 361-379.

- BUIJS, FRANK and JAN RATH 2002 'Muslims in Europe: The State of Research'. New York: Russell Sage Foundation
- CALDWELL, CHRISTOPHER 2007 'Graphic images of separateness', *Financial Times*, UK.
- CANTLE, TED 2001 'Community cohesion: A report of the independent review team'. London: Home Office
- CASANOVA, JOSE 1994 *Public religions in the modern world*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- CESARI, JOCELYNE 2004 *When Islam and democracy meet: Muslims in Europe and in the United States*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- COMMISSION ON BRITISH MUSLIMS AND ISLAMOPHOBIA 2004 *Islamophobia: issues, challenges, and action*, Stoke on Trent, UK: Trentham Books.
- COLLINS-MAYO, SYLVIA and DANDELION, PINK 2010 *Religion and Youth*, Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
- CROCKETT, ALASDAIR and DAVID VOAS 2006 'Generations of Decline: Religious Change in 20th Century Britain', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, vol. 45, no. 4, pp. 567-584.
- DAVIE, GRACE 2004 'New approaches in the sociology of religion: A Western perspective,' *Social Compass*, vol. 51, no. 1, pp. 73-84.
- DAVIE, GRACE et al. 2003 *Predicting Religion: Christian, secular and alternative futures*, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.
- DWYER, CLAIRE and SHAH, BINDI 2009 'Rethinking the identities of young British Pakistani Muslim women: educational experiences and aspirations ' in Peter Hopkins and Richard Gale (eds), *Muslims in Britain: race, place and identities*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 55-73.

- DWYER, CLAIRE et al. 2008 'From cricket lover to terror suspect' - challenging representations of young British Muslim men', *Gender, Place and Culture*, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 117-136.
- ERIKSON, ROBERT S. et al. 1988 *American public opinion: its origins, content, and impact*, New York; London: Macmillan; Collier Macmillan.
- FIELD, CLIVE D. 2007 'Islamophobia in Contemporary Britain: The Evidence of the Opinion Polls, 1988-2006', *Islam & Christian-Muslim Relations*, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 447-477.
- FONER, NANCY and RICHARD ALBA 2008 'Immigrant Religion in the U.S. and Western Europe: Bridge or Barrier to Inclusion?', *International Migration Review*, vol. 42, no. 2, pp. 360-392.
- GALLUP 2009 'The Gallup Coexist Index 2009: A Global Study of Interfaith Relations'.
- Gest, J. 2010 *Apart: alienated and engaged Muslims in the West*, London: Hurst.
- GFK NOP SOCIAL RESEARCH 2006 'Attitudes to living in Britain: A Survey of Muslim Opinion. On behalf of Channel 4 Dispatches.
- GILLIAT-RAY, SOPHIE 2010 *Muslims in Britain: an introduction*, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- GLYNN, SARAH 2002 'Bengali Muslims: the new East End radicals', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 25, no. 6, pp. 969-988.
- HEELAS, PAUL and WOODHEAD, LINDA 2005 *The spiritual revolution: why religion is giving way to spirituality*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing
- HELLYER, H. A. 2009 *Muslims of Europe: the 'other' Europeans*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- HOME OFFICE 2010 'Citizenship Survey 2009-10: Statistical Release '.
- HOPKINS, PETER 2006 'Youthful Muslim masculinities: gender and generational relations', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, vol. 31, pp. 337-352.

- HOPKINS, PETER E. and GALE, RICHARD 2009 'Introduction: Muslims in Britain - race, place and spatiality of identities' in Peter Hopkins and Richard Gale (eds), *Muslims in Britain : race, place and identities*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 1.
- HOPKINS, PETER E. and GALE, RICHARD 2009 *Muslims in Britain : race, place and identities*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- HOUT, MICHAEL and FISCHER, CLAUDE S. 2002 'Why More Americans Have No Religious Preference: Politics and Generations', *American Sociological Review* vol. 67, no. 2, pp. 165-190.
- HUSSAIN, SERENA 2008 *Muslims on the map: a national survey of social trends in Britain*, London ;New York: Tauris Academic Studies.
- ICM AND OMNIBUS RESEARCH 2008 'Muslim opinion poll on behalf for Channel 4 Dispatches'.
- JACOBSON, JESSICA 1997 'Religion and ethnicity: Dual and alternative sources of identity among young British Pakistanis', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 238-256.
- JENNINGS, M. K. and NIEMI, RICHARD G. 1981 *Generations and politics: a panel study of young adults and their parents*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- JOPPKE, CHRISTIAN 2009 'Limits of integration policy: Britain and her Muslims', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 35, pp. 453-472.
- JOPPKE, CHRISTIAN 2004 'The retreat of multiculturalism in the liberal state: theory and policy', *The British journal of sociology*, vol. 55, no. 2, pp. 237-257.
- KIBRIA, NAZLI 2008 'The 'new Islam' and Bangladeshi youth in Britain and the US', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 243-266.
- KING, GARY et al. 2000 'Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation', *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 44, no. 2, pp. 347-361.

- KLAUSEN, JYTTE 2005 *The Islamic challenge: politics and religion in Western Europe*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- MANDAVILLE, PETER 2009 'Muslim Transnational Identity and State Responses in Europe and the UK after 9/11: Political Community, Ideology and Authority', *Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies*, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 491-506.
- MANDAVILLE, PETER G., 2001 *Transnational Muslim politics: reimagining the umma*, London ;New York: Routledge.
- MAXWELL, RAHSAAN 2010 'Trust in Government Among British Muslims: The Importance of Migration Status', *Political Behavior*, vol. 32, pp. 89-109.
- MAXWELL, RAHSAAN 2006 'Muslims, South Asians and the British Mainstream: A National Identity Crisis', *West European Politics*, vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 736-756.
- MIRZA, MUNIRA et al. 2007 'Living apart together: British Muslims and the paradox of multiculturalism', London: Policy Exchange.
- MODOOD, TARIQ 1997 *Ethnic minorities in Britain: diversity and disadvantage*, London: Policy Studies Institute.
- OUSELEY, HERMAN 2001 'Community Pride Not Prejudice: Making Diversity Work in Bradford'. Bradford: The Bradford District Race Review Panel.
- PEACH, CERI 2006 'Muslims in the 2001 Census of England and Wales: Gender and economic disadvantage', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 629-655.
- PEACH, CERI 2005 'Britain's Muslim Population: An Overview' in Tahir Abbar (ed), *Muslim Britain : communities under pressure*, London ;New York :New York: Zed Books ;Distributed exclusively in the USA by Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 18-30.

- PEW RESEARCH CENTER 2006 'The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other', vol. The Pew Global Attitudes Project.
- PEW RESEARCH CENTER 2006 'Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns about Religious and Cultural Identity'.
- PHILLIPS, DEBORAH 2006 'Parallel lives? Challenging discourses of British Muslim self-segregation', *Environment and Planning*, vol. 24, pp. 25-40.
- PUTNAM, ROBERT D. and CAMPBELL, DAVID 2010 *American grace: how religion divides and unites us*, New York: Simon & Schuster.
- ROY, OLIVIER 2004 *Globalised Islam: the search for a new Ummah*, London: Hurst.
- SAEED, AMIR et al. 1999 'New ethnic and national questions in Scotland: post-British identities among Glasgow Pakistani teenagers', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 22, no. 5, pp. 821-844
- SUTTON, PHILIP W. and VERTIGANS, STEPHEN 2005 *Resurgent Islam: a sociological approach*, Cambridge, UK: Polity.
- TOMZ, MICHAEL et al. 'CLARIFY: Software for interpreting and presenting statistical results', vol. 2011, no. April 4.
- VOAS, DAVID 2010 'Explaining change over time in religious involvement' in Sylvia Collins-Mayo and Pink Dandelion (eds.) *Religion and Youth*, Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited, pp. 25-32.
- WERBNER, PNINA 2004 'Theorising Complex Diasporas: Purity and Hybridity in the South Asian Public Sphere in Britain', *Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies*, vol. 30, no. 5, pp. 895-911.
- WILSON, GRAEME 2007 'Young British Muslims 'getting more radical'' *The Telegraph UK*
- WUTHNOW, ROBERT 2007 *After the baby boomers: how twenty- and thirty-somethings are shaping the future of American religion*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

TABLES

*Table 1: Descriptive statistics of variables describing religious belief and practice, religious salience Islam-specific attitudes, and social attitudes*

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Measurement</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>N</b>
<i>Religious belief and practice</i>				
Religious attendance	1=never, 2 = sometimes, 3 =weekly	1.67	.79	1360
Prayer	6-point scale, 1=never to 6=several times a day	2.89	2.0	1360
Read scripture	6-point scale, 1=never to 6=several times a day	2.16	1.5	1360
Belief in God	5-point scale, 1= don't believe to 5= absolutely sure	3.8	1.5	1360
<i>Religious salience</i>				
Importance of religion ...				
In daily life	4-point scale, 1= not at all to 4 = very	2.15	1.1	1360
to sense of self	4-point scale, 1= not at all to 4 = very	2.62	1.3	1360
in making political decisions	4-point scale, 1= not at all to 4 = very	1.95	1.0	1360
to family / career decisions	4-point scale, 1= not at all to 4 = very	2.36	1.2	1360
<i>Islam-specific measures</i>				
Ramadan fasting	5-point scale, 1=never to 5=always	4.45	1.1	404
Introduction of Sharia law “to resolve civil cases between Muslims”	1 = Yes, introduce in cases between Muslims 2 = Yes, introduce but only in cases where it does not conflict with British law 3= No, do not introduce	2.17	.81	461
Women and men should separately in Mosques	1= Yes, 0=No	1.16	.50	387
Truth in Islam	1 = only one true way to interpret Islam, 2 = can't choose, 3 = there is more than one true way to interpret Islam	2.21	.94	482
Headscarf	1 = respondent/wife wears a headscarf, 0 = does not	0.66	.47	391
<i>Social attitudes</i>				
Religion is a private matter should be kept out of public debates	5-point scale, 1 = agree strongly to 5 = disagree strongly	2.19	1.1	1315
It is perfectly proper for religious leaders to try to persuade people how to vote	5-point scale, 1 = agree strongly to 5 = disagree strongly	3.86	1.0	1311
Morality of premarital sex	3-point scale, 1=always wrong to 3=never wrong	2.18	.82	636
Morality of homosexuality	3-point scale, 1=always wrong to 3=never wrong	1.79	.80	603
Abortion should be allowed...				
Woman decides she doesn't want baby	1=Should be allowed, 0 = No	0.61	.49	1237
Couple can't afford a child	1=Should be allowed, 0 = No	0.51	.50	1185
Woman's health in danger	1=Should be allowed, 0 = No	0.94	.24	1262
Gay marriage	1=homosexual couples should be allowed to legally marry; 2 = should be allowed to form civil unions; 3 = should not be allowed to obtain legal recognition	2.04	.83	1248

Table 2: Coefficients and t-scores from regressions of religious practice and belief on age/religion groups and background variables

	Religious attendance	Prayer	Read Scriptures	Belief in God
<i>Religion/age categories</i>				
None, young [reference]				
None, old	0.289 (1.00)	0.901*** (-3.92)	-0.223 (-0.57)	0.191 (1.05)
Christian, young	2.737*** (9.14)	2.509*** (-9.88)	0.913* (2.11)	2.167*** (9.08)
Christian, old	2.797*** (10.19)	2.907*** (-12.93)	1.297*** (3.58)	2.311*** (12.52)
Muslim, young	2.843*** (8.61)	3.421*** (-11.71)	1.660*** (3.92)	2.718*** (7.15)
Muslim, old	2.882*** (9.37)	3.672*** (-13.76)	1.855*** (4.57)	2.956*** (10.59)
<i>Background</i>				
No qualifications [reference]				
O-level qualification	0.282** (2.85)	-0.0187 (-0.21)	0.183 (1.25)	-0.0854 (-0.73)
A-level qualification	0.454*** (4.39)	0.170 (1.81)	0.235 (1.51)	0.0680 (0.56)
College degree	0.715*** (6.54)	0.179 (1.77)	0.418* (2.54)	-0.195 (-1.46)
Female	-0.0723 (-1.00)	0.723*** (10.67)	0.271* (2.41)	0.568*** (6.66)
Married	0.236** (3.09)	-0.0390 (-0.55)	0.104 (0.87)	0.112 (1.22)
Children at home	0.0177 (0.22)	-0.0838 (-1.12)	-0.255* (-2.03)	-0.0109 (-0.11)
Working	-0.248** (-3.23)	-0.312*** (-4.42)	-0.464*** (-3.97)	-0.307*** (-3.34)
Own	0.0217 (0.26)	0.0591 (0.77)	0.124 (1.05)	-0.0357 (-0.36)
Asian	0.979*** (6.64)	-1.364*** (-9.38)	2.298*** (10.43)	2.398*** (9.98)
Black	1.457*** (8.03)	2.255*** (12.10)	2.645*** (9.77)	2.158*** (7.13)
<b>N</b>	<b>4224</b>	<b>3994</b>	<b>1535</b>	<b>2434</b>

Note: t statistics in parentheses

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Table 3: Coefficients and t-scores from regressions of religious salience on age/religion groups and background variables

	Importance of religion in everyday life	Importance of religion to sense of self	Importance of religion to political decisions	Importance of religion to family /career decisions
<i>Religion/age categories</i>				
None, young [reference]	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
None, old	0.0980 (0.62)	0.0920 (0.37)	-0.277 (-1.16)	-0.501* (-2.16)
Christian, young	1.839*** (9.40)	1.951*** (6.94)	1.244*** (4.43)	1.385*** (5.03)
Christian, old	2.188*** (14.08)	2.300*** (9.71)	1.314*** (5.81)	1.467*** (6.67)
Muslim, young	2.435*** (10.18)	3.461*** (9.47)	1.210*** (3.85)	1.760*** (5.57)
Muslim, old	2.591*** (12.28)	3.192*** (10.50)	1.027*** (3.61)	1.562*** (5.52)
<i>Background</i>				
No qualifications [reference]	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
O-level qualification	-0.0663 (-0.77)	-0.121 (-1.03)	-0.0315 (-0.26)	-0.322** (-2.72)
A-level qualification	0.0132 (0.15)	0.00523 (0.04)	0.0917 (0.74)	-0.0814 (-0.66)
College degree	0.0906 (0.93)	-0.0880 (-0.65)	0.0597 (0.45)	-0.274* (-2.06)
Female	0.464*** (7.32)	0.322*** (3.67)	0.0827 (0.95)	0.293*** (3.37)
Married	0.108 (1.61)	0.107 (1.14)	0.0837 (0.89)	0.268** (2.87)
Children at home	-0.0847 (-1.19)	-0.188 (-1.87)	0.106 (1.09)	-0.0703 (-0.72)
Working	-0.282*** (-4.17)	-0.412*** (-4.40)	-0.223* (-2.43)	-0.348*** (-3.79)
Own	0.0505 (0.70)	0.0524 (0.52)	0.124 (1.26)	0.101 (1.02)
Asian	1.595*** (10.85)	1.914*** (9.39)	1.225*** (6.52)	1.968*** (10.12)
Black	1.805*** (10.24)	2.038*** (7.90)	1.321*** (5.56)	1.778*** (7.22)
N	4223	2422	2201	2216

Note: t statistics in parentheses

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Table 4: Coefficients and t-scores from regressions of Islam-specific attitudes on age groups and background variables, Muslims only

	Fasting during Ramadan	Sharia law should be introduced in civil cases between Muslims	Women and men should pray separately	There is more than one true way to interpret Islam	Respondent or spouse wears a headscarf
Young Muslims	0.598* (2.11)	-0.448 (-1.78)	0.274 (0.63)	0.165 (0.68)	-0.113 (-0.41)
Old Muslims [reference]	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
<i>Background</i>					
No qualifications [reference]					
O-level qualification	-0.168 (-0.56)	-0.230 (-0.95)	0.349 (0.72)	0.0407 (0.17)	0.462 (1.50)
A-level qualification	-0.537 (-1.66)	0.0500 (0.19)	-0.183 (-0.37)	0.0309 (0.12)	0.00754 (0.02)
College degree	-0.517 (-1.56)	-0.129 (-0.49)	-0.0360 (-0.07)	0.456 (1.70)	0.00883 (0.03)
Female	0.119 (0.52)	-0.270 (-1.46)	0.0366 (0.10)	0.0441 (0.23)	-0.349 (-1.46)
Married	0.843** (3.18)	-0.167 (-0.79)	0.590 (1.45)	-0.232 (-1.11)	1.051*** (3.94)
Children at home	0.353 (1.44)	-0.0882 (-0.43)	0.427 (1.12)	0.300 (1.47)	0.377 (1.49)
Working	-0.0877 (-0.38)	0.336 (1.76)	-0.417 (-1.14)	0.281 (1.47)	-0.994*** (-4.00)
Own	0.331 (1.46)	-0.0139 (-0.07)	0.208 (0.57)	0.0736 (0.39)	-0.170 (-0.71)
Asian	0.593 (0.88)	-1.768*** (-7.04)	1.668* (2.10)	-0.584* (-2.25)	2.061* (2.35)
Black	0.929 (1.25)	-1.420*** (-3.84)	1.550 (1.73)	-1.528*** (-3.94)	2.235* (2.41)
N	442	503	422	528	427

Note: t statistics in parentheses

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Table 5: Coefficients and t-scores from regressions of sex, abortion, and gay marriage variables on age, religion, and background characteristics.

	Religion should be kept out of public debates	OK for rel. leaders to sway voting	Premarital sex is never wrong	Abortion allowed: woman doesn't want	Abortion allowed: couple can't afford	Abortion allowed: woman's health in danger	Homo-sexuality is never wrong	Gay marriage should be legal
<i>Religion/age categories</i>								
None, young [reference]	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
None, old	0.175 (0.88)	-0.598** (-3.01)	-0.564 (-1.28)	0.334 (1.37)	-0.010 (-0.04)	0.537 (1.00)	-1.031** (-3.10)	-1.044*** (-4.44)
Christian, young	-0.699** (-2.76)	-0.110 (-0.43)	-1.276* (-2.42)	-0.302 (-1.00)	-0.598* (-2.04)	0.420 (0.60)	-1.078* (-2.51)	-0.773** (-2.65)
Christian, old	-0.479* (-2.46)	-0.166 (-0.86)	-1.300** (-3.02)	-0.242 (-1.04)	-0.605** (-2.63)	0.141 (0.28)	-1.453*** (-4.45)	-1.474*** (-6.37)
Muslim, young	-0.611* (-2.08)	0.343 (1.15)	-2.257*** (-4.08)	-0.493 (-1.45)	-0.851* (-2.40)	-0.0495 (-0.08)	-1.981*** (-3.91)	-0.974** (-2.83)
Muslim, old	-0.184 (-0.71)	-0.484 (-1.84)	-2.549*** (-4.98)	-0.403 (-1.33)	-0.867** (-2.84)	0.407 (0.66)	-1.746*** (-4.04)	-1.741*** (-5.75)
<i>Background</i>								
No qualifications [reference]								
O-level qualification	-0.0431 (-0.38)	-0.214 (-1.89)	0.311 (1.69)	0.343* (2.57)	0.187 (1.39)	0.348 (1.38)	0.900*** (4.79)	0.355** (2.92)
A-level qualification	-0.253* (-2.14)	-0.262* (-2.21)	0.705*** (3.55)	0.410** (2.95)	0.102 (0.73)	0.672* (2.33)	1.212*** (6.17)	0.528*** (4.22)
College degree	-0.489*** (-3.85)	-0.0450 (-0.35)	0.972*** (4.61)	0.613*** (4.10)	0.329* (2.22)	0.778* (2.49)	1.670*** (7.99)	0.853*** (6.31)
Female	0.117 (1.42)	-0.186* (-2.23)	0.145 (1.05)	0.141 (1.45)	0.00707 (0.07)	0.335 (1.66)	0.861*** (6.31)	0.586*** (6.58)
Married	0.141 (1.59)	0.00357 (0.04)	-0.445** (-2.98)	-0.280** (-2.64)	-0.0825 (-0.78)	0.239 (1.08)	-0.737*** (-5.11)	-0.591*** (-6.22)
Children at home	-0.259** (-2.83)	0.267** (2.88)	0.117 (0.72)	0.104 (0.94)	-0.0943 (-0.87)	-0.403 (-1.78)	0.141 (0.94)	0.381*** (3.80)
Working	-0.0687 (-0.78)	-0.0615 (-0.69)	0.777*** (5.24)	0.110 (1.05)	0.116 (1.11)	0.170 (0.80)	0.630*** (4.36)	0.520*** (5.50)
Own	-0.167 (-1.78)	-0.0337 (-0.36)	0.143 (0.92)	0.0545 (0.50)	-0.0208 (-0.19)	0.0787 (0.37)	0.220 (1.42)	0.00673 (0.07)
Asian	-0.331 (-1.79)	0.189 (0.99)	-2.170*** (-7.14)	-0.580** (-2.76)	-0.653** (-3.01)	-1.150** (-2.93)	-1.379*** (-4.38)	-1.377*** (-6.46)
Black	-0.707** (-3.10)	0.609** (2.59)	-1.569*** (-4.26)	-0.734** (-2.71)	-0.943** (-3.28)	-1.537*** (-3.68)	-1.562*** (-3.53)	-1.242*** (-4.43)
N	2176	2166	1044	2063	1988	2112	995	2101

Note: t statistics in parentheses

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

RIDHI KASHYAP is a guest fellow in the Migration and Urban Research Group at the Institute for Empirical and Applied Sociology at the University of Bremen.  
ADDRESS: EMPAS, Building FVG-Mitte, 1 Celsiusstrasse, 28539 Bremen, Germany.  
Email: rkashyap@post.harvard.edu

VALERIE LEWIS is research faculty at The Dartmouth Institute for Health Policy and Clinical Practice at Dartmouth Medical School.  
ADDRESS: The Dartmouth Institute, 35 Centerra Parkway, Lebanon, NH 03766, USA.  
Email: valerie.lewis@gmail.com

## FIGURES

*Figure 1: Predicted probabilities of religious practice, holding control variables at mean*




Figure 2: Predicted probabilities of religious salience, holding control variables at mean




Figure 3: Predicted probabilities of Muslim attitudes, holding controls at mean




Figure 4: Predicted probabilities of moral and social attitudes, holding controls at mean

