

D.PHIL. THESIS

Social Policy, Protest Participation and Violent Crime in Latin America

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Green Templeton College, University of Oxford

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy



Michaelmas Term 2014

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Thesis Abstract: This thesis consists of four self-contained articles which focus on different aspects of citizens' demand for and governments' supply of social policy in Latin American democracies. The underlying questions that link the four papers are a) do social and economic grievances affect citizens' propensity to protest? and, b) do democratic governments in the region use social policy as an instrument to mitigate social discontent and violent crime? In the first two papers, I use public opinion data in order to examine the determinants of citizens' participation in protest with a special focus on dissatisfaction with the quality of public services, demands for inequality-reduction policies and economic deprivation. The results show that among other factors, protest participation is motivated by citizens' discontent over the quality of basic social services, support for redistributive policies, and relative economic deprivation. The third and fourth papers analyze the "supply side" of social spending in the region focusing on collective protest and violent crime, respectively. The third article argues that under democracy, organized labor is in a better position relative to other groups in society to obtain social policy concessions as a consequence of their collective action efforts. The results show that whereas social security spending increases as a consequence of labor militancy, cutbacks in human capital spending are less likely as peaceful large-scale demonstrations increase. The fourth paper argues that political leaders use education spending as an instrument to mitigate violent crime. It also argues that the effect of violent crime on education spending is larger when leftist governments are in power. The empirical analysis provides support for these arguments.

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my special appreciation and thanks to my supervisors, David Rueda and Martin Seeleib-Kaiser, for their constructive criticism, and their constant encouragement and support. I am also enormously grateful to Nancy Bermeo, Gerardo Munck, and Timothy Power, for valuable comments and suggestions, which certainly contributed to improve my work.

I would also like to thank participants of the Latin American Seminar at the University of Southern California, the Midwest Political Science Association Conference in Chicago, the American Political Science Association Conference, and the Workshop on Inequality in Context at Tampere University in Finland for their insightful comments and suggestions to different versions of the articles of this thesis. I appreciate financial support provided by the Mexican National Council of Science and Technology.

During my time in Oxford I made extraordinary friends. I would like to extend my gratitude to Jesper Kulvmann, Amrit Virk, Thorn Pitidol, Jaree Pinthong, Gisela Robles and G.J Melendez-Torres. All of them have made this journey a more joyful one.

Thanks to my father Edmundo and my mother Martha, to my five sisters and my brother; all of them have always been a source of love and inspiration in my life.

I thank Mauricio Rivera for his helpful comments and criticism, and above all for his exceptional support and company throughout these years.

Word Count

Approximately 47,000 words.

Declaration

The fourth paper in this thesis, “Beyond Sticks and Stones: Human Capital Formation in Response to Violent Crime in Latin America”, has been co-authored with Mauricio Rivera.

To my parents, Edmundo and Martha.

To my grandparents, Irma and Edmundo.

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
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Introduction

Since the “third wave of democratization” (Huntington, 1991) took place Latin America has experienced a profound political transformation. Whereas only 30 percent of the countries were classified as democracies in 1974 -the starting year of the global wave of transitions from autocracy to democracy-, the percentage of democratic countries in the region reached 90 percent by 2008 (See Figure 0.1). Indeed, Latin America is the most democratic region outside the so-called industrialized democracies (Munck, 2003). Most notably, whereas authoritarianism was the modal type of government and many democracies were short-lived over the course of the twentieth century in Latin America, most third wave democratic regimes have survived in the post-1978 period. In short, the wave of transitions from authoritarianism to democracy represents “one of the most profound changes in the history of Latin American politics” (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2014, p. 4).

Figure 0.1: Democracy in Latin America (1970-2008)



Source: Cheibub et al. (2010).

Despite the surge and consolidation of democracy over the last three decades, citizens dissatisfaction with popularly elected governments, and with the social

outcomes of democratic politics in the region is widespread. According to the 2012 Latin American Public Opinion Survey (LAPOP), 42 percent of respondents were very dissatisfied or dissatisfied with the way democracy works in their countries. In line with this, area specialists have stressed the low quality of democracy in Latin America (O'Donnell et al., 2004; O'Donnell, 2010; Levine and Molina, 2011). A fast growing body of research has turned its focus from traditional questions concerning the conditions under which democracy survives and consolidates and how regime institutions work to a renewed focus on the state. Beyond the well-known institutional shortcomings of democracy, among LA-area specialists there appears to be a consensus that democracy has underperformed in areas or dimensions that are mainly associated with the functioning of the state (O'Donnell, 2010; Mazzuca, 2010).

More specifically, in addition to the largely examined institutional deficits of democracy (i.e., corruption, clientelism, ineffective checks and balances) (see Munck, 2004, for an extensive review), social issues related to poverty, inequality, under-provision of public goods, and societal violence have attracted increasing attention, and are considered amongst the most remarkable deficits of democracy performance in contemporary Latin America (Munck, 2003; Levy and Schady, 2013; Huber and Stephens, 2012).

Although Latin American countries have made some progress in recent years, poverty is widespread in rural areas, as well as in the periphery of urban areas. A large segment of the population in the region still lives under rather adverse and unprivileged material conditions, and lack access to basic public services such as clean water, health, and education. By 2011, despite a significant reduction of poverty between 2003 and 2008, 13 per cent of Latin Americans lived under extreme poverty and 27 percent under moderate poverty (World Bank 2013). In other words, around 80 million people live under \$2.5 a day, and 160 million people survive with no more than \$4 dollars a day (Rodriguez-Castelan et al., 2013).

Secondly, the promise of building more equal societies began to wane rapidly after transitions from authoritarianism to democracy. Latin America is one of the most unequal regions in the world. By 2011, the GINI coefficient in the region ranged from 0.43 to .57, both of which are much higher compared to the minimum (0.24) and maximum (0.41) GINI coefficients for non-Latin American OECD countries. This means that, with no exception, all Latin American states had larger income disparities than the most unequal non-LA country in the OECD (i.e., Turkey) (Rodriguez-Castelan et al., 2013).

Thirdly, in addition to high levels of poverty and inequality, newly democratic governments in the region have experienced an astonishing wave of crime and homicidal violence over the last thirty years (Bergman, 2006; Whitehead and Bergman, 2009). Frequently, international organizations such as the World Health Organization and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime describe the region as the most violent worldwide. In line with this, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has recently defined this phenomenon as an epidemic of violence. Not surprisingly, public opinion surveys frequently show that public insecurity ranks at the top of public concerns within the region (Cruz, 2009; Whitehead and Bergman, 2009).

Democracy and Social Policy in Developing Countries

As noted above, social problems such as poverty, inequality, and societal violence constitute most prominent symptoms of the low quality of democracy in Latin America. It is thus not surprising that these phenomena have motivated the emergence of new avenues of social science research that go beyond the dominant focus on political regimes, transitions, and consolidation (e.g., O'Donnell, 1973; Linz and Stepan, 1978; Collier and Collier, 1991; O'Donnell et al., 1986; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2014). Particularly, a new and rapidly growing literature has emerged on the factors that shape social policy in developing countries, as well as its outcomes.

A central concern among scholars has been to understand whether democra-

cies invest more in social policies (i.e., education, health and social security) as compared to their authoritarian counterparts. Democracy has been consistently found to exert a positive impact on social spending in the developing world, particularly on human capital investment (Avelino et al., 2005; Brown and Hunter, 1999; Huber et al., 2008a; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001; Rudra and Haggard, 2005; Segura-Ubiergo, 2007; Stasavage, 2005). Commonly suggested theories for this finding highlight the two key attributes of democratic regimes: political contestation and inclusiveness (Dahl, 1971). Well-known models in political economy imply that transitions from dictatorship to democracy should lead to reductions in inequality and poverty. Once competitive elections are in place and universal suffrage is granted, political leaders are expected to be responsive to the demands for redistribution of the decisive voter, especially in unequal societies (Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Acemoglu, 2006; Boix, 2003). Similarly, in contrast to authoritarian leaders who resort to the provision of private benefits to co-opt the political opposition, democratic leaders turn to the provision of more publicly oriented goods because they depend on the support of a larger coalition in order to remain in power (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Lake and Baum, 2001).

Electoral-based explanations are central in the literature of democracy and social policy in the developing world and this is not surprising. Elections are the main instrument citizens have at their disposal to give mandates to their representatives and hold them accountable by punishing or rewarding them on the basis of their performance while in office (Manin et al., 1999). Moreover, even with all the limitations elections entail as an instrument to control governments, it is still the only mechanism of vertical accountability that respects the egalitarian political principle of one person, one vote (Przeworski, 1998, p. 362).

General Research Questions

In democracies, citizens' participation in elections is an important instrument to induce welfare state policies, but it is certainly not the only one. Political participation under democracy entails a spectrum of activities, ranging from

conventional political methods such as voting in free and fair elections to non-conventional or less frequent political activities, namely street protests, strikes and riots. By non-conventional methods of political participation I do not necessarily mean illegal or anti-systemic activities, but a set of political actions taking place outside the formal institutional arena (i.e., elections, legislatures, etc.).

The focus in this thesis is on different aspects of citizens' demand for and governments' supply of social policy in Latin American democracies. On the "demand side" of social policy this thesis seeks to uncover the sources of citizens' propensity to protest. More specifically, it seeks to answer the following question:

- To what extent participation in protest is motivated by dissatisfaction with social services provision, income inequality and economic grievances?

On the other hand, this thesis analyzes the "supply" side of social policy by focusing on two factors that have been so far ignored in the literature on social policy in developing countries: collective protest and violent crime. The research question is:

- Do democratic governments in the region use social policy as an instrument to mitigate social discontent and violent crime?

Overview of the Thesis

The present thesis consists of four self-contained articles. The first paper argues that satisfaction with the provision of public services and the demand for redistributive policies affect the democratic deficit (i.e., the gap between support for and satisfaction with democracy), and constitute important drivers of citizens engagement in protest participation. Using survey data from a sample of Latin American countries, it shows that the democratic deficit in Latin America widens as citizens dissatisfaction with education and health services increases and as citizens perception that the government should implement policies to reduce inequality increases. Moreover, it also shows that both, discontent over public social services and support for redistribution increase citizens propensity to protest.

The second paper analyzes the relationship between economic deprivation and protest participation. More specifically, it seeks to answer the following questions: How do economic grievances and availability of resources matter for an individual's propensity to join a protest? Do welfare policies condition the effect of economic motives on the propensity to protest? The paper argues that relative economic deprivation motivates protest participation and that this effect varies according to individuals' income. Among individuals whose income falls close to the middle of the income distribution economic motives to participate (i.e., worsening of financial situation and attribution of blame to the government for economic outcomes) and availability of resources (i.e., income) converge to fuel protest participation, but not among the very poor or the rich. Whereas among the poor, the relative scarcity of resources mitigates the politicization of economic grievances, among the rich the relative abundance of resources and alternative channels of political influence available to this group produce the same effect.

Secondly, it further argues that governments' adoption and/or expansion of labor and social policies designed to lessen the impact of external economic shocks reduces the effect of economic motives on the propensity to join a protest. The empirical analysis yields support for these arguments in a sample of Latin American democracies. At the macro-level empirical evidence shows that economic performance and income inequality do affect overall levels of collective protest. At the individual-level the results show that economic motives encourage protest participation only among individuals close to the middle of the income distribution, but not among the poor or the rich. Finally, the introduction or strengthening of labor and social policies in the context of economic downturns mitigates the effect of individuals' economic motives on the propensity to join a protest.

The third paper analyzes the relationship between collective protest and social spending in Latin America from 1970 to 2007. The main argument is that under democracy, organized labor is in a better position relative to other groups in society to obtain social policy concessions as a consequence of their collective action efforts. Labor insiders mobilize around specific demands, and labor strikes

carry significant economic and political costs on governments. In contrast, other groups in society rarely protest around specific social policy issues and are more often subject to successful demobilization tactics from political leaders. The empirical analysis shows that in democracies, collective protest has differentiated effects on social spending. While strikes have a strong positive long-term effect on social security and welfare spending, none of the different forms of collective protest affect education or health spending. Furthermore, the results provide evidence of a deterrent effect of mass protests in democratic regimes; cutbacks in human capital spending are less likely as peaceful large-scale demonstrations increase.

The fourth paper turns its attention to the relationship between violent crime and social policy. A great deal of research has examined law enforcement and repressive government responses to violent crime. Yet the existing literature tends to neglect political leaders non-coercive responses to violent crime. This paper argues that welfare spending is an instrument that leaders have to mitigate violent crime. Violent crime tends to be perpetrated by young males from socio-economic disadvantaged backgrounds, thus, political leaders advance policies of human capital formation via education spending in contexts of high levels of social violence. From a politicians perspective, investment in human capital formation policies is expected to contribute to reduce crime rates via its positive effect in secondary school enrollment rates. It also argues that the effect of violent crime on education spending is larger when left governments are in power since they tend to stress individuals motivations over windows of opportunities as the main causes of crime. The analysis provides support for these arguments from a sample of Latin American democracies from 1980 to 2007. It also show that governments efforts toward enhancing human capital formation increase secondary education enrollment, which in turn reduces violent crime.

1 Democratic Deficits and Protest Participation in Latin America: The Effects of Dissatisfaction with Social Policies and Demand for Redistribution

Abstract

Studies on the welfare state have demonstrated that democratization has been accompanied by major increases in human capital spending in Latin America. However, in many of these young democracies discontent over the provision and the quality of basic services is widespread, which has led to the politicization of discontent through mass protests. This article argues that satisfaction with the provision of public services and the demand for redistributive policies affect the democratic deficit (i.e., the gap between support for and satisfaction with democracy) and constitute important drivers of citizens' engagement in protest participation. Using survey data from a sample of Latin American countries, this article shows that the democratic deficit in Latin America widens as citizens' dissatisfaction with education and health services increases and as citizens' perception that the government should implement policies to reduce inequality increases. Moreover, it also shows that both, discontent over public social services and support for redistribution increase citizens' propensity to protest.

1.1 Introduction

There is a broad consensus among scholars that since the transitions to democracy, education and health spending have seen substantial increases in Latin America (e.g., Huber et al., 2008a; Avelino et al., 2005; Brown and Hunter, 2004; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001). Moreover, recent declines in poverty and inequality in almost all the countries of the region are associated with human capital spending and with the introduction or expansion of conditional cash transfer programs (CCT's) (Gasparini and Lustig, 2011; Levy and Schady, 2013; Huber and Stephens, 2012). During the last decade, before the onset of the economic crisis in 2008, the countries of the region also experienced sustained economic growth that reached an average rate of almost 5% (ECLAC and OECD, 2012). The combination of these factors have led to a significant growth of the middle-class;¹ from 103 to 152 million people, which accounts for approximately 30% of the region's population (Ferreira et al., 2012).

Despite these positive trends, Latin American countries exhibit amongst the highest levels of income inequality in the world.² In fact, the strengthening of policies to better redistribute income and to combat unequal access and poor quality of basic public services remain crucial challenges for the democracies in the region (Levy and Schady, 2013; Cardoso and Magalhaes, 2001). Recent survey data from the *Americas Barometer* (LAPOP, 2012) shows that around 40% of the population in the region are “very dissatisfied” or “dissatisfied” with the quality of public schools, and this percentage reaches 50% in the case of public health services. Moreover, around 80% of the population consider that the government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality.

What are the consequences of citizens' discontent over social policies and income inequality for democratic legitimacy? Do these factors have an impact on individuals' propensity to protest? This article analyzes the consequences of

¹Defined as those living on \$10 to \$50 a day in 2005 purchasing parity (Rodriguez-Castelan et al., 2013).

²Compared to other OECD countries, the lowest Gini coefficients in the region, those of Argentina and Uruguay (.43; the highest is .57) is still higher than the highest Gini coefficient in other OECD countries which corresponds to Turkey and reaches .41. (Rodriguez-Castelan et al., 2013, p. 21)

citizens' dissatisfaction over health and education policies and income inequality on the democratic deficit and the propensity to protest. I argue that citizens' negative assessments of the provision of public services and greater demand for policies to reduce inequality are positively associated with the democratic deficit (i.e., the gap between support for and satisfaction with democracy) and constitute important drivers of citizens' engagement in protest participation.

In recent years several governments in the region have indeed faced citizens' discontent over inequality and demands for social policy change (Valls, 2013). For instance, the student protests in Chile demanding major reforms to the education system in 2011 are considered the largest demonstrations since the return to democracy in the country.³ Also known as the "Chilean Winter", the movement's broad framing of its demands reflected increasing discontent over the deep inequalities that characterize the country. The protests rapidly gained ample support from diverse segments of the Chilean society, often expressed through "cacerolazos" or "saucepan protests" (Long, 2011). Another example are the mass protests in Brazil in 2013, which originated as a consequence of an increase in the public transportation fare, and rapidly evolved to include broader grievances related to corruption, and especially, to a lack of adequate access to education and health services. In the words of one protester: "This is not just about bus fares any more. We pay high taxes and we are a rich country, but we can't see this in our schools, hospitals and roads" (Watts, 2013). The protests, some of which included hundreds of thousands demonstrators took place in the midst of the organization of the World Cup. Among the protesters placards with slogans showing their demands were common: "We don't want the Cup. We want education, hospitals, a better life for our children" (Benson and Levine, 2013).

An extensive literature on support and satisfaction with democracy has emphasized the relevance of economic performance (e.g., Mishler and Rose, 2001) for citizens' confidence in political institutions and/or on the level of support and satisfaction with democracy. Scholars have also focused on other factors

³The immediate precedent of the protests in 2011 are the demonstrations in 2006 by secondary school students, also known as "The Penguins' Revolution" (Donoso, 2013).

such as corruption (e.g., Seligson, 2002, 2006; Weitz-Shapiro, 2008; Booth and Seligson, 2009), crime control (e.g., Fernandez and Kuenzi, 2010; Ceobanu et al., 2011), and municipal governments' provision of information and efficiency (Weitz-Shapiro, 2008). Despite the relevance that inequality and the provision of public services have for the region, it has not been analyzed yet to what extent ordinary citizens' views on the quality of public services and the need for redistribution affect their support and/or satisfaction with democracy.

Using survey data from a sample of 18 Latin American countries, this article shows that the democratic deficit in Latin America widens as citizens' dissatisfaction with the quality of education and health services increases, and as citizens' beliefs that the government should implement policies to reduce inequality are stronger. Moreover, it also shows that both, discontent over public social services and support for redistribution increase citizens' propensity to protest.

In an insightful piece on the state of the democracy in Latin America Munck (2003) identified the high levels of violence, corruption, poverty and inequality as endemic problems of the democracies in the region. In his own words: "Latin America has the distinction of being the most consistently democratic region of the world outside the advanced democracies...The region is also characterized by negative elements that distinguish it not only from Western European countries and other rich democracies, but in some respects such as inequality, even from other developing regions" (2003, p. 566). Analyzing the consequences that inequality and the poor provision of public services have on citizens' perception of the democratic deficit, and whether these sources of discontent are politicized in the protest arena contributes to better understand the drivers of change in the democracies of the region. Thus, the results presented here have broader implications for the study of democratic accountability and governability in the region.

1.2 Support for Democracy and the Democratic Deficit

It is well-known among scholars that support for democracy is a multifaceted concept. Starting at a general level, “support refers to the way in which a person evaluatively orients himself to some object through either his attitudes or his behavior” (Easton, 1975, p. 436). Much of the literature on democratic legitimacy takes at its point of departure Easton’s distinction between *diffuse support* and *specific support* (e.g., Booth and Seligson, 2009; Norris, 2011). For instance, Norris (2011, ch. 2) disaggregates five forms of support ranging from the most diffuse to the more specific; national identities, approval of core regime principles and values, evaluations of regime performance, confidence in regime institutions, and approval of incumbent office holders. In a similar vein, Booth and Seligson (2009, 60) establish six dimensions of democratic legitimacy ranging from the most specific referents to the more abstract dimensions: regime economic performance, local government, political actors, regime institutions, political community, and regime principles. In both disaggregations of the concept of democratic legitimacy, actual levels of support are higher the more diffuse support is. In fact, a central characteristic that distinguishes specific forms of support from diffuse ones, is that while the former are closely connected with citizens’ satisfactions derived from the performance of political actors or institutions, diffuse forms of support do not immediately depend on performance, and thus, are more durable than specific forms support (Easton, 1975).

Central to this paper is the assessment of the extent to which support for redistributive policies and the level of satisfaction with the provision of public services affects the size of the democratic deficit and the propensity to protest. To analyze democratic deficits I follow Norris’ idea which links citizens’ demand for democracy with their perceived supply. As Norris explains: “The size of the democratic deficit derives from the overwhelming approval of democratic values and principles, which are widely expressed in most societies today, and yet the more skeptical evaluations of the democratic performance of governments, which are also relatively common” (2011, p. 31). Building upon Eckstein (1961), Norris


further argues that high congruence between demand and supply of democracy can be considered a signal of contentment with the status quo, and thus, the likelihood of regime instability should be low. However, when the size of the democratic deficit is large, there is room for the channeling of demands for change through political mobilization (Norris, 2011, p. 33). Indeed, general theories of political conflict have long considered that the gap between people's aspirations and satisfactions, which may increase as a result of social modernization (i.e., increased literacy, urbanization, mass media etc.), is a source of political instability and violence (e.g., Davies, 1962; Huntington, 1969; Gurr, 1970).

After three decades of sustained democracy in Latin America fears of authoritarian reversals have dissipated and scholarly attention has shifted toward how to improve the functioning of democracy or the quality of democracy (Munck, 2004). Democracy as a political system actually enjoys high levels of support, as in most democracies around the world (Booth and Seligson, 2009; Norris, 2011). Moreover, similar to Western democracies, in Latin America protest participation has been normalized. That is, protest mobilization is an alternative channel to other forms of political participation (i.e., voting, campaigning, contacting officials etc.) used by citizens to voice their demands and express their discontent (Booth and Seligson, 2009, ch. 5). It is thus plausible that perceived democratic deficits in Latin America share common sources with protest participation.

Before turning to the argument linking demands for economic equality and the provision of public goods with democratic deficits and protest participation, Figure 1.1 illustrates the extent of the democratic deficits in Latin America. Using data from the 2012 survey of the Latin American Public Opinion Project, *Support for Democracy* measures the extent to which citizens agree with the statement: "Democracy may have problems but it is better than any other form of government". On the other hand, *Satisfaction with Democracy* measures how satisfied individuals are with the way democracy works in their country. To calculate the *Democratic Deficit*, which is the difference between support for democracy and satisfaction with democracy, both variables have been rescaled to range from 0

to 1. As explained above, democracy as a political system enjoys high support in most countries. Whereas average support is well above .6 in all of the countries, except for Honduras; average satisfaction with the way democracy works only reaches .6, in Uruguay and it is below that level in the rest of the countries. It is worth noting that cases such as Peru, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador and Honduras have very low levels of democratic deficits due to their also relatively low levels of support for democracy and relatively high levels of democratic satisfaction. On the other hand, there are cases where both support for democracy and satisfaction with democracy show above regional average levels such as Venezuela, Uruguay, Argentina, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama and Brazil. Finally, a third group of cases show below regional average levels in both, support for and satisfaction with democracy. These cases are: Paraguay, Mexico, Dominican Republic, Colombia, Guatemala and Bolivia.

Figure 1.1: Democratic Deficits in Latin America



1.3 Previous Research and Hypotheses

Studies on the sources of satisfaction with democracy have underscored a number of factors that influence citizens' reported levels of satisfaction with democracy. Prominent among them are different measures of the quality of governance, democratic processes, and policy performance. For instance, using an aggregate measure that combines the Worldwide Governance Indicators (i.e., voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, rule of law, and control of corruption) (Norris, 2011, ch. 11) finds a strong positive relationship between this index and citizens' satisfaction with democracy in 44 countries of the world.

Similarly, Dahlberg and Holmberg (2013) find that the quality of bureaucratic institutions as defined by their effectiveness, professionalism, and impartiality shape citizens' evaluations about the working of democracy in a positive way. Similar to other studies focused on the extent to which certain features of the political and party system are conducive to higher representation, they find that ideological congruence between parties and voters leads to higher levels of satisfaction with democracy. Moreover they find that among the sample of democracies that they analyze, those government's attributes matter more than indicators for the quality of representative democracy for citizens expressed satisfaction with democracy. Wagner et al. (2009) study focused on European democracies test a number of correlates of satisfaction with democracy and find that a better rule of law, lower corruption, checks and balances, and general institutional quality enhance satisfaction with democracy.

There is a parallel between the findings of studies focused on macro-level measures of government performance and institutional quality and those focused on individual-level variables. Subjective evaluations on the quality of governance as well as the extent to which people feel represented in the political system have proven to be important predictors of citizens' satisfaction with democracy. For instance, Huang et al. (2008) show that positive perceived government performance in areas such as the respect for individual freedoms and human rights,

effectiveness in handling the most important issue, and the degree of corruption affect how satisfied citizens are with democracy. The negative consequences of perceived level of corruption is a consistent finding in the literature and several studies show that its effect extends to support for democracy. Bratton et al. (2004, ch. 11) work on Africa shows that corruption has a strong effect on the perceived supply of democracy⁴, and that this effect is of similar size of important variables such as trust in institutions and economic performance. Given that many of the interactions between citizens and their governments happen at the local level, Weitz-Shapiro (2008) focuses on government performance in Argentina as experienced by the citizens in their municipality. She finds that citizens discriminate between different types of information when they evaluate how democracy works and the extent to which they are committed to democracy. While having to wait long lines does not affect either, the provision of information and the perceived level of corruption largely affect satisfaction with democracy, and the latter also negatively affects citizens' commitment to democracy (but see Graham and Sukhtankar, 2004).

An important debate in the literature relates to the extent to which economic factors weight more heavily than political and/or cultural aspects for democratic support (Mishler and Rose, 1996, 2001, 2005; Shin et al., 1989). A comprehensive study which includes many of the young democracies of the world shows that aspects related to the electoral process as well as trust in democratic institutions are equally important as individuals' evaluations of the state of the national economy for citizens' satisfaction with democracy (Chu et al., 2008; also see Chang et al., 2006). Contextual variables related to economic performance such as economic growth, unemployment and inflation have also been found to affect satisfaction with democracy (Ezrow and Xezonakis, 2011; Wagner et al., 2009; Booth and Seligson, 2009).

Until recently, scholars started to investigate the influence of other policy-related issues such as crime victimization, subjective well-being and human de-

⁴Measured as the average of two questions in the Afrobarometer (1999-2001), one that asks individuals how much of a democracy is today in their country, and the second which focuses on the extent of satisfaction with ask with the way democracy works in the individuals' country.

velopment. Work focused in Africa and Latin American countries shows that individuals who have been victims of crime or feel unsafe are significantly less likely to be satisfied with democracy (Bratton et al., 2004; Booth and Seligson, 2009; Fernandez and Kuenzi, 2010). Social policy performance has been proxied using aggregate outcome-based measures such as the human development index and an index of subjective well-being which combines individuals' self-reported level of happiness, satisfaction with their life, the state of their health, and their financial situation (Norris, 2011, Ch.10). Similarly, focusing on European democracies, Anderson and Singer (2008) analyzed the effect of inequality, measured at the country level, on citizens' trust in public institutions and on satisfaction with democracy and found that inequality does have a negative impact on those aspects of system support. Recently, also focusing on Europe Lühiste (2014) investigated the role that social protection policies play at both, the aggregate and individual level (i.e., evaluations of health care, pensions and unemployment compensation policies) on citizens' satisfaction with the working of democracy. She found that social exclusion reduces satisfaction with democracy while positive assessments of social protection policies have the opposite effect.

This article shares with the above mentioned studies the common interest of incorporating social policy performance to the study of democratic legitimacy. However, rather than resorting to the use of aggregate measures of social spending or outcome-based indicators of well-being, similar to Lühiste (2014), I focus on citizens' evaluations of the role of the state in providing basic social services as well as on reducing inequalities. Nonetheless, different from Lühiste (2014), this article focuses on Latin American democracies and examines the democratic deficit instead of analyzing only support for democracy or satisfaction with democracy. More importantly, beyond analyzing the effect of these factors on the democratic deficit, a central concern of this paper is to empirically assess the extent to which grievances related to social services' provision and citizens' demands for inequality-reduction policies associate with the propensity to join a protest. Thus, this article examines the following hypotheses:

H1. Individuals dissatisfaction with the quality of education and health services increases the democratic deficit.

H2. The democratic deficit widens as the level of individual support for the need of redistributive policies increases

H3. Dissatisfaction with the quality of education and health policies is positively associated with the propensity to join a protest.

H4. Support for government intervention to reduce inequality is positively associated with the propensity to participate in protest.

1.4 Data and Method

In order to test the hypotheses presented in the previous section, I use data from the 2012 survey of the LAPOP for 18 Latin American democracies.⁵ The main dependent variables are the *Democratic Deficit* and *Protest Participation*. As explained in the first section of this paper, the democratic deficit measures the difference between support for democracy and satisfaction with democracy. To measure participation in protest I use a question that asks individuals whether they have participated in a protest march or demonstration in the last twelve months. Positive responses are coded as 1, and zero otherwise (for the exact wording of all questions see the Appendix).

Independent variables

The central concern of this article is to analyze the extent to which satisfaction with the provision of social policies and support for policies to reduce income inequality affect the democratic deficit and protest participation. To measure the extent of citizens' *Dissatisfaction with education and health*, I calculate the average from individuals' responses to two questions that ask about their level of satisfaction with the quality of public schools and with the quality of medical and health services. The resulting variable goes from 1 to 4 with increments of

⁵The countries included are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. Fieldwork dates vary by country between January and April.

.5; the higher the value, the more dissatisfied an individual is with the quality of education and health policies. *Demand for inequality-reduction policies* measures the extent to which individuals agree that the government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. This variable ranges from 1, strong disagreement to 7, strong agreement.

Control Variables

Several additional variables have been included in the analyses to account for other factors that have been found in previous research to have an impact on each dependent variable. Most of the control variables are common to both dependent variables. First, there is robust evidence that citizens who have been victims of crime are less satisfied with democracy and more likely to participate in politics, including protest participation (Bateson, 2012). Additionally, recent work has shown that citizens' evaluations of government's actions to fight public insecurity affect their level of support and satisfaction with democracy (Fernandez and Kuenzi, 2010). Thus, I include a control for whether the respondent has been a *Victim of any type of crime* in the last 12 months. The variable *Government improves public safety* accounts for the extent to which individuals consider that the government is tackling the problem of public insecurity. Possible answers range from "not at all" to "a lot".

To account for arguments linking economic conditions to satisfaction with democracy (e.g., Mishler and Rose, 1996), I include two indicators which measure citizens' evaluations of their *Country's economic situation* as well as of their own *Personal economic situation*. Both indicators range from "very good" to "very bad". Similarly, I include the level of *Life satisfaction* to capture individuals' subjective assessment of their general well-being (Dalton et al., 2010). Possible answers range from "very dissatisfied" to "very satisfied".

Several indicators account for individuals' interest and knowledge of politics. Individuals who report high levels of *Interest in Politics* should be more likely to participate in politics and also be more critical citizens (Norris, 2011). This

variable ranges from “none” to “a lot”. Similarly, I include an indicator of *News attention* to measure the frequency with which individuals get informed about politics. This variable goes from “daily” to “never”. On the other hand, *Perception of corruption* controls for political grievances associated with wrongdoings among public officials (e.g., Seligson, 2002). Possible answers range from “very uncommon” to “very common”. *Left_right* accounts for political ideology based on individuals’s self-placement on a left-right scale. In order to account for the role of the indigenous population in social movements and protests in the region (e.g., Van Cott, 2010; Yashar, 2005; Inclán, 2008), I also include a dummy variable which identifies individuals who consider themselves to be *Indigenous*. Individuals who voted for the incumbent should show lower levels of democratic deficits and should also be less likely to protest as compared to those who voted for a losing candidate, thus, I include a dummy variable to identify those individuals who *Voted for the incumbent*.⁶ Finally, I include the usual socio-demographic controls. The level of education is measured with the numbers of *Years of education* that an individual has completed. *Distance to median income* measures how far an individual’s total monthly household income is from that of the median.⁷ *Marital status* identifies those individuals who are married. I also include an indicator for gender, which takes the value of 1 for *Female*, and zero otherwise. *Unemployed* individuals are distinguished from the rest with the expectation that for these respondents the democratic deficit is larger and thus, should also have more motives to protest. Finally, I also include an indicator for the *Age* of the individual and whether he/she lives in an *Urban* area.

Three additional factors that affect protest participation but not democratic deficits have been included only in the analysis of protest participation. These are: the frequency with which individuals *Participate in group meetings*, *Solve community problems* and *Use the internet*. These variables have been reversed so

⁶I created this variable using an item that asks respondents who did they vote for in the last presidential election. Those who voted for a candidate who resulted the winner were coded as one, and zero otherwise.

⁷The original variable has 17 categories based on the currency and distribution of each country. Similar to Anderson and Beramendi (2011), I recoded this variable to reflect an individual’s distance from the median income, thus, it ranges from -8 to 8.

that the higher their value, the more frequent the reported activity is.

Method

Given the different nature of the main dependent variables, I use a linear regression and a logistic regression to test the hypotheses on the democratic deficit and protest participation, respectively. LAPOP (2012) uses a common sample design based on a multi-staged stratified probability sample. The specifications of the regression analyses take into account the design effects of the sample.⁸ For the 2012 round LAPOP used the municipality as the primary sampling unit. Country-dummies are also included in both models to account for the effects of unobserved factors that are shared within each country. Because the primary interest of this paper is at the individual-level, I focus on the linear and logit models which include country fixed-effects (see Bryan and Jenkins, 2013). However, as a robustness check I also run a multilevel linear regression and a multilevel logit model with random intercepts, using the municipality as the grouping variable at the second-level.

1.5 Results


For presentation purposes the regressions table is not shown here but it is available in the Appendix. Instead, Figure 1.2 and 1.4 summarize the results from the linear regression and the logit models, respectively.⁹ According to H1, the size of the democratic deficit is expected to widen as citizens' dissatisfaction with the quality of education and health policies increases. The results shown in Figure

⁸Stata 11 was used for the statistical analysis and the survey setting was applied to the main models presented here (svyset upm [pw=weight1500], strata(estratopri)).

⁹Table 1.2 in the Appendix reports the linear regression model of the democratic deficit and two logit models of protest participation. The number of observations varies in each model because the question on democratic satisfaction, which was used to calculate the democratic deficit, was only asked to half of the interviewed. However, given that this question was asked randomly in every country (i.e., only to individuals with odd questionnaires) potential concerns of selection bias can be ruled out. For the models of protest participation this is not a problem. Thus, the logit model in column 2 uses all of the available observations. To test the robustness of this model to variations in the sample, column 3 shows the results from a logit model that used a restricted sample based on the observations included in the model of the democratic deficit. Despite the difference in sample size, the results are very similar between the two logit models. This provides additional support for the main findings of this paper. The results shown in Figures 1.2 and 1.4 are based on the models in columns 1 and 2.

1.2 provide strong support for this hypothesis. The average marginal effect¹⁰ of *Dissatisfaction with education and health policies* is .06 and significant at the .001 level. On the other hand, H2 suggests that the democratic deficit widens as the level of individuals' support for redistributive policies increases. The results also strongly support this hypothesis. The average marginal effect of *Demand for inequality-reduction policies* is .033 and it is significant at the .001 level.


Figure 1.2: Average Marginal Effects of Independent Variables on the Democratic Deficit in Latin America



¹⁰When using average marginal effects to estimate the effect of each variable on the outcome variable, a marginal effect is computed for each case, then all computed effects are averaged. This is a more convenient way to estimate the substantial effects of independent variables since compared to marginal effects at means, which uses the mean value of each independent variable, average marginal effects uses the actual values for all other independent variables for each case. For instance, when estimating the effect of being unemployed, average marginal effects treats all observations as if the individual is unemployed and leaves all other independent variables values as is. Then it does the same but this time treating the respondent as though he was not unemployed. The difference in the two probabilities computed is the marginal effect for that case and this process is repeated for each case. Finally, it computes the average of all marginal effects and this would give the average marginal effect of being unemployed.

Figure 1.3 shows the effects of both independent variables on the level of the democratic deficit. At low levels of *Dissatisfaction with education and health policies* the democratic deficit is around .07. As dissatisfaction increases, the democratic deficit widens and at the highest level of dissatisfaction with public services, the predicted value of the size of the democratic deficit reaches .25. Similarly, at very low levels of *Demand for inequality-reduction policies* the size of the democratic deficit is very small but as support for the idea that the government should reduce income differences between the rich and the poor increases, the predicted value of the size of the democratic deficit also increases. At the maximum level of support for inequality-reduction policies, the predicted size of the democratic deficit is around .2.

Figure 1.3: Effects of Main Independent Variables on the Democratic Deficit in Latin America



Turning to the results from the logit model on protest participation, Figure 1.4 shows the average marginal effect of each variable on the propensity to join a

protest. According to H3, *Dissatisfaction with education and health* should positively affect individuals' propensity to join a protest. The results support this hypothesis and show that the average marginal effect of this variable is approximately .02 and significant at the .001 level. The results also support H4 which suggests that citizens' *Demand for inequality-reduction policies* is positively associated with protest participation, though its effect is small (.002) and marginally significant at the .10 level.

Figure 1.4: Average Marginal Effects of Independent Variables on Protest Participation in Latin America





Figure 1.5 plots the predicted probabilities of protest participation as *Dissatisfaction with education and health* increases and as *Demand for inequality-reduction policies* increases. Moving from the minimum level of dissatisfaction to its maximum increases the probability to join a protest from .06 to almost .1, while moving from the minimum level of support for redistribution to its maximum increases the probability to join a protest from .062 to .072.

Figure 1.5: Effects of Main Independent Variables on Protest Participation in Latin America



Effect of control variables. All of the control variables show the expected relationships with the democratic deficit and protest participation. First, the size of the democratic deficit increases as individuals' views on the *Country's economic situation* and their own *Personal economic situation* worsen. With regards to the variables related to crime, it is worth noting that whereas having been a *Victim of crime* does not affect the democratic deficit, considering that the *Government improves public safety* does reduce the democratic deficit. Thus, it is citizens' evaluations of how efficiently the government tackles public insecurity what matters for reducing democratic deficits. Not surprisingly, the more widespread citizens think *Corruption* is among public officials, the larger the democratic deficit. Additionally, for individuals who report higher levels of *Interest in politics* the democratic deficit is larger. In contrast, *News attention* does not significantly affect the gap between support and satisfaction with democracy. The results

with regards to the *Left_right* political ideology spectrum suggest that the more rightist an individual considers himself/herself, the larger the democratic deficit, though this effect is very small and it is marginally significant. As expected, for individuals who *Voted for the incumbent* the democratic deficit is reduced. The socio-economic variables *Education*, *Age*, *Distance to median income* and being *Unemployed* positively associate with the democratic deficit. Other variables such as being *Indigenous*, *Marital status*, *Female* and living in an *Urban* area do not significantly affect democratic deficits in the region.

Finally, the propensity to participate in protest is significantly higher for individuals who have been *Victims of crime*. This is in line with previous research on crime and political participation at the individual level. Not surprisingly, more politically engaged citizens are more likely to join a protest; those who report higher levels of *Interest in politics*, who *Participate in group meeting*, and help to *Solve community problems*. On the other hand, individuals who place themselves more to the right in the *Left_right* political spectrum are less likely to join a protest. In line with studies which emphasize the role of *Indigenous* people for social movements, these citizens are significantly more likely to protest as compared to other ethnic groups. Importantly, the results reveal that *Internet usage* is positively and significantly associated with protest participation. Surprisingly, *Perception of corruption* does not significantly protest propensity. It may well be that political grievances related to corruption alone do not encourage protest participation, and that only in combination with other factors or events such as the implementation of unpopular policies corruption-related grievances lead to protest mobilization (see e.g., Hochstetler, 2006). Finally, most of the socio-demographic variables do not significantly affect protest participation, except for living in an *Urban* area and *Education*.

Robustness checks To check the stability of the results presented above, Figure 1.6 and 1.7 show how do the linear and logit models compare to a multilevel specification of each model with random intercepts, and using the municipality as the grouping variable at the second-level. As can be seen, the estimates of

the linear regression with country dummies and those of the multilevel linear model are very similar. Indeed, the estimates from the former tend to be more conservative as reflected in the larger confidence intervals of the latter. Moreover, the conclusions with regards to the central and all control variables hold when a multilevel model is estimated. This appears to be also the case when we compare the logit and multilevel logit estimates for protest participation. The only relevant differences are that *Life satisfaction* reaches statistical significance, and living in an *Urban* area is no longer statistically significant in the multilevel model. As a second robustness check, I re-estimated the main models shown in Figures 2 and 4 excluding the observations with negative values on the democratic deficit indicator, given that higher levels of satisfaction with democracy compared to support for democracy, strikes as an inconsistency in individuals responses (see Table 1.3 in the Appendix). The results are robust to the exclusion of these observations.

Figure 1.6: Comparison between Coefficients from a Linear Regression with Country Dummies and a Multilevel Linear Model





Figure 1.7: Comparison between Coefficients from a Logit Model with Country Dummies and a Multilevel Logit Model



1.6 Conclusion

The main objective of this article has been to empirically assess whether citizens' dissatisfaction over the quality of the social services delivered by the state, as well as their level of support for a strong role of the government in reducing inequality associate with the democratic deficit and protest participation in Latin America. The results support the view that citizens' expect democracies to reduce inequality and deliver good quality education and health services. Not only does poor performance on these areas is associated with wider democratic deficits in the region, but also citizens' dissatisfaction with the performance of governments on these issues positively associate with their propensity to join a protest.

The findings presented in this article have broader implications for the study of social policy in the region. Empirical studies on social spending in developing countries generally put emphasis on the importance of elections. Propositions related to specific mechanisms of democracy and to different forms of political participation that go beyond the act of voting remain underdeveloped, often regarded as secondary effects of democracy and are not operationalized in empirical analysis. However, as this article suggests, citizens' evaluations on how the state performs in social policy-related areas do appear to affect their views on democracy and also their inclination to engage in protest.

1.7 Appendix

Table 1.1: Summary Statistics

	mean	sd	min	max
Democratic Deficit	.153	.347	-1	1
Protest	.0983	.298	0	1
Dissatisfaction with education and health	2.46	.626	1	4
Demand for inequality-reduction policies	5.83	1.47	1	7
Victim of crime	.207	.405	0	1
Government improves public safety	3.92	1.75	1	7
Country's economic situation	3.08	.904	1	5
Personal economic situation	2.87	.777	1	5
Life Satisfaction	3.35	.733	1	4
Interest in Politics	2.13	.941	1	4
News attention	1.6	1.01	1	5
Perception of corruption	3.11	.837	1	4
Left_right	5.56	2.68	1	10
Indigenous	.0649	.246	0	1
Voted for the incumbent	.404	.491	0	1
Participation in group meetings	3.12	1.27	2.33	9.33
Solve community problem	1.59	.889	1	4
Internet usage	2.4	1.58	1	5
Years of education	9.66	4.41	0	18
Distance to median income	.571	3.92	-8	8
Marital status	.361	.48	0	1
Female	.448	.497	0	1
Age	38	15.5	16	96
Unemployed	.0519	.222	0	1
Urban	.714	.452	0	1
Observations	10154			

Table 1.2: Models of the Democratic Deficit and Protest Participation

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Democratic deficit		Protest		Protest	
Dissatisfaction with education and health	0.060***	(0.008)	0.182***	(0.055)	0.142**	(0.069)
Demand for inequality-reduction policies	0.033***	(0.003)	0.040*	(0.024)	0.076**	(0.029)
Victim of crime	-0.017	(0.020)	0.437***	(0.081)	0.532***	(0.090)
Government improves public safety	-0.016***	(0.003)				
Country's economic situation	0.035***	(0.007)				
Personal economic situation	0.018**	(0.006)				
Life Satisfaction	-0.008	(0.012)	-0.054	(0.050)	-0.156**	(0.060)
Interest in Politics	0.016*	(0.008)	0.381***	(0.039)	0.384***	(0.044)
News attention	-0.005	(0.006)				
Perception of corruption	0.019***	(0.005)	-0.060	(0.041)	-0.089*	(0.049)
Left_right	0.004*	(0.002)	-0.117***	(0.015)	-0.114***	(0.018)
Indigenous	0.015	(0.016)	0.682***	(0.134)	0.498**	(0.161)
Voted for the incumbent	-0.026**	(0.013)	0.070	(0.069)	0.056	(0.083)
Years of education	0.005**	(0.002)	0.036***	(0.010)	0.020*	(0.012)
Distance to median income	0.006***	(0.002)	-0.031**	(0.012)	-0.012	(0.013)
Marital status	0.012	(0.012)	-0.106	(0.071)	-0.041	(0.086)
Female	0.002	(0.013)	-0.077	(0.080)	-0.076	(0.090)
Age	0.002***	(0.000)	0.000	(0.003)	-0.001	(0.003)
Unemployed	0.033*	(0.017)	-0.518*	(0.285)	0.144	(0.176)
Urban	0.010	(0.022)	0.186**	(0.092)	0.235**	(0.106)
Participation in group meetings			0.272***	(0.021)	0.246***	(0.027)
Solve community problem			0.257***	(0.038)	0.249***	(0.046)
Internet usage			0.118***	(0.027)	0.145***	(0.033)
Constant	-0.385***	(0.067)	-5.070***	(0.368)	-4.712***	(0.487)
Observations	10154		19864		9879	

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .001$

Table 1.3: Robustness Check (excluding observations with negative values on the deficit)

	(1)		(2)	
	Democratic Deficit		Protest	
Dissatisfaction with education and health	0.043***	(0.005)	0.203***	(0.057)
Demand for inequality-reduction policies	0.016***	(0.002)	0.056**	(0.025)
Victim of crime	0.004	(0.007)	0.406***	(0.084)
Government improves public safety	-0.022***	(0.002)		
Country's economic situation	0.026***	(0.004)		
Personal economic situation	0.011**	(0.004)		
Life Satisfaction	-0.007	(0.004)	-0.050	(0.049)
Interest in Politics	0.002	(0.003)	0.387***	(0.040)
News attention	-0.012***	(0.003)		
Perception of corruption	0.015***	(0.004)	-0.060	(0.042)
Left_right	0.001	(0.001)	-0.113***	(0.014)
Indigenous	0.026**	(0.012)	0.757***	(0.138)
Voted for the incumbent	-0.027***	(0.006)	0.061	(0.072)
Years of education	0.002**	(0.001)	0.037***	(0.011)
Distance to median income	0.004***	(0.001)	-0.029**	(0.012)
Marital status	-0.008	(0.006)	-0.171**	(0.073)
Female	-0.007	(0.006)	-0.078	(0.077)
Age	0.001***	(0.000)	-0.002	(0.003)
Unemployed	0.010	(0.012)	-0.663**	(0.305)
Urban	-0.003	(0.007)	0.191**	(0.091)
Participation in group meetings			0.284***	(0.024)
Solve community problem			0.254***	(0.039)
Internet usage			0.096***	(0.028)
Constant	0.017	(0.037)	-5.081***	(0.377)
Observations	7626		17389	

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .001$

Wording of questions. LAPOP, 2012.

Dependent variables

Support for democracy. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

1 (strongly disagree) - 7 (strongly agree), or 88=DK and 98=DA

Satisfaction with democracy. And now, changing the subject, in general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in country?

(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

Protest participation. In the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?

(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

Independent variables

Dissatisfaction with education and health. And the quality of public schools? And the quality of public medical and health services?

(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA

Control variables

Victim of crime. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months?

(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

Government improves public safety. To what extent would you say the current administration improves citizen safety?

1-7 (not at all-a lot), 88 = DK, 98 = DA

Country's economic situation. How would you describe the countrys economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?

(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad
(88) Doesnt know (98) Doesnt Answer

Personal economic situation. How would you describe your overall economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?

(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad
(88) Doesnt know (98) Doesnt Answer

Life Satisfaction. To begin, in general how satisfied are you with your life?

(1) Very satisfied (2) Somewhat satisfied (3) Somewhat dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (88) Doesnt know (98) Doesnt Answer. Reversed.

Interest in Politics. How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none?

(1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA. Reversed.

News Attention. About how often do you pay attention to the news, whether on TV, the radio, newspapers or the internet?:

(1) Daily (2) A few times a week (3) A few times a month (4) Rarely (5) Never (88) DK (98) DA

Perception of corruption. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is

(1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon? (88) DK (98) DA. Reversed.

Left-Right. On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right. The number one means left and 10 means right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale? Tell me the

number.

Indigenous. Do you consider yourself white, mestizo, indigenous, black, mulatto, or of another race?

(1) White (2) Mestizo (3) Indigenous (4) Black (5) Mulatto (7) Other (88) DK (98) DA

Voted for the incumbent. Who did you vote for in the last presidential elections of year (varies by country)?

Years of education. How many years of schooling have you completed?

Distance to median income. Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly income of this household fit, including remittances from abroad and the income of all the working adults and children?

17 categories based on the currency and distribution of the country

Marital status. What is your marital status?

(1) Single (2) Married (3) Common law marriage (4) Divorced (5) Separated (6) Widowed (88) DK (98) DA

Female. Note your own sex:

(1) Male (2) Female

Age. On what day, month and year were you born?

Unemployed. How do you mainly spend your time? Are you currently

(1) Working? (2) Not working, but have a job? (3) Actively looking for a job? (4) A student? (5) Taking care of the home? (6) Retired, a pensioner or permanently disabled to work (7) Not working and not looking for a job? (88) DK (98) DA

Urban. (1) Urban (0) Rural

Participation in group meetings. I am going to read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend their meetings:

At least once a week (4), once or twice a month (3), once or twice a year (2), or never (1). Sum of answers to three subquestions: a) Meetings of a community improvement committee or association + b) Meetings of an association of professionals, merchants, manufacturers or farmers + c) Meetings of a political party

or political organization. Ranges from 3 (never) to 12 (at least once a week).

Solve community problem. In the last 12 months have you tried to help to solve a problem in your community or in your neighborhood?

Please, tell me if you did it at least once a week (1), once or twice a month (2), once or twice a year (3) or never in the last 12 months (4). Reversed.

Internet usage. Talking about other things, how often do you use the internet?
(1) Daily (2) A few times a week (3) A few times a month (4) Rarely (5) Never
(88) DK (98) DA. Reversed.

2 Economic Deprivation, Welfare Policies and Protest Participation in Latin America

Abstract

Does economic deprivation encourages protest participation? How do economic grievances and availability of resources matter for an individual's propensity to join a protest? Do welfare policies condition the effect of economic motives on the propensity to protest? I argue that relative economic deprivation motivates protest participation and that this effect varies according to individuals' income. Among individuals whose income falls close to the middle of the income distribution *economic motives* to participate (i.e., worsening of financial situation and attribution of blame to the government for economic outcomes) and *availability of resources* (i.e., income) converge to fuel protest participation, but not among the very poor or the rich. Whereas among the poor, the relative scarcity of resources mitigates the politicization of economic grievances, among the rich the relative abundance of resources and alternative channels of political influence available to this group produces the same effect. Secondly, I further argue that the adoption or expansion of labor and social policies designed to lessen the impact of external economic shocks reduces the effect of economic motives on the propensity to join a protest. The empirical analysis yields support for these arguments in a sample of Latin American democracies. At the macro-level empirical evidence shows that economic performance and income inequality do affect overall levels of collective protest. At the individual-level the results show that economic motives encourage protest participation only among individuals close to the middle of the income distribution, but not among the poor or the rich. Finally, the introduction or strengthening of labor and social policies in the context of economic downturns mitigate the effect of individuals' economic motives on the propensity to join a protest.

2.1 Introduction

Popular protests motivated by economic grievances are common in Latin America. A restricted search in Factiva’s news database for the countries of the region which includes the words “protest” and “economic crisis” between 2008 and 2010 gives a total of 108 news articles. These include, among others, a nationwide strike in the agriculture sector in Argentina in 2008, after President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner announced an increase in export taxes in farm products in order to help curb inflation (Cormier, 2008). In Brazil, over 2,000 workers demonstrated in January of 2009 to demand from the government an interest rate cut to prevent companies from continuing firing workers (France-Presse, 2009). Similarly, in Chile workers held several demonstrations in 2009 as part of a general strike organized by the Unitary Labor Central (Central Unitaria de Trabajadores, CUT). Around 12,000 workers from several economic sectors demanded from the government job security and state protection during the economic crisis (APRS, 2009; Miranda, 2009). Beyond these simple illustrations, a recent systematic survey of protest events in the region finds that from October 2009 to September 2010 there were a total of 2,318 protest events in the region, 50% of which were motivated by labor-related issues and the satisfaction of basic needs. Protestors demanded better conditions and/or mobilized in reaction to governments’ economic policies (Calderón, 2013).

The above suggests that citizens in Latin America resort to unconventional forms of political participation to show their discontent over economic issues. Studies on the link between economic performance and conventional forms of political participation show that similar to what happens in other regions of the world,¹ in developing countries electoral turnout increases as a consequence of economic downturns and poor economic performance damages the political prospects of incumbent parties (e.g., Aguilar and Pacek, 2000; Benton, 2005; Radcliff, 1992;

¹Following Kramer’s (1971) seminal study, a vast literature focused on developed democracies has studied the effect of economic performance on electoral behavior (e.g., Duch et al. 2000; Duch and Stevenson (2008); Pacek and Radcliff 1995a; for a review see Duch, 2009). More recently, this literature has been enriched by studies on the political consequences of the recent economic crisis (e.g., Bermeo and Pontusson, 2012; Bermeo and Bartels, 2014; Kriesi, 2014; Rueda, 2012, 2014) Kriesi (2014) Rueda (2012) Rueda (2014) Bermeo and Bartels (2014).

Remmer, 1991; Pacek and Radcliff, 1995b). But do economic grievances have an impact on an individual's propensity to engage in protest? In other words, just as citizens participate more in elections and punish incumbents for bad economic outcomes, do they also take to the streets as an alternative channel to express their frustration and voice their demands? Are these complementary channels citizens use to express their discontent? Given that protest participation is costlier and more risky than electoral participation, how do economic grievances and the availability of resources matter for citizens' propensity to protest?

Prominent theories of political conflict have long considered economic grievances, among other types of discontent, as a potential source of political mobilization and violence. In Gurr's *Why Men Rebel* "relative deprivation" (RD)² related to economic conditions falls in the category of welfare values, those "that contribute directly to well-being and self-realization" (1970, p. 25; see also Davies, 1962). RD theory received much criticism, for instance, from theorists arguing on the relevance of resource mobilization and organization as the bases for the emergence and development of social movements (e.g., McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Jenkins, 1983).³ More recently, also within this structuralist tradition, theories have focused on explaining cycles of contention emphasizing that collective action takes place when perceived opportunities and threats change, and actors strategically employ a repertoire of contention built upon organizational networks and common frames (Tarrow, 1994; McAdam et al., 1996; for a critique see Lichbach, 1997).

Despite this, recent works have revived the relevance of RD arguments for understanding political conflict (e.g., Cederman et al., 2011; Bartusevičius, 2014; Stewart, 2010; Brancati, 2014; Mueller, 2013).⁴ This article follows these works in emphasizing RD as an important motivator of protest participation. Whereas

²RD is understood as "the discrepancy between the goods or conditions to which people believe they are rightfully entitled (*value expectations*) and what they think they are capable of getting and keeping (*value capabilities*)" (emphasis added) (1970, p. 24).

³At the center of the resource mobilization approach lies a proposal to resolve Olson's (1965) dilemma on collective action, which holds that if individuals can free-ride and benefit from the good provided as a consequence of collective action, they have no incentives to act collectively.

⁴RD arguments were also criticized from scholars in the literature on civil wars (e.g., Collier et al., 2004; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; for a critical review of this literature see Cederman et al., 2013, p. 15-29).

these studies focus on several forms of inequality measured at the country level, or on inequalities between groups, this paper is focused on the individual level. Economic relative deprivation here refers to an individual's comparison of his/her current economic situation with his/her own recent past, or what Gurr defines as *decremental deprivation* (1970, p. 46).

On the other hand, the literature on political participation has underscored the importance that resources play for citizens' involvement in democratic life. From this perspective those individuals who have the necessary resources to participate in politics such as time, money and civic skills (i.e., communication and organizational capacities) are more likely to take part in protests and in other forms of political participation (Brady et al., 1995; Verba et al., 1993; Verba, 2003). Recent empirical research that combines data from developed and developing countries at the individual level seems to support the view that resources, and not economic grievances, is what matters for protest participation (Dalton et al., 2010). However, grievances are proxied with a question on life satisfaction, which does not necessarily capture relative economic deprivation. Moreover, studies that focus on economic grievances find that these are crucial to account for the emergence of prodemocracy protests (Brancati, 2014), protest potential (Rüdiger and Karyotis, 2014) and for actual participation (Mueller, 2013).

Building upon the RD and resource approaches, this article explores the link between economic grievances and protest participation in Latin America. I argue that economic adversity encourages protest participation when individuals also attribute responsibility to the government for economic performance. *Economic motives* for mobilization derive from an individual's economic decremental deprivation and his/her attribution of responsibility to the government for economic performance. I further argue that this effect should vary according to individuals' availability of resources (i.e., income). Among individuals whose income lies close to the median economic motives and resources converge to fuel protest participation, but not among the very poor or the rich. Among the poor, the scarcity of resources mitigates the politicization of economic grievances while among the rich

the relative abundance of resources and alternative available channels of political influence produces the same effect. Finally, the paper argues that labor and social policies aimed at lessening the potential effects of poor economic performance on citizens' lives reduce the effect of economic motives on the propensity to join a protest.

Using cross-national time-series analysis, I first assess the effects of economic inequality and economic performance on collective protest in Latin American countries. In a second step and using individual level data from LAPOP (2010), I analyze the factors that affect citizens' propensity to join a protest. The results provide important insights to better understand the logic of protest participation in recent democratic politics in the region. At the macro-level, I find that both economic performance and economic inequality are strong predictors of overall levels of protest. At the individual level, the results are consistent with the argument that economic motives fuel protest participation. Moreover, the empirical evidence also shows that this effect is only significant among individuals whose income is close to the middle of the income distribution. The findings also reveal important implications for the wider literature on social policy in Latin America. Overall, labor and social policies introduced with the primary purpose of mitigating the impact of poor economic performance on citizen's lives reduce the effect of economic motives on protest propensity. However, dualism in the labor market is a source of unequal participation in protest. Individuals who have access to health insurance, which covers mostly those in formal employment, are more likely to participate in protest than are those who do not have access to health insurance.

The results presented here are also relevant for the study of democratic accountability and distributive politics in the region. Democracy has provided important political opportunities for groups to mobilize to express their discontent and opposition to unpopular policies in the region (e.g., Arce and Bellinger, 2007). Protests have also been a decisive factor in the fall of democratically elected leaders in South American countries (Hochstetler, 2006).⁵ However, long-

⁵See also (Bermeo, 1997) and Collier and Mahoney (1997) for the role of mobilization during

standing barriers to participation still prevail among vulnerable segments of the population. In an insightful piece Kaufman (2009) spelled out some “inconvenient facts” of political economy models of redistribution which derive predictions from pure economic motivations and which do not seem to hold in current Latin American politics. In his own words: “One problem with a simple model that connects inequality, the median voter, and redistributive transfers is that democracy empowers not only low-income voters, but middle-income and working-class interest groups that often oppose a shift of resources toward the poor” (2009, p. 364). Several studies have emphasized the profound disadvantages of labor market “outsiders” relative to “insiders” in the democratic process due to their inherent heterogeneity of preferences which poses formidable obstacles to collective action (Rueda et al., 2015; Wibbels, 2006). Thus, in light of these recent studies, the findings of this paper showing that relative income and unequal access to welfare state policies generate important differentials in citizens’ propensity to mobilize is relevant for the wider literature on democratic representation, given that as it has long been recognized “unequal participation spells unequal influence” (Lijphart, 1997, p. 1).

2.2 Research on Protest Participation in Latin America

The last decade has seen a renewed interest within the comparative political economy literature on the factors that drive political participation in Latin American democracies (e.g., Kurtz, 2004; Arce and Bellinger, 2007; Arce and Kim, 2011; Silva, 2009; Eckstein, 2001; Aguilar and Pacek, 2000; Fornos et al., 2004). Concomitantly to the process of democratization that began in the late 70’s, the countries of the region followed a process of market-oriented reforms to liberalize their economies which had profound social consequences (e.g., material hardship, increases in poverty and economic inequality, and the rise of labor market informality). The implications for political participation and democratic representation were unpromising: despite gains in democratization, economic liberalization

transitions to democracy.

posed formidable barriers to individual and collective political participation for large segments of society. As a result of economic liberalization, “atomization and quiescence” of civil society in newly democratized countries were reflected in decreasing levels of protest and electoral participation (Kurtz, 2004; Wolff, 2005).

Later research, however, questioned the “atomization” perspective and showed that while economic liberalization provided the basis for the politicization of grievances, democratization opened up new political opportunities for groups to mobilize. More robust evidence showed that economic liberalization in the presence of democracy leads to higher levels of collective protest (Arce and Bellinger, 2007). The vast amount of research, whether quantitative or qualitative, on protest participation and social movements in the region, shows that increasing mobilization was triggered by the social inequalities that economic crises and liberalization processes brought about in the democracies of the region (e.g., Walton and Ragin, 1990; Roberts, 2008; Eckstein, 2001; Wolff, 2007; Almeida, 2007). As Roberts puts it: “Popular mobilization does suggest, however, that market reform left unmet social needs or heightened economic insecurities that provided a basis for the collective articulation of political grievances” (Roberts, 2008, p. 330).

The focus of most of the studies on collective action which incorporate RD arguments is predominantly on specific social movements or particular protest campaigns (e.g., Almeida, 2007; Walton and Ragin, 1990; Silva, 2009; Eckstein, 2001). On the other hand, there is also evidence that macroeconomic performance matters for protest participation. When included as a control variable in models of collective protest, GDP growth shows a negative effect on antigovernment demonstrations (Arce and Bellinger, 2007). Studies that focus directly on the relationship between macroeconomic performance and challenges to the state shows that poor economic growth increases challenges aimed at economic policy change, and that inflation is positively associated with the number of strikes (Franklin, 2010).

In contrast, research on protest participation in the region at the micro-level is scant and existing work focuses on political institutions and political grievances as

engines of protest participation (Machado et al., 2011). Thus, despite consistent evidence that economic performance affects electoral and protest participation at the macro-level, much less is known about how relative economic deprivation affects an individual's propensity to participate in protest. However, there is recent evidence showing that economic RD is a trigger of protest participation. For instance, Brancati (2014) shows that pro-democracy protests are more likely to take place when the economy performs poorly and people blame the nature of the regime for economic outcomes. Similarly, at the individual-level Mueller (2013) finds that RD, and not political grievances, fueled protest participation in Niger during the recent economic downturn. An analysis of protest participation in Greece in 2010 (Rüdiger and Karyotis, 2014) shows that economic deprivation influences opposition to austerity measures as well as protest potential, but not actual protest participation. Instead, similar to what Dalton et al. (2010) find, the availability of resources seem to explain better protest participation. However, Dalton et al. (2010) do not focus specifically on economic deprivation, as they use an indicator of life satisfaction as a proxy for grievances.

In this article RD is analyzed both, at the macro level and at the individual level, separately. Moreover, central to the argument of this paper is the question of how economic motives and resources interact to affect protest participation among individuals.

2.3 Economic motives, resources and individual protest participation

In this section I combine the RD approach with the resources model of political participation to develop an argument on how relative deprivation and resources interact to affect an individual's propensity to join a protest. I argue that relative economic deprivation encourages protest participation when individuals also attribute responsibility to the government for economic performance as compared to those who have not experienced a condition of economic deprivation, or those who have, but do not attribute blame to the government for economic outcomes.

Economic motives for mobilization, thus, derive from an individual's economic deprivation and his or her attribution of responsibility to the government for economic performance. I further argue that the effect of economic motives on the propensity to join a protest is conditioned by the resources available to individuals. Among individuals whose income falls close to the middle of the income distribution *motives* to participate and *availability of resources* converge to fuel protest participation, but not among the very poor or the rich. Finally, I expect economic motives to have a weak effect on the propensity to join a protest as the number of labor and social policies introduced by governments to mitigate the effects of the economic crisis increase.

In a context of poor economic performance some individuals are likely to experience a deterioration of their financial conditions due to job loss, partial reductions of working hours, rising inflation, reduction of alternative sources of income such as remittances from abroad, etc. These factors may cause people to feel economically deprived, discontented and frustrated about their current situation as compared to their own economic condition in the past. This form of RD is defined by Gurr as *decremental deprivation* (Gurr, 1970, p. 46). A relative resource deficit such as the loss of income⁶ can increase discontent and thus, incentives to participate in protest (Schlozman and Verba, 1979; Opp, 2000; Piven and Cloward, 1971). However, relative economic deprivation does not necessarily lead to the politicization of grievances. Mobilization as a consequence of economic discontent, is more likely when individuals suffering economic difficulties blame the government for their economic situation and thus, take their grievances to the political arena in search of redress (Rosenstone, 1982; Arceneaux, 2003; Brancati, 2014, p. 25-27). An individual who thinks he/she is responsible for his/her economic fortune will have less incentives to take their economic grievances to the political sphere. The process of politicization of grievances involves awareness of shared grievances and the identification of a political actor, to whom individuals attribute blame and who becomes the target of their discontent and demands

⁶The prospects of bad economic times have been found to affect protest participation in advanced democracies (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2008)

(Simon and Klandermans, 2001; Brancati, 2014; Javeline, 2003). Moreover, attribution of blame does not need to match objectively to the actual causes of poor economic performance, but rather what matters for the politicization of grievances is that individuals identify the government or its policies, at least partially, as the source of their deprivation. As Javeline (2003, p. 108) succinctly argues:

“Blame is a subjective phenomenon...an aggrieved individual who attributes blame specifically but incorrectly is still a more likely protester than the aggrieved individual who attributes blame unspecifically due to a thoughtful and accurate assessment of the origins of his/her problem or its potential solution”.

In democratic countries, elections are the main conventional mechanism to hold governments accountable for economic issues (for reviews see Duch, 2009; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2008). However, between elections, discontent and the articulation of citizens’ demands as a consequence of poor economic performance or the implementation of unpopular economic policies are frequently expressed through strikes, riots, and popular demonstrations (Kriesi, 2014; Epstein, 2003; Almeida, 2007; Franklin, 2010). Thus, the first hypothesis of this article is:

H1. When individuals face economic RD and blame the government for economic performance (i.e., economic motives), the likelihood to join a protest increases.

On the other hand some political participation acts are more resource-demanding than others.⁷ According to the well-known *resource model* of participation, individuals’ availability of time, money and civic skills (i.e education and organizational skills to engage effectively in politics), are important predictors of citizens’

⁷Considering voting to be the least resource-demanding political activity, one would expect a weak positive effect or no effect at all of resources on the propensity to participate in elections. Despite this, empirical research has shown that income positively affects individuals’ propensity to turn out to vote in developed democracies (Anderson and Beramendi, 2011) as well as in Latin American countries where individuals with no income are less likely to turn out to vote as compared to the rest (Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita, 2013).

political participation (Brady et al., 1995; Verba et al., 1993). Individuals' participation in protests has been linked, for instance, to a higher level of education (e.g., Dalton et al., 2010; Mueller, 2013; Machado et al., 2011; Javeline, 2003), group membership in civic and political organizations (e.g., Mueller, 2013; Machado et al., 2011; Rüdiger and Karyotis, 2014; Norris et al., 2005), low risk of being injured or arrested (Rüdiger and Karyotis, 2014), and higher individual income (Martinez, 2008).

The question then is whether economic motives or the availability of resources predominate for the propensity to join a protest? Considering income as one important resource which may condition the effect of economic motives, I focus on three income groups: the poor, the rich and those in between; those whose income is close to the middle of the income distribution. Based on the idea that participation in protest is a resource-demanding type of participatory, I hypothesize that among the poor the relative lack of resources predominates over economic motives to participate. Thus, despite incentives, what I define as economic motives, either low participation or no-effect of economic motives is expected for this group. The poor tend to hold political attitudes of inefficacy and feelings of disinterest on the part of political representatives with regards to their needs, factors which may discourage political participation. Moreover, investing time in political participation has a high opportunity cost for the poor. In the words of a poor woman in urban Mexico: "We don't try to petition anymore. Every time we go we have to pay the bus fare, I lose time from work, and I have to find someone to take care of my two children who don't go to school. We just can't afford it anymore" (Holzner, 2007, p. 98-99).⁸

Similarly, despite economic motives, for rich individuals the relative abundance of resources should either turn irrelevant or mitigate the need to join a protest to express discontent over an experience with economic adversity. Since rich individuals possess relatively more resources than other groups of society and are more likely to count on savings and on other means to cope with fi-

⁸Even though this statement refers to petitioning, Holzner also points out in his study that the vast majority of the poor preferred contacting public officials over protesting, which they generally saw as a "risky, dangerous and not very efficient strategy" (2007, p. 110).

nancial loss, a worsening of their financial situation will rarely be so large as to encourage protest participation.⁹ Moreover, for this group of individuals other less costly and more direct channels of political influence are available (e.g., lobbying, making contributions to their preferred political party), and presumably the current status quo favors their economic interests so that resorting to protest is less attractive.

On the other hand, for those individuals whose income is close to the middle of the income distribution, resource availability is sufficiently high to facilitate mobilization when economic motives for protest are present. In this scenario, the availability of resources and economic motives complement each other to fuel protest participation. Thus, I expect a positive effect of economic motives on the propensity to join a protest for individuals whose income falls close to the middle of the income distribution. These type of individuals may not have enough resources to voice their demands and influence policy choices through other means that are more readily available for richer individuals and that require money and direct access to the state (e.g., lobbying). However, these individuals are also more likely than the poor or the rich to benefit from basic services and access to welfare state policies, which may give them further incentives to defend their benefits or demand better protection from the state when they experience economic deprivation. Based on the above discussion the second hypothesis of this paper is:

H2. The effect of economic motives on the propensity to join a protest is larger among individuals whose incomes lies close to the middle of the income distribution.

Finally, in times of economic difficulties governments may introduce or extend labor and social policies to prevent citizens from experiencing severe economic dislocations. In the past social spending has been highly procyclical in the region (Wibbels, 2006), and although public spending, specially on health and education, remained very procyclical during the recent economic slowdown in

⁹Although this could be modified as a consequence of an aggressive redistribution policy which may threaten the status quo from which the wealthy benefit.

the region (CEPAL, 2010), several governments introduced or expanded labor and social policies to mitigate the adverse consequences of poor economic performance. Under such circumstances, economic motives may become less relevant for explaining increases in protest participation. Indeed there is evidence that in developing countries where the welfare state is weak or non-existent, economic downturns correlated with higher voter turnout (Radcliff, 1992). Thus, the third and final hypothesis of this paper is as follows:

H3. The effect of economic motives on the propensity to join a protest is reduced as the number of labor and social policies introduced by governments in response to the crisis increase.

2.4 Data and Methods

In order to assess the hypotheses derived in the previous section, I use cross-sectional survey data from 16 countries in the region which come from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP, 2010).¹⁰ There are two advantages of using LAPOP data for the purpose of this paper. First, the survey includes specific questions related to the economic situation around the year 2009, when Latin American countries were most affected by the global crisis. Although the crisis did not have the devastating effects in the region as other economic crises had in the past, its consequences were not minor. For instance, a recent report shows that “economic growth declined in almost all countries, and indeed collapsed in some...because of the crisis an additional 3.2 million people were poor in 2009 compared with what was expected without the crisis” (Bussolo et al., 2014, p. 1) (see Figure 2.5 in the Appendix). According to the argument developed in this paper, one would thus expect to see larger effects of economic deprivation on protest participation as the severity of a crisis is more pronounced. Second, the survey question on protest participation is asked in terms of actual, and not

¹⁰The countries included in the analysis are those for which complete data on all the variables of interest is available. These are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela.


potential protest participation, and it is restricted to an specific time frame, and not based on whether and individual has ever joined a protest in her/his lifetime.

Hence, the main dependent variable is protest participation and comes from the following question: “In the last twelve months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?” “Yes” answers are coded as one, and as zero otherwise. The binary measure of the dependent variable makes the use of logistic regression suitable for the analyses of the propensity to protest. LAPOP (2010) uses a common sample design which consists of a multi-staged, stratified probabilistic sample, with household level quotas, thus, all the models account for the design effects of the sample.¹¹ Additionally, I include dummy variables for each country in all models, except for the last model which assesses the effect of economic motives on protest conditional on the number of labor and social policies (H3). Given that the latter are measured at the country-level I use a multilevel logistic regression with random intercepts.

The survey also includes a question that asks individuals about the purpose of the protest in which they participated. In a context of economic recession it would be natural to expect that issues related to the economy and the provision of public services were dominant themes of protest. Figure 2.1 shows that the most common types of protest were those related to economic topics, followed by political issues. The former included issues related to work, prices, inflation and lack of opportunities, while protests against laws, parties or politicians and problems of corruption were the themes of political protests. Political protest may also capture protests related to the announcement of unpopular policies, such as austerity measures, introduced as a consequence of the economic context. These are followed by protests related to education (e.g., lack of opportunities, high tuition fees, poor quality or education policy) and lack of public services, while only a small percentage of individuals reported having participated in protests related to security problems, human rights or environmental themes.

¹¹In each country approximately 1,500 individuals were surveyed. In some countries the number of individuals is higher, such as in Bolivia (n=3,000), Chile (n=1,965), Ecuador (n=3,000), and Brazil (n=2,500) (Seligson and Smith, 2010, p. xvi). The analysis used Stata 11 and the survey setting was applied to all regressions (svyset upm [pweight=weight1500], strata(estratopri)).

Figure 2.1: Motives of Protest



Independent variables

The main independent variables are economic motives, resources, and labor and social policies introduced by governments in response to the economic slowdown. *Economic motives* derive from both an individual's experience with economic deprivation relative to his or her own past situation (decremental deprivation), and his or her attribution of blame to the government for economic conditions (H1). I follow previous work (Rosenstone, 1982; Arceneaux, 2003) in measuring economic motives. Thus, I first identify economically deprived individuals, those whose *household income has decreased* over the past two years (see the Appendix for the exact wording of questions). Then I identify individuals who *attribute blame* to the government for the economic crisis. Respondents who attribute responsibility to the government (i.e either to the previous or current administration) for the economic crisis are coded as 1, and 0 for all other responses (e.g., the rich people of our country, ourselves, the rich countries etc.). *Economic motives*,

thus, represent those individuals who are economically deprived and blame the government for the economic crisis.

In order to assess whether the effect of economic motives varies according to income (H2), I rely on respondents' self-placement in a ten-point income scale, based on income rungs which correspond to the total monthly household income. The resulting income deciles are specific to the currency and income distribution of each country. Similar to Anderson and Beramendi (2011), I recoded the income scale to reflect *Distance to median income*, so that the recoded variable ranges from -5 to 5.

Finally, labor and social policy measures introduced by governments as a response to the economic downturn are measured at the country-level. Labor policies include: subsidies for hiring and retaining staff, changes to unemployment insurance, training programs, and emergency employment programs. In addition, several governments introduced or expanded conditional cash transfer programs, basic non-contributory pensions, and food support programs as part of the repertoire of social policies. I use the total number of policies implemented by governments as a response to the economic slowdown. These data comes from (ECLAC-UN, 2012, p. 60) (see Table 2.3 in the Appendix).

Control variables

A number of factors known to affect an individual's propensity to join a protest have been included in the analysis. First, the sociological literature on protest participation has argued that an individual's personal constraints related to marriage, employment status, age, etc., may increase the costs and risks of protest participation. For instance, married individuals may have less free time to participate in protest as family responsibilities increase. These "biographical availability" (e.g., McAdam, 1986; Schussman and Soule, 2005) characteristics of an individual are measured on the one hand, through *Marital status* (1 for married, 0 otherwise), gender (*Female*), and *Age*. A negative relationship between these variables and the propensity to join a protest is expected. On the other hand, it

has been argued that employed people are less likely to join a protest because of the potential risks of being fired, and/or because employed individuals have less free time. Thus, I include a variable which indicates whether the respondent is *Unemployed*. To better capture the situation of workers, I also add an indicator of whether the individual has *Health insurance*, as a proxy for formal employment. Finally, because there are costs associated with traveling from rural to urban places, where most protests take place, I expect people who live in an *Urban area* to be more likely to join a protest.

To account for other important factors emphasized in the resource model of political participation (Brady et al., 1995) and in arguments related to mobilization networks (Tarrow, 1994; McAdam et al., 1996), the analysis includes the number of *Years of education* that an individual has completed. Secondly, I include a variable measuring how frequently an individual participates in *Group meetings* (i.e community improvement committee; association of professionals, merchants, manufacturers or farmers; political party or political organization). I first reversed each variable so that the higher the value the more frequent participation is. I then added the values of respondents' answers on their level of involvement in these meetings. The resulting variable ranges from 3 to 12, the higher the number the more involved an individual is. A related variable accounts for an individual's active role in *Solving community problems* (from never to once a week). A fourth variable which accounts for an individual's linkage to political mobilization networks is *Clientelism*. This variable identifies individuals who have been offered private benefits by a political candidate or party in exchange of their support. Though previous research on individual protest participation has not considered clientelism as a factor affecting the propensity to join a protest, there is evidence that clientelism increases electoral participation (Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita, 2013). I expect this variable to be positively correlated with protest participation. Finally, the internet has proved of enormous relevance in the last years for the organization and dissemination of information relevant to protest events. Frequent internet usage could, in some instances, serve as a sub-

stitute for being asked to protest in person, a factor that has been found to positively affect the propensity to protest (Schussman and Soule, 2005). Thus, I include a measure of an individual's frequency of *Internet Usage* (from never to daily).

Two attitudinal variables control for the existence of political grievances and their possible effect on protest participation. To gauge an individual's general feeling about the political system, I control for the level of *Satisfaction with democracy*. I reversed this variable so that higher values mean an individual is more satisfied with the way democracy works in his/her country. The expectation is that the more satisfied an individual feels with the working of democracy, the less likely he or she would be to join a protest. Secondly, *Perception of corruption* takes into account how common individuals perceive corruption is among public officials based on their individual experiences. I reversed this variable so that higher values indicate a higher level of perceived corruption among public officials.

Three more variables account for individuals' political ideology, their level of support for redistribution and whether they use conventional forms of political participation. First, I use respondents' self-placement in a 10-point *Left_right* scale to proxy political ideology. Similarly, with regards to support for government intervention to reduce inequality, I include an individual's level of *Support for redistribution*. To assess whether protest participation is a complementary participatory activity to more conventional forms of political participation, I include an indicator of whether an individual *Voted in the last presidential election*.

Recent research shows that a powerful predictor of political participation is crime victimization (Bateson, 2012). Thus, I include a variable which identifies whether an individual has been a *Victim of crime*. Finally, given that *Indigenous* groups have been among the main drivers of mobilization in several countries of the region (e.g., Inclán, 2008; Cott and Lee, 2007; Vanden, 2003), I include a dummy variable which takes the value of one if an individual identifies himself or herself as indigenous (See Table 2.4 in the Appendix for summary statistics of all variables).

2.5 Results

The main concern of this paper is to assess how availability of resources and economic motives affect an individual's propensity to join a protest. Thus, most of the analysis focuses on the individual level. However, as a first step, this article evaluates the extent to which RD as measured by economic performance and income inequality affects overall levels of collective protest across 17 Latin American democracies (1996-2008).¹² To measure collective protest, I use Banks' *Cross National Time Series Data Archive* (2011), which provides comparable data on the number of protest events on a country-year basis. *Strikes* are defined as direct challenges to the state or its policies that involve 1000 or more workers and more than one employer. *Antigovernment Demonstrations* refer to the number of peaceful gatherings that involve at least 100 people with the purpose of voicing their opposition to the government or its policies. *Riots* are violent demonstrations that involve the use of physical force and at least 100 citizens.

The main independent variables are economic performance, measured with an indicator of *GDP per capita growth*; and the level of economic *Inequality* which uses a comparable estimate of the Gini index constructed on the basis of equivalized household disposable income using the Luxembourg Income Study data as the standard (Solt, 2009). I also control for a number of variables that could affect the level of social conflict in democracies. *Inflation* controls for the rate of price change in the economy as a whole. The variable *Urban* controls for the percentage of the population living in urban areas.¹³ An indicator based on the *Corruption perception index* controls for political grievances that may lead to increased social conflict.¹⁴ To take into account the effect of economic reforms on collective protest I use the *Structural reform index* constructed by Lora (2012).¹⁵

¹²Complete data on all variables is available for 173 observations.

¹³All three variables come from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2010).

¹⁴Provided by Transparency International, this indicator measures the level of public sector corruption as perceived by business people, risk analysts and the general public. It ranges from 10 (highly clean) to 0 (highly corrupt). I reversed the values of this variable to range from 0 (highly clean) to 10 (highly corrupt) (available at: <http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview>).

¹⁵As explained by the author; the index averages the scores of the indexes which reflect the evolution in five reform areas: i) trade policy, ii) financial policy, iii) tax policy, iv) privatization, and v) labor legislation. It ranges from 0 to 1 and is provided for 19 Latin American countries

To account for the possibility that protests in one country may trigger protests in other countries, I constructed an indicator of *Diffusion* which is simply the regional sum of each event in any given year. The possibility that protest activity may be hindered by violent state repression (Moore, 1998; Carey, 2008) is accounted for by aggregating three indicators of human rights violations; torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings (Cingranelli and Richards, 2010). Each of these measures whether the violation in question occurred frequently (0), occasionally (1) or did not occur (2). Thus, the variable *Repression* ranges from 0 to 6, indicating low to high respect of physical integrity rights (Table 2.5 in the Appendix provides summary statistics).

Given that protest events at the country level are measured as event-counts, I use a negative binomial regression model to assess the relationship between economic performance, economic inequality and protest participation at the macro-level. The negative binomial model uses maximum likelihood estimation to assess the probability of event occurrences. It is recommended to estimate a negative binomial regression model instead of a poisson model when there is overdispersion in the data, that is when the variance is greater than the conditional mean. Failing to account for overdispersion in the data produces downwardly biased standard errors, which could in turn lead to mistaken conclusions about the significance of the parameter estimates (Long and Freese, 2005). To mitigate problems of reverse causation all the independent variables lagged one year. Also, to account for potential serial correlation all models include the lagged dependent variable in the right hand side of the equation (not shown). Finally, I use robust standard errors clustered by country in order to account for heteroscedasticity.

Table 2.1 presents the results of four models. In the first model the dependent variable collective protest is the sum of strikes, demonstrations and riots. Models 2-4 present the results separately for each event-type. First, economic performance is negatively and significantly associated with overall levels of collective action as well as with each type of protest event, though the significance level is weaker for demonstrations. These results are consistent with my argument from 1985 until 2009 (2012, p. 26).

that poor economic performance triggers citizens' social discontent and they also suggest that this holds true for labor-related protest (i.e., strikes), as well as for peaceful and violent mobilization. Considering Model 1, the substantial impact of economic performance indicates that moving from the mean level of GDP per capita growth (2.34%) to minus one standard deviation (-1.59%) increases the predicted number of events from 1.18 to 1.49, an increase of 26%. Similarly, moving from the mean level of growth (2.34%) to the minimum (-11.7%), would increase the number of predicted events from approximately 1.18 to 2.7, an increase of 128%. Thus, bad economic performance can have a quite substantial impact on the level of social conflict. On the other hand, the rate of inflation does not seem to affect collective protest in the region, at least for the period under study.

The results also indicate that economic inequality has a positive and significant effect on aggregated levels of collective action and on mass demonstrations, but it does not seem to encourage strikes nor riots. According to Model 1, moving from the mean level of economic inequality (48.5) plus one standard deviation (52.1), increases the number of predicted events from 1.15 to approximately 2, that is, an increase of 74%. Similarly, moving from the mean level of inequality to its maximum (54.7), increases the number of predicted events from 1.1 to 2.9, an increase of 150%. Additionally, the results show that corruption has a positive impact across all protest-types, so that higher levels of perceived corruption in the public sector are associated with higher levels of social protest. On the other hand, the results for the effect of structural reforms is not consistent across models, though it appears to be positively associated with the predicted number of strikes and riots. As one would expect urbanization and higher protection of physical integrity rights facilitate protest participation. Finally, the results suggest that there are diffusion effects for the aggregated levels of collective protest and for strikes, but not for antigovernment demonstrations nor riots.

Table 2.1: RD and Collective Protest Across Latin American Countries

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Collective action	Strikes	Demonstrations	Riots
main				
L.GDP per capita growth	-0.058*** (0.018)	-0.123*** (0.029)	-0.030* (0.018)	-0.105*** (0.020)
L.Inflation	-0.008* (0.004)	-0.020 (0.021)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.021 (0.017)
L.Inequality	0.149*** (0.033)	0.025 (0.064)	0.173*** (0.037)	0.059 (0.051)
L.Corruption perception index	0.495*** (0.062)	0.509*** (0.115)	0.441*** (0.058)	0.617*** (0.170)
L.Structural reform index	-1.378 (1.938)	8.191*** (3.096)	-4.468** (1.980)	4.059 (3.059)
L.Urban	0.056*** (0.008)	0.038** (0.019)	0.064*** (0.008)	0.040*** (0.012)
L.Repression	0.221*** (0.060)	0.077 (0.080)	0.233*** (0.066)	0.106 (0.093)
L.Diffusion collective action	0.020** (0.009)			
L.Diffusion strikes		0.267*** (0.061)		
L.Diffusion demonstrations			0.012 (0.017)	
L.Diffusion riots				0.018 (0.069)
Observations	173	173	173	173
ll	-272.180	-82.792	-225.818	-113.959

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Individuals' propensity to join a protest

Moving to the the individual-level analysis, the central focus of this paper, Table 2.2 presents the results related to the effect of *Economic motives* (H1) on the propensity to join a protest. Model 1, includes all the variables without the interaction. First, let's focus on the main independent variables. Consistent with H1, the indicator for *Economic motives* has a positive and significant effect on the propensity to join a protest. On the other hand, though the coefficient for the variable *Distance to median income* is positive, it does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance.

A number of control variables show significant effects on an individual's propensity to join a protest. To better understand the magnitude of these effects, Figure 2.2 displays the average marginal effects for each variable. Being *Indigenous*, having received *Clientelist* offers by politicians and *Economic motives* show relatively large effects on the propensity to join a protest. Overall, the variables related to biographical availability have the expected effects (i.e., *Marital status*, *Female*, and *Urban residence*), with the exception of being *Unemployed* and having *Health insurance*. While being unemployed is not statistically significant, having health insurance has a positive and statistically significant effect on the propensity to join a protest. Considering that these individuals are likely to be formally employed, it is not surprising that they have a higher probability to join a protest. This is consistent with studies that show that while recent collective action is characterized by a diversification of actors, labor remains an important actor for the organization of protests and strikes in the region (e.g., Almeida, 2007; Calderón, 2013).

The variables related to mobilization resources and networks also have the expected effects on protest participation. Additional to clientelism, *Participation in group meetings*, *Internet Usage*, and *Solving Community problems*, all encourage protest participation. Surprisingly, neither *Satisfaction with democracy* nor *Perception of corruption* have significant effects on protest participation. This seems

Table 2.2: Individuals propensity to join a protest

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	protest	protest	protest
Labor and Social Policies			
Economic motives	0.314**	0.356***	-0.015 (0.069)
Distance to median income	0.027	0.023	0.398** (0.186)
Economic motives X Distance to median		0.033	0.027* (0.016)
Economic motives X Labor and Soc Pol			-0.033 (0.054)
Marital status	-0.180**	-0.180**	-0.156** (0.066)
Female	-0.145**	-0.146**	-0.170*** (0.060)
Age	-0.003	-0.003	-0.002 (0.002)
Unemployed	0.068	0.068	0.043 (0.112)
Health insurance	0.251***	0.253***	0.227*** (0.069)
Urban	0.210**	0.211**	0.235*** (0.076)
Years of Education	0.014	0.014	0.013 (0.009)
Participation in group meetings	0.310***	0.310***	0.294*** (0.021)
Solve community problem	0.215***	0.215***	0.223*** (0.033)
Vote buying	0.399***	0.400***	0.397*** (0.075)
Internet usage	0.087***	0.087***	0.104*** (0.024)
Satisfaction with democracy	-0.047	-0.046	-0.082* (0.042)
Perception of corruption	0.003	0.002	-0.024 (0.036)
Left_right	-0.083***	-0.083***	-0.073*** (0.012)
Support for redistribution	0.082***	0.082***	0.079*** (0.022)
Voted in last elections	0.189**	0.190**	0.194** (0.083)
Victim of crime	0.410***	0.409***	0.379*** (0.065)
Indigenous	0.624***	0.625***	0.546*** (0.117)
Constant	-3.782***	-3.785***	-4.358*** (0.369)
Constant			-1.847*** (0.397)
Observations	15627	15627	15627


Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

to suggest that individuals' political grievances are not central individual-level motivators of protest participation. On the other hand, both indicators related to political ideology are significant and show the expected effects. Individuals who consider themselves closer to the right of the ideological spectrum are less likely to join a protest. In contrast, individuals who support redistribution are more likely to participate in protest.

The results also show that individuals who participate in elections also participate in protest. This is in line with arguments that see protest participation as a complementary mechanism of participation to more conventional forms of political participation (Inglehart, 1989; Norris, 2002). Finally, consistent with previous work, crime victimization triggers citizens' protest mobilization (Bateson, 2012).


Figure 2.2: Average Marginal Effects (Model 1)



According to H2, the effect of economic motives should vary according to an individual's position in the income distribution. I argued that among the poor, the scarcity of resources predominates over economic motives, so that no effect of the latter is expected among this group. Similarly, among the rich,


the relative abundance of resources, as well as the availability of other means of political influence to this group, should mitigate the effect of economic motives on their propensity to join a protest. Only among individuals whose income is close to the median income, the presence of economic motives and available resources for mobilization fuels protest participation. Model 2 in Table 3 shows the results of the interaction term between resources (i.e., income) and motives. Since interaction effects cannot be directly interpreted from the regression table, given that “if the covariance term is negative, as is often the case, then it is entirely possible for $\beta_1 + \beta_3 Z$ to be significant for substantively relevant values of Z even if all of the model parameters are insignificant” (Brambor et al., 2006, p. 70). Thus, to understand the effect of economic motives across the different values of the income distribution the Figure 2.3 presents the marginal effect of economic motives along the values of the income scale. It shows that consistent with H2, the effect of economic motives is only significant among individuals whose income lies close to the median of the income distribution.

Figure 2.3: Economic Motives and Income Interaction



Finally, Model 3 presents a multilevel logistic regression with random intercepts in order to assesses H3, which argues that the effect of economic motives on protest participation weakens as the number of labor and social policies introduced by governments in response to the economic downturn increase. The results from the interaction between economic motives and labor and social policies are shown in Figure 2.4. Overall, the effect of economic motives on protest participation decreases as governments introduce or expand existing measures to mitigate the effects of the economic crisis on citizens' lives. As the number of policies reach the maximum value, the effect of economic motives on protest participation becomes statistically insignificant. This provides evidence that governments can effectively use labor and social policies to mitigate citizens' economic discontent.

Figure 2.4: Motives and Labor and Social Policies Interaction



2.6 Conclusion

This article provides important insights for the study of economic deprivation and protest participation in Latin America. It shows that economic performance

and income inequality do affect overall levels of collective protest across Latin American democracies. At the individual-level, the analysis provides important insights on how economic deprivation and resources matter for citizens' propensity to participate in protest in Latin America. I argue that the combined effect of resources and incentives converge to an optimal point to fuel protest participation among individuals whose income falls close to the middle of the income distribution. In contrast, for low-income individuals the relative scarcity of resources predominates. Thus, despite that individuals experience a condition economic deprivation and attribute responsibility to the government for economic outcomes, they are not more likely to be mobilized. Among high-income individuals something similar is observed but for a different reason. Among this group, the relative abundance of resources makes the channeling of discontent through protest participation less attractive. I have argued that this is either because high-income individuals have alternative and more direct channels of political influence, or because economic deprivation experienced by this group of individuals is not so severe as to encourage protest participation. Finally, the incorporation of governments' implementation of labor and social policies to cushion citizens from the adverse effects of economic downturns proves to be effective in mitigating the effect of economic motives on protest participation.

This study adds to our knowledge of political participation and democratic accountability in Latin America. Political protest is a mechanism through which citizens express their opposition or discontent over government's actions and policies. Unlike electoral participation which provides limited opportunities to express grievances, collective mobilization between elections can serve as a channel to demand government responsiveness on specific issues of concern to citizens, activating mechanisms of "societal accountability" (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti, 2000). However, where economic inequalities translate into political participation the voice of large segments of the population may not be heard as frequently and intensively as that of other sectors of the population. Unless the preferences of those who mobilize and are politically engaged are similar to those who do not,

large inequalities among citizens are likely to persist, hindering a core attribute of democracy (Munck, 2014).

Finally, with regard to the differential effects that social policy (i.e health insurance) has on political participation in the region, the results suggest possible fruitful avenues for future research. As research on developed democracies has shown, the dualization of labor markets carries significant implications for the politics and the development of the welfare state (Emmenegger et al., 2012; Rueda, 2007, 2014; Pontusson and Rueda, 2010). Research focused on less developed countries has been less focused on the political consequences of labor market segmentation. Though there is some evidence that labor market insiders do not have strong preferences for redistributive policies (Haggard et al., 2013) more work is needed to explore individuals' characteristics and their association with support for particular types of social policies in the region; the consequences of labor market segmentation for other types of political participation; and the consequences of political participation for the expansion and introduction of social policies targeted to the poor in less developing countries.


2.7 Appendix

Additional tables and figures

Table 2.3: Labor and Social Policies Introduced in Response to the Economic Downturn

	Labor policies	Social policies	Total
Argentina	4	2	6
Bolivia	1	1	2
Brazil	1	2	3
Chile	4	1	5
Colombia	2	1	3
Costa Rica	1	2	3
Dominican Republic	1	3	4
Ecuador	1	1	2
El Salvador	1	3	4
Guatemala	0	1	1
Haiti	0	0	0
Honduras	0	1	1
Mexico	4	1	5
Nicaragua	2	2	4
Panama	0	3	3
Paraguay	1	2	3
Peru	2	0	2
Uruguay	4	1	5
Venezuela	0	0	0

Figure 2.5: Economic growth in Latin America in 2009



Source: CEPALSTAT

Table 2.4: Summary Statistics of Individual-level Variables

	mean	sd	min	max
protest	.0885	.284	0	1
Distance to median income	-.88	2.24	-5	5
Economic motives	.117	.322	0	1
Marital status	.392	.488	0	1
Female	.482	.5	0	1
Age	38.1	15.4	16	98
Unemployed	.0799	.271	0	1
Health insurance	.409	.492	0	1
Urban	.723	.448	0	1
Years of Education	9.87	4.37	0	18
Participation in group meetings	3.17	1.27	2.33	9.33
Solve community problem	1.58	.869	1	4
Vote buying	.141	.348	0	1
Internet usage	2.31	1.55	1	5
Satisfaction with democracy	2.59	.717	1	4
Perception of corruption	3.2	.845	1	4
Left_right	5.64	2.44	1	10
Support for redistribution	5.84	1.46	1	7
Voted in last elections	.794	.404	0	1
Victim of crime	.227	.419	0	1
Indigenous	.0546	.227	0	1
Observations	15627			

Table 2.5: Descriptive Statistics of variables included in country-level models of protest

	mean	sd	min	max
Collective action	1.68	2.4	0	13
Strikes	.243	.599	0	4
Demonstrations	1.09	1.61	0	8
Riots	.341	.702	0	4
GDP per capita growth	2.34	3.93	-11.7	16.2
Inflation	9.75	11.6	-23.5	116
Inequality	48.5	3.63	38.9	54.7
Corruption perception index	5.37	1.42	1.44	7.34
Structural reform index	.619	.065	.5	.8
Urban	71.4	14.7	44	93.3
Repression	2.92	1.47	0	6
Diffusion collective action	15.1	13.2	0	59
Diffusion strikes	2.1	2.49	0	10
Diffusion demonstrations	9.77	7.58	0	40
Diffusion riots	2.65	2.52	0	10
Observations	173			

Variable question wording and coding

Protest. In the last twelve months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march? Yes (1), no (0).

Independent Variables

Distance to median income. Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly income of this household fit, including remittances from abroad and the income of all the working adults and children? [10 deciles based on the currency and distribution of the country]. Recoded (-5 to 5).

Household income reduced. Over the past two years, has the income of your household: (1) Increased? (2) Remained the same? (3) Decreased?. Recoded (Decreased = 1, Increased or remained the same = 0).

Blame attribution. Who is the most to blame for the current economic crisis in our country from among the following: (01) The previous administration (02) The

current administration (03) Ourselves (04) The rich people of our country (05) The problems of democracy (06) The rich countries (07) The economic system of the country, or (08) Never have thought about it (77) Other (88) DK (98) DR (99) N/A. Recoded (1= The previous administration or the current administration, 0= the rest)

Health Insurance. Do you have medical insurance? (1) Yes (0) No (88) DK.

Control variables

Unemployed. How do you mainly spend your time? Are you currently Actively looking for a job (1), the rest (0) [working, not working but have a job, a student, taking care of the home, retired a pensioner or permanently disabled to work, not working and not looking for a job].

Female. Female (1) male (0).

Age. How old are you?

Education. How many years of education have you completed?

Marital status. What is your marital status? Married (1), the rest (0) [single, common law marriage, divorced, separated, widow].

Urban. Urban (1), rural (0).

Satisfaction with democracy. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in country? (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied. Reversed; (1) very dissatisfied to (4) very satisfied.

Perception of corruption. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon? Reversed; (1) very uncommon to (4) very common.

Left_right. On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right. One means left and 10 means right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right, According to the meaning

that the terms left and right have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale?

Support for Redistribution. The government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement? Ranges from 1, strongly disagree to 7, strongly agree.

Group meeting. I am going to read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend their meetings at least once a week (4), once or twice a month (3), once or twice a year (2), or never (1). Sum of answers to three subquestions: a) Meetings of a community improvement committee or association + b) Meetings of an association of professionals, merchants, manufacturers or farmers + c) Meetings of a political party or political organization. Ranges from 3 (never) to 12 (at least once a week).

Clientelism. In recent years and thinking about election campaigns, has a candidate or someone from a political party offered you something, like a favor, food, or any other benefit or thing in return for your vote or support? Has this happened often, sometimes or never? Often and sometimes responses are coded as one.

Voted in last presidential election. Did you voted in the last presidential election? (1) Yes (0) No.

Solve community problem. In the last 12 months have you tried to help to solve a problem in your community or in your neighborhood? Please, tell me if you did it at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year or never in last 12 months. Recoded from (1) never to (4) once a week.

Internet Usage. How often do you use the internet? (1) daily (2) a few times a week (3) a few times a month (4) rarely (5) never. Recoded from (1) Never to (5) daily.

Victim of crime. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type

of crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (0) No.

3 Social Spending Responses to Organized Labor and Mass Protests in Latin America, 1970- 2007

Abstract

This paper analyzes the relationship between collective protest and social spending in Latin America from 1970 to 2007. I argue that under democracy, organized labor is in a better position relative to other groups in society to obtain social policy concessions as a consequence of their collective action efforts. Labor insiders mobilize around specific demands, and labor strikes carry significant economic and political costs on governments. In contrast, other groups in society rarely protest around specific social policy issues and are more often subject to successful demobilization tactics from political leaders. Results from an error correction model (ECM) show that in democracies, collective protest has differentiated effects on social spending. While strikes have a strong positive long-term effect on social security and welfare spending, none of the different forms of collective protest affect education or health spending. Importantly, I also find evidence of a deterrent effect of mass protests in democratic regimes; cutbacks in human capital spending are less likely as peaceful large-scale demonstrations increase.

3.1 Introduction

Does collective protest affect the social policy choices of Latin American governments, and if so, does this influence vary according to the type of protest and social spending? The literature on welfare state policies in developing countries consistently finds that democracy is an important determinant of social spending (Avelino et al., 2005; Brown and Hunter, 1999; Huber et al., 2008a; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001; Rudra and Haggard, 2005; Stasavage, 2005). In line with political economy approaches on redistributive politics and public goods provision (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Meltzer and Richard, 1981), democratic governments spend more on social policies than their authoritarian counterparts. This is particularly the case for those policies aimed at promoting human capital such as education and health spending. Compared with social security spending, which benefits a privileged group of formal sector workers, education and health spending reaches a larger segment of the population. Hence, to win elections, democratic leaders have incentives to increase the types of social spending that benefits a majority of the population, including low-income groups (Avelino et al., 2005; Brown and Hunter, 2004; Segura-Ubiergo, 2007; Stasavage, 2005).

This growing literature has contributed significantly to our understanding of the relationship between democracy and social spending in developing countries. However, much emphasis has been placed on politicians incentives to increase/reduce certain categories of social spending as a result of the expansion of the electorate. Less attention has been devoted to alternative channels of political participation that citizens have at their disposal to show their discontent and attempt to influence public policy (but see Garay, 2007; Giraudy, 2007). This is somewhat surprising given that mobilization by lower income and working class groups has played a central role in studies of welfare state development in industrialized democracies (Hicks and Misra, 1993; Hicks and Swank, 1984; Isaac and Kelly, 1981).

Empirical research on collective protest in developing countries has analyzed the causes of popular mobilization (e.g., Arce and Bellinger, 2007; Arce and

Kim, 2011; Robertson, 2007), as well as several outcomes associated with it. For instance, existing research shows that governments respond differently depending on the tactics used by challengers. While the most common response is toleration, the likelihood of repression increases as a result of violent disruption, but nonviolent disruption increases the probability of concessions (Franklin, 2009). Moreover, collective protest is an important determinant of regime transitions from dictatorship to democracy (e.g., Bermeo, 1997; Collier and Mahoney, 1997; Teorell, 2010; Rivera and Gleditsch, 2013), as well as of presidential falls in Latin American democracies (Hochstetler, 2006). Surprisingly, the effect of collective protest on policy change in developing countries, has not been systematically analyzed in a cross-national setting.

Using data from 18 Latin American countries for the period 1970-2007, this article analyzes the relationship between different types of protest and human capital (i.e., education and health), and social security and welfare spending. I argue that under democracy, organized labor¹ is in a better position relative to other groups in society to obtain social policy concessions as a consequence of their collective action efforts. Labor insiders mobilize around specific demands, and labor strikes carry significant economic and political costs on governments. In contrast, other groups in society rarely protest around specific social policy issues and are more often subject to successful demobilization tactics from political leaders. The empirical results largely support this argument and show that while organized labor protest in the form of strikes has a long-term positive effect on social security spending under democracy, none of the different forms of collective protest affect human capital spending. Importantly, however, I also find evidence of a deterrent effect of protest by the masses. The results from a multinomial logistic regression show that as the number of large-scale demonstrations increases, democracies are less likely to cut back human capital spending compared with dictatorships.

¹Organized labor and labor market insiders Rueda (2005) are used interchangeably in this analysis. Both terms are used to refer to formal sector workers who have access to social security benefits (i.e., benefits for income loss due to sickness and disability, old age, and unemployment) as part of their employment relationship.

By stressing the role of popular mobilization and collective protest in policy outcomes, this article contributes to current debates on the democratic politics in the region (Munck, 2004). Whereas existing research has emphasized how citizens influence governments decisions through formal political institutions, this article considers state-society relations from a broader perspective and shows that citizens are able to influence governments policy choices through collective protest.

Furthermore, analyzing the impact that different types of protest by labor insiders and the masses have on separate categories of social spending enables us to forge a better understanding on the relationship between democracy and social spending. While there is a general consensus that democracies in the region invest more in human capital than authoritarian regimes, there has been less consensus on the effect of democracy on social security spending (Avelino et al., 2005; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001). By taking into account the mobilization capacity of labor, this article shows that democratic regimes increase social security spending only when they face labor militancy. In addition, this article adds to our understanding on human capital spending in Latin American democracies by considering whether in addition to competitive elections, mass protests affect policy choices related to education and health.

3.2 The Argument

Political regimes and collective action

My starting point is the contention that citizens collective protest is more likely to influence public policy under democracy than under dictatorships. Political regimes structure the opportunities for groups to organize and mobilize to voice their demands or express their discontent (Eisinger, 1973; Tilly, 1978; for a review see Meyer, 2004). Compared with authoritarian regimes, democracies reduce the costs of organizing state-oriented challenges by refraining from using widespread repression against those who engage in different forms of collective protest (Arce and Kim, 2011; Carey, 2008; Davenport, 1995).

Not only through elections are democratic leaders held accountable for their performance while in office but also mechanisms of horizontal accountability involving oversight and investigation by other public agencies constrain their exercise of power (Manin et al., 1999; Schedler et al., 1999). Moreover, democratic institutions are associated with normative values that facilitate the channeling of dissent by peaceful means, so that resorting to violent confrontation is costly and severely damages political legitimacy (Henderson, 1991; Davenport, 1999). In particular, freedom of the press exposes public officials behavior to a larger group of the citizenry beyond those involved in the act of protest, thus, increasing the potential costs of repression.²

There is systematic evidence that compared with autocracies, the democracies of the region are less likely to respond with repression to collective protest, especially when challenged by peaceful forms of protest (Carey, 2008). Moreover, repression is not a useful strategy to put an end to collective protest in democratic regimes, as repressive tactics often trigger further protest (Carey, 2006). Thus, it is plausible to expect that compared with authoritarian governments democratic leaders will have greater incentives to address challengers discontent and to deploy strategies other than repression for dealing with social instability. These strategies range from ignoring/tolerating protestors to the deployment of maneuvers aimed at demobilization (Lipsky, 1968), to policy concessions such as the expansion of welfare state policies (Hicks and Misra, 1993; Hicks and Swank, 1984).

Collective protest and social spending

In this article, I focus on the social policy impact of different types of collective protest. Analyzing policy change as an outcome of protest implies focusing at the intermediate level of analysis, rather than at the structural level where other types of outcomes are possible, such as gains in democratization or the formation of new political parties (Amenta and Young, 1999a,b). It also entails departing

²For a similar argument on the impact of the freedom of the media on the use of torture, see Conrad and Moore (2010).

from approaches that focus on protest actions and evaluate their consequences based on the short-term governmental responses related to the challengers specific programs.³

Governments can use social policy as a tool for maintaining political legitimacy and social peace, and for preventing the exacerbation of social discontent once it materializes (e.g., Piven and Cloward, 1971; Taydas and Peksen, 2012; Thyne, 2006; Rudra, 2005). While mobilization has included other non-welfare issues, the question of social inclusion has been central to most large-scale collective protests in the highly unequal societies of the region (Almeida, 2007; Arce and Bellinger, 2007; Eckstein, 2001; Roberts, 2008; Silva, 2009; Walton and Ragin, 1990; Bellinger and Arce, 2011). Thus, without neglecting that other types of outcomes are possible, this articles main focus is on the potential long-term social spending choices that may result from the sustained mobilization of social groups (Amenta et al., 2010).⁴ However, governments may not necessarily increase all types of social spending in response to collective protest. As Tilly (1978) puts it, “Governments respond selectively to different sorts of groups, and to different sorts of actions” (p. 106).

Building on the central insight of the insider-outsider approach that distinguishes preferences for social policies between different groups within labor (Rueda, 2005, 2007), as well as on the literature on collective protest in the region, I argue that governments facing challenges from different groups of the population have incentives to respond to the interests of relatively more organized groups, those who impose the highest costs on them as a result of their protest. In contrast, governments are inclined to deploy alternative strategies aimed at the disarticulation and demobilization of the relatively unorganized and more heterogeneous protest movements when faced by competing pressures from different sectors of society (Lipsky, 1968).

The segmentation of the labor market in Latin American countries implies

³See Franklin (2009) for an insightful example of this approach.

⁴The recent literature on social movements calls for a move beyond the emphasis on success and failure as determined in relation to challengers stated goals (Gamson, 1990) to a focus on other potential political outcomes or unintended consequences of challengers actions such as changes in social spending (Amenta et al., 2010; Amenta and Young, 1999a).

that preferences over social policies differ between labor market insiders and outsiders. Labor insiders (i.e., formal sector workers), the sole beneficiaries of social insurance programs, mobilize around issues that directly affect their status as a privileged group, and not to defend or pressure the government for redistributive policies such as human capital spending.⁵ Outsiders (i.e., informal sector workers) benefit from human capital spending but rarely mobilize to demand expansions of education and health policies. The lack of an organized constituency in favor of human capital spending in turn contributes to the vulnerability of this type of spending during times of economic decline (Wibbels, 2006).

There is indeed consistent evidence that being a union member is associated with less support for redistribution in developing countries (Haggard et al., 2013), that labor strength has negative effects on income equality and that it slows, rather than accelerates reductions in infant mortality rates (McGuire, 1999). In addition, it is well known that in stark contrast to industrialized democracies, where all components of social spending help to improve the income distribution, in the developing world, and specifically in Latin America only human capital spending is progressive, that is, it reaches the most disadvantaged segments of society (CEPAL, 2005). In addition, empirical research shows that in the context of economic openness, as human capital spending increases, income inequality decreases while the opposite effect is found for social security spending (Rudra, 2004).

Organized labor protest. Relative to other groups of society, organized labor enjoys an advantaged position to effectively press governments and obtain policy concessions. They mobilize around concrete demands and possess organizational resources that aid in sustaining challenges to the state that other groups do not readily enjoy. Strikes by organized labor carry significant costs on governments due to its capacity to disrupt economic activity and mobilize political support (Hicks and Misra, 1993; McHugh, 1991; Swank, 1983; Hicks and Swank, 1983).

As one of the main actors of the corporatist arrangement between labor and

⁵Labor market insiders may also benefit from human capital spending, but when organized labor chooses to mobilize, they do so to defend their interest in relation to labor policies (Madrid, 2003; Murillo and Schrank, 2005).

the state, labor unions were provided with organizational and economic resources to meet their needs in exchange for political support and the acceptance of state-imposed constraints (Collier and Collier, 1991). In some countries, the assets inherited by state sponsored unions gave them sufficient advantage to remain as the major actors in labor politics in the post-transition period and helped them play an influential role in the process of labor reform (Caraway, 2012; Cook, 2006). Organized labor has often resorted to its powerful weapon, the strike, as a means to demand better working conditions and to oppose policies that most affect its interests. Labor and pension reforms have met the most vigorous opposition from organized labor, as these reforms impose significant losses on them relative to other reforms (Madrid, 2003).

Although in some cases negotiation took place without militancy, other times unions choose to confront their long-standing political allies carrying successful strikes, which in some instances eventually undermined the governance of labor-based administrations (Murillo, 2000, p. 142). There is strong evidence that governments who faced powerful organized labor at home were able to negotiate less intrusive loan conditions with regard to labor with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Caraway et al., 2012). Several studies also point out to a more general pattern in the region of partial deregulation of labor and enactment of union-friendly labor legislation in the context of free market economic reforms (Madrid, 2003; Mosley and Uno, 2007; Murillo, 2001; Murillo and Schrank, 2005). For instance, Murillo and Schrank (2005) show that “13 of the 18 collective labor reforms approved in Latin America between 1985 and 1998 have enhanced rather than undercut labor’s ability to organize and bargain collectively” (p. 972). Certainly, the strengthening of collective labor rights improves its capacity to resist unwanted policy changes and demand better working conditions. In her analysis of Venezuela, Mexico, and Argentina, Murillo (2000) shows that in a significant proportion of instances of labor militancy, unions were successful in obtaining government concessions. Based on the above discussion, I expect mobilization by organized labor to be positively associated with increases in social security

spending in democracies.

Mass protest. The masses have also engaged in collective protest to show their discontent with or opposition to state policies, and often the largest protest movements included the participation of organized labor in coalition with other sectors of society. However, unlike labor-dominated protest in the form of strikes which are organized around specific demands for collective rights, social security entitlements or wage increases, ordinary citizens rarely mobilize proactively in large numbers around redistributive policies such as human capital investment (Bermeo, 2010; Wibbels, 2006).

Indeed, two of the central features of large-scale protest have been its reactive and heterogeneous nature. The mobilization of diverse groups and formation of alliances have been facilitated on the basis of convergence around the common purpose of resisting unwanted economic policies (Almeida, 2007; Eckstein, 2001; Roberts, 2008; Silva, 2009). Certainly, gaining resonance within a broader public helps to build strength and increases the capacity to exert pressure on governments through disruptive tactics and large-scale demonstrations. At the same time, however, diversity implies fragmentation of interests and greater difficulty to align and reconcile heterogeneous preferences once the moment to act proactively to channel protestors demands arrives. As it is well documented in the literature of social movements very often the factors that contribute to the rise and strength of social movements limit their influence at later stages of the policy process beyond the agenda setting stage (Amenta et al., 2010). Relatedly, governments are more likely to tolerate and/or deploy other strategies at their disposal to deal with protest by relatively less organized and disadvantaged groups of society. These strategies are facilitated by the very heterogeneous nature that characterizes mass protest and are frequently used with the purpose of weakening and further demobilization of the group. According to Lipsky (1968), these tactics involve, among others, the dispensation of symbolic satisfactions, directing attention to the most dramatic cases, postponement of action, and the discredit of protest leaders.

In Latin America, there are several cases that illustrate the above logic. For instance, the student *Pingüino* movement (2006) in Chile succeeded in mobilizing hundreds of thousands of secondary students for educational reform. As the movement grew in strength, the government was forced to open access to formal channels for the processing of their demands. Once the students accepted to participate in formal discussions, their large numbers made decision making difficult, and their organizational resources and expertise were insufficient to have an impact beyond the policy agenda (Donoso, 2013). Similar dynamics appeared to be at work in the *Piqueteros* movement of the unemployed in Argentina and the Ecuador's indigenous movement. In both cases, their heterogeneous and fragmented nature contributed to their eventual demobilization by their respective governments. As Wolff (2007) puts it:

Very clearly, the destabilization in both countries did not involve any significant redistribution of power and wealth. Rather, it was based, in part, on the division, co-optation and marginalization, partial disarticulation and demobilization of the contentious “protest alliances” . . . (p. 22)

In accord with the above logic that highlights the reactive and heterogeneous nature collective protest by the masses, I do not expect mass protest to influence social spending.

However, I also consider a potential counter argument, which would suggest that successfully sustained protest by the masses intensifies pressure on democratic governments to expand social policies with broad appeal, such as investing in human capital. Competitive elections have provided incentives to democratic leaders for expanding social policies that reach large segments of the population (e.g., Avelino et al., 2005; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001), and in a context of widespread discontent the power in numbers (DeNardo, 1985) may encourage democratic leaders to expand policies in these areas. Political leaders could use human capital spending to signal that they care about disadvantaged groups of the population and are resolved to enhance policies that improve their prospects

and for redressing long-standing inequalities. After all, there is a wide agreement among scholars that grievances rooted in feelings of injustice and social exclusion provided the basis to build coalitions among different sectors of the population (Eckstein, 2001; Roberts, 2008; Silva, 2009). In addition, they could do so as a preventing strategy to avoid undesirable political outcomes as a result of an exacerbation of discontent such as being forced out of office by the masses (Hochstetler, 2006). Consequently, if this argument is correct and there is a positive unintended consequence (Amenta et al., 2010; Giugni et al., 1999) of large-scale collective protest, one should expect that democratic governments in the region increase human capital spending in the face of mass protest.

3.3 Data

Dependent variable

To estimate the effect of collective protest on social spending, I use Cross-National Time-Series (CNTS) data from 18 Latin American countries for the period 1970-2008. The main dependent variables are human capital spending (i.e., the sum of spending on health and education) and social security and welfare spending, both as a percentage of GDP. These data are taken from the Social Policy in Latin America and the Caribbean Dataset, which covers the period 1970-2000 (Huber et al., 2008b). I updated these data up to 2008 using data from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (See Table 3.1 in the Appendix).

Independent variables

The key independent variables are the different types of collective protest, democracy, and their interactive term. To measure collective protest, I use the CNTS data archive (Banks, 2011). Banks data provide event counts of politically motivated strikes, anti-government demonstrations, and riots. Protest by organized labor (*Strikes*) includes “any strike of 1000 or more industrial or service workers that involves more than one employer and that is aimed at national government

policies or authority.” Demonstrations include “any peaceful gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature.” Riots are defined as “any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force.” To measure mass protest, I use the total sum of demonstrations and riots (*Demriots*).⁶ As has been discussed by some scholars, there are several advantages of using Banks data. First, it provides the most comprehensive cross-national comparable data on different kinds of protest events covering a long period of time. Second, it reports only large-scale events. This is particularly important in this article because these types of events are most likely to have an influence on national policy (Arce and Bellinger, 2007; Teorell, 2010).

To distinguish democratic from autocratic regimes, I employed the Polity score and following standard practice, I created a binary indicator for democracy (*Democracy*), coded “1” if a country has a Polity score equal or above 6, and “0” otherwise (see, for example, Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001). For robustness checks, I use Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreelands (2010) dichotomous classification of political regimes and Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez- Liñán’s (2001) classification of political regimes in Latin America.⁷ To test the hypotheses presented in the previous section, each indicator of collective protest is interacted with the democracy variable.

Control variables

Following existing research on social spending, several control variables have been included. Two indicators account for the effect of globalization on social spending. One is total trade, measured as exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP (*Trade openness*). The second indicator is foreign direct investment (FDI), measured as the net inflows of investment as a percentage of GDP.⁸ There is

⁶Considering each variable separately does not significantly change the results presented here.

⁷Democracies and semi-democracies were collapsed into one category for comparison with autocracies.

⁸Data come from Heston et al. (2009).

no consensus in the literature on the effect of globalization on social spending. While some scholars have found support for the efficiency hypothesis (Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001), others find support for the compensation hypothesis (Avelino et al., 2005; Rudra and Haggard, 2005), and still others find no effect (Huber et al., 2008a). Thus, I adopt a nondirectional hypothesis for the impact of globalization on social spending.⁹ Three demographic controls are incorporated that account for arguments about the expansion of social policy as a consequence of industrialism.¹⁰ Urbanization is measured as the percentage of the total population that resides in urban areas (*Urban population*). For social security spending, it is a common practice to include the percentage of the total population that is 65 and older (*Aged population*). This variable represents the constituency who benefits from social security spending and thus, its impact on social security spending reflects the difficulty of cutting entitlements of organized groups (Brown and Hunter, 1999). For education and health spending, the demographic variable that is employed is the percentage of the population that is in the age range between 0 and 14 (*Youth population*). Finally, logged inflation rates (*Inflation*) and two additional controls that account for the level of economic development and economic growth are entered in all models. Both, the log of real GDP per capita and annual GDP growth is measured by purchasing power parities (GDP).¹¹ (See Table 3.3 in the Appendix)

3.4 Model

Changes in the allocation of resources to social policies are not likely to occur immediately, as it takes time to agree upon the public budget and implement changes. Consequently, I use a single equation error correction model (ECM)¹² for time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data that facilitates the distinction between

⁹For a recent and comprehensive review on the effects of globalization on the welfare state in advanced and developing countries, see Swank (2010).

¹⁰Data come from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2010).

¹¹In the error correction model (ECM), the first difference of this variable measures economic growth (see the “Model” section).

¹²Previous works on social spending that use an ECM include Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001), Iversen and Cusack (2000), Segura-Ubiergo (2007), and Wibbels (2006).

short-term and long-term effects. In the ECM, the dependent variable is measured in changes or first differences. To deal with panel heteroskedasticity and spatial correlation, all models are estimated through ordinary least squares (OLS) with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) (Beck and Katz, 1995). In addition, it is important for the purposes of the article to account for the effect of time-invariant variables, which are not included as controls and may cause problems of omitted variable bias, as well as for time trends common to all countries that may contribute to explain variation in social spending. Thus, all specifications include fixed effects with unit and time period dummies.¹³ Also, a lagged dependent variable is included in the right-hand side of the equation to deal with the problem of serial correlation of errors (Beck and Katz, 1996). The ECM rests on the idea that the independent variable X and the dependent variable Y are in a long-term equilibrium relationship, which is disturbed by short-term shocks. Eventually, the equilibrium relationship between both variables is reestablished at a rate dictated by the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable (De Boef and Keele, 2008). Thus, the lagged dependent variable has a dynamic interpretation and allows the estimation of long-term effects of X on Y .

To separate out the short-term effects from the long-term effects of the independent variables on Y , the model requires that all independent variables be entered in both, lagged levels and first differences, along with the lagged level dependent variable. It is important to note that the ECM and the often used linear autoregressive distributive lag (ADL) model are equivalent in the sense that the relationship implied in each model between dependent and independent variables is the same, and thus, the same information can be derived from them (Banerjee et al., 1993; De Boef and Keele, 2008). As described above, the main variables of interest are the interaction terms between democracy and the different types of protest events (e.g., *Strikes* and the sum of demonstrations and riots, *Demriots*). Thus, in the next section, I estimate a set of models given by the following equation:

¹³ F test and Hausman test results indicate that the fixed effects belong to the model.

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta Y_{i,t} = & \phi Y_{i,t-1} + \beta_1 \Delta Strikes_{i,t} + \beta_2 \Delta Demriots_{i,t} + \beta_3 \Delta Democracy_{i,t} + \beta_4 (\Delta Strikes_{i,t} \times \\ & \Delta Democracy_{i,t}) + \beta_5 (\Delta Demriots_{i,t} \times \Delta Democracy_{i,t}) + \beta_6 Strikes_{i,t-1} + \\ & \beta_7 Demriots_{i,t-1} + \beta_8 Democracy_{i,t-1} + \beta_9 (Strikes_{i,t-1} \times Democracy_{i,t-1}) + \\ & \beta_{10} (Demriots_{i,t-1} \times Democracy_{i,t-1}) + \beta_j \Delta X_{i,t} + \beta_k X_{i,t-1} + \lambda T + \alpha D + \varepsilon_{i,t} \end{aligned}$$

Where $\Delta Y_{i,t}$ represents the indicator for the different categories of social spending (measured in first differences) as a percentage of GDP in country i at time t . $\mathbf{D}$ and $\mathbf{T}$ are vectors of country and year dummies, respectively. The transitory effect of the main independent variables is given by the coefficients β_1 to β_5 while the long-term effect is captured by the coefficients β_6 to β_{10} . Similarly, all control variables are measured in first differences and lagged levels and their effect is given by β_j to β_k , respectively. While the short-term effects are readily available from the regression table, the estimation of the long-term effect or long run multiplier (LRM) requires that the coefficient of the lagged level independent variable be divided by minus the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable ϕ , which measures the error correction rate or the rate at which independent and dependent variables return to equilibrium. This parameter should be between 1 and 0. It reflects the property of a long-term equilibrium under which the model rests. As explained by Iversen and Cusack (2000), The incremental effects of a shock to any exogenous variable are progressively reduced over time, causing spending to converge to a long-term equilibrium (p. 330).

In this article, the main variable of interest is the interaction term between the number of protest and the dummy indicator for democracy, thus, the total long-term effect of, say, strikes in democracies is given by $[\beta_6 + \beta_9] / -\phi$. Unlike the short-term effect of an independent variable, which is felt immediately, the long run effect is distributed among future time periods. As De Boef and Keele (2005) explain, One implication of error correction is that even in the absence of change in X for many periods, we expect Y to continue to change as long as the series are not in equilibrium (p. 12). When an independent variable exhibits only a short-term relationship with the dependent variable, the effect will not persist over

time, that is it has no memory (De Boef and Keele, 2008). To directly estimate the LRM of the variables of interest and, more importantly its standard errors, all the analyses use an instrumental variable approach based on the Bewley (1979) transformation (see De Boef and Keele, 2008).

3.5 Results

Table 3.1 reports the results of the different ECMs for human capital, and social security and welfare spending. For presentation purposes, country and time dummies have been excluded from the tables. The focus will be on the marginal effects of the different interaction terms between democracy and protest by organized labor and the masses. Recall that the effect of protest when democracy is present is given by the sum of the coefficient for protest and the coefficient of the interaction term (for the short-term effect, this is given by $\beta_1 + \beta_4$ and for the long-term effect by $[\beta_6 + \beta_8] / -\phi$. All LRMs are calculated via the Bewley transformation to obtain the correct standard errors for the estimates of the long-term effects. It is important to emphasize that when analyzing interaction effects we cannot draw any conclusions about the marginal effect of one variable when another variable is present from the coefficients of the regression table. As Brambor et al. (2006) explain, If the covariance term is negative, as is often the case, then it is entirely possible for $\beta_1 + \beta_3 Z$ to be significant for substantively relevant values of Z even if all of the model parameters are insignificant (p. 70). Based on the LRM estimates from the Bewley transformation, therefore, I calculated the marginal effect of the interaction term to assess whether the marginal effect of protest under democracy is statistically significant.¹⁴

Columns 1 to 3 of Table 1 show the results of the models for social security spending. Alongside each model, the LRMs for each variable are shown. As indicated by the coefficient of the lagged levels of the dependent variable, the

¹⁴The formula to calculate the standard error of the marginal effect of the interaction term is

$\hat{\sigma}_{\frac{\partial y}{\partial x}} \sqrt{\text{var}(\hat{\beta}_1) + Z^2 \text{var}(\hat{\beta}_3) + 2Z \text{cov}(\hat{\beta}_1, \hat{\beta}_3)}$, where $\hat{\beta}_1$ is the coefficient of protest and $\hat{\beta}_3$ is the coefficient of the interaction term (see Brambor et al., 2006).

rate at which equilibrium errors are corrected is around 18% per year. In other words, after a change in one of the predictor variables that disturbs the equilibrium, long-term levels of social spending will move at this rate year after year until the disequilibrating shock is corrected and a new equilibrium level for social spending is achieved. Consistent with path dependency, social security and welfare spending responds to equilibrium errors slowly. This reflects the strong persistency through time of this type of social spending that benefits powerful constituencies and hence is difficult to change. In column 1, the results from the baseline model for social security and welfare spending are shown. It includes all control variables and the signs for all of them are consistent with previous literature. Similar to Avelino et al. (2005), I do not find evidence that democracy has an independent effect on social security spending, neither in the short nor in the long run. In Model 2, I include the indicator for both types of protest. While the coefficient for the LRM of strikes is positive, it does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. However, the LRM for protest by the masses (*Demriots*) is negative and statistically significant. It shows that one additional protest by the masses has the total effect of reducing social security spending by 0.3 percentage points of GDP. This result is difficult to interpret because it does not take into account the type of regime under which mobilization occurs.

Table 3.1: Estimated Effects of Labor Strikes and Mass Protests on Social Spending.

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)	
	D.Social Security		D.Social Security		D.Social Security		D.Human capital		D.Human capital		D.Human capital	
	ECM	LRM	ECM	LRM	ECM	LRM	ECM	LRM	ECM	LRM	ECM	LRM
D.Trade openness	0.007*		0.008*		0.007		0.003		0.004		0.004	
	(0.004)		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.006)	
L.Trade openness	0.001	0.007	0.001	.008	0.001	0.0078	0.004	0.02	0.004	0.02	0.004	0.02
	(0.001)	(0.015)	(0.001)	(.016)	(0.001)	(.016)	(0.003)	(0.013)	(0.003)	(0.014)	(0.003)	(0.013)
D.FDI	-0.018		-0.020		-0.024		-0.024		-0.023		-0.024	
	(0.015)		(0.017)		(0.017)		(0.020)		(0.020)		(0.020)	
L.FDI	-0.036**	-0.198	-0.041**	-0.242*	-0.049**	-.296**	-0.022	-0.099	-0.024	-0.11	-0.026	-0.117
	(0.017)	(0.127)	(0.019)	(.138)	(0.019)	(.141)	(0.019)	(.117)	(0.019)	(.120)	(0.020)	(.121)
D.Inflation	-0.103**		-0.095*		-0.109**		-0.130***		-0.131***		-0.134***	
	(0.049)		(0.049)		(0.049)		(0.038)		(0.038)		(0.038)	
L.Inflation	-0.045	-0.294	-0.047	-.346	-0.065	-.452**	-0.032	-0.139	-0.036	-0.161	-0.038	-0.168
	(0.040)	(0.193)	(0.041)	(.210)	(0.040)	(.215)	(0.031)	(.179)	(0.031)	(.185)	(0.031)	(.187)
D.GDP per capita	-1.905		-2.053		-2.271*		-0.481		-0.517		-0.557	
	(1.351)		(1.311)		(1.336)		(0.654)		(0.673)		(0.660)	
L.GDP per capita	-0.421*	-3.348**	-0.456**	-4.250**	-0.408*	-3.865**	-0.324**	-0.729	-0.354**	-1.033	-0.337**	-0.984
	(0.228)	(1.528)	(0.211)	(1.682)	(0.211)	(1.688)	(0.159)	(1.223)	(0.166)	(1.296)	(0.166)	(1.293)
D.Urban population	-0.235***		-0.260***		-0.276***		-0.488***		-0.499***		-0.503***	
	(0.080)		(0.088)		(0.089)		(0.183)		(0.183)		(0.183)	
L.Urban population	0.047**	.212**	0.053***	.248**	0.050***	.243**	0.024	0.139	0.027*	0.146	0.025	0.137
	(0.018)	(.107)	(0.018)	(.116)	(0.018)	(.116)	(0.015)	(.088)	(0.016)	(.091)	(0.016)	(.091)
D.Aged population	-0.369		-0.734		-0.627							
	(1.225)		(1.288)		(1.453)							
L.Aged population	0.201	.954	0.184	.850	0.161	.746						
	(0.173)	(.768)	(0.151)	(.823)	(0.142)	(.829)						
D.Youth population							-0.010		0.013		0.017	
							(0.322)		(0.319)		(0.320)	
L.Youth population							0.090***	0.471***	0.092***	0.473***	0.092***	0.468***
							(0.021)	(.136)	(0.021)	(.138)	(0.021)	(.138)
D.Democracy	0.086		0.090		-0.059		0.293**		0.315**		0.271**	
	(0.177)		(0.173)		(0.186)		(0.130)		(0.132)		(0.138)	
L.Democracy	-0.087	-.434	-0.163	-0.93	-0.319**	-1.855**	0.190*	0.817	0.154	0.688	0.088	0.388
	(0.122)	(.633)	(0.124)	(.717)	(0.143)	(.859)	(0.109)	(.596)	(0.123)	(.619)	(0.142)	(.701)
D.Strikes			-0.006		-0.121				-0.014		-0.050	
			(0.048)		(0.081)				(0.042)		(0.074)	
L.Strikes			0.078	0.499	-0.262**	-1.531*			0.066	0.3	0.072	0.334
			(0.062)	(.404)	(0.119)	(.846)			(0.052)	(.263)	(0.105)	(.718)
D.demriots			-0.017		-0.036*				0.015		0.002	
			(0.018)		(0.020)				(0.014)		(0.017)	
L.demriots			-0.055***	-0.353**	-0.029	-.191			-0.021	-0.085	-0.041*	0.222
			(0.021)	(.162)	(0.026)	(.204)			(0.018)	(.123)	(0.023)	(.172)
D.Democracy*					0.132						0.049	
D.Strikes					(0.095)						(0.090)	
L.Democracy*					0.441***	2.643***					-0.008	-0.05
					(0.120)	(1.001)					(0.122)	(.804)
D.Democracy*					0.057*						0.028	
D.Demriots					(0.033)						(0.025)	
L.Democracy*					-0.008	-.066					0.048	0.222
					(0.037)	(.279)					(0.034)	(.236)
L.Social Security	-0.176***		-0.164***		-0.162***							
	(0.042)		(0.039)		(0.037)							
L.Human Capital							-0.215***		-0.212***		-0.213***	
							(0.029)		(0.030)		(0.030)	
Observations	563		563		563		596		596		596	
R-squared	0.210		0.223		0.244		0.221		0.228		0.230	

Note: Panel corrected standard errors in parenthesis. Models include country and time fixed effects. *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Column 3 presents the main model, which includes the interaction terms between democracy and protest by organized labor, and the interaction term between democracy and protest by the masses. First, only the indicator for protest by the masses (i.e., the sum of demonstrations and riots) is statistically significant in the short run, though its substantive impact is very small. It shows that a unit

change in mass protest has the immediate effect of reducing social security and welfare spending by 0.036 in nondemocratic regimes. Consistent with the idea that the effect of protest is more likely to be felt in the long term, the results show that none of the interaction effects are significant in the short run.

However, once we consider the interaction effect between democracy and protest by organized labor over the long run, I do find strong support for the argument developed in this article. The coefficient for the lagged level of strikes is negative and statistically significant at the $p < .10$ level in the long term. Since the strikes variable is interacted with the democracy indicator, none of these can be interpreted in the conventional way. The coefficient for the strikes variable represents the effect that a change in strikes has on social security spending when democracy equals zero, that is, in nondemocratic regimes. The LRM for this variable shows that a one-unit increase in strikes has the total effect of reducing social security and welfare spending by 1.5 percentage points in non-democracies. This is consistent with research showing that the repressive character of authoritarian regimes is associated with the exploitation of workers and the deterioration of their living conditions in addition to physical repression (e.g., Przeworski et al., 2000). More central for the argument of this article is the effect of protest by organized labor when democracy is present. Calculating the marginal effect shows that under democracy a one-unit increase in strikes increases social security and welfare spending by 1.1 percentage points in the long run, and this effect is statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level. Interestingly, the results also reveal that in the absence of mobilization by organized labor, democratic governments reduce this type of spending, so that in the long run, social security spending decreases by 1.8 percentage points. While Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001) find that democratic governments decrease social spending and Avelino et al. (2005) find no effect of democracy on social security spending, the results in this article show that the effect of democracy is conditional on the mobilization of labor insiders. It may be that when governments do not face opposition from labor insiders, they have more room for maneuver to cut back this type of regressive spending,

and perhaps, allocate more resources to other components of social spending. Thus, the behavior of democratic leaders with regard to social security spending is contingent on the mobilization of labor. Notice that all control variables behave similar to the previous model suggesting stability of the results. It is also important to note that with an error correction rate of 16%, after 5 years around 50% of the total effect would have taken place (see Figure 3.2 in the Appendix).

Columns 4 to 6 show the results for human capital spending. Consistent with previous studies, in all models the youth population variable has a positive and significant effect on human capital spending in the long run. Moreover, the short-term effect of democracy, that is a transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime, has the immediate effect of increasing human capital spending by about 0.3% of GDP. It is, however, apparently surprising that the effect of democracy is not significant for the long term. To see whether this effect differs between education and health spending I analyzed education and health spending separately and the results indicate (not shown) that the positive effect of democracy is sustained over the long term for the case of education but not for health. The immediate effect of a transition to democracy on education spending is an increase of about .24 as a percentage of GDP, while the LRM is .64, both statistically significant at the .01 and .10 level, respectively. Turning now to the impact of the variables for the different types of protest, the results in column 6 show that neither protest by the masses nor protest by organized labor have an effect on human capital spending. Furthermore, I find no evidence for a conditional effect of protest depending on regime type.¹⁵

I consider two alternative specifications to the models presented above. First, it could be argued that it is the level of collective protest and social unrest rather than the type of protest what encourages political leaders to increase social spending on education and health. As investing in human capital benefits broad sectors of society, compared with nondemocratic politicians democratic leaders could benefit from responding in this way to generalized social discontent. How-

¹⁵The results presented here do not substantively change if the different types of protest are analyzed separately or if human capital spending is disaggregated.

ever, reestimating the models using an aggregate measure of collective protest (i.e., demonstrations, riots, and strikes) does not change the results presented here. Collective protest does not significantly affect investment in human capital. However, consistent with the main finding of this article, collective protest does affect social security spending. Aggregating the different types of protest masks the effect of strikes on social security and welfare spending because according to the results presented above only protest by labor insiders increases this type of spending in democratic regimes.


Second, I consider the possibility that protest by the masses has an effect, not in the form of increasing human capital spending, but on preventing cutbacks in these areas. Conceivably, as argued above, much of large-scale protest in the region can be characterized as societal resistance to unwanted economic policies (e.g., Roberts, 2008). As the literature on protest and social movements has emphasized, citizens often mobilize as a result of a perceived threat, that is, as a consequence of the costs they may expect to suffer if they do not act collectively (see, e.g., Almeida, 2007; Tilly, 1978; Goldstone and Tilly, 2001). Thus, it is plausible that governments' response takes the form of refraining from cutting back important components of social spending that benefit a majority of the population when the masses are largely mobilized. I find evidence in support of this argument. Specifically, the results from a multinomial logistic regression model show that as nonviolent mass demonstrations increase, the likelihood of education spending cutbacks is significantly reduced in democratic regimes.¹⁶ In contrast, this effect is positive for nondemocratic regimes, and the difference between the two is statistically significant. This is certainly an important result, which suggests that compared with autocracies, democratic governments refrain from cutting back human capital spending when citizens engage in peaceful forms of collective protest (see Figure 3.1).

¹⁶The dependent variable takes the value of 0 if there was a negative change, the value of 1 if there was no change, and the value of 2 if the change was positive. I use robust standard errors clustered by country.

3.6 Robustness Checks

To check for robustness of the main results of this article with regard to the effect of protest by organized labor on social security spending, I performed a modified jackknife procedure in which each country was excluded from the regression analysis at a time. The results reported in Table 1, column 3, are robust to the exclusion of one country at a time from the analysis. As a second robustness check, I used Cheibub et al. (2010) and Mainwaring et al. (2007) indicators of democracy. Again, the main results hold using these alternative measures of democracy. In addition, the results are robust to the inclusion of a number of additional controls: an indicator of potential labor power (Rudra, 2002), a measure of state repression (Wood and Gibney, 2010), an indicator of capital account openness (Chinn and Ito, 2006), a dummy variable that indicates the presence of an agreement with the IMF, a measure of debt service (World Bank, 2010), and a variable that proxies for the age of the social security system (see Table 3.4 in the Appendix). The results also reveal that the negative effect of strikes in nondemocracies that is reported in Table 1 is not robust to the inclusion of additional control variables. One reason for this result might be that different types of autocracies behave differently in response to mobilization and thus further disaggregation may be needed to sort out these effects.

Figure 3.1: Average Marginal Effects



AME of democracy on the probability of a negative change of education spending as mass demonstrations increase. AME = average marginal effects; CIs = confidence intervals; ldemon = number of demonstrations with a one-year lag; lpolityd = democracy (=1).

3.7 Conclusion

This article incorporates nonconventional forms of political participation in the analysis of social spending in Latin America. The results suggest that distinguishing between labor insiders protest and mass protest and assessing their impact on different categories of social spending are relevant for the study of social policy and democratic politics in the region. While previous research reached contradictory findings about the effect of democracy on social security spending, this article provides evidence that the effect of democracy on social security spending is conditioned by organized labor protest. Their organizational capacity inherited from earlier periods puts them in a better position relative to other groups to effectively mobilize to defend their entitlements. However, mass protest has also had important consequences for human capital spending. While democratic lead-

ers increase human capital spending as a consequence of electoral incentives, mass protest inhibit cutbacks in these areas in democratic regimes. Taken together, these results advance our understanding of democratic politics in the region and of how citizens influence policies through different democratic channels.

This article is a first step in systematically analyzing the social policy outcomes of collective protest. While the focus of this analysis has been on particular components of social policy measured through social spending, the range of social policy programs in Latin America is certainly not fully captured through social spending measures. Future research should explore the relationship between social mobilization and the introduction and expansion of social programs targeted at specific groups.

3.8 Appendix

Table 3.2: Average Social Spending and Total number of Labor Strikes and Mass Protests in Latin America (1970-2007)

	Average Social Spending			Total	
	Total	Human Capital	Social Security	Strikes	Demriots
Argentina	12.69	6.29	6.40	21	39
Bolivia	8.99	6.01	2.77	37	73
Brazil	14.58	5.79	8.79	11	48
Chile	14.36	6.13	8.26	14	86
Colombia	9.04	5.25	3.14	5	19
Costa Rica	13.58	9.51	4.09	4	12
Dominican Rep	4.57	3.59	1.04	19	47
Ecuador	5.35	4.24	1.11	15	30
El Salvador	5.07	4.23	.84	5	38
Guatemala	3.72	2.97	.75	8	36
Honduras	7.49	6.81	0.57	5	23
Mexico	8.61	5.75	2.86	2	55
Nicaragua	8.78	7.67	2.69	9	25
Panama	12.53	8.95	3.58	11	35
Paraguay	5.69	3.22	2.40	5	31
Peru	5.65	3.82	1.56	24	50
Uruguay	19.06	5.47	13.58	19	24
Venezuela	7.90	5.65	2.25	7	63
Total	9.33	5.63	3.70	221	734

Table 3.3: Regional Means of Independent Variables, 1970-2007

Variables	Mean	Std.Dev	Total	Min	Max
Democracy	.65	.48	364	0	1
Strikes	.39	.81	221	0	6
Demriots	1.30	2.11	734	0	20
Trade	57.81	38.57		10.32	222.29
FDI	1.95	2.34		-9.87	18.46
Inflation	2.80	1.52		-1.08	9.52
GDP (logged)	8.73	.44		7.48	9.82
Growth of GDP	.01	.05		-.53	.19
Urban population	62.86	16.29		30.82	92.64
Old aged population	5.04	2.20		2.57	13.68
Youth Population	37.46	6.21		23.29	47.66

Figure 3.2: The Long-term Effect of Strikes




Table 3.4: Robustness Checks

Table 3.4. Robustness Checks					Confidence interval	
Control Variables	Democracy		Marginal Effect		lower bound	upper band
Democracy (Cheibub et al., 2010)	90%	0	-1.955014	1.11391	-0.1226344	-3.787393
		1	0.8900585	0.47051	1.664053	0.1160641
Democracy (Mainwaring et al., 2007)	95%	0	-1.357211	0.87667	0.3610637	-3.075486
		1	0.790678	0.38888	1.552886	0.0284705
IMF (World Bank, 2010)	90%	0	-0.820506	0.96554	0.7678146	-2.408827
		1	0.9952737	0.54596	1.893381	0.0971668
Potential Labor Power (Rudra, 2002)	90%	0	-0.4703845	0.9818	1.144675	-2.085444
		1	1.007429	0.58776	1.974289	0.0405685
Social Security System Maturity (Own elaboration)	95%	0	-1.28966	0.78296	0.2449361	-2.824257
		1	0.9886286	0.44413	1.85912	0.1181372
Repression (Wood and Gibney 2010)	95%	0	-0.7799944	1.01961	1.218447	-2.778436
		1	1.22512	0.58551	2.372712	0.0775279
Debt service (World Bank, 2010)	90%	0	-0.7573639	1.01964	0.9199486	-2.434676
		1	1.067415	0.58551	2.030571	0.1042587
Capital account openness (Chin and Ito, 2006)	95%	0	-0.8772925	0.97488	1.033469	-2.788054
		1	1.124333	0.56412	2.230008	0.0186576

4 Beyond Sticks and Stones: Human Capital Formation in Response to Violent Crime in Latin America

Abstract

A great deal of research has examined law enforcement and repressive government responses to violent crime. Yet the existing literature tends to neglect political leaders' non-coercive responses to violent crime. We argue that welfare spending is an instrument that leaders have to mitigate violent crime. Violent crime tends to be perpetrated by young males from socio-economic disadvantaged backgrounds, thus, political leaders advance policies of human capital formation via education spending in contexts of high levels of social violence. From a politician's perspective, investment in human capital formation policies is expected to contribute to reduce crime rates via its positive effect in secondary school enrollment rates. We also argue that the effect of violent crime on education spending is larger when left governments are in power since they tend to stress individuals motivations over windows of opportunities as the main causes of crime. The analysis provides support for these arguments from a sample of Latin American democracies from 1980 to 2007. We also show that governments' efforts toward enhancing human capital formation increase secondary education enrollment, which in turn reduces violent crime.

4.1 Introduction

On December 11, 2006, former President Felipe Calderon declared the war against drugs in Mexico. Calderon ordered 6,500 troops into his hometown Morelia, Michoacán, to restore order after a rise of drug-related violence (see Schedler, 2014).¹ Since then, the hallmark of Calderon's policy was the strengthening of police presence and the armed forces, and a substantive surge on the budget of the state security apparatuses. On April 8, 2011, former president of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) pointed out that the wave of violence in Mexico is rooted in the lack of attention to the poor, as in other countries from Latin America (LA) (CNN, 2011). From Lula's perspective, violent crime and delinquency in the region are negative externalities arisen from social exclusion and lack of opportunities. This statement raises important questions with regards to the strategies that governments deploy to guarantee public safety. How do governments respond to violent crime in Latin America? Do they primarily focus on coercive strategies such as law enforcement and even repression, or do they also resort to non-coercive strategies aimed at preventing crime? furthermore, If governments resort to non-coercive strategies against violent crime, do these instruments work for reducing crime?

Scholarship has made significant progress in understanding law enforcement and repressive responses to violent crime in Latin America.² Case-based research has shown that violent crime leads to law enforcement policies such as increasing the number of police personnel and the severity of punishment (Bailey and Dammert, 2005; Hinton and Newburn, 2008; Holland, 2013; Fruhling et al., 2003). Furthermore, studies have found that violent crime is associated with a greater risk of police brutality and repression (e.g., Caldeira, 2000; Brinks, 2008). However, the literature has overlooked alternative strategies that governments deploy to fight violent crime. This lack of attention is somewhat puzzling given that

¹The administration of Felipe Calderon (2006-2012) from the rightist National Action Party (PAN) turned most of its efforts towards strengthening the state security apparatuses to fight organized criminal organizations.

²In line with previous research, we define violent crime as an act of violence that is carried out by one citizen against another citizen. We keep out from our definition any kind of political violence perpetrated by insurgent or terrorist actors against the state (e.g., Neumayer, 2003).

state authorities generally have at their disposal non-coercive strategies to prevent and mitigate violence (Weber, 1946; Buchanan, 1975; Piven and Cloward, 1993). In fact, a handful of empirical studies indicate that welfare state policies can play an important role in maintaining peace and order by mitigating social grievances and popular discontent (e.g., Thyne, 2006; Gizelis, 2010; Taydas and Peksen, 2012).

In this article we focus on governments' non-coercive responses to violent crime and on the indirect effects of these strategies on the levels of violent crime. Our theoretical argument proceeds in three stages. We argue that governments increase education spending in response to violent crime. More specifically, political leaders increase spending on human capital formation because they anticipate that such investment will reduce individuals' propensity to become involved in criminal activities. Then, we posit that the effect of violent crime on education spending is larger in the presence of left-oriented governments because left parties tend to stress individuals motivations over windows of opportunities as the main causes of crime. Finally, we argue that investment in human capital formation indirectly influences violent crime through its effect on secondary education enrollment.

We find empirical support for our theory from a sample of 18 Latin American democracies between 1980 and 2007. We show that democratic governments increase substantively spending on human capital formation in response to violent crime, and the effect of violent crime on this spending is larger in countries ruled by left-oriented governments. In addition, we show that governments' efforts toward enhancing human capital formation increase secondary education enrollment, which in turn reduces violent crime. As such, our empirical analysis suggests that democratic governments often deploy non-coercive strategies to fight violent crime, and that these strategies can have a pacifying effect within society.

This article's contribution is threefold. First, existing research on conflict has been overweeningly focused on coercive strategies of social control. As Davenport

(2007, p. 9) puts it, “the use of alternative mechanisms of control in the face of political conflict and the role of repression in the government’s repertoire has been not examined extensively.” By focusing our work on the effects of violent crime on social policy we demonstrate that governments also resort to non-coercive strategies to strengthen public security.

Second, the literature on social spending in developing countries has contributed significantly to our understanding of the political and economic factors that influence different categories of social policy (Brown and Hunter, 1999; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001; Rudra, 2002; Avelino et al., 2005; Wibbels, 2006; Huber et al., 2008a). However, studies have not considered other sources of conflict within society beyond those of a redistributive nature which may lead governments to devise non-coercive social policy-based responses to address them. Relatedly, scholarship on Latin America has started to analyze the rise of the left and how leftist governments have performed in recent years (e.g., Baker and Greene, 2011; Weyland et al., 2010), but we have yet to understand whether and how it matters that leftist presidents are in power for the pervasive criminal violence in the region. Our analysis thus contributes to this purpose by showing that left-oriented governments resort to the use of non-coercive strategies to fight violent crime more than right-oriented presidents do.

Finally, and more broadly, this paper goes beyond the traditional focus on political violence by focusing on violent crime. It contributes to the study of an often neglected form of violence that affects the daily lives of millions of citizens, particularly in less-developed countries. Political scientists have been overwhelmingly focused on different forms of politically-motivated violence related to civil wars and terrorism.³ In comparison, other types of non-political violence that occur in contexts free from civil war have remained largely understudied. Furthermore, states free from civil war are often assumed as contexts of peace, neglecting that violent crime severely hinders public security, has negative externalities on human development (Soares, 2006), negatively affects citizens’ satisfaction with democ-

³We refer to for a comprehensive review of the civil war literature (Kalyvas, 2007). On terrorism research, see Sandler (2014).

racy and contributes to citizens' support for authoritarian alternatives (Fernandez and Kuenzi, 2010; Bateson, 2012).

4.2 Violent Crime in Latin America: Stylized Facts

The hallmark of violent crime in Latin America is its severity. According to the UN, more than a million people died as a consequence of an unlawful purposefully inflicted killing by another person throughout the period 2000-2010 (UNDP, 2013). This estimate is consistent with worldwide comparisons with regards to violent crime. Table 4.1 displays the average of homicide rates per 100,000 people and the proportion of democracies by region in 2004, the most recent year for which global data are available. Two remarkable facts emerge from this table. First, Latin America is the most democratic region in the world outside the so-called industrial democracies in North America and Western Europe. Second, Latin American democracies are the most violent across the world with 20.2 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, above Sub-Saharan Africa democracies with 15.7. This figures reflect the inclusion of countries with high levels of violent crime at the time they democratized, but also illustrate the gradual rise of violent crime in almost all countries from the region over the past thirty years.

A vast amount of evidence indicates that violent crime is systematically perpetrated by young, lower-income males with limited access to the education system. A number of reports from IOs indicate that middle and high-income groups tend to be the victims of property crime, whereas low-income groups are more likely to be the victims of violent crime, i.e. lethal violence, physical injuries. Most accounts likewise demonstrate that violent crime is perpetrated mostly by young males from disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds (UNODC, 2007; USAID, 2006). For example, a recent report from the World Bank (2011, p. 12) concludes that “most perpetrators and victims of crime and violence are young people, mainly young men.” Furthermore, violent crime is associated with “lower levels of education due the low costs that engaging in criminal behavior has for these young people, the absence of positive social influences from mentors and

peers, and from delinquency being the best income alternative for a young person without any remarkable skills” (2011, p. 18).

Table 4.1: Homicide rates & proportion of democracies by region (2004)

	<i>N</i>	Homicide rates (mean)		Democracies (% by region)
		Autocracies	Democracies	
Eastern Europe & post Soviet Union	28	8.012	4.319	68
Western Europe & North America	20	-	1.294	100
Latin America	19	6.505	20.247	95
Middle East & North Africa	17	3.027	2.770	12
Sub-Saharan Africa	42	23.018	15.734	29
East Asia	5	10.553	2.272	60
South East Asia	16	4.037	6.996	37
Total (Average)	147	(9.192)	(7.661)	
Sources: Cheibub et al. (2010) and ?.				

In a similar manner, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime points out that violent crime is mainly perpetrated by young males between the ages of 15 and 24, and suggests that violent crime arises from the exclusion of the education system (UNODC, 2007). Related evidence also indicates that young males with low levels of income and education face the highest risk of falling among the ranks of gangs and organized violent crime. For instance, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) reports that “the majority of gang members are male, and young men are both more likely to be victims of gang violence, as well as perpetrators” (USAID, 2006, 64). In particular, “gang members themselves largely come from poor, marginalized, urban areas, and are products of an environment characterized by overwhelmed and ineffective service delivery, social exclusion and weak social capital” (USAID, 2006, 73). It is important to note that this pattern is not exclusive to Latin American countries. Empirical studies focused on industrialized democracies show a link between homicide rates and young males from poor neighborhoods who have lower levels of education compared to their peers (e.g., Sampson, 1995; Neapolitan, 1997; Levitt, 2004; Siennick and Staff, 2008; Entorf and Spengler, 2010; Sweeten et al., 2013; Hirschi and Gottfredson, 1983).

To sum up, democracy cohabits with high levels of violent crime in Latin America. Given the non-political nature of violence and the individual profile of its perpetrators, we may expect that democratic governments will not only repress violent actors, but will also attempt to tackle the social roots of violence. As the slogan of the British Labor Party suggests: “Tough on crime tough on the causes of crime.”⁴ The task of this article is thus to explore the violent crime-social spending nexus in Latin American democracies. The following sections attempt to address theoretically and empirically these issues.

4.3 Education Expenditures in Response to Violent Crime

Violent crime is a form of social disorder that hinders both citizens’ quality of life and economic development. A great deal of research has largely emphasized coercive strategies that governments deploy to reduce violent crime and enhance public safety. Empirical studies show that high violent crime rates in Latin American democracies have influenced law enforcement policies such as increasing the number of police personnel and the severity of punishment (Bailey and Dammert, 2005; Hinton and Newburn, 2008). In several cases, political leaders have implemented the so-called *mano dura* policies which range from the suspension of procedural rights to the military intervention in policing activities (see, e.g., Holland, 2013; Pereira and Ungar, 2004). Related work likewise points to a strong positive association between violent crime and a greater risk of police brutality and human rights violations (see, e.g., Caldeira, 2000; Brinks, 2003; Ahnen, 2007; Brinks, 2008; HRW, 2009a).

The empirical evidence has fostered the impression that violent crime is inexorably linked to state coercive behavior and repression, exposing an important limitation of the quality of democracy in Latin America: the lack of the rule of law and a weak respect for human rights (O’Donnell, 1999). We believe, however, that an excessive focus on law enforcement and repressive responses to violent crime has lead scholars to overlook alternative instruments that governments use

⁴See BBC interview. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/otr/intext92-93/Blair4.7.93.html>

to strengthen public security. This lack of attention is somewhat surprising since earlier theoretical approaches highlight that governments embrace both coercive and non-coercive instruments of power that political leaders can employ not only to deter violent challenges to their authority, but also to assure citizens' protection from criminal acts by their fellow citizens (Weber, 1946; Buchanan, 1975). In fact, studies on civil wars have shown that government spending on social policy constitutes an important tool to strengthen stability and enhance domestic peace by reducing the risk of civil war onset (Thyne, 2006; Taydas and Peksen, 2012). However, civil wars reduce education spending and secondary enrollment rates (Lai and Thyne, 2007; Gates et al., 2012).

Building on these insights and case-study evidence, we argue that an alternative strategy to fight violent crime consists of deploying non-coercive strategies to reduce the likelihood of involvement in criminal activities by the youth. Given that violent crime in Latin American countries is deeply rooted in economic deprivation and social exclusion of young people, increasing public spending on human capital formation is an additional, complementary policy that state leaders can advance to mitigate violence and enhance public safety in the medium and long term. Democratically elected leaders anticipate positive externalities from increasing education spending which encourages them to implement non-coercive strategies to appease society. In particular, human capital formation policies can alter individuals' calculus on the cost and benefits derived from crime (Becker, 1968). From a government's perspective, investing in education is aimed at tackling the social roots of violent behavior by increasing individuals' opportunities and facilitating social mobility. Thus, governments' efforts toward human capital formation are expected to decrease the incentives for criminal behavior by increasing individuals' prospects of upward mobility. Put differently, political leaders have incentives to employ non-coercive strategies of social control since welfare policies can potentially mitigate the positive effects of social exclusion on criminal behavior (see Hsieh and Pugh, 1993).

Some skeptics may argue that government spending on social policy is an

unlikely response to violent crime because governments may not be able to reap the fruits of such investments during their term in office. From this perspective, governments may prefer coercive over non-coercive instruments to fight violence because social policy-based strategies, namely education spending may not have an immediate effect on violent crime rates. Therefore, before proceeding we consider why democratic leaders may consider non-coercive strategies to mitigate violent crime through education spending.

First, by stressing the need to tackle the social roots of violence, governments can signal their commitment to address longstanding problems associated with social exclusion through policies that will result in society-wide benefits. A more educated society may not only contribute to reduce crime and violence, but it also boosts economic growth and development (Barro, 1991). Given that education spending benefits a larger sector of the population as compared to social security, support for education expenditures is widespread in Latin America. Thus, governments have incentives to expand social policies that can help to mitigate violence and which do not face opposition from society. In fact, citizens' support for education policies is widespread and ranks markedly higher than other areas, such as spending on security. According to the 2012 Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) survey, when individuals are presented with a list of policy areas, and are asked in which area should the government invest more money, education turns out to be the most preferred category with 45% of individuals selecting this option.⁵ This is followed by health (17.47%) and assistance to the poor (11.91%) (See Table 4.2).

⁵Includes all the countries for which the question is available. The total number of observations is 8,237.

Table 4.2: Support for Government Expenditures in Latin America

In which of the following areas the government should invest more money?	%
Education	44.89
Infrastructure	5.35
Housing	8.23
Retirement	3.78
Assistance to the poor	11.91
Environment	1.03
Health	17.47
Security	7.33
Total	100

Second, public policy involves a learning process in which leaders' decisions and citizens' support are shaped by previous experiences. Over the last two decades, heavy-handed policies in Latin America have been generally ineffective in strengthening public security and reducing violent crime (see Holland, 2013; Caldeira, 2000). The failure of repressive policies in the region has triggered some public skepticism about their effectiveness, leading to greater support for other alternatives that are designed to influence the social roots of violent crime.⁶ In Rio de Janeiro, for example, many of the city's poorer and socially marginalized areas known as *favelas* have traditionally been plagued with violent crime. Despite that policing and repression have been the main instruments of control in these areas (Caldeira, 2000), recent government strategies highlight the need to tackle the social roots of crime through social policies, albeit these do not exclude the importance of policing strategies (World-Bank, 2013; WOLA, 2011).

Third, international actors, namely NGOs have often condemned the excessive use of repression and human rights violations associated with coercive strategies against violent crime in the region (HRW, 2009a,b). Instead, international organizations and foreign donors have stressed governments' commitment to social policy and the provision of public goods as an important tool to mitigate violence within society. Recently, for example, the World Bank (2011, p. 25) underlines

⁶Unfortunately, due to the lack of data, so far there is not cross-national research examining whether law enforcement policies (i.e., increasing police personnel) influence violent crime.

that “policies and programs to encourage secondary school enrollment and completion are critical. Young people that stay connected to school are less likely to exhibit disruptive and violent behavior, carry or use a weapon, or experiment with illegal substances.” Similarly, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) highlights the usefulness of soft preventive strategies such as expanded educational opportunities, implementation of school-based violence prevention curricula, provision of safe recreational opportunities for youths, alternative income generation activities, and targeted community and parental awareness initiatives and training” (USAID, 2006, 16). Taken together, international pressure to enforce human rights norms and the promotion of educational policies to tackle crime help to understand the use of non-coercive governments’ strategies to strengthen citizen security.

To summarize, we have argued that education spending is likely to increase as a response to violent crime because strengthening human capital formation is expected to reduce individuals’ incentives for criminal and violent behavior. Our argument does not imply that a social policy-based response to rising violent crime serves as a substitute for other law enforcement strategies. Indeed, governments can include non-coercive strategies as a complement in the toolbox of policies they devise to tackle violent crime. It is nonetheless plausible that by emphasizing one type of strategy, the resources available to pursue another type of strategy be reduced. We return to this issue later in the empirical analysis.

The following hypothesis summarizes the above argument:

Hypothesis 1: Governments will increase education expenditures in response to violent crime. Thus, violent crime has a positive effect on education spending.

Skeptics may argue that the direction of causality flows in the other way around: states with larger investments on education have lower homicide rates because government expenditures actually affect the individual roots of violent crime. As we will show below, however, the empirical evidence suggests that increasing education spending does not directly affect violent crime. Before proceeding, we

briefly consider here some theoretical and empirical reasons why the main causal direction does not run from human capital spending to violent crime.

We can think that democratic governments may deploy preventive strategies at time t to assure public security at time $t+1$. Or, once violence reaches high levels, they may deploy reactive strategies in t in order to reduce violence and guarantee peace at $t+1$. Put differently, governments can invest on human capital since it is expected to prevent the emergence of violent actors in the future. Alternatively, governments do not prevent but instead react to violent crime by spending on education. Whereas preventive strategies imply that the causal direction flows from education spending to violent crime, reactive strategies suggest that the causal relationship runs the other way around. We believe that preventive strategies are less likely to be deployed by the governments of the region, mainly because of the context in which Latin American democracies are embedded. From democratic transitions onwards, most elected leaders have faced severe fiscal constraints that have limited states' capacity to spend on social policies. In fact, only four countries are classified as welfare states (Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay) (Huber and Stephens, 2010).

Furthermore, a closer look at the data suggests that the causal chain does not flow from education spending to violent crime. If so, we should observe that countries that experience low homicide rates have higher education expenditures; or vice versa, countries with high homicide rates have low spending on education. With the exception of Argentina and Costa Rica, where government spending on human capital formation is comparatively high and homicide rates lower, this is not the main pattern in the other countries from the region. Most notably, countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and Venezuela exhibit significant spending on human capital formation, but medium and high homicide rates. These descriptive patterns are illustrative, suggesting that governments resort to reactive (rather than preventive) non-coercive strategies to fight violent crime.

4.4 Violent Crime, Government Ideology, and Expenditure on Education

Our argument so far implies that violent crime has an independent effect on human capital spending. However, government ideology is a prominent feature that can influence non-coercive responses to violent crime and public insecurity.⁷ Hence, it is likely that executives' political ideology will affect responses to violent crime since ideology influences individuals' conceptions about the causes of crime, as well as particular interpretations about the role that the state should play in society and how it should address issues of public concern (see Heywood, 2003; Ahnen, 2007; Holland, 2013).

Right parties often emphasize that deviant behavior is rooted on windows of opportunities that facilitate the commission of crime. In Latin America, right-based coalitions have supported heavy-handed policies of law enforcement to fight crime. In El Salvador, for example, President Francisco Flores from the right wing party ARENA introduced *Plan Mano Dura* in 2003; then renamed as *Plan Super Mano Dura* under the administration of Antonio Saca. They highlighted government tolerance as the main determinant of delinquency and violence, and thus promoted the use of area sweeps, military intervention in policing, and suspensions of procedural rights, which consisted on a temporary anti-gang law that permitted the arrest of suspected gang members on the basis of their physical appearance. Similarly, in the rise of crime and gang violence during the late 1990s in this country, Minister of Public Security Hugo Barrera referred to law codes as "the principal problem in public security because they provide excessive protections to criminals" (Holland, 2013, 58). In Argentina, likewise, Carlos Menem discarded the claims that unemployment and social exclusion were the causes of crime, and instead promoted a heavy handed approach based on "a strong arm and zero tolerance" (Smulovitz, Catalina, 2003, p. 130).

These conservative views generally contrasts with another interpretation emphasizing that absolute and relative deprivation are the main triggers of crime and

⁷Given the prominence of presidential systems in Latin America, herein we refer interchangeably to "government," "executives," and "presidential" ideology.

violence. From this perspective, criminal activity is mainly a negative externality arisen from social exclusion and the lack of opportunities for social mobility. Thus, left-oriented parties tend to see investments in human capital as an instrument to enhance public safety. In the 2010 presidential campaign in Colombia, for example, candidate Rafael Pardo supported democratic enforcement policies, and in particular advanced the idea of a “more egalitarian Colombia” in response to security deficits linked to urban violent crime and the presence of guerrilla and paramilitary groups. In the same line, facing a security crisis in Guatemala, the winner candidate Álvaro Colom called for combating crime through social programs Uang (2013). In the 1999-2000 Chilean election, Ricardo Lagos encouraged social policies to improve public safety.

Contemporary Brazil is another example of how governments respond to violent crime by increasing social spending. Public insecurity and violent crime have ranked amongst the most pressing problems since the country’s transition to democracy in 1985 (Holston and Caldeira, 1998; Caldeira, 2000). Homicide rates have almost tripled with a national average of 21 homicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants throughout the period 1981-2004. Over decades, law enforcement and unlawful repressive policies were the main instruments against crime among sub-national governments that generally considered violence an outcome of the state’s permissiveness and the presence of windows of opportunities derived from the weakness of the criminal justice system (see Ahnen, 2007; Pereira and Ungar, 2004). Nevertheless, in his inaugural speech in 2003, Luiz Inacio Lula Da Silva introduced a rather different approach and stressed the deterioration of social bonds as a cause of violent crime and the need for an integral approach to fight it:

It is true that the deterioration of social ties in Brazil over the past two decades as a result of economic policies that did not favored economic growth brought a menacing cloud to our tolerant pattern of national culture. Horrific crimes, massacres and lynchings twitched and made the country day-to-day, especially in large cities, an experience close

to a war of all against all. Because of this, I start this mandate with the firm decision to put the federal government in partnership with the states, at the service of a public safety policy far more vigorous and efficient. A policy, that combined with health, education, among others, is capable of preventing violence, suppress crime and restore citizens' security.

During President Lula's administration, the Brazilian government strengthened its commitment to fight violent crime through social policy. Based on a conception of delinquency and violent crime as resulting in part from social exclusion and lack of opportunities, the Brazilian government consolidated and expanded previous efforts aimed at poverty reduction and human capital formation.⁸ For instance, the government budget for *Bolsa Familia* -the cornerstone of social policy in democratic Brazil- rose substantively from 26% in 2003 to 38% in 2005 (Hall, 2006, p. 707).

Whereas our general argument stresses that violent crime exerts a positive effect on education spending, we expect that such effect will be greater under left and left of center governments. Even when right wing state executives have incentives to invest in social policies to fight violent crime, it is unlikely that they will make the same efforts as compared to left governments, mainly because conservative parties emphasize the use of law enforcement policies. Conversely, by its very nature, left-oriented governments tend to support non-coercive responses to violence over other factors related to the criminal justice system. Based on the preceding discussion, we summarize our expectations about the interaction of violent crime and political ideologies in the next hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: Violent crime will have a greater positive effect on education expenditures when a left-oriented president is in power.

⁸In Brazil, government social spending increased significantly after the transition from dictatorship to democracy in 1985. In particular, former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso promoted and consolidated welfare policy efforts in democratic Brazil.

4.5 Do Non-coercive Responses to Violent Crime Work?

Our main concern in this paper is to inquire whether violent crime motivates non-coercive responses by governments. Given the salience of the violent crime phenomenon in Latin America, it is of great interest to assess the potential effect of states' non-coercive strategies on violent crime. We have argued that democratic governments advance policies of human capital formation in response to violent crime and that this effect should be stronger when left-oriented governments are in power. There are strong reasons to believe that expenditure on education can have an indirect negative effect on violent crime rates. More specifically, based on sociological theories of crime and deviant behavior, we contend in this section that a relevant mechanism through which human capital spending can influence violent crime is linked to school enrollment. As long as spending does not materialize in higher numbers of young people attending school, we do not expect government spending to have a direct influence on violent crime. Spending on human capital formation is thus likely to exert an indirect negative effect on the levels of violence by increasing attendance to school among young people.

Rational choice theories highlight that formal mechanisms of law enforcement increase the costs of deviant behavior and hence deter individuals from crime and violence (e.g., Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973). In addition to *formal* mechanisms of control, the social bond theory proposes that criminal behavior is also a function of the degree of *informal* controls that shape individuals' behavior and restrain them from crime acts⁹ (Hirschi, 1969). Most notably, it has been argued that school attendance can help to create and enhance social bonds that reduce individuals' propensity to commit crimes, including violent crimes, through four main mechanisms. The educational system strengthens emotional linkages of a student with other members of society (*attachment*), and raises the value of future goals associated with the prospects of social mobility (*commitment*). School attendance also reduce the amount of time that otherwise young people would allocate to criminal activities (*involvement*). Finally, school attendance reinforces

⁹ We refer to Thyne and Schroeder (2012) for a useful review.

adherence to formal and informal rules within society. People accepting rules as legitimate are generally less likely to act illegally, outside social norms (*beliefs*). Taken these mechanisms together, it has been suggested that larger rates of school enrollment are associated with lower rates of violent crime. We summarize the present discussion in the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3a: Education expenditures increase education enrollment.

Hypothesis 3b: Education enrollment decreases violent crime rates.

4.6 Research Design

To test our argument we use cross-sectional time-series data for all democratic countries in Latin America for which the relevant data is available from 1980 through 2007. We use Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) classification of political regimes to define our empirical universe of analysis. A regime is classified as democratic if it meets all of the following rules: 1) the executive is elected through popular election or by a body that was itself popularly elected; 2) the legislatures is popularly elected; 3) there is more than one party competing in the elections and; 4) an alternation in power under electoral rules identical to the ones that brought the incumbent. Based on these rules we have in our data 414 country-year observations coded as democracies between 1980 and 2007. Given data availability on homicide rates, however, our largest sample includes 321 observations for eighteen countries from the region.

Dependent variable

In order to test our theory, we use *Education expenditures* as a percentage of GDP as our main dependent variable. The data come from the Social Policy in Latin America and the Caribbean Dataset (Huber et al. 2008), which covers our period of analysis up until 2000. We have updated this data for the 2001-2007 period using figures from the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.¹⁰

¹⁰Available at the ECLAC's website: <http://www.cepal.org/default.asp?idioma=IN>

Explanatory variables

Our main empirical indicator of violent crime is the national *Homicide rates* per 100,000 inhabitants, in line with other studies (e.g., Neumayer, 2003; Fox and Hoelscher, 2012; Ahnen, 2007). We employ homicide data from the United Nations Crime Trends Surveys (UNCTS) (UNDOC, 2011).¹¹ Scholars have argued that homicide data from the UNCTS suffers from under-reporting given that it is based on information from government agencies. Instead, homicide data from the World Health Organization is often considered as the most reliable source since it draws on cause of death reports from hospital personnel (see Bergman, 2006). Despite such skepticism, a quick comparison indicates that UNCTS and WHO data for Latin American countries are highly correlated ($r = .8$). More importantly, homicide rates are higher in the UNCTS data than in the WHO data. Given that the UNCTS provide a larger coverage, in the main analysis we employ homicide data from the UNCTS for all democratic country-year observations for which data is available between 1980 and 2007.¹² Homicide data are not available on a yearly basis for all countries; hence, we used linear interpolation to generate a more complete dataset. Following this procedure the number of country-year observations increased from 257 to 321.¹³

Our presidential ideology indicator comes from Murillo et al. (2010). As defined by the authors, left ideology refers “to political actors who seek, as a central programmatic objective, to reduce social and economic inequalities.”¹⁴ This variable is measured using a scheme that classifies the ideology of the president in power on a five-point scale, where 1 is Left, 2 is center-left, 3 is center, 4 is center-right and 5 is right. For the purposes of this paper, we have recoded this variable into a dummy indicator that takes the value of “1” captures whether a president is from a center-left or left ideology, and “0” otherwise.

¹¹We calculated homicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants using population data from Gleditsch (2002).

¹²Table 4.7 in the Appendix shows that the results do not change substantively when we use homicide data from the World Health Organization.

¹³The results do not substantively change if we analyze only non-interpolated data. See Table 4.7 in the Appendix.

¹⁴See Murillo et al.’s codebook (<http://mariavictoriamurillo.com/data/>)

Control variables

The selection of control variables follows the convention in the study of social spending in developing countries. First, scholars have argued that governments in poorer countries are more likely to invest more resources on human capital to promote development (e.g., Brown and Hunter, 2004). We thus incorporate the natural log *GDP per capita*. Second, it has been argued that economic crises may reduce the available resources for certain social policy areas, including health and education, which are more vulnerable to retrenchment during times of economic adversity (Wibbels, 2006). Hence, we include a measure for *Economic growth*. Third, some scholars look at the effect of international factors on government expenditures. *Trade openness* controls for the potential influence of globalization; it is measured as exports plus imports as percentage of GDP. Data for the above controls come from Heston et al. (2009). Fourth, another indicator of globalization is the level of *Foreign direct investment (FDI)*, which is measured as the net inflows of investment as percentage of GDP. This data come from the World Bank (2010). To clarify, we do not anticipate any effect since previous findings in the literature with regards to the effect of globalization on social spending are mixed we do not anticipate any specific effect (see Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001; Avelino et al., 2005; Wibbels, 2006; Huber et al., 2008a).

Fifth, we incorporate the percentage of the *Population aged 0 to 14* to control for the possibility that the size of the school age population may increase education spending (Brown and Hunter, 2004). Sixth, we control for the percentage of the *Aged population* as the size of the population over age 65 influences states efforts towards other areas of social policy (i.e., health and social security) and may reduce the resources available for investment in education. We obtained data for these variables from the World Bank (2010). Seventh, Huber et al. (2008a) argue that a longer *Democratic legacy* results in stronger institutions and thus is likely to be related to greater social investment in the long run. Thus, we incorporate the cumulative number of years that a country has been classified as democratic from 1945 to the year of observation, as classified by Cheibub et al. (2010).

Finally, we include the GINI coefficient to measure *Inequality*. Although existing studies on social spending in developing countries often ignore the role of inequality,¹⁵ we incorporate this variable because it could be argue that inequality is an underlying cause of both violent crime and government spending on education. On the one hand, governments attempt to reduce inequality by increasing education spending since it affects individuals prospects of social mobility. On the other hand, Fajnzlber et al. (2002) show that inequality is positively associated with higher homicide rates Neumayer (2005)(however, see Neumayer, 2003, 2005). As such, inequality is clearly a relevant control variable in our analysis.¹⁶

4.7 Method and Results

In order to test our hypotheses we use Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions. As it is well known, analysis of time-series, cross-sectional (TSCS) data is problematic because OLS standard assumptions are often violated. The assumption of homogenous units tends to be violated in panel data since the error terms generally have different variances across units, thus heteroscedastic errors. Therefore, inferences on the coefficients of explanatory variables are biased when these variables are associated with time-invariant unobserved unit factors. The appropriate F-test indicates that unit heterogeneity is present in our data, hence we employ fixed-effects with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) (Beck and Katz, 1995). Additionally, given that the errors are not independent from one time period to another and the serial correlation of errors produce biased estimates, we include *Education expenditures at t-1* to adjust for error autocorrelation. We also include time dummies to account for policy time trends and external shocks that affect the countries of the region similarly during the period of analysis.

In Table 4.7, Models 1 and 2 are the primary models for testing Hypotheses 1 and 2. We do not report country and time dummies for presentation purposes. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, we find a positive and statistically significant effect of *Homicide rates at t-1* on *Education expenditures*, indicating that governments

¹⁵See (Rudra, 2004), for an exception.

¹⁶Table 4.6 in the Appendix provides descriptive statistics of all variables.

deploy non-coercive strategies as a response to violent crime. Within the parameters of Model 1, an increase of one standard deviation in violent crime (20.49) in the previous year would cause an increase of .18 in education spending as a percentage of GDP in the current year. With an increase in homicides of two standard deviations, education spending would raise by .37. Overall, this is an important effect and it is significant at the .001 level. Moreover, we analyze to what extent this effect persists over time using an Error Correction Model (ECM) that allows us to separate out the long-term effect from the short-term effect. Using the Bewley transformation to obtain the correct standard error of the long-term effect of violent crime (De Boef and Keele, 2008), our results show that the total effect of homicide rates on education spending is .02 ($p < .001$). This means that an increase of one standard deviation in homicide rates would have a total long-term effect of a .5 increase in education spending as a percentage of GDP.¹⁷ On the other hand, the effect of *President ideology* is positive and statistically significant at the .05 level. In the presence of a leftist president, education spending is associated with an increase of .148 as a percentage of GDP.

We now turn to our Hypothesis 2, which suggests that the effect of homicide rates on education spending is larger when a left-based president is in power. Model 2 incorporates an interaction term between *Homicide rates* and *President ideology*. Following recent works on the interpretation of interaction terms, it should be emphasized that one cannot draw any conclusions about the interaction effect from the coefficients of the constitutive terms from the regression table. As Brambor et al. (2006, 70) explain, “If the covariance term is negative, as is often the case, then it is entirely possible for $\beta_1 + \beta_3 Z$ to be significant for substantively relevant values of Z even if all of the model parameters are insignificant.”. Analyzing the marginal effect of the interaction term shows strong support

¹⁷These results are available in Table 4.8 in the Appendix.

for our second hypothesis.¹⁸ We find that the marginal effect of violent crime is higher and significant when a president of the left is in power. The results show that an increase of one standard deviation in homicide rates would result in an increase of about .38 ($p < .01$) percentage points in education spending when left executives are in power, whereas the same increase in violent crime is associated with an increase of only .17 ($p < .001$) when executives who hold more rightist positions are in power.

In Models 3 to 8 we include additional control variables or alternative indicators to ensure that our results are robust and stable despite alternative specifications and changes in the sample size. Model 3 adds a binary indicator of *Civil war*, according to the 25 battle-deaths related threshold from Gleditsch et al. (2002). This is because the presence of an internal armed conflict may influence both homicide rates (Neumayer, 2003, 627) and spending on education (Lai and Thyne, 2007). In Model 3, the coefficient for *Civil war* is not statistically significant at conventional levels which is very likely due to the small number of observations with civil war in our sample.¹⁹ Importantly, our main results remain significant and of similar magnitude as reported in Model 2.

Model 4 adds an indicator of government repression as an effort to control for coercive strategies that governments may use to deal with violent crime. It may be argued that social spending and coercive strategies are substitute instruments

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The formula to calculate the standard error of the marginal effect of the interaction term is (2006, 70):

$$\hat{\sigma}_{\frac{\partial Y}{\partial X}} \sqrt{\text{var}(\hat{\beta}_1^\beta) + Z^2 \text{var}(\hat{\beta}_3) + 2Z \text{cov}(\hat{\beta}_1 \hat{\beta}_3)}$$

¹⁹There are 16 civil war country-year observations in our data, all of which are from Colombia and Peru.

Table 4.3: Fixed-effects Estimates of Education Expenditures in Latin America

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
L.Education expenditures	0.615*** (0.048)	0.606*** (0.047)	0.605*** (0.048)	0.613*** (0.049)	0.425*** (0.122)
L.Homicide rates	0.009*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.007)
L.President ideology	0.148* (0.074)	0.011 (0.087)	0.012 (0.086)	0.022 (0.086)	-0.064 (0.216)
L.Log Gdp pc	-0.494 (0.324)	-0.272 (0.329)	-0.285 (0.322)	-0.375 (0.316)	-0.084 (0.538)
L.Economic growth	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.010)
L.Trade openness	0.011*** (0.002)	0.011*** (0.002)	0.011*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.004 (0.006)
L.FDI	0.025** (0.009)	0.027** (0.009)	0.027** (0.009)	0.027** (0.009)	0.041 (0.027)
L.Population aged 0 to 14	0.080* (0.035)	0.102** (0.035)	0.104** (0.036)	0.100** (0.037)	0.167* (0.084)
L.Aged population	-0.096 (0.131)	-0.136 (0.137)	-0.133 (0.137)	-0.106 (0.133)	0.054 (0.326)
L.Democratic legacy	-0.012 (0.015)	-0.015 (0.015)	-0.021 (0.019)	-0.026 (0.018)	-0.043 (0.209)
L.Inequality	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.002 (0.017)
Hom*President ideology		0.010 (0.007)	0.010 (0.007)	0.010 (0.007)	0.026* (0.012)
L.Civil war			0.081 (0.120)	0.081 (0.120)	-0.222+ (0.122)
L.Repression				-0.024 (0.025)	
L.Military expenditures					-0.066 (0.196)
Constant	5.575+ (2.894)	3.541 (2.930)	3.838 (2.864)	4.746+ (2.717)	0.209 (9.342)
Observations	321	321	321	317	203
R ²	0.864	0.865	0.865	0.866	0.883

All models include dummies for country and year. PCSE in parentheses.

+ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

that governments deploy to fight violent crime. Unfortunately, the lack of data on law enforcement expenditures prevent us from assessing this relationship. We use the Physical Integrity Rights Index from Cingranelli and Richards (2010) as a proxy of coercive strategies of an unlawful nature that governments can resort to fight violent crime. Indeed, repression and human rights violations have been a common practice in most states despite the wave of democratization in Latin America over the last quarter of the twenty century (see Brinks, 2008; Pereira and Ungar, 2004; Caldeira, 2000). If the conjecture that coercive and non-coercive strategies are substitutes is supported, we should observe a negative effect of *Repression* on education spending since governments may transfer some resources from social spending to coercive strategies. In Model 4, however, we fail to find any evidence of a substitute effect as the coefficient for *Repression* is not statistically significant, although it is correctly signed.

Alternatively, Model 5 replaces the indicator of repression for a measure of military expenditures as a percentage of GDP (World Bank, 2010); however, although the coefficient is negative as expected, we again fail to find any significant effect on education spending. Interestingly, in this model the effect of civil war is now negative and statistically significant at the .10 level, which is consistent with (Lai and Thyne, 2007). Moreover, calculating the marginal effect of the interaction term reveals that while the marginal effect of homicide rates when a leftist president is in power remains statistically significant at the .01 level and is higher in magnitude (i.e., a one standard deviation increase in violent crime increases education spending by .5), the effect is no longer significant when a rightist government is in power.

In Table 4.4, Models 6 and 7 investigate further the robustness of our main finding by modifying and replacing the indicator of political ideology, respectively. In Model 6 we use the same source indicator of the executives' ideology (Murillo et al., 2010), but we code it differently to include Center, Center-Left and Left in the same category. Considering the marginal effect of the interaction term ($Hom * President\ ideology2$), we confirm that our results resemble those in pre-

vious models, as the marginal effect of violent crime is positive and statistically significant at the .01 level when a Left or Center government is in power. The only difference is that the magnitude is slightly smaller, which is reasonable since we include the Center in the same category.

Table 4.4: Fixed-effects Estimates of Education Expenditures in Latin America; Robustness Tests

	(6)		(7)		(8)	
L.Education expenditures	0.615***	(0.049)	0.561***	(0.054)	0.605***	(0.060)
L.Homicide rates	0.008***	(0.002)	0.002	(0.003)	0.007**	(0.003)
L.President ideology2	-0.217**	(0.082)				
Hom*President ideology2	0.008**	(0.003)				
L.Log Gdp pc	-0.407	(0.297)	-0.584	(0.506)	-0.361	(0.411)
L.Economic growth	-0.000	(0.007)	-0.000	(0.010)	-0.003	(0.009)
L.Trade openness	0.010***	(0.002)	0.019***	(0.006)	0.010**	(0.003)
L.FDI	0.024*	(0.010)	0.031**	(0.010)	0.035***	(0.010)
L.Population aged 0 to 14	0.100**	(0.037)	0.046	(0.046)	0.105*	(0.046)
L.Aged population	-0.065	(0.126)	-0.189	(0.181)	-0.179	(0.153)
L.Democratic legacy	-0.022	(0.019)	0.085	(0.113)	-0.039 ⁺	(0.023)
L.Inequality	0.002	(0.007)	0.011	(0.008)	0.002	(0.009)
L.Civil war	0.240 ⁺	(0.144)	0.139	(0.244)		
L.Repression	-0.029	(0.024)	-0.039	(0.028)	-0.014	(0.030)
L.Ideology score			-0.012	(0.014)		
Hom*Ideology score			0.001***	(0.000)		
L.President ideology					0.042	(0.117)
Hom*President ideology					0.010	(0.009)
Constant	4.546 ⁺	(2.470)	3.570	(7.624)	5.495	(3.629)
Observations	317		219		288	
R ²	0.866		0.878		0.863	

All models include dummies for country and year. PCSE in parentheses.

⁺ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$


In Model 7 we replace the executives' ideology indicator of a measure of *vote-revealed leftism*, recently introduced by Baker and Greene (2011). The authors constructed a 20 point scale ranging from 1 (farthest left) to 20 (farthest right), which captures the level of support for candidates with leftist ideologies in a particular election by considering the ideological positions and relative electoral success of all competitors that win votes.²⁰ We reversed this variable so that

²⁰For a detailed description of this measurement, see Baker and Greene (2011, 46-50).

higher values indicate the presidents party is more leftist. One advantage of this measure is that “it preserves fine-grained distinctions among parties along the entire ideological spectrum [and] it is invariant to the number of parties or candidates in a given election and thus significantly improves the validity of cross-national and cross-temporal comparisons” (2011, 47-48). Accordingly, in Model 7 we introduce the interaction term between violent crime and the Baker-Greene ideology indicator *Hom*Ideology score*.

To better understand the effect of violent crime at different values of the indicator of president ideology, we present Figure 4.1. The results are highly consistent with our results from previous models. Figure 4.1 also shows the distribution of observations along the political ideology score which makes easy to visualize that the results are significant for values higher than 4 of the ideology score. Likewise, the graph shows that around 82 percent of the observations in the sample fall somewhere along those values. Finally, in Model 8 instead of controlling for civil war as we do in the previous models, we exclude these observations war. Our results remain robust to the exclusion of these observations at the .05 level .

Figure 4.1: Marginal Effect of Violent Crime on Education Spending at Different Levels of President Ideology



Finally, turning to the control variables, *GDP per capita* and *Economic growth* are both negatively signed in all estimates, but do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. The results with regards to the population variables behave as expected. The coefficient for *Population aged 0 to 14 years* is positive and statistically significant across estimates, suggesting that elected democratic governments respond to the demographic structure of their countries. In contrast, the coefficient for *Population over age 65 is negative*, although it fails to reach

statistical significance. We also find support that globalization influences government expenditures. Both *Trade openness* and *FDI* have a significant positive effect on human capital spending. Although this finding differs from previous research showing that there is a negative association between trade openness and social spending (e.g., Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001), it is consistent with Avelino et al. (e.g., 2005) who find a positive association between trade openness and welfare expenditures. Finally, neither *Democratic legacy* nor *Inequality* appear to affect education spending.

The indirect effects of non-coercive responses on violent crime

We argue that education spending has an indirect negative effect on violent crime rates by increasing school enrollment. Therefore, we expect to find that expenditure on human capital formation increases school enrollment (Hypothesis 3a) and that school enrollment in turn decreases violent crime rates (Hypothesis 3b). Table 4.5 present the results for assessing these hypotheses. In Model 1, the dependent variable is *Secondary enrollment* and the main explanatory variable is *Education expenditures* as a percentage of GDP. Controls include *GDP per capita* (logged), *Economic growth*, *Urban population* (%), *Civil war*, and a decade dummy for the 1990's onwards, instead of the year dummies.²¹ We provide country-fixed effects with PCSE and a one-year lagged dependent variable. Model 1 shows strong support for Hypothesis 3a, as the coefficient for *Education expenditures at t-1* is positive and statistically significant at the .001 level, indicating that a government's commitment to human capital formation indeed increases secondary education enrollment. This result is consistent with earlier work showing that spending on human capital has positive effects such as improving the income distribution in less developed countries (Rudra, 2004). The coefficients of the control variables behave as expected. As in previous studies (e.g., Brown and Hunter, 2004), the results suggest that *Economic growth* is negatively associated with school enrollment. In contrast, the *Urban population*

²¹We use secondary education enrollment data to measure school attendance, defined as "the gross enrollment rate in the secondary education for the total population" (from UNESCO). Data on the youth population comes from the United Nations.

positively influences secondary education enrollment. Moreover, in line with Lai and Thyne (2007), we also find that civil wars have a negative effect on *Secondary enrollment* (Gates et al., 2012).

Table 4.5: Estimates of Secondary School Enrollment & Homicide Rates

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Secondary enrollment		Homicide rates		Homicide rates	
L.Secondary enrollment	0.8805***	(0.027)	-0.0832**	(0.027)	-0.0896***	(0.027)
L.Log GDP pc	-0.6224	(1.009)	-4.1373*	(1.667)	-4.3724*	(1.818)
L.Economic growth	-0.0639*	(0.032)	-0.0465	(0.044)	-0.0465	(0.045)
L.Urban population	0.1585*	(0.076)	0.4950***	(0.091)	0.5051***	(0.097)
L.Civil war	-1.0383*	(0.484)	1.4072	(1.386)	1.3959	(1.390)
L.Education	0.5438***	(0.164)			0.2043	(0.382)
L.Homicide rates			0.8327***	(0.042)	0.8297***	(0.044)
L.Inequality			-0.0359	(0.050)	-0.0386	(0.050)
L.Youth bulges			1.3763***	(0.233)	1.3512***	(0.231)
d_1990			-0.6356	(0.494)	-0.5909	(0.518)
Constant	0.5621	(10.698)	-19.2637	(14.441)	-17.7106	(14.873)
Observations	387		319		319	
R^2	0.986		0.973		0.973	

All models include dummies for country and year. PCSE in parentheses.

⁺ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Once we showed that investment on human capital formation has a positive effect on *School attendance*, we proceed to test the relationship between *School attendance* and *Homicide rates* in Models 2 and 3. As in Model 1, we provide country-fixed effects with PCSE and a one-year lagged dependent variable. Likewise, all independent variables are lagged one year. We include several controls plausibly associated with homicide levels: *GDP per capita* (logged), *Economic growth*, *Urban population* (%), *Inequality*, *Youth population*, and *Civil war*. Consistent with Hypothesis 3b, the estimated coefficient for *Secondary education enrollment* is negative and statistically significant at the .01 level in Model 2. This result suggests that the educational system can play an important role in pacifying society. Interestingly, this is compatible with previous research on political violence showing that school enrollment has a substantive negative effect on the likelihood of civil wars (Thyne, 2006).

Finally, Model 3 incorporates *Education expenditures* in the right-hand side of the equation and consistent with our argument, we find that the coefficient of education spending is not different from zero. In addition to our results displayed in Table 3, this null finding provides support for our claim that non-coercive responses to violent crime represent reactive, rather than preventive strategies to fight crime. The results with regards to the control variables are consistent with earlier studies in the field (e.g., Neumayer, 2003). The coefficient for *GDP per capita* is negative and statistically significant, meaning that economic development decreases homicide rates. Instead, *Urban population*, *Youth bulges*, and *Homicide rates at t-1* are related to higher homicide rates. Taken together, our empirical estimates provide support for the argument that non-coercive responses to violent crime can improve public safety. The results show that government spending on human capital formation has an indirect effect on homicide rates via school attendance.

4.8 Conclusion

This article has examined states' non-coercive responses to violent crime among democratic regimes from Latin America. While most case studies center their attention on the law enforcement and repressive strategies that governments deploy against violent crime, we develop a theoretical account in which state welfare policy constitutes a prominent tool that political leaders have to fight violence and enhance public security. In particular, we argued that violent crime is likely to influence spending on education because governments expect to affect the individual determinants of violent crime through mechanisms of attachment and commitment which education enhances. This argument stems from the empirical regularity that violent actors tend to be young males with low levels of education. We further argued that when left-oriented governments are in power, the effect of violent crime on education spending is higher.

Readers who are familiar with the criminology literature may not be surprised that democratic governments are likely to strengthen welfare policy to reduce vi-

olent crime. However, the empirical findings in this study are far from trivial. Indeed, violent crime is one of the most pressing and troubling problems in Latin America, where regional homicide rates rank among the highest in the contemporary world. Yet, an overwhelming emphasis on law enforcement and repressive strategies against crime has distracted attention from the non-coercive strategies that governments deploy to reduce violence within society. Our findings showed that these strategies should not be dismissed since states are likely to increase spending on human capital formation in response to violent crime.

We also found robust evidence that ideology matters, as compared to conservative governments left and left of center governments devote higher spending on human capital formation in response to violent crime. Whereas a fast-growing body of research has examined the rise of left governments in Latin America (Baker and Greene, 2011), we still lack a comprehensive picture on whether and how it matters that leftist presidents are in power for several policy domains. Thus, our empirical results help to fill this gap and show that leftist governments are more likely to tackle the social roots of violent crime by boosting their investment on human capital formation. Both the theoretical rationale and findings in this study are compatible with recent research showing that, compared to elite based democracies, popular democracies in Latin America privilege welfare policy and attempt to improve their citizens' well-being through redistributive policies (Menaldo, 2011).

Without denying the relevance of law enforcement strategies, we also demonstrated empirically that non-coercive strategies against violent crime work. We showed that education spending has a positive significant effect on school enrollment rates and that school enrollment rates negatively affect violent crime levels in Latin America. As such, our empirical results shed light on the effectiveness and the pacifying effect of non-coercive responses to violent crime. Importantly, although the empirical scope in this paper is limited to Latin America, our results resemble earlier findings in quantitative conflict research that shows states efforts toward social welfare, and in particular education expenditures are likely

to reduce the risk of conflict onset (Thyne, 2006).

While improving on previous studies of violent crime in the region, our work also has limitations that we shall intend to address in the future. Despite our efforts to assess whether investment on human capital formation constitutes a substitute instrument for law enforcement strategies against violent crime, the lack of data availability on public security expenditures prevented us to scrutinize properly whether or not governments employ substitute strategies to fight violent crime. We believe that future research could focus on this question using case-based research to analyze deeply whether governments deploy substitute or complementary strategies to tackle violent crime. This line of research would contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of how democratic governments deal with violent crime.

4.9 Appendix

Table 4.6: Summary of variables

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Education spending	321	3.934	1.218	1.49	8
Homicide rates	321	20.163	21.376	.130	140.88
President ideology	321	.180	.385	0	1
Ln GDP pc	321	8.777	.504	7.481	9.774
GDP pc growth	321	1.289	4.113	-14.281	14.644
Trade openness	321	63.254	35.998	16.929	222.287
FDI	321	2.677	2.444	-2.498	14.921
Population aged 0 to 14	321	35.153	5.808	23.540	46.830
Aged population	321	5.643	2.461	3.152	13.617
Democratic legacy	321	30.426	12.163	0	60
Inequality	321	49.853	4.361	42	60.3
Civil war	321	.049	.217	0	1
Repression	317	3.097	1.664	0	6
Military expenditures	203	1.754	.942	.384	4.157

As a robustness check, we replicate the core models displayed in Table 3 in the paper (Models 1 and 2). Instead of using interpolated data from the United Nations Crime Trends Surveys (UNCTS), Models 1 and 2 in Table 4.7 report fixed-effect estimates using non-interpolated data from the UNCTS (*Homicide rates* NI). The number of observations decreases from 321 to 257, yet the results are substantively similar to those reported in Table 3 in the paper. The coefficient for *Homicide rates* is positive and statistically significant in Model 1. With regards to the interaction term (*HomNI*President ideology*), the results in Model 2 show that the marginal effect of homicide rates on education spending when a leftist president is in power is .015 ($p < .05$).

In a similar manner, in Models 3 and 4 we replace the interpolated homicide data from the UNCTS for an indicator of homicide rates from the World Health Organization (*Homicide rates* WHO). Again, we find a positive significant effect of homicide rates on education expenditures. According to Model 4 the marginal effect of homicides rates on education spending when a leftist president is in power (*Hom_WHO*President ideology*) is .025 ($p < .05$), which is slightly stronger compared to the results from Model 2 reported in the paper.

Table 4.7: Fixed-effects Estimates of Education Expenditures in Latin America; Robustness checks

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Education	Education	Education	Education
L.Education	0.625*** (0.028)	0.615*** (0.020)	0.542*** (0.054)	0.530*** (0.052)
L.Homicide rates NI	0.007*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)		
L.President ideology	0.192** (0.061)	0.078 (0.082)	0.157* (0.075)	-0.029 (0.096)
L.Log gdp per capita	-0.639+ (0.357)	-0.465+ (0.245)	-0.125 (0.278)	0.110 (0.301)
L.Economic growth	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.007)
L.Trade openness	0.009*** (0.001)	0.009*** (0.001)	0.007* (0.003)	0.007* (0.003)
L.FDI	0.003 (0.007)	0.004 (0.006)	-0.014 (0.014)	-0.013 (0.014)
L.Population aged 0 to 14	0.134*** (0.021)	0.152*** (0.016)	0.032 (0.025)	0.051+ (0.027)
L.Aged population	-0.201** (0.070)	-0.229*** (0.063)	0.070 (0.103)	0.016 (0.098)
L.Democratic legacy	-0.006 (0.016)	-0.010 (0.013)	-0.014 (0.013)	-0.016 (0.014)
L.Inequality	-0.012** (0.005)	-0.012** (0.005)	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.008)
HomNI*President ideology		0.008 (0.006)		
L.Homicide rates WHO			0.009* (0.004)	0.007* (0.004)
Hom_WHO*President ideology				0.019* (0.009)
Constant	7.207** (2.743)	5.591** (1.817)	2.390 (2.230)	0.513 (2.344)
Observations	257	257	323	323
R ²	0.874	0.875	0.866	0.868

Standard errors in parentheses


All models include dummies for country and year. Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses;

+ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

As detailed in the paper, we also employ an Error Correction Model (ECM) to distinguish the long-term effect from the short-term effect of homicides rates on governments' spending on education. We report these results in Table 4.8. Importantly, using the Bewley transformation to obtain the correct standard error of the long-term effect of violent crime, our empirical estimates indicate that the total effect of homicide rates on education expenditures is .02 ($p < .001$). This means that an increase of one standard deviation in homicide rates would have a total long-term effect of a .5 increase in education spending as a percentage of GDP.

We further assess the robustness of our findings by examining whether extreme values in the homicide rates variable influence the main results. Looking at the data, we found around 17 country-year observations with extreme values of over 65 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (see Figure 4.2). Therefore, we replicate our main models but excluding these extreme values. As seen in Table 4, these estimations did not alter the substance of the empirical estimates reported in the paper.

Figure 4.2: Distribution of Homicide Rates in Democratic Regimes in Latin America



/Users/barbarazarate/Dropbox/Projects/social violence and social spending/data 2

Table 4.8: Error Correction Estimates of Education Expenditures

	(1)	(2)
	D.Education	D.Education
L.Education	-0.4321*** (0.052)	-0.4578*** (0.048)
L.Homicide rates	0.0124*** (0.003)	0.0107** (0.003)
L.President ideology	0.0512 (0.086)	-0.2186* (0.102)
D.Homicide rates	0.0146* (0.007)	0.0102 (0.007)
D.President ideology	-0.0888 (0.099)	-0.2687+ (0.149)
L.GDP per Capita	0.0000 (0.000)	0.0001* (0.000)
D.GDP per Capita	0.0002 (0.000)	0.0002* (0.000)
L.Trade openness	0.0109*** (0.002)	0.0100*** (0.002)
D.Trade openness	0.0121* (0.005)	0.0127* (0.005)
L.FDI	0.0658*** (0.012)	0.0643*** (0.013)
D.FDI	0.0373*** (0.010)	0.0386*** (0.010)
L.Population aged 0 to 14	-0.0054 (0.054)	0.0250 (0.053)
D.Population aged 0 to 14	-0.3084 (0.254)	-0.4178 (0.257)
L.Aged population	-0.0984 (0.154)	-0.1411 (0.157)
D.Aged population	-4.2918** (1.344)	-4.7392** (1.458)
L.Democratic legacy	-0.0188+ (0.011)	-0.0252* (0.012)
D.Inequality	0.0060 (0.008)	0.0053 (0.008)
L.Inequality	0.0043 (0.008)	0.0032 (0.008)
L.Hom*President Ideology		0.0190* (0.008)
D.Hom*President Ideology		0.0148 (0.012)
Constant	3.0054+ (1.673)	2.4116 (1.620)
Observations	307	307
R ²	0.345	0.358

Standard errors in parentheses

All models include dummies for country and year. Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses;

+ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Conclusion

Over the last two decades a growing literature on social spending in developing countries has made substantial contributions to our understanding on the sources of social policy variation in the developing world. Overall, this literature consistently shows that democratization processes have been accompanied by a greater emphasis on the part of democratic leaders to investment in human capital. Theoretical models generally point out that democracy should be positively associated with greater social spending, mostly because citizens can influence government policy through competitive elections. Empirical analyses in the field have provided robust evidence that democracy and democratic historical legacies are indeed strongly and positively related with spending on social welfare.

Despite the valuable contributions that this growing literature on social policy in developing countries has made, more work needs to be done to better understand the link between the “demand” and the “supply” side of social policy. This necessarily involves considering citizens’ expectations and demands for social policy. The first and second articles of this thesis contribute to this endeavor. Indeed the importance of bringing in the role of citizens’ views on the performance of democratic governments has been recently highlighted in the comparative agenda on democratization as an urgent need for explaining democratic stability:

We will need to assess how well the outputs of public policy well paying jobs, safe streets, and access to quality schools and health care, delivered by governments that are perceived to be clean and fair meet the expectations of constituents. We will also need to reconnect the legislative process to citizen participation, government responsiveness, democratic accountability, and the quality of political representation. We need, in other words, to build a new approach to studying democratic regimes (Hagopian, 2005, p. 336).

On the other hand, with regards to the “supply” side of social policy, future work would greatly benefit from going beyond a purely state-centered approach and incorporate how different pressures from below affect political leaders’ incentives

to expand social policies. The third and fourth articles of this thesis represent a contribution in this direction.

In this thesis I have attempted to advance this literature in two fundamental ways. On the one hand, whereas the existing cross-national studies in the field have typically focused on citizens' influence through conventional methods of political participation on social policy, I have turned to examine the way citizens are able to influence governments' social policy through non-conventional forms of political participation such as strikes, demonstrations and riots.

On the other hand, I took a step back and examined whether the provision of public services and citizens' views with regards to inequality influence their propensity to protest and mobilize against democratically elected governments in the region. Regarding this latter point, using survey data analysis I found strong evidence that citizens' dissatisfaction with education and health services as well as citizens' support for redistribution increase the democratic deficit in the region (i.e., the gap between support for democracy and satisfaction with democracy). Furthermore, individuals' dissatisfaction with social services provided by the state and discontent over inequality increase the likelihood of protest participation.

The second paper further investigated how adverse economic conditions influence citizens' propensity to protest. Specifically, it examined how relative economic deprivation and individuals' availability of resources interact to fuel popular mobilization. In line with the findings presented in the first paper, I showed evidence that economic motives encourage protest participation only among individuals whose income is close to the middle of the income distribution, but not among the poor or the rich. Theoretically, this is because whereas among the poor, the scarcity of resources mitigates the politicization of economic grievances, among the rich the relative abundance of resources and alternative channels of political influence available to this group produce the same effect. Additionally, the implementation and/or expansion of labor and social policies aimed at lessening the effects of the economic crisis proved to be relevant for mitigating the role of economic motives on individuals' propensity to protest.

Furthermore, the findings from the analysis on the relationship between economic deprivation and collective protest at the macro-level are largely consistent with the empirical results at the micro-level; economic performance and income inequality showed strong effects in the expected direction on overall levels of collective protest among the countries in the region.

Having shown how economic conditions and dissatisfaction with social services provision affect citizens' engagement in contentious politics, in the third paper I examined whether different types of collective protest influence governments' social spending choices. Interestingly, I found that collective protest has differentiated effects on social spending. While strikes have a strong positive long-term effect on social security and welfare spending, none of the different forms of collective protest affect education or health spending. Importantly, I also showed evidence of a deterrent effect of mass protests in democratic regimes; cutbacks in human capital spending are less likely as peaceful large-scale demonstrations increase.

Finally, the fourth paper went beyond the effect of protest on social spending and focused on one the most striking phenomena within the Latin American region: societal violence. The underlying logic in this paper is that, as in the case of contentious collective action, it is plausible to expect that governments have incentives to employ spending on welfare policy to mitigate and/or prevent social problems. In particular, from a politician's perspective, investment in human capital formation policies is expected to contribute to reduce crime rates via its positive effect in secondary school enrollment rates. The empirical analysis supports this approach and showed that homicide rates are positively associated with government spending on education. The analysis also demonstrates that the effect of violent crime on education spending is larger when leftist governments are in power given that they tend to stress individuals' motivations over windows of opportunities as the main causes of crime.

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