A Responsible Great Power: The Anatomy of China's Proclaimed Identity

Tiang Boon Hoo
Nuffield College

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of DPhil in International Relations at the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford

Hilary Term 2013

83,981 words

Abstract

There has been much interest and attention on the representation of China as a responsible great power. Indeed, Chinese leaders, policymakers and scholars have not been hesitant to declare China as one. Yet, relatively little is known about when, how and why this proclaimed self-identity emerged in Beijing. This thesis represents an initial attempt to unpack these questions. Mobilising the idea of international identity, I map the evolution of China's declared identity as a responsible power, and examine its attributes and drivers.

My central contention is that since the early 1990s, China has been increasingly identifying—not only portraying—itself as a responsible great power. As this thesis shows, there is a vibrant epistemic terrain relating to the idea of global responsibility within China. For some time now, Chinese elites have been debating intensely the kind of responsible power that China should be. That these domestic identity debates take place frequently, away from the attention of most of the world, suggests the Chinese regard the idea of big power responsibility far more seriously than had it been purely a convenient propagandist tool. Examining how these elites think about the responsible power role, hence, may be crucial to a better understanding of the implications and trajectory of China's rise. Nevertheless, the development of this identity has not been solely a product of Chinese domestic narratives and perceptions. The role of the United States as a moral adjudicator and pressure source is also significant.

CONTENTS

	Abstract	ii
	Acknowledgements	iv
	Glossary of Acronyms	v
1	Introduction	1
2	China's Responsible Great Power Identity in Historical Perspective	41
3	The Start of China's Identification as a Responsible Great Power, 1978 to 1996	80
4	Expansion of the Responsible Great Power Narrative, 1997 to 2004	122
5	The Responsible Great Power Discourse: Continuing Proliferation and Debate, 2005-2012	172
6	Conclusion: Clarifications, Findings and Implications	216
	Bibliography	238

Acknowledgements

This thesis is the culmination of five years of extensive but fulfilling research efforts. That I am able to complete this study is a testimony to the sacrifices, patience and mentorship of my supervisor, Professor Rosemary Foot. She read every chapter at least three times with much meticulousness, challenged my interpretations and arguments, and offered invaluable suggestions to improve the work.

But many other intellectual, professional and personal debts have been incurred as well. I would like to thank: the Oxford Leverhulme Contemporary China Studies Programme for generously funding this research; participants and discussants at the Nuffield College BRIC Seminar, the New Orleans ISA Annual Convention, and the Department DPhil Seminar for providing useful feedback on parts of the thesis; friends at the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies for their feedback on the research; the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences and the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies for their exceptional hospitality and support during my China field trips; and the many Chinese scholars who agreed to be interviewed and with whom I have forged friendships.

Above all, I would like to thank my lovely spouse, May Lin. She sacrificed her promising career in Singapore to accompany me on my intellectual journey in Oxford and did so with a curious mix of jovial forbearance. This thesis is hers as much as mine. I dedicate it to her.

Glossary of Acronyms

AFC	Asian Financial Crisis
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BWC	Biological Weapons Convention
CASS	Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CD	Conference on Disarmament
CICIR	China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations
CIIS	China Institute of International Studies
CNP	Comprehensive National Power
CPPCC	Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
CRS	Congressional Research Service
CSCAP	Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
ESR	Economic and Security Review
G20	Group of 20
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFC	Global Financial Crisis
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations
IWEP	Institute of World Economics and Politics
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MFN	Most Favored Nation
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NPC	National People's Congress
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSC	New Security Concept
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group

ONUMOZ	United Nations Operations in Mozambique
P5+1	The Permanent Five+Germany
PKO	UN peacekeeping operation
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PNTR	Permanent Normal Trading Relations
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
PRC	People's Republic of China
RGP	Responsible Great Power
RMB	Renminbi
SASS	Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SD	Senior Dialogue
SED	Strategic and Economic Dialogue
SIIS	Shanghai Institutes for International Studies
UN	United Nations
UNASMIL	UN Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDOF	UN Disengagement Observer Force
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNGOMAP	UN Good Offices Mission to Afghanistan and Pakistan
UNIFIL	UN Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIIMOG	UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group
UNMEE	UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIL	UN Mission in Liberia
UNOB	UN Operation in Burundi
UNOCI	UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNOGICA	UN Observer Group in Central America
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAET	UN Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTAG	UN Transition Assistance Group
WEP	World Economics and Politics
WTO	World Trade Organisation

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

…China's identity in relation to international society constitutes the century-puzzle of the Chinese since 1840.

– Qin Yaqing, Executive Vice President,
China Foreign Affairs University[1]

Why Study China's 'Responsible Great Power' Identity?

The rise of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has been one of the central themes of international relations in the past twenty years. Responding to the growth in Chinese power and influence, there have been several calls, led notably by the United States, exhorting China to be a responsible great power. This is most clearly exemplified by former US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick's prominent 2005 speech, where he urged China to move towards becoming a 'responsible stakeholder' in the international system. Underlining the stakeholder idea is the belief that China should contribute more directly to the resolution of global challenges such as nuclear proliferation, climate change and international financial stability because it has a duty to sustain the international system that enabled its rise.[2] This call for China to assume greater global responsibilities has not been incongruent

[1] Qin Yaqing, 'International Society as a Process: Institutions, Identities and China's Peaceful Rise,' *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 3 (2010), p. 130.
[2] Robert Zoellick, 'Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility,' *Remarks to the National Committee on US-China Relations*, 21 September 2005. Available at the US State Department archive: http://2001-2009.state.gov/.

with messages emanating from Beijing. Signally, China has declared it wants to be a responsible great power (*fuzeren de daguo).*

This study aims to shed more light on China's proclaimed identity as a responsible great power (RGP). In particular, it aims to trace the evolution of China's RGP identity, uncovering the conditions and factors that led to its emergence and development. The emergence of the RGP identity begs at least five empirical puzzles: (i) How has this identity been produced in China? (ii) What are the factors that animate its origins and evolution? (iii) What is its discursive content? (iv) To what extent have external actors such as the US played a role in shaping it? (v) And to what extent is it a stable or established identity? To date, virtually no focused studies have been done to address these questions. The lack of in-depth examination of the Chinese RGP identity has been lamented by Alastair Iain Johnston. In his 2008 book *Social States*, he notes: 'explaining the evolution of the [RGP] identity at this particular time in history is obviously an important question,' one for which he wished to have a 'definitive answer.'[3] This study represents an initial attempt to remedy the dearth of scholarship in this area.

However, plugging the lacuna in scholarship is not the only reason why we should seek to understand more about China's responsible great power identity. This research is interesting to policy and academic audiences in at least three other ways. First, there exists a perspective amongst some analysts that China is basically non-status quo or revisionist in orientation

[3] Alastair Iain Johnston, *Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 149, footnote 156.

and trajectory.[4] Others perceive China's RGP characterisation as nothing more than for external image building and propaganda purposes.[5] I argue such views are insufficiently attentive to the proliferation and range of Chinese RGP ideas. The central contention of the study is that since the early 1990s, China has been increasingly identifying—not only portraying—itself as a responsible big power. As this study will show, there is a vibrant epistemic terrain relating to the idea of global responsibility within China. For some time now, Chinese elites have been debating intensely the kind of responsible power that China should be. That these domestic identity debates take place frequently, away from the attention of most of the world, suggests that the Chinese regard the idea of big power responsibility far more seriously than had it been purely a convenient propaganda tool. It is important that this study highlights this underappreciated aspect.

Second, a clearer understanding of the evolution of the RGP identity will help contribute to a deeper knowledge of the mechanisms of state identity formation. In general, international relations (IR) scholarship can be said to have established, with some degree of success, the connections

[4] For a survey of related views, see Emma V.Broomfield, 'Perceptions of Danger: the China Threat Theory,' *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 12, No. 35 (2003), pp. 265-284. See also Patrick Stewart, 'Irresponsible Stakeholders? The Difficulty of Integrating Rising Powers,' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 89, No. 6 (November/December 2010), pp. 44-53; John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton 2001), pp. 401-404; Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, *The Coming Conflict with China* (New York: Alfred A.Knopf, 1997).

[5] This is not to suggest that image concerns are not relevant. However, I disagree that China's RGP characterisation is purely for external propaganda purposes. See, for examples, Hongying Wang, 'National Image Building and Chinese Foreign Policy,' *China: An International Journal*, Vol.1, No. 5 (2003), pp. 46-72; Yang Jiang, 'Response and Responsibility: China in East Asian Financial Cooperation,' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 23, No. 5 (2010), pp. 603-623.

between state identities and foreign policy--that identity 'matters.'[6] The vast and burgeoning number of works in this area testifies to this.[7] Yet, concerning *how* identity has come to matter—or more specifically, how state identities emerge and then persist or change—is a puzzle that is less well understood and requires further study.[8] This is an important issue because before we can fully grasp the significance of the relationship between state identities and foreign policy, we must first understand what these identities are, where they come from and how they get produced or change.

Third, the views of national elites often provide insights into the extant and likely future behaviour of the state, especially in China where the political and intellectual classes wield disproportionate influence over

[6] There are basically four interrelated ways in which identity is discussed in the literature. The first involves philosophical or meta-theoretical studies of identity. Second, identity is seen as a factor by which outcomes in international politics are explained. Third, identity is often the underlying subtext when scholars evoke sociological or normative arguments in their works. Finally, identity can be taken as the outcome to be studied and explained.

[7] (i) On studies that look at how identity differences are a cause of conflict among states, see Jonathan Mercer, 'Anarchy and Identity,' *International Organisation*, Vol. 49, No. 2 (1995), pp. 229-252; Samuel Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilisations,' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3 (1993), pp. 22-49; Thomas Risse-Kappen, 'Democratic Peace-Warlike Democracies,' *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (1995), pp. 491-517. (ii) On studies that disagree with the view that identity factors cause conflicts, or examine the cooperative and integrational effects of identity, see Peter Hay Gries, 'Social Psychology and the Identity-Conflict Debate: Is a "China Threat" Inevitable?' *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 11, No.2 (2005), pp. 235-265; Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on US Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Michael N. Barnett, 'Identity and Alliances in the Middle East,' in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 400-447; Anthony Smith, 'National Identity and the Idea of European Identity,' *International Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 1 (1992), pp. 55-76; Tyler M. Curley, 'Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion,' *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 53 (2009), pp. 649-668. (iii) For accounts that examine the effects of domestic identities on national policies, see Ted Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities & Foreign Policies, 1955 & 1999* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); Henry R. Nau, *At Home Abroad: Identity and Power in American Foreign Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); Rawi Abdelal, *National Purpose in the World Economy: Post-Soviet States in Comparative Perspective* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); Thomas Banchoff, 'German Identity and European Integration,' *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1999), pp. 259-289; Andrew Oros, *Normalising Japan: Politics, Identity and the Evolution of Security Practice* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).

[8] For examples, see Michael N. Barnett, *Dialogues in Arab Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).

policymaking. Of course, Beijing is becoming increasingly responsive to public opinion at the same time that there are rising numbers of politically nontrivial societal actors (e.g. civil society, social media, the new middle class). Nevertheless, the PRC remains a society where the process of national policymaking is still largely dominated by political and intellectual elites.[9] Examining how these elites think about China as a great power hence may be crucial to a better understanding of the implications of China's rise. As one Chinese scholar notes, 'Any big country's rise will inevitably change the world. The important question is: What kind of changes?'[10] How will China use its power and influence as it grows stronger? Will China increasingly challenge or shape a global order that is predominantly rooted in a Western-centric normative framework? Will China's rise lead to a 'tragedy' of big power politics or a great power 'concert' in global governance, or neither? Chinese elites' views on questions of identity may help further illuminate these consequential questions.

In many ways, this study is an intellectual history of Chinese perceptions of China's great power identity and responsibilities. It aims to tell the story of how and why the RGP identity emerged in Beijing. In this introductory chapter, I start by surveying the small body of literature on China as a responsible great power. This is followed by an overview of the key ideas of international responsibility and identity that serve as conceptual reference points for this research. Following that, the chapter provides a brief

[9] Daniel C. Lynch, 'Envisioning China's Political Future: Elite Responses to Democracy as a Global Constitutive Norm,' *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 51 (2007), pp. 702-703.
[10] Interview with scholar at Renmin University, Beijing, May 2011.

account of possible Chinese self-conceptions other than the RGP identity. In the fourth section, it addresses the issues pertaining to research methodology and next explores the types of data sources that are required for this research. The chapter closes with a short description of the organisation of the study.

Literature Review: China as a Responsible Great Power

Secondary literature that centres on and brings together the themes of China's responsibility and its great power status is fairly sparse.[11] To be sure, these phrases have been referred to in several international relations studies on China, but most works go no further than to merely note the RGP phenomenon.[12] There are only a handful of studies that provide a focused discussion of the subject matter.[13]

[11] To be specific, literature is defined here as international relations publications in the English language. For works in the Chinese language and mainly published in China, they are considered as Chinese sources.

[12] For some examples, see Evan S. Medeiros and M.Talyor Fravel, 'China's New Diplomacy,' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 6 (November/December 2003), pp. 22-35; Lowell Dittmer, 'East Asia in the 'New Era' in World Politics,' *World Politics*, Vol. 5 (2002), pp. 38-65; Injoo Sohn, 'Learning to Cooperate: China's Multilateral Approach to Asian Financial Cooperation,' *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 194 (2008), pp. 309-326; Simon Shen and Mong Cheung, 'Reshaping Nationalism: Chinese Intellectual Response Towards Sino-American and Sino-Japanese Relations in the Twenty-First Century,' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (2007), pp. 475-497; Thomas J. Christensen, 'The Advantages of an Assertive China,' *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 90, No. 2 (March/April 2011), pp. 54-67. Johnston provides a limited discussion of the RGP identity in his investigation of social influence in international institutions. Nevertheless, the RGP identity is not his main subject of inquiry. See Johnston, *Social States*, pp. 146-149.

[13] There are some studies that assess China's compliance levels with international regimes/norms or the extent to which it is a status quo state. Although such topics are related to international responsibility, they are thematically different from my inquiry; hence I have excluded them from the review. See Ann Kent, *Beyond Compliance: China, International Organizations and Global Security* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); Alastair Iain Johnston, 'Is China a Status Quo Power?' *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (2003), pp. 5-56; Rosemary Foot and Andrew Walter, *China, the United States and Global Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Gerald Chan, *China's Compliance in Global Affairs: Trade, Arms Control, Environmental Protection, Human Rights* (Singapore: World Scientific Series on Contemporary China, 2006).

One of the earliest studies is Rosemary Foot's appraisal of whether China is a responsible state. Engaging the concept of international society, Foot assesses the PRC's behaviour since its establishment in 1949. Foot observes that the notion of responsibility in international society is essentially intersubjective and has shifting goalposts. Notwithstanding this caveat, she finds that in certain domains such as arms control and nuclear non-proliferation, economic integration, and environmental protection, China has made considerable and positive progress as a responsible country since the reforms of the late 1970s. However, in terms of newer and more solidarist yardsticks of state responsibility—human rights and democratic governance—China remains an outlier.[14]

A more expansive discussion can be found in the edited monograph *Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy*. Featuring a collection of scholarly perspectives put together by Yongjin Zhang and Greg Austin, this collection positions itself amongst debates about the responsibility of power and China's foreign policy conduct. One contribution of the volume is that a substantial part organises the motifs of power and responsibility around discussion of a range of empirical issues such as China's domestic politics, its participation in international institutions and national security, Northeast Asian regional dynamics, and cross-strait relations.[15] There is however little

[14] Rosemary Foot, 'Chinese Power and the Idea of a Responsible State,' *The China Journal*, Vol. 45 (2001), pp. 1-19.
[15] Yongjin Zhang and Greg Austin, eds., *Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy* (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2001).

attempt to connect the findings of the individual essays or to assess their implications.

Xia Liping's work in English describes the internal and external factors that will shape China's identity as a responsible great power. Xia argues that the extent to which China will assume the role of a responsible power will depend on its degree of integration with the international system. As one of the few works that explore the dynamics underpinning the RGP identity, Xia's essay in the *Journal of Contemporary China* marks a notable contribution. Nevertheless, importantly, Xia's essay is most probably designed for a policy audience: the author appears to be writing in his professional capacity as the General Secretary of the Shanghai Institute of International Strategic Studies, with a view towards engaging US foreign policy elites. Xia's article does not explicate China's RGP identity in any substantive academic sense. Instead, he writes about the 'conditions' needed to help China become a responsible power, with the implicit message being that there are areas where the US can do more (or less) to encourage the emerging RGP persona.[16]

Susan Shirk devotes a chapter in her book *Fragile Superpower* to explore the various dimensions of Chinese foreign policy in terms of the responsible power concept. Here, standards of responsibility are implicitly assumed rather than specified. Evidence of China's responsible behaviour include for her an active embrace of multilateralism, a more accommodative stance towards its neighbours, promotion of strategic frameworks such as the

[16] Xia Liping, 'China: A Responsible Great Power,' *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol.10, No. 25 (2001), pp. 17-25.

'peaceful rise' idea and New Security Concept, cooperation on Korean peninsula security issues, and economic policies designed partially to buy goodwill. While in areas such as energy security Beijing still seems to be on the 'wrong side' of issues for a nation that seeks RGP recognition, Shirk suggests an overall more responsible China can be discerned, one which is palpably concerned about its international reputation.[17]

Two studies focus on specific empirical cases to examine the RGP phenomenon. Yang Jiang's article is concerned with China's behaviour in the area of East Asian financial cooperation. Jiang's assessment is that while Chinese policy postures are elaborated by a spectrum of responses that ranges from objection, nominal participation and active contribution, China is generally moving towards the direction of greater financial regionalism. Such a trend can be partially explained by Beijing's desire to project a responsible great power image, among other driving factors.[18] Beverley Loke offers a more explicit examination of the RGP phenomenon in her case study of China's foreign policy in Sudan. Conceiving international responsibility in terms of a relationship with national interests, Loke concludes that Beijing has deftly managed its Sudan policy, balancing its economic interests there with a greater willingness to meet external expectations of its responsibilities. Loke stops short of classifying Chinese actions in Sudan as responsible, but notes

[17] Citing a 1999 article by Chinese scholar Wang Yizhou, Shirk asserts that Wang 'originated' the use of the term 'responsible power' in Chinese discourse. The findings of this research indicate otherwise. Certainly, Wang is one of the more prominent commentators in the RGP debate. However, as this study shows in Chapter 3, there is already a nascent discussion of the RGP concept by other individuals from the early 1990s. See Susan Shirk, *China: Fragile Superpower* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 105-139.

[18] Jiang, 'Response and Responsibility,' pp. 603-623.

that the PRC is clearly envisaging 'a wider global role with greater responsibilities.'[19]

There are two important gaps in the accounts outlined above. The most obvious aspect is that the majority of them focus overwhelmingly on questions of Chinese behaviour. Little attention is given to how and why Chinese views of international responsibility have developed in the first place. Authors who have discerned the emerging RGP identity also make little attempt to provide an in-depth analysis of this identity. Although Xia's work may count as a marginal exception, it essentially expresses Xia's views on the idea of a responsible great power rather than capturing the full range of debates and discourse that animates the RGP identity. The second limitation is that existing accounts do not make adequate use of available Chinese language sources. Greater use of these sources is likely to enrich the quality of the analysis.

In many respects, the narrative of China as a responsible great power is a picture that has no dedicated painter yet: the frame is there, but the canvas is barely wet. Becoming this painter is therefore my aim in this project.

[19] Beverley Loke, 'Between Interest and Responsibility: Assessing China's Foreign Policy and Burgeoning Global Role,' *Asian Security*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2009), pp. 205-212.

Conceptual Discussion

This section provides an overview of the key concepts relevant to this inquiry. It is important to clarify, however, that this study is not concerned with 'proving' or empirically illustrating these concepts. As mentioned, this study is primarily an intellectual exercise in uncovering the evolutionary path of China's proclaimed RGP identity. To this end, examining some of the ways in which ideas such as international responsibility—in particular, great power responsibility—and international identity have been defined and understood might be helpful in providing conceptual reference points for this study of the RGP identity.

Responsibility in International Relations

How states should conceive their responsibilities in international politics is an issue not easily shorn from controversy or contestation. After all, it could be argued that it is not possible to have a truly impartial understanding of responsibility, which is essentially political.[20] Despite the difficulties, nevertheless, it is possible to identify at least three interrelated interpretations of the idea of responsibility in international relations.

The first involves thinking about responsibility from the prism of a liberal solidarist society of states. Solidarism, as Andrew Hurrell puts it, strives for a critical mass of states that is capable of addressing the moral and

[20] Toni Erskine, 'Locating Responsibility: The Problem of Moral Agency in International Relations,' in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 699-706.

political questions of the world.[21] It stresses the prioritisation of 'common [shared] values and some notion of the common good' in international society.[22] In this perspective, a state is seen to be morally and normatively accountable to the community of states of which it is a member. From the vantage point of liberal solidarism, this means a responsible state adheres or contributes to the core values and norms of a liberalist international society; conversely, a state runs the risk of being labelled as 'irresponsible,' or worse, faces the prospect of sanctions and diplomatic exclusion if it refuses to accept or abide by these norms.[23] In the post-Cold War era, these have increasingly reflected ideas such as human rights, human security and democratic governance.[24]

The second approach is what may be termed as a pluralist conception of responsibility, championed by scholars such as Robert Jackson. As opposed to the 'value consensus' striven for by liberal solidarism, pluralism emphasises the ethos of difference and toleration in world affairs. At the heart of the pluralist view is the acceptance of the particular, giving precedence to norms such as sovereign equality, non-intervention and non-use of force. Accordingly, state responsibility translates into what Jackson calls the morality of 'tending your own patch,' based on the argument that 'if all countries are responsible for their own affairs, the world will be a better place

[21] Andrew Hurrell, *On Global Order: Power, Values and the Constitution of International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 5.
[22] Foot, 'Chinese Power and the Idea of a Responsible State,' p. 2.
[23] Hurrell, *On Global Order*.
[24] Ibid; Cathal J. Nolan, 'Introduction,' in Cathal J. Nolan, ed., *Power and Responsibility in World Affairs: Reformation versus Transformation* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2004), pp. 1-3; Thomas W. Pogge, *World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002).

than if certain powerful countries convinced of the superiority of their values are responsible' not only to themselves but also for the affairs of other nations.[25] The pluralist view of responsibility is thus uncomfortable with the interplay of power and values in international society and prefers the more traditional understanding of global order that had been reflected in the formation of the United Nations (UN). Proponents argue the pluralist view is more justifiable because of a legal basis in the form of Article 2, Article 51 and Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which codifies the principles of non-intervention, sovereignty and territorial integrity. To them, the pursuit of a liberal normative agenda that transcends national boundaries (even if well-intentioned) is dangerous—and ultimately irresponsible.[26]

Great Powers and Great Power Responsibility

A third way of conceptualisation is premised on a hierarchal understanding of responsibility, the notion of great power responsibility. This is the belief that responsibility in international affairs cannot be divorced from the power status of a state, and that the 'heaviest' or largest share of global responsibilities rests in the hands of the great powers.[27] Yet, what constitutes a 'great power' in international society is hardly a straightforward issue—

[25] Robert H. Jackson, 'Sovereignty as a Doctrine of Moderation,' in Cathal J. Nolan, ed., *Power and Responsibility in World Affairs: Reformation versus Transformation* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2004), p. 71.
[26] Ibid, pp. 60-75.
[27] G.R. Berridge and John W. Young, 'What is a Great Power?' *Political Studies*, Vol. XXXVI (1988), p. 228; Cathal J. Nolan, 'The Evolution of Great Power Rights and Responsibilities,' in Cathal J. Nolan, ed., *Power and Responsibility in World Affairs: Reformation versus Transformation* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2004), pp. 15-32.

even if it may seem to some as fairly axiomatic or a matter of 'common sense'—and differing interpretations abound. For Kenneth Waltz, great powers are the 'units of greatest capability' in a self-help system, the ones that 'set the scene of action for others as well as themselves.'[28] In some ways, Waltz's materialist definition is roughly similar to Martin Wight's estimation of great powers as those states with markedly wider strength and resources as compared to other states. But unlike Waltz, who has little to say about the obligations that these material advantages entail, Wight points out that precisely because only great powers possess these unique conditions, the burden of 'settling' international affairs must necessarily fall upon them. That is why a model great power, in Wight's view, is also a 'Great Responsible.'[29]

Hedley Bull sees great powers in similar terms, noting that these are actors that clearly possess a clear preponderance in power. But here, Bull's understanding goes beyond a materialist explanation to also incorporate a social dimension. According to Bull, great powers are those powers:

> recognised by others to have, and conceived by their leaders and peoples to have, certain special rights and duties. Great powers, for example, assert the right, and accorded the right, to play a part in determining issues that affect the peace and security of the international system as a whole. They accept the duty, and are thought by others to have the duty, of

[28] Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 198.
[29] Martin Wight, *Power Politics* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1979), pp. 43-44.

> modifying their policies in the light of the managerial responsibilities they bear.[30]

Bull's interpretation thus stipulates the additional condition of social recognition to ascertain whether or not a state qualifies as a great power. This perspective implies that great power identity is essentially a 'reciprocal construction composed of the interplay between a state's view of itself and the view of it held by the other members of international society.'[31] Such a definition would hence exclude those that may have certain front-rank qualities in the economic and/or military arenas but were not afforded great power recognition by others.

Bull's purpose of invoking a recognition dimension to the notion of a great power lies in his conviction that great powers encompass special 'system' responsibilities. These obligations require great powers to take into account 'the interests and the views' of others in their policies, and more importantly, to define their interests 'widely enough to encompass the preservation of an international system in which the bulk of member states regard themselves as having a stake.'[32] In other words, the primary responsibility of a great power should be to help support and sustain the international order. To this moral aim, Bull suggests that great powers have a responsibility to (i) properly manage relations among themselves and to (ii)

---

[30] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 3rd Edition, 2002), p. 196.
[31] Barry Buzan, The *United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty-First Century* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), p. 61; Michael Alan Brittingham, 'China's Contested Rise: Sino-America Relations and the Social Construction of Great Power Status,' in Guo Sujian and Hua Shiping, eds., *New Dimensions of Chinese Foreign Policy* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007), pp. 83-108.
[32] Hedley Bull, 'The Great Irresponsibles? The United States, the Soviet Union, and World Order,' *International Journal*, Vol. 35 (1979-1980), pp. 437-447.

use their overwhelming superiority in capabilities to give some level of 'central direction' to international society.[33] Here, there are hints of pluralist and solidarist thinking in the Bullian conception of great power responsibility. In some ways, the notion that great powers have to manage interstate relations well is an implicit recognition of the plurality (e.g. powers with differing value systems) that exists in international life. At the same time, great powers do not possess unlimited influence, which is why they may need some level of solidarity to maintain international order. This solidarity, Bull suggests, can either be in the form of some agreement on a division of global responsibilities or joint great power responsibility in common policies.[34] One contemporary version of the kind of great power solidarity envisaged by Bull is the American stakeholder idea, which calls for joint US-China responsibilities in sustaining international order.

But going beyond the Bullian definition, perhaps the most visible appearance of great power responsibility today is embodied in permanent membership of the UN Security Council. The Security Council is the only international institution vested with the mandate to authorise the use of armed force in the event of a deemed threat, breach or act of aggression to international peace and security. However, because in practice the Security Council is dominated by its permanent members, this means that the Permanent Five are essentially the core countries with the responsibility of

[33] Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, p. 200.
[34] To be certain, Bull recognises that great power solidarity is not mandatory for global order. Great powers can also contribute to global order through unilaterally exercising their 'local preponderance.' See ibid, pp. 207-220.

maintaining international peace and security.[35] Institutionally, moreover, only Permanent Five members possess the right of veto, maintaining among themselves some semblance of a balance of power that is important for the stability of great power relations.[36] This implies a responsibility for the Permanent Five to use their veto prudently and wisely.

International Identity

This study engages the notion of international identity to analyse China as a responsible great power. By international identity, I am referring to a state's sense of its place or role in the international system. This is a conception of identity that is essentially statist in ontology. Here, I draw on Lowell Dittmer and Samuel Kim's characterisation of a country's identity as a structure of ideas stratified by the interdependent tiers of state and society. At the top of this structure are state elements such as 'policies, principles, "basic lines" and world views' of governing/policy-relevant elites while the lower and broader tier embodies the collective perspectives, values and beliefs of the larger societal body.[37] International identity, as interpreted in this study, is analytically situated at the top tier of Dittmer and Kim's structure, i.e. the level of the state. Hence, it does not correspond to some national or cultural

[35] Indeed, Gerry Simpson argues that the Security Council permanent membership amounts to 'legalised hegemony.' See Gerry Simpson, *Great Powers and Outlaw State: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 62-90.
[36] Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, pp. 201-202.
[37] Lowell Dittmer and Samuel Kim, 'In Search of a Theory of National Identity' in Lowell Dittmer and Samuel Kim, eds., *China's Quest for National Identity* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 24-27. Rodney Bruce Hall critiques mainstream IR theories for failing to 'delineate [the state] from the nation.' See Rodney Bruce Hall, *National Collective Identity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 4.

solidarity group per se, a characterisation centred at the societal level. This relates to the fact that, 'to the extent that only a small elite is actively involved in national and foreign affairs,' the identity of a country—especially one pertaining to the international domain—is primarily mediated or directed by its elites.[38] This is not to imply that international identity stands in isolation from societal forces. Depending on the political context, the views of elites can often reflect the sentiments of the broader society. Elite perceptions and societal sentiments are not mutually exclusive and in various issues of national concern, they are often congruent or overlapping.[39]

The logic of the Self and Other will be used to inform this study's understanding of state identity formation. The parsimonious explanation is that identity is mutually constructed by the Self and Other. As a reference point for the Self, the Other is the external source of role ideas for the Self. Role ideas from the Self and Other thus interact in a fluid process to impart form and content to one's identity. In relation to international identity, this means that its formation is a product of the state's self-perception (internal cognition) and social learning from other states (external learning) about its role in international society. The Self-Other dialectic has been theorised and used widely in various social science disciplines, so this study is employing an identity framework that has substantial intellectual foundations.

[38] Michael Ng-Quinn, 'National Identity in Premodern China: Formation and Role Enactment,' in Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, eds., *China's Quest for National Identity* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).

[39] In fact, as Robert Putnam's 'two-level games' show, elite perceptions are often beholden to societal pressures (especially in liberal democracies). See Robert D. Putnam, 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,' *International Organisation*, Vol. 42 (1988), pp. 427-460.

At this juncture, it is necessary to clarify or explicate a few points regarding the Self-Other dynamic as employed here. For a start, this process does not imply an absence of instrumentality in identity formation. In other words, why a state identifies itself in a certain way in the international system can be a matter of strategic choice or a function of particular interests. This is not to downplay the potential role of other states in socialising and shaping a state's identity. But the agency of the state 'to take a deliberate attitude towards the world and lend it significance' should not be neglected.[40] As Amitav Acharya's work on 'constitutive localisation' demonstrates, states are not passive heirs of external ideas and norms. States have the capacity to adjudicate their role preferences even as these preferences are subjected to external influences.[41] Accordingly, there is no reason why identity formation cannot be 'rationalistic,' i.e. constructed on the basis of interests and purposes as deliberated by the state. Such an epistemological position is similar to what Ernst Haas and Peter Haas have called 'pragmatic constructivism,' reflecting a synthesis of sociological and rationalist approaches in IR.[42]

Second, this study focuses on the United States as the primary significant Other in China's RGP identity. Undoubtedly, there is more than one state that can assume the role of a significant Other in Chinese identity. Japan, for example, is seen as an influential 'victimising Other' in the

[40] John Gerard Ruggie, Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane and Philippe C. Schmitter, 'Transformations in World Politics: The Intellectual Contributions of Ernst B. Haas,' *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 8 (2005), p. 275.
[41] Amitav Acharya, *Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).
[42] Ernst B. Haas and Peter M. Haas, 'Pragmatic Constructivism and the Study of International Institutions,' *Millennium*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (2002), pp. 573-601.

production and sustenance of China's victim self-perception, while North Korea is an important connection in contemporary Chinese socialist identity.[43] Overall, however, in relation to China's place in the international order, the United States is arguably the most critical Other. A 2011 study finds that almost 80% of new research in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), a state-affiliated network of Chinese think-tanks, focuses on topics related to the United States.[44] My field interviews with PRC analysts in Beijing and Shanghai also corroborated the centrality of the US in Chinese estimations.[45] This centrality is underpinned by a number of reasons, of which the most evident is that Beijing perceives the US as the key 'constraint' or 'enabler' of its rise, especially after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.[46] Moreover, as the predominant power in international society, the United States is effectively the gatekeeper to China's aspirations for great power status. Whether Washington recognises Chinese power will have an inexorable impact in the capitals of the world, a social reality that Beijing recognises. The United States is also the main external interlocutor in the RGP discourse: as an instigator and adjudicator of China's global responsibility. These reasons explain why it makes sense for this study to focus on the role of the US, though it must be qualified that this does not imply the exclusion of other less influential external actors in the assessment.

[43] Shogo Suzuki, 'The Importance of "Othering" in China's National Identity: Sino-Japanese Relations as a Stage of Identity Conflicts,' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 20, No.1 (March 2007), pp. 23-47.
[44] John Lee, 'China's America Obsession,' *Foreign Policy*, 6 May 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/05/06/china_s_america_obsession.
[45] Interviews with scholars at Renmin University, Beijing University, Fudan University, China Communication University and Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing and Shanghai, April-June 2011.
[46] Foot and Walter, *China, the United States and Global Order*, p. 19.

My final point relates to the issue of actor behaviour in identity formation. Here, the question of Chinese foreign policy behaviour relates to the extent to which China's identity is reinforced or weakened by its conduct. As findings from identity studies suggest, an actor's behaviour will strive to 'bring meanings in the [encountered] situation into agreement with the meanings in the identity standards.'[47] Behavioural consistency with existing identity standards, therefore, will help strengthen an actor's identity while behavioural discrepancy will weaken it. In other words, a state's behaviour can have implications for its identity. Examining China's actions that are contextually relevant will help provide a more comprehensive account of the RGP identity's development.

Other Possible Identities

Other than the RGP identification, it is possible to observe at least four other mutually non-exclusive Chinese identities in the international system: socialist state, Third World country, developing nation, and victim of history. It will be useful here to briefly review these identities, so as to provide alternative reference points for the discussion of the RGP identity.

The socialist face of China (*shehui zhuyi guojia*) has traditionally been a prominent aspect of its identity in the international milieu, but this has receded in relative importance with the end of Cold War. Such an identity still

[47] Peter J. Burke, 'Identity Change,' *Social Psychology Quarterly*, Vol. 69, No. 1 (2006), p. 86. See also Peter J. Burke and Jan E. Stets, *The Roots of Identity Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 27-32; Teresa Tsushima and Peter J. Burke, 'Levels, Agency, and Control in the Parent Identity,' *Social Psychology Quarterly*, Vol. 62, No. 2 (1999), pp. 173-189.

holds significance within the domestic political context, with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) government deliberately seeking to conflate national identification with 'identification with the Communist leadership.'[48] Many aspects of Chinese society are also still organised around Marxist-Leninist principles even as the PRC has embraced economic capitalism.[49] Nevertheless, in foreign policy, this identity has diminished in relevance. Since the 1990s, Chinese leaders have appeared reluctant to identify China in socialist terms on the international stage other than in reference to its relationship with specific countries, i.e. North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba and Laos.[50]

Like its socialist profile, China's Third World identity (*disan shijie guojia*) has seen a general decline. In the 1960s, in part because of the Sino-Soviet split, Maoist China sought political solidarity with Third World nations—putatively countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. This identification was predicated on a supposed connection with the 'have-nots' and oppressed former colonies of the world, but it also had strategic rewards in the form of garnering a potential support constituency for China in its struggle against

[48] Guoguang Wu, 'Identity, Sovereignty and Economic Penetration: Beijing's Responses to Offshore Chinese Democracies,' *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 16, No. 51 (May 2007), pp. 295-313.
[49] Interview with Renmin University scholar, Beijing, May 2011.
[50] See (i) 'Zhuchaoxian Dashi Liu Hongcai Juxing Qingzhu Jiandang Jiushi Nian Zhaodaihui' [Ambassador to Korea Liu Hongcai Hosts 90th Anniversary Celebration of CCP's Founding], *Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China*, 30 June 2011, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/gjhdq/gj/yz/1206_7/1206x2/t835593.htm; (ii) 'Xi Jinping Huijian Laowo Renmin Gemindang Zhongyang Zong Shuji, Guojia Zhuxi Zhumali' [Xi Jinping Meets the General Secretary of the Lao's People Revolutionary Party and Laos President, Choummaly Sayasone], *Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China*, 16 June 2010, http://www.mfa.gov.cn/chn/gxh/tyb/zyxw/t709247.htm; (iii) 'Jia Qinglin Huijian Yuenan Guojia Zhuxi Chen Deliang' [Jia Qinglin Meets Vietnam's President Tran Duc Luong], *Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China*, 23 March 2006, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/gjhdq/gj/yz/1206_45/xgxw/t241881.htm; and (iv) 'Zhou Yongkang Zaijing Huijian Guba Guohui Guowu Weiyuan Fuzhuxi Jian Neizheng Buzhang' [Zhou Yongkang Meets Cuban State Council Vice-Chairman and Interior Minister], *Xinhua*, 30 August 2010.

the global status quo.[51] It persisted in the 1970s, as shown by the official announcement of Mao's Three Worlds Theory at the United Nations General Assembly Sixth Special Session in 1974.[52] But with the passing of Maoist China by the late 1970s, the Third World identity became increasingly unviable to Beijing. It raised inevitable tensions with Chinese strategies of reform, which emphasised accommodation with the international status quo in order to join the ranks of those outside of the Third World. China's sense of pride in its civilisational greatness also continued to weaken any imagined association with the unglamorous category of the Third World. Unsurprisingly, Peter Van Ness notes that since the 1980s, China has wanted to 'escape from being Third World.'[53] That said, Chinese Third World identity has not followed a linear path to irrelevance. Although its relative importance has waned, Beijing has not been averse to its strategic invocation on select occasions. For example, in the wake of international sanctions after the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, Beijing had been quick to articulate an identification with the Third World, depicting itself as a target of oppression by Western 'neo-imperialism.'[54] Beijing has also been keen to promote a Third World identity centred on 'non-Westernness' in its diplomacy with Africa, in part to

[51] Peter Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), pp. 15-18. See also Alaba Ogunsanwo, *China's Policy in Africa 1958-1971* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 71.
[52] Xie Yixian, *Zhongguo Dangdai Waijiao Shi [Modern Chinese Diplomatic History]*, (Beijing: Zhongguo Qingnian Chubanshe, 2002), pp. 290-291.
[53] Peter Van Ness, 'China as a Third World State: Foreign Policy and Official National Identity,' in Lowell Dittmer and Samuel Kim, eds., *China's Quest for National Identity* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 212.
[54] Ibid, pp. 211-212.

boost its growing economic and energy agenda there and in part to cultivate a support constituency potentially valuable in multilateral settings.[55]

China as a developing nation (*fazhan guojia*) is a profile that has been comparatively more consistent in Chinese identity discourses. Objective reality informs this: despite its rapid economic growth, the PRC is still lagging behind in a number of international development measures (e.g. gross national income per capita, degree of urbanisation, level of poverty) while the 2010 UN Human Development Index ranked China 89th out of 169 countries.[56] It is often the case that the developing country identity is conflated with China's Third World characterisation, but ideationally, they are not entirely coterminous. Increasingly, the developing nation discourse is often more about China's level of economic development than an imagined solidarity based on bloc politics. Of course, all Third World countries are also developing nations, but when Chinese developing nation identity is evoked these days, it is not necessarily implying a political connection with the Third World and refers more to the fact that China is not yet a rich country.[57] This distinction should not be ignored.

---

[55] Scarlett Cornelissen and Ian Taylor, 'The Political Economy of China and Japan's Relationship with Africa: A Comparative Perspective,' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (2000), pp. 615-633.

[56] *Human Development Report 2010* (United Nations Development Programme, 2010), p. 4. Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/.

[57] As former foreign minister Qian Qichen describes it, to say that a country is a developing nation is to point out that 'its economy is less developed and is in the process of moving from a traditional economy to a modern one.' Qian cited in Qi Pengfei, *Zhongguo Gong Chandang Yu Danddai Zhongguo Waijiao [Chinese Communist Party and Modern China's Diplomacy]*, (Beijing: Zhonggong Dangshi Chubanshe, 2010), p. 252. Xiao Huanrong similarly notes the distinction between the developing nation identity and the Third World nation concept. See Xiao Huanrong, 'Zhongguo De Daguo Zeren Yu Diqu Zhuyi Zhanlue' [China's Great Power Responsibility and Strategy of Regionalism], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics]*, Vol. 1 (2003), p. 46.

The victim self-perception (*shouhaizhe*) draws from China's historical memory of suffering and humiliation at the hands of imperialist powers during the 19th and early 20th centuries. Central to this identity is the national narrative that China had been treated unfairly and badly by outsiders in the past. As William Callahan's work on Chinese national humiliation (*guochi*) discourses and Peter Hay Gries's study of Chinese defensive nationalism show, the victim persona has been a frequently invoked side of China.[58] When the G7 group of developed countries imposed collective sanctions on the PRC in the aftermath of Tiananmen, Deng Xiaoping, the paramount leader, immediately saw these sanctions as reminiscent of the eight-country allied invasion of China at the turn of 19th century.[59] When the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was accidentally bombed by American forces in 1999, a *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily) opinion-editorial instinctively compared the incident to past instances of foreign aggression, declaring that the PRC is not '1899 China' and that 'the Chinese people are not to be bullied.'[60] When Chinese premier Wen Jiabao gave his first press interview as head of the State Council in 2003, one of the first things he said was that 'the [war] suffering of Old China had left an indelible imprint' on him.[61] These are just some examples of how a

[58] William A. Callahan, *China: The Pessoptimist Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Peter Hays Gries, *China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).
[59] Deng Xiaoping, 'Zhenxing Zhongguo Mingzhu' [Rejuvenate the Chinese Nation], in *Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan Disanjuan [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume III]*, (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1993), p. 357.
[60] Han Zhongkun, 'Zhongguo bushi yibajiujiu' [This is not 1899 China], *Renmin Ribao [People's Daily]*, 12 May 1999.
[61] 'Guowu Yuan Zhongli Yu Zhongwai Jizhe Jianmian Hui' [State Council Premier's Press Conference with Chinese and Foreign Reporters], *Xinhua*, 18 March 2003.

particular understanding of history—the victimised China—has continued to colour contemporary Chinese worldviews.

Why such a negative identity persists after the establishment of 'new' China, the People's Republic, is a question that has interested several scholars. An 'English School' approach might underscore the role of international society which normatively, China has never been fully part of, even today. During much of the Cold War years, it was essentially alienated from international society while in the reform period, integration with international society has not been an easy process. These experiences, when they sometimes imply an unequal status vis-à-vis Western powers or an 'international pariah' status, can lend to a sense of injustice in China.[62] Meanwhile, a more endogenous explanation might point to the role of the Chinese state in reinforcing the victim complex. A prime example is Beijing's efforts, since the 1990s, to make national humiliation history a more integral part of the official teaching curriculum and mass 'patriotic' education.[63] We should also not forget the impact of popular nationalism on Chinese victim perceptions. The starting point of many nationalist websites and forums as well as popular books such as *China Can Say No* and *China Is Not Happy* is that the country has to stand up for itself more in the international arena if it is to avoid being bullied.[64]

---

[62] Shogo Suzuki, 'The Importance of "Othering" in China's National Identity,' pp. 33-36; See also Jia Qingguo, 'Disrespect and Distrust: The External Origins of Contemporary Chinese Nationalism,' *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 14, No. 42 (2005), p. 20; Yongjin Zhang, *China in International Society since 1949: Alienation and Beyond* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 248-249.
[63] Callahan, *China: The Pessoptimist Nation*, pp. 31-52.
[64] Song Qiang, Zhang Cangcang, Qiao Bian and Gu Qingsheng, *Zhongguo Keyi Shuobu [China Can Say No]*, (Beijing: Zhonghua Gongshang Lianhe Chubanshe, 1996); and Song Xiaojun, Wang

In highlighting the possible Chinese identities other than the RGP self-characterisation, it is worth remembering that this study is not about answering the question 'What is China's identity writ large?' Rather, the focus is on answering: What is China's identity as a responsible great power? As with Callahan, Gries and others' exploration of the victim Self of China, my aim is to illuminate its RGP side.

Yet, in seeking to do so, there is a need to be mindful that the various faces of China do not exist in isolation: to varying degrees, they are interrelated and are linked. To understand China's RGP identity, we also need to understand its points of intersection with other Chinese identities. For instance, the relationship between the responsible great power and victim identities is not entirely contradictory. Some Chinese scholars see the RGP identity as a response to the victim role, arguing that because of China's experience as a victim of hegemonic forces, it would never seek to be a hegemonic force itself; it would be 'harmonious' and responsible.[65] A similar dynamic is also reflected in the common Chinese 'victim' slogan 'Never Forget National Humiliation (*Wuwang Guochi*).' It is typically followed by the statement 'Rejuvenate China (*Zhenxing Zhonghua*),' which implies a revival and pursuit of Chinese great power identity.[66]

Xiaodong, Wang Jisu, Song Qiang and Liu Yang, *Zhongguo Bu Gaoxing [China is Not Happy]*, (Jiangsu: Renmin Chubanshe, 2009).

[65] For example, Jin Canrong argues that one key idea underpinning China's RGP identity is the notion of 'independent diplomacy,' which is especially 'precious' in view of 'Chinese historical experience of foreign encroachment and slavery.' See Jin Canrong, *Daguo De Zeren [Big Power's Responsibility]*, (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe, 2011), pp. 24-25. For a similar view, see Shi Yinhong, 'Chengjiu Yu Tiaozhan: Zhongguo Heping Fazhan, Hexie Shijie He Guoji Zeren' [Achievements and Challenges: China's Peaceful Development, Harmonious World and International Responsibility], *Guoji Wenti Luntan [International Review]*, Vol. 1 (2008), p. 24.

[66] Callahan, *China: The Pessoptimist Nation*, pp. 14-16.

Research Methodology

How should this study approach the mapping of the RGP identity in a way that is both systematic and rigorous? My methodological choice is to employ interpretive genealogy.[67] Interpretive genealogy refers to the reflexive charting and assessment of the 'present in terms of its past.' Its main task is not to merely detail the past, but to 'describe how the present became logically possible.'[68] In some ways, interpretive genealogy may be described as ideational process-tracing, in that it seeks to flesh out and interpret the 'intervening steps' that account for the emergence and development of an existing conception, but doing so in a narrative approach.[69] A distinguishing feature of the genealogical approach is that it is 'episodical.' The aim, therefore, is not to assess the past as a whole, but to organise the assessment in terms of episodes that are 'crucial to [the] understanding' of the present.[70] The genealogical method has already been employed effectively to trace and explain the evolution of political ideas, as exemplified by, *inter alia*, Jens Bartelson's study of sovereignty and Srdjan Vucetic's work on the identity of the 'Anglosphere.'[71] This suggests that it will be equally useful in helping

[67] Interpretive genealogy can be broadly subsumed under the category of 'historical methods' in international relations. See Joel Quirk, 'Historical Methods,' in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 518-536.
[68] Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 7-8.
[69] Alexander George, 'The Causal Nexus between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision Making Behaviour: The "Operational Code",' in Lawrence Falkowski, ed., *Psychological Models in International Politics*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 113-119; Richard Price, 'A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo,' *International Organisation*, Vol. 49, No. 1 (1995), pp. 73-103; Sarah Percy, *Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 32-41.
[70] Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, p. 8.
[71] Ibid; See Srdjan Vucetic, *The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of a Racialised Identity in International Relations* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).

understand China's declared identity as a responsible great power, an ideational outcome.

A considerable part of the genealogical tracing involves the study of discourse, which entails the 'qualitative and interpretive recovery of meaning from the language that actors use to describe and understand social phenomena.'[72] Why discourse? Identity is physically unobservable, but it is given form and content by discourse in three interrelated ways: first, discourse is essentially the medium by which social reality is constructed. Discourse, with its associated language and symbols, transmits meaning to real world phenomena. Second, discourse is 'productive' of things, in that it helps define or makes distinct certain positions while excluding others.[73] Third, discourse, as part of speaking, is a key aspect of the agency of the actor.[74] As Charlotte Epstein notes, 'social actors are first and foremost speaking actors.'[75] In essence, identity is captured by the identity discourses that concretise it.

For this study's context, the relevant discourses are those that relate to domestic elite ideas and debates about China's global role or place. By paying close attention to when, what and how domestic elites have thought about their country's international role, it is possible to reconstruct collectively-held perceptions of the state Self.

---

[72] Rawi Abdelal, Yoshiko Herrara, Alastair Iain Johnston and Rose McDermott, 'Identity as a Variable,' in Rawi Abdelal, Yoshiko Herrara, Alastair Iain Johnston and Rose McDermott, eds., *Measuring Identity: A Guide for Social Scientists* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 6.
[73] Jennifer Milliken, 'The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods,' *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1999), p. 229.
[74] Here, the term 'speaking' is used in a broad sense and refers to the written word as well.
[75] Charlotte Epstein, 'Who Speaks? Discourse, the Subject and the Study of Identity in International Relations,' *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (2010), p. 343.

An unavoidable question at this point is: whose discourse? In particular, who are the domestic elites whose identity discourses this study should track? Concerning this, there are basically two levels of examination. The first is the obvious choice of party leaders and senior government officials in the Chinese foreign policymaking system. Primarily, this would comprise (i) members of the Party Politburo and its Standing Committee, the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group, and the Central Committee Foreign Affairs Office; (ii) senior leaders in the People's Liberation Army; and (iii) senior officials in relevant state organs, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce. Major foreign policy decisions are usually made at the level of the Politburo Standing Committee and the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group.[76] But as a whole, foreign policymaking in China is a much broader process and multiple stakeholders exist and work together within the political and policy setup. This also suggests that, insofar as official policymaking can be described as broadly collective, some degree of political factionalism or bureaucratic contestation should not be discounted. This study takes into account such dynamics, where relevant.

The second category is university academics and think tank analysts outside of the formal Chinese bureaucracy. There are several Chinese IR scholars who have contributed to domestic debate and discourse on the RGP identity. These include scholars such as Shi Yinhong, Pang Zhongying and Jin Canrong of Renmin University; Wang Jisi, Jia Qingguo, Wang Yizhou and Ye

[76] Interviews with scholars from Renmin University and the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, Beijing and Shanghai, May 2011; November 2011.

Zicheng of Peking University; Pan Zhongqi, Ren Xiao and Chen Zhimin of Fudan University; Qin Yaqing of China Foreign Affairs University; Yan Xuetong of Tsinghua University; Xiao Huanrong of China Communication University; Zhao Tingyang of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Huang Renwei, Hu Jian and Liu Ming of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences; Yang Jiemian and Niu Haibin of the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies; and Men Honghua and Liu Jianfei of the Central Party School.[77] But just how relevant is this second group, i.e. Chinese intellectuals, given that they do not represent the Chinese state per se? From a policymaking context, their views and writings are certainly important. For one, the opinions of Chinese intellectuals are often reflective of official positions in Beijing, representing 'a microcosm of wider thinking in the Chinese leadership.'[78] But more importantly, Chinese intellectuals are becoming increasingly influential in their own right, giving rise to what Xuanli Liao calls 'pluralistic elitism' or what Merle Goldman notes as 'politically-engaged intellectualism.' [79]

---

[77] Some examples of articles by these scholars include Ye Zicheng, 'Zhongguo Shixing Daguo Waijiao Zhanlue Shizai Bixing' [China's Employment of Great Power Diplomatic Strategy is Imperative], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics]*, Vol.1 (2000), pp. 5-10; Niu Haibin, 'Zhongguo Zeren Lun Xilun' [Analysing China Responsibility Theory], *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations]*, Vol. 3 (2007), pp. 46-50; Liu Ming, 'Zhongguo Guoji Zeren Lun Pingxi' [An Assessment of China International Responsibility Theory], *Mao Zedong Deng Xiaoping Lilun Yanjiu [Studies on Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping Theories]*, Vol. 1 (2008), pp. 50-55;Liu Jianfei, 'Zhongguo Zeren Lun Kaoyan Heping Fazhan' [China Responsibility Theory Tests Peaceful Development], *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations]*, Vol. 4 (2007), pp. 22-26; Wang Yizhou, 'Mianxiang 21 Shiji De Zhongguo Waijiao: Sanzhong Xuqiu De Xunzao Ji Pingheng' [Towards Chinese Diplomacy in the 21st Century: Pursuing and Balancing Three Needs], *Zhanlue Yu Guanli [Strategy and Management]*, Vol. 6 (1999), pp. 18-24.

[78] To be sure, even as Chinese intellectual discourses often reflect governmental positions, they are increasingly showing a wider diversity of opinions as compared to the past. See Rana Mitter, 'An Uneasy Engagement: Chinese Ideas of Global Order and Justice in Historical Perspective,' in Rosemary Foot, John Lewis Gaddis, Andrew Hurrell, eds., *Order and Justice in International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 225.

[79] See Xuanli Liao, *Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks and China's Policy Towards Japan* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2006), pp. 15-52; Merle Goldman, 'Politically-Engaged Intellectuals in the 1990s,' *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 159 (1999), pp. 700-711. See as well Yongjin

There are a number of ways by which Chinese intellectuals play important contributory roles in China's foreign policy. For a start, they directly influence policy when they are asked to collaborate with or provide inputs to the Chinese government. Such consultancy roles could be ad hoc where, depending on the international political situation, relevant specialists are invited to brief or submit reports to senior government officials and party leaders.[80] One notable instance of such specialist work was the research report submitted to Chinese president Hu Jintao by Zheng Bijian, the former vice-president of the Central Party School, advocating the idea of the 'development path of China's peaceful rise.' Zheng's recommendations eventually culminated in the formulation of the major foreign policy doctrine of the 'peaceful rise' (*heping jueqi*).[81]

Consultancy work could also be on a more official basis where scholars are appointed to national advisory roles or take part in state policy projects. Examples of scholars in influential advisory positions include Shi Yinhong, who has been appointed as a counsellor to the State Council, and Jia Qingguo, who is a member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) National Committee.[82] In terms of official policy projects, scholars at state-funded think tanks—such as the China Institute of International Studies,

---

Zhang, 'Politics, Culture, and Scholarly Responsibility in China: Toward a Cultural Sensitive Analytical Approach,' *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (2007), pp. 103-124.

[80] Interviews with scholars from Renmin University and the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, Beijing and Shanghai, May 2011; November 2011.

[81] Bonnie Glaser and Evan Medeiros, 'The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy-Making in China: The Ascension and Demise of the Theory of "Peaceful Rise",' *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 190 (2007), pp. 291-310.

[82] See 'Wen Jiabao Yu Xinpingren Guowuyuan Shenshi, Zhongyang Wenshi Yanjiu Guan Guanyuan Zuotan' [Wen Jiabao Talks to Newly Appointed State Councillors and Members of the Central Committee Literature and History Office], *Xinhua*, 14 April 2011.

the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations and the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies—are frequently involved in research work for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Central Committee Foreign Affairs Office.[83] Indeed, there is a growing trend of cross-movement of individuals in the scholarly and bureaucratic spheres. Former senior government officials are often appointed as leaders of think tanks or honorary deans of university departments while academics occasionally move to state ministries or party organs to do formal policy work.[84] In addition, a number of university departments as well as think tanks still retain a Leninist party structure in their organisational setups, which means that some senior scholars assume concurrent leadership roles of party secretaries or vice-secretaries in their respective units.[85]

Meanwhile, Chinese intellectuals exert indirect foreign policy influence when their publications offer policy ideas. Scholars' writings in party journals, academic journals, and their production of policy-oriented reports and books constitute a rich source of knowledge for policy makers and party officials to draw on. Articles in the Chinese IR journal *Guoji Zhanwang (Global Review),* for

[83] The China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) is affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs while the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) is bureaucratically linked to Central Committee Foreign Affairs Office and the Ministry of State Security. Hence, it is not surprising to find that these institutions have collaborative projects with the government and party. See David Shambaugh, 'China's International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structures and Process,' *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 171 (2002), pp. 575-596. The Shanghai Institutes for International Studies also lists the MFA as one of its research clients. See *Shanghai Guoji Wenti Yanjiu Yuan 2010 Niandu Baogao [Shanghai Institutes for International Studies 2010 Annual Report]*, (Shanghai: Shanghai Guoji Wenti Yanjiu Yuan), p. 14.

[84] An example is Pan Zhongqi, Professor of International Relations at Fudan University. For a period of time, he was seconded to the MFA to work as the First Secretary of the PRC's Mission to the European Union.

[85] Notable examples are Pan Shiwei and Qin Yaqing who concurrently hold the posts of party secretaries in their academic organisations (Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences and China Foreign Affairs University respectively).

example, have been used as reference materials for the periodical of the National People's Congress.[86] Another type of indirect policy contribution relates to the unofficial information collection/dissemination role played by intellectuals, especially those based at state-affiliated think tanks. Senior think tank scholars often participate in 'Track-II' policy conferences, receive diplomatic guests from abroad and travel overseas for study trips. These exchanges are a source of intelligence for the Chinese foreign policymaking system; they also act as an unofficial channel for disseminating information or conveying specific messages to foreign policy audiences.[87] Finally, as pundits in the media and authors of popular books, intellectuals can influence the direction and scope of public debate on Chinese foreign policy issues.

Sources

This study relies on Chinese identity discourses to reconstruct the RGP identity and thus draws on sources in the Chinese language. Certainly, there are extant English language publications that are useful for this research, but depending solely on them is inadequate. A further contribution of this study, thus, is that it brings together the extensive range of Chinese data that has thus far been underutilised in research on the RGP identity. Many of these sources are produced primarily for domestic audiences which, as noted earlier, suggests that those who are writing on this topic are less concerned

[86] *Shanghai Guoji Wenti Yanjiu Yuan 2010 Niandu Baogao*, p. 15.
[87] Shambaugh, 'China's International Relations Think Tanks,' p. 576.

about external image building. These sources can be broadly categorised as follows:

Party Publications, Government Reports and Leadership Writings/Autobiographical Accounts

In this area, there are a number of publicly available documentary sources. Examples of such sources are (i) state and party periodicals such as *Liaowang* (Outlook) and *Qiushi* (Seeking Truth); (ii) party-oriented IR books such as *Dangyuan Ganbu Buke Buzhi De Guoji Guanxi Changshi* (International Relations Knowledge that Party Cadres Cannot Not Know, 2011) and *Zhongguo Gongchan Dang Yu Dangdai Zhongguo Waijiao* (Chinese Communist Party and Modern China's Diplomacy, 2010); and (iii) government reports such as State Council White Papers (*Baipi Shu*).

Particular authoritative sources are the writings and autobiographical accounts of former Chinese leaders and diplomats. Books such as *Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan* (Selected Writings of Deng Xiaoping, Volumes I-III, 1993-1994) and *Jiang Zemin Wenxuan* (Selected Writings of Jiang Zemin, Volumes I-III, 2006) as well as autobiographical accounts like *Deng Xiaoping Waijiao Moulue* (Deng Xiaoping's Foreign Policy Strategy, 2008) and *Jiang Zemin Chuan* (The Legend of Jiang Zemin, 2005) are rich sources of statements by former leaders. Equally valuable are those personal memoirs of former diplomats, which offer interesting insights into China's diplomatic positions and the thinking behind them. Some examples are Chen Youwei's *Tiananmen*

Shijian Hou Zhongguo Yu Meigui Waijiao Neimu (After Tiananmen: The Inside Stories of Sino-US Diplomacy, 1999); Qian Qichen's *Waijiao Shiji* (Ten Episodes in China's Diplomacy, 2003); Wu Jianmin's *Waijiao Anlie* (Case Studies in Diplomacy, 2007); and Zeng Jianhui's *Yihui Waijiao* (Congress Diplomacy, 2005).

Academic Books

There are growing numbers of Chinese works that explore themes related to the RGP identity. Books that directly discuss the issues of China's responsibility include Jin Canrong's *Daguo De Zeren* (Great Power's Responsibility, 2011); the edited volume *Guoji Zeren Yu Daguo Zhanlue* (International Responsibility and Great Power Strategy, 2008) by Pan Zhongqi; and Hu Jian's *Jiaose Zeren Chengzhang Lujing* (Role, Responsibility and Growing Path, 2010). For works that probe the related themes of China's great power role, China's international leadership, and its role in global governance, there are among others, Yang Jiemian's *Guoji Weiji Fanhua Yu Zhongmei Gongtong Yingdui* (Proliferation of International Crisis and Sino-US Joint Response, 2010); the *Daguo Ce* (Great Power Policy, 2009) volume series; Xiong Wenchi and Ma Jun's edited monograph *Daguo Fazhan Yu Guoji Daoyi* (Great Power's Development and International Morality, 2009); Yan Xuetong and Xu Qin's *Wangba Tianxia Sixiang Ji Qidi* (Thoughts of World Leadership and Implications, 2009); and Wang Yizhou's *Quanqiu Zhengzhi He Zhongguo Waijiao* (Global Politics and China's Foreign Policy, 2003).

International Relations Journals

There are several international relations journals published in China. While it is difficult to rank them individually, it is possible to approximate the more influential publications for research priority. Arguably, these are (i) *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi* (World Economics and Politics, by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences); (ii) *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu* (International Studies, by the China Institute of International Studies); (iii) *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi* (Contemporary International Relations, by the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations); (iv) *Guoji Zhengzhi Yanjiu* (International Politics Quarterly, by Peking University); (v) *Waijiao Pinglun* (Foreign Affairs Review, by China Foreign Affairs University); and (vi) *Zhanlue Yu Guanli* (Strategy and Management, by the China Society for Strategy and Management).[88] The journals published by the think tanks [especially (ii) and (iii)] tend to be more policy-oriented and can occasionally include articles by senior government officials.[89] But more than that, as David Shambaugh observes, they are often important '"early warning indicators" of policies to come.'[90]

Other than these top-tier journals, relevant IR publications that should also be considered include *Shijie Zhishi* (World Affairs); *Meiguo Yanjiu* (American Studies); *Dangdai Yatai* (Contemporary Asia-Pacific); *Guoji Zhanwang* (Global Review); *Taipingyang Xuebao* (Pacific Journal); *Mao Zedong Deng Xiaoping Lilun Yanjiu* (Studies on Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping

[88] Interview with Shanghai Institutes for International Studies analyst, Shanghai, May 2011.
[89] For instance, the volume 1, 2011 edition of *International Studies* featured an essay by Foreign Affairs Minister Yang Jiechi. See Yang Jiechi, 'Dangqian Guoji Geju De Yanbian He Woguo Waijiao Gongzuo' [Current Changes in International Pattern and China's Diplomatic Work], *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies]*, Vol. 1 (2011), pp. 1-4.
[90] Shambaugh, 'China's International Relations Think Tanks,' p. 581.

Theories); *Shehui Kexue* (Journal of Social Sciences); *Guoji Guancha* (International Observation); *Jiaoxue Yu Yanjiu* (Teaching and Research); and *Guoji Luntan* (International Forum).

Newspapers and Online Portals

Newspapers or news networks such as *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily), *Huanqiu Shibao* (Global Times), China Daily and *Xinhua* are good sources of party and governmental statements. Given that they come under the auspices of the party or the State Council, they are sometimes considered to be the 'mouth pieces' of Beijing. Nevertheless, it is becoming apparent that state/party newspapers are increasingly publishing a wider diversity of commentaries that may not necessarily mirror the official line.

Much information about leader's statements and government positions can also be obtained from official websites such as www.china.org.cn (under State Council Information Office); www.fmprc.gov.cn (under Ministry of Foreign Affairs); www.gov.cn (main government portal); www.npc.gov.cn (portal of the National People's Congress); and cpc.people.com.cn (main CCP portal).

Field Interviews

Interviews with Chinese scholars, especially those that have contributed to the domestic debate on the RGP identity, help supplement existing documentary evidence, adding depth and nuance to the research. For this

study, I interviewed several resident scholars (as well as one senior bureaucrat) in China. Based at the state-affiliated think tanks, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS) and Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS), during my field trips, the institutional connections facilitated my contact with and access to people helpful for my project.[91] It also allowed me to observe first-hand the structure and practices of Chinese think tanks. In view of the practice of interview confidentiality (unless prior permission given), the study presents the views of those interviewed on an anonymised basis, sharing at most their institutional affiliations.

Structure

Following the introductory chapter, Chapter 2 provides the historical context to this study's inquiry, surveying early Chinese ideas of national greatness and obligation. Engaging this history is crucial to telling a complete story and serves as a basis for a more historically informed discussion of the RGP identity thereafter.

The remaining parts of the study are concerned with the contemporary empirical process and evolution of China's proclaimed RGP identification. The investigation is chronicled in three timeframes: 1978-1996; 1997-2004; and 2005-2012. Chapter 3 focuses on the period from 1978 to 1996. While it is argued that the genesis of China's RGP identity can be traced to the time between the early 1990s to the mid-1990s, the fact is that since 1978 and the

[91] I was the recipient of visiting fellowships at SASS and SIIS from March to May 2011 and from September to December 2011 respectively.

promotion of reform and opening-up policies by Deng Xiaoping, there has been a radical shift in China's international orientation. Given that identity is an evolutionary process, it is negligent to delineate an understanding of the RGP identity without at least some reference to preceding events. This clarifies why it is germane that Chapter 3 starts its discussion from 1978 onwards.

Chapters 4 and 5 plot and explain the development of the RGP identity in the periods 1997-2004 and 2005-2012 respectively. The years 1997 and 2005 are chosen as critical points in China's RGP trajectory because these are the junctures that have been observed to be particularly consequential in terms of subsequent expansion of RGP discourses. The year 1997 marked the onset of the Asian financial crisis, an event which led to palpably increased self-justification and regional appreciation of China as a responsible power because of Chinese actions to maintain the value of its currency, a move seen to be stabilising for neighbouring economies. For the year 2005, it represents the start of another marked proliferation of domestic RGP discourses, seemingly in response to the responsible stakeholder idea promoted by the US government. Of course, there have been other events or periods that are important to the RGP identity, but the years 1997 and 2005 stand out as distinctive analytical points for this research. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes this study by reviewing the main research findings. It also considers some key implications in light of the findings.

CHAPTER TWO

China's Responsible Great Power Identity in Historical Perspective

The aim of this chapter is to explore and sketch the historical antecedents of China's proclaimed identity as a responsible great power. The discussion spans the imperial epoch to the end of the Maoist era. It also examines Chinese elite perceptions of their nation's great power identity and the idea of responsibility, both as separate phenomena and in terms of their potential interlinkages. I begin with a historical survey of the great power aspects of the RGP identity while in the second part I focus on the idea of responsibility.

There are two important caveats to state upfront. First, even as this chapter seeks to locate the historical facets of the RGP identity, it does not attempt or pretend to be an in-depth historical review. As pointed out in the introduction, the main intention of this chapter is to provide a contextualisation of China's RGP identity from a historical perspective, serving as the basis for a more informed, contemporary discussion of the RGP identity thereafter. Second, my focus is on the great power and responsibility elements of China's identity, and not China's identity on the whole. This is not to suggest the exclusion of potentially contradictory identity discourses (such as a 'weak China' complex). To the extent that such discourses are contextually relevant and share linkages with Chinese great power perceptions, they are necessarily discussed.

Great Power Dimension in Chinese History

Imperial China: Great Central Kingdom

For considerable periods in Chinese traditional history, Chinese ruling classes and elites had tended to perceive their nation as the 'great central kingdom.'[1] This was the so-called Central Kingdom complex, predicated on a sinocentric understanding of China as 'all [realms] under heaven (*tianxia*).'[2] China, according to this conception, was not just a glorious and powerful civilisation—it was essentially the only veritable civilisation around, since it was geographically convergent with 'heaven' and it was difficult to think of any civilised equivalents existing outside of this boundary.[3] As a corollary, the Chinese emperor was also the 'Son of Heaven (*tianzi*)' and had the supposed celestial right to preside over 'all of human affairs.'[4] The *Book of Odes* would hence write, 'Under the wide heaven, there is no land that is not the Emperor's (*putian zhixia, mofei wangtu*)…'[5]

Imperial China, from the Central Kingdom perspective, was thus more than just a great power. It was the world's greatest power, a 'world empire'—to borrow the words of Immanuel Wallerstein—one in which sense of the

[1] Zi Zhongyun, 'The Impact and Clash of Ideologies: Sino-US Relations from a Historical Perspective,' *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 6, No. 16 (1997), pp. 531-536.
[2] While the term 'Middle Kingdom' is commonly used, this chapter uses the transliteration which scholars such as Zhang Tiejun and Zi Zhongyun have adopted: 'Central Kingdom.'
[3] The concept of *tianxia* gained further expression and content in the form of the *wufu* (five areas) theory during the Han dynasty. Based on the *wufu* theory, the Central Kingdom was basically divided into five realms: the centre came under the emperor's direct control while the remaining four were mainly administered by the imperial court. See Zhang Tiejun, 'Self-Identity Construction of the Present China,' *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 23 (2004), pp. 281-301; Yongjin Zhang, 'System, Empire and State in Chinese International Relations,' *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 27 (2001), p. 53.
[4] Samuel Kim, *China, the United Nations and World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 20.
[5] Immanuel Hsu, *The Rise of Modern China* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 6

Chinese polity overlapped with the idea of the world.[6] In other words, in the Central Kingdom outlook, China was essentially coterminous with the world. As for peoples who fell outside of this world, they were typically tarred with the inferior civilisational label of 'barbarians' (*yi*). This denigration of foreigners as *yi* meant that in the Chinese imperial order, there was little justification or need for an institution that performed a dedicated, interstate-style, foreign affairs function.[7] The authoritative Confucian *Book of Rite*s, in fact, explicitly instructed that 'the officials of the Empire shall have no intercourse with foreigners.'[8]

It is important to recognise that the Central Kingdom conception should be understood with a certain degree of abstraction and generalisation. For a start, it would be facile to characterise the Central Kingdom outlook as being uniform or prevalent across all dynastic periods. There had been various instances in Chinese history when China had been less than politically unitary and had been segmented into various feudal states (e.g. the Warring States period from 476-221 B.C. or the Three Kingdoms era from 220-264). Ironically, the idea of the Central Kingdom was said to have originated during the period of the Zhou dynasty when China had a nominal central government and was effectively a collection of feudal states along the Yellow

[6] Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origin of the European World Economy in the 16th Century* (London: Academic Press, 1974); Warren Cohen, 'China's Rise in Historical Perspective,' *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol.30, No. 4-5 (2007), pp. 683-687.
[7] Kim, *China, the United Nations and World Order*, p. 24; Zhang, 'System, Empire and State in Chinese International Relations,' p. 55.
[8] Werner Levi, *Modern China's Foreign Policy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1953), p. 4.

river.[9] Moreover, China, even when politically unified, waxed and waned in territory and power throughout the course of its pre-modern history: from around its peak during the Han, Tang and early Qing dynasties to approximately its smallest during the Northern and Southern Song times.[10]

Second, the sinocentricity implied in the Central Kingdom perspective was, on numerous occasions, more form than substance. As Rana Mitter has written, 'There is a great deal of evidence which shows that pre-modern Chinese in reality regarded themselves as being part of a much flatter hierarchical system than their own rhetoric suggests.'[11] Tang China, for example, pursued considerable trading relations with foreigners while during this period, Chinese external trade extended across the Indian Ocean to as far as the African coast.[12] Early Qing China also did not hesitate to sign the Treaty of Nerchinsk with the Russians in 1689, a diplomatic *demarche* that basically denoted tacit recognition of Russian equality.[13] These two historical exemplars are even more striking if one considers that Tang and early Qing China represented arguably the height of Chinese prestige and power when, presumably, sinocentrism should be at its corresponding acme. Meanwhile, during periods when Chinese power declined or when strategic priorities shifted, it was also not uncommon to find the imperial government initiating

[9] Kim, *China, the United Nations and World Order*, p. 21.
[10] Ong Siew Chey, *China Condensed: 5000 Years of History & Culture* (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish International, 2005), pp. 1-82.
[11] Rana Mitter, 'An Uneasy Engagement: Chinese Ideas of Global Order and Justice in Historical Perspective,' in Rosemary Foot, John Lewis Gaddis and Andrew Hurrell, eds., *Order and Justice in International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 209.
[12] Historically, the Tang dynasty was known for its 'extroverted' and cosmopolitan nature. Michael Hunt, 'Chinese Foreign Relations in Historical Perspective,' in Harry Harding, ed., *China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 6-7; Ong, *China Condensed*, p. 60.
[13] Mitter, 'An Uneasy Engagement.'

a policy of 'matrimonial alliances and sending of gifts' to appease truculent foreign tribes along its northern and western fronts.[14] The historical account of 'political bride' Wang Zhaojun marrying a tribal warlord in 33 B.C in order to secure peace along the Han borders is one classical case.[15] Lastly, even the tributary system—frequently cited as evidence of a sinocentric Chinese worldview—was in reality more symbolic and titular than commonly assumed.[16] This is not to imply that tributary relations did not represent a sense of Chinese civilisational superiority; they certainly did and as Samuel Kim pointed out, such tributary relations were often maintained at some financial cost to the Imperial Court in order to burnish a Chinese image of pre-eminence.[17] Rather, the point is that the Chinese suzerain-vassal dynamic was underpinned by much ritualism and symbolism, and beneath the euphemistic veneer of tributary relations, the substantive arrangement that existed was one which served mainly to regulate trading relationships. To a considerable extent, therefore, the tributary practice was essentially an indirect mode by which the imperial court imposed tariffs on foreigners keen on trading with and in China.[18] Indeed, many of these so-called vassals maintained *de facto* political autonomy vis-à-vis the Central Kingdom, even if

[14] Michael Ng-Quinn, 'National Identity in Premodern China: Formation and Role Enactment,' in Lowell Dittmer and Samuel Kim, eds., *China's Quest for National Identity* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 56.
[15] Ong, *China Condensed*, p. 22.
[16] Michael Hunt, for example, describes the tributary system as instantiating 'unshakeable sinocentrism.' See Hunt, 'Chinese Foreign Relations in Historical Perspective,' p. 6.
[17] In fact, the Imperial Court, paid for all expenditures relating to a tributary envoy's trip to 'pay homage' to the Chinese emperor. See Kim, *China, the United Nations and World Order*, p. 25.
[18] Mitter, 'An Uneasy Engagement.'

some of them had been ostensibly 'subjugated' in the first instance by Chinese military power.[19]

The third point relates to the fact that there had been periods during which Imperial China was in effect governed by 'barbarians' from the north, notably, the Mongols during the Yuan dynasty (1279-1367) and the Manchus during the Qing dynasty (1644-1911). Given the sinocentricism and the Othering of foreign peoples as inferiors, 'alien' rule of China suggested potential complications for the Central Kingdom perception. Yet, this had been hardly the case. Not only did the Central Kingdom outlook continue to persist, it was in fact reinforced and perpetuated during the Mongol and Manchu reigns.[20] Especially for the latter, embrace of the Central Kingdom narrative had not been difficult. In the course of Manchu rule over China, described by John Fairbank as a 'synarchic' regime, the Manchus had become strongly sinicised, to the extent that they became 'staunch champions' of Chinese cultural heritage and political tradition.[21] In that sense, the Manchus, in ruling the Central Kingdom, essentially came to be included within the Chinese civilisational world. [22]

[19] Ng-Quinn, 'National Identity in Premodern China.' See as well Yongjin Zhang and Barry Buzan's argument that the tributary system could be considered a form of historical East Asian international society. Yongjin Zhang and Barry Buzan, 'The Tributary System as International Society in Theory and Practice,' *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 5 (2012), pp. 3-36.
[20] Kim, *China, the United Nations and World Order*, p. 22.
[21] The term 'synarchy' was used to describe the 'joint Sino-Foreign administration' of China. See John Fairbank, 'Synarchy under the Treaties,' in John Fairbank, ed., *Chinese Thought and Institutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 204-231.
[22] As Lyman Miller wrote, '… the ruling Manchu house became so submerged in Chinese traditions of governance as to have lost any distinctive identity apart from the Han Chinese they governed.' See Lyman Miller, 'The Late Imperial Chinese State,' in David Shambaugh, ed., *The Modern Chinese State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 24.

What were some of the factors that helped engendered the Central Kingdom outlook? For one, the material power (both economic and military strength) wielded by the Chinese empire fostered a strong endogenous sense of self-primacy and pre-eminence.[23] Certainly, Chinese power declined and rose at various points but there were significant periods when Imperial China's power was prominent and sustained, such as the Han, Tang, Ming and early Qing eras. According to Yan Xuetong, China had enjoyed 'superpower' status during these phases of Chinese 'high noon.'[24] The material power retained by the Chinese empire for considerable parts of its history meant that it was natural for ruling elites to conceive or assume China as the most significant political force.

Yet, this impression of the centrality and universality of the Chinese state would not have prospered without the belief that there was a lack of a civilisational equivalent that could rival China. This is not to suggest that the Chinese were unaware of other centres of civilisation such as the Byzantine and Persian empires. There was certainly some level of awareness; but constrained by geographical barriers, such inter-civilisational contacts were usually limited or irregular.[25] In any event, when such contacts did take place, they only seemed to the Chinese to affirm the superiority of its sinocentric model. Hence Kim argued: '…the absence of a rival civilisation became a

[23] Wang Gungwu, *China and the World since 1949: The Impact of Independence, Modernity and Revolution* (London: Macmillan Press, 1977), p. 3.
[24] It was also asserted that China accounted for as much as 30% of the world's Gross Domestic Product during the early nineteenth century. See Yan Xuetong, 'The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes,' *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 10, No. 26 (2001), p. 33.
[25] Li Zhaojie, 'Traditional Chinese World Order,' *Chinese Journal of International Law*, Vol. 1, No.1 (2002), p. 20.

potent factor in the development of the Chinese image of world order.'[26] Finally, although the tributary system characterised in many ways the Chinese approach towards commercial relations with outsiders, the symbolism of creating *prima facie* appearance of Chinese superiority was at least helpful for sustaining ruling elite beliefs of Imperial China's pre-eminent position.[27]

In sum, the Central Kingdom complex was the embodiment of pre-modern China's sense of its great power status, an outlook that emphasised the primacy of Chinese power. Of course, the Central Kingdom complex was not a constant or uniform phenomenon and was certainly contextually nuanced. Still, notwithstanding these qualifications, the Central Kingdom complex was a largely recurring theme in pre-modern Chinese state identity and positioned China as the principal political force and hegemon.

Late Qing and Republican China: 'Weak China, Suppressed Greatness'

Moving to the late Qing era, Chinese belief in the superiority of its own model would be fundamentally shaken. Technologically advanced foreign powers from Europe, America and Japan dominated and humiliated China at will, making a mockery of the notion of the 'great central kingdom.'[28] Indeed this period, beginning with the Anglo-Chinese Opium War (1839-1842), marked the start of the so-called century of shame (*bainian guochi*) and the label of

[26] Kim, *China, the United Nations and World Order*, p. 22.
[27] As Michael Ng-Quinn put it, the Chinese need to 'play the role of the suzerain was more psychological than material.' Ng-Quinn, 'National Identity in Premodern China,' pp. 55-56. On the socialisation effects of the tributary system, see Zhang and Buzan, 'The Tributary System as International Society in Theory and Practice,' pp. 18-27.
[28] Cohen, 'China's Rise in Historical Perspective,' pp. 687-691.

great victim rather than great power seemed a far more apt description of China. [29]

The encounters with alien forces, clearly stronger and more developed than the stagnant Qing empire, proved to be a powerful experience for the Chinese, albeit one which was largely traumatic. It was cognitively and emotionally distressing for the Chinese because through these encounters, not only was the idea of the Central Kingdom comprehensively overturned, they illustrated China's swift metamorphosis from 'power to pupil;' it was not even seen or treated as an equal.[30] The arrival of foreign imperialism meant that the Chinese self-perception of the Central Kingdom was to be forcibly re-evaluated and China had little choice but to 'learn' about its new international role—as prescribed by external Others—as a pupil. As Michael Hunt noted, 'much of the impetus' for Chinese self-reflection was the consequence of 'repeated blows struck by foreign powers.'[31]

By the late nineteenth century, there was a growing sentiment among reformist Chinese elites that China had to 'self-strengthen' (*ziqiang*).[32] This advocacy represented a tacit admission by these elites that China had become moribund and that in order to arrest the slide, reform measures were unavoidable. The call for reforms clearly exemplified Chinese sense of

[29] Other labels of China then included the 'sick man of Asia' (*dongya bingfu*) or 'a heap of loose sand' (*yipan sansa*).
[30] William Kirby, 'The Internationalization of China: Foreign Relations at Home and Abroad in the Republican Era,' *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 150 (1997), pp. 433.
[31] Michael Hunt, 'Chinese National Identity and the Strong State: The Late Qing-Republican Crisis,' in Lowell Dittmer and Samuel Kim, eds., *China's Quest for National Identity* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 63-64.
[32] Kim, *China, the United Nations and World Order*, pp. 38-39.

weakness at that time.[33] Yet, there was also a second, more revisionist dimension to the *ziqiang* discourse: that China's weak position was basically anomalous and its tradition of being a strong centralised state demanded a return to its former status. As such, for Qing reformists like Feng Guifen, *ziqiang* was not merely about rectifying China's problems; more than that, it was about restoring China to its original strength, surpassing foreigners and becoming again the 'leading power in the world,' 'the greatest country on earth.'[34] Even among anti-Qing revolutionaries such as Qiu Jin and Song Jiaoren, there existed a sense of a Chinese claim to national greatness. Song, for example, exhorted the Chinese to live up to 'the mighty accomplishments of [their] ancestors over the past five thousand years—in conquest, administration, expansion of [their] national territory, and the elevation of [their] national prestige.'[35] Memories of China's greatness endured among many Chinese political elites even as they were coming to terms with the unwelcome reality of an anaemic China.

This broad perceptual tenor of a weak China with its greatness suppressed was to continue in the Republican era (1912 onwards), by which Chinese elites were becoming increasingly radical in their political outlook. The emerging view among many nationalists then (such as Sun Yatsen) was

[33] By 1898, several reformers led by the late Qing official, Kang Youwei, would insist that China's situation of debility needed more than just 'self-strengthening;' China needed to 'dismantle the building and built anew' and implement a radical and through shake-up of the system. See Hunt, 'Chinese National Identity and the Strong State,' p. 60.
[34] William Theodore De Bary, Wing-Tsit Chan and Burton Watson, *Sources of Chinese Tradition* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), pp. 708-710.
[35] Don Price, *Russia and the Roots of the Chinese Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 181.

that only fundamental 'political renovation' would suffice.[36] In fact, for many of those associated with the momentous May Fourth Movement of 1919, political transformation was not enough: a sweeping societal makeover was also required where, in particular, Confucian tradition, ostensibly representing the cultural and ideological evil responsible for China's decline, had to be jettisoned.[37] At the same time, the growing iconoclastic mood also underscored the fact that Chinese perceptions of a weak China were becoming acute. Sun would describe China as a 'hypo-colony' (*ci zhimingdi*), which was apparently worse than a semi-colony since it was a 'slave to many countries.'[38] This burgeoning sense of China in crisis meant that for many Chinese nationalists, their immediate concern was to 'save China' (*qiu zhongguo*) and avert national ruin. The closely-related, restorative theme of "rejuvenating China" (*zhenxing zhongguo*)—i.e. to 'regain its lost international status'—was also important but was secondary compared to the more exigent aim of national salvation.[39]

In 1928, Chiang Kai-shek established the Nationalist government in Nanjing. While Chiang's regime managed to achieve some degree of political unification and gained diplomatic recognition fairly swiftly, internal conditions remained fundamentally bad. China was still gripped by civil

[36] Hunt, 'Chinese National Identity and the Strong State,' pp. 68-70.
[37] To be sure, there were prominent intellectuals such as Zou Taofen who argued that Confucianism should be adapted rather than cast aside. See Rana Mitter, *A Bitter Revolution: China's Struggle with the Modern World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 14-15; 110-117.
[38] De Bary, Chan & Watson, *Sources of Chinese Tradition*, pp. 768-771.
[39] As Yan Xuetong noted, rejuvenation (*zhenxing*) implied a restoration of 'China's lost international status rather than gaining something new.' See Yan, 'The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes,' p. 34.

conflict and remained effectively a 'de facto federation.'[40] On the external horizon, moreover, the threat of Japan loomed ominously. A perception (both domestic and foreign) of Chinese vulnerability persisted. Chiang certainly shared this view as well, but like many of his peers, Chiang's image of China also encompassed visions of reviving its greatness. Hence amongst the various reasons underpinning the Generalissimo's pursuit of a strong state solution, i.e. 'restore unity and order, end foreign humiliation, abolish unequal treaties, regain lost territory,' a prime motivation for Chiang was to 'ultimately restore China's lost grandeur.'[41]

Interestingly, this sense of grandeur appeared to show some signs of recovery by the time of the Second World War when Nationalist China aligned itself with the Allied camp. Great power aspiration was, of course, not the main reason for Chiang to side with the Allies. It was strategic pragmatism as well as a common enemy in Japan that drove Chiang's government to throw in its lot with the Allies.[42] Indeed, China's contribution to the Allied cause remained limited. Although China was strategically vital to 'keeping Japan divided in a two-front war,' its material weakness vis-à-vis its major Western allies was clear and many American analysts would lament China's 'dubious military value' to the war effort.[43] Considerable military and

[40] Ong, *China Condensed*, p. 87; Mitter, *A Bitter Revolution*, p. 149.
[41] Hunt, 'Chinese National Identity and the Strong State,' p. 68.
[42] Kirby, 'The Internationalization of China,' p. 444.
[43] Michael Alan Brittingham, 'China's Contested Status: Sino-US Relations,' in Guo Sujian & Hua Shiping, eds., *New Dimensions of Chinese Foreign Policy* (Lexington Books, 2007), p. 94; Michael Schaller, *The US Crusade in China, 1938-1945* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), pp. 89-90.

financial aid from the United States was needed 'just to keep [the Chiang regime] afloat.'[44]

Yet, as the war wore on, China's patent material shortcomings did not deter the Americans from taking the lead in symbolically inducting China into the great power club. Indeed, this appeared to be a key US policy. As Secretary of State Cordell Hull would relate in his memoirs, it was a US foreign policy objective to recognise and build China 'as a major power entitled to equal rank with the three big Western Allies, Russia, Britain, and the United States.'[45] China was thus able to take part in the Washington and Quebec 'great power' conferences of May and August 1943 respectively, and two months later in October 1943, it was 'formally acknowledged as one of the Big Four' in the Declaration of the Moscow Conference. By the end of World War II in 1945, *de jure* recognition of Nationalist China as a great power seemed to be acquired when it became one of the five permanent members of the new United Nations (UN) Security Council.[46]

Formal external recognition of China's big power status contributed to some degree to a restoration of Chinese great power beliefs. Yet, the impact of this recognition should not be overstated. First, there had been conscious efforts by the Nationalist government to elevate China's international status. John Garver has shown that China's great power status was not simply bestowed on it by the Big Three; it was also, to a considerable extent, a 'hard-

[44] Brittingham, 'China's Contested Status,' p. 95.
[45] Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. 2* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), p. 1583.
[46] Brittingham, 'China's Contested Status,' pp. 94-97; John Garver, *Chinese-Soviet Relations 1937-1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 193-194.

won diplomatic achievement' by Chiang's government.[47] Second, the great power status accorded to China was, in reality, more nominal than substantial. Privately, both Winston Churchill and Stalin did not share much optimism about China's great power potential. Churchill, in particular, had been hugely sceptical. As he bluntly put it: China as 'one of the world's four great powers [was] an absolute farce.'[48] At the same time, American estimations of Chinese power were more circumscribed than commonly assumed. True, among the three, the US did project a more sanguine view of Chinese power than the USSR and Great Britain. But the primary rationale for doing so, as Warren Cohen has suggested, might have to do less with genuine American belief in China's potential and more to do with the assumption that a 'grateful' China would be largely acquiescent to the US.[49] Thus Cohen noted that, ultimately, 'Roosevelt, no less than Churchill or Stalin, denied Chiang an equal role in the process of making strategic or logistical decisions.'[50] Indeed, the US had been quick to sign away Chinese sovereign interests in Outer Mongolia at the 1945 Yalta Conference, an Allied big power meeting where China was conspicuously left out.

The nineteenth to the early mid-twentieth century represented an intense period of national shock, angst and reflection for the Chinese. Sure of

[47] Thus Garver argued that '…what is remarkable is not that Chiang did not achieve more, but that, given the weakness of the Republic of China, he achieved so much.' Wang Gungwu also noted that the Nationalists had devoted 'more than twenty years of effort to regain international respect.' See Garver, *Chinese-Soviet Relations 1937-1945*, pp. 192-196; 229; Wang, *China and the World since 1949*, p. 28.
[48] Akira Iriye, 'The United States as an Asian-Pacific Power,' in Gene Hsiao, ed., *Sino-American Détente and Its Policy Implications* (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 12; Brittingham, 'China's Contested Status,' p. 96.
[49] As Winston Churchill put it crudely, China's inclusion amounted to 'a faggot vote on the side of the US.' See Warren Cohen, *America's Response to China: An Interpretive History of Sino-American Relations* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971), p. 162.
[50] Ibid, p. 153.

its own primacy for considerable parts of its history, China's 'great central kingdom' identity was brutally exposed as a myth, severely questioned by superior Western and Japanese forces. Consequently, these foreign examinations led to a deep sense of Chinese self-doubt and vulnerability, and a disconcerting self-image of a weak China was to form an uncomfortable association with enduring perceptions of China's former grandeur. In some ways, perhaps, it is flawed to assume that China's great power outlook had ceased to exist totally during this period. It is more accurate to say that Chinese perceptions of national greatness had been forcibly suppressed, were latent rather than active, and were more an expectation than a reality. This may partly explain why, after the Second World War, the Nationalist government would repeatedly underline China's regained status of a great power, even if such a status was largely nominal and lacked substance.[51]

Maoist China: 'Great Power Awakening'

The emergence of Communist China in 1949 marked the beginning of a period of a more substantial revival of China's great power identity. Territorially, save for Outer Mongolia, the Communists inherited a China that was approximately the size of the Qing empire at its peak. But more significantly, the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) represented, for the first time since 1911, the concentration of the resources of China in the hands of a single authority, one which had the trappings of a

[51] The Nationalist government might have had in mind domestic considerations when it tried to emphasise China's great power status: that the Chinese nation had become 'great' again under its leadership. See Wang, *China and the World since 1949*, p. 27.

modern state rather than a collapsing dynastic polity. This was a *bona fide*, unified China compared to the Nationalist's 1928 quasi-version. Several analysts would come to conclude that the PRC's establishment had fundamentally altered the global balance of power.[52]

For Mao Zedong and his colleagues, like the Nationalists, they shared a common and enduring vision of China fulfilling its 'rightful' place as a great power. This was in some ways reflected in Mao's well-known, 'China-stood-up' speech of 21 September 1949. Underlining that China was 'a great, courageous and industrious nation' and possessed, at base, 'very favourable conditions' of population and territorial size, Mao asserted that it was inevitable that the Chinese would 'emerge in the world as a nation with an advanced culture;' own a 'powerful' military force; and 'win [a] speedy victory on the economic front.'[53] Mao, of course, was under no illusion that China had become overnight a modern power, comparable to that of the US and USSR; in the same speech, he readily admitted that the Chinese had 'fallen behind.'[54] That said, Mao appeared to harbour considerable optimism regarding the PRC's future, noting that it was 'infinitely bright.'[55]

Events in the early 1950s seemed to indicate that Mao's early confidence was well-placed. During this period, the recognition of China's

[52] Indeed, Gerald Segal argued that 'one of the first steps in the PRC's emergence as a third great power upsetting the bipolar equation can be found prior to the declaration of the People's Republic.' See Gerald Segal, 'China and the Great Power Triangle,' The China Quarterly, Vol. 83 (1980), p. 491. See as well John Garver, *Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1993), pp. 39-43.
[53] Mao Zedong, 'The Chinese People Have Stood Up,' in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. V* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1977), pp. 15-18.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Mao Zedong, 'Long Live the Great Unity of the Chinese People,' in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. V* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1977), p. 19.

potential for great power status was considerably enhanced. Two factors were particularly influential. First, in February 1950, China operationalised its policy of 'leaning to one side' (*xiangyi biandao*) and entered into a formal alliance with the Soviet Union. While this was in an apparent capacity of a subordinate ally which acknowledged the primacy of Moscow as the leader of the global socialist movement and implied that China was not an equal of the USSR, the Sino-Soviet alliance nonetheless entailed appreciable benefits for Chinese great power aspirations: (i) it greatly improved Chinese security vis-à-vis the main perceived enemy--the US; and (ii) it promised an augmentation of China's conventional power capabilities. Indeed, during the alliance's early stages, Washington would come to develop a perception of China as 'a land of burgeoning power,' one 'with enormous potential that was on the verge of being realised with Soviet help.' [56]

Second, China unexpectedly and impressively fought American-led UN forces to a standstill in the 1950-53 Korean War. Although the Soviet factor had been crucial to China's military success in Korea, this was still a hugely competent Chinese performance. [57] After all, the Chinese had taken on an established great power, the United States (in their words, 'an enemy welding weapons many times superior to ours) and stood its ground. [58] Consequently, this war result translated to more positive assessments, both

[56] Rosemary Foot, *The Practice of Power: US Relations with China since 1949* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 140-142.
[57] The Soviets provided mainly military supplies, though there was also some limited combat activity. The most important Soviet contribution, however, was indirect: its deterrent value, the prospect that it might be drawn into the war. See Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, 'China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited,' *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 121 (1990), pp. 94-115.
[58] Mao Zedong, 'Our Great Victory in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea and Our Future Tasks,' in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, *Vol. V* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1977), p. 115.

internally and externally, of China's major power credentials.[59] As Michael Yahuda noted, the Korean War brought about 'a significant change in China's self-confidence and international image' and 'earned the PRC the great power status for which the Chinese have long yearned…'[60] The Americans, in particular, would acquire what was described as 'a deep respect' for Chinese military power in the aftermath of the war, a perceptual consequence that would later have ramifications for US strategy in Vietnam (the so-called ghost of the 'Yalu debacle').[61]

By 1954, it seemed that the Chinese would be confident enough to publicly declare themselves as a major power. Shortly after the 1954 Geneva Conference on Korea and Indo-China, the People's Daily (*Renmin Ribao*), proclaimed:

> For the first time as one of the Big Powers, the People's Republic of China joined the other major powers in negotiations on vital international problems and made a contribution of its own that won acclaim of wide sections of world opinion. The international status of the People's Republic of China as one of the big powers has gained universal recognition. Its international prestige has been greatly

[59] Chen Jian argued that one of the prime reasons underlying the Chinese decision to enter the Korean War related to Mao's desire to pursue 'a glorious victory' over the Americans so as to advance the PRC's 'international prestige and influence.' See Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), p. 116.
[60] See Michael Yahuda, *China's Role in World Affairs* (London: Croom Helm, 1978), p. 60; Michael Yahuda, 'China's Foreign Relations: The Long March, Future Uncertain,' *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 159 (1999), p. 650.
[61] Foot, *The Practice of Power*, p. 146; Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 143.

> enhanced. The Chinese people take the greatest joy and pride in the efforts and achievements of their delegation at Geneva.[62]

This 'big power' declaration was, of course, propaganda in many respects but at the same time, it is worth noting that the North Vietnamese success at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 had represented a clear proxy victory for the PRC—and for communism in general—and was hence encouraging to Chinese esteem and great power aspirations.

Further hints of China's great power aspirations would come at the Afro-Asia Bandung Conference in 1955. Although the PRC identified itself with the newly decolonised states of Africa and Asia, it also openly attempted to claim a leadership role among these countries and did so with 'considerable success.'[63] And as if to suggest the Chinese brand of leadership would be a benevolent one, Mao would go on in 1956 to issue statements on the nature of PRC's great powerhood: it would eschew 'great power chauvinism' (*daguo zhuyi*) and behave as a 'modest' great power.[64] Outsiders were to help reinforce this perception of rising Chinese power in the mid-1950s. The dominant impression in Asia during that period (according to some assessments in Washington) was that China was a 'dynamic, permanent and not unfriendly world power,' and that communism now represented the inexorable 'wave of the future.' Even Moscow, as the PRC's patron, would

[62] See People's Daily Editorial, 22 July 1954 in *People's China*, Vol. 15 (1954), p. 4. According to Yongjin Zhang, the Geneva Conference marked the first time that the PRC enjoyed international recognition as a great power. In his view, the US and its allies had probably 'unwittingly' granted great power status to the PRC. See Yongjin Zhang, *China in International Society since 1949*: *Alienation and Beyond* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), p.37.
[63] Cohen, 'China's Rise in Historical Perspective,' p. 695.
[64] Mao Zedong, 'Patriotism and Internationalism,' in *Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), p. 180.

begin to revise its estimation of Beijing and treat it more as a peer than a junior ally. Stalin's death in 1953 was, of course, an important factor in the shifting Sino-Soviet dynamics but it was still a testimony to China's growing clout in 1956 that the Kremlin would feel compelled to openly turn to it for counsel and assistance in the wake of upheavals in Eastern Europe. [65]

Nevertheless, against this backdrop of a seeming rise in China's big power stature and ambition, there were discernable indications that Beijing itself recognised its material inadequacies vis-à-vis the developed world. One clear example was the mid 1950s 'catching up' discourse, a direct admission that China was still in many ways underdeveloped and far from being a complete world power.[66] In fact, in 1956, Mao would describe China as a 'poor' and 'blank' country. As the Chairman put it, 'By "poor," I mean we do not have much industry and our agriculture is underdeveloped. By "blank," I mean we are like a blank sheet of paper and our cultural and scientific level is not high.'[67]

Beijing's perception of its material shortcomings was linked to the need to 'catch up' with the developed world—the US, in particular, and this desire would prove to be an important motivation behind the ultimately disastrous 1958 policy of the Great Leap Forward (GLF). The Chinese leadership evidently felt that unless China attained greater material muscle, they would 'never be taken seriously by imperialists,' a conclusion arrived at, it seemed,

[65] Foot, *The Practice of Power*, pp. 200-201.
[66] John Gittings, 'New Light on Mao: His View of the World,' *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 60 (1974), pp. 757-758.
[67] Mao Zedong, 'The Relationship between China and Other Countries,' in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. V* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1977), p. 306.

after the 1955-1957 US-Sino ambassadorial dialogues had failed to produce any tangible results. Consequently, Mao would draw the link between economic parity and international respect, declaring that when the PRC had achieved its targets in the 'three great commanders of grain, steel and machinery,' Beijing would be able 'to negotiate with the Americans with a bit more spirit.'[68]

By the early 1960s, however, it would become clear that, instead of 'catching up,' the Chinese had only succeeded in widening their economic disparity with most of the developed world. The GLF programme had turned out to be a complete economic disaster, triggering a nationwide famine in China that would result in approximately 30 million deaths.[69] Unsurprisingly, this was a trail of devastation that severely undermined Chinese big power hopes. Indeed, there were signs that during this time—the 'bitter years (specifically, 1959-1962)'—Beijing felt somewhat vulnerable and insecure. This was illustrated to some extent by the unconventional consideration among some Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders then for a more conciliatory policy, termed the 'Three Reconciliations and the One Reduction' (*sanhe yishao*), towards the US, USSR and India.[70]

The early 1960s was also the period when the growing Sino-Soviet divide, which started to brew in the late 1950s, erupted into open antagonism between Moscow and Beijing. From a strategic perspective, the rupture of the Sino-Soviet alliance was hardly propitious for China because not only did it

[68] Gittings, 'New Light on Mao,' p. 757.
[69] Mitter, *A Bitter Revolution*, p. 197.
[70] Foot, *The Practice of Power*, pp. 212-213.

signify a weakening of the PRC's strategic position, it meant that Beijing now faced two superpower adversaries concurrently, as well as the disconcerting prospect of superpower collusion at China's expense.

That said, the emergence of a China unconstrained by Soviet influence reflected, to some extent, a determination by Beijing to be regarded as an equal to the US and USSR (even if it was materially out of its depth). In this respect, freedom from the Soviet orbit represented an opportunity for China to further consolidate its own sphere of influence and re-invent itself as a 'third' force in world politics. So by 1963, not only had China refuted the Marxist-Leninist credentials of the Soviets, it was casting itself as the one 'true source' of Marxist-Leninism, the 'epicentre of world revolution.'[71] Beijing, in effect, was openly challenging Moscow's position as the leader of the international communist camp. At the same time, building on the earlier prestige gains at the 1955 Bandung conference, Beijing also attempted to further advance its claims to leadership of the Third World. Here, the Chinese rhetoric had emphasised China's common identification with the former 'oppressed' imperial colonies but it was evident that the Chinese leaders (Mao, in particular) turned to the Third World because they saw it as representing a fertile base of support—'the area of greatest political opportunity,' as it was claimed—for China to build an alternative front against the global status

[71] See Yahuda, *China's Role in World Affairs*, pp. 121-126; Garver, *Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China*, pp. 133-163; John Gittings, *Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968) See as well Chen Zhimin, 'Nationalism, Internationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy,' *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 14, No. 42 (2005), pp. 35-53. As Chen Zhimin noted, 'China was able to obtain a "sense of greater international status" through its "thought center" role in world revolutionary movements…'

quo.[72] Peter Van Ness has noted: 'Mao was prepared to incur the risk of opposing both superpowers at the same time because, in his view, the opportunity to take a leadership role in global politics and to enhance China's power was so great.'[73]

To be sure, both the roles as the 'thought centre' of the socialist bloc and leader of the Third World overlapped each other. They were also, on various occasions, evoked in terms of China's 'victim' identity where the primary argument was that because China had been a 'victim' of foreign imperialism, it made sense to align with the socialist and anti-colonist worlds which supposedly shared similar historical experiences. But regardless of the permutations, these two conceptions essentially embodied the channels by which China asserted its global leadership claims from a position of weakness.

In 1964, China's great power aspirations were boosted with the successful development of nuclear weapon capability. After all, the PRC had: (i) acquired one of the more vivid symbols of great power status; (ii) broken the 'nuclear monopoly' of the other major powers; and (iii) crucially, demonstrated Chinese determination and indigenous ability to master a sophisticated technology with minimal external assistance.[74] Earlier, in 1958, Mao also stated that if the Chinese did not possess the Bomb, 'others [would

[72] Peter Van Ness, 'China as a Third World State: Foreign Policy and Official National Identity,' in Lowell Dittmer and Samuel Kim, eds., *China's Quest for National Identity* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 203-207.
[73] Ibid, p. 206.
[74] See Jonathan Pollack, 'China and the Global Strategic Balance,' in Harry Harding, ed., *China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 172; Jonathan Pollack, 'Chinese Attitudes towards Nuclear Weapons, 1964-9,' *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 50 (1972), pp. 244-271; Alice Langley Hsieh, *Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1962).

not] think what we say carry weight.'[75] Hence, in terms of Chinese prestige and the development of China's great power outlook, the acquisition of nuclear weapons clearly had positive implications. However, the impact of these implications should not be overstated. First, there was considerable evidence that the Chinese leadership had approached the nuclear issue from the standpoint of a vulnerable power, from a position of weakness rather than strength. Thus, in similar vein to the 1950s 'catching up' discourse, Mao argued in 1956 that 'if we are not to be bullied in the present day world, we cannot do without the Bomb.'[76] Others referred to the role of nuclear status in helping China shed the label the 'sick man of the east'. This suggests a strong link between the acquisition of nuclear weapons and the goal of deterring victimisation, rather than a conscious effort to achieve great power status as such.[77] From that perspective, the significance of acquiring nuclear weapons for China's great power identity should be kept in some perspective. Second, the development of nuclear weapon capability did not dramatically improve China's military strength vis-à-vis the US's and USSR's military power. True, China had entered the nuclear club but it was virtually a nuclear infant compared to the more established members. So, even as China's nuclear explosion had altered the extant nuclear order in considerable ways, there

[75] Foot, *The Practice of Power*, p. 171.
[76] Mao Zedong, 'The Relationship between China and Other Countries,' in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. V* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1977), p. 288.
[77] Two months after the China's successful atomic test, Zhou Enlai said, 'Have we not exploded an atom bomb? Has not the label, 'sick man of the east', fastened on us by Westerners, been flung off?' See Chong-Pin Lin, *China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy: Tradition within Evolution* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1988). See as well Chen Yi's statement about China degenerating into a 'second-class or third-class nation' if it did not obtain nuclear weapons. Alice Langley Hsieh, 'The Sino-Soviet Nuclear Dialogue: 1963,' in Raymond Garthoff, ed., *Sino-Soviet Military Relations* (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 164.

was still a huge asymmetry between Chinese nuclear capacity and that of the Americans and the Soviets.[78]

With the advent of the most radical phase of the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s (1966-1969), matters of foreign affairs took a backseat compared to those of domestic concerns. Yet, even as Beijing became embroiled in a no-holds-barred, intra-party power struggle, Chinese foreign policy in this period still encompassed 'profound internationalist content.'[79] The CCP leadership (or more accurately, those who still retained influence in steering Chinese foreign policy, such as Mao, Zhou and Lin Biao) continued to articulate the dual, globalist images of China as the 'centre of world revolution' and leader of the Third World. But compared with the early and mid 1960s, the emphasis now shifted more to the former than the latter, where in particular, the version of international socialism promulgated by Beijing assumed a more radical, more revolutionary and more deterministic shape. It would be facile to connect this shift entirely to the effects of the Cultural Revolution, but it was also the case that the more radical ideological content of the Chinese worldview was the corollary of the ultra-leftist political thought during this time.[80]

Given the more radical flavour of Chinese foreign policy discourse during the Cultural Revolution period, ideological interests, it seemed, took

[78] Jonathan Pollack argued that there was 'virtually no evidence to support the argument that decision makers in Peking began to view China's strategic position as qualitatively improved by the mere possession of limited nuclear capability.' See Pollack, 'Chinese Attitudes Towards Nuclear Weapons,' p. 249. On the notion of a nuclear order, see William Walker, 'Nuclear Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment,' *International Affairs*, Vol.83, No.3, (2007), pp. 431-453.
[79] Yahuda, *China's Role in World Affairs*, p. 190.
[80] Ibid, see Chapter 7.

precedence over big power considerations. To be sure, China still asserted global leadership claims through its dual conceptions as the mentor of the socialist camp and the Third World, and in 1967, managed to successfully develop thermonuclear capability. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that, on balance, because of the fixation with ideology as well as the upheavals in Chinese society and state, the Cultural Revolution period represented a time when a certain degree of stasis and introspection marked China's big power outlook.

This situation would change dramatically, however, in the early 1970s with the dawn of the Sino-American rapprochement when China effectively became a 'tacit ally' of the US.[81] During this period, in part due to the external validation that the rapprochement gave Beijing, China's sense of itself as a global power was appreciably strengthened. Broadly, the rapprochement enhanced China's great power identity in two key ways. First, because the Nixon administration took substantial steps to court the Chinese, it signified, to a considerable extent, an acknowledgement by the world's most powerful country of China's big power qualities and potential. China was perceived by the US, a significant Other, to possess enough strategic leverage to justify a major American policy volte-face. This American perception, in turn, heightened the Chinese sense of its own significance in global politics. Gilbert Rozman has described Beijing as being 'enamoured' with the great power triangle and that it 'increasingly measured its

[81] Evelyn Goh, *Constructing the US Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: From 'Red Menace' to 'Tacit Ally'* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

importance as one of the three global powers capable of shifting the global balance of world power.'[82] Second, the rapprochement eased the PRC's entry into the UN in that the US no longer actively sought to block Chinese representation.[83] The UN seat thus allowed the PRC to finally secure one of the most basic markers of great power status: a formal place in the UN Security Council as one of the Permanent Five, at the expense of the Nationalist government in Taiwan.

The rapprochement clearly played a substantial role in imbuing a stronger sense of Chinese great power identity in the 1970s. But it should be pointed out that, even as the Nixon administration recognised the strategic weight of Chinese power, it was not oblivious to the fact that China, objectively, was still economically and militarily backward. Nixon himself drew attention to this reality in his second annual State of the World Report in 1971.[84] Moreover, the Chinese leadership recognised and readily admitted China's material weaknesses. Zhou stated in 1975 that China remained a 'poverty-stricken and backward country' and that it would take around two decades or more before China reached the 'front ranks in the world' (assuming the Four Modernisations were implemented).[85] In addition, the rapprochement was underpinned by a confluence of factors other than China's perceived strategic value in the great power triangle: they included, *inter alia*, Beijing's assessment that the Soviets ('socialist imperialism')

[82] Gilbert Rozman, 'China's Quest for Great Power Identity,' *Orbis*, Vol. 43, No. 3 (1999), p. 388.
[83] Foot, *The Practice of Power* Foot, pp. 46-51.
[84] Ibid, pp. 218-222.
[85] Alexander Eckstein, *China's Economic Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 240-241.

represented the greatest threat to Chinese interests; US strategic considerations in Indochina; and Nixon's grand strategic doctrine of détente.[86] In fact, inasmuch as the rapprochement was about American courting of the Chinese, it was equally about Chinese wooing of the Americans. These reasons indicate that American recognition of China's big power credentials should not be exaggerated.

Responsibility in Chinese History

Having sketched out the broad contours of China's great power identity (until the end of Mao's era), this chapter now turns to a survey of Chinese notions of responsibility, paying attention, in particular, to the extent to which such a theme had been evoked as part of a Chinese great power outlook.

The concept of responsibility in pre-modern China can basically be traced to the philosophical influence of Confucius and his disciples. To be precise, the literal equivalent of responsibility in Chinese language—*zeren*—hardly featured in classical Confucian discourse. The phrase that was used was *yiwu (*the character *yi* implies righteousness, while *wu* means task), which roughly corresponds to the meaning of duty or burden.[87] But what determined the allocation of duty within Chinese society? For the Confucians, their idea was to employ a functional understanding of social distinctions as the mediating paradigm. The basis of this, as the leading Confucian Xun Zi

[86] Doak Barnett, *China and the Major Powers in East Asia* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1977), pp. 193-200; Chen, *Mao's China & The Cold War*, see chapter 7.
[87] Wang Gungwu, 'Power, Rights and Duties in Chinese History,' *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, Vol. 3 (1980), pp. 1-26.

put it in his *Rich Country* essay, was that it would be difficult for 'proper' conduct to be established 'when the duties of office and the tasks of the occupations lack clear [social] distinctions.'[88] As such, in the Confucian conception, social distinctions were an inevitable aspect of human life whereby one's distinct position (*dingwei*) within society dictated one's commensurate duties or obligations.[89] The role of the son entailed corresponding duties of filial piety towards the parents. The ruler had the duty to govern the subjects with kindness and wisdom while the subjects had the reciprocal duty of serving the ruler with unquestioned loyalty. There were other examples of course but the key point was that Confucian discourses of responsibility were framed mainly in terms of socially-defined duties within a communitarian setting, and they were largely domestic in character and scope.

This is not meant to imply that there were no external dimensions to pre-modern Chinese conceptions of responsibility. The Central Kingdom worldview of the Imperial era meant the internal Confucian social order manifested itself to some degree beyond the borders of China.[90] In other words, just as social distinctions were needed to regulate relations in Chinese society, social distinctions were needed to regulate the Central Kingdom's relations with foreign nations.[91] As an extension of Confucian thought, this implied that a relationship of duty also existed between the Chinese

[88] Kung-Chuan Hsiao, *A History of Chinese Political Thought, Volume One* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 185.
[89] Wang, 'Power, Rights and Duties in Chinese History,' pp. 5-11; Gerald Chan, *China's Compliance in Global Affairs* (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2006), pp. 15-16; John Fairbank, 'The People's Middle Kingdom,' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 44, No. 4 (1966), pp. 574-577.
[90] Li, 'Traditional Chinese World Order,' pp. 32-35.
[91] Foreign peoples were assigned the inferior positions of 'barbarians' or 'vassals' while the Chinese remained on the civilisational and social high ground.

civilisation and outsiders. However, unlike the more reciprocal sense of obligations that functioned within Chinese society, on the external front, the moral equation was asymmetric and the burden of duty rested primarily with outsiders. Foreign peoples (whether as 'barbarians' or 'vassals') had a supposed duty to show reverence to the Chinese monarch, but the latter as the 'Son of Heaven,' with apparent powers of authority over all of mankind, was not necessarily beholden to the obligation of demonstrating 'virtuosity' to foreign peoples.[92] Such an outlook could clearly be seen in the Qianlong Emperor's condescending reply to King George III during the Macartney Mission to China in 1793. Qianlong decreed that it was the 'bounden duty of [George III] to reverently appreciate [the Chinese emperor's] feelings and to obey [the Chinese Emperor's] instructions henceforward for all time, so that [George III] may enjoy the blessings of perpetual peace.'[93] Of course, such a skewed understanding of responsibility, couched in terms of duties of foreigners to the Chinese throne, existed only in Chinese minds. One would be hard pressed to find amongst foreign nations, vassals included, where a concrete sense of duty towards the Imperial Court existed.

In Republican China, Chinese political discourses of responsibility moved noticeably away from the traditional Confucian conception. That said, the level of discussion of the responsibility concept could hardly be described as substantial or extensive; it was certainly not among the key themes or ideas

[92] To the extent that the Chinese emperor demonstrated 'virtuosity' towards outsiders, it was a privilege extended (in Qianlong's words: 'a kindly indulgence') rather than an obligation of the throne. See E. Backhouse and J.O.P. Bland, *Annals & Memoirs of the Court of Peking* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1914), pp. 330-331.
[93] Ibid, p. 331.

which concerned the Chinese political elites then.[94] Still, Sun Yatsen had considered the concept of responsibility to be significant enough to be included in his blueprint for rejuvenating China.

Sun essentially conceived two forms of responsibility for the Chinese nation. The first related to the notion of 'internal' responsibility (*duinei zeren*) and its primary claim was that it was the responsibility of 'four hundred million' Chinese people to 'liberate all oppressed Chinese,' 'revive the national spirit and recover [China's] national standing.'[95] The second pertained to the notion of 'external' responsibility (*duiwai zeren*) and this related to expectations of China's big power obligations to the world. According to Sun:

> There was a common phrase in ancient China: 'Help the weak, lift up the fallen (*jiruo fuqing*).' Because of this strategy, China was strong for a few thousand years…if China becomes strong again, not only must we restore our national standing, we must also assume a great responsibility towards the world. If China cannot assume that responsibility, even when she becomes strong again, she will be a great disadvantage, not an advantage, to the world…What is China's responsibility to the world?...We must

[94] Mao, incidentally, in his younger days (from 1912-1920), had writings that briefly explored a metaphysical interpretation of responsibility—one loosely based on the adage of 'saving all under heaven as duty (*jiu tianxia wei jiren*).' See Fan Li, 'Mao Zedong Zaoqi Wengao Zhong de Zeren Shiyi' [The Explication of Responsibility in Mao Zedong's Early Manuscripts], *Dali Zueyuan Xuewan Pao [Journal of Dali College]*, Vol. 2 (2003), pp. 8-11.

[95] See 'Sun Zhongshan De Xueshuo Shi Weixin Lun? Sun Zhongshan Zou De Shi Ziben Zhuyi' [Are Sun Yatsen's Words Idealism? Is Sun Yatsen Walking the Path of Capitalism?], *Mingge Zhongyang [People's Revolution Central]*, 2008. Available at http://www.minge.gov.cn/. See as well Sun Yatsen, *Sanmin Zhuyi: Minzu Zhuyi Di Liujiang [Three Principles of the People: Sixth Lecture on Nationalism]*, 1924. Available at http://www.gzmg.gov.cn/.

aid the weaker nations and oppose the imperialist powers of the world (*duiyu ruoxiao minzhu yao fuchi ta, duiyu shijie lieqiang yao dikang ta*).[96]

Sun added that in order to effectively oppose imperialist powers and to 'liberate those nations who equally suffered from imperialism,' it was beholden upon China to work with an 'international united front of both oppressed and free nations.'[97] In doing so, Sun envisioned, China would 'unify the world on the foundations of morality and peace' and 'bring about a great harmony of equality and fraternity.'[98] Lastly, Sun emphasised that the goal of 'safeguarding world peace' constituted the 'divine duty (*tianze)*' of the Chinese nation. Sun would codify the tenet of 'safeguarding world peace' into the Kuomintang party programme and the *Chinese Revolutionary Party Premier's Oath* in 1912 and 1914 respectively.[99]

What were the salient features of Sun's discussion of the responsibility idea? First, responsibility was a moral imperative that concerned the entire Chinese nation; there was hence a nationalistic quality to it. Second, China had inescapable obligations to the global community and these were centred on fighting imperialism and helping weaker nations that were similarly

---

[96] Ibid.

[97] Li Benyi, 'Sun Zhongshan Dui Huanghuo Lun De Pipan Jiqi Shijie Zeren Guan' [Sun Yatsen's Criticism of the Yellow Peril Theory and his World Responsibility Outlook], *Hubei Daxue Xuepao Zhexue Shehui Kezue Ban [Journal of Hubei University: Philosophy and Social Sciences]*, Vol. 32 (2005), pp. 599-600; 'Sun Zhongshan De Xueshuo Shi Weixin Lun? Sun Zhongshan Zou De Shi Ziben Zhuyi.'

[98] Sun, *Sanmin Zhuyi: Minzu Zhuyi Di Liujiang Sanmin Zhuyi.*

[99] Li, 'Sun Zhongshan Dui Huanghuo Lun De Pipan Jiqi Shijie Zeren Guan.' Sun Yatsen also claimed that once the Chinese civilisation fulfilled its destiny (*shiming*) of assuming greater world responsibility, it would become the 'guiding lamp of mankind' (*quan renlei de zhilu deng*). See Li Xiufang and Yu Haixia, 'Sun Zhongshan De Zhongxi Wenhua Guan' [Sun Yatsen's Outlook on Chinese and Western Culture], *Xian Jiaotong Daxue Xuepao Shehui Keixue Ban [Journal of Xian Jiaotong University: Social Sciences]*, Vol. 26 (2006), p. 86.

oppressed by imperialism. Third, China's responsibility—both internal and external—was inexorably linked to its self-image as a 'suppressed' great power: it was the internal responsibility of the Chinese nation to re-establish China's great power standing, so that China could better fulfil its external obligations to the world.

Interestingly, perhaps as a result of Sun's influence, Chiang Kaishek would go on to articulate and advance a formulation of responsibility that was broadly similar to Sun's ideas. In his widely-circulated 1943 manifesto, *China's Destiny*, Chiang argued that it was the responsibility of all Chinese people to rebuild China into a 'completely free and independent state that can fulfil its duty to the peoples of the world.'[100] This 'world' duty, in Chiang's view, obliged China to stand 'shoulder to shoulder' with other nations, sharing with them 'the responsibilities for the maintenance of permanent world peace and the liberation of mankind.' Indeed, Chiang had claimed that it was precisely because of this sense of 'duty and responsibility' that compelled China to seek 'independence and strength.' The Generalissimo also took the opportunity in *China's Destiny* to remind the international community that China had effectively taken on 'one of the heaviest responsibilities of all the Allied nations' in its War of Resistance with Japan; he would describe this as 'a foreign policy of not shirking its own responsibility.' [101] In sum, although Sun's and Chiang's evocations of

[100] To be sure, there was some uncertainty as to how much of the ideas in *China's Destiny* were from Chiang Kaishek himself since there were claims that Tao Xisheng was Chiang's ghost writer. See Chiang Kaishek, trans. Philip Jaffe, *China's Destiny*, (London: Dennis Dobson, 1947), pp. 103-104, 155, 214, 237.
[101] Ibid, pp. 107, 148-150, 157, 202-238.

responsibility had appeared somewhat quixotic and were certainly propagandistic, it could be argued that given both men's central place in Chinese political history, the discussions of China's 'world' obligations represented some of the earliest antecedents of a connection between Chinese ideas of responsibility and the great power identity.[102]

During the Maoist period, like the Republican years, the subject of responsibility was not a prominent aspect of Chinese political discourse. Nevertheless, from time to time, the PRC leaders would engage in a language of responsibility in their political rhetoric, although it seemed that the precise Chinese phrase for responsibility, *zeren*, was hardly ever used.

The PRC leadership's interpretation of responsibility had both domestic and foreign dimensions. On the domestic front, the responsibility concept was primarily given expression in the 1950s political line of 'central' or 'basic duty' (*zhongxin or jiben renwu*) and its key emphasis was the economic construction of China.[103] In the lexicon of Mao: 'economic construction was the centre of all duties' (*yi jingji jianshe wei yiqie renwu de zhongxin*).[104] To be sure, the linking of China's 'central duty' with economic development was first made by Mao in 1933 when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had yet to win power. But in 1949, with the victory of the CCP in the Chinese civil war, Mao would again

[102] Interestingly, the notion of responsibility was given considerable coverage in *China's Destiny* and was evoked on no less than 30 occasions.
[103] A similar terminology used was 'fundamental duty' (*gengben renwu*). See Zhang Huimin, 'Mao Zedong Dongzhi Dui Woguo Shehui Zhuyi: Jianshe De Daolu, Buzhou He Renwu De Tansuo' [Mao Zedong Comrade and Our National Socialism: Probing its Construction Path, Step and Duty], *Gansu Lilun Xuekan [Gansu Theory Research]*, Vol.5 (1993), pp. 35-37.
[104] See Wang Zhiyu, 'Mao Zedong "Yi Jingji Jianshe Wei Yiqie Renwu De Zhongxin" Lunduan Yanqiu' [Researching Mao Zedong's Thoughts on "Economic Construction as the Centre of all Duties"], *Shandong Nongye Daxue Xuepao Shehui Keixue Ban [Social Sciences Journal of Shandong Agriculture University]*, Vol. 34 (2007), pp. 81-86.

urge his comrades not to forget the 'central duty' of China's economic construction, further exhorting that they master 'techniques and management methods of productivity.'[105] Three months after the PRC's establishment, Zhou Enlai made a similar argument, noting that economic productivity was 'the basic duty of new China.'[106] By 1956, the central duty-economic construction nexus would gain formal endorsement at the 8th National Congress of the CCP, where Liu Shaoqi, representing the Central Committee, announced that the 'central duty' of China was to ensure the growth of its productivity levels.[107] In the 1960s, however, it seemed that this narrative of 'central duty' would increasingly fall out of favour with the Chinese leadership. As the political emphasis shifted from economic construction to the imperative of class struggle, Mao chose instead to characterise Chinese domestic obligations in terms of class and revolutionary duties.[108]

Concerning the external elements of Maoist China's outlook on responsibility, Yongjin Zhang has argued that the 1954 Geneva Conference could be considered the 'very beginning' of the PRC's understanding of the idea that being a great power within the post-War world 'carried with it the heavy burden of responsibility bestowed upon great powers…'[109] While Zhang did not cite any supporting Chinese statements, there appeared to be

[105] Ibid.
[106] Yang Zenghe, 'Xin Zhongguo De Jiben Renwu He Shehui Zhuyi De Biaozhi' [New China's Basic Duty and The Mark of Socialism], *Qianxian [Frontline]*, Vol. 3 (1988), pp. 5-7.
[107] Xiu Huanfen, 'Jianguo Tou Qinian Mao Zedong Guanyu Zhongxin Renwu: Zhuanyi De Lilun Guandian He Keguan Shijian' [Mao Zedong on the Central Duty during the First Seven Years of Nation-Building: Shifting Theoretical Viewpoint and Objective Practice], *Fujian Shifan Daxue Xuepao Zhexue Shehui Kezue Ban [Journal of Fujian Teacher Training College]*, Vol. 3 (1993), pp. 1-5; Wang, 'Mao Zedong "Yi Jingji Jianshe Wei Yiqie Renwu De Zhongxin" Lunduan Yanqiu,' p. 86.
[108] See Zhang, 'Mao Zedong Dongzhi Dui Woguo Shehui Zhuyi: Jianshe De Daolu, Buzhou He Renwu De Tansuo,' p. 37.
[109] Zhang, *China in International Society since 1949*, p. 37.

some later rhetorical evidence in corroboration of this claim. In November 1956, in a major speech commemorating (incidentally) Sun Yatsen, Mao stated. 'China is a land with an area of 9,600,000 square kilometres and a population of 600 million people, and she ought to have made a greater contribution to humanity. Her contribution over a long period has been far too small. For this we are regretful…'[110] Here, the language of responsibility was not explicitly evoked by Mao; the term used was 'contribution' (*gongxian*). That said, it appeared that Mao had intended to evoke a connection between this 'contribution' and China's great power identity. Although Mao did not mention great power directly, he nonetheless drew attention to Chinese big power attributes of population and territorial size.

Interestingly, from 1954 onwards, China started to render aid to Third World countries despite the fact that, economically, China was hardly in a better position than many that it supported. This aid, from 1954 to around the time of Mao's death in 1976, amounted to almost US$5 billion.[111] Certainly, there were various motivations behind the Chinese aid calculus but one potential consideration was that because the Chinese were claiming a leading role in world politics (albeit through leadership in the Third World), it needed to demonstrate a certain degree of big power 'magnanimity.' As Yahuda has argued, 'Although China's economic aid has been less tied and more disinterested than most, the idealism which inspired it was linked to Chinese

[110] Mao, 'Patriotism and Internationalism,' pp. 179-180.
[111] John Copper, *China's Foreign Aid: An Instrument of Peking's Foreign Policy* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1976), see chapter 6.

aspirations to "greatness."'[112] Third World aid, thus, could be seen in some ways as one example of China's big power contribution.

The other way in which the PRC's responsibility was externalised related to its ideological commitments—specifically, China's international revolutionary duty. Here, the argument was that since China had succeeded its own revolution and had become the centre of world revolution, it was to some extent responsible to fellow 'oppressed' brethrens in their respective revolutionary struggles. Hence, in 1963 at a meeting with African leaders, Mao would declare, 'The people who have triumphed in their own revolution should help those still struggling for liberation. This is our internationalist duty.'[113] In 1965, Lin Biao made a similar exhortation, asserting that 'socialist countries [like China] should regard it as their internationalist duty to support the people's revolutionary struggles in Asia, Africa and Latin America…'[114] Given that China's big power outlook was in some ways exemplified by its revolutionary centre role, it could be argued that this 'internationalist duty,' as defined by Beijing, was an expression of Chinese *noblesse oblige* but one couched in ideological terms.

To be sure, Chinese claims of revolutionary responsibility were often more form than substance and Chinese contributions to the international

[112] Michael Yahuda, Towards the End of Isolationism: China's Foreign Policy after Mao (London: Macmillan, 1983), p. 100.
[113] See Mao, 'Patriotism and Internationalism,' p. 178. The 1963 *CCP Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement* also noted that China's special role in revolutionary socialism meant 'a heavier responsibility for the unity of the entire socialist camp and international communist movement.' See William Griffith, *The Sino-Soviet Rift* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1964), p.259.
[114] Lin Biao, 'Long Live the Victory of People's War,' People's Daily, 2 September 1965, in *Peking Review*, Vol. 8 (1965), p. 24.

revolutionary cause were usually limited to ideological inspiration or broad rhetorical guidance.[115] Nevertheless, during the Vietnam War, China did extend substantial material and logistical support to North Vietnam, providing large quantities of military equipment as well as the deployment of Chinese engineering troops. There was also a considerable level of Chinese operational assistance: from 1965 to 1969, some sixteen divisions of Chinese antiaircraft artillery units, with an overall strength of over 150,000 men, were deployed in Vietnam.[116] While there were various reasons underlying China's substantial involvement in the Vietnam War, one explanation pertained to the fact that Beijing was essentially enacting its revolutionary 'big-brother' persona and was hence 'obliged' to render help that measured up to its 'centre of world revolution' status.[117] In that sense, more than just an 'internationalist duty,' China's military assistance to the North Vietnamese was also partially an indication of a big power mindset.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided a contextualisation of China's RGP identity from a historical perspective. This is not a history of China's state identity as such. Rather, it is a history of evolving Chinese perceptions of great power identity

[115] Shogo Suzuki, 'China's Quest for Great Power Status: The Social Mechanisms of Delinquent Gang Formation,' *Center of International Politics Working Paper Series*, *University of Manchester*, Vol. 29 (2007), pp. 12-21.
[116] Chen, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, pp. 221-229.
[117] Chen Jian went as far as to argue that Beijing was seeking to 'create a modern version of the relationship between the Central Kingdom and its subordinate neighbours.' See Ibid, p .237.

and the idea of responsibility, and the extent to which these two aspects were linked.

During the pre-modern era, the Central Kingdom complex was the exemplification of traditional China's sense of its great power status, an outlook that projected the Chinese state as the principal political force in the world. However, coming to the nineteenth century, Chinese belief in the superiority of its own model would be fundamentally shaken and the Central Kingdom conception would be brutally exposed as a myth. Consequently, a 'weak China' complex would emerge, but it was one that resided in tension with suppressed perceptions of China's national greatness. In the Maoist period, there would be a more substantive sense of China's revival as a great power, though the Chinese leadership was also keenly aware of the PRC's material inadequacies and sought to project the country as an impoverished country on various occasions. Concerning the dimension of responsibility, the historical record suggests that there were only moderate doses of this facet in Chinese political narratives. While some of the narratives on responsibility connected to Chinese perceptions of great power identity, these linkages were generally limited, and when evoked, were either circumstantial or indirect.

CHAPTER THREE

The Start of China's Identification as a Responsible Great Power, 1978 to 1996

Chapter two discussed the historical backdrop to China's proclaimed responsible great power identity. It found that, historically, there was only ad hoc or indirect association of the responsibility concept with Chinese great power perceptions. Chapter three undertakes a more contemporary examination, focusing on the period from 1978 to 1996. In charting the topography of the RGP identity during this period, this chapter also aims to provide greater clarity on the genesis of this identity. Some scholars regard the period after 2005, in particular after the emergence of the 'responsible stakeholder' discourse, to be the juncture when China's RGP identity began to emerge.[1] I offer a different interpretation here. I argue that a nascent Chinese RGP identity was already discernable in the early to mid-1990s, although as previously noted, the preceding period from the late 1970s to the 1980s is important for understanding the context in which the RGP identity developed.

Continuing the previous chapter's approach, this chapter begins by genealogically tracking the two core narratives of the RGP identity—the notion of a great power and the idea of responsibility—as separate phenomena. This helps the chapter to trace the point when these two facets converged to express an aggregate RGP identity, as well as tease out the

[1] Interviews with scholars at Beijing University, Fudan University, the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences and the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, May-June 2011; November 2011.

intervening conditions and factors that led to its emergence. This chapter is organised as follows: first, it explores the course of China's great power identity in the 1980s. The next section examines Chinese perceptions of responsibility during this period. The third section, divided into three sub-segments, shows how China's great power identity converged with the idea of responsibility during the early to mid-1990s. In the concluding section, I assess the basis for China's desire to proclaim itself as a responsible great power.

Great Power Identity in the 1980s

The 1970s could be considered, on balance, to be a period of increased substantiation to Chinese perceptions of their country's great power status. American statements, such as President Nixon's 1971 public assertion that the PRC would become 'one of the five great economic superpowers,' had provided some validation of China's great power identity.[2] This validation was also supported by positive events such as the 1972 US-China rapprochement, and the ascension to UN Security Council permanent membership in 1971. Nevertheless, by the late 1970s, it was discernable that a more moderated perspective was preferred. Deng and his colleagues clearly had a more realistic appraisal of Chinese power. Acknowledging China's considerable technological and economic gaps vis-à-vis the developed world,

[2] Rosemary Foot noted that Nixon's statement had 'caused enormous excitement among the Beijing leadership.' See Rosemary Foot, *The Practice of Power: US Relations with China since 1949* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 105.

Deng openly admitted that China had been 'stagnant and slow-developing for a long time' and it was 'time for [China] to learn from other advanced countries in the world.'[3] This declaration, in effect, called on the PRC to assume the role of a 'student' vis-à-vis developed nations, cognisant of its shortcomings and keen to catch up. This 'student' self-perception reflected Deng's pragmatic outlook on international politics, a departure from the more ideologically rooted Maoist era.

A greater recognition of China's limitations would persist for much of the 1980s. Chinese leaders frequently emphasised China's economic backwardness and underdeveloped status. In many ways, this was a tacit admission of the failings of 30 years of Maoist rule.[4] And it contributed to a revival of anti-traditionalist sentiments among the Chinese intelligentsia. For many Chinese intellectuals, anti-traditionalism became associated with the idea of Westernisation; Zhao Suisheng has described this as a 'Western-learning fever' (*xixue re*). The controversial 1988 nation-wide television series, *Heshang* (River Elegy), which contrasted a backward China with images of a progressive West, was one vivid expression of the 'look West' attitude.[5]

---

[3] Deng Xiaoping, 'Shixing Kaifang Zhengce, Xuexi Shijie Xianjin Kexue Jishu' [Adopt Open Policy and Learn from the World's Advanced Science and Technology], in *Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan Dierjuan [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume II]*, (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1993), pp. 132-33. See also Deng Xiaoping, 'Liyong Waiguo Zhili He Kuoda Duiwai Kaifang' [Use Foreign Intellectual Resources and Open Wider to the Outside World], in *Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan Disanjuan [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume III]*, (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1993), p. 32.

[4] As Suisheng Zhao observed, 'Many Chinese intellectuals could not help asking why China was still so backward after 30 years of socialist revolution.' See Suisheng Zhao, 'Chinese Intellectuals' Quest for National Greatness and Nationalistic Writing in the 1990s,' *The China Quarterly*, Vol.152 (1997), p. 726.

[5] Ibid, pp. 727-730. See also Merle Goldman, Perry Link and Su Wei, 'Chinese Intellectuals in the Deng Era: Loss of Identity with the State,' in Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, eds., *China's Quest for National Identity* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 143-146.

In conjunction with the underdevelopment theme, the CCP leadership also made efforts to articulate a Third World identity for China.[6] Yet unlike the Maoist period, in the 1980s, this seemed less about traditional Third World solidarity in the mould of anti-hegemony and economic self-reliance and more acknowledgement of the PRC's impoverished position.[7] The reversal in Chinese foreign aid policy demonstrated this. The 1980s saw a sharp reduction in Chinese assistance to Third World countries as China itself became a major recipient of international aid. By 1989, China had become the world's largest aid recipient, with incoming annual aid of almost US$2.2 billion.[8] The consequence was a reduction of China's ideological power in the Third World. For all its flaws, the former Maoist model of self-reliance represented a developmental alternative with considerable appeal among those Third World nations suspicious of foreign capitalists and aid. Deng's policies, however, moved away from the self-reliance logic and seemed to endorse economic dependency on or a strong economic relationship with the developed world.[9]

Alongside China's own reassessment of its relative power, American perceptions of China's national power became more measured and less prone to hyperbole. Initially, when the Reagan administration took office in early

[6] See, for example. Deng Xiaoping, 'Weihu Shijie Heping, Gaohao Guonei Jianshe' [Safeguard World Peace and Ensure Domestic Development], in *Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan Disanjuan [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume III]*, (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1993), pp. 56-57.
[7] Peter Van Ness argued that 'China had in fact turned its back on the Third World.' See Peter Van Ness, 'China as a Third World State,' in Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, eds., *China's Quest for National Identity* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 206.
[8] Samuel S. Kim, 'International Organisations in Chinese Foreign Policy,' *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 519 (1992), p. 152.
[9] Foot, *The Practice of Power*, p. 241; Samuel S. Kim, 'China as a Regional Power,' *Current History*, Vol. 91 (1992), p. 251.

1981, there appeared to be a continuation of the view that China was central to American geopolitical interests. The then US Secretary of State Alexander Haig, for example, had considered the PRC to be 'the most important country in the world' for Washington.[10] However, by 1982, such an assessment would come to be seen as untenable and the Reagan administration began to see China's role as 'less than vital.' In the US view, China was basically 'too technologically backward to do more than tie down Soviet forces that would otherwise be available for employment on other fronts.'[11] In fact, such was China's perceived vulnerability vis-à-vis the Soviet Union that Washington saw little need to accommodate to various key Chinese interests (e.g. the Taiwan issue). The US felt it 'could take China for granted' as China was ostensibly the more dependent party relative to the US.[12]

There was some evidence that the revised American judgement influenced Chinese leaders' own estimations of the PRC's strategic importance. In a study of US-China bargaining relations from the early to mid-1980s, Robert Ross argued that Beijing had been aware of Washington's assessment of China's limited role and that it eventually reconciled itself to this view, adopting a more conciliatory stance in the process.[13] In some ways, thus, Chinese leaders had 'learned' about their country's diminished strategic role from interactions with American leaders. That said, the Sino-American

[10] Harry Harding, *A Fragile Relationship: Sino-American Relations since 1972* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1992), p. 119.
[11] Jonathan D. Pollack, 'China and the Global Strategic Balance,' in Harry Harding, ed., *China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 162.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Robert Ross, 'China Learns to Compromise: Change in US-China Relations, 1982-1984,' *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 123 (1991), pp. 742-773.

relationship was not the only source of socialisation and identity learning for China. Implementation of the opening-up policy in the 1980s meant that the PRC was essentially allowing the wider world to play a larger part in shaping its identity. China participated more in multilateral organisations; permitted the import of foreign goods; encouraged the entry of foreign capital, technology and expertise; and allowed its citizens to travel abroad for education, academic exchange and tourism. These increased external exchanges helped the Chinese gain more knowledge of the outside world, but they also reinforced existing perceptions of national inadequacies by showing how less advanced the PRC still was in comparison to the developed world.[14]

Nevertheless, this trend of a more circumscribed great power identity should not be overstated at the expense of other events that had encouraged, or were indicative of, a certain degree of consistency in the Chinese big power mindset. By 1980, China had successfully tested intercontinental nuclear weapons, with a range theoretically capable of reaching US and Soviet targets. This was followed by the development of sea-based nuclear capabilities in 1982. [15] These were nontrivial technological breakthroughs and added credibility to China's nuclear power status. The year 1982 also saw the formal announcement of China's 'independent' foreign policy, where it would 'never attach itself to any superpower, or enter into alliance or strategic relations with either of them.'[16] From the perspective of US-China relations, Beijing was

[14] Zi Zhongyun, 'The Impact and Clash of Ideologies: Sino-US Relations from a Historical Perspective,' *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 6, No. 16 (1997), p. 548.
[15] Pollack, 'China and the Global Strategic Balance,' pp. 71-72.
[16] Foot, *The Practice of Power*, p. 234.

effectively signalling that it would not accept being relegated to a 'subordinate role' vis-à-vis the US even as ties deepened. There were of course other reasons for adopting this strategic position but Beijing evidently had misgivings of being perceived as a junior partner to the US.[17] This in some ways mirrored the PRC's previous pursuit of an autonomous path from the USSR, reflecting a certain continuity in the big power mindset.[18] In 1984, the Chinese government successfully negotiated the transfer of Hong Kong's sovereignty from the United Kingdom to China. Effective from 1997, the handover agreement was generally considered to have been a major diplomatic victory and it boosted Chinese national pride, addressing a longstanding issue symbolic of former humiliations at the hands of foreign aggressors.[19]

By the latter half of the 1980s, China's economy was powering ahead with encouraging results. China's relations with the Soviet Union improved, as they did with several other countries, including Japan. US-China relations also broadened with a reduction in frictions, and this helped facilitate increased sales of US military equipment to China. On the international front, therefore, there was a greater sense of security and stability, which aided the advancement of Deng's domestic reform programme. By 1986, Huan Xiang, a prominent scholar-diplomat who served as Deng's national security advisor, argued, '…after revision of its domestic and international policy,' China's

[17] Vladimir Petrov, 'China Goes It Alone,' *Asian Survey*, Vol. 23, No. 5 (1983), pp. 580-597.
[18] Petrov described the Chinese assertion of strategic independence as 'audacity.' See Ibid: p. 589.
[19] Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), p. 675.

'position in the three poles [i.e. US, USSR and China] is definite.'[20] A year later, Huan along with General Yang Dezhi, went on to assert that 'the mentality of being a world power' was imperative for China and that it 'should not be satisfied with being a second-class power or regional power.'[21] Also that year, analyst Chen Feng, writing in the influential Chinese journal *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi (World Economics and Politics)*, noted that 'China is a big power turning towards the world,' one that would 'inevitably produce a central impact on both the world system and itself.'[22] Such analyses indicated a level of perceptual self-consistency regarding the PRC's great power identity.

On the whole, Chinese leaders and intellectuals were realistic about China's capabilities in the 1980s. They frequently described a national Self that was still relatively poor and backward. And up to a point, this self-perception had been 'learned' during China's interactions with the US and other developed nations. This did not imply that China eschewed its great power perspective: on several occasions, it continued to perceive international affairs through the lens of a big power. Rather, such thinking became more measured and less presumptuous. Deng's remarks probably sum up the identity dichotomy best: 'China is both a major power and a minor one. When we say it is a major power, we mean it has a huge population and a vast

[20] Huan Xiang is largely credited as the person who introduced the concept of multipolarity in post-Mao foreign policy discourse. See Huan Xiang, 'Dui Shijie Xingshi Fazhan Qushi De Fenxi Ji Junwei Tichu Zhuanru "Heping Shiqi" Zhanlue Juece De Lilun Yiju' [An Analysis of the Development Trends in the World Situation and the Theoretical Basis of the Central Military Commission's Strategic Policy Regarding the Shift to the "Period of Peace"], in *Huan Xiang Wenji [Collected Works of Huan Xiang]*, (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 1994), pp. 1327-1328.

[21] Yang Dezhi and Huan Xiang, *Guofang Fazhan Zhanlue Sikao [Thinking on National Defense Development Strategy]*, (Beijing: Jiefangjun Chubanshe, 1987), p. 23.

[22] Chen Feng, 'Luelun Guoji Yicun' [A Brief Discussion of International Mutual Dependence], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics]*, Vol. 2 (1987), p. 37.

territory, although it has more mountains than arable land. But at the same time, China is a minor power, an underdeveloped or developing country. If we talk about China's ability to safeguard peace and deter war, it is certainly a minor one.'[23]

Perceptions of Responsibility in the 1980s

Chinese statements alluding to the notion of responsibility were limited during the 1980s. Even so, Deng was one principal exponent of the concept though he did not necessarily reference the idea of responsibility directly. As Deng stated: 'China's contribution to the world is not small' and 'if its material foundation and strength grow stronger, this contribution will inevitably become bigger.'[24] On another occasion, he emphasised that China's 'primary foreign policy duty was to strive for peace' and it was critical that it assumed the role of a 'peaceful, not-warlike' power.[25] In 1985, the Chinese premier Zhao Ziyang added to this discourse with an implicit reference to the idea of big power responsibility. Taking the unusual step of writing in a foreign journal, *International Affairs*, Zhao expressed the view that '[as] a large country with a population of one thousand million, China is aware of its

[23] Deng Xiaoping, 'Heping He Fazhan Shi Dangdai Shijie De Liangda Wenti' [Peace and Development are the Two Main Issues in the World Today], in *Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan Disanjuan [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume III]*, (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1993), p. 105.
[24] Xu Shengxi, 'Deng Xiaoping Guanyu Zhengqiang Woguo Guoji Diwei De Sixiang' [Regarding Deng Xiaoping's Thought on Strengthening the Nation's International Position], *Guoji Zhengzhi Yanjiu [International Politics Quarterly]*, Vol. 3 (1995), p. 76.
[25] Wang Zhongshen, 'Lun Deng Xiaoping De Zhongguo Xingxiang Guan' [Discussing Deng Xiaoping's View on China's Image], *Fujian Lutan [Fujian Forum]*, Vol. 6 (1994), p. 3.

responsibility and its weight in international affairs.'[26] While the significance of these remarks should not be exaggerated, they did hint at some awareness of China's international obligations and a belief that power begets additional responsibilities.

In 1988, Deng employed the Chinese term for responsible, *fuzeren*, to characterise China, in what appeared to be the first time a Chinese leader used this adjective to describe the country. In comments made to the visiting US national security advisor Frank Carlucci, Deng called China 'a trustworthy nation, a responsible nation.' [27] To be sure, Deng had given this characterisation in response to American concerns about the alleged sales of the Silkworm missile to Iran; hence, it was contingent and did not refer to a broader sense of global responsibility as such.[28] It was against this backdrop that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) would proceed to describe China in similar terms in its announcement of the 'three principles of arms sales' the same year:

> China is a responsible country. Concerning the question of military products export, we always assume a serious, prudent, and responsible attitude. In this regard, we strictly adhere to three principles: First, our military products export should help strengthen the legitimate self-defense capability of the countries

[26] Zhao Ziyang, 'The Objectives of China's Foreign Policy: For Lasting Peace, Increased Friendly Cooperation and Co-Prosperity,' *International Affairs*, Vol. 61, No. 4 (1995), p. 578.
[27] Sun Yi, 'Deng Xiaoping Huijian Carlucci' [Deng Xiaoping Meets Carlucci], *Renmin Ribao [People's Daily]*, 8 September 1988.
[28] To a lesser extent, Washington was also concerned about Chinese arm sales to Saudi Arabia, which Beijing did not deny. See Eden Y. Woon, 'Chinese Arms Sales and US-China Military Relations,' *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXIX, No. 6 (1989), p. 611-614.

concerned; second, it should help safeguard and promote peace, security, and stability in the regions concerned; and third, we do not use the military sale to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations.[29]

Beyond the rhetoric, Chinese international behaviour in the 1980s did seem more 'responsible' than any other time in the PRC's history.[30] From 1977 to 1988, China signed 148 multilateral treaties, an increase of more than five times as compared with 1949-1970.[31] Its membership in non-governmental organisations increased from 71 to 574 during the same period.[32] By 1989, it had joined 37 major intergovernmental forums which included, among others, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.[33] China also became discernibly more supportive of and participatory within the UN, an institution it once derided as a 'dirty international political stock exchange in the grip of a few big powers.'[34]

The support of the United Nations was most evident in the shift of Chinese policy regarding UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs). In the 1950s and 1960s, China viewed such activities negatively, considering them illegitimate, a form of neo-colonialism and a tool of big power politics. In the

[29] 'Waijiao Bu Fayanren Qiangdiao: Zhongguo Chukou Junpin Shou Sanyuanzhe' [Foreign Ministry Spokesman Stresses: China Adheres to the Three Principles of Arm Sales], *Renmin Ribao [People's Daily]*, 9 September 1988.
[30] There are of course competing interpretations of what constitutes responsible behaviour in international society. These interpretations were surveyed earlier in my introductory chapter.
[31] *Shijie Zhishi Nianjian 1989/1990 [World Knowledge Yearbook 1989/1990]*, (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 1990), pp. 1047-1064.
[32] Samuel S. Kim, 'China's International Organisational Behaviour,' in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 406.
[33] Samuel S. Kim, 'Thinking Globally in Post-Mao China,' *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1990), p. 193.
[34] Ibid.

1970s, its attitude towards UN peacekeeping had become less antagonistic but still indifferent overall. The critical watershed came on 18 December 1981. On that occasion, the PRC voted for the extension of the UN contingent in Cyprus (UNFICYP), marking its first 'positive approach' towards a mandate of UN peacekeeping forces.[35] The following year, in 1982, it also started to assume its share of expenses relating to the UNIFIL (the UN Interim Force in Lebanon) and UNDOF (the UN Disengagement Observer Force) operations. By 1988, the PRC had become a full member of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. This facilitated a more active Chinese role in UN peacekeeping and it subsequently voted in favour of the establishment of three new groups, *viz.* the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), the UN Good Offices Mission to Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), and the UN Observer Group in Central America (UNOGICA).[36] In 1989, China sent twenty civilians to join the UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG) and five military observers to serve in the UNDOF—its first ground involvement with UN peacekeeping forces.[37]

In the area of arms control and non-proliferation, notwithstanding behaviour that included assisting Pakistan's nuclear programme and the sale of arms to Iran and Iraq during the 1980-1988 Gulf War, there were also nascent contributions from China.[38] Whereas in the Maoist period China mostly shunned or criticised such regimes, the 1980s marked the start of

[35] See Yongjin Zhang, 'China and UN Peacekeeping: From Condemnation to Participation,' *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1996), pp. 1-3; Yitzhak Shichor, 'China and the Role of the United Nations in the Middle East,' *Asian Survey*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (1991), p. 261.
[36] Shichor, 'China and the Role of the United Nations in the Middle East,' pp. 261-266.
[37] Zhang, 'China and UN Peacekeeping: From Condemnation to Participation,' p. 9.
[38] Woon, 'Chinese Arms Sales and US-China Military Relations,' p. 603.

growing Chinese participation in them. Notable developments included joining the Conference of Disarmament (CD) in 1981; ratification of the Inhumane Weapons Convention in 1982; creation of the diplomatic post of Special Ambassador for Disarmament in 1983; accession to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and membership of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984; and ratifications of the South Pacific Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone Treaty and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in 1987 and 1989 respectively.[39] Chinese leaders and officials also made a number of notable announcements that indicated China would move in the direction of greater non-proliferation commitments. As early as in 1985, Beijing declared that it 'would be willing to reconsider its position' in regard to the formation of a nuclear test ban body.[40] Another noteworthy announcement came in 1986 when Beijing formally confirmed that it 'had not conducted atmospheric nuclear tests for many years and would thereafter not conduct [such] tests in the future.'[41]

There was thus considerable evidence that 1980s China was a substantially different international actor from the earlier Maoist version. No longer seeking to be a disruptive influence on the extant global order, the PRC

[39] See Alastair Iain Johnston and Paul Evans, 'China's Engagement with Multilateral Security Institutions,' in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross, eds., *Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power* (Abingdon: Routledge, 1999), pp. 235-272; Ann Kent, *Beyond Compliance: China, International Organisations and Global Security* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 65-77; Zhou Baogen, 'Zhongguo Yu Guoji He Bu Kuosan Jizhi De Yizhong Gongjian Zhuyi Fenxi' [A Constructivist Analysis of China and the International Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics]*, Vol. 2 (2003), pp. 23-27.

[40] Kent, *Beyond Compliance*, p. 75; See also Evan S. Medeiros, *Reluctant Restraint: The Evolution of China's Nonproliferation Policies and Practices, 1980-2004* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 30-96.

[41] Xie Yixian, *Zhongguo Dangdai Waijiao Shi, 1949-2001 [Contemporary Chinese Diplomatic History, 1949-2001]* (Beijing: Zhongguo Qingnian Chuban She, 2002), p. 388.

now endeavoured to 'link up with the international track' (*yu guoji jiegui*).[42] And while it had yet to meet a number of the membership requirements of a Western-oriented international society, the general trend suggested a country leaning towards that direction. It would be problematic nevertheless to link the overall more cooperative behaviour to Chinese views of responsibility. Such rhetoric had been too limited and contingent in the 1980s to have formed a substantive role for China. At that time, there were also few attempts by relevant 'Others' such as the US or the international society to engage China from the normative perspective of responsibility.[43] China's behaviour could be better and more simply understood as a consequence of its reform and opening-up policy: a more participatory international approach was seen as essential for gaining access to Western technology, expertise and capital. At the same time, it was crucial that China forestalled a hostile external environment that could potentially thwart this access and derail its development. It was hence important that Chinese behaviour tried to align with, or at least not actively challenge, the prevailing global system.[44]

[42] Hongying Wang, 'Linking Up with the International Track: What's in a Slogan,' *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 189 (2007), pp. 1-23.
[43] This is not to say that the US and the international society did not try to promote China's integration into the existing global order. See Foot, *Practice of Power*, p. 223.
[44] Rana Mitter, 'An Uneasy Engagement: Chinese Ideas of Global Order and Justice in Historical Perspective,' in Rosemary Foot, John Lewis Gaddis and Andy Hurrell, eds., *Order and Justice in International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 223.

An Incipient Official 'Responsible Great Power' Identity: Early to Mid 1990s

The Transitional Period of 1989-1991

The end of the 1980s came as a severely testing time for Beijing as forces unleashed by the 4 June 1989 Tiananmen massacre threatened to destabilise the country. Internally, the CCP was weakened by factional strife, a development that meant the temporary slowing down of economic reforms. Domestically, the CCP faced serious questions over the legitimacy of its rule, a problem further exacerbated by the subsequent fall of Eastern European communist regimes. On the external front, the PRC met with intense excoriation from Western governments, especially the US, resulting in diplomatic and material sanctions being imposed against it.[45]

The Tiananmen bloodshed had palpable implications for China's identity. As a result of the CCP's actions, the US and its allies effectively regarded the PRC as a pariah state in international society. [46] This negative identity perception was not lost on the CCP leadership but in Beijing, the message was interpreted differently. The PRC saw itself as the target of unjust American imperialism, whose ultimate goal was to subvert the Chinese political system. Sanctions by the Group of Seven and attempts to isolate it were likened to a gross interference in Chinese internal affairs and sovereignty. The upshot was that a historically-informed victim identity

[45] Joseph Fewsmith, *China since Tiananmen* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 21-47.
[46] Yongjin Zhang, *China in International Society since 1949: Alienation and Beyond* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1998), p. 248.

would come increasingly to the fore in Beijing. Deng's words were telling; he said:

> I am a Chinese, and I know about the history of foreign aggression against China. When I heard that the seven Western countries had decided to impose sanctions on China, my immediate association was to 1900, when the allied forces of the eight powers (*baguo lianjun*) invaded China.[47]

Deng also concluded that the Tiananmen crisis reflected a failure in 'ideological and political education' and his response was to initiate a patriotic education programme that deliberately sought to remind the country about China's former humiliations at the hands of foreign powers.[48] This policy further perpetuated Chinese self-perception as a victim of international *realpolitik*.

In addition, the ending of the Cold War, starting from around late 1989, compelled Beijing to reassess its international position. From a geopolitical perspective, this situation did not seem propitious for China. Not only would Beijing lose the strategic leverage that it might once have enjoyed as a result of US-Soviet competition, it also meant that the strategic rationale that had underpinned the US-Sino relationship—the common Soviet threat—was basically gone. Of course, by the late 1980s, tripolarity dynamics had been less

[47] Deng Xiaoping, 'Zhenxing Zhongguo Mingzhu' [Rejuvenate the Chinese Nation], in *Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan Disanjuan [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume III]*, (Beijing Renmin Chubanshe, 1993), p. 357.
[48] William Callahan, *China: The Pessoptimist Nation* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 31-59.

of a factor as both the US and China pursued détente with the USSR.[49] Still, because foreign policy had been conceived for most parts of the PRC's history in largely globalist terms, the end of the Cold War seemed to imply an inevitable reduction of China's global significance and influence. Its political position was also not helped by the fact that communism in the Soviet bloc countries was unravelling quickly.[50] Thus, the general conclusion among many analysts was that 'China's global position and leverage have been weakened.'[51]

Around this time, Deng would go on to issue a twenty-eight character axiom as a strategic compass for China's foreign policy direction—*Lengjing Guancha, Wenzhu Zhenjiao, Chenzuo Yingfu, Taoguang Yanghui, Shanyu Shouzhou, Juebu Dangtou, Yousuo Zuowei*—which roughly translates to: 'Calmly observe; secure our footing; handle the situation soberly; hide our capacities and bide our time; excel in keeping a low profile; avoid being the leader; but do some things.'[52] Although this dictum was prescribed in the context of a perceived precarious environment, it had implications for Chinese great power identity. The words 'hide our capacities and bide our time; excel in keeping a low profile; avoid being the leader' could be construed as advice for China to conceal or downplay the great power aspects of its identity (albeit for the time being). However, the final part of the axiom,

[49] Xiaoxiong Yi, 'China's US Policy Conundrum in the 1980s: Balancing Autonomy and Interdependence,' *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXIV, No. 8 (1994), p. 679.
[50] Rosemary Foot, *Rights Beyond Borders* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 138-139.
[51] Bonnie S. Glaser, 'China's Security Perceptions: Interests and Ambitions,' *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 3 (1993), p. 253.
[52] 'Wu Jianmin Jiangshu Zhongguo Waijiao 60 Nian: Taoguang Yanghui Ren Yaoguan 100 Nian' [Wu Jianmin Talks about 60 Years of China's Foreign Policy: We Should Keep a Low Profile for 100 years], *Xinhua*, 1 June 2009.

'do some things,' did suggest that China should undertake some limited activities. Deng would later furnish additional insights into his strategic thoughts. In reference to some developing countries' hope for China to assume a bigger global role, he replied, 'China must not try to be the leader (*bu dangtou*). This is one of our basic national strategies.' In Deng's view, 'China is not strong enough and cannot afford to be in this position' and that 'to be in this role will not benefit China, but make China lose many initiatives.'[53] One could thus see that there was a strategic dimension in Chinese identity construction: a bigger global role was seen as potentially detrimental given China's extant level of development.

China's heightened sense of vulnerability would be reinforced during and immediately after the 1990 Gulf War. The war vividly demonstrated the unmatched technological superiority of the American war machine and, conversely, highlighted the vast disparities between the US and Chinese militaries.[54] By comparison, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) seemed antiquated. The dominant view in the Chinese military then was that 'the American troops are very strong and powerful and we are not a match for them.'[55] Furthermore, the ease with which the US had been able to orchestrate affairs within the UN to accommodate its military agenda was disconcerting to the Chinese.[56]

---

[53] Deng Xiaoping, 'Shanyu Liyong Shiji Jiejue Fazhan Wenti' [Be Adept at Using the Time to Solve our Development Question], in *Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan Disanjuan [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume III]*, (Beijing Renmin Chubanshe, 1993), p. 363.
[54] Jianhai Bi, 'The Role of the Military in the PRC Taiwan Policymaking: A Case Study of the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996,' *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 11, No. 32 (2002), p. 551.
[55] Harry Harding, *A Fragile Relationship*, p. 296.
[56] Foot, *The Practice of Power*, p. 248.

Yet, because the Gulf war was prosecuted under the aegis of the UN, it was also a timely reminder that China could not be ignored in world affairs: as one of the Permanent Five, Beijing retained the right to veto American initiatives in the Security Council.[57] More importantly, the conflict represented an opportunity for post-Tiananmen China to repair its relations with the US as well as improve its international image. Thus, during the Gulf crisis, Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen made a special trip to Iraq to meet Saddam Hussein, and the contents of this private meeting were later shared with 'relevant countries.' This gesture, Qian later claimed in his memoirs, was greatly appreciated by the countries concerned and was considered an 'indication of the serious, responsible spirit of China as a large country…'[58] In the Security Council, China voted for all ten UN resolutions that imposed sanctions on Baghdad, abstaining only on Resolution 678 which authorised the use of force against Iraq. Signally, the day after China's abstention on Resolution 678, Qian was able to secure a meeting with President George H. W. Bush, thus officially ending the American prohibition on high-level bilateral contact.[59]

[57] Deng was apparently pleased about this 'reminder.' As Deng reportedly said when he saw Qian Qichen's vote of abstention on UN resolution 678 on television: 'By holding up his hand, he again showed the world that China has a decisive say in solving major disputes in the world.' Incidentally, in 1990, Deng also declared China a 'political big power.' See Michael Yahuda, 'Deng Xiaoping: The Statesman,' *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 135 (1993), pp. 565-566; Deng Xiaoping, 'Zhenxing Zhongguo Mingzhu,' p. 357.

[58] Qian Qichen, *Waijiao Shiji [Ten Episodes in China's Diplomacy]* (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 2003), p. 96.

[59] In his memoirs, Qian revealed that US Secretary of State James Baker had linked the prospect of Qian's visit to Washington to China's cooperation in the UN Security Council. Baker had hoped that China would vote for, or at least not veto, Resolution 678. However, after China's vote, Qian complained that President Bush still refused to receive him and it took a 3am call to US national security advisor Brent Scowcroft in order for this symbolic meeting to materialise. See Ibid: p. 98; 103-104.

Interestingly, China's support for UN sanctions had been, on occasions, expressed in the language of responsibility. For example, in response to media allegations that the PRC had violated the UN trade embargo against Iraq, Beijing declared, 'China is a responsible country. We have been holding a very serious attitude toward the implementation of resolution 661.'[60] That China would defend itself as a responsible state here was perhaps not surprising. It had earlier asserted itself as such (in 1988) and that was also in an area connected to a Middle East security issue. Yet, what was notable during the Gulf crisis was that some Western officials also used this same language of responsibility in relation to Chinese behaviour. As one Western diplomat saw it and was quoted as saying in the *Washington Post*, China's generally supportive Gulf stance could be linked to the importance of being perceived as 'a friendly, responsible power.'[61] This suggested that other foreign nations were either taking greater notice of Chinese claims of responsibility or themselves beginning to use the parlance of responsibility to assess China.

In 1991, the Soviet Union finally collapsed and Beijing was forced to confront an uncomfortable reality that had been looming for a while: it was now the last major socialist power. Recognising the fundamentally contradictory nature of the Chinese and American political systems, residual

[60] 'Waijiao Fayanren Shuo: Zhongguo Zhishing Anlihui 661 Haojueyi Shi Renzhen De' [Foreign Affairs Spokesman: China's Implementation of Resolution 661 is Serious], *Renmin Ribao [People's Daily]*, 1 October 1990.
[61] Lena H.Sun, 'China to Halt Arms Sales to Iraqis,' *Washington Post*, 6 August 1990.

CCP fears about a putative US ploy of peaceful evolution were stoked.[62] Nevertheless, many Chinese scholars still remained hopeful and argued that the overall trend portended a shift towards greater multipolarisation (*duojihua*), reviving an argument that first took shape in 1986. Indeed, official rhetoric in 1991-1992 also indicated such an assessment, noting that 'this is the initial stage of the evolution towards multipolarisation.' According to the multipolarisation view, the coming global order would resemble a five-pole configuration comprising mainly, the US, China, Japan, Russia and Europe/Germany.[63] This greater levelling of power, it was claimed, would come primarily as an upshot of the US's strategic overextension, as evidenced by its increasing economic woes, domestic problems and growing tensions with allies.[64] In effect, *duojihua* foretold a situation of growing power equivalence between the US and China.

Comprehensive National Power and First References

By 1992, the post-Tiananmen diplomatic isolation was nearing an end. China's economic direction was also given greater clarity and impetus with Deng's high-profile trip to the South. Overall, the impression that Beijing conveyed (human rights-democratic issues notwithstanding) was that it was committed to integrating China further with the world. Around this time, Beijing began to give greater attention to the question of China's power

[62] Qimao Chen, 'New Approaches in China's Foreign Policy: The Post-Cold War Era,' *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 3 (1993), p. 238.
[63] Rosemary Foot, 'Chinese Strategies in a US-hegemonic Global Order: Accommodating and Hedging,' *International Affairs*, Vol. 82 (2006), p. 81.
[64] Yong Deng, 'Hegemon on the Offensive: Global Perspectives on US Global Strategy,' *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 116, No. 3 (2001), pp. 345-346.

status—what it is and how to measure it. The notion of comprehensive national power (CNP; *zonghe guoli*) was proposed. While the idea originated in the 1980s at the behest of Deng, it was only at the 1992 Fourteenth Party Congress that it was included in official documents for the first time. Noting the inevitability of a 'comprehensive national power competition,' Jiang Zemin, the CCP General Secretary, stated then that 'the core of current international contest is comprehensive national power based on economic and political power.'[65]

Colonel Huang Shuofeng, one of the principal authors of the CNP idea, went on to give further conceptual flesh to the term in the monograph *Zonghe Guoli Lun* (*Discussing Comprehensive National Power*). In Huang's view, the objective of CNP was to 'assess the comprehensive power of enemies, allies, and one's own country in order to scientifically plan national strategic decision-making.'[66] To this end, Huang defined CNP as comprising four main power 'indices': material, spirit, coordination and environment. He explained, 'The material power and spirit power indexes reflects a country's [hard and soft] strength for existence and development; the coordination power index reflects the leadership system of organization, command, management and decision-making; and the environment power index reflects the restricting circumstances of comprehensive national power.' Based on

[65] Zheng Yongnian, *Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernisation, Identity and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 115.
[66] Huang Shuofeng, *Zonghe Guoli Lun [Discussing Comprehensive National Power]* (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1992), p. 159.

Huang's CNP formulation, the PRC ranked sixth in the global power hierarchy in 1989.[67]

The official introduction of the CNP concept was a nontrivial juncture in the trajectory of China's great power identity. In a sense, it represented for the first time a Chinese attempt to formalise and systematise an assessment of great powerhood. Although CNP did not measure the notion of 'greatness' per se, the concept sought to establish a country's relative power position in the international system, which was one indicator of whether that country was in or out of the great power club. Furthermore, the notion of CNP took into account both tangible and intangible factors as well as exogenous and endogenous conditions. This suggested a degree of holism that more conventional power measures (i.e. military strength, gross national product, population, land size) lack. Compared to these one-dimensional indicators, CNP seemed more reliable in quantifying the rise (or fall) of China. The importance of CNP measurement on China's self-image was not lost on Zheng Yongnian; as he put it, CNP was the 'the new face' of Chinese identity.[68] Significantly, it aimed to estimate and verify the degree to which China would be able to categorise itself as a major power.

The year 1992 also marked another notable development. At a speech given at the luncheon of the US Foreign Policy Association, Qian Qichen declared China a 'responsible great power' (*fuzheren de daguo*). This was the first occasion that a senior Chinese leader combined both terms—'responsible'

[67] Ibid: p. 162; 220-221.
[68] Zheng, *Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China*, p. 119.

and 'great power'—to express an aggregate PRC identity. Qian's elaboration of the RGP self-image went as follows:

> As one of the world's responsible great powers, China will strive for world peace and development in its foreign policy of independence and peace. As such, it will continue to observe the principles of mutual respect, equality and non-interference in its relations with the world and neighbouring countries. China will continue to participate in regional peace-making efforts. It will strengthen UN coordination and international cooperation in the maintenance of world peace and security as well as other major international issues. China will also unwaveringly work towards the establishment of a new international economic order that is just, reasonable and equal.[69]

Qian's words painted a China that seemed eager to work closer together with other powers in the pursuit of common international goods. Yet, the comment 'establishment of a new international economic order' appeared to imply some disenchantment with the status quo in the global economy. This might be due to the fact that China at that point was still subjected to the yearly American scrutiny of its MFN (Most Favored Nation) status. Following Qian's proclamation, Jiang also began to incorporate the idea of responsibility

[69] He Hongze, 'Zai Meiguo Waijiao Zhengce Xiehui Shang Qian Qichen Tan Zhongmei Guanxi Zhichu: Shuangfang Yingben Zhe Huxiang Zunzhong, Pingdeng Xiangdai, Xinshou Nuoyan, Zunshou Xiehui De Jingshen Chuli Liangguo Guanxi [Foreign Minister Qian Qichen Discusses Sino-American Relations at the US Foreign Policy Association Meeting: Both Sides Should Adopt the Spirit of Mutual Respect, Mutual Equality, Keeping Promises and Respecting Agreements to Handle Bilateral Relations], *Renmin Ribao [People's Daily]*, 24 September 1992.

in his speeches. At the 1993 Seattle APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) conference, Jiang told his audience:

> But if the world continues to be chaotic, insecure and plagued by economic troubles at the turn of the century, how are we going to account for this to the world's people? As we assumed leadership at a time of transition from the old to the new century, we were predestined to carry such a responsibility.[70]

It was likely that Qian and Jiang made these initial references to responsibility mainly out of an instrumental concern for China's external image. China had just broken out, or was on the verge of breaking out, of the post-Tiananmen isolation that had been foisted on it. Thus, it was important that the country and its leaders were portrayed in a way that denoted a positive international orientation, one seemingly more aligned with global norms and more willing to make contributions. That both leaders chose to articulate the role of a responsible China in a foreign setting was indicative: it suggested that the target audience of this communication was external 'Others.'

[70] *Speech by President Jiang Zemin at the Informal APEC Leadership Conference*, 20 November 1993. Available at: http//www.fmprc.gov.cn/.

By the mid-1990s, there was less Chinese reticence about categorising the PRC as a great power even as Beijing continued to perpetuate a twin identity narrative of historical victim and an underdeveloped country. Concerning the victim discourse, it was helped by the patriotic education programme that had been steadily developing inside Chinese society since 1990. Emphasising a version of the past that underscored China's 'national humiliations,' the programme oversaw the production of textbooks and materials—e.g. *The Indignation of National Humiliation* (1990), A *Dictionary of National Humiliation* (1992), *Simple Dictionary of National Humiliation* (1993)—that highlighted the negative role perception of China as a victim of history. It also helped fuel a nationalistic domestic climate that would inspire calls in 1995 to establish a 'national humiliation day' as well as the publication of popular books such as Song Qiang's *China Can Say No* (1996).[71]

Yet, alongside the victim self-perception, Chinese confidence in assuming a big power role was evidently growing. As noted previously in the introductory chapter, Chinese victim and great power identities are not necessarily mutually exclusive; indeed, William Callahan has described this mixture of insecurity and self-confidence as 'pessoptimism.'[72] Thus, even as some intellectuals continued to promulgate the narrative of Chinese victimisation, from around 1992, others were increasingly advocating that

[71] Callahan, *China: The Pessoptimist Nation*, pp. 31-59; Song Qiang, Zhang Cangcang, Qiao Bian and Gu Qingsheng, *Zhongguo Keyi Shuobu [China Can Say No]*, (Beijing: Zhonghua Gongshang Lianhe Chubanshe, 1996).
[72] Ibid.

China should adopt a big power mindset. Many Chinese scholars held the view that while the US remained (and looked likely to continue as) the sole superpower, the PRC was nonetheless among the major powers of the world. This was encapsulated by the Chinese phrase *yichao duoqiang* (one superpower, many great powers).[73]

One prominent contributor to the great power discourse in China at that time was Wang Yizhou, a scholar at the Institute of World Economics and Politics (IWEP) of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS).[74] Noting in 1994 that the nation had achieved annual economic growth rates of more than 10 percent for the past three years, Wang wrote that the PRC's growing impact on the global balance of power was 'indubitable.' Wang's conclusion was that there had been increased 'movement towards great power affairs (*daguohua*)' in China's foreign policy.[75] Ye Zicheng, a scholar of international relations at Beijing University, offered a more nuanced appraisal. In a detailed 1994 study of Chinese great power identity, Ye called China 'a great power that is not really a great power,' an insight essentially predicated on Deng's earlier characterisation of the country as both a major and minor power.[76] Nevertheless, Ye proceeded to identify what he defined as the core principles of Chinese 'great power consciousness' (*daguo yishi*). The first was a sense of

[73] Some scholars like Wang Jisi, then director of the Institute of American Studies at CASS, believed that 'the superpower (US) is more super, and the many great powers are less great.' See Wang Jisi, 'Building a Constructive Relationship,' in Morton Abramowitz, Funabashi Yochi, and Wang Jisi, *China-Japan-US: Managing the Trilateral Relationship* (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1998), p. 22.
[74] Interview with analyst at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, May 2011.
[75] Wang Yizhou, 'Gengjia "Daguohua" De Yinian' [Another Year of Increasing "Movement towards Great Power Affairs"], *Shijie Zhishi [World Affairs]*, Vol. 24 (1994), pp. 2-3.
[76] Ye Zicheng, ' "Daguo Fei Daguo" Yu Zhongguo De Guoji Diwei' ["A Great Power that is not Really a Great Power": China's International Position], *Guoji Zhengzhi Yanjiu [International Politics Quarterly]*, Vol. 4 (1994), pp. 1-2.

'internal consciousness' that prioritised domestic development and needs first. The second principle was to oppose great power chauvinism, hegemonism and superpower dominance. These were the 'warped, perverted and harmful' forms of great powerhood. The third principle was a 'consciousness of peace' which Ye attributed to China's putative tradition of pacifism throughout its history. 'On both paths before and after China becomes a "global" great power,' Ye further argued, 'peace is necessary.'[77]

In 1995, the IWEP produced what was the second major assessment (after Huang's 1992 study) of China's comprehensive national strength. Using an alternative methodology, the IWEP estimated that the PRC ranked 10th in the global CNP order. This placed China one place ahead of South Korea (11th) and suggested that the PRC was at best a second-tier power.[78] Nevertheless, in 1996, the idea of China as a great power received direct endorsement from the government. Chinese great power identity, Jiang announced, would lead Beijing to embark on 'great power diplomacy' (*daguo waijiao*). This implied an emphasis on relations with other big powers such as Russia, France and the US, and it would be aimed at establishing 'strategic partnerships' with these countries.[79] One example of such collaboration was the 1996 Sino-Russian

[77] Ibid: pp. 4-5.
[78] The Committee for Research on Comprehensive National Power Comparison, 'Zhongguo Guoji Diwei De Bianhua Fenxi' [An Analysis of Changes in China's International Position], *Taipingyang Xuebao [Pacific Journal]*, Vol. 1 (1995) , pp. 135-144.
[79] H. Lyman Miller and Liu Xiaohong, 'The Foreign Policy Outlook of China's "Third Generation" Elite,' in David M. Lampton, ed., *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 144.

'strategic cooperative partnership,' which some Chinese analysts hailed as a 'paragon of bipolar engagement.'[80]

An important reason why Beijing was now more confident about articulating a big power role view related to its self-awareness that the country was becoming more significant in the global economy. Between 1978 and 1995, the PRC's total national output increased by around 400 percent, making it the fastest growing economy in the world. If one estimated the size of China's economy on the basis of purchasing power parity (PPP), the World Bank estimated that China's 1994 gross domestic product (GDP) was already equivalent to the world's second largest economy, behind only to the US.[81] The economic factor aside, the increased centrality of UN institutions in world affairs in which Chinese involvement was crucial, China's relatively quick extrication from the post-Tiananmen isolation, and the continuing resilience of the Chinese political model, were additional conditions prompting the development of the great power self-categorisation.

Important also to this identity formation was the role of the United States. In late 1992, Barber B. Conable Jr. and David Lampton, as the chairman and president of the National Committee on US-China relations respectively, argued that 'China's strategic value is inaccurately perceived as having greatly diminished following the collapse of the Soviet Union,' with the

[80] Zhao Junjie, Wang Pingzhen and Huo Yanping, 'Jiang Zemin Yu Zhongguo Waijiao Xingeju' [Jiang Zemin and China's New Diplomatic Situation], *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lishiwang [The History of the People's Republic of China]*, http://www.hrpc.org.cn/.
[81] Samuel S. Kim, 'China as a Great Power,' in Orville Schell and David Shambaugh, eds., *The China Reader* (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), pp. 450-451.

implication being that China remained an indispensable global power.[82] This perception was shared by the new Clinton administration. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord, for one, had contended that '[China] is salient in new challenges that require global action.'[83] Later in 1994, when the administration unexpectedly dropped its earlier policy of linking China's MFN status to the issue of human rights, this seemed to many to be a tacit admission of the PRC's rising economic clout. By the mid-1990s, the US consensus was that there had been an overall augmentation of China's strategic significance and power since the end of the Cold War.[84]

Washington thus saw the PRC as a big power and, indeed, had communicated this role perception to Beijing. But its role prescription was more than that: it hoped that the PRC would assume the responsibilities that the US thought corresponded with its rising status. Clinton told Jiang in 1995:

> …a stable, open and prosperous China—in other words, a strong China—is in our interest. We welcome China to the great power table. But great powers also have great responsibilities.[85]

The RGP rhetoric was repeated the following year by both Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Defense Secretary William Perry. In an important statement on US-China relations, Christopher stated that while the United

[82] Barber B. Conable, Jr. and David M. Lampton, 'China: The Coming Power,' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 5 (Winter 1992/1993), p. 134.
[83] Foot, *The Practice of Power*, p. 255.
[84] David M. Lampton, 'China and Clinton's America: Have They Learned Anything?' *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXVII, No. 12 (1997), pp. 1099-1118.
[85] Joseph S. Nye, 'The "Nye Report": Six Years Later,' *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 1 (2001), p. 98.

States 'strongly supports' China's emergence as a nation 'that is taking its place as a world leader,' it would also try to 'ensure' that China develops as 'a strong and responsible member of the international community.'[86] The Defense Secretary was more explicit still, directly exhorting China to behave as a 'responsible world power.' To Perry, this meant that Beijing should eschew irresponsible behaviour such as the exportation of nuclear technology, intimidation of Taiwan and abuse of human rights.[87]

In many respects, the American RGP call was a conditional affirmation of China's great power identity: while the US considered China to be a great power, the latter had to behave 'responsibly' for the US truly to recognize it as one. At the same time, it was also a reflection of the Clinton administration's policy of 'constructive engagement' with China. Although the administration had initially appeared to be unsure of its China policy direction, it soon concluded that isolating or containing the PRC was not in the interest of the US. This view was further sharpened in 1995 with the publication of the US National Security Strategy which argued that engagement would help coax Beijing to 'define its interests in ways that would be compatible with the [US].'[88] In this respect, the role prescription of a responsible great power was

[86] Warren Christopher, 'American Interests and the US-China Relationship,' *Address to the Asia Society, the Council on Foreign Relations and the National Committee on US-China Relations*, 17 May 1996. Available at the Electronic Research Collections (ERC) of the US Department of State and Federal Depository Library at the University of Illinois, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/index.html.
[87] Bill Gertz, 'Perry Calls on China to Earn US Trust: Airs Complaints on Rights, Nukes,' *The Washington Times*, 14 February 1996. Another senior US official who had communicated a similar message was National Security Adviser Anthony Lake. Although Lake did not evoke the specific language of responsibility, he apparently told Chinese leaders (during his 1996 visit to China) that Washington wanted Beijing to be a co-manager of the twenty-first century international order. See Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, 'Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to US Primacy,' *International Security*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Spring 2010), p. 84.
[88] Nye, 'The "Nye Report",' pp .95-103.

apposite. Joseph Nye, a former US Assistant Secretary of Defense and principal author of the 1995 US Security Strategy, would thus publicly state, 'Nothing is more important than integrating the rising power of China as a responsible member of the international system.'[89]

Interestingly, Chinese self-depiction as a responsible great power—not just a great power—was more evident during the mid-1990s, and it would seem that Beijing was trying to align more closely with the American role 'script' of China. In 1995, speaking at a luncheon hosted by American think tanks, President Jiang noted that China and the US are 'two great countries,' 'major powers with global influence' and 'permanent members of the UN security council.' That was why, he added, both 'share major responsibilities for world peace and development.'[90] Jiang would later make a similar RGP pitch at the 1996 Manila APEC conference, stating that both China and the US have 'common responsibilities' as big powers.[91] Similarly, when Foreign Minister Qian visited Chicago in 1996, he insisted that China, as a member of the Permanent Five, 'is fully aware of [its] responsibility for advancing world peace and stability and has always been working towards this end.'[92]

It would be facile, nevertheless, to attribute Chinese RGP identification during this period solely to the influence of Washington. Certainly, Beijing

---

[89] Joseph S. Nye, 'We Can't Afford to Lose China Again,' *Los Angeles Times*, 29 December 1996.
[90] *Chinese President Jiang Zemin's Speech at a Luncheon hosted in his honour by several US Organisations in New York, including the America-China Society, the National Committee on US-China Relations, the US-China Business Council, the Foreign Policy Association, the Council on Foreign Relations and the Asia Society*, 23 October 1995. Available at:http://www.nti.org/.
[91] 'Jiang Zemin Manila Se Huijian Kelindun' [Jiang Zemin Meets Clinton in Manila], *Zhongguo Zhongyang Dianshitai [China Network Television]*, 24 November 1996, at http://www.cctv.com/.
[92] *Speech by Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen at Luncheon Hosted by Chicago Council on Foreign Relations*, 20 September 1996. Available at:http://www.nti.org/.

wanted US validation (*rentong*) of its great power identity, and in that sense, would be more inclined to promote the narrative of China as a responsible great power. But as a further reading of Qian's Chicago speech suggests, the Chinese foreign minister made the RGP references partly to refute the 'China threat theory,' an argument that was starting to gain currency in the US and elsewhere. Qian indicated that even though China had always worked towards fulfilling its great power responsibilities in the Security Council, there were still prejudiced 'talks about the so-called China threat, a fallacy fabricated and disseminated with no regard to facts by some people around the world.'[93]

At the same time, external role ideas do not automatically find their way into Chinese identity perspectives; how these ideas are interpreted and appraised by the Chinese is important. Indeed, there was evidence to suggest that the American RGP exhortations were being viewed differently by some in China at that time.[94] For example, Song Yimin, a senior researcher at the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) and a former Foreign Affairs Ministry bureaucrat, suggested that such calls mainly reflected the limits of American power and influence and that Washington had 'little choice' but to ask other leading states (such as China) to assume greater global

[93] *Speech by Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen at Luncheon Hosted by Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.*

[94] As I have mentioned in the introductory chapter, there was a considerable range of Chinese intellectual responses vis-à-vis American calls for China to be a responsible great power. The focus of this chapter, however, is on those appraisals that had taken place in the mid-1990s, in response to the initial RGP calls.

responsibilities.[95] Yang Jiemian, a prominent scholar of US foreign policy, was similarly critical in his appraisal, writing in 1996 that such calls were nothing more than an attempt to use international rules to 'constrain' (*yueshu*) China and to turn it into a responsible great power that was 'only beneficial to the US.'[96] Others critiqued the American RGP call by arguing that Chinese great power responsibility should first be directed at the Asia-Pacific region. In this view, the US-Japan security arrangement should be dismantled and replaced by a 'just and rational,' four-power order of China, US, Japan and Russia; only then could the PRC assume the role of a 'balancer' and partake in the big power responsibilities of providing security for the region.[97]

Related scholarly contributions and ideas between 1993 and 1996 might also have facilitated or supported the official RGP identity. Broadly grouped into two interrelated strands, the first connected with the theme of China's role in the world. One example was Ye's 1994 study of Chinese great power identity in the Beijing University journal, *Guoji Zhengzhi Yanjiu (International Politics Quarterly)*, where he acknowledged the dialectical nature of this identity. Ye argued that, on the one hand, because China was a great power, it

[95] Song Yimin, 'Meiguo Waijiao Zhengce De Xintiaozheng' [New Readjustments in US Foreign Policy], *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies]*, Vol. 3 (1995), pp. 33-36.
[96] Currently, Yang Jiemian is the president of the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies. See Yang Jiemian, 'Meiguo Daxuan He Kelindun Zhengfu Tiaozheng Duihua Zhengce' [The American Election and the Shift in Clinton Administration's China Policy], *Meiguo Yanjiu [American Studies]*, Vol. 4 (1996), p. 132. For a similar view, see Jin Xiaochuan, 'Lun Xinjiu Guoji Zhixu Zhuanhuan Zhong De Zhongguo Guoji Jiaoshe' [Discussing China's International Role during the Change from Old to New International Order], *Xueshu Luntan [Learning Forum]*, Vol. 6 (1996), p. 76. Jin, a People's Liberation Army analyst, suggested that American views of China's international role often possessed an 'inhibitive' character (*yiduo yangshao*).
[97] Zhao Gancheng, 'Yatai Diqu Xinzhixu Yu Zhongguo de Zeren' [The New Order in Asia-Pacific and China's Responsibility], *Guoji Wenti Luntan [Forum on International Studies]*, Vol. 2 (1996), pp. 49-51; Shi Yongming, 'Yatai Anquan Huanjing Yu Diqu Duobian Zhuyi' [The Security Environment in Asia-Pacific and Regional Multilateralism], *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies]*, Vol. 1 (1996), pp. 41-47.

was necessarily different from other 'normal' developing countries and should assume its 'rightful, concomitant' responsibilities. On the other hand, because China was objectively still a developing nation, it should also recognise the limits of its influence and obligations.[98] Another scholar, Sheng Hong, advocated a change from a narrowly defined national Self to a cosmopolitan Chinese identity based on the traditional concept of *tianxia* ('all under heaven'). He reminded his audience that, historically, China's development was underpinned by a 'world' view, rather than 'national' view.[99] This 'world' view, as epitomised by the concept of *tianxia*, meant that China was responsible not only to its people but also the world, a moral imperative which would ultimately benefit China. Evoking a language reminiscent of early modern Chinese political discourse, Sheng wrote:

> Nationalism can save China, but it cannot save the world. But if it cannot save the world, then it cannot ultimately save China because China has the largest share of the world's population.[100]

Ergo, 'tianxia-ism' with its emphasis on a universal perspective, was preferable.

The second area related to the subject of the PRC's strategic options vis-à-vis the international society. Li Shenzhi, a former vice-president of CASS, believed that increasing Chinese integration in international society was inevitable. Thus, 'if China would like to play a bigger role in the future,' Li

[98] Ye, ' "Daguo Fei Daguo" Yu Zhongguo De Guoji Diwei,' p. 2.
[99] Sheng Hong, 'Zong Minzhu Zhuyi Dao Tianxia Zhuyi' [From Nationalism to Tianxia-ism], *Zhanlue Yu Guanli [Strategy and Management]*, Vol. 1 (1996), p. 16.
[100] Ibid: p. 18.

said, 'the only option is to learn and accept the established rules of the game.'[101] Scholars such as Yan Xuetong and Wang Huning agreed but believed that a more active approach towards international society was needed. Yan, a leading exponent of realist IR thought in China, argued in 1994 that while participation in international society was essential, China should not 'passively' (*xiaoji*) accept the extant Western-centric order. Rather, participation should be seen as a way for China to put forward its own 'constructive ideas' to create an external environment conducive to its interests. Only then, Yan claimed, would China be able to 'shoulder more of the responsibility of leading the world to a better future.'[102] As for Wang, a well-known political scientist who was also an adviser to Jiang, he advocated that China strengthen its 'soft power' in international society, a factor that he saw as increasingly relevant to global political leadership.[103] Borrowing largely from Nye's original conception of soft power—the ability to influence other actors through attraction rather than coercion—Wang's discussion of soft power in 1993 marked the first time the idea entered into Chinese discourse. To the extent that responsibility in global affairs can be seen as a form of soft power, Wang's views promoted the idea of a more responsible China.[104]

---

[101] Zhao, 'Chinese Intellectuals' Quest for National Greatness and Nationalistic Writing in the 1990s,' p. 744.
[102] Yan Xuetong, 'Zhongguo Jueqi De Keneng Xuanze' [Possible Options for China's Rise], *Zhanlue Yu Guanli [Strategy and Management]*, Vol. 6 (1995), p. 14. For a similar perspective, see Jin Xiaochuan, 'Lun Xinjiu Guoji Zhixu Zhuanhuan Zhong De Zhongguo Guoji Jiaoshe' [Discussing China's International Role during the Change from Old to New International Order], *Xueshu Luntan [Learning Forum]*, Vol. 6 (1996), p. 78.
[103] Wang Huning, 'Zuowei Guojia Shili De Wenhua: Ruan Quanli' [Culture as National Strength: Soft Power], *Fudan Shehui Kexue Xuebao [Fudan Social Science Journal]*, Vol. 3(1993), pp. 91-96.
[104] Interview with Renmin University scholar in Beijing, May 2011.

Of course, actual Chinese behaviour, did not necessarily conform to the proclaimed RGP identity. For example, when the PRC unilaterally declared the South China Sea as part of its sovereign maritime area in 1992, it elicited consternation within the region and in Washington.[105] This was also the time when the idea of China's rise representing a threat began to foment.[106] China's perceived belligerence in the 1995-1996 Taiwan Straits crisis; alleged sales of missile technology and chemical weapons to Pakistan and Iran respectively; and overall reluctance (as others saw it) to improve its human rights situation were also issues that were damaging to its RGP rhetoric.[107] Not surprisingly, there was some skepticism in international society concerning the authenticity of the RGP self-image.

Yet, with regard to certain international norms, it was evident that Beijing was more willing to make efforts to conform.[108] As part of a policy trend that started in the 1980s, there was some expansion of Chinese involvement in UN PKOs. From 1992 to 1993, the PRC contributed a total number of 800 military engineers and 49 observers to assist the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).[109] In 1993 and 1994, twenty Chinese military officers were sent to help UN forces monitor the cease-fire agreement in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). And after 1993, China

[105] Allen Carlson, *Unifying China, Integrating with the World: Securing Chinese Sovereignty in the Reform Era* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 83.
[106] Yong Deng, *China's Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 104-107.
[107] Gertz, 'Perry Calls on China to Earn US Trust.'
[108] Alastair Iain Johnston, 'Is China a Status Quo Power?' *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (2003), pp. 5-56.
[109] Bates Gill and Chin-Hao Huang, 'China's Expanding Peacekeeping Role: its Significance and the Policy Implications,' *SIPRI Policy Brief* (February 2009), p. 2; Bonny Ling, 'China's Peacekeeping Diplomacy,' *China Rights Forum*, Vol. 1 (2007), p. 47.

began sending personnel to the UN Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL).[110] Meanwhile, Chinese multilateral activities continued apace, especially at the regional level. By 1993, China was a member of APEC and in 1994, it took part in the inaugural ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting. In 1996, it joined the 'Track-II' Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) as well as further consolidated its relations with ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), becoming a full dialogue partner.[111] Of particular significance that year was the formation of the Shanghai Five, a China-led security initiative that included Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. Thus, the PRC was now not only a participant in multilateral organisations, it was also in some sense a regime entrepreneur. The Shanghai Five reflected China's 'new security concept,' which emphasised mutual 'win-win' security instead of a Cold War, zero-sum idea of security.[112]

Arguably, during this period, the one area in which China made the most progress vis-à-vis its stated RGP identity was the arms control/nonproliferation regime. In 1992, it agreed to observe the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and formally joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). When the NPT was up for review in 1995, China committed its support for an indefinite extension.[113] On that occasion, Qian took the opportunity to declare that 'China has never shied away from its due

[110] Allen Carlson, 'Helping to Keep the Peace (Albeit Reluctantly): China's Recent Stance on Sovereignty and Multilateral Intervention,' *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 1 (2004), p. 17.
[111] Jianwei Wang, 'China's Multilateral Diplomacy in the New Millennium,' in Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang, eds. , *China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), pp. 166-177.
[112] Larson and Shevchenko, 'Status Seeker,' p. 82; Susan Shirk, *China: Fragile Superpower* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 128-129.
[113] Foot, *The Practice of Power*, p. 253.

obligations for nuclear disarmament.'[114] Earlier, at the UN Conference on Disarmament and Security Issues in the Asia-Pacific Region, Qian also stated that the largest nuclear powers should 'bear special responsibilities' and 'corresponding obligations in disarmament.'[115] It would seem that China was keen to use its greater involvement in the arms control/nonproliferation regime to promote a RGP self-image. In 1996, China signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), reportedly against the wishes of some within the military who had wanted additional testing. According to Bates Gill and Evan Medeiros, Beijing acceded to that treaty in large part due to concerns over its responsible great power 'stature.'[116]

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the trajectory of China's RGP identity from 1978 to 1996 and it has argued that the incipient phase of this identity could be traced to the period between the early 1990s and the mid-1990s. During this period, Chinese leaders began to publicly identify China as a responsible great power, and sought to draw linkages between China's responsibility and its great power role. Rhetorically, this squared with American exhortations for China to play a bigger role in the international system and assume greater global

[114] *Statement by H.E. Mr Qian Qichen, Vice Premier and Foreign Minister and Head of Delegation of the People's Republic of China at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, 18 April 1995. Available at: http//www.nti.org/.
[115] *Speech by Mr Qian Qichen, State Councillor and Foreign Minister, at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament and Security Issues in the Asia-Pacific Region*, 17 August 1992. Available at: http//www.nti.org/.
[116] Larson and Shevchenko, 'Status Seekers,' p. 83; Bates Gill and Evan S. Medeiros, 'Foreign and Domestic Influence on China's Arm Control and Nonproliferation Policies,' *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 161 (2000), p. 90.

responsibilities; although there were those in China who viewed such calls with some skepticism. Chinese discussions on the related themes of the PRC's role and strategic course vis-à-vis the international society were also conducive to the official RGP narrative.

The broad thrusts of why the PRC began to pursue the identity of a responsible power relate predominantly to functionality (as in it was a useful identity for achieving certain purposes) and social enhancement (as in it promised social rewards). In the 1980s, the idea of China as a responsible great power was a vague concept at best. Chinese perspectives on responsibility had mainly come in a non-great power context and when the explicit characterisation of a responsible nation was first evoked, it related specifically to the issue of China's arms sales. Furthermore, during this period, Beijing had a more circumscribed sense of its big power identity, preferring instead to stress its underdeveloped status. However, in the aftermath of the Tiananmen violence, Beijing was deemed a pariah by several Western countries, a status which Chinese leaders clearly resented. Together with the ending of the Cold War and its attendant repercussions, this was clearly a time of major threat to China's great power identity. Against this backdrop, involvement in the UN proceedings and diplomacy vis-à-vis the 1990 Gulf War was an opportunity for China to repair its damaged reputation and lessen its social isolation, and it would use the occasion to strategically portray itself as being a responsible member of international society. This would later culminate in official proclamations of China as a responsible great

power in 1992-1993. The fact that these proclamations were first used in front of foreign audiences suggested that they had been made with a view to improving China's external image.

From 1993-1996, there were again incentives for China to continue and promote an official RGP identity. Strategically, as Qian's 1996 Chicago speech indicated, it was a useful conceptual tool for refuting the 'China threat theory' that had been gaining currency. It was in the interests of Beijing to be characterised as a benign power that was receptive to the established 'rules of the game' and lessen the prospect that others would consider it as a threat to be opposed, a scenario that would have been problematic for its goals of economic development. Indeed, the notion that a RGP identity could and should benefit China's interests had been evident in the writings of scholars who had (directly or indirectly) discussed the subject. Although there were those who felt that this identity might constrain China's rise, there were certainly advocates who saw it as a useful identity, one that embodied a viable strategic path for navigating international politics.

Socially, the identity category of a responsible great power would be helpful for furthering China's membership in international society. But more than that, it would be helpful for gaining greater American recognition of an emerging Chinese big power identity that had become more pronounced by the mid-1990s. As mentioned earlier, Washington's RGP exhortations represented a conditional affirmation of China's great power identity--that China had to behave 'responsibly' for the US to accept it as one. This might

have encouraged Chinese political elites to define China's global role in terms of big power responsibility, at least at the official rhetorical level.

In sum, while there were some indications that Beijing was aware of its international responsibilities in the 1980s, it was the period in the early to mid-1990s that basically marked the time when the initial contours of China's RGP identity started to form. From 1997 onwards, the body of this proclaimed identity would become more distinct as Chinese RGP narratives expanded in quantity and range. The next chapter will explore that critical post-1997 phase.

CHAPTER FOUR

Expansion of the Responsible Great Power Narrative, 1997 to 2004

In chapter three, I showed that, contrary to most perceptions, an embryonic Chinese RGP identity was already discernable in the early to mid-1990s. In this chapter, I continue to investigate the development path of the RGP identity, focusing on the period from 1997 to 2004. It is argued that this period represents the second substantive phase of China's self-identification as a responsible great power, during which RGP identity narratives expanded considerably. The chapter begins by highlighting the major events connected to the development of the RGP discourse. It then explores ideas of international responsibility that had emerged in China, followed by a discussion of related strategic concepts. China's general conduct during this period is briefly examined before the chapter concludes.

The Jiang-Clinton Summits

As previously noted, a more pronounced effort by Beijing to expand its ties with other major powers emerged from around 1996. After the upgrade of Sino-Russian ties to a 'strategic cooperative partnership' in 1996, China declared in 1997 that it would build a 'long term, comprehensive partnership' with France. [1] The following year, China announced the start of

[1] For a Chinese perspective on Sino-French relations, see Xue Longgen, 'Zheng Zai Shenhua Fazhan De Zhongfa Chuanmian Huoban Guanxi' [The Deepening and Development of the China-France

'comprehensive partnerships' with the United Kingdom and European Union.[2]

The top priority for China's big power diplomacy, nevertheless, remained its relations with the US and in this area there was discernable progress. At the invitation of President Clinton, in October 1997, Jiang Zemin became the first Chinese president to visit the United States in 12 years. Jiang's visit led to agreements between both nations to increase cooperation in the fields of bilateral dialogue, nuclear energy, environmental protection, non-proliferation, trade and law. More significantly, it culminated in the landmark joint statement that China and the US would work 'towards a constructive strategic partnership'− the first time that the term 'partnership' had been used formally to describe relations between the countries. Clinton elaborated on American expectations of this partnership at the joint press conference with Jiang: China ought to 'join its strength and influence' with the US to 'advance peace and prosperity, freedom and security.'[3] For its part, rhetorically at least, the Chinese government appeared to share a parallel outlook, with Jiang acknowledging that China and the US, as nations of significant global influence, shouldered 'common responsibilities' for the questions of human survival and development.[4] A similar point was also

---

Comprehensive Partnership], *Guoji Zhengzhi [International Politics]*, Vol. 5(1999), pp. 25-27, continuing on p. 64.

[2] 'Overview on China-UK Relations,' *Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North Ireland*, October 2010. Available at: http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng/zygx/introduction/; Ibid, p. 64.

[3] *Transcript of the Press Conference by President Clinton and President Jiang Zemin*, 29 October 1997. Available at: http://china.usc.edu/ShowArticle.aspx?articleID=750.

[4] Jiang Zemin, 'Zai Baigong Huanying Yishi Shang De Jianghua' [Speech at White House Welcome Ceremony] in *Jiang Zemin Wenxuan Dierjuan [Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Vol. II]*, (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 2006), p. 50; At Jiang's speech just before departing Los Angeles, he repeated his

reiterated by Jiang during his speech at Harvard University, where he noted that both countries shared 'common interests and responsibilities.' According to Jiang, these encompassed areas such as international security, non-proliferation, environmental protection and fighting transnational crime.[5]

The call for China to work alongside the US in some form of a great power concert was again made during Clinton's 1998 visit to the PRC. In Beijing, Clinton stressed that it was in America's interest to see a 'prosperous' China that assumed its global responsibilities. And as if to draw attention to the kind of responsible actions that China should be doing more of than at present, Clinton welcomed Chinese decisions or commitments, *inter alia*, to sign the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to release a number of high-profile political detainees, to restart bilateral dialogue on human rights, to consider participation in the missile technology control regime, to help reinforce the Biological Weapons Convention, to refrain from assisting missile programs in South Asia and Iran, and to further tighten its controls on nuclear exports.[6] The joint denunciation of India's 1998 nuclear tests was particularly appreciated by the Clinton administration and portrayed China as a co-guardian of the international nuclear order.[7] Later, in a speech at Beijing University, Clinton commended the Chinese government

---

view that 'China and the US are two great countries with significant responsibilities towards the world.' See 'Zhongguo He Meiguo Jianli Xianshi zhuyi Xin Guanxi' [China and US Establish Doctrine of Realism, New Relations], *Lianhe Zaobao [Zaobao Daily]*, 5 November 1997.

[5] Jiang Zemin, 'Zengjin Xianghu Liaojie, Jiaqiang Youhao Hezhuo' [Enhance Mutual Understanding, Strengthen Friendly Cooperation] in *Jiang Zemin Wenxuan Dierjuan [Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Vol. II]*, (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 2006), p. 64.

[6] *Transcript of President Clinton and President Jiang Zemin's News Conference in Beijing*, 27 June 1998. Available at: http://china.usc.edu/ShowArticle.aspx?articleID=739.

[7] Michael Yahuda, *The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific* (Abingdon: Routledge, Third Edition, 2011), p. 281.

for not devaluing the Renminbi during the Asian financial crisis, saying that it had 'steadfastly shouldered its responsibilities to the region and the world.'[8] This marked the first time that an American president openly credited China for acting 'responsibly.'

The Jiang-Clinton visits were further opportunities for the US to influence China vis-à-vis the RGP role. As noted in the previous chapter, from around 1995, there had been attempts by Washington to prod Beijing along a direction that corresponded to American understandings of great power responsibility. American rhetoric about China's expected role and conduct during the 1997-1998 summits reflected a continuation of that policy. For China, as earlier mentioned, its leaders had begun to portray their nation as a responsible global power from 1992, so it was no surprise to find continued Chinese positioning in this role. The Chinese certainly wanted American acceptance as a great power and were aware of the linkage of the responsibility issue to this goal.[9] Moreover, the RGP role had important strategic value and could help moderate concerns about China's growing power. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to link this more cooperative stance towards the US as solely a matter of RGP posturing. Aside from issue-

[8] *Transcript of President Clinton's Beijing University Speech*, 29 June 1998. Available at: http://china.usc.edu/ShowArticle.aspx?articleID=514.

[9] Several Chinese scholars had noted and documented the importance of the responsibility issue to the Clinton Adminstration. Jin Canrong, for example, identified a key part of Clinton's China strategy was to 'induct China into the American-led international order, turning it into a responsible member of the international society.' Similarly, Kui Song and Niu Xinjun wrote that the US 'sought to promote greater Chinese responsibility' as part if its China policy. See Jin Canrong, 'Geng Duo De "Jianshe Xing": Ping Jiang Zhuxi Fangmei Yilai De Zhongmei Guanxi' [More "Constructiveness": Appraising Sino-American Relations since Chairman Jiang's Visit to the US], *Dangdai Yatai [Contemporary Asia-Pacific]*, Vol. 6 (1998), p. 6; Kui Song and Niu Xinjun, 'Zai Tansuo Hezuo Fazhan De Zhongmei Guanxi' [Probing Developing Sino-American Relations amidst Cooperation], *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations]*, Vol. 12 (1999), p. 80.

specific considerations, pressure had been mounting on Beijing to take steps to improve Sino-American relations that had been strained by events such as Lee Teng Hui's 1995 US visit and the 1995-1996 Chinese missile tests in the Taiwan Strait.[10]

The Asian Financial Crisis

The 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis (AFC) marked another notable event in the evolution of China's self-identification as a responsible power. During the crisis, Beijing contributed a total of around US$ 4 billion to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) rescue fund, including aid packages of US$ 1 billion each to Thailand and Indonesia. Additionally, while it could have done so, Beijing did not opt for competitive devaluation of its currency, which surprised many observers. Economically, this benefited those regional economies whose currencies had depreciated by 30-75%, enhancing their export competitiveness as well as attractiveness as a foreign investment destination relative to China. It also reduced pressure on these economies to further devalue their already weakened currencies.[11]

China's response to the AFC was widely welcomed in international society. Other than praise from Clinton, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and

---

[10] Joseph Fewsmith, *China since Tiananmen: From Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 213. Writing in 1996, Yan Xuetong noted that 'avoiding conflicts with the US' was absolutely vital for China. See Yan Xuetong, *Zhongguo Guojia Liyi Fenxi [Analysis of China's National Interest]*, (Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe, 1996), pp. 158-160.

[11] See Zhang Xuebin, 'Lun Zhongmei Liangguo Zhengfu Zai Yazhou Jinrongweiji Zhong De Biaoxian' [Discussing the Performance of the Chinese and American Governments during the Asian Financial Crisis], *Guoji Zhengzhi Yanjiu [International Politics Quarterly]*, Vol. 2 (1999), pp. 40-42; Wang Hongying, 'A Responsible Great Power? China's International Image Management in the 1990s,' *East Asia Institute Working Paper*, No. 44 (July 2000), pp. 13-18.

French President Jacques Chirac also applauded Beijing's actions, with the latter claiming that China had 'shown the example of a great power that shouldered its responsibilities.'[12] Regionally, China's AFC decisions were well-received in ASEAN capitals, especially in contrast to what was perceived as harsh and conditional crisis prescriptions by the IMF. It was thought that China's currency policy had been instrumental in stabilising the crisis in Southeast Asia, leading one Thai leader to opine that 'only China' had really assisted Thailand and ASEAN Secretary-General Rodolfo Severino to say that Beijing had emerged from the crisis with huge credibility.[13]

Beijing's role in fighting the AFC and the ensuing positive reaction from the international community reinforced China's sense of itself as a responsible big power. Chinese analysts were quick to suggest that China's international 'position' (*diwei*) had risen.[14] They pointed to the fact that many

[12] Clinton also praised the Chinese government for showing 'great statesmanship and strength.' See *Transcript of President Clinton and President Jiang Zemin's News Conference in Beijing*. Indeed, various Chinese writings on the AFC stressed the positive reaction of world leaders. See Yang Chengxu, 'Zhongguo Guoji Diwei Jiju Tigao' [The Rapid Rise of China's International Position], *Liaowang [Outlook]*, No. 51 (1998), pp. 20-21; Chen Fengjun, 'Jinrong Weiji Hou Yatai Geju De Bianhua' [The Changes in Asia-Pacific Regional Structure after the Asian Financial Crisis], *Guoji Zhengzhi Yanjiu [International Politics Quarterly]*, Vol. 2 (1999), pp. 27-28; Yu Changmiao, 'Guanyu Renminbi Huilu De Sikao' [Reflecting on the Direction of the Renminbi's Exchange Rate], *Zhonggong Zhongyang Dangxiao Xuebao [Journal of the Party School of the Central Committee of the CPC]*, Vol. 7, No. 4 (2003), pp. 108-112; Guest Commentator, 'Zai Kaoyan He Tiaozheng Zhong Fazhan de Guoji Xingshi' [International Situation in Tests and Readjustment], *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations]*, Vol. 12 (1999), p. 12.

[13] Joshua Kurlantzick, *Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), p. 36; The Kuala Lumpur Declaration of the 1998 APEC Summit also described China's currency policy as having acted as an 'anchor' to the crisis's stabilisation. See *Kuala Lumpur Declaration–Strengthening the Foundations for Growth*, 18 November 1998. Available at: www.apec.org.

[14] For examples, see Zheng Bijian, 'Zhuazhu Jihui Yu Lilun Wuzhuang' [Grasping Opportunity and Theoretical Augmentation], *Qiushi [Seeking Truth]*, No. 7 (1999), p. 6; Wang Haihan, 'Dui Dangqian Zhongmei Guanxi Jiqi Fazhan Qianjing De Jidian Kanfa' [Some Perspectives on Current Sino-American Relations and its Development Prospects], *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies]*, Vol. 4 (1998), p. 9; Zhai Fengyu, 'Yingjia, Shujia, Haishi Youwing Youshu? Ping Zhongmeiri Sanguo Zai Dongya Jinrong Weiji Zhong De Deshi' [Winner, Loser, Or both Win and Lose? Reviewing the Gains and Losses of China, US and Japan in the Asian Financial Crisis], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World*

countries, in particular the US, had recognised China's 'inescapable influence' in Asia's economic affairs; that China had maintained an impressive growth rate of above 8% in spite of the crisis; and that the relative decline of neighbouring economies had accentuated the ascendancy of China's regional economic status.[15] Unsurprisingly, Chinese analysts (writing in various publication media including textbooks) cited China's actions during the AFC as further evidence of an emerging identity as a responsible power. In this view, China had demonstrated the 'self-sacrificial' character of a responsible power when it chose to maintain the Renminbi's value at the expense of its export competitiveness and investment inflow, and directly contributed to the stability of the international economic order.[16] It was also a matter of 'trust and promise to the region and the world,' according to Wang Yizhou. By keeping to its pledge of not devaluing the Renminbi, Wang added, the Chinese government had laid down an important 'marker' of an 'open and responsible' attitude.[17]

Economics and Politics], Vol. 7 (1998), pp. 38-39; Yang Chengxu, 'Zhongguo Guoji Diwei Jiju Tigao,' pp. 20-21; and Chen Fengjun, 'Jinrong Weiji Hou Yatai Geju De Bianhua, ' pp. 27-29.

[15] Zhou Zhongfei, 'Mianxiang 21 Shiji De APEC Yu Zhongguo' [Towards the 21st Century, APEC and China], *Guoji Zhanwang [Global Review]*, Vol. 23 (1998), p. 5; Zhai Fengyu, 'Yingjia, Shujia, Haishi Youwing Youshu?' p. 39; and Chen Fengjun, 'Jinrong Weiji Hou Yatai Geju De Bianhua,' p. 28.

[16] Some examples are: Chen Hongbin, 'Zhongguo Zheng Zai Chengwei Fuzheren De Daguo' [China is Becoming a Responsible Great Power], *Baike Zhishi [Encyclopaedic Knowledge]*, Vol. 2 (1999), pp. 1-2; Li Zhiye, 'Daguo Guanxi Chubu Daowei, Liang Xing Hudong Shijian Chengxiao' [Preliminary Positioning of Great Power Relations, Benign Interactions Start to Show Results], *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations]*, Vol. 12 (1999), p. 86; Editor, 'Jinrong Weiji Yinfa De Huati' [Topics Raised by the Financial Crisis], *Shijie Zhishi [World Affairs]*, Vol. 1 (1999), p. 33; Wang Mongkui, 'Yazhou Jinrong Weiji Yu Zhongguo' [The Asian Financial Crisis and China], *Qiushi [Seeking Truth]*, No. 21 (1998), p. 47; and Guest Commentator, 'Zai Kaoyan He Tiaozheng Zhong Fazhan de Guoji Xingshi,' p. 12. See as well the Chinese Academy for Social Sciences (CASS) postgraduate history textbook: Tao Wenzhao and He Xiqiang, *Zhongmei Guanxi Shi [A History of China-US Relations]*, (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chuban She, 2009), p. 303.

[17] Wang Yizhou, 'Quanqiu Hua Guocheng Yu Zhongguo De Jiyu: Yazhou Jinrong Weiji Beijing Xia De Jidian Sikao' [Globalisation and China's Opportunities: Some Thoughts Amidst the Asian Financial Crisis], *Dangdai Shijie Yu Shehui Zhuyi [Contemporary World and Socialism]*, Vol. 3 (1998), p. 19.

In the event, discussion of China's responsibility vis-à-vis the AFC led some scholars to ask questions about Japan and the US's corresponding roles. Japan, for example, was regarded as failing to do its part as Asia's strongest economy when it took the easy way out of joining the regional trend of currency devaluation.[18] In the case of United States, some Chinese analysts argued that it should bear responsibility for the crisis's extension. It was suggested that unlike its decisive response in the 1994 Mexican Peso crisis, Washington's initial attitude of 'watching from the sidelines' of the AFC led to the escalation of the contagion. Washington was also alleged to have compounded the problems of affected ASEAN economies— 'adding frost to the snow' (*xueshang jialin*)—when it imposed conditions for its aid.[19] In appraising the actions of Japan and the US during the crisis, these critiques essentially served to underline how the two other major Asia-Pacific powers had been less 'responsible' and more concerned about their narrow interests as opposed to China.

Yet, to say that Beijing had not considered its own interests during the AFC would be inaccurate. While China's decision to reject currency devaluation was made in part out of a concern for its declared RGP identity, there were also other important considerations at work. First and foremost, China could be embroiled in the AFC if it did not take concrete measures to

[18] Zhai Fengyu, 'Yingjia, Shujia, Haishi Youwing Youshu?' p. 39

[19] Zhang Xuebin, a Beijing University scholar, criticised American support for ASEAN states as 'shockingly little.' Zhai Fengyu, an official at the former Ministry of Foreign Trade & Economic Cooperation (redesignated as Ministry of Commerce in 2003), was also cynical of American intentions, asserting that the US had achieved its aims of using the crisis to 'weaken Asia.' See Zhang Xuebin, 'Lun Zhongmei Liangguo Zhengfu Zai Yazhou Jinrongweiji Zhong De Biaoxian,' pp. 43-47; and Zhai Fengyu, 'Yingjia, Shujia, Haishi Youwing Youshu?' pp .40-41.

help limit the spread of the contagion.[20] Second, devaluation would make imports more expensive and raise the price of many Chinese exports that depended on the processing of imported materials; this might ironically result in reduced export competitiveness. It could also potentially lead to lose-lose cycles of competitive currency depreciations across the region. Third, devaluation could further destabilise the Hong Kong dollar and put additional strain on the Hong Kong economy. At a time when the PRC had just regained sovereignty over Hong Kong, this would be particularly damaging to Beijing's political credibility in the territory. Fourth, it would not benefit China's bid to join the WTO if it was seen to be adopting policies (e.g. devaluation) that were counterproductive to the stabilisation of the crisis.[21] Finally, China had been in a relatively comfortable monetary and fiscal position to uphold the Renminbi's value, given its non-fully convertible currency, currency restrictions, and sizeable buffer of foreign exchange reserves.[22]

It should be pointed out that the RGP identity was not the only role narrative evoked during the financial conflagration. Two other identities—China the developing nation and China the victim—were also discernable in Chinese discourse of the crisis. On the former, some Chinese scholars noted

[20] Rong Dianxin, 'Dongya Jinrong Weiji Yu Zhongguo De Kaifang Zhengce' [The Asian Financial Crisis and China's Open Up Policy], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics]*, Vol. 7 (1998), p. 31.
[21] Samuel S. Kim, 'China's Path to Great Power Status in the Globalisation Era,' *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2003), p. 64; Wang Yizhou, 'Quanqiu Hua Guocheng Yu Zhongguo De Jiyu: Yazhou Jinrong Weiji Beijing Xia De Jidian Sikao,' pp. 18-19; Wang Mongkui, 'Yazhou Jinrong Weiji Yu Zhongguo,' p. 20.
[22] David Shambaugh, 'China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,' *International Security*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Winter 2004/2005), p. 68.

that China had identified with developing nations on a number of occasions (e.g. 1998 APEC Summit, Kuala Lumpur) during the crisis.[23] In their view, while the crisis had proven that China can 'uphold the interests of developing countries,' it had also irrefutably demonstrated that the prevailing international financial and economic order marginalised the interests of developing countries. *Ergo*, they argued, China should strive and work together with these countries to 'reform the order.'[24] This perception of victimisation was not only limited to the issue of economic development. There was also the sense that the AFC had presented an opportunity for some to cast unfair aspersions on Chinese intentions. 'Hegemonic forces,' it was argued, had tried to link the cause of the crisis to China's 1994 Renminbi devaluation, as well as portray China as a 'Trojan horse' seeking regional domination via the crisis.[25]

The Failed WTO Bid and the Belgrade Embassy Bombing

By early 1999, the earlier American optimism about China and its overall direction had dimmed considerably, and Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji would openly comment that the political climate in Washington had become 'anti-China.'[26] It was in this mood that Zhu would embark on his visit to the US in

[23] See, for examples, Xu Mingqi, 'Fengxian, Duice, Zeren: Zhonggup Yu Guoji Jinrong Tixi' [Risk, Measures, Responsibility: China and the International Financial Order], *Shijie Zhishi [World Affairs]*, Vol. 7 (2000), p. 28; Zhou Zhongfei, 'Mianxiang 21 Shiji De APEC Yu Zhongguo,' p. 6.
[24] Ibid; Zhang Xuebin, 'Lun Zhongmei Liangguo Zhengfu Zai Yazhou Jinrongweiji Zhong De Biaoxian,' p. 42.
[25] Zhang Xuebin, 'Lun Zhongmei Liangguo Zhengfu Zai Yazhou Jinrongweiji Zhong De Biaoxian,' pp .42-43; Wang Haihan, 'Dui Dangqian Zhongmei Guanxi Jiqi Fazhan Qianjing De Jidian Kanfa,' p. 9.
[26] Avery Goldstein, 'The Diplomatic Face of China's Grand Strategy: A Rising Power's Emerging Choice,' *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 168 (2001), p. 852; 'Guowuyuan Zongli Zhu Rongji Da Jizhe

April 1999, with the view to concluding bilateral negotiations on China's entry to the WTO. Despite the negative atmosphere, the Chinese government had high hopes that Zhu's trip would be successful and finally clear the foremost hurdle to China's WTO accession.[27] For the Clinton administration, it saw the WTO issue as another opportunity to exert pressure on Beijing regarding its international obligations even as it recognised that China's WTO membership would, on balance, bring more benefits than costs to the US. Thus, on the eve of Zhu's visit, Clinton publicly stated that American support for the WTO bid depended fundamentally on China's willingness to 'accept the responsibilities that come with WTO membership' and 'to play by the global rules of trade.' [28]

Certainly, the Chinese government was keen to secure an agreement with the US on the issue of WTO admission. Although there were elements within Beijing that were apprehensive about the bid for WTO membership, overall, there was broad consensus among the Chinese leadership that China had to join the WTO sooner rather than later.[29] Several reasons underpinned the pursuit of WTO membership, not least the belief that WTO accession would boost China's big power standing. 'When China joins the WTO,' one article in the *World Affairs* (*Shijie Zhishi*) journal asserted, it will have another

---

Wen' [Interview with Premier Zhu Rongji], *Renda Gongzuo Tongxun [Work Report of the People's Congress of China]*, 1999, p. 39.

[27] In Zhu's opinion, '99% of the road towards a WTO deal had been completed.' See Pan Rui, 'Xi Zhongmei Guanyu Zhongguo Jiaru Shimao Zuzhi Tanpan' [Analysing Sino-American Negotiations regarding China's WTO Entry], *Guoji Zhanwang [Global Review]*, Vol. 9 (1999), p. 10. See also Joseph Fewsmith, 'China and the WTO: The Politics behind the Agreement,' *NBR Analysis*, Vol. 10, No. 5 (1999), p. 24.

[28] *President Clinton's Remarks to the United States Institute of Peace*, 7 April 1999. Available at US Government Printing Office Database: http://www.gpo.gov/.

[29] Wei Liang, 'China's WTO Negotiation Process and its Implications,' *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2002), pp. 706-718.

stage to 'express its big power influence and activism.'[30] Yet, this desire to project itself as a big power seemed at odds with the insistence by Chinese negotiators that the PRC joined the WTO as a developing state. It was argued that China's GDP per capita was still very modest as compared to many nations, making it 'unfair and unacceptable' that China should bear 'international obligations that did not match its development status.'[31]

China's emphasis of its status as a developing state had been a point of contention during its WTO negotiations with Washington, but it would be concerns about potential congressional opposition (on a WTO deal) that dissuaded Clinton from sealing an agreement during Zhu's visit. Naturally, Clinton's decision disappointed Zhu and the visiting Chinese delegation—'a slap in Zhu's face,' as one scholar put it. Chinese unhappiness was further exacerbated when details of a draft agreement, documenting concessions offered by China, were unilaterally released online by the American side.[32]

Zhu's failure to secure a WTO deal as well as the leakage of details on the concessions provoked domestic reactions that referenced China's past victimisation at the hands of foreign aggressors. China's WTO compromises were likened to the 'new 21 demands selling out the country,' in allusion to the harsh conditions imposed on China by Japan in 1915. Some even claimed that the government's embrace of globalisation, as evidenced by its

[30] Zhen Bingxi, 'Toushi Zhongguo Jiaru WTO De Jincheng Ji Libi' [Comprehending the Process as well as Pros and Cons of China's Entry to WTO], *Shijie Zhishi [World Affairs]*, Vol. 22 (1999), pp. 26-27.
[31] Ibid, p. 25. Zhang Jianqing also wrote that the 'objective reality' of China's developing status had been ignored. See Zhang Jianqing, 'Guanyu Zhongguo Jiaru Shijie Maoyi Zuzhi De Ruogan Sikao' [Several Thoughts on China's Entry to WTO], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics]*, Vol. 10 (1999), pp .64-65.
[32] Susan Shirk, *China: Fragile Superpower* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 228-231.

committed pursuit of WTO membership, was not too dissimilar from Wang Jingwei's traitorous collusion with the Japanese during World War II.[33] Such analogies are overblown, of course. But they are a reflection of 'longer-standing historical memories of unfair trade' that inevitably cast a shadow on China's bid to join the WTO.[34]

Chinese sense of victimisation would be further heightened when the PRC embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, was hit by American bombs in May that year. The Chinese government was already wary of the US-led NATO campaign to unilaterally bomb Yugoslavia with the justification that 'human rights transcend sovereignty.'[35] So when the PRC embassy was also bombed, killing three Chinese reporters and injuring twenty others, Chinese outrage was neuralgic. Mass demonstrations erupted outside of American embassies and consulates in Beijing, Chengdu and Guangzhou as the Chinese government condemned the incident as 'a crude violation of China's sovereignty.'[36] The American explanation that the embassy bombing had been accidental was dismissed as 'lies' or 'excuses' by Chinese commentators.[37] Meanwhile, rhetoric alluding to the Chinese victim identity quickly surfaced. In a speech welcoming returning diplomats from Belgrade, Jiang declared

[33] Fewsmith, 'China and the WTO,' pp. 30-31.
[34] Rana Mitter, 'An Uneasy Engagement: Chinese Ideas of Global Order and Justice in Historical Perspective,' in Rosemary Foot, John Lewis Gaddis and Andy Hurrell, eds., *Order and Justice in International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 223.
[35] Rosemary Foot, 'Chinese Power and the Idea of a Responsible State,' *The China Journal*, No. 45 (2001), p. 44.
[36] Editor, 'Jiu Beiyue Daotan Longji Wo Zhunan Dashi Guan Shijian, Tang Jiaxuan Waizhang Zaici Xiang Meifang Tichu Yanzheng Jiaoshe Bingdi Jiao Zhengshi Zhaohui' [Concerning the Incident on NATO's Attack on the PRC Belgrade Embassy, Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan Again Lodges Solemn Representations with the United States], *Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Guowu Yuan Gongbao [Gazette of the State Council of the People's Republic of China]*, No. 19 (1999), p. 800.
[37] Editor, 'Nuhou De Zhongguo' [China Roars], *Liaowang [Outlook]*, Vol. 20 (1999), pp. 12-51.

that China can never be 'bullied.'[38] Foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan responded similarly, asserting that China's reaction showed it cannot be easily 'bullied or humiliated.' [39] A number of commentaries in Chinese publications saw vestiges of history in the embassy bombing. One article in the *Guoji Zhanwang (Global Review)* journal claimed that the bombing was reminiscent of 'late 19th to early 20th century, old style imperialism,' while a *Renmin Ribao* opinion-editorial reminded its readers that 'this is not the age when the Western powers plundered the Imperial Palace at will, destroyed the old Summer Palace and seized Hong Kong and Macao.'[40] The grim conclusion of several commentaries was that if a nation 'lagged behind others,' it faced the prospect of being 'beaten up;' therefore, China had to unremittingly strengthen its comprehensive national power to avoid being bullied.[41]

The embassy incident crystallised the fears and concerns of Chinese intellectuals on the Kosovo war. To many of them, it had demonstrated that 'hegemonism and power politics' continued to thrive in the post-Cold War era; that the prevailing trends of 'peace and development' were being

[38] Jiang Zemin, 'Zai Huanying Woguo Zhunan Sila Fulian Meng Gongheguo Gongzuo Renyuan Da Hui Shang De Jianghua' [Speech at Ceremony to Welcome Staff of the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia], *Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Guowu Yuan Gongbao [Gazette of the State Council of the People's Republic of China]*, No. 19 (1999), p. 774.

[39] Interestingly, in the same speech, Tang also claimed that China's 'constructive' actions during the Kosovo war—e.g. firm opposition towards foreign intervention—had showed it was a responsible great power. Tang's speech at an internal MFA conference can be found at: 'Zhongguo Buke Qi, Zhongguo Renmin Buke Wu' [China Cannot be Bullied, Chinese People Cannot be Humiliated], *Shijie Zhishi [World Affairs]*, Vol. 11 (1999), pp. 7-8.

[40] Gu Ji, 'Renquan Weishi De Fan Renlei Baoxing' [The Violent, Anti-humanity Actions of the Human Rights Defender], *Guoji Zhanwang [Global Review]*, Vol. 9 (1999), p. 2; Han Zhongkun, 'Zhongguo bushi yibajiujiu' [This is not 1899 China], *Renmin Ribao [People's Daily]*, 12 May 1999.

[41] For a representative work on the so-called 'backwardness begets beatings' argument, see Fang Ning's paper in the party journal, *Party Construction Research*: Fang Ning, 'Luohou Aida Suixian' [Backwardness Begets Beatings: Some Thoughts], *Dangjian Yanjiu [Party Construction]*, Vol. 9 (1999), pp. 39-40. See also Editor, 'Fazhan Jingji, Zengqiang Guoli' [Develop Economy, Strengthen National Power], *Liaowang [Outlook]*, Vol. 20 (1999), pp. 56-62.

challenged; and that Western powers could wantonly intervene in the affairs of other countries (the so-called 'new interventionism').[42] At the broader level, the Kosovo war led some scholars to moderate their estimations of China's relative position in the international order. The war had shown that the US could easily bypass the UN Security Council and act unilaterally, circumscribing China's veto power.[43] At the same time, it highlighted the continuing gulf in technological levels between the US and the PRC militaries (similar to assessments derived in the wake of the 1990 Iraq War). Therefore, it was important that one 'clearly and realistically' assessed China's national strength and recognised that it remained backward in several areas, reasoned Chu Shulong and Wang Zaibang, scholars at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations.[44] For others, such as Yan Xuetong, it was evident that the world was not becoming more multipolar; rather the 'one superpower, many great powers' scenario had become more pronounced.[45]

Undoubtedly, the period from early to mid-1999 was a testing time for China's relations with the United States. Chinese policymakers and analysts were clearly concerned by what they perceived as increasing American proclivity towards hegemonic behaviour. Indeed, there were voices who

[42] Wang Fuchun, 'Kesuowo Zhanzheng Yu Zhongguo De Waijiao Zhanlue' [The Kosovo War and China's Foreign Policy Strategy], *Guoji Zhengzhi Yanjiu [International Politics Quarterly]*, Vol. 4 (1999), p. 24; Xu Xueyin and Zhu Xian, 'Pin Xin Ganshe Zhuyi' [Assessing New Interventionism], *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations]*, Vol. 8 (1999), pp. 19-22.
[43] Wang, 'Kesuowo Zhanzheng Yu Zhongguo De Waijiao Zhanlue.'
[44] Chu Shulong and Wang Zaibang, 'Guanyu Guoji Xingshi He Wo Duiwai Zhanlue Ruogan Zhong Da Wenti De Sikao' [Reflections on the International Situation and Important Questions of China's Foreign Strategy], *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations]*, Vol. 8 (1999), p. 6.
[45] Yan Xuetong, 'Guoji Huanjing Ji Waijiao Sikao' [International Environment and China's Foreign Relations], *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations]*, Vol. 8 (1999), pp. 7-8.

called for a more confrontational foreign policy towards the US, wherein China would align with the developing bloc or Russia to resist American hegemony. Nevertheless, a consensus quickly emerged in Beijing that, despite the diplomatic travails, 'peace and development' were still the dominant currents in international society and there was neither the need nor capacity to challenge the United States. Beijing recognised there was no real alternative to maintaining stable Sino-US relations, even if this relationship seemed to be moving further away from the stated ideal of a 'constructive strategic partnership.'[46] It was with these in mind that, shortly after the embassy incident, Jiang stressed that China had to build relations with the US even as it opposed hegemonism. High-level bilateral dialogue quickly resumed and by September 1999, Jiang would meet Clinton on the sidelines of the 7th APEC Leader's Meeting.[47]

'Bin Laden Saved China'

The last quarter of the Clinton administration's second term unfolded in a less turbulent direction for US-China relations. Rising Chinese nationalism and growing American anti-China sentiments were still troubling undercurrents but in late 1999, Beijing finally reached a deal on WTO accession with the United States. Clinton also publicly reaffirmed Washington's commitment to the 'one China' status quo when Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui controversially characterised the cross-strait relationship as 'special state-to-

[46] Goldstein, 'The Diplomatic Face of China's Grand Strategy,' pp. 853-854.
[47] Tao Wenzhao and He Xiqiang, *Zhongmei Guanxi Shi*, pp. 327-331.

state' relations. And before the end of his second term, Clinton signed legislation (after hard-won congressional approval) to grant permanent normal trading relations (PNTR) status to China.

But if Clinton would get praise from Jiang at the end of his tenure, the election of George W. Bush to the American presidency in early 2001 caused initial consternation in Chinese policy circles.[48] As the Republican presidential candidate, Bush had stated it would be a 'mistake' to label China a strategic partner of the US, calling the country a 'strategic competitor.'[49] Condoleezza Rice, a key foreign policy consultant to Bush and later US National Security Adviser, also argued earlier in the *Foreign Affairs* journal that China was not a 'status quo power.'[50] Such statements had not been lost on Chinese officials and analysts.[51] That being said, the first US visit by a Chinese leader since Bush assumed power went well. Meeting with Vice-Premier Qian Qichen in Washington, Bush stated his belief that Sino-American relations should be 'constructive.' Qian, on his part, tried to present China as a responsible power during the visit (as he did in earlier visits). At a luncheon attended by American policy elites, Qian pointed out that the 'fundamental duty' of Chinese foreign policy was to 'work towards a peaceful international

[48] Guan Li, *Ruhe Yu Meiguo Gongchu: Lengzhan Hou Zhongguo Dui Meifangzhen Yu Zhongmei Guanxi [How to Coexist with America: China's US Diplomatic Guideline and Sino-American Relations after the Cold War]*, (Beijing: Jiuzhou Press, 2010), pp. 162-163.
[49] Thomas Lippman, 'Bush Makes Clinton's China Policy an Issue,' *Washington Post*, 20 August 1999.
[50] Condoleezza Rice, 'Promoting the National Interest,' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 79 (January/February 2000), p. 56.
[51] Tao Wenzhao and He Xiqiang, *Zhongmei Guanxi Shi*, pp. 336-337.

environment,' and that peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region constituted the 'mutual responsibilities' of China and the US.[52]

Qian's visit had barely passed when, in April 2001, Beijing and Washington found themselves in another major diplomatic crisis. An American EP-3 military surveillance plane had collided with a trailing PLA fighter jet in mid-air, killing the Chinese pilot and forcing the American plane to make an emergency landing on Hainan. Beijing's immediate reaction was to blame the collision on the American plane, accusing it of transgressing China's airspace and sovereignty. Demands for an apology and the US to stop its reconnaissance flights near the Chinese coastlines followed, but tensions were raised further when the Bush administration appeared reluctant to show contrition over the incident[53] Unsurprisingly, anti-American sentiments ran high in China—and writings of how the PRC was again the victim of American hegemonic behaviour began to emerge. One claimed that the US 'always attempted to find trouble with China.'[54] Another wrote of how 'even though the aggressor was the US, it still treated a victimised China with an unreasonable and tyrannical attitude…'[55] On the whole, however, the reaction in China was more restrained as compared to the 1999 embassy bombing incident. This was, in part, the corollary of steps taken by the government to

[52] Guan Li, *Ruhe Yu Meiguo Gongchu*, pp. 164-165.
[53] Joseph Y.S. Cheng and King-lun Kgok, 'The 2001 "Spy" Plane Incident Revisited: the Chinese Perspective,' *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2004), pp. 63-83; Yu Zhang, 'Chinese Nationalism and the 2001 US Spy Plane Incident,' *International Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2005), pp. 77-85.
[54] Editor, 'Meiguo You Biyao Shenke Fansi' [America Needs to Have a Profound Self-Review], *Shijie Zhishi [World Affairs]*, Vol. 9 (2001), p. 11.
[55] Wu Jianxin, 'Weihu Guojia Zhuquan He Zunyan, Fandui Baquan, Badao He Baqi: Jianxi Zhongmei Zhuangjishi' [Defend National Sovereignty and Dignity, Oppose Hegemony, Tyranny and Domineering Attitude: Analysing the US-China Plane Collision Incident], *Shixiang Zhengzhi Ke Jiaoxue [The Teaching of Thought and Political Study]*, Vol. 5 (2001), p. 56.

better manage the domestic fallout. Beijing was careful to rein in the excesses of Chinese nationalism, which left unbridled, could have damaging consequences for Sino-American relations (and potentially, the CCP regime). It was perceived that relations with the US were simply too important to allow circumstances to drive it into a tailspin.[56]

For many Americans, however, the reaction of the Chinese appeared neither restrained nor was it indicative of a nation aspiring to be a benign responsible power. The view in Washington had been that the EP-3 plane was forced to land in circumstances beyond its control—the Chinese pilot was primarily at fault for the collision—so American government and public were incensed when the PRC detained the EP-3 crew for 11 days and dismantled the EP-3 aircraft.[57] A Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report described Beijing as having acted in a 'hard-line' and 'uncooperative' manner, while some American observers believed that China's behaviour had strengthened the case of those who argued for a tougher foreign policy approach.[58] Against this backdrop, the same month, the Bush administration announced the sale of arms to Taiwan that included 8 diesel submarines and 4 Kidd-class destroyers.[59]

By mid-2001, however, there were signs that bilateral relations were starting to mend, even if Jiang was said to have expressed his misgivings about Bush's foreign policy outlook (which he described as 'logically unsound;

[56] Shirk, *China*, p. 236.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Shirley Kan, 'China-US Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001: Assessments and Policy Implications,' *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress*, 10 October 2001, pp. 9-22.
[59] Steven Mufson and Dana Milbank, 'Taiwan to Get Variety of Arms,' *Washington Post*, 24 April 2001.

confused and unprincipled; unwise to the extreme'). [60] One discernable indication was Secretary of State Colin Powell's visit to Beijing in late July.[61] Meeting the PRC leadership and addressing Chinese concerns that the new US administration appeared to pursue a more adversarial China policy, Powell publicly stated that Washington saw China 'as a friend.' The United States, according to Powell, wanted a 'friendly relationship,' with the view of getting China to 'play a more active role in the world.'[62] This conveyed the sense that the Bush administration, like the Clinton government, would seek China to assume more of the global responsibilities that came with its rising power. Powell's remarks had in fact squared with Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly's earlier testimony to the Senate Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, though Kelly's words were certainly more assertive. In May 2001, Kelly stated:

> We will hold China to its bilateral and international commitments. If China chooses to disregard its international obligations in areas as diverse as security issues, human rights, non-proliferation or trade, we will use all available policy tools to persuade it to move in more constructive directions……China's own interests—and its responsibility for the promotion of global peace, security, and prosperity—

[60] Lanxin Xiang, 'Washington's Misguided China Policy,' *Survival*, Vol. 43, No. 3 (2001), p. 8.
[61] Other positive early indications included the Bush administration's decision to extend China's normal trading status in June 2001; and a phone conversation between Bush and Jiang on 5th July 2001, which concluded with both leaders affirming the importance of US-China relations. See Guan Li, *Ruhe Yu Meiguo Gongchu*, p. 167.
[62] *Transcript of Secretary of State Colin Powell's Interview on CCTV*, 28 July 2001. Available at the US Department of State Archive: http://2001-2009.state.gov/.

> should guide the leadership in Beijing to uphold international standards in policy areas ranging from human rights to non-proliferation. China must live up to its global obligations…[63]

Ostensibly, one area in which China might be said to be 'living up to its obligations' was counterterrorism.[64] In the wake of the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 (9-11), Beijing was quick to show its cooperative side. It speedily offered its commiserations to the American people. It supported and collaborated with US international anti-terrorism efforts, which included setting up a counterterrorism dialogue mechanism with Washington, clamping down on terrorist financing in Chinese banks, contributing intelligence on Islamist networks in the region, and establishing a FBI liaison office in Beijing. It publicly backed the US military campaign against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and exercised its political leverage with Islamabad to help sway it to cooperate with American efforts against those elements. It voted for anti-terrorism resolutions 1368 and 1373 in the UN Security Council, marking the first Chinese votes in support of UN decrees with the scope for the use of force. And as host of the APEC Summit held in Shanghai in October 2001, it assented to the inclusion of an

[63] James Kelly, 'The Future of US-China Relations,' *Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs*, 1 May 2001, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.
[64] Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko describe China as having acted as a 'responsible global citizen' in 'addressing Washington's new concerns about terrorism.' See Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, 'Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to US Primacy,' *International Security*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Spring 2010), p. 85.

anti-terrorist agenda in the official statement.[65] These actions and more culminated in Bush's direct affirmation of China's power status at the October APEC meet, calling it a 'great power.' Bush stopped short of describing China as a responsible power but nonetheless praised Beijing for 'stand[ing] side by side with the American people' in the fight against terrorism.[66] Later, Kelly addressed the House Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific, acknowledging that China had rendered valuable cooperation and support post-11 September.[67]

Bush would visit China again in 4 months, a historical precedent. Standing together with Jiang at the Great Hall of the People's Republic of China on 21 February 2002, the 30th anniversary of Nixon's historic trip to China, Bush described China as 'a force of peace' in the region. Bush also recognised China's rising economic power and took the occasion to remind the host nation that it had the 'right and responsibility to fashion and enforce the rules of open trade.' This corroborated the view that the Bush administration saw Beijing emerging as a co-shaper and co-manager of the global economic order. On the part of the Chinese leadership, Jiang did not deviate from embellishing his statements with customary RGP narratives,

[65] See Rosemary Foot, 'Bush, China and Human Rights,' *Survival*, Vol. 45, No. 2 (2003), pp. 167-168; Jia Qingguo, 'The Impact of 9-11 on Sino-US Relations: A Preliminary Assessment,' *The International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 3 (2003), pp. 164-165; Tao Wenzhao and He Xiqiang, *Zhongmei Guanxi Shi*, pp. 344.
[66] *Transcript of the Remarks by President Bush and President Jiang Zemin in Press Availability*, 19 October 2001, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.
[67] James Kelly, 'US-East Asia-Pacific Relations,' *Statement before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific*, 14 February 2002, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.

adding that both nations had 'more rather than less common responsibilities' to the world.[68]

Such was the extent of the improvement in bilateral ties that by the end of 2002, the US destroyer, the USS Paul Foster, was allowed to make a port call at Qingdao while Bush had had his third meeting with Jiang in about a year.[69] In fact, in October 2002, Jiang became one of the few world leaders to be invited to Bush's personal Crawford ranch—a strong gesture of American friendship. That meeting resulted in a striking statement from Bush that he considered China an 'ally' in America's War on Terror.[70] Bush would reiterate a similar sentiment around a year later when new Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited Washington, hailing China and the US as 'partners' in meeting the security challenges of the 21st century. On that occasion, Bush also emphatically validated China's position in the global order, calling it a 'great civilisation, a great power, and a great nation.'[71]

Since 9-11, thus, there had been a substantial warming of US-China relations. Between then and the end of 2004, formal dialogue between Bush and PRC leaders took place eight times while Powell met his Chinese counterpart, Li Zhaoxing, at least eleven times.[72] There were, of course, still

---

[68] *Transcript of President Bush's Meeting with Chinese President Jiang Zemin*, 21 February 2002, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.

[69] In September 2003, Powell would proclaim that US-China relations 'are the best they have been' since Nixon's 1972 visit. See Colin Powell, *Remarks at the Elliot School of International Affairs*, 5 September 2003, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.

[70] *Bush-Jiang Crawford Summit—Transcript of Bush-Jiang Press Conference*, 25 October 2002, http://www.gpo.gov/.

[71] *Transcript of Remarks at Arrival Ceremony: President Bush and Premier Wen Jiabao*, 9 December 2003, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.

[72] In this period, Bush met Jiang (October 2001, February 2002, October 2002), Hu Jintao (May 2002, June 2003, October 2003, November 2004) and Wen Jiabao (December 2003). On the frequency of Powell and Li's meetings, see Colin Powell, *Remarks at Conference on China-US Relations*, 5

several areas of policy differences and interest divergence between both sides but it was patent that in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks, there was a renewed momentum to ties between Beijing and Washington. Indeed, given the bilateral difficulties that had accompanied the initial months of the Bush administration, it was wryly suggested in China that 'Bin Laden saved [the PRC].'[73]

Chinese analysts generally acknowledged that 9-11 had an impact on China's power status and its relations with the US, although there were differing assessments on the nature of this impact. On the one hand, it compelled Washington to focus on the more pressing threats of Al-Qaeda and Jihadist terrorism instead of the potential threat of a rising China, which made it easier for Beijing to respond positively to the US, and vice versa. This led anti-terrorism to become part of the rationales that undergirded stable US-China relations, increasing opportunities for: (i) Sino-American dialogue and collaboration; (ii) a bigger Chinese role in global security governance; and (iii) establishing linkages between China's support for US counterterrorism efforts and its proclaimed RGP identity as Jiang tried to do at the 2001 APEC Summit.[74] On the other hand, 9-11 and its corollary effects also produced

---

November 2003; and *Transcript of Remarks with Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing after their Meeting*, 30 September 2004, http://2001-2009.state.gov/. Indeed, both men had established such a strong personal rapport that they eventually stopped using prepared talking points. Li would even call Powell at his home and joked that both men might get a 'gold medal' for the most number of 'phone calls between foreign ministers.' See aforementioned citations.

[73] Shirk, *China*, p. 241.

[74] See Jia Qingguo, 'One Administration, Two Voices: US China Policy during Bush's First Term,' *The International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 3 (2003), pp. 23-36; Qin Yaqing, 'Guannian Tiaozheng Yu Daguo Hezuo' [Adjusting Perspective and Big Power Cooperation], *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations]*, Vol. 3 (2002), p. 8; Jin Canrong, 'Yingxiang Zhongguo Guoji Huanjing De Lianglei Xin Yinsu Pinggu' [Assessing the Two New Factors Affecting China's International Environment], *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations]*,

concerns about China's strategic position vis-à-vis the US. As shown by the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration's panoptic vision of 'fighting terror' could be used to justify pre-emptory military actions or interventionist policies. While Beijing had not opposed America's position during UNSC deliberations on Iraq, such a principle was at odds with China's state-centric views of sovereignty, whose strategists feared that it could be applied to the case of North Korea.[75] In fact, many of these strategists expressed skepticism of American intentions on Iraq—further heightened when the US army failed to find concrete evidence of weapons of mass destruction—and saw that war as proof of enduring American hegemonism and imperialistic inclinations.[76] Nor were they unconcerned about the US's increased military presence in Central Asia, growing influence in South Asia, and the ease in which it had been able to displace the Taliban and Saddam Hussein regimes.[77] These

---

Vol. 11 (2002), pp. 7-8. On Jiang's statement at the 2001 APEC conference, see *Transcript of the Remarks by President Bush and President Jiang Zemin in Press Availability*. One CCTV news editor writing in the *International Politics Quarterly* also claimed that China established the 'image' of a responsible great power at the 'post 9-11 APEC meeting.' See Shen Jianing, 'APEC Shanghai Huiyi Yu Zhongguo De Guoji Xingxiang' [Shanghai APEC Conference and China's International Image], *Guoji Zhengzhi Yanjiu [International Politics Quarterly]*, Vol. 1 (2002), pp. 115-118.

[75] China had, in fact, voted for UNSC resolution 1441 which stated that Iraq breached its disarmament obligations. Assistant Secretary Kelly also complimented Beijing for criticising 'Baghdad's attempts to play games with the UN Security Council.' Nevertheless, it was clear that Chinese thinkers were disturbed by the American pre-emption doctrine and the ensuing Iraq war. See, for examples, Xia Liping, 'Yilake Zhanzheng Dui Guoji Zhanlue Geju Bianhua Ji Woguo Anchuan Huanjing De Yingxiang' [The Impact of the Iraq War on International Strategic Structural Development and China's Security Environment], *Lilun Cankao [Theoretical Reference]*, Vol. 1 (2004), pp. 27-29; Zhang Shengjun, 'Quanqiu Jiegou Chongtu Yu Meiguo Baquan De Hefa Xing Weiji' [Global Structural Conflict and the Legitimacy Crisis of American Hegemony], *Meiguo Yanjiu [American Studies]*, Vol. 3 (2003), pp. 30-41. On American appreciation of China's response, see James Kelly, 'US Policy on China and North Korea,' *Remarks to the World Affairs Council*, 30 January 2003, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.

[76] See the section on American hegemony in Wang Jisi & Qin Yaqing, eds., *Zhongguo Xuezhe Kan Shijie—Guoji Zhixu Juan [Chinese Scholars View the World—Volume on International Order]* (Beijing: Xin Shijie Chubanshe, 2007), pp. 89-157. See as well Liu Jinzhi, 'Shiping Xiao Bushi De Tiguo Waijiao' [Appraising Junior Bush's Diplomacy of Imperialism], *Guoji Zhengzhi Yanjiu [International Studies Quarterly]*, Vol. 4 (2004), pp. 83-92.

[77] Mohan Malik, *Dragon on Terrorism: Assessing China's Tactical Gains and Strategic Losses Post-September 11* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), pp. 28-31.

factors contributed to a sense that the United States had extended its strategic superiority over China, which as early as late 2001, prompted Jiang to promote the study and strengthening of 'national strategic capability' (*Zhanlue Nengli*) at a major PLA conference.[78] This sense of relative vulnerability was also not helped by the belief amongst several Chinese scholars that anti-terrorism was a short-term common objective and that over the longer-term, the US might revert to a more adversarial attitude towards China.[79]

Debating International Responsibility

Yet, combating terrorism was never the only area which the Bush administration wanted greater Chinese cooperation. As mentioned, even in the early months of the Bush government, it had been apparent that there would be a continuation of the policy of pushing China to act as a responsible power on a range of international issues, from non-proliferation and the North Korea nuclear problem to international trade and human rights. Perhaps the clearest indication of this policy came from the Director of Policy

[78] Jiang Zemin, 'Yingzao Youli Zhanlue Taishi, Zengqiang Guojia Zhanlue Nengli' [Create a Favourable Strategic Situation, Enhance National Strategic Capability] in *Jiang Zemin Wenxuan Dierjuan [Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Vol. II]*, (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 2006), pp. 352-365. Following the Iraq war, one analyst described the American military as 'unbeatable under the heavens.' See Guo Xuetang, 'Baquan Zhouqi Lun De Pinkun—Jianxi Meiguo Baquan Shifou Zou Xiang Shuailuo' [Poverty of the Theory of Hegemonic Cycle—An Analysis of Whether American Hegemony is Going Downhill], *Meiguo Yanjiu [American Studies]*, Vol. 3 (2003), pp. 42-51.

[79] See, for examples, Pan Zhongqi, 'Zhongmei Guanxi de Zhanlue Jichu: Guoqu, Xianzai Yu Weilai' [The Strategic Foundations of US-China Relations: Past, Present and Future], *Guoji Guancha [International Observation]*, Vol. 3 (2002), pp. 33-37; Ni Shixiong and Zhuang Jianzhong, 'Bushi Zhengfu Dui Hua Xin Zhanlue Yu Zhongguo Dui Mei Xin Zhanlue Chushen' [Preliminary Inquiry of the Bush Government's New China Strategy and China's New America Policy], *Meiguo Yanjiu [American Studies]*, Vol. 0 (2002), pp. 19-32.

Planning at the State Department, Richard Haass, when he addressed the National Committee on US-China relations in December 2002. Speaking on the question of China's international role, Haass stated unequivocally that China's leaders 'must confront the reality that greater power brings with it the burden of greater responsibility.' While the PRC had made considerable strides in integrating into the international system and signed 'protocols and treaties,' Haass noted, that was not enough. Nor was it sufficient merely that both sides had regular dialogue or 'shared interests.' What was more important, in Washington's view, was that US and China cultivated a sense of shared purpose and identity, 'one built on the basis of what [both countries] are *for*.' The kind of 'solidarity,' Haass remarked, which George Kennan had envisioned the US to have with 'other like-minded nations.'[80]

Haass's words suggested that Washington saw the issue of China's responsibility not only from a Bullian view of great power responsibility, but increasingly through the prism of solidarism, which defines a responsible state as one that shares, or contributes to, the values and norms of a liberalist global order. For the Chinese leadership, its rhetoric had not moved beyond a general language of asserting common global responsibilities or pronouncing China as a contributor to international peace and security. Nevertheless, at the semi-official, intellectual level, there was greater flavour to the discourse. As explored in the previous chapter, from around the early to mid-1990s, Chinese scholars had begun to ponder more about the questions of China's

[80] Richard Haass, 'China and the Future of US-Sino Relations,' *Remarks to the National Committee on US-China Relations*, 5 December 2002, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.

role and responsibilities in international society. There would be a perpetuation and deepening of this discussion between 1997 and 2004.[81]

One notable contributor was Tsinghua University scholar Pang Zhongying. Writing in the leading Chinese journal *World Economics and Politics (WEP)*, Pang suggested that the PRC, despite its accession to the WTO in 2001, had yet to become a wholly 'normal' country in the international system. From the viewpoint of history, it was not normal if China did not become a world power, but as Pang expounded, the question of China's 'normalisation' depended ultimately on whether it was inducted into the 'mainstream' of international society, and whether it shared the 'interests and views' of this mainstream. Pang was of the view that since China 'could not leave international society,' it should align more with the norms of international society, even to the point of rethinking its traditional foreign policy emphasis on independence and autonomy. This 'self-correction,' he argued, would lead to the normalisation of China's status as a responsible great power.[82]

Beijing University scholars Ye Zicheng and Li Ying appeared to share Pang's sentiments but criticised the national psychology of victimhood in preventing a more 'normal' big power outlook in China. They wrote: 'Whenever difficulties arose with Western powers, one was often tempted to think about the eight-nation allied invasion or the late Qing dynasty's

[81] Here I will highlight what I consider to be some of the more prominent Chinese arguments on China's international responsibility.

[82] Pang Zhongying, '"Shijie Daguo" Yu "Zhengchang Guojia": Lun "Zhengchang Guojia" Fanshi Yu Guojia De Shijie Guan Chongsu' ["Global Great Power" and "Normal Country": Discussing the Model of the "Normal Country" and the Remoulding of the Worldview], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics]*, Vol. 11 (2002), pp. 12-16.

humiliations at the hands of foreign aggressors, reflecting a particular interpretation of history to understand modern reality.' If China wanted to become a great power, such negativity had to be jettisoned; it was more important that it developed 'normal' big power traits of 'self-confidence,' 'optimism' and 'responsibility.' On the last quality, Ye and Li reminded their audience that Deng's diplomatic guideline '*taoguang yanghui*' (hide brightness, nourish obscurity) was followed by the phrase '*yousuo zuowei*' (do something useful), which implied a Chinese 'spirit of responsibility and contribution' towards the world. This sort of diplomatic activism called for China to 'direct and establish international rules,' and to assert its 'voice' in international affairs, inasmuch as Deng's concept of strategic obscurity was still salient.[83]

The writings of Pang, Ye and Li all connected to the belief that it was crucial for China's identity development to encompass a sense of great power responsibility. But what was great power responsibility, as conceived in China? Men Honghua and Huang Haili provided one interpretation in the influential policy journal *American Studies*. Reflecting a conceptualisation of great power responsibility that was not too dissimilar from the English school conception, Men and Huang argued that 'responsibility cannot be divorced from power'—*ergo*, 'great powers have greater responsibilities than other states.' This bespoke the duty of safeguarding international peace and security as necessarily falling on the shoulders of the powerful 'Few' (i.e. great powers), who also had 'special responsibilities to more actively provide

[83] Ye Zicheng and Li Ying, 'Goujian Daguo Waijiao Zhihun: Zhengchangxin, Zixinxin, Leguanxin' [Constructing the Soul of a Great Power's Diplomacy: Normalcy, Self-Confidence, Optimism], *Shijie Jingji Pinglun [International Economic Review]*, Vol. 3 (2001), pp. 22-23.

international public goods.' Men and Huang did not particularly elaborate on the type of public goods that China should provide, but did suggest the recovery of failed states as one area which Beijing could provide leadership as a responsible power and in its collaboration with the United States.[84]

Qu Congwen engaged history to arrive at a similar view of great power responsibility. Qu agreed with the notion that great powers had added responsibilities and that these responsibilities included the obligations to act with restraint and to improve the international system. Nevertheless, different historical epochs entailed different morality 'requirements' for the 'ways' of the great power, which were usually predetermined by the 'forerunning powers' of the day.[85] In Qu's observation, beginning from the 1980s to 1990s, the concept of the responsible great power had become the new moral benchmark for extant and aspiring powers, representing the continuing process of the 'enlightenment' of the international system. International society had yet to achieve a complete consensus on the meaning of great power responsibility, he noted, but there was little doubt that this idea was emerging as the 'choice of history' for great powers in the 21st century.[86]

A more structural understanding of China's great power responsibility could be found in Xiao Huanrong's widely-cited paper in the *WEP* journal. Xiao attempted to systematise great power responsibility in terms of levels—

[84] Men Honghua and Huang Haili, 'Yingdui Guojia Shibai De Bujiu Cuoshi: Jianlun Zhongmei Anquan Hezuo De Zhanlue Xing' [Remedial Measures for Failed States: A Strategic Dimension of Sino-American Security Cooperation], *Meiguo Yanjiu [American Studies]*, Vol. 1 (2004), pp. 26-27.
[85] Yan came to a comparable conclusion, stating that 'the norm of international responsibility is defined by the strong.' See Yan Xuetong, 'The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes,' *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 10, No. 26 (2001), p. 37.
[86] Qu Congwen, 'Fuzeren De Daguo Guan' [The Concept of the Responsible Great Power], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics]*, Vol. 10 (2002), pp. 72-77.

domestic, regional, and global—that corresponded to a state's power status. This ordering of power and responsibility was conceived as follows (table 1):

Table 1: Xiao's Power-Responsibility Matrix

	Domestic responsibility	***Regional responsibility***	***Global responsibility***
Basic great power	*Seek basic security and prosperity*	*Pursuit of a strategic periphery*	*Lesser or basic in nature*
Regional great power	*Realise basic security and prosperity*	*Establishment of a security ring*	*Of greater importance; fulfil some global obligations*
Superpower	*Realise abundant security and prosperity*	*Establishment of global spheres of influence*	*To manage the global order*

Xiao's taxonomy led to a measured assessment of China's responsibility-power juncture (*zeren dingwei*): first, China's domestic obligations corresponded to those of a 'basic great power' (i.e. seeking basic security and prosperity), because among other things, it still faced several developmental challenges and had not achieved reunification with Taiwan. Second, based on most readings of Chinese national power, China was already a regional big power. However, it had yet to fully meet its regional responsibility of establishing a 'strategic periphery' of friendly states, much less a regional 'security ring.' Third, although China could not be considered a superpower, it had inextricable influence and roles in global governance. Xiao concluded that, even as 'appropriate' global responsibilities should be pursued, the focus of China's great power responsibility should necessarily be on its regional obligations. This meant an emphasis on Asian regionalism and its processes,

which in Xiao's estimation, would have a positive impact on enhancing China's regional leadership role as well as its ability to fulfil its domestic and global responsibilities.[87]

As was clear, Xiao perceived great power responsibility as squaring with the needs of China's development and security. The same could be said of Men and Huang, who stated that the pursuit of big power responsibilities did not preclude the consideration of national interests (as they put it, ideally, there should be a 'confluence of responsibility, power and interest')[88] For Wang Yizhou, an authoritative voice in Chinese academia, he saw little dichotomy between interest and responsibility, arguing that responsibility was both 'an interest and requirement' (*liyi yu xuqiu*) in Chinese foreign policy. Wang concurred with Xiao's assessment that Beijing should address its regional obligations more than its global obligations, given that China was still a developing state and had unresolved sovereignty issues. That said, China could still have meaningful contributions to the extant international order. In this area, Wang suggested Beijing's responsibilities as: (i) helping establish a 'fairer and more stable' global order; (ii) the 'reaffirmation and bolstering of the moral authority and influence of the United Nations'; and (iii) helping reform the IMF and the World Bank so that the global financial regime more accurately reflected the development needs and risk capacities of member states. Wang was overall optimistic that as China's comprehensive

[87] Xiao Huanrong, 'Zhongguo De Daguo Zeren Yun Diqu Zhuyi Zhanlue' [China's Great Power Responsibility and the Strategy of Regionalism], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics]*, Vol. 1 (2003), pp. 48-51.
[88] Men and Huang, 'Yingdui Guojia Shibai De Bujiu Cuoshi,' p. 27.

national power rose, transforming its diplomatic priorities, 'its great power temperament and responsible persona would become more manifest.'[89]

Yet, societal attitudes that indicated ideological dogmatism and a 'retaliatory' mindset of a victimised nation did not help China's RGP cause. It was therefore important, CASS scholar Shen Jiru argued, that a 'healthy citizenry consciousness of China as a responsible great power' was cultivated. Shen pointed out that China was an important member of the 'world family.' External problems could quickly become China's problems while China's internal difficulties could similarly affect others. It stood to reason that China should seek an 'alignment of interests' between the Chinese nation and the world's societies, advocated Shen.[90] The term 'norms' was not used, but it could be argued that, like Pang's earlier discussion of China as a 'normal' country in international society, Shen's views hewed towards a sense of solidarism.

Shen's advocacy of a 'globally responsible citizenry' was reflective of the sanguinity many in China felt about their country's growing international stature and role. Certainly, amongst Chinese intellectuals, there was rising interest of and receptivity to the narrative of China as a responsible power. Compared to the early to mid-1990s period, from 1997 to 2004, Chinese scholars appeared to be less cynical of the RGP vision, though this is not to

[89] Wang Yizhou, 'Sanda Xuqiu: Fazhan, Zhuquan Yu Zeren' [Three Great Requirements: Development, Sovereignty and Responsibility], *Shijie Zhishi [World Affairs]*, Vol. 5 (2000), pp. 9-10. A longer version of this article can be found in: Wang Yizhou, 'Mianxiang 21 Shiji De Zhongguo Waijiao: Sanzhong Xuqiu De Xunqiu Jiqi Pingheng' [Towards China's 21st Century Diplomacy: Seeking and Balancing Three Kinds of Requirements], *Zhanlue Yu Guanli (Strategy and Management)*, Vol. 6 (1999), pp. 18-26.

[90] Shen Jiru, 'Fuzeren Daguo De Gongmin Xintai' [The National Mentality of a Responsible Great Power], *Zhanwang [Outlook Weekly]*, Vol. 2 (2004), p. 1.

say their views necessarily converged with those propounded in Washington or that perceptions of China's victimhood and developing status faded. As we have seen, external events had served as an impetus to Chinese discussions on international responsibility. The 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, notably, led many Chinese scholars and policymakers to assert China's RGP identity. Similar assertions were made about China's post 9-11 anti-terrorism contributions and its membership in the WTO (e.g. China, the 'responsible developing power').[91] Meanwhile, various strategic concepts that had gained currency in Beijing during this period were also conducive to the RGP discourse. The next section looks at these ideas.

New Security Concept, Soft Power and Peaceful Rise

The New Security Concept (NSC) marked the evolution of China's security diplomacy in the post-Cold War era. Building on security policy rhetoric of the mid-1990s as well as conceptual antecedents like the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the NSC came to being as an authoritative doctrine (*tifa*) when it was outlined in China's 1998 national defense white paper. Its status as a major policy guideline was further enshrined when it was included in major Jiang speeches, in official statements at the Sixteenth Chinese

[91] See, for examples, Wang Jian, 'Zhongdong Fankong Xingshi Ji Zhongguo De Zuoyong' [The Anti-terrorism Situation in the Middle East and China's Role], *Shijie Jingji Yanjiu [World Economy Research]*, Vol. 12 (2004), pp. 69-73; Song Hong, 'Fuzeren De Fazhan Daguo: Woguo Zai Shijie Maoyi Zuzhi Zhong De Diwei He Zuoyong' [The Responsible Developing Power: Our Nation's Position and Role in the World Trade Organisation], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics]*, Vol. 12 (2002), pp. 28-33.

Communist Party Congress, and in subsequent white papers on defence (2000, 2002, 2004). [92]

The thrust of the NSC was that security should be underpinned by 'mutual benefit, mutual trust, equality and cooperation' between states instead of arms build-up and alliances. Such nomenclature had not been uncommon in Chinese diplomatic language but in the area of security policy, their use represented a new development. Important to their formulation in the NSC was the perspective that in an increasingly interdependent world, 'no states can unilaterally achieve its security aims,' and that the security of all states was inextricably linked. It was hence vital, the NSC argued, that states built trust with each other and pursued security cooperation. This cooperation was envisaged to extend to non-traditional threats such as terrorism, pandemics and international crime, speaking to the notion of 'comprehensive security' that had gained increased prominence post-September 11. The broad definition of security also dovetailed with the Chinese idea of comprehensive national power, conceiving security as with power, in multiple dimensions. [93]

The advocacy of the New Security Concept led to parallel Chinese RGP claims. It was noteworthy that the 1998 white paper which outlined the NSC also pronounced China as 'a responsible great power, a firm force for

[92] Although the ideas associated with the New Security Concept first appeared around 1996 (apparently proposed by foreign minister Qian Qichen), I agree with Bates Gill that the concept attained formal policy status with its inclusion in the 1998 white paper. See Bates Gill, *Rising Star: China's New Security Diplomacy* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), pp. 4-7.

[93] *Zhongguo De Guofang [China's National Defense]*, (Beijing: Guowu Yuan Xinwen Bangongshi, 1998), pp. 840-843; Jianwei Wang, 'China's Multilateral Diplomacy in the New Millennium,' in Yong Deng and Fei-ling Wang, eds., *China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), pp. 161-162.

upholding world peace and stability.'[94] In academia, China Foreign Affairs university vice-president Qin Yaqing was an influential voice who argued the shift in security thinking demonstrated China's 'willingness to be a responsible power of the international society.'[95]

In some respects, the positioning of China as a promoter of progressive security norms could be seen as Beijing's attempt to boost its soft power in the security arena. This should not be surprising. Since the late 1990s, the idea of soft power had become increasingly prominent in Beijing, and many Chinese scholars and policymakers saw it as an integral aspect of China's comprehensive national power. In 2002, it received top-level endorsement when Jiang's report to Sixteenth CCP Congress affirmed the strategic relevance of the concept. At the 13th collective study session of the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee in 2004, themes related to China's soft power were also raised.[96]

Generally concurring with the idea that soft power was about influencing others through attraction rather than coercion, Chinese discussions in this area centred on aspects such as a nation's culture, ideologies, image and developmental model. At the heart of this discourse was the question of how these elements could ameliorate China's power position. It was perceived that soft power 'competition' had become a core

[94] *Zhongguo De Guofang*, p. 839.
[95] Qin Yaqing, 'Guanjia Shenfen, Zhanlue Wenhua He Anquan Liyi: Guanyu Zhongguo Yu Guoji Shehui Guanxi De Sange Jianshe' [National Status, Strategic Culture and Security Interests: Three Hypotheses on China's Relations with International Society], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics]*, Vol. 1 (2003), p. 10.
[96] Young Nam Cho and Jong Ho Jeong, 'China's Soft Power: Discussions, Resources and Prospects,' *Asian Survey*, Vol. XLVIII, No. 3 (2008), pp. 453-472; Li Mingjiang, 'China Debates Soft Power,' *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 2 (2008), pp. 287-308.

aspect of the international competition between states, and that for China's rise to be sustainable, the strengthening of this dimension was crucial.[97] This was especially so given China's aspiration to be a responsible big power, argued one scholar from the Compilation and Translation Bureau of the Central Committee; it had to 'possess the capacity to relate to other states.'[98] A similar view was espoused by strategist Fu Xin. Writing in the MFA-linked journal *International Studies*, Fu suggested that China could not afford to ignore its responsibilities to international society if it wanted to augment its soft power and international image.[99]

A fundamental argument connecting the motifs of soft power and the New Security Concept was that China's rise would be peaceful. This message had been promulgated by Beijing for some time, but it was only in November 2003 at the Boao Forum that the *tifa* of China's 'peaceful rise' was formally articulated by leading CCP political theorist Zheng Bijian. Zheng had earlier written and submitted a report on 'the development path of China's peaceful rise' to Chinese president Hu Jintao, who would publicly express his support for this concept by December 2003. There would be subsequent statements of

[97] For some notable examples of Chinese writings on soft power between 1997-2004, see Pang Zhongying, 'Guoji Guanxi Zhong De Ruan Liliang Ji Qita' [Soft Strength and Others in International Relations], *Zhanlue Yu Guanli [Strategy and Management]*, Vol. 2 (1997), pp. 49-51; Zhang Ji and Sang Hong, 'Wenhua: Guoji Zhengzhi Zhong De "Ruan Quanli"' [Culture: "Soft Power" in International Politics], *Shehui Zhuyi Yanjiu [Socialism Studies]*, Vol. 3 (1999), pp. 38-41; Zhu Majie. 'Xin Shiji Guoji Guanxi Zhong De Ruan Guoli Jingzheng' [Competition for Soft Power in International Relations in the New Century], *Guoji Zhanwang [Global Review]*, Vol. 2 (2001), pp. 7-11. For more updated views, see Mingjiang Li, ed., *Soft Power: China's Emerging Strategy in International Politics* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2011).

[98] Yuan Shan, 'Guan Yu "Beijing Gongshi" Yanjiu De Ruogan Wenti' [Concerning the Several Problems of Research on the "Beijing Consensus"], *Dangdai Shijie Yu Shehui Zhuyi [Contemporary World and Socialism]*, Vol. 5 (2004), p. 20.

[99] Fu Xin, 'Quanqiuhua Shidai De Guojia Xingxiang: Jiandui Zhongguo Mouqiu Heping Fazhan De Sikao' [A Nation's Image in the Age of Globalisation: Reflecting on China's Pursuit of Peaceful Development], *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies]*, Vol. 4 (2004), p. 17.

endorsement by key members of the CCP Politburo, although from around April 2004, Chinese leaders preferred to use the ostensibly more neutral terminology of 'peaceful development' instead of 'peaceful rise.'[100]

Substantively, there was little change and there remained considerable support in Beijing for the ideas advocated by Zheng. According to Zheng, China's rise would be a benign and non-hegemonistic phenomenon. History had shown the rise of new powers often destabilised the prevailing international order and caused wars, especially if these powers sought national aggrandizement through military means. Which was why, Zheng claimed, China would never repeat the mistakes of these powers and go down the same 'harmful' path; instead, it would pursue a 'new' course of rising peacefully through internal reforms and participation in economic globalisation. This obligated China to 'strive' for a benign external environment, which meant avoiding confrontation with other big powers and cultivating good regional relations. Zheng was confident that China's emergence would have positive implications for the Asian region; as he put it, the peaceful rise of China constituted part of Asia's peaceful rise story.[101]

Official endorsement notwithstanding, the peaceful rise concept prompted an internal debate in China. Some emphasised the developing state identity and thought it was premature to speak of China as a rising power.

[100] Bonnie Glaser and Evan Medeiros, 'The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy-Making in China: The Ascension and Demise of the Theory of "Peaceful Rise",' *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 190 (2007), pp. 291-310.

[101] Zheng Bijian, 'Zhongguo Heping Jueqi Xin Daolu He Yazhou de Weilai' [China's New Path of Peaceful Rise and Asia's Future], *Xinhua*, 24 November 2003; Interview with Zheng Bijian, 'Heping Jueqi: Zhongguo Tese Shehui Zhuyi De Yige Ji Zhongyao De "Zhongguo Tese"' [Peaceful Rise: The Most Important "Chinese Characteristic" in Socialism with Chinese Characteristics], *Xue Lilun [Theory Research]*, Vol. 8 (2004), pp. 4-6.

Others were concerned that the idea of peaceful rise weakened China's hand in employing force options against Taiwan; had no historical precedent and was thus not realistic; challenged Deng's earlier advice of adopting a low profile international posture; diminished the rationale for China's military modernisation; and potentially promoted nationalistic sentiments. [102] Supporters of the peaceful rise theory, on the other hand, saw linkages between this concept and China's RGP identity. Zheng himself made this connection at the 2003 Boao Forum, citing the elevation of Chinese living standards (i.e. one-fifth of the world's population) as evidence that China had 'shouldered its responsibilities towards mankind's development.'[103] Similarly, at the 2004 Boao Forum, it was asserted that China would emerge as a 'non-hegemonic, peaceful and responsible great power.' [104] This outlook was evidently shared by several scholars writing in a special 2004 issue of the *Teaching and Research* journal, conceiving peaceful rise as entailing the fulfilment of China's obligations and role as a responsible power.[105] For Qin Yaqing, he perceived a similar (if inverse) dynamic: China's RGP 'political thought and practice' were proof that its rise would be peaceful.[106]

[102] Glaser and Medeiros, 'The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy-Making in China,' pp. 301-306.
[103] Zheng Bijian, 'Zhongguo Heping Jueqi Xin Daolu He Yazhou De Weilai.'
[104] This claim was made by Long Yongtu, a senior Chinese diplomat and Secretary-General of the Boao Forum. See Editor, 'Long Yongtu Shuo: Zhongguo Jiang Chengwei Buchengba, Heping, Fuzeren De Daguo' [Long Yongtu Says: China Will Become a Non-Hegemonic, Peaceful and Responsible Great Power], *Shenzhou [Divineland]*, Vol. 6 (2004), p. 13.
[105] In particular, see the articles by Song Xinning, Liu Xige and Yang Yi in *Jiaoxue Yu Yanjiu [Teaching and Research]*, Vol. 4 (2004).
[106] Qin Yaqing, 'Shijie Gegu Yu Zhongguo De Heping Jueqi' [Global Structure and China's Peaceful Rise], *Dangjian [Party Construction]*, Vol. 5 (2004), p. 12.

China's Conduct

But beyond the rhetoric, how did China's general behaviour relate to its stated RGP identity during this period?[107] As we have seen, in fighting the Asian financial crisis and international terrorism, China had generally evinced a more cooperative face. That side was again perceptible on the North Korea (DPRK) nuclear issue. China publicly voiced its opposition to the nuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, took part in four-party talks with both Koreas and the US between 1997-1999, and supported the referral of IAEA's report on the DPRK's violations to the Security Council. More significantly, it played a leading role in mediating the 2002-2003 nuclear standoff between Washington and Pyongyang, brokering first the US-China-DPRK trilateral talks in July 2003 and then persuading Pyongyang to accept a six-party talk format on negotiations (which it also hosted).[108] These actions and more were appreciated by Washington, and led Powell to hail China's assistance as a 'vivid example' of the great power concert that the US had come to expect with China.[109] Not surprisingly, many Chinese commentaries argued that Beijing had acted responsibly on the North Korea nuclear issue—although it was unclear from these writings the extent to which the RGP identity had been a factor in Beijing's response.[110] What was evident though was that China had substantial interests in getting North Korea to abandon its nuclear

[107] In view of the thesis's focus and scope, this will be brief behavioural examination.
[108] Shirk, *China*, pp. 123-127.
[109] Powell, *Remarks at Conference on China-US Relations.*
[110] See, for example, Guan Li, *Ruhe Yu Meiguo Gongchu*, p. 187.

programme. Pyongyang's pursuit of nuclear weapons was clearly destabilising to China's regional security environment. There was also the risk of American military intervention, a scenario that could lead to a North Korean refugee crisis at Chinese borders as well as the loss of the DPRK as China's strategic buffer.[111]

In terms of broader non-proliferation/arms control efforts, China took a number of new steps to demonstrate its support. These included: joining the Zangger Committee and ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997; issuing a control list of nuclear exports that accorded with those of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), eventually joining the group in 2004; assenting to an additional IAEA protocol in 1999 that permitted more stringent checks on China's civilian nuclear programme; pledging in 2000 that it would withhold international assistance on the development of nuclear-capable missile delivery systems; strengthening its control regulations on missile-related exports in 2002; and publishing its first white paper on non-proliferation in 2003.[112] These measures, however, were not enough to prevent a critical review of China's non-proliferation record in July 2003 by the Bush administration. The administration was particularly concerned with what it considered to be a lack of enforcement from Beijing to control the alleged sales of missile-related technologies by errant Chinese firms to Iran

[111] Shirk, *China*, p. 126.
[112] Gill, *Rising Star*, pp. 74-99; Gerald Chan, *China's Compliance in Global Affairs: Trade, Arms Control, Environmental Protection and Human Rights* (Singapore: World Scientific, Series on Contemporary China, 2006), pp. 111-140.

and Pakistan. It also stated its belief that China retained a clandestine chemical and biological weapons programme.[113]

China's role in another area of maintaining international security—UN peacekeeping operations—would be less contentious. Between 1997 and 2004, it participated in a total of eleven peacekeeping operations, increasing its number of sent peacekeepers by almost ten-fold from 2001 to 2004. Examples of some of these operations with Chinese participation included: the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNASMIL), in Liberia (UNMIL), in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE); the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), in Burundi (UNOB); as well as the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).[114] The PRC's participation was still limited to non-combat activities, but for China's National Defense University scholar Tang Yongsheng, this involvement denoted not only the 'practical' use of Chinese power; but also China's 'condition and image' as a 'responsible and cooperative' power.[115]

This period also saw greater Chinese participation, enmeshment and leadership in regional security mechanisms. For example, in 2001, China helped establish the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which among other things, promoted non-traditional security cooperation among its members (comprising also Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and

[113] Paula DeSutter, 'China's Record of Proliferation Activities,' *Testimony before the US-China Commission*, 24 July 2003, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.
[114] Jin Canrong, *Daguo Zeren [Big Power's Responsibility]*, (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe, 2011), pp. 38-46.
[115] Tang Yongsheng, 'Zhongguo Yu Lianheguo Weihe Xingdong' [China and United Nations Peacekeeping Operations], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics]*, Vol. 9 (2002), p. 42.

Tajikistan). Its naming was reflective of Beijing's central role within the group as well as its origins as the Shanghai Five collective.[116] Additionally, China deepened its involvement in the ASEAN Regional Forum. Although Beijing had been initially skeptical about the ARF and its aims, it gradually came to the assessment that active engagement in this organisation was not necessarily incompatible with Chinese interests. Thus by 1997, Beijing was co-chairing a session on confidence-building initiatives with Manila. In 2003, Beijing broke new ground in its ARF approach with its proposal of an annual defense dialogue. This culminated in the unprecedented 2004 ARF Conference on Security Policy that was attended by senior military and defense officials of all 24 member states. Given that one of the ARF's goals had apparently been to 'socialise' the PRC to become a 'responsible regional power,' it could be argued that China had gone some way towards meeting this expectation (at least within the confines of the ARF).[117] Indeed, during this period, China also signed a number of significant security-related documents with ASEAN, most notably the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and the association's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. The former committed China to seek peaceful solutions in regards to sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea while the latter (where the PRC had been the first non-ASEAN signatory) equally obligated China to renounce the threat or use of force in the settlement of conflicts. The last

[116] Chien-peng Chung, 'The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: China's Changing Influence in Central Asia,' *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 180 (2004), pp.989-1009.
[117] Gill, *Rising Star*, pp. 29-34; Rosemary Foot, 'China in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Organisation Processes and Domestic Modes of Thought,' *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 5 (1998), pp. 425-440.

example related to regional governmental security dialogues and military exchanges. In both areas, China upgraded its participation levels. By 2004, Beijing had established security dialogue arrangements with the governments of Pakistan, Thailand, Japan, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Australia, India, and Russia. Earlier, in 2003, China invited for the first time foreign military observers (which included officers from Thailand, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore) to watch a large-scale PLA exercise. That year, it also held joint military exercises with the navies of India, Pakistan and Kazakhstan, marking a notable change from its long-standing policy of eschewing such collaboration.[118]

China's regional activism was not limited only to the security domain. In terms of regional economic organisations, *inter alia*, Beijing continued to be an active player in APEC, signed up to the development-oriented forum, the ASEAN Plus Three (which also included Japan and South Korea), and created its own regional economic dialogue institution, the Boao Forum (modelled after the World Economic Forum). In 2002, it signed a framework agreement that aimed to establish a China-ASEAN free trade zone by 2010, which helped temper fears among ASEAN states that their economies risked being sidelined by the Chinese economic juggernaut.[119]

At the global level, China's 2001 entry to the WTO had an important impact on the free trade regime. As previously noted, WTO accession had produced claims in China that it would act as a responsible power in the

[118] Shambaugh, 'China Engages Asia,' pp. 64-99.
[119] Ibid.

global economic order. That would appear to be the case when China adopted a posture of moderation in the trading dispute between a coalition of developing states and the developed economies of Europe and North America at the 2003 Cancun WTO meeting. Beijing was praised by the US and others for its 'constructive proposals and a moderating speaking tone,' and in trying to 'bridge the gap between developing and developed nations.'[120] Washington was less complimentary, however, on the issue of China's WTO compliance. While in some aspects China committed itself to policies that were over and above what was required by WTO, its commitment in areas such as agriculture and service sector policies, intellectual property rights, transparency, and market access drew concerns. Washington also made known its dissatisfaction with China's fixed exchange rate system, which it saw as irresponsibly contributing to 'imbalances that threaten the global economy.'[121]

Meanwhile, Beijing took some steps—mainly procedural and relating to treaty signature—which signalled its awareness that recognition as a responsible power (especially from the US) depended in part on its alignment with the international human rights regime. It signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the ICCPR in 1997 and 1998 respectively, ratifying the former in June 2001. It engaged in

[120] Alan Larson, 'China's Role in the World Economic System,' *Remarks to the Students and Faculty of the University of International Business and Economics at Beijing*, 5 November 2003, http://2001-2009.state.gov/; Rosemary Foot, 'Chinese Strategies in a US-hegemonic Global Order: Accommodating and Hedging,' *International Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 1 (2006), p. 87.
[121] Larson, 'China's Role in the World Economic System'; Randall Schriver, 'China and the WTO: Compliance and Monitoring,' *Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Commission*, 5 February 2004, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.

bilateral human rights dialogue with more countries (e.g. UK, Australia, Norway, Canada) and from 1998, participated in formal dialogue with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. It continued to permit village-level elections, which by the late 1990s, covered nearly 80% of China's villages. And by 2004, it had published 19 rights-related governmental white papers.[122] That year also saw the inclusion of the idea of human rights in the Chinese constitution for the first time.[123] Nevertheless, human rights was one area which China was always going to find hard in fully meeting American and other western states' expectations because, among other factors, Chinese definitions of human rights emphasised collective and development rights over individual and political rights, and because many in Beijing still interpreted human rights in cultural relativist terms rather than from a universal or organic standpoint.[124] There had been greater pluralism in Chinese perspectives on human rights, to be sure.[125] But these perceptual changes were obviously not enough to effect substantial change as evidenced by continuing reports of Chinese abuses in areas such as

[122] Chan, *China's Compliance in Global Affairs*, pp. 173-202; Merle Goldman, *Comrade to Citizen: The Struggle for Political Rights in China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), p. 1.
[123] Dingding Chen, 'Explaining China's Changing Discourse on Human Rights, 1978-2004,' *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (2005), p. 156.
[124] I would prefer not to use the phrase 'international' expectations because as Alastair Iain Johnston has pointed out, China had consistently been able to garner support at the United Nations to vote down motions critical of its human rights record. See Alastair Iain Johnston, 'Is China a Status Quo Power?' *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (2003), p. 20; Andrew Nathan, 'Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Policy,' *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 139 (1994), pp. 622-643.
[125] Chen, 'Explaining China's Changing Discourse on Human Rights, 1978-2004,' pp. 155-182.

labour rights, land rights, religious freedom, minority rights and political rights.[126]

On environmental protection, China's ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2002 was a significant move that won it praise as a responsible power from several global leaders.[127] Its decision was made even more striking by the fact that the Bush administration pulled out of the protocol in 2001. Yet arguably, ratifying the protocol had not been a particularly difficult decision for Beijing. Although China was obliged to implement 'mitigating' ecological policies (e.g. the shutting down of older, coal-based power plants) that would have an impact on domestic industries, as a Non-Annex I Party with developing country status, it was effectively exempted from binding emission quotas. This made it relatively easer for Beijing to accept the terms of the Kyoto Protocol. This is not to imply that China considered environmental protection a peripheral issue, of course. Numerous statements from Chinese leaders affirming the importance of sustainable development, the enactment of several environment-related legislations, and the inclusion of environmental protection targets in China's Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) were indications that China took environmental concerns seriously. On the specific problem of environmental warming, Beijing also stated that it saw its management as a 'common' global responsibility—albeit 'differentiated' in proportion from those of developed countries (which it believed should bear

[126] See, for example, Lorne Craner, 'Prospects on Human Rights and Democracy in China,' *Statement before the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, 22 April 2004, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.
[127] Xiao Cong, 'Zhongguo Shige Fuzeren De Daguo' [China is a Responsible Great Power], *Shishi [Current Affairs]*, Vol. 2 (2002), p. 31.

an increased burden).[128] Overall, nevertheless, it would appear that China's environmental protection record could be improved. As Minxin Pei pointed out, China's environmental conditions were worsening rather than improving.[129] Its emission levels had also surged to the point that it had become the world's second largest producer of greenhouse gases by 2002.[130] This essentially discounted the possibility of having any meaningful solution on global warming without deeper Chinese involvement, even if much of its emissions increase could be attributed to legitimate development needs.

Conclusion

The cartography of China's self-conception as a responsible great power in the period 1997-2004 bespoke continuities and changes. For the Clinton and Bush governments, there was essentially a continuation of the policy to seek China to act more 'responsibly' in international society. There was some pushing of the rhetorical envelope by Bush administration officials, as evidenced by the call for US-China relations to move beyond shared interests to include a sense of shared values. But generally, the message to Beijing remained a consistent and simple one: the US welcomed China's rise, but its ascendancy should be matched by a willingness to shoulder the attendant global responsibilities. Washington never explicitly specified what it thought

[128] Ann Kent, *Beyond Compliance: China, International Organisations and Global Security* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 167-172; Chan, *China's Compliance in Global Affairs*, pp. 143-171.
[129] Minxin Pei, 'China's Governance Crisis,' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81 (September/October 2002), pp. 104-105.
[130] Kent, *Beyond Compliance*, p. 147.

these responsibilities should be, but it was apparent from American statements that these related to China's contributions towards regional and international security, and its conformity to the major norms of the extant global order. In some of these aspects, as reviewed in the preceding section, it could be argued that China had evinced a more cooperative side or taken steps to improve its record. It was hard to tell the extent in which the proclaimed RGP identity had been a factor in Beijing's behaviour, but what was evident was that in several areas, Chinese writings sought to establish linkages between China's actions and the RGP identity.

Indeed, RGP narratives had proliferated in Chinese writings during this period, reflecting continued Chinese positioning in that role. At the official level, Chinese leaders continued to embellish their statements with RGP references, but qualitatively, these did not go beyond general assertions or claims. In effect, there had been little variation in the rhetorical substance of official RGP discourse between this period and the earlier 1992-1996 phase. At the intellectual level, however, there was greater diversity and density to the discursive flow. As we have seen, Chinese scholars (some of which were influential voices) engaged in a wide-ranging discussion on the questions of China's great power role and its responsibilities. Although there were perceptual differences in the emphasis and content of China's obligations, most concurred on the importance of Beijing assuming greater global responsibilities. Interestingly, some of these views hewed towards a solidarist

sense of responsibility or an English school conception of great power responsibility.

The expansion of the RGP discourse in China could be attributed in part to external events such as the Asian financial crisis and the 11 September terrorist attacks, where Beijing's responses had prompted further claims and discussion of the RGP identity. The US's influence was still perceptible as indicated by continuing Chinese acknowledgment of the importance of the responsibility issue to Washington's full recognition of China's great power status. But essentially, many of the Chinese arguments on international responsibility were endogenous conceptualisations that had not referenced American views of China's big power conduct, reflecting what could be described as ideational 'localisation.'[131] The rising domestic prominence of ideas such as the New Security Concept, soft power and peaceful rise also squared with the development of the RGP discourse. This identity discussion would continue to evolve and deepen in the period after 2004. That phase will be examined next.

[131] Amitav Archarya, *Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).

CHAPTER FIVE

The Responsible Great Power Discourse: Continuing Proliferation and Debate, 2005-2012

Chapter 4 explored the trajectory of the Chinese RGP self-conception in the period 1997-2004. This chapter tracks the RGP identity's development from 2005 to 2012, the cut-off point of 2012 reflecting the end of the President Hu era in Chinese political history.[1] The chapter begins by examining the various discourses which had an impact on Chinese deliberations about their nation's big power role and responsibilities. This is followed by an assessment of the RGP identity within the context of an expanding US-China relationship in the second term of the Bush administration. The chapter then turns its attention to a major event with implications for the RGP identity—the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. Next, it addresses the issue of China's perceived growing assertiveness in international diplomacy, and examines the Obama administration's response as well as overall approach to China. In the penultimate section , the chapter outlines and discusses the key positions in the Chinese RGP debate, perspectives that had sharpened and clarified over the 2005-2012 period.

[1] Hu Jintao handed over the Chinese presidency to Xi Jinping during the March 2013 National People's Congress. But substantively, a power transition in Beijing was considered to have taken place in November 2012 when Hu handed over the reins of the party (General-Secretary) and the military (Chairman, Central Military Commission) to Xi.

Responsible Stakeholder Discourse

The introduction of the 'responsible stakeholder' concept by US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick in September 2005 marked another significant point in the evolving American rhetoric on China. Addressing the National Committee on US-China Relations, Zoellick spoke of the need for China to be 'more than just a member' of the international system—it also needed to be a 'responsible stakeholder.' His contention was that China had been a prime beneficiary of the extant international system, and thus had an obligation to bolster and sustain the system that 'enabled' its rise. This called for China to take greater ownership over global challenges such as nuclear proliferation, environmental protection, international financial stability, working with the United States in the management of these issues. This sense of shared global responsibility should be based on more than just common interests between the two powers, Zoellick suggested. Reiterating an earlier American call, he urged both countries to define their relationship on the basis of 'what both are for,' building a sense of shared purpose and values.[2]

By the end of 2005, the notion of China as a responsible stakeholder would become even more prominent in US policy discourse, with Zoellick calling it 'a strategic framework' to guide Washington's approach to Beijing.[3]

---

[2] Robert B. Zoellick, 'Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility,' *Remarks to the National Committee on US-China Relations*, 21 September 2005. Available at the US State Department Archive: http://2001-2009.state.gov/. Apparently, Zoellick had asked for ideas about how to establish the basis of a new US relationship with China. His then adviser and policy planning officer on East Asian and Pacific affairs, Evan Feigenbaum, provided the main suggestions. Conversation with Rosemary Foot, November 2012.

[3] Robert B. Zoellick, *Deputy Secretary Zoellick Statement on Conclusion of the Second US-China Senior Dialogue*, 8 December 2005, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.

The call for China to act as a responsible stakeholder was echoed by other senior officials of the Bush Administration. In a speech in Beijing in 2006, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson emphasised that the US would 'welcome China's role as a responsible stakeholder in international organisations…'[4] Similarly, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Thomas Christensen, speaking to the US-China Economic and Security Review (ESR) Commission in 2006, stressed that the 'crux' of American policy towards China was to 'channel' the latter down the path of being a responsible global stakeholder.[5] This strategy also received support from the US military, its 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review affirming the importance of getting China to act as a responsible stakeholder.[6] In 2007, Christensen updated the ESR Commission, underlining that China had yet to become the 'truly' responsible stakeholder envisioned by Zoellick and that the US would continue its policy of 'encouraging' the PRC to evolve as one.[7]

The usage of the vocabulary of stakeholder did not change the fact that the core message from Washington remained the same: that China's international responsibilities should match its burgeoning power. The concept, however, marked a different approach from earlier American rhetoric in that

[4] Henry Paulson, *Statement from Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson at the Closing of the US-China Strategic Economic Dialogue*, 15 December 2006, http://2001-2009.state.gov/. For similar remarks by Paulson, see as well: Henry Paulson, 'Growth and Future of China's Financial Markets,' *Prepared Remarks*, 7 March 2007, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.
[5] Thomas Christensen, 'China's Role in the World: Is China a Responsible Stakeholder?' *Remarks before the US-China Economic and Security Commission*, 3 August 2006, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.
[6] *Quadrennial Defense Report* (US Department of Defense, 2006), p. 29. See as well: Richard Lawless, 'China: Recent Security Developments,' *Prepared Statement before the House Armed Forces Committee*, 13 June 2007, available at: http://www.dod.gov.
[7] Thomas Christensen, 'The State of US-China Diplomacy,' *Remarks before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission*, 2 February 2007, http://2001-2009.state.gov/. (These remarks were delivered by John Norris, Director of the Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs on the behalf of Christensen).

it sought to speak more directly to Chinese interests. In characterising China's role in terms of a stakeholder of the international system, the suggestion was that it was in Beijing's interests to maintain or improve this system. There were certainly indications that many in China interpreted this concept from the vantage point of interests. For one, the dominant Chinese transliteration for the term stakeholder was *liyi xiangguan zhe*, which literally means actors with related interests.[8] Yet, this was a balance of interests skewed in favour of the United States, claimed some Chinese analysts. According to Lin Fengchun, the stakeholder concept implied the leveraging of China's strength to bolster the US's 'hegemonic' position in international society.[9] China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) Assistant President Yuan Peng expressed a similar outlook, opining that the 'strategic' obligations expected of China had a 'unilateral American flavour.'[10] Nevertheless, most Chinese analysts did not seem too critical of the responsible stakeholder concept. While some wondered if the US could really relinquish its 'market share' in world politics and treat China as an 'equal' partner, the primary sentiments were that the concept validated the PRC's growing international status and position; implied American acceptance of China's inevitable rise; was a more positive US engagement approach; and portended a shift from the 'tough'

[8] Other less common terms were *Chi Guren* [Shareholder] or *Gongtong Jingying Zhe* [Co-Administrator]. Interview in Shanghai, May 2011.
[9] Lin Fengchun, 'Fuxi? Huoxi? "Zhongguo Fuzeren Lun" Jiedu' [Fortune? Misfortune? Interpreting the "China Responsibility Theory"], *Shehui Guancha [Social Outlook]*, Vol. 4 (2006), pp. 42-43.
[10] Quoted in ibid.

China threat discourse towards the more 'reasonable and moderate' China responsibility theory.[11]

The responsible stakeholder concept had the effect of drawing further international attention to the question of China's global obligations, squaring with the increasing willingness of bodies such as the European Union to assess their relationship with Beijing in similar terms (see, for example, the 2006 EU Commission report, *EU-China: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities*). But more significantly, it appeared to add new impetus to continuing Chinese identity discourses about China's great power role and responsibilities, with many of the post-2005 discussions citing Zoellick's seminal speech as a reference point.[12] At a later point of the chapter, these discussions will be explored in greater detail.

[11] Indeed, several Chinese commentators viewed the stakeholder concept from the perspective of 'the US's positioning of China.' See Liu Wanai, 'Meiguo Zhongxin Dingwei Zhongguo: Liyi Xiangguan Zhe' [America Re-Positions China: Stakeholder], *Zhongguo Xinwen Zhoukan [China Newsweek]*, November 2005, pp. 40-41; Wu Xitang, 'Ruhe Kandai Meiguo Dui Zhongguo De Dingwei' [How to Understand America's Positioning of China], *Dangdai Shijie [Contemporary World]*, Vol. 2 (2006), pp. 14-15; Wang Lianhe, 'Meiguo Dui Huazhengce Xin Siwei? Ping Zuolike De Jianghua [New Thinking for America's China Policy? Assessing Zoellick's Speech], *Guoji Guancha [International Review]*, Vol. 1 (2006), pp. 33-37; Editor, 'Zaikan Zuolike 9.21 Yanjiang' [A Look Again at Zoellick's 21 September Speech], *Guoji Zhanwang [Global Review]*, Vol. 2 (2006), p. 10; Li Peng, ' Cong "Zhanlue Jingzheng Zhe" Dao "Liyi Xiangguan Zhe": Meiguo Dui Hua Zhanlue Dingwei Zhuanbian Yu Taiwan Wenti' [From "Strategic Competitor" to "Stakeholder": The Change in US's Strategic Positioning of China and the Taiwan Problem], Taiwan Yanjiu Jikan [Taiwan Research Quarterly], Vol. 1 (2006), pp. 1-13; Yu Zhen, 'Shilun Meiguo Duihua De Duizhong Zhanlue' [Discussing America's Direct China Strategy], *Guoji Guancha [International Review]*, Vol. 1 (2006), pp. 2-8.

[12] It did not escape Zoellick's attention that the Chinese quickly picked up on the stakeholder concept, saying he was 'very pleased that the stakeholder concept has generated some good discussion and debate in China.' See Robert B. Zoellick, *Press Conference in China*, 24 January 2006, http://2001-2009.state.gov/. On Zoellick's 21 September 2005 speech (as reproduced in the Chinese language), see Editor, 'Waikan Lun Zuolike Dui Meizhong Guanxi De Xin Dingwei: Liyi Xiangguan Zhe' [Discussing Zoellick's New Positioning of Sino-American Relations: Stakeholder], *Guoji Zhanwang [Global Review]*, Vol. 2 (2006), pp. 8-9.

Domestic conversations on the responsible stakeholder framework during this period were paralleled by the emergence of two other related policy discourses. The first related to the 'harmonious world' (*hexie shijie*) idea, first articulated by Hu Jintao at the Asian-African Summit in 2005 and further outlined during Hu's speech at the UN's 60th Anniversary Conference that year.[13] Its status as a diplomatic guideline was further consolidated when it was referenced in the 2005 White Paper on China's Peaceful Development Road, the 2006 Government Work Report, the 2006 Central Committee Foreign Affairs Work Conference and Hu's report to the 17th CCP Congress.[14]

As the foreign policy counterpart to the policy framework of 'harmonious society,' the harmonious world idea represented both a rhetorical refurbishment of the Chinese diplomatic outlook and an extension of the peaceful rise thesis.[15] Among other things, the concept called for amity and equality among nations, greater international cooperation and inclusiveness, the pursuit of common security and development, a more 'democratic' international society and the accommodation of the world's

[13] Qi Pengfei, *Zhongguo Gongchan Dang Yu Dangdai Zhongguo Waijiao, 1949-2009 [Chinese Communist Party and Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy, 1949-2009]*, (Beijing: Gongchan Dangshi Chubanshe, 2010), p. 98.

[14] *Zhongguo De Heping Fazhan Daolu [China's Peaceful Development Path]*, (Beijing: Guowu Yuan Xinwen Bangongshi, 2005), Section 5; Wen Jiabao, 'Zhengfu Gongzuo Baogao' [Government Work Report], *Xinhua*, 5 March 2006; 'Zhongyang Waishi Gongzuo Huiyi Zaijing Juxing: Hu Jintao Zuo Zhongyao Jianghua' [Central Committee Foreign Affairs Work Conference Held at Capital: Hu Jintao Makes Important Speech], *Xinhua*, 23 August 2006; 'Hu Jintao Zaidang De Shiqida Shang De Baogao' [Hu Jintao's Report at the 17th CCP Congress], *Xinhua*, 15 October 2007.

[15] As one party-published historiography claimed, 'harmonious co-existence transcends peaceful co-existence' among nations. See Qi, *Zhongguo Gongchan Dang Yu Dangdai Zhongguo Waijiao, 1949-2009*, p. 99. Liu Jianfei made a similar point, claiming that a harmonious world is even 'better' than a peaceful world. See Liu Jianfei, 'Heping Jueqi Shi Zhongguo De Zhanlue Xuanze' [Peaceful Rise is China's Strategic Choice], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics]*, Vol. 2 (2006), p. 40.

cultural and civilisational diversity.[16] Qualitatively, these did not diverge too much from ideas advocated in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence or the New Security Concept while the advocacy for greater pluralism in international society was not new and had been previously espoused by Jiang Zemin.[17] What was relatively different, however, were: (i) its use of the Confucian philosophy of *he* (harmony) to express China's vision of international order; and (ii) the attempt to synchronise foreign policy with domestic policy at the strategic conceptual level.[18]

Chinese analysts were quick to laud the putative strengths of the harmonious world concept. It was suggested that the conception was the externalisation of Chinese traditional virtues, marking a uniquely Chinese contribution to global normative development; correctly grasped 'the pulse of the times' and was hence more effective than the West's 'confrontational' approach in addressing the contradictions of a multi-cultural/civilisational world; constituted a more pro-active international approach that met both internal and external needs; represented a roadmap towards a more 'just and reasonable' global order; and conveyed China's big power outlook and commitment to peaceful development.[19] Deng's 1993 'puzzle' on the kind of

[16] 'Nuli Jianshe Zhijiu Heping, Gongtong Fanrong De Hexie Shijie' [Build towards a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity], *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily], 16 September 2005.
[17] See Jiang Zemin, 'Let Us Jointly Create a Better World' [Rang Women Gongtong Dizao Yike Geng Meihao De Shijie], in *Jiang Zemin Wenxuan Diyijuan [Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Vol. 1]*, (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 2006), pp. 476-482; Jiang Zemin, 'Jointly Construct a Peaceful and Prosperous New Century' [Gongtong Chuangzao Yike Heping Fanrong de Xin Shiji], in *Jiang Zemin Wenxuan Disanjuan [Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Vol. 3]*, (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 2006), pp. 472-478.
[18] Yongnian Zheng and Sow Keat Tok, '"Harmonious Society" and "Harmonious World": China's Policy Discourse under Hu Jintao,' *China Policy Institute Briefing Series*, No. 26 (2007), p. 8.
[19] See the report on the 'Harmonious World and China's Diplomacy' conference, with contributions from a number of leading Chinese IR scholars: Wu Jianmin, Yu Xintian, Liu Zhenming, Wang Jisi,

world that should be ushered in the 21st century had finally been answered, it was claimed. [20] Unsurprisingly, connections were made between the harmonious world idea and the declared RGP identity. According to a number of Chinese scholars, the advocacy of a harmonious world signalled China's 'will and ambition' to shoulder international responsibilities, keeping with its 'promise' to 'uphold global peace and development as a responsible great power.'[21] It was Beijing's 'reply' to the burgeoning expectations of its RGP role in international society, noted Zhao Lei, an analyst at the Central Party School.[22] It was also one that demonstrated the 'self-discipline' of a responsible power, Qin Yaqing suggested, alluding to the apparent restraint and moderation of the harmonious world idea.[23]

The second related policy discourse that emerged around this time centred on the Chinese politico-economic model. Like discussions on the responsible stakeholder concept, Chinese debates in this area arose as a

---

Rao Geping, Bai Yansong, Feng Shaolei, Cai Tuo, Qin Yaqing, Zhang Tuosheng, Zhang Yan, Jin Canrong, Ma Xin and Li Zhaojie, 'Hexie Shijie and China's Diplomacy' [Harmonious World and China's Diplomacy], *Waijiao Pinlun [Foreign Affairs Review]*, Vol. 87 (2006), pp. 15-20. See as well Xu Jian, 'Zonglun Guoji Xingshi Yu Zhongguo Waijiao' [On the International Situation and China's Diplomacy], *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies]*, Vol. 2 (2007), pp. 18-19, continued on p. 31; Yu Xintian, ' "Hexie Shijie" Yu Zhongguo De Heping Fazhan Daolu' ["Harmonious World" and China's Peaceful Development Path], *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies]*, Vol. 1 (2007), pp. 7-12, continued on p. 18; and Wang Yusheng and Yin Chengde, 'Guanyu "Goujian Hexie Shijie" De Shikao' [On Thoughts on "Constructing a Harmonious World"], *Lilun Cankao [Theoretical Reference]*, Vol. 5 (2007), pp. 11-12.

[20] Qi, *Zhongguo Gongchan Dang Yu Dangdai Zhongguo Waijiao, 1949-2009*, p. 99.

[21] See, for examples, Pu Ping, 'Heping Fazhan Daolu Yu Hexie Shijie' [Peaceful Development Path and Harmonious World], *Jiaoxue Yu Yanjiue [Teaching and Research]*, Vol. 11 (2007), pp. 53-54; Yue Xiaoyong, 'Dui Tuidong Jianshe Hexie Shijie Lilun De Chubu Renshi' [Preliminary Thoughts on the Theory of Promoting the Construction of a Harmonious World], *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies]*, Vol. 4 (2007), p. 5; Xu, 'Zonglun Guoji Xingshi Yu Zhongguo Waijiao,' p. 15. In a *China Daily* commentary, China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies analyst Qin Xiaoying also claimed that the harmonious world idea demonstrated 'the CPC's handling of international is maturing and [that] China is becoming a responsible global power.' See Qin Xiaoying, 'China's Path to World Peace and Prosperity,' *China Daily*, 30 October 2007.

[22] Zhao Lei, 'Yi "Hexie Shijie" Linian Tisheng "Fuzheren Daguo" Xingxiang' [Promote the Self-Image of a "Responsible Great Power" with "Harmonious World" Thought], *Zhongguo Dangzheng Ganbu Luntan [Chinese Cadres Tribune]*, Vol. 12 (2007), pp. 47-48.

[23] See Wu and others, 'Hexie Shijie and China's Diplomacy,' p. 18.

response to an external idea. This catalyst was Joshua Cooper Ramos's provocative 2004 writings on the Chinese development model. Labelling this paradigm the 'Beijing Consensus,' Ramos argued that China's approach presented a competitive and viable alternative to the more conventional American development model, the 'Washington Consensus.' As opposed to the Washington Consensus's prescription of free-market economics with democratic governance, the Beijing Consensus spoke of a seemingly efficacious development path that combined state capitalism with political autocracy. To be sure, Ramos did not explicitly express the Beijing Consensus in such a way, preferring instead to explicate what he noted as three defining features of the Chinese approach: the turn to innovation to complement reform; a more holistic sense of development that looked beyond the traditional GDP per-capita measure and towards aspects such as equality and sustainability; and an emphasis on developmental self-autonomy.[24]

Ramo's arguments stirred energetic reactions in China where efforts were made to reinterpret the notion of the Beijing Consensus (*Beijing Gongshi*) or China model (*Zhongguo Moshi*).[25] Political scientist Yu Keping, for example, characterised the Beijing Consensus as essentially a 'strategic choice' to effect modernisation under globalisation.[26] For others, it was about the

[24] Joshua Cooper Ramo, *The Beijing Consensus* (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2004).
[25] Reactions to Ramo's views were confined not only to China, of course. Elsewhere, there were vigorous debates on the notion of the Beijing Consensus. See, for examples, Suisheng Zhao, 'The China Model: Can it replace the Western Model of Modernisation?' *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 19, No. 65 (2010), pp. 419-436; Scott Kennedy, 'The Myth of the Beijing Consensus,' *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 19, No. 65 (2010), pp. 461-477; Stefan Harper, *The Beijing Consensus: How China's Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Basic Books, 2010).
[26] Yu Keping, 'Guanyu "Zhongguo Moshi" De Sikao' [Thinking about the "China Model"], *Hongqi [Red Flag]*, Vol. 19 (2005), p. 13.

'coordination and balance between reform, development and stability,' 'reform incrementalism,' or the synthesis of 'socialist democracy and socialist market economy,' *inter alia*. Regardless of the differing understandings, many Chinese commentators agreed that China's development strategies, taken together, could be regarded as a particular brand of political and economic model.[27]

That said, Chinese assessments about this model's implications or impact were mixed. One view was that while the China model had been an unqualified economic success, it seemed to generate or exacerbate problems such as environmental pollution, rising income gap, social inequities, market deficiencies and corruption; *ergo*, the ideal China model should be a 'low-cost' development path. Some were also concerned that the narrative of a China model put an unnecessary spotlight on the country's political, human rights and environmental protection record, as well as creating the perception that the PRC represented an ideological challenge to the United States and the West, adding grist to the China threat mill. Questions were also raised about the fact that the China model encompassed only a relatively short history of success, had yet to achieve full recognition in international society, and was still arguably a 'work in progression.'[28]

---

[27] See Qiu Gengtian, 'Zhongguo Moshi Yu Di Daijia Fazhan Daolu' [The China Model and the Path of Low-Cost Development], *Zhonggong Zhongyang Dangxiao Xuebao [Journal of the Central Committee Party School]*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2008), pp. 35-36; Luo Jianbo, 'Ruan Shili Yu Zhongguo Waijia' [Soft Power and China's Diplomacy], *Xin Yuanjian [New Thinking]*, Vol. 5 (2008), p. 48; Ma Zhengang, 'Xifang Xuanran "Zhongguo Moshi" Zhi Beihou' [On the West's Play Up of the "China Model"], *Renmin Luntan [People's Tribune]*, No. 240 (2008), p. 29; Jiang Jinquan, 'Jiexi "Zhongguo Moshi"' [Understanding the "China Model"], *Liaowang [Outlook]*, No. 25 (2005), pp. 42-43.

[28] See Cai Tuo, 'Tansuo Zhong De "Zhongguo Moshi"' [The Evolving "China Model"], *Dandai Shijie Yu Shehui Zhuyi [Contemporary World and Socialism]*, Vol. 5 (2005), pp. 13-14; Qiu, 'Zhongguo

Those more optimistic, on the other hand, believed that talk of the China model indicated the improvement of China's soft power. To the extent that the model had replicable elements, it was perceived that China's development experience held valuable lessons for and appealed to other developing countries and emerging powers. Optimists pointed out how in the wake of the Washington Consensus's 'experimentation' failures in Latin America and elsewhere, leaders in Africa, India and Russia had started to look towards Beijing for development insights and as a model to 'emulate.'[29] The China model, Tao Wenzhao argued, had broken the 'myth' that there was only one right way of modernisation (i.e. Washington Consensus).[30] But its greatest impact, in the view of several Chinese commentators, was its elevation of 70% of the world's poor (which resided in China) out of absolute destitution, contributing greatly to the human condition. These assessments stopped short of making direct reference to the RGP identity but maintained that the China model was a positive force for humanity.[31] Finally, there was the belief amongst some that China's global status had been raised. That the PRC's development system was now looked upon as a potential alternative to the more established American model not only implied the perspicacity of Chinese strategic choices, it was an affirmation of China's rising status as a

---

Moshi Yu Di Daijia Fazhan Daolu,' pp. 35-39; Ma, 'Xifang Xuanran "Zhongguo Moshi" Zhi Beihou,' pp. 28-29.

[29] Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, for example, had been cited in China as saying that 'India should view China as a model for economic growth and global trade.' See Men Honghua, 'Zhongguo Ruan Shili Pinggu Baogao' [Assessment Report on China's Soft Power], *Guoji Guancha [International Review]*, Vol. 3 (2007), pp. 37-38; Tao Wenzhao, 'Zhongguo Moshi De Shijie Yingxiang' [The Global Influence of the China Model], *Renmin Luntan [People's Tribune]*, No. 21 (2008), p. 50; Editor, 'Zhongguo De Ruanshili Zhiyuan' [The Sources of China's Soft Power], *Dangzheng Luntan [Party and Government Forum]*, Vol. 2 (2007), p. 79.

[30] Tao, 'Zhongguo Moshi De Shijie Yingxiang.'

[31] See, for example, Luo, 'Ruan Shili Yu Zhongguo Waijia,' p. 47.

political power and potential peer of the US. Thus, as one scholar put it, the China model was also a 'model of a great power's rise.'[32]

Rising Great Power Perception

Chinese scholars' attention to their nation's international status should not be surprising. As previous chapters have shown, elites in China had always been concerned about perceptions— both internal and external—of their nation's position and rank in international society. Indeed, from 2003, moving beyond the traditional measurement of comprehensive national power, the government think tank, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, started publishing the *China's International Status Report* (*Guoji Diwei Baogao*) which qualitatively tracked the annual status gains and losses of the PRC.[33]

By the end of 2008, there seemed to be a stronger sense within China that its global status had risen. 'The year 2008,' *China's International Status Report* asserted, 'was the year the PRC finally grew up (*cheng ren*)…it was transforming from a regional big power to an emerging world power.'[34] Such perceptions (insofar as the developing state identity continued to be perpetuated) could be attributed to a number of material developments: among others, the continuing robustness and performance of the Chinese economy, the expanding Chinese economic presence in Latin America and

[32] Zhang Youwen and Huang Renwei, ed., *Zhongguo Guoji Diwei Baogao [China's International Status Report*, (Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, 2005), see Chapter 1; Tao, 'Zhongguo Moshi De Shijie Yingxiang.'
[33] Interview with SASS scholar, Shanghai, June 2011.
[34] Zhang Youwen and Huang Renwei, ed., *Zhongguo Guoji Diwei Baogao [China's International Status Report*, (Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, 2009), p. 19.

Africa, the successful conduct of China's first anti-satellite weapons test, the launch of the Shenzhou-7 mission that executed China's first spacewalk, and most notably, the triumphant hosting of the 2008 Olympic Games.[35] These factors and more helped boost national pride and strengthened Chinese great power identity.

The role of the United States in reinforcing Chinese status perceptions was significant as well. The second half of the Bush administration saw greater institutionalisation and levels of interaction between the Chinese and American governments, spanning over more than fifty bilateral dialogues, meetings and working groups. These included but were not limited to: (i) the Senior Dialogue, the leading regular US-China summit on political and security affairs, and its economic counterpart, the Strategic Economic Dialogue; (ii) the regular sub-dialogues on regional issues between the US Assistant Secretaries of States and China's Vice-Foreign Ministers; (iii) the Energy Policy Dialogue between primarily, the US Department of Energy and China's National Development and Reform Commission; (iv) the Global Issues Forum, co-led by the US State Department and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and aimed at strengthening US-China cooperation on common transnational concerns; (v) the bilateral discussions on trade and commerce issues via the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade; as well

[35] Ibid, Chapters 1-3. See as well the 'panel' essay, Wang Yizhou, Yan Xuetong, Jin Canrong, Shen Dingli, Yu Wanli and Zhang Guoqing, 'Aoyun Zhihou: Zhongguo Diwei Bian Mei Bain' [After the Olympics: Change or No Change in China's Status], *Shijie Zhishi [World Affairs]*, Vol. 18 (2008), pp. 14-24; and Yan Xuetong, 'The Rise of China and its Power Status,' *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 1 (2006), pp. 5-33. On China's space activities, US Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless noted that 'China's leaders view the development of space and counter-space capabilities as bolstering national prestige and, like nuclear weapons, demonstrating the attributes of a world power.' See Lawless, 'China: Recent Security Developments.'

as (vi) the bilateral military dialogues that encompassed the Defense Policy Coordination Talks, the Defense Consultative Talks and the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement Meetings.[36] In Washington's view, such 'real' dialogues extended beyond immediate bilateral concerns and increasingly focused on the coordination of responses between US and China on a range of regional and global issues.[37] This unprecedented level of diplomatic engagement between the two powers probably fell short of Bull's idea of a great power concert but nonetheless fostered the impression of a global order increasingly shaped or contested in the capitals of the US and China (typified by talk of the so-called 'Group of 2' or 'Chimerica').[38] In Beijing, many viewed these dialogues, especially the Senior Dialogue and the Strategic Economic Dialogue, as suggesting the prevailing hegemon, the US, was willing to engage a rising China on an equal basis (*ping tai*), which helped reinforce Chinese estimations of their nation's big power status.[39] Moreover, these meetings and exchanges frequently featured remarks by senior US officials that affirmed or implied China's great power status. In his closing address to

[36] I have highlighted some of the more important dialogue mechanisms that were created from around the second term of the Bush Administration. Exceptions to this list are the Defense Consultative Talk (1997) and the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement meetings (1998). See Thomas Christensen, 'Shaping China's Global Choices through Diplomacy,' *Statement before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission*, 18 March 2008, http://2001-2009.state.gov/; Thomas Lum, 'US-China Relations: Policy Issues,' *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress*, 12 March 2010, pp. 7-8. On an updated and fuller list of US-China dialogue mechanisms, see Bonnie S. Glaser, 'The Diplomatic Relationship: Substance and Process,' in David Shambaugh, ed., *Tangled Titans: The United States and China* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2012), Textbox 7.1, pp, 175-176.

[37] Christensen, 'Shaping China's Global Choices through Diplomacy. '

[38] According to Fred Bergsten, around late 2004, he introduced the notion of a US-China 'G2' to Zoellick who subsequently discussed this idea with the Chinese. See Fred Bergsten, 'A Partnership of Equals: How Washington Should Respond to China's Economic Challenge,' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 4 (July/August 2008), pp. 65-69. On the 'Chimerica' neologism, see Niall Ferguson, 'Team "Chimerica"' *Washington Post*, 17 November 2008.

[39] See, for example, the 'panel' essay: Fu Mongzi, Yuan Peng, Da Wei, Guo Yongjun, Niu Xinchun and Zhu Wenfeng, 'Zhanlue Duihua Yu Zhongmei Guanxi' [Strategic Dialogue and Sino-American Relations], *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations]*, Vol. 8 (2005), pp. 52-61.

the second Senior Dialogue, for instance, Zoellick referred to China as 'a major global player.'[40] Likewise, during a preparatory visit to China for the 2007 Strategic Economic Dialogue, Paulson stated, 'China is already a global economic leader and deserves to be recognised as a leader.'[41]

As with earlier American rhetoric and the stakeholder language, such references were made with more than just recognition of China's growing global influence in mind; equally, they related to expectations for Beijing to use its influence in a 'responsible' way. Interestingly, Chinese behaviour on a number of global issues between 2005 and the end of 2008 suggested some willingness to address these expectations. Beijing continued to play a crucial role in hosting the Six-Party Talks, helping broker a 2005 statement that committed Pyongyang to renounce its nuclear program. And when this commitment was contravened by North Korea's subsequent missile and nuclear tests, it supported international measures to sanction its traditional ally. In 2007, Pyongyang disabled its nuclear reactors at Yongbyon, a development that appeared to have stemmed from direct Chinese pressure. On the Iran nuclear issue, there was some alignment between Beijing's actions and its stated aim of preventing Iranian nuclear weapons capability. While its economic and energy links with Tehran were perceived as undermining efforts to check Iranian nuclear ambitions, China voted in favour of a number of UN Security Council resolutions (in particular, Resolutions 1737, 1747 and 1803) that sanctioned the latter for its alleged nuclear transgressions. The less

[40] Zoellick, *Deputy Secretary Zoellick Statement on Conclusion of the Second US-China Senior Dialogue*.
[41] Paulson, 'Growth and Future of China's Financial Markets. '

reluctant attitude towards the use of sanctions squared with Beijing's increasing willingness to bend its traditional position on non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Thus, from an initial hands-off approach to the Darfur human rights crisis in Sudan, it moved to endorsing the UN three-phase plan for stabilising the region, eventually getting its officials (including the personal involvement of Hu) to persuade Khartoum to accept the establishment of a joint UN-African Union peacekeeping force. This more flexible approach towards the non-interference principle was also evident when, in a first for the Chinese military, the PLA sent warships to the Gulf of Aden to help combat piracy off the Somalian coast in 2008. Signally, this effort was met with UN Security Council approval—with China's support—for international policing forces to pursue pirates into Somalian maritime territory.[42]

Of course, Washington's expectations of Beijing's big power conduct went well beyond those highlighted above and it would have liked China to do more. But US officials also recognised that some of Beijing's actions during this time were unprecedented and suggested a degree of progression towards meeting US hopes of a more 'responsible' China. As Christensen would later write in *Foreign Affairs*, Beijing had 'responded impressively, although only partially' to the Bush administration's responsible stakeholder call.[43] A similar

[42] See Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Andrew Small, 'China's New Dictatorship Diplomacy: Is Beijing Parting with Pariahs?' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 1 (January/February 2008), pp. 38-56; Thomas Christensen, 'The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy,' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 90, No. 2 (March/April 2011), pp. 56-57; Christensen, 'Shaping China's Global Choices through Diplomacy'; Jonathan Holslag, 'Embracing Chinese Global Security Ambitions,' *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2009), pp. 105-118.
[43] Christensen, 'The Advantages of an Assertive China,' p. 56.

assessment was put forward by Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte. Updating the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2008, Negroponte testified that China's traditional observance of the non-interference principle was 'giving way to diplomatic interventions that highlight [its] stated ambition to be seen as a responsible major power.'[44]

The Global Financial Crisis and Chinese Responses

That said, the main area in which Washington wanted greater cooperation from Beijing by late 2008 was its support in fighting the global financial crisis (GFC). The financial tsunami that had originated in the US was now threatening to engulf the global economy and China. With its substantial US Treasury holdings and the world's largest foreign exchange reserves of around US$1.9 trillion, Beijing was seen as a potentially vital partner to help deal with the crisis. On 21 September 2008, Bush personally called Hu to express his hope that both countries would work together to shore up international financial stability.[45] Similar sentiments were relayed by Paulson to Vice-Premier Wang Qishan, the Chinese leader in charge of Beijing's financial crisis committee.[46] When the Obama administration succeeded the Bush government in early 2009, it too lost no time in looking for Chinese

[44] John Negroponte, 'US-China Relations in the Era of Globalisation,' *Opening Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, 15 May 2008, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.
[45] According to a US Congressional Research Service report, the 'purpose of that call was to ask for China's help to deal with this financial crisis by urging China to hold even more US Treasury bonds and US assets.' See Wayne Morrison, 'China and the Global Financial Crisis: Implications for the United States,' *Congressional Service Report for Congress*, 3 June 2009, p. 8.
[46] Henry Paulson, 'China and the Global Economy,' *Remarks to the National Committee on US-China Relations*, 21 October 2008, available at http://china.usc.edu/.

cooperation. New Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was sent to visit China (and three other Asian nations) on her first official trip abroad, marking a departure from diplomatic tradition. Such was the importance attached to Chinese support vis-à-vis the crisis that the Obama administration initially appeared willing to downplay the traditional US concern on human rights in China: en route to Beijing, Clinton underlined that human rights issues should not 'interfere' with efforts to address the GFC.[47] Internationally meanwhile, hopes were building that China might act as a 'saviour' or 'white knight' to bail out stricken economies.[48]

For its part, Beijing conveyed early reassurances that it would act 'responsibly' over the GFC. 'As a responsible country,' Vice-Premier Wang told visiting former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, China would 'always emphasise communication and cooperation with the world's nations to jointly uphold international financial and economic stability.'[49] Premier Wen Jiabao made a similar pledge, telling British Prime Minister Gordon Brown in October 2008 that 'China would continue to adopt a responsible attitude in its active efforts' to deal with the crisis.[50] These pledges,

[47] Clinton also stated that human rights issues should not be allowed to 'interfere' with US-China cooperation on climate change and North Korea. See Editorial, 'Not So Obvious,' *The Washington Post*, 24 February 2009. In Beijing, Clinton expressed the US hope that China would continue to buy its debt. See Morrison, 'China and the Global Financial Crisis,' p. 8.

[48] Zheng Yongnian and Lye Liang Fook, 'The International Financial Crisis and China's External Response,' *East Asian Institute Background Brief*, No. 420 (December 2008), p. 1.

[49] 'Wang Qishan: Zhongguo Zhengfu Jiangtong Geguo Yiqi Yingdui Jinrong Weiji' [Wang Qishan: Chinese Government Will Work Together with the World on Financial Crisis], *Zhongguo Jinrong Jia [China Financial Analyst]*, Vol. 10 (2008), p. 14. Wang's assurances also apparently convinced Paulson to remark to the National Committee on US-China relations that 'it is clear that China accepts its responsibility as a major economy that will work with the United States and other partners to ensure global economic stability.' See Paulson, 'China and the Global Economy.'

[50] 'Wen Jiabao: Zhongguo You Xinxin Weihu Zhongguo Jinrong Shicang De Wending' [Wen Jiabao: China is Confident of Safeguarding the Stability of its Financial Market], *Zhongguo Jinrong Jia [China Financial Analyst]*, Vol. 10 (2008), p. 14. Vice-Premier Li Keqiang also made similar assurances,

nevertheless, came with an important qualifier: to the extent that Beijing would work together with other nations in responding to the crisis, its priority and primary duty would be to ensure the continued stability of its domestic economy. As the Chinese leadership saw it, China's 'greatest contribution' to the world would be to first manage its own economic affairs well.[51] A *China Daily* editorial captured this perspective trenchantly:

> …it is only fair to say China, by saving itself, is contributing to the world at large. If this does not sound convincing, just imagine what would follow if the Chinese economic locomotive loses steam.[52]

Beijing certainly had reasons to fear an economic slowdown in China. Not only could this lead to attendant problems such as social unrest and popular discontent, an enduring downturn could well call into question the legitimacy of a CCP regime that had increasingly rested on ensuring high economic growth.[53] Beijing's answer was to implement a series of expansionary fiscal policies designed to boost domestic spending and stimulate the Chinese economy. These included two massive stimulus programs with a combined worth of 4.23 trillion Yuan to boost infrastructure spending and prop up key industrial sectors; a 850 billion Yuan spending

---

telling Robert Zoellick (who had become the World Bank President) that China would adopt a 'responsible attitude' in maintaining global financial stability. See 'Li Keqiang Huijian Shijie Yinghang Hangzhang Zuolike' [Li Keqiang Meets World Bank President Robert Zoellick], *Xinhua*, 16 December 2008. For an example of commentaries that mirrored the leadership rhetoric, see Hu Jian, 'Miandui Jinrong Weiji, Zhongguo Buhui Gean Guanhuo' [Facing the Financial Crisis, China Will Not Watch from the Sidelines], *Shehui Guancha [Social Outlook]*, Vol. 12 (2008), p. 8.

[51] See ibid and 'Wang Qishan: Zhongguo Zhengfu Jiangtong Geguo Yiqi Yingdui Jinrong Weiji,' p. 14.

[52] Editorial, 'Role of a Stakeholder,' *China Daily*, 14 November 2008.

[53] Zheng and Lye, 'The International Financial Crisis and China's External Response,' pp. 7-8.

plan to expand basic health care services and coverage; a housing appliance subsidy plan for all rural residents to encourage consumption spending; and employment measures worth 42 billion Yuan to help create new urban jobs.[54]

China's preference to prioritise its resources for domestic needs corresponded with its general reluctance to commit significantly more capital to buy US and European debt. Such a move would help bolster the US and European economies and Beijing keenly understood that the health of these economies was inextricably linked to its own. However, Chinese leaders were hesitant to raise their country's holdings of US and European assets for a number of reasons. For one, the safety and prospects of these assets in a bearish economic climate were a major concern; already, the depreciation of China's US holdings had sufficiently concerned Wen that he openly commented that he was 'a little worried.'[55] There were also perceived political and strategic risks. Within China, such investments could create the perception that Beijing was bailing out rich foreigners at the expense of its citizens, an impression not helped by the fact that a considerable number of Chinese people were still living in poverty and that many Chinese saw the financial crisis as a consequence of Western fiscal ill-discipline. Outside of China, they could accentuate anxieties that Beijing might one day use its

[54] Sarah Tong and Zhang Yang, 'China's Responses to the Economic Crisis,' *East Asia Institute Background Brief*, No. 438 (March 2009), pp. 1-15; William Overholt, 'China in the Global Financial Crisis: Rising Influence, Rising Challenges,' *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2010), pp. 28-30.

[55] 'Wen Jiabao: Xinnuan Ce Jingjinuan, Suishi Ke Tichu Xin Ciji Jingji Zhengce' [Wen Jiabao: Warm Hearts Warm Up the Economy, China is Ready to Put Forward New Stimulus Plans], *Xinhua*, 13 March 2009.

accumulation of American/European financial assets as a means by which to coerce or pressure the US and its allies.[56]

For these reasons, China's external response to the crisis had been less a debt bailout of distressed economies and more a broad effort to stimulate global growth through monetary contributions to international bodies, multilateral economic diplomacy and the reduction of trade barriers. It committed US$40 billion to the IMF to reinforce its crisis response capacity. It established a US$10 billion investment cooperation fund with ASEAN and pledged credit support of up to US$15 billion to the association's member states. It promised preferential credit of US$10 billion to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and Africa, where in the latter's case, the least developed states were additionally granted debt waivers and tax relief for 95% of their imports to China.[57] But perhaps the most visible aspect of its external response was its involvement in the G20 forum, the economic bloc now seen as the leading institution to coordinate a global response to the crisis. From late 2008 to 2009, the crisis's most severe period, China participated in all three G20 Leaders' Summits and among other things, pledged to improve macroeconomic policy coordination with other G20 states, avowed opposition to domestic economic protectionism, and generally agreed to expand its domestic consumption to help rebalance the global economy.

[56] Interviews with scholars at the SASS and Renmin University, Shanghai and Beijing, May-June 2011. See as well Zhou Shijian's article in the party publication *Shishi Baogao* (by the Central Committee Propaganda Department): 'Suishi Fuguo, Suishi Qiongguo?' [Who is a Rich Country, Who is a Poor Country?], *Shishi Baogao [Current Affairs Report]*, Vol. 11 (2008), pp. 55-56.

[57] Liang Guodong, 'Zhongguo Waijiao De Huimou Yu Zhanwang: Fang Waijiao Buzhang Yang Jiechi' [Looking Back and Ahead at China's Diplomacy: Interviewing Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi], *Zhongguo Renda Zazhi [National People's Congress of China Magazine]*, Vol. 5 (2010), pp. 32-33.

Yet, this involvement also suggested a sense of dissatisfaction towards the extant global financial architecture. The view from Beijing was the crisis had been caused in part by deficiencies in the international financial system. Which was why, it argued, along with others in the G20, the system should be reformed to encompass new 'widely accepted [financial] standards and norms' and to allow developing economies a bigger role and 'say' (*huayu quan*) in international financial bodies such as the IMF and World Bank.[58] Influential voices in China were also heard calling for 'fairer' alternatives to the US dollar as the international reserve currency.[59]

The call for a more representative, less US-centric, international financial system was reflective of perceptions in China that the crisis had 'adjusted' the international status quo and that a realignment of the global order was underway. Most Chinese analysts assessed that the PRC's international position had clearly been raised relative to others, especially in relation to the United States. That the US and Europe were seemingly unable to come up with concrete measures to address their economic problems while China's economy performed better than most during this period were two reasons often cited for this positional improvement. 'Others sank while we

[58] 'Foreign Minister: Hu's Proposals Play Important Role at G20,' *China Daily*, 4 April 2009; Liu Rui and Xu Yiming, 'Jinrong Weiji Zhihou Zhongguo Dui G20 Yingdang Chiyou De Jiben Lichang' [China's Basic Position on the G20 after the Financial Crisis], *Shehui Kexue Yanjiu [Social Sciences Research]*, Vol.2 (2010), pp. 67-72.

[59] One prominent call was from China's Central Bank governor Zhou Xiaochuan. Zhou proposed for the expansion of the currency basket in the IMF's special drawing right (SDR) and to use this broadened SDR to replace the US dollar as the international reserve currency. The idea was to reduce the Chinese and international economy's vulnerability to a weakening US dollar, which accounted for around 60% of the reserves of global central banks. See 'Big Push for Global Reserve Currency,' *China Daily*, 31 March 2009; Andrew Marble, 'China, the Financial Crisis and Sino-American Relations: An Interview with Pieter Bottelier,' *Asia Policy*, No. 9 (2010), pp. 126-129.

floated up,' said Tsinghua University scholar Yan Xuetong.[60] Chinese analysts did not believe, however, that the fundamental structure of 'one superpower, many great powers' had been changed; the US remained the sole global hegemon even if its power gap vis-à-vis China and other emerging powers had become smaller and less pronounced.[61] Still, many analysts agreed that the crisis had been a *'jiyu'* (accidental opportunity) for China in a number of ways. Along with the amelioration of its global position, it was perceived that the crisis had resulted in (i) the extension of China's big power influence; (ii) the affirmation of its development model and enhancement of its soft power; and (iii) further opportunities to realise its 'role transformation' in international society as a responsible great power.[62]

---

[60] See examples: Li Jie, 'Cong Jinrong Weiji Toushi Guoji Tixi Zhuanxing Dongxiang' [Trends of the International System Transition from the Perspective of the Financial Crisis], *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies]*, Vol. 3 (2009), pp. 11-17; Yan Xuetong, 'Dangqian Guoji Xingshi Yu Zhongguo Waijiao De Tiaozheng' [The Current International Situation and the Adjustment of Chinese Diplomacy], *Zhanlue Juece Yanjiu [Journal of Strategy and Decision-Making]*, Vol. 2 (2010), pp. 3-17. Meanwhile, Qin Yaqing assessed that in the wake of the financial crisis, China entered the 'core of the international system' for the first time. See Qin Yaqing, 'Guoji Tixi De Yanxu Yu Biange' [Change and Continuity in the International System], *Waijiao Pinlun [Foreign Affairs Review]*, Vol. 1 (2010), p. 9.

[61] See the executive summary of the CASS (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) organised-conference on the global financial crisis: Chen Yingchun, 'Yantao Hui Jianxun: "Quanqiu Jinrong Weiji, Guoji Yingxiang Jiqi Duice"' [Executive Summary of Conference on "The Global Financial Crisis: International Impact and Countermeasures"], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economy and Politics]*, Vol. 12 (2008), p. 2. See as well: Shao Feng, 'Jinrong Weiji Dui Guoji Guanxi De Yingxiang Ji Zhongguo De Yingdui' [The Financial Crisis's Impact on International Relations and China's Response], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economy and Politics]*, Vol. 12 (2008), pp. 23-26; Xu Jin, 'Jinrong Weiji Nanyi Diandu "Yichao Duoqiang" Geju' [Difficult for the Financial Crisis to Overturn the "One Superpower, Many Great Powers" Structure], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economy and Politics]*, Vol. 12 (2008), pp. 26-27; Zhao Bin, 'Jinrong Weiji Daozhi Meiguo Huayu Shishi Wo Baquan Zhongjie? [Did the Financial Crisis Lead to a Weakening of America's Voice or the Conclusion of American Hegemony?], *Dangshi Wenyuan [Literary Circles of CCP History]*, Vol. 2 (2010), pp. 24-25; Qin Yaqing, 'Guoji Tixi De Yanxu Yu Biange,' pp. 8-11. For an alternative view that posited the possibility that the crisis might actually enhance the US's unipolar status, see Song Wei, 'Guoji Jinrong Weiji Yu Meiguo De Danji Diwei' [The International Financial Crisis and America's Unipolar Position], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economy and Politics]*, Vol. 5 (2010), pp. 25-48.

[62] For examples, see Wu Xinbo, 'Guoji Xingshi Jubian Xia Zhongguo De Guoji Quxiang' [China's International Orientation Amidst Changes in the Global Situation], *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies]*, Vol. 1 (2010), pp. 21-26; Shao Feng, 'Jinrong Weiji Dui Guoji Guanxi De Yingxiang Ji Zhongguo De Yingdui,' pp. 23-26.

Concerning the last point, there was certainly the belief amongst Chinese policymakers and analysts that the country had acted responsibly over the crisis, in line with its early assurances. Foreign minister Yang Jiechi publicly stated that the PRC's responses showed it was a responsible actor that had made 'vital contributions' to promote global economic recovery.[63] Chinese commentators also lauded Beijing's leadership in the G20, calling it the 'preparatory class' for China's emergence as a responsible power.[64] Outside of China, however, assessments about its contributions were mixed. While it was acknowledged by the World Bank, IMF and others that China's domestic stimulus package had prevented the global financial crisis from becoming worse, there were those who felt that Beijing had not sufficiently pulled its weight in leading the global economic recovery. A 2009 European Council on Foreign Relations policy report, for example, argued:

> Efforts to get Beijing to live up to its responsibility as a key stakeholder in the global economy by agreeing to more international coordination have been largely unsuccessful. The G20 Summit in London in early April 2009 demonstrated Beijing's ability to avoid shouldering any real responsibility; its relatively modest contribution

[63] Liang Guodong, 'Zhongguo Waijiao De Huimou Yu Zhanwang: Fang Waijiao Buzhang Yang Jiechi,' p. 32.
[64] 'G20: Zhongguo Chengwei Fuzeren Daguo De "Yuke Ban"' [G20: The "Preparatory Class" for China as a Responsible Great Power], *Huanqiu Shibao [Global Times]*, 23 June 2010.

of $40 billion to the IMF was effectively payment of a 'tax' to avoid being perceived as a global deal-broker.[65]

By the 2010 Seoul G20 Summit, the sentiment that China had not done enough vis-à-vis efforts to revive the world economy had grown. There was, in particular, in Washington, a growing perception and frustration that Beijing had persistently acted in an 'irresponsible' or 'unfair' manner to keep the Yuan artificially low, which many Americans thought contributed to the US's ballooning trade deficit with China and undermined its recovery efforts. These arguments, predictably, were rejected by Beijing. Noting that the Yuan had appreciated by almost 24% since 2005, its reply was that Chinese currency policy had been 'coherent and responsible.' It also pointed out that the US position lacked credibility because its policy of printing money to stimulate the economy (the so-called quantitative easing) was tantamount to a planned weakening of the American dollar.[66] Reactions from Chinese commentators, meanwhile, were generally defensive. One analyst argued that the US perspective basically sought to encumber China with more financial obligations than it could manage, revealing the 'intertwining of Western jealousy, expectation, suspicion and fear.' Another thought that the currency

[65] On acknowledgement of the global impact of China's policy responses, see 'WB, US, Brazil Hail China's Economic Stimulus Plan,' *China Daily*, 10 November 2008; 'IMF Hails China's Policy Response in Financial Crisis,' *News Release of the PRC Ministry of Commerce*, available at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/. On critical assessments, see John Fox and Francois Godement, *A Power Audit of EU-China Relations* (London: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2009), p. 2.

[66] 'G20 Refuses to Back US Push on China's Currency,' *China Daily*, 12 November 2010; 'Hu Jintao Jieshou Faguo Feijia Luobao Putaoya Lusashe Caifang' [Hu Jintao Interviewed by France's Le Figaro Daily and Portugal's Lusa News Agency], *Renmin Ribao [People's Daily]*, 04 November 2010.

calls failed to 'distinguish between truth and falsehood' and were essentially an 'irresponsible moral trap.'[67]

Perceived Chinese Assertiveness and the Obama Administration's Approach

In addition to Beijing's perceived intransigence over the Yuan's valuation, Chinese responses to a number of international issues from late 2009 also increasingly concerned Washington. On North Korea, for example, China's reluctance to castigate Pyongyang over two major provocations in 2010—the alleged attack on the South Korean naval ship *Cheonan* and the bombardment of South Korea's Yeonpyeong island—had seemed to Washington and others to be overly protective of its traditional ally. Neither was Washington impressed with the continuing reports of sales of restricted arms and missile technologies by Chinese entities; the increasing restrictions on internet freedom in China; or what it saw as Beijing's more determined clampdown on human rights activism in the wake of democratic advances in the Middle East and North Africa.[68]

Particularly disquieting for the Obama administration were signs that Chinese diplomacy was taking on a more assertive hue. When the US announced the sale of a US$6.4 billion arms package to Taiwan in January

[67] Sun Jingxin, 'Jingji Lingyu Zhong De "Fuzeren Lun" Pouxi' [Dissecting the "China Responsibility Theory" on Economics], *Duiwai Chuanbo [International Communications]*, Vol. 10 (2010), pp. 37-38; Zhao Changhui, ' "Zhongguo Fuzeren Lun" De Daode Xianjin' [The Moral Trap of the "China Responsibility Theory"], *Zhongguo Baodao [China Report]*, Vol. 3 (2009), p. 110.

[68] Christensen, 'The Advantages of an Assertive China,' pp. 57-58; David Shear, 'China: Recent Security Developments,' *Statement before the House Armed Services Committee*, 13 January 2010, available at:http://www.state.gov; Daniel Kritenbrink, 'US Policy toward the People's Republic of China (PRC),' *Statement before the US-China Economic & Security Review Commission*, 13 April 2011, http://www.state.gov.

2010, China condemned the move as a violation of its 'core interests' and warned of retaliatory 'consequences' such as military dialogue suspension and possible sanctions on US defence equipment firms.[69] It reacted similarly strongly when Obama proceeded to meet the exiled Tibetan leader the Dalai Lama the following month, charging again that its core interests were being undermined.[70] But rising Chinese assertiveness appeared to be most perceptible on issues relating to the country's maritime sovereignty. Hillary Clinton's 2010 characterisation of the South China Sea territorial dispute as a US 'national interest' was met with not only strident objections from Beijing, but also blunt warnings to ASEAN states against attempts to involve the US in the matter (which according to one Chinese vice foreign minister, would be akin to 'playing with fire').[71] As a result of perceived Chinese 'bullying' over competing maritime claims, China's relations with some ASEAN states, in particular the Philippines and Vietnam, deteriorated sharply. A more muscular attitude was also palpable in Chinese diplomatic jousts with Japan over the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. In one notable example in 2010 where a Chinese captain was detained following his vessel's collision with Japanese patrol ships near the disputed islands, Beijing reacted by summoning the Japanese ambassador six times, halting high-level bilateral

[69] 'China Denounces US Arms Sales to Taiwan,' *China Daily*, 9 January 2010; John Pomfret, 'US Sells Weapons to Taiwan, Angering China,' *The Washington Post*, 30 January 2010.
[70] 'Waijiao Bu Fayanren Ma Chaoxu Jiu Aobama Huijian Dalai Fabiao Tanhua' [Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ma Zhaoxu Comments on Obama-Dalai Meeting], *Xinhua*, 19 February 2010.
[71] Christensen, 'The Advantages of an Assertive China,' p. 59; Edward Wong, 'Beijing Warns US about South China Sea Disputes,' *The New York Times*, 22 June 2011.

exchanges, allegedly curtailing its rare earth exports to Japan, and demanding an official apology and compensation.[72]

Against this backdrop of a seemingly more assertive China, around late 2010, the Obama administration signalled that it would reorient the US strategic focus away from the Middle East and Afghanistan towards the Asia-Pacific region.[73] Termed as 'forward-deployed diplomacy' by Hillary Clinton, this shift envisioned a rise in US economic, political, and military investments in the region. More specifically, it aimed to: (i) shore up existing US regional alliances (i.e. with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia); (ii) forge more robust relationships with other major regional actors (such as India and Indonesia); (iii) expand US trade with Asia-Pacific nations; and (iv) establish a more active and visible American presence in regional multilateral fora (such as the ARF and the East Asia Summit). At the heart of this realignment was more than just acknowledgement of the Asia-Pacific's centrality to the 21st century; it also implied recognition of the significance of China's role to this centrality and how a more engaged American leadership in the region could be potentially productive in steering China towards a path that in US perceptions would be beneficial for regional

[72] Suisheng Zhao, 'Shaping the Regional Context of China's Rise: How the Obama Administration Brought back Hedge in its Engagement with China,' *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 21, No. 75 (2012), pp. 373-374.

[73] Although Clinton's November 2011 speech 'American's Pacific Century' has often been cited as representing the official announcement of the US strategy to 'pivot' towards the Asia-Pacific, documentary evidence suggests the outlines of this shift were first articulated around fall 2010. See Hillary Clinton, 'America's Engagement in the Asia-Pacific,' *Remarks in Honolulu*, 28 October 2010, http://www.state.gov; Hillary Clinton, 'Inaugural Richard C. Holbrooke Lecture on a Broad Vision of US-China Relations in the 21st Century,' *Remarks in Washington D.C.*, 14 January 2011, http://www.state.gov.

stability and growth.[74] 'To get China right, you have to get the region right'— was how some in Washington put it.[75] Yet, for many in China, they did not see how this US strategic repositioning was 'right.' To many Chinese scholars, the policy adjustment was yet another affirmation of the lingering suspicion that the US saw China as a threat and intended to keep it down to maintain the US regional hegemonic status. For others, it typified the American realist approach, in that Washington returned to its 'old game of hedging against China' and was less 'conciliatory' once it deemed that the PRC had become less critical to, or was less willing to assist, its economic recovery.[76]

However, even as Washington looked to 'shape' the regional environment of China's rise, it continued to apply rhetorical pressure on the question of China's international obligation.[77] Like the earlier two administrations, the idea and language of China's great power responsibility

[74] Ibid; see as well William Burns, 'Keynote Remarks at 5th Biennial US-China Relations Conference,' *Remarks at Texas A&M University*, 24 October 2011, http://www.state.gov; Hillary Clinton, 'America's Pacific Century,' *Remarks at the East-West Centre*, 10 November 2011, http://www.state.gov.

[75] Kritenbrink, 'US Policy toward the People's Republic of China (PRC).'

[76] As Zhu Feng, Zhao Kejin and Yin Xiting had argued, the American 'strategic turn towards the East' was predicated on the idea of China as the 'hypothetical enemy' (*jiaxiang di*). Liu Liming also wrote that several Chinese observers saw the US policy adjustment as a means by which to 'prevent China's rise;' a form of strategic 'defense through attack.' Not all Chinese analysts thought, however, that the US's Asia 'Pivot' amounted to a straightforward containment policy of China. See Zhu Feng, 'Aobama Zhengfu "Zhuansheng Yazhou" Zhanlue Yu Zhongmei Guanxi' [The Obama Government's "Pivot to Asia" Strategy and Sino-US Relations], *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations]*, Vol. 4 (2012), pp 1-7, continued on p. 50; Zhao Kejin and Yin Xiting, 'Meiguo Zhanlue Tiaozheng Yu Zhongmei Xinxing Daguo Guanxi' [The US Strategic Adjustment and the New Type of Sino-American Big Power Relations], *Guoji Guanxi Xueyuan Xuebao [Journal of the University of International Relations]*, Vol. 6 (2012), pp. 71-84; Lin Liming, 'Yigong Weishou: Meiguo "Zhanlue Dongyi" De Zhanlue Benzhi Pingxi' [Defense through Attack: Assessing the Basic Character of the US "Strategic Turn" Towards the East], *Dangdai Shijie [Contemporary World]*, Vol. 9 (2012), pp. 8-11. For other examples, see Liu Bo, 'Meiguo Zhanlue Dongyi De Xingdong Tedian' [The Characteristics of the American Strategic Action to Turn Towards the East], *Guoji Guanxi Xueyuan Xuebao [Journal of the University of International Relations]*, Vol. 5 (2012), pp. 54-58; Han Zhaoying and Wang Shishan, 'Meiguo De Yatai Zai Pingheng Zhanlue Jiqi Fumian Yingxiang' [On the US Asia-Pacific Rebalancing Strategy and its Negative Impacts], *Xueshu Qianyan [Academic Frontiers]*, Vol. 12 (2012), pp. 6-13. On the supposed realistic nature of US strategic thinking, as asserted by some in China, see Wu Xinbo, 'Forging Sino-US Partnership in the Twenty-First Century: Opportunities and Challenges,' *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 12, No. 75 (2012), p. 392.

[77] Zhao, 'Shaping the Regional Context of China's Rise.'

had been a crucial feature of the Obama government's China policy. Through enhanced dialogue mechanisms such as the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (SED) as well as existing bilateral and multilateral forums, the Obama administration sought to impress upon the Chinese leadership that the PRC's rising power must be matched by increasing global responsibilities. This message was calibrated and communicated to Beijing in a number of ways. For one, there was discernibly less usage of the stakeholder jargon, even if US officials still strove to convince the Chinese that it was ultimately in their interests to act as a responsible global player.[78] Second, the Obama administration emphasised that it was important that China acted in ways that reassured the world about the nature and trajectory of its rise. In other words, it did not regard China's emergence, in itself, as naturally beneficial. 'China's rise is potentially good for the world,' Obama pointedly remarked in the presence of Hu during a joint White House press conference, 'to the extent that [it] is functioning as a responsible actor on the world stage…'[79] Third, from around 2011, the US rhetoric increasingly shifted to a discourse of how China needed to observe 'the rules of the road,' with the implication being Beijing had been acting less responsibly than expected, especially in the economic sphere. This spoke to more than just, as earlier mentioned, US

[78] See, for examples, Clinton, 'Inaugural Richard C. Holbrooke Lecture on a Broad Vision of US-China Relations in the 21st Century'; Robert Hormats, 'The United States and China: The Next Five Years,' *Remarks at the Brookings-Caixin Conference*, 18 May 2011, http://www.state.gov; Robert Hormats, 'Addressing the Challenges of the China Model,' *Remarks at AmCham-China's Annual DC Dialogue*, 3 May 2011, http://www.state.gov.

[79] See James Steinberg, 'Adminstration's Vision of the US-China Relationship,' *Keynote Address at the Centre for a New American Security*, 24 September 2009, http://www.state.gov; *Transcript of Remarks at the Press Conference with President Obama and President Hu of the People's Republic of China*, 19 January 2011, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov.

frustrations with Chinese currency policies; it also related to America's overall misgivings with what it saw as the 'unfair' and mercantilist practices of Chinese state capitalism. The Obama administration warned that if Beijing was seen to be trying to 'game the system' to the detriment of others and avoided making its due contributions, the country risked an international reaction that could impact both global and Chinese development.[80]

To be sure, the tougher tenor of the US rhetoric on China did not mean that the Obama administration had not recognised Chinese efforts to cooperate in some areas. Washington acknowledged and welcomed, among other things, China's support for additional sanctions (e.g. UN resolutions 1716 and 1874) on North Korea after Pyongyang's 2009 nuclear and missile tests; its declaration of opposition to Iran's alleged nuclear activities and its involvement with the P5+1 process to manage this issue; its financial contributions to Afghanistan's reconstruction efforts as well as reaffirmation of support for US counterterrorism efforts; and its pledge to lower national emissions levels and to report on such mitigation work (albeit on a non-binding basis).[81] Both governments also worked at creating additional mechanisms of bilateral dialogue, which by 2012, led Hillary Clinton to claim

[80] For examples, see *Transcript of News Conference by President Obama*, 14 November 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov; *Transcript of Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Gillard of Australia in Joint Press Conference*, 16 November 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov; Hormats, 'The United States and China: The Next Five Years.' Indeed, the Chinese state capitalism model had been described as 'a direct threat to US jobs and competitiveness.' See Hormats, 'Addressing the Challenges of the China Model.'

[81] Kritenbrink, 'US Policy toward the People's Republic of China (PRC)'; Shear, 'China: Recent Security Developments.' On climate change, some observers felt that China had played a spoiler role at the December 2009 Copenhagen Climate Summit. US Deputy Secretary Steinberg, however, saw things differently and went on the record to praise China's contribution, noting: 'I think we saw in the final outcome in Copenhagen a clear recognition of China taking at least positive steps, if not complete steps, on each of [the] elements [needed to address the issue].' See James Steinberg, 'US-China Cooperation on Global Issues,' *Remarks at the Brookings Institution*, 11 May 2010, http://www.state.gov/.

that both powers 'literally consult with each other almost on a daily basis about every consequential issue facing our nations and the world today.'[82] Earlier, in 2010, Deputy Secretary James Steinberg told a Washington audience that the 'balance sheet' on US-China collaboration could be considered a 'pretty positive one.'[83] On the whole, nevertheless, the Obama administration was realistic about the extent to which it could expect cooperation from China, especially by the latter half of its first term. While there had been pockets of progress, it was under little illusion that China still had considerable ground to make up in terms of matching Washington's own expectations of what it took to be a responsible global actor.[84]

Chinese Positions on International Responsibility

Beijing certainly did not share American perspectives that alluded to its less than responsible ways in international society. It continued to rely on standard rhetorical responses that asserted how 'China, as a major country, does not shirk its responsibilities,' or how China and the US, as great powers, shouldered 'important responsibilities on a host of major issues.'[85] Such statements could be attributed in part to a degree of embeddedness of RGP narratives in the Chinese policy system (i.e. as an official pronounced

[82] Hillary Clinton, 'Remarks with Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi,' *Remarks at the Great Hall of the People's Republic of China*, 5 September 2012, http://www.state.gov/.
[83] Steinberg, 'US-China Cooperation on Global Issues.'
[84] Zhao, 'Shaping the Regional Context of China's Rise,' p.377.
[85] See, for example, Vice-Premier Li Keqiang's commentary, 'The World Should Not Fear a Growing China,' in the *Financial Times*, 9 January 2011; See as well, 'Hu Jintao: China, US Shoulder Important Responsibilities on Host of Major World Issues,' *Comments, the PRC Ministry of Commerce*, http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/.

identity), and in part to continuing Chinese awareness of the importance of the responsibility issue to US-China relations and to American recognition of China's great power status.[86] They could also be linked to growing Chinese concerns about the country's worsening image problem abroad. It was not lost on Beijing that perceptions of a more belligerent China had been gaining ground internationally (especially from around 2010), and that such perceptions bolstered the China threat discourse. This was apparent when Premier Wen took the unusual step of addressing these concerns at the 2010 National People's Congress. Noting that there had been talk of China becoming 'more arrogant and tough,' and that 'some are putting forward a theory of Chinese triumphalism,' Wen's response was to claim that 'China is a responsible country,' one which 'has called for and taken an active role in international cooperation on economic and political issues in [the] world.'[87]

At the sub-official, intellectual level, domestic views on China's responsibility were considerably more colourful. As the previous chapter explored, between 1997 and 2004, in conjunction with the domestic expansion of the RGP discourse, Chinese scholars had already started engaging in a wide-ranging discussion on questions of the PRC's big power role and responsibilities. This trend continued into the period from 2005 to 2012, but what was noteworthy was that during this time, the various key positions in the Chinese RGP debate became further sharpened. This is not to imply that these perspectives did not exist earlier; rather, the distinct stances in the RGP

[86] Yan Xuetong, 'Dangqian Guoji Xingshi Yu Zhongguo Waijiao De Tiaozheng,' p. 9.
[87] 'China's Roars Grow Louder,' *The Straits Times*, 18 March 2010.

debate became more discernable in the 2005-2012 period. These could be broadly grouped into what I label as the internationalist, development and skeptics' position.[88]

The internationalist perspective generally concurred with the notion that China should take on more global responsibilities. This argument was informed by a number of interrelated narratives. The first connected with the Bullian belief that great powers, by virtue of their stronger capacities, had greater responsibilities in international society. In this view, Beijing needed to better comprehend the 'responsibility of [its] power' (*quanli de zeren*), redefining its obligations to the world to match its burgeoning strength.[89] Liu Jianfei of the Central Party School pointed out that due to power disparities in the international system, it was natural that there would be differences in responsibilities that states bear; *ergo*, for a swiftly rising China, it was 'reasonable' that international society had expectations that it 'shouldered more international responsibilities and served a bigger function in international affairs.'[90] But great power responsibility was more than just an

[88] It should be emphasised that these positions were not mutually exclusive. Very often, Chinese scholars held composite views that were a combination of aspects from the different positions.

[89] Li Baojun and Xu Zhengyuan, 'Lengzhan Hou Zhongguo Fuzeren Daguo Shenfen De Jiangou' [China's Self-Identity Construction as a Responsible Power in the Post-Cold War Era], *Jiaoxue Yu Yanjiu [Teaching and Research]*, Vol. 1 (2006), p. 51; Niu Haibin, ' "Zhongguo Zeren Lun" Xilun' [Examining the "China Responsibility Theory"], *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations]*, Vol. 3 (2007), p. 48; Xing Yue and Zhan Yijia, 'Fuzeren Daguo: Lilun, Lishi Yu Xianshi' [Responsible Great Power: Theory, History and Reality], in Pan Zhongqi, ed., *Guoji Zeren Yu Daguo Zhanlue [International Responsibility and Great Power Strategy]*, (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 2008), pp. 82-84.

[90] Liu also opined that 'objectively-speaking,' given China's rise in global economic power and influence, it should contribute to a larger share to the United Nations budget. See Liu Jianfei, ' "Zhongguo Zeren Lun" Kaoyan Heping Fazhan' ["China Responsibility Theory" a Test of Peaceful Development], *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations]*, Vol. 4 (2007), pp. 22-23. Conversely, Xing Yue and Zhan Yijia argued that 'one cannot expect small powers in the system to shoulder major responsibilities.' See Xing Yue and Zhan Yijia, 'Fuzeren Daguo: Lilun, Lishi Yu Xianshi,' p. 82.

issue of burden sharing in international relations, others noted. There was also an element of *noblesse oblige*, in that a great power's exalted status behoved it to do more for international society. Conversely stated, if aspiring powers failed to 'positively engage with international society and did not solve its problems,' Renmin university scholar Jin Canrong noted, they would find it difficult to earn the great power recognition which they craved.[91] Hence, for China to 'regain its historical status as a great world power, it must act like a great world power.'[92] This called for, among other things, the maintenance of international peace and stability; improved transparency in foreign policy making; participation and leadership in international institutions; provision of global public goods; and greater activism in promoting regional cooperation and security.[93] Fundamentally, it was about acting as a 'humane authority' in global affairs, wrote one prominent Chinese strategist.[94]

Another narrative in support of the internationalist position came closer to a solidarist understanding of responsibility. Drawing on Chinese ideas such as *tianxia* ('all under heaven') and the 'common responsibility' idea, it was argued that China was morally and normatively accountable to the 'shared' and 'common' world of which it was a part. This spoke of a less

[91] Jin Canrong, *Daguo De Zeren [Big Power's Responsibility]*, (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe, 2011), p. 1.
[92] Yan Xuetong, 'How Assertive Should a Great Power Be?' *The New York Times*, 21 March 2011.
[93] For Li Baojun and Xu Zhengyuan, the maintenance of international order represented the 'lowest common consensus' on great power responsibility. See Li Baojun and Xu Zhengyuan, 'Lengzhan Hou Zhongguo Fuzeren Daguo Shenfen De Jiangou'; see as well, Niu Haibin, ' "Zhongguo Zeren Lun" Xilun,' pp. 48-49.
[94] See Yan Xuetong, 'How Assertive Should a Great Power Be?' For a fuller exposition on Yan and his Tsinghua colleagues' ideas about the notion of China as a 'humane authority' in international affairs, see Yan Xuetong and Xu Jin, eds. , *Wangba Tianxia Sixiang Qidi [Thoughts of World Leadership and Implications]*, (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 2009).

nationalistic worldview, one which emphasised that China's future and interests were inextricably linked to the world's, promoted a perception of international relations from the standpoint of human survival and progress, and underlined that global challenges were the responsibility of all nations.[95] This more communal conception of international relations was also consistent with Hu's harmonious world idea, it was claimed.[96]

A strategic or pragmatic outlook towards international responsibility was also counselled by some Chinese scholars. One reason cited was that as the beneficiary of the current globalised international system, it was in China's interests to contribute to its continued sustainability and well-being; it would not benefit China if this system became unstable. These scholars also reminded readers that China needed a relatively benign external environment for development and in this respect, could not afford to be 'isolated' or treated like a 'heretic' in international society. This required that Beijing try its best to address expectations of its conduct or at least give the appearance of doing so.[97] It would not help China's 'grand strategy,' Shi Yinhong, a prominent intellectual and advisor to the CCP government noted, if it was perceived to be an irresponsible 'free-rider.' In Shi's view, China's pledge to rise peacefully

[95] Ma Zhengang, 'Zhongguo De Zeren Yu "Zhongguo Zeren Lun"' [China's Responsibility and the "China Responsibility Theory"], *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies]*, Vol. 3 (2007), p.1; Zhang Xiaotong, 'Hu Jintao Shidai Guan De Zhongguo Zhuzhang' [Hu Jintao's Contemporary View on China's Stand], *Liaowang [Outlook]*, Vol. 47 (2009), pp. 32-36; Interview with Beijing University scholar, May 2011.

[96] See, for example, the Fudan University seminar report on 'Zhidu Gonggei Yu Daguo Jueqi: Zhongguo De Shimin' [Order Co-Contributor and the Rise of a Great Power: China's Destiny] in *Dongtai Yu Zhengce Pinglun [Trends and Policy Review]*, No. 14 (2011), p.8.

[97] Interviews with scholars at Beijing University, SASS and Fudan University, Shanghai and Beijing, May-June 2011; Interviews with SIIS scholars, Shanghai, September-November 2011; Wang Cungang and Wang Ruoling, 'Lun Zhongguo Fuzeren Daguo Shengfen De Jiangou' [Discussing the Construction of China's Identity as a Responsible Great Power], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi Luntan [Forum on World Economics and Politics]*, Vol. 1 (2008), p. 21; Liu Jianfei, ' "Zhongguo Zeren Lun" Kaoyan Heping Fazhan.'

had not been enough to assure others of its benign intentions and 'prudence'; hence, it needed to commit itself to a 'responsible emergence with words as much as deeds.'[98] Wu Xinbo, a Fudan University scholar, offered different advice. Presupposing a link between international duties and rights, he suggested that Beijing leverage its responsible power role to push for a larger and more proportionate share of rights in international society.[99]

However, even as several Chinese scholars argued that Beijing could and should shoulder more international responsibilities, it was equally stressed that these obligations should not be decided unilaterally by others and that at a minimum, China should seek to 'coordinate' with outside powers on what these obligations would entail.[100] As one Chinese analyst put it, 'one can only be responsible for something that one accepts.'[101] Liu Ming of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences agreed but went further to caution that external interpretations of China's responsibilities should not be allowed to cast the country in a 'morally defensive' position and that Beijing needed to take greater initiative in defining its global obligations. For Liu, ideally, China should be a 'distributor' (*fenpei zhe*) of responsibilities vis-à-vis the

[98] Shi Yinhong, 'Chengjiu Yu Tiaozhan: Zhongguo Heping Fazhan, Hexie Shijie He Guoji Zeren' [Achievements and Challenges: China's Peaceful Development, Harmonious World and International Responsibility], *Dangdai Shijie Yu Shehui Zhuyi [Contemporary World and Socialism]*, Vol. 2 (2008), pp. 83-84.
[99] Wu Xinbo, 'Guoji Xingshi Jubian Xia Zhongguo De Guoji Quxiang,' p. 24.
[100] Fudan University seminar report, 'Zhidu Gonggei Yu Daguo Jueqi: Zhongguo De Shimin,' p. 8; Liu Jianfei, ' "Zhongguo Zeren Lun" Kaoyan Heping Fazhan,' p. 26; Xu Zhengyuan, 'Quanli Yu Zeren: Lengzhan Hou Zhongguo Fuzeren Daguo Shengfen De Jiangou' [Power and Responsibility: The Construction of China's Identity as a Responsible Great Power after the Cold War], in Pan Zhongqi, ed., *Guoji Zeren Yu Daguo Zhanlue [International Responsibility and Great Power Strategy]*, (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 2008), p. 47.
[101] Interview with SIIS scholar, Shanghai, November 2011.

international order.[102] Such views, in a sense, reflected the limits of the internationalist perspective.

Yet this was still a less conservative position when compared with the development position, which argued against Beijing taking on 'excessive' global responsibilities—not because it was unwilling, but because it lacked the 'objective' capacity to do so (*meiyou nengli*). The development position did not deny that China should make an 'appropriate' level of international contribution, but it was clearly wary that external obligations risked the prospect of national overextension. At the core of the development narrative, therefore, was an estimation of China's power position which accentuated its developing status. This particular argument underscored that the PRC's national income per capita was still comparatively modest (around one-fifth of US levels); that the PRC still had more than 100 million people living below the poverty line; that its 'socialist' development was still at a nascent stage and faced severe challenges such as corruption and a rising income gap; that its export/investment-based economic model was potentially unsustainable in the long run; and that the country had yet to attain complete territorial sovereignty.[103] Under these conditions, Li Jie of the MFA's Policy Research

[102] According to Liu, the idea of great power responsibility 'was not uniform, encompassed contradictory elements and was nebulous.' In his view, thus far, no 'international authority' had been unable to provide a definitive account of the concept. Liu Ming, 'Zhongguo Guoji Zeren Lun Pingxi' [Appraising the China International Responsibility Theory], *Mao Zedong Deng Xiaoping Lilun Yanjiu [Studies on Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping Theories]*, Vol. 1 (2008), pp. 52-54.

[103] Interviews with scholars at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences and Renmin University, Shanghai and Beijing, May-June 2011; 'China Not 2nd Strongest Economy: FM Official,' *China Daily*, 10 April 2012; Editor, 'Responsibilities of a Big Power,' *Beijing Review*, Vol. 44 (2007), p. 37; Li Jie, 'Cong Zeren Lun Toushi Guoji Tixi Zhuanxing' [Viewing the Transformation of the International System from the Perspective of the Responsibility Theory], *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies]*, Vol. 1 (2008), pp. 36-41, continuing on p. 47; Liu Jianfei, ' "Zhongguo Zeren Lun" Kaoyan Heping

Department contended, it would be 'unrealistic' to expect China to 'shoulder international responsibilities that were not commensurate with its capability and development stage, especially those that would entail sovereignty, security and development costs.'[104] It could also be politically difficult to justify, Jin Canrong suggested, noting that many Chinese questioned why a 'poor China' should seek to behave 'generously' to others when it should be (in their view) helping itself first.[105] For these reasons, proponents of the development position argued that Beijing should prioritise its internal responsibilities and focus on national 'self-strengthening'; it had a 'right' to develop. In so doing, it was claimed that China would not only fulfil a major responsibility to the world (i.e. by improving the living standards of one-fifth of the world's population; creating positive economic externalities etc.), it would also build a stronger 'foundation' to better shoulder its international responsibilities.[106]

While the development perspective raised questions about Chinese great power identity and advocated a more circumspect and inward-looking approach towards China's responsibilities, it accepted the overall idea that Beijing should act 'responsibly' (albeit in accordance with its national conditions). The same could not be said about the skeptics' position, which was suspicious of the responsibility concept. The primary argument here was that the RGP discourse, in particular those emanating from the US and

---

Fazhan,' p. 24; Liu Ming, 'Zhongguo Guoji Zeren Lun Pingxi,' pp. 52-54; Xu Zhengyuan, 'Quanli Yu Zeren: Lengzhan Hou Zhongguo Fuzeren Daguo Shengfen De Jiangou,' pp. 46-55.

[104] Li Jie, 'Cong Zeren Lun Toushi Guoji Tixi Zhuanxing,' p. 41.

[105] Jin Canrong, *Daguo Zeren*, p. 7.

[106] Liu Jianfei, ' "Zhongguo Zeren Lun" Kaoyan Heping Fazhan,' p. 26; Xu Zhengyuan, 'Quanli Yu Zeren: Lengzhan Hou Zhongguo Fuzeren Daguo Shengfen De Jiangou,' pp. 46-47.

Europe, encompassed a hidden agenda to: (i) hamper China's rise by saddling it with 'unreasonable' and disproportionate international burdens; (ii) pass the buck on most of the world's problems to China (i.e. 'billing' Beijing), diverting attention away from the 'fact' that others were primarily to blame and responsible for these problems; and (iii) exploit China's growing strength to perpetuate American hegemony.[107] Given these ostensible motives, it was alleged that the RGP discourse was fundamentally a 'cousin to the China threat theory and China collapse theory', its main difference being that it was more 'gentle' in expression than the others. Thus, Ma Zhengang, a senior diplomat and president of the China Institute of International Studies cautioned: '… we should not blindly think that the US looks up to us when it requests China to take on more global responsibilities, much less revel in self-importance…'[108] A similar view was espoused by Huo Jianguo, a senior scholar-official at the Ministry of Commerce. In an interview entitled 'Why is China Supposed to Be Responsible for the World,' Huo asserted that the idea of China as a responsible power (as articulated by the US) was 'dangerous' and amounted to a way of 'killing China with flattery.' In Huo's opinion, the US and others had grown increasingly 'jealous' of China's success, especially

[107] Interviews with Beijing University and SASS scholars, Beijing and Shanghai, May-June 2011; 'Experts Last Out at "China Responsibility" Theories,' *China Daily*, 20 August 2010; 'Beware [of] Extolling China to Danger with World-Level "Responsibilities",' *People's Daily*, 17 August 2010; Zhao Changhui, ' "Zhongguo Fuzeren Lun" De Daode Xianjin'; Zhang Shengjun, ' "Zhongguo Fuzeren Lun" Keyi Xiuyi' ["China Responsibility Theory" Can Retire], *Renmin Luntan [People's Tribune]*, No. 6 (2007), p. 50.
[108] Ma Zhengang, 'Zhongguo De Zeren Yu "Zhongguo Zeren Lun",' p. 3.

in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, and were seeking to 'invent more excuses' to burden China and check its development.[109]

It might be tempting at this juncture to ask: Which was the leading perspective in the Chinese RGP debate during this period? Short of a large-scale, phased national survey of relevant Chinese opinion-makers and intellectuals, it would be difficult to say with some degree of confidence. Yan Xuetong has claimed that the skeptics' position represents the Chinese 'mainstream' but cited no evidence at how he arrived at this assertion.[110] The results of my field interviews and discussions with Chinese interlocutors in 2011, on the other hand, suggests that Chinese analysts were inclined to understand the responsibility discourse from lenses that encompass elements of both the internationalist and development perspectives.[111] This is not to say that among those I had spoken to, there had been no cynicism expressed about the RGP concept. But it appeared that most leaned towards some combination of the internationalist and development views. Admittedly, these interviews and discussions comprised only a small sample size, and entailed a certain degree of interpretative subjectivity. Thus, they should not be understood as anything more than an estimate of perceptions in the RGP debate during a specific period. Nevertheless, caveats aside, they can be potentially indicative. Field data suggests that, amongst Chinese analysts, it was less a question of whether China should behave responsibly and more a

[109] Editor, 'Interview: Why is China Supposed to be Responsible for the World,' *Beijing Review*, Vol. 35 (2010), pp. 46-47.
[110] Yan Xuetong, 'How Assertive Should a Great Power Be?'
[111] Between April-June 2011 (Shanghai and Beijing) and September-December 2011 (Shanghai), I interviewed several Chinese scholars (including one policymaker).

question of how China should behave responsibly (whether to tilt towards external or internal obligations).

Conclusion

Overall, the years 2005 to 2012 marked a period of further entrenchment of the RGP identity at both official and intellectual levels.[112] This period saw an unprecedented level of dialogue and policy engagement between the US and China, which reinforced perceptions of China's great power identity but also created additional opportunities for Washington to focus attention on questions of Chinese behaviour. Comparing the Bush and Obama administrations, the tenor of the latter's rhetoric on China appeared to be more forceful (especially from around 2010), but by and large the message to Beijing remained the same: that its global responsibilities should be made commensurate with its rising power. There was evidence that some of this rhetoric had an impact on Chinese deliberations, as seen by the advocacy of the stakeholder concept which spurred discussion of the responsible great power role in China.

Of course, the continued proliferation of Chinese RGP narratives related to more than just responses to American arguments. Domestic debates about the harmonious world concept and the Chinese development model facilitated this discourse, while events such as the 2008-2009 global financial crisis also played a role. As with the 1997-1998 crisis, Beijing used the GFC of

[112] This is not to argue that China was becoming more 'responsible'; that relates to a normative question that is not the focus of this study.

2008 to project itself as a responsible global actor, believing that it had responded 'responsibly' over the crisis. But unlike the 1997-1998 crisis, assessments of Chinese contributions this time were more mixed and many believed that it could have done more to help boost global economic recovery. Indeed, by 2010, Washington was more vocal in arguing that some of Chinese trade and economic practices, in particular the currency revaluation policy, were 'unfairly' undermining efforts to restore the global economy.

These sentiments were part of a broader perception in Washington, from around 2010, that the gap between Chinese behaviour and American expectations was growing. Compared with the period between 2005 and 2008, when US commentators and officials argued that some of Beijing's actions indicated that it had 'responded impressively, although only partially' to the responsible stakeholder call, by the second half of the Obama administration's first term, this view had changed. It had become apparent to US officials then that Beijing was increasingly acting in ways that suggested not only a more abrasive China, but also one that still had much ground to make up in terms of addressing US expectations of its conduct. Why this had been so is a multi-faceted question that deserves a separate and fuller treatment, but understanding Chinese views on international responsibility might well provide us with some general insights.[113] As the chapter has shown, there had been at least three different schools of thought in the RGP debate in China, of which only the internationalist position advocated that Beijing take on more global responsibilities. Yet, that position was qualified by the insistence

[113] As mentioned earlier, this study does not seek to 'explain' Chinese behaviour as such.

amongst Chinese analysts that these responsibilities reflect Chinese choices. Moreover, all three positions in the debate (internationalist, development and skeptics') involved narratives that spoke implicitly or explicitly to Chinese interests. While this is not problematic in itself, it implies differences in responsibility 'standards' between China and others when these interests diverge from others' interests. Taken together, Chinese RGP perspectives suggests limits to how far Beijing would behave as a 'truly' responsible power as envisioned by the US.

CHAPTER SIX

Conclusion: Clarifications, Findings and Implications

The ideas of this study may be subject to misunderstanding, so it is useful here to restate a number of important clarifications about the aims, nature and scope of this study. For a start, this study is not an attempt to prove or argue that China is a responsible great power. That is fundamentally a normative question, one which entails the task of specifying certain 'standards' of responsible conduct as normative benchmarks to judge China's behaviour. This study is animated by a different focus: telling the story of how and why China has come to pursue a self-identity as a responsible great power. The contention here is not that China is a responsible great power; rather, it is that Beijing has been increasingly imagining itself as one, in ways that suggest the Chinese have been thinking about big power responsibility far longer and more seriously than commonly assumed. In many ways, therefore, this study is about Chinese perceptions of great power identity and responsibilities, and the evolution of these perceptions. Essentially, it is an intellectual history of China's responsible great power identity.

That this study is an interpretive narrative of particular Chinese identity beliefs and their evolution explains why the potential objection that this study ignores realist concerns is misplaced. It is never the intention of the study to situate itself within debates about challenging one theoretical perspective against another (e.g. constructivism versus realism or liberalism).

It is also not the study's aim to explain questions of Chinese behaviour; its goal is to illuminate a particular Chinese identity. The nature of the subject means that, organically, this research is constructivist in ontology and in that sense, cannot be simply understood in terms of evaluating the explanatory power of one theoretical approach against other approaches.

Another important point to reiterate is that this study does not seek to address the question 'What is China's identity?' Its focus is on answering: What is China's identity *as* a responsible great power? As such, this study is not concerned with the issue of whether or not other possible Chinese identities— i.e. socialist state, Third World nation, developing country or victim of history—could have become more dominant than the RGP identity. Nor is it making the claim that the RGP identity is now the primary face of China. The aim here is more circumscribed and specific, which is to unpack the development path of China's RGP identity, a story that has not been fully told. In this study, discussion of other identity narratives has mainly come in the context of how the other self-conceptions relate to the evolution and trajectory of the RGP identity.

What does this study add to existing IR scholarship, in particular, literature on China's international relations? As stated earlier, there is a dearth of focused studies on China's proclaimed identity as a responsible great power. Most IR works on China go no further than to merely note the RGP phenomenon. Even among the few studies that do evoke the themes of China's great power identity and the responsibilities attendant upon that,

they have mainly focused on questions of Chinese behaviour. Little attention is given to how and why Chinese great power beliefs and narratives of global responsibility emerged in the first place. This research is therefore an attempt to address these gaps in the scholarship. That said, the contribution of this study goes beyond its immediate academic goal of addressing these lacunae. This study is interesting for three other major reasons.

First, there exists a belief amongst some IR scholars that the PRC is essentially non-status quo in orientation and trajectory. While this study is not set up to contest such views, the argument here is that such perspectives do not take into adequate account the presence, growth and range of Chinese RGP ideas. This is not to say that China's rise is necessarily benign in nature, but rather to point to a development that is often underappreciated or neglected in IR analyses of China: that since the early 1990s, a rich discursive space has emerged domestically regarding the idea of China as a responsible great power. Moreover, as pointed out in Chapter three, there exists an assumption that the Chinese RGP identity narrative only started to appear from around 2005, in particular, after the emergence of the 'responsible stakeholder' discourse. This study, however, shows that the RGP identity has longer roots than commonly understood and that a nascent form of this identity was already evident in China from around the early to mid-1990s. That Chinese elites have been debating vigorously about the kind of responsible power that China should be brings me to my second point: the views of these elites can often reveal insights into the existing and likely

future behaviour of China. In the final part of the conclusion, the implications of these elites' perspectives of China's great power identity and responsibilities will be discussed. Finally, a better understanding of the evolution of the RGP identity can help contribute to knowledge about the processes of state identity formation. As noted earlier, it has been reasonably established in IR scholarship that identity 'matters' in international politics. Yet, concerning how identity has come to matter—in particular, how state identities emerge and develop or fade away—is an area that is less well-understood. This study does not make any generalisable claims from the case of China's RGP identity, but does offer a particular rich, historical illustration and analysis of state identity development from which other studies may draw.

Main Findings

China's Responsible Great Power Identity: the Development Trajectory

This section summarises the evolution of China's RGP identity.[1] As has been argued, the start of China's identification as a responsible great power can be basically traced to the period between the early 1990s and the mid-1990s, when Chinese leaders began to officially pursue the RGP narrative, drawing linkages between China's responsibility and its global power role. This RGP narrative, however, did not emerge out of a temporal and ideational vacuum.

[1] Obviously, the story of the RGP identity's evolution encompasses much more complexities and nuances, as we have seen in the preceding four chapters. This section outlines essentially the major contours in the trajectory of the RGP identity (until 2012).

It was prefaced by 'cognitive priors' that preceded the reform era and which encompassed the earlier historical beliefs of Chinese elites in relation to their nation's great power status and the idea of responsibility.[2]

In the pre-modern era, the Central Kingdom complex was the embodiment of traditional China's sense of its great power status. This perspective conceived the Chinese polity and civilisation in terms of a 'world empire,' a perception which conflated China with the idea of the world and imagined it as the principal hegemon. Nevertheless, by the nineteenth to the early mid-twentieth century, such an outlook would be dramatically turned on its head. Chastening encounters with more advanced foreign powers led to a deep sense of Chinese self-doubt and insecurity as Chinese belief in the superiority of its own model was profoundly shaken. Subsequently, a 'weak' and 'victimised' China complex would develop but it was one that resided in considerable tension with suppressed, residual beliefs of China's national greatness. It would take the advent of Communist China for perceptions of national greatness to be more substantively revived. In the Maoist period, developments such as the outcome of the 1950-53 Korean War; China's development of a nuclear weapons capability; Beijing's pursuit of leadership in the Third World and the socialist bloc; the Sino-American rapprochement; and the PRC's formal entry into the UN and Security Council, among others, were factors that helped strengthen China's sense of itself as a global power. However, the Maoist leadership was also keenly aware of their nation's

[2] Amitav Acharya, *Whose Ideas Matter: Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010).

patent material inadequacies vis-à-vis the developed world and were not hesitant to play up the PRC's status as a developing country and an impoverished state on several occasions.

On early Chinese ideas of responsibility (until the end of the Maoist era), the investigation here suggests that there was limited evocation of this concept in Chinese political narratives. In pre-modern China, discussions of responsibility were informed by the Confucian concept of *yiwu* (duty), in which obligations were framed in terms of socially-defined duties within a communitarian setting and were primarily domestic in scope. The discourse would assume a more political character in the Republican and Maoist periods. The writings of Sun Yatsen, Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong show that leading Chinese political figures did engage in rhetoric that sought to connect the notion of international responsibility to China's big power aspirations. Sun, for example, spoke of China's obligation to 'aid the weaker nations and oppose the imperialist powers of the world' when it 'becomes strong again,' while Chiang referred to China's 'world' duty to 'stand shoulder to shoulder' with other nations to share 'the responsibilities for the maintenance of permanent world peace and the liberation of mankind.'[3] For Mao, his references were more indirect and were mainly couched in the language of China's 'contribution to humanity' or its international

[3] 'Sun Zhongshan De Xueshuo Shi Weixin Lun? Sun Zhongshan Zou De Shi Ziben Zhuyi' [Are Sun Yatsen's Words Idealism? Is Sun Yatsen Walking the Path of Capitalism?], *Mingge Zhongyang [People's Revolution Central]*, 2008, http://www.minge.gov.cn/; Sun Yatsen, *Sanmin Zhuyi: Minzu Zhuyi Di Liujiang [Three Principles of the People: Sixth Lecture on Nationalism]*, 1924, http://www.gzmg.gov.cn/; Chiang Kaishek, trans. Philip Jaffe, *China's Destiny* (London: Dennis Dobson, 1947).

'revolutionary' and 'socialist' duties.[4] Nevertheless, in Republican and Maoist China, the level of discussion on the responsibility concept could hardly be described as extensive or deep. While there was some limited discussion by political leaders, the notion of China's global responsibility was not among the key themes or ideas which concerned Chinese elites then.

Deng Xiaoping's elevation to paramount leadership in the late 1970s marked the end of the Maoist era and the start of Chinese reforms and the opening-up policy. It was evident that Deng's China was a substantially different international actor from the earlier Maoist version. No longer seeking to be a disruptive international influence, the PRC now strove to 'link up with the international track' and the general trend suggested a country keen to further its integration with international society.[5] Economically, the 1980s was a period of tremendous revitalisation for China, which helped bolster Chinese big power perceptions. Nevertheless, the end of the 1980s came as a severely testing period for Beijing as forces unleashed by the 1989 Tiananmen violence threatened to destabilise the country while externally China was deemed a pariah by several Western countries and sanctions were imposed against it. Along with the end of the Cold War and its attendant implications, this was clearly perceived in Beijing as a time of major threat to China's great power identity. Against this backdrop, involvement in the UN proceedings and diplomacy vis-à-vis the 1990 Gulf War was an opportunity

[4] Mao Zedong, 'Patriotism and Internationalism,' in *Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), pp 178-180.
[5] Hongying Wang, 'Linking Up with the International Track: What's in a Slogan,' *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 189 (2007), pp. 1-23.

for Beijing to repair its image and lessen the diplomatic isolation, and it would use the occasion to position itself as a responsible member of international society. This would later culminate in Chinese official declarations of the country as a responsible great power in 1992-1993.

From 1993-1996, Chinese leaders would continue to promulgate the narrative of the PRC as a responsible great power. There was rising confidence in Beijing regarding the country's capacity to play a global power role, in part because of a self-awareness that China was becoming more influential in the global economy.[6] More significantly, this growing sense of China's great power status was accompanied by claims from Beijing that China was aware of its big power obligations and that it would continue to advance 'world peace and development.'[7] Such Chinese rhetoric came at a time when American policymakers were beginning to publicly call for China to act as a responsible big power. The view from Washington was that the PRC had arrived at the 'great power table' and this arrival required the PRC to assume the responsibilities that corresponded with its rising status.

The period from 1997 to 2004 can be interpreted as the second distinctive phase of China's self-identification as a responsible power. This

[6] The economic factor aside, other conditions promoting the development of Chinese big power view included the increasing centrality of UN institutions in global affairs in which Chinese involvement was expanding; China's relatively quick diplomatic rebound from the post-Tiananmen isolation; and the continuing resilience of the Chinese politico-economic model.

[7] *Chinese President Jiang Zemin's Speech at a Luncheon hosted in his honour by Several US Organisations in New York, including the America-China Society, the National Committee on US-China Relations, the US-China Business Council, the Foreign Policy Association, the Council on Foreign Relations and the Asia Society*, 23 October 1995, http://www.nti.org/; *Speech by Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen at Luncheon Hosted by Chicago Council on Foreign Relations*, 20 September 1996, http://www.nti.org/.

period was marked by a discernible expansion in RGP narratives in China, reflecting continuing Chinese positioning in that role. At the official level, Chinese leaders continued to allude to the RGP identity in their statements, but qualitatively these did not go beyond general assertions. At the broader, sub-official level of the Chinese academic and think-tank community, there was greater depth and diversity to the discursive terrain. As Chapter four shows, Chinese scholars became increasingly engaged in a wide-ranging discussion about the questions of China's great power role and responsibilities. Interestingly, there appeared to be rising interest in and receptivity to the idea of China as a responsible power amongst Chinese intellectuals, though this is not to suggest that there were no critical opinions or that Chinese understandings of global responsibility necessarily converged with those propounded in Washington. On the part of the US, there was certainly a continuation in the policy of exhorting China to act more 'responsibly' in international society. While there were calls for US-China relations to go beyond shared interests to incorporate a sense of shared values, in general, the American message to Beijing remained a consistent one: the US welcomed China's rise, but its ascendancy should be matched by a willingness to shoulder the concomitant global responsibilities.

There would be no substantive change in the US policy of encouraging China to act as a responsible power between 2005 and 2012. This period was characterised by an unprecedented level of dialogue and policy engagement between the American and Chinese governments, which heightened

perceptions of China's great power identity but also created additional opportunities for Washington to spotlight and apply rhetorical pressure on questions of China's obligations to international society. Alongside the shift in American strategic focus towards the Asia-Pacific region, this pressure appeared to become more pronounced from around late 2010, as Washington ratcheted up the tone of its rhetoric and was more critical of some of China's policies. As for Beijing, it did not rhetorically deviate from its RGP role script. Chinese leaders continued to rely on assertions that 'China, as a major country, does not shirk its responsibilities,' or that they understood the great power role brought 'important responsibilities on a host of major issues.'[8] Indeed, this period witnessed greater prevalence and prominence of the RGP narrative in Chinese policy discourses as the concept became further entrenched at the official level. The continuing proliferation of the RGP narrative also extended to the discursive space of Chinese scholars and think-tank analysts. As with the 1997-2004 period, Chinese intellectuals continued to ponder the ideas of China's great power role and responsibilities between 2005 and 2012. Notably, over this period, the key positions in the Chinese RGP debate became further clarified and more evident.

[8] Li Keqiang, 'The World Should Not Fear a Growing China,' *Financial Times*, 9 January 2011; 'Hu Jintao: China, US Shoulder Important Responsibilities on Host of Major World Issues,' *Comments, the PRC Ministry of Commerce*, http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/.

Chinese Perceptions of China's Responsibility

This section outlines the key findings relating to Chinese understandings about the question of China's responsibility. Obviously, Chinese views on the matter are nuanced and not static, and as Chapter 2 has indicated, have long historical antecedents. Nevertheless, if one focuses on the contemporary history from 1992, when Beijing began to purposefully pursue the RGP self-identification, it is possible to distil three distinct, general positions in the Chinese RGP debate. As mentioned, these positions became further sharpened and were more perceptible from 2005 onwards, though this is not to say that these perspectives were not present earlier or that Chinese elites cannot hold composite views that combine aspects of these perspectives. A considerable portion of the findings here are drawn from Chinese scholarly publications as well as field interviews and discussions with Chinese analysts. On the relevance of Chinese intellectuals views, Chapter one has provided a fuller and more detailed justification. But briefly, the argument here is that in the Chinese socio-political system, the views of scholars are nontrivial and are often reflective of, as Rana Mitter puts it, 'a microcosm of wider thinking in the Chinese leadership.'[9]

This study labels the three Chinese 'responsibility' schools of thought as the internationalist, developmental and skeptics' position (see Table 1 for a simplified overview). The internationalist position broadly agreed with the

[9] Rana Mitter, 'An Uneasy Engagement: Chinese Ideas of Global Order and Justice in Historical Perspective,' in Rosemary Foot, John Lewis Gaddis, Andrew Hurrell, eds., *Order and Justice in International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 225.

idea that China should take on more global responsibilities. This perspective was informed by a number of interrelated narratives and rationales. The first is connected with the Bullian belief that great powers, by virtue of their stronger capacities and special status, have larger obligations towards international society. It acknowledged that China was a rising power and argued that Beijing needed to redefine or expand its international obligations to better match its growing strength and status. The second narrative, drawing on Chinese ideas such as *tianxia* (all under heaven) and the harmonious world theory, conceived China as being morally and normatively responsible to the shared and common world of which it was a part. It saw China's future and interests as being inescapably linked to this world society. The third narrative spoke of a logic of consequences. Here, the argument was that it was in China's interests to contribute to the current international system because: (i) it would not benefit China if this system floundered; (ii) it would improve China's social and moral standing in international society and reduce the likelihood of a hostile external environment that would be deleterious to China's development; and (iii) it would improve China's bargaining power for a larger share of rights in international society. An important caveat to note about the internationalist position is that, even as it argued for a more activist China that should shoulder more global responsibilities, it was qualified by the insistence from Chinese analysts that these responsibilities should reflect Chinese choices.

The developmental position advocated a more circumspect and inward-looking perspective towards China's responsibilities. Promoting a view of China which emphasised its developing status, this position counselled against Beijing taking on excessive global responsibilities, arguing that the country should prioritise its domestic obligations and focus on 'helping itself first.' It perceived international responsibilities as unnecessary burdens to national development and argued that Beijing should only take on external responsibilities that were commensurate with China's level of development and capacity. Proponents were wont to point to, among other limiting conditions, the PRC's still relatively modest national income per capita; its still large numbers of poor among its population; and the severe domestic problems posed by its development.

But while the developmental perspective accepted that China could take on international responsibilities (albeit in accordance with national conditions), the skeptics' position was dismissive and distrustful of the responsibility concept. Suspicious of talk of China's responsibility, in particular those ideas coming from the West, it saw the RGP discourse through the lens of a purported hidden agenda to: (i) constrain China through international burdens; (ii) pass the buck on global problems to China; and (iii) exploit China's rising strength to perpetuate the American-dominated global order. Fundamentally, the skeptics' position perceived the RGP idea as an anti-China 'moral trap,' akin to a soft version of the 'China threat theory' and 'China collapse theory.'

On the question of which was the leading perspective in the Chinese RGP debate, the results of the author's field interviews and conversations with Chinese interlocutors suggest that Chinese analysts were inclined to lean towards some combination of the internationalist and developmental perspectives. Field data suggest that, amongst Chinese analysts, it was less a question of whether China should behave responsibly and more a question of how China should behave responsibly (whether to tilt towards external or internal obligations).

Table 1: Broad Positions in the Chinese RGP Debate

<table>
<tr><th></th><th>Internationalist</th><th>Developmental</th><th>Skeptics'</th></tr>
<tr><td>Broad Argument</td><td>Take on more global responsibilities</td><td>Take on global responsibilities in accordance with China's development level</td><td rowspan="3">Suspicious of the idea of China's global responsibilities</td></tr>
<tr><td>Rationale</td><td>1. Great powers have greater responsibilities because of their stronger capacities and special status.
2. Morally and normatively accountable to the world society
3. Strategic incentives</td><td>1. China is still a developing country
2. Excessive external obligations risked national overextension
3. Focus on domestic obligations</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td colspan="2">China's responsibilities should be self-determined</td></tr>
</table>

Explaining China's Responsible Great Power Identity

This section provides a brief overview on the factors that had been the most significant in producing and sustaining China's RGP self-perception (until 2012). Five broad factors are inferred. They relate to (i) the role of the US; (ii) the role of external events; (iii) instrumentalism; (iv) social aspirations; and (iv) domestic ideational influences. These factors are not mutually exclusive and can overlap, but for analytical purposes, they are taken as separate categories.

The Role of the US This study identifies the United States as the primary significant Other in China's RGP identity, in which the Other is the external source of role ideas for the state. Here, the empirical record shows that the US had an observable impact on the RGP identity. Its impact was illustrated in three ways. First and foremost, the US was China's primary interlocutor in the RGP discourse. Ever since the time of the Clinton administration, Washington had been relatively consistent in pursuing the policy and rhetoric of urging Beijing to act more 'responsibly' in international society or to take greater ownership over global challenges. As was evident, some of the American RGP rhetoric had a bearing on Chinese identity discussions. This was most clearly exemplified by the 2005 introduction of the 'responsible stakeholder' concept, which provoked debate in China as well as added new impetus to continuing Chinese discussions on the RGP identity. Second, as the predominant power in international society, the US was effectively the doorkeeper to China's aspirations for great power status.

Whether Washington recognised China's big power role would have a concomitant impact in Beijing and the capitals of the world, a social reality that the Chinese recognised. Indeed, American recognition of China's power had a perceptible influence on Chinese estimations of their nation's great power status. But full American recognition also encompassed a normative dimension and Washington made it known to Beijing that the latter had to behave 'responsibly' for the US to truly recognise it as a great power. Third, from a geopolitical perspective, the US was perceived in Beijing as the key 'constraint' or 'enabler' of China's rise. Chinese policymakers and analysts saw the US as the external actor with the most potential to make or break the rise of China. This perception shaped the calculus of Chinese deliberations vis-à-vis the great power role and responsibilities.

External Events This study finds that external events served as catalysts to the discussion of the RGP identity in China. The 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis led to a marked expansion of Chinese RGP narratives as scholars and policymakers asserted that China had responded responsibly over the crisis. The various US-China presidential summits culminated in several declarations by Chinese leaders proclaiming China's RGP identity. Beijing's contributions to counterterrorism efforts in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, to global trade after its formal ascension to the World Trade Organisation, to the Six-Party Talks on the North Korea nuclear issue, among others, prompted talk on the RGP identity in China. The 2008-

2009 global financial crisis and Beijing's ensuing responses sparked spirited internal conversations on China's responsibility vis-à-vis the global economic order. These are some examples of how particular events played a precipitating or conditioning role in the production and reproduction of Chinese RGP perceptions. In many respects, events highlight the role of contingency in identity development.

Instrumentalism This factor relates to the strategic or pragmatic aspects of identity construction. As noted in Chapter one, international identity construction can be a deliberate process in which role imagination is informed on the basis of interests and purposes as determined by the state. Relating to China, there was evidence that the RGP identity was promulgated and promoted in part because it was perceived to be in China's interests to position itself as one. As Chapter three shows, the official RGP narrative was first made with a view towards improving China's external image at a time when Beijing was just breaking out of its post-Tiananmen isolation. Additionally, Chinese leaders and analysts saw the RGP identity as a useful conceptual tool to address the perception that China's rise would be a threat to others in the international system. It was argued that it was in the interests of China to be characterised as a benign and beneficent power so as to lessen the prospect that others would consider it a threat to be opposed. This reflected the Chinese strategic perception that China required a relatively 'unproblematic' external environment to pursue its goals of economic

development. Incidentally, the idea that a RGP identity could and should benefit China had been evident in the writings of several Chinese scholars who discussed the subject. Many saw it as a useful identity that embodified a viable strategic path for navigating international politics.

Social Aspirations This study suggests that one reason why Beijing pursued the RGP identity was that this identity portended social rewards in international society. The role category of a responsible power would be helpful for furthering China's membership in international society. But more than that, it would be helpful for gaining greater American acceptance of an emerging Chinese big power identity that had become more pronounced by the mid-1990s. To be sure, direct arguments on the social rationale for the RGP identity had not been particularly evident in Chinese writings. What were more evident in these writings were two points: One, the PRC strongly desired to be seen and treated as a great power in international society, i.e. a 'legitimate great power.'[10] Two, the Chinese acknowledged the linkage and importance of the responsibility issue to full great power recognition by the US and others in international society. The inference therefore is that Chinese elites might have chosen to describe their country's global role in terms of big power responsibility, at least at the official rhetorical level, partly because they wanted greater recognition of China's great power identity.[11] This, in

[10] Shogo Suzuki, 'Seeking "Legitimate" Great Power Status in Post-Cold War International Society: China's and Japan's Participation in UNPKO,' *International Relations*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (2008), pp. 45-63.

[11] Of course, whether China can be successful in obtaining this great power recognition is an entirely different matter altogether. Meanwhile, for more on the argument that China can be 'socialised,' refer

some ways, connotes an element of instrumentalism, albeit in the social dimension (i.e. pursue social incentives).

Domestic Ideational Influences It is observed that several of the Chinese arguments on international responsibility were essentially endogenous conceptualisations that had not referenced external ideas, reflecting what could be described as ideational 'localisation.' Indeed, the rising domestic prominence of Chinese strategic or political ideas such as New Security Concept, the peaceful development thesis and the harmonious world view squared with and were facilitative to the discussion of the RGP identity in China. For example, it was argued that the peaceful development strategy essentially implied the fulfillment of China's obligation and role as a responsible great power. Similarly, it had been claimed that Beijing's advocacy of the harmonious world view signalled its commitment to shoulder global responsibilities. Chapters four and five have explored in greater detail the linkages and relevance of these ideas on the RGP identity, so this section will not elaborate them again. But clearly, the empirical evidence of this study shows that the RGP identity's development was informed by a considerable degree of indigenous ideation. As with identity instrumentalism, this factor reflects the agency of the actor in identity construction.

---

to: Alastair Iain Johnston, *Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

Implications and Prospects

The findings of this study suggest limits and possibilities to the PRC's trajectory in international society. Recalling the three schools of thought in relation to the Chinese RGP debate, it is suggested here that the dimensions of this particular discursive space set boundaries on China's conduct as a responsible power. As we have seen, only the internationalist narrative in this debate advocated that China shoulder more global obligations. The other two competing narratives either promoted a minimalist perspective on global responsibility (i.e. developmental position) or rejected the responsibility concept (i.e. skeptics' position). But even the more 'liberal' internationalist position was qualified somewhat by an overarching Chinese argument that the content of China's responsibilities should be self-decided. Additionally, all three positions in the debate involved arguments that spoke directly or indirectly to Chinese interests, which raises questions about the obligations of a responsible power when these interests differ from those of others in international society.

Yet, the fact that the concept of interest had featured relatively prominently in Chinese RGP discourses also implies potentialities for the RGP identity. As Jutta Weldes notes, national interest is not an absolute concept and can be malleable.[12] This implies that as Chinese interests evolve or get redefined, internal understandings of China's responsibilities will shift accordingly. And as this study observes, Chinese perceptions and estimations

[12] Jutta Weldes, 'Constructing National Interests,' *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1996), pp. 275-318. See as well Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).

do get influenced by other international actors, in particular, the United States. Taken together, this means that for the US or governments who are interested in 'shaping' China's RGP identity, the challenge is to think about how to sway Beijing's costs-benefit calculations such that it would perceive its interests in a way that would align more with others' interests. There was in fact evidence to suggest that US policymakers understood this logic. Washington's promotion of the 'stakeholder' concept was notably an attempt to appeal more directly to Chinese interests by arguing that it would benefit Beijing to maintain or improve the international system. Interestingly, many Chinese analysts had not seemed too critical of this concept.

Whither China's proclaimed responsible great power identity? There is little reason to expect that Beijing will not continue to pursue this identity narrative. After all, as an official narrative that is becoming increasingly established in the Chinese foreign policy system, it is reasonable to expect a degree of institutional continuity and 'stickiness' to the RGP identity.[13] Moreover, the category of a responsible great power is a socially desirable status in international society, one which one Chinese scholar describes as the 'standard' for great powerhood in the 21st century; so it is understandable that Beijing would want to claim itself as such.[14] If the RGP identity continues to receive official endorsement, then it is expected that Chinese debates on the great power role and responsibilities will persist. The interesting question, of

[13] On the argument that states seek a certain degree of consistency in its understanding of its place in the world, see Jennifer Mitzen, 'Ontological Security in World Politics: State identity and the Security Dilemma,' *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2006), pp. 341-370.
[14] Qu Congwen, 'Fuzeren De Daguo Guan' [The Concept of the Responsible Great Power], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics]*, Vol. 10 (2002), pp. 72-77.

course, is whether these debates and conversations will eventually lead the RGP identity to become the prevailing national psyche of China.

Bibliography

English Language Sources

Abdelal, Rawi, *National Purpose in the World Economy: Post-Soviet States in Comparative Perspective*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2001.

Abdelal, Rawi, Yoshiko Herrara, Alastair Iain Johnston and Rose McDermott, 'Identity as a Variable,' in Rawi Abdelal, Yoshiko Herrara, Alastair Iain Johnston and Rose McDermott, eds., *Measuring Identity: A Guide for Social Scientists,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009.

Acharya, Amitav, *Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism,* Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2009.

Backhouse, E. and Bland, J.O.P., *Annals & Memoirs of the Court of Peking,* Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1914.

Banchoff, Thomas, 'German Identity and European Integration,' *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1999.

Barnett, Doak, *China and the Major Powers in East Asia,* Brookings Institution Press, Washington, 1977.

Barnett, Michael N., *Dialogues in Arab Politics*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1998.

Barnett, Michael N., 'Identity and Alliances in the Middle East,' in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1996.

Bartelson, Jens, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995.

Bergsten, Fred, 'A Partnership of Equals: How Washington Should Respond to China's Economic Challenge,' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 4, July/August 2008.

Bernstein, Richard and Ross Munro, *The Coming Conflict with China,* Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1997.

Berridge, G.R. and John W. Young, 'What is a Great Power?' *Political Studies*, Vol. XXXVI, 1988.

Bi, Jianhai, 'The Role of the Military in the PRC Taiwan Policymaking: A Case Study of the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996,' *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 11, No. 32, 2002.

Brittingham, Michael Alan, 'China's Contested Status: Sino-US Relations,' in Guo, Sujian and Shiping Hua, eds., *New Dimensions of Chinese Foreign Policy,* Lexington Books, Lanham, 2007.

Broomfield, Emma V., 'Perceptions of Danger: The China Threat Theory,' *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 12, No. 35, 2003.

Bull, Hedley, 'The Great Irresponsibles? The United States, the Soviet Union, and World Order,' *International Journal*, Vol. 35, 1979-1980.

Bull, Hedley, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics,* Columbia University Press, New York, 2002.

Burke, Peter J. and Jan E. Stets, *The Roots of Identity Theory,* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009.

Burke, Peter J., 'Identity Change,' *Social Psychology Quarterly*, Vol. 69, No.1, 2006.

Burns, William, 'Keynote Remarks at 5th Biennial US-China Relations Conference,' *Remarks at Texas A&M University*, 24 October 2011, http://www.state.gov/.

Bush-Jiang Crawford Summit – Transcript of Bush-Jiang Press Conference, 25 October 2002, http://www.gpo.gov/.

Buzan, Barry, The *United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty-First Century,* Polity Press, Cambridge, 2004.

Callahan, William A., *China: The Pessoptimist Nation,* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010.

Campbell, David, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity,* University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1998.

Carlson, Allen, 'Helping to Keep the Peace (Albeit Reluctantly): China's Recent Stance on Sovereignty and Multilateral Intervention,' *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 1, 2004.

Carlson, Allen, *Unifying China, Integrating with the World: Securing Chinese Sovereignty in the Reform Era,* Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2005.

Chan, Gerald, *China's Compliance in Global Affairs: Trade, Arms Control, Environmental Protection, Human Rights*, World Scientific Series on Contemporary China, Singapore, 2006.

Chen, Dingding, 'Explaining China's Changing Discourse on Human Rights, 1978-2004,' *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2005.

Chen, Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War,* University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2001.

Chen, Qimao, 'New Approaches in China's Foreign Policy: The Post-Cold War Era,' *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 3, 1993.

Chen, Zhimin, 'Nationalism, Internationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy,' *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 14, No. 42, 2005.

Cheng, Joseph Y.S. and King-lun Kgok, 'The 2001 "Spy" Plane Incident Revisited: the Chinese Perspective,' *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2004.

Chiang, Kaishek, trans. Philip Jaffe, *China's Destiny*, Dennis Dobson, London 1947.

China Daily, ' "China Responsibility" Theories,' 20 August 2010.

China Daily, 'Big Push for Global Reserve Currency,' 31 March 2009.

China Daily, 'China Denounces US Arms Sales to Taiwan,' 9 January 2010.

China Daily, 'China Not 2nd Strongest Economy: FM Official,' 10 April 2012.

China Daily, 'Foreign Minister: Hu's Proposals Play Important Role at G20,' 4 April 2009.

China Daily, 'G20 Refuses to Back US Push on China's Currency,' 12 November 2010.

China Daily, 'Role of a Stakeholder,' 14 November 2008.

China Daily, 'WB, US, Brazil Hail China's Economic Stimulus Plan,' 10 November 2008.

Cho, Young Nam and Jong Ho Jeong, 'China's Soft Power: Discussions, Resources and Prospects,' *Asian Survey*, Vol. XLVIII, No. 3, 2008.

Christensen, Thomas, 'China's Role in the World: Is China a Responsible Stakeholder?' *Remarks before the US-China Economic and Security Commission*, 3 August 2006, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.

Christensen, Thomas, 'Shaping China's Global Choices through Diplomacy,' *Statement before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission*, 18 March 2008, htttp://2001-2009.state.gov/.

Christensen, Thomas, 'The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy,' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 90, No. 2, March/April 2011.

Christensen, Thomas, 'The State of US-China Diplomacy,' *Remarks before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission*, 2 February 2007, http://2001- 2009.state.gov/.

Christopher, Warren, 'American Interests and the US-China Relationship,' *Address to the Asia Society, the Council on Foreign Relations and the National Committee on US-China Relations*, 17 May 1996, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/index.html/.

Chung, Chien-peng, 'The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: China's Changing Influence in Central Asia,' *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 180, 2004.

Clinton, Hillary, 'America's Engagement in the Asia-Pacific,' *Remarks in Honolulu*, 28 October 2010, http://www.state.gov/.

Clinton, Hillary, 'America's Pacific Century,' *Remarks at the East-West Centre*, 10 November 2011, http://www.state.gov/.

Clinton, Hillary, 'Inaugural Richard C. Holbrooke Lecture on a Broad Vision of US-China Relations in the 21st Century,' *Remarks in Washington D.C.*, 14 January 2011, http://www.state.gov/.

Clinton, Hillary, 'Remarks with Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi,' *Remarks at the Great Hall of the People's Republic of China*, 5 September 2012, http://www.state.gov/.

Cohen, Warren, *America's Response to China: An Interpretive History of Sino-American Relations,* John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1971.

Cohen, Warren, 'China's Rise in Historical Perspective,' *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 4-5, 2007.

Conable Jr, Barber B. and David M. Lampton, 'China: The Coming Power,' *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 71, No. 5, Winter 1992/1993.

Copper, John, *China's Foreign Aid: An Instrument of Peking's Foreign Policy,* Lexington Books, Lexington, 1976.

Cornelissen, Scarlett and Ian Taylor, 'The Political Economy of China and Japan's Relationship with Africa: A Comparative Perspective,' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 13, No. 4, 2000.

Craner, Lorne, 'Prospects on Human Rights and Democracy in China,' *Statement before the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, 22 April 2004, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.

Curley, Tyler M., 'Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion,' *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 53, 2009.

De Bary, William Theodore, Wing-Tsit Chan and Burton Watson, *Sources of Chinese Tradition,* Columbia University Press, New York, 1960.

Deng, Yong, 'Hegemon on the Offensive: Global Perspectives on US Global Strategy,' *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 116, No. 3, 2001.

Deng, Yong, *China's Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations*: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008.

DeSutter, Paula, 'China's Record of Proliferation Activities,' *Testimony before the US-China Commission*, 24 July 2003, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.

Dittmer, Lowell and Samuel Kim, 'In Search of a Theory of National Identity' in Lowell Dittmer and Samuel Kim, eds., *China's Quest for National Identity,* Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1993.

Dittmer, Lowell, 'East Asia in the 'New Era' in World Politics,' *World Politics*, Vol. 5, 2002.

Eckstein, Alexander, *China's Economic Revolution,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1977.

Editor, 'Interview: Why is China Supposed to be Responsible for the World,' *Beijing Review*, Vol. 35, 2010.

Editor, 'Responsibilities of a Big Power,' *Beijing Review*, Vol. 44, 2007.

Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North Ireland, 'Overview on China-UK Relations,' October 2010, http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng/zygx/introduction/.

Epstein, Charlotte, 'Who Speaks? Discourse, the Subject and the Study of Identity in International Relations,' *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2010.

Erskine, Toni, 'Locating Responsibility: The Problem of Moral Agency in International Relations,' in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008.

Fairbank, John, 'Synarchy under the Treaties,' in John Fairbank (ed.), *Chinese Thought and Institutions,* University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1957.

Fairbank, John, 'The People's Middle Kingdom,' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 44, No. 4, July 1966.

Ferguson, Niall, 'Team "Chimerica",' *Washington Post*, 17 November 2008.

Fewsmith, Joseph, 'China and the WTO: The Politics behind the Agreement,' *NBR Analysis*, Vol. 10, No. 5, 1999.

Fewsmith, Joseph, *China since Tiananmen: From Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008.

Finnemore, Martha, *National Interests in International Society*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1996.

Foot, Rosemary, 'Bush, China and Human Rights,' *Survival*, Vol. 45, No. 2, 2003.

Foot, Rosemary and Andrew Walter, *China, The United States and Global Order,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010.

Foot, Rosemary, 'China in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Organisation Processes and Domestic Modes of Thought,' *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 5, 1998.

Foot, Rosemary, 'Chinese Power and the Idea of a Responsible State,' *The China Journal*, Vol. 45, 2001.

Foot, Rosemary, 'Chinese Strategies in a US-hegemonic Global Order: Accommodating and Hedging,' *International Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 1, 2006.

Foot, Rosemary, *Rights Beyond Borders,* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000.

Foot, Rosemary, *The Practice of Power: US Relations with China since 1949*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995.

Fox, John and Francois Godement, *A Power Audit of EU-China Relations,* European Council on Foreign Relations, London, 2009.

Garver, John, *Chinese-Soviet Relations 1937-1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism,* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988.

Garver, John, *Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China,* Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1993.

George, Alexander, 'The Causal Nexus between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision Making Behaviour: The "Operational Code",' in Lawrence Falkowski, ed., *Psychological Models in International Politics,* Westview Press, Boulder, 1979.

Gertz, Bill, 'Perry Calls on China to Earn US Trust: Airs Complaints on Rights, Nukes,' *The Washington Times*, 14 February 1996.

Gill, Bates and Chin-Hao Huang, 'China's Expanding Peacekeeping Role: Its Significance and the Policy Implications,' *SIPRI Policy Brief*, February 2009.

Gill, Bates and Medeiros, Evan S., 'Foreign and Domestic Influence on China's Arm Control and Nonproliferation Policies,' *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 161, 2000.

Gill, Bates, *Rising Star: China's New Security Diplomacy,* Brookings Institution Press, Washington, 2007.

Gittings, John, 'New Light on Mao: His View of the World,' *The China Quarterly*, No. 60, 1974.

Gittings, John, *Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute,* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1968.

Glaser, Bonnie S. and Evan S. Medeiros, 'The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy-Making in China: The Ascension and Demise of the Theory of "Peaceful Rise",' *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 190, 2007.

Glaser, Bonnie S., 'China's Security Perceptions: Interests and Ambitions,' *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 3, 1993.

Glaser, Bonnie S., 'The Diplomatic Relationship: Substance and Process,' in David Shambaugh, ed., *Tangled Titans: The United States and China,* Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, 2012.

Goh, Evelyn, *Constructing the US Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: From 'Red Menace' to 'Tacit Ally',* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004.

Goldman, Merle, 'Politically-Engaged Intellectuals in the 1990s,' *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 159, 1999.

Goldman, Merle, *Comrade to Citizen: The Struggle for Political Rights in China* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2005.

Goldman, Merle, Perry Link and Su Wei, 'Chinese Intellectuals in the Deng Era: Loss of Identity with the State,' in Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, eds., *China's Quest for National Identity,* Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1993.

Goldstein, Avery, 'The Diplomatic Face of China's Grand Strategy: A Rising Power's Emerging Choice,' *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 168, 2001.

Gries, Peter Hays, *China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy,* University of California Press, Berkeley, 2005.

Gries, Peter Hays, 'Social Psychology and the Identity-Conflict Debate: Is a "China Threat" Inevitable?' *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2005.

Griffith, William, *The Sino-Soviet Rift*, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, Cambridge, 1964.

Haas, Ernst B. and Peter M. Haas, 'Pragmatic Constructivism and the Study of International Institutions,' *Millennium*, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2002.

Haass, Richard, 'China and the Future of US-Sino Relations,' *Remarks to the National Committee on US-China Relations*, 5 December 2002, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.

Hall, Rodney Bruce, *National Collective Identity,* Columbia University Press, New York, 1999.

Hao, Yufan and Zhihai Zhai, 'China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited,' *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 121, 1990.

Harding, Harry, *A Fragile Relationship: Sino-American Relations since 1972,* Brookings Institution Press, Washington, 1992.

Harper, Stefan, *The Beijing Consensus: How China's Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century*, Basic Books, New York, 2010.

Holslag, Jonathan, 'Embracing Chinese Global Security Ambitions,' *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2009.

Hopf, Ted, *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities & Foreign Policies, 1955 & 1999*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2002.

Hormats, Robert, 'Addressing the Challenges of the China Model,' *Remarks at AmCham-China's Annual DC Dialogue*, 3 May 2011, http://www.state.gov/.

Hormats, Robert, 'The United States and China: The Next Five Years,' *Remarks at the Brookings-Caixin Conference*, 18 May 2011, http://www.state.gov/.

Hsiao, Kung-Chuan, *A History of Chinese Political Thought, Volume One,* Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1979.

Hsieh, Alice Langley, 'The Sino-Soviet Nuclear Dialogue:1963,' in Raymond Garthoff, ed., *Sino-Soviet Military Relations,* Praeger, New York, 1966.

Hsieh, Alice Langley, *Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era*, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1962.

Hsu, Immanuel, *The Rise of Modern China,* Oxford University Press, New York, 1975.

Hu, Jintao, 'Hu Jintao: China, US Shoulder Important Responsibilities on Host of Major World Issues,' *Comments, The PRC Ministry of Commerce*, http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/.

Hull, Cordell, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. 2,* The Macmillan Company, New York, 1948.

Hunt, Michael H., 'Chinese Foreign Relations in Historical Perspective,' in Harry Harding, ed., *China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s,* Yale University Press, New Haven, 1984.

Hunt, Michael H., 'Chinese National Identity and the Strong State: The Late Qing-Republican Crisis,' in Lowell Dittmer and Samuel Kim, eds., *China's Quest for National Identity,* Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1993.

Huntington, Samuel, 'The Clash of Civilisations,' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, 1993.

Hurrell, Andrew, *On Global Order: Power, Values and the Constitution of International Society,* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.

Iriye, Akira, 'The United States as an Asian-Pacific Power,' in Gene Hsiao, ed., *Sino-American Détente and Its Policy Implications,* Praeger, New York, 1974.

Jackson, Robert H., 'Sovereignty as a Doctrine of Moderation,' in Cathal J. Nolan, ed., *Power and Responsibility in World Affairs: Reformation versus Transformation* Praeger, Westport, 2004.

Jia, Qingguo, 'Disrespect and Distrust: The External Origins of Contemporary Chinese Nationalism,' *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 14, No. 42, 2005.

Jia, Qingguo, 'One Administration, Two Voices: US China Policy during Bush's First Term,' *The International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 3, 2003.

Jia, Qingguo, 'The Impact of 9-11 on Sino-US Relations: A Preliminary Assessment,' *The International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 3, 2003.

Jiang, Yang, 'Response and Responsibility: China in East Asian Financial Cooperation,' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 23, No. 5, 2010.

Jiang, Zemin, *Jiang Zemin's Speech at a Luncheon Hosted by several US Organisations in New York, including the America-China Society, the National Committee on US-China Relations, the US-China Business Council, the Foreign Policy Association, the Council on Foreign Relations and the Asia Society*, 23 October 1995, http://www.nti.org/.

Jiang, Zemin, *Speech by Jiang Zemin at the Informal APEC Leadership Conference*, 20 November 1993, http//www.fmprc.gov.cn/.

Johnston, Alastair Iain, 'Is China a Status Quo Power?' *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 4, 2003.

Johnston, Alastair Iain, *Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2008.

Johnston, Alastair Iain and Paul Evans, 'China's Engagement with Multilateral Security Institutions,' in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross, eds., *Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power,* Routledge, Abingdon, 1999.

Kan, Shirley, 'China-US Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001: Assessments and Policy Implications,' *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress,* 10 October 2001.

Kelly, James, 'The Future of US-China Relations,' *Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs*, 1 May 2001, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.

Kelly, James, 'US Policy on China and North Korea,' *Remarks to the World Affairs Council*, 30 January 2003, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.

Kelly, James, 'US-East Asia-Pacific Relations,' *Statement before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific*, 14 February 2002, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.

Kennedy, Scott, 'The Myth of the Beijing Consensus,' *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 19, No. 65, 2010.

Kent, Ann, *Beyond Compliance: China, International Organisations and Global Security,* Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2007.

Khong, Yuen Foong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965,* Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1992.

Kim, Samuel S., 'China as a Great Power,' in Orville Schell and David Shambaugh, eds., *The China Reader,* Vintage Books, New York, 1999.

Kim, Samuel S., 'China as a Regional Power,' *Current History*, Vol. 91, 1992.

Kim, Samuel S., 'China's International Organisational Behaviour,' in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice,* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994.

Kim, Samuel S., 'International Organisations in Chinese Foreign Policy,' *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 519, 1992.

Kim, Samuel S., 'Thinking Globally in Post-Mao China,' *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 27, No. 2, 1990.

Kim, Samuel S., 'China's Path to Great Power Status in the Globalisation Era,' *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2003.

Kim, Samuel S., *China, the United Nations and World Order,* Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1979.

Kirby, William, 'The Internationalization of China: Foreign Relations at Home and Abroad in the Republican Era,' *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 150, 1997.

Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Stephanie and Andrew Small, 'China's New Dictatorship Diplomacy: Is Beijing Parting with Pariahs?' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 1, January/February 2008.

Kritenbrink, Daniel, 'US Policy toward the People's Republic of China (PRC),' *Statement before the US-China Economic & Security Review Commission*, 13 April 2011, http://www.state.gov/.

Kuala Lumpur Declaration–Strengthening the Foundations for Growth, 18 November 1998, www.apec.org/.

Kurlantzick, Joshua, *Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2007.

Lampton, David M., 'China and Clinton's America: Have They Learned Anything?' *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXVII, No. 12, 1997.

Larson, Alan, 'China's Role in the World Economic System,' *Remarks to the Students and Faculty of the University of International Business and Economics at Beijing*, 5 November 2003, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.

Larson, Deborah Welch and Alexei Shevchenko, 'Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to US Primacy,' *International Security*, Vol. 34, No. 4, Spring 2010.

Lawless, Richard, 'China: Recent Security Developments,' *Prepared Statement before the House Armed Forces Committee*, 13 June 2007, http://www.dod.gov/.

Lee, John, 'China's America Obsession,' *Foreign Policy*, 6 May 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/05/06/china_s_america_obsession/.

Levi, Werner, *Modern China's Foreign Policy,* University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1953.

Li, Keqiang, 'The World Should Not Fear a Growing China,' *Financial Times*, 9 January 2011.

Li, Mingjiang, 'China Debates Soft Power,' *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 2, 2008.

Li, Mingjiang, ed., *Soft Power: China's Emerging Strategy in International Politics* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2011).

Li, Zhaojie, 'Traditional Chinese World Order,' *Chinese Journal of International Law*, Vol. 1, No.1, 2002.

Liao, Xuanli, *Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks and China's Policy Towards Japan,* The Chinese University Press, Hong Kong, 2006.

Lin, Biao, 'Long Live the Victory of People's War,' People's Daily, 2 September 1965, in *Peking Review*, Vol. 8, No. 36, September 1965.

Lin, Chong-Pin, *China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy: Tradition within Evolution,* Lexington Books, Lexington, 1988.

Ling, Bonny, 'China's Peacekeeping Diplomacy,' *China Rights Forum*, Vol. 1, 2007.

Lippman, Thomas, 'Bush Makes Clinton's China Policy an Issue,' *Washington Post*, 20 August 1999.

Loke, Beverley, 'Between Interest and Responsibility: Assessing China's Foreign Policy and Burgeoning Global Role,' *Asian Security*, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2009.

Lum, Thomas, 'US-China Relations: Policy Issues,' *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress*, 12 March 2010.

Lynch, Daniel C., 'Envisioning China's Political Future: Elite Responses to Democracy as a Global Constitutive Norm,' *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 51, 2007.

Malik, Mohan, *Dragon on Terrorism: Assessing China's Tactical Gains and Strategic Losses Post-September 11,* Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, 2002.

Mao, Zedong, 'Long Live the Great Unity of the Chinese People,' *Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. V,* Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1977.

Mao, Zedong, 'Our Great Victory in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea and Our Future Tasks,' *Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. V,* Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1977.

Mao, Zedong, 'Patriotism and Internationalism,' *Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong,* Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1966.

Mao, Zedong, 'The Chinese People Have Stood Up,' *Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. V*, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1977.

Mao, Zedong, 'The Relationship between China and Other Countries,' *Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. V,* Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1977.

Mao, Zedong, 'The Relationship between Economic Construction and Defence Construction,' *Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. V,* Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1977.

Marble, Andrew, 'China, the Financial Crisis and Sino-American Relations: An Interview with Pieter Bottelier,' *Asia Policy*, No. 9, 2010.

Mearsheimer, John, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,* Norton, New York, 2001.

Medeiros, Evan S. and Fravel, M.Taylor, 'China's New Diplomacy,' *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 82, No. 6, November/December 2003.

Medeiros, Evan S., *Reluctant Restraint: The Evolution of China's Nonproliferation Policies and Practices, 1980-2004,* Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2007.

Mercer, Jonathan, 'Anarchy and Identity,' *International Organisation*, Vol. 49, No. 2, 1995.

Miller, Lyman and Liu Xiaohong, 'The Foreign Policy Outlook of China's "Third Generation" Elite,' in David M. Lampton, ed., *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000,* Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2001.

Miller, Lyman, 'The Late Imperial Chinese State,' in Shambaugh, David, ed., *The Modern Chinese State,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000.

Milliken, Jennifer, 'The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods,' *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1999.

Mitter, Rana, 'An Uneasy Engagement: Chinese Ideas of Global Order and Justice in Historical Perspective,' in Rosemary Foot, John Lewis Gaddis, Andrew Hurrell, eds., *Order and Justice in International Relations,* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004.

Mitter, Rana, *A Bitter Revolution: China's Struggle with the Modern World,* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005.

Mitzen, Jennifer, 'Ontological Security in World Politics: State identity and the Security Dilemma,' *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2006.

Morrison, Wayne, 'China and the Global Financial Crisis: Implications for the United States,' *Congressional Service Report for Congress*, 3 June 2009.

Mufson, Steven and Dana Milbank, 'Taiwan to Get Variety of Arms,' *Washington Post*, 24 April 2001.

Nathan, Andrew, 'Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Policy,' *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 139, 1994.

Nau, Henry R., *At Home Abroad: Identity and Power in American Foreign Policy*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2002.

Negroponte, John, 'US-China Relations in the Era of Globalisation,' *Opening Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, 15 May 2008, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.

Ness, Peter Van, 'China as a Third World State: Foreign Policy and Official National Identity,' in Lowell Dittmer and Samuel Kim, eds., *China's Quest for National Identity,* Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1993.

Ness, Peter Van, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation,* University of California Press, Berkeley, 1970.

Ng-Quinn, Michael, 'National Identity in Premodern China: Formation and Role Enactment,' in Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, eds., *China's Quest for National Identity,* Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1993.

Nolan, Cathal J., 'Introduction,' in Cathal J. Nolan, ed., *Power and Responsibility in World Affairs: Reformation versus Transformation,* Praeger Publishers, Westport, 2004.

Nolan, Cathal J., 'The Evolution of Great Power Rights and Responsibilities,' in Cathal J. Nolan, ed., *Power and Responsibility in World Affairs: Reformation versus Transformation*, Praeger Publishers, Westport, 2004.

Nye, Joseph S., 'We Can't Afford to Lose China Again,' *Los Angeles Times*, 29 December 1996.

Nye, Joseph S., 'The "Nye Report": Six Years Later,' *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 1, 2001.

Ogunsanwo, Alaba, *China's Policy in Africa 1958-1971,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1974.

Ong, Siew Chey, *China Condensed: 5000 Years of History & Culture,* Marshall Cavendish International, Singapore, 2005.

Oros, Andrew, *Normalising Japan: Politics, Identity and the Evolution of Security Practice*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2008.

Overholt, William, 'China in the Global Financial Crisis: Rising Influence, Rising Challenges,' *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 1, 2010.

Paulson, Henry, 'China and the Global Economy,' *Remarks to the National Committee on US-China Relations*, 21 October 2008, http://china.usc.edu/.

Paulson, Henry, 'Growth and Future of China's Financial Markets,' *Prepared Remarks*, 7 March 2007, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.

Paulson, Henry, *Statement from Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson at the Closing of the US-China Strategic Economic Dialogue*, 15 December 2006, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.

Pei, Minxin, 'China's Governance Crisis,' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, September/October 2002.

People's Daily Editorial, 22 July 1954 in *People's China*, Vol. 15, 1954.

People's Daily, 'Beware [of] Extolling China to Danger with World-Level Responsibilities",' 17 August 2010, http://english.people.com.cn/9000190776/90883/7107682.html.

Percy, Sarah, *Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International Relations*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.

Petrov, Vladimir, 'China Goes It Alone,' *Asian Survey*, Vol. 23, No. 5, 1983.

Pogge, Thomas W., *World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reform,* Polity Press, Cambridge, 2002.

Pollack, Jonathan D., 'China and the Global Strategic Balance,' in Harry Harding, ed., *China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1984.

Pollack, Jonathan D., 'Chinese Attitudes Towards Nuclear Weapons, 1964-9,' *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 50, 1972.

Pomfret, John, 'US Sells Weapons to Taiwan, Angering China,' *The Washington Post*, 30 January 2010.

Powell, Colin, *Remarks at Conference on China-US Relations*, 5 November 2003, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.

Powell, Colin, *Remarks at the Elliot School of International Affairs*, 5 September 2003, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.

PRC Ministry of Commerce, 'IMF Hails China's Policy Response in Financial Crisis,' *News Release of the PRC Ministry of Commerce*, http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/.

President Clinton's Remarks to the United States Institute of Peace, 7 April 1999, http://www.gpo.gov/.

Price, Don, *Russia and the Roots of the Chinese Revolution,* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1974.

Price, Richard, 'A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo,' *International Organisation*, Vol. 49, No. 1, 1995.

Putnam, Robert D., 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,' *International Organisation*, Vol. 42, 1988.

Qian, Qichen, *Speech by Mr Qian Qichen, State Councillor and Foreign Minister, at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament and Security Issues in the Asia-Pacific Region*, 17 August 1992, http//www.nti.org/.

Qian, Qichen, *Speech by Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen at Luncheon hosted by Chicago Council on Foreign Relations*, 20 September 1996, http://www.nti.org/.

Qian, Qichen, *Statement by H.E. Mr Qian Qichen, Vice Premier and Foreign Minister and Head of Delegation of the People's Republic of China at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,* 18 April 1995, http//www.nti.org/.

Qin, Xiaoying, 'China's Path to World Peace and Prosperity,' *China Daily*, 30 October 2007.

Qin, Yaqing, 'International Society as a Process: Institutions, Identities and China's Peaceful Rise,' *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 3, 2010.

Quirk, Joel, 'Historical Methods,' in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008.

Ramo, Joshua Cooper, *The Beijing Consensus,* The Foreign Policy Centre, London, 2004.

Rice, Condoleezza, 'Promoting the National Interest,' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 79, January/February 2000.

Risse-Kappen, Thomas, 'Democratic Peace-Warlike Democracies,' *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1995.

Risse-Kappen, Thomas, *Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on US Foreign Policy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995.

Ross, Robert 'China Learns to Compromise: Change in US-China Relations, 1982-1984,' *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 123, 1991.

Rozman, Gilbert, 'China's Quest for Great Power Identity,' *Orbis*, Vol. 43, No. 3, Summer 1999.

Ruggie, John Gerard, Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane and Philippe C. Schmitter, 'Transformations in World Politics: The Intellectual Contributions of Ernst B. Haas,' *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 8, 2005.

Schaller, Michael, *The US Crusade in China, 1938-1945*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1979.

Schriver, Randall, 'China and the WTO: Compliance and Monitoring,' *Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Commission*, 5 February 2004, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.

Shambaugh, David, 'China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,' *International Security*, Vol. 29, No. 3, Winter 2004/2005.

Shambaugh, David, 'China's International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structures and Process,' *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 171, 2002.

Shear, David, 'China: Recent Security Developments,' *Statement before the House Armed Services Committee*, 13 January 2010, http://www.state.gov/.

Shen, Simon and Mong Chueng, 'Reshaping Nationalism: Chinese Intellectual Response Towards Sino-American and Sino-Japanese Relations in the Twenty-First Century,' *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 20, No. 4, 2007.

Shichor, Yitzhak, 'China and the Role of the United Nations in the Middle East,' *Asian Survey*, Vol. 31, No. 3, 1991.

Shirk, Susan, *China: Fragile Superpower,* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008.

Simpson, Gerry, *Great Powers and Outlaw State: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004.

Smith, Anthony, 'National Identity and the Idea of European Identity,' *International Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 1, 1992.

Sohn, Injoo, 'Learning to Cooperate: China's Multilateral Approach to Asian Financial Cooperation,' *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 194, 2008.

Spence, Jonathan D., *The Search for Modern China,* W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1999.

Steinberg, James, 'Administration's Vision of the US-China Relationship,' *Keynote Address at the Centre for a New American Security*, 24 September 2009, http://www.state.gov/.

Steinberg, James, 'US-China Cooperation on Global Issues,' *Remarks at the Brookings Institution*, 11 May 2010, http://www.state.gov/.

Stewart, Patrick, 'Irresponsible Stakeholders? The Difficulty of Integrating Rising Powers,' *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 89, No. 6, November/December 2010.

Sun, Lena H., 'China to Halt Arms Sales to Iraqis,' *Washington Post*, 6 August 1990.

Suzuki, Shogo, 'China's Quest for Great Power Status: The Social Mechanisms of Delinquent Gang Formation,' *Center of International Politics Working Paper Series, University of Manchester*, Vol. 29, March 2007.

Suzuki, Shogo, 'Seeking "Legitimate" Great Power Status in Post-Cold War International Society: China's and Japan's Participation in UNPKO,' *International Relations*, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2008.

Suzuki, Shogo, 'The Importance of "Othering" in China's National Identity: Sino-Japanese Relations as a Stage of Identity Conflicts,' *The Pacific Review,* Vol. 20, No.1, 2007.

The Straits Times, 'China's Roars Grow Louder,' 18 March 2010.

The Washington Post, 'Not So Obvious,' *Editorial*, 24 February 2009.

Tong, Sarah and Zhang Yang, 'China's Responses to the Economic Crisis,' *East Asia Institute Background Brief,* No. 438, March 2009.

Transcript of News Conference by President Obama, 14 November 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/.

Transcript of President Bush's Meeting with Chinese President Jiang Zemin, 21 February 2002, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.

Transcript of President Clinton and President Jiang Zemin's News Conference in Beijing, 27 June 1998, http://china.usc.edu/ShowArticle.aspx?articleID=739.

Transcript of President Clinton's Beijing University Speech, 29 June 1998, http://china.usc.edu/ShowArticle.aspx?articleID=514739.

Transcript of Remarks at Arrival Ceremony: President Bush and Premier Wen Jiabao, 9 December 2003, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.

Transcript of Remarks at the Press Conference with President Obama and President Hu of the People's Republic of China, 19 January 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/.

Transcript of Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Gillard of Australia in Joint Press Conference, 16 November 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/.

Transcript of Remarks with Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing after their Meeting, 30 September 2004, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.

Transcript of Secretary of State Colin Powell's Interview on CCTV, 28 July 2001, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.

Transcript of the Press Conference by President Clinton and President Jiang Zemin, 29 October 1997, http://china.usc.edu/ShowArticle.aspx?articleID=750/.

Transcript of the Remarks by President Bush and President Jiang Zemin in Press Availability, 19 October 2001, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.

Tsushima, Teresa and Peter J. Burke, 'Levels, Agency, and Control in the Parent Identity,' *Social Psychology Quarterly*, Vol. 62, No. 2, 1999.

United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report*, 2010, http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/.

US Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Report,* 2006.

Vucetic, Srdjan, *The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of a Racialised Identity in International Relations,* Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2011.

Walker, William, 'Nuclear Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment,' *International Affairs*, Vol.83, No.3, May 2007.

Wallerstein, Immanuel, *The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origin of the European World Economy in the 16th Century,* Academic Press, London, 1974.

Waltz, Kenneth, *Theory of International Politics,* McGraw-Hill, New York, 1979.

Wang, Gungwu, 'Power, Rights and Duties in Chinese History,' *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, Vol. 3, 1980.

Wang, Gungwu, *China and the World since 1949: The Impact of Independence, Modernity and Revolution,* Macmillan, London, 1977.

Wang, Hongying, 'A Responsible Great Power? China's International Image Management in the 1990s,' *East Asia Institute Working Paper*, No. 44, July 2000.

Wang, Hongying, 'Linking Up with the International Track: What's in a Slogan,' *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 189, 2007.

Wang, Hongying, 'National Image Building and Chinese Foreign Policy,' *China: An International Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 5, 2003.

Wang, Jianwei, 'China's Multilateral Diplomacy in the New Millennium,' in Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang, eds., *China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy,* Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 2005.

Wang, Jisi, 'Building a Constructive Relationship,' in Morton Abramowitz, Funabashi Yochi, and Wang Jisi, *China-Japan-US: Managing the Trilateral Relationship,* Japan Center for International Exchange, Tokyo, 1998.

Wei, Liang, 'China's WTO Negotiation Process and its Implications,' *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2002.

Wight, Martin, *Power Politics*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1979.

Weldes, Jutta, 'Constructing National Interests,' *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1996.

Wong, Edward, 'Beijing Warns US about South China Sea Disputes,' *The New York Times*, 22 June 2011.

Woon, Eden Y., 'Chinese Arms Sales and US-China Military Relations,' *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXIX, No. 6, 1989.

Wu, Guoguang, 'Identity, Sovereignty and Economic Penetration: Beijing's Responses to Offshore Chinese Democracies,' *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 16, No. 51, May 2007.

Wu, Xinbo, 'Forging Sino-US Partnership in the Twenty-First Century: Opportunities and Challenges,' *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 12, No. 75, 2012.

Xia, Liping, 'China: A Responsible Great Power,' *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 10, No. 25, 2001.

Xiang, Lanxin, 'Washington's Misguided China Policy,' *Survival*, Vol. 43, No. 3, 2001.

Yahuda, Michael, 'China's Foreign Relations: The Long March, Future Uncertain,' *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 159, 1999.

Yahuda, Michael, 'Deng Xiaoping: The Statesman,' *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 135, 1993.

Yahuda, Michael, *China's Role in World Affairs,* Croom Helm, London, 1978.

Yahuda, Michael, *The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific,* Third Edition, Routledge, Abingdon, 2011.

Yahuda, Michael, *Towards the End of Isolationism: China's Foreign Policy after Mao,* Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1983.

Yan, Xuetong, 'The Rise of China and its Power Status,' *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 1, 2006.

Yan, Xuetong, 'The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes,' *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 10, No. 26, 2001.

Yan, Xuetong, 'How Assertive Should a Great Power Be?' *The New York Times*, 21 March 2011.

Yi, Xiaoxiong, 'China's US Policy Conundrum in the 1980s: Balancing Autonomy and Interdependence,' *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXIV, No. 8, 1994.

Yu, Zhang, 'Chinese Nationalism and the 2001 US Spy Plane Incident,' *International Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 1, 2005.

Zhang, Tiejun, 'Self-Identity Construction of the Present China,' *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 23, 2004.

Zhang, Yongjin and Barry Buzan, 'The Tributary System as International Society in Theory and Practice,' *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 5, 2012.

Zhang, Yongjin and Greg Austin, eds., *Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy*, Asia Pacific Press, Canberra, 2001.

Zhang, Yongjin, 'China and UN Peacekeeping: From Condemnation to Participation,' *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1996.

Zhang, Yongjin, 'Politics, Culture, and Scholarly Responsibility in China: Toward a Cultural Sensitive Analytical Approach,' *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2007.

Zhang, Yongjin, 'System, Empire and State in Chinese International Relations,' *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 27, 2001.

Zhang, Yongjin, *China in International Society since 1949: Alienation and Beyond,* Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1998.

Zhao, Suisheng, 'Chinese Intellectuals' Quest for National Greatness and Nationalistic Writing in the 1990s,' *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 152, 1997.

Zhao, Suisheng, 'Shaping the Regional Context of China's Rise: How the Obama Administration Brought back Hedge in its Engagement with China,' *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 21, No. 75, 2012.

Zhao, Suisheng, 'The China Model: Can it replace the Western Model of Modernisation?' *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 19, No. 65, 2010.

Zhao, Ziyang, 'The Objectives of China's Foreign Policy: For Lasting Peace, Increased Friendly Cooperation and Co-Prosperity,' *International Affairs*, Vol. 61, No. 4, 1995.

Zheng, Yongnian and Lye Liang Fook, 'The International Financial Crisis and China's External Response,' *East Asian Institute Background Brief*, No. 420, December 2008.

Zheng, Yongnian and Sow Keat Tok, ' "Harmonious Society" and "Harmonious World": China's Policy Discourse under Hu Jintao,' *China Policy Institute Briefing Series*, No. 26, 2007.

Zheng, Yongnian, *Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernisation, Identity and International Relations,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999.

Zi, Zhongyun, 'The Impact and Clash of Ideologies: Sino-US Relations from a Historical Perspective,' *The Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 6, No. 16, 1997.

Zoellick, Robert B., 'Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?' *Remarks to the National Committee on US-China Relations*, New York, 21 September 2005, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.

Zoellick, Robert B., *Deputy Secretary Zoellick Statement on Conclusion of the Second US-China Senior Dialogue*, 8 December 2005, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.

Zoellick, Robert B., *Press Conference in China*, 24 January 2006, http://2001-2009.state.gov/.

Chinese Language Sources

Cai, Tuo, 'Tansuo Zhong De "Zhongguo Moshi"' [The Evolving "China Model"], *Dandai Shijie Yu Shehui Zhuyi [Contemporary World and Socialism]*, Vol. 5, 2005.

Chen, Feng, 'Luelun Guoji Yicun' [A Brief Discussion of International Mutual Dependence], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics]*, Vol. 2, 1987.

Chen, Fengjun, 'Jinrong Weiji Hou Yatai Geju De Bianhua' [The Changes in Asia-Pacific Regional Structure after the Asian Financial Crisis], *Guoji Zhengzhi Yanjiu [International Politics Quarterly]*, Vol. 2, 1999.

Chen, Hongbin, 'Zhongguo Zheng Zai Chengwei Fuzheren De Daguo' [China is Becoming a Responsible Great Power], *Baike Zhishi [Encyclopaedic Knowledge]*, Vol. 2, 1999.

Chen, Yingchun, 'Yantao Hui Jianxun: "Quanqiu Jinrong Weiji, Guoji Yingxiang Jiqi Duice"' [Executive Summary of Conference on "The Global Financial Crisis: International Impact and Countermeasures"], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economy and Politics]*, Vol. 12, 2008.

Chu, Shulong and Wang Zaibang, 'Guanyu Guoji Xingshi He Wo Duiwai Zhanlue Ruogan Zhong Da Wenti De Sikao' [Reflections on the International Situation and Important Questions of China's Foreign Strategy], *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations]*, Vol. 8, 1999.

Deng, Xiaoping, 'Heping He Fazhan Shi Dangdai Shijie De Liangda Wenti' [Peace and Development are the Two Main Issues in the World Today], in *Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan Disanjuan* [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume III], Renmin Chubanshe, Beijing, 1993.

Deng, Xiaoping, 'Liyong Waiguo Zhili He Kuoda Duiwai Kaifang' [Use Foreign Intellectual Resources and Open Wider to the Outside World], in

Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan Disanjuan [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume III], Renmin Chubanshe, Beijing, 1993.

Deng, Xiaoping, 'Shanyu Liyong Shiji Jiejue Fazhan Wenti' [Be Adept at Using the Time to Solve our Development Question], in *Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan Disanjuan [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume III]*, Renmin Chubanshe, Beijing, 1993.

Deng, Xiaoping, 'Shixing Kaifang Zhengce, Xuexi Shijie Xianjin Kexue Jishu' [Adopt Open Policy and Learn from the World's Advanced Science and Technology], in *Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan Dierjuan [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume II],* Renmin Chubanshe, Beijing, 1993.

Deng, Xiaoping, 'Weihu Shijie Heping, Gaohao Guonei Jianshe' [Safeguard World Peace and Ensure Domestic Development], in *Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan Disanjuan [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume III],* Renmin Chubanshe, Beijing, 1993.

Deng, Xiaoping, 'Zhenxing Zhongguo Mingzhu' [Rejuvenate the Chinese Nation], in *Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan Disanjuan [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume III]*, Renmin Chubanshe, Beijing, 1993.

Editor, 'Fazhan Jingji, Zengqiang Guoli' [Develop Economy, Strengthen National Power], *Liaowang [Outlook]*, Vol. 20, 1999.

Editor, 'Guowuyuan Zongli Zhu Rongji Da Jizhe Wen' [Interview with Premier Zhu Rongji], *Renda Gongzuo Tongxun [Work Report of the People's Congress of China],* 1999.

Editor, 'Jinrong Weiji Yinfa De Huati' [Topics Raised by the Financial Crisis], *Shijie Zhishi [World Affairs]*, Vol. 1, 1999.

Editor, 'Jiu Beiyue Daotan Longji Wo Zhunan Dashi Guan Shijian, Tang Jiaxuan Waizhang Zaici Xiang Meifang Tichu Yanzheng Jiaoshe Bingdi Jiao Zhengshi Zhaohui' [Concerning the Incident on NATO's Attack on the PRC Belgrade Embassy, Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan Again Lodges Solemn Representations with the United States], *Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Guowu Yuan Gongbao [Gazette of the State Council of the People's Republic of China]*, No. 19, 1999.

Editor, 'Long Yongtu Shuo: Zhongguo Jiang Chengwei Buchengba, Heping, Fuzeren De Daguo' [Long Yongtu Says: China Will Become a Non-Hegemonic, Peaceful and Responsible Great Power], *Shenzhou [Divineland]*, Vol. 6, 2004.

Editor, 'Meiguo You Biyao Shenke Fansi' [America Needs to Have a Profound Self-Review], *Shijie Zhishi [World Affairs]*, Vol. 9, 2001.

Editor, 'Waikan Lun Zuolike Dui Meizhong Guanxi De Xin Dingwei: Liyi Xiangguan Zhe' [Discussing Zoellick's New Positioning of Sino-American Relations: Stakeholder], *Guoji Zhanwang [Global Review]*, Vol. 2, 2006.

Editor, 'Zaikan Zuolike 9.21 Yanjiang' [A Look Again at Zoellick's 21 September Speech], *Guoji Zhanwang [Global Review],* Vol. 2, 2006.

Editor, 'Zhongguo De Ruanshili Zhiyuan' [The Sources of China's Soft Power], *Dangzheng Luntan [Party and Government Forum]*, Vol. 2, 2007.

Editor, 'Nuhou De Zhongguo' [China Roars], *Liaowang [Outlook]*, Vol. 20, 1999.

Fan, Li, 'Mao Zedong Zaoqi Wengao Zhong de Zeren Shiyi' [The Explication of Responsibility in Mao Zedong's Early Manuscripts], *Dali Zueyuan Xuewan Pao [Journal of Dali College]*, Vol. 2, November 2003.

Fang, Ning, 'Luohou Aida Suixian' [Backwardness Begets Beatings: Some Thoughts], *Dangjian Yanjiu [Party Construction]*, Vol. 9, 1999.

Fu, Mongzi, Yuan Peng, Da Wei, Guo Yongjun, Niu Xinchun and Zhu Wenfeng, 'Zhanlue Duihua Yu Zhongmei Guanxi' [Strategic Dialogue and Sino-American Relations], *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations]*, Vol. 8, 2005.

Fu, Xin, 'Quanqiuhua Shidai De Guojia Xingxiang: Jiandui Zhongguo Mouqiu Heping Fazhan De Sikao' [A Nation's Image in the Age of Globalisation: Reflecting on China's Pursuit of Peaceful Development], *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies]*, Vol. 4, 2004.

Fudan University Reporter, 'Zhidu Gonggei Yu Daguo Jueqi: Zhongguo De Shimin' [Order Co-Contributor and the Rise of a Great Power: China's Destiny] in *Dongtai Yu Zhengce Pinglun [Trends and Policy Review]*, No. 14, 2011.

Gu, Ji, 'Renquan Weishi De Fan Renlei Baoxing' [The Violent, Anti-humanity Actions of the Human Rights Defender], *Guoji Zhanwang [Global Review]*, Vol. 9, 1999.

Guan, Li, *Ruhe Yu Meiguo Gongchu: Lengzhan Hou Zhongguo Dui Meifangzhen Yu Zhongmei Guanxi [How to Coexist with America: China's US Diplomatic Guideline and Sino-American Relations after the Cold War]*, Jiuzhou Press, Beijing, 2010.

Guest Commentator, 'Zai Kaoyan He Tiaozheng Zhong Fazhan de Guoji Xingshi' [International Situation in Tests and Readjustment], *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations]*, Vol. 12, 1999.

Guo, Xuetang, 'Baquan Zhouqi Lun De Pinkun—Jianxi Meiguo Baquan Shifou Zou Xiang Shuailuo' [Poverty of the Theory of Hegemonic Cycle—An Analysis of Whether American Hegemony is Going Downhill], *Meiguo Yanjiu [American Studies]*, Vol. 3, 2003.

Han, Zhaoying and Wang Shishan, 'Meiguo De Yatai Zai Pingheng Zhanlue Jiqi Fumian Yingxiang' [On the US Asia-Pacific Rebalancing Strategy and its Negative Impacts], *Xueshu Qianyan [Academic Frontiers]*, Vol. 12, 2012.

Han, Zhongkun, 'Zhongguo Bushi Yibajiujiu' [This is not 1899 China], *Renmin Ribao [People's Daily]*, 12 May 1999.

He, Hongze, 'Zai Meiguo Waijiao Zhengce Xiehui Shang Qian Qichen Tan Zhongmei Guanxi Zhichu: Shuangfang Yingben Zhe Huxiang Zunzhong, Pingdeng Xiangdai, Xinshou Nuoyan, Zunshou Xiehui De Jingshen Chuli Liangguo Guanxi' [Foreign Minister Qian Qichen Discusses Sino-American Relations at the US Foreign Policy Association Meeting: Both Sides Should Adopt the Spirit of Mutual Respect, Mutual Equality, Keeping Promises and Respecting Agreements to Handle Bilateral Relations], *Renmin Ribao[People's Daily]*, 24 September 1992.

Hu, Jian, 'Miandui Jinrong Weiji, Zhongguo Buhui Gean Guanhuo' [Facing the Financial Crisis, China Will Not Watch from the Sidelines], *Shehui Guancha [Social Outlook]*, Vol. 12, 2008.

Huan, Xiang, 'Dui Shijie Xingshi Fazhan Qushi De Fenxi Ji Junwei Tichu Zhuanru "Heping Shiqi" Zhanlue Juece De Lilun Yiju' [An Analysis of the Development Trends in the World Situation and the Theoretical Basis of the Central Military Commission's Strategic Policy Regarding the Shift to the "Period of Peace"], in *Huan Xiang Wenji [Collected Works of Huan Xiang],* Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, Beijing, 1994.

Huang, Shuofeng, *Zonghe Guoli Lun [Discussing Comprehensive National Power],* Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, Beijing, 1992.

Huanqiu Shibao [Global Times], 'G20: Zhongguo Chengwei Fuzeren Daguo De "Yuke Ban"' [G20: The "Preparatory Class" for China as a Responsible Great Power], 23 June 2010.

Jiang, Jinquan, 'Jiexi "Zhongguo Moshi"' [Understanding the "China Model"], *Liaowang [Outlook]*, No. 25, 2005.

Jiang, Zemin, 'Gongtong Chuangzao Yike Heping Fanrong de Xin Shiji' [Jointly Construct a Peaceful and Prosperous New Century], in *Jiang Zemin Wenxuan Disanjuan [Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Vol. 3]*, Renmin Chubanshe, Beijing, 2006.

Jiang, Zemin, 'Rang Women Gongtong Dizao Yike Geng Meihao De Shijie' [Let Us Jointly Create a Better World], in *Jiang Zemin Wenxuan Diyijuan [Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Vol. 1]*, Renmin Chubanshe, Beijing, 2006.

Jiang, Zemin, 'Yingzao Youli Zhanlue Taishi, Zengqiang Guojia Zhanlue Nengli' [Create a Favourable Strategic Situation, Enhance National Strategic Capability] in *Jiang Zemin Wenxuan Dierjuan [Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Vol. II]*, Renmin Chubanshe, Beijing, 2006.

Jiang, Zemin, 'Zai Baigong Huanying Yishi Shang De Jianghua' [Speech at White House Welcome Ceremony] in *Jiang Zemin Wenxuan Dierjuan [Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Vol. II]*, Renmin Chubanshe, Beijing, 2006.

Jiang, Zemin, 'Zai Huanying Woguo Zhunan Sila Fulian Meng Gongheguo Gongzuo Renyuan Da Hui Shang De Jianghua' [Speech at Ceremony to Welcome Staff of the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia], *Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Guowu Yuan Gongbao [Gazette of the State Council of the People's Republic of China]*, No. 19, 1999.

Jiang, Zemin, 'Zengjin Xianghu Liaojie, Jiaqiang Youhao Hezhuo' [Enhance Mutual Understanding, Strengthen Friendly Cooperation] in *Jiang Zemin Wenxuan Dierjuan [Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Vol. II]*, Renmin Chubanshe, Beijing, 2006.

Jin, Canrong, 'Geng Duo De "Jianshe Xing": Ping Jiang Zhuxi Fangmei Yilai De Zhongmei Guanxi' [More "Constructiveness": Appraising Sino-American Relations since Chairman Jiang's Visit to the US], *Dangdai Yatai [Contemporary Asia-Pacific]*, Vol. 6, 1998.

Jin, Canrong, 'Yingxiang Zhongguo Guoji Huanjing De Lianglei Xin Yinsu Pinggu' [Assessing the Two New Factors Affecting China's International Environment], *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations]*, Vol. 11, 2002.

Jin, Canrong, *Daguo De Zeren [Big Power's Responsibility]*, Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe, Beijing, 2011.

Jin, Xiaochuan, 'Lun Xinjiu Guoji Zhixu Zhuanhuan Zhong De Zhongguo Guoji Jiaoshe' [Discussing China's International Role during the Change from Old to New International Order], *Xueshu Luntan [Learning Forum]*, Vol. 6, 1996.

Kui, Song and Niu Xinjun, 'Zai Tansuo Hezuo Fazhan De Zhongmei Guanxi' [Probing Developing Sino-American Relations amidst Cooperation], *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations]*, Vol. 12, 1999.

Li, Baojun and Xu Zhengyuan, 'Lengzhan Hou Zhongguo Fuzeren Daguo Shenfen De Jiangou' [China's Self-Identity Construction as a Responsible Power in the Post-Cold War Era], *Jiaoxue Yu Yanjiu [Teaching and Research]*, Vol. 1, 2006.

Li, Benyi, 'Sun Zhongshan Dui Huanghuo Lun De Pipan Jiqi Shijie Zeren Guan' [Sun Yatsen's Criticism of the Yellow Peril Theory and His World Responsibility Outlook], *Hubei Daxue Xuepao Zhexue Shehui Kezue Ban [Journal of Hubei University: Philosophy and Social Sciences]*, Vol. 32, No. 5, September 2005.

Li, Jie, 'Cong Jinrong Weiji Toushi Guoji Tixi Zhuanxing Dongxiang' [Trends of the International System Transition from the Perspective of the Financial Crisis], *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies]*, Vol. 3, 2009.

Li, Jie, 'Cong Zeren Lun Toushi Guoji Tixi Zhuanxing' [Viewing the Transformation of the International System from the Perspective of the Responsibility Theory], *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies]*, Vol. 1, 2008.

Li, Peng, 'Cong "Zhanlue Jingzheng Zhe" Dao "Liyi Xiangguan Zhe": Meiguo Dui Hua Zhanlue Dingwei Zhuanbian Yu Taiwan Wenti' [From "Strategic Competitor" to "Stakeholder": The Change in US's Strategic Positioning of China and the Taiwan Problem], *Taiwan Yanjiu Jikan [Taiwan Research Quarterly]*, Vol. 1, 2006.

Li, Xiufang and Yu Haixia, 'Sun Zhongshan De Zhongxi Wenhua Guan' [Sun Yatsen's Outlook on Chinese and Western Culture], *Xian Jiaotong Daxue Xuepao Shehui Keixue Ban [Journal of Xian Jiaotong University: Social Sciences]*, Vol. 26, July 2006.

Li, Zhiye, 'Daguo Guanxi Chubu Daowei, Liang Xing Hudong Shijian Chengxiao' [Preliminary Positioning of Great Power Relations, Benign Interactions Start to Show Results], *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations]*, Vol. 12, 1999.

Liang, Guodong, 'Zhongguo Waijiao De Huimou Yu Zhanwang: Fang Waijiao Buzhang Yang Jiechi' [Looking Back and Ahead at China's Diplomacy: Interviewing Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi], *Zhongguo Renda Zazhi [National People's Congress of China Magazine]*, Vol. 5, 2010.

Lianhe Zaobao [Zaobao Daily], Zhongguo He Meiguo Jianli Xianshi zhuyi Xin Guanxi' [China and US Establish Doctrine of Realism, New Relations], 5 November 1997.

Lin, Fengchun, 'Fuxi? Huoxi? "Zhongguo Fuzeren Lun" Jiedu' [Fortune? Misfortune? Interpreting the "China Responsibility Theory"], *Shehui Guancha [Social Outlook]*, Vol. 4, 2006.

Lin, Liming, 'Yigong Weishou: Meiguo "Zhanlue Dongyi" De Zhanlue Benzhi Pingxi' [Defense through Attack: Assessing the Basic Character of the US "Strategic Turn" Towards the East], *Dangdai Shijie [Contemporary World]*, Vol. 9, 2012.

Liu, Bo, 'Meiguo Zhanlue Dongyi De Xingdong Tedian' [The Characteristics of the American Strategic Action to Turn Towards the East], *Guoji Guanxi Xueyuan Xuebao [Journal of the University of International Relations]*, Vol. 5, 2012.

Liu, Jianfei, 'Heping Jueqi Shi Zhongguo De Zhanlue Xuanze' [Peaceful Rise is China's Strategic Choice], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics]*, Vol. 2, 2006.

Liu, Jianfei, ' "Zhongguo Zeren Lun" Kaoyan Heping Fazhan' ["China Responsibility Theory" a Test of Peacefu Development], *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations]*, Vol. 4, 2007.

Liu, Jinzhi, 'Shiping Xiao Bushi De Tiguo Waijiao' [Appraising Junior Bush's Diplomacy of Imperialism], *Guoji Zhengzhi Yanjiu [International Studies Quarterly]*, Vol. 4, 2004.

Liu, Ming, 'Zhongguo Guoji Zeren Lun Pingxi' [Appraising the China International Responsibility Theory], *Mao Zedong Deng Xiaoping Lilun Yanjiu [Studies on Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping Theories]*, Vol. 1, 2008.

Liu, Rui and Xu Yiming, 'Jinrong Weiji Zhihou Zhongguo Dui G20 Yingdang Chiyou De Jiben Lichang' [China's Basic Position on the G20 after the Financial Crisis], *Shehui Kexue Yanjiu [Social Sciences Research]*, Vol. 2, 2010.

Liu, Wanai, 'Meiguo Zhongxin Dingwei Zhongguo: Liyi Xiangguan Zhe' [America Re-Positions China: Stakeholder], *Zhongguo Xinwen Zhoukan [China Newsweek]*, November 2005.

Luo, Jianbo, 'Ruan Shili Yu Zhongguo Waijia' [Soft Power and China's Diplomacy], *Xin Yuanjian [New Thinking]*, Vol. 5, 2008.

Ma, Zhaoxu, 'Waijiao Bu Fayanren Ma Chaoxu Jiu Aobama Huijian Dalai Fabiao Tanhua' [Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ma Zhaoxu Comments on Obama-Dalai Meeting], *Xinhua*, 19 February 2010.

Ma, Zhengang, 'Xifang Xuanran "Zhongguo Moshi" Zhi Beihou' [On the West's Play Up of the "China Model"], *Renmin Luntan [People's Tribune]*, No. 240, 2008.

Ma, Zhengang, 'Zhongguo De Zeren Yu "Zhongguo Zeren Lun"' [China's Responsibility and the "China Responsibility Theory"], *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies]*, Vol. 3, 2007.

Men, Honghua and Huang Haili, 'Yingdui Guojia Shibai De Bujiu Cuoshi: Jianlun Zhongmei Anquan Hezuo De Zhanlue Xing' [Remedial Measures for Failed States: A Strategic Dimension of Sino-American Security Cooperation], *Meiguo Yanjiu [American Studies]*, Vol. 1, 2004.

Men, Honghua, 'Zhongguo Ruan Shili Pinggu Baogao' [Assessment Report on China's Soft Power], *Guoji Guancha [International Review]*, Vol. 3, 2007.

Mingge Zhongyang [People's Revolution Central] 'Sun Zhongshan De Xueshuo Shi Weixin Lun? Sun Zhongshan Zou De Shi Ziben Zhuyi' [Are Sun Yatsen's Words Idealism? Is Sun Yatsen Walking the Path of Capitalism?],2008, http://www.minge.gov.cn/.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China 'Jia Qinglin Huijian Yuenan Guojia Zhuxi Chen Deliang' [Jia Qinglin Meets Vietnam's President Tran Duc Luong], 23 March 2006,http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/gjhdq/gj/yz/1206_45/xgxw/t241881.htm/.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China, 'Xi Jinping Huijian Laowo Renmin Gemindang Zhongyang Zong Shuji, Guojia Zhuxi Zhumali' [Xi Jinping Meets the General Secretary of the Lao's People Revolutionary Party and Laos President Choummaly], 16 June 2010, http://www.mfa.gov.cn/chn/gxh/tyb/zyxw/t709247.htm/.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China, 'Zhuchaoxian Dashi Liu Hongcai Juxing Qingzhu Jiandang Jiushi Nian Zhaodaihui' [Ambassador to Korea Liu Hongcai Hosts 90th Anniversary Celebration of CCP's Founding], 30 June 2011,http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/gjhdq/gj/yz/1206_7/1206x2/t835593.htm/.

Ni, Shixiong and Zhuang Jianzhong, 'Bushi Zhengfu Dui Hua Xin Zhanlue Yu Zhongguo Dui Mei Xin Zhanlue Chushen' [Preliminary Inquiry of the Bush Government's New China Strategy and China's New America Policy], *Meiguo Yanjiu [American Studies]*, Vol. 0 , 2002.

Niu, Haibin, '"Zhongguo Zeren Lun" Xilun' [Examining the "China Responsibility Theory"], *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations]*, Vol. 3, 2007.

Pan, Rui, 'Xi Zhongmei Guanyu Zhongguo Jiaru Shimao Zuzhi Tanpan' [Analysing Sino-American Negotiations regarding China's WTO Entry], *Guoji Zhanwang [Global Review]*, Vol. 9, 1999.

Pan, Zhongqi, 'Zhongmei Guanxi de Zhanlue Jichu: Guoqu, Xianzai Yu Weilai' [The Strategic Foundations of US-China Relations: Past, Present and Future], *Guoji Guancha [International Observation]*, Vol. 3, 2002.

Pang, Zhongying, '"Shijie Daguo" Yu "Zhengchang Guojia": Lun "Zhengchang Guojia" Fanshi Yu Guojia De Shijie Guan Chongsu' ["Global Great Power" and "Normal Country": Discussing the Model of the "Normal Country" and the Remoulding of the Worldview], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics]*, Vol. 11, 2002.

Pang, Zhongying, 'Guoji Guanxi Zhong De Ruan Liliang Ji Qita' [Soft Strength and Others in International Relations], *Zhanlue Yu Guanli [Strategy and Management]*, Vol. 2, 1997.

Pu, Ping, 'Heping Fazhan Daolu Yu Hexie Shijie' [Peaceful Development Path and Harmonious World], *Jiaoxue Yu Yanjiue [Teaching and Research]*, Vol. 11, 2007.

Qi, Pengfei, *Zhongguo Gongchan Dang Yu Dangdai Zhongguo Waijiao, 1949-2009 [Chinese Communist Party and Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy, 1949-2009]*, Gongchan Dangshi Chubanshe, Beijing, 2010.

Qian, Qichen, *Waijiao Shiji [Ten Episodes in China's Diplomacy]*, Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, Beijing, 2003.

Qin, Yaqing, 'Guanjia Shenfen, Zhanlue Wenhua He Anquan Liyi: Guanyu Zhongguo Yu Guoji Shehui Guanxi De Sange Jianshe' [National Status, Strategic Culture and Security Interests: Three Hypotheses on China's Relations with International Society], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics]*, Vol. 1, 2003.

Qin, Yaqing, 'Guannian Tiaozheng Yu Daguo Hezuo' [Adjusting Perspective and Big Power Cooperation], *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations]*, Vol. 3, 2002.

Qin, Yaqing, 'Guoji Tixi De Yanxu Yu Biange' [Change and Continuity in the International System], *Waijiao Pinlun [Foreign Affairs Review]*, Vol. 1, 2010.

Qin, Yaqing, 'Shijie Gegu Yu Zhongguo De Heping Jueqi' [Global Structure and China's Peaceful Rise], *Dangjian [Party Construction]*, Vol. 5, 2004.

Qiu, Gengtian, 'Zhongguo Moshi Yu Di Daijia Fazhan Daolu' [The China Model and the Path of Low-Cost Development], *Zhonggong Zhongyang Dangxiao Xuebao [Journal of the Central Committee Party School]*, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2008.

Qu, Congwen, 'Fuzeren De Daguo Guan' [The Concept of the Responsible Great Power], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics]*, Vol. 10, 2002.

Renmin Ribao [People's Daily], 'Hu Jintao Jieshou Faguo Feijia Luobao Putaoya Lusashe Caifang' [Hu Jintao Interviewed by France's Le Figaro Daily and Portugal's Lusa News Agency], 04 November 2010.

Renmin Ribao [People's Daily], 'Nuli Jianshe Zhijiu Heping, Gongtong Fanrong De Hexie Shijie' [Build towards a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity], 16 September 2005.

Renmin Ribao [People's Daily], 'Waijiao Bu Fayanren Qiangdiao: Zhongguo Chukou Junpin Shou Sanyuanzhe' [Foreign Ministry Spokesman Stresses: China Adheres to the Three Principles of Arm Sales], 9 September 1988.

Renmin Ribao [People's Daily], 'Waijiao Fayanren Shuo: Zhongguo Zhishing Anlihui 661 Haojueyi Shi Renzhen De' [Foreign Affairs Spokesman: China's Implementation of Resolution 661 is Serious], 1 October 1990.

Rong, Dianxin, 'Dongya Jinrong Weiji Yu Zhongguo De Kaifang Zhengce' [The Asian Financial Crisis and China's Open Up Policy], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics]*, Vol. 7, 1998.

Shanghai Guoji Wenti Yanjiu Yuan 2010 Niandu Baogao [Shanghai Institutes for International Studies Annual Report], Shanghai Guoji Wenti Yanjiu Yuan, Shanghai, 2010.

Shao, Feng, 'Jinrong Weiji Dui Guoji Guanxi De Yingxiang Ji Zhongguo De Yingdui' [The Financial Crisis's Impact on International Relations and China's Response], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economy and Politics]* Vol. 12, 2008.

Shen, Jianing, 'APEC Shanghai Huiyi Yu Zhongguo De Guoji Xingxiang' [Shanghai APEC Conference and China's International Image], *Guoji Zhengzhi Yanjiu [International Politics Quarterly]*, Vol. 1, 2002.

Shen, Jiru, 'Fuzeren Daguo De Gongmin Xintai' [The National Mentality of a Responsible Great Power], *Zhanwang [Outlook Weekly]*, Vol. 2, 2004.

Sheng, Hong, 'Zong Minzhu Zhuyi Dao Tianxia Zhuyi' [From Nationalism to Tianxia-ism], *Zhanlue Yu Guanli [Strategy and Management]*, Vol. 1, 1996.

Shi, Yinhong, 'Chengjiu Yu Tiaozhan: Zhongguo Heping Fazhan, Hexie Shijie He Guoji Zeren' [Achievements and Challenges: China's Peaceful Development, Harmonious World and International Responsibility], *Dangdai Shijie Yu Shehui Zhuyi [Contemporary World and Socialism]*, Vol. 2, 2008.

Shi, Yongming, 'Yatai Anquan Huanjing Yu Diqu Duobian Zhuyi' [The Security Environment in Asia-Pacific and Regional Multilateralism], *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies]*, Vol. 1, 1996.

Shijie Zhishi Nianjian 1989/1990 [World Knowledge Yearbook 1989/1990], Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, Beijing, 1990.

Song, Hong, 'Fuzeren De Fazhan Daguo: Woguo Zai Shijie Maoyi Zuzhi Zhong De Diwei He Zuoyong' [The Responsible Developing Power: Our Nation's Position and Role in the World Trade Organisation], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics]*, Vol. 12, 2002.

Song, Qiang, Zhang Cangcang, Qiao Bian and Gu Qingsheng, *Zhongguo Keyi Shuobu [China Can Say No]*, Zhonghua Gongshang Lianhe Chubanshe, Beijing, 1996.

Song, Wei, 'Guoji Jinrong Weiji Yu Meiguo De Danji Diwei' [The International Financial Crisis and America's Unipolar Position], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economy and Politics]*, Vol. 5, 2010.

Song, Xiaojun, Wang Xiaodong, Wang Jisu, Song Qiang and Liu Yang, *Zhongguo Bu Gaoxing [China is Not Happy]*, Renmin Chubanshe, Jiangsu, 2009.

Song, Yimin, 'Meiguo Waijiao Zhengce De Xintiaozheng' [New Readjustments in US Foreign Policy], *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies]*, Vol. 3, 1995.

Sun, Jingxin, 'Jingji Lingyu Zhong De "Fuzeren Lun" Pouxi' [Dissecting the "China Responsibility Theory" on Economics], *Duiwai Chuanbo [International Communications]*, Vol. 10, 2010.

Sun, Yatsen, *Sanmin Zhuyi: Minzu Zhuyi Di Liujiang [Three Principles of the People: Sixth Lecture on Nationalism]*, 1924, http://www.gzmg.gov.cn/Article/szs/szswx/200811/25.html.

Sun, Yi, 'Deng Xiaoping Huijian Carlucci' [Deng Xiaoping Meets Carlucci], *Renmin Ribao[People's Daily]*, 8 September 1988.

Tang, Jiaxuan, 'Zhongguo Buke Qi, Zhongguo Renmin Buke Wu' [China Cannot be Bullied, Chinese People Cannot be Humiliated], *Shijie Zhishi [World Affairs]*, Vol. 11, 1999.

Tang, Yongsheng, 'Zhongguo Yu Lianheguo Weihe Xingdong' [China and United Nations Peacekeeping Operations], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics]*, Vol. 9, 2002.

Tao, Wenzhao and He Xiqiang, *Zhongmei Guanxi Shi [A History of China-US Relations]*, Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chuban She, Beijing, 2009.

Tao, Wenzhao, 'Zhongguo Moshi De Shijie Yingxiang' [The Global Influence of the China Model], *Renmin Luntan [People's Tribune]*, No. 21, 2008.

The Committee for Research on Comprehensive National Power Comparison, 'Zhongguo Guoji Diwei De Bianhua Fenxi' [An Analysis of Changes in China's International Position], *Taipingyang Xuebao [Pacific Journal]*, Vol. 1, 1995.

Wang, Cungang and Wang Ruoling, 'Lun Zhongguo Fuzeren Daguo Shengfen De Jiangou' [Discussing the Construction of China's Identity as a Responsible Great Power], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi Luntan [Forum on World Economics and Politics]*, Vol. 1, 2008.

Wang, Fuchun, 'Kesuowo Zhanzheng Yu Zhongguo De Waijiao Zhanlue' [The Kosovo War and China's Foreign Policy Strategy], *Guoji Zhengzhi Yanjiu [International Politics Quarterly]*, Vol. 4, 1999.

Wang, Haihan, 'Dui Dangqian Zhongmei Guanxi Jiqi Fazhan Qianjing De Jidian Kanfa' [Some Perspectives on Current Sino-American Relations and its Development Prospects], *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies]*, Vol. 4, 1998.

Wang, Huning, 'Zuowei Guojia Shili De Wenhua: Ruan Quanli' [Culture as National Strength: Soft Power], *Fudan Shehui Kexue Xuebao [Fudan Social Science Journal]*, Vol. 3, 1993.

Wang, Jian, 'Zhongdong Fankong Xingshi Ji Zhongguo De Zuoyong' [The Anti-terrorism Situation in the Middle East and China's Role], *Shijie Jingji Yanjiu [World Economy Research]*, Vol. 12, 2004.

Wang, Jisi and Qin Yaqing, eds. , *Zhongguo Xuezhe Kan Shijie – Guoji Zhixu Juan [Chinese Scholars View the World – Volume on International Order]* Xin Shijie Chubanshe, Beijing, 2007.

Wang, Lianhe, 'Meiguo Dui Huazhengce Xin Siwei? Ping Zuolike De Jianghua' [New Thinking for America's China Policy? Assessing Zoellick's Speech], *Guoji Guancha [International Review]*, Vol. 1, 2006.

Wang, Mongkui, 'Yazhou Jinrong Weiji Yu Zhongguo' [The Asian Financial Crisis and China], *Qiushi [Seeking Truth]*, No. 21, 1998.

Wang, Qishan, 'Wang Qishan: Zhongguo Zhengfu Jiangtong Geguo Yiqi Yingdui Jinrong Weiji' [Wang Qishan: Chinese Government Will Work Together with the World on Financial Crisis], *Zhongguo Jinrong Jia [China Financial Analyst]*, Vol. 10, 2008.

Wang, Yizhou, 'Gengjia "Daguohua" De Yinian' [Another Year of Increasing "Movement towards Great Power Affairs"], *Shijie Zhishi [World Affairs]*, Vol. 24, 1994.

Wang, Yizhou, 'Mianxiang 21 Shiji De Zhongguo Waijiao: Sanzhong Xuqiu De Xunzao Ji Pingheng' [Towards Chinese Diplomacy in the 21st Century: Pursuing and Balancing Three Needs], *Zhanlue Yu Guanli [Strategy and Management]*, Vol. 6, 1999.

Wang, Yizhou, 'Quanqiu Hua Guocheng Yu Zhongguo De Jiyu: Yazhou Jinrong Weiji Beijing Xia De Jidian Sikao' [Globalisation and China's Opportunities: Some Thoughts Amidst the Asian Financial Crisis], *Dangdai Shijie Yu Shehui Zhuyi [Contemporary World and Socialism]*, Vol. 3, 1998.

Wang, Yizhou, 'Sanda Xuqiu: Fazhan, Zhuquan Yu Zeren' [Three Great Requirements: Development, Sovereignty and Responsibility], *Shijie Zhishi [World Affairs]*, Vol. 5, 2000.

Wang, Yizhou, Yan Xuetong, Jin Canrong, Shen Dingli, Yu Wanli and Zhang Guoqing, 'Aoyun Zhihou: Zhongguo Diwei Bian Mei Bain' [After the Olympics: Change or No Change in China's Status], *Shijie Zhishi [World Affairs]*, Vol. 18, 2008.

Wang, Yusheng and Yin Chengde, 'Guanyu "Goujian Hexie Shijie" De Shikao' [On Thoughts on "Constructing a Harmonious World"], *Lilun Cankao [Theoretical Reference]*, Vol. 5, 2007.

Wang, Zhiyu, 'Mao Zedong "Yi Jingji Jianshe Wei Yiqie Renwu De Zhongxin" Lunduan Yanqiu' [Researching Mao Zedong's Thought on "Economic Construction as the Centre of all Duties"], *Shandong Nongye Daxue Xuepao Shehui Keixue Ban [Journal of Shandong Agriculture University: Social Sciences]*, Vol. 34, 2007.

Wang, Zhongshen, 'Lun Deng Xiaoping De Zhongguo Xingxiang Guan' [Discussing Deng Xiaoping's View on China's Image], *Fujian Lutan [Fujian Forum]*, Vol. 6, 1994.

Wen, Jiabao, 'Wen Jiabao: Xinnuan Ce Jingjinuan, Suishi Ke Tichu Xin Ciji Jingji Zhengce' [Wen Jiabao: Warm Hearts Warm Up the Economy, China is Ready to Put Forward New Stimulus Plans], *Xinhua*, 13 March 2009.

Wen, Jiabao, 'Wen Jiabao: Zhongguo You Xinxin Weihu Zhongguo Jinrong Shicang De Wending' [Wen Jiabao: China is Confident of Safeguarding the Stability of its Financial Market], *Zhongguo Jinrong Jia [China Financial Analyst]*, Vol. 10, 2008.

Wen, Jiabao, 'Zhengfu Gongzuo Baogao' [Government Work Report], *Xinhua*, 5 March 2006.

Wu, Jianmin, Yu Xintian, Liu Zhenming, Wang Jisi, Rao Geping, Bai Yansong, Feng Shaolei, Cai Tuo, Qin Yaqing, Zhang Tuosheng, Zhang Yan, Jin Canrong, Ma Xin and Li Zhaojie, 'Hexie Shijie and China's Diplomacy' [Harmonious World and China's Diplomacy], *Waijiao Pinlun [Foreign Affairs Review]*, Vol. 87, 2006.

Wu, Jianxin, 'Weihu Guojia Zhuquan He Zunyan, Fandui Baquan, Badao He Baqi: Jianxi Zhongmei Zhuangjishi' [Defend National Sovereignty and Dignity, Oppose Hegemony, Tyranny and Domineering Attitude: Analysing the US-China Plane Collision Incident], *Shixiang Zhengzhi Ke Jiaoxue [The Teaching of Thought and Political Study]*, Vol. 5, 2001.

Wu, Xinbo, 'Guoji Xingshi Jubian Xia Zhongguo De Guoji Quxiang' [China's International Orientation Amidst Changes in the Global Situation], *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies]*, Vol. 1, 2010.

Wu, Xitang, 'Ruhe Kandai Meiguo Dui Zhongguo De Dingwei' [How to Understand America's Positioning of China], *Dangdai Shijie [Contemporary World]*, Vol. 2, 2006.

Xia, Liping, 'Yilake Zhanzheng Dui Guoji Zhanlue Geju Bianhua Ji Woguo Anchuan Huanjing De Yingxiang' [The Impact of the Iraq War on International Strategic Structural Development and China's Security Environment], *Lilun Cankao [Theoretical Reference]*, Vol. 1, 2004.

Xiao, Cong, 'Zhongguo Shige Fuzeren De Daguo' [China is a Responsible Great Power], *Shishi [Current Affairs]*, Vol. 2, 2002.

Xiao, Huanrong, 'Zhongguo De Daguo Zeren Yu Diqu Zhuyi Zhanlue' [China's Great Power Responsibility and Strategy of Regionalism], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics]*, Vol. 1, 2003.

Xie, Yixian, *Zhongguo Dangdai Waijiao Shi, 1949-2001 [Contemporary Chinese Diplomatic History, 1949-2001],* Zhongguo Qingnian Chubanshe, Beijing, 2002.

Xing, Yue and Zhan Yijia, 'Fuzeren Daguo: Lilun, Lishi Yu Xianshi' [Responsible Great Power: Theory, History and Reality], in Pan Zhongqi, ed., *Guoji Zeren Yu Daguo Zhanlue [International Responsibility and Great Power Strategy]*, Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, Shanghai, 2008.

Xinhua, 'Guowu Yuan Zhongli Yu Zhongwai Jizhe Jianmian Hui' [State Council Premier's Press Conference with Chinese and Foreign Reporters], 18 March 2003.

Xinhua, 'Hu Jintao Zaidang De Shiqida Shang De Baogao' [Hu Jintao's Report at the 17th CCP Congress], 15 October 2007.

Xinhua, 'Li Keqiang Huijian Shijie Yinghang Hangzhang Zuolike' [Li Keqiang Meets World Bank President Robert Zoellick], 16 December 2008.

Xinhua, 'Wen Jiabao Yu Xinpingren Guowuyuan Shenshi, Zhongyang Wenshi Yanjiu Guan Guanyuan Zuotan' [Wen Jiabao Talks to Newly Appointed State Councillors and Members of the Central Committee Literature and History Office], 14 April 2011.

Xinhua, 'Wu Jianmin Jiangshu Zhongguo Waijiao 60 Nian: Taoguang Yanghui Ren Yaoguan 100 Nian' [Wu Jianmin Talks about 60 Years of China's Foreign Policy: We Should Keep a Low Profile for 100 years], 1 June 2009.

Xinhua, 'Zhongyang Waishi Gongzuo Huiyi Zaijing Juxing: Hu Jintao Zuo Zhongyao Jianghua' [Central Committee Foreign Affairs Work Conference Held at Capital: Hu Jintao Makes Important Speech], 23 August 2006.

Xinhua, 'Zhou Yongkang Zaijing Huijian Guba Guohui Guowu Weiyuan Fuzhuxi Jian Neizheng Buzhang' [Zhou Yongkang Meets Cuban State Council Vice-Chairman and Interior Minister], 30 August 2010.

Xinhua, 'Guowu Yuan Zhongli Yu Zhongwai Jizhe Jianmian Hui' [State Council Premier's Press Conference with Chinese and Foreign Reporters], 18 March 2003.

Xiu, Huanfen, 'Jianguo Tou Qinian Mao Zedong Guanyu Zhongxin Renwu: Zhuanyi De Lilun Guandian He Keguan Shijian' [Mao Zedong's Central Duty during the First Seven Years of Nation-Building: Shifting Theoretical Viewpoint and Objective Practice], *Fujian Shifan Daxue Xuepao Zhexue Shehui Kezue Ban [Journal of Fujian Teacher Training College]*, Vol. 3, 1993.

Xu, Jian, 'Zonglun Guoji Xingshi Yu Zhongguo Waijiao' [On the International Situation and China's Diplomacy], *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies]*, Vol. 2, 2007.

Xu, Jin, 'Jinrong Weiji Nanyi Diandu "Yichao Duoqiang" Geju' [Difficult for the Financial Crisis to Overturn the "One Superpower, Many Great Powers" Structure], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economy and Politics],* Vol. 12, 2008.

Xu, Mingqi, 'Fengxian, Duice, Zeren: Zhonggup Yu Guoji Jinrong Tixi' [Risk, Measures, Responsibility: China and the International Financial Order], *Shijie Zhishi [World Affairs]*, Vol. 7, 2000.

Xu, Shengxi, 'Deng Xiaoping Guanyu Zhengqiang Woguo Guoji Diwei De Sixiang' [Regarding Deng Xiaoping's Thought on Strengthening the Nation's International Position], *Guoji Zhengzhi Yanjiu [International Politics Quarterly]*, Vol. 3, 1995.

Xu, Xueyin and Zhu Xian, 'Pin Xin Ganshe Zhuyi' [Assessing New Interventionism], *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations]*, Vol. 8, 1999.

Xu, Zhengyuan, 'Quanli Yu Zeren: Lengzhan Hou Zhongguo Fuzeren Daguo Shengfen De Jiangou' [Power and Responsibility: The Construction of China's Identity as a Responsible Great Power after the Cold War], in Pan Zhongqi, ed., *Guoji Zeren Yu Daguo Zhanlue [International Responsibility and Great Power Strategy]*, Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, Shanghai, 2008.

Xue, Longgen, 'Zheng Zai Shenhua Fazhan De Zhongfa Chuanmian Huoban Guanxi' [The Deepening and Development of the China-France Comprehensive Partnership], *Guoji Zhengzhi [International Politics]*, Vol. 5, 1999.

Yan, Xuetong and Xu Jin, eds., *Wangba Tianxia Sixiang Qidi [Thoughts of World Leadership and Implications]*, Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, Beijing, 2009.

Yan, Xuetong, 'Dangqian Guoji Xingshi Yu Zhongguo Waijiao De Tiaozheng' [The Current International Situation and the Adjustment of Chinese Diplomacy], *Zhanlue Juece Yanjiu [Journal of Strategy and Decision-Making]*, Vol. 2, 2010.

Yan, Xuetong, 'Guoji Huanjing Ji Waijiao Sikao' [International Environment and China's Foreign Relations], *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations]*, Vol. 8, 1999.

Yan, Xuetong, 'Zhongguo Jueqi De Keneng Xuanze' [Possible Options for China's Rise], *Zhanlue Yu Guanli [Strategy and Management]*, Vol. 6, 1995.

Yan, Xuetong, *Zhongguo Guojia Liyi Fenxi [Analysis of China's National Interest]*, Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe, Tianjin, 1996.

Yang, Chengxu, 'Zhongguo Guoji Diwei Jiju Tigao' [The Rapid Rise of China's International Position], *Liaowang [Outlook]*, No. 51, 1998.

Yang, Dezhi and Huan Xiang, *Guofang Fazhan Zhanlue Sikao [Thinking on National Defense Development Strategy],* Jiefangjun Chubanshe, Beijing, 1987.

Yang, Jiechi, 'Dangqian Guoji Geju De Yanbian He Woguo Waijiao Gongzuo' [Current Changes in International Pattern and China's Diplomatic Work], *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies]*, Vol. 1, 2011.

Yang, Jiemian, 'Meiguo Daxuan He Kelindun Zhengfu Tiaozheng Duihua Zhengce' [The American Election and the Shift in Clinton Administration's China Policy], *Meiguo Yanjiu [American Studies]*, Vol. 4, 1996.

Yang, Zenghe, 'Xin Zhongguo De Jiben Renwu He Shehui Zhuyi De Biaozhi' [New China's Basic Duty and The Mark of Socialism], *Qianxian [Frontline],* Vol. 3, 1988.

Ye, Zicheng and Li Ying, 'Goujian Daguo Waijiao Zhihun: Zhengchangxin, Zixinxin, Leguanxin' [Constructing the Soul of a Great Power's Diplomacy: Normalcy, Self-Confidence, Optimism], *Shijie Jingji Pinglun [International Economic Review]*, Vol. 3, 2001.

Ye, Zicheng, ' "Daguo Fei Daguo" Yu Zhongguo De Guoji Diwei' ["A Great Power that is not Really a Great Power": China's International Position], *Guoji Zhengzhi Yanjiu [International Politics Quarterly]*, Vol. 4, 1994.

Ye, Zicheng, 'Zhongguo Shixing Daguo Waijiao Zhanlue Shizai Bixing' [China's Employment of Great Power Diplomatic Strategy is Imperative], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics]*, Vol. 1, 2000.

Yu, Changmiao, 'Guanyu Renminbi Huilu De Sikao' [Reflecting on the Direction of the Renminbi's Exchange Rate], *Zhonggong Zhongyang Dangxiao Xuebao [Journal of the Party School of the Central Committee of the CPC]*, Vol. 7, No. 4, 2003.

Yu, Keping, 'Guanyu "Zhongguo Moshi" De Sikao' [Thinking about the "China Model"], *Hongqi [Red Flag]*, Vol. 19, 2005.

Yu, Xintian, '"Hexie Shijie" Yu Zhongguo De Heping Fazhan Daolu' ["Harmonious World" and China's Peaceful Development Path], *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies]*, Vol. 1, 2007.

Yu, Zhen, 'Shilun Meiguo Duihua De Duizhong Zhanlue' [Discussing America's Direct China Strategy], *Guoji Guancha [International Review]*, Vol. 1, 2006.

Yuan, Shan, 'Guan Yu "Beijing Gongshi" Yanjiu De Ruogan Wenti' [Concerning the Several Problems of Research on the "Beijing Consensus"], *Dangdai Shijie Yu Shehui Zhuyi [Contemporary World and Socialism]*, Vol. 5, 2004.

Yue, Xiaoyong, 'Dui Tuidong Jianshe Hexie Shijie Lilun De Chubu Renshi' [Preliminary Thoughts on the Theory of Promoting the Construction of a Harmonious World], *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies]*, Vol. 4, 2007.

Zhai, Fengyu, 'Yingjia, Shujia, Haishi Youwing Youshu? Ping Zhongmeiri Sanguo Zai Dongya Jinrong Weiji Zhong De Deshi' [Winner, Loser, Or both Win and Lose? Reviewing the Gains and Losses of China, US and Japan in the Asian Financial Crisis], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics]*, Vol. 7, 1998.

Zhang, Huimin, 'Mao Zedong Dongzhi Dui Woguo Shehui Zhuyi: Jianshe De Daolu, Buzhou He Renwu De Tansuo' [Mao Zedong Comrade and Our National Socialism: Probing its Construction Path, Step and Duty], *Gansu Lilun Xuekan [Gansu Theory Research]*, Vol. 5, 1993.

Zhang, Ji and Sang, Hong, 'Wenhua: Guoji Zhengzhi Zhong De "Ruan Quanli"' [Culture: "Soft Power" in International Politics], *Shehui Zhuyi Yanjiu [Socialism Studies]*, Vol. 3, 1999.

Zhang, Jianqing, 'Guanyu Zhongguo Jiaru Shijie Maoyi Zuzhi De Ruogan Sikao' [Several Thoughts on China's Entry to WTO], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics]*, Vol. 10, 1999.

Zhang, Shengjun, '"Zhongguo Fuzeren Lun" Keyi Xiuyi' ["China Responsibility Theory" Can Retire], *Renmin Luntan [People's Tribune]*, No. 6, 2007.

Zhang, Shengjun, 'Quanqiu Jiegou Chongtu Yu Meiguo Baquan De Hefa Xing Weiji' [Global Structural Conflict and the Legitimacy Crisis of American Hegemony], *Meiguo Yanjiu [American Studies]*, Vol. 3, 2003.

Zhang, Xiaotong, 'Hu Jintao Shidai Guan De Zhongguo Zhuzhang' [Hu Jintao's Contemporary View on China's Stand], *Liaowang [Outlook]*, Vol. 47, 2009.

Zhang, Xuebin, 'Lun Zhongmei Liangguo Zhengfu Zai Yazhou Jinrongweiji Zhong De Biaoxian' [Discussing the Performance of the Chinese and American Governments during the Asian Financial Crisis], *Guoji Zhengzhi Yanjiu [International Politics Quarterly]*, Vol. 2, 1999.

Zhang, Youwen and Huang Renwei, ed., *Zhongguo Guoji Diwei Baogao [China's International Status Report],* Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, Shanghai, 2005.

Zhang, Youwen and Huang Renwei, ed., *Zhongguo Guoji Diwei Baogao [China's International Status Report]*, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, Shanghai, 2009.

Zhao, Bin, 'Jinrong Weiji Daozhi Meiguo Huayu Shishi Wo Baquan Zhongjie?' [Did the Financial Crisis Lead to a Weakening of America's Voice or the Conclusion of American Hegemony?], *Dangshi Wenyuan [Literary Circles of CCP History]*, Vol. 2, 2010.

Zhao, Changhui, ' "Zhongguo Fuzeren Lun" De Daode Xianjin' [The Moral Trap of the "China Responsibility Theory"], *Zhongguo Baodao [China Report]*, Vol. 3, 2009.

Zhao, Gancheng, 'Yatai Diqu Xinzhixu Yu Zhongguo de Zeren' [The New Order in Asia-Pacific and China's Responsibility], *Guoji Wenti Luntan [Forum on International Studies]*, Vol. 2, 1996.

Zhao, Junjie, Wang Pingzhen and Huo Yanping, 'Jiang Zemin Yu Zhongguo Waijiao Xingeju' [Jiang Zemin and China's New Diplomatic Situation], *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lishiwang [The History of the People's Republic of China]*, http://www.hrpc.org.cn/.

Zhao, Kejin and Yin Xiting, 'Meiguo Zhanlue Tiaozheng Yu Zhongmei Xinxing Daguo Guanxi' [The US Strategic Adjustment and the New Type of Sino-American Big Power Relations], *Guoji Guanxi Xueyuan Xuebao [Journal of the University of International Relations]*, Vol. 6, 2012.

Zhao, Lei, 'Yi "Hexie Shijie" Linian Tisheng "Fuzheren Daguo" Xingxiang' [Promote the Self-Image of a "Responsible Great Power" with "Harmonious World" Thought], *Zhongguo Dangzheng Ganbu Luntan [Chinese Cadres Tribune]*, Vol. 12, 2007.

Zhen, Bingxi, 'Toushi Zhongguo Jiaru WTO De Jincheng Ji Libi' [Comprehending the Process as well as Pros and Cons of China's Entry to WTO], *Shijie Zhishi [World Affairs]*, Vol. 22, 1999.

Zheng, Bijian, 'Heping Jueqi: Zhongguo Tese Shehui Zhuyi De Yige Ji Zhongyao De "Zhongguo Tese"' [Peaceful Rise: The Most Important "Chinese Characteristic" in Socialism with Chinese Characteristics], *Xue Lilun [Theory Research]*, Vol. 8, 2004.

Zheng, Bijian, 'Zhongguo Heping Jueqi Xin Daolu He Yazhou de Weilai' [China's New Path of Peaceful Rise and Asia's Future], *Xinhua*, 24 November 2003.

Zheng, Bijian, 'Zhuazhu Jihui Yu Lilun Wuzhuang' [Grasping Opportunity and Theoretical Augmentation], *Qiushi [Seeking Truth]*, No. 7, 1999.

Zhongguo De Guofang [China's National Defense], Guowu Yuan Xinwen Bangongshi, Beijing, 1998.

Zhongguo De Heping Fazhan Daolu [China's Peaceful Development Path], Guowu Yuan Xinwen Bangongshi, Beijing, 2005.

Zhongguo Zhongyang Dianshitai [China Network Television], 'Jiang Zemin Manila Se Huijian Kelindun' [Jiang Zemin Meets Clinton in Manila], 24 November 1996, http://www.cctv.com/.

Zhou, Baogen, 'Zhongguo Yu Guoji He Bu Kuosan Jizhi De Yizhong Gongjian Zhuyi Fenxi' [A Constructivist Analysis of China and the International Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime], *Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics]*, Vol. 2, 2003.

Zhou, Shijian, 'Suishi Fuguo, Suishi Qiongguo?' [Who is a Rich Country, Who is a Poor Country?], *Shishi Baogao [Current Affairs Report]*, Vol. 11, 2008.

Zhou, Zhongfei, 'Mianxiang 21 Shiji De APEC Yu Zhongguo' [Towards the 21st Century, APEC and China], *Guoji Zhanwang [Global Review]*, Vol. 23, 1998.

Zhu, Feng, 'Aobama Zhengfu "Zhuansheng Yazhou" Zhanlue Yu Zhongmei Guanxi' [The Obama Government's "Pivot to Asia" Strategy and Sino-US Relations], *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations]*, Vol. 4, 2012.

Zhu, Majie, 'Xin Shiji Guoji Guanxi Zhong De Ruan Guoli Jingzheng' [Competition for Soft Power in International Relations in the New Century], *Guoji Zhanwang [Global Review]*, Vol. 2, 2001.