

CITIZENSHIP, SECURITY, AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM IN JAMAICA

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the relationship between practices of citizenship and the challenges associated with the pursuit of, and threats to, security in contemporary Jamaica. This approach is accompanied by an unpacking of the ways in which people occupying different spaces in Jamaican society position themselves vis-à-vis the state. I argue that the security problem in Jamaica has to be understood in the context of a widening citizenship deficit, and the fact that there is a separate way, outside of the formal context of the state, for pursuing citizenship at the community level in what are referred to as garrison communities. This separate way has emerged in response to the failure of the Jamaican state to provide both citizenship and security to its most disadvantaged and disenfranchised members.

The state, the legal rights it is expected to provide, and the universalistic discourses which form the basis of citizenship in the West, have not served as the primary means by which citizenship has been constituted for all Jamaicans. The nature citizenship assumes is rooted in Jamaica's colonial past, and since the postcolonial period has been tied to a rather uneven and unequal developmental trajectory, influenced by colour/class relations, space, political culture and identity as well as neoliberal policies and noticeable state failures. Through extralegal, dialectic, and contested practices, garrisons have become essential sites for realising citizenship. The local practices that inform the social order of the garrisons are decidedly in conflict with, and contest, the state's legal-rational institutions, calling its legitimacy and the veracity of the social contract – derived from Rousseau – into question.

The theme of the thesis is pursued through an in-depth, multi-sited study, carried out in three communities, which explores the particularities, the everyday security experiences and discourses of people occupying different places and spaces in Jamaican society, and through consideration of the security policies and perspectives of policy elites and policy managers.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

I am interested in the discursive and practical exchanges between security and citizenship in the Jamaican context. Security presents ongoing challenges for Jamaica, both from a developmental and governance perspective, and calls attention to the different ways in which citizenship is constituted according to space, class, politics, identity, and the composition of the social order. Gaps in citizenship might not produce or be produced by the same conditions, but ‘non-citizens’ have been central to discourses on both rights and security in Jamaica

I argue that the security problem in Jamaica has to be understood in the context of a widening citizenship deficit and the fact that there is a separate way— outside of the formal context of the state and democratic norms of citizenship— of pursuing citizenship at the community level, in garrison communities. This separate way has emerged in response to the failure of the Jamaican state to provide both citizenship and security to its most disadvantaged and disenfranchised members. The localization of citizenship has been influenced, too, by the dominant state security paradigm and the way in which it has been

deployed in the expansion of state power and marginalization of other constructions of security, such as human and citizen security.

The state, the legal rights it is expected to provide, and the universalistic discourses which form the basis of citizenship in the West have not served as the primary means by which citizenship has been constituted for all Jamaicans. The nature citizenship assumes is rooted in Jamaica's colonial past, and since the postcolonial period is tied to a rather uneven and unequal developmental trajectory, influenced by colour/class relations, space, political culture and noticeable state failures. Through extralegal and contested practices, garrison communities have become essential sites for realizing citizenship. The local practices that inform the social order of the garrisons are decidedly in conflict with, and contest, the state's legal-rational institutions, calling its legitimacy and the veracity of the social contract – derived from Rousseau – into question.

Figueroa and Sives (2002) identify garrison communities with homogeneous voting patterns and their indissoluble bonds with political parties. A garrison, write Figueroa and Sives,

can be defined as one in which any individual/group that seeks to oppose, raise opposition to, or organise against the locally dominant party would be in physical danger, thus making continued residence in the area extremely difficult, if not impossible. Any significant social, political, economic or cultural developments within the 'garrison' can only take place with the tacit approval of the leadership (national and/or local) of the dominant party. The 'garrison' is therefore, in its extreme form, a totalitarian social space in which the options of its residents are largely controlled. (2002: 85).

Harriott (2008) associates garrisons with organized crime and the politics-crime nexus.

Clarke (2006) associates garrisons with lower class deprivation, poor quality housing, and unemployment. There are eight unambiguous garrison constituencies in Jamaica and a further seven which have between 25 and 50 percent garrison control. These garrisons are mainly located in the inner cities of the Kingston Metropolitan area (Report of the National

Committee on Political Tribalism, 1997). This is not a significant portion of the population, given that there are about 63 constituencies in Jamaica, but through extralegal, dialectic, and contested practices, garrison communities have become essential sites for seeking and contesting citizenship, and are at the centre of the security challenge in Jamaica. Increasingly, it is not so much the formal rights associated with citizenship that matter most to people living in garrisons, but embodied acts and social identities by which they constitute themselves as citizens.

Following Jamaica's independence in 1962, political subjectivities assumed an intensely partisan form, as national leaders sought to mobilize urban supporters around party loyalties (Sives 2010, Small 1995, Stone 1980). This process occurred devoid of any real attempt to include deprived communities into wider social, political and economic structures. Following independence, urbanization also sharpened class divisions in the city (Clarke 1975). The division of society into classes or strata, ranked in terms of an hierarchy of wealth, prestige, and power is regarded as a prominent and almost universal feature of any social structure (Bottomore 1965). Depending on whether one accepts a Marxist or a Weberian perspective, class is produced by structural inequalities and the stratification of society, either through production or consumption processes, in a capitalist economy (Crompton 1998, Wright 2005). Along with these foundational understandings, a more complex picture of class exists in Jamaica where phenotype is also an important consideration for understanding the ways in which class is constructed. Miscegenation between whites and blacks during the colonial period produced an intermediate stratum of 'browns' (Clarke 1975, Curtin 1955, Shepherd and Beckles 2000, Long 1774) whose class position, like that of the whites, was not necessarily tied to production, market processes or occupation. It was more of an inherited status.

Jamaica's socio-political context

With the indigenous Amerindians decimated, following Columbus's conquest of the Island in 1494, a population consisting of white masters and black slaves, who were transported through the Atlantic Slave trade from West Africa, became the new occupants of Jamaica after the British colonised it, having captured it from the Spanish in 1655. The ending of slavery in 1838 eventually culminated in a period of Crown Colony government (1866), following the Morant Bay Rebellion of 1865, which ultimately resulted in a period of constitutional decolonization, beginning in 1944, and independence in 1962. Modelled on the British Westminster system, constitutional decolonization (1944-1962) did not offer a radical platform to address ingrained structural inequalities (Munroe 1972) or rectify the problematic nature of citizenship in Jamaica.

The constitution was blind to issues of race and its influence on the peculiarity of the post-colonial context. Instead, it adhered to a universal set of rights; and, while a very small white majority continued to wield economic power, the 'browns' (who were a mixture of both European and African descent) were upwardly mobile and aspired to the ideal European aesthetic, while the upwardly mobile blacks benefitted disproportionately from systems of education, employment and government (Henriques 1953). Unsurprisingly, therefore, universal adult suffrage, granted in 1944, did not provide a panacea for addressing problems of citizenship in Jamaica. 'Political rights' needed, necessarily, to be accompanied by civil and social rights and vastly improved by social and human relations among the different classes. In the 1960s political parties sought to marry 'social rights' (mainly in the form of housing, through a 'political welfare system') to political loyalty and violence. Coupled to Jamaica's failure to habituate itself to less socially and economically marginalizing practices, these factors foreground the challenges associated with the contemporary social order in Jamaica.

Moreover, in the context of neoliberalism, and given the implementation of structural adjustment policies in the 1980s, the Jamaican state was rendered further incapable of reconciling the ubiquitous tensions between global and local priorities, and between the state and the market (Alleyne 2001, Boyd 1987, Handa and King 1997). The implementation of structural adjustment policies led to increases in unemployment, owing to privatization and a simultaneous reduction in the size of government. In the case of Jamaica, social inequality rose dramatically between 1991 and 1992—the period that witnessed the ‘most dramatic financial and trade liberalization reforms in the economy’ (Handa and King 1997: 6).

By utilising the community as a critical site for the enactment of citizenship, garrison communities have actively sought to re-establish their place in the society, seeking respect, recognition, security, dignity, and material advancement through sub-national practices, or what Isin and Neilsen (2008) calls ‘acts of citizenship’. Such acts, and the local practices that inform the social order of the garrisons, are decidedly in conflict with, and contest, the state’s legal-rational institutions, calling its legitimacy and the veracity of the Rousseauian and Hobbesian social contract into question. The problem, however, is that governance through the state is often replaced by ‘donmanship’ and violent non-state actors with *de facto* authority, who rely on illicit activities and drugs. Donmanship is a key feature of garrisons: the *de facto* legitimacy of a local don, a community leader, who controls how violence, security and criminality are ordered within the sphere of his geographical and political domain, is derived and authorised by his local followers. Donmanship has provided a localised system of governance for many individuals within the garrisons, but, by their very nature, the garrisons are exploitative entities.

In contrast to what obtains in the garrisons, Jamaica’s middle class derives formal citizenship through the institutions of the state and by virtue of class position, education and place of residence. Consequently, while the middle class has also become disenchanted with

governance processes and suffers from a growing problem of insecurity, its ‘good citizens’ remain fairly passive, preferring to seek refuge in civil-society organisations and private security. Garrisons, though, have shown an inclination toward decentring the state. This has resulted in demands for a total or partial opt-out from state citizenship and a preference for operating by the extralegal and cultural rules and norms at the local level (Campbell and Clarke 2017). What this suggests is that when employed in security studies, understandings of citizenship must also emphatically rely on place-based understandings and the local, if they are going to be applicable to non-Western contexts.

The state as defined by Weber is that entity which can ‘successfully claim a legitimate monopoly of the use of physical force within a given territory’ (Weber 1919: 50), and this entity is usually made up of centralized political, bureaucratic, and legislative organs. The existence of rival entities within certain territories, such as Jamaica, which use force to pursue their own goals, poses challenges for a Weberian concept of the state. The state has also been regarded as a ‘cultural artefact’ with ‘transnational dynamics’, (Gupta 2006) and contemporary conceptualizations have recognized the importance of culture, history, human relations and the blurred lines between state, society and other forms of political association (Nettl 1968, Sharma and Gupta 2006).

Security

There is a well-developed though limited body of literature on Caribbean security, despite its salience as an important policy and societal concern. The security *problematique* is increasingly perceived as an insurmountable threat, and one of the main hindrances to governance, social cohesion and development¹ (Harriott 2000, Headly 1994, Francis et al. 2009). With a population size of approximately 2.6 million, Jamaica has gained widespread

¹ Francis et al (2009) points out that while Jamaica witnessed increasing growth in the 1960s, amid high levels of mainly property crime, this pattern has shifted— economic growth has been fairly static since the 1990s, and this has corresponded with a significant increase in violent crimes.

notoriety for its high murder rates, and is commonly regarded as the ‘murder capital of the world’. The murder rate for 2017 was 59 per 100,000 of the population, rising from 8 per 100,000 in 1970 and 34 per 100,000 in 2000.² Still, not many Caribbean scholars investigate this predicament. Similarly, Jamaica is largely forgotten in international discussions of security; until recently the histories of security have been written and rewritten with only partial recognition of the realities that inform the security realities of subaltern spaces (Ayoob 1995, Azar and Chung- In Moon 1988). The focus of this body of literature has, instead, revolved around threats to state security, external threats, and inter-state conflict (Buzan 1991, Buzan and Hansen 2009). I adopt a critical approach to the study of security which, rather than merely focusing on the state and a set of objective criteria, emphasises subjective meanings, emancipation, individual experiences and a set of contingent circumstances (Booth 2007).

Harriott (2009) writes of a subculture of violence and a system of normalised crime in Jamaica; violence has become ingrained, and is increasingly seen as a business which yields social and political success. The security problem is further exacerbated by the proliferation of gangs and the impact of drug trafficking. Locally-originated gangs, such as the Shower Posse, extended their tentacles to the US, Canada and the UK, and became active participants in the trafficking of drugs and weapons. Furthermore, Jamaica represents a key point in the transshipment of drugs between South and North America (Griffith 2004). Griffith contends that there are four aspects to the drug problem in the Caribbean: drug production; its consumption and abuse; trafficking; and money laundering. This has made Jamaica a relatively ‘important’ site for America’s geo-politics and the ‘war on drugs’. While the focus on drugs is a worthwhile endeavour, it is possible that the need to look more broadly at the

² Ministry of National Security, Jamaica, 2009

social and political underpinnings of insecurity could easily become obscured by the need to cultivate short-term solutions, concerned with foreign policy and securing the US's interest.

Although violence and criminality seem to have been normalised in a significant number of communities, there is recognition that issues to do with social justice and economics underpin deviant social behaviour in Jamaica. Headley (2004) suggests that Jamaica's crime-related policies are reductionist and simplistic, falling short of appreciating that crime is a reactionary force against social injustices by the urban disaffected. Furthermore, consistent observations across most sources of data, and in most regions, have shown that crime 'tends to cluster around social class, with the lower social classes experiencing far more violent offending and victimization' (Tibbettes and Hemmen 2009: 28). This is certainly the case in Jamaica. To be sure, these are the spaces in which development is most lacking, so that there is an inextricable link between security and development indicators (Collier 2003).

Jamaica has advanced a number of security reform projects in past decades. Because policing is so central to addressing internal security risks as well as transnational threats, most reform efforts have targeted the police force. At the core of such reforms is a preoccupation with suppressing crime directly through repressive action by the state (Harriott 2003). Frustration with a weak, and much too slow, justice system, and the notion that force must be meted out against lawless subjects seem to have justified extrajudicial killings by the police. Given the existence of an ingrained culture of resistance and tendencies toward corruptibility, efforts to reform the police force have proven difficult, at best and, at worst, have failed to yield desired results. It was only in 2007, for instance, that a comprehensive review of the police force was attempted. Hence Harriott's view that, since independence, Jamaica has mainly employed a crime-fighting model which emphasises that 'crime must be controlled primarily by law enforcement measures, and the arrest and conviction of

criminals' (2000: 10). Without denying the relevance of such strategies, there is good reason to doubt their efficacy.

Headley (1994) has criticised the crime-control model, arguing that what is needed in Jamaica is a social justice approach, which appreciates and addresses the root causes of crime, instead of merely treating the symptoms. The narrowly-contrived political solutions, which placed a political premium (and sought to capitalise) on the harsh socio-economic conditions in the slums of Kingston, most notable in the 1960s, rendered insecurity the foremost challenge for Jamaica. The security conundrum in Jamaica has been further precipitated by a differential system of security, privilege, and entitlement, according to class, colour, status, and place of residence, and new ways of asserting citizenship, necessitated by these conditions. These circumstances continue to stir feelings of resentment and exclusion, amid mounting aspirations. Intensified by the gap between aspiration and reality, state legitimacy occupies a tenuous space within the garrisons.

Gray (2004), while pointing to a legitimacy crisis in Jamaica, has argued that the state has been able to exercise dominance through parasitic tendencies which have accompanied the state's tendency to co-opt and encroach on the cultural repertoire of the downtown sufferers and gangsters. Within Jamaica, members of marginalized cultural groups and rude boys-cum-gangsters have become 'educated to the system', and this has further eviscerated the social contract. The state's neglect of, and its failure to provide security for, some of its poorest, most politically-aligned communities, has culminated in a decentring of the state as the main site of citizenship in the lower classes. At the same time, the middle-class are also turning to private security, but Jaffe argues that 'while formal private security does not curtail the democratic rights of those it protects (only those it protects against), for inner-city residents the system of donmanship entails a direct trade-off between security and political freedom (2012a: 193).

Situating the Study: Why Security and Citizenship?

In Jamaica, the notion of citizenship has significance for those whose rights are negotiated, instead of guaranteed, for those who aspire to share more broadly in the social goods in the society, and for those who seek personal security, respect, and power through the embodiment of contradictory and violent practices. It should also concern those who benefit disproportionately from state governance, and who are, therefore, likely to bear, even at a minimum, the psychological cost of extra-state processes that violently disrupt, in some ways, the old social order that privileges deference to power and social status. The thesis seeks to contribute to current scholarship by taking as a point of departure an investigation of the complex relationship between security and a broader conception of the different ways in which citizenship is constituted in Jamaica. This investigation is grounded in an exploration which is sensitive to spatial, historical, and temporal factors.

The research adds to the body of work that aims to problematize universalistic and Eurocentric conceptualizations of both security and citizenship. These conceptualizations normally neglect the relevance of culture, history, and context. This thesis uses citizenship to intervene in, and cast doubt on, notions of security that resist local and politicised understandings. Not many thesis have examined the relationship between security and citizenship; the ones that have done so have mainly focused on the European context, migration and the war on the terror. Gillaume and Husyman's (2013) book *'Security and Citizenship: The Constitution of Political Being'*, concentrates on how political being is constituted in relation to securitizing practices with particular emphasis on terrorism and migration. In *'At the Edges of Citizenship: Security and the Constitution of non-citizen Subjects'* Hepworth (2015) examines forms of non-citizenship, exclusion from the political community and how they relate to specific security policies in Italy. Noxolo and Husyman's

(2009) book *Community, Citizenship and the War on Terror* focuses on how the war on terror has shaped the meanings given to community and citizenship.

By using citizenship as a lens to view the security situation in Jamaica, I hope to draw out contradictions inherent in a statist approach to security reform and expose major weaknesses in the dominant, hegemonic discourses and practices. Rather than forcing a capitulation, these approaches reproduce and consolidate the structures that give rise to alternative forms of de facto legitimacy. The Jamaican state is not the most important source of citizenship or legitimacy for those who either feel shut out of the formal systems of power and privilege in the society or trapped in their own local system of resistance and place-making.

While citizenship has been examined in the context of Jamaica, the subject matter has been primarily explored through racial and nationalistic referents. Rex Nettleford's (1977, 2001) exemplary work focuses on racial tensions in Jamaica, and the subsequent national and political strategies that saw black consciousness, as evidenced in the Rastafari movement, and, therefore race, being subordinated to nationalism through a consistently powerful invocation of the aspirational Jamaican motto, 'out of many one people'. Politicians and the privileged in the society, who regarded black power as too fractious and threatening to the status quo, appropriated the motto as a way of containing racial demands for equality (Nettleford 2001).

Thomas (2004) has also examined the question of citizenship through the lens of race, arguing that a new black consciousness had emerged in Jamaica, which is no longer subordinated to the 'creole nationalism' of which Nettleford writes.³ Thomas (2011) also examines what she refers to as embodied citizenship in the Jamaican context; she looks closely at the colonial context that underpins 'exceptional' violence and uses the 'imperial moment' and

³ Thomas argues that in the late 1990s 'a significant shift had occurred within Jamaica's public sphere, whereby the creole visions of 'Jamaicaness', consolidated by political and intellectual elites, at the time of independence, became publicly superseded by a racialized vision of citizenship' that she calls modern blackness (2004: 11).

neoliberalism to frame her study. Thomas is also interested in practices of citizenship and extra-legal performances rather than a mere rights-focused view of citizenship. Thomas situates the problem in the colonial period and explores the transnational context, using ‘reparation’ as her main ‘frame of thinking’.

This thesis utilizes the security narratives drawn from interviews designed specifically to understand how security is constructed within different spaces and how the contemporary conditions in Jamaica have shaped and are shaped by such narratives and practices. Issues around political identity, policing, private security, culture are deployed to account for the present state of security in Jamaica. My study also utilises the institutional context as a site with which to examine issues around security reform and international influences. In addition to the works mentioned in the foregoing, I draw on the work of various authors in my attempt to explore the question of citizenship and security in Jamaica. Stone’s (1980) seminal piece, *Democracy and Clientelism in Jamaica* has become critically acclaimed for unpacking a significant part of the contemporary security hermeneutics in Jamaica. Explicit in Stone’s argument is the idea that the relationship between the state and garrison communities was mainly secured through clientelism. Stone’s thesis serves as a basis from which to examine changes in social and political relations in Jamaica. Gray (2004) argues that Stone downplays the social power of the ‘urban poor’. Through a discourse on the relationship between the state and the urban poor, he shows how the state has been able to embrace and manipulate the culture of the poor for its own purposes. Even though he sees the state as parasitic and manipulative, he also shows how the rebellion of the poor through outlawry affords it social power and poses a challenge to state legitimacy. Sives, however, believes that Gray (2008) over-emphasises the social power of the urban poor. I also make use of Harriot’s work on organized crime and Clarke’s (1975, 2006) work which considers the

colonial period, urbanization, and the relationship between the spatial patterning of Kingston of urban insecurities.

Methods

I have utilized a mainly qualitative, multi-sited, field-work based approach to collect and analyse the data presented in this study. My intention has been to conduct an intensive enquiry in order to understand different perspectives on security as well as the perception, attitudes, lived-experiences and meanings that people occupying different spaces in Jamaican society give to their security realities. The aim was to take an epistemological approach which is sensitive to place and the way in which power can be reproduced through our ontological and methodological approaches.

It is impossible to understand the relationship between security and citizenship, and its correlates, without analysing discourses and practices at different sites where this relationship manifests. The city, subnational spaces and the state are therefore central to the areas of analysis in this thesis. The study was carried out across four sites— 1) an urban, middle-class community (Market Heights, Kingston), 2) an urban garrison, lower-class community (Golden Town, Kingston), and 3) a small-town garrison community (Turl Head, Clarendon); and among policy elites and policy managers in Kingston, Jamaica. I have used pseudonyms to protect the identity of all respondents.

Golden Town, one of the first garrisons to be established in Jamaica, has been an extraordinarily important site for exploring contemporary security discourses and practices in Jamaica. Gangs in Golden Town who are involved in organized crime pose a threat to national security. They have challenged state authority and the state's monopoly on the use of force, but they have also colluded with state actors and political elites to realize mutual objectives. Everyday citizens in Golden Town also experience numerous insecurities. Turl

Head was chosen primarily because it offers insights into garrison politics, but also brings a non-metropolitan dimension to bear on the security dialogue which is lacking in many academic studies on Jamaica. Market Heights was chosen as a comparator based on some the typical qualities it shares with other middle-class communities.

There are challenges associated with conducting research on security in Jamaica, especially in garrison communities. Negotiating access and gaining the trust of participants required time and patience. Research in Golden Town is conducted at a very specific moment and provides a useful snapshot of the community in transition. Navigating different spaces and dealing with gender and other barriers were not exactly easy tasks. But the opportunity to learn about daily life in these spaces provided opportunities for personal reflections, which are integral because they provide new vantage points and opportunities to make the ‘strange familiar and the familiar strange’ (Marshall and Rossman 2011).

Thesis Aims and Structure

In an attempt to explore the interrelated issues that are of significance in this thesis, I examine what role, if any, space and place play in influencing the way in which security narratives are constructed by garrison communities on one hand and the middle class on the other. I am interested in how political identity, policing, respect, culture, and state governance overlap and act as critical narratives and practices for understanding the nature of security in Jamaica. Two further aims are to examine the nature of the relationship between citizenship and security in Jamaica and institutional and policy approaches employed to address security. In order to realize these broad aims, I ask the following questions: how do people in Jamaica give meaning to and understand their security realities? How does citizenship, as a concept and a practice, help to foreground an understanding of the multiple and intersecting narratives given by communities in explicating their lived security realities? How does the social order

impact on, and is impacted upon by, both poor and middle-class communities in their pursuit of security?

The first three chapters outline the concepts, as well as social and political phenomena which are pertinent to the study, explore existing theories and locate the study. The last five chapters explore and discuss the empirical findings from four sites and provide a conclusion to the thesis. Chapter 2 introduces and interrogates the key concepts and uses a critical framework to explore the debates which have emerged in studies on both security and citizenship. By interrogating concepts such as identity politics, modernity, exclusion, and subcultures of violence, I look at the way in which security and citizenship ‘speak’ to each other in both theoretical and practical terms. I then develop these concepts further in the empirical chapters to show how they relate to the practical issues I am interested in exploring. What emerges is a fluid movement between theory and practice and the use of one to challenge, support or expand on the other.

Having laid the theoretical and conceptual foundation, I then discuss the Jamaican context in Chapter 3. I pick up on central issues raised in the introduction as a way of illuminating Jamaica’s social order and its political and economic structures. I bring together debates, past and present, on the political, social and economic order with the aim of providing a lens for the reader to situate the study. In addition to providing the context for situating the research, this chapter aims to sharpen the focus on the citizenship deficit in Jamaica, preparing the reader for the empirical chapters. It sets the stage as well for discussing the dynamic between citizenship and security, according to spatial, political, and class realities, and gives the reader important information on constant struggles experienced and staged by sections of the lower classes in their attempts to establish a sense of place in the society.

Chapter 4 examines Golden Town, a lower-class, garrison community, and assesses the security narratives of individuals residing there. A number of themes are highlighted which relate to the way in which the community has acted as a site of citizenship, simultaneously rivalling and acting in concert with the state, consolidating strong spatial, political, and social identities. Respect is of paramount importance to Golden Town, a community which has experienced hostile encounters with the state and over time has become alienated from society, politically, socially and otherwise.

Chapter 5, another empirical chapter, explores Market Heights— a middle-class comparator for Golden Town. I examine how differences around space, place, and class act to define security experiences and the relationship each community shares with the state as well as their place in the social and political order in Jamaica. Various narratives are explored in a bid to understand the security landscape of the community and practices pursued to address fear and feelings of insecurity.

Chapter 6 highlights the security narratives of another lower-class garrison community, Turl Head, and provides an assessment of issues to do with deprivation, contested power at the local level, and concerns with social justice. There were significant similarities with Golden Town, certainly in terms of issues around political identity, respect, violence, and narratives which centralise ‘being educated to the system’— a system that has not provided sufficient means to properly include marginalised sections of the population into the society in any meaningful way. However, Turl Head is evidently more impoverished than Golden Town with higher levels of unemployment, and the interviews revealed a pervasive sense of ‘nutten naah gone’: a more embedded reality of hopelessness. There are also tensions within Turl Head— different groups have enacted ‘donmanship’ in ways that do not conform to the ‘one order’ system, evident in Golden Town.

Chapter 7 examines security policymaking and draws upon interviews conducted primarily with Jamaican policy elites in various governmental organizations, as well as with non-governmental institutions. It interrogates policy and institutional approaches to security in Jamaica and the hegemonic discourses and practices which frame the security agenda with a view to critically analyzing the methods of reforms undertaken and the prioritization of the international, national, and organizational over the local. Chapter 8 revisits the main findings and arguments presented in the study, and uses them to further contextualize and argue for greater attention to the interconnectedness between citizenship and security, both at the theoretical and practical level. I consider the policy implications of the study and provide policy-relevant conclusions.

CHAPTER 2

UNDERSTANDING SECURITY AND CITIZENSHIP

Introduction

In this chapter I outline and critically assess the relevant literature on security and citizenship as a way of exploring the arguments I present in the remaining sections of this thesis. Both security and citizenship are contested concepts and their traditional meanings have been challenged by academics, particularly those who support a more critical, place-based understanding of social and political phenomena. The theoretical exploration of practices/acts of citizenship and substantive citizenship aims to open up the discussion on the citizenship deficit in Jamaica in order to move the debates beyond the limits created by a juridical, legalistic framework that privileges the nation-state and those whose citizenship is made more readily accessible through institutions of the state. By using the theoretical framework to lay the building blocks, I plan to unpack the empirical chapters in a way that critically interrogates the relevant concepts. The empirical chapters determined, significantly, the theoretical concepts that are explored here; they suggest a strong correlation between security and citizenship, making it imperative to examine the ways in which citizenship and security ‘speak’ to each other.

Security

Twenty-first century discourses on security undoubtedly represent an arena of conceptual contestation. The core of such contestations revolves around debates which involve epistemological questions about knowledge creation and how to theorise various referent objects that compete with the state to frame an understanding of security. A positivist approach emphasises objectivity, and focuses primarily on the state and military conflict,

while post-positivists are concerned with subjectivity and the meaning people assign to their own security experiences. In keeping with a post-positivist and critical approach, security is seen as socially constructed and represents protection from violent and non-violent threats not only to states, but to individuals and communities, whether externally or internally derived⁴ (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007, Wolfers 1962). Security threats also differ across time and space. Ayoob (1995) and Azar and Chung-In Moon (1988) have focused on differentiating threats according to whether a country is developed or developing in order to locate the subaltern and call attention to its marginalization in studies of security. These and other nuanced approaches are important for framing and interrogating the debates on international security paradigms.

Historical Perspectives

Classical writers treated the individual as the main referent object of security and emphasised subjective interpretations of what it means to be secure (Rothschild 1999). Most noteworthy in the earliest accounts of security is the fundamental meaning conveyed that the individual is the object of security (Rothschild 1999). During the Enlightenment period, the individual remained the primary focus of security, but the importance of subjective interpretation lost its appeal. Kant (1796), in discussing the possibility for ‘perpetual peace’, refers to one neighbour guaranteeing another’s ‘personal security’. Similarly, Adam Smith (1762) views security as a concern with protecting individuals and their property from violent attacks. It is Hobbes’ classical book, *Leviathan*, however, that sets forth the premise on which most modern debates about security have been framed. Hobbes (1962) introduces the state as the entity with absolute power, capable of guaranteeing the physical security of one individual against another. Hobbes theorises that:

⁴ This definition is consistent with the Post-Cold War redrawing of the definitional boundaries, and Richard Ullman’s (1983) broadened definition of the term, and is also in keeping with human security perspectives.

because there be some, that taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires; if others, that otherwise should be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by standing only on their defence to subsist. And by consequence, such augmentation of dominion over men, being necessary to a man's conservation; it ought not to be allowed... There is no way for any man to secure himself, so reasonable, as Anticipation; that is by force or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him (1962: 94-95).

In contending that 'there is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipation', he places the state in a position to claim absolute and legitimate authority over its subjects. The problem with Hobbes' theory is that it sees the state as a well-intentioned and legitimate entity, negating instances where the state rather than acting to provide individuals with a sense of security represents a threat to their security. Various examples, both in developed and developing countries have shown that the state sometimes represents a threat to the security of individuals, calling the veracity of the Hobbesian state, which supposedly acts to protect the individual, into question (Buzan and Hansen 2009).

Contemporary Contestations

The dominant view of security, as defined in the modern academic literature, relates to the protection of the state from external, military threats, with security treated as an objective phenomenon. However, the modern interdisciplinary nature of security studies has opened it to various, different, and at times diametrically opposed perspectives — theoretical perspectives within similar disciplines often preclude scholarly agreement (Buzan and Hansen 2009, Held 1980, Terriff 1999, Wendt 1999, Williams 2008). It is reasonable to suggest that two main controversies lie at the heart of these modern contestations. The first concerns who or what constitutes the main referent object of security—the state, the society or the individual (Buzan 1998, Booth 2007, Williams 2008). The second raises questions about the extent to which the security agenda should be widened to accommodate non-military and ontological threats, in order to capture non-Western realities, the post-Cold War

landscape, as well as the prevalence of more basic life-threatening issues (Booth 1998, Buzan and Waever 1998, Dalby 2009, Deudney 1990, Haq 1999, Kaldor 2007).

Until the end of the Cold War, there was very little questioning of the assumptions that the state was the central unit of analysis — and that security was an objective phenomenon. Walt, a classical realist, defines security as ‘the threat, use, and control of military force’ (1999: 222). By making military force a central focus of security, Walt makes security synonymous with discourses on the state and takes it as the central actor. There is little doubt today that a state could be secured from external threats, while individuals within that state experience high levels of internal threats in the shape of abject poverty, diseases, violence and economic exploitation—referred to variously as non-traditional threats, human insecurity, and forms of structural violence (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007, Sen 1999). The end of the Cold War period is, therefore, commonly cited as an important watershed in the study of security—the number of inter-state conflicts has significantly declined, and there has been a corresponding increase in the number intra-state conflicts. For example, ‘out of the 110 conflicts recorded between 1989 and 2000, only 7 of them were between states, the rest were civil wars’ (World Report on Violence and Health 2002: 218).

Changes in transnational relations have also affected the way in which security is studied. As explained by Keohane and Nye, ‘the state-centric paradigm is becoming progressively more inadequate as changes in transnational relations take place’ (1981:12). Transnational criminal networks, as evidenced by various terrorist activities and the widespread influence of drug trafficking, are now central to an understanding of security. Equally important are new socio-economic challenges and structural violence, caused by the uneven influences of globalization on developing countries. These issues will continue to influence contemporary security debates, with clear political and policy implications for countries in the ‘Global South’.

A Critical Approach to Security

A critical approach to the study of security, rather than merely focusing on the state and a set of objective criteria, emphasises subjective meanings, emancipation, individual experiences, and a set of contingent circumstances (Booth 2007, Krause 1997, Mustapha 2013, Vaughan-William 2010). Security should, therefore, account for social and historical context and rely on a self-reflexive approach that engages with the importance of values and interest. Critical theory employs Hegelian ‘immanent critique’ which reevaluates a position from its own standpoint and reveals the shortcomings inside out (Delaney 2005). Dant argues that the notion of critique arises ‘precisely through the awareness of the failure of political action, even the most extreme and radical political action of revolution to bring about the changes needed in political and social formations’ (2003: 15).

As a distinct field of knowledge, critical theory is usually associated with the establishment of the Institute of Social Research at the Frankfurt School in Germany and centres on the work of 20th century theorists such as Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, and Habermas. But critical theory also draws very heavily on the work of Marx, Gramsci, Hegel, Weber, Freud, Kant, and Lukas. There is a distinction to be made between critical theorists who have their origins in the Frankfurt School and poststructuralist critical writers. The former approach is ‘cosmopolitan, self-consciously progressive, emancipator, post-positivist, post-Marxist, open-ended about human possibilities, enlightenment-inspired and epistemologically self-conscious, while the latter is more critical of Western fundamentalism and meta-narratives’ (Held 2004:19).

Krause (1997) points to a number of claims made by critical theorists regarding security. First, threats are seen as constructed instead of given, and policies are seen as ‘appropriate responses’ to these threats. Second, the way in which the object of security is

defined is very much intertwined with ‘discourses of threat’, and is constituted and reconstituted through political practices, social interaction, and discourses (1998: 317). Third, critical theorists have an interest in finding solutions capable of transcending the problem of insecurity, since they do not believe that ‘the condition of threats and insecurity is a given’ (1998: 314). Consequently, critical theory seeks to decentre the state and its ‘historical artefacts’ regarding state sovereignty, rationality and universality of knowledge. It takes communities, individuals, and groups as the main referent objects and examines the relationship between knowledge and the perception of reality. It argues strongly for the emancipation of the individual and their communities, and seeks to reassert the importance of values as critical factors to be immersed into the notion of security (Booth 1994). It rejects the notion that the state by itself can provide for freedom of individuals, and argues it is important to ‘culturize modernity’ as an important lens through which to view and understand various issues that confront human freedom and dignity (Bilgin 2008). Booth argues that the implication of security lies in the realization that ‘the sources of human (in)security are far wider than those traditionally in the purview of strategists whose interests are being served by keeping other issues off the agenda’ (1997: 334). Critical theorists, therefore, believe in politicizing security which means questioning of elites, universal ‘truth’ and the use of power.

Set against this background, there are two main schools of thought that critical theorists, whether they originate in human geography, among feminists, or in other disciplines challenge—realism and liberalism. In contesting a realist view of security, critical theory questions Hobbes’ autonomous, rational individual, whose only source of protection is the state. Realism is a Eurocentric construct and the security plight of subaltern groups and internal security concerns are usually obfuscated and dismissed as irrelevant (Mustafa 2013, Tickner 1992). For this reason, realism has never been particularly relevant to the realities of

most developing countries, lacking in military power to shape and ensure their interests are adequately represented at the global level. Realism centres on the assumption that human beings are by nature self-seeking, that the international arena exists in a state of anarchy, and survival of each state depends, therefore, on its military capability to defend itself against military threats (Carr 1939, Elman 2008). Much of the discourse is, therefore, built up around a material view of the world, which focuses particularly on building capabilities to ensure that state assets are not threatened. In this way realism privileges the state and takes threats to the state as being axiomatic—‘in defining international political structures, we take states with whatever traditions, habits, objectives, desires, and forms of government they may have; we do not ask whether states are revolutionary or legitimate, authoritarian or democratic, ideological or pragmatic’ (Waltz 1979: 99). This is diametrically opposed to the fundamental belief of critical theorists that the state and its structures are constructed through social and historical processes, and through discourses. There is an attached importance to understanding non-material factors (politics, culture, social interaction) because of how they shape threats, interests, and actions. In this way, critical theorists and constructivists recognise a critical link between material and ideational factors (Wendt 1992).

Within the critical school, feminists have challenged state-centric, realist thinking on security. They argue that the language and practice of security is highly masculine and driven mainly by concerns that do not take women into consideration and must, therefore, be decoded (Whitworth: 2008). They argue strongly against realist assumptions and the primacy given to ‘political man’ and Adam Smith’s ‘rational economic man’. This leaves little scope for women to exercise ‘control over the conditions of their protection’ (Tickner, 1992: 28). A more gender-aware notion of security is meant to focus attention on the position of women and the ‘patriarchal philosophies’ that often perpetuate violence against them (Teriff 1999). There is a general tendency in various parts of the world for women to be objectified, leading

to structural subordination, where ‘bodies become sexed through gender and remain in the framework that produces gender and sex as different’ (Zern and Zalewski 2009: 627). While this study does not make gender its main focus, it is important to recognize the input of critical feminist theory in challenging masculine conceptualizations of security.

Critical theorists also take issue with liberal perspectives. Like realism, liberalism centralises the state and the structures of the state (Burchell 1995, Doyle 1997). By focusing on high politics and interstate conflicts, liberalism fails to examine internal security challenges that are of significance to developing countries. Liberalism also views capitalism and the free market as primary vehicles through which to achieve a resolution to inter-state conflict. Adorno and Horkheimer (1972) convincingly argue that capitalism, and the consumer fetishism which it promotes, is another means of domination which seeks to postpone conflict, control the human subconsciousness and create the illusion of inclusion in the capitalist economy. This kind of economic liberalism has encouraged structural violence in a number of developing countries (Escobar 2001). Liberals have a tendency to associate peace with the absence of war, rather than improvements in the human condition and personal freedom (Doyle 1997, Farber and Gowa 1995, Williams 2001). In fact, the concept of structural violence was born out a need to shed light on the deep inequalities that amount to ‘negative peace’.

‘Whereas the focus on direct violence would lead to analyses of the motives of international and intranational actors, with efforts to create institutions that can prevent them from exercising direct violence (for instance, punishing those who do), structural violence will lead to a critical analysis of structures, and possibly to efforts to transform structures pregnant with violence into less violent ones’ (Galtung, 1985: 146)

Human Security Perspectives

As a concept, human security shows concerns with structural violence and an understanding of security that moves it outside the state domain, and expands the focus beyond violence to

account for non-violent threats to the security of individuals, as well. It forges a marriage between security and development, and security and fundamental human rights, and places the individual at the centre of security analysis (Ogato and Sen 2003). In the policy domain, human security has been credited with the ban placed on anti-personnel land mines and the establishment of the International Criminal Court of Justice. Human security revisits and broadens three critical areas of the security debate: referent objects, sectors and threats. The main security referent object is no longer the state or the society, but the individual. The military and core security sector organisations are seen as part of wider array of actors including those in the economic, environmental and social sectors. Threats to the individual emanate from not only military threats, but also threats from poverty, natural disasters, diseases such as HIV/AIDS and internal conflicts. Human security recognises a duality in the security architecture—freedom from fear and freedom from want. Recognition of this duality is critical to the existence of millions of people in marginalised communities in developing countries, whose lives are bedevilled by these twin concerns.

According to the United Nations Development Program's *Human Development Report* that first used the concept, 'human security can be said to have two main aspects. It means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life—whether in homes, in jobs or in communities' (Human Development Report 1994: 22). The report identifies six main categories: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security. These categories clearly and deliberately include everything, raising concerns over its analytical usefulness. Paris, for instance, believes the 'drafters of the report seem distinctly uninterested in establishing any definitional boundaries' and while the 'sentiments embodied in these statements are honourable, they do little to clarify the meaning or boundaries of the human

security concept' (2001: 2). Academics have attempted more nuanced approaches, some preferring to adopt a broad base, while others are more concerned with narrowing the scope of the concept to allow for measurable criteria. Jorge Neff (1997) offers a very broad view of security, but adds a cultural dimension to account for cultural orientations of societies, such as 'images of the social world and collective experiences.' His categories do very little to add clarity to the ostensibly academic muddle. King and Murray, in a bid to rescue some degree of clarity, take a narrower perspective, arguing that human security is 'the number of years of future life spent outside a state of generalised poverty' (2001: 116). They have also attempted to develop a measurement that would allow for significantly better analysis, using five key indicators: poverty, health, education, political freedom and democracy. Nonetheless, as Alkire (2009) points out, decisions about what to include in definitions of human security are ultimately based on value judgements.

This raises the question, who should determine what is important enough to claim human security status. Consistent with his own value judgement, and seeking to offer a narrower view as well, Krause opines that, 'human security ought to be about 'freedom from fear' not about 'freedom from want'... the broad vision of human security is ultimately nothing more than a shopping list; it involves slapping the label human security on a wide range of issues that have no necessary link' (2004: 367). While it is necessary to have a more nuanced view of human security, Krause's definition goes against the fundamental principle of human security—human security is an attempt to demolish the artificial wall that stands between socio-economic threats and threats from violence. It is also very much the case in countries that suffer both high levels of violence and high levels of deprivation that there is in fact a necessary link between freedom from want and freedom from fear.

Linking development and security: An objective of human security

Debates oscillating around the convergence of security and development policies have to be placed in the context of an understanding of both security and development. In its earliest formulation development was seen as a condition of economic growth and also related to well-being (Smith 1776). What is referred to as modern development emerged in the aftermath of World War II (Ingam 1993, Todaro 2000). Development became an important goal for newly-independent but, at the same time, largely underdeveloped Third World economies. The focus of development came to be regarded as a concern with economic growth and national income rather than well-being. According to the modern outlook on development, poorer countries could potentially witness increases in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) through a process of modernity whereby they would mimic the economic models and cultural practices of developed countries. Development, in this sense, implied racial and cultural superiority of the West, industrialization as well as urbanization with a strong emphasis on economic growth (Spybey 1992).

Notwithstanding the move to adopt a basic needs approach in the 1970s, which emphasised the importance of access to food, shelter and certain basic amenities (Ghai 1977), the 1980s saw the rise of neo-liberalism, synonymous with privatization, free trade and market-based development, regarded by critics as a new form of Western imperialism (Harvey 2003), and dialectically as the best route to development by international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), both of which came to regard 'too much' state as culpable for the problems encountered by developing countries (Turner and Hume 1997). Structural adjustment policies that sought to reduce the size and role of the state were presented as universal remedies for addressing development challenges; burdened by the 1973 and 1979 oil crises, and the economic recession in the early 1980s,

some developing countries accepted the IMF's conditionalities, and became progressively worse-off in the aftermath.

Neoliberalism has failed to deliver developmental outcomes, and has merely served to intensify the problems it proposed to address. One persistent criticism of development has been its failure to break with 'one-size-fits-all' policies and to recognize the differences in developmental needs and identities across and even within countries (Escobar 2001). Drawing on the ideas of postcolonialism, development geographers have challenged these typical modes of thinking and the ways in which Third World development is imagined, articulated, and disarticulated in the West (Radcliffe 2005). They take issue with the common tendency to essentialize the development histories and realities of subaltern spaces using dominant and generic development ideas. More recently, and in the midst of ongoing conflicts coupled with anaemic economies and widespread, unabated poverty, development has been characterised as elimination of poverty and as freedom (Sen 1999). Seen as freedom, development requires much more than growth in national incomes, it requires a 'means-ends' approach that emphasises both the evaluative and the instrumental role of freedoms, and which provides the individual with basic capabilities to address 'unfreedoms', such as 'systematic social deprivation', tyranny and other social and economic injustices. The Human Development Index, developed in 1990, (which takes account of life expectancy, birth rate and illiteracy) is a partial reflection of this understanding.

The logic of human security is premised on the idea that to a large extent it is the bifurcation of security and development strategies that accounts for consistent security dilemmas in poor and conflict-prone societies. It follows, therefore, that one of the critical ways in which human security is to be realised is via a merging of international development and security policies. As a direct consequence, both phenomena are becoming increasingly regarded as two sides of the same coin and mutually reinforcing objectives. What is included

or excluded from development strategies has far-reaching consequences – development strategies necessarily value and prioritise some concerns over others and some citizens over others. Human security scholars are acutely aware of this, and have argued that development policies should account for security issues affecting marginalised populations. Changes in the referent object of security, which forces the analysis down to the individual level, and which broadens the scope of security, extending it into areas such as poverty, also make the development discourse much more penetrable. Characterizing security as freedom from want, as well as freedom from fear, as the *1994 Human Development Report* proposed, was also a deliberate move to forge the linkages between both phenomena.

The new security fault lines and vulnerabilities caused by neo-liberal developmental strategies and globalization, it is argued, are major sources of socio-economic vulnerability that create fertile ground for conflicts (Collier 2003) – and are also in and of themselves security threats (Thomas and Wilkin 1995). Neoliberal policies have led to increases in unemployment, owing to privatization and a simultaneous reduction in the size of government in developing countries. Without doubt, this also fostered greater levels of inequality. Unsurprisingly, high levels of inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean coincide with a very high homicide rate in the region (Ferranti et al., 2004, Soares and Naritomi 2012). Consistent observations across most sources of data have shown that crime ‘tends to cluster around social class with lower social classes experiencing far more violent offending and victimization’ (Tibbets and Hemmens 2009: 28). To be sure, these are the spaces in which development is most lacking, so that an inextricable link between security and development indicators such as poverty and inequality is evident in most conflict-prone regions characterised by demonstrably high levels of impoverishment and violent conflicts (Collier 2003). It is against this background that Abouharb and Cingranelli contend that the ‘execution of structural adjustment has caused governments to reduce their levels of respect

for economic rights and social rights, creating higher levels of civil conflict and more abuse of internationally recognised rights' (2007: 2). Funi, Picciotto, Oloniskan and Clarke (2007) see the main hindrance to the achievement of the millennium development goals as its failure to address violent conflict— a fundamental obstacle to poverty alleviation. Similarly, it is felt that lack of progress in attaining these goals has severely compromised the peace-building process, especially in Africa. Poku, Renwick and Porto assert, therefore, that only by 'formulating and executing policies that explicitly address the mutuality of developmental and security challenges will the human potential of Africa be released' (2007: 1156).

Providing a Critique: Human Security and Biopolitics

In developing countries, security policies, and the emphasis placed on human security, have to a large extent been influenced by Western priorities. The September 11 terrorist attacks on the US have prompted an interventionist policy toward suspicious, underdeveloped 'others', for fear that left untreated, local despair could spill over into the international arena with severe implications for the security of developed countries (Duffield 2007). Critics, therefore, argue that human security, with its emphasis on development, is merely an opportunity for the West to impose its values on, and intervene in, developing countries to minimise the risk of local threats spilling over into the international realm (Roberts 2009). This criticism has arisen in light of the interminable securitisation and politicisation of development funding following 9/11 and the series of terrorist attacks in Europe. Of import, as well, is the fact that most development and security projects are funded and driven by the North, and invariably influenced by their own security and development priorities. Drawing on Foucault's ideas of biopolitics, Duffield sees the security/development nexus as an opportunity for developed countries to act on the lives of 'non-insured populations' in developing countries. His view is that human security is being constructed around core biopolitical functions in the interest of global security, pointing to other critics' pronouncements, that though 'human security

represents the fusion of development and security, the balance has tipped against development, in favour of a harder version of security which prioritises homeland livelihood systems and infrastructures' (2005: 3). Development aid for reconstruction and support intervention is thus focused on strategically relevant areas, as opposed to neutral zones on a needs basis (Roberts 2009).

Human security has faced similar cynicism and distrust in places like East Asia. The human security tenet, 'responsibility to protect', which was adopted at the 2005 World Summit, has been fiercely resisted (Evans 2004). The central criticism is that this could provide the North with a viable justification to breach a country's sovereignty by intervening in its domestic affairs under the guise of humanitarian protection. US intervention in Iraq is a clear indication that this is not an unreasonable observation. The same thing has happened in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Sierra Leone (Duffield 2007). The US also intervened in Latin American countries, invaded Grenada in 1983 and aided the Jamaica Labour Party in the 1980s how when it was felt that its security interest was at risk during the Cold War. In defence of the ubiquitous criticism that by merging development and security, human security actually encourages intervention and militarisation of development issues, Ul-Haq opines that this anxiety stems from a misunderstanding, since 'it would be far less interventionist to send development, rather than aid, to poor lands. And it would be best to design some agreed rules of the game in place of the present *ad hoc* system' (1999: 92).

Even so, it is not clear whether human security itself can be localised. Tschirgi's observation that, 'because both development and security are extremely broad and elusive concepts, the call for integrating them often leads to a policy enigma', applies to most developing countries (2005: 10). A further difficulty is that the terms development and security convey different things to different people when used in different and even within similar contexts. They are, however, often presented as agreed upon concepts, and used

indiscriminately across countries. More crucially, the human security literature treats the merging of development and security as an apolitical issue, when on the contrary, security and development are inherently political, which means that successful efforts at the global-advocacy level could be diametrically opposed to local political ideals and ambitions and the way in which Western countries seek to institute ‘human security’ practices. Furthermore, human security provides an insufficient account of related complexities that hinder the realisation of security and development objectives – the citizenship deficit, local decision-making structures, the social and political order, as well as spatial and class segregation at the domestic level that foster alienation and increase social tensions.

Exploring Citizenship

There is growing interest in citizenship as a theoretical tool for framing and mapping various social and political problems around inclusion and exclusion (Steiner, Mason and Hayes 2013, Johnson 2008). Such problems reflect the corrosive effects of modernity, economic liberalism, and the impact of past imperial structures on people’s lives, but also the effect of the immediate socio-political context in which they occur. People’s ability to make claims on their governments and their capacity to participate effectively in democratic and social processes have become increasingly threatened, especially in places where citizenship was previously restricted and only available to certain kinds of citizens. The triad consisting of modernity, neoliberalism, and globalization has worsened inequalities (by creating greater differential wealth, power and resource endowment) which citizenship ought to address. Inequality, social exclusion, discrimination and insecurity have all been correlates in the global, capitalist economy (Bosworth and Guild 2008, Noxolo and Huysmans 2010, Mcghee 2010) The quest for deeper forms of citizenship is not restricted to developing countries, where gaps in citizenship are more apparent.

Along with a circulating view that continues to suggest that deprived and excluded populations are ‘undeserving’ and a burden on tax payers, a retreat of the welfare state has occurred in countries such as Britain (Rose 1999). Within these larger countries, debates about citizenship usually revolve around migration, multiculturalism, and the movement of people across national borders (which have brought the West in closer proximity with subaltern and ‘othered’ populations). In this thesis, however, I am more interested in the complexities of ‘border crossing’ at the national and local levels and the socio-economic and political processes that separate different kinds of citizens and contribute to a deficit in citizenship. I am also concerned with the way in which added pressure placed on developing countries to liberalize and modernise their economies, while taking a more minimalist approach to governing, further erode the prospect of enacting a more inclusive form of citizenship.

Depending on context and the issues that are important to people who constitute themselves as subjects of citizenship, citizenship can take on different emphases. In its classical, Aristotelian use, citizenship took on masculine, racist, and elitist definitions; only privileged white males could claim citizenship, and this claim was tied to disinterestedness and the ability to participate equally in the private and public spheres in non-instrumental ways (Pocock 1998). Citizenship invoked a politics of exclusivity, and as such women, slaves and subjects were automatically excluded (Clarke 1996). Ignatieff is of the view that:

‘from its inception, the myth of citizenship implied the following chain of association: political choice requires independence of mind, independence of mind presupposed material and social independence; citizenship therefore inheres only in those capable of material, social and intellectual independence (1995: 57).

This perspective still resonates amongst certain social groups in many western countries. But, importantly, as well, many postcolonial societies have remained in the throes of such mythology. Those who are very low on the totem pole and lack independence are normally

excluded. A more modern view of citizenship usually takes, as its starting point, either of two opposing views: citizenship evolved out of modernisation, industrialisation and urbanization (Marshall 1950, Turner 1990); or citizenship was achieved through social and political struggles (Giddens 1982, Mann 1987, Said 1979). Turner (1994) sees citizenship as an ‘aspect of the civil religion of modern society’, built on a social contract. According to this view, in order to adjust to changes brought on by the secularization and urbanization of modern societies, citizenship replaced and created new loyalties and solidarity outside the family. In this context, *jus soli* complemented, replaced or competed with a *jus sanguinis* form of citizenship.

T.H. Marshall, the British sociologist, who is often credited with developing the modern concept of citizenship, defines it as ‘a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess this status are equal with respect to the rights and duties which this status endows’ (1950:10). Marshall does not see citizenship as a unitary concept, and as such he notes that it consists of three elements – civil, political, and social rights. Civil rights include freedom of speech, freedom to choose one’s faith and to associate, the right to privacy, and the right to own property. Political rights are those rights that enable people to participate in the exercise of political power, from the right to vote to the right to due process and so on. Social rights include the ‘whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share in the full social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society (1950: 11).

By drawing on the British experience, Marshall was mainly concerned with exploring the tension, and a kind of paradox, between the inequalities promulgated by class and capitalism and the status of equality that citizenship seeks to engender. Social rights are expected to reconcile, as far as possible, this apparent paradox and, as such, are seen by Marshall as a prerequisite for the realization of citizenship. By drawing almost exclusively

on the British example, Marshall is, however, criticized for his periodization of the development of citizenship, the evolutionary Anglo-centric nature of his account, and his almost exclusive focus on social class (Giddens 1982, Lister 2005). For Marshall, citizenship follows a linear process, starting with the granting of civil rights, followed by political then social rights. The importance of struggle, issues around gender and race— which would have anchored the focus on social class— are not treated in Marshall’s account. While Marshall focuses heavily on class conflict, there is a lack of similar attention to social struggles (Mann 1987). The civil rights movements in the US, for example, was an important watershed in the history of citizenship—through the activism and relentless protest by blacks who demanded not mere incorporation in the system, but a change in the very laws and structures that oppressed them, citizenship was actively demanded, not passively received (Garcia 1996). As such, although Marshall’s framework represents a shift from the limited meaning conveyed by citizenship in the Greek Polis, there is still a gap that is not accounted for, as it relates to context and the limited applicability of a Eurocentric, rights-focused, juridical and passive concept of citizenship.

Beyond a Marshallian Concept of Citizenship

Since Marshall’s theorisations, important shifts have taken place in the citizenship debates. The debates seek to move the discourse away from an almost exclusive focus on universalism and rights toward a greater focus ‘particularism’ and substantive forms of citizenship (Gunsteren 1998). It has now become common place to recognise that in addition to being defined through legal status, citizenship involves a set of symbolic, economic and cultural practices (Insin and Wood 1999, Insin and Neilsen 2008). As a result, citizenship differentiates those who are members of a society from those who are not, according to both legal and non-legal status (Barbalet 1998, Faulks 2000, Mamdani 1996). Barbalet (1988) regards citizenship as ‘being characterised as both a status and a set of rights’, arguing, as

well, that the importance of rights derives from the social nature of status, so that ‘the issue of who can practise citizenship, and on what terms, is not only a matter of the legal scope of citizenship and the formal nature of the rights entailed in it’ (1988:1). There are individuals, based on identity and where they fit in the spatial and social patterns of a society, who must necessarily constitute themselves as citizens through various practices that give them a sense of identity and belonging. Insin and Neilsen (2008) contend that:

to investigate citizenship in a way that is irreducible to either status or practice, while still valuing this distinction, requires a focus on those acts, when, regardless of status and substance, subjects constitute themselves as citizens, or better still, as those to whom the right to have rights is due. But the focus shifts from subjects as such to acts or deeds that produce such subjects.

The notion of practising citizenship and acts of citizenship (Barbalet, Insin and Neilsen’s) are of particular interest in this paper. Insin and Neilsen’s (2008) conceptualisation is important for unpacking a more localised form of citizenship since not all members of a society are able to access citizenship at the national or state level, making the community an important site, certainly in the case of Jamaica. But unlike Insin and Neilsen (2008), I am also interested in the subjects who perform these acts. Consequently, and throughout this research, it will be evident that my focus does not ‘shift’; it merely expands to consider both subjects and deeds. An understanding of the everyday realities of the subject, his or her social position, and other similar characteristics are critical for assessing and contextualizing practices of citizenship (Staheli 2010).

Two Main Schools of Thought on Citizenship

There are three broad approaches to studying citizenship – liberalism, communitarianism and republicanism. I am more interested in teasing out the debates on the first two, which I believe are most important to the overall focus of the thesis and for exploring the intersection between security and citizenship, which I want to establish in this chapter. Both liberal and communitarian views on citizenship demonstrate a proclivity toward preferring binary

opposites and avoiding an in-between space on the citizenship spectrum— citizenship is either an individualistic or a collectivistic enterprise (Faulkner 2000). It is safe to suggest that historically, and before the ‘democratization wave’, Eastern European and Latin American countries tended to support a more collectivist and corporatist type of citizenship, while the US, the UK, and Western European countries have supported a more liberal paradigm (Yashar 2005, Tulchin 2007). The liberal paradigm has been the most influential by far, following the Renaissance period in Europe and the idea of the individual as supreme (Lukes 1973). Aspects of this liberal paradigm are embedded in the very constitutions and social structures of many postcolonial and developing societies.

Liberal Citizenship

Liberals value citizenship primarily because of the rights it bestows and the space it gives individuals to pursue their interests ‘free from interference’ (Aveneri and Avner 1992, Weale 2002). Adult suffrage and electoral democracy are seen as the cornerstone elements of modern, liberal forms of citizenship (Barbalet 1988). This liberal paradigm is imbued with a ‘capitalistic logic’, to invoke Peters (1996), since the autonomous, rational individual, guided by self-interest, is the main subject of a capitalist economy which relies on consumerism and unfettered individual pursuits. Ignatief (1975) argues that liberal political theory defends an economic definition of man that tends to depoliticise man, such that save granting basic rights, there is limited expectation from the state and a general depoliticisation of important social and collective issues (Dahrendorf 1988). In fact, progress and success are measured by individual efforts, and there is usually a false claim to equality of opportunity, without a corresponding focus on inequality of condition (Burton 2005, Castells 1978). Also, liberalists have a tendency to regard difference with suspicion; citizenship, therefore, must support principles that promote sameness, which inevitably results in the exclusion of those of who are regarded as different. The liberal individual, through the application of a set of democratic

rights, is expected to transcend any collectivist or group tendency, and to embrace a ‘minimal and consensual state with formal legal anchorage’ (Armstrong 1979: 4).

Calvinism, with its emphasis on individual responsibility, and the rise of capitalism were of critical importance to the increased prominence given to values associated with classical liberalism, electoral democracy, and individualism in modern societies (Tawney 1922, Weber 1935). These influences were as important as the proliferation of a possessive market society in 17th England, the era of Romanticism in the 18th century as well as the rise of classical economics (Lukes 1973). Lukes’ examination of three basic tenets of individualism—dignity of man, autonomy, and privacy – draws attention to the basic value system of a liberal account of citizenship. The first is premised on ‘the Christian moral principle of the supreme and intrinsic value of the human being’ (1973: 52) and individual salvation. The second tenet, autonomy, which is probably the most emphasised in liberal accounts of citizenship, is the idea that an individual actions and thoughts are undetermined by agents or causes outside of her/his control and individual choices are always subjected to rational analysis. The idea of privacy, the third in the triad, seeks to ascertain the importance of an arena outside the public realm where individuals can retreat, so that they may be guided by their own choices and thoughts without interference. Taken together, liberal citizenship makes the individual the responsible agent. The problem, however, is that in practice, some citizens are made to be responsible, and others are not.

Communitarian Perspectives

While liberals centralize the individual, communitarians give community solidarity and collectivism primacy over individual rights and entitlements. They place importance on the community as a way of seeking to reconcile the individualistic tendencies arising out of a liberal, often uncritical approach to the pursuit of citizenship (Shaffir 1998, Tam 1998). For

communitarians, community, along with the social and cultural space it provides, is seen as prior to the state and the political order, and as the starting point for discussing citizenship (Dallmayr 1988, Delanty 2002). They regard the community as the entity that provides the kinds of social, cognitive, symbolic and aesthetic ties that are more durable than those formed through the modern associational order (Tönnies 1957). They also deny that the self is grounded in a set of universal, rational principles (Selznick 1998). Instead, the self is best understood in relation to a set of historical and cultural permutations. Weber's methodological individualism, which asserts that the individual should be the starting point of any study on society, is a position communitarian reject on the basis that a prior moral community and the social order are important frames for understanding individual action and motivations.

The problem with communitarianism, however, is that it perceives communities as harmonious entities that share common goals (Selznick 1998). Parsons' (1977) functionalist and 'voluntaristic ideal' of community, along with communitarians' assertion of the group as the defining centre of identity, is therefore, not as simple or primordial as it might appear to be. At the community level, political, gender and various kinds of other identities can exist alongside each other in a fractious relationship. Certain individuals can also pursue rational decisions, according to the power dynamic at the local level, while still existing as part of the whole. One therefore has to be careful in defining the community as a homogeneous and harmonious entity, despite its usefulness in understanding the everyday place-based issues that impact on people's citizenship. It is worth noting, at this point, that some communities can even take on an authoritative, coercive character – here I am thinking about communities, which, owing to an imbalance between state and community inclusion, produce local authority figures who take on various kinds of authoritarian and state-like structures. But unlike the atomistic, fragmented tendencies that individualism promotes, a cultural or

collectivist theory of citizenship is more interested in harnessing local solidarities and creating a common good.

Given its refusal to be seduced by procedural democracy and its attention to cultural resources and local context, communitarianism establishes itself, in my view, as a superior frame for thinking about citizenship among marginalised populations in developing countries, while the liberal account is more attuned to elites within these very spaces. In seeking to address the polar opposite positions taken by both theories, a number of academics have tried to reconcile liberalism to communitarian principles. Walzer (1997), a liberal conservative, wants to show appreciation for the community as a site of justice, but wants to hold on to a universal moral code and the imaginary state of nature behind the veil of ignorance, where such code is agreed. McGuinness (2008) offers this critique of Walzer:

Walzer hopes to accommodate pluralism, diversity and respect for communities within a universalistic framework. The minimalist code includes prohibitions against murder, deception, gross cruelty and betrayal, which Walzer argues have been actual prohibitions in virtually all human societies. However, as the meanings of these prohibitions will have been socially defined, it leaves the possibility that what counts as gross cruelty, or betrayal, in one society will not be so understood in another. Actual meanings can only be specified contextually.

Similarly, Charles Taylor (1995) criticises Kymlicka for appreciating the community only to the extent that it performs an instrumental role— by acting as a source of justice and a means to attain social cohesion— in the absence of alternatives. Outside of these instrumental roles, however, there is no intrinsic value assigned to the community as an important cultural resource or as an end in itself. On the other hand, Taylor (1995) regards the community as a source of embodied practices and principles that guide individuals and provide a basis for decision making, not merely as a means by which people meet certain rational goals, within the confines of the liberal economy. The perennial question should political community shape social life or should social life play an even greater role in shaping political meaning remains a pertinent one.

Citizenship and Security: Examining the Link

Citizenship and security touch each other in important ways, and although many studies have not explored this theoretical relationship, they evidently ‘speak’ to each other in ways that are worth examining and questioning. This interconnection is perhaps made most visible in Latin American and Caribbean societies, and in a number of countries in Africa. But Western politics has also elucidated the fact that when people suffer various insecurities— personal, structural and otherwise— and when the spaces they occupy and their culture are securitized, their citizenship is undoubtedly brought into question (Guillaume and Huysman 2013). The opposite is also true— gaps in citizenship create insecurity and numerous social anxieties for individuals and their communities, so that there is a symbiotic and fluid relationship at play (Young 1999).

The privatization and commodification of security participate in this uneasy relationship between citizenship and security (Caldeira 2000, Krahan 2010, Mandel 2002, Merry 1993). When those who are full members of the society use the market place to erect physical and social boundaries to protect themselves from ‘dangerous others’, it brings visibility to the interconnection between security and citizenship. But those perceived in this manner sometimes participate in ‘privatised’ and commodified forms of security provision, as well. Of further significance, the 21st century has witnessed a move by states and societies to securitize undesirable subjects, who are then targeted through repressive action by the state (Duffield 2001, Mullard and Cole 2007). In an age characterised by increasing fear of terror, states have taken advantage of the insidious fear in their societies and used it as an opportunity to challenge policies that encourage multiculturalism and tolerance (Collins 2013, Watson 2009). Multiculturalism has, therefore, come to be regarded with great scepticism by those who want to return to a focus on social cohesion and sameness (Modhood 2013, Pitcher 2009, Turkiiner 2006).

In many postcolonial societies, the link between security and citizenship is scarcely new—insecurity/security and citizenship/non-citizenship have always been experienced as inseparable. Denial of citizenship and the use of violence were used to ensure public order, and treated as prerequisites for securing mercantile ambitions (Falola 2009). Violence and citizenship have, therefore, always been inextricably intertwined and pertinent to the politics of the colonial subject (Fanon 1963, Simatei 2005, Schmidt 2013). The dominant colonial discourse which constructed blacks as inferior, on the basis of biological and psychological differences, and as uncivilized, was deployed as a justificatory tool for the denial of citizenship under slavery. Slaves came to be regarded as a threat to the very plantations they were tied to, and their basic humanity was denied according to racial discourses that regarded them as inferior and threatening to white supremacy. In this historical context, violence became a tool for responding to domination and demanding changes in the structures of the colonies. Violence sometimes silenced and victimized the violated, but it also provoked resistance from those who refused to conform to its debilitating effects. C. L. R. James brilliantly demonstrates how, under the leadership of Toussaint L'Ouverture, Haiti defeated the French in the Haitian Revolution (1791) and became an independent country as early as 1804.

I will return to an examination of this colonial context in Chapter 3, where I situate the study and explore the Jamaican context. In this section, however, my discussion on the intersection between security and citizenship necessitates examining issues around modernity, exclusion and recognition, spatialization, identity politics and cultural debates on security.

Combining the Social and the Spatial: Modernity, Exclusion and Insecurity

Exclusion and marginalisation have been longstanding concerns among social scientists, who are interested in the conditions that create and perpetuate ‘us and them’ narratives, insider-outsider dynamics and unequal power relationships, which undergird various modes of resistance and struggles for inclusion (Amin 1994, Byrne 1997, Hills, Le Grand and Piachaud 2002). Exclusion, therefore, is an important concept for interrogating citizenship and a foremost concern for studies on insecurity. The inclusiveness, which citizenship ostensibly incorporates, has become questionable in the light of excluded populations, often denied the right to act as bearers of rights to whom certain privileges and entitlements are due (Dahrendorf 1988).

There is, among geographers, a concern about urban politics and the lack of rights to the city (Friedmann and Douglas 1998, Wekerle 2000), and the ‘ways in which citizenship rights and urban space are produced in relation to each other’ (McGann 2002). It is in the face of these concerns that Bader concludes that ‘citizenship always meant the exclusion of non-members’ (1997: 2). By sending out certain symbols, making choices between competing ideas for framing public policy and creating various mechanisms of social control, the state actively intervenes in the day-to-day dynamics of exclusion. Following Barbalet, it is important to realise that ‘the struggle for citizenship has been the struggle against exclusion and the inequalities which exclusion produces’ (1988: 7). These struggles have been explicitly tied to certain forms of ‘insurgent’, ‘fractious’ and disruptive security practices, with more and more studies demonstrating a link between various modes of resistance, violence and delinquency, on the one hand and exclusion on the other (Centner 2011, Holston 2008, Young 1999). Citizenship is important to studies of marginalised populations precisely because of these factors, and the way in which people are excluded by both transnational and national processes. Munck (2004) regards exclusion as a ‘social counterpart’ to globalization

as well as a new form of poverty. Citizenship, the way it is constructed in different locales, and the expectations it espouses, can arbitrarily facilitate exclusionary social practices at the transnational level. This, in turn, can lead to or exacerbate violent local geographies. This violence can become cyclical and compelling (Pearce 2007, Wilson 2013).

Exclusion 'refers to the dynamic process of being shut out, fully or partially, from any of the social, economic, political or cultural systems which determine the social integration of a person in society' (Walker and Walker 1997: 8). Drawing on the work of Abrams, Hogg, Marques and Mendes (2005), exclusion can take place at many different levels. At the societal level, there is 'consensual exclusion of particular sets of people within a society' (2005: 18). At the institutional level, there are certain criteria which form the basis of selection for inclusion by various institutions in the society. At the intergroup level, boundaries are drawn through established differences from other groups, and at the level of the intragroup, exclusion sets standards by which membership is legitimated. There is also intrapersonal exclusion, which is about one's emotional and cognitive state of being (which can either enable or prevent a person from considering opportunities for inclusion in the first place). The various levels of exclusion, as pointed out by the authors, are not mutually exclusive but are very much related. Exclusion at the interpersonal level can, for example, be affected by the broader societal, institutional, and even abstract forms of exclusion. These various forms of exclusion have increasingly been utilized, to different degrees perhaps, as important frames of reference in societies that experience various forms of insecurities, including physical and structural violence. It is important to locate the intersection between exclusion and individual security focused at any of these levels.

Modernity, late modernity, 'postmodernity', and the 'maelstrom of changes', which have accompanied these developments, provide a background, which can be used to anchor the discussion. It is important to understand the inclusion-exclusion dynamic in the context of

modernity and late modernity, as a way of tracing the changes that such processes brought about in the Western world and beyond. The aim is to illuminate and discuss the implications such changes had on faraway places, not just the very places where industrialisation and these processes took hold. Of key concern, of course, is the impact these changes set in motion for vulnerable groups and those who did not fit into the ideals of modernity and a modern, industrial economy.

Young (1999) regards the change from modernity to late modernity as one in which there was a move from an inclusive to an exclusive society, and with it changes in expectations of citizenship and contemporary developments in criminality. To invoke Young: 'the market economy in Post-Fordism involved a qualitative leap in levels of exclusion' (1999: 8). This saw changes taking place in the labour market, accompanied by a heightened sense of individuality. This led to exclusion of skilled workers from the labour market. Using the British example, Young argues that many in the working class became spectators of the kind of progress to which they aspired, only to be faced with the reality of constraints, material and cultural, in a capitalist economy that no longer valued their skills or emphasised their inclusion in the society. And while 'the market excludes participation as a worker, it encourages voraciousness as a consumer', with the result being a kind of 'precarious inclusion', where social citizenship is denied (1999:8). Harvey (1989) also talks about the shift from primary to secondary labour markets, and with it the rise of individualism in a broadly neoliberal economy, which heightened and made visible the gaps between the haves and the have-nots, facilitating what he calls 'accumulation by dispossession'. In this exclusive society, where late modernity led to new anxieties and uncertainties — and where citizenship became further denied to those who did not fit into the parameters of modernity or late modernity, 'subcultures' were formed to compensate for deep-seated feelings of exclusion:

young men facing such a denial of recognition turn, everywhere in the world, in what must be almost a universal criminological law, to the creation of cultures of machismo, to the mobilization of one of their only resources, physical strength, to the formation of gangs and to the defence of their own 'turf'. Being denied the respect of others they create a subculture that revolves around masculine powers and 'respect' (Young 1990: 12).

But, if we take Baudelaire's (1986) conception of modernity as being characterised by both the transient and the immutable, from the very beginning modernity suggested uncertainty for those unable to exist in its in-between spaces (Entrikin 1991). Furthermore, modernity aimed at a universal morality and emphasised an objective, rational basis for progress, as well as freedom from the mythological era (Habermas 1987). This was bound to have an impact on the transfer of such principles, without sensitivity to spatial, cultural, and temporal factors.

And as Harvey notes,

if the modernism of the inter-war years was 'heroic' but fraught with disaster, the universal or 'high' modernism that became hegemonic after 1945 exhibited a much more comfortable relation to the dominant power centres in society... High modernist art, architecture, literature, etc. became establishment arts and practices in a society, where a corporate capitalist version of the Enlightenment project of development for progress and human emancipation held sway as a political and economic dominant... The architecture that resulted merely produced impeccable images of power and prestige for publicity-conscious corporations and governments, while producing modernist housing projects for the working class that became a symbol of alienation and dehumanization (1989: 35-36).

Other studies have suggested a similar connection between modernity and the labour market, on one hand, and alienation and exclusion, on the other. *In Learning to Labour*, Willis (1977) investigates the reason 'lads' from working class backgrounds are more likely to end up with working class jobs. Willis concludes that the constraints and exclusion erected by class stratification create resistance to authority and a neglect of aspirations which are seen as unlikely achievements. Jamaica's class structure is especially visible in Kingston and has undoubtedly, as shown in the empirical chapters, affected the aspirations and 'livity' of the lower class.

Exclusion is also perpetuated and developed in relation to space and the built environment to reflect urban politics, class relations, and social segregation in urban spaces (Friedmann and Doughlass 1998, Mitchell 1995). Architecture and the privatization of public space have become powerful symbols of hegemony and control, and as such the design of space and place, as pointed out by Sibley (2003) is a process built on inclusion and exclusion. Sibley is interested in the narratives of the excluded and the kinds of socio-spatial exclusion experienced and articulated by subject groups. By mapping exclusion at different scales, from the home to the nation-state, he effectively unpacks the impact of space and the built environment as a social control mechanism. Through these mechanisms, some kinds of people are rendered deviants and dangerous, and ought to be policed by the state or private security companies, or excluded through architectural design and the privatization of public spaces (Kohn 2004, Lewis and Kedron 2011).

The fact that wanting to belong is a natural human characteristic (Dewall 2013) means that groups will react to their exclusion by either forming new groups, which display exclusionary tendencies or groups which challenge the systems of exclusion, experienced as oppressive mechanisms. Exclusion can, therefore, become a boundary-forming exercise carried out by those who wish to exclude, but also by the excluded. Furthermore, various empirical studies have shown how exclusion and the denial of full citizenship have resulted in ‘insurgent’ and ‘informal’ ways of claiming citizenship among such groups. The *favelas* in Rio Janeiro and São Paulo have reacted to the ways in which they have been excluded through the legal and institutional systems in their society, as well as through social relations and their experiences in public spaces. Holston’s (2008) research on Brazil points to the ways in which an ‘inclusively differentiated’ form of citizenship has resulted in insurgent practices, which use extra-legal processes to carve out a space in the society where people experience a sense of belonging, while challenging the state’s authority. Similarly, Koonings and Kruijt

(2007) have argued that problems with public security and state legitimacy have occurred alongside class discrimination, socio-economic marginalisation, neoliberalism and police abuse in Latin American cities, such as Mexico City, Rio de Janeiro, Medellin, Managua and Caracas. This, they argue, has resulted in fractured forms of citizenship and intensified class segregation. But there continues to be a gaping chasm between the modern state's interest in responding through legal justice and 'cultural reform' and demands by excluded populations for social justice and their inclusion in the formal economy, the labour market in particular.

Identity Politics and the Sub-Culture of Violence Debate

Identity and the 'politics of difference' are key issues in citizenship debates, and offer another way into the discussion on the way in which citizenship and security 'speak' to each other. A more particularistic account of citizenship relies on understanding the various ways in which groups that are oppressed seek recognition and respect on the basis of their identity, whether sexual, racial, social or ethnic. As a corollary, identity groups are usually defined through their struggles for recognition:

identity politics and the politics of identity are widely used to refer to a number of transformations in group behaviour and political arguments... These are typically deployed to highlight, the appearance, since the 1960s of new kind of social mobilization based upon various collective identities that were previously hidden, suppressed or neglected – both by the dominant culture of liberal society and by the agenda of the political left... These movements argued forcefully for the merits of a distinctive, common identity that shaped the interests and outlook of individuals who possessed these particular social 'markings' (Kenny 2004: 3)

By positing new issues for political consideration or deliberation, Kenny (2004) sees identity politics as being subversive of the established order. But depending on context, the issues central to identity politics may assume different forms. In Canada identity politics is chiefly concerned with land rights of indigenous populations (Kymlicka 1995). Race and gender have been central concerns in the US (Rogers 2006); in the UK and parts of Western Europe, the salient issues are mainly to do with race, culture and cultural discrimination against

immigrants and their religious beliefs and practices. Within parts of Latin America and the Caribbean, identity politics is formed on the basis of indigenous and ethnic politics, as well as spatial and cultural and partisan politics (Wade 2010, Wilson 2012). But it is not uncommon for the state and political institutions in places like Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa, to seek to co-opt subversive groups, incorporate them marginally into various political institutions or suborn such identities to a 'greater political cause' or to national identity. In Jamaica, as I will discuss in subsequent chapters, modes of incorporation and co-optation have historically relied primarily on forging strong partisan political identities to eclipse subversive action that could arise from racial and class-based identity, for instance. Using the argument that people make decisions not as citizens, but as members of disparate groups, identity politics has attracted criticism for being anti-democratic. However, it is very difficult for people to make decisions as 'citizens' when they are not accorded the status of a citizen.

One of the most popular advocates of identity politics is Iris Young. She supports recognizing group rights and is opposed to universal rights, which are often applied indiscriminately, and discriminately, across different groups. But those who support a more universalistic account for citizenship argue that recognising group rights can lead to cultural fragmentation and threaten social cohesion. Says Kymlicka:

on the one hand many of these groups are insisting that society officially affirm their difference and provide various kinds of institutional support and recognition for their difference... On the other hand, if society accepts and encourages more and more diversity in order to promote cultural inclusion, it seems like citizens will have less and less in common. If affirming difference is required to integrate marginalised groups into the common culture, there may cease to be a common culture (1995: 9).

However, there is more at stake than ensuring a 'common culture' and affirming difference. People can become targets for state discipline based on how they are identified and based on how they identify themselves, even where some semblance of a 'common culture' exists.

And even where group rights are used as a means of incorporation, the application of such rights can operate in a way that ignores or arbitrarily enforces such rights.

The Subculture of Violence Debate

Since its introduction by Wolfgang and Ferracut (1976), who treated the subculture of violence theory as natural and fixed, and particular to blacks in America, scholars, some from the Chicago school, have revisited the subculture of violence theory and claims that violence can be divorced from the historical, political, and systemic variables that often influence the ways in which violence is dispensed among the urban poor. Postcolonial theorists such as Franz Fanon (1986) were apt to point out how discourses around race produce specific subjectivities through their impact on definitions of the self and notions of desirability. Fanon saw violence as a way of countering the experiences of violence inflicted during colonialism.

While early subculture theorisations evidently depoliticised crime and security, and paid scant regard to situational and ecological factors in communities that experience high levels of violence, in *Code of the Street*, Anderson (1999) challenges the view that violence is a defining norm of the entire culture of communities. The ‘code of the street’, argues Anderson, applies predominantly to public behaviour and is normative only for the most alienated and socially isolated segment of the community’ (1999: 69). She notes, further, that unless they are completely immersed in street behaviour, young people tend to engage in ‘codeswitching’, and mainly conform to expectations of the code in public encounters—where it may be necessary or justified—while conforming to more conventional norms in private settings. Such norms include rules such as:

‘Watch your back.’ ‘Protect yourself.’ ‘Don’t punk out.’ ‘Respect yourself.’ ‘If somebody messes with you, you got to pay them back.’ ‘Don’t you come in here crying that someone beat you up; you better get back out there and whoop his ass.’ (Anderson 1999: 70-71)

Drawing on Fugard's novel, *Tstoti*, and Merton's work on anomie, Makombe (2013) highlights the way in which a subculture of violence emerged in South Africa in response to apartheid and its monopoly on power in the society. In this context, subcultures of violence and gang violence are regarded by Makombe as a counterforce to the dominant culture. He argues that the ability to challenge established power in a society, where violence was institutionalised and used to discipline black bodies, is not just a matter of normalised violence, but of creatively surviving, adapting, struggling and making a choice to use violence as a tool of demanding social power and recognition. Identity politics, struggles, subversion, and violence are all interrelated phenomena, and perhaps identity politics, by engaging with culture as well as citizenship, provides a bridge between subculture of violence theories and more structural explanations. Identity politics intervenes by tying issues of identity and local context to the broader macro issues of established power, and showing how they are interconnected. It stresses, therefore, the tension between place as a given and continuous attempts at place-making. It depicts the subject as an active participant not just responding to structural forces, determinately, but also seeking to fashion his/her own destiny and defend particular social and political identities.

Having provided an introduction and a theoretical framework for the study, enabling the reader to think through some of the important literature that is relevant to this thesis, the following chapter will now examine the Jamaican context, paying special attention to its political structures, the period of decolonization and the post-independence period.

CHAPTER 3

JAMAICAN DECOLONIZATION, POLITICS AND CITIZENSHIP

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of Jamaican society— the country where the study was conducted. I am interested in presenting the context for understanding how citizenship developed in Jamaica. The degree to which citizenship did or did not materialise is illuminated and accounted for in the discussion that follows. The empirical chapters widen this discussion and utilize additional academic literature relevant to Jamaica. In this chapter the contemporary landscape and oeuvre of a number of academics are examined with the aim of providing a contextual background. The approach of this chapter allows us to understand various permutations at work in Jamaican society, including an enduring deficit in citizenship which has survived many decades.

I sketch the decolonization period and examine the formation of the two-party political system in Jamaica, used as a means of validating democracy and marking the beginning of full internal control over the country's political, social, and economic system, while retaining the Queen as the head of state. This provides the context for examining how Jamaica has fared — since the decolonization period— how the state, as an entity vested with certain powers, has used this power, and how alternative mechanisms, partly as an outgrowth of these processes, have sprung up. Taken as a whole, there is ample evidence to suggest that while strides have been made towards developing a local framework of citizenship, these have taken on a particularly legalistic, fragmented, and differentiated mode. This is evident in patterns of spatial and social segregation that accompanied processes of urbanization, as well as policies designed to respond to rapid growth in Kingston's population and the presence of

socially and economically disenfranchised groups in the city. Fifty-three years after independence, Jamaica is still struggling to fulfil its promise of a more equal and less divisive society.

Jamaica is part of the English-speaking Caribbean and is located in the Caribbean region, south of Cuba. According to census data produced by the Statistical Institute of Jamaica, the country has a population of approximately 2.67 million, with about 658 thousand people residing in Kingston, the capital city. Jamaica covers an area of 10, 991 square kilometres, which makes it the third largest country in the Caribbean, next to Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Jamaica also has the 5th largest population, and the largest among the English-speaking units. While the Caribbean is connected by the history of colonialism and slavery, and defined according to similarity in either identity, language, geography, history, culture, geopolitics, or organisation (Girvan 2001, Best 1971), the presence of a diversity of peoples, cultures and languages resists any simple definition. It is by placing Jamaica in this larger Caribbean context, which still bears the indelible imprint left by colonialism, that past and present structures are likely to become more easily intelligible.

From Colonialism to Decolonization

Differential citizenship began in Jamaica as a natural outgrowth of colonialism and the coming together of Africa and Europe under chattel slavery. The extent to which decolonization modified or affected citizenship is a primary concern in this section. But first it is important to understand the colonial period that decolonization was meant to bring changes to. Two analytical frameworks are of interest here— (1) the legal as well as racial/colour basis on which notions of who was qualified to be a citizen was based, and (2) the way in which the social order, based on white supremacy and black inferiority, held this together. Moving to the decolonization and post-independence period, I then examine gaps

between legal and substantive forms of citizenship and the growing importance of class and space as important determinants of citizenship. Not only are socio-legal factors of importance to citizenship in post-independent Jamaica, but lack of state security and state as well as extralegal punishment, closely intertwined with space and the garrisons, has become another platform on which people have come to view themselves as either belonging in ‘the society’, or outside. This adds another layer to the citizenship matrix in Jamaica. This relationship between violence and citizenship. Patterson (1982) has shown how violent practices of slavery lead to domination of the ‘socially dead person’. Slavery and codified racism dictated and authorized violent practices, but in their aftermath, discipline and punishment, in their different forms, carried out by state and non-state actors, have continued to reinforce the borders of citizenship, demarcating non-citizens from citizens and those positioned in-between on the citizenship spectrum.

During colonialism citizenship and race were inextricably intertwined. Writing on Kingston, Clarke notes that ‘the population comprised three hierarchically organized and legally defined strata— white free men, black slaves, and an intermediate group of mixed descent, who were no longer bondsmen but, like the Jewish community, had only limited civil rights’ (2006: 7). In accordance with this structure, racial divisions were invidious and pervasive, with citizenship tied to colour and property, and located outside the purview of the majority of blacks, who were slaves. Consequently, the legal monopoly exercised by planters during colonialism and the strict social hierarchies that flowed from this were associated with genealogy, which later became influenced by phenotype (Clarke 1975). Still there were certain provisos related to three classes of freed persons that intervened in the general rule, but without changing the underlying structures that held the plantation economy together. The classes included those manumitted according to their owner’s wishes, but without the right to vote in general elections or give evidence in court; those born free and whose

evidence was accepted in civil cases; and those made free by private acts and who enjoyed more privileges than the first two groups, but were very limited in number (Long 1774). And while freed blacks could vote in elections, starting only in 1832, their ability to exercise this right was severely hampered by their lack of property.

A remarkably persistent impact of colonialism and the collision of Europe and Africa in the Caribbean was the ‘white bias’ it created in Jamaican society. The white bias placed a premium on phenotype as the ideal aesthetic and this was a key determinant for how privilege was to be distributed, and in what racial order. Long points out that ‘the descendants of the Negroe blood, entitled to all the rights and privileges of white subjects, in the full extent, are such, who are three steps removed in the lineal digression from the Negroe...’ (1774: 322). Lineal digression implied distancing and gave impetus to the task of inculcating a belief in the black person that he/she was racially inferior, uncivilised and in need of Christianization. Consequently, African cultural practices were strongly discouraged, denigrated, or criminalised. Obeah, in particular, was regarded as subversive of the established order, and remains illegal in Jamaica. The first Obeah laws were enacted in 1760, with amendments passed in 1898⁵. While some scholars have argued that the transatlantic slave trade did not lend itself to cultural retention, others have shown why this is an erroneous and polemic view, as slaves did retain aspects of their culture, even in the face of significant rupture and dominance of European ways of life and institutions (Herskovits 1941, Mintz and Price 1992, Warner-Lewis 2003). Practices, including Myalism (white magic) and Obeah (black magic) continued to be important in the post-emancipation period, acting as a means of interpreting

⁵ The Obeah Act 1898 regards obeah and myalism as synonymous and states that ‘a person practising obeah means any person who, to effect any fraudulent or unlawful purpose, or for gain, or for the purpose of frightening any person, uses, or pretends to use any occult means, or pretends to possess any supernatural power or knowledge; and “instrument of obeah” means anything used, or intended to be used by a person, and pretended by such person to be possessed of any occult or supernatural power.’

and responding to various experiences in Jamaican society. Such practices assumed even greater significance in the light of continuing social injustices well into the post-emancipation and post-independence period. Moore and Johnson shed light on the importance of this kind of Afro-Jamaican belief system.

The Afro-Creole belief system was the embodiment of the cultural mind of the Jamaican people. The very foundation of the Afro-Jamaican world view, it was integral to the process of rationalizing and ordering their lives, both spiritually and materially. Like its West African antecedent cosmology, it made no distinction between the secular and the sacred, but rather formed an intricately interwoven mosaic embracing all aspects of Afro-Jamaican life. Vilifying it as superstition, paganism and savagery, therefore was a direct attack on the psyche of its adherents (2004: 14).

The Afro-Creole belief system acted as a counterpoint to European forms of citizenship and social mores. Alongside these belief and cultural practices were recurring instances of violent revolt and resistance and rising political-consciousness, occasioned by oppressive structures in the society.

From Emancipation to Rebellion and Riots

The legacy of slavery and colonialism has had a protracted influence on Jamaica. Substantively and legally, the slave-emancipation period, starting in 1834, did not, save for the abolition of slavery, lead to drastic structural changes. In addition to being shut out of the electoral franchise, one in three West Indians could not read or write and one in four never attended school (Campbell 1993). Black men could not vote unless they owned property valued at six pounds or paid thirty pounds in rent or three pounds in direct taxes. This meant only 1% or less of the population exercised the right to vote (Hall, 1959, Hueman 1981). Starting with this observation, Campbell goes on to argue that formal freedom availed most West Indians little in the 'face of customary discrimination', but instead it increased racial prejudice. Curtin (1955) also points to the fact that even after emancipation, few West Indians received either education or health-care. The schools were established as elite institutions that

catered to whites and eventually to middle class-coloured children (Hamilton 1964). The education system was, in this regard, a European model that catered to those who were seen as citizens. It is no wonder that the church began to play such a significant, but highly questionable role in the post-emancipation period. William Knibb and the Baptist missionaries took on the task of establishing free villages, but following his death in 1845, and given unstable economic conditions, most peasants were forced into squatting and denied access to the land (Garland 1842, Turner 1998). Critically, the church provided a temporary but also pacifying device for those at the bottom of the social hierarchy. It attempted to keep them in their place, teaching the 'value' of obedience and the Christian promise of redemption (Gussai and Murrell 2000). Both colonial and postcolonial structures reflect this pattern, where an alternative entity is relied on to 'fill' the ubiquitous lacuna left by the state.

Given the extremely oppressive conditions that continued almost unabated well into the post-emancipation period, where both legal and substantive citizenship continued to elude most of the population, it is not surprising that these conditions eventually resulted in the October 11, 1865 Morant Bay Rebellion. The Morant Bay Rebellion is widely regarded as a very critical moment in Jamaica's political history because of the way in which it challenged the country's established order (Heuman 1994, Shepherd and Beckles 1996). But while it provided a platform to demonstrate widespread dissatisfaction, it did not significantly alter the relations among the different classes (Augier 1993). Augier associates the limited impact of the rebellion with the intervention by the military and the imposition of direct rule from Britain in the form of Crown Colony Government in 1866. He concludes that 'the society survived the riots without alteration in its social and economic structures (1993: 171). The Morant Bay rebellion started in Jamaica, October 11, 1865, when Paul Bogle, a well-known deacon in the Baptist Church, and his followers intervened in an act by the police to arrest a man in St. Thomas following an eviction for trespassing. This eventually culminated in a

violent altercation between the military and Bogle and his forces, who marched with conch shells into Morant Bay. In response to being fired on by volunteers, who killed 7 of the protesters, 20 whites were killed by Bogle and his men. A military intervention followed which led to houses being burnt, the killing of some 430 persons, with a further 600 flogged, and the hanging of Bogle (Heuman 1994). Heuman argues that the Morant Bay Rebellion was not only a well-organised act against material injustices but was driven by the level of political consciousness of blacks in the society. A keen awareness of miscarriages of justice, inequality, and racial discrimination reverberated throughout the rebellion. Protesters chanted, 'colour for colour', one policeman was instructed by men carrying sticks and cutlasses to repeat the words, 'so help me God after this day I must cleave from the whites and cleave to the blacks' (Heuman 1994: 5). Hostile race relations were, therefore, at the forefront of the grievances of the Morant Bay protesters. It was clear that blacks in Jamaica were calling for greater racial solidarity among their own kind.

Creating Winners and Losers: an Elite Exercise in Constitutional and Political Transfer

The Morant Bay Rebellion culminated in the introduction of the system of crown colony government in Jamaica in 1866, which meant the country was governed directly by Britain. The local whites and browns feared that without direct legislative control of the state machinery by Britain, they would be at danger of another uprising by the 'uncivilized' blacks, who were challenging established power and the social and political order in Jamaica (Holt 1992). Crown colony government merely represented a change of guards—it substituted a legislative council for assembly government, and continued to function in the interests of the propertied class (Hamilton 1964). In fact, when an elective element was introduced in 1884 (made up of nine elected members, four *ex-officios* and up to five nominated persons) it came as no surprise that all its members were white and drawn from the business and agricultural sectors (Sires 1955).

Without much needed changes in the colonial structures, and given harsh labour conditions and the slow growth in urban industries, by 1889 about 84,000 Jamaicans had left to seek work overseas, either as labourers for the construction of the Panama Canal or the railway enterprise in Costa Rica (Proudfoot 1970). By 1935, when these opportunities had dried up, and in the midst of a general downturn in the economy, affected by external events including the war and the 1930s depression, protest again gripped the island in 1938, when the labour riots broke out. The West India Royal Commission, which investigated the riots, made the point that ‘the discontent that underlies the disturbances of recent years is a phenomenon of a different character, representing no longer a blind protest against worsening of conditions, but a positive demand for the creation of new conditions that will render possible a less-restricted life’ (1945: 425). The riots demonstrated, once again, that protest and violence had become established features of Jamaican society, an instrument used for making demands on society for access to its economic resources and a more dignified place in society. The browns in the middle class who were no doubt hungry for power and authority took advantage of the opportunity presented by the lower-class labour riots and used it to make demands on Britain for constitutional decolonization (Munroe 1972).

Constitutional Decolonization

Modelled on the British Westminster system, constitutional decolonization (1944-1962) did not offer a radical platform to address ingrained structural inequalities or rectify the problematic nature of citizenship in Jamaica. The Westminster model of constitutional decolonization assumes that society is socially and institutionally homogeneous, and values thereby shared, necessitating merely incremental political changes (Mills: 1997). The constitution was blind to issues of race and its influence on the peculiarity of the post-colonial context and social divisions amongst the population. Instead, universal rights were enshrined in the constitution and modelled on the Westminster Whitehall model. Jamaica was

used as an institutional model for the rest of the Caribbean, and more time was spent ensuring that the metropole was satisfied with its progress, rather than adopting a constitution that suited local needs. Norman Manley, the leader of the Peoples National Party and past Rhodes Scholar took the view that he did not perceive a need for radical changes to the British model, with which Jamaica would have been most familiar (Munroe 1972).

Munroe (1972) makes a number of convincing arguments to support his hypothesis that decolonization failed to break with the past and instead encouraged a system of oligarchy. In essence, changes were more symbolic than real. This is a general problem in the Caribbean; while Haiti, for example, was able to break the bonds of slavery as early as 1804, Haiti's subsequent institutional regimes fundamentally lacked the appropriate norms, structures, processes, and rules required to solidify and consolidate their victory (Strotzky 1997). In the first instance, the two main political parties the Peoples National Party and the Jamaica Labour Party which emerged showed no desire to depart from Westminster politics. According to Munroe (1972) both Norman Manley and his cousin Bustamante led political parties, which reflected the divisions of colour and class in the society. He shows how the middle-class rank and file members, who made up both the Jamaica Labour Party and the Peoples National Party, became primary successors and beneficiaries of constitutional decolonization. Echoing these views, McIntosh asserts that:

the independence constitutions are Orders-in-Council of the British Imperial Parliament –amended versions of the colonial constitution, with Bills of Rights engrafted onto them. This allowed easy transition from colony to independent state. This continuity implied no important changes between the colonial and independent constitution. The parliamentary system remained virtually the same, and the constitutions, for the most part, are said to have remained monarchical (2002: 6).

Differences between the British model and the adapted version are reflected in a number of features in the Jamaican model, including bicameralism, separation of powers, special majorities and the existence of a written constitution (Ghany 1994). Additionally,

Westminster as practised in Britain is different from its practice in the Caribbean, as would be anticipated when a foreign model comes in contact with a local culture. In many Caribbean societies Westminster politics (as in the UK) ensured a ‘winner-takes-all’ political practice, and once in power, the historical precedent was for the ‘spoils’ and state benefits to be enjoyed almost exclusively by party loyalists and supporters, leaving the losing party and its supporters almost powerless (Ryan 1999). It is against this background that the Jamaican parliament, since the granting of adult suffrage in 1944, increasingly came to be viewed as a vote-winning and tribal institution, rather than an institution for change. Elections were neither free nor fair, and to attain electoral success and amass grassroots support, nepotism, corruption, and violence became unrelenting features of Jamaica’s democracy. By the late 1940s, Western Kingston had become a battleground for competitive trade union politics (Sives 2010), which carried over into the post-independence period.

Adult Suffrage, Independence and Beyond

While universal adult suffrage in 1944 was a step in the right direction, by 1946 the unemployed represented 25.59 percent of the total labour force (Hamilton 1964). The Report of the Commission on Public Service (1949) stated that in 1943, 75% of the population was underprivileged and unable to contribute to national revenues. The position taken by the report was that there were problems with the constitution — ‘very plainly a constitution such as that possessed by Jamaica will, in such [economic] circumstances, emphasize palliatives for economic sickness rather than drastic cures’ (1949: 6).

the flawed nature of economic development experienced in Jamaica after the second World War produced a discordant class system—at the top of the social hierarchy, it fostered the emergence of a local capitalist class in a subordinate role to foreign capital. This class was based on ownership of land and control of the colonial distributive trade through import/export agencies and commission houses (1988: 33).

It was not surprising then that Edward Seaga, past leader of the Jamaica Labour Party and former Prime Minister of Jamaica, won support among the public for his famous 1962 speech about the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’.

By the 1960s political parties sought to take advantage of widespread despair arising out of such high levels of inequality and impoverishment among the lower classes, particularly in Kingston, the capital city. This was achieved by marrying social rights (mainly in the form of housing, through a ‘political welfare system’) to political loyalty and violence and pitting the urban lower classes against each other. This represented a moment in Jamaica’s history when citizenship was explicitly and deliberately tied to violence and politics. Two things disrupted state control over the relationship between violence and citizenship. Firstly, neoliberalism and structural adjustment policies from 1980 onwards led to a rolling back of the state, and, secondly, there was the rise of the drug trade that disrupted the power dynamic between politicians and the garrisons. In the context of neoliberalism, and given the implementation of structural adjustment policies in the 1980s, the Jamaican state was rendered incapable of reconciling the ubiquitous tensions between global and local priorities, and between the state and the market. One impact of structural adjustment was the rise in unemployment from 22 to 30 percent between 1972 and 1989 (King 2000). Structural adjustment policies exacerbated the problem of individual security and facilitated the development of parallel social orders between the state and garrison communities as local communities became further alienated in the aftermath of its implementation.

Additionally, the citizenship deficit also manifests in the lack of legitimate opportunities in the formal Jamaican economy. The informal sector in Jamaica accounts for about 40% of total economic activity (Alleyne 2007). Anderson (2004) points out that structural adjustment negatively impacted on unemployment and economic growth in Jamaica. Her computation of the employment figures between 1977 and 1989 showed

employment for both men and women being reduced from 60-53 and 56-44% respectively. She points out as well that the informal economy, which includes domestic workers, street vendors, drug dealing and street hustling, has acted as a reservoir for surplus labour created by 'labour market- related poverty'.

Social Relations

Social relations have significantly shaped the contours of differential citizenship in contemporary Jamaica. Resistance and riots continued as primary means of challenging established power, as well as illuminating problems with social relations in the society in the post-independence period. The Coral Garden Riots or the anti-Chinese Riots (1965) and the Rodney Riots (1968) clearly indicated that all was not well in post-independence Jamaica (Brodbber 1989). Colour/class divisions and differential access to privileges and entitlements provoked feelings of resentment. Henriques (1953) argues that it is Jamaica's colour-class dynamic which determine social hierarchy and access to privilege in the society. In line with his main argument that there is a white bias in the society, Henriques proposes that 'the whole colour-class system is dependent upon the almost complete acceptance by each group of the superiority of the whites, and the inferiority of blacks' (1953: 41), but because the 'black person is unable to take over white ideas and culture completely, it is the essential 'in-betweenness' or 'half-identification', which is the basis of his personality (1953: 61).

M.G. Smith, writing on cultural pluralism in the 1950s and 1960s, argued that cultural pluralism was the basis of conflict amongst the different groups in Jamaica. According to M. G. Smith, 'in a culturally divided society, each cultural section has its own relatively exclusive way of life, with its own distinctive systems of action, ideas, values and social relations' (1965: 768). Smith is of the view that intersectional mobility would take a lifetime, because it requires adaptation to new institutional systems.

Smith's theory has been variously critiqued for ignoring the fact that other social factors including class, not mere differences in ethnic practices, are central to understanding Jamaica, and Caribbean societies (Braithwaite 1960, Chevannes 2006, G. K Lewis 1968, R. T. Smith 1988). Clarke (1981) denotes Jamaica as a plural-stratified society where class, colour and culture, with colour fading as a stratifying factor after 1970, exist in a symbiotic relationship in Kingston, producing 'three strata associated with different geographical locations, anchored by competitive bidding for real estate' (2011: 95). R. T. Smith (1988) argues for an understanding of culture and kinship in the Caribbean that is not understood in a strictly institutionally-differentiated manner. Chevannes (2006) believes that most Jamaicans operate in two worlds, two orders and they move the boundaries back and forth as it suits.'

The key thing is that Smith links cultural pluralism with structural pluralism (or differential incorporation). Historically, we can see that it is differential incorporation of free whites compared to free people of colour (with limited civil rights) compared to slaves (with essentially no rights) that produces the Creole cultural stratification exemplified in family, religion and education during slavery and the post-emancipation period. Smith wants to address the question of 'interracial accommodation', incorporation, and the 'factors which regulate allocation of differential status among racially different stocks within Caribbean societies' (1974: 270). Class has been a consistent factor in the determination of status allocation. Clarke (2006) points to the importance of spatial formations, interlinked with class, influenced by 'cityward migration' between 1860 and 1920 and urbanization in the 1950s, which led to an increase in the city's population and changes in the social geography of Kingston. According to Clarke, class distinctions were even more pronounced after independence (1962) between West Kingston and inner East Kingston, as it became palpable that the spatial distribution of the population was correlated with class.

Spatial distribution of the population in Kingston is also correlated with insecurity. Insecurity and the garrison phenomena have become increasingly important determinants of inclusion and lack of citizenship in Jamaican society. Chapter 6 and subsequent Chapters examine class, space, and security as key areas for examining differential citizenship in contemporary Jamaica. It is the political landscape and issues around trust, legitimacy, and the democratic process that are now examined in a bid to further contextualise the study.

Jamaican Politics

Political Culture and Trust

To further explore how citizenship has evolved in Jamaica, it is important to understand two salient factors that affect all aspects of political life in Jamaica—trust and the political culture. The problem of legitimacy is no doubt impacted by overall low levels of trust in political institutions, in particular. Low levels of trust and the formation of a specific type of political culture, I would argue, are significantly influenced by the manner in which political institutions have sought to intervene in the day-to-day enactment of citizenship and the democratic process in Jamaica. Jamaica's political culture has been shaped, and is shaped, by the political structures in the society. Individuals are 'socialized into their culture but they also reproduce it' (Chilton 1988). Understanding the political culture of a particular society is important for the precise reason that 'revealing the patterns of orientation to political action helps us to connect individual tendencies to system characteristics' (Almond and Powell 1966: 51-52). There are various ways in which individuals in Jamaica have been socialized and oriented toward certain forms of political action and certain political norms and values. These have been produced and reproduced through actions and discourses that take place between political parties and communities, and the different classes in the society.

Jamaica's political culture is strongly associated with charismatic and populist leadership, as is the case in most of the Caribbean (Ryan 1999, Singham 1968). Strong political identity and violence are also defining features of Jamaica's political culture, and these have had negative and stifling effects on democracy. The 'politics of affect' implies that policies, participation in the democratic process and political performance do not always determine overall attitudes toward politics. Sives contends that 'in many ways political inclusion through clientelist ties can alleviate some of the negative consequences of economic and social exclusion by providing a sense of belonging, identity and hope. This can be a critical support for elite hegemony' (2002: 70).

While clientelism produces a discordant system of democracy the findings of a study conducted by Powell and Lewis (2010) on political culture and democratic values, found that Jamaicans were strongly committed to democratic norms. Commitment to democratic norms does not, however, naturally translate to satisfaction with democracy. Forty-five percent of the respondents interviewed in the study were not 'very satisfied' with 'the way democracy works in Jamaica', and in response to the question, 'I would not mind a non-democratic government in power, if it could solve the economic problems', 38% of the respondents said they agree. And while Jamaicans value democracy, they do not trust their political institutions. According to the same study, only 10% of Jamaicans trust the parliament and about 8% trust the political parties. People trust schools and the church more than they trust the institutions of the state; Jamaicans do not trust political institutions to govern in the public interest. By fostering trust, a society is better able to cultivate inclusion through acts of reciprocity, but coordinated action, civic participation and reciprocity, necessary elements for building trust, (Francis 2002, Putman 1993), are difficult to achieve in an atomistic society, where the political culture encourages differential citizenship and alienation from social and political institutions in the society.

Sives (2010) argues that partisan identity, and its interconnection with violence, started when the trade unions sought to strengthen their position in the communities. As Sives points out, as early as 1949, the political parties and the trade unions, to which they were closely affiliated, had become major sources of violent clashes in Jamaica, with the main implements of violence being sticks, stones and machetes. She argues, as well, that partisan identities, then, became linked with the distribution of state resources in the 1950s and 1960s. This type of politics facilitated hostile political geographies built around spatial control, violence and protection, and homogeneous voting patterns.

'Flawed Democracy'

The Economist Intelligence Unit (2013) categorizes Jamaica as a 'flawed democracy'. Jamaican democracy has been variously discussed, but one of the most outstanding theorisations has been Carl Stone's (1980). He characterises Jamaica's democracy as a clientelistic type of democracy. Stone distinguishes clientelism in Jamaica from class-based politics of liberal democracy and authoritarian states, preferring to see it 'as a mechanism by which to institutionalize a power structure that competes with, and parallels, the old and continuing power structures rooted in the ownership of the means of production, by local and capital foreign capitalist interest' (1980: 93). In this system politicians, who are seen as patrons, distribute economic resources to garrison communities, in this case clients, in return for votes. In this way, dominant power structures are created and sustained through mutual dependency, the use of violence and intimidation. The relationship between violence and democracy remains an important phenomenon, and while the Jamaican case is by no means exceptional, the relationship between violence and democracy seems to have assumed a peculiar shape. The insertion of violence into Jamaica's political culture placed democracy, from the very beginning, on shaky ground, challenging the very notion of a democratic state according to its modern definitions.

Stone is criticised by Sives (2010) for overstating the power of the state while downplaying the social power of the urban poor. The power dynamic between politicians and garrison communities has undergone changes, the details and impact of which will become evident in Chapter 5. This is partly the result of the inability of the Jamaica state to afford a broad-based system of patronage. New ways— not accounted for by Stone’s clientilistic model— of competing with the ‘old and continuing power structures’ have also emerged. The state, I would argue, uses its control over policing and its ability to intervene in, and shape, dominant discourses as a way of maintaining its power, or to swing the pendulum in its favour. And while garrison communities remain a strong source of electoral power for the state, power is also institutionalized through discourses and through the state’s custodianship of citizenship for the middle and upper classes in Jamaica. Irrespective of a pervasive sense of disenchantment with the state at all levels, the state manages to derive ‘legitimate’ power by capitalizing on high levels of fear in society. That the most ‘effective’ means of counteracting the power of the garrison and dangerous ‘others’ is to increase the power of the state to deploy extra-legal and more punitive forms of punishment is a view shared by many Jamaicans. This, I would argue, provides an important means by which the state in contemporary Jamaica consolidates its power and sustains its domination over resisting populations.

The legacy of chattel slavery has had a protracted impact at all levels – structural, psychological, social, and economic. No quirk of history will dismantle the remnants of a past built on narratives and practices of racial superiority, exploitation, and disenfranchisement of the disadvantaged. Changes require deliberate action. But no real attempts were made to bring about these changes in the post-emancipation period— freedom did not amount to real changes and the old structures continued intact. Well into the post-independence period, a considerable – and for some an increasing – deficit in citizenship is

evident in Jamaica, and although selective music and language patterns of those in the lower classes have been appropriated and form the foundation of Jamaica's cultural repertoire, colour but especially class and spatial politics are major platforms on which access to social goods in the society is either made available or denied. Along with these, issues of trust, legitimacy and insecurity continue to affect governance and the nature of citizenship in 21st-century Jamaica. Having outlined the context, I now turn to the the empirical chapters.

CHAPTER 4

OPTING OUT OF STATE CITIZENSHIP? GOLDEN TOWN

Introduction

Golden Town is the most emblematic and extreme garrison in Kingston. The community has a population of approximately 15,000; youth unemployment is 30% and 62% of the population only has a secondary school education (Planning Institute of Jamaica 2010). The Golden Town garrison was among the earliest to be constructed by political parties in the capital city, and for many years, the community was scarcely penetrated by law enforcement and was able to initiate the use of force in an organised way against the state.

The state has been decentred as the main referent focus of citizenship in Golden Town, and the community operates its own form of locally-legitimised order under the leadership of a 'don'. From the 1960s, the don, also designated as the 'president', acted as an interlocutor for both politicians and the community in the distribution of state benefits and the dispensation of violence. The don also assumed a dominant role in the protection of his community from its political nemeses in neighbouring communities. Politicians were able to set the parameters and terms of citizenship for residents of Golden Town, which became violently performative, even theatrical, embodying polarising political symbols and unremittingly hostile political geographies.

Within Golden Town, emphasis was placed squarely on the right to vote, which was deliberately tied to the distribution of scarce benefits and spoils. Voting was, however, not a sufficient condition to guarantee acquisition. Distribution of benefits relied on strong

loyalties, which were proven through violent performances on behalf of the political parties to ensure electoral success. For this reason, I explore how the inextricable ties between politicians and garrison communities created strong political identities and influenced the forms that citizenship assumed in Golden Town. But the 1980s witnessed major changes as the dons became increasingly independent of politicians. Citizenship was no longer embodied in the political institutions of the state— resistance and donmanship became indispensable features of the ways in which people use violence and their agency to redefine their sense of place in the society, socially and economically. The alternative security discourses and practices that inform life in Golden Town are crucial to this attempt. There is, as I will show in this chapter, a critical and symbiotic link between the failures of the state and the local legitimisation of an alternative order, presided over by a don. The don is the most central figure in Golden Town—he is critical to the ways in which people derive a sense of respect and develop separate ways of realising a sense of citizenship at the community level.

Residents in Golden Town constitute themselves as citizens who belonged to and identified with a community that was regarded as completely safe. There is a dialectic relationship between the use of violence and the emphasis placed on security, which the state does not guarantee. There is, however, growing insecurity and a sense of ‘out of placeness’ that has accompanied the absence of the don. The theorisation of garrison communities as ‘subcultures of violence’ can at times negate the emphasis placed on security and the willingness to submit to the don’s rules, which utilizes violence as punishment, to attain a sense of security. This chapter also examines how the interplay between security and violence and the system of donmanship act to reproduce certain dominant discourses in Jamaican society.

Forging of Spatial and Political Identities

Golden Town has been regarded as one of the most extreme garrison's in Jamaica, but residents are opposed to nomenclatures that suggest that the entire community is defined by criminality:

All class a people live a Golden Town, we a no criminal, teachers and nurse come from here too—and it is no wonder the police have been so shocked to see that most people from Golden Town have a nine to five job, we a no, no [mother] of all garrisons (Sarah, 44-year-old 'shop-keeper').

Residents in Golden Town emphasised the overlapping role of space, history and politics as critical signifiers of the ways in which security evolved as a central issue in their everyday lives. Clear political borders were drawn in the late 1960s, and political supporters from opposing parties dared not cross these physically demarcated as well as metaphorical borders; and when they did, very often the price paid was blood. The security narratives in Golden Town are historically grounded—they draw extensively upon memory and the past to construct the present, making the historical narratives decidedly relevant as well⁶. Specific political leaders and party politics have had a profound and protracted impact on the formation of identities in Golden Town. People developed close political affinities and held on to them because politics became an integral determinant of life chances in the ghettos. But this affinity also resulted from the embodiment of symbols and performances, violent and otherwise, that were developed and staged spectacularly on behalf of political parties. Pauline, a senior member of the community, invoked this sense of political identity:

Politics is the reason I get this house- I had nowhere to live. Politics is also the reason I got a job at the school. This gave me the means to afford my food. I love [our past MP]. We fought fire with fire and blood for blood against [the representative of the other political party] and put the PNP out of [Lion Town]. You think is a little bit we go through to have all of this. This is a stronghold and no matter what we cannot change. Our first member of parliament would die if Golden Town was to ever come

⁶ For further reading on violence and memory see Pilar (2006) *Dwellers of Memory: Youth and Violence in Medellin, Columbia* and Berber (2012) *History, Memory and State-Sponsored Violence: Time and Justice*.

under the control of the People's National Party— and we can't allow that to happen, we want him to live. I love that man so much

These political narratives are best understood in relation to the impact and the lasting affair politicians succeeded in creating between politics, violence, identity and scarce resources. Identification with politics, space, violence, and protection from the political Other became major symbols for groups, who had begun the search for avenues to constitute themselves as citizens.

Based on what he calls the 'culture of poor people', John, who has lived in the community for many years, had these views about how partisan identities support the security practices and narratives of the community:

if you look at the culture of poor people in Jamaica, you understand why politicians were able to study and to bond with poor people. Henry Williams [past Member of Parliament of the Community] revolutionized Golden Town by studying the people. But that culture that he instituted is changing. These politicians no longer love poor people and that is the problem. Let me tell you how Golden Town run— if the people realize that you love and care for them, their loyalty remains with you forever. This is how Golden Town run. The study that Henry Williams did on the people showed him how to control the community. Our country has a system where once there are loop holes, we will manipulate the system. And you can't blame anyone for doing that. The dons have done the same thing, because they study and understand the culture of poor people. People know that this current MP doesn't love poor people and that is why they react differently to him. Henry Williams, to help poor people, even sent people to China to train. People used to say that Free Zone Money short, but nobody would take up that money and give it to you on a Friday. People don't forget these things, and that is the reason Henry Williams was in control even while this current MP is in power.

There is a clear sense of an enduring, formidable, yet fluid, identity suggested by John's reference to control, loyalty and change. Marcia (1980) suggests that individuals can experience a sense of identity foreclosure. Foreclosed individuals tend to develop a significant attachment to their current circumstances and to the individuals who have helped to put those circumstances in place; and they tend to resist change at almost any cost (Schwartz 2001). In the case of Jamaica, this condition results from the strong emphasis placed on emotional bonds, historically tied to the relief of impoverishment and economic

opportunities. Emphasis placed on strong, charismatic leadership, together with the influence of Jamaica's political culture, has partly neutralised the reaction to a growing perception and recognition that politics and donmanship both produce problematic conditions in the garrisons. However, John's assertion that the culture instituted by Henry Williams in the 1960s is changing, and with it reduced support for the current Member of Parliament, suggests the fluidity of partisan identities, even in the midst of tendencies toward identity foreclosure. Challenging the liberal humanist view, poststructuralists have argued that identity should be seen as constructed, malleable and contingent, rather than fixed (Butler 1990, Young 1997). Identity formations in Golden Town have, in fact, been significantly influenced by the dons, as well as a set of contingent social, economic and political circumstances.

The harsh economic realities of deprivation and the search for belonging and 'care' facilitated strong emotional bonds and strong political identities. But, there is a shifting narrative on the role of politics vis-à-vis other ways of identifying, and, with it, an obvious shift from a sole focus on maintaining political boundaries to a greater focus on donmanship, materialism and wealth. People have come to identify closely with the system of 'donmanship' and what it represents, in terms of its indispensability in constructing a social, cultural and economic 'We'. If we take Hall's view that 'identities are names we give to the different ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves within, the narratives of the past' (1990: 225), then the don, and the system of 'donmanship', must be seen as central to a sense of a 'distinguishing us' in Golden Town. The don has always been, and continues to be, one of the most central figures in Golden Town and other garrisons, and is, therefore, a critical part of Golden Town's political identity, when we define politics beyond the formal institutions of the state (McKenzie 1978). This is in keeping with Mead's (1934) and Sen's

(2006) perspective, as well, that identity can take on pluralistic forms⁷, making it a difficult issue to assess which types of identities are most important. In the Jamaican garrisons, both political and other forms of social identities around dancehall culture, ‘hustling’ and respect important.

The 1980s witnessed a growth in the economic strength of dons in Golden Town who took on the responsibility of maintaining order and security as well as provisioning the community with social and economic goods. Resources acquired through ‘legitimate’ businesses with the state, together with drugs, crime and extortion provide the means to these ends. Unsurprisingly, then, there is general consensus among community members that their don played a social, as well as a legal justice role.⁸ Patsy, who works in the market downtown, as an informal commercial worker, a ‘higgler’, sheds light on how the don’s role is viewed within the community:

the don was a very good man. We don’t want him come back... in this place that the police dem mash up. He deserves better. Usually, if my kids don’t have lunch money, I can go to him; if they have no uniform I can go to him... Any help they [referring to the don] will give you. When I needed to start my business, he was the one who gave me the money to get it started and he made sure that all the kids are in school. If I am sick, I can go to him and he is not going to hesitate to help out. We don’t see the politician when we need help...

The power and legitimacy derived from these roles are consolidated by his charisma. Within Golden Town, the don is regarded as a messianic figure. People referred to the don as the ‘flower’ in Golden Town, who must not return to a destroyed ‘Garden’, which has been whittled down at the hands of the security forces. The leadership style of this don mimics, to some degree, the messianic, populist, and hero-worship approaches of Caribbean political leaders (Singham 1968). There are, however, clear departures from the ethos and character

⁷ Sen argues that ‘the intricacies of plural groups and multiple loyalties are obliterated when we see each person as embedded in one affiliation replacing the richness of an abundant life with the formulaic narrowness of insisting that people are situated in just one organic pack’ (2006: 14).

⁸ See Miller (1976) for an extensive discussion on the utilitarian concept of justice as articulated by John Stuart Mill. See also John Rawl’s book *A Theory of Justice*, 1999 for an alternative perspective on ‘justice as fairness’.

the community assumed under a type of unilateral political leadership. Providing the community with a sense of security and respect remains one of most notable legacies of dons in Golden Town. But criminality, involvement in the drug trade, violence, along with the exploitative nature of donmanship and an acquisitive culture have proven to be major challenges. According to Lucy, a member of one of the focus group discussions:

The don mek people know say a live up time— it's not all about politics and defending party. Man from Rema [a community of Peoples National Party supporters] and Golden Town a link now; and is the paper [money] the boss a push and him mek the youth dem know say dem must defend the dollars. Before this don none of that never happen; you would not find a Golden Town youth and Red Town youth a link so close.⁹

Materialism and the acquisition of 'the paper' (money) are regarded as critical ways of achieving progress in Golden Town. This perspective is critical to an understanding of the different meanings associated with progress in postcolonial societies, where slavery and capitalism have impacted negatively on the socio-economic and class systems.

Sides of the Same Coin: Violence, Security and the Enactment of Citizenship.

Golden Town had a reputation for being extremely safe; this is one of the bases on which it differentiates itself from other communities; its ability to 'keep the peace' was unmatched. Until recently, the community was regarded as 'violence-free', a rather rare occurrence in the garrisons. Violence is exported to other communities, local and international, but an associated symbolic status is derived from Golden Town's reputation of being 'one hundred percent safe'. People felt this status commanded respect from community members and outsiders alike. Tom, a very influential member of the community, had this to say about the 'order' in Golden Town:

⁹The don made it known that it's time for people to 'live up'—it's not all about politics and defending party. The men who are from Red Town, [the PNP area], and those from Golden Town are coming together now. And it is money that the boss is now placing significant emphasis on. He is also telling the youths they must [should] 'defend the dollars'. Before this don became the leader of the community, none of this happened. You would not find a youth from Golden Town and a youth from Red Town socialising so closely.

there was an order in Golden Town, and everybody respected the order. People could walk into Golden Town and feel very safe; nothing would happen to them. Everybody wanted to know how one man could have maintained such an order; even the police are asking. They are confused. A guy got shot right next to the police post, and the police don't seem to have any control in the community. They are confused. Nothing could happen when the don was here. He has his networks and things are immediately investigated and dealt with. Right now, Golden Town mash up; we have all been saying it. It will never be the same. We lose our security and our order. Anybody can come in do what they want to do. I did not know I would live to see the day when this would happen. Right now... we have no choice. It will be difficult to change things, but we have to start somewhere. We need law and order in Golden Town, one way or another.

This narrative points to the importance of security as a valued good in Golden Town. 'The order' represents an alternative system of rationality to that of the state's, and it is also a means by which people have come to constitute themselves as members of their community. Tom's concerns with 'losing' this order arises out of concerns regarding the disruption of a predictable order that delivered security. Equally, the order in Golden Town provided the means by which people pursued a cultural and economic 'living', or 'livity', in a rules-based environment where fear is significantly minimised. Commenting on some of the consequential effects of the changes which have accompanied changes in the community order, Diane claimed that:

before you could party and wear short clothes; but now with the tenseness of the place, even if nothing happens to make you fearful, you are still going to be fearful. Sometimes when it gets to 11pm you feel fearful, and it was never like that. Everybody is afraid now because anything can happen. My main fear is that I could get raped; before you could walk in your underwear and nothing will happen. You have a lot of country people who are not coming back to town. We cannot be safe on the road now. The police and soldier need to pack up and leave. We had our stage shows and we partied every night. Him mek sure tell them to leave the girl dem alone— you have girls who dress very skimpy and nobody troubles them. Him lay out him rules straight.

Like Diane, most of my interviewees acknowledged the role played by a one-order system that utilises violence and ensures safety, while facilitating cultural performances related to dancehall. Street dances and all-night parties are critical components of the cultural repertoire

of the community, and are integral to the construction of garrison life.¹⁰ One of the foremost complaints among females in Golden Town revolved around their inability, as one respondent states, ‘to go wi dance and enjoy wiself – police a lock off the music and close wi club early and we caan get fi party like when the don was around’. There were also views that pointed to the adverse effects of all-night parties and failure to establish social boundaries in what are often highly sexualised cultural spaces meant that parenting assumed less-favourable forms. Authority figures rather than parents are often regarded as disciplinarians and often perform roles which are more generally associated with institutions such as the family or the school.

Equally, economic survival and the wherewithal to achieve it depended on the don’s system of patronage and rules. One of the focus group respondents had this to say:

I am a higgler [informal commercial worker]¹¹ and right now nutten naah gwaan [nothing is happening] inna the market. The people from country ‘fraid fi come a market; and if they don’t come business slow down here. People who come buy things down here are also afraid of robbery and rape, now that they know the [the don] is not here. Right now, most women are turning to prostitution because the incursion mash up [have destroyed] most people business and it hard fi get a fresh start, especially without the boss, and all a the man dem flee the community or police kill them off.

It is the constellation, therefore, of economic, cultural, psychological and personal factors that legitimates the system of a singular order in Golden Town. The value placed on ensuring the safety and security of all members of the community gives Golden Town a particularly unique characteristic, but such value is also used as a *prima facie* justification for violence. Herein lies the moral dilemma and a simultaneous order and disorder of which Chevannes

¹⁰ Hope (2006), in her book *Inna Di Dancehall: Popular Culture and the Politics of Identity in Jamaica*, notes that the cultural identity generated from dancehall, which emphasises sex and sexuality, masculinity, violence, poverty, and structural injustices is critical to the ways in which inner-city and working class Jamaicans contest hegemonic structures and public spaces. Cooper (2004) argues, too, that dancehall affords women a sense of sexual liberation, even with its explicit misogynistic lyrics, and is fundamental to any understanding of power and marginality in Jamaica.

¹¹ See Ulysse (2007), *Downtown Ladies: Informal Commercial Importers, A Haitian Anthropologist and self-making in Jamaica*, for a discussion on Jamaica’s Informal Commercial Workers and their place and role in the political economy.

(2006) writes. In describing the Rastafari's place within the postcolonial order, Chevannes describes them as being 'destructive of one order while at the same time creative of another' (2006: 81). It is true that Golden Town operates a creative order. At the same time, however, suppressing people's political freedom and ensuring they submit to the rules of the don reproduces and legitimises the use of violence, in all its various forms. Security and violence are seen as different sides of the same coin in Golden Town. This raises a moral dilemma: the use of disorder to create order reproduces stigmatisation and elite attitudes that regard disadvantaged groups who exist in these spaces as undeserving subjects. This provides little impetus to invest in changes that target specific groups without criminalizing and alienating entire communities.

While providing the means of responding to, and acting upon, structural inequalities in society, the embodiment of subversive and anti-state practices has created considerable difficulties. The dialectic, insurgent forms of citizenship that characterise the social order in Golden Town have led to public indignation and divided public opinion on responses deemed appropriate for improving public order and the state of governance in Jamaica. A significant percentage of the population considers vigilante policing and stringent legislation worthwhile and satisfactory options for 'dismantling' garrisons.

Golden Town's system of rules and order that legitimises violence forms a central part of the community's sense of belonging and identity. At the same time, exploitation is a dominant feature of the ways in which social relationships and power are constituted locally and is an indubitable feature of the don's rule. The don provides the societal respect denied to most residents, but also reproduces the old social order, reinforcing the hierarchical, exploitative relationships typical of broader state-society relationships in Jamaica. Any attempt to nullify the claim that the Jamaican state has 'parasitic' tendencies (Gray 2004) would be futile. However, local leaders display and adopt similar inclinations. At the

community level, power, benefits and patronage are unequally distributed; there are members of Golden Town who benefit disproportionately from the system that prevailed. Tom and Cameron, members of the community, provide insights into aspects of the order and their place in that order:

I was born a gangster. I have no fear for anything. I have been to prison three times. I live my life. I don't give a damn. Everybody do it for something, whether protection or a hype life. I got involved because I was desperate, but when I got educated to the system, I started stealing for fun from people who had it all. But since I have a job, I stop the stealing now. There is jungle justice in the community— I was beaten badly before; I still have the scars, so I take my punishment (Tom).

How it works for me is that if someone disrespects me, I will sort it out. When you don't have a family people take step of you, and there is a lot of anger and outrage...When pressure reach you, you do or die. When you need to take care of yourself a lot of stuff come in your head. You have to be educated to the system. Wi inna modern time and we understand the system. You cannot get rid of crime. Illegal activities run the world, and all a dem know that— politician, criminal, everybody. We also watch a lot of TV. Everybody get an education fi tear down somebody pocket, politicians too. If you stop crime money no run; only people who fool don't know that. And don't think a only poor people a commit a crime; we do the act for the society people dem, and sometimes we don't even have a car or a boot fi show for it. (Cameron)

Their comments touch on the local order of the community, and he further contextualises this order within the ambits of what he calls the 'system' and the modern, international political economy. Cameron shows how access to information and the influence of the international media help to shape the expectations of subjects of citizenship within a system that is unmistakably understood. His distinction between 'poor people' and 'society people' suggests that poor people are not a part of Jamaican society. The 'society' is preserved for elites (and those who are not poor). He refers to the use of 'jungle justice' and, by drawing upon his own experience, shows how it is dispensed within the community. Under the leadership of the don, the community legitimised the use of violence against it own members, who 'violated' the terms of a localized social contract.

These narratives illuminate the nuances in local realities and, inevitably, they bring the moral character of the state and the society, as a whole, into great disrepute. Furthermore, Golden Town' security apparatus and the basis upon which it is legitimised question the premise of Hobbes's (1962) classical ideas regarding the willingness of citizens to defer absolute authority and power to the state, the only entity able to prevent a war of all against all, and to remove the feeling or perception of fear. In the case of Golden Town, there is deference to absolute authority, but not the state's. Security is provided by criminal dons, who are regarded by members of the community as more efficient than the state in providing security and order. Moreover, rather than seeing the state as the institution that protects *par excellence*, the state and its security institutions are regarded as threats to the safety and well-being of community members.

State Policing: Narratives on Lack of Respect and Denial of Rights

Police abuse haunts the community's collective memory, significantly impacting on the proclivity toward any kind of acquiescence or deference to police authority. Jane, a 38-year-old resident, offers these insights about the police:

Some of them try to be friendly but others are not. My daughter will say hi to them and they will not answer. I am a woman so they are not really troubling me, but they really molest the youths. I used to feel a hundred percent safe before the police took over. Putting aside that, people within the community will try to hurt you. Before they could not and would not.... We are not sure if they are doing it to retaliate against the police or just doing it because they want to...

During the interview, she attempted to mediate her views of the police with her fear for the 'newly bad' in the community, who seemingly have the power to operate outside of the instituted 'order'. It became, therefore, a question of choosing between the lesser of two evils. Still, for most respondents, like Ann, who operates a small business, the security forces are not representative of a legitimate alternative. From her point of view, an end to the intransigence appears rather bleak:

I will not forget what they have done to us.-They need to pack up and go. All they have done is to come kill the innocent and disrespect people. But I am not taking any disrespect from any of them. They pushing doors and trying to get friendly with the females at nights. Better them gone and low wi [leave us alone]. Wi not going to change and they are not going to change either.

Explicit in both narratives are concerns with methods of policing, police-citizen relationships, disrespect, and police legitimacy. Respect is a critical issue for people in Golden Town; there is no doubt that its salience is in part the result of Jamaica's colonial past, but also its contemporary politics. Respect in the garrisons is practice-driven and ultimately tied to the community's approach to violence. Without the recognition respect associated with status, according to class, colour, residence and education in Jamaica, a considerable number of males in Golden Town seek respect through insurgent practices and spectacular displays of masculinity and power. The older community members spoke of 'young boys' creating a spectacle as they move about on a daily basis with their guns on display.

Disrespect and the Denial of Difference

Everybody in my community knows me, and they know that I am a good youth. I go to school and play professional sports at the same time. The absence of the don has its good and its bad. The police don't know anybody, or where they stand in the community. It is a nightmare because the police harass me on a daily basis and treat me like a criminal. As I said before, they don't know anyone, and they treat us like we are all criminals and nobodys. I am stopped, searched, and questioned every day I enter my community. I am an innocent youth just trying to earn a decent living. Right now I am preparing to go to College (Tommy, a 24 year old resident of Golden Town).

The denial of difference has been a feature of policing in Golden Town. Gendered policing is one of the ways in which a 'difference-denial' approach is manifested in Golden Town. Male youths are the main target of very harsh policing, while females must contend with sexual overtures. Both are demeaning—they affront and act as an encumbrance to the very humanity and freedoms of both sexes. Tom, whose remarks I have noted in the above quotation, expresses and takes issue with the denial of difference in the community and the

depersonalised character that policing assumes. He is concerned with the reification of the community and how this accommodates a rights-denial approach to policing.

It is difficult to contest the view that there is a problem with oppression and the denial of rights in Jamaica. Those at the very bottom experience oppression from people in classes above them and even people within their own classes. Mary explains the forms that such denial and abuse often take:

if the guys are playing cards dem jus turn over the board. The police come with a thinking to molest the youths and with the thinking that everybody is the same thing. They are not interested in doing their work. They have always killed innocent people. You would not like the classification that we are all murderers. They have not tried to get to know the people. Sometimes youth say things to offend the police, but not all of us are the same thing. The police slapped me in my face because I asked if I could use the bathroom. I was told to urinate in front of the officers on the outside of my building. This was not the worst thing that happened. The lady standing next to us watched her brother being killed... the soldier placed him outside to sit on a chair and begged the police not to kill him... I was so shaken up, but they say out of bad must come good.

In another focus group, similar sentiments were echoed regarding the inescapable difficulties that confront the political subject in Golden Town. Paul, a twenty-four-year-old pursuing a college diploma in secondary education, shares his stories about policing.

There is a lot of intimidation because they think ghetto people don't know or possess any rights. We need the medium to educate people about their rights and the laws in the country. The problem is how the police enforce the law. Their mindset is to set a precedent and disrespect. People don't push for their rights; they cower in fear when the police come around. They need educated people to police the community, who actually know how to talk to people. Their approach will definitely turn you off. My friend and I were walking home from church one night, and we came upon two police. As soon as we saw them we became frightened, but we remained calm. The police pointed their guns and shouted to us, 'hey boy, unuh come here'. At first we wanted to run, but we knew that would have been dangerous. 'Where unuh a come from', they asked, and kept their guns pointed at us. I said, 'church, sir', shaking. I thought they were going to kill us. The police response was that, 'you think we don't know you are criminals? Who you fooling talking about coming from church? After harassing us for a few minutes, they let us go and told us to run as fast as we could.

As these incidents indicate, there is a gradation of rights so that rights in Jamaica are not universal in the *de facto* sense, even though they exist *de jure*. Rights are often times

unsuccessfully negotiated in marginalised spaces. Rights are contextualised and conferred upon citizens according to historical precedent, space, class, status and phenotype. Citizens in Golden Town therefore, expressed fear of the police who allege are capable of committing a range of atrocities, influenced by politics, class, perception, and strong abhorrence for the community. These factors will continue to affect police legitimacy.

The Disruption of Place and ‘Out of Placeness’

There are numerous discourses of vulnerability which have emerged in Golden Town. If the traditional system — the system of donmanship, in its tenuous state, must eventually succumb to the will of the state, itself a distrusted and highly inconsistent set of institutions, how does the community dislocate, accept, or negotiate the terms of reference of its incorporation? Tod explains the main security concerns of the community:

the entire community has been disoriented and thrown off balance. The brute force of the police force has replaced the love and care of the don, who protected the community at all cost. People will eventually have to adjust to the changes, but the changes have left a huge hole in the system which needs to be filled. This is not being done. First and foremost, there is need for employment, and this is not forthcoming. The problem, as I see it, is that people in Golden Town are not accustomed to being a part of the society in the way that they now have to be. People in Golden Town do not even venture outside to visit family for too long. They feel out of place, they don't belong. People are used to a rules-based system, and that is the only way they will feel safe. People are already cowering in fear. I think we need God; that is the only way. People feel that the police will be too slow, and that they will only arrive on the scene after the crime has been committed. People are accustomed to swift jungle justice, and the justice system in Jamaica cannot deliver that.

The notion of place is a prominent feature of life in Golden Town and in the wider society. The disruption of place and the ‘out of placeness’ raise a set of pertinent concerns. Donmanship, with its set of alternative practices, is crucial to the way in which people in Golden Town resist legal authority, negotiate a sense of place in their community and respond to their exclusion from the society. A number of participants spoke about their desire to ‘get away’ from Jamaica. Golden Town has always maintained a community abroad. One respondent, Kamar, spoke about her failed attempt to establish ‘a living’ through drug dealing

in the UK —she was caught and deported to Jamaica. She had gone to the UK with hopes of achieving a better life through earnings from the drug trade which did not materialise.

Globalization— the increased movement of people, goods and services across national borders, poses a challenge to definitions of place which confine our understandings to the local (Massey 1994). Golden Town's role in the drug trade has expanded its sense of place. But the interplay between success and tragedy, resulting in part from expansive involvement in the drug trade, has also raised the spectre of confrontation between the local and the international.¹² The influence of 'foreign', as well as its romanticization have intensified the tragedy of place in Golden Town. But many in Golden Town remain enraptured by hopes of a better life 'in foreign'. Foreign, to some extent, represents an extension of the local community. The community, defined as it is by political history, a set of universal rules and shared norms, is not confined to a local or physical space, although physical space matters significantly. Massey, in attempting to broaden the concept of place, writes,

'what gives a place its specificity is not some long internalized history but the fact that it is constructed out of a particular constellation of social relations, meeting and weaving at a particular locus... Instead of thinking of place as areas with boundaries around they can be imagined as articulated moments in the networks of social relations.' (1994: 54).

In the case of Golden Town, Massey is correct on the second count, but her first point regarding the relevance of a 'long internalized history' is contestable. The history of colonialism, coupled to a violent, clientilistic political trajectory, has, in fact, defined and shaped subjectivities within Golden Town, making history, as well as politics critical components of the community's sense of place. History and a myriad of factors, cultural, institutional, economical and political, overlap, and impede the community's sense of an

¹² See Ivelaw Griffith (1998) for an expansive discussion on Caribbean security and the implication and impact of Jamaica's involvement in the drug trade between North and Central America for which it is a major transshipment point.

alternative imagination, intensifying, as well, its sense of 'out of placeness'. There are numerous challenges that will affect Golden Town's ability to become a part of the society. The free rider system which allowed 'free' access to water and electricity no longer exists; this is a cataclysmic economic reality for those unprepared for immediate demands of payment for these services. It is possible that regulating and imposing sanctions on those who are not able to pay could cause further economic marginalisation. At the same time, however, it could provide residents with greater justification to demand more equal treatment from the society, and may provide an impetus for participating more actively in state governance. This would, perhaps, protect members from denigrating remarks that define them as irresponsible, free loaders and dependents.

Furthermore, for respondents concerned with the future of community governance, the police remain a central concern. Under the existing system, people have been exposed to ongoing policing, and have had to interact with the security forces on a daily basis. But many remain unconvinced of the police's capacity to secure individuals within Golden Town or to 'replace' their don. Nonetheless, people were willing to compromise with the police. They felt that the police's relationship with the community could be improved if the police showed mutual understanding and respect, became more sensible to their realities, and grasped the difficulties associated with transitioning from a system of donmanship to more formal means of governance. Interviewees felt that jobs should be provided for youths to address their sense of alienation from the rest of the society as well as the lack of legitimate opportunities. However, they felt that 'government was useless', and could not be relied on to bring about these changes. For members of Golden Town, change will have to come from governance dialogues and structures which recognise and respect difference. Embedded in this approach must be respect for the poor. 'It's not that we fear [the don], we respect him; one man can rule the world because of respect and him respect us' (Ann, a 24 year old female

interviewee), encapsulates the attitude of the community towards authority. Respect remains one of the bases on which Golden Town is willing to embrace change.

CHAPTER 5

MIDDLE-CLASS SECURITY: MARKET HEIGHTS

Introduction

In this chapter I use Market Heights as a comparator to examine some of the relevant themes discussed in the previous chapter, namely the issue of citizenship and security, how they interconnect and the ways in which people occupying different strata and locations in Kingston position themselves vis-à-vis the state. Market Heights is a middle-class community with a population size of just over 4,111; the community is located in South Eastern St. Andrew, five miles out of Kingston—the capital city and is bordered by two ‘uptown’ suburbs and by a garrison and a lower-income area. While it was easy to enter Market Heights, it was difficult to get into people’s homes without scheduled interviews and prior introductions. People were generally locked away behind ‘grilled’ doors and windows.

The development of Market Heights was facilitated by the government of the Peoples National Party (PNP), under the leadership of Norman Manley, the first (and only) Premier of Jamaica. Similar to Golden Heights, this was a political decision to support sections of the party’s key supporters. Unlike Golden Town, however, this development was not tied to violent performances, as a way of securing votes. The mortgages were underwritten by the administration, and houses provided mainly to lower-level civil servants, who, hitherto, had rented property in the middle-class sections of East Kingston and around Half Way Tree (Clarke 1975). In fact, the People’s National Party emerged as Jamaica’s ‘middle-class party’, while the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), the other major political party, was identified more closely with the working class (Munroe 1972). Arguably, the JLP has since morphed into what some Jamaicans regard as the ‘brown man’ party, while the PNP became a potent

symbol of a ‘black man time now’ narrative under the leadership of P.J. Patterson, the longest serving Prime Minister of Jamaica, whose leadership lasted from 1992 to 2006.

Drawing on data collected through interviews in Market Heights, I demonstrate how threats to middle-class security and the construction of these threats have reproduced and, in some cases, produced new trajectories of insularity, intensified hegemonic individualism and amplified demands for more stringent laws to protect the middle class from what is sometimes regarded as pathological cultures of criminality. Arguably, the availability and increasing use of private security and neighbourhood watches to provide security are contributing to the depoliticisation of sections of the middle class in Jamaica.

Private security —and the general turn to market-based strategies— favours a kind of neoliberal citizenship which to a large extent aggravates but also mediates the security problem in Jamaica (Campbell and Clarke 2017). Market Heights is not a homogeneous community, however, and throughout this chapter, I attempt to draw out the narratives of residents who sometimes share different and contested perspectives on the themes I examine. I make constant reference to older, more ‘established members’ of the community, transient members, and the ‘new middle class’.

‘The Fear of the Unknown:’ the Intersection of Class and Security

Market Heights occupies a relatively advantageous position in a Jamaican society, historically defined by the trilogy of class, colour and residence. In Market Heights, participants in the capitalist system of production and manufacturing consist mainly of owners of small-scale businesses while the majority are employed in the public sector.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to discuss the security of Jamaica’s middle class without reference to garrison communities. The middle class usually defines itself in opposition to

these communities and the lower class, in general. Simon,¹³ a 31-year-old attorney-at-law defines the community, explains the security landscape and the problems that arise because of proximity to ‘depressed communities’:

Market Heights is middle class so we do not really have a big security problem, except for theft and robberies... Market Heights is a middle-class community and by virtue of that there is a perception that we have things that those in the poorer/depressed communities do not have, which to some extent is true, so they prey on the community. The persons who carry out robberies on the community are from outside—they live in the surrounding depressed communities and they are usually semi-literates and illiterates, and most of them are not employed... Some people are a bit afraid, especially at nights, but I am okay— you just have to be very security-conscious.

One of the distinguishing features of middle and upper-class communities in Jamaica is the way in which they are constituted as ‘safe places’ when compared to urban lower-class communities, typically located within close proximity. James, a 29-year-old actor, invokes class as an important point of departure in understanding Market Height’s security. James characterises middle-class apprehension as the ‘fear of the unknown.’ He asserts that:

while I can only speculate from my middle-class bubble about what takes place in the ghetto, I would say for the middle and upper classes there is always a fear of the unknown compared to the ghetto where it is quite different since, in a sense, you are only threatened by the people and the things you know. I would say though that as a middle-class community, Market Heights is fairly safe... I don’t feel threatened in Market Heights and I would not be scared to walk around the community; there is no violent confrontation in Market Heights. There are mainly opportunistic activities, whereas crime against the person would spike in the ghettos.

As suggested by James that to be middle class in Jamaica is coterminous with escaping the harsh realities that attend security in volatile and poorer communities, particularly in urban Jamaica. Security is tempered by class, and class implies differences in ontological realities. Some members of the community defined lower-class criminality as pathological and as a cultural problem. Patrick, a recent university graduate, now working in the private sector, offered these comments:

people who commit crimes in Market Heights do it because they glorify crime and are unwilling to accept a regular job; it has nothing to do with their socio-economic reality. You will have no social infrastructure to help with crime. Social intervention will not help; it is too reactive and not proactive. I really believe that the only way for the crime rate to go down is for criminals to be afraid. And when you look at how the crime rate fell... nothing happened during the state of emergency and that for me is the only way. Obviously, these people are not afraid of prison. We need to get rid of some of the human rights activists in Jamaica. The Justice system needs to be reformed and making the Bail Act more stringent is a great idea. How can you have someone getting bail for murder, facing the judge and getting bail for another murder charge? Sometimes the police are just fed up and they take matters in their own hands. I don't fully agree with the situation, but as they say in Jamaica—they just have to do what they have to do... Greed is the problem: a lot of criminals make a lot of money, but they still want more. The problem is greed—everybody wants to live the lifestyle that the entertainers sing about. When that doesn't happen, it is then that all hell breaks loose.

Patrick's view reflects a common view of the security conundrum in Jamaica. The discourse on security is often divorced from the underpinnings of the body politic, as well as the wider cultural and social milieu that articulate it. Patrick's sympathy towards a 'do what you have to do' approach to legal justice was not uncommon in Market Heights. The remarks of a high-ranking police officer's remark indicates how rooted this 'do what you have to do' approach is in Jamaica:

we just want to know that we are doing is the right thing, and it needs to be done. And sometimes when we don't find any justification in law, or any legal precedent for action, we ask ourselves who will benefit: individuals, the JCF [the Jamaica Constabulary Force] or the wider community, and that's how we resolve it. We say, 'is this the right thing to do'? We just work with that formula; and if it comes out to be something which we consider to be right and needs to be done, we continue to do it.

Power, Respect, Culture and Security: Understanding the Link

Citizens in Market Heights, particularly older members of the community, emphasized middle class respectability, respect for property and neighbourly-considerateness. Insecurity emerges under conditions where the culture of respectability becomes infiltrated or threatened by outside forces. John, a retired police officer, residing in Market Heights, refers

to a period in the 1980s, which marked the onset of cultural tension between the different groups and a 'difference culture':

certain civil servants and certain people who could afford to started to move out of Market Heights— and when you rent the place, the yards weren't well kept and people didn't want to live with them... They were very loud and vulgar and you were no longer safe. They were coming from the ghettos nearby. The closest they came to setting up a ghetto was in Moores [a nearby community] and the government took it over, put in proper housing for civil servants so they had to get out...We have empty spaces as well and parks in Market Heights... The changes to security were because of the people who came here: for you to live in Market Heights, you have to be quiet, you can't turn up your music; we don't do that. We take responsibility for each other...

John believes the culture of the 'ghettos' pose a direct threat to the security of the good middle-class citizen. Culture is seen as an important explanation of both security and insecurity. There is therefore a reluctance to embrace spatial integration across the different classes. Dorothy, a member of the neighbourhood, watch points to changes that have taken place in the country as whole and how communities are impacted:

people who commit crimes in Market Heights are not really driven by deprivation— some of them yes, some of them no. We are not separate from the fact that we have had a break-down in integrity in this country— some people call it corruption. In this country, we have lost respect for other people's property and there is what you call a bad-minded culture. You don't necessarily work for what you have; you just take somebody else's. You live in Jamaica, so you should know this. I remember a little boy... my neighbour had a problem with stealing because she had some mango trees in her yard. And a group of school children were on it, and she said, 'get down off my mango tree right now— she was a very proper lady. And one of them turned around, looked on her and said, 'woman why u no shut up, you can buy land?' So, you understand, then, that from right down there they are not learning anything.

Dorothy invokes the loss of respect and integrity as primary underpinnings of a broader societal problem. The woman asking the children to desist from picking her mangoes is confronted with the 'loss of respect' for class-position and ownership of property. It raises, too, the issue of the perceived profile of the Jamaican who is in a position to afford property and what that Jamaican looks like.

Norma, a retired civil servant, also talked about this idea of security risks, purportedly produced through shifting patterns of propriety in Jamaica:

there are people renting in Market Heights who don't conduct themselves well and they sometimes entertain questionable characters, and that can pose a security risk for the community. It is partly for this reason that I don't have any tenants here. And as you can see, I do have the space for it. People should dress well, speak well and conduct themselves well. I remember living in New York... and I would take the bus sometimes to work and I never spoke—I did not want anyone to associate me with the vulgarity of some of the Jamaicans living there. And because of the way I looked and conducted myself, most people did not regard me as a Jamaican, anyway. I don't know what is wrong with this new generation of Jamaicans. Some of the ones who disturb Market Heights are just plain thieves; they don't see anything wrong with it, they come around and they steal the flowers... The police should beat them to teach them a lesson.

Norma comes from a generation where respect for middle-class values was significant in Jamaica. This is not to suggest that subversion and resistance to middle class values and attitudes were not always features of the society. However, an oppositional culture has developed since the late 1960s which is regarded as the antithesis of and a threat to middle-class security and values.

Neoliberal Subjectivities? The Old and Established and the New Middle Class

While middle-class communities experience low levels of violent crimes, there is a deep psychological fear associated with the weakening of the state's control over the use of violence in Jamaica. The pursuit of safety and security through private security and the founding of the Market Heights' Neighbourhood Watch have emerged as middle-class solutions which complement, rather than oppose, state security, as obtains. Even though the middle-class has historically been treated more respectfully by the state and its institutions, the middle class still faces challenges. The state is also being decentred in middle-class communities—citizens are turning to new forms of governmentality in the form of private security, gated communities, and civic groups. There is tension between enacting something akin to a kind of republican citizenship, with emphasis on civic virtue, and a form of

neoliberal citizenship, which places emphasis on autonomy, individual rights and responsibility.

Within Market Heights, individualism, autonomy, and privacy are regarded as major cultural referents. While individualism is understood as a natural, if not immutable, feature of middle-class communities, there is no uniform perspective regarding which groups are reproducing this culture. The older, established members view the ‘new generation of residents’ as lacking in a culture of cooperation, while the latter criticizes the former for their tendency toward anonymity and individualism. A member of the Neighbourhood Watch, Dorothy, offers her views how such differences impact the organization:

I do the Neighbourhood Watch, and I have done it for 14 years. We got it to a level of security where people would actually say, when they are selling their house, that it is located in Market Heights. So, we did that transformation. But what has happened with Market Heights now is we have had a renewal of the citizens, because some people migrated and others have died. But those coming in have not come in with the same understanding and culture to get them to cooperate and get things done. The people moving here of a different culture... A lot of people who lived here when we started the Neighbourhood Watch were first time owners, but apart from that there have been changes within the community and for the police as well...

The ‘new middle class’—constructed as being of a ‘different culture’— is invoked as the reason initial efforts to establish secured communal spaces have not been sustained. Dorothy suggests a generational change that has eroded the security ‘transformation’ in the community. Urbanisation and social mobility are constantly bringing new members into old, spaces in Jamaica and the orientation of these groups are not always aligned. Reece, a younger member of the community, had this to say:

Market Heights is an older community. The general populace owns property and they are not confrontational. They tend to keep to themselves. In other places people have limited space and they have to come in contact with other persons... I am not active in the community; in fact, outside of the members of my household, I don’t really know anybody and you are unlikely to meet anyone unless it is through a personal link. It is just the way these communities are.

There is no doubt that space and property ownership are critical elements influencing the individual's proclivity toward communal or individualistic strategies. In comparing security in Market Heights with that of the surrounding uptown communities, Paul shared these views:

the security problem in Market Heights is the same for any other area: the economic situation and the semi-literate and illiterates who rob people; they will rob you in the ghetto in the same way. But in the ghetto people are more vigilant; you don't just walk in the community as a stranger unchallenged, but in Market Heights everybody being the middle class minds their own business.

A group of students who rent houses in Market Heights characterised it as an impersonal community where self-interest takes precedence over community. One student asserted that:

I don't feel safe in Market Heights. I don't usually stay home by myself. I had preconceived notions of Market Heights. Residents, in order to preserve themselves, they will lock themselves away. They will probably not intervene even if a crime is taking place at their gate. In Tabernacle [a garrison community] the community provides protection but not in Market Heights. In Tabernacle, they will protect the students. In Market Heights, students have to take their own initiative to be safe... I am not aware of the Neighbourhood Watch... In Market Heights it is mainly about what each resident can do. Nobody takes the time to know anybody else.

There was a pervasive sense that the absence of collective responsibility, coupled with the anonymity which accompanies life in Market Heights, creates considerable challenges to security. The much older members who share nostalgic memories of a sense of community have attempted to harness the collective energies of its diverse members through civic groups. This has, however, proved difficult to sustain in an environment where middle-class communities have become inherently individualistic.

Perhaps one of the difficulties in getting people to coalesce around a common goal also resides in the treatment of those considered to be 'of a different culture'. As noted earlier, some residents who rent in Market Heights were frowned upon and regarded as security risks. One member of the community for was eager to point out that 'not everybody in Market Heights comes from the middle class.'

Space, Private Security and Private Pursuit of Security

Market Heights residents accorded great importance to the idea of space. A general spatial feature of Kingston is the juxtaposition of pockets of poverty close to wealthier communities on the Liguanea plain. Gated communities and apartments have emerged as a response to this geographical feature. Gated apartments exist within the geographical confines of Market Heights, but most properties remain accessible to those in the ‘nearby ghettos’. This geographical feature has favoured discussions about the desirability of constructing a wall around the entire structure of the community to make it inaccessible to ‘dangerous outsiders’:

Market Heights does not have a ghetto on its boundaries, really, but there is a long-term plan to fence the entire community. If people were as fearful as they say they are, the proposal would have gotten more support. The park is now manned, and we collect \$500 per year from everybody towards this endeavour (Michael, Market Heights Citizens’ Association).

Gated communities or the new ‘spatial governmentality’ (Merry 1993) and the privatization of public spaces have intensified social segregation in places such as South Africa, Brazil, Mexico, Senegal and Kenya (Maxi and Irazabal 2005, Merry 1993, Caldeira 2000, O’Donnell 1999). Gated communities have proliferated very rapidly in Jamaica, representing a new form of ‘social patterning’, and indicating the retreat of the middle and upper classes from public spaces. A new gated apartment complex was constructed on vacant land in Market Heights, where an old theatre (and later a church) once stood. The high demand for these apartments and their exclusiveness are reflected in their expensiveness.

While private security is not ubiquitous, the private pursuit of security is a universal in Market Heights. Patrick provides these insights:

criminals know that there are a lot of people living in Market Heights who don’t have their own transportation... I made sure I bought a car and I maintain a very strict guideline as far as my routine is concerned. I don’t take any chances. I have a mechanical gate and at the moment it is very nerve-racking to get out of the car and open the gate at nights. I am thinking of getting some lights on the outside, and I know there are some people with private security— you can see the logo of the security company on their gates...

Arguably, the commodification of safety has somewhat blurred the line that demarcates public and private goods. Most students in the focus group discussion I conducted felt solely responsible for their own security— when presented with a scenario of being robbed or violated by criminals, they all said they would feel personally responsible for not being cautious enough given their awareness of the security realities in Jamaica.

‘Taking the Community Back’: From Whom and from What?

I don’t like politicians, I think they pollute everything. When you involve politicians in meetings, you begin to get dirty politics. We have to take the community back from this type of politics. Unless it is absolutely necessary, I don’t think they should be invited to our neighbourhood watch meetings (Peter, member of the community).

The depoliticisation of the middle class has been affected by the piecemeal and self-interested ways in which the state has approached its developmental roles. This has created apathy among Jamaica’s middle class and a cynical attitude towards politics:

Jamaica is being affected by the politicians and the barons; they have not looked on development in any way except ensuring that they take the spoils for themselves. They don’t develop the communities, there are no roads, nothing, and they just settle people on captured land without proper physical infrastructure.

The perennial failures to provide and sustain a remarkable nation-building project have, perhaps, culminated in indifferent attitudes toward political leadership in Jamaica. Meeks (2007) has argued that the middle class has retreated from ‘the centre of Jamaican life’, viewing this as further indication of the soundness of his argument that there is a process of hegemonic dissolution taking place. The Market Heights’ Neighbourhood Watch is positioned as a counterpoint to the phenomenon of ‘dirty politics’, and this notion of ‘taking the community back’ is regarded as a viable alternative to this kind of politics. A member of the organization explains the development of the organization and context within which it operates:

we were the pilot study for the community policing. We were assigned dedicated policemen, and by virtue of that we were able to establish trust with the police; before, citizens did not trust the police and were afraid to report crimes. When we started the neighbourhood watch, there was a group of guys, in response to the

situation, who had started patrolling the community. We directly organised something with the then Minister of Security and Justice and they patrolled on their own with one police officer; they had a radio and could also patrol and report. Their radio was monitored at all times by the police, and they could call the station. That has changed and there is not so much involvement anymore. Right now, I have asked the police to give me some foot patrol and for the citizens to call for every crime; we don't want them to dismiss anything as a small crime— everything should be reported. I am to meet with the superintendent. I have met with the inspector. I am giving them one more chance to respond, before I send off a letter to the commissioner of police.

In effect, residents have been policing themselves but not with the aim of a total opt-out of the formal security system. The desired goal is to involve the police as a way of rebuilding trust. It is not mere coincidence, therefore, that most residents in Market Heights have less disparaging views of the police. There is a history of police-responsiveness unlike in garrison communities where unresponsiveness and confrontation between residents and police are common. Yet, trust remains a central issue even in the midst of good police-citizen relations. Some of my interviewees still felt that they had to be cautious in reporting crimes to the police. Emma, a teacher, had this to say:

we in Market Heights are more passive participants in the crime situation in the community; we are mainly victims. There is a Neighbourhood Watch and they meet weekly... I am not a part of the neighbourhood watch. They leave Minutes from the meetings and I thought to myself it may have been a good idea to go... I'm also weary of those ideas, because I think that sometimes criminals use those venues, and they may also go to the meetings to figure out how to work around certain things. This is probably one of the scariest things: you don't know who it is, so it could be someone who is walking on the street and you may think it is just another community member participating in the meetings. We don't know our neighbours, so it could be someone else and you could be very sorely surprised... But I do keep a machete by my bed, always.

Security experiences and narratives differ according to the political and social geography of the communities in question. Failure of the state to address growing security problems in Jamaica has forced middle-class citizens to turn to private security and autonomous civic groups despite their advantageous position as full-citizens, when compared to garrison communities. Both middle-class and garrison spaces are showing apathetic attitude towards

the state and both have pursued private solutions to address their security concerns. In the next chapter I focus on Turl Head, a garrison community in Jamaica.

CHAPTER 6

‘DOING WHAT WISDOM DICTATES’: TURL HEAD

Introduction

Having examined Market Heights, a middle-class comparator, this chapter returns to a garrison, Turl Head. Turl Head is a small-town community, located outside of Kingston, which most residents define as a ‘garrison’. Turl Head is chosen primarily because it brings a non-Kingston perspective to bear on the security dialogue, which is lacking in many academic studies on Jamaica. Given structural variations between communities, Turl Head offers a lens to further explore and compare constructions of security within different geographical locales. According to the 2001 Population Census, the community covers an area of 0.5 km, and has a population of about 1,115. The community is over seventy years old, yet it is described by the Social Development Council in Jamaica as lacking adequate and consistently maintained infrastructure. Information collated by the Social Development Council shows an unemployment rate of 75%. Turl Head was originally part of a sugar estate, but the community has become quite extensive, and people have settled illegally on both government and privately-owned land. The government has sought to regularise land ownership by allowing citizens to make deposits, followed by monthly payments on acquired properties.

The article demonstrates how localized ideas of citizenship and political identity shape attitudes towards violence, individualism and policing. Turl Head’s security repertoire evolved under circumstances of democratic clientelism, a type of politics that utilizes political violence and patronage to consolidate party support and compete for electoral victory (Stone 1980), creating, in the process, communities lacking in a sustainable and well-

intentioned citizenship project (Campbell 2014). Despite the presence of a criminal ‘don’ in Turl Head, high levels of fear still permeate the community.

Turl Head, in many ways, is like Jamaica’s typical garrisons, where reprisals and gang-related violence, power struggles over community leadership are quite common. Owing to a myriad of factors, which this article examines, there are significant problems with security and the ways in which violence is utilized in Turl Head. Violence is a frequent recourse for those who feel shut out of, or insufficiently incorporated into, the formal systems of citizenship in Jamaica. The system of donmanship, which seeks to rectify this problem, has unearthed problems of its own. Within the community, violence, and the threat of it, is increasingly being used as a tool to settle disputes and assert power.

The church and local civic organisations are actors that represent middle entities between the state and the don, and are attempting to curb pressures for a totalitarian space where everyone is subjected to the same rules. The community has become a site where habits associated with privileged structures and the legal system in Jamaican society are rejected, contested, and re-narrated. But, using multiple forms of violence, battles over recognition, respect, and power are also fought at the community level, among its own members. Struggles and fractious forms of community governance arise from the embodiment of a certain kind of localised citizenship, which also has debilitating effects on local solidarity. These present profound barriers to forging and consolidating a strong and viable form of communitarian citizenship.

‘Nutten Naah Gwaan’: The Struggle for Social Justice and the Deprioritization of Violence

Turl Head is a community afflicted by a deep sense of social malaise, which is related to both violence and punishment and the lack of material goods and services. There is both a legal

and social justice problem in Turl Head and people usually invoke one in order to explain the other. Conceptions of justice have been variously explored: as being reflective of natural law, as prescribed by God (Aquinas 1882, Behr 2005), as the greatest good for the greatest number (Mill 1877), and as fairness (Rawls 1972). For Miller, social justice is about ‘the distribution of benefits and burdens throughout a society, as it results from the major social institutions’ (1976: 21). Miller contends that benefits should include ‘intangible benefits such as prestige and self-respect’ and material goods as well. On the other hand, legal justice concerns punishment for wrongdoing and the compensation for injury. When both are discussed together, in terms of their relative impact, people often found it necessary to deemphasize legal justice and the violence that expresses it as a way of highlighting their view that social justice issues were more disruptive to their daily lives. For the very few who are financially stable, violence and legal justice were of greater significance, but when looked at from the perspective of the broader community, they saw the lack of material goods and the lack of prestige and respect that often articulates it as the greater of the two evils.

Given conditions of poverty, unemployment, and scarcity, people have accepted the inevitability of conflict and violence in garrison spaces. Conflict has become a part of the everyday, in much the same way as deprivation. People have been creative in seeking solutions to both. It is deprivation, however, that has held many captive, and created a sense of gloom and hopelessness. When political violence erupted in the community in the 1980s, it was constructed as a solution to economic and social marginalisation. Advances in social and economic welfare, and progress would be determined by the struggles waged for political representation. Violence, progress, and politics went hand in hand. For the most part, there has been a shift in the relationship between these three variables. With the lack of progress, and having existed under perpetual and, to some extent normalised conditions of insecurity, it is now common, with very modest exceptions, to disaggregate politics from progress, with

people asserting that poverty is a more significant and unrelenting concern than the threat of violence. In other words, people regard legal justice as less significant than social justice.

Jacqueline is 30 and is a single mother; she has two daughters, ages 12 and 13, but she is unable to ensure their regular attendance at school, and she has the added responsibility of caring for her father. When I approached Jacqueline, she was standing under a tree in the community. Breaking down in tears, she contemplated her stagnant and seemingly dire circumstances:

although the crime wicked in the community, the poverty is the bigger issue right now. The crime wicked and the supportance very, very hard. Right now nutten naah gwaan; a di [the] president mi come under the tree to see if mi can beg some rice. When mi beg them nutten [anything]dem haffi gimmi [they have to give me], ‘cause dem know mi no have nutten fi gi mi two daughta [they know I cannot provide for my tow daughters]. Dem caan even go school everyday. The big one more expensive fi sen because the school well far, and mi no waan stop the two a dem from school. A \$200 mi a hustle right now. More time a cash pot [a lottery game] mi try mi luck wid fi si if can win a money to send them to school. Mi caan stay inna di yard when hungry a bite the pickney dem, mi affi come hustle – everybody know mi is a hustling girl...

I never go any school; we couldn’t afford it. So that’s why mi want dem [her kids] fi get the opportunity. Right now mi want to go back a school, but mi cannot afford it. And mi cannot get anything from the MP; mi deh ya a suffer [I am suffering]. The MP and the councillor dem no answer dem phone. This morning mi wake up frass, feeling so stressed. To tell you the truth, I don’t know how I am going to survive. I was crying this morning when mi realise say the house dry, not even bread. Nuff people eat dinner and all now mi no eat dinner – it very uncomfortable Ms. You can come look inna mi house if you want. No food, not even piece dry bread and a little sugar... Mi no have no bathroom – a ghetto place this, so is a one room house. A mi throw piece a board and fix it up. Mi daughta dem cannot even take a bathe inna privacy...

Hustling is a very common practice among the disenfranchised, the unemployed, and the average garrison dweller. Jacqueline’s survival had always been informed by her ability to hustle, as she puts it. She went on to talk about how she had descended from a successful hustler to someone living in a rather ‘uncomfortable’ manner.

Mi used to have a bar. I was a hustling girl. And mi use to sell weed [marijuana] and do fish fry. I am going through it bad now. Police come and take away my things and mi had to jump in canal to escape. A 5 years now since dem [the police and

‘informers’] put mi down pon mi face. Mi used to have a drugs man... But nutten naaa gwaan fi him now. Mi mash up bad— you can look on mi and see it: mi get meagre now... Mi aunty dream say mi dead. But dem say a 7 days rise and 7 days fall. Mi just want a start again— something to give me a start... Right now, people will help out some time. Mi haffi [have to] find a way out. Right now I am sick, and I cannot even afford the medication... But what is worse a mi gyal pickney dem [my daughters] mi a worry ‘bout. Trust mi a gyal pickney mi have, and they will start taking man [become sexually active at an early age], if mi cannot find it to take care of them. And I don’t want them to go astray.

Jacqueline, despite her circumstances, was more hopeful than all other interviewees who were in a similar economic position. Her impoverishment has, in the past, been punctuated with successful hustling, and this has kept her hopes alive. For Jacqueline the effects of violence, pernicious as they are, are still less daunting than the ‘uncomfortableness’ created by extreme poverty.

Similar sentiments that ‘nutten naah gwaan’, which describes the stagnant nature of life in the community, were echoed strongly by other interviewees. Like Jacqueline, Norma has three children, is also a single mother without the wherewithal to properly care for herself or her three children. She depends on a man to provide for her. None of these sources provide consistent support. Her daughter who ‘supports’ her relies on the generosity of her child’s father, who hustles. Norma lives in a one bedroom house, which has to be rebuilt after each hurricane. Norma was on her way to ‘hustle to get some cash for dinner’, when I asked if she would be willing to speak with me. When asked about her security and the security of the community, she had this to say.

I don’t make problem with anybody, so I don’t really have to worry too much about the crime. I don’t really make it trouble me. They have guns and we all know that, but if anything gwaan [happens] mi no really know about it, and I try not to say anything about it. They can do anything, and you can never be sure who is doing it. Everybody wants to rule and dictate what is to be done. Poverty affect me, crime no don’t do me anything. A my food that I can’t afford mi worry about. Right now mi need a proper house. I don’t live nowhere... That’s not a proper house. Benjamin [a community leader] promise to help me out with some blocks, and to try see if I can get a bathroom.

Timothy lives with his grandmother and relies on her and his mother for occasional support. He has a high-school-level education, and is desperate for employment. When I approached Timothy he was hanging out on in front of his friend's house 'meditating on life', as he puts it. Timothy is seriously contemplating a life of crime as a way of addressing his economic despondence. This was his view:

Ms., I am seriously thinking about joining some of my friends. I have been around them and I have been around guns, but I have never done anything wrong. I just know that if I should tell them I am ready, I can get a gun. I don't want to do this, but when things get really hard mi naa lie, a lot of time I think about it. It is not easy when you are a ghetto youth. It's hard to find things—food, clothes, anything at all. I don't really have a proper education so it's hard to find a job.

The comments that poverty cannot be fully disentangled from crime and violence echoed throughout the interviews. Most people were placed in a more disadvantageous position because of their impoverishment: social mobility and opportunities to leave the community are, in reality, almost impossible, because of social and economic marginalisation, which is influenced by the lack of education and parents' general inability to provide an environment to support their children's education and social development. The desperation engendered by poverty is also creating a worryingly complacent attitude among some community members toward violence.

'Political Warriors': Political Identities and Violence in Turl Head

One defining feature of a garrison is the strong emphasis placed on political history and the insoluble bonds created from the interconnection between politics, violence, and patronage. Like Golden Town, Turl Head evolved under conditions of political violence and clientelistic forms of democracy. Prior to the political violence, which erupted in the 1980s, marking the community's transition to a Jamaica Labour Party stronghold, Turl Head had supported the Peoples National Party. The struggles for political representation sowed the seeds of violence, which ultimately sealed the fate of the community and destined it to a cycle of violence and

poverty, intermittently interspersed with promises of development to coincide with national and local elections. Jacqueline sees political identity as an inherent feature of garrison politics, steeped in bonds that are psychologically and emotionally significant and generally divorced from broader social and economic concerns. According to her:

people will not change – they going vote for the same party that not helping them. Them love the party. Born inna[in the] bone dead inna mind; they caan switch to PNP. Even when the party naa give them nutten, dem still love it... When I call the MP or the Councillor, they don't answer their phones. If it was not for Ninja (the 'president'), I wouldn't get anything. Him write my name on the list [for employment to clean the streets in the community]. That is how I ended up getting two days of sweeping and washing the road. I won't vote in the next election but mi caan turn PNP. Them not helping wi. So how me must vote? You no think if is even once a month they should try to come in the community and talk to people, or try to do something about the poverty?

Paul, who was incarcerated for a stabbing incident and subsequently granted bail, self-identifies as a 'political warrior':

I am a political warrior. I defend my political party— everybody knows my tradition and my capability. I am one of the main persons on this construction site, and one of the right hand persons for my party leader. We defend the party and keep the place under control. A long time mi involved inna politics – mi mek my name. Mi earn my respect... Mi rich – I am not poor. Right now I am going on the road to buy some drinks and enjoy myself. Some people in the community poor though.

Paul and Jacqueline invoke political identity as an important frame of reference to explain the way in which politics functions, when assessed at the individual or collective level and the effect it has on political action and decision-making within the community. It is also common for political identity to be discussed in relation to whether it has benefited individuals or not, and to what extent. Paul enjoys unfettered access to the Member of Parliament and uses direct channels to access benefits. The respect Paul earns as a 'political warrior' generates social, political and economic advantages. His identity is one built up by the past and rationalised by circumstances and realities of the present. He associates his 'riches' and his 'tradition' with politics. On the other hand, and like that of the vast majority of community members,

Jacqueline's story is one informed by the more negative role of politics, but not sufficiently so to shatter deep-seated bonds that create unyielding political loyalties.

Most people occupy one bedroom houses with unattached bathrooms and kitchens, and there is general consensus that political loyalty and political violence have not translated into tangible benefits for most residents. Devon, the pastor of the community's Gospel Church of Jesus Christ Apostolic, expressed these views.

A big chunk of the crime in the 1980s was politically motivated, and if you were not saying JLP then you would be in trouble. In Turl Head our democracy is being trampled upon, and there is a stigma because of this. And some people do it [vote for the JLP] out of fear. And this is one of the things I always say to my brethren. I don't join people going on bandwagons. I don't vote for party; I vote for policies and based on the basic needs of my community. And most people do not have the basic, and that is what bothers me a lot. They vote for a person even though they don't have any roads, or anything— no proper housing, nothing.

The historical relevance of large scale political violence and intimidation, their reduced political value (which accompanied the consolidation of firm political identities), and the subsequent rolling back of the state have had a remarkable impact on the community's imagination and the ways in which residents have conceptualised and understood the conditions of the present, as well as their future within Jamaica's social order. Politics promised much, but delivered little. In order to secure votes, politicians convinced the masses that their fate was ultimately and directly tied to ensuring they put the 'right' government in power by whatever means necessary. Rewards would come in the form of hand-outs and other material resources to ease their impoverishment. But, political victory has left many without a 'stake' in national politics (despite firm loyalties), leaving instead a legacy of violence, strong political identities and stigmatisation.

Political identity and absence of progress and positive political memories have typically coincided with decreasing confidence in the moral worth of people's life. Lives in Turl Head were always treated as expendables, and memories of the use of violence toward a

political end remain deeply lodged in the psyche of the residents. These stories are passed on to each new generation of youths, who are inclined to ‘legitimately’ re-enact the violence of the past toward more ‘progressive’ ends. There is no doubt, therefore, that political violence, memories of it, and the generational transfer of such memories have affected both the community’s outlook on violence and the state’s legitimate claim on the use of force. This has given rise to a clear contradiction between state laws and longstanding practices that support pragmatic use of violence, without legal considerations or concern for the lives of ‘non-citizens’. Political identity is not the main cause of violence or insecurity in the community, but it is a significant part of the problem. People continue to lend support almost uncritically to political parties, weakening the competitive features of elections and the impetus for governments to perform and create redistributive policies that would undercut the demand and use of violence as a redistributive tool.

The Experience of Security in Turl Head: ‘Livivity’ in the Commons

In Turl Head fear of violence is generated from two main but not exclusive sources. There is a high level of fear among residents who have relatives who have been victimised or involved in conflicts of a violent nature, in which case fear is usually driven by the possibility of reprisals and failure of the police to prevent them happening. In the second instance, those who enjoy a standard of living which is above that of the average resident’s usually find themselves in a defensive position, crippled by fear of being punished for not adequately sharing the fruits of their labour. While residents in Golden Town declared their community completely safe and secure under the leadership of a don, in Turl Head this was not the case. Many felt that the presence of the don curbs violence within the community and offers residents protection; still, most residents did not feel safe. Fear and victimization are minimised not by the mere presence of a don, but by a combination of factors: being born into a family with an outstanding ‘tradition of badness’; placing a limit on the freedom to

express one's opinion, or taking a neutral stance on matters relating to conflict and the personal affairs of community members; and sharing and contributing to the social and economic needs of the community. Individuals perceived as having the capacity to be charitable ought to do so. This is the general feeling among those who are in possession of very little, and is one of the primary bases upon which those who are economically viable must rely for their safety. It is considered a sacrilege to threaten the lives of those who are committed to some form of social justice and collective welfare. Cooperation with this belief system has other rewards, chief of which are respect and a favourable character assessment.

On the contrary, there was no guarantee of personal security or respect for those who possessed the means, but did not consider it obligatory or necessary to treat individual success and progress as collective goods, or to place the collective interests ahead of the individual's. In explaining the double murder of a married couple in the presence of their children, John had these remarks:

It is all about 'livity'[living together and sharing] inna the place, and that couple travel go foreign all the time and they do all type a things that show you that dem [they are] making it. And dem live inna the community so dem benefit too, whenever we keep the place safe from outsiders. We all know that them making a nice living. They have a shop and everything. But they close off – they don't do anything for anybody, so the youth dem pree dem for it [watch and assess their actions closely].

John does not regard the murder as a gruesome act. By failing to treat their economic success as a collective good, the couple had suffered the 'natural' consequences. A collective good is 'by definition such that other individuals in the group cannot be kept from consuming it once an individual has provided it for himself' (Olson 1965: 15). This is how most 'goods' are conceptualised in Turl Head, at least normatively. Moreover, it is felt that once an individual expends effort protecting the community from outside threats, there are benefits accumulating to all members of the community. By this logic, that individual expects to share in other goods (social and economic), from which he could potentially be excluded. This is a primary

tenet of donmanship in Turl Head. Security and social justice are, therefore, mutually constituted. And in cases where this logic doesn't resonate, there are people who are willing to exercise coercive power to secure compliance or use violence to punish non-compliance. When individual interest is allowed primacy over group interest, the incidence of violence is likely to increase in Turl Head. The critical question, therefore, is how to govern the community in a way that ensures its sustainability and avoids a 'tragedy of the commons.'¹⁴

There is little scope in settlements and 'commons' such as Turl Head for pursuit of individualism. In a culture where kinship and communal bonds dominate the local structures, individualism fosters hostility. Ranny, explains the tension between individual success and collective demands at the level of the group (sometimes represented by individuals, who presumably act on behalf of the group). Ranny was born and raised in the community and self-identifies as a hardworking person, who came from an extremely poor background. He was unable to attend school, owing to his parents' low economic status and recalls surviving many evenings without a meal. This meant he had to 'put his shoulders to the wheel' at a very early age. He shared these perspectives:

I don't feel safe, even though I pay my dues. When criminals cannot get anyone to prey on, they will prey on you. It will affect me one day or another. My main fear is that I could be killed or robbed. I am also worried about my family. They say they won't violate us, but they can't be tamed. I have lost a very close friend, and I know taxi-operators who have been murdered. Once you have to share your space with people of questionable character, you can't be safe. One of the things you have to do is you have to share your supplies. This is how you stay alive in the garrison. This is what wisdom dictates. Wisdom also dictates that I should leave...

Ranny understands the tacit, though not altogether consensual social contract in the community. Sharing and negotiating are necessary for safety and security in spaces where there is little or no external support mechanism, and as a result individuals have built up an

¹⁴ Hardin's tragedy of the commons can be used as a way of understanding the importance of cooperation in the achievement of *Pareto* optimal levels of individual security. There are significant threats to contend with when the rational individual pursues his/her self interest (which results in the 'tragedy of the commons') while occupying the 'commons' – in this case, a 'garrison community'.

identity around a shared experience of poverty and struggle, hardship and cooperation. Similarly, Benjamin, who regards himself as one of the leaders of the community, derives his legitimacy from his willingness to assist the less- fortunate in the community. He describes himself as a ‘survivor, who has been about survival from day one and had to be out in the streets from an early age, learning the ropes of survival through one thing or another’.

According to Benjamin:

I am a genuine leader who people can rely on. They accept me as a generous person. I make my funds from putting on stage shows, not from politicians. Every Christmas I feed all the elderly people in the community. This is important because everybody grabbing now that the economy is bad. The trust is not there right now. If people seem to think you are making it over them, then arguments tend to develop. I am the one most people call when they cannot manage to find or afford things on their own... Most guys look up to me, so I feel safe most times. I have connections and I can call a one and talk to him. That’s where my affection comes in. People at my doorsteps from everywhere. I am educated to the system, and a lot of youths are not, so there is a lot of corruption and badmind, and people will take things from those who work for it. You will have a work and you call a one, but some of them don’t want to work; they have no goals. And if you are leading all the projects, then the little man is looking for something. If you can’t meet the demand your life could be threatened.

Ms. Gloria also suggested a critical link between safety, respect, and sharing:

I run short on supplies for the shop, and that’s my only problem really, but not crime or anything extreme. Sometimes I am afraid to open the shop, but this is when men from the hills, and we are not sure who they are. But overall I feel secure. I never had any issue with people. And because I am in the centre of things, people come to me for things, so I get respect because of this so nobody not troubling me.

Accompanying concerns about threats, which might result when individualism leads to excludability, group rivalry, everyday disputes, and reprisals threaten individual security and are major causes of violence and fear. Most respondents had lost a family member, or known someone who had been killed in a violent confrontation. Construction sites represent major spaces of conflict and are usually rife with power struggles over economic resources and leadership. It is expected that party supporters of the government in power should be given automatic preference when it comes to job distribution on construction sites. It is not unusual for disputes, like the one described above, to escalate to astronomical levels which may

eventually lead to some kind of reprisal. Fear of reprisals is ubiquitous among those who have family members who have been involved in violent conflicts. Maggie is 45, sick, unemployed, and lives in a one-bedroom house, given to her by one of her sons. She is in search of employment, but has been unable to find a job. Gloria is very afraid; one of her sons was chopped in the head several times. She describes her and her son's experience in these terms:

I am afraid because a guy is in jail for the shooting of my son, but he has friends... My son is just as afraid as me – he is not living at his house. He lives at the ball-ground entrance, and have some youth around the place who try to keep watch. But the friends can come back at any time, so we are not safe. And is not like the police can stop them if they determine to come back and kill him. The police always turn up long after the crime done commit already. So him have to be looking out for them, him and him friends. Him have to prepare to defend himself.

Like Maggie, Marcia is also fearful of the possibility of a reprisal, because of a bitter feud that resulted in her brother's death and the shooting of her uncle in a separate incident.

According to her:

crime not good in the community – people waan yuh live under dem order. Presi a try set the community right though. The don weh dem have not really hurting anybody in the community. You can talk to him and him will settle a dispute but personally mi naa go dem way. Long time days, outside man use to come in the community and people would get stab. I don't go out – dem say nowhere no safer than yaad. I don't feel safe – I am living with a fear now. Somebody is in jail, but if him get bail more killings or shootings might happen.

John, a 25-year-old, explained that he was attacked and stabbed by someone. An apology given subsequent to the incident averted what would have otherwise been a serious retaliation. Says John, 'my family bad and everybody know this. So nobody no really waan prolong anything with mi.'¹⁵ John's lack of fear is associated with his family's reputation and the respect they earn from this reputation. John convinced his family to accept the apology instead of 'spilling blood'. Tom, another interviewee, was involved in a similar incident, with someone who 'disrespected' him. Tom regards Turl Head as a very unsafe place, but

¹⁵ 'My family is bad, and this is well-known. So, nobody wants to prolong a dispute with me.'

contends that he is not very fearful— he has established a reputation for being ruthless. He is of the view that:

If your born inna it, you have to stay in it. People in Turl Head don't play – they will kill you. You have to be careful and you have to have a very concrete approach. The crime thing is very serious because everybody trying to get rich and want to live a happy life, and nobody not taking any disrespect 'roun here... I am not fearful; nobody not going harm me so easily. They know I am not normal.

The security narratives and experiences in Turl Head are constituted through an amalgamation of diverse influences, ranging from spatial formation, political history, communal practices (that prioritize the community's interest over the individual's), culture, and local ideas about what is just and right. Also, violence has become a way of strongly asserting and bringing attention to the male ego and compensating for weakened masculinities under conditions of severe deprivation. Violence in some ways, then, has flourished more expansively in borderline spaces, where deprivation comingles with hopelessness and a political history of violence. The involvement of the state in matters of ensuring justice or punishing criminals does not inexorably create greater feelings of security or improve security for that matter. Instead it often creates anxiety about reprisals. Reporting a crime may increase the likelihood of some form of retaliation, since the police are regarded as the enemy of the community and only 'informers' rely on police protection.

Policing in the Absence of Trust and Respect

There are significant problems with policing in Turl Head. Lack of trust and disrespect constitute the most significant hindrances to establishing better relations between police and citizens. The rapid deterioration in trust correlates with increased incidences of police killings, abuses and confrontation. Shared community stories, passed on inter-generationally, detailing police corruption, collusion with criminals and vigilantism, have impacted immensely on local attitudes toward policing. Police officers are widely regarded as

‘common criminals’, who lack the moral authority to enforce a set of laws and rules to which they do not necessarily or always comply.

Police confrontations can prove extremely off-putting, evoking recalcitrance and a keen awakening of the spatial injustices that occur in the everyday lives of those ostensibly regarded as denizens. The sight of police officers shouting, ‘come off a di street boy’, followed by physical assault (as I prepared to leave the community after a meeting) depicted an ostensibly typical scenario between police, ‘corner youths’, and those immediately perceived as criminals. The police assume this is the most effective way of achieving cooperation and acquiescence in garrison communities, and the corner youths and criminals perceive this as an act of disrespect to which they must not conform. Moreover, for the average citizen, not faced with these daily assaults, the perception of the police is still very negatively constituted. While the don is regarded sceptically by many, the main support for, or indifference toward, his leadership derives from the need for ‘protection’. One woman commented that the dons are needed to protect her and her neighbours from the police and soldiers.

Timothy is 19; he is unemployed and unemployable. He shared these comments:

You can’t trust the police; they come in and they disrespect all of us in the community. Once they see you on the corner or anywhere in your community, they treat you like a criminal. The police are criminals too just like some of us in the community. So how they want to tell us what to do? I don’t trust police and most people in the community don’t trust them either... I prefer the don than the police. If you don’t get in the don’s way, him naah do yuh nutten [he is not going to harm you].

Respect remains an essential demand for individuals in Turl Head, men especially, who, as a result of unemployment and their alienation from the rest of the society, have been emasculated socially and economically. Attempts to demand respect are significantly affected by police confrontations. Police brutality reinforces entrenched attitudes toward criminals and people categorised as poor and ‘lawless’. The relevance and value placed on procedural

justice have dissipated as extra-judicial killings have increased. Many have found ways of retaliating against the police instead of seeking redress through the law, which is regarded as an exercise in futility. Moreover, to accept police brutality without retaliating is to accept disrespect. The form that resistance takes in Turl Head will most likely continue to be profoundly influenced by the extent to which respect is either accessible or inaccessible, and the degree to which people continue to regard disrespect as a function of their social and economic status.

There were community members who were open to the idea of policing, but under a different set of practices. These members felt generally that criminals and dons operate an oppressive system that could potentially be improved through police reforms and improved trust:

We need to get rid of the don so people can move around freely. The same dons that claim that they protecting people are also scaring people. But at the time we cannot trust the police, so people are afraid to provide them with information. And they really don't treat the youths, especially, with any respect. They need to change up things with the police and how they go about their business in the community.

Similarly, Ranny argues that:

until law abiding citizens can trust the police, it is going to be impossible to rid the community of crime or to get the full cooperation of people who do not believe in donmanship and the use of violence in the community.

By drawing on the stories of residents in Turl Head, this article has offered further insights into the security narratives which are of relevance at the sub-national level. Internal dissonance and conflict are features of Turl Head's everyday realities. This creates space for establishing and supporting varied institutions, ensuring loyalties are more widely dispersed. Donmanship is not the only source of authority in the community, although it is very significant. The church and local civic organisations are seeking to have an impact on the community's morale. Additionally, state legitimacy and solutions to violence are being sought through the implementation of 'social intervention' programmes and infrastructural

projects. The Jamaica Social Investment Fund (JSIF) has been attempting to implement various projects in Turl Head – these projects, in theory, are geared toward poverty alleviation and improving security. The sources of Turl Head’s insecurities are complex, and the solutions must, therefore, reflect an appreciation of such complexity.

CHAPTER 8

RESPONSES TO SECURITY IN JAMAICA

Introduction

Having provided three empirical chapters aimed at exploring the sub-national, this chapter provides another empirical chapter, which examines the security discourse at the national

level. In the first place, I am concerned with examining dominant security discourses which emphasise state security. The security of the state is still the main preoccupation of policy elites; (re)gaining state authority and ensuring the survival of the state are often pursued without regard for the rights of everyday citizens in subnational spaces where state intervention, in this case policing, is prominent. Unsurprisingly, therefore, policies such as Jamaica's 2007 National Security Policy and the reviewed 2012 version regard state survival and national security as the foci of Jamaica's security. The kinds of visible and invisible forms of insecurity experienced by everyday citizens are still marginalized in the dominant state security paradigm.

The main public policy response to state security has been to increase the power of the state through legislation and special police-military operations. In the absence of security policy and reform changes that are commensurate with local realities, or which aim to change the circumstances that create insecurity and produce threats to state security, challenges associated with legitimacy, violence, organized crime and state security have persisted. The focus on national security which has dominated the colonial and postcolonial periods has relied upon techniques of punishment that are often incompatible with freedom and full citizenship. Despite the fact that they have, if anything, created more insecurity than security, they continue to be embraced by policy elites and a wide array of class factions in Jamaica as common sense, appropriate responses.

Some Threats Matter More than Others: The State Security Emphasis

Security policies in Jamaica are mainly developed and articulated in relation to the security of the state. For example, the 2012 Reviewed National Security Policy begins its introduction with an emphasis on, and conceptualization, of national security:

the concept of national security includes the measures taken by a State to ensure its survival and the safety and welfare of its people. There are many potential challenges

to the integrity of the State. These include the use of conventional or unconventional forces to destabilize a government, annex resources or impose regime or policy change. They also include a range of threats to economic, institutional and social structures.

States have always been concerned with guarding their territorial integrity and various assets at their disposal from threats arising externally – this is the meaning conveyed by national security (Sherry 1977). This is no different for Jamaica given its small size as well as the impact of transnational organized crime, such as drug trafficking. Organized crime is especially important because of the way in which it affects state authority and legitimacy, and the endemic corruption that ensues:

the security problem has been linked with a certain embeddedness of organized crime in the society, which has had further consequential effects: people have been suborned in a range of sectors, social, economic and administrative... Importantly, as well, the society doesn't accept that the state is at risk or under threat from organized crime (Mark Thomas Parliamentarian).

Organized crime relies on strong and enduring links that are forged between politics and crime and public demand for illicit activities.¹⁶ Transnational organized crime is part of the dominant security discourses not only because of the threats it poses to the Jamaican state but because of its importance as a policy issue to the US, a hegemonic force in the Caribbean region. And while organized crime operates at all scales - international, national and local- its impact at the local level is often obfuscated in larger discourses that focus on the state and national level realities. The profits from organized crime are used by dons to dominate local communities and to fill the lacunae left by the state in the provision of important public goods.

¹⁶ Albanese argues that organized crime is 'a continuing criminal enterprise that rationally works to profit from illicit activities that are often in great public demand. Its continuing existence is maintained through the use of force, threats, monopoly control, and/or the corruption of public officials' (Albanese, 2005: 10)

Additionally, the threat of terrorism has become a part of the central security discourse in Jamaica. Michael McDonald, a policy elite, noted that:

terrorism constitutes a low probability threat, but with the potential for a very high impact, given that Jamaica is an important tourist destination for especially US citizens, who could be potential targets. This impact has to be mitigated by a coherent response if an incident occurs. For example, the response to the Montego Bay hijacking¹⁷ was the international gold standard for such matters. Our ability to deal so effectively with that event restored confidence in our country after the event. Therefore, it is a capability we must have and must invest in.

While terrorism has the potential to cause harm in the Caribbean because of how important tourism is to Caribbean economies (Griffith 1999), proximity to the US and the reliance on donor funding mean that national priorities can easily become conflated with low-probability threats such as terrorism. The ‘war on terror’ has also supported policies and laws that are deemed to be incompatible with human rights and human security. Additionally, resources used to build capacities and institutions to respond to terrorism, a low-probability threat, reduce the state’s ability to invest in subnational development and community policing that could provide long-term solutions to Jamaica’s major security threats, both human and national.

As I have explained in previous chapters, garrisons and gangs are pertinent in security discourses in Jamaica. Gangs who normally reside in garrisons are involved in organized crime and the perpetration of violence. For these reasons, garrisons are usually regarded as violent spaces, where ‘everybody is a criminal’. The security of the everyday citizen who resides in the garrisons are not usually central in state security discourses. The idea that everyday citizens in garrisons ‘get what they deserve’ is a pervasive narrative in Jamaican society:

¹⁷In 2009 there was an attempted hijacking of a Canadian chartered flight scheduled to transport 159 passengers going to Canada from the Sangster International Airport, Montego Bay airport in Jamaica. After negotiations with the perpetrator, 20 year old Stephen Fray broke down, the security forces were able to intervene successfully, freeing 6 crew members without any collateral damage.

...This idea that the don provides protection in the communities is a warped dysfunctional way of thinking. He [a student who lives in a garrison community, and who insisted that the don provided more protection than the police] gets what he deserves when the police enters his community — he is still thinking like a dunce. And we should not use social exclusion as an excuse; there is nothing intrinsically marginalising in terms of how the society operates, and there is not anything that is an insurmountable obstacle. But they have been sold that story for years [that the police does not provide protection for the garrisons], even by politicians, some of who were exposed on Wikileaks for preaching that same falsehood. It facilitates a culture of secrecy and makes it difficult for police to get information; that is what it does (John Harrison: policy elite).

The suggestion that there is ‘nothing intrinsically marginalising in terms of how the society operates’ is evidence of the different perspectives about who or what is to be secured and whose insecurity matters. It also sheds light on the reasons threats to individuals is often regarded as less important than threats to the state by policy elites. While new actors with divergent views about security have entered the policymaking space— civil society groups, in particular, that gained prominence in Jamaica at the start of the 21st century— this has not had a significant influence on the dominant security discourse and practices.

We continue to have a conversation on security in Jamaica that presupposes that the vast majority of people from socio-economically, disadvantaged backgrounds are criminals. Security of the person, for me, is predicated on the idea that it is the individual’s security, security of space, of privacy and threats from things, including physical security etc., which are important; all of these things have to be factored in. We are not centralising the human being and the ordinary Jamaican— they are not placed at the centre. (Joanna Thompson: Civil Society).

Relating Practice to Discourse: Policy Stability

Somit and Peterson argue that with few exceptions, ‘the policies adopted in a given polity reflect and flow from the views about human nature held by those charged with setting these policies’ (2003: 5). Differential citizenship and ideas about who is a citizen and who is not are central to how elites constitute their primary spaces of intervention and the ways in which techniques and mechanisms of power and discipline are mobilized to control and regulate their conduct (Dikec 2007). Security practices in Jamaica draw heavily on police and military operations which are not well-targeted or results-oriented.

Despite the lack of policy success, with few exceptions, security practices have remained unchanged. Policing is central to security practices and the enforcement and implementation of security policies and strategies. Established as a colonial machinery, mandated to control and harshly discipline the black sections of the population, the Jamaica Constabulary Force, established in 1867 in the aftermath of the Morant Bay Rebellion, continues to evince hostile attitudes toward the urban, black poor. A retired member of the police force made the following remark:

law and order has always been challenging, historically, in most societies; it is an imposing factor on freedom in Jamaica. In its embryonic stage, it was designed to protect the plantocracy from the black people. That concept still has not left the minds of some Jamaicans. And some Jamaicans, the elites in the society, hold the view that we must protect the bourgeoisies in the society, still. I challenge any one to my view that the class structure of the society is such that that some of those people still want to us to protect them, like we did in the colonial days (Andrew Cameron).

The law and order techniques which are expected to ‘dismantle’ criminal groups, protect the state, and lead the charge in producing the desired social outcome often lead to social alienation, a further erosion of trust, and a greater commitment to subversion of the established order. Instead of improving the legitimacy of the state, these policies lend further legitimacy to alternative, extralegal structures at the sub-national level. Having emphasized a social justice approach in the past, one of Harriott’s (2009) recent proposals is that policy should respond to the problem and not the cause of the problem. He proposes that the state should increase surveillance and maintain a permanent presence in communities where organized crime and the subculture of violence, which he deems the ‘centre of gravity’, are unbridled. He is of the view that law and order should be prioritised to deal with the ‘institutionalisation of norms governing the use of violence’ and the debilitating effects of organized crime:

If, as I have argued, organized crime it at the heart of the Jamaican crime problem, and if it is also correct that a subculture of violence has emerged in the country, then my theoretical expectation is that the greatest short-term crime control return is to be

had from making law enforcement more effective and more targeted. A crime control strategy that seeks to tackle the core problems should therefore initially have at its core, law enforcement (2009: 10)

Harriott cautions that law enforcement and crime control should not rely solely on crime fighting, and he goes to great lengths to show that crime fighting can produce undemocratic effects and has criminalizing consequences. History has shown that new alternatives are likely to emerge when law enforcement strategies are not consistent and perceived to be fair and when opportunities in the formal sector are limited. The rise in the cocaine trade preceded the criminalization of ganja; the emergence of the don as a messianic leader followed the triumph of neoliberalism and the rolling back of the state; the lottery scam has now become popular, coinciding with efforts to curtail the cocaine trade through the 'war on drugs'. A constant variable amid these shifts have been high levels of perceived political corruption, inconsistent law enforcement strategies, low levels of human, economic and social development and a general lack of important freedoms to grant the disenfranchised some level of autonomy and a proper place within Jamaica's social order.

Windows of opportunity that should disrupt old practices have merely been used to create incremental changes (which are often statistical, not structural) followed by a return to the old and dominant practices. Unsurprisingly, the drop in the homicide rate that preceded the extradition of Dudus was not sustained. Belief systems and opportunity structures which undergird organized crime and violence did not change. The state was not able to reassert its legitimacy and bring about radical changes in structures, institutions, beliefs and attitudes at this specific moment in Jamaica's history. The extradition request made by the US for the extradition of Dudus and the subsequent confrontation between Tivoli Garden's and the state were used to promote a narrow consensus in the society for the need to 'be tough on crime' and zero-tolerance policing. There was also vast public support for the use of force by the

state to respond to and quell attacks on the state by Tivoli Gardens.¹⁸ Support for a long-term reform movement was not as apparent. The following remarks were made by a parliamentarian:

the society doesn't accept that the state is at risk or under threat. They will have to agree to make the expenditures. There is not a consensus emerging, and that is at least in part because of the absence of a consensus in the body politic. This creates pressure for political parties— they have to respond to public outburst and hysteria. It is, therefore, difficult for the public to grasp the logic of a reform process... And there is a visible, appalling type of violence which, because of its very nature, places pressure on political parties for immediate, as opposed to long term efforts (Calvin Jones: Parliamentarian).

It would be a mistake to believe that the state only 'responds to public outburst and hysteria'— it actively participates in its production and reproduction. The state delayed the signing of Dudus's extradition and allowed time for resistance to build on the margins. In the end, instead of using the extradition as a 'policy window' to initiate changes what was achieved was policy stability. The burning of police stations and the intervention of the army to quell the uprisings that followed masked underlying tensions and made it easier for the state to advance policies that prioritised continuity rather than change.

The Illusion of 'Security Reform'

There has been a move to intersperse the dominant operational approaches to national security with attempts at 'reform'. Essentially, a shift in security policymaking continues to elude those who proclaim such shifts. Reform inevitably creates winners and losers, and the old guard usually have a vested interest in maintaining old structures and the power dynamic that underpin those structures. The most popular reference points for security reform in Jamaica are the National Security Policy, which was developed in 2007 (and reviewed in 2012), the creation of the Major Organized Crime and Anti-Corruption Unit (MOCA),

¹⁸ See the Report of Tivoli Commission of Inquiry

undertaking of a strategic review of the Jamaica Constabulary Force and the passing of criminal laws. These are the main pillars upon which the reform agenda rests.

There is consensus that reforms cannot be judged solely on the basis of new proposals or a broadening of concepts, but rather on the effect they have on solving relevant problems. A common view in the Caribbean holds that reform is ‘conceived as no more than a reorganisation of departments with a view to improve efficiency’ (La Guerre 1994: 216). The implementation of long-term solutions proposed in the National Security Policy has been much more difficult to achieve. One of the reasons for this is the election cycle and the pressure to satisfy populist demands. Lamar Lewis, made the following observation:

having been in that seat before, you are really racing against time to secure the long-term changes that are needed, while maintaining the support of the public that want an instant solution, and who are ambivalent about some of the other issues.

While temporal constraints invariably arise in parliamentary democracies, where the election cycle places political parties under pressure to act swiftly, there is a conviction that security decisions derive in large measure from rational self-interest, defined according to the need to maximise political capital and win elections irrespective of any negative impact such relationships might have on the deteriorating security fibre in society.

A National Security Policy Unit was established in 2007, and mandated to monitor and coordinate the implementation of the National Security Policy across all Ministries, Departments, and Agencies. Following its establishment, the Unit encountered numerous challenges:

there were problems at the very core. How was implementation of the policy to be coordinated and by whom? It became a senior management problem. There was interest – people needed to be helped along to understand what was happening. Ultimately there was no political responsibility for the policy (Policy elite).

Bureaucratic confusion is also common among policy managers:

There has been change over the last decade... Since 2007, there have been efforts to modernize; before this, we were reactive to a lot of policy and legislative issues. The focus is now much wider— we are now looking more broadly at international security issues, but there are still fundamental problems and confusion in the organization about what we are supposed to be doing. This Unit [one of the units in the organization] is not necessary, and there are significant overlaps and a lot of unnecessary bureaucracy around. The idea was to streamline the Unit to deal with certain areas. We need to look at the structure right now and reorganize— there is no synergy between the Units, and it's all confusion... There is no direction coming from the top (Peter Stafford: Policy Manager).

Attempts at reforming the police force throw up similar or even more significant challenges. One of the main problems with reforming the JCF has always been the insurmountable challenge posed by its organizational culture (Harriott 2003). Recognising this, the 2007 strategic review of the JCF advances the view that professionalism, corruption, discipline, and leadership in the Jamaica Constabulary Force should be paramount in any reform attempts that seek to address the security crisis in Jamaica. The review proposes 124 recommendations, but actual reform of the police force, even with the establishment of The Independent Commission of Investigations, INDECOM, has been elusive.

The force is not influenced by a policy document. How [they] do things is not rooted in a policy document, it is more influenced by; where they came from to join the organization. Up until ten years ago, most came from the rough part of town; hardcore policing is what they are accustomed to. If we take a culture of the rough part of town, you have to be seen as a killer to be safe. Even people who are not inherently violent put on this face to survive. That is what he understands policing to be. Who are the trainers? All stories told to the recruits are told about hardcore policemen. They want to be like Trinity and Renato (Andy Caine: Policy Manager)

The paramilitary approach, as Andy suggests, is culturally embedded, and this has posed difficulties for different approaches, especially community policing. Community policing, both as concept and practice, has for the most part been dismissed as ill-suited to the security realities in Jamaica. This is a function of the limited way in which community policing is understood, but also a function of the way in which the dominant culture in the police force resists such alternatives. Community policing is seen as antithetical to the ingrained beliefs in the dominant culture:

taking on all the community problems is not policing; it is public relations. And I think this is what people are expecting; there have been shifts in the concept from what we mean by community policing. Sometimes the police do not take action, and that is not policing, it is Public Relations. If there is a law-and-order problem, the police must take action. Our job is to confront the gangs; that is our problem, not community policing (Policy Manager)

In the light of these views, Michael, a member of the donor community, observed that:

The leadership in the police force is showing not only skills but intent. However, he is deprioritizing the community policing, and this is problematic. He has come in with his own support base, he has the ability to push things through in his own way. There are very interesting things happening and some very interesting statistics: a huge number of officers have been fired, and the JCF is showing commitment to ethical, professional policing. The other interesting thing is that shootings were down, but fatal shootings by police are up by the 13%. The commissioner's perspective on this was very unrepentant— he is going to meet them head on; I have sympathy with this— there are a lot of guns on the street, and it is not easy. There is also a lot of money involved for them to maintain their pitch.

While the police are said to be performing their tasks more professionally, fatal policing shootings are on the rise and the Commissioner is committed to ensuring that the homicide statistics decrease. Focusing on statistics as the sole measure of how well the police force performs is a factor that has undoubtedly affected the attempts to engineer a shift in Jamaica's security architecture. The emphasis on quantitative measures is not sufficiently balanced against qualitative indicators of change.

Instrumental 'Intervention'

There are a plethora of 'social intervention' programmes and institutions, established both within and outside the security apparatus. Social intervention programmes operate with an underlying social logic, but this logic is employed instrumentally.

Social intervention was always a short-term strategy, but not the core of our reforms; if you simply address the crime organizations, then the pace of the response in terms of the economic recovery was going to be such that there would be a large pool of marginalised people, who would take a hostile view to the state, and to the society. So, there needed to be intervention. If your approach is going to be that you are going to lock up and kill everybody, then what I will say is that Jamaica cannot stand the blood; you need that dialogue between the communities and the state, but at arm's length (James Stafford: parliamentarian).

In effect, social programs were never regarded as a form of basic entitlement, to be claimed by marginalised communities. Social intervention is still being used as an ad hoc tool in communities that experience violence and produce threats to state security instead of a developmental long-term solution. At the same time, ‘political warriors’, ‘presidents’, and those who have become ‘educated to the system’ have exploited the weaknesses in the state’s approach to intervention. Moreover, in the absence of more concrete, visible changes, especially with regards to policing, there is no guarantee that such interventions can reduce hostile disposition toward the state.

An approach, which prioritizes the security of the state and that of the ‘good citizen’ has opportunistically been interspersed with piecemeal social programmes, which aim to reconcile garrison communities to increased surveillance, paramilitary policing, and extralegal action by the state. The state security paradigm narrowly constructs as dangerous, those who occupy marginalised spaces in the society, in order to deploy force indiscriminately and with impunity, while privileging a set of belief systems about what and who is to be secure, and how. Such a construction invokes responses from the security forces which are diametrically opposed to a new paradigm of security. The following chapter will now provide a conclusion to the study.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

Using four sites of analyses, the thesis has explored the nature and dynamic of the relationship between citizenship and security and interrogated the socio-political order in Jamaica which articulates this relationship. I have argued that the relationship between citizenship and security is an important one in the Jamaican context and shown how a deficit, as it relates to state security and the composition of the social order, has been integral to the legitimization of alternative practices of citizenship at the community level. These practices which utilize narratives on both security and violence are often in conflict and contest democratic norms of citizenship and the state's legal-rational order.

The first three sites are located at the sub-national level and provide an approach and the context to explore the everyday security narratives and practices of Jamaicans occupying different places on the class, space, insecurity and citizenship spectra. As garrison communities, Golden Town and Turl Head are located at the bottom of the social hierarchy and face persistent, but by no means identical security challenges. Market Heights provided a comparator for these two sites and revealed important insights into the way in which spatially and socially differentiated groups in Jamaica position themselves vis-à-vis the state (Chapter 6). Additionally, the study teased out important patterns, contradictions, and challenges that confront the Jamaican state in its efforts at 'reform' while using the old state security paradigm, informed by a set of historical discourses, beliefs and practices (Chapter 7).

While there is a dominant security discourse which focuses on state security, communities articulate their own understandings of their subjective experiences and construct narratives to reflect their own particular experiences and spatial context. This challenges the notion that security can be viewed as an objective experience, defined by clear existential threats. The study also revealed that class, status, space, culture, and identity politics significantly affect the way in which narratives on security are constructed and the practices that people use to address both gaps in public security and citizenship.

In Turl Head and Golden Town, insecurity was mainly discussed in relation to the fear of violence, repressive policing, disrespect, and issues around social justice. In Golden Town, the don, an authority figure, maintains order and fill the lacuna left by the state, but establishes in the process an exploitative relationship which relies on extralegal violence, and to a considerable extent, the suppression of individual agency. Everyday experiences of security in Golden Town provided the context within which people re-narrate, resist, and interrogate established structures of power which confine them to their ‘proper’ place in society. In this regard, their security experiences were being determined locally but also nationally. Hegemonic structures at the national level along with gaps in citizenship played an important role in determining what means are available to combat security threats through the legal and formal systems of the state. Substantive citizenship through the formal systems of the state is usually not on offer to garrison communities. The role that these communities play in the international drug trade and the impact of neoliberal policies on their well-being and life chances also meant that security experiences were determined not just locally and nationally, but also internationally.

And while individuals in Golden Town and Turl Head felt shut out of formal and legal citizenship in Jamaica, they also felt somewhat trapped in the local system of donmanship. The inability to access citizenship at the level of the state has had a significant

impact on the relationship between the state and garrison communities and has influenced the embodied acts of citizenship. These acts and the narratives that underpin them were at the crux of my efforts to understand the nature of the relationship between security and citizenship. Communities such as Golden Town, where the lack of state legitimacy and state security is tied to a deficit in citizenship, pose significant challenges for (re)centring the state. Owing to the sense of out-of-placeness that people experience when they enter certain public spaces or what is regarded as the 'society', social inclusion, as a strategy for granting citizenship in Jamaica, would have to be taken on as a long-term project. Moreover, garrisons have erected their own boundaries and used space in a way that contributes to spatial segregation. The study has also revealed the way in which security is tied to how people identify themselves and the ways in which they seek recognition and appraisal respect. Golden Town earned a reputation and respect for being 'one hundred percent safe'. The pursuit of security exists side by side with violence.

Unlike Golden Town, Turl Head's alternative system of citizenship and security is not as developed, centralized or well-resourced. Demands for social justice pose an ever-increasing challenge for most residents. Turl Head lacks the capacity to absorb surplus demands created by the gaping holes left by the state. In fact, the community cannot support these demands for a kind of collective social justice. The relationship between citizenship and security will become more embedded at the local level as communities act out their sense of marginalization and disenchantment and turn inward on themselves. The politics of the 1960s and 1980s, which pitted the urban poor in the 'downtown' areas of Kingston against each other, consolidated this kind of divisive politics. Glaring gaps in citizenship can, therefore, legitimise the use of violence against members of a group although they identify on the basis of political identity, common culture, and a similar set of social circumstances. This, I think, demonstrates that when the state abdicates what are arguably two of its most crucial

responsibilities, the provision of security and meaningful citizenship, necessitating alternative structures to be forged at the community level, there is an even greater likelihood of the occurrence of violence within these spaces. The problem, however, is that the incentive for the state to initiate social change is less when resistance and protest exist side by side with strong partisan political identities in the garrisons and neoliberal, individualistic tendencies in the middle class.

Market Heights adds another layer to these findings: the state is being decentralized not only in garrison communities, but also in middle-class communities in Jamaica. But unlike the garrisons, middle-class communities are not asking for an opt-out of state citizenship. Market Heights' citizens are part of Jamaica's middle class and are well-placed in the social and economic order. Their experiences as well as their relationship with the state take on less antagonistic and oppositional forms and are qualitatively different to the experiences of garrison communities. The passive, middle-class citizen benefits from respectful policing and is given access to citizenship through the institutions of the state.

Nonetheless, fear of violence has ensured that the middle class is not totally reliant upon the state for providing security. Security has become commodified and the use of private security is widespread among the middle class. Community organizations and Neighbourhood watches have also sprung up to ensure that citizens take responsibility for their own safety. And already people have bought into the idea that it is the individual and not the state that is responsible for ensuring personal security (Chapter 4). In this regard local organizations have also expressed a desire 'to take the community back'— to assume and take responsibility for what happens within its own borders. In many ways, as the findings reveal, the security debacle in Jamaica has served to increase social distance and has placed a premium on social segregation (Clarke 2006). The privatization and commodification of security has contributed to these processes (Jaffe 2012). And where civic organizations are

formed in middle-class communities, they mainly serve the interest of their immediate members— providing greater security to the middle class and seeking solidarity from groups within its own class to combat outside threats. But civic efforts have proven difficult in the midst of a form of liberal kind citizenship in middle-class communities that emphasizes citizenship through autonomy and individualism. Private security is more easily reconciled to the need for privacy, autonomy and individualism, which defines one's state of 'middle classness' in Jamaica. In the same way that status, access to citizenship, space and symbolic power help to determine the security responses of the middle class to their sense of fear and insecurity, exclusion and denial of a dignified place in the social order have, in many ways, determined the security practices that the marginalised are willing to support.

Cultural norms of respectability are also regarded as important in the middle class, and there is a perception that middle-class spaces are safer once this culture is not infiltrated by lower-class norms. Consequently, the nature of the relationship between citizenship and security, in terms of narratives and practices, vary according to space, class, culture and symbolic power. With increasing levels of social segregation and in a very class-conscious society, middle-class citizenship is also associated with acquiring status goods and living in safe zones or gated communities.

The findings from the national site provided a bridge between the discursive and practical exchanges between the sub-national and the national scale. The chapter revealed the ways in which dominant state security discourses and the transnational and national security landscape (particularly in the aftermath of 9/11) shape security policy choices and influence the national reform agenda. As I have argued, the main focus of the Jamaican state is on state security, policing, policy stability and the securitization of entire communities. Additionally, the very institutions that are expected to lead reform efforts are themselves constantly undergoing 'reform', which begs the question of what really constitutes reform in the

Jamaican context. Arguably, the notion of reform has been conflated with organizational changes, so that reform has come to be located in the state without circulating outward to communities in any meaningful way.

Security reform in Jamaica betrays a tendency toward a sharp disconnect from a wider project of social change which would disrupt established structures, differential citizenship and spatial segregation. According to the discourses which have become dominant in society, people in the garrisons are not entirely fit to be included in the immediate spheres of 'civil and polite society'. In fact, there are elites who view individuals in the garrisons as deserving of their precarious social and economic position. To the extent that these have become hegemonic discourses, it has become even more difficult to achieve a paradigm shift that can be implemented across local, organizational and national spaces. The insecurity of people who rely on informal policing and threats to the security of the state must be addressed simultaneously, instead of pitting one against the other.

Policy Implications

Both the empirical and theoretical findings from this study have implications for policy. The findings suggest that citizenship must become a core policy focus in future security policies for Jamaica. Citizenship must be discussed substantively and in relation to the legal/formal and extra-legal/ informal means by which it is often denied or attained. The historical oeuvres should be one of basic starting points for policy deliberations, but policymakers should also excavate the current narratives and practices which have become dominant, taken-for-granted approaches. Policies must question received knowledge about the primary spaces of intervention in the society and more privileged spaces, as well. Policy should seek to resist essentialist, hegemonic narratives that negate difference. The same should apply for

privileged spaces that exercise influence over the policy-space. The interests and values of individuals within these spaces must never be taken as given or fixed.

Critically, the state has to renegotiate the social contract with especially garrison communities in Jamaica. One of the critical ways of doing this will have to revolve around providing both formal and substantive citizenship, which should include guaranteeing, even at a minimum, a degree of security to people in the garrisons. The legal-rational order has to find some way of incorporating the views and needs of its marginalised ‘non-citizens’, who have the wherewithal, necessary outrage and frustration to unleash its pent-up frustration and feelings of indignity upon the society. Still, the political and social institutions that articulate and regulate the social order in Jamaica have been tremendously successful at suppressing and containing persistent modes of fulmination against systemic and institutionalised oppression. Strong political identities and deliberate action by political parties have also divided the garrisons and pitted them against each other, and this has made it considerably difficult to organize such communities around action for social change. Equally, the educational capital needed to participate in policymaking is yet to be attained by most of the disenfranchised in Jamaica, and the state is yet to demonstrate its commitment to changing this reality.

Several elements of the state have to be involved in developing and implementing a range of policies. The state has lost the moral authority to govern and has, therefore, to be more open to substantial input from individuals and groups outside the state and political apparatus. While civil society groups have been able to participate in policymaking, they don’t view this participation as meaningful for achieving change. Political power remains dominant in determining the outcomes of policies. If civil society groups are to successfully push through the kinds of security policy changes they are proposing, which, in my view, are well-intentioned, they may have to reconsider their approach. Civil society groups, in order to

gain a greater semblance of local legitimacy, should challenge all forms of injustice and raise opposition to the overall system, not just the security and criminal justice system. People feel shut out of the social and economic system in Jamaica, as well, and this is one area that does not get as much attention from the high profile civil society groups. These groups focus on legal justice, which has currency and resonates with the global civil society agenda without equal attention to social justice and established economic and social power in the society.

The police force in Jamaica will require a different approach, one that benefits from 124 recommendations in their strategic review, perhaps, but at a very elemental level, respect is what will quicken the pulse of change between police and garrison communities, and make these social spaces less-resistant to police authority. Policies must return, therefore, to some very basic requirements, while placing the local language at the centre of its deliberations. People in Turl Head and Golden Town have been very clear in their pronouncement of what it means to be respected, and the basis on which they are willing to reciprocate. People are desirous of a means of enhancing their life chances; they want swift justice and respectful policing, recognition of their similarities as well as their differences and respect for their basic humanity.

The future of citizenship and security in Jamaica will hinge to some considerable degree on the results of a renegotiated social contract between the state and the different classes, and between the classes themselves. Spatial and social segregation, repressive state policy, cultural denigration and disrespect of the lower classes will not put things right. Dons have reigned, been buried, and some extradited; political parties, too, have changed office regularly, yet the system, in which many garrison youths feel trapped, has remained fairly unshaken, suggesting that something must be rotten in the underbelly of the overall system in Jamaica. Along with the system of donmanship, the overseas drug market which provides prodigious resources to support oppositional factions and social projects in the garrisons is by

its very nature problematic both from a local and an international perspective. Increasing pressure from the US, manifested in demands for the extradition of local dons, could place the middle class in an even more defensive position, as people in the garrisons seek alternative ways of surviving.

Deep fissures inhere at the broader societal level; people have held on too tenaciously to their inherited and acquired places and have derived a sense of social and symbolic power, perhaps, by lording it over those still lacking the means to properly establish a sense of place in a socially and economically unsympathetic milieu. Despite the presence of a significant number of factors, which should logically result in a coherent, unified, ideological base for class protest, the state continues to find ways of averting any such occurrence. A capricious justice system, strong political geographies, political identity and a sense of identity foreclosure around party loyalty remain strong, and provide the state with a critical means for dominating the poor, even in the midst of protest and subversive practices. Some shared vision of the common good and a willingness to extend it across social, class, and political boundaries would have to be the bases upon which a new society is reimagined and engineered.

Security and overall policy reform in Jamaica have to be approached along all relevant scales, from the international to the local. So far, it is the local which has been the most obscured and, as described in this thesis, the other scales are equally problematic. Owing to the lack of positive and meaningful convergence along these different scales, shifts in security have been difficult to achieve. The organizational and national agenda seem to have been more influenced by the international arena and the dominant concepts and priorities established there, such as human security, than by the political and social history of Jamaica and its contemporary circumstances. International actors do not necessarily seek to escape the influence of their own Western ideologies and cultural frames of understanding.

What this means is that the transfer of policy ideas and packages to Jamaica has to be tempered and resisted by local actors, who are more likely to be familiar with the policy requirements of Jamaica. But, even so, the policy community in Jamaica is characterised and influenced by the pervasiveness of governmental power and is often more sympathetic to Western ideas, while resisting local narratives which are denied a more central place on the security reform agenda. At the same time, a competitive two-party system derivative of the British Westminster model, is enshrined in Jamaica's constitution. This system fosters and reinforces political structures and a political culture which are antithetical to participatory democracy, security for all, and reduced governmental power. This continues to pose challenges for improved governance and policymaking.

The confrontation between the Jamaican state and Golden Town, and the rhetoric related to zero-tolerance policing, have helped to strengthen the national resolve around applying hard power as opposed to soft power in its bid to 'rid' the society of crime and insecurity, both objective and subjective. The capitalist economic order that subjects individuals and institutions to rational choice discourses, and which gives primacy to the idea of optimisation of self-interest, autonomy and individualism, promotes a legal system and a social order that addresses itself to the rational individual, seeking to maximise self-interest. This system cannot contend with a variety of other influences, including collectivism, culture, community identity, and violence, all of which are not necessarily defined by the maximisation of the interests of the individual. Deterrent and reactive strategies that are limited in their view of what motivates action within targeted spaces of intervention are likely to be met with resistance and to produce negligible results. One of the most notable failures has been the failure on the part of the state and policymakers at various scales to treat with importance, the insoluble link between citizenship and security in the Jamaican context. There is also a failure to come to terms with the manner in which both the denial of

citizenship and the citizenship deficit on one hand and the privileging of other kinds of citizens, on the other, have perpetuated the security dilemma in Jamaica. This has led to new forms of seeking citizenship and ways of belonging that seek to resist law and order and the legal-rational system. Moreover, modernity and the influence it has had on spreading notions of individuality, autonomy, and marketization create further problems for citizenship and security in the context of exclusion and a widening gap between those who can claim and reorient their citizenship in ways acceptable to the 'new' social and moral order of the society and those who resist this order and find it difficult to operate within its parameters.

While civil society groups are articulating a view which seeks to make the 'ordinary Jamaican' the main unit of analysis there are difficulties involved in achieving the kind of power that would make it possible to significantly influence policy, according to their proposed frameworks. Most of the prominent civil society groups are not multi-class coalitions, and this has affected their legitimacy and their effectiveness. The political elite in Jamaica, I would argue, regard such groups as their nemesis and a challenge to the power of the state and the political class. Particular civil society groups, like the political elite, may also present themselves as messiahs and as the only morally-legitimate institutions in Jamaica.

Jamaica's methods of policing and its entire security architecture are in dire need of changes, but changes to the entire social and political order also necessary. Interrogating the relationship between citizenship and security and dismantling hegemonic discourses and practices which perpetuate rather than solve the problem are necessary factors for responding to persistent security challenges.

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