

Who on earth wants global democracy – and why (not)?

A theoretical and experimental study of international public opinion

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Abstract

To what extent and why do people want the world to be governed democratically – or not? This is the central question of my dissertation. I create a novel theoretical framework starting with genetic and socio-environmental influences such as parents and peers, moving to proximate motives such as cosmopolitan values and interests, as well as conditioning factors like political knowledge and feasibility beliefs. These are connected to individual attitudes and actions on global democracy, which is conceptualized as a directly elected world parliament and government focused on transnational issues like global poverty and climate change. Furthermore, I theorize potential interrelationships between individual preferences for political parties and their global democracy attitudes and actions. In order to evaluate arising expectations, I conducted survey experiments on nationwide samples of citizens in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. My key findings are: First, once the proposals are considered, clear majorities of people in all five survey countries tend to support global democracy. Second, individual attitudes toward global democracy are significantly associated with the theorized factors of values and interests, especially the perceived necessity of global democracy to address problems like international peace and climate change, as well as the supposed importance of public participation in world politics. Third, while individual global democracy attitudes are affected by partisan cues in countries with long-established major parties, people's global democracy attitudes tend to affect their voting intentions in more fluid multi-party systems – a finding with significant implications for domestic politics. My dissertation contributes to empirical and normative research on international organizations by providing the first social scientific study of world public opinion on global democracy. Moreover, my thesis bears important lessons for practitioners working on global governance, as the world struggles to address multiple transnational crises – from international mass migration to climate change.

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Of course, the list of institutions and individuals I would have to thank on the occasion of completing my DPhil is much longer, as it should not only contain influences and supporters during my time in Oxford, but also before then. A more complete list thus includes Yale University, the London School of Economics and Political Science, and my schools – especially the Albert-Einstein-Gymnasium in Kaarst, Germany – as well as all those individuals who taught, backed, and encouraged me on my path to and through Oxford. Aside from educational institutions, my experience in the “real world” contributed immensely to the content and shape of this thesis as well. Hence, I also thank – among others – Bain & Company, Germany’s Foreign Office, the European Parliament, the Campaign for a UN Parliament, and all those who provided me with the insights and skills necessary to master the mix of issues and methods in this thesis. I avoid choosing whom from my pre-Oxford time to name and applaud here, as I might need another 400 pages to do so adequately. Therefore, I would simply like to express my deepest gratitude to all those who contributed to making this happen.

Last but not least, I would like to thank you, dear reader, for taking an interest in my work and – more importantly – in the issues that this thesis deals with. As the world continues to change, many forces are at play in determining the direction it takes. Part of the responsibility for shaping these changes falls on each of us as citizens of the world that we share. In this sense, I hope that you find the following text illuminating and inspiring.

1) Introduction

How do people want the world to be governed? To some observers, current crises like climate change and the Covid-19 pandemic demonstrate the need for more effective global governance. To others, nationalist leaders and policies promise to be the path forward. Much recent scholarship has focused on the resurgence of nationalism worldwide (e.g. Norris and Inglehart 2019). Other scholars have intensively studied the legitimacy of existing international organizations (e.g. Tallberg, Bäckstrand, and Scholte 2018; Tallberg and Zürn 2019). Meanwhile, theorists have debated the merits of more cosmopolitan – i.e. stronger and more democratic – global governance (e.g. Held 1995; Pogge 2002; Cabrera 2020). Yet, systematic social-scientific studies about public attitudes toward such proposals for global democracy remain rare. Do people worldwide want to abolish the current international system; do they support maintaining existing international organizations; or would they actually prefer stronger and more representative global governance – and if so, to what extent and why? My thesis addresses this question.

1.1) Preview of the thesis

Based on established public opinion literature and current research on the legitimacy of global governance, I develop a novel theoretical framework on the drivers of political attitudes and behavior with respect to global democracy, which I conceptualize in constitutionalist terms as composed of a directly elected global parliament and government to recommend and implement policies on transnational issues. The framework takes genetic and socio-environmental influences like parents and peers as the starting point. I theorize personal values and interests as proximate motives for people's global democracy attitudes and actions on global democracy. In addition, political knowledge and feasibility beliefs may condition such attitudes and actions. Lastly, the strength of attitudes is theorized as a principal driver of the

costliness of political actions that an individual is willing to take with respect to global democracy.

In this dissertation, I place special emphasis on studying one specific kind of political action – the act of voting – and one particular type of socio-environmental influence: political parties. Based on the concept of attitudinal centrality, I theorize four ways in which global democracy attitudes and party preferences may interrelate in cases of attitudinal dissonance, i.e. when one's own position toward global democracy conflicts with the stance of the party that one prefers. The first scenario is partisan mobilization, which occurs when partisanship is strong, while global democracy attitudes are weak, such that the latter are brought in line with the former. My second scenario is cognitive mobilization, which relates to the reverse constellation of strong global democracy attitudes and weak party attachment, which is when I would expect the latter to adapt to the former. My third scenario is called attitudinal parallelism, referring to weak global democracy attitudes and party attachments, in which case attitudinal dissonance is readily accepted and both attitudes are maintained. Lastly, partisan self-delusion refers to the scenario in which both global democracy attitudes and party preferences are strong, such that individuals may deny evidence about the supposed position of their preferred party on global democracy.

In order to test my theory and hypotheses emerging out of it, I conducted nationwide survey experiments on diverse samples of between 961 and 1,714 citizens in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US) – in collaboration with the survey companies Dynata and YouGov in August 2019 and July 2020 respectively. My main findings are the following: As expected, majorities of people in the five countries I surveyed have never considered the idea of global democracy before. In line with my hypotheses, most people who do consider the issue, weakly support global democracy and many are willing to take low-cost action on it, e.g. signing online petitions. While in some countries and voter groups (e.g.

Republicans in the US) partisan cues affect citizens' opinions on global democracy, in other circumstances (e.g. left-leaning parties in Germany) citizens' thinking about global democracy affects their voting intentions. The most robust and universally observed finding is that people everywhere tend to believe that their preferred party shares their own views on global democracy, even in cases where such a position seems highly implausible from the perspective of the general population. For instance, in the United States, a clear majority (67%) among the surprisingly large proportion of Republicans (48%) who support global democracy believes that their party endorses proposals for a world parliament and global government as well. Moreover, my experiments reveal various instances of people's willingness to delude themselves about their preferred party's position on global democracy in the face of (supposed) evidence to the contrary.

The rest of this thesis is structured as follows: In this introductory chapter, I discuss existing literature that is relevant to my research question, pointing out the research gap that aim to fill. In Chapter Two, I construct the general theoretical framework on global democracy attitudes and actions, outlining expectations arising from it. The third chapter elaborates on the research design and the methods that I use in testing my expectations on people's views and willingness to act on global democracy. Chapter Four presents descriptive and observational analyses of my surveys in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US. In the fifth chapter, I develop a theoretical framework on the interrelationship between people's global democracy attitudes and preferences for political parties. The sixth chapter discusses my experimental survey design and methods for testing expectations arising from this framework. Chapter Seven presents the results of my survey experiments in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US. Finally, the eighth chapter concludes and outlines further areas for research.

1.2) Literature review and research gap

This study connects with and adds to the existing literature in three principal ways: First, it contributes to extant work on global democracy by providing a systematic theoretical framework and empirical exploration of world public opinion concerning democratic reforms of global governance. Second, in line with the “new behavioral revolution” (Hafner-Burton, Haggard, Lake, and Victor 2017) and the current resurgence of psychologically oriented work (Kertzer and Tingley 2018) in the field of International Relations (IR), my dissertation contributes to current attempts of understanding public opinion with regard to global governance (e.g. Bechtel and Scheve 2013; Ecker-Ehrhardt 2014; Koenig-Archibugi and Cabrera 2016; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2020). Third, my study extends recent efforts on investigating the psychological foundations and implications of *moral* cosmopolitanism (e.g. Reysen and Katzarska-Miller 2013, 2018; Bayram 2015) by providing a theoretical and empirical exploration of public opinion with regard to *institutional* cosmopolitanism.

The first principal area of research that my study contributes to is the decade-old scholarship on global democracy. In the wake of World War II (WWII), a large and diverse literature on the idea of a democratic world government developed, primarily motivated by the horrors of two world wars, the newly emerged threat of global nuclear warfare, and the hope of developing a global governance system that could end war once and for all (e.g. Willkie 1943; Reves 1945; Russell 1945; Committee to Frame a World Constitution and Hutchins 1948; Einstein 1950; Clark and Sohn 1966). However, with the onset of the Cold War, the idea of a democratic world government soon faded (Baratta 2004:chap. 24). After the fall of the Berlin Wall, politicians and academics gained hope for a more democratic and just global order (e.g. Pogge 1992). Political theorists started devising ambitious blueprints for comprehensive reforms of the international system (Archibugi 2004). The buzzwords were now “cosmopolitan democracy” or “global democracy”, rather than “democratic world government”, although the

proposals' components were quite similar to those of the earlier generation of world government thinkers (c.f. Clark and Sohn 1966; Held 1995:279–280).¹ Early studies (e.g. Beitz 1979; Pogge 1992; Archibugi 1993; Held 1995) soon spurred a large academic literature centered on normative arguments about different kinds of global democracy and relevant reforms. Examples of contemporary work supporting global democracy and corresponding reforms include those of Pogge (2002), Gould (2004, 2014), Held (2004), Caney (2005), Yunker (2005, 2007), Cabrera (2006, 2020), Dryzek (2006; Dryzek, Bächtiger, and Milewicz 2011), Archibugi (2008), Habermas (2008, 2014), Marchetti (2008), Tännsjö (2008), Tinnevelt (2012), Scholte (2014), Schwartzberg (2016), and Zürn (2016). More recent arguments opposing global democracy or democratic world government are the works of Zolo (1997), Rawls (2001:36), Nussbaum (2006:312–313), Miller (2010, 2016), Shapiro (2011:159–166), and Risse (2012:chap. 16). Hence, global democracy has been characterized as a key subject of inquiry (Kuyper 2015:1) in IR and other fields.

While most academic work on global democracy is normative, many claims in the literature are empirical and thus amenable to social scientific inquiry. This argument is made by Moravcsik in his contribution to the debate on a global democratic deficit which he considers “one of the central questions – perhaps *the* central question – in contemporary world politics” (Moravcsik 2004:336). He insists that the assessment of such a democratic deficit in world politics “is as much social scientific as philosophical” (Moravcsik 2004:337) and goes on to develop a theoretical framework for evaluating the extent of such a deficit. In other notable attempts to explore a key empirical claim in the global democracy literature, Koenig-

¹ Some scholars who advocate global democracy explicitly reject the proposal of a world state (e.g. Held 1995:230; Pogge 2002:178; Caney 2005:266) – arguably for mistaken strategic reasons (Nili 2015). Others who advocate a world state (e.g. Lu 2018) or world government (e.g. Deudney 2006) do not necessarily call for global democracy. However, in general, there is significant overlap and agreement between global democracy and world government/state advocates (e.g. Cabrera 2001, 2006, 2014; Wendt 2003:529, 2015; see also Scheuerman 2014).

Archibugi (2011, 2012) focuses on the frequent assertion that global democracy would be infeasible. Analyzing democratization data and events at the national and regional levels both quantitatively and qualitatively, he concludes that global democracy may be unlikely but not impossible.

Shifting focus to public opinion, Hale and Koenig-Archibugi (2019) address the empirical basis for two common objections to global democracy, building on prior work (Hale and Koenig-Archibugi 2016) concerning the European Union (EU). First, they find that various authors have claimed that in a global democracy more people would be dissatisfied with policies than they are at present. Second, Hale and Koenig-Archibugi recap the assertion that more people than currently would be “persistent minorities” in a global democracy, i.e. constantly outvoted by a majority. Based on public opinion data, they then go on to compare – among others – heterogeneity, polarization, and overall dissatisfaction in policy values between individuals *within existing countries* and between individuals *within a hypothetical world polity*. In contrast to the aforementioned claims, Hale and Koenig-Archibugi find that dissatisfaction with policy values and the extent of persistent minorities would *not* increase in the world as a whole, compared to individual countries: The world as a whole would be like an average country today, but not an outlier.

Another widespread public opinion-related assumption in the normative literature is that people worldwide would not or do not support proposals like a world parliament or a global government. Both critics and advocates make this assertion. For instance, Miller (2010) – a critic – claims that people would be unwilling to submit themselves to a global democracy given the unlikelihood that their diverging interests and beliefs would be upheld in a world parliament functioning based on majoritarian principles. Implicitly or explicitly, as in Miller’s case, this empirical assumption frequently contributes to the normative conclusion that global democracy is hence not desirable. However, even advocates often share the empirical

assumption that people worldwide would not support the establishment of global democratic institutions. For instance, Yunker (2011:80) repeatedly refers to “the general consensus among humanity against the formation of a world state”. For advocates like Yunker, this assumption does not strengthen the case for the *undesirability* of global democracy, but serves to demonstrate its supposed present *infeasibility*. That is, *because* large majorities of people presumably reject the notion of a global government, there is not much hope for realizing it. The underlying empirical assumption about the lack of public support is thus crucial for such arguments about desirability and feasibility to hold. But to what extent is this assumption valid? Given that the project of global democracy is ultimately about the will of the world’s people, the relative lack of scholarly attention to world public opinion in this regard seems striking. My dissertation is – as far as I am aware – the first research project tackling this important gap in our understanding. As such, it prepares the ground for future studies by addressing the following broad research question, which serves as the starting point for more focused inquiries throughout this text: To what extent and why do people worldwide support or oppose global democracy?

In parallel to recent work on empirical questions associated with global democracy, the IR discipline – along with Political Science more generally – is presently experiencing a “new behavioral revolution” (Hafner-Burton et al. 2017:2) and a resurgence of interest in psychology (Kertzer and Tingley 2018). Scholars have explored people’s preferences regarding topics such as international trade (e.g. Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Hiscox 2006; Rho and Tomz 2017) and immigration (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Yamamoto 2015; Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2016, 2017) using experimental survey methods. However, in their review of the field, Kertzer and Tingley (2018:8) find that survey work in Political Science has thus far somewhat neglected substantive areas like global governance and

international organizations (IOs). Such assessments notwithstanding, there is by now a sizable body of survey research on public opinion relating to IOs.

In recent years, scholars have explored public opinion on global governance in various ways. For instance, Bechtel and Scheve (2013) conducted a conjoint survey experiment in France, Germany, the UK, and the US uncovering the design features of potential climate change agreements that could change public opinion from minority to majority support. Others have focused on the legitimacy of existing IOs, especially the United Nations (UN). For instance, Dellmuth and Tallberg (2015) argue that the “social legitimacy” of IOs – measured as self-reported confidence in the UN – is driven by “institutional performance” (i.e. output-related) considerations and “confidence extrapolation” (i.e. based on people’s confidence in *national* governmental institutions and thus actually unrelated to the UN itself), rather than “interest representation” (i.e. input-related) considerations. They thus argue against what they consider the consensus opinion among scholars who call for global democracy as the remedy to the democratic deficit in world politics, claiming instead that people trust and want IOs for other reasons than realizing democratic aspirations. Dellmuth and Tallberg’s (2015) argument (like many other current studies) is limited by its reliance on available survey data – in this case the results of the World Values Survey and the European Values Study between 1999 and 2004. Among others, their analysis is based on the very strong assumptions that ordinary citizens are aware of their country’s (permanent or temporary) membership status in the UN Security Council and the quantity of NGOs from their country accredited at the UN. Other recent studies, which explore public opinion on extant IOs using secondary survey data, include those of Edwards (2009), Machida (2009), Johnson (2011), and Ecker-Ehrhardt (2014). In contrast, my dissertation examines primary multinational survey data that I gathered in collaboration with the survey firms Dynata and YouGov (see Chapter 3).

In subsequent studies, some scholars of public opinion on IOs moved to studying primary data themselves. For instance, Dellmuth and Tallberg (2020) use vignette-based survey experiments to examine the effects of elite cues on IOs. Departing from cueing theory, they conduct a survey experiment on nationwide samples in the US, the UK, and Germany. They find, among others, that cues by national governments, negative cues, as well as cues on IOs' procedures and performance are especially effective. My dissertation complements this research, albeit in a somewhat different context. That is, in contrast to such original survey work on public opinion concerning *existing* IOs, my dissertation investigates international public preferences on *proposed* global democratic institutions – with a particular focus on cues by national political parties (see Chapters 5-7).

In line with research on public opinion concerning IOs, some scholars have recently started to explore the underlying psychological foundations of cosmopolitan attitudes. For instance, Bayram (2015) analyzes data from the World Values Survey using the Schwartz Value Theory. She finds that self-proclaimed world citizenship appears to be multifaceted in that it is apparently compatible with diverse values such as self-transcendence, self-enhancement, openness to change, and trust toward strangers. Informed by work in the field of Psychology as well, Reysen and Katzarska-Miller (2013, 2018) provide a model to explain the “antecedents and outcomes” of global citizenship. Based on their experiments' findings, they argue that global awareness and a particular normative environment lead to individual self-identification as a world citizen which produces prosocial values, i.e. intergroup empathy and helping, an appreciation of diversity, a concern for social justice and environmental sustainability, as well as a perceived responsibility to actively contribute to positive change in the world. A common denominator of these recent efforts to better understand cosmopolitan attitudes is that they all focus on *moral* cosmopolitanism, which can be defined as a philosophy whereby “every human being has a global stature as an ultimate unit of moral concern” (Pogge 1992:49). This has been

contrasted with *legal* or *institutional* cosmopolitanism (Cabrera 2018), i.e. the commitment to a “concrete political ideal of a global order under which all persons have equivalent legal rights and duties, that is, are fellow citizens of a universal republic” (Pogge 1992:49). While extant work focusing on psychological foundations has explored people’s *moral* cosmopolitanism, scholars have largely neglected to investigate people’s attitudes toward *institutional* cosmopolitanism – a research gap that my thesis aims to address.

To the best of my knowledge, there is no social-scientific study thus far which empirically investigates the extent and drivers of public attitudes toward global democracy. In the wake of World War II, the general public – at least in some parts of the world – took considerable interest in the proposal of a world government (Weiss 2009). In this context, Gallup conducted regular polls throughout the 1940s and 1950s asking Americans if “the UN should be strengthened to make it a world government with the power to control the armed forces of all nations, including the US”, finding that support for this idea decreased from 54 percent (vs. 24% opposed) in 1946 to 40 percent (vs. 42% opposed) in 1956 (Weldon 2015).² After disappearing behind the Iron Curtain, the idea of a democratic world government reemerged following the end of the Cold War, such that – once again – pollsters started taking an interest in it, albeit to a much lesser extent than previously. For instance, in its Millennium Survey, Gallup asked respondents about the “most important aims for the United Nations in the future”, suggesting its development “into a World Government” as one of the options (Gallup International Association 2009:8).

In recent years, some polls aimed more directly at the idea of global democracy. To begin with, a survey commissioned by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and conducted by the polling firm GlobeScan (2005) asked respondents to indicate their opinion

² Support and opposition percentages do not sum to 100, as the rest were no-opinion responses.

on three different global democratic proposals: first, the creation of a directly elected parliament at the UN, which closely parallels prominent proposals for a UN Parliamentary Assembly as a population-apportioned second chamber next to the UN General Assembly (e.g. Bummel 2010; Heinrich 2010 [1992]; Leinen and Bummel 2017); second, direct elections of representatives to the UN General Assembly, as urged by Einstein (1947) in the early years of the UN's existence; and third, giving leaders of – among others – non-governmental organizations (NGOs) a formal role in shaping UN policies and actions, which is in line with long-standing calls from global civil society (Kaldor 2003, 2013) and Macdonald's (2008) argument for "global stakeholder democracy". The survey found international average support figures between 61 and 74 percent favoring these proposals and average rejection rates of only 16 to 23 percent, with the remaining respondents undecided. Moreover, the proposals received broad support (i.e. absolute and relative majorities) in all polled countries – including the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. The survey results are reproduced in Figure 16 (p. 249), Figure 17 (p. 250), and Figure 18 (p. 251).

Another multinational poll commissioned by the BBC – and conducted by the market research firm Synovate – inquired into people's views on the establishment of a global parliament that would be based on the principle of proportional representation and equipped with the power to pass binding laws (BBC Press Office 2007; Synovate 2007:9), which is what Falk and Strauss (2001) advocate and what the Campaign for a UN Parliamentary Assembly ultimately strives for (Bummel 2010; Leinen and Bummel 2017). The survey found that an international average of 37 percent would be likely to support such an idea, while 36 percent

would probably reject it – with the rest undecided (see Figure 19, p. 252) – exposing discrepancies between different nations’ views on the proposal.³

At the time of writing, the Global Challenges Foundation (GCF) had commissioned three surveys in which respondents were asked, among others, about their support for the creation of a new supranational organization with the power to take binding decisions on global issues like climate change, war, and poverty. In 2014 (see Figure 20, p. 253), GCF’s results showed that an international average of 71 percent broadly favored the creation of such an organization, whereas 21 percent rejected it, and the rest remained undecided (Global Challenges Foundation 2014).⁴ In the 2017 survey (see Figure 21, p. 254), once again, international averages of 71 vs. 21 percent are reported to support and oppose the idea respectively (Global Challenges Foundation 2017b). Finally, in the 2018 iteration of the survey (see Figure 22, p. 255), an international average of 70 percent indicated that they “strongly” or “somewhat” agree that such “a new supranational organisation should be created to make enforceable global decisions to address global risks”, while 17 percent were opposed and the rest undecided (ComRes and Global Challenges Foundation 2018:38). These surveys are especially intriguing as they indicate a high level of cross-national support for the creation of powerful supranational institutions – an essential ingredient of many proposals for global democracy – at the very time as the contemporary right-wing nationalist backlash reached new heights in countries around the world (Norris and Inglehart 2019).

Overall, therefore, different pieces of existing multinational survey evidence indicate widespread support for important elements of global democratic proposals. Nevertheless,

³ These figures are not based on Synovate’s results table which reported unweighted averages. Instead, the numbers are based on my own calculations, taking the arithmetic mean of the country results published by Synovate (2007:9–10) to calculate the international averages.

⁴ These figures are not reported by GCF, but based on my own calculations, taking the arithmetic mean of the country results published by GCF (Global Challenges Foundation 2014).

scholars need to study people's attitudes toward global democracy more carefully and systematically. First, none of the existing survey evidence captures the vision of global democracy fully. While the BBC surveys focus on the proposal of global elections and a world parliament, the GCF surveys concentrate on the idea of a powerful supranational organization tackling global issues. Capturing global democracy more comprehensively would arguably involve integrating different legislative and executive elements. Second, these datasets do not contain other relevant variables that would allow for exploring the results in greater detail. For instance, in order to understand the impact of democratic and globalist ideology on people's attitudes toward global institutional reforms, relevant questions concerning individual values and worldviews are missing in the datasets. Finally, existing surveys only allow for observational analyses, as they do not employ experimental methods. This limits the type of causal inference one can draw and the kinds of findings one can obtain. All of these limitations underline the need for social-scientific inquiries into people's attitudes on global democracy, which my dissertation contributes to.

A more systematic exploration of public opinion regarding global democracy is an important research gap to be addressed by the present study. As outlined above, filling this gap would be crucial for advancing scholarly debates in three principal ways: Firstly, assumptions related to public opinion feature prominently in the normative debate on global democracy (e.g. Nye 2001; Miller 2010; Scheuerman 2011; Yunker 2011). However, thus far such claims remain largely unsubstantiated. Therefore, my study provides greater theoretical and empirical clarity to ground this debate. Secondly, while the field of International Relations – and Political Science, more broadly – have seen a resurgence of interest in Psychology, much work remains to be done in the study of global governance and international organizations (Kertzer and Tingley 2018). My study expands recent efforts to explore public opinion with respect to such neglected areas (e.g. Ecker-Ehrhardt 2014; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015; Tallberg et al. 2018).


Whereas existing work concentrates on international organizations *as they are*, my research explores world public opinion on *proposed* global governance institutions. Thirdly, recent psychologically informed work has focused on investigating the foundations and implications of *moral* cosmopolitanism (e.g. Bayram 2015; Reysen and Katzarska-Miller 2018). My thesis builds on and broadens these studies by focusing on people's attitudes toward *institutional* cosmopolitanism.

Besides contributions to scholarly debates, this study is also of practical significance. First, activists for or against global democracy should be interested in my inquiry because it allows them to understand better if, how, and to what extent citizens can be motivated to support or oppose democratic reforms of global governance. Second, my study is topical in the current age of resurgent nationalism, as it elucidates whether and for which parties global democracy advocacy (or opposition) would be a fruitful strategy to pursue. Third, for practitioners in international organizations, this study adds an important missing piece to the existing literature on the perceived legitimacy of such institutions: While extant work elucidates public support (or opposition) to the current institutional setup and performance of international organizations, my dissertation shows how major reforms may affect public attitudes by either augmenting (or undermining) the perceived legitimacy of global governance institutions. However, before delving into the results and implications of this study, let us begin by conceptualizing and theorizing people's attitudes and actions on global democracy.

2) Theory: Individual attitudes on global democracy

In this chapter, I create – what is, to the best of my knowledge – the first exploratory theoretical framework for modeling the formation and adaptation of political attitudes and actions with respect to global democracy; a framework that should be applicable to political attitudes and actions in other issue areas as well. After defining the core concepts of global democracy and attitudes in the first section, and investigating the nature of attitudes on global democracy in the second part, the chapter's third section theorizes the drivers behind such attitudes. Based on this framework, my theory goes as follows: Most people presumably have undeveloped attitudes toward global democracy, by which I mean that they have never considered the idea but would develop consistent attitudes on it if prompted to do so. These attitudes may be influenced by genetic and socio-environmental factors such as parents and peers, NGOs and political parties, as well as people's home countries. The proximate motives behind individual attitudes can broadly be categorized into interests and values. Among the value-related drivers of global democracy attitudes, I expect that citizens – similar to political theorists – deem input and output considerations particularly important, i.e. the desire for greater public participation in world politics and the belief in the potential effectiveness of global institutions in addressing transnational challenges. Moreover, individual attitudes and actions are possibly conditioned by people's knowledge about global governance and feasibility considerations concerning global democracy. While many people's attitudes are weakly positive and not powerful enough to motivate costly action toward or against global democratization, sufficient numbers of people may have strong enough convictions to carry political consequences – a hypothesis to be further explored in later chapters. My theoretical framework is illustrated in Figure 1 below and further elaborated later in this chapter (see Section 2.3).

Figure 1: Theoretical framework on global democracy attitudes and actions



In developing this theory, I rely on different approaches: Firstly, I follow the standard scientific path of building on existing research such as the work of scholars and non-academic institutions reviewed in the introductory chapter, as well as other relevant research – especially in the fields of Psychology and Political Science. Secondly, I use deductive reasoning in developing novel hypotheses on issues where there is a lack of prior scholarly work, or where

I question pre-existing theories or findings. Thirdly, I employ inductive reasoning, for example, by studying participant comments in other ongoing experimental survey projects on related topics (Ghassim 2019; Ghassim and Pauli 2019; Ghassim, Koenig-Archibugi, and Cabrera 2020) and by examining the behavior of pre-testers for the survey experiments of the present study. Thus, patterns observed in preliminary findings have helped generate new hypotheses, e.g. regarding the drivers of individual attitudes on global democracy, which I have incorporated into my theoretical framework. In this way, I do not just make assumptions about people's motives that I then test in my survey experiments, which would constitute an exclusive top-down approach; I also base my assumptions on people's own statements about their motivations, thereby employing a bottom-up approach as well.

The goal in this chapter is not to devise a theory that will be fully empirically assessed in subsequent chapters (which goes beyond the scope of my dissertation), but rather to create the first exploratory framework on global democracy attitudes lending itself to theoretical expansion and refinement, as well as empirical evaluation, in later chapters of this dissertation and in future studies. In this spirit, Chapters Five through Seven theoretically expand and empirically evaluate different aspects that derive from the present framework: potential interrelations between individual global democracy attitudes and people's party preferences. That is, I study political parties as a possible socio-environmental influence on individual attitudes, as well as people's voting intentions in the context of global democracy, in order to assess how politically consequential public preferences are in this regard.

The present chapter is structured as follows: I begin by defining the core concepts of "attitudes" and "global democracy" for the purpose of this study. The next section explores the nature of individual attitudes on global democracy by drawing on Converse's (1970) classical study of "non-attitudes" to theorize the existence, consistency, valence, and strength of people's attitudes and willingness to take political action. The final section discusses potential drivers

of individual global democracy attitudes and actions – from systematic influences such as genetic and socio-environmental factors, to proximate motives referring to relevant values and interests, to conditioning factors like political knowledge and feasibility beliefs.

2.1) Core concepts: Attitudes and global democracy

Before delving into the discussion of individual attitudes with respect to global democracy, this section establishes the key terms for my inquiry: *attitudes* and *global democracy*. Let me begin by conceptualizing attitudes for the present study by drawing on psychologists, seminal works in Sociology and Political Science, as well as recent studies in the field of International Relations. An attitude may be defined as an “evaluative integration of cognitions and affects experienced in relation to an object” (Crano and Prislin 2006:347). Psychological studies generally do not differentiate between the formation of and changes in attitudes, as “new” attitudes evolve from refinements of existing ones and since it is assumed that the processes leading to attitudinal formation and change are equivalent (Druckman and Lupia 2000; Bohner and Dickel 2011). An important idea in the background of my inquiry is the concept of sociological legitimacy which goes back to the seminal work of Weber (1968 [1922]). Sociological legitimacy in our context refers to the level of public acceptance of the exercise of authority by a political regime.⁵ Delving more deeply into the particular kind of sociological legitimacy relating to political institutions, Easton (1965, 1975) differentiates between “specific” and “diffuse” regime support, i.e. referring either to views directed at certain policies or at the regime as a whole. With regard to global governance institutions, various scholars have recently drawn on these classics to reconceptualize legitimacy in the context of global governance as the popular belief that an international organization’s exercise

⁵ This must be distinguished from “normative legitimacy” which denotes a regime’s objective conformity with certain standards of governance (Buchanan and Keohane 2006).

of authority is appropriate (Dellmuth, Scholte, and Tallberg 2019; Tallberg and Zürn 2019). However, their work begs the question: What about *potential* global governance institutions? Do people have attitudes on such proposals in the first place? The present study builds on the works cited above to explore this question.

In studying individual attitudes toward global democracy, I assume that people can form views on hypothetical institutions in a similar fashion as they develop views on existing institutions, especially if such hypothetical institutions closely reflect extant phenomena. For example, Chinese activists may forcefully conceive of and argue for Western-style parliamentary democracy in China, even though their country has arguably never been democratic throughout its history. The idea of a Chinese democracy may nonetheless be supported or opposed by both Chinese citizens (who would stand to be directly affected by such a transformation of their country) and people around the world (who would not be as directly affected, at least under the assumption that Chinese foreign policy is largely independent from the country's domestic political structure). In a similar fashion, the assumption that people worldwide can form consistent attitudes on global democracy seems justified – especially with respect to my conceptualization in the present study, as the envisioned institutions constitute relatively straightforward transfers of well-known governance arrangements from the domestic to the global level. Let me elaborate by defining the concept of global democracy for the purpose of the present inquiry.

Numerous authors have attempted to categorize the variety of global democratic proposals in the literature (e.g. Miller 2010; Dingwerth, Blauburger, and Schneider 2011; Archibugi, Koenig-Archibugi, and Marchetti 2012b; Scholte 2014; Kuyper 2015; Zürn 2016). All of these schemes feature an especially salient kind of global democracy proposal, i.e. so-called “federal” (Archibugi et al. 2012b), “world government” (Miller 2010), or “constitutionalist” (Dingwerth et al. 2011) models of global democracy. Similar to the

classificatory scheme of Scholte (2014), this conception pools ideas such as a “minimal world state” and “cosmopolitan democracy” (Zürn 2016), which other authors have treated as separate categories (see also Kuyper 2015). The present study focuses on these models. Of course, there are various other kinds of global democratic proposals which may be categorized as “intergovernmental” (Zürn 2016), “deliberative” (Kuyper 2015), or “postmodern” (Scholte 2014). However, this study concentrates on what is arguably the historically most prominent and theoretically most consequential type of proposal for global democracy.⁶

Global democracy in its constitutionalist form may be defined as a potential future world order in which policies on global issues like climate change, world poverty, and international security would ultimately be determined by the world’s citizens through democratic institutions at the global level. This conception is “constitutionalist” because it envisions more government and the rule of law at the global level (Dingwerth et al. 2011:50). Moreover, the conception is “maximalist” since it foresees the substantive scope of global democracy to cover issues other than security policy (Baratta 2004:328). Archibugi, Cabrera, Caney, Einstein, Habermas, Held, Marchetti, Pogge, Reves, and Wells are commonly considered advocates of such a constitutionalist model of global democracy (Kuyper 2015; Zürn 2016). Conceptualizing global democracy in this robustly cosmopolitan way in the present study arguably amounts to a strong test of public attitudes in this respect. That is, if people are found to support such a strong vision of global democracy, we may expect them to

⁶ While constitutionalist global democracy advocates have had notable practical success in recent decades, e.g. with the establishment of the International Criminal Court (Struett 2008), one may argue that NGOs demanding access to specific international institutions in the name of democracy have constituted the politically most consequential global democracy-related activism in recent years. My focus on constitutionalist proposals here is not meant to judge which kind of proposals have *practically* been the most consequential. Instead, my choice to concentrate on constitutionalist proposals is due to their historical prominence and their *theoretical* transformative potential. I thank Mathias Koenig-Archibugi for his comments on this point.

endorse “weaker” global democracy proposals as well (presumably as “second-best” proposals).

Two institutional elements of constitutionalist global democracy models are especially salient: firstly, the idea of global electoral institutions such as a world parliament; and secondly, the proposal of stronger global governance institutions like a world government.⁷ In the academic debate, the most prominent proposal for global electoral institutions is made in a series of articles by Falk and Strauss (1999, 2000, 2001). The two authors suggest the creation of a global parliament which would represent the world’s citizens directly and approximately in proportion to population sizes, thus adding the principle “one person, one vote” to the institutional landscape of global governance, which has thus far been dominated by the theoretical principle of “one country, one vote” (see also Bummel 2010; Leinen and Bummel 2018). The second salient element of constitutionalist global democracy proposals is that of transferring sovereignties to supranational institutions to the point of creating a world government which would be responsible for particular global issues. One of the most prominent recent examples of such a proposal is advanced by Deudney (2006) who – in the spirit of the earlier generation of post-WWII advocates (e.g. Russell 1945; Einstein 1946) – calls for the creation of a global government, primarily to control the catastrophic risks posed by nuclear weapons. Most global democracy models contain both legislative and executive institutional elements as the ones above (e.g. Held 1995, 2004; Pogge 2002; Caney 2005; Cabrera 2006; Marchetti 2008).

It is worthwhile to investigate public opinion on these elements separately as well as jointly. There are several reasons for this. First, processes of political integration and

⁷ As elaborated in footnote 1, some scholars advocating global democracy explicitly reject a world state, nonetheless leaving significant overlaps and agreement between global democracy and world government/state proponents.

democratization – whether national or transnational – tend to occur sequentially rather than simultaneously. European integration constitutes a salient example: While institutions like the European Council and Commission have acquired significant power over the past decades, the European Parliament has only in recent years gained more sway vis-à-vis the other institutions, thereby arguably leading to a gradual democratization of the European Union (Cini and Borragán 2016). Assuming that the processes of global integration and democratization would also occur sequentially (if at all), it is intriguing to investigate the expected level of legitimacy for such proposed reforms among the global public. For example, would the world's citizens be more supportive of or resistant to the creation of a global parliament to devise non-binding recommendations on global political issues like peace and security? Or do people worldwide place greater emphasis on establishing stronger global governance institutions that could effectively tackle global issues like climate change, no matter whether such policies are devised by democratically elected representatives or not?

Second, investigating people's preferences with regard to these different legislative and executive institutional elements separately is interesting for practical reasons because different advocacy groups currently pursue diverging strategies in these respects. For instance, while the Campaign for a UN Parliamentary Assembly (2017) has advocated the establishment of transnational electoral institutions for years, the Global Challenges Foundation appears to place greater emphasis on the creation of a strong supranational organization (Szombatfalvy 2010:chap. 6; Global Challenges Foundation 2017a). Thus, exploring people's preferences with respect to the proposal of a world parliament and a global government separately will also allow us to gauge which of these strategies pursued by present-day advocacy groups promise to be more effective in mustering public support.

Last but not least, it is highly important to investigate support and opposition concerning fully constitutionalist global democracy models, i.e. setups that include both the

legislative institutional element of a global parliament and the executive organ of a global government. This is a frequently proposed constitutionalist global democracy idea and arguably the most consequential proposal (compared to “only” a global parliament or government *by itself*). Hence, the rest of this chapter – and indeed, most of this dissertation – concentrate on the combined constitutionalist idea of a global democracy including a world parliament and a global government. Due to the inherent connections between legislative and executive institutional elements in the theory and practice of democracies, we may expect strong correlations between individual attitudes toward the ideas of a global parliament and government, separately and jointly. That is, while there are of course good reasons to expect that certain people would be more prone to support a global parliament by itself than a global government by itself, for instance, overall we may expect global democracy supporters to endorse both institutions separately and jointly, while global democracy opponents should tend to reject both institutions individually as well as jointly.

2.2) Nature of global democracy attitudes and actions

Before theorizing potential drivers of individual global democracy views, I first need to establish the nature of such attitudes. In contrast to Converse’s (1970) concept of “non-attitudes”, I argue that many people have *undeveloped* attitudes on global democracy which – once formed – are largely consistent. Based on existing public opinion data, I suspect that most people are positively inclined toward constitutionalist global democratic proposals, but rather weakly so. I then argue that many people’s attitudes would hence stimulate at most relatively low-cost political action on global democracy like signing petitions; but that the stronger people’s attitudes are, the more likely they are to take high-cost action such as donating money or voting for a political party (see Figure 1, p. 37).

2.2.1) Existence of individual attitudes on global democracy

Let me begin by outlining my theory on the existence of widespread *undeveloped* attitudes with respect to global democracy. In his seminal discussion of “non-attitudes”, Converse (1970) puts forth the controversial yet influential thesis that many people do not truly hold the attitudes that they express in surveys. Instead, Converse (1970:176) argues that these stated beliefs are “non-attitudes”, as they relate to opinions which are not held by respondents in any meaningful way. Converse (1970:173) constructs what he calls a “black-and-white model” of public opinion in which one portion of the population has intertemporally stable beliefs on a particular subject matter, while the rest of the population has completely unstable attitudes on the same question, i.e. positions which vary randomly from survey to survey. He applies this model to a question on governmental market intervention in three surveys of Americans between 1956 and 1960. He claims that his black-and-white model matches the data very well, as many respondents on the panel switch their position on this question from poll to poll. After excluding the possibility of genuine attitudinal change in this time span, Converse concludes that the large part of the sample where random fluctuations in attitudes were supposedly observed must have expressed “non-attitudes”. While he does not discuss in detail how his black-and-white model performs with regard to other survey questions, he does indicate in passing that there are probably many shades of gray (rather than merely black and white) with respect to most attitudes, i.e. that some people’s views may be *relatively* stable rather than completely consistent or entirely random (Converse 1970:174–5). He purposefully chose to illustrate his black-and-white model with respect to the survey question on governmental market regulation because it is with reference to such complex and remote subjects that “non-attitudes” become most evident (Converse 1970:174). Is world politics one such complex policy area where many people would presumably hold “non-attitudes”?

While many academics believed for decades that the public had little knowledge of and interest in world politics, scholarly opinion on this has shifted over time such that people are now seen to hold rather consistent views on global affairs. Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida (1989) asked whether it is indeed true that presidential candidates “waltz before a blind audience” when they dedicate parts of their electoral campaigns to foreign policy issues. They argued that public attitudes on international relations were available and cognitively accessible, that the public perceived clear differences between presidential candidates on foreign policy issues in recent elections, and that these issues affected the public's vote choices (Aldrich et al. 1989). Similarly, while Eichenberg (2007) claims that “[c]itizens in most countries are not well informed on global issues” and “understandably ambivalent” on many related questions, he also argues – based on a review of relevant scholarship – that public opinion on foreign policy is generally quite stable, coherent, and plausible. While the idea of global democracy remains a hypothetical proposal (but see Goodin 2010), the issue falls squarely within the realm of world politics. Thus, one may ask: To what extent do such optimistic assessments regarding the existence of meaningful public attitudes on world politics apply to views on global democracy as well? As there has not been a systematic scientific inquiry into this question at the time of writing, that is one of the tasks for the present study.

From the history and present of public discourse on world government and global democracy, I deduce two expectations regarding the existence of public attitudes on such issues: First, most people currently do not have any attitude as they have never considered the idea of global democracy. Second, in principle, such issues are accessible to many people – possibly even more than during the post-WWII heyday. Let me elaborate on these points one by one, after briefly recapitulating relevant aspects about the history and present of the global democracy debate.

During the mid-twentieth century world government “heyday” (Cabrera 2010a), debates about the proposal of a global government were reportedly omnipresent in public discourse. Scholars have noted that the topic featured so frequently in the media that “[t]hroughout the 1940s, it was impossible in the United States to read periodicals, listen to the radio, or watch newsreels and not encounter the idea of world government” (Weiss 2009). Moreover, public enthusiasm reached across the world, motivating both prominent individuals – like Albert Einstein, Bertrand Russell, and Albert Camus – as well as scores of ordinary citizens to join related political movements and express strongly reformist views with respect to existing international organizations like the UN (Baratta 2004; Cabrera 2010a; Weldon 2015). Nonetheless, as noted above, the idea of a global government soon disappeared behind the Iron Curtain, only to reemerge in a new guise after the fall of the Berlin Wall. At least in the constitutionalist way that it is conceptualized here, the newly coined concept of “global democracy” bears a strong resemblance to previous notions of a democratic world government. However, since the end of the Cold War, such global democracy ideas have primarily been discussed in scholarly and activist circles, rather than motivating a mass movement and widespread societal debates as during the post-WWII heyday. From this brief history of the global democracy debate, I deduce two expectations of relevance for the present inquiry.

First, since the current global democracy debate has largely been limited to elite circles of scholars and activists, most citizens have probably never heard of the idea and have thus presumably never thought about it. Of course, it is entirely possible that some people nonetheless develop such ideas by themselves. Especially in the current age of globalization – when ideas, goods, and people spread ever faster across the planet – ideas resembling world government or global democracy are arguably not as far-fetched and may even seem intuitive to some. Nonetheless, I suspect that majorities of people worldwide have never considered the idea of global democracy as conceptualized here. In this sense, most people may not have “non-

attitudes” – i.e. unstable views – on global democracy, but indeed may not have developed any attitude at all yet.

Second, as the precedent of the world government heyday shows, global democracy could be a topic that motivates political debates across society. That is, the issue is potentially accessible to a broad base of citizens. This arguably applies *a fortiori* in the current age of global governance’s “politicization” (Zürn, Binder, and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012; Zürn 2014). That is, if the thesis is true that international institutions have become central objects in contemporary political debates (Zürn 2018), then proposed reforms of such institutions should potentially interest the masses as well. Moreover, assuming that public interest in such matters depends in part on the level of political comprehension, the broad societal appeal of the global democracy debate may be even greater nowadays after decades of increasing education rates. Indeed, Converse (1970) highlighted the role of education in promoting the development of genuine attitudes. Beginning in the 1960s, there were significant increases in political education and engagement in Western democracies and elsewhere (Dalton 2000). Therefore, even if – according to my assumption above – many people do not currently hold views on global democracy (because they have never considered it), there is reason to believe that many people – presumably even more than during the post-WWII global government heyday – *could* and *would* form an opinion when informed about such proposals, e.g. through advocacy by NGOs or studies like mine. In this sense, I expect that *undeveloped* attitudes on global democracy, which may potentially be quite consistent (see Section 2.2.3), are much more prevalent than unstable “non-attitudes”. However, if the expectations outlined below (see Section 2.2.3) below are largely not borne out, i.e. if people mostly turn out to have rather inconsistent views on global democracy, then we may conclude that stated attitudes in this respect are in fact non-attitudes.

2.2.2) Valence of individual attitudes on global democracy

If the proposition is accepted that meaningful attitudes on global democracy (potentially) exist, one may wonder: What *are* people's attitudes in this regard? More technically speaking, what valence do individuals attach to the idea of global democracy? Or in other words, would one expect people to be rather in favor or against global democracy nowadays? Drawing on survey data of recent years, from various countries, on diverse proposals, using different question wordings, I deduce expectations about the valence that people worldwide attach to proposals for global democracy. As noted in the introductory chapter, surveys commissioned by the BBC and the Global Challenges Foundation, in particular, which were conducted between 2004 and 2018 in countries ranging from China to Sweden to the United States (GlobeScan 2005; Synovate 2007; Global Challenges Foundation 2014, 2017b; ComRes and Global Challenges Foundation 2018) show that majorities worldwide are generally in favor of global democratic proposals such as the establishment of a world parliament and a powerful supranational organization. Based on these surveys, I suspect that majorities around the world support global democracy in its constitutionalist form as well, i.e. combining the proposals of a world parliament and global government.

Although existing surveys do not directly address the idea of constitutionalist global democracy as conceptualized here, the triangulation of results indicates that majorities worldwide may be in favor of such a combination of various legislative and executive global democracy proposals as well. While the BBC polls show widespread support for legislative global democratic proposals, the surveys of the Global Challenges Foundation find broad support for supranational executive institutions. My resulting expectation that majorities worldwide would support global democracy constitutes an intriguing contrast to the prevailing emphasis on the worldwide resurgence of right-wing, nationalist, authoritarian populism (Norris and Inglehart 2019). Indeed, my expectation seems counterintuitive since the

contemporary authoritarian-populist backlash worldwide suggests, on the face of it, that global democratic proposals would – if anything – be at a rather low point in their historical popularity across the world. Thus, at a time when *nationalist* politicians and parties are on the rise worldwide, is it reasonable to suggest that *cosmopolitan* proposals such as a world parliament and global government would receive significant public support? As this is indeed what I argue, I must ensure that my expectation is firmly rooted and that my results are reliable. The next part addresses this goal (see Section 2.2.3).

Moreover, as noted in the introductory chapter as well, existing surveys were not intended to explore the drivers behind people's views. Indeed, the reasons for public support of global democratic proposals cannot be properly deduced from the available data. However, I suspect that people's motives for supporting global democracy now are broader than the prevention of a third world war, which was presumably the principal driver behind people's views during the post-WWII global government heyday. Further below (see Section 2.3), I delve more deeply into the possible drivers of contemporary public attitudes toward global democracy.

2.2.3) Consistency of individual attitudes on global democracy

In this section, I theorize that individual views on global democracy are generally consistent in that people are mostly capable of expressing reasoned attitudes on such matters. My theory thus responds to the central challenge posed by Converse (1970) which is that many political attitudes expressed by survey respondents are arbitrary. More specifically, Converse claims that many people do not truly hold the attitudes that they express in surveys and could have taken the opposite stance with equal probability. He substantiates this claim by pointing to the lack of intertemporal stability in many respondents' attitudes. Converse concludes that many individuals' expressed positions in public opinion surveys are actually "non-attitudes"

which are void of meaning and consistency. Can I conceptualize attitudes toward global democracy using his criterion of intertemporal stability?

In contrast to Converse's study, there is unfortunately – to the best of my knowledge – no panel data (yet) containing questions on global democracy. However, this does not mean that the concept and measurement of attitudinal consistency used in this study fall short of the standard set by Converse. In fact, I would argue that my conceptualization of attitude consistency is superior to the one used by Converse. As outlined below, there are various issues with Converse's conceptualization of attitudinal consistency; and my study aims to overcome these shortcomings in the context of individual attitudes toward global democracy. Let me begin with Converse's criterion of intertemporal stability as an indicator of attitudinal consistency. In multinational cross-sectional surveys in 2014, 2017, and 2018, the Global Challenges Foundation asked people worldwide very similar questions on their attitudes toward the establishment of a supranational organization with the power to take enforceable decisions on issues relating to international security, world poverty, and the global environment (Global Challenges Foundation 2014, 2017b; ComRes and Global Challenges Foundation 2018). While there was some variation in attitude distributions in each country from one survey round to another (possibly partly due to differences in wording, sampling variation, and attitudinal changes), the international average of support for this idea only varied slightly from poll to poll, standing at 71 percent in 2014 and 2017 and at 70 percent in 2018 respectively (see Figure 20, p. 253; Figure 21, p. 254; Figure 22, p. 255). Overall, the results give the impression of relatively high intertemporal stability – and thus, in Converse's terms, consistency – of people's attitudes toward global democratic proposals in recent years.⁸

⁸ Of course, one could counter – in accordance with Converse's (1970) "black-and-white" model – that such high intertemporal stability may also be possible if one part of the population had completely stable positions while the other part maintained entirely arbitrary views. However, as

In order to further substantiate the consistency of people's attitudes toward global democratic proposals, a complementary approach to Converse's assessment of intertemporal attitudinal stability would be to triangulate the findings with other sources. Given their variations in wordings, time frames, and countries covered, the Global Challenges Foundation's surveys may be considered sources of triangulation for each other. As noted above, there are only a few comparable surveys in recent years – in particular, two polls commissioned by the BBC. However, in contrast to the Global Challenges Foundation's questionnaires which referred to ideas for supranational executive institutions, the BBC's surveys related to legislative proposals such as the direct election of delegates in the UN General Assembly, the establishment of a UN Parliament next to the General Assembly, or a global parliament with proportional representation and the right to pass binding law (GlobeScan 2005; Synovate 2007). Given their different substantive focuses, the BBC results are thus not comparable to those of the Global Challenges Foundation. Moreover, while the BBC polls on a UN Parliament and direct elections of UN General Assembly delegates showed support figures similar to those in the Global Challenges Foundation's surveys (see Figure 16, p. 249; Figure 17, p. 250), the BBC poll on a global parliament with proportional representation displayed strong divides between different national publics (see Figure 19, p. 252). Given the scarcity of further sources for triangulation, the different emphases of available public opinion data, and the contrasting results of existing surveys, I cannot establish the consistency of people's attitudes toward global democracy based on extant polls alone.

In addition to the approaches above, and arguably more tellingly with respect to the consistency of individual attitudes *at a given point in time*, one may ask to what extent people's

Converse himself implies, attitudinal consistency usually comes in shades of gray rather than black and white. I thank Mathias Koenig-Archibugi for his comments on this point.

attitudes are *internally coherent*. For this question, I draw on Converse (1964) again – but this time on his work regarding attitude “constraints”, i.e. expected interdependencies between views that form part of a coherent belief system. Converse especially emphasizes the importance of education in his argument that elites are generally more consistent than ordinary citizens in their belief systems. He reasons that education is what allows people to understand and make connections between abstract and seemingly unrelated concepts such as communism and atheism. Since such relationships are not evident to less educated people, their political attitudes are also less consistent. For example, less educated people would be less likely to have an ideologically coherent attitude connecting communism with atheism. Therefore, one may deduce that the more citizens’ thinking reflects that of relevant educated elites, the more coherent their views would be on average.

In this vein, I contend with respect to global democracy that people’s views may be deemed consistent if they align with the arguments of scholars and activists in support of and opposition to global democracy. The underlying assumption is that scholars and activists, who spend much of their time thinking about global democracy and related issues, have the most coherent views in this regard – both in support and opposition – as they have presumably had to defend their views in the face of the best counterarguments and thereby solidified them as much as possible. Therefore, note that it is not the *general* level of education that my study focuses on, but *specific* education about global democracy. Hence, I derive from the global democracy debate in the fields of Political Theory and International Relations the “constraints” that are typically associated with global democracy attitudes, in order to investigate the extent to which the views of citizens align with such expert arguments. Thus, the more consistent people’s attitudes on global democracy are, the more I would expect them to reflect the views of elites such as global democracy scholars and activists.

Of course, there are many arguments in support of and opposition to global democracy; but not all pro and contra arguments are universally shared by supporters and opponents respectively. For instance, while some global democracy advocates focus on instrumental motives such as overcoming world poverty (e.g. Pogge 2002), other theorists are more procedurally motivated to enable the political participation of people worldwide in decision-making from the local to the global level (e.g. Held 1995). Similarly, while some opponents mainly fear the prospect of political violence as a consequence of global integration (e.g. Rawls 2001:36), others concentrate on the potential threat of cultural homogenization through global democratization (Nussbaum 2006:313).

To be sure, certain pro or contra global democracy arguments may be shared by people in the other “camp” as well. For instance, some people may support global democracy, while acknowledging the prospect of a global redistribution of wealth in favor of those who currently constitute the world’s “bottom billion” (Collier 2008), which is a major concern of global democracy opponents (see Scheuerman 2011). Others may accept certain merits of global democracy in principle (e.g. its potential for ensuring international peace, if successful), but still reject the idea on balance given the danger of political violence (Kant 1795; Pogge 2009). However, I expect that such agreements between adherents of the two “camps” are the exception rather than the rule. That is, I assume that people would generally hold or support arguments in favor of the position that they advocate to a greater extent and with more intensity than arguments for the opposing view.⁹

⁹ Of course, it is theoretically possible that the global democracy attitudes of people in one “camp” (e.g. advocates) are entirely due to one or a few arguments (e.g. global democracy’s potential for broadening political participation in global policy-making), but that people in this camp would disagree with most other arguments supporting their overall position (e.g. global democracy’s potential for world peace). However, my point here is that, in general, advocates of global democracy would support arguments in favor of global democracy – and that opponents would endorse arguments against global democracy – to a greater extent and with greater intensity than arguments of the respectively other camp. I thank Mathias Koenig-Archibugi for his comments on this point.

I therefore expect individuals who advocate global democracy to mainly hold or support positions which expert activists and political theorists consider to be in line with global democracy, while I expect people who reject global democracy to primarily maintain views that are considered by experts to be consistent with opposition to global democracy. If this is the case with respect to the attitudes of citizens, then their global democracy views could be seen as “constrained” in a similar sense to the way that Converse (1964) uses the word, i.e. as indicative of an internally consistent belief system. Indeed, this would arguably be a harder test than the evaluation of intertemporal attitudinal stability proposed and used by the later Converse (1970), since intertemporal attitudinal stability could be possible without holding a position that is filled with much content. That is, someone could plausibly maintain the same view over years without thinking much about it or being able to provide reasons for her position.¹⁰ In contrast, the assessment proposed here establishes to what extent an individual’s expressed attitudes are backed by various arguments and positions which one would, on average, expect to correlate with a particular stance. Thus, while Converse’s test examines the *stability* of attitudes, the approach suggested here aims at establishing the *depth* of attitudes. My proposed assessment therefore targets attitudinal consistency *at a given point in time*, unlike Converse’s (1970) approach which evaluates consistency *over time*.

Overall, upon development, I expect people to have relatively consistent attitudes on global democracy. The precedent of mass public engagement during the post-WWII global government heyday, the relative consistency of different surveys in recent years showing widespread pro-global democracy attitudes among people worldwide, the relative

¹⁰ Throughout this dissertation, I use female pronouns by default, unless the gender of an individual I am referring to is male, in which case I use the appropriate pronouns. In order to prevent grammatical confusion, I do not follow the contemporary trend of using third-person plural pronouns (e.g. “they”) as referring to an individual.

intertemporal stability of the Global Challenges Foundation's survey results on creating a new supranational organization to address global risks – they all indicate that majorities around the world are favorably inclined toward the proposal of a constitutionalist global democracy; or at least potentially so, given that the lack of public discussion about this issue nowadays indicates that most people have indeed never actively considered the idea, such that their positive inclination is presently undeveloped (as elaborated in Section 2.2.1). Conversely, if upon exposure to the idea of global democracy, individuals' stated views are not associated with corresponding arguments from the normative literature then we may conclude that their attitudes toward global democracy are in fact inconsistent. That is, if individuals are largely not able to consistently substantiate their support or opposition with arguments that are in line with their view, but quasi-randomly vary between arguments in favor and against, then they cannot be said to hold consistent attitudes on global democracy.

2.2.4) Strength of individual attitudes on global democracy

Building on my expectations regarding the existence, consistency, and valence of individual global democracy attitudes, this section discusses the *strength* of people's views. In simplified terms, one may either have a weak or strong opinion on global democracy; and such attitudes may be either opposed or supportive. As discussed above (see Section 2.2.1), I assume that most people have never heard of or thought about the idea of global democracy, given that the post-Cold War discourse has largely been limited to activist and scholarly circles. Moreover, I assume causal linkages between deliberation time and attitudinal strength. That is, the more one thinks about an issue, the stronger one's view on it becomes; and vice-versa, the stronger one's view on an issue is, the more one thinks about it. Therefore, assuming that most people nowadays have never considered the idea, I also expect majorities to hold relatively weak attitudes on global democracy after being exposed to the idea, in many cases presumably for the first time. How could I verify or falsify my expectations in this context?

The standard approach to theorizing – and operationalizing – attitudinal strength is to envision a continuum from strong support to strong opposition with varying degrees of strength and ambivalence in between. With respect to global democracy, for example, one person may be strongly supportive of the idea of a world government, while another may weakly oppose such a proposal. Whether or not complete ambivalence between two positions is a legitimate position, and thus one that merits theorization and operationalization, is a matter of debate among scholars. Converse (1970) argues for differentiating between “non-attitudes” and genuinely ambivalent attitudes. Others consider a stated lack of opinion (as expressed, for example, by a “Don’t Know” response in surveys) essentially equivalent to an expression of complete attitudinal ambivalence – as operationalized by a middle response in surveys (Young 2012). Thus, while there is no scholarly agreement on how to theorize, operationalize, and analyze completely ambivalent attitudes (or non-attitudes) in terms of their strength, there is broad agreement on the bipolar differentiation between endorsement and rejection of a particular view, as well as the existence of varying degrees of strength in people’s support and opposition.¹¹

¹¹ Another way of establishing attitudinal strength may be by evaluating the extent to which people hold or support global democracy views or arguments as proposed by political theorists, i.e. analyzing which proportion of such pro or contra global democracy views is endorsed alongside expressions of support or opposition regarding global democracy. However, such an approach would arguably equate quantity with quality, and thereby miss the mark of evaluating attitudinal strength which is a more qualitative than quantitative concept. In other words, an individual may hold very strong views on attitudinal objects like global democracy and yet not subscribe intensely to many of the arguments supporting her position. For instance, someone may be very concerned about the threat of cultural homogenization as a consequence of global democratization, even though she does not share other people’s strong fears concerning global tyranny or wealth redistribution. However, her concern about cultural homogenization may be so powerful that it leads her to strongly oppose proposals for global democracy, whereas a person who is more broadly worried about wealth redistribution and global tyranny – but not intensely so – may reject ideas for global democracy more weakly. As this hypothetical example illustrates, establishing the strength of people’s attitudes on global democracy should at least not solely be based on evaluating the extent to which arguments and views pro or contra global democracy are shared. Indeed, as discussed above (see Section 2.2.2), such an approach is arguably more appropriate for addressing the consistency rather than the strength of people’s attitudes. I thank Ray Duch and Tom Hale for their comments in this context.

2.2.5) Willingness to take political action on global democracy

Attitudes can become politically consequential once they cause people to take action; and the stronger individual attitudes are, the more they motivate political action (Krosnick and Petty 1995; Eagly and Chaiken 1998; Kinder 2006:201; Petty and Krosnick 2014). Let me begin by defining and conceptualizing a few terms in this context. Political consequences here relate to the impact that actions taken by individuals have on their environment, i.e. affecting more than just their own thinking. Furthermore, I define the willingness to act politically as people's readiness to invest scarce resources such as time, money, or a ballot into an active pursuit of political objectives, broadly defined. In this regard, I roughly differentiate between low-cost and high-cost political actions which differ in terms of the value of the resources they require. Examples of low-cost acts are expressing one's political views to friends in passing, signing a petition on the street, or posting political messages on social media platforms. I consider such acts low-cost as they do not require individuals to invest much of their time or other scarce resources. If people are willing to take such actions, they demonstrate their commitment to incur some – but not very high – costs in pursuing certain political objectives, broadly defined. In contrast, high-cost actions include, for instance, donating money to a political cause, participating in a protest, voting in an election, or joining a political party. I categorize such acts as high-cost because they require people to invest more scarce resources like time, money, or a ballot. Given people's budget constraints (in terms of time, money, votes, etc.), I expect that – on any given political cause – individuals are more likely to take low-cost action than high-cost action.

Again, referring back to the precedent of the post-WWII global government heyday, history has demonstrated the potential for broad-based political mobilization and a possibly widespread willingness to take costly political action on global democracy, e.g. by engaging in relevant NGOs like the World Federalist Movement, as many people did in the aftermath of

WWII (Baratta 2004). The worldwide campaigns for the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in the 1990s and 2000s are two more recent examples of such movements, which drew in part on public support from around the world, although they were mainly driven by NGOs in concert with cooperative governments (Stahn 2007; Struett 2008; Bellamy 2009; Evans 2009). In general, I already noted that the present debate on global democracy (as conceptualized here) is primarily characterized by scholarly discussions and relatively low-profile activist efforts, rather than a political mass movement. This ties in well with my expectations above concerning the strength of individual attitudes on global democracy, i.e. that most people do not have very strong attitudes on global democracy.

It seems reasonable to assume that people's willingness to act is positively associated with – and indeed partially caused by – attitudinal strength. That is, the stronger one's attitudes on any given issue are, the more likely one is to take political action on it, all else equal. In the present context, this means that the stronger individual attitudes on global democracy are, the more likely one is to take costly political action in support of or opposition to global democracy. Since I hypothesized above that most people's attitudes on global democracy are not very strong, I expect that most people would not be willing to take very costly political action on global democratization. Nonetheless, even limited instances of individual willingness to take political action may be politically consequential, e.g. if they affect nationwide voting distributions (as further discussed in Chapters 5 through 7). Conversely, if attitudinal strength is not positively associated with individual willingness to take action on global democracy, then my expectation in this context is not borne out. That is, if people's willingness to take political action is not associated with the strength of their support or opposition concerning global democracy, then the supposed link between attitudinal strength and political behavior does not seem to exist with respect to global democracy.

Finally, the relationship between attitudinal strength and willingness to act politically likely varies in different contexts. For instance, assuming two individuals' equivalent strengths of attitudes on a particular issue, their willingness to take political action may still differ due to diverging political cultures in their respective home countries. In the present context this means that while an individual who is strongly opposed to global democracy in country A may be willing to participate in a street protest against the establishment of a world parliament, an equally strongly opposed individual in country B may only be willing to take the relatively low-cost action of anonymously signing a petition against the idea of a world parliament, since the political culture of her country accepts street protests only in highly exceptional circumstances.¹² Nonetheless, on average, I expect that – in any given political context – people are more likely to take political action, the stronger their attitudes on a particular issue are, including global democracy.

2.3) Drivers of global democracy attitudes and actions

How do individual attitudes on global democracy (if any) emerge? And what explains variation in the valence and strength of people's attitudes, as well as their willingness to act on global democracy? This section explores the arguably most significant theoretical factors influencing individual global democracy attitudes and actions. Firstly, I differentiate between genetic and socio-environmental factors as the two principal categories of systematic influences on people's political attitudes and actions – including those relating to global democracy. Secondly, I theorize individual interests and values as the two main categories of proximate motives for personal global democracy attitudes and actions. Thirdly, I posit two

¹² This example illustrates potential linkages between systematic influences (e.g. here, home countries), attitudes, and actions on global democracy (see Section 2.3).

primary conditioning factors on individual global democracy attitudes and actions: knowledge of global governance and considerations of global democracy's feasibility.

I do not claim that all factors outlined here are in fact empirically verified as drivers of people's global democracy attitudes and actions; nor is it within the scope of the present study to empirically assess every aspect of this theoretical framework (although substantial parts are subjected to empirical testing in subsequent chapters). Instead, this section prepares the ground for exploring various aspects of individual global democracy attitudes and actions in greater theoretical and empirical detail. In this vein, subsequent chapters delve deeper into the potential interrelation between individual global democracy attitudes and political parties, assessing the extent to which political parties (a socio-environmental factor) could affect individual attitudes in this respect, and to what extent people's vote choice (a costly political action) may depend on their global democracy attitudes (see Chapters 5-7). My theoretical framework is illustrated in Figure 1 (p. 37) and explicated in the following.

2.3.1) Systematic influences: Genetic and socio-environmental factors

Let me begin by briefly considering the possibility of genetic influences on people's attitudes toward global democracy. In recent years, there has been a vivid scholarly debate whether and to what extent genetic predispositions affect individual political attitudes (e.g. Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2005; Smith, Oxley, Hibbing, Alford, and Hibbing 2011; Smith, Alford, Hatemi, Eaves, Funk, and Hibbing 2012). While such a proposition may seem intuitively implausible, some scholars have used established methods such as twin studies to demonstrate the apparent impact that genes can have on one's political predispositions (e.g. Hatemi, Funk, Medland, Maes, Silberg, Martin, et al. 2009). Such findings imply that potential attitudes on global democracy could also be partly influenced by people's genetic makeup. While theoretically possible and intriguing, investigating genetic drivers of individual attitudes

in this regard lies beyond the scope of this study's empirical inquiry – in contrast to potential socio-environmental factors which are more intuitive and less controversial.

There are, of course, countless possible socio-environmental influences on individual political attitudes, including people's views concerning global democracy. Socio-environmental influences may be defined as all human influences in an individual's life, whether from personal acquaintances (e.g. friends) or people who one does not know personally (e.g. celebrities). Here, I aim to discuss – what are arguably – some of the most salient ones in the context of global democracy: parents and peers, NGOs, political parties, and nations.

Parents and peers are among the most studied and most commonly acknowledged social influences on people's political views. While parents generally have a great influence on individual attitudes in early childhood (Sanderson 2010:186), various studies (e.g. Minoura 1992; Harris 1995) highlight the impact of peer socialization in the formative years of late childhood and youth, arguing that it is in the period from approximately nine to fifteen years that people's fundamental moral norms and worldviews are shaped. Therefore, I expect that, in the context of global democracy attitudes, people are likely influenced by views of their parents and peers. This influence may be direct, e.g. if one's parents or peers express specific views on global democratic proposals such as the idea of a world parliament and thereby affect one's attitudes in this respect; or the influence could be indirect through the stated positions of parents or peers on attitudes that may be considered related to the idea of global democracy, e.g. concerning world poverty, climate change, or international peace.

Advocacy by NGOs constitutes another important socio-environmental influence on people's political attitudes. Political theorists posit that NGOs could act as "cosmopolitan avant-garde" agents of global justice (Ypi 2012:chap. 7). Indeed, studies in various academic fields – ranging from Sociology to Public Policy to International Law – have found that NGOs

and civil society movements wield great moral authority which they can use to influence public opinion in both developing and developed countries on a wide range of issues (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2020) – from climate change (Brulle, Carmichael, and Jenkins 2012) to human rights (Davis, Murdie, and Garnett Steinmetz 2012) to trade agreements (Dür and Mateo 2014). In the present context, NGOs like Democracy Without Borders and its Campaign for a UN Parliamentary Assembly, as well as the World Federalist Movement as their umbrella organization, are the main contemporary sources of global democracy advocacy (Campaign for a UN Parliamentary Assembly 2017; Democracy Without Borders 2018; World Federalist Movement – Institute for Global Policy 2018). I thus expect that NGOs in general, but especially these global democracy-specific ones, potentially constitute important influences on people's attitudes regarding global democracy – at least to the extent that people come into contact with them despite their limited reach.

National political parties are a frequently studied and evidently powerful socio-environmental influence on individual attitudes. In particular, since the development of partisan mobilization theory (cf. Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960), scholars have debated the effectiveness of partisan cues at influencing individual attitudes and actions in various political contexts, among others, with respect to European politics (Hobolt and de Vries 2016; Stoeckel and Kuhn 2018; Torcal, Martini, and Orriols 2018). With regard to people's global democracy attitudes, partisan mobilization has presumably had little (if any) effect in the real world thus far, as most political parties worldwide have not publicly declared any position on global democracy. Nonetheless, theorists consider political parties a potential “agent” of global democratization (Archibugi and Held 2011). Given this theoretical interest in the prospective role of parties in global democratization, and the potential impact that they could have, I theorize and empirically evaluate this possible socio-environmental influence on global

democracy attitudes in much greater detail in subsequent chapters of this study (see Chapters 5 through 07).

Last but not least, nation-states – especially people's home countries – constitute an important socio-environmental influence with respect to most political attitudes, evidently including proposals for global democracy. There are countless ways in which an individual's home country may systematically affect her political attitudes. For instance, different countries have distinct cultures in which certain values are emphasized to different extents. One common distinction are the more liberal and individualistic orientation of Western countries vis-à-vis the more traditional and collectivist cultures prevalent in the Eastern hemisphere (Inglehart and Welzel 2010; Triandis 2018). Such cultural differences at the country-level have potentially strong impacts on citizens' political attitudes. For example, people in more individualistic societies may prefer a political culture in which different viewpoints on specific policy issues are openly debated before any decisions are taken by political leaders, whereas citizens of more collectivist countries may prefer a more consensual and less openly conflicted decision-making process. Cultural differences and other systematic variations at the country-level may thus also affect people's views on global democracy.

One noteworthy aspect about the results of existing surveys on global democratic proposals is the evident cross-national variation in people's attitudes. For instance, in the case of the aforementioned BBC survey on the creation of a world parliament with proportional representation (Synovate 2007), 64 percent of Indians were broadly supportive of such a proposal, while only 15 percent of Danish respondents tended to endorse it (see Figure 19, p. 252). This strong cross-national variation indicates that there are structural conditions at the country-level making residents of certain states more or less likely to support particular global democratic reforms than people from other countries. For instance, in this case, the results might be partly explained as follows: Indian respondents – as they live in a relatively populous

country – may tend to believe that in such a global parliament their nation would be better represented, whereas Danish participants in this survey might have feared such a scenario due to considerations of their nation's comparatively small size. Indians thus possibly tend to favor the creation of a world parliament due to the prospective benefit to their country, while Danes may partly lean toward rejecting such an idea as it might not be in their nation's interest. This example illustrates the potential effect that a socio-environmental influence (i.e. a country characteristic, namely national population size) may have on a proximate motive (i.e. a sociotropic interest in the benefit of one's nation, see Section 2.3.2), and the systematic impact it may thereby have on people's attitudes and actions with respect to global democracy (see Figure 1, p. 37).

More generally, I thus expect systematic differences between different nations' attitudes toward global democracy. Besides cultural differences and population sizes, there are other country-level variables, e.g. regime type or geopolitical power, which could affect people's global democracy attitudes. For instance, citizens of democratic regimes may generally be more prone to support global democracy due to the democratic values that their country's educational system and media instill in them; whereas citizens of geopolitically powerful countries may (all else equal) be less supportive, since global democratization might lead to a decline of their nation's status in the world if power differentials between countries are reduced as a result. Once again, these examples illustrate the potential impacts of socio-environmental factors (here, people's home country, specifically its regime type and geopolitical status) on individual values and interests (here, their democratic ideology and their sociotropic interest in the global power status of their country), and thereby people's attitudes and actions toward global democracy (see Figure 1, p. 37).

Overall, I conclude that by living in a particular country, individuals are exposed to systematic socio-environmental influences that affect their beliefs, knowledge, values, and

interests in the context of global democratic proposals and thus ultimately their attitudes and behavior in this respect. Comprehensively assessing the potential impact of various country characteristics, and being able to distinguish them from other possible drivers, requires surveying numerous nations and gathering large sample sizes in each country. While my dissertation aims at a wide global geographic coverage (by surveying nations from various parts of the world – see Section 3.2), systematically evaluating country-level effects is beyond this study's empirical inquiry.

2.3.2) Proximate motives: Interests and values

Let me now proceed to the main proximate motives behind individual global democracy attitudes, i.e. potential values and interests that may impact people's views in this regard. I draw on the rich Political Theory literature and empirical studies in Political Science and International Relations to identify the most important motives for people to endorse or reject global democracy. In line with the goal of this first exploratory theoretical framework, a reasonably comprehensive discussion of relevant proximate motives affecting people's attitudes with respect to global democracy involves two core dimensions: interests and values (Dellmuth and Schlipphak 2019). I discuss each of these in turn.

Self-interest is often considered a driver of individual political attitudes, although the empirical evidence in this regard is mixed (Sears and Funk 1991; Crano 1997). In the context of the legitimacy of global governance institutions, Dellmuth (2018) similarly discusses "utilitarian appraisals" as an oft-theorized driver of people's views. It is common to differentiate between "egotropic" and "sociotropic" interests in this regard (Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000). Whereas egotropic interests refer to an individual's perception of her own benefit, sociotropic interests relate to a person's consideration of the benefit of a group that she feels to belong to (e.g. her family, party, or nation). That is, in order to be defined as an egotropic interest, the (expected) benefit to oneself would be the key characteristic; whereas

for sociotropic interests, an (expected) benefit to a group that one feels to belong to would be central.¹³

With regard to global democratic proposals, interest-related factors also frequently feature as potential considerations in the formation of people's attitudes. For instance, Nye (2001:4) assumes shared interests between billions of Chinese and Indians vis-à-vis the rest of the world in a potential global parliament built on the principle of proportional popular representation. Indeed, it seems plausible that interest-related considerations could contribute to individual attitude formation with regard to global democracy. For instance, we may expect an individual from the global South, who hopes to become wealthier as a consequence of worldwide material redistribution in the wake of global democratization, to be positively inclined toward the creation of global democratic institutions such as the establishment of a world parliament. Conversely, a person from the global North, who may fear to suffer materially as a consequence of global democratization and worldwide redistribution, would possibly be more likely to oppose global democracy for that very reason.¹⁴ Overall, therefore, we may expect self-interest to be a potent motive behind people's global democracy views.

Let me now proceed to the second main category of proximate motives which potentially affect people's attitudes toward global democracy: *values*. Social psychological and public opinion studies generally consider people's values a principal driver of individual political attitudes (e.g. Feldman 1988, 2003; Kertzer, Powers, Rathbun, and Iyer 2014). A value

¹³ The boundary between interests and values can sometimes be blurry, of course. For instance, in the case of a sociotropic interest in the benefit of one's nation, one may also speak of the value of nationalism. Generally, however, I refer to interests when considerations of personal or group benefits are the key motivations. In contrast, I use the concept of values to denote considerations where possible personal or group benefits do not play the decisive role, since a certain position would be taken even in the absence of such benefits. I thank Mathias Koenig-Archibugi for his comments on this point.

¹⁴ This example illustrates how a socio-environmental factor (i.e. national living standards) may affect a sociotropic interest (i.e. an interest in maintaining the national standard of living) and thereby attitudes and actions with respect to global democracy.

may be defined as a standard or criterion for developing and maintaining attitudes toward relevant objects as well as for guiding action (Rokeach 1968). For example, one may expect that a person who subscribes to the value of gender equality is more likely to support affirmative action laws such as gender quotas in company boards and might even actively advocate such laws by arguing for them in private conversations, signing petitions, joining protests, etc. Similarly, in the present context, there are specific values that I generally expect to drive individual attitudes and actions toward global democracy.

To begin with, there are certain core values that I would expect to underly people's attitudes toward global democracy, i.e. democracy, globalism, and cosmopolitanism. First, individual positions on global democracy probably depend in part on the extent to which people hold a democratic ideology more broadly.¹⁵ That is, I expect that the extent to which someone endorses proposals for global democracy depends on whether and how much this person supports the democratic form of government in general. Conversely, it would seem plausible for someone who is opposed to the idea of democracy in principle to also reject proposals for *global* democracy.

Second, attitudes on global democracy are likely dependent upon people's level of "globalism". I define globalism in this context as the principled conviction that some issues (e.g. climate change) are inherently transnational and thus best addressed by policies of worldwide scope. A globalist, as defined here, welcomes the making and implementation of policies on a transnational level under certain conditions (cf. Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012, 2014). An

¹⁵ Note the difference to the socio-environmental influence of a country's democratic regime quality mentioned above (see Section 2.3.1): The immediate driver of individual global democracy attitudes is the proximate motive of a *person's* democratic ideology. This may well stand in opposition to the values that are systematically instilled at the country-level. For instance, a citizen of the United Kingdom may prefer absolute monarchy as a form of government, even though she lives in a democracy. However, the point above was that, on average, democratic countries are more likely than non-democratic countries to instill democratic values in their citizens and hence affect people's global democracy attitudes and actions. I thank Karolina Milewicz for her comments on this point.

anti-globalist, however, may reject transnational political decision-making in principle, e.g. due to a strong belief in the idea of territorial sovereignty (Rabkin 2005), and thus also oppose proposals for global democracy which imply more transnational policy-making.

Third, cosmopolitanism is commonly viewed as a value system underlying proposals for global democracy (see e.g. Archibugi and Held 1995). Cosmopolitanism is a moral and political philosophy committed to individualism, universality, and generality (Pogge 1992:48–49), meaning that all living *humans* (rather than nations, for example) are the ultimate units of concern for *everyone* (not only their compatriots, for instance). Empirically, cosmopolitanism appears to be compatible with a variety of values – from diversity to liberty – and with self-interest, as Bayram (2015) argues based on analyzing global public opinion data using Schwartz’s (1992) value theory. Pogge specifies that moral cosmopolitanism “imposes limits upon our conduct and, *in particular, upon our efforts to construct institutional schemes*” (Pogge 1992:49 my emphasis). Indeed, cosmopolitans may believe in the empowerment and democratization of global institutions as a means of fulfilling their moral obligations toward fellow human beings worldwide. Thus, assuming that such normative reasons would be reflected empirically in people’s attitudes as well, I expect that – all else equal – the more democratic, globalist, and cosmopolitan an individual is, the more likely she is to endorse global democracy.

Let me now move to even more proximate value-related considerations which may motivate individual global democracy attitudes. In the field of Political Theory, the two principal argumentative strands in global democracy advocacy are *procedural* and *instrumental*. That is, while some scholars primarily emphasize “input”-related considerations in arguing for global democracy, other scholars concentrate on “output”-oriented aspects (Scharpf 1999). Held’s (1995) seminal work is a prime example of the former argumentative strategy. Held maintained that globalization has led to a situation in which many political decisions of

relevance to people's daily lives are made at the global level with no – or at best very little and indirect – participation by individuals. For Held and colleagues like Archibugi (1993, 2008), “cosmopolitan democracy” is the way to remedy this lack of public input into global policy-making. They thus focus on the procedural side of democratizing the institutions and processes through which global policy-making takes place. A different (but complementary) approach is to concentrate on instrumental considerations, i.e. the benefits (or costs) that global democracy could generate. Scholars like Pogge (2002), Caney (2005), and Cabrera (2010b, 2020) primarily conceive of global democracy as a means toward the end of global justice, e.g. by overcoming world poverty. They argue that more democratic global institutions would be useful or indeed necessary to tackle many forms of global injustice. Other theorists disagree and highlight the potential negative consequences that global democratization may entail, e.g. the prospect of cultural homogenization (Nussbaum 2006:313) or even the fear of global tyranny (Rawls 2001:36).

In parallel to scholars' argumentative strategies, I expect that citizens' attitudes toward global democratic proposals are also principally driven by input and output considerations. That is, the more people believe that greater public participation in global policy-making is needed, and/or the more they believe that democratizing world politics would help in addressing global challenges like climate change, the more I would expect them to favor the creation of global democratic institutions. Conversely, the less people are convinced of the potential input- and/or output-related merits of global democracy (or even believe that global democratization may be counterproductive in these respects), the less I would expect them to endorse the establishment of such institutions, and the more likely they are to oppose related reforms.

2.3.3) Conditioning factors: Political knowledge and feasibility beliefs

Finally, my theoretical framework includes two factors that may condition individual attitudes and actions on global democracy: first, political knowledge about global governance, especially its alleged undemocratic characteristics; and second, considerations regarding the feasibility of global democracy, which are important given that the hypothetical nature of this attitudinal object may be associated with its desirability and people's willingness to take political action. This subsection discusses political knowledge and feasibility beliefs as two conditioning factors in turn.

Political knowledge is a central concept in the study of political attitudes and behavior. It is generally defined as “the range of factual information about politics that is stored in long-term memory” (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1993:10). The level of a person's political knowledge is determined by three factors: first, *ability*, i.e. the possession of adequate cognitive skills; second, *opportunity*, i.e. the provision of information; and third, *motivation*, i.e. the individual desire to learn (Luskin 1987; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1993; Barabas, Jerit, Pollock, and Rainey 2014:841). Many studies have identified factors such as education and mass media as potential influences on individual ability, opportunity, and motivation to acquire political knowledge, identifying links between such factors and analyzing their impact on public opinion and political behavior (e.g. Converse 1964; Neuman 1986; Zaller 1992; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1993; Althaus 2003; Albright 2009). Converse (1964), for example, refers to the factor of education to argue for the positive association between political knowledge and the coherence of people's political beliefs; and Zaller (1992) posits that while political knowledge makes people more likely to receive messages (e.g. party cues), it also makes people more likely to resist messages that are inconsistent with their political predispositions.

The role of political knowledge in individual attitude formation has been acknowledged in the context of the legitimacy of global governance institutions as well (Dellmuth 2018). With

regard to global democracy attitudes, people's knowledge about present-day global governance (Dellmuth 2016) – particularly its alleged democratic shortcomings – may be especially significant. For instance, one may expect that greater awareness of the veto rights in the UN Security Council or the distribution of vote shares in the Bretton Woods institutions could condition individual attitudes toward proposals for comprehensive democratic reforms of the international system. That is, on the one hand, awareness of the arguably unfair distribution of power in present-day international organizations may *trigger* people's desire for global democracy. On the other hand, becoming aware of such global democratic deficiencies may *strengthen* preferences for proposals such as a world parliament among people who are already supportive of such ideas. Conversely, knowledge of such imbalances in the current global governance system may trigger or strengthen the desire to maintain potential relative advantages of one's nation-state – especially among people who are nationalist and conservative. Political knowledge on people's attitudes and actions may thus condition the attitudes of both supporters and opponents of global democracy. More specifically, we may expect that greater political knowledge could strengthen both supporters and opponents in their respective attitudes on global democracy. However, it may also be the case that greater political knowledge conditions the attitudes of supporters more than those of opponents – or vice-versa.

With regard to the hypothetical nature of the attitudinal object of global democracy, considerations of its feasibility and likelihood may condition individual attitudes and willingness to act. Arguments and assumptions concerning the possibility and probability of global democratic proposals frequently feature in discussions between scholars, activists, and other commentators (e.g. Falk and Strauss 2001; Nye 2002; Koenig-Archibugi 2011). Theoretically, one may argue that feasibility aspects should be separated from desirability considerations (Gilbert and Lawford-Smith 2012). Nonetheless, in practice, scholars often put forth practicability arguments in discussions about the desirability of global democracy. Such

arguments frequently serve to reinforce the normatively preferred position. That is, while global democracy advocates tend to insist on its realizability (e.g. Strauss and Falk 2002), opponents usually emphasize its impracticability (e.g. Miller 2010).

Similar to scholars, citizens' attitudes and actions on global democracy may be associated with their beliefs regarding its practicability. Indeed, my pre-tests for this study and respondent comments in a related project (Ghassim and Pauli 2019) show that in some cases such considerations of feasibility are connected to people's assessments regarding the desirability of global democratic proposals. That is, some respondents evidently align with critics who argue that global democratization is *impossible* or at least an *unlikely* prospect, given the enormous disparities between the various nations worldwide (e.g. in cultural and economic ways), the large size of the world in terms of territory and population, and the consequently possible difficulties if global democratization were to be attempted (cf. Dahl 1999, 2004; Nye 2001; Grant and Keohane 2005; Buchanan and Keohane 2006:416–417; Keohane 2006; Miller 2010). Such arguments are discussed by Koenig-Archibugi (2011, 2012) who maintains – on empirical grounds – that factors like cultural and economic heterogeneity as well as territorial size may make global democracy unlikely but not infeasible. Nonetheless, I expect such feasibility and probability considerations to be associated with people's attitudes toward global democracy. Mirroring scholarly debates, citizens who hold supportive attitudes may deem global democracy more feasible, while people who reject global democracy may consider it less viable.

Moreover, feasibility considerations could condition people's willingness to act toward or against global democracy, assuming that individual readiness to act depends in part on the probability that such action yields any results. For instance, if people generally support global democracy, but do not think that it is possible or likely, they may be less motivated to act on it, as they might consider such actions a waste of their resources; whereas if global democracy is

thought to be a realistic prospect, advocates might be more willing to act on their convictions if such actions promise to pay off in the future. Conversely, if someone is opposed to global democracy, but does not deem it feasible or likely, she might see less of a need to take action against global democratization; whereas if an opponent considers global democracy a realistic prospect, she may be more motivated to take political action to prevent this vision from becoming reality. Hence, we may expect that willingness to act – both in support and opposition of global democracy – is stronger, the more likely or feasible people deem global democracy to be. On the other hand, though, it may also be that feasibility considerations have a stronger bearing on the willingness-to-act of individuals who support global democracy or of those who are opposed – and not on both equally.

This concludes my discussion of the first exploratory theoretical framework on individual global democracy attitudes. To summarize, I suspect that most people's attitudes toward global democracy are currently underdeveloped, potentially consistent, rather supportive, but not very strong. I argue that genetic and socio-environmental factors are the systematic influences underlying individual actions and attitudes on global democracy. These influences are theorized to motivate interests and values with respect to global democracy which I consider the proximate motives driving people's attitudes. The stronger people's attitudes are, the more likely they are to be willing to take high-cost actions on global democracy. Such attitudes and actions, in turn, are conditioned by political knowledge and beliefs in the feasibility of global democracy. Chapters Three and Four subject this chapter's expectations to empirical testing.

3) Research design and methods: Individual attitudes on global democracy

In order to test the theory and expectations outlined in the previous chapter, I conducted surveys on nationwide samples in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US – in collaboration with the survey companies Dynata and YouGov in August 2019 and July 2020 respectively. The present chapter first discusses the principal method of this study: online surveys. Following that, I elaborate on my choice of survey countries and the design of my questionnaire. Lastly, I explain how I conducted the surveys and analyzed the results.

3.1) Online surveys

In recent years, studies based on online surveys have proliferated in the field of Political Science (Mullinix, Leeper, Druckman, and Freese 2015:3). With the worldwide spread of faster and more stable internet connections, the founding of online survey firms like YouGov, and the emergence of online labor markets such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (Mturk), scholars have gained access to large pools of potential survey participants providing affordable and timely primary polling data (Levy, Freese, and Druckman 2016:1). Thus, ever more researchers have been turning to online surveys in order to validate their theories relating to human attitudes and/or behavior (Nardi 2014).

While online surveys can be innovative and productive, they also bear certain problems. First and foremost, researchers need to keep in mind that online samples must be considered a form of convenience sample – albeit a very diverse one. Contributors generally sign up to online survey panels themselves, rather than being randomly selected based on probability sampling, as surveys using traditional methods attempt to do. Therefore, results of studies based on online sampling usually cannot be considered entirely representative of national populations and must – like traditional survey samples – be reweighted in order to increase their representativeness for the general population. However, we should also refrain from idealizing surveys using traditional methods like random-digit dialing. Response rates of even

the largest polling agencies have dropped significantly in recent decades – from 28 percent in 1997 to seven percent in 2017 in the case of Gallup (Marken 2018), and from 36 percent in 1997 to six percent in 2018 in the case of Pew (Kennedy and Hartig 2019). These developments have arguably led to a convergence in the quality of samples derived from traditional and online sources. Nonetheless, researchers in International Relations and Comparative Politics need to bear in mind that online samples – obviously – consist of internet users and are thus primarily composed of contributors from more technologically savvy and digitally connected population segments in both developed and developing countries. This composition may lead to systematic biases in online samples – and hence among respondents to my surveys as well. For instance, it has been found that average American workers on Mturk are younger as well as more introvert and liberal than average Americans in the general population (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012; Goodman, Cryder, and Cheema 2013; Paolacci and Chandler 2014; Huff and Tingley 2015; Levay et al. 2016). While some biases can be ameliorated by reweighting, such methods do not provide a remedy in cases where underlying population segments are not included at all in an online survey environment, e.g. elderly people living in rural areas of developing countries without access to the internet.

How serious are the bias problems of online samples in the context of my inquiry? First, recent studies have demonstrated that treatment effects, which were originally observed in survey experiments using convenience samples, could be validated in population-based surveys as well as real-world behavior (cf. Barabas and Jerit 2010; Hainmueller et al. 2015; Mullinix et al. 2015). Hence, for the parts of my study focusing on treatment effects (Chapter 5-7), online samples promise to be at least a good starting point. Second, we should remember that online samples are far more diverse than the convenience samples frequently used in other disciplines (Horton, Rand, and Zeckhauser 2011:3; Berinsky et al. 2012), e.g. samples of undergraduate students which so often form the basis of psychological studies (Sherman,

Buddie, Dragan, End, and Finney 1999). If useful lessons can be drawn from such research despite biased underlying samples, then this should apply *a fortiori* to my inquiry employing online survey experiments. Lastly, depending on the diversity of the online sample in question, it is possible to ameliorate potential bias issues by reweighting the data, as indicated above. Progress in this area has been such that online polling firms like YouGov are by now considered good enough to be cited as sources of nationwide representative polling alongside survey firms that use traditional methods, e.g. in weekly opinion polls in Germany (Zicht and Cantow 2019).

Another problem associated with the method of online survey experiments is the fact that researchers cannot – unlike in a laboratory – control the wider experimental environment of their studies. That is, since respondents can access the surveys from almost any place and device connected to the internet, they may be exposed to different distractions. Generally, online surveys thus pose the problem for researchers to ensure that respondents are attentive, e.g. by absorbing treatments properly (Duffy, Smith, Terhanian, and Bremer 2005). In my study, I employ an incentive system (Goodman et al. 2013) and self-commitment devices motivating people to pay attention as they are completing the survey. In addition, different data quality checks allow me to distinguish, for example, between more and less attentive respondents in my analysis of the results (see Section 3.3.7).

Why did I conduct online surveys rather than multinational polls using traditional methods such as random telephone number dialing? For one, as noted above, the qualitative differences between these two types of surveys are arguably overstated, given that participation rates in polls using traditional methods have steadily declined in recent years. Moreover, there are budgetary reasons of course. Commissioning large international polling agencies like Gallup and Pew costs tens of thousands of Pounds and thus exceeds the budgets of many researchers, which is probably part of the reason why many social scientists rely on publicly available survey data (see Section 1.2). However, freely available datasets, e.g. data from the

World Values Survey (Inglehart, Haerpfer, Moreno, Welzel, Kizilova, Diez-Medrano, et al. 2014), are not very useful for my purposes, since they rarely contain questions relating to global democracy specifically. The few aforementioned surveys by the BBC (BBC Press Office 2007) and the Global Challenges Foundation (2014, 2017b; ComRes and Global Challenges Foundation 2018) are exceptional in containing questions on global democratic proposals, but they also do not fulfill my particular needs (as noted in Section 1.2).

For my purposes, online surveys indeed bear significant advantages over alternative methods such as telephone surveys, face-to-face interviews, or focus groups. First, online surveys are better suited than other methods to ensure that treatments are allocated to respondents correctly, e.g. by using specialized software like Qualtrics. In contrast to other methods, online surveys are a very impersonal way of communicating with respondents, which carries significant benefits. For example, in focus groups, face-to-face interview settings, or telephone surveys, research has shown that respondents are influenced by certain verbal or non-verbal acts of communication by interviewers, who have their own biases, and are thus led to respond in conformance with the researcher's expectations (Duffy et al. 2005). Online surveys allow me to minimize the leading effect of my questions, i.e. reduce "experimenter expectancy effects" (Sanderson 2010:47–49). Second, since this study broadly deals with people's attitudes as well as the drivers behind them, it is imperative to gather sufficiently large amounts of data to be able to make statements regarding the statistical significance of certain variations between people's preferences. Due to big participant pools, online surveys allowed me to gather amounts of data that are large enough to do so. Given that other methods like laboratory experiments, telephone surveys, and face-to-face interviews are impractical and/or too expensive to conduct for such large quantities of respondents as I am targeting, I relied on online surveys as the most suitable, affordable, and efficient option available for my purposes (Cobanoglu, Moreo, and Warde 2001).

3.2) Choice of survey countries

I conducted my surveys in Brazil, Germany, Japan, and the US in August 2019 in collaboration with Dynata. In July 2020, I conducted another survey in the UK with YouGov.¹⁶ My selection of survey countries was based on certain criteria. In the following, I discuss my considerations for choosing to survey Brazil, Germany, Japan, and the US, as well as how the UK fits in with these criteria as well. First, I wanted to poll countries that are culturally diverse in order to maximize the global generalizability of my results. Second, I decided to include both developing and developed countries in my sample due to potentially systematic impacts on people's attitudes regarding global democracy. Third, for the sake of greater relevance to international politics, I wanted my sample to contain relatively powerful countries from different world regions. Fourth, given its potential relevance to the issue of global democracy and popular attitudes in this respect, I aimed to include countries that are affected to different extents by the current wave of right-wing populism around the world. Fifth, budget constraints imposed practical limits, e.g. concerning required sample sizes and translation capabilities, which restricted the feasible size of my sample to five countries. Lastly, for substantive and methodological reasons, I aimed for the countries in my sample to be democratic, but yet diverse in terms of the structure of their political landscape. I elaborate on this criterion in Chapter Six.

In order for my survey results to be as globally generalizable as possible, the countries I surveyed needed to be culturally and geographically diverse. Hence, if I observe certain results across all the countries that I survey, that would indicate the generalizability of my

¹⁶ I thank the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford for accepting my application to conduct these survey experiments in the context of our departmental collaboration with YouGov. Through this collaboration, the UK was pre-determined as one of my survey countries.

results to other countries around the world. First, as a South American country influenced, in particular, by its colonial history under Portuguese rule, as well as a significant former destination of slave trade from Africa, Brazil is historically and culturally very distinct and markedly different from the other countries in my survey (Skidmore 2009). In the widely used Inglehart-Welzel cultural map of the world, which is based on World Values Survey data, Brazil is classified as part of the Latin American cultural sphere (Inglehart and Welzel 2010). Second, as a continental Western European country, while arguably more culturally related to the US than Brazil and Japan, Germany is still different enough to fulfill my criterion of cultural diversity (Fulbrook 2019). Inglehart and Welzel (2010) classify Germany as belonging to a cultural sphere that they call “Protestant Europe”. Third, as an East Asian country with marked cultural differences compared to the other countries in my sample, Japan clearly fulfills the criterion of cultural diversity to be included in my survey (Morton and Olenik 1994). Inglehart and Welzel (2010) classify the country as part of the Confucian cultural sphere. Lastly, the UK and the US are categorized by Inglehart and Welzel (2010) as belonging to the “English speaking” cultural sphere, thus differing from the remaining countries in my sample. While culturally similar in many ways, not least due to their closely intertwined histories, these two Anglophone countries have distinct cultures nonetheless (Crowther and Kavanagh 1999) and thus provide for additional diversity in my sample of countries.

Given potentially systematic differences between people in developed and developing countries in their considerations of global democracy, as indicated at several points above (see Section 2.3.1), I aimed for a survey sample that would contain both kinds of countries. Due to its still relatively low national living standards, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, and human development index (HDI) score, Brazil is commonly characterized as a developing country (United Nations Development Program 2019), thus differing from Germany, Japan, the

UK, and the US which are all classified as developed or “high income” countries based on commonly used indicators (The World Bank Group 2017).

In order for my results to be of greatest possible relevance to practical global politics, I wanted to include relatively powerful countries from different world regions. While the global power status of the US requires no further elaboration (Hurrell 2007; Monteiro 2014), let me briefly explain why the other four countries fulfill this criterion for inclusion in my sample. As members of the Group of Seven (G7), Germany, the UK, and Japan are three of the leading economic powers worldwide. Moreover, commonly used indicators in Political Science such as the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) confirm the relatively large power wielded by these three countries, ranking as the fifth, eighth, and tenth most powerful countries of the world in 2012 respectively (Singer 1988; Correlates of War 2013). Lastly, Brazil is a relatively powerful country, especially on the South American continent. Globally, its geopolitical power is illustrated by its memberships in the Group of 20 (G20). Brazil’s power is further evidenced by the CINC database where it ranks as the sixth most powerful country of the world in 2012 – the last year for which records are available in this database at the time of writing (Correlates of War 2013).

In light of the contemporary wave of right-wing populism around the world and its potential relevance to opinions about global democracy, I aimed to sample countries that were affected to different degrees by this phenomenon. First of all, the US under President Trump is regarded as the prime example of the recent rise and victories of right-wing populism worldwide (Norris and Inglehart 2019) at the time of writing. Secondly, Brazil also counts among the prime examples of countries that are strongly affected by the contemporary wave of right-wing populism around the world, as evidenced by the election of the far-right candidate Jair Bolsonaro to the Presidency in 2018 (Hunter and Power 2019). Third, the UK counts among the primary examples of countries characterized by populist politics and leaders, not

least due to the result of the 2019 general election, in which Boris Johnson – a Brexit protagonist – became Prime Minister. Fourth, while Prime Minister Abe of Japan – who was still in power at the time of my survey – is commonly considered a right-wing populist as well, his rhetoric markedly differs from that of national leaders like Trump and Bolsonaro, and his rise to power in Japan precedes the contemporary “authoritarian backlash” around the world (Mark 2016; Norris and Inglehart 2019). The case of Japan thus arguably differs from the clear instances of right-wing populist victories in Brazil, the UK, and the US. Finally, in Germany, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party had entered the political landscape relatively recently. While the AfD had become a political force across Germany, it was the preferred party of only a minority of around 13 percent in national polls at the time of my survey (Zicht and Cantow 2019). Moreover, the AfD found itself excluded from opportunities to govern at the federal and state levels at the time, since the other five leading parties were unwilling to form coalitions with the AfD (see e.g. ZEIT Online 2019). Germany was thus arguably less affected by the right-wing populist movement around the world than the other countries in my sample.

Linguistic homogeneity constituted another criterion in selecting countries for my sample. This criterion was important for practical reasons due to budget restrictions and consequently limited capabilities to translate my survey into too many languages. Unfortunately, this criterion precluded other potentially interesting countries for my survey such as India, the Philippines, or South Africa due to their linguistic diversity and the resulting practical difficulties in producing sufficient numbers of translations under the given budget constraints. In contrast, the four countries I chose for my survey are all characterized by linguistic homogeneity. That is, there is one quasi-universally spoken language at the national level in each of my sampled countries: Portuguese in Brazil, German in Germany, Japanese in Japan, and English in the UK and the US.

Following best practice guidelines for multinational surveys (Harkness, Braun, Edwards, Johnson, Lyberg, Mohler, et al. 2010; Behr, Braun, and Dorer 2016), my questionnaire was translated into the principal languages of each country by at least two knowledgeable native speakers, i.e. current or former graduate students in Political Science or related fields. The translation process included two main stages: one advance translation in order to identify any translation issues in the target language and modify the questionnaire accordingly so as to allow for equivalent translations into *all* languages (Behr et al. 2016); and one final translation based on the last version of the questionnaire. For my survey in Germany, I produced the translation myself and had it checked by several other knowledgeable German native speakers. The other translations were composed by two or more native speakers and myself, using my own foreign language skills and online translation services such as Google Translate. In cases of doubt about the translations based on these checks or disagreements between the two principal native translators on a particular questionnaire item, we discussed the different options and made decisions that aimed to stay as close as possible to the English original, while sounding as natural as possible in the target language. Moreover, whenever established translations for questions or answer choices were available from projects such as the World Values Survey, I tended to opt for those translations instead of adaptations suggested by my translators, thus relying on previously tested translations and to ensure the comparability of my surveys to existing multinational polls.

The English version of my survey is the original on which all translations are based. It was adapted for each country and offered to all respondents as a second language option. For my survey in the US, the questionnaire was also translated into Spanish which was offered as a second language choice. By default, my survey was shown to respondents in the principal language of their respective country of residence.

3.3) Questionnaire design and variable operationalization

In this section, I elaborate on the choices I made in designing my questionnaire, and how I use the questions from my survey to operationalize the variables of relevance to testing my hypotheses. The different elements of my survey are reproduced or illustrated in various figures as referenced throughout subsequent sections.¹⁷ The sequence of illustrations in the Figures section (see p. 196 onward) is intended to visualize respondents' experience of my survey in an approximately chronological order. For designing the survey instruments in Brazil, Germany, Japan, and the US, I used Qualtrics (2018) – a widely utilized online software for programming, conducting, and analyzing survey experiments. My survey in the UK was designed by me, but scripted and fielded by YouGov.¹⁸

3.3.1) Pre-testing

The final design of my questionnaire resulted from extensive pre-testing in several stages. I pre-tested my survey in the five target countries, in all five languages (including Spanish), and on respondents of different genders, age groups, and educational levels. In the first stage, I developed my survey items under the guidance of questionnaire design experts and pre-tested key elements of the original English version (e.g. the questions on my dependent variables) on fellow students of survey methodology employing read-aloud and probing

¹⁷ Due to constraints imposed by YouGov and a few revisions after completing the Confirmation of Status process at the University of Oxford, my survey in the UK in July 2020 differed somewhat from my previous surveys in Brazil, Germany, Japan, and the US. Most importantly, while the UK survey was based on my prior surveys, it had to be substantially shorter. In order to avoid overcomplicating my presentation here, I generally use footnotes to outline differences in the YouGov survey.

¹⁸ The final versions of my survey in the five selected countries – illustrating all its design elements and functionalities – are available at the following URLs:

Brazil: https://qfreeaccountssjc1.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_bkqquTDit3f0BY9?Q_lang=PT-BR

Germany: https://qfreeaccountssjc1.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_6LLRSb4On3amQAt?Q_lang=DE

Japan: https://qfreeaccountssjc1.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_0IpOCe7KIKTvGrb?Q_lang=JA

UK: <https://start.yougov.com/refer/vtLxBVZTcqZNFz>

USA: https://qfreeaccountssjc1.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_1zEbKdByaFayWpf?Q_lang=EN

techniques (Willis 2004; Willis and Miller 2011). Based on expert advice and the pre-testing results, I revised my questionnaire comprehensively.

In the second stage, I pre-tested my revised survey in the various languages. In some cases, I sat next to survey respondents as they were completing the survey, answered questions that they had about the survey (which indicated potential points that required further clarification) and proactively asked them probing questions (after they had responded) about particular survey items where I was unsure if the intended meaning or functionality was evident to respondents (Willis 2004; Willis and Miller 2011). In other cases, I discussed the survey completion process with pre-testing subjects on the phone or via messaging services, sending updated versions of questions in order to refine the wording of certain items of my questionnaire, for example.

In the third pre-testing stage, after another round of revising translations, I sent test links of my survey to subjects of different genders, age groups, and educational backgrounds in my five target countries who were simply asked to complete the survey without knowing that I was testing it. This was intended to ensure that the survey was pre-tested under realistic fielding conditions. Pre-tests were then followed up with a short questionnaire about respondents' understanding of the central concept of global democracy (see Section 3.3.3), the most problematic question types such as slider questions (see Section 3.3.2), the ease of understanding my survey overall, the clarity of my instructional manipulation check (see Section 3.3.7), respondents' ability to remember throughout the survey that they could skip questions (see Section 3.3.2), the believability of my party vignette treatment (see Section 6.2), annoyance at the elements of deception in my survey (see Section 6.3.2), perceived biases in the questionnaire, and respondent fatigue. Due to space considerations, my pre-testing protocols are not included here, but available upon request.

3.3.2) Question and answer formats

The most important principles behind my question wordings were that they must be understood by the general public and presented in a balanced manner. The criterion of understandability was ensured through extensive pre-testing on laypeople, as outlined above (see Section 3.3.1). My principle of balanced wording is informed by research on respondent acquiescence which is one of the most studied phenomena in the field of survey methodology (Alwin 1991; Krosnick 1999; Harzing 2006; Olson and Bilgen 2011). For instance, respondents are often found to agree rather than disagree with a statement that they are presented with. This may especially apply in cases where respondents' opinions are not firm, e.g. because they have never deeply contemplated a particular question. Given that my survey asks for respondents' opinions on an issue – global democracy – that they have in most cases probably thought about only rarely or never (see Section 2.2.1), it was especially important to ensure that my survey questions are phrased and presented in a manner that is as balanced as possible (Shaeffer, Krosnick, Langer, and Merkle 2005). I hence refrained from using standard question types that simply ask for respondents' agreement or disagreement with a certain statement, but rather made the different opinions explicit in the question wording, offering answer choices that feature an equal number of options between the two diverging opinions, thus achieving “minimal balance” (Shaeffer et al. 2005). For instance, instead of asking respondents to agree or disagree with a suggestive statement proposing to establish a global parliament, I ask respondents to what extent they support or oppose the proposal, which is then presented as neutrally as possible, without including leading words like “should”.

The main question format in my survey are multiple choice questions. This format is illustrated by Figure 54 (p. 274) in the Dynata surveys and Figure 108 (p. 297) for the YouGov survey. I generally ask respondents to provide one answer and – in rare cases, e.g. when asking for respondents' nationality – allow for multiple answers. My reliance on these questions as the

primary format is due to respondents' familiarity with it, its efficiency in the use of survey space, and the expediency in analyzing its results.

Another principal question format in my survey are slider questions. That is, I present respondents with two polar opposite statements on a particular issue, e.g. the feasibility or infeasibility of global democracy, and ask them to indicate their position on a scale between these two positions. This question format is illustrated by Figure 70 (p. 278) and Figure 111 (p. 299). Survey methodologists are debating the advantages and drawbacks of slider questions (Roster, Lucianetti, and Albaum 2015). Indeed, an unexpected finding from my pre-tests was that slider questions are not intuitively understood by all respondents. One pre-tester did not understand that she needed to pull the slider to the left or right end in order to provide extreme responses, while pulling it somewhere in the middle to provide attenuated responses. Another pre-tester did not understand that Qualtrics's default starting position of the slider (on the far left) was not a pre-selected choice and that he needed to click on the slider at least once if he wanted to select the far-left option. I adapted the instructions in my questionnaire if such instances indicated plausible and potentially recurrent misunderstandings of any survey items (see Figure 31, p. 261; Figure 111, p. 299). Nonetheless, this question type is undoubtedly useful for certain purposes in my survey. Specifically, in some cases, it would have been too wordy or even misleading to label all points between two contradictory positions. A sliding scale allows respondents to indicate their tendency of agreement with one side or another of a debate visually rather than verbally.

The third key question format in my survey are open comment boxes (see Figure 48, p. 272). I include three of them, asking respondents to elaborate on their global democracy attitudes, their willingness to act on global democracy, and – at the very end – their comments on any other response they gave or feedback regarding the survey in general. This question

format is illustrated by Figure 48 (p. 272).¹⁹ These questions add useful information to my survey data as they enable me to validate the quantitative results with more qualitative data, allow me to study respondents' attitudes more deeply, and potentially lead to further inductive hypotheses in this respect that I had not thought of before.

On attitudinal questions, e.g. about people's support or opposition concerning global democracy, I generally use a six-point scale (see Figure 54, p. 274; Figure 109, p. 298). This serves several purposes. First, it does not offer a middle option, thus leading respondents to state even slight tendencies in one direction or another, or otherwise skip the question. Second, it strikes a balance between too few choices and too many options, allowing respondents to state slight, firm, or strong views on each of two sides of an issue, while not overwhelming them with too many options. That is, on the one hand, if I only offer two or four choices, that does not sufficiently allow for capturing differences in magnitude between different respondents' answers. On the other hand, if I offer too many choices, e.g. ten, that would not allow for establishing reliable differences in opinions between two respondents who choose adjacent answer choices. For instance, two respondents might have the same strength of conviction on a particular issue, yet one respondent might select option seven, while another may choose option eight. Moreover, offering too many choices, e.g. ten, does not highlight the lack of a middle option. That is, while a scale of one to ten technically does not include a middle option, respondents may still interpret the number five as the middle of the scale. This may cause a concentration of answers on a choice that is technically slightly to the left of the middle, while in fact reflecting the extent of respondents' indecisiveness. The third purpose of offering respondents a six-point scale is that it allows both for labeling only end-points as in my slider

¹⁹ Due to space restrictions imposed by YouGov, this question format did not feature in my UK survey.

questions (e.g. Figure 70, p. 278; Figure 111, p. 299) and for labeling all answer choices as in my multiple-choice questions (e.g. Figure 55, p. 275; Figure 109, p. 298) which would be difficult to do reasonably with, say, ten options. On my six-point scales, I generally used an adjective or verb in its pure form (e.g. “important” or “oppose”) as options two and five, the strong form (e.g. “highly important” or “strongly oppose”) as options one and six, and the weak form (e.g. “rather important” or “rather oppose”) as options three and four. In the case of multi-country surveys like mine, it is particularly important to ensure that translations of answer choice scales are equivalent. While words like “agree” may be easily translatable into all languages, terms like “somewhat” or “strongly” are not as straightforward to translate and their connotations may vary in different languages. This problem is magnified when further increments are added to a scale. Hence, my six-point scale strikes a balance between obtaining sufficiently differentiated response data, avoiding middle responses, and ensuring translatability into different languages.

I should note that I deviate from the principle of six-point scales in some cases. First, when asking about frequencies of behaviors (e.g. the frequency of discussing world politics), I offer four-point scales (see Figure 36, p. 262), relying on standard measures from the World Values Survey which offer “never”, “rarely”, “sometimes”, and “often” as answer choices (World Values Survey Association 2012). I deviate from the principle of six-point scales in such instances because offering that many options on questions of behavioral frequency arguably provides less useful detail than on attitudinal questions. Moreover, offering the same answer choices as prior surveys makes my results more comparable to pre-existing data. Second, I deviate from the principle of six-point scales in the case of a few attitudinal questions where a middle response is a plausibly frequent answer and qualitatively different from a non-response. For instance, when I ask respondents about their expectation whether the global poor or rich would dominate affairs in a global democracy, I also offer “neither” as a middle option

(see Figure 59, p. 276). I then operationalize the question as a tendency to domination by either the poor or the rich on the one hand, or neither the poor nor the rich on the other hand, i.e. as a four-point scale. Third, I deviate from the principle of six-point scales when asking about issues where I am primarily interested in a binary outcome, e.g. “yes” or “no”. Examples of this are my questions about the perceived ethnic minority status of a respondent (see Figure 98, p. 289) and about a respondent’s willingness to take a specific kind of action in line with her attitudes toward a particular global democracy proposal (see Figure 51, p. 273; Figure 110, p. 299).

In ordering my response choices, I strive for sequences that are least susceptible to satisficing biases, intuitive to respondents, and consistent throughout the survey. First, by default, I opt for horizontal rather than vertical designs of my answer choice scales in order to reduce “primacy effects” (Krosnick and Alwin 1987), especially on those attitudinal questions that respondents had presumably not thought very much about before and thus might have been prone to satisfice by selecting the first reasonable answer. However, catering to the limited screen sizes of smartphones, the standard left-to-right ordering of my questions is changed to a top-to-bottom order for some respondents, using the adaptive-design features of my survey. Due to my preference for laptop users (see Section 3.3.7), only a minority of respondents was affected by such potential variations in my survey design (see Table 123, p. 415). Secondly, intuitiveness is achieved by sorting responses from positive to negative (e.g. “support” to “oppose”) in the case of bipolar answer choice scales, and from smaller numbers to larger numbers in the cases of unidirectional scales (Krosnick and Fabrigar 1997). In some cases – for instance, my questions about the importance of something (e.g. faith) – I employ a unidirectional scale from “not important at all” to “highly important” from left to right (see Figure 94, p. 287). While I could have also opted for the reverse order, I remain consistent throughout my survey in using these answer choice sequences.

Lastly, it is worth noting and discussing that I generally do not offer a “don’t know” choice. The principal motivation behind this is to reduce “satisficing” behavior among respondents (Krosnick 1991; Krosnick, Narayan, and Smith 1996). Scholars have demonstrated that including “don’t know” options in surveys induces respondents to choose that answer in order to reduce the cognitive effort required to deliberate and provide a reasoned response, even though they would do so in the absence of the “don’t know” option (Krosnick, Holbrook, Berent, Carson, Hanemann, Kopp, et al. 2002). In an ongoing project on the related question of a world government, where we included both a “don’t know” option and a comment box in past surveys, we observe that respondents select “don’t know”, even though their written comments clearly indicate that they have a substantive opinion on the issue that could have been quantified in terms of a tendency toward either side of the scale that we offered (Ghassim and Pauli 2019). Thus, in order to prevent such instances, many survey methodologists (see Schaeffer and Presser 2003:79–80) recommend to refrain from offering a “don’t know” option, unless it is logically required, as in the case of factual questions where a researcher is interested in firm knowledge rather than best guesses. Other survey researchers (e.g. Welzel 2019) argue that not including a “don’t know” option forces respondents to provide “non-attitudes” (Converse 1970). In my survey, I opt for a middle way: While I do not include a “don’t know” choice, I allow respondents to skip questions in order not to force them into a non-attitude. My approach is similar to that of well-established multinational surveys, e.g. the World Values Survey, where “don’t know” options are not explicitly offered as answer choices, but recorded when volunteered by respondents (World Values Survey Association 2012:2). The difference is that in my consent form and in a separate item at the very beginning of my survey, I make this design feature of my survey explicit by asking respondents to confirm their understanding that they are free to skip any question which they deem too sensitive or which they do not have an answer to, even after carefully considering it (see Figure 26, p. 258; Figure 105, p. 296).

The decision to make this feature explicit was based on several considerations. First, I wanted to avoid that some respondents find out about the possibility to skip questions, while others do not, which would have led to distortions in my data. Second, I wanted respondents to be clear about this feature from the outset such that there would not be any imbalances between questions before and after the note about this feature. Third, for ethical reasons, respondents arguably must be offered the option of not answering certain questions, e.g. if they deem them too personal. Fourth, allowing respondents not to answer questions that they cannot or do not want to respond to also increases data quality as it presumably reduces instances of random selection of answer choices.

Finally, I should highlight that most of my optional questions included conditional requests for completion (see Figure 30, p. 261).²⁰ This measure served several purposes. First, pre-testing showed that some respondents simply forgot to answer questions on which they actually had a clear opinion. Thus, such prompts were helpful in reminding them of their omissions. Second, such prompts helped to motivate additional deliberations and thus solicit answers from respondents who were inclined to skip a question, but needed an additional nudge to provide their most likely answers and best guesses. Third, those respondents who satisficed and wanted to get through the survey as quickly as possible were likely to be annoyed by this feature and thus encouraged to drop out of the survey rather than complete it and pollute my data with low-quality responses.

3.3.3) Introductory prompt

One of the most important elements of my survey was the introduction of the concept of global democracy, which most respondents presumably had never considered before – at least not in the terms that I am interested in for the purposes of this study. My introductory

²⁰ Due to restrictions imposed by YouGov, my UK survey did not contain this feature.

prompt was shown to all respondents (see Figure 15, p. 196) and read as follows (see Figure 40, p. 264):

There is a debate about the idea of global democracy. The term “global democracy” refers to proposals for institutions that would be democratic and aimed at global issues. “Democratic” here means representing the world population. Examples of “global issues” are international peace, world poverty, and climate change.

Some global democracy advocates propose establishing a **world parliament**, directly elected by the world population, to **recommend** policies on global issues. Instead of a world parliament, others advocate creating a **global government** to **implement** policies on global issues. Yet others suggest forming a **global democracy including both a world parliament and a global government**. Proponents of such institutions generally agree that national parliaments and governments should still address issues that are not global. Finally, other people oppose proposals for global democracy altogether.

A few aspects of this prompt are worth noting. The first sentence introduces respondents to the existence of the debate about global democracy of which most were probably not aware before taking my survey. It thus also sets the stage for my vignette treatment on the supposed positions of existing political parties regarding global democracy (see Section 6.2). That is, the vignette which is presented later in the survey hence seems logically linked to the debate about global democracy that is introduced here. The rest of the introductory prompt’s first paragraph serves to define the concept “global democracy” in general terms, by dissecting it into the constituent elements “democracy” and “global”. Democracy is defined in minimalist terms, focusing on the representation of the world population (Schumpeter 1942; Dahl 1989). The examples of “global issues” that I provide are drawn from the academic literature on world government and global democracy since WWII with a gradually shifting focus from international peace (e.g. Russell 1945; Einstein 1946; Clark and Sohn 1966) to global inequality (e.g. Pogge 2002; Cabrera 2006) to global environmental issues (e.g. Caney forthcoming, 2006; Biermann 2007).

Moreover, the three illustrative policy areas are issues that scholars commonly view as global (e.g. Hale, Held, and Young 2013).²¹

The second paragraph of my introductory prompt delves into the specific global democratic proposals which I am interested in for the purpose of this study. As outlined in Chapter Two, the central concept is that of a “constitutionalist” (Dingwerth et al. 2011) model of global democracy, including both executive and legislative elements. The two other proposals split this key concept due to our interest in public attitudes toward its constituent elements (see Section 2.1). The proposal of a global parliament is defined as an institution that would be composed through direct elections by people worldwide and equipped with the capacity to make *recommendations* on global issues such as the ones mentioned above (Falk and Strauss 2001; Bummel 2010; Leinen and Bummel 2017). This is distinguished from the proposal of a global government which would have the capacity to *implement* policies on global issues, thus exceeding the powers of the envisioned global parliament (Deudney 2006; Biermann 2007). The second to last sentence paraphrases the concept of subsidiarity (cf. Føllesdal 1998) which constitutes a key element in many proposals for global democracy (e.g. Held 1995), stating the general agreement among global democracy advocates that national institutions should not be abolished, but limited in their responsibilities to non-global issue

²¹ The introductory prompt of my UK survey differed slightly, primarily due to a word limit imposed by YouGov. The prompt read as follows (see Figure 105, p. 290):

There is a debate about the idea of ‘global democracy’ which refers to proposals for institutions that would be democratic and aimed at global issues. ‘Democratic’ here means representing the world population. Examples of ‘global issues’ are international peace, world poverty, and climate change.

Some advocates propose establishing a directly elected world parliament and/or a global government, in order to recommend and implement policies on transnational issues. Proponents of such institutions generally agree that national parliaments and governments should still address issues that are not transnational. Other people oppose such global democracy proposals altogether.

areas. Moreover, it is worth noting that I bold some of the key words in this prompt in order to distinguish the three global democratic proposals from one another, as some pre-testers reported that they could not remember the distinctions between them. Finally, I generate balance through the last sentence that some people oppose such global democratic proposals entirely. This is admittedly a rather minimalist attempt at achieving balance, as no alternative concepts to the global democratic proposals here are presented. My rationale for this decision (and revision of previous drafts where the current international system was explicitly and elaborately presented as the alternative) is as follows: Implicitly, respondents will in any case compare the presented global democratic proposals to the status quo of the international system. Hence, it is not necessary to mention and elaborate on the current global order explicitly as an alternative to global democracy. Of course, there are many other proposals for international institutional reforms and various alternative global democracy conceptions (Archibugi et al. 2012b; Scholte 2014; Zürn 2016). However, assessing public opinion on them goes beyond the scope of the present inquiry.

3.3.4) Dependent variables

There are four key (groups of) dependent variables in my study: prior thinking about global democracy, attitudes toward global democracy, willingness to act on global democracy, and preferences for political parties. Similar to other International Relations research exploring public opinion on world politics (e.g. Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017), my study thus has more than one dependent variable. Here, I elaborate on how I operationalize the first three in my survey, while Chapter Six will further discuss political party preferences as a dependent variable in my survey experiments (see Section 6.3.1).

As my first dependent variable, I am interested in the extent to which people had thought about global democracy before taking my survey (see Figure 49, p. 273, and Figure 50, p. 273). Hence, I ask them first whether they had ever thought about the issue before; and if

they answer affirmatively, I follow up with a question on the extent to which they had thought about global democracy before, offering “not at all”, “very little”, “more than a little”, and “quite a lot” as answer choices. Note that the option “not at all” effectively amounts to a revision of the foregoing affirmation of prior thinking global democracy. This method of splitting the question into two is motivated by my hypothesis that most respondents have not had any prior exposure to global democracy yet. However, given the known tendency of respondents to choose a middle response (Lietz 2010), asking only the question about magnitude and offering the four response options from the outset probably would have inflated the results on the existence of prior global democracy thinking. That is why I separated this question into two.²²

The second group of key dependent variables in my study are people’s attitudes toward the different legislative and/or executive global democratic proposals – with a particular focus on the idea of a fully constitutionalist global democracy including *both* legislative and executive elements. On this survey page, respondents first saw the following prompt:

We are interested in your views on different proposals made by global democracy advocates. Please evaluate each of them – independently from other global democracy ideas that you may have.

This was intended to ensure that respondents would focus only on the proposals presented to them, and not possible other conceptions of global democracy that they might have in their minds (see Figure 53, p. 274). My question on people’s attitudes toward a world parliament was then phrased as follows:

To what extent do you support or oppose the following proposal? Please read carefully.

²² This differed from my approach in the UK survey, where – due to constraints imposed by YouGov – I asked respondents to place themselves on a six-point-scale between the endpoints “I have **never** thought about global democracy before taking this survey today” and “I have thought **a lot** about global democracy before taking this survey today”.

“A global **parliament**, directly elected by the world population, to **recommend** policies on global issues (for example, international peace, world poverty, and climate change), while national parliaments would still address issues that are not global.”

- Strongly support
- Support
- Somewhat support
- Somewhat oppose
- Oppose
- Strongly oppose

A few aspects are worth noting about this question. Firstly, it reflects the concept of a global parliament that was already mentioned in the introductory prompt, including direct elections by the world population, the right to make recommendations, and the focus on global issues along with the principle of subsidiarity. Secondly, based on feedback from several pre-testers who had difficulties noting the differences between the three proposals, I highlighted the key words which differentiate this proposal from the other ones. Thirdly, the answer choices reflect my aforementioned principle of providing six-point scales, offering three incremental levels of support and opposition each, in a bipolar scale ranging from “strongly support” to “strongly oppose” from left to right.

My question on the proposal of a global government is worded as follows:

To what extent do you support or oppose the following proposal? Please read carefully and note the differences to the proposal above.

“A global **government** to **implement** policies on global issues (for example, international peace, world poverty, and climate change), while national governments would still address issues that are not global.”

- Strongly support
- Support
- Somewhat support
- Somewhat oppose
- Oppose
- Strongly oppose

As for my question about a world parliament, this question reflects the idea of a global government that was already captured in the introductory prompt about global democracy, i.e. an institution at the global level with the power to implement policies on global issues, pursuant

to the principle of subsidiarity. Once again, I highlight the key words to distinguish this proposal from the other ones. In addition, I explicitly ask respondents in the introductory prompt to “note the differences” to the proposal they saw before.

Lastly, my question about the proposal of a global democracy, including both the legislative and executive institutional elements above, is phrased as follows:

Finally, to what extent do you support or oppose the following proposal? Please read carefully and note the differences to the proposals above.

“A global **democracy including** both a global **government** and a global **parliament**, directly elected by the world population, to **recommend** and **implement** policies on global issues (for example, international peace, world poverty, and climate change), while national parliaments and governments would still address issues that are not global.”

- Strongly support
- Support
- Somewhat support
- Somewhat oppose
- Oppose
- Strongly oppose

Again, as for the two proposals above, this question reflects my wording in the introductory prompt on the concept of global democracy, as combining the proposals of a world parliament and a global government with recommendation and implementation powers on global issues respectively, while observing the principle of subsidiarity with respect to the responsibilities of national institutions. As above, I highlight the most important words and explicitly ask respondents to “note the differences” to the other proposals.

I randomize the sequence of my questions about a world parliament and a global government to avoid order effects (McFarland 1981; Strack 1992; Gaines, Kuklinski, and Quirk 2007). However, the item about a fully constitutionalist global democracy including both legislative and executive elements always follows these two questions. This was intended to ensure that the full global democracy proposal is properly conceived as the combination of the two other proposals. Nonetheless, since all questions feature on one page, respondents are able to refer back to each proposal in any case, and potentially adjust their responses in relation to

each other, which allows me to identify the average ranking of these three proposals by respondents overall.²³

The third group of dependent variables in my study relates to people's willingness to take action on the issue of global democracy – be it against or in favor. Thus, my questions about people's willingness to act are conditional upon whether people indicated support for or opposition to each of the global democratic proposals, i.e. a global government, a world parliament, and a global democracy including both. I ask respondents if they want to take certain actions to reemphasize their support or opposition to each of the global democracy proposals on which they stated their attitude. I tell them that “we will make any necessary preparations”, once they indicate their willingness to take a certain action. This statement is intended to move respondents as close as possible to the decisions of truly taking the actions on which they indicate their willingness. In line with my theoretical framework, I examine both low-cost and high-cost actions that people may be willing to take. As elaborated in more detail

²³ Once again, my UK survey differed slightly here. While the question and answer choices remained the same, I slightly adapted the wording and order of the institutional proposals, adding the word “only” when referring to the proposals of a global government and parliament, and offering the fully constitutionalist global democracy proposal first rather than last, in order to emphasize the differences to the exclusive government and parliament proposals, following comments from pre-testers in this survey round – see here:

- The establishment of a global **democracy including both** a global **government** and a global **parliament**, directly elected by the world population, to **recommend** and **implement** policies on global issues (for example, international peace, world poverty, and climate change), while national parliaments and governments would still address issues that are not global.
- The establishment of **only** a global **parliament**, directly elected by the world population, to **recommend** policies on global issues (for example, international peace, world poverty, and climate change), while national parliaments would still address issues that are not global.
- The establishment of **only** a global **government** to **implement** policies on global issues (for example, international peace, world poverty, and climate change), while national governments would still address issues that are not global.

These changes did not affect the substance of the presented proposals or the question-answer process, as respondents in all countries saw all proposals on the same page and were thus able to adjust their responses in relation to one another, as intended.

above (see Section 2.2.5), I focus on online petitions and social media posts as low-cost actions, as well as donations to advocacy groups and voting for political parties as high-cost actions.²⁴ While I test the latter experimentally (see Section 6.3.5), I simply ask respondents for their willingness to take the former three actions. The order of the global democratic proposals on which respondents are asked for their willingness to act is fully randomized. Examples of my questions on people's willingness to act are presented in Figure 51 (p. 273) and Figure 110 (p. 299). The question block concludes with an open comment box in which respondents are asked to explain their willingness to act on the various global democracy proposals (see Figure 52, p. 274). As for the comments on global democracy attitudes, these elaborations help me validate quantitative results, enable me to better understand respondents' willingness to act, and may point to avenues for future research.²⁵

Lastly, I should note that – in line with my theory – some dependent variables serve as explanatory variables for other dependent variables. Specifically, I use the extent of prior thinking about global democracy as an explanatory variable for attitudes toward global democracy, and the willingness to act on global democracy, since all of these could plausibly be affected by the amount of prior thinking about the issue. Furthermore, I use people's attitudes toward global democracy as an explanatory variable for people's willingness to act

²⁴ Further below (see Section 3.3.5.1), I verify if the assumed cost ranking of anonymous petitions, social media posts, and donations is correct.

²⁵ Due to restrictions imposed by YouGov, my UK survey did not contain conditional programming. Furthermore, YouGov objected to an element of deception in my original question. I thus adapted this question as follows for the UK survey – keeping the same options and answer choices:

Would you like to take any of the following actions to underline your support or opposition concerning global democracy?

Moreover, again due to space constraints imposed by YouGov, in my UK survey I did not follow up on this question with an open comment box.

toward global democracy – because attitudinal strength is theorized as a key driver of people's willingness to act (see Section 2.2.5).

3.3.5) Explanatory variables

This section elaborates how I operationalized the factors influencing individual global democracy attitudes, as theorized in Chapter Two. These include socio-environmental factors as systematic influences, values and interests as the two categories of proximate motives that my framework focuses on, as well as political knowledge and feasibility beliefs as two conditioning factors. Let me now discuss how I operationalized each of these theorized factors in turn.

3.3.5.1) Systematic influences: Socio-environmental factors

Potential drivers of people's attitudes on global democracy are social influences that expose them to such ideas. Three of the principal groups of influences that I investigate in my study are: first, the immediate social environment of family, friends, and peers; second, advocacy groups working on the issue of global democracy; and third, political parties. While Chapters Five through Seven address political parties as a social influence, this subsection deals with my operationalization of the former two: the immediate social environment and advocacy groups. As with my questions on prior thinking about global democracy, I ask questions about family, peer, and advocacy group influences in two parts, due to my hypothesis that most respondents have not had any pre-exposure to the issue of global democracy before my survey and my assumption that asking respondents only one question could inflate the quantity of non-zero responses to this question (see Section 3.3.4). First, I ask whether there had been any discussions with family, friends, and peers, or exposure to advocacy groups (see Figure 49, p.

273).²⁶ And second (only if the responses to the previous questions are affirmative), I ask about the extent of such prior social influences with respect to global democracy (see Figure 50, p. 273). One thing to note about this is the direction of communication that I am interested in and that I inquire about. In both questions, I effectively ask whether the respective social influences have affected respondents' prior thinking about global democracy. That is, I do not ask, for example, *whether respondents have talked to* people in their social environment about the issue of global democracy, but – vice-versa – *whether family, friends, and peers have talked to* respondents about such issues. Of course, the risk remains that respondents may overread these differences and conflate the two communicational directions.

3.3.5.2) Proximate motives: Values and interests

The next element in my theoretical framework on the drivers of individual attitudes and actions on global democracy are people's values and interests as proximate motives. In the following, I discuss how I operationalize them along the main categories that I theorized in Chapter Two (see Section 2.3.2): I begin with potential interests that may affect people's global democracy attitudes and actions. I then move to the fundamental values of democracy, globalism, and cosmopolitanism. Following that, I discuss procedural and instrumental justifications of global democracy.

Arguments for and against global democracy often relate to the particular interests of specific groups in world politics. In the following, I outline how I operationalized different interest-related considerations in my survey.²⁷ As noted in Chapter Two, one of the most common arguments against global democratization is that it bears the risk of turning world

²⁶ My UK survey did not include this question, due to YouGov's limitations on the number of questions.

²⁷ Due to limitations in space imposed by YouGov, my UK survey only contained a summary question on individual interests with respect to global democracy (see Figure 112, p. 294).

politics into a tyranny. Such fears have been expressed by the likes of Kant (1795) and Rawls (2001:36); and they have also featured in comments that respondents provided in related projects (Ghassim and Pauli 2019). This suggests that public attitudes and actions toward global democracy could be influenced by the potential (lack of) fear that world politics may become tyrannical instead of democratic. I thus asked my respondents if they deem it likely or unlikely that global democracy would turn into a global tyranny (see Figure 62, p. 276).

Another commonly issued fear is that world politics would – if not become a global tyranny – be dominated by the world's poor, who constitute numerical majorities in terms of population size (Nye 2001). Alternatively, of course, one may suspect that global democratization would lead to world domination by rich countries and people. Or one may not see global democratization inherently leading to domination by either the rich or the poor. In my survey, I asked respondents about their thoughts on precisely this question (see Figure 59, p. 276).

Related to this argument is the fear of creating persistent minorities (Hale and Koenig-Archibugi 2019). That is, one common argument against global democracy is that it would create groups of people who are consistently outvoted on all issues by a majority worldwide, and would thus always remain a minority (Christiano 2008). From a normative democratic theory point of view, this would be problematic. In order to examine whether it is such a fear (or a lack thereof) that drives people's attitudes and actions on global democracy, I enquire whether people believe that their views on global issues like international peace, world poverty, and climate change are similar to or different from the opinions of most people worldwide (see Figure 79, p. 280).

In a similar vein, one fundamental motivation for global democracy is that individuals may strive to be better represented – or even participate directly – in world politics (see e.g. Held 1995). In order to study if this is a key motivation associated with people's global

democracy attitudes, I asked my respondents whether they believe that they would be better or worse represented in world politics as a result of global democratization (see Figure 64, p. 277). A related issue is whether people *value* better public representation and participation in world politics per se, independently of whether they would personally benefit from it or not. I deal with this value consideration further below.

Moving closer to home, there is a variety of ways in which the prospect of global democracy relates to individual interests through potential domestic ramifications, e.g. the effects that global democratization might have on domestic regime quality. Some theorists have argued that global democratization would put top-down pressure on national political systems, thus promising to enable domestic democratization or to strengthen existing democratic regimes (Archibugi and Cellini 2017). Hence, for individuals who would appreciate such top-down pressure, global democratization may be an appealing prospect for this very reason. In the European context, scholars have argued that fears of adverse impacts on domestic democracy contribute to public opposition to further regional integration in certain member states of the European Union (Rohrschneider 2002). I inquired into this potential motivation by asking respondents if they believe that global democracy would rather strengthen or weaken their domestic democracy (see Figure 65, p. 277).

Another interest consideration relating to domestic factors is the potential effect of global democratization on national living standards. Scholars have noted that global democratization might lead to demands for a large-scale global redistribution of wealth – especially from the global North to the global South (Scheuerman 2011). Hence, depending on where people are from, if they deem such redistribution demands to be a likely scenario, and whether they would support or reject such a development, this issue may influence people's attitudes and actions on global democracy. I thus asked my respondents if they believe that

citizens of their country would become wealthier or poorer as a result of global democratization (see Figure 67, p. 278).

Finally, global democracy implies fundamental transformations in geopolitics as we know it. Hence, people's interests might be indirectly affected by the potential impact that global democratization would have on individual countries' power status (cf. Nye 2002; Rabkin 2005). Assuming that people generally prefer to live in a country with a higher geopolitical standing, we may thus suspect that this factor influences personal attitudes and actions on global democracy as well. I assessed to what extent this is the case by asking respondents how they believe global democracy would affect their home country's power status in world politics (see Figure 66, p. 277).

Let us now move to the fundamental values that may underly a person's attitude toward proposals for global democracy. The first value to be operationalized is democracy. In order to do so, I asked respondents two questions. For one, I enquired about their view whether democracy is the best or worst form government, in principle (see Figure 81, p. 281). Moreover, I paraphrased a minimalist conception of democracy (Schumpeter 1942; Dahl 1989) by asking respondents if they deem elections between competing political parties a good or bad way of choosing a government in principle (see Figure 77, p. 280).²⁸

The second fundamental value from my theoretical framework to be operationalized is globalism. I inquired into people's globalist orientation – or a lack thereof – with several questions again. For one, I asked if people think that their country should take (or avoid taking) responsibility in managing the world's problems (see Figure 82, p. 281). Furthermore, I enquired whether people generally support or oppose globally oriented political actions like

²⁸ Most of these questions were not included in my UK survey due to the limitations imposed by YouGov; but if so, the UK survey questions are mentioned here explicitly.

international peacekeeping, development aid, and fighting climate change (see Figure 78, p. 280). Moreover, I inquired into respondents' principled support or opposition to existing international organizations like the UN (see Figure 73, p. 279). Finally, I asked respondents how important or unimportant they find the principles of national sovereignty and independence (see Figure 72, p. 279).

The third fundamental value that I theorize in Chapter Two is cosmopolitanism. I asked about people's level of cosmopolitanism in different ways. For one, I investigate if people see themselves more as world citizens or more as national citizens (see Figure 83, p. 281; Figure 112, p. 300). In addition, I paraphrase the principles of universality, generality, and individualism – which underlie the concept of cosmopolitanism (Pogge 1992) – by asking if people consider the well-being of people in other countries as important or less important than the well-being of people in their country (see Figure 84, p. 282). Finally, I enquire whether respondents deem it justified or unfair that some nations are poor while others are rich, in order to assess respondents' acceptance of global inequality (see Figure 75, p. 280) – a fundamental issue for moral cosmopolitans (Pogge 2002).

The next theorized category of proximate motives driving individual global democracy attitudes concerns procedural justifications, i.e. those relating to the argument that global democracy would lead to a better representation of people worldwide in global politics. One of the fundamental assumptions underlying this argument is that the present international system fails to represent people, i.e. that it is not democratic. I asked my respondents in different ways about their assessment in this context. First, I asked them on a unidirectional scale how democratic they find present-day world politics – from “not democratic at all” to “completely democratic” (see Figure 76, p. 280). Second, in a slider question, I investigated if my

respondents believe that the current international system represents or fails to represent the will of most people in the world (see Figure 80, p. 281).²⁹

Related to the perceptions of a global democratic deficit is the *importance* that people attribute to public participation in world politics. Note the difference: While people may deem world politics undemocratic, they may not consider it important for the public to participate in politics at this level anyway, and thus would not mind the existence of global democratic deficiencies. Conversely, a person may not see a democratic deficit in world politics because she believes that the global public is already sufficiently involved in global political decision-making, which she considers important. Hence, perceptions of a global democratic deficit are related but distinct from the *importance* that people attribute to global political participation. I investigated if respondents deem it important or unimportant to enable people worldwide to participate in world politics by providing a six-item scale from “not important at all” to “highly important” (see Figure 71, p. 279).

Lastly, in addition to perceptions of a global democratic deficit and considerations of the importance of public participation in world politics, there is also the question of whether global democracy would in fact allow for an adequate representation of the world population. While advocates may opine that global democratic institutions are the only effective way of ensuring such popular representation at the international level, opponents may disagree and argue such institutions would be far too removed from citizens to be able to represent their will adequately. Such considerations in turn may influence people’s attitudes and actions on global democracy. In order to assess the extent to which this is the case, I asked my respondents if

²⁹ Due to limitations imposed by YouGov, my UK survey did not feature these questions.

they believe that global democracy would be too distant from or close enough to people to represent their will (see Figure 58, p. 275).³⁰

The final category of proximate motives that I theorize in Chapter Two are instrumental justifications, i.e. arguments that relate to the potential benefits that global democracy may bring – not (just) to one personally, but to society as a whole. Once again, we may start by considering the current international system in this context. One common argument for global democracy is that existing international organizations – and the global governance system, more generally – are not capable of addressing today's transnational issues (see e.g. Pogge 2002; Caney 2005). The extent to which individuals agree with such evaluations of the current international system may influence their attitudes and actions on global democracy. I thus asked survey participants if they deem current international organizations capable or incapable of addressing the world's problems (see Figure 74, p. 279).

As a consequence of the alleged incapability of the extant international system in addressing transnational issues, theorists and activists have long argued for global democracy as an institutional approach to addressing problems like international peace, climate change, and world poverty effectively (e.g. Clark and Sohn 1966; Pogge 2002; Cabrera 2006; Leinen and Bummel 2018). The potential (lack of) effectiveness of global democracy in addressing global issues may also be a key motive of public support (or opposition) concerning global democratization. In order to be able to distinguish between the importance of three key global issue areas in this respect, I asked my respondents in three separate questions if they think global democracy would be effective at addressing the issues of climate change (see Figure 54, p. 274), world poverty (see Figure 55, p. 275), and/or international peace (see Figure 56, p. 275).

³⁰ Due to YouGov's space limitations, my UK survey did not contain this question.

Other commentators have gone a step further and argued that issues like international peace cannot effectively be addressed without global democratic institutions, i.e. that global democracy is necessary for addressing the world's problems (cf. Reves 1945). This is related to the expected effectiveness of global democracy on transnational issues noted above, but it arguably goes beyond it, since global democracy is not only seen as desirable but essential. If individuals think so as well, that may certainly be a strong driver of their support for global democracy – or if they disagree on the necessity of global democracy for resolving transnational issues, that may be associated with their opposition to the idea. In my survey, I thus enquired whether participants believe that global democracy is necessary to address the world's problems or not (see Figure 57, p. 275).

Another instrumental value-related consideration relating to global democracy is the expectation of greater unity or more conflict among people worldwide as a result of global democratization. On the one hand, one may argue that global democracy would lead to more unity worldwide, as we would move from an international system of competing – and potentially warring – countries to a world order in which all of humanity is part of one global society based on universal law. On the other hand, one may argue that – perhaps driven by vast cultural diversity – global democracy is a recipe for greater conflict among humankind, whereas setups such as the current international system maintain more sustainable levels of independence and distance between different peoples. Such considerations may, of course, affect the attitudes and actions of citizens concerning global democracy. I thus asked respondents if they believe that global democracy would lead to more unity or conflict among humankind (see Figure 61, p. 276).

The final instrumental value-related counterargument to global democracy, which I explore in this study, concerns expected adverse effects on cultural diversity. Some theorists have argued that the formation of strong supranational organizations, as envisioned in the

constitutionalist global democracy model that I conceptualize here, would inevitably entail cultural homogenization (e.g. Nussbaum 2006:313). One may counter that global capitalism, as ineffectively regulated as it currently is, inevitably leads to cultural homogenization, whereas global democracy would be a way of *preserving* cultural diversity. Since such considerations may affect personal attitudes and actions on global democracy, I asked respondents in my survey if they think that there would be more, less, or the same level of cultural diversity in a global democracy as compared to today (see Figure 60, p. 276).

3.3.5.3) Conditioning factors: Political knowledge and feasibility beliefs

In Chapter Two, I theorize two factors that may condition individual attitudes and actions on global democracy: first, political knowledge, especially on the alleged undemocratic characteristics of present-day global governance; and second, beliefs concerning the feasibility of global democracy. This section elaborates on the ways in which I operationalize these factors and expectations in my survey.

In Chapter Two, I lay out that political knowledge is commonly theorized as determined by three factors: *ability*, i.e. the possession of adequate cognitive skills; second, *opportunity*, i.e. the provision of information; and third, *motivation*, i.e. the individual desire to learn (Luskin 1987; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1993; Barabas et al. 2014:841). In this vein, the following paragraphs outline how I operationalize relevant political knowledge in the present context, and its potential determinants in terms of ability, opportunity, and motivation.

Based on my expectations (see Section 2.3.3), I would like to assess the potential influence that people's level of understanding of world politics – especially their awareness of arguably undemocratic characteristics of the international system – can have on their attitudes and willingness to act on global democracy. To this end, I ask my respondents two types of

questions related to world politics on which there are objectively correct answers.³¹ First, I inquire directly into people's knowledge about global governance, in particular, certain aspects of existing international organizations that are often criticized as undemocratic by global democracy scholars. Second, I explore individual ability by investigating to what extent people understand the logical implications of certain procedural rules in (world) politics. The sequence of these two question blocks is randomized in order to avoid any ordering effects (Gaines et al. 2007). Moreover, I remind people of their commitment to answer the questions without referring to any external sources such as internet searches or bystanders (see Section 3.3.7).

My first knowledge question investigates respondents' awareness of the vote share system in the World Bank Group (see Figure 85, p. 282). Survey participants are shown the following question and answer choices in random order to prevent any effects due to the sequence of options:

Which of the following best describes the vote share system in the World Bank Group?

- A. Each country has the same share of votes.
- B. The vote shares are proportional to countries' population sizes.
- C. The vote shares are based on economic contributions and power.
- D. Five countries have veto powers, while the other countries have just one vote each.

In addition to the correct answer (C), I include three options that seem like plausible answers and/or reflect vote share systems of other international organizations. Answer choice A corresponds to the vote share system in the UN General Assembly, among others. Option B seems like a plausible choice that corresponds to the principle of popular proportional representation which many national parliaments are based on. Finally, option D reflects the vote share system in the UN Security Council. While it is, of course, still possible that

³¹ Due to space constraints imposed by YouGov, I only asked one knowledge question in my UK survey.

respondents select the correct answer by mere luck, the likelihood of this is reduced through the inclusion of plausible and familiar alternative choices. This question is thus highly suitable for the purpose of evaluating people's knowledge of world politics. In particular, it relates to a characteristic of the international system that is often criticized as deeply undemocratic (cf. Fox and Brown 1998), but tends to be more known by people who follow world politics rather closely. I thus expect that it can discriminate well between different levels of relevant knowledge among my respondents.³²

My second knowledge question is intended to evaluate people's awareness of another characteristic of the present international system that is commonly characterized as undemocratic (Lesage, Debaere, Dierckx, and Vermeiren 2013), but tends to be known only among people who follow world politics rather closely: the customary rules of leadership selection at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – see Figure 86 (p. 282). Respondents are presented with the following question and answer choices in alphabetical order (in the respective survey language) to facilitate the response process (Tourangeau, Rips, and Rasinski 2000; Groves, Fowler, Couper, Lepkowski, Singer, and Tourangeau 2011):

Where have the Managing Directors of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) come from thus far? Please select all that apply.

- A. Africa
- B. Asia
- C. Australia
- D. Europe
- E. Israel
- F. Russia
- G. South America
- H. Switzerland
- I. United States of America

The correct answer is option D: It has been a customary rule since the creation of the Bretton Woods institutions that a European citizen is named as the leader of the IMF (Truman 2006).

³² Due to limitations imposed by YouGov, my UK survey did not include this question.

At the time of my survey, this custom had been observed without exception since the creation of the IMF. It would be unreasonable to assume that respondents can correctly recall the nationalities of all past IMF leaders. However, I assume that if respondents know of this customary rule at the IMF, they will be able to correctly select only Europe. I thus accept as right only those answers where option D is selected exclusively. I make it more difficult for unaware respondents to answer this question correctly by including the misleading prompt to “select all that apply”, implying that there could be more than one correct choice. As additional answer options, I include other continents, so that listing Europe does not seem out of place as an answer choice to those respondents who do not know the correct answer. By listing only Europe along with a set of individual countries, I would have risked drawing the attention of uninformed respondents to the correct answer choice. However, including only continents also did not seem like the best option to discriminate between truly knowledgeable and uninformed respondents. In particular, it seemed reasonable to include the United States as an individual answer choice (especially given that the custom in the other principal Bretton Woods institution, the World Bank, is to always name an American as its leader). However, only including the US as an individual country also would have seemed odd and potentially misleading to respondents. Thus, I included as answer choices individual countries that may seem like plausible choices, including Russia and the smaller countries Switzerland and Israel.³³

My third knowledge question asked about people’s awareness of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. In a multiple-choice question, I list 54 UN member states as answer options – including the five correct answers, the other survey countries, some of the most populous countries of the world, plausible choices of relatively small but powerful countries, and a random selection of rather small countries from around the world (see Figure

³³ My UK survey did not contain this question, due to restrictions imposed by YouGov.

87, p. 283, and Figure 88, p. 284). I explicitly state in my question that there are five permanent members of the UN Security Council and hence limit the number of answers respondents can select to a maximum of five in order to prevent potential difficulties in analyzing the answers of respondents who select more than five answer choices. Other scholars (e.g. Dellmuth 2016) have included variations of this question as part of their studies. In order to assess people's level of relevant knowledge about world politics, this question is highly suitable for the purposes of my survey as it relates to one of the most salient examples of arguably undemocratic characteristics of the existing international system (Bourantonis 2004; Bosco 2009; Murithi 2012). Moreover, the question allows for a very intuitive way of establishing different levels of knowledge among my respondents in this respect. That is, I can simply count how many of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council people are able to name correctly. The underlying assumption is thus that the more correct answers people provide, the more they know about this particular aspect of world politics, and that the knowledge of each is indicative of an equivalent increment in the total level of knowledge.³⁴

Based on these three questions on individual knowledge about global governance, I calculate a composite knowledge score in which I simply sum the correct responses. That is, respondents can get up to five points on this scale for naming all the five permanent member states of the UN Security Council correctly, plus one point each for correct responses on the World Bank's vote share system and leadership conventions at the IMF.³⁵

Moving on to one of the determinants of political knowledge – *ability* – I include several comprehension questions. First, I ask my survey participants about the implications of a veto

³⁴ My UK survey featured an adaptation of this survey question limited to 25 countries as answer choices, due to restrictions imposed by YouGov (see Figure 113, p. 295).

³⁵ Since my UK survey only included the question on the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the score there ranged from zero to five.

in the UN Security Council through the following question, with answer choices in random order (see Figure 89, p. 285):

What happens to a resolution in the United Nations Security Council if a permanent member with veto power votes against it?

- A. The resolution does not pass, regardless of how the other members vote.
- B. The resolution passes if a simple majority of the other members votes in favor of it.
- C. The resolution passes if two thirds of the other members vote in favor of it.
- D. The resolution passes if all other members vote in favor of it.

In addition to the correct answer (A), I added several seemingly plausible options which – at closer inspection – clearly contravene the concept of a veto, certainly as strictly as it is observed in the UN Security Council. This comprehension check is intended to finetune my assessment of people's understanding of world politics. I assume that the more individuals understand world politics, the more they are able to recall facts about it and also grasp the logical implications of certain important procedural rules such as the veto in the UN Security Council.³⁶

In order to further explore people's ability to acquire relevant political knowledge, the second comprehension check I employed was a more general question about respondents' comprehension of different commonly used majoritarian voting rules in political institutions (see Figure 90, p. 285). I showed respondents the following question and answer choices (once again, in random order):

Imagine a parliament. Which of the following voting rules generally creates the lowest hurdle for a proposal to pass?

- A. A relative majority (more votes than any other proposal)
- B. An absolute majority (more than half of the votes)
- C. A supermajority (more than two thirds of the votes)
- D. Consensus/unanimity (all of the votes)

³⁶ My UK survey did not feature this question because of limitations imposed by YouGov.

Because of several pre-testers' confusion due to this item's proximity to questions about the UN Security Council, I added the first sentence ("Imagine a parliament.") in order to emphasize that I am inquiring about the logical implications of the listed voting rules in general terms, rather than in relation to any specific context in real-world politics. In addition to the correct answer (A), I included further options that reflect majority rules in different national and international contexts, i.e. the absolute majority rule as in many parliaments around the world, the two-thirds supermajority rule as in the UN General Assembly on "important questions" pursuant to Article 18(2) of the UN Charter (United Nations 1945), and the consensus rule as in the World Trade Organization (Steinberg 2002). Given that option A is the only logically correct choice (in particular, in the context of a generic parliament, rather than any real-world institution), this question is suitable for effectively distinguishing respondents who comprehend the implications of fundamental procedural rules in politics from those who do not.

I then calculate a composite score of political comprehension, simply summing the correct responses to these two questions. That is, respondents get one point each for knowing the implications of a veto and different voting rules in an imaginary parliament. Thus, the minimum comprehension score is zero (for getting both questions wrong), while the maximum score is two (for getting both questions right).

Lastly, my survey included several questions to operationalize the potential knowledge determinants *motivation* and *opportunity*. First, I asked respondents about their level of interest in world politics (see Figure 35, p. 262). This is a straightforward question about people's subjective motivation for knowledge acquisition. Second, I asked respondents about the frequency with which they discuss world politics with people in their social environment (see Figure 36, p. 262). The rationale behind this is that discussing world politics with people that one is close to is an additional expression of interest in the subject, i.e. *motivation*, but also an

indicator of how much *opportunity* an individual has to acquire additional knowledge by talking to fellow citizens, thereby potentially learning from them as well as refining one's own views and arguments. The general engagement with world politics is then calculated as a composite score, summing the scores of these two questions to form a range from zero to eight, thereby weighting stated interest more heavily than frequency of discussions.³⁷

General political activeness is a further indicator of individual motivation to acquire political knowledge – and a potentially significant driver of people's willingness to take action on the issue of global democracy (both in favor and against). That is, whether or not people are ready to take action on the *specific* issue of global democracy may depend on their *general* level of willingness to take such political actions on other issues. Given my focus on three specific kinds of political actions (i.e. signing petitions, posting on social media, and donating money), which are costly to respondents to different extents, I also ask about people's *general* readiness to take those actions in the past in a question matrix, offering “never”, “rarely”, “sometimes”, and “often” as answer choices (see Figure 34, p. 262) – in line with the scales of well-established multinational survey projects (World Values Survey Association 2012).³⁸ The results of people's general willingness to engage in the different political actions that I investigate confirm the assumed ranking (see Figure 136, p. 313). In all surveyed countries, signing petitions is the most frequent of the three behaviors, followed by political social media posts, and donations to political causes. In line with my *ex ante* assumptions, this suggests that people indeed find signing petitions least costly, posting on social media somewhat costlier, and donating money the costliest of the three political actions that I investigate in this study. Thus, using respondents' answers to these questions, I compute an aggregate score on people's

³⁷ My UK survey did not include these questions due to limitations imposed by YouGov.

³⁸ Once again, due to YouGov's restriction on the number of questions, I did not include this question in my UK survey.

general political activeness. The score is calculated as follows. First, indications by respondents that they engage in a certain type of political activity “never”, “rarely”, “sometimes”, or “often” are recoded with the frequency scores of 0, 1, 2, and 3 respectively. Second, the frequency scores for signing petitions, posting on social media, and donating money are weighted with the factors 1, 1.25, and 1.5 respectively. Third, the weighted scores for the three kinds of actions are added to form a composite score of general political activeness, ranging from zero to 11.25.

Another – more generic – group of variables relating to ability, motivation, and opportunity to acquire political knowledge are questions on the socio-economic status of individuals, specifically educational attainment and household income. While education may be considered an indicator of knowledge itself, but also ability, motivation, and opportunity; income may be viewed as an indicator of the opportunity to acquire knowledge, assuming that greater financial means allow for more leisure time and more access to information sources. My question about the educational level of a respondent is adapted from the World Values Survey (2012:19) splitting educational attainments into nine groups, ranging from no formal education to obtaining a doctoral degree (see Figure 99, p. 290). My measurement of respondents’ household income is split into three: firstly, I ask respondents what currency they earn their income in; secondly, I ask about the joint income before taxes of respondents and anyone who they may share an income with (e.g. their partners); and thirdly, I ask about the number of people who depend on this income, e.g. including the respondent herself and her children (see Figure 100, p. 291). In this way, I am able to calculate respondents’ income effectively.³⁹

³⁹ YouGov’s panel data includes information on education and income by default, such that I did not need to ask for it explicitly in my UK survey.

In Chapter Two, I outlined that greater political knowledge may strengthen the attitudes of both supporters and opponents of global democracy, or of either the support or opposition camp more strongly than the other (see Section 2.3.3). Testing for a potential quadratic association between political knowledge and global democracy attitudes did not confirm the assumption that the strengthening applies to both sides of the attitudinal spectrum. That is, it is not generally true that both strong supporters and opponents tend to have higher political knowledge than weaker supporters and opponents. Instead, the bivariate association between political knowledge and global democracy attitudes is usually linear. I thus operationalize my political knowledge variables as linear terms in the multivariate regression models.

As theorized in Chapter Two (see Section 2.3.3), another group of conditioning factors for people's attitudes relate to assessments of the feasibility and likelihood of global democracy. One of the questions in my survey connects the issue of feasibility to that of cultural diversity, enquiring whether respondents deem the world population too diverse for global democracy or not (see Figure 68, p. 278). Moreover, I investigate whether people think that the world is too large for global democracy to work or not (see Figure 69, p. 278). Aiming at people's overall assessments of global democracy's feasibility and likelihood, I ask whether respondents deem global democracy rather possible or impossible (see Figure 70, p. 278; Figure 111, p. 299), and whether they consider it likely or unlikely that global democracy will ever become reality (see Figure 63, p. 277).⁴⁰

As theorized in Chapter Two and outlined above, I assume that increasing belief in the feasibility of global democracy may make *both* supporters and opponents more likely to act on their convictions, or may have a stronger influence on *either* supporters or opponents. Testing

⁴⁰ Due to limitations imposed by YouGov, my UK survey only featured a question on whether respondents consider global democracy rather possible or impossible, but not on the likelihood of global democracy or other questions relating to the feasibility of global democracy.

for a potential quadratic association between feasibility beliefs and willingness-to-act, the former assumption is not verified. That is, bivariate correlation analysis does not indicate that feasibility beliefs are higher among stronger supporters and opponents, or those willing to take more costly action in support of or opposition to global democracy. Rather, these preliminary analyses suggest a solid linear relationship between feasibility beliefs and global democracy attitudes and actions. I thus operationalize my feasibility variables as linear terms.

3.3.6) Control variables

In addition to questions about my dependent variables and explanatory variables, I also asked certain questions the answers to which I include as control variables. They must be included in my regression models, given that such variables may be associated with both the dependent variable and my explanatory variable and thus distort observed coefficients.

One such factor to control for is political orientation on the classic ideological left-right scale. Global democracy has not been a major issue in real-world politics such that there is no major real-world association between left-right ideology and positions on global democracy, although global democracy is ideologically arguably more in line with the internationalist left than the nationalist right (see Section 6.3.2). It is thus possible that there is a relation between left-right ideology and my explanatory and dependent variables, which is why I need to control for it. I operationalize this factor in three ways: First, employing a common approach in survey-based research (e.g. World Values Survey Association 2012:7), I ask respondents to place themselves on a six-point scale between left and right where only the end-points are labeled (see Figure 95, p. 288).⁴¹ Second, I ask respondents to place themselves on a scale between two ideologically opposite positions that represent classically left and right positions in terms of economic ideology. The two polar opposite statements on which I asked respondents to position

⁴¹ This question did not feature in my UK survey, due to limitations imposed by YouGov.

themselves in order to assess their economic left-right position are taken from the World Values Survey (2012:8) and slightly adapted for the purposes of my study (see Figure 32, p. 261).⁴² The third question intended to investigate respondents' position on the classical ideological spectrum relates to their *socio-cultural* left-right orientation. Here, the two opposites are generally considered to be individual freedom to live as one pleases and cultural norms or even laws to determine how people are supposed to live their lives (Feldman 2013). For the purposes of my survey, I developed a single question intended to capture this dimension of people's positioning on the socio-cultural left-right spectrum (see Figure 33, p. 261).⁴³

Another group of control variables in my survey relates to the potential minority status and international life experiences of respondents. I ask respondents, firstly, if they grew up in the survey country or another one, and – if so – which one (see Figure 97, p. 288). Secondly, I ask respondents about their nationality, i.e. if they are citizens of the survey country and/or another one and, if so, which one (see Figure 96, p. 288). Thirdly, I ask respondents if they ever considered themselves an ethnic minority in the society that they lived in – when growing up and/or at present (see Figure 98, p. 289). I then calculate a composite score from zero to two for different types of ethnic minority experience throughout one's lifetime. A score of one indicates that a person was an ethnic minority for some part of her life, while the score of two indicates having been an ethnic minority throughout one's entire life.⁴⁴

Another control variable that I include in my study is (religious) faith (see Figure 94, p. 287). For the purposes of my study, it is arguably wise to include the importance of faith at least as a control variable, since strong religious faith may not only be associated with people's

⁴² Due to space constraints imposed by YouGov, my UK survey did not contain this question.

⁴³ Once again, due to space constraints imposed by YouGov, this question did not feature in my UK survey.

⁴⁴ YouGov's panel data includes such information about respondents' ethnicity by default, so that I did not have to ask for it explicitly in my UK survey.

political ideologies, but also with their attitudes toward my dependent variables. For instance, in the case of the Bahá'í faith, there is a clear religious dogma that supports the idea of a global government (Danesh 2010), while some have identified world federalist tenets in Catholic social doctrine as well (Brauer and Bummel 2016). Moreover, I should note that, as a result of pre-testing, I changed the wording of this question from “religion” to “faith” in order to capture non-religious believers as well.⁴⁵

Three commonly featured control variables are age, gender, and region. Note that respondents must be at least 18 years old to participate in my survey, and are screened out if they indicate that they are, in fact, less than 18 years old – even after confirming on the consent form that they are 18 years or older (see Section 3.3.8). Respondents are asked about their gender and have three options to choose from: female, male, or “other” on which they can elaborate in a free text box (see Figure 27, p. 259). Note that my quotas include only males and females, though (see Section 3.4.1), which means that respondents of a third gender are included in my final sample without reweighting. Lastly, I ask about people’s region of residence listing the main administrative divisions in each country, i.e. states in Brazil, Germany, and the US, as well as prefectures in Japan, in addition to offering respondents the option of clarifying that they actually live in another country (see Figure 29, p. 260), in which case they were excluded from my survey.⁴⁶

3.3.7) Data quality measures and checks

In order to assure the quality of my survey data, I took a variety of measures, which this subsection elaborate on. First, given the quantity of issues that I ask people about, it is important

⁴⁵ Once again, YouGov’s panel data includes such information on respondents’ faith by default, so that I did not need to ask for it explicitly in my UK survey.

⁴⁶ YouGov’s panel data on respondents includes such geographic information by default, so that I did not need to ask for it explicitly in my UK survey.

to preempt respondent fatigue and its potentially negative effects on the quality of my survey data. Hence, in order to facilitate the question-answer process (Tourangeau et al. 2000), I take several steps: I bold the keywords in the slider questions, so that respondents can quickly understand the choice that they are asked to make (e.g. Figure 64, p. 277). Moreover, I sort my questions by type (multiple-choice vs. slider) and whether or not they feature the term “global democracy”. The order of questions is then randomized fully within blocks and between the blocks that feature the term “global democracy” or not. In this way, I try to design and structure questions such as to facilitate the response-giving process, while spreading potential satisficing effects evenly across the various questions inquiring into specific reasons for supporting or opposing global democracy.⁴⁷

Second, there are different reasons why I asked multiple questions on several variables: Firstly, for some important concepts in my theoretical framework, e.g. cosmopolitanism and democratic ideology, the potential explanatory power relating to global democracy attitudes needs to be studied especially carefully. Secondly, two separate questions help to shed light on people’s views regarding different facets of the concepts. Thirdly, asking two separate questions help to identify satisficing behavior among respondents. That is, if I observe that people indicate contrary opinions on two questions on which their answers should theoretically be positively correlated, that would be a possible indication of satisficing.⁴⁸

Third, in accessing my survey, I gave priority to laptop and tablet users, rather than smartphone users. The latter were only allowed to complete my survey at a later stage when some quotas – particularly for younger age groups – still needed to be filled. My rationale for

⁴⁷ Due to limitations imposed by YouGov, my UK survey did not include these randomizations of question sequences. However, note that my UK survey was much shorter overall such that considerations relating to respondent fatigue were not as relevant.

⁴⁸ Because of space constraints imposed by YouGov, my UK survey only included the question whether people rather consider themselves citizens of the world or citizens of their country.

prioritizing laptop and tablet users was threefold. First, while I programmed my survey to be device-adaptive and designed it to be compatible with different screen sizes, including smartphones, computer/laptop and tablet users saw the survey in exactly the format that I intended, e.g. including the horizontal display of answer choice scales for multiple-choice questions. This is possible on smartphones as well, e.g. when respondents flip their phone such that the screen orientation switches to wide-screen. However, I cannot control whether or not respondents do that and hence preferred computer/laptop/tablet users who would always see my survey in the desired format. Second, I preferred computer/laptop/tablet users because they are more likely to be completing the survey from home and thus with less potential distractions than smartphone users who could be anywhere where they have an internet connection. Third, I preferred users of computers, laptops, and tablets because such devices are generally easier to type on – due to the availability of a physical keyboard and/or larger screen sizes – and hence make elaborations on responses in open comment boxes more likely.⁴⁹

Fourth, self-commitment questions constitute another element of data quality assurance in my survey. Survey methodology research shows that self-commitments are a highly effective – perhaps even the *most* effective way – of increasing respondent compliance in survey-based or interview-based research (Oksenberg, Vinokur, and Cannell 1979; Vannette 2018). I used two such questions. First, immediately after putting it in the consent form (see Section 3.3.8), I reemphasized to respondents on a separate page my principle that all questions are optional (see Figure 26, p. 258). However, as in the consent form, I also reiterate the importance of collecting survey data that is as comprehensive as possible, asking respondents to only skip questions if they deem them too sensitive or if they do not have an answer even after careful

⁴⁹ YouGov did not offer the option of preferring users with particular device types in my UK survey.

deliberation. As indicated above (see Section 3.3.2), I opted for this method instead of including “don’t know” or “prefer not to say” options which survey methodologists have shown to induce satisficing behavior among respondents (Krosnick et al. 2002). Respondents could choose to confirm that they were willing to observe these principles or reject to self-commit to them. If they did the latter, they were automatically screened out of my survey as they were evidently unwilling to abide by my rules for ensuring data quality.⁵⁰

My second self-commitment question related to the use of external sources such as internet searches or bystanders. I asked respondents to confirm that they will refrain from using or referring to any such external sources whilst completing my survey (see Figure 38, p. 263). This exclusion of external sources serves several purposes. First, I want to ensure that respondents concentrate on the particular constitutionalist conception of global democracy that I present them with. If they were to start searching the internet about global democracy, they might encounter other conceptions, which in turn may affect their responses to my survey questions. Second, I wanted to obtain responses directly from the people who are taking my survey, rather than their responses after talking about these issues with family or friends who might be present or nearby while they are completing my survey. Hence, I asked respondents to refrain from referring to such bystanders. Third, as my survey includes some knowledge questions on which there is an objectively correct answer, such information could be obtained by searching the internet or talking to other people. Asking respondents to self-commit to refraining from such behavior promises to reduce data pollution. Once again, if respondents

⁵⁰ Due to space constraints imposed by YouGov, my UK survey did not include this design element. Instead the survey stated the following to all respondents below the introductory prompt on global democracy (see footnote 21, p. 88; Figure 105, p. 290):

Questions in this section are generally optional. However, the research quality depends on your responses being as comprehensive as possible. Thus, we kindly ask you to only skip those questions that you consider too sensitive or about which you are unsure even after careful consideration.

agreed not to use any external sources, they were permitted to continue completing my survey; but if they rejected to self-commit, they were automatically screened out and prevented from completing the rest of my survey in order to ensure data quality. In addition to the self-commitment question on external sources, I also remind respondents of this principle at several points throughout the survey (e.g. before they start completing the knowledge and comprehension questions).

Fifth, another measure in my survey to increase data quality were assurances about the pseudonymization of data before questions that could be deemed sensitive (see Figure 93, p. 287). That is, in addition to the consent form, where this principle is outlined in greater detail (see Section 3.3.8), I remind survey participants that their responses are never linked to their real names during the research process. I include these reminders at two points: first, before the questions about party preferences; and second, before the battery of questions on sensitive demographics such as home country, nationality, income, faith, and ethnicity. Survey methodology scholars have shown such assurances of anonymity and confidentiality to be effective (Singer, Von Thurn, and Miller 1995).⁵¹

Sixth, a further measure to ensure a high level of data quality are completion time-based validations on individual pages of my survey. That is, I used metadata functionality on Qualtrics to ensure that respondents stayed on a page for a minimal amount of time that was proven to be necessary (based on pre-testing) for the questions and answer choices to be read. Respondents who attempted to move on to the next survey page before this minimal amount of time had passed were shown error messages that asked them to allow themselves sufficient time to read the texts and/or answer my questions. I included such speeding checks for different

⁵¹ Due to restrictions imposed by YouGov, my UK survey did not include such an assurance of pseudonymization before the question on voting intentions.

purposes, e.g. to ask respondents to take enough time to answer questions (see Figure 39, p. 264), and to allow themselves sufficient time to read my introductory prompt about global democracy (see Figure 40, p. 264). The timer validations were calibrated assuming a fast completion speed, so that respondents were not unnecessarily shown these messages when they were in fact just completing my survey properly but very quickly. However, the timers still kept respondents on such pages for long enough, so that they could not easily click themselves through my survey without responding.⁵²

Seventh, as another data quality assurance method in my survey, I employ a common method for gauging respondent attention: an instructional manipulation check (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, and Davidenko 2009; Hauser and Schwarz 2015). The check I employ is disguised as a question about informational sources, but actually asks respondents to insert the number “8” in the “Other” box, instead of indicating their preferred news source (see Figure 37, p. 263).⁵³ This question is generally effective at identifying those respondents who fully read questions, even if they believe that they already know the answer. However, pre-testing also showed that some respondents who fully read the instructions still fail to complete it as requested. While in a short pilot phase for the survey in Germany, respondents who did not complete the attention check were screened out automatically, I then decided – together with the Dynata team – not to screen out respondents on this basis anymore. Hence, all my analyses can be run accounting for respondents’ performance on this measure. I use it as a control variable in my regressions and for robustness checks.

Finally, in order to ensure high data quality, it was useful to include a question on whether or not respondents had previously taken a survey on global democracy. While global

⁵² Due to restrictions by YouGov, my UK survey did not include such time-based validations.

⁵³ I thank Brian Schaffner for inspiring this attention check.

democracy survey research is rare so far, it is nonetheless possible that respondents on the panel that I use had previously participated in polls on a similar topic as my survey. To a certain degree, such prior polls might constitute pollution of my data. For example, prior polls could have triggered or contributed to respondents' previous thinking about global democracy and thereby inflated my estimates of the prevalence of global democracy considerations in the general population. Worse still, if prior thinking were in turn related to other measures such as the strength of global democracy attitudes and/or the willingness to take action on global democracy, then previous polls could be a source of pollution for several of my key dependent variables. For all these reasons, it is important to be able to identify cases of potential pollution through prior surveys. In fact, in the case of the US, one prior poll that could have polluted my data in this study was a survey on UN reforms that I ran with two scholars a few months earlier in collaboration with Dynata as well (Ghassim et al. 2020). However, I evaded this potential source of pollution by asking Dynata not to invite potential respondents who had participated in the previous project. Moreover, by obtaining unique respondent ID numbers from Dynata, I can match the two datasets and identify respondents who potentially still ended up participating in both studies.

3.3.8) Adherence to legal and ethical requirements

At the beginning of the survey, my consent form was shown to every respondent (see Figure 23, p. 256, and Figure 24, p. 257). This form is based on the best-practice template provided by the Central University Research Ethics Committee (2016b) at the University of Oxford. In line with legal requirements, the form contains information on how respondents can withdraw their consent, on the pseudonymization of response data, on the confidentiality of data, on the purposes for which the survey data is used, on the storage of data, on procedures in cases of complaints, as well as on the principle that questions are optional, but that faithful completion of the survey is expected. At the end of the form, respondents must confirm that

they are at least 18 years old and that they agree to participate in the survey under the stated conditions (see Figure 25, p. 258).⁵⁴

3.4) Conducting and analyzing the surveys

In this section, I first elaborate on the process of fielding my survey experiments in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US. I then discuss the methodology and criteria I use for reweighting my data to make it more representative of the general populations in these countries. Lastly, I explain the methods and tools that I employ for analyzing my survey results.

3.4.1) Fielding the surveys

I commissioned the survey firm Dynata (a merger between Survey Sampling International and Research Now) to field my survey in Brazil, Germany, Japan, and the United States in August 2019. Dynata is an established polling firm which many scholars collaborate with for their survey-based research (e.g. Malhotra and Margalit 2010; Berinsky, Margolis, and Sances 2016; Brutger and Kertzer 2018). One principal advantage of cooperating with Dynata – rather than fielding surveys on online labor markets like Amazon Mechanical Turk – is the speed of delivery with the help of a dedicated team, instead of pure reliance on the processes of a database to which participants in online labor markets have access. Dynata has a proprietary pool of potential survey participants from across the general populations in countries around the world (Dynata 2019). The company makes additional outreach efforts to include hard-to-reach groups in their panels. In contrast to online labor markets, Dynata can thus send targeted requests for participation in my survey to respondents with specific characteristics, including population groups that are usually underrepresented in typical online

⁵⁴ In the case of my UK survey, I relied on YouGov for fulfilling these legal and ethical requirements.

labor market panels (Paolacci and Chandler 2014; Huff and Tingley 2015; Peer, Brandimarte, Samat, and Acquisti 2017).

I asked Dynata to provide samples of respondents who reflected population averages in terms of gender, age, and region – in the form of interlocked quotas. These quotas were calculated by Dynata using their census tool which draws on the most current available figures of population numbers for different demographic characteristics such as the ones that I targeted (Slejuc 2019). Of course, including even more variables such as educational attainment or income in the interlocked quotas would have been helpful to improve the representativeness of survey results, but unfortunately Dynata's pool of participants only allows for interlocking the three aforementioned variables at maximum. The quotas that Dynata provided for each survey country are reproduced in Table 1 (p. 328) for Brazil, Table 2 (p. 329) for Germany, Table 3 (p. 330) for Japan, and Table 4 (p. 332) for the US.⁵⁵ After provision of the quotas by Dynata, I implemented them on Qualtrics in order to track their fulfillment as my surveys proceeded, and to automatically screen out respondents after my quotas were filled. As agreed with Dynata, respondents were generally allowed to complete the survey, even if they failed my attention check; however, only those respondents who passed the attention check incremented the quotas, thus requiring reweighting after collecting the survey data (see Section 3.4.2).

My surveys in Brazil, Germany, Japan, and the US were fielded between 21 August and 2 September 2019. I used a standard formula for sample size calculations to determine the minimal sample sizes for my four survey countries (Cochran 2007). Based on population sizes of tens or even hundreds of millions per country, a desired 95 percent confidence interval around point estimates, and an acceptance of five percentage points as the margin of error, the minimal sample size per country is 385. Given my four experimental conditions and desired

⁵⁵ For the UK, weights were provided by YouGov, as described below (see Section 3.4.2).

minimal sample sizes per treatment group, I raised the sample sizes per country to a minimum of 519 respondents who completed the survey and passed the attention check. Due to the high number of respondents who failed the instructional manipulation check and hence did not count as complete responses, my final sample sizes are around double the minimum which I had set. The full sample sizes of respondents who completed my survey and consented to the use of their data are 1,224 in Brazil, 961 in Germany, 1,124 in Japan, and 1,198 in the US. The sample sizes of respondents who passed the instructional manipulation check and completed my survey are 523 in Brazil, 519 in Japan, and 520 in both Germany and the US. The raw distributions of respondents in each country by gender, age, region, and party preference are presented in Figure 116 (p. 302) through Figure 135 (p. 313).

My UK survey was conducted by YouGov between 8 and 15 July 2020. YouGov is one of the most renowned online panel-based survey company worldwide. The quality of its data on voting intentions is often considered on par with established survey companies, e.g. as illustrated in Germany, where it features among the prime sources of regular voting intention polls (Zicht and Cantow 2019), and in the 2019 UK general election where YouGov successfully predicted a landslide victory for the Conservative Party (Stokel-Walker 2019). At the time of writing, YouGov reported to have recruited over one million potential survey respondents on their UK online panel, drawing on a wide range of sources (YouGov 2020a). For nationally representative surveys, YouGov invites a sub-sample of this large panel which is representative of British adults in terms of age, gender, social class, and education. In the case of my UK survey, these qualitative advantages in terms of the respondent sample compared to my surveys with Dynata came with certain costs. For one, I could not program the UK survey myself using Qualtrics, but had to rely on YouGov's employees to script the survey based on the questionnaire and design that I provided. Moreover, as noted throughout this text, YouGov imposed limits on the number and type of questions that I could ask. Conducting the

survey with YouGov thus allowed me to gather nationally representative results for the UK, but at the cost of some limitations imposed by the survey company. The final sample size of my UK survey amounted to 1,714 respondents.

3.4.2) Weighting

I use entropy balancing (Hainmueller 2012; Hainmueller and Xu 2013) to reweight the survey data in order to reflect representative population proportions along several key parameters. The aforementioned quotas provided by Dynata (see Table 1 through Table 4, pp. 328-332) form the basis for weighting my sample in order to reflect national averages in terms of gender and age by region. In addition, I reweight my survey data such as to be reflective of national voting preference distributions at the time of the survey. Table 5 (p. 333), Table 6 (p. 334), and Table 7 (p. 334) present my voting weights for Germany, Japan, and the US respectively.

Unfortunately, in Brazil no such reweighting is possible as there are no regular nationwide polls inquiring into people's voting preferences for political parties. I thus decided to work with the reweighted data based on gender and age by region as my best estimate of how the Brazilian population as a whole is currently distributed in terms of voting preferences for the various political parties (see Figure 119, p. 304).

In Germany, I rely on data from weekly polls that are conducted by various public opinion research institutes (Zicht and Cantow 2019). These generally ask respondents what party they would vote for if there was a general election next Sunday (since general elections in Germany always take place on Sundays). For each of the six leading parties in Germany and a residual category of other parties, I calculate the averages of estimates by two leading public opinion research agencies in the week that my survey took place – Emnid from 22-28 August 2019 and Forsa from 26-30 August 2019 – which results in the voting preference distributions that are reproduced in Figure 123 (p. 306).

For my Japanese survey data, I also use nationally representative public opinion data on voting preferences from timeframes that are as close as possible to the dates on which my survey was fielded. In particular, I average polling data from Kyodo News (2019) and ANN / TV Asahi (2019) from 17-18 August 2019 in order to calculate my estimates of voting preference distributions at the national level at the time of my survey. However, in Japan, this reweighting step requires some more adjustments than in the case of Germany. In particular, given the relatively high number of around 29 percent of non-substantive responses (e.g. “other”, “no party”, and/or “undecided”) in opinion polls, which was much higher than in my raw survey data, or votes for the subject-specific Party to Protect the People from NHK (N-Koku), I keep the proportion of “other party” preferences at the level of my raw data, i.e. 11 percent, and redistribute the difference of 18 percent proportionally to vote shares across the eight parties that I include in my sample. The resulting estimated voting preference distribution and weights for Japan are reproduced in Figure 127 (p. 309).

For the US, I also rely on public opinion data for the timeframe most closely corresponding to my survey fielding dates. In particular, I use nationally representative survey data comparing voting preferences for – what were, at the time of my survey – the frontrunner of the Democratic Party for the Presidency, Joe Biden, to the sitting American President of the Republican Party, Donald Trump, with a view to the 2020 Presidential election. I draw on Emerson College polling data from 24-26 August 2019 and IBD/TIPP survey data from 22-30 August 2019, averaging the figures for the two candidates, and allocating the small remaining difference to the residual category (Emerson Polling 2019; Graham 2019). The resulting estimates of voting preferences in the US are presented in Figure 135 (p. 313).

After entropy-balancing my samples for each country based on the aforementioned distributions of gender, age, region, and voting preferences, as well as reweighting each country sample up or down to 1,000, I obtain weights that require no further trimming or other

adjustment as they remain well within the commonly accepted limits for the maximum reweighting factor of any individual observation (Biemer and Christ 2012). The mean, standard deviations, and range of my final weights based on gender, age, region, and voting preferences are summarized for Brazil in Table 8 (p. 334), for Germany in Table 9 (p. 334), for Japan in Table 10 (p. 334), and for the US in Table 12 (p. 335). Nevertheless, I should reiterate that even my weighted samples in Brazil, Germany, Japan, and the US are not strictly speaking nationally representative. They were not produced by probability-based random sampling using traditional methods, which would have proven prohibitively costly and infeasible given my budget constraints, but which should also not be considered a panacea in this day and age of steadily declining survey participation rates (see Section 3.1). My samples in these countries may nonetheless be characterized as nationwide and diverse, comparable in quality to various other scientific studies that have relied on Dynata and similar online samples in their survey-based research (e.g. Kam 2012; Margolis and Sances 2017; Banks and Hicks 2019; Womick, Rothmund, Azevedo, King, and Jost 2019).

For my UK survey, YouGov calculated and provided the weights which were calculated as follows: first, by age which is interlocked with gender and education, based on targets derived from the Labour Force Survey and mid-year estimates of the Office for National Statistics (ONS); second, by political attention, based on the face-to-face element of the British Election Study; third, by social grade, based on National Readership Survey data and the 2011 UK census; fourth, by voting decision in the 2019 general election, interlocked with region, based on official election results and ONS population estimates; and fifth, by voting decision in the 2016 Brexit referendum, based on the official nationwide referendum result. General election voting intention figures are additionally weighted by estimated likelihood to vote (YouGov 2020b). The mean, standard deviation, and range of my UK survey weights are summarized in Table 11 (p. 334).

3.4.3) Analysis of results

In terms of software, I use Microsoft Excel and Stata to clean the data and prepare it for analyses. I use Stata to conduct the statistical analyses of my survey results. I run my analyses on pooled samples of countries, including country fixed-effects, as well as country-by-country. This enables me to make country-specific observations, but also to identify phenomena that are valid across the countries in my sample and thus potentially generalizable to other countries around the world. For my descriptive analyses, I primarily use simple (cross-)tabulations. In this way, I determine, for example, the percentages of people in the various countries who state different magnitudes of support or opposition for the global democracy proposal (see Section 3.3.4). In my analyses of explanatory factors (see Section 3.3.5), I employ the standard method of multivariate regression modeling, primarily relying on ordinary least squares (OLS), but using ordered logistic regression for robustness checks (Cohen, West, and Aiken 2014). For instance, in order to identify factors that are statistically significantly associated with people's global democracy attitudes, I construct regression models in which I include variables that might theoretically affect such attitudes (see Section 3.3.5), as well as various control variables (see Section 3.3.5.3). The next chapter reports the results of my descriptive and observational analyses.

4) Results: Individual attitudes on global democracy

My surveys in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US) show that, while most people have never thought about global democracy, clear majorities of citizens in all surveyed countries endorse global democratic proposals including a world parliament and/or a global government, once they are considered. While many people indicate a rather weak endorsement of such proposals, significant numbers of people are strongly in favor of global democracy, deeming it important to enable people worldwide to participate in global politics and indeed necessary to address global issues like international peace and climate change. My analyses further indicate that the stronger people's attitudes, the more willing they are to take political action – especially in support of global democracy.


This chapter discusses the central descriptive and observational analyses of my survey results and is structured as follows: First, I present my results on the extent and drivers of people's prior thinking about global democracy. Second, I elaborate on the key results regarding people's attitudes toward global democracy, especially the extent to which the different proposals are supported and what the principal reasons behind people's attitudes are. Third, I outline my analyses of the extent and drivers of people's willingness to take different degrees of political action toward global democracy. Fifth, I discuss the data quality and robustness of my descriptive and observational results. Finally, I conclude by summarizing and discussing the results.

4.1) Prior thinking about global democracy

As expected, majorities in all five surveyed countries had never thought about the issue of global democracy before (see Figure 2 and Figure 3, p. 137), although the results turn out quite differently across countries. Across the four countries of my Dynata survey in 2019 – i.e. Brazil, Germany, Japan, and the US – an average of 67 percent had never thought about global democracy before my survey. At the high end of the range, 81 percent in Japan state that they


had never considered global democracy before, whereas 70 percent in Germany and 67 percent in the US had never entertained such thoughts. At the low end of the spectrum, only 51 percent of Brazilians say that they had never contemplated the issue of global democracy. Since this question was asked on a scale rather than as a multiple-choice question in my UK survey (see Figure 112, p. 300), the results are not entirely comparable to the other countries. In the UK, the two far-left options on my unlabeled response scale – next to having “never” considered global democracy before taking the survey – were selected by 32 and 19 percent, i.e. in total 51 percent, of respondents respectively (see Figure 3 below).

Figure 2: Prior thinking about global democracy



Note: The pooled results here exclude the UK, as restrictions imposed by YouGov led me to offer different answer choices there (see Figure 3 below).

Figure 3: UK – Prior thinking about global democracy



Among those who indicate that they have previously considered the issue of global democracy, surprisingly high numbers state that they have thought about it at least “more than

a little” in all surveyed countries (see Figure 2, p. 137). Across Brazil, Germany, Japan, and the US, an average of 24 percent said they had thought about the issue either “more than a little” or “quite a lot” before. At the lower end of the range, about 17 percent of people in Japan indicate that they have thought about global democracy at least “more than a little”. In Germany and the US this figure increases to around 20 percent, while in Brazil surprisingly high numbers state that they have thought much about global democracy, i.e. 28 percent “more than a little” and around 10 percent “quite a lot”. In my UK survey – with its different design – the three right-leaning options on my unlabeled response scale (next to the statement of having thought about global democracy “a lot” before the survey) were selected by 17, nine, and seven percent of respondents respectively (see Figure 3, p. 137). Let us now explore the principal explanatory factors for people’s prior thinking on global democracy, focusing on those variables that are statistically significant at conventional levels in the pooled regression, and moving from more to less substantive and consistent results.

The main drivers of prior thinking about global democracy appear to be the influence of family, friends, and peers, as well as advocacy groups, besides the levels of interest and knowledge about world politics (see Table 13, p. 335). The coefficient of global democracy-related influence by family, friends, and peers is positive, highly statistically significant ($p < 0.01$), and of substantive magnitude in the pooled regression and in all surveyed countries. Global democracy-related influence by advocacy groups is a similarly important factor for the extent of people’s prior thinking about global democracy – positively associated, highly statistically significant ($p < 0.01$), but generally of lesser substantive magnitude. The exceptions here are Japan, where the substantive magnitude is larger, and Germany, where the coefficient is marginally insignificant at conventional levels ($p < 0.13$). This latter finding is somewhat ironic, given that some of the leading global democracy advocacy groups are based in Germany (e.g. Campaign for a UN Parliamentary Assembly 2017), which casts doubt on whether most

respondents were thinking specifically of global democracy advocacy groups when answering this question. Another primary driver of prior thinking about global democracy is subjective interest in world politics, which has a positive and highly statistically significant coefficient ($p < 0.01$) in the pooled regression, in Germany, and in the US, and a significant association ($p < 0.05$) in Brazil and Japan. The last factor which has a strong positive association ($p < 0.01$) with prior global democracy thinking in the pooled regression (and in Brazil) is global governance knowledge. This association is significant ($p < 0.05$) in the US, weakly significant ($p < 0.1$) in Japan, and statistically insignificant in Germany.

Political comprehension and political activeness seem to be secondary drivers of people's prior thinking about global democracy, with statistically significant positive associations ($p < 0.05$) in the pooled regression, as well as Brazil, Japan, and the US (split between the two factors). An interesting contrast to my finding on global governance-specific knowledge is that the pooled regression coefficient on educational level is weakly statistically significant but *negative*, indicating that it is not general education, but specific knowledge, which drives thinking about global democracy – and that general education may indeed inhibit thinking about global democracy (perhaps because of a nation-state-centric bias in educational systems).

With respect to control variables, we should note that males consistently claim to have thought more about global democracy before than females, albeit the pooled regression coefficient is only weakly statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). Moreover, the statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) coefficient on my attention check control variable probably indicates reverse causality, i.e. that those who have thought more about global democracy before were more likely to be attentive (probably because of a greater level of interest in the survey). Furthermore, migration experience such as coming from another country than the survey country and having a dual or other nationality are not statistically significant in the pooled

regression, but only in individual countries, i.e. Brazil and Japan, and in different directions. Meanwhile the coefficient on life experience as an ethnic minority is statistically insignificant in all regressions. We may thus conclude that there is no solid association between personal migration background and prior thinking about global democracy.

Last but not least, we should discuss the extent to which prior thinking about global democracy may be driven by pollution through prior polls. The relevant coefficient is statistically insignificant in the pooled sample, which is reassuring. It is only statistically significant in Brazil ($p < 0.05$) and weakly so in the US ($p < 0.1$), indicating some positive association between previous participation in a poll on global democracy and having thought about the issue before taking my survey. Reverse causality might have played a role here too, since especially interested people might have explicitly sought out such polls. However, in Germany and Japan, the coefficient's sign is in the opposite direction and statistically insignificant. Given the scarcity of surveys on global democracy, it seems doubtful that large numbers of people anywhere had previously participated in polls on global democracy. In my US survey, only eight respondents who completed my survey had previously participated in a conjoint experiment on UN reforms several months before (Ghassim et al. 2020). In any case, even if there was significant pollution, it would have biased my results *against* my hypothesis by triggering *more* prior thought about global democracy among people. It thus seems that majorities of people in the four surveyed countries have never considered global democracy before, while surprisingly high numbers (especially in Brazil) indicate that they have put significant prior thought into the issue.

Finally, let us note that my statistical models on the explanatory factors behind people's prior thinking about global democracy – both the pooled regression and each of the country models – have an R-squared of around 0.4 implying a relatively high goodness-of-fit (see Table

13, p. 335). This indicates that about 40 percent of individual variation in the extent of prior thinking about global democracy can be explained by the variables in this model.

4.2) Consistency of global democracy attitudes

Particularly since most people have evidently never considered the idea of global democracy before, but also due to the hypothetical nature of the concept, it is crucial to establish the consistency of individual global democracy attitudes. That is, when people state an opinion on global democracy, do they really mean it? In Chapter Two, I theorized attitudinal consistency as the *depth* of people's attitudes, in contrast to attitudinal *stability over time* which is what Converse (1970) attempted to study. I argued that individual attitudes toward global democracy should be viewed as consistent if they are backed by arguments for or against global democracy as experts, e.g. political theorists, commonly make them. As outlined in Chapter Three, my survey featured various questions drawing on arguments for and against global democracy from the Political Theory literature, as well as likely correlates such as democratic and cosmopolitan convictions. The present section examines to what extent these arguments and expected correlates are in fact associated with individual global democracy attitudes. Based on these analyses, I find that most people's global democracy attitudes indeed appear to be consistent.

First, I use my pooled sample of Brazil, Germany, Japan, and the US to examine the bivariate correlations between the principal dependent variable – i.e. people's attitudes toward the composite concept of a global democracy including a parliament and government – on the one hand, and 29 potential explanatory variables on the other hand.⁵⁶ My results are

⁵⁶ Due to restrictions imposed by YouGov, my UK questionnaire could not include as many questions and is thus not suited for my analyses in this subsection.

summarized in Table 14 (p. 337). The tested explanatory variables derive from the proximate motives in my theoretical framework, i.e. interests and values.

In line with the notion of attitudinal consistency, I find a statistically significant (i.e. at least $p < 0.1$) bivariate correlation in the expected direction between global democracy support (or opposition) on the one hand, and the following 24 factors on the other hand: (1) believing that global democracy would strengthen (or weaken) domestic democracy, (2) expecting that one's home country would become wealthier (or poorer) as a result of global democratization, (3) thinking that one's country would become more (or less) powerful, (4) believing that one's compatriots would become better (or worse) represented in world politics, (5) considering global public participation in world politics important (or unimportant), (6) viewing global democracy as necessary (or unnecessary) to address the world's problems, (7) deeming global democracy potentially effective (or ineffective) at fighting climate change, (8) seeing global democracy as a potentially effective (or ineffective) means to ensure international peace, (9) considering global democracy potentially effective (or ineffective) for overcoming world poverty, (10) believing that one's views on global issues like climate change are similar to (or different from) those of people worldwide, (11) thinking that in a global democracy there would be more (or less) cultural diversity, (12) preferring one's country to take (or avoid taking) responsibility for addressing global issues like climate change, (13) supporting (or opposing) global actions such as peacekeeping in principle, (14) considering the world too diverse (or not) for global democracy, (15) thinking of the world as too large (or not) for global democracy, (16) expecting that global democracy would be too distant from (or close enough to) citizens, (17) considering the risk of global tyranny likely (or unlikely), (18) expecting that global democracy would be dominated by either the world's poor or rich (or neither), (19) expecting more (or less) conflict as a result of global democracy, (20) viewing oneself more as a national (or a global) citizen, (21) caring more about the well-being of one's compatriots (or that of

foreigners, or both equally), (22) considering global inequality justified (or unjustified), (23) supporting (or opposing) international organizations in principle, and (24) deeming the principles of national sovereignty and independence important (or unimportant).

There is only one case in which the bivariate correlation between individual global democracy attitudes and a potential explanatory variable arguably contradicts theoretical expectations: People who consider existing international organizations (IOs) rather capable of addressing the world's problems are more likely to support global democracy. We might have instead expected belief in the *incapability* of current IOs to drive public support for global democracy. One possible explanation for this potential contradiction is that belief in the effectiveness of IOs reflects *general* support for supranational governance on transnational issues, rather than an endorsement of the *specific* status quo of global governance. Indeed, this interpretation is confirmed by a strong bivariate correlation between principled support for IOs and belief in their capability to address transnational issues. Given that, it would indeed be consistent of those who *generally* believe in supranational institutions to also support stronger global governance.

Lastly, in four cases of explanatory variables – relating to perceptions of a global democratic deficit and democratic ideology more broadly – the associations with global democracy attitudes are statistically insignificant. That is, there is no positive association between global democracy support on the one hand, and the following views on the other: considering present-day world politics undemocratic, deeming the current global order unrepresentative of people's will, viewing democracy as the best form of government, and considering free and fair elections a good way of selecting a government.

In addition to investigating the international public's aggregate – or what may be called *inter-personal* – consistency in terms of backing their global democracy attitudes with corresponding arguments for and against global democracy, I also investigate the extent to

which individuals *by themselves* are consistent in their attitudes, a concept which we may call *intra-personal* consistency for short. As theorized in Chapter Two, this is in line with Converse's (1964) concept of attitudinal constraints. For each of the 29 explanatory variables above, I categorize a respondent's position as intra-personally consistent if it is in line with her overall attitude toward global democracy. I then add up the number of intra-personally consistent views on explanatory variables and divide them by the total number of explanatory variables, i.e. 29, for each individual. The resulting percentage indicates the extent to which an individual holds intra-personally consistent views concerning her overall position on global democracy. The distribution of intra-personal consistency values in my pooled international sample is illustrated in Figure 4 below.

Figure 4: Distribution of intra-personal consistency





Figure 5: Cumulative distribution of intra-personal consistency



The cumulative distribution of intra-personal attitudinal consistency shows that around three-quarters of people hold views of which more than 50 percent are in line with their overall attitudes toward global democracy (see Figure 5 above). Moreover, the mean of intra-personal consistency values indicates that on average people hold views on global democracy which are 60 percent aligned with their overall attitudes toward global democracy – a result that is highly statistically significantly different ($p < 0.01$) from the 50 percent threshold, which would indicate that respondents on average hold views that are not systematically related to their global democracy attitudes (see Table 15, p. 338).

As noted in Chapter Two, we should not interpret attitudinal consistency as implying that an individual must endorse *all* arguments in support of or opposition to global democracy. A person can have highly consistent views on global democracy without endorsing all arguments put forth in favor or against. Hence, the average figure of 60 percent alignment

above should not be interpreted as meaning that on average individuals are only 60 percent consistent in their global democracy attitudes. Similarly, the approximately 25 percent of respondents under the 50 percent alignment mark above are not necessarily inconsistent in their views toward global democracy. Their overall attitude toward global democracy may simply be driven by a smaller number of motives to which they attribute greater weight. For example, an individual may strongly support global democracy given its potential effectiveness on climate change, but not necessarily believe that global democracy would be an effective means of addressing world poverty or international peace. Conversely, a person may reject global democracy due to the prospect of devolving into global tyranny, while acknowledging its potential effectiveness in addressing world poverty and climate change. The measures above only demonstrate that most people's consistency in global democracy attitudes can be quantified in terms of a statistically significant difference to the threshold of 0.5 which would indicate a random selection of arguments in favor of and against global democracy.

Overall, my analyses on attitudinal consistency with regard to global democracy show two things: First, the vast majority of explanatory variables is correlated with the main dependent variable in the expected way. That is, in 24 out of 29 cases, the hypothesized arguments for and against global democracy were indeed overwhelmingly confirmed as correlates of global democracy views by international public opinion. In four cases, the associations are not statistically significant; and only in one case is the correlation in the reverse direction that we might have expected, albeit with a good alternative explanation. These findings demonstrate what I have called *inter-personal* attitudinal consistency. Second, the vast majority of people – around 75 percent – hold views which are more than 50 percent aligned with their overall position on global democracy. On average, people's views on individual arguments for and against global democracy are 60 percent in line with their overall attitude toward global democracy – a figure that clearly diverges from the 50 percent benchmark which


would indicate that there is no systematic relation between individual global democracy attitudes and expected correlates. These findings demonstrate what I have called *intra-personal* consistency. I conclude that most people's attitudes toward global democracy are largely consistent.

4.3) Attitudes toward global democracy

As expected, clear majorities in all four surveyed countries endorse the presented proposals for executive and/or legislative global democratic institutions, although – again – the result patterns clearly differ in the five countries. The descriptive results presented in this section are based on the control groups of each country, so as to prevent distortions due to potential experimental effects (see Section 7.1). For this reason, subsequent multivariate regressions control for experimental condition.

The proposal of a global democracy, including a world parliament and a global government, is supported by an average of 65 percent internationally – ranging from 57 and 61 percent in the UK and US at the lower end to 65, 68, and 73 percent in Germany, Brazil, and Japan at the higher end (see Figure 6, p. 148). Among global democracy supporters, a relative majority – i.e. plurality – of 30 percent across countries, and pluralities in each survey country state that they “rather” support global democracy, thus selecting the weakest of the three provided options for support. However, in Brazil and the US, people who indicate that they “support” or “strongly support” global democracy outnumber weak supporters. The percentage of very strong supporters is at 10 percent internationally, ranging from four and eight percent in Japan and the UK respectively, to 17 percent in Brazil, with Germany and the US in the middle at 10 and 11 percent respectively. The proportion of strong opponents is about as large as that of strong supporters: nine percent in the pooled sample, ranging from one percent in Japan, to ten percent in Germany and Brazil, to twelve percent in the US and 14 percent in the UK.

Figure 6: Attitudes toward global democracy incl. a world parliament and government




Note: This sample is limited to the control group in each survey country.

Attitudes toward the proposal of a global parliament are similarly distributed (see Figure 7, p. 149). An international average of 67 percent across all five survey countries support the idea, while 33 percent oppose it, making the proposal of a global parliament marginally the most popular of the three proposals that I presented respondents with. Clear majorities in all five countries support the establishment of a world parliament: 55 percent in the UK, 65 percent in the US, 69 percent in Germany, 70 percent in Brazil, and 74 percent in Japan. A plurality of 37 percent across survey countries only indicate slight support for a world parliament, and in all survey countries a (relative) majority weakly supports a world parliament. In Brazil and Germany, the percentages of those who “support” or “strongly support” are higher than the proportions of weak supporters. Strongest possible support is at nine percent internationally. At the upper end of the support spectrum, indications of the strongest possible endorsement range from three percent in Japan, to six percent in the UK, eight percent in Germany, nine percent in the US, and 16 percent in Brazil. At the other end of the attitude spectrum, fiercest opposition is again about as widespread as strong support: eight percent in the pooled sample

– with a range from 13 percent in the UK, to ten percent in Brazil and the US, to eight percent in Germany and one percent in Japan.

Figure 7: Attitudes toward a global parliament




Note: This sample is limited to the control group in each survey country.

Finally, attitudes on the proposal of a global government are similarly distributed as well (see Figure 8, p. 150). An international average of 64 percent across all five survey countries supports it, while 36 percent oppose it. Like the proposal of a global parliament and their combination into a constitutionalist global democracy, the idea of a global government also commands majorities of support in all five surveyed countries, ranging from 53 percent in the UK at the lower end, to 62 percent in the US, to 67 percent in Germany and Brazil, and finally to 73 percent in Japan at the higher end. Support and opposition distributions are similar as for the two global democratic proposals above. A plurality of 37 percent across countries weakly support a global government. Slight support tendencies constitute (relative) majorities in all countries, but they are outnumbered by the sum of stronger supporters in Brazil (37%). Strongest possible support is at eight percent internationally. Once again, Brazil has the highest percentage of strong supporters (12%), while eleven percent in Germany, ten percent in the US, five percent in the UK, and three percent in Japan indicate such strong support. Strongest

possible opposition is at nine percent across countries. The highest number of strong opponents is again found in the UK (15%), followed by the US (11%), Brazil and Germany (10% each), which are all clearly more than in Japan (1%).

Figure 8: Attitudes toward a global government



Note: This sample is limited to the control group in each survey country.

We observe certain patterns in the results, indicating systematic differences between different countries, as expected. Notably, respondents in Japan are consistently most supportive overall, while clearly avoiding extreme positions on either end of the scale. People in the UK and US are least supportive of global democratic proposals overall, and also most likely to express the strongest levels of opposition against them; whereas the strongest levels of support for global democratic proposals are consistently found in Brazil. I also noted above that the response distributions on the three global democratic proposals – i.e. a world parliament, a global government, and their combination into a constitutionalist global democracy – appear highly similar. This is confirmed by a correlation analysis in the pooled sample, showing correlation coefficients of 0.69, 0.72, and 0.73 between the three proposals, which are all highly statistically significant ($p < 0.01$) – see Table 16 (p. 339). Given very similar response distributions, high correlations between responses to the three questions, the greater academic

and practical relevance of the full global democracy proposal, as well as space considerations, the rest of this section concentrates on the proposal of a global democracy including both legislative and executive institutions.

In order to explore the drivers behind people's attitudes toward global democracy, I conduct multivariate regression analyses on the various expected factors that I theorize and operationalize in Chapters Two and Three. Given the large number of potential influencing factors, and the possibility of strong correlations between them, it is important to ensure that the factors do not correlate too strongly which would invalidate fundamental assumptions of multivariate regression analysis. I thus conduct a variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis on the pooled sample, finding that none of the factors which I include in my multivariate regression models are correlated more strongly than the commonly accepted threshold (see e.g. Allen 1997; Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter, and Li 2013). That is, the VIFs in my regression model are all far below ten (see Table 17, p. 339). I thus proceed with one pooled regression including country fixed effects, plus five separate multivariate regression models for each of my survey countries, taking global democracy attitudes as the dependent variable and answers on the various questions operationalized in Chapter Three as potential explanatory variables, plus different control variables. My regression results shed light on the empirical validity of my theoretical model in Chapter Two (see Table 18, p. 342; Table 20, p. 354). The following discussion focuses on factors which are shown to be statistically significantly associated with global democracy attitudes in the pooled sample and which are of theoretical interest according to the framework outlined in Chapter Two, discussing the results in order of consistency.

First and foremost, individual values are validated as the principal driver behind people's global democracy attitudes. Chief among these are input and output considerations, but also the core values of cosmopolitanism and globalism. Let me discuss each of these in turn. To begin with, output – i.e. instrumental – considerations appear to be central motives for

people to endorse or reject global democracy. The perceived necessity of global democracy to address the world's problems is the substantively largest factor in the pooled regression and highly statistically significant ($p < 0.01$) in each survey country, including the UK. That is, the more (or less) a person believes that global democracy is necessary (or unnecessary) to solve global issues, the more she supports (or opposes) global democracy. Several other regression results confirm the importance of output considerations in individual deliberations on global democracy. Specifically, the expected (in)effectiveness of global democracy in the areas of international peace and climate change has a statistically highly significant ($p < 0.01$) association with individual global democracy attitudes in the pooled regression, albeit not in every single country regression: While international peace is a significant driver among Germans ($p < 0.05$), Japanese ($p < 0.01$), and Americans ($p < 0.05$), climate change is a significant factor in the considerations of Brazilians ($p < 0.1$) and Americans ($p < 0.05$).⁵⁷ Two further output considerations, which are significantly ($p < 0.05$) associated with individual global democracy attitudes in the pooled sample, are the expected effects of global democracy on cultural diversity as well as unity or conflict in the world. Across countries, and especially in Germany ($p < 0.01$) and Japan ($p < 0.1$), respondents support (or oppose) global democracy more, the more they believe that it would increase (or decrease) cultural diversity in the world. Moreover, across countries – but especially in the US ($p < 0.01$) – the potential of global democracy to lead to more unity (or conflict) in the world motivates people to support (or oppose) global democracy.

Second, input – i.e. procedural – considerations are validated as another central value-related determinant of individual global democracy attitudes (see Table 18; Table 20, p. 354). In particular, whether global public participation in world politics is considered important (or

⁵⁷ My UK survey did not include these questions due to restrictions imposed by YouGov.

not) is a crucial driver of individual global democracy attitudes. This factor is positively associated and statistically significant in the pooled regression ($p < 0.01$). The coefficient is positive and statistically significant at conventional levels in Brazil ($p < 0.1$), Germany ($p < 0.05$), Japan ($p < 0.01$), and the US ($p < 0.1$), but not in the UK ($p < 0.16$). The importance of input considerations for individual attitudes toward global democracy is confirmed by other regression results. For one, the coefficient on global democracy's expected distance to people is negative and highly statistically significant ($p < 0.01$) in the pooled regression, and in every surveyed country. That is, the more distant people expect global democracy to be from citizens, the less they support it. Moreover, the (un)representativeness of the current global order is significantly associated with public support for global democracy across countries, as the coefficient is positive and weakly significant ($p < 0.1$) in the pooled regression and in Japan.

Third, my theoretical framework in Chapter Two outlined core values like cosmopolitanism, globalism, and democracy as potential proximate motives for individual attitudes toward global democracy (see Section 2.3.2). My empirical results corroborate these expectations. Globalism is particularly strongly associated with individual attitudes toward global democracy. The perceived importance of the principles of national sovereignty and independence is negatively associated with support for global democracy and statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) in the pooled regression, as well as in Germany ($p < 0.1$) and Japan ($p < 0.01$). Principled support (or opposition) to international organizations is positively associated with support (or opposition) to global democracy and weakly statistically significant ($p < 0.1$) in the pooled regression, but highly significant in the US ($p < 0.01$). Similarly, principled support (or opposition) concerning global political actions such as international peacekeeping and fighting climate change is positively and weakly significantly ($p < 0.1$) associated with individual global democracy attitudes in the pooled regression. My UK survey results provide further evidence

for the importance of supranationalism.⁵⁸ UK respondents who voted Leave (“Brexit”) or abstained in the 2016 referendum on the UK’s membership in the European Union are statistically significantly less likely ($p < 0.1$ and $p < 0.01$ respectively) to support global democracy than those who voted Remain, all else equal.

Cosmopolitanism is another core value associated with public attitudes toward global democracy. Considering oneself more a national than a global citizen is negatively and statistically significantly ($p < 0.05$) associated with individual attitudes on global democracy in the pooled regression. The coefficient has the same direction in all surveyed countries, but is statistically significant at conventional levels ($p < 0.05$) only in Germany and the UK.

Finally, there is one counterintuitive result with respect to core values. The pooled regression shows a negative and statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) association between supporting democracy in general as a form of government and endorsing global democracy. However, this coefficient does not have the same sign in all countries and is only weakly significant ($p < 0.1$) in the US. Moreover, the second question on democratic ideology – whether free and fair elections are a good way of choosing a government – does not corroborate this counterintuitive finding with respect to democracy.

Moving on from values, interests are another proximate motive from my theoretical framework in Chapter Two which are confirmed by my empirical results, albeit less comprehensively. In the pooled regression of my surveys in Brazil, Germany, Japan, and the US, global democratization’s expected effect on domestic democracy is strongly associated ($p < 0.01$) with individual attitudes toward global democracy. That is, the more people believe that global democracy would weaken their domestic democracy, the less they support global

⁵⁸ Due to YouGov’s restrictions, my UK survey did not contain the same questions on globalism as my surveys in Brazil, Germany, Japan, and the US.

democracy. The coefficient is negative in all surveyed countries and statistically significant in Germany ($p < 0.01$) and Japan ($p < 0.1$). My UK survey results provide further corroborating evidence for the importance of personal interests in shaping individual global democracy attitudes, given that the relevant coefficient is positive and highly statistically significant ($p < 0.01$) – see Table 20 (p. 354).⁵⁹ However, other variables relating to personal interests are not significantly associated with global democracy attitudes, e.g. the expected effect of global democracy on national wealth, power, or representation. This indicates that personal interests – at least as I have defined and operationalized them – are not as significant determinants of people's global democracy attitudes as individual values are.

Other central elements of my theoretical model have less of a direct association with individual global democracy attitudes. Potential socio-environmental influences such as family, friends, and peers as well as advocacy groups are not significantly associated with global democracy attitudes. Hence, while I find that they do play a role in the *formation* of individual attitudes toward global democracy (see Section 4.1), they are – on aggregate – not associated with the *direction* of such attitudes. Similarly, considerations concerning the possibility and likelihood of global democracy, as well as global governance knowledge and political comprehension, are not significantly associated with individual attitudes toward global democracy. There are a few exceptions to this. In Brazil and the UK, belief in the feasibility of global democracy is positively and statistically significantly ($p < 0.05$ and $p < 0.01$ respectively) associated with individual attitudes toward global democracy. Furthermore, in the UK, global governance knowledge and general political attention are negatively and statistically significantly ($p < 0.05$ and $p < 0.01$) associated with global democracy attitudes.

⁵⁹ Due to restrictions imposed by YouGov, my UK survey only included one summary question aiming at uncovering associations between individual interests and global democracy attitudes.

As anticipated in Chapter Two, other factors play a role in determining global democracy attitudes as well. Most notably, classical left-right ideology is associated with global democracy views in complex ways. While leaning to the *economic* right has a statistically highly significant ($p < 0.01$) association with global democracy *opposition*, leaning to the *cultural* right has a statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) association with global democracy *support*. More broadly, self-categorization as politically right-leaning has a statistically weakly significant ($p < 0.1$) negative association with individual global democracy support. The general expectation that politically left-leaning individuals are more supportive of global democracy is corroborated by my UK survey results, where citizens who self-identify with Labour, the Liberal Democrats, the Scottish National Party (SNP), the Greens, or Plaid Cymru (all left-leaning parties) are more supportive of global democracy on average than self-identified Conservatives.

Conversely, my empirical results do not confirm the expectation that people with more or more intense migration experience are more supportive of global democracy. The pooled regression coefficients on having another or dual nationality and on having been an ethnic minority for parts of one's life are not statistically significant at conventional levels. Moreover, being from somewhere else than the survey country (i.e. being an immigrant) is in fact *negatively* and statistically significantly ($p < 0.05$) associated with support for global democracy in the pooled regression.

Other control variables are also significantly associated with global democracy attitudes. The importance of faith has a negative and statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) association with global democracy attitudes. Age is also negatively and highly significantly ($p < 0.01$) associated with global democracy support. Furthermore, there are several variables which are significantly associated with individual global democracy attitudes in the five survey countries, e.g. gender

in the UK. I do not discuss these findings here for space considerations, but they are presented in Table 18 (p. 342) and Table 20 (p. 354).

Lastly, we should note that the R-squared estimates of my regression models range between 0.37 and 0.56, indicating a relatively high goodness-of-fit. That is, between 37 and 56 percent of the variation in the dependent variable – i.e. global democracy attitudes – can be explained by the various explanatory and control variables in the models.

4.4) Willingness to act on global democracy

Let us begin our investigation of people's willingness to act on global democracy. Remember that the results of people's general willingness to engage in the different political actions that I investigate confirm the assumed ranking of anonymous online petitions as least costly, followed by social media posts, and donations as the most costly of the three actions (see Figure 136, p. 313; Section 3.3.5.1). Hence, for my analyses, I compute a composite willingness-to-act score for all respondents on each of the global democratic proposals, ranging from -7 to 7 in increments of one integer. This composite score considers indicated willingness to take action *against* global democracy as negative scores, and willingness to act *in support of* global democracy as positive scores. Taking into account the varying costs associated with the different kinds of political actions, as well as the ease of interpreting the measure, I decided to weight an indicated willingness to anonymously sign an online petition with a factor of 1, the willingness to post on social media with a factor of 2, and the willingness to donate with a factor of 4. Hence, the maximum willingness to take action *against* a particular global democracy proposal is indicated by a score of -7, while the maximal willingness to take action *in support of* a particular global democratic proposal is indicated by a score of 7. A score of


zero indicates that a respondent is not willing to take any of the suggested actions with regard to a particular global democracy proposal.⁶⁰

With respect to the presented global democratic proposals, people's willingness to take action diverges in the five surveyed countries, although certain patterns are observed across the board. The figures presented here are based on the control groups in the various countries in order to avoid potential influences of the experimental manipulations (see Section 4.4). The average willingness to act (in different ways) in support of global democracy is 41 percent in the pooled sample, while 44 percent on average are unwilling to take any action, and 15 percent on average are willing to act (in various ways) against global democratization (see Figure 9, p. 159). At the support side of the spectrum, 7 percent of respondents on average are willing to take all suggested kinds of actions (i.e. petitions, social media posts, and donations) on global democracy, while 17 percent are only willing to anonymously sign petitions in support. On the opposition side, seven percent are only willing to sign petitions, while two percent are willing to take all suggested actions against global democracy. These patterns are broadly reflected in average cross-country willingness to act on the global parliament and government proposals (see Figure 10, p. 159, and Figure 11, p. 160).⁶¹

⁶⁰ Note that this is different from my question about the general frequency of political actions. While the weights to calculate the composite score here should still reflect the *order* of the costs associated with the different actions that I inquire about, they need not reflect the same magnitude.


⁶¹ Due to restrictions imposed by YouGov, my UK survey only included a question on respondents' willingness to act on the fully constitutionalist global democracy proposal.

Figure 9: Willingness to act on the global democracy proposal




Note: Positive scores indicate willingness to act in support of global democracy, negative scores indicate willingness to act in opposition, and zero implies no willingness to act on global democracy. The willingness to sign an online petition, to share posts on social media, and to donate money are weighted by one, two, and four respectively (in terms of absolute values). The aggregate score ranging from -7 to 7 refers to the sum of these weighted actions. The indicated percentages in the bars refer to the scores of -7, -1, 0, 1, and 7 respectively. Due to restrictions imposed by YouGov, my UK survey only included general questions about actions on all global democracy proposals, not on each specific proposal.

Figure 10: Willingness to act on the global parliament proposal



Note: See note to Figure 9. Due to restrictions imposed by YouGov, my UK survey only included general questions about actions on all global democracy proposals, not on each specific proposal.

Figure 11: Willingness to act on the global government proposal



Note: See note to Figure 9. Due to restrictions imposed by YouGov, my UK survey only included general questions about actions on all global democracy proposals, not on each specific proposal.

Delving into the individual countries' results, we should note first that in every country more people are willing to act in favor than against any of the global democratic proposals (see Figure 9, p. 159; Figure 10, p. 159; and Figure 11, p. 160). While such willingness to act in favor of global democratic proposals constitute relative and absolute majorities in Germany and Brazil respectively, simple majorities in Japan, the UK, and the US are unwilling to take action on any of the global democratic proposals – be it in favor or against. The strongest willingness to act in favor of global democracy is consistently found in Brazil, where around 15 percent of people are willing to anonymously sign petitions, post on social media, *and* donate money to advocacy groups working toward the different global democratic proposals. This is followed by the US, Japan, Germany, and – consistently in the last position – the UK, where eight percent or less are ready to take all the suggested actions in support of the different global democratic proposals. Brazil is also exceptional in that the proportion of people willing to take maximal action on any of the proposals is consistently greater than the proportion of people willing to take minimal action by anonymously signing an online petition. In Germany,

Japan, the UK, and the US, relative majorities of those who want to take pro-global democracy action are only willing to sign petitions, but nothing else.

These patterns of willingness to act are mirrored on the other end of the spectrum in people's willingness to act *against* the different global democratic proposals – albeit at lower levels. In all five countries, a relative majority would generally only be willing to sign a petition against any of the global democratic proposals, but not take any further action. The only exception to this is the US in the case of the global *government* proposal, where the fiercest possible opposition camp (3%) is slightly stronger than the mildest possible opposition camp (2%).

Among supporters and opponents of global democracy, respondents from Germany consistently indicate the largest percentage of lowest possible willingness to act both in favor and against the various proposals. Meanwhile, Japan, the UK, and the US consistently have slight absolute majorities (i.e. between 51 and 55 percent) – and thereby the highest proportions of people – who are not willing to take any action on any of the global democratic proposals presented to them.

We thus note the strong parallels between people's willingness to act on the different global democratic proposals within and across countries. This is further corroborated by correlation analyses on people's willingness to act on the different global democratic proposals, which show that there are highly substantial and statistically significant ($p < 0.01$) correlations of 0.64, 0.66, and 0.67 between people's willingness to act on the three different – but related – global democratic proposals presented to them (see Table 21, p. 356). Due to our primary theoretical interest in the fully constitutional global democracy proposal – including a global parliament and government – as well as space considerations, the rest of this section focuses on people's readiness to take action with respect to that overarching proposal.

Multivariate regression analyses reveal the main explanatory factors behind people's willingness to act on the proposal of a global democracy (see Table 23, p. 358; Table 24, p. 364). As in my discussion above (see Section 4.3), the focus here is on variables with a statistically significant association in the pooled regression, proceeding from stronger to weaker and from more to less consistent associations, in line with the theoretical model outlined in Chapter Two. As for my analyses of global democracy attitudes above, I begin by ensuring that the tested model is not plagued by multicollinearity issues. To this end, I conduct a variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis again, which indicates that the VIFs of all included variables are far below the threshold of ten which is commonly considered problematic (see Table 22, p. 356). I thus proceed with a pooled regression for Brazil, Germany, Japan, and the US, as well as individual country regressions for these four countries and the UK (which has a different regression model, due to necessary variations in the survey setup). The regressions again contain all available variables of theoretical interest, plus control variables, but excluding some that prior VIF analyses suggested would introduce multicollinearity issues (e.g. income and past votes in the UK), bringing the UK regression model in line with the other survey countries' models which also omitted these variables for reasons of comparability and pooling.

As expected, the strongest predictive factor for people's readiness to act in support of (or opposition to) global democracy is the valence and strength of their attitude in this respect. In all five surveyed countries, the stronger people's support (or opposition) concerning global democracy, the more they are willing to act in favor of (or against) it on average, controlling for other factors. This factor is highly statistically significant in all surveyed countries ($p < 0.01$) and also has by far the strongest substantive association with willingness to act on global democracy. Other central factors in driving people's willingness to act on global democracy are advocacy group influence and general political activeness. Both variables have statistically highly significant associations ($p < 0.01$) in the pooled regression; and while the advocacy group

coefficients are significant in Brazil ($p < 0.01$) and the US ($p < 0.05$), the political activeness coefficients are significant in Germany ($p < 0.01$) and Japan ($p < 0.05$).⁶²

Other factors also play an important role in driving individuals' willingness to take action for (or against) global democratization. These factors include global democracy's expected effect on cultural diversity, which has a statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) positive association with willingness to act – both in the pooled regression and Germany. Whether one sees herself more as a global (or national) citizen is weakly ($p < 0.1$) associated with greater willingness to act in favor of (or against) global democracy in the pooled regression, albeit having a stronger association in Brazil and the US ($p < 0.05$). The expectation that global democratization would carry the risk of global tyranny (or not) has a weakly statistically significant association ($p < 0.1$) with willingness to act in opposition to (or support of) global democracy in the pooled regression, and a stronger association in the US ($p < 0.05$). Finally, the perceived necessity (or not) of global democracy to address the world's problems is weakly associated ($p < 0.1$) with greater willingness to take action in favor of (or against) global democratization in the pooled regression. Note that these are associations of these variables with willingness-to-act *beyond* the association that they have *through* attitudinal strength.

The cross-country analysis suggests general interest in world politics and ideological self-categorization as further determinants of individual willingness to act on global democracy. The former factor is positively associated with willingness to act in support of global democracy. This factor of general interest in world politics is statistically significant in the pooled sample ($p < 0.05$), as well as in Brazil ($p < 0.1$) and the US ($p < 0.1$). Self-identification as more politically left (or right) is associated with greater willingness to act in support of (or

⁶² Due to restrictions imposed by YouGov, neither of these questions features in my UK survey.

opposition to) global democracy. This factor is statistically significant in the pooled regression ($p < 0.1$) and in Germany ($p < 0.05$).

Individual country regressions reveal other factors which have statistically significant associations with global democracy, e.g. global democracy's expected effect on national representation in my survey in Brazil. There are also some counterintuitive results such as my UK survey finding on the importance of public participation in world politics. However, such findings are restricted to individual countries and not statistically significant across countries, and thus not discussed here due to their lacking consistency and space considerations. Overall, we should note that the regressions have R-squared values of between 0.34 and 0.48, indicating that the models can explain large parts of the variation in people's willingness to act on global democracy.

4.5) Data quality and robustness of results

As indicated above (see Section 3.3.7), I employed various measures to ensure data quality. This section presents and discusses the most relevant statistics in this respect, i.e. data on: the results of my self-commitment questions on skipping questions and external sources, the devices used to access my survey, possible pollution through prior surveys on global democracy, respondents' completion times, and robustness checks.

I used two self-commitment questions asking respondents, firstly, to only skip questions that they find too sensitive and, secondly, not to use external sources while completing my survey (see Section 03.3.7). If respondents failed to commit to either of these two desired behaviors, they were automatically screened out of my survey. The results for these two data quality measures are highly encouraging. First, on average, less than four percent of respondents in each survey country refused to confirm that they would only skip questions under the specified circumstances (see Table 121, p. 415). The results range from 0.5 percent in Brazil to 10.5 percent in the US, which is clearly an outlier, given the also very low

percentages in Germany (1.8%) and Japan (1.5%). After screening out respondents on this basis, the remaining ones were then asked to confirm that they would refrain from using external sources. Once again, the results were very encouraging, as only one percent on average indicated their non-compliance with this desired behavior (see Table 122, p. 415). Once more, participants from the US were most likely to refuse self-commitment here, which points to systematic differences in the US respondent pool. However, note that only two percent of US respondents who still remained in my survey at this point were screened out on the basis of non-compliance with the use of external sources. This indicates that I managed to exclude the vast majority of non-compliant respondents in all survey countries. As indicated above (see Section 03.3.7), survey methodology research shows that self-commitment questions are very effective at motivating respondents to provide high-quality – i.e. honest and comprehensive – responses (Oksenberg et al. 1979; Vannette 2017, 2018). Therefore, this measure provides one indication that the completed surveys, on which my analyses are based, are of high quality.

Another measure to obtain better survey data was to prefer laptop and tablet respondents over smartphone users for various reasons (see Section 3.3.7). Among those respondents who completed my survey and whose responses were thus analyzed, an international average of 84 percent used the most preferred input method – their laptop – to complete my survey (see Table 123, p. 415). Once again, the US constitutes an outlier, as almost one third of respondents completed my survey using either a smartphone or a tablet, while only nine, eight, and 14 percent did so in Brazil, Germany, and Japan respectively. Overall, I conclude that the vast majority of my respondents used the preferred input device, thus promising high data quality based on this measure as well.⁶³

⁶³ In the UK, YouGov administered the survey implementation process, giving me no option for a preferential treatment of laptop users. YouGov does not impose any restrictions on devices used

My next data quality measure was possible pollution due to respondents who had previously taken a survey on global democracy. High rates of such respondents would be problematic because they could inflate my estimates of people in the general population who had previously considered global democracy, for instance, and thus distort the results. Table 124 (p. 416) shows that an average of eight percent of respondents across countries stated that they had already taken a survey on global democracy before participating in my study, ranging from three and six percent in Japan and Germany respectively to twelve percent in Brazil and the US. While these figures – especially in Brazil and the US – are higher than expected given the scarcity of published survey research on global democracy, they still indicate that the vast majority of respondents had no prior exposure to public opinion research on global democracy, thus confirming the high quality of my data based on this measure as well.

Lastly, it is worth considering the time that respondents spent on my survey as an additional measure of data quality. Remember that my timer validations ensured that all respondents who completed the survey had to spend a certain minimal amount of time on various pages of my survey (see Figure 39, p. 264; Figure 40, p. 264).⁶⁴ In addition, a look at respondents' survey durations confirms that most participants took sufficient time to reply to my questions.⁶⁵ In Brazil, most respondents took between 20 and 25 minutes to complete my survey (see Figure 155, p. 326). While the number of those who took 45 minutes or more is exceptionally high in Brazil, this group likely includes many people who took breaks while completing the survey; hence the proportion of people in this last category cannot be taken at face value. In Germany (see Figure 156, p. 326) and Japan (see Figure 157, p. 327), around 50

by respondents. It estimates that around two thirds of respondents complete surveys on a smartphone or tablet, while around one third complete them on desktop or laptop computers (McDonnell 2020).

⁶⁴ Due to constraints imposed by YouGov, no such restrictions were imposed on respondents to my survey in the UK.

⁶⁵ YouGov only provided data on the *dates* on which respondents started and completed my UK survey, but not the exact start and finish *times*.

percent of respondents took between ten to 20 minutes to complete the survey. In the US, around 30 percent took ten to 15 minutes to finish the survey, while another 25 percent completed it in between 15 and 20 minutes (see Figure 158, p. 327). Note that in every country there is only a small percentage of people who completed the survey in less than 10 minutes, which was technically possible – despite the timer validations. Overall, these figures indicate that most respondents took sufficient time to complete my survey, thereby adding yet another piece of evidence confirming the high quality of my survey data.

The quality and robustness of my observational analyses is demonstrated in various ways. Firstly, the goodness-of-fit (R-squared) of my models is consistently high, which means that significant portions of the variation in my dependent variables can be explained by the independent variables in each of my statistical models (cf. Lewis-Beck and Skalaban 1990). Nonetheless, these statistics also remind us that substantial portions in the variation of people's prior thinking about global democracy, their attitudes in this regard, and their willingness to act remain to be explained. Second, none of my regressions are affected by worrisome levels of multicollinearity. The variance inflation factor, a standard test of multicollinearity, remains far below the critical threshold of ten (O'Brien 2007). Third, none of the control variables in my models are consistently statistically significant across countries for any model, which is a good sign, given the lack of plausible theoretical explanations to account for such statistically significant associations of control factors. Fourth, there are very few cases of inconsistencies across countries in that the sign of a coefficient and its statistical significance differ from country to country. Fifth, there are isolated instances of statistical associations observed in individual countries where the coefficient sign points to a relationship that contravenes theoretical expectations. Overall, however, the observed directions of coefficients and statistically significant associations are overwhelmingly in line with theoretical expectations.

Lastly, I conducted several robustness checks on my pooled regression. First, since the dependent variable has a six-point ordinal scale, I conduct an ordered logistic regression in addition to the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions that I report throughout this text. Second, I conduct my pooled regression without weights, in order to ensure that the results are not unduly driven by the weighting I employ. Third, I conduct my pooled regression on the control group only, to be sure that the different experimental treatments did not significantly affect the coefficients of individual explanatory variables. Fourth, I conduct the pooled regression only on those respondents who passed my attention check, in order to check if relatively inattentive respondents did not dilute my results significantly. My results are summarized in Table 19 (p. 347). They show that the primary regression results, i.e. the direction of the coefficients and their statistical significance, are highly similar when comparing my main weighted OLS regression with the ordered logistic and the unweighted OLS. The overwhelming majority of statistically significant coefficients are confirmed by the two robustness checks; and only in few instances do the results not align. The picture changes for the final two robustness checks, i.e. those including only the control group and only attentive respondents respectively. In these two regressions, there are numerous cases in which the coefficients from the original OLS regression do not align with those in the robustness checks. However, we should remember that the samples of these two robustness checks are different and much smaller, which leads to bigger standard errors and potential biases in the estimates. In my main OLS regression, I control for both experimental condition and respondents' attentiveness, thus mitigating potential biases introduced by these two factors. Overall, the various indicators discussed in this section suggest that the quality of my data is high and that my empirical results are very robust.

4.6) Summary and discussion of results

My surveys in Brazil, Germany, Japan, and the US in August 2019 and in the UK in July 2020 yield several key findings: First, as expected, majorities of people in all surveyed countries have never considered the issue of global democracy before; while among those who have considered global democracy before, surprisingly high numbers indicate that they have thought more than a little about the issue. Among those who have considered global democracy before, the main drivers appear to be the influence of family, friends, and peers, as well as advocacy groups, in addition to the levels of interest in and knowledge about world politics. Second, my analyses of inter-personal and intra-personal consistency show that most people across countries hold largely consistent views on global democracy, once they form them. Third, among those who consider the issue of global democracy, clear majorities in all surveyed countries favor proposals of establishing a world parliament and/or global government. As theorized, these attitudes are primarily explained by individual values and interests. Chief among these are: output-related factors such as the perceived necessity of global democracy to address the world's problems, especially international peace and climate change; input-related considerations like enabling people worldwide to participate in global politics; core values such as cosmopolitanism and globalism; as well as a personal interest in global democratization's expected effects on domestic democracy. Fourth, while pluralities in most countries are not willing to take any action for or against global democracy, among those who are willing to act, those who want to act in favor outnumber those who want to act against global democracy. The extent of people's willingness to take action on global democracy is most clearly driven by their attitude toward global democracy. In particular, people who are more strongly supportive of (or opposed to) global democracy are more willing to take different levels of political actions such as signing petitions, posting on social media, and for donating to advocacy groups in support of (or opposition to) global democracy.

These findings show widespread support for the proposal of a constitutionalist global democracy. Moreover, the most salient motives of individual attitudes mirror central arguments in the academic debate on global democracy, i.e. instrumental justifications pointing to the potential benefits of global democratization with respect to transnational issues, and procedural justifications highlighting the importance of enabling public participation in world politics. The results are especially encouraging for global democracy advocates – both among activists and among political theorists. With regard to the latter, for instance, the results here show that the widespread assumption that majorities worldwide would reject global democracy are not justified. With regard to political activists, the results of this study demonstrate the significant potential for global democracy advocacy among citizens – a potential which largely remains to be mobilized, however. Of course, it is an open question to what extent this can be done and hence if global democracy can indeed become a major political issue in the real world. This, in turn, depends in part on whether global democracy will become an issue in national political debates, and what happens if it does. Chapters Five to Seven address that question.

5) Theory: Global democracy attitudes and party preferences

This chapter theorizes different scenarios on the interrelation between political parties' positions on global democracy, public attitudes toward global democracy, as well as people's preferences and willingness to vote for political parties. That is, after devising the first theoretical framework on global democracy attitudes and empirically assessing expectations arising from it in previous chapters, this chapter theorizes in greater detail the possible effects of one specific socio-environmental influence (i.e. political parties) on people's global democracy attitudes, as well as the potential impact of global democracy attitudes on a high-cost political action (i.e. voting in national elections). The expectations arising from my theory will then be tested in subsequent chapters.

This chapter's scenarios assume an initial dissonance between individual preferences for political parties and personal global democracy attitudes. That is, the underlying assumption is that individuals at first have a different view on global democracy than the political party that they prefer. In my first scenario – called “partisan mobilization” – individuals have strong preferences for their political parties, while holding weak attitudes toward global democracy, which presumably leads to adjustments of their global democracy attitudes. In the second scenario – “cognitive mobilization” – individuals have strong global democracy attitudes, but weak party preferences, leading to adjustments of the latter. The third scenario – “attitudinal parallelism” – predicts that imbalances between the two attitudes would be tolerated or not perceived at all, given that neither preference is very important to the individuals in question. In the fourth scenario – “partisan self-delusion” – both people's global democracy attitudes and their party preferences are highly important to them, which leads them to dissociate the two attitudinal objects from each other or deny external evidence about any dissonance between them. If the second scenario – cognitive mobilization – is widespread enough, this could have

significant political implications since parties' position on global democracy could affect their national vote shares.

The chapter is structured as follows. I begin by laying the conceptual groundwork for my subsequent discussion by introducing the idea of attitudinal object centrality, outlining my theoretical framework, and presenting the two key attitudes for the present purpose: individual views on global democracy and personal party preferences. Following that, I theorize the potential interrelation between global democracy and party preferences at the individual level by introducing the theories of partisan and cognitive mobilization, attitudinal parallelism, as well as partisan expectations and self-delusion. The final section lays out potential scenarios at the societal level and deduces political implications as well as theoretical expectations with respect to these various scenarios.

5.1) Theoretical framework: Attitudinal centrality and dissonance

The key concept underlying the theoretical discussion of the present chapter is the idea of attitudinal object centrality, which refers to the relative importance that a particular attitude plays compared to other attitudes in a person's belief system (Converse 1970). For Converse (1970:181–182), object centrality has “two faces” – one “motivational” and one “cognitive”. The former connotes “the degree to which the object gears into the primary goal or need-structures of the individual”, whereas the latter refers to “the proportion of ‘mental time’ which is occupied by attention to the attitude-object over substantial periods” (Converse 1970:181–182). In other words, an attitudinal object is more “central” in an individual's belief system the more it motivates her goals or needs and/or the more time she spends thinking about it. Of course, there are many attitudes in individual belief systems, and occasionally such attitudes come into conflict with each other.


Employing the concept of object centrality, I theorize different scenarios on the conflict of two attitudinal objects in an individual's belief system. I build on Converse (1970) who

creates a theoretical framework on potential scenarios following imbalances between two attitudinal objects.⁶⁶ Imagine two such objects – X and Y – in a person's belief system. For illustration purposes, think of an Imaginary Person (e.g. Vivian Voter) who supports a Fictional Party (e.g. the Liberals), and assume that both the person and the party have a position on a Hypothetical Policy (e.g. the right to abortion). Now, if the Imaginary Person has the same stance as the Fictional Party on the Hypothetical Policy, then there is no dissonance or imbalance in her belief system. However, if Vivian Voter has a different stance on abortion than the Liberals, then an attitudinal imbalance emerges. For simplicity, I assume that the Imaginary Person supports the Fictional Party (X) while opposing the Hypothetical Policy (Y), and that the Fictional Party supports the Hypothetical Policy (see Figure 12 below).⁶⁷ This is the attitudinal imbalance underlying the following four scenarios which differ in the centrality that the Imaginary Person attributes to X and Y. That is, in all of the following scenarios, X and Y are each either of high or low centrality in the Imaginary Person's belief system.

⁶⁶ Converse's work, in turn, draws on Festinger's (1962) dissonance theory as well as the Rosenberg-Abelson discussion on balance theory (Rosenberg and Hovland 1966).

⁶⁷ I thank Karolina Milewicz for inspiring this illustration of attitudinal dissonance.

Figure 12: Attitudinal dissonance



The first scenario is that attitudinal object X is highly central, while the attitude toward Y is of low centrality to the Imaginary Person. In this case of imbalance, the individual's attitude toward Y is expected to change. For illustration purposes, referring back to the example above, imagine that X refers to the Liberal Party, while Y denotes the right to abortion. The Imaginary Person – Vivian Voter – is a strong supporter of the Liberal Party while initially expressing a weak rejection of abortion rights. However, the Liberal Party supports the right to abortion. There is hence a conflict between Vivian's support for the Liberal Party and her initial rejection of abortion rights. Now, the first scenario in my theoretical framework predicts that Vivian's attitude toward abortion rights would change and come in line with the Liberal Party's position.

The second scenario is simply the reverse of the above. That is, if Y is highly central, while X is of low centrality, I would expect changes in attitudes toward X. Whereas Converse subsumed this scenario under the previous one, it is essential for subsequent parts of my study to differentiate between these two scenarios. Let me again use the example above for illustration purposes: If Vivian Voter strongly rejects the right to abortion while weakly endorsing the Liberal Party which positions itself pro-abortion, then Vivian may resolve this

attitudinal imbalance by adapting her party preference and not supporting the Liberal Party anymore. Instead, she may start preferring a party which – like her – rejects the right to abortion.

The third scenario in my framework is that both X and Y are of equally *low* centrality, leading to the outcome that any imbalance between them is “not noticed or, if noticed, readily tolerated” (Converse 1970:185). Referring to the example above again, imagine a situation in which Vivian Voter weakly supports the Liberal Party and somewhat rejects the right to abortion, which is supported by the Liberal Party. However, since Vivian’s attitudes are neither strong with respect to the Liberal Party nor with regard to abortion, she may either not notice the imbalance (e.g. because she does not pay sufficient attention to the Liberal Party’s positions and/or the specifics of the abortion rights debate); or she may not feel the urge to adapt her attitudes, even if she notices the imbalance, because she does not feel much (if any) “discomfort” (Converse 1970:186) due to the dissonance between two attitudes of low centrality. Hence, Vivian may continue to support the Liberals, while opposing abortion.

The fourth and final scenario is that both X and Y are of equally *high* centrality, generating an imbalance which would produce “[s]ome form of dissociation or denial of external evidence” about the link between them (Converse 1970:185). Once again, I illustrate this point with reference to the example above: Imagine that Vivian Voter strongly rejects the right to abortion and fiercely supports the Liberal Party which endorses abortion rights. My framework then predicts that Vivian would either find a way to dissociate the two attitudes (e.g. by arguing that support for abortion rights is not a central position of the Liberals and has nothing to do with her support for the party), or deny the imbalance (e.g. by considering reports about the Liberal Party’s support for abortion rights “fake news” and insisting that the Liberals, in fact, share her opposition to abortion). Thus, she would go on endorsing the Liberal Party, while rejecting abortion rights.

One thing to note, which Converse (1970) fails to address, is the potential observational equivalence between Scenarios Three and Four above. While the two scenarios are clearly substantively different, their visible outcomes may be indistinguishable from one another in some cases. That is, in both scenarios there is a dissonant relationship between two attitudinal objects which becomes evident but remains unchanged. While the reasons for this lack of attitudinal adaptation may be ignorance or toleration (in Scenario 3), or dissociation or denial (in Scenario 4), such different motivations for the lack of attitudinal change may not necessarily be observable. Differentiating between Scenarios Three and Four, or – if not feasible – acknowledging the possibility of their observational equivalence, is thus critical for interpreting empirical data in this context.

5.2) Key concepts: Global democracy and party preferences

Having introduced the concept of object centrality and discussed the implications of attitudinal dissonance, let me now proceed to the two specific attitudinal objects of the present chapter: global democracy and political parties. First, global democracy is still conceptualized as previously. That is, in its constitutionalist form, I distinguish primarily between executive and legislative institutional elements. I have noted already (see Section 2.1) that people may legitimately hold differentiated attitudes toward proposals for supranational legislative and executive institutions. That is, an individual may support a world parliament, but not a global government, for instance. Nonetheless, in order to simplify theory-building in the present chapter and in line with the strong empirical association between support for the three proposals (see Section 4.3), let me assume a uniform attitude toward the composite concept of a fully constitutionalist global democracy consisting of legislative and executive institutional elements.

Second, with respect to the attitudinal object of political parties, one may differentiate between people's *party preferences* and their *voting intentions*. Depending on the national context, these two may not necessarily align. In particular, in electoral systems operating based

on the “winner-takes-all” principle, people may agree most with one party (A), but decide to vote for another less preferred party (B) in an election because a vote for A would carry the risk of being politically inconsequential, given the country’s voting system. The political systems of the United Kingdom and the United States are good examples of this, as citizens may be led to vote for one of the few major parties rather than smaller ones which do not have a realistic chance of electoral success. Moreover, even in proportional representation systems, common rules for minimal thresholds that parties need to cross in order to gain parliamentary seats – e.g. the five-percent hurdle in the German parliament – produce similar dilemmas for voters. That is, while a citizen may prefer one of the smaller German parties which usually receive far less than five percent of the national vote share, she has an incentive not to “waste” her ballot by voting for those smaller parties, but instead to vote for one of the six largest parties which are generally expected to obtain more than five percent nationwide and are thus virtually guaranteed seats in parliament. Thus, it is often the case in the real world of politics that citizens dissociate their party preferences from their voting intentions. While party preferences are arguably the more accurate reflection of individual attitudes, people’s voting intentions are more politically consequential. Bearing this in mind, the present chapter nonetheless assumes congruence between party preferences and voting intentions in order to simplify the theoretical discussion below.

5.3) Interrelation between global democracy attitudes and party preferences

How may people’s attitudes toward global democracy and party preferences be related? Currently, there is presumably not much of an interrelation, as most political parties have not expressed a stance on the issue of global democracy. That is, while numerous politicians, some international party alliances like the Global Greens and the Liberal International, as well as a few national political parties like the German Greens have endorsed global democratic ideas such as the proposal of a UN Parliament (Campaign for a UN Parliamentary Assembly 2005,

2010, 2017, 2020; Global Greens Congress 2012), no major political party anywhere has – to the best of my knowledge – positioned itself on the broader issue of a full-fledged global democracy as conceptualized here. Thus, given the lack of explicit positions by political parties on this issue, I do not expect any significant association between individual party preferences and potential global democracy attitudes at present. Nonetheless, the topic is worth exploring since political parties are potential “agents” of transforming the international system on a “path” toward global democracy (Archibugi and Held 2011). That is, changes within democratic countries in a more cosmopolitan direction and the agency of political parties have been theorized as drivers of potential transformations toward global democracy (Archibugi and Held 2011; Archibugi and Cellini 2017).

My study addresses the implications of one way in which such changes could come about, i.e. if national political parties were to take a public stance on the issue of global democracy and these positions were to become widely known. Thus, for the purpose of the present chapter, I assume that political parties in a given national context may develop and publicly express views on the issue of global democracy, and that these positions could be categorized as either supportive or opposed. Furthermore, I assume that people have preferences for political parties, and may develop genuine attitudes toward global democracy, as shown empirically in the previous chapter.⁶⁸ Let me thus begin to theorize the potential interrelation between individual attitudes toward political parties and global democracy. My four scenarios and their relation to the concept of attitudinal object centrality (see Section 5.1) are illustrated in Figure 13 (p. 179) and elaborated in the following.

⁶⁸ Note that my interest is in individuals’ attitudes toward global democracy, not parties’ positions on the issue (which are rather treated as a background condition to explore possible effects of party positions on global democracy attitudes, and the potential impact of people’s global democracy attitudes on their voting intentions). I thank Karolina Milewicz for her comments on this point.

Figure 13: Four scenarios – interrelation between global democracy and party preferences

| | | Global democracy attitudes | |
|-----------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------|------------------------|
| | | Low centrality | High centrality |
| Political party preferences | High centrality | Partisan mobilization | Partisan self-delusion |
| | Low centrality | Attitudinal parallelism | Cognitive mobilization |

5.3.1) Partisan mobilization

The first way in which the two kinds of attitudes may interrelate is via the process of “partisan mobilization”. This builds on the first scenario in my theoretical framework above (see Section 5.1). The partisan mobilization theory holds that people tend to adopt those substantive positions which the party that they favor advocates (cf. Campbell et al. 1960). To put it differently, people follow “partisan cues” (e.g. Foos and de Rooij 2017; cf. Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017). Political parties and/or their representatives can influence public preferences – and especially the attitudes of their supporters – through public statements on TV, on billboards, or in the news, for instance. In effect, individuals use the positions of political parties as heuristic devices (or “cues”), i.e. as mental shortcuts to prevent a costly process of searching for all the relevant information on a particular issue (cf. Zaller 1992; Druckman and Lupia 2000; Bullock 2011). This applies especially in cases where people do not have a firm (or any) opinion on an issue yet and thus use their parties’ positions as guides to determine their own attitude on a subject matter (Campbell et al. 1960). For instance, in the context of debates about governmental market intervention or *laissez-faire* policies, people may adopt their preferred

parties' positions rather than try to gather all relevant information themselves, given that the latter approach would be too time-consuming.⁶⁹ Partisan cues have been identified as an important driver of public attitudes toward the European Union (Hobolt and de Vries 2016; Stoeckel and Kuhn 2018; Torcal et al. 2018) and other global governance institutions (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015, 2020; Dellmuth 2018). In the present context, partisan mobilization theory would predict that individuals readily follow cues of their strongly preferred political party and adopt its substantive position on global democracy, assuming that people's global democracy attitudes are either previously non-existent or, if existent, of relatively low centrality in their personal belief systems.

5.3.2) Cognitive mobilization

The second way in which global democracy attitudes and party preferences may interrelate is through the process of “cognitive mobilization”, which builds on the second scenario in my framework above (see Section 5.1). The theory of cognitive mobilization was devised as a rival of partisan mobilization theory (Dalton 1984, 2007). Since the 1960s, when partisan mobilization theory was developed, education and information levels have risen dramatically (Dalton 2000). Through increases in the reach of mass media and improvements in education levels, making information about politics widely available and accessible, citizens gained more and more opportunities to form their own opinions on many political issues. According to cognitive mobilization theory, ever better informed citizens vote for the party which best represents their independently developed policy positions. Various scholars have since investigated cognitive mobilization theory in the context of public opinion on European

⁶⁹ Indeed, Kam (2005) finds that reliance on partisan cues (“heuristic processing”) decreases and reliance on issue-relevant values (“systematic processing”) increases, as political awareness rises. This finding illustrates how the different factors in my theoretical model on global democracy attitudes (see Section 2.3), i.e. in this case socio-environmental influences, political knowledge, and values may interrelate. In the interest of parsimony, however, I bracket this finding in the present theoretical discussion of partisan mobilization for my purposes.

integration (e.g. Inglehart 1970a, 1970b; Inglehart, Rabier, and Reif 1987), but found that it is “only valid in a limited context” and that it has only a “small substantive impact” (Gabel 1998).⁷⁰

Applying cognitive mobilization theory to my present study on individual attitudes and actions regarding global democratization would entail people’s exposure to various arguments for and against global democracy, e.g. from the Political Theory literature in order to both inform and educate people with respect to global democracy. For instance, debates about global democracy may include advocates arguing for global democracy’s merits in pursuing global justice, whereas opponents might highlight the dangers of global tyranny. As a result of the cognitive mobilization of citizens, one may expect the following: People form their opinion on global democracy independently based on exposure to such diverse arguments, and – if they feel strongly about this issue, i.e. if global democracy becomes a highly central attitudinal object – they select or change their preferred party due to its position with respect to global democratization. This is based on the assumption that casting a ballot is generally considered a highly costly political action (see Section 2.2.5) and the empirical finding that attitudinal strength is in fact strongly associated with the costliness of political actions that individuals are willing to take (see Section 4.4).

At this point, let me establish briefly that partisan and cognitive mobilization phenomena are not logically contradictory and may occur simultaneously, even though the latter theory was devised to rival the former. On any given issue, some individuals might be affected by partisan cues, while others may exemplify cognitive mobilization. The same individual may also be subject to cognitive and partisan mobilization on different issues –

⁷⁰ In fact, the term “cognitive mobilization” was first coined by Inglehart in the context of debates about political integration in Europe (Albright 2009:250).

choosing her preferred party due to strong preferences on a particular topic (in line with cognitive mobilization) and adopting her preferred party's position on a topic that she knows and/or cares little about (in line with partisan mobilization). Note that the two can also apply sequentially to the same people, e.g. when an individual is made aware of an issue (e.g. abortion) by a specific party and adopts its position (e.g. opposition), has weak views on it at first, then develops contradictory and stronger views (e.g. support), and eventually changes her party preference due to the resulting dissonance between her now firm position and the party's different stance in this respect. The centrality of attitudes is key here. If party preferences are highly central to a person while global democracy attitudes are of low centrality, I expect to observe partisan mobilization effects. If global democracy attitudes are highly central while party preferences are of low centrality to certain individuals, I expect to observe cognitive mobilization effects.

5.3.3) Attitudinal parallelism

“Attitudinal parallelism” is my term for the third way in which global democracy and party preferences may be interrelated, which corresponds to the third scenario of my framework above (see Section 5.1). The essence of attitudinal parallelism is that two views of low centrality in an individual's belief system are maintained independently of each other, whether or not they are compatible or conflicting. Congruence or dissonance between such attitudes does not matter deeply to the person who holds them due to the low relative importance she attributes to both. As outlined in the previous section's framework, cases of dissonance or imbalance are thus either not noticed or readily accepted.

In the present context, attitudinal parallelism would mean that imbalances between individual attitudes on global democracy and their preferences for political parties may go unnoticed; or, if such positioning is noticed, it may not affect the global democracy attitudes or party preferences of people who do not hold strong beliefs on political parties and global

democracy, and hence do not feel any discomfort due to attitudinal dissonance. Thus, after the emergence of such dissonance, they may continue to support (or oppose) global democracy, and prefer a certain political party, in the same constellation as before the emergence of the attitudinal dissonance.

5.3.4) Partisan expectations and self-delusion

“Partisan self-delusion” is how I call the fourth way in which global democracy attitudes and preferences for political parties may be interrelated, drawing on the fourth scenario in my framework above (see Section 5.1), i.e. when two attitudes of equally *high* centrality conflict. My theory predicts that affected individuals redress the resulting imbalance by dissociating the two conflicting attitudes, or denying external evidence about the imbalance between them. In the context of global democracy attitudes and party preferences, the denial reaction may imply, for instance, that parties state explicit positions of support or opposition with respect to global democracy, but that strong partisans who hold contrasting and firm beliefs on global democracy ignore such statements and claim that their preferred party actually shares their personal position on global democracy. Such acts of partisan self-delusion are an extreme expression of what I call the phenomenon of “partisan expectations”.

My theory of partisan expectations may be put as follows: I assume that people have a general tendency to strive for internally coherent belief systems, which leads them to think that their preferred party shares their personal views on political issues, even in the absence of any evidence to this effect. It seems reasonable to assume that such striving for attitudinal congruence applies especially in cases where two attitudes are of central importance to an individual. In the present context, the theory of partisan expectations would thus imply that people tend to believe that their preferred party shares their own position on global democracy – and even more so, the stronger their global democracy attitudes and party preferences are

(even though, in reality, most major parties do not have any publicly known positions on global democracy).

When the supposed position is one that would seem non-stereotypical for a specific party (P) – i.e. where society would overwhelmingly agree, that P would most likely not have a particular stance on a specific issue – then the phenomenon of partisan expectations verges on partisan self-delusion, i.e. the denial of external evidence which I introduced in the framework above (see Section 5.1). To provide an illustration, let me refer back to the previous example: Imagine that Vivian Voter supports the Liberals and opposes abortion, but that the Liberals support abortion. Moreover, most people in Vivian's society believe that the Liberals support abortion rights, as opposition to abortion would seem counter-stereotypical for the party. Now, if Vivian – without having heard of the Liberals' actual stance – thinks that the party's position is in line with her own, i.e. opposed to abortion, such an expression of the partisan expectations theory arguably verges on partisan self-delusion, given the generally accepted low probability of such a stance by the Liberals. In the present context, this strong expression of the partisan expectations theory would imply the following, for instance: Even global democracy supporters who are adherents of political parties which are fiercely opposed to the values underlying global democracy (e.g. globalism, cosmopolitanism, and democracy) would be more likely than other partisans to believe that their preferred party shares their own pro-global democracy position. For example, supporters of right-wing nationalist parties, who also happen to endorse global democracy, would be more likely than the average partisan to believe that their party endorses global democracy, and may even delude themselves about their preferred party's position in this respect.⁷¹


⁷¹ However, in line with the theoretical framework of Chapter Two, I would of course expect people with such values to be less likely to support global democracy in the first place

5.3.5) Summary of individual-level scenarios

Let me now summarize the four different scenarios for the interrelation between global democracy attitudes and party preferences at the level of individual citizens. To begin with, imagine a person who supports or opposes global democracy. If her preferred party's position on global democracy has the same valence as her own view, then no dissonance exists and I do not expect any attitudinal changes. However, if her preferred party's position deviates from her own, then there is an imbalance which leads to the following expected attitudinal adaptations based on my theory above.

First, if the individual's attitude toward her preferred political party is highly central in her belief system while her attitude toward global democracy is of low centrality, I expect her to adjust her global democracy attitude in the direction of her party's stance on the issue – a prediction derived from partisan mobilization theory. Second and conversely, cognitive mobilization theory leads me to expect the individual to adjust her party preferences if her global democracy attitude occupies a highly central position in her belief system while her party identity is of low centrality to her. Third and in contrast to this, if both global democracy and party preferences are of relatively low centrality in her belief system, I expect the attitudinal dissonance to remain unnoticed or, if noticed, to be readily tolerated in a state that I have called attitudinal parallelism. Fourth and lastly, if both global democracy and party preferences are of relatively high centrality in her belief system, I expect that she attempts to dissociate the two attitudes or deny any external evidence concerning their association – phenomena that derive from my theory of partisan self-delusion. My four scenarios and their connection to the theoretical framework above (see Section 5.1) are illustrated in Figure 14 (p. 186) below.

Figure 14: Summary of individual-level scenarios



5.4) Societal-level scenarios, implications, and expectations

The possible theoretical paths, which I outlined at the individual level above, aggregate to a few scenarios at the societal level. Considering global democracy attitudes as the outcome of interest, there are three salient categories of scenarios at the society-level: first, an aggregate increase in *support* for global democracy; second, an aggregate increase in *opposition* to global democracy; and third, *no aggregate changes* in the distributions of global democracy attitudes. Mirroring these, there are three salient scenarios for political party preferences at the societal level: first, an aggregate increase in support for global democracy-*supporting* parties; second, an aggregate increase in support for global democracy-*opposing* parties; and third, no changes in aggregate support for global democracy-supporting and -opposing parties. In developing these scenarios at the aggregate level, I assume that there are known distributions of global democracy attitudes and party preferences in society before they come into contact (i.e. before political parties declare their positions on global democracy) and potential dissonances emerge (i.e. before partisan and cognitive mobilization can take any effect). Moreover, I assume that all citizens have attitudes toward global democracy and political parties, and that all political parties have positions on global democracy, which can be classified as either supportive or opposed.

Let me begin with three societal scenarios focusing on individual global democracy attitudes as the outcome of interest. First, there may be an aggregate increase in support and a decrease in opposition to global democracy. This result could emerge if the attitudes of global democracy supporters are relatively stable in the wake of global democracy-opposing cues by certain political parties, while a sufficient number of global democracy opponents is swayed by global democracy-supporting cues of their preferred parties, for instance. Conversely, the second possible scenario is an aggregate decrease in societal support for global democracy and an increase in opposition. This result could emerge if opponents' attitudes on global democracy

are rather solid, while more advocates are convinced by partisan mobilization against global democracy, for example. Finally, the third scenario is that the overall distribution of global democracy attitudes remains unchanged in the face of partisan cues. This could either be because changing global democracy attitudes in both directions cancel each other out, or because partisan mobilization does not have any notable effect on people's global democracy attitudes at the aggregate level – neither on people who support global democracy, nor on those who oppose it.

The politically more consequential societal scenarios are those relating to people's party preferences as the outcome of interest. Such scenarios can carry significant political implications, especially if voting intentions are affected. The first scenario is that voters may overall reward parties that endorse global democratization and punish those which oppose it. That is, the votes won by parties supporting global democracy would outweigh the votes lost by them because of their position on global democracy. If sufficient numbers of people have strong enough preferences for global democracy, which do not align with their preferred parties' positions, and if these people outweigh the numbers of fierce opponents who experience an attitudinal dissonance with their party preference, then we would expect some aggregate movement of voting intentions toward those parties that endorse global democracy. Such an outcome would have immense implications for political campaigns. Specifically, such a result would show that – strategically speaking – at least certain parties should consider adopting global democracy support as a policy position, since it might increase their voter base.

Second, voters may overall punish parties that endorse global democratization and reward those which oppose it. That is, the votes lost by global democracy-supportive parties may outweigh the votes won by them because of their stance on the issue. This could happen, for example, if sufficient numbers of opponents have such strong objections to global democracy, which do not align with their parties' positive stance on global democracy, and if

these people outweigh the numbers of fierce supporters who experience such an attitudinal dissonance, leading to an aggregate shift of voting intentions away from global democracy-supportive parties toward those parties that oppose global democracy. Such an outcome would also have significant strategic implications for political campaigns. Specifically, such a result would demonstrate that – at least for certain parties – endorsing global democracy may not be a wise political move from a strategic perspective, as it would on average lose votes for a party doing so. Conversely, opposing global democracy may pay off for certain political parties in terms of national vote shares.

Third, it may be that global democracy is not a decisive issue for voters at the aggregate level, i.e. that voting distributions would not change due to people's preferences regarding global democratization and parties' positions in this regard. This result would materialize if voter migration in the direction of pro-global democracy and contra-global democracy parties cancel each other out; or if there are not enough voters moving in either direction to make a significant difference to aggregate vote distributions. Strategically speaking, such an outcome of unchanged vote distributions would mean that parties should neither have an incentive to endorse global democracy nor to reject it. Thus, parties could decide to adopt global democratization as a campaign topic, or they could refrain from doing so; it would probably not make a difference to the share of votes they ultimately obtain. Similar to the second scenario above, such a result would thus explain why it has been rational for politicians not to invest resources and political capital into adopting global democracy as a campaign topic. Simply stated, my second and third societal scenarios would demonstrate that supporting or opposing global democracy would not pay off for national political parties in terms of votes. Hence, such results would help explain why global democracy has so far not been an issue in national elections, and why it may not become one in the foreseeable future.

Finally, let me turn to individual and aggregate expectations based on the theoretical scenarios outlined above. To begin with, note that the expected effects strongly depend on the stimuli that citizens receive, e.g. which parties (are said to) endorse global democracy and which ones (supposedly) oppose it, thus affecting partisan mobilization efforts. Moreover, the expected effects depend on what arguments feature prominently in (potential) public debates about global democracy, thereby impacting the process of cognitive mobilization. Generally speaking, however, I deduce the following four expectations from my theory in this chapter.

First, I expect partisan mobilization effects to dominate where relatively weak global democracy attitudes and rather strong party preferences are prevalent. That is, those segments of the public where global democracy attitudes occupy a position of relatively low centrality in people's belief systems while party preferences are highly central, are likely to be swayed by partisan cues. This is more likely to be the case in electoral systems with major parties that have long-established voter bases. Second, I expect to observe cognitive mobilization effects among people with relatively strong attitudes on global democracy, but rather weak attitudes toward political parties. That is, among those segments of society where attitudes toward global democracy occupy highly central positions in people's belief systems while party preferences are of rather low centrality, I expect that citizens may be willing to choose or change their preferred party in line with their personal views concerning global democracy. This outcome can be highly politically consequential if it entails a shift in aggregate voting intentions at the societal level (as described above). I expect that this scenario is most likely to materialize in multi-party electoral systems with greater fluctuations in voter bases. Third, when both global democracy attitudes and party preferences are generally of relatively low centrality in citizens' belief systems, I would expect to observe attitudinal parallelism. That is, any dissonance between people's attitudes toward global democracy and their preferred parties' positions would go unnoticed or be readily tolerated. Certain levels of attitudinal parallelism are to be

expected in all countries, given the hypothesized weakness of global democracy attitudes (see Section 2.2.4) and the assumption of relatively weak partisan attachments being widespread everywhere. Fourth and finally, if both global democracy attitudes and party preferences generally occupy positions of relatively high centrality in people's belief systems, I expect to see partisan self-delusion effects and strong forms of partisan expectations bordering on self-delusion. That is, citizens would tend to neglect reasonable expectations regarding their preferred parties' positions on global democracy, and deny external evidence concerning imbalances between their personal global democracy attitudes and political parties' positions in this regard. Given that this phenomenon is based on an assumed general human tendency to strive for attitudinal consistency, I expect the phenomena of partisan expectations and self-delusion to be evident in all countries. The following chapters subject these expectations to empirical assessment.

6) Research design and methods: Global democracy attitudes and party preferences

This chapter begins by discussing the general method that I use to assess the interrelationship between individual global democracy attitudes and preferences for political parties: online survey experiments. Following that, I elaborate on the final selection criterion for the countries in my sample: democratic diversity. Then I discuss the design of my survey experiments in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US. The last subsection outlines how I analyze the experimental survey results.

6.1) Online survey experiments

Survey *experiments* differ from ordinary surveys in one crucial respect: Whereas in ordinary surveys all respondents are usually given the *same* set of questions, in survey experiments *randomly* selected groups of subjects respond to questions under different *conditions* – normally designated *control* and *treatment*. This approach is based on the experimental method employed in other fields of the natural and social sciences. For instance, in clinical or psychological studies, experimental subjects are usually randomly divided into one or more treatment groups as well as control and/or placebo groups. While a treatment group is given a certain medication, the control or placebo groups receive no medication or a dummy treatment respectively. By comparing the development of treated subjects to those in the control and/or placebo groups, researchers can measure the effectiveness of treatments (cf. Angrist and Pischke 2008:chap. 2; Mutz 2011:chap. 1; Gerber and Green 2012). Political scientists have conducted survey experiments for decades (e.g. Palmer and Duch 2001), but in recent years studies using such methodology have proliferated – in line with the “new behavioral revolution” (Hafner-Burton et al. 2017) and facilitated by the aforementioned rise of online surveys (see Section 3.1).

In my dissertation, I conduct survey experiments using vignette treatments. Vignettes usually take the form of some text, photo, audio, and/or video which randomly selected groups

of participants are exposed to, before being asked questions on which their responses are supposed to be affected by the treatment (Mutz 2011:chap. 4), whereas the control group is not exposed to the vignette. This is where the key value of conducting experiments lies: We can administer randomized treatments and observe changes or differences in certain variables of interest directly, which allows us to draw clear inferences with respect to the causal drivers. Further below (see Section 6.3.2), I present the specific vignettes that I use.

6.2) Survey country selection

Continuing my prior discussion on the selection of survey countries (see Section 3.2), let me now discuss the final criterion in my considerations: democratic diversity. In order to be able to test all my hypotheses on the interrelationship between global democracy attitudes and party preferences and to increase their generalizability, the countries in my survey experiments needed to be democratic, yet diverse. In particular, to test my hypotheses regarding cognitive and partisan mobilization, it was necessary for me to ensure that there are sufficient and varying degrees of competition between political parties in regular contested elections in the countries that I surveyed.

Brazil is generally classified as a democracy by standard measures commonly used in the field of Political Science such as the Polity IV index (Marshall and Gurr 2014; Polity IV 2014a) and the democracy scores calculated by Freedom House (2019a). Brazil's political system is characterized by a very high number of parties each receiving a relatively small share of the national vote in regular elections. In the first round of the 2018 general election, the party of the current Brazilian President, Jair Bolsonaro, received only around 12 percent of national votes for the Chamber of Deputies, the larger body of the bicameral national legislative in Brazil (Election Resources on the Internet 2018). Of the 30 parties that won seats in the Chamber of Deputies, 23 parties received more than one percent of the national vote. Brazil

thus constitutes an extreme case of competition between political parties and is therefore a suitable country to be included in my survey.

Based on common measures (Polity IV 2014b; Freedom House 2019b), Germany is unequivocally considered a highly democratic country. Indeed, Germany is a historically firmly established democracy with a dynamic multi-party system. At the time of writing, six parties (or coalitions of parties) – from the far-left to the far-right – have seats in the Bundestag, the main legislative body at the federal level. Five of the six parties in the German political system have been represented in parliament at the national level almost without interruption for the past decades. In contrast to Brazil, Germany's democracy is thus characterized by greater stability and less fragmentation in terms of the number of parties at the federal level, which is partly due to the five-percent qualifying hurdle for any party to enter the national legislature (Jesse 1987).

Japan is a free and democratic country based on common indicators as well (Polity IV 2014c; Freedom House 2019c). Japan's political system is characterized by a limited set of decades-old and relatively new political parties (Kohno 1997). While the leading political party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), was preferred by around 40 percent of voters at the time of my survey, there were eight other parties polling at around one to ten percent nationwide (TV Asahi 2019) – some of them relatively new. At the time of my survey, the latest significant addition to the Japanese political landscape – the Reiwa Shinsengumi party – was founded in April 2019 (Brasor 2019). In recent decades, there have been various instances of political parties at the national level in Japan arising, merging, or dissolving. Hence, Japan is a well-established democracy characterized by a relatively small set of partly stable and partly changing political parties, and thus a suitable addition to my sample of countries.

The UK is considered democratic based on widely cited indicators such as those of Polity IV (2014d) and Freedom House (2020). It is an established democracy with free and fair

elections and freedom of the press. At the time of my survey in July 2020, the two main political parties in the UK, the Conservatives and Labour, were polling at around 44 and 37 percent respectively, followed by several smaller parties from the left to the right end of the political spectrum polling at under ten percent each. The UK can thus be described as a multi-party democracy with two main parties, which – as in the case of the US (see below) – is partly due to its “first past the post” voting system (Lundberg 2017). With its distinct democratic setup, the UK thus constitutes a suitable addition to my sample of countries.

Finally, the US is characterized as democratic by common indicators (Polity IV 2014e; Freedom House 2019d) and yet differs fundamentally in one important way from the other democracies that I selected for my study. That is, the US political system is dominated by only two main parties. While there are other parties in the American political system (which can and have played a decisive role in national elections), due to the “winner-takes-all” voting system only Democratic and Republican Party candidates generally have a chance to win elections at the national level. Hence, as the classical case of a two-party system, the US arguably constitutes a kind of polar opposite to the Brazilian political system and is thus another suitable addition to my sample of countries based on the criterion of democracy.

6.3) Design of the survey experiments

Building on my previous discussion of questionnaire design and variable operationalizations (see Section 3.3), this subsection elaborates on those parts of my survey design that relate to the interrelation between global democracy attitudes and individual party preferences (see Chapter 5). I begin by outlining the dependent variables that I use in my survey experiments. I then move to the partisan cues and cognitive mobilization battery which constitute my experimental treatments. Following that, I discuss how I study the theorized phenomena of partisan expectations and partisan self-delusion. Finally, I present the survey sequences of the different experimental groups (see Figure 15 below).

Figure 15: Survey sequence and experimental conditions – Brazil, Germany, Japan, USA



6.3.1) Dependent variables

In addition to the different dependent variables that I outlined in Chapter Three (see Section 3.3.4), another group of dependent variables in my study relates to arguably some of the most important political attitudes that people have and arguably the costliest and most consequential of all political actions that I examine, i.e. people's party preferences and, in particular, their voting intentions. I ask respondents the following three questions in random order:

If there was a national election tomorrow, which party would you **vote** for?

Which political party generally appeals to you **most**?

Which political party do you generally feel **least** close to?

A few aspects are worth noting about these questions. First, by referring to “a national election tomorrow” and using the word “generally”, I inquire about people's overall preferences for political parties, rather than their specific preferences in light of parties' positions on global democracy that they learn about in my survey (see Section 6.3.2). This is important because I want to isolate the effect that the issue of global democracy has on people's overall party preferences. Second, I distinguish between people's voting intentions and their most preferred party. As outlined in Chapter Five, these may differ depending on a country's vote system. For instance, a person might like Party A the most, but vote for Party B because a vote for Party A would be politically inconsequential due to the particularities of the electoral system in question, e.g. a five-percent hurdle as in Germany's general elections. I adopted my questions on the party that people would vote for in the next nationwide election and my question on the most preferred party of respondents, from the World Values Survey Association (2012:16). My question on respondents' least preferred party is adopted from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems survey (2017). Third, due to some pre-testers' neglect of the differences between the three questions – in particular, their failure to note that I was also asking about the *least* favored political party – I bolded the key words to highlight the differences between the

three questions. As answer choices I offered the main political parties in each of my survey countries, sorted from largest to smallest in terms of the share of the vote that they had commanded in the last general election before my survey, as well as a residual category for “another party”. In Brazil, I explicitly included 23 parties that received at least one percent of the national vote share to the Chamber of Deputies in the 2018 general election (Election Resources on the Internet 2018). In Germany, I included the six leading parties with parliamentary representation at the national level (Zicht and Cantow 2019). In Japan, I included eight of the leading parties at the national level, excluding the Party to Protect the People from NHK (N-Koku) which is the preferred party of a small percentage of voters nationwide, but is so subject-specific (focused on the topic of broadcasting) that it would have been implausible to include it as having a position on the issue of global democracy (Kyodo News 2019). In the UK, I included the Conservatives, Labour, the Liberal Democrats, the Scottish National Party (SNP), the Greens, the UK Independence Party (UKIP), the Brexit Party, and Plaid Cymru as the main parties at the national level. All these parties received around one percent or more of the national share of voting intentions at the time of my survey (Politico 2020).⁷² Finally, in the US, I included the Democratic and Republican parties explicitly. Given its great practical significance, I treat the question about people’s voting intentions as the main variable to establish respondents’ party preferences.

6.3.2) Treatments: Partisan and cognitive mobilization

As outlined in Chapter Five, I am interested in exploring potential influences on people’s global democracy attitudes and behavior, as well as the interrelationship between people’s party preferences and their views and actions on global democracy. Some potential

⁷² Note that I excluded Northern Irish parties – e.g. the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Féin – given that Northern Ireland was not part of this survey, due to restrictions imposed by YouGov. In effect, my survey thus covers only Great Britain, not the entire UK.

influences – e.g. by family, friends and peers (see Section 2.3.1) – are difficult to simulate experimentally (certainly in an online environment), which is why I decided to ask respondents about them instead and used multivariate regression analysis to identify possible statistical associations (see Section 4.1). Other effects that interest us are amenable to experimental manipulation. Specifically, I developed treatments to evaluate the effects of *partisan mobilization* and *cognitive mobilization* on people's global democracy attitudes and their party preferences (see Chapter 5). This led me to create four different experimental conditions (see Figure 15, p. 196).⁷³

My cognitive mobilization treatment is simple. Given my assumption that most people have never considered global democracy, which I empirically verified (see Section 4.1), I needed to motivate them to consider the issue from various angles without leading them in a particular direction. Hence, I created a battery of questions containing the most salient considerations on global democracy from the normative literature, including common arguments for and against global democracy (see Section 3.3.5). In line with my principles on question wording (see Section 3.3.2), I phrased every question in a balanced way, so that respondents would consider them without being led in a certain direction by me. While these batteries of questions also serve as explanatory variables (see Section 3.3.5), I changed their position in the survey flow (see Section 6.3.5) such that they acted as my cognitive mobilization treatment in the third condition (see Figure 15, p. 196).⁷⁴ Simply stated, I exposed those randomly selected respondents whom I wanted to cognitively mobilize to a battery of questions about global democracy. Given my hypothesis that most people have never thought about

⁷³ Due to limitations imposed by YouGov, my UK survey only included a control and a treatment condition with the combination of the two treatments (see Figure 104, p. 289).

⁷⁴ In my UK survey, the battery of explanatory variables was placed after the dependent variable questions in the control group, and before the dependent variable questions in the treatment group.

global democracy before, and certainly not intensively so, this treatment should have generated deep considerations of global democracy in people's minds, thus producing the expected effects if the cognitive mobilization hypotheses hold.

Now, let us move on to my partisan mobilization treatment. In each of the five survey countries, my party vignette – which some randomly selected respondents are exposed to (see Section 6.3.5) – is a simple table with two columns that presents the supposed global democracy positions of the main political parties at the national level (see Figure 42 through Figure 45, pp. 265-270; Figure 107, p. 297). I thus conduct a “multi-party cue experiment” (Brader and Tucker 2012). Parties are presented as either in support or opposition to global democracy. Given that – to the best of my knowledge – none of the political parties in any of the countries I surveyed have an official stance on the topic of global democracy, I needed to fabricate the positions of political parties on this issue for the purpose of my vignette treatment – while abiding by legal and ethical guidelines in debriefing respondents about the use of deception, of course (see Section 6.3.6). Indeed, the fact that political parties do not have an official position on global democracy makes the issue especially suitable for the purpose of experimental manipulation, as I can be sure that my survey is respondents' first and only source on this.

In designing my vignette treatment, I had several considerations in mind. Firstly, in order to maximize its deceptive effect, the vignette needed to be plausible to as many respondents as possible. Hence, I had to choose carefully what parties to include on which side of the table. In doing so, I relied on various sources: first, my own knowledge of and research on the political systems of the five countries; second, data from the Manifesto Project (Volkens, Krause, Lehmann, Matthieß, Merz, Regel, et al. 2018) which contains variables on the internationalist orientations of at least some of the parties in my survey; third, consultations with scholars, students, and politicians with expert knowledge on the political systems of my

five focus countries; and finally, probing questions to my pre-testers on the plausibility of different versions of my vignettes.

Secondly, since the theorized effects are all based on attitudinal dissonance, testing my hypotheses required maximizing instances of such dissonance within the given constraint of vignette plausibility. Given my knowledge of previous surveys on global democratic proposals (e.g. BBC Press Office 2007; ComRes and Global Challenges Foundation 2018) and the resulting assumption that majorities of people in countries around the world *endorse* global democracy, I thus needed to expose majorities of people to a vignette that presented their preferred party as *opposed* to global democracy. Based on the distributions of party preferences at the time (see Section 3.4.2), I therefore aimed to choose the parties in each country such that the global democracy opposition side of my vignette table were the preferred parties of around two thirds of the population, while the parties on the global democracy support side of my vignette table were the first choice of around one third of the population in question. For Germany, Japan, and the UK this was feasible due to the availability of up-to-date nationwide polling data and the existence of a multi-party system that allowed for calibrating the desired proportions of parties on the global democracy support and opposition sides of my vignette table. For Brazil, this was only partially feasible. The Brazilian political system features a high number of political parties and thus allows for dividing up parties onto the two sides of my vignette in order to obtain the desired proportions. However, given the lack of regular public opinion polls on popular support for individual parties in Brazil, I could only base my vignette design on the results of the last Brazilian general election in 2018 (Election Resources on the Internet 2018). Finally, due to the American two-party system and the approximately even split in public preferences for the two leading parties, designing my party vignette in line with the consideration of a two-to-one ratio for global democracy-opposing to -supporting parties was unfortunately not possible in the US.

Thirdly, to the extent possible under the constraints above, I wanted to design my party vignette such as to cut across common left-right ideological divisions. That is, I tried to avoid the impression among respondents that global democracy was a typical issue on which left and right parties are divided along classical ideological lines. Indeed, global democracy does not seem to be a left-right issue in the real world, as prominent supporters of global democratic advocacy groups such as the Campaign for a UN Parliament come from both the political left and right in different countries (Campaign for a UN Parliamentary Assembly 2020). Nonetheless, we should note that left-leaning parties traditionally have a more internationalist orientation, while right-leaning parties tend to be more nationalist – general tendencies that we may apply to their expected global democracy positions. I thus placed the majority of left-leaning parties on the global democracy support side and the majority of right-leaning parties on the global democracy opposition side of my table, which was in line with the plausibility criterion above, as confirmed by my research, Manifesto Project data, and my consultations with country experts. Moreover, to the extent that the plausibility and proportionality criteria above allowed for it, I placed a few left-leaning parties on the global democracy opposition side of my table and a few right-leaning ones on the support side. Once again, given the American two-party system, this design feature of my vignette could unfortunately not be realized in the US.

All in all, therefore, my party vignettes should be plausible to respondents, should maximize instances of attitudinal dissonance, and should not appear like an issue on which parties are divided along classical ideological lines. Figure 42 (p. 265), Figure 43 (p. 268), Figure 44 (p. 269), Figure 45 (p. 270), and Figure 107 (p. 297) present the party vignettes for my survey experiments in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the US, and the UK respectively. Figure 149 (p. 323) presents the resulting empirical alignments between voting intentions and global

democracy attitudes. My justifications for the positions of every single party in all five survey countries are omitted here due to space considerations, but available upon request.

6.3.3) Partisan expectations and self-delusion

In order to test my partisan expectations hypothesis, I want to determine whether or not people's own global democracy views correlate with – and perhaps affect – their expectations regarding their preferred party's position on the issue. Hence, I ask respondents who have not been exposed to my party vignette treatment (see Section 6.3.5) to indicate their beliefs regarding the stances of the main political parties in their country with respect to global democracy (see Figure 41, p. 265; Figure 106, p. 296). In both experimental conditions where this question block is included (see Section 6.3.5), I ask for people's voting preferences with respect to political parties in their country (see Section 3.3.4) *before* I inquire about their guesses with respect to political parties' positions on the issue of global democracy, and – of course – before the party vignette (see Section 6.2).⁷⁵ People's indicated party preferences thus remain unaffected by any potential effects of thinking about their party's position about global democracy. Hence, I can assess, e.g. by cross-tabulation and adequate statistical tests (see Section 3.4.3), whether or not there are any statistically significant differences in the beliefs regarding people's preferred parties' positions on global democracy, depending on whether individuals support or oppose global democracy themselves.

With respect to partisan self-delusion, I noted in Chapter Five that there are instances in which the partisan expectations phenomenon can be interpreted as bordering on partisan self-delusion, e.g. when voters of far-right parties who are also global democracy supporters believe that their preferred party endorses global democracy as well. In addition to that, I also

⁷⁵ Due to restrictions imposed by YouGov, my survey setup in the UK differed in that only the control group got my question about partisan expectations, while the treatment group saw only the vignette reconstruction task (see Figure 104, p. 289).

integrated a more direct test of partisan self-delusion into my survey. I call it the *vignette reconstruction task*. It asks respondents to recreate my party vignette by dragging and dropping the various party logos from the left side of the screen to a table on the right side of the screen (see Figure 91, p. 286) which looked very much like the party vignette table that they had seen previously, i.e. with two columns entitled “support for global democracy” and “opposition to global democracy” (see Figure 42 through Figure 45, pp. 265-270).⁷⁶ While originally intended as a manipulation check for testing whether respondents absorbed my party vignette properly, pre-testing showed that the vignette reconstruction task was useful for identifying instances of partisan self-delusion. Hence, I focus on respondents who experience an attitudinal dissonance, i.e. those whose preferred party’s position on global democracy is different than their personal attitude. If such respondents remember their party’s position on global democracy incorrectly (based on the supposed evidence which my vignette presents), then I interpret that as evidence for partisan self-delusion. That is, I believe that such individuals mentally align their party’s global democracy stance with their own, as they are subconsciously reluctant to accept the dissonance between these two attitudes.

6.3.4) Data quality assurance

In addition to the data quality measures and checks outlined in Chapter Three (see Section 3.3.7), I employ additional methods to assure that my survey experiment operates as intended. These include reading speed validations, instructions not to refer to external sources, respondents’ score on my vignette reconstruction task, and an assessment of whether or not my respondents believed the party vignette that I presented them with.

⁷⁶ Due to restrictions imposed by YouGov, my vignette reconstruction task in the UK only included the Conservative Party, Labour, and the Liberal Democrats (see Figure 114, p. 296).

First, as in other parts of my survey (see Section 3.3.7), I included a reading speed check on my party vignette, forcing respondents to stay on that page for a minimal amount of time (which was validated by pre-testing), and asking them to take sufficient time to absorb the information in my treatment (see Figure 46, p. 271). This was intended to ensure that my treatment could affect respondents' behavior (if it was indeed potentially effective).

Second, since my party vignette is a treatment involving deception, it is important that respondents do not search the internet in an attempt to verify the false information that my vignette provides; otherwise the effectiveness of my treatment could be reduced. In this spirit, I noted above (see Section 3.3.7) that I ask respondents at several instances throughout my survey experiment not to refer to outside sources such as family and friends or the internet for completing the survey. Among others, I do so when asking them to answer my vignette reconstruction question (see Figure 91, p. 286).

Third, in addition to employing an instructional manipulation check for gauging respondent attention (see Section 3.3.7), I use respondents' score on the vignette reconstruction task. I assume that the number or proportion of parties that respondents are able to remember correctly from my party vignette is a good additional indicator of attention. Thus, I simply calculate the sum of correctly recalled parties for each respondent in all five surveyed countries, and divide it by the total number of parties presented in the vignette of the respective survey country.

Fourth, I include a manipulation check which is intended to ascertain if my treatment was properly absorbed by respondents. This check evaluates whether or not a respondent believed the information contained in the treatment. I call this the *vignette belief check*. In order to establish this, I asked respondents whether their global democracy attitudes and party preferences influenced each other. Although this question is, of course, of substantive interest to my study, I do not expect that respondents are necessarily capable or willing to point out

such interrelations or mutual influences between these variables. Instead, this question primarily served the purpose of establishing if respondents believed the information contained in my vignette. I assume that respondents who affirmed an interrelation between the two variables must have believed my vignette, since the only source where they could have received information about political parties' positions on global democracy was my survey (given that political parties in my survey countries did not have publicly known positions on global democracy at the time of the survey). If, however, respondents negated that there is any interrelation between their global democracy attitudes and their party preferences, they were asked why and given, among others, the option to indicate that they did not believe the positions of political parties that they were presented with (see Figure 92, p. 287). I interpret this choice as an indication that my experimental manipulation failed.

6.3.5) Experimental conditions and survey sequences

Respondents in my survey experiments were randomly allocated into four groups of experimental conditions – described below and illustrated in Figure 15 (p. 196).⁷⁷ All groups have in common that they are first presented with the consent form (see Figure 23, p. 256, and Figure 24, p. 257) and self-commitment question on skipping questions (see Figure 26, p. 258). This is then followed by the question block on quota demographics (see Figure 27, p. 259; Figure 28, p. 259; Figure 29, p. 260), preliminary political questions (see Figure 32, p. 261; Figure 33, p. 261; Figure 34, p. 262; Figure 35, p. 262; Figure 36, p. 262), and the instructional manipulation check (see Figure 37, p. 263). The number and order of the subsequent survey items differs by experimental condition.

⁷⁷ Due to restrictions imposed by YouGov, my UK survey only included two experimental conditions: a control group and a treatment group receiving both the partisan and cognitive mobilization treatments (see Figure 104, p. 289).

In line with recommendations from the survey methodology literature (Gordon and McNew 2008) and pre-testing observations, I generally allow respondents to move back to previous survey questions if they wish to change their response. The exceptions are circumstances in which moving back would bear the risk of invalidating my results. For instance, in the case of the vignette reconstruction task, I did not want respondents to be able to refer back to the party vignette when reconstructing it. Hence, I did not offer a back button on the page of the vignette reconstruction check.

The first experimental condition is the control group for the purpose of my cognitive mobilization experiment with voting intentions as the dependent variable, and half of the control group for my partisan mobilization experiment which takes global democracy attitudes as the dependent variable (see Figure 15, p. 196). Following standard experimental practice, this group differs from the other experimental conditions in that no treatment precedes the questions on dependent variables (Gerber and Green 2012). The dependent variables can thus be measured in their status quo condition. In order to average out any (unlikely) effects resulting from the order of my two dependent variable blocks (on global democracy and party preferences), I randomize the order of the two blocks. The blocks on explanatory variables (see Section 3.3.5) are displayed *after* the questions on the global democracy dependent variables (see Section 3.3.4), such that the former cannot influence the latter. All of this is finally followed by the question block on partisan expectations (see Section 6.3.3)6.3.3). I do not place the partisan expectations block earlier in the survey flow of the control group because it seems plausible that linking party positions and global democracy in respondents' minds might affect my key dependent variables on global democracy and party preferences. The flipside of this order, of course, is that the partisan expectations of respondents in this experimental condition may in turn be affected by the cognitive mobilization treatment. I am able to identify and mitigate such potential effects by including the partisan expectations block at a different

position in the fourth experimental condition, preempting any potential effects on it (see below), and pooling results of the two partisan expectations blocks.

The second experimental condition is the treatment group for the purpose of my partisan mobilization experiment with global democracy attitudes as the dependent variable (see Figure 15, p. 196). This group of respondents is first presented with the introduction of the global democracy concept (see Section 3.3.3) and then immediately exposed to the vignette treatment (see Section 6.2). Right after the treatment, the two dependent variable question blocks on global democracy attitudes and party preferences (see Section 3.3.4) follow in random order. Only after that, the batteries on potential explanatory variables (see Section 3.3.5) are displayed. This is to ensure that the explanatory variable blocks, which also serve as my cognitive mobilization treatment (see Section 6.2), do not impact the dependent variables in this experimental group.

The third experimental condition is the treatment group for the purpose of my cognitive mobilization treatment which takes voting intentions as the dependent variable (see Figure 15, p. 196). Here, the introductory block on global democracy (see Section 3.3.3) is immediately followed by the explanatory variable batteries, i.e. my cognitive mobilization treatment (see Section 6.2). After that, respondents are presented with the dependent variable questions on global democracy (see Section 3.3.4). Then they see the party vignette (see Section 6.3.2), right before they are asked about their party preference (see Section 6.3.1).

The fourth experimental condition serves as the second half of the control group for my cognitive mobilization experiment, which takes voting intentions as the dependent variable (see Figure 15, p. 196).⁷⁸ Party preferences and the introductory block on global democracy (see

⁷⁸ In addition, this experimental condition allows for exploring the combined effect of cognitive and partisan mobilization on global democracy attitudes and actions. This is not part of the present study, however.

Section 3.3.3) are immediately followed by the question block on partisan expectations (see Section 6.3.3). Right after, I expose respondents in this group to the party vignette treatment (see Section 6.2). This is followed by the cognitive mobilization treatment in the form of the explanatory variable batteries (see Section 3.3.5). Finally, I ask respondents my questions about their global democracy attitudes and willingness-to-act (see Section 3.3.4).

The last substantive parts of my survey are the manipulation checks in case of the three treatment groups (see Section 6.3.4), the blocks including knowledge and comprehension questions (see Section 3.3.5.3), and the items on sensitive demographics (see Section 3.3.5.3). My survey then concludes with a debrief about the use of deception and a request for final consent to use respondents' data.

6.3.6) Research ethics conformity

The debriefing page at the end of my survey experiment (see Figure 101, p. 292, and Figure 102, p. 293) is in line with legal and ethical requirements (Central University Research Ethics Committee 2016a, 2016c). I informed respondents about the use of deception in my study and gave them the opportunity to withdraw their consent at this point still if they wish to do so (Sharpe, Adair, and Roese 1992; Sanderson 2010:56). The debrief contains some of the information that were already included in the consent form (see Section 3.3.8), in particular, on my identity as the principal researcher, a reassurance on the pseudonymization of data, and procedures for potential cases of complaints. Moreover, the debriefing page contains some new information, especially the full title of my study and information about the use of deceptive elements in my survey. In order to draw respondents' attention to this part of the debrief, I bolded the sections on deception and made it mandatory for respondents to tick boxes that confirm that they have read the parts about the use of deceptive elements in my survey (see Figure 103, p. 294). Respondents then finish the survey by checking a box that says "Complete this survey" and moving to the next page, after which they are redirected to Dynata to obtain

their remuneration for participating in my survey.⁷⁹ Only the responses of survey participants who confirm their consent to the use of their data at this point are henceforth analyzed.

6.4) Analysis of results

For my experimental analyses, I rely on standard tests of statistically significant differences in means and proportions for weighted samples. In particular, I use the Adjusted Wald test (Cañette 2010) to calculate p-values indicating statistically significant differences between the control and treatment groups in my experiments on the effects of partisan mobilization on global democracy preferences. In order to analyze statistically significant differences in the proportions of party preferences as a result of my cognitive and/or partisan mobilization treatments, I calculate Pearson's χ^2 statistics (Stata n.d.). These are adjusted for my survey design with the second-order correction of Rao and Scott (1981) and converted into F-statistics. The following chapter discusses the results of these analyses.

⁷⁹ Due to space constraints imposed by YouGov, my UK survey included a shorter debriefing page, focusing on the use of deception with the following text (see Figure 115, p. 296):

This section of the survey was part of an academic study and included hypothetical scenarios. The aforementioned positions of British parties regarding global democracy were fictional. Moreover, we will not ask you to sign any online petition, post anything on your Facebook account, or ask for donations to any advocacy groups. We apologise for any inconvenience caused. Please rest assured that your responses remain entirely anonymous. Thank you very much for your contribution to this research project!

7) Results: Global democracy attitudes and party preferences

This chapter discusses the principal results of my survey experiments. I find that partisan mobilization is effective only in certain countries and among voter groups of mostly long-established parties. In other countries with more fluid multi-party electoral systems, voting intentions tend to be more affected by cognitive mobilization, i.e. deep thinking about global democracy. In line with the thesis of attitudinal parallelism, I observe widespread stability of preferences in cases when weak global democracy attitudes and weak party preferences lead to attitudinal dissonance. Lastly, in line with my partisan expectations and self-delusion hypotheses, I observe in every surveyed country that people tend to believe that their preferred party shares their personal view on global democracy, even deluding themselves to this effect in the face of (supposed) evidence to the contrary.

This chapter is structured as follows: First, I present the results on the effect of partisan mobilization in the five surveyed countries on people's global democracy attitudes. Second, I analyze the effects that the cognitive mobilization treatments have on people's voting intentions at the national level. Third, I delve into the evidence on partisan expectations and self-delusion among citizens of Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US.

7.1) Partisan mobilization

This subsection discusses my empirical results on partisan mobilization, i.e. the hypothesis from Chapter Five that – under particular circumstances of attitudinal dissonance – individual global democracy attitudes are affected by the positions of people's preferred political parties on the issue (see Section 5.3.1). The subsection proceeds as follows: I begin by looking at the aggregate level in each country, analyzing to what extent partisan mobilization leads to shifts in global democracy attitudes across the entire sample of a country. I then move on to discussing effects at the party-level, considering if global democracy attitudes within each voter group in my survey countries are affected either positively or negatively by partisan cues.

Finally, I delve deeper into the causal mechanisms theorized in Chapter Five, looking at potential partisan mobilization effects in the subgroups of (strong) partisans of global democracy-supporting and -opposing parties.

At the country-level, my survey experiments do not show widespread partisan mobilization effects. The partisan mobilization treatment has a statistically significant aggregate effect ($p < 0.05$) on global democracy attitudes only in Japan (see Figure 137, p. 314, through Figure 142, p. 316). The differences in global democracy attitudes between the control and treatment conditions in Brazil, Germany, the UK, and the US are not statistically significant. In order to understand potential partisan mobilization effects better, however, we must not only look at aggregate changes in global democracy attitudes, but at potential differences within particular voter groups – specifically whether those differences are in line with the supposed position of the respective party and if they point in the expected direction (i.e. in line with the partisan cues).

Let me begin with Brazil. Partisan mobilization effects here are rather difficult to detect for most parties due to the large number of parties and the consequently small subgroup sizes of each voter group. Indeed, my heterogeneous treatment effect analysis reveals only two statistically significant results (see Table 25, p. 366): In line with one partisan cue, which claimed that the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) supports global democracy, PSDB voters in the treatment group are indeed more likely to endorse global democracy than PSDB voters in the control group, and this effect is weakly statistically significant ($p < 0.1$). However, in contrast to my partisan mobilization hypothesis, voters of the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) become less likely to support global democracy in the treatment condition after being exposed to a partisan cue of their preferred party endorsing global democracy. This result is also weakly statistically significant ($p < 0.1$), albeit based on a very small sample size ($n = 15$). We do not observe any other statistically significant partisan mobilization effects in Brazil, notably not

among the three voter groups that are bigger than PSDB, i.e. voters of the Social Liberal Party (PSL), the Workers' Party (PT), and NOVO (see Figure 119, p. 304).

Moving on to Germany, we again observe a scarcity of evidence for partisan mobilization effects, in fact, a complete lack thereof (see Table 26, p. 367). All differences between the treatment and control groups for each voter subgroup – from left to right – are far from statistically significant. This is especially noteworthy, given that several of these voter groups largely have global democracy attitudes which contrast with the supposed position of their preferred parties (see Table 39, p. 374), as I discuss further below (see Section 7.4).

Let us now proceed to Japan. Remember that this is the only country in which we observe an aggregate (negative) change in global democracy attitudes. Subgroup analyses show that this effect is driven by the supposed opposition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to global democracy and the impact on its voters' attitudes in this respect who are generally largely in favor of global democracy (see Table 41, p. 375), while the LDP is presented as opposed to global democracy (see Figure 44, p. 269). While the change in global democracy attitudes as a result of partisan mobilization is statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) among LDP voters (see Table 27, p. 367), no other voter group in Japan shows statistically significant changes in global democracy attitudes as a result of exposure to the party vignette treatment. However, it should be noted that the effects on voters of the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) and the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) are in the expected directions, i.e. in line with the partisan cues that showed global democracy support and opposition respectively, as well as only marginally statistically insignificant at conventional levels ($p < 0.14$ and $p < 0.11$ respectively).

In my UK survey, we cannot disentangle the effects of partisan cues from those of cognitive mobilization.⁸⁰ We can only analyze the combined effects that the party vignette and

⁸⁰ This is due to restrictions on my experimental setup imposed by YouGov.

the cognitive mobilization battery had on individual attitudes toward global democracy. When looking at individual voter groups (see Table 47, p. 378), we observe that global democracy attitudes in three subgroups were significantly affected by my treatments: First, Conservatives in the treatment group were less likely to support global democracy, and this finding is weakly statistically significant ($p < 0.1$). Second, voters of the Liberal Democrats were significantly more likely to support global democracy – a result that is statistically significant at conventional levels ($p < 0.05$). And third, voters of the Greens were significantly more likely to support global democracy, a finding that is highly statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). While there were no such significant differences between the control and treatment conditions among the other voter groups, it is noteworthy that in all three of the instances above the effect conformed with my partisan cues. That is, voters of the Conservatives, Liberal Democrats, and Greens all became less or more likely to favor global democracy in line with what my party vignette presented their preferred parties' stance as. Hence, this breakdown of my UK results provides further evidence for the theorized partisan mobilization effects – albeit, as in the other countries, not among all voter groups and with a different experimental setup.

Moving on to the US, we observe a weakly statistically significant ($p < 0.1$) partisan mobilization effect among voters of the Republican Party, but not among Democrats (see Table 28, p. 367). This aligns with our expectations and our knowledge of global democracy attitudes in the US more broadly. That is, a majority of respondents in my US survey support global democracy (see Figure 6, p. 148), and in fact 48 percent of Republicans do so too in the control condition (see Table 43, p. 376). Assuming that party allegiances in the US are stronger than elsewhere, it thus makes sense that Republican voters in the US are more likely than voters of parties elsewhere to be swayed by a partisan cue that their preferred party opposes global democracy. In fact, this seems to be what happened in my survey experiment.

Let us now proceed to examining the causal mechanisms theorized in Chapter Five. Given the slightly different survey designs, I split my analyses, focusing on Brazil, Germany, Japan, and the US first, and then moving to the UK. Let me begin with the former group. Based on my theoretical framework, we may expect two things: First, among partisans of global democracy-supporting parties, support for global democracy may increase in the partisan mobilization treatment group compared to the control group. Meanwhile, the number of weak global democracy opponents in this subgroup may decrease, as they are the most likely group to be swayed by partisan cues. Second, among partisans of global democracy-opposing parties, opposition to global democracy may increase after partisan mobilization, along with a decrease in weak global democracy supporters who are most likely to be swayed by partisan cues. However, neither of these expectations is borne out by my survey experiments in Brazil, Germany, Japan, and the US. Among supporters of global democracy-endorsing parties, there are no statistically significant differences in the partisan mobilization control and treatment groups – neither the expected increase in global democracy support, nor the expected decrease in weak global democracy opposition (see Table 29, p. 368). Similarly, among supporters of global democracy-opposing parties, we do not observe the expected differences after partisan mobilization – neither the expected increase in opposition to global democracy, nor the expected decrease in weak global democracy support (see Table 30, p. 368). However, note that my survey experiments in Brazil, Germany, Japan, and the US were not ideally suited for examining the effects theorized in Chapter Five – specifically, due to the lack of a question on partisanship strength.

My UK survey allows us to study more specifically the extent to which the theoretical model outlined in the fifth chapter helps to explain the results we observe (see Table 31, p. 369, through Table 36, p. 372). In Chapter Five, I hypothesized that partisan mobilization should especially affect individuals with strong partisan identities but weak views on global democracy.

I expected such individuals to adjust their global democracy attitudes in line with their preferred party's stance in cases when such views conflicted. If these expectations are borne out, we should expect to observe the following in the treatment group compared to the control group: First, there should be fewer weak global democracy supporters and more global democracy opponents among strong supporters of global democracy-opposing parties. This is based on the assumption that weak global democracy supporters would be swayed by anti-global democracy cues from their strongly preferred party. Second, we would expect to see fewer weak global democracy opponents and more global democracy supporters among strong partisans of global democracy-supporting parties. This is based on the assumption that weak global democracy opponents would be swayed by pro-global democracy cues from their strongly preferred political party. However, neither expectation is confirmed by the empirical data. While there is indeed a statistically significant increase in moderately strong support for global democracy among strong partisans of global democracy-supporting parties (increasing from 15% to 43%), this change seems to be driven more by a shift from weak *supporters* (decreasing from 38% to 7%) rather than weak *opponents* of global democracy (decreasing from 9% to 5%) – see Table 36 (p. 372). In other words, the partisan mobilization treatments seems to *solidify* the (otherwise weak) views of strong partisans with respect to global democracy, but they do not generally change the valence of people's attitudes.

Overall, we may thus conclude that my experimental investigation of the potential effects of partisan mobilization on global democracy attitudes shows that among some important voter groups in a diverse set of countries – especially Japan, the UK, and the US – partisan cues can indeed be effective. However, such observations are far from universal, so that we cannot speak of strong partisan mobilization effects with respect to global democracy. Moreover, the theoretical expectations outlined in Chapter Five seem to have limited purchase with respect to the effects of partisan cues on global democracy attitudes. That is, contrary to

our expectations, the empirical data does not show weak global democracy supporters and opponents, who are strong partisans, to be swayed by their preferred party's position on global democracy and then switch their view on global democracy.

7.2) Cognitive mobilization

This subsection presents empirical results relating to my cognitive mobilization hypothesis (see Section 5.3.2), i.e. the expectation that – under particular circumstances of attitudinal dissonance – strong global democracy supporters or opponents may prefer a certain political party to another due to its stance on global democracy. The subsection proceeds as follows: I begin by discussing cognitive mobilization effects at the party-level for each country. I then move to heterogeneous treatment effect analyses in order to further explore the mechanisms theorized in Chapter Five, i.e. focusing on the subgroups of strong global democracy supporters and opponents across countries and in each country individually.

Let us begin with the case of Brazil again. Here, we do not observe cognitive mobilization effects for most parties (see Figure 144, p. 318, and Table 38, p. 374). However, cognitive mobilization does lead to a highly statistically significant ($p < 0.01$) decrease in support for NOVO, a weakly significant ($p < 0.1$) decrease for the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB), and a weakly significant increase ($p < 0.1$) in voting intentions for the Populist Socialist Party (PPS) – see Table 38 (p. 374). It is noteworthy that large majorities of NOVO and MDB voters in the control group endorse global democracy (see Table 37, p. 373), while my vignette presented both parties as opposed to global democracy.⁸¹ Hence, the reductions in vote shares due to cognitive mobilization may be interpreted as Brazilians' punishment for these parties' supposed opposition to global democracy. In other words,

⁸¹ PPS was presented as opposed to global democracy in my vignette. There were no PPS voters in my control group.

substantial numbers of potential NOVO and MDB voters were willing to vote for another party due to their support for global democracy. The observation of cognitive mobilization effects in Brazil is also worth noting, as it contrasts with the relative lack of partisan mobilization effects in this country (see Section 7.1). This indicates that cognitive mobilization effects may be more prevalent in countries in which partisan mobilization is rather less observed.

In Germany, my experiments yield perhaps the most politically consequential results. My cognitive mobilization treatment causes statistically significant increases in votes for the Greens ($p < 0.05$) and the Left ($p < 0.1$), significantly reduces ($p < 0.1$) the share of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), and does not significantly affect the remaining parties – see Figure 145 (p. 319) and Table 40 (p. 375). Once again, these results are especially intriguing in light of my vignette and global democracy preferences of the different voter groups: My vignette presented the Greens and the Left as supportive of global democracy, whereas the SPD was said to oppose global democracy (see Figure 43, p. 268). However, majorities of these three parties' voters in the control group supported global democracy (see Table 39, p. 374). Hence, the observed cognitive mobilization effect indicates that potential voters of other parties decided to vote for the Greens or the Left because of their support for global democracy, while the SPD was punished by its potential voters due to its opposition toward global democracy. While it would be intriguing to analyze if cognitive mobilization is directly responsible for voter migration between these left-leaning parties, the available data from my survey experiments unfortunately does not allow for such analyses because respondents in random control and treatment groups are only asked once about their voting intentions rather than before and after treatment. Nonetheless, as in Brazil, the observation of significant cognitive mobilization effects in Germany is noteworthy too, since it contrasts with the complete lack of partisan mobilization effects in this country (see Section 7.1). Once again, this shows that

cognitive mobilization may appear more, where partisan mobilization effects are less present – specifically in countries more fluid multi-party systems like those of Brazil and Germany.

In Japan, there are no discernible cognitive mobilization effects. That is, the vote shares of no party changes after the cognitive mobilization treatment and the presentation of my party vignette (see Figure 146, p. 320, and Table 42, p. 376). Once again, the comparison with my analysis above is noteworthy, which showed partisan mobilization effects in Japan – specifically, among voters of the Liberal Democratic Party (see Section 7.1). This is yet another illustration of the apparent tradeoff between cognitive and partisan mobilization effects in different countries.

Let us now move to the UK. While my analysis above did reveal noteworthy partisan mobilization effects among some voter groups in the UK – i.e. the Conservatives, the Liberal Democrats, and the Greens (see Section 7.1) – the only group for which voting intention proportions significantly differ after my cognitive mobilization treatment is the Brexit Party (see Figure 147, p. 321, and Table 49, p. 379), which is said to oppose global democracy. Its vote share increases from one to three percent – a weakly statistically significant increase ($p < 0.1$). Hence, once more, cognitive mobilization seems to be less prevalent in countries where partisan mobilization is more consistently observed – particularly in countries with long-established major parties such as the UK with the Conservatives and Labour.

In the US, we observe the same phenomenon as in the UK and Japan: While my analysis above (see Section 7.1) did reveal partisan mobilization effects among Republican voters, no cognitive mobilization effects are evident (see Figure 148, p. 322, and Table 44, p. 376). That is, once US citizens are motivated to consider global democracy thoroughly, including the two major parties' positions on it, vote shares in the population as a whole do not significantly change compared to the status quo. This solidifies the impression that either cognitive or partisan mobilization effects tend to be prevalent in countries; and that the former

are concentrated in fluid multi-party systems, while the latter are more consistently observed among voter groups of long-established major parties such as LDP in Japan, the Conservatives in the UK, and the Republicans in the US.

After analyzing the effects at the aggregate level, let us now move to a heterogeneous treatment effect analysis in order to study the causal mechanisms that I theorize in Chapter Five. To this end, I focus on the subgroups of strong global democracy supporters and opponents. Based on my theoretical framework, we may expect the following changes between the cognitive mobilization control and treatment groups: First, in the subgroup of strong global democracy supporters, the vote share of global democracy-opposing parties should be smaller in the treatment group compared to the control condition. Second, in the subgroup of strong global democracy opponents, the vote share of global democracy-supporting parties should be smaller in the treatment group compared to the control condition. However, neither of these expectations are consistently borne out in my survey experiments in Brazil, Germany, Japan, and the US. Table 45 (p. 377) presents the results for the subgroup of strong global democracy supporters in Brazil, Germany, Japan, and the US, as well as for the pooled sample of these four countries. While my theoretical model in Chapter Five may suggest that the vote shares of global democracy-opposing parties should decrease after cognitive mobilization among the subgroup of strong global democracy supporters, the results show no statistically significant differences confirming this. In fact, the only statistically significant difference ($p < 0.05$) is an *increase* in votes for global democracy-opposing parties in Germany. Table 46 (p. 377) shows the results for the subgroup of strong global democracy opponents. Again, while we may expect a decrease in the vote shared of global democracy-supporting parties, there are no statistically significant differences – neither in the pooled sample nor in any of the four countries.

Once again, we should note, however, that my analyses in Brazil, Germany, Japan, and the US does not quite capture the theoretical model in Chapter Five, given the lack of data on

partisanship strength (see Section 5.3.2). More specifically, my theoretical model in Chapter Five predicts that the vote shares of global democracy-supporting parties would decrease among people who strongly oppose global democracy *and have weak preferences for global democracy-supporting parties*. Conversely, my theory predicts that the vote shares of global democracy-opposing parties would decrease among people who strongly support global democracy *and have weak preferences for global democracy-opposing parties*. Since my UK survey did include a question on strength of partisanship, it allows for a deeper exploration of the extent to which the theorized mechanisms outlined in Chapter Five may drive effects on people's voting intentions.

Based on my theoretical model, I would expect the following in the treatment group compared to the control group in the UK: Among individuals who strongly support global democracy, we should see the proportion of voters of global democracy-supporting parties increase and the proportion of weak partisans of global democracy-opposing parties decrease. This is based on the assumption that some weak partisans of global democracy-opposing parties would come to strongly support global democracy following thorough consideration and then decide to change their party preference, endorsing a party that also supports global democracy. These expectations are confirmed by the data (see Table 50, p. 379, and Table 51, p. 380). First, the proportion of voters of global democracy-supporting parties among strong supporters of global democracy increases from 29 percent in the control condition to 44 percent in the treatment group – a difference that is statistically significant ($p < 0.05$). Second, as hypothesized, this difference does seem to be driven by a decrease in the proportion of weak partisans of global democracy-opposing parties among strong global democracy supporters, which is 41 percent in the control condition but only 27 percent in the treatment group – a statistically significant decrease ($p < 0.05$).

A second expectation deriving from my model in Chapter Five is that – in the treatment condition compared to the control condition – we should see more voters of global democracy-opposing parties and fewer weak partisans of global democracy-supporting parties among strong global democracy opponents. This is based on the assumption that weak partisans of global democracy-supporting parties, who become strong opponents of global democracy through deeper consideration, would then decide to adapt their party preference and endorse a party that also opposes global democracy. These expectations are also confirmed by the data (see Table 52, p. 380, and Table 53, p. 381). First, among strong global democracy opponents, voting intentions for global democracy-opposing parties indeed increase from 90 percent in the control condition to 96 percent in the treatment group – a statistically significant increase ($p < 0.05$). Second, as expected, this increase seems to be driven by decreases in weak partisans of global democracy-supporting parties among strong global democracy opponents, which amount to nine percent in the control condition but only one percent in the treatment condition – a highly significant difference ($p < 0.01$).

In general, we may thus conclude that the countries in my sample seem to be primarily affected either by partisan mobilization or by cognitive mobilization, rather than by both at the same time. This finding is in line with the classic formulation of these two theories as alternatives (Dalton 2007). Moreover, it is in line with my expectations that partisan mobilization would be more prevalent in countries with large parties that have long-established voter bases, whereas cognitive mobilization would be more likely in multiparty system with greater voter fluctuation. Specifically, in the case of my study, Brazil and Germany show more significant cognitive mobilization effects, while Japan, the UK, and the US provide good illustrations of dominant partisan mobilization effects.

Heterogeneous treatment effect analyses in Brazil, Germany, Japan, and the US do not provide evidence for the cognitive mobilization mechanisms theorized in Chapter Five.

However, the results of my UK survey, which is better suited for such subgroup analyses, do confirm the hypothesized mechanisms from Chapter Five: Weak partisans who have strong views on global democracy are willing to vote for another party due to the (supposed) discrepancy between their own global democracy views and the stance of their usually preferred national party on global democracy. The caveat here, of course, is that I am only able to demonstrate this effect for one country. However, more broadly my results show that – at least in some countries and among some voter groups – deeper thinking about global democracy, combined with domestic political parties' positioning in this respect, may affect national vote shares. In other words, my results indicate that global democracy could become a decisive political issue at the domestic level in some countries if and when national parties take a stance on it.

7.3) Attitudinal parallelism

My thesis of attitudinal parallelism in Chapter Five predicts that – under certain circumstances of weak global democracy attitudes and party preferences – citizens who experience an attitudinal dissonance between their own global democracy attitude and the stance of their preferred party on this matter would not notice the dissonance or accept it without adjusting either their global democracy attitude or their party preference. Among this subgroup of respondents, I thus expected to observe no treatment effects – neither through partisan cues nor cognitive mobilization.

Let me begin by considering the countries in my 2019 Dynata survey: Brazil, Germany, Japan, and the US. In these countries, my attitudinal parallelism hypothesis would suggest that among weak global democracy supporters and opponents who experience an attitudinal dissonance, i.e. by preferring a political party which does not share their view on global democracy, we would not expect to see any shifts in voting intentions. This is based on the assumption that imbalances between two weakly held attitudes are readily accepted. The

evidence confirms this expectation. Neither in the pooled sample of Brazil, Germany, Japan, and the US, nor in each of these countries individually, are there significant differences in the proportions of preferences for global democracy-supporting parties or global democracy-opposing parties in the control vs. treatment conditions among weak global democracy opponents and supporters respectively (see Table 54, p. 381, through Table 63, p. 386).

When considering potential differences in global democracy attitudes, we find the same. Based on my attitudinal parallelism hypothesis, we would not expect to see significant changes in the proportions of weak global democracy supporters and opponents among partisans of anti-global democracy and pro-global democracy parties respectively. This is borne out by the empirical results. There are no significant differences between the control and the treatment condition in terms of weak global democracy support among partisans of anti-global democracy parties. Conversely, there are no significant differences between the control and the treatment condition in terms of weak global democracy opposition among partisans of pro-global democracy parties (see Table 64, p. 386, through Table 73, p. 391).

My UK survey allows us to examine the theorized dynamics more closely. Specifically, we would expect that weak supporters of global democracy who also weakly support a political party opposed to global democracy would not adjust their global democracy attitudes or party preferences. This is indeed what we observe. Among weak partisans of global democracy-opposing parties, there is no statistically significant difference in the proportions of weak global democracy supporters between the control and treatment groups (see Table 74, p. 391). Similarly, among weak partisans of global democracy-supporting parties, there is no statistically significant difference in the proportions of weak global democracy opponents between the control and treatment groups (see Table 75, p. 392). In line with my attitudinal parallelism hypothesis, these findings indicate that preferences remain unaffected in cases of dissonance between two weak attitudes.

Finally, let us consider potential attitudinal parallelism with respect to party preferences in the UK. My attitudinal parallelism hypothesis in Chapter Five predicts that among weak global democracy supporters, weak partisans of global democracy-opposing parties should not be affected by the attitudinal dissonance that emerges. This is indeed what we observe when looking at the data (see Table 76, p. 392). Moreover, the attitudinal parallelism thesis predicts that among weak global democracy opponents, weak partisans of global democracy-supporting parties should not change their party preference because of the attitudinal dissonance they experience. Once again, this is indeed what the results show (see Table 77, p. 393). We can conclude that the attitudinal parallelism phenomenon is widespread, as expected. We observe attitudinal parallelism among weak global democracy supporters and opponents, as well as (weak) partisans in all countries.

7.4) Partisan expectations and self-delusion

Another universally observed interrelationship between global democracy attitudes and party preferences is that people tend to expect their preferred party to share their view on the issue of global democracy – a phenomenon that I call *partisan expectations*. This phenomenon appears even in cases where such a supposed position contravenes the overwhelming expectations of society as a whole regarding the global democracy stance of a party, thus bordering on what I call *partisan self-delusion*. Indeed, the partisan expectations effect is so strong that many respondents misremember their preferred party's supposed position. In such clear instances of partisan self-delusion, voters tend to mentally align their preferred party's global democracy stance with their own position on global democracy, even after they have been presented with (supposed) evidence to the contrary.

Let us begin with the case of Brazil again. Among the voters of the right-wing Social Liberal Party (PSL) of President Bolsonaro, 51 percent support global democracy, while 49 percent oppose it (see Table 37, p. 373). Among the 51 percent who support it, 77 percent

believe that the PSL supports it too, while among the global democracy-opposing PSL voters a majority of 53 percent believes that their party opposes global democracy as well (see Table 79, p. 395). These differences are highly statistically significant ($p < 0.01$), indicating that people's own positions regarding global democracy may affect their expectations regarding their preferred party's position on this issue. Given PSL's strongly nationalist agenda under President Bolsonaro, it seems somewhat unreasonable to expect the party to endorse global democracy. Thus, this partisan expectations finding can be said to border on partisan self-delusion. This effect becomes even clearer when considering the number of those who delude themselves, even after being presented with the supposedly true position of PSL on the issue of global democracy (see Table 80, p. 395). Remember that my vignette presented PSL as opposed to global democracy (see Figure 42, p. 265). While only 20 percent of those PSL voters who oppose global democracy themselves incorrectly remember their preferred party's position in my manipulation check, this proportion significantly increases ($p < 0.01$) to 41 percent when PSL voters are themselves in favor of global democracy. In other words, PSL voters are significantly more likely to misremember their preferred party's (supposed) position on global democracy if they support global democracy themselves – illustrating the phenomenon of partisan self-delusion.

The phenomena of partisan expectations and self-delusion are evident among voters of the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) as well. While PSDB may currently be classified as a center-right party on the Brazilian political spectrum, I placed it on the global democracy-supportive side of my party vignette, and indeed 63 percent of its voter base supports global democracy (see Table 37, p. 373). Among those PSDB voters who support global democracy themselves, only 13 percent expect that PSDB opposes global democracy, while 50 percent of PSDB voters who oppose global democracy themselves believe that PSDB rejects it (see Table 81, p. 396). This partisan expectations instance is highly statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). As

expected, significant levels of partisan self-delusion are observed among PSDB voters as well (see Table 82, p. 396): While only 17 percent of PSDB voters who support global democracy themselves erroneously place PSDB on the global democracy opposition side in my manipulation check, this figure increases to 46 percent among those PSDB voters who oppose global democracy – a statistically significant difference ($p < 0.05$).

Finally, similar patterns are observed among NOVO voters. As indicated above, 70 percent of them support global democracy (see Table 37, p. 373). When those NOVO voters who support global democracy are asked where their party stands, 95 percent believe that it supports global democracy, while among NOVO voters who oppose global democracy themselves only 50 percent believe that NOVO is supportive of the issue (see Table 83, p. 397). The difference in beliefs between these two groups is highly statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). The phenomenon of partisan expectations is reemphasized when analyzing NOVO voters' responses to my vignette reconstruction task which strongly indicate partisan self-delusion. Among those NOVO partisans who oppose global democracy themselves only ten percent remembered their party's supposed position incorrectly, while this proportion rises to 36 percent among those NOVO voters who support global democracy themselves (see Table 84, p. 397) – a statistically significant difference ($p < 0.01$).

The results regarding partisan expectations and self-delusion are not statistically significant in every case – partly due to the low subsample figures because of the large number of Brazilian parties included in my study. However, the general tendencies clearly indicate partisan expectation and self-delusion effects almost across the board in Brazil. There are two notable exceptions to this pattern: Voters of the formerly governing Workers' Party (PT) and the Green Party (PV) are exceptionally consistent in guessing their party's position regarding global democracy, and placing their party on the correct side of the global democracy support-opposition table after exposure to my party vignette, independently of where voters stand

themselves on the issue of global democracy (see Table 85, p. 398; Table 86, p. 398; and Table 87, p. 399). This deviation from the patterns of partisan expectations and self-delusion observed for other parties may be due to greater partisan attachments and thus greater attention paid to the party vignette. This seems a reasonable hypothesis in the case of PT, in particular, given the strongly polarizing effect that this party has in Brazilian society and the presumably strong party attachments of those voters who still support PT (Guidry 2003; Saad-Filho and Boito 2016). Another reason, perhaps especially applicable to PV, is that one position – global democracy opposition – appears too implausible to partisans, whether or not they support or oppose global democracy themselves (dos Santos 2008). Indeed, when asked about parties' global democracy positions, 62 percent of Brazilians believed that PV supports global democracy – the top value among all Brazilian parties included in my survey (see Table 78, p. 394).

The partisan expectations and self-delusion phenomena are evident in Germany as well. Let us begin with the case of the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD). Sixty-eight percent of SPD voters support global democracy (see Table 39, p. 374), and 70 percent of Germans believe that the SPD endorses global democracy (see Table 88, p. 399). Among those SPD voters who support global democracy, only 16 percent believe that their party opposes global democracy, whereas among those SPD voters who oppose global democracy 34 percent believe that their party shares this view (see Table 89, p. 400). While in line with the pattern of partisan expectations that we expect, these differences are not statistically significant at conventional levels. However, SPD voters did display significant levels of partisan self-delusion in my experiments (see Table 90, p. 400). Remember that my party vignette presents the SPD as opposed to global democracy (see Figure 43, p. 268). Among those SPD voters who oppose global democracy themselves 89 percent memorized this correctly, while the percentage of

correct recall decreases to 68 percent among those SPD voters who support global democracy, which constitutes a statistically significant difference ($p < 0.05$).

The case of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party provides an example of the power of partisan expectations in Germany. AfD supporters are the only voter group in Germany of whom a majority (55%) opposes the global democracy proposal (see Table 39, p. 374). Accordingly, there is overwhelming agreement that the AfD party is opposed to global democracy (see Table 88, p. 399). Yet, while only five percent of those AfD voters who oppose global democracy believe that their party supports global democracy, this proportion increases to 36 percent among those AfD voters who support global democracy – a clear case of partisan expectations which is highly statistically significant ($p < 0.01$) (see Table 91, p. 401), bordering on partisan self-delusion, given the improbability of a such a stance by the AfD. However, we observe no direct self-delusion effects among AfD supporters (Table 92, p. 401).

Finally, among voters of the Free Democratic Party (FDP), a libertarian party, the phenomenon of partisan expectations can be observed as well. More than two-thirds (73%) of FDP supporters endorse global democracy (see Table 39, p. 374). However, a majority of 57 percent in Germany believes that the FDP is opposed to global democracy (see Table 88, p. 399), and indeed my party vignette presented the FDP on the global democracy opposition side (see Figure 43, p. 268). Among FDP voters, 62 percent of those who support global democracy themselves believe that their party is supportive as well, while among those FDP voters who oppose global democracy themselves 72 percent believe that their preferred party does so as well (see Table 93, p. 402). This difference is statistically significant ($p < 0.1$) and constitutes a perfect example of partisan expectations with respect to global democracy. While partisan self-delusion effects among FDP voters are statistically insignificant at conventional levels ($p < 0.19$), the pattern is as we would expect (see Table 94, p. 402).

Although the other cases of partisan expectations and self-delusion in Germany are not statistically significant, the general pattern holds – once again, with one notable exception: Green voters in Germany consistently deem their party to be supportive of global democracy, independent of their own position on the matter (see Table 95, p. 403), and also perform exceptionally well in my vignette reconstruction task asking them to remember their party's position on global democracy (see Table 96, p. 403). As in Brazil, this exception may occur because the alternative position – opposition to global democracy – would seem so implausible for the Greens. Indeed, when asked about parties' positions on global democracy, 79 percent of Germans believed that the Greens support global democracy – the top value among the six leading German parties (see Table 88, p. 399).⁸²

In Japan, the partisan expectations phenomenon with regard to global democracy is omnipresent as well. First of all, we should note that a majority of Japanese overall and majorities in every single voter group endorse the proposal of global democracy (see Table 41, p. 375). Among voters of the leading governing party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 82 percent of those who support global democracy themselves believe that the LDP endorses it too, while among those LDP voters who oppose global democracy only 44 percent believe that the LDP endorses it (see Table 98, p. 404). This is a highly statistically significant difference ($p < 0.01$). Similarly, among voters of the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) who support global democracy 86 percent believe that the CDP endorses global democracy too, whereas only 40 percent of CDP voters who oppose global democracy think that their party supports the proposal (see Table 99, p. 405) – a difference that is highly statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). This pattern of partisan expectation holds true for voters of far-left and far-right parties as well.

⁸² Another reason that the party vignette may be easier to remember for Green voters in Germany is that their party is only one of two who are presented as supportive of global democracy. However, consistent results across countries for progressive parties point to the conjectured reason.

Among voters of the far-left Japanese Communist Party (JCP), 80 percent believe that their party supports global democracy if they themselves endorse the proposal, whereas 71 percent of those who oppose global democracy themselves believe that the JCP does so too (see Table 100, p. 405), which constitute statistically significant differences ($p < 0.05$). Finally, among voters of the far-right Japan Innovation Party (Ishin), 83 percent of those who support global democracy believe that Ishin does so too (bordering on partisan self-delusion), whereas 69 percent of Ishin voters who oppose global democracy believe that their party rejects the proposal as well (see Table 101, p. 406) – once again constituting a highly statistically significant difference ($p < 0.01$). As in Brazil and Germany, there is an exception to the rule of partisan expectations: Among voters of the Reiwa Shinsengumi party, there is significant agreement that their party supports global democracy, independently of how Reiwa voters themselves think about global democracy (see Table 102, p. 406) – and in line with my vignette (see Figure 44, p. 269). The reason for this strong agreement by partisans on Reiwa's global democracy positions may be similar to the Green parties in Brazil and Germany: The alternative position (opposition to global democracy) would seem too out-of-character for Reiwa, given that it positions itself as a progressivist force like Green parties elsewhere (Brasor 2019).

Perhaps the starkest example of the effects of partisan expectations and self-delusion is offered by the US case. First of all, we should remember that global democracy support is a majority position in the US, but that Democratic and Republican voters are divided on the issue with a clear majority of Democrats (71%) in favor and a majority of Republicans (52%) opposed (see Table 43, p. 376). This divide reflects guesses of the general population about the global democracy positions of these two parties: Whereas a 73 percent majority of Americans believes that the Democrats support global democracy, 68 percent believe that the Republicans oppose it (see Table 116, p. 413). However, there are significant divides *within* these two main voter camps on the issue of global democracy.

Among those 52 percent of Republican voters who oppose global democracy (see Table 43, p. 376), 73 percent believe that their party rejects the proposal too, whereas among those Republicans who support global democracy (48%), 67 percent believe that their party supports global democracy as well (see Table 117, p. 413), a difference that is highly statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). These strong partisan expectations are underscored by significant levels of partisan self-delusion among Republican voters with respect to global democracy. Among those Republicans who oppose global democracy 84 percent remembered my party vignette correctly by confirming that the Republican Party rejects global democracy (see Table 118, p. 413). Among Republicans who support global democracy, 43 percent failed to remember my party vignette correctly and stated that the Republican Party supports global democracy. The difference between these two groups is highly statistically significant ($p < 0.01$), providing a good demonstration of the partisan self-delusion phenomenon.

Both phenomena of partisan expectations and self-delusion are observed among Democrats as well, although the difference here lies in the consistency of majority opinions regarding the party's position. 88 percent of those 71 percent of Democrats who support global democracy (see Table 43, p. 376) believe that their party does so as well, while this figure decreases to 63 percent among those Democrats who oppose global democracy (see Table 119, p. 414). This difference is highly statistically significant ($p < 0.01$); yet it is different from the results that we observed among Republican voters in that a majority of the Democrats' voters think that their party supports global democracy – independent of their own beliefs on this issue. Nonetheless, this agreement on the Democratic Party's supposed position concerning global democracy does not preclude partisan self-delusion effects among Democrats (see Table 120, p. 414). Those respondents who vote for the Democratic Party and support global democracy remembered their party's position correctly at a rate of 94 percent, whereas only 83 percent of

those Democrats who oppose global democracy remembered my vignette correctly – a difference that is statistically significant at conventional levels ($p < 0.05$).

Moving on to the UK, let us begin by noting the distribution of global democracy attitudes by party preference. Similar to other countries and as expected, left-leaning voters tend to favor global democracy, while right-leaning voters tend to reject it (see Table 48, p. 378). Partisans of the Brexit Party, UKIP, and the Conservatives overwhelmingly reject global democracy with 77, 74, and 61 percent respectively. Meanwhile, voters of Plaid Cymru, the Greens, SNP, Labour, and the Liberal Democrats overwhelmingly support global democracy at proportions of between 61 and 88 percent. These tendencies are reflected in people's expectations concerning the respective parties' positions on global democracy. In contrast to my other survey countries, I only included questions on which global democracy stance citizens would expect the three major parties to take: Conservatives, Labour, and Liberal Democrats.⁸³ While 70 percent of UK citizens believe that the Conservative Party opposes global democracy, 60 and 67 percent respectively believe that the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats support global democracy (Table 103, p. 407).

Like in the other survey countries, we observe the partisan expectations phenomenon across the board in the UK (see Table 104, p. 407, through Table 115, p. 412). To start with the Conservatives, note that 70 percent believe that the Conservative Party opposes global democracy (see Table 103, p. 407). However, among Conservative voters only 61 percent believe that their party does so (see Table 104, p. 407). As my partisan expectations hypothesis in Chapter Five predicts, this difference appears to be driven by the personal global democracy attitudes of Conservative voters. Such individuals who are global democracy opponents themselves overwhelmingly (80%) believe that their party is opposed to global democracy as

⁸³ This limitation was due to space constraints imposed by YouGov.

well. Conversely, among Conservative partisans who are global democracy supporters, 70 percent believe that the Conservative Party supports global democracy as well. The difference between these two groups is clearly in line with my expectations, very substantial in magnitude, and highly statistically significant at conventional levels ($p < 0.01$) (see Table 104, p. 407). My theory in Chapter Five predicts that partisan expectations would be especially pronounced among strong partisans. Among strong Conservatives, we indeed observe very significant partisan expectations (see Table 105, p. 407). While 88 percent of those strong Conservatives who oppose global democracy themselves believe that their preferred party does so too, 63 percent of those who support global democracy themselves believe that their party shares this position. The difference between these proportions is highly statistically significant ($p < 0.01$).

Moving on to partisan self-delusion, the results are largely in line with the expectation that respondents tend to delude themselves about their preferred party's position on global democracy, bringing it in line with their personal attitude toward global democracy. Table 106 (p. 408) shows that 87 percent of Conservative voters remember their preferred party's supposed position on global democracy correctly, i.e. that the Conservative Party allegedly opposes global democracy. However, there is a substantial difference between global democracy opponents and supporters in this respect. While only four percent of the former group misremember their party's position, 29 percent of the latter group fail to remember the Conservative Party's position correctly. This difference is highly statistically significant ($p < 0.01$).

Due to its slightly different design – specifically, the inclusion of a question on partisanship strength – my UK survey allows for exploring the partisan expectations and self-delusion hypotheses more deeply in light of the theoretical framework of Chapter Five. Thus, let us now concentrate on the subgroup of strong Conservative partisans who are strong global democracy supporters, as my theoretical framework in Chapter Five predicts partisan self-

delusion effects especially among this subgroup. Specifically, I hypothesized that those who are strong global democracy supporters and also strong Conservative partisans (thus experiencing an attitudinal dissonance in light of my vignette which presents the Conservative Party as opposed to global democracy) should be more likely to delude themselves. That is, they should be more likely to convince themselves that the Conservative Party actually supports global democracy, even after being exposed to contradictory information. We observe that 84 percent of those who do not fall into the subgroup of strong Conservative partisans and strong global democracy supporters remember correctly (based on my vignette) that the Conservative Party (supposedly) opposes global democracy (Table 107, p. 408). Among individuals who are both strong Conservative partisans and strong global democracy supporters, i.e. the subgroup that my theoretical framework in Chapter Five expects to be most affected by partisan self-delusion, correct recall of the Conservative Party's position is at 79 percent and thus lower, as expected. However, given the small sample size of this subgroup ($n=18$), the statistical significance of this difference cannot be established ($p<0.62$).

Next, let us consider partisan expectations on the Labour Party's position with respect to global democracy. Among UK citizens, 60 percent believe that the Labour Party supports global democracy (Table 103, p. 407). The partisan expectations phenomenon becomes clear when considering the subgroup of Labour voters: Overall, 64 percent of them believe that their party supports global democracy (Table 108, p. 409). However, there is huge variation based on whether Labour voters support global democracy themselves or not. Among Labour partisans who support global democracy, 75 percent believe that their party supports global democracy as well. Meanwhile, among Labour partisans who oppose global democracy, 61 percent believe that the Labour Party opposes global democracy too. This difference is – once again – clearly in line with my partisan expectations hypothesis outlined in Chapter Five, substantively large, and highly statistically significant ($p<0.01$). Looking at strong Labour

partisans, in particular, confirms this picture (see Table 109, p. 409). In this subgroup, 57 percent of those who oppose global democracy themselves believe that the Labour Party does so too, while 82 percent of those who support global democracy themselves think that the Labour Party also endorses global democracy. This difference is highly statistically significant ($p < 0.01$).

A similar picture emerges for partisan self-delusion. 82 percent reconstruct the Labour Party's supposed position on global democracy correctly, i.e. that the Labour Party allegedly opposes global democracy (Table 110, p. 410). Once again, those Labour voters who oppose global democracy themselves are more likely to remember their preferred party's position correctly (85%), while 24 percent of those Labour voters who support global democracy themselves misremember their preferred party's position. The difference between the two groups is weakly statistically significant ($p < 0.1$). However, digging more deeply into the causal mechanisms theorized in Chapter Five, we observe a surprising result among individuals who are strong global democracy supporters as well as strong Labour partisans (and thus affected by the attitudinal dissonance that my vignette creates for them by presenting the Labour Party as opposed to global democracy). While in this subgroup 95 percent remember Labour's supposed global democracy position correctly, this proportion is 80 percent – and thus *smaller* – among individuals who do not belong to that subgroup (Table 111, p. 410). The direction of this difference is contrary to my expectation outlined in Chapter Five, as I would have expected such attitudinal dissonance to generate *more* partisan self-delusion among those affected by it. Moreover, the difference is substantial and statistically significant ($p < 0.05$). One potential explanation for this surprising result is that people – at least from specific voter groups – pay *more* attention to information that generate attitudinal dissonances, making them more likely to recall such information later.

Lastly, let us consider citizens' expectations on the Liberal Democrats' position on global democracy. Among UK citizens, 67 percent believe that the party supports global democracy (Table 103, p. 407). This figure increases to 77 percent among supporters of the Liberal Democrats (Table 112, p. 411). This difference is associated with people's own attitude toward global democracy: Among Liberal Democrat voters who support global democracy, 86 percent believe that their party does so too; while among Liberal Democrat voters who oppose global democracy, only 62 percent believe that their party supports global democracy. This difference is weakly statistically significant ($p < 0.1$) and thus provides further evidence for the partisan expectations hypothesis in Chapter Five.⁸⁴ Moreover, as in other survey countries, it should be noted that supporters of the Liberal Democrats – unlike Conservative and Labour partisans – are relatively consistent with respect to their preferred party's supposed stance on global democracy: Independently of whether these voters support or oppose global democracy themselves, a majority of them believes that the Liberal Democratic party supports global democracy. Once more, the explanation may be that opposition to global democracy would just be too uncharacteristic a position for the Liberal Democrats.

Moving on to partisan self-delusion, we observe a surprising result. 83 percent remember their party's alleged position on global democracy correctly, i.e. that the Liberal Democrats supposedly endorse global democracy (Table 114, p. 412). However, there is a significant difference between those Liberal Democrats who support global democracy themselves and those who oppose it – but in the opposite direction as expected: Among the former group, 72 percent remember their party's supposed position correctly; while among the latter group this proportion is even *higher* at 90 percent – a difference that is highly statistically

⁸⁴ The difference is statistically insignificant in the subgroup of strong Liberal Democrats in the control group (see Table 113, p. 411), but since this subgroup only consists of 7 individuals the results are not very meaningful.

significant ($p < 0.01$). As before, one possible explanation for this surprising finding may be that certain voter groups pay greater attention to instances of attitudinal dissonance and are thus able to recall them better. In order to explore the partisan self-delusion phenomenon among Liberal Democrats in greater depth, we need to look at the subgroup of strong partisans who are also strong global democracy opponents. However, the available data is insufficient to provide evidence in support or opposition of my specific hypothesis in Chapter Five: In my sample, there is no subgroup of strong Liberal Democrat partisans who are also strong opponents of global democracy, so it is not possible to test the hypothesis that this subgroup would be more prone to partisan self-delusion (Table 115, p. 412).

Overall, my findings in all surveyed countries show that the phenomenon of partisan expectations is highly prevalent with respect to global democracy. Indeed, these expectations seem to be so strong that many people delude themselves about their preferred party's stance on global democracy, even after being confronted with supposedly correct information to the contrary. However, the mechanism theorized in Chapter Five – whereby strong partisans with a strong but dissonant global democracy attitude should be most likely to display partisan self-delusion – is not unequivocally confirmed.

7.5) Data quality

I consider several measures to assure the quality of my data. The most problematic statistic are the high failure rates on my instructional manipulation check (see Figure 37, p. 263).⁸⁵ On average, 54 percent failed to respond correctly (see Table 125, p. 416). However, I should reiterate that, while this test was intended to filter out inattentive respondents, pre-testing on various language versions of my survey showed that respondents of different nationalities who were paying very close attention to my survey still failed to respond to this

⁸⁵ Due to space constraints imposed by YouGov, my UK survey did not contain this question.

question correctly. Thus, my instructional manipulation check was de facto more than merely an attention check; it also contained elements that apparently confused many respondents, thereby undoubtedly contributing to the high failure rates observed here.

The worrying results of my first attention check are qualified by my second measure of attention, the vignette reconstruction score, which evaluated how much of the party vignette table respondents could later reconstruct correctly (see Figure 91, p. 286). This attention check provides powerful evidence that most of my respondents were indeed quite attentive. In Brazil (see Figure 150, p. 323) and Japan (see Figure 152, p. 324), more than 60 and 50 percent of respondents respectively remembered more than half of the parties in my vignette table correctly. In Germany, 65 percent of respondents remembered all six parties correctly (see Figure 151, p. 324). In the UK, 67 percent of respondents remembered all parties' positions correctly (see Figure 153, p. 325).⁸⁶ Lastly, in the US, 76 percent remembered both parties' positions correctly (see Figure 154, p. 325). Thus, despite respondents' relatively weak performance on my instructional manipulation check, the vignette reconstruction task scores suggest that participants were paying quite close attention to my survey.

As an additional data quality measure, I employed a treatment manipulation check – the vignette belief check (see Figure 92, p. 287) – in which I used a question about the potential interrelationship between party preferences and global democracy preferences to evaluate if respondents believed the information in my vignette (see Section 6.2).⁸⁷ The results are encouraging. On average, 79 percent believed the party vignette, ranging from 74 percent in Germany to 85 percent in the US (see Table 126, p. 416). These values are good, considering that it intuitively seems somewhat implausible for a grand topic like global democracy not to

⁸⁶ Due to space constraints imposed by YouGov, my UK survey only included questions on the supposed global democracy positions of the Conservatives, Labour, and the Liberal Democrats.

⁸⁷ Due to space constraints imposed by YouGov, this question did not feature in my UK survey.

be more present in public debate if parties indeed had official positions on it. Thus, the fact that roughly four out five respondents in my surveys believed my vignette speaks for the plausibility of the choices I made in placing parties on the global democracy support and opposition sides and for the design of my vignette tables more generally (see Section 6.2).

We should remember that, in addition to the different measures outlined here, I employed various other data quality assurance mechanisms and robustness checks which I outlined in Chapters Three and Four. They showed, for example, that non-compliant respondents were successfully excluded and that robustness checks demonstrated the solidity of my results. Based on these diverse measures, I thus conclude that the quality of my experimental survey data is high.

7.6) Summary and discussion of results

In line with the expectations outlined in Chapter Five, the present chapter presents evidence for various phenomena: First, we observe significant instances of partisan mobilization effects – especially in Japan, the UK, and the US. As expected, these effects occur in countries with large parties that have long-established voter bases. Second, we note significant instances of cognitive mobilization in Brazil and Germany. Once again, as expected, these effects thus become especially apparent in countries and under circumstances of multi-party electoral systems with fluctuating voter bases. Third, attitudinal parallelism is observed across countries as I expect in Chapter Five, given that weak global democracy attitudes and party preferences are widespread. Fourth, the phenomena of partisan expectations and self-delusion are common across countries, as citizens strive for consistency between their various attitudes and thus bring their global democracy views and party preferences in line with each other – often even in the face of (supposed) evidence to the contrary.

For practical politics, the main upshots are the following: On the one hand, there are some voter group (e.g. LDP partisans in Japan and Republicans in the US) whose global

democracy attitudes are contingent on cues that they receive from their preferred party. As on many issues that have been studied in the literature, my experiments thus evidence the enormous sway that parties have over the policy preferences of their voter base. Conversely, other voter groups (e.g. NOVO sympathizers in Brazil and left-leaning voters in Germany) evidently consider global democracy positions a criterion for choosing which party to vote for. Specifically, my experiments show that some voters appear willing to punish or reward political parties like NOVO in Brazil, the SPD in Germany, or the Brexit Party in the UK which are said to oppose global democracy; or parties like the Greens and the Left in Germany, which seem to support global democracy. For such parties my experiments bear especially important implications, as they demonstrate if global democracy advocacy or opposition could be a viable strategy to receive a greater vote share at the national level. We may therefore conclude that, while global democracy is not an issue in political debates at the national level yet, if and when this does happen, the evidence here indicates that in some cases it may well become a decisive one, given people's willingness to take action toward global democratization when exposed to the idea – even such consequential action as voting for a political party.

8) Conclusion

In this dissertation, I explored to what extent and why people around the world support or oppose global democracy. I took global crises like climate change and the Covid-19 pandemic, as well as associated debates about world order such as the resurgence of nationalism and the alternative vision of more powerful and more representative global governance institutions as my starting point. I then moved to outlining the scholarly literatures that my thesis contributes to, i.e. normative arguments on global democracy, empirical debates about the legitimacy of global governance institutions, and psychological work on the foundations of cosmopolitan attitudes (e.g. Archibugi, Koenig-Archibugi, and Marchetti 2012a; Bayram 2015; Tallberg et al. 2018; Zürn 2018; Cabrera 2020).

Building on research in the fields of Political Science and Psychology, in particular, I developed a novel theoretical framework on individual attitudes and actions concerning global democracy, which I conceptualized in constitutionalist terms as composed of a world parliament and/or government. My framework starts with genetic and socio-environmental influences as the fundamental drivers of political attitudes and then theorizes related interests and values – especially procedural and instrumental motives – as proximate drivers of global democracy attitudes. Moreover, I theorize that political knowledge and feasibility beliefs potentially condition people's attitudes and willingness to act. I hypothesize the strength of individual attitudes to be a key driver behind people's willingness to take action in support or opposition of global democracy: Stronger attitudes are more likely to cause people to be willing to take high-cost action on global democracy, while weaker attitudes make people more prone to be willing to take low-cost action (if any) on global democracy.

Chapters Five through Seven explored the interrelation of individual global democracy attitudes with one particular kind of socio-environmental influence, i.e. political parties at the national level, and one specific type of willingness to act, namely citizens' voting intentions.

Focusing on attitudinal centrality as a core concept and taking attitudinal dissonance as a starting point, I theorized four different scenarios: first, partisan mobilization, i.e. the scenario in which the greater centrality of preferences for political parties leads strong partisans to adapt their global democracy attitudes in the face of evident dissonance between their party preferences and global democracy views; second, cognitive mobilization, i.e. the scenario in which the greater centrality of global democracy attitudes leads strong supporters or opponents to change their party preference and support a party that shares their view on global democracy; third, attitudinal parallelism, i.e. the scenario in which both global democracy attitudes and party preferences are of relatively low centrality such that people are readily willing to accept attitudinal dissonance in this respect; and fourth, partisan self-delusion, i.e. the scenario in which both global democracy attitudes and party preferences are central, such that some people delude themselves about their party's position on global democracy, even in the face of evidence to the contrary.

In order to test expectations arising out of my broader theoretical framework, as well as the specific interrelationship between individual preferences for political parties and global democracy attitudes, I conducted survey experiments on nationwide samples of citizens in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US – in collaboration with the survey firms Dynata and YouGov – in 2019 and 2020. These samples were weighted for national representativeness along at least four dimensions: age, gender, region, and party preference. I conducted observational analyses using the standard method of multivariate regressions. For my survey experiments, I used vignette treatments exposing respondents to the supposed positions of national political parties with respect to global democracy (i.e. the partisan mobilization treatment) and batteries of questions about global democracy, which served to stimulate people's thoughts about global democracy (i.e. cognitive mobilization).

My main results are as follows: First, clear majorities of citizens in all surveyed countries endorse global democracy in its constitutionalist form, composed of a world parliament and global government – with international average support at 65 percent, ranging from 57 percent in the UK to 74 percent in Japan. Second, public attitudes toward global democracy are most consistently driven by instrumental considerations – especially a concern for international peace and climate change – as well as procedural motives, e.g. belief in the importance of enabling public participation in world politics. Third, relative majorities of those who are willing to take political action on the issue of global democracy prefer to take low-cost actions such as signing online petitions rather than high-cost actions like donating money. Nevertheless, my survey experiments show occasional cognitive mobilization effects, i.e. that in different countries, characterized by relatively fluid multi-party systems, an important attitude for political behavior – people’s voting intention – is affected by deeper thinking about global democracy and the supposed positions of political parties on this issue. For instance, in Germany, left-leaning parties that are said to support global democracy benefit significantly in terms of expected vote shares. In other countries – characterized by long-established major parties – we tend to observe partisan mobilization effects, i.e. that voters of certain parties follow their preferred parties’ cues and adapt their global democracy attitudes accordingly. We thus observe that there seems to be a tradeoff between partisan and cognitive mobilization, as we tend to observe one or the other more strongly in each of the surveyed countries. In contrast, a universal phenomenon across all countries is that large proportions of the population seem to be affected by attitudinal parallelism. That is, they seem to retain their party preferences and global democracy attitudes, despite potential dissonance between them – possibly because both attitudes are often rather weak. Finally, another universal phenomenon across countries is that of partisan expectations. That is, partisans generally tend to believe – and frequently delude themselves – that their preferred party shares their own view on global democracy. This even

applies in cases where such a party position would seem highly unlikely, e.g. right-wing parties such as PSL in Brazil, AfD in Germany, Ishin in Japan, Conservatives in the UK, and Republicans in the US.

My findings bear significant practical implications. First, they embolden global democracy advocates around the world as they show that majorities of citizens in various countries support their calls for stronger and more representative global governance institutions. At the same time, my results provide reasons for such activists to be more cautious in certain contexts, given that the strength of support and opposition varies greatly across countries. For example, while Japan has the highest average rate of support for global democracy, it also features the lowest proportion of *strong* supporters. Moreover, while majorities in the UK and the US are in favor of global democracy, these two countries also feature an exceptionally high proportion of *strong opponents* of global democracy. My results thus constitute a mixed bag for global democracy advocates: While they are encouraging overall, they indicate which kinds of resistance such advocates may face along their path.

Second, in the context of national politics, my results show that some leading parties in key countries could potentially gain significant vote shares if they adopt global democracy advocacy as a campaign topic. The aforementioned example of left-leaning parties in Germany is a case in point. However, it should be highlighted that this is the result of a controlled survey experiment, in which the causal relationship between supposed global democracy positions of political parties and people's voting intentions can be directly identified. This means that the expected effects of parties' global democracy support and opposition in individual countries, in these hypothetical constellations, at the time that my surveys took place, are clear; but this is not to say of course that such gains or losses in terms of vote shares would necessarily follow in the real world. In practical politics there are many more factors and interdependencies at play that affect people's party preferences. The intention of my survey experiments was not to

model this complexity. Instead, my goal was to *isolate* the expected effects on people's voting intentions caused by considerations of arguments for and against global democracy, combined with the (hypothetical) global democracy positions of political parties. As such, my results are useful for political parties to consider, but do not foresee all consequences – both positive and negative – that positioning on global democracy may entail.

In addition to such practical implications, my study contributes to the academic literature in various ways. First, my dissertation contributes in different ways to the normative literature on global democracy. For instance, it contravenes a commonly held assumption among normative theorists that people worldwide would not support global democracy. Rather, it shows that there is widespread international support for this idea. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the least supportive nations in my sample – on average – are the UK and the US, i.e. two countries where large numbers of scholars writing about these topics come from. Such scholars' claims that majorities worldwide do not support global democracy (e.g. Miller 2010; Yunker 2011) may reflect relatively widespread opposition – and disproportionately high numbers of strong opponents – in their own home countries; but my study shows that their empirical assumptions are neither justified with respect to the populations of their home countries, nor in relation to other nations.

Second, with regard to the empirical literature on the legitimacy of global governance, my dissertation adds an important missing piece. Thus far, scholars have concentrated primarily on the perceived legitimacy of *existing* global governance institutions (e.g. Tallberg et al. 2018; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2020) and attitudes toward proposed *reforms* of international organizations like the UN (Ghassim et al. 2020). My thesis constitutes the first comprehensive investigation of international public opinion with respect to global democracy – one of the most popular *long-term visions* for global governance among normative theorists in recent decades. Third, my study advances ongoing debates on the psychological foundations of

cosmopolitanism. Extant work has focused on exploring the drivers of *moral* cosmopolitanism (e.g. Reysen and Katzarska-Miller 2013, 2018; Bayram 2015, 2017). My dissertation complements this literature with a novel theoretical framework and in-depth analyses on manifold drivers of *institutional* cosmopolitanism – from socio-environmental factors, to interests and values, to political knowledge and feasibility beliefs.

There are many promising avenues for further research. For one, my sample of countries – while stretching across the globe – is nonetheless limited in several respects. For instance, all countries in my sample are relatively powerful, populous, and democratic. Hence, an important extension of my study would be to broaden the sample of countries by including less powerful, populous, and democratic countries in a future iteration of this survey. Another way of building on the current study would be to deepen its exploration. There are many parts of my theoretical framework in Chapter Two that remain to be explored. For example, genetic influences have been bracketed completely as an explanatory factor here; even though scholars have been very interested in the biological underpinnings of political attitudes (e.g. Alford et al. 2005; Hatemi et al. 2009). Conducting such research specifically on the topic of global democracy – or more broadly, global governance – would make for a fascinating extension and deepening of my study. However, there are of course also more conventional aspects of my theoretical framework to be explored more thoroughly. For instance, while I focused on one particular socio-environmental influence (i.e. political parties) and one specific political action (i.e. voting intentions as the attitudinal precursor to the act of voting), there are many other such influences and actions that scholars may explore – from the influence of NGOs to the act of political protest.

As humanity faces several global crises – from the Covid-19 pandemic to climate change – the necessity of effective and democratic global governance seems evident to many people. Yet, while majorities of citizens around the world may support a fundamental

transformation of global politics, many others are vehemently opposed, as this study indicates. My dissertation thus constitutes a small piece in the puzzle of humanity's trajectory in the twenty-first century – a puzzle for which there are many paths to failure, and various potential solutions.

Figures

Figure 16: Survey on the creation of a directly elected UN Parliament

Survey question:

“The United Nations is currently exploring possible reforms. Please tell me if you favor or oppose each of the following proposals.”

“Creating a new UN Parliament, made up of representatives directly elected by citizens, having powers equal to the current UN General Assembly that is controlled by national governments.”



Note: For presentational purposes, I combined the categories “Depends”, “Neither”, and “Don’t know” into one category. Deviations from 100% in each row are due to rounding.


Source: GlobeScan 2005, pp. 3-4

Figure 17: Survey on the direct election of representatives to the UN General Assembly

Survey question:

“The United Nations is currently exploring possible reforms. Please tell me if you favor or oppose each of the following proposals.”

“Having your country's official representative to the United Nations General Assembly be elected by the people of your country.”



Note: For presentational purposes, I combined the categories “Depends”, “Neither”, and “Don’t know” into one category. Deviations from 100% in each row are due to rounding.


Source: GlobeScan 2005, pp. 1-2

Figure 18: Survey on giving NGOs and businesses a formal role in shaping UN work

Survey question:

“The United Nations is currently exploring possible reforms. Please tell me if you favor or oppose each of the following proposals.”

“Giving leaders of major environmental and social groups, trade unions, and business organizations a formal role in shaping United Nations policies and actions, rather than having only government leaders do this.”




Note: For presentational purposes, I combined the categories “Depends”, “Neither”, and “Don’t know” into one category. Deviations from 100% in each row are due to rounding.

Source: GlobeScan 2005, pp. 5-6

Figure 19: Survey on the establishment of a global parliament

Survey question:

“How likely would you be to support a Global Parliament, where votes are based on country population sizes, and the global parliament is able to make binding policies?”




Note: The international averages are not reported by Synovate but calculated by me as the arithmetic mean of all country results. Deviations from 100% in each row are due to rounding.

Source: Synovate 2007, pp. 9-10

Figure 20: 2014 survey on the creation of a new supranational organization

Survey question:

“Do you think a new supranational entity should be established to take enforceable global decisions in order to solve global problems such as climate change, environmental pollution, war and poverty?”




Note: Deviations from 100% in each row are due to rounding.

Source: Global Challenges Foundation 2014, p. 48

Figure 21: 2017 survey on the creation of a new supranational organization

Survey question:

“A supranational organisation is an international body comprised of different member countries. It does not replace national governments, but places global interests above that of nation-states. Examples of supranational organisations include the European Union, NATO, and the United Nations. Do you think that a new supranational organisation should be created to make enforceable global decisions to address global risks?”




Note: This table is based on a non-publicly available dataset which was generously provided by ComRes and the Global Challenges Foundation. The data reflects the summary results reported by ComRes and the Global Challenges Foundation (2017, p. 18). Deviations from 100% in each row are due to rounding.

Source: Global Challenges Foundation and ComRes 2017

Figure 22: 2018 survey on the creation of a new supranational organization

Survey question:

“To what extent do you agree that a new supranational organisation should be created to make enforceable global decisions to address global risks?”



Note: This table is based on a non-publicly available dataset which was generously provided by ComRes and the Global Challenges Foundation. The data reflects the summary results reported by ComRes and the Global Challenges Foundation (2018, p. 38). Deviations from 100% in each row are due to rounding.

Source: Global Challenges Foundation and ComRes 2018

Figure 23: Consent form – part 1



General Information

We appreciate your interest in completing this online survey. Please read through these terms before agreeing to participate by confirming that you are at least 18 years old and ticking the "yes" box below.

The principal researcher on this project is Farsan Ghassim, a DPhil student in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford. His doctoral research, including this project, is conducted under the supervision of Professor Karolina Milewicz. This survey is implemented in collaboration with the survey company Dynata, using software of the service provider Qualtrics.

In this project, we are investigating public opinion with regard to certain current affairs. You will be asked to answer various questions throughout this survey, which include your opinions on political issues and other topics that you may consider sensitive. The survey should take about ten minutes. No background knowledge is required. The responses you provide will be used for the purposes of Farsan Ghassim's doctoral dissertation and other potential scientific publications. This research is conducted in the public interest.

Do you have to take part?

Your participation is voluntary. You may withdraw at any point during the survey for any reason, before submitting your answers, by closing your browser window. Please note that it will be more difficult to withdraw your consent after completing the survey because the researcher's dataset will not contain your real name. If you want to withdraw your consent after finishing the survey, but do not want your identity to be revealed to the researcher, please contact Dynata (<https://www.dynata.com/company/contact/>) and ask them to get in touch with the researcher on your behalf.

Please note that we reserve the right to only reimburse participants who complete the survey in good faith and consent to the use of their response data. Questions are generally optional. However, we expect you to only skip those questions that you find too sensitive to answer, or which you truly cannot answer even after giving them some thought. We will run relevant checks before making final decisions on reimbursements of participants.

What data will be used and how?

Your answers will be pseudonymized. This means that any data which may allow us to uncover your true identity will not be accessible to the researcher, while your response data will not be passed on to Dynata who may know your real name. Moreover, we will use all reasonable endeavors to keep your personal data confidential, i.e. not disclose it to the public. However, please note that complete confidentiality during internet communication procedures can never be guaranteed.

Your data may be used in academic publications. Your IP address will not be saved by the researcher. Research data will be stored for a minimum of three years after publication or public release in line with University of Oxford regulations, requirements of funders, scientific journal guidelines, and applicable laws. The data that we collect from you may be transferred to, and stored or processed at, a destination outside the European Economic Area ("EEA"). By submitting your personal data, you agree to this transfer, storing or processing. Moreover, please note that your data may be saved by Qualtrics on backups or server logs beyond the timeframe of this research project.

Figure 24: Consent form – part 2

Who will have access to your data?

Dynata is the data controller with respect to your personal data and, as such, determines how this data is used. Please see their privacy notice here:

<https://www.dynata.com/privacy-policy/>. Your responses are recorded in pseudonymous form on a password-protected Qualtrics account. Qualtrics is a service provider for conducting online surveys and adheres to EU-US Privacy Shield regulations. The University of Oxford will obtain only fully pseudonymized data from Qualtrics for the purposes of this research project.

This project has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through, the University of Oxford Central University Research Ethics Committee [reference number: SSH_DPIR_C1A_19_020]. Responsible members of the University of Oxford and funders may be given access to the survey data for monitoring and/or audit of the study to ensure that we are complying with relevant guidelines, or as otherwise required by law.

We would like your permission to use your pseudonymous response data in scientific studies, and to share this data with other researchers (e.g. in online databases). No personal information that could identify you will be shared with other researchers or made public. The principal researcher would be glad to provide you with feedback on the study's results upon your request.

What if there is a problem?

If you are concerned about any aspect of this project, please contact the researcher, Farsan Ghassim (farsan.ghassim@univ.ox.ac.uk), or his supervisor, Professor Karolina Milewicz (karolina.milewicz@univ.ox.ac.uk), either directly or through Dynata (<https://www.dynata.com/company/contact/>). We will do our best to answer your query. The researcher should acknowledge your concern within ten working days and give you an indication of how he intends to deal with it. If you remain unhappy or wish to make a formal complaint, please contact the Chair of the Social Sciences & Humanities Inter-Divisional Research Ethics Committee at the University of Oxford:

- E-mail: ethics@socsci.ox.ac.uk
- Address: Research Services, University of Oxford, Wellington Square, Oxford, OX1 2JD, United Kingdom

The Chair will seek to resolve the matter in a reasonably expeditious manner.

This research project is designed to be consistent with the *Data Protection Act 2018* of the United Kingdom and the *General Data Protection Regulation* of the European Union. Please refer to these sources for further information on your rights as a participant in this research project.

Consent

Please note that you may only participate in this survey if you are at least 18 years old.

I certify that I am 18 years of age or over.

If you have read the information above and agree to participate with the understanding that the responses you submit will be processed accordingly (in pseudonymous form), please check the relevant box below to start the survey.

Yes, I agree to take part in this survey.



Figure 25: Illustration of consent form validations

Consent

Please note that you may only participate in this survey if you are at least 18 years old.

I certify that I am 18 years of age or over.

If you want to proceed, you need to read and confirm the following by clicking on the button below.

If you have read the information above and agree to participate with the understanding that the responses you submit will be processed accordingly (in pseudonymous form), please check the relevant box below to start the survey.

Yes, I agree to take part in this survey.



Figure 26: Self-commitment on skipping questions

Please remember from the consent form that questions in this survey are generally optional. However, the quality of our research depends on your responses being as comprehensive as possible. Thus, we kindly ask you to only skip those questions that you consider too sensitive or which you truly cannot answer, even after thinking about them carefully. Do you agree to comply with this?

Yes

No

Figure 27: Question on gender

What is your gender?

☐ Female

☐ Male

☐ Other gender:

Figure 28: Question on age

How old are you?

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
years





Figure 29: Illustration of question on respondents' region of residence

In which part of the country do you live?

| |
|--|
| Baden-Württemberg |
| Bayern (Bavaria) |
| Berlin |
| Brandenburg |
| Bremen |
| Hamburg |
| Hessen (Hesse) |
| Mecklenburg-Vorpommern |
| Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony) |
| Nordrhein-Westfalen (North Rhine-Westphalia) |
| Rheinland-Pfalz (Rhineland-Palatinate) |
| Saarland |
| Sachsen (Saxony) |
| Sachsen-Anhalt (Saxony-Anhalt) |
| Schleswig-Holstein |
| Thüringen (Thuringia) |
| I don't live in Germany, but in: |
| <input type="text"/> |

Figure 30: Pop-up prompt to request responses


Response Requested

There are 5 unanswered questions on this page. Would you like to continue?

Continue Without Answering Answer the Questions

Figure 31: Slider question clarifications


On each of the following scales from 1 to 6, please indicate which of the two statements you agree with more and how strongly you do so. The score 1 means that you completely agree with the statement on the left, 6 means that you completely agree with the statement on the right, and 2 to 5 indicate weaker agreement with one of the two sides. In order to provide an answer, you must click on the slider at least once or pull it to where you want it.

Figure 32: Question on economic left-right position


"Our country's government should take more responsibility to ensure that every citizen is provided for."

"Citizens of this country should take more responsibility to provide for themselves."

1 2 3 4 5 6

Figure 33: Question on cultural left-right position


"Every citizen of this country should live in whichever way he/she likes."

"Every citizen should live according to this country's cultural norms."

1 2 3 4 5 6

Figure 34: Matrix question on political activeness

How often have you ...

| | Never | Rarely | Sometimes | Often |
|---|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| ... signed online petitions on political issues? | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ... posted political content on social media platforms like Facebook? | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| ... donated money to political causes? | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

Figure 35: Question on interest in world politics

How interested or uninterested are you in world politics?

| | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|------------|----------------------|
| Not interested at all | Not interested | Rather not interested | Rather interested | Interested | Highly interested |
|-----------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|------------|----------------------|

Figure 36: Question on frequency of discussions about world politics

How often do you discuss world politics with your family, friends, or colleagues?

| | | | |
|-------|--------|-----------|-------|
| Never | Rarely | Sometimes | Often |
|-------|--------|-----------|-------|

Figure 37: Instructional manipulation check

Some people get most of their news from traditional sources like TV programs or newspapers, whereas others go online or receive their news from social media. However, this question is actually not designed to tell us where you get your news. It is a standard attention check to determine if participants read this far in the question. Please only select Other below, type the number 8 in the box, and ignore the following question. What is your most important news source?



The image shows a survey interface with a list of news sources. The first option, 'Television', is highlighted with a blue border. Below it are 'Radio', 'Newspapers', 'News websites or apps', 'Facebook', 'YouTube', and 'Other:'. Under the 'Other:' label is a small, empty rectangular text input box.

Television

Radio

Newspapers

News websites or apps

Facebook


YouTube

Other:

Figure 38: Self-commitment on external sources

Thank you very much for reading our questions carefully. For the quality of our research, it is very important that respondents pay close attention to this survey.

Now would you please confirm that you will complete this survey without talking to others, searching for answers on the internet, or using other external sources?



The image shows two radio button options. The first option is 'Yes, I confirm.' and the second option is 'No, I do not confirm.'.

Yes, I confirm.

No, I do not confirm.

Figure 39: Illustration of answering speed validation

Please allow yourself sufficient time to read and answer our questions carefully.

Thank you very much for reading our questions carefully. For the quality of our research, it is very important that respondents pay close attention to this survey.

Now would you please confirm that you will complete this survey without talking to others, searching for answers on the internet, or using other external sources?

Yes, I confirm.

No, I do not confirm.

←

→

Figure 40: Illustration of introductory text and reading speed validation

Please allow yourself enough time to read this text carefully.

Please read the following text carefully:

There is a debate about the idea of global democracy. The term “global democracy” refers to proposals for institutions that would be democratic and aimed at global issues. “Democratic” here means representing the world population. Examples of “global issues” are international peace, world poverty, and climate change.

Some global democracy advocates propose establishing a **world parliament**, directly elected by the world population, to **recommend** policies on global issues. Instead of a world parliament, others advocate creating a **global government** to **implement** policies on global issues. Yet others suggest forming a **global democracy including both a world parliament and a global government**. Proponents of such institutions generally agree that national parliaments and governments should still address issues that are not global. Finally, other people oppose proposals for global democracy altogether.

→

Figure 41: Illustration of partisan expectations question

What do you think: Which political parties in the Germany support global democracy, and which ones oppose it?

| | Support for global democracy | Opposition to global democracy |
|---|------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Christian Democratic Union / Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Social Democratic Party (SPD) | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Alternative for Germany (AfD) | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Free Democratic Party (FDP) | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| The Left (Linke) | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Alliance 90 / The Greens (Grüne) | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

Figure 42: Party vignette for Brazil

Please pay close attention, as this will be important to recall later in the survey.

The following table shows the positions of some political parties in Brazil on the issue of global democracy:

| Support for global democracy | Opposition to global democracy |
|--|--|
|  <p>Workers' Party / Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT)</p>  <p>Brazilian Social Democracy Party / Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB)</p>  <p>Brazilian Socialist Party / Partido Socialista Brasileiro (PSB)</p> |  <p>Social Liberal Party / Partido Social Liberal (PSL)</p>  <p>Social Democratic Party / Partido Social Democrático (PSD)</p>  <p>Progressistas</p> |

| | |
|--|--|
|  <p>PDT 12 Democratic Labour Party / Partido Democrático Trabalhista (PDT)</p>  <p>PSOL Socialism and Liberty Party / Partido Socialismo e Liberdade (PSOL)</p>  <p>podemos Podemos</p>  <p>Green Party / Partido Verde (PV)</p>  <p>Communist Party of Brazil / Partido Comunista do Brasil (PCdoB)</p> |  <p>Brazilian Democratic Movement / Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB)</p>  <p>Liberal Party / Partido Liberal (PL)</p>  <p>Brazilian Republican Party / Partido Republicano Brasileiro (PRB)</p>  <p>DEMOCRATAS Democrats / Democratas (DEM)</p>  <p>New Party / Partido Novo (NOVO)</p>  <p>Republican Party of the Social Order / Partido Republicano da Ordem Social (PROS)</p>  <p>Brazilian Labour Party / Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB)</p> |
|--|--|

| | |
|--|--|
| |  <p>Solidariedade</p>  <p>Avante</p>  <p>Social Christian Party / Partido Social Cristão (PSC)</p>  <p>Popular Socialist Party / Partido Popular Socialista (PPS)</p>  <p>Patriota</p> |
|--|--|

Figure 43: Party vignette for Germany

Please pay close attention, as this will be important to recall later in the survey.

The following table shows the positions of some political parties in Germany on the issue of global democracy:







| Support for global democracy | Opposition to global democracy |
|---|--|
|  <p>Alliance 90 / The Greens</p>  <p>The Left</p> |  <p>Christian Democratic Union / Christian Social Union</p>  <p>Social Democratic Party</p>  <p>Alternative for Germany</p>  <p>Free Democratic Party</p> |

Figure 44: Party vignette for Japan

Please pay close attention, as this will be important to recall later in the survey.

The following table shows the positions of some political parties in Japan on the issue of global democracy:









| Support for global democracy | Opposition to global democracy |
|---|--|
|  <p>Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) / Rikken-minshutō (Rikkentō)</p> |  <p>Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) / Jiyū-Minshutō (Jimintō)</p> |
|  <p>Komeito</p> |  <p>Japan Innovation Party / Nippon Ishin no Kai</p> |
|  <p>Japanese Communist Party (JCP) / Nihon Kyōsan-tō</p> |  <p>Democratic Party for the People (DPP) / Kokumin-minshutō</p> |
|  <p>Reiwa Shinsengumi</p> |  <p>Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) / Shakai Minshu-tō (Shamin-tō)</p> |

Figure 45: Party vignette for USA

Please pay close attention, as this will be important to recall later in the survey.

The following table shows the positions of some political parties in the United States on the issue of global democracy:



| Support for global democracy | Opposition to global democracy |
|---|--|
|  Democratic Party |  Republican Party |

Figure 46: Illustration of viewing speed validation on vignette treatment

Please give yourself enough time to take in the information on this page.

Please pay close attention, as this will be important to recall later in the survey.

The following table shows the positions of some political parties in Germany on the issue of global democracy:

| Support for global democracy | Opposition to global democracy |
|---|--|
|  <p>Alliance 90 / The Greens</p>  <p>The Left</p> |  <p>Christian Democratic Union / Christian Social Union</p>  <p>Social Democratic Party</p>  <p>Alternative for Germany</p>  <p>Free Democratic Party</p> |



Figure 47: Question on importance of global democracy

How important or unimportant is the issue of global democracy to you?

| | | | | | |
|----------------------------|------------------|----------------------------|---------------------|-----------|---------------------|
| Not important at all | Not important | Rather not important | Rather important | Important | Highly important |
|----------------------------|------------------|----------------------------|---------------------|-----------|---------------------|

Figure 48: Open comment question on global democracy attitudes

It is very important for our research to understand your opinion on global democracy. Thus, would you please explain the reasons for your views on the global democratic proposals above?

Figure 49: Matrix question on prior exposure to global democracy

| | Yes | No |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Have you ever taken a survey on global democracy before? | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Had you ever thought about global democracy before taking this survey today? | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Did your family, friends, or peers ever talk to you about global democracy? | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Have you ever heard of an advocacy group working on global democracy? | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

Figure 50: Follow-up questions on prior exposure to global democracy

| | Not at all | Very little | More than a little | Quite a lot |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| How much had you thought about global democracy before taking this survey today? | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| How much did your family, friends, or peers talk to you about global democracy? | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| How much have you heard of an advocacy group working on global democracy? | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

Figure 51: Illustration of question on willingness to act on global democracy

Previously you stated that you **oppose** the proposal of a **global parliament** that would recommend policies on global issues. Would you like to take any of the following actions to reemphasize your opposition? Please say “yes” or “no” to each, and we will make any necessary preparations.

| | Yes | No |
|---|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Anonymously sign an online petition on this? | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Post about this on social media like Facebook? | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Donate money to an advocacy group that works on this? | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

Figure 52: Open comment question about willingness to act on global democracy

It is important for us to understand your willingness or unwillingness to act on the different global democratic proposals. Please explain your reasons for wanting or not wanting to take the actions above:




Figure 53: Clarification on references to global democracy

Now please answer the following questions.

Note that whenever “global democracy” is mentioned, we are referring to the previously mentioned proposal combining a global parliament and a global government.


Figure 54: Question about global democracy’s effectiveness on climate change

Do you think global democracy would be an effective or ineffective way of addressing the issue of **climate change**?


| | | | | | |
|----------------|-----------|------------------|--------------------|-------------|------------------|
| Very effective | Effective | Rather effective | Rather ineffective | Ineffective | Very ineffective |
|----------------|-----------|------------------|--------------------|-------------|------------------|

Figure 55: Question about global democracy's effectiveness on world poverty


Do you think global democracy would be an effective or ineffective way of addressing the issue of **world poverty**?

*Figure 56: Question about global democracy's effectiveness on international peace*

Do you think global democracy would be an effective or ineffective way of addressing the issue of **international peace**?

*Figure 57: Question on necessity of global democracy*

Do you find global democracy necessary or unnecessary to solve the world's problems?

*Figure 58: Question on global democracy's distance from people*

Do you believe that a global democracy would be too distant from or close enough to people to represent their will?






Figure 59: Question on domination of global democracy by the poor or rich


Do you think that a global democracy would be dominated by the world's poor, the rich, or neither?

*Figure 60: Question on cultural diversity in a global democracy*

Do you think in a global democracy there would be more, less, or the same cultural diversity in the world as today?

*Figure 61: Question about global democracy's effect on unity/conflict in the world*

Do you believe that global democracy would lead to more unity or conflict among humankind?

*Figure 62: Question on the risk of global tyranny*

Do you believe it is likely or unlikely that a global democracy could turn into a global tyranny?





Figure 63: Question on the likelihood of global democracy

Do you think it is likely or unlikely that global democracy will ever become a reality?

*Figure 64: Question on global democracy's effect on compatriots' global representation*

"In a global democracy, citizens of my country would be **better** represented in world politics than currently."

1

2

3

4

5

6



"In a global democracy, citizens of my country would be **worse** represented in world politics than currently."

Figure 65: Question about global democracy's effect on domestic democracy

"Global democracy would **strengthen** democracy in my country."

1

2

3

4

5

6



"Global democracy would **weaken** democracy in my country."

Figure 66: Question about global democracy's effect on national power status

"In a global democracy, my country would become **more** powerful than it currently is."

1

2

3

4

5

6



"In a global democracy, my country would become **less** powerful than it currently is."







Figure 67: Question about global democracy's effect on national wealth*Figure 68: Question on global democracy's feasibility in light of cultural diversity**Figure 69: Question on global democracy's feasibility in light of the world's size**Figure 70: Question on the possibility of global democracy*

Figure 71: Question on importance of global political participation


Would you find it important or unimportant to enable people worldwide to participate in world politics?

*Figure 72: Question on importance of national sovereignty and independence*

How important or unimportant do you find the principles of national sovereignty and independence?

*Figure 73: Question on international organizations*

In principle, do you support or oppose current international organizations like the United Nations?

*Figure 74: Question on problem-solving capacity of international organizations*

Do you believe that current international organizations like the United Nations are capable or incapable of addressing the world's problems?




Figure 75: Question about global inequality

Some nations are poor, while others are rich. Do you think that is justified or unfair?

| | | | | | |
|----------------------|-----------|------------------|---------------|--------|-------------------|
| Completely justified | Justified | Rather justified | Rather unfair | Unfair | Completely unfair |
|----------------------|-----------|------------------|---------------|--------|-------------------|

Figure 76: Question on a global democratic deficit

Do you find present-day world politics democratic or undemocratic?

| | | | | | |
|-----------------------|----------------|-----------------------|-------------------|------------|-----------------------|
| Not democratic at all | Not democratic | Rather not democratic | Rather democratic | Democratic | Completely democratic |
|-----------------------|----------------|-----------------------|-------------------|------------|-----------------------|

Figure 77: Question on competitive elections to choose a government

In principle, do you think an election between competing political parties is a good or a bad way of choosing a government?

| | | | | | |
|-----------|------|-------------|------------|-----|----------|
| Very good | Good | Rather good | Rather bad | Bad | Very bad |
|-----------|------|-------------|------------|-----|----------|

Figure 78: Question on global political actions

In principle, do you support or oppose globally oriented political actions like international peacekeeping, development aid, and fighting climate change?

| | | | | | |
|------------------|---------|----------------|---------------|--------|-----------------|
| Strongly support | Support | Rather support | Rather oppose | Oppose | Strongly oppose |
|------------------|---------|----------------|---------------|--------|-----------------|

Figure 79: Question about similarity of views on global issues

Do you believe that your views on global issues like international peace, world poverty, and climate change are similar to or different from the opinions of most people worldwide?

| | | | | | |
|--------------|---------|----------------|------------------|-----------|----------------|
| Very similar | Similar | Rather similar | Rather different | Different | Very different |
|--------------|---------|----------------|------------------|-----------|----------------|




Figure 80: Question on representativeness of current international system*Figure 81: Question on democracy as a form of government**Figure 82: Question on national government's global responsibility**Figure 83: Question on global vs. national citizenship*

Figure 84: Question on well-being of foreigners vs. compatriots




Figure 85: Knowledge question about voting rules at the World Bank

Which of the following best describes the vote share system in the World Bank Group?

Each country has the same share of votes.

The vote shares are proportional to countries' population sizes.

The vote shares are based on economic contributions and power.

Five countries have veto powers, while the other countries have just one vote each.

Figure 86: Knowledge question about leadership conventions at the IMF

Where have the Managing Directors of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) come from thus far? Please select all that apply.

Africa

Asia

Australia

Europe

Israel

Russia

South America

Switzerland

United States of America

Figure 87: Knowledge question about permanent UN Security Council members – part 1

Which five United Nations members have permanent seats and veto rights in the Security Council?

| |
|-----------------------------|
| Argentina |
| Australia |
| Austria |
| Bangladesh |
| Belgium |
| Brazil |
| Bulgaria |
| Canada |
| Chile |
| China |
| Colombia |
| Congo (Democratic Republic) |
| Czech Republic |
| Denmark |
| Egypt |
| Ethiopia |
| Finland |
| France |
| Germany |
| Greece |
| Hungary |
| India |
| Indonesia |
| Iran |
| Ireland |
| Israel |
| Italy |
| Japan |
| Malaysia |

Figure 88: Knowledge question about permanent UN Security Council members – part 2

| |
|--------------------------------|
| Mexico |
| Netherlands |
| New Zealand |
| Nigeria |
| Norway |
| Pakistan |
| Philippines |
| Poland |
| Portugal |
| Romania |
| Russia |
| Saudi Arabia |
| Singapore |
| Slovakia |
| South Africa |
| South Korea |
| Spain |
| Sweden |
| Switzerland |
| Thailand |
| Turkey |
| United Arab Emirates |
| United Kingdom / Great Britain |
| United States of America |
| Vietnam |

Figure 89: Comprehension question about UN Security Council veto

What happens to a resolution in the United Nations Security Council if a permanent member with veto power votes against it?

The resolution passes if a simple majority of the other members votes in favor of it.

The resolution passes if all other members vote in favor of it.

The resolution passes if two thirds of the other members vote in favor of it.

The resolution does not pass, regardless of how the other members vote.

Figure 90: Comprehension question about voting rule implications

Imagine a parliament. Which of the following voting rules generally creates the lowest hurdle for a proposal to pass?

An absolute majority (more than half of the votes)

A supermajority (more than two thirds of the votes)

Consensus/unanimity (all of the votes)

A relative majority (more votes than any other proposal)

Figure 91: Illustration of vignette reconstruction task

Do you remember the global democracy positions of the political parties in Germany which we showed you before? As far as you recall, and without any help from outside sources, simply drag and drop the parties from the list on the left to the correct box on the right. (The order of parties does not matter.)







| Items | Support for global democracy | Opposition to global democracy |
|--|------------------------------|--------------------------------|
|  <p>Christian Democratic Union / Christian Social Union</p> | | |
|  <p>Social Democratic Party</p> | | |
|  <p>Alternative for Germany</p> | | |
|  <p>Free Democratic Party</p> | | |
|  <p>The Left</p> | | |
|  <p>Alliance 90 / The Greens</p> | | |

Figure 92: Illustration of vignette belief check

Do your political party preferences and global democracy views influence each other?

Yes

No

Why? Please select all that apply.

Because the issue of global democracy is not so important to you.

Because the views of your preferred party on global democracy are not so important to you.

Because you do not believe that the political parties have these views on global democracy.

Other reason:

Figure 93: Reminder about pseudonymization of survey data

As stated in the consent form at the beginning, please remember that we will not associate your real name with any of your responses in this survey. Now please answer this final set of questions:

Figure 94: Question on importance of faith

How important or unimportant is faith in your life?

Not
important
at all

Not
important

Rather
not
important

Rather
important

Important

Highly
important

Figure 95: Question on left-right self-placement

Many people speak of “left” and “right” when describing political ideologies. On a scale from 1 to 6, where would you place yourself on this spectrum? The score 1 means far left, 6 means far right, and 2 to 5 mean rather left or rather right.

| | | | | | |
|-------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|--------------|
| Left (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | Right (6) |
|-------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|--------------|

Figure 96: Illustration of question about nationality

What is your nationality? If applicable, please select more than one choice and/or indicate your other nationality/-ies.

| |
|-------------------------|
| German |
| Other nationality/-ies: |
| <input type="text"/> |

Figure 97: Illustration of question about home country

Which country did you mostly live in until you turned 18 years old?

| |
|----------------------|
| Germany |
| Other country: |
| <input type="text"/> |

Figure 98: Questions about ethnic minority status

Were you part of an ethnic minority group in the country that you grew up in?

Yes

No

Are you part of an ethnic minority group in the country that you currently live in?

Yes

No

Figure 99: Question about education

What is your highest attained or expected level of education based on the list below?

No formal education

Started but did not complete primary/elementary school

Completed primary/elementary school

Started but did not complete secondary/high school

Completed secondary/high school

Started but did not complete university/college

Completed university/college (Bachelor/Master)

Started but did not complete doctoral studies

Completed doctoral studies (PhD)

Figure 100: Questions about income

Which currency do you mainly earn your income in?

Euro

Other currency:

In the currency you indicated above, what is the approximate **yearly** gross income (**before taxes**) of yourself and those whom you may share an income with (for example, your partner)?

How many people depend on the income you indicated above (for example, including yourself, your partner, and your children if they do not have an own source of income)?

Number of people
depending on the
income:

Figure 101: Debrief and final consent – part 1



Dear survey participant,

In line with the University of Oxford's regulations and general research ethics, we must inform you about the purpose of this study and the use of deception in this survey.

At the beginning of this questionnaire, you were informed that this survey relates to "current affairs". The full title of this doctoral research project is: "Who on earth wants global democracy – and why (not)? A theoretical, observational, and experimental study of public opinion". The primary purpose of this survey is to study people's positions on global democratic reforms, in particular, the effect of party preferences on global democracy views and vice-versa.

For scientific purposes this survey included some elements of deception. **The aforementioned positions of political parties regarding global democracy were fictional.** It was necessary to fabricate them because most political parties indeed do not have publicly known positions on the topic of global democracy.

I understand that the stated positions of political parties on global democracy were not real.

Moreover, please note that we are not asking you to sign any petition, post anything on Facebook, or donate to any advocacy group. The relevant questions were intended to gauge the strength of your willingness to take action regarding global democracy.

Deception in experiments is a common scientific method, for example, the use of placebos in medical trials. Nonetheless, we apologize for trying to deceive you as part of this study.

I understand that I am not expected to take any actions on global democracy as a result of my answers in this survey.

Figure 102: Debrief and final consent – part 2

As stated throughout this survey, please rest assured that your responses are analyzed in pseudonymous form and treated confidentially. This means that your response data will not be associated with your real name (which remains unknown to the researcher), and that we will not share information on your true identity with the public. Moreover, please note that you may still withdraw your consent for using your survey responses by closing your browser window. However, we reserve the right to only reimburse participants who completed this survey in good faith and who consent to the use of their response data.

If you are concerned about any aspect of this project, please contact the researcher, Farsan Ghassim (farsan.ghassim@politics.ox.ac.uk), or his supervisor, Professor Karolina Milewicz (karolina.milewicz@politics.ox.ac.uk) – either directly or through Dynata (<https://www.dynata.com/company/contact/>). We will do our best to answer your query. The researcher should acknowledge your concern within ten working days and give you an indication of how he intends to deal with it. If you remain unhappy or wish to make a formal complaint, please contact the Chair of the Social Sciences & Humanities Inter-Divisional Research Ethics Committee at the University of Oxford:

- E-mail: ethics@socsci.ox.ac.uk
- Address: Research Services, University of Oxford, Wellington Square, Oxford, OX1 2JD, United Kingdom

The Chair will seek to resolve the matter in a reasonably expeditious manner.

If you have read and understood the important information above and would like to confirm your consent to the use of your pseudonymous response data, please proceed by clicking the “Complete this survey” button below.

Complete this survey

Thank you very much again for contributing to this research project! We truly appreciate it.



Figure 103: Illustration of confirmation validation

For scientific purposes this survey included some elements of deception. **The aforementioned positions of political parties regarding global democracy were fictional.** It was necessary to fabricate them because most political parties indeed do not have publicly known positions on the topic of global democracy.


I understand that the stated positions of political parties on global democracy were not real.

If you want to proceed, you need to read and confirm the following by clicking on the button below.

Moreover, please note that we are not asking you to sign any petition, post anything on Facebook, or donate to any advocacy group. The relevant questions were intended to gauge the strength of your willingness to take action regarding global democracy. Deception in experiments is a common scientific method, for example, the use of placebos in medical trials. Nonetheless, we apologize for trying to deceive you as part of this study.

I understand that I am not expected to take any actions on global democracy as a result of my answers in this survey.

Figure 104: Survey sequence and experimental conditions in the UK



*Figure 105: Introductory prompt in UK survey***YouGov**

There is a debate about the idea of 'global democracy' which refers to proposals for institutions that would be democratic and aimed at global issues. 'Democratic' here means representing the world population. Examples of 'global issues' are international peace, world poverty, and climate change.

Some advocates propose establishing a directly elected world parliament and/or a global government, in order to recommend and implement policies on transnational issues. Proponents of such institutions generally agree that national parliaments and governments should still address issues that are not transnational. Other people oppose such global democracy proposals altogether.

Questions in this section are generally optional. However, the research quality depends on your responses being as comprehensive as possible. Thus, we kindly ask you to only skip those questions that you consider too sensitive or about which you are unsure even after careful consideration.

*Figure 106: Partisan expectations question in UK survey***YouGov**

What do you think: Which of the following parties support global democracy, and which ones oppose it?

Note that by 'global democracy' we are referring to the previously introduced proposal combining a global parliament and a global government.

| | Support for global democracy | Opposition to global democracy |
|--------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Conservative Party | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Labour Party | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Liberal Democrat | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |



*Figure 107: Party vignette in UK survey***YouGov**

Political parties in Great Britain are split as follows on the question of supporting or opposing global democracy. Please pay close attention to this overview as it will be important to recall later in this survey.

Note that by 'global democracy' we are referring to the previously introduced proposal combining a global parliament and a global government.

| Support for global democracy | Opposition to global democracy |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Liberal Democrat | Conservative Party |
| Scottish National Party (SNP) | Labour Party |
| Green Party | UK Independence Party (UKIP) |
| Plaid Cymru | Brexit Party |

*Figure 108: Voting intention question in UK survey***YouGov**

If a general election were held tomorrow, which party would you vote for?

- ☐ Conservative Party
- ☐ Labour Party
- ☐ Liberal Democrat
- ☐ Scottish National Party (SNP)
- ☐ Green Party
- ☐ UK Independence Party (UKIP)
- ☐ Brexit Party
- ☐ Plaid Cymru
- ☐ Another party
- ☐ I would not vote
- ☐ Don't know

By answering this question, you will be giving your consent to YouGov using information about your political opinions. You can change this on your Account page at any time.



Figure 109: Global democracy attitudes questions in UK survey

YouGov

We are interested in your views on different proposals made by global democracy advocates. Please evaluate each of them - independently from other global democracy ideas that you may have.

To what extent do you support or oppose the following proposals? Please read carefully.

| | Strongly support | Support | Somewhat support | Somewhat oppose | Oppose | Strongly oppose |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| The establishment of a global democracy including both a global government and a global parliament , directly elected by the world population, to recommend and implement policies on global issues (for example, international peace, world poverty, and climate change), while national parliaments and governments would still address issues that are not global. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| The establishment of only a global parliament , directly elected by the world population, to recommend policies on global issues (for example, international peace, world poverty, and climate change), while national parliaments would still address issues that are not global. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| The establishment of only a global government to implement policies on global issues (for example, international peace, world poverty, and climate change), while national governments would still address issues that are not global. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |



Figure 110: Global democracy actions questions in UK survey

YouGov

Would you like to take any of the following actions to underline your support or opposition concerning global democracy?

| | Yes | No |
|---|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Post about this on social media like Facebook? | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Donate money to an advocacy group that works on this? | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| Anonymously sign an online petition on this? | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |



Figure 111: First part of scale questions in UK survey

YouGov

Please state your positions on the following scales between 1 and 6 (the scales work like this: there are opposing statements on the two ends of each scale. Options 1 or 6 denote strong agreement with one side or the other, choices 3 or 4 imply weak agreement with one side or the other, and responding 2 or 5 is an intermediate position between weak or strong agreement with one side or the other).

Note that whenever 'global democracy' is mentioned, we are referring to the previously introduced proposal combining a global parliament and a global government.

| | | |
|---|-------------|---|
| 'It is important to enable people worldwide to participate in world politics.' | 1 2 3 4 5 6 | 'It is not important to enable people worldwide to participate in world politics.' |
| 'Global democracy is possible .' | 1 2 3 4 5 6 | 'Global democracy is impossible .' |
| 'Global democracy is necessary to solve the world's problems.' | 1 2 3 4 5 6 | 'Global democracy is not necessary to solve the world's problems.' |







Figure 112: Second part of scale questions in UK survey

YouGov

Please state your positions on the following scales between 1 and 6 (the scales work like this: there are opposing statements on the two ends of each scale. Options 1 or 6 denote strong agreement with one side or the other, choices 3 or 4 imply weak agreement with one side or the other, and responding 2 or 5 is an intermediate position between weak or strong agreement with one side or the other).

Note that whenever 'global democracy' is mentioned, we are referring to the previously introduced proposal combining a global parliament and a global government.

| | | |
|--|---|--|
| I consider myself more a citizen of the world than a citizen of my country. |  | I consider myself more a citizen of my country than a citizen of the world. |
| If the world became a global democracy, my personal interests would be affected positively . |  | If the world became a global democracy, my personal interests would be affected negatively . |
| I have thought a lot about global democracy before taking this survey today. |  | I have never thought about global democracy before taking this survey today. |
| I am a strong supporter of the party that I would vote for if there was a UK general election tomorrow. |  | I am a weak supporter of the party that I would vote for if there was a UK general election tomorrow. |

>

Figure 113: Knowledge question in UK survey

YouGov

For the following question, please do not ask anyone else, search for the right answer on the internet, or use any other outside sources. Simply choose those options that you know to be correct. Even if you are unsure, select your best guesses; but do not pick more than five choices.

Which five United Nations members have permanent seats and veto rights in the Security Council?

- ☐ Australia
- ☐ Bangladesh
- ☐ Brazil
- ☐ China
- ☐ Egypt
- ☐ Ethiopia
- ☐ France
- ☐ Germany
- ☐ India
- ☐ Indonesia
- ☐ Iran
- ☐ Israel
- ☐ Japan
- ☐ Mexico
- ☐ Nigeria
- ☐ Pakistan
- ☐ Philippines
- ☐ Russia
- ☐ Saudi Arabia
- ☐ South Africa
- ☐ Switzerland
- ☐ Thailand
- ☐ Turkey
- ☐ United Kingdom
- ☐ United States of America



Figure 114: Vignette reconstruction task in UK survey



Figure 115: Debrief in UK survey




Figure 116: Brazil – raw and weighted distribution of respondents by gender




Figure 117: Brazil – raw and weighted distribution of respondents by age




Figure 118: Brazil – raw and weighted distribution of respondents by region




Figure 119: Brazil – raw and weighted distribution of respondents by party preference




Figure 120: Germany – raw and weighted distribution of respondents by gender




Figure 121: Germany – raw and weighted distribution of respondents by age




Figure 122: Germany – raw and weighted distribution of respondents by region




Figure 123: Germany – raw and weighted distribution of respondents by party preference




Figure 124: Japan – raw and weighted distribution of respondents by gender




Figure 125: Japan – raw and weighted distribution of respondents by age




Figure 126: Japan – raw and weighted distribution of respondents by region




Figure 127: Japan – raw and weighted distribution of respondents by party preference





Figure 128: UK – raw and weighted distribution of respondents by gender



Note: In my UK survey, YouGov did not record or provide data on third-gender respondents.

Figure 129: UK – raw and weighted distribution of respondents by age




Figure 130: UK – raw and weighted distribution of respondents by region




Figure 131: UK – raw and weighted distribution of respondents by party preference




Figure 132: USA – raw and weighted distribution of respondents by gender




Figure 133: USA – raw and weighted distribution of respondents by age




Figure 134: USA – raw and weighted distribution of respondents by region







Figure 135: USA – raw and weighted distribution of respondents by party preference*Figure 136: Frequency of political actions*

Note: The x-axis indicates the mean frequency score: 0=never, 1=rarely, 2=sometimes, 3=often. Due to space constraints imposed by YouGov, this question did not feature in my UK survey.


Figure 137: Effect of partisan mobilization on global democracy attitudes




P-values of differences in means are: Brazil = 0.840, Germany = 0.808, Japan = 0.041, UK = 0.670, and USA = 0.494.

Note: The dots indicate mean values between “strongly oppose” (1) and “strongly support” (6). The line marks the 95% confidence interval around the mean. In the UK, the treatment was a combination of partisan cues and cognitive mobilization, due to restrictions imposed by YouGov.


Figure 138: Pooled sample – global democracy attitudes across experimental conditions




Note: The control group here refers to experimental condition 1, while the treatment group refers to experimental condition 2. These calculations do not contain the UK, which did not include the same experimental conditions, due to restrictions imposed by YouGov.

Figure 139: Brazil – global democracy attitudes across experimental conditions

Note: The control group here refers to experimental condition 1, while the treatment group refers to experimental condition 2.

Figure 140: Germany – global democracy attitudes across experimental conditions

Note: The control group here refers to experimental condition 1, while the treatment group refers to experimental condition 2.

Figure 141: Japan – global democracy attitudes across experimental conditions

Note: The control group here refers to experimental condition 1, while the treatment group refers to experimental condition 2.




Figure 142: UK – global democracy attitudes across experimental conditions


Figure 143: USA – global democracy attitudes across experimental conditions

Note: The control group here refers to experimental condition 1, while the treatment group refers to experimental condition 2.

Figure 144: Brazil – voting intentions across experimental conditions




Note: In line with my experimental setup (see Figure 15, p. 196), the control group here contains the first and fourth experimental conditions, while the treatment group comprises the third experimental condition.

Figure 145: Germany – voting intentions across experimental conditions

Note: In line with my experimental setup (see Figure 15, p. 196), the control group here contains the first and fourth experimental conditions, while the treatment group refers to the third experimental condition.

Figure 146: Japan – voting intentions across experimental conditions



Note: In line with my experimental setup (see Figure 15, p. 196), the control group here contains the first and fourth experimental conditions, while the treatment group comprises the third experimental condition.

Figure 147: UK – voting intentions across experimental conditions







Figure 148: USA – voting intentions across experimental conditions


Note: In line with my experimental setup (see Figure 15, p. 196), the control group here contains the first and fourth experimental conditions, while the treatment group refers to the third experimental condition.

Figure 149: Alignment between global democracy attitudes and voting intentions


Note: The sample here is limited to the control group.

Figure 150: Vignette reconstruction scores – Brazil


Note: The x-axis denotes the number of correctly recalled party positions in the vignette table. The y-axis denotes the cumulative percentage of respondents who got a certain number of correct responses or less.

Figure 151: Vignette reconstruction scores – Germany


Note: The x-axis denotes the number of correctly recalled party positions in the vignette table. The y-axis denotes the cumulative percentage of respondents who got a certain number of correct responses or less.

Figure 152: Vignette reconstruction scores – Japan

Note: The x-axis denotes the number of correctly recalled party positions in the vignette table. The y-axis denotes the cumulative percentage of respondents who got a certain number of correct responses or less.

Figure 153: Vignette reconstruction scores – UK

Note: The x-axis denotes the number of correctly recalled party positions in the vignette table. The y-axis denotes the cumulative percentage of respondents who got a certain number of correct responses or less.

Figure 154: Vignette reconstruction scores – USA

Note: The x-axis denotes the number of correctly recalled party positions in the vignette table. The y-axis denotes the cumulative percentage of respondents who got a certain number of correct responses or less.





Figure 155: Survey completion times – Brazil*Figure 156: Survey completion times – Germany*

Figure 157: Survey completion times – Japan*Figure 158: Survey completion times – USA*

Tables

Table 1: Brazil – sampling quotas/weights

| Region | Gender | Age group | Percentage |
|--|--------|-----------|------------|
| Center West (Distrito Federal, Goiás, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul) | Male | 18-24 | 0.6% |
| | | 25-34 | 0.9% |
| | | 35-44 | 0.7% |
| | | 45-54 | 0.6% |
| | | 55-75 | 0.7% |
| | Female | 18-24 | 0.7% |
| | | 25-34 | 1.0% |
| | | 35-44 | 0.8% |
| | | 45-54 | 0.7% |
| | | 55-75 | 0.9% |
| North (Acre, Amapá, Amazonas, Pará, Rondônia, Roraima, Tocantins) | Male | 18-24 | 0.7% |
| | | 25-34 | 1.0% |
| | | 35-44 | 0.8% |
| | | 45-54 | 0.7% |
| | | 55-75 | 0.7% |
| | Female | 18-24 | 0.7% |
| | | 25-34 | 1.1% |
| | | 35-44 | 0.9% |
| | | 45-54 | 0.8% |
| | | 55-75 | 1.0% |
| Northeast (Alagoas, Bahia, Ceará, Maranhão, Paraíba, Pernambuco, Piauí, Rio Grande do Norte, Sergipe) | Male | 18-24 | 2.4% |
| | | 25-34 | 3.3% |
| | | 35-44 | 2.7% |
| | | 45-54 | 2.1% |
| | | 55-75 | 2.4% |
| | Female | 18-24 | 2.4% |
| | | 25-34 | 3.6% |
| | | 35-44 | 3.0% |
| | | 45-54 | 2.5% |
| | | 55-75 | 3.3% |
| South (Paraná, Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina) | Male | 18-24 | 1.2% |
| | | 25-34 | 1.7% |
| | | 35-44 | 1.4% |
| | | 45-54 | 1.1% |
| | | 55-75 | 1.3% |
| | Female | 18-24 | 1.3% |
| | | 25-34 | 1.9% |
| | | 35-44 | 1.5% |
| | | 45-54 | 1.3% |
| | | 55-75 | 1.7% |
| Southeast | Male | 18-24 | 3.6% |
| | | 25-34 | 5.1% |
| | | 35-44 | 4.1% |

| Region | Gender | Age group | Percentage |
|---|--------|-----------|------------|
| (Espírito Santo, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo) | | 45-54 | 3.2% |
| | | 55-75 | 3.7% |
| | Female | 18-24 | 3.7% |
| | | 25-34 | 5.5% |
| | | 35-44 | 4.5% |
| | | 45-54 | 3.8% |
| | | 55-75 | 4.9% |

Table 2: Germany – sampling quotas/weights

| Region | Gender | Age group | Percentage |
|---|--------|-----------|------------|
| East (Berlin, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt, Thüringen) | Male | 18-24 | 1.3% |
| | | 25-34 | 1.5% |
| | | 35-44 | 1.8% |
| | | 45-54 | 1.9% |
| | | 55-64 | 1.7% |
| | | 65-75 | 2.2% |
| | Female | 18-24 | 1.2% |
| | | 25-34 | 1.5% |
| | | 35-44 | 1.8% |
| | | 45-54 | 1.9% |
| | | 55-64 | 1.7% |
| | | 65-75 | 3.0% |
| North (Bremen, Hamburg, Niedersachsen, Schleswig-Holstein) | Male | 18-24 | 1.0% |
| | | 25-34 | 1.2% |
| | | 35-44 | 1.4% |
| | | 45-54 | 1.5% |
| | | 55-64 | 1.3% |
| | | 65-75 | 1.7% |
| | Female | 18-24 | 0.9% |
| | | 25-34 | 1.1% |
| | | 35-44 | 1.4% |
| | | 45-54 | 1.4% |
| | | 55-64 | 1.3% |
| | | 65-75 | 2.3% |
| South (Baden-Württemberg, Bayern) | Male | 18-24 | 1.6% |
| | | 25-34 | 1.9% |
| | | 35-44 | 2.3% |
| | | 45-54 | 2.4% |
| | | 55-64 | 2.1% |
| | | 65-75 | 2.8% |
| | Female | 18-24 | 1.6% |
| | | 25-34 | 1.9% |
| | | 35-44 | 2.3% |
| | | 45-54 | 2.4% |
| | | 55-64 | 2.2% |

| Region | Gender | Age group | Percentage |
|---|--------|-----------|------------|
| West (Hessen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Rheinland-Pfalz, Saarland) | Male | 65-75 | 3.8% |
| | | 18-24 | 2.1% |
| | | 25-34 | 2.4% |
| | | 35-44 | 2.9% |
| | | 45-54 | 3.0% |
| | | 55-64 | 2.7% |
| | | 65-75 | 3.6% |
| | Female | 18-24 | 2.0% |
| | | 25-34 | 2.4% |
| | | 35-44 | 2.8% |
| | | 45-54 | 3.0% |
| | | 55-64 | 2.8% |
| | | 65-75 | 4.8% |

Table 3: Japan – sampling quotas/weights

| Region | Gender | Age group | Percentage |
|---|--------|-----------|------------|
| Chūbu (Niigata, Toyama, Ishikawa, Fukui, Yamanashi, Nagano, Gifu, Shizuoka, Aichi) | Male | 18-24 | 1.0% |
| | | 25-34 | 1.4% |
| | | 35-44 | 1.3% |
| | | 45-54 | 1.3% |
| | | 55-64 | 1.4% |
| | | 65-75 | 1.7% |
| | Female | 18-24 | 1.0% |
| | | 25-34 | 1.4% |
| | | 35-44 | 1.3% |
| | | 45-54 | 1.3% |
| | | 55-64 | 1.5% |
| | | 65-75 | 2.3% |
| Chūgoku (Tottori, Shimane, Okayama, Hiroshima, Yamaguchi) | Male | 18-24 | 0.4% |
| | | 25-34 | 0.5% |
| | | 35-44 | 0.5% |
| | | 45-54 | 0.5% |
| | | 55-64 | 0.5% |
| | | 65-75 | 0.6% |
| | Female | 18-24 | 0.3% |
| | | 25-34 | 0.5% |
| | | 35-44 | 0.5% |
| | | 45-54 | 0.5% |
| | | 55-64 | 0.5% |
| | | 65-75 | 0.8% |
| Hokkaidō | Male | 18-24 | 0.2% |
| | | 25-34 | 0.3% |
| | | 35-44 | 0.3% |
| | | 45-54 | 0.3% |
| | | 55-64 | 0.3% |

| Region | Gender | Age group | Percentage |
|---|--------|-----------|------------|
| | Female | 65-75 | 0.4% |
| | | 18-24 | 0.2% |
| | | 25-34 | 0.3% |
| | | 35-44 | 0.3% |
| | | 45-54 | 0.3% |
| | | 55-64 | 0.4% |
| | | 65-75 | 0.5% |
| Kantō (Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gunma, Saitama, Chiba, Tōkyō, Kanagawa) | Male | 18-24 | 2.0% |
| | | 25-34 | 2.9% |
| | | 35-44 | 2.6% |
| | | 45-54 | 2.6% |
| | | 55-64 | 2.9% |
| | | 65-75 | 3.4% |
| | Female | 18-24 | 1.9% |
| | | 25-34 | 2.8% |
| | | 35-44 | 2.6% |
| | | 45-54 | 2.6% |
| | | 55-64 | 3.0% |
| | | 65-75 | 4.7% |
| Kinki/Kansai (Mie, Shiga, Kyōto, Ōsaka, Hyōgo, Nara, Wakayama) | Male | 18-24 | 1.1% |
| | | 25-34 | 1.5% |
| | | 35-44 | 1.4% |
| | | 45-54 | 1.4% |
| | | 55-64 | 1.5% |
| | | 65-75 | 1.8% |
| | Female | 18-24 | 1.0% |
| | | 25-34 | 1.5% |
| | | 35-44 | 1.4% |
| | | 45-54 | 1.4% |
| | | 55-64 | 1.6% |
| | | 65-75 | 2.5% |
| Kyūshū (Fukuoka, Saga, Nagasaki, Kumamoto, Ōita, Miyazaki, Kagoshima, Okinawa) | Male | 18-24 | 0.6% |
| | | 25-34 | 0.8% |
| | | 35-44 | 0.8% |
| | | 45-54 | 0.8% |
| | | 55-64 | 0.8% |
| | | 65-75 | 1.0% |
| | Female | 18-24 | 0.6% |
| | | 25-34 | 0.8% |
| | | 35-44 | 0.8% |
| | | 45-54 | 0.8% |
| | | 55-64 | 0.9% |
| | | 65-75 | 1.4% |
| Shikoku (Tokushima, Kagawa, Ehime, Kōchi) | Male | 18-24 | 0.2% |
| | | 25-34 | 0.3% |
| | | 35-44 | 0.2% |
| | | 45-54 | 0.2% |

| Region | Gender | Age group | Percentage |
|--|--------|-----------|------------|
| | | 55-64 | 0.3% |
| | | 65-75 | 0.3% |
| | Female | 18-24 | 0.2% |
| | | 25-34 | 0.2% |
| | | 35-44 | 0.2% |
| | | 45-54 | 0.2% |
| | | 55-64 | 0.3% |
| | | 65-75 | 0.4% |
| Tōhoku (Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, Akita, Yamagata, Fukushima) | Male | 18-24 | 0.4% |
| | | 25-34 | 0.6% |
| | | 35-44 | 0.5% |
| | | 45-54 | 0.5% |
| | | 55-64 | 0.6% |
| | | 65-75 | 0.7% |
| | Female | 18-24 | 0.4% |
| | | 25-34 | 0.6% |
| | | 35-44 | 0.5% |
| | | 45-54 | 0.5% |
| | | 55-64 | 0.6% |
| | | 65-75 | 1.0% |

Table 4: USA – sampling quotas/weights

| Region | Gender | Age group | Percentage |
|---|--------|-----------|------------|
| Northeast (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont) | Male | 18-24 | 1.5% |
| | | 25-34 | 1.5% |
| | | 35-44 | 1.5% |
| | | 45-54 | 1.7% |
| | | 55-64 | 1.3% |
| | | 65-75 | 1.3% |
| | Female | 18-24 | 1.4% |
| | | 25-34 | 1.5% |
| | | 35-44 | 1.5% |
| | | 45-54 | 1.7% |
| | | 55-64 | 1.4% |
| | | 65-75 | 1.7% |
| Midwest (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Wisconsin) | Male | 18-24 | 1.8% |
| | | 25-34 | 1.9% |
| | | 35-44 | 1.8% |
| | | 45-54 | 2.0% |
| | | 55-64 | 1.6% |
| | | 65-75 | 1.6% |
| | Female | 18-24 | 1.7% |
| | | 25-34 | 1.8% |
| | | 35-44 | 1.9% |
| | | 45-54 | 2.1% |

| Region | Gender | Age group | Percentage |
|--|--------|-----------|------------|
| South (Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia) | Male | 55-64 | 1.7% |
| | | 65-75 | 2.1% |
| | | 18-24 | 3.0% |
| | | 25-34 | 3.1% |
| | | 35-44 | 3.1% |
| | | 45-54 | 3.3% |
| | Female | 55-64 | 2.7% |
| | | 65-75 | 2.6% |
| | | 18-24 | 2.9% |
| | | 25-34 | 3.1% |
| | | 35-44 | 3.1% |
| | | 45-54 | 3.5% |
| | | 55-64 | 2.9% |
| | | 65-75 | 3.5% |
| West (Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, Wyoming) | Male | 18-24 | 1.5% |
| | | 25-34 | 1.5% |
| | | 35-44 | 1.5% |
| | | 45-54 | 1.6% |
| | | 55-64 | 1.3% |
| | | 65-75 | 1.3% |
| | Female | 18-24 | 1.4% |
| | | 25-34 | 1.5% |
| | | 35-44 | 1.5% |
| | | 45-54 | 1.7% |
| | | 55-64 | 1.4% |
| | | 65-75 | 1.7% |

Table 5: Germany – voting weights

| | |
|---------|-------|
| CDU/CSU | 28.0% |
| SPD | 15.0% |
| Greens | 22.5% |
| FDP | 8.0% |
| Left | 7.0% |
| AfD | 13.0% |
| Others | 6.5% |

Table 6: Japan – voting weights

| | |
|---------|-------|
| LDP | 53.5% |
| CDP | 12.6% |
| Komeito | 5.6% |
| JCP | 5.5% |
| Reiwa | 3.2% |
| Ishin | 5.8% |
| DPP | 2.2% |
| SDPJ | 1.1% |
| Other | 10.6% |

Table 7: USA – voting weights

| | |
|-------------|-------|
| Republicans | 44.0% |
| Democrats | 54.0% |
| Other | 2.0% |

Table 8: Brazil – summary statistics of final weights

| Rewighted sample size | Observations | Mean weight | Standard deviation | Minimum | Maximum |
|-----------------------|--------------|-------------|--------------------|----------|----------|
| 1,000 | 1,224 | 0.816994 | 0.244706 | 0.001439 | 2.000996 |

Table 9: Germany – summary statistics of final weights

| Rewighted sample size | Observations | Mean weight | Standard deviation | Minimum | Maximum |
|-----------------------|--------------|-------------|--------------------|----------|----------|
| 1,000 | 961 | 1.040583 | 0.610401 | 0.038009 | 3.896607 |

Table 10: Japan – summary statistics of final weights

| Rewighted sample size | Observations | Mean weight | Standard deviation | Minimum | Maximum |
|-----------------------|--------------|-------------|--------------------|----------|----------|
| 1,000 | 1,124 | 0.88968 | 0.493603 | 0.093923 | 3.161397 |

Table 11: UK – summary statistics of final weights

| Rewighted sample size | Observations | Mean weight | Standard deviation | Minimum | Maximum |
|-----------------------|--------------|-------------|--------------------|----------|----------|
| 1,714 | 1,714 | 1 | 0.627957 | 0.254301 | 6.069418 |

Note: My UK data is part of a different dataset, as the survey was conducted separately by YouGov. In any analysis that includes a pooled sample including the UK, the reweighted sample size was adjusted to 1,000 as well.

Table 12: USA – summary statistics of final weights

| Rewighted sample size | Observations | Mean weight | Standard deviation | Minimum | Maximum |
|-----------------------|--------------|-------------|--------------------|----------|----------|
| 1,000 | 1,198 | 0.834725 | 0.453675 | 0.051362 | 3.127863 |

Table 13: Explanatory factors of prior thinking about global democracy

| | (1) Pooled | (2) Brazil | (3) Germany | (4) Japan | (5) USA |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| <i>Dependent variable:</i> Prior thinking about GD [0=none, 3=much] | | | | | |
| <i>Explanatory variables:</i> | | | | | |
| Family, friends, peers GD influence [0=none, 3=much] | 0.479*** (0.000) | 0.491*** (0.000) | 0.623*** (0.000) | 0.286*** (0.001) | 0.421*** (0.000) |
| Advocacy group GD influence [0=none, 3=much] | 0.244*** (0.000) | 0.192*** (0.000) | 0.126 (0.127) | 0.512*** (0.000) | 0.198*** (0.000) |
| Ideological self-placement [1=left, 6=right] | 0.011 (0.391) | 0.012 (0.552) | -0.009 (0.766) | -0.042 (0.154) | 0.056** (0.023) |
| Economic orientation [1=left, 6=right] | 0.003 (0.786) | -0.003 (0.863) | 0.028 (0.146) | -0.034 (0.114) | 0.001 (0.955) |
| Cultural orientation [1=left, 6=right] | -0.014 (0.154) | -0.029 (0.110) | 0.002 (0.917) | 0.005 (0.784) | -0.002 (0.921) |
| Importance of faith [1=low, 6=high] | 0.014 (0.148) | -0.000 (0.986) | -0.016 (0.408) | 0.044** (0.037) | 0.017 (0.305) |
| Interest in world politics [0=low, 8=high] | 0.060*** (0.000) | 0.045** (0.020) | 0.058*** (0.002) | 0.030** (0.012) | 0.077*** (0.000) |
| Global governance knowledge [0=low, 7=high] | 0.031*** (0.000) | 0.057*** (0.001) | 0.014 (0.475) | 0.024* (0.081) | 0.039** (0.030) |
| Political comprehension [0=low, 2=high] | 0.043** (0.020) | 0.086** (0.039) | -0.016 (0.689) | 0.025 (0.417) | 0.086** (0.017) |
| Political activeness [0=low, 11.25=high] | 0.016** (0.012) | 0.007 (0.518) | 0.012 (0.412) | 0.037** (0.012) | 0.018 (0.101) |
| Gender = Male | 0.051* (0.065) | 0.096* (0.080) | 0.017 (0.782) | 0.100** (0.027) | 0.015 (0.764) |
| Gender = Other | 0.141 | 0.067 | -0.198 | | 0.239 |

| | (1) Pooled | (2) Brazil | (3) Germany | (4) Japan | (5) USA |
|--|----------------------|---------------------|--------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| <i>Dependent variable:</i> Prior thinking about GD [0=none, 3=much] | | | | | |
| <i>Explanatory variables:</i> | (0.721) | (0.853) | (0.132) | | (0.591) |
| Age [in years] | -0.001 (0.537) | -0.004* (0.088) | 0.001 (0.494) | -0.002 (0.164) | 0.001 (0.619) |
| Educational level [1=low, 9=high] | -0.023* (0.057) | -0.028 (0.306) | -0.026 (0.336) | -0.024 (0.285) | -0.004 (0.853) |
| Home country [1 = survey country, 2 = other country] | 0.055 (0.689) | -0.383** (0.015) | 0.147 (0.589) | -0.525*** (0.004) | 0.069 (0.620) |
| Dual/other nationality [0=no, 1=yes] | 0.022 (0.844) | 0.514*** (0.002) | -0.146 (0.509) | 0.145 (0.404) | 0.058 (0.731) |
| Ethnic minority [0=never, 1=sometimes, 2=always] | -0.008 (0.706) | 0.002 (0.955) | 0.019 (0.833) | 0.014 (0.770) | -0.002 (0.963) |
| Prior survey about GD [0=no, 1=yes] | 0.039 (0.562) | 0.228** (0.019) | -0.292 (0.103) | -0.174 (0.398) | 0.226* (0.054) |
| Attention check [0=failed, 1=passed] | 0.059** (0.025) | 0.007 (0.894) | 0.113* (0.078) | 0.076* (0.097) | 0.077 (0.131) |
| Smartphone user [0=no, 1=yes] | -0.043 (0.291) | -0.139 (0.130) | -0.036 (0.742) | 0.029 (0.693) | 0.010 (0.885) |
| Survey duration [in minutes] | 0.000 (0.156) | 0.000 (0.155) | -0.000* (0.090) | 0.000 (0.342) | 0.000* (0.082) |
| Experimental condition = 2 | -0.087** (0.021) | -0.041 (0.585) | 0.016 (0.867) | -0.075 (0.230) | -0.185*** (0.007) |
| Experimental condition = 3 | -0.021 (0.583) | -0.104 (0.149) | 0.126 (0.212) | -0.024 (0.726) | -0.014 (0.841) |
| Experimental condition = 4 | -0.037 (0.343) | 0.024 (0.746) | 0.073 (0.469) | -0.082 (0.228) | -0.062 (0.394) |
| Country = Germany | -0.146*** (0.003) | | | | |
| Country = Japan | -0.113** (0.019) | | | | |

| | (1) Pooled | (2) Brazil | (3) Germany | (4) Japan | (5) USA |
|--|--|------------------|-------------------|------------------|----------------------|
| <i>Explanatory variables:</i> | <i>Dependent variable:</i> Prior thinking about GD [0=none, 3=much] | | | | |
| Country = USA | -0.046 (0.267) | | | | |
| Constant | 0.032 (0.781) | 0.323 (0.160) | -0.169 (0.479) | 0.227 (0.227) | -0.533*** (0.004) |
| Observations | 4,371 | 1,190 | 927 | 1,084 | 1,170 |
| R-squared | 0.387 | 0.362 | 0.381 | 0.410 | 0.397 |
| *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Full p-values in parentheses | | | | | |

Note: “GD” stands for global democracy.

Table 14: Correlations between global democracy attitudes and explanatory variables

| Variable | Correlation with GD attitude (1 = oppose, 6 = support) | p-value of correlation |
|--|---|---------------------------|
| GD effect on domestic democracy (1 = strengthen, 6 = weaken) | -0.42 | 0.00 |
| GD effect on home country wealth (1 = wealthier, 6 = poorer) | -0.39 | 0.00 |
| GD effect on home country power (1 = increase, 6 = decrease) | -0.33 | 0.00 |
| GD effect on compatriots' representation (1 = better, 6 = worse) | -0.38 | 0.00 |
| Democratic quality of world politics (1 = undemocratic, 6 = democratic) | 0.10 | 0.15 |
| Representativeness of global order (1 = representative, 6 = not representative) | -0.05 | 0.22 |
| Importance of global political participation (1 = not important, 6 = important) | 0.38 | 0.00 |
| Necessity of GD to assess global issues (1 = unnecessary, 6 = necessary) | 0.57 | 0.00 |
| GD effectiveness on climate change (1 = ineffective, 6 = effective) | 0.50 | 0.00 |
| GD effectiveness on peace (1 = ineffective, 6 = effective) | 0.55 | 0.00 |

| Variable | Correlation with GD attitude (1 = oppose, 6 = support) | p-value of correlation |
|---|---|-----------------------------------|
| GD effectiveness on poverty (1 = ineffective, 6 = effective) | 0.52 | 0.00 |
| Similarity of public views on global issues (1 = different, 6 = similar) | 0.23 | 0.01 |
| Diversity in global democracy (1 = less, 4 = same, 7 = more) | 0.32 | 0.00 |
| Diversity in current world (1 = too diverse, 6 = not too diverse) | 0.29 | 0.00 |
| Size of the world (1 = too large, 6 = not too large) | 0.33 | 0.01 |
| GD proximity to people (1 = close enough, 6 = too distant) | -0.38 | 0.01 |
| Global tyranny through GD (1 = unlikely, 6 = likely) | -0.22 | 0.03 |
| GD domination by poor or rich (0 = none, 1 = little, 2 = some, 3 = strong) | -0.21 | 0.01 |
| GD effect on global unity/conflict (1 = more conflict, 6 = more unity) | 0.52 | 0.00 |
| Global vs. national citizenship (1 = more global, 6 = more national) | -0.25 | 0.02 |
| Care more about compatriots vs. foreigners (1 = foreigners, 6 = compatriots) | -0.22 | 0.05 |
| Wealth inequality between countries (1 = unfair, 6 = justified) | -0.18 | 0.07 |
| Principled attitude toward IOs (1 = oppose, 6 = support) | 0.37 | 0.01 |
| Importance of sovereignty/independence (1 = not important, 6 = important) | -0.16 | 0.02 |
| Capability of IOs to solve global issues (1 = incapable, 6 = capable) | 0.35 | 0.01 |
| Own country responsibility on global issues (1 = take, 6 = avoid) | -0.24 | 0.01 |
| Principled attitude on global actions (1 = oppose, 6 = support) | 0.41 | 0.00 |
| Democracy as a form of government (1 = best, 6 = worst) | -0.04 | 0.12 |
| Attitude toward competitive elections (1 = bad, 6 = good) | -0.01 | 0.90 |

Table 15: Mean of intra-personal attitudinal consistency on global democracy

| | Mean | Linearized standard error | 99% confidence interval | |
|----------------------------------|-------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------|
| | | | Lower bound | Upper bound |
| Intra-personal GD consistency | 0.603463 | 0.004766 | 0.575629 | 0.631298 |

Table 16: Correlations between attitudes on global democratic proposals

| Regression (DV - EV) | Coef. | Std. Err. | t | P>t | [95% confidence interval] | |
|---------------------------------------|-------|-----------|-------|------|---------------------------|------|
| Global democracy - global parliament | 0.72 | 0.01 | 47.91 | 0.00 | 0.69 | 0.75 |
| Global democracy - global government | 0.73 | 0.02 | 46.24 | 0.00 | 0.70 | 0.76 |
| Global parliament - global government | 0.69 | 0.02 | 43.63 | 0.00 | 0.66 | 0.72 |

Note: “DV” stands for dependent variable. “EV” stands for explanatory variable. “Coef.” is the regression coefficient. “Std. Err.” is the linearized standard error. “t” is the t-statistic. “P>t” is the p-value.

Table 17: Variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis for GD attitudes regression

| Variable | VIF | 1/VIF |
|---|------|-------|
| Prior thinking about GD [0=none, 3=much] | 1.69 | 0.59 |
| Family, friends, peers GD influence [0=none, 3=much] | 1.92 | 0.52 |
| Advocacy group GD influence [0=none, 3=much] | 1.75 | 0.57 |
| GD's effect on home democracy [1=strengthen, 6=weaken] | 2.60 | 0.39 |
| GD's effect on national wealth [1=wealthier, 6=poorer] | 2.30 | 0.43 |
| GD's effect on country power [1=increase, 6=decrease] | 1.96 | 0.51 |
| GD's effect on national representation [1=increase, 6=decrease] | 2.36 | 0.42 |
| Current world politics [1=undemocratic, 6=democratic] | 1.24 | 0.81 |
| Current global order [1=representative, 6=unrepresentative] | 1.31 | 0.76 |
| Public participation in world politics [1=unimportant, 6=important] | 1.65 | 0.61 |
| GD necessary to solve global problems? [1=no, 6=yes] | 2.73 | 0.37 |
| GD effective on climate change? [1=no, 6=yes] | 2.23 | 0.45 |
| GD effective on peace? [1=no, 6=yes] | 2.78 | 0.36 |
| GD effective on poverty? [1=no, 6=yes] | 2.72 | 0.37 |
| Worldwide views on global issues [1=different, 6=similar] | 1.18 | 0.85 |

| Variable | VIF | 1/VIF |
|---|------------|--------------|
| GD's effect on cultural diversity [1=less, 4=same, 7=more] | 1.42 | 0.70 |
| World too diverse for GD? [1=yes, 2=no] | 2.38 | 0.42 |
| World too large for GD? [1=yes, 6=no] | 2.52 | 0.40 |
| GD's distance to people [1 = close enough, 6 = too far] | 1.62 | 0.62 |
| Global tyranny through GD? [1=unlikely, 6=likely] | 1.33 | 0.75 |
| Domination of GD by world's poor/rich [0 = no, 3 = yes, by rich/poor] | 1.36 | 0.74 |
| GD's effect on conflict/unity [1 = more conflict, 6 = more unity] | 2.31 | 0.43 |
| Subjective citizenship [1 = more global, 6 = more national] | 1.63 | 0.62 |
| Well-being of foreigners vs. compatriots [1 = as important, 6 = less important] | 1.81 | 0.55 |
| Global inequality [1=unfair, 6=justified] | 1.41 | 0.71 |
| Principled position on IOs [1=oppose, 6=support] | 1.89 | 0.53 |
| Sovereignty and independence [1=unimportant, 6=important] | 1.37 | 0.73 |
| IOs' capability on global issues [1=incapable, 6=capable] | 1.85 | 0.54 |
| Home country: responsibility for global issues [1=take, 6=avoid] | 1.74 | 0.58 |
| Global political actions [1=oppose, 6=support] | 1.90 | 0.53 |
| Democracy as form of government [1=best, 6=worst] | 1.67 | 0.60 |
| Competitive elections for government [1=bad, 6=good] | 1.22 | 0.82 |
| Feasibility of GD [1=impossible, 6=possible] | 2.26 | 0.44 |
| Likelihood of GD [1=unlikely, 6=likely] | 1.89 | 0.53 |
| Global governance knowledge [0=low, 7=high] | 1.59 | 0.63 |
| Political comprehension [0=low, 2=high] | 1.28 | 0.78 |
| Interest in world politics [0=low, 8=high] | 1.93 | 0.52 |
| Political activeness [0=low, 11.25=high] | 1.64 | 0.61 |
| Ideological self-placement [1=left, 6=right] | 1.46 | 0.69 |
| Economic orientation [1=left, 6=right] | 1.36 | 0.74 |

| Variable | VIF | 1/VIF |
|--|------------|--------------|
| Cultural orientation [1=left, 6=right] | 1.33 | 0.75 |
| Importance of faith [1=low, 6=high] | 1.56 | 0.64 |
| Gender = 1, Male | 1.14 | 0.88 |
| Gender = 3, Other | 1.04 | 0.97 |
| Age [in years] | 1.42 | 0.70 |
| Educational level [1=low, 9=high] | 1.25 | 0.80 |
| Home country [1 = survey country, 2 = other country] | 1.44 | 0.70 |
| Dual/other nationality [0=no, 1=yes] | 1.44 | 0.70 |
| Ethnic minority [0=never, 1=sometimes, 2=always] | 1.28 | 0.78 |
| Smartphone user [0=no, 1=yes] | 1.27 | 0.79 |
| Survey duration [in minutes] | 1.02 | 0.98 |
| Prior survey about GD [0=no, 1=yes] | 1.44 | 0.69 |
| Attention check [0=failed, 1=passed] | 1.18 | 0.85 |
| Experimental condition = 2 | 1.65 | 0.61 |
| Experimental condition = 3 | 1.63 | 0.62 |
| Experimental condition = 4 | 1.65 | 0.61 |
| Country = Germany | 2.21 | 0.45 |
| Country = Japan | 2.57 | 0.39 |
| Country = USA | 2.11 | 0.47 |
| Mean VIF | 1.73 | |

Table 18: Explanatory factors of attitudes toward global democracy

| | (1) Pooled | (2) Brazil | (3) Germany | (4) Japan | (5) USA |
|---|--|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| <i>Explanatory variables:</i> | <i>Dependent variable:</i> Attitude toward GD [1=oppose, 6=support] | | | | |
| Prior thinking about GD [0=none, 3=much] | -0.012 (0.630) | -0.049 (0.276) | 0.027 (0.589) | 0.024 (0.603) | 0.039 (0.395) |
| Family, friends, peers GD influence [0=none, 3=much] | -0.031 (0.326) | -0.066 (0.220) | -0.024 (0.680) | -0.091 (0.226) | -0.026 (0.631) |
| Advocacy group GD influence [0=none, 3=much] | 0.025 (0.469) | 0.023 (0.687) | -0.058 (0.409) | 0.056 (0.456) | 0.053 (0.374) |
| GD's effect on home democracy [1=strengthen, 6=weaken] | -0.077*** (0.001) | -0.038 (0.411) | -0.129*** (0.009) | -0.065* (0.070) | -0.037 (0.342) |
| GD's effect on national wealth [1=wealthier, 6=poorer] | 0.022 (0.341) | 0.029 (0.558) | 0.041 (0.350) | 0.002 (0.956) | -0.024 (0.528) |
| GD's effect on country power [1=increase, 6=decrease] | -0.015 (0.484) | 0.004 (0.931) | -0.063 (0.152) | -0.005 (0.890) | -0.017 (0.635) |
| GD's effect on national representation [1=increase, 6=decrease] | -0.019 (0.407) | -0.029 (0.513) | -0.043 (0.413) | -0.009 (0.808) | -0.003 (0.943) |
| Current world politics [1=undemocratic, 6=democratic] | -0.007 (0.730) | 0.047 (0.220) | -0.035 (0.428) | -0.070** (0.035) | 0.009 (0.775) |
| Current global order [1=representative, 6=unrepresentative] | 0.032* (0.052) | -0.001 (0.961) | 0.043 (0.199) | 0.052* (0.084) | 0.006 (0.854) |
| Public participation in world politics [1=unimportant, 6=important] | 0.096*** (0.000) | 0.064* (0.087) | 0.104** (0.019) | 0.108*** (0.002) | 0.069* (0.053) |
| GD necessary to solve global problems? [1=no, 6=yes] | 0.215*** (0.000) | 0.191*** (0.000) | 0.148*** (0.003) | 0.157*** (0.002) | 0.292*** (0.000) |
| GD effective on climate change? [1=no, 6=yes] | 0.071*** (0.001) | 0.088* (0.070) | 0.063 (0.144) | 0.050 (0.131) | 0.077** (0.036) |

| | (1) Pooled | (2) Brazil | (3) Germany | (4) Japan | (5) USA |
|---|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| <i>Dependent variable:</i> Attitude toward GD [1=oppose, 6=support] | | | | | |
| <i>Explanatory variables:</i> | | | | | |
| GD effective on peace? [1=no, 6=yes] | 0.095*** (0.000) | 0.063 (0.249) | 0.104** (0.040) | 0.156*** (0.000) | 0.100** (0.026) |
| GD effective on poverty? [1=no, 6=yes] | 0.007 (0.790) | 0.045 (0.389) | 0.060 (0.261) | 0.041 (0.331) | -0.122*** (0.006) |
| Worldwide views on global issues [1=different, 6=similar] | 0.020 (0.327) | 0.012 (0.710) | -0.048 (0.239) | 0.067** (0.046) | 0.049 (0.165) |
| GD's effect on cultural diversity [1=less, 4=same, 7=more] | 0.036** (0.030) | 0.020 (0.502) | 0.087*** (0.010) | 0.053* (0.056) | 0.023 (0.454) |
| World too diverse for GD? [1=yes, 2=no] | -0.017 (0.370) | 0.039 (0.251) | 0.002 (0.973) | -0.034 (0.301) | -0.063* (0.056) |
| World too large for GD? [1=yes, 6=no] | 0.041** (0.027) | 0.026 (0.457) | 0.050 (0.207) | 0.004 (0.896) | 0.061* (0.079) |
| GD's distance to people [1 = close enough, 6 = too far] | -0.056*** (0.008) | -0.032 (0.401) | -0.071 (0.124) | -0.015 (0.662) | -0.118*** (0.003) |
| Global tyranny through GD? [1=unlikely, 6=likely] | 0.000 (0.989) | 0.061* (0.063) | 0.042 (0.262) | -0.040 (0.139) | -0.032 (0.310) |
| Domination of GD by world's poor/rich [0 = no, 3 = yes, by rich/poor] | 0.015 (0.440) | 0.038 (0.332) | 0.026 (0.536) | 0.026 (0.326) | -0.020 (0.575) |
| GD's effect on conflict/unity [1 = more conflict, 6 = more unity] | 0.063** (0.013) | 0.073 (0.150) | 0.000 (0.993) | 0.042 (0.281) | 0.126*** (0.006) |
| Subjective citizenship [1 = more global, 6 = more national] | -0.034** (0.030) | -0.003 (0.923) | -0.058** (0.047) | -0.043 (0.152) | -0.028 (0.356) |
| Well-being of foreigners vs. compatriots [1 = as important, 6 = less important] | 0.011 (0.494) | 0.076*** (0.008) | -0.032 (0.380) | 0.012 (0.674) | -0.005 (0.868) |
| Global inequality [1=unfair, 6=justified] | -0.003 (0.875) | 0.040 (0.151) | -0.015 (0.725) | 0.023 (0.398) | -0.087** (0.010) |
| Principled position on IOs [1=oppose, 6=support] | 0.042* (0.057) | 0.046 (0.249) | 0.028 (0.559) | -0.006 (0.867) | 0.107*** (0.006) |

| | (1) Pooled | (2) Brazil | (3) Germany | (4) Japan | (5) USA |
|--|--|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-------------------|
| <i>Explanatory variables:</i> | <i>Dependent variable:</i> Attitude toward GD [1=oppose, 6=support] | | | | |
| Sovereignty and independence [1=unimportant, 6=important] | -0.045** (0.021) | -0.055 (0.173) | -0.066* (0.080) | -0.118*** (0.001) | -0.017 (0.622) |
| IOs' capability on global issues [1=incapable, 6=capable] | 0.021 (0.318) | 0.018 (0.633) | 0.040 (0.348) | 0.020 (0.581) | 0.054 (0.161) |
| Home country: responsibility for global issues [1=take, 6=avoid] | 0.010 (0.558) | -0.032 (0.299) | 0.044 (0.272) | 0.037 (0.182) | 0.022 (0.496) |
| Global political actions [1=oppose, 6=support] | 0.042* (0.065) | -0.009 (0.826) | 0.047 (0.327) | 0.057 (0.139) | 0.026 (0.487) |
| Democracy as form of government [1=best, 6=worst] | 0.043** (0.019) | 0.056 (0.102) | 0.011 (0.775) | -0.027 (0.394) | 0.058* (0.064) |
| Competitive elections for government [1=bad, 6=good] | 0.012 (0.517) | 0.036 (0.257) | -0.005 (0.901) | -0.018 (0.587) | 0.043 (0.172) |
| Feasibility of GD [1=impossible, 6=possible] | 0.002 (0.928) | 0.084** (0.035) | -0.050 (0.213) | -0.054 (0.125) | -0.026 (0.477) |
| Likelihood of GD [1=unlikely, 6=likely] | 0.015 (0.458) | -0.010 (0.796) | 0.062 (0.136) | 0.049 (0.202) | 0.018 (0.543) |
| Global governance knowledge [0=low, 7=high] | 0.007 (0.528) | 0.012 (0.597) | 0.014 (0.583) | 0.003 (0.837) | -0.013 (0.585) |
| Political comprehension [0=low, 2=high] | -0.027 (0.250) | -0.037 (0.503) | -0.064 (0.210) | -0.003 (0.926) | 0.021 (0.645) |
| Interest in world politics [0=low, 8=high] | 0.004 (0.754) | -0.002 (0.942) | 0.040 (0.147) | -0.012 (0.453) | 0.005 (0.778) |
| Political activeness [0=low, 11.25=high] | 0.012 (0.139) | 0.027* (0.086) | 0.022 (0.169) | 0.009 (0.557) | -0.002 (0.876) |
| Ideological self-placement [1=left, 6=right] | -0.035* (0.073) | 0.012 (0.731) | -0.098** (0.033) | -0.044 (0.191) | -0.030 (0.417) |
| Economic orientation [1=left, 6=right] | -0.044*** (0.002) | -0.064** (0.022) | -0.064** (0.025) | 0.015 (0.494) | -0.038 (0.199) |

| | (1) Pooled | (2) Brazil | (3) Germany | (4) Japan | (5) USA |
|--|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| <i>Dependent variable:</i> Attitude toward GD [1=oppose, 6=support] | | | | | |
| <i>Explanatory variables:</i> | | | | | |
| Cultural orientation [1=left, 6=right] | 0.033** (0.021) | 0.045* (0.099) | 0.050* (0.090) | 0.031 (0.167) | 0.007 (0.796) |
| Importance of faith [1=low, 6=high] | -0.026** (0.033) | 0.013 (0.615) | -0.044* (0.064) | -0.001 (0.949) | -0.029 (0.187) |
| Gender = 1, Male | -0.054 (0.121) | -0.128* (0.093) | -0.053 (0.481) | 0.044 (0.379) | -0.056 (0.411) |
| Gender = 3, Other | -1.164 (0.109) | -0.119 (0.754) | 0.460* (0.100) | | -1.080** (0.047) |
| Age [in years] | -0.004*** (0.004) | -0.005 (0.111) | -0.003 (0.249) | -0.000 (0.952) | -0.008*** (0.002) |
| Educational level [1=low, 9=high] | -0.005 (0.776) | 0.012 (0.730) | -0.004 (0.894) | 0.013 (0.590) | -0.016 (0.553) |
| Home country [1 = survey country, 2 = other country] | -0.350** (0.013) | -0.221 (0.690) | -0.611*** (0.001) | 0.177 (0.761) | -0.005 (0.978) |
| Dual/other nationality [0=no, 1=yes] | 0.197 (0.177) | -0.145 (0.724) | 0.054 (0.799) | 0.519** (0.041) | 0.126 (0.562) |
| Ethnic minority [0=never, 1=sometimes, 2=always] | 0.026 (0.325) | 0.000 (0.993) | 0.076 (0.289) | 0.087 (0.140) | -0.000 (0.993) |
| Smartphone user [0=no, 1=yes] | 0.123** (0.019) | 0.083 (0.507) | 0.077 (0.547) | 0.053 (0.529) | 0.171* (0.074) |
| Survey duration [in minutes] | -0.000 (0.275) | 0.000 (0.595) | -0.001 (0.484) | 0.000 (0.153) | -0.000 (0.566) |
| Prior survey about GD [0=no, 1=yes] | -0.055 (0.515) | 0.062 (0.637) | -0.224 (0.173) | 0.136 (0.444) | -0.291** (0.047) |
| Attention check [0=failed, 1=passed] | -0.019 (0.598) | -0.027 (0.737) | 0.065 (0.434) | -0.086* (0.086) | 0.011 (0.881) |
| Experimental condition = 2 | 0.136*** (0.005) | 0.289*** (0.006) | 0.301** (0.016) | 0.114* (0.077) | 0.021 (0.819) |

| | (1) Pooled | (2) Brazil | (3) Germany | (4) Japan | (5) USA |
|--|---------------------|------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| <i>Dependent variable:</i> Attitude toward GD [1=oppose, 6=support] | | | | | |
| <i>Explanatory variables:</i> | | | | | |
| Experimental condition = 3 | -0.021 (0.672) | 0.070 (0.483) | 0.148 (0.230) | -0.080 (0.251) | -0.165* (0.080) |
| Experimental condition = 4 | -0.010 (0.833) | 0.125 (0.249) | 0.189 (0.132) | -0.028 (0.660) | -0.155* (0.080) |
| Country = Germany | 0.143** (0.029) | | | | |
| Country = Japan | 0.195*** (0.002) | | | | |
| Country = USA | 0.032 (0.589) | | | | |
| Constant | 2.122*** (0.000) | 0.654 (0.407) | 3.291*** (0.000) | 1.892** (0.012) | 2.511*** (0.000) |
| Observations | 4,286 | 1,150 | 918 | 1,068 | 1,150 |
| R-squared | 0.440 | 0.371 | 0.500 | 0.465 | 0.559 |
| p-values in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 | | | | | |

Note: “GD” stands for “global democracy”. “IO” means “international organization”.

Table 19: Robustness checks on pooled GD attitudes regression

| Explanatory variable | OLS coef. | OLS p-value | ologit coef. | ologit p-value | unweighted coef. | unweighted p-value | control coef. | control p-value | attentive coef. | attentive p-value |
|---|------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|
| Prior thinking about GD [0=none, 3=much] | -0.01 | 0.63 | -0.01 | 0.78 | -0.01 | 0.70 | -0.03 | 0.52 | -0.02 | 0.60 |
| Family, friends, peers GD influence [0=none, 3=much] | -0.03 | 0.33 | -0.03 | 0.65 | -0.03 | 0.31 | -0.05 | 0.40 | -0.04 | 0.43 |
| Advocacy group GD influence [0=none, 3=much] | 0.02 | 0.47 | 0.05 | 0.42 | 0.01 | 0.81 | 0.06 | 0.35 | 0.03 | 0.58 |
| GD's effect on home democracy [1=strengthen, 6=weaken] | -0.08 | 0.00 | -0.14 | 0.00 | -0.07 | 0.00 | -0.09 | 0.03 | -0.09 | 0.01 |
| GD's effect on national wealth [1=wealthier, 6=poorer] | 0.02 | 0.34 | 0.04 | 0.42 | 0.03 | 0.10 | 0.04 | 0.43 | 0.05 | 0.13 |
| GD's effect on country power [1=increase, 6=decrease] | -0.02 | 0.48 | -0.02 | 0.57 | -0.02 | 0.17 | 0.04 | 0.35 | 0.01 | 0.78 |
| GD's effect on national representation [1=increase, 6=decrease] | -0.02 | 0.41 | -0.06 | 0.14 | 0.00 | 0.90 | 0.03 | 0.44 | -0.03 | 0.39 |

| Explanatory variable | OLS coef. | OLS p-value | ologit coef. | ologit p-value | unweighted coef. | unweighted p-value | control coef. | control p-value | attentive coef. | attentive p-value |
|--|------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|
| Current world politics [1=undemocratic, 6=democratic] | -0.01 | 0.73 | -0.03 | 0.43 | 0.01 | 0.44 | -0.05 | 0.22 | -0.03 | 0.36 |
| Current global order [1=representative, 6=unrepresentative] | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.09 | 0.01 | 0.86 | 0.02 | 0.36 |
| Public participation in world politics [1=unimportant, 6=important] | 0.10 | 0.00 | 0.18 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 0.00 | 0.04 | 0.34 | 0.06 | 0.05 |
| GD necessary to solve global problems? [1=no, 6=yes] | 0.22 | 0.00 | 0.42 | 0.00 | 0.20 | 0.00 | 0.32 | 0.00 | 0.23 | 0.00 |
| GD effective on climate change? [1=no, 6=yes] | 0.07 | 0.00 | 0.15 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 0.00 | 0.03 | 0.44 | 0.06 | 0.05 |
| GD effective on peace? [1=no, 6=yes] | 0.09 | 0.00 | 0.20 | 0.00 | 0.10 | 0.00 | 0.11 | 0.03 | 0.14 | 0.00 |
| GD effective on poverty? [1=no, 6=yes] | 0.01 | 0.79 | 0.02 | 0.67 | 0.01 | 0.57 | 0.01 | 0.87 | 0.05 | 0.19 |
| Worldwide views on global issues [1=different, 6=similar] | 0.02 | 0.33 | 0.05 | 0.20 | 0.01 | 0.47 | -0.05 | 0.17 | -0.01 | 0.58 |

| Explanatory variable | OLS coef. | OLS p-value | ologit coef. | ologit p-value | unweighted coef. | unweighted p-value | control coef. | control p-value | attentive coef. | attentive p-value |
|---|------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|
| GD's effect on cultural diversity [1=less, 4=same, 7=more] | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.08 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.54 | 0.02 | 0.28 |
| World too diverse for GD? [1=yes, 2=no] | -0.02 | 0.37 | -0.03 | 0.34 | 0.01 | 0.75 | 0.03 | 0.43 | -0.04 | 0.12 |
| World too large for GD? [1=yes, 6=no] | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.08 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.18 | 0.04 | 0.29 | 0.04 | 0.13 |
| GD's distance to people [1 = close enough, 6 = too far] | -0.06 | 0.01 | -0.12 | 0.00 | -0.06 | 0.00 | -0.04 | 0.36 | -0.07 | 0.02 |
| Global tyranny through GD? [1=unlikely, 6=likely] | 0.00 | 0.99 | 0.01 | 0.85 | 0.00 | 1.00 | -0.06 | 0.05 | -0.05 | 0.02 |
| Domination of GD by world's poor/rich [0 = no, 3 = yes, by rich/poor] | 0.01 | 0.44 | 0.06 | 0.10 | 0.01 | 0.53 | 0.06 | 0.10 | 0.05 | 0.08 |
| GD's effect on conflict/unity [1 = more conflict, 6 = more unity] | 0.06 | 0.01 | 0.12 | 0.01 | 0.07 | 0.00 | 0.05 | 0.37 | 0.03 | 0.41 |
| Subjective citizenship [1 = more global, 6 = more national] | -0.03 | 0.03 | -0.06 | 0.03 | -0.02 | 0.07 | 0.00 | 0.92 | -0.06 | 0.02 |

| Explanatory variable | OLS coef. | OLS p-value | ologit coef. | ologit p-value | unweighted coef. | unweighted p-value | control coef. | control p-value | attentive coef. | attentive p-value |
|---|------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|
| Well-being of foreigners vs. compatriots [1 = as important, 6 = less important] | 0.01 | 0.49 | 0.02 | 0.47 | 0.02 | 0.24 | 0.07 | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.41 |
| Global inequality [1=unfair, 6=justified] | 0.00 | 0.88 | 0.01 | 0.69 | 0.00 | 0.77 | 0.02 | 0.46 | 0.01 | 0.58 |
| Principled position on IOs [1=oppose, 6=support] | 0.04 | 0.06 | 0.07 | 0.09 | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.99 | 0.03 | 0.35 |
| Sovereignty and independence [1=unimportant, 6=important] | -0.04 | 0.02 | -0.06 | 0.11 | -0.04 | 0.01 | -0.04 | 0.24 | -0.07 | 0.01 |
| IOs' capability on global issues [1=incapable, 6=capable] | 0.02 | 0.32 | 0.05 | 0.27 | 0.00 | 0.84 | 0.03 | 0.37 | 0.03 | 0.30 |
| Home country: responsibility for global issues [1=take, 6=avoid] | 0.01 | 0.56 | 0.01 | 0.71 | 0.00 | 0.92 | -0.01 | 0.80 | 0.02 | 0.37 |
| Global political actions [1=oppose, 6=support] | 0.04 | 0.07 | 0.12 | 0.01 | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.16 | 0.04 | 0.19 |
| Democracy as form of government [1=best, 6=worst] | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.09 | 0.01 | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.10 | 0.00 | 0.98 |

| Explanatory variable | OLS coef. | OLS p-value | ologit coef. | ologit p-value | unweighted coef. | unweighted p-value | control coef. | control p-value | attentive coef. | attentive p-value |
|--|------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|
| Competitive elections for government [1=bad, 6=good] | 0.01 | 0.52 | 0.04 | 0.22 | 0.01 | 0.37 | 0.01 | 0.83 | -0.04 | 0.11 |
| Feasibility of GD [1=impossible, 6=possible] | 0.00 | 0.93 | -0.01 | 0.72 | 0.01 | 0.51 | 0.10 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.64 |
| Likelihood of GD [1=unlikely, 6=likely] | 0.02 | 0.46 | 0.05 | 0.17 | 0.01 | 0.59 | -0.06 | 0.11 | 0.01 | 0.74 |
| Global governance knowledge [0=low, 7=high] | 0.01 | 0.53 | 0.02 | 0.48 | 0.00 | 0.88 | 0.02 | 0.45 | -0.01 | 0.42 |
| Political comprehension [0=low, 2=high] | -0.03 | 0.25 | -0.04 | 0.33 | -0.03 | 0.27 | -0.03 | 0.54 | -0.04 | 0.27 |
| Interest in world politics [0=low, 8=high] | 0.00 | 0.75 | 0.01 | 0.55 | 0.01 | 0.39 | -0.02 | 0.29 | 0.01 | 0.69 |
| Political activeness [0=low, 11.25=high] | 0.01 | 0.14 | 0.02 | 0.19 | 0.01 | 0.29 | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.61 |
| Ideological self-placement [1=left, 6=right] | -0.03 | 0.07 | -0.06 | 0.10 | -0.02 | 0.19 | -0.01 | 0.88 | -0.05 | 0.06 |
| Economic orientation [1=left, 6=right] | -0.04 | 0.00 | -0.09 | 0.00 | -0.04 | 0.00 | -0.06 | 0.03 | -0.03 | 0.16 |

| Explanatory variable | OLS coef. | OLS p-value | ologit coef. | ologit p-value | unweighted coef. | unweighted p-value | control coef. | control p-value | attentive coef. | attentive p-value |
|--|------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|
| Cultural orientation [1=left, 6=right] | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.21 | 0.03 | 0.16 |
| Importance of faith [1=low, 6=high] | -0.03 | 0.03 | -0.04 | 0.06 | -0.02 | 0.04 | -0.03 | 0.20 | -0.02 | 0.25 |
| Gender = 1, Male | -0.05 | 0.12 | -0.11 | 0.10 | -0.08 | 0.02 | -0.16 | 0.02 | -0.02 | 0.70 |
| Gender = 3, Other | -1.16 | 0.11 | -1.90 | 0.33 | -0.47 | 0.11 | | | | |
| Age [in years] | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.01 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.01 | -0.01 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.14 |
| Educational level [1=low, 9=high] | 0.00 | 0.78 | -0.02 | 0.44 | 0.00 | 0.85 | -0.02 | 0.49 | -0.03 | 0.15 |
| Home country [1 = survey country, 2 = other country] | -0.35 | 0.01 | -0.71 | 0.02 | -0.23 | 0.05 | -0.46 | 0.11 | -0.22 | 0.27 |
| Dual/other nationality [0=no, 1=yes] | 0.20 | 0.18 | 0.50 | 0.12 | 0.09 | 0.44 | -0.36 | 0.12 | 0.07 | 0.71 |
| Ethnic minority [0=never, 1=sometimes, 2=always] | 0.03 | 0.33 | 0.04 | 0.40 | 0.03 | 0.22 | 0.04 | 0.42 | 0.05 | 0.22 |
| Smartphone user [0=no, 1=yes] | 0.12 | 0.02 | 0.20 | 0.05 | 0.13 | 0.01 | 0.19 | 0.05 | 0.17 | 0.02 |
| Survey duration [in minutes] | 0.00 | 0.28 | 0.00 | 0.53 | 0.00 | 0.24 | 0.00 | 0.96 | 0.00 | 0.09 |
| Prior survey about GD [0=no, 1=yes] | -0.06 | 0.52 | -0.11 | 0.50 | 0.04 | 0.53 | -0.15 | 0.41 | -0.08 | 0.65 |
| Attention check [0=failed, 1=passed] | -0.02 | 0.60 | -0.02 | 0.75 | -0.02 | 0.49 | -0.23 | 0.00 | | |
| Experimental condition = 2 | 0.14 | 0.01 | 0.22 | 0.01 | 0.12 | 0.01 | | | 0.31 | 0.00 |

| Explanatory variable | OLS coef. | OLS p-value | ologit coef. | ologit p-value | unweighted coef. | unweighted p-value | control coef. | control p-value | attentive coef. | attentive p-value |
|-----------------------------|------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|
| Experimental condition = 3 | -0.02 | 0.67 | -0.05 | 0.59 | -0.02 | 0.73 | | | 0.07 | 0.30 |
| Experimental condition = 4 | -0.01 | 0.83 | -0.02 | 0.82 | 0.00 | 0.92 | | | 0.16 | 0.02 |
| Country = Germany | 0.14 | 0.03 | 0.20 | 0.12 | 0.16 | 0.00 | 0.17 | 0.25 | 0.10 | 0.28 |
| Country = Japan | 0.20 | 0.00 | 0.24 | 0.04 | 0.21 | 0.00 | 0.16 | 0.17 | 0.16 | 0.08 |
| Country = USA | 0.03 | 0.59 | 0.03 | 0.80 | 0.01 | 0.88 | 0.14 | 0.18 | 0.02 | 0.84 |

Table 20: UK – explanatory factors of global democracy attitudes

| <i>Explanatory variables:</i> | <i>Dependent variable: Attitude toward GD [1=oppose, 6=support]</i> |
|---|---|
| Personal interest in GD [0=no, 1=yes] | 0.245*** (0.000) |
| GD necessary to solve global problems? [1=no, 6=yes] | 0.207*** (0.000) |
| Public participation in world politics [1=unimportant, 6=important] | 0.047 (0.154) |
| Subjective citizenship [1 = more national, 6 = more global] | 0.061** (0.020) |
| Feasibility of GD [1=impossible, 6=possible] | 0.132*** (0.000) |
| Global governance knowledge [0=low, 5=high] | -0.080** (0.028) |
| Political attention | -0.038*** (0.004) |
| Partisanship strength [1=low, 6=high] | -0.032 (0.154) |
| Vote in 2016 EU referendum = 2, Leave | -0.155* (0.057) |
| Vote in 2016 EU referendum = 3, Abstain | -0.289*** (0.008) |
| Vote in 2016 EU referendum = 4, Forgot | 0.348 (0.192) |
| Partisanship = 2, Labour | 0.353*** (0.000) |
| Partisanship = 3, Liberal Democrat | 0.275** (0.032) |
| Partisanship = 4, Scottish National Party (SNP) | 0.617*** (0.005) |

| <i>Explanatory variables:</i> | <i>Dependent variable:</i> |
|--|---|
| | Attitude toward GD [1=oppose, 6=support] |
| Partisanship = 5, Plaid Cymru | 0.882* (0.052) |
| Partisanship = 6, UK Independence Party (UKIP) | -0.105 (0.651) |
| Partisanship = 7, Green | 0.594*** (0.000) |
| Partisanship = 8, Brexit Party | 0.089 (0.731) |
| Partisanship = 9, Women's Equality Party | 0.729 (0.386) |
| Partisanship = 97, No – None | 0.014 (0.905) |
| Partisanship = 98, Other | -0.054 (0.756) |
| Partisanship = 99, Don't know | -0.034 (0.808) |
| Partisanship = 998, Skipped | 0.253 (0.352) |
| Age | -0.005 (0.143) |
| Gender = 2, Female | 0.167** (0.012) |
| Experimental condition = 1, Treatment | -0.021 (0.739) |
| Constant | 2.075*** (0.000) |
| Observations | 1,569 |
| R-squared | 0.516 |

p-values in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: “GD” stands for global democracy. Further control variables in the regression model include ethnicity, religion, marital status, work status, municipality, region, social grade, and educational qualification. These variables are excluded here for presentational purposes.

Table 21: Correlation analysis on willingness to act on global democratic proposals

| Regression (DV - EV) | Coef. | Std. Err. | t | P>t | [95% confidence interval] | |
|---------------------------------------|--------------|------------------|----------|---------------|----------------------------------|------|
| Global democracy - global parliament | 0.64 | 0.03 | 24.38 | 0.00 | 0.59 | 0.69 |
| Global democracy - global government | 0.66 | 0.02 | 27.70 | 0.00 | 0.61 | 0.70 |
| Global government - global parliament | 0.67 | 0.02 | 28.49 | 0.00 | 0.62 | 0.71 |

Note: “DV” stands for dependent variable. “EV” stands for explanatory variable. “Coef.” is the regression coefficient. “Std. Err.” is the linearized standard error. “t” is the t-statistic. “P>t” is the p-value.

Table 22: Variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis for willingness to act on GD regression

| Variable | VIF | 1/VIF |
|---|------------|--------------|
| Attitude toward GD [1=oppose, 6=support] | 1.73 | 0.58 |
| Prior thinking about GD [0=none, 3=much] | 1.69 | 0.59 |
| Family, friends, peers GD influence [0=none, 3=much] | 1.92 | 0.52 |
| Advocacy group GD influence [0=none, 3=much] | 1.74 | 0.57 |
| GD's effect on home democracy [1=strengthen, 6=weaken] | 2.61 | 0.38 |
| GD's effect on national wealth [1=wealthier, 6=poorer] | 2.30 | 0.43 |
| GD's effect on national representation [1=increase, 6=decrease] | 2.35 | 0.43 |
| GD's effect on country power [1=increase, 6=decrease] | 1.96 | 0.51 |
| Current world politics [1=undemocratic, 6=democratic] | 1.24 | 0.81 |
| Current global order [1=representative, 6=unrepresentative] | 1.31 | 0.76 |
| Public participation in world politics [1=unimportant, 6=important] | 1.66 | 0.60 |
| World too diverse for GD? [1=yes, 2=no] | 2.38 | 0.42 |

| Variable | VIF | 1/VIF |
|---|------------|--------------|
| World too large for GD? [1=yes, 6=no] | 2.52 | 0.40 |
| GD's distance to people [1 = close enough, 6 = too far] | 1.63 | 0.61 |
| GD necessary to solve global problems? [1=no, 6=yes] | 2.81 | 0.36 |
| GD's effect on cultural diversity [1=less, 4=same, 7=more] | 1.42 | 0.70 |
| GD effective on climate change? [1=no, 6=yes] | 2.24 | 0.45 |
| GD effective on peace? [1=no, 6=yes] | 2.79 | 0.36 |
| GD effective on poverty? [1=no, 6=yes] | 2.72 | 0.37 |
| Global tyranny through GD? [1=unlikely, 6=likely] | 1.33 | 0.75 |
| Domination of GD by world's poor/rich [0 = no, 3 = yes, by rich/poor] | 1.36 | 0.74 |
| GD's effect on conflict/unity [1 = more conflict, 6 = more unity] | 2.34 | 0.43 |
| Subjective citizenship [1 = more global, 6 = more national] | 1.63 | 0.62 |
| Well-being of foreigners vs. compatriots [1 = as important, 6 = less important] | 1.81 | 0.55 |
| Worldwide views on global issues [1=different, 6=similar] | 1.18 | 0.84 |
| Global inequality [1=unfair, 6=justified] | 1.41 | 0.71 |
| Sovereignty and independence [1=unimportant, 6=important] | 1.37 | 0.73 |
| Principled position on IOs [1=oppose, 6=support] | 1.89 | 0.53 |
| IOs' capability on global issues [1=incapable, 6=capable] | 1.84 | 0.54 |
| Home country: responsibility for global issues [1=take, 6=avoid] | 1.74 | 0.58 |
| Global political actions [1=oppose, 6=support] | 1.91 | 0.52 |
| Democracy as form of government [1=best, 6=worst] | 1.67 | 0.60 |
| Competitive elections for government [1=bad, 6=good] | 1.22 | 0.82 |
| Feasibility of GD [1=impossible, 6=possible] | 2.26 | 0.44 |
| Likelihood of GD [1=unlikely, 6=likely] | 1.89 | 0.53 |
| Global governance knowledge [0=low, 7=high] | 1.59 | 0.63 |
| Political comprehension [0=low, 2=high] | 1.28 | 0.78 |

| Variable | VIF | 1/VIF |
|--|------------|--------------|
| Interest in world politics [0=low, 8=high] | 1.93 | 0.52 |
| Political activeness [0=low, 11.25=high] | 1.64 | 0.61 |
| Ideological self-placement [1=left, 6=right] | 1.46 | 0.69 |
| Economic orientation [1=left, 6=right] | 1.36 | 0.74 |
| Cultural orientation [1=left, 6=right] | 1.33 | 0.75 |
| Importance of faith [1=low, 6=high] | 1.56 | 0.64 |
| Home country [1 = survey country, 2 = other country] = 2 | 1.44 | 0.70 |
| Dual/other nationality [0=no, 1=yes] | 1.44 | 0.70 |
| Ethnic minority [0=never, 1=sometimes, 2=always] | 1.28 | 0.78 |
| Gender = 1, Male | 1.14 | 0.87 |
| Gender = 3, Other | 1.04 | 0.96 |
| Age [in years] | 1.43 | 0.70 |
| Educational level [1=low, 9=high] | 1.25 | 0.80 |
| Prior survey about GD [0=no, 1=yes] | 1.44 | 0.69 |
| Attention check [0=failed, 1=passed] | 1.18 | 0.85 |
| Smartphone user [0=no, 1=yes] | 1.27 | 0.79 |
| Survey duration [in minutes] | 1.02 | 0.98 |
| Experimental condition = 2 | 1.65 | 0.61 |
| Experimental condition = 3 | 1.63 | 0.62 |
| Experimental condition = 4 | 1.65 | 0.61 |
| Country = 2, Germany | 2.22 | 0.45 |
| Country = 3, Japan | 2.58 | 0.39 |
| Country = 4, USA | 2.12 | 0.47 |
| Mean VIF | 1.73 | |

Note: “GD” stands for global democracy. “IO” refers to international organization.

Table 23: Explanatory factors of willingness to act on global democracy

| | (1) Pooled | (2) Brazil | (3) Germany | (4) Japan | (5) USA |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Dependent variable:</i> Willingness to act on GD [-7 = strongly against, 7 = strongly for]</p> | | | | | |
| <i>Explanatory variables:</i> | | | | | |
| Attitude toward GD [1=oppose, 6=support] | 1.125*** (0.000) | 1.280*** (0.000) | 1.021*** (0.000) | 0.933*** (0.000) | 1.119*** (0.000) |
| Prior thinking about GD [0=none, 3=much] | 0.087 (0.151) | 0.012 (0.883) | 0.184 (0.188) | 0.119 (0.297) | 0.051 (0.669) |
| Family, friends, peers GD influence [0=none, 3=much] | -0.056 (0.462) | 0.123 (0.224) | -0.127 (0.429) | 0.119 (0.546) | -0.343** (0.039) |
| Advocacy group GD influence [0=none, 3=much] | 0.287*** (0.001) | 0.373*** (0.002) | -0.122 (0.606) | 0.219 (0.249) | 0.434** (0.011) |
| GD's effect on home democracy [1=strengthen, 6=weaken] | 0.038 (0.382) | 0.039 (0.630) | 0.141 (0.114) | -0.046 (0.553) | 0.019 (0.828) |
| GD's effect on national wealth [1=wealthier, 6=poorer] | -0.016 (0.726) | -0.026 (0.741) | -0.053 (0.593) | 0.002 (0.981) | 0.038 (0.641) |
| GD's effect on national representation [1=increase, 6=decrease] | -0.013 (0.770) | -0.146** (0.046) | -0.049 (0.631) | 0.094 (0.273) | 0.036 (0.668) |
| GD's effect on country power [1=increase, 6=decrease] | 0.007 (0.869) | 0.050 (0.549) | -0.024 (0.796) | -0.079 (0.368) | 0.066 (0.415) |
| Current world politics [1=undemocratic, 6=democratic] | 0.012 (0.776) | 0.130** (0.049) | -0.045 (0.635) | 0.136* (0.066) | -0.124 (0.143) |
| Current global order [1=representative, 6=unrepresentative] | -0.006 (0.874) | 0.083 (0.124) | 0.012 (0.876) | 0.020 (0.770) | -0.103 (0.140) |
| Public participation in world politics [1=unimportant, 6=important] | -0.005 (0.909) | -0.027 (0.703) | 0.016 (0.852) | -0.139* (0.087) | 0.139 (0.103) |
| World too diverse for GD? [1=yes, 2=no] | 0.061 (0.144) | 0.118* (0.077) | 0.044 (0.631) | 0.158* (0.093) | -0.048 (0.543) |

| | (1) Pooled | (2) Brazil | (3) Germany | (4) Japan | (5) USA |
|---|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| <i>Dependent variable:</i> Willingness to act on GD [-7 = strongly against, 7 = strongly for] | | | | | |
| <i>Explanatory variables:</i> | | | | | |
| World too large for GD? [1=yes, 6=no] | -0.024 (0.563) | -0.013 (0.848) | 0.015 (0.869) | -0.022 (0.800) | -0.024 (0.769) |
| GD's distance to people [1 = close enough, 6 = too far] | -0.030 (0.480) | -0.028 (0.693) | 0.014 (0.874) | -0.124* (0.089) | -0.029 (0.744) |
| GD necessary to solve global problems? [1=no, 6=yes] | 0.094* (0.062) | 0.027 (0.739) | 0.065 (0.516) | 0.165 (0.125) | 0.154 (0.114) |
| GD's effect on cultural diversity [1=less, 4=same, 7=more] | 0.078** (0.020) | -0.043 (0.422) | 0.188** (0.012) | 0.055 (0.374) | 0.053 (0.399) |
| GD effective on climate change? [1=no, 6=yes] | -0.007 (0.866) | 0.046 (0.553) | -0.142 (0.121) | 0.036 (0.674) | 0.029 (0.726) |
| GD effective on peace? [1=no, 6=yes] | -0.031 (0.565) | -0.025 (0.790) | -0.103 (0.346) | 0.002 (0.983) | -0.010 (0.923) |
| GD effective on poverty? [1=no, 6=yes] | -0.016 (0.780) | -0.027 (0.776) | 0.124 (0.246) | 0.059 (0.510) | -0.079 (0.487) |
| Global tyranny through GD? [1=unlikely, 6=likely] | 0.062* (0.082) | 0.032 (0.591) | 0.009 (0.898) | -0.059 (0.323) | 0.174** (0.025) |
| Domination of GD by world's poor/rich [0 = no, 3 = yes, by rich/poor] | -0.014 (0.736) | -0.036 (0.603) | 0.069 (0.443) | 0.109 (0.126) | -0.076 (0.372) |
| GD's effect on conflict/unity [1 = more conflict, 6 = more unity] | 0.028 (0.558) | -0.050 (0.536) | 0.056 (0.575) | 0.077 (0.415) | 0.055 (0.539) |
| Subjective citizenship [1 = more global, 6 = more national] | -0.064* (0.050) | -0.121** (0.016) | 0.011 (0.877) | 0.037 (0.565) | -0.156** (0.022) |
| Well-being of foreigners vs. compatriots [1 = as important, 6 = less important] | 0.002 (0.948) | 0.001 (0.992) | -0.157** (0.045) | 0.030 (0.636) | 0.077 (0.209) |

| | (1) Pooled | (2) Brazil | (3) Germany | (4) Japan | (5) USA |
|---|-------------------|-------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| <p><i>Dependent variable:</i> Willingness to act on GD</p> <p><i>Explanatory variables:</i> [-7 = strongly against, 7 = strongly for]</p> | | | | | |
| Worldwide views on global issues [1=different, 6=similar] | 0.013 (0.747) | -0.007 (0.917) | -0.066 (0.374) | -0.070 (0.410) | 0.104 (0.177) |
| Global inequality [1=unfair, 6=justified] | -0.002 (0.954) | -0.021 (0.690) | -0.012 (0.882) | -0.111 (0.100) | 0.140* (0.094) |
| Sovereignty and independence [1=unimportant, 6=important] | 0.026 (0.510) | 0.068 (0.368) | 0.091 (0.267) | -0.125 (0.154) | 0.014 (0.852) |
| Principled position on IOs [1=oppose, 6=support] | 0.032 (0.466) | -0.023 (0.755) | 0.270*** (0.008) | 0.078 (0.330) | -0.136 (0.111) |
| IOs' capability on global issues [1=incapable, 6=capable] | -0.022 (0.593) | 0.073 (0.293) | -0.041 (0.642) | -0.112 (0.194) | -0.076 (0.332) |
| Home country: responsibility for global issues [1=take, 6=avoid] | -0.001 (0.970) | 0.002 (0.972) | 0.080 (0.359) | -0.120* (0.082) | 0.016 (0.789) |
| Global political actions [1=oppose, 6=support] | 0.016 (0.736) | 0.064 (0.417) | -0.088 (0.403) | 0.100 (0.234) | 0.050 (0.575) |
| Democracy as form of government [1=best, 6=worst] | -0.051 (0.175) | 0.080 (0.226) | -0.075 (0.389) | -0.152** (0.023) | -0.047 (0.487) |
| Competitive elections for government [1=bad, 6=good] | -0.005 (0.891) | 0.001 (0.979) | -0.020 (0.787) | -0.157* (0.058) | 0.023 (0.756) |
| Feasibility of GD [1=impossible, 6=possible] | -0.005 (0.903) | -0.073 (0.316) | 0.040 (0.654) | -0.037 (0.631) | 0.007 (0.928) |
| Likelihood of GD [1=unlikely, 6=likely] | 0.035 (0.401) | 0.068 (0.313) | -0.005 (0.955) | -0.002 (0.984) | 0.026 (0.730) |
| Global governance knowledge [0=low, 7=high] | 0.030 (0.270) | 0.022 (0.657) | 0.012 (0.835) | 0.084* (0.061) | 0.028 (0.590) |
| Political comprehension [0=low, 2=high] | -0.022 (0.696) | -0.179 (0.112) | -0.065 (0.577) | 0.019 (0.858) | 0.021 (0.848) |

| | (1) Pooled | (2) Brazil | (3) Germany | (4) Japan | (5) USA |
|--|---------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Dependent variable:</i> Willingness to act on GD [-7 = strongly against, 7 = strongly for]</p> | | | | | |
| <i>Explanatory variables:</i> | | | | | |
| Interest in world politics [0=low, 8=high] | 0.053** (0.033) | 0.097* (0.093) | -0.058 (0.332) | 0.065 (0.101) | 0.090** (0.041) |
| Political activeness [0=low, 11.25=high] | 0.067*** (0.000) | 0.044 (0.184) | 0.153*** (0.000) | 0.109** (0.011) | 0.011 (0.745) |
| Ideological self-placement [1=left, 6=right] | -0.069* (0.083) | -0.077 (0.249) | -0.202** (0.031) | -0.012 (0.880) | -0.069 (0.346) |
| Economic orientation [1=left, 6=right] | 0.036 (0.216) | 0.010 (0.839) | -0.008 (0.891) | 0.037 (0.567) | 0.073 (0.270) |
| Cultural orientation [1=left, 6=right] | -0.003 (0.908) | 0.006 (0.889) | -0.010 (0.864) | 0.005 (0.938) | -0.061 (0.293) |
| Importance of faith [1=low, 6=high] | 0.041 (0.118) | 0.052 (0.288) | 0.052 (0.313) | 0.011 (0.846) | 0.000 (1.000) |
| Home country [1 = survey country, 2 = other country] = 2 | 0.172 (0.592) | 0.022 (0.971) | 0.448 (0.378) | -1.165 (0.238) | -0.325 (0.422) |
| Dual/other nationality [0=no, 1=yes] | -0.162 (0.624) | -0.283 (0.661) | -0.033 (0.949) | -0.370 (0.665) | -0.481 (0.359) |
| Ethnic minority [0=never, 1=sometimes, 2=always] | -0.028 (0.684) | -0.063 (0.516) | 0.224 (0.401) | 0.018 (0.887) | -0.029 (0.782) |
| Gender = 1, Male | 0.126 (0.124) | 0.273* (0.070) | 0.034 (0.859) | 0.055 (0.674) | 0.100 (0.534) |
| Gender = 3, Other | -1.150 (0.276) | -0.108 (0.901) | -1.762*** (0.003) | | -0.753 (0.495) |
| Age [in years] | -0.000 (0.892) | -0.001 (0.833) | 0.007 (0.230) | 0.002 (0.594) | -0.012* (0.091) |
| Educational level [1=low, 9=high] | 0.016 (0.658) | -0.045 (0.506) | 0.118 (0.121) | -0.034 (0.591) | -0.046 (0.460) |

| | (1) Pooled | (2) Brazil | (3) Germany | (4) Japan | (5) USA |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Dependent variable:</i> Willingness to act on GD [-7 = strongly against, 7 = strongly for]</p> | | | | | |
| <i>Explanatory variables:</i> | | | | | |
| Prior survey about GD [0=no, 1=yes] | 0.078 (0.731) | -0.270 (0.371) | 0.145 (0.813) | 0.923 (0.139) | 0.244 (0.525) |
| Attention check [0=failed, 1=passed] | 0.100 (0.193) | 0.028 (0.851) | 0.121 (0.458) | 0.235* (0.068) | -0.009 (0.957) |
| Smartphone user [0=no, 1=yes] | -0.074 (0.569) | -0.029 (0.908) | 0.201 (0.517) | 0.219 (0.234) | -0.406* (0.094) |
| Survey duration [in minutes] | 0.000 (0.880) | -0.001 (0.109) | 0.002** (0.037) | 0.000 (0.951) | 0.000 (0.883) |
| Experimental condition = 2 | 0.081 (0.461) | -0.016 (0.937) | 0.203 (0.422) | 0.112 (0.524) | 0.046 (0.834) |
| Experimental condition = 3 | 0.112 (0.294) | 0.262 (0.178) | 0.272 (0.311) | -0.045 (0.808) | -0.028 (0.893) |
| Experimental condition = 4 | 0.034 (0.752) | 0.052 (0.794) | 0.244 (0.361) | -0.007 (0.970) | -0.125 (0.536) |
| Country = 2, Germany | -0.110 (0.451) | | | | |
| Country = 3, Japan | 0.150 (0.282) | | | | |
| Country = 4, USA | -0.172 (0.180) | | | | |
| Constant | -5.000*** (0.000) | -5.259*** (0.000) | -5.268*** (0.000) | -2.773** (0.015) | -4.350*** (0.000) |
| Observations | 4,269 | 1,144 | 916 | 1,065 | 1,144 |
| R-squared | 0.401 | 0.481 | 0.431 | 0.404 | 0.393 |
| <p style="text-align: center;">p-values in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1</p> | | | | | |

Note: “GD” stands for “global democracy”. “IO” means “international organization”.

Table 24: UK – explanatory factors of willingness to act on global democracy

| <i>Explanatory variables:</i> | <i>Dependent variable:</i> |
|--|---|
| | Willingness to act on GD [-7 = strongly against, 7 = strongly for] |
| Attitude toward GD [1=oppose, 6=support] | 0.632*** (0.000) |
| GD necessary to solve global problems? [1=no, 6=yes] | 0.092** (0.045) |
| Public participation in world politics [1=unimportant, 6=important] | -0.169*** (0.000) |
| Personal interest in GD [0=no, 1=yes] | 0.047 (0.289) |
| Subjective citizenship [1 = more national, 6 = more global] | 0.051 (0.147) |
| Feasibility of GD [1=impossible, 6=possible] | -0.020 (0.652) |
| Global governance knowledge [0=low, 5=high] | -0.004 (0.947) |
| Political attention [1=low, 11=high] | 0.021 (0.321) |
| Partisanship strength [1=low, 6=high] | -0.040 (0.230) |
| Partisanship = 2, Labour | 0.205 (0.189) |
| Partisanship = 3, Liberal Democrat | 0.374* (0.072) |
| Partisanship = 4, Scottish National Party (SNP) | 0.015 (0.966) |
| Partisanship = 5, Plaid Cymru | 1.600* (0.096) |
| Partisanship = 6, UK Independence Party (UKIP) | 0.823** |

| <i>Explanatory variables:</i> | <i>Dependent variable:</i> |
|--|---|
| | Willingness to act on GD [-7 = strongly against, 7 = strongly for] |
| | (0.013) |
| Partisanship = 7, Green | 0.865*** (0.004) |
| Partisanship = 8, Brexit Party | -0.351 (0.408) |
| Partisanship = 9, Women's Equality Party | 2.895** (0.015) |
| Partisanship = 97, No – None | -0.105 (0.517) |
| Partisanship = 98, Other | -0.358 (0.546) |
| Partisanship = 99, Don't know | 0.143 (0.551) |
| Partisanship = 998, Skipped | -0.930 (0.211) |
| Vote in 2016 EU referendum = 2, Leave | -0.129 (0.269) |
| Vote in 2016 EU referendum = 3, Abstain | 0.073 (0.645) |
| Vote in 2016 EU referendum = 4, Forgot | 0.020 (0.964) |
| Age | -0.006 (0.254) |
| Gender = 2, Female | -0.209* (0.058) |
| Experimental condition = 1, Treatment | -0.090 (0.365) |
| Constant | -1.606*** (0.003) |
| Observations | 1,548 |

| | | |
|-------------------------------|--|---|
| <i>Explanatory variables:</i> | | <i>Dependent variable:</i> Willingness to act on GD [-7 = strongly against, 7 = strongly for] |
| R-squared | | 0.344 |

p-values in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: “GD” stands for global democracy. Further control variables in the regression model include ethnicity, religion, marital status, work status, municipality, region, social grade, and educational qualification. These variables are excluded here for presentational purposes.

Table 25: Brazil – partisan mobilization effects on global democracy attitudes

| Party | Supposed GD position | Coefficient | Linearized Std. Err. | t | P>t | [95% Conf. Interval] | |
|---------------|-------------------------|-------------|-------------------------|-------|------|-------------------------|------|
| Avante | Opposition | 0.00 | (omitted) | | | | |
| DEM | Opposition | 0.70 | 0.70 | 1.00 | 0.34 | -0.83 | 2.23 |
| MDB | Opposition | -0.23 | 0.99 | -0.23 | 0.82 | -2.35 | 1.88 |
| NOVO | Opposition | -0.27 | 0.32 | -0.83 | 0.41 | -0.91 | 0.37 |
| Patriota | Opposition | 0.00 | (omitted) | | | | |
| PCdoB | Support | -0.57 | 1.30 | -0.44 | 0.71 | -6.14 | 5.01 |
| PDT | Support | -0.26 | 0.46 | -0.56 | 0.58 | -1.23 | 0.71 |
| PL | Opposition | -0.55 | 1.25 | -0.44 | 0.68 | -4.02 | 2.92 |
| Podemos | Support | 0.99 | 0.68 | 1.44 | 0.18 | -0.54 | 2.51 |
| PPS | Opposition | 0.00 | (omitted) | | | | |
| PRB | Opposition | -0.50 | 0.54 | -0.92 | 0.43 | -2.22 | 1.23 |
| Progressistas | Opposition | 0.02 | 0.53 | 0.05 | 0.97 | -1.19 | 1.24 |
| PROS | Opposition | 0.00 | (omitted) | | | | |
| PSB | Support | -1.31 | 0.72 | -1.81 | 0.09 | -2.87 | 0.24 |
| PSC | Opposition | -0.95 | 1.06 | -0.90 | 0.42 | -3.89 | 1.98 |
| PSD | Opposition | -0.53 | 1.00 | -0.53 | 0.62 | -2.98 | 1.93 |
| PSDB | Support | 0.64 | 0.38 | 1.68 | 0.10 | -0.12 | 1.39 |
| PSL | Opposition | 0.22 | 0.32 | 0.68 | 0.50 | -0.42 | 0.86 |
| PSOL | Support | -0.30 | 0.71 | -0.42 | 0.68 | -1.82 | 1.22 |
| PT | Support | 0.05 | 0.26 | 0.19 | 0.85 | -0.46 | 0.56 |
| PTB | Opposition | 0.02 | 0.31 | 0.08 | 0.94 | -0.77 | 0.82 |
| PV | Support | -0.05 | 0.54 | -0.09 | 0.93 | -1.18 | 1.08 |
| Solidariedade | Opposition | 0.00 | (omitted) | | | | |

Note: There are no statistics for several parties due to limited subgroup sample sizes. The control group here is experimental condition 1, while the treatment group is experimental condition 2.

Table 26: Germany – partisan mobilization effects on global democracy attitudes

| Party | Supposed GD position | Coefficient | Linearized Std. Err. | t | P>t | [95% Conf. Interval] | |
|--------------|---------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------------------|----------|---------------|---------------------------------|------|
| AfD | Opposition | -0.07 | 0.61 | -0.12 | 0.91 | -1.30 | 1.15 |
| CDU-CSU | Opposition | 0.17 | 0.45 | 0.38 | 0.70 | -0.73 | 1.08 |
| FDP | Opposition | 0.03 | 0.47 | 0.05 | 0.96 | -0.93 | 0.98 |
| Greens | Support | 0.23 | 0.28 | 0.83 | 0.41 | -0.32 | 0.79 |
| Left | Support | 0.28 | 0.35 | 0.80 | 0.43 | -0.43 | 0.99 |
| SPD | Opposition | -0.17 | 0.42 | -0.41 | 0.68 | -1.03 | 0.68 |

Note: The control group here is experimental condition 1, while the treatment group is experimental condition 2.

Table 27: Japan – partisan mobilization effects on global democracy attitudes

| Party | Supposed GD position | Coefficient | Linearized Std. Err. | t | P>t | [95% Conf. Interval] | |
|--------------|---------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------------------|----------|---------------|---------------------------------|-------|
| CDP | Support | 0.30 | 0.20 | 1.51 | 0.14 | -0.10 | 0.70 |
| DPP | Opposition | -0.53 | 0.55 | -0.96 | 0.35 | -1.72 | 0.66 |
| Ishin | Opposition | 0.13 | 0.22 | 0.57 | 0.57 | -0.32 | 0.57 |
| JCP | Support | 0.12 | 0.32 | 0.39 | 0.70 | -0.52 | 0.76 |
| Komeito | Support | -0.16 | 0.25 | -0.66 | 0.52 | -0.68 | 0.35 |
| LDP | Opposition | -0.33 | 0.15 | -2.29 | 0.02 | -0.62 | -0.05 |
| Reiwa | Support | 0.27 | 0.31 | 0.88 | 0.39 | -0.35 | 0.89 |
| SDPJ | Opposition | -0.85 | 0.44 | -1.92 | 0.11 | -1.98 | 0.28 |

Note: The control group here is experimental condition 1, while the treatment group is experimental condition 2.

Table 28: USA – partisan mobilization effects on global democracy attitudes

| Party | Supposed GD position | Coefficient | Linearized Std. Err. | t | P>t | [95% Conf. Interval] | |
|--------------|---------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------------------|----------|---------------|---------------------------------|------|
| Democrats | Support | -0.02 | 0.15 | -0.11 | 0.91 | -0.30 | 0.27 |
| Republicans | Opposition | -0.42 | 0.25 | -1.70 | 0.09 | -0.91 | 0.07 |

Note: The control group here is experimental condition 1, while the treatment group is experimental condition 2.

Table 29: Partisan mobilization effects among supporters of pro-GD parties

| Sample | Difference in GD attitudes | p-value | Difference in weak GD opposition | p-value |
|---------|-------------------------------|---------|-------------------------------------|---------|
| Pooled | 0.04 | 0.22 | -0.03 | 0.28 |
| Brazil | 0.06 | 0.25 | -0.03 | 0.48 |
| Germany | 0.05 | 0.50 | 0.02 | 0.77 |
| Japan | 0.04 | 0.46 | -0.03 | 0.54 |
| USA | 0.01 | 0.84 | -0.04 | 0.35 |

Note: The sample here is limited to supporters of global democracy-supporting parties. The shown differences refer to average global democracy attitudes in the control and treatment groups which comprise experimental conditions 1 and 2 respectively.

Table 30: Partisan mobilization effects among supporters of contra-GD parties

| Sample | Difference in GD attitudes | p-value | Difference in weak GD opposition | p-value |
|---------|-------------------------------|---------|-------------------------------------|---------|
| Pooled | -0.04 | 0.21 | -0.01 | 0.84 |
| Brazil | -0.03 | 0.62 | -0.01 | 0.83 |
| Germany | 0.04 | 0.62 | 0.07 | 0.35 |
| Japan | -0.09 | 0.13 | -0.04 | 0.52 |
| USA | -0.11 | 0.13 | -0.05 | 0.38 |

Note: The sample here is limited to supporters of global democracy-opposing parties. The shown differences refer to average global democracy attitudes in the control and treatment groups which comprise experimental conditions 1 and 2 respectively.

Table 31: UK – partisan mobilization – GD attitudes of strong anti-GD partisans

| | | Experimental condition | |
|---------------------------------|------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| | | Control | Treatment |
| Global democracy attitude | Opposition | 0.4894 [.4167,.5626] | 0.4761 [.4057,.5475] |
| | Support | 0.5106 [.4374,.5833] | 0.5239 [.4525,.5943] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.7982

Note: The sample here is limited to strong partisans of global democracy-opposing parties. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 32: UK – partisan mobilization – weak GD support of strong anti-GD partisans

| | | Experimental condition | |
|-------------------------------------|-----|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| | | Control | Treatment |
| Weak global democracy support | No | 0.7222 [.6494,.7848] | 0.7266 [.6587,.7854] |
| | Yes | 0.2778 [.2152,.3506] | 0.2734 [.2146,.3413] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.9252

Note: The sample here is limited to strong partisans of global democracy-opposing parties. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 33: UK – partisan mobilization – GD attitude strength of strong anti-GD partisans

| | Control | Treatment |
|------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| Strongly oppose | 0.19 [.143,.2533] | 0.2394 [.1815,.3088] |
| Oppose | 0.12 [.0857,.1761] | 0.1081 [.0705,.1622] |
| Somewhat oppose | 0.17 [.1224,.2393] | 0.1286 [.0905,.1795] |
| Somewhat support | 0.28 [.2152,.3506] | 0.2734 [.2146,.3413] |
| Support | 0.14 [.0942,.1944] | 0.1833 [.135,.2441] |
| Strongly support | 0.10 [.0603,.1493] | 0.0672 [.0407,.1092] |
| Total | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.4538

Note: The sample here is limited to strong partisans of global democracy-opposing parties. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 34: UK – partisan mobilization – GD attitude change of strong pro-GD partisans

| | | Experimental condition | |
|---------------------------------|------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| | | Control | Treatment |
| Global democracy attitude | Opposition | 0.182 [.0809,.3601] | 0.1252 [.0529,.2685] |
| | Support | 0.818 [.6399,.9191] | 0.8748 [.7315,.9471] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.5068

Note: The sample here is limited to strong partisans of global democracy-supporting parties. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 35: UK – partisan mobilization – weak GD opposition of strong pro-GD partisans

| | | Experimental condition | |
|--|-----|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| | | Control | Treatment |
| Weak global democracy opposition | No | 0.9073 [.7724,.9657] | 0.9471 [.8365,.9843] |
| | Yes | 0.0927 [.0343,.2276] | 0.0529 [.0157,.1635] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.4605

Note: The sample here is limited to strong partisans of global democracy-supporting parties. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 36: UK – partisan mobilization – GD attitude strength of strong pro-GD partisans

| | Control | Treatment |
|------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| Strongly oppose | 0.02 [.0024,.1238] | 0 |
| Oppose | 0.07 [.0148,.2814] | 0.0723 [.0215,.2163] |
| Somewhat oppose | 0.09 [.0343,.2276] | 0.0529 [.0157,.1635] |
| Somewhat support | 0.38 [.2125,.5718] | 0.0733 [.0289,.1738] |
| Support | 0.15 [.0653,.3013] | 0.4287 [.2796,.5919] |
| Strongly support | 0.30 [.1411,.516] | 0.3728 [.2121,.5676] |
| Total | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.0134

Note: The sample here is limited to strong partisans of global democracy-supporting parties. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 37: Brazil – global democracy attitudes by party preference

| Party | Opposition | Support | Total |
|---------------|-------------------|----------------|--------------|
| Avante | 100% | 0% | 100% |
| DEM | 45% | 55% | 100% |
| MDB | 22% | 78% | 100% |
| NOVO | 30% | 70% | 100% |
| Other | 45% | 55% | 100% |
| PCdoB | 0% | 100% | 100% |
| PDT | 11% | 89% | 100% |
| PL | 0% | 100% | 100% |
| PRB | 0% | 100% | 100% |
| PROS | 0% | 100% | 100% |
| PSB | 36% | 64% | 100% |
| PSC | 100% | 0% | 100% |
| PSD | 0% | 100% | 100% |
| PSDB | 37% | 63% | 100% |
| PSL | 49% | 51% | 100% |
| PSOL | 15% | 85% | 100% |
| PT | 16% | 84% | 100% |
| PTB | 0% | 100% | 100% |
| PV | 26% | 74% | 100% |
| Patriota | 23% | 77% | 100% |
| Podemos | 65% | 35% | 100% |
| Progressistas | 21% | 79% | 100% |
| Solidariedade | 0% | 100% | 100% |

Note: This table is restricted to the control group for the purposes of global democracy attitudes, i.e. experimental condition 1. There were no PPS voters in the control group.

Table 38: Brazil – effects of cognitive mobilization on voting intentions

| Party | Supposed GD position | Vote share in control group | Vote share in treatment group | p-value of difference |
|---------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Avante | Opposition | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.32 |
| DEM | Opposition | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.82 |
| MDB | Opposition | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.06 |
| NOVO | Opposition | 0.14 | 0.08 | 0.00 |
| Patriota | Opposition | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.77 |
| PCdoB | Support | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.39 |
| PDT | Support | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.67 |
| PL | Opposition | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.15 |
| Podemos | Support | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.83 |
| PPS | Opposition | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.09 |
| PRB | Opposition | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.58 |
| Progressistas | Opposition | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.36 |
| PROS | Opposition | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.63 |
| PSB | Support | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.48 |
| PSC | Opposition | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.55 |
| PSD | Opposition | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.34 |
| PSDB | Support | 0.10 | 0.09 | 0.81 |
| PSL | Opposition | 0.19 | 0.20 | 0.72 |
| PSOL | Support | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.41 |
| PT | Support | 0.17 | 0.22 | 0.14 |
| PTB | Opposition | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.34 |
| PV | Support | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.81 |
| Solidariedade | Opposition | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.14 |

Note: The control group here includes experimental conditions 1 and 4, while the treatment group refers to experimental condition 3.

Table 39: Germany – global democracy attitudes by party preference

| Party preference | Opposition | Support | Total |
|-------------------------|-------------------|----------------|--------------|
| AfD | 56% | 44% | 100% |
| CDU-CSU | 50% | 51% | 100% |
| FDP | 27% | 73% | 100% |
| Greens | 17% | 83% | 100% |
| Left | 19% | 81% | 100% |
| SPD | 42% | 58% | 100% |
| Other | 44% | 56% | 100% |

Note: The sample here is limited to the relevant control group, i.e. experimental condition 1. Deviations from 100 percent are due to rounding.

Table 40: Germany – effects of cognitive mobilization on voting intentions

| Party | Supposed GD position | Vote share in control group | Vote share in treatment group | p-value of difference |
|--------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| AfD | Opposition | 0.11 | 0.13 | 0.67 |
| CDU-CSU | Opposition | 0.30 | 0.24 | 0.19 |
| FDP | Opposition | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.82 |
| Greens | Support | 0.21 | 0.30 | 0.02 |
| Left | Support | 0.05 | 0.08 | 0.09 |
| SPD | Opposition | 0.17 | 0.11 | 0.06 |

Note: The control group here refers to experimental conditions 1 and 4, while the treatment group refers to experimental condition 3.

Table 41: Japan – global democracy attitudes by party preference

| Party | Opposition | Support | Total |
|--------------|-------------------|----------------|--------------|
| CDP | 22% | 78% | 100% |
| DPP | 42% | 58% | 100% |
| Ishin | 41% | 59% | 100% |
| JCP | 15% | 85% | 100% |
| Komeito | 0% | 100% | 100% |
| LDP | 30% | 70% | 100% |
| Reiwa | 21% | 79% | 100% |
| SDPJ | 0% | 100% | 100% |
| Other | 21% | 79% | 100% |

Note: The sample here is limited to the relevant control group, i.e. experimental condition 1.

Table 42: Japan – effects of cognitive mobilization on voting intentions

| Party | Supposed GD position | Vote share in control group | Vote share in treatment group | p-value of difference |
|--------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| LDP | Opposition | 0.54 | 0.55 | 0.80 |
| CDP | Support | 0.14 | 0.14 | 0.93 |
| DPP | Opposition | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.49 |
| Ishin | Opposition | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.55 |
| Reiwa | Support | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.11 |
| Komeito | Support | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.31 |
| SDPJ | Opposition | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.88 |
| JCP | Support | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.94 |

Note: The control group here refers to experimental conditions 1 and 4, while the treatment group refers to experimental condition 3.

Table 43: USA – global democracy attitudes by party preference

| Party preference | Opposition | Support | Total |
|-------------------------|-------------------|----------------|--------------|
| Democrats | 29% | 71% | 100% |
| Republicans | 52% | 48% | 100% |
| Other | 43% | 56% | 100% |

Note: The sample here is the relevant control group, i.e. experimental condition 1.

Table 44: USA – effects of cognitive mobilization on voting intentions

| Party | Supposed GD position | Vote share in control group | Vote share in treatment group | p-value of difference |
|--------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Democrats | Support | 0.52 | 0.50 | 0.60 |
| Republicans | Opposition | 0.46 | 0.47 | 0.70 |

Note: The relevant control group here is composed of experimental conditions 1 and 4, while the treatment group is experimental condition 3.

Table 45: Cognitive mobilization among strong global democracy supporters

| Sample | Difference in vote share of GD-opposing parties | p-value |
|---------------|--|----------------|
| Pooled | 0.06 | 0.17 |
| Brazil | 0.01 | 0.91 |
| Germany | 0.25 | 0.02 |
| Japan | -0.09 | 0.41 |
| USA | -0.01 | 0.90 |

Note: This sample is limited to strong global democracy supporters, showing the difference in vote shares of global democracy-opposing parties in the cognitive mobilization control group (comprising experimental conditions 1 and 4), and the treatment group (i.e. experimental condition 3).

Table 46: Cognitive mobilization among strong global democracy opponents

| Sample | Difference in vote share of GD-supporting parties | p-value |
|---------------|--|----------------|
| Pooled | -0.06 | 0.31 |
| Brazil | -0.03 | 0.77 |
| Germany | -0.14 | 0.13 |
| Japan | -0.13 | 0.26 |
| USA | 0.05 | 0.62 |

Note: This sample is limited to strong global democracy opponents, showing the difference in vote shares of global democracy-supporting parties in the cognitive mobilization control group (comprising experimental conditions 1 and 4), and the treatment group (i.e. experimental condition 3).

Table 47: UK – partisan mobilization effects on GD attitudes

| Party | Supposed GD position | Control group's mean GD attitude | Treatment group's mean GD attitude | p-value of difference |
|-------------------|----------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Brexit Party | Opposition | 2.30 | 2.65 | 0.58 |
| Conservatives | Opposition | 2.94 | 2.72 | 0.08 |
| Greens | Support | 4.04 | 5.07 | 0.00 |
| Labour | Opposition | 3.92 | 4.08 | 0.30 |
| Liberal Democrats | Support | 3.70 | 4.36 | 0.03 |
| Plaid Cymru | Support | 4.61 | 4.81 | 0.68 |
| SNP | Support | 4.28 | 4.40 | 0.78 |
| UKIP | Opposition | 2.79 | 2.12 | 0.42 |

Note: Global democracy (GD) ratings range from “strongly oppose” (1) to “strongly support” (6).

Table 48: UK – global democracy attitudes by party preference

| Party preference | Support | Opposition | Total |
|-------------------|---------|------------|-------|
| Conservatives | 39% | 61% | 100% |
| Labour | 71% | 29% | 100% |
| Liberal Democrats | 61% | 39% | 100% |
| SNP | 78% | 22% | 100% |
| Green | 80% | 20% | 100% |
| UKIP | 26% | 74% | 100% |
| Brexit Party | 23% | 77% | 100% |
| Plaid Cymru | 88% | 12% | 100% |
| Other | 49% | 51% | 100% |

Note: The sample here is limited to the control group.

Table 49: UK – effects of cognitive mobilization on voting intentions

| Party | Supposed GD position | Vote share in control group | Vote share in treatment group | p-value of difference |
|-------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------|
| Brexit Party | Opposition | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.06 |
| Conservatives | Opposition | 0.44 | 0.42 | 0.55 |
| Greens | Support | 0.06 | 0.07 | 0.51 |
| Labour | Opposition | 0.34 | 0.31 | 0.35 |
| Liberal Democrats | Support | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.32 |
| Plaid Cymru | Support | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.97 |
| SNP | Support | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.91 |
| UKIP | Opposition | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.80 |

Table 50: UK – effects on voting intentions among strong global democracy supporters

| | | Experimental condition | |
|--|------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| | | Control | Treatment |
| Vote intention for a party with global democracy stance... | Opposition | 0.7093 [.6203,.7847] | 0.5629 [.4714,.6504] |
| | Support | 0.2907 [.2153,.3797] | 0.4371 [.3496,.5286] |
| | Total | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.0208

Note: The sample here is limited to strong global democracy supporters. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 51: UK – effects on weak partisanship of global democracy-opposing parties

| | | Experimental condition | |
|--|-------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| | | Control | Treatment |
| Weak partisan of a global democracy- opposing party | No | 0.5861 [.4991,.668] | 0.73 [.6416,.8033] |
| | Yes | 0.4139 [.332,.5009] | 0.27 [.1967,.3584] |
| | Total | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.0188

Note: The sample here is limited to strong global democracy supporters. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 52: UK – effects on voting intentions among strong global democracy opponents

| | | Experimental condition | |
|--|------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| | | Control | Treatment |
| Vote intention for a party with global democracy stance... | Opposition | 0.8952 [.8362,.9347] | 0.9634 [.9117,.9853] |
| | Support | 0.1048 [.0653,.1638] | 0.0366 [.0147,.0883] |
| | Total | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.0312

Note: The sample here is limited to strong global democracy opponents. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 53: UK – effects on weak partisanship of global democracy-supporting parties

| | | Experimental condition | |
|--|-----|-------------------------|------------------------|
| | | Control | Treatment |
| Weak partisan of a global democracy- supporting party | No | 0.9113 [.8561,.9467] | 0.987 [.9485,.9968] |
| | Yes | 0.0887 [.0533,.1439] | 0.013 [.0032,.0515] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.0029

Note: The sample here is limited to strong global democracy opponents. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 54: Pooled – attitudinal parallelism among weak global democracy supporters

| | | Experimental condition | |
|---------------------------|-----|------------------------|-----------|
| | | Control | Treatment |
| Vote for anti-GD party | No | 0.42 | 0.45 |
| | Yes | 0.58 | 0.55 |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.3903

Note: The sample is limited to weak global democracy supporters. The control condition here comprises experimental conditions 1 and 4, while the treatment condition comprises conditions 2 and 3.

Table 55: Pooled – attitudinal parallelism among weak global democracy opponents

| | | Experimental condition | |
|--------------------------|-----|------------------------|-----------|
| | | Control | Treatment |
| Vote for pro-GD party | No | 0.66 | 0.65 |
| | Yes | 0.34 | 0.35 |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.7900

Note: The sample is limited to weak global democracy opponents. The control condition here comprises experimental conditions 1 and 4, while the treatment condition comprises conditions 2 and 3.

Table 56: Brazil – attitudinal parallelism among weak global democracy supporters

| | | Experimental condition | |
|---------------------------|-----|------------------------|-----------|
| | | Control | Treatment |
| Vote for anti-GD party | No | 0.44 | 0.51 |
| | Yes | 0.56 | 0.49 |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.2370

Note: The sample is limited to weak global democracy supporters. The control condition here comprises experimental conditions 1 and 4, while the treatment condition comprises conditions 2 and 3.

Table 57: Brazil – attitudinal parallelism among weak global democracy opponents

| | | Experimental condition | |
|--------------------------|-----|------------------------|-----------|
| | | Control | Treatment |
| Vote for pro-GD party | No | 0.56 | 0.55 |
| | Yes | 0.44 | 0.45 |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.9571

Note: The sample is limited to weak global democracy opponents. The control condition here comprises experimental conditions 1 and 4, while the treatment condition comprises conditions 2 and 3.

Table 58: Germany – attitudinal parallelism among weak global democracy supporters

| | | Experimental condition | |
|---------------------------|-----|------------------------|-----------|
| | | Control | Treatment |
| Vote for anti-GD party | No | 0.29 | 0.37 |
| | Yes | 0.71 | 0.63 |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.2165

Note: The sample is limited to weak global democracy supporters. The control condition here comprises experimental conditions 1 and 4, while the treatment condition comprises conditions 2 and 3.

Table 59: Germany – attitudinal parallelism among weak global democracy opponents

| | | Experimental condition | |
|--------------------------|-----|------------------------|-----------|
| | | Control | Treatment |
| Vote for pro-GD party | No | 0.75 | 0.78 |
| | Yes | 0.25 | 0.22 |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.7583

Note: The sample is limited to weak global democracy opponents. The control condition here comprises experimental conditions 1 and 4, while the treatment condition comprises conditions 2 and 3.

Table 60: Japan – attitudinal parallelism among weak global democracy supporters

| | | Experimental condition | |
|---------------------------|-----|------------------------|-----------|
| | | Control | Treatment |
| Vote for anti-GD party | No | 0.36 | 0.31 |
| | Yes | 0.64 | 0.69 |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.3155

Note: The sample is limited to weak global democracy supporters. The control condition here comprises experimental conditions 1 and 4, while the treatment condition comprises conditions 2 and 3.

Table 61: Japan – attitudinal parallelism among weak global democracy opponents

| | | Experimental condition | |
|--------------------------|-----|------------------------|-----------|
| | | Control | Treatment |
| Vote for pro-GD party | No | 0.81 | 0.79 |
| | Yes | 0.19 | 0.21 |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.7593

Note: The sample is limited to weak global democracy opponents. The control condition here comprises experimental conditions 1 and 4, while the treatment condition comprises conditions 2 and 3.

Table 62: USA – attitudinal parallelism among weak global democracy supporters

| | | Experimental condition | |
|---------------------------|-----|------------------------|-----------|
| | | Control | Treatment |
| Vote for anti-GD party | No | 0.61 | 0.70 |
| | Yes | 0.39 | 0.30 |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.1091

Note: The sample is limited to weak global democracy supporters. The control condition here comprises experimental conditions 1 and 4, while the treatment condition comprises conditions 2 and 3.

Table 63: USA – attitudinal parallelism among weak global democracy opponents

| | | Experimental condition | |
|--------------------------|-----|------------------------|-----------|
| | | Control | Treatment |
| Vote for pro-GD party | No | 0.50 | 0.46 |
| | Yes | 0.50 | 0.54 |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.5818

Note: The sample is limited to weak global democracy opponents. The control condition here comprises experimental conditions 1 and 4, while the treatment condition comprises conditions 2 and 3.

Table 64: Pooled – attitudinal parallelism among voters of anti-GD parties

| | | Experimental condition | |
|--------------------|-----|------------------------|-----------|
| | | Control | Treatment |
| Weak GD support | No | 0.64 | 0.64 |
| | Yes | 0.36 | 0.36 |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.9051

Note: The sample is limited to voters of global democracy-opposing parties. The control condition here is experimental condition 1, while the treatment conditions comprise conditions 2, 3, and 4.

Table 65: Pooled – attitudinal parallelism among voters of pro-GD parties

| | | Experimental condition | |
|-----------------------|-----|------------------------|-----------|
| | | Control | Treatment |
| Weak GD opposition | No | 0.85 | 0.86 |
| | Yes | 0.15 | 0.14 |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.4636

Note: The sample is limited to voters of global democracy-supporting parties. The control condition here is experimental condition 1, while the treatment conditions comprise conditions 2, 3, and 4.

Table 66: Brazil – attitudinal parallelism among voters of anti-GD parties

| | | Experimental condition | |
|--------------------|-----|------------------------|-----------|
| | | Control | Treatment |
| Weak GD support | No | 0.68 | 0.69 |
| | Yes | 0.32 | 0.31 |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.8244

Note: The sample is limited to voters of global democracy-opposing parties. The control condition here is experimental condition 1, while the treatment conditions comprise conditions 2, 3, and 4.

Table 67: Brazil – attitudinal parallelism among voters of pro-GD parties

| | | Experimental condition | |
|-----------------------|-----|------------------------|-----------|
| | | Control | Treatment |
| Weak GD opposition | No | 0.88 | 0.90 |
| | Yes | 0.12 | 0.10 |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.6191

Note: The sample is limited to voters of global democracy-supporting parties. The control condition here is experimental condition 1, while the treatment conditions comprise conditions 2, 3, and 4.

Table 68: Germany – attitudinal parallelism among voters of anti-GD parties

| | | Experimental condition | |
|--------------------|-----|------------------------|-----------|
| | | Control | Treatment |
| Weak GD support | No | 0.70 | 0.64 |
| | Yes | 0.30 | 0.36 |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.4047

Note: The sample is limited to voters of global democracy-opposing parties. The control condition here is experimental condition 1, while the treatment conditions comprise conditions 2, 3, and 4.

Table 69: Germany – attitudinal parallelism among voters of pro-GD parties

| | | Experimental condition | |
|-----------------------|-----|------------------------|-----------|
| | | Control | Treatment |
| Weak GD opposition | No | 0.90 | 0.87 |
| | Yes | 0.10 | 0.13 |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.5826

Note: The sample is limited to voters of global democracy-supporting parties. The control condition here is experimental condition 1, while the treatment conditions comprise conditions 2, 3, and 4.

Table 70: Japan – attitudinal parallelism among voters of anti-GD parties

| | | Experimental condition | |
|--------------------|-----|------------------------|-----------|
| | | Control | Treatment |
| Weak GD support | No | 0.51 | 0.51 |
| | Yes | 0.49 | 0.49 |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.9907

Note: The sample is limited to voters of global democracy-opposing parties. The control condition here is experimental condition 1, while the treatment conditions comprise conditions 2, 3, and 4.

Table 71: Japan – attitudinal parallelism among voters of pro-GD parties

| | | Experimental condition | |
|-----------------------|-----|------------------------|-----------|
| | | Control | Treatment |
| Weak GD opposition | No | 0.87 | 0.88 |
| | Yes | 0.13 | 0.12 |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.8497

Note: The sample is limited to voters of global democracy-supporting parties. The control condition here is experimental condition 1, while the treatment conditions comprise conditions 2, 3, and 4.

Table 72: USA – attitudinal parallelism among voters of anti-GD parties

| | | Experimental condition | |
|--------------------|-----|------------------------|-----------|
| | | Control | Treatment |
| Weak GD support | No | 0.76 | 0.77 |
| | Yes | 0.24 | 0.23 |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.8462

Note: The sample is limited to voters of global democracy-opposing parties. The control condition here is experimental condition 1, while the treatment conditions comprise conditions 2, 3, and 4.

Table 73: USA – attitudinal parallelism among voters of pro-GD parties

| | | Experimental condition | |
|-----------------------|-----|------------------------|-----------|
| | | Control | Treatment |
| Weak GD opposition | No | 0.79 | 0.82 |
| | Yes | 0.21 | 0.18 |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.4303

Note: The sample is limited to voters of global democracy-supporting parties. The control condition here is experimental condition 1, while the treatment conditions comprise conditions 2, 3, and 4.

Table 74: UK – attitudinal parallelism among weak partisans of GD-opposing parties

| | | Experimental condition | |
|--------------------|-----|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| | | Control | Treatment |
| Weak GD support | No | 0.6604 [.5978,.7179] | 0.6862 [.6186,.7467] |
| | Yes | 0.3396 [.2821,.4022] | 0.3138 [.2533,.3814] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.5668

Note: The sample is limited to weak partisans of global democracy-opposing parties.

Table 75: UK – attitudinal parallelism among weak partisans of GD-supporting parties

| | | Experimental condition | |
|-----------------------|-----|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| | | Control | Treatment |
| Weak GD opposition | No | 0.8702 [.7785,.9274] | 0.8826 [.7132,.9578] |
| | Yes | 0.1298 [.0726,.2215] | 0.1174 [.0422,.2868] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.8602

Note: The sample is limited to weak partisans of global democracy-supporting parties.

Table 76: UK – attitudinal parallelism among weak GD supporters

| | | Experimental condition | |
|-----------------------------------|-----|------------------------|-----------|
| | | Control | Treatment |
| Weak partisan of anti-GD party | No | 0.48 | 0.53 |
| | Yes | 0.52 | 0.47 |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.3841

Note: The sample is limited to weak global democracy supporters.

Table 77: UK – attitudinal parallelism among weak GD opponents

| | | Experimental condition | |
|----------------------------------|-----|------------------------|-----------|
| | | Control | Treatment |
| Weak partisan of pro-GD party | No | 0.89 | 0.89 |
| | Yes | 0.11 | 0.11 |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.9861

Note: The sample is limited to weak global democracy opponents.

Table 78: Brazil – guesses on parties' global democracy positions

| Party | Support | Opposition |
|---------------|----------------|-------------------|
| PV | 62% | 38% |
| PSDB | 55% | 45% |
| MDB | 54% | 46% |
| PSD | 53% | 47% |
| DEM | 52% | 48% |
| NOVO | 52% | 48% |
| PDT | 49% | 51% |
| Solidariedade | 49% | 51% |
| PSL | 49% | 51% |
| PSOL | 48% | 52% |
| Progressistas | 48% | 52% |
| PT | 48% | 52% |
| PSB | 47% | 53% |
| PL | 46% | 54% |
| Podemos | 44% | 56% |
| PPS | 43% | 57% |
| Avante | 42% | 58% |
| PTB | 42% | 58% |
| PROS | 39% | 61% |
| PRB | 39% | 61% |
| PCdoB | 38% | 62% |
| PSC | 38% | 62% |
| Patriota | 38% | 62% |

Note: The sample here includes experimental conditions 1 and 4.

Table 79: Brazil – PSL voters' global democracy attitudes and partisan expectations

| | | Global democracy attitude | |
|--------------------------|------------|---------------------------|------------------------|
| | | Opposition | Support |
| Own party position guess | Opposition | 0.5274 [.3793,.6708] | 0.2296 [.136,.3608] |
| | Support | 0.4726 [.3292,.6207] | 0.7704 [.6392,.864] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.0029

Note: The sample here is limited to PSL voters. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 80: Brazil – PSL voters' partisan self-delusion on global democracy

| | | Global democracy attitude | |
|-----------------------------------|--------|---------------------------|-------------------------|
| | | Opposition | Support |
| Own party vignette reconstruction | Failed | 0.2001 [.123,.3086] | 0.4141 [.3127,.5233] |
| | Passed | 0.7999 [.6914,.877] | 0.5859 [.4767,.6873] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.0046

Note: The sample here is limited to PSL voters. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 81: Brazil – PSDB voters' global democracy attitudes and partisan expectations

| | | Global democracy attitude | |
|--------------------------|------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|
| | | Opposition | Support |
| Own party position guess | Opposition | 0.4978 [.2288,.7681] | 0.1251 [.0512,.2745] |
| | Support | 0.5022 [.2319,.7712] | 0.8749 [.7255,.9488] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.0096

Note: The sample here is limited to PSDB voters. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 82: Brazil – PSDB voters' partisan self-delusion on global democracy

| | | Global democracy attitude | |
|-----------------------------------|--------|---------------------------|-------------------------|
| | | Opposition | Support |
| Own party vignette reconstruction | Failed | 0.4631 [.218,.7274] | 0.1743 [.0987,.2893] |
| | Passed | 0.5369 [.2726,.782] | 0.8257 [.7107,.9013] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.0273

Note: The sample here is limited to PSDB voters. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 83: Brazil – NOVO voters' global democracy attitudes and partisan expectations

| | | Global democracy attitude | |
|--------------------------|------------|---------------------------|------------------------|
| | | Opposition | Support |
| Own party position guess | Opposition | 0.5048 [.3061,.702] | 0.048 [.0149,.1437] |
| | Support | 0.4952 [.298,.6939] | 0.952 [.8563,.9851] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.0000

Note: The sample here is limited to NOVO voters. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 84: Brazil – NOVO voters' partisan self-delusion on global democracy

| | | Global democracy attitude | |
|-----------------------------------|--------|---------------------------|-----------------------|
| | | Opposition | Support |
| Own party vignette reconstruction | Failed | 0.1004 [.035,.2558] | 0.359 [.244,.4928] |
| | Passed | 0.8996 [.7442,.965] | 0.641 [.5072,.756] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.0076

Note: The sample here is limited to NOVO voters. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 85: Brazil – PT voters' global democracy attitudes and partisan expectations

| | | Global democracy attitude | |
|--------------------------|------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|
| | | Opposition | Support |
| Own party position guess | Opposition | 0.2407 [.1055,.4599] | 0.1631 [.0948,.2662] |
| | Support | 0.7593 [.5401,.8945] | 0.8369 [.7338,.9052] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.4078

Note: The sample here is limited to PT voters. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 86: Brazil – PT voters' (lack of) partisan self-delusion on global democracy

| | | Global democracy attitude | |
|-----------------------------------|--------|---------------------------|-----------------------|
| | | Opposition | Support |
| Own party vignette reconstruction | Failed | 0.0861 [.0273,.2406] | 0.041 [.0167,.097] |
| | Passed | 0.9139 [.7594,.9727] | 0.959 [.903,.9833] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.2960

Note: The sample here is limited to PT voters. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 87: Brazil – PV voters' (lack of) partisan self-delusion on global democracy

| | | Global democracy attitude | |
|---|--------|---------------------------|-------------------------|
| | | Opposition | Support |
| Own party vignette reconstruction | Failed | 0.2539 [.0491,.6917] | 0.2368 [.1028,.4567] |
| | Passed | 0.7461 [.3083,.9509] | 0.7632 [.5433,.8972] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.9304

Note: The sample here is limited to PV voters. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 88: Germany – guesses on parties' global democracy positions

| Party | Support | Opposition |
|---------|---------|------------|
| AfD | 8% | 92% |
| CDU-CSU | 54% | 46% |
| FDP | 43% | 57% |
| Greens | 79% | 21% |
| Left | 60% | 40% |
| SPD | 70% | 30% |

Note: The sample here includes experimental conditions 1 and 4.

Table 89: Germany – SPD voters' global democracy attitudes and partisan expectations

| | | Global democracy attitude | | |
|--------------------------|------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| | | Opposition | Support | Total |
| Own party position guess | Support | 0.6637 [.382,.8631] | 0.8424 [.6622,.9358] | 0.7871 [.6376,.886] |
| | Opposition | 0.3363 [.1369,.618] | 0.1576 [.0642,.3378] | 0.2129 [.114,.3624] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.1902

Note: This sample is limited to SPD voters. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 90: Germany – SPD voters' partisan self-delusion on global democracy

| | | Global democracy attitude | | |
|-----------------------------------|--------|---------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| | | Opposition | Support | Total |
| Own party vignette reconstruction | Failed | 0.1193 [.0454,.2784] | 0.332 [.2258,.4587] | 0.2721 [.1892,.3746] |
| | Passed | 0.8807 [.7216,.9546] | 0.668 [.5413,.7742] | 0.7279 [.6254,.8108] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.0236

Note: This sample is limited to SPD voters. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 91: Germany – AfD voters' global democracy attitudes and partisan expectations

| | | Global democracy attitude | | |
|--------------------------|------------|---------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| | | Opposition | Support | Total |
| Own party position guess | Support | 0.0465 [.0104,.1838] | 0.3589 [.1652,.613] | 0.1869 [.0888,.3514] |
| | Opposition | 0.9535 [.8162,.9896] | 0.6411 [.387,.8348] | 0.8131 [.6486,.9112] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.0035

Note: This sample is limited to AfD voters. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 92: Germany – AfD voters' (lack of) partisan self-delusion on global democracy

| | | Global democracy attitude | | |
|-----------------------------------|--------|---------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| | | Opposition | Support | Total |
| Own party vignette reconstruction | Failed | 0.1198 [.0575,.233] | 0.1294 [.0583,.263] | 0.1241 [.0727,.204] |
| | Passed | 0.8802 [.767,.9425] | 0.8706 [.737,.9417] | 0.8759 [.796,.9273] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.8840

Note: This sample is limited to AfD voters. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 93: Germany – FDP voters' global democracy attitudes and partisan expectations

| | | Global democracy attitude | | |
|--------------------------|------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| | | Opposition | Support | Total |
| Own party position guess | Support | 0.2827 [.0937,.6006] | 0.6108 [.4042,.7841] | 0.5247 [.3546,.6893] |
| | Opposition | 0.7173 [.3994,.9063] | 0.3892 [.2159,.5958] | 0.4753 [.3107,.6454] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.0747

Note: This sample is limited to FDP voters. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 94: Germany – FDP voters' partisan self-delusion on global democracy

| | | Global democracy attitude | | |
|-----------------------------------|--------|---------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| | | Opposition | Support | Total |
| Own party vignette reconstruction | Failed | 0.077 [.0179,.2769] | 0.2045 [.1042,.3623] | 0.1605 [.0873,.2765] |
| | Passed | 0.923 [.7231,.9821] | 0.7955 [.6377,.8958] | 0.8395 [.7235,.9127] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.1787

Note: This sample is limited to FDP voters. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 95: Germany – Green voters' global democracy attitudes and partisan expectations

| | | Global democracy attitude | | |
|--------------------------|------------|---------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| | | Opposition | Support | Total |
| Own party position guess | Support | 0.8875 [.6743,.9678] | 0.902 [.7971,.9557] | 0.8994 [.8114,.9489] |
| | Opposition | 0.1125 [.0322,.3257] | 0.098 [.0443,.2029] | 0.1006 [.0511,.1886] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.8478

Note: The sample here is limited to voters of the Greens. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 96: Germany – Green voters' (lack of) partisan self-delusion on global democracy

| | | Global democracy attitude | | |
|-----------------------------------|--------|---------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| | | Opposition | Support | Total |
| Own party vignette reconstruction | Failed | 0.0425 [.0058,.2521] | 0.0353 [.0145,.083] | 0.0363 [.0162,.0794] |
| | Passed | 0.9575 [.7479,.9942] | 0.9647 [.917,.9855] | 0.9637 [.9206,.9838] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.8625

Note: The sample here is limited to voters of the Greens. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 97: Japan – guesses on parties' global democracy positions

| Party | Support | Opposition |
|---------|---------|------------|
| CDP | 65% | 35% |
| DPP | 58% | 42% |
| Ishin | 52% | 48% |
| JCP | 46% | 54% |
| Komeito | 61% | 39% |
| LDP | 63% | 37% |
| Reiwa | 55% | 45% |
| SDPJ | 53% | 47% |

Note: The sample here includes experimental conditions 1 and 4.

Table 98: Japan – LDP voters' global democracy attitudes and partisan expectations

| | | Global democracy attitude | |
|--------------------------|------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|
| | | Opposition | Support |
| Own party position guess | Opposition | 0.5626 [.4368,.6809] | 0.1757 [.1201,.2497] |
| | Support | 0.4374 [.3191,.5632] | 0.8243 [.7503,.8799] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.0000

Note: This sample only includes voters of LDP. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 99: Japan – CDP voters' global democracy attitudes and partisan expectations

| | | Global democracy attitude | |
|--------------------------|------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|
| | | Opposition | Support |
| Own party position guess | Opposition | 0.6018 [.3223,.8276] | 0.1394 [.0736,.2484] |
| | Support | 0.3982 [.1724,.6777] | 0.8606 [.7516,.9264] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.0004

Note: This sample only includes voters of CDP. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 100: Japan – JCP voters' global democracy attitudes and partisan expectations

| | | Global democracy attitude | |
|--------------------------|------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|
| | | Opposition | Support |
| Own party position guess | Opposition | 0.7071 [.2865,.9355] | 0.2043 [.0889,.4032] |
| | Support | 0.2929 [.0645,.7135] | 0.7957 [.5968,.9111] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.0192

Note: This sample only includes voters of JCP. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 101: Japan – Ishin voters' global democracy attitudes and partisan expectations

| | | Global democracy attitude | |
|--------------------------|------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|
| | | Opposition | Support |
| Own party position guess | Opposition | 0.6925 [.4648,.8537] | 0.1658 [.0645,.3642] |
| | Support | 0.3075 [.1463,.5352] | 0.8342 [.6358,.9355] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.0006

Note: This sample only includes voters of Ishin. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 102: Japan – Reiwa voters' global democracy attitudes and partisan expectations

| | | Global democracy attitude | |
|--------------------------|------------|---------------------------|------------------------|
| | | Opposition | Support |
| Own party position guess | Opposition | 0.3241 [.1035,.6657] | 0.2997 [.161,.4884] |
| | Support | 0.6759 [.3343,.8965] | 0.7003 [.5116,.839] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.8895

Note: This sample only includes voters of Reiwa. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 103: UK – guesses on parties' global democracy positions

| Party | Opposition | Support |
|-------------------|------------|---------|
| Conservatives | 70% | 30% |
| Labour | 40% | 60% |
| Liberal Democrats | 33% | 67% |

Note: Due to space constraints imposed by YouGov, my UK survey only included questions on the supposed global democracy positions of these three parties.

Table 104: UK – Conservatives' global democracy attitudes and partisan expectations

| | | Global democracy attitude | | |
|--------------------------|------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| | | Opposition | Support | Total |
| Own party position guess | Opposition | 0.8 [.7172,.8632] | 0.3029 [.2162,.4065] | 0.6073 [.5401,.6707] |
| | Support | 0.2 [.1368,.2828] | 0.6971 [.5935,.7838] | 0.3927 [.3293,.4599] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.0000

Note: This sample is limited to Conservative voters in the control group. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 105: UK – strong Conservatives' partisan expectations by GD attitude

| | | Global democracy attitude | | Total |
|--------------------------|---------|---------------------------|---------|-------|
| | | Oppose | Support | |
| Own party position guess | Oppose | 0.88 | 0.37 | 0.71 |
| | Support | 0.12 | 0.63 | 0.29 |
| Total | | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.0000

Note: This sample is limited to Conservative voters in the control group. Each cell indicates

Table 106: UK – Conservative voters' partisan self-delusion by global democracy attitude

| | | Global democracy attitude | | Total |
|---|-------|---------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| | | Oppose | Support | |
| Own party vignette reconstruction | Wrong | 0.04 [.0195,.0802] | 0.287 [.1954,.4002] | 0.1255 [.0875,.1767] |
| | Right | 0.96 [.9198,.9805] | 0.713 [.5998,.8046] | 0.8745 [.8233,.9125] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.0000

Note: The sample here is limited to Conservative voters in the treatment group.

Table 107: UK – strong Conservative partisans' self-delusion on GD

| | | Strong Conservative partisan and strong global democracy supporter | |
|---|---------|--|-------------------------|
| | | No | Yes |
| Own party vignette reconstruction | Wrong | 0.1579 [.1275,.194] | 0.2106 [.0621,.5183] |
| | Correct | 0.8421 [.806,.8725] | 0.7894 [.4817,.9379] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.6233

Note: This sample is limited to the treatment group, as the control group did not see the party vignette and the vignette reconstruction task. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 108: UK – Labour voters' global democracy attitudes and partisan expectations

| | | Global democracy attitude | | |
|--------------------------------|------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| | | Opposition | Support | Total |
| Own party position guess | Opposition | 0.6137 [.4815,.731] | 0.2468 [.1773,.3324] | 0.3563 [.2871,.4321] |
| | Support | 0.3863 [.269,.5185] | 0.7532 [.6676,.8227] | 0.6437 [.5679,.7129] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.0000

Note: This sample is limited to Labour voters in the control group. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 109: UK – strong Labour voters' partisan expectations by GD attitude

| | | Global democracy attitude | | |
|--------------------------------|---------|---------------------------|---------|-------|
| | | Oppose | Support | Total |
| Own party position guess | Oppose | 0.57 | 0.18 | 0.27 |
| | Support | 0.43 | 0.82 | 0.73 |
| Total | | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.0015

Note: This sample is limited to Labour voters in the control group. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 110: UK – Labour voters' partisan self-delusion by global democracy attitude

| | | Global democracy attitude | | Total |
|---|-------|---------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| | | Oppose | Support | |
| Own party vignette reconstruction | Wrong | 0.1476 [.098,.2164] | 0.2419 [.1586,.3508] | 0.1803 [.1345,.2374] |
| | Right | 0.8524 [.7836,.902] | 0.7581 [.6492,.8414] | 0.8197 [.7626,.8655] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.0856

Note: The sample here is limited to Conservative voters in the treatment group.

Table 111: UK – strong Labour partisans' self-delusion on GD

| | | Strong Labour partisan and strong global democracy supporter | |
|---|-------|--|-------------------------|
| | | No | Yes |
| Own party vignette reconstruction | Wrong | 0.2027 [.1699,.2401] | 0.0514 [.0128,.1846] |
| | Right | 0.7973 [.7599,.8301] | 0.9486 [.8154,.9872] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.0213

Note: This sample is limited to the treatment group, as the control group did not see the party vignette and the vignette reconstruction task. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its

Table 112: UK – LibDem voters' global democracy attitudes and partisan expectations

| | | Global democracy attitude | | |
|--------------------------------|------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| | | Opposition | Support | Total |
| Own party position guess | Opposition | 0.3828 [.1837,.6309] | 0.1382 [.0407,.3774] | 0.2344 [.1245,.3974] |
| | Support | 0.6172 [.3691,.8163] | 0.8618 [.6226,.9593] | 0.7656 [.6026,.8755] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.0990

Note: This sample is limited to voters of the Liberal Democrats in the control group. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 113: UK – strong Liberal Democrats' partisan expectations by GD attitude

| | | Global democracy attitude | | |
|--------------------------------|---------|---------------------------|---------|-------|
| | | Oppose | Support | Total |
| Own party position guess | Oppose | 0.33 | 0.00 | 0.14 |
| | Support | 0.67 | 1.00 | 0.86 |
| Total | | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.2687

Sample size (n) = 7

Note: This sample is limited to Liberal Democrats in the control group. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 114: UK – LibDem voters' partisan self-delusion by global democracy attitude

| | | Global democracy attitude | | Total |
|---|-------|---------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| | | Oppose | Support | |
| Own party vignette reconstruction | Wrong | 0.1047 [.0672,.1596] | 0.2808 [.191,.3922] | 0.1659 [.1232,.2197] |
| | Right | 0.8953 [.8404,.9328] | 0.7192 [.6078,.809] | 0.8341 [.7803,.8768] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.0005

Note: The sample here is limited to Conservative voters in the treatment group.

Table 115: UK – Strong LibDem partisans' self-delusion on global democracy

| | | Strong LibDem partisan and strong global democracy opponent | |
|---|-------|---|-----|
| | | No | Yes |
| Own party vignette reconstruction | Wrong | 0.1836 [.1514, .2208] | --- |
| | Right | 0.8164 [.7792, .8486] | --- |
| Total | | 1 | --- |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: N/A

Note: This sample is limited to the treatment group, as the control group did not see the party vignette and the vignette reconstruction task. Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 116: USA – guesses on parties' global democracy positions

| Party | Support | Opposition |
|-------------|---------|------------|
| Republicans | 32% | 68% |
| Democrats | 73% | 27% |

Table 117: USA – Republicans' global democracy attitudes and partisan expectations

| | | Global democracy attitude | |
|--------------------------|------------|---------------------------|-----------------------|
| | | Opposition | Support |
| Own party position guess | Support | 0.274 [.1973,.3669] | 0.67 [.5722,.7549] |
| | Opposition | 0.726 [.6331,.8027] | 0.33 [.2451,.4278] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.0000

Note: Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 118: USA – Republicans' partisan self-delusion on global democracy

| | | Global democracy attitude | |
|-----------------------------------|--------|---------------------------|-------------------------|
| | | Opposition | Support |
| Own party vignette reconstruction | Failed | 0.1631 [.1105,.2342] | 0.4295 [.3425,.5211] |
| | Passed | 0.8369 [.7658,.8895] | 0.5705 [.4789,.6575] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.0000

Note: Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 119: USA – Democrats' global democracy attitudes and partisan expectations

| | | Global democracy attitude | |
|--------------------------|------------|---------------------------|------------------------|
| | | Opposition | Support |
| Own party position guess | Support | 0.6291 [.5081,.7358] | 0.8769 [.8232,.916] |
| | Opposition | 0.3709 [.2642,.4919] | 0.1231 [.084,.1768] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.0000

Note: Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 120: USA – Democrats' partisan self-delusion on global democracy

| | | Global democracy attitude | |
|-----------------------------------|--------|---------------------------|-------------------------|
| | | Opposition | Support |
| Own party vignette reconstruction | Failed | 0.1702 [.1063,.2612] | 0.0598 [.0384,.0921] |
| | Passed | 0.8298 [.7388,.8937] | 0.9402 [.9079,.9616] |
| Total | | 1 | 1 |

Pearson test for a difference in column proportions: p-value = 0.0009

Note: Each cell indicates a column proportion and its 95% confidence interval.

Table 121: Self-commitment on skipping questions

| | Accept | Refuse |
|---------|---------------|---------------|
| Brazil | 99.5% | 0.5% |
| Germany | 98.2% | 1.8% |
| Japan | 98.5% | 1.5% |
| USA | 89.5% | 10.5% |
| Average | 96.4% | 3.6% |

Note: Due to space constraints imposed by YouGov, my UK survey did not include a dedicated question on this, but instead a prompt to this effect at the outset (see Figure 105, p. 296).

Table 122: Self-commitment on external sources

| | Accept | Refuse |
|---------|---------------|---------------|
| Brazil | 99.6% | 0.4% |
| Germany | 99.6% | 0.5% |
| Japan | 98.7% | 1.3% |
| USA | 98.1% | 2.0% |
| Average | 99.0% | 1.0% |

Note: Due to space constraints imposed by YouGov, my UK survey did not include a dedicated question on this, but instead prompts to this effect in the context of relevant questions (see Figure 113, p. 301, and Figure 114, p. 302).

Table 123: Respondents' devices

| | Laptop | Tablet/smartphone |
|---------|---------------|--------------------------|
| Brazil | 91% | 9% |
| Germany | 92% | 8% |
| Japan | 86% | 14% |
| USA | 68% | 32% |
| Average | 84% | 16% |

Note: YouGov did not provide me with specific data on the devices used by respondents in my UK survey, but with a general estimate that around one third of their respondents use notebooks, PCs or tablets, while around two thirds use smartphones (McDonnell 2020).

Table 124: Prior survey on global democracy

| | Yes | No |
|---------|------------|-----------|
| Brazil | 12% | 88% |
| Germany | 6% | 94% |
| Japan | 3% | 97% |
| USA | 12% | 88% |
| Average | 8% | 92% |

Note: Due to space constraints imposed by YouGov, my UK survey did not contain this question.

Table 125: Instructional manipulation check

| | Passed | Failed |
|---------|---------------|---------------|
| Brazil | 43% | 57% |
| Germany | 52% | 48% |
| Japan | 46% | 54% |
| USA | 43% | 57% |
| Average | 46% | 54% |

Note: Due to space constraints imposed by YouGov, my UK survey did not contain this question.

Table 126: Manipulation check – party vignette believed

| | Yes | No |
|---------|------------|-----------|
| Brazil | 83% | 17% |
| Germany | 74% | 26% |
| Japan | 76% | 24% |
| USA | 85% | 15% |
| Average | 79% | 21% |

Note: Due to space constraints imposed by YouGov, my UK survey did not contain this question.

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