In search of citizens in Citizennagar

The politics of contingent citizenship in the aftermath of the 2002 Gujarat riots in India

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Abstract

This thesis attempts to look at the question of Muslim citizenship in the aftermath of Hindu-Muslim violence in India. With the advance march of Hindu nationalism in India, when media and academic studies increasingly identify Muslims as second-class citizens, very little work has been done to show what this second-class citizenship actually looks on the ground. In my work, I go beyond the legal understanding of formal citizenship, or membership of a nation and look at the quality of substantial citizenship, understood through lived experiences of Muslims in India. Though we have considerable literature on the causal effects of these riots, or the role of Hindu nationalism in such violence and scholarly work on the questions of justice and reconciliation for the Muslim survivors, we know very little about how these riots influence their experience and expectations of citizenship. There is also lack of work on the lives of women survivors of these riots, in my thesis whose path to recovery and quest for citizenship is different than Muslim men.

Drawing on sixteen months of fieldwork among the survivors of the 2002 Gujarat riots who live in the outskirts of the Ahmedabad city, I ask how the politics of contingent citizenship can be situated in the aftermath of Hindu-Muslim conflict in India. I explore the notion of contingent citizenship in my work through the situated analysis of lives of Muslim survivors in the aftermath of 2002 violence. In this process I find that the political subjectivity as citizen is contingent upon negotiations with multiple actors, local specificities and position within fuzzy social dynamics. As working with conflict survivors require attention to complex ethical issues, I used novel methodological approaches such as activist anthropology. In this process, my thesis provides rooted analysis that challenges both the present and the past on the question of Muslim citizenship in India.

List of Abbreviations

AAP	Aam Aadmi Party
AIMIM	All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen
AMC	Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation
AMU	Aligarh Muslim University
BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
BSUP	Basic Services for the Urban Poor
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
ILU	I Love You
INC	Indian National Congress
IUML	Indian Union Muslim League
MLA	Member of Legislative Assembly
MP	Member of Parliament
NCM	National Commission for Minorities
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PDS	Public Distribution System
PIL	Public Interest Litigation
RSS	Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
RTI	Right to Information (Act)
SRD	Sabarmati Riverfront Development (project)
TPS	Town Planning Scheme
UN	United Nation
VHP	Vishwa Hindu Parishad

Glossary

Azaad/Azaadi	Free/Freedom
Bandh	Strike
Besahara	Helpless fellow/ Without guardian
Bindas	Being carefree
Charmaliya	Four Storey Building in Gujarat
Dargah	Shrine built over the grave of religious figure, often a Sufi saint
Dangapirit	Riot affected persons
Dhamaal	Local Gujarati word for riots
Dharna	Sit-in protest/demonstration
Iftaar	Dusk moment when Muslims end their fast in Ramadan
Insaniyat	Humanity/Humanism
Jimmevari	Duty/Responsibility
kachhre ka dhera	Heap of Garbage/ Garbage dumpsite
Kagaz	Paper/Official document
Lash	Dead body
Qaum	Community of people with shared history, religion and culture
Ramzan	Islamic holy month of Ramadan
Visthapit Colony	Colony for the displaced
Sangh Parivar	"Family of organisations", an umbrella term for the nexus of diverse national, regional and schematically varied Hindu nationalist organisations
Sanghi	Member of *Sangh Parivar*
Sansthawale	People belonging to organisations (NGO)
Sarkar	state/government
Shakha	Local RSS unit/office
Ummah	Global Muslim Community
Uttarayan	Annual Kite Festival in Gujarat

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1 Introduction: the question of Muslim citizenship after 2002 riots

India and its Muslim population are at crossroads today like never before. Every day we can see headlines printed in national and international media questioning the future of Muslims in India. “India: no country for Muslims” (Mander, 2017), “India Plans Big Detention Camps for Migrants. Muslims Are Afraid” (Gettleman and Kumar, 2019), “India’s Muslims quiver” (Safi, 2019) are some recent examples of these phenomena published across the world. More and more academics and media personnel are referring to Muslims as ‘second class citizens’ in a majoritarian democracy, where Hindu nationalist forces are ruling the roost under the Prime Ministership of Narendra Modi in India (Chatterji, Hansen, and Jaffrelot 2019; Slater 2019).[1] The idea of Muslims as second-class citizens in India, is not new due to their socio-economic marginalisation, since India was made independent from colonial rule in 1947 compared to other communities (Hasan 2001; Rahman 2018).[2]

The massive win for Modi, and overwhelming support for Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the political organisation he belongs to, both in 2014 and in 2019 Indian general elections have made scholars question the sustainability of Indian democracy and its commitment to protecting its minority populations like

[1] A small note on using single and double quotation marks here that will be used henceforth. Double quotation marks are attributed to the sources all the time, however single quotation marks are referred to a specialist term that are unique to a context, or to denote a commonly used phrase without any citation.

[2] I have used British spelling throughout this thesis unless the words and sentences are attributable to someone else. In that case, I have kept the original spelling.

Muslims (Ayoob, 2019; Widmalm, 2019).[3] In such a scenario, scholars like Jaffrelot (2019) argued that India is on its path to an ethnic democracy, a concept popularized by Smooha (1990) in the context of Israel and its hierarchical citizenship practices for Jews and Arab Muslims.[4] India, which adopted its constitution on January 26, 1950, had committed itself to constitutional democracy with equal rights for all (Khilnani, 1997).

Recent exercise by the Indian state to denationalize almost two million people in the northeastern region of Assam have only furthered such discussions on ethnic democracy (Pradhan, 2019). More so given the fact that the BJP government in New Delhi is pushing to amend citizenship laws in Indian Parliament to make all illegal migrants citizens except Muslims (Jayal, 2019).[5] And such development in India is only "entrenching a majoritarian and exclusionary conception of citizenship" where Muslims are the worst affected community (Jayal, 2019:35).

In this research I go beyond the debate on the legal status of citizenship, which is mainly concerned with the affiliation to the nation-state. Citizenship in the theoretical sense is largely understood as being "full members of a community" (Marshall, 1983:253), and as scholars stress mainly of a political community

[3] BJP or Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian People's Party) is the current ruling party at the centre in India and have been continuously ruling the state of Gujarat since 1998. BJP espouses the cause of Hindu nationalism since its inception (See Jaffrelot 2007). It is the political branch of the broader *Sangh Parivar* run by RSS or *Rashtriya Sawamsevak Sangh*. Its religious arm is called VHP or *Vishwa Hindu Parishad* (Katju, 2003) and its youth wing is known as *Vajrang Dal* which is a militant Hindu vigilante group. They all together espouse the cause of *Hindutva* in India. *Hindutva* is different from Hinduism; it is a political expression of the idea of *Hindu rashtra* or Hindu nation with a second class status for minorities (Banerjee, 1991; Basu, 1993; Pattanaik, 1998).

[4] An ethnic democracy is defined by a polity combining "the extension of political and civil rights to individuals and certain collective rights to minorities with institutionalized dominance over the state by one of the ethnic groups" (Smooha, 1990:391).

[5] The word 'illegal migrant' here means people who entered the geographical border of India and living in the country without any papers or residential permit (Sadiq 2009).

(Cohen and Ghosh, 2019).[6] In my work, I look at what I call 'the politics of contingent citizenship' among the Muslim survivors in the aftermath of the 2002 Gujarat riots in Ahmedabad, the biggest city in the state of Gujarat in India.[7] In section 2.1.3 of this thesis, I elaborate on what I understand by politics of contingent citizenship.

In the early spring of 2002, a train carrying *karsevaks* (Hindu religious volunteers) returning from the Indian holy city of Ayodhya, was set ablaze allegedly by some Muslims at Godhra station in Gujarat, a western state of India, killing 59 people. What followed thereafter was a deadly communal riot continuing for days, and at some places for weeks, targeting the minority Muslim population of the state which left around 2000 dead and more than hundred thousand people homeless (Nussbaum, 2008).[8] Due to the scale of the atrocities, and the alleged participation of state officials in the crimes, many commentators believe that 2002 Gujarat riots are a pivotal point in modern Indian history in terms of its commitment to

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[6] "A *political* community is distinct from ascriptive communities, which may be based on ties of birth, kinship, caste, religion, and the like. A political community comes into existence when people agree to live together within a framework of naturally agreed and recognized rules, consenting to a sovereign political authority the power to enforce these rules, the consent being subject to periodic renewal, with the people retaining the power to withdraw it" (Roy 2016: xii-xiii). Please also refer to how Arendt (1958) defined the idea of political community in her book *The Human Condition.*

[7] My usage of the term survivor here is what Lifton (1967) defined as someone who has been affected by brutal violence and death.

[8] Varshney (2002) has also discussed how Indian scholars, politicians and bureaucrats since the British era have been using the term "communal" rather than "ethnic conflict" to denote politics and conflicts based on religious groupings, such as Hindus and Muslims, the principal subjects of this study. They used to reserve the latter term primarily for clashes between linguistic or racially distinct groups.

secularism and minority rights since India enacted its Constitution in 1950 (Vardarajan, 2002; Mander, 2004; Kapur, 2006).[9]

The people I study were made survivors after being violently attacked and displaced in this riot. They were forced to live in relief camps first and then shifted to a resettlement colony, on the outskirts of Ahmedabad city called Citizennagar, or city of citizens (Bunsha, 2002). In the subsequent years, local human rights organisations have been fighting to grant legal status to these resettlement colonies as sites for Internally Displaced People or IDPs, an international legal term coined at the United Nation (Janvikas, 2012).

When I use the phrase 'the politics of contingent citizenship' in this context, I treat the idea of citizenship for these survivors not as given, or understood through their legal membership to the Indian nation-state, but something whose realisation on

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[9] Though the Gujarat riots have been referred to as 'pogrom' by many scholars (Dhattiwala and Biggs, 2012; Ghassem-Fachandi, 2012) due to the participation of certain state agencies in the violence (Human Rights Watch (HRW), 2002), as 'carnage' (Engineer, 2003; Mander, 2004) and also as 'genocide' by some (Concerned Citizens Tribunal (CCT), 2002; IIJ, 2003; Nussbaum, 2003), I am borrowing Horowitz's definition of "deadly ethnic riot (Horowitz, 2001) due to its contextual validity in the case of Gujarat violence of 2002 and will, therefore, use the term 'riots' throughout. Horowitz (2001:1) defines "deadly ethnic riot", which is closer to what I am referring to in my work, as "an intense, sudden, though not necessarily wholly unplanned, lethal attack by civilian members of one ethnic group on civilian members of another ethnic group, the victims were chosen because of their group membership."

However, the most popular word for riot used by the local population in Ahmedabad is *Dhamaal*, which means an uproarious event, or more literally something associated with fun (Sethi 2018). Ghassem-Fachandi (2006) in his thesis, described the word in detail through his ethnographic encounters during the 2002 riots itself. The idea of fun is often understood from the perspective of the Hindu residents of the city who during the time of *dhamaal* are either bystanders to violence or enjoying a break from the ennui of everyday life. Other words for 2002 riots that I have heard in Ahmedabad during my 2005 trip to the city was *toofan*, literally means storm. *Toofan* is quite literary use to refer riots, as violence is seen to be disrupting everything in the life of people.

the ground is contingent upon local contexts and networks of power, social dynamics, political maneuvering, negotiation with different actors and other countless strategies. To understand, citizenship beyond formal status, I have engaged with anthropological discussions on citizenship, mainly strategies of claim-making in everyday life, acts and practices of citizenship, differential access to rights and entitlement based on religion, region and gender. In this perspective, the dichotomy between formal citizenship (legal status) and substantive citizenship (the lived experience) assumes greater significance (Holston and Appadurai, 1996). Such a study contributes to the ever-growing literature on the bottom-up approach to citizenship, especially from a South Asian perspective (Williams, 2015; Chatterjee, 2017).

By carefully studying the contingent factors associated with claim-making from below, I challenge the primacy of legal citizenship and vocabularies of action and identity provided by nation-state to its members. My vocabularies of action and identities are formed organically in the process of moral and political articulation of rights and entitlements by these Muslim survivors. The gender aspect in this research is very important, as Muslim women in India are often treated as a monolithic category (Hasan and Menon, 2006). In this work I have used the narratives of Muslim women survivors of 2002 to construct their own meanings of citizenship, challenging the fixed categories they are linked with.

It is pertinent to note here that my research on the Muslims of Ahmedabad city, their struggle and everyday life has been done in the shadow of Hindutva, the Hindu nationalist ideology which has seen the community outside their imagined Indian nation since the idea was coined in 1920 (Jaffrelot, 2007). In Gujarat, this ideology has been used extensively in the political arena since the 1980s and reached its peak in the mid-1990s. However, its presence in the region goes back to colonial times (Shah, 1994; Spodek, 2011). The ever-growing influence of Hindutva in the state institutions at the sub-national and national level (Chatterji et al, 2019), has greatly influenced the way my respondents in Citizennagar

negotiate their formal status as a citizen, with the state and other non-state actors to demand better citizenship rights.

To understand the life and struggles of the Muslim survivors' of 2002 riots, I ask three interrelated questions which are essentially linked with the lived experiences of the 'Muslim question' (Shani, 2010) associated with Indian citizenship. *First,* how the politics of contingent citizenship can be situated in the aftermath of the Hindu-Muslim conflict in India, particularly in the context of the 2002 riots? *Second,* what kind of citizenship struggles and practices emerge from a site inhabited by displaced Muslim survivors of riots? And *third,* what are the roles of state agencies and other non-state actors in the struggle and everyday lives of survivors to claim better citizenship rights?

To find answers to these questions, I had employed ethnographic research methods to conduct my research in Citizennagar for a period of 13 months, with some intervals in between, from October 2015 to January 2017. In my attempt to understand the nuances of citizenship claims and practices with a bottom-up approach, ethnography provided the best means to get my data rather than structured interviews. By bottom-up approach, I understand how political subjectivities are formed on the ground and people are made into citizens and experience the substantive aspects of citizenships in their everyday life. I elaborate on this approach further in section 2.1.5 of this thesis.

During this time, I have lived in Ahmedabad city and interacted with a range of people along with my sustained interaction with the residents of Citizennagar. As I found these residents wary of an outside researcher, I adopted different kind of strategies including helping them as an 'activist anthropologist' (Hale, 2006) to establish better connection and trust among my informants. I rarely got great data through structured interviews as people were conscious and stiff to respond to specific questions. Rather I relied on informal chats at tea-stalls, exploring the city together, hanging out till late night, attending marriage ceremonies and travelling

with my informants. In this process, I regularly maintained field notes on my MacBook on the Evernote app instead of recorded interviews. [10]

The introduction is structured in the following manner. I start with a discussion on 2002 riots, with its apparent cause, effect on Muslims of Gujarat, and how the violence against Muslims was rationalized by state officials, from top to bottom. Next, I present a small history of Citizennagar, a resettlement colony set up for the survivors of the 2002 riots, and how it can be situated in the larger story of urbanisation process and exclusion of Muslims in the Ahmedabad city. Thereafter, I present a brief analysis of citizenship, from a normative idea in the past to its modern day manifestation in people's everyday lives through multiple contingent factors and contexts. In the following section, my goal is to introduce the concept of Hindutva through its historical analysis and changing political characteristics vis-a-vis the Muslims of India. I end the section on Hindutva with its focus on violence as a tactic of disciplining the 'other' in its political imagination. In the next section, I come back to the site of Citizennagar and briefly elaborate on how it offers new questions on citizenship practices and struggle in the aftermath of anti-Muslim riots in India.

[10] I have discussed in detail the process of writing my fieldnotes and analysing them later in section 3.8 of this thesis.



Figure 1: Map of India indicating the State of Gujarat and Ahmedabad city (Credit: APTRI Ahmedabad)



Figure 2: Map indicating the location of Citizennagar and Muslim dominated areas of the Ahmedabad city (Source: Mahadevia 2007:25)[11]

[11] This map was produced by Ahmedabad based academic Darshini Mahadevia in 2007. It does not show the Muslim community populated Bombay Hotel area near Shah Alam where my research site Citizennagar was set up in the aftermath of the 2002 violence for the riot affected people. I have used and edited the map to indicate the location of the same. In the map, black areas show complete Muslim dominated spaces and grey areas show mixed population sites of Ahmedabad where both Hindus and Muslims live next to each other.

1.1 2002: the fire which consumed everything

Kya hua tha usdin? (What happened on that day?) I asked Fazeel bhai sitting on the rocks of Kozhikode beach located in the southern part of India when he said in the middle of our conversation, *"aur usdin humse ghar log sab chhin gaye"* (And that day we lost our homes and our people, our everything).[12] It was a sultry night sometime in the last week of April, 2016. The hot and humid air filled the sky and the Arabian Sea in front of us was calm with only a few waves could be seen at a distance. Fazeel bhai, a resident of Ahmedabad in Gujarat had come to Kerala along with ten more people on the invitation of a local political party. The party organised a press conference for them, where they had to speak to the local media about their lives after the 2002 riots, that rocked the Ahmedabad city with gruesome violence against its Muslim residents.[13]

As a DPhil student at Oxford, I had been conducting my fieldwork since November 2015 amongst these people, but it took me six months to ask them a simple question: where did it start? I have read pages after pages of survivors' testimonies in the media, in reports of human rights organisations reports, legal judgements, academic resources, etc., but I could not ask them this simple question for a long time as I knew they hate repeating to visitors and researchers the descriptions of how murderous mobs attacked their houses, and killed and raped their relatives on the fateful day of March 1, 2002.

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[12] Fieldnotes taken on May 3, 2016. In the northern and western parts of India, people are often called with the suffix of 'bhai' or brother'. All quotations from my conversation with Fazeel in this section 1.1 was taken from the same fieldnote.

[13] I write about the Kerala trip by these people in detail in my fifth chapter of this thesis.

Fazeel bhai told me the story of that day as he witnessed it, bearing similarities with the modus operandi of the series of violent attacks and destruction in Muslim neighbourhoods recorded in those hundreds of testimonies I have read earlier. He began with the words, *"Godhra mein aag lagi aur pura Gujarat ko us aag ne nigal lia"* (The fire started in Godhra and consumed the entire state of Gujarat).[14]

On the early morning of February 27, 2002, a train just outside the Godhra station near the site of Signal Falia was stopped suddenly after an alleged altercation with local Muslim population. Many of the passengers in this Sabarmati Express were *karsevaks* (Hindu religious volunteers) who were coming back to Ahmedabad from the holy city of Ayodhya, after participating in a religious ceremony to demand the construction of a grand temple devoted to Lord Ram at a disputed site.[15]

What followed thereafter was a tragic incident where one coach of the train caught fire and burnt completely leaving 58 people dead on the spot. Whether the fire was started accidentally from inside or it was a case of arson carried out by local Muslims, remains disputed as two separate judicial commissions constituted to investigate the matter came to different conclusions. Noting similar anomalies in the state's interpretation of past cases of violence, especially concerning communal riots in India, Van der Veer (2005:269) rightly argues when he says, "There is no true story of violence…Something terrible has happened and there is

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[14] I have used State with a capital 'S' is to denote the regional units of India which is different from the state with the small letter 's', to refer to the institutional apparatus following the nomenclature adopted by Sud (2012) in her work on Gujarat itself. Currently India has 29 States and 7 Union Territories (UT). UTs are different from states as they are controlled directly by the Indian central government sitting in Delhi. Please see Noorani (2005) for a detailed study on the states and its administrative power and duties in India.

[15] This site used to the location of a medieval era mosque constructed by emperor Babur in 1527 AD which was demolished by *karsevaks* in 1992 following a campaign spanning decades alleging that this mosque (known as *Babri masjid*) was built exactly on the same location where Lord Ram was born. Nandy et al. (1995) has extensively written how this particular disputed site impacted the post independence politics of India and Hindu-Muslim relations.

no plot, no narrative, only traces that lead nowhere." This observation by Van der Veer is quite opposite to the concept of 'institutional riot system' developed by Brass (1997), which explains the likelihood of Hindu-Muslim violence through local political network's interest in maintenance or creation of communal tension between the two communities. In the case of 2002, both arguments can be invoked based on which person or official you ask.

The then Chief Minister of Gujarat, Narendra Modi even before the railway police could file the First Information Report (FIR), termed the incident as the handiwork of neighbouring country, Pakistan's ISI and a planned terrorist act, something that the Home Minister of India also echoed in his statement (Nampoothiri and Sethi, 2012).[16] On February 28, Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), a Hindu nationalist organisation called for a *bandh,* (strike), to avenge the killing of Hindus in the train fire and the ruling party Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) declared its support. The General Secretary of VHP, Pravin Togadia said while announcing the strike, "Hindu society will avenge the Godhra killings. Muslims should accept the fact that Hindus are not wearing bangles." (cited in Setalvad and Anand, 2002:16). Dead bodies of pilgrims killed in Godhra was brought to Ahmedabad with full state support during the strike, and local media published their images with provocative headings blaming the Muslim community for their failure to stop this attack on Hindus.[17]

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[16] In the judicial commission constituted by the Gujarat government under Justice G.T Nanavati and Justice Akshay H Mehta, in para 3, page 6 of its report, the state government submitted its claim that the incident was planned by the Muslim terrorists from Jammu and Kashmir in association with Muslim extremists from Godhra to destablize the state and "spread terror". Available at https://home.gujarat.gov.in/homedepartment/downloads/godharaincident.pdf (Accessed online on March 20, 2019)

[17] Editors Guild of India, an umbrella body of media organisation based in New Delhi issued this statement by blaming the local media in promoting hatred and inciting violence. "the role of the sections of the Gujarat media, specially the *Gujarat Samachar* and more notably *Sandesh*, was provocative, irresponsible and blatantly violative of all accepted norms of media ethics.

Gujarat is not new to violence, but what happened in the following two months, especially from the date of the *bandh* till the first week of March was unprecedented in its scale and brutality (Ghassem-Fachandi, 2012). Organised mobs armed with swords, tridents, kerosene cans and petrol bombs attacked Muslim neighbourhoods and villages in 20 out of the 25 districts of Gujarat, which caused large number of deaths and destruction of property. According to official estimates as revealed in Indian Parliament, 790 Muslims and 254 Hindus died, and more than 2500 people were injured during this period (BBC News, 2005). However, most of the unofficial accounts and reports from human rights organisations claimed that more than two thousand people died in these attacks (Concerned Citizens Tribunal, 2002; IIJ, 2003).

Many of these accounts and reports also alleged that factories, shops, restaurants, wells, vehicles, graveyards belonging to the Muslim community were also destroyed in an attempt to paralyse them on the economic front (Lokhande, 2015). More than one hundred thousand people were displaced as a result of this violence (Mander, 2006b). Most of the survivors' testimonies recorded in multiple reports produced by civil society and human rights organisations points to a coordinated attack on isolated Muslim localities by organised Hindu mobs and police officers; something which warrants to be called an anti-Muslim pogrom (Ghassem-Fachandi, 2012). In the only ethnographic account of this violence on the day of the *bandh,* Ghassem-Fachandi (2010:45) writes,

> The carnevalesque quality of violence, a sort of communal Saturnalia, of the first three days of the pogrom would soon become rationalized retroactively in terms of a self-proclaimed "Hindu anger" (*hindu krodh*), the

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This cannot be lightly passed over" (Verghese, Padgaonkar and Patel, 2002). For more detail on the role of media during 2002 violence, please see Ahmed (2010).

> perceived energy behind a collective *pratikriya*, a "counter-action" or "reaction" to the Godhra train incident. *Pratikriya*, a word that derives from the domain of ritual, communicates a sense of immediate karmic retribution, a mechanism that works automatically and cannot be stopped. Where Muslims had personally fled their shops and residences, as in Shahpur area, gangs satisfied themselves with the goods in their shops. Where Muslims were physically present, however, especially if they were poor and had little property, their actual physical bodies became the object of play and violent consumption.

This rationalisation of the violence started from the first day itself with the Chief Minister Modi leading the charge of justifying these attacks on Muslims as 'spontaneous reaction' from the Hindu community quoting the Newtonian third law, "every action has an equal and opposite reaction" (TNN, 2002b).[18] This action-reaction theory to explain the post-Godhra violence was parroted by most of the ruling party politicians as well as the local vernacular media. Police in their official records filed all complaints of violent attacks on Muslims with the Godhra incident as the reason behind mobs being out of control to express their grief and anger over the massacre of Hindus (Farasat and Jha, 2016).

What happened in Gujarat in 2002 is only a pattern that has been witnessed time and again in other cases of Hindu-Muslim violence in India. There is a particular

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[18] Narendra Modi was the Chief Minister of Gujarat during the period 2001-2014. As 2002 riots happened under his watch and many blamed him for abetting and overlooking the crimes and keeping government machinery crippled during the crisis (Human Rights Watch 2002; Mander 2009). Supreme Court constituted Special Investigation Team (SIT) cleared him of any wrongdoing in the famous Gulberg society case but the amicus curiae Raju Ramchandran submitted his findings to the court which said there was enough evidence to prosecute him. See http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/offences-can-be-made-out-against-modi-report-by-raju-ramachandran-481218 (Accessed online on July 26, 2019)

incident which acts as a trigger to target a minority community; state remains ineffective or sometimes becomes complicit in the violence on behalf of the powerful community; following the violence, judicial commissions are set up as 'state spectacle of democracy' and there is an obsession with a 'master narrative' to explain everything from beginning to end (Pandey, 1990; Hansen, 2000). In the next section, I will introduce my research site Citizennagar, and locate it in the history of Hindu-Muslim violence in Ahmedabad and a process of ghettoisation that followed thereafter.

1.2 The case of Citizennagar: a brief history of segregation in Ahmedabad city

The state of Gujarat has been known as the 'laboratory of Hindutva' due to the history of anti-Muslim sentiment in the state harboured by the right-wing Hindu nationalist groups and the resulting political developments (Ghassem-Fachandi, 2010; Spodek, 2010). One of the first and biggest instances of anti-Muslim violence in independent India since the days of Indian partition happened in Ahmedabad during the year of 1969 (Sud, 2008).

But according to many authors and scholars, the 2002 Gujarat riot was unprecedented in its impact on the Muslim community and with the level of state connivance in the violence through police and bureaucratic inaction (Engineer, 2002; PUDR, 2002; Sharma, 2002; Vardarajan, 2002). Pravin Togadia, the then head of VHP declared immediately after the horrific events of 2002, "In Gujarat, for the first time there has been a Hindu awakening and Muslims have been turned into refugees. This is a welcome sign and Gujarat has shown the way to the country" (cited in Spodek, 2010:380). The idea of Muslim citizenship in a Hindu India, as written by Hindutva ideologues almost looks like this, where they would be treated in contempt and absolute ignorance (Wolf, 2011).

The word refugee is significant here, given the fact that following the riots, the affected persons took shelter in resettlement camps/colonies set up by non-governmental and faith-based organisations and in many ways, became refugees in their own nation. According to a news report published on May 6, 2014, of the 98,000 officially displaced persons following the 2002 riots, 16,000 remain in the 83 colonies spread across Gujarat more than a decade after the riots (Choksi, 2014). Although, in the context of Gujarat, both 'relief camp' (Ahmed, 2004; Jasani, 2008; Nigam, 2009; Spodek, 2010) and 'resettlement colony' (Chandhoke et al., 2007; Gupta, 2011) have been used, I'm going to choose 'resettlement colony' to imply a certain permanence in that space, a differentiation that organisations

administering refugees, and refugees themselves, may often make (Malkki, 1995:304) In section 2.4 of this thesis, I elaborate on this subject further to situate my research site in the literature on refugee camps and IDPs.

It is important to note that in their response to the commissioners of the Supreme Court of India in the writ petition CWP/196/2002 (popularly known as the right to food petition), the state government claimed that "all relief camps were closed and riot affected people have returned to their homes" (Mander 2006:5235). The issue of Muslims living in relief camps and resettlement colonies after regular occurrence of riots in Ahmedabad or other parts of Gujarat should not be seen in isolation. It is also linked with broader questions on Muslim marginalisation and their place in the city, where they are often forced to live in some ghettos or segregated areas.

Jairath (2011:13) points out that though the Prime Minister appointed Sachar committee addressed the question of equity among the Muslims, it left out the questions of security and identity which are "essentially in relation to recurring 'communal' riots, social discrimination, ghettoisation, stereotyping and a loss of faith in the state organs in terms of justice". He further says, "some of the most important concerns of Indian Muslims at present, there are not of religious nature but relate with issues of livelihood, democracy and justice as equal citizens of the secular Indian state" (2011:13). This is certainly the case for the survivors of the Gujarat riots.

Marginalisation among the Indian Muslims, be it for economic reasons or socio-cultural factors force them to live in segregated areas, often termed as Muslim ghettos in the media (Gayer and Jaffrelot, 2012). Whether the trajectories of Muslim marginalisation in the case of Ahmedabad city started with the onset of 2002 riots or it goes back to the colonial times, scholars have given different opinion on the matter (Breman, 2004; Bobbio, 2015). Some sections in the media and number of non-governmental organisations have offered their views on the

city divided between 'Hindu Ahmedabad' and 'Muslim Ahmedabad' in the aftermath of the 2002 riots. For example, Chaudhury (2007:701) presents historic and ethnographic evidence to suggest that Ahmedabad was once an abode of 'composite culture' and 'cosmopolitanism' where Hindus and Muslims lived peacefully, but the violence of 2002 resulted in people living in 'majority' and 'minority' areas.

On the other hand, scholars like Jasani (2010:154)argues that spatial segregation in Ahmedabad is not a recent phenomenon, but something that was always there along "caste, community and religious lines". Bobbio (2015) also argues that the very nature of urbanisation of the Ahmedabad city in the last century coupled with the larger economic and political changes impacted its spatial ordering based on caste and religious characteristics.

Both Bobbio (2015:111) and Breman (2008:291) talks about how the recurrent violence of the 80s created distinct Hindu and Muslim zones in the Vejalpur and Sanklit Nagar, and people building actual walls dividing both the zones which they called as 'border'. Especially during this time, the multi-religious community of Sanklit Nagar on the outskirts of the Ahmedabad Municipal area became Juhapura and emerged as a huge Muslim enclave. In 1993, Breman (2008:327) observes Juhapura as "an overcrowded district that has been inundated with many tens of thousands of refugees in a short period of time".

After the violence of 2002, such patterns of displacement continued in Ahmedabad; and apart from the Juhapura area, Bombay Hotel became another site where people affected by the horrific events started to relocate in search of 'safety in numbers' (Mahadevia, 2007). In the aftermath of the 2002, most of the upper and middle class Muslims of Ahmedabad chose Juhapura as their destination, and its reputation as the 'India's largest Muslim ghetto' only got bigger in the subsequent years (Jaffrelot, 2014; Peer, 2014).

On the other hand, poor and lower class Muslims in large numbers found refuge in the newly developed Bombay Hotel, located near the city's garbage dump. However, the history of this area goes back to the mid-1990s when Muslim developers started to acquire land from local farmers through the use of 'stamp papers' or power of attorneys instead of registered sales deeds (Mahadevia et al., 2016). The developers thereafter subdivided these plots and built small tenements upon them without any official permission and informally sold them to poor and low-income groups.

One of these developers named Mr. Rahman had played a major role in setting up the resettlement colony of Citizennagar post-2002 riots for the survivors of the Naroda Patiya locality of Ahmedabad city, an area highlighted in media because of the brutality its Muslim residents faced during the riots (Banerji, 2012). Immediately after the 2002 riots, this developer, in association with other faith-based organisations, helped in running one of the biggest relief camps set up inside the Shah Alam *dargah,* a 15th century mausoleum located on the south-eastern part of the city.[19] In 2003, he with the help of Indian Union Muslim League (IUML), a party mainly based in the state of Kerala in India, and other faith-based organisations, built 130 one-room shacks next to the garbage dump, called it Citizennagar and distributed them to the survivors of the violence without any paper that legally authorises their occupancy of these houses.[20] Since then

[19] This camp gained huge symbolic value in the aftermath of the 2002 riots because of the visit of the then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee on April 4, 2002. Vajpayee, a Prime Minister elected on a BJP ticket in 1999 Indian General Election called the horrific events of 2002 as a "national shame" and claimed India having "lost face in the world" while visiting the camp (Mahurkar, 2002). This camp temporarily sheltered 9000 local Muslim residents of Ahmedabad at the time of his visit.

[20] In my interview with this developer (Fieldnotes taken on December 1, 2015), he informed me that he has always been with the Indian National Congress (INC) party or Congress party in short, the principal opposition party in the Gujarat state. INC ruled Indian federal government from 2004-2014 and IUML was its important ally both in the centre and in the state of Kerala.

Citizennagar has always found prominence in media and non-governmental organisation's reports because of multiple factors, including residents who are high profile witnesses to some important legal cases related to 2002 violence as well as extreme poor quality of life compared to other resettlement colonies (Janvikas, 2012; Dhar, 2017a). [21]

My work on Citizennagar particularly focuses on not only the everyday life in a segregated zone of Ahmedabad city, but also how the residents' claims and struggles for citizenship are intimately linked with the political life and aspiration of multiple actors including this specific developer. In the next section, I am briefly introducing citizenship as a normative idea and how scholars imagine the concept as contingent upon several factors.

[21] Citizennagar is located just at the edge of the Ahmedabad's main dumpsite site of the Pirana landfill site. It receives around 3000 metric tonnes of garbage daily which exceeds its capacity of 1800 ton/daily Mishra (2014).



Figure 3: Life in the shadow of Pirana dumpsite, Ahmedabad

1.3 Discussing citizenship: from normative ideas to contingent modes

Based on the historical analysis of the urbanisation processes in Ahmedabad city in the middle of recurrent Hindu-Muslim conflicts, Bobbio argues that citizenship practices in Ahmedabad in the presence of Hindu-Muslim conflict are located in "the constant interchange between the level of political and administrative control of the city and the mixture of spontaneous adaptation, organised reaction to and implicit disruption of the given order that the urban poor showed in their day-to-day struggle to survive in the city" (2015:9). But how the day-to-day struggle of the poor can be constituted as a claim to citizenship which originates as a legal status bestowed by a territorially bounded post-Westphalian nation state (Benhabib, 2005)?

Sociologist T.H. Marshall in 1950, in one of the earliest academic discussions on the topic defined it as: "citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed" (1983:253).

While Marshall's account of citizenship helped us to unpack its social, political and civil dimensions, the over emphasis on citizenship as a regime of rights and equating community with nation has been critiqued since by other scholars who worked with people struggling to become "full members of a community" even today (Lister, 1997; Kabeer, 2005).

It is in this backdrop that feminist and postcolonial scholars have argued to see citizenship beyond its initial patriarchal and western mode of understanding and look towards the myriad of ways individuals encounter the state and society (Werbner and Yuval-Davis, 2005; Holston, 2008). Therefore, citizenship can be more broadly understood as a set of practices that constitute the relation between

state and citizens rather than the juridical status conferred by states upon individuals in a national community (Ong, 1999).

More than a set of practices, "as a more totalising experience between society and the state, citizenship is both inspired and shaped by identity, social positioning, cultural assumptions, institutional practices and a sense of belonging" (Chopra, Williams, and Vira, 2011:244). Citizenship connects rights with agency as its practices may define personhood in ways in which "citizenship as rights enable people to act as agents" (Lister, 1997:15). Therefore, rather than as a 'status', the idea of citizenship is always a process of becoming, an incomplete process which is made and unmade through events, individual experiences with them and how they wish to engage with them further in various stages of their life. For this reason, the process of citizenship cannot be treated as static and the idea of it is always embedded in the social and cultural relations and other complex web of powers where people are constantly negotiating and renegotiating their agency (Lister, 1997).

The analytical framework of citizenship is very relevant in the Indian context. It highlights the state-society interactions mainly through what the state is offering with its welfare schemes, affirmative policies like reservation, language policies, and how these schemes and policies shape the relational aspect of the society and individual vis-à-vis the state (Scott, 1998; Corbridge, 2005; Gupta, 1995; Fuller and Harris, 2001).

Though it has been increasingly accepted that citizenship mainly refers to encounters between society and the state, Isin (2008) argues that citizenship can be enacted on the positions within and experiences of the 'social'. Therefore, Isin defines citizenship as "the art of being with others, negotiating different situations and identities, and articulating ourselves as distinct yet familiar to others in our everyday lives" (2008:7). Thinking of citizenship from the social angle forces us to consider the limits of the state in delivering rights.

However, opinion is divided on the role of state in defining the contours of citizenship. Whereas scholars like Gaventa (2002) and Jayal (2013) argue that often people depend upon the vocabulary of the state to fight for their own claims of citizenship, some scholars like Gordon and Stack (2007:121) think that for people to secure their livelihood, we have to think about citizenship as "a kind of freedom in the sense of room for manoeuvre" from the state and other forces of power.

Stack (2012) on the other hand believes citizenship is more about the people's aspirations of living in a society in a civil way rather than about the legal relationship with the state. Similar sentiments can be found in the ethnographic account of Gooptu (2016) in Kolkata where a group of persons consider new forms of spirituality as an individual vehicle to achieve a certain mode of citizenship which state has failed to deliver.

In the post 2002 context, Jasani (2008) writes on the practice of Islamic charities to promote a hardline version of Islam in the resettlement colonies they had set up following the violence. Such promotion of different form of Islamic ideas other than that of Sufi tradition historically experienced in Gujarat, as a way to reimagine life after 2002 violence, can be seen from the perspective of Gooptu's (2016) work on new spiritualism. Some Muslim residents of Ahmedabad argue for similar practices of citizenship when they emphasize Muslims have to look inward after all these instances of violence rather than blaming anyone or any authority. A respondent named Mansuri from Juhapura in Ahmedabad while talking to writer Zahir Janmohammed says: "We Muslims are the one who needs to change" (2013:469) and argues by saying "Your focus is all wrong, Zahir. You should not write about the riots. Forget that. All that matters is education. If we do not focus on education, we will be finished" (2013:467).

So how can we think of the struggles for citizenship in a poor neighbourhood set up to rehabilitate the survivor's of 2002 riots? Can education be the vehicle in this process? Or new religious practices provide the feeling of a community in the absence of an actual political community based on equals? If not, then what are the ways through which people negotiate their modes of belonging to this community?

Before answering these questions, I am going to analytically study the concepts of Hindutva and Hindu nationalism, with its history and changing character in contemporary Indian politics. I am particularly looking at its fraught relationship with the Muslims of India, and how violence was one strategy to discipline the 'others' in its definition.

1.4 Emergence of Hindu Nationalism and the Muslim 'other'

1.4.1 Hindutva: A short history

One of the important elements in this thesis is to situate the politics of citizenship among the survivors of communal violence, who are Muslims in this case. Also, the root of this violence, especially of 2002 riots and thereafter, lies with the Hindutva politics and a certain Hindu nationalist discourse (Varadarajan, 2002, Nussbaum, 2008). In this discourse, the Muslims are not understood as undocumented 'alien' (Bosniak, 2008) who reached the Indian border from an alien country en masse and now seeking paper citizenship (Sadiq, 2009), but it emphasizes on the cultural construction of the Indian nation-state through "collection of eclectic ideas, images and practices", where historically Muslims are the other who invaded this nation in medieval era and occupied the Hindu India (Anand, 2011:2). This kind of viewpoint is essentially linked with the question of Muslim citizenship in contemporary India, both at the level of analytical discourse and state practices as all kind of Indian institutions are increasingly captured by the Hindu nationalist forces since the 1990s (Hasan, 2005).

These forces are embodied in and scattered through multiple organisations catering to different social, cultural and political role and they are all known as branches of the *Sangh parivar* (Sangh family). Though BJP is known to be the political arm of this family, most scholarships recognise RSS as the main engine of these body of organisations providing the ideological mentorship to the *Sangh* (Anand, 2011). Then there is the religious unit of this family called VHP, youth wing known as Bajrang Dal, women's wing such Rashtra Sevika Samiti, Durga Vahini and many more small outfits who declare their allegiance to the *Sangh parivar* (Kanungo, 2006).

The word Hindutva is often conflated with Hindu nationalism, as the former is the core concept of the later. The term was introduced by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (1942) in the 1920s, in which he defined Hindu as a person who considers the geographical unit from the Indus to the seas as his fatherland, as well as the holy land where his religion took birth. In this way, Van der Veer (1994:1) argues Hindutva, "equates religious and national identity", where an Indian is only a Hindu in question and this concept put other important "Indian religious communities, such as Christians and Muslims, outside the nation".

The term Hindutva foreground the fact that Hindus form the majority in India, thus the country should be governed by them as a Hindu state (*rashtra*). During the Independence struggle against the British, if the nationalism of Indian National Congress party was territorial, and that of Muslim league was cultural, Mishra (1999:1) argues that Savarkar provided a combination of both, and became the "chief exponent of this territorial-cultural nationalism".

According to Savarkar, the real allegiance of Indian Muslims lies in Mecca, and the pan-Islamist concept of *Ummah*, is a threat to the caste and sect ridden Hindu community in India, as Muslims are a better organised, aggressive and proselytising community (Jaffrelot, 2007b).

However, Savarkar's concept of nationalism and the idea of Muslim foreignness to the Indian body-politic was not original. He drew his ideas from orientalist scholarship on Hinduism. Thapar (1989:229) argues that "emergent national consciousness appropriated this definition of Hinduism as well as what is regarded as the heritage of Hindu culture." Metcalf (1995) also believes on similar lines and has shown how such western scholarship on Indian Muslims portrayed them as a monolithic, fanatic and invader community foreign to Hindu India and Hindu nationalism borrowed such conceptions in its discourse.

It is for this reason, scholars argue that the history of Hindu nationalism does not start with Savarkar only but goes back to the history of mainstream nationalism in India itself, much of which is linked with Congress (INC) party (Zavos, 2000). Since the very beginning of the INC, it had many members who harboured ambiguous views on majoritarianism, primarily articulated through Hindu nationalism and communal violence, something that continues to this day (Arun, 2018). In the early twentieth century, Gould (2004:9) argues, "Congress's close association with forms of secularism that were based on the attractive and acceptable notion of a 'Hindu' civilisation and culture broke down any possible taboo surrounding religious mobilization in the locality" (cited in Anand, 2011:3). Similarly scholars like Bhagavan (2008:39) believes that Hindutva would not have found any place in postcolonial Indian political life, had it not been the case "in which the INC knowingly and intentionally sheltered and nourished Hindu nationalist ideologues, most notably Gujarat's K.M. Munshi, in the crucial moments before and after the midnight hour birth of the new nation state."

Though Savarkar was the one who provided the initial ideological basis to the idea of Hindu nationalism, he did not provide any roadmap on how the aim of Hindu India countering the Muslim threat would be achieved. It was Keshav Baliram Hedgewar (1889–1940) from Nagpur, Maharashtra who met Savarkar and got influenced by his ideology and subsequently founded RSS in his hometown in the 1920s. As a Hindu organisation entrusted with propagating the ideology of Hindutva and strengthening the Hindu community through physical activities held at its local branches called *Shakha*, it quickly gained prominence as a largest Hindu nationalist movement (Jaffrelot, 1996). Initially claiming apoliticism, soon the top organisers of RSS realised the importance to be in active politics to electorally mobilise people around the ideals of Hindutva (Anderson, 1972). Just after Indian independence, the erstwhile Hindu Mahasabha, a lobbying group within INC to raise Hindu interests during the colonial era, failed to take off as a distinct political party. Thereafter some RSS ideologues had started consultation to create a new political wing. Such discussion within and outside the RSS, resulted in the

formation of Bharatiya Jana Sangh or BJS (the precursor to the BJP) in 1951, just on the eve of the first Indian General Elections (Graham, 1990).

The aim and objective of all political parties at the behest of Sangh parivar is to make India a Hindu nation and giving its rightful place in the world. Though scholars argue among themselves whether it is a political movement, or a social movement, or both, there is no denying that masked in cultural terms, Hindu nationalism and associated organisations today, aim to redefine the Indian culture and transform its society according to its basic tenets (Anand, 2011; Basu, 2005). In this context, the idea of capturing the Indian state is only a means to an end. The scholarship on Hindu nationalism is burgeoning today and quite exhaustive. However, some deserve mention here where it has been studied extensively through the activities of these organisations and their relations with the Indian state (Annavarapu 2015; Baber 2019; Banerjee 1991; Berglund 2004; Heredia 2009; Ludden 2005; Mathur 2010; Nussbaum 2008; Sud 2012; Zavos 2000).

1.4.2 Hindutva and the 'other'

In a recent work, Jaffrelot (2019) analyses the political developments since the 2014 Indian General Elections which BJP emphatically won along with, he noted the social, economic and political marginalisation of Indian Muslims happened in this period. Studying the increasing violence against Muslims by Hindu vigilante groups with tacit support from various state agencies, Jaffrelot (2019:64) argues,

> The Hindu Rashtra is therefore indeed underway. This label in fact perfectly describes the ambivalence of the process at stake as 'Hindu *Rashtra'* refer as much to a people united by blood ties, a culture and community codes as to a political framework; it is at once a society, a civilisation, a nation, and a state'.

I will come to the question of Hindu nationalism and violence later, but here I want to focus on the ambiguous and complex position undertaken by the Hindu nationalists to project their idea of Hindu *Rashtra* and who are the rightful claimants to it.

Most scholars have pointed out that the journey of Hindutva, since the time of Savarkar to this day, has been through complex pathways, when it was given different meanings at different times, articulated in paradoxical terms, reformulated with inherent consistencies and expressed in self-contradictory languages (Jaffrelot 1996; Hansen and Jaffrelot 2001); like the question of what Jaffrelot referred above as 'people united by blood ties, a culture and community'. Who are these people? In the writings of all RSS and VHP ideologues, or in the election manifestos by erstwhile BJS or present BJP, they have made clear distinctions between Hindus and non-Hindus and in their framework, a born Hindu naturally qualifies as an Indian, as part of these 'people', whereas non-Hindus required to be Indianised or Hinduised in their lifestyle (Tiwari, 1988; Datta, 2010; Palshikar, 2015). So there is no confusion or ambiguity with regard to the born Hindus as they are the core constituents of the Hindu *Rashtra.* Bhatt (2004) argues that according to Hindutva, the interests of minorities are not aligned with the nation, and therefore, unlike Hindus, the notion of rights, justice and recognition do not fully apply to them. Such differential conception of moral dignity and worth for minorities arise from the fact that minorities are not 'authentic Hindus', which render them liable to be deprived of rights, redress and recognition.

However, all the inconsistencies and self-contradictory positions circle around the question of who constitutes the 'other' or whether non-Hindus are part of the Hindu *Rashtra,* if yes then what should be the terms and conditions for such membership? Ahmed (2019) have elaborated on this issue by looking into Hindutva's relationship with the Muslims of India. Before coming to the conclusion, "Hindutva without Muslims is meaningless", Ahmed (2019:79) analyses the trajectory through which Hindutva ideologues, since the 1920s, in

their multiple speeches and written texts have tried to elaborate the question of Muslims in Hindu India.

First, in the September, 2018 speech by RSS *Sarsanghchalak* (head of the organisation) Dr. Mohan Bhagwat suggested that India belongs to Hindutva and Muslims are core member of this ideology. He said,

"According to us, Hindutva has three basics. Patriotism, the glory of our forebears, and culture ...It can never be construed [as] the undesirability of Muslims in its ambit. If ever it is claimed that it does not desire Muslims in its ambit, that day it will die down as Hindutva" (cited in Ahmed 2019:64).

The contradiction in this statement is apparent, which is characteristic of familiar expressions by other Hindutva ideologues on issues like economy and society (McGuire and Copland, 2007). In his statement, though Bhagwat elaborated on the three core beliefs of Hindutva universally applicable to anyone lives in India, he only asked Muslims to prove their patriotism, advising them to unquestionably admit that their ancestors were Indians, and advocated them to accept five core values of Indian (read Hindu) culture – unity in diversity, coordination, sacrifice, tolerance and thankfulness. So Ahmed (2019) rightly asks that such conditional membership in the fold of Hindutva does not explain, Bhagwat's emphasis that Muslims are vital for the survival of Hindutva. While Hindu nationalists celebrate the fact that 'Hinduism' in teaching and practice espouses pluralism and that its doors are open to all faiths (Oberoi, 2001), it is clear that the terms and conditions for accepting other religionists can only be set by the Hindutva. In 2006, the predecessor of Bhagwat, K.S. Sudarshan, declared that Muslims are welcome to join their organisation "but only if they call themselves 'Hindu' since Hindu relates to citizenship" (cited in Anand 2011:12).

This categorisation of people from other religions living in India was aptly done by Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar, RSS Chief from 1940 to 1973, who in the book *We, or*

Our Nationhood Defined (1939) claimed that Hindus could learn from Nazi in Germany who exemplified highest form of race pride by expelling Jews from their country (Islam, 2006). He declared that India was Hindustan, the land of Hindus where Jews and Parsis are "guests" and Muslims and Christians are "foreign invaders" (Islam 2006:3). Here again, such categorisation was emphasized because the holy sites of Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains' are in India, and therefore they are considered as culturally Hindus by Hindu nationalists like him unlike Jews, Parsis, Muslims and Christians, whose holy land are outside of Indian territory.

Golwalkar in his book clearly laid out the terms and conditions for citizenship for people belonging to these religions,

> The foreign races in Hindusthan [India] must either adopt the Hindu culture and language, must learn to respect and hold in reverence Hindu religion, must entertain no ideas but those of the glorification of the Hindu race and culture, and must loose (sic) their separate existence to merge in the Hindu race, or may stay in the country, wholly subordinated to the Hindu Nation, claiming nothing, deserving no privileges, far less any preferential treatment, not even citizen's rights. There is, at least, should be, no other course for them to adopt (Golwalkar, 1939: 47-48, cited in Kamat and Mathew 2003:7).

Golwalkar's idea that either foreign races (read Muslims and Christians) must forgo their distinct ways of life to merge with the Hindus, or stay in India without claiming any rights, or privileges, and the emphasis was on 'not even citizen's rights', has only been made palpable in the diktats of Bhagwat and Sudarshan later. BJS, erstwhile political wing of RSS in its 1957 election manifesto only softened the tone and mentioned Indianisation as its primary objective. It said, "For the preservation of national unity [...] Jana Sangh will take the following steps: (a) Creating a feeling of equality and oneness of Hindu society by liquidating untouchability and casteism (b) Nationalizing all non-Hindus by inculcating in

them the ideal of Bharatiya culture" (cited in Ahmed 2019:76). Be it RSS ideologues Golwalkar or Bhagwat or its political wings like BJS or BJP, everyone make this distinction between Hindus and non-Hindus in their texts and speeches, where born Hindus naturally qualifies as patriot but non-Hindus require to go through a process of Indianisation, which essentially means Hinduisation.

Ahmed (2019:77-78) has given a long list of things to argue how Hindutva imagines the process of Indianisation of Islam, Indianisation of Muslim everyday life, Indianisation of Muslim family life, Indianisation of Muslim eating habits and Indianisation of Muslim politics in India. Other examples of such Indianisation process can be found in the activities organised by the Muslim Rashtriya Manch (MRM), a Muslim organisation affiliated to RSS, founded at the initiative of K.S. Sudarshan in 2002 to spread Sangh ideology among Muslims (Raza, 2014). In 2012, MRM claimed to have had collected 7 lac signatures from Muslims to scrap Article 370 of Indian Constitution, which accorded special privileges and higher autonomy to the disputed region of Jammu and Kashmir, a Muslim dominated state (Ghatwai, 2012). Currently the patron of MRM is RSS National Executive member, Indresh Kumar, who was once accused of right-wing terror cases targeting Muslims. On its website, it highlights how MRM members organise seminar and talks against beef eating among the Muslims as it hurts Hindu sentiments, or why instant Talaq is unislamic and Muslims should adopt uniform civil code, thereby ending Muslim personal laws in India as part of *Sangh parivar* initiative, or campaign in Muslim madrasahs to unfurl Indian flags on Independence day (MRM, 2019).

The question arises, what if these foreign races put up resistance or defy the *Sangh parivar*'s diktats on Indianisation? According to their ideologues, in doing so, such non-Hindu communities fail in their duty as citizens of Indian nation and must be ready to face consequences. In the aftermath of the 2002 Gujarat riots, resolution by RSS top body said, "Let minorities understand that their real safety lies in the goodwill of the majority" (TNN, 2002a). Though Christians have also faced violence on account of foreignness in the hands of these Hindutva forces (Kanungo,

2008), but Muslims constitute the most important 'other' for the RSS and BJP today among all the religious minorities. This is becuase they are prominent due to their number, existent socio-political influence, baggage of history, and of course, the presence of a Muslim nation like Pakistan as neighbour.

Since independence, be it senior INC politicians or Hindu nationalists, all contributed to this notion that the loyalties of some Muslims lie with Pakistan because they are their coreligionists (Pandey, 1999). Ahmed (2019) argues that Muslims are indispensable for Hindutva politics for two reasons, one being that their presence serve as constant reminders of the medieval invaders in Hindu political imaginations whose deeds needs to be avenged, and the second is to hide the internal contradictions and ambiguities present in such politics. Ahmed writes, "Since it is not possible to get rid of Muslims completely, it is easier for Hindutva to make them a permanent 'other'" (2019:79).

1.4.3 Hindutva and Violence

While discussing the distinct conceptions of moral dignity and worth of individual subjects based on their religion, Bhatt (2004) also argued Hindutva encourages conflict due to its views on minorities. He said,

> Hence, Hindutva also cannot ensure political or civic morality since it foundationally forfeits the moral requirement that all individuals are of equal worth ('are ends'). Nor can Hindutva guarantee 'perpetual peace' since it is a bounden religious obligation upon whosoever declares themselves to be a Hindu, and despite any individual aversion to violence, to engage in conflict with illegitimate others (2004:152).

Here Bhatt has given his viewpoint on how the concept of Hindutva can be associated with violence with the 'other', most notably the Muslim community, and

thus, incompatible with liberal notions of democracy. However, it is important to mention here that the history of Hindu-Muslim violence in India, often known as communal violence in official texts and academic scholarship, should not be equated with history of anti-Muslim violence in India linked with Hindutva. Pandey (1990) has shown how communalism has a colonial legacy, where bureaucratic exercise of sharpening Hindu and Muslim identities led to inter-religious conflict in the past. Nonetheless, it is arguable whether the past history of communal conflict has a total bearing on the present; and not all communal violence in post-independent India are explicitly linked with mobilisation around Hindutva.

Instances of communal violence in the past were associated with multiple factors, including quest for political power among warring factions in once dominated Congress party, changing nature of centre and provincial governments in India over the past decades, losing grip of traditional elites due to structural changes in society and economy (Basu 1997; Basu and Kohli 1997). Although it would not be an exaggeration to claim that most of the communal violence, since the 1980s, where the target community is Muslim, have some linkage with Hindutva in one way or the other (Patil, 2017). Basu (1997) argued that Hindu nationalism always took a militant turn whenever the state was in flux. Political leaders accommodated their demands rather than refusing to budge. She claimed that 1980s proved to be the decisive decade for the *Sangh parivar* to expand its influence through anti-Muslim violence. In this decade, the dominance of Congress party in Indian politics was waning due to leadership vacuum, and both the Congress and National Front government at that time showed their willingness to accommodate Hindu nationalist agendas (Hasan 2012).

With the mobilisation around the construction of a temple in Ayodhya dedicated to Lord Ram at the disputed site of medieval era Babri mosque, which Sangh affiliates claimed as the original birthplace of the Hindu god, BJP witnessed unprecedented political growth and increased its number in Indian parliament from 2 seats in the 1985 election to 85 seats in 1989 (Hasan 2005). This

mobilisation ended with the overnight destruction of the Babri mosque at the hand of *karsevaks* in 1992. Before this destruction, the then BJP leader Lal Krishna Advani took out a major chariot procession (*rath yatra)* across India passing through many small and big cities demanding the construction of the Ram Temple at the mosque site. Other Sangh affiliates like VHP and RSS organised rallies in support of this *rath yatra* in their respective cities, and inflammatory pamphlets and provocative slogans were raised against Muslims. Such activities unleashed violent riots during or after Advani's *rath* passed through these cities, which resulted in the death of more than 3000 people across India, most notably in Mumbai (Copland, 2010).

Apart from the 2002 Gujarat riots and the 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots – the two prominent instances of anti-Muslim violence amongst many other small riots since the Ayodhya movement - Hindu nationalist forces today are implicated in orchestrating another form of attack against Muslims. The violence is not an event like riots anymore but it is inscribed in everyday attacks on Muslims for consuming beef in the name of protecting cows, the holy animal for many Hindus and a potent cultural symbol of Hindutva today; or the forced chanting of '*Jai Shri Ram*' (hail Lord Ram), a slogan popularised during Ayodhya campaign (Pandey 2019). Mob vigilantism is the new weapon of violence against Muslims of India today for the people subscribed to Hindutva ideology.

Hansen (2019:23) observes this recent phenomenon and says,

> Violence is indeed a foundational element of Hindutva - as ideology and as political action. But the routinisation of violence in Indian public life is not only the making of the BJP and its allies. Hindu nationalists have amplified and systematised a longer-standing trend towards accepting public anger, and collective violence, as a legitimate means of political expression and legitimate means of exercising political power.

According to him, public violence and vigilantism in India is not seen as an anathema to a functioning democracy, but as a justified political mechanism to exhibit power, and Hindu nationalists have only used it to their ends. Jaffrelot (2019) has argued that RSS has always been at the forefront of vigilantism since its inception, to defend supposedly Hindu interest against the rest. The Hindu nationalist movement from the very beginning "has displayed a tendency to fight Muslims physically" so that opponents of Hindus know their strength and resist the state if it intends to appease Muslims (2019: 56). Jaffrelot further shows that all violence is legitimate, "not only against the Muslims, but also against all those protecting them - such as Mahatma Gandhi, whom Golwalkar claimed was motivated by petty electoral intentions" (2019:56).

Since the 2014 Indian General Elections, when BJP came to power with full majority, such vigilantism by RSS and other Hindu nationalists organisations have entered a new phase, where it enjoys state protection. It is not easy to delineate how instances of violence in everyday life in India are just plain criminal act against individual or group of people or its causal factors are linked with Hindutva ideology and mobilisation. But political empowerment of Hindu youth associated with the *Sangh parivar*, and channeling their anger towards the minorities through well-funded vigilante groups, both online and in real life made them care less to disguise Hindutva violence (Banaji, 2018; Poonam, 2018). Jha (2017) shows in his work, how Hindutva's what he called 'shadow armies' and 'foot soldiers' since 2014 have launched a spate of hate crimes against Muslims and Dalits (lower caste Hindus) in India armed with knives, tridents, swords and sticks. It received widespread condemnation in national and international media, and even by the Supreme Court of India itself but very little was done on the ground to address these crimes through systemic police and judicial intervention as there was no political will on the part of the BJP ruled state machinery (Ayyub, 2018).

Here I would like to argue that violence is the weapon Hindu nationalists use to avenge and punish those people who resist the norms and practices of citizenship espoused in Hindutva ideology by their way of life. As I have shown above, the

boundaries of Indian citizenship are being increasingly defined by Hindutva's conceptions of political community and such foot soldiers are engaged to enforce them through violent means. Telle (2013) introduces the idea of 'vigilante citizenship', while studying the role of violent non-state actors in Indonesia reacting to the construction of a temple there. She argues, "as citizenship has been implemented under the double logic of democracy and security, albeit biased toward the latter, civilian security groups effectively exercise a form of vigilante citizenship" (2013:186, cited in Banaji 2018:335).

Deviating from the Weberian notion of state as the ultimate authority on legitimate violence, these Hindu vigilante groups with patronage from ministers in Indian government treats their acts of violence no less legitimate than police actions to maintain law and order;[22] and that is why violence is not only committed but also communicated through modern technology or social media like Facebook and WhatsApp to the general public as well as within its own ranks as a mark of triumph. Banaji (2018) argues that extreme spectacles of violence is essentially a Hindutva project to construct what she called the vigilante publics; and not just these instances of vigilante crimes, but also the violence in 2002 which "offers a template for the consolidation of a vigilante public, with a high tolerance for mass-murder, and without conscience or regret (2018: 342).

[22] Jayant Sinha, a former Harvard graduate and junior minister in Modi government feted and garlanded eight men convicted of lynching a Muslim men in 2018, when they were out on bail due to the intervention of Jharkhand High Court. All these men were allegedly members of the RSS and attacked the victim due to their suspicion that he was carrying beef. Read more at Gettleman and Kumar (2018).

1.5 Citizennagar and citizenship: in search of new belonging

Most of the theoretical and sociological debates on citizenship today rests upon the fact that citizenship should be primarily understood as a way to belong to a nation-state (Benhabib, 2005). However, Yuval-Davis (2006:207) argues that "the nation-state is historically specific and constitutes only one of several layers of people's citizenship". My research talks about these layers of citizenship and argues that we have to understand that these layers as contingent factors depending upon the contexts, institutions and actors that people are involved with to construct them as citizens.

For the people of Citizennagar, the struggle to become members of a political community is about their struggle to belong to the city, to the state of Gujarat and ultimately to the nation-state of India. During my conversation with them, they had often raised these issues of belonging by citing what they read in the newspaper or saw in some shrill TV debates standing at some corner shops. They may have been rehabilitated to the edge of the city, but they cannot be expected to live on an island in a highly networked world as todays. Negative portrayal of Muslims in media, or hate speeches by BJP politicians treating the community as foreign or 'other' to the national imagination of India reflect in the anxieties of belonging amongst the Citizennagar residents as well (Kumar, 2011; Bhushan, 2016).

I will problematize the question of Muslim belonging and citizenship in postcolonial India in section 2.3 of my thesis. However, to elaborate my point here, the idea of Muslim belonging has always been a thorny issue in Indian polity since its independence from colonial rule in 1947 (Sherman, 2015). Muslims in the state of Gujarat are perceived as "permanent cultural outsiders" as Parekh (2002) says as the demand for equal citizenship by Muslims provoked "intense hostility among

the guardians of Hindutva-based Gujarati culture, especially the middle class" in 2002. Not just at the regional level, but the forced migration of Muslims in the periphery of the city as a result of targeted violence, raise questions on the possibilities of a city based belonging (Holston and Appadurai, 1996).

Though the state is accused of abandoning the survivors of 2002, be it in terms of rehabilitation (Chandhoke *et al.*, 2007) or justice (Jaffrelot, 2012), it is not completely absent, and through urban planning or judicial intervention, it affects the limits of belonging for these Muslim survivors of Citizennagar (Mahadevia et al. 2017).

My research intends to investigate these anxieties of belonging at various levels, which shows that people are engaged in a myriad way to claim their membership at those levels. It is not just education or participation in spiritual centres that they are relying on their struggles to be a citizen, but I am arguing for 'politics of contingent citizenship' that operate at different junctures.

To develop my concept, I rely on the work of Holston (1998) on 'insurgent citizenship', where he distinguishes between formal and substantive citizenship. According to him, formal citizenship refers to membership in a nation-state and substantive citizenship signifies an array of social, economic, political and cultural rights people have and exercise. I further explore Holston's work with Glenn's (2004) argument that enforcement or lack of enforcement of formal citizenship rights by institutions and actors impact the degree of substantive rights people enjoy. I argue that through my concept of politics of contingent citizenship we can pay close attention to these negotiations with institutions and actors responsible for, or specific circumstances that yield lesser or greater substantive citizenship rights. In my concept, I am less concerned with the *outcome* but rather the *process* and *factors* involved in citizenship struggles.

This idea focuses on how Citizennagar residents are not just mere victims but who actively participate in claim-making and bottom-up struggles in order to bring change in their lives. My ethnography shows the desire for citizenship as a way of belonging and how it is highly subjective to given contexts and interplay of different actors and situations.



Figure 4: Citizennagar with the Pirana dumpsite in the background

1.6 Research Questions

Most of the literatures on Hindu-Muslim conflict in India revolves around the causal factors (Hasan 1984; Engineer 2002; Brass 2003; Jaffrelot 2003; Varshney 2002) behind such conflicts; and though issues linked to citizenship in India have been explored from different angles (Shani 2010, 2017; Jayal 2013; Roy 2016), never has it been studied from of the perspective of Muslim survivors in these cases of violence. Therefore, my research contributes by answering the following questions:

First, *how the politics of contingent citizenship can be situated in the aftermath of the Hindu-Muslim conflict in India, particularly in the context of the 2002 riots?*

As discussed, though Muslims in India enjoy legal affiliation to Indian nation-state, formal citizenship does not translate into substantive citizenship for them. The idea of Muslims as second-class citizens only exacerbates with the increasing influence of Hindutva in Indian state and society, and episodic violence against the community. With this angle, I attempt to explore new perspectives on the Muslim citizenship question in contemporary Indian polity today.

Second, *what kind of citizenship struggles and practices emerge from a site inhabited by displaced Muslim survivors of riots?*

This question takes its cue from the first and keeps its focus on what happens to Muslims after these instances of targeted violence. In this particular case, I look at the question of rehabilitation of Muslims in Ahmedabad in these resettlement colonies, and their everyday struggle to claim better citizenship rights as *dangapirit* (riot affected person) or IDPs as local activists identify them by. I have attempted to answer this question by examining the emergent contexts, new forms of resistance and mobilizations, and unfolding of hope and anxieties in this specific

site of Citizennagar. It allows us to explore how survivors of riots complicate the question on Muslim citizenship with their actions.

Third, *what are the roles of the state agencies and other non-state actors in the struggle and everyday lives of survivors to claim better citizenship rights?*

This question evolves from the last question where I throw light on the role of outside actors, both state institutions and non-state actors who engages with the site of Citizennagar. I explore the nature of such interactions from the vantage point of all characters involved and look at the ways it shapes the experiences of being citizens, and people negotiate claim-making from below on the ground.

1.7 Structure of the thesis

In chapter 2, I present a theoretical overview of citizenship theories, and the emergence of racialized citizenship in the contemporary world. I also locate such theories during the inception of India as a postcolonial state, in the idea around Muslim citizenship in India, and how the concept can be linked to the issues of refugees and IDPs. In chapter 3, I discuss the methodology of this study to highlight how I explored the Ahmedabad city, and ended up choosing Citizennagar as my research site. In the same chapter, I have carefully explained my position as a researcher, and how this led me to explore being activist anthropologist.

It must be mentioned here that all the chapters from four to eight attempt to engage with the first research question along with either second or third research question mentioned in the previous section (1.6). In the fourth chapter, I talk about the struggle of the residents of Citizennagar to acquire ownership documents of their houses and other related information from the developer who helped in rehabilitating them after 2002. The fourth chapter discusses issues related to property, citizenship and its association with patron-client relationships. In the next chapter, I look at how narratives of death are raised by these people in a press conference in Kerala, a southern Indian state to make moral claims on the political community, and link citizenship struggles with the 'politics of life' (Fassin, 2010) through death narratives.

Chapter 6, explores the idea of gendered citizenship through the everyday lives of the women survivors of Citizennagar. It looks at the intra community relationship in Citizennagar to locate the struggles of these women. Thereafter in chapter 7, I explore a character named Saleem, who engages with the site of Citizennagar to situate his local politics in order to emerge as a, what I call, young agent of citizenship. In this section, I analyse his actions and strategies to negotiate his political citizenship in the Ahmedabad city. Chapter 8 deals with the role of state agencies in the everyday life of Citizennagar, and how the struggle for documents

constitute their understanding of substantive citizenship. Finally I present my concluding remarks in Chapter 9.

2 Theorising Citizenship: India, Muslims and IDPs

2.1 Citizenship: a contested concept

Among all the resettlement colonies present in Gujarat where most of the survivors of 2002 riot continue to live today, my research site first struck me because of its name, Citizennagar or city of citizens. In naming the site, the English word 'citizen' was interestingly added to the Hindi word 'nagar', which translates to city. If we delve into the history of the word 'citizen', we find that it originated in the civic experiences of the ancient city-republics of Greece (Bellamy, 2008). I am not sure if a village, locality or even town exists with a similar name in India today. But the presence of a Muslim community in this very site of Citizennagar, who were displaced due to organised violence against them for the cause of Hindutva, coupled with the history of such violence which define modern Indian citizenship itself, presents us with a fascinating paradox to explore.

In 1994, it was announced that the concept of citizenship had returned to the modern world after a hiatus of twenty years in the context of globalisation and the formation of new nation-states after the end of the cold war (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994; A. Roy, 2005). A few years before that Hall and Held (1989:16) also argued that citizenship as a concept is back "in the political debate with a vengeance" and must find its place as a central theme in socialist politics. Both right and left groups use it with equal passion, they said.

Today when scholars and journalists are warning of India becoming an ethnic democracy under the ruling BJP, the question of citizenship, especially for the Muslims is of utmost importance (Khalidi, 2008; Jaffrelot, 2019). But what do we mean by citizenship or being a citizen in our day-to-day encounter? In the general sense, scholars today understand the concept as being a member of a political

community, most notably in a nation-state in the contemporary world (Hammar 1986; Heater 1999). Such membership is legally inscribed with the right to a passport, or allow the adult members to vote in local, regional and federal/general elections to elect a body of representatives who would rule over them. Conflating citizenship with nation is quite common as both the ideas emerged simultaneously in different parts of the world (Jayal, 2013). Though Oommen (1997) makes the case for distinction between the concept of citizenship and nationality as they may influence each other, at the same time one cannot capture the meanings and practices associated with the other concept.

However, random use of the word citizenship can be puzzling as no single authoritative definition exists, or we can say so many theories revolve around this concept that it is almost an impossible task to come up with the perfect answer. Citizenship can be, "a status, a standing, an institution, an instrument of political categorization, a set of actions related to virtue, civicness, a form of identification, a process, an affect, and various other things" as Cohen and Ghosh (2019:10) explains. They argue that the idea of citizenship can be called 'essentially contested concepts', following the work of W.B.Gallie (1956), because we cannot reach consensus on the specific meanings of citizenship, just like other key concepts like 'democracy', 'nation', 'state', and so on.

Scholars like Jayal (2013:2) argue that every "single dimension of the concept of citizenship is contested in contemporary India: citizenship as a legal status, citizenship as a bundle of rights and entitlements, and citizenship as a sense of identity and belonging." Such contestation to the concept defines citizenship. How this contestation happens, and in what context, forms the basic structure of this thesis.

Shklar (1991:1) rightly claimed, "There is no notion more central in politics than citizenship, [yet] none more variable in history nor contested in theory." The academic literature on citizenship is burgeoning day by day with scholars

discussing, debating, challenging old concepts and bringing forth new notions of the idea. The concept of citizenship has been read widely and from various angles, and this led to the emergence of ideas like cosmopolitan citizenship (Linklater, 1998), psychological citizenship (Carens, 1996), performative citizenship (Isin, 2017), necro citizenship (Castronovo, 2001), gendered citizenship (Munday, 2009), ecological citizenship (Smith, 1998), active citizenship (Onyx, Kenny and Brown, 2012), passive citizenship (Salatic, 2013) and many more. I return to these various concepts of citizenship mentioned above from chapter four to eight of this thesis, as my ethnographic accounts speak to some these ideas.

All these different notions of citizenship, with common themes and common divides, according to Bosniak (2008), can be predominantly divided into three overlapping categories - a) What are the substances of citizenship or what constitutes citizenship? b) What are the domains or locations of citizenship or where is the idea manifested on the ground?, and c) Who are the subjects of citizenship or more simply put, who is a citizen? Scholars like Shachar et al. (2017) ask whether broad range of emergent conceptions of citizenship that encompass and surpass nation-state, society, individual to multiple forms of humanist commitments would make us abandon the idea altogether? Bosniak (2008) takes this question head on and argues that citizenship as an idea has so much both normative universalist and particularist content hidden in itself, that it can withstand all scrutiny and offer new meanings in unseen contexts, sometimes totally opposite to earlier interpretations. She says, this "is the defining ambiguity at the heart of citizenship: citizenship represents both an engine of universality and a brake or limit upon it" (2008:2).

2.1.1 Emergence of racialized citizenship

In the middle of the twentieth century, Arendt (1968:81) declared citizen "is *by definition* a citizen among citizens of a country among countries. His rights and duties must be defined and limited, not only by those of his fellow citizens, but also by the boundaries of a territory. . ." Such ideas are asserted by many recent theorists on the matter like Himmelfarb (1996:74) who said citizenship "has little meaning except in the context of a state."

Tilly (1993:501) brings in the concept of democracy, with its inherent idea of equality for all, compulsory debate and discussion with citizens to change state representatives and law, and protection from state arbitrariness to argue "political democracy depends on citizenship, which in turn depends on statehood." Citing the situation caused by Balkan crisis in 1992-1993, he further states, "Disintegration of citizenship's protections promotes violent vindication of particular rights and privileges, which threatens breadth, equality, and binding consultation- hence all democracy-as well. The qualities of democracy, citizenship, and statehood interlock inextricably" (1993:501).

The membership to a particular nation-state, democratic or not, both in the western world and in the global south (following their independence from erstwhile colonial powers), in the last century have been debated mainly along the lines of *jus soli* or 'right of the soil', and '*jus sanguinis*' or 'right of blood' (Jayal 2013). In *jus soli,* citizenship is ascribed to a nation-state through the principle of territory, by being born within its borders, while in *jus sanguinis,* citizenship is given by the principle of descent, by parents or grandparents or bloodline.

According to Brubaker (1998), these markers are essentially linked with different ideas of nationhood. Some states embrace *jus soli,* where nationhood is defined along political and territorial boundaries, whereas *jus sanguinis* are adopted by states where nationhood is formed along ethnicity or descent. He further says, *jus soli* is an assimilationist concept and characteristic feature of modern states, but *jus sanguinis* is restrictive and "reflects an ethno-cultural understanding of nationhood as prior to and independent of the state" (1998:132).

In case of India, Jayal (2019) argues that after independence in 1947, the country adopted a mixture of both *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* in defining citizenship. At that time constituent assembly of India called "the first as a form of 'enlightened, modern, civilized' and democratic citizenship as opposed to the second, which it said was 'an idea of racial citizenship'" (quoted in Jayal 2019:34). However, what started in the 1985 amendment of the Citizenship Act pertaining to naturalisation in the province of Assam, was only consolidated with subsequent changes of the same law based on individual's descent instead of their birth. With the latest amendment of the Citizenship Act in December, 2019, India has more firmly consolidated *jus sanguinis* as the basis of its citizenship laws under the Modi government. However, the principle of *jus soli* has not been completely done away with yet.

With the rise of nationalist governments throughout the world (Shephard, 2017; Rachman, 2018), states are adopting a stricter version of *jus sanguinis,* Fitzgerald (2017) calls this 'racialized citizenship'. Here the citizenship "may be ethnicized, or more narrowly racialized" with four separate junctures - three of them deal with the external elements of citizenship and one with its internal feature (2017:130). The three external moments are where "nationhood is defined through rules of birthright acquisition, naturalization and denationalization" and the fourth deals with the process of racialization through changes in "the status, rights, and obligations of a group or individual within a state" (2017:130).

So, a racialized nation-state may give or deny citizenship to a selective group of people who were born in its territory. It can restrict the naturalization process of some particular groups whereas it can assimilate the preferred ethnic groups faster than others. Denationalization along ethnic lines may happen in some states, where a group of citizens are declared foreigners or 'illegal' and then forced to leave the country. [23] In the Indian context, some scholars are already calling it a 'ethnic democracy' (Jaffrelot, 2019), and changes are being brought in to amend citizenship acts in Indian Parliament along religious lines with Muslims being the particular target of such laws (Jayal, 2019). Therefore it is open to debate if India is on the path to adopt such racialized citizenship.

According to Fitzgerald (2017:132), the "fourth moment of potential racialization is the internal dimension of citizenship, which can be separated into legal status and substantive practice", the latter is the subject matter of this thesis which I will elaborate further in my chapters. He further says, "The practice of citizenship continues to be a racialized much more than citizenship status. Even the most homogenous countries include ethnic, if not specifically racial divisions, and differential access to the social, political, and civil rights of citizenship reflect these divisions" (2017:132). Shafir and Peled (1998:256) provides us with the perfect example of this phenomena when they talks about the country of Israel and show how "hierarchy of citizenship" is practiced on the ground with respect to its Jewish and Muslim citizens, and at the bottom of this hierarchy exist the noncitizen Palestinians.

[23] The Rohingya crisis in Myanmar, where hundreds of thousands of people are being forced to leave following the military offensive by its government and declared foreigners in 2015, can be argued to be the classic example of such denationalization. For more details please see Ahsan Ullah (2016).

In the next chapter, I discuss these substantive elements of citizenship beyond the legal status attached to it and how it can be placed in the politics of contingent citizenship.

2.1.2 Differentiated Citizenship

American political theorist Iris Marion Young coined the term 'differentiated citizenship' to point out the limitations of normative universal notions of citizenship, and how injustices happen when we are blind to differences that exist in social norms and rights-based distributive paradigms (Young, 1989). She did not dismiss the universalist content present in citizenship ideals in her work. She rather stressed that as long "as political ideology and practice persisted in defining some groups as unworthy of equal citizenship…it was important for emancipatory movements to insist that all people are the same in respect their moral worth and deserve equal citizenship" (1989:267).

Though citizenship is often projected as an equalizing force, Young's idea of differentiated citizenship takes into account how social groups and their identity "should be understood in relational terms" in liberal democratic polity (1989:260). These group identities often form or fade away in particular contexts, through social processes, relational affinities and differentiations. Sometimes people themselves identify with these processes to decide who are they are and who are the other. In Young's work, we find a strong argument for a kind of citizenship, which effectively recognizes different social groups and their distinct characters, along with providing an adequate platform for representing their voices and grievances vis-à-vis the dominant social group. And for this reason, she advocates that members of minority or underrepresented social groups "should be able to participate together in public institutions without shedding their distinct identities or suffering disadvantage because of them" (1989: 273). The idea of universal citizenship with uniform rules for everyone acts as a hindrance in assuring full membership to members of such social group.

Indeed, Young's concept of differentiated citizenship takes a cue from the struggle of feminists, black liberation activists, gay men and lesbians in the United States to argue that "rights and rules that are universally formulated and thus blind to differences of race, culture, gender, age, or disability, perpetuate rather than undermine oppression" (1989:267). Formulating citizenship in the abovementioned manner directs us to look at citizenship in two very important ways. Firstly, it encourages us to understand the framework within which group rights could work for the oppressed and minority communities without forcing them to assimilate or subsumed by the majority discourse (Mintz, Tossutti and Dunn, 2013). Secondly, it draws our attention to the fact that though citizenship possesses normative values of equality, there is an asymmetrical distribution of rights as public goods to different social groups which ultimately creates a gradience in the concept (Cohen, 2009).

Holston and Appadurai (1996) talk about the distinction between the/a formal and substantive form of citizenship to point to this gradience. They argue,

> If the formal refers to membership in the nation-state and the substantive to the array of civil, political, socio-economic, and cultural rights people possess and exercise, much of the turmoil of citizenship derives from the following problem: although in theory full access to rights depends on membership, in practice that which constitutes citizenship substantively is often independent of its formal status (1996:190).

Holston (1998), while introducing the concept of 'insurgent citizenship' to talk about the exclusion of poor from the urban spaces of Sao Paulo, points to this independent nature of substantive citizenship. His work questions the primacy of the nation-state as the modern political unit and citizenship as the national membership because such notions failed to provide the required rights and entitlements to people who enjoy formal inclusion. According to him, several aspects of substantive citizenship "often inaccessible to those who are formal

citizens (e.g., the native poor), yet available to those who are not (e.g., legally resident "aliens") (1998: 169).

In another very important work, with an extensive historical and sociological analysis of Anglo-American citizenship, Somers (2008) draws our attention to the plight of the poor African-American residents of New Orleans, in the aftermath of the 2005 Hurricane Katrina. She held market fundamentalism responsible for the exclusion of the poor unemployed people from the ambit of citizenship privileges because they are deemed worthless in a society that runs on the exchange value of human. In this scenario, we can see how despite their formal citizenships, these poor black residents were left behind by state emergency relief teams. Thus, a picture of modern statelessness emerges.

Somers' (2008) work also shows that constitutionalist discourses on citizenship that value formal membership in a political community often fail to capture different circumstances where the degree of substantive citizenship varies to a great extent. Though in the work by Holston (1998) and Somers (2008) we may see that substantive citizenship is not contingent upon formal citizenship, the latter remains important for many people in the modern world. Somers (2008:6) has also argued in her work for "the foundational right to political and social membership as well as *de jure* and *de facto* inclusion and recognition." The importance of *de jure* and *de facto* inclusion and recognition is evident in the struggle by refugees to attain citizenship of host countries (Agier, 2011), or to fight against denationalization and statelessness (Ahsan Ullah, 2016).

Whatever the institutional or administrative failure in delivering rights and entitlements to legal citizens of a nation-state, formal citizenship embodied in law and policy remains the last resort or aspiration for many oppressed and marginalized groups. However, the idea of differentiated citizenship makes us understand how different social groups may experience enjoyment or even denial of substantive citizenship to a lesser or greater degree.

2.1.3 The politics of contingent citizenship

Glenn (2004) argues that the concept of substantive citizenship raises two important issues. She says,

> One has to do with a capacity to exercise rights to which one is formally entitled. T. H. Marshall made this point when he argued that social citizenship—the right to a modicum of economic security, education, and other resources—was necessary to realize one's civil and political rights…The second issue has to do with enforcement or lack of enforcement of formal citizenship rights by the national, state, or local government or by members of the public (2004: 53).

In the first instance, she gives the example of how differential access to legal representation decides if individuals can exercise their right to sue other persons in a court of law. Therefore, the operation of one fundamental right is conditional on the possession of another set of fundamental rights. To prove the second point, she talks about how racialized and gendered citizenship "is created when theoretically universal citizenship rights are differentially enforced" (2004:53). She cites the case of universal suffrage and how it is historically enforced unequally across different social groups in the United States, especially the blacks and women.

Introducing the concept of 'semi-citizenship', which focus on partial enjoyment of certain rights linked with citizenship, Cohen (2009:24-25) argued that "both historical and normative claims that the rights of citizenship are contingent on each other" in Marshall's analysis raise serious questions. She claims that the idea of contingency "among citizenship rights makes citizenship perilously reductive" (2009:24). Citizenship may be defined as 'bundle of rights' enjoyed by 'full member of a community', but if "citizenship rights were contingent upon one

another, then distinctions between rights would ultimately break down entirely" (2009:25). Also delivering certain social rights should not entail the justification of promoting civil and political rights, "because liberty rights cannot be reduced to welfare rights, or vice versa" (2009: 24). Finally, she argues that the long-lasting presence of all forms of semi-citizenship proves that contingency within citizenship rights makes no sense. However, this argument by Cohen (2009) does not answer what factors are responsible to make semi-citizenship possible.

Concepts like partial or restricted citizenship or semi-citizenship (a discussion I follow again in section 2.3.4) as given by Cohen (2009) allow us to look at the realisation of particular set of rights. One may be formally entitled to all set of rights as a legal citizen, but in focusing on substantive citizenship, we may understand better which right or rights activates in what context. This takes us to what Glenn (2004) raised in her second issue with substantive citizenship earlier.

In the context of non-white people and women in the US, Glenn (2004:55) states "citizenship has always been a malleable structure, molded by the efforts of dominant groups seeking to enforce their own definitions of citizenship and its boundaries, and by the efforts of subordinated groups to contest these definitions and boundaries." In this way, citizenship acquired different meanings over time and place for distinct social groups. She further says that it is due to the "struggles at the local level that regionally and historically specific formal and substantive citizenship has emerged" (2004:55).

If we follow Glenn's argument on substantive citizenship in the beginning, then we find that different actors are responsible in its actualisation; be it the government at the local, state or national level or members of the public. In this thesis, I argue that the fruition of a greater or lesser degree of substantive citizenship happens through claim-making, positioning oneself in particular social contexts, and the different role played by state and non-state actors. This can be studied by paying close attention to the struggles of disadvantaged groups at the local level, who in

my case are survivors of violence. It is in this backdrop that I introduce the concept of politics of contingent citizenship to analyse what's happening in the lanes of Citizennagar.

While the idea of substantive citizenship attends to the *outcome* of full, partial or even lack of enforcement of different rights associated with citizenship, the politics of contingent citizenship draw our attention to the *process and factors* involved. In chapter five of this thesis, my respondents narrate stories of death and loss without gaining anything in the end, but that does not restrict us from studying the actors and contexts which played a significant role.

Irrespective of the outcome on the degree of substantive citizenship, in this way we can pay greater focus on the everyday life as well as state-citizen and citizen-citizen interactions from the perspective of the people at the local level. From normative discussion on semi-citizenship or partial citizenship, this concept traces their journey in particular contexts. In explaining the contours of differential citizenship rooted in local struggles against enforcement of universal rules or to demand particular rights and entitlement, such formulation of citizenship may prove useful to yield an account of circumstances where such struggles become possible.

Chung (2009) has earlier used the term 'politics of contingent citizenship' to study citizenship and migration in the non-Western world. In my study, the 'politics of contingent citizenship' emerge through the ethnographic observations on the actors and contexts entangled in spatio-temporal conditions in the aftermath of a violent event rather than from historical and political analysis of an issue. Though I have borrowed the term from the scholar above, I have used it in the context of exploring factors linked with substantive citizenship. In this sense, my work is closer to the ethnographic analysis by Hull (2017) regarding the professional ethic of nurses in rural hospitals in South Africa, and the implications for contemporary understanding of citizenship. Calling these nurses 'contingent citizens' Hull

(2017:17) focussed less on "outward demands of citizenship" vis-a-vis hegemonic ideas of membership and "instead more on subtle affirmations of belonging". I follow the same path with my interviewees in Citizennagar as it "allows us to conceptualise a wider terrain of citizenship formation as partial, restricted and contingent" (2017:17).

Taking further the discussion on differential citizenship, I started this section with Glenn's (2004) discussion on substantive citizenship and two important issues attached to it. I quoted the work on 'semi-citizenship' by Cohen (2009) to debate the first issue and show how in contrast to Marshall's understanding, citizenship rights may exist independently of each other. Substantive citizenship may exist without all or nothing approach to people's capacity to exercise different strands of rights. However, in touching the second issue, I explained how the politics of contingent citizenship can explain different levels of substantive citizenship enjoyed by people. Rather than focusing on the outcome, an examination of the dynamics of local struggle gives us a better view of the transformation of formal rights into substantive ones.

2.1.4 Top-down approaches to citizenship

Lazar (2013) in her discussion on *The Anthropology of Citizenship,* focuses on the political subject formation, which lies at the heart of all citizenship regimes through both top-down and bottom-up approaches. She defines this regime as, "legal, bureaucratic, ideological and material frameworks that condition practices of and ideas about government and participation in politics" and these regimes are "constantly shifting and dynamic" (2013:10). The idea that both top-down and bottom-up processes contribute in citizen making has been argued by Ong (1996:737) as well, who said citizenship is a "process of self-making and being made." As state is the entity, which defines and decides in most cases who is a citizen and who is an alien, the 'being made' part of citizenship happens through top-down policies adopted by the state, something Foucault argued as well (Baitenmann, 2005). Aretxaga (2003) suggested an analytical approach to study the encounters between citizens and the state policies and officials, to understand these evolving norms and practices of citizenship regime. In many ways, state makes and remakes citizens in the modern world.

Often nation-states, formed along religious, ethnic, racial or linguistic lines, adopt certain policies in order to 'assimilate' different kind of minority populations with a majoritarian spirit. Ong (2003) talks about government policies in the United States, that aims to integrate Cambodian refugees fleeing the murderous Pol Pot regime in the inner and hi-tech enclaves of California. Another important term was coined by Rosaldo (1994), when he investigated the idea of 'cultural citizenship' to understand the process of assimilation and respect for difference. He defined cultural citizenship as, "the right to be different (in terms of race, ethnicity or native language) with respect to the norms of the dominant national community, without compromising one's right to belong, in the sense of participating in the nation-state's democratic processes" (1994:57).

There are numerous works on cultural citizenship in India, especially with regard to its minority population. However, I would like to mention two scholars here. Bajpai (2011) provides us with a historic analysis on the formation of group-differentiated rights in India, with special provisions for minorities and lower caste Hindus, with the goal to challenge inequalities and yet maintain common citizenship. Konig (2016) explored the same concept in India, through the study of some recent cases of media censorship, activated through both official and unofficial channels. His work focused on the arbitrary nature of censor policy of Indian government, often based on majoritarian impulses which only complicate the nation-building process from the top.

One of the other important ways the state create citizens with particular social, economic and moral outlook is through its education policies and schools (Lazar, 2010). In the project of nation building, developing civic commitment, promoting nationalist ideas and discourses, school system is always a valued institution (Gellner, 1983). In case of India, advocates of Hindutva have always focused in this arena and with the capture of state power, they always intervened through the change of textbook curriculums (Flaten, 2017).

Apart from these actions, welfare and developmental activities are also employed to produce certain kinds of citizens by government agencies today (Robins, Cornwall and von Lieres, 2008). The state often uses different provisions of healthcare and treatment to change citizenship practices as well (Maioni and Couture, 2010). Sivaramakrishnan (2011) in his work focused on public policies concerning health, education and agriculture in India, and argued how neoliberal interventions in these areas have put the idea of citizenship in a democracy in jeopardy. The idea of top-down approaches to citizenship can be expanded in multiple arenas with new and emergent forms of state and market interventions, especially in the digital sector coming up in recent times (Mossberger, Tolbert and McNeal, 2008; Itty, 2015).

2.1.5 Bottom-up approaches to citizenship

The idea of citizenship is not only a top-down enterprise and Ong (1996) in her work made an important contribution by showing us how 'being made' is essentially connected with 'self-making'. It talks about an important analytical element which is the agency of people who fight for citizenship or better forms of citizenship. Lazar (2013) compiles a list of ethnographic accounts in her edited volume to show myriad ways of framing and claim making on the state, or even on a community. She believes such "studies bring out the complex relationships between people and state bureaucracy, and between people and law, as citizens operates in the gaps between expectations of resolution, certainty and buttressing of privilege that are usually associated with the public face of the legal system and realities of specific legal processes" (2013:12).

Though there is plenty of work on theoretical debates on citizenship, we need more empirical accounts to understand how different people imagine themselves as citizens or understand their own citizenship experience (Lister *et al.*, 2003; Jones and Gaventa, 2004). These empirical accounts, showcasing people's lives and struggles can demonstrate different languages associated with membership in a political community, where it can be about obligations (Warren, 2001; Englund, 2008), or belonging to a collectivity through naturalised membership (Lazar 2008). These multiple languages of citizenship have become an important tool to claim rights the world over, prompting political theorists and anthropologists to argue that citizenship and rights are fundamentally allied together (Isin, 2009; Kallio, Mills and Skelton, 2016). Escoffier (2018) talks about 'mobilizational citizenship' to explain the sustainability of collective action by Chilean local activists and '*poblador/pobladores*' (urban underprivileged dweller/s), to claim rights and build community for themselves in a regime that excludes them. Thorson (2012) argues that people today generally have an understanding of citizenship vocabulary, which they often employ for political socialization as well as political participation to secure rights and entitlements.

In this thesis, I am also studying these various languages of claim-making in order to secure certain rights which take different routes but happens at the single site of Citizennagar. I am obviously drawing from other examples present in the world where similar struggles were ensued to claim rights associated with citizenship. Like I engage with Petryna's (2002) idea of 'biological citizenship', where people affected by the Chernobyl radiation claim disability benefit from the state by displaying their poor health to certified medical professionals.

In one of the significant study of bottom-up approaches to citizenship, we can see how people struggle for the regularization of land titles in the periphery of Sao Paulo just as what Holston (2008) explained through the concept of 'insurgent citizenship'. Earle (2018), drawing inspiration from the work of Holston, studied the link between housing rights, social movements and citizenship, and called the act of people occupying empty buildings in Sao Paulo and justifying it with law as 'transgressive citizenship'. Not only in São Paulo, but also in Mumbai, Appadurai (2001) studied the fight for housing rights as part of citizenship struggle by poor urban dwellers.

Holston and Appadurai (1996:202) have argued that today "cities may still be the most important sites in which we experience the crises of national membership and through which we may rethink citizenship." Malkki (2002:355) also believes that "the city entails expectations of citizenship". It is the city where many of these bottom-up struggles are happening today, where concepts such as the right to the city to fight the dominance of capital (Harvey, 2003) has given way to new forms of urban citizenship (Bayat and Biekart, 2009).

In my thesis various themes discussed in this section will appear time and again as my work will follow the same route and provide ethnographic accounts from the vantage point of multiple actors who are engaged in the process of claim-making from below.

This chapter provides a theoretical map of citizenship from multiple perspectives. First, I have discussed how the idea of citizenship originated, then I studied its trajectory in contemporary times and what led to the emergence of racialized citizenship, and then I have provided the central analytical frame of this thesis i.e the politics of contingent citizenship.

In the next section, I have moved on to the emergence of citizenship in the Indian context. The section on citizenship in Indian context delves into the historical analysis of the concept and how it was legally debated at the time of its origin apart from briefly looking into the contemporary factors that challenges the concept there today. Next, I have put my focus on the question of Muslim citizenship and why it is important to explore it in the larger backdrop of communal violence in India. And in the final section, I have discussed the literature on camp and citizenship and argued why it is important in the context of Gujarat riots.

These four sections give us an idea of what lies ahead and how my ethnographic exploration of citizenship in Citizennagar will unfold in the next chapters of this thesis. My ethnographic accounts show, like in the work of Lazar (2013:12), "the room for manoeuvre that citizens enjoy is not completely free, but constrained by legal and political regimes and by the language of political action available to actors."

2.2 Citizenship in India: imperfect beginning and uneven terrains

One question is pertinent at this stage and that is, is citizenship fundamentally a western concept rooted in western texts and practices? Scholars like Dominique Schnapper starts his European debate on citizenship by saying, "EUROPE INVENTED THE IDEA OF CITIZENSHIP, and Europe is the birthplace of nation-state" (Schnapper and Dedios 1997:1999).[24] The task to come up with a coherent theory of citizenship rooted in South Asian history becomes harder when we recognise that Indian society is stratified along complex layers of multiple forms of social identifications (Sadiq 2017). There is no denying that this very land has witnessed the birth of Sufi traditions and Bhakti movements, where the idea of humanity beyond any social markers were put on a high pedestal. Much before Thomas Paine or John Stuart Mill, it is the Vaishnavite poet, Chandidas who was born in the fourteenth century declared, '*sabar upare manus satya tahar upare nai*' (Man is true above everything, nothing is higher than man) (Hossain, 2012).

If citizenship is about becoming 'full member of a community', then how would we read Kabir's doha or Lalon Fakhir's baul songs, which celebrates or talks about how love for another human being is the only criterion to celebrate togetherness? But as we discussed earlier, citizenship is not just about being a member of any association, community or organisations which may have bounded memberships based on certain criteria, it is about whether such membership is political or not (Cohen & Ghosh 2019). In the Indian context, scholars more or less agree that it is

[24] The author used Capital letters in the first sentence of the paper itself to stress the link between Europe and citizenship. Eurocentric approach in the discussion on citizenship is not very uncommon (Sadiq 2017).

through the anti-colonial struggle rooted in nationalist views and a certain democratisation process that political communities emerged to shape a form of postcolonial citizenship (Chatterjee 1993; Kaviraj 2005).

During the colonial era, when Europe was busy debating liberal conceptions of citizenship and forms of civil, political and social rights in its own land, it continued to reject the universal right of man and kept most populations as subject in the land they colonised (Mehta, 2000). Kabeer (2006:2) rightly critiqued Marshall's (1983) account of citizenship in Britain on this colonial silence when she says, "It is silent on gender and race and on the rights of those whose lands were colonised, whose way of life was disrupted and whose humanity denigrated by the imperial powers, including of course, Britain."

But when such array of discriminations by the colonial empire based on racial, graded, hierarchical understanding of citizenship was challenged in the anti-colonial struggle, and new nation-states emerged in the process, how did the imperial subjects' transition to a citizenship regime? Whereas subjecthood referred to the allegiance to the empire, this regime offered not only membership in a new political community but also the rights and duties which people never experienced. Who are the citizens and what will be the content of this new citizenship are questions which challenged the makers of modern India? Sadiq (2017:181) justifiably argues that "this period of decolonization amid new nationalism highlights how the concept of citizenship, as status, rights, nationality, and privilege are not ideal universals (as in the European tradition), but are instead contingent, malleable, and open to redefinition."

Kabeer (2006) observes that though it was expected that Indian independence will bring in change in the sphere of social and economic justice, liberal notions of citizenship were outside of this imagination. Khilnani (1997) argues that the right to universal franchise, one of the fundamental aspects of modern citizenship, appeared in independent India without any popular protest from marginalised

groups. He believes it came to be a reality only because a small circle of intellectual elites wanted to follow Europe in the belief that the developments happened over there through centuries which prepared conditions for material prosperity, could be replicated in India to achieve the same goal in a short time. Some scholars have also credited state bureaucracy and a 'passive revolution' as the main force behind the social transformation and the democratisation process initiated in modern India (Kaviraj, 1998; Chatterjee, 2010).

Shani (2018:16) in her recent work on the question of citizen-making and universal franchise immediately after independence, has differed from these scholars and termed the exercise as "interaction between political processes and democratic institution building from above and from below." It was not just the elites or state bureaucracy who were solely responsible for bringing in democratic citizenship in India, but as Shani argues, millions of poor Indians seldom participated in making themselves visible and enrolling themselves on the electoral data, and bureaucrats extended a helping hand to assert the authority of the new nation-state. She writes, "becoming voters turned them into equal right-bearing citizens for the purpose of authorising their government" and in this process they "attained a position, albeit a limited one, of being equal in the public domain, while they were also members of a highly hierarchical society" (2018:17). If the poor in India today vote in large numbers and ensure the survivability of Indian democracy, we can find its origin in the same process (Banerjee 2014).

Here I would like to come back to an important analysis and exemplification of citizenship in India since the colonial era till recently in the work Jayal's *Citizenship and its Discontents* (2013). She argues that different citizens experience the nation in different ways, and evolution of citizenship should be seen not only as a relation between citizen and state but also between citizens themselves. In one of the chapters of her book, she provides an ethnographic study of dalit and adivasi migrants from Pakistan who arrived in the border districts of Rajasthan, some awaiting grant of legal citizenship, and some who have received the same but "remain disappointed with its inability to afford them access to the more

substantive rights that citizenship is presumed to entail" (2013: 83). Their marginal status in society and the little political usefulness as a voting bloc elicit insignificant support from both BJP and Congress, two main parties in the region during the electoral campaigns.

In my work on Muslim survivors of 2002 Gujarat riots, I mainly follow the discussion on thin and thick citizenship in the work of Jayal (2013). Given that in my case, thin citizenship or legal status as Indian citizen is given in case of my informants, I follow her conceptual underpinnings of thick citizenship and how it is expressed through claims over social citizenship, social and economic opportunities beyond mere issues of identity and belonging to a faith. But contrary to such claim-making from below, she is exactly on point on her deliberations on the 'political state' formations in India through discriminatory practices against Muslim and Hindu migrants inscribed in ordinary law and rules. Jayal (2013: 79) argues, that the "politics of religious identity remain central to the framing of citizenship in the political state, even if distanced from the constitutional state."

When the Indian Constitution was enacted in 1950 by the Constituent Assembly, it did not define citizenship, but Part II of the Constitution (Article 5-11) primarily drew a line between a citizen and non-citizen in the context of British partition of Indian subcontinent and massive exchange of population between the two emergent nations – a Hindu majority India and a Muslim majority Pakistan. In 1955, the Indian Parliament promulgated the Citizenship Act to take into account all future aspects linked to Indian citizenship. Chatterji (2012) shows how both nations in the aftermath of the partition adopted a mix of *jus soli* (right of soil) and *jus sanguinis* (right of blood) principles to assign citizenship to people living in their territory. However, it also created the figure of 'minority-citizens' (Hindus in Pakistan and Muslims in India) who lost their freedom of mobility and were to lose their properties if they harboured any intention of moving to the neighbouring country.

The arbitrary exercise of partitioning the Indian subcontinent in order to form territorial nationhood destabilized the otherwise stable heterogeneous communities rooted in their respective social and geographical settings for centuries in order to cater to the visions of the modern nation state, only entrenched in various forms of group identities. According to Roy (2010:3), this emergence of postcolonial citizenship put focus on how "citizenship is deeply contested and is experienced and unfolds in specific social fields amidst heterogenous and often contested political imaginaries, assumptions and practices."

Sadiq (2009) and Roy (2010) both contend that the anti-colonial struggle created solidarities across various group identities, and the ideals of constitutional equality through *jus soli* principles brought them together in the beginning. Though scholars like Jayal (2013:52) argue that "in a territorially defined political community, the Indian choice of *jus soli* could not but be premised on a delinking citizenship from nationality", but at the same time she believes that since the beginning of the Indian republic, the tension between *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* remains strong. And for this march towards majoritarian *jus sanguinis* over *jus soli* in independent India, the partition is to be blamed for sowing the seeds of ethno-nationalism.

Mamdani (2001) has shown how the initial euphoria over the postcolonial nationalism and solidarity among factional groups that brought in an inclusive regime of horizontal citizenship in the beginning ended within a few decades over competing claims on resources and indigeneity. What followed thereafter was a struggle for ethnicization of citizenship laws by various groups, and erosion of trust and mutual respect, resulting in ethnic conflict and even genocide. In case of India, similar developments have given rise to an ethnonationalist politics which is structurally and physically violent to the Muslim community (Jaffrelot 2007). I will come to the question of Muslim citizenship in the next section but after this

brief historical sketch of postcolonial citizenship in South Asia, I will focus on some contemporary issues around this topic.[25]

Caste, class and indigeneity are important elements of modern Indian citizenship today, just as they were at the time of independence (Bertorelli et al. 2017; Jaoul 2016; Gorringe 2008; Tejani 2013; Shah 2013; Waghmore 2013). In the case of my respondents living in Citizennagar, caste and indigeneity are less of a marker than class and religion which affect their experiences and practices of citizenship. [26]

Sadiq (2017:196) highlights the issue of class in conceptualising postcolonial citizenship, as he believes that neoliberal economic development "in the post-colony, where citizens are converted into individual consumers or litigants", will affect the gap between formal rights enshrined in the Constitution and the 'rights in practice'. To highlight this aspect, he refers to the work by Fernandes (2004), Bhan (2014) and Ghertner (2014) where questions are raised regarding the "overlap between postcolonial economic development and citizenship building through exclusion of the poor" (Sadiq 2017:196). Whereas Fernandes talked about how neoliberal development has marginalised the urban poor but is totally disregarded by the middle class in India who are engaged in a 'politics of forgetting', Bhan and Ghertner put their focus on a middle-class aesthetics around a cosmopolitan vision of India. In this aesthetic consciousness, urban poor is a hindrance to the development of the nation, and thus preferred as lesser citizens with lesser rights.

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[25] The literature on contemporary debates on citizenship in India is ever growing and exhaustive (Konig 2016; Roy 2016). However, my discussion is only limited to the larger debates around issues affecting my respondents living in Citizennagar. Thus the selection bias on my part.

[26] This is not to claim Muslim are a casteless society as many scholars show how caste stratification remains important among the Muslim minorities in terms of social and economic capital (Ahmad, 1973; Lindholm, 1985). There is very little research however on the issue of caste among the Muslim survivors of communal violence. In my research, neither my respondents raised this subject nor I attempted to study the same in my thesis.

In an interesting paper by Bertorelli et al (2017) based on household surveys in Bengaluru, India, it asked a very relevant question – Does citizenship abate class in this nation? In order to find the answer to this question, they focused on both class and non-class based forms of deprivation in India – like caste, religion and gender – which constitute important markers of social exclusion in cities and rural areas alike. They also developed the citizenship index to study people along these markers based on their knowledge and participation in civic and political affairs. In their quest for effective citizenship, they found that though the level of participation is higher among the poor lower caste Hindus, adivasis and Muslims, knowledge works in opposite direction and mainly the domain of the rich and upper caste Hindus. But the main conclusion this study draws is that while "citizenship mitigates the effect of class and illiteracy, it does not seem to do the same for caste, particularly Dalits/Adivasis or for religion" (2017:54).

So being a Muslim, can be a real hindrance to access effective citizenship in this South Indian city and ascription to thin citizenship is of little avail. There is no common Muslim experience, and lived realities differ from city to city based on regional politics and varying socio-economic opportunities. But, studies like above points a trend in marginalisation among Muslims across regions. As my respondents in Gujarat are both very poor and Muslims, this study provides us with an understanding of how differentiated citizenship may work in another Indian city, more so if we add another element of deprivation – survivors of violence.

2.3 Indian Muslims, politics of exclusion and citizenship

2.3.1 Being Muslim and Indian

Historian Gyanendra Pandey (1999) asks a very provocative and yet politically quite relevant question in the context of the contemporary Indian polity in his paper titled "Can a Muslim Be an Indian?" The 'Muslim question' define the Indian citizenship since its inception, as ethno-nationalist notions of citizenship found certain currency in the initial days of citizenship laws in India due to the impact of partition and mass displacement of people based on religious lines (Chatterji 2012; Pandey 1999; Shani 2010). In Pandey's account, we can clearly see that even the secular leaders of modern India, treated Muslims with suspicion and called for conditional citizenship for them, e.g. only if a Muslim take up arms and "shed his blood fighting the Pakistani hordes" (1999:617).

The political developments around this time sowed the seed of this dominant notion, where Hindus are considered the natural citizens of India and Muslims would always have to prove their loyalty to their motherland by following certain norms or perform as "nationalist Muslims". Here we can draw a parallel with the criticism around Marshallian notions of citizenship, wherein it is generally accepted that the citizen will be a full-bodied white male and exclude other people from the realm of citizenship on the basis of gender, sexuality and race.

Even before the partition of India, Muslims in the Indian subcontinent were grappling with the idea of modernity vis-a-vis the notion of Muslim *ummah* (universal brotherhood among Muslims), and how belonging to the modern nation-state could be articulated without compromising their religious principles (Krishna, 1986; Jalal, 2002). What happened after independence, especially within the Muslim community, who had to deal with the question of belonging to the new

nation and adopt modern notions of citizenship and fight the forces that constantly suspected their loyalty, are best analysed by two historical accounts of Shani (2010) and Sherman (2015).

The question of loyalty for Muslims as we can see above emerge in the context of the neighbouring country of Pakistan. It has been repeatedly claimed by many Hindu extremists associated with the *Sangh parivar* that Muslims are foreigners and they only belong to Pakistan (Anand, 2019), and that is why Hasan (2001:6) says, "For Muslim communities that remained in India, partition was a nightmare." In the account of Noorani (2003), we find that elite sections of the Muslim population, from landlords, bureaucrats to rich businessmen, decided to heed the call by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, one of the biggest leaders of the community during the partition era and join Pakistan with the expectation of a better life in a new nation. However, those who decided to remain in India were mostly illiterate, landless labourers and small artisans, who later on faced all the blame of partitioning the country. Even as recent as in 2018, senior BJP leader, former Indian MP and founder of VHP's youth wing Bajrang Dal, Vinay Katiyar said, "Muslims should not live in this country. They divided the country in the name of religion, what is the need of living in this country? They should go to Bangladesh or Pakistan, what work do they have here?" (ANI, 2018)

Hasan (2001:7) rightly argues that legacies of partition still impact the daily lives of Indian Muslims and observes,

> Lawyers, doctors, engineers, teachers, and civil servants were comfortably ensconced in Lahore or Karachi either in response to Mohammad Ali Jinnah's clarion call or to bolster their career prospects. On the other hand, the so called Islamic community in India, which had no place in Jinnah's Pakistan, was fragmented, and left vulnerable to right-wing Hindu thoughts."

Raghavan (2019) looks at this historic juncture and state-making in the aftermath of partition from the perspective Nehru-Liaquat pact, where India and Pakistan agreed to be accountable to each other in the Bengal province, in terms of minority protection. But alluding to the present situation prevailing in both the countries, she argues, "the shaping of an exclusively majoritarian and discriminatory approach to politics, citizenship and minority rights in India and Pakistan, is not in fact the consequence of partition, but rather the repudiation of its intentions" (2019:17).

2.3.2 Muslims, ghettos and modes of exclusion

It was first the Sachar Committee (2006) and then Ranganath Mishra Commission (2007) which empirically established for the first time in Independent India that on most social and economic indicators Muslim communities are lagging behind even compared to the Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) of India, who are usually considered the most marginalised sections of the country. These reports showed, with quantitative data accessed from various government departments and private entities, that Muslims in India are one of the least represented communities in government and private sectors jobs, educational institutions, credit access and infrastructural facilities. Rauf (2018) argued that though following the publishing of these reports, debates mainly focused on the lack of development among Muslims of India, little attention has been paid to the processes and conditions that led to these poor socio-economic conditions inflicting the community.

Muslim marginalisation in Indian scenario is often presented with the lens of ghettoisation, something some studies claim to be prevalent across classes (Galonnier, 2015; Susewind, 2017). Chatterjee (2017:1) argues that such ghettos manifests Muslim marginalisation in spatialised forms, and emerge in "specific parts of the cities' geography that are carefully set apart from the quarters of the dominant communities by both metaphorical and physical boundaries." These bounded sites often become the reasons for outsiders to see Muslims with peculiar stereotypes, and attribute several characteristics to them, based on little or no interactive associations or understanding of ground realities which only further their marginalisation process (Gupta 2015). Therefore, Chatterjee (2017:1) correctly reflects, "such spaces occupied by Muslims generally carry severe negative assessments, seen, as they are, as receptacles of a heightened consciousness of identity and self-assertion, which greatly hamper the life chances of ordinary Muslims who live in them."

In his work on Muslims and the politics of exclusion Punyani (2018:89) agrees with such assessment and argues that the "sad state of the Muslims' social 'security' is reflected by the increased ghettoisation of the community." In their significant work on Muslim marginality in India, Gayer and Jaffrelot (2012) studied several government data and other secondary sources to comprehend the lived realities across 11 cities. The essays written by various authors in their book situate the experiences of the Muslim communities within particular social and regional context. So we find, in the cities of eastern and southern India, with the prevalent inclusive atmosphere, there are still instances of cooperation and symbiotic social relationships between Hindus and Muslims. On the other hand, in northern and western India, cities are frequently affected by Hindu-Muslim violence, and thus concerns of safety and security aggravates a situation, where both self-segregation and forced segregation of Muslims led to them to live in areas with marked and patrolled boundaries. In Gujarat, Muslim areas in urban centres are often distinguished and identified with words like 'borders' and 'Gaza strip' in both official and unofficial accounts, and such neighbourhoods are known as 'Mini-Pakistan' (Punyani 2018).

2.3.3 Global narratives on Islam and Indian Muslims

Not only these local contexts of othering and violence, in recent times Muslims in India are also affected by the global discourse on terrorism post 9/11, where they are increasingly perceived as anti-modern, religious fanatics who support terrorist activities (Roy 2005). Just after the 2002 Gujarat riots, in one of the speeches of none other than Prime Minister of India, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who maintained a moderate and inclusive figure in BJP since its inception (Kapur 2000) validated the one sided global narrative of linking only Muslims with terrorism. He said, "Wherever Muslims live, they don't like to live in co-existence with others, they don't like to mingle with others; and instead of propagating their ideas in a

peaceful manner, they want to spread their faith by resorting to terror and threats. The world has become alert to this danger" (The Wire Staff, 2018).

In the context of such prejudiced narratives from the top, where Indian Muslims are constantly referred to in the context of anti-Pakistan rhetoric, coupled with identification as a community responsible for world terrorism, segregation through ghettos epitomised the otherisation process (Panikkar, 2006). Rauf (2018:151) argues that if on one hand such combinations of factors led Hindus in general to believe that Muslims are incapable of being a part of the modern, developed and progressive India, these "popular perceptions lead to the internalisation of worthlessness among Muslims that takes root in the form of 'stigmatisation'.

In the work of Chatterjee (2012), we see how the lens was turned to situate the local occurrence of place-based othering and violence, in the context of post 9/11 discourse on Muslim terrorism and threat in a global debates. She argues that the 2002 Gujarat riots was not just a local event that emerged out of native factors, but was part of a global trend on Muslim othering. Reflecting on the 2002 violence and its impact on the Muslims of Ahmedabad, Chatterjee (2012: 144) observes, "Strategies of 'cultural' (recognition) othering work hand-in-hand with strategies of socioeconomic (redistribution) othering in producing the other who can then be annihilated through 'immediate spontaneous' events that spark conflict."

Punyani (2018) also talk about the demonisation of Muslims in different arenas and how communal violence only form a part of a larger process to exclude Muslims from the national community. He says, "The message of communal agenda manifested through violence and through creating a difficult situation for minorities is now isolating them in most parts of India. So one can see the trajectory of violence as follows — it begins with pre-violence biases, stereotypes, then violence, post-violence neglect, isolation, ghettoisation and finally leads to

partitioning of the national community at the emotional and physical levels" (2018:88).

2.3.4 Indian Muslims and second-class citizenship

When it comes to conceptually linking these facts and data about the Muslims in India, especially in the context of anti-Muslim riots and violence, socio-economic marginalisation or ghettoised lives, academic scholars, journalists and Muslim themselves usually invoke the idea of second-class citizenship (Bhatt 2012; Engineer 2018; Mander 2017; Slater 2019). Since Narendra Modi got elected in 2014 and 2019 Indian General Elections, many news associated with Muslims emerging from India talk about their fear of being reduced to second class citizens (Jain and Lasseter, 2018; Merelli, 2019). On the eve of elections results in 2019, when it was predicted that Modi would win with a landslide victory, Agence France-Presse (AFP, 2019) quoted Mohiuddin Azad in Azamgarh, a northern Indian city long associated with Islamic scholars and poets, who said, "We are one step away from being turned into second-class citizens." But what does this second-class citizenship mean in the context of Indian Muslims that the phrase has discovered new found currency? Marriam-Webster dictionary defines the hyphenated term 'Second-class citizens' as, "someone who is not given the same rights as other people."

Schnapper & Dedios (1997) in their study of European debate of citizenship use this phrase to contextualise residency-citizenship of foreigners in European nations, whereas they may have right to residency and access to other forms of civil, economic and social rights but not much political rights. They argue that "without granting the right to vote and to participate in political life, in the narrow sense of the word, means creating second-class citizens who, unlike others, cannot defend their rights and interests through political action" (1997: 206).

Philosopher Hannah Arendt (2017) in her work on the origins of totalitarianism used the term to emphasize the preconditions that prevailed before the Jewish holocaust happened. “Even the Nazis started their extermination of Jews by first depriving them of all legal status (the status of second-class citizenship) and cutting them off from the world of the living by herding them into ghettos and concentration camps” (2017: 295). Stilz (2010) criticised the guest workers programme in the United States, which admit and provide legal status to foreign workers, but provide no path to full citizenship, which she said would create second-class citizenship.

The term second class citizenship is as common as citizenship itself and as Punke (1972:127) rightly claims that talk “about ‘second-class’ citizenship suggests inquiry as to ‘first class’ citizenship, or as to what citizenship itself means?” Cohen & Ghosh (2019:97) in their eponymous book on citizenship says, Internally Displaced Persons or IDPs and refugees in the world “do not even have the most pared-down form of semi-citizenship”. Cohen (2009) defines semi-citizenship as anything less than full citizenship in Marshallian terms. On the other hand, Engel (2016) with his study of the gays and lesbians in the United States, and their limited access to civil and military service opportunities despite their legal status as citizens used the term ‘fragmented citizens’, also sometimes referred to as ‘less-than-whole’ citizens. The term ‘fragmented citizens’ in his work demarcate a zone which is above second-class citizenship but below full and equal citizenship.

Both rhetorical and analytical applications of these three terms (second class citizenships, semi-citizenships or fragmented citizens) by various journalists or academics, in my argument, refers to the vast political terrain of subjectivity that falls between Marshallian notion of full members of a community (political) that usually dominant members of a nation-state make up, and subjects, non-citizen aliens, or other categories of people who struggle for one or all components of citizenship rights (civil, political and social). In my work, my usage of the term point to this above understanding.

In Shaban's (2018) edited volume called *Lives of Muslims in India: Politics, Exclusion and Violence,* the term '*second class citizenship'* has been inserted in the Index list as authors like Punyani (2018:89) and Engineer (2018:124) used it to refer the lives of Indian Muslims in the contest of Hindu-Muslim violence in their essays. In case of Gujarat, following 2002 riots, the term was in widespread use to refer to the Muslim survivors living in camps (Raza and Singh 2008:5).

Finally, I would like to conclude with a brief reference to the Shani's (2010) work on the conception of citizenship in India and the Muslim question through historical analysis of the events from partition till 2002, which again go back with what we started in this section with the question posed by another historian, Gyanendra Pandey (1999). Shani applied the lens of three dominant strains of citizenship discussed in various global literature – civic/liberal, republican and ethno-nationalist conceptions of citizenship and then added an Indian conception of *non-statist* citizenship developed by none other than Mahatma Gandhi to study Indian Muslims vis-a-vis Indian state. [27] While acknowledging that Indian Muslims "are part of a much larger and deeply diverse group of marginalised members of the Indian citizenry,'' she argued that different markers such as caste, religion and language were never the sole criteria for them to claim membership in the Indian state (2010:172).

[27] Shani (2010:152) argues, "As an institution for membership claims within the political organisation of the state, citizenship may also imply a notion of membership of the state in the society, or a desire for a minimal interaction with the state, in order to protect individuals and groups." According to her, it is not limited to Gandhian theory and practice and offer "most elaborated conception of the mixed duties and responsibilities of citizens" (2010:153).

In her work, we see that the identity remains a central concept for Indian Muslims in charting through these multiple conceptions of citizenship and claim-making on the Indian state. She finally concludes,

> In the shifts between citizenship discourses (1) Muslims experienced some form of dissent from the dominant citizenship discourse, which fostered a sense of agency in their citizenship; (2) the possibility of alternative ways of incorporation provided Muslims with a means of reckoning with their limits, and of defining demands for remedies. In this navigation between alternative citizenship discourses, Muslims cultivated some sense of a stake in the nation (Shani 2010: 172).

I would like to offer a few criticisms of this work as it either valourises or essentialises the Indian Muslim identity, much like in ethnonationalist discourses. In order to enter a broader debate, Shani overlooks other attributes such as class or language, which still presents us with a diversity to the Muslim question which she acknowledges herself. A Bengali Muslim or a Malayali Muslim will not fight for the improvement of Urdu status, or restoration of minority status for Aligarh Muslim University like a North Indian Muslim (Hasan 2001). It privileges the notion of recognition over redistribution in the question around Muslim citizenship, which Sachar Committee (2005) brought back as an important element in the lives of Indian Muslims. Without a doubt, the identity of being Muslim, becomes central during instances of Hindu-Muslim violence and when they are forced to live in makeshift camps or resettlement colonies following attacks on them, but issues of social citizenship triumph over identity claims as my ethnographic accounts confirm. Shani's (2010) account of Muslim citizenship also says very little on the women in the Muslim community. My research shows that woman have different conceptions of membership claims with regard to the state and fellow Muslims themselves. Shani also offers a limited idea of the ground responses from diverse Muslim interest groups to the policies adopted by the Indian state. My research speaks to this theme in chapter six of this thesis.

The work of Shani (2010) and the prevalent notion around second-class citizenships and Indian Muslims, points to the limitations of historical and political analysis of the issue. Then the question remains, how should we understand second-class citizenship for Indian Muslims? This is linked to my first research question mentioned in section 1.6 of this thesis. Other questions that arise are: is second-class citizenship largely a top-down construction of political subjectivity? or do Muslims themselves realising that second-class status imposed on them and strategise their response to alleviate their position? We can connect these questions to the third research question asked in section 1.6 where I talked about the role of state and other non-state actors. And the more questions follow like: how does claim making from below change the contours of this Muslim question with relation to Indian citizenship? Or, what happens to these claims, when Muslim survivors of violence are forced to live in segregated camps and colonies, and not just in urban ghettos (a discussion I will follow in the next section 2.4)? The abovementioned questions draw largely from the second research question cited in section 1.6 where I want to look at citizenship struggles and practices.

Ethnographic analysis can offer us brilliant new insights to these questions and my research is part of the same exercise. On the question of social marginalisation of Muslims and on citizenship itself, especially around the questions posed above, we have very little scholarly work with detailed ethnographic accounts in Indian context.[28] My work contributes to the academic literature on Indian Muslims from this standpoint.

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[28] There are some notable exceptions. Like Banerjee (2008) traces the life histories and experiences of diverse Muslim individuals, where one common factor is that they are from the religious background. Williams (2011) writes on the experience of state and its associated welfare schemes among the Muslim communities of Banaras in north India. Chatterjee and Mehta (2007), Robinson (2005) or Gupta (2011) all provide us with an important analysis of Muslim experiences following cases of Hindu-Muslim violence which I have often referred to throughout this thesis.

In the next section, I discuss the concept of camps and colonies, refugees and IDPs in Indian context, with reference to global debates on these notions, and why and how it is linked with Indian Muslims and their struggle for citizenship rights.

2.4 Camp, Colony, Resettlement and Displaced (*Visthapit*)

Many temporary structures, numbering 104 were set up a month after the 2002 riots to provide shelter to the survivors of the violence (Sonnenberg, 2014). With 1.5 lakh people, mostly Muslims living in it in the state of Gujarat, they were generally called 'relief camps' by journalists, civil rights activists and academics alike (Bunsha 2002; Mishra, Shukla, and Vora 2002; Vardarajan 2002). The physical spaces where humanitarian assistance was provided to the riot survivors in the form of short-term shelter and food was justifiably called as 'relief camps'. Not only they were known as 'relief camps', but in some media reports these spaces were also called 'refugee camps' because they were home of "displaced Muslims, refugees in their own nation" (Mahurkar, 2002).

We have discussed earlier how the words camp and colony evoke different reactions and understanding of the unfortunate individuals who are entrapped in a life different than the rest of the population (Section 1.2). In my thesis, my interviewees themselves distinguish between both the words with the sense of temporality as scholars like Malkki (1995) suggested in her work on Hutu refugees from Burundi who were forced into exile in Tanzania. They call the temporary shelter for riot survivors set up inside the Shah Alam mosque in Ahmedabad just after 2002 violence as "Shah Alam camp" and Citizennagar as *Visthapit colony,* colony for the displaced. Whenever they invoke past to recall the sorrowful days of 2002, they would tell about their journey from Shah Alam camp to Citizennagar colony and how it helped them to find their feet on the ground as time passed.

Like in this media report on Citizennagar by Sharma (2017) in *The Indian Express* where she quotes one of the residents who was among the first to move in this colony from Shah Alam camp reminiscing, "It was then called Nayi Basti (new settlement)". In recent writings on 2002 Gujarat riots, places like Citizennagar are mostly mentioned as resettlement colonies (Chandhoke et al. 2007; Gupta 2011; Sagar 2017) which I have also used throughout my thesis. However, some visitors or journalists coming to Citizennagar continue to use the word camp to denote the same space. One such report by journalist Avantika Mehta is worth mentioning as it also linked the camp life with experiences of citizenship, something this thesis elaborates in the following chapters. It says,

> Though the state claims to have moved on, the riot-affected are stuck in time and place at the rehabilitation camps – once meant to be temporary, but which have since transformed into homes for most survivors. Many of those who remember the riots have grown weary, beleaguered from years of being ignored, displaced and overlooked. The residents of one such camp Citizen Nagar wonder when they will finally be treated like actual citizens of the country (Mehta 2017).

Apart from "resettlement colony", "rehabilitation camp", in some cases journalists and academics also bring the word "relief" back, along with "ghetto" to identify such sites (A, 2008; Lokhande, 2015; Dhar, 2018). In one media report, Dhar (2017) writes on Citizennagar around the same time as Mehta, "Like all the relief colonies spread across Gujarat, Citizennagar was set up as a temporary camp but has burgeoned into a permanent slum."

All these terms to signify spaces like Citizennagar in Gujarat, are often used interchangeably or from the perspective of the person writing on them, based on their understanding of these physical sites and the life they see there during their visit. But an academic like Malkki (1995) elaborates more on the terms 'camp' and 'settlement' based on their usage by various actors linked with such spaces. She

says, “In the language of the agencies administering, settling, and studying refugees, a camp denotes a temporary or an emergency accommodation, while a settlement refers to a more permanently settled group of refugees” (1995:304). In her work, the refugees continued to use the word camp unlike the agencies to reveal the uncertainty of the spaces that they inhabited whereas in my case, Citizennagar residents prefer the word colony in their attempt to find a certain rootedness as apparent in my chapters.

2.4.1 Riots, Refugees and IDPs in India

In the final chapter of my thesis, I have shown how civil society organisations working with the survivors of 2002 riots pushed the government and judiciary to accept internationally used legal terms like “Internally Displaced People” or IDPs to refer to families living in Citizennagar and other resettlement colonies. This is in marked contrast to previous scholarship on Hindu-Muslim violence in India, and specially in Gujarat where survivors of such violence who were forced to leave their homes in order to settle in a new place were mainly discussed in terms of ‘Muslim relocation’ (Gupta 2011) or ghettoisation following riots (Mahadevia 2007).

Internally displaced persons (IDPs), according to the United Nations (1998:1) *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* are

> persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.

In this sense, the introduction of the term IDP, not legally binding (unlike Refugee) is new in academic and policy discourse around the International Human Rights regime (Banchoff and Wuthnow, 2011). Seshadri (2008) writes that only in the

last 15 years, the international community has put its focus on the plight of IDPs. They are distinguished from refugees with one important feature – they "have not crossed an internationally recognised border" (Devakumar 2008:1211). Refugees, a more popular term in international forums since the United Nations adopted the 1951 Refugee Convention, have been studied extensively in Indian context since millions fled their home during the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 (Chatterji 2007; Dasgupta 2016). [29]

One of the major global surveys on IDPs conducted in 2002 by the Norwegian Refugee Council (2002) mentioned IDPs in India arising due to the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir, North-East India and in Gujarat, along with a separate section on 'development induced displacement'. Though the 2002 violence in Gujarat found a prominent place in this report, it also mentioned

> India has no national policy or institutional legal framework concerning internally displaced persons. The Draft National Policy for Rehabilitation of Persons Displaced as a Consequence of Acquisition of Land proposed by the Ministry of Rural Development applies only to displacement arising from land acquisition. It therefore disregards displacement caused by human rights violations, physical violence and communal or ethnic violence (Norwegian Refugee Council 2002: 116-117).

This report also accuses India of shunning international scrutiny and refusing humanitarian aid to the IDPs present in India as it argues that the central and concerned regional governments are fully capable of meeting the subsistence

[29] "India has neither signed the 1951 UN refugee convention nor does its 1967 protocol allows the UN high commissioner for refugees — which works with IDPs — access to camps. Without a central law, the IDPs end up being nowhere people seeking shelter and succour" (Editorials 2017).

needs of these people, and "foreign observers have to respect Indian national sovereignty" (2002:117). Lama (2000:26) argues that as the Indian government gives low priority to the issues of IDP or displacement due to violence, and has no clear cut policy on "pre and post-displacement situations". He further says that as Indian civil society and other interest groups show "withdrawal syndrome" in such cases, no solution lies ahead to this problem.

However, in contrast to what Lama observed, civil society activism around the survivors of 2002 riots made the federal quasi-judicial body National Commission of Minorities (NCM) intervene and ask the Government of India to think of a National Policy on the rehabilitation of IDPs as a result of violence (Janvikas 2013). It is due to the struggle by various human rights organisations, the term was used in the approach paper to the 12th Five Year Plan, that too for the first time in an Indian government document. NGO Janvikas (2013:11) claims, "It suggested that the Government of India had taken note of these people, who form a new vulnerable community."

So what has changed since the previous cases of Hindu-Muslim violence in India and with that of 2002 Gujarat riots? One obvious reason is the involvement of national and international human rights organisations like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch in documentation and rehabilitation activity after the 2002 violence (HRW 2002, IIJ 2003), who helped to contextualise international terms in local context. Though non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have been using the term IDP in their reports, barring some exceptions (Lokhande 2015;Seshadri 2008), only few academics have engaged with it both conceptually and analytically, especially in the context of displacement due to Hindu-Muslim riots in India. Seshadri (2008:37) appeals for more focus on IDPs while discussing the survivors of 2002 riots and rightly argues,

> The refugee is endowed with the right (often supervised by international aid organizations) to seek asylum outside of his or her nation. The refugee

> is *expelled* by his or her nation-state. An IDP, on the other hand, is a refugee who has no refuge. He or she is *impelled* within by his or her nation into camps that ostensibly provide relief by concentrating a huge number of people into a centrally located and bounded space.

Relief camps and the word 'refugee' has a special connotation in Indian context, maybe because ideas like IDPs were not in use in academic, legal and policy matters earlier. Relief camps as a humanitarian mechanism to provide temporary shelter to people affected by violence or natural disasters have been there in modern society as an added feature. This is what Agier (2011:5) aptly calls, "the effects of a functional solidarity, 'organic' in Durkheimian sense, between the humanitarian world (the hand that cares) and the police and military ordering (the hand that strikes) on the part of the world as a whole."

Scholars have written on refugee camps which later on became refugee colonies in the aftermath of the Indian partition that started new neighbourhoods in cities like Delhi and Kolkata (Chatterji 2007; Prakash 2018). In the work of Shani (2007:162) we can see the use of the term 'refugee' to denote Muslims fleeing from attacks by Hindu mobs, or the identity of Muslims living in relief camps after the 1985 Ahmedabad riots. Based on memories of partition, the word 'refugee' is often applied in India, not only for people who crossed international borders in order to seek refuge and safety as the UN definition states, but also who have become homeless in their homeland (Janvikas, 2013), lost a roof over their head in their own nation due to conflicts (Raina, 2013). Both in the work of Shani (2007) and Mahurkar (2002), the act of fleeing homes due to Hindu-Muslim violence made people 'refugees' living in the relief camps. It is in this sense more of a political category than a legal one in the Indian context.

The presence of this political category within their governed spaces makes governments uncomfortable as it exposes their claim of good governance. In the aftermath of the 2002 riots, the then Chief Minister Narendra Modi, within a month

of violence asked the survivors to go back home from their relief camps as he wanted to prove "things are back to normal in Gujarat" (Bunsha 2002). Organisers of these relief camps were harassed and discouraged to operate these camps even when riot survivors expressed fear of more violent attacks in case of their return (Mander 2009). Not only in Gujarat, but also after the 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots in Uttar Pradesh in India, similar tactics were applied by the regional government in spite of people living in relief camps had nowhere to go (PTI, 2014).

Today due to state apathy, relief camps set up after every communal violence in India, be it 2002 Gujarat or 2013 Muzaffarnagar, or even in the case of ethnic conflict in North-East India, over the years are turning into permanent settlements with no basic amenities (Hussain, 2000; Nagarajan, 2017). People in Citizennagar also informed me that when they moved into their houses in the beginning, they thought it was only temporary. But years later, they still live in the same place with little improvement in their living conditions. In the next section, I come back again to where we started. In this part, I try to explore how the concept of citizenship and associated struggles can be linked to the site of camp.

2.4.2 Camp and citizenship

In this section, I discuss how these camps and settlements for refugees and IDPs complicate the question of citizenship as it is essentially linked with issues of inclusion and exclusion in a political community. And issues of citizenship are directly linked with the politics of belonging (Yuval-Davis, 2006) that spaces like segregated camps and colonies challenges to the core. Malkki (2002:353) aptly says that the "very notion of displacement implies emplacement, a 'proper place' of belonging', an idea often invoked as central to the discussion on citizenship.

Socio-spatial segregation is the key element in most of the sophisticated theories around refugee camps in the world (Malkki, 1995; Agier, 2002). Michel Agier

(2002:320), declares that refugee camps are an "experimentation of the largescale segregations that are being established on a planetary scale." Whatever the administrative categories of identity applied to people living in the camps - refugees, displaced, illegals, asylum seekers, Agier (2011:16) says they are a "community of existence, based on shared experience and lived situation". They exist in contemporary society as the signs of our times and live along its margins (Das, 2004). According to Hyndmen (2000:183), a form of "geographical isolation and social segregation" makes refugees 'subcitizens".

As sites of segregation, camps are socio-spatial sites of power that exist nowhere else and they are not meant for 'hybrid socialization' (Agier 2002). Malkki (2002:353) suggests that the emergence of refugees pose 'problems of organization' for technologies of power in modern times, and spaces like refugee camps "operates in intimate relation to the logic of the national order of things." Malkki's (1995) work on Burundian Hutu refugees living in a western Tanzanian camp, shows how such spaces had the social effect of 'purifying' and solidifying differences between different groups of people. She further argued,

> that the socio-spatial organization of the camp itself and the fact that it was a settlement specifically for Hutu refugees from the 1972 genocide in Burundi- and not just for any victims, any refugees- demonstrably enabled transformations of politics and subjectivity that produced a collective, categorical Hutu-ness as a moral and essential opposite to Tutsi-ness (Malkki 2002: 358).

If we draw a parallel from these arguments, can we argue that forcing 2002 riots survivors to live in the *Visthapit* colonies, is to create a Muslim-ness, 'as a moral and essential opposite to' Hindu-ness as imagined by the proponents of *Hindu rashtra?*

Segregation happens when the state and society recognises its own failure to integrate certain people and groups based on markers of difference. Camps are set up as the ultimate signifier of exclusion from a body of people. Agier (2011:16) rightly observes this relationship between camp and citizenship and says,

> Submerged in the troubles of exile and the risks of anonymity, refugees made a common complaint that remained unheard: 'No one knows who I am'. By their flight, they had been forced to renounce their exercise of citizenship, the name of a double political relationship- both the recognition and protection of a state.

Refugees are mainly discussed as the figure of the 'stateless', in terms of nation-state and its given affiliation to individuals in the work of philosopher Hannah Arendt (Bernstein, 2005). In Arendt's work we find that the state of statelessness specifically points towards some kind of preparation, a premonition of things to come, where the ultimate goal is total dehumanization of such individuals through suppression of rights that is materialised through a political and historical process. The stateless, according to Arendt (2017:296), is the quintessential figure with no exercise of citizenship, who struggle for "right to have rights" in her famous words.

However, in a significant analysis of Arendt's work by Caloz-Tschopp (2000:24), it went beyond the category of the statelessness to include every 'superfluous' individuals who have lost the protection of state today, and they include, among many, "refugees in camps or wandering, exiled minorities, internally displaced and expelled, i.e., the whole series of those who are today 'disconnected from any political system able to offer them a place and protect them'" (cited in Agier 2011:18). Following the arguments of Caloz-Tschopp, Agier (2011) calls these people 'undesirable' in the modern world. He argues, "beyond the negative political figure of the stateless, there is thus more broadly another negative figure, in this case an anthropological one, as the basis for the special control, rejection and management of the undesirable" (Agier 2011:18).

Not only as 'undesirable', the phenomena of sociological exclusion and spatial distancing of a group of people have been studied from multiple perspectives, and we find similar notions like 'human refuse' (Bauman, 2004), 'bare life' (Agamben, 1998), 'supernumeraries' (Davis, 2006) or 'pariahs' (Wacquant, 2007).

I situate my research within these notions and their exposition in Indian context, in the aftermath of a riot like in 2002. Following Agier's argument that these figures are not only political but also anthropological, we need more ethnographic research today to place the experiences of camp or colony life in India in the broader debates around the notions of undesirables or human refuse. It is very important that in the discussion around communal violence and Muslims in India, we need to go beyond the debates on 'relocation' or ghettoisation of the survivors in specific parts of the city (Mahadevia 2003), as places like Citizennagar emerges with a different kind of spatial organization from the technologies of power; and I do not mean that works that look at such marginalisation after communal violence are not important or local analysis are irrelevant, but rather argue that resettlement colonies evoke a different paradigm to be studied today. Very little ethnographic accounts exist today where we can clearly see the links between these technologies of power with the everyday life and political subjectivity emerged in the resettlement colonies, not only in Gujarat but also in India itself.

Therefore, my work presents detailed information on the treatment of individuals and groups in Gujarat that form part of the world's 41.3 million IDPs. [30] In my work, I am not engaging with institutional validation of numbers of people falling in these kinds of categories, or the limits or challenges to the definitions to classify their experiences. I am more involved in understanding their lives bounded in a spatial

[30] The number is taken from the main website of the United Nations (UN) Refugee Agency. Please see https://www.unhcr.org/uk/figures-at-a-glance.html (Accessed online on August 1, 2019)

site with hardening identities and emergent political subjectivity around new experiences of engagement with broader society and technologies of power, namely the state. The concept of citizenship from below, and locating them in ethnographic accounts provide me with the key to grasp this phenomena in my work.

Agier (2011:34) rightly observes,

> The political question of the stateless is more current today than at any previous time, even if the terms have changed a great deal since the creation of the UNHCR and the 1951 Geneva Convention. Still today, whatever the legal and identity categories ascribed to them on the path of exile, those women and men labelled 'refugees', 'internally displaced', 'expelled' or 'illegal' are still referred to the essential question of their citizenship, which alone opens for them the way to the 'right to have rights'.

In the next chapter, I discuss my research methodology in detail focusing on the strategies I adopted and ethical concerns I was faced with during my fieldwork. I start the chapter with anecdotes from my first visit to Ahmedabad in 2005 and how I ended up working with the residents of Citizennagar for my research. In this chapter, I have also shown that given the complexities attached to working among the conflict survivors, I had to follow the activist anthropologist approach in the field.

3 Research Methodology: " Aur ek chutiya aa gaya kitab likhne"

3.1 Back to the beginning: Ahmedabad 2005

In my day to day conversations, I am often asked how I ended up working on a thesis topic involving the 2002 Gujarat riots in India? Do I have any connection with this region in India? Is it because my Master's thesis was on a subject concerning 2002? In a way, all these conjectures and assumptions are true to my motive in doing this research, but my journey with Gujarat starts long before in December, 2005 when I visited Ahmedabad and stayed in one of the resettlement colonies for over a month.

At that time I was in my late teenage years and doing first year of my undergraduate program in Geography at Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) in northern India. Harsh Mander, who became a civil rights activist after his stint in Indian Administrative Services (IAS), serving predominantly in the tribal regions of Madhya Pradesh and Chattisgarh came to my university in 2005. He visited AMU to give a talk on the survivors of the 2002 riots and their struggle for justice in a hostile political climate in the state. In the previous year, after leaving bureaucracy he had founded an organisation, Aman Biradari to work on human rights issues in various parts of India. At the end of his talk, he invited students from Department of Law and Social Work to volunteer for the Aman Biradari's *Nyayagrah* team working in various districts of Gujarat during their month long winter/christmas

break of the University. [31] Around twenty-five students of AMU from these backgrounds responded to his call and prepared to leave for Gujarat in the first week of December. Most students in this team thought that working in a human rights organisation would earn them experience and help them later in their professional careers in case they decide to pursue jobs in this sector.

I was from Science faculty of AMU and yet I felt an urge to join this team and work among the survivors of communal violence. Being from a small village in northern part of West Bengal, where I grew up in a Muslim family in the 1990's, I always understood political violence as clashes between communist and non-communist parties to capture local governing institutions like Panchayat (Bandyopadhyay, 2001). Though religious identities of Hindu and Muslim played a significant role in social and economic scheme of things in my area, but I had never heard of violent clashes between the communities from my father or other old relatives. However, it is important to mention here that during the colonial times Bengal province, predecessor to West Bengal today was a prime site of Hindu-Muslim conflict (Das

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[31] The website of Aman Biradari introduces *Nyayagrah* in Gujarat with the following words,

> The Nyayagrah team is comprised of Hindus and Muslims, men and women, middle class and working class, believers and non-believers who are drawn together by their commitment to the ideal of equal citizenship rights for all Gujarat is irrespective of their religion, class, caste, or gender. The team strives to create a self-sustaining legal resource that will provide valuable legal advice to the poor and vulnerable sections of both the Hindu and Muslim communities in Gujarat.
>
> Nyayagrah with the Lawyers' Collective fought a long battle in the Supreme Court to challenge the closure without trial of more than 2000 cases registered after the Gujarat carnage. An enormous success of Nyayagrah, in January 2006, the Gujarat government ordered the reopening of all but 22 of the closed cases.

Available at http://www.amanbiradari.org/nyayagrah.html (Accessed online on May 5, 2019)

1991). In my childhood, we heard of instances when issues like slaughtering a cow in the open, or news of an interreligious marriage led to tension between Hindu and Muslim communities, and sometime caused small violent skirmishes but things used to get quickly resolved due to intervention from the local committee of the ruling left front parties.[32]

However, the experience was very different for me when I came to join AMU in April, 2002 after finishing my secondary school in my village. Aligarh is one of the north Indian cities which feature prominently in the map concerning communal violence in India since the time of Indian independence (Gayer and Jaffrelot 2012). Academics like Paul Brass (2003) and others have worked extensively on the factors that was behind such violent clashes between the communities and how it shaped the city and the 'Muslim university' established by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan in 1878. As a fifteen year old boy, who had never heard of people killing each other in the name of religion, I got introduced to the term *danga* in Aligarh, most common word to refer to Hindu-Muslim violence in India. When I arrived on campus, I was told about incidents of murders and looting in the areas just outside the campus as a spillover effect of the Gujarat riots, something that was happening more than a thousand miles far away from Aligarh.

Danga, was a constant topic of discussion among my newly acquired friends from various cities of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, who enthusiastically shared their family stories of surviving attacks on Muslim communities, both from marauding Hindu mobs and complicit local police forces. AMU was also a place where seminars, lectures and conferences on the subject of communal violence and Indian Muslims happen in large numbers and I became engaged audience in such events. Soon names of places like Meerut, Moradabad, Maliana, Ayodhya, Bhagalpur, Nellie

[32] Communists led Left Front ruled the region of West Bengal in India from 1977 to 2011 and their government was known for maintaining communal harmony in the state (Traub, 2019).

etched in my mind, with their history of communal violence happened in some specific year.

It was my general interest in this subject, that made me approach the people in Aman Biradari (AB), who after some persuasion allowed me to join the team, in spite of my science background. Their team thought apparently this experience would not help me in my future career, so joining them would be a futile exercise. Thereafter all the AMU students, including me arrived in Ahmedabad station in the wee hours of December 10, 2005 and taken to nearby Ramol by local volunteers of AB, where our accommodation was arranged in the mosque of a resettlement colony for 2002 survivors set up by Islamic organisation Jamiat-Ulema-I-Hind (Council of Muslim Theologians). It was called Madninagar, named after one of the founders of this organisation Maulana Arshad Madni.

In the first three days, we were part of many activities inside the mosque before being sent to various districts of Gujarat to live with the 2002 riots survivors to document their everyday lives, their struggle and resistance in different contexts. Senior volunteers and Harsh Mander himself briefed us over the work they have already done and how we could contribute in their organisation. Local Gujarati scholars like Ghanshyam Shah talked to us on the history of communal violence in Gujarat. AB team also arranged screening of Final Solution, a documentary film made on Godhra and post-Godhra violence by Rakesh Sharma. [33]

In the end of all these exercises, it was decided that I along with another law student would stay four weeks in one of the houses of Ramol settlement colony rather than inside the mosque, where we were housed earlier. This resettlement colony was constructed to house the survivors of riots from Naroda Patiya and it

[33] For more on the film, please see Griffin (2019).

comprised of 80 single small rooms, each with an attached kitchen and toilet. During the next few weeks, I sat with many residents of Ramol and inquired about their lives prior and after the *dhamaal,* the word these residents used to refer to 2002 riots. This experience familiarised me with the milieu in a resettlement colony and the problems people were facing at that time. In my confidential report that I had to submit to the AB representatives, I noted how people living in the colony complained about lacs of rupees being spent to beautify the mosque around them, but receiving no subsistence either from the state or from this particular faith based organisation to repair their roofs during monsoon. I also wrote how these survivors, who have followed Sufism, a liberal version of Islam and generation and generation visited the graveyard of Sufi saints to pray were mocked as heretics by clerics linked to these organisations who wanted to impose their version of hardline Islam.[34]

I also learned two important things which proved to me extremely useful in dealing with the riot survivors. During my visit to Ahmedabad in December, 2005 I was a practicing Muslim and regularly attended the Friday Jummah prayer in the local mosque along with these survivors. I discovered that it was always hard to isolate male members of the colony and properly talk to them individually in most places, except in the mosque, soon after the Jummah prayer, which provide a distinct tranquil and serene atmosphere. In my experience in this particular time, most people are quite often very reflective about their lives and speak in a very calm and gentle manner on the right and wrong things that have happened in their lives. May be it is the act of submission to the almighty moments before, that momentarily made them forget their daily struggle and they speak without giving much importance to everything that will perish in the material world. I remember many valued comments on life prior to and after the riots made by them. Sadly I lost the notebook where I scribbled their words in the subsequent years.

[34] Jasani (2008) have written about the project of Islamic reform in these colonies.

In my interaction with riot survivors, I was told that most of the times, academics, researchers, NGO representatives engage these survivors for their individual projects or reports and leave the place after a few weeks, which often made them feel 'used' in a process where only one side receive all the benefits. This kind of realisation made me offer primary English lessons for two hours to the kids in the colony everyday after dinner in front of my room, which made me earn trust and respect from the elders in the colony. Engaging with kids, many of whom witnessed the worst violence just four years ago taught me how the violence and growing up in a spatially bounded colony impacted their lives, especially their education and view on people of different religion living together. Many of them conveyed to me how they left their schools after their Hindu classmates made hateful comments on account of their religion. Incidents like these coupled with experiences of violence made them convinced them that Muslims and Hindus cannot live with each other. When I pointed to them how visitors like Harsh and others in the colony are also Hindus, and bears no negative thoughts for them, one of the kids told me said, "maybe they are from different castes in Hindus and only few in numbers." [35]

Ahmedabad was not far away from Ramol, and could be reached in 20 minutes by public transport. One day I made a trip to Ram Rahim Nagar, a slum neighbourhood in the city best recognised for its long history of peace. I was told about this place by another volunteer and I was curious to know why even in 2002 when most neighbourhoods in the city faced the worst violence, it remained peaceful. While visiting the area, I met a few people based on a Aman Biradari connection and was given the 'practice tour' of the place when I met the 'Mandal'

[35] All the quotes in this section have been retrieved from my memory, which I later included in my early fieldnotes as I started to spend my time in Gujarat from October, 2015 to January, 2017. For more on the use of ethnographic self as resource and writing memories in ethnographic account, please see Collins and Gallinat (2010).

elders, a self governing slum committee committed to maintain peace through a kind of vigilantism as mentioned in the work of Dhattiwala (2019:79).

One day based on the information given by another *Nyayagrah* volunteer, I along with Harsh Mander, made a trip to a small village in Sabarkantha district to hear a positive story, deeply situated in the local histories of chasm and group enmity. We visited a Muslim village, where thousands of people were fed and accommodated in granaries and sheds by members of the Thakur community in the aftermath of the riots with utmost care and humanity. In our investigation, it was revealed that local Thakur community historically shared a bad relationship with the Patel community (both Hindus) who attacked the Muslim village in the first place. And thus, local histories of conflict superseded the attachments to their respective religion here.

One failed story of romance in the backdrop of 2002 riots, left its imprint on me. I remember that day in late December, 2005 and my conversation with Tariq, a resident of Madninagar colony quite vividly even to this day. I met Tariq in the colony, who was in his late twenties and had recently got married. Among all the residents in Madninagar, his lifestyle looked better than others and his house seemed well decorated because he had a low level job in a private company unlike others in the colony. One day, he took me to Naroda Patiya where his extended family was still living.

As I was entering the locality riding pillion on his scooter, he was telling me all the details of the attack that happened on March 1, 2002. In the main roundabout of the area (called circle locally), he stopped and said, “Here they put tyres on people and burnt them alive. At least fifty people died on this spot only”. He took me to what was apparently his old house in one small lane of Naroda Patiya. His father was still living there with his uncle and their extended family. He told me that still lot of Muslims were living in Naroda Patiya in the shadow of threat as they could not find enough houses in other Muslim localities of Ahmedabad.

In one room of his old house, while we were waiting for tea from his aunt, he was silent and looked reflective for a moment. He showed me a stitched tablecloth near where he was sitting and said, "It was gifted to me by a Bengali Hindu girl I was in love with. She was our neighbour here at that time. Their family unfortunately left Gujarat and went back to Kolkata after witnessing the *dhamal."* He paused and then said, *"*We even planned to elope and get married just before the violence. *Dhamal* finished a lot of things, including our love." Looking at the tablecloth, which had a big cat with a fish in its mouth stitched on it, I commented, "It is beautiful. She must be very good with embroidery. And cat and fish are regular motif in Bengali art you know." He kept telling me old stories of how they met and how they secretly used to go for movies together. In the end he said, "I feel bad that I can't take this tablecloth with me to my house. My wife knows about her and is very sensitive about it. She still calls me sometimes and we cry together. But I have told her nothing can be done anymore and we both have to forget the past and move on."

I asked him at this point, "But have you moved on?" He was silent for a while and then said, "It is hard you know. But you have to live in the present however painful your past is. Be it love or memories of *dhamal,* I remember them everyday but then cannot do anything about it. May be that's how you move on. Just get used to it."

3.2 In search of research site with strangers in the city

I reached Ahmedabad as a DPhil International Development student from the University of Oxford in the month of October in 2015, almost a decade after my last visit to the city. And just after my arrival, I was quite unsure of my potential research sites. Based on my previous conversations with Tariq, in my early stages of research I put my focus on the modalities and complexities involved with moving on (Mcgrattan, 2012) and 'dealing with the past' (Stevens, 2004) for the residents of resettlement colonies 13 years since the 2002 violence. Based on

secondary literature on riot survivors, by Mander (2009) and Gupta (2011), I was also interested in understanding the importance of concepts like justice and reconciliation or forgive and forget in the context of Gujarat, as similar concepts have been researched extensively in the global context, most notably South Africa, Rwanda, Cambodia (Hayner, 2001). In this context, I asked three main questions: a) How are the people who were directly affected by the consequences of the 2002 riots 'dealing with the past' and moving on with time? b) Whether these affected persons forget, forgive, strive towards reconciliation or employ other strategies to get on with their lives? c) How can we situate the post-violence experience of people directly affected by it in the larger literature around 'communal violence' in India?

On my arrival in Ahmedabad, a city with a long history of anti-Muslim violence (Spodek, 2011) in order to find answer and respondent to these questions, I started to face methodological difficulties since the very first day. In 2005, I was mostly living in Ramol and visited Ahmedabad only with senior volunteers from Aman Biradari who were familiar with the neighbourhoods in the city. In the last decade, I lost touch with almost everyone in the organisation, and also with Tariq and others in Madninagar. So when I arrived in the city I was almost sure everyone must have forgotten me. I had also forgotten the parts of the city itself which I had visited in the past.

There was another factor that cause considerable delay in my research in the beginning. In August, 2015 the Patel (also known as Patidar) community under the leadership of a young leader Hardik Patel, organised massive strike in the state that continued for weeks to demand reservation in public jobs and educational institutions (Sharon, 2015). In order to quell the protest, police brutally cracked down on protesters and it resulted in the death of ten people. While I arrived in the city, practically without knowing anyone except few contacts in local NGOs who were not in the city then, I could not find a house immediately to rent. And this led me to stay in a cheap hotel for a week in the Kalupur area, a Muslim dominated locality in the old part of Ahmedabad with its own history of tension

between Hindu and Muslim community. There was an uneasy calm due to the recent patidar agitation and sporadic clashes were happening in different parts of the city. Police often imposed restrictions on movements around the city and banned internet as anticipatory measures to stop further escalation to the situation.

It is in this backdrop, Muslims around my hotel were discussing among themselves that Hindutva elements in the city may trigger another Hindu-Muslim riots to deflect attention from the Patidar agitation. According to them the electoral chances of BJP in the next regional assembly election would be affected if Patidar agitation continued longer. Such fears were not unwarranted given the Muslims in the city had witnessed caste violence between different section of Hindus morphed into Hindu-Muslim conflict targeting Muslims in the 1980s (Shani, 2007).[36] Such conversation made me concerned about my personal safety, and I decided to move back to Kolkata and Delhi for sometime till the tension ebbed in the city.

In Delhi, I met Harsh Mander after a decade and reminded him of my Madninagar visit along with AB team a decade earlier. I requested him to put me in touch with people living there for the purpose of my research. Mr. Mander was a visiting faculty at the Indian Institute of Management (IIM), Ahmedabad at that time and assured me that next month (November, 2015), when he would visit the city to deliver a lecture he would take me to Madninagar colony with him. He also kindly offered to have me act as his Teaching Assistant in IIM, which I accepted with the thought that it would help me to establish some network in the city.

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[36] In 1985, violence erupted in Ahmedabad city as upper caste Hindus were angered by the Gujarat government, as the latter increased the reserved quota for Socially and Economically Backward Castes/ Classes (SEBC) candidates from 10% to 28% in local educational and governmental institutions. Though the initial conflict was restricted between upper caste and backward caste Hindus, soon it metamorphosed into a full-scale Hindu-Muslim violence. Shani (2007) argues that 1985 riots should be understood not through the prism of Hindu-Muslim antagonism, but by the process of transformation among Hindus on the question of caste and class.

In November, when I arrived in the city again and visited Madninagar along with Mr. Mander, I found Tariq (discussed in previous section) and others with whom I used to stay in the colony. However, I felt that in the last ten years a lot of things had changed and due to loss of contact, the old bonhomie was gone between me and others in the colony. They vaguely remembered me and I realised I have to start anew at that site. I also discovered that Aman Biradari as organisation have limited its activity in the colony, and many of the old volunteers were not working with it anymore. After this trip to Madninagar, when I was contemplating which other resettlement colonies in Ahmedabad city I should explore and how I should begin my research by finding the right contacts, I came across the name of 'Citizennagar' as one potential site of research.

Citizennagar, the resettlement colony was not new to me as in most NGO report, academic works, and in media reports on the present condition of 2002 survivors, this place was featured prominently primarily for two reasons, a) its close proximity to the Pirana dumpsite, where all the waste and filth of Ahmedabad was dumped daily causing abject living conditions for its residents compared to other resettlement colony residents, b) many of the inhabitants were prime witnesses in some prominent cases linked to 2002 riots and thus received widespread media coverage (Dhar, 2017b). However, it was one conversation over lunch that I struck up with a stranger in Irani cafe, near Teen Darwaza (a Muslim locality) in old Ahmedabad that made me certain to explore the site of Citizennagar for my research.

The stranger, Ashfaq sahab was possibly in his late sixties, and he lived in Danilimda part of the city.[37] He was thin, tall, had a white cap and long white beard,

[37] *Sahab,* an urdu word often suffixed with names in India as a mark of respect.

which made him appear as a deeply religious Muslim man to me. During our conversation, when I told him about my purpose of visiting Ahmedabad, he revealed that during the 2002 riots, his two small garment shops were completely burnt by Hindu attackers and he received no government compensation later. When I asked him about his present life situation, he said, "the *dhamal* in 2002 forced me to be on the streets with my family as all of my properties were affected. But I thank Allah, that with the help of my family and friends, I have rebuilt my life again and doing well in my business today."[38] On hearing about my plan to research on the resettlement colonies in Ahmedabad and study the contemporary everyday life of riot survivors, he said, "The best place for you in my mind is Citizennagar among all the places I know. If you want to see how *Sanghis* want Muslims to live in future India, you should study this place. According to them, Muslims are the second class citizens who have no place in a vibrant city and only qualified to live as a 'waste' in the margins of the city, where all the waste would be thrown."[39]He used the English phrase 'second class citizen' in a sentence constructed in Urdu, "*Sanghion ke lie Musalman second class citizen hai. Jinka aukat bas gandagi ban ke kachre ke dher ke pas rahna hoga."*

This person has possibly never read Bauman (2004) and his concept of human waste, where Bauman talks about the inevitable consequences of modernity and globalisation manifested in the form of waste- both human and material. These humans who are redundant in contemporary society are thrown into refugee camps or urban ghettos. Ashfaq sahab brought Bauman into our conversation with his lived experience and told me something that totally intrigued me. He said further, "You are a researcher. Find out why in Delhi, Mumbai or in our Ahmedabad it is only Muslims who live near the dumpsite, where all the city's waste is

[38] Fieldnotes taken on November 2, 2015

[39] Ibid

thrown?"[40] I replied to him that Delhi and Mumbai are not my research site, but I am thankful to him for giving me this lead on Ahmedabad. Two words occupied my mind after this particular conversation, Muslims and citizenship.

The meaning of citizenship with respect to Muslims of Ahmedabad as second-class citizens (a concept I have discussed in section 2.3.4 of this thesis) made me interested to explore further. We have discussed earlier how at the level of nation-state, or at the subnational level in Gujarat, down to the city level in Ahmedabad, Muslim lives are often characterised as equivalent of second-class citizens in India (Bhatt, 2012; Thomas, 2015; Shaban, 2018; Imam, 2019). And then this statement by Ashfaq Sahab, reduced this scale of second-class citizenship to a small geographical unit of few hundred square metres within the city itself. He made this small locality as the ultimate representative of Muslim citizenship in India in the aftermath of a Hindutva influenced communal violence targeting the community.

I asked myself, what constitute this second-class citizenship for the Muslims living in Citizennagar? If they are formal citizens of India, what claims and struggle they mount in their lives to demand their rights and entitlements? How these people who live near the waste dumpsite frame such citizenship in their everyday lives?

3.3 Ethnographic fieldwork and gatekeeping

To understand what constitute second-class citizenship, and its associated claims, struggles and resistance in the lanes of Citizennagar, and its Muslim inhabitants who were displaced after violent attack on their lives and properties and forced to live in camps and then in resettlement colonies, I had adopted ethnographic

[40] Ibid

methods as part of my research. I particularly wanted to pay close attention to the everyday lives of these residents, their moments of fear and insecurities, concerns and levels of suffering for living in a colony adjacent to the city's waste dumpsite, their ways of negotiation with local actors and politicians, small acts of resistance and compromises, and ultimately their dreams and aspirations.

In the beginning, though the word Muslim and second-class citizenship intrigued me, but it was not the overarching framework but all these countless features of everyday life and struggles in the lanes of Citizennagar helped me frame my future interactions with them. Many scholars argue, ethnographic approach provides the best mechanisms to understand these multiple facets of everyday life of people who assert their presence in a society in a myriad of ways (Coughy, 1982; Miall, Pawluch and Shaffir, 2005; Lapinske, 2018). Basso and Selby (1976:3) rightly asks, "[W]here does ethnography begin if not in a disciplined attempt to discover and describe the symbolic resources with which the members of a society conceptualize and interpret their experience?" Not only everyday life, but scholars argue that bottom-up approaches to citizenship rights and practices are best captured through ethnographic accounts rather than using other qualitative research methods (Lazar, 2013). The politics of contingent citizenship, where the idea of membership in a political community is not given, through just legal affiliation to a nation-state, but contingent upon day to day practices, local idioms, actors and contexts, can be revealed through ethnographic observation (Stack, 2012).

In the ethnographic method, researcher attempt to comprehend "a level of rich, deep sociocultural description of people's life-worlds by spending considerable time...taking notes along the way, not just of what people do, but also about why, where, with whom, and how they do it" (Banaji, Mejias, and de la Pava Vélez 2018:99). To spend considerable time, which is considered essential for such method in the field (Jeffery and Troman, 2004), I stayed in the Ahmedabad city from mid October 2015 to early September 2016 developing sustained and deep

connection with my informants over the time. I again visited the city for a month in January, 2017 to update my data and streamline my research questions.

Though ethnographic accounts remain my primary method of collecting data, but for the purpose of verifying and substantiating claims and complaints of my interviewees, I combined such data with information gathered through government websites and documents, legal papers, land documents, city plans, NGO reports, newspaper, articles, blogs, web portals, exhibitions, seminar, talks and other various sources. Informal discussions with my friends, academics, civil society activists and strangers in the city on its history of Hindu-Muslim conflict, its impact on the socioeconomic changes in the city, lifestyle of different communities all contributed to my knowledge in the field.

I draw my understanding of the field in the work of Bourdieu (1990:192), where he argues, "It is the structure of the relations constitutive of the space of the field which determines the forms that can be assumed by the visible relations of interaction and the very content of the experience that agents may have of them." In my understanding, be it the features of everyday life or bottom-up claims and struggle of citizenship, it originated through the structure of relations and experiences materialising at this particular field site of Citizennagar. Therefore in my case the field, or the resettlement colony of Citizennagar is not just a spatial site, defined through geographical lines, but it refers to "the interlocking of multiple social-political sites and locations" (Gupta and Ferguson 1997:37).

It is important to note here what Lefebvre (1991) argued related to the social spaces, that they are produced through the interactions of people, nature and material objects. Citizennagar as a field site is the result of displacement after violence, political discourses on justice and rehabilitation, actors coming together due to ideologies and relations, assemblage of resources and technology, and therefore a social space. My aim in this research therefore is to go beyond the

spatio temporalities of this particular social space, to discover its entanglement with the local and global network of ideologies, people and processes.

The challenges of such ethnographic fieldwork are plenty, as many other scholars have argued in the context of researching conflict in South Asia (Tambiah, 1997; Wood, 2006; Wilkinson, 2009). I was conscious of the fact that I have to carefully negotiate my entry in Citizennagar, an important aspect of ethnographic research (Murphy and Dingwall, 2001). In recent scholarship around ethnography, scholars are increasingly questioned on their entry into the field and how it shaped their research objectives and gathering of data (Harris, 1997).

When I started my fieldwork, I was already aware of research fatigue (Clark, 2008) among the survivors of 2002 riots who complained to visiting researchers of repeating the same information again and again to academics, media personnel and NGO representatives. For example, one woman confessed to Jasani (2011:257) "how she would hide in the toilets when she lived in the camps, as she was tired of relaying the story of violence to the media and human rights organisations that were frequenting the camps to collect testimony." The second challenge for me was the negative perception for many NGOs and their representatives in the city, which I had heard from colony residents during my last visit in Ahmedabad a decade earlier. The usual practice in Ahmedabad for any visiting researcher was to contact local NGOs and their representatives before arriving in the city, who would put them in touch with the riot survivors. These NGOs have been working among the survivors since 2002, and therefore have established a good network in some of the resettlement colonies.

But to access resettlement colony residents through NGOs operating in Ahmedabad comes with its own issues linked to gatekeeping. Gatekeeping is one of the most contentious subjects in social sciences through which researchers gain entry in target population (Chaudhuri, 2017). I follow Kawulich (2011:58) observation, that "gatekeeping means the process by which investigators gain

access to the research setting under study and to the participants in that setting." Every new research setting pose unfamiliar challenges and thus problems and prospects related to gatekeeping can vary from place to place. Researchers should be mindful of the role that gatekeepers play in a community, as many times they "can help or hinder research depending upon their personal thoughts on the validity of the research and its value, as well as their approach to the welfare of the people under their charge" Reeves (2010:317). These local NGO representatives in Ahmedabad can be very helpful to researchers from abroad navigating through unknown international locations, or even other Indians not fluent in the local language, but they may hinder access to people or aspects in research work hidden behind the obvious.

In my case, I was constantly aware of these ethical issues and challenges during my own fieldwork. With regard to my entry to the site, I was careful enough to avoid the pitfalls of power dynamics that gatekeeping by local NGO creates among *dangapirit,* a local term for 2002 riot survivors. Like some residents who complained to me about the role of NGOs or *sansthawale* as they called them, stated their reasons for such dislike as creating hierarchies within their community by favouring only publicly articulate members. Some of my field respondents alleged that selected members gain more visibility, and more cultural capital through their association with local NGOs. They then use their improved position to negotiate in local conflicts. So to gain entry in such a site through gatekeepers naturally entangles the outside researchers in local conflict even before their research has begun. The friendship and closeness that I eventually developed with some people in Citizennagar may have similar repercussions. However, this is not something I am aware of. At least I can say I have considered prior asymmetries and modified my interactions in the process.

3.4 Being Muslim in Ahmedabad

Within a month of living in Ahmedabad, and exploring different places through auto-rikshaw or on foot, I gained the confidence and sensory perception of different sites in the city. As I mentioned in the previous section, that I had to stay in a hotel in Kalupur for a week as finding accommodation in the main city was quite difficult for me. Months before arriving in Ahmedabad, I contacted another researcher by email to seek his help in this regard. The researcher wrote back to say, "Housing can be tricky, esp for a Muslim, and I would say that Juhapura and Paldi are the only two options. It took me two years to find a flat and it was partly out of my frustration of finding housing that I started to write about Juhapura." [41]

My identity as Muslim in the city of Ahmedabad, a "highly tense and ethnically segregated city recovering from extreme violence" offered me the opportunity to do what Dhattiwala (2017:8) called 'insider research'. However I believe like every identity, 'insider researcher' is also located on a spectrum that needs to be continually expressed, suppressed and negotiated based on emergent situations in the field for the purpose of research (Young and Holmes, 2010). In a place like Ahmedabad, or generally in India religion "revealing cues are largely the name, dress, and language (and diction)" as Dhattiwala (2017:13) rightly says. In my case, I am not visibly Muslim with beard or skullcap. During my fieldwork, I always dressed in jeans, t-shirts or other clothes used by people from all religious backgrounds. But because I hail from West Bengal, my Hindi or Urdu have a little problem with diction, or choice of words which might have made me appear non-Gujarati in Ahmedabad.

[41] Salam, A, Email Correspondence with Adil Hossain (September 9, 2015). Name of the researcher changed as I have not sought his permission to reproduce part of this email exchange between us.

So among the Muslims in Ahmedabad, I could often see myself as insider when they sometimes opened up to me to talk about contemporary subjects afflicting Muslim community in India. Many random strangers I met in the city, in restaurants, in tea-stalls, in auto-rikshaw, when they started a sentence "as you know with us,'' I could sense my 'insider' status. Here the 'us' is implied to share experiencing a life, imbibing cultures, traditions, and social mores according to certain Islamic principle (if not all) and realising a political identity with its own entanglement, entitlements, fear and apprehensions (Bilgrami, 1992; Alam, 2008). And this is why, even philosophers like Akeel Bilgrami, who claim to have grown up in a Muslim family with irreligious background, and never himself practiced tenets of Islam, become 'Muslim for five minutes' (Bilgrami 1992:1071) when asked by a potential landlord in an Indian city.

The identity of researcher like me, who was a practicing Muslim till my AMU days but later turned into an agnostic, have followed a similar trajectory with my identity especially in a city like Ahmedabad. In social and political contexts, theological commitment to a religious ideology does not matter but the concept of shared identity does. Though I am an agnostic, I am aware of my political identity as a Muslim, I know that if I am caught in a Hindu-Muslim conflict in India, my name would be enough to target me.

However at times, it was not my Muslimness that was important but being a non-Ahmedabadi or a non-Gujarati mattered to the people I met in the city, as these features highlighted me as being an outsider. In such a situation, I was highly aware of the level of conversation I had where people tried to share information about their city and lives as something novel to me. In such cases, the same person who used "as you know with us,'' uttered "let me tell you" or "you should know" implying my outsiderness. Throughout my fieldwork, I was mindful of these shifting narratives and always treated my acquired data in a context specific manner.

We can find similar examples in the work of Dhattiwala (2017), who also worked among the people associated with 2002 Gujarat riots in Ahmedabad. She (2017:8) introduces herself as a "Gujarati Muslim who lived through three waves of Hindu–Muslim violence in Ahmedabad", and worked as an academic and journalist in a leading English daily based in the city and thus she could use the insider researcher perspective. However during one visit to a fieldsite with Muslim inhabitants, where she took her 'insiderness' as granted, because of her Muslim background, her marriage to a Jewish man turned one interviewee hostile, owing to historic Islam-Judaism conflict. Therefore, she observes, "Over time, it also became clear that the insider–outsider category was a continuum, rather than each category being mutually distinct" (2017:14).

My Muslimness also became a barrier in conducting research interviews with the Hindu officials in the city, especially those who were in charge of the Bombay Hotel in the city administration. This is same area of Ahmedabad city of which a small section is called Citizennagar (Mahadevia *et al.*, 2017). One particular incident led me to decide to work only with the survivors and local civil rights activists, valuing their narratives and perspectives rather than looking for interviews and documents from city officials to triangulate my information. A friend once put me in touch with a city planner based at the Ahmedabad Municipal Office (AMC). When I phoned him I was told that he had checked my profile on Oxford department website, and given that I am Muslim and working on 2002 riot survivors, he did not expect that I would write favourably of AMC or his office. In a subtle way, he informed me of his inability to help.

This may not be common and I believe other Muslim researchers have got access to city's documents through kind hearted officials, but my early experience as such in the field put me on a different path. Next day, I contacted my department administrator and asked her to remove my profile from the website. But it is only futile to expect that in today's world I can remove my digital footprint from the

internet. My Oxford association and Muslimness continued to act as a barrier in some instances as the research proceeded.

Unlike the other researcher mentioned above, luckily within a month of my arrival in the city, owing to the same Muslimness I found a nice house to rent in Muslim Society, Navrangpura in the Western part of Ahmedabad, a posh locality. With small road lined with apartment blocks, Muslim Society is the only area apart from Paldi in Western Ahmedabad where Muslims are living today. An old AMU friend working in Ahmedabad gave me contact number to check if apartments are available in Muslim Society or not. I called up the number, and the person who responded asked me for viewing after becoming certain that I am a Muslim and unmarried single man with no female visitor. He reiterated that it is a Muslim neighborhood where residents do not appreciate any unislamic activity, indirectly referring to premarital sex.

I knew I was lucky to have got the house in a perfect location.

3.5 Discovering Ahmedabad and Citizennagar

During my early days of living in Muslim Society, when I had not established my contact in Citizennagar, I used to go out for long walks after dinner to check out nearby areas. Lucky restaurant, near the historic site of Sidi Syed Mosque and Nehru bridge on the way, became my favourite places to hang out till late night. This is where I met many strangers, mostly Muslims residents of old Ahmedabad who happily joined me in conversations over tea and *maska bun* (a local bread with jam and butter). Often I struck up conversations with homeless beggars, mostly Muslims from different parts of Gujarat and elsewhere who slept on the Nehru bridge. This early phase of my fieldwork, in which these conversations happened with strangers allowed me to understand the city and its Muslim residents like never before.

Ghassem-Fachandi (2006) in his PhD thesis, write evocatively about the seven bridges that connect old Ahmedabad with new Ahmedabad over the Sabarmati river, which was a dry riverbed earlier but after the riverfront development, looks like an artificial long water reservoir.[42] He writes, "the place on the bridge, an in-between space, is the location where lovers meet at night, or couples promenade side by side, Hindu or Muslim, Dalit or Jain, man or woman, enjoying the rare cool breeze, away from the city body and the logic of 'community'" (Ghassem-Fachandi

[42] Mathur (2012) writes about the Sabarmati riverfront development project that has restricted the natural river flow, demolished old slums and displaced hundreds of thousands of poor to beautify the city, and make it 'world-class' as an example of 'urban planning as totalitarian governance'.

2006:45). My late night exploration of this in-between space made me understood the inequality that exists between the two Ahmedabads- Hindu and Muslim- separated by an ancient river. I also began to understand how violence is spatially distributed in the city, or how these instances of violence are constantly changing the skyline of Ahmedabad and a new 'city within a city' is being formed (DNA Correspondent, 2012).

It is with these perspectives on the city and people, and my personal reservations on gatekeeping by local NGOs, that one day I decided to visit Citizennagar by myself. A Muslim man in his late thirties I met on Nehru bridge in one of these late nights in November, 2015 told me its address in the city and how to reach there by using three separate autorikshaw rides. Two different kinds of autorikshaws, a popular three-wheeler vehicle for transportation of people operate in the city. One is small, with meter installed to check the price, and space for a maximum of three people in the back with minimum fare of 20 rupees (.28 USD) for 1 kilometre. People shorten the autorikshaw and call it riksha. The others are called tempo, a little bigger, with spaces for six people in the back, and two in front, on the left and right side of the driver, and minimum fare is five rupees (.07 USD) for one stop (one or two hundred meters). In the western part of Ahmedabad, where traffic is highly regulated only the former kind of autorikshaw runs. In the old Ahmedabad, with its small overcrowded lanes, and with little traffic oversight both autorikshaws and tempo operate. These tempos are often cramped with double the people than they have space for, like five in the front leaving little room for the driver, so that he can get more earning. They are mostly driven around by young underage Muslim teenagers, with mushroom cut died hair, blasting latest bollywood numbers from its cracked loudspeakers and whizzing past supercrowded roads and lanes. All this makes it quite a dangerous ride. The difference in implementation of state laws related to safe traffic, quite important to save lives can be witnessed as one moves from western part of the city to Muslim dominated east.



Figure 5: Commuting in Ahmedabad city

So one day from Lucky restaurant, one autorikshaw took me to Jamalpur, from Jamalpur another tempo took me to Shah Alam, and from Shah Alam another tempo left me at Gulmohar stop from where Citizennagar is at just five minute minutes walking distance. While walking on the lane to Citizennagar, one could see uneven unplastered single and double storey apartment block lining up the road, with people often lying on cots outside. Lack of water drainage in the area was quite visible with water logged here and there with insects and mosquitos hovering over them. Mounds of plastic waste were lying around at every ten steps. In their first visit, any person could see the stark difference, and lack of civic amenities compared to other part of the city. At the same time, in between these

houses, in a very small space, there exists a three storey big mosque with green dome and a tall minaret.

On my first visit, I sat in a tea stall attached next to the mosque and started inquiring about the place. I met a young boy in his late twenties who was sitting beside me, and introduced myself as a Muslim from West Bengal who had just arrived in the city to teach in a local college. During my initial days of fieldwork, I used my affiliation to IIM Ahmedabad as TA to Harsh Mander in this manner to avoid being tagged as a complete outsider based in a foreign university. I found it gave me better connect with the people that I interacted with. Also people in lower class neighbourhoods understood the identity of a teacher easily rather than a PhD student based abroad. Scholars like Bulmer (1982:253) suggests that in sensitive research, some form of "mild deceit *to some extent*" (emphasis in original) is inescapable, provided deliberate deception is not used and the researcher follows the 'doing no harm' (Wood 2006) principle.

I often found people I met in these neighbourhoods wondering or confused about the nature of my job if I stated that I am a researcher from Oxford University. It could raise suspicion instead which I wanted to avoid at any cost in my research on conflict survivors in Ahmedabad. Only after sustained interactions I used to tell my interviewees, how I did my schooling in a village in West Bengal, and then finished my BA and MA in AMU, and was now doing my PhD at Oxford on a scholarship to write on Muslims in India, my co-religionists. People often wondered if doing PhD means conducting 'surveys' and often admitted that they thought there is nothing beyond MA.

I also got curious questions like, why the United Kingdom (UK) government or my institution here have been funding me to study Muslims in Ahmedabad. I would often answer jokingly that possibly UK wants to know more about the world than other countries who do not fund students like us. On hearing me, my interviewees in Citizennagar would respond that possibly it is due to the UK's intention to

recolonise the world again. Their answer was not far from what scholars like Rakowski (1993) points out while exploring ethics in internationally funded research in global south.

However, the mention of writing on Muslim issues in the city as part of my obligations to my fellow Indian Muslims, who are deeply marginalised and excluded in nation's march to development always found support among my interviewees in Citizennagar. This prevalent notion was that as I have received comparatively better education than millions of poor Indian Muslims, thus I have a duty towards my *qaum* or community. I was often told that I am not an individual but a part of a 'community' during many interactions with fellow Muslims. My positionality as a privileged Muslim youth doing his DPhil at Oxford was constantly negotiated in the field within these situated contexts.

Philosopher Hannah Arendt theorised on this sense of responsibility towards fellow humans (Herzog, 2004) and it has been an intrinsic part of citizenship debates in communitarian perspective (Etzioni, 2011). Among Muslims such sense of obligation is often internalised around the concept of Islamic brotherhood (Ḡazālī and Holland, 1980). My articulation of my research objectives to my interviewees within these frameworks often helped me to gain their trust. Also highlighting my previous student activism and degree in AMU (an epicentre of Muslim learning in North India which many people had already heard about), helped me to establish familiarity and trust during my fieldwork.



Figure 6: Life goes on in the shadow of garbage dump



Figure 7: The road to Citizennagar from RM tempo stop, Bombay Hotel

3.6 "*Aur ek chutiya aa gaya Kitab likhne*": The problem of overresearch and research fatigue in Citizennagar

When I met that young man in that tea stall near Citizennagar, I told him that in 2005 I had come to Ahmedabad from AMU to see life in the colonies and this time I thought instead of Ramol, I would meet people in Citizennagar. I heard about this resettlement colony near '*kachhre ka dhera*' (garbage dump) quite a lot so I was curious, I informed him. After finishing our tea, he took me to his father, Alam sahab, whom I discovered later as the most respected and authority figure in the colony. In our first meeting, which I write in detail in my subsequent chapters (section 5.5) apart from other things, he mainly started by complaining about NGOs exploiting riot survivors, academic researchers and media personnel regularly visiting them to write their own stuff and forgetting about them later, and their lives remains the same since 2002 in spite of everything.

The question of a site being over-researched or its residents experiencing research fatigues, have not been explored in many works in Indian context. Clark (2008:955-956) writes,

> research fatigue can be said to occur when individuals and groups become tired of engaging with research and it can be identified by a demonstration of reluctance toward continuing engagement with an existing project, or a refusal to engage with any further research. This reluctance is then attributed to their previous or continuing involvement with research. In effect, the experience of an earlier engagement begins to act as a barrier to future involvement.

The survivors of 2002 riots during my initial interaction complained to me on similar lines. Especially the allegation that they have repeated the same

information to many people in the past without any positive outcome in their lives, and thus they are reluctant to be part of any future research. They are not completely averse to the idea of being researched, but see very little changing on the ground. Similar reluctance to research studies have been discovered on the part of minority black communities in the UK as well (Afshar *et al.*, 2002).

Questions like "what is there for us?" often complicate the researcher's positionality with regard to his/her research informants, and raise other ethical issues which are often missed in other ethnographic accounts on the survivors of communal riots in India. As researchers we are quite aware, that given the political situation in India, with ever growing influence of Hindutva in Indian society and state institutions, any positive 'change' is not an inevitable consequence of our research work. Also after we would finish our 'fieldwork' at such sites, the process of evaluation of any 'change' that may or may not happen is quite hard to follow in the later months or years. Clark (2008:960) rightly comments, "Therefore, it is often difficult for researchers to say what has changed as a result of the research beyond contributing to their own careers or the abstracted body of knowledge." To address the problem of research fatigue, he further says there are identifiable benefits to the participants, and the same people are not being asked the same questions repeatedly.

Similarly in the lanes of Citizennagar, people are quite familiar with strange faces, sometimes Indians sometime 'white people' arriving in the colony and start asking questions directly on what happened to them in 2002, how many died in their family, or if any members of their family got raped or not, or the levels of suffering in their contemporary life. There is a preoccupation with their victim identity among the visiting researchers or media persons. With short visits made over a day or at most a week, the aim to extract maximum information within a short time. This alienates Citizennagar residents to future research. Some researchers are aware of their limitations but in order to address the challenges of doing fieldwork among conflict survivors, end up in gravely hurting them.

From my interviewees, I even heard clear unethical practices on the part of such visitors, one of who allegedly offered 500 INR (7 USD) per questionnaire/ interview which made them feel "totally insulted and made them relive the pain".[43] A woman resident later on told me how she politely told the latter researcher that they are not beggars. They would not sell their stories of suffering in exchange for money and asked her never to come back to the colony again. Using expletives (quite common in Citizennagar), she said to me, "I told that bitch that take 500 rupees from us but don't come back here again with fake sympathies."[44]

Many months after I had known and befriended my interviewees in Citizennagar, one of them told me with a big laugh, "Adil bhai, when you first came to the colony, we thought that you are also one of them.

"Like whom? I asked.

"We said among ourselves, *aur ek chutiya aa gaya kitab likhne*?"

(Another fucker has come to write a book on us)[45]

3.7 Activist anthropology among survivors of violence

Be it NGO representatives or academic researchers, Citizennagar residents often alleged that people come to the colony, leave with the required information and then earn fame or money by using their narratives in the national or global scale. Organisations and individuals working among the 2002 violence survivors benefit

[43] Fieldnotes taken on May 20, 2016

[44] Ibid

[45] Fieldnotes taken on April 23, 2016

more than the actual survivors. Such allegations are not without merit. Writing for other contexts, scholars like Malkki (2002) and Agier (2011) also confirms that often intervention by humanitarian actors rather than improving the lives of refugees or IDPs, only isolate them and make them as subjects of public spectacle. Alam Sahab once rhetorically told me, "people come to Citizennagar in the first time in autorickshaws and the second time in cars." Indeed, stories from Citizennagar or other resettlement colonies in Gujarat often end up as public narratives. In social science research, the ethics of using such narratives have been a contested topic (Gready, 2008). Especially what happens testimonies and stories which are embedded in intimacy and immediacy goes public and global? Gready (2008:147) rightly argues, "the struggle now is less over the articulation of the marginalized and subaltern voice than for greater control over voice, representation, interpretation and dissemination."

These negotiations of asymmetries, and unequal relationship between researcher and researched are quite common to many in the field of social sciences, where the question 'what's in it for me?' for me is thrown at researcher (Corbin and Morse, 2003). Even for native researchers like me, who are engaged in research in their community (in this case 'Muslims''), the question of positionality and ethics in doing ethnography is of utmost importance (Jacobs-Huey, 2002). Chege (2015) also says that pre-fieldwork training done at university level (if any) can hardly prepare researchers for such ethical questions, which are quite context-specific. He further argues referring to such challenges that, "all has to be experienced on site and the best one can do is to be open to active, empathetic and ethical participation (2015: 478). I followed the same advice with my research participants from Citizennagar. Take the issue of consent during my fieldwork. Consenting to being interviewed, or otherwise studied, is an important element of ethical participation in research activity. I always ensured oral consent from participants in my research as many were illiterate. They preferred this mode of research consent. Over time, I also followed Hamill (2011). She rightly observes that consent is often implicit in sensitive research contexts, once a relationship of trust is developed between researcher and researched.

Today speaking or writing on 2002 riots or the mere mention of it in any platform, because of its link with current Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, is considered part of anti-national rhetoric by supporters of BJP (Ayyub, 2019). These political developments around the topic of 2002 riots only complicate the role of a researcher like me. During my fieldwork, I tried to be constantly mindful about ethical participation with people in Citizennagar to collect my data. I knew that good ethnography can happen only if I am reflective of my everyday choices in the field (Wilson and Chaddha, 2009). Also, the issue of reflexivity in a politically charged ethnography like mine is an important topic which cannot be ignored (Weedon, 1997). Reflexivity according to Giddens (1984:3) "should be understood not merely as self-consciousness but as the monitored character of the ongoing flow of social life" around us, the researcher. Both the idea of self-consciousness and studying the changes in social life based on researchers activity is part of ethnographic research today, to make any project reliable, trustworthy, non-exploitative to outsiders (Berger, 2015). Horsburgh (2003:9) rightly says reflexivity is the 'active acknowledgement by the researcher that her/his actions and decisions will inevitably impact upon the meaning and context of the experience under investigation'.

It is with this understanding, I often asked myself the important question that many ethnographers are asking themselves today, "knowledge for whom?" This central question has led to the emergence of what Hale (2007) calls 'activist anthropology', where researchers are asked not to restrict themselves in the positivist realm of objectivity, but to inculcate a deep understanding of the social and political cost of their work. He quotes an earlier work by Sjoberg (Sjoberg, 1967) on the ethics of social research and says, "One can reduce biases and increase objectivity within social science. However, such cannot be achieved through repetition of the formula "I am objective," but thorough examination of the impact of ethical and political decisions upon social research" (cited in Hale 2008:8).

The political nature of my work made me realise in the field I cannot be distant from the interviewees and their everyday struggles to conduct my research. The question of "what's in it for us when you go and write your book" forced me to look at other ways to establish trust and confidence with my informants. One important element of activist anthropologist research is to politically align oneself with the cause of the people under study (Hale 2007). Feminist scholars such as Haraway (1988) and Moya & Hames-Garcia (2000) have argued that politically aligned research with research subjects often reveal new analytical insights.

To politically align with the survivors of anti-Muslim riots and pogrom in India, is to acknowledge the overwhelming influence of Hindu nationalism in India, and in Gujarat particularly and how it exercises power over Muslims through state institutions (Ghassem-Fachandi, 2012). Such acknowledgement of power, inequalities and imbalances is very important in the field (Foucault, 1980; Chege, 2015).

During my fieldwork, thinking about all these aspects, I decided to engage with my interviewees to know what they want most in their lives and how my research can contribute to their struggles. In chapter four of this thesis, I discuss in detail that Citizennagar residents often pointed out the lack of legal documents for their houses and the issue of a garbage dump as the main problems they have been facing. These residents believe that their enjoyment of citizenship rights, including better civic amenities from the local municipal authorities, are contingent upon obtaining documents certifying their ownership of the houses they live in today. After a few months of my arrival in Citizennagar, I was also joined by Saleem, a local activist (I discuss him in detail in Chapter 7) who had close friends in Bombay Hotel. More than the issue of house documents, he wanted to do something on the Pirana garbage dump that affected the entire Bombay Hotel and its 25000 residents.

In my undergraduate days, I was a Right to Information (RTI) activist who found nationwide recognition by exposing corruption cases at my alma mater AMU.[46] Prominent Indian magazine *Outlook* profiled me in 2010 as one of the young faces of RTI movement in India who exposed corruption in high places in spite of threats to their lives (Basu and Bhatt 2010). So in the field, I strategised with Saleem that we should file RTI applications in the offices of regional government and AMC to know if green/environment rules regarding waste management are being followed in Ahmedabad or not. All such applications and petitions were filed under the name of Saleem, though as Indian citizen I could have obtained them as well. Soon we received a response from AMC on the Pirana dumpsite, with a clear indication of violating national and local environmental laws, which Saleem passed to the local media who covered it quite prominently.

I along with Saleem often presented these documents to Citizennagar residents to know their opinion on what they think and how we should move further. Based on these RTI documents, Saleem later on filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in the High Court of Gujarat to force the AMC to shift the waste dumping site away from the human settlement in Bombay Hotel.[47] At the time of writing, the case is still

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[46] Right to Information Act or better known as RTI Act was passed by Indian Parliament in 2005, on the line of Freedom of Information (FOI) Acts passed by western democracies in the previous years. This act allows any citizen of India to "access information held by or under the control of not only the executive but also of the judiciary and the legislature, from the office of the President of India to that of the humblest village council" (Naib 2011:xi).

[47] Holladay (2012:555) calls Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in India as "uniquely Indian judicial mechanism" whose purpose is to serve "as a tool for protecting the rights of India's impoverished and disadvantaged." On the history of PIL in India, he informed us, "In 1978, the Supreme Court received a letter from an inmate detailing the gruesome torture of a fellow inmate at the hands of the prison guards. The note, a mere scribble on a piece of paper, prompted the Court to assume jurisdiction over the case, ruling that a prisoner was entitled to the same rights and liberties conferred on the rest of society.16 The case opened the floodgates to a litany of public interest claims, assuming virtually every form, including media reports, formal briefs, and letters" (2012: 559).

going on in the court but it is expected that it would pass a favourable order in the PIL (Banerjee 2019).

Concerning the house documents, I followed the cues given to me by the Citizennagar residents themselves which led me to many places, including offices of local planners and builders or meeting local politicians and strongmen. I regularly shared my acquired information with my informants to build trust and confidence between us. In April 2016 I along with ten residents of Citizennagar visited the southern Kerala State, sharing a twenty-four-hour journey in a train to know the whereabouts of their housing documents, as the colony was set up with the assistance from a political party in Kerala (Dhar 2017). These actions on my part helped me to establish a bond where the question "what's in it for us?" took a backseat as I was able to express myself more and demonstrate my commitment to their struggle. They also often guided me on how to study the different aspects of their lives associated with their struggle for housing documents or pollution from Pirana garbage dump.

Hale (2007:105) argued "the practice of activist anthropology involves a basic decision to align oneself with an organized group in a struggle for rights, redress, and empowerment and a commitment to producing knowledge in collaboration and dialogue with the members of that group.'' It can be argued that given the political situation on the ground Citizennagar residents are not a typically organised lot. However as a vulnerable group, they are constantly engaged in the struggle to secure more rights for themselves. My research evolved organically with my association and collaboration with them, and with more enthusiastic participation from their side, it allowed me to find more meaning in my research.



Figure 8: Researcher in the field. Saleem and his team sitting with us as well. Pirana dumpsite and smoke can be seen in the background.

3.8 Data Analysis and Writing

Since day one in Ahmedabad city, I started writing fieldnotes, with the date and subject line both on my laptop and my phone. For this purpose, I extensively used the note-taking software Evernote (Sarna and Richie, 2012), which helped me write and organise my documents in password protected files and folders which I kept modifying with new developments in the field. In my fieldnotes, which I tried to write at least once every few days, unless I was travelling outside Gujarat I mainly described the places I visited, the people I met, and my reflection on the main experiences of the day. Sometimes these fieldnotes ended up as a descriptive form of writing, which scholars like (Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw 2001:359) calls 'fieldnote tale', where I would write a coherent story with detailed descriptions of

characters and events. And sometimes I would just put random observations with important quotes of the day. In the second scenario, the main emphasis in my writing was not to write chronologically but to highlight the high points of my ethnographic encounters. Atkinson et al. (2001:3) writes, "fieldnotes are not a closed, completed, final text: rather they are indeterminate, subject to reading, rereading, coding, recording, interpreting, reinterpreting."

My experiences of writing fieldnotes in this manner come from my previous job as a Journalist, where the emphasis from my editors was often on quotable quotes. Another former journalist who later turned in an academic Harrington (2003:92) interestingly observes,

> Journalists are the junkyard dogs of ethnography. We aren't trained in formal research methods or theories. We've got no idea of the differences between the Chicago school and British social anthropology, no idea what you're talking about when you debate postmodernism, post-postmodernism, poststructuralism, or postcritical ethnography. Not to mention ethno-methodology and phenomenology. But, as the saying goes, we've learned a thing or two along the way.

In order to make people around me less conscious, I would often avoid using pen and notebook and instead use my mobile phone (which also had the software Evernote installed) to jot down important quotes and keywords to write elaborate fieldnotes later. Many times, people responded in a formal way if I took out pen and paper to note something in front of them. Rather it was convenient for me to use my phone to write down something important under the pretext of texting a friend. As mobile phones are ubiquitous in Citizennagar, and some of my interviewees regularly used smartphones in my presence as well, I was under the impression that such behaviour would not raise any eyebrow.

As my journey goes with my academic fieldwork, my previous learning of 'a thing or two' helped me a lot in meeting new people and exploring new places, and to write about them in a way so that I can make sense of it later. Initially, I was concerned with protecting the anonymity of my informants in my fieldnotes so I would write on Citizennagar and its residents without clear references to their jobs or house number or information on relatives as I feared it would expose them to the future threat. But later on, as I grew close to them, they themselves expressed their consent to me to use their real name for any research purposes. They told me that everyone knows them, media write on them, Television channel makes documentaries using their real names, so why should I be an exception? Gupta (2011) writes how survivors of communal violence in Ahmedabad and Mumbai insisted on getting their narratives recorded with their original identity. In spite of such assurances from the side of my informants, I have used pseudonyms in all my chapters in this work as my research explored intracommunity tensions and other sensitive topics linked with Citizennagar. Using real names, of both influential local actors and Citizennagar residents, may put my interviewees at mild risk which I intend to avoid.

The fieldnotes on Evernote are marked with dates and special tags such as "Citizennagar", "Bombay Hotel", "Muslim Society" and the pseudonyms featuring in these notes were used, to refer back to them anytime to reconstruct my memories with locations. Another important ethnographic tool I used was photographs taken at specific moments of the day at selected places (Harper, 2003). I captured more than 400 photographs which were categorised later according to months and location. I took photographs almost every time I visited Citizennagar with due consent from people to record effects of pollution from the garbage dump. I also used them to write descriptively on the lack of civic amenities I witnessed that day, or to remember a particularly poignant moment of the day. Writing my notes on Evernote with photographs attached to it, only increased the recall value of my ethnographic accounts in the field when I later analysed them. After coming back to Oxford, looking at these photographs transport me back to

the exact moment and location, and guide me through the sensory environment better than any textual description.

In the beginning, I talked to my informants in Citizennagar on every little information of their everyday life, their social and economic struggle in the city of Ahmedabad, their dreams and aspirations, marriage and children and kept writing them in my Evernote account. In the meantime, I also recorded interviews with other sources in Ahmedabad, especially people working in NGOs, academics teaching and researching in local institutions, local artistes and planners, shopkeepers and businessmen with questions focusing on Ahmedabad's history, it's Hindu-Muslim relations, local government and politics, food, architectures, mosques, impressions on Muslim localities and so on. The initial focus was to gather information on contemporary life in a resettlement colony, nature of the relationship between state institutions and these displaced people, and the changing character of the city with survivors of Hindu-Muslim violence.

After finishing the fieldwork in September 2016, 'citizenship' was not my overarching framework to analyse my fieldnotes to begin with. I continued to reread my fieldnotes to find patterns and common themes. It is by going back and forth in collated data, that I discovered the statement from that old man in Irani cafe on Muslims in Citizennagar as second-class citizens, after which I started reading bottom-up theories on citizenship. Following this, I sharpened my researched questions and addressed the fuzzy areas in my data to streamline my thoughts around the idea of claim-making in everyday life in Citizennagar. It is from this perspective, I started to examine my data to find the contingent factors in such claim-making practices and their realisation. At this stage, I returned to Citizennagar again for a month in January 2017 to follow up on my streamlined questions and contextualise my data according to them. This short trip to Ahmedabad helped me to address the inconsistencies found in earlier data analysis and enhanced my abilities to read my data more coherently.

In this exercise, initially, I missed giving close attention to the everyday life of the women in Citizennagar that I recorded in my fieldnotes. As a male I was also apprehensive of writing on women and citizenship, analysing and interpreting their experience of domestic issues and community relations. Feedback from my supervisor and comments from my confirmation examiners (all women) gave me the confidence to approach this topic in this thesis. Overall, through such a process of evaluation and reevaluation of my data, I refined my themes and categories of analysis, came up with chapter themes and sub-themes.

3.9 A short note on translation

Unless otherwise specified, all the translation of conversations with my informants are mine. We mainly spoke in Hindustani, with occasional local Gujarati words thrown at me from their side. In such cases, I had always asked them back to give me the meaning of these unknown words as they understood it in local contexts. In my fieldnotes and then in the transcription stage, I used to write the Hindustani quotations in roman scripts and later on translated them retaining the contextual meaning of the words. In my attempt, I followed what Abu-Laghod (2008:33-34) said on the role of the researchers as to make participants stories "readable" by "cutting the uninteresting, avoiding the repetitive, giving translation and providing intelligibility" where necessary.

I have made sincere effort to provide the approximate English meaning of the words and quotations I have used in this thesis. The Hindustani words and sentences would appear first in *italicised* format with the translated English text written next to them in this thesis.

4 “We just want the paper for our houses”: A case of brokered citizenship

> Here, just twenty years ago, the pochia grass grew high and free, trappings the overflow from the dyeing and chemical workshops. Snakes slithered among the vegetable plants. And at night the foxes could be heard, howling in the eerie moonlight. There were no shops, no lights, just a dim glow from a solitary hut. The land was owned by a Hindu Patel woman, or so I am told…
>
> This swathe of land, off the Narol Road, was parcelled out among a host of small-time, would be developers. Through the fraught nineties a steady trickle of Muslims arrived from the city. Some even bought a plot as an investment. Bit by bit, the jungle was cut down. ‘Bombay Hotel’ is what the new residents called it. ‘Bombay Hotel’, after the dhaba that once was on the Narol Road… After 2002, the trickle turned into a flood. From all over town and adjoining villages…they came. Leaving neighbourhoods with schools, roads, street lights, hospitals, transport and markets, scalded by fear, they came, seeking safety in numbers. And the houses proliferated like weeds in this arid landscape (Shah 2015:176).

4.1 Introduction

In this part of Ahmedabad, named Bombay Hotel, as eloquently described by Shah (2015) above, the first thing I noticed on my arrival was that everyone knows about this family of two brothers and their children. Their faces adorn the colourful flex banners in this part of the city, at every nook and corners, along with national and state leaders of the Congress party, whose faces are printed smaller compared to these brothers who could be seen wishing people on various festivals. Let us call them Adam and Malik Rahman, the prominent Muslims builders who shaped the contours and past of this area with their political influence in the local

administration. Residents call them 'Rahman Builders', the biggest developers of all in the Muslim areas of the southeastern part of Ahmedabad. They provide patronage and guidance to many small-time would-be developers who want to make it big in this part of the city by earning money from dealing with properties or sharing tea and snacks with political leaders.

Bombay Hotel is part of the Danilimda municipal ward in AMC, which is represented by four elected ward members, among which two seats are reserved for women. All four elected local representatives from this area win on the symbol of Congress party. One amongst them is Sajid Rahman, the son of Malik Rahman, a young person in his mid-twenties who has just returned from the United Kingdom after obtaining a degree in management. His photographs along with the Congress symbol of hand, printed on small flexes and hung on electric poles in Danilimda shows him wearing black Nehru jacket over white kurta and pants. Though there are three more ward members from this area, it is only his face which is most visible in this area. Along with his name his alias is also printed on small flex banners (locally called 'flex') which is Munna 'baba', a word affectionately used to call a child in the local area. The flexes are there as if to remind everyone that he is the popular local boy with whom everyone, from eight to eighty, identifies with.

The other three ward members, who also represent Congress party in the local AMC are there at the pleasure of 'Rahman Builders' as most locals told me in my conversations with them. They gave me information regarding these brothers, often in hushed tones or by whispering in my ear as if they are part of the common knowledge available to everyone but cannot be said aloud. In the past, Rahman Builders have ensured to change these ward members from time to time and picked new people, based on their support and allegiance to them to fight these ward elections. Locals told me, such decisions on their part happens to ensure that no one becomes a bigger leader than them. They will tolerate no challenge to their dominance in local politics. Rumours also abound, that the public funds allocated to these ward members by the AMC to construct and repair roads, deliver water tanks and lay water pipes, and for other civic amenities are only used not at the

local politicians' behest or discretion, but only as per the diktats of the Rahman brothers.

I got the opportunity to meet one of these ward members at a tea stall in Bombay Hotel, where I asked him about the authenticity of such rumours. He neither confirmed nor denied it. He just chuckled with the words, "people say a lot of things on our backs and I don't think it is necessary to respond to every rumour". He added later, "Rahman brothers are big leaders of this area and we do things in consultation with them. We have no disagreements on anything." [48]

People in Citizennagar, talk about these Rahman brothers with more reverence and fear than police, courts or other arms of the state. More than any NGO operating in their locality, they think that only Rahman brothers' critical intervention can help them properly rehabilitate after the 2002 violence, a process they consider incomplete without access to the legal papers of the houses they live in today. I briefly mentioned in the Introduction chapter (section 1.2) of this thesis, how Rahman builders in the aftermath of 2002 riots, not only organised relief camps to immediately shelter ten thousand riot survivors but also distributed these 86 one-room shacks to Citizennagar residents. Through an elaborate public function attended by national-level Congress politicians and Indian Union Muslim League (IUML) leaders from Kerala, Rahman brothers distributed the keys to these Citizennagar shacks to riot survivors in 2003. However, no one ever received any official document/legal papers till date confirming the legality of their occupancy of these houses.

[48] Fieldnotes taken on January 31, 2016

The figure of Rahman brothers echoes the idea of 'big men' in the work Mines (1994), who earns respect and command as an individual.[49] These kinds of men display "civic individuality" through their goodwill, local connections, ability to employ resources and men to a certain aim (1994:18-23). According to Mines, their status is maintained by an aura about the person, something happens "by three elements all conveyed by stories and rumors about the person: his good character (kunam), his generosity (vallanmai) and his efficacy, that is, his ability to prosper and make things happen according to his will within institutions, or in civic life more generally" (Mines 1994:42–43, 56-58; cited in Hansen 2005: 184).

In this backdrop, this chapter explores the idea of 'brokered citizenship' for the residents of Citizennagar, through their fraught relationship with the Rahman brothers. I situate my work in the idea of 'propertied citizenship' as explored in the works of Hammar (2017) and Roy (2003) in the context of urban peripheries in the global south, where illegal squatters and slum dwellers struggle against the networks of state and non-state actors to become "proper" citizens (Hammar 2017:83). Like in the work of Hammar (2017:84), who studied the urban displacement and resettlement of long term illegal squatters in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, in this chapter I am particularly analysing "the simultaneities of statutory and substantive forms and meanings of citizenship in dynamic encounter with property."

Though the struggle and aspirations in Bulawayo and Citizennagar concerning 'propertied citizenship' have some similarities, unlike in Bulawayo in my case no national and local administration is involved in the shift from "unsettled subjects

[49] In northern and western part of India, they are often called *bara admi* in Hindi or big/respectable man.

to settle citizens" (Hammar 2017:99).[50] On the other hand, big men like Rahman brothers continue to influence the character of substantive citizenship in the lanes of Citizennagar through his control and hold over property papers related to the houses they built there. And as its resident's citizenship rights are contingent upon the actions and brokerage of Rahman brothers, I have termed it as a case of 'brokered citizenship'.

The role of property, especially in the context of rehabilitation of riot survivors in India, from their original homes to distant places have not been explored adequately (Lokhande 2015). More so when such survivors were faced with violence induced displacement and shifted to IDPs, we know little about the questions of property at their new accommodation sites. In the aftermath of the 2002 Gujarat riots there was significant absence of any state managed rehabilitation programme or lack of any initiative to facilitate their return to where they came from (Mander 2006). Such indifference on the part of the state institutions, only deepen the impoverishment of poor Muslims survivors who can never dream of buying new houses or land to relocate. In such a scenario, they are left vulnerable to the generosity or political gameplans of non-state actors to rehabilitate in new spaces or access basic civic amenities like water and drainage.

The idea of brokered citizenship speaks to the argument forwarded by Hull (2017:17) in section 2.1.6 where she says, "wider terrain of citizenship formation as partial, restricted and contingent." As the possession of mere legal citizenship

[50] In my Chapter 8 of this thesis, I have explored the struggle for paper citizenship by the residents of Citizennagar, and the role played by various state agencies including local government and judiciary.

does not guarantee enjoyment of rights, in this case people are compelled to rely on powerful actors to negotiate their political subjectivity.

This chapter attempts to answer the first research question- *how the politics of contingent citizenship can be situated in the aftermath of the Hindu-Muslim conflict in India, particularly in the context of the 2002 riots?* And also the third research question- *what are the roles of state agencies and other non-state actors in the struggle and everyday lives of survivors to claim better citizenship rights* as mentioned in section 1.6. In the next section, I will discuss how the concept of property and citizenship is linked and then I follow it with my ethnographic accounts from Citizennagar to elaborate more on this concept. In this way I show the importance of propertied citizenship in the lives of Muslim survivors of Hindu-Muslim violence.



Figure 9: Main road of Bombay Hotel. AMC trash bins can be seen in the photo.

4.2 Property and Citizenship: Making a connection

Scholars argue access to property often constitutes the legal subject and rights bearing individual (Lund 2011). The idea of citizenship, or membership in a political community has been contingent upon ownership of property since the very beginning of the idea itself, and most notably in the works of political philosophers like Rousseau and Locke (Lazar 2013, Shafir 1998).

In the literature around city and citizenship (Holston and Appadurai, 1996), the question of who belongs to the city is often invoked with the local form of struggles and practices. This idea of belonging is fundamental to citizenship and it can be about the demands for inclusion and exclusion both (Yuval-Davis, 1999; Kabeer, 2005). Bhowmik (2006) explored the idea of local citizenship in the slums of Mumbai and found that rich and middle class 'Citizens' of that metropolis petitioned the government to disenfranchise the urban poor because they do not have legal documents to prove their residence.

In an ethnographic account on propertied citizenship, where Roy (2003:469) explored different paradigms of citizenship in the cities of the United States and suburban slums of Calcutta, one of her protagonists insisted, "If one is a citizen, one can't be homeless." In the work of Ammar (2017), we see how illegal squatters in Zimbabwe hoped to move into city council built low-income housing far away from the city. These squatters themselves accept that moving to these houses away from the city would worsen their impoverishment for lack of jobs and losing previously earned economic opportunities. However, they welcomed the prospect of obtaining legal housing in their lives by saying sentences like, "We're now moving into formal life", or they would finally become "a proper person", or they would live "an orderly life" at last (2017:84).

It is in this perspective, Lund's (2011) work conceptually connecting the idea of property and citizenship by studying the land rights struggle and issues of belonging in countries of Africa becomes relevant. In his work, he speaks of recognition (Honneth 1996) as an important element for the political institutions to work in a matter of property rights. And there he brings the idea of citizenship. He argues that it "is never merely a question of land but rather also a question of property, and of social and political relationships in a very broad sense" (Lund 2011:73). And he identifies this relationship "between people and specific political institutions invokes the concept of citizenship" (2011:73).

However, the struggle to be seen by the political institutions often happens through the acknowledgement of the 'signature of the state', which Das (2004:251) says is "understanding the presence of the state in the life of the community, both as a bearer of rules and regulations, and as a spectral presence materialised in documents". That is why the struggle for local citizenship often happens through property documents in the countries of the global south.

4.3 "Even we know this is our home"

On November 13, 2015, when I visited Citizennagar first time, I was guided to meet Alam Sahab and his wife Safina. When they introduced themselves I did not remember their names but I recalled that I have seen their face earlier. On the tenth anniversary of the 2002 Gujarat riots, the then editor-in-chief of CNN-IBN channel, senior Indian journalist Rajdeep Sardesai did a prime-time programme on February 28, 2012, to highlight the plight of riot survivors even after a decade. In the news report, Mr Sardesai introduced Citizennagar with the following words,

> But even Shahpur's overflowing toilets appear tolerable when compared with what we witnessed, at the resettlement colonies on the outskirts of Ahmedabad. These colonies came up to house the poorer Muslim families

> who had to run away from the riot-hit areas. One such colony Citizennagar has been created right next to Ahmedabad's largest garbage dumpsite. Large families crowded into small tenements; the living conditions are simply subhuman. [51]

A younger 'Alam Sahab', whose beard still looked black appeared in the video telling Rajdeep about the precariousness of their lives in Citizennagar, with the camera often zooming at the Pirana garbage dumpsite in the backdrop. He says, "Look around, see the mountain of garbage behind us. Is this something you can call life? We should have all died in 2002 rather than dying here slowly". [52]

Three and a half years after this video was aired on national television, when I arrived in the lanes of Citizennagar, Alam Sahab seems to have aged, his beard coloured with Mehendi, white hair dominating his head rather than the black ones unlike in the CNN-IBN video. He told me that due to his poor health he had left the job of a carpenter two years ago, and now sits at home all day.

It was my first day so I had consciously avoided asking them anything related to 2002 and kept the conversation going around the topic of everyday life in Citizennagar, local schools, medical facilities, mosque and role of Islam in their lives. And during this first conversation, he repeated the same sentence he said to Rajdeep in that video.

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[51] CNN-IBN (2012) "Has Gujarat been able to bury the ghost of Godhra" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vzh4ozwotkE (Accessed online on 20 April, 2018) This video can only be accessed from India.

[52] Ibid

Our conversation went on like this

"Alam Sahab: Today our lives can be compared to those dogs living on the street. Neither anyone talks nor anyone looks at us anymore. It would have been better if the rioters killed us in 2002. With one stroke of a sword, you are finished. Far better than forcing us to die slowly with the poison all around us. You can find every possible disease at the garbage site.

Me: Are people in this colony suffering from any diseases?

Alam Sahab- Let alone suffering from the diseases, many people died already in this colony. And all for this garbage dumpsite in our backyard. I am saying all this because we have seen it happening over the years.

Do your research here and you will know so many people died from TB and respiratory diseases. Three men died just last year in this lane. All were aged between thirteen to fifty. Many people come to us and want to know what happened in 2002. What is happening now is worse and yet no one cares.[53]

In my fifth chapter, I have discussed the meaning of such conversations around death as a form of moral claim-making on the state and larger society. But here I will focus more on the everyday struggle of these residents to live on this particular land. My first-day conversation with Alam Sahab and others in Citizennagar was quite emotive, given the nature of facts they wanted to share with a visiting researcher like me. On my first visit, I was also introduced to Alam

[53] Fieldnotes taken on November 15, 2015.

Sahab's wife 'Safina apa', who is quite known among the local politicians and NGOs in Ahmedabad.[54] I was told about her even before arriving at Citizennagar.

Immediately after the 2002 riots, the Congress party appointed Safina as one of the spokespersons to speak on the alleged complicity of Modi and his administration in the 2002 violence. She was the prime witness in the Naroda Patiya massacre in which 62 people were killed and Maya Kodnani, Women and Children Welfare Minister of the Gujarat Government was on trial at that time for the same.[55] According to her, she was not involved in any political activity before 2002 but after the riot, she was contacted by the local Congress party workers to join the party. Congress called her again during the 2007 state assembly elections to play the same role but did not do so in the 2012 elections. By then Congress had started to avoid mentioning 2002 riots to counter the development talk of Modi who fought that election as the Chief Ministerial candidate for the third time in a row (PTI, 2012).

Safina informs me that she knows most of the local Congress politicians, down from the four municipal councillors elected from the Bombay Hotel area to the state party chief. "I have also met Sonia Gandhi in Delhi" she alluded to her meeting with the INC President.[56] "But see our lives have not changed even a bit. We came here empty-handed and even today we have nothing but what you can see around" she quipped.

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[54] *Apa* is a term used by the inhabitants of Citizennagar to address an elderly woman. In South Asia, in Muslim societies where *Hindustani* or Urdu is spoken both the word *apa* and *baji* are used to address someone as the elder sister.

[55] For more on this legal case, please see Setalvad (2012).

[56] Fieldnotes taken on November 15, 2015. All quotations in this section are taken from this fieldnote.

These politicians had often promised her that situation in Citizennagar will see improvement. They would build a wall blocking the garbage dumpsite, a new road in the colony and fix the drainage crisis but no promises were kept. Promises remained empty words for the wards of Citizennagar, as they alleged. They told me that they have accepted it as a fact that formal state institutions like AMC meant to deliver the basic services like water, sewage lines, roads and other facilities in the area are not interested in Citizennagar and that they have to rely on others to get things done. Berenschot's (2010) work on political mediation shows similar bureaucratic inefficiency in delivering public services in Gujarat led to the rise of small-time fixers who mediate between citizens and local state bodies. But in the words of Citizennagar residents, it is not a case of inefficiency on the part of state officials, but complete abandonment of their colony because of their identity as "danga-pirit" or riot-affected individuals. [57]

Safina further commented, "After repeatedly asking for the road for many years, only last winter they put some grits here and thought that their job was done. They are going to pass the annual budget soon for this area. I will go and meet the local councillor tomorrow and see what can be done." Though Alam Sahab sits at home most of the time, I was told that Safina is quite active and does all the "dour-bhag" or running around to see things get done for the 'development' of Citizennagar. Soon the conversation drifted towards the topic of my family if I am married or not, do I pray or not and Alam Sahab asked Safina to make coffee for us. I tried my best to suggest that I would be fine without it but Alam Sahab insisted since I had come to their home for the first time.

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[57] I work on these complaints and allegations in the Chapter 8 of my thesis, where people complained of "cutting", or being cut away from the state services, due to their identity as *dangapirit.*

At this point, I inquired what was the biggest problem they are facing and how that could be solved according to them. Some other residents of Citizennagar had joined us in the meantime, sat on the nearby cot and kept listening to our conversation quite attentively. I was introduced to Sabir, Mansoor and his wife Sayema who lived in the adjacent shack.

"Ek to ye Kachra peti aur dusra hamara ghar ka kagzat. Isse bada koi mudda nahi hai yahan" Sabir entered the conversation as he answered the question by saying that the biggest problem they would list leaving aside every other issue would be- "Firstly is this garbage dumpsite and secondly it is the issue of our house papers."[58] Everyone present in the room agreed. He continued, "You talk to anyone in Citizennagar and all would agree that these are two things they want to be resolved first.''

Alam Sahab then offered a further explanation on the matter. He told me that when they had arrived at Citizennagar in the early days of 2003 they had no idea how long they would continue to live at that site. After living for 13 years at Citizennagar he said, "Even we know this is our home now."

He expressed dismay that the children playing in the colony are oblivious of the life they once led in Naroda Patiya where Citizennagar residents used to live earlier. He said that the foul smell, the stench all around, the site of the mountain of garbage collected from Ahmedabad city and dumped there is the reality these children have always seen. His eyes teeming with nostalgia while talking about Naroda Patiya. "Worst things happened with us there but at least we had *'sukun'*(peace) in our lives. Living here in the middle of all the wastes of the city,

[58] I have used the term 'house papers' or *ghar ke kagzat* as my informants told me to refer to the property, the one room shacks they have been occupying since they moved to Citizennagar in 2003.

can you even imagine living a good life?" Alam Sahab threw the question with despair in his tone.

Mansoor commented from the other side of the room, "We know that the issue of the garbage dumpsite is not going to be solved anytime soon. It was there even before we came here and it will be there even after our death. I have no hope that something can be done about this issue. And if corporation (AMC) does not throw their garbage here where they will do it? I don't think they care if we live or die here." Sabir informed me that the issue of garbage dumpsite gravely affects the people in Citizennagar compared to others in Bombay Hotel area as they are situated just next to it. He expressed pessimism that unless any major political intervention happens or AMC themselves decide it to be relocated, nothing would ever be done to this problem. "The entire city of Ahmedabad depends upon this place. Even to clean it up it would require another ten years" he said with a tinge of hopelessness in his voice.

"But why does nobody talk about our houses? Everyone comes here, ask us what happened in 2002, who died and how who got raped and not. There are a lot of sansthawale (NGO officials or worker) who come to the colony and talk to Safina but they are still obsessed with the events of 2002. I have told them many times that instead of the past if they just work on our present lives, we will be much better and happy. But who listens to what we want?" Alam Sahab passed a critical comment in the discussion. He looked visibly angry by the time he finished his last sentence. And their apprehensions are right as most of the literature on 2002 riots, that I had covered by then offered a very little clue on this issue of property as a legitimate demand by the riot survivors. In the work of most scholars, the riot survivors were mostly discussed in terms of their struggle to secure legal victory in the criminal cases lodged after the violent events in 2002 (Jaffrelot 2007a; Gupta 2011).

I kindly asked them to give me all the details regarding this particular issue citing my lack of knowledge in the matter. They informed me that though they had been living in Citizennagar since 2003, they had never received any kind of documents that would assert their rights over their property. The word they repeatedly used was 'malikana haq' (Madhok, 2017) which roughly translates to 'ownership rights'. Over the years since they had relocated in the shanty houses of Citizennagar, slowly they have managed to obtain ration cards, electricity connection and even house tax papers.[59] But till date they had never received a legal document which would mention, "ye ghar aapka hua" or "this house belongs to you".

"So, who do you think has the house papers of Citizennagar?" I asked inquisitively. Safina shouted from the kitchen which is just like a tiny extended space attached to a 10x10 ft room,

"Rahman builder"

4.4 Rahman builder: The case of Muslim big men in Ahmedabad

Me (A): So, do you get help in organising marriages of your sons and daughters?

Roshan (R): Yes. You have to go and inform them of 7-8 days in advance.

A: Inform whom?

[59] This struggle to obtain one after another official documents, certifying their presence at the site of Citizennagar has been discussed at length in my Chapter 8 of this thesis. In that chapter, I have drawn from the work of Das (2011) on the citizenship struggle of the urban poor through "creating rights" by obtaining one after another state documents.

R: People who help. You have to go and tell them eight days in advance that you are sick or your father is dead, or you have no working member in your family. Whatever your situation is!

A: Tell whom?

R: Like Adam Rahman. All these big-shot people, the builder. No one else, these builder help. Even your relatives don't help.

A: So, relatives don't help at all?

R: No, they might give you 100 rupees or some vessels for dowry. Maximum they give is 500. But what will happen with 500? builder like Rahman help with 5000-10,000 rupees. They also contribute towards buying clothes, vessels and other stuff.

A: And builder help everyone?

R: Yes, everyone! You go to their office, like in Gulmohar, there in their office, you can go and meet them, and they will give you.

A: Why do they give you money? What is their profit?

R: If you help someone, then it helps to wash away your sins. Maybe that's why![60]

Roshan laughed after saying the last sentence. She implied in no uncertain terms that those who have more money and thus rich, they commit more sins than others and by their act of charity, they only justify their wealth. Next, I asked her whom she voted for in the last election. She replied very candidly, "Hath pe" (on the hand). The hand is the symbol of the Congress Party. She informed me no other political party has any influence in Bombay Hotel but Congress.

[60] Fieldnotes taken on April, 2016

It had been a few months into my fieldwork, and this conversation made me aware of the complicated relationship Citizennagar residents share with the members of the Rahman family, the proprietor of Rahman constructions. Adam Rahman and Malik Rahman are the sons of Shafaqat Rahman who used to be a prominent Muslim businessman and real estate developer from the Shah Alam area of Ahmedabad. Shafaqat Rahman has a brother named Irshad who is still alive. Both Adam and Malik have taken over their father's business in that area. The family tree of both the brothers with all the sons and daughters constitute the Rahman family today. This family has an impressionable presence in the life of my informants in Citizennagar. Also interesting is the ubiquitous use of the word, 'Rahman builder' by people of Citizennagar and Bombay Hotel to call the members of the family, mainly the two brothers.

After the 2002 violence, many faiths based Islamic charities and NGOs stepped in to provide immediate relief to the survivors of riots when state failed to provide any assistance (Jasani 2008, Vardarajan 2002). Shah Alam dargah, a 15th-century mausoleum around the grave of Sufi mystic Hazrat Shah-e-Alam, hosted more than ten thousand survivors in its precinct, became the largest relief camp at that time. Adam and Malik Rahman, being the influential local Congress politicians and land developer, played a crucial role in running this camp for six months by managing funds from friendly political parties, charitable organisations and private individuals.

After that some people from this relief camp returned to their original homes in spite of threat of violence, some shifted with their relatives, and some were rehabilitated to various resettlement colonies like Citizennagar, Vatwa, Ekta Nagar around Ahmedabad city. Shah Alam camp became famous as the then Prime Minister of India Atal Behari Vajpayee visited the camp to see the survivors of 2002 violence and publicly asked Chief Minister Narendra Modi to follow 'Rajdharma' or to act like a statesman and impartial administrator (Bunsha, 2002)

As mentioned above, Rahman builder played an essential role in constructing these various resettlement colonies in Ahmedabad city, as many 2002 riot survivors were unwilling to go back to their previous home due to the threat of violence persisting for months (Mander 2006). Most of the relief camps, set up soon after the 2002 riots, hosting thousands of survivors were instructed to be shut within a month by the State Government of Gujarat, with Modi at the helm of administration because it countered their claim that things were back to normal (Bunsha, 2002; Lokhande, 2015). Many of these camp organisers faced harassment from local police administration and arrested on concocted charges to deter them from running these relief camps (Vardarajan 2002). According to Citizennagar residents, Rahman builder countered tremendous pressure from the then Modi administration and still kept running the Shah Alam camp.

In this backdrop, the actions of Rahman builder assume more considerable significance, as establishing these resettlement colonies required the command of resources and networks to get things done. Since the 1990s, they had already bought properties in Bombay Hotel, which was a vast swathe of 'empty land' near the Muslim area of Shah Alam. The concentration of Muslim population in this area made it an ideal place to relocate the Muslim survivors of riots who looked for 'safety in numbers' (Mahadevia et al. 2014) in the city.

Desai et al. (2016) writes on Rahman builder and and their contribution towards rehabilitating the riot survivors in the following words,

> Although financed by Muslim charities, the development of the Citizen Nagar (sic) colonies and allotment of tenements to the riot victims was undertaken by a prominent Muslim builder. He informally bought land from a landowner in the area through his political connections and constructed the colonies without any development permissions.

In the presence of senior Congress party leaders Rahman builder, in early 2003 distributed the keys of 86 houses in Citizennagar to people like Sabir and Alam

Sahab, who were either living with some relatives at that time and looking for houses or languishing in some relief camps in Ahmedabad city run by defiant organisers. As informed by Alam Sahab earlier, only keys were given to those people, and no documents related to their possessions of those houses were made available to them. He said to me later, "As you can imagine, we had no roof over our head and we had nowhere to go. So this act of kindness made us so much overwhelmed and happy at that time." [61]

He paused and added further, "We could not go back to Naroda Patiya as we had just witnessed all the killings and rapes. People were too scared to even think of it. We did not have any place where we could have said okay, this is our home now. Also, who wants to live in relief camps forever?" [62]

The role of influential Muslim characters during and after the riots, when state agencies failed to protect and help victims of violence have been explored in the work of Hansen (2000; 2005). In one work, Hansen (2005:188) talks about Javeed, a "Muslim big man in Mumbai," who became *bhai* (literally brother) due to his involvement in violent and illegal activities, and aspired to become *dada* (literally grandfather), a local term used for gangsters or *bhai* of some standing. Most people in his Muslim neighbourhood remembers him as the warrior, who along with his men protected the community from the Hindu attackers during the 1992 Mumbai riots, that started just after the Babri mosque demolition.

After serving jail time for murdering another local *bhai*, Javeed established his authority by helping poor people getting telephone lines or providing assistance in getting jobs or saving people from abusive landlords and employers. He later

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[61] Fieldnotes taken on January 20, 2015

[62] Ibid.

on, unsuccessfully ran for local municipal elections to enhance his standing among the community and to be more effective what Hansen (2005:190) interestingly calls "informal sovereign." Hansen defined 'informal sovereign' as different from middlemen or brokers, who act as a conduit between public and government offices, to mediate public services in India like arranging ration cards, electric connections, construct and repair roads and so on.

'Informal sovereign' are what Hansen and Stepputat (2005:31) call the "repertoires of authority" in urban India, who can be "accomplished business people, activists, local politicians as well as criminal figures." According to them, these informal sovereigns "have managed to capture, privatize or make semi-autonomous territories, institutions, identity forms, and practices in the interstices of the fragmented configuration of sovereign power in the modern city-scapes" (2005:31). Democratic practices in India, where authority is often dispersed among various actors and institutions, apart from the state has allowed "these men to present themselves as populist heroes, representing manly virtues (*mard*) and defending neighborhoods and community life"(2005:31). In western Indian cities, especially in low-income neighbourhoods or impoverished slums, where the penetration of state, police and bureaucracy is lesser than other places, Hansen (2005:190) argues these sites are governed and policed by these "local big men."

Rahman builder are not *bhai* or *dada* in a sense that they run underworld networks or big criminal gangs. However as an influential business and political family they extend similar influence as 'local big men' among the local Muslim population. They earned enormous goodwill due to their role in rehabilitating 2002 riot survivors in Bombay Hotel. During my fieldwork I found them actively engaged in enhancing their position in the local communities by organising big feasts, showing off their political connections, and displaying their wealth.

They followed all the traits that constitute the idea of big man according to Mines (1994), where publicly shared stories and rumours are important elements in the process of making such individual. Hansen (2005:185) rightly says, “However morally ambiguous these men and their activities are in the eyes of local residents, they are, nonetheless, the elementary units of local politics, of social work, and cultural organization.” To further the argument by Hansen, in this chapter I focus on the activities of Rahman builder. I explore how by organising big feast and large personal events like son’s wedding, the family maintain an aura of influence and authority in the locality.

Hoardings of Rahman builder are ubiquitous in the Shah Alam and Danilimda part of Ahmedabad. Many small-time developers and builders in the Bombay Hotel area owe their allegiance to this family, as my informants tell me. The first time I had met Malik Rahman at his office in late November 2015, he was busy launching the political career of his nephew Sajid Rahman aka Munna Baba. His efforts did not go waste as Munna Baba won handsomely in that municipal election as the Councillor from Danilimda constituency.

During the Islamic holy month of Ramadan (or *Ramzan* as locals pronounce it), when Muslims the world over fast from dawn to dusk, political iftar parties have become a trend in India, including the Ahmedabad city. Iftar, which is an event to end the fasting just around the sunset after a day of no food and water is a sacred moment for Muslim individuals. However, Hebbar (2016) traced the history of political iftar parties in India where personal space shifted to become 'political and governmental'. Indian politicians across religion and party lines host people at their home or at some big open space at the time of the iftar to organise a public display of political support and solidarity (Ahmed 2018). Who is going to the iftar party of which politician turns into a matter of intense media debates. Similarly, who can organise the biggest iftar party with how many people attending it becomes the talk of the town about the political significance of any leader.

During my fieldwork, one such iftar party was organised by the Rahman family in the month of Ramzan. The party dominated the public discussion in the Muslim parts of Ahmedabad. I did not attend it. However, I saw some glimpse of this substantial public affair while sitting inside an autorickshaw on my way to Citizennagar one day. I could witness big hoardings were put up across the Shah Alam area announcing the 'iftar party' organised by this family. People, mostly Muslims, with their skull caps or handkerchief tied around the head, numbering in thousands attended the iftar party as I could guess from the long queues formed outside the venue. I was stuck in traffic for long that day, which allowed me to observe this event for quite long. In this part of Ahmedabad high traffic, suspending road movements for half an hour or more was quite regular.

The venue of the iftar party was an open field in the Shah Alam area just adjacent to the main road crisscrossing through this part of Ahmedabad. I saw political dignitaries arriving at the gate in prominent Black Scorpio and other big expensive cars. Members from the family received them with slogans raised by their supporters in the background. Chorus of *Congress Zindabad* (praise to Congress) and *Rahman family Zindabad* (praise to the Rahman family) filled the air with a celebratory atmosphere.

Other passengers told me in the autorickshaw that all the senior Congress politicians of the state attend this iftar party as if it was common knowledge. In 2017, one friend from Ahmedabad sent me a Youtube link showing the grand iftar extravaganza organised by the same family next year as well. In that video edited with heavy music in the background for possible promotional purposes, I could recognise Bharat Singh Solanki, the then President of the Gujarat State Congress Committee and other senior members of the youth wing of the Congress party. Munna Baba was receiving them with the same chorus of praise in the background.

Not only political iftar but also the marriage function of Habib Rahman, son of Adam Rahman in May 2015 became a significant event in this part of Ahmedabad

and widely covered in the local media (Patel, 2015). Local media published stories of how white foreign dancers and small-time Bollywood actors were invited for the ceremony to entertain the guests. Models from Mumbai were hired to welcome the guest at the main gate of the wedding venue. Stories highlighted how the lighting arrangement in the ceremony cost crores of rupees, and it was done in the entire area of Shah Alam. Newspapers in Ahmedabad openly wrote about the estimated expenditures of such events to display the wealth and power of such personalities in the city. They also listed the name of the senior Congress party leaders who attended the marriage ceremony like in the case of political iftar organised by Adam Rahman.

Mines and Gourishankar (1990) in their work on South Indian' big-wealthy-person' (periyavar) observed such organisation of big feast and marriage functions and called them the 'institutional big man'. In their work, they argued that all their public activities of charity and private functions shape "institutional development and political life in big, modern cities" (cited in Piliavsky 2014:13). However in the work of Mines and Gourishankar (1990), discussion on certain kinds of altruistic behaviour highlights the concept of dharmic patronage (Bayly, 1973) targeting community and religious institution, without any political objectives. Though Adam Rahman and his family may intend to attain the status of a big-man, their public activities often aimed at showing the extent of their political influence, especially their association with the top leadership of the Congress Party. Thus their primary objective is to access and maintain political patronage through such organising of significant personal and religious festivities and inviting senior Congress politicians.

From the statements of Roshan at the beginning of this section, we can find Rahman builder are engaged in helping people in Bombay Hotel with their children's wedding costs, gifts and dowries, through which they maintain their influence on local poor. Especially for the riot survivors, who received no assistance from the state in terms of their security and rehabilitation and with the domination of Hindutva politics in the city, Rahman builder's role as the local big

men is crucial. Local big men like them establishes their reputation, their authority and above all 'sovereignty', the power to discipline bodies and community and establish zones of exception from legality and formality (Schmitt, 2005). They do it by drawing allegiance and reverence from the local population through fear and assistance both. As instances of Hindu-Muslim violence, especially in Gujarat, where the state allegedly sided with the Hindu attackers and then provided no assistance or relief to Muslim survivors, the space for Muslim big men has only increased in their community over years.

Hansen's (2005) work on "local big men" and Michelutti et al. (2019) study on outlaws and criminals in Indian society, put focus on this phenomena of how these characters help their communities and neighbourhoods, and also assert distinct authority alongside the state machinery. In both the works, Muslim figures have rarely received any patronage and protection from the government unlike their Hindu counterpart in similar contexts. Instead, these Muslim big men are always engaged in negotiating their spaces of domination with local administration, with police and bureaucrats sometime allow them to informally rule and sometime attempts to penetrate their sphere of influence. Thus informal sovereign is always at odds with the power of the state sovereign, a much bigger force at play.

4.5 The desire for propertied citizenship in Citizennagar

People in Citizennagar often remember the role of Rahman builder in organising the relief efforts for the beleaguered Muslim survivors of 2002 violence quite positively in my conversations with them. However when they start talking about this family in the present, the voice gets low, and the words used in hushed tones. As if they are confused themselves how to talk about this family's present day activities without acknowledging their help towards people like them in the aftermath of 2002. My informants wondered why the same family who acted like their saviours during the worst times of their life, are not ready to listen to them today on the issue of their house papers?

One Citizennagar resident named Allauddin told me, "Rahman builder have lots of properties. If you go to Daryapur, Danilimda, Shah Alam most of the properties and buildings are developed by them. They did a lot for the Muslim community in 2002, and that's why they get 'izzat' (respect) from all quarters."[63] He went on to repeat the fact how Rahman builder decide who would contest in local municipal elections on Congress ticket as all senior Congress politicians "are in his pocket,'' an expression used to stress his political influence. [64] Allauddin told me that though many political parties, including BJP, Nationalist Congress Party (NCP), and Aam Admi Party (AAP) tried their luck in Danilimda and Bombay Hotel, but people only vote for the Congress party as others have poor organisation in the area.

After a pause, he referred back to the topic of Rahman family again and said,

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[63] Fieldnotes taken on July 4, 2016

[64] Ibid

> We have got nothing to do with their wealth or their politics. We just want the 'paper' for our houses from them. He helped us a lot in 2002. Only if they show us their kindness again by giving us our house papers, not only us but also our grandchildren will pray to Allah for their health and prosperity. [65]

Most residents in Citizennagar told me about the need for the house papers with this line of argument: Since they arrived at this site in 2003, more members have been added to their families by way of birth and marriage which have created an enormous problem of space. There is very little space for all of them to adjust in a one-room shack. Also, some of the residents of Citizennagar now have the economic capacity to add more rooms by way of a new construction or repair their shack, but the lack of proper house documents is holding them back from making the significant investment from their lifetime savings. They felt that if they made any decision to go ahead with such construction in the absence of valid legal papers proving their ownership of that said land and houses they live in, tomorrow anyone can evict them and their investment in their houses may go to waste.

Their fear and apprehension regarding the house papers, are directly related to the question of recognition and its three related dimensions of existence, emotion and institution as argued by Honneth (1996). Without their house papers, they believe that their existence at Citizennagar is at peril and they can be evicted any day. When citizennagar residents talk about living in a limbo, having less space for family members, or fear to construct new rooms and losing their lifetime investments in case they are forced to relocate, they raise the same fears as people mention in the ethnographies of Hammar (2017) and Roy (2003).

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[65] Ibid.

The idea propertied citizenship as discussed earlier in section 4.1 attach value to legal ownership of houses, as it helps people in “moving into formal life”, allow people to become “a proper person” or to live “an orderly life” (Hammar 2017:84). And that is why the Citizennagar residents are continuously struggling for propertied citizenship. The house papers for Citizennagar one-room shacks can make them a proper person with formal and orderly life that they aspire for. And without it they constantly fear to become homeless again, of becoming a nobody, a non-citizen, like they felt after they were displaced in 2002 violence and lived in relief camps as they convey in their conversation with me.

Interestingly to justify this fear of eviction, they also invoked the Rahman family. According to them, Shafaqat Rahman, father of Rahman brothers in the aftermath of the 1985 anti-Muslim violence in the city distributed houses to some survivors just like the ones in Citizennagar in Shah Alam area. He also just like his son’s act in Citizennagar, only handed over the keys with no documents to the beneficiaries at that time. They informed me that they got to know from someone that those houses were demolished by Adam Rahman later by forcefully evicting the occupants, because he wanted to get back that plot to start a building project. They fear their fate in similar lines. Adam and Malik Rahman may look charitable today but what if Munna Baba does the same thing in future and evict the residents of Citizennagar for some hidden interest.

"These rich people's intentions are hard to guess. Today they can be benign for some reasons, and tomorrow they may crush the poor people for their selfish motives. You see, if they don't give anything in written to us what if their children tomorrow claim that we are falsifying facts to occupy the inherited property?"

Mansoor elaborated this point further with many 'what if' situations in this context.[66]

During my fieldwork, I tried my best to locate the people who were given houses by Shafaqat Rahman but failed. I asked Citizennagar residents, who that 'someone' was who passed on the information, but most of them conveyed to me that they could not remember. This lack of specific information was encountered by Das (2011) as well while doing her ethnography in the slums of outer parts of Delhi. She refers to such missing specificity in storytelling and comments that it, "is a typical feature of narratives among the urban poor I have encountered and indexes the fact of diffused forms of knowledge over which no one ever has full control but which, like a gambler's luck, can pay dividends" (2011:326). Like Das, such forms of 'diffused knowledge' were given to me as well, and I attempted to understand them through the fear and insecurities in the mind of my informants.

Citizennagar residents in their conversation always point towards the adjacent colony of Dhoraji Yatimkhana, which houses many of their relatives and friends who suffered the same fate during the horrific events of 2002. It is the only other resettlement colony present in Bombay hotel for the riot-affected people. It was one Muslim organisation of Ahmedabad who had set up the Dhoraji Yatimkhana around the same time as Citizennagar. Local residents informed me that in 2013, apparently, the owner of that organisation handed over the house papers to the residents and since then people have constructed new rooms and buildings. They wondered, why Rahman builders are not doing the same with them?

[66] Fieldnotes taken on May 3, 2016

Mahadevia et al. (2017) while differentiating Dhoraji Yatimkhana and Citizennagar as Citizennagar A and B comments on the situation in the following words,

> The allottees in Citizen Nagar A were given allotment papers called "Baksheesh no Lekh." This does not give legal land tenure, although it does give them some level of legal claim to the tenement. Those who were allotted tenements in Citizen Nagar B were not given any documents and are also not allowed to make structural changes to their tenements.

As I will explain further, my informants are less concerned or aware with the idea of legal land tenure as described above something which may protect them from AMC led eviction practices in the locality during implementation of Town Planning Schemes. They rather desire any form of written document from Rahman builders that would mention those one room shacks belong to them. In the next section, I discuss how Rahman builder and Citizennagar residents both understand the dynamic encounter between property, authority and citizenship.

4.6 The question of authority and brokered citizenship



Figure 10: Flex banner put up by Baba (Rahman family) in Bombay Hotel urging people to join the Youth wing of INC

In my initial days of fieldwork in 2015, after my conversation with Alam Sahab and other residents in Citizennagar, I went to interview Rahman builder about the status of house papers in question. Their big three-storey office and the residence was located on Shah Alam road leading to the famous mausoleum in the area. After

the guard asked for my ID and then sent it inside, I called into his chamber after waiting for half an hour. At that time, local municipal elections were going on, and Malik Rahman was very busy with the election campaign as his nephew (Munna Baba) was also the candidate.

I started my interview with a discussion on the election itself and inquired about his nephew's chances of winning. His smirk reply was that even if Prime Minister Modi contests the election there, it will not impact the electoral outcome in their area. This reference to Modi, who not only represent the power of the Indian nation-state as its Prime Minister, but also earned reputation as authoritarian administrator (Crabtree, 2019) is to establish themselves as the 'informal sovereign', and display their capability to challenge any authority in their territory. The authority and reputation of local big men are often dependent on such public rhetoric of defiance and asserting their voice.

Such rhetoric is often used to express their manliness by challenging other powerful men, in this case Prime Minister Modi who is known for his self-identification as man with 56-inch chest, and other expressions of toxic masculinity (Baijal, 2018). Some of my informants indeed used the expression '*ilake ka asli mard*' or 'the true man of this area' to refer to Rahman builder and their influence in the locality. To assert authority through masculine performance is quite common for these local big men. Hansen (2005) is right to argue that such expression of informal authority, is often linked with the concept of *mardangi*- or manliness, a Persian term used in Hindu, Urdu and other Indian languages. The word *mard* used by Citizennagar residents, with the same etymology as *mardangi,* and then prefixing it *'asli'* or 'real' is to refer the potentiality of Rahman builder to display "defiant masculine sovereignty" (2005:190).

In my meeting, Malik Rahman advised me to go and talk to local people to get a sense of the election. He stressed only then I would understand the extent of local

political support Rahman family enjoys in that part of Ahmedabad. He came across as a very confident and experienced politician to me.[67]

Soon I asked the question which led me to visit him. On asking why he was not giving the house papers in the name of Citizennagar residents, as they have been demanding for a long time, he paused and then replied,

> You don't understand the ground reality. It was a grim situation in 2002. At that time, we were managing a relief camp with ten thousand people who had lost their relatives, houses and properties and had nowhere to go. We called up and contacted many of the politicians both in my party and in other Muslim friendly parties for help. Some like the Muslim League party from Kerala offered their help.[68]

He offered me a little history of their charitable acts after the 2002 violence, how they managed to coordinate with political parties and local faith-based organisations to collect enough funds, find locations for new resettlement colonies, and set up these one-room shacks to at least provide a roof overhead to these riot survivors. But then he went on to address the central issue raised in my question concerning Citizennagar, the distribution of the house papers to its residents. He said,

> Now we all know that there are quite weak and needy people living there. We fear that if we give them the papers, they will sell it and move elsewhere. Also, the colonies were set up for charity to help the riot-

[67] As a former journalist, I have interviewed national level politician to local level activists in the past. So this was my first impression.

[68] Fieldnotes taken on November 30, 2015

> affected people of 2002. If these people sell their houses to other people and move elsewhere, that place will lose its characteristics. But let me be clear, we have nothing to do with that piece of land or their houses. We have given them these houses as a charity. They are free to do whatever they want to do in their colony. We are not stopping them from doing any construction or anything.[69]

After meeting Malik Rahman, I visited Citizennagar next day and conveyed his statements to the residents of Citizennagar. On my arrival, many men and women sat around me on their cots. They repeatedly asked me what exact words he had used regarding their house papers and I said the same. After noting his words, one resident named Faisal curtly said, "All is politics. He wants us to keep begging from him all of our lives. At least he should have some sense of *'khairaat'* (charity). Even if we sell our houses and move to a better location, what's his problem? Don't we deserve better lives than living near the garbage dump of Ahmedabad city?"[70] He further said, "And who wants to invest in their houses if they don't have proper documents. Today he is saying something tomorrow he can say something else. We should have something in written form right! Now we have got no papers for our houses."[71]

Though everyone would complain about Rahman Builder in the lanes of Citizennagar, they also agreed in unison that no one has directly confronted him regarding their house papers. And the reason they stated was fear of retribution or such act on their part would construe as defiance to this family's authority. "We fear that if we demand the house papers from him, he may evict us from our homes. He has men, and he has political connections. What will we be able to do?" rues

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[69] Ibid

[70] Fieldnotes taken on December 2, 2015

[71] Ibid.

Alauddin.[72] They informed me that though they had discussed among themselves about the need to go to Rahman builder's office many times regarding these house papers, the actual act of going never happened as some amongst them always backed out.

Here one interesting paradox about the whole situation need to be examined. If we consider the tenure security of the houses built in Citizennagar A (Dhoraji Yatimkhana) and Citizennagar B (houses of my informants), allotment papers like 'Baksheesh Nu Lekh', or other informal papers from donors of these houses, including Rahman builder offers almost no protection from demolition by local city council on account of illegality as I mentioned above. And as we can see from the work of Mahadevia et al. (2016) on the tenure security of the houses in Bombay Hotel, if Town Planning schemes adopted by AMC are implemented all these houses would be demolished or face "cutting."[73] They write,

> Most of the lands are still registered in the names of the original "farmer" landowners in the government land records (7/12) documents because none of the transactions have been registered at the Collectors Office. It is likely that the state authorities and state actors knew of the informal transactions taking place in the area (especially since political leaders were involved), but feigned ignorance and allowed the land to be informally sold and developed (2016:4).

Few months into my fieldwork and I found the local land records (7/12 documents) registered at the Collectors Office. I shared it with my informants in Citizennagar and asked them why they still want the house papers from Rahman builder, cause in government records they are not even the owners of the land and

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[72] Fieldnotes taken on July 30, 2015

[73] I have written about the threat of cutting in Bombay Hotel in detail in my Chapter 8 of this thesis.

properties located in their colony. Rahman builder for obvious reasons, did not share the actual information with these riot survivors, to maintain the aura of charity from their side and thus continue to assert their authority at this particular site.

My act of sharing the 7/12 documents was not received with much excitement in Citizennagar. My informants remain firm in their belief, that as the Rahman builder are the actual donor of their houses, they must have the original house papers with them, or the persons or organisations who helped these brothers in this endeavour to set up the resettlement colony. Alam Sahab remarked to me once, "We just want Rahman builder to write even in a plain paper and give it to us, which clearly say that from today this home is yours."[74]

I put this question of land titles to Gagan Sethi, one of the leading civil society figures in Ahmedabad and founder of Janvikas, an NGO set up in 1987 and working on "communal violence and justice for the violence-affected people of Gujarat and Orissa".[75] In one informal chat, he also told me that he was the one who suggested the name 'Citizennagar' to some members of 'Citizen Relief Service', a local NGO coordinating the efforts to rehabilitate the 2002 riot survivors in association local businessmen like Rahman brothers and other political parties.[76]

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[74] Fieldnotes taken on January 25, 2016

[75] Janvikas (2017) " About Janvikas" (Accessed online on October 1, 2017 at http://www.janvikas.in/about-us.html)

[76] Fieldnotes taken on June 15, 2016

The process of naming this site is unclear as Malik Rahman also feigned ignorance when I asked him about it. "We just started to call it Citizennagar" was his reply.[77] Here the word 'we' either gave credit to no one or he attributed it to his family. I found one plaque in Citizennagar crediting 'Citizen Relief Service' for distributing the houses to riot survivors. I could not find the name of Rahman builder on that plaque. But given my conversation with the Citizennagar residents, and other academic works (Mahadevia et al. 2016) their absence from any plaque crediting the role of individuals or organisations in setting up this resettlement colony looked irrelevant.[78]

Gagan Sethi informed me that though he and other members of the civil society had asked Rahman brothers many times to distribute these houses papers to the residents of resettlement colonies, they never acted on it. When I asked why such is the case, he responded that it "may be due to personal interests in that particular land that these people are dilly-dallying the matter."[79]

Janvikas, in its report on the tenth anniversary of Gujarat riots, devotes one section to the problem of homeownership among the residents of resettlement colonies. Interestingly it used the phrase IDP colony or colony for Internally Displaced People, a more familiar word in international human rights discussions around people affected and displaced by civil war. The report says

> Janvikas has initiated a process to facilitate the transfer of ownership of houses into the names of individual beneficiaries. The lack of ownership by

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[77] Fieldnotes taken on November 30, 2015

[78] I write on this particular plaque in detail in the next chapter, which provides us with an understanding of the nature of this site.

[79] Fieldnotes taken on June 15, 2016

> individual families creates a sense of insecurity among the IDPs to access any government schemes/loans etc. These colonies were built in an emergency since the displaced people did not have any shelter. Under these circumstances, the formalities involved in converting agricultural land into non-agricultural land, in getting the plans approved, etc. were not followed. It is the duty of the state government to regularise the construction of houses. The government also should give 100% concession in regularising the constructions and in transferring the ownership rights to individual families. So far, the government has not provided any relief but continues to demand the IDPs follow the entire procedure (Janvikas 2012:23-24).

The report does not mention the role of private players like Rahman builder in the transferring of ownership to the residents of these colonies and solely holds the government responsible for the process. However, given the initial act of spotting the land, then negotiating the construction of a colony like Citizennagar without proper plans happened due to the action of 'big men' like Rahman brothers. The murky conversation of agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes in Bombay Hotel also happened through the political and local influence of private builders and politicians (Desai *et al.*, 2016). The government alone is not the only actor in this case, as evident in my ethnographic accounts.

I discussed earlier how Lund (2011, 2016) points out the scope and constitution of authority in defining the access to property rights. Sikor and Lund (2009) on the other hand argue that whether any property is legal or not, the question of power and authority is constituted through who authorize the access to such property. They say, “the process of seeking authorization for property claims also works to authorize the authorizers and, at the same time, institutions underpinning various claims of access—hence catering for particular constituencies—undermine rival claims to the same resources” (2009:2). Berry (2009) in her work discusses the mutual constitution of authority and citizenship, through the angle of property as well.

Therefore, though the state in India is the ultimate authority in dealing with land and property, the case of Citizennagar offers us with a different perspective and highlights the role of big developers like Rahman builder who employ different methods to maintain their control. Through their charity at the time of need, absence of state agencies during rehabilitation of riot survivors, public display of defiance and masculinity, showing off wealth and political connections, Rahman builder established himself as the 'informal sovereign' in Bombay Hotel, which go with their image of local big men.

But till the state agencies asserts its own powers and implement the Town Planning schemes in Bombay Hotel, and thus curtail the stamp of authority of the Rahman family, the Citizennagar residents knew who to go for the authorisation of their property. And in turn, Rahman family draw their influence and reputation in the locality from such claims to property at their doorstep. That's why an acknowledgement of the ownership of their houses, even in plain paper from them is so valuable to Citizennagar residents.

The residents feel that they are trapped between both government and Rahman brothers for their plight. Difficulty of accessing government schemes and loans for low-income groups also mentioned in my conversation with them, indicating that even informal tenure papers like "Baksheesh Nu Lekh" are accepted as proper legal documents in various offices.

Sabir told me, "Where should we go and who will listen to us? We cannot get any loans from the bank because we don't have proper papers for our houses. We go to the bank; meet the manager and he says go and bring your house papers first.

Rahman builder doesn't understand or doesn't care why this is a huge problem in our lives. Everyone has their politics."[80]

I argue that this complex relationship between Rahman family and Citizennagar residents, expressed through the dynamics of property can be called a case of 'brokered citizenship.' As discussed earlier, both Lund (2016) and Berry (2009) argue how access to different forms of rights are intimately linked with property rights, and such property shape mutual constitution of authority and citizenship. This is why my conceptualisation of 'brokered citizenship' focused on the questions of authority, reputation, masculine performance and claim to 'informal sovereignty' through the issue of property and the people who demands its access.

My ethnographic account showed, how beyond the concept of formal citizenship, non-state actors like the Muslim big men of Ahmedabad can act as the vehicle or hindrance to substantive citizenship in India for Muslim survivors of riots. The power of brokering citizenship rights happens when the state abdicated its responsibility to look after the citizens, and people like Rahman builder get the opportunity to express authority and distribute resources as goodwill or charity. My account of Rahman family highlights how some social and economic rights are not claimed from the state but from these local big men, who command resources and network to deliver them.

[80] Fieldnotes taken on April 30, 2016

4.7 Conclusion

There is no doubt that it is the state failure or sheer lack of intention to rehabilitate the survivors of 2002 riots, that has pushed the Citizennagar residents to seek help from 'local big men' or 'informal sovereigns' like Rahman brothers. It is also essential to keep in mind, that as Citizennagar is a segregated community (even in Bombay Hotel area), for an influential family like Rahman builder, it is easy to maintain the structures of surveillance and keep them in fear of falling out of favour with him. I find the case of 'brokered citizenship' as a new way to look at the life of the 2002 riots survivors, beyond the literature on justice and rehabilitation after the violence in 2002 (Mander 2009; Gupta 2011).

The case of Rahman builder and his sway over the lives of Citizennagar residents, as my work demonstrates connects two distinct issues- one on property and citizenship and another on the role of Muslim big men in the aftermath of riots, through display of authority and maintaining their dominance. As mentioned above, the debate on why property ownership fundamentally connected with citizenship has always been there since ancient Athens (Manville, 1997). I used the work by Lund (2016) here to show how he uses recognition as an essential element to enter the discussion on property and citizenship. I have used this literature in the context of 'local big men', who play a significant role in the aftermath of communal violence. In the discussion on justice and rehabilitation for the riot survivors, academics have rarely touched the subject of property. This chapter has put the subject as one of the important focus of study in such a context.

This chapter is also significant in a way that shows how the process of urbanisation in Ahmedabad looks like on the ground. Much has been written on the process of urban development in Ahmedabad and how it is intimately connected with the history of Hindu-Muslim violence in the city (Rajagopal 2010; Mahadevia, Desai, and Vyas 2014; Bobbio 2015).

In my work, I have contextualised the struggle of Muslim survivors in the aftermath of such violence in negotiating and claiming property rights from influential local big men, who put their own stamp of authority in the urbanisation process of the city. The politics of contingent citizenship for the riot survivors happen from these complex processes and negotiation with powerful actors to properly rehabilitate and start their life anew at a new place. Their everyday struggle to obtain property documents is linked with the claim to membership in the city and the larger political community. It also shows the precariousness prevailing in the lives of these riots survivors and how big developers like Rahman builder define their authority and power in relation to them.

In the next chapter, I continue with the struggle of Citizennagar residents to secure the housing documents from another actor: IUML, a Muslim political outfit based in Kerala who was mentioned by Rahman builders in section 4.6. In my ethnographic accounts, I have described how these residents travel to Kerala in South India on the invitation of another political outfit to plead the IUML leaders to locate their housing documents and hand it over to them. In this chapter, narratives of death and related documents take the centerstage in the life of these residents, as a way to put a moral claim on state and the larger society. I argue that these death narratives constitute bottom-up claims to citizenship for these people.

5 Being a citizen in life and death: Journey from Ahmedabad to Kerala

5.1 Introduction

The opening sequence of the Hindi play *Muavze* (compensation) written by Indian playwright Bhism Sahni (1993) shows the Police Commissioner of an anonymous Indian city giving instructions to his subordinates and informing his superiors about the arrangements in place in case a riot breaks out:

> ...treatment of the wounded, clearing of dead bodies, relief to the homeless, all arrangements have been made in advance. Yes? Yes compensation has also been arranged...For immediate payment. Compensation to the killed. Yes (Laughs) Sorry. Compensation to the kith and kin of those killed. Ten thousand on being killed, three hundred to the wounded, nothing on minor injuries, only first aid… I am ordering the closure of schools in the hope that by Monday riots will break out (1993:10).

Bereft of any human consideration and sympathetic feeling, Sahni focused on the mechanical response of the bureaucracy and politicians not to take any preventive steps to stop the violence, but to showcase their efficacy in the aftermath of it.

People gathered outside the Commissioner's office to ask for compensation for previous riots, are instructed to produce evidence in the form of dead bodies. One character's father-in-law reminds him that mere injury will not work; he has to die in the riots so that his daughter gets the compensation money. The father-in-law buttressed the point that death is the ultimate marker of riots and lifeless bodies

are the ultimate ways to claim compensation money from the government. In this play, people most affected by the riots are not mere victims, and they actively exercise their agency to deal with their material deprivation. Tales of death and lifeless bodies pave the way for people to negotiate their claims on the state and the larger society.

In Citizennagar, death often appears as a subject of pain, laughter, and justification for making moral claims on the local and national authorities. The everyday life in this colony essentially connects 'the politics of life' with the questions of citizenship and various practices associated with it (Fassin, 2010; Rose 2001). What I argue in this chapter is that the politics of life here is expressed through rhetoric and tales of death by the residents of Citizennagar. During my fieldwork in October 2015, as shown in section 3.2 of this thesis, I was warned of riots breaking out in Muslim parts of the Ahmedabad city to divert attention from the Patidar agitation as the protests were perceived as hurting the BJP ruled government in Gujarat.

A Muslim person I met at a tea stall in Kalupur, told me how the ruling party might cause trouble with the words, *"ekbar dhamaal shuru hua to lashein bichh jayenge"* or "once the riot starts, dead bodies will litter the streets."[81] *Dhamaal* or riots in Gujarat, as it is called locally, always correspond to the imagery of *lash,* an Urdu word for dead bodies. Lokhande (2015) writes how the State of Gujarat had discriminated in offering compensation to the Hindu victims of burnt S-6 bogey of Sabarmati Express, and Muslim victims of post-Godhra riots happened across the region.[82]

[81] Fieldnotes taken on October 7, 2015

[82] Vardarajan (2002) also writes in detail on this aspect of discrimination in distributing compensation money to people of different faiths. 1 lac INR (1405 USD) was announced as ex-

The images of these dead bodies, questions of who is dead and who is not, documents proving the relationship with the dead person, death certificates or post-mortem reports issued by doctors in public hospitals, then assume huge importance in such a context. Poor relatives of the deceased person then queue outside government offices to submit these documentary evidences to claim their compensation cheque. Something that the father-in-law in the play *Muavze* hoped to get in case his son-in-law embrace death during the riots and become a *lash.*

In this chapter, I draw upon the concept of 'social death' (Králová2015) and 'zone of abandonment' (Biehl, 2004) to explain what is happening in the lanes of Citizennagar, especially with the narratives of death and loss, and mournful expression of being forgotten, or left alone to suffer. My ethnography of this locality follows the notion proposed by Das (2011) that citizenship is not just status but a process in the lives of the urban poor who construct their identity as citizens through certain moral claims on the state and the larger society. The use of death as a case of moral claim by the residents of Citizennagar points to a certain failure of the civil society in Ahmedabad to deal with the aftermath of the 2002 riots. My view on the role of civil society in Ahmedabad in the post-2002 scenario has been articulated by Chandhoke (2009:28) who quite aptly comments that:

> In the case of Ahmedabad, the preconditions for a democratic and vibrant civil society have been weakly articulated and inadequately institutionalised. Therefore, when the religious right arose and provided the trigger for the translation from non-associationalism to violence, civil society was rendered helpless (2009:28).

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gratia to the legal heir of the victim died in post-Godhra riots, 2 lacs (2810 USD) offered to the nearest kin of Hindu victims of the fated Sabarmati Express by the State of Gujarat in 2002.

Then, how can the poor survivors of violence exercise their rights in such a context? This challenges our understanding of both the reach of the state and the role of civil society for the exercise of democratic rights, given that this is a community living in an urban space.

Chatterjee (2004), in his discussion on the politics of the governed, talks about moral claims made by the poor; yet he employs a different theoretical lens to evaluate the connection between politics and citizenship. He goes beyond the lofty ideals of civil society as a form of associational politics (Walzer, 1991) and explores the idea of political society as a useful domain for the members of subaltern groups, who he argues are not well presented or accommodated in the domains of civil society. However, in my ethnography of Citizennagar, I have highlighted that just like civil society, the domain of political society has largely been unsuccessful to provide a platform for the moral claims of the residents there.

In this backdrop, this chapter presents my argument around the idea of the politics of contingent citizenship, where the poor survivors are engaged in a 'self-making' exercise, through tales of death and loss, to demand better substantive citizenship rights. Here citizenship is contingent upon these tales as moral claims on the state and the larger society. Also, as my interviewees travel to a different part of India to make such claims, it complicates the picture of relief and rehabilitation practices followed after the 2002 riots.

In this way I attempt to answer both the first and the third research question mentioned in section 1.6. The third question of my thesis investigates the role of various actors, who aid or act as hindrance to the claim-making exercises of riot survivors. Here I ask: *what are the roles of state agencies and other non-state actors in the struggle and everyday lives of survivors to claim better citizenship rights?*

I have framed the narratives of death by Citizennagar residents as moral claims, because I recognise that "claims to a 'biological citizenship'- a demand for, but

limited access to, a form of social welfare based on medical, scientific, and legal criteria that recognise injury and compensate for it" are no longer valid for my interviewees (Petryana 2013:142).[83] Petryna conceptualises 'biological citizenship' not over dead bodies, but by studying "injured biology of a population" in the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster (2013:142). This chapter, on the other hand, is concerned with death and its narratives in the aftermath of a conflict. I draw from the work of Petryna on biological citizenship to show, how even death narratives and associated documents can constitute claims to social citizenship.

In the immediate aftermath of the 2002 riots, the state accepted evidence in terms of medical certificate from public hospitals, to compensate people for being partly and seriously injured during the riots (Vardarajan 2002). But 14 years since 2002, there is no such scheme or provision to compensate people who were affected by the riots, as state does not recognise the *dangapirits* or riot-affected persons in Citizennagar or IDPs in Gujarat, belonging to any special socio-political category (Janvikas 2013). However, as my chapter 8 shows, the residents of this place continue to demand such categories for themselves to be qualified for state protection against demolition drives by local city council in illegal settlements, or social housing for the poor, and other social welfare schemes.

[83] Petryna(2002) offers her concept of biological citizenship in the aftermath of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in Ukraine, where people produced evidence of radiation and bodily injuries from government operated radiation research clinics. She highlights "informal economy of illness and claim to a biological citizenship" (2013:142) in Ukraine, to show how loss of traditional employment, protection from state against inflation, lessening of legal-political categories as an aftereffect of a harsh market transition led to new modes of claiming social citizenship. People approaching the state agencies in Ukraine with medical evidence of illness and sick health was one of them. In India, both federal and state governments often announce compensation money for relatives of people died in natural disasters (Shivanandan, 2015), tragic road accidents (Our Bureau, 2018), or in communal riots (Lokhande 2015). Very little work exists to show how concerned persons make claims on the state to receive these compensation amounts like in the work of Petryna (2002).

Das (1994) has talked about how identities and subjectivities of a person change in the aftermath of experiencing violence. Such is also the case with my informants in the lanes of Citizennagar. They make their claims of citizenship through articulating their victimhood and connecting their past with the present. Here victimhood opens up a space for agency-making claims as responsible citizens, as they increasingly feel ignored and forgotten as a decade and a half has passed after the actual event of violence. The subject of death here provides the basis for this victimhood and the subsequent moral claims on the state and the larger society. Therefore, I ask in this chapter: how does the continued presence of death in the lives of Citizennagar residents affect the experiences of citizenship?

In the next section, I briefly describe how the discourse around the 2002 riots impacted the everyday life in Citizennagar, especially a top-down narrative from media and politicians focusing on the riot survivors. I show how in the absence of legal justice, the lives of Citizennagar residents were imagined by others in binaries- either they have moved on or they are in perennial victimhood. It presents us with the background, where citizenship claims are made through narrative of deaths in the subsequent sections of this chapter through two ethnographic case studies.

5.2 Citizennagar: Life in the shadow of the 2002 Gujarat riots

While walking from Gulmohar tempo stop in Bombay Hotel area to the houses in the Citizennagar, any outsider like me would feel compelled to stop and look at the plaque installed near an electric transformer. It reads as follows (all in capital letters): "28/02/2002, GODHRA RAYOT. NARODA PATIYA EFACKTER. VISTHAPIT COOLONY. a) DHORAJI YATIMKHANA. b) CITEZEN NAGAR." This plaque was written on a black board with white colours. Any English reader would recognize the spelling mistakes, but the writing on the wall is spot on. It tells you

clearly where you are standing. You have reached the place which is a *'Visthapit Coolony'*, a colony for the displaced. People living here are mostly from the Naroda Patiya neighbourhood of Ahmedabad who got affected during the post-Godhra riots, which started on 28 February of 2002. The colony is constituted in two parts; one is the Dhoraji Yatimkhana, and another is Citizennagar. The memory of everything is contained in this one plaque, and it is placed at a visible spot at that locality for any stranger to find.

Another plaque is placed nearby, which in contrast looks quite sophisticated as it reads 'Citizen Nagar' (City of Citizens) in large, bold, golden letters. It shines as the letters are embossed on a black tile. In a way, it kind of announces the superiority of the name 'Citizennagar' over any other titles given to the area.[84] It further informs us in all capital letters that house distribution took place here for the "riot victims of Gujarat 2002" on behalf of the Kerala State Muslim League Relief Committee. It also tells us the date of the programme for 'distribution of keys' of 40 houses by the President of Kerala State Muslim League, which was carried out by Muslim League leader and Minister of State in the External Affairs Ministry of Government of India Mr E. Ahmed on July 23, 2004.

The fact that an association of a Minister from the central government in Delhi was involved in this latter case is quite apparent with the more 'sophisticated' look of this plaque, compared to the other one. Though the '40 houses' were distributed by this political party from the state of Kerala, in India, the programme was said to have been organised by 'Citizen Relief Service' with registration no E- 6975/1987 with its office in the Shah Alam area of Ahmedabad. This information was written at the end of this plaque. It is important to note here that President of Kerala State

[84] e.g. Dhoraji Yatimkhana is written side by side with Citizennagar on the same plaque. Below, in smaller letters, it specifies the area as the Moulana Azad Area which is written as part of the Danilimda municipal unit of Ahmedabad.

Muslim League only distributed "the keys" of these houses to the people in Citizennagar. No land title or legal document was given, leaving the residents in a state of jeopardy due to which it has become their prime demand to get any document that proves the ownership of their houses.[85]

The third space on the wall of the same structure is a blackboard where the number 786 is written on top in Arabic numerals, which is usually denoted as 'Bismillah'. According to Islamic practice, you say 'Bismillah' or 'In the name of God' before any start or initiative. On the blackboard, there is a welcome message in Gujarati inscribed on behalf of the local members of the Congress Party.

In the afternoon, one often finds mostly the male residents of both Citizennagar and Dhoraji Yatimkhana colony sitting on the cemented circle around the electricity transformer. If there are more people, they take a seat on the cemented bench across the road (the width of it maybe 3 meters). I have found women who have often stopped by to chat with me there, sitting beside these men. But I have never found any of them hanging out with these males or in female-only groups in that particular space at regular intervals, unlike the male residents. When you arrive in Citizennagar, this is the place you are first introduced into. People hanging out there will ask your name, from where you are, what you do, and most importantly, which '*sanstha*' or organisation you belong to. They would often ask about one's institutional or visiting card and which political party the visitor is associated with.

So why has everyone been visiting this spot? Since 2002, Citizennagar has been a popular place for researchers, academics, NGO representatives, journalists and politicians to talk about the lives of Muslims in Gujarat. The social and economic

[85] This demand has been discussed in the previous chapter in my thesis.

conditions of Muslims in Gujarat have always been spoken of in terms of their fate after the conflict (Gayer & Jaffrelot 2012). The rise of Narendra Modi in Indian politics through his consecutive victories as Chief Minister in the Gujarat assembly elections of 2002, 2007 and 2012 and his subsequent election as Prime Minister of India in 2014 made conversation on the 2002 Gujarat riots vis-a-vis Modi's role in it ubiquitous in Indian politics (Bobbio, 2013; Sardesai, 2014).

Especially during the media frenzy ahead of 2014 Indian General Election, people mostly took sides in the debate based on their political affiliation; whether Modi's Gujarat development model needs to be replicated throughout India or electing a person as Prime Minister who has been accused by many of abetting the killings of Muslims in his state in 2002 (Sardesai 2014). People criticising Modi's role in the violence in 2002 also accused him of ignoring the plight of Gujarati Muslims who directly or indirectly got affected during the communal violence (Mander 2007, Jaffrelot 2012).



Figure 11: The black plaque outside Citizennagar located near the electrical transformer

On the other hand, people impressed with 'Gujarat's development model' espoused by Modi during his Chief Ministership of a decade, asked the same survivors of riots to move on without any explanation of what this idea stood for (Biswas, 2012). The 'moving on' discourse was framed by Modi supporters not in the context of perusal of justice or rehabilitation for the survivors, but on the

general argument that Modi's neoliberal economic policies will also benefit the Muslims in the state.[86]

The rhetoric of 'moving on' has been bandied in the context of riots in India. For example, although the former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh apologised to the Sikh community in Parliament in 2005 for the anti-Sikh riots in 1984 in which thousands were killed, he also said, "by constantly reminding of the 1984 riots, sometimes you unwittingly vitiate the creative thinking of the Sikh community...we need to move on" (PTI, 2010).

No apologies came from the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the party in power in the state of Gujarat in 2002, but they employ strikingly similar language. Prakash Javadekar, current Minister of Human Resource Development in the Union Government of India ruled by the BJP, said in a news article published in *The Hindu* in 2013 that Prime Minister Narendra Modi reached his constituency including Muslims of Gujarat through the plank of "good governance" and though "people want to move on" from the horrific events that rocked the state, it is the media and opposition parties who are obstructing the process (Javadekar, 2013).

This phrase 'moving on' employed by both main political parties of India, has not been defined or academically explored in the Indian context, but it bears similar expression to the 'forget and move on' approach that Hayner (2011) discusses concerning post-civil war political discourse in Mozambique and Cambodia. Conceptually, victimhood and 'moving on' are intrinsically linked because the latter term is directed towards people perceived to be victims in the political sense.

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[86] For an academic analysis on the Modi's neoliberal policies alongside pursuing Hindu nationalist agenda please see Sud (2012).

As discussed above, interestingly, in the context of Gujarat, the 'moving on' narrative flows in contrast from a denial of victimhood to those living in resettlement colonies. In their study titled 'The Displaced of Ahmedabad', researchers Chandhoke *et al.* (2007:12) say:

> It is clear that for the present government, these families just do not form an integral part of Gujarati society and politics; they have been expelled both spatially and socially to the margins of the city… And it is here, in these barren spaces, that the victims of the carnage in Ahmedabad have been settled, and are expected to begin their life anew, amidst even more deprivation than they faced in their original habitats.

Langenbacher and Shain (2010) show that the political recognition of victimhood is highly dependent upon the relationship that victims, perpetrators and the audiences share. If the perpetrators remain in power even after the actual event, oppressed and traumatised groups feel further alienated and fear retribution in case they decide to claim the rights of victims (see also Kleinman, 1997). This is not just the case with victimhood but applies even to claiming the same basic rights that everyone in the polity should have access to, regardless of the past.

In the case of Citizennagar, I argue that this fear operates at many levels. Moreover, as basis for making rights claims, the residents are part of both a) narrative of victimhood for living on the margins of Ahmedabad near the city's garbage dumping site and b) about being survivors expressed through the continued and surprising narrative presence of death among the inhabitants of Citizennagar.

In this hostile political climate, riot-affected people of Gujarat have been forced to compromise and live a new 'normal' life but, as Gupta (2011:113) argues, the "demand for justice will remain." One way that this demand for justice is expressed is through pursuing long-standing legal cases. It is estimated that of the 1,600 cases that the Supreme Court ordered to reopen in 2006, only 0.21% to 1.18% of

cases have resulted in convictions, with a large number are still pending (Sonnenberg, 2014:26) According to Jaffrelot (2012:77),

> The reasons for this failure of the rule of law – whose magnitude will have to be qualified since proceedings are still under way – lie in the grip that Hindu nationalism (as an ideology and a political movement) holds over the state machinery (including the police and the judiciary) in Gujarat and the central authority's relative powerlessness (both at the executive and judicial level) to counteract it.

So, the failure of the judiciary and the executive to protect the rights of these citizens and media's lack of attention to their plight as the political landscape changed with Narendra Modi as Prime Minister in New Delhi, push the people in the resettlement colonies to express deeply entrenched "reactive attitudes and feelings," as Strawson (1974:6) calls them.

But the pathologization of victimhood poses its own problem. As discussed earlier, in the run-up to the 2014 Indian General Election, most of the analysis of the lives of Gujarati Muslims, especially those who were living in resettlement colonies, applied the lens of 'persisting victimhood' or 'having moved on'. There was an assumption that there can be no life for these people beyond the binary of these two identities.

The life of Citizennagar residents should be looked at in conjunction with the stories of persistent injustice, social exclusion and ghettoisation in the city of Ahmedabad as described in section 1.2 of this thesis. Also, the site of Citizennagar as a resettlement colony or IDP has created new forms of marginalisation and induced a fear of "being forgotten" among the same residents, as they continue to live in the periphery of the city in inhuman conditions.

In the next section, I briefly discuss the theoretical concepts of biopolitics (Rabinow and Rose, 2006), 'social death' (Králová2015) and 'zone of abandonment' (Biehl, 2004) to establish their link with citizenship claims. Before presenting my ethnographic accounts, where residents complain of 'nothing happens' or that their suffering are ignored, such conceptual exploration help us to understand the context, where narratives of death can be constituted as bottom-up claims to citizenship.

5.3 Biopolitics, social death and citizenship

Foucault coined the term 'biopower' in order to explain historical phenomena such as; census of birth rate and population, the beginning of policies to deliberate upon them, political interventions in order to promote public hygiene, old age issues and insurance policies to address them, questions of race and its impact on geographical conditions in a town.[87] Along with 'biopower', which is more connected with the individual, Foucault (2003) introduces the concept of 'biopolitics', which he restricted to its 'core' meaning, i.e. "what we call population" (cited in Fassin 2009:45). He explains the power over life through a bipolar diagram. The diagram shows, "one pole of biopower focuses on an anatomo-politics of the human body, seeking to maximise its forces and integrate it into efficient systems. The second pole is one of regulatory controls, biopolitics of the population, focusing on the species body, the body imbued with the mechanisms of life: birth, morbidity, mortality, longevity" (Rabinow and Rose, 2006:196).

Biopolitics, as discussed above, is essentially about population. Fassin (2007) quotes his work on the debates and policies around AIDS outbreak in South Africa, showing policy maker's neglect towards certain communities and how the country's politics of racial segregation led to the foundation of apartheid regime. He says that racial "politics were biopolitics" (Fassin 2009:54). Beinart (2001) also looks into the apartheid regime since 1948 with this lens and showed that how systematic segregation and creation of 'townships' and 'homelands' for white and black people provided the South African government with opportunities to leave some section of the populations to their fate, with deliberately fudged data on mortality. The technologies of government can be used to 'erase' the traces of

[87] Foucault invented the term during one of his last lectures at College de France of 1975-76 under the course title *Society must be defended* (2003)

people's lives as well (Fassin 2009:55). Achille Mbembe (2003) rightly terms such politics of death as 'necropolitics'.

To discuss the conceptual links between social death and citizenship, we have to look at the social exclusion and how it impacts human life. In the context Citizennagar, discussing exclusion is highly significant. It brings us to the paradox of Citizennagar being covered extensively by media, academics and NGOs, and residents still complain that "nothing happens" or "nobody cares" for them. Such understanding of one's life is akin to the concept of social death that Kralova (2015) describes.[88]

In an engaging ethnography conducted in Vita, a "precarious rehabilitation centre for drug addicts and alcoholics" in Southern Brazil, Biehl (2004:476) states that death has found its place even in contemporary cities unlike what Mauss (1979) has pointed out in his work on 'primitive' societies. And such cases of 'rejecting into death' may happen through systematic exclusion and abandonment. He describes the Vita, as 'a zone of abandonment', life in Vita as "death-in-life" and people living there as 'ex-humans' (Biehl 2004:38-85).

Kralova (2015:239) has linked the concepts of 'bare life' (Agamben 1998) and 'ex-humans' (Biehl 2004) to come at a broader understanding of social death through "a loss of social identity, and social integration, triggered by a person's inadequacy in the eyes of others."[89] This is crucial for understanding how survivors of

[88] Marcel Mauss (1979), in his essay on death, argues that in many purportedly 'lower' civilisations if death happened because of social origin and not due to any biological or medical reasons, it could ravage someone's mind and body.

[89] If Canguilhem (1968) think of life as something comprised from birth to death, Agamben (1998), while discussing the concept of 'bare life' proposes that life is what can be put to death by the sovereign. "Behind the long strife-ridden process that leads to the recognition of rights and formal liberties stands the body of the sacred man with his double sovereign, his life that cannot be sacrificed yet may be killed," affirms Giorgio Agamben in *Homo Sacer* (1998:10).

communal violence may relate death to their claims for citizenship. So how can we talk about social death in the aftermath of a conflict like the 2002 Gujarat riots?

And consequently, how can social death can be linked to questions of citizenship? One answer is that the "notion of citizenship identity derives from the most basic meaning of citizenship: membership of a community (itself a contested concept)", an understanding which is diametrically opposed to the concepts like social death and social vitality (Lister 1997:3). The other path through which we can connect these two concepts is acknowledging social death as a form of 'structural violence' or "violence exerted systematically- that is indirect- by everyone who belongs to a certain social order" (Farmer, 2004:307) on an individual or group of people and thus violating their citizenship rights. Combining the two is my conceptual way of linking death to citizenship.

Drawing on the work of Arendt's (2017) critique of human rights, Somers (2008:25) argues that citizenship rights are essentially about "the right to have rights". Hannah Arendt put recognition and the right to inclusion in a political body central to her critique on human rights (Hann, 2017). Arendt argues that persons without any legal protection, without any due recognition, without the 'right to have rights' are ultimately "expelled from the political community into the camps" (Hann 2017:5).

The residents of Citizennagar often talks about this banishment from the larger society and the city itself, because of their lives are confined in a camp (refer to section 2.4). *De jure*, they are still Indian citizens yet at the same time, through their lived experience of abandonment, exclusion, and the misrecognition of their victimhood, they are, *de facto,* living the 'bare life', a "life that cannot be sacrificed yet may be killed" (Agamben 1998:10).

In the next two sections, I present two ethnographic encounters with the residents of Citizennagar, where I argue that social death or allegation of being pushed into

'zone of abandonment' is not the end of the story in their lives. Rather, it seems that it is by invoking death that these residents are resisting their condition of bare life, and making moral claims on the state, or rather claims to have the right to have rights. My analysis of these cases looks at the contradictory and complex claim-making; in one way they appear as lying in the "tragic mode of the exception", and on the other side it looks at life situated in the "ordinary experiences of persons within a democratic space" (Fassin 2010:89).

5.4 Case one: Nothing happens in Citizennagar and the mystery of PM report

One day when I visited Citizennagar sometime in early April of 2016, I took Saleem Bhai, my friend in Ahmedabad, with me. I knew him since my undergraduate days at AMU. Now he lives in Ahmedabad and aspires to contest local elections on a Congress party ticket[90]. He has friends and supporters in the Bombay Hotel area who put us in touch with the Citizennagar residents when I first reached Ahmedabad. He started frequenting Citizennagar with me since the early days of my fieldwork and asked for my help to file RTI application at the AMC offices on matters relating to health and education facilities in Bombay Hotel, environment policies followed at Pirana dumping site and details of town planning policies implemented there, among many others.

Taking these RTI replies sent by the AMC in our hand and riding pillion on Saleem Bhai's motorcycle, I reached the transformer site of Citizennagar. People sitting there looked at us curiously when we arrived and then made spaces for us to sit near them. Saleem Bhai started the conversation saying, "You must have thought we have not done any work regarding the garbage site. But see we have collected some information that must be of interest to you". He informed them that the AMC is planning to shift the site by 2030 and make that space a green zone. Everyone else sitting there made an expression of disgust and disappointment. One among them commented that AMC couldn't be trusted on this matter. Their plans are just on paper, he emphasised.

Abid Bhai, who is an auto-rickshaw driver and a long-standing active member of the Congress party for a long time from the Citizennagar area is considered better

[90] In Chapter 7 of this thesis, I discuss his political activities in Ahmedabad, and especially in Citizennagar with the idea of 'young agent of citizenship'.

educated in matters of documents by other people sitting there. They asked him to see these documents. He took them from our hand and shouted at his son from a distance to fetch his glasses. Looking at the RTI reply he said, "These fools in AMC have no clue what to do with the garbage site. First they said by 2011 they would shift it. Then they said by 2017 they would. Now in your papers they are saying 2031. What's the use? We will die by then. We will live our lives just like this now. Nobody cares. It's a reality. No one is going to hear us."[91]

After sifting through the documents, he repeated that he had filed many RTI applications in the past regarding the garbage site and got some of the documents that Saleem Bhai had obtained. "But I am a family man. You need time to do all this. If I leave driving my auto and get involved in doing this only, who will run my home?" He said that after all these years, he had lost his enthusiasm to be active around these issues. In the early days when he relocated here from Naroda Patiya, he tried his best to improve the situation around, but nothing happened. Looking at others, he made a point that unless they organise a '*dharna*' (sit-in protest), nothing will change in their lives. He turned his face towards Saleem Bhai and me and then lamented, "No one has got time here for all this. Now if you collect some 50-60 people and sit outside AMC office there is a chance that something may happen." He further said as if he was always ready to lead such '*dharna*', but found little support in his colony, "When people are behind you only then you feel motivated to do such things, else who cares, tell me?"

The two other men were looking at him approvingly but said nothing at this point. A sombre silence and heavy breathing that one can hear followed these statements. Abid then said that only after repeated requests that had been made in past years AMC constructed this bad road in the colony connecting it to the main

[91] Fieldnotes taken on January 15, 2016. All the quotes in this section used from the fieldnote.

road near the Gulmohar society. The local councillor only listens during election time. After election, he vanishes, and everyone starts complaining here.

“We all know that a school and hospital needs to be built here. We all give taxes here. It should be returned to us for good causes as well. But who listens to us?” he reiterated to the audience there. One person there said, “Abid Bhai knows everything here” and others nodded their head.

Abid Bhai continues to speak, “All the local councillors, MLA are from Congress. The local councillor is a Muslim, and yet nothing happens here”. He pulled out a paper card from his pocket which showed that he is an active member of the Congress party. I thought he was giving it to me to keep it, so I started to put it in between the pages of my diary. But he took it back from my hand and said, “No I just wanted you to see it".[92]



Figure 12: INC provided identity document of Abid bhai of Citizennagar

[92] In my defense, I thought it was a visiting card that he must had distributed to people in the past.

Then, he again kept observing our papers and his eyes were stuck on the sheet where Saleem Bhai noted all the names from Citizennagar who had died in the last few years. The conversation soon drifted towards the organisation of health camps in that locality. He informed us that if someone puts an application in the local hospitals, they do try to organise health camps there. We were told that doctors from the Vadilal SaraBhai hospital, the largest public hospital in Ahmedabad, had come there a year earlier to set up a check-up camp on diabetes, while doctors from the Nagri hospital, another Ahmedabad public health centre, set up a camp for eye checking in the recent past. Saleem Bhai then asked if he could get the medical records of the people who had died in Citizennagar. Abid Bhai answered in the affirmative and informed us that photocopies of "PM reports" could be easily obtained from the houses. I was confused about hearing the words "PM report" for a moment; when I asked what it meant, he replied it means Post Mortem report.

By then, the atmosphere near the transformer had become heavy, and everyone remained silent for some time. We were looking for words to break the heaviness that had enshrouded the milieu at that moment. Nehal Bhai, another person sitting there quipped, which again confused me for a moment- "Doctor to tayyar baitha rahta hai ke yaha koi mara nahi aur waha uska PM kar ke nikal dia" (*Doctors are all ready. Someone just dies here, and they release the PM).*

I did not get the joke, but all others laughed out loud, including Saleem Bhai. I just looked askance at everyone. I asked them if they can show me one PM report. Abid Bhai called out for his son again to bring a file. He came back with a plastic binder, a semi-transparent blue one, inside of which there was another torn paper file containing a lot of papers. "These plastic files are better. They are cheaper and stronger than paper ones. I don't buy the paper files anymore." he quipped. He handed me a document with 'Death Certificate' written on the top of it. "Is it the post-mortem report?" I wanted to confirm. Nehal Bhai replied from back, "Yes, yes, this is the thing they give us in hospital when someone dies". Death certificates and post-mortem reports are two separate documents, which are commonly issued by a state-employed medical officer in India (Kotabagi, Chaturvedi and Banerjee,

2004). When death happens due to a disease or accident or homicide, and the reason for such deaths are unknown, such medical officers often conduct post mortem examinations to ascertain the cause of death. [93] In such cases, death certificates are medico-legal documents, verified by an investigating police officer to confirm the identity and address of the deceased, which are then produced by doctors based on such post mortem exercise. Therefore post-mortem report, which mainly deals with the cause of death, and not identity and address of the person concerned form the basis for death certificate, not another way around.

It was interesting to note that Citizennagar residents were using the word 'PM report' to mean death certificates, a copy of which they showed me in this interaction. I understood that this had something to do the 2002 violence. Following the violence, to claim ex-gratia announced by the government, people had to get post-mortem report of their dead relatives, with both police and doctors involved. After cross verifications by police with relatives and other sources, to ascertain address and identity of the person, government doctors used to provide death certificates.

In the minds of my informants in Citizennagar, the word 'PM report' got registered instead of 'death certificate', even after 14 years after they witnessed their family members got killed in 2002. These PM reports of their relatives only confirmed, that their family members did not die a natural death and thus constitute claims on the state to demand compensation money. For the poor Muslim survivors, such documentary evidence of death often led to certain claims of social citizenship, as no other entitlement was offered by the state at that time. During my fieldwork I had heard of longstanding enmity between family members, over establishing the legal heir of the compensation money just after the riots. A newlywed wife would get it, or the mother or the brother of the deceased can claim such amount from

[93] Deaths due to old age or commonly known diseases, are not subject to post-mortem.

the state created family rifts in many cases if the amount was not properly distributed. The question of who would queue in government offices with the 'PM report' in hand, constituted the power to shape family relations in poor neighbourhoods.

Petryna (2013) writes, how in Ukraine following the Chernobyl disaster, poor survivors believed that constitution of illness is the only way to claim entitlement from the state which failed to provide jobs or other economic rights. Today, in the lanes of Citizennagar 'PM reports' do not offer any entitlement from the state but only remains a document to be preserved in plastic folders. These narratives of death only form the moral claims on the state and the larger society. They may not constitute biological citizenship like in the work of Petryna (2013), but certainly, such claims should offer them their due entitlements.

Nehal Bhai's humour on the bureaucratisation of death, where the doctors in nearby public hospitals are more concerned with the writing of death certificate than treating the patient can be compared to the satire in Sahni's work as discussed in the beginning. The system around the people in Citizennagar is always ready to produce the documentary evidence of death and physical suffering in their lives. But the bureaucratic apparatus is apathetic or clueless on how to address and solve the issue. Be it Walzer's (1991) civil society or Chatterjee's (2004) political society; nothing can provide any relief in the lives of Abid or Nehal. When they complain that "nothing happens" in Citizennagar and nobody cares about their lives, they allude themselves to be in the 'zone of abandonment' of Biehl (2004). It is the social death that Kralova (2015) writes about.

It can also be said that they constantly think about their past experiences of violence and displacement, which brought them risk of anonymity at a new place as Agier (2011) warns in his discussion on camp and citizenship. The double political relationship that we discussed in section 2.4.2 of this thesis- of both recognition and protection from the state are missing in a space like Citizennagar.

Living such a life people complains of “nothing happens” or that no one knows “who I am” as Agier mentions in his account (2011:16).

Citizennagar provides us with an opportunity to talk about ‘biopolitics’ and ‘social death’ in the aftermath of communal violence, especially from the perspective of the survivors. How have the survivors of such violence, who possibly had escaped death themselves earlier, are confined to spaces where people get ‘rejected into death’ by the authorities?

What does it mean for the citizenship claims of the people living in Citizennagar? I argue that it is not static, and people forward their moral claims in myriad ways to construct meaning on what it means to be a citizen. In the next section, I will look at the same people in a different space, which is essentially politically contested but offers them the opportunity to look beyond the ‘bare life’ and ‘social death’.



ફોર્મ - ૬ FORM - 6

№ 015278 -1/13

ગુજરાત સરકાર
GOVERNMENT OF GUJARAT
આરોગ્ય અને પરિવાર કલ્યાણ વિભાગ
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND FAMILY WELFARE

મરણ પ્રમાણપત્ર
DEATH CERTIFICATE

(જન્મ અને મરણ નોંધણી અધિનિયમ, ૧૯૬૯ની કલમ ૧૨/૧૭ અને
ગુજરાત જન્મ-મરણ નોંધણી નિયમો, ૨૦૦૪ના નિયમ - ૮ મુજબ)
(Issued under Section 12/17 of the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969
and Rule 8 of the Gujarat Registration of Births and Deaths Rules, 2004)

આથી પ્રમાણિત કરવામાં આવે છે કે, નીચેની માહિતી મરણના મૂળ રેકર્ડમાંથી લેવામાં આવી છે. જે ... વોર્ડ - બહેરામપુરા ... તાલુકાના ... ગામ/શહેરના રજિસ્ટરમાં છે.
This is to Certify that the following information has been taken from the original record of death which is in the register for Village/City ... of Taluka ... of District ... of Gujarat State.

૧.	નામ	: [redacted]	૨.	જાતિ (પુ/સ્ત્રી)	: પુ
1.	Name	:	2.	Sex (M/F)	:
૩.	મરણ તારીખ	: 23-12-13	૪.	મરણ સ્થળ	: સિવિલ
3.	Date of Death	:	4.	Place of Death	:
૫.	માતાનું નામ	: -			
5.	Name of Mother	:			
૬.	પિતા/પતિનું નામ	: અબ્દુલ રહેમાન શેખ			
6.	Name of Father/Husband	:			
૭	મરનારના મૃત્યુ સમયનું સરનામું		૮	મરનારનું કાયમી સરનામું	
7.	Address of deceased at the time of Death.		8.	Permanent address of deceased	
	મ.નં.૧૮ સિટીઝન નગર ...ટી.૨૬ ...મોટેરા ની સામે ...ઇ.ડબ્લ્યુ.એસ.૨ ...અમદાવાદ			...અમદાવાદ	
૯.	નોંધણી ક્રમાંક	: ૪૮૮	૧૦.	નોંધણીની તારીખ	: ૨૪-૧૨-૧૩
9.	Registration No.	:	10.	Date of Registration	:
૧૧.	રીમાર્કસ (વિશેષ નોંધ)	:			
11.	Remarks (if any)	:			
	પ્રમાણપત્ર કાઢી આપ્યાની તારીખ	: ૨૪/૧૨/૧૩		પ્રમાણપત્ર કાઢી આપનાર સત્તાધિકારીની સહી	
	Date of issue	:		Signature of the issuing authority	
				અમદાવાદ મ્યુ. કોર્પોરેશન વોર્ડ - બહેરામપુરા	
				પ્રમાણપત્ર કાઢી આપનાર સત્તાધિકારીનું સરનામું Address of the issuing authority	

Seal

Ensure Registration of every Birth & Death
દરેક જન્મ અને મરણની નોંધણી અવશ્ય કરાવીએ

(સ.મુ. ૨)-વાય-૫૧ ... 2000-6-2010

Figure 13: Death certificate of a relative of one Citizennagar resident

5.5 Case Two: Did I do well?

Salma woke up early in the morning of May 2, 2016. She got ready before everyone else in her group as she would be speaking along with Fazeel, another resident of Citizennagar, at the Calicut Press Club at 10 am that day. She had arrived in the city of Kozhikode or Calicut, located in the northern part of Kerala state, just a week earlier, along with five other women and six men from her locality of Citizennagar. This was her first trip to Kerala, the southernmost state of India, almost 1800 km from her city of Ahmedabad.

This trip had been organised by Shaheed Waseem, a 30-year-old journalist with a local newspaper in Calicut, also associated with the youth wing of Communist Party of India (Marxist) or CPM. He went to Gujarat two years earlier to cover the lives of Muslims in Ahmedabad and ended up in Citizennagar. In December 2015, he wrote a long story on the plight of the residents of Citizennagar for his local newspaper, interviewing Salma and others (Shreyas 2015). He highlighted the fact that how Indian Union Muslim League (IUML), the same political party whose name is written on the plaque at Citizennagar, had resettled the 2002 riot victims near Ahmedabad's largest garbage dumping site. 'Waseem Bhai' as he was called by the others from Citizennagar, told Salma that his December story created a lot of controversy in Kerala and was run by local TV channels rattling the senior officials from the party.

This time he had brought the people of Citizennagar to Kerala on the eve of the Kerala State Assembly elections, scheduled to be held on May 16, 2016. He got the support from his party to arrange their return train fare and boarding and lodging at a modest local hotel at Calicut till the eve of the elections. The ruling United Democratic Front (UDF), a group of seven political parties led by Indian National Congress, was pitched against the Left Democratic Front (LDF), another group of political parties led by the CPM in this election. IUML is part of the UDF, and it has a strong presence among the Muslim dominated districts of Kerala like

Mallapuram. The headquarter of this party is located at the heart of Calicut city, on the Red Cross Road that leads to the beautiful coast of the Arabian sea.

On the one hand, Waseem thought and convinced Salma and others that if people from Citizennagar remain in Calicut city during the election time, it will put pressure on IUML to resolve the issue of house ownership, as they were the ones who distributed the keys to the Citizennagar residents. On the other, he got support from his party in his plan as he believed that local media would pick up the story hurting the political prospects of the Muslim League, showing them as a culprit in the eyes of their Muslim supporters in the state. Needless to mention, it was assumed that this move by Waseem would electorally benefit the CPM. Attacking the IMUL with a cause related to, as mentioned earlier, one of the most discussed cases of political victimhood in India, the case of the 2002 survivors would hurt its political support among the local Muslims.

Waseem used all his connections to organise the press conference at the Calicut Press Club. He booked the time slot in the Press Club as it was quite busy during election time. He called up his friends in the local media and party to send as much media as possible to the conference. He prepared a press note in English and the local language of Malayalam and sent it to the offices of both print and electronic media in the city.

He asked the Citizennagar residents the previous night at the hotel, where he was also staying, who amongst them would address the media at the Press Club. In this consultation process, it was decided that Fazeel and Salma would do the job as they are good at "speaking in public".[94] In the consultation meeting, Fazeel clearly

[94] Fieldnotes taken on May 6, 2016. All quotes are taken from the same fieldnote. I also wrote about this specific Kerala event in my fieldnotes dated May 8 and May 10, 2016 as well.

said in front of everyone, “Salma Apa (sister) must sit at the podium. She has lost her son and husband in recent times due to illness caused by the garbage dump site. And she can speak well in public. I am sure she will be able to make them understand how we live there in Citizennagar”. Salma replied to the group, “Yes I will. Do not worry. I gave the interview to Waseem Bhai in December, remember”. All other present there nodded in affirmative.

At 10 am on May 2, 2016, we all reached the venue and took our seat on the podium in the main conference room of the Press Club. It was full of journalists, both from print and electronic media with their notebooks, audio recorders and cameras. Waseem requested me to sit with both Fazeel and Salma in case the local press asked for translation of their narratives. He explained the local media is not well versed with Hindustani, the spoken language of the Citizennagar residents, so I may have to explain in English. I agreed to help them. He asked one of his local friends to distribute the press note there along with the list of deaths in Citizennagar compiled by Saleem Bhai earlier with name, age, year of death and the possible illness they suffered.

Fazeel first spoke to the media, explaining how violence in 2002 forced them to live in a temporary camp in Ahmedabad, and then how people from Kerala came to see them in the camp and distributed the keys of their houses in Citizennagar, along with other local politicians, and how they face many health problems in living near the garbage dump site, a “very polluted site which has killed many of my friends and relatives”. He said in a sombre voice.

Next Salma was asked to speak. Waseem helped to adjust the mic so that her voice became audible to everyone in the room. She also started speaking first about her life in Naroda Patiya and how the 2002 riots forced her to relocate in Citizennagar along with her husband and very small kids. She said she sometimes wonder why ‘*Keralawale*’ or people from Kerala gave her the house near ‘Kachre ka dher’ or “heap of garbage”. And then her voice started to break, and her eyes got visibly moist. She started to talk about the deaths in her family. Her husband first died

three years back and then her ten-year-old son just the next year. Her husband first complained of chest pain and breathing problems. But he never stopped going for the work in a nearby jeans factory where he secured the job as a daily wager. And then one day he died after lying on the floor of civil hospital of Ahmedabad for two days, she informed the audience in a voice that emanated pain and helplessness. From sobbing, she started to visibly cry when she started to talk about her son. She told the audience how within a year he got paralysed and remained bedridden for six months. And one day he died too. She became silent after that. She resumed speaking and said, "No one deserves to live as we are living in Citizennagar".

After a brief pause, the journalists sitting across the podium started to throw questions in English. "Why they have come to Kerala?" "What do they expect to get from party officials in Muslim league in Calicut"?, "Do they receive any government support or not?", "Why couldn't their problem be solved in Ahmedabad itself?" "Are they supporting the LDF candidates in Kerala"?, "Are they going to campaign during the elections?". I tried my best to translate these questions and convey them to both Fazeel and Salma. They patiently replied to the questions and stressed the point that they had arrived in Kerala only to appeal to the Muslim league officials that "for the sake of humanity" they help them resolve the issue of house ownership. They made it clear that they are not aware of which party had brought them to Kerala and not interested in the political campaigning on behalf of any party. They just want their house ownership issue resolved, that was it.

Soon after the press conference ended and people left the room, Salma came near me and asked me inquisitively with a smile on her face, "Adil Bhai, did I do well?" I answered in the affirmative and said that she could handle media questions well, something which many people cannot. She looked happy with the praise. That day

some prominent local TV channels screened part of the press conference. News article appeared in online portals and local print media the next day. [95]



WEDNESDAY • 4 MAY 2016 • KOZHIKODE

ഗുജറാത്ത് പുനരധിവാസം

നീതിതേടി ഇരകൾ കേരളത്തിൽ

● വീടിന്റെ രേഖകൾ കിട്ടുന്നതുവരെ കേരളത്തിൽ തങ്ങും

സ്വന്തം ലേഖകൻ

കോഴിക്കോട്: ഗുജറാത്ത് വംശഹത്യയെ തുടർന്ന് വീടും സ്ഥലവും നഷ്ടപ്പെട്ടവർക്കായി മുസ്‌ലിം ലീഗ് നിർമിച്ചുനൽകിയ വീടുകൾക്ക് രേഖകൾ വേണമെന്നാവശ്യപ്പെട്ട് ഇരകൾ കേരളത്തിൽ. ഗുജറാത്തിൽനിന്ന് 20 പേരടങ്ങുന്ന സംഘമാണ് കേരളത്തിലെത്തിയത്. 2002ലെ ഗുജറാത്ത് കലാപത്തെ തുടർന്ന് വീടും സ്ഥലവും നഷ്ടപ്പെട്ട 40ഓളം കുടുംബങ്ങളെയാണ് അഹ്മദാബാദിലെ ദാനിലിംഡക്കടുത്തുള്ള സിറ്റിസൺ നഗറിൽ മുസ്‌ലിം ലീഗിന്റെ നേതൃത്വത്തിൽ പുനരധിവസിപ്പിച്ചത്. ഇവിടെ നിർമിച്ചുനൽകിയ 40 വീടുകളുടെ ഒരുവിധ രേഖയും 12 വർഷമായിട്ടും നൽകിയിട്ടില്ല.

അഹ്മദാബാദ് നഗരത്തിലെ മാലിന്യങ്ങൾ നിക്ഷേപിക്കുന്ന ഗ്യാസ്പുർ പിരാനയുടെ സമീപത്താണ് കുടുംബങ്ങളെ പുനരധിവസിപ്പിച്ചത്. അഹ്മദാബാദിലെ കോൺഗ്രസ് നേതാവ് ഷെരീഫ് ഖാനെയാണ് വീടുകളുടെ നിർമാണച്ചുമതല ഏൽപിച്ചത്. വൈദ്യുതി ബില്ലും നികുതിയുമെല്ലാം വീട്ടുകാരാണ് അടക്കുന്നത്. എന്നാൽ, വീടിന്റെ രേഖകൾ റിലീഫ് കമ്മിറ്റിയുടെ പേരിലാണെന്ന് സിറ്റിസൺ നഗറിൽനിന്നെത്തിയവർ കോഴിക്കോട്ട് വാർത്താസമ്മേളനത്തിൽ പറഞ്ഞു. ഭീതാസമ്മേളനത്തിൽ പറഞ്ഞു. നിരവധി തവണ മുസ്‌ലിം ലീഗ് അധികാരികളിലേതും നേതാവ് ഇ. അഹമ്മദ് എം.പിയുമായും വീട് നിർമിച്ചുനൽകിയ നവാബ് ബിൽഡേഴ്സുമായും ബന്ധപ്പെട്ടെങ്കിലും ഫലമുണ്ടായില്ല. രേഖകൾ ലഭിക്കാത്തതിനാൽ വീട് പുതുക്കിപ്പണിയാൻ പോലും കഴിയുന്നില്ല. മാരകമായ അസുഖങ്ങളുമായാണ് പലരും ജീവിക്കുന്നത്. നിരവധി പേർ മരിച്ചു. മാരേ ദിവസം കഴിയുംതോറും ജീവിതം കൂടുതൽ ദുരിതപൂർണമാവുകയാണെന്നും ഇതിനെതിരെ നിജസ്ഥിതി ബോധ്യപ്പെടുത്താനാണ് കേരളത്തിലെത്തിയതെന്നും ഇവർ പറഞ്ഞു.

മേഴ്സിഡസ്ക്കു മുന്നിൽ സിറ്റിസൺസ് നഗറിലെ ദുരിതജീവിതത്തെ കുറിച്ച് 'മാധ്യമം' ആഴ്ചപ്പതിപ്പ് റിപ്പോർട്ട് ചെയ്തിരുന്നു. തുടർന്ന്, മുസ്‌ലിംലീഗ് ഒന്നരക്കോൾ പുനരധിവസിപ്പിക്കുകയോ വീടിന്റെ രേഖകൾ നൽകുകയോ ചെയ്യണമെന്നും പ്രശ്നം പരിഹരിക്കുന്നതുവരെ കേരളത്തിൽ തുടരാനാണ് തീരുമാനമെന്നും ഇവർ പറഞ്ഞു.

ഗുജറാത്തിൽ പ്രവർത്തിക്കുന്ന ഇൻസാഫ് സംഘടനയുടെ പ്രവർത്തകരായ സഫീർ ഗുമി, ആദിൽ ഹുസൈൻ എന്നിവർക്കൊപ്പമാണ് 12 പുരുഷന്മാരും എട്ടു സ്ത്രീകളുമടക്കമുള്ള സംഘം കേരളത്തിലെത്തിയത്. വംശഹത്യയുമായി ബന്ധപ്പെട്ട കേസുകളിലെയും കലാപക്കേസുകളിലെയും പ്രധാന സാക്ഷികളായ 16 പേർ ഇവിടെയാണുള്ളത്. ഇവരുടെ ജീവനപോലും അപകടത്തിലാണെന്നും സഫീർ ഗുമി പറഞ്ഞു.

സൗദി – മക്ക
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ഗുജറാത്ത് കലാപബാധിതർക്ക് മുസ്‌ലിംലീഗ് നിർമിച്ചുനൽകിയ വീടുകളുടെ രേഖകൾ കൈമാറണമെന്നാവശ്യപ്പെട്ട് വാർത്താസമ്മേളനത്തിനെത്തിയ സിറ്റിസൺ നഗറിലെ താമസക്കാർ കാലിക്കറ്റ് പ്രസ്ക്ലബിനു മുന്നിൽ

തെരഞ്ഞെടുപ്പു മുന്നിൽക്കണ്ടുള്ള തന്ത്രം –കുഞ്ഞാലിക്കുട്ടി

കോഴിക്കോട്: ഗുജറാത്ത് കലാപത്തിലെ ഇരകൾക്കായി മുസ്‌ലിം ലീഗ് പുനരധിവാസ പ്രവർത്തനങ്ങൾ നടത്തിയ സിറ്റിസൺ നഗറിലെ അന്തേവാസികളെ കോഴിക്കോടെത്തിച്ചത് തെരഞ്ഞെടുപ്പ് തന്ത്രത്തിന്റെ ഭാഗമാണെന്ന് മന്ത്രി പി.കെ. കുഞ്ഞാലിക്കുട്ടി. കോഴിക്കോട് സൗത്ത് നിയോജകമണ്ഡലം യു.ഡി.എഫ് സ്ഥാനാർഥി ഡോ. എം.കെ. മുനീറിന്റെ പ്രകടനപത്രിക പുറത്തിറക്കുന്ന ചടങ്ങിനിടെ മാധ്യമപ്രവർത്തകർ ഇക്കാര്യം സൂചിപ്പിച്ചപ്പോഴാണ് കുഞ്ഞാലിക്കുട്ടി പ്രതികരിച്ചത്. സിറ്റിസൺ നഗറിലെ താമസക്കാർ വന്നതായിരിക്കില്ല. അവരെ കൊണ്ടുവന്നതാണെന്നും എല്ലാ തെരഞ്ഞെടുപ്പിലും ആവർത്തിക്കുന്ന തന്ത്രമാണിതെന്നും അദ്ദേഹം പറഞ്ഞു. കലാപബാധിതർക്ക് കിട്ടിയ വീട് താമസയോഗ്യമല്ലെങ്കിൽ അത് നൽകിയവർ ഇക്കാര്യം അന്വേഷിച്ച് തുടർനടപടികൾ സ്വീകരിക്കുമെന്നും കുഞ്ഞാലിക്കുട്ടി കൂട്ടിച്ചേർത്തു.

Figure 14: News on Citizennagar residents as appeared in regional Kerala newspaper

The event in Kerala, with all the political drama unfolding around the residents of Citizennagar, proves that 2002 riots were a key political event that had generated many effects, both in Ahmedabad and in other parts of India. Especially it

[95] Please see Deccan Chronicle (2016) for example.

highlighted the tensions and internal differences within the Muslim community and Muslim political leadership in India. Muslims of India are a highly heterogeneous population group, divided along class position, linguistic affiliation, gender, ethnicity, age, gender and different forms of urbanity (Gayer and Jaffrelot 2012). But the horrific events of 2002, made an impact throughout India in the Muslim psyche and political articulations of belonging.

The narratives of death and loss constituted the main part of this press conference organised in Kerala. Salma and her family faced it not only during the 2002 riots but also in the subsequent years. The experiences of living near the garbage dump of the Ahmedabad city only deepened her and others' continued marginalisation. The State of Gujarat ruled by the BJP had been unresponsive to their claims to social citizenship. People like Rahman builder remains an important figure in their lives and ignorant of their pleas on giving them the house papers, something which can bring them recognition material benefits, and above all claim to urban citizenship.

Salma's tales of death and loss, at this press conference, forms the moral claim on IUML, who worked alongside Rahman builder in 2002 in giving them the houses in Citizennagar. This moral claim-making from below, also highlights the role of non-state actors, especially in the context of 2002 riots, where state has visibly failed to look after its citizens. It is also to fight back the perceptions of social death among the residents of Citizennagar, who often think themselves as forgotten today.

I reject the certainness in the works of Foucault (2004) and Agamben (1998), where they see human beings trapped in modern systems of thoughts and practices, or the dichotomies of 'bare life' versus 'qualified life'. Rather people like Salma, who offer alternatives in their struggles for citizenship (understood as claim to become "full members of the community") by their act of speaking point towards a third space which is beyond these theoretical dichotomies. Her

conscious choice to appeal to the "humanity" of IMUL party officials shows that she wants to put "humanitarianism as politics of life" (Fassin, 2007:1). The deaths in her family have an eternal presence in her life; it was not just the end.

Fassin (2009), drawing on the example of illegal immigrants applying for asylum in France, shows what happened when French government under pressure from non-governmental organisations created a new criterion to legalise undocumented immigrants suffering from serious illness that cannot be treated in their home country with the clause "humanitarian". Deterred asylum seekers who escaped religious and ethnic violence in their countries but could not use such reason to get asylum, started to apply under this clause and "ironically express their despair when told their case is not serious enough to be considered relevant concerning the humanitarian clause" (2009:51). The shifting political meaning of their suffering forced these asylum applicants to speak more of their sick life than political victimhood resulting from violent events.

Fassin invokes the case of 'biolegitimacy' here, which he believes is the foundation of Petryana's (2002) work on 'biological citizenship', which she developed while working with the victims of Chernobyl nuclear disaster. He says

> After Chernobyl, the Ukrainian government granted the victims of the disaster a specific political status which gave them access, insomuch as they were officially recognized as such, to compensation and aid. From then on, they only existed through the physical sequels of their radiation, which they would have to exhibit in front of civil servants in public administrations. Similarly, undocumented immigrants may be granted social rights- not only a residence permit but also medical air- as long as they prove their suffering (Fassin 2009:51).

In the case of Salma and others from Citizennagar, what my ethnography shows is that in their struggle for citizenship, they also have to prove their physical and

mental suffering constantly to claim physical resources and rights. The narratives of death and sick lives near the garbage dumpsite of Ahmedabad is their way of proving to the world what they should deserve as 'citizens'. My case expands the understanding of lives of citizens beyond what Petryna (2002) offers with 'biological citizenship' or what Agamben (1998) proposed in 'bare life'. What I argue in this chapter is that narratives of death and loss may also constitute a distinct political understanding of suffering. If medical suffering of asylum seekers in France, or radiation sickness of Chernobyl victims constitutes 'biolegitimacy', or the power of life as opposed to the biopolitical power over life, then stories of loss and suffering due to precarious existence in close proximity to a polluted site in Citizennagar should also be considered the same. In this chapter, I show that the conversation around post mortem report, or Salma's passionate intervention in Kerala invoking death is to reclaim the power of life in citizenship claims.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter takes my argument on the politics of contingent citizenship forward by studying the narratives of death and loss among the residents of Citizennagar. Here we could see that in order to claim better substantive citizenship rights, in the face of continued injustice and a forced narrative of moving on, they put moral claims on the state and the larger society. And in this way, my informants perceive the citizenship rights are contingent upon tales of death, which they do not keep restricted in private domain but share in the public sphere to claim resources. To quote Murray (2006:211), "such an intimate relation with death, death becomes the condition of life."

I started the chapter with a satire by Bhism Sahni where we could see the bureaucratisation of death in the event of a possible riot in a fictional city. But this is not just limited to fiction as my Case One shows in this chapter. In the chapter, we can witness how the residents of Citizennagar talk about their dear one's death through humour or saved the evidence of these deaths in the materiality of documents. PM or Post Mortem reports and their photocopies are kept safely in the plastic folders as they bear the proof of what happened in 2002 and in the subsequent years in their lives. Before presenting my ethnographic accounts, I briefly discuss biopolitics, social death and citizenship as I find these distinct concepts intricately linked in the lives of my informants in Citizennagar.

When national political leaders force upon a narrative of moving on, without dispensing justice or provide any material benefits to allow them to live a dignified life, we can see how these residents put their stories of life and death in the political domain as a form of a moral claim. Though they complain of 'social death' or being pushed in a 'zone of abandonment' by the larger society, they also show their willingness to fight back such exclusion. In the last part, I present the case of

Salma and her passionate appeal to the IUML politicians on account of loss and mourning in the years after the 2002 riots, where she lost her husband and son.

In the next chapter, I present an account of gendered citizenship in the lanes of Citizennagar by studying the lives of women living there. I continue with my narrative of Salma and her life in this chapter, as it attempts to answer the gender angle in the Muslim citizenship question raised in section 2.4.3 of this thesis.

6 Violence, everyday and gendered citizenship in Citizennagar

6.1 Introduction

Citizennagar was not a quiet place during the day, and sometimes you could hear noise coming from one or the other house in the colony even till late at night. One room shacks with doors open most of the time make sounds quite ubiquitous in this place.

You could see small children often pestering their parents with repeated requests to buy them ice-cream or some sweet snacks from a vendor, who would arrive in the colony blasting music from a broken system attached to his small trolley. The noise level would often cross such decibel levels that ringing inside the ear may continue for hours even after the vendor has left the place. One may experience similar feelings when small kids from nearby Madrassas (independently run Islamic schools) wearing a white kurta, pyjamas and skull cap entered their locality to ask for alms. They would play *naat* (poetry in praise of Prophet Muhammad) in an audio system appended to their tricycle which only emanates the shrill voice of the child performer, leaving any listener confused on the exact words of the poetry. The cacophony of various kinds of sounds dominate here. It might also happen with televisions in some houses buzzing with the latest Bollywood numbers or screeching sound of some Television family sagas running for a decade.

Amidst all the cacophony, in one evening of mid-May, a meeting was happening in the house of Mansoor Bhai. In the meeting everyone was raising their pitch to be heard, quite common in this locality whenever people sit together to discuss. After

visiting Kerala without much success to know the whereabouts of the documents related to their houses, this was the first strategic meeting that was being organised to decide the next mode of action by Citizennagar residents. [96] "We are back to square one as we still don't know who has got the papers of our houses" claimed Fazeel Bhai.[97] Some people in the corner of the room were debating why it is only Rahman builder who could help them to resolve this issue and no other politician from India. Some in other corner was considering options of doing a sit-in demonstration in front of Rahman mansion to demand the papers for their houses.

"You people are cowards. I should take some women from the colony and do the sit-in in front of their house. Whatever we have to do, we will. Let us beg, plead, protest in front of their house but at least let us find a permanent solution to this problem. How long do you want to wait like this?" Salma said by rising from her position.

"You don't understand. It is not easy. What if they take any action against us?" Mansoor Bhai tried to reason with Salma.

“I do not understand why you people fear him so much. We lost everything during the *dhamaal* (riots). What more we can lose at this point? We were on the streets after leaving our houses in Naroda Patiya, right! If anything happens and we are back on the streets again, Allah would find us another home.” Salma made a passionate appeal to everyone present to take some concrete action rather than leaving the issue of house papers unsolved as they had done before. Some women

[96] I have written about this in detail in my chapter 4 and 5.

[97] Fieldnotes taken on May 15, 2016. All the quotes in this section are from the same fieldwork notes.

nodded their head to support her. The meeting ended without any agreement on what would be the right plan of action. However, I noticed the emergence of the difference of opinion between these groups of women and men on how to move forward on the issue. On one hand men looked cautious and fearful of their plan to antagonise Rahman Builders with sit-in protest, and on the other side it was women who were willing to take the risk.

In this chapter, I discuss the lives of these women of Citizennagar through the lens of gendered citizenship. Citizenship claims or the struggle to be the part of a political community is essentially a gendered phenomenon, as Lister (1997) argues. In my ethnographic observations, I present a picture of the everyday life of these women to understand how they are negotiating their position within their community, and engaging with the world beyond Citizennagar. To understand the phenomenon of everyday life in the aftermath of violence, I follow the work of Das (2007). However, whereas she stopped at her claim that people recover through 'descent into the everyday', I argue that the everyday life of women survivors is essentially linked with a gendered mode of citizenship. Everyday life which consists of both daily mundane things like eating, cleaning house, having normal conversations and intergenerational aspects like raising children, marriage, birth and death have special importance among the women survivors of riots. It also allows them to fight for inclusion in a political community that failed to protect them in the first place.

In my section 2.3.4 of this thesis, I have discussed earlier how in the analysis on Muslim citizenship, Shani (2010) missed the gender aspect of it, failed to show how women articulate such conceptions both at the inter-community and intra-community level. There are several studies on Muslim women in India, especially quantitative analysis on their socio-economic marginalisation feature prominently in them (Hasan and Menon, 2006; Sanyal, 2011; Hossain, 2013; Devikeri and D'souza, 2015). Several important studies were done on the gendered experiences of women during the Hindu-Muslim conflict in India like the

works of Jasani (2011), Harel-Shalev (2017), Olsen (2005), Robinson (2010), Sen (2011).

However, except notable examples like Rajan et al. (2011) very little ethnographic account or other analytical works exist that present a conceptual exploration on the question of how gendered experiences of Muslim women can be read in the light of citizenship theories from below. More so, when it comes to experiences in the aftermath of Hindu-Muslim violence in India, we have given little attention. Hasan & Menon (2006) argues that the identity of Muslim and women make them doubly marginalised so if we factor their experiences after violent conflict, we can examine new facets of discrimination and exclusion.

Muslim women also often treated as a monolithic category, understood through the words of religious leaders and portrayed as victims of Muslim personal laws in India (Kirmani, 2009; Narain, 2013). My research, not only discuss their marginalisation emerged out of little-explored dimension, as survivors of riots, but also it challenges the fixated category of Muslim women dominated in contemporary scholarship today. In my work they are not just Muslim women, but a sum of many other identities, constructed through their own narratives that are missing in other literature. In this way, I follow Kirmani (2009:49-50) who argues that placing "women within a particular locality moves away from the idea that all Muslim women in India uniformly share a common history and burden of oppression, and rather looks at women as multifaceted actors negotiating within particular social contexts."

My chapter on the gendered notions of citizenship emerged out of everyday lives of women living in Citizennagar can be situated in this context. It also essentially answers the second research question (along with the first) mentioned in section 1.6 of this thesis- *what kind of citizenship struggles and practices emerge from a site inhabited by displaced Muslim survivors of riots?* I start my discussion with a theoretical underpinning of everyday in the context of violence and how the idea

of everyday can be linked to the concept of gendered citizenship. Thereafter I follow it with my ethnographic account of Salma and her daily struggle to maintain her family in the aftermath of the 2002 riots. After this I proceed with a discussion on Salma's life and how it speaks about a mode of gendered citizenship after 2002. In the next section, I present another ethnographic account consisting of three women of Citizennagar, who talks about being carefree and independent against the wishes of male residents of the locality. And lastly I argue, how as an unintended consequence of the 2002 riots, new forms of struggle and resistance are put up by the women of Citizennagar.



Figure 15: Women of Citizennagar queuing for water in front of AMC tankers

6.2 Everyday and violence

> The first question that should be identified concerns the status of suffering in history- the various ways in which historical forces inflict psychic harm on collective bodies and the ways in which violence shapes subjectivity. It is here that a comparison with other historical experiences has been deemed appropriate. The Jewish Holocaust furnishes one such comparative experience. Indeed, the Holocaust, slavery, and apartheid all represent forms of original suffering. They are all characterized by an expropriation of the self by unnamable forces… *Indeed at their ultimate foundation, the three events bear witness against life itself… Whence the question: How can life be redeemed, that is, rescued from this incessant operation of the negative?* (Mbembe 2002:259, cited in Das 2003:298)

Mbembe's (2002) questions on how life can be liberated from the continuous influence of the negative are very relevant to what happened in Gujarat in 2002. In post-independent India, Muslim women particularly became the target of brutal sexual violence during the Hindu-Muslim conflict in 1969, 1990, 1992, 2002 and 2013 in different parts of India (Shah, 1991; Banerjee, 1996; Dixit, 2013; Kumar, 2016). According to scholars like Kumar (2016) and Sarkar (2002), the nature of violence against Muslim women during the 2002 riots in Ahmedabad and other provinces in Gujarat reached new limits due to the alleged support from members of the ruling party and regional government machinery.

Throughout the world, researchers acknowledge that violence against women during war and ethnic conflict has significant meaning in the gendered context of that particular country (Kelly, 2000; Farwell, 2004). India is not different from such experience when it comes to Hindu-Muslim conflict. Instances of barbaric violence against Muslim women during the 2002 violence challenge us to think

what Mbembe (2002:259) asked, "*How can life be redeemed, that is, rescued from this incessant operation of the negative?*"

Das (2007), in her work, argued that recovery from the trauma of violence happens through 'descent into everyday' rather than 'ascent into the transcendent'. In her work, the everyday has not been provided with a theoretical armour, but the word encompasses many meanings in a specified context. Before presenting my ethnographic encounters with Muslim women from Citizennagar, I discuss here the concept of everyday, its significance in the aftermath of violence, mainly from the aspect of self-making that Ong (1996) argues as essential in citizen formation.

Throughout the work of Das (2007), the everyday is the basis of ethnographic attention, a starting point and the ground upon which human life performs various activities. The word everyday is simple and quite obvious- that it would contain all the mundane, commonplace, uncertain happenings in life, normal activities that we often miss to observe. Everyday life consists of "the daily…temporal rhythms of cooking and eating food, cleaning the house, bathing the children, engaging in the usual conversations' as well as "the larger generational rhythms of marriages, birth, rearing of children, ordinary illnesses, infirmities of old age, and death" (Das 2007:11).

Everyday is not about grand theoretical debates on life but "pragmatic concerns regarding the livelihood, schooling of children, healthcare" (Das and Kleinman, 2001:18). Everyday has a context around it, and it is the face-to-face relations people share in local communities. And therefore, it concerns the "relations between the sexes and…intergenerational connections" that happens within kin groups and families (Das and Kleinman, 2000:7) and it is also linked with "everyday commerce between people" (Das and Kleinman, 2001:19). Conrad (2014) following the arguments of Das (1998) further says that in "a general way, these mundane concerns and relations are common to human beings all around

the world, part of which constitutes the human *form of life* in the vertical sense, as distinct from non-living things and from other life forms in the world."

The idea of everyday can be an important analytical point to begin with in the aftermath of conflict and violence, that has affected a specific community or group of people. Conrad (2014:78) rightly points out that "every day seems to have a particularly unstable quality in the aftermath of violent crises, where norms have been upended and relationships radically called into question."

Not only the work by Das (2007) supports this view, but also, we can see the same thing in the work of Mehta and Chatterji (2001:202) where they dealt with the question of "how people ravaged by violence resume everyday life" by linking "collective disorder and rehabilitation work". Their work among the riot survivors in Mumbai (then Bombay) slums of Dharavi locality in the aftermath of 1992 Hindu-Muslim violence argues that what "remains after the riot is not a coherent moral and local world but a multiplicity of fractured communities, each charting through rehabilitation work, its strategies of survival and coexistence" (2001:202). It is important to note here that such views run contrary to the work of scholars like Nandy *et al.* (1995) who believe that after the violence is over, the resilience of traditional Indian community life leads individuals and communities back to normality.

Beyond India, Maček (2009) puts focus on everyday through his ethnography during the siege of Sarajevo where informants interviewed by him made great efforts to maintain a 'normal life' in the face of the worst inhumane conditions. His work effectively connects the concept of everyday and 'normal life' by describing "some situation, person, or way of life" (2009:5). He further argues, "the concept carried a moral charge, a positive sense of what was good, right, or desirable: a 'normal life' was a description of how people wanted to live; a normal person thought and did things that were regarded as acceptable. The term pertained not only to the way of life people felt they had lost but also to a moral framework that

might guide their actions" (2009:5). In another work, Gampel (2000) shows how in the everyday lives of the Holocaust survivors and their families 'the uncanny' is a constant presence.

But everyday is not a stable phenomenon. It operates within a "space of contingency and improvisation, even under the most ordinary of circumstances" as Conrad (2014:79) rightly points out. Ochs (2012) argues through the close studies of the language used in everyday contexts, that this phenomenon is not what it is imagined to be- reasoned, rational, inflexible and conventional.

How can the idea of everyday be linked to the concepts of gendered citizenship? Das (2003) has tried to link everyday with the idea of self-making, an intrinsic act that makes citizens from bottom-up, as Ong (1996) argues. Das (2003:300) says,

There is no pretense here at some grand project of recovery but simply the question of how everyday tasks of surviving – having a roof over your head, being able to send your children to school, being able to do the work of the everyday without constant fear of being attacked- can be accomplished. I found that the making of the self was located in the shadow of some ghostly past but in the context of making everyday inhabitable.

The idea of gendered citizenship has been evolved to counter the Marshallian conception of citizenship where the idea of to be the "full member of a community" was available only to white working-class men (Lister, 1997). Hearn, E.H and Golanska (2011:2) reviewed the scholarship on gender and citizenship and began with the observation: "Citizenship has historically been framed by the nation-state and its supposedly gender-neutral, in practice often male, citizens."

We can draw a parallel between this observation and Indian experience with state making and citizenship, something that Sarkar (2001) also argues. Menon &

Bhasin (1998) also point to the fact that the project of Indian modernity, in spite of its promise of equal citizenship at the moment of Indian independence in 1947, "was confounded at the outset by the clear demarcation of public (represented as male and modern) from private (represented as female and traditional)" (1998:108).

The struggle of women to attain full citizenship rights has its origin in the idea of the public and private sphere. Vogel (1991) classifies public sphere is associated with the political, while the private sphere relates to the domain of the family. Be it in the West, or India; therefore male became the first to entitle themselves with citizenship rights by their access to the public sphere, and women lagged because they remain associated with the family domain. Yuval-Davis (1997:12) rightly observes, exclusion of women from citizenship rights "was part and parcel of the construction of the entitlement of men, not only as individuals but also as 'representative of a family (i.e. a group of non-citizens)."

Though the public-private barrier remains there in accessing citizenship rights for women, this is increasingly being challenged by women through demanding gender-specific rights (Lister, 1997) access to gendered spaces (Smyth, 2008), better pay and access to new employment opportunities (Lister, 1990). Feminist scholars mainly argue that economic independence, coupled up with physical and emotional independence is essential to construct women as an autonomous citizen (Lister, 1997). It can also be argued that the act of 'self-making' by women, in their everyday life both through ethics of care and justice (Sevenhuijsen, 1998), is to reposition themselves vis-a-vis the male citizens in their surroundings. In my work, I try to argue that the everyday life of Citizennagar women, is part of this 'self-making' exercise, which happens in the backdrop of a violent past, contribute to their citizenship struggles.

Whereas Das (2007) has explored the idea of 'descent into the everyday' in the lives of partition victims like Asha and Manjit in her work, as an attitude of

resignation or acts of mourning for their lost world, the stories of Muslim women in my work such as those of Salma, Masuda apa or Saimaa apa point to something else. So what happens with Salma, Masuda Apa or Saima Apa after the 2002 violence? Did they 'descend into the everyday' as Das argues as some consequences of violence in the lives of women? or has these women's everyday attained new meaning in the context of their life and family in Citizennagar? How the idea of the everyday in the lives of these women be linked to the conception of a novel version of gendered citizenship through a different kind of self-making? How does such self-making complicate the question of gender in the construction of Muslim citizenship in India? I present my ethnographic accounts in an attempt to answer these questions.

6.3 "I have learnt to live after coming here": gendered modes of survival

Ramzan (or *Ramadan*) is the holiest month in the Islamic calendar. In 2016, it started on June 6 and ended on July 5. For almost a month, many Muslims throughout the world do not eat or drink anything from dusk to dawn. The temperature in Ahmedabad during the month of June easily goes beyond 45 Celsius. Fasting at this time without a drop of water when the days are longest in the year is undoubtedly hard, but the faithful Muslims follow the religious dictum and believe that this month will purify their souls and fill it with virtue.

In this month, Citizennagar is quite silent in the evening as most of the residents break their fast, and some male residents rush to the nearby mosque for the Maghrib prayer. This particular moment nearing dusk when men break their fast wearing white caps or by tying their handkerchief on their head and women covering their head with *dupatta* (a long scarf) is called *iftaar.* During *iftaar* TV sets in all the houses fall silent, rarely do people break out in shrill fights and kids too don't run amok in the neighbourhoods; instead, they sit with their parents or join their neighbour or some relative in the colony to eat together. It does not matter whether they were fasting or not, but who would miss a family get together around food and *sharbat* (popular south Asian drink often made with different fruits and flower petals). In many Muslim families, children above the age of ten or twelve are encouraged to fast during the month of Ramzan.

While I was doing my fieldwork in Citizennagar, I got invited to join the *iftaar* from many of the people I was working with. The quietness prevailing in this time offered me some great opportunity to have some long and meaningful conversations with the residents of this locality, something that had not happened in the previous months. I had told them earlier that I am not fasting, which received some judgmental looks on my devotion to the religion of Islam.

One particular evening in Ramzan, while I was at the house of Salma to join her family for *iftaar*, she broke the news to me that she had been contemplating leaving Citizennagar for good. The *iftaar* consisted of fried chicken, crispy fried onion pakoras, dates and *sharbat* made with lime and sugar. Unlike *iftaar* in the houses of many Muslim elite and middle-class families, where I have seen women working in the kitchen alongside their maidservants throughout the afternoon to prepare multiple dishes and drinks for the occasion, Salma told me that she does not like to cook for iftaar as she gets tired in the evening after a day of work. She would rather prefer to ask her elder son to buy fried chicken or pakora or other fried snacks from the nearby RM market. In this market many roadside vendors set up stalls in the afternoon specifically during the month of Ramzan.

"You know it is cheap, easy and saves me from all the hassles. Women should have easy lives rather than being stuck in cooking and cleaning all the time" she said to me.[98] After the *iftaar,* I offered to clean the dish I was using, but she politely declined. She said I am a guest, and she would not let the guest do anything in her house.

At the end of the iftaar, she told me that she has decided to move to Fatehwadi, another small neighbourhood in Juhapura, on the other side of the Sabarmati river. At Rs.2000, she has rented a place, and it is a "better place than this *chawl*" she informed me with a big smile on her face. She would put the Citizennagar home on rent, and it will fetch her thousand rupees a month. Citizennagar is under AMC, so even though the place is near the garbage dump site or *kachra peti* as she calls it, it is still not bad in the renting market, she enlightened me while cleaning up the dishes in the kitchen.

[98] All quotes in this section was taken from Fieldwork notes dated June 15 and June 19, 2016.

On the south-eastern part of the Ahmedabad city, Juhapura has become the biggest Muslim areas in the state of Gujarat after the 2002 riots (mentioned in section 1.2 of this thesis). It is adjacent to Vejalpur, one of the biggest Hindu neighbourhoods of the city. However, as Juhapura is not part of the AMC and falls outside of its influence, it lacks severely in terms of civic amenities and infrastructure compared to the Hindu areas of the city. Also, most importantly, one journalist, while covering the 2012 regional assembly elections observed that the ruling party abandoned the area after Hindus moved out of this place after 2002 (Mishra, 2012).

She further said in her report, "Abandonment by the ruling party is linked to the withdrawal of the state… There is no proper drainage or street lighting in Juhapura. Across the "border", they say, from where the Hindu locality of Vejalpur begins, are the sodium lights, the wide road, the overbridge and water supply. Though the highway runs by Juhapura, the state corporation bus skirts the colony and residents must go all the way to Sarkhej or Vasna to take the bus to Bhavnagar and Rajkot" (Mishra, 2012). People have put up walls and gates demarcating the "border" between the Hindu Vejalpur and Muslim Juhapura after the 2002 riots.

Mahadevia (2007:29) believes after 2002, "Juhapura emerges as a self-sufficient Muslim City in Ahmedabad" with private schools and kindergartens, builder provided water supply and sewerage systems and, big markets in the area. In her work, she has also talked about the emergence of Fatehwadi locality as the preferred destination for many riot survivors. She writes, "[On] The agricultural land in the village Fatehwadi area of Juhapura, many new residential colonies have come up. About 1,000 such small units would have come up. These are single to two-room tenements with a small kitchen and individual toilets. These are all ground floor units that can be built upon in the future" (Mahadevia, 2007:28). For people like Salma, such a place still offers better living conditions than being in Citizennagar in the vicinity of the garbage dump.

I asked her how did she manage the contacts to find this particular place in Juhapura? She replied that her *"gharwale"* (family) helped her throughout this process and showed this place there which she liked after seeing it. I thought she was referring to her father's and brother's side as *"gharwale",* but she clarified that it is her late husband's sister's family who is still quite close to her and helpful in many ways. "Most of my husband's relatives live in Juhapura so it will not be a new place for me to live. And they always extended their help in my difficult times, Salma voiced to me in an optimistic tone.

Her elder son Sameer is fifteen and have been learning to tailor from the age of eight from an experienced tailor in the Bombay Hotel area. Salma happily informed me that he is going to "Africa" to work in a clothing showroom next year. She could not afford an education for her children as private schools in Bombay hotel charge a lot of money, and there was no good public school in that locality. Her other son, who is around ten also left his school recently and will start learning to tailor from the same person. After Sameer would leave for "Africa" to work there, in the Juhapura house Salma will live with her younger son. She already married off her daughter Ruksana at the age of sixteen with a man from Gomtipur who has a small garment shop there. She also works part-time at home by stitching and putting patches on readymade clothes with minor defects. "It pays less, but at least she is doing something" her mother informs me.

Salma then cracked a joke that her son is *angutha chaap* (who sign with his thumb), meaning he is completely illiterate and has received no education in his childhood. The two sons of her husband's sisters have already been working in "Africa" for some time in a showroom, so Salma requested her to "adjust" her son Sameer with them as well. "They are good people. They readily agreed to help me. If my sons start earning well, I am tension free" she told me with a sense of gratitude on her face. I asked her which country in "Africa" Sameer is going to work, and she looked puzzled as if she did not ask this question to her relatives.

I inquired from her what she would do to earn after moving to Juhapura with her younger son, and she replied in a very casual way, "*kuchh na kuchh kar hi lungi*" (I will do something or the other). She disclosed her plans to work as a maidservant in the homes of Juhapura doing all the cooking and cleaning in someone else's home or she might sell vegetables on a cart. She had earlier in the previous year run a shop in the Citizennagar colony itself where she sold cigarettes, biscuits, tea and all day to day stuff after borrowing money from her relatives. "It is so hard to run a business here. People used to come and gossip at my shop and started to ask things for free. You know them all so how could you stop them from taking things from your shop? Everyone said they would pay me later, but very few did. In the initial days, I used to earn 200-300 rupees a day as profit, but then the shop ran into losses. So, I decided to close it after two months" her face expressed her disappointment when she uttered the last sentence.

"Do you keep your money in the bank, or you just spend it on a day to day basis?" I asked her. She was forthright with her answer on money-related issued to me. She said that her husband might have had a bank account but neither she inquired nor she ever cared for this information. Her husband used to work with a very kind-hearted Jain owner of a small factory located near Naroda Patiya, which used to make plastic chains for jeans pants. "*Ghar ache se chal jata tha aur jaise bhi ho paiso ke mamle mein hum khush the*" (The home ran smoothly, and whatever it was in terms of money we were contented). Then she praised the Jain boss of her husband because he extended help to them during their turbulent times. "After the riots, he even came to meet us in the Shah Alam camp and loaned us some money so that we can live through those hapless times. You see, we were hopeless about our lives during those days. What do we do or where we would go from there we knew nothing?" Salma looked mournful while talking about the camp days.

She informed me that she opened up a bank account in her name in a nationalised bank within a year following the violence of 2002 after her husband insisted and

the government announced compensation for houses damaged in the riots to the extent of Rs.50000 (Human Rights Watch, 2002). "*Wo paisa kab aya aur kab gaya kuchh pata hi nahi chala. Aap hi kahiye pachas hajar rupya mein aajkal kya hota hai?"* (I don't know when that money came and went. You tell me, what can you do with 50 thousand rupees today?) she lamented to me with her sceptical look.

Apparently, after this, she never kept any money in the bank and usually spends her earnings from working as casual labour in a nearby small metal parts factory on a day to day basis. This factory is located on one side of the Bombay Hotel area, and she earns 200 rupees per day for 8-10-hour shift there. "The work is quite irregular and depends on the orders they receive from other factories. I and some other women from Citizennagar work in this factory. If our boss tells us there won't be any work from this month or so, we look for other temporary jobs elsewhere. From Ruksana's marriage to set up this shop, I know how I have been managing our lives. I am always in debt. Life is very uncertain here, you see!" she told me with a tinge of sadness in her voice.

After a little pause, she said, "*Lekin main yaha aake jeena bhi sikh gayi* (I have learnt to live after coming here)."

Salma lost her husband in 2012 and her ten-year-old son in 2014 after a yearlong illness, breathing problems, paralysis in the end and above all lack of treatment in Citizennagar.



Figure 16: Women of Citizennagar enjoying at the Kozhikode beach. Salma standing in the middle. "I witnessed sea for the first time in that trip", she told me later

6.4 Salma's life and everyday

Das (2003:300) speaks of how "everyday task of surviving" of finding shelter and sending kids to school is linked to the idea of 'self-making'. And though this process of 'self-making' is situated in the context of "some ghostly past' but it is happening with the aim of "making [the] everyday inhabitable" (2003:300). The past for people like Salma, who survived the worst atrocities during the 2002 violence, suffered displacement and were then forced to start life anew in Citizennagar is well documented (Chandhoke et al., 2007; Kumar, 2016; Nussbaum, 2004).

The violence witnessed by many Muslim women during the 2002 riots, especially in Naroda Patiya from where women in Citizennagar came from, followed a pattern as scholars and civil rights activists recorded in various testimonies (Hameed *et al.*, 2002; A. Kumar, 2016). In most of the cases, women were gang-raped and then tortured in the most gruesome ways, and after that, they were burnt alive.

Historian Tanika Sarkar, who was part of a panel investigating the violence against women during 2002, showed that the apparent obsession with women's sexual organs and the intent to destroy them points to "a dark sexual obsession about allegedly ultra-virile Muslim male bodies and overfertile Muslim female ones, that inspire[s] and sustain[s] the figures of paranoia and revenge" (Sarkar, 2002:2874). Sarkar further argues that the way women got attacked reflects a certain kind of performance of sexual sadism which is far worse than mere revenge and the call for violence is essentially linked with anxiety about male sexuality.

Syeda Hameed, author and civil society activist who was part of the panel who recorded the cases of sexual violence during 2002 argues on similar lines. She says,

Violence had never assumed this sick dimension even during the post-partition communal carnage. There are only a few instances, which can match this in degrees, such as the sexual depravities suffered by women in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia. One clear motive emerges: women's bodies were used as sites for humiliating men. The rationale: if women were mauled and torn apart it is the best way to 'teach a lesson' to the men. What injury is inflicted on the minds and bodies of the women is of no consequence to the perpetrators (Hameed, 2005:325-326).

Given the discourse around sexual violence in India, victims rarely spoke about their ordeal, and it is only the witnesses who often provided the reliable information to the civil society activists as Jha (2017) informs us. One of the witnesses of such cases of violence in Naroda Patiya Mumtazben says, "People who made it to refugee camps thought if we reveal our daughters, our wives, our relatives, women from our neighbourhood have been raped, we will be condemned to live in shame for ever. So many people just had to live with such great wounds" (Jha 2017).

No information is available to enlighten us that rape survivors in the aftermath of the 2002 violence received any kind of counselling (Khanna, 2008). According to Mumtazben, all the medical treatment made available to any survivor were done discreetly so that families could be protected from shame (Jha, 2017). The women I met in Citizennagar, may or may not be survivors of sexual violence committed during the 2002 riots, but they all witnessed it from close quarters.

I did not delve into the collective memory of violence and trauma (Connerton, 1989) that such violence might cause in a community like Citizennagar, especially on its women. Instead I choose to focus on their everyday life where they are busy in arranging food for *iftaar,* or negotiating with close relatives to find a better house, or to secure job for her children among many other things. It is a conscious choice on my part in an attempt to be "related to the capacity of seeing and

documenting the eventedness of the everyday" as Das (2003:302) describes in her work.

Everyday oppressions exist in the life of the communities affected by violence in the past. What ought to be done in such a situation? Das and Kleinman (2001:19) has argued,

> Clearly a double movement seems necessary for communities to be able to contain the harm that has been documented *in these accounts* (life after violence: emphasis mine): at the macro level of the political system it requires the creation of a public space that gives recognition to the suffering of survivors and restores some faith in the democratic process and at the micro levels of community and family survivors it demands opportunities for everyday life to be resumed.

But in the context of the political climate that dominated Gujarat in the years following the 2002 riots (Mander, 2006; Bandukwala, 2012), and feeble attempts at rehabilitation (Janvikas, 2012), both macro and micro issues as stated above are mainly unaddressed. So why I am associating the everyday with women more than the men in the colony though they may have some similar experiences in redeeming life after violence?

Featherstone (1992:165) says, "The heroic life is the sphere of danger, violence and the courting of risk whereas everyday life is the sphere of women, reproduction and care." According to him, in theorising everyday gender has always been an important factor. Lefebvre (2002), in a similar way, looked at women as the ultimate agent and casualty of everyday life. He writes that everyday life "weighs heaviest on women" and "Some are bogged down by its peculiar cloying substance, while others escape into make-believe…They are the subject of everyday life and its victims" (cited in Felski, 2000:17).

We should ask what constitutes Salma's everyday and life in my ethnographic account? She claimed she learnt to live again in the lanes of Citizennagar. The Urdu word she used *jeena,* which translates into 'to live', something that shape 'life' into being. And her everyday after 2002 violence consists of putting small efforts to add new meanings in her life. The act of 'self creation on the register of the everyday' as aptly put by Das above, happens in her life by fasting during Ramzan, inviting people at home, through those everyday conversation with family members to 'adjust' her son in any job, finding new roof over their head and many other small acts.

One after another tragedy struck her life in the lanes of Citizennagar. Soon after her marriage she witnessed the 2002 violence and was forced into displacement along with her family, which brought her to Citizennagar in 2003. After seven years, her husband regularly complained of illness, mostly because of the water and air pollution from the dumpsite and left his daily wager job at a nearby factory. This illness pushed Salma to take menial jobs in small factories near Bombay Hotel to run her family as a daily wage worker. As Featherstone (1992) says, 'care' is an important part the of everyday life of women. Not only was she engaged in domestic care as wife and mother, but life after 2002 in Citizennagar led to her accept new roles in life as the earner in her family. Jasani (2011: 258) reflecting on the changing dynamics of gender roles in the aftermath of 2002 riots observes,

> It is important to bear in mind, however, that violence and dislocation within the city had displaced established hierarchies, especially in the worst affected neighbourhoods; most of the men were killed, and women were frequently the prime witnesses. Hence, they had to liaise with both state and non-state actors, blurring the public and private gender divide.

Not only as legal witnesses, which some women in Citizennagar indeed are but also people like Salma as the prime earner in the family has tried to rebuild lives both

for themselves and for their wards. There is no clear demarcation between their domestic and public sphere in such a scenario. This blurring of the public and private gender divide, be it through their action to pursue justice or to find menial, uncertain jobs as daily wager or temporary worker in some local factory to sustain their family, establish a new norm of gendered citizenship for women like her.

Her spirit lies in the statement, “I will do something or the other,'' at the face of everyday that is teeming with uncertainties and structural violence that is associated with extreme poverty. Her attempt at putting up a shop and doing small business in the colony failed. The resumption of everyday life happens with anything that comes on her way, from the struggle to get a job of a maidservant, or something in a nearby factory, to set up a small shop, or to sell vegetables on a cart in the lanes of Bombay Hotel.

6.5 "Women have become *bindas* after the riots."

One evening in early August 2016, I sat with Salma, Masuda apa and Saima apa while the marriage ceremony preparation of Sahanaj's daughter was going on in the nearby lane. The noise was, as usual, making its presence in Citizennagar as a music system was blasting Bollywood songs whose lyrics I could barely hear in spite of my repeated attempts. With mud around due to incessant rains in the last few days, the small open space between two lines of houses was used to raise a canopy with tarpaulin. Some chairs and wooden tables were lying under the tarpaulin where guests would feast on food later. Two persons were cooking the food in a huge cooking pot mounted on a tripod with open fire beneath it.

I was invited to attend the ceremony as Sahanaj went to Kerala with us and we spoke quite often during my visits to the area. Sahanaj, a medium height woman in her early forties dressed up very nicely for the day and seems to be in charge of the whole ceremony as she was running from post to post receiving relatives, guests and arranging other stuff. Before sitting with Salma and others in one corner, I went to see her, and she took me inside her house and introduced me to her daughter who was being prepared as the bride at that time. The daughter looked visibly underage, not more than fifteen or sixteen.

Sahanaj face was gleaming with joy when she told me that the groom is working in a transport business in Juhapura. He carries marbles and tiles in his small vehicle. Interestingly, the men of Citizennagar I used to hang out with often whispered among themselves, how Sahanaj is "always on her mobile phone" and must be having an affair with a man who visited her regularly and her husband is "good for nothing" as he has got no job and personality to stand up to his woman. Women residents of Citizennagar on the other hand, in their discussion with me often praised Sahanaj, and how she single-handedly ran her family and found a perfect match for her daughter "in time" in spite of little support from her husband.



Figure 17: At the Sahanaj's daughter's marriage. She is looking at my camera.

In this melee, I posed a question then on the main issues faced by the women of Citizennagar. Masuda apa answered first by saying "*kam dhandha nahi hai* (no scope of work)" and then with a burst of laughter she uttered the word 'hamara marad' or "our men". [99] Salma and Saimaa apa nodded. Continuing the glee on her face, she said that the men of her locality are always falling ill and constantly

[99] All quotes are taken from fieldwork notes dated July 28 and July 30, 2016 except otherwise stated.

complain of pain in their chest or the joints. "Women don't get time to take care of themselves. They are always tired looking after these sick men in their families" she explained further.

Salma joined the discussion and commented with another round of laughter, "But now we kick the men in their ass (*pichhwade pe lath*). They can't take us for granted anymore. Women have become *bindas* after the riots." Saima apa agreed in unison and voiced her opinion with a flicker of a smile, *"Dhamal ke baad aurat sab azaad ho gayi"* (After the riots women became free). These statements by these women put me in surprise for some time. Specially the use of the word '*bindas*' and '*azaad*' in the context of 2002 riots was quite interesting to me.

Bindas, can be literally translated to 'being carefree' or can be understood as a mode of self-expression by defying existing authority or norms. In the *why loiter* movement both in India and Pakistan, where activists argued for using public spaces by women in defiance of patriarchy, the word *bindas ghumna*, which can be translated to "roam around freely' was used quite commonly by them (Phadke, 2011). On the other hand, the meaning of the urdu word *azaad* is free and a related word *azaadi* means freedom. Chants of *azaadi* became a rallying cry in the feminist movements of South Asia in the 80s and 90s, to challenge patriarchal norms and violence against women (Mohan, 2016). [100] The unintended consequence of the 2002 riots in the lives of women has not been explored much in literature, except the notable mention of Rajan et al. (2011).

[100] Mohan (2016) further credited feminist scholar Kamla Bhasin to popularize this slogan. He says, "The 'Azadi' slogan was raised in India in 1991 at a women's study conference held in Jadavpur University in Kolkata where Bhasin chanted the slogan as a group of women chorused. The chant went like this – "Meri behane maange Azadi, meri bachhi maange Azadi, naari ka naara Azadi... (My sisters want freedom, my daughter wants freedom, every woman's slogan is freedom)".

In their work, they looked at the rupture in everyday lives of women in the aftermath of Hindu-Muslim violence in India. One of their informants from Mumbai referring to the 1992 Mumbai riots also comments, "*Voh fasaad ke baad dimaag khul gaya'* ('after the violence I began to see the world for what it is')" (Rajan et al. 2011:216). Women informants quoted in their work admitted that they started to engage with previously untouched issues and questions in the lives, as before the violence they were confined to private sociopolitical spaces. Rajan et al. (2011:216) argues, "Rupture, as we understand it from women's articulations, is not only caused by complete displacement, but also by, as it were, a rupturing of consciousness."

During my fieldwork, I never asked the women residents of Citizennagar the gory details of torture and rape that I have read in numerous books and reports. They had lived it and it was hard for me as a researcher to speak to them about it. As a man, I felt the hesitation to enter this intimate space of memory and violence and start a conversation. Only once Salma herself raised the topic and said, "You can't imagine what happens to the women in Naroda Patiya. They were raping the women first and then burnt them in front of their kids, brothers and fathers. When we tried to bath them before the *janaza* prayer and the burial process, their flesh came out. Allah should never allow anyone to see anything like that." [101] I did not inquire further as the long silence after this statement meant everything to me. But the same Salma, who talked about the uncertainty of her life during Ramzan, was now laughing at men in Citizennagar and saying how the riots changed their lives unexpectedly. I asked everyone (Salma, Masuda apa and Saima apa) what they mean by "women have become more carefree after the riots."

Salma told her story with her late husband Mahfuz following my question. She said,

[101] Fieldwork notes taken on April 20, 2016

> I used to be shy and quiet when I got married. I was not like this as I am now. You see, I am known as a total *mufat* (candid speaker) in the colony. Everyone knows me as someone who can say anything to anyone. I don't fear anyone anymore.
>
> My husband did not love me. He had an affair with a woman in our neighbourhood in Naroda Patiya. He used to bring all the nice gifts for her. Once he gifted her a beautiful saree. I first saw it and thought it was for me. Next day I saw the woman wearing it. You can understand how much I was upset with him. Whenever I used to stand up to him, he had beaten me up every time. After the riots, when we moved to Citizennagar he was pretty upset as he had to end the affair. And then one day, I don't know what happened to me, but when he tried to beat me again, I hit him back and continued till he fell on the ground. Most of the *mohallewale,* (colony residents) supported me except few. After that day, he never dared to touch me again.

Hearing this incredible story from Salma, I was perplexed for a moment on how her life's transformation is connected with what happened in the 2002 riots? Is it just her that many women experienced a different kind of transformation in their lives after witnessing so much violence? Saima apa offered her perspective, "It may not be all women, but some women definitely found strength in their new lives after what happened to us. They got the attitude like after they have lost so much what's more to lose. They know that unless they don't take charge of their lives, nothing will change."

These above statements by the women in Citizennagar, in the context of 2002 violence potentially challenge the stability of major categories like women, gender and religion, which are often treated as monolithic and uniform in the case of Muslim women in India (Hasan and Menon, 2005). However, as Castelli (Castelli,

2001:4, cited in Kirmani, 2009:49) says, "Each of these terms – women, gender, and religion – is inherently unstable. None of them is tied in an unproblematic way to an easily discerned, identified, or fixed object ... Each term represents, in other words, a powerfully 'troubled' category."

Also, if we see the literature on the gender dimension following major episodes of ethnic conflict, civil war or genocide, women are the worst affected survivors of such cases of violence and their suffering often leads to trauma (El-Bushra and Lopez, 1994; Ashford and Huet-Vaughn, 1997). Das (2007:8) talked about those people, and especially women who had "had seen or endured" violence during the Indian partition in 1947 and the effect of such violence she argues, "perhaps they had speech but not voice". She further describes women, "who chose to be mute, who withdrew their voice to protect it" (2007:8).

I do not contradict her observations and other scholars with the ethnographic accounts of Salma and other women in Citizennagar I got the opportunity to interact with and maybe there are other women survivors of 2002 violence who chose to be mute, who lost voice in spite of their speech. But my account also shows, some women can respond to human tragedies in multiple ways, and their act of speech should be constituted as a different form of voice within. They may not 'withdraw their voice to protect it' or retreat into themselves as many scholars argue as one major consequence of conflict (O'Connel, 1993), but the effect of violence can be the major source for asserting their voice. Violence can rupture their normal consciousness, but at the same time can be the "catalysts for the forming of particular critical consciousness (Rajan, Dhanraj and Lalita, 2011:217).

Salma also talked about domestic violence above, a violent feature of patriarchy which often makes women vulnerable and marginalised in their communities in India (Bhattacharya, 2013). It is interesting to see how in her own narrative, she connects her post-2002 life to end such acts of violence on the part of her husband.

She rather boasts in front of other women how she took revenge by kicking him till he fell on the ground.

Masuda apa then told me that though the *sansthawale* (people from NGOs) could not do much with regard to the issue of legal documents for their houses which all three reiterated as the biggest issue they were facing, some of their local representatives have done a good job by educating and organizing the women in the colony. "Now if anyone's husband beat his wife, then the police don't come here to help us. No one reports to police as well. We call these *sansthawale,* and their women then come to resolve these issues by strictly warning the accused husband. *Wo faisla kar dete hai* (They decide for us)" said Masuda apa.

"*Ladies log ab hoshiar ho gayi hai aur ek sath khadi ho jati hai to mard peechhe hat jate hai yahan"* (Women are more united and aware now, and that's why men think to mess with us) Salma passed a comment to add what Masuda apa was saying. She added further, "These *sansthawale* are not that bad as Farooq Bhai and others were telling you in Kerala. I mean recently they invited other women and me to learn driving by paying them 3000 rupees (42 USD) per head. Along with it in their meeting, they tell us why women should organise and know their rights. They tell us what's happening with women in the world."

Masuda apa then told me that recently she and two other women from Citizennagar went to Delhi to participate in a seminar organised by these *Sansthawale.* She could not name the organisation when I inquired. She told me Rashida apa (working with Jan Vikas, an NGO based in Ahmedabad) came to them and asked them to go to Delhi to talk about their lives. I probed her further to know what kind of meeting she attended. She then asked me to wait and went back to her house to bring her notebook. She came back and then showed some of her scribblings on a paper. The spellings were not clear, but as it was written in capital letters, some parts were legible. I could read NATIONAL CONSULTATION FOR POLICY DECISIONS (IDPs), COMMUNAL VIOLENCE BILL, BUNIYAD, 19TH JULY

2018, X (not readable) INSTITUTE, NEW DELHI. I praised her for knowing English so well to write all this information. She laughed and said, "I am *angutha chhap* (illiterate). How would I know English? It was written on a banner behind the podium where speakers were delivering their lecture. Rather than sitting idle, I started copying it with the pen and paper they gave us." I told them what she did was a work of genius and anyone would be impressed with such copying English letters.

Later on, I investigated with the material provided to me by Masuda apa, and I found about the initiative 'Buniyad' on the website of Action Aid, a leading non-governmental organisation.[102] It collaborated with Jan Vikas for this initiative and states that their focus area of intervention as, "A just, secular, violence, free and peaceful society and state; Ensuring control of resources and livelihood." The website in the basic information on the initiative section says,

> Janvikas and ActionAid have been associated since 2001 while working on the issues of relief and rehabilitation of earthquake victims in Kutch. In 2002 both came together along with other organisations as a part of Citizen's initiative to respond to the communal carnage in Gujarat. The funding relationship started in 2007 and Janvikas became NF partner to work on the issues of Internally Displaced People (IDP). Antrik Visthapit Hakk Rakshak Samiti was formed to raise the issues of IDPs, to take forward the interventions with the IDPs. Janvikas became LRP partner in 2008. Since then Janvikas has been working in partnership with ActionAid on the issues of IDPs and Muslims in 69 colonies and for peace and communal harmony. This programme is implemented by Janvikas in partnership with ActionAid and named as Buniyaad.

[102] https://www.actionaidindia.org/project/buniyaad/ (Accessed online on Sept 20, 2018).



Figure 18: Written note by Masuda Apa after attending a meeting in Delhi

But attendance to such meeting or mingling with *sansthawale* is not free of problems as they apprised me. The men in the colony don't like that they go outside and meet these people. They complained to me that people spread rumours about them if they become too involved with these people from outside. Salma informed me that though she doesn't have a husband anymore and live in a 'bindas' way, without caring about the opinion of other people, sometimes people provoke her kids with rumours and then fights break out at home. She indirectly meant that such accusations from the men in the colony are about character assassination by associating them with men from outside. Rajan, Dhanraj and Lalita (2011:217) talks about women who identified themselves "'*bahar nikli hui aurat*' (a women who has left the confines of four walls)", not as a negative phenomenon but "as a metaphor, a necessity of their lives, and perhaps even as the social norm/category they must now inhabit." The way Salma and other

women in Citizennagar told me about it, they framed it as a newfound confidence in dealing with the world in spite of censures from men in the colony. Though men want to restrict their movement, and discipline their lives, they want to live in a *bindas* way. It does not matter if men in the colony think them as *bahar nikli hui aurat.* They have embraced the rupture in their everyday lives and in their consciousness, where accessing public spaces is an important part.

I had some idea on what Salma was pointing towards in our conversation while the marriage ceremony was going on in full swing nearby. I had also hung out often with the men of Citizennagar who often joked that some women in the colony like to put their makeup on, dress nicely and visit different cities with these *sansthawale.* That these women think themselves too independent, too *samajhdar* (wise) and too free that they don't even take their advice before taking any decisions to go and attend these meetings. *"Aur jo apne gharwalon ki nahi sunegi to kaise phir seedhe raste pe chalegi?*" (And who don't listen to their family, how can she walk on the straight path?) one male resident told me during a conversation. [103]

In such conversation, sexually coloured remarks were uttered in plenty and resentment was expressed for a certain kind of defiance that the women in the colony showed to these men. Their anger towards these non-governmental organisations had many layers apart from their general accusations that these bodies did not do much for them in spite of "acquiring funds in their name". This conversation with Salma, Masuda apa and Saima apa made me understand one layer.

[103] Fieldwork notes taken on August 14, 2016

Such experiences for Muslim women in Citizennagar in the aftermath of 2002 Gujarat experience is not new. Robinson (2010:367) has analysed this aspect, "where increasing ethnic violence over recent decades, resulting in the further ghettoisation of Muslims, has impacted the everyday lives and concerns of women." Desai et al. (2016) have depicted a grim picture for women living in Bombay Hotel, a part of which is called Citizennagar. In their account, women report multiple cases of rape and sexual violence which they attributed to lack of security, and "increase in the number of single male migrants who are employed at workshops across Bombay Hotel" (2016: 65). Women also report cases of domestic violence by husbands, which Desai et al. (2016:65) attributed to long hours of working, excessive consumption of alcohol by men to "subsume their hardship" in the face of uncertain employment opportunities in the area.

Robinson (2010:367) argues, with the rise of Hindu nationalist threats and relocation to new places, a new sense of fear gripped the Muslim community, and "women are affected the most". In the aftermath of violence, women in these localities have supposedly taken up new roles, enter public spheres to find livelihood opportunities, engage with members of NGOs and sometimes access state resources, which has upended the community relations from inside. Robinson therefore says,

> At this very juncture, they find themselves bound by both community norms and fears of attack from outside, and they feel the weight of community norms more sharply. On the one hand, for a woman displaced and bereaved, the boundaries of community offer security, but it comes at a price. The price is conformity with decreed norms of conduct and decency (2010:367).

My ethnographic account above shows similar developments in Citizennagar. These norms of conduct and decency, often imposed through community surveillance point to the battle within, where women are increasingly defying such

diktats and living their lives as Salma claimed above. They are often accused of crossing the lines and betraying the community, not only from older men from the colony but also from their sons, which shows how patriarchy is manifested in the social context that has emerged after the riots.

The case of Citizennagar is not a stand-alone example of this. Sen (2011)documents the lives of young kids between the ages of 9 and 14 years, in the Muslim ghettos of Hyderabad city often affected by Hindu-Muslim clashes, who formed armed vigilante groups to patrol slum borders and establish disciplinary control over slum life. They not only physically prevent outsiders from entering their neighbourhoods but also organise public beatings for local women, including their own mothers for suspecting affairs with outside Hindu men. Robinson (2010: 368) rightly says, "The stories of these women show that they lived under the shadow not just of 'riot' but of violences, if I may so pluralize the word, of diverse kinds."

The account of Masooda apa above also shows that NGOs and their representatives, in spite of all the accusation of exploitation, have some positive influence in the lives of these women. It also shows the changing role of NGOs in the citizenship struggle of Muslim women, in this case, inhabitants of IDPs. It is only in the mid-1980s, Muslim led women NGOs began to appear in India which had very little influence on the practical lives of poor women as they were concerned with Muslim personal laws and government responses (Vatuk, 2008; Kirmani, 2011).

Later on, organisations like All-India Muslim Women's Personal Law Board (2005), the Muslim Women's Rights Network (1999), the Women's Research and Action Group (1993), and the Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan (2005) came up and gave shape to the idea of Muslim feminism in India (Kirmani, 2009). These organisations specifically focused on cases of the legality of polygamy and legal age of marriage for girls within Muslim religion, domestic violence, custody and

inheritance rights in the Muslim community. The process of engagement adopted by Masooda apa, with organisations at the behest of international NGOs like Action Aid, points to new forms of association and citizenship struggles among the Muslim women.

We can see above how international legal terms like IDPs, or *Visthapit* are being appropriated, with the active process of listening and copying by illiterate women like Masooda apa in their fight for substantive citizenship. Their usage of such terms like IDP learnt in NGO created spaces by these women also influence visitors and scholars in the colony as well, who study these spaces with their own perspective (Gupta, 2015). Also NGOs are not only intervening in cases of domestic violence in the colony, but also giving access to these women to outside events and activities, and in the process they are reconfiguring their own roles in this process.

In the ethnographic accounts above, the politics of contingent citizenship for Muslim women emerged in multiple contexts and spaces. Whereas everyday is one active site for 'self-making' for the women in Citizennagar, their struggle for economic citizenship to run their family in the shadow of uncertainties, or their battle to counter disciplinary control by men in the colony brings forth several contingent factors. It proves that beyond formal citizenship, their struggle for better rights and entitlements are contingent on emergent forms of negotiations within the community and outside.

Here I have followed the argument expounded by Yuval-Davis (1999:120) where she says,

> in order to understand the relationship of people in general, and women in particular, to politics and society at the end of the second millennium, there is a need to separate analytically citizenship from the 'nation-state'. At the same time, the underlying view in the article is that it is important to keep and expand- the notion of citizenship rather than abolish it.

Salma's decision to move to Juhapura and struggle to earn to meet her needs should be looked beyond the ordinariness of everyday and linked to a certain kind of citizenship struggle. Rather than resigning to trauma and retreating to the private domain, when Saima apa and Masuda apa offer resistance in their everyday life to patriarchal notions of piety and honour, it expands the notion of citizenship. This chapter shows how the women of Citizennagar with their life and struggle have offered us the perfect opportunity to explore the idea of everyday and gendered citizenship together.

6.6 Conclusion

Choudhuri (2016), while focusing on the effect of socio-political conflict on women in Assam, in North East India, found that conflict can be restricting for them, can bring upon new forms of vulnerabilities in their lives. At the same time, she argues that social boundaries may change, and gender roles can collapse in such a scenario through which new spaces are created for women. These spaces can be leveraged by women to push for transformation in their status and advance their struggle for better citizenship.

This chapter started with the determination exhibited by the women of Citizennagar to confront Rahman builders, unlike the men in the colony, to find a permanent solution to their housing rights. After that, I presented a theoretical analysis of everyday and how it can be conceptually linked with self-making, one of the ways bottom-up citizenship formation happens as argued by Ong (1996). My ethnographic account focusing on the changing roles of women in the aftermath of the 2002 riots, presented through the story of Salma showed how violence added new forms of vulnerabilities in their life and what constitutes everyday for women like her. My analysis of Salma's life argues how everyday has become the site of both suffering and resistance for women in Citizennagar. It also points out how instances of Hindu-Muslim violence change the traditional gender roles and dichotomy of public-private sphere in the lives of Muslim women.

Community policing and disciplining bodies of women in Muslim 'ghettos' have become an important feature in the aftermath of 2002 violence, as Robinson (2010) describes. In my work, I have complicated this picture by placing narratives of women who are actively resisting with new forms of engagement with NGOs working with them, and standing up to men to resist their aggression. We can see how Indian Muslim women are looked at through the trinity of multiple marriages,

triple talaq (controversial Islamic practice of instant divorce), and purdah and "societal stereotypes of 'praying men and veiled woman'" dominant in media narratives (Hasan and Menon, 2006:4), but the reality on the ground is very different. Muslim women just like men are very much part of the struggle for citizenship, to avail better economic and social opportunities. Gendered citizenship in the lanes of Citizennagar, is contingent upon multiple context and actors, but it challenges old understanding of gender roles and gendered spaces.

In the next chapter, I talk about an actor who is not a resident of Citizennagar, but as a young Muslim resident of Ahmedabad, who harbour political ambition in the local political arena engages with the site as an activist. I discuss ideas like 'politics of presence' and 'activist citizenship' to frame his activities, as described in my ethnographic accounts in this chapter, to present the figure of a "young agent of citizenship".

7 Saleem: The Story of an activist citizen in Ahmedabad

7.1 Introduction

During my fieldwork in Ahmedabad, a case of mob violence against a group of Dalits, lower-caste Hindus considered one of the marginalised groups in India, rocked the nation's politics (Kateshia, 2016). On July 11, 2016, in a small Gujarati town called Una, cow vigilantes associated with upper-caste Hindu nationalist groups brutally thrashed four Dalit youths for skinning a dead cow, their traditional profession. It caused massive anger and protests among Dalit groups across the nation and led to the rise of a new Dalit leader, Jignesh Mevani, a young lawyer and NGO activist based in Ahmedabad (Nigam, 2017).

Along with other civil society activists from Ahmedabad, Mevani planned a 331-kilometre long protest march from Ahmedabad to the site of the attack in Una city to unfurl the Indian flag on its Independence Day on August 15, 2016, crossing Dalit villages en route.

Saleem decided to join the march. He was a small time Muslim businessman from Ahmedabad city who had been struggling to grab the limelight as an emerging Muslim leader by appearing in various local Gujarati channels and newspapers. He mobilised other Muslim youths who had been part of a small organisation he set up a few months back to highlight the plight of Muslims in Gujarat, to join the protest walk called by Mevani. Their purported intention was to join this long march by Mevani and other Dalit groups, by walking with them for ten days and nights, with intermittent halts in Dalit dominated villages, to show solidarity to the Dalit cause on the part of the Muslim community.

Other long-established Muslim organisations like Jamiat-Ulema-e-Hind and Jamaat-e-Islami extended their support to this Mevani led protest (IANS, 2016). As the case of Una attacks on Dalits gained national prominence, and main opposition parties raised this issue in Indian Parliament, national media and academic scholars started to write stories and op-eds on this emergence of a new Dalit-Muslim unity in Gujarat (Devji, 2016; Dhar, 2016). Mevani emerged as the next generation of Dalit leaders in India. Print and electronic media were abuzz with stories on which leader from the opposition party he was going to meet next or which political party would give him the ticket to contest elections in the 2017 Gujarat Assembly elections (Das, 2016; Roy, 2017).

I had been hanging out with Saleem for some time since I arrived in the Ahmedabad city due to some old connection. As I started interacting with the 2002 riot survivors in Citizennagar, at some point he became my local guide and major source to contact Muslim religious outfits and other political leaders. In this process, he also often joined me during my visit to Citizennagar and started to raise their problems as part of his political campaigns. I will come to this aspect later in this chapter in detail.

When the Una incident happened, by that time, I had already spent eight months in Ahmedabad, and due to our regular interaction, we became close friends. One day he called me on the phone while walking to Una along with these Dalit leaders and told me, "Can you ever imagine such mobilisation among the Muslim community and political leaders if any one of their people gets attacked and killed by these cow vigilantes? I can count more than 20 cases in Gujarat like this where Muslims were attacked and police did nothing. Today Mevani has become their leader after one single incident, and he is sure to rise in Indian politics after this rally. Write my word. Dalits are not untouchables in politics, but Muslims are." His sombre voice offered me his case for a sense of competitive victimhood. "Muslims

in Gujarat needs new leadership. I will do whatever I can." he cut the call with what sounded like a resolve for action. [104]



Figure 19: Saleem joining Jignesh Mevani in a Dalit-Muslim joint programme. Name blackened.

In this chapter, I delve into the actions and practices of Saleem, his interaction with the residents of Citizennagar as part of his struggle to make them 'subject of rights', something Isin (2009:371) argues is a fundamental part of citizenship strategies. Why Muslims in Gujarat needed new leadership and why this urge in him to do whatever he could had emerged out of a particular context. Also this historical understanding of local politics with little or no political representation on the part

[104] Fieldnotes taken on August 13, 2016

of Muslims, only added to their marginality as Saleem emphasised time and again to me. What are the political responses to the 'second-class citizens' that scholars and even members of Indian judiciary often make the case with the Muslims of Ahmedabad (Bureau, 2015)?

This is why Saleem's actions and speech are important. This is another bottom-up approach to citizenship, where the actors are involved in the process of 'self-making' as Ong (1996) argues. The politics of contingent citizenship is expressed here through the politics of 'presence' (Sassen 2002) and strategies adopted by an 'activist citizen' (Isin and Nielson, 2008). And in this process, I attempt to answer both the second research question- *what kind of citizenship struggles and practices emerge from a site inhabited by displaced Muslim survivors of riots?* and the third research question-*what are the roles of state agencies and other non-state actors in the struggle and everyday lives of survivors to claim better citizenship rights?* of this thesis as mentioned in section 1.6.

In the next chapter, I will introduce these concepts along with the right to the city (Lefebvre, 1996), which is articulated in Saleem's actions and speeches in various parts of this chapter. Following this, I delve into the life history of Saleem to understand the contexts and background, which encouraged him to embrace a particular public life and desire for political leadership. Thereafter, I present my ethnographic account from Citizennagar to show his levels of interaction and negotiations with its inhabitants, and how he raised the issues of garbage dump and pollution in the public sphere as part of his political strategy. I call his figure a "young agent of citizenship".

7.2 The politics of 'presence' and 'activist citizenship' in a city

Sassen (2002) on her work on post-national and denationalised citizenship, argues for new forms of local citizenship that are emerging today in cities across the world. She uses the term 'presence' to capture a condition where she makes "a distinction between powerlessness and the condition of being an actor even though lacking power" (2002:285). Cities are becoming the site where significant transformations challenge older hierarchies of power and politics. Due to globalisation and emergent forms of new technology, the "national as container of social process and power is cracked" as Sassen argues (2002:285). And that is why there is a rise of new political actors at the sub-national level, who are engaged in novel models of citizenship identities and practices. She further argues that these "citizenship practices" have to do with the production of 'presence' by those without power and a politics that claims rights to the city" (2002:385).

How we can imagine the right to the city for Muslims in Ahmedabad city, who allege state-sponsored violence against their community force them to live in segregated zones with little or no public amenities? We understand '*the right to the city',* an idea conceptualised famously by Lefebvre (1996), not only right to various kinds of urban services and facilities like housing, work and education "but an active right to make the city different, to shape it more in accord with our heart's desire, and to re-make ourselves thereby in a different image" (Harvey, 2003:941). Therefore, this concept lies at the heart of most debates on urban and local citizenship (Blokland *et al.*, 2015).

The politics of 'presence' as discussed above by Sassen, can also be expressed by another concept, which is the figure of activist citizenship, and the actor who practices it as an activist citizen (Isin 2009). He argues,

> "the emergence of this figure is implicated in the emergence of new 'sites', 'scales' and 'acts' through which 'actors' claim to transform themselves (and others) from subjects into citizens as claimants of rights...The rights (civil, political, social, sexual, ecological, cultural), sites (bodies, courts,

> streets, media, networks, borders), scales (urban, regional, national, transnational, international) and acts (voting, volunteering, blogging, protesting, resisting and organizing) through which subjects enact themselves (and others) as citizens need to be interpreted anew (2009: 368).

He further writes that his conception is different from the active citizenship that emerged during the French revolution, where it is associated with a republican model of citizenship with people participating in the polity through voting, taxpaying and military services. Active citizens do not participate in anything new but follow established norms of obligatory practices. On the other hand, activist citizens engage in writing scripts and creating the scene (2009: 381).

In this conception, both the ideas of 'presence' and 'activist citizen', including the struggle for the right to the city can be said to be the part of bottom-up approach to citizenship, where people exercise agency and find meaning in particular practices (Lister 1997). In case of Muslims in Ahmedabad and especially 2002 riots survivor, we have seen how increasingly political parties like Congress, who traditionally fight with BJP, both at national and sub-national level, abandoned political mobilisation around Muslim issues (ET Bureau, 2012). The cause was given, that any mention of Muslim interests, especially anything related to 2002 riots, would alienate the majority Hindu community. In such a scenario, how the Muslim community negotiate political citizenship? How can they exercise their rights of participation and speech to ensure the values of democratic citizenship, which are entitled by the Indian constitution to every citizen including Muslims?

Isin (2002) argues that exclusion plays a central role in the struggle for inclusion and people construct their citizenship experiences vis-a-vis the immediate others. In section 1.4 of this thesis, I have shown how Hindu nationalism have slowly acquired greater significance in public life and influence in both local and national institutions (Mathur, 2010). This only alienates Muslims further and hampers

their inclusion in social and political life in India. When Hindu nationalism is engaged in the production of normative citizenship practices, and excluding the Muslim community from every sphere, this chapter talks about struggle for inclusion. Staheli (2005:343) argues that in most cases, struggle for citizenship should be presented as "a quest for inclusion."

Whereas in my other chapters I discussed this quest for inclusion from the perspective of the residents of Citizennagar in terms of housing rights, putting moral claims with tales of death and loss or everyday lives of women, the element of political agency was missing. Political participation through voting and election campaigning are considered to be the hallmark of democratic citizenship (Shani, 2018). But here my concern is not becoming the active citizen through voting and participating in the electoral process, that many of my respondents in Citizennagar have admitted regularly doing in my conversation with them. They present their logic of participating in local or national elections, like many other urban poor in India do, to register the fact that they exist, or belong to this particular site (Banerjee, 2014). Besides that no one in the colony particularly engaged in political acts that Isin (2009) above defines as activist citizenship.

In my preceding chapter 4, I have argued that Citizennagar residents do not emerge as a significant voting bloc to bargain for favours or entitlements in exchange for their votes. The political landscape is divided between only two political parties - Hindu nationalist BJP and Congress. Therefore, this site shows the limit of political society (Chatterjee 2004) and calls for alternative citizenship practices.

Stokke and Erdal (2017) rightly argues that the arena of citizenship is inherently political and the source and product of political strategies. Therefore, citizenship is constructed from below due to contentious politics involving multiple actors and various approaches (van der Heijden, 2014)

Through the story of Saleem and his interaction with this small locality of Citizennagar and its residents, I investigate the role of multiple actors from different backgrounds in the politics of citizenship after the 2002 riots. To understand the politics of citizenship, I refer to what Stokke and Erdal (2017:190) mention the concept "as a shorthand reference to collective demands for legal protection, social redistribution, cultural recognition and political representation". In this process, I am also putting my attention to the role of spaces like Citizennagar, which has assumed a particular political significance after the violence in 2002. This place can offer opportunities to politically organise and articulate demands to actors from outside who engage with such spaces. These opportunities show the possibility of multiple routes to struggle for citizenship in a place like Citizennagar, which can also be termed as 'spaces of citizenship' (Painter and Philo, 1995).

Gleiss (2017:233) writes that scholars "have not limited citizenship struggles to participation in electoral politics and decision-making; rather, they have included a broader set of rights, means, and targets of political action" and such "citizenship struggles take place within a context-specific configuration of opportunities and restrictions", which she refers as "political space". While she argues for the need to look at political space as discursive spaces, in the work of Miraftab and Wills (2005) or Holston (1999), the physical sites located in Cape Town and Sao Paulo emerge as the political spaces where the grassroots struggles by the poor urban dwellers give rise to new forms of citizenship.

And this is where Saleem and his engagement with the site of Citizennagar and its residents assume importance. In my next sections, I discuss how he navigates the political territories of Ahmedabad city, and articulate his political citizenship in an activist mode. If in other chapters, we have witnessed discriminatory and insensitive attitude from the side of the government concerning the site and people of Citizennagar, this chapter allows us to see how political subjectivity can

be formed for oneself and others as 'subject of rights' (Isin 2009: 371). And that is why it is apt to call a figure like him 'the young agent of citizenship'. I am developing this concept in the next section.

7.3 "*Gujarat ke Musalmano ko naya leader chahiye*" (Muslims in Gujarat need new leadership)

In the run-up to the 2017 Gujarat assembly elections, Nag (2017) portrays a grim picture of the Muslim community as a group who had become irrelevant in the election process. In a state with 9 per cent Muslim population, which should correspond to more than 16 Members of Legislative Assembly (MLA) seats in a house of 182 members based in terms of proportion, only three won in 2017, two in 2012, down from five in 2007, and three in 2002. In the Loksabha or 'House of the people', the lower house of Indian Parliament where people directly elect their representatives at the national level, Gujarat sends 26 Members of Parliament (MP) to the house. Since 1962, first Loksabha elections held after the formation of the state of Gujarat, out of unified Bombay, it never had more than two Muslims MPs at one time, except in the 1977 elections, when Ahmed Patel got elected from Bharuch and Ehsan Jafri who was murdered brutally during the 2002 riots, from Ahmedabad city.

Ahmed Patel is the lone Muslim MP from the state, but not from Loksabha but from Rajya Sabha, the upper house of Indian parliament where the regional assembly members from different political parties elect them. It is also known as 'Council of states'. Patel is better known today as a senior politician and strategist of the Indian National Congress (INC), the main opposition in Gujarat assembly and Indian Parliament. He also served as the political secretary of INC President Sonia Gandhi. Even with his clout in the ticket distribution within the party, Nag (2017) quotes a report from other journalists where Patel admits, that it is nearly impossible for a Muslim MP to get elected from Gujarat today. This painful picture of Muslims in electoral politics in the state points to the level of alienation the community faces today both from the broader public and the main political parties.

Nag (2017) writes, "Many reasons have marginalised the Muslims in the polity of Gujarat. This includes the general apathy of the ruling party (to put it conservatively) towards Muslims, matched only by the apathy of the common Muslim towards the electoral process." The report quotes another journalist who casually remarked that more than 50 per cent of Muslims don't cast their votes. In this report, Nag (2017) quoted one local political journalist and another local social activist. The journalist Rajiv Shah opined that there "are not too many Muslim netas around who would mobilise their followers for any cause" which "contributes to their disenchantment to the political process" (2017). The other prominent Gujarati social activist Hanif Lakdawala comments, "I think no Muslim goes to political parties and no political parties go to Muslims" (2017).

Saleem agrees with such views concerning Muslim politics in Gujarat. He says to me,

> Why Muslims will go to the political parties when BJP does not treat them well or offer any significant post in the party or ticket to fight elections. Congress, on the other hand, knows that these poor fellows have nowhere to go but come to us in the end. In politics, you need to claim your rights with the fight and struggle and by showing that you matter for them. [105]

I met Saleem during my initial days in fieldwork when I arrived in Ahmedabad city in October in 2015 from Oxford without knowing anyone in the town. After my arrival in Ahmedabad, I happened to meet an old friend of mine from Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) called Ali, who after studying Masters of Finance Control there started working for a Multinational company in Ahmedabad. When I told him that I had arrived in the city to work on the survivors of the 2002 riots as part of

[105] Fieldnotes taken on November 20, 2015

my Oxford research degree, he suggested that I must meet Saleem, someone I might remember from our days at AMU.

During my student life at AMU, I had heard of and saw Saleem but never interacted. He was a few years ahead than me and was finishing his undergraduate degree in Commerce. A young man of gaunt, tall and dark appearance, Saleem was feared by many junior students like us as he used to lead a student gang in the campus and often engaged in a violent fight with other student groups. Hearing all these stories about him, students like me regularly maintained a distance. Ali joked with me that Saleem has completely changed except that earlier he was interested in student politics at AMU and now in the Muslim politics of Gujarat.

It was a quite cordial first meeting with Saleem over tea at a roadside tea stall in Ahmedabad, where we shared many nostalgic stories from our days at AMU. I could see he had aged in all these years, put on some extra weight so not lanky in appearance like before and nowhere close to the old image I had of him as a student gang leader. He is now married, has an eight-year-old daughter, runs small interior design shops with marbles and tiles and his old parents live with him. His father came to Ahmedabad from Azamgarh in Uttar Pradesh to work as a labourer in textile factories in the early 1970s, and they have remained here since. Now they all live in the Muslim majority Dariyapur area of the city in a small house.

He is very much a family man as he informed me. I recalled an incident of 2006 to him which became quite well known in the campus, where he allegedly has beaten up few other student gang leaders near the university park, and he responded with a big laugh, “Those were the days! In student life, sometimes you do indulge in acts of mischief. No one here in Ahmedabad would believe what kind of life I had at

AMU."[106] He recalled an incident where a student leader from Allahabad University, who had dozens of murder cases registered against him came to attend a political rally at AMU and was surprised to find Saleem as a young man with an unassuming appearance, quite different from his fearsome image. "Now I never break any law. I rather tell students that they should better concentrate on their studies and make their community (Muslim) proud. Meaningless violence gets you nowhere" Saleem added after his big laugh recalling his student life. [107]

Next time he came to Muslim society, Navrangpura where I was living at that time riding on his TVS Victor motorcycle. He had arrived at my place after visiting the city's Women's Police Station, which was located near to my house to register a case of domestic abuse against his sister's husband and his family members. He told me they had been mentally harassing her sister for some time, and after some severe fight between the couple, she left her in-law's house a week back. Since then she had been living at his residence. Saleem thought given the total communication breakdown, lodging a police case might force the husband to seek compromise and treat his sister better. "I am determined to raise my daughter in a way that she becomes economically independent when she grows up. She should be in a position that she does not have to rely on anyone except herself. Nothing can be more important for a girl today" he opined to me while telling me about his sister's family situation.[108] I agreed with his emancipatory stand on a subject concerning gender justice. It surprised me a little given that I had not met many young Muslim aspirants in politics with such strong views on the matter, especially one who argues for economic independence among Indian Muslim women.

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[106] Fieldnotes taken on November 28, 2015

[107] Ibid

[108] Ibid

But it did not take more than a day, and contradiction appeared in his stand at an individual level and the level of his community, who are fellow Muslims according to him. At the level of the community, where his politics and activism lies, he was quite pragmatic and not primarily driven by the same belief he applied in his own life. In the same evening, he took me to a meeting near Cama Hotel in the city where most of the prominent Muslim clerics of the state assembled to discuss the planning of 17th National Convention of All India Milli Council, an apex body with representatives from different Islamic organisations. This programme, which was called "Ittehad e Millat" (unity of the community) was organised on December 17, 2016, in Ahmedabad. More than a hundred thousand Muslims had gathered to protest against rising attacks on their fellow brethren in the country.

In the same gathering, all the Muslim clerics unanimously condemned a judge from Gujarat High Court, who observed while delivering judgement in November that the Indian state should work towards implementing a uniform civil code and stop Muslims from practising polygamy (Siddiqui 2015). After hearing Saleem's comments during the day on her sister's situation and his mission for his daughter, I could not imagine him supporting this resolution on polygamy in that meeting near Cama Hotel itself. In front of me, I saw all the clerics arguing in favour of raising this matter at the December 17 convention and found Saleem engaging positively with them.

When I nudged him on the matter sitting next to him, he replied, "Many in the judiciary hold majoritarian views and don't like Muslims. Rather than making a direct attack on our community, they should allow us to debate such contentious issues internally."[109] I could not agree with him and expressed my disagreement on the issue of polygamy in Muslim society. In that meeting, I witnessed how these Muslim religious leaders talked to him with awe, knowing his capability on media

[109] Fieldnotes taken on December 3, 2015

outreach. He was entrusted with the public relations duties for the event so that he could contact his friends in local media to cover it.

Muslim community to him, is a political group who have been discriminated by the ruling parties in India and therefore they are lagging socially, economically, educationally and culturally. In my first conversation itself, when I asked general questions on the state of Muslims in Gujarat today, he effortlessly mentioned facts and figures from Justice Sachar Committee (2006) and Justice Ranganath Mishra Committee reports (2007) to justify his views. He repeatedly quoted articles from the Indian constitution, especially those concerning the rights of minorities and how they were flagrantly violated in Gujarat. He seemed to be aware of most of the judicial reports and their findings concerning the Hindu-Muslim violence that had happened in the state in the past. In our usual conversation, he would often drop names of some reports or rules on the topic discussed at the moment.

"You see these days I am often in Television debates in local Gujarati channels, and unlike others who scream at each other, I like to talk based on logic and facts. So I try to know about everything as much as possible. If only I knew English like you, those Delhi channels would have called me too" he said to me.[110] He confessed his aim to be in the limelight so that political leaders and other activists of Gujarat know him very well.

Saleem told me that all the prominent opposition leaders in Gujarat know him, "at least by face" he adds.[111] He asked me if I need the number of Ahmed Patel and other Congress leaders in the state for my research and I politely replied I would ask in times of need.

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[110] Fieldnotes taken on December 5, 2015

[111] Ibid

On my inquiry, how he reached the TV debates, he told me that he is often there as a supporter of All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (or the United Congregation of Muslims), popularly known as MIM, a small political party led by Barrister Asaduddin Owaisi. Owaisi is the lone MP in this controlled family party which has been winning from the Hyderabad constituency, the tech city in South India since last few decades. However, soon after the 2014 Indian General Election, Owaisi and his party started to target the Muslim dominated districts of other Indian states like Maharastra, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar by addressing the fear among the Muslim electorates. Lakhsmi (2015) reported this rise in *The Washington Post* as,

> A third-term member of Parliament from a small party in southern India, he has continued to emerge as a rising star in Muslim politics by tapping into the growing anxieties of India's 170 million Muslims following the sharp rise of Hindu nationalist forces after the election of Prime Minister Narendra Modi more than a year ago.

Owaisi, 46, is being hailed as a "superstar of the Muslim community," a "truth-speaking angry young man" and "a ray of hope" among India's Muslims.

"Owaisi speaks the truth, unlike Congress and Communists who have no particular concern for the Muslims. But the problem is you can't win elections in India just with Muslim votes. You have to make strategic alliances with other communities."[112] Saleem said this to explain the rise of Owaisi as a prominent leader among Indian Muslims. "He is trying his best to form the alliances with Dalit and other lower-caste Hindu population. See his rise in recent Maharashtra assembly elections," he added further. [113]

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[112] Ibid

[113] Ibid

Saleem, even though he acted as MIM's voice in Gujarat, at least on Television, was not sure of its prospects in that state though he believed in the coming years Owaisi would expand beyond his traditional base in Hyderabad. "In Gujarat, if a Muslim wants to get elected, there is no party but Congress to rely on. However, when it comes to real Muslim issues of jobs, education or illegal arrest of Muslim youths only a party like MIM can throw challenges at authorities in spite of the fact that they don't have popular support." he continued to offer me reasons in our conversation for his support for Owaisi's party. [114]

Saleem talked to me of his dream to speak as a leader of the Muslim community inside the Gujarat assembly, "or someday in Parliament, why not?" he sometimes inquisitively posed the question with a flicker of smile and hope on his face.

On my question, why he joined a politically insignificant MIM instead of planning to fight as an independent candidate he said that it is always better to have a party backing you than to be alone. Saleem spoke about how it all started by saying, "When I read the news after the 2014 Loksabha elections that MIM wanted to expand in other states, I contacted Owaisi's team and went to Delhi by train to meet him. He was impressed with my knowledge of facts and figures. He asked me to organise a strong local unit in Ahmedabad."[115] He said that though he can call Owaisi anytime to seek his advice and support, it is not much of any use. To contest elections and organise popular support on the ground, one needs money, and MIM had failed aspiring politicians like him as he conceded to me.

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[114] Ibid

[115] Fieldnotes taken on January 25, 2016

Money has been the biggest concern for Saleem and the "main obstacle" to his rise in local politics as Saleem complained. He went on to explain this obstacle and said, "All the Muslim leaders in Gujarat Congress are big businessmen who use their money to buy tickets for themselves and their families to fight elections at the municipal or assembly level. I do not have this option. Either I have to be famous so that people recognise me and parties like Congress offer me a ticket and money both, or I have no chance at all." [116]

With his small business, where he earns enough to run his family and his political activities with organising seminars, talks, protests on Muslim issues by convincing other youths to join him, it's a tough balance according to him. Saleem was also a prolific writer who churn out articles in English, Hindi, Gujarati and Urdu almost every week. "I take the help of others to get my language corrected. Language is not important; issues are, right?" he threw the question at me when I asked him how he managed all this together.[117] He had also started a four-page bi-monthly newspaper in Urdu called 'Tarkash' (The Quiver) in 2014 where he dons the role of both the publisher and the editor. He was very serious about it in the beginning. He said, "I even got it registered after months of hassle, with signatures from the Commissioner and applying to the Office of the Registrar of Newspapers for India. But I realised later people don't read these small newspapers. We are in the age of the internet. You can publish on your websites and blog and share it on social media." [118]

Realising this he kept regularly writing for various web portals and small newspapers focusing on Muslim issues of Gujarat. His write-ups were often against the Congress party itself and their supposed lackadaisical approach to secularism

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[116] Ibid

[117] Fieldnotes taken on December 1, 2015

[118] Ibid

and upliftment of Muslim community. “Until you don’t criticise them heavily they don’t take notice of you and negotiate with you to take you on board” he characteristically said candidly about his strategy.[119]

With the use of social media platforms like Facebook and Whatsapp, he extensively shared his articles among his friends, followers and civil society activists with whom he was connected. Apart from his old friends, he made new ones due to his activism and media appearances on behalf of the MIM.

Not everyone he was associated with was ready to work under the banner of the MIM. So he, taking along these new and old friends, mostly youth in their late 20s and early 30s from Danilimda, Shah Alam and Bombay Hotel area formed an organisation called INSAAF in the first months of 2015. ‘Insaaf’ is an Urdu word which means justice. “I carefully chose the name so that it reflects the organisation’s aims and objectives. But for the larger public, we needed an English version of the name and Justice was not enough for it” he explained on the naming process.[120] Then he came up with a full form which looked pretty impressive.

Saleem published letterheads with the mastline “INITIATIVES FOR SOCIAL ACTIVITIES AND FRAMING” (INSAAF) soon after informally forming the organisation to write to constitutional and government bodies and issue press releases on minority issues. “I will soon apply to register INSAAF as a proper and legitimate NGO,”[121] he said to express his concern that without registration people would not take it seriously and question its activities. On my question regarding the insertion of the word “FRAMING”, he laughed and commented that the ‘F’ in INSAAF needed a word and it suited the most.

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[119] Ibid

[120] Fieldnotes taken on November 28, 2015

[121] Ibid

He appointed himself as the President of INSAAF, his close friend Arif became the Secretary of the organisation, and other seven-eight youths became the executive members of it. There were only executive members and no general members to be precise. It is important to mention here that Arif, who runs a small bakery shop in Shah Alam area and lives in Bombay hotel, spoke to me about his political ambitions in the city in my later interactions. It is Arif, who introduced Saleem to the people of Citizennagar as his father sold vegetables on a cart in the main Bombay Hotel market and knew the Citizennagar residents well.

As my interactions grew with Saleem, and we started to hang out almost every week during my fieldwork for tea at the Lucky restaurant of Ahmedabad, he along with Arif and these executive members of INSAAF would discuss their next press release or petitions. It was either Arif or Saleem who would often pay for everyone. I was not allowed to spend in spite of my repeated insistence. I was instead asked to do quick edit and grammar check of the petitions, press releases or letters that Saleem used to bring from home. Sometimes he would just come up with a topic, and I would be entrusted to write it from scratch in 'good English'. This exchange of favours between us was mostly unsaid. Instead it was framed in our conversations as my duty towards my fellow Muslims.



INITIATIVE FOR SOCIAL ACTIVITIES FRAMING (INSAF) FOUNDATION

Office: 89-1509, Sundaram Nagar, Rakhial, Ahmedabad. contact No.8270848548 / 09408556222, email: keleemshaf@gmail.

To
Hon'ble Governor
State of Gujarat
Gandhi Nagar, Gujarat

Dated: 21/11/2016

Subject- **Regarding Setting up State Commission of Minorities in Gujarat , security of Muslim and Prisoners in the state and other issues related to minorities**

Respected Madam,

With due respect I wish to inform you that Gujarat is one of the few states in India which had not set up a State Commission for Minorities. It is quite regrettable and must be done at the earliest for the interest of all minority communities in the state.

In Gujarat, time and again minorities faced discrimination and brutality with little recourse to justice and rehabilitation. Specially the kind of atrocities happened with the Dalits in Una are quite regular with minorities but they are more vulnerable in this state than other communities. It is also not prudent to approach National Commission of Minorities all the time when many issues are related to the law and order of Gujarat state.

It is also learnt that Chairman, National Minority Commission had sent several letters to the Government of Gujarat to set up a state minority commission but they were ignored by citing that there would be no appeasement of minorities here. **It is interesting to note that today BJP government is in the Centre and under the auspices of Shri Narendra Modi, Minority Affairs Ministry is quite active to look into the issues of minorities. Also many BJP ruled states like Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan have active State Minority Commissions.** It does not look that in Gujarat where questions on the treatment of minorities have often got raised in the past resist the formation of a State Minority Commission.

We are actively working for the welfare of minorities . so , As a social organization we hope govt. Will listen our demands and will act to fulfill the following demands.

- **Enact the minority commission act and reservation act for the state**
- **Set up state minority commission**
- **Ensure the securities of muslim prisoners who are in different district and central jail**
- **Compensation to the family Ayub Shaikh who was killed by so called Gau Rakshak on 16 sep. 2016**
- **Make policy to remove Ghettoisation problems in minorities dominated areas**

It is a time to built up a confident among minorities The entire minority community will be thankful to the Hon. Governor for such initiative.

Your's sincerely

CHIEF MINISTER OFFICE

(PTO)



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-9.NOV 2016

MOST IMMEDIATE / TIME LIMIT

[redacted]
C/o Initiative for Social Framing (INSAF)
89-1509, Sundaram Nagar,
Rakhial,
Ahmedabad

APPOINTMENT WITH THE HON. GOVERNORSHRI OF GUJARAT..

Sir,

I am desired to refer to your letter dated the 2nd November, 2016, on the subject mentioned above and to state that your appointment alongwith five others with the Hon. Governorshri of Gujarat is fixed at **11.15 a.m on Monday, the 21st November, 2016** at Raj Bhavan, Gandhinagar.

Kindly confirm the appointment.

You are also requested to report at Gate No-2, Raj Bhavan, Gandhinagar, at least 15 minutes prior to the appointment time.

Figure 20: Saleem petitioning the Governor of Gujarat to set up State Minorities Commission on INSAF letterpad. Office of Governor responding to his appointment request.

During my stay in Ahmedabad, he raised many issues through these letters and petitions addressed to the concerned authorities. He petitioned the Commissioner and Mayor of Ahmedabad on the problem of garbage dump near Citizennagar, sent letters to the Education Minister of Gujarat on the issues of inclusion of more famous Muslim figures in school syllabus, or increasing numbers of Urdu medium schools in the state (generally associated with Muslim community), and requested the President of India to enact special laws protecting Muslims and Dalit from cow-protection groups whose attacks on minorities increased after Modi assumed power in 2014. [122]

In June-July of 2016, he sent many letters to the Gujarat Chief Minister Anandiben Patel to demand the setting up of the statutory body of State Minority Commission in the state, which her party BJP consistently opposed in the past citing it as appeasement policy to Muslims. He always sent copies to the Chief Justice of Gujarat High Court, Governor of Gujarat and the President of India while sending such letters. "It is important to send a copy of these letters to other constitutional bodies. Who knows how they will use it later in case the situation changes and they prefer to act on it? I always keep the receipts from the post office so that no one can deny that INSAAF did not raise these issues" he informed me on asking about these small details.[123] Saleem expressed his extreme disappointment with

[122] Increasing attacks on Muslims, where they were lynched to death by cow vigilante group in Northern and Western India after BJP won the Indian general elections in 2014, was widely covered in national and international media (Safi, 2016). In this backdrop civil society activists and opposition parties like Congress demanded the enactment of special anti-lynching laws. Only in 2019, some Indian states like Rajasthan and West Bengal have passed such laws in their regional assembly (PTI, 2019).

[123] Fieldnotes taken in February 11, 2016

Congress as they never raise these issues or hit the streets in protest in spite they are the main opposition party in the state.

7.4 Muslim politics in Gujarat and being a young agent of citizenship

Saleem was not a conventional aspiring Muslim politician in Ahmedabad. He did not hail from a political family and did not have considerable access to monetary resources, which appear to be essential feature of Indian politics. In the case of Rahman builders, we witnessed earlier, how political capital is built through patron-client relationships and by using money acquired through business practice or inheritance. Scholars have pointed out that "substantive explanation for the hold of political dynasties over Indian politics lies in the nature of Indian democratic practice itself, which remains restricted to campaigning and voting during elections" (EPW Editorials, 2012:7). And in India, fighting electoral battles with hi-tech social media campaigns launched by political parties in recent times is a costly affair which naturally debars many poor candidates (Chaudhary and Rodrigues, 2019). In some political parties in India, it is an open secret that party ticket to fight elections to become an MLA or MP are sold to the highest bidder, as one MLA in Rajasthan Assembly admitted (India Today Web Desk, 2019).

Such practices are a threat to democratic citizenship, and it narrows the scope of representative politics for people like Saleem. Indian journal *Economic and Political Weekly* (EPW)'s editorial, reflecting on such negative dominance of dynasty and finance in Indian politics, called "for a different form of engagement with democratic politics which goes beyond formal proceduralism and involves substantial struggles and movements" (EPW Editorials 2012: 7). It also said that popular movements and organisation "beyond state-regulated politics provide more fertile ground for a truer and more deliberative democracy" (2012:7-8). This editorial explores how new leaders emerged out of political activism and protests during the Indian emergency in 1975-77 when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi suspended the constitution. These new leaders did not hail from any wealthy or political families and ended up by dismantling old political structures by challenging the status quo (Prakash, 2019).

In Gujarat, similar protest movement after the Una incident led to the rise of Jignesh Mevani as an emerging youth Dalit leader of India, something Saleem predicted to me on the phone. It is this popularity that Mevani banked upon to contest and win the 2017 Gujarat Assembly elections on an independent ticket with Congress support (Doval, 2017). Another two protest movements around the same time for demanding quota in public jobs led to the rise of Hardik Patel from Patidar community, and Alpesh Thakor from the Other Backward Castes or OBCs (Chowdhury, 2017). One crucial question to ask here is, can a young Muslim leader emerge through such popular protest in Gujarat like Mevani? Reflecting on this question, one Indian columnist Ajaz Ashraf (2017b) wrote,

> The ghettoisation of Muslims made them invisible in the commonly shared public space, which is where political action is scripted and acted out for efficacy. To have an impact, a protest should be visible to the State, other citizens and the media. What significance could the venting of fury by Muslims in their ghettoes possibly have?

During the protest by Mevani, the name of Shamsad Pathan, a young lawyer-activist from Ahmedabad who fought in the court in some of the Naroda Patiya riots cases found some passing mention in media reports as its Muslim face (something Saleem wanted to be noticed for). According to Pathan, exposure by Indian media is vital in making or breaking the image of a leader, and they are uninterested in promoting young Muslim leadership (Ashraf 2017). Another young activist, Mujahid Nafees who set up Minority Coordination Committee (MCC) of Gujarat in 2016 showed willingness in politics but alleged intimidation by state intelligence and police officials. In the column by Ashraf (2017), Nafees asks, “In such a climate, who would think of entering the political arena to raise the community’s demands?” Local Muslims also alleged that Muslim dominated Legislative Assembly constituencies of Ahmedabad were broken up under

delimitation practices to make them electorally insignificant, and sans any possibilities of leadership emerging within.

Though scholars like Ansari (2001) have written about lack of Muslim political representation in India, we have very little scholarship on a similar subject in Gujarat. More so, ethnographic work that speaks about particular contexts and situations which looks into causal factors and effects of such a scenario is mostly absent. In the light of the above, every action by INSAAF and Saleem, from speaking on Muslim issues on Television, writing articles and news articles with Muslim perspective in local media, sending petitions and demand to the Mayor of Ahmedabad or Chief Minister of Gujarat corresponded to the fact that Muslim youths in Ahmedabad had not completely retreated to their ghettos. Saleem especially expressed his desire to negotiate a complex political landscape with little opportunity and political capital for a Muslim youth like him. His actions and manoeuvres, at every step point to the fact even after his complex positionality within the geographies of exclusion and marginalisation, or his failure to cause a big protest, his political agency remains intact.

His struggle was a struggle for citizenship from below, to ensure that the accepted norm in the Ahmedabad city changed, and old style of politics replaced with a politics of 'presence'. Nyers (2007:3) rightly points out, that the fight for citizenship is "not just about legal status, but for recognition as someone with an audible and corporeal presence that can be described as 'political'". The case of Saleem proves this point, and for his struggle to make himself and others as 'subject of rights', right to health and livelihood, through his political actions and speech, I call him young agent of citizenship. In the next section, I present an ethnographic account of his political activity concerning Citizennagar and its residents. In that process, I chart out his journey as an activist citizen in the landscape of Ahmedabad.



Figure 21: Saleem raising his fist in the air in a protest demonstration in Ahmedabad to condemn lynchings of Muslims and Dalit over cow slaughter

7.5 'I am not an outsider' and the notion of good citizenship

In the spring of 2016, one day on my arrival at Citizennagar, I had to face an angry Sohrab sitting near the electricity transformer along with a few familiar faces. Sohrab was a resident of Dhoraji Yatimkhana, mentioned as Citizennagar B in the work of Mahadevia *et al.*, (2016). During the 2002 riots, he was working in the middle east as a construction worker. His wife and small children were assisted by his relatives to shift to safety in the Shah Alam camp. After the dhamal, when he returned from abroad his house in Naroda Patiya had been destroyed. He decided to move to a home in Dhoraji Yatimkhana and started his life as a tailor in the Bombay Hotel area with some success. As discussed in chapter four of this thesis, a few years back, the donor of this colony, a wealthy Muslim owner of a Petrol pump station in Ahmedabad provided the residents with "Baksheesh nu lekh" papers, which they understood as some legal ownership of their homes. After getting those papers, Sohrab immediately constructed a two-storey building which stands in contrast to the other one-room shacks of Citizennagar today, where many of his relatives lived. Many of them in their interaction with me often used to point at his house as a successful example of how getting "*ghar ka kagaz*" (house papers) could transform their way of living.

"Your friend Saleem came to do some testing two days back, and he used my electric connection when I was not home. My wife, in good faith, allowed him to use it. But she told me that they used some big machines on our roof, and I am sure it has incurred a lot of costs. I can see the meter went up" Sohrab complained to

me with anger on his face.[124] I tried to appease him by saying that I would talk to him, but I also maintained that he started coming to Citizennagar much before me and we are two separate individuals. So in case, he commits any mistake I should not be held responsible. Other sitting there who have known me for some time now, supported my contention and requested Sohrab not to harass me on this issue. One among them sitting in the corner winked at me and gestured to ignore his anger. But I could not but respond to Sohrab's anger as I felt Saleem should have discussed it with him at length before taking such initiative. I sensed a fear that it may cause trouble to my interaction with my respondents thought the wink eased my anxiety a bit.

"I called your friend to pay up a thousand rupees (15 USD) to me as compensation, and he flatly ignored me. How dare he could do that with me? I will not let him enter this colony" Sohrab continued his rant directed at me. Saleem came to the colony the next day along with Hafez and me to discuss the proposal that Citizennagar residents should visit Kerala, the southernmost state of India in April just before the assembly elections there. In Chapter Five of this thesis, I have discussed this visit in detail.

Before coming, I had already apprised them of the situation in the colony, and Saleem shrugged it off saying it's a small matter to him. Sohrab and others were sitting precisely at the same place. Looking at us, he made a face as if he was waiting for this moment to confront Saleem to get his money back. He started the conversation along the same line and repeated that he is entitled to compensation cause Saleem used his roof and electricity connection to operate some big machines in his absence. His voice was often bordering between anger and complaint.

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[124] All the quotes in this section taken from Fieldnotes taken on April 2 and 3, 2016

“Do you even know what I am doing for the colony?” Saleem asked back to Sohrab looking at others sitting there. “I don’t know what you are doing, but I want my money. Everyone comes here for their motives and leave us with nothing.” Sohrab responded with a firm tone.

“Don’t equate me with others. I am not an outsider that I would promise something and then run away. I am also from Ahmedabad. You can find me any day near Arif’s father’s cart or at Shah Alam chowk.” Saleem tried to put a strong defence by evoking his connection to their familiar places. Then looking at the audience as if he was looking for approval, he provided them with a long monologue where he explained all the activities that he had been doing for the past month. Sohrab did not interrupt him though he kept making faces showing signs of disapproval for such validation seeking attempts by Saleem.

Saleem told them that this past December he heard from me about the stories of unusual and sudden deaths of many people in the lanes of Citizennagar, which the colony residents linked to the bad quality of air and water caused by the vast garbage dump next to the colony. “Have any of these Congress leaders talked about these deaths in the AMC or Assembly? There are two councillors from Bombay Hotel. No, right? So I wanted to do something about it.” He then proceeded to talk that how he sent several letters with my help at the office of the Commissioner, AMC to request a civic plan along with the following; 1) conduct health and safety survey to know the severity of the situation on ground with regard to the health of Citizennagar residents; 2) conduct land, air and water test in Citizennagar to see the level of pollution level at that site; 3) immediate arrangement for medical facilities in case the pollution levels beyond normal limits are confirmed in report; 4) to dump the garbage of the Ahmedabad city as per the regulations of the Central Pollution Control Board to reduce its effect.

“But I knew this BJP ruled AMC would not respond to my letters, so I talked to some scientists in Ahmedabad city and decided to survey by myself. Those machines were part of this exercise. I am using money out of my pocket to do this. And still, you are asking for money? If better-off amongst you don’t want to help yourselves how you expect others to support you?” Saleem ended his monologue looking at others as if Sohrab, the better off amongst them is also responsible for helping the Citizennagar residents. He was apparently aware of the internal divisions in the colony between the residents of Citizennagar and Dhoraji Yatimkhana concerning the housing papers discussed in my fourth chapter.

Sohrab looked unsatisfied with the long explanation given by Saleem. Faheem, a young man in his late twenties and resident of the colony, jumped into this conversation to side with Saleem. He declared to everyone else there that he believes in his work and that at least unlike others who visited the colony both Saleem and Hafez appear sincere in their desire to help them.

“Why are you people always concerned about money? They both are trying to do something, and you only mind some hundred rupees. When was the last time any leader or organisation raised the issue of our land papers or deaths happening because of the garbage dump?” Faheem made an active intervention with his questions. Sohrab appeared silent for a while as if he was not ready for these questions. Others started to make comments in hushed tones to Sohrab to let it go this time. Sohrab who seemed visibly dissatisfied with what happened around him quietly left the place and marched towards his home.

It is evident in this narrative, and there is a deep distrust for any outsider in the lanes of Citizennagar. More so, when someone like Saleem appears and claims to raise the issue of water and air pollution on their behalf. The cynicism on the part of Sohrab, an older figure than Faheem comes from the fact that very little has changed in their lives due to external intervention, especially in their socioeconomic status. But Saleem was confident due to his neighbourhood ties in

Bombay Hotel, that no one can accuse him of being an outsider and he is an established part of the local network. Savell (2015) also argue with her case study of Rio de Janeiro *favelas* (squatter neighbourhood) that local networks are essential to assume the role of a civic leader in poor urban peripheries. It is because of his access to local network that he understands local dynamics prevailing in Citizennagar, and therefore go on to mention the class inequalities within the colony.

To draw legitimacy for his actions, Saleem has to point to the failure of local state agencies and institutional leadership, which mainly comes from the Congress party. As state agencies, in this case AMC are accused of neglecting their civic duties, people have to look after each other. In such a context, Saleem's idea of good citizenship is that the comparatively well-off residents of Citizennagar should go beyond selfish interest and help others in the colony. This idea of good citizenship found resonance with Faheem, who appealed to Sohrab to control his anger and sacrifice a few hundred rupees for the larger interest of the colony.

Saleem put all his activities in front of them in a long monologue and stressed the fact that he was doing complex scientific surveys out of his own pockets, emphasizing his role as a civic leader and a good citizen both. However, we should not omit the fact that Saleem's involvement in that particular site, whether with genuine intention to help the Citizennagar residents or to expand his local networks for his political goals, had an instrumentalist angle to it. In the next section, I analyse this angle in detail and show why Citizennagar offered new modes of political inclusion for activist citizens like Saleem.



અમદાવાદ મ્યુનિસિપલ કોર્પોરેશન
મહાનગર સેવા સદન - સોલીડ વેસ્ટ મેનેજમેન્ટ વિભાગ
મ્યુનિસિપલ સેન્ટર વર્કશોપ, એસ.ટી. સ્ટેન્ડ પાસે, જગન્નાથજીરોડ, અમદાવાદ - ૩૮૦૦૨૨
ટેલીફોન નં. ૦૭૯ – ૩૨૯૮૨૩૮૫, ફેક્સ નં. ૦૭૯-૨૫૩૨૧૪૮૪
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SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT
RTI No.....५१.....
Date.....२१/२/१६.....

પ્રતિ,
શ્રી જાવેદ કુરેશી,
[redacted] મદી મસ્જીદની પાછળ,
BRTS વર્કશોપ પાસે, બોમ્બે હોટલ, દાણીલીમડા, અમદાવાદ.

વિષય :- રાઈટ ટુ ઈન્ફોર્મેશન અધિનિયમ - ૨૦૦૫ અન્વયે માંગવામાં આવેલ માહિતી બાબત..

સંદર્ભ :- સીટી સિવીક સેન્ટર પૂર્વઝોન, રખિયાલ આર.ટી.આઈ. ક્રમાંક : ૨૦૧૬૦૨૧૨-૨૬૦૬૦-૨૬૦૦૩૧૬-૦૦૦૨, સો.વે.મે. વિભાગ ઈન્વર્ડ નં.૫૧ તા.૧૬/૦૨/૨૦૧૬

ઉપરોકત વિષયનાં અનુસંધાનમાં જણાવવાનું કે આપના દ્વારા રાઈટ ટુ ઈન્ફોર્મેશન અધિનિયમ - ૨૦૦૫ અન્વયે માંગેલ માહિતી અનુસંધાને નીચેની વિગતો જાણમાં લેવા વિનંતી.

મુદ્દા નં.	અરજદારે માંગેલ માહિતી		ખાતાની રીમાર્કસ
3	Please furnished the sources of all the garbage dumped in the Bombay Hotel Area, in the area between Suez Farm and Citizen Nagar.	:-	સદર બાબત અંગે જણાવવાનું કે દૈનિક ધોરણે સરેરાશ ૩૦૦૦ મેટ્રીક ટન ઘન કચરાનો આખરી નિકાલ કરવામાં આવે છે.
4	Please furnish a list with the number and name of the projects sanctioned, amount allocated, expenditure details for health and safety in the Bombay Hotel Area of Baherampura ward	:-	Bombay Hotel Area સારૂ Health and Safety બાબતે અલગથી કોઈ બજેટ ફાળવવામાં આવતું નથી.
5	Please furnish the total budgetary allocation for the management of the aforesaid garbage dump, if any, for the past five financial year	:-	આપના દ્વારા માંગવામાં આવેલ માહીતીનાં કુલ ૫ પાના થાય છે. જેનાં પ્રતિ પાના દીઠ રૂા. ૨/- લેખે ૫ પાનાનાં કુલ રૂા. ૧૦/- સો.વે.મે. વિભાગની જે.એલ. હાઈસ્કુલ, ખમાસા ગેટ પાસે, ઢાલગરવાડ, અમદાવાદ ખાતે આવેલ ઓફિસે રોકડમાં જમા કરાવ્યેથી માહિતી આપશ્રીને આપવામાં આવશે.
9	Please furnish certified copies of any future plans sanctioned for that area and the garbage dump site.	:-	આપના દ્વારા માંગવામાં આવેલ માહીતીનાં કુલ ૧૯૫ પાના થાય છે. જેનાં પ્રતિ પાના દીઠ રૂા. ૨/- લેખે ૧૯૫ પાનાનાં કુલ રૂા. ૩૯૦/- સો.વે.મે. વિભાગની જે.એલ. હાઈસ્કુલ, ખમાસા ગેટ પાસે, ઢાલગરવાડ, અમદાવાદ ખાતે આવેલ ઓફિસે રોકડમાં જમા કરાવ્યેથી માહિતી આપશ્રીને આપવામાં આવશે.

Figure 22: AMC response to Saleem's RTI on the Pirana dumpsite pollution

7.6 "Citizennagar can be the future of Indian Muslims if we don't act": the making of an activist citizen.

After Sohrab left us that day, Faheem took me, Saleem and Hafez, to the house of Sharafat Sahab to plan the Kerala trip. Others sitting at the site of the transformer followed us to his home. After the exchange of greetings, Sharafat Sahab asked his wife to make tea for us. It was April, and the temperature was high, so the idea of hot tea did not allure us. We politely declined and requested him not to bother. He then gave some money and asked a small kid present there to bring cold drinks for us.

Faheem directed his gaze at Saleem and exclaimed in excitement, "Brother, that day on Television I saw you on the *Bharat Mata ki Jai* debate and felt like a lion was speaking. The Congress spokesperson was so meek in the debate, but you made that VHP guy sweaty. He was struggling to find words to reply to you". Saleem smiled at this praise and said how he enjoyed confronting the member from VHP on live Television, who was aggressively asking Indian Muslims to go to neighbouring Pakistan if they fail to chant the slogan "*Bharat Mata ki Jai*" (glory to mother India). "Congress is playing a double game with Muslims on nationalistic issues as it constantly fears that supporting Muslims would alienate the Hindu votes. Their stand is never clear, so I had to take a clear stand in the TV studio debates. We all should know that chanting any slogan doesn't make Muslims more Indian. Moreover, the constitution nowhere asks us as such" Saleem spoke addressing everyone in the room.

The most recent version of this longstanding controversy started on March 14, 2016, when the MIM leader Asaduddin Owaisi declared in an election speech that he would never chant the slogan, even if a knife were put to his throat. Daroom Uloom Deoband, the seat of Deobandi school of Sunni Islam in South Asia, a prominent Islamic centre located in north India later entered the debate and issued a fatwa instructing Indian Muslims not to chant the slogan as it goes against the fundamental Islamic principle of worshipping one god. The Hindu right-wing organisations including ministers and MPs from BJP continued attacking Muslim leaders like Owaisi for being anti-national on this matter.

“Give me your number. I will contact you in future. I work as a daily wager in a factory nearby else I would have worked with you regularly” Faheem said to Saleem, who then proceeds to share his mobile number. “Call me in case of a problem here. I want you to support me, join me in protest marches at least on issues affecting you. If I organise a sit-in demonstration in front of Mayor office on the garbage dump, you should come” Saleem laid out his strategy and beseeched support from the Citizennagar residents.

Sharafat Sahab, the eldest in the room, requested Saleem not to be confrontational with Congress as “they are not that bad and have been there since Gandhi’s time”. He mentioned that the local Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA), Shailesh Parmar, who wins from Danilimda constituency had been raising the issue of a garbage dump for some time in the media, so it is only pragmatic for Saleem to work with him on this issue.

Saleem interjected with all his passion at this suggestion, “Show me that even once any Congress leader raised the issues affecting the people of Citizennagar in AMC or Gujarat assembly? That’s the real platform to speak on these topics, and they had never done so. What you will gain from media coverage for a day or two?” He threw back the question to the audience who looked puzzled to comment on the matter. “My point is whosoever work on our causes, join hands together so that they can make some impact” replied Sharafat Sahab to Saleem. “All parties are the same to us. We want them to work more and speak less” he further added.

Saleem realised the curt tone in the response of Sharafat Sahab. He said, pointing towards Hafez, “We are all working together for you, be assured of that. Hafez is a youth leader with the Communist party in Kerala. Now his ideology and mine are poles apart. They don’t care for the cultural and religious aspects of the Muslim community. Many among them don’t follow any god. But see we are still planning things together for the people of Citizennagar, for the Muslims of Gujarat.”

Saleem after that announced that he would leave MIM soon as he felt that it was being perceived as a Muslim only party in Gujarat and not capable of making any political impact in the state. He opined that it would not be able to make inroad in the non-Muslim population, so he had been thinking of an alternative. He told them that after careful consideration he had decided to join the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) or Common People's Party, and according to him, it might emerge as a strong contender to both BJP and Congress in the near future.

AAP emerged as a result of a popular anti-corruption movement in 2010 led by social activist Anna Hazare and Arvind Kejriwal in New Delhi. In 2015, it was able to capture power in the Indian capital by winning 63 out of 70 assembly seats in the provincial election, and Kejriwal became the Chief Minister. Though it had earlier set up its state unit in Ahmedabad and trying to organise its grassroots support, it is only in early 2016 that it started to project itself as the third alternative in the 2017 Gujarat assembly elections. Saleem hoped to join AAP and aspired to be their Muslim face in the city of Ahmedabad. He also considered the activism background of most of AAP's top-level functionaries, including its chief Arvind Kejriwal to take the decision. He thought that he would also be valued for his activism among the Muslim community.

"We should do something during the Sabarmati Riverfront festival that is going to happen in May. All the national and world media will cover the programme, and we can highlight the problems that are happening to you cause of the garbage dump. And the best will be if we can carry some waste to the venue, and do a sit-in protest in front of the main gate during the inaugural programme." Saleem proposed his plan of action in front of them. "In my first protest on behalf of the AAP, I want the issues of Citizennagar to be raised. And Modi and Gujarat government cannot get a better response to their clean India campaign that this protest with waste from Pirana dump." He continued with an absolute passion for rattling the state government and its officials with his innovative protest ideas.

Sharafat Sahab, who was quietly listening to Saleem did not look excited with this protest plan. He praised the idea propounded by him but suggested to him that they should focus on the Kerala plan for now. The issue of the house papers is the most important thing to them, and he would like everyone present in the room to invest their energy on this matter only. Hafez and I intervened and told Saleem that this idea of protesting with waste from the garbage dump would be a great strategy to begin his career with AAP. Saleem looked a little disappointed as others sitting there did not appear ready to join him for this future protest. He said, "I understand the house paper issue is important and we should be ready for Kerala visit. But my point is we have to loudly declare that Citizennagar can be the future of Indian Muslims if we don't act."

After our visit to Kerala, which Saleem missed citing his sister's domestic trouble and that he should be around her in Ahmedabad during such a crisis, he did not execute his protest strategy by carrying waste to the Sabarmati riverfront festival venue. But he organised a demonstration in front of AMC with a banner of AAP in the summer of 2016. Wearing the signature white cap of AAP, with "We want self-governance" written in black letters, Saleem and 20-25 other party members of AAP Ahmedabad unit interacted with media holding their banners standing next to each other.



Figure 23: Saleem protesting in front of AMC with other AAP partyworkers on the issue of pollution near Citizennagar

The banner was written in Gujarati, and a photograph of Arvind Kejriwal was placed in one corner. A large picture of the garbage dump was shining in the centre. In bold black letters, the banner demanded that Ahmedabad is made cleaner as promised by the BJP government in the state and people living next to the garbage dump should be allowed to live in more humane conditions. They shouted slogans for an hour and AAP members including Saleem and his group of followers addressed the crowd around them explaining the life-threatening conditions caused by the garbage dump. Members from print and electronic media interacted mainly with Saleem, asked him questions on their protest. He told them that the state government of Gujarat had earlier formed a committee on the Pirana garbage dump and this committee report submitted in the state assembly admitted that water and air around the site have become polluted.

"The Congress councillors of this area had been sleeping since ages over this problem and BJP government has no intention to address the issue as people living around the garbage are Muslims. If they don't respond positively, I will take the matter to the judiciary" Saleem declared to the media when they asked his next strategy. On the same evening of the protest, I met him at the Lucky restaurant

again to hang out till late night over endless cups of tea. I asked him if joining AAP and organising this protest would help him in his political career. He replied with an Urdu epithet “umeed pe duniya qayam hai”, “Politics is about hope. And the world lives on hope. Isn't it?”

7.7 Young agent of citizenship and political spaces of action

My thesis argues that the site of Citizennagar, a resettlement colony located on the outskirts of Ahmedabad city, and which was set up to rehabilitate the survivors of the 2002 violence, can be called such a ‘political space’ (Gleiss 2017), where citizenship is contingent on a lot of factors, including actions by actors like Saleem . In my other chapters, I have discussed such ways of citizenship from the perspective of demand for house papers from a local real estate businessman, or through narratives of death and loss, everyday lives for women. However, this time I turn my focus to a youth who is an outsider to this particular site but choose to engage with this political space with an instrumentalist view. His actions and strategies to raise the issues affecting Citizennagar in the broader public sphere to rise in local politics, made me refer to him as the ‘young agent of citizenship’.

It is pertinent to note here, that such modes of activism or citizenship struggle have not emerged among the residents of Citizennagar, who rely on other practices and strategies in their fight to claim membership in the political community. However Saleem’s interaction with the same site to a different end around new modes of citizenship need to be studied. The story is also unique in the sense that it connects citizenship and political struggle in the aftermath of violent conflict and that too with a space which is associated with IDPs in India.

As I have shown earlier, citizenship struggle in Citizennagar was about inclusion, and therefore Saleem's activism offers us a new perspective on building up movements on IDPs, not necessarily using the international legal language but articulated through local context and marginalities. Though he did not use the word IDP in my conversation with him, his plans to disrupt the Sabarmati riverfront festival with waste from garbage dump, to highlight the plight of Muslims living in IDPs shows the real quality of an activist citizen. He was aware that the contrast between people protesting with waste from garbage dump and the aesthetics of a festival could make an excellent public spectacle. Also Saleem raised the issue in terms of relational justice, where the right to the city for Hindu inhabitants in Ahmedabad, cannot be different than those living in Citizennagar. His actions demonstrate that as equal citizens, Muslims in Ahmedabad should have equal rights in redefining the urban spaces, based on the city imageries they each conceives.

So why I am arguing him as "young agent of citizenship" who have emerged from the lanes of Citizennagar? First, his political demonstration was an act politics of presence as Sassen (2002) argues, where he attempted to challenge the norms of urban citizenship in Ahmedabad. And secondly Saleem's acts of engagement with the residents of Citizennagar, especially his attempt to collect data on the air and water pollution level at that particular site and to bring forth such issue into the political arena in association with the political parties he often allied with, can be called 'being political' (Isin, 2000). Both I argue are essential to expanding the notions of citizenship by the actions of a young agent. It is also important to understand the implication of his actions in terms of the Muslim citizenship question, explored by Shani (2010) that I have discussed earlier. Her work did not answer how Muslim youths exercise their agency and negotiate with complex contexts on the ground, to the continually changing notions around Citizenship that state and other forces like Hindutva put forth. Saleem's actions of 'being political', talking about hope in politics, under trying circumstances in Ahmedabad

city, repose his faith in democratic citizenship in India and the rights and entitlement of political citizenship that comes with it.

But it is just not 'being political" that makes him into the "young agent of citizenship", but his way of exploring the link between marginality and the political in a space like Citizennagar, which was located on the periphery of the city, both in the geographic and political sense. Whereas, due to their life choices and livelihood, the residents of the colony struggle in various ways to claim citizenship, Saleem's engagement with the same site showed radical potential in using the marginality as some "conditions of possibility" (Allen, 2002). Turner (2016:151) argues on the idea of 'citizenship from marginal spaces' by saying, "The acts and encounters which emerge from marginal spaces provide both disturbances of citizenship and equally provide alternative ways of accounting for and understanding the political". Saleem's agentive qualities need to be recognised here in transforming the site's marginality into a cause of political struggle.

7.8 Conclusion

The chapter looked at citizenship struggle from the perspective of a specific form of youth activism when dealing with a site and its residents that has evolved in a city in the aftermath of a conflict. This is very different than what Bayat (2009:18) term as nonmovement among the youths in post-revolutionary Iran or Middle East during the Arab spring to "reclaim their youth habitus-— in being treated as full citizens, in what to wear, what to listen to, and how to appear in public, and in the general choice of their lifestyle and pursuit of youthful fun". In spite of all the selfish interest to rise in the local politics and an instrumentalist approach with survivors of conflict, here the youth in question, Saleem's action can be viewed not only as an individual's quest for political space in a majoritarian democratic milieu, but also it has an impact on a marginalised community.

In my fourth chapter of this thesis where I deal with the concept of brokered citizenship, I quoted Berenschot (2011) work on the rise of Hindu nationalism among lower-caste Hindu population through 'political fixers' who act as intermediaries between citizens and state institutions. I argued that though scholarly work has been done from the perspective of Hindus in Gujarat on the role of different actors present amongst them in local politics, and how it contributes to the Hindu-Muslims violence (Berenschot, 2009, 2011), the literature on such actors on Muslim side who work amongst the Muslim population before, during and after the violence are sparse. This chapter on 'young agent of citizenship' is a small attempt to fill this gap in the literature.

It was a personal journey for me to work with Saleem closely during my fieldwork and witness his success and failures in achieving his dream of 'being someone' in Ahmedabad's Muslim community. During the 2017 Gujarat assembly election, Saleem contested from the Vatva constituency on behalf of a nondescript party called Socialist Party (India) and lost his deposit as in an electorate of more than a hundred thousand people; he could only garner a few hundred votes. "I only

fought the election from Socialist Party cause AAP declared it wouldn't fight this particular election from any seats in Ahmedabad, and these social activists requested me to fight cause they wanted to maintain their registration with the Indian Election Commission. I even did not campaign for myself and was busy in campaigning against the Congress candidate from Dariyapur" Saleem justified his terrible loss in the election with these words to me.[125] He is dogged in his stiff opposition to the Muslim candidates from the Congress party as he sees them as an opportunist wealthy businessman with no concern for the Muslim community. "They must suffer loss if we want new leadership to emerge and work for real for the Muslims who are worse than Dalits today" he further contended. [126]

Though he could not be someone with his electoral fortune, some national media took notice of him and his work among the residents of Citizennagar. In a prominent critical media portal *The Wire* (Kumar, 2017), he was the sole person to be profiled and interviewed to talk on the missing narratives on Muslims in the 2017 Gujarat assembly elections. In this interview he passionately raised the issue of pollution in Citizennagar and how it is severely affecting the health and livelihood of the people there and that local Congress leadership has utterly failed to address such pertinent topics. Interestingly, he always publicly recalls including in this interview, how an Oxford University student did his research in Citizennagar with him and found out that people are living as "second class citizen" in a place named Citizennagar.

The story of Saleem, I argue, is also about hope among the Indian Muslim youth. In this case, he fought against the normative assumptions by articulating his citizenship through being political and via acts of disruption (Isin, 2002). In this way, he sought to challenge the usual presumption of victimhood among the

[125] Fieldnotes on December 20, 2017

[126] Ibid

Muslims in India (Alam, 2008). And it also corresponds with Shani's (2010) work where she argued that Muslims across India adopt multiple strategies and practices to struggle for citizenship. Sometimes these strategies and struggles around citizenship happen simultaneously across different sites and scales to form different modes of relationship with state and society.

In the next chapter, I come to back to the discussion on *sarkaar*, or the role of state in the life of the Citizennagar residents. In section 2 and 2.1.4, we have talked about state as one of the most important actors in the arena of citizenship. And that's why, in my last chapter I present my ethnographic accounts to show how the state continue to discriminate the survivors of 2002 riots, and limits the fruits of citizenship for them.

8 Where is sarkar for us? citizenship in the shadow of "cutting"

8.1 Introduction

It was the month of January 2017. Ahmedabad city had just finished celebrating one of its biggest annual festival called *Uttarayan,* where people in large numbers fly countless colourful kites from their rooftop for two days to mark the end of winter and the arrival of spring. Many tourists from different parts of India and the world could still be spotted in the old parts of the Ahmedabad city with Digital-Single-Lens-Reflex cameras hanging from their neck and eyes teeming with curiosity. Many residents in the city credit Modi's time as Chief Minister to popularise *Uttarayan* among the tourists by inaugurating International Kites Festival on the western bank of the Sabarmati river in 2012.

While travelling on the busy road from Shah Alam to Jamalpur, one could see countless kites lying on the road or hanging from electric wires, as signs of previous days' kite fighting between restless youths and teenagers in their small neighbourhoods. Many of the kite wires laced with *manja,* a thick substance made with coloured powdered glasses to give sharpness to these wires to cut down kites flying from other roofs were dangling everywhere. I was advised to wear a scarf around my neck by Syed Sahab before venturing out and visit Citizennagar in this time to protect myself from such wires. Local newspapers in Ahmedabad had earlier reported of people getting killed due to such manja coated wires slicing the throats of a passerby.

In the same month, the city also made it to the national media due to the outbreak of Bird Flu, caused by the H5N1 virus, which mainly affect the poultry birds and if

eaten can prove fatal for humans (Kaushiki, 2017). Ahmedabad's city administration came into action promptly as the sudden appearance of this deadly flu threatened Vibrant Gujarat summit that year. This summit was started by Chief Minister Narendra Modi with much fanfare after 2002 riots to resurrect his image as the man of development and to attract business investment in the State of Gujarat, a journey from Hindutva to development as Sud (2012) aptly argues. On the orders of the Animal Husbandry department, all the meat and egg shops within a 10-kilometre radius of Hatijan and Memnagar area where the bird flu was initially reported were asked to shut down. The department declared Ahmedabad a "regulated zone".

One day during this time, I visited Citizennagar to hang out with few of its residents in one of the roadside tea stalls of Bombay Hotel. No one present there talked about bird flu or the Vibrant Gujarat summit. Life was going on in the same rhythm as every day.

When it was time for me to leave, they put me in a shared auto-rickshaw heading towards Jamalpur. While jostling for space along with five other passengers in the rear of the vehicle, I looked out and glanced at those small eateries selling fried chickens. I could see how teenage boys in their half pants and torn shirts, were busy putting chicken legs and breast tied to iron sticks on the barbecue platforms. White smoke from coal covered their faces while they gasped for their breath while fanning these meat items with a piece of cardboard. From Bombay Hotel to Shah Alam and then from Shah Alam the auto reached its destination in Jamalpur. While crossing these places, almost after every fifty metres there were these small restaurants selling fried chicken and people gorging on them with paper-thin *rumali rotis* (a form of bread). A local friend working in a local NGO once joked to me that it is symptomatic of any Muslim area in India that it would have many such

fried chicken outlets at every step. "They really love their chicken", he said pointing to this phenomena. [127]

Trivedi (2019) reports, how since BJP came to power in 2014, meat eating is demonised and vegetarian practices of upper caste Hindus imposed on others through public policies on school meals and government approved health diets. According to her BJP always supports vegetarianism as it resonates with Hindutva's vision of uniform cultural practices, food being an important element in it. She writes that after "the 2002 pogrom and the ghettoisation of Muslims that followed, Hindus justified not wanting to live next door to them because of their "smelly" non-vegetarian habits"(2019). Ghassem-Fachandi (2012:35) in his work explains how meat in Gujarat "is an overdetermined substance, powerful precisely because it enters into multiple relationships between and among members and sections of society that are exactly *not* Muslim."

However, whereas Muslims are identified as a meat eater and thus figures of disgust in everyday conversation, many posh restaurants in the western side of Sabarmati river are not vegetarian. They openly offer non-vegetarian items on their menus which are often frequented by people who are "*not* Muslims." From Jamalpur auto-rickshaw stand, I got an Uber as I had to reach one such posh restaurant that day in the Satellite area to attend the birthday party of a friend whom I met during my stay in Ahmedabad.

While I sat across a round table along with four other people, with dim light and soft music in the background, the attendant dressed in a white shirt and black tie arrived with few shiny menus inside leather folders. He announced that due to the outbreak of bird flu in the city, the government ordered all the restaurants in

[127] Fieldnotes taken on August 8, 2016.

Ahmedabad to stop serving chicken and duck items to its customers. He informed us that in case we decided to opt for non-vegetarian items, only pork would be available. I was quite surprised, as I recalled the scenes, I witnessed half an hour back. I addressed my friends with a curious smile and said, "How is this possible? I mean, I was just there in Jamalpur and Shah Alam area before arriving here, and people are happily stuffing themselves with fried chicken legs."[128] I expressed my amazement to the fact that government order on banning poultry items was missing in these areas.

A friend sitting there retorted; "People? Do you mean Muslims? See, in Gujarat, the government doesn't care how Muslims die. Either in the riots or by bird flu, it is only good riddance for them."[129] We all joined in the laughter that ensued after. One friend then added an explanation that the government circular had also mentioned that food items cooked above 70 centigrade were safe. He guessed that might be the reason the local administration did not shut down these fried chicken shops.

There are two ways to look at this particular story. One can be that in the city of Ahmedabad, Muslims by their act of defiance to this government circular on meat-eating is engaged in a form of everyday resistance against a state that they may view associated with majoritarianism (Scott 1998). [130] But the issue is here is not of carrying on existing food habits against the wishes of the state, but the emergence of a certain kind of biopolitics when it comes to Muslims living in the city (Lemke, 2001, 2004).[131] So I would rather keep my focus on the production of

[128] Fieldnotes taken on January 20, 2017

[129] Ibid.

[130] Thanks to Dr Zaad Mahmood at the University of Oxford for highlighting this argument.

[131] In section 5.3, I have briefly introduced the theory of biopolitics and biopower in modern society.

this biopolitical state and how it engages or ignore a section of its population. In this case, the regional government is seen to be putting the health of Muslims at risk through weak or no implementation of its regulatory order on the consumption of poultry item in the areas inhabited by the Muslim community. This order was meant to protect the lives of all citizens.

Following the works of Das and Poole (2004:3), it can be argued that Muslims in Ahmedabad live "along its territorial and social margins" where the idea of the state as a "rationalized administrative form of political organization […]becomes weakened or less fully articulated." The state is defined here by reflecting "on how the practices and politics of life in these areas shaped the political, regulatory, and disciplinary practices that constitute" such a political organisation (2004:3). I will further this argument and contend that, in the aftermath of the 2002 riots, the state in Gujarat is present in the lives of Muslims by being absent. [132] This argument is also build on the work by Williams (2011) who coined the term 'absent present' to describe the missing role of 'welfare state' in India in ensuring equal citizenship to Muslims of Varanasi.

The idea of a less interventionist state is not new in the realm of economic policies, especially in the era of neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005). But how we can imagine the role of the state in the realm of citizenship for the Muslim residents in Ahmedabad, especially that of Citizennagar? More so when recent scholarships branded BJP ruled states and federal government in India as 'Majoritarian state' (Chatterji, Hansen and Jaffrelot, 2019; Gettleman and Kumar, 2019). How such 'majoritarian state' manifests itself in the everyday lives of survivors of communal riots when the state actors themselves were alleged to be involved?

[132] I thank my supervisor Prof Nikita Sud to encourage me to develop this line of thought.

The statement from my friend wherein he alluded to the absence of state officials and their diktats on health safety, and the possibility of death of Muslim citizens "either in the riots or by Bird Flu" points to the formation of a biopolitical state. It decides who is either deemed as "killable bodies through the specter of homo sacer" or "who are not so much killed as allowed to die" (Das and Poole, 2004:29).[133] It also speaks to the literature I cited earlier on 'racialized citizenship' (Fitzgerald 2017); the state is engaged in providing different meaning to the substantive citizenship, based on the notion of majority and minority.

In this chapter, I investigate the role of the state in the lives of Citizennagar residents in reshaping their status and experiences of citizenship. In my second chapter of this thesis, I had devoted a section on different conceptions of citizenship, wherein I showed how scholars disagree on the centrality of the state on this matter. In that chapter, I engaged with scholars from both sides, those who think of citizenship as a concept which flows from the top, and those who conceive it in the everyday practices and struggles of a group of people, thus an idea which takes shape from below. And in this process, I attempt to answer all the three research questions mentioned in section 1.6 of this thesis.

Whereas the above mentioned ethnographic account showed the biopolitical state, and different class of citizens 'being made' (Ong, 1996) by it, in which some people are protected while some are exposed to health hazards, I will also turn the lens from the bottom and analyse how the so-called 'second-class' citizens engage with state policies and officials in this chapter. My analysis supports the argument forwarded by Sud (2012) that the state is not a unitary entity but a protean

[133] For the figure of *Homo Sacer,* please refer to Agamben (1998).

amorphous one, where social, economic and political trends influence its policies and officials.

It is important to note here that though in my other chapters, people living and engaging with Citizennagar, struggle for membership in the political community through the narratives of death, struggle for house papers, gendered practices in everyday lives or by political speech and acts, all this is happening with the shadow of the state in the background. Therefore I turn my focus on the state in this chapter and look at its complex relationship with the notions of citizenship in the lives of Citizennagar residents.

8.2 *Sarkar*, everyday and citizenship

Fuller and Harris (2001) have rightly noted that in the Indian context, *sarkar* is the most ubiquitous term to denote state and government both at the same time. Mathur (2016:22) captured the irony of this translation and added:

> The fact that the Hindustani word sarkar does not make the government/state distinction that exists in English is to be noted, for it indicates an expansive notion of state power and government. Sarkar, in my reading, is best understood as an intimate repository of state power.

During my fieldwork, my respondents used the term *sarkar* in the same manner without any fixed meaning attached to it but as 'repository of state power' as Mathur here suggested.

In Citizennagar, Syed Sahab once complained to me that how Indian Billionaire Mukesh Ambani illegally purchased land belonging to a Muslim charitable organisation in Mumbai to build the world's most expensive private-owned building and how the government acted like his broker (Shroff, 2016). He also alleged in his conversation that the ruling BJP government only helped the rich and was rightly called "*Suit Boot ki Sarkar*" by Congress leader Rahul Gandhi to point out its closeness with big industrial capitalists (Bhatt, 2015). While conversing about these facts, his ideas on *sarkar are not different* than Miliband's (1969) arguments of the state as an instrument to further the interest of capital. However, in other instances, the same person would tell me how the BJP government and all the bureaucrats in local and regional offices represent '*Hindu o ki sarkar*' (government of Hindus). In uttering such views, he would rather agree with the notion that social forces have penetrated a supposedly neutral and rational organisation. So according to him, the state is not only instrumental in

helping big capital, but also people subscribing to Hindu nationalist views are sitting in its offices and actively promoting a majoritarian agenda.

Similarly, in their book on the state, Fuller and Harris (2001:15) argue that the word *sarkar* "appears on many levels and in many centres, and its lower echelons at least are always staffed by people with whom some kind of social relationship can or could exist; the 'faceless bureaucrats' actually do have faces." They also argued by quoting the work of Hansen (1999) that in research on Hindu nationalism in India, "there is more explicit concern with the question of the state-partly because the protagonists themselves have forced it on the top of the agenda" (2001:11). After discussing how the *sarkar* is imagined and perceived, I proceed to discuss why everyday is an important element in this process.

The idea of everyday has come up time and again in my chapters because I wish to locate citizenship practices in the modes of living and struggles by people associated with Citizennagar. How these residents experience the state (Corbridge, 2005) or struggle to make themselves visible to the state as rights-bearing citizens (Chatterjee and Mehta, 2007), everyday life is an important locus of my research. This way we shift our focus towards a better-grounded approach in understanding the notions of citizenship and the state. Hansen & Stepputat (2001:14) argued to 'disaggregate the state into the multitude of discrete operations, procedures and representations in which it appears in the everyday life of ordinary people' through ethnographic accounts.

Gupta (1995:376) also acknowledged the need to do more "to lay the empirical basis for ethnographies of the state." He explained that though scholarly work focused on the idea of the state through significant events and influential persons, big structures and salient policies, not much work was done to situate everyday practices of the bureaucrats and their effects in the lives of rural people. In his influential work, Gupta reasoned that it is in these offices occupied by grassroots officials, Indian citizens "come into contact with "the state", and this is where many

of their images of the state are forged" (1995:376). It is through everyday practices and experiences among the rural populations vis-a-vis low-level state officials, the abstract state reveals itself in his work and discourse on the state is formed. He concludes that there exists a 'blurred boundary' between the state and society at the lower level, as these officials continue to shift their role and actions from being 'public servant' to a 'private individual.'

There is a considerable absence of literature on the ethnographic encounters between the state and Muslim community, except the notable mentions like Chatterjee (2017), who worked among the Muslims of Kolkata and Williams (2011), who worked on the Muslims of Varanasi. Especially I follow the work of Williams (2011:264) to understand "situated perspective on Muslim experiences and expectations of the state." Through the study of a government health insurance programme for the poor weavers of Varanasi, majority of whom are Muslims, Williams studied their encounter with the state. In her study, she found the state is marked by its what she called 'an absent presence', because Muslims continue to expect the state would deliver welfare provisions to them, "in spite of its everyday absence" (2011:264). Such 'absent present' feature of the state discriminate Muslims of equal citizenship, she argued.

In the next section, I go on to describe how the residents of Citizennagar struggled to retrieve one after another *sarkari kagaz* or official documents after arriving at the site just after the 2002 violence. It also looks at the distinct role of executive and judiciary in providing them with documentary citizenship, negotiating their existence as *dangapirit* (riot affected person).

8.3 *"Sarkar kaha hai hamare liye"*: Where is the state for us?

Documents or the Urdu word for it *kagaz* appear in many ways in my conversation with Citizennagar residents. Mathur (2016:24) argues that "both the fundamentally fragmented nature of *sarkar* and the processes whereby it accomplishes the hard act of assemblage", happens through "*sarkari kagaz* (paper)." Gupta (2012) writes about illiterate rural villagers of Uttar Pradesh who treat documents as sacred objects. In the lanes of Citizennagar, *kagaz* were as important as meagre cash savings that people keep them folded in some clothes piece. Here some are literate some are illiterate, but the way they mention *kagaz* in our conversations and ascribe meanings to each of their documents, they can all be called paper literates. In section 5.5 of my thesis, I talked about how one resident Mohiuddin Bhai kept collecting documents himself concerning public services and health facilities available at Citizennagar and on the Pirana garbage dump by teaching himself about the RTI Act.

Sadiq (2009:102) links documents, citizenship and the state in countries like India with the following words, "Documents have come to embody individual identity in developing countries. The documentation of individual identity is part of a larger infrastructure of citizenship meant to identify members of the polity, thus creating a "citizenship from above"- from the state." However, in his work on illegal immigrants, he uses the term "documentary citizenship" to denote the process by which they "gain citizenship through the acquisition of fraudulent documents" (2009:102).

In the case of Citizennagar, the residents never spoke to me about facing any hardships or engaging in unlawful activities to acquire any form of paper identification. They spoke to me as if in the span of a few years one after another document came to their lives and improved things a little more.

"In the beginning, we had nothing with us except for a few clothes which we took with us on the day we left our homes for the Shah Alam camp. For many of us, our documents were also burnt by the attackers. It was a different struggle to retrieve them back apart from all the hardship after the violence." Fazal, one interviewee told me once.[134] I heard similar statements from other residents who had arrived in the lanes of Citizennagar "with nothing in their possession" in the early months of 2013.

They acknowledge the fact that within a few years of moving to their respective houses from Shah Alam camp, *sansthawale* (NGOs) contacted them to get their signature or *angutha chhap* (fingerprint) in various papers and told them that "they would use these documents in court to give us *insaaf* (justice)".

The National Commission for Minorities (NCM), a federal quasi-judicial body established by an act of Parliament in 1992, issued a statement on October 23, 2006 after meeting with these colony residents. They also met state officials included the Chief Minister of Gujarat and representatives from local NGOs. They said, "The State government has provided no amenities or facilities in the camps, nor has it made any attempt to facilitate the return of these families, in a safe environment, to their original homes" (quoted in Janvikas 2003:10).

[134] Fieldnotes taken on November 16, 2015

In 2013, Ahmedabad based non-governmental organisation Centre for Social Justice (CSJ), in association with other NGOs published a report titled "Homeless in Homeland" to document the abysmal living conditions faced by Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), a United Nations recognised community throughout India.[135] It termed 2002 Gujarat riots as the 'starting point' in discussion around the social and legal existence of IDPs in India. The report states, "The Gujarat violence in 2002 laid the background for a long fight for justice, internally displaced person languishing in 86 colonies across seven districts of the State are a living example of how the State easily excludes communities who fall in the vulnerable category" (Janvikas 2013:9).

It is in the 2007 report by N.C. Saxena, who headed the Supreme Court-appointed committee on Right to Food that the plight of these IDPs first time came to the fore. Saxena found that "4,545 families comprising around 30,000 persons affected by the post-Godhra riots are still living in difficult and pathetic conditions in 81 relief colonies across Gujarat with acute problems in getting food and livelihood security" (Correspondent 2007). This report accused the State of Gujarat of violating court directions with regard to the right to food schemes in the "resettlement colonies" (Janvikas 2013: 9). Based on this report the district collectors were asked to take note of the situation and enforce schemes on the right to food. It said, "All families who continue to live in relief colonies must be given Antyodaya cards, as internally displaced persons who lost all their belongings, face fear and economic boycott and are too afraid to return to their original homes" (Correspondent, 2007).

[135] To see UN guiding principles on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), please refer to https://www.unhcr.org/uk/protection/idps/43ce1cff2/guiding-principles-internal-displacement.html (Accessed online on April 10, 2019)

Everyone in Citizennagar informed me that the first document they had in their possession following their arrival in the colony was the *Antodaya Ration Card,* an important feature of the public distribution system (PDS) in India.[136] They claimed that a government official visited the colony and surveyed the house in 2007 by taking their name, age and address and provided them with this document, which entitles its recipients to get food items from specified shops at a highly subsidised rate. In my conversation, I was told that from nothing in their possession to affirm who they are and where they live, the ration cards gave them a beginning. It allowed them to claim legitimacy and belonging to Citizennagar in the eyes of the law for the first time, based upon which they started to struggle for other public utilities and services like electricity connection, roads, water connection, and access to health care facilities.

We can argue here that their struggle is not so different than what Das (2011) describes with poor urban dwellers in Noida, in northern India. The poor there set up shanties (*jhuggis)* in occupied government land, and one document received from local government as 'emergency measures' due to a local struggle became the basis to obtain other papers, thus starting the process of "deepening their claims over housing"(2011:327). She further argues,

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[136] Gupta and Mishra (2018:20-21) writes,

> The public distribution system (PDS) is among the largest anti-poverty and government welfare programmes which were implemented by the Indian state to provide subsidized food grains to poor families, to stabilize market prices of food items and to maintain a buffer stock. Till 1990, PDS was universal in its coverage. However, due to the heavy burden of fiscal deficit, partly due to higher spending on subsidies, this programme was revamped in 1997 to a targeted public distribution system (TPDS). Under this revamped programme, the whole population was divided on the basis of the official poverty line norm into two categories, namely, below poverty line (BPL) and above poverty line (APL). Later, Antodaya Anna Yojna (AAY) was also initiated to benefit the poorest sections of the population. These systematic changes in the functioning of the PDS programme have been highly debated among academicians and policy planners.

> Just as the jhuggis are built incrementally – you first occupy a bit of land, you then put up thatched mud walls and a tin roof, and then as more money comes in to the house and the family grows, you put up one cement wall, or you put a door or build a room on the roof – similarly, you try to build credentials for rights incrementally. The legal notion that you either have rights or you do not would make no sense within these strategies of creating rights (2011: 327).

Citizennagar residents' obtaining the ration card set in motion the employment of other 'strategies of creating rights', as Das explained above.

As we have discussed earlier, the State of Gujarat in their response to Supreme Court of India in the writ petition CWP/196/2002 (popularly known as right to food petition) refused to acknowledge the existence of these colonies like Citizennagar and gather any data around them (Mander 2006), the 'citizens' in Citizennagar struggled to make themselves visible to the state. Though this struggle met with some success in terms of accessing *sarkari kagaz* like ration cards, electricity bill and voter IDs, the state has done very little to ameliorate the social and material conditions of these citizens since they acquired these state documents. The *Homeless in Homeland* report states similar views when it says, "Meanwhile, the struggle for implementing what the Supreme Court had granted, and the struggle for the IDPs' survival, continued. Looking at the Gujarat government's complete noncompliance on the issue, it became necessary to highlight the IDPs' concerns…" (Janvikas 2013:10).

Gujarat government's negligent attitude reflected not only in multiple reports by media and NGOs but also it often entered in my conversation with the colony residents. I heard statements like "*Sarkar humhe insaan hi kahan samajhtein hai*' (The state doesn't even consider us humans) when they complained about pollution from the Pirana garbage dump, or inadequate supply of water tankers

from AMC, which they rely on for clean drinking water. My respondents told me that they have become accustomed to the salty tea due to the polluted water they get there. Gilbert and Phillips (2003) wrote about the fundamental urban and environmental rights for every city inhabitant- home and water, which lies at the heart of what they call "urban environmental citizenship."

Citizennagar inhabitants often invoked the rights associated with formal citizenship in comparative terms with other residents of the city. In addition, these rights linked with 'urban environmental citizenship' are essentially connected to their personhood. The case being if the state treats them as humans, with all their inherent rights just like other citizens, it would not shirk away from its duties to provide them with clean air and water. This way, they shift the responsibility on the state for straying off the path of welfarism, an objective of the state they associate with. This comparative enjoyment of rights in different parts of the city and nation, especially in terms of clean environment, relates to what scholars named environmental citizenship, another important element of substantive citizenship claim (Gabrielson, 2008). It also speaks about a graded citizenship attributed to the Muslim survivors of 2002 riots, who find themselves at the bottom of the ladder compared to other members of the society.

And this is where my respondents were aware that though they had other rights associated with legal or formal citizenship, the elements of substantive citizenship, most importantly the right to live a dignified life free from health hazards were missing. The question of exercising civil rights did not arise as my respondents were still engaged in their struggle to find proper legal documents cementing their rootedness at that particular site. The distinction between first-class citizens and second class citizens becomes apparent in such a scenario: mere legal status does not correspond to better availability of social citizenship. Jayal (2013:165) argues, "in normative terms, social provision is legitimately seen as a moral imperative of substantive citizenship, which is seriously incomplete in the presence of social inequality." The residents of Citizennagar were aware of this moral imperative

which is why they were disappointed that even after getting all their *kagaz,* they were denied the civic amenities like others.

On the contrary, in my other chapters, I have shown how colony residents often complained that "nothing happens here". They also quite regularly expressed to me in a similar vein, "*Sarkar kahan hai hamare liye"* (Where is the state for us?)[137]. The welfare state, omnipresent in the lives of other citizens in Ahmedabad in the form of social housing or clean water, was absent in Citizennagar. In their struggle of 'creating rights', they expressed disappointment as getting *kagaz* did not translate into other forms of substantive citizenship. Though my informants struggle to enter into the realm of the state by obtaining necessary *kagaz,* and continue to identify the state as the main vehicle of social welfare, it is characterised by its conspicuous absence. They have struggled in the past to get ration cards, to establish electrical connection and paid taxes on their property to AMC just to make this point against the narrative of the state, that they exist. Though they continue to look up to the state to be counted, the *sarkar,* on the other hand, remains oblivious of their presence. And it is done quite deliberately. They are alive and present in Citizennagar, but the state remains absent.

It goes back to my earlier engagement with the work of Williams (2011), which shows the role of the state in similar vein among the Muslim weavers of Varanasi. In calling the state "an absent presence" figure in the lives of the Muslims, Williams also attempts to answer why marginalised groups desire the intervention of state in spite of its discriminatory practices. She says, "One answer might lie in the state's role as a last resort for a population that has experienced persistent and pervasive patterns of discrimination within society and marginality within local political networks" (2011: 277).

[137] Fieldnotes taken on 15 November, 2015

Even for the Citizennagar residents, who are poor and marginalised, the state is actually seen as the last resort as I show in the next section. Here I discuss housing, an important element of social citizenship. I analyse how the state practices in Gujarat blatantly discriminated between Muslims and Hindus in this regard. The state is not only absent in this case but also intervene only to discriminate citizens according to their religion.

8.4 "*Sarkar* has a *jimmevari* to relocate us to a better place"

One evening in May 2016, a sexagenerian woman named Mehrunnisa Begum told me how *sarkar* forgot all their *insaniyat* (humanity) when it came to *dangapirit (riot affected)* Muslim family like hers. During my fieldwork, she was unusually outspoken most of the time and quite openly accused her husband of doing nothing for their family in the hardships they faced following 2002 violence. She always emphasised in her conversation with me that it was she who took the responsibility of running her family "by managing some money from here and there" when the husband was plain "lazy and coughing all the time". Such words for their ailing partners, who point to the garbage dump as the reason for their ill health are not uncommon in the colony.

The first time I met her and asked if she had received any help from the NGOs working in the colony, she angrily retorted,

> This BJP government killed our families and then did nothing for our rehabilitation. And these NGOs and others who come here for interviews only give us false hope that something will happen. When we were hungry

for days when we came here, none of them even asked how we were living. Should we eat all these interviews to be alive?[138]

In that particular evening, on finding me alone sitting near the electricity transformer located at the entrance of Citizennagar, she asked me to wait, from a distance, gesturing with her hand towards me. She was sitting on a dilapidated cot which creaked when she stepped out of it. She went to her one-room shack and came out with old folded documents wrapped carefully in a violet plastic cover. She handed over one postcard size receipt from Ahmedabad Municipal Commissioner's office to me and said, "You seem to be a well-educated boy from our community. Can you do something with it? I don't complain without doing anything. I have done everything these NGOs and others asked me to do. But nothing happened till now. Now, which door should I knock tell me, please? Only if someone will understand that we cannot live like this here ?"[139]

On my query on if she got any help in writing this petition, she answered in the affirmative. Though I asked for a copy of the petition, she informed me that the guy who helped her in writing and posting the letter did not bring any photocopy and only provided her with the receipt. I asked her what she wrote in the petition to the AMC Commissioner, and she said,

"I told the Commissioner *saheb* that *sarkar* and police did not protect us during the violence, due to which we became *besahara* and ended up here in Citizennagar near the garbage dump. Now sarkar has a *jimmevari* to relocate us to a better

[138] Fieldnotes taken May 25, 2016

[139] Ibid.

place".[140] Mehrunnisa used terms like *saheb, besahara* and *jimmevari* while writing a petition to the head of local government in Ahmedabad to appeal for better resettlement. She added the word 'saheb' as a suffix to 'Commissioner', a word which mainly referred to white men during the colonial era and later on found widespread use as a signifier of authority, power and sometimes as a mark of respect for someone ahead in the social and economic hierarchy. People often call *"Chhota saheb"* and *"Bada Saheb"* in offices to differentiate between junior and senior officials, with *chhota* means small and *bada* means big. *Besahara,* an Urdu word which means to be unaided, unsupported or someone without any guardian or patron. In South Asia, it is often used for orphaned children . *Jimmevari,* on the other hand, can be translated as 'to take responsibility', or to be entrusted with the duty to look after something.

She continued with her rationale of such a petition to the Commissioner. "I told him that Sarkar is like our '*mai-baap',* so it should also look after us and show some kind gestures on their own. I asked him, is this justice? All the jhuggi residents living near Sabarmati river got relocated to *Charmaliya* near Vatva with all the necessary *kagaz* when their home was demolished by *sarkar* to make the city beautiful. Now, what sins have we committed that they have left us to live and die here like insects? *Insaniyat ke nate ye galat hai* (This is wrong for the sake of humanity)."[141] This time she called the state as *mai-baap* (literally mother-father), which scholars like Das (2007) and Sharma (2008) argue people use to emphasise "the intimacy of a parental bond" with *sarkar* or the state in Indian context(cited in Mathur 2016:23).

Mehrunnisa refered to the relocation of 200 families in 2009 from their informal settlements on the banks of Sabarmati river to several kilometres away in four-

[140] Ibid.

[141] Ibid.

storey buildings, locally called *Charmaliya*. These people were evicted from their homes to implement the Sabarmati Riverfront Development (SRD) project. Desai (2012:49) has argued, "SRD project is one of the many urban projects that have emerged around the world over the past two decades, with the articulation of new urban imaginaries". These state allocated four-storey buildings, which Citizennagar residents also referred as 'duplex flats' or *pucca ghar* in their conversation with me. They were built under the Basic Services for the Urban Poor (BSUP) program undertaken by the Indian central government as part of Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JnNURM) to modernize its cities. In Ahmedabad, between 2005 to 2012, due to various development projects run by the State of Gujarat, many informal settlements were demolished and people living there were resettled in BSUP apartments built in different locations.[142]

Desai (2012) observed that as people are relocated to their new houses built in multiples sites spread throughout the city by holding a computerized lottery, it consequently leads to the breaking up of established social networks. Though Salmi (2019) writes on such BSUP apartments given both to poor Hindu and Muslim residents of the city, who live in separate sections of such resettlement sites, often pejoratively identified as 'India' and 'Pakistan' as signs of active 'othering' of Muslim community as alien citizens, we find that no riot-affected families got such housing. In the words of Mehrunnisa, we can see a self-reference to her identity as Muslim, something she considered as 'sin' in the eyes of the state, who is not qualified to get government housing, in spite of worse socio-economic conditions than others. She invoked the word *insaniyat* or humanity to link it with the state as its essential characteristics. But she found that the state of violated this

[142] Desai (2014) also informs us that the total cost of each housing unit stands at 4,25,00 Rupees (approx. 6125 USD) which is shared between multiple agencies and stakeholders to provide cheap government housing to the urban poor. Central government bear 50%, state government gives 20%, and 30% paid jointly by the municipal corporation and the individual household.

concept when she referred to active discrimination in allocating government housing based on religious identity.

I believe as she also knows that some poor Muslim slum dwellers did indeed get such houses under BSUP, she mainly referred to non-recognition of displacement due to anti-Muslim violence in the city, which had made people like her possibly more and not less as a suffering subject. Chatterjee (2012:144) argues that such local tensions in the city are actively linked with a globalized discourse on Muslim othering post 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States. She makes a similar point when she writes, "Thus redistribution, resettlement, employment and living wage are very important issues in Ahmedabad, but they are getting enframed around religious identities of Hinduness and Muslimness- the Hindu poor evicted under urban renewal schemes need rehabilitation; the 2002 conflict mediates that Muslim do not deserve such redistribution because they are the 'others'." She implicated the state in this exercise of othering of poor Muslim survivors of 2002 violence by posing them ineligible for government housing vis-a-vis Hindu citizens affected by development projects induced displacement.

In this section, I showed how state documents played an important role in the lives of the Citizennagar residents. They kept them with a lot of care. My stories also reflect that IDPs in India, especially people displaced due to Hindu-Muslim violence, had their own struggle to become what Sadiq (2009) calls 'paper citizens'. Sadiq writes about illegal immigrants from Bangladesh who enter India and fraudulently obtain various forms of identification documents by using weak and ineffective bureaucracy to become citizens.

In my ethnographic accounts, we can see, it is only after the intervention of Supreme Court appointed observer, riot survivors who were displaced within Gujarat and in Ahmedabad city, receive ration card registered to their new location sites. Such forms of documentary citizenship through various forms of IDs were important to these people as they knew state value, what Tarlo (2003) calls 'paper

truths'. They wanted to posit such truths against the state narrative which failed to recognise and provide any succour to residents displaced due to conflict. That is why every document in their possession had to be preserved as any 'educated' person or NGO representative could appear in their colony on any day, and then helped them in furthering their struggle in 'creating rights'.

In the literature on state formation and discursive citizenship practice, identity documents have often been treated as prominent technologies of knowing populations and putting them in the national order of things (Torpey, 2000). Chhotray & McConnel (2018:114) argue, "The forms of legal identification that IDs hold can be crucial to an individual's life chances. The granting of an ID or a denial of IDs dictate a person's mobility, ability to work, and right to citizenship." The people in Citizennagar are aware of these instrumentalist capabilities linked with IDs. And being survivors of violence, who had to fight for meagre rehabilitation packages offered by the government in the aftermath of 2002, absence of paper means 'officially dead' (Vasta, 2011) with no right any claims and entitlement in the eyes of the state (Bunsha 2002).

Lokhande (2015:91-129) details the paltry amount of compensation 2002 riot survivors received and how forms of identification for the nearest kin of the dead or missing became important for the distribution of such relief packages (like 2500 USD for death) announced by the government. My respondents also expressed fear of future violence, given the rise of anti-Muslim crimes following the 2014 Indian general election and their visuals distributed via public and social media. And they conveyed their concern to me as if unlike in 2002, they should be more prepared for any eventuality.

It is important to mention here that the word *Sarkari kagaz* is normally used for identification or property documents by the residents of Citizennagar unlike in the work by Mathur (2016) cited earlier. In her work it is more linked with the functioning of Indian bureaucracy and state practices. Citizennagar residents

distinguish between people around them by who have these *sarkari kagaz* and who does not. These documents are usually linked with three dimensions of citizenship as explained by Jayal (2013) : first, as legal status (with documentation proving vital for it to be ascertained); second, as a bundle of rights and entitlements (where documents hold the key to the 'goods of citizenship' whether these are welfare subsidies or a particular social status); and third, as a form of identity (quoted in Chhotray & McConnel 2018:113). This explains the 'ID-paper fetishism' in the lanes of Citizennagar to a great extent, a phrase used in the work by Gordillo (2006). In Gordillo's study, we can see how indigenous population in Argentinean Chaco attach great value to identification documents given to them in the recent years. Denial of such documents in the past made them feel alienated from the realm of citizenship rights. However possession of these identity documents do not ensure the delivery of social goods it formally promise, as they are contingent upon multiple actors and circumstances.

Mehrunnisa's appeal to the Commissioner of AMC on account of *insaniyat* or humanity, argues for the importance of the state with all its sublime dimensions what Hansen (2001) mentions in his work on the 1992 Bombay riot survivors. The state should be just, reasonable, tolerant and fair in the eyes of Mehrunnisa but it had forced them to live a subhuman life, made people like her *besahara*. The myth of the state shattered in the eyes of the citizens like her when it actively discriminated people on account of their suffering in allotting government housing. The *sarkar* was missing in their eyes though they have managed to obtain range of *sarkari kagaz* over the years. Such contradiction defined their lives as they claimed constantly in their everyday conversation.

8.5 State, courts and the enigma of ILU ILU

Qasim was thirty-five years old and drove a three-wheeler auto-rickshaw ferrying passengers on the eastern side of the Ahmedabad city. "Sometimes I go to the posh localities on the western side of the river as well, but I often get looks while driving in those areas as if an outsider has entered their locality. So I try to avoid that side as much as possible. Maybe it's because of my beard", he said with a chuckle in our first meeting.[143] He sported a neatly trimmed thick and long beard that made him a visible Muslim in the city. Along with his parents, Qasim was lucky to escape the attack at Gulberg society by marauding Hindu mobs. After finding temporary shelter at Shah Alam camp, they found a roof over their heads in the lanes of Citizennagar in the year 2003. " I was a teenager then so I remember everything. You will find many young people in Citizennagar who were quite young at that time and can't recall anything today. They don't know how lucky they are!"[144] he told me once to stress the horrific nature of the violence he had to witness during the riots.

I met him in the last months of my fieldwork. He himself tried to befriend me by regularly offering to go for tea at the roadside stalls in Bombay Hotel. These tea break taking me away from my usual hangout spots in Citizennagar were often meant to feed me with gossip about the colony. He told me quite enthusiastically who are the close supporters of Rahman builders in the colony so I should be careful in my conversation with them or who are rumoured to have affairs outside their marriage in Citizennagar or how he knew some men in Bombay Hotel who loved to have sex with other men. "Everything works these days you see. Signs of

[143] Fieldnotes taken on June 5, 2016

[144] Ibid.

the apocalypse but what can you do? People are happy in their own ways" he told me with a wink.

One thing that I had heard often from most people in Citizennagar was that there was a time when there were no roads, no electricity, shops and houses in Bombay Hotel but the entire area developed because of the Supreme Court's interventions to provide *insaaf* (justice) to *dangapirit* (riot-affected people) living in Citizennagar. During one such tea breaks, Qasim claimed once, with absolute certainty,

> Bombay Hotel used to be a jungle when we arrived here. Gujarat *sarkar* or AMC did nothing to develop this area. After Supreme Court scolded the *sarkar* for ignoring us for years and asked them to connect us to the main city, then they constructed the road linking us to Narol highway and see today so many people living in this area. It is a city within the city. People should thank us that we were shifted to Citizennagar from Shah Alam camp. From the electricity connection to water tankers, everything was given to us and then others in Bombay hotel enjoy these facilities.[145]

It is interesting to hear such narrative as most of the academic and non-academic works do not mention any such history of the Bombay Hotel area (Chaudhury, 2007; Mahadevia, Desai and Vyas, 2014; Shah, 2015; Desai and Sanghvi, 2017). Desai and Sanghvi (2017:52) would agree with Qasim partially when they write, "The construction of rehabilitation housing in Bombay Hotel by Muslim charities for the Muslim victims of the 2002 violence also spurred the locality's growth". However, they argue that faulty and slow implementation of Town Planning

[145] Fieldnotes taken on July 15, 2016

schemes led to the absence of basic civic amenities in the area.[146] Therefore, how Qasim links the Supreme Court's order on resettlement colonies in the right to food petition with the development of Bombay hotel initially confused me. I did not offer my counter to him when I later learnt the actual facts regarding the case from Gagan Sethi, a prominent social activist in Ahmedabad. I thought it was unnecessary to challenge his perception.

Though informal development of Bombay Hotel began in the 1990s and this area brought under the municipal limits in 1975, the state was slow to plan and implement TPS for Bombay Hotel. In 2003, city planners began their work and came up with two TPS for the area - TPS 38/1 and TPS 38/2. After a lot of dilly-dallying on the matter, the Gujarat government sanctioned both the TPS 38/1 in January 2009 and 38/2 in October 2006. By 2013, Desai and Sanghi (2017) estimate 200 families with 25000 population were living in the Bombay Hotel area and yet implementation did not begin. They write, "Throughout this period, AMC withheld the delivery of basic services citing the illegal (*ger-kaaydesar*) nature of development and the absence of TPSs for the area (2017:52).

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[146] The urban local bodies (ULB) of Ahmedabad- AMC and AUDA use the Town Planning scheme(TPS), which is governed by the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act of 1976 for planned and controlled development of the city. Desai and Sanghvi explains (2017:52),

> The mechanism is based on the twin concepts of land pooling and readjustment. The ULB prepares a TPS for an area of 1–2 sq km, in which it pools all the land parcels; acquire up to 40% of each parcel to provide infrastructure (roads, water supply, sewerage, social amenities like schools and parks), SEWS housing, and land for sale; and returns the remaining land to the original landowners in the form of reconstituted parcels. The value of the reconstituted parcels is expected to have increased due to infrastructure provision, and landowners have to pay half of the land-value increase as a better- ment charge. The land for sale and betterment charges are meant to help the ULB recover its costs.

One of the important characteristics of TPS was the presence of a policy to leave some land for public housing for socially and economically weaker sections (SEWS). In Ahmedabad, lands allocated in other TPS for SEWS often remained vacant or unused for intended purpose. The AMC had constructed public houses under the BSUP programme to "to resettle slum dwellers involuntarily displaced by urban projects rather than create additional housing stock for the growing urban poor population that is in search of affordable housing" (Mahadevia et al. 2017).

The Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976 mandates that ULB would consult the landowners before preparing the TPS. However, no one in Bombay Hotel, including the residents of Citizennagar, would qualify as stakeholders for AMC in the pre-planning stage for the same reason. Therefore, many people, including Qasim, constantly uttered the word "cutting" during my fieldwork. It referred to the threat of demolition of houses and shops by AMC which would fall on the way of proposed road, water and sanitation infrastructure plans laid down in the sanctioned TPS for the area. "Cutting" therefore comes from the English word "cut", a verb which denotes to remove or to make an opening. Mahadevia *et al.* (2017), terming it as 'exclusionary urban planning', inform us,

> Since TPS implementation has been delayed in most of the Muslim areas, the chances of AMC actually constructing SEWS housing on SEWS lands that are accessible to Muslims are also low. Moreover, the Gujarat Housing Board (GHB) has been revived in recent years by the Gujarat State Government, however, none of the housing being built or proposed through GHB funds for EWS (Economically Weaker Section) and Lower-Income Group (LIG) is located in Muslim areas of the city, and is therefore not accessible to Muslims."

The importance for the *ghar ka kagaz* or house papers in the mind of Citizennagar residents can be understood with the threat of 'cutting'. During these demolition drives, these papers could provide tenure security to them rather than understood as squatters by Urban Local Bodies. However, in his conversation with me, Qasim admitted that colony residents were wrong to assume that mere *ghar ka kagaz* from Rahman builders would save them from "cutting". He said, "Almost every second building in Bombay Hotel was sold by Rahman builders with all the necessary papers and yet they are also facing the same threat as us. Though the papers are important to us, only if AMC and Gujarat *sarkar* recognises as *dangapirit,* then maybe we could be saved from cutting." [147]

Writing on the reconstruction of Bhuj city in Gujarat after the 2001 earthquake, Simpson (2013) argues that adoption of English terms often signals alienation and distress. Qasim's voice and many others in Citizennagar with whom I interacted expressed the same alienation, the fear of being 'cut' from government welfare schemes that other citizens in the city enjoyed. This cutting pointed towards the missing moral imperative on the part of the state which social citizenship could have brought in their lives.

One day in late July 2016, Qasim took me around on a walking tour in Bombay Hotel to show me signs of black arrow marks on various buildings and shops. "AMC people arrived here some years back to paint these signs as a warning to the people where 'cutting' will actually take place. Everyone in this area is living with the fear that any day it can happen. And why not? They have invested their life savings in these properties and one day it's all gone" he said to me while pointing to these arrows. He informed me that AMC had often made attempts to come with bulldozers and large police forces to demolish homes and shops in Bombay Hotel. However, it only led to a violent battle between epolice and "public" of this area.

[147] Fieldnotes taken on July 15, 2016

People always started to gather in large numbers on the main road in Bombay Hotel whenever they hear AMC team was coming for "cutting".

Desai et al. (2016) write that along with local leaders' popular mobilisation against TPS implementation, people also sent copies of ration cards, election ID, property tax and electricity bills to various departments of AMC, such as the estate department, town planning office or zonal office They sought to register their voice as legitimate owners of their property and negotiate compensation in case demolition couldn't be stopped. But there was no clarity on future demolition as AMC only preferred to officially intimate the legal landowners who did not live in the area and not to these people who actually faced the danger.

Qasim felt confused and often asked me if Citizennagar would be affected by 'cutting'. "Till now nothing has happened yet but I have heard rumours that our houses will be demolished in the next raid by the AMC team," he told me as I feigned ignorance on the matter. His main reason for the confusion he said, how AMC is bigger than the Supreme Court which recognised them as *dangapirit* and asked the Gujarat *sarkar* (State of Gujarat) to provide relief to them. "Supreme Court should intervene in case AMC decides to implement 'cutting' in our colony as it is bigger than everything here right?" he inquisitively asked me expecting a positive response. I replied to him saying that it might do so, in case it sympathized with their cause.

One day he took me little afar from Citizennagar, crossing paths submerged in water and plastic waste to show me that the local power station set up by AMC to provide electricity to entire Bombay Hotel had 'Citizennagar' written on its board. The point being that Supreme Court asked the local government to provide the electrical connection first to Citizennagar and then using this opportunity, other residents of Bombay Hotel appealed to the government who then established this small power station to give electricity to all living there. However, according to Qasim, the local government wrote Citizennagar on the board outside this power

station to acknowledge the Supreme Court's order regarding Citizennagar and its residents.

Though I was a sceptical of this assertion by Qasim, one day we took a detour from our tea breaks to see the proof of Citizennagar's role in Bombay Hotel. The power station was located in the empty field behind Citizennagar, some five hundred meters from the colony. The two hundred metres high Pirana landfill was standing tall in the background and garbage mounds were jostling for space with its wall. On reaching the spot, we both discovered that no 'Citizennagar' was written on the board and simply "Subunit Power Station, AMC, Behrampura Ward, Ahmedabad" was embossed in black letters. I did not say much but Qasim himself looked at me and said, "Something is wrong you know. I am sure not just me but others from Citizennagar have seen our colony's name here somewhere. They must have removed it." Then he added, "Sometimes I feel the sarkar and court are playing ILU ILU with us".

I asked him what this 'ILU ILU' means in this context. I knew it was a famous song from 1991 Bollywood blockbuster *Saudagar,* where the lead actor and actress dancing in separate locations, describing the beauty of flowers and forest proceed to tell the full form of ILU ILU as 'I love you' to their friends. The romantic undertone of the song and its significance in the context of riot survivors and state was lost on me. "ILU ILU means to play hide and seek with someone. You hide behind the bushes and then appear sometimes, just to create more mystery for the other person" he explained to me. "*Sarkar* beat us every single day and then once in few years the court put a little ointment on top of it to ease the pain. But it never goes away" he filled me in with his analogy of the state that they experience in life. In my understanding, I found it almost impossible to comprehend that the local government would put the name of a resettlement colony full of IDPs on a public power station, following Supreme Court's orders. But it made me question the intent of telling such a story.

Both Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan (2014) in their work on state formation in Africa, and Hansen and Stepputat (2001)in studying the postcolonial state formation, stress on the need to study the heterogeneous nature of the state. In his work on changing inheritance laws in India, Agarwal (2010) shows how the state can be the platform for contestation and cooperation of different entities with inconsistent adherence to notions of gender justice. In the words of Qasim, and many other respondents of Citizennagar, I have often found this stress on the distinction between *sarkar* and the court, something analytically discussed in Indian context by Rudolph & Rudolph (2001). Most of the time court denotes higher judiciary - High Court of Gujarat or Supreme Court of India as in the case of lower judiciary they often used the word 'magistrate'. Usually, it is understood that the state in India has three main branches - legislature, executive and judiciary. But we also see it is disaggregated at many levels in India - like federal, state, district, subdivision to block level, or represented by agencies, commissions and other departments constituted at different junctures (Sud, 2012, 2014). In the case of Citizennagar, we can see that civil society activists compelled the higher judiciary to provide some relief to the 2002 riot survivors using constitutional obligations. On the other hand, local executive and judiciary failed in similar aspects.



Figure 24: Qasim showed me these arrows on the houses of Bombay Hotel, which he said were marked by AMC for the purpose of "cutting"

Jaffrelot (2012) and Chopra & Jha (2014) write on the intervention by the Supreme Court of India when local judiciary and executive colluded with each other to deny justice to 2002 riot survivors in many of the criminal cases. However, as we can see above, the role of the Supreme Court was negligible in ameliorating the living conditions of the same survivors. Despite this, Qasim and others put the Supreme Court in a separate box when they talked about *sarkar* and how it failed them. The myth of state, as Hansen (2001) called it, then became synonymous with a romantic Bollywood song in their mind where *sarkar* and court played hide and seek with people like those living in Citizennagar. Gupta (2012:24), in his influential work on officials working on development schemes in Uttar Pradesh,

showed how violence "is enacted at the scene of the care" through corruption and stress on bureaucratic paperwork, even when it concerns poor illiterate citizens. In case of Citizennagar, where the regional government providing them with Antodaya ration cards after Supreme Court intervention, meant for the poorest citizens in the country, the same people were denied housing under BSUP by the local AMC. Instead, the threat of demolition on their one-room shacks teeming with overflowing garbage in their backyard looms larger everyday as it was deemed illegal by the local municipality.

Mahadevia *et al.* (2016:28), in their detailed study on Bombay Hotel, list 11 societies situated there which would be affected by the implementation of the TPS, including that of Citizennagar A, where most of my respondents have been living since 2003. In 2016, Saleem, the main protagonist of the previous chapter, filed a Public Interest Litigation in Gujarat High Court through lawyer Rahul Sharma, arguing that the Pirana dumping site, "violates the Solid Waste Management Rules, 2016, causing severe pollution in the nearby areas. The garbage dump site is causing serious health issues for people staying in the areas and may even have led to deaths" (Express News Service, 2016). The PIL sought proper medical checkup and treatment of people living in Citizennagar, adequate compensation to them for pollution-related deaths, and relocation of the garbage dumpsite to other parts of the city. In response to this PIL, which was still pending before the court at the moment of writing, AMC submitted an affidavit which said, "Upon inquiry prima facie it founds (sic) by the Estate Department of Corporation that the above-referred human habited within 500 of the site are illegal and without there being any proper construction whatsoever...In view of the preliminary inquiry/survey, it is reveal (sic) that all the above referred occupants are without there being any proper permission" (Express News Service, 2017).

This PIL only complicated the status of Citizennagar inhabitants in the eyes of the state in line with changing circumstances and institutions at play. These conditions necessarily reflect what Roy (2009:80) indicates "in the ever-shifting relationship between what is legal and illegal, legitimate and illegitimate, authorized and

unauthorized" and something which "is both arbitrary and fickle and yet is the site of considerable state power and violence." In this chapter, I have argued that in the case of Citizennagar, the state is present by being absent from the lives of its people. In this section, be it through the TPS or by its own affidavit in the case of the PIL mentioned above, it appeared only to negate the existence of people living in that particular site. The limit of intervention from the side of the Supreme Court in improving their socio-economic condition had been minimal, and the executive indifference and rather threat of violence in the name of challenging illegality defined the everyday life of these people.

8.6 Conclusion

In my earlier discussion on second-class citizenship, I quoted Cohen & Ghosh (2019:97), who argue that refugees and IDPs worldwide do not possess even the "most pared-down form of semi-citizenship". In this chapter, I started with an ethnographic account where my friend exposed through humour the biopolotical nature of the state vis-a-vis the Muslim residents of Ahmedabad, where some citizens are valued over others. I then discussed the conceptions of *sarkar* and *sarkari kagaz,* in the everyday life of Indian citizen as it assumed a central role among the Citizennagar residents.

The missing *sarkar,* as alleged by my informants, only appeared in their life when, they started to get one after another *sarkari kagaz* thanks to civil society activism. *Sarkari kagaz* only allotted them some formal status. Their struggle for 'paper citizenship', despite them not being alien as in the work of Sadiq (2017) proves the fact that internal dimensions of racialized citizenship (Fitzgerald 2017) can produce many ironies as such. However, as Scott (1998:4) argues in *Seeing like a State*, modern statecraft depends on 'administrative ordering of nature and society', which he himself argues as 'unremarkable tool' for welfare and freedom of people. He also writes that these actions of enumeration, surveys and census are important "for the concept of citizenship and the provision of social welfare just as they might undergird a policy of rounding up undesirable minorities" (1998:4).

However, we must see the struggle by Citizennagar residents to acquire 'paper citizenship', and their complaint that *sarkar* is missing in their lives, or it is shirking its *jimmevari,* from the perspective of racialized citizenship. Whereas, as Jayal (2019) points out, in Assam many Muslims are on the verge of getting denationalized on the basis of their religion, in Gujarat, the local state officials put considerable resistance to register my interviewees in official records and extend social welfare schemes like housing. In Ahmedabad, an extreme version of *jus sanguinis* was in practice. And this is when citizens like Qasim feelt like they were

being ‘cut’ from the city, their region and the nation itself. The intervention of the Supreme Court of India, of course, started their journey in ‘creating rights’, but it discontinued its oversight. Ultimately, local officials took over to ‘cut’ people from the state’s welfare activities.

The question therefore remains, what happens to the politics of contingent citizenship in such a scenario? We can see that the lives of 2002 riot survivors were fundamentally linked with producing right papers to claim formal citizenship, of not being dead in official papers, leave alone claiming substantive citizenship. The status of second-class citizenship, with most elements of Marshallian notions of the idea missing, emerged in such a context for Citizennagar residents. Every aspect of their citizenship was contingent, from arbitrary exercise of authority by local officials, to intervention from higher judiciary, something ‘first-class’ citizens did not struggle for.

The pleading voice of Mehrunnisa in terming the *sarkar* as *mai-baap,* if only it provided government housing for the poor to citizens like her can be representative of ‘authoritarian citizenship' that Distelhorst and Fu (2019) talk about while studying petitions to local bodies in China written in a similar language. While rhetorically Mehrunnisa bowed before the state power in the extreme sense of helplessness, and performed a different kind of subjecthood than expected in democratic citizenship, it simply meant to attract attention and assistance from the concerned officials.

9 Conclusion

> The construction of the Muslim as a subject to be feared and who poses a threat from which the sovereign subject requires protection erodes the legitimacy of the Indian Muslim, who is increasingly cast as a foreigner, alien and outsider. This claim is used to recast the insider as an outsider, regardless of her formal legal status. Normative boundaries solidify to place this subject squarely outside the realm of juridical entitlements, legibility, and belongingness. While law can offer redress at the level of reparations and recognition of the harms inflicted on legitimate subjects, such redress does not address the normative processes that have rendered these subjects illegitimate (Kapur, 2010:167).

In this thesis, I have introduced various characters whose lives revolve around the lanes of Citizennagar. From Safina, who got invitation to meet powerful politicians like Sonia Gandhi to narrate her story during and after the 2002 riots, to her husband Alam sahab who complained that living in Citizennagar was to embrace slow death due to pollution from the Pirana garbage site. From Abid bhai, who carefully kept his relatives' death certificates in his colourful plastic folders, to Salma who started a small business to raise her kids after the death of her husband. From Mehrunnisa who petitioned the AMC officials to get housing under the BSUP programme, to Qasim who thought people in Citizennagar would be affected by 'cutting', the demolition drive by AMC to implement Town Planning schemes. In most of the stories we also witness resilience in the face of adversity and government apathy.

In the lanes of Citizennagar, we find these characters embroiled in multiple challenges resulting from their displacement in the aftermath of the 2002 riots. A year after the violence, and as a matter of charity, they were given these one room shacks near a garbage dumping site, but without papers establishing their legal claims to such property. In the years after, my respondents spoke about how they accessed one after another paper to advance their claims in that particular site.

Papers which gave them identity, or helped them with roads, water and other civic amenities, or addressed the issue of legal housing itself.

My thesis attempted to find out how in the face of such diverse complexities, residents of Citizennagar drew on different forms of strategies and resources to alleviate their problems, including engagement with actors like the Rahman builders or aspiring youth politician like Saleem. Reflecting on these multifarious encounters between people and institutions in the context of 2002 riots – and following the common thread of emergent notions of citizenship – in this concluding chapter, I focus on the conceptual, empirical and methodological contribution of this thesis. I argue that my thesis provides for an important contribution in the field of citizenship, particularly in the context of Hindu-Muslim violence in India and its survivors. Specifically, the dynamic interactions of multiple characters in this thesis helped me develop the notion of politics of contingent citizenship.

9.1 Transformative potential of contingent citizenship

9.1.1 Conceptual contribution

In my thesis, I have developed the notion of the *politics of contingent citizenship* to explain the role of various actors, emergent contexts and struggles happening in the lanes of Citizennagar. Conceptually I have expanded this notion by exploring other ideas like 'brokered citizenship' and the 'young agent of citizenship'. In this section, I elaborate my conceptual contribution by discussing the concepts which appeared in my chapters.

While placing the narratives and struggles of my informants in local and national discourses on belonging and political subjectivity, we find merit in the argument that enacting their citizenship is contingent upon their shifting positions within the social, "as spaces of inclusion and exclusion are produced through social processes and uneven power relations" (Isin, 2008; Williams, 2015:183). In my work, I closely study the structural processes and agentic practices responsible for such wide array of experiences of inclusion and exclusion. In this sense, my work conceptually forwards the work on actual practices of citizenship by the marginalised groups who find the concept as contested, restricted and partially realised in their everyday life (Isin, 2002; Chatterjee, 2004; Holston, 2008).

Existing theories of citizenship and works on Indian Muslims failed to fully grasp their lived realities, or they could not comprehensively encompass or allow for holistic analysis of people's lives in camps and resettlement colonies in the aftermath of communal riots (Shani, 2010; Shaban, 2018). My work in that sense tried to understand the complexity and messiness that emerged in the lives of the survivors of communal riots in India. Building on the work of Young's (1989) 'differentiated citizenship', Somer's (2008) work on citizenship and statelessness in tandem with Holston's (1998) important distinction between formal and substantive citizenship, this research has proposed the concept of *politics of contingent citizenship*.

I follow Glenn's (2004) argument that different application of formal citizenship rights by associated actors and institutions can help us understand disparate degree of substantive citizenship in people's lives. I argue that by paying closer attention to people's interactions with actors and institutions, we are able to focus on circumstances and contexts responsible for variance in substantive citizenship. In this way we study the *process* and *factors* involved in citizenship struggles rather than the *outcome* on these struggles. In the context of 2002 Gujarat riots, I asked *how the politics of contingent citizenship can be situated in the aftermath of the Hindu-Muslim conflict in India, particularly in the context of the 2002 riots?*

In my work, I comprehend citizenship as both formal and substantive, but the politics of contingent citizenship make us look at contextual specificities where people struggle for both. In the aftermath of a violent conflict, such as 2002, where people are displaced in large numbers, they tend to identify social goods with citizenship. Even though some scholar like Holston (1998), delink substantive citizenship from its formal origins giving the example of 'legally resident aliens', we can see in my work how the double identities of my respondent as poor and Muslim make them struggle for formal recognition as well.

In developing and exploring the concept of *politics of contingent citizenship,* especially in the lanes of Citizennagar, I have also advanced notions like 'brokered citizenship' and 'young agent of citizenship'. While looking at access to statutory and substantive citizenship through the dynamic interaction with property (Hammar, 2017), I questioned the role of certain local big men (Mines, 1994) or 'informal sovereigns' (Hansen & Stepputat, 2006) in my thesis (Chapter 4). I argued that people's enjoyment of property rights is not often secured just by the possession of legal citizenship, and they often have to rely on powerful local actors to negotiate the availability of such rights. In this way I explore an idea what I called brokered citizenship.

On the other hand, in chapter 7 I located the figure of the 'young agent of citizenship' in the activities of a character called Saleem with the site and people of Citizennagar. Though it also focused on intermediary figures in citizenship

struggles, and thus similar to the concept of brokered citizenship. However, I distinguished this figure through the idea of 'activist citizen' that I analyse in the workings of Saleem. I built on the notion of activist citizen by Isin (2009) who contrasted it with active citizen by arguing that while the latter just follow obligatory practices, the former create new meanings of citizenship in the process of transforming themselves from a subject to a citizen. I emphasize in my chapter, that a Muslim youth like Saleem, with his demonstrations and protests to demand greater rights and entitlements for the people of Citizennagar acted as the 'young agent of citizenship'. Next I will highlight how these concepts allowed me to make empirical contribution in the literature.

9.1.2 Empirical contribution

In this section, I underline how following a distinct ethnographic approach my thesis has given a situated analysis of Muslim citizenship in India. Through my work, I have followed the trajectory of exclusion and marginalisation of 2002 riot survivors and how they struggled against it, in the backdrop of the increasing role of Hindutva in state institutions in Gujarat. In this process, I have given accounts of Muslim lives rooted in local contexts and specificities rather than providing a broad picture of community underdevelopment through quantitative methods, as they appear in various government and NGO reports. Also, I tried to stay away from stereotyping political subjectivity of Muslims by focusing on their neighbourhood struggles of belonging rather than studying them through the lenses of securitisation and terrorism.

Empirically, my research has responded to the calls for greater engagement with conflict literature in South Asia from the perspective of the survivors (Tambiah, 1997; Chatterjee and Mehta, 2007; Das, 2007; Ghassem-Fachandi, 2012). My thesis can also be placed in the ever-growing literature on displacement and humanitarian management of population in the aftermath of such conflict through designated spaces like camps and colonies (Malkki, 1995; Agier, 2011; Holzer and Warren, 2015; Oosterom, 2016). With respect to 2002 Gujarat riots, other scholars

have engaged with the issue of displacement and life in camps, highlighting Islamic reform (Jasani, 2008), peace activism among the Muslim survivors (Susewind, 2013), lack of basic civic amenities (Mander, 2006), and most importantly high level of exclusion and marginalisation in not only Ahmedabad city but also in the Gujarati society and politics (Chandhoke *et al.*, 2007). My thesis took these conversations forward on the largescale impact of displacement due to riots and life thereafter in resettlement colonies with a distinct ethnographic approach.

The empirical material of this research also contributed to expand the literature on Indian Muslims and how different forms of sociality emerged within them in response to the growing influence of Hindutva in Indian polity. In my work, Hindutva remained in the background but the survivors in Citizennagar constantly remind us that it was due to the prevalence of the same ideology that state institutions discriminated them and failed to address their socioeconomic condition. In chapter 8 of this thesis, when Mehrunnisa complained that poor Hindus benefitted from public housing schemes like BSUP unlike 2002 riot affected Muslims like her, the concepts of marginalisation and exclusion were evoked in relational terms. Whereas scholars like Sarkar (2002) and Kapur (2006) have shown us the discursive practices of Hindutva, my ethnographic accounts from Citizennagar traced its sedimentation in the social and political exclusions of Muslims in everyday life.

In recent years, especially since Justice Sachar Committee published its report in 2005, scholars have increasingly tend to understand the grievances of the Muslim community within the frame of marginalisation and socio-economic development (Jairath, 2011; Gayer and Jaffrelot, 2012). However, these official committees and inquiry commissions, with their overwhelming obsession with statistics and data, only ended up producing a generalised account of Indian Muslim backwardness. They erased their local characteristics and intercommunity tensions in underlining the religious identity as Muslims. Acknowledging the importance of such official reports to provide due state recognition of suffering and lack of representation at all levels, some scholars have given us rich account of Muslim lives, embedded in various local contexts and the history of different cities of India

(Williams, 2015; Chatterjee, 2017; Jamil, 2017). The stories of Citizennagar residents of this thesis, and their struggle to rebuild their lives in Ahmedabad city after 2002 add to such sketches of Muslim experiences, with adequate attention to local struggles and negotiations by the actors involved.

Besides, many scholars approached Muslim citizenship and Muslim subjectivity in the other parts of the world through securitisation, terror law and protest against dictators (Mamdani, 2004; Roy, 2005; Bayat, 2017). In the case of Ahmedabad, we can see in the work Chatterjee (2009:1010) how local officials and Hindu residents find "absolute conjunction" between terrorism and Indian Muslims, and "the local 'other' is easily juxtaposed with the global 'other' in Islamophobic bordering strategies." My research attempts to break such stereotype around Muslims of India and contextualise their life events within the realm of citizenship struggle. It shows that when majoritarian politics constantly brand them as 'other' or 'intruder' in a nation, they chart their own path of belonging through local struggles and actors (Kapur, 2007). It forces us to eschew global dichotomies of good Muslim or bad Muslims and see their actions and everyday life in rooted contexts.

In chapter 4 and 8, I had detailed the struggle of Citizennagar residents to acquire legal papers for their dwelling by negotiating with powerful local actors and institutions. I also looked at the processes through which these residents incrementally establish their claim in this site after following "strategies of creating rights" (Das 2011:327). These struggles and processes by people who have been historically constructed as the 'other', should be seen as claims to formal citizenship. Also, in studying their struggle to get legal papers for their houses, or to access government welfare schemes, I have attempted to answer the second research question of this thesis: *what kind of citizenship struggles and practices emerge from a site inhabited by displaced Muslim survivors of riots?*

The question of housing tenancy has remained central in accessing substantive citizenship for the urban population in various part of the world (Holston, 2008; Earle, 2012). Anand (2017) shows how slum residents in Mumbai struggle to

embed themselves in complex local political networks to secure housing tenancy, as it is crucial for other social citizenship rights like water connection. In my work, I highlight how displacement due to communal violence involves issues of housing rights for survivors, a topic that has got little attention in existing literature.

Especially, I focused on informal sovereigns like the Bombay Hotel based builder and businessmen Rahman brothers and their enormous influence in providing housing to riot survivors. By using the lens of brokered citizenship, I have shown how authority over land and property was mutually constituted in Citizennagar in the complex interaction between its residents and the Rahman brothers. In the end, residents did not acquire the right house papers, but my chapter interrogate the local specificities and unequal interaction between multiple actors involved in factoring elements of substantive citizenship rights for Citizennagar residents. In short, the state had quietly withdrawn from spaces like Bombay Hotel inhabited by Muslim survivors of riots. The state only intervened occasionally to remind them of its presence. People like the Rahman builders offered a version of social citizenship in exchange of allegiance and electoral support.

In reading Chapter 4 & 8 together, we find that the emergence of Citizennagar as a IDP colony in official correspondence, coupled with the role of informal sovereigns like the Rahman builders in controlling such spaces through allegiance and fear, have created a new human condition for Muslims in India. It followed the analysis of Agier (2002) who bemoaned the simultaneity between military offensives resulting in suffering and losses, and humanitarian intervention in the form of refugee camps. My work highlighted the changing contours of citizenship practices at a site which was created to provide temporary relief to survivors of violence and yet attained a certain permanency over the years. As there is very little work available on IDP colonies resulting from communal violence, my work contributed both empirically and conceptually by foregrounding the politics of contingent citizenship in such spaces. In this process, my work stressed the need to incorporate new elements of struggle and improvisations which are transforming

relief camps into part of towns and heralding the emergence of new political subjects.

On the other hand, along with interrogating the role of Rahman builders, following Saleem's story through his engagement with the site of Citizennagar and its people as detailed in Chapter 7, I focused on my third research question: *what are the roles of the state agencies and other non-state actors in the struggle and everyday lives of survivors to claim better citizenship rights?*

Most scholarship on Muslim young men in India have either looked at them as passive victim of government apathy towards their social and economic development (Banerjee, 2008; Shaban, 2018), or as goondas or underworld gangsters (Hansen and Stepputat, 2005). Commentators like Ashraf (2017) bemoans the lack of leaders among the Muslim community unlike in other religious and caste groups in India, especially in Gujarat. Through the stories of Saleem, who later continued to be at the forefront of the CAA protests, I have countered these notions of passivity among Muslim youths and shown how he acted as a"young agents of citizenship." His political manoeuvring around the site of Citizennagar to improve its living conditions in order to raise his prospects in local politics, allow us to capture the realities of political citizenship available to Muslim youths.

Perhaps the most useful way to distinguish my work from others would be to contrast it from other scholarship on Muslim citizenship in India (Shani, 2010; Shaban, 2018), where the focus is either on constitutionalist discourse or on state policies around socioeconomic development of the community. I tend to agree with Shani's (2010) assertation that Muslims in general shifted between liberal and republic notions of citizenship to ensure their incorporation in the making of the Indian state. Though I would like to offer my critique of Shani (2010) or Shaban's (2018) work, because of their preoccupation with elite voices among north Indian Muslims or other influential Muslim groups, who in past mainly

engaged themselves in petitioning the state for the protection of Muslim personal law, or maintaining the status of Urdu language, or to restore the minority status of AMU. The real contribution of my work lies in foregrounding the voices of poor riot survivors in the citizenship discourse, who dreamt, among many other issues, of inclusion in society and a nation through public housing and better living condition.

9.1.3 Methodological contribution

In my attempt to theoretically develop the politics of contingent citizenship, based on the everyday interaction, day to day practices, challenges upon negotiating with local actors and institutions to factor the realisation of both formal and substantive citizenship in Citizennagar, I had to rely on a research methodology that would take into account both physical and emotional journeys – mine as well as the participants. The research site was also extensively covered in media and academic literature due to the prominence of 2002 riots in Indian politics today (Shah, 2015; Desai *et al.*, 2016; Mehta, 2017; Dhar, 2018). In my work I fully recognised the value of ethnography and interviews in unraveling many facets of citizenship strategies and struggles (Lazar, 2013; Williams, 2015) and acknowledged how it contributed in citizenship research in other contexts (Lazar, 2008; Stack, 2012).

Responding to many criticisms leveled against research in post conflict settings in South Asia (Tambiah, 1997; Wood, 2006; Wilkinson, 2009), especially how researchers negotiate their entry among the survivors of violence (Agier, 2011), I avoided gatekeeping as much as possible in making my way to Citizennagar. Drawing insight from the work on 'activist anthropology' by Hale (2007), I attempted to answer questions on positionality and reflexivity in a research on 2002 riots survivors (Dhattiwala, 2017) and added new dimension to my research methodology. I understand that a research site like Citizennagar and its people are grappling with the problem of over research and research fatigue due to extensive

media exposure (Clark, 2008). Most importantly, my research constantly made me aware that my research participants often asked the question "What's in it for me?" while engaging with my work. My act to engage Saleem in Citizennagar, and subsequently to align myself with the issues voiced by Citizennagar residents was an attempt to present a new research approach for future researchers on riot survivors.

Bringing such perspectives on reflexivity and positionality and building upon them helped me develop a research methodology that yielded new viewpoints and empirical findings while complementing and enhancing the original conceptual framework. As shown in chapter 5, following my informants' physical journey from Ahmedabad to Kozhikode in South India in search of their house documents allowed me to understand their parallel emotional journeys as well. Travelling with Salma and others for a period of fortnight not only created greater empathy and trust among researcher-research participants, but also helped me understand citizenship claims in many different ways. Salma's passionate intervention in the press conference organised by local CPM unit in Calicut, Kerala with stories of the death of her husband and son and explaining the precarious existence near the heap of garbage in Citizennagar allow us to understand better the concept of 'biological citizenship' (Petryna, 2002). Or how the idea of 'biolegitimacy' as conceptualised by Fassin (2009) can be understood in the context of 2002 survivors and their citizenship struggles. I will conclude this section by highlighting how my conceptual and methodological approaches bleed into each other to give us new perspectives on contexts and specificities that matter in citizenship struggle.

My methodological framework, where I aligned myself with the causes of my research participants, helped me develop my conceptual framework of the politics of contingent citizenship. In this way I paid closer attention to how survivors of riots responded to different forms of vulnerabilities and marginalisation in their lives to claim better rights. Their actions may not yield any result or changed their fortunes on substantive citizenship, but it asks us to interrogate the role different

actors and contexts play in their realisation. Why a political party based in Kerala is involved in her housing tenancy issue? Or how the act of speech and a certain political behaviour to claim citizenship rights was made possible far away from Ahmedabad? Or why the local political rivalry between CPM and IUML matter for 2002 riot survivors of Citizennagar? Questions like these which transcended space and involved divergent political fields and actors could be explored through my conceptual framework, which in turn helped me to develop fine grained analysis of citizenship practices and claims with my methods.

9.2 Ahmedabad's Shaheen Bagh and new terrains of citizenship struggle

On 12 December 2019, President of India Ram Nath Kovind gave his assent to the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 (or CAA), two days after it was passed in both houses of the Indian Parliament. In the run-up to the debate on the said law, Home Minister of India Amit Shah declared inside the Parliament on November 19 that the Indian government would implement a National Register of Citizens, or NRC, throughout the country. The aim of the NRC would be to list every person living in India, with the idea to separate those people the state would consider citizens from those that Shah had described as "intruders" (Venkataramakrishnan, 2019). With the CAA providing a faster route to citizenship to everyone except Muslims from the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan, even if they had entered India illegally, Indian Muslims feared that the joint operation of both CAA and NRC would render many stateless.

Jayal (2019:1) argued that with the arrival of CAA and NRC in the Indian polity, the "Indian idea of citizenship – as embodied in the Constitution and the law – is in the throes of a profound and radical metamorphosis." As India was on the path of choosing a regime of "faith-based citizenship", the idea of legal citizenship for 200 million Indian Muslims was in peril for the first time since India adopted its constitution on January 26, 1950. Because the Indian government threatened to put people who would not be able to make it to the proposed NRC in detention camps, many Muslims anticipated the loss of formal citizenship and a life without the 'right to have rights', in Hannah Arendt's language.

Following the passage of CAA in the Indian parliament, many Muslims took to the streets protesting against the law in the last week of December of 2019. It is only apparent that with all the dissent around CAA and NRC, questions of formal citizenship, embodied in law and policy took the centre stage. In the face of police action and loss of lives in other parts of India, one such protest in the Indian capital

New Delhi where thousands of Muslim women came out and occupied part of a road in Shaheen Bagh chanting *Azadi* (freedom) captured abundant media attention, both nationally and globally (Gupta, 2020). These women, who continued their protest movements for months, became the face of the nationwide anti-NRC and anti-CAA protests.

In January 2020, protest tactics adopted by Shaheen Bagh women, be it the slogans, songs or placards moved beyond New Delhi and were followed by Muslim women in over fifty cities who started their movements against the CAA and NRC. Much like the 'Seattle model', a broad set of tactics used on the streets of Seattle, the United States in November 1999 by anti-World Trade Organisation (WTO) protestors which spread around other North American cities in the subsequent year (Wood, 2012), the Shaheen Bagh model of protests reached other Indian cities including Ahmedabad. Visibility of Muslim women with men in the background in such protest sites characterised this movement against the amended citizenship law and NRC process.

In Ahmedabad, Saleem, the main protagonist of this thesis' chapter 7 and women of Bombay Hotel actively participated in these protests by holding indefinite sit in demonstration inside a public housing compound called Ajit Mill. National media called Saleem one of the main organisers of this protest and published photographs of Muslim women holding a placard that said "*2002* ke *dange mein kagaz jal gaye/ Ab kagaz kaha se laye?* (My documents were burned in 2002 riots/ now where do we get our papers from?)" (Service, 2020). This reference to the 2002 riots in the context of citizenship protests distinguishes the struggle of Muslim women in Ahmedabad, compared to other 'Shaheen Bagh' modelled protest in the country.

When women protesting at the Ajit Mill compound raised the memories of 2002 violence, they reminded the government that they were at the top of what Agier (2011:213) called the 'hierarchy of misfortune'. These memories include the lived

experience of being paperless in the aftermath of the riots, and as categories of people whose existence were not acknowledged by the state (Mander, 2006). At the time I started my fieldwork in the lanes of Citizennagar in late 2015, I thought the *de jure* citizenship of my respondents was a given fact, so my primary focus remained on the complex local dynamics responsible for patchy experiences of substantive citizenships in their life.

However, the journey of people in Citizennagar, from 2002 till date, is important in understanding not only the struggle to acquire papers to establish formal citizenship but also how it translates into substantive rights. When in chapter 8, Qasim complained about "cutting", it evoked an expression of being cut from the welfare schemes of government which allot poor people like them housing with a secured tenancy. State policies and law like CAA and NRC only complete the project of cutting Muslims from the body politic of India. The experience of living in an IDP settlement unrecognised by the state makes living for Citizennagar residents uncertain and shows us how the state employs different tactics to manage population it considers 'undesirable' (Agier 2011).

Today people like Saleem and the Muslim women of Bombay Hotel, with their Ajit Mill protests against the Indian state's plan to incorporate new citizenship regime, have entered in new terrains of citizenship struggle. Before they entered these new terrains in recent times, my research provides the life sketches of these people in chapter 6 and 7 which give us an idea of how they negotiate at local levels to shape their political subjectivity. In chapter 6, where I focused on the emergence of a new kind of gendered citizenship among the women survivors of 2002 riots, I argue how some women centre themselves in everyday life following life altering events. Whereas existing scholarship on Muslim women in India treat them as a monolithic group suffering due to issues like *triple talaq* (Islamic form of divorce), polygamy and other stereotypical assumption on Muslim men (Hasan and Menon, 2005, 2006), my work offer new perspective on their agentic capabilities in the face of sheer adversity. In future research on CAA protests and role of Muslim women, my conceptual framework of politics of contingent citizenship can be

expanded by looking at the small negotiations and struggles these women made within their communities before entering such protests.

In my research, the three main central questions raised the issues of belonging, the incoherence in preconceived monolithic identities and issues thereof, long term repercussions of communal polarisation and violence after that, and attitude of state institutions towards Muslims with prevalent prejudice. Along with it my work studied the impact and responses on the ground of such prevalent notions. The partition and the years of Hindu-Muslim violence, especially in Ahmedabad, have only reinforced and strengthened the boundaries that separate both the community and alienate the Muslims in exclusive zones.

During the recent CAA and NRC protests, I was also present in Kolkata where the local Muslim women were leading the front, and all sections of the community joined in large numbers. At the site of the protests during casual conversations, I observed that many questions were lurking in the mind of the Muslims present there. If we are not citizens of India, then who are we? What makes anyone citizen of any place? What are the resources and forms of embeddedness required in our society to be called citizen? Why are we on the streets and others are not? And what happens if the Modi government is successful and we are transformed from citizens to stateless humans? My work begins a conversation on these questions and throws us in the realm of possibilities.

To conclude my thesis by drawing our attention to the new terrains of citizenship struggles, with respect to CAA and NRC protests and the agentic actions of people like Saleem and the Muslim women of Ahmedabad, is to stress the fact that citizenship is an instituted process (Somers, 1993). The same has been highlighted throughout this thesis with the stories of Citizennagar residents and by the conceptual framework of the politics of contingent citizenship. I have argued that citizenship is not a static phenomenon and it is constantly in flux with each associating character playing their role. People are constantly mounting struggle

to rise the ladder of citizenship. I hope that by using the conceptual, empirical and methodological findings in a nuanced and sensitive fashion, we can discover further productive pathways to study citizenship struggles in India and other parts of the world.

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