

Cosmopolitan Patriotism as a Civic Ideal

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Abstract: Recent theoretical debates have questioned the compatibility of patriotism with global political responsibilities, as identified by cosmopolitan theory. In response, several authors claim that a cosmopolitan patriotism is both possible and desirable. In this Article, we propose two desiderata for cosmopolitan patriotism as a civic ideal, which existing accounts fail to meet. First, arguments for cosmopolitan patriotism should provide an account of collective identification, supporting the relation between the actions of one's country and one's appropriate reactive attitudes. Second, such a theory should be able to explain the patriot's commitment to critical engagement with her country's actions. We then offer a critical appraisal of two accounts linking patriotism with global responsibility – *Permissible Partialism* and *Globally Responsible Nationalism* – and demonstrate how they fall short. Finally, we propose an account of civic republican patriotism, which better explains how cosmopolitanism and patriotism can be brought together.

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Introduction

Political philosophers disagree about the justification and scope of global justice. Some argue that the ideal of equal respect for all is incompatible with national partiality, and advocate a bold program of strong cosmopolitanism. Others defend a weak cosmopolitanism, where the fulfilment of global obligations is compatible with the discharge of special duties to compatriots.¹ Beyond these disagreements, however, theorists are faced with a common problem. The realization of cosmopolitanism – whether “strong” or “weak” – demands radical reform of the current world order, which is marred by unjustifiable mass deprivation, profound inequalities and shameless inter-state *Realpolitik*. Yet the dispositions and virtues required for such reform (i.e., concern for the fate of others and willingness to make sacrifices to improve it) are currently harnessed, almost exclusively, towards concern for a specific sub-set of “others”: compatriots.

In what has been described as a new political divide, politicians and ideologues pit patriotic loyalty against “globalism”. To give just two recent examples: British Prime Minister Theresa May (2016) announced that those who believe they are citizens of the world are citizens of nowhere, who “don’t understand what the very word citizenship means”. US President Donald Trump, in his speech at the UN General Assembly (2018), declared his administration’s commitment to the “doctrine of patriotism” against global governance. Patriotic partiality, thus understood, stands in the way of cosmopolitanism.

It is not surprising, therefore, that several contributors to the academic debate have attempted to move forward and articulate a civic ideal that adequately captures the motivational

¹ On the distinction between weak and strong cosmopolitanism, see (Miller 2007, 24–50).

efficacy of patriotism in the service of cosmopolitanism.² The hope is that patriotism's motivational force could be maintained, while the morally urgent demands of cosmopolitan reform would be appropriately met. In other words, one could be a citizen of the world without turning into "a citizen of nowhere". We will hereafter refer to such civic ideal by the name "cosmopolitan patriotism". It is not clear, however, what is required for such an account to succeed.

Our goal in this Article is threefold. In the first section, we propose two desiderata for cosmopolitan patriotism as a civic ideal: one is a sense of collective identification which supports the relation between the actions of one's country and one's appropriate reactive attitudes towards them, and the second, an account of commitment to engaged critique of these actions, rather than blind loyalty or alienated disdain. In the second section, we evaluate two prominent variations on the theme of cosmopolitan patriotism and demonstrate how they fall short of the two success criteria we defend. In the third section, we turn to our positive proposal: a *civic republican* form of cosmopolitan patriotism, which is able to capture the valuable aspects of the alternatives without succumbing to their flaws. In this version of the civic ideal, the republican patriot is concerned with global justice because she is committed both to the freedom of her political community and to the basic value of non-domination.

1. Cosmopolitan Patriotism: Two Desiderata

Consider a citizen we shall call Selma. She has a deep commitment to her country and her political community, and while she is often critical of the government in power, she takes pride

² By "Civic Ideal", we mean the kind of citizen that would be entailed by the theory in question. This has close affinities to the debates surrounding civic education (Galston 2007; Nussbaum 2008).

in the current and past achievements of her country and her people, and is willing to fight to right the wrongs committed by (and to) them. At the same time, she is a “global citizen”, concerned with how her state’s actions contribute to global injustices, and she is engaged in political activism aimed at addressing these injustices to the best of her ability. Selma is motivated by both patriotic and cosmopolitan commitments – that much is clear. Yet, more strongly, she is a cosmopolitan patriot: her patriotic and cosmopolitan commitments are not merely compatible, but reinforce one another. She could plausibly have been a cosmopolitan without being a patriot, or vice versa, but her being a cosmopolitan patriot makes her a better patriot *and* a better cosmopolitan.

What kind of attitudes and beliefs would be required for Selma’s cosmopolitan patriotism to be motivationally effective? It has seldom been noticed that such attitudes must thread a fine line between feelings of identification and feelings of critical distance. More precisely, we can identify two desiderata that flow from the description above: the first is a sense of collective identification; the second is an attitude of critical engagement.³

1.1. *Collective Identification*

Selma’s cosmopolitanism primarily, but not exclusively, focuses on rectifying the injustices committed by *her own state*. This is a cosmopolitanism for a non-ideal world, one that remains agnostic as to the end-state of cosmopolitan reform. It sets out priorities that can be justified both morally – we are primarily responsible for the harms we ourselves inflict on others – and

³ This is broadly consistent with the social psychology literature (Ferguson and Branscombe 2014), identifying three antecedents to collective guilt: *collective identity* (corresponding to our first desideratum), *harm responsibility*, and *harm illegitimacy* (both covered by our second desideratum).

pragmatically – the most effective route to a globally just order is to control and channel the power of states. As such, this cosmopolitanism is compatible with a range of positions on the political theory of global justice.

Now, for Selma’s cosmopolitan *patriotism* to get off the ground, it needs to be tied to a theory of collective moral responsibility. Theories of collective responsibility, applied to states, identify the extent to which people can appropriately be blamed (or praised) for the policies conducted by their state. They identify the conditions (e.g., shared intentions, collective personhood, or pragmatic reactive attitudes) under which people are collectively responsible (Kutz 2000; Tollefsen 2003; Miller 2007; List and Pettit 2011; Pasternak 2013). Consider paradigmatic cases of international injustice such as military occupation, imperial domination, economic exploitation, or human trafficking. While in each of these cases there are individuals who can be assigned responsibility for particular *instances* of injustice (e.g., the war criminal; the corrupt CEO; the profiteering trafficker), such reductive individualism do not exhaust the injustice in question, nor do they settle the question of who bears political responsibility for addressing this injustice. In some cases, it is not even clear whether *any* single individual agent can be held directly responsible, as the recent literature on climate injustice makes clear.

Our enquiry, while connected to such positions on collective responsibility, is slightly different. We *postulate* that Selma, under certain conditions, is responsible for the actions of her state, and we ask how she can be motivated to *feel* she is responsible. Our question is not how collective moral responsibility can be justified but, rather, how it can motivate citizens to act in certain ways – how it can ground an effective civic ideal. A basic requirement of feeling collectively responsible is that the individual sees herself as part of a broader collective agent. The actions carried out and the attitudes exemplified by this collective agent are, in some sense, perceived by her as an extension of her own actions and attitudes. When Selma, our cosmopolitan patriot, learns that her country has acted in an admirable way – for example, that

the political leaders of her state refused to engage in a profitable trade deal with a war criminal – she feels pride. When she learns about crimes in her nation’s past, she feels shame, and perhaps even guilt. These attitudes are not comprehensible unless this sense of collective identification is in place.

1.2. Critical Engagement

While a sense of collective identification is necessary, it is certainly not sufficient to ground cosmopolitan patriotism as such. The link between collective agency and the attitude of the individual may be a thoroughly apathetic or even a regressive one insofar as cosmopolitan responsibilities are concerned. Consider these two examples:

1. Tony sees himself as part of national collective in the sense we described above. However, while superficially committed to cosmopolitan values, when faced with an injustice committed by his people, he is inclined to ignore it or rationalize it, in order to maintain his preconceived views of his group’s moral integrity.
2. For Tony’s compatriot, Meera, learning about injustices committed by her people generates in her a sense of alienation and disdain. She reacts by wishing to distance herself from the collective; if this is what being part of the collective means, she will have no part of it.

Whatever else we may think about Tony and Meera, it would be difficult to consider either of them cosmopolitan patriots – they fail to be sufficiently cosmopolitan or sufficiently patriotic, respectively. Tony maintains his sense of collective identification, but fails to assign appropriate responsibility for harm; Meera correctly assigns responsibility to the collective agent, but no longer sees herself as politically responsible for addressing the injustice. Instead, a cosmopolitan patriot is expected to act in a way that reflects an attitude of ‘critical

engagement'⁴, threading a fine line between the twin dangers of blind allegiance and alienated disdain.

A useful way to conceptualize this point is to turn to a version of Albert Hirschman's well-known account of loyalty, exit, and voice (1970). Hirschman described two possible responses to decline in firms, organizations and, most importantly for our purposes, states. In terms of political obligation, to the extent that one discovers that the state is not acting as one expects it to act, one can respond by either trying to bring about a change (what Hirschman calls giving voice) or deploy a threat to leave it (exit). Loyalty to the state will incentivize a turn to voice where otherwise exit was chosen. But the possibility of exit both enhances and stifles voice; exit being unthinkable for the patriot (in the case of Tony) undermines his ability to effectively criticize his state, and too easy an exit for the 'rootless' crowds out civic engagement (in the case of Meera). Critical engagement, thus conceived, is a necessary component of any conception of cosmopolitan patriotism.

2. Reconciling Patriotism with Cosmopolitanism: Two Models

In this section, we examine two prominent arguments in support of cosmopolitan patriotism. We do not mean to suggest that the following is an exhaustive survey of the literature, only that these accounts are representative strategies for resolving the tension between patriotism and cosmopolitanism. We argue, however, that while each of these models captures something that is right about cosmopolitan patriotism, they also fail, in instructive ways, to meet the desiderata of collective identification and critical engagement that we identified above. In both accounts, patriotism is only (at best) compatible with cosmopolitanism.

⁴ Following (Walzer 1993), and grouping together the concepts of "harm responsibility" and "harm illegitimacy" (see footnote 3 above).

2.1. *Permissible Partialism*

Attempts to make cosmopolitanism and patriotism compatible often rely on the wider debates surrounding the demands of universal impartiality, in what we hereafter will refer to as *Permissible Partialism* (Nathanson 1989; 2017; Tan 2004). The puzzle, as usually understood, is this. Patriotism, conceived as a special concern for one's compatriots, seems to be in tension with the moral equality of persons. On the other hand, if universal impartiality towards all is strictly required, morality becomes overly demanding and impossible to live by. In a bleak world of moral saints, one could not justify caring more about one's family than about humanity as a whole; intimate relationships would be morally prohibited; and personal projects, which define our practical identity, would also be excluded. To address this problem, it is suggested that morality must include a way to accommodate such commitments as permissible without, at the same time, sacrificing its universality or impartiality. The challenge of accommodating patriotism within cosmopolitanism is "the central problem confronting the cosmopolitan position in the contemporary debate" (Tan 2004, 135–36). As Stephen Nathanson (2017) presents the problem, "if globalism rejects all forms of partiality in the name of equality, most people will simply hold onto partiality and reject globalism".

Permissible Partialism accounts maintain that patriotism may be permissible so long as it does not conflict with the moral demands of cosmopolitan morality. Thus, Nathanson (1989, 538) argues that "patriotism is exactly like all other forms of loyalty," which "remains a virtue so long as it is constrained by other moral principles". Patriots have special concern for their country, but "they recognize the rights of people in other countries and accept moral constraints on the means by which their own country may pursue its well-being" (Nathanson 2017). Tan (2004, 158), writing from within the framework of a Rawlsian theory of justice, argues that "cosmopolitan impartiality constrains the practice of patriotic partiality by holding that partial concern is permissible (not to say obligatory) only when the appropriate conditions

of justice are met or, in other words, only when the global ‘playing field’ is level may one privilege one's special ties.”

While this strategy is useful for demonstrating how impartial morality may conceptually accommodate particularist concerns, we wish to consider it as a possible version of cosmopolitan patriotism. Can this theory meet the two desiderata we stipulate, and provide a plausible and motivationally sustainable civil ideal? There are good reasons to think it cannot.

First, it supports, at best, a mere compatibility between patriotism and cosmopolitanism. That in itself does not a cosmopolitan patriot make. One may be, for example, a passionate supporter of the local football team, but even if this commitment is fully compatible with one's cosmopolitan duties (as they would be, in all but the most extreme cases), it would be odd to think of this attitude as “cosmopolitan football fandom”. The commitment to universal moral duties is independent of the love for one's country, and vice versa. Yet if the two are mutually independent, then the problem cosmopolitan patriotism was meant to resolve – the motivational inefficacy of cosmopolitanism – remains unresolved.⁵

Second, as *Permissible Partialism* is agnostic about the grounds of patriotic motivation, it must be considered as a subset of personal projects and loyalties more generally. Tan explicitly draws an analogy to permissible partiality within the state, arguing that “within the rules and limits of impartially defined institutions, individuals may utilize their rightful resources as they wish, including favoring personal projects and special social commitments” (Tan 2004, 159). If we are correct in thinking that a sense of collective identification is required to motivate taking political responsibility, it is not clear whether this could be maintained if

⁵ Critiques of “moderate patriotism” pursuing a similar line of thought, although from different perspectives, were made by (MacIntyre 1984; Yack 2012).

patriotism is conceived as a personal project. Even if the patriot has special concern or affection for the well-being of her country, and is willing to make sacrifices to promote the country's good, there is no necessary connection between these attitudes and a sense that one is responsible for injustice. This is the difference, say, between being a French patriot and being a Francophile: the latter may have a special concern and affection for France, and care a lot about French politics and culture, without seeing oneself as part of the French people. The patriot might conceive of her patriotism as one that entails responsibility for the actions of her state, but that is a fortuitous coincidence.

Even if this hurdle is cleared, *Permissible Partialism* remains flawed as a model for cosmopolitan patriotism since patriotic attitude are viewed as merely permissible, and therefore optional. Nathanson (2017) explicitly defends the mere permissibility of patriotism: as it is construed as special concern and as a personal identity, patriotism cannot be required as a moral duty. We may have duties as citizens – for example, obeying the law, paying taxes, serving in a jury - but fulfilling one's duties of citizenship does not require one to be patriotic. Yet seeing patriotism as optional, or *merely* permissible, undermines the commitment to view wrongs committed by one's state as one's political responsibility. If universal morality is mandatory, and a special concern for one's country is permissible, the conscientious individual would be pushed to forego this special concern.

2.2. *Globally Responsible Nationalism*

Globally Responsible Nationalism starts off from the opposite direction to *Permissible Partialism*. Rather than beginning from the individual, and conceiving of patriotism as a permissible personal project, *Globally Responsible Nationalism* is rooted in a conception of the nation as an ethical community, and of patriotism as an appropriate moral response to some features of this community. In other words, while *Permissible Partialism* views patriotism as

permissible attitude – one personal project among many – *Globally Responsible Nationalism* views it as associative duties of partiality towards fellow nationals. These duties are embedded in everyday practices and affective attitudes, and are not deduced from general universal principles (Tamir 1993; Hurka 1997; Scheffler 2001; Miller 1995; 2007).

So far, this seems like a straightforward nationalist view justifying partiality to fellow nationals, in strict opposition to cosmopolitanism. How can this be an account of *cosmopolitan* patriotism, then? Importantly, recent *Globally Responsible Nationalism* accounts maintain that associative duties to fellow nationals entail sharing in the responsibility for their actions, specifically when these are performed as acts of the national collective. As such, they provide an account of the responsibility of individual members of a national community for acts of the collective. These include not only the harms of war, economic exploitation or domination committed in their name, but cross-generational injustices as well: historical injustices committed by their predecessors, most prominently slavery, and future injustices, such as contributions to climate change.

In terms of the two desiderata we identified, *Globally Responsible Nationalism* presents the almost inverse picture to *Permissible Partialism*. First, consider collective identification. Unlike *Permissible Partialism*, here there is an account linking the individual patriot to the actions of the nation. In David Miller's version of the argument (2007, 111–35), there are two accounts of collective national responsibility. The first is the 'like-minded group' model: when members of a group share aims and outlooks, they have a responsibility for the outcome of the group's actions, even when they could not be said to cause it (e.g., individuals within a rampaging mob). The second is what he calls the 'cooperative practice' model, which ascribes responsibility to all participants in a specific practice who share the benefits of this practice, and have a fair chance to influence collective decisions (e.g., employees of a firm).

Miller's argument is intended as a theory of collective responsibility. It has been subjected to probing challenges, not least on the question of whether nations (instead of states) are appropriate subjects of collective responsibility (e.g. Levy 2008; Pierik 2008). We leave this question aside to ask, instead, whether this account is able to make sense of the cosmopolitan patriot's *sense* of collective identification, of viewing the nation's actions as her own. In the first model, it is plausible to think that a member of a national community who shared the aims and outlooks of this collective could come to see the collective's actions as an extension of her own agency. Here Miller's qualification that there needs to be a reciprocal recognition of each other's like-mindedness becomes important, to avoid cases of mere delusion. Similarly, in the second model, participating in and benefitting from a specific social practice may also generate a sense of responsibility to address the harms of this practice, even if one disapproves of these actions. This is supported, for example, by recent empirical findings that 'white guilt' among white Americans, as well as support for restitution to African-Americans, is predicted by self-focused belief in the illegitimate benefits of white privilege, rather than by other-focused concern for social equality (Iyer, Leach, and Crosby 2003).

Globally Responsible Nationalism is meant to provide a realistic middle ground between extreme cosmopolitanism and extreme nationalism, by focusing on instances in which one's national community is responsible for injustice. It thus provides a solid basis for the first desideratum of cosmopolitan patriotism, collective identification. In the terms of Hirschman's framework, a cosmopolitan patriot faced with an injustice committed by her group would need to choose voice over exit. Given the social nature of national membership and the emphasis on associative rather than voluntarist political obligation, *Globally Responsible Nationalism* accounts are less prone to the option of easy exit. Since the patriotic sentiment is not a moral commitment contingent on its compatibility with cosmopolitan principles, but one grounded in

identification with the national group, it would be more difficult and costly for the cosmopolitan patriot to detach.

The problem with *Globally Responsible Nationalism* has to do with the second desideratum of cosmopolitan patriotism, critical engagement. Since the argument relies on social identification, as opposed to a commitment to a particular set of normative ideals (Miller 2017), it faces the risk of promoting complacency with injustice. This thought is reinforced by empirical studies into the social psychology of in-group bias, arguing that there are strong psychological incentives to ignore or rationalize instances in which one's community of identity does not live up to its perceived image. For example, an influential study by Doosje, Branscombe, Spears and Manstead (1998) has argued that high identifiers are more strongly motivated than low identifiers to maintain a positive social identity, and thus individuals will search for ways to reject the notion that their group has committed wrongful acts (cf. Terry and Hogg 1996; Doosje et al. 2004). Faced with injustice, high identifiers have ample strategies for mitigating guilt, from denying the harm itself (e.g. in the case of Turkish denial of the Armenian genocide), denying the group's connection to the harm (e.g., in the case of British denial of the empire's causal contribution to postcolonial violence), to situating their in-group as the victims (e.g., in mainstream Israeli narratives of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict).

Now, the empirical correlation between strong identification with the nation and uncritical patriotism needs to be further nuanced, as the two should not be conflated (Miller and Ali 2014, 245–46). As recent studies show, the levels of in-group bias depend not just on the degree of identification, but on the mode of identification (Staub 1997; Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999) and on the relevant political and discursive context (Penic, Elcheroth, and Reicher 2016). On the conventional *Globally Responsible Nationalism* account, identification with one's nation is conceptualized on the basis of cultural conventions and symbolic traits, based on the observation that “we are disposed to sympathize with, help, trust, and take

responsibility for those that we perceive to be like ourselves” (Miller 2017). But this form of conventional attachment is a weak basis for critical attachment (Roccas, Klar, and Liviatan 2006), and pushes those willing to take on the critical role to detach from the group. Thus, while *Globally Responsible Nationalism* accounts may avoid the problem of easy exit, its basis for critical engagement remains questionable.

3. Cosmopolitan Patriotism: a Republican Account

Let us now quickly recap the problems we found in the alternative accounts. For *Permissible Partialism*, patriotism was relegated to a private preference for partiality, permissibly existing within the boundaries of universal morality; as such, it avoids the dangers of blind loyalty, and promotes a civic ideal critical of the status-quo. However, it does so at the cost of failing to support collective identification. For *Globally Responsible Nationalism*, collective identification is met through a thick account of social identity, in which the collective’s actions implicate the individual. But this success comes at the expense of critical engagement, since high levels of identification often generate a tendency to rationalize or ignore injustice, particularly towards outsiders.

One way of reading the different versions of cosmopolitan patriotism is through a recognition of the inherent tension between particularist and general duties which requires some kind of trade-off and compromise, and then accordingly place these two positions on a spectrum as alternative trade-offs (Lenard and Moore 2011). In this section, however, we employ a different approach. In what follows, we provide an account of civic republican patriotism, show how republican patriotism meets our two desiderata, and explain why patriotism is central to a republican account of cosmopolitanism.

3.1. Civic Republican Patriotism

Civic republican patriotism is essentially a conception of political citizenship.⁶ Its primary political concern is freedom from domination by arbitrary powers, either by private actors (*dominium*) or by public institutions (*imperium*). Freedom from domination is not merely a personal status, but a common good: in the absence of institutional protection, all are susceptible to domination. As an antidote to abuses of political power by corrupt elites or by reckless majorities, republican theorists endorse not merely constitutional and legal mechanisms – the rule of law, separation of powers, and constitutionally entrenched rights – but also an ideal of the virtuous citizen. This republican conception of citizenship requires citizens not merely to obey the law, but take part in practices of social cooperation and deliberation, make considerable compromises and sacrifices, and be vigilant against abuses of power. It highlights the importance of identification with one’s political community, including willingness to take responsibility for the freedom of one’s state. Patriotism, if not identical to virtuous citizenship, is at least concomitant with it (Viroli 1995).

This patriotism is, crucially, a critical patriotism. This is because, by contrast to nationalists’, the focus of patriots’ allegiance is not the particular culture of their nation but, rather, the political ideal of non-domination that their polity should strive to realize. Civic republicans maintain that the link between nationalism and patriotism is historically contingent: the shared collective identity they value is primarily a *political* identity – albeit one that has been nurtured in particular traditions, practices and histories. The shared view of the good is not a pre-political given based on ethnic or cultural similarity, nor is it fully

⁶ The following is only a sketch of the republican position. For a more detailed account of this view, see (Pettit 1997; Bellamy 2007; Laborde and Maynor 2008; Pettit 2012)

encompassing of any individual's ethical identity (Honohan 2001). As a result, republican identification mitigates the risks of in-group bias that we have detected in cultural versions of nationalism.

Republican patriots subordinate their allegiance to a country to their love of liberty, even if it is their allegiance to this or that particular polity that gives shape to their commitment to liberty. In line with Carl Schurz's famous words (1913), they do not say "my country right or wrong", but rather "my country, if right, to be kept right; and if wrong, to be set right". They engage in democratic deliberation selectively to appropriate or reject past traditions or present actions, in light of their normative ideals. The prior commitment of civic patriots to non-domination enhances their sense of "democratic indignation" (Habermas 1993) at the failings of their own state and fellow citizens, and their willingness to act upon them. In sum, this interpretation of patriotism preserves the critical bite captured by *Permissible Partialism* but with a twist: critique is understood not as a rejection of patriotism, but as a constitutive part of it (Mason 2000, 115–47; Laborde 2002; Müller 2007).

This picture of the ideal republican patriot is attractive, but how motivationally plausible is it? In what follows, we suggest that republican theory provides more robust internal motivational mechanisms than the other frameworks we have discussed thus far. Three considerations are salient.

First, our account tracks existing, ordinary-morality motivations more closely than more abstract cosmopolitan theories, and therefore is more politically realizable. In particular, civic republicans need not deny the motivational force of nationalism. They only point out that national liberation movements already appeal not only or principally to a shared cultural identity, but also to the political value of freedom from domination. It is the aim of republicans to make these latent political elements more salient, and to transform existing national identities

in an open and inclusive direction (see Williams and Macedo 2005). The ‘domination complaint’ is a widely recognized and shared political attitude (Pettit 2005). Opposing domination and resisting arbitrary power are common and effective tropes in the rhetoric of political parties and social movements, past and present, and it is through the demands of these groups, rather than through philosophical contemplation, that the injustice of domination becomes visible (Erez 2017).

Second, the motivational virtues of critical patriotism are *built into* republican citizenship. It is not a condition of applicability of the theory in a non-ideal world, nor a permissible residual attitude once the relevant normative constraints have been met. Republican citizens cultivate attitudes both of collective identification and critical engagement: this just is what it means to be a citizen. In *Permissible Partialism*, patriotism is only a permissible personal preference, defined within the boundaries of universal morality but lacking any moral value of its own. Republican patriotism, in contrast, is explicitly normative.

Third, republicans have developed sophisticated accounts of what we might call the *mechanisms of virtue* – the political, social, cultural, moral and institutional conditions that are essential to the cultivation of citizenship. Civic virtue is not a natural tendency, but an attitude that requires acculturation through habit and practice. It is well beyond the scope of this paper to provide a full review of the different approaches to engendering civic virtue in the republican tradition, and in any case it would be misleading to see this tradition as speaking with one voice (cf. Burt 1990; Viroli 1995; Pettit 1997, 241–70; Costa 2009; Dagger 2018). In broad terms, however, the robustness of the civic republican ideal can be attributed to three complementary motivational mechanisms (following Burt 1990, modifying her terminology slightly).

The first is *political identification* – the aim is to ‘educate the passions’ so that citizens develop a sense of responsibility for the actions of their polity and appropriate reactive attitudes

of pride and shame towards them. As Ian MacMullen has shown, there is a distinct mode of civic identification with one's polity that need not be rooted in feelings of love and affection, and is therefore conducive to the critical thinking that people should practice in their role as citizens of a democracy (MacMullen 2013). The second motivational mechanism is *enlightened self-interest* which leads citizens to support public institutions that defend the freedom of all as the best means to protect their own freedom, either as individuals or as members of particular groups (Burt 1990, 29–32; Pettit 2012, 225–28). The third is *norm internalization* (Pettit 1997; cf. Costa 2009). Norms of republican citizenship are cultivated first by regard-based social sanctions and the desire for social esteem (what Pettit calls the 'intangible hand'); and gradually internalized as stable dispositions to follow the norm for non-instrumental reasons (Brennan et al. 2013).

In sum, our account of patriotism is better suited to meet the joint desiderata of collective identification and critical engagement than the two representative alternatives we set out earlier.⁷ This is because it brings to light the motivational mechanisms that can in practice sustain them. Patriotic commitments are deeply entwined with political identification, prudent self-interest, and the internalization of social norms.

3.2. Civic Republican Cosmopolitanism

We have argued that the civic republican interpretation of patriotism is better suited to meet the two desiderata than the alternatives surveyed. We have not yet explained, however, how this could be a version of *Cosmopolitan Patriotism*. After all, one may reasonably raise the following objection: a virtuous citizen in a well-ordered republic may indeed be motivated to

⁷ The three models we have set out – permissible partialism, globally responsible nationalism, and civic republicanism – map three logical options, which are accessible within different theoretical perspectives. Take the example of a Rawls-inspired statist cosmopolitanism. As Rawls's work itself said little about either civic motivation or the tension between cosmopolitan and patriotic duties, Rawlsians are at liberty to interpret their theory in ways that support either of these options.

challenge those in power when they threaten the freedom of the political community to which she belongs, be they internal or external threats; why would she be motivated to act against injustices towards people outside of the boundaries of the political community, either committed by her own state or by third parties? Shouldn't republican patriots simply accept that, *extra rempublicam nulla justitia*?

They should not, for two crucial reasons. The first is that because of the global reach of domination, republican concern must extend beyond nation-states. The second is that republican motivational mechanisms are in practice operational beyond national boundaries. Let us develop these two points in turn.

The starting point of republican cosmopolitanism is to note that, given the level and intensity of global interdependence, domination does not stop at national borders, and is a structural feature of the global economic and political order. The ideal of non-domination lends itself, as a result, to a cosmopolitan reading. The precise institutional and political implications of this claim are contested even among self-identifying republicans.⁸ In the interpretation we endorse here, while republican cosmopolitans are committed to a universal political morality centered on non-domination, they also argue that non-domination makes differentiated demands in domestic and in global contexts (Laborde 2010).

Domestically, within political communities such as states, citizens collectively and democratically decide how best to interpret the special demands of their associative

⁸ For a more internationalist interpretation of the republicanism of non-domination, see (Pettit 2010; Slaughter 2005; Laborde and Ronzoni 2016); for a more cosmopolitan interpretation, (Bohman 2004; Lovett 2016; Martí 2010). Kantian defences of patriotism follow a similar trajectory (Kleingeld 2000; Stilz 2009).

membership and secure political and social justice internally. Call this *optimal non-domination*. The global order, by contrast, should be structured around the more minimal, yet still demanding ideal of *basic non-domination*. Basic non-domination secures the legal, political and material preconditions that allow all human beings to be achieve optimal non-domination within their own political communities. This entails both the worldwide protection of human rights – including basic rights of subsistence – as well as the reduction of global inequalities, insofar as these support relations and structures of domination (Laborde 2010; Laborde and Ronzoni 2016).

Republican cosmopolitanism thus understood can be described as a version of ‘statist cosmopolitanism’ (Ypi 2012). The state is both a coercive institution necessary for the feasible implementation of cosmopolitan principles, and a political association cultivating in its members a sense of justice through civic education. There is therefore no contradiction between cosmopolitan reform and the associative relations embedded in the state. Republicans recognize the importance of the state, its institutions, and the rule of law for the protection of citizens from domination, as well as its role as a primary bearer of cosmopolitan duties – at the very least, as a transitional stage.

Now that we have a sketch of the principles of republican cosmopolitanism, we can lay out our argument that patriotism, understood as the political attitude of citizens towards their state, is essential to, and compatible with republican cosmopolitanism. As noted above, normative theories differ on their end-goals: they may be committed to weak or strong cosmopolitanism. We intend to remain agnostic as to the substantive merits of such end-goals. We simply start with a plausible minimal assumption: that all theories face a problem of transition: how to *motivate* cosmopolitan reform in a world where the most effective justice-conducive motivation is biased towards compatriots.

Even if we accept that the state is a primary cosmopolitan duty bearer, it remains unclear what will motivate states to act as cosmopolitan agents (Ulaş 2017). In republics, the actions of the state must be legitimized and authorized by its citizens. The “statist” element of civic republicanism acknowledges both that the state itself is a potential source of domination, and that its legitimacy is preserved only through regular practices of participation and contestation, retaining a vigilant attitude towards those in power. This interpretation, we argue, offers a more compelling reconciliation of cosmopolitan reform and patriotic attitudes than the other theories we have surveyed.

3.3. *The Cosmopolitan Patriot*

Our strategy, then, is to provide an account of the republican motivational mechanisms that precisely explains how patriotic motivation can be harnessed for cosmopolitan goals. The basic thought is that the object of cosmopolitan motivation – the pursuit of non-domination – is the same as that of civic motivation. But we need to show how motivational mechanisms operate on both these levels.

Let us return to our example of Selma, who sees herself both as a patriot and as a cosmopolitan. A republican account explains how Selma can coherently hold both patriotic and cosmopolitan motivations by showing that they *mutually reinforce one another*. Indeed, we argue that the same mechanisms that make republican patriotism psychologically robust – *political identification, enlightened self-interest, and norm internalization* – can be applied to the international realm. This is straightforwardly the case where patriotic sentiment supports resistance against direct foreign domination, in cases of aggressive war or colonialism. In what follows, we argue that similar mechanisms are at work in more indirect contexts: in cases of global structural domination, domination by one’s state, and domination by and of third parties.

We should note that, while republican cosmopolitan patriotism is normatively coherent and motivationally powerful, our claim is not that the mere presentation of the ideal resolves the tension between cosmopolitan morality and patriotic partiality. In practice, the pursuit of both ideals *can* conflict – many imperfect moral duties do. All we argue is that our account best *mitigates* this conflict, because a patriotism that makes no contribution to either basic or optimal non-domination does not, from a republican point of view, ground any moral duty in the first place. So the scope for moral conflict is reduced, albeit not entirely eliminated.

Structural Domination

In a world where many risks of domination are structural and global, the basic non-domination of all states, including Selma's, is achieved, not through mutual independence and non-interference, but through the establishment of non-dominating relationships of interdependence and cooperation. Therefore, Selma's patriotic *enlightened self-interest* will lead her to make sure that her state cooperate with other states, including through mutually self-binding international organizations.

Consider, for example, the ability of multinational corporations and hypermobile elites to make use of the competition between states in the globalized market in order to select which jurisdiction would benefit from their tax revenue, regulate their labor conditions, and supply the public goods of protection. Even powerful states are incentivized to behave as market actors under this structure, undermining their own ability to pursue progressive policies and commodifying their civic institutions, subjecting their constituents to the interests of powerful foreign actors. A unilateral exit of one state from the global market does not resolve the issue, as selecting a non-competitive strategy risks driving away the mobile and wealthy, eroding the state's tax base (Avi-Yonah 2000; Rodrik 2011; Dagan 2018). Similar examples could be drawn from policies considering other structural risks, such as climate change, global health,

and international security. A patriotic commitment to the freedom of her state thus commits Selma to seek transnational or cosmopolitan solutions to the vulnerability of her own political community.

To be clear, such a commitment to securing the global conditions for political freedom should not be construed as a narrowly instrumental or strategic concern. Just as, domestically, the rule of law constitutes my freedom (instead of contingently causing it), likewise, international cooperation constitutes the freedom of states, which depends on their common freedom. One obvious problem here is that the weakness of international systems of sanctions and incentives increases the risk of free-riding – where states are tempted to pursue their own interests without concern for the interests of others, if they can do so with impunity.

Yet as republicans have long noted, these corrupting tendencies can be checked by the socializing power of *norm internalization*. International cooperation can be motivated by the wish to be seen to be a good (international) citizen – to comport well with one’s self-image and identity. Where the particular national history is colored by struggles to establish norms of the rule of law and fair play, shirking from contributions to a global public good for immediate gain could be seen as betrayal of this history. In a recent example, Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Paris Climate Accord (which would make the US one of only two countries not to ratify the agreement) was met not only with long-term instrumental critiques, but also with identity based ones. With the US being the main contributor to fossil fuel emissions, its government refusal to share in the burden of reducing the damage caused to the environment was in contradiction to its self-image as a responsible world leader.

Domination by One’s State

Second, Selma as a cosmopolitan patriot ensures that her state does not dominate others. This is because such domination implicates her own collective responsibility, and therefore activates

her sense of *political identification*. As a republican patriot, she sees herself as responsible for the actions of her state; and she stands ready to criticize and dissent from them. A republican patriot, therefore, would be motivated to denounce the domination exercised by her state – in a way that the two alternative accounts we canvassed earlier would not. Such domination can be direct, as is the case of Selma’s state’s arbitrary unilateral exercise of national power over foreigners (e.g., border controls) and over other states (e.g., trade policies). But it can also be indirect, as in the case of her state’s participation in a structurally unfair global order where powerful states abuse their position of power and dominance (White 2003; Bohman 2004; Laborde 2010).

In a series of recent articles, Shmuel Nili (2016; 2018) provides a novel formulation of this idea. Employing the Dworkinian conception of “law as integrity,” (2002), in which the formal legal system of the state forms the character of the political community, Nili argues that if the state is an agent with a moral character, it is one that can act (or fail to act) with integrity. It has, in other words, agent-relative, self-referential reasons to act in ways that are coherent with this character, even when it does not have agent-neutral reasons to act in these ways (Nili 2016, 150–52). Crucially, the integrity of the liberal polity is not restricted to its borders; if a liberal state acts illiberally in its international affairs, it too undermines the coherence of its identity. This tallies with the civic republican insight that international norms and domestic norms cannot be entirely distinct, and that the state’s violation of democratic norms abroad is inconsistent with its claim for democratic authority at home – what Daniele Archibugi (2008, 6–7) describes as “democratic schizophrenia.”

We go beyond Nili’s argument, however, as republicans also have a reason rooted in *enlightened self-interest* to worry about their state dominating others. Repressive practices abroad are not only inconsistent with liberty at home, but actively undermine it. Because liberty is a fragile achievement, Selma’s state’s unchecked domination abroad ultimately threatens

liberty at home, as it normalizes oppression and turns it inwards.⁹ So violations of international norms and acts of global injustice concern the republican patriot not (only) because it reflects poorly on the moral character of the political community, or the integrity of its constitutional identity, but also because once the state begins engaging with these practices globally, it is likely to become more relaxed in using it domestically (Coyne and Hall 2018).

One may object, of course, that the link between international and domestic domination is only contingent: “we can easily imagine, for instance, a society that has laws clearly perpetuating slavery beyond its borders without these laws having a discernible impact on its domestic affairs” (Nili 2018). Yet the historical republican tradition and contemporary comparative research both identify the mechanisms by which global domination ('empire', for the classical republicans) undermines democracy at home. Consider examples such as prolonged military occupation (which leads to militarization of civilian order and culture), the use of surveillance against foreign nationals (which leads to such measured employed within the state against internal enemies), and exceptional uses of executive power, which undermine the rule of law.

Domination of and by Third Parties

So far we have argued that republican patriots such as Selma have reasons to resist global structural domination, and to oppose the oppression of others by their own state. But should Selma also challenge domination of and by third parties, as well as help secure the conditions of basic non-domination (e.g. human rights) for all? More importantly for our purposes, would a patriot like Selma be *moved* to do so?

⁹ See, e.g., (Arendt 1975; Constant 1988); On the ambivalence of republican attitudes to empire more generally, see e.g. (Pitts 2012; Rana 2010).

Republican theory can justify a broader set of indirect duties, connected not to special relations and obligations, but tracking the general, universal value of non-domination (Lovett 2016). The motivational effectiveness of this claim, however, hinges on the *internalization of norms* of non-domination. In the republican tradition, just as civically-minded individuals care about their common liberty, so they care about the common liberty of others. Republicans recognize all struggles for liberty and against oppression as isomorphically similar – as pursuing the same common good of non-domination – and one of the virtues they are motivated by is that of global political *solidarity* (Viroli 1995; White 2003; Nabulsi 2005, 177–240).

Consider anti-colonial struggles. For republicans, these are not primarily struggles for the national self-determination of particular people with their distinctive culture and traditions; nor are they struggles against this or that imperial power. Rather, anti-colonial struggles are the paradigm of struggles for the common good of political liberty. National self-determination is important for republicans only insofar as it supports political liberty. Consider the case of the International Brigades fighting alongside the republicans during the Spanish Civil War. Members of the International Brigades fought for Spanish self-determination as part of a broader movement of resistance against fascist authoritarianism. Similarly, civic republican patriots will be concerned with threats to political liberty everywhere – e.g., the weakening of civil society, consolidation of power, limiting the freedom of the press – even when these violations of liberty are defended by claims to “national self-determination”.¹⁰

While *norm internalization* is the main route from patriotism to cosmopolitanism in this case, it is not the only one. Concern for global domination can also be motivated by appeals to *political identification*. As Alyson Brysk argues in her research on the reasons that drive

¹⁰ For a recent example, see Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s argument for ‘illiberal democracy’ as the state’s constitutional identity (Pap 2017).

support for the human rights regime, small and medium democracies, in particular those in which national identity was constructed against global domination, have identity-based reasons to act in defense of basic human rights and democratic norms globally. As she puts it, “Canadian soldiers sacrificing their lives in Afghanistan, or Swedish taxpayers bankrolling African refugees are not just trying to be better human beings – they take national pride in expressing their identity as Swedes or Canadians through these global contributions” (Brysk 2009, 221).

Finally, *enlightened self-interest* may also play a part here. Concern for the freedom of one's own political community can motivate action against third-party violations of human rights, when these are seen as potential future threats to the world order. Domestic respect for human rights signals that the state has decided to resolve disputes through non-violent methods, and therefore reinforces peace and stability in the international sphere (Sobek, Abouharb, and Ingram 2006), while a regime violating its subjects' liberties is seen as a threat to stability. Moreover, state domination rarely limits itself to one state: as the recent literature on ‘authoritarian diffusion’ demonstrates, authoritarian governments and their supporters emulate and reinforce each other, either by ideational inspiration or by a common interest in preserving their power (Weyland 2017). A republican patriot seeking to protect the liberty of her state would therefore, on prudential as well as on principled grounds, be concerned with the liberty of others.

Concluding Remarks

We opened this paper with a puzzle. Given the apparent tension between the particularism of patriotic motivation and the universalism of cosmopolitan responsibilities, could there be a cosmopolitan version of patriotism, or must we accept that the two are inherently in conflict? Is it true that those who claim to be citizens of the world are, in fact, citizens of nowhere?

As we argued throughout this paper, analyzing this question requires unpacking the meaning of both cosmopolitanism and patriotism, and the source of their supposed conflict. *Permissible Partialism* and *Globally Responsible Nationalism*, despite their merits, fail because their versions of cosmopolitan patriotism lack collective identification and critical engagement. A civic republican reading of both patriotism and cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, demonstrates how these two commitments can be brought together.

We saw, therefore, how republican patriotism can be linked to concerns about global injustice in a way that makes cosmopolitan patriotism coherent and motivationally effective. For republicans, states need to be reformed and transformed, through civic engagement by their own citizens, to be aligned with cosmopolitan ends. Republican patriotism is key to the prospects of republican cosmopolitanism. Republican cosmopolitanism needs civically engaged citizens who are motivated to make sure that that their state does not dominate others; that they are not dominated by others; and that others are not dominated by others. Because republican patriotism meets the two desiderata we outlined above, it is uniquely able to be a cosmopolitan form of patriotism.

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