THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL INEQUALITY

Justice, Order and North-South Relations from the NIEO to the G20

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Nicholas Lees
University College
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**The Evolution of International Inequality: Justice, Order and North-South Relations from the NIEO to the G20**

Nicholas Lees  
DPhil in International Relations  
Hillary 2013

**ABSTRACT**

Within the contemporary international order, deep structural inequalities coexist alongside a nominally pluralistic society of states that grants international personality to politically organised communities. Asymmetric interactions between distinct political communities have shaped the development of the international system from the colonial era to the present phase of global economic integration. Rising interdependence, problems of unequal development and the democratic mobilisation of peoples around the world have generated moral claims regarding the injustice of global inequality.

In this context the international politics of inequality have taken the format of challenges by the political representatives of the global South to the dominance of the advanced industrialised North. The normative dimensions of this process can be understood through a focus on this process of political argument between unequals. Political argument is contestation over the principles appropriate to govern a sphere of social interaction. The thesis seeks to vindicate the notion that the challenges by the global South have given rise to a dynamic of political argument within a norm-governed international society. Changes in patterns of normative belief, material power and forms of political organisation have historically shaped North-South relations. Therefore, through the analysis of particular episodes of North-South argument, the thesis attempts to provide insights into the moral limits and possibilities of an evolving international society.

Analysing the organised attempts to challenge inequality on the part of the representatives of the global South, the thesis seeks to advance the position the tensions generated by claims over inequality might provide the nucleus for the incorporation of egalitarian concerns into the operation of international society. Through participation in common practices of statehood, the peoples of the global South possess at least some ability to challenge structural inequalities and thus the potential to expand the moral limits of international society.
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The Evolution of International Inequality: Order, Justice and North-South Relations from the NIEO to the G20

Introduction

According to Oscar Wilde ‘A map of the world that does not include utopia is not worth even glancing at’. Yet if we had to draw a map enabling us to chart a course from familiar shores to utopia, we might have difficulty knowing where to begin. To embark on such an exercise in cartography we might need to know something about the moral contours of the globe: the geography of human needs, values and interests. Even after such a survey, our map at present might look something like those from the age of discovery, with continents sketchily outlined and perhaps even whole regions left blank.

Charting any course would depend on understanding where we are navigating from. The question of how to represent the world has a tendency to generate controversy. Famously, the German amateur historian Arno Peters alleged that the widely-used Mercator projection was Eurocentric, as it depicted northerly nations disproportionately large compared to those at the equator, surreptitiously privileging the former over the latter. He thus proposed his own projection which would show all nations in their correct proportions.

Peters was being disingenuous: it is not possible to map a sphere onto a rectangular plane without introducing some kind of distortion. Yet we might ask whether the conceptual maps we use in international relations and international political theory are not subject to distortions of their own. Has the global South been accorded sufficient significance in attempts to chart a route towards the utopia of social justice? Unbeknownst to us, do our maps fail to show the whirlpools and treacherous straits which lie on the way?

Mapping the world as we know it has always been an exercise in power. Innovations in areas such as cartography formed part of an arsenal of new organisational techniques which enabled the consolidation of the nation-state in Europe as well as the imperial subjugation of non-European peoples. Colonial expansion shaped the cartography of power in the modern world, giving rise to the social, economic and political divide between the geographic meta-regions of

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1 See Booth (1991: 536).
2 For an account of the cartographic controversy, see Crampton (1994).
North and South. The first contact scenarios of the age of discovery and conquest have exercised an influence over Western political thought easily as great as any ‘myth of Westphalia’ (Teschke 2005). The idea of a pre-social ‘state of nature’, inspired by ignorance of the pre-existing social structures of Amerindian peoples, animated both attempts to establish the basis of political order both within and between societies. This idea of the ‘foreign encounter’ between previously alien peoples in the state of nature has continued to fascinate contemporary international theorists concerned with the kind of international society distinct peoples might create amongst themselves (Wendt 1993).

Yet rather than beginning with such abstract scenarios, we might instead acknowledge that the encounter between ‘ego’ and ‘alter’ was an historical event which has already occurred – and on very unequal terms. The broad outlines of the world we seek to map were created through a series of such unequal encounters when the fractious kingdoms of a Western peninsula of Eurasia constructed a global imperial order. Anarchy was what certain states made of it, and what they made was a deeply unequal world. Yet the subordinate parties to such asymmetric encounters have long sought to challenge structures of international inequality and put forward their own blueprints of world order which would no longer consign them to the periphery. It might, therefore, make sense to turn our attention from ‘ego’ to ‘alter’, examining how the subordinate participants in the making of the global order have sought to renegotiate their position through political argument. Perhaps, as a result, we might revise those maps which include utopia as a destination, filling-in some of the blanks and restoring the nations of the global South to proportions which reflect their significance in the continuing evolution of international society.

**Order, Justice and North-South Relations**

The central claim of this thesis is that questions of injustice and inequality form one of the central moral tensions within international society; that participation in common practices of statehood has granted the representatives of the peoples of the global South at least some ability to challenge the inegalitarian features of international society by making claims appealing to norms of justice; and that thus these tensions might provide the nucleus for the incorporation of egalitarian concerns into the operation of international society.

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3 The re-description of Europe as a peninsula of Eurasia, of only minor importance through most of world history, is taken from Braudel (1993: 304).
The enquiry begins the claim that international inequality is one of the primary forms of social inequality in the world and that these inequalities arise from, and reciprocally reinforce, deep structural asymmetries within the society of states. Inequality is organised internationally and the international sphere is organised unequally.

The existence of such organised inequalities amongst interdependent actors inevitably gives rise to normative claims regarding justice. Contemporary political philosophers have attempted to locate rationally defensible bases for such moral claims, putting forward egalitarian cosmopolitan theories of global justice. However, adequate political theory requires not only the formulation of moral ideals, but consideration with how ideals are to be negotiated and realised under non-ideal conditions. Justice cannot simply be granted or bestowed by the stronger party, it comprises a set of relationships which must be established through a complex renegotiation of rights and prerogatives amongst actors. Understanding the sort of moral ideals which might be realised within an international society requires a better understanding of the process of renegotiation and political argument amongst unequals within international relations.

To develop a more compelling international political theory of justice therefore demands that we identify the circumstances under which political argument between unequal parties might be possible and interrogate empirical instances of this process. This thesis therefore seeks to ascertain what combination of material and moral pressure exercised on the part of the weak can enable them to compel the powerful to recognize them as legitimate partners in dialogue and possibly even acknowledge their claims. It seeks to vindicate the notion that there is a dynamic of political argument within a norm-governed international society, however fragile it may be, and thus that through participation in international society peoples of the periphery can, under certain conditions, transform their conditions. Because these challenges on the part of these states, organised through coalitions as the ‘global South’, have at least the potential to expand the moral limits of international society they should be acknowledged as having normative significance. Whilst accepting that actors in international relations are motivated by much narrower interests and that deployment of material power often determines outcomes, we can at the same time recognise that, by participating in argument over moral claims, actors involved in the politics of North-South relations are engaged in a process which is of significance and relevance to international political theory.

Thus this thesis presents a set of challenges to the realist or pluralist view that substantive and procedural issues of justice have no place in international relations and that international society is purely limited to a concern with minimalist goals such as survival. Challenges arising from
inequality have been part of the evolution of international society and disagreement over these issues has increasingly come to shape the practical negotiations over the governance of an integrating global order. It is, however, sceptical of the notion that progress towards achieving such goals as distributive justice depends on the moral agency of a nascent world society or putative ‘global civil society’. Rather, agency is accorded to the states of the global South, or more properly the peoples whom they are representatives of, in conjunction with interlocutors within the North including social democrats and transnational networks of activists. It advances a set of arguments that solidaristic goals do not require international society to be superseded by some new form of global polity. Rather, addressing questions of inequality and injustice at the level of international society is a prerequisite and precondition for the construction of a global order that could feasibly embody principles of justice.

The thesis aims to demonstrate that a more egalitarian global order depends what Weber called the ‘slow boring of hard boards’, the arduous process of coalition building, political organisation and campaigning on the part of the states representing the marginalised. The analysis it presents offers no guarantees that the process of political argument will be sustained or a ‘reason of states’ will inevitably emerge amongst unequal parties, but nonetheless aims to demonstrate that such eventualities lie within the realm of possibility.

Towards an Analysis of International Inequality

Inequality within international society is the guiding concern of this thesis. To say that two entities are unequal is to claim that they differ qualitatively from one another in terms of one or more of their attributes, or in terms of the position that they occupy within a system of relationships. Claims of inequality, however, usually involve the stronger claim that entities are not just different, but that there exists a non-equivalence between them (Gosepath 2011). Judgements regarding inequality presuppose that the differences between actors allows them to be ranked and positioned on a scale of measurement according to some criteria.

Making claims about inequality between human individuals or groups presumes that it is possible to construct a meaningful rank order on their basis of their attributes or positions that they occupy. Such a ranking is only viable if we can establish what resources and attributes are valuable and what positions superior to others within a given social domain. Those making claims about interpersonal and intergroup inequality have pointed to the existence of certain ‘primary social goods’ or resources within virtually all social systems (Rawls 1999a). Primary resources are ‘all purpose means’ which are useful in pursuing a very broad range of activities.
Virtually any individual or group, irrespective of their particular values and end-goals, would value such resources at least instrumentally. Attributional accounts in the social sciences regard social inequalities as the outcome of the pre-social assets and capacities possessed by actors. Neo-realism is an example of such an approach within international relations theory, as inequality within the international system is theorised in terms of the distribution of material capabilities amongst states. This distribution of capabilities is exogenous to the system itself and, whilst it determines the position of individual states within systems of alliances, the fundamental nature of international politics is invariant and determined not by relative material capabilities but by the organising principle of anarchy (Waltz 1979: 96).

Less materialist approaches attempt to explain inequality as a social construct arising from ideational or discursive systems which rank groups and individuals differentially or from the way in which certain social relationships are constituted (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 55). The relationship between employer and employee, ruler and ruled, and master and slave are constitutively unequal as they involve a non-equivalence of roles. Bridging social constructivist accounts focusing on relationships and the materialist focus on resources are ‘organisational materialist’ accounts (Mann 2006: 347) according to which ‘inequality emerges from asymmetrical social interactions in which advantages accumulate on one side or the other’ (Tilly 2001: 362). From the perspective of this sort of relational account of inequality, attributional

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4 We could of course construct hypothetical scenarios about individuals, sub-cultures and cultures who would disdain primary resources because of their specific value system. But it is unlikely that such scenarios would tell against the general notion of using primary resources as the basis for interpersonal and intergroup comparisons of inequality.

5 A materialist approach focusing on primary resources has been criticised by Sen, who has argued that it constitutes an unwarranted form of resource fetish and has advocated instead an emphasis on human capabilities and the various requirements necessary for human life to go well (1979). Nonetheless, the distribution of primary resources and the configuration of social power clearly impacts the opportunities for individuals to develop their capabilities. In addition, Sen’s work with Nussbaum (1993) has demonstrated that there is enough intersubjective agreement based on the common features of human nature to make the construction of a meaningful ranking of human development possible. Claims about inequality probably cannot be truly free from value judgements, but intersubjective agreement about core human needs and the emergence of primary resources within complex societies severely limits the sceptical challenge.

6 This is the viewpoint of many, although by no means all, feminist accounts which hold that ‘feminine’ attributes, qualities and contributions are systematically devalued by a patriarchal society. There is a strong affinity with this holistic account of patriarchy and the more general deconstructionist/post-structuralist position which holds that the social world is organised by binary pairs of categories, with one member of the category ‘privileged’ over the other. This perspective is applied to North-South relations by Doty (1996).

7 The social constructivist accounts of inequality in terms of constitutively unequal relationships described by Barnett and Duvall (2005: 55) might also be said to be relational, as they place their focus on relationships and transactions amongst actors. But there is a basic problem for these kind of accounts that describe: what is it that maintains the participation of subordinate actors in such relationships? A constructivist account of inequality would have to appeal to either the internalisation of values on the part of subordinate actors (which in itself seems to be question-begging), to wider discursive formations within
differences amongst actors largely relate to their differing ability to make authoritative claims on valuable resources within a social order. Primary resources not only include physical resources but the ability to exercise what Mann calls ‘social power’ (1986; 1993) via characteristic forms of social organisation which have a generalised capacity to enable ‘the production of intended effects’ (Russell 2004[1938]: 23). Constitutively unequal social relationships are enforced at the boundary through deployment of primary resources in the exercise of coercive, authoritative, allocative and symbolic power. The position of some individuals at the centre or apex of a network of unequal relationships provides them with the capacity to meet challenges to their position and ‘organisationally outflank’ inferiors (Mann 1986: 7).

This approach focuses on how asymmetric transactions concatenate to produce larger scale, emergent social structures. Proponents of this approach note that the result is rarely the crystallisation of ‘neat, continuous hierarchies’ (Tilly 2001: 362-3). Similarly, Wright’s examination of socio-economic class in terms of ‘structured patterns of interaction’ leads him to suggest that particular individuals can occupy multiple class locations simultaneously (Wright 2005a: 8-9). Nonetheless, inequalities seem to have a broad tendency to ‘line-up’ with one another, producing rough patterns of stratification within societies which cut across multiple spheres of human activity. These patterns are then frequently ‘fortified by construction of social categories that justify and sustain unequal advantage’ (Tilly 2001: 362), as ascribed differences are pressed into service to reinforce unequal social boundaries. This perspective holds that inequality is primarily the product of social processes rather than a brute fact. Thus the emergence of structural inequalities can be thought of as ‘vertical differentiation’ (Donelly 2009: 50), the set of processes which differentiates social actors according to hierarchies, strata and position within asymmetric networks of interaction.

A relational approach therefore emphasises ‘causal interconnections between the success of some and the failure of others’ (Wright 2005b: 2), as inequality is posited as arising from ongoing asymmetric interactions and forms of social closure which produce differential benefits and burdens rather than differences in natural endowments. Because they are sustained by organised

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8 Nor is inequality primarily attributed to natural differences amongst agents, to unstructured choice arising from different preferences, to continuous direct coercion, or to value judgements arising within a holistic cultural system. This is not at all to deny that there are inequalities which are just brute facts. Some individuals suffer from congenital illnesses due to their misfortune in the genetic lottery. In international relations, the size and population of states in the contemporary international system reflects historically contingent events rather than unequal transactions. Nonetheless a relational approach holds that the inequalities which we are most concerned with as social scientists should be accounted for in relational terms.
social interaction, forms of what Tilly calls ‘durable inequality’ are rarely dependent on any particular belief system or ideology — ideational flux frequently accompanies structural continuity (Tilly 1998: 121). Rather, the formation of collective identities and the social negotiation of roles and prerogatives are crucially shaped by the patterns of asymmetric interaction. Inequality, therefore, shapes and sets limits on the sorts of relationships which are possible between individuals and groups. Yet at the same time emergent social divisions provide the basis for organised political challenges against inequality, as actors who find themselves in a common position of disadvantage may develop solidarity amongst themselves (Tilly 1998: 212-3). Thus from individual asymmetric relationships, organised forms of political conflict, contention and demand-making arise.

If we acknowledge that human inequality is not an invariant constant, enquiry naturally turns to the historical transactions and processes which have generated socially organised inequality. Large-scale inequality and solidified forms of stratification seem to have emerged alongside urbanisation, the intensive division of labour, and complex forms of political organisation (Mann 1986; Christian 2004, Peterson 2010: 191-2). As soon as there were distinct political communities, unequal relationships and patterns of stratification seem to have sprung up both within and amongst those communities (Frank 2005: 89-90). The process of interdependent but unequal development and the central dynamics of international relations appear to be intertwined from the very outset. It therefore seems that to comprehend the development and evolution of international systems we need to understand how they were constitutively shaped by asymmetric relationships, whilst to understand inequality as a social phenomenon we must understand its international dimension.

But a society made up of distinct societies, what Buzan calls a ‘second order society’ (2004: xviii), has certain distinct features which must be taken into account. Applying notions of relational inequality, unpacking the implications and empirically analysing how such relationships play out in specific scenarios requires close attention to the specific features of societies of distinct states in order to do justice to the various dimensions and multiform implications of international inequality.

Investigating Inequality in International Society

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9 Indeed, Mann (1986) argues that it was enslavement of adjacent populations which enabled the emergence of the division of labour and the state.
The perspective outlined above holds that material inequalities, ongoing asymmetric relationships and assignment of unequal prerogatives within a stratified order give rise to challenges against perceived injustice and forms of organised political contestation by subordinate actors. Inequality is identified as part of the ‘deep structure’ of all hitherto extant social systems, including the international system. The asymmetric patterns of interaction within such systems profoundly shape the negotiation of social roles and the emergence of intersubjective norms. The emergence of superordinate and subordinate social groups within the context of a norm-governed order in turn results in organised contestation and moral challenges against perceived injustice. Through the practice of public claim-making actors enter into the process of renegotiation over the terms of social coexistence and cooperation. Examining inequality thus leads towards the terrain of political argument and normative questions about the nature of justice within an interdependent world. A truly adequate understanding of international inequality, therefore, requires a perspective that can bring together both the etic and emic forms of inquiry to provide insight into both impersonal structures and intersubjective patterns of meaning.\textsuperscript{10}

The best candidate for such a perspective is the English School or international society approach. This perspective has combined a rigorous attempt to theoretically understand the bases of international order with a nuanced sensitivity to the normative questions which are inevitably generated by the interactions between distinct political communities. Its advocates have emphasised its theoretical pluralism (Roberts 2008: 335-6) and its unique ability to ‘act as an interlocutor between opposing positions that otherwise lack the ability to communicate effectively with each other’ (Little 2000: 396). In particular, the distinction that this approach draws between international systems and international societies allows us to distinguish between those processes which are the inadvertent result of decentralised social interaction, and the conscious efforts at collective agency and intersubjectively negotiated identity formation amongst actors.\textsuperscript{11}

Central to the English School approach has been an awareness of the process of change within the various international systems which have existed throughout history. One example of such scholarship is Adam Watson’s \textit{The Evolution of International Society} (1992), which broke down

\textsuperscript{10} On the etic/emic distinction see Harris (1980: 32-5).

\textsuperscript{11} The international system/international society distinction see Watson (1992: 311) and Little (2000: 405-9). Buzan (2004), drawing on Wendt (1999), makes a case for abandoning the distinction on the grounds that each represents a different way of socially constructing the international and therefore both are equally intersubjectively negotiated. Interactions between actors involve social negotiation and identity formation in some respect. However the system-society distinction allows us to distinguish between those processes which are the inadvertent result of decentralised social interaction, and the conscious efforts at collective agency and intersubjectively negotiated identity formation amongst actors.
boundaries between historical sociology and the international society perspective by providing a detailed examination of the historically contingent emergence of the present international order, and the specific dynamics which gave rise to different international societies throughout history.

Following in the tradition of Watson’s work, a major aim of this thesis is to examine the connection between the evolution of international society and the evolution of international inequality. The notion of evolution might suggest an affinity with the social evolutionary accounts of classical sociologists such as Spencer or Durkheim, or alternatively an approach which draws on Darwinian or Lamarckian mechanisms of selection. Although certain chapters engage with scholars who advance such perspectives, the term evolution is employed more modestly to refer to cumulative change. This approach therefore regards the salient features of the present unequal international society as arising due to a series of historically contingent, path dependent processes. It draws on those approaches to political economy and historical sociology which regard present worldwide inequalities as resulting from self-reinforcing forms of bifurcation, and asks how these inequalities have influenced and have been influenced by the closely related development of the society of states.

Despite the increase in sophistication in international relations theory in recent years, inequality within the international system has not received sustained attention in its own right. This in part stems from the well known weaknesses of more inflexible structuralist perspectives such as Wallerstein’s (1974) world-systems approach. It also reflects the lacunae of orthodox theoretical approaches which have tended to see inequality in terms of brute inequalities of resources that determine which actors will prevail in a clash of preferences — an approach which deflects the challenge that inequality poses by acknowledging its relevance only at the surface level of international relations. More positively, radical and critical scholars have conducted valuable new lines of enquiry into groups at the edges of international relations who have been ignored by traditional accounts (Darby 1997). Nonetheless, by focusing on ‘margins, silences and bottom rungs’ (Enloe 2000) these approaches move the focus of inquiry away from a focus on contestation over inequality as a central dynamic at the heart of the international system.

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12 In particular, Watson highlighted what has come to be known as the ‘pendulum theory’ that ancient international systems were governed by a tendency towards oscillation between empire and fragmentation. This is notable from the perspective of the present inquiry because it seems to suggest that attempts to impose and resist hierarchy have been an important part of the dynamic of many international societies across history.

13 On these two approaches to international relations and world politics, as well as an ambitious agenda for combining the two, see Modelski and Thompson (2001).
Chapter 1 therefore attempts to demonstrate that inequality is one of the central ways in which the international system is ordered and that asymmetrical patterns of interaction deeply structure the international sphere. Inequality and development, rather than being tangential to the core concerns of international relations, are identified as being central processes within the historical emergence of international society. Rather than focus on a single economic or geopolitical ‘system-logic’, the chapter analyses how inequalities between polities have been compounded historically through a series of asymmetric interactions. The distinct but interrelated forms of asymmetric interaction within the international society have led to an emergent and historically contingent North-South divide, which forms one of the central political cleavages within international society.

One response of late-developing and post-colonial states to their situation has been to the construction of the global South, enabling them to act — with varying degrees of coherence — as a coalition able to make certain claims within international society. As these collective claims originate in certain enduring features of the way in which the international system is structured, we have a prima facie reason to take them seriously as substantive political claims. Thus although much of the English School theorising has focused on of the tension between cultural difference and moral universalism within a pluralistic society, we can identify a different and distinct set of morally significant international debates over the purportedly unjust aspects of international inequality.

It might, however, be objected that the sort of organisational materialist and economically structuralist approaches which Chapter 1 draws upon provide a poor basis for addressing questions of agency and normative change. Ashley’s highly influential attack on neo-realism convinced many critical theorists that all systematic theorising reifies and naturalises social processes (Ashley 1984). Yet classical structuralist perspectives such as that of Cardoso and Faletto (1979) emphasised the scope for agency in the context of structural constraint. Indeed, a perspective drawing on historical sociology rejects invariant monotonic relationships, the notion that social processes are equifinal, and the claim that structural constraints are irresistible. In an

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14 This frame has continued to inform English School scholarship, see for example Buzan 2010. This is quite distinct from the set of normative questions which arise from material and relational inequalities, although the two sets of moral debates inevitably overlap due to the dominant role of the Euro-American world in determining the values which have shaped international society.

15 Hypothetically, it might be claimed that questions of justice and inequality are subordinate to the pluralist-solidarist debate because they map onto the question of whether there are valid normative principles of global scope. However, this dichotomy is founded on the assumption that the primary divisions within international society arise from difference, that is to say from the tensions within international society between the pull of moral universalism and the fact of the existence of a multiplicity of values, ways of life and cultural belief systems.
open system, the nature of social entities and the relationship between causal factors can change, never truly settling into the sort of stable relationships which would make the application of strict covering laws feasible\textsuperscript{16}. Charges of reductionist materialism or undue structural determinism are therefore misleading. Nonetheless, we cannot assume \textit{a priori} that the exercise of agency will be possible and scope for normative change will exist in every circumstance, it depends on the ability of organised agents to challenge existing structures and relationships through the exertion of material and moral pressure. This perspective has clear implications for how we approach substantive normative questions arising in an unequal international society, which the following section examines in more detail.

\textbf{International Inequality and the Claims of Global Justice}

Chapter 1 brackets substantive normative concerns to examine structural processes within the international system. Chapter 2, however, focuses attention on the normative implications of global and international inequality. To do so, the chapter employs an understanding of international political theory as an engaged analysis of the ethical and normative dimensions of international politics. It thus follows in the footsteps of the return to normative theorising within contemporary international relations theory (Brown 1992; Smith 1992)\textsuperscript{17}. In particular, it draws on the current of thinking within the English School of international relations which attempts to pinpoint and articulate the moral tensions within international society.

Chapter 2 begins with an inquiry into the implications of moral equality between persons in a materially unequal world. It defends the claim that global inequalities give rise to a set of demands of global social justice, and argues that these solidaristic goals must be addressed within international society rather than through the creation of new sites of global authority or the interstitial emergence of a singular world society. The starting point for this normative investigation is a sympathetic critique of cosmopolitan approaches within political philosophy and international political theory. Cosmopolitanism is a perspective which holds that the moral principles which ought to govern political institutions are, in principle, universal and that the moral equality of persons grounds extensive duties of global justice to bring about a more equal

\textsuperscript{16} The point is stated elegantly by Rasler and Thompson (2001, 61-2): ‘Necessary and sufficient conditions imply the attainment of some type of equilibrium. Evolutionary arguments assume otherwise—that equilibriums are never quite attained. The dust never settles as the interaction among variables continues to evolve.’ We are unlikely to find general laws in the social world because we are unlikely to find \textit{sui generis} categories.

\textsuperscript{17} Despite the fact that even sophisticated commentators continue to regard normative enquiry as beyond the disciplinary boundaries of international relations (Jackson 2011: 24-5), international political theorists have successfully sought to advance knowledge of the normative dimensions of international relations through rigorous, systematic and theoretically sophisticated research.
distribution of valuable social resources amongst persons. Cosmopolitan perspectives in political philosophy are highly salient to the concerns of this thesis because they present a rigorous account of the moral implications which global inequalities give rise to in a world of distinct political communities. Cosmopolitan accounts present an ideal of global justice which serves as a goal to work towards and against which the present global order can assessed.

Although cosmopolitan accounts of global justice are the starting point of our investigation into the normative dimensions of international inequality, they are on their own insufficient. An increasingly vocal group of self-styled political realists within political theory have alleged that post-Rawlsian political philosophy, exemplified in cosmopolitan accounts of global justice, fails to take the unavoidably political character of politics into account. Rejecting the Rawlsian notion that justice is the first virtue of political institutions, more radical realists such as Geuss, Mouffe and Williams spurn a concern with moral principles in favour of an approach focusing on power and the purposes to which it is put (Geuss 2008; Mouffe 1993; Williams 2005). But it isn’t clear what standard for the evaluation of action can be employed if we reject moral principles, or whether normative theorising about politics if we jettison any appeal to substantive ideals.

Nonetheless these anti-moralists seem correct that contemporary political philosophy is missing something, that in disregarding ‘merely’ empirical features of real politics it overlooks a whole host of normative questions. These concerns have been convincingly developed by political theorists such as Galston, Pettit, Philp, and Stears who have attempted to clear a space to think about distinctively political principles (Galston 2010; Pettit 1997; Philp 2010; Stears 2005). The problem with much political philosophy for these thinkers is not its concern with moral principles, but that a lack of concern with the context of real politics blinds it to a host of centrally important questions relating to agency, authority, enduring political disagreement, and the stability of political principles under non-ideal conditions. For many post-Rawlsian political philosophers, facts and values can be cleanly separated — and political philosophy proper concerns itself solely with the latter (Cohen 2003). Facts about empirical politics are thus demoted to the status of merely instrumental concerns. But for more realist thinkers Kant’s dictum that ‘ought implies can’ has non-trivial implications for how we evaluate rival normative

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18 Political realists of this variety sometimes seem to be suggesting that moral principles are of limited relevance to politics because are necessarily subordinate to prudence and expediency. Nonetheless, what counts as ‘prudent’ or ‘expedient’ within a situation itself depends on a set of value judgements about desirable claims. A return to realism in international political thought would, in addition, be particularly unappealing prospect for international political theory to follow, given that the space for normative reasoning has re-emerged only recently within the discipline of international relations. As Robertson-Snape (2000) has suggested, international political thought remains at risk of being trapped in a cycle of repetition and recurrence where the rediscovery of ethical questions only seems to presage the eternal return of realism.
claims. Political principles are therefore derived from moral principles without being straightforwardly reducible to them: political principles, like those of jurisprudence, are distinct from those which govern interpersonal morality. They are discovered, not only through introspection, but through the light shed by the study of empirical politics (Stears 2005: 334) – including the empirical process of dialogue and negotiation over political principles amongst actors commonly participating in public life.

These considerations seem particularly salient, and perhaps even unavoidable, for international political theory, as the conditions within the international system seem radically non-ideal. Avoiding confronting such issues raises the risk of importing unwarranted assumptions from conventional political thought into the international sphere. International political theorists must, therefore, attempt to identify those principles which are appropriate to the specific conditions of a second-order society.

On the basis of these considerations, Chapter 2 aims to demonstrate that asymmetrical interactions and structural inequalities provide not just the trigger for claims of justice, but also serious limitations on the institutionalisation of principles based on those claims. Cosmopolitan approaches have not adequately appreciated the full normative implications of inequality in an unreformed world of states and how, in such a context, inequality can undermine redistributive justice as a normative ideal which can ground substantive political principles. This appears to be a strange claim to make, as cosmopolitan political theorists have been deeply concerned with inequality. Egalitarian cosmopolitan accounts hold that very strong obligations of justice are triggered by the fact of global inequality. Nonetheless, many egalitarian cosmopolitans seem to regard inequality in terms of an exogenously given distribution of resources and envisage redistributive schemes in terms of transfers of these resources between well defined actors. Other cosmopolitan theorists such as Pogge, it is true, argue that inequalities can in significant part be attributed to global institutional arrangements. But Pogge too stops short of reflecting upon how the realisability of ideals of global distributive justice might be shaped by structural inequalities and focuses little attention on the radical transformations to the relations amongst actors which implementing his preferred scheme of distributive justice would involve. This is, however, inadequate once we recognise that ought implies can, and that ‘can’ is determined by the way that relevant social relationships are constituted. Dispositions, capacities and relationships which are necessary prerequisites for the realisation of certain principles may simply

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19 Pogge (2008) in fact seems to attribute contemporary global institutional arrangements with much more responsibility for global inequality than does the perspective presented in Chapter 1. This is may be because Pogge’s notion of responsibility is subjunctive: global institutional arrangements are held to be harming the poor because they could be arranged so that poverty was minimised but they are not.
not exist in the context under consideration. The test for political principles must be how fragile they are to movements away from ideal conditions. If, as we relax requirements of full compliance, the institutionalisation of the principle would continue, if imperfectly, to promote the realisation of the moral values on which it is justified then that principle can be considered robust or stable. If under realistic non-ideal conditions, however, the institutionalisation of a principle would undermine the very values on which it is predicated then we must acknowledge that such a principle is unstable.

Chapter 2 contends that the principles of global justice are unstable in exactly this way within the present global order, as their implementation would exacerbate asymmetrical relationships amongst individuals and peoples – thus undermining conditions of equal concern and respect for persons. The global order at present lacks strong mechanisms of impartial arbitration and rules-enforcement, as well as any real global public sphere in which the claims of all relevant persons can be aired. Absent these features, and in the context of deep inequalities, the institutional agents charged with fulfilling the goals of global distributive justice would remain acutely sensitive to powerful organised interests within the global North. With little ability to make effective demands on distant global sites of authority, the supposed beneficiaries of such a scheme of global justice would remain dependent on the continued good-will of powerful global actors – placing them in an invidious position. Cosmopolitan political philosophy does not therefore provide a sound basis for egalitarian international political theory. Cosmopolitans have succeeded in providing a powerful set of arguments identifying global inequalities as morally scandalous, but have not provided a set of robust political principles which could serve as a regulative ideal in the contemporary global order. Its moral vision is laudable, but the implicit sociology of morals it provides is deeply flawed.

Chapter 2 draws on dialogic ethics and neo-Roman republicanism to provide something of a course correction, enabling us to take into account issues which are not on cosmopolitanism’s map when considering questions of global justice. But they provide waypoints rather than resting places; a fully specified political theory of global justice is not within our grasp. This, however, does not imply any retreat from normative concerns. Indeed, the perspective developed throughout the thesis agrees with the position advanced by Frost (1996) that ethical considerations are part of the warp and weft of international relations, woven into the constitution of international society. Rather than regard moral concerns as externally imposed on international relations, this approach is in agreement with the Weberian claim that politics is an inherently normative sphere of activity, as all claims to authority are claims to the right to rule others (Philp 2010: 471). All forms of political order, therefore, have a normative dimension.
The analysis presented in Chapter 2 therefore works towards an examination of the ethical potentials of the global order as it actually exists. The approach adopted draws on the ‘moral limit and possibility’ approach advanced by Price (2008a), which calls on scholars to focus on the scope that exists within international politics for progressive change. This involves an effort to locate the various forms of ‘moral limit’ which frustrate attempts to apply ethical principles beyond the nation state, the clarification of the ‘alternative orders which are feasible transformations of the existing world’ (Cox 1986: 10), the evaluation of the merits these alternatives, and the stipulation of ‘conditions of possibility’ for their realisation (Price 2008b: 200).

Focusing on the conditions of possibility for promoting normative change and social transformation pushes us towards focusing on agency. Under non-ideal conditions it is of great importance to ask which actors occupy a position within a social system such that they are empowered and able to act on behalf of some desirable normative ideal. Chapter 2, however, provides reasons to be sceptical about whether this agency can emerge from ‘global civil society’ or world society at present. The potential for democratic states to act as legitimate representatives and agents on behalf of their populations, on the other hand, has been overlooked. The states of the global South have at least the potential to act as a vehicle for the claims of the economically marginal population of the periphery and through their agency even transform some of the unequal structural features of the global order. Much, although by no means all, of the scepticism towards the state in the global South is prompted by the misleading errors of globalisation theory or forms of structural pessimism which are much too absolutist. Therefore the chapter concludes that there is considerably more moral potential in international society, and less in world society, with regards to issues of justice and equality than has been previously recognised.

It is this conclusion that provides the connection which links the concerns of the first two chapters with the overall argument being advanced by the thesis. The states of the global South have found themselves on the margins of the world economy and an international society which they did not create. They have responded to their situation through attempts at coalition-building and attempts to renegotiate their position within the international order. The question arising from these first two chapters, therefore, is whether the structural position that these states occupy, their constitution as social actors and relationship with their populaces, and their empowerment as independent states within international society enables them to at least potentially act as agents on behalf of egalitarian goals. The next section unpacks these issues to examine how the thesis will assess the moral limits and possibilities of this form of agency.
By focusing on moral limits and possibilities, the empirical and theoretical investigation is guided throughout the thesis by a normative concern with inequality. This places this inquiry in close proximity to the tradition of emancipatory social science, which Wright suggests should be understood as an enterprise which links the production of systematic scientific knowledge to the moral purpose of overcoming injustice (Wright 2010: 7). Methodologically, this entails ‘elaborating a systematic diagnosis and critique of the world as it exists; envisioning viable alternatives; and understanding the obstacles, possibilities, and dilemmas of transformation’ (Wright 2010: 7). Scholars adopting this approach act as explorers, seeking to map the contours of the social world and identify the bogs and precipices which limit human flourishing whilst constantly scanning the horizon for signs of opportunities for normatively desirable change.

Central to this approach, therefore, is an attempt to identify the immanent potentials within a social order which agents can seize upon to effect transformative change. Within the discipline of international relations the influence of these ideas can be attributed to the work of Robert Cox, especially through his famous distinction between status quo oriented ‘problem solving theory’ and emancipation oriented ‘critical theory’ (Cox 1981:128-9). Perhaps the most ambitious attempt to build on the Coxian concern with emancipatory change is to be found in the work of Andrew Linklater. Advancing what he terms a ‘critical praxeology’, Linklater has attempted to identify the unmet ethical demands which arise within the parameters of the present international order and the immanent potentials for the realisation of these demands (Linklater 1998: 5). Drawing heavily on the work of Habermas, Linklater provides a sociology of morals in which the normative change occurs through a humanizing process driven by the expansion of communicative reason (Linklater 1990a: 134-7). However, his reliance on this master-process produces a tendency towards reliance on teleological appeals (cf. Linklater 1998, 27), a lack of attention to questions of agency, and an unwillingness to tackle questions of moral limit or ambiguity (Hurrell 2007a).

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20 This statement of intent inspired and has continued to guide both neo-Gramscian approaches within international political economy (Gill 2008) and the critical security studies research programme (Booth et al 2005; Booth 2007). Notions of emancipation have been most fully developed by scholars working within the remit of critical security studies.

21 Linklater’s attempt to go Beyond Realism and Marxism (1990b) follows Habermas’s efforts to go beyond the ‘productive paradigm’ (i.e. Marxian historical materialism) in the social sciences (1990).
Nonetheless we can bear in mind Linklater’s insights about the relationship between normative tensions, renegotiation of moral relationships and the transformation of international society whilst drawing on other critical theorists who have placed more emphasis on concrete struggles for emancipation. A particularly useful approach is adopted by Murphy, who identifies what he calls ‘egalitarian social movements’ within the global order, examples of Polanyi’s social movements for self-protection who have challenged the inegalitarian consequences of the process of dis-embedding markets from society (Murphy 2001). These organised campaigns by subordinate groups have been the primary bearers of claims regarding inequality and injustice that arise from the unmet needs generated by the uneven global expansion of industrial capitalism. Whilst often resisted and defeated, their challenges have influenced the attempts by hegemonic actors to re-establish order after periodic global crises, driving the evolution of the global political economy. As others within this tradition have emphasised, these groups have frequently derived their capacity for agency from their subordinate social position due to their ability to withdraw cooperation from asymmetric relationships (Wright 2005a: 20). In addition to structurally-specific forms of agency, social movements have available to them opportunities for claim-making which arise from the general need to sustain legitimacy within authoritatively governed interdependent societies.

In either case it is important to note the central importance of collective organisation and the wider structural context of action in determining the success of such social movements. Organisation and coalition building requires a degree of consciousness raising, of building bridges between diverse actors who nonetheless occupy a structurally similar position within a set of social relations and encouraging an emphasis on these similarities as a basis for identity through Spivak’s tactic of ‘strategic essentialism’. However, the success of even well-organised and coherent social movements, as well as their opportunities for self-organisation in the first place, remain dependent on the structural context for claim making – what Tilly and Tarrow term the ‘political opportunity structure’ (2007: 75). Organisation and claims-making must therefore be studied in the context of regimes, i.e. particular political orders (Tilly 2006: 113).

The ‘contentious politics’ (Tilly and Tarrow 2007) of such campaigns of claim-making involves something more than interest-based bargaining between pre-existing actors within an exogenously determined structure. This is not to say that power, interests and social structures are of no relevance. But claims of the sort we are interested in are not merely power-backed

22 An excellent example of such a process is provided by EP Thompson’s (1991) study of the making of the English working class which, rather than being a mechanical outcome of capitalism, required efforts to create a common social identity and culture amongst individuals who shared a similar position within a capitalist social system.
expressions of interest by collections of actors. Claims have substantive content; they are public appeals to broadly accepted principles. Yet although they draw on existing norms, claims of this kind usually call for them to be reinterpreted or applied in novel circumstances. Claim making can therefore bring about normative change and a transformation of the relationships and identities amongst actors. For example, Tilly’s analysis of the emergence of democracy in Britain emphasises how a huge shift occurred in the 19th century from previously sporadic and often violent forms of protest to new forms of public claim making. These new forms of political action, most significantly the rise of the public meeting, accelerated the emergence of a public sphere as activists fought for the expansion of political rights (Tilly 2010: 208). These democratising movements succeeded in expanding the space in which collective appeals on the basis of public conceptions of legitimacy could be made precisely through such practices of public claim-making.

Tilly acknowledges the importance of the political opportunity structure, emphasising the disarmament of the populace by the state, the opportunities presented by the parliamentary system, and the transformations associated with industrial capitalism (Tilly 2010: 298; Tilly 1993: 105-141). Public claims were rarely truly disinterested and continued to be underwritten by the implicit threat of violence. Yet the argument Tilly presents implies that political contention was not just an epiphenomenon of the political opportunity structure or the balance of forces, but could transform patterns of political order. The process remains highly contingent on not only the structural relationships between actors and the configuration of political regimes, but the existing normative resources which actors have available to them. Yet under certain circumstances, the process of claim making seems to have a force of its own as actors become drawn into the process of making arguments and counter-arguments, appealing to shared principles of legitimacy but renegotiating them as they do so. In Britain subordinate groups did not just increase their capacity to make self-interested demands in the process of political negotiation, but actually helped to create the conditions where substantive arguments could be heard in a shared public sphere.

Clear connections exist between the concerns of critical international relations theory, the sociology of contentious politics and the English School preoccupation with how the development of international society is both driven by, and gives rise to, competing normative claims. These perspectives provide us with a starting point from which to examine the controversies over inequality and injustice emerging specifically within international society. By combining the normative and empirical strands of our enquiry we may be able to develop a more fine-grained analysis of the immanent potentials within international society.
Chapter 3 therefore aims to develop the idea, suggested by Murphy (2001: 273), of regarding the states of the global South as potentially forming an egalitarian social movement in their own right. It asks what role they might play in transforming international society such that its moral remit can expand to include issues of economic justice without either reinforcing hierarchies or risking instability. Regarding states of the global South as vehicles for egalitarian claims in international society obviously has difficulties, especially as these states have frequently been very poor representatives of their own peoples.

Even leaving aside these issues there are questions of what sort of processes and mechanisms will either limit or expand the scope for subordinate actors to challenge inequalities within an international society. To this end, Chapter 3 takes the lines of inquiry introduced here and further develops them by focusing on the possibilities for weaker actors to renegotiate their position within an unequal international order. Initially engaging with other international relations theorists who have analysed the nature of normative change and the characteristics of the relationship between unequals in international relations, the chapter attempts to examine how much space can exist within international society for claims asserting the injustice of global inequalities and asks whether subordinate states can, through contestation, expand this space from the structural position they occupy. It enquires into the conditions of the emergence of a ‘reason of states’, the emergence of some kind of public sphere under conditions of anarchy.

To do so it develops the concept of political argument: instances where actors make iterated appeals to wider principles to support the pursuit of their goals by attempting to convince one another and third parties of the legitimacy of their claims. Examining the specific contexts in which argument takes place, it puts forward the idea of a normative order, a concept drawn from the sociological notion of a political opportunity structure, the neo-Gramscian notion of successive hegemonic world orders, and the English School concern with political order and the idea of an international society constituted by mutually acknowledged binding norms. Similar to the use of the notion of a moral economy employed by historians such as Polanyi (2001[1944]) and Thompson (1971), the concept of a normative order is used to draw attention to the tacit expectations of actors about proper conduct and the assignment of rights and responsibilities within international society at a specific point in time. It emphasises that all forms of political order embody certain values, instantiate a particular distribution of resources and rely on some degree of intersubjective legitimacy for their maintenance. The approach adopted in this chapter, however, is not agnostic but insists that ‘norms cannot be studied apart from their normativity’
(Cochran 2009: 221) as the values embodied within international society have genuine substantive content and embody real values.

**Intermezzo: Addressing the Sceptics**

Chapter 3 aims to establish that, not only is it meaningful to speak of a dynamic of political argument within international relations, but that the process of political argument over inequality and injustice is something of normative significance. The above account of the manner in which the argument presented in the first three chapters has, however, made a set of assumptions which are open to dispute. Specifically, the discussion has proposed a particular relationship between order and justice in which unjustifiable forms of inequality provoke perennial political challenges on the part of subordinate actors. An unequal order, therefore, is intrinsically unstable; management of inequality is difficult and generates constant tensions and opportunities for change. Hegemonic actors must respond to claims of injustice, which shapes the evolution of a political order even in cases where the campaigns of subordinate actors fall short of their substantive aims.

This approach clearly contrasts sharply with the default approach to inequality adopted by many orthodox approaches within the discipline of international relations. In most institutionalist and neo-realist accounts if inequality is examined at all it is conceptualised as a ‘brute fact’, the product of an exogenous distribution of capabilities, rather than being the product of ongoing asymmetric relationships and interactions. Outcomes are held to be determined by the invariant features of the structure of international anarchy, or by the features of a stereotyped set of game-theoretic interactions arising from different configurations of power and preferences. Thus inequality creates no dynamic of its own, it simply determines who gets what in an unchanging international system. Even if weaker actors were successful in achieving their claims, this would only effect a redistribution of power and wealth – not any real change in the patterns of international politics.

Whereas this mainstream perspective regards the establishment of order in international relations as something unconnected to questions of justice, another perspective regards claims about the injustice of social inequalities as actively harmful to the maintenance of international order. Justified as an essential element of the natural order or part of the inescapable reality of politics, inequality is therefore held to be essential for stability. For proponents of such a perspective – who have included hegemonic stability theorists, modernisation theorists and neo-conservative advocates of an American empire – the challenges of inferior parties cannot be accommodated
and equality threatens chaos. Order and justice therefore are deeply incompatible. A similar perspective is offered by Lebow, who draws on Aristotle in his argument that the weak cannot afford to allow themselves to experience anger towards the strong (Lebow 2008: 69). Lacking power, anger is a ‘luxury’ that the weak cannot permit themselves to feel, subordinate peoples must ‘learn to live with their lower status and more limited autonomy’ (Lebow 2008: 69). Any challenge they foolishly make is likely only to be ferociously punished by the strong (Lebow 2008: 534). As Barkawi has pointed out, this kind of Thucydidean perspective displays a degree of amnesia about the very high price which the supposedly weak have exacted from the strong even in defeat (Barkawi 2006: 57). Yet neither should we forget the tremendous violence which has frequently been visited on subordinate actors after failed challenges to inequality, as witnessed for example in the horrific civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala. Furthermore, even though mass campaigns against inequality ranging from jacqueries to peasant revolts such as Thomas Münster’s millenarian crusade and China’s Taiping Rebellion have been recurrent phenomena, we can question whether these were genuinely transformative – whether they reshaped relations between unequals and expanded the space for argument and claim making over valid normative principles.

Indeed, the very notion of durable or structural inequalities acknowledges that asymmetric relationships are deeply embedded. Thus within the longue durée of the international system one witnesses uncanny continuities. Even given the profound changes in the dominant belief systems and normative commitments within international society, one finds that certain practices and relationships based on inequality persist. As a set of themes may recur throughout the work of an artist, time and time again the same relationships based on inequality return. Thus Cowen and Shenton (1996) and Duffield (2009) identify the discourse and practice of trusteeship as an ongoing feature of international relations that pre- and post-dates formal colonialism, protean in its capacity for adaptation to changing social circumstances. As in Lampudesa’s The Leopard, everything might appear to change within the international order whilst the same familiar relationships endure.

As Tilly points out (1998: 125), the transformation of inequality is the exception; the norm is for subordinate parties to adapt to their circumstances. As the weak are frequently aware of the likely disastrous consequences of all-out confrontation (Scott 1985: 22), Scott suggests that conflict between unequals takes the form of ‘foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance’ and so on (Scott 1985: xvi). Instead of a clash of rival claims of justice, we should instead expect only a cold war limited to symbolic skirmishes, with argument proper replaced by a ‘hidden transcript’: a covert discourse of the weak that serves as a
ledger of indignities and injustices against them (Scott 1990). This pessimism about the possibilities for the weak to transform conditions of inequality has led Scott to focus on ‘the art of not being governed’ (2009): the efforts by marginal groups to exit a system of oppression rather than transform it.

The intellectual project of this thesis, therefore, faces a sceptical challenge from perspectives which maintain that no dynamic arises from the political claims which result from inequality. An array of objections present themselves: there is simply no space for transformative argument because politics is governed by a logic of interest-based bargaining; claims of justice cannot be satisfied without provoking disorder; inequality can fuel conflict and violent counter-reaction but not change; the weak are restricted to resistance at the margins and attempts to escape from unequal political orders. Yet we can point to at least one significant example of the weak successfully transforming their position within the international order and bringing about lasting normative change within international society.

Decolonisation and Normative Change

At the beginning of the C20th, the European imperial order may to observers have appeared to be a permanent feature of the international system: enforced by expeditionary armies, legalised and ratified through treaties and international agreements, integrated by webs of trade and investment, buttressed and legitimated by ethnocentric and often racist ideologies, animated by the self-confidence of the rulers and maintained through the collusion or acquiescence of the ruled. Rebuffing the protests of Japan, the colonial powers succeeded in re-encoding racial and imperial hierarchy into international society after the fratricidal conflict of the First World War. Imperial rule had itself been a longstanding feature of global political order: ‘history is in significant part a story of the rule of one ‘people’ over others’ (Holsti 2004: 239). Yet within the span of a generation this imperial system had unravelled.

The public basis for the legitimacy of imperialism, the promotion of ‘civilisation’ on behalf of international society, was undermined by the descent of Europe into barbarity and by the association of racialism with Nazi ideology (Holsti 2004: 266). The social contract on which colonialism had been maintained were together fatally undermined in East Asia by the abject failure to protect imperial subjects in the face of Japanese expansionism, in India by draconian measures towards the political opposition, and everywhere by the mobilisation and disruption caused by total war. In the brief phase of liberal paternalism which followed the war the colonies were treated as cash boxes, the extraction of primary resources from which would have enabled
the colonial powers to resolve balance of payment difficulties (Bayly and Harper 2007: 95-136; Darwin 1984: 197). But colonial powers were unable to convince domestic populations to support full conscription to maintain empire (Clapham 1985: 27). Nor could they persuade the colonies to accept continued imperial tutelage. The public justification for colonialism came to rest on preparing colonies for self-government but the paternalistic assumptions of such a policy made it increasingly difficult to publically sustain, and once independence was achieved by Ghana the colonial order rapidly unwound.

As Chakrabarty argues the demand for independence was a uncompromising rejection of the notion that non-Europeans were ‘not yet’ ready for self-government (Chakrabarty 2007: 8-10). Having lost the political argument, France and Portugal paid a heavy cost in their futile and bloody attempts to retain their colonies. Jackson maintains that colonialism collapsed because it became ‘morally unthinkable and politically untenable’ (Jackson 1993: 125), attributing this to shifts in normative ideas rather than the balance of forces. But it was not ideas alone that delegitimized colonialism, but the ability of national liberation movements to use these ideas to generate effective political pressure, and to force the colonial powers into a position where they had no option but to accept the logic of their argument or shatter the legitimacy of imperialism through the use of violence. The norms and institutions of European colonialism were turned against it — not least the UN which as Mazower has emphasised was seen as a means of preserving the imperial order until Nehru’s India began to use it as a forum to challenge the norms of racial inequality (Mazower 2009). Each newly independent nation added a voice in

23 Kolko points out that Britain’s ‘Africa possessions’ dollar surplus during the early 1950s paid for one-fourth of the imports from the United States’. See Kolko (1988: 111). In East Asia, Malayan rubber and tin remained important for buoying the UK’s balance of payments.
24 Conscripted British troops were near mutinous during the effective re-conquest of Asia. See Bayly and Harper (2007: 135-189). Already in the 1940s, empire was a cause for which the British public and British soldiers were unwilling to make sacrifices for.
25 Britain’s preferred compromise was for colonies to acquire self-government within the commonwealth under a common monarch. But once India had acquired full independence, other colonies were unwilling to accept an ‘inferior’ settlement. France however managed to ensure it retained de facto if not de jure suzerainty over its former colonies in West Africa, as all parties were aware that most of the post-colonial Francophone states of the region would continue to rely on France for their survival.
26 Mazower attempts to demonstrate that the UN has never been the ‘enchanted palace’ that idealists have imagined it to be by highlighting its transition from a prop for empire to a purposeless assembly of nations without any substantive moral goals. Yet this perhaps underestimates the UN’s success in helping manage the transition between the inter-imperial order and the globalised international society. Murphy (1994) argues that the mandate system introduced ideas of trusteeship on behalf of international society and thus eventually compelled the colonial powers to defend individual instances of colonialism in terms of publically recognised norms. The UN also took over many of the functions of the League of Nations in providing international public goods and helping to stabilise and spread the benefits of industrialism. The nucleus formed by these organisations has subsequently formed a platform for actors promoting humanitarian goals and for the agenda of the global South.
the United Nations calling for decolonisation, helping to effect a normative cascade whereby white minority rule was internationally delegitimized (Jackson 1990: 16). Imperialism and racism were no longer the prerogatives of the civilised, but the ultimate pejoratives. A phase transition had occurred, heralding a shift from an international order in which European domination formed one of the grundnorms of international society to one in which all states grant at least lip-service to the principle of sovereign equality and self-determination for all peoples. Decolonisation was not just a series of victorious political struggles, but the victory of political argument over the legitimacy of certain forms of inequality. The hysterical fears of global racial war which had haunted the colonial imagination proved to be phantoms, and whilst many post-colonial states fell into internal turmoil it is worth noting that in the post-War era socioeconomic inequality between nations finally stopped its century-and-a-half rise (Milanovic 2009: 12). Perhaps most importantly, decolonisation marked for many colonised peoples the beginning of the end of externally imposed political immaturity.

The collapse of the colonial order demonstrates that inequalities between distinct political communities can and have been overcome rapidly, faster than the protagonists might have even imagined. Decolonisation can be understood as a fraught and tense political renegotiation of relations between unequal actors in which both moral suasion and the threat of force played a role. The formerly voiceless were able, with some success, to demand acknowledgement as equals, radically changing the composition of international society. As Krause claims:

'Future historians will perhaps argue that the most profound transformations of twentieth-century world politics were catalysed not by the atom bomb, the two world wars, or the transformation of the global economy, but by the dismantling of European empires that created and incorporated new states into the Westphalian system.' (Krause 1998: 125)

The struggles of the weak and the economically marginal are not always trivial issues irrelevant to the high-geopolitics of international relations: the uncompromising demand for self-determination undid great powers and shaped the course of superpower conflict. The breakdown of the inter-imperial order and the expansion of the norm of self-determination to include non-Western nations were significant enough shifts in and of themselves. But by

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27 The key resolution within the UN was the General Assembly Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Resolution 1514 (XV)), which classified concerns about ‘preparedness’ of colonies as a ‘pretext’ which should not delay decolonisation. (http://www.un.org/Depts/dpi/decolonization/declaration.htm).

28 The international system of course retains many imperial aspects in the ‘internal’ organisation of many ‘nation-states’, with regards to the status of various dominions and protectorates, and in the relations between nominally independent states. The nature of inter-state hierarchy within the international system will be discussed in Chapter 1.
effecting the expansion of international society to include underdeveloped and formerly colonised peoples still enmeshed in asymmetrical and problematic relations with the formerly imperial core, these changes thrust a new set of moral questions regarding inequality, development and justice to the heart of international politics. By achieving national sovereignty, the peoples of the post-colonial world gained new opportunities to pursue their grievances within international societies and to make alliances with other late-developing societies. Decolonisation thus opened up a new international dimension for contention over issues of injustice and inequality.

Claims of Justice within an Unequal International Society

The major perspectives within international relations all orientate themselves by a seminal historical incident which is held to demonstrate something profound about politics among nations, whether that example is Munich, Bretton Woods, the Congress of Vienna or Gorbachev’s ‘New Thinking’. This thesis asks what we might learn if we select decolonisation as the event to orientate ourselves by instead. Navigating from this starting point, the empirical chapters of the thesis examine how the marginal states within the international system emerged as the global South to challenge features of an unequal international order. These chapters aim to demonstrate the complexity of the interaction between normative principles and material power within an unequal, anarchical society.

To this end, the framework developed in Chapter 3 is employed to identify the mechanisms which have given rise to opportunities for political argument and the process of iterated claim-making over inequality within international society. By reconstructing the ideational, organisational and material context of various episodes of political argument over inequality, these case studies contribute to our understanding of what combination of moral suasion and political pressure can bring about normative change within international relations. This enables us to better understand the conditions under which unequal actors might be drawn into a process of substantive argument and established norms within international society opened-up for re-evaluation. In examining the consequences of attempts by various agents, including states of the global South, global civil society movements and Northern social democrats, to advance egalitarian claims beyond the nation-state these chapters provide evidence for the argument that the different structural positions of agents matters a great deal to the sort of role they can play in the advance of egalitarian goals. Thus by studying episodes within the history of North-South relations, this thesis aims to shed light on the moral limits and possibilities of international society. This enquiry thus contributes to the task of international political theory by assisting in
the identification of immanent possibilities for progressive change within the international order and assessing feasible extent of the moral horizons of international society.

Chapter 4 focuses on the attempts at coalition formation on the part of post-colonial states in the wake of decolonisation and their attempts to challenge and renegotiate their place within the international system in the 1970s. It examines the formation of the New International Economic Order, the challenges it issued, the nature of its demands, the moral debates it provoked and the responses of the North. This case was selected because it provides an instance where the relative bargaining power of coalitions of the global South underwent a sudden, unexpected increase and, for a period, the states of the global South were able to bargain from a position closer to that of equals. The chapter draws on archival material in order to trace how the claims by the South were received by Northern actors and answer the question of how much traction Southern arguments had with Northern interlocutors. It analyses what the episode tells us about both the relations between the North and South, the possibilities and limits of coalition building, and the relationship between material power and normative change.

Chapter 5 examines the nature of relations between Northern actors and extremely marginalised nations in a case where there is little scope for agency or self-organisation on the part of the latter. It provides an account of the debt crisis amongst Highly Indebted Poor Countries, the moral questions that this issue provoked within international and world society, the global campaign for debt reduction, and the responses of Northern actors. This case was selected because it provides us with an example where power differentials between Northern and Southern actors were large and enduring. Consequently the chapter places focus on a very different form of moral agency: one primarily based on external advocacy and humanitarian duties rather than political argument between unequals. The chapter assesses how claims emerging from elements of global civil society or world society intersect with North-South relations and how far these claims can constrain powerful social actors and introduce concerns of global social justice into the remit of international society. It therefore analyses the possibilities and limits for advancing egalitarian conceptions of justice in the absence of collective agency on the part of states of the global South.

In order to narrow the focus of enquiry, Chapter 6 examines relations between the EC/EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of nations from Cotonou to Lomé. This provides a microcosm for examining the changing normative basis of the relations between the North and South: examining the relationship between Europe and former colonies from the immediate post-colonial era, to the high-point of Third World militancy, to the fracture of these coalitions
and ‘Afro-pessimism’, to visions of a ‘cosmopolitan Europe’ or ‘normative power Europe’ in a world of emerging powers. This case was selected because it provides us with allows us to trace the historical development of North-South relations across decades within a continuous framework for negotiation. It also provides an instance of negotiation between coalitions of the North and global South in a ‘post-Westphalian’ context. The Chapter thus contributes to the aims of the thesis by providing an assessment of the basis for the changing relations between European and ACP actors, and an exploration of the moral limits and possibilities of differing normative orders amongst unequals. It further provides empirical examples to support the analytic argument put forward in Chapter 2 that attempts to institutionalise cosmopolitan principles within a structurally unequal order may leave the supposed beneficiaries dependent to the continued good will of superordinate actors.

Chapter 7 examines the return of coalitions of developing countries, the growth of South-South cooperation and the rise of the emerging economies, focusing once again on the attempts at self-organisation on the part of these actors and the arguments that these coalitions have put forward. This case, or set of cases covering issues areas such as trade and the environment, was selected because of the widely recognised significance of the rise of emerging powers for international relations. Moreover, if concerns over North-South inequalities played no role in the political disagreements between status quo and emerging powers in this period, it would constitute a critical disconfirmation of the theoretical approach developed in this thesis. The chapter thus examines continuities and discontinuities in the ongoing argument between advanced industrial states and less economically developed states, arguing that despite the evident surprise on the part of Northern observers the return of structuralist arguments and Southern bullishness attests to the fact that the North-South cleavage was dormant rather than obsolete. Not assuming a false unity amongst these actors, it examines the tensions and fault-lines within these new groupings and the new forms of moral argument emerging within and amongst the South.

Contemporary global inequalities and the continued reorganization of the shape of world politics in the 21st Century raise unavoidable questions about competing claims of justice in a world organised into distinct polities. Reintegrating the normative and empirical study of the international dimensions of global inequality is an essential step towards understanding the challenges which the world polity faces and vital in confronting questions of justice in a divided world. It is to this task which this thesis addresses itself.
Chapter 1

The Structure of International Inequality

World inequality is, by any measure, vast. According to Milanovic, global Gini inequality of PPP dollar income remained roughly static, falling very slightly from 65.7 points in 1980 to 65.4 points in 2002 (Milanovic 2009b: 12). Between-nation population weighted inequality remains the primary component of global inequality, accounting for 56.8 points of global Gini in 1980 and 52.6 points in 2002 (Milanovic 2009b: 12). Accounting for 86.5% of global income inequality in 1980 and 79.8% in 2002, population weighted between-nation differences in income declined only slightly as a component of global inequality. Modest decreases in this measure of inequality are attributed by Milanovic to steady improvements in the mean per capita incomes in populous Asian states, primarily India and China (Milanovic 2009b: 11).

Furthermore, if we examine non-population-weighted Gini inequality between nations, then we find the international system even more starkly divided between North and South than thirty years ago. From 1978-2002, the divergent fortunes of middle-income nations effectively ‘emptied out’ this section of the non-population-weighted income distribution (Milanovic 2005: 61), effecting a transition from a trimodal to a bimodal distribution of international incomes. A few middle income nations joined the rich world, whilst others sunk into a broader category of poor nations (Milanovic 2005: 52). Milanovic therefore notes that the trend after the late 1970s has therefore ‘reinforced the strong domination of Western countries at the very top of the income distribution’ (Milanovic 2005: 61), with only Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea graduating to ‘Northern’ levels of income out of the entire group of middle income NICs.

Despite the trend towards convergence of ‘nearly everything that matters’ in terms of basic quality of life (Neumayer 2003; Kenny 2005; Becker, Philipson and Soares 2005), the resources available for individuals and societies to pursue their goals massively differ, and extreme deprivation persists, with approximately 2.1 billion individuals still subsisting on less than $2 a day (World Bank 2008: 1). From the perspective of political economy, income inequality matters because income is related to power in the world economy; income at current exchange rates is a

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1 For purposes of comparability ‘old’ PPP measurements have been employed. Recent surveys and attempts to develop a new PPP benchmark indicate that global inequality is significantly higher than these measurements, placing the latest estimates of Gini inequality in 2002 at 70.7 points. See Milanovic (2009a). Using this measure, population weighted international incomes inequality makes up an even higher proportion of global inequality, see Milanovic (2009b: 12).
measure of the ability of a society to ‘to import, to borrow, to repay loans, and also to participate in international rule-making fora’ (Wade 2004: 166-7). Adopting this measure, Wade finds that the GNP of the developing world expressed as a share of the GNP of the developed world remained steady at approximately 4.5% between 1960 and 1999 (Wade 2002: 44), despite growth amongst Asian economies. Income, furthermore, is not the only metric of inequality within the international system: nation-states are unequal on every measure that could be considered politically relevant (Payne 20005). Miniscule Nauru and Tuvalu must coexist in the same international system as China and the US. Military capabilities remain highly concentrated, with the US accounting for 41.5% of world military expenditure in 2008 and the top 15 ‘big spenders’ accounting for 81% of the total (SIPRI 2009: 183). The ability of states to exercise diplomatic influence within international organisations is limited by resource constrains due to the high costs of permanent representation and technical expertise necessary for participation in negotiations.

Although solid growth in India and China as well as the resultant buoyancy in commodity markets since 2004 have likely helped to close some small part of the international income gap, the international system remains drastically and enduring unequal. Inequality remains one of the most empirically striking features of international relations. The goal of social science is however to provide an account of the structures and social processes that underlie and arise from such broad empirical regularities. One influential approach to analysing the large-scale features of the international order has been that of Barry Buzan, according to whom a theory ‘organises a field systematically, structures questions and establishes a coherent and rigorous set of interrelated concepts and categories’ (2004: 24). The primary purpose of theory is therefore to provide a ‘descriptive apparatus’ that enables theorists to understand the social world in a structured and organised way (Buzan and Waever 2003: 64), a conceptual framework that renders international processes intelligible, provides for the evaluation of significant change and allows comparisons to be made across time and space (Buzan 2004: 25). The goal is not to locate a ‘master key’ to the international system, but to focus on specific sets of processes that produce the most salient features of the contemporary international order. Adopting this methodology involves a search for theoretically plausible and empirically grounded mechanisms\(^2\) in a variety of literatures, and synthesising them into a theoretical account.

As outlined in the Introduction, social scientific perspectives on inequality can, for our purposes, be divided into two broad categories. Attributional accounts explain inequalities in terms of the

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\(^2\) On mechanisms in social-scientific explanation see Elster 2007.
differences in qualities and resources amongst actors. Neo-realism belongs in this category, as it regards the inequalities within international politics as straightforwardly derived from the exogenous distribution of material capabilities amongst actors. Inequality is thus habitually seen as a ‘surface’ phenomenon arising from the properties of individual nation states rather than part of the ‘deep structure’ which constitutively shapes international relations (Ruggie 1986, 135-136).

Relational accounts, on the other hand, regard inequality as endogenous, as an artefact of the way in which society is organised rather than a brute fact. This Chapter attempts to advance a relational approach, acknowledging the importance of attributional inequalities between political communities but also emphasising the causal and constitutive connections between the unequal positions actors occupy within international relations. International inequalities can, therefore, be understood as the outcome of a process of ‘vertical differentiation’ (Buzan and Albert 2010; Donelly 2009) whereby political communities come to occupy superior or inferior positions as a result of their interaction with one another. However, the perspective advanced here differs from older structuralist approaches which adopted a holist perspective that identified a singular system-logic as determining the shape of the entire international system (Wallerstein 1974). Instead, this chapter adopts an ‘organisational materialist’ or ‘relational realist’ according to which material structures of inequality should be understood arising from various kinds of asymmetric transaction between actors which overlap and intertwine with each other, eventually becoming sedimented, institutionalised and reified.

The analysis thus aims to advance theoretical understanding and analytical clarity about how inequality operates as one of the primary ordering principles structuring international relations. It aims to present a case for putting the politics of unequal development at the centre of our understanding of global politics. The chapter provides essential groundwork for central arguments advanced in this thesis: that certain inequalities are endogenous to the international system and have shaped the evolution of international society; that these inequalities place structural pressures on subordinate and peripheral actors to attempt to challenge patterns of stratification; and that there exists a political cleavage within international society between states of the North and those of the South. By examining the deep structure of inequality that exists within the international systems, this chapter seeks to explain the roots of this political cleavage and demonstrate that it arises not merely as a result of subjective perceptions and identities but because of the enduring features of the way the international orders is organised.

3 Other holist perspectives in the social sciences include Parsonian structural-functionalism, according to which societies are functionally integrated wholes organised around fundamental cultural value orientations, and certain varieties of Marxism that argue society should be understood as a ‘structured totality’.
Following the ‘organisational materialist’ approach of Tilly (1998) and Mann (1986, 1993), this chapter therefore regards stratification as an emergent phenomenon which arises as relationships between particular actors concatenate, crystallizing into durable social structures (Tilly 1984: 33). The reification of these structures and the ‘typification’ of the positions occupied by actors results in the emergence of ascribed categories and claims of identity. Rather than seeking to identify a single ‘logic’ which animates the international system and generates patterns of stratification, the account presented below follows neo-Weberian scholars by adopting a pluralist approach. Thus, neither economics nor geopolitics is granted ultimate primacy. Rather, the account below focuses on the mechanisms by which initial economic and geopolitical inequalities have been compounded within the international system and the world economy, and the way in which various types of inequality have reinforced one another historically. Acknowledging the emergent character of international stratification requires an acknowledgement that the transactions and relationships giving rise to patterns of inequality take place along many dimensions, on many levels of analysis. Inequality, therefore, cannot simply be categorised as either international or global, economic or political.

This chapter therefore seeks to analyse how the intersection of five dimensions of social interaction produces patterns of stratification within the international system. First considered are bilateral relations between independent states that result in hierarchical relationships; second, the unequal differentiation amongst states/societies based on a common trajectory of political and socio-economic development; third, global social stratification arising as a result of impersonal systemic interactions across multiple social domains. The fourth dimension of interaction, the process of interactive development between unequal state-society complexes, arises from the dynamic relationship between these previous dimensions. The fifth dimension, that of collective management and world order, corresponds to the process whereby inequality is encoded at the highest levels of international and global political order. This final dimension of inequality is where we find the starkest difference between North and South, where the international politics of inequality is most visible.

**Dimension 1: Hierarchical Inter-State Relations**

Inequality is one of the most immediately striking features of inter-state relations, yet there has been resistance amongst theorists to taking questions of international inequality seriously beyond the ‘surface structure’ of the inter-state system. According to neo-realist accounts, states are functionally undifferentiated security seekers who differ only in their relative material capacities
(Waltz 1979: 96). No matter how large the differences between the power-capabilities of states, the ‘ordering principle’ or ‘deep structure’ (Ruggie 1986: 135-136) of international anarchy imposes uniformity on units. Irrespective of inequalities, states remain sovereign as in the last instance they retain the ability to decide how to cope with internal and external threats (Waltz 1979: 96). As Vattel claimed, a dwarf is as much of a sovereign as a giant. Inequalities exist only in terms of state endowments, not structured relationships between agents.

Nonetheless, Waltz’s frequent comparisons between international relations and oligopolistic markets (Waltz 1979: 72, 77-78, 93-94, 98-99, 105-106, 134-135) undermine the notion that all states are equally subject to the same structural forces⁴. Just as oligopolistic firms are less subject to the ‘tyranny of small decisions’ and have at least some ability to collude and control the market, great powers acts as poles exerting ‘fields of force’ which shape the overall pattern of relationships in the international system (Donelly 2009: 55). In the same way that there is a structural difference between the position of those who act as ‘price makers’ and ‘price takers’ in oligopolistic markets, great powers and minor powers experience the ‘logic of anarchy’ in very different ways. International politics takes place according to the terms set by the great powers, insofar as they themselves can buck the logic of the anarchic international system through oligopolitistic management of world politics (Little 2007: 208).

The oligopolistic management of world order will be returned to in the fifth section of the analysis. But as has been recognised by Latin American traditions of realism (Escudé 1998; Tickner 2003a), bilateral interstate relations can be hierarchical even under conditions of anarchy. Recent theoretical contributions have demonstrated that anarchy and hierarchy are not antonyms, the former refers to absence of government whilst the latter concerns the existence of a rank order between actors, or vertical differentiation (Donelly 2009: 50). Rejecting the binary distinction between anarchy and hierarchy, we can focus on both the informal and formal relationships of inequality in the inter-state system.

Even if all states retain the formal sovereignty, we can still make a qualitative distinction between those states capable of directly subordinating other states, and those who must resist or adapt as

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⁴Waltz misses these features of his theory because he is focused on great power politics: ‘A general theory of international politics is necessarily based on the great powers’ Waltz (1979: 73). ‘It would be as ridiculous to construct a theory of international politics based on Malaysia and Costa Rica as it would be to construct an economic theory of oligopolistic competition on the minor firms in a sector of an economy’ Waltz (1979: 72). This is no reason to ignore international politics from the perspective of Malaysia and Costa Rica, however.
best they can\textsuperscript{5}. Drawing on Lukes’ second facet of power (Lukes 2005: 16-20), agenda setting and non-decision making, enables us to more fully understand inter-state inequality in terms of effective control of outcomes. Indeed, Waltz seems to acknowledge that the non-use of coercion and the ‘automatic’ alignment of the preferences of the weak with the interests of the strong starkly demonstrates the significance power inequalities (Waltz 1979: 185). The fact that decision making ability is retained by even the weakest of states is beside the point. As Poggi notes: ‘\textit{every} command implicitly acknowledges that compliance with it is, when all is said and done, a contingent matter’ (emphasis added, Poggi 1990: 6). Thus the formal contingency of obedience is not sufficient to establish the absence of hierarchy\textsuperscript{6}.

Scholars have also demonstrated that more formalised relations of hierarchy and institutionalised semi-sovereignty have been common to international systems past and present. As Krasner points out, in a competitive ‘self-help system’ states will have occasion to advance their goals by suborning the juridical sovereignty of others or even sacrificing their own (Krasner 1999: 53). Indeed, research has demonstrated that the international system has contained many complex forms of super and sub-ordination. A central (re)discovery is that sovereignty is not indivisible, but consists of a bundle of rights that can be separated and ‘thus may be imperfectly or incompletely — unequally — enjoyed’ (Donnelly 2006: 146). A subordinate actor may cede authority over one issue area, but not another, or may cede the right to take some actions autonomously, but not others (Lake 2007: 56). Lake argues that there exists an unbroken continuum from alliance, to protectorate, to informal empire, to formal empire (Lake 1996: 7). At each step along the continuum one state cedes authority to their ally (Lake 2007: 60)\textsuperscript{7}. This form of hierarchy endures in the global US network of bases, Russia’s relationship with many CIS nations and India’s relationship with Bhutan (Donnelly 2006: 149). The authoritative element of such ‘hub and spoke’ alliances is bilateral, but others have examined enduring imperial sub-systems within international politics, such as within the C19th British commonwealth (Sharman and Hobson 2005: 73), the Soviet sphere of influence (Wendt and Friedman 1995: 699), and the Francafrique.

One of the most sophisticated accounts of hierarchy is provided by Cooley, who uses concepts from organizational theory to distinguish between U-form, or unitary, hierarchy and M-form, or

\textsuperscript{5} Organisationally, the practices of imperial administration are distinct from those of anti-colonial resistance, those of counterinsurgency different from insurgency.

\textsuperscript{6} The wider literature on power acknowledges that the difference between compliance extracted through coercion and through authoritative political command differs only in that the former is usually more costly, less enduring and more brittle. See Poggi (1990: 7).

\textsuperscript{7} Indeed as relations approach the imperial, authority is better understood as being delegated by the superordinate power than ceded by the subordinate Lake (1996: 9).
delegative, hierarchy (Cooley 2005: 41). Under U-form hierarchy, specialist functions are centralised within the core, which directly administers the periphery in those issue areas. Under M-form hierarchy, peripheral actors are delegated a level of authority over a full range of issue areas. This corresponds to instances where subordinate actors retain the responsibility for almost all aspects of day to day government, but a superordinate state ultimately retains overall control at arms length. For example, dollarisation is an example of U-form hierarchy, as a state abdicates control of its monetary policy to a central organisation within a foreign state (Cooley 2005: 163). Various forms of semi-sovereign dependency, from C19th colonies to modern tax havens, correspond to M-form hierarchy, providing super-ordinate actors with the advantage of control without the difficulties of direct administration. Cooley’s schema can help us make sense of a wide variety of hierarchical relationships in international relations, such as US ‘informal empire’ in Latin America, which can be thought of as a weak M-form organisation in which the US retained arms length control over the course of regional developments through occasional intervention.8

Patterns of hierarchy are therefore revealed once we recognise the existence and variety of both informal and formal relationships of political inequality in the inter-state order. An exclusive focus on the inter-state system, however, must be complemented by a consideration of other dimensions along which inequality operates. Inter-state inequality also gives rise to practices of collective management and rule creation on the part of major powers which are intrinsically ‘public’ and therefore go beyond bilateral inter-state relations. These practices are examined separately in section five. Likewise, focusing only on the inter-state dimension ‘black boxes’ the state. As a result there is a risk of ignoring long-term, path dependent processes through an overemphasis on ‘repetition and recurrence’ (Wight 1966: 33) of inter-state relations throughout history. The next section therefore attempts to break out of this static approach by the temporal dimension into the analysis through examining the process of development – the process of sequential social change that differentiates societies from one another along a common path.

Dimension 2: Secular Socio-Economic Development

Societies might be differentiated within the international system by their level of development, that is, their stage of progress along a putatively universal socio-economic trajectory. The best known example of such a schema represented by modernisation theory, a tremendously influential account of social change within C20th social science. Modernisation theory combined

8 From this perspective, historical US hemispheric policy can be understood as a kind of ‘control mechanism’ that ensured that Latin American states ruled in a fashion conducive to US interests. See Colás (2008).
Parsonian sociology with economics and political science to create a general framework of analysis based on the notion of a qualitative ‘break’ between traditional and modern societies (Gilman 2003). This mirrored the orthodox Marxism claim that societies pass through a series of stages due to the development of productive forces, sequentially revolutionising the relations between producing classes, ushering in a new mode of production and transforming wider social relations\(^9\). Again, development was understood as a unilinear process: ‘The country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future’ (Marx 1867).

Theories of modernisation, whether ‘classical’ or Marxist, have nonetheless been subjected to vituperative criticism from many different perspectives\(^10\). Post-colonial theorists saw modernisation theory as a paradigm example of Orientalism, positing a universal path from an archaic past to an enlightened Western present (Pieterse 1991); the determinism of modernisation theory was challenged empirical studies of the complexity of the relationships involved in political change (Dahl 1998); stagist master-theories of social change came under thoroughgoing criticism by historical sociologists (Tilly 1984: 41-2); whilst the failure of ‘high modernist’ development projects sapped enthusiasm for policies based on modernisation theory (Scott 1998).

Nevertheless, despite the problems with the concept of modernisation, it still seems plausible to speak of a process of ‘development’ that meaningfully links together diverse processes in changing societies. Scholars such as Inglehart and Werzel have put forward what might be termed ‘neo-modernization theory’, which draws on a large body of evidence to demonstrate that ‘economic development does tend to bring about important, roughly predictable changes in society, culture, and politics’ (Inglehart and Welzel 2009)\(^11\). Although this position remains contentious\(^12\), the notion that there are similarities between societies experiencing a process of

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9 The most cogent systematic defence of ‘orthodox’ historical materialism is GA Cohen’s *Karl Marx’s Theory of History: a Defence* (2000). Many neo-Marxists have departed from this stagist account, see for example Rosenburg (2009).

10 The notion of underdevelopment, employed by dependency theorists in their criticisms of modernisation theory, presumes existence of some hypothetical process of development, which underdevelopment is the negation or flipside of. The deconstruction of the ideas of development and modernisation therefore challenges the assumptions of dependency theory and its successors.

11 The essence of their argument is that rising individual resource endowments produces change in social values that lead to institutionalisation of individual rights and democratisation. See Inglehart, Welzel and Klingeman (2003: 346). Neo-modernisation theory therefore reverses classical modernisation theory’s assumption that cultural change leads to economic change. See Inglehart and Welzel (2009).

12 Sceptics such as Przeworski and Limongi criticise the claim that economic development generates democracy and instead emphasise the idiosyncratic causes of regime change. Yet they find that democracies are more likely to survive in wealthy countries and so establishes a long run probabilistic
social transformation seems inescapable (Roxborough 1988: 755). There is enormous variation within this process, but this does not change the fact that all societies must come to terms with certain broad social features of the contemporary world, chiefly ‘bureaucratic states and economic markets’ as Donnelly pithily summarises (Donnelly 2007: 287). Drawing on Mann’s historical sociology (1986, 1993), development might be understood as greater control over nature, greater ability to organise social action across social space, and greater ability to draw on power resources for individual and social purposes. Modernisation can be understood as the standardisation and rationalisation that accompanies development, and is not only a feature of the modern era: the Chinese Warring States period witnessed a tremendous period of modernisation nearly two thousand years before the rise of the West (Hui 2004). What should, however, be jettisoned is the notion that some societies are ‘developed’ and have reached a stable end state where they need no longer adapt to and promote economic, social and political change (Payne 2005: 324).

Therefore, rather than regarding social change as entirely local and contingent, development and modernisation can be thought of as a common process, and therefore as a means of vertically differentiating between societies within the international system. More and less socio-economically developed societies differ in respects which cannot be reduced to their relative capabilities. Particularly relevant for international relations is the extent to which actors have been successful at establishing political order, building a cohesive polity and constructing a set of Weberian bureaucratic state institutions (Evans and Rauch 1999). In this vein Ayoob and Holsti have sought to explain global patterns of insecurity in terms of the challenges arising from the project of state-building, which has been delayed or protracted in much of the global South (Ayoob 1995; Holsti 1996).

relationship between economic growth and democratisation See Przeworski and Limongi (1997). Both sides of the argument are therefore in agreement about macro-trends.

13 This position is echoed by Tilly, who writes that ‘the development of capitalism and the formation of powerful, connected national states dominated all other social processes and shaped all social structures [in the modern world]’ (1984: 15).

14 The notion of development, as the term is used here, is not a synonym for ‘progress’ but simply refers to the secular, empirical tendency in world history towards more extensive and intensive forms of organisation and control over both nature and human action. As Adorno argued, there is no general historical pathway leading from ignorance to universal enlightenment, but there is one from the slingshot to the atomic bomb. See Adorno (2006: 12).

15 Again it should be stressed that the processes of state-and-nation building have never been truly ‘completed’ even in the North – as evidenced by the existence of regionalist movements in Europe and North America as well as violent separatist campaigns in Spain and Northern Ireland. Political cohesiveness, furthermore, is also clearly a factor in the extent to which a state can prevent external actors from subverting it and reducing it to subordinate status, as analysed in the first section.
Qualified distinctions can be usefully made by international theorists between states and societies on the basis of their level of socio-economic development, despite the fact that because it refers to society-wide changes the concept is difficult to capture using a single metric. Nonetheless, as Rosenberg (2006) has insightfully pointed out, the central problem with theories of development has been the assumption that development is an endogenous process that societies undergo in isolation from one another. It is therefore necessary to consider first the global dimension of development and the spontaneous emergence of self-sustaining inequality between macroregions before considering the way in which developmental, transnational and geopolitical processes have been united in international relations.

**Dimension 3: Global Socio-Economic Stratification**

Rather than focusing on the inter-state system or comparing individual nations in isolation as they develop, we can adopt a perspective that posits the existence of a singular, unequal global society. This was the approach adopted by strong structuralist approaches including dependency and world-systems theories which argued that the global order should be considered as a single social system stratified in terms of core and peripheral macro-regions. These theorists asserted that economic convergence between underdeveloped and industrialised societies was difficult if not impossible due to a self-reinforcing global division of labour based on unequal exchange between core and periphery. The world-system was conceived as comprising a self-organising and self-reinforcing pattern of unequal exchange based on a hierarchical division of labour, determining the economic fortunes of societies and social groups.

World-systems and dependency perspectives lost ground following criticisms of their reductive economism, their failure to move beyond general theoretical pronouncements, mechanical assumptions and their denial of state agency through an overriding focus on the system level of analysis (Hobson 2000: 134-7, 142). Perhaps most damaging has been the success of the East Asian economies in achieving ‘core’ levels of economic development. This bifurcation of fortunes amongst economies of the periphery has been taken by many as falsifying the claims of strong structuralist approaches that the global division of labour is fixed and that development is impossible within the capitalist world economy. In a total reversal of dependency/world systems

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16 The most significant ‘orthodox’ contributions to the world-systems perspective are most important contributions include Chase-Dunn (1998); Wallerstein (1974). Other important works include Abu-Lughold (1989); Arrighi (1995); Arrighi and Silver (1999); Frank and Gills (1993).

17 For a fairly typical offhand dismissal, see Krasner (1999: 54). It’s worth noting that the benefit of the doubt that neo-realists pleaded for in the aftermath of the unforeseen end of the Cold War was not granted to dependency and world systems theorists.
claims, neo-liberal theorists have put forward ‘conditional convergence’ theories which advocate integration into the world economy as the engine of ‘catch-up growth’\(^{18}\) and identify impediments to economic development as being entirely internal to LEDCs (de Soto 2000).

Yet, as will be further discussed, these account overlooks the active involvement of the state in the process of economic development within the NICs, who were able to achieve growth and structural transformation by actively seeking to change their position within the global division of labour rather than passively acquiescing to the logic of comparative advantage (Chang 2002; Rodrik 2007). The notion of a generalised phenomenon of catch-up growth, as predicted by neoclassical models, has come under sustained criticism\(^{19}\). Furthermore several prominent economic theorists have posited that the assumption that economic integration will automatically lead to convergence is faulty, and that under certain circumstances an economic system can spontaneously bifurcate into a ‘core’ and ‘periphery’. Krugman, Venables and Fujita have demonstrated theoretically that an initial divergence between the rates of manufacturing growth between two regions might be self-reinforcing. Buyers and sellers of intermediate and finished goods may wish to relocate in already industrialised areas to minimise transportation costs (Krugman and Venables 1995: 7). Real wages may fall in the periphery as manufacturing capability and investment relocates to core regions (Krugman and Venables 1995: 7). Rather than diminishing returns driving the diffusion of capital throughout an international economy, new spatial economics shows that these forward and backward linkages generate ‘economies of agglomeration’ and a spontaneous bifurcation between economic regions (Fujita 1996). These findings echo other mechanisms of positive feedback identified by development economists, such as how industrial growth might promote general productivity growth within an economy (Verdoorn’s Law), enabling a region to capture further export markets through competitive advantage, increasing its prospects for further growth (Thirlwall 2003: 276).

There is evidence that these processes have historically retarded the ability of ability of late developing regions to undergo economic development. Amsden provides evidence that the British technological revolution in textiles after 1815 imposed the necessity to innovate, either in terms of ability to compete on volume or quality, on all rival producers. Unlike some European

\(^{18}\) Dollar (1992), and Sachs & Warner (1995) are amongst the most influential contributions to have advanced this position.

\(^{19}\) ‘When one looks at the cross-national evidence on growth, there is no indication that poorer countries grow systematically more rapidly than richer countries.’ See Rodrik (2006: 10). Milanovic argues the divergence of global and international incomes provide ‘incontestable evidence’ that the classic macroeconomic theories of growth are flawed (2005: 47). If lack of growth were caused by poor policies (as suggested by neo-liberal conditional convergence theories), then one would expect something like a normal distribution of incomes amongst societies due to the independence of policy idiosyncracies; instead, we see an enduring bimodal distribution.
producers, Asian textile producers were unable to technologically adapt to the challenge and were therefore forced to compete on price by accepting lower wages (Amsden 2001: 31-4). Contra the assumptions of neoclassical economics, technological know-how diffuses only very gradually from the advanced core to the rest of the world economy (Rasler and Thompson 2009; Reuveny and Thompson 2001, 2008). Centres of innovation are therefore able to reap monopolistic rents in these leading sectors by seizing market share and outcompeting other producers. The contemporary transnational reorganisation of production may have exacerbated this problem by disaggregating increasing-returns, high-value added aspects of production from low value-added manufacturing (Wade 2005: 23). Without developing technological know-how of their own, less developed regions are forced by the logic of comparative advantage to specialise in low value added industries, further undermining their ability to keep up with technological change.

Indeed, the longstanding structuralist argument that primary commodity extraction is a poor basis for economic development remains plausible. The Singer-Prebisch thesis that the terms of trade for unprocessed commodities would gradually decline has been largely vindicated (Kaplinsky 2006; UNCTAD 2005), with the proviso that the same effect has also impacted simple manufactures. Accumulation of evidence on the resource curse and the example provided by rentier petro-states demonstrates that a political economy based on primary commodity extraction rarely provides the basis for broad-based, inclusive economic development (Ross 1999; Bulte, Damania and Deacon 2005).

The mechanism put forward by many dependency and world-systems theorists, unequal exchange, relies on Marx’s labour theory of value (LTV). Despite serious efforts to make sense of Marx’s framework, even sympathetic scholars have concluded that the LTV is untenable (Elster 1985). Not only are several of the assumptions behind the LTV tendentious, but claims about economic ‘value’ as opposed to price are impossible to evaluate empirically — apart from

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20 From this perspective, the success of the East Asian NICs was closely related to their successful participation in the leading sector of electronics manufacturing and the opportunity this offered to take advantage of Northern economic demand. This fits with Rodrik’s account of the economic development of these nations, which stresses the key stimulatory role played by external demand.

21 But whilst generic manufactures have fallen in their barter-price, certain niche market primary commodities have not. This nonetheless is consistent with a structuralist account that stresses the role of leading sectors and quasi-monopolies in determining the returns from participation in the global economy. A second major qualification must be made that primary commodity prices have risen rapidly since around 2004 due to the industrialisation of China. Nonetheless, this trend is entirely consistent with the original theoretical explanation of the thesis offered by Prebisch, which emphasised the inelasticity of demand for primary commodities. See Kaplinsky (2006) for a detailed discussion of trends.

22 Kevin Rudd’s ill-fated attempts to tax the windfall profits of the Australian mining sector demonstrates that all primary commodity exporting nations, both more and less economically developed, can face difficulties in attempting to harness their commodity endowments for wider social benefit.
in terms of very long-run price trends. Therefore ‘unequal exchange’ cannot provide the central mechanism for a structuralist analysis of international relations. But there are strong reasons to suppose that there exists spontaneous global structures which limit economic development and that the benefits of the global division of labour can be contingent and unevenly distributed. Furthermore, bifurcations between more and less economically developed regions can generate additional forms of maldevelopment as negative externalities from the North spill over into the South. Roberts and Parks for example have provided evidence that, although the North reaps the benefits of continued industrial growth, the costs in terms of anthropogenic environmental insecurity are disproportionately shouldered by those in the least developed regions (Roberts and Parks 2007: 103-132). Pollution and waste created in the industrial world is exported to the global South due to frequently weak laws and enforcement capabilities (Roberts and Parks 2007: 133-184). Northern demand for commodities creates rents which are captured by political elites and used to buy off the population to forestall political opposition, undermining the link between taxation and representation. Demand for narcotics and supply of small arms from the industrialised world exacerbates problems of criminality and political fragmentation in less economically developed nations. Scholars have argued that some sub-Saharan African political regimes rely for their survival on the rents from global commodity chains, ‘shadow networks’ in illicit goods and the pecuniary benefits of de jure sovereignty, producing a pattern of ‘extraversion’ (Bayart 2009: 21-22).

These patterns of external orientation have in some instances produced a non-identity of interests between Southern elites and their populations, encouraging the former to enter into alliances with external actors as identified by dependency theorists and classical structuralists such as Galtung (1971). Indeed, to understand the process of global stratification, it is necessary to reintroduce states and inter-state interaction to our analysis. As Bergson argues, it was colonial conquest that incorporated large parts of the world into the world economy, the global division of labour did not just emerge spontaneously from small local economic variations (Bergson 1990: 70-2). Amsden likewise suggests that the coercive aspects of colonial economic practices might have arisen as attempts to prevent market forces and Ricardian comparative advantage from operating to the advantage of the colonised (Amsden 2007: 28-9). Conversely, it is through state-building in the context of a hostile inter-state environment that successful Southern industrialisers have promoted national development and succeeded at ‘swimming against the tide’ by improving their position in the global division of labour (Amsden 2001, Chang 2002, Evans 1995, Kohli 2004, Wade 1990).
This section has attempted to examine what is living and what is dead in the classical structural analysis of global stratification. Although the notion of unequal exchange, and mechanistic and rigid formulations of the perspective must be must be discarded, there are reasons to believe that self-reinforcing economic processes and forms of cumulative causation (Wade 2005) may well have promoted structural bifurcation in the world economy and consequently the international system. A focus on the global level is incomplete, however, as states and other political actors are not passive recipients of irresistible system-level pressures but have adopted differing strategies for coping with the challenges of inequality and development. The following section thus aims to integrate the three dimensions thus far considered in order to provide an account of how inter-state, secular and global processes have generated patterns of stratification in the contemporary international system.

**Dimension 4: The Geopolitics of Development**

Synthesising the three dimensions detailed above allows us to analyse how the geopolitics of the process of socio-economic development has shaped the international system and led to the emergence of enduring patterns of stratification. To reveal more clearly these processes we can draw on the work of Mann (1986; 1993) and abandon the ‘billiard ball’ model of the international system as made up of self-contained, unitary states. From the outset, the state developed in a world of multiple political communities embedded in extensive transnational networks of social interaction. Doing justice to this fact requires us to put ‘relations before states’ (Jackson and Nexon 1999) and acknowledge that social and political institutions are composed of networks that organise and mobilise human action. The fact that ‘state-society complexes’ are continuously interacting with other societies undergoing development undermines the possibility for any ‘pristine’ process of development. Thus the process of socio-economic development has been ‘jagged and discontinuous’ rather than linear (Rosenberg 2006: 330). Interaction between different state-society complexes draws all societies and regions into a common process of development, but different processes may both promote and work against inequality and stratification.

Interaction might encourage uniformity within the international system through the ‘horizontal’ transfer of innovations from the ‘leading edges’ of socio-economic development, interrupting the internal trajectory of societies. This might well occur through processes of cultural diffusion, but as Rosenberg has argued, the key mechanism has frequently been geopolitical pressure from

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23 Rosenberg (2006) provides an extended discussion of how the spread of innovations cuts across social space and developmental trajectories.
actors who possess more advanced means of socio-economic organisation (Rosenberg 2010: 9). In a competitive inter-state system, political actors may find themselves on a ‘treadmill’: forced keep pace with the fastest runner, or risk ‘falling off’ and being subordinated\textsuperscript{24}. Spruyt (1994; 2001) develops this line of enquiry most fully, building on Tilly’s analysis of the emergence of the early modern state (1985, 1992) \textsuperscript{25}. An exogenous shock, European incorporation into patterns of long-distance trade, produced a diversity of new political units. In addition to ‘selection’ through geopolitical rivalry, coalitions of domestic actors consciously imitated the most successful of the new institutional forms, the sovereign state, in order to advance both their domestic and international goals (Spruyt 1994: 6-7). Finally, these early modern states ‘empowered’ one another by promulgating new principles of political legitimacy and authority based on the notion of sovereignty (Spruyt 1994: 15). Thus mechanisms of diffusion, geopolitical competition, conscious emulation, and empowerment can promote uniformity amongst interacting inter-state actors.

Yet some political communities were not able to keep up with the ‘geopolitical treadmill’, and have thus faced collapse or outright conquest. Colonial powers created a spectrum of different forms of colonial administrations, from totally extractive colonies such as the Belgian Congo, to the liberal ‘neo-Europes’ of North America and the Antipodes. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson argue that European settlers in the former created for robust institutions of private property and representative government, whilst attempts to enslave native peoples in the latter resulted in stagnant extractive economies and oligarchic rule (2001: 1376). This resulted in divergences in the pace of industrialisation leading to path dependent courses of development and international income disparities (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2002: 179). Inter-state inequalities may consequently have generated long-term patterns of inequality and stratification within the international system and the global division of labour.

Analysing the colonial powers themselves, Arrighi develops Tilly’s analysis (1992) to contend that capitalism developed out of the military revolution in Europe which promoted the rationalisation of social institutions and technological development for war-making purposes (1995; 2007: 63-68, 73-95). In a process of positive feedback, these were then deployed in the pursuit of new markets in a self-reinforcing cycle of warfare, imperialism, profit and reinvestment. Arrighi’s speculations are supported by the close links between the development

\textsuperscript{24} This is the interpretation of Kenneth Waltz’s theory of inter-state politics (1979) offered by Little (2007: 214-15).

\textsuperscript{25} Tilly’s arguments are echoed by other historical sociologists such as Mann and Giddens, who also emphasize the extent to which the development of the modern state has been driven by war. See Giddens (1995) and Mann (1993).
of the means of destruction by European states and subsequent industrial growth, for example through advantages in steel production bequeathed to the British economy generated by cannon manufacture during the Napoleonic wars (McNeil 1982: 203). The ‘virtuous’ cycle linking geoeconomics with geopolitics has continued, with American military research projects such as ARPANET giving rise to innovations such as the internet that have generated further waves of economic growth.

Indeed many theorists of hegemony have seen geopolitical competition as leading to a form of vertical differentiation where a state-society complex takes on a leadership role, reshaping the international order. Many of these theorists have focused, not only on military preponderance, but on leadership at the edge of socio-economic development. The hegemon or system-leader leads waves of technological innovation (Modelski and Thompson 1996: 52) and/or acts as a model for economic development by generating new industrial practices, political institutions and modes of business organisation (Arrghi and Silver 1999; Cox 1983: 171; Murphy 2001: 303-305; Teschke 2005; van der Pijl 1998, 2006). These benefits do not necessarily diffuse uniformly throughout the international system, as innovations have frequently only been successfully absorbed by those at already at a certain level of socio-economic development.

Succession between hegemons in the modern era has so far occurred within the core of maritime European states, amidst a gradual expansion of the circle of state-society complexes firmly incorporated within this core. The process of absorbing these innovations and undergoing the necessary social and economic restructuring to keep pace has on the other hand been extremely disruptive and potentially destabilising outside of this core, however, generating patterns of precariousness and insecurity (Murphy 2005). Neo-Gramscian scholars have examined how, unable on their own to affect this process of restructuring, elites may look towards external actors able to assist them transforming their own societies (Cox 1983: 166). As examined in section three, early developing regions and centres of innovation may inadvertently force other regions to specialise in producing low value added goods or focus on primary resource extraction. The process of absorbing these innovations and undergoing the necessary social and economic restructuring to keep pace has on the other hand been extremely disruptive and potentially destabilising outside of this core. Thus the mechanisms of competition and emulation may promote inequalities and distortions rather than uniformity. Likewise it is easy to

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26 An important piece of potential counterevidence to this argument would be if the rapid spread of wireless and mobile information-communications technologies throughout much of the less economically developed world were to have a significant impact on patterns of inequality and economic development.

27 Thus elite actors within less socio-economically developed societies have actively supported relationships of political subordination with external powers.
see how Spruyt’s mechanism of empowerment, where like political units legitimise one another and delegitimise non-alike units, might result in a ‘standard of civilisation’ within international society.

Thus innovations on the part of the leading, advanced state-society complexes do not necessarily result in homogeneity within the international system. It may, in evolutionary fashion, lead to the emergence of a core and a periphery as a result of differentiation along an axis of ability to integrate socio-economic innovations and generate endogenous socio-economic development. State-society complexes have faced a succession of different internationally and transnationally transmitted pressures to adapt and modernise right up to the present. Within this context, social actors responding to these pressures have not simply passively reacted to external pressures, but adopted a wide variety of strategies.

Coping with this succession of internationally and transnationally transmitted pressures within a stratified international order has been a perennial challenge for state-society complexes. This has generated a variety of responses and strategies on the part of late-developing societies. These range from whole-scale import of the ‘script’ of modernity, as Japan did through its process of break-neck modernisation and emulation of the West after Perry’s Black Fleet forced the Shogunate to end the policy of sakoku, to outright rejection and cultural aloofness. One option has been for existing elites to embrace a hierarchical relationship with external actors, as described by dependency theory. This strategy of ‘bandwaggoning’ may provide social actors with advantages against local rivals (Wohlforth 1999: 30) and still allow for autonomy vis-à-vis the patron or even opportunities for outright manipulation. The consequence, however, has frequently been an exacerbated the problem of ‘extraversion’, breaking the linkages between elites and the rest of society (Bayart 2009: 21-22). By establishing a ‘bridge’ between domestic elites and foreign powers, such strategies deepened inequalities from the attributional differences to relational hierarchies.

Often directed at internal compradors or ‘traitors’, rejectionist strategies have often taken the form of millenarian movements. They have usually been sanguinary failures. Al-Qaeda in this regard represents an instance of a well establish category of militant, culturally conservative

28 The following discussion is influenced by Paul Schroeder’s (1994) attempts to enumerate the actual options available to states in early modern Europe beyond those offered by neo-realism and apply a similar analysis to the strategies of societies under pressure from core states.

29 The problem of tails wagging dogs is well documented and as Hilton L Root has analysed (2008), the problem continues to bedevil powers such as the US. Of course, the fact that tails might wag dogs does not alter the anatomical relationship between the two.
salvationist movements such as the Chinese Righteous Harmony Movement which sought to expel Europeans from Shanghai in 1898 (Mead 2007: 373). The strategy of aloofness, scorning European influence and resisting external intrusion, remained plausible for the Ottoman and Chinese Empires throughout most of the C19th, as they did not hold European achievements in particularly high regard (Darwin 2007, 137-145). Yet these policies could not ultimately be maintained in the face of organised European geopolitical pressure and transnationally mediated domestic pressures for reform.

The middle path adopted by most non-European and late developing societies has been the selective importation of innovations based on the goals of organised interest groups, the conditions of their insertion into the international system and existing relationships and linkages with core actors. Very often this strategy has been characterised by ‘neo-traditionalism’, the selective appropriation of European innovations to a specific cultural setting and an attempt to adapt ‘traditional’ practices to the modern world. Frequently this has taken the form of an attempt to preserve, or even invent, a cultural sphere relating to the home, spiritual values and femininity, whilst adopting the ‘masculine’ tropes of modernity in such fields as politics, science, industry and warfare (Tickner 2003b: 323). Whilst neo-traditionalism was frequently a strategy of elites attempting to safeguard their own position, social movements of subordinate classes and subaltern groups attempted to utilise ideas and strategies of political organisation imported from the advanced core in order to challenge hierarchies at both the domestic and international level. Counter-elites have thus attempted to critically interrogate both local and core practices in order to develop a vernacular form of modernity and express the concerns of locally marginalised actors. Adaptation has rarely been passive, therefore, but has passed through the selection mechanism of local interests and values. Moreover there has been a huge variation in the success of the different strategies attempted within the periphery. A frequent result has been the emergence of in ‘dual’ polities in which modern forms of organisation extend little beyond the capital, mirroring the dual, enclave economies of late developing societies.

This highlights how the process of interactive development produces not only inequality but hybridity. Late developing societies find themselves in profoundly different circumstances than early developers, preventing convergence amongst state-society complexes. Early developers may have blocked others from adopting the path they have taken whilst simultaneously opening up ‘short cuts’ in socioeconomic development, a contradictory process of combined and uneven development (Rosenburg 2009). New models of social organisation arise and become candidates for emulation. The increasing capital intensity of industrialisation (Gerschenkron 1963) and the destabilising strains caused by war and social change (Skocpol 1979) have repeatedly created
opportunities for the implementation of radical models of social organisation. As a result ‘contender states’ (van der Pijl 2006) have arisen, posing a threat to states within the liberal ‘core’ due to both their ability to mobilise power resources and the rival vision of modernity and international order they represented. Rivalry between the liberal core and these contender-states has been more than just military and geopolitical, the Cold War was a battle between two systems that each claimed the ability to manage the problems of modernity and promote material wellbeing (Westad 2005; Leffler 2007). Diplomatic historians now recognise the existence of a ‘third race’, in which the superpowers promoted rival models of development for emulation in the developing world (Cullather 2007). The Soviet model was, however, unable to keep up with the pace set by the West in the ‘scientific and technological revolution’, predicated as this new round of economic change was on interfirm linkages the Soviet Union could not take advantage of (Brooks and Wohlforth 2001: 25).

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**Table 1.**

Mechanisms within the international system that promote uniform and bifurcated patterns of development, and the emergence of horizontal cleavages as a result of these processes.

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30 The tendency for major challenges to hegemonic and imperial dominance to emerge from ‘marcher states’ through international history has been noted by many scholars including Chase-Dunne (1998), Little, Kaufman and Wohlforth (2007), Gilpin (1981) and Mann (1986)
The exhaustion of Soviet communism not only closed the most important horizontal cleavage in the international order, but confirmed that all but the most predatory states face an imperative to promote socio-economic development. As Payne argues, development has become a universal problematic within the international system (Payne 2005: 324). Yet after the Cold War, a narrower range of strategies remain open for late developing state-society complexes. As former Brazilian president Cardoso argued: ‘either the South enters the democratic-technological-scientific race, invests heavily in R&D, and endures the ‘information economy’ metamorphosis, or it becomes unimportant, unexploited, and unexploitable’ (2001: 276). As in other examples of durable inequality, subordinate actors have found it may be preferable to adapt to circumstances rather than directly challenge structures of inequality (Tilly 1998: 96). Nonetheless successful economic development still seems to require an effective catalytic state capable of exercising ‘governed interdependence’ (Weiss 2006: 181,184). This means that autonomous statehood has lost none of its importance as a goal for organised social interests within the periphery, whether these are elite coalitions or social movements of subordinate groups.

Within a context complex interdependence and global economic integration, the importance of shaping the international political economy has become increasingly important. States find themselves enmeshed in the politics of unequal but interdependent development. Yet attempts to collectively govern and bring order to the international system are not new, and in the politics of global rule making structural inequality has played an enduring role. This is the subject of the final section.

**Dimension 5: Collective Management and World Order**

Historically, multiple attempts have been made to collectively write the rules of the international order. Although the international system is characterised by anarchy in that no world government exists, the existence of enduring forms of great power management suggests that the international system should be understood as oligarchic. A rank order or hierarchy has long existed in which ‘disparities in capability are reflected, more or less formally, in the decision making of the society of states’ (Clark 1989: 2). Less consensual and voluntaristic than the image sometimes offered by the English School or international society approach (see Bull 2002 [1977]: 13; Wheeler 2000: 25), the great powers have repeatedly arrogated certain prerogatives and responsibilities amongst themselves based on mutual acknowledgement of each other’s role in

31 According to Amsden (2001: 190-248) for example, industrialising nations cannot passively depend on FDI for crucial technological transfers but must foster national firms capable of promoting technical and managerial skills.
the ‘club’ of great powers (Clark 2009: 214; Clark 1989: 3). As Little suggests, the international peace settlements after major wars have been crucial junctures in the making of modern international society, as it is after victory that architects of the peace have the opportunity to create an international order in line with their values and interests (Little 2007: 270).

Suzuki highlights the problems with emphasising only the positive, cooperative facets of international society (Suzuki 2005: 156), noting the ‘Janus-faced’ character of the European order (Suzuki 2005: 148-9). At the very same time that the major European states were creating a Europe-wide order predicated on sovereign equality and mutual non-interference, an extra-European colonial order was being created based on the principle of the division of sovereignty and the construction of hierarchy (Keene 2002: xi). After European colonial expansion the non-European world was incorporated into global international society, but on an unequal basis. Outside of Europe, the colonial powers acted ‘on the basis of very different practices, rules and values to those that they applied to themselves’ (Little 2007: 272-3). A distinction was recognised between fully sovereign states, semi-sovereign states whose sovereignty was divisible and over whom trusteeship could be exercised, and non-sovereign peoples who lacked any of the rights of statehood (Keene 2002: 76-83, 102-106). This order was publicly codified in the form of unequal treaties (Keene 2007), ratified amongst European powers through conferences and agreements, and legitimated through the diffusion of inegalitarian theories that justified the stratification of peoples, civilisations and races (Said 1979).

Although post-colonial perspectives emphasise how representations of the non-European world were constitutive of an enduring, unequal world order (Doty 1996), they neglect the question of why some representations came to dominate. Those non-European empires able to hold their own against the Europeans were able to disdain European culture and practices, remaining aloof long into the 19th Century (Darwin 2007: 137-145). The ‘turn to empire’ in European political thought (Pitts 2005) was directly preceded by cotemporaneous ‘geopolitical earthquakes’ which undermined previously resilient Eurasian empires (Darwin 2007: 160-162). As they were surpassed materially, Eurasian civilisations found themselves ‘organizationally outflanked’ (Mann 1986: 7) as the European powers ratified and consolidated this order amongst themselves by

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32 This corresponded to the distinction drawn between civilized, semi-civilized and barbarous peoples on the basis of whether and how productively a people worked the land which they occupied. The trichotomous distinction also reflects the influence of theories of the life-cycle of civilisations on European thinking. Drawing lessons from the decline of the classical Greco-Roman world and the rise of Christian Europe after the renaissance, many Europeans came to believe that other civilisations such as India were at the nadir of a civilisational cycle whilst Europe was in its ascendency. ‘Barbarous’ or ‘savage’ peoples, however, were seen as outside of time and outside of this process. See Cowen and Shenton (1996).
constructing a hierarchical and dualistic international society buttressed by Eurocentric and later racist ideas. This enabled and empowered even minor European states such as Belgium to participate in the inter-imperial order (Grovogui 2001).

The major powers acted collectively not only to underwrite international inequality, but to form alliances to repulse ‘contender states’, such as Napoleonic France, which have challenged the extant international order. The evolution of the fundamental institutions of international society has therefore been deeply related to the process of unequal and uneven development. After the Second World War a ‘great-power directorate’ (Clark 2009: 205) once again set the terms of the peace and created the architecture for the post-war international order. Whilst the UN system did represent an ambitious attempt to expand the scope of international organization (Kennedy 2006: 24-47; Murphy 1994), it was within the Atlantic bloc that the most significant attempts in international institution-building took place. The neo-liberal institutionalist research programme attempts to understand this post-war Atlantic order in terms of a pattern of mutually beneficial cooperative interactions, buttressed by a set of institutions and regimes which provide solutions to otherwise difficult to solve problems of coordination, credibility, monitoring and enforcement (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985: 249-250). As Baker points out, however, Pareto-improving outcomes might still be massively unequal and ‘cooperation’ can be as much the product of rational acquiescence to coercion as a voluntary arrangement between equals. In some circumstances cooperation may take the form of exploitative collusion, leaving actors outside the transaction worse off (Baker 2006: 14).

Gruber has examined the dark side of cooperation through his notion of ‘go-it-alone-power’, where one set of actors can remove options available to other actors, leaving the latter no option but to cooperate according to terms set by the former. Although the decision to cooperate after their most preferred option is removed is pareto-improving for the ‘losers’ compared to non-cooperation, they end up worse off than under the status quo ante (Gruber 2000: 39). For example during the Uruguay Round trade negotiations the Quad terminated the GATT, incorporating past agreements within the massively expanded remit of the WTO. Developing countries were presented with an all or nothing choice to acquiesce to the new arrangements or be left outside of the multi-lateral trading system (Steinberg 2002: 360). As Gruber notes, the exercise of this form of power to rewrite global rules rests only on the ability to form a coalition of indispensable actors, no direct coercion is required (Gruber 2000: 40).

33 The US, EU, Canada and Japan.
As Drezner notes, there is now an increasingly thick institutional environment in the international political economy, composed of ‘regime complexes’ comprising multiple organizations and agreements (Drezner 2007: 24). Under conditions of complex interdependence, major economies have increasingly attempted to harmonise their regulatory systems. Deeper levels of integration have meant that regulatory regimes increasingly come to govern ‘behind the border’ issues through the development of international trade law, the process of legalization, the universalisation of professional standards and practices, and growth of conditionalities attached to international agreements. Major states have remained the primary drivers behind this process (Drezner 2007: xii), international organizations remain the agents of state-based principals. Whilst networks of non-state actors may have a greater role in rule making and standard setting than before, the advanced economies of the core ultimately set the rules by which the international economy is governed. Leading states have not been displaced but becomes enmeshed in new intergovernmental and public-private policy making networks, remaining central to systems of ‘governed interdependence’ (Weiss 2006: 181,184). Similarly, Slaughter argues that states have increased their ‘effective sovereignty’ (Slaughter 2004: 268-9) through disaggregation, participating within transgovernmental networks and passing certain components of sovereignty to new supranational organisations (Slaughter 2004: 12, 20-1).

Yet as the international regulatory order now stretches more deeply within state borders, those outside of the nexus of global rule making increasingly become responsible for enforcing rules made by, and in the interests of, the core34. The present world order has become more deeply hierarchical in that rules made by the most economically advanced states have increasingly come to govern economic life the world over. What emerges is an infrastructure or skeleton of world order ‘based on an intricate three-dimensional web of links between disaggregated state institutions’ (Slaughter 2004: 15); or as Strange characterised it, a nascent transnational empire (Strange 1989).

The state has not, therefore, withered away; rather state power has been reorganised and redeployed (cf. Wendt 1997) through deeper integration and new forms of global authority that have emerged out of the trilateral Western bloc forged in the Cold War (Shaw 2000). Thus Hoogvelt terms globalisation ‘implosive’ (2001: 19) and Nayar argues it is ‘truncated’ (2005) because integration has proceeded much faster within the Atlantic alliance and the ‘Greater

34 The onus now placed on states in the developing world to enforce the technological monopolies of Western firms by both WTO agreements and the extra-territorial, unilateral Special and Super 301 policies of the US is perhaps the most egregious example.
Members of this advanced core no longer wield power purely as a result of their material capabilities, but also because of their position within an increasingly dense and extensive system of global organization. As Mann argues, when human activity is institutionalized in order to collectively reap the benefits of cooperation, ‘those who occupy supervisory and coordinating positions have an immense organizational superiority over the others’ (Mann 1986: 6-7). Those outside the apex of systems of organization find themselves ‘organizationally outflanked’ (Mann 1986: 7), as they lack the ability to set the terms of social cooperation, yet are compelled to continue participating due to their lack of exit power. State-society complexes on the outside of the Northern bloc are therefore in a structurally dissimilar position from ‘insiders’ with regards to the management of the international economic order. As Bailin suggests, advanced industrial states of the core are able to act as a kind of ‘group hegemon’ within the world economy as a result of patterns of close coordination and vehicles such as G7 (Bailin 2005: 62, 110). Patron-client relationships between core and periphery have similarly been multilateralised through international institutions in a manner that parallels past practices of imperial trusteeship (Watson 2007: 72).

The above analysis attempts to delineate the historical transition from a Eurocentric world order founded on an oligarchy of great powers and a diffused standard of civilisation encoded into international law, to a dense transgovernmental and tentatively supranational capitalist order centred on the advanced core. An enduring constellation of increasingly integrated states, led by the US, therefore retains the ability to shape the structure of the international and global order. Other states find themselves in a structurally different position of being outsiders within the process of global rule making. This outsider status and the position as ‘rule takers’ is ultimately what defines the contemporary ‘global South’ in contemporary international politics.

Conclusion

This Chapter has attempted to understand international inequality and stratification as an emergent phenomenon that constitutively shapes the international order. It has an advanced an account which is emphasises asymmetric relationships as well as exogenous inequalities in material resources. The approach outlined here rejects the holist notion that international relations or the world system needs to be understood as a social whole governed by a singular logic. Neither geopolitical nor economic factors dominate. Rather it is the interaction and

35 This is geopolitical analysis of the nature of the liberal international order is advanced by a surprising range of theorists, from Deudney and Ikenberry (1999), ‘liberal materialist’ champions of the US-led order, to neo-Gramscian critics such as Gill (2003: 83).
concatenation of different sorts of asymmetric interaction under historically contingent circumstances that generates patterns inequality or vertical differentiation within the international system. Initial advantages accumulate and reinforce each other, producing self-sustaining patterns of economic and political inequality on the international and global levels.

The first section analysed hierarchy within anarchy, examining the nature of bilateral hierarchical relationships within the inter-state system. The second attempted to recover the notion of development for international theory in order to examine differentiation amongst states along a socio-economic trajectory. The third critically assessed accounts of stratification within a single global social system, rejecting some classical structuralist arguments but defending the core insight that spontaneous bifurcation may occur within a world-wide social system. The fourth, most ambitious, section attempted to bring these three sections together to analyse the interactive process of competitive international development. The final section brought together the first and fourth sections to examine the process of the construction of world order through collective management and rule making on the part of the core of advanced European and neo-European states. Thus although mechanically determinist versions of structuralism cannot be supported, a strong case can be made in support of a non-fatalist structuralism which recognises the importance of agency on the part of states and social actors as well as the contradictory pressures for convergence and divergence that exist within the international system.

In providing a theoretical account of inequality and stratification within the international system, this Chapter has claimed that the North-South cleavage is real and enduring. Thus it has attempted to provide an explanation of why in virtually every issue-area in international politics has witnessed a rough division between North and South, from trade, to nuclear proliferation, to humanitarian intervention, to climate change. The process of global unequal development has led to rising political mobilisation on the part of populations and organised interests, placing pressures on almost all states to pursue policies of national economic development and maintain their sovereignty as they integrate into an increasingly globalised order. But in doing so, the states of the global South encounter obstacles and barriers within a stratified international system. This gives rise to a politics of international inequality, as the states of the global South seek to challenge the institutionalised aspects of these inequalities.

36 The exemplar of such an approach remains Cardoso and Faletti’s Dependency and Development in Latin America (1979).
37 This should not be misunderstood as a claim that there is unanimity within either the North or the South, but that in each of these cases there is a distinctive and easily recognisable Northern or Southern position. The analogy being made is with political cleavages within contemporary politics, the recognition that class provides one of the main electoral cleavages does not mean that all members of a socio-economic group have identical political loyalties.
This chapter has therefore sought to defend the inter-state dimension as crucially important for understanding inequality and stratification in world politics. In doing so it challenges attempted to challenge strongly globalist perspectives such as that of Hoogvelt, who has argued that stratification is primarily a social division between global classes, cutting across nation-states (Hoogvelt 2001: xiv). Halperin defends the similar position that stratification primarily occurs between classes within nations in the context of a wider global economy (Halperin 2004: 279), arguing that ‘dependency is class dependency, not state dependency’ (Halperin 2004: 115). Yet these class-based structuralist accounts fail to emphasise that between-nation inequality remains been a much larger component of global inequality than within-nation inequality (Milankovic 2009b) and downplay the irreducibly inter-state character of many forms of worldwide stratification. Such perspectives imply that autonomous national development policies on the part of states within the South will do little
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Table 2

Relationships between different dimensions of inequality in the international system. The horizontal rows list how a dimension of interaction affects other dimensions, the vertical columns how a dimension of interaction is affected by other dimensions.
to ameliorate global inequality and encourage a shift in focus from inter-state contention to de-
centralised, capillary patterns of governmentality (Duffield 2001, 2009). Yet the notion of a
global deterritorialised system of rule (Hardt and Negri: 2000) is wildly inaccurate: there exists a
core within the international system which exerts an inordinate influence over the creation of
global rules, as well as a periphery that confronts the existence of this rule-bound system.

Nonetheless, this Chapter has attempted to analyse the North-South divide in a non-binary
fashion. Several dimensions of interaction exist which together produce the emergent division
between core and periphery. The position of individual state-society complexes varies on each of
the significant dimensions of attributional and relational inequality. We might therefore be able
to distinguish between state-society complexes using three axes: mass, socio-economic
development and centrality. The first corresponds roughly to the notion of ‘material capabilities’
in neo-realist accounts. State-society complexes commanding greater populations, financial assets
and productive potential are able to play a structurally different role to minor powers. They
engage in the management of the international system, may establish hierarchical relationships
with other states, and impact on the options of other actors, whether consciously or not. The
second corresponds to how close a society is to the ‘leading edge’ of social power, how
successful it has been at originating and adopting innovations in mobilising resources to meet
social goals. This second axis is related to the first because there is a close connection or even
feedback loop between socio-economic development and ability to project power internationally.
The third corresponds to how central a state-society complex is to international and global
systems of organisation and rule-making. The third relates to the first in that major powers have
played a greater role in shaping international rules, and to the second in that the growth in
infrastructural power of the state-society complexes of the core has led them to create a denser
system of international and global rules.

The three axes, though closely associated, are conceptually and substantively distinct. As Tilly
suggests, although stratification is pervasive in human society it rarely gives rise to entirely
consistent rank orders or homogenous strata (Tilly 1998: 29). This does give some support to
Payne’s claim that, whilst inequality is central to international political economy, the inequalities
in international relations and the world economy do not do not neatly map onto familiar notions
of North and South (2005: 324). However, even if all Southern states and societies are not
equally peripheral along each axis\(^66\), common challenges generated by peripheralisation are

\(66\) Drawing on the comparison with socio-economic class once again, this is an acknowledgement that
stratification is not binary but a matter of gradation. In addition cross-cutting cleavages complicate the
idea of a neat rank ordering amongst actors and groups.
widely shared throughout global South and the positive existence of an integrated advanced core necessarily places other actors in the position of being ‘outsiders’. This commonality of exclusion provides a kind of negative unity to the South even though the three primary axis of inequality listed above cross-cut and only imperfectly align with one another. The ‘global South’ is not an invariant category but a contingent social formation which has arisen in an emergent, evolutionary fashion due to the interaction of the processes described in this Chapter and the active diplomatic attempts to build a degree of international solidarity amongst outsider states, as analysed in Chapters 4, 6 and 7. The division between North and South is therefore a social construct reflecting the material and organisational circumstances of actors but remaining a historically contingent product of political artifice (Alden, Morphet and Vieira 2010)\textsuperscript{67}. To speak of North and South is not to offer a typology of states, an invariant binary categorisation, but to acknowledge the rough-hewn but real set of more-or-less congruent cleavages which structure international relations. When we talk of the North-South divide we are choosing to focus on one aspect, albeit an important aspect, of the overall composition of the international order.

The analysis developed in this chapter advances the overall argument of the thesis by demonstrating that the North-South cleavage is real and enduring and arises from deep structural features of the international system and the global order\textsuperscript{68}. Thus it differs from the position that sees the North-South cleavage as largely subjective in character, arising from the perception of grievance on the part of the South, rooted in the common memory of European colonialism and subsequent post-colonial experiences (Parks and Roberts 2007: 62-63, MacFarlane 1999: 19). This subjective dimension cannot be discounted, but the ‘structuralist perspective’ is also a reflection of certain objective features of the organisation of the international system and the realities of international relations as states and peoples of the global South encounter it\textsuperscript{69}. If this claim is correct then it gives us a reason to take the arguments put forward by Southern states and their coalitions seriously. Claims about the unequal and hierarchical nature of the international order are not merely spurious rhetoric. Even if they are cynically motivated, these

\textsuperscript{67} For example, the late developing nations of South Europe as well as Central and Eastern Europe did not become part of the global South despite their experience of peripheralisation. Instead they were incorporated into the two Cold War superpower blocs and subsequently gained the opportunity to join the North. They never gained a diplomatic identity as longstanding members of the outsider coalition in international relations, unlike the nations of Latin America. Yugoslavia, however, played a major role in the global South through the Non-Aligned Movements due to their position as outsiders from the two superpower blocs and their attempt to pursue autonomous policies of national development whilst maintaining economic links to the capitalist world economy.

\textsuperscript{68} Nonetheless the complexity of the processes that comprise international inequality, cross-cutting relationship between the different axes of stratification and the diversity of the South have significant political implications, as Chapters 4-7 will make clear.

\textsuperscript{69} Although it has often given rise to a hyperbolically anti-Western variant that advances a conspiratorial, Manichean and paranoid perspective on the nature of the present international system and the global order. See Chapter 3 for further discussion.
claims are public appeals to an interpretation of the operation of the international system that is
not implausible. Thus they potentially have substance as real arguments and as challenges to the
operation of the international order. This provides us as scholars with a reason to pay attention
to these arguments, acknowledge them as having substantive content and subject them to critical
evaluation. But in the same way that this chapter has argued that inequality has been neglected
within international relations theory, the Chapter 2 will suggest that despite the extensive debate
over global justice, political theory has failed to fully appreciate the normative implications of
global and international inequality.
Chapter 2
Global Social Justice in an Unequal International Order: Global Transformations and the Conditions for the Possibility of Justice

The previous chapter argued that inequality should be understood as part of the ‘deep structure’ of the international system. Inequality goes far beyond differentials in material resources in bilateral inter-state relations; it profoundly structures the patterns of interaction within the international system, the development of individual societies within a common world economy and the formation of systems of rules to establish global order. In order to make sense of the patterns of asymmetric interaction which have shaped patterns of stratification in international relations Chapter 1 bracketed normative concerns. However, the emergence of patterns of social organisation that determine access to valuable social resources inevitably results in the assertion of claims regarding the proper distribution of those resources. These are claims of social or distributive justice. Such claims for greater material equality form an eliminable part of the social world and must be acknowledged as containing substantive normative content which deserves to be subject to sustained critical interrogation. This entails an engagement with approaches in political theory which have attempted to ascertain the normative implications of global and international inequalities. Such an engagement enables us to understand the moral tensions operative within politics beyond the nation-state.

To this end, this chapter engages with cosmopolitan accounts of the demands of global justice within political philosophy. Such accounts have provoked a wide-ranging debate over the scope of principles of social justice and remain a touchstone in debates over the normative implications of inequality on a world scale. However, questions over global justice have thus far hinged on whether we citizens of the wealthy North share a moral co-naturality with distant others in the absence of a ‘thick’ global community and whether the duties of our compatriots have priority over non-compatriots who are absolutely worse off. The enquiry in this chapter, however, focuses not on the question of the grounds and the scope of duties of social justice, but whether such principles would be ‘stable’ if institutionalised at the global level. Thus it asks whether contemporary accounts of global justice provide

1 It is not being claimed that this is an odious feature of the debate over global justice, but rather an intellectually limiting one. It isn’t a surprise that the debate has been framed in terms of what ‘we’ in the economically advanced world owe ‘them’ in the less economically developed world given that this corresponds to a set of ethical questions that conscientious individuals in the economically advanced world are faced with. The contention of this chapter, however, is that this approach generates certain pitfalls and limits the horizons of international political thought. When we start thinking about ‘them’ as agents who have a valid say in the construction of new forms of political community the questions we ask might be very different.
sufficient basis for a non-ideal theory of justice in a structurally unequal world. Although sidelined within contemporary political philosophy, the question of the moral limits and possibilities of specific social orders has been of central concern in the history of political thought.

By interrogating cosmopolitan accounts of justice and the potential for their realisability, the analysis identifies those features of the international order which militate against the furtherance of egalitarian goals. In particular, the ideas advanced by neo-republican theorists are employed to demonstrate that attempts to institutionalise principles of distributive justice would still leave the supposed beneficiaries in a position of precarious dependence on the more powerful. The chapter then assesses attempts by cosmopolitan political theorists to provide grounds for ‘cosmopolitan hope’ through the advancement of a sociology of morals identifying transformative possibilities within the present global order. Such accounts frequently focus on the role of supranational institutions, the emergence of a post-Westphalian order, and/or the rise of a ‘world society’. However, in advancing monological accounts of political principles or by focusing on transformative processes emanating from the North, such accounts accord only a limited role for the peripheral peoples of the world to participate in the wide-ranging renegotiations of political community which would necessarily precede any attempt to institute a global scheme of distributive justice. Through a critique of cosmopolitan political theory, the chapter works towards a defence of a state-based egalitarian perspective which accords a significant role to the representatives of peripheral peoples in any negotiations over the moral implications of global interdependence.

**The Demands of Justice in an Unequal World**

Rising awareness of international interdependence in the 1970s led political philosophers such as Charles Beitz to reflect upon the principles appropriate to govern political life beyond the nation-state (Beitz 1979), building on the debate initiated by John Rawls over the requirements of justice within democratic political communities (Rawls 1971; Rawls 1999a). From the Rawlsian perspective justice is to be understood as the ‘first virtue’ of political institutions: the core normative criteria according to which they should be evaluated. The concept of justice provides an evaluative standard to use to judge institutional arrangements. When existing arrangements fall short of this standard, obligations arise to bring them into line with the requirements of justice.
In other words, justice is the demand that institutions give individuals what they are owed, morally speaking. The concept of justice does not necessarily imply equalisation of resources or even equal treatment of persons, however. Aristotle, for example, argued that it is as unjust to treat unequals equally as it is to treat equals unequally (Gosepath 2011). Nonetheless, several contemporary political philosophers have attempted to advance egalitarian theories of justice influenced by the Kantian tradition. According to this perspective, human beings possess certain intrinsic qualities that constitute them as subjects of moral concern. These qualities of moral personhood are held to be possessed by all adult human beings. Whilst some persons may be taller or of greater intelligence than others, no person can be said to possess greater or lesser moral personhood than any other. Thus all human beings are held to be of equal moral concern; the value of equality is the value of respect for all persons.

Minimally, this generates a moral imperative to ensure the essential or basic rights of individuals are safeguarded (Shue 1996). But many political philosophers have followed John Rawls (1999a), Richard Dworkin (2000) and Brian Barry (1995) in arguing that respect for moral personhood requires more than this. Political institutions create a framework within which individuals can interact and cooperate for mutual advantage. Any given arrangement of institutions will create a certain pattern of advantages and disadvantages amongst individuals, backed by the coercive power of the state. Because the configuration of such a ‘basic scheme’ affects the autonomy of individuals and their ability to pursue their goals, affected persons are entitled to a justification for why a set of political/legal institutions is configured in one way rather than another. According to Rawls’s influential account, the only scheme which no affected person could reasonably object to is one in which primary resources (as discussed in the Introduction) are distributed so as to maximise the share of the least well-off. In other words, a distribution of socially valuable material resources which allows inequality is legitimate only insofar as those inequalities benefit the worst-off individual. Such a distribution can be thought of as presumptively equal: inequalities amongst participants within a common social enterprise such as the nation-state must have special justification. The class of duties to institute such a distribution are referred to as duties of social justice.

Liberal egalitarian political philosophers such as Beitz (1979) and Pogge (1989) attempted to expand Rawls’ account of social justice beyond the nation-state, giving rise to a long running debate over the requirements of justice on a global level. These cosmopolitan theorists of justice contend that there is no prima facie reason why obligations of social justice that apply within the

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2 Such as by enabling efficiencies that can be harnessed to benefit the least well-off.
nation-state should not apply beyond it. The rights on which duties of justice are grounded, cosmopolitans claim, are universal because they arise from the capacity of all persons for reason and autonomy irrespective of their membership of particular political communities (Caney 2005: 66). Indeed, cosmopolitans see the nation-state as only one of the many institutional associations or patterns of interaction to which the criteria of social justice might be applied. Duties of justice may arise at the international, regional and global levels. Existing institutional arrangements cannot be said to be just unless they could be justified to all affected individuals.

From this starting point, egalitarian cosmopolitan theorists such as Beitz, Caney, Moellendorf, Pogge and Tan have argued that significant obligations of justice do indeed exist at the global level. They point to the inequalities that exist in terms of socially valuable resources within the world. They note that interdependence between states makes it possible to speak of a basic structure or constitutional order that determines the distribution of these resources. Thus, they argue that justice requires that political institutions be reformed or established to promote a more egalitarian distribution, potentially necessitating radical schemes for the redistribution of the world’s wealth. Notably, these thinkers argue for social justice and a presumptively equal distributive scheme between persons worldwide – not between states.

For reasons that will be elaborated later in the article, the precise details of the distributive scheme that each of these theorists argues justice demands need not concern us. What matters is that such cosmopolitan scholars have demonstrated that Rawlsian arguments have normative implications that extend beyond the nation-state. According to these thinkers, a theory of justice focused entirely on arrangements within a single nation-state would be deeply inadequate, as it would risk systematically prioritising the interests of one group over another. The only way to show equal concern and respect for persons is to consider all affected individuals when evaluating a set of political institutions. In an interdependent and unequal world this will, cosmopolitans contend, necessarily lead us towards a global theory of social justice and a mandate for global redistribution.

Other perspectives within political philosophy have, of course, taken issue with the liberal egalitarian conception of what is required in order to show equal concern and respect to persons.

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3 Beitz (1999); Caney (2005); and Tan (2004) present similar Rawlsian accounts of global distributive justice, arguing that justice requires a presumptively egalitarian global distributive scheme given even the most minimal degree of international/global interdependence. Moellendorf (2002; 2009) advances an egalitarian account which pays careful attention to the threshold necessary for duties of social justice to be incurred and advances the basis for an account of global equality of opportunity. Pogge (1994; 2008) departs from his previous Rawlsian position to argue that the duties generated by global poverty and inequality are negative duties not to inflict harm on others.
According to Lockean libertarians such as Robert Nozick, when individuals mix their labour with unowned natural resources they gain property rights over any goods produced (Nozick 1974). This ability to acquire property stems from an individual’s right of self-ownership. Once individuals have acquired property legitimately, any pattern of distribution which arises out of freely-made economic exchanges between individuals can be considered just. To redistribute property acquired legitimately would thus fail to show respect for persons because it would impinge upon individual self-ownership, coercing individuals into serving as resources for the benefit of others. Following such a line of argument, Kukuthas (2006) argues that no duties of social justice whatsoever exist, whether at the global, international or domestic levels. Justice requires only, and nothing less than, global respect for the universal rights of personhood and property.

Three problems with the libertarian perspective bear noting. First, the Lockean account of the original acquisition of natural resources is wildly ahistorical. Present property-holdings cannot feasibly be claimed to have originated with the mixing of labour with natural resources by individuals who conformed with the ‘Lockean proviso’ to ensure they left ‘as much and as good’ for the rest of mankind. The role of force and fraud in the original acquisition of property undermine the notion that the present global distribution of wealth arose unintended from a series of just transfers between free persons. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how it is possible to acquire property whilst leaving ‘as much and as good’ to the rest of mankind given that all the Earth’s natural resources are finite.

Second, GA Cohen has pointed out that any system of property rights involves a huge set of limitations on human freedom (Cohen 1995). When one acquires property rights over some entity, one gains the right to exclude all others from utilising that entity in one or more respects. If I own a plot of land, I have the right — backed by the force of law and the coercive power of the state — to exclude others from planting crops on it or setting up a campsite on it. In the contemporary global economy, intellectual property rights impose serious impediments on the freedom of non-rights-holders. The limitations on freedom created by a system of property rights is not regarded as problematic by libertarians, providing that system has come about through a series of just transactions. But if we have doubts about the libertarian account of legitimate acquisition of property, then such limitations on human freedom might worry us. In addition, liberal egalitarians such as Dworkin point out that the libertarian account places enormous moral demands on those with little wealth, as they are required to support and comply

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4 Pogge 2005 examines some of the implications of the Lockean proviso on a global level.
with a coercive political order that limits their freedom by enforcing the property rights of those who are wealthier. Liberal egalitarians argue that equal respect for persons requires that states must be able to justify their use of coercion to those subject to it. Redistributive schemes can thus be regarded as a necessary part of the justification for a given scheme of property rights to those who benefit least from it.

Third, libertarian perspectives take too little account of human freedom. As described above, a given system of property rights may imply strong and uncompensated limitations on the ‘negative’ freedom of the majority of individuals. In addition to this, libertarianism is not directly concerned with individual freedom in another important and intuitive sense: the extent of an individual’s option-set. This sort of freedom, the ability to advance one’s preferences and to exercise substantial control over one’s own life encapsulated in van Parijs’s notion of ‘real freedom’ (van Parijs 1995), requires not just non-interference but access to the socially valuable resources necessary for genuine autonomy. Liberal egalitarianism promotes ‘real freedom’ because it promotes the widest possible distribution of those primary resources needed by individuals to exercise self-government. Because it is wholly focused on an account of inviolable property-rights, libertarianism takes as little account of ‘real freedom’ as it does of coercion. Libertarianism thus presents a narrow and artificially limited account of what it means for a political order to show ‘equal concern and respect’ to autonomous moral persons.

Marxism might be thought to present a radical egalitarian challenge to conventional liberal egalitarian accounts of social justice. But a central element of the Marxist critique of capitalism is based on Marx’s labour theory of value (LTV) and, as discussed in Chapter 1, this framework is seriously problematic. Perhaps more importantly, even if the LTV were valid then a theory of justice based on it would have counter-intuitive and strongly anti-egalitarian implications. According to such an account, workers are exploited if they do not receive their full share of the economic product. This implies that able-bodied steelworkers in an imaginary socialist society would be exploited and subject to a wrong if they were taxed to provide assistance to co-citizens with learning difficulties or to provide disaster-relief for an underdeveloped and hurricane-prone nation. It might be objected that, normatively, the LTV was intended as an immanent critique of classical economics rather than the foundation for an account of social justice in the Rawlsian mould. Indeed, as examined below, it might make more sense to regard Marxism as presenting

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5 As argued by GA Cohen (1995), there are strong parallels between libertarianism and a theory of justice based on the LTV: both are ‘entitlement’ theories according to which individuals have a moral claim to the whole of the product of their labour.
an ‘ethic of ultimate ends’ rather than an alternative account of social justice to liberal egalitarian perspectives.

The liberal egalitarian cosmopolitan account of the global scope of social justice has, however, been challenged by an anti-cosmopolitan perspective that insists that the duty to institute an egalitarian distribution of primary material resources only arises within bounded political communities. The position that extensive duties of distributive justice exist within, but not beyond, the nation-state has been defended by Thomas Nagel (2005). Nagel argues that what Julius terms a ‘justice relation’ (Julius 2006: 176), a social relationship between individuals that incurs obligations of justice, only arises when actors are co-participants in a democratic political community subject to coercive authority. Justice therefore does not require the creation of any new form of global political association to bring about a more equal global distribution of resources, as obligations of social justice only arise within pre-existing democratic polities (Nagel 2005: 128-30).

Although a sophisticated challenge, Nagel’s contributions have not decisively rebutted the cosmopolitan account of global justice. Pogge argues that extensive duties of global justice arise out of a duty of non-maleficence. At present, he claims, the rich world imposes a scheme on the global poor which leaves them unable to meet their basic needs. Thus duties of global justice are in fact negative duties to stop harming others (Pogge 2005). From a different perspective, Julius and Moellendorf agree with Nagel that duties of social justice arise out of specific social relationships between individuals, but aver that the kinds of association that ground a ‘justice relation’ are much wider than he acknowledges (Julius 2006; Moellendorf 2009: 31-2). Thus the sort of action and interest-affecting associations which already exist beyond the nation-state in our highly unequal world may indeed ground obligations of justice. Anti-cosmopolitan theories of justice have not, therefore, provided a definitive rebuttal of the notion of global distributive justice and the moral case for greater global economic equality. As examined in Chapter 1, there are good reasons to think that international, and therefore global, inequality is not simply a brute fact but has arisen in part from asymmetric interactions and relationships amongst actors.

6 Caney, however, defends a ‘desert island’ theory of justice according to which ongoing interaction or participation in a common association is not a prerequisite for obligations of justice to apply. See Caney (2005: 112) and Bertram (2006: 329). According to this view the simple fact of inequality amongst persons triggers redistributive obligations if it would be feasible to create a common distributive scheme. Beitz has also expressed support for similar perspective, arguing that it ‘now seems wrong to say that these facts explain in any very specific way why principles of international distributive justice should constrain the present structure of the world economy’. See Beitz (1999: 204). Nonetheless, much of the force of the argument for social justice seems to derive from the fact that in an interdependent world the actions of agents affect the actions and the core interests of others, and that there are causal connections between the wealth of some and the poverty of others.
Indeed, the previous chapter corroborates cosmopolitan perspectives that emphasise the existence of a ‘global basic structure’ (Buchannan 2000: 705-6). Egalitarian cosmopolitans have provided compelling arguments why such ongoing interactions and action-affecting structures might trigger obligations of social justice and the duty to redistribute primary material resources to promote a more equal distribution amongst persons worldwide.²

Nonetheless, although determining whether there exists a ‘justice relation’ at the global level has been the primary goal of the debate over global justice, this is insufficient for the development of a compelling political theory of egalitarian cosmopolitanism. The debate over global distributive justice provides an exemplary instance of the trend whereby political philosophy has shorn itself of empirical concerns in favour of an exclusive focus on the search for fact-independent values upon which political principles are founded. But as suggested in the Introduction, political theory involves much more than this. Under non-ideal conditions, especially the radically non-ideal conditions of international relations, we need to understand how a particular set of principles will be realised in an institutional context. If it is not possible to work towards the realisation of a principle without inadvertently undermining it or infringing on another important value, then that principle can be considered unstable. If so then cosmopolitan justice becomes very much the utopian ‘mirage’ that its critics allege (Kukathas 2006), a sublime yet ultimately ephemeral vision, as evoked through the image of the ‘Parliament of Man’ in Tennyson’s *Locksley Hall*.³ We might be able to view such a shimmering edifice distantly in the mists, but we may be

² Some claims put forward by cosmopolitans, however, are normatively and empirically flawed. Pogge’s attempt to ground a theory of global justice on the duty of non-maleficence is one example. It is an empirically dubious proposition that the overwhelming proportion of extreme poverty can be attributed to coercion by the wealthy world. Pogge can only maintain such a claim by using very wide-ranging definitions of ‘coercion’ and ‘harm’. Whilst familiar notion of harm requires a diachronic comparison, that individuals are made worse off than they were or would have been, Pogge’s notion is subjunctive, requiring only that some are worse off than they would be under some alternative scheme (2008: 25). Pogge claim is therefore that the wealthy harm the poor by implementing an institutional system that fails to allow them to satisfy their basic needs. But this seems to be a failure to implement social justice rather than actively harming others. This may be plausible, but is better understood as a duty of associational justice rather than an obligation of non-maleficence.

³ Tennyson’s protagonist is fully aware of how lofty such an ambition is. After the ecstatic vision of the ‘Federation of the world’, the subsequent stanzas reflect on the present ‘with the jaundiced eye’, leading to a contemplation of a world ‘out of joint’ in which hungry faces prowl whilst ‘order festers’. Only after this sober reflection does the protagonist aver that nonetheless, a purpose can be discerned in history and that the horizons of men will continue to expand. The final section of the poem makes it clear that the protagonist identifies this progress with the triumph of Europe over the Orient:

> ‘Not in vain the distance beacons. Forward, forward let us range, Let the great world spin for ever down the ringing grooves of change. Thro’ the shadow of the globe we sweep into the younger day; Better fifty years of Europe than a cycle of Cathay.’

The cosmopolitical goal of the Parliament of Man is therefore for Tennyson bound up with the European civilising mission, a detail that serves as a reminder of the potential affinity between cosmopolitanism and imperialism, explored further below (Tennyson 1868: 86-7)
at a loss how to navigate our way towards it without descending into swamps and marshes. Thus defenders of cosmopolitanism must be able to show that the notion of cosmopolitan social justice is not, to quote Kant, ‘fantastic and overstrained’ (Kant quoted in Tan 2004: 35). Cosmopolitan political philosophers themselves have acknowledged the need to provide grounds for ‘cosmopolitan hope’, a rational basis for believing that cosmopolitan goals are not unrealisable (Moellendorf 2002: 176). Nonetheless this aspect of cosmopolitan political theory has been greatly underdeveloped. An adequate account of global distributive justice in international political theory requires a much more extensive interrogation of whether the international sphere could possibly conform to the ideal of global social justice.

The Question of Justice Within and Beyond the State in Historical Political Thought

A concern with the conditions for the possible realisation of justice is largely absent from contemporary political philosophy. But as commentators such as Stears (2005) have noted, this trend threatens to alienate political theory from a concern with many of the issues which historically animated debates in political thought. What is missing from cosmopolitan theories of global justice is consideration of the moral limits and possibilities of the global order, sustained reflection on how the way in which the social world beyond the national state is constituted shapes the realisability of certain values. Certainly, a number of major historical political thinkers did not restrict themselves to seeking to locate the grounds of certain kinds of moral obligation, but were deeply concerned with the social conditions for the realisation of political ideals.

Kant is frequently regarded as the inspiration for contemporary cosmopolitan approaches in international political theory. But Kant was troubled by the question of whether political developments might make it possible for a cosmopolitan order to come into being, leading him to question whether the world might not be fit for moral action. Kant believed that if human social relations were such that cosmopolitan principles could not govern them, cosmopolitan goals would be quixotic. The dictates of the moral law that Kant identified with the categorical imperative would still be valid, yet ultimately in vain: ‘ought’ after all implies ‘can’. Thus in his *Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View* (1784), Kant suggested that human history might be plausibly interpreted as leading towards a state in which a moral kingdom of ends might become reality, appealing to a pre-modern notion of providence and rational purpose in history to vindicate the claim that it is meaningful to speak of cosmopolitan right and thus work towards its realisation.
Although he believed, like his cosmopolitan successors, that the existence of a world moral community demanded some minimal form of world political community, Kant was all too aware of the difficulties standing in the way of a cosmopolitan order. His concerns about the uncertainties and instabilities of the ‘state of nature’, in which conflicting claims of right cannot be resolved without recourse to violence, led him to defend a statist order as a necessary stepping stone towards a truly cosmopolitan global federation (Kant 2007[1795]: 16-17). Kant’s political philosophy therefore seems to hold that political principles are distinct from moral principles even if the latter are ultimately derived from the former. The realisation and institutionalisation of moral principles is not a straightforward task and can only take place within a specific kind of political order.

If we take the Kantian challenge seriously, then this raises serious questions as to how far we can evaluate political arrangements such as the nation-state in narrowly instrumental terms. For most cosmopolitans, the state is at best a trustee, charged with carrying out the requirements of global justice. Beitz for instance sees the state as a ‘means to the end of social justice’ (Beitz 1999: 104). But if the Kantian claim that it is only meaningful to speak about justice when it can be realised within a form of social order is valid, then the state should not act just as a potential vehicle for the promotion of justice, but a framework, a form of political community, within which justice is more than a mere hypothetical goal but might come to govern the relations between persons (cf. Miller 2007: 40).

This comes close to the position articulated by Hegel, who emphasised the essential role of the modern state in providing a domain in which interpersonal right can be established. Hegel maintained that moral principles could only be realised under concrete circumstances, such as within modern civil society. He was nonetheless concerned with what he termed the ‘problem of poverty’, the ethico-political lacuna within the modern state created by the inequality and the existence of an underclass outside of the embedded ethical life of civil society (Hegel 1991: §240-244). For Hegel the condition of the poor was more than an ethical problem, it was a problem of whether the relations between the enfranchised and the disenfranchised were governed by ethics at all, or whether a rift might run through modern society.

Similar concerns led Marx in a very different direction. In early works such as On the Law on Theft of Wood (1842), Marx takes from Hegel the notion that the poor are outside the ethical order established by bourgeois society. Yet Marx was ultimately unconvinced by Hegel’s attempts at reconciliation (Benhabib 1986: 109) and instead came to the conclusion that civil society and the modern state, far from instantiating conditions of right, merely express the
domination of a particular class. The goal of seeking justice for those excluded and oppressed from the bourgeois social order was therefore seen as meaningless by Marx: justice is not something that can conceivably come into being within capitalist society. The capitalist state is neither the guarantor of a ‘moral community’ of any kind, nor the vehicle for the promotion of universal moral goals, but rather the machinery of oppression. Instead, Marx looks towards the proletariat to take on the historical role of overthowing and abolishing capitalist society, allowing for the realisation of truly human goals. As Rengger argues, Marxism should be understood as a political theory of ultimate ends rather than a theory of right (Rengger 2008: 191). It is not concerned with the duties owed between persons as it is radically sceptical about the possibility for modern capitalist society to support any such system of ethical duties. ‘Justice’ cannot govern relations between bourgeois and proletariat, and thus Marxism calls for the total transformation of capitalist society. Thus there exists a longstanding debate in political theory of whether a theory of Recht, the institutional actualisation of moral principles⁹, is possible at all. Cosmopolitan political philosophy, however, attempts to move from an account of moral values to a fully specified political theory without any consideration of the essential, and irreducibly political, issues of authority, agency and realisability under non-ideal conditions.

**The Difficulties of Justice Beyond the Nation-State**

The above examples suffice to demonstrate that throughout the history of political thought, major thinkers have struggled not only with the question of who owes what to whom, but with the question of whether it is meaningful to speak of political right and obligation at all outside of specific social and political arrangements. These questions necessitate that we make space within political theory for the distinct considerations relevant to political principles. The nature of particular social orders and facts about empirical politics are not merely instrumental concerns, but are crucially relevant for what kind of political principles are relevant for the world as it is or might be. This necessitates an attendance to questions of moral limit and possibility within the present global order. The proposition that the demands of global distributive justice give rise to an action-guiding set of political principles only holds if cosmopolitan political philosophers have not overlooked some salient aspect of the world beyond the nation state. Egalitarian cosmopolitans, however, may have overlooked the problems which deep structural inequalities pose for the institutionalisation of principles of distributive justice beyond the nation state.

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⁹ For a thoroughgoing attempt to explicate a cosmopolitan theory of Recht from within the German tradition of political thought and critical social theory, see Fine (2007).
It may seem perverse to suggest that inequality can undermine the possibility of institutionalising a set of obligations that arise in part from those same inequalities. But inequality may act as an impediment to the realisation of global justice because the material inequalities which are relevant to considerations of justice also shape the power relations between actors – and therefore the feasible moral and political relationships that might exist between them. Many cosmopolitans have grounded the claims regarding global justice on appeal to the existence of an inegalitarian ‘global basic structure’, the institutional structures and enduring patterns of social interaction that determine the fortunes of individuals and societies, reproducing a stratified global order (Buchanan 2000: 703; Pogge 2008: 150; Tan 2004: 25-6). Yet in reflecting on the normative implications of these structural inequalities, such thinkers have focused on the obligations they give rise to, not on the ways in which they might profoundly shape the relations between actors.

Clearly, given the fact that international inequality comprises the primary component of global inequality, any scheme of global distributive justice would involve large net transfers of resources from presently wealthy peoples to less well-off groups in the rest of the world. An egalitarian global distributive scheme is therefore a long way from being incentive compatible for the political representatives of wealthier nations. This is not a compelling argument against the ideal of global distributive justice, *per se*. Cosmopolitanism is a prescriptive theory sets out an evaluative standard based on obligations generated by normative principles such as justice. If the demands of justice are demanding then so be it, after all the present distribution of resources is very demanding on the world’s poor. Nonetheless, the scale of the demands of global distributive justice means that we are venturing deep into the territory of non-ideal theory. If theorists of global social justice are correct, then it seems that what might be prudent for the wealthier political communities in the world is very different from what justice demands of them.

As Pettit suggests, conformity with a cosmopolitan conception of global justice would require ‘saintly’ motivation on the part of wealthy nations (Pettit 2010: 86). However, if un-saintly actors could make some progress towards the ideal of justice then this would not present a problem, global social justice would remain stable as an ideal theory which could at least be approximated under non-ideal conditions. The problem, however, is that spontaneous compliance could not be expected to approximate the ideal of egalitarian justice in an unsaintly world. The problem is highlighted well by the neo-Roman republican theory advanced by Pettit (1997) and Skinner (1998). Taking inspiration from a tradition of thinkers including Cicero and Machiavelli, neo-republican theorists have argued that freedom should be understood not just as the absence of
restraint but being free from domination. A person may be unfree even if not interfered with if the exercise of their rights remains dependent on the good-will of others (Skinner 1998: 70). What matters is not the probability ‘but the mere possibility’ of being deprived of one’s rights (Laborde & Maynor 2008: 7). Under such circumstances individuals are unfree in that they live at the will of another under conditions of dependence and vulnerability (Pettit 1997: 32). Neo-republicans therefore reject the notion that a benevolent tyrant could ever institute conditions of liberty, as the rights of individuals would remain intrinsically precarious.

Although the focus of neo-republicans is on liberty, many of the same considerations apply to questions of social justice. After all, the obligations of social justice are ultimately derived from the equal moral personhood of all agents. According to Pettit, to be acknowledged as a moral agent a person must be able to command respect rather than be granted consideration out of ‘grace or pity’ (Pettit 1997: 32). This is because to be accorded respect ‘is to be treated as a voice that cannot be dismissed without independent reason: to be taken as someone worth listening to’ (Pettit 1997: 91). Justice is the requirement that institutions adequately respect the rights of individuals, giving them their due by treating them with equal concern and respect. But if obligations of justice only flow in a single direction, from the wealthier to the poorer world, then conditions of reciprocity would be absent amongst actors. Transfers of resources rightly owed to other peoples could, at any time, be reduced or curtailed. This would place the supposed beneficiaries of global distributive justice in a position of permanent precariousness and obnoxious dependence, undermining precisely the values on which global social justice is predicated.

Thus it seems that Beitz’s suggestion that, although it is empirically unlikely, an empire might hypothetically promote social justice is deeply misleading and reveals a flaw in cosmopolitan reasoning (Beitz 1999: 99-102)\(^{10}\). Even if the hypothetical empire did act in a way that happened to be consistent with the demands of justice, this would not mean that justice had been established between rulers and the ruled. A hypothetical empire might happen to grant subordinate actors their due in terms of benefits and burdens, but with no effective means of ensuring that their voices could command the attention of their rulers, the former would still not command respect as moral agents. Superordinate actors would always have the option of withdrawing or changing the terms of any agreement between them.

\(^{10}\) We can leave aside the invidious political implications of Beitz’s claim. It is unlikely that many liberal cosmopolitans would now be so glib about appearing to offer legitimation to projects of empire-building. The more important question is why liberal cosmopolitanism, as opposed to neo-republicanism, is unable to provide an adequate, principled, rejection of empire.
To illustrate that this not just an instrumental question with how justice is best realised but rather concerns appropriate principles for non-ideal conditions, it is worth examining an example put forward by Barry to critique the idea of justice as either mutual advantage or reciprocity. The notion of justice as mutual advantage, as put forward by theorists such as Gauthier (1986), claims that an arrangement is just if and only if it benefits all actors concerned more than the status quo ante. As a reductio ad absurdum, Barry asks us to consider the example of contact between European settlers and native Americans, whereby the settlers dispossessed the latter from their lands through force and fraud. He notes that given the power imbalance it was mutually advantageous for both the settlers and native Americans for the latter to acquiesce to grossly unequal treaties rather than be driven off their land (Barry 1995: 41). Barry claims that this scenario arouses our incredulity because it demonstrates that justice as mutual advantage ‘fails egregiously to do one thing that we normally expect a conception of justice to do, and that is provide some moral basis for the claims of the relatively powerless’ (Barry 1995: 46).

But it is possible to acknowledge that the native Americans had a legitimate claim to treatment as equal moral agents whilst remaining sceptical about whether meaningful relations based on justice could have existed between them and the settlers. Even treaties that conformed with the requirements of justice would have left the native Americans in a precarious situation. They would have remained dependent on the continued good will of the settlers given that the treaties could have been reneged upon at any point. Accounts of justice as mutual advantage or reciprocity are clearly flawed because they fail to identify the grounds of justice correctly. But this does not mean that mutual advantage and/or threat reciprocity are not necessary prerequisites for stable conditions of justice between distinct political communities. It would of course have been possible for settlers to refrain from inflicting specific harms on the native Americans, to refrain from inter-personal wrongs, but it is difficult to see how a stable relationship based on justice could have been established between them given the radical power imbalance between the two societies.

Although we may acknowledge that the duties owed by the settlers in this example are genuine obligations, because these duties are not institutionalised within a political relationship they are rendered effectively supererogatory. Praiseworthy individual acts on the part of the settlers could not alter the structural inequalities in the relationship between them and the native Americans. Consideration of this scenario demonstrates the problems that radical inequality causes for political theories of justice. Once we make even the smallest departures away from pure ideal-theory serious problems arise, as equal concern and respect to the beneficiaries of a scheme of justice could not be ensured outside of conditions of strict, indeed total, compliance with the
demands of justice. The beneficiaries, unable to effectively press their own moral claims, would be left dependent on the good will of others, a condition well described by Rousseau as ‘the worst thing that can happen in human affairs’ (Rousseau 1984: 125). Justice cannot be established through being granted by a superordinate actor.

It might be thought that these are merely abstract concerns which do not have any bearing on real-world efforts to imperfectly approximate global justice. However, within a highly unequal international order, steps towards a scheme of global justice might open up opportunities for the exercise of power against such a scheme’s supposed beneficiaries. Because of the incentive incompatibility of global justice, wealthier nations would face constant temptations to use resource flows to further their own goals and interests, subverting the autonomy of others. Indeed, this is a familiar problem. The use of bilateral aid as a means of purchasing political influence and the problems of multilateral conditionalities are well documented (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Woods 2005), and expanding the scale of resource flows might further open up such perverse outcomes. Because of the depth of global inequalities, any global redistributive scheme could not simply consist of a one-off transfer of resources, but would require an ongoing and institutionalised programme. Principles of global social justice, therefore, seem deeply unstable under non-ideal conditions because attempts to institute them might undermine the very values on which they are based – leaving subordinate actors in a situation of obnoxious dependence on the good will of the powerful. Cosmopolitans could, of course, condemn departures from the ideal of justice, but this would not place us any closer to a cosmopolitan political theory which could provide regulative principles appropriate for a non-ideal conditions 11.

Cosmopolitanism Beyond the Constitutional State

It may be that the way in which the international sphere is constituted prevents the stable institutionalisation of an egalitarian distributive scheme. Although there are dangers in drawing too strong a dichotomy, a fruitful contrast can be made with conditions within the democratic nation-state. Although there are great inequalities in contemporary democracies, it is not

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11 It is important to press the point that, as Brown notes (2007a, 10), cosmopolitan theories of justice are put forward as political theories concerning the proper arrangement of political institutions. Theories of justice in this sense are quite distinct from cosmopolitan accounts which focus primarily on interpersonal moral duties in an unequal world, such as that of Singer (1972). If there is no way of bringing an institutional scheme into being which promotes global distributive justice, then cosmopolitan political theory has nothing to offer beyond the account of individual obligations provided by theorists of applied ethics.
impossible for citizens to command a level of moral respect even from powerful actors. Subordinate actors have historically been able to group together to challenge the terms on which the state relates to citizens and citizens relate to one another. Once won, these achievements have been at least reasonably enduring if not irreversible, allowing for somewhat stable conditions for something approximating justice. It would be myopic to ignore the criticisms by radicals of the flaws and limits intrinsic to contemporary states, but total cynicism is equally unwarranted. The modern democratic state establishes the possibility of achieving certain political ideals, as if political institutions fall short of embodying justice, they are not normally dangerously self-undermining and citizens can work to rectify its inadequacies. The problem with cosmopolitanism may be that it has attempted to apply notions of distributive justice to a social setting which has thus far been alien to such concerns. A comparison with Rawls’ project (Rawls 1993), which aimed to justify existing social arrangements and reassure fellow liberals that the normative commitments underlying democratic welfare states were not incoherent, is telling.

There is a possibility that Nagel might thus be partially correct, in that reciprocal submission to a common power within a political community seems like it may be central to the concept of justice. Only it is not the ground for claims of justice, but rather the most familiar and best established, although perhaps not the only, condition under which the institutionalisation of principles of social justice becomes a possibility. Such an approach is taken up by Chwaszcza, who insists that one ineliminable precondition for a scheme of justice is missing in the world beyond the nation-state: a dedicated, central agent capable of upholding conditions of interpersonal right. She thus accuses cosmopolitan political theory of inappropriately transposing liberal political theory into the international domain, surreptitiously assuming the existence of a constitutional state ‘invested with all the relevant competence and responsibility to facilitate justice, peace, welfare, and social and political life’ (Chwaszcza 2008: 122). Chwaszcza claims that because liberal theory presumes an addressee, cosmopolitan notions of global justice make little sense in the absence of a global central authority. As Miller suggests, there exists ‘a large normative gap between identifying a state of affairs as intolerable and identifying agents, individual or collective, who have responsibility to remedy it’ (Miller 2007: 232). Cosmopolitanism, according to Chwaszcza, fails because it mischaracterises the kind of agents that exist in the international sphere and thus the institutionalised principles that can feasibly exist beyond the nation-state. She thus argues that we should address international political theory to those institutional agents that do exist, states in the plural, and jettison fantasies of global justice in favour of more modest but less quixotic ambitions (Chwaszcza 2008: 130-5).
This would seem to lead in the direction of a much more modest conception of the normative ambitions that can be pursued beyond the nation-state, perhaps a thin pluralist inter-state ethics focusing on the goal of mutual coexistence. Nonetheless, this position seems too absolutist, ruling out any more ambitious moral goals by drawing a strict distinction between political morality inside and outside of the constitutional state. Moreover, such an approach presents only a static image of moral possibilities and limits, neglecting the fact that the social relationships that enable the realisation of certain normative principles can and do change. Cosmopolitan political theorists can and do acknowledge that the state system as it presently exists may not be capable of accommodating principles of global justice. But they have also challenged whether certain features of the state-system which act as impediments to the realisation of more expansive moral goals might not be capable of transformation, indeed even undergoing transformation at the present. Thus, by presenting an explicit or implicit sociology of morals, several cosmopolitans have attempted to provide a basis for ‘cosmopolitan hope’ with regards to global justice. In this respect the accounts presented by cosmopolitan political philosophers have significantly overlapped with those put forward by international political theorists professing support for cosmopolitan principles. The following sections analysed three kinds of transformation which cosmopolitan theorists have seen as creating the potential for the realisation of ideals of global justice: the rise of international institutions; multi-layered governance in a post-Westphalian order; normative change associated with globalisation; and the emergence of global civil society.

**Cosmopolitanism and Global Institutions**

The analysis presented above suggested that although the present international order may not allow for the institutionalisation of principles of global justice, this is not a fatal impediment to cosmopolitan political theory if its proponents can point to certain social transformations which might overcome the moral limits and expand the possibilities of the global order. Egalitarian cosmopolitans have sometimes sought to downplay the extent of the change in prevalent practices required by global justice (Brown 2007a: 10-11), but should not shirk from the fact that the obligations of justice they identify would require radical transformations.

A comprehensive scheme of global justice would necessarily imply the creation of new supranational forms of authority. This is disguised by the oft-employed distinction between ‘moral’ and ‘institutional’ cosmopolitanism. The former is a commitment to the universality of certain moral principles, whereas the latter is a commitment to the creation of global, supranational forms of authority (Beitz 1999:199). But as the duties of justice identified by moral
cosmopolitans are claims about the proper organisation of institutions, cosmopolitan accounts of global justice necessarily demand that political institutions the world over be reorganised to comply with an egalitarian scheme of distributive justice. Individuals, no matter what their particular citizenship, would be co-participants within a global scheme promoting and ensuring social justice amongst members of this community. The more ambitious cosmopolitan theories of justice, such as Pogge’s global resource dividend (Pogge 2001), would require something more than this, as serious efforts towards supranational institution building would presumably be required to organise and coordinate the ongoing process of economic redistribution.

Indeed, many moral cosmopolitans have expressed an *instrumental* commitment to institutional cosmopolitanism because they recognise that spontaneous compliance within an unreformed inter-state order is an unfeasible path to global justice. Such thinkers see any statist global order as problematic because of the ‘partiality, one-sidedness and limitedness of ‘reasons of state’” (Held 2004: 178), the exclusiveness of national community and the fact that even democratic states may ignore the interests of non-citizens (Archibugi 2000: 143)\(^\text{12}\). Global institutions might, therefore, provide restraint on the autonomy of states and act to enforce principles of cosmopolitan justice (Caney 2005: 179), effectively serving as a substitute for global constitutional state.

It is worth pausing to note that the emergence of such supranational authorities really would constitute a radical shift in the nature of political community. The consequence of the creation of a set of central global redistributive organisations would not simply be a shift in the flow of valuable resources, but would constitute a wide-ranging revision of existing social relationships. Serious efforts to tackle global inequality would necessarily undermine the locational rents enjoyed by a high proportion of Northern populations, undermining the existing social contract within democratic welfare states\(^\text{13}\). The relationship between citizens and the state in recipient nations would be substantially altered. The link between taxation, democratic representation and the provision of public goods by states might be undermined – a set of relationships already known as the ‘flypaper effect’ in the literature on the political economy of aid (Remmer 2004).

That existing forms of political community would be radically altered is not, in and of itself, an argument against the institutionalisation of a scheme of global distributive justice. The problem is that the empowerment of international organisations as trustees of social justice would not

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\(^{12}\) On the ambivalence of Frankfurt school influenced critical international thought towards the state see also Linklater (1998: 193) and Habermas (1996: 514-5).

\(^{13}\) This argument has been advanced by David Miller as a factor which undermines the cosmopolitan case for global distributive justice. See Miller (2009).
necessarily overcome the problems for global justice present in a structurally unequal, statist order. The cosmopolitan solution seems straightforward: if states are partial and interested, create impartial and disinterested international organisations. Yet this suggestion ignores the way in which international institutions are socially constituted in the present global order. Even if they retain a margin for autonomy, international institutions are widely acknowledged by scholars as the agents of dominant states within the international system and the dominant social actors within those states\textsuperscript{14}. This is not an incidental feature, but part of their social composition and therefore a characteristic of the global order which must be taken account of by political theorist. In a structurally unequal world, the creation of deeper forms of supranational organisation would reproduce rather than transcend the inegalitarianism of a state based order\textsuperscript{15}. As Murphy suggests ‘it is difficult to imagine how even the “global lawmakers” could make a world of relatively equal market power and truly democratic and effective global institutions’ (Murphy 2005: 183). The more critical cosmopolitans such as Archibugi have recognised the potential pitfalls that inegalitarian, hierarchical forms of cosmopolitanism pose (Archibugi 2002: 32). Other such as Held express enthusiasm for steps towards institutional cosmopolitanism (Held 2009: 546) without reflecting on how, as examined in Chapter 1, many of those steps have been bound-up with great-power competition and international hierarchy. As Fine has argued, many cosmopolitan theorists have been too unwilling to face the deep flaws of ‘actually existing cosmopolitanism’ (Fine 2007: 140).

Nonetheless, the role played by international institutions in the present global order is not fixed by some natural necessity, but is part of the way in which the international is presently constituted. Egalitarian cosmopolitans have not fixated on the moral potentials of supranational organisations within an unreformed international order, but rather have seen them as playing an important role in the concert with broader social transformations.

**Normative Change Within a Post-Westphalian Order**

\textsuperscript{14} The dominant ‘neo-liberal institutionalist’ perspective on patterns of international regime building argues that international institutions are instruments for the resolution of problems of coordination and collective action that arise amongst states. Outcomes of international negotiations are determined by the preferences and the bargaining power of states (Drezner 2007). International institutions remain the agents of their state-based principals. The preferences of states are, in turn, shaped by the preferences of major organised interests (Moravcsik 1997). Leading radical perspectives in international political economy broadly agree on this analysis, characterising international institutions as elements of a hegemonic global order that furthers the interests of dominant actors in the most powerful states (Cox 1981; Payne 2005).

\textsuperscript{15} Zolo, a trenchant critic of cosmopolitanism, claims that attempts to create a cosmopolitan order would inevitably consolidate and institutionalise a global oligarchy perpetuating the inequalities of the status quo (Zolo 1997: 2). His argument is rather hyperbolic, but the strong affinity between cosmopolitanism and empire has long been noted by scholars such as Wight (1991: 47-8).
Thinkers such as Linklater (1998) claim that we are in the midst of a transformation of political community. The state-based international system faces challenges it is unable to surmount, pointing towards a ‘post-international’ (Booth 2007: 4) or a ‘post-Westphalian’ (Linklater 1990a: 182) era which has at least the potential for increased collective self-determination and the realisation of universalistic values such as social justice. Cosmopolitan political theorists have thus connected their claims to those of the ‘strong globalization thesis’ who see transformational processes at work in international relations due to the rapid rise in the velocity and density of transnational, transplanetary social interactions (Scholte 2005: 59-60). Under such circumstances democratic nation-states can no longer be understood as self-determining agents (Held 2003a: 161) and the idea of the state as a self-contained structure in which moral goals can be realised becomes increasingly problematic (Fine 2007: xii). The goal of building structures in which individuals can collectively determine their fate without recourse to coercion cannot take place at solely the national level and must be supplemented by a demand to construct new global institutions. Held claims that cosmopolitanism puts forward the solutions to the new challenges posed by globalization and is therefore ‘just as pertinent as the theory of the modern state was when it was first promulgated in *Leviathan*’ (Held 2003b: 465). In a somewhat dialectical movement, globalisation creates a pragmatic need for cosmopolitanism as well as the conditions of the realisation of cosmopolitanism’s normative goals. Cosmopolitanism is therefore held to be grounded in a set of values that are emergent in the present global order, ‘not made up of political ideals for another age’ (Held 2004: 171).

Nonetheless, the claim that ‘globalisation’ is undermining the nation-state as a coherent structure that can uphold individual rights and promote social justice is deeply problematic. In the global South, it is highly debatable whether the process of global economic integration has had any clear or uniform deleterious effect on the state and the enfranchisement of citizens. Global economic integration seems to be accompanied by the renegotiation of socio-economic inclusion and exclusion, rather than a generalised ‘race to the bottom’. As Chapter 1 argued, the

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16 Nonetheless, there remains a lack of consensus about the meaning of the term ‘globalization’. Proponents of the strong globalization thesis such as Scholte have struggled to define the concept in a way that does not reduce it to several other distinct processes (2005: 50-59). Globalisation is variously understood as a cause of social change and the effect of social changes; as a political project and as an organic social process (Desai 2000). As a result, some see the debate over globalisation as fundamentally misguided and have called for its abandonment (Rosenberg 2005). A much more promising strategy than making over-general claims about some purported process of ‘generic globalisation’ is to disaggregate the various processes operating at multiple scales and levels in the social world, as Chapter 1 attempted to.

17 Rudra finds that the welfare state appears to have undergone retrenchment in much of the economically developing world, but this affected relatively better off households rather than the truly poor (2002, 2008). Rudra’s research also finds that that global economic integration does not necessarily hollow out the state,
weakness and disfunctionality of some states has much deeper historical roots than the contemporary microelectronic/communications revolution. Indeed, it is not difficult to locate clear examples where states have successfully increased their role in securing individual rights and evidence suggests that citizens in many economically developing societies are increasingly satisfied with national conditions. It seems premature and unwarranted to assert that the state cannot meaningfully contribute to the goals of global justice. Indeed, Mann and Weiss have argued, ‘globalisation’ has come about as the states of the advanced core have internationalised themselves (Mann 1997; Weiss 1998).

Cosmopolitan political thought has, in fact, been strongly influenced by just such a post-Westphalian political project: the contemporary European Union. For Beck, European integration opens up new possibilities for social organisation, potentially supporting the realisation of post-national cosmopolitan principles (Beck and Grande 2006: 5). Europe in turn becomes an anchor for the wider project of replacing realism with cosmopolitan integration as the underlying logic of international relations (Beck and Grande 2006: 222). Thus Europe is seen as the model for transforming statist and nationalist international relations, enabling the realisation of cosmopolitan values at a global level. A compelling founding myth for a new Europe, perhaps. But in so far as Europe has created a post-national political order, its members are still members of the ‘advanced core’ of industrialised states. The view that the EU represents precursor of the post-Westphalian future of the international order seems to involve some strongly stagist evolutionary assumptions. Nonetheless Beck sees Europe as a sort of catalyst in its influence on the rest of the international system, offering a cosmopolitan alternative to the logic of empire promoted by the US (Beck and Grande 2006: 219-23). Held too sees Europe as playing a leading role in any attempt to reform the international system (Held 2004: 167).

but may coincide with democratisation where it is combined with social safety nets as part of a political bargain (2005).

18 Two examples will suffice: Brazil’s Bolsa Familia policies are credited with successfully redistributing resources and extending services to poor households. On Brazil see The Economist, Feb 7 2008, http://www.economist.com/world/americas/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10650663. According to research by ActionAid, the related Fome Zero policy managed to reduce child hunger by 73 percent and child deaths by 45 percent. See World Bank Growth and Crisis Blog, 13 November 2009, http://blogs.worldbank.org/growth/brazil-fights-hunger-illiteracy. In India, liberalisation and integration into the global economy may have increased inequalities, but they have not decreased the volume of the popular demands on the democratic state. Scholars of Indian politics have identified a ‘silent revolution’ in the form of lower-caste mobilisation (Jaffrelot 2003). The recent protests against corruption provide evidence of an increasingly assertive Indian demos. This is not in any way to underestimate the extremes of social and economic exclusion in India or Brazil, but to suggest that the narrative of ‘unfinished democratisation’ is at least as plausible as that of ‘the retreat of the state’. These examples are two of dozens that could be drawn from emerging economies and consolidating democracies in the developing world.

19 Data gathered by the Pew Global Attitudes Project on cross-national levels of satisfaction with national governments suggests that satisfaction in much of the global South is rising: http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=257
Whether Europe can significantly alter the dominant logic of international relations and restructure relations between unequals within the international system deserves sustained attention, and will be examined at length in Chapter 6.

Even if contemporary states are not in terminal decline as frameworks which can contribute to the goals of social justice, changes associated with a ‘post-Westphalian’ world might nonetheless be creating new moral possibilities. ‘Communities of fate’ may come into being exist beyond the nation-state (Held 2003a: 161), forming the basis for new cosmopolitan renegotiations of political community. This may come about, not only through top-down attempts at institution-building, but through bottom-up molecular processes. Waldron argues that a cosmopolitan ethic may emerge interstitially as a result of the ‘circumstances of dense interaction that occur all over the place’ (Waldron 2006: 98). Appealing to what he calls the ‘positive, expository dimension’ in Kant’s approach (Waldron 2006: 94), he argues that cosmopolitan principles should be understood as first originating in practice and shared sentiment but then eventually taking on life as a ‘worldly normative reality’ (Waldron 2006: 95). This ‘worldly reality’ provides a basis for cosmopolitan norms that mere ‘moralizing’ on the part of philosophers and political theorists cannot (Waldron 2006: 93). Global cosmopolitanism becomes feasible because it becomes part of the lived social reality of individuals, part of the warp and woof of ordinary experience. Dobson echoes this point, arguing that ‘distant proximities’ (Rosenau 2003) have turned ‘the theoretical possibility of transnational obligation... into everyday reality’ (Dobson 2006: 180).

These sort of decentralised processes might, some cosmopolitan theorists claim, lead to a shift in the patterns of normative belief across the international system. Many cosmopolitan international political theorists hold that emancipatory goals might thus be realised by rethinking the ‘normative foundations on which modern political life is organized’ (Devetak 2002: 175). For Booth the ‘broad structural patterns of our lives’ (Booth 2007: 21) have been dominated by belief systems, ‘world constructing ideas’ (Booth 2007: 11), that deny human universality and prevent individuals from seeing themselves in terms of ‘the global we’ (Booth 2007: 2). In a similar ideationalist or constructivist vein, cosmopolitan political philosophers have frequently drawn Singer’s notion of the expanding moral circle (Singer 1981), the widening of the domain of those

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20 In the same way in which the existence of a national community does not necessarily obviate the persistence of local communities, new feasible transnational relations based on cosmopolitan right and interpersonal right within the nation-state are not mutually exclusive.

21 Indeed, Waldron is critical of an approach to political philosophy that ‘involves little more than the moralizing of an individual over some issue of right or justice accompanied by a meta-ethical claim to objectivity so far as that moralizing is concerned’. See Waldron (2006: 93). Waldron’s approach is strongly Wittgensteinian in that he sees participation in ongoing norm-governed practices as providing the normative ground for those practices. Attempting to locate fact-independent values or criteria wholly external to existing practices is therefore a misguided effort.
deemed to be morally relevant. Beitz regards it as a ‘commonplace’ that the ‘circle of affinity is historically variable’ (Beitz 2000: 683), whilst Caney suggests that moral boundaries can be redrawn to include co-nationals because the sources of moral motivation might be widened to include concern for those beyond the nation-state (Caney 2005: 133). This expansion of concern from co-nationals to all humanity is central to Linklater’s approach, which focuses on teasing out the possibilities for cosmopolitan change already immanent within the present normative order. Thus he regards commitments to ameliorating unjustifiable material inequalities as already implicit within the normative commitments of increasingly post-Westphalian liberal democracies (Linklater 1998: 3).

However, issue must be taken with the evolutionary notions of a progressively expanding circle of concern. If we examine historical examples of the institutionalisation of schemes of distributive justice we find much more radical, ambiguous and wrenching transformations. The emergence of the modern democratic welfare-state, the most enduring ‘community of fate’ in the cotemporary world, arose in substantial part as an inadvertent consequence of a torturous process of industrialisation, class-struggle and war-making efforts by state bureaucracies. State-building involved the break-down and absorption of existing trust-networks and concerted attempts to mould disparate communities into a national citizenry through education and enforced cultural homogeneity. The renegotiations involved in building and extending schemes of distributive justice cannot be brushed aside lightly, as they involve quite radical reconfigurations of morally significant relationships between actors. Increased communication and interaction alone will not necessarily effect a shift towards egalitarian norms, whilst the structures which shape the moral possibilities of the social world are not only ideational, but also material and organisational.

Thus major shifts in the values embodied in particular social orders do not come about through spontaneous normative shifts alone, but through protracted episodes of political struggle and social renegotiation. Thus we need to examine the account of agency employed in the moral sociology advanced by cosmopolitan international political theorists.

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22 Central contributions in the voluminous literature on the making of the modern state include Mann (1993), Skocpol (1992), Tilly (1992), Tilly (1993).
23 Murphy (2005: 175) notes that throughout much of the world the extremely wealthy live side-by-side with the very poor without the emergence of any common sense of solidarity.
24 Indeed, despite a more recent emphasis on the power of diffuse ideas, cosmopolitan-oriented critical theory has in the past acknowledged that thought alone does not bring about normative change. Theorists can only highlight possibilities and immanent potentials, their realisation depends on the political praxis of historically acting subjects (Held 1990: 178).
Global Civil Society as the Agent of Global Social Justice

The claims of cosmopolitan theories of social justice are not only directed at existing institutions and extant sites of authority, as Chwazscza’s arguments suggest, but comprise obligations to bring institutions and sites of authority into line with the demands of justice or create them if none already exist\(^\text{25}\). Thus in a global order which is presently unable to support principles of distributive justice, the obligation falls on conscientious individuals the world over to bring about the transformation necessary. It is here that cosmopolitan political philosophy locates its addressees and agents, expressing a clear affinity with approaches in international political theory which have identified a key role for global civil society and networks of transnational activists\(^\text{26}\). Such networks can be thought to comprise a nascent element of ‘world society’, in that they act on the basis of a notion of a common humanity with certain shared interests and bound by common moral principles.

Whereas cosmopolitan political theorists readily acknowledge that states may be governed by a logic of self-interest, participants in global civil society/world society are seen as free to pursue goals based on moral principles. By contributing towards normative and institutional change, such actors might effect a transition to a global order which is hospitable to principles of global social justice. Non-state actors might act to hold states and international actors to account by drawing attention to questions of inequality and injustice (Morvaridi 2008: 32). Global civil society therefore might act as a conscience and a corrective to the one-sidedness of *raison d'état*, forcing states to modify their behaviour to bring it into line with justice and thus ‘humanising’ international relations. Held puts forward a vision of post-Westphalian order in which global civil society actors would play a key part in the deliberative process of fashioning new ‘multi-layered’ institutions (Held 2004: 112, 115-6). The new specialised, functional agencies, operating under global democratic oversight, would then act as agents capable of discharging the duties of cosmopolitan justice. Thus actors within world society are identified as playing an essential role in the transformations which would enable the international order to support the institutionalisation of principles of global justice.

\(^{25}\) This is an important element of the ‘division of moral labour’ employed by post-Rawlsian theories of justice. Individuals cannot be expected to take on the burden of promoting social justice, this falls to the political and legal institutions of a liberal democratic society. But individuals do have the obligation to maintain these institutions and support efforts to bring the ‘basic structure’ of a society into line with social justice.

\(^{26}\) For an empirical analysis of transnational activist networks in world politics, see Keck and Sikkink (1998).
The more globalist position articulated by theorists such as Archibugi looks towards the emergence of a global democratic community as the spread of mass media and information technology makes what was a moral possibility a social reality (Archibugi 2002: 25). In the stronger version of this thesis, an activist global civil society acts as a ‘vanguard’, a demos-in-waiting for a ‘cosmopolitanism to come’. This position, which might be ascribed to some of the actors involved within the World Social Forum, sees the present international order as transitional, pregnant with the possibility of a new global order in which cosmopolitan right might be realised through the actions of a collective agent, a ‘postmodern Prince’ (Gill 2000a) or the global ‘multitude’ (Negri and Hardt 2000). Pogge too appeals to the notion that only a few thousand activists could ‘change the world forever’ and eradicate severe poverty in just a few years (2005: 80-81). World society therefore is presented as emerging interstitially within a state-based order to act on behalf of an immanent global moral community.

In seeking to understand the changing moral limits and possibilities within the global order, and therefore the principles which might meaningfully apply beyond the nation-state, the role of global civil society or world society cannot be ignored. Some have questioned the power of such actors to effect transformative change, claiming that non-state actors are limited in their ability to ‘fundamentally challenge the state, the corporation or the structure of international governance’ (Reitan 2007: 453). Nonetheless this issue cannot be answered in the abstract, and their potential to act on behalf of egalitarian principles within a structurally unequal state-system warrants close empirical analysis. Thus Chapter 5 analyses the role of global civil society actors in the campaigns for debt cancellation and analyses the limits and possibilities of this form of agency.

**Dialogic Ethics and Asymmetric Relations**

However, aside from the issue of how effective global civil society actors can be in pushing issues of distributive justice onto the agenda in what remains a statist international order, there is a further question about whether they can truly transcend the inequalities that cosmopolitans identify as morally scandalous. The asymmetric relationships which structure international relations are unlikely to shape merely the relations between states, but also might shape the composition of any putative world society. Advocates of transnational networks and civil society have been accused of failing to appreciate the impact of such inequalities. A central problem is that participation within these groups and networks is likely to be restricted to ‘a vanguard of transnational civil society activists’ (Smith and Brasset 2008: 86). Thus transnational advocacy networks are likely to reflect the views and commitments of the committed activists, largely based in the wealthier societies of the North, who compose them. It is thus questionable
whether we can speak of a global civil society when participation is limited in important respects to citizens of the dominant states in an unequal international system. Similar concerns have prompted many to 'question by what authority non-governmental organisations purport to speak for others and aspire to influence domestic and international polities' (Reitan 2007: 449). Even enthusiasts of post-territorial governance such as Held have worried NGOs may sometimes hinder rather than help cosmopolitan objectives, noting that the prevalence of Northern transnational actors may mean that in many international forums already dominant states may be represented twice (Held 2004: 112). Global civil society actors are not necessarily ‘angels’ or ‘nomads’ (Reitan 2007) free to act as agents on behalf of pure principle as sometimes represented; Barnett has demonstrated that humanitarian and development organisations are strongly influenced by environmental constraints (Barnett 2009), constraints which likely reflect wider structures of power and inequality.

If actors within global civil society cannot stand outside global structures of inequality then this jeopardises the sociology of morals advanced explicitly by cosmopolitan international political theorists and implicitly by cosmopolitan political philosophers. Global civil society is frequently identified as supplying the agency required to transform the international order and make global justice realisable. But, if global civil society reproduces the same inequalities of the inter-state system then peripheralised peoples would remain dependent on the good-will of some external agent. As Chandler argues, such a relationship lacks any sort of reciprocity between the rights holder and the duty holder (Chandler 2003: 340), the former might be granted what they are owed but remain unable to demand it. We have shifted the original problem of moral asymmetry rather than transcended it.

The problem may, however, be even more acute than this, as what is at stake is not just transfers of resources but profound transformations in the nature of political community. As examined previously, even modest steps towards a comprehensive scheme of global justice would both require and in turn generate political struggles and complex renegotiations of rights, challenging previously settled moral commitments. Any such transformations would generate consequences which could not be predicted and incorporated a priori into our political theories. Faced with new moral frontiers, political theory should not necessarily regard our commitments as settled, but accept that empirical developments may shed light on reasons for holding certain commitments and might even encourage us to revise our principles. To the extent that valid political principles must take into account the broad features of the social world, it is dubious to attempt to preempt the open ended process of social renegotiation that the creation of new forms of moral
community necessarily involves. Therefore the attempt to put forward a fully specified account of global justice is premature.

These concerns are in fact articulated powerfully in the tradition of Frankfurt School critical political theory influenced by Habermas, in which the possibility for communicative reason immanent in human social relations holds out the prospect for the establishment of universal moral norms and human emancipation. The validity of moral norms cannot be assessed outside of the historical development of the human capacity for rational self-determination and the particular forms of political community that human beings construct amongst themselves (Linklater 1990a: 136-7). From this perspective Held argues the principles that govern social life cannot be determined a priori through an exercise in philosophical reasoning and must be arrived at through impartial deliberation (Held 2009: 542). This concern has been most fully developed by Benhabib, who emphasizes what she calls the jurisgenerational qualities of argument, the possibility that successive ‘democratic iterations’ will reconfigure notions of rights, moral boundaries and political membership (Benhabib 2006: 69). Valid principles emerge from negotiation and dialogue between actors engaged in certain common practices.

Even if we remain agnostic about its moral epistemology, this dialogical approach has much to recommend it methodologically. There are good reasons to maintain an incredulity or degree of Pyrrhonian scepticism about normative claims which have not been subject to wide-ranging debate (Hurrell 2007: 302-3). The moral community embodied in the modern nation-state had a long gestation period, passing through many ‘democratic iterations’ where new moral challenges arose and were subject to negotiation. Modern political thought developed as an attempt to make sense of these changes and respond to the moral challenges generated within new forms political community. Normative innovations such as human rights might or might not have a fact-independent validity, but this is of far less importance than the fact that they have demonstrated their worth as ‘relative universals’ capable of meeting the challenges posed in a world of ‘bureaucratic states and economic markets’ (Donnelly 2007: 287). Beyond the nation-state, however, the iterative process of renegotiation and reflection in response to the moral challenges of an interdependent world is still very much in its infancy. At the frontiers of political morality we cannot simply put our faith in our existing intuitions to guide us. Thus claims made by political philosophers such as Tan that a cosmopolitan theory of global justice should leave no room for competing accounts is deeply problematic (Tan 2004: 79). The criteria of hypothecal justification, the test of whether all rational agents would supposedly give their assent to a

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27 Which is why post-colonial scholars such as Chakrabarty (2008) readily acknowledge the indispensability of this tradition for understanding the moral problems posed by modernity.
principle, is inadequate. It takes no account of either the commitments actors actually do hold, the rationality of which may at first be difficult to discern, or of normative concerns which we cannot anticipate due to the open-ended nature of political change. As Chapter 3 will examine, in the absence of a central enforcer, the development of principles which could attain widespread legitimacy is even more important – as norms themselves have to be authoritative in order to ensure compliance. Thus we might agree with Forst, who elaborates a critical theory of transnational justice, defending the actual practice of dialogue and justification as the 'starting point for the construction of principles of justice' (Forst 2001: 169). In lieu of offering a fully specified account of what global social justice, we might instead — informed by normative theorising — focus our attention on those sites where negotiation over principles of global social justice have already begun in earnest.

However whilst Frankfurt School-influenced international political theorists readily acknowledge the importance of communicative reason and expanding the scope for open dialogue as part of the construction of new cosmopolitical democratic institutions, there are serious problems with the sociology of morals they advance. If, as suggested above, deep structural inequalities act as impediments for the truly marginalised to participate in the social renegotiations that will reshape the global order, then this must inevitably raise serious questions about any cosmopolitical project. The sources of transformation identified by cosmopolitan political theorists are all primarily socio-spatially located within the Northern advanced core of the global order: duty-bearing wealthy states; the supranational institutions that act as their agents; pockets of post-Westphalia; the transformative changes associated with ‘generic globalisation’; and the mobilised citizens of democracies participating in transnational activist networks. Bull’s concern about the shallow roots of cosmopolitan global culture and world society remains salient given that the vast majority of humanity has little opportunity to participate in it (Bull 1977: 305). Murphy has powerfully illustrated that the huge social distance between the global elite and the globally marginalised means that it is extremely difficult for the former, however well meaning, to develop an awareness of the values and concerns of the latter (Murphy 2005: 182-3). If marginalised peoples cannot participate in the process of negotiation over a post-Westphalian order, any ‘democratic iteration’ over principles of distributive justice will be crucially circumscribed.

The Moral Potential of International Society

This problem seems to leave us at an impasse. Is it possible to conceive of an account of global social justice which does not leave the supposed beneficiaries hostage to the good-will of the
powerful, or excluded from the process of renegotiation over rights and duties amongst actors in an economically interdependent world? One possibility, overlooked by cosmopolitan international political theorists, is that steps towards global social justice might be achieved within the context of a state-based order and that such steps might indeed be a necessary prerequisite for a globally just order. That is, we might enquire whether transformations endogenous to the state-system could provide greater opportunity for the realisation of egalitarian goals than might its transcendence by new global forms of political community. We might, therefore, go against the grain of much contemporary international political thought and explore the possibility that there is more moral potential within international society than in 'world society'.

It is worth recalling Bull’s argument that the state-system itself is not the root cause some of the major injustices of the world (Bull 2002 [1977]: 280). As Keck and Sikkink acknowledge: ‘even where third world activists may oppose the policies of their own governments, they have no reason to believe that international actors would do better, and considerable reason to suspect the contrary’ (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 215). As they go onto suggest, the ideal of statehood still commands great loyalty in many parts of the global South. Rao suggests that activists in the global South often utilise transnational channels, not to exit the national *demos* in favour of a nascent world society, but to shame their own governments and compel them to better represent their people (Rao 2010: 139). As outlined above, the strong globalisation thesis of the withering away of the state is greatly overstated. Moreover, the idea that the ideal of democratic self-determination in the global South can be brushed aside as a trivial or irrelevant moral accomplishment in a global era displays a myopia that borders on arrogance.

Indeed, as Bull claimed 'it has been by creating sovereign states in defiance of the colonial powers... that the poorer and weaker nations have been able to achieve some measure of international justice for themselves' (Bull 2002 [1977]: 281). National sovereignty has been something of a shield through which weak societies have attempted to protect themselves from the extremes of international inequality, even when they have been grievously failed by their own representatives. In an international system which is only incompletely globally integrated, ‘insofar as the population of the world can express itself politically, it is only via the society of states’ (Jackson 2000: 112). Statehood grants a people a voice within the international sphere, and thus in achieving self-government peripheralised peoples might, potentially, be able to participate in the process of negotiation over the terms of co-existence in an unequal world.\(^28\)

\[^28\] It may be that the appeal of cosmopolitical solutions to global problems is more geographically limited than cosmopolitan political theorists have recognised. A survey carried out by Chase-Dunn and others at
Division of the world into separate political communities is not only an impediment to cosmopolitan aspirations, creating a bifurcated moral universe that distinguishes between duties to compatriots and those owed to persons in general, but actually contains moral possibilities of its own by according even the weakest and most marginal peoples some form of political agency. Cosmopolitan political theorists have made a case for looking towards world society and a nascent post-Westphalian normative order as the source of emancipatory potential. But in an unequal world there is reason to reflect on the moral potentials still unrealised in a society of states.

Conclusion

The above enquiry has suggested that the present international order is not socially constituted such that principles of global justice could attain stability. Even well intentioned attempts to make progress towards approximating egalitarian ideals of social justice would remain problematic in a structurally unequal world, creating the potential for more deeply asymmetric relationships between rights-bearers and duty-holders. Cosmopolitan notions of global justice are therefore too fragile to withstand exposure to even minimally non-ideal conditions. Thus it seems that the Hegelian goal of a reconciliation between our ethical impulses and the world in which we find ourselves in, a goal taken up by contemporary political philosophers such as Rawls (1999a), may remain out of reach. The grounds may exist for demands of global justice without the conditions for the possibility of their realisation. If ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, then this creates serious problems for accounts of global social justice which are intended to ground authoritative political principles. Our moral horizons may have expanded beyond our ability to construct new, effective forms of political community capable of institutionalising moral principles without creating new forms of moral jeopardy.

Nonetheless, in the tradition of emancipatory social science, we should not regard the barriers and impediments to realizing certain values within a specific order as being immutable and fixed. Cosmopolitan political theorists have thus attempted to locate sources of ‘cosmopolitan hope’ through the identification of transformative possibilities within the global order. These efforts amount to a more or less coherent cosmopolitan sociology of morals, serving as an adjunct to cosmopolitan political philosophy and a core element of cosmopolitan international political

the World Social Forum found a much more scepticism about the notion of global democracy amongst delegates from the global South compared to those from the North. See Chase-Dunn et al (2008: 353).
theory. International institutions, ‘generic globalisation’ and an activist global civil society are hypothesized as being able to correct the maladies of a state-based international order.

Yet whilst cosmopolitans have focused on the fact that the world is divided into distinct political communities, creating a bifurcated moral universe that distinguishes between duties to compatriots and those owed to persons in general, structural inequality itself seems to be an equally salient obstacle standing in the way of establishing the preconditions for progress towards global distributive justice. The establishment of new forms of political community embodying principles of distributive justice would necessarily involve more than just the straightforward expansion of the circle of moral concern. Movement towards even a minimal scheme of global social justice would demand widespread and radical renegotiations of rights and duties amongst actors. The transformative processes cosmopolitans look towards would not necessarily allow for the supposed beneficiaries of a putative scheme of global justice to actually participate in the process of negotiation over the terms of any new cosmopolitical order.

The cosmopolitan perspective and the sources of transformative potential it identifies should not be dismissed and indeed in later chapters will provide important lines of enquiry. Nonetheless, through a critique of cosmopolitan political theory, this chapter has made a case for an egalitarian perspective which focuses on the possibilities of international society. Cosmopolitan political theorists may have been too dismissive of the moral potentials of the inter-state dimension of human affairs, a position that mirrors uneasily the stance of realists. Certainly, many cosmopolitans have been overly hasty in their claim that states can no longer serve as frameworks in which the goals of social justice can be advanced. Indeed, democratic states are in a unique structural position in that domestic political representatives can potentially be held accountable by their citizens in a way that transnational agents cannot. If the states representing the marginalised and peripheral peoples of the world are able to act as genuine representatives for their interests, then they may be able to serve as the vehicle for claims of justice within international society. This chapter has suggested some reasons why steps by subordinate states to demand greater international equality might be a necessary prerequisite for progress towards global justice. If so, then in assessing the sources of potential transformative agency and the conditions for the possibility of global justice, it might be necessary to focus on the attempts by states within the global South to challenge certain inegalitarian features of the global order and to renegotiate the principles which govern contemporary international society.

Based on these considerations, the following chapter seeks to assess the extent of the potential for international society contains unrealised potential for the renegotiation of relations between
unequal actors. This entails focusing, not on external or interstitial sources of transformation, but on endogenous sources of change within the set of common practices and intersubjectively binding rules that constitute international society. Chapter 3 attempts to advance such an enquiry through a focus on political argument, the iterated exchange of claims which appeal to wider principles beyond the immediate interests of actors. It thus attempts to question how far social renegotiation over the terms of cooperation and interdependence might be possible in an unequal world organised into distinct political communities. This shifts the focus from external sources of agency and transformation to an examination of the possibility that the representatives of the subordinate peoples of the global order might challenge and even transform structural impediments to global social justice.
Chapter 3
Political Argument, Inequality and Moral Agency: Assessing the Moral Limits and Possibilities of International Society

The previous chapter questioned whether principles of global distributive justice could achieve stability in an unequal international order and found cosmopolitan accounts of the transformative possibilities residing in world society and a post-Westphalian North to be problematic. For this reason it argued that international political theorists should not be as quick to dismiss the moral potential of international society. Within the society of states, even very marginal or peripheral peoples may be able to exercise a degree of voice through the attainment of statehood. It might therefore be possible that states might act as potential vehicles for the relatively marginalised to hold others to account and to issue moral claims about the terms of coexistence in an interdependent world.

The present chapter aims to pursue these suggestions by focusing on the possibility of political argument in a world of states. Political argument is understood as a process of contested claim making, a controlled form of conflict which might enable existing structures and governing principles to be opened up for renegotiation. It develops a framework which seeks to identify a distinctive dynamic of political argument, distinguishing it from both truth-seeking dialogue and interest-based bargaining, whilst advancing mechanisms which might enable its operation. The approach adopted in this chapter therefore holds that there may be some substantive normative content to the claims and appeals made by states in international relations, and that international society does embody certain values. However, scope for political argument and normative renegotiation in international relations is affected both the fact of anarchy and the deep structural inequalities within the international system. The discussion thus identifies that limits on political argument that these factors impose. Through an engagement with the English School or international society perspective, the analysis turns towards an assessment of the scope for organised attempts to initiate political argument through participation in the common practices of statehood. Acknowledging that some space for political argument, and therefore the expansion of the moral remit of international society, may exist within international relations, the analysis nonetheless emphasises that the conditions for substantive political argument always remain a fragile and precarious achievement.

Intersubjective Renegotiation and Normative Change in International Relations
Chapter 2 suggested some reasons to be cautious of accounts which seek to provide grounds for ‘cosmopolitan hope’ through social evolutionist accounts which posit the obsolescence of the nation state and a global shift towards egalitarian values through the interstitial emergence of a singular world society. This account of the emancipatory potentials of ‘generic globalisation’ (Sklair 2009) and global civil society is both empirically tendentious and normatively problematic. Instead, this chapter attempts to analyse the potential for the realisation of egalitarian goals within international society by examining the extent to which such an order might feasibly afford subordinate parties the opportunity to renegotiate their own position. As argued in the previous chapter, any movement towards a defensible ideal of global distributive justice would require far reaching and extensive renegotiations between existing political communities as both an empirical precondition and as a normative requirement. Specifically, such a negotiation would need to take place those who claim to represent the peoples of the advanced industrialised core and those who claim to represent peripheral peoples.

Constructivist scholars have emphasised the extent to which all international relations is the product of socially negotiated relationships between actors: the international order is to a large degree ‘a world of our making’ (Onuf 1989). Despite the fact that Wendt has at times put forward explicitly evolutionary and teleological arguments (Wendt 2003), the social constructivist research programme that he helped to pioneer emphasises the fundamental openness of all social negotiations over roles, norms and identities (Wendt 1999). The original constructivist research programme drew on a Searlean account of speech-acts and Giddens’ notion of structuration, but constructivist scholars such as Risse have also employed Habermasian notions of the ideal speech position to delineate a class of social interactions distinct from those governed by a logic of consequences and a logic of appropriateness (Risse 2000: 3). On Risse’s account, argumentative rationality is distinct from strategic rationality because the goal of the former is to arrive at a reasoned consensus through an open ended dialogue in which power plays no role and preferences are not fixed (Risse 2000: 7). Risse cautiously suggests that in at least some circumstances in international relations the force of better argument does in fact seem to determine outcomes (Risse 2000: 28).

If Risse is correct then the consequences for our understanding of international relations are significant, as international political outcomes may be in part determined by substantive normative claims as well as strategic considerations and behavioural norms. Crawford’s *Argument and Change in World Politics* (2002) is perhaps the most significant attempt to explore the implications of such a position, examining centuries of large-scale normative change in international relations as the outcome of repeated instances of ethical argument. Crawford
repeatedly emphasises the ubiquity of ethical argument over prescriptive, action-guiding norms within international relations (Crawford 2002: 12, 85-6, 101, 119). She argues that ‘the major evolutionary or revolutionary changes of world politics are thus a consequence of reasoned choice’ about substantive moral principles (Crawford 2002: 10). Similarly, Linklater might be interpreted as, in addition to advancing more evolutionary lines of argument, making the claim that the universal capacity for communicative reason suggests that possibilities present within the modern world, revealed through immanent critique, might be actualised through conscious choice (Linklater 1990a: 134-7; Linklater 1998: 5).

If the relations between states are in substantial part the result of truth-seeking debate and reasoned moral choices then it does seem possible that egalitarian claims could result in a wide-reaching renegotiation of the relationships within international society. Such a process would be potentially transformative, as through argument the subordinate party might be able to re-write the relationships constitutive of their status as unequals.

Risse, however, is somewhat less sanguine than Crawford about the scope for truth-seeking dialogue: states may talk a lot ‘but do not necessarily argue, reason or deliberate’ (Risse 2000: 8). He acknowledges that the three logics of social interaction he identifies are ideal-types (Risse 2000: 8) and that in reality the three may overlap, meaning that dialogue may in fact proceed strategically in a manner that is not entirely truth conducive (Risse 2000: 18). Given the structural inequalities identified in Chapter 1, asymmetries and power-differentials are likely never to be absent from instances of argument between unequals. Crawford is cognisant of this consideration, noting that we can expect normative argument in international relations to occur on ‘a decidedly unlevel playing field’ (Crawford 2002: 31). But acknowledging a problem is not the same as addressing it; constructivism simply lacks the conceptual tools to address questions of material power and inequality in the process of social renegotiation and normative change. Anarchy might be what states make of it, but inequality implies that social relationships have already been constituted in a certain way. Asymmetric relationships and differential possession of attributes shape the possibilities for renegotiation on the part of actors. Even shifts in patterns of normative belief may not transform asymmetric relationships and structural patterns of inequality. Thus we can identify deep continuities in North-South relations despite superficial changes in moral discourse (Cowen and Shenton 1996; Keene 2004; Duffield 2009).

1 For example, colonial territories were able to convince imperial powers to acknowledge their status as sovereign states. See the discussion of decolonisation in the Introduction.

2 Certainly the narrative of unilinear progress which Crawford’s account sometimes suggests is flawed: the crudest forms of biological racism arose after the abolition of the transatlantic slave trade. The defeat of latter through political argument did not stop another ideological set of practices that denied common
Thus it is necessary to go beyond constructivist approaches to develop an account of the possibilities and limits of inter-state argument and renegotiation. Rather than viewing power and inequality as extrinsic to the process of reasoned deliberation, this account attempts to acknowledge them as ineliminable features of the encounter between unequal moral agents in international relations. However, rather than encouraging cynicism, this approach will attempt to locate the normative possibilities that do exist within a power-political setting by identifying the potential for substantive argument even in a non-ideal context. The following account thus advances a moral sociology of international society that recognises that substantive normative change is an open and contingent process in which the practices of reason-giving necessary to generate morally legitimate, authoritative norms are fragile.

The Possibility of Political Argument

As suggested above, central issues relating to how negotiation over substantive principles occurs within an unequal, power-political context. True, the notion of dialogue within an ideal speech situation is regarded by theorists such as Risse as an ideal-type which can only be approximated in reality (Risse 2000: 8). Yet this leaves the problem that a potentially unbridgeable gap seems to exist between the ‘logic of argument’ and the ‘logic of consequences’. Truth-seeking dialogue seems fundamentally incompatible with strategic means-end rationality. The idea of strategic argument, in which actors advance substantive arguments in order to advance their own interests, seems incoherent. The problem is that if each actor is aware that the arguments being put forward by the other are merely self-serving, they would presumably disregard them as expressions of disguised interest or just cheap talk. In a process equivalent to backwards induction in game theory, argument would unravel and be replaced by straightforward bargaining. If, however, actors take seriously the principles underlying the arguments being put to them, one would expect that they would not seek to manipulate them to their own advantage.

The actual practice of argument might therefore be neither fully rational in either a substantive or instrumental sense, making it difficult to explain analytically. Nevertheless, despite the incompatibility of these two logics, intuitively both appear to be at work in politics both at the

humanity from taking its place. The victories won by argument might not, therefore, always be permanent.

3 In that genuine, but strategic argument might involve agents holding incoherent preferences and beliefs that could not be plausibly reconciled, such as maintaining that a principle should hold universally – except in one’s own case, or in appealing to one principle but ignoring another intersubjectively acknowledged principle, or appealing to and denying the validity of a the same principles in different argumentative settings.
domestic and international level. Empirical research has suggested that, whilst unambiguous examples of truth-seeking dialogue are difficult to locate in international relations, international negotiations are guided by procedural moral norms and almost always involve appeals that go beyond threats, offers and assertions of preference (Albin 2003; Deitelhoff and Müller 2005). Yet the accounts offered thus far in international relations theory of how an international order based on shared norms is maintained have thus far been rather thin: Buzan argues that coercion, interest and internalised norms all play a role but fails to specify the crucial mechanisms (Buzan 2004: 233-4). We do not have a truly satisfying account of how argument can meaningfully operate outside of ideal conditions and thus lack a moral sociology which would aid our non-ideal inquiry into global justice. This section therefore attempts to advance the debate about how key mechanisms enabling strategic argument and contested normative change might operate.

To make sense of this problem we might depart from convention by treating political argument as something distinct from rather than synonymous with dialogue, examining it as a distinct social process in its own right. We can define political argument as comprising those instances where actors make iterated appeals to wider principles to support the pursuit of their goals by attempting to convince one another and third parties of the legitimacy of their claims. Under this definition, political argument is more distinct from interest-based bargaining within a given structure because in advancing their goals actors appeal to established principles, whilst at the same time calling for them to be reinterpreted or applied in novel circumstances. Such a concept of political argument draws on the ‘contentious politics’ approach of Tilly and Tarrow (2007), which emphasises both the close connection between the ‘political opportunity structure’ and opportunities for political contention. Yet, because organised political claims can transform the structural context of action, there is a reciprocal relationship between structural context and political contention — meaning that episodes of political contention are fluid and open (Tilly 2006: 58, 113, 214).

Nonetheless, we can gain further analytic leverage by adapting the conceptual framework Mann employs for the analysis of power. Mann’s account of the emergence of socially organised power networks builds on Parsons’ attempt to construct a theory of the emergence of collective power (Mann 1986: 7). Dissatisfied with the Weber-Dahl definition of power as zero-sum and relational, Parsons advances a conception of social power based on an analogy with the creation of credit in a monetary economy. Only a very simple economic system can be based on the direct exchange of commodities: complex economic systems develop a generalised medium of exchange, based initially on metallic coinage but eventually on symbolic tokens representing a claim on some valuable resource (Parsons 1963: 240). Similarly only a very basic political system
can be based on force, the emergence of a political system governing complex social interaction requires that other kinds of transaction replaces the direct exercise of coercive power. Parsons points to democratic political systems as an exemplar of this process, in which citizens grant political actors power by casting votes (Parsons 1963: 254). The argument parallels Schumpeter’s defence of democracy as providing an efficient mechanism for allocating power according to who would have been victorious in a counterfactual civil war (Schumpeter 1985). Voting and organised party politics provide a rough estimate of the distribution of power in society, enabling political disagreements to be settled without recourse to force. Parsons argument is also echoed in Morgenthau’s claim that attempts to assert national prestige represent efforts by states to convince others of their material power, as the policy of prestige sends semi-reliable signals about a nation’s capabilities and intentions (Morgenthau 1978: 172). It is noteworthy that Gilpin describes status as the ‘currency’ of international relations (Gilpin 1981: 31).

Parsons however takes his analysis beyond a concern with relational or dyadic power, as drawn upon by realists. Paralleling Arendt (1970), he argues that collective power is the ability to secure collective action in pursuit of common goals. Social power is not zero-sum as it can be created in a similar manner as credit, the issue of which is possible so long as depositors trust that their funds can be redeemed in future (Parsons 1963: 237). Likewise large scale systems of political cooperation are possible because individuals are willing to place their trust in central institutions and contribute social resources to collective goals (Parsons 1963: 241). When this trust breaks down, collective power diminishes, resulting in the collapse of voluntary compliance with sources of authority (Parsons 1963: 257). Legitimacy, therefore, can be understood as constitutive of social power.

Parsons’ approach, which Mann (1986: 7) has shown to be useful even if we do not share the structural-functionalist assumption that society is a singular whole, provides a compelling set of mechanisms that can help to bridge the gap between material power and a norm governed order. In international relations, states are able through diplomatic means to symbolically register their support or dissent from international arrangements and the actions of other states. The arguments and claims put forward by states are not merely symbolic placeholders for interest backed by material capabilities, but competing prescriptions for how the institutional features of

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4 Military parades, shows of force, forward basing and direct threats are all symbolic assertions of material power backed by a commitment to utilise it. The irreducibly symbolic element of high strategy, and the extremely abstract plane on which it often operates, accounts for its apparent absurdity – as parodied in Kubrick’s Dr Strangelove: Or How I Quit Worrying and Learned to Love the Bomb.

5 Note that whilst the realist concept of power is relational, as it conceptualises power in terms of A’s ability to affect or control the actions of B, the realist concept of inequality is attributional, as A’s power over B stems from the capabilities possessed by the individual actors.
the international system should be organised to meet collective goals. Rather than relating to Parsonian fundamental value orientations, normative beliefs arise in response to fundamental human social needs. As Kratochwil suggest, norms and rules ‘are problem-solving devices for dealing with the recurrent issues of social life: conflict and cooperation’ (Kratochwil 1989: 69). It is this that explains the otherwise mysterious transmutation of facts into values6.

When socially empowered actors violate established norms, other actors may withdraw their support for shared endeavours, dissolving existing systems of social cooperation. Arrighi and Silver draw on Parsons’ account of hegemony, arguing that during hegemonic decline, legitimacy crumbles, actors withdraw their consent to be led and the ‘tyranny of small decisions’ takes over, producing a period of disorder (Arrighi and Silver 1999: 26-30). International cooperation thus rests on the perception that the international order remains legitimate according to publically defensible criteria. In the inverse of this scenario, states employing their material power for ends perceived as dangerous, undesirable and illegitimate are likely to find other states mobilising resources against them, as suggested by Stephen Walt’s notion of the balance of threat (1987). States thus invite sanction and censure when their power is used ‘irresponsibly’ in pursuit of goals disruptive to the international order, or when the means they employ are perceived as illegitimate. A state’s ability to act is shaped by whether it is perceived as a ‘responsible stakeholder’ or a pariah, and thus the levels of cooperation or hostility it elicits from other states. Recalcitrant states risk finding themselves excluded from the most important systems of international cooperation and disempowered as legitimate actors. To quote Niebhur: ‘When power is robbed of the shining armor of political, moral and philosophical theories, by which it

6 Snyder (2006) provides a very insightful discussion of the interplay between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ in the historical sociology of Michael Mann. He notes that it was the this-worldly successes of other-worldly religions that ensured their rapid and successful spread. The utility of ideologies, religions and moral norms in solving perennial social problems provides the ‘social proof’ of their normative veracity to actors. See Snyder (2006: 322). Mousseau draws on the cultural materialist anthropology pioneered by Marvin Harris (cf. 1980: 70-5), arguing that cultural value systems can be understood as generalised heuristics which are broadly adaptive to the practical conditions of their social circumstances. See Mousseau (2003: 488-9; 2009: 57-9). Of course, because of the inequalities within most human societies, most cultural value systems can be understood as at least partially ideological as they mystify the socially-organised asymmetries that exist amongst actors. Lest it be thought that this perspective constitutes a reductive materialism which regards moral norms as an epiphenomenon of interests, it should be recalled that for a great many moral theories the fundamental criteria of normative evaluation is whether an action or a practice contributes to ensuring that fundamental human needs are met. Thus a materialist perspective is quite compatible with a moral epistemology which grants that there are principles which constitute ‘relative universals’ (Donnelly 2007: 287).

7 Gill (1995: 401) too differentiates between hegemony and dominance, the latter relying on coercive force and signalling collapsing legitimacy.

8 The use of improper means sends important signals about a state’s intentions and its values. Revolutionary states from the USSR to the Islamic Republic of Iran, for example, have flouted the norms of diplomacy – a sign which other states interpreted as indicating a dangerous revisionist posture. As Chapter 7 notes, the same concerns were raised by the unilateral behaviour of the US during the War on Terror.
defends itself, it will fight on without armor; but it will be more vulnerable, and the strength of its enemies will increase’ (Niebhur 2005 [1932]: 23).

Whether the threat of withdrawal of cooperation is effective will depend on the systematic significance and material power\(^9\) of actors, as well as their ability for actors to organise themselves in a coherent fashion. Because, typically, actors face censure or reprisal for employing direct forms of coercion and causing disorder, those engaging in political contention must develop means to issuing threats obliquely and methods of tactical withdrawal of cooperation\(^{10}\). Frequently, the rules that constitute a particular social order designate some expressions of dissent and opposition as legitimate and others illegitimate. When issuing a challenge against the existing order, actors must take care because threats and direct coercion rapidly erodes the possibility for political argument. According to Tilly public demonstrations of worth, unity, numerousness and commitment are central to almost all campaigns to effect political change (2006: 54). Such displays establish legitimacy at the same time as expressing dissent and the threat to withdraw cooperation. Drawing on Niehbur again, the refusal to cooperate is itself a form of compulsion, but it can nonetheless be an effective vehicle for conveying moral pressure as unlike violence it does not destroy the moral relationship between actors (Niebhur 2005 [1932]: 159-167).

Political argument is thus an *indirect* form of coercion, mediated through public norms and networks of social cooperation. It therefore seems to rely on the existence of third-parties who form an audience to the process. In international relations this may take the form of other states, but audiences may also be domestic or even transnational. States are themselves composed of networks of social cooperation and if the foreign policy of a state violates norms held domestically it may undermine its ability to act on the international stage or even prompt disintegration. In so far as a global public or world society exists it may also act as an important audience for international political argument.

These mechanisms in part explain how ‘rhetorical coercion’ becomes possible in politics and international relations (Krebs and Jackson 2007). During such a process of protracted political argument, the reasons and justifications given by international actors may become public in a way that constrains state action. When a state challenges another to justify their actions in terms

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\(^9\) For the purposes of the argument, this could just as much be market size as men under arms. What matters is that actors have control over important social resources that must be mobilised if some collective goal is to be achieved, whether it is an alliance or a free trade zone.

\(^{10}\) Because effective strategies of political protest must conform with and draw upon contextually-dependent norms, we find an enormous variety in the ‘scripts’ of contentious performances.
of an acknowledged international norm it forces the latter to conform with that norm or bear the costs of publically disregarding it. Argument does not have to be sincere for it to be real in its effects even if it does not operate through persuasion, as it can force actors into publically endorsing positions they would not otherwise have done (Krebs and Jackson 2007: 36). Even within these ‘adversarial political interactions’ actors may still be bound to obey rational maxims of argument (Duffy, Frederkring and Tucker 1998: 274-5). Such coercive aspects of argument may in turn give rise to the ‘civilizing force of hypocrisy’ (Elster 1998: 111) as states within international society internalise the norms endorsed through adversarial public argument. By identifying their interests with the operation of certain principles within international society, actors may come to affirm those principles as first-order preferences — increasing their motivation to censure rule-breakers. As Holsti notes: ‘Much of what “is” in international politics has a tendency to become an “ought” or even more formal rule’ (2004: 23). However, the ‘stickiness’ of norms implies that reflection on and revision of existing norms is only likely to come about through organised challenge and sustained pressure.

The above account presents a set of mechanisms which comprise an analytic framework for understanding political argument. Because argument has been identified as having its own dynamic independent of the intentions of individual actors, we do not necessarily need to look towards disinterested ‘angels’ acting on behalf of universal principles as the sole potential moral agents in the international sphere. Under certain circumstances self-interested actors may help bring about the “right” ends for the “wrong” reasons (Stears 2005: 345). But there is a question of whether this dynamic ever operates in a sustained fashion within international relations, or whether under conditions of anarchy and structural inequality it will always falter. If so, the moral possibilities within international society would seem to be severely limited and any hope of achieving egalitarian goals would be dependent on some external transformation of the international order, such as through the interstitial emergence of a new global society. The following section therefore attends to the specific impediments to political argument which are operative within the international sphere.

**Argument in an Anarchical World**

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11 The bridging mechanism here might be the transition from habit to rule-guided action. As Winch notes, following a rule requires an understanding of how to apply that rule in novel cases (1958: 61). Once an actor has understood a rule, it is a relatively small step to internalisation of that rule and even conscious commitment.

12 Stears (2010) demonstrates that participants in radical democratic movements in the C20th America were fully aware that their goals could not be achieved by moral suasion alone, but only through challenging the status quo through militant, provocative tactics that would command the attention of the American public and the power elite.
In assessing the possibility for political argument between politically organised communities, it is necessary to address the specific impediments to argumentative reasoning within the international sphere. Although we might question the extent to which unfettered truth-seeking dialogue characterises politics within democratic societies, we can at least be confident that some degree of debate and argument over normative principles does take place. Whether substantive political argument can actually take place within international relations in any sustained fashion is, however, questionable at least. Conventional political argument is crucially characterised by the existence of the state, whether it serves as the addressee of claims or as an adjudicator between claims. In the absence of a overarching sovereign, political argument within a ‘second order society’ (Buzan 2004: xviii) is likely to be of a different character and potentially much more limited in scope. These problems are potentially compounded by power differentials and structural inequalities amongst actors.

The ‘absent sovereign problem’ is identified as being of crucial importance by Mitzen. On her reading of Habermas, ‘the state’s enforcement power is crucial to making public reason possible in modern political life’ (Mitzen 2005: 404). The creation of a public sphere in which public reasoning can take place is a two stage process that separates order and legitimacy. In modern democratic societies, the state secures the possibility for communicative action by enforcing order and compelling compliance with the outcome of democratic debate. The provision of order as a pre-requisite for substantive dialogue is essential according to Mitzen, due to the close and often unacknowledged relationship between argument and violence. Engaging in the process of argument can be a slippery slope, as if actors are not compelled or sufficiently committed to resolving their disagreements discursively, argument can escalate into violent conflict (Mitzen 2005: 401). The war of words can indeed be a kind of war, and as Clausewitz argued, war tends towards extremes (1997: 7-9).

Mitzen maintains that a public sphere in which reasoned dialogue can operate is always problematic, as it requires that disagreement be both permitted (even encouraged) yet contained (Mitzen 2005: 403). As Parsons’ account emphasizes, when argument escalates actors may resort to more ‘intrinsic’ forms of social influence and finally employ the ultimate sanction of physical force (Parsons 1963: 241). In the absence of global supersovereign or any truly comprehensive

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13 The risk is not only that violence comes to characterise the relationship between groups and political communities, but that intra-group relations might also become militarised. The dangers of subordinate actors in international politics becoming entrapped in a vicious circle of violence and militarisation resulting from anti-colonial mobilisation is explored by post-colonial feminists such as Agathangelou and Ling (2009), as well as Prashad (2008: 105-133).
and binding system of positive law the problems are even greater as the ‘two stage solution’ for resolving the tension between legitimation and order is not possible. Argument may be difficult to contain in the inter-state system because the participants in the debate have not given up the right to use violence or other coercive means to achieve their ends. There is no guarantee that states will resolve their arguments discursively or abide by the outcome of the process of reasoned argument. Given that no enforcer undergirds the process of normative reasoning in international relations and that violence always remains at least a possibility, inter-state interactions remain characterised by the security dilemma (cf. Booth and Wheeler 2008). The pervasive mistrust that results limits the scope for normative reasoning, as explored by Crawford in her discussion of how fear shuts down the possibilities for communication (Crawford 2009: 118). Mitzen argues that this condition is basic impediment, as where individuals are under threat ‘all energy is consumed with securing survival’ (Mitzen 2005: 403). Violence is, furthermore, not the only threat that actors face: in a global order where basic human needs continue to go unmet and where political stability is elusive for many nations, the terms of cooperation and interdependence are themselves questions of survival.

The possibilities of violence and/or coercion do not necessarily have a uniformly negative impact on the prospects for moral dialogue, however. Conditions of equal threat and mutual insecurity might compel actors to grant respect to one another out of fear. Unequal capacity to threaten sanctions may therefore be the crucial impediment. As Scott argues, inequality in terms of power has the effect of silencing subordinate actors: ‘If the expression “speak truth to power” still has a utopian ring to it, even in modern democracies, this is surely because it is so rarely practiced’ (1990: 1). Less powerful actors may anticipate and conform to the preferences of the powerful such that overt conflict never actually arises (Lukes 2005: 20-5). Social power may emerge and an unequal social order established even if argument is never broached. Thus conflict such as it does occur takes place in a subterranean fashion in the form of ‘prosaic but constant struggle’, characterised more by individual intransigence and subversion rather than collective agency and direct confrontation (Scott 1985: xvi). Even the removal of the possibility of violence from relations between unequals would not remove this impediment to dialogue, as

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14 As Parsons notes ‘The critical point then, at which the institutional integration of power systems is most vulnerable to strain, and to degeneration into reciprocating threats of the use of force, is between territorially organized political systems. This, notoriously, is the weakest point in the normative order of human society today, as it has been almost from time immemorial.’ See Parsons (1963: 242).

15 A clear example of this process at work was provided by the release by Al Jazeera of the Palestinian Papers from the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation.
there are other means of leverage and control through which inequalities of power might operate\textsuperscript{16}.

However, it is worth emphasising that violence has indeed frequently characterised redistributive struggles between unequal parties. Propertied classes have repeatedly used violence to resist egalitarian demands. Fascism has been interpreted as, at least in part, a hysterical counter-reaction to the threat that socialism posed to established wealth\textsuperscript{17}. Due to the frequency of coups initiated by fearful property owners in the global South, Przeworski (2007) has questioned whether democracy is possible in poor, unequal societies. The colonial era is replete with examples of terror and violence unleashed on ‘unworthy’ adversaries who transgressed a set of inegalitarian norms.

A further problem is that political argument might not be possible if actors do not affirm at least some common principles: the very possibility of disagreement presumes some degree of background agreement (Hurley 1989: 63). The extent of value consensus is incontrovertibly greater within societies than between them on a global scale. Furthermore, modern states are subject to internal moral claims from their citizens that may be subjectively stronger than those from external actors. Obstacles may stand in the way of the process of reason-giving if the persuasiveness of reasons is grounded in a specific cultural way of life or material context\textsuperscript{18}.

This problem of incompatible value systems may be compounded by inequality. The perception that international system as hostile to their interests and unfairly structured in favour of the North gives rise to a broadly shared ‘structuralist perspective’ (Parks and Roberts 2007: 62-63) amongst states of the global South. This framework of perceptions and value judgements has its historical roots in the expansion of an unequal international society and, as Chapter 1 argued,\textsuperscript{16}.

\textsuperscript{16} Many of these, such as ‘go-it-alone power’ and the ability to organizationally outflank subordinate actors, are discussed in Chapter 1. Post-structuralists have consistently emphasized the subtle, suffocating means of control through which power operates. Recently scholars have drawn on Foucault’s notion of biopolitics to examine the extension of capillary means of control to troublesome populations in the global South (Duffield 2001, 2009).

\textsuperscript{17} According to Mann, the explanation for authoritarian nation-statism in the interwar era ‘turns crucially on the behaviour of political conservatives, “old regimes,” and the property owning classes. For here [Central and Eastern Europe] class does matter, profoundly, if in a rather peculiar way. Right across one-half of Europe, the upper classes turned towards more repressive regimes, believing these could protect themselves against the twin threats of social disorder and the political left. But this does not seem to have been very “rational” behaviour. For they greatly exaggerated the threats and neglected safer means of avoiding them that were prevalent across the northwest’ (2004: 24-5).

\textsuperscript{18} For a consideration of the problems that may pose to cosmopolitan approaches to international political theory (understood broadly) see Mehta (2000).
some qualified forms of this structuralist position are by no means untenable. Even if Wendt (1999) is correct that the ‘truths’ about international relations are learnt by states through a process of intersubjective interaction, as Suzuki (2005) points out the experiences of post-colonial states have often served as lessons that the international system is a hostile realm characterised by structural inequality and the struggle for power. Indeed, Southern states have repeatedly come to the conclusion that their mistrust has been well founded after their goals have been frustrated. On the other side of the equation, Northern actors have seen Southern claims about structural inequality as attempts to distract attention from the very real flaws of post-colonial states. Thus mistrust and a gap in perceptions and assumptions may exist between North and South in international politics, presenting obstacles in the way of meaningful argument. This is arguably more than a clash of interests between ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’: it concerns the perspectives that states bring to bear in engaging with any given international issue and international argument they participate in.

Finally, the level of interdependence or ‘interaction capacity’ (Buzan, Jones and Little 1993) between members of a second-order society may be too low for a public sphere to emerge out of necessity. Hertz argued that social life is characterised both by the inevitable necessity of cooperation and the omnipresent dangers of conflict, giving rise to a keenly felt tension in international relations (Herz 1951: 3). Yet both these problems are more intense at the domestic level, creating an imperative to establish some kind of political order that stabilises cooperation and eliminates the threat of violence. In domestic societies, even the non-violent withdrawal of cooperation by actors can be significant enough to compel the attention of those the actions are aimed at.

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19 The structuralist worldview also expresses itself in a variety of seemingly paranoid beliefs. These include the popularity of anti-semitic conspiracy theories throughout the Middle East, intransigent AIDS-denyism amongst high-level members of the ANC, and claims that the threatened Swine flu epidemic was engineered by Western pharmaceuticals. Other beliefs seem to fall into a grey area: Buzan and Waever report that Brazilian security professionals seem seriously concerned about the possibility of Northern attempts to undermine Brazilian sovereignty over the Amazon (2003: 332-3); some suggest that Chinese strategists feared that the no-fly-zones in Iraq were a prelude to American attempts to sunder Xinjiang and Tibet from China (Pillsbury 2000). What seems absurd to Northern observers may seem reasonable in the South due to a different set of historical experiences.

20 This perhaps explains the enduring influence of structuralist and realist perspective in the study of international relations in the developing world. See Neumann (1998) for a collection of perspectives on international relations theory and the developing world.

21 This will be discussed further in Chapter 4. Arguments of this tenor have been put forward by influential actors such as Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Anne Krueger and Jeane Kirkpatrick.

22 That socio-economic inequalities might undermine the basis for a shared public sphere is a longstanding concern expressed within political thought. Contemporary commentators worried that the industrial revolution and the emergence of the urban proletariat was creating deep divisions in society, threatening civil order. These concerns were famously expressed by Disraeli, who wrote there had come into being: ‘Two nations; between whom there is no intercourse and no sympathy; who are as ignorant of each other’s habits, thoughts, and feelings, as if they were dwellers in different zones, or inhabitants of different planets; who are formed by a different breeding, are fed by a different food, are ordered by different manners, and are not governed by the same laws: the rich and the poor’ (Disraeli 2008[1845]: 86-7).
aimed at. Boycotts, strikes and passive resistance can all thrust issues of moral concern into the public sphere. Violence as a response to these strategies is frequently costly and ineffective. In international relations, however, this level of interdependence is much lower.

These obstacles in the way of moral argument in international relations indicate that one cannot ‘simply assume public spheres are possible in anarchy’ (Mitzen 2005: 407), especially when one takes into account the specific problems arising from inequality. It is necessary, therefore, to focus on when and where argument we can expect to find argument in international relations.

Crawford suggests that we should see opportunities for the process of argument and reasoning in ‘environments thick with international institutions’ (2002: 35), echoing Risse’s view that the most likely candidates are ‘international institutions based on nonhierarchical relations enabling dense interactions in informal, network-like settings’ (Risse 2000: 19).

What is significant about such circumstances is that they represent instances where rising interdependence or interaction capacity (Buzan, Jones, Little 1993: 43) has encouraged actors to bound power by institutionalising disagreements. According to Deudney, this is a perennial, but not inevitable, response to the dangers inherent in the rise in interaction capacity between political communities within an industrialising world. The unpalatable options of unmitigated anarchy and imperial hierarchy have only been avoided by efforts to balance and restrain concentrations of power (Deudney 2007: 48-9). What Deudney calls ‘negarchy’, or counter-power, has been created through mechanisms of mutual binding between states and the institutionalisation of recessed forms of power-balancing. In Deudney’s account it is possible to see how some sort of space for an international public sphere in which argument might come about. Modern constitutional states are restrained through numerous checks and balances, legal systems ensure a degree of formal equality amongst citizens, and material power is ‘recessed’ but nonetheless registered through elections and campaigning. The development of equivalent mechanisms in international relations might similarly mitigate the uncertainties of argument under anarchy.

Indeed, Deudney traces a long history of development of negarchic mechanisms within contemporary international society. In a similar argument Mitzen emphasises these limitations on the recourse to violence as potentially leading to an international public sphere. Mitzen argues that a horizontal normative order arose out of the tradition of European diplomacy ‘constituted

23 Arendt argued that it is the ‘fences of laws between men’ that limits tyranny and prevents public life from collapsing into a ‘wilderness of fear and suspicion’ that permits only ‘fear-guided movements and suspicion-ridden actions’ (Arendt 2004: 600).
by mutual recognition of sovereignty and ongoing communication’ (2005: 411). This normative order regulated the use of violence and compelled states to justify and rationalised the use of force through appeal to a public body of international law, providing the ‘first step toward making it possible for state action ultimately to become subject to public reason’ (Mitzen 2005: 409). Crucially, this can be viewed as a self-reinforcing process: as participants will increasingly seek to provide reasons for their positions that other could accept and the consensus grows that agreements are binding. This is of central importance, because in the absence of a sovereign power, the principles embodied in a norm-governed international society must themselves be authoritative as they are not underpinned by any higher authority.

The impediments to sustained argument between separate and unequal political communities examined above are then serious, but not a priori insurmountable. From anarchy in the abstract, the next section turns to examine the specific features and the moral potentials inherent in the contemporary, historically contingent anarchical society.

**The English School and the Civilising Process of International Society**

Political argument might only be feasible in international relations to the extent to which patterns of institutionalised restraint have been established amongst actors. Nonetheless, there is a perennial question of whether establishing such restraint does not require that actors forgo the pursuit of more substantive moral goals: the need to prevent disorder might limit the scope for renegotiation of normative principles. This tension between order and justice has been at the heart of the English School tradition of enquiry into international relations, which has devoted sustained focus to the specific features of the contemporary order emphasized by Deudney and Mitzen such as diplomacy and international law. It is necessary to engage with this perspective in order to adequately examine the extent to which argument is possible within an unequal, anarchic society of states.

According to proponents of this perspective, the society of states must be understood on its own terms as a ‘second order society’ composed of distinct political units (Buzan 2004: xviii). Although it is an anarchical society, it is not anomic. Some form of international society exists insofar as states ‘conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another’ (Bull 2002 [1977]: 13). Yet it is a thin and minimal sort of society: fragile, focused upon essential goals of survival and coexistence, and only partially capable of supporting more morally ambitious aspirations (Bull 2002 [1977]: 49). Bull’s emphasis on these limits in part reflects the English School’s concern about the fragility and contingency of contemporary
international society. For Wight, the international society has been threatened both by cynical realpolitik and cosmopolitan political ideologies, both of which deny the validity of a plural international order (Wight 1991: 47-8). The existence of an international society depends on the recognition amongst component states of one another’s legitimacy. According to the logic of this argument, the secularisation of international politics and the development of positive international law from natural law doctrine represent central steps in making an international society possible by removing irreconcilable issues of ultimate ends from international relations.

Although it is by necessity limited, proponents of this account of the nature of international society stress its accomplishments. Holsti argues that ‘in the past three centuries, the sovereigns have at least begun to enmesh themselves in normative networks that substantially “tame” them and make their peaceful coexistence reasonably secure’ (Holsti 2004: 322-3). International society peacefully accommodates a degree of pluralism and multiplicity unlikely within an imperial order, whilst the nation-state provides a potential vehicle for the claims of diverse peoples (Jackson 2000). The persistence of international society is held to reflect the outcome of perennial efforts by states to reach a via media enabling at least the pursuit of elementary goals of survival and coexistence. This via media is underwritten by a set of fundamental norms which Buzan refers to as the primary institutions of international society (Buzan 2004: 167). These institutions are maintained through a common commitment by states and a degree of voluntary self-restraint. International society is therefore not the temporary outcome of the constant push-and-shove of interstate rivalry, but the result of attempts to ‘wilfully construct’ (Williams 2004: 50) an order that safeguards the security and independence of states.

Maintenance of such an order has encouraged states to recognise the need to moderate their demands and, at various junctures, accept the importance of a ‘just equilibrium’ (Little 2007: 67, 270-1). Practices of restraint developed as a result of shared fears that an ‘associational’ international society would lapse into an ‘adversarial’ international society (Little 2007: 68). Through a process of breakdown and reconstruction, the primary institutions of international society developed through a succession of peace settlements (Little 2007: 275). Clark sees these

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24 Watson argued that imperial systems have been as common as multi-actor systems in the past, if not more so (1992). The failure to impose imperial rule over Europe gave rise to contemporary international society. Thus as present scholarship confirms, the present international order is an outlier, not an exemplar (Tin-bor Hui 2004).

25 Based on a survey of other contributions within this tradition, Buzan identifies diplomacy, international law (and the principle that agreements must be kept), sovereignty, the balance of power and great-power management as the primary institutions.
post-war settlements as the turning points at which competing notions of international legitimacy have been negotiated and incorporated into the international order (Clark 2005).

But this mechanism need not only apply to war, the central point is that change comes about when the international order comes under challenge. Thus international society is jeopardised if it is not regarded as legitimate by its component states, it must continue to command a sufficiently broad moral authority and embody commonly agreed moral and political principles. Legitimacy requires more than pareto-optimal interest satisfaction, but procedural fairness in decision making and rule creation (Albin 2003). Thus international society can be understood to contain a constant element of argument and contention as one of its constituent elements. The subtitle of Clark’s study, Reform and Resistance in the Society of States (1989), encapsulates the essence of this process. Although there remains the risk of breakdown and systemic conflict, the process of ‘taming the sovereigns’ is potentially self-reinforcing, as repeated iterations build an increasingly stable constitutional order, creating further scope for an inter-state public sphere.

Nonetheless, there is a question over whose voice counts in this ongoing process of negotiation over legitimacy. The English School perspective has tended great power management as one of the primary institutions of international society (Buzan 2004: 232). Great powers are held to possess certain rights and responsibilities beyond others states and the legitimacy of any international order, even a hegemonic order, is crucially dependent on their collective consent (Buzan 2004; Clark 2009; Little 2007: 287). International society has always been stratified and, as Clark acknowledges, oligarchic (1989: 2). Inequality and the denial of membership to ‘uncivilised’ states have been enduring features of international society (Keene 2002: 14-22). Not only does negotiation over legitimacy primarily occur amongst great powers, but some states are omitted from the conversation entirely because they fail to meet the entry requirements (Jackson 1990). This lends credence to the claim that the English School contains conservative tendencies, favouring an order which institutionalises the interests of the dominant states. Nabulsi, for example, suggests that the intellectual antecedents the international society perspective draws upon are committed to a conservative and even authoritarian defence of the status quo which rationalises the limits the international order places on emancipatory goals (Nabulsi 1999).

Lest this seem too Whiggish a narrative, the disastrous attempt to at constructing a peace at Versailles should be noted. Great powers can fail to construct a stable and legitimate international order. International society theorists have returned a decidedly mixed verdict on the post-war settlement following the Western victory in the Cold War. See Clark (2001) and Hurrell (2007: 287-318).

Nabulsi’s specific concern relates to the right of resistance to occupying powers in traditions of thought on the laws of war.
Order before Justice and the Inescapability of International Hierarchy

However from the perspective of classical realism, this criticism is both accurate and at the same time misguided. It identifies that the configuration of international society reflects the interests of its most powerful participants correctly, but fails to recognise that little greater than the maintenance of order can be achieved in international relations. Presenting international society as embodying universal values is not only fraudulent but dangerous. Thus Carr excoriated the self-satisfied assumption of moral superiority on the part of the status quo powers, arguing that the ‘haves’ who benefitted from the international system were just as responsible for the breakdown of the interwar order as the revisionist ‘have nots’ who challenged it. Moral claims in international relations might be sincere, but they are ultimately self-deceiving expressions of group interest (Carr 2001: 65). The responsibility lies with the beneficiaries of an international order to provide ‘sufficient concessions to make it tolerable to those who profit by it least’ (Carr 2001: 152), else in the long run the resentment of the ‘underprivileged nations’ (Carr 2001: 76) will boil over into violence (Carr 2001: 152).

Yet to some extent, Carr’s focus on inequality is misleading. Whilst clearly sympathetic to the ‘have nots’ within the international system, Carr is famously indifferent to the fate of minor nations (Carr 2001: 192), confidently predicting their eventual absorption into supranational units (Carr 2001: 213) and thus rejecting as meaningless any notion of equality between states (Carr 2001: 149). Thus Carr limits his call for accommodation between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’ to a plea for the construction of a workable via media between rising and status quo powers alone. Similarly, Morgenthau defends a non-moralised policy of accommodation based on a policy of compromise and ‘give and take’ as the correct response to the demands of other great powers (Morgenthau 1978: 70). No stable space exists for the expansion of practices of argument and normative negotiation; international relations remains under a permanent condition of potential war, especially between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’. International dialogue and the appeal to the ‘stock of common ideas’ (Carr 2001: 130) of international morality

28 Although Carr attempts to set up a dialectic between utopia and reality, it is certainly the latter that is the privileged element in the dyad. If utopia really is nothing more than an illusion and an impossibility, it is difficult to see how utopia and reality could ever be combined in a single social order. Because Carr uses the terms ‘moral ideals’ and ‘utopia’ as synonyms, it makes it very difficult to see what place morality can actually have within Carr’s schema (Wilson 2000: 181).
29 The difficulty lies in correctly recognising when the claims of other powers are limited, self-contained and thus capable of being accommodated, and when they are in fact unlimited and threaten to overturn the international order as a whole (Morgenthau 1978: 70-1), which he defines narrowly in terms of the distribution of power (Morgenthau 1978: 70). Identifying the ambitions of another state is difficult, as it either risks allowing revisionist states to manoeuvre themselves into a position to threaten the international order (Morgenthau 1978: 70), or will generate a spiral of mistrust and insecurity if legitimate interests are not acknowledged (Morgenthau 1978: 71).
serves only to secure order amongst near-equals. Thus for Morgenthau and Carr there cannot really be a morality of states or renegotiation of substantive values in international relations, only an ethic of statecraft based on the prudent and self-restrained pursuit of power and accommodation of interest\textsuperscript{30}. Material power ultimately acts as the arbiter of who can be a ‘voice’ in international politics. As for the peoples of weaker or subordinate states, they must ‘learn to live with their lower status and more limited autonomy’ (Lebow 2008: 69).

But if inequality and hierarchy is an unavoidable fact of international relations for classical realists, it is positively desirable for perspectives which emphasise the essential role played by a hegemon in securing order. Notable amongst such perspectives is neo-conservatism. The proponents of this doctrine claim that no international society as such exists\textsuperscript{31}. Rather, the values of the international order reflect the values of the hegemonic power, specifically the US (Kristol and Kagan 1996: 20). The values of the international order are understood not as an evolving set of public criteria, nor whatever consensus might exist between states, nor the product of a condominium between the great powers. As an exceptional power and a uniquely moral nation, the US requires no external legitimacy: practices of restraint and compromise are therefore merely forms of capitulation. Equality in international relations, therefore, would be pernicious as it would constrain the ability of the US to act unilaterally in promoting democratic values.

As Mann (2003) has argued, neo-conservatism operates with a fundamentally flawed conception of social power which emphasizes militarism at the expense of other socially organised sources of power\textsuperscript{32}. In terms of the account above, military power in international relations is a form of ‘intrinsically effective’ power in that it is direct and unmediated in its effects. It largely depends on the attributes and internal organisation of a state rather than its broader social relationships.

But this does not mean that it is actually of utility in accomplishing the sort of expansive goals envisaged by neoconservatives. Achieving any sort of social goal involves the exercise of collective, socialised forms of power which involve the consent or acquiescence of other parties. Neo-conservatism ignores necessity of securing broader legitimacy and in doing so promotes a

\textsuperscript{30} A differing, and perhaps more optimistic, interpretation is offered by Dunne, who argues that Carr was concerned not with an ‘end point utopia’, which he clearly believes to be impossible, but a ‘process utopia’ (Dunne 2000: 227). Any particular actually-existing order remains ‘tainted with self-interest and hypocrisy’ (Carr 2001 :87). Yet Carr remains sublimely unconcerned about the necessary exclusion of minor nations that the construction of such an order may involve.

\textsuperscript{31} This was bluntly expressed by proponents of neo-conservatism: ‘The centre of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies’ (Krauthammer 1990: 23), ‘if America wants stability it will have to create it’ (Krauthammer 1990: 29). There exists no order outside of that which is imposed by a great power acting according to its own moral self-belief.

\textsuperscript{32} In part this is because, like other forms of ‘reactionary idealism’ (Drolet 2011), neo-conservatism makes a fetish of ‘will’.
form of solipsism that fails egregiously to recognise that in a plural international society other political communities have distinct interests, goals and values.

In promoting its vision of the US as global colossus towering above others, neo-conservatism jeopardises the possibilities for both order and justice in international relations. It represents an exemplar of what Morgenthau termed ‘nationalistic universalism’, ideologies which assert that their bearer possesses ‘the whole truth of morality and politics’ (Morgenthau 1978: 262). Morgenthau believed to be this to represent one of the greatest threats to international order, as it undermined the practices of accommodation amongst great powers and the culture of diplomacy which guaranteed stability and the freedom of the multiplicity of elements composing the international system (Morgenthau 1978: 175). Neo-realists have likewise criticised the pursuit of a crusading, moralised foreign policy (Waltz 2000: 12), as an absence of self-restraint can only result in provoking undue counter-reactions from other great powers (Walt 2005). Rather than pursuing the quixotic goal of maintaining eternal superiority over potential peer-competitors, neo-realists advise seeking pragmatic accommodation with rising powers (Layne 2006: 160). Whilst the truly weak can have no input into the crafting of world order, neo-realists also oppose attempts to assert power over such strategically marginal states (Van Evera 1990; Taliaferro 1998).

The realism of Morgenthau and Carr, and the neo-realism of their successors, therefore urges accommodation between status quo and rising powers, but offers little scope for the meaningful accommodation between genuine unequals. The force of the realist perspective and its emphasis on the limited scope for moral argument between unequals, needs to be taken seriously. However, the dismissal of the ability of the weak to ever present a meaningful challenge to the strong and the denial of the possibility of accommodation between them is surely a serious lacunae of realism as an international political theory. Nowhere does Mackinder’s analysis of the threats to British sea-power in The Geopolitical Pivot of History (1904) consider that peoples under imperial rule might seek independence and establish themselves as nations within the society of states – all within a generation. Waltz offers only a retreat into isolationism in his expression of hope that the US might exhibit ‘a forbearance that will give other countries at long last the

33 To Morgenthau, these tendencies amongst C20th mass ideologies have given international politics in the modern world ‘a ferocity and intensity not known to other ages’ (Morgenthau 1978: 263). According to Williams, Morgenthau associated these tendencies towards the rejection of limits, the embrace of violence and the identification of the other as an enemy with fascism (Williams 2005: 122). The spectre of Schmidt, whose veneration of executive power was hungrily embraced by American neo-conservatives, is clearly hovering in the background in this aspect of Morgenthau’s thought (cf. Brown 2007b). Morgenthau’s project was in part an attempt to rescue realism from machtpolitik, the absolutism of Schmidt, the geopolitics of Haushofer, and the ultranationalism of Treitschke.
chance to deal with their own problems and to make their own mistakes’ (Waltz 2008: 192). The overreactions and irrational interventions in the periphery that many realists lament might have been prevented not only through a prudent attention to strategic self-interest, but by actually engaging in dialogue and having the patience to attempt to understand the concerns of the weak.

Inequality After the Expansion of International Society

Realists find themselves in agreement with English School scholars that countervailing power is central to the preservation of the international system. For theorists of international society, attempts to unilaterally impose a set of values on the international order undermines the practices of restraint which limit violence and allow the realisation of limited but vital shared goals. Little thus identifies the balance of power as the most central of the primary institutions of international society (Little 2007). Because these mechanisms of restraint are regarded as social institutions rather than the fortuitous outcome of the distribution of power, English School theorists have been more willing to grant that there is a morality of states which is to some extent independent of the interests and values of the great powers at any given time. Indeed, major powers can act as the ‘great irresponsibles’ in failing to live up to their obligations as members of a norm-governed international order (Bull 1980). Thus English School theorists employ a broader conception of order than do realists, acknowledging to some extent both the claims of more marginal international actors and that the international normative order is answerable to more general human values. So whilst Bull emphasised that some form of order is necessary for human conduct and social action, he was fully aware that order is not an unqualified good and that a particular order always instantiates a specific set of values (Bull 2002 [1977]: 3-4, 21). Echoing Carr, Bull notes that the ‘have-nots’ within the international system, the states of the Third World, have an understandable preference for justice over order given the inequities of international order as it exists (Bull 2002 [1977]: 74-5). He seems to regard the legitimacy of international society as precarious unless these claims are addressed (Bull 2002

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34 An oscillation between interventionism and isolationism, so characteristic of US foreign policy, displays an unwillingness to actually engage with others as equals on their own terms.

35 For English School theorists the balance of power is above all an institution. Recent studies have shown that balancing has been a recurrent feature of international systems, but has failed as often as it has succeeded, plunging international societies into chaos or prolonged periods of imperial rule. The balance of power cannot therefore be considered equivalent to a gyroscopic mechanism that continually returns international systems to an equilibrium, see Stuart J Kaufman, Richard Little and William C Wohlforth ed., The Balance of Power in World History, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007). This collection builds on some of the lines of argument advanced in (Watson 1992).

36 Indeed, it is at least questionable whether it is not the intermediate powers, able to act somewhat autonomously but limited in their ability to disregard the fundamental norms of international society, which have not contributed to a greater extent to maintaining a norm-governed international order.
Indeed it is questionable whether a minimal pluralist international society is actually capable of providing order or ensuring that conditions for ‘survival’ are maintained. Within an unequal global order in which destitution and hunger persist, the question of unmet basic needs is a question of both order and justice (Murphy 2005: 16-31). Yet whilst Bull is somewhat sympathetic to arguments of subordinate actors within the international system, he remains concerned that their challenges risk that the ‘consensus which does exist about order or minimum coexistence will be undone’ (Bull 2002 [1977]: 92).

Some, limited, scope for normative renegotiation seems to exist within the weak public sphere of international society. Disagreement over the extent has animated the debate within the English School between pluralists and solidarists. The former are more inclined to emphasise the fragility of the mechanisms of restraint in international society and believe that commitment to a common set of values is too nebulous and inchoate to form the basis of more universalistic global norms. As Buzan suggests the ‘binding force’ of trust and shared normative commitments may be greater in some parts of the world than others: specifically the sub-society composed of the formerly-Christian, formerly-colonial states of Europe and its offshoots (Buzan 2004: 235-6). This cultural segmentation, of course, insects with and reciprocally reinforces the socio-economic divisions within the global order.

Solidarists, however, are more inclined to note the spread of universalistic values within democratic nations and as well as the rise of a world society, those individuals and organised networks who share a common consciousness of membership in a global community, which might act as a transmission belt for more expansive norms into international society. An important argument put forward by solidarists, who have drawn heavily on social constructivism, is that international society is genuinely governed by rules, but that because all systems of rules are plastic and open to interpretation normative change remains possible. This places the question of political argument, which consists of disagreement about the interpretation of public norms, how to adjudicate seemingly incompatible norms and how to apply them in novel circumstances, at the centre of our account of the moral horizons of international society. The question of the malleability of norms remains a confusing issue, one that some have attempted

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37 A related problem is that contemporary English School theorists see conceptions of international legitimacy as being grounded in a domestic understanding of the political and ‘the moral purpose of the state’ (Reus-Smit 1999). These are likely to vary across the world so long as states are not homogeneous in terms of their social and political values. Given the stronger ‘binding force’ within the Western world, this is likely to create frictions between the historically dominant segment of international society and the primarily post-colonial non-West.

38 For a historical account of the role of world society in shaping standards of legitimacy in international relations, see Clark (2007).
to resolve by the idea of a Wittgensteinian language game. Drawing on Searle’s chess example, Wheeler argues that states are limited by the constitutive rules of international society but that these rules might be renegotiated as a result of new moral claims (Wheeler 2000: 7). According to this perspective the rules regulating or constituting social practices are always ambiguous (Winch 1958: 7), creating scope for change. Nevertheless actors ‘cannot hope to stretch the application of the existing principles indefinitely’ (Skinner 1988: 117), giving them some kind of ‘binding force’.

The gap in this argument is its failure to explain why states cannot leave the ‘game’ of international relations or just break the rules. What is to stop an actor from ceasing to participate in a rule-governed practice? Thus Wheeler is vulnerable to the realist claim that because there is no ultimate adjudicator between competing values or authoritative arbitration between competing claims, international norms cannot attain a status beyond organized hypocrisy. Krasner claims that central norms in international relations are widely acknowledged but consistently disregarded (Krasner 1999: 67). He therefore alleges that international norms provide little more than the ‘script’ for inter-state interaction, providing the form but not the substance (Krasner 1999: 41).

Krasner’s challenge presents a serious question about the possibility for argument under conditions of anarchy, and indeed any notion of a norm-governed international society. Nonetheless, there are difficulties with Krasner’s argument. Hypocrisy is ambiguous as it involves an acknowledgement of the norm it violates. At the very least, it indicates a desire to be seen as conforming to a set of public norms. One will not find hypocrisy in a truly anomic social system. Under some circumstances hypocrisy might undercut a norm, in other circumstances it might act as a stepping stone towards deeper consolidation (Price 2008a: 29). Instances of hypocrisy, and the subsequent claims and counter-claims generated by participants in a norm-governed practice, can act as the grist to the mill of the dynamic of political argument.

Furthermore, the perspective developed so far in this chapter suggests that states would have difficulty in completely disregarding public norms because in doing so they would lose the ‘credit’ of legitimacy extended to them by other states, limiting their ability to benefit from systems of international cooperation directed at resolving collective problems. The social power that arises from being accorded legitimate actorhood by fellow actors would evaporate. Thus

39 The discussion of language games and constitutive rules in international relations generally ignores the fact that in games actors have opportunities for cheating. Even though the rules of poker are constitutive of the game, play can continue even if I surreptitiously peek at your cards or swipe some of your chips.
they would risk entering an ‘adversarial’ rather than ‘associational’ international system in which power was no longer ‘recessed’ but deployed in ‘intrinsically effective’ forms in outright rivalry and direct conflict. The existence of an international scheme of cooperation constrains states and tames sovereigns in the same manner as individuals were socially ‘caged’ when, after the creation of more extensive schemes of ‘compulsory cooperation’ in the first political communities, they lost their power of exit (Mann 1986). The capacity to disregard international norms in part depends on the ability of a state to ‘go-it-alone’, but it seems unlikely that any state can flout international rules without consequences. When an actor breaks public rules consistently they risk being excluded from the rule-governed practice in question.

Nonetheless, there exists scope for states to resist complying with the norms of international society and ignore the claims made against them. It is possible to overstate the extent to which the norms of international society are constitutive of the modern state. Whilst the ‘global dispersed practice’ of statehood does constitute certain aspects of the international actorhood of states (Frost 2003), many of the practices which constitute the state as a corporate actor are territorially based. States can, and have, survived in opposition to or exclusion from international society – albeit at a cost. More pressing than international recognition is the requirement for states to secure and maintain the support of domestic actors. As Frost notes, ‘the existence of a state always implies the existence of a group of people who are in some way bound together, in large part, by a set of normative commitments and obligations’ (Frost 1996: 58). Very often these norms bind states to a greater degree than the norms of international society. Empowered as representatives of domestic social actors, statespeople are held under moral obligation to advance a conception of the national interest – understood here in terms of both material interests and values. These national obligations frequently act as ‘trumps’ to claims that emerge within international society.

Frost (1996) presents a ‘constitutive’ account according to which states are constantly engaging in argument and justifying their actions. But it is one of the central complaints of many states in the global South is that their claims are not addressed or acknowledged by their Northern interlocutors. International norms do not bind all states to the same extent. Strong states resting atop societies made up of empowered actors bound together by some idea of a social contract, or under some kind of hegemonic project, possess a much greater ability to advance a set of normative claims in international relations and resist those of others than do fragile late-developing states unable to secure the support of domestic constituencies and dependent on external support. Many possibilities may be ‘immanent’ within a norm–governed order that assigns rights and responsibilities amongst actors, what matters is which possibilities are
actualised through successful political argument and the — always conjoined — exercise of political power. As Frost acknowledges, not all practices ‘are voluntarily entered into or based on consensus’ (Frost 1996: 59). Asymmetries of power result in asymmetries in argument: the powerful may possess the capacity to bear the costs for failing to give adequate account for their actions.

Furthermore, the constitutive practices within international society do not empower all states to an equal extent: whilst attribution of sovereignty to a political community is a necessary condition for that community to participate as a state within international society, it is not a sufficient condition. Political communities that have been ascribed sovereignty have not always possessed the internal organisation that would have enabled them to exercise autonomous agency within international society. As Jackson observed, many entities recognised as juridically sovereign states lack the empirical features of statehood (1990). These quasi-states are alleged to be unable to effectively discharge the obligations for the maintenance of international order that international society places on them, and are incapable of acting as coherent actors within international society40. Some states in the periphery lack strong vertical channels of legitimacy between state and society (Holsti 1996: 98) and thus may not be structured so that they ‘track the interests’ (Pettit 2009a: 7; Pettit 1997: 184)41 of their citizens in a way that would make them effective international representatives42. Similarly, Watson points out that small-island states in particular are ‘quite unable to manage by themselves’ (Watson 2007: 72) and can only acquire the ‘façade’ of Westphalian sovereignty, effectively remaining ‘more like autonomous provinces of an increasingly integrated world system’ (Watson 2007: 78). Jackson’s account points to a genuine dilemma and potential limit in how far international society can incorporate the claims of the world’s most marginal peoples, as these peoples lack an effective voice or defender of

40 Quasi-states or ‘failed states’ have become a major concern of Northern governments and a major preoccupation of policy-oriented research and journalism. But the discussion of ‘failed states’ frequently obscures more than it reveals, covering a huge range of dysfunctional forms of social organisation that prevent the kinds of state-society relationships and public agency that we associate with the ideal of constitutional government (Patrick 2008). Rather than focusing on a particular category of delinquent state it might be better to emphasise the common problematic of development.

41 States need not necessarily be constitutional democracies to track the interests of their citizens to the extent which meaningfully qualifies them as representatives of their peoples. Rawls makes a convincing case that liberal states should accord respect and moral agency to what he calls ‘decent societies’ which respect basic human rights and are organised as ‘consultation hierarchies’ (Rawls 1999b: 71). This category might be applied to states such as Singapore and Malaysia, whose semi-democratic institutions, hegemonic ruling parties and embedded policies of illiberal multiculturalism limit open political contestation but do channel popular concerns of all major social groups into the policy-making process. Thus liberal democratic credentials need not be thought of as necessary credentials for full participation in contemporary international society.

42 For a full discussion of the issue of quasi-states and moral agency, see Erskine 2001.
their interests in international relations. There is no easy solution to this problem, only the possibility that demands of mobilised peoples of the global South for responsive government will ultimately prove difficult to resist.

Nonetheless, we should be cautious not to engage in too great a degree of scepticism. Something like a weak public sphere has been maintained in international society because attempts at exit have been few and attempts to wholly overturn the contemporary international order have been resisted. Political communities have continued to act as participants in the set of ‘dispersed practices’ which constitute statehood within international society (Frost 2003). By participating in these common practices, states have empowered one another as legitimate actors and moral agents within international relations, acknowledged as the representatives of peoples. The hard-won ‘expansion of international society’ (Bull and Watson 1984) has therefore been of real significance, because through it political communities beyond the Euro-American historical core of international society have been able to participate in a set of practices which do afford them some kind of voice. This is not to elide the deep continuities between pre- and post-decolonisation international society, discussed in Chapter 1, but to recognise that nevertheless the practice of ‘being a sovereign state’ has empowered many formerly subjugated peripheral political communities as potential agents within international society.

Despite hysterical fears that generalised chaos or global racial war would follow from the collapse of the inter-imperial order (Mazower 2009: 195), the constitutive practices within international relations were sufficiently flexible to incorporate the new representatives of formerly colonised peoples. These new entrants even attempted to play a role as agents on behalf of the fundamental norms of international society. The Nehruvian policies of non-alignment and positive neutrality were, according to A P Rana, quite conscious efforts aimed at ‘maintenance of the structure of international society’ (Rana 1969: 311) and thus avoiding a breakdown of order which would result in widespread chaos or re-imposition of hegemony. This attempt at the exercise of ‘peaceful coercion’ through sustained moral pressure backed by the

43 As A P Rana lamented ‘weaker nation states, in the sort of poorly evolved international society in which we live, have very limited means of benefiting from the mantle of nationhood they have assumed, and are indeed open to depredation, and even decay, however prominently they may sport labels of State sovereignty and sovereign equality.’ (1974: 771).

44 States are not of course the only actors in international relations empowered as legitimate actors or as moral agents. The Secretary General is empowered as a representative of the United Nations to act as a somewhat independent agent, and can bring to bear moral pressure on other international actors, attempt to engage in moral suasion in direct dialogue with national governments, and is capable of promoting normative change. NGOs and transnational activists are increasingly recognised as legitimate stakeholders or even moral agents by states and international organisations.

45 The nature of sovereignty has of course changed throughout history, it is only after the rise of the modern nation-state that sovereignty was depersonalised and understood in terms of the right of national self-determination rather than the prerogatives of a particular ruler. This understanding was universalised during decolonization.
claim to represent the impoverished and excluded in the global order (Rana 1969: 303, 306), is quite a different strategy than the alternative rejectionist strategy mooted by some radical post-independence leaders. Indonesia’s Sukarno pressed for the Non-Aligned Movement to replace the United Nations, effectively to serve as the locus of a new Afro-Asian international society which would wage a struggle against the West/North (Alden, Morphet and Vieira 2010: 60). If this strategy had been followed it would have taken the post-colonial nations outside of the ongoing process of negotiation over the nature of a legitimate international society, outright antagonism replacing political argument. Instead the new states of the nascent global South were to issue their claims as participants in a common norm-governed order.

It is potentially of some significance that the states of the global South have not just made claims individually as members of the society of states, but collectively as a distinct element of that society and as the representatives of some section of the world’s population. Pettit’s neo-Roman republican approach to political theory provides insights into the normative implications of this fact. Pettit’s approach provides a non-ideal account of the nature and moral possibilities of constitutional democracy which advances a particular conception of individual and collective freedom (Pettit 1997). As examined in Chapter 2 republicans contend that it is not only interference which makes individuals unfree but also domination, the potential for the exercise of interference – corresponding to what Lukes calls the second-facet of power or non-decision-making power (Lukes 2005: 20-5). In order to ensure that freedom is maintained, democratic citizens must have the ability to resist both private and public domination by contesting the exercise of power (Pettit 1997: 63). One element of this is the process of contestation and broad-ranging public deliberation (Honohan and Jennings 2006: 216) in social spaces in which decisions are responsive to reasons (Pettit 1997: 185).

Pettit and other neo-Roman republicans have more recently turned their focus to the international system, where possibilities for both inter-state and private domination abound (Pettit 2009b: 15; Laborde 2010: 10). Inter-state inequalities will generate asymmetrical bargaining and result in outcomes which dominate weaker parties, who may only be able to

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46 Acharya (2008: 81) suggests that ‘we ought to seek theoretical insights from Nehru or Sukarno just as Western theorizing has drawn from Woodrow Wilson and Henry Kissinger’. Indeed we can gain theoretical insights by comparing the visions of international society pursued by these two statesmen of the global South.

47 Laborde (2010) seeks to advance a ‘critical republican’ perspective, drawing on Thomas Pogge. She argues that the advanced economically developed societies (and not just states) impose an order on the global poor that dominates them. But such an order might be less personalised than this. When actors are embedded in large-scale networks of interdependence, the ‘spontaneous order’ that emerges from innumerable individual transactions may structurally condition the feasible choices available to individual actors, as explored in Chapter 1. Domination can be systematic.
adapt to rather than contest inequalities (Pettit 2009a: 21). Republican international theory also acknowledges that democratic communities may potentially dominate other polities (Bohman 2008: 212), a possibility overlooked or de-emphasised by supposedly republican defenders of the liberal international order (Deudney and Ikenberry 1999). Rather than emphasising the qualities of agents republicanism is focused on structural asymmetries and the possibility of constructing a ‘structure of civic virtue’. Yet unlike cosmopolitans, republicans tend not to argue that such problems point beyond the state system but rather to the reconfiguration of domestic and international institutions. Pettit believes that the problem of domination beyond the nation state can be overcome through the creation of what he terms a quasi-constitutional international order (Pettit 2009b: 15). Pettit’s account of such an order is very similar to the English School account elaborated above, suggesting that the emergence of a common set of reasons might lead to the development of an onus of justification on states and therefore limit naked *realpolitik* (Pettit 2009b: 17). Raw, unmediated *raison d'état* would therefore be replaced by the reasons of states. If a process of deliberation on the basis of commonly acceptable reasons can be established, this may provide the basis for a body of public international law and for sanction of dominators, offering some measure of protection and recourse for vulnerable states (Pettit 2009b: 18).

Nonetheless, for Pettit this concern seems secondary the more fundamental problem of making right equal might: ‘in a world of grossly unequal power, deliberation is not going to be enough’ (Pettit 2009b: 19). Early modern republicans recognised that rulers may not listen to reasons if they prefer to seek wealth and power (Skinner 1998: 89). States will listen to one another only in so far as they respect one another: ‘and states will respect one another only in the measure that they command one another’s respect; they each have enough power to leave others no choice but to respect them’ (Pettit 2009b: 19). Respect cannot be bestowed as an act of benevolence, actors must be able to command it (Pettit 2009b: 21). Pettit nevertheless makes the case for an international form of ‘anti-power solidarity’ (Andronache 2006: 114). Coalitions of weaker countries might join together to collectively resist the power of the stronger, enabling them to deliberate from a position of strength and holding the powerful to their agreements (Pettit 2009b: 18-19). This conclusion stems from Pettit’s philosophical defence of political self-

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48 Indeed, Gruber (2000: 6-8) has pointed out that powerful actors do not even need to engage in coercive bargaining to exercise power over weaker actors: they can simply ‘go-it-alone’ by creating new arrangements that benefit only those whose cooperation is essential.

49 Deudney and Ikenberry emphasize republican mechanisms of ‘co-binding’ in their enthusiastic account of the liberal international order, but despite describing the US-led bloc as an ‘open-democratic political order’ disregard its highly asymmetric relationships with much of the rest of the world and the global South in particular. Ikenberry himself admits that the international order is ‘more hierarchical today than at any era since the days of ancient Rome’ (Ikenberry 2004: 629) and that by the mid-2000s many constraints on US power had disappeared (Ikenberry 2004: 614).
organisation by marginalised groups in order to exercise counter-power and negate domination. Historically the freedom of marginalised and oppressed groups has been better served by gaining power through collective organisation rather than being granted rights (Pettit 1997: 304). It is this assertion of countervailing power that maintains an inclusive sphere in which public reasons can be heard.

If we can view states as moral agents through their participation in a common international society, the existence of such coalitions may similarly have significance for our understanding of international society as a sphere in which substantive norms are contested. Buzan suggests that there may exist sub-societies within wider international society (Buzan 2004: 208) and if international society can be thought of as embodying certain values, then so might a coalition of states who join together to make a certain set of claims within international society. Erskine suggests that ‘plural communities’ (Erskine 2001: 75) may exist within international relations which have been able to achieve a level of coordinated, collective action without becoming genuine corporate actors. It might be plausible to think of such coalitions as exercising a form of group moral agency if such agents participate in some action in furtherance of a particular vision of international society (Brown 2001: 90). Thus there is a case for supposing that the states of the global South might act as an ‘egalitarian social movement’ in their own right, as suggested by Murphy (2001). Caution is needed, however, as Brown suggests that to be credited with such agency the coalitions in question must be purposive rather than practical forms of association, attempting to bring about permanent normative change within international relations rather than advance a set short-term interests (Brown 2001: 92). Participation in an enduring purposive association organised around a set of moral or political claims, however, might enable states to act as moral agents rather than a merely self-interested actor by making claims on behalf of a set of principles acknowledged as valid by other coalition members.

50 Interestingly, the example that Brown chooses to illustrate his argument is the NATO coalition in their prosecution of the Kosovo war (Brown 2001: 96). This resonates with the argument put forward in Chapter 1 that it is meaningful to speak of a more or less coherent ‘North’ or ‘Greater West’ in its geopolitical manifestation. Indeed it follows from the argument advanced in this Chapter that any such coalition of states would advance its own conception of international order and advance claims related to, without being reducible to, its structural position within international society.

51 The technical and facilitative role of international organisations should not, nevertheless, be disregarded. Coalitions might be able to increase the ability of their member states to act individually as agents through information sharing, capacity building and consciousness raising. Especially when considering minor powers and weaker states, this form of mutual aid might be necessary as it might be difficult and/or costly for an actor to determine precisely what their interests are or what their goals should be. Furthermore such coalitions may go beyond inter-state networks of support to include non-state actors such as NGOs and linkages with wider transnational movements and sub-national networks of social action. A parallel may exist here with the transnational activist networks studied by Keck and Sikkink. They argue that an important factor in the success of activists campaigns has been the extent of transnational ties which provide solidarity, ideas and information (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 74, 200).
Despite these possibilities, there is still a question of whether countervailing coalitions could really play the same role that emancipatory social science and political theory has identified them as playing in domestic politics. Pettit’s analysis of coalitions of marginal states mirrors his earlier interpretation of the trade union movement, which ‘increased workers’ non-domination precisely by giving them collective powers with which to confront the powers of employers’ (Pettit 1997: 94). Yet trade unions conducted their campaigns within the context of a constitutional state. Outside of this context there are, Pettit emphasises, limits to reciprocal power as a strategy for securing non-domination. Reciprocal power constitutes a tense equilibrium, a war by other means maintained by a ‘balance of deterrence’ underpinned by the threat of retaliation, presuming the willingness of groups to use actual coercive power against one another (Pettit 1997: 94). The risk is stasis or attempts to break through deadlock using force\(^5\). As Arendt argues, violence frequently stems from impotence, a last resort in response to a lack of power and an inability to control outcomes (Arendt 1970: 47, 53). The republican tradition emphasises ‘bounding power’ by institutionalising such forms of conflict (Deudney 2007). Yet it is only through provoking limited forms of conflict that outsiders are likely to attract attention towards their claims and thus bring about the reconfiguration of a normative order. Controlled conflict and political argument within a rudimentary public sphere might thus act as an integrative force (Honohan 2002: 230), deepening the institutionalisation of a norm-governed order and expanding the scope of its moral concerns.

**Conclusion**

The foregoing discussion has presented an analysis of the possibility for political argument over substantive values within international society. It drawn upon existing constructivist, critical theoretical and English School contributions to the question of how norm-governed orders emerge within a society of states, but has also attempted to build upon these approaches by employing concepts of political contention and social power developed within historical sociology. In doing so, this chapter has attempted to identify a distinct dynamic of political argument which might potentially operate within international relations. If international relations is a ‘world of our making’, this chapter has sought to make sense of how this world is made and remade when actors differ both in their vision of international order and their ability to impose\(^5\)

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\(^5\) This is demonstrated in the responses to the oil crisis and the call for a New International Economic Order by American commentators such as Tucker (Haslam 2002: 225). As Arendt argues, violence frequently stems from impotence, a last resort in response to a lack of power and an inability to control outcomes (Arendt 1970: 47, 53). Violence, furthermore, destroys the possibility of dialogue between actors.
that vision upon others. Through an engagement with the English School or society of states perspective, the above account has sought to identify the extent to which the primary institutions of international society, the gradual taming of the sovereigns and the expansion of the practices of statehood to formerly colonised peoples has created scope for argument between unequals in international relations. It has therefore suggested that there is good cause to re-evaluate the potential for moral agency on the part of the states of the global South within international society.

The analysis developed through the chapter has identified certain boundary conditions which might enable political argument to be sustained and initiated within international society. This framework will serve to guide the empirical analysis presented in subsequent chapters. The most important factors can be restated briefly in order to recap the central points of the discussion above.

Opportunity for the initiation of political argument may occur due to shifts in the distribution of the material bases of power, as in cases where aspirant, revisionist powers make claims against the prevailing international order, but also in circumstances of more general power de-concentration. Argument may also arise where a would-be hegemonic power oversteps the established norms within international societies, with political arguments put in service of an anti-hegemonic coalition’s efforts to delegitimize the hegemonic power and increase the costs of unilateralism. Similarly, where the legitimacy of dominant actors has been undermined, they may acknowledge the claims of other parties in an attempt to reconstruct a viable normative order.

Political argument requires material power to be socialised and recessed, necessitating mechanisms of negarchy and impediments on recourse to direct coercion. Furthermore the greater the existing degree of interaction capacity and interdependence, the more likely it is that forms of collective power and thus possibilities for political argument already exist. Denser interdependence is likely to generate strong imperatives to reach agreement in order to solve collective problems. Greater interdependence increases the vulnerability of actors to one another’s actions, increasing the need for cooperation and making the threat of withdrawal from cooperation more significant. Under such conditions, the number of systematically significant actors who much be accommodated may increase, resulting in the need to legitimate the international order on a broader basis. Thus it is within densely institutionalised environments, especially those open to public scrutiny by third parties, that we are most likely to find examples of ‘rhetorical coercion’ through political argument. In such settings state-based actors may find themselves trapped by the logic of argument, compelled to defend their actions through appeal
to widely acknowledged principles. This, of course, is only a viable option if there is a sufficient degree of value consensus such that there are principles acknowledged intersubjectively amongst actors as valid. Such a possibility depends on whether actors mutually recognise one another as legitimate actors participating in a common norm-governed practice.

With regards to subordinate parties within the international order, their ability to challenge inequalities through political claim-making depends on the opportunities within the existing order. These opportunities may be existing normative commitments of that order which provide scope for challenge, extension or reinterpretation; the existence of sympathetic interlocutors amongst status quo or rising actors; and/or through the need of dominant actors to seek broad legitimacy at moments of change and reconstruction within international society. The substantive content of the claims of those who cannot simply enforce their will through ‘intrinsically effective’ means is especially important. For it to be plausible to states of the global South moral agents on behalf of egalitarian principles then they must be structurally constrained to ‘track the interests’ of their peoples in some respect. Furthermore, their claims must go beyond immediate interest but must involve an appeal to an alternative conception of international order. The existence of ‘plural unions’ in the form of coalitions amongst subordinate actors may serve to channel the individual claims of states within the global South into claims on behalf of a component of international society and a section of the global population.

Having advanced a framework for the analysis of political argument between subordinate and superordinate actors, and made a case for its normative significance in understanding the moral possibilities of a world of distinct but interdependent political communities, the following chapters turn towards an empirical analysis of specific episodes of North-South contention. They examine the opportunities for political argument, focusing on the possibilities for creation of political coalitions, shifts in material power, the institutional opportunities to exercise voice and agency, and existing patterns of normative belief.
Chapter 4
The Revolt Against the North: Political Argument and the Campaign for a New International Economic Order

This chapter analyses the attempt by post-colonial and late developing states to challenge to the industrialised nations through the demand for a New International Economic Order. With the benefit of hindsight the NIEO episode seems like a historical anomaly, a puzzling attempt by the weaker states in the international system to overcome international inequality that ultimately only seemed to reaffirm the hierarchical nature of the international system. However, the challenge issued by the NIEO is of significance because it ignited a wide ranging argument about the rights and duties of states within international society, the international obligations arising from enduring poverty and the normative implications of sovereign equality. It therefore represents an important instance that can tell us a great deal about the process of argument between unequals in international relations and the management of inequality within international society.

This chapter therefore aims to provide an account of the relationship between material, institutional and ideological factors that enabled the emergence of this episode of political argument amongst unequals, assessing the limits and possibilities for the emergence of dialogue that the circumstances afforded. It traces the attempt by a diverse group of states to present themselves as a united Third World coalition and provoke an argument with the industrialised North over their role within the international division of labour. It will examine the way in which specific agents addressed their claims about the proper organisation of the international economic system and reacted to competing claims.

The analysis reveals that the conditions for the possibility of political argument depend on the coherence of political coalitions, the material balance of power, the institutional opportunities to exercise voice and agency, and the potential for reinterpretation of shared commitments and normative frameworks. Thus the potential for normative change depends not only on the ambiguities of and implications immanent within intersubjective systems of meaning, but on the ability for agents to actualise latent possibilities through sustained political argument. Perspectives which focus on the ambiguities and contradictions of discursive systems, such that of Doty (1996), or on implicitly acknowledged principles, such as that of Linklater (1998), identify the plasticity of normative orders correctly but overlook the role of organised political agency. As this chapter will show, sustained political pressure can result in a re-constitution of
prevalent beliefs and values, as dominant actors are forced to reflect upon the appropriate principles to govern an interdependent world. Yet norms are not simply epiphenomena of the distribution of material power, would be initiators of political argument must be able to present themselves as legitimate interlocutors and convincingly appeal to substantive moral or political principles in order to advance their claims.

By analysing the NIEO challenge in terms of opportunities for coalition-building, the existing frameworks of norms, shifts in material power and the availability of institutional venues this chapter aims to shed light on what specific combinations of material and moral pressure can have moral traction in interactions between unequals in international relations. It asks whether a dynamic of political argument existed between the North and the Third World coalition, constraining actors and compelling them to participate in the process of claim-making and justification. If so, then there is a question of whether the challenge by the South brought about change within international society, intentional or unintentional, or whether any movement was reversed when power relations subsequently shifted once again.

Through an analysis a central episode in the politics of unequal development, this Chapter aims to further develop an understanding of the limits and possibilities within the post-war order and the extent to which international society can accommodate egalitarian claims.

**From Decolonisation to the Third World**

The newly won sovereignty of the post-colonial states remained precarious in the decades after the first wave of decolonisation. Their sovereignty had been conferred upon them externally by departing colonial powers (Ayoob 2002: 43), and new political elites found themselves governing highly divided societies. Faced with the difficulties of maintaining order and meeting popular aspirations for socio-economic development, the new elites sought to create links with former colonial powers and superpower patrons (Ayoob 1989: 71). Decolonisation remained an unfinished process, not least because hold-out white minority regimes remained. Thus the achievements of decolonisation remained uncertain, as pockets of white minority rule remained whilst new concerns over ‘neo-colonialism’ (Nkrumah 1965) and superpower intrusion loomed.

The shared insecurity and past experience of European domination gave rise to solidarity amongst post-colonial states and national independence movements. The importance of participation in international society were recognised by the leaders of Third World nations even before the majority of colonial nations became independent, with India convening the Asian
Relations Conference in 1947. Most significantly, the Afro-Asian conference in Bandung 1955 brought together 29 nations and a generation of post-colonial leaders including to condemn colonialism and racism. The subsequent Cairo Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organisation conference in 1957 was however unsuccessful, owing to the rift between communist and non-communist attendees (Mortimer 1984: 11). It was ironically the leadership of a non-colonial state, Yugoslavia, alongside India and Egypt that led to the crystallisation of a movement based on the principles of Bandung (Braillaird and Djalili 1984: 91). The resulting Belgrade Conference of 1961 linked the two issues of non-alignment and anti-colonialism, asserting a conception of sovereignty as autonomy from the great powers (Mortimer 1984: 14).

The process leading towards the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) revealed that, rather than standing outside and seeking to overthrow international society, the majority of Third World states were positioning themselves as critical participants. The common agreement on the Sanskrit principles of *Pancha Sila* at Bandung was effectively a Third Worldist adoption and appropriation of the norms of European diplomacy. Post-colonial states had become participants in a common set of practices and, through argument, they sought to revise aspects of international society from within. Acting in concert, they attempted to permanently overturn colonialism as an institution of international society and reduce the remaining white minority to pariah status. The diplomatic posture of ‘positive neutrality’ and the arguments of the NAM resonated because they drew on established international norms and liberal principles, as well as egalitarian anti-racist and anti-colonial concerns.

Despite Dulles famous comments concerning the immorality of neutralism, the Eisenhower administration was willing to accommodating neutralist states such as India, seeking to create a *modus vivendi* on a non-ideological basis with emerging nations (Brands 1989). Bandung may have even nudged the Eisenhower administration towards a stronger anti-colonialist position (Parker 2006: 886-888). In any case, in its efforts to promote a global liberal order the US undermined the sterling bloc and, ambivalently at first but more forcefully the Suez crisis, pushed for decolonisation. The agencies of the UN assisted in the process of decolonisation and its agencies made contributions to the developmental goals of the new states (Murphy 1994: 208-215). It is

1 From Bandung onwards (Parker 2006: 879), ‘imperialism’ and ‘colonialism’ have predominantly been understood by the African and Asian officials to refer to white minority rule over non-whites only. This lacuna combined with the quasi-imperial features of many post-colonial states frequently left the Third World coalition open to vitriolic criticism for its hypocrisy, especially during the heated debates of the 1970s.

2 Neutrality had a low international standing after the Second World War and the fight against the fascist powers. After decades of living under the threat nuclear Armageddon arising from bipolar conflict, neutrality gained considerable prestige as a foreign policy position.
true that US policy-makers in the Truman administration assigned the nations of the global periphery a subordinate place as suppliers of raw materials for the industrial economies of North America, Europe and Japan (Leffler 1992: 164-180; Kolko 1988: 55). But the demand for resources generated by the ‘golden age’ of welfare capitalism in the North helped stimulate impressive economic growth rates within the global South. Contemporary scholars have noted the unprecedented and unrepeatable commitment to economic development, statebuilding and nonreciprocal market access during this period (Amsden 2007: 47-48).

The US-led post-war order which replaced the inter-imperial order thus accommodated the goals of the post-colonial states in important respects. However, this normative order become unstuck as a result of US attempts to manage the consequences of the worldwide post-war political mobilisation and economic development. From the outset, the US was adamant that if post-colonial nations did not remain under colonial tutelage then they must at least be kept out of the Soviet orbit (Leffler 1992: 165, 180). The majority of the colonial powers came to acknowledge or acquiesce to the moral argument in favour of decolonisation. But in cases where they remained intransigent or mishandled the transfer of power, such as the Congo, the US became embroiled to prevent radicals from coming to power and to ensure the Soviets did not gain a foothold (Parker 2006: 891).

The Cold War was fundamentally a struggle between two rival models for organising human societies, two paths of development. The quasi-totalitarian modernisation guiding the US suggested it was possible to manage change in developing societies and therefore pre-empt the revolutionary communism in the periphery (Gilman 2003). This over-confidence was to lead the US deeper into support of authoritarian regimes, such as through the Kennedy administration’s

3 US planners ‘recognized the economic interdependence of the modern world and of economic and military power…If the United States were to win, US officials had to revive the world capitalist system, rebuild the industrial workshops of Europe and Asia, integrate them with sources of raw materials and foodstuffs on the periphery, and keep them in an American orbit.’ (Leffler 1992: 180).
4 The evidence available indicates that around 1950 indicators of basic quality of life and human development begin to converge (Kenny 2005), although the long-term data available is rather patchy and depends too much on evidence from India. In terms of income, during the first two decades of the Cold War, population weighted international inequality actually begins to plateau after a century and a half of divergence (Milanovic 2009). Thus the post-war order and decolonisation do seem to have provided a context in which egalitarian goals could be pursued through state-based, internationally-assisted development.
5 This is not at all to deny the brutal, authoritarian aspects of modernisation theory-inspired development assistance, nor the subtle racism underlying this form of guidance over ‘backward peoples’, nor the trenchant anti-communist motives behind the assistance. Nonetheless otherwise critical scholars have acknowledged that the depth and extent of commitment to the project of worldwide development on the part of the US is striking and impressive (Gilman 2003: 22). This programme notably included a substantial aid packages for anti-communist allies in South East Asia.
6 For an overview of current historiography of the Cold War battle over development, see Cullather (2009), Engerman (2004), Leffler (2007) and Westad (2005).
1961 Alliance for Progress in Latin America. But the American vision for the hemisphere increasingly generated tension in its relations with the region as it limited any independent or nationalist foreign policy. Accommodation was only possible as long as the Third World accepted the status quo that suited the US (Brands 1989: 326). Vietnam became the crucible of US efforts to contain the spread of communism in the Third World and the test of its ability to transform developing societies (Kolko 1988: 131). Failure heralded a US leadership within the industrialised capitalist world, a loss of public support, inspiration for other revolutionary movements in the Third World and a paralysis of the liberal post-war elite.

As Suri has argued, US mobilisation under the banner of a liberal internationalist foreign policy had pushed it towards dangerous over-commitment in the periphery (Suri 2003). But Suri’s thesis that the post-war order generated aspirations that sowed the seeds of political crisis is applicable beyond the superpowers and wealthy industrialised world. National liberation had generated demands amongst newly mobilised Third World populations which could not be met. Post-colonial elites had embarked on projects to emulate the North and acquire the material fruits of industrialism. Although growth rates were significant, they were unable to satisfy restive populations whose expectations had been raised by the global ‘development project’. As studies of political instability suggest, thwarted expectations can be more destabilising than deprivation itself (Gurr 1970).

The late 1960s were a period of turbulence and protest within the Third World, as in the case of the massive student protests in Mexico city and the bloody Tlatelolco massacre which ensued (Dirlik 1998: 311). Inequalities and perceptions of exploitation within divided societies generated outbreaks of violence, such as in the East Pakistan war of 1971 and the ugly race riots.

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7 Kolko (1988: 156) draws on documentary sources to suggest that after the victory of Castro in 1959 the US administration came to regard the non-communist, nationalist left as the greatest threat. But American policies also alienated it from even conservative elites committed to nationalist policies.

8 Halliday suggests that a considered assessment of the aftermath of Vietnam partially vindicates the domino theory, given that a large number of revolutionary movements were indeed ‘emboldened’ by the US defeat – just as American policymakers feared (Halliday 1999). Perhaps equally important, however, was the damage caused to US prestige by the way in which it prosecuted the war at such enormous expense in human life. The specific combination of brutality and failure was therefore arguably the reason behind the precipitous weakening of the position of the US after Vietnam.

9 As in as in India where Nehru’s vision of factories as the temples of the new nation won out over Ghandi’s rural ideal of ‘Swadeshi’. As Talcott Parsons highlighted, a worldwide consensus had rapidly emerged about the desirability of industrial development: ‘In spite of the immense range of variation in values and other elements of culture, . . . there has come to be an almost world-wide consensus on the evaluation of high, industrial-level, economic productivity. . . . Essentially it means the general acceptance of the industrial models of Western society as providing at least one essential part of the “good society.”’ (quoted in Engerman 2004: 23)

10 Dirlik notes that the students were from modest backgrounds and on their way to becoming members of the Mexican elite, yet nonetheless felt a sense of alienation arising from the gap between reality and their expectations of economic development and national autonomy (Dirlik 1998: 315).
of Kuala Lumpur in 1969. In Peru a military coup took place in 1968 bringing to power a junta who set about pre-empting left-wing demands for redistribution and social reform (Brands 2008: 114; Kolko 1988: 213-6). Therefore by the end of the 1960s even many conservative authoritarian regimes had difficulty in avoiding popular demands for economic development.

Krasner argues that it was the vulnerability of Third World states to the fluctuations of international markets that lead them to oppose the liberal international order in favour of global ‘authoritative allocation’ of resources (Krasner 1985: 66-7). Yet, as Krasner is willing to admit at certain points (1985: 33), it was the endurance of inequality and the political questions over the distribution and the relative benefits of participation in the world economy that played a central part in provoking dissatisfaction with the existing order. Evidence now suggests that the terms of trade for commodity producers were indeed declining, in line with the Singer-Prebisch thesis regarding the secular decline in the relative price of primary commodities. Thus due to unmet expectations inflated by development theory, the stubborn persistence of international inequality, and chronic internal instability, regimes of Asia, Africa and Latin America were pushed to seek a renegotiation of the position in the international economic order.

The resulting efforts to challenge unequal global structures were at times cynical attempts to appease domestic opponents, as Mexico’s Echeverría bragged in private (Brands 2008: 114-5). Nonetheless, in so far as Third World states were compelled to challenge global inequalities by popular pressure then, even if their proximate motive was political expediency, their claims ought to be taken seriously. An extraordinary range of different regimes adopted a similar position on the shortcomings of the post-war order, indicating that their complaints arose from some structural feature of the international system.

Thus by the late 1960s a set of demands had arisen from within the US-led hegemonic social order based around the UN, Bretton Woods and the global project of development. Therefore

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11 The Pakistan civil war came about because of the perception by East Pakistanis/Bangladeshis that they were being exploited by the Urdu speaking West. The May 13 incident in Malaysia prompted the ruling Barisan Nasional coalition to adopt the New Economic Model, a system of racial preferences aimed at shifting the economic balance in favour of the Malays in order to compensate for supposed Chinese dominance of commerce.

12 Although not, of course, all. The Brazilian state, for example, resisted pressures to share the benefits of wealth equitably and safeguarded dominance of a narrow segment of the population.

13 See UNCTAD (2005), Kaplinsky (2006) and the discussion of the role of leading sectors and quasi-monopolies in determining the returns from participation in the global economy in Chapter 1.

14 The enormous disappointment with modernisation theory and the attempt to achieve convergence resulted in the ‘impasse’ in development studies in the 1980s and spawned a huge literature on the failures and pathologies of development as a political ideology and practice (Escobar 1995; Scott 1998; Ferguson 1999).
whereas Suri (2003) sees popular pressures as resulting in conservative attempts by leaders to engineer détente amongst the great powers, the result was the intensification of the friction between North/South.  

The Non-Aligned Against the North

Discontent does not in and of itself translate into attempts to challenge a particular political order (Skocpol 1979), especially when the discontented occupy a subordinate position. Discontent on the part of the Third World could not, therefore, become the basis for making an argumentative challenge against the North unless they first organised themselves on the basis of their grievances. But the available opportunities for coalition-building shaped the way in which the Third World coalition would frame their claims. Some of the elements of the ideology which would unify the coalition emerged early within the post-war order, as commitments to the reconstruction of Europe under the World Bank/EBRD auspices gave rise to claims by non-European states affected by the war and debates over the creation of a permanent UN reconstruction and development agency (Murphy 1984: 25, 30-1). Latin American nations buttressed their moral claims by pointing to the significant sums they had contributed towards European post-war reconstruction (Murphy 1984: 34). Dissatisfaction over this issue fed into disagreements over the Bretton Woods regime and the ITO, as Latin American nations and India desired a system which would relax principles of free trade in order to enable them to pursue policies of industrial development (Murphy 1984: 28). Thus by 1959, the essentials of a Third World economic ideology already existed (Murphy 1984: 12).

This ideology provided the basis for deeper consolidation and wider coordination amongst disparate states within the global South. Latin American involvement in the Cairo Economic Conference of 1962 brought individuals closely involved with the Non-Aligned Movement together with structuralist economists such as Prebisch (Mortimer 1984: 16). The result was the issue of a Joint Declaration which set the agenda for the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 1964, and the consolidation of the Third World caucus in the General Assembly as the Group of 77 (Mortimer 1984: 17). These platforms provided a node for the diffusion of ideas, cementing structuralist theories as the 'common sense' of the nascent

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15 As Brands points out, the same events which led to detente promoted conflict between the North and the Third World: 'To a striking degree, initiatives meant to stabilize great-power relations (the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, the emergence of détente, the decision to abandon a rickety Bretton Woods system) set off profoundly destabilizing reactions in North-South affairs' (Brands 2008: 137)

16 In the event the short lived United Nations Relief and Reconstruction was wound up in 1947, despite proposals by its supporters to transform it into what would have been a multilateral development agency disbursing funds quasi-automatically on the basis of need.
Third World coalition and providing it with a language in which to frame its demands (Murphy 1983: 64). By the 1970s even Brazil’s Médici was to be found making the claim that there existed a ‘dichotomy’ between North and South (Brands 2008: 123).

The influx of African and small island states in the 1960s greatly increased the number of small, poor and internally fragile states within the international system (Krasner 1985: 32). But although they joined the calls to reorder the international division of labour to promote development, the new states frequently appealed to a different set of moral arguments. New African states emphasised duties of restitution, whereas other post-colonial states had emphasised an ongoing duty to promote the cause of economic development (Murphy 1984: 77). The basis of these moral claims is quite different: the former concerns specific obligations between actors on the basis of identifiable historical wrongs, whilst the latter consists of an appeal to generic obligations of social justice incumbent on actors irrespective of their past relationships within one another. Yet the coalition was able to fudge the issue of restitution, in part because dependency theory provided a common language of grievance with which to express moral claims. This placed moral responsibility on the North as the beneficiaries of an exploitative set of relationships operative on a global scale. The hosts of the G77 conference in Algiers in 1967 thus spoke confrontationally about the need for Third World countries to take control of their resources, nationalise industry and press for new international financial bodies (Mortimer 1984: 26-29).

The bridge between the ideologies of non-alignment, anti-colonialism and economic redistribution was a particular notion of sovereignty. According to the claims that the Third World coalition repeatedly levelled, each state had the right to advance its own strategy of national economic development. The ideology that of coalition was therefore adamantly pluralist. It rejected the notion that all states must adopt a single path to economic development and the notion that cosmopolitan solutions should have the right to interfere with national priorities (Murphy 1984: 41). Without such a principle it is difficult to see how any common ground could have been found between such a diverse set of regimes committed to such a range of development strategies. This commitment to pluralism was argued to imply solidaristic duties on the basis of claims that the international economic order presented barriers to national economic development and systematically disadvantaged some participants, undermining the sovereign rights of states. From one perspective, we seem faced with a further example of the ‘schizophrenia’ of Third World states in the international order (cf. Ayoob 1989), in this case clinging to an orthodox account of ‘Westphalian’ sovereignty whilst simultaneously demanding the extension of welfare-statist principles on the basis of universalistic claims about justice.
Alternatively, the central demands of the coalition can be considered as an immanent critique of the post-war order, a set of demands predicated on the positive right for all nations to achieve substantive self-determination – which formal decolonisation was only the first step towards. Adopting this perspective, the demands of the Third World emerged from the tensions between different principles governing the relations between states in the post-war order and the unrealised aspirations that this order had given rise to. In either case, the Third World coalition’s demands drew on elements of the existing frameworks of norms, whilst reinterpreting them and pushing for their extension.

At the end of the 1960s interest increased in models of self-reliance based on Yugoslav or Chinese models, epitomised by Tanzania’s Arrusha declaration (Murphy 1984: 94-5). Supporting these departures in economic policy were radical structuralists such as Frank and the Egyptian Maoist economist Samir Amin. These thinkers remained deeply suspicious about the subsequent call for an NIEO, arguing for revolutionary transformation of the world system or some form of national auarky as human needs could not be met within the framework of the world capitalist system. Such radical perspectives dismissed the notion of dialogue or reform as a path towards the realisation of egalitarian ideals. These ideas had only a limited influence on subsequent North-South debates, as they pointed towards attempts to exit rather than renegotiate the international economic order.

However, due to important shifts in material power the Third World challenge to the North coalesced quite rapidly after 1970. The difficulties in Vietnam and collapse of dollar-gold convertibility convinced leaders such as Venezuela’s President Carlos Andrés Pérez that a sea change was underway in international politics, with the Cold War winding down and a new multipolar world emerging due to the rise of new centres of ‘economic gravitation’ (Brands 2008: 111-2). The context of ‘a shaken global order’ provided a potential opportunity for the outsiders press their claims against it (Brands 2008: 106). After several years of drift, unity amongst the G77 was re-established in the General Assembly by 1971 and the distinction between it and the Non-Aligned Movement blurred (Braillaird and Djalili 1984: 163; FCO 1980: 63).

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17 On the notion of immanent critique see Geuss (2005). Murphy (1984, 2001), in his examination of how the claims of egalitarian social movements emerge endogenously within a hegemonic order, is clearly guided by the notion of immanent critique. This is not unsurprising, due to the influence of Frankfurt School critical theory on neo-Gramscian perspectives.

18 This interpretation is supported over the longstanding controversy of the notion of a ‘right to develop’ as advanced by the states of the global South.

19 Addo et al (1984) provides a selection of articles critical of the NIEO written by prominent world-systems and dependency theorists including Frank and Amin.
However it was the October 1973 oil crisis that radicalised the Third World, providing an
striking example of the ability of a cartel of producer states to alter the structure of the world
market, giving Third World countries 'a new sense of power and status' (Rothstein 1979: 3). The
crisis was greeted enthusiastically in the South, surprising Northern observers who expected,
correctly, that an oil price hike would hurt developing economies (Murphy 1983: 68). But whilst
non-OPEC states of the South had no veto over the oil crisis, they could attempt to link the
price-hike and their demands against the North by offering their rhetorical support. Although
the embargo began as a means to pressure the Western alliance over support for Israel20, radical
oil states within OPEC and OAPEC were willing to link the oil crisis broader demands of the
Third World coalition (Yergin 1993: 638). Hence the oil producers acted as an avant garde for the
Third World (Maul 1975: 34). The Third World coalition was already committed to the principle
of national control over natural resources based on a shared interpretation of the norm of
national sovereignty. Thus the formation of the OPEC cartel and subsequent efforts at
nationalisation were regarded as effective examples of direct action in support of a legitimate
principle. Like other political campaigns, the logic of political argument encouraged the Third
World coalition to present themselves as worthy, unified, numerous and committed (Tilly 2006:
54). This necessitated supporting fellow non-industrialised nations out of principle and even
bearing the cost of doing so if it furthered a common cause.

The availability of institutional venues, in the form of the UN General Assembly, granted the
coalition a platform from which to make their claims. At the Sixth Special Session of the UN in
1974, the G-77 put forward two documents, the 'Declaration on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order' and the 'Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order' (Braillard and Djalili 1984: 166-167). The initiative at the special
session was supplemented by the Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of States of autumn
197421, an attempt to ratify the principle that control of natural resources was a sovereign
prerogative, paving the wave of nationalisations in the 1970s22. Demands subsequent to the Sixth
Special Session declaration of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) included the call

20 Racialist states such as Portugal and Rhodesia were also quickly targeted. See Yergin (1993: 614).
21 The Charter on the Rights and Duties of States further led to the creation of the Commission on
Transnational Corporations and the ill-fated attempt to negotiate a Code of Conduct for Transnational
Corporations.
22 According to Olivierro (2010: 144) there were 575 instances of the expropriation of MNCs between
1960 and 1992, three fifths of which (336) took place between 1970 and 1975. As Olivierro notes, the
NIEO campaign to bring MNCs under the control of the governments of LEDCs was part of a wider
political climate of uncertainty and suspicion towards the role and activities of MNCs in both the North
and the South. See also Minor (1994) for a similar analysis locating expropriations within a very specific
period of the politics of unequal development. Duncan (2004), however, argues that expropriations in
extractive industries are a typical response of democratic governments to price booms and are thus a
cyclical economic phenomenon rather than the product of a specific phase of LEDC-MNC relations.
for structural adjustment to allow relocation of productive capacity to the Third World
expressed in the Lima Declaration of March 1975 (Ikansen 1980: 7); attempts to negotiate a
regime for exploitation of seabed resources during the Third Conference on Law of the Sea
running from 1973 to 1982 (Ikansen 1980: 11); the demand for creation of an Integrated
Program for Commodities to reduce primary commodity price volatility at UNCTAD IV in 1974
(Ikansen 1980: 12); the call for the establishment of a target of first 1% and then 0.7% of GNP
for Official Development Assistance to developing countries, as called for at the Sixth and
Seventh Special Sessions of the UN in 1974 and 1975 (Ikansen 1980: 14); the demand for a
departure from the Most Favoured Nation principle in the GATT in favour of a Generalised
System of Preferences, providing developing countries with non-reciprocal access to Northern
markets;23 the demand for generalised debt relief for developing countries (Rothstein 1984:
322); and efforts to renegotiate the shipping and air freight regimes (Kranser 1985).

As sweeping as the NIEO demands were, the programme nonetheless remained a reformist
challenge seeking change within the established international economic order. Its proponents
had sensed a crisis in an order they were subordinate participants within and attempted to
renegotiate their position whilst it was still fluid. But Rothstein highlights the paradoxes of
adopting a trade unionist strategy in an international class struggle (Rothstein 1977: 145): it
presumes the permanence of the inequalities that it seeks to ameliorate. The NIEO campaign
was ambiguous about whether its aim was to make juridical sovereign equality an empirical
economic reality, such as in attempts to promote industrial diffusion or open up transport
monopolies, or whether it was an attempt to achieve a better deal for states half-acknowledged
as permanent weaker parties, as in the case of commodity stabilisation initiatives, aid
commitments and preferential tariff agreements. Participating in argument from an inferior
position necessarily accepting certain aspects of the given order and thus renegotiation may
sometimes involve partial acceptance of and adaptation to the status quo.

The set of claims advanced by the Third World coalition were shaped by the political
opportunity structure which existed in the international order. The way in which they issued
their arguments reflected the available opportunities for coalition-building, the existing
frameworks of norms, concurrent shifts in material power and the availability of institutional
venues. Their campaign was, therefore, not made in a vacuum but related to their structural
position and the configuration of the post-war order. Focusing on these factors enables us to ask

23 The Third World coalition had already successfully pressed the GSP in 1971, but the call for the NIEO
increased the coherence of the coalition within the GATT and linked it to the wider process of North-
South debate (Narlikar 2003: 58).
how much scope international society offered the coalition in pursuit of their claims, how well positioned they were as agents and the specific opportunities and constraints of the way in which they issued their arguments. From the platform that had been constructed within the UN the Third World coalition issued a direct challenge to the industrialised world. The following section analyses the extent to which this challenges generated a dynamic of argument between North and South.

Challenge and response

Even though Third World’s opening salvo was an internal critique of a shared international order, it did not immediately result in substantive argument with the North. As Murphy points out, the initial NIEO declarations of 1974 were railroaded through the General Assembly by means of the Third World’s supermajority (Murphy 1984: 127). The NIEO coalition of course justified their demands in moral language, but the initial justifications primarily took an exhortative format rather than adopting an integrative strategy of combining moral claims with an appeal to wider shared values and interests. The scope for real debate was limited by the fact that the NIEO was in effect an opportunistic response to the oil crisis which packaged together various Third World demands, concatenating different claims into a log-roll (Rothstein 1979: 34; Rothstein 1988). Due to its emphasis on maintaining unity, it was difficult for the coalition to devise a common position, generating 'a tendency to remain at the rhetorical level – the level of grand principle – where all can agree and where the practical demands of simply adding everyone's demands together can be avoided or delayed' (Rothstein 1979: 201). The coalition had no effective intra-group bargaining system and consequently had no way of making the difficult trade-offs between various alternative proposals. Log-rolls are difficult to take seriously as principled political proposals. Thus at first the North did not acknowledge the substance of what appeared to be a symbolic expression of dissatisfaction rather than a legitimate set of grievances combined with well thought out proposals for reform.

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24 As Brands notes, the activist policies of Latin American political elites undermines the familiar depiction of them as passive puppets of the US (Brands 2008: 124). The widespread demands for nationalisation of primary commodity extraction industries and transfer of industrial production to the South also undermine perspectives influenced by radical dependency theory. Halperin, for example, argues that there is a non-identity of interest between the populations and the elites of less developed states, with the former pursuing policies which reinforce the disarticulated, extractive character of national economies in the global South (2006; 2009). Yet whilst many ineqlitarian regimes within the Third World coalition pursued policies which left wealth concentrated, important aspects of the NIEO programme called for measures to promote the path of integrated national development that comprador elites should, presumably, have resisted.
Instead what the Third World coalition presented was a 'laundry list' of demands (cf. Hurrell & Narlikar 2006: 421) which grouped together various proposals for reform as large non-negotiable packages (Rothstein 1979: 221). This was especially unfortunate as some of the proposals were not technically feasible and others not well thought out. British Treasury documents bear witness to the evident frustration of civil servants assessing the merits of NIEO demands as the starting point for North-South negotiation – ‘nonsense’ is scribbled in the margin of one internal document\(^{25}\). For some orthodox Northern economists such as Harry Johnson, it was simply a product of the economic illiteracy and special interests of Third World policy makers and organisations such as UNCTAD (Murphy 1983: 57)\(^ {26}\). The format of their protest meant it would always be easy to represent the NIEO coalition as a group of mercantilist states, whose programme represented a grasp for a greater share of rents in a liberal economic order rather than a set of claims with a moral basis. But technical weaknesses placed a further obstacle in the way of dialogue in good faith.

Nonetheless, although little in the way of debate took place in 1974, the South had managed to compel the attention of the North by linking the NIEO demands to the OPEC price-hike and the threat of future producer cartels. It seemed that a fatal weakness of industrial civilisation had been exposed\(^{27}\), the spectre of ‘reverse dependency’ loomed for the most prosperous regions of the world. This shock could not be ignored: it highlighted the flaws and limits of the post-war order and revealed the dissatisfaction of subordinate parties with the terms of the existing settlement. Political challenges, backed by effective pressure, compel a response amongst those against whom they are directed. Thus although he was simultaneously and unsuccessfully attempting to engineer a split between OPEC and non-OPEC Third World states, Kissinger addressed the concerns of the NIEO coalition in a speech to the UN General Assembly at the Sixth Special session. The speech was strongly internationalist in tone and emphasises the global nature of the problems facing humanity, warning of the dangers of a global energy crisis, rampant inflation, unchecked population growth and the looming threat of famine\(^ {28}\). The clear message is that the problems faced by the international community have become too big for any one nation, superpower, or bloc to manage:

\(^{25}\) T317/2310
\(^{26}\) Other critics included members of the neoliberal Mont Pelerin society who would play an important role in resisting and reversing the attempt by the NIEO coalition and its fellow travellers to effect a shift in the development agenda (Bair 2009).
\(^{27}\) The Soviet Union, with its large natural resource reserves and lower economic stake in the then Third World, was much less affected by the upsurge in resource nationalism. This further heightened the sense of threat in the North.
\(^{28}\) On the neo-Malthusian concerns which arose in the 1970s, see Hardin (1968, 1974).
'No nation or bloc of nations can unilaterally determine the shape of the future. If the strong attempt to impose their views, they will do so at the cost of justice and thus provoke upheaval. If the weak resort to pressure, they will do so at the risk of world prosperity and thus provoke despair.' (Kissinger 1974: 574)

Kissinger’s speech can be understood as a plea for the peoples of the periphery not to overturn the lifeboat of industrial civilisation. As recent historical scholarship has emphasized, the 1970s witnessed an irruption of globalist thinking as a result of the complex and interlinked set of problems nations faced (Ferguson 2010). The call for the NIEO therefore occurred at 'a juncture in history when chaos seemed to threaten' (Litwak 1984: 1), when the confidence of the US and the industrialised world had already been shaken by both domestic and international difficulties. Within the North, inflation, industrial strife and the collapse of the Bretton Woods currency regime were bringing the post-war 'golden age' of economic expansion and political consensus drew to a close (Glyn 2006: 2-23). Radical critics and neo-conservative intellectuals found themselves in agreement that public authorities were unable to meet popular aspirations (Bell 1996 [1976]; O'Connor 1973; Habermas 1973). Increasing domestic difficulties were linked with increased awareness of both interdependence and shared vulnerability (Maier 2010: 42-3). Post-war certainties were under challenge and the international order appeared to be in a state of fluidity.

Thus Kissinger may have been a deeply conservative realist geopolitician aiming to create a new international architecture in order to restore the paramount position of the US, in the interim Third World claims had to be acknowledged because it remained uncertain whether the US could re-impose order. The global nature of new challenges made it more difficult for problems to be resolved by the superpowers alone (Kissinger 1979: 68). It seemed possible that acceptance of a new multi-centric international order and a re-negotiation of the rights and responsibilities of international actors would be necessary to avert catastrophe. Kissinger’s speech, even if it was tactically motivated, might therefore have opened space for the reciprocal process of claim and counter-claim between North and South.

By opening an argument, albeit through asserting a set of demands, and maintaining a degree of unity, the South set the stage for the possibility of debate in 1975. A variety of positions towards the demands of the developing world were adopted. Some adopted a policy of near wholesale endorsement, such as Sweden under Palme, whilst others, such as Britain, adopted a policy of

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29 See Suri (2010) for a recent perspective on Kissinger’s grand strategy. Suri’s account, however, overlooks the imperial character of the system of hub and spoke diplomacy which Kissinger attempted to put in place through triangular diplomacy with the USSR and China, as well as the Nixon Doctrine of devolving responsibilities to regional powers in the periphery.
limited accommodation. This involved efforts to discern areas of mutual interest on which compromise between North and South could be reached and the identification of issues where no compromise was necessary or desirable. Evidence of British preparation for the Seventh Special session demonstrates how the challenge posed by the NIEO coalition could not simply be ignored by Northern states. British policymakers were acutely aware of the need to remain ‘on the right side of the argument’\(^{30}\). Concern was expressed that the NIEO coalition had seized the initiative and had been successful in setting the agenda for international negotiations\(^{31}\). The UK was all too aware that it had been rhetorically manoeuvred into a position where it had little choice but to react. A challenge phrased in moral language had been issued, backed by political pressure, and therefore Britain was compelled to defend its response by appeal to publicly acknowledged principles. Political agents are not simply free to pursue their own interests, nor are intersubjective values ever so completely internalised that the gap between interest and principle disappears\(^{32}\). But to continue to participate in a rule-bound normative order necessitates that an agent be able to defend their actions in terms of acknowledged principles. Thus policymakers emphasised the need to be able to offer an explanation of Britain’s position regarding the NIEO demands in order for its position to remain credible.

A considerable sensitivity regarding the ethical credentials of British policy is evidenced throughout the discussions in preparation for the special session. Throughout British documents there is an emphasis on the moral character of British policy and the rejection of ‘allegation made by some that nothing is being done’\(^{33}\). There is acknowledgement that the problems highlighted by the Third World coalition, inequity and acute problems by some LEDCs, were indeed of serious import (T 317/2310). Almost apologetically, a point is repeatedly made of the fact that Britain supported the ambition of reaching an aid target of 0.7% of GDP, but would struggle to do so due to the economic difficulties arising from recession\(^{34}\). Officials highlight cases where British policy is felt to be on a sound moral footing\(^{35}\) and make favourable comparisons with other nations such as France, whose public positions are held up as being hypocritical\(^{36}\). This gives us every reason to think that British policy-makers believed that there was a case to answer in the accusations of the Third World.

\(^{30}\) FCO 61/1282
\(^{31}\) T 317/2310
\(^{32}\) The most compelling statement of this significant point, which presents an important challenge to strong constructivist assumptions, is made by Wrong (1961).
\(^{33}\) T 317/2310
\(^{34}\) FCO 58/925
\(^{35}\) FCO 61/1281
\(^{36}\) FCO 58/926
Moreover, the hard-headed language of ‘the national interest’ in internal documents also belies the rather expansive way in which policymakers perceived UK interests. Perhaps the concept of the national interest, a notoriously protean notion, employed is so wide-ranging because ideas of interdependence seem to have achieved significant currency within internal debates. Thus protecting British commercial interests, ensuring essential supplies of raw materials, maintaining the credibility of international institutions, maintaining good relations with Commonwealth nations and reducing the gap between rich and poor are all listed as core elements of the national interest in discussion papers. Such a list is expansive enough to provide ammunition for almost any perspective in international relations theory. Yet for the purposes of this enquiry, it serves to demonstrate that neither was the British engagement with the NIEO negotiations wholly cynical, nor can the role of political pressure and perception of mutual insecurity be discounted in provoking reflection on the moral basis of national policy. The self-perceived interests of states are fluid enough that political challenge and contestation can potentially bring about a revision of normative beliefs.

The idea of interdependence was therefore mooted as a means of bridging concerns of North and South. However, because the UK came to the negotiations accepting the need for reform, does not mean that it wholly endorsed and found no reason to criticise the moral basis of the call for an NIEO. In particular, scepticism is expressed as to whether many of the proposals would actually assist the poorest states. Moral claims on the basis of absolute deprivation seem to be taken much more seriously than the claims of middle-income developing states. Thus it seems reasonable to infer that British officials were more willing to accept the moral case for those parts of the NIEO programme focused on ameliorating the conditions of the worst off on a discretionary basis. They were less willing to consider proposals to permanently change the relationship between industrialised and non-industrialised nations. There were also clear limits to the costs the UK government was willing to bear in meeting the demands issued by the NIEO coalition. Serious cuts in British living standards were considered beyond the pale. British policymakers were also deeply sceptical of the prospects for the wide ranging format for negotiations that the NIEO coalition proposed. Officials did not want to open debate with LEDCs, but rather, having acknowledged the legitimacy of aspects of their complaint, steer them towards issue-specific negotiating fora. Britain avoided political argument, only through the

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37 T 317/2310
38 FCO 58/926. With a degree of understatement, and perhaps a dash of laconic wit, the documents acknowledge that these objectives ‘may not be easy to reconcile’.
39 FCO 59/1230-1
40 FCO 58/926
41 T 317/2310
challenge of the NIEO coalition was it forced, reluctantly, to enter into the war of words. Its hope was that the ‘radicals’ would exhaust themselves, after which practical negotiation could begin with ‘moderates’. Overall Britain’s approach was deeply pragmatic and was based on an acceptance of the need to accommodate relatively new actors whose dissatisfaction with the status quo was to some degree legitimate due to their material deprivation. Officials were willing to countenance some limited movement towards the NIEO coalition’s demands and sought to construct a public defence of Britain’s position in order to steer negotiations towards a reasonable compromise as the basis for the orderly management of interdependence.

This form of traditional diplomacy in the context of the challenges of interdependence was not so different from that pursued initially by the US under Kissinger’s leadership. Yet 1975 saw the US actually attempting to open up debate with the Third World and the escalation of the temperature in discussions over the NIEO. This was in part the result of the appointment of Daniel Patrick Moynihan as US Ambassador to the United Nations. A social democrat, Moynihan had come to the belief that something like a party system divided along class lines was emerging in international relations (Moynihan 1978: 34). For Moynihan, this necessitated moving beyond traditionalist, low-key diplomacy towards an actual engagement with the states that now formed the majority within the international system (Moynihan 1978: 35). Accepting the consequences of interdependence under these circumstances would mean ‘going into opposition’, requiring that the US both show a willingness to participate with other states as equals in an interdependent world as well as a defend its own liberal values bullishly. Acknowledging the new nations as a legitimate voice in international relations was dangerous, but in the context of the apparent decline in US hegemony, so was remaining aloof. Moynihan believed that the stakes were high, invoking the longstanding American fear of becoming an island in a hostile world:

‘We could quickly find ourselves having withdrawn from the very international system we ourselves created, leaving it to our enemies to treat us as an outcast, an increasingly outlawed nation in a world system that is theirs, not ours’ (Moynihan 1978: 146).

Kissinger and Moynihan thus embarked on a new direction, the former delivering a speech at the University of Wisconsin in July 1975 which attempting to engage with the concerns voiced by

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42 FCO 61/1302

43 Moynihan was selected for the role due to his experience as Ambassador to India and an article he published arguing that the NIEO could be understood as a product of the Fabian ideology of British-educated post-independence leaders, as well as his bullish temperament. In Moynihan’s own words, ‘the president kept looking for a person who could acknowledge our own moral failings and yet make no apologies to our moral inferiors’ (Moynihan 1978: 8)
the Third World and outline a new direction for development policy (Moynihan 1978: 120). As Moynihan freely admits, one aim was to disrupt the coalition arrayed against the industrialised world, but at the same time the new policy was a signal to the new states: ‘We have heard you. We are listening – listening hard’ (Moynihan 1978: 122). At the Seventh Special Session in September Moynihan delivered a speech penned by Kissinger that was positively received and was viewed by both Third World states and observers as marking a shift in US policy (Murphy 1984: 129). According to Moynihan the US was attempting to convince the NIEO coalition that they ‘were not only listening but understood. Understood more than perhaps some would wish, and could play the same game’ (Moynihan 1978: 136).

But although the Seventh Special Session ended with optimism on all sides, this attempt to provoke argument with the Third World would result in political acrimony. Moynihan became increasingly frustrated at the sloganeering of the NIEO coalition, their seeming unwillingness to actually engage in dialogue rather than make one-sided demands. Debate within the UN became increasingly rancorous. Sluga argues that underlying the supposedly socio-economic divide between North and South within the United Nations lurked the old division; the General Assembly having become ‘a theatre of race, color and ethnicity’ (Sluga 2010: 232). The Western world truly perceived itself as a minority in a non-white world and stood accused of being unwilling to confront this reality (Sluga 2010: 231). As disagreements took on a racial hue, debates became increasingly intemperate and participants embittered.

The possibility of political argument between actors relies on the mutual recognition of each other’s status as legitimate interlocutors, something that is clearly undermined in the presence of suspicions of bad faith and racial and civilisational frames of thinking. Believing that the radicalism of the era represented an adolescent maladjustment to reality (Halliday 1999: 294) and believing in a hierarchy of civilisations, Kissinger insisted that ‘nothing of importance can come from the South’ (quoted in Lawrence 2010: 208). The Third World coalition was also deeply concerned with race. The demand for a radical reordering of the international economic order and the campaign against white-minority rule cannot truly be separated during this period, the oil crisis having began as an embargo on Israel, a state which was seen as being in the same category as apartheid South Africa. Tension reached boiling point during the debate and vote on the infamous ‘Zionism is Racism’ resolution within the general assembly. US policymakers were

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44 A racial lens on politics within the UN was difficult to avoid given the continued difficulties over the politics of race in the US and the outspoken role that Moynihan had played in the domestic American debate over these issues.

45 This was in keeping with the tenets of modernisation theory, which held that radicalism was the product of psychological distress in politically immature societies. See Gilman (2003).
horrified and deeply offended by the resolution, supported by a clear majority of the G-77 nations. To Moynihan, it signalled the triumph of totalitarian thinking in much of the world, the subversion and politicisation of all international discourse (Moynihan 1978: 166-90). He was not afraid of saying so, and found himself briefed against by Kissinger and the British ambassador to the UN, Sir Ivor Crewe, before being removed from his position.

Having sought to open up an argument with the Third World coalition, Moynihan had in fact escalated the argument and ultimately found himself repudiating his former views that dialogue between North and South as equals was either possible or desirable. Moynihan came to regard threats to the US as part of a singular ‘Afro-Arab-Communist axis’ (Moynihan 1978: 274). Kissinger had already complained bitterly about the 'alignment of the non-aligned' (Mortimer 1984: 41). The continued threat to the West posed by the USSR and the perception of Soviet influence behind all Third World radicalism does seem to have undermined the willingness of the North, and especially the US, to seriously engage with the demands of the G-77. Even during détente, the pervasive insecurity of the Cold War created an environment of tension and fear, in which the Third World challenge to the position of the North was perceived as a potential existential threat.

The credentials of the states in the Third World did not help in dispelling the perception of them as threatening and illiberal. Conservatives such as W Scott Thompson accused them, with a degree of justice in many cases, of being racist, corrupt and despotic\footnote{46} (Moynihan 1978: 55-6). The call from within UNESCO for a New International Information Order, which purported to call for measures to protect cultural autonomy but appeared to many as a fig leaf for censorship, hardly helped matters. The states Third World coalition had difficulties in convincing the North of their status as moral actors. Their claims were therefore seen as cynical and narrowly motivated by self-interest. Although they maintained a surprising degree of unity, as strength in numbers was their key advantage, the coalition also displayed a lack of commitment. A key element of the coalition, the oil states, were unwilling to actually offer more than rhetorical support for their fellows in the NIEO coalition and contributed little material assistance to non-oil producing LEDCs.

\footnote{46} However, based on Polity IV data, it is not so clear whether there really was a major worldwide autocratic shift between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s. The proportion of dictatorships increased by nearly 10\% during this period, but the proportion of democracies also increased – both rises coming at the expense of intermediate or anocratic regimes. See the survey of worldwide trends in Epstein (2006: 556)
Denuded of the armour of moral legitimacy, realists such as Tucker could dismiss the challenge of the outsider states as nothing more than a familiar aspect of the struggle for power. Romantic illusions dispelled, Tucker argued that the strategy of the Third World was revealed as ‘an old game’ (Tucker 1977: 156): the quest for a reordering of international hierarchies, not their abolition or transcendence. Thus the US and the North were entitled to disregard the claims of the Third World coalition and instead safeguard their own security — through military means if necessary (Haslam 2002: 225). Tucker later reluctantly admitted that the rising material and moral costs had made it impossible to resolve the challenges the North faced through force (Tucker 1977: 81) — but his comments demonstrate how rapidly escalation can occur when argument is broached between unequal actors in a domain in which the possibility of violence remains. Tucker was correct in his diagnosis that the success of the claims of the NIEO coalition would in part be determined ‘by an appeal to justice that will eventually strike a responsive chord in those who are asked to recognize and act upon a conception of common good that transcends the bounds of the state’ (Tucker 1977: 111). Any genuine attempt to remedy structural inequalities on a world scale would require more than a mercantilist grab for resources, but a compelling case that could win over sympathetic interlocutors in the North.

The Third World coalition was successful to a limited extent in this effort, gaining a level of sympathetic support from Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands. But aspects of the NIEO programme undermined the notion of an affinity between the goals of the coalition and those of egalitarians in the industrialised world. Some of the claims of the Third World were transmitted transnationally by sympathetic civil society actors in the North. The 1970s witnessed a profusion of nongovernmental organisations concerned with issues of poverty and development (Lawrence 2010: 213). Yet despite the activities of these groups, Northern states do not seem to have been subject to a very high degree of sustained popular pressure over the issue of the NIEO47. Although Prashad has suggested that Third Worldism was a political movement whose roots were considerably deeper and more extensive than has previously been recognised (Prashad 2008), the NIEO remained an elite-led campaign (Murphy 1984: 170). The accusation that the resource transfers demanded by the NIEO would amount to taking from the poor in the rich world to give to the rich in the poor world undermined the campaign’s moral appeal.

This was exacerbated by the seeming indifference to domestic inequalities on the part of the coalition, which regarded domestic political arrangements as wholly sovereign (Murphy 1984: 41). International inequality was and remains a larger element of global inequality than domestic

47 Some campaign groups such as Liberation did petition the UK government in support of the NIEO proposals, but the extent of the campaign seems to have been fairly limited. FCO 58/926
inequality. But is difficult to see how any principled case could be made for regarding the
domestic arrangements of the South as out of bounds when demands were being made for the
states of the North to make significant changes to their domestic arrangements in order to
alleviate international inequality. Relative lack of concern with issues of poverty alleviation and
basic needs led to the realisation that the goals of the Third World coalition and Northern
egalitarians were non-identical. Stanley Hoffman complained that ‘the anti-imperialist nations
show a remarkable ability at double bookkeeping’ (quoted in Haslam 2002: 229). In addition, the
claims of the poorest LEDCs had greater traction than the middle-income countries who would
likely have benefited from many of the NIEO proposals – the moral claims of poverty and of
restitution for colonialism are different to, and were likely more influential than, egalitarian
concerns alone (Murphy 1984: 84). Because the process of argument between North and South
was truncated, there was little opportunity for the two sides to engage in the kind of dialogue
that might have bridged different moral claims and commitments.

From Argument to Stalemate

Thus the Third World coalition was limited in its ability to convince interlocutors in the North
of its worthiness or the moral necessity of its cause. The coalition's one potential 'trump card'
was the possibility that Third World primary commodity producers might form producer cartels
as OPEC had done and coerce rather than convince the North to accede to its demands.
However, although the oil crisis led to a great deal of enthusiasm for this idea within the Third
World, major practical problems prevented this from being a viable strategy. Cartels are
intrinsically difficult to maintain because, as with similar forms of collective action such as
striking, individual states face strong incentives to defect. This would have been especially true
for Third World states, given the looseness of the coalition and their individual vulnerabilities.
Furthermore, unless demand for a commodity is price-elastic, a cartel is unlikely to be able to
exercise much leverage (Krasner 1985: 297). Although the Third World states did control a large
fraction of the world's deposits of rare minerals, none of these occupy the central position in an
advanced industrial economy that oil does. Most minerals and ores can be stockpiled or
substituted in the production process (Maull 1984), weakening the position of any producer
cartel.

Thus although the Third World coalition had managed to successfully press for the Conference
on International Economic Cooperation and force the North to the negotiating table, it was
unable to achieve much headway in advancing the goals of the NIEO. No breakthrough
occurred at the CIEC in 1975, as the North remained focused on the issue of energy security
The concessions that were granted during negotiations stopped far short of the genuine structural change in the international economic system that the coalition was hoping for. Whilst the South was attempting to advance an agenda which called for structural change, the North regarded the conference as an exercise in quid pro quo bargaining (Mortimer 1984: 104). Massive structural change was never likely 'and persistent demands for such immediate changes only guaranteed immobility' (Rothstein 1979: 26). The US, Germany and Britain in particular were unwilling to meet Southern demands, making small concessions in order to 'keep the lid down on a boiling pot' (Rothstein 1979: 24). The overall strategy was one of delay and ambiguity in order to frustrate the developing countries and encourage a split within the coalition. The Nordic countries and the Netherlands were largely ineffective in their attempts to act as honest brokers and find a solution to the deadlock (Rothstein 1979: 129). The result was a costly stalemate as 'neither side could persuade the other merely by reiterating the power of its own convictions' (Rothstein 1979: 25). The industrialised nations realised that their position was less precarious than it had seemed immediately after the oil shock. The Third World found itself at an impasse because it lacked the combination of an effective means of political leverage and a compelling moral case. The spectre of 'reverse dependency' had receded and the sincerity of the moral claims of the coalition were in doubt. As the status quo powers, the stalemate worked to the advantage of the North. At the 1976 Nairobi conference of UNCTAD, Kissinger bluntly stated that the US could withstand the unrealistic demands and rhetorical attacks of other nations (Prashad 2008: 189).

The CIEC may well have collapsed in 1976, if it were not for the prospect of a change presidential administration in the US (Mortimer 1984: 103). In his presidential campaign Carter challenged the 'imperial presidency' and realpolitik of the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger years, and his election revived Third World hopes of reaching some kind of agreement with the North (Rothstein 1979: 142). The Carter administration sought to de-emphasise rivalry with the USSR and chart a more liberal, multilateral course that would reconcile American values with its interests in a post-hegemonic world (Schmitz & Walker 2004: 113; Skidmore 1993: 700). Carter and much of his staff were members of the Trilateralist Group, which had attempted to fashion a new foreign policy framework for coping with the unprecedented challenges and complexities heralded by interdependence (Gill 1990). The luminaries of this group had been spurred by the

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48 FCO 58/926

49 Whereas Nixon and Kissinger seem to have viewed the US global problems in terms of the need to limit over-commitment and selectively reassert authority, the Trilateralists saw international relations as posing a set of problems that the industrialised capitalist world needed to resolve in order to negotiate the rapids of interdependence. Thus neo-Gramscian theorists, who emphasize the role of organic intellectuals
turmoil and challenges faced by the industrial world in the 1970s, not least the oil crisis and Third World challenge. Thus, somewhat ironically, the challenge by the South was one of the causes of the new phase of denser coordination within the North. But key individuals such as Brzezinski within the administration believed in the necessity of coming to an accommodation with the global South, and were sympathetic to the idea that the instability in the periphery had its origin in the frustration of popular demands by poverty and oppression (Lawrence 2010: 215). But this globalist vision focused on different issues to those that concerned the Third World, emphasising human rights (Schmitz & Walker 2004: 113) and nuclear non-proliferation (Nye 1981: 100) rather than development. The hope that the election of Carter would result in a new phase of cooperation were revealed as a mirage (Mortimer 1984: 106). The sense of crisis had passed and with that the need for the North to make serious efforts to accommodate and engage with the claims of the Third World coalition.

**Shipwreck at Cancun**

Of the period between the call for the NIEO and the end of the Carter presidency, Mortimer states that 'weak states never have had as much say in world politics' (1984: 1). Yet this was to prove a brief conjuncture. Carter’s globalist post-hegemonic approach was unable to maintain domestic support after the onset of the second Cold War. Renewed East-West tension overshadowed concern with North-South issues and the new set of questions arising from interdependence. Thus the report of the high profile Brandt commission (1980), published a year after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, was largely ignored. The report, subtitled ‘A Programme for Survival’, argued that the North should support steps to mitigate divergences with the South on the basis of its own long-term interests. But by 1980 the threat from Soviet Communism appeared much more pressing.

The Reagan administration came to power dedicated to reasserting American primacy, advocating not accommodation but confrontation with radical regimes. Instability in 'hot spots’ was traced back to the machinations of Moscow, justifying the unrestricted use of violence within ruling class-coalitions in resolving periodic social crises, have had an enduring interest in the Group. See for example van der Pijl (1998).

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50 Most importantly through the creation of the G6 in Rambouillet in 1975 and its subsequent consolidation as the G7.

51 On this point Brzezinski is worth quoting in full: ‘We are witnessing a global pattern of redistribution of power. The era of Eurocentric or western political domination in the history of mankind is coming to an end. In the years ahead, what we now call the developing countries will increase their share of the world’s goods… The people they represent will be increasingly literate, informed, and politically assertive’ (quoted in Amsden 2007: 137)
against left-wing insurgents. In many respects the new foreign policy direction had its origins in the turmoil of the early and mid 1970s. Reagan himself had challenged Ford in the 1976 Republican primaries over 'inaction' on the Third World and the shortcomings of détente (Westad 2005: 333). Moynihan had shared with his neo-conservative contemporaries Kristol and Podhertz a belief that the problems of the decade were caused by a crisis of nerve amongst liberals (Moynihan 1978: 7). His confrontational style prefigured the Reagan administration’s attitude towards international institutions, which was distrustful of UN agencies perceived to be dominated by the Third World coalition (Krasner 1985: 301).

Much of the capacity of the Third World to control the international political agenda was derived from the central role that the UN system, built around the principle of sovereign equality, had played in the management of the post-war order. The unintended outcome of the investment by the US of commitment and legitimacy in the UN system had been to grant the weakest and most vulnerable states an unprecedented voice in international relations once they had gained numerical superiority after decolonisation. Sympathetic officials from both the North and South within specialised agencies such as UNCTAD had helped set the international agenda, obliging other actors such as the Bretton Woods institutions to accommodate some developmentalist and social democratic ideas into their policies (Therien 1999: 727). But what Ford termed ‘the tyranny of the majority’ (Sluga 2010: 234) would only last so long as the US remained committed to the system it created. The Reagan administration was confident it could advance its vision of international order without the UN system. In searching for solutions to the problems of interdependence the US looked towards its own allies, cooperation and coordination with whom had significantly expanded through emergence of vehicles such as the G-7, and the Bretton Woods organisations.

As a result the G-77’s efforts to press its agenda at the 11th Special Assembly on the NIEO in 1980 were even less successful than previous rounds of negotiations. Northern countries flatly refused to grant the General Assembly expanded powers, their positions hardened by shifting economic orthodoxy (Peterson 2005: 25). To the surprise of many, Reagan attended the North-South conference at Cancun in 1981, but rather than a renewal of dialogue over the NIEO the

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52 Lawrence (2010) rightly notes that the Reagan administration’s strategy for engaging with the Third World was able to sustain a much greater degree of public support than that of Carter or Nixon-Kissinger. He emphasises that the presidency was much better able to rationalise its policies in terms of widespread perceptions of national security and American values. Yet equally important was the success of the Reagan administration in adopting a method, support of terrorism, which enabled it to wage war against radical Third World regimes without risking a repeat of Vietnam. This policy, which had its uncelebrated origins in the support that Brzezinski had provided to anti-communist Afghan mujahidin under the Carter administration, would eventually generate problems of its own.
conference produced only deadlock. The new administration was unwilling to give any ground to
the Third World coalition and stepped up the assault on its institutional base within the United
Nations. Jean Kirkpatrick, a neo-conservative former Democrat best known for her defence of
US support for human-rights abusing dictatorships (1979), was appointed UN ambassador in
1981. UNCTAD came under heavy criticism, whilst UNESCO was accused of illiberalism and
anti-Westernism by the US and UK before they exited the organisation in 1984 and 1985. From
architect of the UN system, the US became its most significant critic, depriving it of resources
and legitimacy in an effort to deprive it of its role as the central locus of management of the
international order.

The Thatcher-Reagan counterrevolution quickly undermined much of the rationale of the
NIEO. Whilst polities in the North were committed to the Keynesian consensus the extension
of the post-war social contract to create an international social welfare system seemed plausible.
The proposals of global Keynesians and social democrats such as Prebisch and Brandt could
perhaps have bridged Northern concerns over interdependence and Southern calls for a NIEO
(Murphy 1994: 249-50). But the prospects for international reform and redistribution
disappeared once the post-war social contract came under assault. Between 1981 and 1983, the
new administrations used their influence to re-orientate the World Bank and IMF away from
Keynesian economics and towards the new market-focused agenda. This enabled the new
administrations were able to 'capture the intellectual high ground' and set the terms of the debate
over the shape of the international economic system (Payne 2005: 76). The notion that the
North and South had different economic needs was eroded; poverty and economic difficulties
were seen as domestic rather than structural in origin, the result of internal impediments to
growth and policy errors (Therien 1999: 726-729). Explaining underdevelopment in this manner
necessitated what, in a different context, Hall called the 'discursive demolition' of the
developmental state (2003). Thus notions such as Krueger's concept of the 'rent seeking society'
(Krueger 1974) became incorporated into a mainstream account of the problem of economic
development53.

Thus by the early 1980s the shifts in the material balance of power, the institutional
opportunities to exercise voice and agency, and the normative frameworks which had enabled
the Third World challenge had evaporated. The notion of nationally autonomous development,

53 This is emphatically not to claim that many Third World states were not display the features that
Krueger's account identified. Rather it is to highlight the way in which certain questions and issues of
economic development were selectively highlighted in order to frame a political agenda which placed the
whole of its emphasis on market distortions caused by poor economic policies and the pathologies of
domestic institutions.
on which the NIEO claims were predicated, were already facing severe difficulties by the late 1970s, whilst the export orientation of the East Asian NICs met with increasing success. Many developing nations had become indebted to Western banks, who had lent developing countries large sums due to the flood of petrodollars pouring into the financial system after the oil crisis54. This credit flood turned into a credit drought after Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volker raised interest rates to 15.9% between 1980-1 (Noel and Therien 2008: 146), plunging many LEDCs into crisis (Arrighi 2003: 22). Along with falling commodity prices caused by a global recession, this resulted in the announcement by Mexico in 1982 that it was unable to service its debt, sending shock waves through the banking and financial system. The exposure of the East Asian NICs was much more limited, underlining the divergence in the trajectories of developing states as a large number of formerly middle-income nations were plunged into a ‘lost decade’ of slow growth and maldevelopment alongside the poorest LEDCs (Milanovic 2005: 61).

Thus in only three years, the politics of unequal development had entered an entirely new phase in which there was little space for the former Third World to issue a collective set of demands. The management of the international order was rerouted through the IFIs, bypassing the UN system. Undermining the centrality of the UN in the management of interdependence undermined the advantage the Third World had gained through their numerical superiority in a forum for international debate and agenda setting. Social and ideational realignments within the North limited the already tenuous moral traction that Southern arguments possessed. The status of the ‘Third World state’ as a moral agent, already tarnished by the very real shortcomings of the political representatives of the peoples of the developing world, came under systematic and sustained attack. Internal crises undermined capacity for mounting a sustained challenge to international structures. Although many of these changes were inadvertent consequences of the actions of agents and unforeseen structural processes, what should be emphasised in the context of this enquiry is that the shift reflects the successful efforts by Northern actors to radically shift the agenda away from the debates over the NIEO of the 1970s. Thus by the early 1980s the notion of transforming the fundamental rules of the global economic system came to be seen as entirely unrealistic and the strategy adopted by most of the former Third World during this period became one of 'adaptation, not revision' (Holm 1990: 2).

**Conclusion**

54 Adelman (2010) argues that in Latin America the primary reason for increasing levels of indebtedness was not unwillingness to adapt to new economic realities or misguided effort at propping up obsolete models of economic development. Rather, he claims, attempts at financial deregulation combined with the global oversupply of credit created perverse incentives, leading to ballooning external liabilities and vulnerability to external shocks.
There is a sense in which the emergence and failure of the NIEO coalition confirms the words that Thucydides attributes to the Athenians in the Melian dialogue: ‘the strong do what they will and the weak suffer what they must’. A question therefore arises as to the point of re-examining North-South politics in the 1970s. As Murphy (2004) asks, what exactly can we learn from the failed attempts to change the international system by history’s ‘losers’, save perhaps that the weak are weak after all? It has been the aim of this chapter to demonstrate that a detailed examination suggests that the call for an NIEO is more than a historical curio, that it can tell us something significant about the possibilities and limits for political argument in an unequal international order. Close attention to political opportunity structure presented by the post-war order, the scope it offered to states of the global South to challenge global inequalities and the reasons why political argument was not sustained provide insights into the possibilities for renegotiation of inequalities in international society.

Thus for all its analytic rigour, Krasner’s (1985) account of the period of ‘structural conflict’ provides only an incomplete account of the politics of international inequality in the 1970s. Krasner suggests that reform of the international economic order to accommodate both the North and South was impossible because of the fundamentally incompatible preferences of the two groups. Yet Krasner’s assertion that Northern interests were incompatible with those of the South is undermined by the fact that many in the North came to accept that an interdependent and unequal world posed a threat to the interests of industrialised nations, and even acknowledge that there was a moral case to be answered. The only way out of this bind is the familiar neo-realist manoeuvre of substituting positive predictions for normative prescriptions. Hence Krasner recommends that North and South can only avoid conflict only by having less to do with one another (1985: 30). Thus the narrow focus on power-and-interest counsels only silence, remaining mute on the possibilities for political argument and normative change.

Likewise, focusing wholly on frameworks of normative belief does not necessarily take us closer to an understanding of the circumstances where political argument becomes possible and moral claims have significant traction. The perspective on North-South relations advanced by Doty (1996) focuses on the ideational barriers that impede recognition of the peoples of the global South as legitimate political agents. It seeks to unveil the discursive strategies through which the South has been represented by Northern actors as requiring tutelage or control, and reveal their

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55 The arguments for elements of the NIEO which actors in the North found most compelling were not necessarily the same arguments as the ones that the Third World coalition put forward, however.
lacunae or immanent contradictions. In the case of the NIEO, it certainly seems that ideational barriers were a factor in preventing the possibility of moral dialogue: in particular liberal fundamentalism and the unwillingness to give up a worldview based on racial and civilisational categories. Likewise, it is not difficult to locate contradictions or absurdities in the positions adopted by Northern actors, for example in Moynihan’s simultaneous attack on the ‘selective morality’ of the states within the UN and defence of apartheid South Africa, Pinochet’s Chile and Suharto’s Indonesia (Moynihan 1978: 206). But the focus on ideational factors alone is limiting because normative change is not wholly endogenous to systems of normative belief. According the post-structuralist approach adopted by Doty, texts deconstruct themselves, as attempts to fix meaning or to establish an authoritative interpretation of rules always fail. But in an environment where force has not been banished from relations between actors, ‘intrinsically effective means’ may settle ambiguities of interpretation. Material power can ‘fix’ the ambiguous boundaries of normative orders. Contradictions and inconsistencies do not necessarily jeopardise an extant normative order until that order becomes the target of sustained political contestation, at which time the ambiguities and conflicts of principle become the focal points for political argument. The demand for economic development as the substantive corollary of formal sovereignty and the argument for expanding Northern welfare systems to the international level were not implausible interpretations of normative commitments already intersubjectively acknowledged within the North. The expansion of these commitments might even be said to be already immanent within them. But it was only when effective political pressure on the existing international order began to mount that existing normative coordinates were seriously questioned. Normative frameworks are most plastic when under sustained political challenge.

Therefore we gain greater insight into the politics of unequal development if we focus on the unstable terrain of political contestation and the process of argument between unequals in an interdependent but anarchic international society. The analysis presented in this chapter has attempted to demonstrate that moral claims and the appeal to intersubjectively shared principles can have traction, but the circumstances under which this is possible remain highly fragile. Subordinate actors may have to provoke argument by directly challenging dominant actors as a prelude to substantive debate. The weaker party, furthermore, may have to sustain significant

56 Ultimately according to Doty, the South is represented as being ‘other’ in a manner that delimits and shores up the identity of the occidental subject. Because Western/Northern representations of the South/Third World are discursive constructs whose relationship to the signified is tenuous or non-existent, we are left as if trapped in a maze of mirrors, unable to access the ‘reality’ of the South/Third World.

57 Murphy (1994) argues that international attempts to manage the consequences of the expansion of industrial capitalism have been shaped by an interplay between liberal reformists, who have acted as intermediaries between egalitarian social movements and power-holders, and liberal fundamentalists, who have been hostile to attempts to mitigate the side effects of industrial growth through political regulation.
political pressure or counter-power in order to hold the stronger party to intersubjectively acknowledged principles and compel them to publically justify their actions. Although it did not occur in the case of the NIEO, such a challenge may provoke the dominant actors to re-evaluate their long-term interests, which may act as a bridge between the two groups as the possibility emerges of a consensus on new principles to govern areas of mutual interest. What is agreed upon as a pragmatic necessity may eventually become internalised and embraced as substantively valid, as occurred in the case of the principle of racial equality within international society.

The NIEO episode cannot be fully understood in terms of a transactional account of bargaining on a *quid-pro-quo* basis. Instead, the episode should be seen in terms of a political argument between actors participating in a set of common practices over the moral implications of existing norms under new circumstances of racial equality and interdependence. Although argument is not disinterested, the interests and goals of states exchanging claims and counter-claims are not necessarily invariant. As demonstrated in the case of the UK in particular, policymakers felt under pressure to be ‘on the right side of the argument’ and were willing, up to a point, to reflect on the moral basis of their policies and adjust them in light of moral criticisms backed by effective political pressure. The moral principles endorsed by the UK and the North as being compelling may not have been the same as those of the Third World coalition, notably the former were much more willing to acknowledge the moral significance of poverty as opposed to relative inequality. But a detailed analysis of the reception of the NIEO does demonstrate that the pragmatic ethic embodied in the primary institution of diplomacy was capable of accommodating novel claims within international society. Many Northern foreign policymakers were willing to acknowledge that the challenge of the NIEO had highlighted the necessity of adapting features of the international order to new realities. Chief among these were interdependence, which highlighted mutual insecurities and eroded the distinction between prudence and altruism, and the related sense that international society was palpably shifting in its composition, putting the North at risk of finding itself alone in an alien world. However other threats, notably that of the Soviet Union, sharpened the sense of insecurity on the part of the states of the North in a manner that made them less likely to seek accommodation with the South.

Throughout the 1970s the states of the North felt limited in their ability to exit the institutional venues where the NIEO coalition’s claims were being made, thus necessitating that it respond to the challenges it faced. Nonetheless, the acrimonious scenes within the UN during the 1970s demonstrate the uncertainties and dangers of argument in international relations, and the problems created when attempts are made to expand the remit of international society beyond
minimal goals. By the 1980s, mounting frustration with the Third World coalition, its continual rhetorical attacks and its control over international organisations provided some of the impetus behind the neo-conservative foreign policy shift within the US. When leading states of the North came to reject the need for an accommodation with the Third World coalition, they were only able to do so because of the abandonment of past social democratic commitments, a sustained campaign to delegitimize the Third World coalition and undermine the institutional forums where it had made its claims, and the fortuitous but unintentional consequences of domestic monetary policy. Even powerful actors need to socialise their power in a multi-centric system. Attempts to do so involve normative commitments and the creation of institutional sites which may in future constrain them.

Throughout the whole NIEO episode, both moral claims and political pressure were essential in maintaining the space for the debate that did not ultimately materialise. By the late 1970s, the moral arguments the Third World coalition was putting forward had decreasing traction and the threat of ‘reverse dependency’ had waned. Thus at the CIEC, the representatives of the Third World were reduced to simply asserting their demands to the somewhat bemused Northern negotiators. Rothstein makes a persuasive case that the reason that little agreement was forthcoming was due to the weaknesses of the NIEO coalition’s strategy for negotiating from a position of weakness, the inflexibility borne of its origins as a log-roll, its limited technical capacity, and the paucity of feasible policy proposals it made (Rothstein 1984: 321). The Third World coalition therefore failed to move beyond a ‘strict distributive’ strategy backed by vague warnings of terrible consequences, towards a integrative strategy addressing mutual concerns. Nonetheless, equally important in explaining how early optimism gave way to the failure of the campaign is a consideration of the effectiveness of the NIEO coalition in putting across its moral claims. As thinkers from Havel to Niebhur recognised, actors lacking the ‘intrinsically effective means’ to enforce their claims must rely on their moral credentials. By politicising the issue of international inequality, the states of the Third World coalition stepped into an arena of political argument where their moral shortcomings and the ambiguities of their positive proposals were liable to sustained scrutiny. They were thus left making hollow demands which they could not back up by an effective bargaining position. Although the states of the NIEO coalition were in large part responding to a set of popular claims in seeking to redress international inequalities, they were ultimately unable to act as the effective representatives for their peoples.

58 Tucker cynically, but not inaccurately, pillories the longstanding tendency for egalitarians to exaggerate the interest that the rich and powerful have in ameliorating inequalities (Tucker 1977: 78)
Far from a mere anomaly or curio, the NIEO episode provides us with an important example of the space within which moral argument can take place within international relations. After the failure of the Third World coalition, the politics of unequal development during the subsequent two decades were starkly different. Although some concessions such as the 0.7% ODA commitment by OECD states were lasting, the NIEO campaign did not necessarily have a deep impact on the evolution of international society, at least not as its proponents intended. Much of what it aimed to achieve was reversed, and the challenge itself was one factor in prompting the reconfiguration of US hegemony in a way that reduced the scope for claim-making on the part of the global South within international society. Nonetheless it did assist in the formation of networks of sympathetic experts, politicians and activists within the North committed to the moral goals of development and humanitarian assistance as goals within world politics and capable of acting as interlocutors with the South. The campaign may not have been successful, but it was part of a process which consolidated the South as a diplomatic network and unofficial opposition within international relations. Thus the cleavage between North and South in international society would remain, dormant but not obsolete, both in terms of the structural features of the international system and in terms of subjective identity. Thus when the politics of unequal development returned as an issue in international relations, North and South were once again to be the dividing lines along which political argument would take place.
Chapter 5
The International Politics of Debt: Millennial Cosmopolitanism and North-South Inequality

The issue of debt ‘has a particularly marked capacity to reveal the inequalities at the heart of the relationship between ‘richer’ and ‘poorer’ countries’ (Payne 2005: 146). Possibly more than any other issue, it has placed the relationship between the advanced North and highly peripheral societies in the South at the forefront of public debate; provoking passionate political argument and attracting the concern even from those otherwise uninvolved in political activism. The campaign for the cancellation of unpayable debt emerging in the mid-1990s has been perhaps the most significant mobilisation of ‘global civil society’ over issues of economic justice. The politics of debt is therefore of central importance in an examination of the evolving relationship between the North and the South, and of attempts at shaping the normative order governing relations between unequals in international society.

The emergence of the Jubilee 2000 and the subsequent Global Campaign Against Poverty/Make Poverty History provides a vital case study for analysing how the eruption of NGOs and civil society groups in international relations have shaped patterns of moral argument and the renegotiation of values in an unequal world. Because the poorest heavily indebted countries have lacked effective leverage over the creditor states and the International Financial Institutions, the political agenda has almost entirely been set by the Northern creditor states. Thus debt provides an important case which enables us to analyse the moral possibilities and limits of external advocacy on the basis of egalitarian principles by elements of world society when the official political representatives of the marginalised are unable to exert significant influence of their own. The continuity of the unequal relationship between creditor and debtor states allows us to ask what difference new global civil society actors made to the attempts by dominant actors to manage international inequality and whether such actors could open up new spaces for argument over global justice.

The analysis proceeds by tracing how the issue of unpayable poor-country debt emerged as a ‘problem’ on the global political agenda. Through examination of attempts by Northern actors to manage the problem of debt it demonstrates that the instabilities of the structurally unequal relationships opened up spaces in which transnational activist groups could press their claims. The result was that debt became politicised and became a high-profile moral issue. The analysis then focuses on the particular features of the transnational coalition of civil society actors campaigning on the issue of debt, the normative frameworks they drew upon and moral
arguments they put forward, and the aspects of these arguments that had political traction with their interlocutors in the G8 and the IFIs. This part of the analysis provides insight into the question of what channels of influence exist for world society actors and what the mechanisms of normative change might be. Finally, the chapter examines the limits of this form of moral agency in a power-political international order, focusing on the selective appropriation of particular moral arguments and the ambiguities of expanding the sphere of moral concern in circumstances where structurally unequal relationships remain in place. This chapter, therefore, contributes to the concerns of the thesis by asking whether and to what extent transnational activist networks can play the transformative role assigned to them by the cosmopolitan sociology of morals interrogated in Chapter 2, drawing out the implications for how we think about the significance of the agency of states in the global South.

**A Tale of Two Debt Crises**

In the 1980s the development ambitions of many nations in the global South were heavily impacted by the issue of debt following a pair of crises, the first occurring after Northern commercial institutions lent middle-income nations recycled petro-dollars at variable rates which were negative in real terms. Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker’s anti-inflationary interest rate hike and the subsequent worldwide recession left a sequence of states, beginning with Mexico in 1982, unable to service their debt repayments. The nature of this first crisis was acute, and left commercial banks in the North severely exposed. The US pushed the IMF to step in to resolve the crisis by offering loans conditional on structural reforms. Facing a united front of banks, Northern governments and the IFIs, debtor nations had little option to accept the terms on offer. But although an immediate default was averted, there was a gradual recognition of the fact that much of the debt was in fact un-payable and comprised a ‘debt overhang’ preventing investment and growth. The result was debt-relief in the form of the Brady and Baker plans, resulting in a pragmatic — if not exactly egalitarian — defusing of the crisis.

Moral arguments were not absent from the first debt crisis. Yet it was the second debt crisis, resulting from the inability of low-income countries located mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa to service their debts, which prompted wide-ranging ethical debate beyond international policy circles. This slow ‘crisis’ arose from the chronic problems faced by these highly indebted poor nations who had already been having difficulties in servicing their debts. However, whereas the middle-income countries had become over-indebted by taking out loans with commercial creditors, the low income countries had become indebted to bilateral donors, in particular as a result of loans from government backed Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) in the North to buy
capital goods (Evans 1999: 269). Many debts were the result of mercantilism on the creditors’ behalf and the tendency to keep lending rather than write off bad debts (Dijkstra 2008: 17), corruption and/or misconceived development projects on the debtors’ behalf, and poor decision making all round.

Like the first debt crisis, the second debt crisis prompted attempts to negotiate an orderly solution to the debt problem. But whilst a realistic assessment and reasonably rapid action was taken in the case of the debt crisis faced by middle-income nations, ‘whose situations more directly impacted on the economies of powerful industrialized countries’ (Woods 2006: 163), ‘equal attention was never given to the debt burden of the poorest African countries’ (Cheru 2006: 35). Debtor countries had little opportunity to set the agenda and did not form an effective coalition to press their claims and open up the issue to political argument. But, despite the limited scope for initiative on the part of subordinate actors, the instabilities involved in managing the unequal relationship between debtors and creditors opened up the opportunity for non-state actors to issue a set of moral claims over the issue of debt.

**Negotiating debt restructuring – Creditors and Debtors in the Paris Club**

The route by which debt came to be recognised as a major international political issue was circuitous. Amongst the network of finance ministries of the major creditor states it was gradually realised that a large fraction of the debts incurred by poorer nations could not be paid. Thus a tentative consensus was eventually reached by the states of the North on the need for debt relief.

Throughout the period, negotiations over bilateral debt arrangements were organised through the Paris Club of Debtors, convening in Paris and chaired by a senior official from the French Treasury (White 2001: 1196). Permanent membership is made up of 19 OECD nations\(^1\), plus others invited on an ad hoc basis. Although the group has no legal standing and the outcome of its negotiations are no more than an ‘agreed minute’, it is much more than a ‘non-institution’ that it proclaims itself (Payne 2005: 125). Operating as a cartel, dealing with individual countries on a case-by-case basis, ‘undoubtedly increasing the relative bargaining position of the creditor against the debtor’ (White 2001: 1197). The institutional arrangements of the Club can be understood as a solution to the collective action problem faced by creditors. Individual creditors face the temptation to wait until other debt relief by others renders the debtor’s debt burden sustainable.

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\(^1\) Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canda, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States.
and then demand full repayment (Roodman 2006: 23). The temptation for creditors is therefore to do nothing. Individual, uncoordinated debt relief therefore potentially reduces the likelihood of joint action on debt relief (Michaelowa 1999: 467). The Paris Club minimises the possibility of such free riding by mutual monitoring on the part of creditors and facilitating the coordination of a common position based on the lowest common denominator (Gueye, Vaugeois, Martin and Johnson 2007: 10). Agreement on a common position maximises the agenda-setting power of the creditors. Dealing with debtors individually allows creditors devise terms based the maximum sustainable debt burden in each case and prevents collective bargaining and even the hypothetical possibility of a debtor’s strike. The Paris Club therefore offered few opportunities for the exercise of voice on the part of debtor states, it was not an institution within which substantive argument of moral dialogue was ever likely to take place.

Debtors had little latitude to renegotiate their position. Indeed, so weak was the position of some of the most indebted states that creditor countries sponsored efforts to improve their debt management and negotiating capacity. Some highly indebted nations had not been able to track their liabilities and thus had little idea of the actual size of their debt burden or who owed what to whom. The UNDP supported the creation of the Eastern and Southern African Initiative in Debt and Reserves Management in 1994, which was succeeded by the Macroeconomic and Financial Management Institute of Eastern and Southern Africa in 1997 (UNDP 1997: 71). Six OECD countries funded the creation of Debt Relief International (DRI) which aimed to assist HIPCs in negotiations through its 1998 Debt Strategy and Analysis Capacity-Building Programme (Gueye, Vaugeois, Martin and Johnson 2007: iii). These initiatives represent an example of adaptation to the circumstances of inequality: debtor nations were better-off acquiescing to their situation and accepting assistance by creditors attempting to create a stable and effective regime for debt repayment. The institutional support offered by Paris club creditors may well have enabled some highly indebted nations to act as more effective representatives of the interests of their peoples by increasing their technical skill and negotiating capacity. Preserving an orderly regime was also in the interests of debtors, as if the regime had broken down the creditor-free rider problem may have left debtors with unsustainable debt burdens and vulnerable to the pursuit of claims by ‘vulture funds’ (Gueye, Vaugeois, Martin and

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2 Michaelowa (2003: 467) notes that the G7/Paris Club is small enough to resolve this kind of collective action problem with few difficulties. This explains the relatively weak institutionalisation of the organisation – creditors can rely on the ‘gentleman’s agreement’ of the agreed minute as the number of actors are low and the interaction is likely to be repeated. The same considerations as an iterated prisoner’s dilemma game therefore apply.

3 Austria, Canada, Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom

4 Commentators suggest that as a result, individual debtor nations such as Uganda were more able to manage existing debts, clear arrears and rationalise their debt portfolio (Muwanga-Zake and Ndhaye 2001: 5).
Johnson 2007: 29). The sums at stake were high, on average 5% of the budget revenues of the affected countries according to one estimate (Gueye, Vaugeois, Martin and Johnson 2007: 70).

These considerations, however, demonstrate the structural power which the Paris Club creditors had over the debtors. Initiatives to boost the capacity of debtors did not increase their agency to renegotiate their position, but aimed rather at facilitating them to take ‘ownership’ of the debt issue. Nonetheless, structurally unequal relationships require maintenance to remain stable. Thus it was the realisation amongst the creditors themselves that the situation had become unsustainable that prompted movement towards acceptance of the need for debt relief.

Bilateral Debt Restructuring under the Paris Club

Throughout the 1980s, the Paris Club adopted a business-as-usual approach to the issue of indebtedness of low income countries. However, by the end of the decade, individual states such as Sweden and Britain had realised that the efforts to repay bilateral loans by the poorest countries would be damaging and futile (Evans 1999: 269). This followed the growing consensus on the deleterious effects of debt and new research by economists such as Krugman (1988) and Sachs (1989) on the debt overhang and concerns about the debt burden. Under the impetus of UK Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel Lawson, a cut in net present value (NPV) of loan repayments was suggested for the first time (Evans 1999: 269). Counter arguments were mobilised against those in favour of NPV reductions: it was argued that it was morally wrong to allow countries to renege on agreements and to undermine agreed contracts, that the costs would be too high, that an invidious precedent for other debtors would be set, and that debt relief would not translate into increased spending on development (Evans 1999: 270). The principle of moral hazard was emphasised, especially by Germany (Woods 2006: 163). Furthermore, writing down debt required an admission of past mistakes, something that many creditors were not willing to do.

5 The creditor free-rider problem became a reality when Arab creditors stopped requesting repayments from Mauritania during the process of Paris Club/HIPC initiative restructuring, but began to demand repayments once again after the process was completed, rendering its debt burden unsustainable once again (Gueye, Vaugeois, Martin and Johnson 2007: 30).

6 Debt overhang occurs where new potential creditors are wary of lending because of their concern that new funds will be used to service existing loans. It therefore leads to underinvestment and fiscal paralysis. The debt burden is concerns the diversion of scarce resources from development objectives to the servicing of loans. Questions have been raised about the existence of both the debt overhang and the debt burden in very poor countries. Some evidence suggests that some highly indebted poor countries did not actually suffer from the debt overhang (Arslanap and Henry 2006: 181) and/or the debt burden (Kruger and Morath 2007: 107). This is not directly relevant to the analysis presented here, as these reservations were only raised a significant time after a consensus on debt relief emerged and the relief process was already underway.

7 Evans’ first hand account alludes to the salience to Britain of the fact that a large number of heavily indebted poor countries were members of the commonwealth.
states were unwilling to do (Evans 1999: 272). In the face of opposition inertia prevailed and it took time for the Paris Club to accept the argument that large amounts of outstanding debt should be written down. Nevertheless, the UK initiative eventually won over the other G7 nations\(^8\), who found opposing the proposals morally ‘uncomfortable’ (Evans 1999: 272). Low-key political argument shifted positions within the creditor group: by setting the agenda, framing the debate, and deploying specific arguments, Britain had made it costly to oppose its preferred course of action. Visibly opposing concessions for the poorest and most highly indebted countries was an increasingly difficult position.

At Toronto in 1988 the first steps were taken in to begin the partial writedown of debt. Discussion of the debt issue ensued at G7 meetings in Houston and Trinidad 1990, London 1991, Naples, 1994 and Lyon 1996. The ‘Toronto terms’, offering a 33% NPV writedown on outstanding debts, were extended by the London Terms (50% writedown), Naples Terms (67%) and Lyon Terms (80%). The repeated rounds of agreements and succession of terms on offer is a testament to the lack of urgency with which the issue was treated, especially in comparison to the short space of time between the conception and implementation of the Brady plan (Evans 1999: 272). Debt relief motivated by the geopolitical interests of the US proceeded much more rapidly than initiatives proposed by the UK or other middle-ranking Paris club creditors. The US cancelled $7 billion of Egyptian debt after it supported the Gulf War in 1991 (New York Times 10/04/1991), the largest single debt writedown of the 1990s, accounting for ‘one-third of all developing country debt cancellation in the six years 1990-95’ (Hanlon 2000: 885). The US further attempted to use debt relief as a source of leverage in negotiations over military basing in the Philippines in 1991 (New York Times 13/02/1991). The Paris Club also cancelled $16 billion of Poland’s debt to aid its transition from communism (New York Times 15/03/1991).

Despite efforts by bilateral creditors to resolve the debt crisis, albeit for functional rather than moral reasons, only a handful of countries successfully attained debt sustainability as a result of the successive Paris Club negotiations (Dijkstra 2008: 17). The piecemeal approach could not succeed because the nature of poor country indebtedness had changed since the early 1980s – debt had become multilateral. This was the result of a wider shift in the remit of the IFIs towards management of less socio-economically developed nations in the South. As head of the

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\(^8\) Throughout this chapter, references are made to the G8 rather than the G7 when appropriate. Yet Russia should not necessarily be considered a co-equal member alongside the original G7 members. This follows from the theoretical perspective outlined in Chapter 1, which sees arrangements such as the G7 as the institutional vehicles of a reasonably cohesive ‘North’ made up of the advanced industrial democracies of Western Europe, North America and Japan. According to this perspective, the admission of Russia was an attempt to ‘greenline’ and incorporate Russia into the North when such an outcome still seemed a feasible possibility.
World Bank, in 1980 MacNamara had advocated a shift in emphasis from programme aid to support for governments undergoing approved shifts in macroeconomic policy. Structural Adjustment Programs subsequently emerged as a response by the IFIs to the acute debt crisis in middle income countries and then applied to low income countries (Roodman 2006: 14). Heavily indebted low income countries came under a renewed focus of the IMF after Michel Camdessus created a new Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility providing highly concessional long term loans shortly after he became Managing Director in 1987 (Evans 1999: 270). The package of measures developed by the IMF was presented as an attempt to place highly indebted countries in a position to service their debts through concessional lending conditional on adoption of good policies, including austerity measures and specialisation in their area of comparative advantage. Financing public debt is one of the sovereign prerogative of states, the solution of the IFIs to the problems resulting from the exercise of this right was for debtors to give-up elements of their sovereign control over policymaking.

But as a result of the failure of Structural Adjustment Programs to generate growth, developing countries became indebted to multilateral donors – the debt stock of ESAF supported countries having doubled between 1985-1995 (Woods 2006: 162). Critics argue that the creation of the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facilities were motivated by bureaucratic concerns over the mounting inability for countries to pay back previous IMF loans (Evans 1999: 271). Attempting to ‘muddle through’, the poor-country-only International Development Agency (IDA) dispersed funds so that the IBRD could be repaid (Woods 2006: 165). Mounting arrears threatened the financial credibility of the IFIs. The IMF and the World Bank continued to defensively lend and became concerned that their loans would be used to repay one another (Woods 2006: 165). The consequence was that through the 1990s, a high proportion of bilateral aid for low income countries was being directed towards servicing debt repayments to the IFIs (Birdsall, Claessens and Diwan 2004: 85). Bilateral donors began to question why they were supporting multilateral donors for their errors (Hansen, Addisen and Tarp 2004: 5).

The UK, the Netherlands and the Nordic states proposed in 1994 that multilateral debt should be included in the remit of negotiations (Evans 1999: 273). The IFIs themselves were extremely concerned to retain their debt seniority and to resist any initiatives to provide debt relief (Evans 1999: 273). Although management had been very reluctant to accept the need for debt relief, staff within the two institutions had been sympathetic and had in fact played an important role in

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9 Critics argue that the bureaucratic incentives within the IFIs were responsible for the problems. The organisational structure of the IFIs was based around the disbursement of loans hence the disbursement of loans continued; indeed, the IFIs were likely to lend more to those struggling with debt repayments (Roodman 2006: 21).
providing technical support for previous Paris Club negotiations (Woods 2006: 166; Evans 1999: 274). The US had also shifted its position due to the receptiveness of Summers and Rubin in the treasury team (Evans 1999: 276). The World Bank broke first, and by accepting the need for debt relief it made it unfeasible for the IMF not to do likewise (Evans 1999: 277). The IMF’s position had become politically untenable as the issue of debt relief had risen in prominence.

**Multilateral Debt Restructuring: the First HIPC Initiative**

Following the agreement of the Lyon Terms and the acquiescence of the multilateral institutions and their shareholders, the IMF and World Bank put forward the outline of the Highly Indebted Poor Country initiative in 1996. The initiative was the first truly comprehensive package to deal with the issue of debt, including multilateral debt (Gunter 2002: 6). The eligibility criteria however ‘proved to be complex to understand and laborious to implement’ (Payne 2005: 147)\(^\text{10}\). Eligible participants would commit themselves to an adjustment programme and be granted debt relief according to the Naples Terms. At the second stage three years later, the decision point, participants’ track record of compliance would be assessed and interim debt relief granted if necessary. Three years later participants would arrive at the completion point, at which time Naples Terms and multilateral debt relief were applied (IMF 2007: 19-21). The terms offered to HIPCs were standard, with little opportunity for them to negotiate (Gueye, Vaugeois, Martin and Johnson 2007: 26). Indeed in some technical areas of the restructuring decisions were made without consulting the HIPCs: the Paris Club secretariat wrote to the debtors to inform them of decisions after they had already been made (Gueye, Vaugeois, Martin and Johnson 2007: 27). There was little consultation, let alone participation, of HIPCs in the initiative.

The initiative ‘as originally conceived, was a highly elaborate and controlling policy framework’ (Payne 2005: 148) that proved unpopular with donor countries. By March 1997 only six countries had reached the decision point (IMF 2007: 22). NGOs and critics continued to expose the flaws in the procedures of the HIPC programme (Payne 2005: 149) and it emerged that debt relief seemed to have been deducted from development aid (Gunter 2002: 9). The HIPC Initiative therefore was ‘a poor and unworkable compromise reached among creditor countries’ (Woods 2006: 166), and although debt stocks were reduced by around $2.5 billion the limits of

\(^{10}\) Countries were eligible for the initiative if they were IDA-only and Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PGRF)-eligible, i.e. if they already qualified for the IFIs special facilities for low income developing countries (IMF 2009 – HIPC Factsheet), and if they had a debt-to-export ratio exceeding 200-250% and a debt service to export ratio exceeding 20-25% even after Paris Club rescheduling (IMF 1997: 17). Thus the thrust of the HIPC programme remained consistent with the IFIs’ standard policy prescription for developing countries to export their way out of poverty.
the initiative led to dissatisfaction. Constitutively unequal relationships like that between the HIPC nations and their creditors are always open to challenge, and thus superordinate actors have to carefully manage the relationship to prevent organised political claims form emerging. However, because initial technocratic attempts to diffuse the debt issue failed, opportunities opened up for politicisation of debt as a global moral issue.

**NGO Coalition-Building and the Rise of ‘Advocacy’**

Outside of G7 chancelleries and the offices of the IFIs, debt had long been identified as a serious problem by actors in the world of development. Attempts to politically organise across borders on the issue of debt began with the creation of the Debt Crisis Network by Southern activists in 1988 to coordinate action over the debt issue (Mayo 2005: 178). This was to be the start of a winding path that would result in the a coalition of development NGOs, charities and religious groups taking up the issue of debt and pushing it to the top of the global political agenda. It is necessary to analyse the political opportunity structure within their environment that enabled and encouraged these organisations took on a leadership role. This enables us to understand how argument over this moral issue was initiated, the genesis of these arguments and to understand the moral limits and possibilities involved in this form of political agency.

The rise of transnational campaigns concerned with issues of global social justice might be linked to sociological shifts in the North. Inglehart and Welzel stress both the rise of ‘emancipatory values’ and the increasing propensity for individuals to join NGOs and become personally involved in issue-based political campaigns in advanced industrial societies (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). This echoes the identification by some critical theorists of signs that a Kantian ‘universal yet disinterested sympathy’ might be emerging (Devetak 2002: 180). This approach, which shares affinities with the cosmopolitan sociology of morals examined in Chapter 2, must nonetheless be complimented by a focus on the specific environment that development NGOs and charities found themselves in. NGOs are corporate actors and exist within an organisational environment just as states and firms do. As Barnett (2009) has examined, campaigning NGOs are not simply autonomous norm-entrepreneurs, but are constrained and enabled by the pressures that constantly impinge upon them. Yanacopulos stresses that NGOs, like all organisations, require resources from its environment in order to survive and must manage their interaction with their external environment in order to secure stable access to these resources (2005: 96-8).

Initial opposition to the debt fed into wider concern over the human impact of the IMF mandated Structural Adjustment Plans via policy networks that knit together the epistemic
community of the development policy world. As analysed by Therein (1999), the central nodes and bases of institutional support for this perspective include the UN specialist agencies, government departments dedicated to aid and development, social democratic parties, Southern activists and NGOs. These linkages provide conduits for the development and diffusion of a shared, broadly social democratic ideology of development. After the disorientation of the ‘development impasse’ of the 1980s, a concerted push-back began in the mid-1990s as concerns were expressed about the impact of SAPs. At the same time, ‘third way’ parties met electoral success in the US, UK and Germany. Within this context, charities and NGOs operating in the developing world seem to have begun to reflect critically on their own role, increasingly concerned that the mere provision of services was an inadequate strategy. A consensus seems to have arisen that promoting human development required not just the transfer of resources and service-provision but comprehensive, global reform. Thus due to ideational shifts, charities and development NGOs were increasingly drawn towards campaigning and ‘political’ activities to achieve their goals.

Simultaneous, the relationship between actors was changing due to an increased number of NGOs competing over both legitimacy and declining official development aid, resulting in a more competitive environment (Yanacopulos 2005: 97). Coupled with this shift, Southern NGOs increasingly took on an increasingly large share of funding for project work, leading to fears that ‘international or northern NGOs were becoming redundant in the field of development’ (Yanacopulos 2005: 101). Nonetheless, Northern NGOs retained greater resources in terms of revenue, professionalism and technical capacity than their Southern counterparts (Mayo 2005: 186). Crucially, the organisations had leverage over Northern governments due to both their location and their perception as legitimate moral actors. Thus according to a logic of comparative advantage, Northern NGOs and charities began to focus their efforts on campaigning to change the rules of the development game11. They increasingly adopted a strategy of ‘resourcing the South to do its own campaigning, while focusing on pressurizing Northern governments to challenge the neoliberal agendas that were still so predominant globally’ (Mayo 2005: 202).

The turn to campaigning required the increasing adoption of the techniques of marketing and public relations in campaigning, both to achieve value-based goals and due to the organizational need to attract and maintain public support (Mayo 2005: 183). Thus NGOs increasingly sought to identify issues that would have broad public appeal to campaign upon. Campaigning was so

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11 This specialisation of roles was often supported by NGOs in the global South (Leipold 2000: 453)
important in the strategies of the larger NGOs that Oxfam and Christian Aid created a campaigning vehicle, the World Development Movement, to circumvent restrictions on political activities by charities (Mayo 2005: 179).

Development NGOs became increasingly professionalised, in part due to demand on the part of governments for high quality technical research that the larger development organisations were able to provide. These steps significantly increased both the credibility and moral authority of Northern NGOs in debates over development, but they came at high financial cost (Yanacopulos 2005: 102). Mounting costs coupled with the shift of development issues upward to supranational sites of decision-making provided environmental pressure for the emergence of international coalitions of nationally based NGOs, as in the case of Oxfam International (Yanacopulos 2005: 101), which was formed from twelve national branches. The new coalitions enabled specialisation and information-sharing amongst their members, whilst pushing them towards engagement with multi-lateral development issues. Policy-work became an increasingly central element of their activities, whilst the major international development NGOs sought to cooperate on broad-church public campaigns lobbying governments.

Their influence was especially strong within the UK, where the Department for International Development (DFID) gained autonomy from the Foreign Office and a rising budget following the electoral victory of the New Labour in 1997. DFID increasingly sought to work with the third sector ‘development industry’ to formulate policy, whilst the NGOs themselves found increasing success in lobbying the government. The increasing interconnection between DFID and major development NGOs however, left the former dependent on a state whose policies they were, in their campaigning activities, seeking to change. By 2005 £40 million of Oxfam UK’s £180 million budget came from public funds (Hodkinson 2005a). The ambiguities of this position were to have an important impact on the subsequent course of the debt campaign.

Throughout the world, after the neo-liberal austerity programmes of the 1980s faith-based organisations played an increasingly important role in service provision in developing nations (Clarke 2006: 837). Within the US this new impetus to campaigning on poverty borne of direct experience coincided with ‘a surge in foreign policy activism among American religious groups’ (Hook 2008: 155). In the 1990s World Vision International, possibly the world’s largest development NGO, re-interpreted its Christian vocation as requiring not just charitable giving but efforts to campaign on issues of human rights and social justice (Barnett 2009: 645). Similar shifts were underway within the UK, where religious development NGOs such as Christian Aid and CAFOD were already well established and issues of global justice were increasingly seen as
part of the ‘social mission’ of mainstream Christian denominations. Despite the UK’s ongoing trend towards secularisation (Voas and Crockett 2005), the campaigning efforts of religious organisations enjoyed significant traction with the New Labour government. The religious convictions of Blair and Brown are well documented, and the commitment to a kind of ‘Christian social democracy’ seems to have been shared by many of those who influential in the formulation of government policy in the areas of development, aid and relations with the developing world.

Religious organisations had the advantage of extensive pre-existing social networks that they could draw upon. This provided channels beyond the ranks of committed activists through which previously non-political individuals could be mobilised to support a campaign which appealed to widely diffused values. Moreover religious campaigns have unique advantages as vehicles for political campaigns. The ‘aura’ of moral and spiritual legitimacy that they possess means that religious groups can potentially broach political issues without appearing to enter into the domain of politics proper, making their moral demands appear apolitical. This was adopted as a conscious strategy from the 1990s onward through the conceptual fudge of ‘advocacy’ (Barnett 2009: 645).

Indeed as has been documented in detail, secular development organisations themselves share common origins with religious and missionary organisations. Relief organisations such as Oxfam were created in response to the humanitarian crises arising from the aftermath of decolonisation — the opportunities for ‘development’ expanded due to the decline of missionary work. The central allegation of these scholars is that this polymorphous set of practices has played an enduring role ameliorating but rarely challenging structural inequalities, ultimately perpetuating patterns of inequality. It is true that it is possible to note the discursive continuities between the two sets of practices, for example the secularised sense of Christian

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12 To take one example, the former anti-apartheid campaigner, Methodist lay-preacher and later high commissioner to South Africa, Paul Boateng, played an important role in the drafting of the 2005 Africa Commission report.

13 As the research of Inglehart and Welzel (2005) indicates, although the value shifts associated with modernisation have been associated with patterns of secularisation, religious value systems and emancipatory value systems are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Consideration of the debt campaign indicates that religious groups in advanced industrial democracies may re-interpret their own social mission in line with the society-wide value shift.

14 Clarke (2006: 845) notes the family resemblances between the moral missions of missionary work and secular development, whilst Anderson and Rieff (2005: 30-1) argue that both promote altruistic goals in the name of transcendent values. Following Cowen and Shenton’s emphasis on the deep continuities between the two sets of practices (1996), Duffield (2009) has argued that there was no real break between the two.

15 Duffield refers to the ‘monotonous refrain’ of humanitarianism in its various guises, depoliticising the issues of poverty and inequality by focusing on amelioration of suffering in the here and now (2009: 44).
mission which still animates the practice of development or the shared representation of the passive poor in need of uplift and enlightenment. But it might be more analytically fruitful to focus instead on the structural inequalities which make avoiding such pitfalls so difficult. Indeed, the participants in the debt campaign were resolutely committed to a transformative programme emphasising justice, not charity. Yet, as will be examined, throughout the campaign the central protagonists found it difficult to escape familiar discursive patterns and moral relationships based on the tutelage of the marginalised, the structures of inequality exerting a pull that not even the best intentions could easily overcome.

Transnational Activist Networks and Millenarian Cosmopolitanism

The changing organisational environment of the 1990s pushed Northern development NGOs to search for a suitable cause to campaign upon at the same time as the debt issue was becoming increasingly salient within development policy networks. A central concern was the difficulty of making complex issues of development compelling to the general public (Mayo 2005: 179). The breakthrough seems to have come about through Professor Martin Dent’s biblically inspired idea of a ‘Jubilee year’ cancellation of debts (Busby 2007: 248). Professional campaigners were convinced they had found a simple and normatively compelling way of framing the issue, whilst faith groups within the UK were attracted to the campaign as they were ‘looking for ways of giving the millennium deeper spiritual significance’ (2005: 179).

The Jubilee 2000 campaign is significant because it an exemplar of the sort of moral agency on the part of conscientious Northern actors and transnational civil society groups that cosmopolitan-globalist theorists have looked towards. The religious element alloyed the campaign with an appeal to transcendent values (Mann 1986), generating a distinctively millenarian version of cosmopolitanism. A theoretically sophisticated, sympathetic account of the emergence of the movement is provided by Yanacopulos (2004), who analyses the coalition as a group of norm entrepreneurs (cf. Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Thus the new coalitions which had emerged had to link the new norm with an established principle, proposing the extension or reinterpretation of widely-shared commitments within an existing normative framework.

The starkness and emotional appeal of the issue, impoverished countries burdened with un-repayable loans to the richest countries, enabled the coalition to promote the issue as question of

16 On the analysis of frames see Benford and Snow (2000).
justice. This, alongside the attribution of a locus of moral responsibility, has been identified as key to successful political framing (Benford and Snow 2000: 615-6). It is worth, however, examining the arguments put forward by the campaign as well as its sympathetic fellow travellers in more detail. It is possible to distinguish procedural/deontological arguments against the debts from consequentialist claims. Those advancing the former argued that the debts were illegitimate, they should never have been made and so debtor countries were under no obligation to pay them. The central concern was ‘whether a loan should have been made in the first place. To a large extent it is irrelevant whether the debtor ‘deserves’ debt relief’ (Roodman 2006: 111).

They frequently based such claims on appeals to established legal principles and natural law, noting that lender creditor relationships went against the principles of fiduciary trust that inform contract law (Stiglitz 2006: 159), that courts often void debts incurred as a result of misinformation, deception and pressure on debtors (Roodman 2006: 112), and that many of the loans were contracted illegally under the laws of debtor countries (Roodman 2006: 125, 121).

These arguments sometimes adopt an essentially cosmopolitan perspective when employing legal analogies: ‘If a company goes bankrupt, no one would expect the children of the owners or employees of that company to drop out of school to go to work to pay the company’s debts’ (Hanlon 2000: 889). Citizens are depicted as separate from their nation-state and not necessarily accountable for the poor decisions of the latter. The notion of odious debt was also put forward, expanding ideas advanced by Alexander Sack in 1927. Loans that funded armed oppression of the population, enriched the governing elite or merely furthered the geopolitical goals of creditors were argued to be odious and therefore non-binding. Some went further to argue that because credit is fungible ‘all loans to odious regimes and dictators can be classed as odious, even if the ostensible purpose was permissible’ (Roodman 2006: 118). These arguments clearly drew on a conviction that the individual is the proper subject of moral concern and the belief that democracy is the only legitimate form of government. Arguments about legitimacy, however, occasionally take on a paternalistic tone in their anti-sovereignism, as when in an extraordinary passage Stiglitz (2006: 165) draws an analogy with a bank issuing a credit card to a child who proceeds to run up huge debts. Roodman likewise argues that developing countries should not bear the burden of poor policy making because they lack the technical knowledge and experience, pointing out a catalogue of failed credit-financed projects in Tanzania and Nigeria (Roodman 2006: 124). According to these arguments, the states of developing nations were not moral agents capable of legitimately representing the interests of their peoples.

The debt campaigns also clearly tapped into an intuitive but unsystematic notion of ‘unfairness’, the idea that it is wrong to benefit due to the misery of others. These notions, widespread but
difficult to clearly specify, clearly trade on a generic notion of exploitation\textsuperscript{17}. Arguments along these lines seem to have drawn on a Rawlsian notion that a system of social cooperation such as the world economy should operate on principles that work to the benefit of the least advantaged. This was clearly heightened by the fact that the burden of repaying the loans seem to fall on those who in many cases had not benefitted from them. (Roodman 2006: 17)

Outcome based arguments, in their unsystematic form, were based on the presumption that debt cancellation would contribute ‘in some uncontested way to the improvement of the lot of the less developed countries of the world’ (Payne 2006: 923). Oxfam attempted to frame the issue in terms of poverty eradication and other development goals (Yanacopulos 2004: 721). Such arguments were frequently highly emotionally charged – ‘children in Africa die every day because their governments are spending more on debt servicing than they do on health or education’ (Hertz 2004: 3) – and clearly had significant emotional and rhetorical appeal in societies where such public goods were taken for granted. Campaign groups such as War on Want squarely focused their arguments on the issue of unmet needs.

More systematic arguments were put forward by those linking debt relief with human rights (Yanacopulos 2004: 722). The idea of human rights and their relationship to development had become increasingly important in the 1990s. Proponents of the debt-human rights link drew on the UN Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to argue that states parties are legally obligated to use all available means and resources to help every individual achieve these rights. In the words of Friedman: ‘By continuing to insist that poor states use their scarce resources for the debt service payments rather than for improved access to healthcare, education, food and basic shelter for their impoverished populations, the international community becomes complicit in the wide-scale violation of human rights’ (Friedman 2000: 192)\textsuperscript{18}. Significant in strengthening this position was the adoption of the OECD Development Assistance Committee targets in 1996 (Hanlon 2000: 889), which committed members to promoting a series of development goals, and, crucially, the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals by the United Nations in 2001.

\textsuperscript{17} On the notion of international exploitation, see Avar de Shalit (1998). Exploitation is a difficult moral concept to specify because most instances of exploitation are Pareto optimal, therefore conflicting with other intuitive notions of justice such as mutual advantage. This has the counterintuitive consequence that ‘the only thing worse than being exploited is not being exploited’. In addition there are clear instances when ‘benefitting from the misery of others’ is not objectionable, such as the case of remuneration for the work of nurses and doctors.

\textsuperscript{18} These arguments clearly resonate with those made by Thomas Pogge (2005) that present global economic arrangements constitute a massive violation of negative obligations.
Campaigners were sensitive to the fact that ‘debt relief’ framed the issue as one of charity, whereas ‘debt cancellation’ concerned justice and the restoration of the relationship of moral equality between debtor and creditor in line with the concept of the Jubilee animating the claim (Hertz 2004: 11). Such justice based arguments and their Biblical resonance were important in overcoming the widespread common-sense belief that debts should be repaid (Yanacopulos 2004: 723). These arguments have been linked to the rights-based defence of debt relief through the claim that debt relief is a matter of social justice, an obligation to respect the rights of others, rather than beneficence (Hanlon 2006: 110). Emancipatory themes were evoked by the linkage between Jubilee 2000 and the anti-slavery campaign, symbolised through the repeated use of the chain motif (Mayo 2005: 173). Nevertheless, due to the strongly religious convictions animating large sections of the campaign it is difficult to exclude the possibility that the notion of ‘Christian charity’ played an important role in convincing many of the need for debt relief.

By putting forward a range of moral arguments that appealed to intuitive moral principles and notions of human rights, and by framing the issue through the device of the Judeo-Christian notion of the Jubilee, the campaign was able to tap into a huge groundswell of support. The effect of the activism ‘was to transform the HIPC initiative from being a highly technical matter of concern in the main only to the IMF, the World Bank and their immediate clients and critics to a major political issue that demanded the attention of all the leaders of the G7 states’ (Payne 2005: 149). Activism had therefore opened up the issue to worldwide public debate, and the campaigners were winning the arguments.

Public awareness and support for the issue was a necessary but insufficient to determine the political agenda and the campaign started to focus on combined and coordinated programmes of activism. Oxfam International worked behind the scenes, both lobbying and working with governments and the IFIs on the debt issue (Yanacopulos 2004: 721). The UK continued to be receptive on the issue of debt, with both the Treasury and newly formed DFID playing important roles. This position was cemented by the 1998 Commons International Development Select Committee report, which accepted that debt relief was a ‘moral issue’ (HM Treasury 1998). So convinced was the UK government, that is encouraged campaigners to direct their arguments towards recalcitrant members of the G8 such as Germany and Japan (Evans 1999:

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19 Hertz argues that loans are intrinsically suspect, as they ‘often come at a huge political cost: binding countries to each other, and creating a dependency that first establishes and then serves to reinforce pre-existing power asymmetries’ (Hertz 2004: 27).
276)²⁰. These fiscally conservative states framed their reservations in terms of moral hazard, yet found it increasingly difficult to make their case (Busby 2007: 269). Such technocratic principles may have significant traction amongst the epistemic community of central bank officials and finance experts, but they were unpersuasive to wider publics.

The arguments made by campaigners were setting the agenda and Yanacopulos argues that normative ‘cascade’ occurred the May 1998 Birmingham summit (Yanacopulos 2004: 723), the point at which actors outside of the initial norm leaders come to acknowledge its validity. Within the summit, France and Britain pressed for the ‘fast–tracking’ of a number of largely Commonwealth and Francafrique countries recovering from war (Payne 2005: 149). Immediately after the formation of the ‘human chain’ of 70,000 campaign supporters around the conference centre Blair acknowledged the campaign leadership (Yanacopulos 2004: 723-724). Facing this kind of multilevel pressure, it became very difficult for G8 nations publically oppose the idea of debt cancellations (Yanacopulos 2004: 724) and, as Michaelowa argues, politicians may have realised that they could increase their personal popularity with domestic audiences by associating themselves with the issue (Michaelowa 2003: 464).

Agreement on debt relief remained out of reach at Birmingham, however, as Germany and the US refused to countenance selling of IMF gold stocks to finance a workable expansion of the HIPC programme (Woods 2006: 167). Yet the political ground was shifting. HIPC I had not succeeded, unrepayable debt remained on the IFIs’ books and concerns about their financial soundness were mounting (Woods 2006: 167). G8 governments ceded ground by borrowing the language and arguments used by campaigners (Yanacopulos 2004: 725). The victory of the SPD in Germany and further cross-spectrum lobbying in the US removed the opposition of two major G8 nations (Woods 2006: 169). By April 1999, all G8 governments publically put forward proposals on debt cancellation (Yanacopulos 2004: 724), although it required hard bargaining at the G8 Cologne summit and at IMF/World Bank negotiations before and after to thrash out a viable successor to the HIPC initiative (Payne 2005: 149). Thus whilst domestic campaigning on the debt issue had been weak, once debt relief had become an internationally endorsed principle the Japanese government came under pressure to live up to its duties as a member of the international community and follow suit (Busby 2007: 270).

²⁰ Busby suggests that ‘the Jubilee 2000 campaign was needed least where it was strongest’ (2007: 255) as the New Labour government and Gordon Brown in particular were easily convinced by the case for debt relief.
Navigating debt relief proposals through the US Congress required further lobbying, as the US Jubilee campaign had failed to capture the public imagination. A network of influential individuals including Bono, Bobby Kennedy and Joseph Sachs managed to convince a series of well known economists and political veto holders (Hertz 2004: 6-10). Religious argument was once again important and ministers such as Rev. Billy Graham played a central role in convincing recalcitrant Congressmen such as Jessie Helms (Hertz 2004: 18-19). Because of lack of popular mobilisation, pressure via church groups in Republican heartlands proved significant (Busby 2007: 268). National interest also played an important and under-recognised role: John Kasich, Chairman of the Budgetary Committee in the House, came round to the proposal only when he realised the value of improving America’s public image for a relatively modest amount of money. Arguments relating to the reputation of the US were an important third prong utilised by lobbyist in addition to technocratic arguments and religiously-inflected moral claims (Busby 2007: 267).

Reputational appeals were perhaps of particular relevance during the Jubilee 2000 campaign due to the difficulties the project of ‘neo-liberal globalisation’ had encountered. Neo-Gramscian theorist Gill (2000b) argued that by the late 1990s the hegemony of neo-liberal ideas was rapidly waning, and whilst this perhaps overstates the case, it is true that neo-liberalism was facing multiple challenges. The handling of the East Asian Crisis by the IMF had resulted in bitterness and resentment on the part of the ‘Tiger Economies’ and the collapse of WTO negotiations in Seattle signalled mistrust over the direction of the international economic order by the states of the South. Decisions in supranational economic forums had come under increasing public scrutiny through political mobilisations over the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, anti-WTO protests and the anti-sweatshop movement (Mayo 2005: 202-3). Disquiet was also evident amongst officials inside G8 governments and the IFIs, as evidenced by the criticisms of former

21 ‘In the United States, for example, the national rally campaigners organized in April 2000 was attended by 6,000’ (Busby 2007: 261)
22 In distinguishing between material interests and moral values, Busby (2007) is very quick to categorise conservative Republican support for debt relief in terms of the latter. But the emphasis on religious values on the part of the Republican party was part of a long term ‘Southern strategy’ that brought about a realignment in US politics based on a cleavage in terms of social values. The New Right coalition, reinvigorated during the Clinton presidency, was ostensibly committed to promoting religious values whilst maintaining and advancing highly inequitarian social and economic policies. In 2000 George W Bush would promote himself as a ‘compassionate conservative’ during the presidential race. Thus the commitment of conservative Republicans to the debt relief programme can be seen as a minor cost incurred as part of a long-term electoral strategy.
23 According to Hertz, Kasich realised it would be ‘a way to say to people “Look we’re not just a bunch of pricks flying B1 Bombers over your country”’ (Hertz 2004: 14)
Bank chair Joseph Stiglitz\textsuperscript{24} and the emergence of the ‘post-Washington Consensus’, which took on board mildly social democratic ideas.

A political programme that helped resolve a chronic problem of debt management and emphasised the magnanimity, conscientiousness and respect for religiously inspired values on the part of the G8 nations may therefore have been received receptively. Modest debt relief had the advantage of not conceding very much in terms of the political management of the world economy compared to more radical proposals such as the Tobin tax. The political claims advanced by transnational networks pressured the G8 nations to respond, and they were able to do so by drawing and adapting ideas from the same normative framework as campaigners themselves. This attempt to re-legitimise neo-liberalism has been termed ‘neo-liberal cosmopolitanism’ by Gowan (2001). Key thinkers associated with the IFIs, including Collier, Easterly, Summers and Sachs\textsuperscript{25}, elucidated lines of thought within the organisations that justified an increasing role for the IFIs in fighting poverty in developing countries. Major works by these thinkers embrace cosmopolitan principles of universalism and go to great lengths to emphasize the sympathy of the author with the plight of those in developing nations by deploying images of human universality in the midst of cultural difference (Easterly 2001: 286).

This perspective is nonetheless a variation of Krueger’s thesis (1974) that the state in the developing world is an essentially parasitic rent seeking organisation. Easterly (1999), for example, argues that borrowing behaviour is determined by the inelasticity of intertemporal substitution and the subjective discount rate, i.e. ‘a country gets into a heavily indebted position out of its own choice’ (Nissanke and Ferrarini 2001: 27) — or rather the choice of its governing elite. Acting in its own narrow interests, the prototypical HIPC government displays a tendency to run down public assets, and incurs debt in order to facilitate current consumption rather than investment. The problems of structural adjustment were attributed to lenience on the part of donors and IFIs for continuing to lend even when countries failed to comply with conditionalities. These ideas fed into a new consensus within the IFIs and many Northern governments aid and budgetary assistance could be successful, but only when targeted correctly and supported by conditionalities (Hook 2008: 155).

Similarly, Collier (2007) argues that the rich world must support courageous ‘heroes’ struggling against their villainous governments. This is consistent with the cosmopolitan argument that global civil society and transnational activist networks constitute a powerful moral force against

\textsuperscript{24} Culminating in Stiglitz (2002).
\textsuperscript{25} Collier (2007); Easterly (2001); Sachs (2005)
the nation state, which is regarded as both obsolete and fatally compromised by self-interest and power politics. However, whilst it contains a democratising impulse, it also entirely consistent with a Hayekian ambition to free individuals by rolling back the state – whether democratic or undemocratic – and the neo-liberal policy goal of expanding self-regulating markets through liberalisation. As van der Pijl argues (2006: 162), an important shift occurred in political argument after the ‘discovery’ of civil society as a force outside of politics and in opposed to the state. Neo-liberal cosmopolitanism, therefore, sought to liberate the individual from the state, which stands as the primary obstacle to freedom and poverty alleviation. Thus many arguments of the nascent global justice movement were accepted, but reinterpreted in ways that made them amenable to the continued exercise of collective power by the G8 through the IFIs.

The Enhanced HIPC Initiative

The enhanced HIPC package eventually agreed upon aimed at providing ‘deeper, faster, wider’ debt relief, with Cologne Terms of 90% debt stock reduction offered by Paris Club creditors at completion point in addition to comparable reduction from multilateral institutions (Gueye, Vaugeois, Martin and Johnson 2007: 4). In addition, the process for reaching the completion criteria became more flexible and debt-to-export threshold rations were relaxed (Gunter 2002: 6). Ex-ante conditionalities were dropped in favour of the requirement for participants to produce a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper in consultation with the IFIs and civil society groups detailing how the government would use funds freed up to combat poverty. Through widening eligibility and deepening relief, the enhanced HIPC programme was expected to provide $30 billion in present value terms (2000), $17.5 billion more than its predecessor (Michaelowa 2003: 462). The Enhanced HIPC initiative has been described as ‘an artful political compromise’ (Roodman 2006: 25), as it managed to simultaneously satisfy those who wanted quick cancellation and those concerned with the uses to which the funds would be put.

Nevertheless, there were some important limitations of the initiative. Critics argued that funds for debt relief were not genuinely additional and pointed out that net resource transfers as a proportion of recipient GDP still had not recovered from their fall in the 1990s (Arslanap and Henry 2006: 189), whilst some nations with unsustainable debt burdens were left outside of the programme due to the fairly arbitrary criteria which failed to take human development needs into account (Gunter 2002: 7).

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26 The key event influencing the political imagination seems to have been the campaigns by Eastern European dissident movements such as Charter 77 and Solidarnosc.
There were few opportunities for debtor countries to advance their own interests or put forward their own suggestions, save for on the issue of front-loading and interim payments, where HIPCs put forward technical arguments and appeals to the Millennium Development Goals (Vaugeois, Martin and Johnson 2007: 47). The initiative did provide a starting point for the negotiations with non-Paris Club creditors, where anything that the HIPCs received was the result of their determination to push for comparable terms. Nonetheless non-Northern states, even those that were creditors, had little influence on the design of the HIPC initiative itself (Gunter 2002: 11; Gueye, Vaugeois, Martin and Johnson 2007: 35). The core group of G8/Paris Club creditors retained ‘the power to define who gets what, when, and how’ (Cheru 2006: 51)

Contrary to Yanacopulos, the evidence suggests that the arguments put forward by debt campaigners were not internalised by G8 policymakers as the idea of a normative cascade would suggest. Indeed, despite the conviction of the Jubilee 2000 campaigners that the issue was justice, not charity, the HIPC initiative does seem to have been represented as an act of generosity by magnanimous G8 leaders. The technocratic concerns regarding debt sustainability, rather than the more radical arguments calling for debt cancellation based on arguments over legitimacy and human needs, seem to continue to have shaped policy. Thus debts were not declared odious, but partially ‘forgiven’. The selective appropriation of certain arguments and not others suggests that despite the achievements of the Jubilee 2000 campaign and despite the best efforts of campaigners, the unreformed structures of power made it difficult to overcome familiar relationships between unequals based on tutelage and charity.

Making Poverty History at Gleneagles

Due to its time-limited nature, much of the heat went out of debt politics after the conclusion of the Jubilee 2000 campaign, despite weaknesses in the HIPC initiative and the fact that some countries were expected by the IFIs to be paying as much as 20% of revenues on servicing external debts after completion (Gunter 2002: 11). The pleas for further debt relief by African leaders invited to the Okinawa G8 summit were ignored, although the UK continued to express interest in the issue (Payne 2005: 151) and went as far as cancelling all bilateral debt service from HIPCs (Gueye, Vaugeois, Martin and Johnson 2007: 20). Debt relief returned to prominence through the Bush administration’s attempt to ensure debt forgiveness for Iraq, which was seen by campaigners as a potential precedent in establishing debts incurred by dictators as ‘odious’ (IPS 11/04/2004)27.

27 As campaigning NGO Eurodad pointed out, cancellation of Iraq’s debts provided more relief was in a day than a decade of agreements and initiatives provided for Africa (Eurodad 2005: 6).
Britain continued to attempt to keep debt and development on the international political agenda by establishing the Africa Commission in May 2004 (Payne 2006: 917), through the call at the June G8 meeting in Georgia for further debt relief funded by revaluation of IMF gold (Payne 2005: 154) and through the September ‘UK Initiative’, supported by Canada and the Netherlands, to pay off post-HIPC nations’ debts to the IDA and the African Development Fund (Gueye, Vuegeois, Martin and Johnson 2007: 50). The issue however became re-politicised due to the UK’s role as host of the 2005 G8 meeting. The networks and relationships created during the Jubilee 2000 campaigning and sustained through subsequent lobbying on development issues meant that British development NGOs, charities, religious groups and trade unions were quickly able to unite to launch the Make Poverty History (MPH) campaign. With help from sympathetic celebrities, elder-statesmen and entertainment industry insiders, the campaign was quickly able to achieve unprecedented prominence. As Gorringe and Rosie note, MPH was in many respects a rerun of the Jubilee 2000 campaign (2006: 10.1). Once again an organisational ‘big tent’ strategy was adopted, drawing on to build a ‘movement-of-movements’ for global justice. A sophisticated media campaign was utilised to create a clear brand-image for the campaign, which was emblematised by the wearing of the iconic white band. Like the Jubilee 2000 campaign, the emphasis by campaigners was on justice and structural reform on issues of debt, trade and aid – not on charity. Thus during the ‘Live 8’ concerts supporting the campaign, organisers insisted that their aim wasn’t to seek donations to ameliorate the problems of poverty but to attract attention to the campaign to end poverty (BBC 15/06/2005)28. Although it lacked the religious symbolism of Jubilee 2000, the MPH campaign once again appealed to transcendent values by offering individuals a chance to be involved in popular struggle to bring about epochal change29.

The Make Poverty History UK campaign was itself a member of the worldwide Global Campaign Against Poverty, and of course the UK campaign presented itself as only one face of a truly global movement. Its campaigning strategy aimed to direct attention to the G8 summit and force leaders to justify their decisions in a public forum. Thus it seems a textbook case of an attempt to put cosmopolitan ideals into practice and to democratise global governance. Yet it is difficult to avoid the striking fact that MPH was and remained a British movement (Gorringe and Rosie 2006: 11.1). Its US equivalent, the ONE campaign, failed to ignite. The campaign made universalist appeals and employed cosmopolitan arguments yet the campaign was

28 The concerts themselves, which were an initiative of LiveAid veteran Bob Geldof, came under massive criticism by many other members of the MPH campaign.

29 Qualitative research by Gorringe and Rosie (2006: 10.8) indicates that the reason for participation amongst many attending the MPH march was to be ‘part of history’.
essentially a domestic political mobilisation on behalf of cosmopolitan principles, framed in globalist terms. Chandler’s barb that this form of activism is a form of ‘fantasy’ (Chandler 2009: 83) is unfair in that MPH was not an avoidance of real politics, but contains a grain of truth in that the idea of the existence of a ‘global multitude’ behind the campaign was overstated. The strength of the campaign reflected, not the emergence of a genuinely transnational civil society, but the strength of British coalitions campaigning on issues of poverty and development. Whilst the MPH coalition was linked transnationally to wider policy and campaigning networks, just as important seem to have been the broad basis of the campaign within British civil society and the close relationship they enjoyed with DFID and the New Labour government.

After a high profile campaign 250,000 individuals ultimately attended the MPH march in Edinburgh on July 2nd (Papaionnou, Yanacopulos and Aksoy 2009: 811), twice as many as expected (Gorringe and Rosie 2006: 1.1). The MPH campaign thus achieved an unprecedented level of mobilisation over the issues of global poverty and inequality. The G8 nations, led by the UK, claimed to have listened and presented agreement reached was presented as a historic step towards ending poverty. New proposal to write off debt through a new Multilateral Debt Reduction Initiative (MDRI) were unveiled in December 2005, promising to cancel 100% of outstanding debts owed by HIPC-completion countries to the African Development Fund, the IDA and the IMF. The deal was worth a potential $40 billion for countries who had reached the completion point by mid-2005, potentially leading to the cancellation of up to 90% of some nations’ outstanding total debts (Gueye, Vaugeois, Martin and Johnson 2007: 51). The cost to World Bank of HIPC was $12.5 billion in end-2005 NPV terms, and the cost to the IMF was $5.6 billion in end-2005 NPV terms, to be financed through off-market gold sales and donor contributions to Poverty Reduction Strategy Facility – HIPC Trust Fund (Dijkstra 2008: 109). Nevertheless, campaigning NGOs criticised the ‘overblown rhetoric’ surrounding the Gleneagles deal early on (Europad 2005: 2), arguing that the debt stock reduction for HIPCs would not necessarily lead to an increase in funds available, as the MDRI stipulates a reduction in IDA aid flows equal to debt cancelled before new funds are dispersed with conditionalities attached. (Europad 2005: 6). These concerns did not abate after the full details were released: later evaluations indicated that the MDRI would not necessarily result in greater net flows to HIPCs, as it becomes clear that the resources of IFIs such as the IDA were unlikely to be replenished, resulting in reduced concessional lending (Europad 2007: 8). By 2010 it was clear that G8 nations had failed to make good on the pledges made in the combined debt cancellation/aid

30 The Inter-American Development Bank joined the scheme in 2007.
package, with only $12bn of the original $25bn additional funds for Africa materialising (OECD 2010).

The deal struck at Gleneagles therefore fell short of what debt campaigners had hoped to achieve. Yet there were deep ambiguities in the MPH strategy that resulted in dissatisfaction and ultimately acrimony within the coalition. Although framed as a campaign to pressure a site of global decision-making, the strongest channels of political influence still run through nation-states. Thus the British MPH campaign was focused on putting pressure on a government which was already one of the most sympathetic to debt relief within the G8. In such circumstances it was not very difficult for the Blair-Brown government to sidestep the more radical claims for debt cancellation and associate themselves with the campaign. Rather than true ‘norm internalisation’, the G8 leaders seem to have responded to public pressure on debt relief in a tactical fashion, adroitly associating themselves with the noble goals of the campaign but avoiding a genuine commitment to meeting its demands. Campaigners noted that the uptake of their arguments had been selective and self serving, with little mention being made of the illegitimacy of the debts, the co-responsibility for indebtedness or the mechanisms underlying the problems (Eurodad 2005: 7). Indeed, rather than an independent force speaking truth to power, the campaign came close to becoming an extension of British public diplomacy, increasing publicity for the UK’s initiatives and putting pressure on the other G8 leaders to acquiesce to the UK’s preferred package of debt relief.

Unsurprisingly, the sense that Make Poverty History had been co-opted led to angry recriminations from many involved in the movement (Hertz 2005; Monbiot 2005; Pilger 2005; Hodkinson 2005b). The involvement of celebrities was criticised for trivialising the campaign, images of African helplessness attacked for playing on audiences’ pity rather than educating them about the structural causes of poverty (Papaionnou, Yanacopulos and Aksoy 2009: 812). It is difficult to avoid similar concerns to those expressed by Zizek (2008), who criticises this form of campaigning for imploring individuals to enjoy themselves for the sake of others. MPH was a campaign to overthrow radical structural inequalities that demanded little from its participants. Also singled out for criticism was Oxfam International as a result of what some perceived as a ‘revolving door’ relationship with the government (Hodkinson 2005a). The policy of

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31 Let alone anti-capitalist claims made by those within the wider alter-globalist ‘movement-of-movements’.

32 It is difficult not to conclude that MPH was able to draw large crowds to Edinburgh at least in part because it offered the chance to be part of a dramatic moment in history without requiring anything very much in return.
professional NGOs of acting as both insider lobbyists and outsider campaign groups had given them influence in government but jeopardised their independence.

Yet many of the radical criticisms of the MPH campaign seem to presume that its shortcomings stemmed only from a failure to adopt a more uncompromising set of demands (cf. Gorringe and Rosie 2006: 11.5). The more fundamental problem is whether the campaign could have ever achieved what it had set out to. Disappointment was perhaps inevitable given the campaign’s millenarian goals\(^{33}\). As noted above, the unprecedented mobilisation of the movement did not herald the arrival of a genuine world society capable of articulating effective moral demands against global sites of decision making. In the absence of such tectonic shifts, the leverage of the movement depended on the pressure it could exert on individual national governments. Furthermore, whilst the campaign was able to achieve impressive levels of publicity and mobilisation around the issue, unlike other forms of dedicated organisations representing their constituents’ interests or values\(^{34}\), they could not sustain this level of pressure and thus prevent subsequent reneging. The campaign therefore could not transcend the structural relationships that shaped the politics of debt. Despite the noble intentions of the campaign organisers and their painstaking efforts to insist that the campaign was about justice, they could not prevent the degeneration of the question of debt reduction into an issue of charity.

The fundamental coordinates of power over decision making in the global economy had not changed. Although for the first time a significant number of African nations attended the conference through the ‘outreach’ programme\(^{35}\), this did not change the fact that aid-dependent HIPC\(^{s}\) remained ‘supplicants at the top table’ (Payne 2006: 929). Southern activists such as Charles Mustasa of AFRODAD noted that the agreement did not address ‘the real global power imbalances’ (Eurodad 2005: 7). But the HIPC nations were, as a group, in no position to be able to assertively defend their own interests. Some Southern NGOs called for immediate cancellation of debts (Jubilee South 2005), but such radical demands were merely hortatory. Southern NGOs had no channels of influence to G8 governments themselves; nor could they feasibly pressure their own governments to repudiate their debts as the HIPC\(^{s}\) remained dependent on easily-curtailed aid and were threatened by legal redress. As of 2008 11 out of 24

\(^{33}\) As Payne points out, there is something quite strange about the notion that poverty could be consigned to history through the stroke of the G8’s pen (Payne 2006: 922).

\(^{34}\) Such as nation-states, trade unions, professional bodies, veterans’ associations, or component parties in corporatist and consociational political systems.

\(^{35}\) Those present through to the unfortunately named programme were Algeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and Tanzania.
HIPC countries had already experienced litigation, with 26 out of 44 creditors winning their cases (with 14 pending) and $30 billion awarded to creditors. (Dijkstra 2008: 108).

An analysis of the Make Poverty History campaign and the politics of debt at Gleneagles thus reconfirms the existence of real moral limits in world politics. As Payne notes, why should it surprise anyone that the G8 states were reluctant to give up their control over management of global economic rule-making and the advantages that it brings (Payne 2006: 935)? But if transformative changes were unlikely, it may still be possible to identify some forms of normative change and successful moral argument. To its credit, debt campaigners did succeed in making debt a moral issue and thrusting it onto the global agenda. Yet the space for such moral argument seems to have been limited due to peculiarities of the movement’s primary interlocutor, the UK government. Unlike other G8 nations where norm internalisation was weak, as evidenced by attempts to renege on Gleneagles commitments (Guardian 25/06/2010; OECD 2010), the New Labour government was in many respects genuinely sympathetic to the religiously-inflected arguments of Jubilee 2000 and MPH. Nonetheless it remained committed to a neo-liberal cosmopolitan programme, selectively appropriating aspects of the MPH campaign.

Once arguments are made in a public sphere they are no longer under the control of those that articulate them. Pressures to cancel debt and increase aid were accommodated by the G8 and the IFIs through an extension of conditionalities. The MDRI, like the enhanced HIPC initiative before it, was a course correction in the management of poor, fragile nations borne of a compromise between advocates of faster debt cancellation and those wary of writing bad cheques to debtors. The compromise was operationalised through the introduction of the requirement for debtors to produce a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, which finessed the continuation of conditionalities with a commitment to broader goals of human development. This obligated participant HIPCs to work with civil society to produce a plan outlining how funds freed by debt relief will be utilised to target poverty ahead of the decision point and to implement these policies for a year to progress to the completion point.

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36 To suggest that these benefits flow only to elites, corporations or capitalist classes within these states is nothing more than an evasion of the ethical issue that there are many areas of potential conflict of material interest between the populations of the advanced industrialised nations and the global South. This is of course to say nothing of the conflicts of interests entailed by any step towards an egalitarian redistributive scheme on a global scale.

37 The internalisation of these norms within the British polity as a whole is furthermore evidenced by the commitment of the coalition government to maintain levels of overseas aid achieved by New Labour and to continue working towards the 0.7% ODA target (DFID 2010).
Participant nations were required to create a strategy paper in consultation with civil society groups outlining how funds freed by debt relief would be utilised to target poverty, then implement the policies successfully for a year in order to progress to the completion point (IMF 2009 – HIPC Factsheet). The focus on poverty reduction addressed the concerns of those critical of IMF structural adjustment policies and was apiece with attempts by the IFIs to reposition themselves as promoting ‘pro-poor growth’ in furtherance of the Millennium Development Goals (IMF 2009 MDRI)\(^{38}\). The conditional aspect of the mechanism addressed concerns about that debt forgiveness would encourage fecklessness, yet also contained an explicit commitment to debtor nation ‘ownership’ (Woods 2006: 170). The rationale was that ‘ownership’ would increase the effectiveness of conditionality by increasing the commitment of recipients (Woods 2006: 170). But as Whitfield points out there is a fundamental difference between ownership as commitment to policies and ownership as control over policies (2008: 3). Thus despite the ‘powerful’ rhetoric of ownership and putting borrowers in the driving seat in practice ‘the result has been to change little’. (Woods 2006: 172). The IFIs retained their ‘schoolmasterly’ (Woods 2006: 190) position of tutelage over indebted nations.

The participatory emphasis of the PRSPs placed a new focus on civil society, reassuring those concerned about elite corruption and reflecting an attempt to incorporate many of the ideas of critics of the IFIs and the G8. Yet a basic problem with this policy has been the method for selecting those who should participate in consultations (Roodman 2006: 30). Engagement was therefore often arbitrary, ignoring important parts of civil society (Woods 2006: 171). Rather than strengthening democracy, the process of participation may have undermined it, as ‘the legally elected representatives of the population, the members of parliaments, were often forgotten in the process’ (Dijkstra 2008: 116)\(^{39}\). The goal of participation conflicted with that ownership and democratic control over outcomes by giving the IFIs room for manoeuvre vis-à-vis creditor governments (Woods 2006: 171). The new emphasis on public participation can therefore be thought to be an attempt to mobilise ‘civil society’ against elites, based on a neoliberal cosmopolitan conviction that even democratic states are rent-seeking organisations that needed to be heroically resisted by civil society groups. Yet groups opposing conditionalities themselves have been sidelined and debtor governments have continued to pay closer attention.

\(^{38}\) This all sits uneasily with the fact that the original HIPC programme measured debt sustainability in terms of macroeconomic indicators alone and ‘did not have any explicit link to poverty reduction’ (Gunter 2002: 11). Given the emphasis on retrenchment in the policy prescriptions of the IFIs, it is not difficult to see why many have questioned whether these packages of reforms are ‘pro-poor’ at all (Morrissey 2004: 285).

\(^{39}\) This may be a tremendously counterproductive step, as scholars examining the debt crisis have found that parliamentary oversight has been crucial step in helping the country to regain control over the problem of debt (Muwanga-Zake and Ndahye 2001: 13).
to multilateral donors rather than civil society due to their continued dependence on multilateral funds (Dijkstra 2008: 113).

The PRSPs have therefore continued the movement from project based to policy based lending, involving the IFIs ever further in public policy and constituting ‘micro-management of developing countries at an unprecedented scale’ (Ruckert 2004: 6). As Dijkstra notes, each phase of the debt saga has resulted in more, not less conditionality, resulting in a vicious circle of dependence on the IFIs (Dijkstra 2008: 121). Despite advocating ‘ownership’, the approach of the IFIs to the drafting of the PRSPs bypassed and undermined core democratic institutions. The conditionalities attached to aid relief forced governments to make themselves accountable first and foremost to the IFIs rather than their own citizens, rendering many HICPs effective wards of the international community.

Although a central aim of development-oriented NGOs had been to overcome prevailing neoliberal agendas (Mayo 2005: 202), the IFIs remained resilient enough to adapt to these new pressures and re-legitimise their practices in the context of the new framework of norms pioneered by actors within global civil society. The case of the enhanced HIPC initiative and the MDRI demonstrates that pressuring states to act on ethical principles in the context of structural inequalities and an unreformed, power-political international system risks extending and entrenching political inequalities. As in case of attempts to stamp out the slave trade throughout the Niger delta (van der Linden 2010), cosmopolitan pressures on states to expand their moral remit can push them to expand their sphere of control as well as their circle of concern. That further surveillance, control and micro-management of highly indebted nations was one of the primary outcomes of unprecedented campaign for global justice may be ‘perverse, to put it mildly’ (Payne 2005: 154), but also serves to demonstrate the problems and limits of external advocacy as a form of moral agency in international relations.

**Conclusion**

Some scholars have suggested that periodic debt crises are a systemic feature of the international political economy (Reuveny and Thompson 2004). Certainly, they have been an enduring feature of the contemporary international order, from attempts to administer Ottoman debt to the recent Irish and Greek bailouts. In every case, attempts to manage the aftermath of these crises involves elements of normative contestation and political argument, as questions of who exactly owes what to whom are rendered in sharp relief. The ability to finance public debt is one of the prerogatives of sovereign states, yet indebted states have frequently found themselves ceding
effective autonomy to creditors or their multilateral agents. Within any particular normative order, whether the post-Vienna European concert or the nascent political community of the EU, the management of indebtedness can tell us a great deal about how inequality is maintained, managed and challenged.

Thus an analysis of the politics of the ‘debt question’ arising from the chronic problems of indebtedness experienced by some of the poorest states in the international system yields great insights into the ongoing process of negotiation over moral relationships between North and South. The debt issue is of particular importance because it became the lightening rod for some of the most impressive mobilisations around the issue of global justice to have emerged from ‘global civil society’. This chapter has therefore treated the issue of debt as a test case to assess the moral potentials of external advocacy on the part of Northern civil society in cases where the official representatives of the extremely marginalised have neither the latitude nor often the capacity to exercise a great degree of agency.

This new mode of agency, spearheaded by Northern development NGOs, church groups and trade unions, was successful in bringing the moral questions raised by the issues of debt and inequality to much greater public prominence than ever before and for pushing debt towards the top of the international political agenda. By mobilising transnational and domestic networks and by drawing upon arguments appealing to transcendent value-commitments, the campaign was successful in appealing to a large number of individuals to support a moral campaign in advancing goals. However, despite Yanacoupolis’s claims (2004), the campaign cannot truly be characterised as a ‘normative cascade’. As has been examined, the campaign was significantly less globalised and much more local to the UK than has sometimes been acknowledged, pouring some cold water on the idea of an immanent ‘global demos’. Furthermore, the space in which moral arguments advocating debt cancellation were put forward was a complex political environment in which organisational imperatives, material interests and ideational factors intersected with one another. Some of these arguments were accepted and internalised as ‘common sense’, some of them were tacitly and tactically acknowledged, some of them were ignored, and some of them were re-appropriated.

Moral suasion alone was insufficient on its own to bring about normative change, thus the campaign’s impact was greatest in the nation where the movement could draw on the support of the greatest number of voting citizens and where lobbying NGOs had the closest relationship with government. In addition, the ideological commitments of the movement’s interlocutors in the G8 and IFIs were flexible enough that elements of the debt campaign’s arguments could,
during a necessary course correction, be incorporated into attempts at re-legitimising the management of the poorest nations of the global South.

Thus a consideration of some of the perversities in the outcome of the debt campaign demonstrates the existence of real moral limits created by inequality in international relations. We witness the recurrence of certain ways of conceiving the moral relationship between unequals in terms of tutelage and charity. The arguments advanced by some associated with the campaign contributed to this by delegitimizing the states who had incurred the debts. Thus it is impossible to wholly dismiss the claims of Duffield (2009), Cowen and Shenton (1996) that a genealogy links the discourses of colonial-era missionaries with contemporary development NGOs. Yet overemphasising these factors ignore that campaigners were aware of these risks and repeatedly insisted on framing their claims in terms of *justice.*

However without a dramatic shift in the coordinates of power, the gravitational pull of structural inequality proved difficult to escape. Despite the best efforts of the Jubilee 2000/MPH campaigners, the stress on the need to restore the moral equality between debtors and creditors was lost. Concerns with the odiousness of debts and the injustice of the broader structural inequalities that the debts were embedded within were sidelined through the adoption of the principle of debt forgiveness by the G8 and the IFIs. Outcome based anti-poverty concerns were incorporated into the increasingly restrictive frameworks of the enhanced HIPC initiative and the MDRI. These frameworks accentuated the one-way relationship of accountability in which the HIPCs lacked the ability to hold the IFIs or the Paris Club creditors to account. The agency necessary to broach argument over the issue of debt or present a compelling moral challenge could not come from the HIPCs, as they not only lacked the capacity to individually or collectively exercise leverage over their interlocutors but had been subject to repeated ‘discursive demolitions’ (Hall 2003) of their legitimacy as agents. With external assistance some steps were made in improving their capacity to take hold of the issue of debt, but the conditionalities attacked to the enhanced HIPC and MDRI initiatives risk undermining democratic institutions by weakening the crucial connection between governments and citizens. An egalitarian campaign based on cosmopolitan principles may therefore have helped consolidate rather than transform the unequal relations between nations.

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40 As Woods notes ‘those countries least affected by the decisions and actions of the World Bank and IMF have [had] the most influence and the most capacity to hold the institution to account’ (Woods 2006: 193).
Nonetheless, the HIPC initiative and the MDRI had provided debt relief of $71 billion as of December 2007 (IMF 2009) and $3.35 billion as of January 2009 (World Bank 2009: Debt Relief Factsheet) respectively. Despite the fact that a significant share of the resources for debt relief were not additional, in an in-depth survey Dijkstra concludes that debt relief does seem to have freed vital resources for development (Dijkstra 2008: 104). In particular, the Jubilee 2000/MPH movements seem to have been partially responsible for the UK’s sympathetic positions on debt and trade, and the renewed ambition to reach the 0.7% ODA target⁴¹. Thus the debt campaign may have contributed to the consolidation of an unequal relationship whilst improving the terms for the subordinate party.

In the absence of the truly transformative change looked towards by cosmopolitan political theorists, activist networks continue to campaign in a statist international order. Their ability to promote egalitarian depends on their capacity to exercise influence over national governments, but Northern governments retain a great deal of discretion in how they execute policies. Perhaps the major achievement of transnational activist networks is establishing the principle that the directorate of industrialised powers have broader moral responsibilities than the functional management of the world economy. But we should be sceptical of whether the agency of global civil society actors can substitute for that of the state-based representatives of peripheral peoples.

The politics of debt and finance are never static. Although emerging economies had become one of the primary sources of revenue for the IFIs (Woods 2006: 194), they remained outside the core venues of decision-making in the world economy. Nonetheless at Gleneagles in 2005 shifts were already underway in the centre of gravity in the world economy, bringing new actors to prominence to prominence in the political economy of aid, investment and finance (Woods 2008). These shifts and the possibilities for South-South cooperation will be examined in Chapter 7. The following chapter, however, focuses on a single initiative aimed at managing relations between unequals, examining its evolution across several decades of North-South relations.

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⁴¹ This looks to be a semi-permanent shift within UK foreign policy, given the commitment of the coalition government which came to power in 2010 to match previous aid commitments.
Chapter 6
From Lomé to Cotonou and Beyond: ACP-EU Relations and the Changing Dynamic of Unequal Relations

Chapter 4 examined the attempt by the Third World coalition to initiate a direct challenge against the post-war economic order, opening up the possibility for argument between the North and the global South. This chapter, however, examines the attempt by a group of highly peripheral post-colonial states to negotiate and renegotiate their relationship with a specific grouping within the North. For five decades, European states and formerly colonised states of the African, Caribbean and Pacific have attempted to construct a workable normative order as the basis for international relations between unequals. Although actual dialogue remained within rather narrow parameters and the extent of genuine political argument has been rather muted, examining Lomé and Cotonou agreements we find a constant process of negotiation over the terms governing the interaction of these two coalitions. Analysing this process, it is possible to trace how both the shifting distribution of material power and moral arguments based on prevailing norms within the international order shaped the terms of this unique attempt to form a relationship between North and South. Because the succession of EU-ACP agreements have comprised one of the most enduring relationships between coalitions of the North and the global South, it presents us with a microcosm enabling us to examine the shifting 'global politics of unequal development' (Payne 2005) from the post-colonial era to the rise of neo-liberalism and beyond. Although the ACP states have always been the weaker party within this process and the grouping itself was externally imposed, in certain instances their exercise of collective agency has shaped the course of negotiations over the relationship. The case of the EU-ACP framework thus provides an opportunity to examine when moral argument and political pressure by coalitions of the global South can have traction with their interlocutors.

We thus witness a sequence of attempts to instantiate different visions of international order by the parties in question. However, as maintained in Chapters 2 and 3, the attempt to establish a moral order within international relations is never a straightforward process, especially between unequals. We therefore find the key actors frustrated in their efforts and encountering contradictions arising from the relationships they find themselves in. The ACP states have demonstrated the ‘acute schizophrenia’ which some have seen as characterising the foreign policies of peripheral states (Ayoob 1989), at once searching for genuine equality with European states but at the same time unwilling to forgo the benefits of client status and the relative privileges it has gained vis-à-vis the rest of the South. Likewise, the attempts on the part of EU members to implement their conception of moral order have been fraught with ambiguities.
Some of these difficulties have arisen from the intrinsic problems with the attempt to promote liberal or cosmopolitan values through the practice of tutelage. The structural inequalities between the two parties have constantly undermined the real possibility of a relationship based on partnership between the coalitions, leaving the ACP states reliant on the continued ‘good will’ of the Europeans. Irrespective of the intentions of the stronger party, such a relationship makes the establishment of a liberal international order between unequals chronically unstable. Because the weaker party cannot compel the stronger party to acknowledge their own moral claims, the former must in effect surrender their judgement to the latter. Such circumstances tend inevitably towards a relationship of tutelage which, as a neo-republican perspective reveals, is a paternalistic relationship that constitutes a form of alien domination. Therefore the attempts by EU states to build a relationship with self-governing post-colonial states on the basis of the liberal values they publically avow have repeatedly undermined themselves. Whilst these difficulties represent pitfalls inherent to the relations between unequals, they have been compounded by efforts on the part of EU actors to actively pursue moralised policies in the name of ‘cosmopolitan Europe’. Yet despite abrogating such a role for itself, European actors remain subject to the influences of organised interest groups. Deepening conditionalities in the name of cosmopolitan principles therefore may have left ACP states more vulnerable to the particularistic material interests which cosmopolitanism is an attempt to transcend.

The chapter proceeds with by reflecting on the continuities and changes in Europe’s relationship with its external peripheries. It then presents an account of the historical development of EU-ACP relations, paying particular attention to the shifting terms of argument at work in negotiations. Particular attention is paid to the shift in the relationship coterminous with the rise of the Third World coalition in the 1970s, and the new era of EU-ACP relations in the post-post-colonial period after the Cold War. It concludes by reflecting on how the case of the Lomé and Cotonou agreements furthers our understanding of the moral possibilities and the limits afforded within an unequal international order.

**Pax Europa and the Post-Colonial World**

Rapid integration of advanced core of industrial states has been a key factor in the emergence of the North-South divide in international relations. One provocative suggestion for making sense of the European Union’s integration process has been that of Zielonka, who argues that the EU constitutes a form of neo-medieval empire (Zielonka 2006: 164). Like past empires, the influence of the European Union does not end at clearly demarcated territorial borders but gradually fades at distance from the ‘imperial core’ in a series of concentric circles (Zielonka 2006: 1). To take
the Zielonka’s analysis further, the EU might be likened to the Eastern Roman Empire, not merely in order to highlight the complexity of its internal politics but also to characterise its external relations with its peripheries. Like the Byzantine oikomenae, the European Union conceives of itself as the embodiment of enlightened and civilised values, and is committed to raising adjacent peoples up to this standard of civilisation, socialising them into an international order centred on itself (cf. Watson 1992: 107). In both the European and Byzantine international orders, territories outside the ‘imperial core’ have attempted to gain membership or secure favourable terms as clients by adopting the social, ideological and political practices of the core. Watson’s description of the Byzantine external policy is strikingly reminiscent of that of the EU: ‘Byzantium did not just negotiate with opponents, in the modern sense of bargaining with juridical equals. It tried to manage the whole area around it, by combination of military force, trickery, financial subsidy and religious and cultural proselytizing’ (Watson 1992: 111).

The ambiguities of the EU’s practice of managing its external peripheries, its imposition of stringent ‘standards of civilisation’ for accession and the frictions between these practices, and the liberal democratic values avowed by the EU have not gone unnoticed. Reflecting on these issues, Zielonka acknowledges the asymmetry and the structural inequalities between EU members and Central and Eastern European countries during the accession process, but notes that this situation was temporary as the accession countries would eventually join the Union on equal terms with other member states (Zielonka 2006: 58). Yet this is no solution with regards to the status those peripheries which have no prospect of ever being incorporated into the EU. The question arises as to whether the EU can manage the structurally unequal relationship with its external peripheries, incorporated ever more deeply into webs of overlapping agreements, in a manner that does not undermine the values it proclaims.

This problematic can be witnessed in the EEC/EU’s attempts to establish a viable framework for its relations with the African, Caribbean and Pacific states. This dynamic in turn raises questions as to whether the latter group have been able to renegotiate aspects of these arrangements and move beyond a relationship characterised by inequality.

The colonial origins of the relationship between the two states has shaped and defined its historical development. Relations between European colonial powers and their colonies were irreversibly altered by the destruction of the inter-imperial order during the Second World War. The end of the conflict witnessed attempts to resuscitate the empires of Britain and France through a re-assertion of imperial authority. Difficulties in Asia redoubled their efforts to secure the riches of the African continent’s interior (Arnold 2005: 18). Primary commodities extracted
from the colonies provided essential forex in dollar-starved Europe (Darwin 1984: 197; Kolko 1988: 111), and a large hinterland was believed to be essential pre-requisite for would-be great powers. Nevertheless, what was broken could not be mended. Extractive policies damaged the pre-existing social contract with the colonies and the spread of nationalist ideology led to growing demands for independence. Although US policymakers envisaged Africa as the essential geo-economic hinterland of Europe (Leffler 1992: 164-180; Kolko 1988: 55), as evidenced by the famously mooted ‘grand area strategy’, they were keen to break down the inter-imperial trading blocs and incorporate them into the global market as rapidly as possible – especially given the continent’s mineral wealth.

Nonetheless, despite the increasing momentum behind the global process of decolonisation, Britain and France continued to regard their colonies as essential to their own future as powers. France’s colonies granted it quasi-monopolistic economic advantages, added Francophone votes to international organisations and served as an essential buttress of its middle-power status (Bach 1986: 76). When in 1958 Guinea under Seikou Toure spurned incorporation into the Franco-African Community and attempted to seek independence, France was willing to assert its authority by making an example of the West African nation (Bach 1986: 77). Lemumba provoked a similar response from Belgium when he challenged their authority in the Congo (Arnold 2005: 25). Just as Lebow’s classical realism predicts (Lebow 2008: 534), the colonial powers reacted furiously to this challenge by their perceived inferiors (Arnold 2005: 41-2)

Nonetheless the colonies that would eventually compose the ACP did not seek to retain an association with the colonial metropoles solely due to external pressure. The uncertain domestic and international environments which the fledgling nations found themselves in ‘impelled them to take measures designed to ensure survival, or at least improve their chances of it’ (Clapham 1996: 4). As Clapham notes, the most salient source of support to be found were the colonial powers themselves (Clapham 1996: 77). Furthermore, the granting of formal independence did nothing to sever the myriad of links between the colonies and the metropoles, which ‘reached deep into the domestic structure and identity of the new state itself’ (Clapham 1996: 77). The access of the former to global markets usually remained routed through the latter, whilst policymakers and politicians remained linked by a web of interpersonal ties. Thus most of the former European colonies attempted to maintain some kind of post-colonial relationship in their ongoing search for self-determination.

The Post-Colonial Era of EEC-Associate relations
Relationships established in the inter-imperial era would be therefore reconfigured but not severed in the post-war Atlantic order. Hence the relationship between the European Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific states was established in the drafting of the Treaty of Rome itself. France took the preservation of its colonial and post-colonial relationships seriously enough for it to threaten not to sign the 1956 treaty if without the inclusion of what became Article 38, which made provisions for relations with the developing world (Whiteman 1998: 30). These provisions for relations between the EEC and ‘associate states’ were directly modelled on the political, moral and economic relations that France had attempted to cultivate with its African, Indochinese and Caribbean dependencies within the French Union (Montana 2003: 73). The Treaty allowed for an ‘open door’ policy towards specific developing countries with a colonial relationship with EEC members and provided for the creation of the European Development Fund tasked with promoting economic development and trade competitiveness within the associate states (Flint 2009: 80). It therefore allowed for the continuation of post-colonial relationships, and in particular those between France and Francophone Africa, within a multilateral framework (Montana 2003: 72).

The provisions of Article 38 provided the basis for further negotiations upon their expiry in 1962. By this point both the political dynamics between the relevant actors had changed. The EEC having been established, France had effectively lost its power of veto in the form of non-signature. The rising tide of decolonisation had enabled many associate states to achieve formal sovereignty. Post-independence leaders were keen to exercise their sovereign prerogatives, buoyed by Third Worldist ideas which, at the domestic level, saw national liberation movements as empowered by the mobilised populations to overturn unequal relations with the colonial powers (Berger 2004: 30-2). At the international level Third Worldism linked different national struggles on the part of Afro-Asian peoples into common movement, as expressed at Bandung in 1955. On the continent, these ideas were expressed in the form of Pan-Africanism, which after the Sixth Pan-African Congress in 1945 had shifted from a reformist agenda led by middle-class intellectuals in the Americas to a programme demanding independence and equality for the peoples of Africa (Arnold 2005: 10-11). These aspirations were given international voice by Nkrumah’s 1958 Accra conference1, encouraging the development of a continental diplomatic network and allowing for increased coordination between post-colonial African states (Clapham 1996: 106). The prestige enjoyed by Nkrumah meant that his condemnation of neo-colonialism encouraged African states to be wary of giving up their newfound autonomy.

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1 The Accra conference is acknowledged by scholars of Pan-Africanism as a key turning point in the institutional and ideational development of the programme (Young 2010: 147).
Against such a political headwind, De Gaulle had attempted to encourage its African colonies to join the French Community, but by 1960 all 13 states had opted for independence (Brown 2002: 40). Rather than direct association, France’s former colonies were seeking a less restrictive framework. Post-colonial states did not however, reject a relationship with Europe, as they both remained dependent on post-colonial linkages and were genuinely attracted to the success of the early EEC (Montana 2003: 67). Looking towards negotiations, they hoped that they could secure a free partnership for development rather than a neo-colonial compact (Montana 2003: 75). The Yaounde Convention of 1963, which consolidated the EU’s role in shaping European relations with the post-colonial world, thus incorporated a recognition of the formal independence and sovereignty of the post-colonial states into a framework which posited aid and trade as the solutions to their problems of underdevelopment (Brown 2002: 43). Nonetheless, principal negotiations largely took place between EEC members, although France and to a lesser extent Belgium lobbied for the interests of the post-colonial ‘associates’ within negotiations. The associate states threatened to reject the Convention due to the inadequacy of the aid package offered in negotiations, but this tactic achieved little of substance (Ravenhill 1985: 53). The growing influence of the Dutch and German governments, who favoured a ‘globalist’ policy of broadening the EEC’s relations with developing countries, limited the privileges granted to the associate states (Ravenhill 1985: 56).

During the next decade, the Yaounde Convention came under increasing criticism and defence of the relationships that it established became increasingly difficult. The Convention, renegotiated in 1969, had been envisaged as a step towards an EU-African free trade zone based on reciprocity and non-discrimination. Yet Yaounde made few provisions for intra-regional integration by promoting trade and preferential treatment amongst associates (Montana 2003: 77). As a matter of policy the European Development Fund ignored industrial projects and focused on infrastructure and rural production (Ravenhill 1985: 68-70). At the same time the Convention featured ‘embarrassingly neo-colonial’ reverse preferences privileging EEC industrial exports (Ravenhill 1985: 94). Thus Yaounde seemed to institutionalise traditional metropole-periphery relations, ‘axial’ patterns of trade and even the dubious geopolitical notion of Eur-Africa and the politically inegalitarian order it implied (Whiteman 1998: 31). This was more than enough ammunition for Nkrumah to claim that the Yaounde Conventions were ‘neo-colonialism in practice’ (Montana 2003: 81).

The US, wary of the emergence mercantilist economic blocs and the notion of a Eur-African sphere of influence, was no less dubious. According to Raffer, the pressure that the US brought
to bear against its European allies resulted in the ‘Casey-Soames understanding’, an agreement to dismantle the system of reverse preferences (Raffer 2001: 1). At the same time as the US was pushing for its liberal conception of international order, the assertiveness of the associate states increased alongside the consolidation of the Third World coalition and the increased volume of calls to renegotiate North-South economic relations (Montana 2003: 76). African states were increasingly self-confident in making the accusation of neo-colonialism and the EEC states were increasingly unable to defend against these charges (Montana 2003: 80). The Yaounde Conventions had become an embarrassment, as they had failed to effectively promote the economic development of associate states and had exposed the EEC to criticism (Ravenhill 1985: 79).

The neo-colonial aspects of the Yaounde Convention were increasingly difficult to sustain against US pressure, African criticism and lack of enthusiasm on the part of ‘globalist’ member states. These aspects of the relationship were products of France’s attempts to multilateralise its post-colonial policies towards Africa, and were increasingly difficult to maintain in the face of changing standards of international legitimacy. Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to view Yaounde in entirely geo-political or mercantilist terms. It embodied a strongly paternalist sense of responsibility on the part of France, an enduring sense of mission civilitrice continuous with its integrationist colonial policies and even a romantic notion of ‘natural’ complimentarity between the two regions (Ravenhill 1985: 35). The dense web of post-colonial linkages gave rise to unusually close and personalised relationships between Francophone African elites and French politicians (Clapham 1996: 89). The resultant sense of affinity and moral responsibility had real effects: de Gaulle claimed to Omar Bongo, long-serving President of Gabon, that the reason he was opposed to Britain’s attempts to join the EEC was because of concern for the Francophone African countries (Whiteman 1998: 30). But the relationship was inherently unequal, an anachronistic holdover from the normative order of the inter-imperial age which broke down once it came under sustained pressure from both Third Worldist nationalism and liberal anti-mercantilism.

The achievements of the associate states themselves are deeply ambiguous. They possessed sufficient agency and ability to act in concert to loosen the constraints of the post-colonial

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2 EEC-associate state trade actually declined as a percentage of EEC-LDC trade (Montana 2003: 80).
3 In addition to its embrace of its former colonies, France attempted to draw Belgium’s former colonies into its vision of Francophone Africa in a ‘quasi-post-colonial’ fashion (Clapham 1996: 85).
4 Arnold scathingly notes that ‘a study of de Gaulle’s language shows him as entirely paternalist in his attitudes to France’s African subjects’ (2005: 41).
5 Owing to healthy oil revenues and French support, Bongo remained in power from 1967 until his death in 2009.
relationship, whilst simultaneously benefitting from the ‘residual sense of responsibility’ on the part of the colonial powers which ‘provided them with access points which they would not otherwise have possessed’ (Clapham 1996: 84). As clients, they could usually count on protection from their patrons, as in 1964 when French paratroopers returned President M’ba of Gabon to power (Arnold 2005: 61). Their strategy of seeking support from the former colonial powers had helped African states survive as independent polities, but initiated a pattern of external dependence which, by helping to undermine the links between elites and African societies, would ironically erode their standing as moral agents in the eyes of their liberal interlocutors.

The ACP and the Challenge of the NIEO

A new formula needed to be found ahead of the expiry of Yaounde II in 1975 due to the accession of Britain to the EEC and the rise of the North-South questions to a new level of salience in international politics. Even before its accession, the UK’s role as a post-colonial power was already tied up with that of France, the two having recognised in the 1950s that their empires in Africa were interlinked and if one decolonised the other must follow (Arnold 2005: 38). Nonetheless, Britain’s accession to the EEC altered the dynamic of European relations with the post-colonial world, although this was not necessarily intended or appreciated at the time (Whiteman 1998: 30). The enlargement to include Britain in 1973 necessitated the incorporation of much of the non-Asian Commonwealth into the EEC’s associate state category (Montana 2003: 83). Although Britain was sympathetic to the ‘globalist’ argument, it was under moral pressure not to ‘sell out’ the Commonwealth (Ravenhill 1985: 35) and to ensure that the interests of its former colonies, in particular those with sugar exporters, were not undermined through its EEC membership (Ravenhill 1985: 27). Through inclusion of a second major former colonial power, EEC relations with its post-colonial peripheries were transformed from an extension of French neo-colonial foreign policy to a genuinely multi-lateral North-South relationship (Montana 2003: 84).

The accession of Britain and the inclusion incorporation of commonwealth as associate states fed into the second major change ahead of Lomé. Throughout the 1960s solidarity between post-colonial and late-developing states had been growing and, following the oil shock of 1973, the G77 demanded the creation of a New International Economic Order that would address the needs of the non-industrialised world. Coalitions amongst developing nations, and in particular amongst primary commodity exporting nations, were seen as a ‘weapon of the weak’ that would force the industrialised North to the negotiating table. Recalling personal involvement in the negotiations, Whiteman notes ‘it felt like a brave new world at the time’ (Whiteman 1998: 31).
The situation was not seen as the temporary disequilibria that it was, but rather a ‘permanent global power shift.’ (Whiteman 1998: 31). The spectre of ‘reverse dependency’ loomed; Europe had become dependent on economies of the global South for 45% of its trade, with a significant proportion of its mineral supplies coming from Africa (Brown 2002: 51). The idea of ‘producer power’ lent the developing states a confidence and an assertiveness in their dealings. Pan-South coalition building on the global stage provided a ready ‘repertoire of contention’ (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 15) which the associate states could draw upon in their efforts to re-negotiate their relationship with Europe. The inclusion of the Anglophone states of the non-Asian Commonwealth was central in this new political strategy, as their self-confidence allowed them to play a leadership role (Clapham 1996: 99) and their links through the Commonwealth provided significant channels for diplomatic coordination (Clapham 1996: 126).

The consequence was the decision of the African, Caribbean and Pacific associate states in Georgetown 1973 to negotiate Yaounde’s successor as a single 46-member bloc. The EEC was caught by surprise by the departure from previous arrangements (Whiteman 1998: 31), and its attempts to negotiate parallel agreements with each of the regions were undermined (Raffer 2001: 1). Most commentators acknowledge that the ACP was largely successful in acting as a unified coalition and was able to collectively win concessions that its members would not have been able to achieve individually (Ravenhill 1985: 96; Flint 2009: 81). The ACP leadership appreciated the advantages collective bargaining offered and managed to make much of the moral weight that representing three impoverished and marginalised regions provided (Whiteman 1998: 32). Indeed Clapham goes as far as to claim that negotiation over the Lomé convention ‘presented one of the very few occasions on which African states were able to bargain with external powers on something approaching a position of equality’ (Clapham 1996: 99).

Whilst the NIEO coalition was making relatively little headway at the global level, the ACP group were able to secure a number of concessions (Brown 2002: 62). Brown identifies the turning point as taking place during negotiations in Kingston, July 1974. Leadership amongst the ACP was taken by Sonny Ramphal of Guyana, who had been personally involved in North-South negotiations, and Michael Manely of Jamaica, whose government had received a popular mandate for its ‘programme of attempting to reshape the country’s position in the world economy’ (Brown 2002: 56-7). A successful principle of comparative advantage was in operation: with the Caribbean nations providing technical and negotiating skill and the African nations

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6 This of course shows some of the limits of solidarity within the Third World coalition, as the ACP states were quite willing to negotiate themselves a privileged position compared to the rest of the South in dealings with European nations.
providing numerical weight. As in other institutional settings, coalition building may have been a popular strategy amongst Southern states because of the low capacity of many component members. With only a limited ability to develop their own foreign policies along a concept of national interests, many associate states found it easier to adopt a common position and join a logrolling coalition. Nonetheless, in negotiating Lomé I the ACP had served as an effective vehicle for the demands of member states and functioned as a ‘trade union of the poor’ (Whiteman 1998: 32) – although to paraphrase Clapham’s description of the OAU (Clapham 1996: 114), the ACP might be better characterised as a trade union of poor governments, with implications for future perceptions of its legitimacy.

The creation of the ACP reframed Lomé in terms of North-South politics. The negotiations occurred at the high point of concerns over the vulnerability of the industrialised world, as the post-war ‘Golden Age’ ended and an era of global disorder seemed to threaten. The idea of mutual dependency and the need to cooperatively manage the shared vulnerabilities of the industrial age loomed large in negotiations. Thus the text of the convention emphasised international solidarity and cooperation (Montana 2003: 85) – acknowledging the sovereign equality of the ACP states (Brown 2002: 62). The shift in perception of material power and global norms had altered the moral basis of the relationship. Again, this is not to ignore the narrowly self-interested aspects of the agreement. European countries, much more import-reliant than the US, were crucially concerned with safeguarding the supply of raw materials in the wider strategic context of the Cold War (Raffer 2001: 2). But these material imperatives and the arguments of the ACP group compelled the EEC to re-evaluate its relationship with the associate states and acknowledge them as equal partners. They created a brief opening for argument whilst relationships and roles were in flux. Negotiation of the Lomé accord can therefore be seen as one part of an instance of the process of challenge and reconstruction that the international order periodically undergoes — although for reasons examined in Chapter 4 this episode stalled and was eventually reversed.

The agreement eventually reached in February 1975 in Togo went some way to meeting the demands of the ACP grouping. Reverse preferences were abandoned (Ravenhill 1985: 94). The Stabex system was created in order to meet some ACP concerns over commodity price

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7 However, the participation of the Caribbean nations was on occasion resented by the original associate states. The heterogeneous nature of the coalition was obvious to all parties (Montana 2003: 85). Like all political coalitions based on socio-economic status, gradations amongst members existed which could serve as the basis for friction and disunity.

8 Clapham makes this point with specific reference to the diplomatic practice of Pan-African solidarity (Clapham 1996: 107).
fluctuation and offered compensation for export shortfalls, helping to provide a level playing field between ACP and EEC producers (Raffer 2001: 2). The agreement also included protocols which provided effective guarantees of above world-market prices for several primary commodities (Flint 2009: 81). The institutional structure accommodated the new political imperatives in the form of joint committees, councils and a joint assembly (Whiteman 1998: 31). Indeed, for a time Lomé was seen as a model for North-South relations and an example of what cooperation could achieve (Lister 1997: 109).

Ravenhill provides an influential characterisation of the Lomé agreement as instituting a relationship based on ‘collective clientelism’. He claims that this arrangement proved attractive for the ACP nations because it had a contractual basis, acknowledging them as equal partners and guaranteeing the some of the benefits of the agreement, but was at the same time underwritten by an implicit guarantee that ‘the EEC in its role of patron would safeguard their interests where these were not specifically protected by provisions in the Convention.’ (Ravenhill 1985: 4). The multilateralisation of the post-colonial relationship provided the associate states with the opportunity to increase their autonomy by granting them greater distance than restrictive bilateral patron-client relations and allowing them to act in a more-or-less united fashion (Ravenhill 1985: 28). The specific format of collective clientelism was attractive to the EEC as it enabled Britain and France to maintain their post-colonial relations even within the EEC, whilst simultaneously allowing European nations with little colonial past wider access to African economies (Ravenhill 1985: 36, 39). The multilateralism of the agreement muted the neo-colonial aspects of the relationship (Ravenhill 1985: 37) and enabled the post-colonial connection to survive in a changed normative international environment. Ravenhill suggests that ‘playing the role of patron in a collective clientelist relationship appeared to be a relatively low cost strategy that offered the potential to realize some significant long-term benefits.’ (Ravenhill 1985: 41). In one sense therefore Lomé functioned as a vehicle through which policies which would otherwise have been denounced as neo-colonial could be ‘laundered’ (Abbott and Snidal 1998: 18) by creating social distance between the participant states. Yet at the same time, the agreement also gave European politicians and EEC Commissioners a change to put into act on the world stage and put into practice a global vision, such as Commissioner for Development Claude Cheysson’s idea of ‘the Fresco’, a worldwide system of European development agreements and instruments (Whiteman 1998: 32). The EEC’s external development policy was starting to serve as a platform for advancing a distinctive normative vision of international order.

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9 This degree of trust between patron and client may well have been based on the affective ties between colonised and former coloniser generated by shared history, domestic lobby groups and personal ties between policymakers (Ravenhill 1985: 35).
Nevertheless, there remained a tension in the agreement in that the ACP group wanted the advantages of a patron-client relationship, but also desired a partnership on equal terms with the European nations. There were strains ‘between the ACP Group’s demand to be treated as an equal in the relationship and its unwillingness to provide reciprocity’ (Ravenhill 1985: 46). Indeed, the ACP states adopted a zero-sum view of negotiations and were actively suspicious about suggestions of mutual gain (Ravenhill 1985: 323). The ACP was unable to square the circle of securing an equal partnership with the benefits of a satisfactory patron-client relationship. (Ravenhill 1985: 309). The Lomé convention turned out to be ‘riddled with loopholes’ which removed constraints on EEC actions (Ravenhill 1985: 4), to the dismay of the ACP nations. The EEC largely set the agenda and reverted to a paternalistic style: unilaterally making decisions over the quantity of aid to be allocated, aid projects to be funded and the price of sugar (Ravenhill 1985: 312). Thus many of the benefits of the relationship were revealed as being discretionary and based upon the continued ‘good will’ of the EEC. As a better developed institutional framework, the agenda of the convention was largely shaped by goals and political imperatives from within the EEC (Forwood 2001: 424). The ACP, on the other hand, had a weak and underdeveloped secretariat that quickly became overwhelmed with the complexities of the negotiations (Forwood 2001: 424). By 1979 the secretariat had become dependent on the EEC for statistical information (Ravenhill 1985: 316) and thus lacked the capacity to independently make claims on its own behalf.

A further problem for the ACP was the fact that ‘the group [had] no logical raison d’etre’ beyond its role in negotiations (Ravenhill 1985: 314). It therefore lacked credibility as a grouping; the common experience of colonialism proved insufficient to provide unity, and a significant cleavage opened up between the Anglophone and the Francophone African countries, as well as between Pacific and African nations (Ravenhill 1985: 316). It is notable that, despite the rhetorical commitment to Third Worldist principles of solidarity, the ACP grouping almost immediately found themselves going against the objectives of the Group of 77 by trying to protect their privileges in trade negotiations. (Ravenhill 1985: 46). The ACP nations therefore gained a relatively privileged relationship with their collective patron, but this was not the new economic order based on equality that they had demanded.

**The Mirage of ‘Partnership’**

The periodically renegotiations of the Lomé agreement may have provided an opportunity for incrementally transforming the relationship between the EEC and ACP within the context of a
new era in North-South relations. But whilst Lomé I had been conceived as the first step towards a New International Economic Order, by Lomé II it was realised that this was an unrealistic goal and that the movement which generated this demand was rapidly running out of steam (Montana 2003: 86). The sense of mutual dependence evaporated once the shock of the oil shock faded, and the ACP states were seen as increasingly irrelevant to the central commercial interests of the EEC states (Ravenhill 1985: 313). The negotiation of each iteration of the Convention became more and more obscure as perception of their significance declined (Lister 1997: 108). Talk of equal partnership between the European Community and the ACP came to be seen as ‘too hypocritical for comfort’ (Whiteman 1998: 32). The ACP group lost the ability to set the agenda in negotiations and the EEC proposals came to be ‘digested without protest’; the last threat of non-signature on the part of the ACP occurred in 1979 (Whiteman 1998: 33). Lacking the ability to improve the terms, the ACP states could only accept what they were offered given that it was better than nothing. They had entered into an asymmetry relationship characterised by structural inequality in Strange’s sense, in that one party could make the other an ‘offer they can’t refuse’ (Strange 1996: 17). By Lomé IV in 1989, the ACP Secretariat could not even provide alternative figures or counterproposals during negotiations (Lister 1997: 113). Without the credible threat of exit or ability to provide counter-proposals, the ability to shape the outcome of a negotiation narrows dramatically. As a consequence, the nature of the relationship changed from a putative partnership to one obviously based on the continued indulgence on the part of the EEC states.

A central factor in the shifting relationship was the failure of the developmentalist agenda in Africa and the continent’s enduring problems of hunger, poverty and instability. Unlike in much of Asia, the national liberation movements which won power after decolonisation had failed to establish mass parties and robust states with connections to the wider populace. Instead the continent was littered with ‘no-party states’ comprised of weak, neo-patrimonial institutions. A minimalist goal of addressing basic needs and humanitarian concerns became the primary purpose of development policy. Increasingly, the international financial institutions became involved with the economic problems of LDCs, managing national economic policies and setting the international development agenda. Europe offered no alternative development model to this neo-liberal agenda (Lister 1997: 118) and instead sought to promote harmonize their own policies with it — Chris Patten arguing in 1988 that ‘it makes no sense to argue one course in Brussels and other in Washington’ (quoted in Brown 2004: 22). Northern states and multilateral institutions increasingly arrogated the right and responsibility to intervene more directly in LEDC affairs through a raft of new policy mechanisms. Brown notes that Lomé III in 1982 can be seen retrospectively as the key turning point, as this round of negotiations introduced policy
conditionalities to the convention for the first time (Brown 2002: 70). Needless to say, these measures undermined any remaining sense of equality within the relationship (Whiteman 1998: 33). But just as important were how these shifts in the politics of economic development undermined the legitimacy of the LEDC state, and especially the African state, to play a role as a moral agent and act as a representative for marginalised peoples. That the legacy of colonialism had resulted in extraverted states dependent on external support (Bayart 2009: 21-22), such as that which could be extracted from former colonial powers or international commodity markets, was not politically salient. No longer fellow members of a close-knit post-colonial order, nor partners on the shaky raft of industrial civilisation, ACP states found themselves cast as failures, rent-seekers and villains.

**Cosmopolitan Europe in the Post-Cold War Order**

The hopes on the part of the ACP states that the Lomé agreements would guarantee a new era of equal partnership had faded; the EEC’s external relations with associate states were increasingly oriented towards the management of failure in the post-colonial peripheries. Yet as Brown argues whilst the Cold War persisted, the principle of negative sovereignty limited the expansion of political conditionalities (Brown 2002: 66). The triumph of the Atlantic bloc over its Soviet rival, however, heralded a deep shift in North-South relations. As victorious powers always have, the industrial democracies of the North attempted to revise the rules governing legitimate rights and responsibilities of states within international society. Under Clinton, democratic enlargement became the guiding principle of US foreign policy, whilst economic considerations were given a level of consideration only previously according to national security (Chollet and Goldgeier 2008). Hurrell characterises this resurgent liberal internationalism as a form of ‘coercive solidarism’ (Hurrell 1998: 31), an attempt to prescribe a single form of social organisation, liberal democratic capitalism, on a heterogeneous international society. Rather than direct coercion and colonial administration, this goal was primary advanced by constructing overlapping regimes to lock in as yet un-integrated societies to the liberal-capitalist order and through transferring authority to supranational organisations tasked with promoting economic liberalisation.

Ironically, ACP countries were the ones who took the initiative to include human rights considerations in Lomé III negotiations, due to their concern over the economic relations between European countries at the apartheid regime in South Africa. (Raffer 2001: 15). Clapham notes how their criticism of apartheid in international fora more broadly rebounded on African states by attracting attention to their human rights records and by undermining the sovereignty principle (Clapham 1996: 189). Argument does not always accomplish what those that initiate it intend, actors may find themselves constrained by the moral and political claims that they put forward.
As discussed in Chapter 2, this ‘neo-liberal cosmopolitanism’ (Gowan 2001) was animated by a particular normative vision of international order. Universalist in nature, it envisaged a globally integrated order in which individual human rights would be safeguarded through democratic government and the application of market principles. The sovereignty of Westphalian states would remain dependent on conformity with these principles. Although closely related to the geopolitical ambitions of leading Northern states and their powerful organised interest groups, proponents of this ideology could defend their prescriptions by drawing on moral principles with wide currency.

The EU played a key role as one of the primary vehicles of the process of Northern integration on which the wider process of ‘globalisation’ was predicated, especially through its absorption of the former communist states of Central and Eastern Europe. Europe’s considerable achievements in securing peace and stability on the continent, and in presenting an attractive model of prosperity and human rights, generated a degree of optimism about the positive role that it could play in the world at large. Although sometimes pilloried as a political dwarf, Zielonka argues that the EU is nonetheless ‘able to apply its power and leverage abroad in a purposeful and effective manner’ — particularly in reshaping its external environment (Zielonka 2006: 63). A post-national construct embodying democratic values, enthusiasts of the European project saw it as inevitable that the EU would externalise its values in its interactions with the outside world – perhaps even acting as a exemplar of new forms of non-parochial political community (Lacroiz and Nicolaidis 2003: 136-7). Even thinkers of the notoriously pessimistic Frankfurt School expressed optimism about Europe’s potential to act as a vehicle for emancipatory purposes; Beck and Grande (2008) enthuse about a ‘cosmopolitan Europe’ as providing a path away from cynical realpolitik. For Manners, who explicitly associates his account with critical theory, the EU possesses the potential to exercise ‘normative power’. Normative power is not the pursuit of self-interest through peaceful means, but a particular form of structural power exercised to aid the cosmopolitan transformation of international society (Manners 2002, Manners 2006a). Manners argues that through persuasion, supranational institution-building and setting a moral example, Europe can help bring into being a more just and egalitarian world society (Manners 2009).

European policymakers have been receptive to these ideas, perhaps because they provided legitimacy for the ongoing project of integration as well as suggested a unique role for the EU in an international system in which the US remains the hegemon. An appeal to its values in the
issue area of development has likewise enabled Europe to differentiate itself from the Washington consensus through reference to its unique ‘social model’.

Nonetheless, it should be remembered that as well as being based on certain values, the ability of the EU to act in a transformative manner is predicated on a degree of inequality. Europe’s ability to shape and manage its external environment, on which its potential agency as a ‘normative power’ rests, does not just depend on its international structure as a post-Westphalian or neo-Byzantine policy but also on the centrality of its member states in the global economy and the processes of global rule-making. Structural asymmetries cannot fail to play a role in the EU’s interactions with its peripheries, especially with those states which have no prospect of ever joining the European oikumenae.

The question the remainder of the Chapter will as is whether, in the face of these inequalities, a relationship based on partnership is possible and, if not, what moral limits this places on the realisation of Europe’s publically avowed liberal cosmopolitan values. Examining the transition from the Lomé to the Cotonou agreement, the discussion will demonstrate how, with no mechanism to hold them to account, the achievement of these principles depends on the more powerful party’s continued good will. Kant, precursor to today’s liberal cosmopolitans, argued that ‘a good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes, because of its fitness to achieve some proposed end, but only because of its volition, that is, it is a good in itself’ (Kant 1994: 4:394). Yet Kant was equally insistent that a ‘paternalistic government, where the subjects, as minors, cannot decide what is truly beneficial or detrimental to them, but are obliged to wait passively for the head of state to judge how they ought to be happy...would be the greatest conceivable despotism’ (quoted in Guyer 2004). We might be equally sceptical of paternalistic forms of governance, which like paternalistic forms of government negate the autonomy and self-government of those who have little option but to surrender their judgement to it. Without the mechanisms of accountability and the imperative for parties to engage in mutual reason giving, cosmopolitan principles seem perpetually unstable. The question to be answered is whether Europe’s liberal cosmopolitan agenda has undermined itself in conditions where those subject to it have little opportunity to challenge it.

**Lomé in the Post-Post-Colonial Era**

The end of the Cold War signalled rapid change in EU-ACP relations, as it not only undermined the rationale of ensuring the security of raw materials for strategic purposes, but also resulted in a shift of European priorities from the developing world to its own ‘near abroad’. The
imperative to promote democracy and liberalisation with Central and Eastern Europe, ‘greenlining’\(^{11}\) them for rapid incorporation into the advanced core through EU accession, created additional competition for attention, expertise and funds (Lister 1997: 139). This trend was in conjunction with the widening of European interests in other regions including Latin America, Asia and the Mediterranean (Lister 1997: 148). The EU took on an increasingly global role in which its relationship with the ACP states was of decreasing significance. Rather than a special relationship, the association with the ACP states was increasingly normalised, both vis-à-vis other regions and in terms of the wider development agenda. Thus conditionalities relating to structural adjustment were included in Lomé IV and, after it was realised that economic adjustment alone was failing to generate success, new political conditionalities including clauses about human rights, democratisation and good governance were added to the to Lomé IV/i in 1995 (Brown 2002: 188; Flint 2009: 82-3)\(^{12}\). The breadth of these conditionalities bears witness to the expansion of the moral scope of the ‘good governance’ agenda beyond a narrow focus on economic management\(^{13}\). It also reflected the impact of a genuine ‘popular African voice’ vociferously attempting to draw attention to malgovernment on the continent (Clapham 1996: 195). The existence of such a discourse enabled Northern actors to position themselves as acting in the interests of this nascent African civil society (Clapham 1996: 198). For their part, the ACP states were engaged in a process of trading their effective autonomy for continued receipt of aid and access to markets, on which they had become dependent (Brown 2009: 293).

The development of EU policy can be discerned in the European Commission Green Paper on EU-ACP relations of 1996, which asserts the end of the colonial and post-colonial era of European relations with ACP states (European Commission 1996: 10). Relations between the EU and the ACP group were to become more banal, less special and more like those with other regions and LDCs (Whiteman 1998: 34). Indeed the Green Paper noted the artificiality of the ACP group as an entity (European Commission 1996: vii). The affective and historical ties with the ACP nations were de-emphasised, signalling that the post-colonial era was effectively over. Four decades after the beginning of decolonisation, the governments of Europe clearly lacked the close personal ties of the previous generation of leaders and repudiated the notion of

\(^{11}\) Murphy (1994) argues that this process of identifying areas of the globe ready for integration into the North has been one of the primary functions of global governance.

\(^{12}\) Although the ACP states were unable to collectively challenge the imposition of conditionalities, rather perversely conditionalities were in part the product of the agency of LDCs. Clapham argues that faced with the requirements of IFI-imposed structural adjustment packages, many states became adept at obfuscation, delay and evasion (Clapham 1996: 173-77). Although highly marginal, these states were able to employ Scott’s ‘weapons of the weak’ (1985) including foot-dragging and dissimulation to maintain some scope for autonomous action whilst avoiding direct confrontation.

\(^{13}\) Nicolaidis and Lacroix (2003: 141) discuss this in the broader context of the role of ‘good governance’ in European policymaking.
obligations based on the colonial connection. This unilateral repudiation of post-colonial moral responsibilities was not necessarily received well by ACP states. This was illustrated by the furious reaction to the letter sent by Clare Short, British Secretary of State for International Development, to the Zimbabwean Agricultural Minister in 1997:

‘I should make clear that we do not accept that Britain has a special responsibility to meet the cost of land purchase in Zimbabwe. We are a new government from diverse backgrounds without links to former colonial interests. My own origins are Irish and as you know we were colonized not colonizers’ (quoted in Arnold 2005: 915)

Rather than a ‘special responsibility’, Short and other European ministers understood obligations to the ACP states in terms of a generic duty to promote development and combat poverty. In the UK this trend was expressed in the explicit moralisation of its development policy (Power 2008: 14). To this end, the Green Paper sets out the primary goals for the EU’s relationship with the ACP states, emphasising the central importance of promoting institutional change within ACP nations and successfully encouraging their integration into the international economic order (European Commission 1996: vi-vii) and stressing poverty alleviation, human rights and democracy as the ‘cornerstone of coherent external policy’ (European Commission 1996: 3). The Green Paper thus represented a frank acknowledgement by the Commission of the political dimensions of the EU-ACP relationship, and confirmed the importance of European liberal norms and values in shaping its future (Brown 2000: 376). Rather than a reciprocal relationship between equals, the future for the EU-ACP relationship was envisaged as one of tutelage, in which the EU would provide leadership and direction for nations unable to resolve their internal problems or successfully integrate into the global economy on their own.

From Lomé to Cotonou: The External Policies of ‘Cosmopolitan Europe’

In 1998, the Green Paper was adopted by the European Council as the basis for the EU negotiating position, signalling the EU’s desire to replace the Lomé framework. Without any sense of irony, the Green Paper listed the rise of political conditionalities as one of the reasons why the concept of partnership envisaged during the original Lomé negotiations had become inoperable. As Raffer argues, the EU had undermined the practice of partnership and then used this fact to justify its abolition (Raffer 2001: 16). In place of the Lomé framework, the EU proposed a system of Regional Economic Partnership Agreements to replace the non-reciprocal market access provided by Lomé (Salama and Dearden 2001: 5). Negotiations over Lomé’s successor were launched in 1998. Going into the negotiations, significant differences existed amongst the major European actors. Germany regarded the ACP as a colonial relic and favoured normalizing relations with the three regions. Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands favoured...
directing the EU’s focus to LDCs. The UK was sceptical of REPAs and favoured continuation of the ACP group, but felt a political imperative as EU President to ensure agreement was reached within the EU (Forwood 2001: 428-9). Yet the EU states were able to settle on a common position – when the UK and the Netherlands attempted to break ranks due to their deep misgivings, pressure from the Commission and other member states brought them back to the common negotiating position (Forwood 2001: 435). The ACP nations, for their part, agreed in the Libreville Declaration of 1997 and Santo Domingo Declaration 1999 to a great deal of the agenda set by the EU, although strongly resisted granting the EU to unilaterally suspend development assistance if an ACP state violated certain political conditionalities (Salama and Dearden 2001: 6). ACP countries reluctantly accepted REPAs but advocated a longer period of transition and maintenance of non-reciprocal market access for LDCs. Its role was therefore reactive, only extending to toning down some proposals (Forwood 2001: 436). The group was reduced to such a passive negotiating position not only because of its preference for the status quo, but because of the weakness of its coalition. So whereas European integration allowed the Northern coalition to act with a high level of cohesion, the loose, artificial ACP grouping was unable to put forward a substantial counter-argument to the EU’s attempts to revise the status quo.

Negotiations during this period were conducted in the shadow of WTO rules, which were incompatible with the Lomé principle of non-reciprocal market access. A five year waiver had already been granted in the case of Lomé IV/ii, but the preferential treatment granted to ACP producers by the EU came under sustained challenge. In September 1995 with the backing of Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Ecuador and several MNCs the US petitioned the WTO over the privileges granted to European banana producers (Payne 2008: 319). The ‘banana wars’ are perhaps the most heated trade to have taken place within the WTO and provided weight to the claim by EU actors that steps had to be made to ensure that the successor to Lomé would be compatible with the prevailing trade regime. Those sympathetic to the EU’s position argue that the pressures the EU faced were real, not least from other states of the global South disadvantaged in EU markets, and that this made it increasingly difficult to extend the life of Lomé-era preferences (Curran, Nilsson and Brew 2008: 530). The 1979 ‘Enabling Clause’ of the

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14 Using a rational-choice analysis employing a two-level game model, Forwood (2001: 428) suggests that it was the heterogeneity of the European states’ preferences, granting them a narrow ‘win-set’, that least them leverage in negotiations. This may be true, but the success of these nations in adopting a single, coherent negotiating position despite divergent preferences can be contrasted by the tendency towards ‘log rolling’ and the simple addition of preferences into an unwieldy ‘laundry list’ which scholars have identified in the negotiating practices of past Southern coalitions (Rothstein 1979). These negotiating strategies were discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
GATT allows for preferential treatment for LDCs, but it must be granted to all LDCs\textsuperscript{15}, meaning that the only way to preserve the EU-ACP relationship within the EU was through the GAT Article XXIV, which provides for the creation of free trade areas (Curran, Nilsson and Brew 2008: 533).

Yet critics such as Hurt have pointed out that these arguments were disingenuous, that WTO rules were presented as a fixed and immutable natural fact, rather than a political construct (Hurt 2003: 174) – a political construct which the EU had a major role in shaping. Indeed much of the acrimony and mistrust characterising the politics within the WTO has its origins in the creation of the organisation through the infamous ‘power play’ (Steinberg 2002: 36) and the bullying tactics of the Quad in closed door negotiations (Jawara and Kwa 2003). Defender's of the EU’s position acknowledge that it was not impossible for it to fight to extend the waiver in their admission that doing so would be politically costly in terms of the concessions that would have to be granted to other Southern exporters, given that ‘sensitivities on market access for large developing countries are a political reality’ (Curran, Nilsson and Brew 2008: 531, 533). But this appeal to ‘political reality’ betrays the fact that the EU’s argument was made in bad faith. As Flint points out, member states simply regarded it as too costly to defend the preferences granted to ACP states, especially given the pressure the EU faced over such departures from the norms of free trade as the Common Agricultural Policy (Flint 2009: 84). Nicolaidis and Lacroix note that protectionist lobbies in Europe have long trumped normative concerns (2003: 139); in this respect little has changed in an era of ‘cosmopolitan Europe’.

The argument over the waiver nonetheless demonstrates the structural power of Northern actors: in their capacity to make and selectively apply global rules they have been able to skew the terrain on which argument with other actors takes place, presenting their own preferences as \textit{fait accompli} imposed by external factors. Thus in spite of the claim that its hands were tied by WTO rules, in negotiating the Lomé successor agreement the EU pushed as far as possible for the irreversible integration of the ACP nations into the multilateral trading regime. The Cotonou agreement of 2000 therefore stipulated under Article 43.3 that ACP states were obliged to participate fully in any future round of multilateral trade negotiations (Raffer 2001: 8). In certain matters related to biotech and intellectual copyright, the agreement actually went significantly beyond the requirements of the TRIPs component of the WTO (Raffer 2001: 8). The fundamental shape of the ACP’s relationship with Europe or the wider international economic order was, through the Cotonou agreement, placed increasingly beyond debate or negotiation.

\textsuperscript{15} Not all of the ACP grouping are even classified as LDCs according to the UN classificatory system, meaning that not all would be able to benefit from a generalised preferential tariff regime.
The Cotonou agreement furthered the trend towards assigning greater and greater discretion to the EU. The Cotonou Financial Protocol, for example, grants the EDF IX a budget of ‘up to’ 15.2 billion (Raffer 2001: 4). This qualification is important, because this does not require the funds to be spent and allows for reallocation if the EU identifies more important development goals. The funds were to be distributed on the basis of merit rather than entitlement, with the Commission seemingly free to determine what constitutes merit – as well as what constitutes a breach of human rights conditionalities (Raffer 2001: 16-18). It’s instructive to note the stark contrast between these features of Cotonou and the remark made to the ACP states on the creation of the EDF that the fund was ‘their money’ (Whiteman 1998: 33).

The 1996 Green Paper may have laid stress on ‘international political dialogue’ (European Commission 1996: 5), but it is clear that Cotonou limited its scope by transferring greater and greater discretion to the EU despite being presented as a ‘Partnership Agreement’. It might however be objected that even if the partnership promised by the early Lomé agreements has been successively unwound, this is not necessarily objectionable under the circumstances. Although conditionalities have become ever more constrictive, they include requirements relating to poverty reduction, good governance, gender equality, sustainable development and human rights – laudable goals from a cosmopolitan perspective. Given the very real flaws of many of the ACP states as protectors of the rights and interests of their peoples, limiting their effective autonomy in the name of cosmopolitan principle might be defended as legitimate.

Indeed, Flint comments that ‘the EU has been most anxious to ‘talk up’ the Cotonou Agreement in an effort to portray itself as the guardian of the poor and the marginalised’ (Flint 2009: 84). Core elements of the Millenium Development Goals were adopted as the guiding goal of Cotonou (Flint 2009: 85). But given the EU’s eagerness to present itself as an agent of cosmopolitan principles it seems legitimate to evaluate it in those terms. On this point we might question how far the decision to allow the preferential and non-reciprocal benefits enjoyed by the ACP states under the Lomé agreements to lapse is compatible with cosmopolitan goals. As discussed above, it was certainly not impossible for the EU to push for an extended waiver for non-WTO compatible aspects of Lomé or even to offer preferential access to all LDCs on the basis of need. The choices of the EU and its member states have had very real effects in terms of the opportunities and the life chances of the poor and marginalised. In April 2001 the EU, largely for reasons of expediency, came to an agreement with the US that it would phase out quotas for

\[16\] Just as Slocum-Bradley and Bradley (2010) suggest we can assess how ‘good’ in terms of governance the EU’s good governance requirements are
bananas in favour of a flat tariff coming into effect on January 1st 2006 (Payne 2006: 26). Tiny export dependent Caribbean nations such as Dominica, for whom bananas had accounted for 20.1% of GDP and composed 48% of export earnings in 1992 (Payne 2008: 317), faced the irreversible decline of what had been a cornerstone of their development strategies. Given the consequences of some decisions of the EU member states, the one-way directionality of the cosmopolitan conditionalities incorporated into Cotonou can certainly be criticised. However an examination of the efforts to establish regional Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) to replace Lomé provides some deeper insights into the problems and moral limits which arise in the absence of restraints on the more powerful actor in an unequal relationship.

**Promoting Partnership and Regional Integration?**

In the years following the signature of the Cotonou agreement in 2000, the notion of partnership underwent something of a revival. Increasingly, reservations were aired within the donor community that conditionalities were facing limits as a tool of policy. Because they were externally imposed, conditionalities were undermined through ‘policy slippage’ as LDC governments employed Scott’s ‘weapons of the weak’ (1985): evasion, foot-dragging and dissimulation. Increasingly, political capital was invested in the notion of partnership, and the principle was increasingly affirmed in public multilateral settings such as the G8 and the EU-Africa summit in 2007. ‘Partnership’ was presented as a step beyond conditionality (Brown 2009: 291), although in reality the reinvigoration of the concept represented a step back from the highly controlling formulas adopted by Northern donors across a range of issue-areas. With regards to ACP-EU relations, critics have alleged that the deference paid to the concept is an attempt to maintain a hegemonic relationship by encouraging associate states to claim ‘ownership’ of agreements largely imposed on them (Hurt 2003: 163). Those more sympathetic to the European position, however, have implored the EU to make good on the aspiration of partnership, as a successful relationship cannot be based on ‘African governments unwillingly agreeing to changes in which they do not believe’ (Nicolaidis and Collier 2008). Nonetheless, commentators have generally expressed scepticism about whether the much vaunted shift to ‘partnership’ has led to any substantive change (Woods 2006: 172). A consideration of the implementation of Cotonou’s system of EPAs suggests that EU-ACP relations remain characterised as a monologue rather than the dialogue implied by the notion of partnership.

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17 Caribbean banana producers had, however, already lost some of their privileges as a result of the formation of the Single European Market in 1993, initiating a decline that had was already well progressed by 2006.

18 Chapter 5 discusses the failure of the original HIPC debt relief programme, the conditionalities attached to which were far too restrictive for the initiative to be successful.
The Economic Partnership Agreements were initially negotiated with the ACP as a whole, but after 2004 negotiations were devolved to six regional groupings. Yet at this point only three of the regional groupings had established customs unions (Meyn 2008: 520) and many associate states faced challenges in promoting regional integration and preparing for non-reciprocity. As the ostensibly final deadline of January 31st 2007 for the expiry of the waiver for non-reciprocal access to EU markets approached, increasing concern was raised that many of the ACP states were in no position to enter into EPAs. It was feared that many associate states would encounter economic disruption due to the loss of preferences. These concerns were compounded by complaints of bullying and high-handedness on the part of the EU during the ‘end game’ of negotiations. In private, ACP negotiators complained of duress and overwhelming pressure to sign the agreements (IPS 15/12/2007, 21/12/2007). Many African nations thus made last minute agreements to join an EPA, provoking concern that the decisions had been made in haste (Meyn 2008: 523).

There are reasons to think that these concerns were well founded. The removal of tariff barriers required by the EPAs removes an important source of finance for states whose capacity to raise revenues is very limited\(^\text{19}\). The Commission has earmarked funds as part of the ‘aid for trade’ programme, but the fact that some of the funds assigned were diverted from other development projects (IPS 14/09/2007) underlines the discretion that the EU possesses. In any case, the mechanism of replacing customs revenues with aid itself is liable to make associate states more dependent on external sources of support – exaggerating the extraverted character of many ACP states and potentially exaggerating the problems of governance which the EU has sought to address.

The new regions themselves are artificial in many cases and the establishment of new customs unions has threatened to disrupt existing regional economic groupings, particularly in Southern and Eastern Africa (IPS 21/12/2007; Meyn 2008: 521)\(^\text{20}\). Several African nations were members of more than one regional economic organisation, but were prohibiting from negotiating an EPA as part of more than one grouping (Slocum-Bradley and Bradley 2010: 40). That individual African nations have signed up to ‘interim’ EPAs in a fairly \textit{ad hoc} manner has generated further concern about the coherence of the groupings and the risks of trade diversion. The result, some

\(^{19}\) The neo-Weberian approach to historical sociology has stressed how important building effective systems of taxation has been in the historical experience of most modern states.

\(^{20}\) In the Caribbean, however, measures have been largely compatible with existing patterns of regional integration.
fear, has been the creation of a “spaghetti bowl” of different national and sub-regional commitments (Meyn 2008: 525).

The potentially disruptive aspects of the new groupings has been exacerbated by the EU’s differential approach to ACP nations of different levels of economic development. The EU’s Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative provides non-reciprocal tariff-free access to European markets on almost all goods for LDCs. There is therefore little incentive for many LDCs in the ACP grouping to sign such agreements, whilst non-LDC ACP states have faced the possibility of tariff jumps to the level of the WTO General System of Preferences in the absence of an EPA (Meyn 2008: 523). The risk is that regional economic integration led by more economically developed economies will be stalled.

These issues have contributed to the acrimony surrounding the EU’s negotiations with South Africa over the creation of the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement between 1995 and 1999. South Africa’s initial request to participate in the Lomé Convention was, according to Lister, met with ‘dismay’ on the part of EU negotiators – raising serious questions as to whether the EU was committed to its stated goals of partnership and dialogue or if it desired ‘simply more effusive agreement with its policies’ (Lister 1999: 50). South Africa was categorised by the EU as a developed nation, and thus its application to join the ACP grouping was initially blocked. Although South Africa was eventually allowed to join the Lomé Convention on a partial basis, a great deal of mistrust was generated in the four years of negotiations and was taken by other ACP nations ‘as an indication of the EU’s unwillingness to be flexible when considering development policy’ (Flint 2009: 88). Treating South Africa as a special case has been identified as problematic for southern African integration because it not only has it disrupted the existing Southern African Customs Union but also risks ‘leaving southern Africa bereft of an economic growth pole to drive forward integration’ (Flint 2009: 88).

Others have highlighted how the EPA framework may limit extra-regional South-South cooperation. The Cotonou Agreement requires that the EU must benefit from any trade concession granted to an exporter with a 1% share of world merchandise exports (IPS 14/09/2007), adding to fears that the agreement limits the policy space of ACP nations and limits the kind of economic agreements they can pursue with non-EU actors (IPS 01/11/2007). Compounding this problem are concerns about Cotonou’s restrictive rules of origin requirements which, especially when coupled with the trade diversion caused by the EPAs themselves, limit the ability of ACP economies to integrate themselves into global production chains and instead encourage a continued focus on primary commodity extraction (Collier and
Nicolaidis 2008). The Cotonou agreement has therefore been accused of limiting the ability of ACP states to navigate their integration into the global economy for themselves and impeding them in the creation of new linkages with other actors. Rob Davies, Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry in South Africa, went so far as to suggest that this is a matter of design due to Europe’s fears of encroachment of India and China into Africa (IPS 26/02/2008).

Despite the continued references to partnership, the Cotonou Agreement largely freed the EU from the necessity of engaging in dialogue with its Southern interlocutors in the ACP, not least through insisting on negotiating on individual regional groupings and blocking larger economies in specific regions from being able to play a leadership role. Cotonou was the result of a series of steps away from the post-colonial era and the brief period of quasi-corporatist bargaining between the EU and the South. It has been presented by the EU as consistent with a cosmopolitan set of values and a unique vision of international order. Largely unopposed by a countervailing viewpoint from the ACP group, it has had the opportunity to put these principles into practice in an external policy based on pro-poor development and regional integration. It is therefore highly problematic that several of the strategies successfully employed by industrialising economies to promote self-sustaining economic development are potentially disrupted by the Cotonou mandated EPAs, including the establishment of a tax base, promoting regional integration under the leadership of a leading economy, temporarily shielding industries from the global economy, and promoting the diversification of linkages with other Southern economies. Despite its promotion of free trade the EU remains unable to fully overcome its own protectionist interests, and thus restrictions remain on rice and sugar until 2015 (Meyn 2008: 152). Rather than helping marginal and fragile economies manage their integration into a liberal economic order, the EPAs actually seem to reproduce the familiar ‘radial’ or ‘axial’ patterns of structural inequality — with peripheral economies focused on the bottom of the value-chain, dis-integrated with one another and from other Southern economies but strongly integrated with the core. Thus rather surprisingly the Cotonou in many respects seems like a return to many of the features of the Yaounde Convention (Flint 2009: 80).

**Conclusion**

As Brown argues, the EEC/EU relationship with its associate states provides an important case study in the evolution of North-South relations in the international order (Brown 2002: 189). This Chapter has examined three major phases in this relationship. The straightforwardly neocolonial relations of Yaounde were based on strategic and mercantilist interests by former European colonial powers, particularly France. But the relations also embodied a form of post-
colonial responsibility and *noblisse oblige* that had important political consequences. Nevertheless, this arrangement could not survive in the same form once pressure was applied in the form of anti-mercantilist liberalism, which sought to replace post-colonial ties with market logic, and more strident Third Worldism, which sought to re-establish relations between former colony and former colonialis on the basis of sovereign equality. Nevertheless, affective ties, mercantilist interest and the deep inequalities between Europe and the ACP group generated a hybrid ‘collective clientelism’ in the form of the Lomé conventions rather than a genuine relationship amongst equals. This relationship proved dissatisfactory to ACP states because it neither established a relationship of equality with the EEC states, nor fully provided for their interests as subordinates.

The decline in the sense of mutual vulnerability and the increasing perception of the ACP states as economically irrelevant that undermined Lomé. The EU’s relationship with the ACP states took on elements of the neo-liberal programme promoted by the IFIs and began to incorporate political conditionalities. This process was accelerated by the end of the Cold War and the resurgence of solidaristic forms of liberal internationalism. At the same time as promoting the global integration of markets, the EU increasingly advanced a distinctive moral vision of a cosmopolitan global order. Notions of ‘partnership’ established in the Lomé era were gradually undermined by conditionalities and the EU’s ability to avoid engaging in substantive dialogue with the associate states, despite efforts to promote ‘ownership’. The framework set out in the Cotonou agreement provides for the incorporation of the ACP into an overlapping system of economic and political governance, centred on the EU and the ‘core’ of advanced capitalist nations more generally. As Chapter 1 suggested, we can observe a transition from a Eurocentric inter-imperial order to a partially-globalised capitalist order coordinated by dense transgovernmental integration and supranational institution building. It also demonstrates that normative order governing relations between unequals in international society is never static, but subject to constant renegotiation, challenge and revision. Despite these changes, however, many of the structures of inequality between North and South remain, and thus we see similar sets of political practices and organisational structures recurring.

Farrell (2005) suggests that the replacement of Lomé by Cotonou represents the ‘triumph of realism over idealism’. Yet this dichotomy neglects the extent to which a neo-idealistic liberal cosmopolitanism has shaped the EU’s attempt to build a new framework for its relationship with the ACP states. The EU has been keen not only to talk up the moral dimension of the Cotonou agreement (Flint 2009: 84), but has been keen to actively take on an increasing number of cosmopolitan responsibilities and prerogatives. But despite attempting to establish a role for
itself as a benefactor of the developing world the EU remains an imperfect agent of cosmopolitan principle. Whilst Manners associates the idea of ‘normative power Europe’ with egalitarian goals and solutions to problems generated by neo-liberalism (Manners 2009), the actual policies promoted by Europe in its periphery remained firmly within the coordinates of ‘neo-liberal cosmopolitanism’. Furthermore, by appropriating the authority to act on behalf of the interests of the peoples of ACP nations and insulating its policies from challenge by their political representatives, the EU has left those peoples vulnerable to its own more narrowly mercantilist impulses. As Nicolaidis and Lacroix argue, fidelity to cosmopolitan principles does not necessarily require perfect equivalence between Europe’s internal and external policies, it does nonetheless require consistency between them (Lacroiz and Nicolaidis 2003: 136). Yet this consistency is lacking in the case of the relationship between ‘cosmopolitan Europe’ and its external peripheries; the EU’s attempts to exercise moral tutelage over the ACP states may have limited their capacity to overcome the structural inequalities which define the relationship. Absent from the actions of the EU is the reflexivity that Manners insists is essential for the exercise of normative power (Manners 2006b). This would require the EU to look beyond myths of ‘cosmopolitan Europe’ in order to identify the flaws and impediments which limit dialogue with those on its periphery.

A consideration of the Cotonou agreement therefore allows us to reflect on whether Northern voluntarism is sufficient basis for realising cosmopolitan principles in an unequal international order, or whether in the absence of contestation on the part of the representatives of the marginalised such attempts will prove morally unstable and self-undermining. European decisions have compounded the problems arising from the attempt to build a framework for relations with the ACP states. But responsibility cannot be solely attributed to the EU. Real moral limits exist in attempts to build an equitable relationship between unequals, structural factors generate genuine normative dilemmas. Moreover, European states have faced a genuine problem in their relationship with the ACP states, many of whom – though by no means all – cannot be considered genuine representatives of their peoples. By no means is it being claimed that the barrage of pro-poor, governance and human rights conditionalities will have no normatively desirable consequences. Northern actors have faced the unsavoury problem that the aid and assistance they provide to peripheral actors can serve as life-support for deeply imperfect regimes. It is thus not surprising that the EU has found it difficult to acknowledge non-democratic, inept or kleptocratic states as legitimate interlocutors. The objection may of course be made that the failings of ACP states are the result of the history of colonialism, external dependency and insertion into a hostile hierarchical international order – factors which European states possess a historical responsibility for. But as Chapter 3 argued, such arguments
cannot have moral traction unless they are issued by an interlocutor intersubjectively perceived as morally worthy and possessing the means to apply sustained political pressure.

As such an interlocutor, the ACP group had notable flaws. As a historical artefact of European colonialism and subsequent post-colonial policies, the grouping was always artificial. In a post-post-colonial environment it lacks both moral legitimacy and a substantive purpose. The question of why the ACP states should be privileged compared to other developing countries, and LDCs in particular, is not easy to answer. Nonetheless, for a brief period the ACP states were able to act in solidarity, building a multi-regional coalition to seize the initiative and assert their own normative vision of a just international order. Even after the passing of the Lomé era and the effective break-up of the ACP through the implementation of EPAs, individual associate states have nonetheless been able to navigate the process of global economic integration and promote economic development on behalf of their peoples despite facing huge structural constraints. Payne demonstrates that even some of the smallest and most marginal states in the international economic order, the former banana exporters of the East Caribbean, have retained room for manoeuvre through responsive political leadership and by utilising all the tools available to them (Payne 2006). As the final section of this Chapter hinted, the rise of the emerging economies might provide greater space for such manoeuvring in future, as well as provide new opportunities for South-South cooperation and coalition-building. Chapter 7 examines these recent developments in North-South relations more fully.
Chapter 7
North-South in an Era of US Hegemony: From Triumph to Crisis in the Liberal International Order

After the collapse of the campaign for a New International Economic Order, the notion of a North-South divide was widely regarded as belonging to history’s dustbin. The termination of the Cold War seemed to herald the triumph of the liberal international order and the defeat of any serious challenge to its expansion, giving rise to a belief that the most serious issues in international politics would be those, such as terrorism and globalisation, affecting all states in common. Yet recent political developments have demonstrated that the North-South divide was dormant rather than obsolete. The conflicts of interest and value which gave rise to it remain present within international society, forming a cleavage which shapes the politics of almost every major issue-area.

This chapter aims to trace the evolution of North-South relations in the international order, examining the political opportunity structure from the perspective of the states of the global South and identifying the opportunities it afforded to challenge the North. Focusing on the coherence of political coalitions, the material balance of power, the institutional opportunities to exercise voice and agency, and the potential for reinterpretation of shared commitments and normative frameworks, it suggests that despite the existence of discontent within the global South little space existed to initiate argument with the North. In particular, the dominance of an inequalitarian normative framework in the form of neo-liberalism and the unique structural position of the US which allowed it to sequentially overcome negarchic restraints on action within international society created conditions for a Northern monologue instead of a dynamic of argument.

However, the attempt by the US to construct a hierarchical international order around itself proved highly unstable. By seeking to unilaterally disregard practices of restraint within international society, the US undermined its own position and that of the trilateral bloc it leads. At the same time, shifts in material power due to the rise of emerging powers reactivated existing disagreements between North and South. Existing practices of South-South coalition building

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1 For reasons of brevity, this chapter will only focus on the core issues relating to the North-South divide: rule-making in the global political economy, control over decision-making within international institutions and fundamental questions concerning the sovereignty of and authority amongst states. Suffice to say that all major issues of world politics including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Singer 2007) and the politics of the environment (Roberts and Parks 2007) have been identified by analysts as being profoundly shaped by the North-South divide.
were re-energised, generating new challenges within institutions which had previously functioned to cement the structural dominance of the North.

This chapter explores these new opportunities for the exercise of agency on the part of states and coalitions of the South, examining the political arguments over the rights and duties of participants in a common international society in the context of global economic integration and persistent inequality. It suggests that in the context of complex interdependence, worldwide movement towards democracy and de-concentrating material power, aspirant powers may have to justify their role in the process of collective management of the global order by acting as interlocutors for broader social interests and principles. In conjunction with new restraints on structural power of the North, these shifts may be opening new spaces for egalitarian claim-making in international society.

**Conceptualising International Politics after the Cold War**

Theorists of international relations disagree sharply over the patterns of conflict and cooperation between actors in the post-Cold War era and significance of various potentially transformative processes within the international system. These processes can be loosely grouped under three categories: the redistribution of relative material capabilities amongst state-based actors; the world-wide ‘third wave’ of democratisation; and the multifarious set of processes grouped under the nebulous concept of ‘globalisation’. For example, neo-realism places overriding emphasis on the first of these processes and therefore regards international relations after the Cold War as being defined by the problematic created by US unipolarity (Layne 1993; Waltz 2000). Although recognising the importance of the distribution of capabilities due to the significance of ‘market power’ within international negotiations (Drezner 2007), institutionalist scholars are also concerned with how conditions of ‘complex interdependence’ (Nye and Keohane 2001) have promoted the disaggregation and diffusion of power and authority in international relations (Slaughter 2004). These processes are expected to mute conflict, but disagreements remain at the pareto frontier as states remain guided by the differing interests of their domestic constituents (Moravcsik 1997). Yet conflict and cooperation are unstructured, no pattern exists at a system-wide level and states will form ad hoc coalitions to advance their interests. For liberal internationalists (Doyle 1986; Russett and Oneal 2001), the worldwide process of democratisation in combination with the trend towards economic liberalisation constitutes a phase transition in the international order. Patterns of amity and enmity will be reshaped as a tendency towards cooperation between democracies will exist, whilst the potential for conflict will remain both amongst non-democracies and between them and the democratic world.
Although these influential perspectives are useful in understanding international relations after the end of the Cold War, none are completely adequate because none accords significant weight to enduring forms of deep or structural inequality. All are misleading as they fail to identify that many international disagreements have their origins in the enduring inequalities within international society. Once we include a focus on inequality as a central guiding element in our analysis of post-Cold War international relations, a different set of political conflicts are unveiled and new relationships between the three central processes described above become apparent. The subsequent sections will examine how the North-South cleavage endured after the Cold War, how states of the global South attempted to negotiate the rapids of a integrating international system, and how attempts to establish quasi-imperial forms of rule on the basis of unipolarity proved unstable. It suggests, furthermore, that the ongoing process of democratisation that has spread across much of the world is unlikely to mute disagreement between North and South. Indeed, insofar as the peoples of the South have real grievances, political regimes in the South which are even minimally sensitive to the interests of their populaces\(^2\) are likely to be bullish about renegotiating arrangements in the global economic order. Democratic regimes are particularly well-placed to do so: authoritarians with external support or rentier-dictatorships can much more easily deflect popular concerns, whilst anti-imperialist radicals in the South have tended towards rejection rather than renegotiation of the present world order.

The process of democratisation is therefore closely connected to attempts to overcome patterns of stratification within the international order. Indeed, in certain respects the waves of decolonisation and democratisation seem closely linked as processes. Suri suggests that the collapse of empire and the mobilizations of the Cold War initiated a ‘global social awakening’, transforming colonial subjects into global activists (Suri 2006: 356). This is the process which Brzezinski indentified in 1979 in his warning that ‘the era of Eurocentric or western political domination in the history of mankind is coming to an end’ as in the near future the peoples represented by the states of the global South would be ‘increasingly literate, informed, and politically assertive’ (quoted in Amsden 2007: 137). This mounting assertiveness and confidence amongst the states of the global South, coupled with the imperative of global economic integration, has driven them increasingly to the centre of negotiations over the rules governing the global order.

\(^2\) This includes the kind of quasi-corporatist regimes that govern in several states in East Asia, as their ability to rule depends on a developmentalist social contract with their both their populations and with powerful domestic interests rooted in the national economy.
North and South in the Cartography of the New World Order

The travails experienced the global South in the 1980s are well known. Rising interest rates reversed the tide of credit leading to a debt crisis at the same time as the flaws of import-substituting strategies were becoming increasingly apparent. The attempt by the IFIs to encourage indebted economies to intensify primary commodity exports failed to improve economic prospects in the periphery due to the collapse in commodity prices. As is often noted, the trajectory of the East Asian NICs undermined the Third World as a meaningful category (Dirlik 2004: 144). But in conjunction with the economic difficulties experienced by many Latin American economies the result was to empty out the middle, resulting in a much more bimodal international income distribution (Milanovic 2005: 61). Nevertheless, the ‘three worlds’ schema ceased to make any sense after the collapse of the Soviet Second World, not only in terms of geopolitics but also in that finding a third path of development between the models promulgated by the superpowers had been central to the concept of the Third World (Dirlik 2004: 136). Instead, all states outside of the North faced the common challenge of managing their integration into a capitalist international economic order which they had little control over. As Tilly (1998: 96) argues is the norm within stratified social systems, the South found its actions largely limited to 'adaptation, not revision' (Holm 1990: 2).

Nonetheless, many peoples within the global South were able to achieve a new level of political self-determination. Soviet and US clients were increasingly unable to resist sustained popular opposition (Robinson 1996, 14). Crossing the Atlantic from Europe’s peripheries, the Third Wave of democratisation cascaded across much of Latin America (Huntington 1997: 3), whilst white minority rule came to an end throughout southern Africa. Although many of the familiar imperfections of democracy in the South remained (Randall 2004: 51-52), the changing

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1 Increasingly integrated into the world economy through export growth, between 1960 and 1993 the Asia Pacific region increased its share of world economic output by an incredible 650% (Acharya and Stubbs 1999: 119). This placed the region on a very different trajectory from the rest of the South, by the 1990s, Asia was the only region in which poverty was decreasing (Therien 1999: 734).

2 Despite the Reagan Doctrine inspired hostility towards leftist regimes and their populations, the US did not, in the breach, support authoritarians facing mass popular movements for democratic change. Indeed, despite the Reagan’s administrations criticisms of Carter for failing to support friendly tyrants, democratisation began to be seen by the US as a solution to the problems of ‘economic malaise and political instability’ in the global South (Zielonka 2001: 514).

3 The processes was not one of simple diffusion from Europe – African resistance against imperial rule in Portugal’s colonies sparked the Carnation Revolution by left-wing officers, adding to the cascading process of democratisation in Southern Europe.

4 In particular, a powerful argument was made by some neo-Gramscians such as Robinson (1996), who pointed out that what was very often achieved through the Third Wave was ‘polyarchy’, electoral competition without substantive democratic self-determination. This provided the basis for the argument
relationship between late developing states and their peoples may well have enabled more inclusive patterns of socio-economic development (Murphy 2010: 208). Furthermore democratisation had consequences for the relationship between clients and patrons, as in the decision by the Philippine’s not to renew a US basing agreement in 1991 despite sustained pressure and inducements.

Nonetheless, despite the expectations and hopes of second-tier powers such as France and China (Foot 2006: 81), the end of the superpower duopoly did not immediately usher in a multipolar era. The Gulf War revealed that multipolarity was more distant than many expected: potential challengers Germany and Japan, who had previously submitted to American economic leadership through the Plaza Accord of 1985, were willing to cover the costs of Desert Storm (USGAO 1992). Despite ‘declinist’ concerns, the US had maintained its position of hegemony because the elites of the advanced industrial states of the North continued to defer to its leadership. The majority of the South reluctantly backed the UN resolutions against Iraq (Acharya 1999: 85), yet retained deep misgivings about the US-led initiative, viewing it as an instance of colonialism rather than an example of collective security in action (Roberts 1991: 521). Not only did the conflict confirm the imbalance of power within the international system, but the creation of no-fly zones over northern Iraq marked the first of many challenges to the principle of sovereignty in the name of humanitarian principles.

The US had attempted to obstruct and undermine the United Nations in the 1980s, and despite its recommitment to the organisation in the subsequent decade, its relationship remained ambiguous, engaging in multilateralism only on its own terms. The lack of a Chinese or Russian check on US unilateralism enabled armed intervention in the periphery, weakening constraints on the use of force and reinforcing the position of leadership that the US enjoyed over its

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7 For example, as East Asian states Taiwan and South Korea approached Northern levels of income during the 1980s demands for political and labour rights were increasingly successful. Indeed the steady progression towards multi-party democracy and the institutions of a social democratic welfare state seems to confirm at least some of the predictions of supposedly discredited Marxist and modernisation theories. Chapter 1 discusses the merits of these approaches to the sociology of socio-economic development.

8 Concerns about the principle of national sovereignty and fears about the precedent that would be set if a predatory regional power could invade its neighbours unopposed overrode concerns about US unipolarity.

9 Once again, their precarious position within the international order left many states of the global South in a position of ‘acute schizophrenia’: both clinging to and resisting aspects of the same international order (Ayoob 1989).
European allies\textsuperscript{10}. Although many realists had expected NATO to break up following the cessation of the Cold War (Waltz 1993), the central military alliance of the North remained intact and even expanded.

The increased propensity for the US and the North to intervene in delinquent states provoked considerable alarm within the global South, concerned that the shield of negative sovereignty which protected them from the extremes of inequality within the international system was being corroded. Disagreement over humanitarian intervention was thus organised broadly along the lines of the North-South cleavage, and suspicion remained the default position adopted by the global South\textsuperscript{11}. Although the Non-Aligned Movement’s guiding purpose had been its opposition to superpower encroachment, it was unable to present a united front against US ‘coercive solidarism’ (Hurrell 1998: 31) and found itself increasingly marginalised in the post-Cold War period (Acharya 1999: 98; Morphet 1993: 375). The NAM found itself increasingly marginalised, having failed to develop South-South dispute mechanisms the body lost relevance in comparison to regional groupings (Acharya 1999: 98; Morphet 1993: 375). The NAM and its sister organisation the G77 did continue to act as important diplomatic networks, participation in which continued to shape the foreign policy of states of the South (Morphet 2004: 521). But the Movement’s central problem was that the organisation lacked any political programme to advance its shared goals (Acharya 1999: 91). The North, and the US in particular, had ceased to pay the NAM any attention, leaving it consolidated but adrift (Morphet 1996: 461). An uncompromising defence of pluralism risked positioning the movement as a trade union of authoritarian governments in a liberal international order.

Economically, the global South realised that a direct challenge against the North was not possible and that economic integration would have to form the basis of any developmental strategy (Morphet 1993: 372). Individual states sought out agreement with the North on a pragmatic, issue by issue basis (Morphet 2004: 528); signalling the transition from an era of ideologically charged structural conflict to one of complex interdependence (Shaw 1994: 25).

\textsuperscript{10} Indeed, far from being concerned with balancing the overweening power of the United States, European nations were primarily concerned with keeping up and remaining useful to the hegemon, problems of interoperability having come to the fore during the Kosovo campaign.

\textsuperscript{11} This is not, however, to claim that the position of states in the global South was uniform, or that individual states were self-consistent in their evaluation of individual cases (Ayoob 2004: 99). Substantial regional variation existed: Asian states were more consistently anti-intervention, whilst for the Latin American states the historical experience of US intervention was often balanced by commitment to human rights (Ayoob 2004: 109). African states views were much more ambiguous due to the extremely precarious nature of sovereignty on the continent: resisting the diminution of their negative sovereignty, but remaining receptive to intervention in support of the positive sovereignty of existing governments (Ayoob 2004: 110).
Facing an imperative to promote socio-economic development and secure material prosperity, governments within the global South saw little opportunity to achieve these goals except through what had once been termed ‘dependent development’\(^\text{12}\). The balance of forces had dramatically swung in favour of Northern states and capital, convincing leaders such as President Cardoso of Brazil that structural constraints left the South little option but participation in an unequal world economy\(^\text{13}\). In other cases, policies of liberalisation and integration were only adopted after the exertion of significant leverage by ‘the globalizers’ – the IMF and the World Bank (Woods 2006). Although such policies did have their local champions, the claim that the elites of the South were in thrall to neo-liberal ideology is misleading (Budd 2007): the majority remained reluctant integrators, wary of a world economy that remained substantially in control of the North and retaining a determination to retain their autonomy.

These tensions were heightened by the particular grand strategy adopted by the US in the wake of the Cold War. Realising it had received an enormous fillip, the terms of the post-war settlement became more uncompromising as the US became more intent on reshaping the international order to its own advantage (Clark 2001). This was expressed not only in the goal of ‘democratic enlargement’ (Chollet and Goldgeier 2008) but in the increasingly geo-economic focus of US foreign-policy-making during the Clinton administration\(^\text{14}\). A central priority was to open up new markets for US firms to operate in and to maintain its leadership over the North. The creation of the WTO was essential to these ambitions. The organisation was not created primarily to promote liberalisation of merchandise trade\(^\text{15}\): the GATT had already reduced tariffs to very low levels for most tangible goods\(^\text{16}\). Instead, the WTO was a defensive innovation intended to safeguard the multilateral trade regime by averting the danger of a drift towards regional trading areas and the potential break-up of the trilateral bloc (Gruber 2000; Tussie 1998: 39). The secondary motive was to expand the global trade regime to include the new areas of

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\(^{12}\) As Kacowicz notes, the majority of the states of the South ‘resent the marginalization of the Third World from the world economy following the end of the Cold War… the emphasis remains on a continuing quest for insertion into the global economy’ (2007: 577). However, this does not mean that there is a lack of concern over potentially pernicious effects of global economic integration. Rather, political elites of all stripes within the global South recognise that their options regarding national economic development are limited and that they must play with the hand that they have been dealt.

\(^{13}\) See Cardoso (2009) for a retrospective on the constraints and opportunities for Latin American nations in an era of global economic integration.

\(^{14}\) For example through the creation of a National Economic Council to compliment the National Security Council.

\(^{15}\) The global trade regime did however face a threat from non-tariff barriers to trade.

\(^{16}\) This is not to claim that trade liberalisation \textit{per se} was ever the primary goal of the GATT itself: North to South and South to North trade on the basis of comparative advantage was much more restricted than intra-industry trade (Tussie 1998: 35). The GATT was designed to manage the gradual process of economic integration through trade, as evidences by the Multi-Fibre Agreement, which limited the imports of textiles into the markets of the advanced industrialised nations.
comparative and competitive advantage of many Northern states, services and intellectual property, thus ensuring that quasi-monopolies in new industries could be established. These goals were achieved through the ‘power play’ of exiting from the GATT 1947 at the same time as creating the WTO, which incorporated every other multilateral trading agreement negotiated up to the Uruguay round (Steinberg 2002: 360). This left states of the South with a choice between accepting the combined package of agreements or being excluded from the multilateral trading regime in its entirety.

Nevertheless, the perception of illegitimacy generated deep mistrust towards the Quad\textsuperscript{17} within the organisation. This was compounded by the non-transparency of WTO procedures such as ‘Green Room’ discussions amongst a small numbers of important states, repeated complaints of pressure-tactics and external issue linkage wielded against smaller states. Thus even after abandoning NIEO-era strategies bloc-based coalition building and conforming to the norms of the liberal international order, states in the global South found the achievement of their goals frustrated due to the dominance of the North.

This experience, where the global South found its developmental goals frustrated after acting ‘pragmatically’ by acquiescing the US-hegemonic order, was not limited to the sphere of trade negotiations. Even those nation-states who had been most successful at integrating into the world economy and promoting socio-economic development found that their gains were uncertain, their position within the international economic order precarious – as demonstrated by the Asian Financial Crisis (Thomas 1999: 227). Several analysts have argued that the crisis was the outcome of a Minsky bubble (Arestis and Glickman 2002)\textsuperscript{18} which massively amplified underlying problems. The most affected economies were those which had opened their financial systems most fully to capital flows (Wade 2000: 107), in accordance with neo-liberal policy prescriptions. But even more significant than the crisis itself was the response by the institutional embodiments of Northern power within the global political economy. Assuming that financial actors were simply responding rationally to weaknesses in East Asian economies, critics pilloried

\textsuperscript{17} The US, EU, Canada and Japan.

\textsuperscript{18} Schematically, this account of the crisis claims that the high growth-rates of the East Asian NICs attracted huge flows of capital, which were increasingly directed towards assets such as property (Wade 2000: 101-2). The rising asset prices encouraged investors to adopt high-leverage strategies which depended on the continued upward rise in asset prices, further inflating the bubble and making it vulnerable to even a small slow-down in growth. When East Asian growth rates began to cool as they approached the ‘leading edge’ of production and markets for their manufactures became saturated the consequence was panic, and economic damage to the region’s economies far out of proportion to their actual weaknesses. The result of the burst bubble was a massive reversal in financial flows amounting to a turnaround of $105bn between 1996 and 1997 in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Korea and the Philippines (Wade 2000: 88)
Mahathir Mohammed’s attempts to re-impose capital controls. Despite these decisions arguably being ultimately vindicated (Eichengreen and Leblang 2003), the Malaysian PM was mocked as Canute attempting to hold back the waves (Economist 25/09/97). The IMF’s attempts to manage the crisis were not successful, failing to calm markets or prevent the spread of financial contagion from South Korea. Its handling of the aftermath was to have even more serious long term implications; the imposition of austerity policies on the weakened economies of the region was bitterly resented. Commentators have argued that these policies stemmed from an overriding concern to ensure that creditors would be repaid (Wade 2000: 105), whilst others have seen narrowly mercantilist motives in the efforts by the IMF to break-up Korea’s chaebol dominated political economy. In any case, IMF practice was consistent with the overriding aim of US geo-economic policy: to maximally expand the area in which financial capital could operate freely (Beeson and Broome 2010: 514).

Events had revealed serious weaknesses in the global regulation of finance, but any debate over these issues was quickly snuffed out (Beeson and Broome 2010: 515). The crisis was used merely to reinforce the orthodoxy of ‘monoeconomies’, the Asian development model was ‘discursively demolished’ (Hall 2003) and its achievements in lifting millions out of poverty were disregarded. Thus the handling of the aftermath reasserted the dominance of the G7, the Bretton Woods institutions and Northern capital over the international economic order. The implicit challenge that the Asian development model presented was deflected without the need for dialogue or engagement19.

Because the legitimacy of international organisations relies on the perception of their impartiality and expertise (Abott and Snidal 1998), the perception of the IMF as an arm of the Treasury-Wall Street complex dramatically reduced its authority within and without the region20. A consensus emerged within the region that self-insurance and regional mutual aid, rather than reliance on the good-will of North-dominated institutions, was the best means of hedging against future crises (Beeson and Broome 2010: 517-8).

Diverging from general trends, coalitions of the global South had reasonable success in making the case for their claims within the context of global climate negotiations. Disagreement along North-South lines about the appropriate and fair collective response to global environmental

19 The re-imposition of Northern authority dramatically encapsulated in the photograph of IMF Director-General Michel Camdessus standing over President Suharto as he signed a letter of agreement for an IMF stabilisation programme.
20 See Best 2007 for a discussion of the legitimacy dilemmas faced by the IMF and its attempts to meet these challenges.
questions was pronounced, but states of the global South had gradually moved away from a hard-line rejection of international environmental concerns in the name of national developmentalism (Vihma, Mulugetta, Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen 2011: 319). Following the clash of views at 1972 Stockholm Conference, the positions of states of the North and the global South gradually moved towards one another. The former accepted the imperative for development for late-developing states, whilst the latter came to acknowledged notions of global collective environmental responsibility (Rajamani 2012: 607). This provided the basis for acknowledgement of common but differential responsibility and respective capabilities in agreements such as the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. The principles of common but differential responsibility and sustainable development were explicitly endorsed at the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio in 1992, notable because the global South was successful at persuading more powerful Northern actors to accept not just their arguments but also a set of legal obligations (Hurrell and Sengupta 2012: 467). The global South, united around the G77, remained unified despite substantial differences between various groups of states. Rio set the agenda for the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. Coalitions of the global South had some success in making the argument that already-industrialised states had historical responsibility for the vast majority of greenhouse gas emissions. Differential treatment was acknowledged in the central obligations assigned under the Protocol, which were backed by ‘clear, precise, prescriptive and deadline-driven obligations backed by a compliance system with enforcement powers’ (Rajamani 2012: 612). Nonetheless, these features of the protocol resulted exacerbated disagreements within the North, resulting in the US failure to ratify the treaty – in part on the basis of a normative belief that granting exemptions through the principle of common but differential responsibility to ‘major developing countries such as China and India [was] intrinsically unfair’ (Hurrell 2007: 232). The Kyoto episode, a relatively unusual case of Northern disunity, demonstrates that it is possible for the global South to achieve success by arguing from a position of weakness, but that powerful states in the North retain the ‘go it alone power’ to walk away from any consensus with which they fundamentally disagree with.

By the end of the 1990s much of the global South was moving towards the view that, whilst integration into the world economy was unavoidable, they could not place their trust in the Northern guardianship of the architecture of global capitalism. Instead they would need to fight for their own interests through self-help and coalition-building. Nonetheless, by the end of the 1990s the dominant frameworks of analysis brought to bear within international studies de-emphasised the inter-state dimension. This was partially in response to the fact that the South
had indeed been unable to exercise any significant collective leverage during the decade. The notion of the developmental state was weakened after the Asian Financial Crisis, which for radical critics revealed that ‘the ideal of autonomous state-sponsored national capitalist development had always been hollow’ (Desai 2004: 175). Berger likewise expresses the widely-held position that ‘development’ has been eclipsed by an era of globalisation in which the nation-state system is itself in crisis (Berger 2007b).

From this perspective, by the end of the century the politics of unequal development had lost its moorings to a division within international relations because the core-periphery hierarchy was ‘no longer a geographical but a social division of the world economy’ (Hoogvelt 2001: xiv). With the developmental state dethroned, IFIs and donors take over the process of promoting development and ‘global public goods’ (Moore 2004). Thus the politics of North-South is replaced by the competition between ‘the UN paradigm’ and the ‘Bretton Woods paradigm’ — rival perspectives on poverty and inequality associated with different supranational institutions tasked with managing the problematic of underdevelopment (Thérien 1999). Thus supranational bodies were identified as the key targets for new egalitarian struggles to be prosecuted, not by late developing states, but by a global, activist-led ‘movement of movements’.

The protests surrounding WTO ministerial at Seattle in 1999 seemed to signal a shift in politics of unequal development from state-based to transnational forms of contention. But in several respects these events were misleading: it proved much more difficult than some had expected for the ‘movement of movements’ to act as a ‘post-modern prince’ in the struggle against inequality (Worth and Buckley 2009). In addition, the events outside the negotiations overshadowed the

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21 Save for in the issue-area of environmental governance, in which the imperative to include potential industrialisers led to the recognition of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ in the Kyoto Protocol of 1997

22 More pessimistic assessments denied the possibility of even this form of agency, assigning the global South to an indefinite purgatory in which the chaotic patterns of primitive accumulation would likely fail to initiate development, instead leading towards the political economy of permanent social conflict and new attempts on the part of the North to control ‘surplus life’ in the periphery (Moore 2004: 103; Duffield 2009).

23 The weakness of the alter-globalist coalition in part stemmed from the diverging interests of many of its constituent members. The integration of markets places workers in direct competition with each other, and whilst the notion of the ‘race to the bottom’ based on regulatory and wage arbitrage by MNCs is often overstated, genuine free trade is likely to undercut the rents that workers in the North benefit from. It seems very difficult to avoid the fact that many of those from the North protesting against trade liberalisation were straightforward protectionists whose goals were the preservation of their own relative privileges in a very unequal world economy. As Brown suggests, the contradictions of the movement were often glaring: ‘with no sense of irony, a French farmer, José Bové, becomes an iconic figure in the movement on the principle, apparently, that defending the Common Agricultural Policy and subsidised French farms is a way of showing that ‘the world is not for sale’, meanwhile Northern trade unions get in on the act, and at the famous Battle of Seattle in 1999 US steelworkers demonstrated their commitment to global fair trade by throwing imported Brazilian steel into Seattle harbour’. See Brown 2007a, 11.
real reason for the collapse of the ministerial: the frustrations on the part of developing-nation trade representatives at what was perceived as high-handedness on the part of the Quad. Yet because radical scholars adopted a globalist framework, whilst conventional scholars de-emphasized the role of inequality, the North-South dimension of international politics simply ‘dropped out’ of the frame of analysis.\(^{24}\)

But as this section has attempted to demonstrate, mistrust of a Northern-dominated order remained amongst the South, still loosely organised around the NAM and G77, despite efforts to integrate into the world economy and the trend towards democratisation. But, in this period a Northern neo-liberal monologue took the place of argument, despite the efforts of states of the global South to renegotiate certain aspects of the international economic order. In any case, almost as soon as it emerged, the globalist frame would be disrupted by the re-assertion of state power within the international system. In the first decade of the 21st questions of international hierarchy would rise to prominence once again.

**Empire's Spring and Autumn**

The reassertion of US primacy after the terrorist atrocity of 9/11 demolished the arguments of those who had claimed that inter-state geopolitics was obsolete in a global era.\(^{25}\) Nonetheless it did not mark a fundamental break within the post-Cold War period. Having managed its relative decline through the creation of fora such as the G7, which allowed it to share management of the international economic order with the rest of the North (Bailin 2005), the US not only found itself the sole superpower but found its relative position improving through its central role in the unexpected tech-boom of the mid-1990s. Taking advantage of the Revolution in Military Affairs, the US remained secure in its command of the global commons (Posen 2003).\(^{26}\) Beyond its material capabilities, the US drew its power from unique structural position within the global

\(^{24}\) Although see Hurrell and Woods 1999.

\(^{25}\) See Reid (2005) for an (ultimately unconvincing) attempt to resuscitate the Negri-Hardt thesis in the wake of the Global War on Terror.

\(^{26}\) Thompson argues that these capabilities are one of the key pre-requisites for system-leadership, largely due to their importance for acting as the keystone of a balance of power system and their role in keeping global markets open (Thompson 2006: 4). The US’s superiority extended beyond such capabilities to virtually every metric associated with great power status. As Crawford notes, the Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Review of 1997 had already called for a “preeminent” military force capable of “full-spectrum dominance,” exploiting all the country’s technological advantages” (2004: 689). The US has been committed to the maintenance of unipolarity throughout the post-Cold War period. Some scholars even suggested that the US had, perhaps unwittingly, achieved outright nuclear superiority by the middle of the first decade of the 21st (Lieber and Press 2006)
political economy, enabling it to transfer the costs of its actions onto others and reshaping the international environment they operated in (Strange 1987; Wade 2003).

These features of US leadership are best understood as aspects of American hegemony within an integrated North. Social actors outside of the trilateral bloc were much more weakly incorporated into this order and the relationship of the US to states and societies in the global South exhibited imperial features. Its relationship with much of the global South retained much in common with past thalassocracies, or sea-empires, in that – like C19th Britain in Latin America (Cardoso and Faletto 1979) – it used its power to maintain openness to trade and enforce debt repayments (Colás 2008). The existence of the IFIs allowed it and other Northern states to multilateralise the attempt to influence the macroeconomic policies of debtor states. Whilst it did not possess significant overseas territories, the US nonetheless maintained an extraordinary ‘empire of bases’ – an archipelago of military installations straddling 132 nations (Johnson 2004). In some regions of the global South, the US had continued to support authoritarian regimes who complied with its foreign policy goals. Such autocracies, principally located in the Middle East, used this ‘geopolitical rent’ to stave-off demands for democratisation and inclusive development.

Revisionist Cold War historians such as Kolko claimed that support for repressive regimes was counter-productive, and could only radicalise populations against the US (Kolko 1988). This perspective was vindicated by the attacks committed by Egyptian and Saudi Arabian terrorists on September 11th 2001. The rise of violent Islamist extremism is in part the product of the US and the North’s preference for dealing with autocrats rather than democratic representatives of...
Southern peoples. As Ayoob and Bakawi suggest, Islamist terrorism is closely related to the structural division between North and South within the international system (Ayoob 2007; Barkawi 2006). Indeed, radical Salafism is one of a long line of movements in the global South which has responded to imperial pressure with a call to arms and a return to an uncorrupted cultural golden-age.

The reactionary, murderous and anti-modern ideology of Al-Qaeda had, of course, very little purchase within the Muslim world — much less the wider South. The attacks therefore had the potential to promote international cooperation and strengthen the society of states. Indeed, as some have argued, the declaration of the Global War on Terror (GWoT) can be understood as an attempt to defend the society of states from the threat posed by a certain type of non-state actor (Press-Barnathan 2004). By de-legitimising a whole class of social actor, the GWoT had the potential to re-empower the sovereign state and re-affirm the state-system as the best means of maintaining global order. As Buzan notes (2006: 1005), the concern with terrorist networks intersects with a wider set of preoccupations for states in the global South: the transnational shadow-networks which link the arms trade, money laundering, drugs, and terrorism (Duffield 2001). These networks, the dark-side of global economic integration, undermine weak states and empower violent challenges against national sovereignty. Thus the prosecution of the GWoT was potentially compatible with the long struggle on the part of the states of the global South to establish their positive sovereignty.

Some observers initially expected that 9/11 would prompt a renewed US commitment to multilateralism (Smith 2002). Indeed the North already seemed to be initiating steps to restore the frayed legitimacy of certain aspects of its collective management of international order, for example through the Enhanced HIPC initiative (see Chapter 5), adoption by the World Bank of a ‘comprehensive development framework’ (Berger 2007a: 433), and the christening of the new

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32 See also Thompson and Rasler (2009), who provide evidence that terrorism has occurred in multiple waves. In each case, waves of terror seem to have emerged from areas of the world on the periphery facing protracted problems of state-building and socio-economic development, although no conclusive evidence clearly connects such waves with any well understood global set of processes.

33 This response to the experience of ‘falling behind’ and being colonised is one of the several historical strategies discussed in Chapter 1. Note that on this analysis it does make sense to discuss the family resemblances between Salafism and fascism, as they both represent radical responses to the problem of late-development. Indeed, they are alike in that they both advocate forms of cultural fundamentalism and glorify violence. In Polanyian terms, they are both examples of reactionary movements for social self-protection. However, whereas Polanyian scholars stress the disruptive role of the unfettered market, this interpretation places equal weight on geopolitical pressure and imperial intrusion.

34 Ayoob’s suggestion that ‘over the next couple of decades it [political Islam] may become the voice of the vulnerable and the weak in the international system regardless of religious affiliation’ (2007: 642) seems rather far-fetched, even if one distinguishes more moderate forms of Islamism from Salafi and Takfiri currents.
phase of trade negotiations as the Doha Development Round in November 2001. Yet the US very quickly adopted a unilateral course in its foreign policy, taking 9/11 as ‘an opportunity to remake the world’ (Buzan 2006: 1113), implying a potentially drastic reshaping of its relationships with both the North and South. Codified in the National Security Strategy of 2002, this neo-conservative course openly committed the US to adopt an imperial role, dividing the world into allies, enemies and ‘failed states’. Within the North this entailed an abandonment of many features of self-binding and mutual restraint which had previously characterised US hegemony (Deudney and Ikenberry 1999; Ikenberry 2004). Allies would be treated as vassals; inferiors would be compelled to submit; rivals would not be permitted (NSS 2002). Spurning the requirement to seek broad multilateral support for its policies, the US sought to lead ad hoc coalitions of the willing on its own terms. Prosecuting the GWoT, the US increased its expanded its network of bases throughout the arc of instability running from the Horn of Africa through West and Central Asia. Within this macro-region, the US attempted to bring order to ungoverned ‘gaps’ such as Afghanistan (Barnett 2004) in an attempt to bring order to its strategic peripheries. The GWoT was therefore an attempt to adopt an imperial posture to resolve the security problems generated by the failings of the global project of state-based development.

The putative link between terror, WMD proliferation and rogue regimes provided the public justification for the US’s invasion of Iraq in 2003. The invasion of Iraq presented a challenge to the fundamental institutions governing international society. These institutions are, as argued in Chapter 3, essentially limitations on the use of force within a plural international society. The actions of the US constituted a rejection of these limitations, constituting an attempt to unilaterally arrogate the right to withdraw the sovereignty of another state, in what was openly presented as the first stage in an attempt to fundamentally reshape the international order.

By expressing disdain for the institutions of international society, including the institutionalised patterns of consultation amongst the great powers, the actions of the US indicated that it would not be bound by any external criteria of legitimacy, only by its own values. By refusing to acknowledge other states as peers in this fashion and by refusing to accept limits on its actions, the US made its own power seem threatening. As scholars such as Lake (2010: 473) have argued, there is an intrinsic relationship between legitimacy and hierarchy, as authority is constituted by

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35 Even before September the 11th, radical scholars had claimed that the neo-liberal project was in trouble and that due to its fragmenting legitimacy hegemony was giving way to more imperial forms of ‘supremacy’. See Gill 2000.

36 For geopolitical accounts of the ‘new great game’ in Central Asia see Hiro (2010) and Khanna (2008).
the recognition of the superordinate actor’s right to rule. A social concept of power, discussed in Chapter 3, suggests that the ability to act on behalf of collective interests depends on the supply of legitimacy, the willingness of individual actors to commit their support to an agent who acts as their behalf, empowering them with authority.

The ability of the US to adopt an imperial agenda was, therefore, never solely predicated on its primacy alone, but also on the willingness of other major actors to accept its preeminent role within the international order. Unbalanced power is always likely to be perceived as threatening in a social system were the restraints on action are so primitive. But by confirming that it could not be trusted with the power it wielded within the international system, the US reduced the supply of credit in terms of legitimacy which other actors were willing to supply. The US had provided no solution to a set of shared problems within the international system arising from the process of unequal development, and refused to acknowledge the interests and values of others in advancing its vision of international order. Specific opposition to the policies of the GWoT fed into a general dissatisfaction with unbalanced US power (Buzan 2006: 1111). These factors made the Bush administration’s imperial agenda increasingly difficult to maintain, as it could not spread the costs of its policies or count on the support of major actors in other issue-areas.

As Mann argued early on, the power resources possessed by the US were deeply uneven, its attempt at empire-building were incoherent from the outset (Mann 2003). The vision of a international order promoted by the US, democratic solidarism underwritten by a quasi-imperial America, provoked deep anxiety due to the threat it posed to the existing set of broadly agreed international rules. The US had only been able to launch its gambit in West Asia because its ‘exceptional’ role in the international system insulated it from the costs of pushing against the restraints of international society. This ability was predicated on its structural power as issuer of the global reserve currency, temporarily allowing the US to finance overseas wars without increasing taxation. Yet the Credit Crisis of 2008 undercut the ability of the US to remain

37 Lake makes the insightful point that the US’s problems in Middle East stemmed in the first instance from the perceived illegitimacy of the role it played in the region after the first Gulf War in 1991 (Lake 2010: 471).
38 As Garton Ash noted in 2002, ‘the main problem with American power is the power itself. It would be dangerous even for an archangel to wield so much power’.
39 In addition, according to Boyle the unpopularity of US policies with domestic audiences meant that ‘the willingness of linchpin states to accede to US demands for cooperation in counterterrorism was tempered by high domestic costs’ (Boyle 2008: 200).
40 Mann’s central argument is that Bush administration’s unilateral foreign policy amounted to little more than a ‘new militarism’, sharing all the ‘customary strengths and weaknesses of militarism’, possessing ‘power but not authority’ (Mann 2003: 252).
41 This unique position effectively meant that Americans could ‘have more guns and butter than anyone else’ (Wade 2003: 78).
exceptional\textsuperscript{42}. There were always limits on the American public’s willingness to bear the burdens associated with acting as global colossus (Ferguson 2004). The mounting costs of imperial ambition\textsuperscript{43} eroded the domestic bases of support for Bush administration’s policies. The US remains indispensible but could not sustain a policy of unilateralism any longer and has thus had little option but to repair its relationships with other major powers and recommit itself to multilateralism.

Although some had warned that the growing rift between Europe and America during the Bush era presaged a break-up of the Greater West (Buzan 2006: 1110; M Cox 2005a), the trilateral Northern bloc remained robust. Indeed, the undisguised elation expressed by European publics and elites after the election of Obama in 2008 indicated that an active desire for US leadership remained. Nonetheless the rise of emerging economies and the crisis of financial capitalism in its own heartland have generated new challenges to the Northern monopoly on the collective management of the international economic order.

**A Southern Renaissance**

The new course in US foreign policy was unsustainable for three reasons. First, the abandonment of hegemonic restraint on the part of the US generated dismay within the North and threatened the unity of the trilateral bloc. Second, support from major states in the South was muted or absent. Third, the neo-conservative administration dramatically demonstrated that it had no solution to the problems of state-building and socio-economic development which are the primary concern of much of the global South and which increasingly impinge on the security of states in the North. The unilateral and even imperial actions of the US thus alienated much of the rest of international society. Although even neo-realists agreed that a balancing coalition against the US was slow to emerge (Layne 2006), scholars pointed to very obvious signs of dissatisfaction with US hegemony on the part of other major states. Analysts argued that their strategies for coping with a revisionist unilateral power could be understood as a form of ‘soft-balancing’.

Soft-balancing has been defined as ‘institutional and diplomatic strategies’ (Paul 2005: 58-9) utilizing ‘nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine’ a unipolar power (Pape 2005: 10).

\textsuperscript{42} An example of the periods of financial efflorescence and subsequent collapse which Arrighi (1995) argued marks the autumn of a cycle of leadership in the global economy.

\textsuperscript{43} The cost of the Iraq war has been estimated at $3 trillion in economic terms alone (Stiglitz and Bilmes 2008).
According to Pape, soft balancing involves signals of resolve to balance in future (Pape 2005: 37) and for Paul involves the ‘implicit threat’ to form military alliances (Paul 2005: 47). Thus soft-balancing involves sending signals through a reasonably well-developed diplomatic system and the forms of ‘recessed balancing’ (Deudney 2007: 49) that exist within international institutions. Similarly, Schweller argues that a period of de-legitimisation occurs before balancing proper, whereby alienated major powers engage in active attempts to resist the hegemon and offer a ‘criticism of the existing order and a blueprint for a new order’ (Schweller 2010: 6). Thus whereas much of the debate over soft-balancing focuses primarily on the distribution of capabilities within the international system and the perceptions of particular states, Schweller’s approach provides some insights into how soft-balancing is related to public accounts of international legitimacy, shared norms of international society, and rival visions of international order. A position of hegemony is not solely a product of material capabilities; it requires some level of voluntary compliance and thus can diminish when the ‘credit’ of legitimacy is withdrawn. Because the international system is a relatively primitive society, this can take the form of fairly crude threat-signalling. But the increasing institutional density and patterns of complex interdependence offer more subtle ways of withdrawing consent to be led, ranging from passive-non-compliance to active obstructionism.

A further set of questions arise when we consider deeper, structural forms of inequality within the international system. In an important critique of the notion of soft-balancing, Brooks and Wohlforth argue that what we actually observe is merely policy bargaining between the US and other major-powers (Brooks and Wohlforth 2005: 76) – not driven by any systemic logic but rather from idiosyncratic conflicts of economic interest (Brooks and Wohlforth 2005: 79). Yet states in the global South must pursue their economic interests in a world economy which remains unequally structured in certain important respects. The conflicts of interest between major states in the global South with the US are not necessarily random or unstructured but relate to a systemic logic.

In addition, the neo-realist assumptions of the debate over unipolarity produce a bias towards focusing on second-tier states. However, the opposition to US unipolarity was much more

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44 The soft-balancing question is part of a wider debate over responses to unipolarity which in some respects returns to Schroeder’s (1994) discussion of the various generic strategies available to states under conditions of anarchy. Strategies put forward by scholars in addition to soft-balancing include hedging, where states seek to reduce their vulnerabilities in case of future rivalry (Foot 2006: 88), leash-slipping, where present allies attempt to regain their autonomy (Layne 2006: 29-30), and economic pre-balancing or strengthening, where states attempt to close the economic and technological gap between themselves and the unipolar power (Layne 2006: 8-9; Pape 2005: 36-7).

45 In the sociological sense that rules are, for the most part, enforced by actors amongst themselves rather than a distinct dedicated agent. See the discussion of the English School approach in Chapter 3.
widely shared throughout the global South, reflecting longstanding notions of non-alignment, support of traditional notions of sovereignty and opposition to superpower interventionism. Furthermore, many of the shared grievances of the South are with the North as a bloc rather than just the US. As Singaporean diplomat Kishore Mahbubani suggests, the ‘implicit compact’ within the North is frequently underestimated, yet all too apparent to those in the global South. Thus we might look for forms of resistance, delegitimisation, institutional entanglement and coalition-building directed at the North as a coherent bloc rather than just the US. The following sections attempt to make sense of how these different concerns map onto one another, first examining the new assertiveness of emerging powers. Noting how attempts have been made to analyse these states as regional leaders, their ability to take on leadership roles within the South is assessed. This leads to a discussion of renewed attempts at coalition building within the South, focusing on contestation within the WTO, which is then linked to wider forms of diplomatic diversification amongst the major powers within the South. Finally because of their momentum, the emerging powers as well as other successful industrializes have had an indirect systemic impact on the international system, altering North-South relations and in turn enabling new forms of South-South cooperation.

*Emerging Economies: Emerging Powers*

How then does the debate over responses to US unipolarity map onto questions of North-South relations? The question is pertinent because the rapid economic growth experienced by several populous second-tier powers has generated significant debate over how the rise of these emerging powers will shape the international order (Hurrell 2006). One way of conceptualising these changes has been through notion of the BRICs, the large emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China with a large potential capacity for future growth (O’Neil 2001: 5) whose share of world GDP could, by the early 2040s, exceeds that of the G6 (Wilson and Purushothaman 2003: 2). However, very little links the BRICs together in terms of their economic profile (Armijo 2005: 15). Their growth rates, factor endowments, levels of human development and position in the global division of labour are highly heterogeneous. The notion of the BRICs, whilst misleading in some respects seems to have had such influence because it emphasises the mass and momentum of certain emerging economies in an international context where ‘market power’ plays an important role in global rule-making (Armijo 2005: 15).

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46 This resulted in calls to re-orientate the NAM towards anti-US hegemonism during the period of Malaysian leadership after 2003 (IPS 24/02/2003).
Loosely speaking, all of the BRICs find themselves in a position of being outside the trilateral North. As discussed in Chapter 1, the North-South divide historically emerged as the result of intersecting but distinct forms of stratification. Great powers have been accorded special prerogatives and status on the basis of their mass, or material capabilities, but the state-system has remained embedded in a worldwide division of labour characterised by unequal development. The emerging powers occupy potentially ambiguous positions, increasingly possessing significant mass but remaining far from the leading edge of socio-economic development and outside the deeply integrated North. Here we find heterogeneity within the BRICs grouping. Russia, in particular, is an outlier as an already-industrialised re-emergent power. Furthermore, by focusing solely on ‘bigness’ the concept of the BRICs draws attention away from the wider circle of emerging economies, sometimes conceptualised as the BRICSAM states and said to include South Africa, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Mexico and South Korea (Cooper and Antkiewicz 2007: 675). Although even more diverse, drawing the boundary more widely in this fashion points to the sheer number of states outside of the North which play an increasingly significant role in the global political economy.

The significance of the larger emerging powers for North-South relations might, however, lie in the possibility that they may increase the possibilities for South-South coalition formation because of their capacity to act as ‘anchor states’ (Pape 2005: 12). Because states with greater material capabilities can better resist direct bilateral pressure, they might potentially act as a nucleus around which a counter-hegemonic coalition might form\textsuperscript{47}. Thus the rise of the emerging powers might generate new North-South confrontations and open up new opportunities for argument as coalitions check the autonomy of US and Northern decision-making in international fora. Even the democratic late-developing powers have major outstanding grievances with the North, which potentially enables them to take on a leadership role within the global South.

However, as scholars contributing to the debate over regional-powerhood have shown, leadership depends on followership (Prys 2010; Nabers 2010; Schirm 2010: 199). As a social theory of power would suggest, leadership is not automatic but depends on support. This is only

\textsuperscript{47} The notion of ‘anchor states’ draws on the same stylized findings from game theory that supported arguments in favour of hegemonic stability theory. Within a stereotyped collective action problem, certain actors may experience lower costs or higher benefits from cooperation than others and thus may provide the initial impetus needed for provision of a public good. In addition, the notion that pressure for change within international society emerges from relatively strong revisionists seems to have historical support: ‘Challenges to the legitimacy of international order have rarely resulted from the protests of the weak; they have come more often from those states or peoples with the capacity and political organization to demand a revision of the established order and of its dominant norms in ways that reflect their own interests, concerns and values.’ See Hurrell 2006: 2.
likely to be forthcoming if other actors identify with a state’s goals, see it as providing public goods and advancing an attractive vision of international order. If, as the analysis in this chapter has suggested, the preferences and values of states of the global South are broadly influenced by their structurally subordinate position then there may be considerable scope for such leadership at the global level. Indeed the prospects at the global level may be greater than at the regional level, where local powers might be wary of bids for regional hegemony. Brazil under Lula, for example, had sought to promote itself as a responsible regional power as part of its campaign for a UN Security Council seat as part of the G4 alongside Japan, Germany and India (de Lima and Hirst 2006: 21). Yet each of the G4 for different reasons lacked firm support in its claim to represent its region, and faced opposition not only from established powers, but from more minor powers who supported the ‘Uniting for Consensus’ proposals which would weaken the oligarchic features of the UN (Cooper and Fues 2008: 299).

China has been willing use its position on the UNSC to shield the sovereignty of extra-regional states from Northern pressure (Gu, Humphrey and Messener 2008: 286). However it has not sought a more general position of leadership within the South. Although Hu Jintao has also lent his support to calls for the reform of the international economic system in order to enable the South benefit from global economic integration (Foot 2006: 91), China’s actual policies have remained modest and issue-specific, focusing on its own immediate goals (Gu, Humphrey and Messener 2008: 280). Rather than acting as an ‘anchor’ for opposition to the US, China has attempted to ‘hedge’ by cooperating with the US on certain issues, building up bilateral ties with other nations and advancing its position as an important member of international society (Foot 2006: 88-9). A central factor limiting China has been that it may in future become powerful enough to directly challenge the US, which means that it must be extremely careful to avoid its ire in the present. The notion of a ‘Beijing consensus’ on development is also rather dubious, as China’s own model – which it shows little interest in exporting – derives from its unique

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48 Regions can therefore be as much of a constraint as a springboard for would be emerging powers. See Hurrell (2006: 8).
49 Notable opponents included China (opposed to the Japanese bid), Argentina (opposed to Brazil), and Pakistan (opposed to India).
50 This outcome seems to be an instance of a more general tendency. In stratified social systems there is likely to be a tension between efforts by particular actors to improve their relative position, leaving overall patterns of stratification largely unchanged, and collective efforts at challenging patterns of stratification.
51 Florini notes that amongst Chinese scholars and policymakers there exists ‘a general consensus that China is not ready to play a substantially greater role in global governance, either in developing theory and new thinking, or in the policy arena’. See Florini (2011: 29).
52 China has remained scrupulous about presenting its economic rise as non-threatening and theorists remain uncertain as to the future trajectory of China-US relations. See Johnston (2003) for a useful overview of mainstream IR perspectives on the implications of China’s rise. Legro gets to the heart of the matter when he notes that ‘The debate over China is not about what China wants today, but what it might want tomorrow’. See Legro (2007: 518).
historical trajectory and the emulation of other East Asian industrialisers. Similarly, other emerging powers including India, Brazil and South Africa have, to the disappointment of some egalitarian critics, sought integration with the prevailing order instead of advocating a radical break. Its proponents therefore claim that this demonstrates virtues of the US-centred liberal international order (Ikenberry 2008, 2010). Hard revisionism amongst major powers of the global South seems as rare as hard balancing.

Yet regarding the emerging economies as having capitulated to neo-liberalism overlooks how they have asserted their own claims within the present order. Specifically, although all the major emerging economies have adopted orthodox macroeconomic policies and promoted export-oriented growth, they have sought to maintain policy space against external pressures from Northern-dominated institutions such as the IMF. This model of gradualist economic integration led by a pragmatic developmental state acting to strategically promote movement up the global value chain has been referred to as the ‘Southern consensus’ (Payne 2005: 95-97). Late developing nations find their options limited in a neo-liberal era, but still retain some margin of autonomy and have fought to maintain it. That the emerging economies have benefited from high levels of economic growth does not preclude the possibility that they may seek to challenge features of what they perceive as an unequal international order. Despite Malaysia and Singapore’s successful export-oriented industrialisation under a US-security umbrella, both have remained outspoken in their criticisms of aspects of the international order and continued to actively participate in coalitions such as the G77 and NAM.

Focusing on the grievances of the major democratic emerging economies, however, draws illustrates how inequality still shapes relationships across the North-South divide – despite the claims of proponents of the Atlantic order about its non-exclusionary nature. India’s mass enabled it to sustain an intransigent Third Worldist position long after other states in the global South had abandoned such an oppositional stance. Yet India’s position has been ambiguous.

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53 Perhaps the notion of a ‘Singapore-Seoul consensus’ would be more appropriate.
54 For a very useful account of how successful industrialisers have systematically ignored or contravened the Washington Consensus see Rodrik (2007).
55 See Cardoso 2009 and Evans 2009 for a very useful discussion of the extent that states of the global South can exercise agency in the present global order, focusing on the existence of both structural constraints and alternative choices.
56 Indeed, their success seemed to increase their confidence to advance their Islamic-Third Worldist and pan-Asianist perspectives, respectively. Their combative stances have been held despite their conservative, pro-capitalist ideologies of government and their favourable security relations with the United States. Although they are not liberal democracies, the hegemonic ruling parties in both Singapore and Malaysia have deep roots within their societies. They thus remain sensitive to the concerns of much of their own population and are obligated to secure socio-economic development, driving them into conflict with certain aspects of the international economic order.
Since independence it has maintained and oppositional stance within international society, criticising the hierarchical aspects of the international order, seeking to maintain its autonomy and flouting the ‘nuclear apartheid’ of the non-proliferation regime. During India’s intervention in East Pakistan in 1971 the US, as patron of Pakistan’s military dictatorship, dispatched the USS Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal (Kapur and Ganguly 2007: 646), one of the most significant militarised interstate disputes between two democracies. However a rising India has moved towards rapprochement and informal alliance with the US, yet has retained its identity as an outsider state within an unequal international order. Unlike China, which has retained its distance from both the North and South in order to preserve its autonomy, India has sought to maintain its position within the traditional coalitions of the global South even whilst tilting towards the US. It has sustained its claims to act as a champion of the poor and marginalised in the international order, and maintained calls for redistributive measures (Cooper and Fues 2008: 295). Guiding India’s foreign policy is a defensive notion of its own interests, which include the interests as a less developed economy, and a desire to gain the recognition as a great power it believes it deserves.

Despite identifying as a Western nation in terms of culture and political values (Onis 2008: 5), Brazil’s foreign policy has long stressed a commonality with the global South and a distance from the North. This distance was reinforced by the cool reception of Brazilian diplomats in the US after democratisation (Hurrell 2009: 18). Like India, Brazil has a history of participation in the G77 and in its diplomacy has attempted to advocate the interests of weaker actors whilst positioning itself to become a major power (de Lima and Hirst 2006: 25). However its attempts to exert leadership within the South have been strongly connected to both domestic and regional concerns, as in the attempts to link questions of domestic poverty and international development (de Lima and Hirst 2006: 21). Its activism on North-South issues has been closely related to the attempt by Brazil to exert influence within its regional environment. Guided by neo-structuralist ideas, Brazil has sought to promote regional integration in order to better manage the process of

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57 According to Mohan, the warming began in 1999 after the Clinton administration provided diplomatic support for India during the Kargil war initiated by the Pakistani military. The strengthening relationship was codified in the 2005 nuclear pact between the two nations. See Mohan (2006).
58 Analysts have claimed that the culture of Indian foreign policy-making remains shaped by a sense of grievance that India has not been accorded the status it is due within the international order. Narlikar notes that a ‘very strong colonial mindset’ persists in which ‘Nehruvian ideas of self-sufficiency and anti-imperialism’ still guide perceptions of India’s foreign relations. See Narlikar (2006a: 72).
59 Although not the NAM. In the Cold War, Brazil occupied the somewhat unusual position of identifying geopolitically with the US and the West, yet maintaining the importance of ‘the themes of national development and division of countries into poor and rich’. See Vigevani and Cepaluni (2007: 1315).
60 This issue-linkage has been seen by some as a diversionary tactic. According to Burges, ‘significant political direction and rhetoric in foreign policy were handed off to the left so that Lula could quiet his more militant political base while leaving himself space to pursue the economic policies that would win the centrist votes necessary at the next elections.’ See Burges (2010: 56).
global integration and negotiate with Northern actors on a more equal footing (Burges 2008: 76). Whilst attempting to maintain cordial relations with the US, Brazil has therefore emphasised its social democratic credentials and its role as advocate of the interests of the global South.

Similarly, South Africa found that its peaceful transition to democracy did not ensure accommodation on the part of the North. Hopes of a positive relationship with the EU were frustrated by what South Africa saw as the former’s unwillingness to take into account the latter’s needs as a still-underdeveloped nation. In combination with the lingering resentment towards the nations which had traded with and provided diplomatic support to the apartheid regime, the racialised structuralist worldview of the ANC leadership was confirmed (Arnold 2005: 917). Nonetheless, South Africa has attempted to act as an intermediary between the G7 nations and the rest of Africa through the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD).

It is important to note that, at least in part, the frictions between the three nations and the North arise from the democratic character of the former: democracies find it more difficult to accommodate themselves to international hierarchies than dictatorships. Democracies must remain at least minimally sensitive to the needs of their citizens. States which aim to promote human development and mitigate vulnerabilities created through global economic integration, however, run up against impediments in the form of globalized market rules authored by Northern interests, as witnessed in the political conflict over the right of Brazil, India and South Africa to produce and import generic AIDS medication (Evans 2009: 328-31). Nonetheless rise and greater assertiveness of the emerging democracies has not provoked the same anxiety as that of China. In part this is due to their lesser mass and momentum, but it also stems from the fact that as democracies they are not necessarily viewed as intrinsically threatening by the liberal North. With a reduced possibility for escalation, as democracies they may be better positioned to make claims for change from within the existing liberal order. Although each of the three late-developing democracies have appealed to their credentials as members of the global South for instrumental reasons (Hurrell 2008: 57), the fact that they are able to use such appeals to raise their diplomatic profiles demonstrates that a sense of common values and interests still exists

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61 This attempt to play a leadership role has had to face a challenge by Venezuela’s rival oil-funded, statist attempts at region-building (Burges 2010).

62 See Chapter 6 for further details on the fractious relationship between South Africa and the European Union in the post-apartheid era.

63 One unfortunate consequence of this ingrained worldview within the ANC leadership was the appalling AIDS-denialism of the Mbeki presidency.
within the wider global South. The rise of the populous emerging economies therefore opens up new possibilities for South-South coalition building to challenge the North.

South-South Coalition-Building at the WTO

As examined previously, tensions between North and South were already apparent within the World Trade Organisation by the end of the 1990s. Trust between the Quad and other participants in negotiations never truly recovered from the manner of creation of the institution. The ‘single-undertaking’ mechanism introduced during the Uruguay round had generated over-commitment on the part of less developed participants, generating resistance to any extension of the organisation’s agenda (Low 2009: 333). Mistrust amongst the South was compounded by the aggressive tactics of Quad negotiators and efforts by the latter to shift the agenda to the Singapore issues64 before liberalisation of trade in manufactures and agriculture was completed.

In the face of the reality of Northern retention of agenda-setting power within the organisation, the enthusiasm of Southern trade negotiators for issue-based coalition building waned. Although opposition was muted in November 2001 due to unwillingness to challenge the US after September the 11th (Wilkinson 2004: 153), the launch of the ‘Doha Development Agenda’ did not ameliorate North-South tensions. However, although more hard-line groupings such as the Like Minded Group (LMG) continued to play a role, Southern negotiators did not resort to straightforward bloc-based organisation but instead began to organise on the basis of mixed coalitions that combined Southern membership with an issue-based focus (Narlikar and Tussie 2004: 959). This can be plausibly interpreted as demonstrating the persistence of structural divisions within the international economic order even under conditions of complex interdependence. It can also be interpreted as an example of adaptation by states of the global South to new circumstances which had revealed the limits of both the simplistic bloc-based revisionist demands of the NIEO era and passive conformism to the global trade regime.

Although in broad agreement about the non-optional nature of global economic integration, the representatives of the global South have been alert to the encoding of new forms of inequality within trade negotiations. Aware of the dangers of non-participation in the process of collective rule making, the global South has sought to create new coalitions to actively engage in negotiations on a more equal footing (Hurrell and Narlikar 2006: 419)

64 The Singapore issues are the controversial ‘behind the border’ issues of government procurement, competition policy, trade facilitation and investment.
At Cancun in 2003 North-South divisions erupted after a defensive coalition, the G20(Agriculture), formed as a response to fears that the EU and US would attempt a stratagem similar to the Blair House Accord of the Uruguay round (Narlikar and Tussie 2004: 949-950). Although the coalition was composed of states with both offensive and defensive agricultural interests, the group united over their opposition to EU and US agricultural subsidies (G20 2005: 3; Narlikar and Tussie 2004: 961). Although the result was deadlock and the collapse of negotiations, stalemate was perceived as a partial victory for negotiators of the South (Narlikar and Tussie 2004: 949). The outcome was a success in terms of negotiating strategy, as the developing-nation coalition had retained its integrity rather than fragmenting after the Quad brought sticks and carrots to bear against individual members (Hurrell and Narlikar 2006: 426).

Buoyed by the turn of events at Cancun, mixed Southern coalitions and 'alliances of sympathy' (Narlikar 2006b: 1025) proliferated rapidly resulting in an overlapping set of regional, characteristic and issue-based groupings (Yu 2007). In doing so, developing nations were able to draw on familiar diplomatic practices, the history of coalition-building and their numerical advantages. At Hong Kong in 2005 the institutionalisation of the coalitions enabled negotiations to function in a 'quasi-parliamentary' fashion, improving the representation even of nations whose market share remained negligible (Patel 2007: 21). Thus in recent negotiations the states of the global South have been able to organise politically on the basis of their distinctness from the North, without the assumption that their interests are identical. The new groupings have, furthermore, avoided the hortatory demands of the NIEO era and the intransigence which characterised the LMG, instead contributing to shaping the agenda through contributions supported by technical research (Narlikar and Tussie 2004: 962).

The viability of this mature form of pan-South economic diplomacy has depended on the leadership of India and Brazil. To some extent their ability to play this role has depended on their 'market power', but it has also relied on their empowerment as leaders by the overlapping coalitions of the global South as well as their willingness to play such a role (Narlikar 2010: 718). The two emerging economies have been willing to provide the much-needed club good of

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65 The group will be referred to the G20(Agriculture) to distinguish it from the financial G20.
66 Thus a moderate structuralist perspective highlighting the North-South divide as an enduring, historical feature of world politics across multiple issue areas provides insights additional to an institutionalist perspective which focuses on how foreign policy is shaped by the organised domestic interests of individual nations.
67 Both within and without the global trade regime. On coalition building within the GATT/WTO on the part of the global South see Narlikar (2003).
68 Most scholars of the WTO attest that agenda setting is of central importance in the WTO. Due to the single-undertaking mechanism and consensus-based decision-making norm, the wording of negotiating texts exerts a profound influence over negotiations.
technical research (Narlikar 2010: 719)\textsuperscript{69}, for central coalitions such the G20(Agriculture) and the NAMA-11\textsuperscript{70}. In the context of acrimonious North-South relations, the two emerging economies possessed the trust of less developed states. India in particular had established its credibility through its uncompromising negotiating strategy and its role in the LMG. Trust was maintained through careful adherences to practices of consultation within coalitions, reflecting sensitivities over sovereignty on the part of smaller states of the South. Nonetheless, criticisms were raised against the policies of Brazil and India by those who saw them as pursuing their own mercantilist policies and making short-sighted concessions at during negotiations in Geneva in 2004 (Bello and Kwa 2004)\textsuperscript{71}. With their rise to prominence as power-brokers within the WTO, some suggest that trade negotiations are now dominated by the ‘Quartet’, Brazil, India, the US and the EU, rather than the old Quad – leading to accusations that the two developing world trade powers have been ‘running with the hare and hunting with the hounds’ (EPW 2007: 11). But because their position within trade negotiations is predicated on their leadership role within coalitions of the South, there is likely a limit to how far they can pursue narrowly self-interested policies without losing support of states who remain leery of claims of others to represent their interests. Schirm argues that just such non-inclusiveness on the part of G20(Agriculture) leaders such as Brazil resulted in the unsatisfactory outcomes at Hong Kong in 2005\textsuperscript{72}. As Narlikar suggests, it is the sense of the sense of grievance and common perception of being ‘outsiders’ amongst developing states within the WTO which provides the focal point for coalition-building (Narlikar 2010: 723).

Although trade negotiations are governed by the logic of \textit{quid pro quo} reciprocal market access, within an organisation increasingly subject to scrutiny by external audiences (Chorev 2005: 347) states find themselves obliged to provide some kind of account for their policies\textsuperscript{73}. Thus the new

\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{69} Technical research in support of a common negotiating position is joint in production and non-rival in consumption if we assume that a commonality of interest exists amongst actors, which is precisely the assumption behind the existence of the mixed coalitions. The reality of international politics as it is practiced once again bears out the theoretical claims of the moderate structuralist position advanced throughout this thesis: non-Northern nations find themselves in a common position within the global political economy and the international order – promoting recurrent efforts at coalition-building.
    \item \textsuperscript{70} The Non-Agricultural Market Access grouping was formed as a vehicle for developing nations who were concerned that much higher tariff reductions on industrial goods would be required for developing nations than for ‘developed’ nations due to the ‘Swiss formula’ employed.
    \item \textsuperscript{71} Critics are especially suspicious of Brazil’s stance in negotiations, due to its export-oriented agricultural model and its offensive stance in agricultural trade negotiations. See Bullard 2004.
    \item \textsuperscript{72} According to Narlikar these sort of tensions surfaced once again at the July 2008 trade talks. See Narlikar (2008: 721).
    \item \textsuperscript{73} This need for public legitimacy on the part of the WTO was evidenced by the christening of the 2001 round as the ‘Doha Development Agenda’. This may have been a sop to critics of global trade negotiations, but a sop nonetheless provides evidence of awareness of the existence of a norm. Once lip-service is granted to a principle the ‘civilising force of hypocrisy’ may be set in motion. See Chapter 3 for further discussion.
\end{itemize}
Southern coalitions have attempted to speak in multiple registers. At the same time as attempting to establish themselves as technically competent participants in negotiations, the states composing the G20(Agriculture) have made moral claims as legitimate representatives of the interests of the majority of the world’s poor farmers and, indeed, 60% of the world’s population (G-20 2008; Narlikar and Tussie 2004: 953). The public arguments of the new coalitions reiterated longstanding concerns of pan-South coalitions. In calling for agreements which do not infringe policy-space, the coalitions have re-asserted the claim that peoples of the global South have the sovereign right to choose their own path of development. By reiterating the link between agriculture and development, the grouping has attempted to shift the focus of negotiations from trade liberalisation for its own sake to development facilitation (Yu 2007: 10).

The participation of emerging economies within the core processes of negotiation at the WTO thus opens the possibility of the inclusion of issues of procedural fairness, differential needs and possibly even distributive justice to the politics of trade (Narlikar 2010: 720). Critics amongst anti-WTO NGOs have, however, claimed that the goals of the new coalitions are too minimalist and too conformist to advance egalitarian goals (Bullard 2004). Yet the new coalitions were not only the product of a concern with the minutiae of trade agreements, but the product of a new confidence amongst the major emerging economies and a renewed willingness to build coalitions on a South-South basis (Hurrell and Narlikar 2006: 415). Indeed, the G20(Agriculture) seems to have been the product of the attempts at more general diplomatic coordination between Brazil, India and South Africa in June 2003 (Narlikar and Tussie 2004: 951). The diversity of new diplomatic groupings amongst emerging economies and within the South, however, deserves detailed examination in order to identify the relevant considerations for North-South relations.

**Diplomatic Diversification and the World Without the West**

The formation of new coalitions within the WTO coincided with new sense of self-confidence amongst major powers within the South, adding a new impetus to their diplomatic efforts. Whilst India’s traditional diplomatic posture has been referred to as that of a porcupine, cautious and defensive (Narlikar 2006: 59), it has greatly raised its profile, embarking on a campaign of

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74 By organising around a North-South cleavage, the coalitions may have made questions of distributive justice more difficult to avoid.

75 Bullard further questions the right of the political elites of the global South to represent globally marginalised groups, implicitly questioning whether states in the global South can ever act as moral agents for egalitarian goals. She quotes Brazilian Ambassador Hugueney’s claim that ‘the proper role of civil society is to derail the WTO. Our job is to work inside and see if the WTO can play a constructive role in development’, although she remains sceptical about whether a productive division of labour is possible. See Bullard (2004).
'omnidirectional engagement' – with the result that 'never before has India had such expansive relations with all the major powers at the same time' (Mohan 2006). In the Brazilian context Vigevani and Cepaluni refer to this new direction in terms of an attempt to seek 'autonomy through diversification' (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007: 1313). This comprises new attempts to build up bilateral relationships with non-traditional partners beyond the US and Western Europe. Thus in addition to challenging the North in formal international institutions, where interests are deeply entrenched, emerging powers have attempt to establish frameworks for diplomacy outside the influence of the core states. Pape and Drezner discuss these steps as responses to US unipolarity (Pape 2005: 40; Drezner 2007). Yet the motivation seems broader than an effort to promote a balancing coalition. Like promoting regional integration, creating new political and economic interdependencies between hitherto peripheral actors can strengthen their power of exit within global negotiations. The North-South division is in part constituted by axial or radial linkages, and thus the promotion of South-South ties can potentially erode such an asymmetric relationship. This new effort at diplomatic diversification therefore may have the effect of de-centering the North as the hub for the collective management of the global order, undermining its ability to 'organisationally outflank' the South.

This, indeed, seems to have been the conscious motivation behind the formation of the India-Brazil-South Africa Trilateral Cooperation Forum (IBSA) in June 2003. Brazilian foreign policymakers such as Pinheiro Guimarães, former Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had previously maintained that large peripheral states shared characteristics and, due to their distance, lacked conflicts of interest (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007: 1317). Diplomatic traffic between Brazil and India expanded, at first slowly in the 1990s, then rapidly during the Lula presidency (Hirst 2008: 149). For its part, South Africa faced the challenge of making up for its isolation during the apartheid years and the need to build relationships with important coalitions (Shrivastavi 2008: 128). Already by 2001 Mbeki had declared an ambition to create a ‘G-7 of the South’ (Alden and Vieira 2005: 1083). Within this context Pretoria saw was keen to promote links with India and Brazil as part of a ‘butterfly strategy’ to diversify trade and raise its diplomatic profile (Shrivastava 2008: 135). The IBSA grouping was presented as being unique because it represented an attempt to 'combine the classical themes of South–South cooperation – especially development, the fight against poverty and the defence of multilateralism – with the commitment to institutions and democratic values' (de Lima and Hirst 2006: 25). The grouping thus provides a platform which highlights the credentials of its constituent states as both developing nations and democracies, adding moral legitimacy to their claims regarding

For a detailed discussion of India’s relations with other major powers see Rajagopalan and Sahni (2008)
inequalities within the international order. As Alden and Vieira suggest, the formation of the IBSA grouping reflects the fact that reformist powers of the global South cannot simply commit themselves to multilateralism, given the inherent inequalities of existing multilateral fora (2005: 1079). They have instead attempted to promote a common diplomatic position independent of the North, whilst still promoting themselves as intermediaries between North and South.

More than a diplomatic forum, however, through IBSA the three emerging economies have attempted to promote business and civil society linkages. These efforts bear the influence of neo-structuralist notions that South-South cooperation can help reorient developing nations away from asymmetric interdependence with the North – encapsulated in the oft-stated claim that IBSA may promote a ‘new geography of trade’77. This has involved attempts to promote of direct maritime and air transportation links between the IBSA economies, the reduction of tariff barriers and agreements on energy cooperation. The promotion of organic linkages of this kind is significant because it raises the possibility of a re-routing of the patterns of trade and the channels of political and diplomatic influence, which have hitherto run through the North. As Cox has argued, a focus on multilateral institutions by would-be challengers in the international order is insufficient because they represent only the visible manifestation, the tip of the iceberg, of the social power of the North (Cox 1983: 173). Although with the rise in regime complexity influence in multilateral settings is probably more significant than previously, the influence of the North in shaping the global order still seems to rest on the deep linkages between governments, ministries and multi-national firms which knit together the advanced industrialised world. Integrating laterally with one another rather than vertically with the North thus opens the possibility for the IBSA states to act as an independent ‘pole of attraction’, establishing an independent agenda within the management of the global order and reducing their vulnerability to being ‘organisationally outflanked’ (Mann 1986: 7).

Nonetheless, despite recent growth, trade with the US and EU remains much more significant than South-South trade for each of the IBSA economies. As a result there has been criticism from within the IBSA states that South-South cooperation has been granted more emphasis than it actually merits. This means that deepening the IBSA relationship may necessitate going against the grain of immediate interest, in pursuit of longer-term goals and an ambition to reshape the international order. The viability of such a foreign policy may depend on a coherent sense of

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purpose in the international sphere based on consensus amongst policy-makers and elites, supported of democratic social movements\textsuperscript{78}.

Some analysts have advanced a perspective according to which what we see in the case of IBSA is part of a more general increase in diplomatic interaction and economic interdependence between states of the global South, resulting in the emergence of a ‘World Without the West’ (Barma et al 2009). The success in promoting export oriented growth by populous Asian states does appear to be having a system-wide impact that goes beyond the direct bilateral interactions between states (Kaplinsky and Messner 2008). India, China and other significant emerging economies such as Vietnam are acting as drivers of global change, which in turn impacts on the terrain on which North-South relations takes place.

The clearest example of this is the rise in commodity prices due to growth-fuelled demand in Asia. Because demand for primary commodities is relatively inelastic, commodity producers have experienced buoyant markets and rapidly rising trade with what was once referred to as the semi-periphery. As in the past 1970s, high commodity prices have improved the bargaining power of Southern producers vis-à-vis Northern states and international institutions. As some industrialisers have moved up the value chain, complementarities arise and the possibilities for South-South trade expand. But whilst the Asian drivers have indirectly strengthened the position of other states of the global South they have, at the same time, pushed them further into dependence on primary commodity extraction by outcompeting them in low-value manufacturing. Demand-pull inflation and bottlenecks in extractive industries have, furthermore, generated concerns amongst states about the security supply of raw materials. This has resulted in early forms of ‘lateral pressure’, as states resort to mercantilist policies and frictions emerge over spheres of influence\textsuperscript{79}. As Murphy and Augelli have argued, regulating this lateral pressure has been one of the primary purposes of international organisations. Thus, there exists strong imperatives for the North to bring the emerging economies and Asian industrialisers into the collective management of the global order and to enlist them in the attempt to mitigate the disruptive social consequences of economic development.

\textsuperscript{78} For interpretations of which stress the role of mass social movements in shaping the ideology of foreign policy in both Brazil and India see Vigevani and Cepaluni (2007: 1324) and Shrivastava (2008: 132) respectively. However Alden and Vieira 2005, 1084 suggest that domestic support for IBSA is weak, and has come under attack in Brazil from domestic economic interests.

\textsuperscript{79} As arising from China’s increasing role in Africa, where its bilateral trade agreements challenge not only European and American access to raw materials but also political influence over the continent.
This is not the only structural impact of successful economic development on the part of Asian industrialisers, however. After recovering from the financial crisis of 1997, China and the former Tiger economies began to build up large foreign exchange surpluses. Because of their mistrust of the IMF, they began to purchase US treasury bonds as a form of self-insurance in case of a future currency crisis. This attempt at self-help represented an effective vote of no-confidence in the US management of the global financial order. However, alongside the massive surpluses built up by oil-producing states, this attempt at self-insurance created a global savings glut. The massive dollar holdings enabled the US to effectively run a policy of fiscal mercantilism. Exporting debt to the rest of the world increased US structural power as it was able to finance two wars through deficit spending, maintain an ultra-loose monetary policy to sustain growth, and expand household consumption of its population all at the same time. However, the liquidity was recycled through the American economy, generating a Minsky bubble which finally burst, spreading through the global financial system due to the proliferation of securitised financial assets.

Thus the narrow legitimacy of the architecture of the global economic order, and enduring North-South mistrust, contributed to the credit crisis within the heartland of capitalism in 2008\(^8\). Unsurprisingly, in the immediate aftermath attempts were made to repair the damage to Northern stewardship of the global economy by reaching out to the emerging economies of the global South.

**Apres la Deluge**

The magnitude of the credit crisis of 2008 was such that its impact has shaken the foundations of US hegemony and the collective management of the world economy by the North. Although the unevenly globalised capitalist system seems chronically prone to financial crises, the responsibility for prior crises could be attributed to the fecklessness of policymakers in the South. However the global financial crisis manifestly had its origins within the North itself, stemming from reckless deregulation, errors in monetary policy and the abuse of the US’s structural power as issuer of the global reserve currency. It was not surprising that the authority of the North and its institutional agents in matters of economic policy-making has been severely

\(^8\) Guerrieri, for example, argues that ‘Indebtedness and leverage would not have reached such extremes in the world in the absence of international macroeconomic imbalances; on the other hand, the macroeconomic imbalances would not have been so deep and persistent without the extraordinary development of the financial market.’. See Guerrieri (2010: 684).
damaged, having already been weakened by the limitations of the neo-liberal model of development and the imposition of onerous conditionalities. Yet suggestions that the emerging economies were ‘decoupling’ proved premature; following strategies of ‘dependent development’ they remained highly vulnerable to the growth slowdown in the North (Munck 2010: 237).

Buzan and Little have made the suggestion that adherence to the norms of liberal capitalism is becoming one of the fundamental institutions of international society (1999). But it might be better to suggest that the well established institution of great power-management is being expanded to include management of the world economy. Unsurprisingly, the crisis was viewed through a North-South lens beyond the core, as revealed by Lula’s claim that many those responsible for the crisis were white and blue-eyed (FT 27/03/2009). Even before the crisis the governance of the global financial system was beset by problems of legitimacy and perceptions of unfairness on the part of major actors (Cooper 2010: 742). Confidence boosted by their own success in comparison to Northern mismanagement, exemplified by Mahbubani’s triumphant declaration of the emergence of a ‘New Asian Hemisphere’ (2008), the emerging economies were disinclined ‘to continue as rule-takers rather than rule-makers in the international system’ (Florini 2011: 25). But the major economies of the global South recognised the need for coordinated action to prevent a global depression and saw the crisis as presenting new opportunities for expanding their influence over the collective management of the global economic order.

The depth of the crisis meant that the G7 nations alone were unable to act as a ‘group hegemon’ to re-impose stability (Bailin 2005), necessitating efforts to reach out to a broad coalition of states including the most important emerging economies. The G20 had its origins as a relatively low-key ministerial forum for the discussion of minimalist policy reforms to the governance of global finance (Beeson and Bell 2009: 74), but was transformed into a centrally important ‘crisis committee’ for the world economy (Cooper 2010). The choice of the G20 to play this role

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81 It is particularly telling that the response of major states in the North, including the US and UK, to the crisis was a policy of fiscal stimulus, in sharp contrast to the austerity policies imposed on Thailand and South Korea by the IMF in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis. Of course, within the North there has been a backlash against stimulus policies due to the existence of constituencies favouring ‘sound money’ policies favouring bondholders and the removal of the state from its social protection activities. See Krugman, (NYT 30/05/2010)

82 Mahbubani (2011) gets to the point: ‘Given there is no doubt who caused our world’s latest troubles, it should adopt its logical name: the western financial crisis. This reluctance to call a spade a spade reflects an inability to reckon with changes the US and Europe have to make to avoid a repeat. This worries the rest of the world, and Asia in particular – even if western leaders are shockingly unaware of how they are viewed’.

83 The G-20 is comprised of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the EU, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the UK and the US.
reflected both the need to form a coalition comprising a large enough share of the global economy, as well as the intensified imperative to ensure the legitimacy of the ‘steering committee’. The risk of paralysis at a time of crisis was too great not to reach out beyond the North. Even prior to the crisis the diplomatic assertiveness of the BRICSAM nations, the need to legitimate global-rule making before broader publics, and the difficulties with multilateral diplomacy meant that the support of developing nations and regional representatives had become increasingly essential to summit diplomacy (Narlikar 2007: 986).

After the first meeting in Washington DC, the G20 quickly seemed to supersede the G7/8, to the satisfaction of several emerging economies. Indeed, a sense of shifting gravity within the international political economy encouraged powers such as Brazil to act more bullishly, and to push for the G20 to supersede the G7/8 on the grounds of the former’s greater representativeness (Cooper 2010: 753-4). The North’s control over the central mechanisms of collective management of the world economy have therefore come under pressure. Yet many analysts have questioned the extent to which this important opening for the emerging powers truly marks a ‘surrender of dominance’ (Munck 2010: 238). Murphy is sceptical of whether we are moving towards a world ‘in which the liberal capitalist core of the world economy becomes just one, lesser, center of global power’ (Murphy 2010: 205). Indeed, Woods suggests that the creation of the G20 as a consultation forum may represent ‘the last gasp of an old-fashioned concert of great powers’ (Woods 2010: 51). The crisis seems in fact to have resuscitated key sites of Northern authority within the international political economy such as the IMF, which had been in severe difficulties due to the willingness of emerging economies to self-insure rather than rely on its emergency credit facilities (Woods 2010: 54). She notes that whilst several established Northern powers were willing to give up part of their voting share in the IMF to emerging economies during the 2008 round of reforms (Woods 2010: 53), the extent of change in the governance of the institution was modest and the US retained its sole veto (Woods 2010: 56). As a result, the confidence of the emerging economies in the IMF has not been restored (Woods 2010: 56), presenting a major impediment to implementing the monitoring and coordination between major economies that would be necessary to prevent a future crisis (Guerriri 2010: 691).

Indeed the emerging economies have actually increased their reserve holdings as a hedge against future crises (Chin 2010: 696).

84 The Heilegendam process within the G7/8 framework had been aimed at increasing consultation with the major emerging economies, but had proceeded slowly and without any of the urgency that the financial crisis prompted. This form of ‘outreach’ was itself considered inadequate by the emerging economies themselves.
Thus it seems that the formation of the G20 has not de-centred the North within the process of global rule making, and has not resolved the mistrust across the North-South divide. The G20 therefore represents a partial devolution of power within a context of continued attempts at maintaining hegemony by the G7 states. Indeed, the structural power of the G7 was never based on high profile summits, but the embedded practices of close cooperation between finance ministries. It seems possible that, as yet, the emerging economies have not broken into these patterns of densely integrated cooperation. Nevertheless, with momentum on their side and a sense of purpose, the emerging economies seem to have met success at iteratively eroding Northern dominance at each successive G20 meeting (IPS 09/04/11). Attempts to mitigate risk outside of Northern-controlled institutional settings continue apace, with new attempts at bilateral currency swaps between Latin American nations and China as well as an agreement in February 2009 to significantly boost the Chiang Mai Initiative reserve pool (Chin 2010: 703-706). The BRICs grouping has recently become the BRICS with the inclusion of South Africa (CSM 14/04/2011) as it continues to consolidate its role as a contra-G7. The BRIC economies already accounted for 33% of US foreign debt holdings and have strongly signalled their dissatisfaction with the dollar as reserve currency (Reuters 23/03/2009; FT 18/05/2009; Korea Herald 14/11/2010) – a withdrawal of support for the prevailing order. This leads Hoogvelt to suggest that we are witnessing ‘the first signs of a real external limit to the structural power of the US over financial markets’ (Hoogvelt 2010: 61), the emergence of real forms of ‘nergarchy’ within the international political economy. As Chapter 3 claimed, such patterns of restraint are essential for the maintenance of a space in which political argument is possible.

The creation of a new directorate of major economic powers, however, suggests that a reconfiguration of international hierarchy and stratification may be underway. Previously, forms of stratification mapped onto one another well enough to meaningfully speak of North and South. Yet the formation of the G20 has highlighted the trend whereby increasing ‘size trumps all else’ (Cooper, Antkiewicz and Shaw 2007) and mass emerges as primary axis of stratification. Commentators have attacked the G20 for ‘arrogating for itself important financial decisions that should be shared by all countries’ (Åslund 2009). As a result, there has been resistance by diplomatically active small states to the division between the G20 oligarchy and what Payne (2010) calls the ‘marginal majority’. This has resulted in the creation of the Global Governance Group (3G) by Singapore and 27 other small and medium sized states as well as the Global Redesign Initiative sponsored by Qatar, Singapore and Switzerland (Cooper 2010: 752). Thus the emerging structure of global decision-making remains under challenge from

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85 Chapter 1 discusses the different forms of stratification and their interaction in much more detail.
‘outsider’ states, both within and without the G20. Problems of legitimacy have seem to have arisen so quickly because, as Payne suggests, that justification for the creation of the G20 has been based on expediency rather than notions of procedural fairness or an appeal to broader moral concerns (Payne 2010: 738).

A similar set of tensions have been visible within global climate negotiations. As many of the states of the global South overcommitted to an international trade regime under duress, states of the North (excluding the US) committed to a principle which they did not realise the full consequences of when the norm of common but differentiated responsibilities was formalised in the Kyoto Protocol. As the emerging economies experienced sustained economic growth in the 2000s, other states of the North began to share the US’s opposition to the exemptions granted to major greenhouse gas emitters such as China by the climate change regime. Earlier episodes of argument along North-South lines had real consequences, binding participants at the next iteration. States of the North have had to spend considerable time and effort to dilute the principle of common but differential responsibilities during successive rounds of negotiation in light of ‘contemporary economic realities’, attempting to replace a ‘regime of differentiation in favour of developing countries with a regime of flexibility for all countries’ (Rajamani 2012: 617).

Eager to maintain their unity, consistent with the traditions of pan-South coalition-based diplomacy, the G77 plus China sought to resist greater differentiation amongst ‘developing countries’. The principal normative disagreement along North-South lines was over the principle of historical responsibility for climate change. This was central to the coalitions of the South because, as discussed in Chapter 1, the common identity of being part of the global South is in part based upon a shared sense of common historical grievance. Nonetheless, members of the Association of Small Island States and the LDCs group within climate change negotiations began to voice their disquiet at the increased greenhouse emissions of the emerging economies. Concern amongst such states of the global South was elevated when the emerging powers began to seek a more central position for themselves within negotiations, resulting in the agreement between the US and the BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) group at Copenhagen in 2009.

Copenhagen did not signal the end of Southern cooperation in climate change negotiations, however. First, the role of the emerging powers is not the only source of tension threatening the unity of the global South in climate negotiations: the views of highly vulnerable states and the
OPEC grouping diverge markedly (Vihma, Mulugetta, Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen 2011: 325). Second, the emerging powers share with the rest of the G77 a commitment to multilateralism and keeping climate negotiations firmly within the UN system, as evidenced at negotiations Cancún in 2010 (Vihma, Mulugetta, Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen 2011: 328-9). Third, the emerging powers continue to identify with the wider global South, an identity that is recognised by the latter, due to the issue of historical responsibility for climate change and their own experience of peripherality and late-development (Hurrell and Sengupta 20012: 483). Fourth, as in other issue areas, the emerging powers rely on their status as members of the global South to increase the legitimacy of the arguments they make in climate change negotiations. Reciprocally, the wider global South often looks to the emerging powers as ‘anchor states’ possessing the necessary weight to advance their common claims in the process of argument with the North (Vihma, Mulugetta, Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen 2011: 333-4). To retain their position of leadership, the emerging powers must be able to retain the trust of the wider global South, taking care to show awareness of the concerns over procedural and substantive fairness that form the basis of the common position of states of the global South within climate change negotiations.

In the context of cross-cutting forms of stratification and greater public scrutiny of supranational decision-making, it may be that both status-quo and, especially, would-be emerging powers will find that their position increasingly depends on their ability to take on the roles traditionally associated with middle-powers (Cox 1989). More than a straightforward power shift, what seems to be occurring is a de-concentration of power amongst states. In this context order cannot be re-established by either the North alone or even by a US-Chinese condominium; the feasible ‘minimum winning coalition’ has greatly expanded, resulting in a very crowded top-table. To exert influence within this scenario, major powers may have to act as leaders of and intermediaries for both states outside of the inner circle, social interests across social boundaries and broadly acknowledged moral principles. Thus we see a blurring of boundaries as Korea, one of the newest entrants to the North, attempts to play a bridging role between industrialised and industrialising economies, leveraging its ‘unique brand’ (Cooper 2010: 754). These changes might mean that international relations moves beyond a raw clash of interests or the imposition of order by a narrow power-elite, opening up a degree of space for real political argument within a still-unequal society of states.

**Conclusion**

86 The differences between the emerging powers matter a great deal for the positions they can adopt. For example, Brazil, with its ample biofuel and hydropower capacity, has greater room for manoeuvre on issues of greenhouse gas emissions-reduction than India and China.
This chapter has attempted to demonstrate that North-South relations have been central to the ongoing development of international society since the end of the Cold War. It has attempted to analyse the scope that has existed for the global South to renegotiate structural inequalities within the contemporary international order. These historically-derived inequalities, and the mistrust they engender across the North-South divide, are essential for understanding both the substance of international politics over the last two decades, as well as the challenges which the liberal international order now faces in securing broad enough legitimacy to enable successful management the global order. The analysis above has attempted to challenge the view that transformational processes of globalisation have rendered the North-South dimension of world politics obsolete and dethroned the states of the global South as significant actors in the politics of unequal development. Elites within the global South believed that global shifts left them with little option but to liberalise and integrate into the capitalist order. Despite adopting a pragmatic approach, they found that their ability to promote the goals of national economic development was stymied by Northern domination of institutions such as the WTO and IMF. This reconfirmed their position as ‘outsiders’ within the international order and rekindled practices of South-South coalition building. The need to integrate into the world economy has increased the importance of negotiation over the terms of integration.

Nonetheless, the existing political opportunity structure in the immediate post-Cold War period presented few opportunities for the global South to challenge the inegalitarianism and ‘coercive solidarism’ (Hurrell 1998: 31) of the expanding liberal international order. The situation of unipolarity provided a temptation for the US to step beyond the limits imposed by international society and to impose its own vision of international order. Within the situation of unipolarity there was little scope for negotiation. The states of the global South thus found themselves with little option but adaptation. However, by undermining aspects of international society and using its structural power irresponsibly the US encouraged second-tier powers to check and constrain its capacity for unilateral action, and newly industrialised nations to withdraw their trust in the IFIs and engage in self-insurance. Through recklessness and displacing the costs of its actions onto others, the US has engendered the mistrust of the emerging economies, who have challenged the North’s right to monopolise the collective management of the world economy. The attempt by the US to disregard the primary institutions of international society in an attempt to impose a more hierarchical conception of international order proved unsustainable because it was incapable of maintaining the social power necessary to govern an integrating global order.
Save perhaps for the case of global environmental negotiations, the structural power of the US and the North obviated the need for dialogic negotiation over the terms of the international order, resulting in a unidirectional monologue. However, with the emergence of new forms of negarchic restraint, the changing political opportunity structure has enabled emerging powers to issue new claims backed by political pressure. The great power dynamic overlaps and intersects with the North-South dynamic in complex ways. Emerging powers have found themselves in the contradictory position of claiming a right to participate in a great power directorate on the basis of their status as outsiders. Yet an important part of the diplomacy of several emerging powers has been their role as ‘anchor states’ in wider South-South coalitions, and the promotion of a pluralist but egalitarian vision of international order which has wide resonance within the global South. This has empowered them to pressure the states of the North to provide an account of their actions in the highest settings of global decision-making.

An understanding of the relational nature of international inequality, however, provides insights beyond a focus on distribution of capabilities. As well as using their newfound status as veto-players to directly confront Northern actors, the emerging economies have attempted to undermine the radial or axial relations which give rise to the North-South divide by creating new lateral linkages through a process of diplomatic and economic diversification. In attempting to ‘route around the existing order’ (Barma et al 2009) and create a world of civil, economic and political interactions beyond the North, the emerging powers may be shifting the very terrain on which the North-South debate takes place.

Especially significant in this regard is the ongoing process of democratisation within the global South. Authoritarian regimes have a tendency towards seeking external support in their attempts to control their own populations, reinforcing international hierarchies. Democratic states, however, must remain sensitive to the interests of their populations, driving them to pursue goals which may be at odds with those of the North87. However, unlike radical contender states, democratic emerging powers are less likely to seek exit from or the outright overthrow of the liberal international order. Thus they may be better positioned to make specific, limited challenges against the present international order.

Thus far the claims they have made have predominantly focused on issues procedural justice and the responsible management of the global economy. These largely concern the assignment of rights and responsibilities amongst states involved in a mutually advantageous cooperative

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87 Some of these arguments also apply to quasi-corporatist polities such as Malaysia and Singapore. It seems at least feasible that China could develop in a similar direction.
scheme and are thus distinct from more substantive concerns over equality and social justice. Nonetheless, such substantive concerns provide much of the force behind procedural claims – recall Lula’s comments regarding the identity of those responsibility for the crisis. At the same time, the claim to represent the poor and globally marginalised forms an important element of the strategies of would-be rising powers such as the IBSA states. Under conditions of complex interdependence which increase the importance of socialising power, states attempting to gain a position at the crowded top-table may increasingly attempt to act as interlocutors and representatives for wider interests and values.

With the return of some of the conditions for the possibility for political argument, possibilities for the exercise of moral agency on the part of the states of the global South may have opened up. Axes of stratification have become partially, but not completely, decoupled and thus certain emerging powers might continue to take on a leadership role within the global South over specific causes and issues. The international system seems in certain respects to be moving towards a genuinely political society, in which cross-cutting cleavages, a common language of values, dense integration, and limits on violence through ‘recessed balancing’ make possible the emergence of some kind of international public sphere. There is a question, however, of whether the North will recognise the scale of the challenge represented by accommodating the claims of the ‘increasingly literate, informed, and politically assertive’ peoples of the global South.

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Conclusion

This thesis has sought to contribute to a moral geography of international relations through an analysis of the normative tensions that arise from the socio-economic inequalities that exist within international society. To accomplish this goal, Chapter 1 offered a reappraisal of the role of inequality in shaping the international order through an analysis of the way in which asymmetric interactions at the global and inter-state levels may have produced enduring patterns of stratification within international relations. Such structures of material inequality were identified as giving rise to the cleavage between the North and the global South in international relations. Although the states composing the global South are highly diverse, they find themselves in a structurally similar position as ‘outsiders’ within a historically European international society in which disproportionate influence is wielded by a densely integrated core of advanced industrialised states.

In Chapter 2 the normative claims arising within such an unequal but interdependent international society were examined. Beginning with the assumption of the moral equality of persons, the cosmopolitan liberal egalitarian defence of the potential applicability of notions of social justice beyond the nation was argued to be plausible. Nonetheless, such cosmopolitan accounts were found to provide an incomplete basis for an international political theory of global social justice as they are unable to meet the test of realisability and overlook the normative difficulties that would arise from attempts to implement them in an unreformed, unequal international order. Given the persistence of such inequalities, an alternative perspective focusing on the unrealised potentials of international society was offered. According to this perspective, the agency of the subordinate plays an ineliminable role in establishing conditions under which relations based on social justice might be established within an interdependent society of distinct polities. The scope for such a re-negotiation through political argument between unequal actors in international relations was examined in Chapter 3. Due to the historical development of a norm governed international society that enables states to achieve shared goals, states may find themselves ‘caged’ and unable to consistently disregard intersubjectively acknowledged rules without bearing heavy costs. States may thus find themselves bound by the need to enter into political argument and offer justification for their actions. But in a highly unequal order, more powerful states may well be able to pursue many of their goals without having to provide reasons for their actions to subordinate actors. Subordinate actors may have to marshal countervailing power to ensure that superordinate actors cannot simply ignore their normative claims. By
assigning them with actorhood, the present international society offers some scope for the exercise of such agency on the part of states of the global South.

Chapter 4 analysed the initial attempts by post-colonial states to form a common cause with other late-developing states to issue a set of claims regarding the organisation of the world economy against the North. It examined how, for a brief period, the NIEO campaign appeared to herald a structural shift in North-South relations – prompting Northern actors to take claims of states of the global South more seriously and encouraging initial reflection on the principles appropriate to govern an interdependent industrialised age. Examining the reasons why this challenge was not ultimately successful suggested the importance of the conjunction of material and moral pressure. Once the NIEO coalition found itself in the position of making hollow, hortatory demands presented in mercantilist terms its campaign was unlikely to succeed. Yet to finally banish such claims, the US and its allies had to abandon existing commitments and institutional fora in the process of establishing a new regime for governing the global economy.

Chapter 5 analysed the politics of the management of the international debt of some of the poorest states in the global South. It demonstrated that the politics of debt is always highly morally charged due to the set of obligations that bind creditors and debtors together. In the absence of the possibility of agency on the part of states of the global South, it critically assessed possibilities and limits of the moral agency exercised by trans-national advocacy and campaigning networks operating as part of ‘world society’ during the anti-debt campaign. The analysis of this episode suggested that the anti-debt campaign was not only much less global than has been suggested, but that it was unable to prevent the selectively appropriation of its moral arguments by a directorate of Northern powers. Although the campaign was able to establish the principle that the G7/8 had broader moral responsibilities than functional management of the world economy, it was not successful in transforming the fundamental inequalities in the process of rule-making within global economy governance.

Chapter 6 analysed the process of political argument that accompanied the attempts to establish a framework for relations between the EC/EU and the ACP states through the Lomé and Cotonou agreements. It assessed the extent to which notions of ‘cosmopolitan Europe’ and ‘normative power Europe’ were borne out in the EU’s interaction with the ACP states. It found that the ‘post-Westphalian’ European Union has been driven by a set of values in the form of ‘neo-liberal cosmopolitanism’ and that it has taken on paternalistic responsibilities for the ACP states. In doing so, however, it has limited the available scope for normative argument and negotiation with the ACP states and left them structurally vulnerable to its own mercantilist
impulses. Analysis of the history of the EC/EU-ACP relations suggested some problems for the view that egalitarian principles are more achievable under post-Westphalian conditions and confirmed the importance of agency on the part of subordinate actors.

Chapter 7 analysed North-South relations from the end of the Cold War to the present, focusing on contested attempts to expand and consolidate a global liberal order under the hegemonic leadership of the US. It demonstrated that the politics of global inequality have not rendered the politics of international inequality obsolete by identifying and tracing an ongoing set of arguments over the proper organisation and management of the world economy between states of the North and of the global South. In analysing the ‘unipolar moment’ of the United States, it suggested that the transgression of important norms within international society by the US undermined its attempts to establish a more hierarchical international order. This sapped trust in the management of the world economy, contributing to financial instability, and pushed emerging powers to build alliances with one another to reduce the latitude of the US and its allies. From a position of leadership within coalitions of the global South, the emerging powers have issued arguments about the flawed and inequitable nature of the present international order. This has returned the process of North-South argument over questions of procedural and substantive justice to the centre of international relations. Yet differentiation within the global South has forced the emerging powers to focus on providing a compelling set of arguments to justify the pre-eminent role they seek to play in international relations.

This thesis has attempted to demonstrate that normative tensions over inequality are central to international relations. Normative claims arising from issues of inequality are ubiquitous in international society and have shaped the politics of almost every issue-area since de-colonisation. Considerable evidence has been provided that states do seek to justify their actions in terms of prevailing norms and moral principles, political challenge compelling them to provide justifications for their actions. Qualified support can thus be found for the claim that participation in common practices of statehood has given states of the South ability to challenge inegalitarian features of international relations. The inquiry conducted in this thesis highlights both the unrealised moral possibilities of international society as well as the limits of inclusion of the liberal international order. The perspective that asserts that the weak cannot challenge the strong, that they must accept their position and remained satisfied with passive resistance alone, is too absolutist. Whilst the states of the South have often faced little choice but to adapt themselves to an unequal international order, they have repeatedly issued challenges from their position as participants in that order. The resultant tensions have created possibilities for normative change within international society because, as previous chapters have demonstrated,
the instabilities associated with inequality and hierarchy compel the states comprising the ‘core’ to accommodate some of the claims of subordinate actors in order to maintain the collective power needed to sustain order. Although failed campaigns such as the NIEO might be taken to reconfirm Thucydidean clichés, an examination of instances when marginal states have challenged the international order reveals a great deal about the need for even powerful states to husband collective power by cultivating legitimacy. The occasions where material power has shifted, or was perceived as shifting, towards dissatisfied groups of states in the global South provide rich insights into the moments in the process of ‘reform and resistance’ where existing norms become fluid and features of the international order are opened up for revision. This provides insights into the mechanisms through which sustained political pressure can bring about the reconstitution of the normative beliefs of actors as they are forced to acknowledge and respond to their claims of interlocutors. So whilst it is fitful and uncertain, we can nonetheless trace a dynamic of argument between North and South operating in international relations.

By attempting to bring together an empirical study of North-South relations and a normative inquiry into questions of global justice, this thesis has attempted to develop an approach to international political theory that focuses on the moral potential of international society. This focus on moral limits and possibilities (Price 2008a: 52) allows us to work towards a middle-range ethics capable of studying ‘norms in their normativity’ (Cochran 2009: 221). This thesis has thus sought to demonstrate that ethical claims are indeed a constitutive part of the politics of North-South relations, and that an empirical focus on the way in which rival moral claims are negotiated has relevance for our understanding of what values might feasibly be realised in an unequal international order. It has offered a defence of attempts by the states of the global South to challenge aspects of the present international order as a necessary prerequisite for progress towards a global polity at is even minimally egalitarian. If global economic and political integration continue, finding ways to effectively address and manage claims arising from global inequalities are likely to become increasingly pressing imperatives. Under such circumstances international society, providing as it does a space in which the political representatives of the majority of the world’s peoples can advance political arguments and moral claims, is likely to remain the locus of the politics of global inequality. Insofar as a world society exists, it remains nebulous. It is therefore incumbent on theorists concerned with emancipatory and egalitarian goals to continue to inquire into the nature of the values that might be realised within the context of a interdependent but unequal world of distinct political communities so as to better understand the ‘planetary negotiations over the relative universals we are groping to construct’ (Latour 1993: 114).
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