Working paper
Time Inconsistent Environmental Policy and Optimal Delegation.
- Abstract:
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Time consistency problems can arise when environmental taxes are employed to encourage firms to take irreversible abatement decisions. Setting a high carbon tax, for instance, would induce firms to invest in low-carbon technology, yet once investment has occurred the government can then reduce the carbon tax to better achieve other objectives; lower energy prices, redistribution, and electoral success. The resulting time inconsistency discourages firms from investing in the first place. We pr...
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Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
- Series:
- Discussion paper series
- Publication date:
- 2003-01-01
Item Description
- Language:
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English
- UUID:
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uuid:5a411d03-eac1-4183-8abf-49ddad348a1e
- Local pid:
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ora:1214
- Deposit date:
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2011-08-16
Terms of use
- Copyright date:
- 2003
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