

Cold War at the Centre: Liberalism and the Politics of Euratlantic Strategy, 1945-1990

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For my family

Abstract

Patterns of domestic political contestation in international affairs often see the centre aligned against both the left and the right of the ideological spectrum. This is observable in a range of issues, from democracy promotion, intervention, international law, European integration, free trade, globalization and the creation of international regimes. Why centre-periphery ideological competition occurs is an interesting puzzle, given the challenge it offers to the idea that partisanship is an inherently left-right phenomenon. Yet the role of the political centre in foreign policy has not been subjected to systematic analysis.

This thesis studies the nature and effects of the foreign policy position of the political centre. It argues that the centre is distinguished from left and right by its embrace of distinct elements of liberal ideology. The liberal view of international politics differs in three important respects from its socialist and conservative competitors: It is particular, rather than pluralist, when it comes to questions of sovereignty and international legitimacy; it views interdependence, rather than independence, as a natural and desirable condition of the international; and it views deterrence, rather than diplomacy, as the best means of achieving security.

To test the validity of this thesis I discuss the role of ideology in explaining variation in relations between four Euratlantic states (Britain, France, West Germany and Canada) and the United States during the Cold War. This is a hard case given the intensity of global threat at the time. The thesis tests the claim that the strength of Euratlantic-American relations is a function of the relative influence of the political centre at the time. To do this it outlines a mixed-methods research design that combines in-depth case studies with a quantitative analysis of Euratlantic-US relations. The results from both elements confirm the validity of the theoretical proposition.

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List of Abbreviations

CCF	Co-operative Commonwealth Federation
CDP	Centre for Democracy and Progress
CDS	Social Democratic Centre
CDU	Christian Democratic Union
CERES	Centre for Socialist Education and Research
CINC	Combined Index of National Capabilities
CLC	Canadian Labour Congress
CMP	Comparative Manifesto Project
CND	Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
CNIP	National Centre of Independence and Peasants
COPDAB	Conflict and Peace Data Bank
CP	Comparative Politics
CPGB	Communist Party of Great Britain
CSU	Christian Social Union
DEFCON	Defence Readiness Condition
DEW	Distant Early Warning (Line)
DP	German Party
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	European Defence Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EPO	Extra-Parliamentary Opposition
EU	European Union
EXCOMM	Executive Committee of the National Security Council
FDP	Free Democratic Party
FIRA	Foreign Investment Review Agency
FPTP	First Past the Post
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDR	German Democratic Republic
HMG	Her Majesty's Government
ICC	International Control Commission
ICCS	International Commission of Control and Supervision
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INF	Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
IO	International Organization

IR	International Relations
IRBM	Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
MBFR	Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
MP	Member of Parliament
MRP	Popular Republican Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDP	New Democratic Party
NEC	National Executive Committee
NEP	National Energy Program
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defence Command
NTBT	Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares
PCF	French Communist Party
PR	Proportional Representation
PS	Socialist Party
RI	Independent Republicans
RM	Republican Movement
RP	Republican Party
RPF	Rally of the French People
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SED	Socialist Unity Party
SFIO	French Section of the Workers' International
SPD	Socialist Party of Germany
UDF	Union for French Democracy
UDR	Union for the Defence of the Republic
UDSR	Democratic Socialist Union of the Resistance
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNR	Union for the New Republic
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
USAF	United States Air Force
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEIS	World Event Interaction Survey
WEU	Western European Union

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1 / Liberalism and the Politics of Foreign Policy

Introduction

On many important international issues the political centre is aligned against both the left and the right of the ideological spectrum. Despite the prevalence of this pattern, however, the role of the political centre in foreign policymaking has received little systematic analysis. Work on ideology and foreign policy continues to rely on the left-right model to analyse international issues while mainstream IR theory regards liberal theory as a tool of analysis not an object of study. In this chapter I make the case for a systematic examination of the foreign policy position of the political centre. I argue the centre is associated with distinct liberal values that differ in important respects from both their socialist and conservative counterparts. Failure to acknowledge the role played by the political centre, I argue, risks misunderstanding the relationship between politics and foreign policy and underestimating the effects of ideology in international affairs.

Liberalism and its Discontents: Foreign Policy at the Centre

From resistance to globalization and democracy promotion to criticism of European integration and international law, the politics of international relations often finds the political centre aligned against both the left and the right. This is the case across a wide range of issues. In security policy, resistance to democracy promotion, humanitarian intervention and even the 2003 Iraq War came from the left and the right more than the centre. Support for the European Union, international legal

institutions and a plethora of other IOs is also strongest at the political centre. Moreover, the same pattern emerges in economic issues; the centre support free trade, mobility of capital, labour and industry, and many other facets of globalization more than their competitors on the left and right.

This provides a challenge to conventional frames of ideology and foreign policy, which rely on the assumption that political debate takes place between left and right. Despite the prevalence of this pattern of partisanship, however, the role of the political centre has received little systematic attention in the study of foreign policy. It has generally been assumed that similarities between left and right, and the distinctiveness of the centre, are symptoms of the decline of ideology and the seemingly random nature of partisanship thereafter. Patterns are argued away as coincidences associated with the complexity of shifting party positions, or as ironic quirks resulting from the application of ideological principles to international issues. When the centre has been the object of study, the ideological sources of its distinctiveness are often ignored. Those at the centre, it is held, is more likely to pursue a moderate and pragmatic agenda, in contrast to the extremity of fringe positions on the left and right.¹ Thus, it is pragmatism that is thought to provide the link between the political centre and international engagement, on contrast to the ‘principled’ strategies of its competitors.

In this thesis I offer a different account. I claim that these differences between the centre and the left and right are rooted in the divergent ideological commitments, in particular, between socialism, liberalism, and conservatism. Each of these offers a distinct understanding of the nature of the international realm and the role of the state within it. The specificity of the centre resides in its liberal commitments. Liberalism

¹ Sartori (1976), pp. 134-135

differs from socialism and conservatism in the importance it ascribes the individual, in contrast to the collectivism of the other traditions. The distinction between individualism and collectivism, I argue, has important implications for the way in which the international is interpreted and acted upon. In particular, it has consequences for three concepts on which liberals differ from socialists and conservatives: sovereignty, authority and security.

The liberal view of sovereignty is more contingent than that of its competitors. Liberals hold that sovereignty is established by the act of citizen consent and that the individual constitutes the principal referent of international concern. Liberals therefore condition sovereign legitimacy on the existence of democratic institutions and the respect of citizens' fundamental rights. In contrast, socialist and conservative conceptions of sovereignty are more absolute. For socialists this is because they embrace norms of cross-cultural respect and stress the right of communities to be free from external domination. For conservatives, sovereignty constitutes the state as an international actor and safeguards its political independence. The national independence venerated by conservatives is contingent upon respect for other sovereignty, and they do not view the policies of other states as any of their concern. Both socialism and conservatism, therefore, exhibit a more plural conception of international order than liberalism.

The liberal conception of authority is related to its functionalist notion of the state; the location of authority is determined only by the concern to maximise individual freedom and bestow the proceeds of social interaction. Liberals have embraced interdependence as a result, supporting transnational governance where it fulfils the functions of the state more adequately than its domestic counterpart. This may be contrasted with socialist and conservative opposition to transnational authority.

Socialists, for their part, have argued that supra-national authority is linked to the expansion of free-market capitalism and undermines the state's capacity to pursue a redistributive agenda at home. Conservatives, in contrast, view the state as the only legitimate source of authority and argue international governance is illegitimate and ineffectual.

The liberal view of security rests on the provision of a strong collective defence of Western interests, achieved by agglomerating the capabilities of like-minded states. The liberal account relies on the cohesion of the combined effort and the credibility of action in times of crisis, both of which are vital to deterring the activities of unfriendly states. This contrasts with the flexible concept of security endorsed by socialists and conservatives. Socialists seek to mediate between states in order to bring about a reduction in tension that is conducive to global security, an approach that relies on a disinterested diplomatic orientation and the renunciation of the use of force. Conservatives, equating threat with power, have sought to provide for national security through an independent balancing strategy that relies on the flexibility of alliances to increase the country's leverage, and therefore security.

Thus, it is inaccurate to equate liberal policies with 'moderation' and 'pragmatism' alone. Underneath the ostensibly pragmatic foreign policy positions of the centre linger distinctly liberal interpretations of the individual, society, and the state. Understanding this distinctiveness helps us to understand the relationship between ideology and foreign policy by explaining where and why the centre will be in opposition to the left and right. Without acknowledging the role of the centre we risk underestimating the effects of ideology by treating the absence of left-right contestation as evidence for the lack of contestation more generally. In spite of the

importance of understanding the foreign policy position of the centre, however, existing works have largely failed to do so.

The Political Centre in Foreign Policy and International Relations

Ideology and Foreign Policy

Existing works on ideology and foreign policy pay little attention to the political centre. One reason is their reliance on the left-right model of partisanship, which offers a one-dimensional account of the politics of foreign policy. In this vein it has been argued that those on the left are more trusting of other states and more likely to pursue ‘pacific’ strategies² and that the left is therefore predisposed to favour reduced defence expenditures,³ and diplomatic solutions over the use of force.⁴ The left is also thought less likely to initiate conflict in the first place.⁵ When leftist governments become embroiled in conflict, they tend to end the conflict sooner.⁶ The right, in contrast, is more sceptical about the legitimacy of international governance than the left and less concerned to act in concert with allies.⁷ Yet the right do tend to favour of greater free trade and economic openness than the left.⁸ The left have a wider scope of moral concern⁹ and are thought to be more moralistic in general, opposing colonialism¹⁰ and promoting human rights and foreign aid.¹¹

² Rathbun (2011), p. 3

³ Nincic (2008)

⁴ Gries (2014), p. 105

⁵ Arena & Palmer (2009)

⁶ Calin (2010); Koch (2009)

⁷ Gries (2014), p. 104

⁸ Milner & Judkins (2004)

⁹ Gries (2014), p. 110

¹⁰ Gibbs (1995); Rathbun (2004), p. 21

¹¹ Thérien & Noël (2008), pp. 132-134

Yet relying on the left-right model to understand the politics of foreign policy is problematic. Because the model understands the centre only as “the geometrical spot at which the moderates of opposed tendencies meet” it fails to adequately distinguish liberalism from its socialist and conservative competitors.¹² From this perspective political centre can only ever be a diminution of values ascribed to the left or the right, making it impossible to understand issues on which the left and right are both opposed to the centre using this approach. As a result, the existing literature has not been able to adequately account for the differences between liberalism and its socialist and conservative competitors.¹³ Most of these works have addressed only the positions of socialism and conservatism,¹⁴ while those mentioning liberalism have done so only from within the confines of the left-right model, equating liberalism, incorrectly, with the left.¹⁵

International Relations Theory

While existing foreign policy scholarship has said little about liberalism, mainstream IR theory has said much about liberalism¹⁶ but far less about liberal *ideology*. Liberal IR scholarship explains international politics in relation to key concepts from the liberal tradition, including interdependence,¹⁷ transnational politics¹⁸ and regime-type.¹⁹ Yet these works have not taken the *ideological* status of these liberal claims

¹² Duverger (1964)

¹³ The only work the author is aware of that contrasts three traditions rather than two is Thérien & Noël (2000), although this is limited to the effects of Christian Democratic parties (not necessarily coterminous with liberalism) on the rather narrow topic of foreign aid spending.

¹⁴ E.g. Rathbun (2004); Thérien & Noël (2008)

¹⁵ E.g. Gries (2014)

¹⁶ According to Jordan *et al.* (2009), p. 31, 19% of introductory IR courses were dedicated to the study of liberalism, and 17% of IR scholars defined their work as falling within the ‘liberal’ paradigm.

¹⁷ Axelrod & Keohane (1985); Keohane (1982); Keohane & Nye (1971); Snidal (1985b); Stein (1982)

¹⁸ Milner (1997); Moravcsik (2000)

¹⁹ Maoz & Russett (1993); Owen (1994)

seriously.²⁰ They are, as a result, unable to account for the effects of the liberal diagnosis itself on the behaviour of states. By using as a tool of analysis an understanding of the international arena that is essentially contested, liberal IR theory endorses an interpretation that is both contingent (because it is challenged by competing diagnoses) and political (because it endorses the world-view of a distinct ideological tradition).

This is true of IR theory more generally, where the attempt to construct parsimonious analytical theory has overtaken the desire to study the effects of these patterns of thought.²¹ One reason for this is a failure to acknowledge the extent to which core theoretical terms reflect pre-existing political traditions.²² While mainstream IR theory offers the choice between realism, liberalism and Marxism to understand the world, it offers little guidance for understanding the effects on foreign policy of the political traditions from which these theories were derived; respectively, conservatism, liberalism, and socialism. What is needed is a focus on the politics of these competing traditions and their effects on foreign policy, and an examination of the ideological underpinnings of contemporary IR theory.²³

One reason to focus on the *politics* of these ideologies is that this is the only analytical approach that can account for the fundamentally contested nature of the propositions offered by the IR mainstream. Because the basic claims of analytical theory are ideologically bounded, relying on any single theory will always invoke an inherently contested political claim, one that will only ‘explain’ action only to the extent it reflects the dominant ideology at the time. Moreover, analysing the interplay

²⁰ Jahn (2009)

²¹ E.g. Doyle (1993); Doyle (1997), p. 17; Moravcsik (1997); Wight (1991); Zacher & Matthew (1995)

²² The inter-relation between theory and ideology and the construction of the ‘economic interest’ has been the subject of much recent research on political economy (e.g. Appel (2000); Blyth (2002); Chwieroth (2007); Cox (2001); Pechová (2012)) whilst IR has appeared to lag behind in comparison.

²³ Ceadel (1987)

of these traditions offers greater analytical leverage than is afforded by changes in those forces emphasised in mainstream theories: the distribution of power, extent of interdependence and strength of the global elite vary infrequently²⁴ while the strength of these ideas themselves vary significantly and frequently.

The Structure of the Thesis

The argument presented in this thesis focuses on the politics of socialist, liberal and conservative conceptions of the international. It highlights the similarities between the socialist and conservative positions and the specificity of the liberal conception. To represent these differences it develops the horseshoe model of ideology as an alternative to the existing left-right approach. The horseshoe model helps overcome the lacuna in existing studies of the centre by highlighting the differences between liberalism and its competitors. The validity of the model is tested on the relations between Euratlantic states and the US during the Cold War. The hypothesis is that the strength of these relations is a function of the influence of the political centre at any given time. I develop this line of argumentation as follows.

Chapter two presents a theory of foreign policy based on the effects of competing socialist, liberal and conservative diagnoses of the international. It develops the horseshoe model as a means of understanding the relationship between these three, claiming the utility of the model lies in its ability to distinguish between the redistributive (left-right) dimension of ideology and the individualist (top-bottom) one. It makes the case for teasing out the role of the individualist dimension in foreign policymaking and elaborates on the differences between the individualist and

²⁴ Milner (1997), p. 27

collectivist understanding of the international. It also examines the role of political parties in translating ideologies into governmental action and outlines how institutional channel ideologies into outcomes in different ways.

Chapter three outlines the Cold War case against which the validity of the horseshoe model is tested. It argues the Cold War is a hard case for ideology and foreign policy and notes the methodological conveniences arising from the relative stability of the period. It elaborates upon the justification for the four country-cases selected (Britain, France, West Germany and Canada) and establishes the frequency and extent of variation between each of these and the US during the Cold War. It also summarises the predictions of the horseshoe model, associating liberal ideology with strong relations between the countries and the US and socialist and conservative ideologies with correspondingly weak relations. It then outlines a mixed-methods research design that combines four in-depth qualitative case studies and a large-n quantitative analysis, concluding with a discussion of the functions of both elements of the research framework.

The next four chapters present the findings of the case studies in chronological order. Chapter four is dedicated to a discussion of Franco-American relations and the negotiations surrounding the EDC Treaty in the early 1950s. It outlines the French political system and discusses the foreign policy positions of the major political parties. It emphasises the diversity of ideological viewpoints represented in French politics, tracing this to the proportional electoral system used under the Fourth Republic and highlighting the frequency of coalition government. The EDC case demonstrates the validity of the horseshoe model, showing the support of the various liberal parties for the treaty as a means of defending against Soviet aggression and tying France's fate to Europe and the US. It also shows the corresponding opposition

from the communist, the majority of socialists and the conservative Gaullists and charts the influence of these groups in bringing about the failure of the treaty in the National Assembly in 1954.

Chapter five discusses Anglo-American relations and the Suez Crisis of 1956. It begins with a discussion of the British party system, including and the broad nature of the Labour and Conservative parties and the absence of a strong centrist party, arguing these trends results from distortions introduced by the majoritarian electoral system. It argues that the principal ideological division in the British system occur within the major parties rather than between them, arguing that liberals are to be found within both parties, where they vie for influence with socialist and conservative elements, depending on the party in question. The Suez case offers an illustration of this pattern of politics by highlighting the role of right wing Conservatives in bringing about the intervention and the resulting Anglo-American rupture, and the role of left wing Conservatives in promoting rapprochement in the aftermath. It demonstrates that, although the crisis had a catalysing effect on the unity of the Labour party, only the right wing of the party opposed the government out of a concern for Anglo-American relations.

Chapter six examines the politics of Canadian-American relations and the nuclear weapons controversy of the early 1960s. It begins by highlighting differences in the scope of ideology in Canada relative to the European countries, noting the relative weakness of the socialist tradition but the presence of strong liberal and conservative tendencies, the latter a by-product of the country's historical ties to Britain. It then discusses the nature of the Canadian political system, noting its similarity to the Westminster model while contrasting the strong Canadian Liberal party with the weaker British example. The nuclear weapons case demonstrates the applicability of

the horseshoe model across the Atlantic, highlighting the similarity in the Cold War strategies of the social democratic NDP and the right wing Progressive Conservative, both of which sought to challenge the Liberal party's 'continentalist' orientation in economic and security policy.

Chapter seven discusses the politics of West German-American relations with reference to the INF deployments of the early 1980s. It begins by highlighting the specificities of the West German case, noting the effects of German defeat and allied occupation in delegitimising the conservative tradition in West German foreign policy and the resulting promotion by the Conservative CDU/CSU of a more liberal strategy. It also discusses the nature of the West German political system and the prevalence of coalition governments and discusses the important role of the liberal FDP as 'kingmaker' in coalition negotiations. The case of the INF deployments illustrates the negative consequences of leftist opposition for West German-American relations at the time, highlighting the growing opposition to the government's security policy from the socialist SPD and Green parties that led ultimately to the government's collapse. Although the prevalence of CDU/CSU support for strong West German-American relations challenges the horseshoe model, the relative strength of liberal ideology within the party helps explain this seeming anomaly.

Chapter eight presents the results of the quantitative analysis of Cold War strategy, consisting of OLS regression models of relations between 22 Euratlantic states and the US and USSR from 1948 to 1978. It begins by detailing the nature of the study and noting the functions it performs in relation to the case studies, including the extension of the argument beyond the four countries and the provision of greater analytical rigour. It also discusses the construction of the independent and dependent

variables (ideology and cooperation) before detailing the control variables included in the models and the variables derived from competing explanations. It outlines two sets of models, one focusing on Euratlantic relations with the US and the other on relations with the USSR, detailing the various different models run in each set. It then presents the results of the models, which confirm the validity of the horseshoe model, indicating the strength of liberal ideology in government is a significant predictor of strong relations with the US and weak relations with the Soviet Union, in contrast to the left-right model, which is not significant in either model.

Chapter nine summarises the results of the case studies and the quantitative analysis and offers some concluding remarks on the implications of the argument for the study of international relations. It begins by discussing the horseshoe model in light of the available evidence, arguing that the findings of both the qualitative and quantitative analyses strongly support the validity of the model. It then discusses the evidence for competing explanations, noting when the evidence in the cases or the statistical analysis supported these, and when it did not. The chapter then summarises the implications of the argument for our understanding of Euratlantic Cold War strategy, suggesting that the argument challenges the idea of a post-war consensus in the politics of foreign policy and that it demonstrates significant similarities across historical cases that have gone unnoticed. It then highlights the argument's implications for the study of international relations more generally, claiming the evidence undermines the utility of the left-right model of ideology and demonstrates the extent to which analytical theories of IR are an important part of the politics they seek to describe.

Conclusion: Foreign Policy at the Centre

In this chapter I have argued that the foreign policy position of the political centre may be distinguished from its competitors on the left and right by its articulation of a specifically liberal approach to international relations. The specificity of liberalism results from the tradition of individualism that lies at the ideology's core, which affords liberals notions of sovereignty, authority and security that diverge in important respects from socialist and conservative conceptions. The failure of existing scholarship to understand the centrality of liberalism in the politics of foreign policy, I argue, has resulted in a misunderstanding of the relationship between partisanship and international issues and a marked underestimation of the effects of ideology on foreign policy.

2 / A Theory of Ideology and Foreign Policy

Introduction

Ideologies offer individuals diagnostic schemes that help them to interpret the nature of the social world. Each of the three principal ideological traditions – socialism, liberalism and conservatism – offers its adherents a distinctively different diagnosis of the nature of the international arena and the place of the state within it. These competing conceptions of the international form the basis of the politics of foreign policy as it plays out in democratic states. In this chapter I develop a theory of foreign policy that locates the principal sources of state behaviour in the relative strength of these traditions within the domestic arena and the manner in which they are channelled through the institutions of the state.

Ideologies of International Relations

Ideologies consist of basic claims concerning the nature of the political realm and the actors that populate it. They are inter-subjectively held systems of thought utilised by individuals to diagnose the nature of the social world and guide their actions upon it.²⁵ Ideologies help structure complex phenomena; in doing so they serve a diagnostic function; they help individuals understand the world in which they live and to identify and characterise important social and political phenomena.²⁶ Different ideologies diagnose the nature of the international in different ways. These diagnoses

²⁵ Gerring (1997)

²⁶ Hamilton (1987)

are of fundamental importance given the different policies and priorities that follow from competing visions of the international domain.

Three traditions originating in the Enlightenment of the 17th and 18th centuries, and have animated disagreement over the nature of politics over the past several centuries: socialism, liberalism, and conservatism. These ideological positions continue to structure the fault-lines of contemporary political debate on questions of foreign and domestic policy. Yet it is the domestic implications of these three traditions that are most often subjected to scrutiny. In this chapter I discuss the effects that these ideologies have had on the politics of foreign policy. I argue that each tradition views the nature of the international realm differently. To understand how different ideologies conceive of the national interest it is necessary to understand how they view both the domestic and the international domains of political action, as these are irreducibly bound together.

The major political traditions each contain basic ideologies of international relations. These frames provide each tradition with competing diagnoses of the international; they specify the nature of the state and the world they inhabit and offer different prescriptions for the pursuit of the national interest. Because they each hold competing conceptions of the foundations of the international domain and the nature of the state, the international philosophies of the major political traditions resemble ‘folk’ variants of mainstream IR theories.²⁷ In this manner, the world-views of socialism, liberalism and conservatism mirror many of the analytical commitments of Marxist, liberal and realist IR theory respectively. That ideologies and IR theories resemble one another is unsurprising given the self-conscious systematisation of

²⁷ Rathbun (2009); Rathbun (2012c), p. 611

analytical theory from pre-existing philosophical traditions. Still, the partisan basis of these traditions is often forgotten.

Rather than study foreign policy through the lens of a diagnostic tool like realism, liberalism or Marxism, the theoretical approach here studies the conflict between these diagnostic tools themselves and the consequences of these ideational struggles for the conduct of foreign policy. I begin by presenting ‘ideal-types’²⁸ of socialism, liberalism and conservatism and summarise the different domestic and international world-views of each tradition.

Socialism

Socialists are egalitarians; they endorse a benevolent conception of human nature that emphasises the natural trustworthiness of individuals and their capacity for other-regardingness. They argue that the individuals owe to one another the proceeds of social cooperation, such that each individual has sufficient social goods to lead a meaningful life. Sometimes the outcome of redistribution is expressed in terms of need, other times in terms of outright equality in the possession of social goods; in both cases it is the *redistributive* element that distinguishes this understanding of the duties owed by humans to one another.²⁹ They are also collectivists, placing the interests of society above those of the individual. They view the state as an important tool in this regard, as it expresses the interests of the collective and facilitates the redistribution of social resources.³⁰

²⁸ Weber (1947), p. 118

²⁹ McLaverty (2005), p. 187

³⁰ Heywood (2007), p. 44

Internationally socialists emphasise the prevalence of inequality in the international arena, both within and between states. They stress the dependence of weaker states on the capitalist powers, and the role of elites in both in perpetuating this system of domination.³¹ They argue the international system is structured largely along class lines, with the state representing the interests of the dominant economic forces within society. Foreign policy, therefore, an extension of the interests of the capitalist mode of production, is inherently expansionist and exploitative.³² Socialists are more trusting than their ideological rivals of the motives of states, however, and seek to encourage cooperation through initial peaceful gestures. Their trustworthiness of other states leads them to emphasise the immorality and disutility of force. They also hold a broad scope of moral concern, viewing nations as essentially arbitrary dividers of humankind, yet their emphasis on the outcomes achieved by communities for their citizens, and opposition to international hierarchies, results in a concern to maintain the independence of other communities.

Liberalism

Liberals view individuals as neither inherently benevolent nor fickle, but as rational and reasonable decision-makers. Liberals also reject both extremes of substantive equality and naturalised hierarchy; instead they endorse the formal equality of individuals and support the redistribution of social goods only to the extent that this is necessary to guarantee the formal equality of individuals.³³ For liberals the market as the most appropriate mechanism for the fair allocation of social resources, as it

³¹ Rosenberg (1994)

³² E.g. Lenin (1916)

³³ Pogge (1986), p. 80

aggregates individual preferences in a manner the state is unable to do.³⁴ The liberal emphasis on human self-reliance underpins a profound individualism. They reject collectivism as an infringement of individual liberty, endorsing a minimal conception of legitimate state authority.³⁵ Society, for liberals, is ‘a cooperative venture for mutual advantage’,³⁶ rather than a cultural or social construct, while the authority of the state is derived from the consent of individuals, and must not infringe on their inalienable rights.

For liberals, the sources of threats in the international are linked to the nature of the state. States that are undemocratic or de-linked from international institutions are threatening because they have fewer incentives not to engage in aggressive behaviour. To counter threats, liberals emphasise the importance of collective security and strategic deterrence.³⁷ A credible counter-attack, they claim, is best achieved through the agglomeration of capabilities and the strengthening of alliance ties. Given the natural condition of interdependence between states, liberals view supra-national governance as both appropriate and efficacious. These institutions, they argue, provide valuable ways of regulating state behaviour and overcoming the insecurity of anarchy, and they view them as legitimate actors in their own right. Liberals hold an extensive scope of moral concern. The state, for liberals, is only the specific enforcer of universal rights and duties that apply across all individuals. Moreover, the state itself derives its legitimacy only from the consent of individuals, who remain the ultimate moral referent.

³⁴ Hart (1997), p. 228; Turner (2007), p. 67; von Hayek (2006), p. 46

³⁵ Chandler (2009), p. 61

³⁶ Rawls (1971)

³⁷ Gat (1998), pp. 302-303; Hunt (1987); Pugh (2012), p. 9

Conservatism

Conservatives view humans as fickle creatures that are inherently untrustworthy. They err towards a Hobbesian reading of society, where strife is the natural condition of human interaction and the state is key to maintaining order. They view hierarchy as a natural feature of human interaction in a world where talent is distributed unevenly, suggest inequality is both just and productive. It is on these grounds they oppose the redistribution of wealth and believe individual duties extend only so far as non-interference towards others' property.³⁸ Conservatives also place significant emphasis on the nation as a social and political unit.³⁹ They view the nation as an 'organic' social whole that has value in and of itself. The primary duties of individuals are not to themselves, but rather to the nation itself. Thus, while conservatives stress that inequality is natural, they also emphasise the duties that the rich have towards the less well off (the principle of *noblesse oblige*).

Conservatives view the international as a dangerous, amoral and anarchic realm of independent states, where threats are ever-present and power is the single most important currency. Given the perilous nature of international anarchy, conservatives place significant value on the utility of force, which they see as an effective and legitimate tool of statecraft.⁴⁰ The only way to avoid domination, conservatives claim, is by balancing against would-be adversaries, whether this is achieved through the development of capabilities or a flexible strategy of shifting alliances. Conservatives view the nation as the only source of legitimate authority and are consequently sceptical of supranational forms of governance, challenging their

³⁸ Huntington (1957), p. 456

³⁹ Green (2002), pp. 47-49

⁴⁰ Orme (1997/8)

efficacy in a world driven by power,⁴¹ and asserting the supremacy of domestically derived rules and norms. Curtailments on sovereignty, therefore, are acceptable only when justified by overriding strategic necessity and where independence is guaranteed by an intergovernmental decision-making architecture.

The Horseshoe Model of Ideology

How to understand the relation between these different conceptions of the international is an important question. The relation between these three traditions has typically understood by reference to the ‘left-right’ model of ideology, where socialism and conservatism occupy the leftist and rightist wings respectively, and liberalism occupies the centre-ground. At the domestic level the left-right model has significant purchase because it encapsulates neatly the ordering of the various political traditions over the principal value- and policy-conflicts that occur within the state. These debates most often concern the appropriate means of apportioning the proceeds of social cooperation. Socialists endorse redistributive policies, liberals support policies based on equality of opportunity, and conservatives prioritise only a basic formal equality. From the economy, to schools, to social welfare, these basic assumptions animate much of the domestic policy agenda in democratic countries.

Yet, when it comes to specifying the positions of competing ideologies over international issues, the utility of the left-right model diminishes. To begin with, there is no overarching state apparatus in the international domain that is able to offer opportunities for individuals (or for states) that could fall along the lines of egalitarianism outlined above. Moreover, there is little in the way of redistributive

⁴¹ E.g. Goldsmith & Posner (2002); Grieco (1988); Mearsheimer (1994); Morgenthau (1940)

output in the international; the proceeds of cooperation in the international arena are relatively modest compared to those in the domestic. Nor is there a global ‘demos’ that can act as the referent of redistributive policies. Without the key elements of state apparatus, proceeds of cooperation, and social referent, the linkage between policy positions and the left-right ordering of parties breaks down.

The centrality to international politics of issues that concern the nature of the state and questions of authority, rather than redistribution, calls for an alternative understanding of the relationship between the three ideological traditions. Particularly useful is the ‘horseshoe’ model of ideology, which originated in attempts to explain the underlying similarities between the far left and the far right,⁴² and features in much scholarship on the politics of European integration.⁴³ The horseshoe model supplements the redistributive (left-right) dimension of ideology with a second dimension concerning the nature of authority, running from individualism at the top to collectivism at the bottom. The model contends that ideological positions are arranged in a curvilinear fashion across this two-dimensional space, such that socialism and conservatism bracket liberalism on opposite ends of the horizontal dimension, but find themselves opposite liberalism on the vertical dimension (see Figure 1).⁴⁴

⁴² Davies & Lynch (2002), pp. 5-6

⁴³ Gabel & Anderson (2002), p. 910; Hooghe *et al.* (2002), p. 970; Marks & Steenbergen (2002), p. 890; Massetti (2009), p. 525

⁴⁴ Weisberg (1974), p. 749




Figure 1: The horseshoe model of ideology.

The value of the horseshoe model lies in its ability to simultaneously represent the two principal dimensions on which ideological debate takes place without sacrificing the parsimony of the existing model. Although the vertical dimension of ideology is the most salient in foreign policy issues, this does not preclude the emergence of a left-right structuring on some issues; indeed, the horseshoe model incorporates both dimensions because it believes that both are important. What the model provides is a conceptual framework that is able to understand variation on both dimensions without forcing questions of authority to be reduced to positions on the redistributive left-right dimension. The graphs below demonstrate the empirical purchase of the horseshoe model to describe party positions across both the egalitarian dimension (Figure 2) and the individualism dimension (Figure 3).




Figure 2: The horizontal dimension of ideology. Low scores indicate egalitarian positions. Data are from Budge *et al.* (2001).




Figure 3: The vertical dimension of ideology. Low scores indicate collectivist positions. Data are from Budge *et al.* (2001).

The horseshoe model also helps us to understand the relative propensities of actors from different ideological traditions to cooperate with one another. It suggests that cooperation is easiest across the top of the horseshoe, because individuals at these positions share similar ideas on both the horizontal and vertical dimensions. Cooperation from the top of the horseshoe to the wings on either side is more difficult, because the differences are significant on both dimensions, leaving little room for agreement. Finally, between both of the wings the positions are the same on the vertical dimension but furthest on the horizontal dimension, suggesting cooperation is possible but likely to be short-lived and limited to specific issues.

The horseshoe model challenges our existing understanding of the politics of foreign policy, which assumes that the left right model structures ideological contestation. Despite the potential utility of the model, however, its implications for international politics have not been developed in sufficient detail to date. In the next section I discuss the implications of the horseshoe model for the politics of ideology by outlining the consequences of the divide between individualism and collectivism – that is, between liberalism and both its socialist and conservative competitors – for questions of foreign policy.

Liberalism and its Competitors

The divide between individualism and collectivism that separates liberalism from both socialism and conservatism has important implications for foreign policy. By virtue of their individualist commitments, liberals hold distinct conceptions of sovereignty, authority and security from their competitors. The liberal concept of sovereignty emphasises moral particularism in contrast to the pluralism of its

competitors, while its understanding of authority embraces interdependence not independence, and its notion of security embraces deterrence over the alternative of diplomacy. I discuss each of these below.

Sovereignty: Particularism versus Pluralism

Liberals understand the nation as a civic construct formed out of a compact between consenting individuals as a means of achieving the mutual gains from cooperation.⁴⁵ State authority is thus a manifestation of individual consent, not a pre-existing, natural entity. Liberals accordingly endorse a contingent notion of sovereignty that ties the concept of legitimacy directly to the question of consent; legitimate states are those founded on the basis of citizen consent, whereas illegitimate ones are not. Liberals therefore differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate states; the former feature citizen consent and respect the rights of the individuals under their protection, while the latter do not. They are *particularists*, not pluralists; they care about liberal values, not about sovereignty. This leads to two important consequences. The first is the existence of concern for individuals in other nations and the establishment of an obligation to ensure their rights are respected. The second is a differentiation between liberal democratic, and non-liberal, non-democratic states. Non-democratic states are not only illegitimate and potentially dangerous, as the citizens' desire to avoid conflict is not channelled into state conduct.

Socialists are more tolerant towards difference when it comes to competing national institutions and moral philosophies. Although their view of sovereignty resembles the liberal account in its insistence that the rights of states ultimately reside in those

⁴⁵ Rawls (1971)

of individuals, their characterisation is not *individualist* per se. Socialists have therefore been less willing to view states constructed along non-liberal and non-democratic lines as sovereign entities in their own right, and as legitimate members of the international community. The principal task of the state, for socialists, is to ensure the wellbeing of its citizens and ensure the redistribution of the proceeds of social cooperation. Because this often entails a high degree of state authority, and because socialists prioritise outcomes over process, they tend to be more tolerant of anti-democratic regimes. The socialist opposition to hierarchy, which, at the international level seeks to oppose the conditions placed on smaller states by the more powerful, reinforces this pluralism. Thus, the socialist approach to sovereignty has, in practice, veered towards sovereign respect over moral particularism.

Conservatives place significant emphasis on the importance of state sovereignty as the fundamental principle undergirding the states-system. For conservatives, sovereignty is responsible for the constitution of the state as an international actor and for the safeguarding of its political independence. Sovereignty confers legitimacy on the state and enshrines its exclusive jurisdiction over its population and territory. Because sovereignty is a norm of international conduct, rather than a by-product of domestic consent, the national independence venerated by conservatives is guaranteed only through the norm of sovereign respect, creating an obligation for reciprocity. As a result, conservatives do not view the internal constitution of other states as being of any relevance for their sovereign states. Nor, moreover, do they regard the rights of individuals within other states as something they are obliged to defend. Not only is the domestic environment of other countries the prerogative of that individual sovereign, but the scope of moral concern also stops at the borders of their own state, the sovereign holding a duty to their citizens alone. In this sense,

conservatives are pluralists; they endorse an ethic of mutual inter-state respect, and do not differentiate between threatening and non-threatening states. Unlike liberals, they associate threat with power, not regime-type or ideology; thus, any state, if powerful enough, provides a potential source of threat.

Authority: Interdependence versus Independence

The liberal approach to the state is a functional one; generally, as individualists, liberals are sceptical of state authority, but they regard a modicum of social regulation as a necessary means of providing for the mutually beneficial outcomes of social organisation. Because authority derives from individual interest, there is nothing special about the nature of domestic authority; as a result, liberals are open to sub-state and transnational forms of authority, as required, so long as they contribute to mutually beneficial outcomes for individuals. For liberals, then, international interdependence and transnational forms of governance are natural and desirable features of the global environment. These beneficial conditions, moreover, help ameliorate the worst elements of international anarchy and offer increasing incentives for states to withhold aggression. International authority helps prevent conflict between states and helps curtail the power of the state in the domestic arena. It also provides for the maximisation of individual utility in a manner any one state could not achieve on its own. The act of creation of such organisations is not in itself, moreover, a challenge either to the democratic will of the citizenry so long as the act of delegation occurs through democratic channels.

Socialists view the state as the best means of articulating the collective interests of society as a whole. They tend to support a strong state because of the functions that

the state provides, including the coordination of collective action, the facilitation of redistribution, and the expression of the public – as opposed to private – will. Socialists have, as a result, sought to maintain the authority of the state against challenges from various domestic and international sources. The principal international threat to state autonomy, they assert, comes from the spread of global capitalism and the institutions associated with this. Interdependence, for socialists, is viewed as part of the expansion of the capitalist system, an inherently unequal process that consists of the extraction of wealth from poorer countries in the interests of the global elite. The governance structures set up to regulate economic interdependence, they hold, undermine the capacity of the state to intervene in society and hamper the pursuit of a redistributive agenda at home. Socialists have therefore tended to oppose both the interdependence of nations and the growth of supranational forms of authority.

Conservatives view the nation as the principal referent of society and view the state as the principal means of providing for the interests of the nation, both domestically and internationally. Legitimate authority, for conservatives, derives only from the nation, which the individuals within a community owe their allegiance. International interdependence and transnational forms of authority are to be resisted to the extent that they challenge the domestic authority of the state or infringe upon its sovereign prerogatives, which conservatives believe should be jealously guarded. The deepening ties between states are viewed as evidence of power asymmetries between states. Interdependence, then, constitutes nothing more than the interference of the stronger powers in the affairs of weaker states. Attempts to regulate interdependence through increasing transnationalisation are not only illegitimate, but also

inappropriate, given the inefficacious nature of international organisations, the risk of defection and the absence of any force-based remedy to prevent it.

Security: Deterrence versus Diplomacy

The liberal approach to security is based fundamentally on its rationalist assumptions; actors are not necessarily benevolent or fickle, but rather act strategically in response to the incentives they are faced with. Liberals argue in particular that the threat of force is greater when an adversary is not constrained by its citizens and when it is unconnected to the interdependent international order or the institutions associated with it. This is because the population and the international community, for liberals, provide important constraints on the use of force by states. When dealing with threats, liberals contend that the optimal means of defence is the credibility of a potential response to any aggression. As a result, liberal approaches to security stress the importance of agglomerating the capabilities of sufficient states in order to present a formidable threat of overwhelming counter-attack were an adversary to consider a resort to force. The desired level of capabilities is that which is able to alter the cost-benefit analysis of the adversary, thereby precluding the need to use force (so-called deterrence). The liberal approach prioritises the demonstration of sufficient resolve within this defensive partnership to make the threat of force credible.

Socialists have, along with liberals, identified security threats in accordance with domestically derived criteria, but these have come from a more diverse array of sources than in the liberal approach. For socialists, international aggression is as likely to stem from the inherently aggressive nature of capitalist expansion as it is

from chauvinistic nationalist policies of authoritarianism. Socialist security policy, as a result, has rarely fitted the ‘us versus them’ model of the liberal approach. Socialists have also sought to challenge the utility of the deterrence model, claiming instead that increasing capabilities are more likely to reduce trust and set off an arms spiral in which each state is worse off and less secure.⁴⁶ Socialists have argued instead for the mutual reduction of tension through cooperative measures and the unilateral renunciation of armaments such that the potential adversary is convinced of the country’s benign intentions and therefore likely to reciprocate. It is this strategy of mediation that best characterises the socialist approach to security.

The conservative approach to security has emphasised the potential threat from any source and the need to balance power accordingly, the natural corollary of the realist conception of the international that equates threat with power.⁴⁷ Because the anarchic international system offers no guarantees, the possession of significant power by any actor is a potential source of insecurity. Conservatives have sought, within this context, to ensure the independence of the nation and the maximisation of its influence and resources. To achieve this they advocate a balancing strategy, the aim of which is to prevent potential adversaries from becoming too powerful by selectively aligning with various combinations of other states in temporary and fluid alliances. By doing so, conservatives aim to increase the leverage of the state vis-à-vis potential threats. Importantly, successful balancing depends less on aggregate capabilities than on diplomatic manoeuvring, and the ability to pursue flexible strategies. Unlike mediation, the aim is not to reduce tension, but to forestall hegemony; yet the reliance on flexibility and diplomacy, coupled with the emphasis

⁴⁶ Rathbun (2004), p. 22

⁴⁷ Ish-Shalom (2006) and Rathbun (2008) have pointed out this link. Both also caution that the terms are not necessarily synonymous; one can be a conservative without being a realist, and vice versa.

on independence, offer important areas of overlap with the socialist approach to security.

These key differences between the liberal understanding of sovereignty, authority and security and those of its competitors are the direct result of the individualist commitments underpinning liberal ideology, in contrast to the collectivism of both socialism and conservatism. It is this dimension, missing from existing accounts of ideology and foreign policy, which explains the similarities between the left and right and the distinctiveness of the political centre. Liberal foreign policy is characterised by an inflexible ‘friends and enemies’ approach to global order, a strong bent towards interdependence and transnational forms of authority, and a dual militarist and multilateral security strategy. Socialist and conservative foreign policies, on the other hand, share a flexible, pluralist conception of international order, a desire to break away from dependence on other states and organisations, and an independent security strategy.

Party Politics and Domestic Institutions

Ideology is afforded agency through its incorporation into the electoral platforms of political parties. Parties provide collective expression for ideologies because they seek to articulate a programme for government that will appeal to a significant proportion of the electorate to ensure victory at the polls.⁴⁸ They articulate programmes based on the common denominators of individual beliefs up to the point at which they feel confident enough they will reach the threshold of a legislative majority; any less, and they will receive insufficient support, any more and they will

⁴⁸ Rathbun (2004), p. 11; Vassallo & Wilcox (2006), p. 413

find governing difficult. Political parties, therefore, whether motivated by office or by support for particular ideas, afford agency to more or less discrete compositions of inter-linked ideological beliefs.⁴⁹

Parties are more important to an assessment of governmental motivations than the personal qualities and beliefs of party leaders. Leadership is an expression of delegated authority, where the party is the agent, not the other way around.⁵⁰ Parties need leaders to ensure that coordination between various branches operates smoothly, yet seldom desire changes to the party platform. At party leadership (s)elections a range of candidates is offered to the party members who have an incentive to select those whose beliefs most closely reflect their own. The extent to which party leaders deviate from the ‘party line’ significantly limited by the measures parties enact to screen potential leaders *ex ante* and the monitoring placed on them *ex post*.⁵¹ Whilst leaders are able to set the policy agenda and hold the balance between rival factions, their power relative to the party is limited.

The relationship between political parties and ideology is a complex one. Parties may embody diverse configurations of ideological claims and competing factions, each with their own particular beliefs, often contend with one another for influence over the party. Moreover, the relationship between parties and ideologies is subject to change over time; whether through gradual evolution or rapid reorganisation, parties have often evidenced significant movement across the ideological spectrum. Finally, the labelling of parties often belies their ‘true’ ideological colouring; a majority of party names allude directly to the terms ‘socialist’, ‘liberal’, or ‘conservative’, yet

⁴⁹ The logic of ideological agglomeration specified here is similar to the idea of a ‘minimal connected winning coalition’ in the literature on government formation. See Axelrod (1970); de Swaan & Mokken (1980); Grofman (1982), p. 78.

⁵⁰ E.g. Cross & Pilet (2014), p. 5; Quinn (2004), pp. 334-335

⁵¹ Müller (2000), p. 318

these need not indicate strict conformity with the ideal-typical constructs from which they are named.⁵²

Three factors influence the relationship between ideologies and party positions. First, the national political culture of a country “define[s] the range of acceptable possible alternatives from which groups or individuals may, other circumstances permitting, choose a course of action”.⁵³ The scope of legitimate ideological choices afforded parties may be limited in three different ways. It may be truncated on the left, as in Canadian politics, where socialism is a weak force compared to liberalism and conservatism. Conversely, it may be truncated on the right, as in the case of post-war Germany, where elements of conservatism were delegitimised by the memory of Nazism.⁵⁴ Finally, it may be truncated on both sides of the spectrum, as evidenced by the relative weakness of socialism and conservatism in the US, and the strength of the broad liberal internationalist compact in the post-war period.⁵⁵

Second, the nature of a country’s electoral institutions influences the number of viable parties and the domain of ideology ‘allocated’ each. Majoritarian systems that require a plurality of votes within each constituency diminish the number of viable parties by removing smaller parties from the system, which seldom meet the plurality threshold.⁵⁶ These systems promote the existence of broad ‘brokerage’ parties with a tendency towards factionalism, with liberal ideological positions often falling between two large parties (see Figure 4). Proportional systems, in contrast, often feature a greater number of smaller parties because the disproportionality between

⁵² Laver (2001), pp. 3-6

⁵³ Elkins & Simeon (1979), p. 131

⁵⁴ Baker *et al.* (1971), p. 5; Erb (2003), p. 8; Kolinsky (1991), p. 50

⁵⁵ Archer (2007); Foner (1984); Ikenberry (2009)

⁵⁶ Duverger (1964); Taagepera & Grofman (1985), p. 342

votes and seats is far lower.⁵⁷ The large number of parties, moreover, makes coalition government the norm and lessens the ‘winner takes all’ effect, increasing the ideological homogeneity of the parties.⁵⁸ In systems of this type there is often one or more viable parties that is distinctly liberal in character (see Figure 5).




Figure 4: An illustrative example of the relation between parties and ideology in majoritarian systems.

⁵⁷ Gallagher (1991); Lijphart (1990), p. 484

⁵⁸ G. Cox (1990), p. 927




Figure 5: An illustrative example of the relation between parties and ideology in proportional systems.

Third, broad shifts in the character of ideology over time and evolving global norms serve to alter the bounds within which contestation takes place. Unlike shifting party positions, these changes tend to be global in character and as a result they affect all the countries under consideration in similar ways. On the left the most important shift is the slow decline in orthodox Marxism from the 1950s onwards, a product both of its association with the Soviet Union and the failures of socialist planning. Over the period, all parties renounced core elements of Marxist ideology and embraced social democratic principles.⁵⁹ On the right, the principal change was the advent of the ‘New Right’ in the late 1970s and the move of conservative parties away from their traditional roots into a more liberal position, one that emphasised individualism and the free-market over society and the nation. Taken together, these

⁵⁹ E.g. Baker *et al.* (1981), p. 172

twin processes resulted in a discernible narrowing of the ideological spectrum since 1945.

Changes in the partisan competition of the government, then, are the principal occasions on which we would expect to observe changes in a state's foreign policy. Whether the result of a recent national election or a new coalition agreement, the coming and going of parties in government is more often than not accompanied by ideological change. Because ideologies fulfil a diagnostic function in relation to the international, changes in the ideology informing a government's policies results in a shift in perspective accompanied by significant implications. Given the importance of rhetoric in the conduct of a state's foreign relations and the absence of any need for legislation, partisan change in this domain is evident within a short time frame. Whether the altered composition of the government results in a more or less liberal stance is key to determining the likelihood of significant change in the country's relations with the US.

Because parties reach government on the basis of ideological commitments expressed to the electorate, they have an incentive to begin implementing these once they arrive in office. There are several reasons why parties are unlikely to renege significantly on the principles offered to the electorate. First, it is likely that many of the policies and principles outlined conform to the interests and beliefs of the party members themselves, whether in the elite or the rank and file. If this were not the case, there would be little reason to expect any differentiation in party positions.⁶⁰ Second, the credibility of the governing party depends on delivering its promised policies to the electorate. This is especially important in established democracies where parties have strong brands and lengthy reputations to maintain. Third, parties

⁶⁰ E.g. Budge & Laver (1986); Petry (1982); Strøm (1990); Wittman (1983)

have an incentive to distinguish themselves from the previous government, which, by virtue of its defeat, will likely have lost favour with the electorate.

The ability of governing parties to enact their favoured ideological agenda is often limited, however, by the constraints placed upon it by the relative power of competing parties in the legislature. Whether or not governing parties will be able to pursue their favoured policies depends upon the strength and ideological position of their competitors. There are good reasons to believe that legislative constraint matters in spite of the extensive prerogatives afforded the executive in foreign policymaking.⁶¹ First, many important aspects of foreign policy do not fall under the remit of executive prerogative; trade and economic issues are particular examples of internationally important issues subject to the standard constitutional rules of parliamentary oversight. Second, parties link outcomes in one policy area to others, and powerful opponents can use veto opportunities in domains open to legislative influence in order to force compliance on foreign policy issues.⁶² Third, there is a normative constraint on the invocation of executive prerogatives, the use of which is often viewed as anti-democratic. It is for this reason that votes are often taken on foreign policy issues when they are not formally required.

There are three distinct modes of legislative constraint that may impinge on the neat transposition of values to policy (Figure 6).⁶³ In the *oppositional* mode constraint comes from the opposition party (or parties). This is most prominent in presidential systems where the presence of multiple veto-players – “actor[s] whose agreement is

⁶¹ Kriner (2010), p. 12; Lindsay (1992), p. 626; Martin (2000), p. 21; Milner & Rosendorff (1996), p. 152

⁶² Calvert *et al.* (1989), p. 600; Lacy & Niou (2004), p. 26; Palmer (1995), p. 170

⁶³ See King (1976) for a discussion of the different ‘modes’ of executive-legislative relations

required for a policy decision”⁶⁴ – presents many opportunities for the opposition to check the government. It is also evident in parliamentary systems where the government does not possess a large majority in the legislature, making the ideological position of the opposition becomes particularly relevant during such periods.⁶⁵

In the *intra-party* mode the source of constraint emanates from within the governing party itself, either from the backbench members of the legislature or from factions existing within the party itself. This form of constraint is most associated with majoritarian parliamentary systems where a small number of parties cover a broad range of ideological perspectives. Intra-party constraint is, paradoxically, often at its highest when the governing party has a large legislative majority, as party leaders cannot threaten rebellious backbenchers or factions with the prospect of governmental collapse.⁶⁶ This is backed up by data showing that party cohesion increases as legislative support diminishes.⁶⁷

In the *intra-government* mode the constraint comes from the other parties located within the governing coalition. This is most common in proportional parliamentary systems where coalition governments are the norm. The extent to which rival coalition partners constitute a threat is determined largely by the number of seats they contribute to the government’s legislative majority, although it should be noted that smaller partners may evidence considerable influence when they are able to hold the balance of power.⁶⁸ The intra-government mode of constraint is often more damaging than the oppositional mode because parties can threaten governmental

⁶⁴ Tsebelis (1995), pp. 292-293

⁶⁵ Keeler (1993), p. 438; Laver & Hunt (1992); Schmidt (1996), p. 156

⁶⁶ Dewan & Spirling (2011), p. 346; Diermeier & Feddersen (1998), p. 611; Huber (1996), p. 272

⁶⁷ Volden & Bergman (2006), p. 81

⁶⁸ Kaarbo (1996), p. 505; Kaarbo (2012), p. 20

collapse in the former while in the latter they are often only able to prevent the passage of legislation.

	Common in Following Systems	Relation to Seat Share	Empirical Examples
Oppositional	Parliamentary (majoritarian) Presidential Semi-presidential	Minorities and slim majorities increase opposition ability to constrain	United Kingdom, Canada, France
Intra-Party	Parliamentary (majoritarian)	Large majorities increase constraint from within party	United Kingdom, Canada
Intra-Government	Parliamentary (proportional)	Seat-share determines relative influence in coalition	France, Germany

Figure 6: The three forms of domestic constraint and their relation to seat share.

Conclusion: The Politics of Foreign Policy

In this chapter I presented a theory of foreign policy that located the principal sources of state behaviour in the interplay between competing conceptions of the international, as represented by the ideological traditions of socialism, liberalism, and conservatism. I argued that the principal line of differentiation lies not between socialism and conservatism, but between liberalism and both its socialist and conservative competitors. I argued that the best means of representing the politics of foreign policy is offered by the horseshoe model of ideology, which represents the differences between the three ideologies on both an egalitarian dimension from left to right and an individualist dimension from top to bottom.

3 / Research Design and Methodology

Introduction

A hard test of the horseshoe model's validity may be found in the relations between Euratlantic states and the US during the Cold War. The strength of these ties during the period is often ascribed to the intensity of the strategic threat from the USSR and the necessity of forging a strong defensive alliance. Ideology, it is commonly believed, did not make a significant contribution in this regard. In this chapter I apply the theory developed in the previous chapter to this case. I argue that the horseshoe model has discernible consequences for the quality of Euratlantic-US relations; namely, that these will be strongest when liberalism is at its most influential. After elaborating this theoretical argument, I contrast it to the existing theoretical literature and outline a mixed-methods research design framework that allows for a test of the theory's predictions.

Euratlantic Cold War Strategy

The Case of Cold War Strategy

To test the validity of the horseshoe model, this thesis examines the role of ideology in Euratlantic Cold War strategy and its effect on relations with the US. There are several reasons for examining this set of inter-state relations in the period 1945-1990. First, Euratlantic strategy offers a hard-test of ideology. At times of intense global insecurity, strategic necessity is thought to trump political beliefs. The scale of the threat from the Soviet Union, it is often claimed, created strong pressures for

Western cooperation as a means of achieving security. A hard test increases the confidence we may have in our theory's propositions should they be confirmed by our findings. Given the low expectations for the role of ideology and domestic politics in the face of overwhelming security concerns, the validity of the horseshoe model will carry greater weight than if it were successful in other contexts.⁶⁹

A second reason for focusing on this period is the methodological convenience of Cold War stability, which holds constant many structural variables, such as the distribution of power, the global normative environment and the pattern and distribution of regime-types. Moreover, the relative absence of exogenous shocks establishes a broad period across which we may make meaningful comparisons. The absence of shocks on the scale of the world wars or the end of the Cold War also helps maintain the coherence of the key concept of ideology, the implications of which have notably been subject to change at times of momentous systemic alteration (such as 1945 and 1990). The continuity of the Cold War, therefore, allows us to analyse the effects of shifting domestic political circumstances from the 1940s to the 1980s in a manner not feasible in other periods.

A third and final reason concerns the scope of ideological heterogeneity, which was more evident during the Cold War than at any other time. Indeed, the period 1945 to 1990 was the 'age of ideology', characterised by significant competition between competing conceptions of political order and the ends of social interaction. Although manifest most visibly in the intense ideological competition between Soviet communism and US liberalism,⁷⁰ the polarisation of political discourse characterised the domestic environments of the Western democracies also. Viable socialist, liberal

⁶⁹ Gerring (2007), p. 234

⁷⁰ Buzan & Wæver (2009); Haas (2005), Ch. 6; Haas (2007); Kramer (1999); Mouritzen & Wivel (2005), p. 21; Wendt (1992), p. 399

and conservative movements of the time vied with one another for political influence, in stark contrast to the contemporary prevalence of liberalism in the governing programmes of the major parties. One beneficial result of ideological heterogeneity during the Cold War is the establishment of sufficient variation on the independent variable to allow for a meaningful analysis of ideological change.

The Country Cases: Britain, France, West Germany, Canada

The empirical side of this study focuses on the effects of Cold War strategy in four Euratlantic countries: Britain, France, West Germany, and Canada. These countries may be viewed as a small sub-set of the broader population of Euratlantic states, which consists of the countries of Western Europe and North America. The geographical grouping of these countries is of little intrinsic value; rather, it is the shared characteristics of Euratlantic states that are of interest to the analyst. With very few exceptions, in the period under study these countries were democratic, culturally and historically similar, and located within the 'West', rather than the East, of the two Cold War blocs. There are three reasons why these four countries in particular were chosen as the basis of the empirical study.

First, the fact that the four countries are democratic is a necessary precondition for analysing the effects of partisan politics and ideology. The freedom of political thought permitted in democratic polities and the frequent changes of government that characterises politics in these systems results in the introduction of substantial ideological variation in the composition and agenda of successive governments. Another beneficial methodological aspect is the number of individual 'cases' of different governments that results from the frequency of elections in these countries

and the commonality of their political systems and party types. The large number of cases across the countries facilitates comparative analysis and offers a sufficient number of observations to note recurring themes and make robust inferences from these patterns.

Second, these four countries each evidenced significant levels of ideological heterogeneity during the Cold War. To begin with, these countries inherited the diversity of political traditions that characterised European politics in the 18th and 19th centuries, either directly over time (as in the case of France, Britain and West Germany) or indirectly through their colonial heritage (as was the case in Canada). Moreover, their parliamentary institutions significantly increase the susceptibility of the executive to partisan influence and in doing so afford a greater role to ideological debates in foreign policymaking. There are three reasons why ideological differences are more prevalent in parliamentary systems. First, the executive depends on the support of the parliamentary party for its survival and cannot ignore its demands.⁷¹ Second, the presence of fewer checks and balances allows for decisive government without the need to compromise with the opposition on matters of principle.⁷² Third, top-level executive appointments are made on the grounds of political affiliation rather than subject-matter expertise.⁷³

Third, each of these states possessed the necessary power resources to chart a more independent strategy should it wish to do so, including significant military, economic and bureaucratic resources. Not only did this enable the possibility of variation on the dependent variable, it also ensured that it was *consequential*, as the implications

⁷¹ Rathbun (2004), p. 37; Waltz (1967)

⁷² Tsebelis (1995), p. 314

⁷³ Flynn (2014). In the US, for example, it is not uncommon for executive office-holders to continue under the administration of a different party. In parliamentary systems this almost never occurs.

of these countries reorienting their foreign policy position was often crucial for third-parties and for the US, not to mention for the significant population of each country. Moreover, to the extent that the resources of the US dwarfed those of the four countries, they made the most of the multifarious forms of power available to smaller and medium states in order to redress this imbalance.⁷⁴ This included, for example, the threat to tip the balance of global power one way or another,⁷⁵ the use of economic and industrial resources as leverage in negotiations, and a reliance on the institutional power afforded by their key positions in international forums,⁷⁶ (especially as their power was buttressed by unanimity requirements and the ‘one state one vote’ rule).⁷⁷

Country	Political System	Major Parties	Political Culture
Canada	Majoritarian Parliamentary	New Democratic Party Liberal Party of Canada Progressive Conservative	Left-wing marginalised
France	Proportional Parliamentary (4 th) Majoritarian Semi-presidential (5 th)	Communist (PCF) Socialist (PS) Centrists (UDF) Gaullists (UDR, RPR)	Broad left to right
West Germany	Proportional Parliamentary	Social Democrats (SPD) Free Democrats (FDP) Christian Democrats (CDU-CSU)	Right-wing marginalised
United Kingdom	Majoritarian Parliamentary	Labour Liberal Conservative	Broad left to right

Figure 7: Country-level attributes in the four cases.

⁷⁴ See Elman (1995), p. 173, for a discussion.

⁷⁵ Kennan (1947), for example, was particularly concerned the US maintain its hold over the industrial heartland of Western Europe.

⁷⁶ Barnett & Duvall (2005), p. 48; Bourantonis & Magliveras (2002); Schweller & Pu (2011); Voeten (2004)

⁷⁷ E.g. Eagleton-Pierce (2013); Hassdorf (2005); Manners (2002)

Competing Explanations of Cold War Strategy

The Horseshoe Model and the Cold War

The politics of Cold War strategy in these countries coalesced around fundamental differences between the major ideological traditions of socialism, liberalism and conservative concerning the nature of international order and the place of the respective country within this environment. These world-views, in turn, had important consequences for the strength of alignment that respective governments would seek to pursue with the US. Although each ideology offered competing visions in this regard, the most consequential differences existed between the liberal vision and both the socialist and conservative world-views against which it competed. Liberals were, for several reasons, far more supportive of a strong alignment with the US, and a correspondingly weak relationship with the Soviets, than were socialists or conservatives. The reasons for these differences are best explained by the three key distinctions between liberalism and its competitors highlighted by the horseshoe model: (1) its contingent notion of sovereignty, (2) its disaggregated conception of authority, and (3) its rationalist account of security.

Liberals differentiated between the two superpowers to a considerable extent. They stressed the threatening nature of the Soviet Union, which they ascribed to its authoritarian nature and its separation from the interdependent Western order. They viewed the US, in contrast, as a beacon of individual freedom and the key to protecting the Western way of life. They also embraced the interdependent order that existed in the West and promoted increasing institutionalisation of this order and the removal of national barriers to integration. They supported the establishment of strong political and legal institutions at the supra-national level to regulate this order and diminish the domestic influence of the state. Liberals sought to achieve security

through the pooling of national capabilities and the formation of a strong, collective stand against the USSR. As such they prioritised the strengthening of regional security institutions through increased rearmament and the demonstration of Western resolve, the aim of which was to deter Soviet aggression by demonstrating greater strength.

The socialist approach differentiated between the superpowers to a lesser extent, emphasising the dual threat of aggression from both Soviet totalitarianism and US capitalism, both of which they regarded as expansionist by their very nature. This was reinforced by powerful anti-hierarchical tendencies that characterised relations between strong and weak states in terms of dependence and servitude. Nor did socialists embrace transnational authority beyond the narrow confines of the UN, which they regarded as a basis for world government. In every other respect they opposed interdependence, fearing the spread of global capitalism and the resultant diminution of the state's capacity to pursue an interventionist and redistributive agenda at home. Socialists also questioned the merits of collective deterrence, believing instead that the Cold War could be overcome only through a mutual reduction of tension, the means of which necessitated a more diplomatic, more independent and less overtly pro-Western strategy of mediation.

Conservatives similarly differentiated less between the superpowers. They tended to equate threat with power, believing that the US and the Soviet Union both constituted potential threats to the nation's independence. Ideology, from this perspective, mattered little; in a dangerous anarchic environment, the strong did what they could, the weak what they must. Conservatives also opposed the creeping trend towards international governance, arguing against supra-national control on the grounds it was both illegitimate and inefficacious in international affairs. They saw

authority as emanating solely from the domestic sphere, and sought to maintain the reality of national sovereignty in the face of the increasing interdependence between states. The conservative approach sought to bolster the country's national independence by engaging simultaneously with both the US and USSR, a balancing act predicated on a more neutral stance, the aim of which was to increase the nation's leverage relative to both superpowers.

Although the three traditions each conceived of the Cold War in very different terms, the principal differences over the degree of alignment with the US were to be found between the liberal strategy on the one hand, and the socialist and conservative strategies on the other. The liberal approach combined a strongly differentiated view of the superpowers with support for international authority and a belief in collective security and strategic deterrence, each element reinforcing the broader liberal strategy of pursuing a strong partnership with the US to overcome the Soviet threat. The socialist approach, in contrast, portrayed both superpowers as potential threats, opposed interdependence on the grounds it threatened domestic autonomy and sought a more independent position from which to bring about a relaxation of global tension, the three elements cohering into a strategy of mediation. The conservative strategy integrated a realist notion of 'power equals threat' with a concern for national sovereignty and an independent strategy for the nation, the result being a broad strategy of balancing.

Consequences for Relations with the US

While it is the structural underpinnings of intra-Western relations that have received the most attention in the literature, whether in terms of the strategic rationale for alliance,⁷⁸ the density of the institutional and legal ties between these countries⁷⁹ or the commonality of values within the West,⁸⁰ variation in the quality of intra-Western relations is also a significant phenomenon in Cold War politics. Within the contours of relative stability and coherence, “challenges to the Western status quo have reflected significant changes in the relations among the members of that subsystem”.⁸¹ As governments came and went, they left in their wake an undulating pattern of shifting relations towards the East and West. That this was the case for the countries under consideration is evident from the historical record of the American connection in Britain,⁸² France,⁸³ West Germany,⁸⁴ and Canada.⁸⁵ It is also borne out in Figure 8 below.

⁷⁸ Joffe (1984), p. 175; Lundestad (1986)

⁷⁹ Bagozzi & Landis (forthcoming); Deudney & Ikenberry (1999); Gray & Potter (2012); Ikenberry (1992); Mansfield & Reinhardt (2008); Sylvan & Majeski (2009)

⁸⁰ Adler (1997); Borstelmann (2001), p. 47; Kahl (1998); Risse-Kappen (1995), p. 502; Williams & Neumann (2000)

⁸¹ De Porte (1986), p. 188

⁸² Allen (1954); Bartlett (1992); Baylis (1981); Baylis (1997); Bridge (1991); Dickie (1994); Dimpleby & Reynolds (1988); Dobson (1995); Dumbrell (2006); Grayling & Langdon (1988); Hathaway (1990); McDonald (1974); Ovendale (1998); Renwick (1996); Temperley (2002)

⁸³ Costigliola (1992); Davis (2003); Duroselle (1968); Hanrieder & Auton (1980), Ch. 8; Imlay (2009); Miller & Molesky (2004); Soutou (2005); Zahniser (1975)

⁸⁴ Banchoff (1999); Hanrieder (1967); Hanrieder & Auton (1980), Ch. 4; Schweigler (1974)

⁸⁵ Campbell & Christian (1996), Ch. 5; Doran (2006); Martin (1982)




Figure 8: The strength of Euratlantic-US relations, 1948-1978. Low scores indicate positive relations. Data are from Azar (1993).

The effects of ideology on Cold War strategy have a direct effect on the strength of the relationship between each of the countries under consideration and the US. When liberal ideology is powerful within the government, relations with the US are likely to be at their strongest; conversely, when liberal ideology is weak, and socialism or conservatism hold sway, these relations will likely be at their lowest. It is the central claim of this thesis that the relative power of the political centre provides a systematic explanation for this variation over time. They also have a corresponding effect on their relations with the Soviet Union, although owing to the relative absence of English-language sources on Eastern relations, this effect of ideology enters into the thesis only indirectly. To a certain extent, however, these questions are one and the same; given that closer alignment with the US tended to preclude the pursuit of a more cooperative Eastern policy, and moves towards Moscow tended to undermine relations with Washington, the two sets of relations are inextricably linked.

The effects of ideology on Euratlantic strategy and the consequences for relations with the US are important. The shifting strategic orientations of the Euratlantic states had important implications that extended beyond the impact on these countries themselves. Strategically, periods of distant intra-Western relations undermined the credibility of Western deterrence, increased the cost of defence provision and decreased the frequency of high-level military coordination.⁸⁶ Economically, they resulted in decreased trade and investment flows, an increase in ‘adversarial’ moves by either side, and decreased willingness to engage in collaboration on issues of bilateral commercial relations. Institutionally, distant relations led to decreased use of shared institutional forums and a greater likelihood of opposition within these

⁸⁶ Tuschhoff (1999), p. 146

arenas. Finally, socially, distancing was accompanied by reduced political and civilian contacts and by the cancellation of transnational educational and scientific programmes.

That being said, care must be taken not to overestimate the extent of change in Euratlantic strategy toward the US. The Euratlantic states never attempted – and seldom considered – the possibility of outright withdrawal from the Atlantic alliance or the jettisoning of the US ‘security umbrella’. Variation was a matter of degree, never absolute. That the broad contours of these strategic arrangements remained *in situ*, however, should not be held to undermine the value, or indeed validity, of the analysis. Ideology seldom results in abrupt and limitless changes in any issue-area, and foreign policy is no exception to this rule. Consider the effects of Marxism and neo-liberalism on the political economy of advanced industrial economies in recent decades. While the ideological debate is couched in absolutes – in terms like ‘managed economy’ and ‘the free-market’ – the eventual consequences for the level of government intervention in the economy are relatively minor. This does not mean that these changes are not ideological in nature, or that they are unimportant; rather, it cautions that the consequences of ideology on politics and society will only ever approximate the ideal-typical visions on which they are based. This is true for economic policy and Euratlantic strategy, both.

Competing Explanations

Opposed to this ideological explanation affirming the validity of the horseshoe model in Cold War politics are a host of competing explanations drawn from various historical and theoretical schools of thought. One of the main purposes of the remainder of this chapter is to specify a research design framework that allows for the horseshoe model to be tested against these alternative explanations. Before elaborating upon the nature of the framework adopted here, I first offer a brief summary of the key theoretical claims advanced to explain the strength of relations between the Euratlantic countries and the US.

The Left-Right Model: To begin with, the majority of works on ideology and foreign policy that have addressed questions of Cold War strategy and intra-Western relations have viewed the fundamental partisan divide as a left-right one. Beyond a basic consensus on the validity of the left-right model, however, no agreement exists on the precise nature of this relationship. Two distinct approaches have emerged in the literature, neither of which has much to say about liberal ideology. The first view contends that leftist governments are more likely to preside over strong relations with the US because of their greater propensity to trust other states to reciprocate cooperation and their resulting tendency to endorse the creation of multilateral institutions that serve to intensify cooperation.⁸⁷ A second view, in contrast, has claimed that rightist governments are more likely to place greater value on strong relations with the US, owing to their tendency to support economic growth and the similarity of key ideas (like the importance of property) to the dominant values in the US.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ Rathbun (2012b)

⁸⁸ Isernia (2007), p. 57

Realism: Realists, for whom cooperation is little more than a temporary ‘modus vivendi’, have sought to explain variation in terms of allied-state dependence on the US.⁸⁹ According to the realist view we would expect cooperation to be highest at times when the level of external threat facing the states is such that their dependence on the US is at its highest.⁹⁰ During the Cold War this external threat was provided largely by the actions of the Soviet Union. When the threat from the USSR was strong, the allies turned to the US for protection; this was readily supplied because of the US’ interest in maintaining the global balance of power, and the surrender of autonomy was accepted by the allied states as a necessary trade-off in calculating the best means of attaining security.⁹¹ Conversely, when the Soviet threat was low, the allied states needed the US security umbrella less, and feared the potential loss of autonomy resulting from the power differential between the US and themselves.

Liberalism: Liberals have argued that the extent of cooperation is determined largely by the pattern of interests under conditions of economic interdependence.⁹² They claim that patterns of cooperation vary according to the similarity of national preferences and the presence of regimes able to bolster cooperation by ensuring against defection and reducing transactions costs.⁹³ The decision of whether or not to cooperate is thus a strategic one, which depends on the potential gains from cooperation and the guarantees inherent in the broader context for ensuring agreements are kept by other states. Applied to the Cold War scenario, liberals have emphasised the path-dependent effects of increasing economic interdependence and

⁸⁹ Gaddis (1986); Mearsheimer (2001); Waltz (1979)

⁹⁰ Kupchan (1988), p. 318; Tuschhoff (1999), pp. 140-141; Weitsman (2003), pp. 110-112

⁹¹ Joffe (1984); Lundestad (1986)

⁹² Keohane (1984); Keohane & Nye (1971); Moravcsik (1993); Oye (1985)

⁹³ Abbott & Snidal (1998); Axelrod & Keohane (1985); Haggard & Simmons (1987); Krasner (1982); Milner (1992); Ruggie (1982)

institutionalisation throughout the period as leading to more cooperative forms of international engagement between the Western states.⁹⁴

Marxism: Marxists, in contrast, have attempted to define a more holistic approach to intra-Western relations that places them within a broad historical and social context.⁹⁵ They view US-ally relations as the end-result of a process of capitalist expansion which has sought to restructure the political economy of client states to serve the interests of American capital.⁹⁶ Because the elites within the weaker client states also benefit from access to US capital, a superficial analysis of the inter-governmental relations between the US and its allies will mask the exploitative nature of these relationships, which operate against the interests of those in the periphery of both countries.⁹⁷ From the Marxist perspective, inter-allied cooperation is likely to be highest when the economic dependence of the allied states on the US economy is greatest,⁹⁸ or at those times when the interests of the elites in both states are sufficiently aligned that we may identify the emergence of a transnational class.⁹⁹

Economic Performance: Scholars focusing on the nexus between economic performance and foreign policy have argued that international cooperation often suffers during times of recession.¹⁰⁰ There are three reasons why this is thought to be the case. First, poor economic performance and times of recession correlate highly with the rise of anti-centrist political forces on both the left and the right. As these groups are least likely to pursue internationalist policies, we would expect to see

⁹⁴ Duffield (1992); Olson & Zeckhauser (1966), p. 273; Oneal (1990), p. 401; Pierson (2000)

⁹⁵ Cox (1981)

⁹⁶ Barkawi & Laffey (1999), 419; Gill & Law (1993), 96

⁹⁷ Galtung (1971), p. 84

⁹⁸ Cardoso & Faletto (1979), Wallerstein (1974)

⁹⁹ Van der Pijl (1998)

¹⁰⁰ Volgy & Schwarz (1991)

them decline in popularity.¹⁰¹ Second, economic problems at home are likely to distract the government's attention away from the conduct of its external relations and towards the economic problems faced by firms and citizens. Third, and related, governments may seek to engineer external 'crises' to help reduce the salience of domestic issues that they are unable to solve;¹⁰² such attempts are not likely to be characterised by cooperative external relations.

American Politics: Several approaches emphasise the importance of political and ideological changes in the US for the strength of relations with the allies. One claim frequently aired is that Democratic administrations have traditionally supported a greater role for the US' allies in the formulation of Cold War strategy. Various explanations have arisen for this hypothesis, including that Democrats are more trusting and therefore supportive of multilateral solutions,¹⁰³ more open to a global US role,¹⁰⁴ and more willing to finance an extensive strategy of containment that relied on strong allied support.¹⁰⁵ A second claim to invoke US politics claims that international cooperation is a function of the distance between the ideologies of different governments. This approach argues leaders will likely ally with their ideological brethren because they view those with similar values to themselves as less threatening and as more desirable partners on the international stage.¹⁰⁶

Individual Leadership: A final competing approach views relations with the US as the product of the world-views and personality traits of individual leaders and the extent to which these 'mesh' with their counterparts in other governments. Leaders who are cooperative, or hold similar views to other leaders, so the argument goes, are

¹⁰¹ Gamble (1995), pp. 158-159; Mughan & Lacy (2002)

¹⁰² Gelpi (1997); Norpoth (1987)

¹⁰³ Rathbun (2011); Rathbun (2012a)

¹⁰⁴ Green (2012), p. 32

¹⁰⁵ Gaddis (1982), pp. 356-357

¹⁰⁶ Haas (2003); Haas (2005), p. 15; Walt (1987)

more likely to preside over cooperative relations than those who do not exhibit these features. Arguments linking the quality of bilateral relations to the temperament of the leaders at the time are commonplace in the literature on the politics of foreign policy in the British,¹⁰⁷ French,¹⁰⁸ West German¹⁰⁹ and Canadian cases.¹¹⁰ Prominent examples of strong personal relations include those between Reagan and Thatcher, and Truman and King, while relations between Diefenbaker and Kennedy, and Wilson and Johnson, are often ascribed to a clash of personalities. Although this kind of explanation is perhaps most prominent in the historical literature,¹¹¹ it has also been subject to a certain degree of social scientific inquiry.¹¹²

The Research Design Framework

To test the validity of the horseshoe model I adopt a mixed-methods research strategy that combines qualitative case studies of the four countries (Britain, France, West Germany, and Canada) with a quantitative analysis of Cold War strategy from 1948 to 1978. The aim of the mixed-methods approach is to diversify the number of sources from which the evidence is drawn and to combine the most helpful elements of qualitative and quantitative methodologies.¹¹³ The mixed-methods design combines the conceptual precision¹¹⁴ and attention to historical detail¹¹⁵ of the qualitative methodology with the broad scope and analytical rigour of the

¹⁰⁷ Burk (2009), p. 37; Dumbrell (2006), p. 75; Jones (1997), pp. 7, 205, 227.

¹⁰⁸ Brands (1987), p. 484; Waites (1976), p. 452

¹⁰⁹ Johnson & Freyberg (1997), p. 172; Oliver (1997); Szabo (2004), pp. 7-9

¹¹⁰ Doran (2006), pp. 392-393; Lubin (2003), p. 22; Michaud (2006), p. 41

¹¹¹ Ashbee (2013), p. 1202

¹¹² Hall & Yarhi-Milo (2012); Hermann (1980); Rasler *et al.* (1980)

¹¹³ Brady *et al.* (2006)

¹¹⁴ Bennett & Elman (2006); Brady *et al.* (2004), p. 8; pp. 858-859; Bates *et al.* (1998), pp. 10-12; McKeown (2004), pp. 152-153; Sartori (1970); Tarrow (1995), p. 472; Thomas (2005), pp. 861-863

¹¹⁵ Kreuzer (2010), p. 370; Sewell (1996), p.264; Trachtenberg (2006)

quantitative method.¹¹⁶ It is only through the combination of both methodologies that we are able to generate sufficient evidence that a causal relationship exists, for this task requires attention to a number of factors – including mechanisms, micro-foundations, and generalizability – not possessed by any single approach.¹¹⁷

Each of the two elements plays a different role in the overall research design. The case studies allow for the provision of a significant amount of contextual information on the politics and history of each case and for the tracing of political ideologies over time. They also allow for the direct observation of the hypothesised causal mechanisms and for the identification of the role played by competing explanations ‘on the ground’. The quantitative analysis extends the scope of the inquiry by incorporating observations from multiple countries. This helps establish the theory’s ability to travel to other cases and acts as a robustness check on the findings from the case studies. The quantitative analysis also allows us to control for the potentially confounding effects of national and structural attributes and to control statistically for the effects of competing explanations.

The research design offers three distinct kinds of evidence to be used in weighting up the relative validity of the horseshoe model and its alternatives (Figure 9). (1) *Configurational Analysis*: First, each case study features an overview of the politics of each country’s relations with the US that establishes the values for each period of governmental tenure on both the independent and dependent variables. (2) *In-Depth Analysis*: Second, each study focuses on key periods of the country’s relationship with the US, tracing in detail the role of ideology and other factors over several years. (3) *Quantitative Analysis*: Third, the statistical analysis provides an assessment

¹¹⁶ Bueno de Mesquita (1996); Collier *et al.* (2004); King *et al.* (1994), pp. 23-31

¹¹⁷ Gerring (2005); Mahoney (2008)

of the significance of the key independent variable in a variety of situations and offers an estimation of the magnitude of its effect. Together these allow us to triangulate the source of variation in Cold War strategy and intra-Western relations by presenting evidence from a multitude of different perspectives.¹¹⁸ I describe the nature of each approach and the sources used in greater detail below.

Methodology	Description	Function
Configurational Analysis	Comparison of governmental tenure and Euratlantic-US relations, 1945-1990	(1) Establish values on IV and DV
		(2) Highlight cross-national and cross-temporal trends
In-depth Analysis	In-depth study of salient moments in Euratlantic-US relations	(1) Process-trace causal mechanisms
		(2) Consider competing explanations
Quantitative Analysis	Quantitative analysis of 22 Euratlantic states and relations with US and USSR, 1948-1978	(1) Establish external validity
		(2) Increased analytical rigour
		(3) Test against competing explanations

Figure 9: The functions of each element of the research design.

¹¹⁸ Flick (1992)

Case Studies I: Configurational Analysis

The first section of each country study consists of a survey of the positions and strength of the major political actors and their beliefs and a summary of the politics of the relationship with the US from 1945 to 1990. The aim of this overview is to chart changes in the ideology informing government and the quality of relations with the US for successive administrations. This allows us to view the different combinations of values on both variables for a significant number of cross-national and cross-temporal cases. I rely on multiple secondary historical sources to identify the relevant values for each administration. With only a few exceptions, there is usually consensus among historians on both the content of a governing party's ideology and the strength of its relations with the US.

The values for each of the cases are inferred from the presence of key indicators for both variables. Values on the independent variable, ideology, are derived from the domestic and international commitments associated with each of the three traditions, summarised in Figure 10 below. I classify each period of governmental tenure according to a five-point scale from left to right (Socialism/Social Liberalism/Liberalism/New Right/Conservatism). Values on the dependent variable, the quality of relations with the US, are located in the presence (or corresponding absence) of the key strategic, economic and political indicators of strong relations, as summarised in Figure 11 below. The strength of relations is also classified according to a five-point scale (Very Weak/Weak/Moderate/Strong/Very Strong).

	Socialism	Liberalism	Conservatism
Domestic	(1) Public ownership (2) Economic intervention (3) Redistribution (4) Social justice	(1) Individual freedom (2) Rule of law (3) Free-market economy (4) Need for incentives	(1) Social stability (2) Private property (3) Traditional values (4) National identity
International	(1) Mediation in conflict (2) Colonialism immoral (3) Highly sceptical of force (4) Oppose free trade	(1) Support for IOs (2) Promote freedom abroad (3) Force as last resort (4) Lens of interdependence	(1) National sovereignty (2) Dangers of anarchy (c) Opposition to IOs (d) Utility of force

Figure 10: Indicators of the three ideological traditions

	Programme	Contact	Regime Creation	Knowledge	Rhetoric
Strategic	Joint military exercises	High-level military meetings	Military pact or alliance	Intelligence sharing	Support for military acts
Economic	Shared production or procurement	Coordination on economic matters	Trade agreement	Consultation on economic changes/shocks	Favourable mentions of economic contribution
Political	Social, cultural and educational exchanges	Frequent political contacts	Institutions for policy coordination	Regular ministerial coordination	Mention of support for government

Figure 11: Indicators of strong bilateral relations

Case Studies II: In-Depth Analysis

Within each country study I also provide an in-depth account of the politics of ideology at four specific times. The intention of focusing on these moments is to observe the mechanisms associated with changes to a country's Cold War strategy. Specifically, I focus on the following four cases: The negotiations leading up to the rejection of the EDC Treaty in the French Fourth Republic (1950-1954), the Suez Crisis in Britain (1955-1957), the nuclear weapons controversy in Canada (1956-1963) and the decision to deploy Pershing II missiles in West Germany (1979-1983). Although some cases implicate multiple actors (such as the Suez crisis, and to a lesser extent the Pershing II deployments), it was decided to focus on a different case for each country in order to increase the number of 'windows' into Cold War politics being offered.

These individual cases were selected according to three criteria that they all possess. The first is that the politics of the time centred on the basic question of the country's role in the Cold War world. This is self-evident in the French, West German and Canadian cases, and, as I shall demonstrate later, applies to a significant extent in the British case also. The second is that they mark the high point of the political salience of each country's relationship with the US. During each of these periods the primary political issue concerned the value of the Atlantic alliance to the country in question. The third is that significant domestic and international consequences could be discerned in the aftermath of the events in question. That this was the case may be inferred from the incidences of governmental collapse in the cases; this occurred multiple times in the French case and once in both the West German and Canadian cases, while in the British case it was the leader, not the government, who fell in response.

Each study is composed from a combination of archival and historical sources. These include party publications, political biographies, newspaper reports, speeches, cabinet papers, minutes of meetings and the personal papers of various individuals (the various sources consulted are listed in Figure 12 below). I also consult the existing historical and social scientific literature on each case in order to identify the most prominent explanations that have already been put forward.

Primary Sources	Secondary Sources
Minutes of cabinet and ministerial meetings	Political biographies
Party documents	Election manifestoes
Transcripts of speeches and public addresses	Government publications (e.g. FRUS, DBPO)
Personal papers of heads of state and ministers	Secondary historical literature

Figure 12: Sources used in constructing the case studies.

Quantitative Analysis

The statistical analysis consists of a series of OLS regression models analysing the determinants of the intensity of actions between Western states and their allies. I use longitudinal panel data from a sample of twenty-two Western democracies from the period 1948 to 1978, offering a total of 565 separate observations of foreign policy actions. The data cover 70% of the time frame of the Cold War and include every Western ally of the US for which data were available. I run a series of models to determine the causes of the strength of Euratlantic relations with the US. I complement this by running similar models concerning the relations of these states with the Soviet Union.

I incorporate three different sets of variables into the quantitative analysis. First, I specify the primary independent and dependent variables that are implicated in the predictions of the liberalism thesis: political ideology and the quality of relations. For the former I rely on data from the Comparative Manifesto Project, while for the latter I utilise the intensity scale from the COPDAB events dataset. Second, I incorporate several important control variables into the model based on relevant international and domestic attributes. I include variables for national power, regime type, and the duration and intensity of interaction. Third, I include variables to capture the predictions of competing theories. These operationalise the claims of the following competing explanations: the left-right model, realism, liberalism, Marxism, economic performance, American politics, and individual leadership.

There are three functions of the quantitative element of the research design. The first is to extrapolate the claims of the theory beyond the immediate four cases from which it has been demonstrated. By extending the scope of the application to an additional eighteen country cases, the quantitative study helps increase our

confidence in the external validity of the liberalism thesis. The second function of the statistical chapter is to increase our confidence in the rigour of the coding exercise. This is important, because the two most important variables involved in the study – ideology and cooperation – are notoriously difficult to measure, and historical works from different countries at different times do not share a common methodology. The third function of the quantitative analysis is to establish the relative validity of competing explanations of the intensity of interactions between allies by testing the horseshoe model directly against alternative theories.

Conclusion: Testing the Horseshoe Model

I argued in this chapter that the Cold War relations between the US and Euratlantic states offers an appropriate test of the validity of the Cold War given the common assumption that the intensity of the strategic threat made domestic politics relatively unimportant during the time. I discussed the predictions of the horseshoe model for Euratlantic strategy and contrasted the model with competing theoretical explanations, before outlining a mixed-methods research design framework, the aim of which is to test the validity of the theory's propositions.

4 / The EDC Treaty and Franco-American Relations, 1950-54

Introduction

In this chapter I present the findings from the case study of Franco-American relations and discuss the implications of the results for the horseshoe model. I begin by offering an overview of the international and domestic context of post-war France before discussing the ideological positions of the major French political parties. I then discuss the politics of Franco-American relations from 1945 to 1990 before focusing in-depth on the EDC negotiations of the early 1950s.

International and Domestic Context

France in the Post War World

France's position in the post-war international order can be understood only by in relation to its historical role in the European system and the impact the Second World War had on this. Prior to the conflict France was an imperial power with considerable international influence. Though suffering crippling economic problems in the aftermath of the First World War, France recovered its economic and industrial might during the interwar period and remained a major player in world politics. The onset of the Second World War, however, and the Fall of France in 1940, marked a watershed in France's position. France became a 'defeated nation' in both material and psychological terms: Materially the architecture of the French state and its independent national capabilities dissolved with the Fall of France and the occupation of those areas outside Vichy control, while psychologically the defeat

obviated the country's sense of national pride and introduced damaging social divisions.

At the end of the war the French state's economic problems were compounded by the absence of a triumphalist narrative of 'victory'. France's independence was restored predominantly by the efforts of external actors (though the influence of the resistance in France was considerable) and it was upon those actors that the country needed to depend in order to rebuild its economy. France depended in particular on the US; the reconstruction of the French economy after the war was made possible by the loans agreed in the Blum-Byrnes accord in 1946 and the Marshall Plan in 1948.¹¹⁹ The economic dependence of France on the US was reinforced by a strategic dependence once the implications of the USSR's expansionist foreign policy goals became clear, making the actions of the US ever-present in the eyes of French decision-makers.

Political institutions also needed reconstruction, and the period 1945-47 saw the implementation of institutional arrangements that became the French Fourth Republic, a parliamentary system that struggled to deal with the myriad domestic and international problems encountered by successive French governments in the 1940s and 1950s. These periodic crises were predominantly economic; indeed, during the period between the 1946 and 1951 elections, six separate governments collapsed after defeat on economic or budgetary issues. Meanwhile, France's efforts to cling on to its overseas territories – notably in Indochina and Algeria – led to frequent external crises, brutal conflict and, in the Algerian case, domestic rebellion. Ultimately the institutions of the Fourth Republic proved unable to cope with the pressures of conflicts resulting from decolonisation, and the Algiers crisis – in which

¹¹⁹ Imlay (2009), p. 506

elements of the military entered open rebellion against the state – heralded the demise of the Fourth Republic and its replacement by the semi-presidential institutions of the Fifth Republic.

France's withdrawal from the world stage in the aftermath of the war was never total, however, and the country remained an influential 'middle-power' on the world stage. France gained a permanent seat on the UNSC at the organisation's creation and retained the informal status of a 'great power'. French concern at its lack of consultation relative to that of Britain notwithstanding, French support was sought for many pressing international issues by the other Western powers. The country also retained a considerable sphere of influence in the Francophone world and was able to use its presence in its former colonies to its military and economic advantage. Perhaps most important of all, however, France's construction of an independent nuclear deterrent – begun under the Mendès-France government in 1954 and only later infused with Gaullist rhetoric – cemented France's continuing importance as a world power.

France's relations with the Western powers during the period offer more examples of conflict than the other country cases.¹²⁰ France has sought to distance itself from the US to a greater extent than other allies, and the period of Gaullist domination of the Fifth Republic marks the zenith of French anti-Americanism (though this is by no means the only example). Despite challenges to the Atlantic order, of course, France has always maintained its status as a 'Western' power and depended ultimately upon the US' security guarantee, but this has not prevented frequent moves away from close inter-allied cooperation. The one stabilising factor in French allied relations has been the importance of European integration, the product of French designs to

¹²⁰ Davis (2003); Miller & Molesky (2004)

contain West German power on the continent. Whether conceived as a regional manifestation of a broader Western alliance, or as a means of balancing US influence, the French commitment to Europe represented an important continuity in French foreign policy during the period.

The French Political System(s)

The politics of post-war France are marked by both change and continuity; the move from the parliamentary Fourth Republic to the semi-presidential Fifth Republic injected far-reaching changes into the party system and the conduct of politics, whilst the continuity of political traditions and many of the parties that endorsed them offered a modicum of continuity between the two systems. The Fourth Republic was created under De Gaulle's provisional government in the immediate aftermath of the war. The constitutional structure of the new Republic comprised a National Assembly of 544 seats with elections held on the basis of a closed-list system of proportional representation, meaning that the parties retained control over the selection of candidates while the proportion of votes determined the number of seats allocated each grouping. The conduct of foreign and domestic policy lay with the Prime Minister, the individual able to command a workable majority in the legislature, selected predominantly through inter-party bargaining.

The large number of parties, when coupled with the diversity of ideological traditions in French politics and the frequency of domestic and international crises, made governing under the Fourth Republic extremely difficult. The average tenure of governments was less than one year and many coalitions were comprised of precarious combinations of rival political traditions. Moreover, from the 1951

elections onwards, anti-system elements both communist and Gaullist significantly increased their representation in the National Assembly, reducing the number of viable coalition partners yet further. The demise of the Fourth Republic came about as a consequence of France's troubled decolonisation programme and the eruption of the 'Algiers crisis' in 1958. The defection of elements of the French Army to the *pieds-noir* – French settlers in Algeria who opposed the cessation of French rule – and subsequent government inaction led the military to demand De Gaulle take control of the government. Under the pressure of an impending military coup and De Gaulle's willingness to return to power, the Fourth Republic voted to dissolve itself and the process of creating a new constitution was begun.

Year	System	Operation	Notes
1945	Closed-list PR	Closed-list proportional representation with threshold. Inter-party alliances do not affect list.	-
1946 - 1950	Open-list PR	Open-list proportional representation without threshold. Inter-party alliances do not affect list.	Although the ordering of the list was nominally open to voter influence in cases where over 50% voted to alter it, in practice this never occurred, making the system effectively closed-list PR.
1951 - 1957	PR/Majority Hybrid	Closed-list proportional representation if no majority obtained (seats allocated to single party if majority obtained). Inter-party alliances can affect list.	These reforms were designed to undermine the support of the Communist party, which would see its list-allocated seats disappear in districts where other parties could hold a majority, and which held no viable allies.
1958-1985	Two-Ballot FPTP	FPTP system with two rounds. If a candidate obtains a majority they are elected. Otherwise a second round is held with the weakest parties excluded and the candidate obtaining a plurality is elected.	-
1986-1990	Closed-list PR	Closed-list proportional representation with threshold.	This system was used only for the 1986 legislative elections.

Figure 13: Electoral systems used for French legislative elections, 1945-1990. Adapted from Stevens (1996), pp. 220-221.

Date	Event	Prime Minister	Party	Governing Parties (Seats)
Oct-45	Legislative election	De Gaulle	n/a	PCF (148) MRP (141) SFIO (134)
Jan-46	Resignation	Gouin	SFIO	PCF (148) MRP (141) SFIO (134)
Jun-46	Legislative election	Bidault	MRP	MRP (160) PCF (148) SFIO (115)
Nov-46	Legislative election	Blum	SFIO	SFIO (115)
Jan-47	Resignation	Ramadier	SFIO	PCF (166) MRP (158) SFIO (90) Radical (55)
May-47	Coalition changes	Ramadier	SFIO	MRP (158) SFIO (90) Radical (55)
Nov-47	Resignation	Schuman	MRP	MRP (158) Radical (55) CNIP (70) RPF (5)
Jul-48	Resignation	Marie	Radical	MRP (158) Radical (55) CNIP (70)
Sep-48	Resignation	Queuille	Radical	MRP (158) Radical (55) CNIP (70)
Oct-49	Resignation	Bidault	MRP	MRP (158) Radical (55) CNIP (70)
Feb-50	Coalition changes	Bidault	MRP	MRP (158) Radical (55) CNIP (70)
Jul-50	Resignation	Pleven	UDSR	MRP (158) SFIO (90) Radical (55) CNIP (70) RPF (5)
Mar-51	Resignation	Queuille	Radical	MRP (158) SFIO (90) Radical (55) CNIP (70)
Jun-51	Legislative election	Pleven	UDSR	RPF (107) SFIO (94) MRP (82) Radical (77) CNIP (87)
Mar-52	Coalition changes	Pinay	CNIP	RPF (107) MRP (82) Radical (77) CNIP (87)
Jan-53	Resignation	Mayer	Radical	RPF (107) MRP (82) Radical (77) CNIP (87)
Jul-53	Resignation	Laniel	SFIO	RPF (107) MRP (82) Radical (77) CNIP (87)
Jun-54	Resignation	Mendes-France	Radical	RPF (107) MRP (82) Radical (77) CNIP (87)
Feb-55	Resignation	Faure	Radical	RPF (107) MRP (82) Radical (77) CNIP (87)
Jan-56	Legislative election	Mollet	Socialist	SFIO (88) Radical (73) RPF (16)
Jun-57	Resignation	Bourges-Maunoury	Radical	SFIO (88) Radical (73) RPF (16)
Nov-57	Resignation	Gaillard	Radical	SFIO (88) Radical (73) MRP (71) RPF (16) CNIP (95)
May-58	Resignation	Pflimlin	MRP	Radical (73) MRP (71) RPF (16) CNIP (95)

Figure 14: Prime Ministers and Government Composition in the Fourth Republic, 1945-58. Data are from Woldendorp *et al.* (2000).




Figure 15: Government composition in the Fourth Republic as a percentage of seats, 1945-58.

Given the problems encountered by the Fourth Republic, the Fifth Republic was designed with political stability in mind. Problems had been of two kinds: first, governmental tenure had been incredibly short, with over twenty different governments in thirteen years, second, fractionalisation was high, with governments encompassing a large number of parties, not all of which held compatible views. The Fifth Republic overcame both these problems by adopting a semi-presidential constitution based on a predominantly majoritarian electoral system (the ‘second ballot’). The appointment of the Prime Minister and the conduct of the country’s external relations would be the preserve of the President of the Republic, elected to represent the nation on a lengthy seven-year mandate, whilst the day-to-day affairs of the government would be the preserve of the Prime Minister, supported by a smaller number of parties in the legislature. The institutions of the Fifth Republic were largely successful in this regard. Since 1958 governments have lasted longer than under the Fourth Republic and majorities have been theoretically (though not always empirically) obtained by a combination of two parties after most elections.

Date	Event	President	Party	Prime Minister	Party	Governing Parties (Seats)
Nov-58	Legislative election	De Gaulle	UNR	Debre	UNR	UNR (198) CNIP (133) MRP (57) RS (23)
Apr-62	Coalition changes	De Gaulle	UNR	Debre	UNR	UNR (198) CNIP (133) MRP (57)
May-62	Coalition changes	De Gaulle	UNR	Debre	UNR	UNR (198) CNIP (133)
Nov-62	Legislative election	De Gaulle	UNR	Pompidou	UNR	UNR (230) IR (18)
Mar-67	Legislative election	De Gaulle	UNR	Pompidou	UNR	UNR (191) IR (41)
Jun-68	Legislative election	De Gaulle	UDR	Couve de Murville	UDR	UDR (282) IR (64)
Jun-69	Coalition changes	Pompidou	UDR	Couve de Murville	UDR	UDR (282) IR (64) DC (26)
Mar-73	Legislative election	Pompidou	UDR	Messmer	UDR	UDR (178) IR (54) CDP (21)
May-74	Coalition changes	Giscard D'Estaing	IR	Chirac	UDR	UDR (178) IR (54) RM (30) CDP (21) MRSL (11)
Aug-76	Coalition changes	Giscard D'Estaing	IR	Barre	IR	UDR (178) IR (54) CDP (21) MRSL (11)
Mar-78	Legislative election	Giscard D'Estaing	UDF	Barre	UDF	RPR (142) UDF (124)
May-81	Legislative election	Mitterrand	PS	Mauroy	PS	PS (268) PCF (43)
Jul-84	Coalition changes	Mitterrand	PS	Fabius	PS	PS (268)
Mar-86	Legislative election	Mitterrand	PS	Chirac	RPR	RPR (146) UDF (128)
May-88	Legislative election	Mitterrand	PS	Rocard	PS	PS (260)

Figure 16: Presidents, Prime Ministers and Government Composition in the Fifth Republic, 1958-90.
Data are from Woldendorp *et al.* (2000).




Figure 17: Government composition in the Fifth Republic by number of seats, 1958-90

Political Parties in Cold War France

The party system in France is unusually chaotic when compared with that of other Western countries. There is a broad scope of ideological heterogeneity across the parties and a large number of individual actors filling the spaces in-between, many of which have changed significantly – or disappeared – over time. One source of this heterogeneity is the broad scope of political culture in France, with strong popular support for communism, socialism, liberalism, and conservatism. Although partly the European norm this heterogeneity was reinforced by the particularities of French history. As the site of the greatest ideological upheaval of the eighteenth century, the French Revolution of 1789, it was French intellectuals and policymakers who gave form to the ideological traditions predominant during the twentieth century. Moreover, the immediate post-war context of France, and the history of occupation and resistance, offered increasing legitimacy to the communists (many of whom had

been active in resistance circles) whilst at the same time failing to delegitimise wholesale the political right (as was to be the case in West Germany).

The different pressures of the Fourth and Fifth Republics help explain the relationship between these popular ideologies and the parties that endorsed their precepts. The Fourth Republic, with its system of proportional representation, allowed smaller parties to prosper in the legislature. As a direct consequence these parties were able to carve out relatively discrete ideological positions for themselves (see Figure 18 below). Distinct communist, socialist, liberal, conservative, Gaullist and far-right party groups can be identified in the National Assembly of the Fourth Republic, many (though not all) of which were represented by more than one party.

The shift from Fourth to Fifth Republics had important consequences for the nature of the French party system. The first was a temporary fragmentation and realignment of the various political forces in relation to Gaullism. Division were created within various movements depending on whether party factions supported or opposed Gaullist-backed institutions and the general trajectory of 'Gaullist' France.¹²¹ The second consequence was the long-term trend towards the aggregation of diverse ideological positions and the creation of broader parties in response to the pressures of the majoritarian electoral system, which increased the disproportionality between vote share and seat share for smaller parties. The period 1958-90 saw, as a result, the gradual emergence of a leftist bloc composed of communist and socialist groupings alongside the simultaneous amalgamation of the centrist parties and of the centrist and Gaullist 'presidential majority'.¹²²

¹²¹ Cerny (1972), pp. 443-444

¹²² Machin (1989), p. 60




Figure 18: Representation of fit between parties and ideologies in France.

French Communist Party

The principal exponent of Marxist ideology in France was the *Parti communiste français* (PCF), the French Communist Party. The PCF represented a bastion of continuity in French politics; it underwent few ideological changes from the 1940s to the 1970s and its core constituency of urban workers changed very little, although it did steadily decline in popularity over the decades.¹²³ The PCF participated in coalition government from 1945 to 1947 with socialists and liberals before their dismissal from office. From 1958 onwards the PCF and PS engaged in several attempts to construct a unified leftist platform, the most serious of which – the ‘common programme’ of 1972 – broke down in 1977 owing to disagreement over the scope of proposed nationalisations and the PCF’s realisation that the chief electoral beneficiary of intra-left cooperation was the PS. In 1981 the PCF returned to government in an oversized coalition with the PS after having renounced several key Marxist principles, only to withdraw their support in 1984 following the government’s move to the right in economic policy.

Ideologically the PCF endorsed an orthodox Marxist interpretation of French society that emphasised the ‘science’ of economic determinism and the proletarian struggle against bourgeois capitalism.¹²⁴ Though opposed to the bourgeois institutions of the Republic, the PCF did view electoral institutions as a legitimate means of seizing power, and broadly endorsed the Leninist conception of the vanguard party as the best means of achieving proletarian revolution.¹²⁵ PCF policies stressed the importance of central planning and the suppression of market mechanisms, viewing

¹²³ Adereth (1984), p. 158

¹²⁴ Bell & Criddle (1994), p. 40; Guiat (2003), pp. 59-60

¹²⁵ Mortimer (1984), p. 333

national control of industry and the creation of self-managing workers' councils (*autogestion*) as the most appropriate means of regulating economic activity.¹²⁶

Internationally the foreign policy approach of the PCF was based on the common far-left compromise between socialist internationalism and socialist realism. This involved supporting revolutionary and communist movements across the globe through the activities of the activities of Comintern and a commitment to the survival (and expansion) of state-socialism through the promotion of the interests of the USSR. Though the Cold War rhetoric of the PCF often emphasised the importance of neutrality, in reality most members sided with the USSR against the US, and the party received substantial financial transfers from Moscow.¹²⁷ The flipside of support for Moscow was a profound opposition to the US and the Western states more generally. From the PCF's perspective:¹²⁸

The United States was a capitalist behemoth threatening French political, social, economic, and cultural independence. Americans were, from this perspective, guilty of economic imperialism, warmongering, racism, incipient fascism, and cultural debasement.

The PCF's distrust of the capitalist interests of the Western states manifested itself in opposition to both NATO and the process of European unification, both of which it viewed, with suspicion, as serving the expansionist interests of capital through bellicose means.¹²⁹

¹²⁶ Bell & Criddle (1994), pp. 37-38

¹²⁷ Fejtö (1967), p. 13

¹²⁸ Kuisel (1993), p. 16

¹²⁹ Bell & Criddle (1994), p. 49

French Socialist Party

The dominant socialist party in the Fourth Republic, and the partner in many governing coalitions, was the *Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière* (SFIO). Although the intellectual foundations of the party are Marxist in orientation, the SFIO has consistently positioned itself as a social democratic and broadly social liberal party. The SFIO participated in governments with the communists and liberals during the early years of the Fourth Republic; the SFIO rejected overtures from the communists for a PCF-SFIO coalition and insisted on MRP involvement in any governing coalition. After the shift to the right that accompanied the 1951 elections to the National Assembly the party participated sporadically in government, spending many years in opposition to the centre-right governments of the early 1950s.

In May 1969 the SFIO reformed as the *Parti socialiste* (PS) and brought into the party fold informal groupings of assembly members who shared similar viewpoints. In June 1971, Mitterrand's political grouping, the *Convention des institutions républicaines*, joined the PS and simultaneously gained control of its organisational structure. In June 1972 the PS agreed a common programme with the PCF, a compromise offering of nationalisation and a rejection of France's Atlantic commitments should the left come to power.¹³⁰ The common programme eventually collapsed and the left failed to gain power until the presidential and legislative elections of 1981, at which point the balance of power within the left had swung decidedly in the PS' favour. With enough seats for a majority government without the communists, the PS allowed the PCF into government to legitimate their leftist

¹³⁰ Codding & Safran (1979), p. 223; Wilson (1982), p. 245

credentials, offering four minor cabinet posts (and no veto power) in exchange for the renouncing of the PCF's pro-Soviet orientation.

The ideology of the socialist party – from its SFIO to PS incarnations – has occupied a middle ground between social democracy and social liberalism. Though the party has been influenced by Marxist analysis, its policy prescriptions seldom evidenced any of the radicalism of their communist counterparts. Policies advocated by the SFIO/PS included the nationalisation of specific industries, greater redistribution in favour of the worse off, and an increase in the state's regulatory role. As Hanley has argued:¹³¹

Despite use of Marxist terminology...PS ideology is fundamentally reformist in scope. Economically it promised more state intervention, but always within the context of a mixed economy...Although it spoke of class...it did not think in terms of class war...and it always combined such rhetoric with commitment to increasing democratic participation and civil liberties generally, including property rights.

Socialist moderation in France was primarily the result of the PCF's independent strength; unlike in UK, where the small-size of the communist CPGB made it an unattractive option for those on the far-left, in France almost all committed Marxists joined the PCF in favour of the SFIO/PS. As a result, the party never evidences the swings between socialism and social democracy that would characterise the Labour party in the period.¹³²

The end of the Keynesian consensus in the 1970s created some division within PS ranks, with the emergence of leftist and rightist factions endorsed by the members of the *Centre d'études, de recherches et d'éducation socialiste* (CERES) and the Rocardists respectively, and the advocacy of a continued middle way endorsed by

¹³¹ Hanley (1986), p. 114

¹³² Bell & Criddle (1984), p. 11; Bell & Criddle (2014), p. 20; Mortimer (1984), p. 357

the Mitterrandists. In 1979 Mitterrand allied with CERES by proposing a strong leftist agenda, undermining the power of the Rocardists and contributing to the crucial support of the PCF in the second round of the 1981 presidential election. After gaining a majority of votes, Mitterrand committed the new PS-PCF government to follow this leftist course, instigating a sweeping programme of nationalisations, a reflationary monetary policy and measures to reduce unemployment.¹³³ By 1984, however, the failure of the majority of these policies heralded a U-turn in economic policy towards a programme of liberal reforms similar to those endorsed by the Rocardists.

The international policy of the SFIO/PS was also more reminiscent of social liberalism than it was of socialism, with the moderate stance of the PS in relation to Europe and the US responsible for a great deal of the ideological friction between the PCF and the PS. The socialists embraced a leftist humanitarianism that sought to export the social rights of the French workers around the globe and aimed at the creation of “a peaceful world devoid of political, economic, or social barriers”,¹³⁴ though they never sought to achieve this through support of revolutionary actors as the PCF did. The PS’ humanitarianism was coupled with an embrace of the supranational authority of the UN and the desire that this organisation eventually become a global legislature, and they sought to expand both the scope of the UN’s authority into those areas necessary for the removal of social and economic inequalities.¹³⁵

The moderate leftist stance of the SFIO/PS mainstream and the combination of social democracy and social liberalism led the party to endorse a qualified Atlanticism over

¹³³ Lauber (1987), p. 24

¹³⁴ Coddington & Safran (1979), p. 119

¹³⁵ Coddington & Safran (1979), p. 125

the years. Although the socialists had more reservations about both Atlanticism and US-sponsored supra-nationalism than the liberals, they did not endorse the neutralism that socialist parties in Canada, West Germany and the UK supported at various times.¹³⁶ The socialists also viewed attempts at European integration with less suspicion than their European counterparts, although they were at pains to point out that a united Europe would only be able to mediate between the superpowers if it was sufficiently independent of the US, a stance that placed some distance between themselves and the centrists.¹³⁷

Ultimately the moderate socialist and liberal Cold War positions were distinct in two respects: First, the socialists desired to mediate between the US and the USSR in the conflict, even if they did not endorse a wholly neutral stance for this mediation, whereas the liberals sought to contain the Soviet Union and create a credible deterrent through strong regional partnerships in order to do so. Second, the socialists endorsed the promotion of social and economic rights as more important than the promotion of individual liberty, and accordingly afforded greater suspicion towards the economic institutions sponsored by the US.

French Centrist Parties

The pattern of support for centrist parties in France has varied considerably over time. Under the Fourth Republic it was the centre that predominated, with the left-of-centre Christian Democratic party the *Mouvement republicain populaire* (MRP) featuring in almost all governing coalitions in the period. The fortunes of liberalism were also boosted during this early period by the cooperation between the moderate

¹³⁶ Coddington & Safran (1979), p. 129

¹³⁷ Coddington & Safran (1979), p. 129

socialist SFIO and the non-Gaullist conservatives parties (such as CNIP and the Radicals), which were each more liberally oriented than their more ideological partners, the communists and the Gaullists.

The fate of centrist parties under the Fifth Republic was initially less successful; the emergence of Gaullism as the dominant political force split the centre, with some factions preferring opposition to the Gaullists and others cooperation. While the left-of-centre parties, such as the MRP and the Radicals, gradually left the governing coalition in the early years of Gaullist rule, the centrist grouping of Giscard d'Estaing would remain in a near permanent coalition with the Gaullists for the rest of the century, first as the *Republicains indépendants* (RI) and then in the guise of the loosely-federated *Union pour la démocratie française* (UDF). Although the parties of the centre would play a significant part in government, they were always outnumbered by Gaullist deputies; even from 1976 to 1981 when both the president (Giscard) and the prime minister (Raymond Barre) were centrists.¹³⁸

The first two decades of the Fifth Republic witnessed concerted efforts to unite the disparate parties of the political centre. The Radicals left the Gaullist coalition in April 1962 with the MRP following close after in May. The Radical party split in 1972, with those on the left creating a new grouping, the *Mouvement des radicaux de gauche* (MRG), and the remaining members joining the UDF in 1978. The UDF also included Giscard's Republican Party (RP), the latest incarnation – from 1977 onwards – of the RI grouping, formed in 1962. The MRP, in contrast, led a more convoluted path. Most members migrated to the Democratic Centre (CD) in 1965,

¹³⁸ The only time the Gaullists failed to hold a majority within the governing coalition was from 1958 to 1962 when the MRP and CNIP together held a greater number of seats than the Gaullist UNR. It has been suggested that the failure to hold a majority constrained De Gaulle from implementing his independent foreign policy agenda until after the 1962 legislative elections.

which split into two factions – the Republican Movement (RM) and the Centre for Democracy and Progress (CDP) – in 1969.¹³⁹ In 1976 both factions were amalgamated into the Social Democratic Centre (CDS), which joined the RP and the Radicals under the UDF umbrella in 1978.

Ideologically the centre parties' scepticism of strong state authority and their embrace of the free market distinguish them from their competitors on the left and the right. Under the Fourth Republic the dominance of 'planning' as an economic rationale and the partisan consensus over state-led reconstruction induced a statist hue into the dominant liberal movement. The MRP was divided between those embracing an interventionist economic policy, with a significant role for the state, and those who embraced the market mechanism and viewed the primary task of the state to be the protection of individual liberty.¹⁴⁰ Despite the division between those liberals leaning to the left and those to the right, all centrists placed less emphasis on the state than did the socialists and the Gaullists, viewing the primary task of the state as the protection of individual liberty, not redistribution or national strength.

Internationally the liberal parties sought to move France in a more pro-European, pro-Atlantic direction. The 'twin pillars' of the MRP's foreign policy were European integration and the Atlantic alliance.¹⁴¹ They opposed the anti-Americanism of the Gaullists and the neutralism this brought about, as well as the unilateral strategy of nuclear deterrence later adopted by De Gaulle.¹⁴² Unlike the Gaullists, who saw Europe as a means of balancing American power, the liberals saw the construction of a united Europe as part and parcel of the US commitment to the continent. They

¹³⁹ The split was precipitated by the question of entering into a coalition with the Gaullists and the Independent Republicans in 1969. Pompidou had agreed to include more centrists in government as payment for Giscard's absence from the ballot in the previous presidential election.

¹⁴⁰ Irving (1973), p. 106

¹⁴¹ Irving (1973), p. 160

¹⁴² Einaudi & Goguel (1952), p. 194

argued for an institutionally strong Europe, with strong integration and the limitations on sovereignty, unlike the *Europe des patries* envisaged by the Gaullists.¹⁴³ In 1962, in the first few years of the Fifth Republic, the MRP party congress stated “only a Community Europe, as a partner of the United States in NATO, can assure the cohesion of the free world”.¹⁴⁴ The Radical party endorsed a similarly liberal view of international relations. Its political tradition centred on the promotion of “international conciliation, international organization, free-trade, economic coordination... interdependence [and] support for European unification”.¹⁴⁵

The centrist parties of the Fifth Republic continued to observe these liberal ideological traditions, particularly those concerning issues of foreign policy. The Giscardians diagnosed the interstate relations, at least within the West, as naturally interdependent, in stark contrast to the Gaullist emphasis on states as independent entities. They embraced both Europe and the Atlantic alliance, and sought to develop the former along strongly supranational lines. The Giscardians also sought to downplay France’s closeness to the Soviet Union, which the Gaullists had attempted to court. The principal difference between the MRP and the centrist parties of the Fifth Republic was the wholesale embrace of neoliberal economic policies. In particular the Giscardians advocated, and indeed implemented, the abolition of price controls, the elimination of subsidies and the deemphasising of economic planning.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴³ Einaudi & Goguel (1952), p. 188. The term translates as ‘Europe of states’.

¹⁴⁴ Einaudi & Goguel (1952), pp. 194-195

¹⁴⁵ O’Neill (1981), pp. 9-13

¹⁴⁶ Wilson (1982), pp. 148-149

French Conservative and Gaullist Parties

In the post-war history of France there are two conservative political groupings that have been of significance, the Gaullists, represented by successive Gaullist parties from the RPF to the RPR, and the non-Gaullist conservatives, represented primarily by those parties amalgamated into the *Centre national des independants et paysans* (CNIP) in 1948. The principal differences between these groupings concerned the extent of their anti-system commitments, their support for the market mechanism, and their social policies. The members of CNIP, a peasant and petite-bourgeois party, supported financial orthodoxy and an end to *dirigiste* policies; they also advocated for a strongly armed France with an anti-communist foreign policy stance.¹⁴⁷ The Gaullists, on the other hand, saw a stronger role for the state in social policy and opposed the free-reign of the market mechanism. They were also, unlike CNIP, decidedly anti-system during the years of the Fourth Republic and, in later years, more conciliatory towards the Soviet Union.

In spite of the collaboration between many French conservative politicians and the occupying forces, conservative groupings made moderate electoral successes from the earliest years of the Fourth Republic.¹⁴⁸ The parties gained representation individually in the elections of 1945 and 1946, until the creation of CNIP as an umbrella organisation for the right in 1948 led to the development of a common electoral platform. The Gaullist party, the *Rassemblement de peuple Francais* (RPF), created in April 1947 following De Gaulle's return to the political frontline, was primarily responsible for inducing the parties of the non-Gaullist right to amalgamate to stave off defeat. Although both CNIP and the RPF participated in Fourth Republic governments on many occasions, the Gaullists were far more sceptical of alliances

¹⁴⁷ Anderson (1974), p. 237

¹⁴⁸ Anderson (1974), p. 76

with the centrist parties than was CNIP, which called for an alliance between moderate conservatives and liberals in its 1951 electoral platform. There was also a discernible ‘anti-system’ element to Gaullist actions, and unholy alliances between the RPF and the communists against the government were not uncommon.¹⁴⁹

Given that the institutions of the Fifth Republic were created along Gaullist lines, it is understandable that it was the Gaullist variant of conservatism that dominated the political discourse of post-war politics from 1958 onwards. For the first four years of the Fifth Republic (1958-62) CNIP worked alongside the RPF in De Gaulle’s governing coalition. Yet there was little intra-conservative harmony between the two groups, and CNIP opposed the changes in foreign and economic policy introduced by De Gaulle.¹⁵⁰ Following their poor showing in the legislative elections of November 1962 CNIP split, with its members joining the *Centre democratie*, the RI and the Radicals.¹⁵¹ The Gaullists, for their part, would continue to dominate both the executive and the legislature until the mid-1970s, in coalition with the RI and subsequently the UDF.

Given the importance of Gaullist ideology in the Fifth Republic it is worth emphasising its key tenets. Gaullist political philosophy conceived of the French nation and society as an organic collective; as de Gaulle himself wrote: “She is a living entity”.¹⁵² It is this collective view of the state that distinguishes Gaullism from its liberal competitors. Gaullism, though it sought to modernize the French economy, rejected the liberal ideal of laissez faire governance of the domestic

¹⁴⁹ The rejection of the EDC treaty in 1954 was primarily the consequence of

¹⁵⁰ Anderson (1974), p. 249

¹⁵¹ That these groupings all lay at the political centre is indicative of the moderate nature of CNIP’s conservatism.

¹⁵² De Gaulle (1971), p. 3

sphere.¹⁵³ It was the nation, not the individual, which comprised the ultimate reference of Gaullist philosophy. Individuals owed duties towards their country and their fellow citizens, not simply to themselves. Although social differentiation was to be understood as part of the natural hierarchy that existed within society, not as the by-product of meritocratic individualism. Unlike liberalism, then, Gaullism saw a significant role for the state, as an expression of the wishes of the nation, a way of maintaining the existing social order, and a means of exercising duties to the less fortunate.¹⁵⁴

Internationally, Gaullism combined French nationalism with notions of 19th century *Realpolitik*; the result was an international world-view that sought to promote French interests in a dangerous world of fickle nation states and multiple potential challenges to the country's independence.¹⁵⁵ This pessimistic, realist approach to the international set the stage for the Gaullists' conduct of Cold War grand strategy: Viewing international relations through a 'balance of power' lens meant reducing French dependence in bilateral relations and promoting closer relations with the USSR as a counterweight to American influence. Ethics were here largely irrelevant; the internal ordering of the USSR was not of consequence when it came to devising the optimal strategy for maximising French power, what mattered was the promotion of French interests. De Gaulle's understanding of the value of Europe was also borne of this realist philosophy. Integration was to be welcomed as a counter-balance to US hegemony, but it should not be allowed intrude on the independence of its members.

¹⁵³ De Gaulle (1971), p. 136

¹⁵⁴ In the 1980s, the Gaullists (under the guise of the RPR) adopted many of the principles of the 'new right', and traditional Gaullist ideology underwent significant changes as a result. These included the adoption of neo-liberal policies, the downplaying of social policy and intervention, and a muting of traditional Gaullist anti-Americanism (Fysh (1993), pp. 401-402).

¹⁵⁵ Harrison (1986), pp. 175-176; Hartley (1971), p. 28




Figure 19: French parties from left to right. High scores indicate egalitarian positions. The data are from Budge *et al.* (2001).




Figure 20: Average party positions on the Individualism-Collectivism dimension of ideology, 1958-1990. High scores indicate strongly individualist positions. The data are from Budge *et al.* (2001). The precise indicators used to differentiate the two dimensions are listed in the Appendix.

Party Type	Party Name (French)	Abbreviation	Party Name (English)	Ideology	Years Active (1945-90)	Links to Other Parties
Communist	<i>Parti communiste française</i>	PCF	French Community Party	Communist	1945-1990	
Socialist	<i>Union démocratique et socialiste de la résistance</i>	UDSR	Democratic and Socialist Union of the Resistance	Socialist	-	
	<i>Parti socialiste</i>	PS	Socialist Party	Socialist	1969-1990	Emerged out of SFIO.
	<i>Section française de l'internationale ouvrière</i>	SFIO	French Section of the Workers' International	Socialist	1945-1969	Becomes PS in 1969
	<i>Mouvement des radicaux de gauche</i>	MRG	Radical Left Movement	Socialist	1972	Emerged out of Radical Party
Liberal	<i>Mouvement républicain populaire</i>	MRP	Popular Republican Movement	Liberal	1945-1967	Incorporated into DC in 1967.
	<i>Mouvement réformateur</i>	RM	Reformers Movement	Liberal	1969-1976	Split from DC. Incorporates into CDS in 1976.
	<i>Centre démocratie</i>	DC	Democratic Centre	Liberal	1967-1969	Incorporates MRP. Split in 1969 over govt membership.
	<i>Centre des démocrates sociaux</i>	CDS	Social Democratic Centre	Liberal	1976-1978*	Amalgamation of DC and CDP. Part of UDF from 1978.
	<i>Républicains indépendants</i>	IR	Independent Republicans	Liberal	1962-1977	Becomes PR in 1977
	<i>Parti républicain</i>	PR	Republican Party	Liberal	1977-1978*	Rebranding of IR. Part of UDF from 1978.
	<i>Centre, démocratie et progrès</i>	CDP	Centre, Democracy and Progress	Liberal	1969-1976	Split from DC. Incorporated into CDS in 1976.
	<i>Union pour la démocratie française</i>	UDF	Union for French Democracy	Liberal	1978-1990	Umbrella group for collection of centre parties
	<i>Parti radical</i>	Radical	Radical Party	Liberal	1945-1978*	Several members become part of MRG in 1972 and UDF in 1978.
Moderate Conservative	<i>Centre national des indépendants et paysans</i>	CNIP	National Centre of Independents and Peasants	Moderate Conservative	1951-1990	
Gaullist Conservative	<i>Rassemblement de peuple Français</i>	RPF	Rally for the French People	Conservative (Gaullist)	1947-1953**	Many members subsequently join UNR on its creation
	<i>Union pour la nouvelle république</i>	UNR	Union for the New Republic	Conservative (Gaullist)	1958-1971	Becomes UDR in 1971
	<i>Union pour la défense de la république</i>	UDR	Union for the Defence of the Republic	Conservative (Gaullist)	1971-1976	Formerly UNR. Rebranded as RPR by Chirac in 1976
	<i>Rassemblement pour la république</i>	RPR	Rally for the Republic	Conservative (Gaullist)	1976-1990	Formerly UDR.
Far-right Conservative and Nationalist	<i>Union de défense des commerçants et artisans</i>	UDCA	Poujadists	Right-wing Conservative	1953-1958	
	<i>Front national</i>	FN	National Front	Right-wing Conservative	1986-1990	

Figure 21: Political parties in France during the Cold War

The Politics of Franco-American Relations, 1945-1990

Relations between France and the US have been determined to a substantial extent by shifts in the balance of forces in the government and the changing ideological bases of foreign policy that have resulted. Though the complexities of the party system and the government's position vis-à-vis the legislature make broad generalisations somewhat inappropriate, it is generally the case that Franco-American relations have been prioritised when the balance of political forces tends towards the centre, and deemphasised when it tends to the left or the right. The Gaullists have challenged the threat of US domination and embraced a policy of national independence that sought increased engagement with the USSR, while the PCF and leftist elements of the PS have opposed the influence of US capital and sought to downplay the threat from the Soviet Union. The liberals, in contrast, have endorsed Atlanticist conceptions of collective security, promoted closer regional integration, and sought to transform the French economy along lines similar to the US.

Communist participation in government until mid-1947 prevented France from committing to either side in the emerging Cold War. From 1945 to 1947 the government was comprised a three-way split between the PCF, the SFIO and the MRP, led by socialist and centrist premiers (so-called *tripartisme*). Any option of allying with the West or participating in the collective management of West Germany was off the table, both because the communists would immediately veto any policy that directly aligned France with the West, and because other countries – particularly Britain – were sceptical of cooperating with a government that featured

communist representation.¹⁵⁶ The political situation ensured France would seek to distance itself from the emerging geopolitical alignments, the years 1945-47 being a 'neutral era' for French foreign policy.¹⁵⁷ This neutrality was to come to an abrupt end in May 1947, when socialist premier Paul Ramadier dismissed the communists from government following their refusal to support the government's efforts to maintain French control in Indochina.¹⁵⁸

In place of *tripartisme*, a series of 'third force' governments composed of the socialists (SFIO) and the centrists (MRP and Radicals) held sway from 1947 to 1951. It was during the years of the 'third force' that France would align itself with the Atlantic community and establish the necessary institutional architecture to embed this relationship. Ideologically the 'third force' sought to promote moderately interventionist economic policies at home and liberal internationalism abroad. Within a year of the communists exiting government, France had accepted the terms of the Marshall Plan, agreed to West German unification, requested military alliance from President Truman, and openly accepted the principal elements of the West's strategy of containment.¹⁵⁹ Most important, however, was the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty (under the Queuille government) in April 1949 and the beginning of diplomatic manoeuvring in the direction of European integration. Opposition during the period came from the communists, who were opposed to France's alignment with

¹⁵⁶ Creswell (2006), pp. 6, 9

¹⁵⁷ Still others were of the opinion that France during this period was aligned with the Soviets *against* the West. A pamphlet by the British Labour Party envisaged East-West cooperation at the time as possible only through an Anglo-French accord, which would help disengage the respective superpowers dominating each country, the US and USSR respectively (Crossman *et al.* (1947), p. 38).

¹⁵⁸ Williams (1958), p. 20

¹⁵⁹ Creswell (2006), p. 9

the US, and the Gaullist RPF (created in 1947), which derided France's 'debility' and 'satellization' under the US.¹⁶⁰

The legislative power of the PCF and RPF was amplified by the 1951 legislative elections, during which the shift in popular support away from the political centre (that arose several years previously) translated into increasing non-centrist influence in the National Assembly. Although the electoral law of 1951 discriminated against communists and Gaullists, both the PCF and RPF saw their seat share increase.¹⁶¹ The 1950s, as a result, heralded the emergence of significant challenges to France's Atlantic orientation constructed in the late 1940s, much of which still required implementation. Franco-American relations soured during the period primarily because of French recalcitrance over the EDC, the supranational European army, plans for which emerged from French concerns about a rearmed West Germany. The French government signed the EDC treaty in May 1952, but the constitution of the Fourth Republic demanded ratification in the National Assembly; whilst a majority of the centrists supported EDC,¹⁶² around a third of the chamber objected to the treaty.¹⁶³ The government delayed ratification as a result, and worked to elicit Gaullist support by offering concessions to the RPF over the course of 1953.¹⁶⁴ Both the delays and the changes angered the Americans, and despite Dulles threatening an

¹⁶⁰ Duroselle (1976), p. 177

¹⁶¹ The 1951 electoral law sought to favour the moderate elements of the Fourth Republic, in the face of the communist/Gaullist challenge, by implementing a hybrid proportional/majoritarian system for National Assembly elections. Where a single party obtained a majority of votes, it would gain all the constituency seats; where this did not occur, seats were distributed proportionally. Since the support for the PCF and RPF was less geographically concentrated than that of moderate parties, and because they often failed to gain an outright majority of votes, the effect of the new system was to discriminate against both parties.

¹⁶² Irving (1973)

¹⁶³ The communists opposed the EDC because it entailed France being further subsumed into the capitalist Western bloc, while the Gaullists opposed EDC because of its supranational elements.

¹⁶⁴ Creswell (2006), pp. 103-104, 112. The concessions included the right to withdraw French troops, an increase in France's voting allocation within the organization, a proviso that the integrity of French forces be maintained even within EDC, and a demand that a guarantee US financial assistance accompany ratification.

‘agonizing reappraisal’ of US commitment,¹⁶⁵ the treaty was rejected on 30 August 1954 by combined communist and Gaullist opposition.

The brief successive governments of the Fourth Republic’s final years were preoccupied with France’s disastrous colonial wars in Algeria. Most consequential for Franco-American relations was the onset of the Algiers crisis in 1958, which not only precipitated the demise of the Fourth Republic and the return of De Gaulle to the political frontline, but also set the stage for a decade and a half of Gaullist dominance of France’s foreign relations. The initial governing arrangements of the Fifth Republic, involving a Gaullist (UDR) coalition with centrists and the moderate non-Gaullist conservatives, prevented any immediate moves to curtail Franco-American ties, at least beyond rhetoric. The departure of the MRP from the governing coalition in May 1962 (over disagreements with De Gaulle’s designs for Europe),¹⁶⁶ however, and the UNR’s success in the legislative elections of November 1962, placed the Gaullists in an unrivalled position domestically, controlling both the presidency and a majority of the seats in the governing coalition.

French Cold War grand strategy, as a result, underwent a significant reorientation after 1962. The backlash against the US that resulted was extraordinarily comprehensive. Gaullist ideology sought to balance American influence and free France from restrictive Atlantic ties. Independence, in every respect, was the watchword of Gaullist strategy. At a press conference on 14 January 1963, De Gaulle outlined the strategic doctrine accompanying the construction of France’s nuclear deterrent, emphasising the independent nature of the force and the strategy of defence *tous azimuts* (against all). From 1963 onwards the government also began to

¹⁶⁵ Kuisel (1993), pp. 22-23

¹⁶⁶ Einaudi & Goguel (1952), p. 196

restrict purchases of French businesses from companies based in the US.¹⁶⁷ Contacts with the USSR increased markedly during de Gaulle's tenure, as the General pursued a policy of détente vis-à-vis Moscow¹⁶⁸ and scuppered the US vision of a united Europe by vetoing British entry to the Common Market in January 1963. De Gaulle also began gradually to withdraw French forces from NATO command before breaking completely with the alliance's organisational command structure in March 1966.

De Gaulle's anointed successor as president, Georges Pompidou, took office in June 1969. Pompidou's foreign policy continued to adhere to the Gaullist blend of *Realpolitik* and national independence internationally, and support for state intervention in the domestic arena, and Pompidou did not differ from the earlier approach of de Gaulle in his interpretation of France's relations to the superpowers.¹⁶⁹ In foreign affairs, Pompidou is often credited with restoring calm to Franco-American relations. Whilst it is true that a moderate relaxation of tensions occurred during the period, the sources of these overtures owed more to Gaullist ideology than is conventionally acknowledged. Internationally, the structural conditions of the early 1960s had shifted, and the relative rise in Soviet power encouraged a counterbalancing strategy to improve relations with the US. Although Pompidou presided over a moderate relaxation, there were no changes to the overall French Cold War strategy, and by 1973 relations with the US had soured once again.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁷ Kuisel (1993), p. 159

¹⁶⁸ De Gaulle (1971), p. 202

¹⁶⁹ Bernstein & Rioux (2000), pp. 22-23

¹⁷⁰ Soutou (2005), p. 103

In April 1974, Giscard d'Estaing, the leader of the *Republicains independants*, was elected to the presidency, and in 1976 Giscard appointed as prime minister the liberal Raymond Barre.¹⁷¹ The return to power of the centrist elements of the French political scene was accompanied by the pursuit of a more accommodating line with the US and a strategic shift away from reliance on the nuclear deterrent and towards greater collaboration with NATO in the arena of conventional defence.¹⁷² This was matched by a distinct coolness towards the USSR in the years of the Giscard presidency.¹⁷³ Giscard's tenure was also marked by a greater reliance on the free market, manifest in the removal of price controls and subsidies, increased emphasis on restrained fiscal policy, a move away from economic planning, and the pursuit of budgetary discipline and monetary stability.¹⁷⁴ Collectively these foreign policy shifts underwrote a rapprochement between France and the US during the 1970s.¹⁷⁵

Giscard was defeated in the presidential election of May 1981 by socialist candidate Francois Mitterrand. The implications of a socialist government for Franco-American relations were not clear, however, given the diversity of opinions within the left as a whole. Whilst the PCF were ardently pro-Soviet and anti-American, the PS exhibited a diversity of opinions. The left-wing CERES faction, favouring domestic intervention¹⁷⁶ and Cold War neutrality, competed for influence with the Rocardists, the Atlanticist and free-trade wing of the party.¹⁷⁷ The Mitterrandists, for

¹⁷¹ The RI remained in a minority position in the 'presidential majority' during the period. As a result, although liberal policies set the agenda from 1974-81, Gaullist obstruction in the National Assembly also worked as a partial constraint on implementation, particularly in the economic sphere, where Gaullist opposition led to the defeat of several bills.

¹⁷² Palmer (1987), p. 474

¹⁷³ Frears (1981), p. 98

¹⁷⁴ Frears (1981), p. 135

¹⁷⁵ Soutou (2005), p. 103

¹⁷⁶ Alongside their distrust of capitalism, many members of CERES disapproved of the ties between France and the US because they believed they eroded the government's ability to intervene in the economy (Cerny (1983), p. 5).

¹⁷⁷ Cerny (1983), p. 5

their part, were somewhere in between. In the first two years of the Mitterrand presidency it was the left of the party that held the most influence. The PS, in coalition with the PCF, enacted a strongly interventionist economic agenda based on the left's Common Program. The government acted to increase benefits and the minimum wage, to reduce the working week, and to nationalise prominent banks and industries.¹⁷⁸ In the field of foreign policy the government continued the 'Gaullist' tradition of distancing France from the US and the Atlantic alliance,¹⁷⁹ adding to the existing tension over France's leftist turn on the economy.

By 1983, however, the perceived failure of the government's leftist agenda prompted a decisive turn away from the interventionist strategy towards the rapid embrace of neoliberal economic orthodoxy.¹⁸⁰ Having started out by implementing wage increases, committing to full employment and expanding the role of the state in the economy, the PS-PCF coalition ended up freezing wages, accepting unemployment, and emphasising private enterprise,¹⁸¹ prompting the PCF to leave the coalition in July 1984. Mitterrand's foreign policy from the mid-1980s onwards was also characterised by an embrace of the Atlantic alliance¹⁸² and strong criticism of the Soviet Union,¹⁸³ making the late 1980s one of the high points in Franco-American relations.

¹⁷⁸ Wilson (1982), pp. 204-205

¹⁷⁹ Hoffmann (1984/5)

¹⁸⁰ Fourcade-Gourinchas & Babb (2002), p. 566

¹⁸¹ Lauber (1987), p. 24

¹⁸² Costigliola (1992), p. 202

¹⁸³ Harrison (1987), p. 486

Time Period	President/Prime Minister	Governing Parties	Dominant Ideology	Strength of Relations
1945-1947	Gouin, Bidault & Blum	PCF/PS/MRP	Socialist/Liberal	Weak
1947-1951	Ramadier, Schuman, Queuille & Bidault	MRP/SFIO/CNIP	Liberal	Strong
1951-1956	Pleven, Pinay, Mayer, Laniel, Mendes-France	RPF/CNIP/MRP	Liberal/Conservative	Moderate
1956-1958	Mollet, Bourges-Maunoury, Gaillard, Pflimlin	SFIO/Radical/RPF	Socialist/Conservative	Weak
1958-1968	De Gaulle/Debre & Pompidou	UDR/RI	Conservative	Very weak
1968-1973	Pompidou/Murville	UDR/RI	Conservative	Weak
1973-1978	Giscard/Chirac & Barre	UDR/RI	Liberal	Strong
1978-1981	Giscard/Barre	UDR/UDF	Liberal	Moderate
1981-1983	Mitterrand/Mauroy	PS/PCF	Socialist	Weak
1983-1986	Mitterrand/Fabius	PS	Social Liberal	Strong
1986-1988	Mitterrand/Chirac	RPR/UDF	Social Liberal/New Right	Moderate
1988-1990	Mitterrand/Rocard	PS	Social Liberal	Strong

Figure 22: Summary of Franco-American relations, 1945-1990

The European Defence Community, 1950-1954

The EDC as a Case of Franco-American Relations

In order to demonstrate the importance role the domestic political positions outlined above have played in France's Cold War strategy, and in particular the salience of the divide between the centre and the left and right, I discuss below the role of ideology in the negotiations over the EDC Treaty in the early 1950s. Conceived by the French government as a way of delaying US-led plans for German rearmament in late 1950, the EDC plans envisaged a multinational European army under strong supranational control, with the militaries of France, West Germany, Italy and the Benelux nations integrated at all levels. Negotiations on the EDC began in earnest in February 1951 and eventual agreement between the parties led to the signing of the EDC Treaty in May 1952. Yet the ratification process proved tortuous; successive governments, fearful of domestic opposition, refused to place the treaty before the French National Assembly. It was only in August 1954 that Pierre Mendès-France, having failed to reach agreement with the remainder of 'the Six' on 'additional protocols' to appease the Gaullist opposition, submitted the Treaty for ratification in the Assembly, whereupon it met with untimely demise.

The EDC case offers a good opportunity to test the relative saliency of the ideological divide between liberals and collectivists in the conduct of French Cold War strategy. First, because of the long and drawn-out nature of the negotiations – and the magnitude of the stakes – foreign policy issues dominated the politics of the Fourth Republic during this period. This has the beneficial effect of side lining those domestic issues upon which partisan disagreement tends to follow the traditional left-right cleavage. Second, the requirement of legislative ratification made the impact of these political battles highly consequential for France's foreign policy. Had the

Treaty been ratified, not only would the Mendès-France government have survived, but the whole concept of European foreign policy would likely look very different to that of today. Third, the issues animating the broad range of political actors that mobilised during the period were not limited to the idea of 'Europe' or the tolerable extent of supranational delegation. Rather, they focused on the broader question of France's place in the Cold War. This presents an opportunity, therefore, to compare the different ways parties conceived of the country's relation to the superpowers.

In the section that follows, I outline the development of the EDC proposals chronologically, beginning with a discussion of the international situation at the beginning of the 1950s. I then discuss, in order, the negotiations leading up to the signing of the EDC Treaty in May 1952, the domestic political hurdles encountered on the road to ratification, and the events leading to the rejection of the treaty as they unfolded in the summer of 1954. After outlining the empirics of the case I highlight the implications of the argument for the theoretical claims put forward in Chapter Two; namely, that the EDC debate was by-and-large an ideological one, and the course of the treaty's demise explicable in relation to changes in the strength of competing ideologies in the early 1950s.

West German Rearmament and the Pleven Plan

Although the origins of the EDC were in proposals drawn up by the French government, the context within which these plans were deemed necessary were the product of changing perceptions in the US regarding the level of threat posed by international communism. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, coming as it did on the heels of the Soviet demonstration of its nuclear capability and the fall of

China to the communists, strengthened feelings in Washington that the West needed to step up its game against the Soviets.¹⁸⁴ The new strategy, reflected in NSC68, argued for a continued US military presence in Europe, supplemented by the build-up of Europe's own conventional defences.¹⁸⁵ Given that Germany possessed the greatest latent resources in Europe at the time (in terms of territory, population, and industrial base), attention immediately turned to the prospect of a West German contingent as part of the NATO deterrent.

The US desire for a rearmed West Germany within NATO was met with alarm in the French government. Twice in the past half-century had the *Wehrmacht* invaded French territory, and no French administration was keen to set in motion trends that, they perceived, could once more result in German domination of the European continent. French opposition to the proposals was made clear to the US at a series of meetings in September 1950. At a joint-meeting of the Foreign and Defence Ministers of France, Britain, and the US on 23 September 1950, French Defence Minister Jules Moch, attempting to forestall the creation of 'native' West German units, asked "whether it were possible to organise the German units to serve in some army of another country?", suggesting that "they might be interested in serving in the US Army".¹⁸⁶

The refusal of the French government to readily agree to the US proposals for a rearmed West Germany within the NATO framework led to the adoption by the French of a strategy of delay, based on the provision of alternative proposals for a European Army. Although the government was aware that it was in no position to

¹⁸⁴ Telegram from Secretary of State Acheson to Ambassador Douglas (US Embassy in Britain), 8 July 1950

¹⁸⁵ Gaddis (1982), p. 109; Jervis (1980), pp. 578-579

¹⁸⁶ Memo of meeting between US Secretary of State Acheson, US Secretary of Defence Marshall, French Foreign Minister Schuman, French Defence Minister Moch, British Foreign Minister Bevin, and British Defence Minister Shinwell, New York, 23 September 1950

challenge the US on German rearmament in the long-term, in the short-term it could both delay progress on the proposals and increase the salience of its own demands and conditions by taking the initiative. The decision to pursue this route was the product of subtle lobbying efforts on Pleven at home and abroad. In France, Jean Monnet emphasised the importance of offering the US a positive and coherent policy for Europe, whilst policymakers in the US State Department pushed the French to develop indigenous proposals for a West German military contribution.¹⁸⁷

The Pleven Plan,¹⁸⁸ as it became known, advocated for the creation of an integrated European army composed of the national militaries of France, West Germany, Italy, and the Benelux states, subject to a supranational authority along the lines of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) that the Schuman Plan had outlined in May 1950. The proposals envisaged a fully integrated multinational European Army, within a dense institutional architecture along similar lines to the ECSC, as a means of reviving West Germany whilst tying the country firmly to the West. Initial approval of the Pleven Plan, despite its adventurous aims, was rapidly forthcoming, no doubt because the status of the plan as a delaying strategy pleased both proponents and opponents of rearmament. The plan was agreed in the French Cabinet on 21 October 1950, introduced to the Assembly on the 24th of that month, and approved by a majority of deputies on the 26th.

The initial response of the US to the proposals was one of scepticism. The French government had made no secret of its opposition to German rearmament and Washington rightly suspected that the EDC proposals were intended to delay – not encourage – the US’ plans for the continent. To maintain French support for

¹⁸⁷ Creswell (2006), p. 29

¹⁸⁸ The proposals were named informally after the prime minister at the time, Rene Pleven.

(eventual) rearmament, Charles Spofford, US Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council, suggested a revision of the Pleven Plan to allow for the immediate, yet gradual rearmament of Germany. This was to be achieved by establishing a link between NATO any future EDC (with the expectation that a European Army would operate *within* the NATO framework) and creating the combined post of SACEUR.¹⁸⁹ The ‘Spofford Plan’ provided the basis upon which the negotiations for German rearmament would be pursued, with two tracks of simultaneous talks taking place. The first set of talks, beginning in Bonn in January 1951, would concern the nature of a German military commitment to NATO, while the second set, to start in Paris from February, would be dedicated to discussions concerning the creation of EDC.¹⁹⁰

Negotiating the EDC Treaty

The negotiations between ‘the Six’ European states began in Paris on 15 February 1951, led by the French government. Initially much of the discussions concerned the principles upon which the collective defence of Europe would be based, and by the summer of 1951 there had been little in the way of substantive, concrete agreement between the allies.¹⁹¹ That summer, two events occurred that would affect the fortunes of the EDC negotiations in drastically different ways. The first, the June 1951 National Assembly elections, were to prove – in the long term – highly problematic for the idea of a European Army. The elections saw a marked rise in support for both the PCF and the RPF, at the expense of the MRP and SFIO, transferring the balance of power in the assembly from the centre to the wings of the

¹⁸⁹ Brogi (2002), p. 123

¹⁹⁰ Creswell (2006), p. 39

¹⁹¹ Noted in an undated State Department background paper

left and right respectively.¹⁹² Support for the EDC had come primarily from the parties of the centre, and the move to the right threatened to make ratification of any agreement extremely difficult.

The second event – the shift in the US position from relative antipathy towards EDC to a policy of outright support – was more promising as far as the prospects of the proposals were concerned. Key to the US’ change of heart was the ‘conversion’ of General Dwight D. Eisenhower (SACEUR) by Jean Monnet, who had used his extensive influence in the US to persuade the general of the merits of the European approach.¹⁹³ President Truman did not disapprove of Eisenhower’s advice, however, and the official backing of the US was given to the EDC in July 1951, resulting in significant progress at the Paris negotiations in a relatively short space of time.¹⁹⁴ The encouragement of the US persuaded Italy to endorse the supranational approach alongside Germany and France, described by Acheson as the “most fundamental factor of the conference”.¹⁹⁵

Once agreement had been reached among the three largest countries, all that remained was to ensure that the three Benelux states – Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg – would agree to the proposals. Given the unequal power relations involved, it somewhat surprisingly took a significant amount of US pressure to steer these states away from their endorsement of a ‘coalitional’ (i.e. intergovernmental) model for EDC. Both the Netherlands and Belgium argued that the “community should have very limited authority in initial period and would constitute little more

¹⁹² Irving (1973), p. 171

¹⁹³ Dwan (2000), p. 146

¹⁹⁴ Noted in an undated State Department background paper

¹⁹⁵ Telegram from Secretary of State Acheson to French Embassy, 2 January 1952

than a coalition of national forces”.¹⁹⁶ Despite both France and Germany making clear that they would not accept rearmament without substantial supranational control, it took a significant degree of international pressure to bring the Benelux countries around to this position. Acheson visited the Netherlands on 10 January 1952 to make clear that the creation of EDC would result in an increased level of US support to Europe, and not the other way around.¹⁹⁷

At the Lisbon Conference of the North Atlantic Council, which met on 20 February, the allies confirmed the reciprocal guarantees between the EDC and NATO that had been delineated in the Spofford Plan.¹⁹⁸ Meanwhile, in the French National Assembly, domestic opposition to the EDC began to grow among those groups empowered by the 1951 legislative elections. At this point the two events of mid-1951 began to interact in a negative way, with anti-EDC Deputies arguing that the US was pressuring the country into EDC, and in doing so favouring Germany over France.¹⁹⁹ Ambassador Bruce noted that the opposition to EDC no longer came solely from the extremes of left and right, but also from within the SFIO, and to a lesser extent, the MRP. The Radicals and CNIP, however, still supported EDC, and were warning the Assembly of the dangers of a return to US isolationism, which they believed would accompany the rejection of the EDC concept.²⁰⁰

The pattern of voting in the National Assembly during the first few months of 1952 demonstrated the difficulties that lay further down the line, before any treaty had even been signed. On 17 February, the Gaullists requested a series of roll-call votes on motions relating to the EDC. By requiring prime minister Edgar Faure to rely on

¹⁹⁶ Telegram from US Ambassador to France, David Bruce, to State Department, 3 January 1952

¹⁹⁷ Telegram from Secretary of State Acheson to the US Embassy in the Netherlands, 11 January 1952

¹⁹⁸ Creswell (2006), p. 84

¹⁹⁹ Telegram from US Ambassador to France, David Bruce, to the State Department, 12 February 1952

²⁰⁰ Telegram from US Ambassador to France, David Bruce, to the State Department, 12 February 1952

the support of those Deputies present in the Assembly, he was forced to designate the votes motions of confidence. A motion calling for a watering down of the supranational elements of the EDC and a block on the recruitment of German troops before the ratification of the treaty was defeated 327 to 276, with opposition from 15 Deputies from the SFIO, six from the MRP, 23 from CNIP and almost all PCF and RPF legislators.²⁰¹ A vote to reject the amendments also passed, by 345 votes to 267.

Several weeks later, Faure was forced into another confidence motion on the question of French funding for the pan-European programme of rearmament. Faure lost the motion as a result of defectors within his own Radical party, who voted alongside the Communists and the Gaullists to bring down the government.²⁰² The CNIP Deputy, Antoine Pinay, replaced Faure as prime minister after his downfall in March 1952. Over the remainder of the year, Pinay worked to reach agreement with the US and Europeans over the EDC proposals. In common with his predecessor, his government retained a strong Gaullist contingent of 107 Deputies, and there was little change from the situation as it stood in the aftermath of the 1951 legislative elections, save that by now the ability of the Gaullists to bring down the government was widely noticed.

It was the British who would most aid the EDC's cause over the next few months. Many elements within France, particularly members of the SFIO, had offered support for EDC contingent on the British playing a substantial role. Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden had announced in 1951 that Britain would not join the EDC, but British involvement remained desirable to the French because it offered a guarantee against potential German aggression. Though wary of enmeshing

²⁰¹ Telegram from the Chargé in France, Philip Bonsal, to the State Department, 17 February 1952

²⁰² Creswell (2006), p. 85

themselves in a lengthy commitment to the continent,²⁰³ the British desired an agreement on EDC as a stepping-stone towards German rearmament, the best means of preventing Soviet aggression. Once it became clear that agreement on the treaty would depend on some form of commitment, Eden persuaded the British cabinet to endorse a treaty of mutual assistance should any of the EDC nations come under attack, which he announced to the EDC Steering Committee on 8 April 1952.²⁰⁴ The offer of a mutual assurance pact, though not far-reaching enough for many, aided the SFIO's leaders in passing a motion in support of EDC on 24 May.²⁰⁵

On 27 May 1952, one day after the British, French, Germans and Americans signed the Bonn Treaty ending the allied occupation of West Germany, 'the Six' signed the Paris Treaty that formally brought the EDC into existence. The Treaty outlined the creation of a European army, with small divisions of co-nationals grouped into fully integrated multinational corps.²⁰⁶ Decision-making, recruitment, oversight and budgetary powers were to be devolved to a series of common institutions, with an executive body (Commissariat), consultative body (Common Assembly), and court (Court of Justice).²⁰⁷ Article 2(3) of the treaty declared that an attack on one member would be considered an attack on all.²⁰⁸

The US and the British were not signatories to the Paris Treaty, but they did sign a declaration of their commitment to the EDC on the same day (the so-called 'tripartite declaration').²⁰⁹ After the signing of the treaties, American concern turned to the thorny question of ratification. The US was well aware that the opposition in the

²⁰³ Memorandum by George Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, to Secretary of State Acheson, 31 March 1952

²⁰⁴ Telegram from US Ambassador to France, James C. Dunn, to State Department, 9 April 1952

²⁰⁵ Telegram from Secretary of State Acheson to State Department, 24 May 1952

²⁰⁶ Bebr (1955), p. 174

²⁰⁷ Bebr (1955), p. 200-201

²⁰⁸ Bebr (1955), p. 182

²⁰⁹ Telegram from Secretary of State Acheson to President Truman, 27 May 1952

National Assembly was such that a majority could not be guaranteed were the treaty to be submitted for ratification immediately.²¹⁰ US Ambassador to France, James C. Dunn, informed the State Department that: “It is clear that French ratification cannot be taken for granted and that Schumann will need maximum help from British and US. Even now there is some tendency to regard EDC not as French initiative supported by US but as something forced upon France by US pressure”.²¹¹

Attention in France also turned to the prospects of ratification in the days following the agreement on the treaty, although neither the government nor the opposition were particularly keen to ensure swift ratification. For the government this was, first of all, part-and-parcel of the original intention to drag out German rearmament for as long as possible, and secondly, a result of the concessions the government believed it could obtain from delaying ratification whilst citing domestic constraints.²¹² For the opposition groups, the Communists, Gaullists and intra-party dissenters from within the mainstream, the signing of the treaties heightened the prospects of EDC becoming reality, while the beginning of the ratification stage of the process galvanised the groups to action. By the end of summer 1952 the anti-EDC campaign was in full swing.²¹³

²¹⁰ Telegram from US Ambassador to France, James C. Dunn, to State Department, 11 May 1952

²¹¹ Telegram from US Ambassador to France, James C. Dunn, to State Department, 11 May 1952

²¹² See Putnam (1988) for a discussion of the logic behind this assumption.

²¹³ Creswell (2006), p. 95

Party Positions in the Pre-Ratification Period

The positions of the different parties on EDC had by this point become fairly well rehearsed within the respective camps. Although there were some areas of cross-party agreement, notably a fear of German aggression, the ways in which the parties conceptualised the value – or vice – of EDC differed according to the ideological traditions of each party. Moreover, the divisions within some of the parties – often held as evidence against a coherent structuring of beliefs – tended to follow the ideological positions of the different party factions (particularly noticeable in the case of the SFIO). Four distinct ideological groupings in particular can be identified in the positions of legislators on the treaty: communist and left-socialist, moderate socialist, centrist/liberal, and right-wing/Gaullist.

Communist: The members of the PCF were among those most fervently against the ratification of the EDC treaty, with all party members strongly opposed. The level of unity within the PCF was a product of the party's Stalinist organisational structure and its relatively homogenous ideological commitments. Communists opposed EDC on the grounds that it forced France to accept US domination and to participate in actions that explicitly threatened the USSR. French independence, they claimed, was threatened by imperialist US policies, which sought to utilise France in service of capitalist aims and undermine the government's domestic agenda. Brogi summarises the communist position on EDC as follows:²¹⁴

By identifying capitalist oppression with American "domination" [the PCF] appeal combined a promise of material improvement with a defence of national independence... [they] used pacifism to emphasize their commitment to national independence against American imperialism; and as the natural defenders of the economically oppressed, they complemented their patriotism with a display of concern for their countries' welfare, allegedly threatened by a US-imposed rearmament effort.

²¹⁴ Brogi (2002), p. 139

The question of German rearmament was linked to this conception of militaristic capitalism; as a state created in the US' image, the rearmament of capitalist Germany threatened to subordinate France's independence to a US-German condominium within the West.

Interestingly the PCF position on EDC, and indeed the Cold War in general, was not as marginal as were communist views in many other Western states at the time. The sheer size of the PCF, coupled with the benefits it derived from the proportional electoral system used for National Assembly elections, made it a formidable force in French politics, polling over 25 percent of the popular vote in the 1951 elections.²¹⁵ Moreover, as I have discussed above, the viability of the PCF meant that many left-socialists favoured joining the party above the SFIO, adding to the numbers of those who were communist members but not committed Stalinists. The point is that, unlike in other countries, it is very difficult to treat the PCF as anything other than an indigenous political movement with considerable support for its ideological worldview. On EDC in particular, the communist position was not the marginal viewpoint of a few committed Soviet agents, but an ideological programme based on shared Marxist and left-socialist principles.²¹⁶

Socialist: The position of the socialist SFIO was more complex than that of the communists, divided as it was along two distinct lines. Individuals on the left of the party were *ideologically* opposed to the EDC, articulating several arguments against ratification: that German rearmament was dangerous, particularly without British membership of the treaty, that the creation of a European Army would exacerbate

²¹⁵ In contrast, the SFIO polled just over 15 percent, making the PCF the most popular choice of the left.

²¹⁶ It is true, of course, that the PCF was receiving funding from Moscow, but then so, too, were the MRP and SFIO financed partly by Washington (Kisatsky (2003), p. 619).

Cold War tensions, and that it would end once and for all the French commitment to a ‘third force’ Europe.²¹⁷ Opposition to the EDC therefore combined two ideological elements: first, an inherent suspicion of German militarism, and second, the continuing erosion of France’s neutrality in the growing East-West conflict. Moreover, both of these arguments were linked. Those believing in the ‘third force’ argued that EDC was an instrument of US policy that risked the intensification of the East-West conflict; by rearming Germany the West would encourage the East to make similar moves.²¹⁸ Thus, German militarism was not just to be feared for its own sake, but for its role in exacerbating the conflict that socialists thought France should be helping to ameliorate.

Those on the right of the SFIO, whose values were closer to those of the liberals than they were to the left-wing of the party, EDC was to be supported as a means of institutionalising the conduct of relations between the European powers and maintaining the credibility of the Western deterrent. Whilst the socialist left regarded European integration as a potential bulwark against US domination, the socialist right regarded the institutionalisation of Europe as a necessary move in strengthening the US-led Western alliance.²¹⁹ Although the SFIO right were as fearful of German rearmament as the left, they viewed it as a necessary corollary of defending against the Soviet threat, and believed the potentially adverse consequences could be prevented by the supranational control envisaged by the treaty. In many respects, then, it was different attitudes of the left and right to the Cold War itself that differentiated their positions on Europe and the German question.

²¹⁷ The ‘third force’ envisaged that a united social democratic Europe could act as a neutral arbiter between Soviet communism and US capitalism, thereby helping to bring about the demise of the two-bloc system.

²¹⁸ Criddle (1969), p. 59

²¹⁹ Criddle (1969), p. 62

The ideological division between the left and right wings of the SFIO was further complicated by opposition to the treaty from those supporting the principles of the treaty but denouncing their lack of realisation through the proposed treaty. Many on the right of the SFIO viewed the proposed treaty as insufficient in the absence of a full British commitment. This was important for realising the goals of the treaty itself; namely, the containment of Germany, a broad supranational architecture for the whole of Europe, and a counter-weight to the power of the conservative and non-secular states of western, continental Europe.²²⁰ The number of ideologically committed yet practically sceptical SFIO deputies increased over the years, as more and more compromises were made to the supranational nature of the treaty to ease the process of ratification. By the beginning of 1953, the US reckoned that 25 percent of SFIO deputies were ideologically opposed to the treaty, 25 percent supported it outright, whilst 50 percent supported the concept in principle but would only vote in favour of a treaty that met their exact expectations.²²¹

Liberal: Three centrist groupings were active during the Fourth Republic years; the MRP, the Radicals, and CNIP, the latter of which was really a centre-right party, although it was far less conservative than the Gaullists. Each of these groups held similar views concerning the importance of the twin processes of Western solidarity and European unification, and the complementary nature of these endeavours.²²² Indeed, the EDC was itself a centrist idea. Rene Pleven, whose name the concept bears, although formally a member of the small and broadly centrist UDSR, presided

²²⁰ Brogi (2002), p. 131

²²¹ Telegram from David Bruce, US Observer to the Interim Committee of EDC, to the State Department, 12 March 1953

²²² Irving (1973); Kisatsky (2003)

over a strongly centrist government composed of the MRP, Radicals, CNIP and SFIO.²²³ The ideas embodied in the EDC were very much the product of the liberal ideas of foreign policy espoused at the time, representing as it did a means of contributing to Western defence embodying strong elements of supranational control. For this reason a majority of the centrist parties supported the EDC from its very inception, and would vote in favour of the treaty when it finally reached the floor of the National Assembly.

As has been frequently noted, there was opposition to the EDC from some corners of the political centre, and distinct elements of each party deviated from the official party line. Whilst the number of dissenters from centrist parties was no-where near the number who rebelled against the SFIO,²²⁴ it is worth addressing the nature of the objections. The Radical party was probably the most supportive on the whole of the EDC project. Although notable exceptions could be identified – particularly the staunch opponents Edouard Herriot and Edouard Daladier, and the sceptic Mendès-France – a majority of the party supported the EDC and opposed the views of Daladier and company.²²⁵ Within CNIP a sizable majority also supported the government's pro-EDC position. Guérin de Beaumont, future foreign minister under Mendès-France, warned the party that the failure to ratify the treaty would result in a reduced US commitment to France, and almost all CNIP Deputies endorsed his statement.²²⁶

Within the MRP there existed a sizable minority who were opposed to the EDC treaty. This was surprising to many, given the MRP's reputation as the most pro-

²²³ The government also contained a small contingent of five Gaullist Deputies.

²²⁴ Two MRP Deputies voted against the treaty, as compared with 53 SFIO Deputies.

²²⁵ Telegram from Ambassador Bruce to the State Department, 12 February 1952

²²⁶ Telegram from Ambassador David Bruce to the State Department, 12 February 1952

Europe and pro-American party in France.²²⁷ It was also to prove consequential given that foreign secretary Bidault – an MRP sceptic – was to become foreign minister in early 1953. There were two reasons why these Deputies objected: First, they held the same fears of many in the country over the consequences of German rearmament, and second, they believed that military integration for Europe should follow political integration, not the other way around.²²⁸ There were also many Deputies, the number of which gradually increased in the run-up to 1954, who opposed the *modifications* to the treaty, not the principle itself, in a similar fashion to many members of the SFIO right.²²⁹ As these justifications highlight, MRP opposition did not tend towards the anti-American and anti-integrationist sentiment of the communists and Gaullists; indeed, of those who opposed the EDC, only a tiny fraction had also expressed opposition to the ECSC and the Atlantic Pact.²³⁰

It is important not to overstate the extent of centrist opposition to the EDC. In the end, almost all Deputies from the three parties voted in favour of the EDC treaty. Moreover, a clear majority of each party endorsed EDC from the outset, viewing the proposals as the most acceptable means of rearming Germany and thereby contributing to the defence of the West, maintaining a US presence in Europe, and working towards the implementation of a supranational regional order. Although a minority opposed the treaty, they rarely rejected these ideals when doing so, fearing German aggression more than American domination. The notable individuals, such as Daladier and Herriot, who *did* embrace anti-Americanism, became notable precisely because they were the exceptions that proved the rule. Though they became

²²⁷ Telegram from Ambassador David Bruce to the State Department, 12 February 1952

²²⁸ Irving (1973), p. 169

²²⁹ The US Ambassador in France, Douglas C. Dillon, warned the State Department in a telegram sent on 20 September 1953 that intergovernmental Franco-German compromises over the nature of the treaty could not impinge on the principle of supranational control, lest the MRP withdraw their support.

²³⁰ Irving (1973), p. 169

potent symbols of anti-Americanism in 'Atlanticist' parties, they were not representative of centrist sentiments more broadly.

Conservatives/Gaullists: In the early 1950s, Gaullism was a rising force on the French political scene. The RPF itself was created in April 1947 by De Gaulle as a vehicle for his proposed course of French politics, although he personally kept the party at arm's length, and was famously distant from its activities in the Assembly. The Gaullist Deputies, however, shared De Gaulle's emphasis on the traditionally conservative principles of nationalism, traditionalism, and – as far as the international arena was concerned – realism. By the time of the 1951 elections, the RPF was a political force to be reckoned with, polling over one fifth of the popular vote.

Gaullist values contrasted sharply with those underpinning the EDC concept. They opposed the supranational elements of the treaty, claiming these would diminish France's freedom of action and prevent the country from dealing with crises abroad (by which they were primarily referring to colonial 'problems'). They also opposed the undue dependence on the US that they believed would result from the treaty, viewing European integration as a US-plan to diminish French independence.²³¹ As realists, moreover, they were profoundly sceptical of the potential for German rehabilitation, and fearful of a renewed *Wehrmacht*, which they doubted could be contained by institutional arrangements.

For the Gaullists, European integration and the Atlantic alliance were inextricably linked; the integration of Europe through supranational means "had become a snare Washington set on France to deprive it of its equality with Britain and the United

²³¹ Brogi (2002), p. 130; Harrison (1986), p. 173

States”.²³² Indeed, as would become clear in the following decade – as De Gaulle further elaborated his vision of Europe – there was nothing necessarily anti-European about Gaullism. What the Gaullists objected to was being further tied down to a US-dominated Western system that would deprive the country of its independence. European integration was, for the Gaullists, a perfectly reasonable endeavour, so long as it was a truly European exercise, and remained solely at the intergovernmental level.²³³ That the primary concern was with America, not Europe, is clear from the rhetoric of the time. The Gaullist electoral platform in the 1951 elections made much of French “subservience” to America and Gaullist statements of the time were couched in an anti-American nationalism.²³⁴

It is necessary to caveat Gaullist anti-Americanism to some extent, however. Although those following De Gaulle’s variant of conservative thought resented US domination and French entanglement within the integrated West, they offered this critique from a position based on the ultimate acceptance of the US financial and security commitment to Europe. Few in France, including ardent communists and Gaullists, wished to do away with this protective umbrella, and Gaullist opposition was destined to only go ‘so far’ in opposing the US presence in France. What differentiates Gaullism – and also communism and left-socialism in France – from those at the centre was the *degree* of dependence on the US they were prepared to accept, and the *ends* this dependence was aimed at achieving. Gaullists (and their partners on the left) desired ties with the US to the minimum extent to deter the

²³² Brogi (2002), p. 130

²³³ Martin Herz, Second Secretary of the US Embassy in France, noted in a memo on 16 September 1954 that: “Many non-Communist enemies of EDC [principally Gaullists] still go to great pains to stress that they are not against European unity”.

²³⁴ Brogi (2002), p. 130

Soviet Union and sought to stake out an independent position in the Cold War from the resources (security and finance) that the US provided.

The Mayer Government and the 'Additional Protocols'

The party positions elaborated above provided the confines within which successive French governments could operate in pursuing the ratification of the treaty in the National Assembly. The problem for all administrations in the period was the precarious balance of support for the EDC in the Assembly; the PCF and RPF – both strong opponents – had won big in the 1951 elections, and the wavering attitude of many SFIO supporters meant that a majority could not be relied upon should the treaty be submitted. What began as a delaying strategy by the French government as a means of obtaining international concessions, then, was perpetuated by the unwillingness of successive administrations to put the treaty to a vote.

The forging of a centrist coalition along the lines of the 'third force' governments of the post-1947 period was also proving impossible due to a combination of Gaullist power and domestic ideological conflicts. The Radical Rene Mayer, who replaced Pinay at the beginning of 1953, was unable to secure the support of the SFIO because of their disagreements on economic and socio-religious matters. As a result, Mayer was forced to enter into coalition with the Gaullists, achieving a moderate consensus on domestic issues at the expense of dividing the government on EDC policy.²³⁵

Given the need to obtain Gaullist support for the government, and their staunch opposition to the EDC treaty, a number of concessions were agreed by Mayer prior

²³⁵ Creswell (2006), p. 112. The horseshoe model represents these trade-offs between domestic and international issues far better than the left-right model is able to.

to the government's formation. First, Mayer promised to amend the treaty – through the use of additional protocols – to make it acceptable to Gaullist Deputies. This meant compromising on the supranational elements of the treaty and guaranteeing that the integrity of the French Army would be maintained.²³⁶ Second, he committed himself to installing an EDC sceptic as foreign minister, replacing the pro-EDC Schuman with Bidault.²³⁷ Third, he agreed to a muting of the official stance on EDC, refusing to clearly re-state the government's support for the treaty.²³⁸ These governmental manoeuvrings towards a more sceptical stance on EDC were also reinforced by the designation of Moch (SFIO) and Marie-Pierre Kœnig (RPF) – EDC opponents from the left-socialist and Gaullist camps respectively – as the *rapporteurs* for the Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee and its Defence Committee.²³⁹

The additional protocols on the treaty were outlined by the French Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, Hervé Alphand, to the US on 15 January 1953, and 'the Six' on 11 February. The proposals included provisions for the withdrawal of French troops from EDC for use in colonial emergencies, the rectification of a perceived voting disparity between France and Germany in the institutional structure of the EDC, a special status for French forces stationed in Germany, and the continued unity of the French Army.²⁴⁰ The protocols were not well received by the other countries. The 'six' were annoyed by the attempt to introduce such substantial changes to the treaty after it had been signed, whilst Germany in particular criticised the departure from supranationalism envisaged by

²³⁶ Creswell (2006), p. 103

²³⁷ Memorandum by Second Secretary of the US Embassy in France, Martin Herz, 16 September 1954

²³⁸ Telegram from US Ambassador Douglas C. Dillon to the State Department, 20 September 1953

²³⁹ Creswell (2006), p. 103

²⁴⁰ Telegram from US Ambassador to France, James C. Dunn, to State Department, 15 January 1953

the protocols. In spite of their collective opposition to the French move, however, the Interim Committee agreed to all of the French protocols bar one – the French demand to withdraw their army as and when – on which they reached a compromise.²⁴¹

The US, for its part, regarded the move as an attempt to delay ratification, dismissing Bidault's claim that the protocols were necessary to appease the Gaullists, on the grounds they would likely oppose the treaty no matter what.²⁴² One of the profound ironies of the whole EDC affair has been the inverse relationship between US support and French opposition to the treaty. In late 1950 it was the French government that was pushing for EDC, while the Americans remained to be convinced. By mid-1951, the Truman administration shifted its position to one generally favourable towards EDC, at the same time as the legislative elections introduced an upsurge in the number of communist and Gaullist EDC-opponents to the National Assembly. In early 1953, as in 1950 and 1951, this pattern was to repeat itself again. Just as the Mayer government adopted its sceptical position on EDC, the pro-EDC Eisenhower administration came to power in the US.²⁴³

In seeking to buttress domestic support for the EDC, the French government attempted once again to seek a stronger British commitment to the proposed European Army. With the PCF and RPF likely to oppose the EDC in any case, the voting intentions of the wavering SFIO Deputies offered the best chance of ratifying the treaty, and British involvement was a key concern of the socialists. A series of meetings took place with the British government in mid-February 1953 with the aim

²⁴¹ Creswell (2006), p. 114

²⁴² Telegram from Secretary of State Dulles to US Embassy in France, 6 March 1953

²⁴³ Eisenhower's personal support for the European project is well known. On becoming president he continued to push strongly for progress on EDC. This is noted in a memorandum of discussion of a meeting of the Joint-Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon on 28 January 1953.

of reaching agreement on the precise nature of the UK's relationship with the EDC. As far as their stated goal of achieving British concessions was concerned, the meetings were relatively successful. In early March the British agreed to maintain troops on the continent and to consult with the EDC on the desired numbers, and to extend the North Atlantic Treaty to make it coterminous with the 50-year span of the EDC treaty.²⁴⁴

The Laniel Government and US Pressure

Mayer's government was replaced in June 1953 by the government of the centrist Joseph Laniel. Although Laniel was a member of CNIP, his government continued to derive support from the uneasy coalition of centrists and Gaullists that had kept Mayer in power. Given that little had changed in the balance of forces within the government, the US was justifiably sceptical about the prospects of EDC ratification under the Laniel administration, which continually stalled over submitting the treaty to the Assembly. Yet the US maintained that, were it to be submitted before the end of 1953, the treaty's prospects in the Assembly would be good. A majority could be found, they claimed, if there was progress on a settlement of the Saar dispute and an agreement for British association with EDC.²⁴⁵ As time went by, the US feared, the prospects for ratification would decrease; not only would the Gaullists maintain their opposition to the treaty, but the momentum would be lost and the malaise over the treaty's passage would likely contribute to further negative sentiment.

²⁴⁴ Memorandum from Russell Fessenden, Office of European Regional Affairs, to Assistant Secretary of State Livingston Merchant, Undated [c. March 1953]

²⁴⁵ Telegram from David Bruce, US Observer to the Interim Committee of the EDC, to the State Department, 15 October 1953

By the end of 1953, it was clear that the Gaullists would not budge,²⁴⁶ even with the additional protocols agreed, and that EDC was losing ground in the Assembly.²⁴⁷ In response, the US increased the diplomatic pressure on the French government. Prior to the end of 1953, US pressure had been used to persuade other countries – notably the Netherlands – to come around to the French position, or to persuade France that future rewards might not be forthcoming without the ratification of the treaty.²⁴⁸ By the end of 1953, however, the US began to pressure France more frequently, whilst upping the stakes on ratifying the treaty. In December 1953 Dulles promised an “agonising reappraisal” of the US commitment to Europe should the EDC treaty fail to pass the Assembly.

By making clear just how seriously the US regarded the success of EDC, the new strategy of active pressure helped to remove two obstacles that had loomed large in the shadow of the future. The first was the potential for significant socialist opposition to arise against the treaty. In an extraordinary congress held in the wake of Dulles’ announcement, however, SFIO leader Guy Mollet conceded that the party would not seek a prior agreement on the “subordination of EDC organs to supranational political authority”, and passed a motion to ensure disciplinary action for any SFIO Deputies voting against the treaty.²⁴⁹ The second potential obstacle was

²⁴⁶ As Ambassador Douglas C. Dillon informed the State Department on 24 October 1953, the Gaullists were demanding the right to use German troops to help administer and maintain France’s colonies, a price that neither the US or any of ‘the Six’ were prepared to pay.

²⁴⁷ Memorandum of meeting between Maurice Faure and André Dulin (French Delegation to the United Nations) and Livingston Merchant and MacArthur (State Department), Washington, 30 November 1953

²⁴⁸ As Secretary of State Dulles reported to the US Embassy in France on 26 March 1953, President Eisenhower made it clear to the French government that the American people would not countenance further financial assistance to France if they believed they were dragging their feet on ratifying the treaty.

²⁴⁹ Telegram from David Bruce, US Observer to the Interim Committee of the EDC to the State Department, 19 February 1954

a perceived lack of British commitment.²⁵⁰ By March 1954, however, after Washington had impressed upon the British the importance of EDC passing, London agreed it would look at making concessions to bring them closer to the French position.²⁵¹ On 13 April they duly announced an agreement whereby British forces, notably the RAF, would work more closely alongside EDC forces, and a British minister would attend EDC Council meetings.²⁵²

As a counterweight to the concessions offered by the SFIO and the British at the beginning of 1954, this period also saw the emergence of a joint anti-EDC campaign orchestrated by the PCF and the RPF. Although Laniel – citing Gaullist pressures – still refused to submit the treaty for ratification,²⁵³ there was a growing feeling in France that it would need to come up for ratification soon, galvanising the opposition into action. Though many felt the PCF and RPF made unlikely ‘bedfellows’, their positions on foreign policy issues bore striking similarities; both sought to maintain France’s national independence, to forestall the rearming of Germany, to downplay France’s relationship with the US, to improve that with the Soviet Union, and to oppose the supranational elements of the proposed treaty.

Of course, they did not want many of these things for the same *reasons*. On German rearmament, for example, the communists worried more about the German history of fascism and its new capitalist identity than did the Gaullists, who feared the construction of a new power base on their Eastern border. On relations with the East, the similar policies again obscured important differences; the PCF wished an

²⁵⁰ The issue of British involvement arose so frequently because of the irreconcilable nature of each side’s position: The French wanted full British participation, whilst the British would not commit themselves in this way. As a result, the British offered several compromise positions over the years, none of which went far enough to reassure the French.

²⁵¹ Telegram from Secretary of State Dulles to the Embassy in France, 22 March 1954

²⁵² Telegram from Ambassador Douglas C. Dillon to the State Department, 13 April 1954

²⁵³ Memorandum of conversation between Prime Minister Laniel and MacArthur (State Department), 14 April 1954

accommodation between France and the USSR based on Marxist solidarity and an inherent trust of the Soviet Union, whereas the Gaullists sought to bring Moscow into play as a means of balancing US and (potentially) German power.²⁵⁴ So, too, did the opposition to supranationalism stem from distinct elements of each ideology, the PCF opposing the creeping tentacles of US-sponsored capitalism inherent in the ECSC and – its military wing – the EDC, the Gaullists opposing the idea that authority could be vested on any plane above the nation state.

That the communists and Gaullists held diametrically opposing plans for French society and the development of its economy was not forgotten, of course, but it was mitigated at the time by several factors. First, the salience of the EDC question, and its domination of the Fourth Republic's agenda in the early 1950s, meant domestic issues could be subordinated, at least temporarily, to the immediate need of defending the country from the EDC treaty. Second, initial avenues of cooperation on related issues had arisen during the years prior to 1954 that helped both parties acknowledge the similarity of their positions in certain areas. Noticeable areas of agreement in the years leading up to the treaty included opposition to the London Accords of 1948,²⁵⁵ the attempt to impeach socialist Defence Minister Moch in November 1950,²⁵⁶ and the more general opposition to the 'third force' governments that excluded both parties.²⁵⁷

The PCF began to seek Gaullist support in the latter months of 1953 after determining to place the anti-EDC effort above their other goals. In order to make workable the *modus vivendi* with those on the right, the communists scaled back their

²⁵⁴ Brogi (2002), p. 149

²⁵⁵ Kisatsky (2003), p. 632

²⁵⁶ As Ambassador Bruce noted in a dispatch to Secretary of State Acheson on 13 December 1950, both the PCF and RPF voted against Moch on the grounds that "he had not stood up to the Americans sufficiently".

²⁵⁷ Mortimer (1984), p. 364

rhetoric on those policies where they opposed the Gaullists, particularly labour and colonial policy.²⁵⁸ Joint campaigning began in March 1954, with the launching of an international appeal by both groups for an anti-EDC meeting in Paris. The publicity document noted; “the EDC Treaty will jeopardise not only the national independence of the nations involved, but also the political basis for liberty”.²⁵⁹ The meeting was held on 20-21 March and attracted around 200 opponents of the EDC, receiving coverage from *Le Monde* and much of the left-wing French press. The meeting resulted in the release of a ‘catch-all’ statement on behalf of the participants, claiming EDC “would provide [a] climate throughout [the] world of increasing tension”.²⁶⁰

The Road to (Non-)Ratification: The Mendès-France Era

Though the joint meeting was perhaps the most visible symbol of PCF-RPF solidarity on the EDC question, the cooperation between the groupings continued during the summer months of 1954, and in June, at the Thirteenth Congress of the PCF, the communists’ decision to seek an alliance with the Gaullists was officially confirmed.²⁶¹ Several weeks before, however, both parties played an important role in the political manoeuvrings that would ultimately bring the question of ratification to the fore. The defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu on 7 May, a galling example of strategic incompetence and an ultimately unviable colonial policy, led to the downfall of the Laniel government on 12 June 1954. In his place, the Radical – and notable EDC sceptic – Mendès-France, sought to form a government, promising an

²⁵⁸ Fejtö (1967), pp. 35-36

²⁵⁹ Telegram from Robert Joyce, Counsellor of the US Embassy in France, to the State Department, 2 March 1954

²⁶⁰ Telegram from Ambassador in France Douglas C. Dillon to the State Department, 22 March 1954

²⁶¹ Fejtö (1967), p. 36

end to both the war in Indochina and the indecision on the EDC.²⁶² Both the PCF and the RPF supported Mendès-France, and although it was clear the communists would not feature in any government, their support contributed to the investiture of the government by the National Assembly.²⁶³

Mendès-France's government included CNIP and the Radicals, along with the sizable Gaullist contingent, but excluded – for the first time in the history of the Fourth Republic – the MRP, which had refused to support any government opposing EDC.²⁶⁴ The party, led at that time by Pierre-Henri Teitgen, regarded Mendès-France as a staunch opponent of EDC, and believed he would do all he could to sink the treaty (although others were less convinced, believing Mendès-France was 'undecided').²⁶⁵ Whether or not Mendès-France *did* indeed support the EDC was, to some extent, a moot point, given the political pressures he faced. Mendès-France was sceptical that he could pass the treaty in its present form. Maurice Bourguès-Maunoury (Radical) and Guy Mollet (SFIO) from the pro-EDC grouping threatened to topple the government if Mendès-France sought to alter the treaty, while Jacques Chaban-Delmas (RPF) threatened the same if he didn't.²⁶⁶ He believed almost fifty SFIO Deputies would vote against the current treaty, while significantly more Gaullists would oppose it on the right; these were substantial numbers that could not be made up by the MRP's support alone.²⁶⁷

²⁶² Creswell (2006), p. 150

²⁶³ Mortimer (1984), p. 364

²⁶⁴ Telegram from US Ambassador in France, Douglas C. Dillon, to the State Department, 17 June 1954

²⁶⁵ Lacouture (1984), p. 267

²⁶⁶ Telegram from David Bruce, US Observer to the Interim Committee of the EDC, and Douglas C. Dillon, US Ambassador to France, to the State Department, 5 August 1954

²⁶⁷ Telegram from US Ambassador in France, Douglas C. Dillon, to the State Department, 13 August 1954

Seeking a solution to the domestic impasse, Mendès-France asked the most vocal representatives of the pro- and anti-EDC groups in the government – Kœnig for the Gaullists (anti-EDC) and Bourguès-Maunoury for the Radicals (pro-EDC) – for the minimal compromise they would be able to accept.²⁶⁸ When this failed he worked instead to specify ‘additional protocols’ to bring the treaty more in line with the demands of its opponents. The ‘additional protocols’ had been detailed by the beginning of August, and hinged on the suspension of all the supranational elements of the treaty for eight years, a requirement of unanimity between ‘the Six’ in any decisions made during this time, and the integration only of those forces stationed in West Germany. Cabinet approval was received on 13 August, although three Gaullist ministers – including Chaban-Delmas – resigned in protest, confirming the suspicions held by many that no modifications could be achieved that would placate the Gaullist opposition.²⁶⁹

With the government’s approval in hand, the next step for Mendès-France was to take the debate to France’s European allies, calling a meeting of ‘the Six’ in Brussels beginning 19 August to attempt to reach agreement on the ‘additional protocols’. Not only had Mendès-France not consulted with the allies prior to elaborating the protocols, but it was also far from certain that they would have the desired effect in France. The SFIO had committed themselves to vote against the treaty were the supranational features to be removed (as they had been), while the Gaullists, for whom the protocols had been primarily devised, had demonstrated they would rather resign than endorse the ‘additional protocols’.²⁷⁰ As it happens, the participants of

²⁶⁸ Lacouture (1984), p. 269

²⁶⁹ Lacouture (1984), p. 272

²⁷⁰ Telegram from US Ambassador in France, Douglas C. Dillon, to the State Department, 15 August 1954

the Brussels meeting rejected the protocols, which they viewed as yet another delaying strategy on behalf of France, and the conference ended in failure.²⁷¹

Returning from Brussels with no agreement, Mendès-France committed himself to submitting the treaty to the Assembly, as promised prior to his investiture. By this point, the domestic debate had reached a crescendo, and the positions on either side had hardened such that there was almost no room for manoeuvre. With Mendès-France resigned to introducing the treaty to the Assembly – where its passage seemed unlikely – the pro-EDC factions of the Assembly, led by Pinay (CNIP), Mayer (Radical) and Schumann (MRP), introduced a ‘motion for adjournment’ to delay the debate and resume negotiations.²⁷² Mendès-France agreed not to oppose the motion only after three pro-EDC cabinet members (Bourgès-Maunoury (Radical), Eugène Claudius-Petit (UDSR) and Émile Hugues (Radical)) tendered their resignations.²⁷³

When the debate opened in the Assembly, the public galleries were full and standing, and the atmosphere tense.²⁷⁴ The debate was kicked off by Mendès-France’s opening speech, which “seemed to be a discreet encouragement to reject ratification”. Once the debate had officially begun, the anti-EDC bloc introduced a motion to cut-off the debate on the treaty (a ‘*question préalable*’). Under the constitution of the National Assembly, the *question préalable* was afforded a higher priority than the ‘motion of adjournment’, meaning that it would be voted *before* the pro-EDC bloc’s motion to postpone the debate (and, if it was successful, would nullify the adjournment).²⁷⁵

²⁷¹ Creswell (2006), p. 157

²⁷² Telegram from US Ambassador in France, Douglas C. Dillon, to the State Department, 27 August 1954

²⁷³ Memorandum by Second Secretary of the US Embassy in France, Martin Herz, 16 September 1954

²⁷⁴ Telegram from US Ambassador in France, Douglas C. Dillon, to the State Department, 28 August 1954

²⁷⁵ Memorandum by Second Secretary of the US Embassy in France, Martin Herz, 16 September 1954

Because Mendès-France wanted the debate to occur, he reached a compromise with both sides where each withdrew their opposing motions. Yet the pro-EDC elements, believing their chances of defeating the *question préalable* would be higher prior to the debate, reintroduced their ‘motion of adjournment’, at which point the *question préalable* was reintroduced by the anti-EDC bloc, and took constitutional precedence.

The vote on the *question préalable* – as Mendès-France reminded the Deputies – was now the vote on the treaty itself. For the pro-EDC forces it was a considerable risk; they lost their opportunity to debate the contents of the treaty before the Assembly and now faced two sequential votes in order to adjourn the debate.²⁷⁶ In the end their gamble never paid off; the *question préalable* was adopted by 319 votes to 264, rejecting the EDC treaty by a sizable majority. Although the MRP, Radicals and CNIP all voted for the treaty,²⁷⁷ and around half of the SFIO Deputies supported it, the combined weight of the centrist forces was insufficient to overcome the opposition from the PCF, RPF and 53 SFIO members who all voted against EDC.

The consequences of the failure to ratify the EDC treaty were not particularly severe either for France and the Atlantic alliance. The Mendès-France government survived – the treaty vote was not a confidence motion owing to an agreement with the RPF – and Mendès-France would continue to govern until mid-1955. But the government’s ties to the centre and the Western community, however, were damaged by the debacle, and by the perception that Mendès-France had actively worked against the treaty. He understood, therefore, that “neither the MRP, nor Guy Mollet, nor Rene Mayer – nor John Foster Dulles – would ever forgive him for the “crime” of August

²⁷⁶ Memorandum by Second Secretary of the US Embassy in France, Martin Herz, 16 September 1954

²⁷⁷ Only two MRP Deputies opposed the treaty

30".²⁷⁸ Perhaps the only positive thing to come out of the whole affair, for the government at least, was a decline in the coherence of the emerging PCF-RFP alliance, and, as a colleague of Mendès-France reminded him:²⁷⁹

The adoption of the EDC, the entry of France into the system, would have been the opening of a permanent civil war in France. Imagine the Sunday ceremonies at the war memorial in every village, with the Gaullist and the Communist united behind the tricolor. The RPF-PCF alliance institutionalised from that point on would...have made France ungovernable.

For the Atlantic alliance, too, the failure of the treaty did not forestall the process of German rearmament. Given the scale of the parliamentary defeat, there was to be no second attempt at ratification.²⁸⁰ Instead, on the suggestion of British foreign secretary Eden, the process of rearming West Germany would again become a NATO question, separate from the process of European integration. In October 1955 the allies signed the Paris Treaty,²⁸¹ confirming West German membership of NATO, and rearmament through the WEU in place of EDC. Interestingly, the Gaullist influence in the government did not dissipate after the treaty's rejection, and Mendès-France promoted a strategy aimed at distancing France from the US and seeking security agreements with Moscow in the months after the defeat.²⁸² Had his government not fallen on the Algeria question in February 1955 it is possible that he would have pursued a similar approach to that pursued later by De Gaulle in the 1960s.

²⁷⁸ Lacouture (1984), p. 279

²⁷⁹ Lacouture (1984), p. 279

²⁸⁰ Telegram from US Ambassador in France, Douglas C. Dillon, to the State Department, 31 August 1954

²⁸¹ Negotiated in October 1954

²⁸² Soutou (2001), p. 37

The Politics of French Security in the 1950s

The EDC case offers a good example of the competing ideological strands in French politics. As the fight over the treaty pushed questions of foreign policy to the fore, the mobilisation of the different parties reflected their different conceptions of the national interest, and the most appropriate policy for France to pursue vis-à-vis the superpowers. For those at the political centre whose support for EDC instigated this process, it was the liberal view of international relations that dominated their thinking. They sought to increase the credibility of the Western deterrent against the Soviet Union by pooling the capabilities of the European states; they devised supranational structures to streamline cooperation and prevent potential defection (whether from Germany or France); and, finally, they sought to differentiate the threat from East and West, arguing US intentions were benign, Soviet ones aggressive. The EDC proposals were, in every sense, a liberal means of achieving international security, demonstrating the particularism and supra-nationalism associated with centrist foreign policy.

Challenging this liberal vision of international affairs were the two ideological perspectives associated with the left and the right. On the left, socialists (including members of the PCF and the left-wing of the SFIO)²⁸³ argued that the rearmament of West Germany would diminish France's freedom of action and subordinate the country to the empire of US capital. On the right, conservatives (Gaullists) claimed that EDC would undermine France's independence in foreign affairs, tie the country to a condominium of US-West German power, and exacerbate Cold War tensions. What is interesting is the underlying similarity of these conceptions of the national

²⁸³ As I have mentioned above, the existence of a viable communist party in France meant that many on the far-left joined the PCF, rather than the SFIO. As a result, those with views that approximate the socialist 'ideal-type' outlined in chapter two are more likely to be members of the PCF than the SFIO.

interest and France's place in the Cold War. Both the left and the right sought to increase France's independence from the US, improve relations with the Soviet Union, and forestall the rearmament of West Germany.

The EDC case bears out many of the predictions of the horseshoe model. Regardless of whether one opposed the EDC from the right or the left, these views were based on a common approach to Cold War strategy. Many of the claims made against EDC had their origins in the collectivist assumptions of the respective ideological positions; this is evident in the shared emphasis on a pluralist conception of international order, which seeks to downplay the *inherent* threat of communism, the domesticism that informed the rejection of EDC's supranational authority, and emphasis on national independence as a basis for France's external relations. Moreover, although some elements of left-right contestation over international issues were noticeable, these were most often subordinated to the broader task of opposing the EDC proposals (as an example, the PCF deliberately downplayed their criticism of French imperialism to help achieve a united front with the Gaullists possible).

Conclusion: The Politics of Franco-American Relations

In this chapter I discussed the findings from the case of Franco-American relations. The case offers substantial evidence to support the validity of the horseshoe model. French support for independence from the US has come most prominently from the left and the right, whilst the various centrist parties have sought to strengthen France's Atlantic ties. Nowhere is this more evident than in the negotiations over the EDC treaty, which has brought down by combined Gaullist and communist opposition against the preferences of the centrist parties in the National Assembly.

5 / Anglo-American Relations and the Suez Crisis, 1955-1957

Introduction

In this chapter I analyse the case of Anglo-American relations during the Cold War. I begin by discussing the nature of the British party system and the ideological positions of the major parties, before charting the politics of Anglo-American relations from 1945 to 1990. I then discuss in detail the events surrounding the Suez Crisis of 1956 and the extent to which the political circumstances of the time may be explained by the logic of the horseshoe model.

International and Domestic Context

Britain in the Post War World

The history of British foreign policy is a story of gradual decline. In the 18th and 19th centuries Britain was a central member of the European ‘core’ of great powers, where it historically played a deliberate role of ‘balancer’, engaging in ad hoc and fluid alliances to prevent any one power gaining hegemony over the continent. As with the other European powers, Britain was embroiled in the expansion of Western international society to the rest of the world through trade, conquest and colonisation. At the height of its colonial power in the 18th and 19th centuries, the Empire covered a quarter of the globe, affording Britain a significant presence in every corner of the world and a strong military and economic power base. The hegemony of Europe over the rest of the world came to an end over the course of the two World Wars,

themselves largely the consequence of the inadequacies of the ‘balance of power’ for regulating inter-state relations.²⁸⁴

The Second World War resulted in immeasurable destructive consequences for Europe. Whilst Britain was on the victorious side, the scale of the effort sustained in containing the expansionism of Nazi Germany took its toll on the British economy and its imperial commitments. Britain maintained a substantial global military presence at the end of the war, which the country could ill afford. Cognisant of the overwhelming Soviet military presence on the European continent, and unable to mount a European defence, the British turned to the US for financial and military assistance, both at home and abroad. The result was the beginning of a process termed ‘empire by invitation’, where the British (and other European states) welcomed an American continental commitment with open arms and willingly transferred several of their global defence responsibilities (such as that of Greece) to the US. Britain’s role in the world has been profoundly affected by way in which these different post-war trends have played out.

Three trends in particular have been of particular importance; the intensification of Anglo-American ties, the onset of decolonisation and the creation of a pan-European institutional framework. Britain’s role has been re-established largely through its engagement with these sets of relations – the US, the Commonwealth and the EEC – and its ability to act as a broker between the three. Britain’s relationship with the US has been consistently stronger than that of many other NATO members,²⁸⁵ partly due to the intensity of wartime collaboration, a common ‘Anglo-Saxon’ heritage and Britain’s failure to identify as a European power. Yet, from 1973, Britain has been a

²⁸⁴ Schroeder (1976), p. 237

²⁸⁵ Britain ranks joint first in Khong’s (2013) ranking of US clients.

member of the EEC (later EU) and has sought to complement its 'special relationship' with the US with strong Commonwealth and European ties. What characterises Britain's role over all else is its desire to maintain a diversity of alignments; not allowing any set of relations an overly powerful role in determining the course of British foreign policy.

The British Political System

The United Kingdom features a majoritarian parliamentary political system. The British Parliament is composed of two bodies, a directly elected lower chamber, the House of Commons, and an unelected upper chamber, the House of Lords. The government is drawn almost entirely from the more powerful lower-chamber. The six hundred or so seats in the Commons (the number has changed over the period) are elected according to the majoritarian FPTP system, whereby the winner is the individual gaining a plurality of votes in a single constituency. This system has the noticeable effect of reducing the seat share of smaller parties relative to their vote share, because these groupings tend to receive low levels of support spread across many constituencies; as a result, they seldom reach the plurality threshold in *any* constituency.

One result of the lower number of effective parties is the frequency of stable, single-party governments. Examples of coalition governments in the British case, notwithstanding contemporary instances, are extremely rare. Moreover, these governments often last for a significant proportion of the constitutional term limits, with an average duration around four years. Government formation is follows the appointment of the head of government, the prime minister, by the Monarch,

following a general election. The criterion for the appointment is the ability to command the loyalty of a majority within parliament; in practice, this means the leader of the party receiving the most seats will be asked to form a government.²⁸⁶ The British executive is appointed by the prime minister and drawn almost exclusively from the legislature. As with other parliamentary systems, this means that the government must retain the confidence of parliament in order to govern effectively and even to survive, although from the 1970s onwards the failure to pass legislation has not led to the automatic resignation of the government.²⁸⁷

Political Parties in Cold War Britain

Unlike West Germany, Canada, or the US, the British party system has a broad scope of influential ideological positions. Socialism, liberalism and conservatism are all, or at least have been, a strong presence in British politics in the post-war period. Two parties, the left-wing Labour party and the right-wing Conservative party, dominated British politics during this time. In contrast, the Liberal party has seen its seat share almost entirely usurped by the Labour party, which declined in status from a governing party to a marginal entity, receiving as few as six seats in the 1951 election. This does not mean that socialism and conservatism as ideologies have been ascendant whilst liberalism has been in decline; rather, the extent to which the electoral system favours large, broad-based parties – and disenfranchises smaller ones – has led both the Labour and Conservative parties to occupy parts of the political centre ground.

²⁸⁶ In the German system, where outright victories are less common, the President will often base their nomination for the Chancellorship on the viability of inter-party coalition agreements, rather than on seat share.

²⁸⁷ Norton (1980), p. 337

In consequence, individuals holding liberal views are often to be found within the right-wing of the Labour party and the left-wing of the Conservative party, as well as in the remnants of the Liberal party itself. The same also holds true of the ‘wings’ of the political spectrum. The Labour party has historically featured significant numbers of individuals on the far-left who have opted to seek to influence Labour rather than join the CPGB, owing to the near certainty that they would never receive representation in parliament, unlike in France where the proportional electoral system afforded the PCF strong representation in the Fourth and Fifth Republics. Similarly, nationalist elements that would otherwise coalesce into a separate party can often be found within the Conservative party, again owing to the poor prospects of an individual nationalist party along the lines of the National Front or Poujadists in France or the West German DP.

Thus, in the British case, vestiges of liberalism are to be found within the mainstream parties, as are elements of nationalism and communism that would – in other countries – have their own separate parties (see Figure 23 below for a diagrammatic representation). The result is that ideological divisions in British politics occur both within and between the major political parties,²⁸⁸ and, as I shall demonstrate below, in many cases the fiercest disagreements are those that occur within each party.²⁸⁹ The content of the government’s ideological position, and its programme for British foreign policy, depends on which faction is ascendant at any given time.

²⁸⁸ Waltz (1967)

²⁸⁹ This is because the presence in each party of liberal elements vying for influence against socialist or conservative elements virtually guarantees conflict within the party, but holds out the potential for relative agreement *between* parties to the extent that liberalism is influential in each.




Figure 23: Representation of fit between parties and ideologies in Britain.

British Labour Party

The principal socialist party in Britain has, since the 19th century, been the Labour party. (The CPGB, the pro-Soviet grouping of the far-left,²⁹⁰ never improved upon the two seats gained in the 1945 election and remained marginal throughout the period). The Labour party was founded, in 1900, as the Labour Representation Committee, designed to promote the interests of organised Labour in parliament. The party steadily increased its seats, and by the early 1920s Labour had become the principal party of opposition, beating the Liberals into third place.²⁹¹ After participation in the short minority governments of 1924 and 1929-31 and the wartime National Coalition, the Labour party achieved its first majority government in 1945 with a landslide victory.

²⁹⁰ Pollitt (1946), pp. 1-2

²⁹¹ Thorpe (2001), Ch. 3

Almost continual division between the left- and right- wings of the party marks the history of the Labour party in the Cold War period. Although important domestic issues were at stake in these intra-party debates, it was foreign policy issues that animated the majority of divisions, especially the Cold War, which “underscored distinctions of ‘left’ and ‘right’ in Labour’s ranks”.²⁹² Broadly speaking the rivalry over strategy was between the socialist and liberal conceptions of international relations, with the Labour left promoting the socialist position and the Labour right advocating a liberal viewpoint. Although Labour leaders have seldom sought to advance the foreign policy approach of the party’s left wing, some have been notably more inclined to the left than others (Harold Wilson and Michael Foot were both from the left of the party, whereas Clement Attlee and Hugh Gaitskell identified more with the right).

Over the years the individuals and groupings associated with the Labour left have changed significantly. The socialist position has been under the banner of, variously, the Keep Left campaign (1940s), the Bevanite rebellion (1950s), the unilateralist movement (1960s), and the Bennite faction (1980s). Yet the left’s concerns about the leadership’s strategy have remained the same. Domestically the labour left believed in the traditional socialist values of a managed economy, nationalisation and full employment. Internationally they sought a foreign policy that embodied socialist principles, including opposition to militarism, colonialism and capitalism. Indeed, for the Labour left these phenomena were linked; ““so long as there were capitalist nations, there would *most likely be* imperialist expansion, imperialist competition, and consequent war”.²⁹³

²⁹² Black (2001)

²⁹³ Gordon (1969), p. 33

The Labour left's Cold War strategy aimed at "complete impartiality and dissociation from all strategic manoeuvres of the USA and USSR", which, given the density of Anglo-American ties, required effort be made to "disentangle ourselves from USA economic domination, because, as long as we are so entangled, we cannot pursue an independent political policy".²⁹⁴ The neutral, or quasi-neutral, stance would allow Britain to mediate between the superpowers in order to bring about the decline of the two-bloc system, whilst maintaining distance from the creeping influence of the US – "the Citadel of world capitalism".²⁹⁵ Correspondingly, while the Labour left were less trusting of the US than the party right, they were also far more trusting of the intentions of the Soviet Union, and there were many on the left who argued for a more cooperative stance towards Moscow.²⁹⁶ Denis Healey, himself on the right of the party, pointed out that "some loyal members of the party are genuinely concerned about the general line of Labour's foreign policy – because it is held to take sides with a Capitalist America against a Socialist Russia, or to entail a division of men and money from home production which this country cannot afford".²⁹⁷

The Labour left were critical of the remnants of British colonial policy and advocated independence for the territories and an end to Britain's imperialist meddling. They also opposed the use of force in a greater number of scenarios than the Labour right, and although the majority of the left were not outright pacifists, a majority supported unilateral nuclear disarmament, a prohibition on force in all but the most threatening international situation, and the reduction of arms funding and diverting of these

²⁹⁴ Woolf (1947), p. 17

²⁹⁵ Gordon (1969), p. 34

²⁹⁶ Zilliacus (1949), p. 14

²⁹⁷ Healey (1947), p. 3

monies into domestic welfare programmes.²⁹⁸ They also envisaged a strong role for the UN as a future world government, although this attitude did not extend to other forms of international organization, and the Labour left were highly sceptical of European integration, which they viewed as a subtle form of capitalist expansion. Many also viewed European integration as essentially an American project and sought to oppose British membership on the grounds it would further compromise British independence.

The Labour right, in contrast, sought to develop a foreign policy line that was broadly liberal in outlook. They argued in favour of an institutionally dense international order, a strong Western deterrent to defend against the Soviet threat, moves towards greater European integration, and a pragmatic retreat from Britain's colonial territories. In terms of Cold War strategy, the Labour right sought to maintain a strong Atlantic orientation in British foreign policy. They viewed the Soviet Union as a totalitarian threat to peace while noting the "egalitarian qualities and potential" of the US variant of liberalism.²⁹⁹ They also endorsed the US approach to deterrence, E.J. Ewer claiming that:³⁰⁰

If we decide that aggression must be resisted and accept, as immediate hypothesis, that the Soviet Union is potentially aggressive, then it follows that the resistant force must, if possible, be made so strong, and so patently determined, that it will act as an effective deterrent. This is, of course, the case for a close Anglo-American association, as the only combination powerful enough to deter an expansionist Russia.

Nor were the Labour right overly concerned about the deleterious effects of US capitalism, which was closer to their variant of the 'social market economy' endorsed domestically. As a result, the right placed far less emphasis than the left on

²⁹⁸ Boucek (2009), p. 474

²⁹⁹ Black (2001), p. 36

³⁰⁰ cf. Woolf (1947), pp. 30-31

maintaining Britain's autonomy from the American economy or from US-sponsored international economic organisations.

The differences between the left and right of the Labour party are significant, but some of them are subtle and have been under-theorised. One prominent argument asserts that Labour foreign policy overall may be associated with 'liberal internationalism' because of its shared emphasis on moral norms, collective security, international institutions and its anti-militarism.³⁰¹ Whilst it is true that the left and right shared these principles, very often they understood their meaning quite differently. Though both emphasised moral duties, the right sought to promote individual liberty abroad, while the left sought to remedy inequalities. While both supported the UN, for the left this was as the harbinger of world government, and not, as for the right, one element of an emerging interdependent international order. They also differed on the meaning of collective security; for the left this entailed security co-binding through the UN, whereas for the right it concerned the agglomeration of capabilities directed against an external threat, and included in particular support for NATO. Finally, although both left and right claimed to be opposed to militarism, the left believed this to require disarmament and general prohibitions on force, while the right emphasised the *legitimate* use of force and the need to obtain guarantees from other states prior to disarmament taking place.

³⁰¹ Vickers (2003), pp. 6-7

British Liberal Party

The Liberal party suffered a precipitous decline in parliament from the 1920s onwards owing to the rapid growth of the Labour party, to the extent that, by the early 1950s, the party possessed a mere six seats in parliament.³⁰² Despite undergoing a moderate revival during the 1970s under the leadership of Jeremy Thorpe, the Liberals never recovered their previous strength. From March 1977 until May 1979 the Liberals agreed to support Jim Callaghan's ailing Labour administration on the condition that Labour support direct elections to the European parliament. The resulting 'Lib-Lab' pact continued until the Labour government's removal from office, despite the failure of the European elections bill in November 1977.³⁰³ In 1981 the Liberals formed an alliance with the Social Democratic Party, composed of former Labour members concerned at their party's move to the left in the 1980s, and in 1988 the two parties merged to form the Liberal Democrats.³⁰⁴ It was not until 2010 that the Liberals would participate in government, the first such time since the wartime national coalition.

Despite the Liberals never reaching the heights of success achieved by their West German counterparts (the FDP, who were rarely out of government) it is worth briefly discussing the Cold War policy of the Liberal party. For one thing, the party helped set the agenda for British politics and contributed frequently to the discourse on foreign policy issues. For another, the party's stance on foreign affairs offers insight into the centrist account of the Cold War strategy and Anglo-American relations, regardless of the extent to which this agenda was able to influence government policy.

³⁰² Cook (2002), p. 130

³⁰³ Cook (2002), pp. 164-165

³⁰⁴ Cook (2002), p. 167

Unsurprisingly, perhaps, the Liberal party's foreign policy vision accorded strongly with the liberal ideal-type outlined in Chapter Two. To begin with, they were strongly supportive of forms of authority above the state. The party's continued support for international law and the creation of multilateral security organisations "become a leitmotif of Liberal differences from the other parties up to the present day".³⁰⁵ Whereas the British left were pro-UN, the Liberals were pro-NATO, pro-EEC, and pro- pretty much any form of international control, Western or otherwise. Part of the reason for this was the Liberal belief in the decline of sovereignty. Party leader Jo Grimond argued:³⁰⁶

[T]he boundaries between nations have become dangerous anachronisms. Industry is international...Finance is international ...Liberals, so long at least as the nation-state wields anything like its present power, acknowledge that it has a responsibility to look after its citizens and its citizens have an obligation to support it in many circumstances. But this responsibility will change as supra-national organisations take over some of the sovereignty of the nation state.

The Liberal emphasis on interdependence and their embrace of supranational authority was complemented by another distinctly liberal idea, that of moral particularism. Grimond placed emphasis in particular on the sacrosanct status of individual liberty, arguing, "if you accept the Liberal view of life, and the Liberal belief in the *moral imperatives*, they must apply to Communist as well as non-Communist".³⁰⁷ As such, he argued in favour of a more assertive Western role, noting how "astonishing [it is] to see how meekly the Western nations...accept the abuse hurled at them, while Communist countries, who stir up violence...escape

³⁰⁵ Jones & Oliver (2011), p. 8

³⁰⁶ Grimond (1959), pp. 154-157

³⁰⁷ Grimond (1963), p. 228 [emphasis added]

unscathed”.³⁰⁸ Indeed, Grimond was critical of the other British parties in this respect, stating:³⁰⁹

Liberalism is the enemy of Communism and it cannot stand on the defensive. I am not clear where Western Conservatives or Socialists stand when we face the issue of defeating Communism. They sometimes talk about the battle for men’s minds. Yet from time to time they disclaim all intention of interfering with the internal affairs of Communist countries.

Indeed, the importance of liberty led Grimond to defend the Vietnam War in his 1979 *Memoirs*, at a time when few were inclined to defend the conflict, as a necessary means of expanding freedom and defending the West against the USSR.

The final element of Liberal thought on the Cold War was the insistence on the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the need for a strong Western deterrent in response. What liberals found threatening about the Soviet state was the lack of institutional constraints on force. Since the writings of Kant the liberal traditions has extolled the pacific elements of democracy, and the Cold War liberals were no exception. “The West may frequently resort to violence”, Grimond claimed, “but violence is not part of its normal way of thought. It is more difficult for a democracy to engage in war than an autocracy”.³¹⁰ The most appropriate response to the Soviet threat, for Liberals, was deterrence, to be achieved through the coordination of Western governments and the pooling of their defence resources. On this idea Grimond noted: “Deterrence does not mean that each nation must keep up its own nuclear arsenal. Deterrence means having enough nuclear power to deter and no more...and accepting the need for wider groupings and the pooling of national sovereignties”.³¹¹

³⁰⁸ Grimond (1979), p. 195

³⁰⁹ Grimond (1959), p. 151

³¹⁰ Grimond (1963), p. 240

³¹¹ Grimond (1963), p. 246

For this reason, the Liberals gave continuing support to strengthening NATO in order to align the collective resources of the West against Soviet communism.³¹²

British Conservative Party

The Conservative party pre-dates the Labour party significantly. Its lineage traces back to the loose political confederations of landowners and noblemen of the 17th and 18th centuries. The term Conservative came into usage after the issue of the Tamworth Manifesto by Tory Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel in 1834. While early Conservative governments predominantly represented the landed interest against the commercial interests of the Liberal party, the eclipse of the Liberals and the rise of Labour led to a shift in the Conservative position in the early 20th century towards a pro-business and more individualist position. In the post-war period the party began to embrace elements of the welfare state in response to the emergence of Attlee's majority Labour government, and subsequent Conservative administrations up until the 1980s were notable for not attempting to undo the domestic programmes implemented by Labour.

Historically the most important division has been between the moderate Conservatives of the left, whose foreign policy views broadly conform to the liberal ideal-type, and the right wing Conservatives whose views fit better the conservative ideal-type. Conservatives differ from Labour in this regard not in the *diversity* of viewpoints represented but in the coherence of the party in spite of these. As I discuss in greater detail below, there has been a marked tendency in the party to support both the party leader and the government, even at times of acute

³¹² Grimond (1959), pp. 175-176

disagreement. Various suggestions for the degree of party cohesion have emphasised the 'pragmatic' ethic within the party, the absence of concerns about 'democratic control' of the foreign policy process, and the veneration of the leader's position as party 'figurehead'.³¹³

The right wing of the Conservative party has embraced the key elements of the conservative ideal-type, including elements of nationalism, sovereigntism, domesticism, realism, and an appreciation of the utility of force. Their backgrounds were generally in the military, aristocracy, or in colonial governance. The right regarded the Empire as the basis of British prestige and influence and sought to maintain British control over the various territories while keeping other countries – particularly the US – out of their 'sphere of influence'.³¹⁴ They placed significant emphasis on power, convinced of the natural competitiveness of the international arena and the threat posed by subjugation to the powerful. In consequence they advocated an independent course as the best strategy. This included not just independence from the superpowers, but also from forms of international control that threatened to override British sovereignty; the right were notably sceptical of the UN and the EEC, as well as other forms of international organisation.³¹⁵

Conservative moderates, on the other hand, were closer to the liberal position on issues of foreign affairs. They were generally of a younger generation than the 'old guard' of the party, and more likely to have backgrounds in commerce than the military or the aristocracy. This made them more supportive of free trade and international engagement more generally; unlike the Conservative right they did not oppose the Bretton Woods and GATT agreements. They were also more convinced,

³¹³ Douglas (1983), p. 57

³¹⁴ Hodgson (2004), p. 30

³¹⁵ Forster (2002), p. 229

generally, of the utility and efficacy of international governance, seeing considerable promise in both the UN and EEC for regulating international and European statecraft respectively. As the case study below shows, they were more sceptical of force; whilst they did not rule out its use, or at least the threat of its use, they endorsed a restricted set of circumstances (defensive, in concert with the international community) under which it could be used. Moderates also embraced Western Cold War strategy over the pursuit of an independent British strategy; they did not see any virtue in challenging the US-led effort to contain the Soviet Union, nor were they concerned about the expansion of the capitalist system.

It has become commonplace to equate the embrace of the free market with conservative ideology, yet the Conservative embrace of neo-liberalism, on which this assumption is partly based, occurred only in the late 1970s with the decline of the Keynesian consensus in British politics and the programmatic changes that accompanied Margaret Thatcher's election as party leader. Thatcher sought to reorient the British economy along the lines of US *laissez faire* liberalism. Her doctrine, which became known as the 'new right', combined support for the free-market with the traditional conservative values of law-and-order, nationalism, and a strong state. Contrary to popular perception, Thatcherism did not represent a move to the right, so much as an embrace of key elements of centrist political thought. The combination of conservatism and liberalism became evident in the foreign policy of the new right, which combined conservative support for force and distrust of international authority with liberal deterrence strategy and its emphasis on ideological differentiation.³¹⁶ Unlike her predecessors, the cornerstone of Thatcher's

³¹⁶ Nau (2008)

foreign policy was the forging of a strong Anglo-American relationship, accompanied by deep economic ties, and aligned against the Soviet threat.³¹⁷

The Politics of Anglo-American Relations, 1945-1990

The politics of Anglo-American relations has been subject to fewer significant changes over time than in the other countries under study. One of the main reasons for this is that support for the US has divided both parties, with the right wing of the Labour party and the left wing of the Conservative party supporting Atlanticism and their respective wings on the left and right advocating a more independent role. In consequence, governments of either party are based on a compromise between the two wings of the party. Of course, the relative strength of these factions has affected the strength of Anglo-American relations, as the weak relations under the Wilson government and the strong relations accompanying the Thatcher administration attest to. But by and large neither faction has ever succeeded in gaining absolute control over the machinery of either party.

The contours of the Cold War Anglo-American relations were established under the tenure of Clement Attlee's Labour government between 1945 and 1951. Despite the initial intention on behalf of many to pursue Anglo-Soviet and Anglo-American cooperation simultaneously in the immediate postwar years, the emerging realities of the Cold War had convinced a majority of the party by 1947 that Britain's best hope

³¹⁷ It is often claimed that Thatcher was a realist because of her emphasis on power and the threat from the Soviet Union (e.g. Albrecht (1998), p. 123). Yet Thatcher's foreign policy deviated from realism in three crucial respects: First, it equated threat in terms of ideological difference, not power. American power and militarism was not threatening because it was not part of the 'evil empire'. Second, it emphasized the importance of increasing ties within the West, seemingly without concern for the threat to national independent. Third, it stressed the need to re-arm in order to defeat the Soviet menace, in place of the realist strategy of balancing power for security.

for security lay with the Americans, not the Russians.³¹⁸ One of the strongest drivers pushing Britain in this direction was Ernest Bevin, foreign secretary and ‘realist’; Bevin worked hard to convince the US of the need to maintain a presence in Europe in order to deter potential Soviet aggression. The Attlee government presided over a number of significant events that reinforced the Anglo-American relationship, including the beginning of the Marshall Plan in 1947, the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 and support for the US-led effort during the Korean War of 1950. It was also under the Attlee government that the decision was taken to begin production of an independent British nuclear deterrent.³¹⁹

Overall, relations with the US were strong in the early post-war period; the only major source came from US scepticism of the Labour party’s interventionist economic agenda and the concern of some Republicans that America was ‘subsidizing socialism’ in lending to Britain.³²⁰ Opposition to the foreign policy direction of the government came principally from the Labour left, many in the Conservative party supporting the government’s conduct in the international domain. This period marked the beginning of a long tradition of leftist attacks on the leadership’s pro-American foreign policy that would last until the end of the Cold War. From 1945 until 1948 the Keep Left movement argued Britain should reduce its dependence on the US and play the role of neutral mediator in the Cold War. Whilst the intensification of the Cold War quelled dissent in the late 1940s, from 1951 the strong Bevanite faction in the party pushing for a more ‘socialist’ Cold War strategy, advocating reduced dependence on the US, the ‘restraining’ of US aggression and

³¹⁸ Gordon (1969), p. 105

³¹⁹ Callaghan (2007), p. 165

³²⁰ Dobson (1990a), p. 393

the need to mediate between the two superpowers.³²¹ Though the Bevanites accepted the USSR was a flawed state, they drew inspiration from the Soviet model, arguing it needed both time and peace to develop into a true socialist utopia.³²²

The re-election of the Conservatives in 1951 under Winston Churchill resulted in little change in the quality of Anglo-American relations, although one of Churchill's stated aims in office was to improve cooperation with the Americans. Although relations remained relatively strong under Churchill's tenure, no marked improvement was in evidence. Agreement on West German rearmament and the creation of the EDC was reached more rapidly than would have been likely under a Labour government, especially since the opposition were strongly divided over the question of a re-armed West Germany³²³ and vocally opposed to the European project. Partly the reason there was no obvious turnaround was that relations were not all that poor under Attlee, although partly also it stemmed from the existence of nationalist tendencies in the Conservative party whose desire for the continuation of a strong and independent global role for Britain clashed with the realities of the unequal Anglo-American relationship.

The Conservative party's enthusiastic support for a global role for Britain proved irksome for the Eisenhower administration.³²⁴ This was perhaps most evident in May 1954 when Churchill embarked on a unilateral effort to begin negotiations with the Soviet without informing the US.³²⁵ Labour strongly supported Churchill's move,

³²¹ Bevan *et al.* (1951), pp. 8-11. The Bevanite 'manifesto' noted that the postwar period would ideally see "Britain holding the balance between the two great power blocs in the world, withstanding the policies of each where necessary, mediating between them, or at least not tipping the balance too strongly on one side or the other". It did, however, note that such a policy was no longer viable by 1951, which they blamed on the aggression of both superpowers.

³²² Callaghan (2001), p. 68

³²³ Labour Party (1954), p. 2

³²⁴ Charmley (1995), p. 241; Williamson (2006)

³²⁵ Eden (1960), p. 127

former Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison remarking; “one has to run jolly fast to keep to the left of Churchill nowadays”.³²⁶ In the end it was this desire for a strong British world role, promoted by the party’s right wing, that resulted in the greatest break in Anglo-American relations in 1956, as Prime Minister Anthony Eden, Churchill’s successor from 1955, launched the military intervention into the Suez Canal Zone that would result in the most significant break in Anglo-American relations during the entire Cold War period.³²⁷

From 1957 onwards Macmillan’s Conservative government worked to rebuild the Anglo-American alliance in the wake of the Suez Crisis. Macmillan’s tenure is generally regarded as one of the strongest periods of Anglo-American relations during the Cold War.³²⁸ Relations with the Kennedy administration were particularly warm, and the early 1960s saw a string of important agreements reached between the two governments. The US supported Macmillan’s proposals for a ban on nuclear testing³²⁹ and Kennedy consulted personally with Macmillan during the flashpoint of the Cuban missile crisis, the only national leader briefed on his administration’s plans at the time.³³⁰ Kennedy also agreed to sell Polaris nuclear missiles to the Macmillan government, at a reduced price, allowing the British independent deterrent to remain effective.³³¹ Moreover, the Kennedy administration also supported Macmillan’s aim to take Britain into the EEC, although as a consequence of De Gaulle’s veto in January 1963 this never materialized. Macmillan’s generally pro-American stance continued into 1964 under the short-lived tenure of Sir Alec-Douglas Home, Macmillan’s foreign secretary, who succeeded him as prime minister in 1963, and

³²⁶ Macmillan (2003), p. 345

³²⁷ The events surrounding the Suez Crisis are in discussed in detail below.

³²⁸ E.g. Dobson (1990b), p. 242; Dumbrell (2006), Ch. 3

³²⁹ Home (1976), p. 155

³³⁰ Macmillan (2012), p. 511

³³¹ Priest (2005)

whose views on Anglo-American relations differed little from those held by Macmillan himself.³³² Overall, the Macmillan/Home era marked a high point in Anglo-American relations.³³³

Labour's return to power under Harold Wilson in 1964 marked the beginning of a significant downturn in relations between Britain and the US. This was not unexpected given Wilson's leftist credentials,³³⁴ though it was pressure from the Labour left that led in part to the decline in relations. This was especially evident in the Wilson government's stance on the Vietnam War. Johnson desired a 'symbolic' British military presence in Vietnam, however minimal the contribution. Wilson, too, wished to keep the communist insurgency at bay and worried about jeopardizing US military and financial commitments to Britain.³³⁵ The party left, on the other hand, opposed the war, demanding non-involvement of British troops and condemnation of US policy: Had troops been deployed, the party would have entered 'open rebellion'.³³⁶ In discussions with Johnson in Washington in December 1965, Wilson stressed the opposition from within the party to British involvement in Vietnam.³³⁷ His compromise position offered the US rhetorical support but stopped short of any military commitment to the war. Wilson's stance represented a careful political balance. Whilst prudence alone cautioned against a significant military deployment in South East Asia, the refusal to send even the desired symbolic contingent – that,

³³² Holt (2005), p. 700

³³³ Ashton (2005), p. 696, however, notes that elements of the traditional conservative approach did feature in Macmillan's strategy, including support for an independent détente in 1959 and the desire to use EEC membership to balance US influence.

³³⁴ Heppell (2010), p. 152

³³⁵ Pimlot (1992), pp. 384-385

³³⁶ Jones (1997), p. 149; Phythian (2007), p. 59; Vickers (2008)

³³⁷ Pimlot (1992), p. 386; Ziegler (1993), p. 222

moreover, the US had agreed to underwrite financially³³⁸ – owed more to political pragmatism than strategic necessity.

Increased pressure on Wilson – both political and economic – contributed to the deterioration of Anglo-American relations from 1966 onwards. Politically, Labour's success in the general election of that year emboldened the party's left wing and raised its expectations of a leftward shift in foreign policy, ushering in "three years of the most relentless political in-fighting".³³⁹ Increased pressure from the left was manifest in Wilson's admonishment of the Johnson administration for the bombing of Hanoi in May 1966 and his 'peace diplomacy' efforts undertaken in February 1967.³⁴⁰ Wilson sought to reap capital from supporting a diplomatic solution to the East-West conflict,³⁴¹ although he succeeded only in displeasing the US.³⁴² Economically, a series of strikes in dockyards and on the railways in mid-1967 placed significant pressure on the pound, forcing the government to devalue the currency in November that year, from a parity of \$2.80 to \$2.40.³⁴³ The resulting squeeze on the government's finances led to retrenchment in defence spending and the decision to withdraw British forces from 'East of Suez' in January 1968. Neither of these moves pleased the Americans, whose embattled position in Vietnam reminded them of the value of a global British military presence.³⁴⁴

After the low ebb of relations between the US and the Wilson governments the US had high hopes that the incoming Conservative government of Edward Heath would

³³⁸ Parr (2006), p. 108

³³⁹ Ziegler (1993), p. 248. This in-fighting Ziegler attributes to Wilson doing 'too well', arguing: "The last thing Labour needed was a crop of new seats which might be filled by left-wing militants...The size of the majority ensured that the government would be unlikely to fall even if the backbenchers stepped out of line and thus gave potential rebels more scope for making mischief".

³⁴⁰ Colman (2003), p. 138; Hughes (2003)

³⁴¹ Barnaby (1969), p. 58; Vickers (2011), p. 72

³⁴² Colman (2004), p. 121

³⁴³ Pimlot (1992), pp. 481-482

³⁴⁴ Dockrill (2002), p. 220; Dumbrell (1996), p. 230

pursue a more Atlanticist foreign policy. Heath's election, Kissinger remarked, "has generally favourable implications for the US...the new Government can be expected to play a more active and positive role in foreign affairs...will probably offer more support for our Vietnam policies than Wilson's Government, and may be less timid in pressing the Soviet Union".³⁴⁵ Yet the predicted improvement never took place. Heath was convinced Britain's future lay with Europe and that previous attempts to join the community were rejected because of the French belief that Britain would be an outpost of America in Europe. This led to a discernible cooling of Anglo-American relations during the period, although the rationale was largely pragmatic rather than principled, and Heath was not personally anti-American; rather, the intention was to demonstrate to the French the independence of Britain from the US.³⁴⁶

Wilson returned to power in February 1974 with a minority Labour government. Given the frostiness of relations with Heath the US were not particularly concerned about the return of Labour. Anglo-American relations were relatively cordial during the latter-half of the 1970s. One reason was the government's precarious situation in parliament, which served to put the breaks on factional dissent from within the Labour party, the left wing of which remained opposed to strong Anglo-American relations. Indeed, Kissinger noted: "If Labour gets a hefty majority, we will have more trouble. He'll have a wild left wing".³⁴⁷ Thus, although some issues arose between the governments – the US was not particularly pleased with the government's decision to hold a referendum on British EEC membership in 1975, nor its soft stance on Eurocommunism in Portugal and Spain the following year –

³⁴⁵ Memorandum from National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger to President Nixon, undated [c. June 1970]

³⁴⁶ Spelling (2009), p. 642

³⁴⁷ Minutes of meeting between Ford, Kissinger and Scowcroft, 14 August 1974, Gerald Ford Papers

there were few significant strains between Britain and the US. Indeed, US support for the IMF loan to Britain in 1976 partly reflected this satisfaction with the status quo, for the US was aware a negative decision would likely topple the Labour government and decided against such action.³⁴⁸

It was Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government, elected in 1979, which would preside over the strongest period of Anglo-American relations in the entire period. From the late 1970s onwards, the growing ascendancy of neo-liberal economic philosophy in the Conservative party³⁴⁹ engendered an important shift in the party's foreign policy towards a strengthening of the Anglo-American alliance.³⁵⁰ Two factors were largely responsible for the Atlanticist tendencies within Thatcherism. First, strong political and economic ties were the natural corollary of the embrace of deregulated capitalism, given the economic might of the US and its dominant free-market ideology. Second, the individualist liberalism that underpinned this conversion was reflected in a more hostile, anti-Soviet foreign policy, which fitted well with the security policy of the Reagan administration. The strength of relations in the 1980s was manifest in British support for INF deployment, the upgrading of the independent deterrent through the purchase of Trident, US support for the Falklands War, and British support for the US intervention in Libya (but not Granada), coupled with intense rhetorical support for the 'special relationship' on both sides.

³⁴⁸ Transcript of telephone conversation between Ford and Schmidt, 23 November 1976, Gerald Ford Papers

³⁴⁹ Gamble (1988), p. 5; Hall (1993)

³⁵⁰ Beech (2011), p. 350

Time Period	Prime Minister	Governing Parties	Dominant Ideology	Strength of Relations
1945-1951	Attlee	Labour	Socialism	Moderate
1951-1956	Churchill/Eden	Conservative	Conservatism	Moderate/Very weak
1957-1964	Macmillan/Home	Conservative	Conservatism	Strong
1964-1970	Wilson	Labour	Socialism	Weak
1970-1974	Heath	Conservative	Conservatism	Weak
1974-1979	Wilson/Callaghan	Labour	Socialism	Moderate
1979-1990	Thatcher	Conservative	New Right	Very strong

Figure 24: Summary of Anglo-American relations, 1945-1990

The Suez Crisis, 1955-1957

The Suez Crisis as a Case of Anglo-American Relations

In order to demonstrate the accuracy of the portrayal of the politics of Atlanticism in Britain outlined above, and to test the validity of the horseshoe model, in the next section I explore the role that party politics played in the Suez Crisis of 1956. The ‘crisis’³⁵¹ erupted when the President of Egypt, Gamal Abdul Nasser, announced the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company on 26 July 1956. Nasser’s move, intended to secure funds for the construction of the Aswan Dam whilst demonstrating the strength of an independent Egypt, posed a significant challenge to the British and French. Both countries sought to establish an international consensus on the need for international control of the Canal, a move designed to humiliate Nasser and quell acts of appropriation in colonial territories. Meanwhile, they prepared contingency plans for a military assault on the Canal Zone. The failure of diplomatic measures led the British and French to implement these plans, in collusion with Israel, at the end of October, whereupon the absence of US support and the reaction from the global community forced them to accept a ceasefire agreement on 6 November.

The Suez Crisis offers an appropriate opportunity to test the assumptions of the horseshoe model because of the salience of Anglo-American relations and the extent of ideological variation. First, Suez marks the highpoint in the political salience of Anglo-American relations. Attention shifted towards the American connection when it became clear that discord existed between the two countries and peaked in the

³⁵¹ I use the term crisis throughout because it has become the standard vocabulary in the historical literature. While there is not scope here to debate whether Suez was an example of ‘crisis’ or ‘aggression’, it is worth noting that the use of the term ‘crisis’ is a value-laden exercise (e.g. Weldes (1996)).

aftermath of the crisis.³⁵² Nor was discussion of the American connection all *bad*; significant elements of the Conservative left and the Labour right, along with members of the Liberal Party, both advised against actions that would undermine the ‘special relationship’ and sought to rebuild transatlantic bridges in the aftermath. Second, the crisis erupted under conditions of, and partially in response to, considerable ideological heterogeneity across the British political spectrum. The Bevanite rebellion in the Labour government divided the party in the 1950s between the hard-left and the social-democratic right, while the Conservative government’s conduct of foreign policy highlighted important ideological divisions between the moderates on the left and the party’s right-wing.

In the section that follows I offer a narrative of the crisis that highlights the interactions between domestic and international events. I begin by outlining the international context of Britain’s position in the Middle East and the nature of its relations with Egypt. I also discuss the domestic context, mapping the intra- and inter-party divisions that existed in foreign affairs at the time. I then discuss the events following the nationalisation of the canal, including the various diplomatic moves – the London Conference, the Suez Committee’s visit to Cairo, the users’ group proposal, and the UN resolution – pursued by the British (and French), before narrating the consequences of the joint military action and the eventual acceptance of a ceasefire. Finally, I consider the aftermath of the crisis and the effects it had on the Anglo-American relationship and British politics, before discussing the general role played by ideology during the crisis.

³⁵² The word ‘Suez’ has become synonymous with poor Anglo-American relations. It is only infrequently linked to Anglo-Egyptian relations or decolonisation in popular discourse.

The international and domestic context

Egypt was of particular significance to the British owing to the presence of the Suez Canal, the 'lifeline' to a number of imperial possessions, on its territory. Since opening in 1869 the Canal had played a significant role in buttressing Britain's global power, connecting the Mediterranean and Red Seas and considerably shortening the journey between Britain and the colonies. The situation at the end of the war, however, undermined Britain's ability to maintain its global influence. Britain was militarily strong but financially weak, and could not afford the costly business of maintaining commitments the world over. Moreover, the rising tide of nationalism created strong pressures for independence within those areas under British control or influence. Although Egypt was a nominally independent country, the Anglo-Egyptian defence treaty of 1936 established a strong military presence in the country, which became subject to the same clamours for independence as witnessed in 'formal' colonies.³⁵³

It was in this context that Britain faced increased pressure to withdraw its forces from Egypt and to seek alternative means of maintaining a presence in the region. The mainstay of British forces in Egypt withdrew throughout the later years of the 1940s, leaving the not insubstantial base at the Suez Canal Zone as the last remaining military presence. Pressure for withdrawal from the Canal Zone itself increased following the coup staged by Nasser's 'Blessed Movement of Free Officers' on 23 July 1952, while the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, came under increasing pressure at home from the Treasury to reduce Britain's military commitments in the region. In March 1953 the US agreed to proposals for Middle Eastern defence that

³⁵³ Thornhill (2006), p. 4

retained a minimal British presence in the Canal Zone, but allowed for the withdrawal of most forces, subject to negotiations with the Egyptian Government.³⁵⁴

The negotiations deadlocked as it became evident that the Egyptians wanted absolute control of the base while the British desired to maintain their control with a skeleton military presence. In the end, Eden compromised, accepting a full military withdrawal from the Canal Zone, subject to Egyptian protection of British civilians working in the Canal Zone, a right of British re-entry should the region come under attack, and a guarantee of free navigation along the Canal.³⁵⁵ Cabinet consent was obtained for the withdrawal on 22 March 1954 and the arrangement was codified in the Anglo-Egyptian Suez Agreement that October.³⁵⁶

Anglo-Egyptian relations were to remain strained, however, in the years following the British withdrawal from the Canal Zone. Nasser interpreted the Baghdad Pact, signed in 1955 by Britain, Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq and Iran in an attempt keep the Soviets out of the Middle East, as a Western-backed alliance against Egypt.³⁵⁷ Moreover, his desire to demonstrate his country's neutrality and independence fuelled the growing friction with Britain and America. The dismissal of General Sir John Glubb (commander of the Jordanian Arab Legion), on 29 February 1956, was viewed as a deplorable Egyptian act aimed at undermining British influence in the region. Meanwhile, Nasser's courting of the Soviet Union (an arms deal worth \$100 million was signed in September 1955),³⁵⁸ and his publicly stated intention to recognise communist China, rankled with the US, which responded by refusing financial support for the construction of the Aswan Dam on 19 July.

³⁵⁴ Turner (2006), p. 115

³⁵⁵ Though the Constantinople Convention of 1888 already guaranteed this right.

³⁵⁶ Turner (2006), p. 124

³⁵⁷ Thornhill (2006), pp. 207-208

³⁵⁸ Thornhill (2006), p. 211

Party politics and international relations in the 1950s

These events led directly to the nationalisation of the Canal at the end of July that precipitated the crisis in Anglo-Egyptian relations. Before discussing the subsequent course of events, however, it is worth briefly addressing the domestic political context in Britain in the years prior to the crisis. From 1945 until 1951, Britain had been governed by a Labour administration under Clement Attlee. Although some in the Labour party were anti-imperialist, many were not, and the Attlee government presided over a decline in British colonial influence out of necessity rather than ideology. The traditional course in foreign policy charted by Attlee and Bevin in foreign affairs led to the emergence of strong criticism within the party.³⁵⁹ The factional struggles in the Labour party contributed to the government's defeat in 1951 and the return to power of the Conservatives under Winston Churchill.

In opposition the Conservatives had been strongly united, largely because the blame for any 'colonial' follies could be placed on the Labour government. Once in power, however, it became clear that there existed a significant division within the party on issues of foreign policy, not only in relation to colonial policy, but also with regards Britain's place in the Cold War order more generally. As the country lurched from one crisis of 'decolonisation' to another, the foreign policy divide in the party became increasingly evident. At the same time, the schism in the Labour party intensified whilst in opposition, as the Bevanite faction that had contributed to the government's downfall in 1951 grew stronger, and began more actively to pressure the party leadership. Thus, by 1955, both parties found themselves internally divided on foreign policy issues.

³⁵⁹ Vickers (2003), pp. 168-169

The principal divide within the Labour ranks concerned the extent to which Britain should align itself with the West. Whilst specific concerns about the desirability of the use of force and the morality of West German rearmament were evident, these were more often than not subsumed under the broader question of Britain's position in the new global order. From 1947 onwards the socialist left had urged a neutral British foreign policy as the only way of promoting peace between the superpowers, noting "we cannot do this if we ourselves have taken sides either in a Communist *bloc* or in an anti-Bolshevik axis. It would be a betrayal of British and of European Socialism if we meekly accepted Communist leadership. But it would be equally fatal to accept American leadership in exchange for dollars".³⁶⁰ To those on the left, the US was just as threatening as the USSR. "In a war against America", the same authors noted, "these islands would be starved into submission within a few months".³⁶¹

As the realities of the Cold War became known, non-neutralist tendencies gained the upper hand, but they did not disappear. The Bevanite faction of the party in particular – named after their leader Aneurin Bevan – continued to endorse a move away from "the stultifying pattern of international alliances"³⁶² long after the onset of the Cold War proper. They objected to Britain's subservience to US power and, in particular, its growing ties to American capital and the bellicose nature of the US' containment of the Soviet Union³⁶³ and pushed for a more socialist foreign policy that emphasised disarmament and decolonisation as well as a strong, UN-led global order.³⁶⁴

³⁶⁰ Crossman *et al.* (1947), p. 35

³⁶¹ Crossman *et al.* (1947), p. 30

³⁶² Dalton (1986), p. 564

³⁶³ Bevan *et al.* (1951), pp. 8-10

³⁶⁴ Summarising the state of Atlanticism in the party, Gaitskell (1983), p. 318, noted that "hostility to America is strongest on the left...the mere fact that America is large and powerful stimulates some

Bevanite influence increased in the wake of Labour's relegation to the opposition benches in 1951. The faction organised itself into a formal grouping, with an elected chairman and a loyal contingent of (at least) twenty-five MPs.³⁶⁵ In early 1952 the faction rebelled against the (Conservative) government's defence White Paper; in spite of a three-line whip dictating a favourable vote, 57 Labour MPs voted against. That summer, at the party conference in Morecambe, the Bevanites succeeded in winning all but one of the NEC seats allocated to the constituency parties, unseating Labour grandees Herbert Morrison and Hugh Dalton.³⁶⁶ The greatest opposition emerged, however, with the issue of West German rearmament (discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four). At the Scarborough conference in October 1954 the proposal scraped by, with two votes between, while the parliamentary ratification of the Paris Agreements that December saw six Bevanite MPs vote against the official opposition line.³⁶⁷ Then, in early 1955, after witnessing the defeat of his motion for increased negotiations with the Soviets defeated in the Parliamentary Committee, Bevan began collecting signatures from the party for a second motion along similar lines, an act of defiance that led to his (temporary) dismissal from the party.³⁶⁸

The Labour leadership under Attlee and, from December 1955, Hugh Gaitskell, were conspicuously further to the right on foreign policy issues. Labour moderates believed that the greatest threat came from the East, not the West, and therefore viewed the Atlantic alliance as an indispensable tool for promoting freedom and defending against Soviet encroachment.³⁶⁹ As part of this effort they endorsed the

opposition among those who instinctively favour the poor and the weak...[also] America is a capitalist power and most Americans tend to emphasise this".

³⁶⁵ Dalton (1986), p. 563

³⁶⁶ Gaitskell (1983), p. 312

³⁶⁷ Those voting against the proposals subsequently had the Labour whip withdrawn

³⁶⁸ Gaitskell (1983), p. 373

³⁶⁹ In an argument against neutralism offered in 1947, the moderate socialist W.N. Ewer argued as follows: "If we decide...that the Soviet Union is potentially aggressive, then it follows that the resistant

rearming of West Germany and supported the nuclear stance of the West, at least, as long as the Soviet threat needed containing.³⁷⁰ The Labour right believed in moves towards decolonisation, but not without adequate safeguards for maintaining Britain's global influence. As Healey noted: "Until international relations can be conducted entirely under a guaranteed rule of law, the effectiveness of Britain's part in this international activity depends on her power, whether her policy is capitalist [or] socialist".³⁷¹ Thus, for the Labour right, as with the Labour left, positions on colonialism and force were part of a broader philosophy of international relations that corresponded, respectively, to the socialist and liberal ideal-types outlined in Chapter Two.

The Conservative party during the period also evidenced something of a left-right divide in foreign policy, although as the party of the right it was largely those on the left of the Conservative party who espoused liberal views of international relations, while those on the right endorsed a position closer to the conservative ideal-type. The divide in Conservative party views became evident after the departure of Churchill in 1955 and his replacement by Anthony Eden as leader and prime minister. Whilst Churchill's replacement did not, in itself, herald an ideological change, it did provide a vacuum of political authority into which competing traditions attempted to inject their views.

The Conservative moderates were to be found predominantly among the younger members of the party. Their views on international relations approximated the liberal ideal-type and to this extent their views were not dissimilar to those on the right of

force must, if possible, be made so strong, and so patently determined, that it will act as an effective deterrent. This is, of course, the case for a close Anglo-American association, as the only combination powerful enough to deter an expansionist Russia" (cf. Woolf 1947, 30-31).

³⁷⁰ It was the Attlee government that instigated research into the independent deterrent after the McMahon Act of 1946 curtailed Anglo-American cooperation in the nuclear field.

³⁷¹ Healey (1947), p. 3

the Labour party. Moderate Conservatives believed in the importance of international law and the need for supra-national regulation of the states-system; they “shared a respect for the rule of law and diplomacy, together with a respect for observance of the Charter of the UN [and] an acceptance of the necessity of the American alliance”.³⁷² Moreover, as *laissez faire* liberals, they also supported moves towards freer trade and European integration. This liberal view of international affairs provided the basis for the stance that moderate Conservatives would take during the Suez crisis, which encouraged international arbitration and the use of force only as a last resort. Prominent advocates of this interpretation of international affairs included Sir Albert Spearman, Robert Boothby, and both Harold and Nigel Nicolson.

The right wing of the Conservatives, in contrast, approximated almost all the elements of the conservative ideal-type. They disliked international control, viewing it as weak and illegitimate, and profoundly distrusted the UN. Moreover, they fought moves towards free trade and European integration,³⁷³ viewing both as American schemes to undermine British independence.³⁷⁴ They also opposed the idea of the international as an interdependent, governable realm, advocating a “return to traditional methods of great-power diplomacy”.³⁷⁵ Julian Amery, the poster-child for the Conservative right, argued Britain’s “position – power political as well as geographical – is one of being between Russia and America, or if you prefer to think ideologically, between Totalitarian Socialism and Liberal Capitalism”.³⁷⁶

³⁷² Onslow (1997), p. 126

³⁷³ Whilst the majority of right-wing Conservative MPs opposed European integration, a significant minority endorsed the idea as a means of balancing the overwhelming influence of the US. This was part of a broader phenomenon identified in the German and French cases also of seeing Europe as a tool through which to balance US influence. Advocates of this position tended to support minimal, or intergovernmental, institutionalization of Europe, and their world-view differed from those of their right-wing compatriots only at the tactical level.

³⁷⁴ Onslow (1997), pp. 30-31

³⁷⁵ Onslow (1997), p. 121

³⁷⁶ Onslow (1997), p. 119

Concomitant with this 'balancing' element of conservative realism was support for the use of force as a means of demonstrating British resolve and promoting 'her' interests overseas.

Thus, whereas Labour views of international relations divided between socialists and liberals, the Conservatives were split between liberals and conservatives. While the Conservative moderates endorsed interdependence, supranational authority, collective security and the Western deterrent, right wing Conservatives advocated a more traditional combination of nationalism, domesticism and realism. These different worldviews helped to determine the stance that the competing tendencies would take during the crisis itself: the membership of the pro-intervention 'Suez Group' came from the right, whilst the anti-intervention 'Anti-Suez Group' was drawn from the moderate left. Positions for and against the use of force represented deep ideological divisions within the party – rather than *ad hoc* coalitions – each of which, as I shall demonstrate below, offered different prescriptions for the direction of British policy during the crisis.

The Suez Group in the Conservatives proved consequential in the run-up to the crisis itself, and helped to ensure that Eden's response – when the opportunity arose – would be a tough one. Indeed, the course of the crisis itself, and the resulting downturn in Anglo-American relations that accompanied it, was to a large extent the product of the growing strength and influence of this Conservative right wing in this period. By the time of the British withdrawal from the Canal Zone in 1954, the Suez Group were protesting Eden's policy towards the Middle East; when the Anglo-Egyptian Suez Agreement came before the Commons, the Group was able to secure

the support of 28 MPs against the agreement,³⁷⁷ a small fraction of those whose loyalty it would command as the crisis worsened. With the dismissal of Sir John Glubb, too, the Group protested Eden's line, informing that the media, the Cabinet, the whips' office and the various parliamentary committees concerned with foreign affairs were aware how strongly they viewed the issue.³⁷⁸ The result of the campaign was to convince Eden of the need to implement (or, at least, be seen to implement) a harder-line vis-à-vis Nasser.³⁷⁹

Nationalisation and the British response

As it happened, the test of Eden's tougher Middle East policy was right around the corner. On 26 July 1956 Nasser publicly announced the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company through the use of a presidential decree. In his speech he argued that the act of nationalisation offered a means of reinforcing Egyptian independence and obtaining the necessary funds to finance construction of the Aswan Dam.³⁸⁰ He also indicated that foreign shareholders would be compensated for any losses incurred. To say the news was ill received in London would be an understatement. Prime Minister Anthony Eden, already angry at Nasser's increasingly provocative diplomacy, was livid that he could go so far as to threaten Britain's colonial lifeline and position in the Middle East. A meeting was organised late that evening to deal with the matter; in attendance were Cabinet members, representatives from the Opposition (led by Gaitskell), delegates from the French and American Embassies, and the British Chiefs of Staff.

³⁷⁷ Turner (2006), p. 126

³⁷⁸ Onslow (1997), p. 191

³⁷⁹ Onslow (1997), p. 191

³⁸⁰ Telegram from US Ambassador to Egypt Henry Byroade to Department of State, 30 July 1956

At the meeting, a short, factual statement was read by Eden, informing them of Nasser's actions. Gaitskell responded that Eden "ought to act quickly...and that as far as Great Britain was concerned, public opinion would almost certainly be behind them...[and] added that they must get America into line".³⁸¹ The meeting discussed various options, including diplomatic measures, economic sanctions, and the possible use of force. No decisions were made at that time, although "very strong feelings were expressed, especially by Eden, to [the] effect that Nasser must not be allowed to get away with it".³⁸² One decision Eden did take was to establish a smaller 'Egypt Committee' from a small core of Cabinet members in portfolios related to colonial issues and foreign affairs (including Salisbury, Home, and Macmillan).³⁸³ It was also agreed that negotiations between the French, British and Americans would continue, but that a statement could be released immediately to the effect that: "The unilateral decision of the Egyptian Government to expropriate the Suez Canal Company, without notice and in breach of the concessions, affects the rights and interests of many nations."³⁸⁴

The following day Eden made a statement to the House of Commons, informing them of the situation. Unsurprisingly, given his support in the meeting of the previous evening, Gaitskell's line (agreed with his party leaders) was to indicate his support for the prime minister, deploring the "high-handed and totally unjustified step taken by Nasser".³⁸⁵ The only condition he attached was that the issue should be handled through the UN, although Eden gave no response to this statement. Although Eden would be forgiven for thinking he had the unified support of the country, the

³⁸¹ Gaitskell (1983), p. 553

³⁸² Telegram from the US Embassy in the UK to the Department of State, 27 July 1956

³⁸³ Macmillan (2003), p. 579

³⁸⁴ Telegram from the US Embassy in the UK to the Department of State, 27 July 1956

³⁸⁵ Gaitskell (1983), p. 558

Conservative Chief Whip Edward Heath noticed several Labour members shaking their heads as Gaitskell talked, and warned Eden there could be trouble ahead.³⁸⁶ After informing the House he met with the Chiefs of Staff and instructed them to work on contingency plans in case the need for a military intervention arose. He outlined his intention to ‘internationalise’ the Canal, a move that would not only guarantee freedom of passage irrespective of the whims of Egyptian politics, but would certainly humiliate Nasser, and in doing so send a message to other post-colonial leaders that this kind of behaviour did not pay.

Top-level correspondence between Britain and the US on the matter began that day. Eden messaged Eisenhower asking for US assistance and highlighting the threat nationalisation proposed to Western oil supplies. He indicated his readiness, “in the last resort, to use force to bring Nasser to his senses”, and informed the President of his instructions to the Chiefs of Staff, but suggested that “the first step must be [to] align our policies”.³⁸⁷ The Americans took the issue very seriously, even if they were unprepared to risk the use of force. They were concerned about any diminution of the Canal’s character and the possible precedent for the Panama Canal, then under the jurisdiction of the US. They were also aware of the strength of feeling in Britain and France, and the level of support in these countries for a forceful response,³⁸⁸ and wished to avoid a conflagration that would risk bringing them into conflict with the Soviets. (The French foreign minister, Christian Pineau, in particular, had been strongly indicating a military response to reoccupy the Canal Zone).³⁸⁹

³⁸⁶ Heath (1998), p. 166

³⁸⁷ Letter from Prime Minister Eden to President Eisenhower, 27 July 1956

³⁸⁸ Memorandum of conversation between President Eisenhower, Acting Secretary of State Herbert Hoover and CIA Director Allen Dulles, Washington, 27 July 1956

³⁸⁹ Telegram from the US Ambassador to France, Douglas C. Dillon, to the Department of State, 27 July 1956

Convening a meeting in response to the message, Eisenhower noted Eden's "readiness to use force" and stressed the need for a strong response to reaffirm Western authority. The President gave no indication of whether the US would support British force, merely noting that it would be difficult to obtain Congressional support for American military action.³⁹⁰ A report prepared by the US Chiefs of Staff that morning had recommended the US limit itself to diplomatic and economic measures, but made no recommendations regarding American endorsement of British or French intervention.

The tripartite meetings: Britain, France, and the US

To continue the negotiations and coordinate the US response with the British and French, the President despatched Deputy Under Secretary Robert Murphy to London later that day. In a statement from the first of a series of tripartite meetings held between 29 July and 2 August, Murphy urged caution on the British and French. Whilst deploring "the violent and even reckless language employed by President Nasser in announcing unilaterally and without consultation an arbitrary action", he nonetheless recommended that action be taken "only after a sober estimate of the facts", arguing that: "The question of eventual military intervention does not seem to arise...For the present we believe it should be relegated to the background".³⁹¹ For Chancellor of the Exchequer Harold Macmillan, the meetings highlighted important differences between the Europeans and the Americans.³⁹²

³⁹⁰ Memorandum of conversation between President Eisenhower, Acting Secretary of State Herbert Hoover and Colonel Goodpaster, Washington, 27 July 1956

³⁹¹ Statement from Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Robert Murphy, at the first Tripartite Meeting, London, 29 July 1956

³⁹² Macmillan (2003), pp. 579-580

Bob Murphy arrived yesterday. The [Egypt] Committee met and heard the For Secretary's account of the first talk. It is clear that the Americans are going to 'restrain' us all they can...The French are absolutely solid with us, and together we did our best to frighten Murphy all we could...We gave him the impression that our military expedition to Egypt was about to sail.

Although Macmillan was notably more disposed towards a bellicose solution than Eden at this point, it is certainly the case that the British were considering force at the time, while the Americans had effectively ruled it out. (Eisenhower advised Dulles to "show we are not indifferent but are not going to war over it").³⁹³ That said, the US probably misinterpreted the keenness of the British to go to war right away over the Canal. Dulles was of the opinion that the use of force was inevitable given the need for the former-imperial powers to demonstrate their resolve in the face of similar challenges in French Algeria or the remaining British colonies.³⁹⁴ Eden's initial strategy, however, aimed at achieving a diplomatic solution through the threat of force, with the latter aspect a means of boosting British credibility in Nasser's eyes and pushing the Americans to take the issue seriously.³⁹⁵

The question of force had a distinct partisan element even at this early stage. At the beginning of August, Hugh Gaitskell and Jim Griffiths, Labour's deputy leader, arranged a meeting with Eden to discuss their concerns at reports emerging from the meetings indicating the use of force had been discussed. Gaitskell told Eden that the Labour party would not condone the use of force against Nasser, indicating that recourse to the military option could "be used in self-defence, or...in circumstances which could be properly justified before the United Nations".³⁹⁶ Gaitskell was also

³⁹³ Memorandum of conversation between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles, Washington, 30 July 1956

³⁹⁴ Memorandum of conversation between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles, Washington, 30 July 1956

³⁹⁵ Pearson (2003), p. 32

³⁹⁶ Gaitskell (1983), p. 561

concerned that elements in the Conservative party, namely the Suez Group, were now openly 'demanding' that Eden back the use of force to regain control of the Canal. So, too, were moderate Conservatives who opposed a forceful solution, and argued the result could only be "a frightful loss of prestige, but also increased tension in Anglo-American relations".³⁹⁷ Moreover, Eden had started to respond to the pressure from his backbench. Unlike his more measured statement to the Commons on 27 July, his statement to the Foreign Affairs Committee on 31 July – which had been pre-approved by the Suez Group – took an 'extremely strong' line against Nasser.³⁹⁸

Whether Eden desired to keep the force option 'on the table', or simply wished to be seen as more bellicose by his backbench MPs, he and Macmillan continued to insist to the US that a forceful solution was an option that must be considered. Certainly Eden was under considerable pressure from the right wing of his party to push for a military solution.³⁹⁹ The discussions between the three powers, focused on obtaining a mutually acceptable solution, began to hone in on the need for international control of the Canal, in accordance with the Constantinople Convention of 1888. (The convention provided for the free passage of ships through the Canal, in times of peace and war, irrespective of political circumstances). International control suited the American desire not to employ force while allowing the British and French to humiliate Nasser on the international stage by removing his recent acquisition from him, though some in the Cabinet (particularly Macmillan) continued to argue for military measures.⁴⁰⁰ At the third meeting a draft communiqué based on the

³⁹⁷ Nicolson (1968), p. 307

³⁹⁸ Onslow (1997), p. 195

³⁹⁹ Pearson (2003), p. 39

⁴⁰⁰ Macmillan (2003), p. 580

reaffirming the principles of the Convention and suggesting a UN role administering the Canal was placed before the attendees.

The London Conference

On 1 August, Eden agreed to the US option of an international conference, to be held in London, comprised of signatories to the Constantinople Convention and non-signatories whose patterns of trade relied heavily on the Suez Canal. The conference was essential, Dulles argued, because “United States public opinion was not ready to back a military venture by Britain and France which, at this stage, could be plausibly portrayed as motivated by imperialist and colonialist ambitions”.⁴⁰¹ The French also supported the conference option, and the following day the three powers concluded their meetings with Tripartite Statement, which affirmed that “the action taken by the Government of Egypt... threatens the freedom and security of the Canal as guaranteed by the Convention of 1888”. The remedy it proposed was a conference “of parties to the Convention and other nations largely concerned with the use of the Canal...to be held in London”.⁴⁰² Egypt, Italy, Spain, the UK, France, Netherlands, Turkey, and the USSR were invited as signatories, whilst Australia, Sri Lanka (Ceylon), Denmark, Ethiopia, West Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Sweden, and the US were invited based on their use of the Canal.

Meanwhile, with the invites extended, debate continued within and between the parties over the potential use of force. On 3 August Gaitskell wrote to Eden, again

⁴⁰¹ Memorandum of conversation between Prime Minister Eden and Secretary of State Dulles, London, 1 August 1956

⁴⁰² Tripartite Statement issued on behalf of the British, French and American Governments, London, 2 August 1956

concerned about press reports that “Britain and France intend if necessary and without active American participation to use force – even if there is no further aggressive action from Nasser”, informing Eden his party would not support such a move.⁴⁰³ In his response, Eden continued to hedge on the use of force, writing that he “only wanted to be free to use force if the Conference did not succeed in its object or if Colonel Nasser ‘did something else’. Certainly the Government’s attitude to the use of force would also have to depend on the circumstances of the time”.⁴⁰⁴ By the time of Eden’s first television statement on the matter on 8 August, the opposition had stepped up its game; both Labour and the Liberals were now opposed to force ‘whatever happens’ and pushing for a referral to the UNSC.⁴⁰⁵

The idea that the Conservative government might consider using force against a weaker country outside the authority of the UN had a catalysing effect on Labour party cohesion. On 13 August Gaitskell secured the unanimous support of the Parliamentary Committee for his stance on the use of force and his insistence that the matter be referred to the UN. Perhaps most surprising was that Bevan also agreed with the leadership, informing Gaitskell that: “You will be surprised to hear this from me but I think it would be a great mistake to say anything at the moment which would embarrass the Americans”.⁴⁰⁶ The next day, Gaitskell and Griffiths met with Eden, Lloyd and Salisbury, accompanied by the Shadow Foreign Secretary Alfred Robens. During the meeting they “told the Prime Minister that [they] were deeply concerned at this stage with...the scale of the military preparations”.⁴⁰⁷

⁴⁰³ Gaitskell (1983), p. 571

⁴⁰⁴ Gaitskell (1983), p. 572

⁴⁰⁵ Macmillan (2003), p. 585

⁴⁰⁶ Gaitskell (1983), p. 576

⁴⁰⁷ Gaitskell (1983), p. 576

There were two reasons the crisis dampened inter-party consent. First, both force propensity and anti-colonialism followed the traditional left-right model of partisan contestation; thus, the pacifists of the Labour left could unite against the pro-force Conservative right with those on the Labour right who were sceptical of the *unilateral* use of force. Second, the party realised it could capitalise significantly on Conservative mismanagement of the crisis, perhaps even forcing new elections. Underneath the anti-force posture, the socialist and liberal wings of the party still held largely incompatible views of foreign affairs, but for the time being these seldom came to the fore. Only Gaitskell's initial support for a hard-line against Nasser and his vocal concern for maintaining strong Anglo-American relations illustrated the continual differences within the party.

The London Conference opened on 16 August, with close to full attendance. The only countries to refuse the invite were Greece and Egypt, the latter arguing the approach of the three powers was "imperialistic, anti-charter, and destructive of peace and security", and that a conference was unnecessary for freedom of navigation, which they claimed to already guarantee.⁴⁰⁸ Selwyn Lloyd, the Foreign Secretary, assumed the role of chair, and immediately informed the delegates that the conference would proceed in a strictly intergovernmental manner, with no states bound by any majority vote. It was thought unlikely even prior to the conference that a consensus could be gathered around the international control of the Canal. Many of the countries invited had reason to side with Nasser as opposed to Eden or Mollet: India and the newly independent states because Egypt's experience resonated with their recent histories, Greece and Spain because of the enclaves of British rule in

⁴⁰⁸ Telegram from Ambassador Byroade, US Embassy in Egypt, to the Department of State, 7 August 1956

their territories (Cyprus and Gibraltar), and the Soviets because it offered another opportunity to block Western initiative.⁴⁰⁹

The discussion proceeded slowly and tentatively as a result, the Soviets and Indians engaging constructively in the initial sessions whilst failing to 'show their hand'. Establishing the Soviet position was especially important given that hope for Egyptian acceptance for any agreement would rest on the extent to which it could expect Soviet backing.⁴¹⁰ It was reckoned that, of the 22 countries at the conference, at least 12 could be counted on to back some form of international control for the Canal. This was a slim majority of the attendees, but it was not representative; the states in favour were predominantly Western, while those opposed were not.⁴¹¹ On 18 August the British and French delegations began circulating a draft of the proposals they had in mind for the Canal. The draft envisaged a 'definite system' for the free use of the Canal with respect for Egyptian sovereignty and a 'fair return' for the country. Organizationally it was envisaged that a board with Egyptian and international representation would be created to oversee control of the Canal, with the power to sanction states and an arbitral body to overcome disputes.⁴¹²

The Americans offered their support to the British and French draft, although Eisenhower personally thought Nasser more likely to agree to a board with 'supervisory' powers, rather than one tasked with 'executive' powers to operate the Canal.⁴¹³ Movement came on 21 August when Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and Ethiopia agreed to the draft proposals, subject to minor amendments. The following day, Spain also reversed its position. Not only did the turnaround of these countries put a

⁴⁰⁹ Memorandum of minutes from the 292nd meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, 9 August 1956

⁴¹⁰ Telegram from Secretary of State Dulles to the Department of State, 16 August 1956

⁴¹¹ Message from Secretary of State Dulles to President Eisenhower, 17 August 1956

⁴¹² Message from Secretary of State Dulles to President Eisenhower, 18 August 1956

⁴¹³ Message from President Eisenhower to Secretary of State Dulles, 19 August 1956

strong majority of attendees in favour (18 out of 22), it also downplayed the ‘Western’ image of the proposals.⁴¹⁴ On 22 August the ‘five power proposal’, as it was now termed, was introduced to the conference. Having secured the agreement of all the attendees save for India, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and the USSR, the conference adopted a resolution to present the ‘five power proposals’ to Nasser, along with the dissenting viewpoints.⁴¹⁵

To deliver the consensus view to Nasser, the conference convened a committee of representatives from five attending states: Australia, Ethiopia, Iran, Sweden and the US.⁴¹⁶ At the same time, the Egypt Committee of the Cabinet met and made the decision to postpone the eventual military operation by four days to give the diplomatic approach time to work.⁴¹⁷ The ‘Suez Committee’, led by Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies, delivered the findings of the London Conference to Nasser on 24 August. From 3 September onwards the ‘Menzies Mission’, as it became known informally, visited Cairo to negotiate directly with the Egyptian president. Or, at least, *some* delegations attempted to negotiate; the British and French made it clear that “there would be no negotiations”, and viewed the five power proposals as an ultimatum, rather than an initial bargaining position.⁴¹⁸ Unsure of his position, the head of the US delegation, Loy Henderson, telegraphed the State Department for instructions, noting that the “British and French Governments... take [the] position that Committee has no power “to negotiate”.”⁴¹⁹ The compromise reached was that

⁴¹⁴ Message from Secretary of State Dulles to President Eisenhower, 21 August 1956

⁴¹⁵ Message from Secretary of State Dulles to President Eisenhower, 23 August 1956

⁴¹⁶ Message from Secretary of State Dulles to President Eisenhower, 22 August 1956

⁴¹⁷ Macmillan (2003), p. 590

⁴¹⁸ Memorandum of conversation between Deputy Chief of Mission Barbour and Prime Minister Eden, 28 August 1956

⁴¹⁹ Telegram from the US Delegate to the Suez Committee, Loy Henderson, to the Department of State, 29 August 1956

the US would not negotiate, but would 'indicate areas of flexibility' to Nasser within the existing proposals.

As it happened, it was Nasser who was in no mood to negotiate, commenting; "if Menzies was trying to convey the idea that rejection of these proposals would lead to trouble, he was quite prepared to let it come at once".⁴²⁰ The problem was that Nasser failed to take the British and French threat of military action seriously. Ironically, the vocal opposition of the Labour party to a military solution undermined the prospects for a negotiation solution by lessening the credibility of a British resort to force.⁴²¹ As Dulles put it:⁴²²

It seems as though domestic support for a strong line has dwindled to a point where if Nasser rejects, the Macmillan policy can scarcely be carried through and that some form of governmental crisis may result. The attitude of the Labour party is a hard blow for the government at this juncture when bi-partisan unity would give Britain the best chance of retrieving its position without actually having to use force.

Dulles worried that Nasser would hold firm, believing the British government would fall before it had the chance to invade. Eden tried his best to dismiss this view. "The British public", he argued, "except the left-wing Labour element, was strongly behind the government... Gaitskell would stand with the Government in the use of force if that should appear to be necessary".⁴²³ Yet Gaitskell's insistence to Dulles that "HMG 'could not successfully go it alone in the use of force', and the Labour

⁴²⁰ 'Summary of Developments in Suez Situation: Number Two', Report prepared in the Executive Secretariat of the US Department of State, 5 September 1956

⁴²¹ Ramsay (2004), p. 476

⁴²² Message from Secretary of State Dulles to President Eisenhower, 19 August 1956

⁴²³ Memorandum of conversation between Secretary of State Dulles, US Ambassador to the UK Winthrop Aldrich, Prime Minister Eden and Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, London, 19 August 1956

Party would be strongly opposed to any armed action” undermined the prime minister’s statements.⁴²⁴

Ultimately, the Americans, and more importantly, Nasser, remained unconvinced Eden could resort to military action whilst keeping the country on side. On 5 September he made it clear to the Suez Committee that Egypt “would not accept any institutional arrangement which would provide for the operation of the Canal by an international body”.⁴²⁵

Exhausting all Options: The Users’ Agency and the UN

Nasser’s rejection of the five power proposals disappointed the British. They were not prepared to accept a solution that would see Egypt maintain control over the administration of the Canal, nor were they willing to ‘climb down’ after having threatened strong action. Both British credibility and the survival of the government were at stake. Yet the move to an immediate military response did not occur because of the emergence of two diplomatic avenues following the failure of the Menzies Mission.

The first was an idea proffered by Dulles to create a Users’ Association between countries actively involved in transporting through the Canal. This would allow for “the use by the users’ organisation of their own pilots and their collection of the fees...the putting into effect or announcing of alternatives to the use of the Canal so far as oil was concerned, and the continuance of some economic measures taken

⁴²⁴ Memorandum of meeting between Hugh Gaitskell and Secretary of State Dulles, London, 24 August 1956

⁴²⁵ ‘Summary of Developments in Suez Situation: Number Three, Report prepared in the Executive Secretariat of the US Department of State, 6 September 1956

against Egypt”.⁴²⁶ While Dulles did not see the Users Association as a viable, long-term solution, he hoped the suggestion would “carry on the momentum of the London Conference”, thereby preventing British recourse to a military option. Since 5 September the US reckoned British and French forces in the region were sufficient for an attack on the Canal Zone and they worried about the scale and speed of preparations for military activity, with forces placed on alert, reservists called up, and both troops and hardware moving to the region.⁴²⁷ The following day they began consulting with Congressional leaders of the likelihood of an Anglo-French operation being launched.⁴²⁸

The British were enthusiastic about the Users’ Association, for it fitted well with the five power proposals agreed upon in London.⁴²⁹ The problem was that Eden was in a tight situation in parliament. Although voices on the left (including those in his own party) pushed for a diplomatic solution, he found it increasingly difficult to placate the Suez Group, who had stepped up their campaign for intervention following Nasser’s rejection of the proposals. Ambassador Makins requested the US indicate their strong support for the Association to placate critics charging that the move would not apply strong enough pressure on Nasser.⁴³⁰ Noting the British government’s need for a ‘slap in the face for Nasser’ to appease its critics, the US informed Makins the US would certainly take part in the Association, but would not

⁴²⁶ Memorandum of conversation between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles, Washington, 8 September 1956

⁴²⁷ ‘Conclusions on British-French Intentions to Employ Force against Egypt’, Report prepared by the joint ‘Watch Committee’ of the Department of State, CIA and Joint Chiefs of Staff, 5 September 1956

⁴²⁸ Memorandum of conversation between Secretary of State Dulles and the Congressional leadership, 6 September 1956

⁴²⁹ Message from Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary of State Dulles, 7 September 1956

⁴³⁰ Letter from British Ambassador to the US, Sir Roger Makins, to Secretary of State Dulles, 10 September 1956

actively participate in its creation.⁴³¹ The Cabinet endorsed the Users' Association on 11 September after considering the proposal alongside the two other options: immediate use of force, and referral to the Security Council.

To specify the finer details of the Users' Association and work out a plan for its implementation, a second conference was arranged in London with the supporters of the original five power proposals.⁴³² In the end, however, the scheme came to nothing. Eden's use of threatening language to refer to the proposals led to an aggressive Egyptian response. Nasser claimed the Association represented "an open and flagrant aggression on Egypt's sovereignty and [their] implementation means war. If the United States desires war, it may support the scheme".⁴³³ To make matters worse, the Soviets indicated they could not remain indifferent to a Middle Eastern conflict.⁴³⁴ With global tensions rising, Dulles stated on 13 September that the US would not 'shoot its way through' the Canal should matters come to a head.⁴³⁵ Without strong US backing the scheme was a non-starter before the conference assembled. When the delegates did meet in London, there was significant opposition to the scheme from many countries,⁴³⁶ while Dulles seemed in no hurry to reach agreement.⁴³⁷ On 21 September, the conference formally endorsed a Users' Association, but without the power to compel members to pay dues the scheme was 'toothless'.

⁴³¹ Memorandum of conversation between British Ambassador to the US Makins, Secretary of State Dulles and British Chargé d'Affairs Coulson, Washington, 11 September 1956

⁴³² Memorandum of conversation between Secretary of State Dulles, British Ambassador to US Makins and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs William Rountree, Washington, 13 September 1956

⁴³³ Memorandum of conversation between Egyptian Ambassador to US, Adman Hussein, and Secretary of State Dulles, 13 September 1956

⁴³⁴ Nicolson (1968), p. 310

⁴³⁵ Gaitskell (1983), p. 606

⁴³⁶ Memorandum of conversation between Secretary of State Dulles, French Foreign Minister Pineau and British Foreign Minister Lloyd, 20 September 1956

⁴³⁷ Pearson (2003), p. 89

The second diplomatic avenue following the failure of the Menzies Mission was recourse to the UN Security Council. Lloyd had announced to the Americans on 28 August that Britain might refer the issue to the Security Council were the Menzies Mission to fail. When Nasser's rejection made it clear the mission was unsuccessful, parliamentary pressure for a move to the UN reached a crescendo. As parliament convened on 13 September, the Labour party pushed hard for a UN-backed solution, as it had done since the beginning of the crisis.⁴³⁸ They were joined by the Liberal party and by an increasing number of moderate Conservatives,⁴³⁹ many of whom felt "that the Government may have been careless about putting us in the right, and that to reject the suggestion that we should go to the Security Council is a major error".⁴⁴⁰ Eden's position was made all the more difficult by worries that "the militant wing (Waterhouse-Amery) of the party might well turn nasty if he were to change his position too noticeably".⁴⁴¹

Neither the US nor the French were particularly keen to take the issue to the Security Council either, the latter because they preferred a forcible solution,⁴⁴² and the former because of strong likelihood of a Soviet veto. Though Eden also thought the Soviets would veto, he argued it would "be advantageous [for the] UK to show [the] world that it had exhausted all peaceable methods before resorting to other methods".⁴⁴³ Nevertheless, the US declined the British invitation to become a signatory on the Anglo-French letter to UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld on 11

⁴³⁸ Heath (1998), p. 166

⁴³⁹ Macmillan (2003), p. 597

⁴⁴⁰ Nicolson (1968), pp. 309-310

⁴⁴¹ Macmillan (2003), p. 598

⁴⁴² Memorandum of conversation between Secretary of State Dulles and US Ambassador-Designate to France, Hervé Alphand, and British Chargé d'Affairs J.E. Coulson, Washington, 5 September 1956

⁴⁴³ Memorandum of conversation between Deputy Chief of Mission Walworth Barbour and Prime Minister Eden, 28 August 1956

September.⁴⁴⁴ On 22 September, one day after the conclusion of the second London conference, Britain formally requested a Security Council discussion on Suez.⁴⁴⁵ In an attempt to maintain US support, Eden cited concerns the USSR was preparing a similar move, arguing that the referral avoided Britain “being put on the defensive”.⁴⁴⁶

In the period between the UNSC referral and the beginning of negotiations, criticism from the right increased markedly. Having believed the demise of the Users’ Association would lead to a firmer British response, the Suez Group were disappointed by the decision to take the matter to the UN. By now the group had the support of approximately 100 Conservative MPs, making them a considerable force. They also had powerful advocates in the Cabinet and the smaller Egypt Committee, who had begun to apply greater pressure on Eden. Pressure against the use of force came from Labour, the Liberals and the US. On 2 October Dulles publicly stated that the US would not stand ‘100 percent’ with Britain and France, insisting that when it came to colonial matters the US would play a more independent role.⁴⁴⁷ Yet the Suez Group, unlike Eden, were not concerned about US backing; in fact, they were “intent on preventing any capitulation to transatlantic pressure...[and] had no doubts that Britain could and should act independently of her traditional sphere of influence”.⁴⁴⁸

Ironically, Dulles’ statement played into the Suez Group’s hands by convincing Eden that a solution to the crisis would need to come from Anglo-French initiative and not, as he had hoped, through consultation with the US and the international community.

⁴⁴⁴ Memorandum of telephone conversation between British Ambassador to US Sir Roger Makins and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs William Rountree, 11 September 1956

⁴⁴⁵ Memorandum of conversation between British Chargé d’Affairs Coulson and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Rountree, Washington, 22 September 1956

⁴⁴⁶ ‘Summary of Developments in Suez Situation: Number Fifteen, Report prepared in the Executive Secretariat of the US Department of State, 24 September 1956

⁴⁴⁷ Pearson (2003), pp. 114-115

⁴⁴⁸ Onslow (1998), p. 194

Meanwhile, negotiations for a diplomatic settlement got underway at the UN. From 5 October, British, French and Egyptian representatives met frequently in New York while the Security Council deliberated the matter. Disagreement centred on whether or not the Users' Association, which Egypt supported 'in principle', would be able to collect the tolls from ships passing through the Canal.⁴⁴⁹ The tolls issue was crucial because it offered the British and French a way of threatening Nasser with economic sanctions. Without this power, the Association would be a talking shop, and Nasser would be seen by domestic and international audiences to have 'won'.

Despite the British concern for securing an agreement that would be acceptable to the Conservative right, Dulles noted that Lloyd seemed at least to be working towards a practical solution, while neither the Egyptian nor French delegations seemed interested in reaching a settlement.⁴⁵⁰ Evidently, while the Egyptians thought the Anglo-French threat of force was not credible, the French knew this was not the case. Eventually, by 12 October, Hammarskjöld placed before the three parties six principles on which he believed all parties could agree: free transit through the Canal, respect for Egyptian sovereignty, operation free from politics, tolls determined through Egyptian-Users' Association agreement, allocation of some tolls to development projects, and the settlement of disputes through arbitration.⁴⁵¹ When the Security Council met the following day, the British introduced a two-part resolution calling for the endorsement of Hammarskjöld's six principles and further proposing that tolls should be collected from the members of the Users' Association. While the Council accepted the first part unanimously, the Soviets and Yugoslavia

⁴⁴⁹ Memorandum of conversation between Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and the British and French Delegations to the United Nations, New York, 10 October 1956

⁴⁵⁰ Memorandum of conversation between President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles and Under Secretary of State Hoover, Washington, 11 October 1956

⁴⁵¹ Memorandum of conversation between Secretary of State Dulles, Foreign Secretary Lloyd and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Rountree, New York, 12 October 1956

opposed the second part, and, as expected, the veto prevented adoption of the resolution.⁴⁵²

The Llandudno Conference and the Beginning of Collusion

The negotiations in New York took place at the same time as the Conservative party conference in Llandudno, where the ongoing Suez crisis took centre stage. Heath, the Chief Whip, judged that “feelings were running very high indeed and that the Suez Group, a group of right-leaning backbenchers including Julian Amery, Fitzroy Maclean and Charles Waterhouse, would try some rabble-rousing”.⁴⁵³ Heath’s judgement proved correct; the Suez Group engaged in concerted action at Llandudno to push for a harder-line against Nasser, arguing that a failure to do so would hand power to Labour at the next general election.⁴⁵⁴ The group placed a strongly worded resolution before the conference calling for international control and a strong response, which was adopted, and their efforts resulted in a tougher statement from Eden than he had previously delivered.⁴⁵⁵

The efforts of the Suez Group at the conference are seen as ‘crucial’ for Eden’s subsequent decision to use force, along with the efforts of the group to convince Macmillan of the strategic necessity of colluding with Israel, and Mollet of the need to pressure Eden further.⁴⁵⁶ The conference closed on 13 October. The following day, French Prime Minister Mollet visited London, accompanied by his senior generals. In discussions with Eden the French outlined the ‘Challe Plan’ for military

⁴⁵² Memorandum of conversation between British, French and American Delegations to the United Nations, New York, 13 October 1956

⁴⁵³ Heath (1998), p. 168

⁴⁵⁴ Onslow (1997), p. 198

⁴⁵⁵ Pearson (2003), p. 144

⁴⁵⁶ Onslow (1997), pp. 198-200

action in the Canal Zone in coordination with Israel. Eden informed the French he would make a decision by 16 October, although he was personally supportive, cognisant that Britain had exhausted all diplomatic options and could not rely on staunch US support.⁴⁵⁷ More important, however, was the knowledge that the government's survival now hinged on the adoption of a forceful solution to the crisis, a message that had been hammered home over the course of the Llandudno conference.⁴⁵⁸

On 16 October, having obtained the backing of the Egypt Committee, Eden informed the French of his support for the Challe Plan. Secret negotiations between the three countries – Britain, France and Israel – took place at Sèvres, near Paris, on 22 October and two days later agreement was reached on the timing and scope of the intervention, which was guaranteed in the signing of the 'Sèvres Protocol'. The next day, Eden informed the Cabinet of the decision, leading Defence Minister Walter Monckton to tender his resignation, on the grounds that differences with Egypt were not significant enough to justify a resort to force.⁴⁵⁹ On 29 October, Israeli forces began their invasion of the Sinai peninsula, ostensibly to pre-empt an Egyptian attack.⁴⁶⁰ As justification for the move they cited suspicious Egyptian naval movements and the establishment of a joint command by Egypt, Jordan and Syria.⁴⁶¹ The following day the British and French issued an ultimatum to both Egypt and Israel to withdraw from the Canal Zone.

⁴⁵⁷ Pearson (2003), p. 140

⁴⁵⁸ Pearson (2003), p. 140

⁴⁵⁹ Benn (1994), p. 191

⁴⁶⁰ Memorandum of conversation between President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles and Under Secretary of State Hoover, Washington, 29 October 1956

⁴⁶¹ Memorandum of conversation between Israeli Ambassador to US, Abba Eben, and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Rountree, Washington, 29 October 1956. The Israeli prime minister also made similar claims regarding "Nasser's expansionist policy" in a personal message to President Eisenhower the same day.

Before announcing the intervention to parliament, Eden informed the US of the ultimatum the British and French had offered Nasser. The US, monitoring events closely, realised immediately the relation between the Sinai invasion and the Anglo-French ultimatum. They had been aware for several months that France had sold military equipment, including fighter planes, to Israel in greater number than they had publicly declared. Moreover, they realised that collusion occurred as the volume of communications between the British, French and Israelis spiked in the immediate lead-up to the Israeli invasion.⁴⁶² Eisenhower was incensed at the Anglo-French action. The lack of advance warning placed the US in a difficult diplomatic situation, while the risk of the Israeli action bringing the Soviets into the Middle East to defend Egypt risked, in the American view, the onset of a third world war. Certainly the Americans were not prepared to support “an unworthy and unreliable ally”.⁴⁶³ Eisenhower recommended a ‘hands off’ approach and instructed Dulles to issue a public statement distancing the US from Anglo-French activities.⁴⁶⁴

In response to the growing crisis, the US indicated its intention to introduce a UN resolution calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities. The British and French requested the US delay this action to give Egypt time to respond to their demands, but Dulles stated “it was not clear to him why the Anglo-French action, which he could only characterise as a brutal ultimatum to Egypt, should cause a suspension of consideration in the Security Council”.⁴⁶⁵ He also expressed dismay at the actions of the allies, questioning why they “employed a method which could destroy the United

⁴⁶² Message from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden, 30 October 1956

⁴⁶³ Memorandum of meeting between President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles and Under Secretary of State Hoover, Washington, 30 October 1956

⁴⁶⁴ Memorandum of meeting between President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles and Under Secretary of State Hoover, Washington, 30 October 1956

⁴⁶⁵ Memorandum of conversation between Secretary of State Dulles, French Ambassador to US Alphand and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Rountree, Washington, 30 October 1956

Nations and gravely impair relations with the United States”, and claiming it “was the blackest day which has occurred in many years in the relations between England and France and the United States”.⁴⁶⁶ When the Security Council convened on 30 October, at the US’ request, Britain and France vetoed an American resolution calling for Israeli withdrawal and an immediate ceasefire. With the Security Council deadlocked by the veto, it was decided to convene an emergency session of the General Assembly to deal with the crisis, invoking the ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution.

The crisis continued to escalate. On 31 October the British and French began bombing the Egyptian airfields in response to Nasser’s refusal to agree to the terms of the Anglo-French ultimatum, the intention being to gain air superiority prior to a ground invasion of the Canal Zone. That same day, the British and French taskforce set sail from Malta. The US also worked to broker a ceasefire between Egypt and its European allies. By 1 November it had become clear that the course of events on the ground were not favouring Egypt. As a result, Allen Dulles suggested that Nasser might well accept a ceasefire⁴⁶⁷ and the US began negotiations the following day.⁴⁶⁸

On 1 November, the first emergency session of the UNGA met to consider a US resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire. The resolution was adopted by 64 to 4 after five hours of debate. Despite Eden’s hopes that the US would abstain from criticising the intervention, even if it did not directly support it, the resolution was heavily critical of Anglo-French aggression and, most worrying of all, the US had sided with the Soviets against its Atlantic allies on the matter.⁴⁶⁹ The British and

⁴⁶⁶ Memorandum of conversation between Secretary of State Dulles, French Ambassador to US Alphand and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Rountree, Washington, 30 October 1956

⁴⁶⁷ Memorandum of telephone conversation between CIA Director Allen Dulles and Secretary of State Dulles, 1 November 1956

⁴⁶⁸ Telegram from the US Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, 2 November 1956

⁴⁶⁹ Pearson (2003), p. 158

French responded with a joint statement on 3 November, pointing out that while they had given “careful consideration” to the resolution of the General Assembly, they were of the opinion that “police action” needed to be carried out in Egypt. They would be willing to halt the action, Eden continued, were Egypt to agree to a UN force to police the Canal Zone and the continued presence of Anglo-French troops in the meantime.⁴⁷⁰ The statement, the US noted, constituted at least a partial acceptance of the terms of the UNGA resolution.⁴⁷¹

Meanwhile, domestic opposition to the campaign began to mobilise. The moderate Conservatives rallied against the decision, which they blamed on the activities of the Suez Group. One moderate at the time referred to the invasion in the following terms:⁴⁷²

To do this we have sacrificed our principles and practically destroyed UNO and the Charter. We are in danger of being denounced as aggressors...to risk a war with more than half the country against you, with American and UNO opposed...is an act of insane recklessness and an example of lack of all principle.

Leftist Conservatives were also “deeply distressed at the split with Washington” and concerned about the damage the episode would cause to the Anglo-American relationship.⁴⁷³ The entirety of the Labour party, on the other hand, denounced Eden’s move, lining up behind Gaitskell, who argued the invasion was “an act of disastrous folly whose tragic consequences we shall regret for years”.⁴⁷⁴ The party proposed a motion of censure against Eden and “carrying the fight to the country

⁴⁷⁰ Statement delivered by Prime Minister Eden, London, 3 November 1956

⁴⁷¹ Memorandum of conversation between Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Murphy and Canadian Ambassador to US Arnold Heeney, 3 November 1956

⁴⁷² Nicolson (1968), p. 312

⁴⁷³ Onslow (1997), p. 213

⁴⁷⁴ Heath (1998), p. 170

with an immediate national campaign”.⁴⁷⁵ Though concern for Anglo-American relations was less common in the party, some on the Labour right – like Gaitskell and Denis Healey – bemoaned the consequences of the government’s actions for the Atlantic alliance.⁴⁷⁶

Early November was particularly stormy. At the Cabinet meeting on 2 November no consensus emerged on how best to proceed; twelve ministers favoured continuing the military option, three favoured postponement, and a further three favoured an immediate end to the campaign.⁴⁷⁷ With a majority in favour, it was agreed to continue the campaign. Within the Conservative party, the Anti-Suez Group continued to meet and lament the decision to use force. On 4 November, Anthony Nutting, a moderate Conservative and Foreign Office minister, resigned from the government, citing the invasion as the sole reason.⁴⁷⁸ The Suez Group was, in general, content, although its members fretted that the government would not see the invasion through to the end.⁴⁷⁹ The primary fault-line, however, was between the Conservatives and Labour. On 4 November the party helped organise a massive public demonstration against the intervention in Trafalgar Square.⁴⁸⁰ The next day, Gaitskell broadcast to the country, arguing: “We should have been acting on behalf of the United Nations, with their full authority... We are doing this alone, except for France. Opposed by the world, in defiance of the world... today we stand as the aggressors”.⁴⁸¹

⁴⁷⁵ Benn (1994), p. 193

⁴⁷⁶ Benn (1994), p. 193; Dalton (1986), pp. 682-683

⁴⁷⁷ Pearson (2003), p. 159

⁴⁷⁸ Nicolson (1968), p. 315

⁴⁷⁹ Heath (1998), p. 171

⁴⁸⁰ Heath (1998), p. 173

⁴⁸¹ Gaitskell (1983), p. 620

The taskforce arrived at the Egyptian coast in early November and by the 5th British and French forces began landing at Port Said. Eden wrote to Eisenhower the same day to defend the government's actions.⁴⁸² He also pointed out the irony in the UN's lack of condemnation raised of the Soviet Union's suppression of the Hungarian uprising, although this point was lost on the US, who blamed the British for distracting the world's attention from Hungary's plight and undermining the West's moral authority. On 5 November, Egypt agreed to the ceasefire agreement and accepted the presence of a UN force in the region. The British held out a little longer, until it became evident that the move was politically and economically unfeasible. Thirty moderate MPs had written to Eden on the 5th threatening to desert the government unless a ceasefire were arranged,⁴⁸³ while the "the pound was on the point of collapse" after the mass selling of sterling and the Americans demanded a ceasefire as the price of IMF support.⁴⁸⁴ The Cabinet agreed to a ceasefire on 6 November⁴⁸⁵ and Israel and France indicated their acceptance the same day.⁴⁸⁶

The acceptance of the ceasefire represented for Eden the embarrassing climb down he had attempted to avoid. "Torn between the potential collapse of our economy and the long-term implications of a humiliating withdrawal from Egypt", Heath claimed, "we were forced to accept the latter and dress up the operation as a successful attempts to internationalise the crisis".⁴⁸⁷ Eden announced to the Commons on the 6th that the ceasefire would begin at midnight. The Suez Group was dismayed at the news. They argued Eden's 'capitulation' showed a lack of resolve and claimed that another couple of days would have broken Nasser and resulted in decisive British

⁴⁸² Letter from Prime Minister Eden to President Eisenhower, 5 November 1956

⁴⁸³ Benn (1994), p. 206

⁴⁸⁴ Heath (1998), p. 174

⁴⁸⁵ Telegram from the US Embassy in UK to the Department of State, 6 November 1956

⁴⁸⁶ Message from Prime Minister Mollet to President Eisenhower, 6 November 1956

⁴⁸⁷ Heath (1998), p. 174

victory.⁴⁸⁸ Despite their anger, however, all of the Suez Group backed the government two days later in a vote of no confidence brought against Eden.⁴⁸⁹ Nevertheless, they continued to attack the government in Commons debates “from the extreme-right position...urging that the situation could only be saved if, instead of remaining half-in half-out of Port Said, we bodily occupied the whole Zone [and] overthrew Colonel Nasser”.⁴⁹⁰

The party factions also interpreted the role played by the US in the crisis in a different light. For the Conservative right the American refusal to support British action represented a betrayal of legitimate British interests and a sign of the growing danger of US power, which seemed directed at directly undermining the British Empire.⁴⁹¹ Many on the right, who “[did] not like the Russians, the Americans or Nasser,” continued to back the government, arguing “Eden has dealt a blow to these three enemies, therefore Eden must be right”.⁴⁹² Some also began to cultivate contacts with Moscow to attempt to balance US influence in the Middle East.⁴⁹³ Conservative moderates, on the other hand, portrayed anti-American sentiment in the party an act of scapegoating in light of poor British foreign policy decisions. They tabled a motion, designed to demonstrate to Washington the strength of Atlanticist sentiment in the party “urging the Government to do all in its power to restore active cooperation with the American administration...[arguing] it was a fundamental requirement of British foreign policy that Anglo-American relations should be maintained on as close an understanding as possible”.⁴⁹⁴

⁴⁸⁸ Onslow (1997), p. 203

⁴⁸⁹ Heath (1998), p. 175

⁴⁹⁰ Crossman (1981), p. 548

⁴⁹¹ Onslow (1997), p. 204

⁴⁹² Nicolson (1968), p. 319

⁴⁹³ Onslow (1997), p. 204

⁴⁹⁴ Onslow (1997), p. 219

Within the opposition, too, there was a diversity of opinion regarding the role of America, even as the Labour factions and Liberals were united in their condemnation of the government's intervention. The Labour right and the Liberals frequently emphasised the folly of unilateral action without consultation with the US.⁴⁹⁵ This was true of all of Gaitskell's attacks in parliament, which stressed the importance of the Atlantic alliance in addition to the UN. Crossman also argued the crisis showed Britain "must never act without the approval of America", pointing out that "American policy has been far more responsible and sensible...than the neurotic pseudo-Great Power policy of Britain".⁴⁹⁶ While the Labour left could not (and indeed did not) criticise US policy during the crisis, as they too opposed Britain's colonial and militaristic activities, they took advantage of subsequent opportunities to highlight Britain's unhealthy dependence on American power. Even the US, hardly on good terms with the existing government, sought to maintain the Conservatives in office rather than deal with a Labour government with Bevan as foreign secretary.⁴⁹⁷

For Eden the ceasefire marked the beginning of the end for his political career. Tired and ill, Eden left for Jamaica on 22 November to recuperate. He was also unpopular with his party, having satisfied neither the Suez Group nor the Anti-Suez Group. He also admitted to the 1922 Committee of backbenchers several days before leaving that he had lied over the collusion with Israel. When, on 20 December, he informed the Commons that he had no knowledge of the Israeli invasion – a deliberate act of parliamentary misdirection – his support dwindled further. When Eden returned from

⁴⁹⁵ As Jo Grimond, future leader of the Liberal party, put it: "I still think [Suez] to have been a mistake...Eden must have realised that 'going it alone' and thereby risking a clash with the United Nations and the Americans...was highly risky" (Grimond (1979), p. 194).

⁴⁹⁶ Crossman (1981), p. 544

⁴⁹⁷ Onslow (1997), p. 207. Bevan replaced Robens as Shadow Foreign Secretary in November 1956.

Jamaica, he resumed his prime ministerial role, but the party made it clear he needed to go. Jostling began immediately between the “two obvious candidates”, Rab Butler and Macmillan.⁴⁹⁸ The choice was one between the Conservative left and right, and it was clear at the time that “the Suez rebels will not take Butler and the Tory progressives will not take Macmillan”.⁴⁹⁹ Nevertheless, after persistent lobbying from the members of the Suez Group, Macmillan was appointed as Eden’s successor and became prime minister on 10 January 1957 after Eden’s resignation.

In the end, Macmillan presided over the rebuilding of the ‘special relationship’ and the end of open dissent within Conservative ranks, although the anti-Americanism of the right did not disappear after the crisis (if anything it became far more vehement, although perhaps less influential).⁵⁰⁰ Members of the Suez Group who did not resign (a not insubstantial number) were co-opted into the government, while the moderates in the Anti-Suez Group became increasingly influential, their desire to place the Atlantic alliance on a stronger footing resonating with Macmillan’s understanding of strategic necessity in the aftermath of the crisis.⁵⁰¹

At the same time, Labour unity dissolved as the crisis faded and the intra-party differences in foreign policy once again came to the fore. At the party conferences of the late 1950s and early 1960s, Gaitskell and the party leadership had to fight to defend Britain’s NATO membership from the criticism on the left, now manifest in the growing anti-nuclear CND.⁵⁰² At the Scarborough conference in 1960, the party voted in favour of unilateral disarmament, a position that dismayed the US and resulted in significant policy divergence between the parliamentary party and the

⁴⁹⁸ Heath (1998), p. 176

⁴⁹⁹ Crosland (1981), p. 557

⁵⁰⁰ Hodge (2009), p. 153

⁵⁰¹ Onslow (1997), p. 220

⁵⁰² Dalton (1986), p. 685

rank-and-file.⁵⁰³ By 1961, the US noted” “The Opposition Labour party is split over doctrine and foreign policy and Gaitskell's leadership is under continuous attack”.⁵⁰⁴

Ideology and British Foreign Policy in the Late 1950s

It is clear from the discussion above that political ideology played a significant role in the circumstances of the Suez crisis. The various factions within the parties each held different conceptions of the nature of international relations from which they derived competing views of Britain's place in the post-war order and the importance to be attached to the Atlantic alliance. Although the Suez crisis was a debate over colonial policy and the use of force, these competing ideologies of the international proved essential in structuring the fault-lines of conflict within and between the parties.

The Labour left endorsed a view of international relations that approximated the socialist ideal-type. They sought to pursue a neutral path for Britain between the superpowers. Critical of the threat to Britain from both totalitarian communism and unfettered American capitalism, they argued for the development of an independent 'third force' Europe able to mediate between the Cold War protagonists. They also sought to renounce the use of force and opposed Britain's hierarchical relation with territories under its control, and argued for a strong UN as the precursor of a world government. The Labour left viewed the Eden's actions in the crisis as imperialist aggression, and sided with Nasser over the British government; their opposition was primarily directed against the use of force to undermine the independence of a

⁵⁰³ Macmillan (2003), p. 417

⁵⁰⁴ Paper prepared by the Department of State for President Kennedy in advance of Prime Minister Macmillan's visit to Washington, 21 March 1961

weaker state, in violation of its sovereignty. When the split with the US occurred, the Labour left took the opportunity to emphasise Britain's dependence on the US, and the necessity of reducing Britain's subjugation to America.

The international worldview of the Labour right, and that of the Liberal party, was closer to the liberal ideal-type. They emphasised the importance of a strong Atlantic alliance as the best way of promoting individual freedom and defending against the Soviet Union. They viewed the use of force as an 'immoral necessity' and sought to maintain Britain's relationship with its colonies to promote the growth of liberal institutions and prevent their becoming subjects of Soviet rule. Unlike the Labour left, the right did not object to the use of force *per se*, but to its deployment in the absence of UN authorisation, emphasising the illegality of the move. Nor did they side with Nasser, unlike the left. Finally, the right stressed the negative consequences the move would have for Anglo-American relations and blamed Eden for the discord in the Atlantic alliance caused by his actions.

The position of moderate Conservatives (the left of the party) was similar in many respects to that of the Liberals and the Labour right. They placed significant emphasis on the Western deterrent and the cohesion of the Atlantic alliance, emphasising the qualitative differences between the two superpowers. They were sceptical of independent action, believing coordination with Britain's allies and the international community was of fundamental importance. They saw force as a 'necessary evil', to be used only at times of strategic necessity and with the authority of the appropriate international bodies. Moderate Conservatives criticised Eden's resort to force as unjustified and illegal. They also issued strong reservations as to the damage to Anglo-American relations that would likely occur and, when this

proved accurate, worked to persuade the government to re-build its transatlantic bridges.

The worldview of the Conservative right most resembled the conservative ideal-type. Its members believed that Britain could, and should, pursue an independent course in foreign affairs in accordance with the interests of the nation and its territories. They saw the British government as the only source of legitimate authority and opposed the constraints imposed on Britain by the UN and by alliance commitments. They also identified threat with power, believing that the US and Soviet Union constituted threats to British independence, and arguing for a strategy that maximised Britain's freedom of action. The right argued for a strong response to the crisis, believing it necessary to demonstrate British resolve and to maintain its hold on its overseas territories.⁵⁰⁵ This was especially necessary, they thought, given American efforts to undermine Britain's presence in the Middle East. They favoured a military solution while disagreeing that UN approval was necessary or desirable. Although resentful of the lack of US support, the right recommended continuation nonetheless.

Where Eden himself fitted into this schema is disputed. On the one hand, his personal views on Nasser and the act of nationalisation itself evidenced little moderation. Invoking the 'Munich Analogy',⁵⁰⁶ Eden argued Nasser "followed Hitler's pattern", noting the need "to reduce the stature of the megalomaniacal dictator at an early stage".⁵⁰⁷ On the other hand, his memoirs refer to the use of force as "a last resort" and he notes the importance of political limitations on the adoption of military means.⁵⁰⁸ Whatever Eden's personal position on the use of force,

⁵⁰⁵ Verbeek (2003), p. 75

⁵⁰⁶ See Khong (1992) for a conceptual discussion.

⁵⁰⁷ Eden (1960), p. 431

⁵⁰⁸ Eden (1960), p. 429

scholarly contention has largely revolved around the date Eden committed himself to the military option: For some the decision was taken as early as July,⁵⁰⁹ for others it was as late as mid-October.⁵¹⁰ The debate is complicated, and rendered all the more difficult to ‘solve’, by the inherent difficulties of distinguishing motives from rhetoric and initial ‘bargaining positions’ from desired outcomes.

Moreover, external constraints also weighed heavily on Eden’s statements and subsequent actions, and the extent to which Eden *personally* favoured a forceful solution is only one part of the story. Political constraints at the domestic and international level impinged upon Eden’s freedom of action and helped determine the path chosen during key moments of decision. Keeping the two wings of the Conservative party ‘on side’, in particular, was a delicate balancing act. The Chief Whip, Edward Heath, for example, describes how his “task was to reassure the right of the party that it was necessary to continue with diplomatic action, but that a military solution was not excluded...At the same time I had to reassure the left that the diplomatic effort was genuine and not just a holding operation while the military got ready”.⁵¹¹ The decisions taken by Eden at various stages of the crisis, therefore, reflected not only his personal beliefs regarding the utility of force and the need to ‘punish’ Nasser but also his desire to maintain support from the various competing factions within the party.

The course of events must be understood within the context of the shifting pattern of influence enjoyed by each of these domestic groupings. For example, the immediate escalation of the crisis, the desire for a ‘humiliating’ solution that placed the Canal under international control and denied Egypt the dues from users, as well as the final

⁵⁰⁹ Lucas (1991), p. 142

⁵¹⁰ Pearson (2003), p. 169

⁵¹¹ Heath (1998), p. 167

decision to deploy force, can be traced in part to the pressure applied on the government by members of the right wing Suez Group. On the other hand, the decision to take the matter to the UN was the product of concerted and unified opposition from moderate Conservative and the Labour and Liberal parties, while the acceptance of the ceasefire and moves to re-establish stronger Anglo-American ties in the wake of the crisis were heavily influenced by the activities of the Anti-Suez Group. Of course, many of the pressures also stemmed from the course of international events, but the recommended *response* to these differed by party faction, and the relative influence of each ultimately determined the path that was taken; even in the final days of the crisis, members of the Suez Group continued to advise Eden to maintain his chosen course and not capitulate to US pressure.

The politics of the Suez crisis conform closely to the predictions of the horseshoe model, albeit with the not insignificant caveat that several of the issues (namely the use of force and support for colonial involvement) varied according to the traditional left-right model. Most importantly, support for strong transatlantic relations was strongest in the political centre, on the right of the Labour party and within the moderate faction of the Conservative party. The break in Anglo-American relations, moreover, did not result from any inevitable ‘collision’ of British and American interests, but rather from intense lobbying of those on the right who sought to maintain an independent British role in the world and who would willingly sacrifice the ‘special relationship’ to do so.

One notable feature of the politics at the time was the extent to which intra-party divisions occurred in phases. Until early 1955 it was the Labour party that experienced the greatest divergence over foreign policy issues in response to the rise of the Bevanite faction. As the Suez crisis unfolded, however, Conservative unity

collapsed while Labour managed to put together a common front against the government's policy. Labour unity was, of course, something of a façade at the time, brought about by the overwhelming salience of the force issue and a desire to inflict lasting damage on the Conservative government.⁵¹² But it was no more a façade than the Conservative party, held together outside of crisis by the cult of party unity and a mutual interest in preventing a general election,⁵¹³ but concealing two very different views of international relations. With the end of the crisis, these two views ceased to animate explicit intra-party dissent, and the Labour party returned to its fractional, pre-crisis self.

Conclusion: The Politics of Anglo-American Relations

In this chapter I discussed the case of Anglo-American relations during the Cold War. The British case, I argued, features a distinct pattern of politics resulting from its majoritarian institutions, with the principal ideological debates taking place within parties, rather than between them. Because the centre falls across two party groupings, the strength of liberalism in the British case depends largely on the relative strength of competing party factions. This is evident in the case of the Suez Crisis, with support for Atlanticism dividing the Labour party before and after the crisis, and the Conservative party during the crisis itself. However, the catalysing effect of the crisis on Labour unity also demonstrates that conventional partisan struggles between parties often occlude the ideological differences within them.

⁵¹² Labour positions on Suez continued to differ, but the unfolding of the crisis brought few of these differences to the surface. Had the UN authorised the British action, for example, it is likely a schism would have opened up between the pacifists on the left and those more sceptical of force on the right.

⁵¹³ Epstein (1960), p. 223

6 / Canadian-American Relations and the Nuclear Weapons Controversy, 1957-63

Introduction

In this chapter I discuss the evidence arising from the case of Canadian-American relations. I begin by discussing the nature of Canada's political institutions and its role in the post-war world, before comparing the ideological positions of the major Canadian political parties. I then outline the politics of Canadian-American relations from 1945 to 1990 before focusing in detail on the events surrounding the nuclear weapons controversy of the early 1960s. I conclude by considering the extent to which Canadian politics fits the predictions of the horseshoe model and noting some of the specificities of the Canadian case.

International and Domestic Context

Canada in the Post War World

Canada emerged as an independent nation in the latter half of the nineteenth century with the amalgamation of Britain's colonies in the region under the British North American Act of 1867.⁵¹⁴ The new Canadian nation featured political institutions modelled on the Westminster system of majoritarian parliamentary democracy. While the governance of Canadian territory lay with local political actors, Canada's dominion status meant the country's foreign policy remained in the hands of the British, leading to automatic Canadian entry into the First World War in 1914. The Statute of Westminster ceded formal legislative independence and control over

⁵¹⁴ Winn & McMenemy (1976), p. 55

foreign policy to Canada in 1931, and the Canadian parliament joined Britain in declaring war on Nazi Germany in September 1939.

During the course of the Second World War the ties between Canada and the US began to intensify and the period saw an unprecedented degree of top-level political coordination, collaboration in joint defence programmes and the intensification of economic ties between the two countries. As Canada's colonial ties weakened, the establishment of close ties with the US made increasing sense, given the geographical proximity of the two countries, their common political heritage and the increasing number of cross-border economic and social transactions. In the immediate post-war period the 'choice' for Canada was between the development of 'continental' ties with the US and the continuation of the historic relationship with Britain.

From the 1950s onwards it became increasingly evident that Canada's Liberal government sought to develop the country's continental ties at the expense of the British connection.⁵¹⁵ During these early years Canada-US economic and political ties deepened significantly while the Canadian government endorsed the strategy of containing the Soviet Union emerging in the US. The emerging defence partnership filled a vital gap in the defences of both countries and helped solidify Canadian-American relations during the period; Canada, sparsely populated and militarily weak, sought to co-opt the US military might to defend its territory, while the US sought Canadian cooperation in defending "the most vital airspace in the world" above Canada.⁵¹⁶

⁵¹⁵ Grant (2000), p. 29

⁵¹⁶ Mahant & Mount (1999), p. 19; Nossal (1985), p. 5

The Canadian Political System

Canada's political institutions developed along lines similar to the Westminster model owing to the country's colonial-era ties to Britain. The principal difference is that the Canadian system is federal rather than unitary, and each province features its own legislature with significant competences in education, economic and fiscal policy. At the federal level the Canadian parliament comprises a directly elected lower-chamber (the House of Commons) and an appointed upper-chamber (the Senate) with seats divided equally between the four main geographical regions (Ontario, Quebec, the Western provinces and the Maritimes). As a parliamentary system, the prime minister and the executive are drawn directly from the House of Commons, where they must be able to command a majority in order to govern effectively. The Canadian head of state remains the British Monarch, whose power is exercised indirectly through the Governor-General of Canada. The role of the Monarch is limited to the appointment of the prime minister once the results of federal elections are known and mediation in times of governmental crisis, although this latter power is rarely used.

The majoritarian electoral system used in Canadian federal elections results in significant pressure against fractionalisation in the party system. Because the system only awards seats to candidates obtaining a pluralist, smaller parties polling smaller amounts across a number of seats will receive very few seats in relation to votes cast. The result has been the emergence of two broad-based 'brokerage' parties, the Liberals and Conservatives, which have worked to amalgamate different regional and ideological positions into a national, unified platform with a single organisational structure. Two differences to the British party system are readily noticeable, however. First, the absence of a significant Labour movement in Canada resulted in a

situation where, post-World War II, the principal opposition to conservatism was liberalism, not socialism. Second, the importance of the provinces in Canada, and their distinct identity, has often allowed smaller parties (such as the social democratic NDP) a certain level of parliamentary representation, owing to the fact that concentrated vote-share is rewarded by the electoral system whereas diffuse cross-national support is not.

Political Parties in Cold War Canada

The nature of the Canadian party system is influenced heavily by the relative strength of the three political traditions in the country. Socialism in Canada has always held minor relative to that of liberalism and conservatism. Partly this was the consequence of the *sui generis* nature of state development in North America – ‘Canadian exceptionalism’, if you will – but partly also it resulted from the scarcity of labour relative to capital in the land-rich Canadian economy, which undercut the power of organised labour.⁵¹⁷ Unlike the United States, however, Canadian politics has always featured a strong conservative tradition. This was the inevitable result of the imperial tie with Britain and the power of colonial elites within the country. The vestiges of socialism, it has been argued, owe much to this ‘Tory tradition’, which introduced egalitarian thought into the country through the conservative ideals of *noblesse oblige* and the organic society.⁵¹⁸

The majoritarian electoral system used in Canadian federal elections leads to the emergence of broad-based ‘brokerage’ parties that contain within their ranks a

⁵¹⁷ Rogowski (1987), p. 1130

⁵¹⁸ Bazowski (1999), p. 92; Forbes (1987), pp. 309-312; Horowitz (1966), p. 149

heterogeneous collection of regional and ideological factions. In the Canadian political environment, where liberalism and conservatism have traditionally dominated over socialism, post-war politics in Canada was characterised by the existence of a strong liberal party (the Liberals) and a strong conservative party (the Progressive Conservatives). Unlike the British system, where the rise of socialism squeezed out the liberals, the equivalent party in Canada remained strong in the aftermath of the war.

The broad nature of the parties has always meant that a certain degree of factional division within the larger Canadian parties is somewhat inevitable. The Liberal party has historically contained within its ranks a contingent of social liberals (occupying a middling position between liberalism and socialism), whilst the Progressive Conservatives contained a broadly liberal faction. The relative strength of these factions over time altered the Canadian party system, with three phases identifiable. (1) From 1945 to the early 1960s the liberal faction dominated in the Liberal party while the conservative faction was the strongest in the Progressive Conservative party (Figure 25). (2) From the early 1960s until the late 1970s the parties were divided roughly equally between their two factions, with leaders playing a pivotal role (or, should they choose to, a balancing act). (3) From the late 1970s and beyond the social liberal faction dominated the Liberal party while the liberal faction came to predominate within the Progressive Conservatives (Figure 26).

These changes to the factional composition of the parties led to an ideological turnaround in Canadian politics during the Cold War. The Liberals, the party of free trade, continentalism and collective deterrence in the 1950s, had by the 1980s, become the party of state-led intervention, economic independence and quasi-neutralism. The Progressive Conservatives, on the other hand, associated in the

1950s and 1960s with Canadian nationalism, independence and a more flexible Cold War strategy were, by the end of the 1970s, promoting increased trade, US-Canada interdependence, and a hard-line vis-à-vis Moscow. Largely separate factors drove these changes, with the election of Trudeau and the competition from the NDP pushing the Liberals to the left, and the rise of ‘public choice’ approaches to economic management injecting elements of market liberalism into the Progressive Conservatives. Yet party-level changes also reinforced one another; as liberals left the increasingly social democratic Liberal party, they found a home in the Progressive Conservative party.




Figure 25: Representation of fit between parties and ideologies in Canada (1950s/1960s).




Figure 26: Representation of fit between parties and ideologies in Canada (1970s/1980s).

Canadian Social Democratic Parties

The decision to establish the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation was formed at the Western Labour Congress in Calgary on 30 July 1932 by a host of regional socialist and agrarian organisations.⁵¹⁹ The party's initial programme, embodied in the Regina Manifesto of 1933, was strongly socialist in outlook. It committed the CCF to replace "the present capitalist system, with its inherent injustice and inhumanity, by a social order from which the domination and exploitation of one class by another will be eliminated".⁵²⁰ Whilst supportive of the move towards international governance represented by the League of Nations, the manifesto emphasised the need "to rescue the League from its present condition of being

⁵¹⁹ Lewis & Scott (1943), p. 97

⁵²⁰ Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (1933), p. 1

mainly a League of capitalist Great Powers”, noting that “Canada must refuse to be entangled in any more wars fought to make the world safe for capitalism”.⁵²¹

As the realities of the post-1945 international order began to take shape, the CCF had the difficult task of positioning itself in the emerging Cold War structure. By 1948, in response to rising post-war prosperity and the de-legitimisation of communism, the CCF switched its support from outright public ownership to the endorsement of a mixed economy. Internationally, the party remained sceptical of NATO, arguing that as a military alliance it was “contrary to traditional CCF thinking, which saw dangers in the division of the world into military blocs and saw hope only in policies concentrating on economic and social advance”. Moreover, the alliance would always rest on the “questionable policies of the United States”.⁵²²

In the end, although NATO proved to be the most contentious topic at every CCF convention, the decision to endorse the alliance was always carried.⁵²³ Yet party statements continued to make clear their sceptical stance toward the Western deterrent. The 1949 manifesto stated “the CCF will resolutely resist any attempt either by the forces of communism or those of capitalism, to dominate the world. It will continue to fight against totalitarian dictatorship of every kind, whether it comes from the so-called Left or from the Capitalist Right”.⁵²⁴ The manifesto from 1953 noted that the CCF “supports NATO as a collective security measure within...the framework of the UN Charter”, whilst also claiming that the CCF would “pursue an

⁵²¹ Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (1933)

⁵²² Lewis (1981), p. 347

⁵²³ Lewis (1981), p. 349

⁵²⁴ Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (1949)

independent [foreign] policy on all questions” and warning against “over-rearmament at the expense of economic and social security”.⁵²⁵

By 1956 it had become clear that the principles enshrined in the Regina Manifesto were no-longer suited to the domestic and international realities of the post-war period and the more social democratic leaning of its membership at the time. In response the party issued the Winnipeg Declaration of principles in which it committed itself to working within the capitalist system in order to bring about a more equitable distribution of resources.⁵²⁶ CCF international policy ceased to equate capitalist and aggression so readily, though it continued to warn of the dangers of pouring endless resources into fighting against communist expansion.⁵²⁷

Within two years, however, calls began to grow within the CCF for the creation of a new organisation that would allow the party to compete more effectively against the stronger Liberal and Conservative parties at the federal level. In 1958 the Canadian Labour Congress, at its annual convention in Winnipeg, indicated its desire to join with the CCF in order to create a new party.⁵²⁸ The leaders of the CCF concurred, and the new party was formally created at a founding convention in Ottawa in the winter of 1961. The New Democratic Party (NDP), as it became known, largely continued the post-1956 policies of the CCF.

Whilst the leaders of the party supported working within the capitalist system and endorsing the US security umbrella – at least for the time being – the party’s radical fringe within continued to support far greater levels of state intervention and ownership and rejected Canada’s membership of NATO. In the early 1970s the

⁵²⁵ Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (1953)

⁵²⁶ Melnyk (1989), p. 7

⁵²⁷ Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (1956)

⁵²⁸ Morton (1966), p. 7

leftist elements of the NDP organised as ‘the waffle’, a grouping of like-minded socialists critical of the Trudeau government and the attitude of the NDP leadership. In 1969 the movement called for the construction of “an independent socialist Canada”, claiming:⁵²⁹

The major threat to Canadian survival today is American control of the Canadian economy...Canada has been reduced to a resource base and consumer market within the American empire...It is an empire characterised by militarism abroad and racism at home...The American empire is held together through world-wide military alliances and by giant monopoly corporations...Canada’s membership in the American alliance system and the ownership of the Canadian economy by American corporations precludes Canada’s playing an independent role in the world.

By the early 1980s, nearly sixty percent of party activists believed that Canada should withdraw from NATO and NORAD, while sixty-five percent viewed both superpowers as equally threatening to world peace.⁵³⁰

The weakness of socialism in Canada, discussed above, meant the CCF/NDP never achieved the electoral success of their sister parties in Western Europe, and the parliamentary caucus remained small throughout the period. CCF/NDP power peaked when the government was in a minority situation in parliament. Diefenbaker’s minority government of 1962 was ultimately brought down on the back of NDP opposition, which held the balance of power, while the Liberal government of 1972-74 was dependent upon the NDP’s support to govern. It was also powerful at election time when the larger parties worried that the siphoning of support from the left could threaten their majority in several constituencies.⁵³¹

⁵²⁹ Waffle Movement (1969), pp. 8-9

⁵³⁰ McDonald (1987), p. 85

⁵³¹ In this way the distortions of the first-past-the-post system magnify the consequences of losing a small number of votes in any constituency. The threat from the left was greatest where they constituted

Liberal Party of Canada

The origins of the Liberal Party of Canada lay in the mercantile classes of English Canada and the growing demands of the merchant community for the curtailment of the powers of local oligopolies and the imperial government.⁵³² From its very foundation – through a merger of two radical groupings, the English ‘Clear Grits’ and the French-Canadian *Rouges* in 1861 – the party espoused the values of classical liberalism. The Liberals placed significant emphasis on individual freedom, a *laissez faire* economy, and the abolition of tariffs. They also opposed the actions of the imperial government and sought to create new institutions modelled on those in the US, a nation they increasingly sought to align themselves with.⁵³³

By the end of the Second World War, much of the ideological architecture of the Liberal party remained intact. The principal difference was the party’s endorsement of welfare programmes, a response to the needs of returning Canadian soldiers in the aftermath of the war, and the rising success of the CCF, which the Liberals regarded as a potential threat. The party retained its support of free trade and economic continentalism, overseeing a wholesale reorientation of the Canadian economy around US capital. It also embraced the US concept of strategic deterrence as the Cold War began to take root, stressing the scale of the Soviet threat and the importance of alliance solidarity in countering it.

Pearson, foreign minister under St Laurent and the architect of Canadian strategy, followed a similar course on ascending to the party leadership in 1958. In

the primary opposition – often the case in the Western provinces – or where they threatened to defeat one side in Liberal-Conservative marginal, as was the case in Ontario ridings.

⁵³² Campbell & Christian (1996), p. 67

⁵³³ Campbell & Christian (1996), pp. 72-73

government his international policy emphasised well-established liberal themes of interdependence and strategic deterrence, arguing:⁵³⁴

Independence...cannot mean freedom from United States influence or pressure. For us, indeed for any country, independence must be restricted if there is to be international co-operation and peace...[while] we have the right to become a neutral or uncommitted state, but this would ignore the implications of our geographical and strategic position for the defence of this continent, including the United States half, as well as our interlocking economic relations. Neutrality would not give us a stronger voice for peace in the world nor greater security against war.

Pearson's tenure was accordingly accompanied by efforts to realign the US and Canada on security and defence policy, movement towards greater economic interdependence – notably the Auto Pact of 1965⁵³⁵ – and a shift away from the anti-American rhetoric of the previous administration.

The major difference between the Liberal party of the Pearson era and that of the King/St Laurent years was the existence of a substantial grouping of social liberals within the party, influenced by the policies of the left-liberal Walter Gordon who Pearson appointed as his Finance Minister once in government. This Gordon-supporting wing of the party had been influenced by the informal group known as 'Cell 13' that had begun to discuss the future of Liberal policies following the party's defeat in 1957.⁵³⁶ The variant of liberalism they endorsed was more progressive in the sense that it endorsed state-interventionism, opposed the 'negative' conception of liberty that justified individualist policies, and sought to wrest control of the Canadian economy back from the influence of US businesses.

The selection of Pierre Trudeau as Liberal leader in 1968 shifted the balance of power in the party from the liberalism of King, St Laurent and Pearson to the social

⁵³⁴ Pearson (1975), p. 116

⁵³⁵ See Donaghy (1998) for a detailed summary.

⁵³⁶ McCall-Newman, (1982), p. 14

liberalism of Gordon and his acolytes.⁵³⁷ By the 1980s the Liberal party had become staunch opponents of free trade and continentalism. They became increasingly critical of the actions of the US, both towards Canada and the wider world, and successive Trudeau administrations became known for the poor quality of US-Canadian relations that accompanied them. Increasingly, the party sought to downplay the threat from Moscow, suggesting that the actions of both superpowers were largely equivalent, and supporting moves to reach out to the Soviets to help reduce global tension. That the most prominent of these efforts came in 1983 suggests they were not simply the product of détente.

Progressive Conservative Party

The Conservative party grew out of the political activities of Canada's colonial elite in the nineteenth century, and their early policies reflected this heritage. In its broadest manifestation, Canadian conservatism envisaged "the development of a society strengthened by the Imperial connection and hostile to the US".⁵³⁸ Yet it also reflected many of the specific commitments of British conservatism at the time, emphasising the importance of gradual social change, national independence, the sacrosanct status of private property, and the obligation held by all to the nation and its citizens.⁵³⁹ Thus, whilst pro-British and anti-American, the conservative tradition simultaneously promoted gradualism, nationalism, collectivism, and (to a certain extent) welfarism. The addition of 'Progressive' to the party's name, in 1942, was an attempt to modernise the party's policies and highlight the more egalitarian aspects of the Tory tradition.

⁵³⁷ Winn & McMenemy (1976), p. 11

⁵³⁸ Campbell & Christian (1996), p. 27

⁵³⁹ Donnelly (2002); Ladner (1960), pp. 1-2

Yet in most respects the Progressive Conservative remained a traditional party of the right. As the Second World War came to a close and the polarity of the new international order slowly became apparent, the party continued to emphasise key elements of conservative international thought. Chief among these was the need to maintain Canadian independence against the superpowers, which simultaneously reaffirmed the party's commitment to nationalism and a balance-of-power view of the world. The party programme of 1957 argued that "The Platform and Policy of the Conservative Party is based upon...the sovereign independence of Canada", claiming the Liberals would "expose future generations to the possible loss of national independence".⁵⁴⁰ Successive Conservative governments from 1957 to 1963 sought to put these principles into practice, distancing Canada from the US in economic and security affairs and pursuing a more relaxed Soviet policy to maximise Canada's independence of action.

The years from the late 1960s to the late 1970s were accompanied by the gradual transformation of the party from its traditional Tory roots to an embrace of free enterprise and continentalism. In 1967 the party's executive forced a leadership election that replaced Diefenbaker with Robert Stanfield.⁵⁴¹ Under the tenure of Stanfield the number of party members endorsing free-market and pro-business policies grew, partly in response to the perceived failures of Keynesian economic policies in the early 1970s, but also as a by-product of the disaffection of many liberals with the social liberalism of Trudeau's governments of the early 1970s. Stanfield was a traditional conservative, not an economic liberal, although under his tenure the party began increasingly to emphasise individualism over collectivism in its policy statements. Yet it was clear that he was not the candidate of the liberal

⁵⁴⁰ Carrigan (1968), p. 225

⁵⁴¹ Progressive Conservative Party of Canada (1970), pp. 15, 18

wing, particularly when advocating the imposition of wage and price controls in response to the ‘stagflation’ of the early 1970s.⁵⁴²

Joe Clark, leader from 1976 to 1983, sought to promote a balance between individualism and Toryism similar to that practiced under Stanfield, and it was not until Mulroney became party leader in 1983 that the party’s transition from traditional conservatism to *laissez faire* liberalism was largely completed. Mulroney’s political philosophy – a ‘new right-lite’ that emulated some, but not all, of the Thatcher/Reagan model⁵⁴³ – attempted to transform the Canadian economy along more competitive lines. Mulroney’s Conservative government of 1984 implemented measures to reduce the budget deficit and minimise government intervention in the economy, privatized state assets and outsourced government services, and generally attempted to restructure the economy along more market-driven lines.⁵⁴⁴ Moreover, the party’s “preoccupation with continentalism”⁵⁴⁵ resembled that of the post-war Liberal governments more than it did earlier Conservative administrations. The government emphasised the importance of US-Canada alignment and adopted a more hawkish posture toward the Soviets. It also dropped the traditional conservative emphasis on ‘independence’; increasingly the notion of an interdependent international order began to permeate government at the high levels.⁵⁴⁶

⁵⁴² Campbell & Christian (1996), p. 44

⁵⁴³ Strain (2007), p. 43

⁵⁴⁴ Campbell & Christian (1996), p. 53

⁵⁴⁵ Ravenhill (1998), p. 320

⁵⁴⁶ Chapnick (2005), p. 644

The Politics of Canadian-American Relations, 1945-1990

The course of Canadian-American relations has been determined to a large extent by the strength of liberal ideology within the governing parties at the time. When liberalism has been ascendant, governments have pursued strong bilateral relations with the US, encouraging American investment in Canada and emphasise their commitment to the Western alliance. In contrast, at those times when the influence of liberalism has been challenged from the left or the right, governments have sought to downplay US-Canada ties. The connection between ideology and foreign relations in Canada has been complicated by two factors; the broad base of Canadian political parties that is the result of the majoritarian political system, and the gradual movement of the parties over time across the ideological spectrum. Whilst liberalism, as understood here, originally found its home in the Liberal party, by the end of the 1970s the Liberals had moved further to the left, and it was the Progressive Conservative party – having jettisoned its traditional veneer of Toryism and nationalism – that increasingly resembled the liberal ideal-type.

In the years following the Second World War a succession of Liberal governments under Mackenzie King and Louis St Laurent succeeded in bringing Canada and the US closer together in their economic and defence relations. The Liberals embraced a ‘continentalist’ philosophy that sought to further strengthen US-Canada ties whilst diminishing the country’s dependence on the British Commonwealth.⁵⁴⁷ The Liberal governments placed significant emphasis on collective deterrence of the Soviet Union through a strong partnership with the US. Communication with the USSR would take place only from a position of Western strength and a clear Canadian

⁵⁴⁷ Tanguay (1999), p. 97

commitment to the alliance.⁵⁴⁸ As a result the period saw a significant programme of defence cooperation, including the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, the construction of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line in 1955, and the opening of negotiations on NORAD. Moreover, American investment in Canada increased exponentially during this period, leading to a significant number of industries being majority owned by US firms by the mid-1950s.

Diefenbaker's Progressive Conservative government came to power in 1957 promising to decrease Canada's dependence on the US. Canada, Diefenbaker argued, needed "a *national* policy to provide a dynamic influence on the economy, and a sense of *national* purpose and *national* identity".⁵⁴⁹ The government set about implementing policies designed to increase Canada's freedom of manoeuvre, including the introduction of proposals to divert imports from the US to the Commonwealth, increasing support for disarmament and a relaxation of Cold War tension, and a marked increase in anti-American rhetoric from the government. Despite the early successful agreement on NORAD, begun under the previous Liberal government, and Diefenbaker's strong personal relationship with Eisenhower, the period marked a significant downturn in US-Canadian relations. Relations reached their lowest ebb during the 1960s, with the government's efforts to actively undercut US and European trade policies, its perceived Cold War 'neutralism', and its continual stalling on the acceptance of nuclear weapons all contributing to the schism between the Kennedy and Diefenbaker administrations.

Relations normalised again with the return to power of the Liberals at the 1963 election. Pearson had campaigned on a pro-American platform and committed

⁵⁴⁸ Glazov (2002), p. 170

⁵⁴⁹ Diefenbaker (1976), pp. 9-10

himself earlier in the year to taking on the nuclear weapons that had caused such problems for the previous administration, heralding a return to the Liberal strategy of 'deterrence first', and placing alliance solidarity at the forefront of Canadian strategy. Though Pearson angered Johnson with a critical speech on US activities in Vietnam in 1965, such episodes were more rare than before. The rising tide of Canadian nationalism had, by this point, increased the number of those in the party opposed to continentalism. The most powerful of these was Finance Minister Walter Gordon, whose first budget of May 1963 sought to limit the access of US firms to the Canadian market.⁵⁵⁰ Both the Canadian business lobby and the US reacted furiously and the government modified the budget.⁵⁵¹ Pearson's ability to follow a broadly liberal path in foreign and domestic affairs made the period one of relative calm in US-Canadian relations, and a major step forward in bilateral relations was achieved with the signing of the 'Auto Pact' in January 1965.

A major shift in Liberal orientation occurred with the selection of Pierre Trudeau as party leader in 1968. Trudeau, a prominent critic of Liberal foreign policy in the 1960s, was widely perceived to be on the leftist fringes of the party. His selection as leader proved to be a watershed, marking the first time since 1945 that the party was driven by social liberal values from above. Despite Trudeau's willingness to consider new directions in Canadian foreign policy, his cabinet reaffirmed the Canadian commitment to NATO at a special meeting over the weekend of 29-30 March 1969, despite calls from several cabinet ministers for a 'neutral' Cold War stance.⁵⁵² The reaction from the US to the government's more muted support for the Atlantic alliance was one of disappointment, but there was no serious break in relations

⁵⁵⁰ Eayrs (1963), p. 273

⁵⁵¹ Telegram from US Department of State to US Embassy in Ottawa, 28 June, 1963

⁵⁵² Granatstein & Bothwell, *Pirouette*, 23-25

during these early years of Trudeau's tenure. Moreover, despite his reputation as a man of the left, Trudeau allocated high-profile portfolios – Secretary of State for External Affairs and Minister for Trade, respectively – to prominent free-market Liberals Mitchell Sharp and Bud Drury, and announced that the 'just society' promised in the election campaign would be delivered not through state intervention but by means of the free-market.⁵⁵³

The two years following the 1972 election would contrast markedly with the previous period, with the Liberals lost their parliamentary majority and forced to rely on the NDP's support to govern. Policies in these years, as a result, were designed primarily to keep the NDP on side.⁵⁵⁴ They included measures aimed at reducing American investment in Canada and a more openly critical stance on US Cold War strategy. In a speech to parliament on 5 January 1973, Trudeau condemned the US military's actions in Vietnam, and made the decision to withdraw Canada from Vietnam International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS).⁵⁵⁵ To increase economic independence, the government created the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA), instigated a national industrial development strategy, and funded the creation of a crown corporation (Petro-Canada) to compete with existing US oil firms.⁵⁵⁶ These moves were all explicitly enacted as a means of ensuring continued NDP support, and they were even sold to the Americans as such, although this did not prevent the Nixon administration for developing a severe disliking for Trudeau's government as a result.⁵⁵⁷

⁵⁵³ Granatstein & Bothwell (1990), p. 43

⁵⁵⁴ Whitaker (1982), p. 153

⁵⁵⁵ Memorandum from Brent Scowcroft to President Nixon, 22 March 1973

⁵⁵⁶ Clarkson (2005), p. 40

⁵⁵⁷ Thompson & Randall (2008), p. 240

In response to the NDP's strength in the previous parliament, Trudeau ran on a leftist and progressive platform in the run-up to the 1974 election.⁵⁵⁸ Yet the rhetoric went largely unmatched by reality once the Liberals regained their parliamentary majority. Whilst the Liberal government of 1974-1979 did not seek to undo the policies of the previous parliament, little attempt was made to introduce progressive legislation or to 'rock the boat' in US-Canada relations. Yet the balance of power in the Liberal party was now firmly in favour of social liberalism at the expense of the classical liberalism of the 1950s. The 'Turnerites' – followers of John Turner who "loathed the new Liberalism of the Trudeauites" – were now on the fringes of the party.⁵⁵⁹ At the same time, the Progressive Conservatives, led since 1976 by Joe Clark, had become home to increasing numbers of former right-wing liberals. Thus, at the same time as the Liberals were moving to the left, the Conservatives were moving away from traditional Toryism towards economic liberalism.

The first test of the changes in the Conservative party came about on 22 May 1979 when Clark's party defeated the Liberals in the federal election, although as the government remained in power for a matter of months, it was difficult to discern significant shifts in policy. Yet the party Clark led differed from that of the Diefenbaker era, when Red Toryism was at its zenith, and there were notable signs of a changing perspective. There was, for example, a clear shift away from the economic nationalism that characterised the Diefenbaker era. By the end of the 1970s the Progressive Conservatives were calling for the privatization of Petro-Canada, the downgrading of FIRA and the re-embrace of continentalism, adopting "a stance of frank, pro-business continentalism".⁵⁶⁰ The party also voiced criticism of Trudeau's

⁵⁵⁸ McCall-Newman (1982), p. 155

⁵⁵⁹ McCall-Newman (1982), pp. 307-309

⁵⁶⁰ Clarkson (1982), pp. 13-14

perceived downgrading of the Atlantic alliance, and increasingly began to see Washington “more as an asset than a threat”.⁵⁶¹ Moreover, as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan began to undermine détente, the Clark government’s reaction contrasted with Trudeau’s; the government joined the boycott of the Moscow Olympics, banned Aeroflot flights from Canada, discontinued the Canadian-USSR cultural exchanges introduced by Trudeau, and placed an embargo on wheat orders to the Soviet Union.⁵⁶²

The defeat of the Clark government’s first budget in the Commons returned the Liberals to power under Trudeau. The Liberals’ tenure, from 1980 to 1984, proved disastrous for US-Canadian relations. Trudeau attempted to maintain the quasi-neutralism of the 1970s in an era of increasing Cold War tension. Trudeau continued to view the Cold War as a conflict between two morally equivalent superpowers, as did a sizable majority in the party.⁵⁶³ The government offered only a ‘minimalist’ commitment to NATO and NORAD, presided over a deterioration of Canadian forces, and did little to indicate any renewal of antipathy towards the USSR.⁵⁶⁴ In contrast, the Conservatives, led by Brian Mulroney, were advocating a more hawkish stance against the USSR, an increase in defence spending, and closer ties with the US.⁵⁶⁵ It also pursued interventionist economic policies at a time when neoliberalism was fast becoming the norm,⁵⁶⁶ introducing the interventionist National Energy Program (NEP) to regulate and domesticate the oil industry in Canada. The US argued the NEP placed American firms at a disadvantage by subsidising Canadian

⁵⁶¹ Granatstein & Bothwell (1999), p. 221

⁵⁶² Dobell (1991), p. 540

⁵⁶³ Maloney (2007a), p. 136

⁵⁶⁴ Maloney (2007a), pp. 134-135

⁵⁶⁵ Michaud & Nossal (2007), pp. 113-114

⁵⁶⁶ Cooper (1989), p. 95

competitors and favouring national suppliers,⁵⁶⁷ and applied strong diplomatic pressure, referring Canada to a GATT tribunal.⁵⁶⁸ The result was “a severe crisis in Ottawa’s relations with Washington”.⁵⁶⁹

Returned to power on 4 September 1984, the first priority of the Conservatives was to strengthen US-Canadian relations and repair the damage of the Trudeau era.⁵⁷⁰

Mulroney set up yearly ‘summit’ meetings with President Reagan to deal with bilateral issues and stressed his government’s “steadfast support of NATO and American leadership in dealing with the USSR”.⁵⁷¹ Government proposals for rearmament emphasised the importance of NATO and NORAD in deterring Soviet aggression.⁵⁷² Canadian troops in Europe were also increased during the period, although the remainder of the rearmament programme fell victim to the end of the Cold War and most orders were subsequently cancelled.⁵⁷³ The government’s themes of fiscal responsibility, deregulation of financial services, and the privatization of crown corporations resonated with the US.⁵⁷⁴ The first budget, presented on 23 May 1985, reduced the scope of FIRA and NEP, sources of much tension in bilateral relations.⁵⁷⁵ Most significant, however, was the signing of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the US on 2 January 1988, negotiated over the course of Mulroney’s term in office. The Liberals and the NDP, led by John Turner and Ed Broadbent respectively, staunchly opposed the FTA.

⁵⁶⁷ Leyton-Brown (1985), p. 29

⁵⁶⁸ Clarkson (1982), pp. 23-24

⁵⁶⁹ Clarkson (2005), p. 110

⁵⁷⁰ Norton (1998), p. 17

⁵⁷¹ Mulroney (2007), p. 327

⁵⁷² Maloney (2007a), p. 140

⁵⁷³ Maloney (2007a), p. 133

⁵⁷⁴ Strain (2007), p. 47

⁵⁷⁵ Waddell (2007), p. 20

Time Period	Prime Minister	Governing Parties	Dominant Ideology	Strength of Relations
1945-1956	King & St Laurent	Liberal	Liberal	Very strong
1956-1963	Diefenbaker	Progressive Conservative	Conservative	Very weak
1963-1968	Pearson	Liberal	Liberal	Moderate
1968-1972	Trudeau	Liberal	Social Liberal	Weak
1972-1974	Trudeau	Liberal	Socialist/Social Liberal	Very weak
1974-1979	Trudeau	Liberal	Social Liberal	Weak
1979-1980	Clark	Progressive Conservative	New Right/Conservative	Moderate
1980-1984	Trudeau	Liberal	Social Liberal	Weak
1984-1990	Mulroney	Progressive Conservative	New Right	Very strong

Figure 27: Summary of Canadian-American relations, 1945-1990

The Nuclear Weapons Controversy, 1956-1963

The Nuclear Weapons Controversy as a Case of US-Canadian Relations

To demonstrate the efficacy of the different strategies and foreign policy orientations discussed above, I discuss the role that ideology played in the politics of US-Canadian relations during the nuclear weapons controversy of the early 1960s. Elected on a wave of popular anti-American sentiments in 1957, the Progressive Conservative government of John Diefenbaker sought to reorient Canada's relation to the US following several years of perceived increasing dependence under Liberal rule. Under Diefenbaker's tenure the US sought Canadian approval to supply nuclear warheads for the Bomarc missiles they had purchased from the US, which had been designed with a nuclear role in mind. The dithering of the Canadian government over the acceptance of nuclear weapons – coupled by the emergence of discord in other aspects of the relationship – led to increasing ire from the US and contributed to the downfall of the Diefenbaker government in 1963.

There are two reasons why the nuclear case offers a good opportunity to discern the effects of competing ideologies on the conduct of Cold War strategy. First, this was the period during Canadian political history when relations with both superpowers were most salient, and when foreign policy issues came to the fore in parliament. Both the 1957 and 1963 elections were fought primarily on Canada's role in the world and the nature of its relation with the US. Second, the period is one of heightened ideological heterogeneity, occurring prior to the Conservatives' embrace of 'new right' philosophy and the Liberals' move towards the left under Pierre Trudeau. Moreover, the period also witnessed the reinvigoration of socialism in Canada with the creation of the NDP out of the CCF and the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC).

In presenting the case I begin by discussing the nature of Canada's foreign relations under the Liberal governments that preceded Diefenbaker's election, and the challenge offered by the Conservatives at the time. I then discuss the initial years of the Diefenbaker government and Canada's relations with the Eisenhower administration in the US, emphasising the changes to foreign economic policy and security policy that resulted. I then discuss the emergence of the nuclear issue under the Kennedy administration, charting the increasing antagonism of the period, before discussing the downfall of the Diefenbaker government in 1963. To conclude, I elaborate upon the role ideology played in the politics of foreign policy during these years.

The Liberal government and the 'Pipeline Debate'

The Liberal government of Louis St Laurent embraced 'continentalism' as a guiding philosophy. The Liberals sought to decrease Canada's dependence on Britain by promoting the intensification of economic and political ties with the US. Whilst the Liberals had introduced much welfare legislation in the previous decade, they remained the party of free trade, and much of their support came from the regions surrounding the financial hubs of Montreal and Toronto. In security policy the Liberals endorsed the strategy of containment promoted by the US since 1947 and committed Canada unequivocally to the collective defence of the continent through close cooperation with the US. Though the Liberals believed in the value of talks with the Soviet Union, they sought to pursue these only from a position of strength,

and as a result prioritised the strengthening of the Atlantic alliance over the pursuit of negotiations.⁵⁷⁶

Relations between the US and Canada intensified in every respect during this period. Culturally and socially the Liberals aligned the country towards the values of individualism and laissez-faire economics associated with US capitalism and downplayed Canada's ties to the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth. The Canadian economy grew at a rapid rate on the back of American investment, which reached its crescendo in the 1950s at a time when many Canadian businesses were owned south of the border. Moreover, on questions of continental defence the US and Canada were closely aligned both in rhetoric and reality; both countries endorsed deterrence and collective security and to this end the Liberal government agreed to the establishment of US bases and radar stations in Canada and the creation of the DEW radar line along the 60th parallel in 1955.⁵⁷⁷

Liberal policies in the 1950s came under fire from both Conservative and CCF parliamentarians, albeit for different reasons. Conservatives objected to the diminishing role of the tie to Britain, arguing that "Canada's future as a free nation is best assured as a member of the British Commonwealth".⁵⁷⁸ They also worried about undue dependence on the US, criticising Liberal policies for sacrificing Canada's 'sovereign independence', allowing a situation where 65% of national income was generated abroad.⁵⁷⁹ The CCF shared much of the same concerns, but couched them in starker language. They decried the dependence on US capital that had arisen over the decades and the extent to which this reinforced domestic inequalities. They also

⁵⁷⁶ Glazov (2002), p. 170

⁵⁷⁷ Mahant & Mount (1999), pp. 18-19

⁵⁷⁸ Carrigan (1968), p. 163

⁵⁷⁹ Carrigan (1968), p. 225

took issue with the Liberal support for hawkish defence policies of the Truman era, which they believed risked unnecessarily provoking the Soviet Union.

Nowhere was the opposition to the Liberals' 'sell out' of Canada more evident than in the 'Pipeline Debate' of early 1956. By this time anti-American and nationalist sentiment was running high in the country⁵⁸⁰ and both St Laurent and Eisenhower feared the effects of this nationalist resurgence in the next general election.⁵⁸¹ This period also marked the beginning of the parliamentary struggle over the Trans Canada Pipe Line, a private venture by Texas financiers to construct a pipeline from Alberta to Ontario. When it became clear that private money would not be sufficient to complete the final stages of the pipeline, the St Laurent government agreed to establish a public company – the Northern Ontario Pipe Line Crown Corporation – to finance the remaining section into Ontario.⁵⁸² The legislation to establish the crown corporation was introduced at the beginning of May, after being announced in the government's legislative programme at the beginning of the year, and by the time the debate arrived both the Conservatives and the CCF had announced their intentions to obstruct its passage.⁵⁸³

The CCF argued that such a key piece of infrastructure should be publicly – not privately – owned, and that if it *had* to be privately financed, this should come from Canadian, rather than American, sources.⁵⁸⁴ Major Coldwell led the CCF at the time, although opposition to the pipeline was coordinated by party whip, Stanley Knowles,

⁵⁸⁰ Memorandum of conversation between President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles Prime Minister St Laurent and Secretary of State for External Relations Pearson, White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, 27 March 1956

⁵⁸¹ Memorandum of conversation between the Canadian Minister (Glazebrook) and the Counselor (MacArthur), US Department of State, 19 April 1956

⁵⁸² Pickersgill (1975), p. 272

⁵⁸³ Pickersgill (1975), p. 275

⁵⁸⁴ Trofimenkoff (1982), p. 124

who characterised the proposals as “an illustration of capitalism at its worst”.⁵⁸⁵ The Conservatives, on the other hand, resented the increasing trend towards American ownership and Canadian subservience that the pipeline deal represented, and appealed to nationalistic sentiment in opposing the plans.⁵⁸⁶ Though they were less concerned with the line being publicly owned, then Conservative leader George Drew stated he would be willing to accept public ownership over American ownership.⁵⁸⁷ Diefenbaker, only an MP at the time, argued that the deal risked Canada becoming “a virtual economic forty-ninth state”.⁵⁸⁸

The Conservatives and CCF coordinated their actions in parliament to attempt to bring about a delay in the bill’s passage, which – they hoped – would prevent the government from meeting the 7 June deadline for securing public funds. George Drew and Davie Fulton of the Conservatives met frequently with the CCF’s Stanley Knowles to devise a common strategy, which centred on the use of filibusters on the floor of the Commons.⁵⁸⁹ In response, the government introduced selective motions of closure to curtail the debate at various stages. Though the motions succeeded in moving the debate along, they were able to do so only at considerable cost to the government’s democratic credentials, not least because several censure motions were introduced before the day’s debate had even begun.

In the end, the bill passed before the deadline, and the opposition was unsuccessful in their attempts to prevent the creation of the crown corporation. Yet they did succeed in severely damaging the reputation of the St Laurent government, which was associated from that point on with an anti-democratic pro-Americanism that ill-fitted

⁵⁸⁵ Trofimenkoff (1982), p. 124

⁵⁸⁶ Harrop (1984), p. 56

⁵⁸⁷ Harrop (1984), p. 56

⁵⁸⁸ Nash (1990), p. 36

⁵⁸⁹ Trofimenkoff (1982), p. 124

prevailing public opinion at the time. Diefenbaker, elected Conservative leader at the beginning of 1957, continued to press the Liberals on their handling of the pipeline affair and their continentalist stance more generally.

The anti-American atmosphere evident in the run-up to the 1957 election was compounded by allegations made by the US Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security on 14 March that the Canadian Ambassador to Egypt, Herbert Norman, was a communist sympathiser. Norman's subsequent suicide on 4 April, and the unapologetic attitude adopted by the US, incensed Canadian public opinion, and ensured that anti-Americanism would reach "an all-time high" immediately prior to the election, which was announced on 25 April.⁵⁹⁰

Canadian Foreign Relations under the Conservatives

This wave of anti-American sentiment, coupled with the perceived ineptitude of the ruling Liberals, helped Diefenbaker obtain sufficient seats at the 10 June election to form a minority Progressive Conservative government; although the nationalism of the party pre-dated the shift in public opinion, Diefenbaker made a deliberate effort to capitalise on the political salience of anti-American attitudes. Having attempted whilst in opposition "to make a clear stand in opposition to economic continentalism", his election platform stressed the importance of "a *national* policy to provide a dynamic influence on the economy, and a sense of *national* purpose and *national* identity".⁵⁹¹ The 'Pipeline Debate' also worked in the party's favour: Of those who switched their vote from Liberal to Conservative, 38 percent – the largest

⁵⁹⁰ Memorandum of conversation between Canadian Ambassador to US Arnold Heeney and Canadian Minister S.F. Rae, US Department of State, Washington, 9 April 1957

⁵⁹¹ Diefenbaker (1976), pp. 9-10. Emphasis in original.

category of ‘swing voters’ – subsequently said they did so because of Liberal actions during the affair.⁵⁹²

Diefenbaker’s election was greeted with caution and scepticism in the US. Aware of the nationalist leanings of the Conservatives, they predicted his victory signalled “a gradual veering away from traditional liberal trade policies and [an] intensification of nationalistic feeling”. They predicted, quite correctly as it would turn out, that this could lead to ‘heightened protectionism’, a ‘deliberate attempt to reduce dependence on [the] US’, and a ‘more nationalistic and less cooperative approach’.⁵⁹³ The Americans also had concerns about the new government’s commitment to US security strategy, believing Diefenbaker “too trusting of Moscow...[and] too suspicious of Washington”.⁵⁹⁴ The US was not concerned without reason that shifting alignments might be looming ahead. In his earliest public addresses to American audiences, Diefenbaker stressed that: “Canada is not a country that can be taken for granted or a country that follows whatever the United States does, regardless of whether it is beneficial to Canada or not”.⁵⁹⁵ Dulles also reported to Eisenhower that in his initial contacts with (unnamed) leading Ministers, they had remarked; ““you had better know once and for all that we intend to work in the Commonwealth with the UK and that will be the premise of all of our action””.⁵⁹⁶

Yet the initial contacts between Diefenbaker and the Eisenhower administration were remarkably cordial considering the trajectory the Conservatives had in mind for Canada’s future economic and political development. Only when it came to the issue of the US’ wheat surplus disposal programme, which was offloading subsidised grain

⁵⁹² Harrop (1984), p. 66

⁵⁹³ Telegram from the US Ambassador in Canada, Livingston Merchant, to the US Department of State, 11 June 1957

⁵⁹⁴ Nash (1990), p. 52

⁵⁹⁵ Diefenbaker (1976), p. 151

⁵⁹⁶ Letter from Secretary of State Dulles to President Eisenhower, 29 July 1957

from the US onto the Canadian market and damaging domestic producers, did Diefenbaker make clear the extent of his resentment.⁵⁹⁷ Whilst the problem was not a new one, it had been brought into sharper focus by the election of a Westerner to lead the government, an area where agriculture predominated.⁵⁹⁸ Although the issue was never fully resolved, Eisenhower and Diefenbaker did work closely to find ways of alleviating the stresses placed on Western farmers by the US' dumping of surplus wheat.

The primary initiative taken by the Diefenbaker government in its first year was an attempt to 'rebalance' the Canadian economy by shifting imports away from the US and towards Europe and the Commonwealth. Not only would this serve to redress Canada's growing balance-of-payments problem, but it would also contribute to the political realignment away from continentalism, "strengthen[ing] Commonwealth economic ties as a counterpoise to US trade and investment interests in Canada". The proposals were discussed with the British in September 1957, who were supportive of Diefenbaker's proposal to 15 percent of Canadian imports (\$600 million) from the US to the Commonwealth.⁵⁹⁹ At home, the Liberal opposition – led by Pearson – chided Diefenbaker's move as "irresponsible discrimination", arguing that the move threatened Canada's export markets and undermined the global move toward freer trade.⁶⁰⁰

The CCF, on the other hand, whilst agreeing with the government's policy to divert trade away from the US, attacked Diefenbaker's commitment to the project itself,

⁵⁹⁷ Memorandum of conversation between Diefenbaker and the US Ambassador to Canada, Livingston Merchant, Ottawa, 22 June 1957

⁵⁹⁸ Memorandum of conversation between US Ambassador to Canada, Norman Robertson, Mitchell Sharp and A.E. Ritchie, US Department of State, Washington, 24 July 1957

⁵⁹⁹ Despatch from the US Embassy in the UK to the Department of State, 9 September 1957

⁶⁰⁰ Diefenbaker (1976), pp. 74, 80-81

pointing out that the implementation of the policy lagged behind the rhetoric.⁶⁰¹ In this they were proved largely correct as the years went by, as the idea was seldom discussed after 1957, the principal reason being that both the UK and Canada realised that a reorientation of trade on the scale proposed would necessarily violate the GATT commitments of both countries. By the end of the Diefenbaker era, there had occurred only a slight decrease in the proportion of Canadian purchases from the US.⁶⁰²

The Americans were also sceptical of the Canadian move, with Dulles asking Finance Minister Donald Fleming whether Canada wasn't better off with an undiversified trade portfolio, given the relative certainty this offered. Fleming responded that, while "he recognised that US investments in Canada were financing large imports...this was not a reason to shut our eyes to the perils of our trading position".⁶⁰³ Of course, the substantive economic arguments put forward by the US did not address the underlying political issues that they were aware underlay the debate, namely the rise of Canadian nationalism and the government's dislike of continentalism.

On matters of defence and security the initiative, at least in the early years, did not lie with the Diefenbaker government. Negotiations for the establishment of NORAD, for example, were conducted almost entirely under the outgoing Liberal government, and passed to the Conservatives only after the shift in public opinion in the late 1950s made a swift agreement politically infeasible.⁶⁰⁴ An integrated command structure for controlling North American airspace, NORAD was regarded as a

⁶⁰¹ Co-operative Commonwealth Federation campaign leaflet for the federal election, Ottawa, CCF National Office, 1958 (cf. Carrigan (1968))

⁶⁰² Newman (1963), p. 269

⁶⁰³ Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Joint Canada-US Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, Washington, 7 October 1957

⁶⁰⁴ Diefenbaker (1977), p. 17

strategic necessity by both countries as a preventative measure against airborne attacks over the North Pole. Although the US was – perhaps understandably – worried about the prospects of finalising an agreement on NORAD with the Conservatives,⁶⁰⁵ Diefenbaker proved more supportive than they had first imagined, and approved the proposals, almost immediately, in July 1957.⁶⁰⁶ It is perhaps worth noting, however, that Diefenbaker considered NORAD a *'fait accompli'* upon entering office, although there is no doubt that he supported the basic principles of the agreement.⁶⁰⁷

In other areas it was the US that took the initiative. In December 1957 the US requested permission to store nuclear weapons at existing US facilities north of the border at Goose Bay. The Minister of Defence George Pearkes and the Chiefs of Staff all recommended to the cabinet that Canada should agree to the US proposal, which, they argued, would “enhance the effectiveness of the deterrent”, and would complement existing US-Canada defence ventures.⁶⁰⁸ At the subsequent meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee the following April, however, the ministers were somewhat less enthusiastic about the proposals. Secretary of State for External Affairs Smith pointed out that “this was a very serious proposal. This would be the first time that nuclear weapons would be stored in Canada and the implications of such a decision were, in his view, very great”.⁶⁰⁹ Diefenbaker noted that the

⁶⁰⁵ Telegram from Livingston Merchant to the US Department of State, 10 July 1957

⁶⁰⁶ Memorandum of conversation between Prime Minister Diefenbaker, Secretary of State Dulles, and Livingston Merchant, Ottawa, 28 July 1957

⁶⁰⁷ Diefenbaker (1977), p. 15

⁶⁰⁸ Draft memorandum from the Minister of National Defence, George Pearkes, to the Cabinet Defence Committee, 18 December 1957

⁶⁰⁹ Minutes of the Cabinet Defence Committee, 28 April 1958

government would be faced with a critical issue unless it could get Pearson and the Liberals on board as well.⁶¹⁰

By the time of Eisenhower's visit to Ottawa in July 1958 it was clear that US-Canadian relations were strained, although at this point the problems were largely manifest in rhetoric. Dulles reminded Eisenhower before the visit that the attainment of strong relations had been "impeded by the existence of vocal, widespread criticism of the United States and its policies", urging the president to "convey to members of the government a sense of the importance of interdependence among independent nations, and of maintaining harmony and unity among allies".⁶¹¹ In August the National Security Council discussed a list of key problems in US-Canada relations, including Canada's dependence on US trade, its willingness to make available nuclear weapons, and the extent of information sharing in defence relations.⁶¹² By October the State Department was warning that the US' relations with Canada "cannot be taken for granted...Politically, Canada feels it necessary to assert independence from the United States".⁶¹³

The Seeds of Discontent: US-Canadian Relations in 1959

The Conservatives' rhetoric of nationalism and independence was felt at this stage principally in the economic domain, although of course there were certain *political* goals to which the desire for economic independence was placed in service. Thus, at

⁶¹⁰ Minutes of the Cabinet Defence Committee, 28 April 1958

⁶¹¹ Memorandum from Dulles to Eisenhower, 3 July 1958

⁶¹² Minutes of the 376th meeting of the US National Security Council, 14 August 1958

⁶¹³ 'Current Foreign Relations' Issue 43, 29 October 1958 ['current foreign relations' is a weekly classified periodical circulated to US diplomatic offices]

the beginning of 1959, the US characterised economic relations with Canada as follows:⁶¹⁴

The present Conservative Government has gained in experience and in public support. Nevertheless its members have tended at times to behave as if they were still campaigning for public office. It has shown itself assertively nationalistic in its economic relations with the United States and strongly pro-Commonwealth. It has also shown itself increasingly responsive to domestic protectionist sentiment, particularly vis-à-vis trade with the United States.

In the security domain, however, the rapid signing of the NORAD agreement and the ongoing nature of the discussions over nuclear weapons storage offered little indication of the troubles that lay ahead in this area. Over the first few months of 1959, however, two events would undermine the harmony in US-Canadian security relations.

The first of these was Diefenbaker's decision to cancel the 'Avro Arrow' aircraft being constructed by the Canadian company A.V. Roe. The Arrow had been commissioned under the St Laurent government as a means of intercepting long-range Soviet missiles that had the potential to reach Canadian cities from the north. By the end of St Laurent's tenure the government was no-longer committed to the programme, which was pouring money into an aircraft that would be technically obsolete and which had received little interest from abroad.⁶¹⁵ After failing to win the 1957 election, however, it was left up to the Conservative government to formally cancel the Arrow programme, a decision they duly took on 20 February 1959.

The problem for Diefenbaker, however, was that despite its inefficiencies, the Arrow programme had been designed to plug a gap in Canada's northern defences that was

⁶¹⁴ Summary of the US-Canadian Joint Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, 2 January 1959

⁶¹⁵ Story & Isinger (2007), p. 1026

now left open.⁶¹⁶ In an attempt to reassure Canadians that the country was secure against a potential long-range missile attack from the north, Diefenbaker began to tout the US-built Bomarc missiles as a replacement for the Arrow (in reality, the intention had always been to purchase Bomarcs in order to complement the Arrow).⁶¹⁷ The Bomarcs were designed for a nuclear role,⁶¹⁸ and although the government had failed to make a clear decision on equipping the missiles with a nuclear capability, the cancellation of the Arrow forced the issue: Diefenbaker announced that Canada would purchase nuclear warheads from the US, but initially took on the Bomarcs without the ‘tips’ required for this capability.⁶¹⁹

The second event of 1959 with important implications for Canadian security policy was the untimely death of Secretary of State for External Sidney Smith on 17 March. Smith’s successor, Howard Green, was a prominent member of the ‘Red Tory’ faction of the Conservative party, and notably inclined more to Canadian independence than he was to continentalism. The appointment of Green would have important implications for Canada’s Cold War strategy; his “sense of nationalism translated into a strong anti-Americanism”, and, moreover, his interest in disarmament “led him to assume a favourable disposition toward the Soviet Union”.⁶²⁰ Only by pursuing a more cooperative approach towards Moscow, Green believed, could Canadian independence in international affairs be assured.

Whilst Green’s influence on the foreign policy of the government was substantial, Diefenbaker often siding with Green over other cabinet members, it is important not

⁶¹⁶ Nash (1990), p. 81

⁶¹⁷ Maloney (2007b), p. 150

⁶¹⁸ Munton (1996), pp. 516-517, has argued that there was no technical reason why the Bomarcs could not be fitted with conventional warheads. However, debates in strategic circles at the time rested on the assumption that the Bomarcs would be far less effective if equipped with non-nuclear warheads.

⁶¹⁹ Maloney (2007b), p. 157

⁶²⁰ Glazov (2002), p. 89

to overstate the idiosyncratic nature of Green's approach to Canadian security. To begin with, Green's views on the importance of independence in foreign affairs, of breaking free from US 'domination', and of pursuing a more cooperative strategy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union were all shared by many in the cabinet and in the party's grass-roots. Moreover, although Green's 'obsession' with disarmament contributed to his relatively relaxed attitude towards the Soviet threat, he also endorsed a traditionally conservative concept of the balance of power which pushed in the same direction, arguing that a softer stance towards Moscow would be "a way of showing that Canada was not a 'crushed satellite' of the Americans".⁶²¹

The growing divide between Ottawa and Washington in the security arena was evident by the end of that summer. Over the preceding months, Washington had put considerable resources into planning an exercise to test North American air defences, codenamed 'Operation Sky Hawk'. On 28 August the Canadian Ambassador Arnold Heeney wrote to the Department of State to inform them that Sky Hawk risked jeopardising negotiations with the Soviet Union and that, as a result, Canada would not be participating. Canada's approach, the US noted, appeared to involve making concessions *before* negotiations even took place.⁶²² Diefenbaker's decision to cancel Canadian cooperation in Sky Hawk was a product of his fear that those in the military, particularly in the US, made decisions that were subsequently forced upon Canadian politicians and bureaucrats.⁶²³

⁶²¹ Nash (1990), p. 84

⁶²² Memorandum of conversation between Ambassador Heeney, Byrnes and Rae, 28 August 1959

⁶²³ Telegram from the Wigglesworth, Embassy in Canada, to the US Department of State, 29 August 1959

On 1 September, Eisenhower wrote to Diefenbaker personally asking him to reconsider,⁶²⁴ but the response received five days later indicated that both Diefenbaker and Green were against participation.⁶²⁵ The US was disheartened by the lack of Canadian support; Merchant argued that the decision “revealed a lack of appreciation and under-standing on the part of Canadian Cabinet Ministers, particularly Mr Green and the Prime Minister, of the joint aspect of our undertakings in continental defence”.⁶²⁶

The corollary of the decreasing importance of the US in Canada’s Cold War strategy was an increase in the extent to which the country was prepared to engage politically and diplomatically with the Soviet Union. Although often traced back to Green’s disarmament agenda, a more flexible strategy was being considered at the highest level from the moment the Conservatives took office. A report from the Canadian Ambassador to Colombia in October 1957 recommended that “a position of neutrality can serve not only the interests of certain countries [i.e. Canada], but also of the West”, and argued that Canada’s relationship with the US was limited the country’s freedom of action.⁶²⁷ The External Affairs Ministry forwarded the paper to Sidney Smith in time for the NATO Heads of Government meeting,⁶²⁸ at which Canada and the Scandinavian countries were the only ones pushing for a more flexible approach towards Moscow.⁶²⁹ Two months later, a report authored by the external affairs ministry, arguing that the West had accelerated Soviet fears and

⁶²⁴ Telegram from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Diefenbaker, 1 September 1959

⁶²⁵ Telegram from Prime Minister Diefenbaker to President Eisenhower, 6 September 1959

⁶²⁶ Memorandum of conservation on ‘Suggestions for Improving Politico-Military Relations with Canada’, 20 October 1959

⁶²⁷ ‘A Re-Examination of the Balance of Power’, authored by the Canadian Ambassador to Colombia, 15 October 1957

⁶²⁸ Letter from Under Secretary of State for External Affairs Jules Léger to the Ambassador In Colombia, 11 December 1957

⁶²⁹ Memorandum from Under Secretary of State for External Affairs Léger to Secretary of State for External Affairs Sidney Smith, 2 January 1958

urging a recognition of the USSR's status as a great power,⁶³⁰ was forwarded directly to Diefenbaker.⁶³¹

The irony of the Conservatives' Eastern strategy was the combination of anti-Soviet rhetoric with an overall strategy that sought independence of action through a lessening of East-West tensions. The Liberals, in contrast, had sought to promote Canadian interests "through quiet diplomacy and close policy adherence to the USA".⁶³² Thus, although Diefenbaker consistently deployed anti-Soviet rhetoric, at a time of increasing Cold War tension the government was promoting strategies aiming at distancing Canada from US containment policy and increasing Canadian cooperation with the USSR. General Foulkes, the Liberal-appointed⁶³³ Canadian Chief of General Staff, argued upon his retirement in May 1960 that the government placed "excessive confidence on...disarmament", arguing that "Diefenbaker should jam the hard realities [of the Cold War] down the throats of his people".⁶³⁴

In keeping with the strategy of rhetorically chiding the Soviet Union, Diefenbaker issued a strongly critical oration against the USSR in the Canadian parliament on 18 May 1960, and repeated his criticisms at the United Nations General Assembly on 26 September. Diefenbaker received warm praise from Eisenhower and Macmillan for his stand against the Soviets, and for a while the US was convinced that the 'soft' attitude of the Canadian government that had arisen in recent years.⁶³⁵ Yet, as the

⁶³⁰ 'Memorandum on Soviet intentions', Canadian Department of External Affairs, 24 March 1958

⁶³¹ Memorandum from Secretary of State for External Affairs Sidney Smith to Prime Minister Diefenbaker, 30 September 1958

⁶³² Collins (1981), pp. 55-56

⁶³³ A memorandum of discussion from the 446th meeting of the US National Security Council of 31 May 1960 notes that the tensions between General Foulkes and the Conservative government, which he was known to dislike, worsened to the extent that he would not pass on information to his civilian commanders.

⁶³⁴ Memorandum of conversation between Outgoing Chief of General Staff Foulkes and President Eisenhower, 9 May 1960

⁶³⁵ Diefenbaker (1976), p. 134

events of the next few years were to prove, this was the wrong conclusion to draw from Diefenbaker's anti-Soviet rhetoric. So long as the Conservatives sought an independent Cold War strategy free from overbearing US influence, the optimum strategy remained one of cautious cooperation with the Soviet Union.

By the end of Eisenhower's presidency, the quality of US-Canadian relations had declined from what it was in the heady-days of the King and St Laurent governments. Although the early agreement on NORAD suggested that Canadian anti-Americanism might be mere rhetoric, the government's moves towards reorienting Canadian exports, distancing itself from the US' strategy of containment, and reducing Cold War tensions all offered a discernible challenge to the policies of the status quo. What kept the relationship from reaching breaking point was the personal friendship between Diefenbaker and Eisenhower, the latter of whom consistently denied to his colleagues in the Department of State that there was a 'problem' with US-Canadian relations. Yet, as Nash has argued, while relations between the leaders reached 'new height', "at the working levels in Washington, it was close to laughable hyperbole".⁶³⁶

The Kennedy Presidency and the Nuclear Issue

The election of John F. Kennedy to the presidency on 20 January 1961 precipitated a further decline in the strength of US-Canadian relations, and the relationship between Diefenbaker and Kennedy was a famously fraught one. Diefenbaker remarks in his memoirs that, whatever the consequences of a Nixon victory for the US, "I do know

⁶³⁶ Nash (1990), p. 58

that the course of Canada-United States relations would have been a happier one”.⁶³⁷ Added to the personal antipathy each leader held for one another, however, were deeper, structural facilitators of the conflict that was to come. Not only were the policy choices produced by resurgent Canadian nationalism always destined to come into conflict with the preferences of the US sooner or later, but also the close personal relationship that Diefenbaker had with Eisenhower was no-longer present to ameliorate potential conflicts. In this respect, the much-touted personal antagonism between Diefenbaker and Kennedy was more a ‘permissive cause’ of conflict than anything else.

The issue that would cause the greatest consternation between the countries emerged during Diefenbaker’s visit to Washington in February 1961, shortly after Kennedy’s inauguration, when the prime minister informed the president that Canada would delay its decision on the acceptance of nuclear weapons for the Bomarc missiles purchased in 1959.⁶³⁸ The US, for its part, was anxious that a decision be made sooner rather than later, given that the ‘hole’ in the Canadian defences affected the northern United States as much as it affected the urban areas of southern Ontario. Yet the prime minister continued to stall on the nuclear issue throughout the beginning of 1961. When Kennedy visited Ottawa in May, Diefenbaker informed him that the acceptance of nuclear weapons was “politically impossible today”, doubting that the cabinet would agree to such a move.⁶³⁹ He also cited widespread

⁶³⁷ Diefenbaker (1976), p. 166

⁶³⁸ Memorandum of conversation between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Diefenbaker, Washington, 20 February, 1961

⁶³⁹ Memorandum of conversation between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Diefenbaker, Ottawa, 17 May 1961

public opinion against accepting the weapons, whilst Kennedy “expressed perplexity at the fact that the difficulties were so great for Canada in taking this step”.⁶⁴⁰

Whilst the absence of strong Canadian support for continental defence was worrying for the US, perhaps more concerning was the thought that Canada might not be as ‘on side’ with the US-led fight against communism as had previously been the case. Canadian Soviet policy during the early 1960s moved towards détente at a time when the Cold War was intensifying everywhere else. One reason, to be sure, was Green’s disarmament agenda, but another was the increasing political gulf between the US and Canada during the period, with “Diefenbaker’s anti-American posturing in the period from 1961 to 1963 lead[ing] to a softer Canadian position on the Cold War”.⁶⁴¹

Prior to the meeting in May, Secretary of State Rusk had telegraphed Kennedy to inform him of Canada’s increasingly softening attitude towards the Soviets. At a NATO meeting, Green had:

Indicated Canada felt itself positioned between two nuclear giants and felt special interest in reducing tensions between. He thus seems to join the long parade of those who have wished to provide a bridge, meaning continuous concessions on our part to an insatiable power determined to pursue its world revolution by every available means.

Moreover, when the Western allies had met in Geneva, Green had declined to join, believing it inappropriate to demonstrate affinity with the West whilst Canada was a member of the International Control Commission (ICC). Rusk accused Green of

⁶⁴⁰ Memorandum of conversation between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Diefenbaker, Ottawa, 17 May 1961

⁶⁴¹ Glazov (2002), p. 77

‘neutralism’ and advised Kennedy to “have frank talk with Prime Minister during Canadian visit about neutralist tendencies Canadian policy”.⁶⁴²

The onset of the Berlin crisis in June, when Soviet Premier Khrushchev demanded the withdrawal of allied forces from the Western controlled sections of Berlin, seemingly had little effect on the Canadian stance of tepid support for NATO solidarity. Canadian actions on disarmament were essentially unchanged. Throughout the remainder of the year Canadian representatives at the UN endorsed resolutions on disarmament, on limiting the manufacture of nuclear material, and even suggested – in contrast to NATO policy – banning nuclear weapons entirely.⁶⁴³ Moreover, whilst for many allies the Berlin crisis highlighted the importance of a strong Western deterrent (Kennedy publicly announced increased defence spending as a result), for the Diefenbaker government the crisis offered an opportunity to highlight the dangers associated with nuclear weapons and the logic of deterrence.

The day before talks begin in Paris with the aim of solving the crisis, Kennedy wrote to Diefenbaker personally, reminding him that “there is...an aspect of our continental defence which we both understand is imperfect...this is the lack of...nuclear weapons to respond to any attack across the pole”, adding, “I do believe that we cannot achieve a successful negotiating position on Germany and Berlin until we have taken every reasonable step to strengthen our military security”.⁶⁴⁴ Initially Diefenbaker’s response seemed promising; he delivered a speech several days later indicating that Canada would indeed take on nuclear weapons in the future, and the US took this as a sign of final Canadian resolution on the matter. Yet, by the following month, the resumption of nuclear testing by the Soviets and the US, and

⁶⁴² Telegram from Secretary of State Dean Rusk to US Department of State, 14 May 1961

⁶⁴³ Nash (1990), pp. 141-142

⁶⁴⁴ Telegram from President Kennedy to Prime Minister Diefenbaker, 3 August 1961

Kennedy's lack of prior consultation with the Canadian prime minister, changed Diefenbaker's attitude.⁶⁴⁵ By the end of November the US had concluded that any agreement was unlikely given the opposition of many in the cabinet to the acceptance of nuclear weapons and the sensitivity of the prime minister to public opposition.⁶⁴⁶

The Election of 1962

At the beginning of 1962 the issue of Canada's international trade rose to the top of the agenda for the second time. The catalyst was the instigation of the new 'Kennedy Round' of tariff negotiations, which aimed at a wholesale reduction in tariffs between GATT members. Diefenbaker initially opposed the plans on the grounds that the Kennedy Round would undermine, not improve, Canadian economic dependence on the US, and that it would undermine intra-Commonwealth trade. Moreover, the Conservatives were not at this point the party of free trade; whilst the Liberals referred positively to trade liberalisation in every election manifesto from 1945 to 1968,⁶⁴⁷ the emphasis of the Conservatives tended towards economic independence and support for domestic welfare.⁶⁴⁸ Finance Minister Donald Fleming informed the US that Canada would not support the Kennedy Round, which they found both surprising and upsetting. Nash attributes Diefenbaker's subsequent change of mind (he later informed Fleming to support the proposals) to his private supposition that it would never pass Congress and his desire to be seen to be 'on

⁶⁴⁵ Nash (1990), p. 138

⁶⁴⁶ Telegram from Ambassador Merchant to US Department of State, 27 November 1961

⁶⁴⁷ Carrigan (1968), pp. 157, 182, 208, 246

⁶⁴⁸ Carrigan (1968), pp. 192, 210, 229, 255

side' when the initiative stalled. (Against Diefenbaker's best judgement, however, Congress approved the proposals late in 1962).⁶⁴⁹

Canadian opposition to the Kennedy Round was also paralleled to a certain extent by the government's opposition to the British application to join the EEC. Macmillan's Conservative government had announced early on that it intended to seek membership of Europe, and concerted Canadian opposition had begun in 1961 after the British Parliament voted in favour of the proposal. The Kennedy administration had wholeheartedly supported the British move as a simultaneous means of increasing coherence of its European allies, introducing an 'Anglo-Saxon' element to the EEC, and furthering the liberalisation of global – or, at least, regional – trade.

In Canada, the Liberals supported the British proposals for many of the same reasons. Yet Diefenbaker strongly opposed the move, believing it would undermine the British Commonwealth and "lock [Canada] into a continental economic union with the United States".⁶⁵⁰ The government's support for the Commonwealth system made it hostile to any British move towards Europe, frustrating the US' goals in the process.⁶⁵¹ It also annoyed the British, whose leaders were the subject of heated criticism on the matter whenever they visited Ottawa.⁶⁵² In the end, of course, Diefenbaker needn't have worried, as De Gaulle vetoed the British application in January 1963, ending the prospects of British entry into Europe for the foreseeable future.

US policymakers were also becoming increasingly concerned with the continuing intransigence on behalf of the Canadian government over the nuclear weapons issue,

⁶⁴⁹ Nash (1990), p. 150

⁶⁵⁰ Diefenbaker (1976), pp. 201-202

⁶⁵¹ Telegram from the US Department of State to the US Embassy in West Germany, 15 January 1962

⁶⁵² Nash (1990), pp. 149, 158

which by the beginning of 1962 had become the most serious problem affecting the relationship. There was also growing doubt that the level of domestic opposition facing the government was really as significant as Diefenbaker sought to make out.⁶⁵³ In February Diefenbaker had again reported to the US that he was unable to commit himself to accept the weapons, 'dismaying' the US, which increasingly placed its hopes in the statements of the opposition Liberal party as a way of pressuring Diefenbaker to make a decision.⁶⁵⁴

Although at this stage the Liberals too were opposed to taking on nuclear weapons, their opposition on the government's wavering defence policy proved useful in setting the agenda in a direction thought generally favourable to US interests. By April the exchanges between Pearson and Diefenbaker in parliament were increasingly animated by the defence issue and getting more heated by the day. By this point the US was placing its hopes for a decision on the forthcoming elections, which they hoped would either return a pro-US government under Pearson, or at least prevent Diefenbaker from being beholden to populist anti-nuclear sentiment.⁶⁵⁵

As it happened, the onset of the 1962 election campaign did much to harm US-Canada relations, thereby undoing the prospect of an agreement on the nuclear question. The main reason for this was Diefenbaker's suspicion (probably inaccurate in 1962, though less so the following year) that the US, in its dislike of the Conservative government, was actively engaged in supporting the Liberal opposition. Diefenbaker's fears were confirmed, as far as he was concerned, when Pearson attended a reception at the White House for recipients of the Nobel Prize in

⁶⁵³ Telegram from Livingston Merchant to the US Department of State, 26 February 1962

⁶⁵⁴ Telegram from Livingston Merchant to the US Department of State, 27 February 1962

⁶⁵⁵ Memorandum of conversation between President Kennedy and outgoing Canadian Ambassador to the US Arnold Heeney, Washington, 17 April 1962

early May and the president found the time for a forty-minute private discussion with the opposition leader. What most incensed Diefenbaker was that press reports of the meeting highlighted the numerous similarities between Kennedy and Pearson on questions of foreign policy.

The meeting between Kennedy and Pearson elicited an angry response from Diefenbaker to Merchant, who argued that it endorsed the opposition's claims that the Liberals were best placed to manage US-Canada relations. Now that US-Canada relations were the dominant issue in the campaign, Diefenbaker argued, he would need to demonstrate his firmness in the face of US pressure.⁶⁵⁶ To demonstrate his steadfastness, Diefenbaker threatened to make public the contents of a memorandum by Walt Rostow that had been left in the prime minister's office after the president's last visit in May 1961. The memorandum, entitled 'What We Want from Ottawa Trip', contained little incriminating information, merely instructing Kennedy that Diefenbaker was 'firm' on Berlin and the ICC, but 'weak' on nuclear weapons, development assistance and OAS membership. Diefenbaker's threat to publish the memorandum angered the Department of State, which considered it a breach of diplomatic protocol, and personally incensed Kennedy, who indicated his refusal to meet with the prime minister at any time in the near future.⁶⁵⁷

As the campaigns for the 1962 election got underway, the themes of the various parties began to take shape. The Conservative campaign emphasised the statesman-like credentials of Diefenbaker and attempted to associate Pearson and the Liberals with a soft stance on communism and a move towards socialism in domestic

⁶⁵⁶ Letter from Livingston Merchant to Acting Secretary of State George Ball, 5 May 1962

⁶⁵⁷ Telegram from US Department of State to Livingston Merchant, 8 May 1962

policy.⁶⁵⁸ The claims were based almost entirely on misquoting Pearson's statements, and struck an ironic note given that the Conservatives had expanded Canadian social welfare programmes and instigated a softer line toward Moscow. The Liberal programme pushed for an expansion of Canadian trade and emphasised the importance of "working steadily and cooperatively with our allies". If this was a veiled dig at Diefenbaker's conduct of US-Canadian relations, their claim that a Liberal government "will not shift the responsibility of making clear decisions on defence policy when they are required" was a rather more overt criticism.⁶⁵⁹

Although foreign policy weighed heavily in the campaign speeches and slogans of the parties, the nuclear issue was not initially the subject of significant partisan contestation, with all three parties seemingly committed to a nuclear-free Canada in 1962. While the nuclear issue failed to animate intense ideological debate, however, the American question *did*. Accordingly, as the nuclear issue became more and more a question of the desired closeness of Canadian-American relations, partisan positions on 'the bomb' began to shift. The Conservatives, who had previously committed to accepting US nuclear warheads, stated unequivocally that: "We do not intend to expand or allow the expansion of nuclear weapons beyond those who have them. We want disarmament. With the United States and its overwhelming nuclear power there should be no wider expansion of nuclear weapons",⁶⁶⁰ while the Liberals, formally opposed to the weapons, claimed that: "If the members of NATO make an agreement for a NATO nuclear deterrent...then Canadian forces in NATO

⁶⁵⁸ Newman (1963), p. 326

⁶⁵⁹ Carrigan (1968), p. 262

⁶⁶⁰ Carrigan (1968), p. 286

should not be prevented from participating in this agreement by acquiring the necessary NATO tactical and defensive nuclear weapons”.⁶⁶¹

When the country went to the polls on 18 June, the Canadian people returned the Conservatives to power for a third term, although the margin of victory was far from a ringing endorsement of Diefenbaker’s leadership. The Conservatives obtained 116 seats (down from the 208 they had won in 1958), while the Liberals obtained 98 seats, and Social Credit and the NDP won 30 and 19 seats respectively. Whilst Diefenbaker held onto the reins of power, his government was in a minority in parliament, and would need to rely either on Liberal defections or support from the smaller parties to pass legislation. As the course of events that accompanied his final term would demonstrate, the parliamentary situation inherited by Diefenbaker in June 1962 would ultimately lead to the government’s downfall.

Diefenbaker’s Final Term, Kennedy’s Last Straw

Familiar issues accompanied the government’s conduct of foreign policy during its final term of office: Canada’s commitment to the US, perceptions of Canadian ‘neutralism’, and the ever-present vacillation over the adoption of nuclear warheads for the Bomarc missiles. The difference between the late 1950s and late 1962 was the extent to which difficulties associated with these issues would follow externally driven events.

On some issues, like the US- and British-led moves towards a nuclear test-ban treaty, external changes should have presented the opportunity for increasing convergence between the Canadian and American positions. After all, given that Green and

⁶⁶¹ Carrigan (1968), p. 270

Diefenbaker had, since 1959, made it their cause to champion disarmament, the test ban treaty offered an opportunity for a partial rapprochement. In the end it proved not to be the case, however. The Canadians, being far more trusting of the USSR than Kennedy, were prepared to accept an agreement with only minimal verification – a position that was closer to that of Khrushchev than Kennedy – and declined to fall into line with the demands of the other NATO countries for an agreement with more substantial oversight. Canada went as far as supporting a UNGA resolution endorsing a minimally verifiable test ban, leading Kennedy to level at the government the now familiar charge of ‘neutralism’.⁶⁶²

By far the most important event to occur in late 1962, however, was the crisis that accompanied the US discovery on 15 October of Soviet operated intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in Cuba. For the US the thought of offensive Soviet capabilities so close to home was an unprecedented and dangerous state of affairs. As soon as Kennedy was informed of the missiles on 16 October he convened a close-knit circle of advisors from the National Security Council (the so-called EXCOMM) and began discussing options for the US response. Two days later he began negotiations with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and on 21 October EXCOMM authorised a naval blockade on Soviet ships heading to Cuba. The following day, Kennedy informed Diefenbaker of the missiles and the decisions taken.

Diefenbaker objected to the lack of consultation during the crisis, believing he should have been informed sooner than was the case. (Merchant informed Norman Robertson that he “didn’t think Canada had earned, by its actions and by certain non-actions, the right to the extreme intimacy of relations which had existed in years

⁶⁶² Nash (1990), pp. 177-179

past”).⁶⁶³ Nevertheless, he informed the president, via Merchant, that the US would have the support of Canada. That evening, the prime minister addressed the Canadian parliament, outlined the situation, and proposed the creation of an independent UN mission to verify the presence of missiles in Cuba.⁶⁶⁴ The idea for a UN-led response was proposed by Green and Robertson, the Canadian Ambassador to the US. The US was “surprised and disappointed” by Diefenbaker’s statement; it was viewed in Washington as a challenge to the validity of US claims and a sign that Canada was not fully committed to its ally.⁶⁶⁵

What angered Kennedy more, however, was the Canadian government’s delay in placing its forces on alert. On the day Diefenbaker delivered his speech to parliament, US forces had gone to DEFCON-3.⁶⁶⁶ The US assumed Canada would do the same, and Canadian Minister of Defence Douglas Harkness recommended increasing the level of alert, but Diefenbaker – hoping to keep his options open – resisted. In fact, he continually resisted the appeals of Harkness and others in the cabinet to place Canadian forces on DEFCON-3, relenting two days later only when the US upped its alert level to DEFCON-2 and Pearson publicly endorsed Kennedy’s response to the crisis.⁶⁶⁷ While the Conservative government expressed support for the US, that it did so only belatedly contributed to a further decline in US-Canadian relations.

The political fall-out of the crisis reinforced the pressure on Diefenbaker to firmly accept nuclear weapons, as the public became increasingly aware that Canada had

⁶⁶³ Memorandum from Livingston Merchant to Under Secretary of State George Ball [undated]

⁶⁶⁴ McMahon (2009), p. 148

⁶⁶⁵ Memorandum from Livingston Merchant to Under Secretary of State George Ball [undated]

⁶⁶⁶ The lower the DEFCON level, the higher the threat that is perceived

⁶⁶⁷ McMahon (2009), p. 150

not, in their view, possessed adequate defences at a time of intense insecurity.⁶⁶⁸ Compounding the shift in public opinion was the voicing of discontent from within both the Canadian and American governments. Harkness continued to push in cabinet for a positive decision on acceptance of the weapons, while USAF General Lauris Norstad, visiting Ottawa, publicly claimed that by refusing to accept the warheads Canada was in breach of its NATO commitments.

It was in the context of the growing criticism of Diefenbaker's nuclear policy that Pearson, on 12 January 1963, announced that the Liberals would, if elected, accept US nuclear weapons as part of the Canadian defence effort. Diefenbaker saw Pearson's move as 'partnership complete' as far as his relations with the Kennedy administration were concerned, seeking to paint the Liberals as lackeys of the US.⁶⁶⁹ In parliament they accused the opposition of being 'American toadies' and 'Yankee-lovers', as did the NDP, whose leader Tommy Douglas argued that Liberal policy was "made in the United States".⁶⁷⁰ The US, for their part, were extremely pleased with Pearson's U-turn, whilst wary of the need to ensure any such glee was kept private, lest it stoke claims that the Liberals were in the pocket of the US.

The Downfall of the Diefenbaker Government

With the Liberal party's switch to a pro-nuclear stance, and the memory of the Cuban crisis still firmly in the minds of the public and policymakers, the need for a Canadian decision on the nuclear issue had been forced to the surface. No longer could Diefenbaker hide behind the obfuscation of the opposition's own position to

⁶⁶⁸ Ghent (1979), p. 247

⁶⁶⁹ Diefenbaker (1977), p. 7

⁶⁷⁰ Nash (1990), pp. 228-229

deflect attention from his own opaque stance. On 25 January 1963 Diefenbaker informed parliament of the nature and content of the negotiations with the US and offered what appeared to be a final rejection of the proposal for Canada to obtain the weapons, stressing the importance of “not enlarging the nuclear family”.⁶⁷¹ The intention of the speech, the US surmised, was to prevent the growing momentum towards the clarification of Canadian nuclear policy.

In the end, his speech had quite the opposite effect; it brought the nuclear issue to a head, offering the public intimate details of the government’s security strategy on which they could base their own assessments of its effectiveness. To aid their understanding, the US took the unprecedented move of issuing a press release to clarify perceived mistruths in Diefenbaker’s address. The press release detailed the Bomarc acquisition programme, whilst noting they were “not designed to carry any conventional warhead”, claiming “the Canadian Government has not as yet proposed any arrangement sufficiently practical to contribute effectively to North American defence”.⁶⁷² Wary their method of clarification was a risky move, lest the Liberals not win any ensuing election,⁶⁷³ the Department of State decided to go ahead anyway, although Kennedy was supposedly unaware of their actions.

Initial reactions to the press release was predominantly critical of the US move, which was seen by many north of the border as inappropriate meddling in Canadian affairs. The government recalled the Canadian Ambassador to the US, Charles Ritchie, in response, while the Liberals and the NDP joined the Conservatives in condemning the US’ actions. (Although Pearson, unlike Douglas, endorsed the

⁶⁷¹ Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, William Tyler, to Under Secretary of State George Ball, 29 January 1963

⁶⁷² ‘United States and Canadian Negotiation Regarding Nuclear Weapons’, US Department of State Press Release, 30 January 1963

⁶⁷³ Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Tyler, to Under Secretary of State George Ball, 29 January 1963

content of the press release, objecting only to the manner in which it was presented).⁶⁷⁴ Yet while the Department of State's intervention forged a brief period of partisan consensus, the medium-term effects would prove beneficial for the US and create severe difficulties for the Diefenbaker government. What the Department had managed to do was to force the issue, which highlighted the divisions within Diefenbaker's cabinet.⁶⁷⁵

Diefenbaker's desire to call an immediate election on the subject of American interference split the cabinet, which was strongly divided at this point between pro-nuclear and pro-American ministers, and those who opposed both. Minister of Trade and Commerce George Hees requested a decision from Diefenbaker on the nuclear issue, but found himself loudly opposed by the anti-American faction. Harkness, strongly critical of further incensing the US, informed Diefenbaker he had lost the confidence of the cabinet. At this point Diefenbaker offered his resignation. In the end, the cabinet agreed to support Diefenbaker and the resignation was withdrawn, subject to the agreement that no early, anti-US election campaign take place. Once it was been agreed that Diefenbaker would not be leaving, Harkness submitted his resignation instead.⁶⁷⁶

With the cabinet in disarray, the Social Credit MP Robert Thompson tabled a no-confidence motion in parliament, which, if it passed the floor of the Commons, would force the government to resign.⁶⁷⁷ The motion held that the government was divided over questions of national defence and unable to produce a budget for the coming year. Diefenbaker accused Pearson – who supported the motion – of

⁶⁷⁴ Nash (1990), pp. 248-249

⁶⁷⁵ Telegram from the US Embassy in Canada to the US Department of State, 3 February 1963

⁶⁷⁶ Nash (1990), p. 261

⁶⁷⁷ Telegram from the US Embassy in Canada to the US Department of State, 3 February 1963

“sidl[ing] away from the central question of whether Canada would continue as a sovereign state, of whether Canadian policies would be made in Canada by Canadians or by the United States” with the move.⁶⁷⁸ Nonetheless, Diefenbaker needed to ensure a majority could be found to defeat the motion. As members of the Liberals and Social Credit had committed themselves to voting against the government, its only hope lay in securing the support of Douglas’ 19 NDP members, which held the balance of power in the chamber.⁶⁷⁹

The NDP were divided on the issue, however. Many in the party supported Diefenbaker’s foreign policy, especially since he had committed against bringing nuclear weapons onto Canadian soil. A faction within the NDP led by Douglas Fisher argued “the Liberals were the long-term enemy” whilst the NDP Premier of Saskatchewan, Woodrow Lloyd, raised strong objections to bringing down the Diefenbaker government.⁶⁸⁰ In the end, with the government disintegrating and bureaucratic confusion growing, the NDP sided with the Liberals and Social Credit, and on 5 February 1963 they voted, with only two exceptions, to bring down the government. The final tally was 142-111 against the Diefenbaker administration.

Although the NDP voted against Diefenbaker, there is evidence that they did so with a heavy heart. Douglas later argued that from a political point of view he would have preferred to keep the government in power, but that administratively “you just couldn’t do it. We were really into bureaucratic chaos”.⁶⁸¹ He also rebuffed an offer prior to the vote from Wallace McCutcheon, a Conservative minister from the ‘Bay

⁶⁷⁸ Diefenbaker (1977), p. 1

⁶⁷⁹ Harrop (1984), pp. 134

⁶⁸⁰ McLeod & McLeod (1987), p. 235

⁶⁸¹ McLeod & McLeod (1987), p. 235

Street⁶⁸² faction of the party, who offered to replace Diefenbaker should the NDP support the government in the confidence vote. Douglas responded that: “We’re not interested in getting rid of Mr Diefenbaker...and least of all in replacing him with you and your friends ...We’re voting against the fact that the government has been unable to govern”.⁶⁸³

The fall of the government resulted in the calling of new elections, in which Diefenbaker would once again lead the Conservatives. Although he could not guarantee the full support of his cabinet, he first met with his parliamentary caucus – where he had a greater amount of support – who offered their support, later meeting his ministers to confirm the decision.⁶⁸⁴ The campaign was fought on US-Canadian relations and the dominance of ‘big business’. Both Diefenbaker and Douglas pushed essentially the same message, critical of nuclear weapons, American ‘imperialism’, and the Liberal-supported economic elite.⁶⁸⁵ The Liberal platform, in contrast, placed much emphasis on improving Canada’s relations with its allies and the credibility of its defence, arguing to “provide such deterrent strength, we must cooperate closely with our friends in the free world...In our policies for external affairs and defence we therefore must get on well with our friends and work closely with them”. They also promised to restore sound management of the economy and to remove barriers to increasing Canadian trade.⁶⁸⁶

Despite Diefenbaker’s best efforts his anti-American rallying cry was largely unsuccessful. In the end, the Liberals were returned to power with 129 seats to the Conservatives’ 95, allowing Pearson to form a minority government. Aside from the

⁶⁸² Bay Street is the heart of the financial district in Toronto and a metonym for business interests.

⁶⁸³ McLeod & McLeod (1987), p. 236

⁶⁸⁴ Nash (1990), pp. 269-270

⁶⁸⁵ Morton (1986), pp. 40-41

⁶⁸⁶ Carrigan (1968), pp. 295-296

shift in public opinion towards an acceptance of nuclear weapons, Pearson's victory was aided by the division within the Conservatives, as "the Bay Street and St James Street Tories [which had] led to the defeat of the government...continued their bedevilment of the party during the election campaign".⁶⁸⁷ With regards US-Canadian relations, "the advent of a new government in Canada has naturally stirred nearly all branches of the government to new hope that progress can be made in effective negotiations".⁶⁸⁸ They were proved largely correct when, on 11 May 1963, the new prime minister confirmed to Kennedy that he intended to fulfil the nuclear commitments previously entered into by Canada, with Ottawa drafting an agreement that very moment.⁶⁸⁹

Ideology and Canadian Foreign Policy, 1956-1963

The course of US-Canadian relations throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s offers an illustration of the changing approaches to national security that are brought about by transition from one governing ideology to another. The Liberal governments of the 1950s had emphasised the value of free trade, of a 'continental' alignment for Canada, and the importance of a credible deterrent to Soviet aggression. These foreign policy preferences were themselves based on a distinctly liberal conception of global order, one that sought mutual advantage through the intensification of ties between nations, viewed anti-democratic and illiberal countries as inherently threatening and untrustworthy, and sought security through partnership with like-minded allies and the pooling of their resources.

⁶⁸⁷ Diefenbaker (1977), p. 155

⁶⁸⁸ National Security Action Memorandum No. 234 [undated]

⁶⁸⁹ Memorandum of conversation between Prime Minister Pearson and President Kennedy, Hyannis Port, 11 May 1963

The election of the Diefenbaker government supplanted this liberal ideology with one drawn from conservative international thought. In place of the fact and value of ‘interdependence’, the Conservatives saw only dependence, and recommended only independence. In place of the ideological struggle between democracy and autocracy, liberalism and illiberalism, the Conservatives saw only a conflict between two powers. And, in place of the strategic necessity of alliance cohesion, the Conservatives found the necessity of flexibility and independence of action more compelling. This competing diagnosis of the nature of international relations led directly to the governments’ efforts to lessen its dependence on the US, to forge a more ‘independent’ Canadian foreign policy, and to pursue a more flexible Cold War strategy.

Fitting with the predictions of the horseshoe model outlined in Chapter Two, those on the left – most notably the CCF and, later, the NDP – offered similar prescriptions for Canada’s external relations, though they did so on the basis of a different diagnosis to that of the Conservatives. The left sought to lessen Canada’s dependence on American capital, though not because of national veneration, but out of a desire to oppose the intensification of capitalist domination. Both left and right, however, sought to challenge the benefits derived from intensifying cross-border trade and investment. The left also identified both superpowers as threatening, though unlike the Conservatives, the threat they feared came not from power, but from the twin ‘dictatorships’ of capital and authoritarianism. The left and the right, unlike the centre, did not strongly differentiate between the expected foreign policies of the powers. The left, finally, sought to mediate between the superpowers, though they sought greater headway towards global peace rather than an increase in

Canada's global influence. Both left and right, in this sense, were greater proponents of disarmament, mediation, and diplomacy than the centre.

The similarity of the prescriptions of left and right, if not of their diagnoses, was evident at several times throughout the period under study. In the Pipeline Debate of 1956 that would ultimately lead to the downfall of the Liberals, both the CCF and Conservatives cooperated to oppose what they perceived to be undue Canadian deference to US capital. On the proposed measures to divert Canadian trade from the US to the Commonwealth, both parties were in agreement. So, too, did the NDP endorse the government's push for disarmament in the UN and its desire to pursue a relaxation of tension between East and West. When the question of nuclear weapons became tied to the issue of US-Canada relations, both parties resisted Canadian adoption and criticised Pearson's decision to support the proposals. When the issue came to a head after the US press release, the NDP and Conservatives both criticised the US for its intervention. And finally, though the NDP ultimately contributed to the government's downfall, it was made clear that this was in spite of the significant areas of agreement between the parties.

While the similarities between left and right emerged at various times, there were two reasons why this never translated into longer-lasting cooperation, and why left/right similarities on foreign policy issues resulted in temporary, single-issue alliances at best. The first reason was the simultaneous existence of a host of domestic conflicts that placed the parties at odds with one another. Though they shared the domestic goals of reducing the power of business and finance and of ensuring access to social welfare, they held divergent views on the extent and scope of welfare provision, the role of smaller producers in Canadian society, and the philosophy that should underpin domestic policy (i.e. nationalism versus socialism).

Added to this was the existence of specific foreign policy differences. For example, the Conservatives, unlike the CCF/NDP, couched anti-Americanism in a pro-British orientation that sought to strengthen the Commonwealth, whilst those on the left opposed as hierarchical and archaic the ties to the former British Empire.

The second reason that long-term cooperation was never achieved was that both the NDP and the Conservatives competed with one another to a significant extent. Although the parties were the product of competing philosophical traditions, the practical similarities of some of their policies, coupled with the cross-cutting regional cleavages⁶⁹⁰ that existed in the Canadian political system, ensured that many ridings, particularly in the West, were NDP/Conservative marginals. This is in stark contrast to the French case where the Communists and Gaullists drew support from different regions and where, by virtue of a more intense ideological differentiation, they maintained more diverse bases of electoral support. Ironically, in the Canadian case, it was the relative proximity of the parties of left and right that served to undermine prospects for greater left-right cooperation.

Conclusion: The Politics of Canadian-American Relations

In this chapter I summarised the findings from Canadian-American case and discussed their implications for the validity of the horseshoe model. I demonstrated how changes in the Canadian party system wrought on by the growing strength of the NDP and the adoption by the Progressive Conservatives of a more ‘neo-liberal’ position had important consequences for the politics of Canadian-American relations,

⁶⁹⁰ Cross-cutting cleavages are social divisions that do not supervene onto existing political divisions, thereby creating sub-divisions within existing strata. See: Lipset & Rokkan (1967).

which turned a half-circle in their embrace of liberal ideology from the 1950s to the 1980s. I argued that the common denominator underpinning the shifting pattern of partisanship and Canadian-American relations, however, was the strength of liberal ideology. In the in-depth case I demonstrated the ways in which the left and right sought to challenge the liberal order in the late 1950s and the consequences this had for the Canadian-American relations. The findings confirm the validity of the horseshoe model for representing ideological positions on foreign policy issues. They also point to the importance of electoral competition in undermining cooperation between the left and the right.

7 / West German-American Relations and the NATO 'Double-Track' Decision, 1979-83

Introduction

In this chapter I present the findings from the West German-American case. I begin by discussing the international context within which the creation of the West German state took place before examining the ideological traditions of the major political parties in the country. I then offer a history of the politics of West German-American relations from 1949 to 1990 before focusing in detail on the INF deployments of the late 1970s and early 1980s. I conclude by discussing the implications of the case for the validity of the horseshoe model.

International and Domestic Context

West Germany in the Post War World

The context of West Germany's emergence into the post-war world differs significantly from that of the other countries in this study. The military defeat of Nazi Germany and the collapse of the government in 1945 led to the occupation of the country and the establishment of allied rule. The allies oversaw the division of Germany into four occupation zones – under French, British, American and Russian control – and the establishment of the Allied Control Council as a means of governing German territory. The British and American zones were merged in 1947 to form 'Bizonia', but the French zone remained independent until 1949, owing principally to the French government's irritation with the lack of consultation their country had been offered during and after the war.

The consensus required for the collective governance of the country was also undermined by the growing enmity between East and West. In 1947 the Soviets refused to contemplate German integration without four-power control of the industrial Ruhr region, precluding any agreement on unification of the zones. On 20 March 1948, the Soviets ceased participation in the Allied Control Council, and in June they blockaded allied access to West Berlin. In September 1949 the three allied zones were formally merged into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the first national elections were held. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, oversaw the creation of the communist-aligned German Democratic Republic (GDR) in its zone of occupation. The two German states would remain divided until October 1990 after the Cold War had ended.

The peculiarities of West German entry into the post-1945 order would have an important bearing on its role in the Cold War. Because the creation of the West German state owed its existence to the decisions of the allies – particularly the US – the country entered the Cold War firmly on the Western side. The allies had administered West Germany directly until 1949 and moulded the country's democratic institutions. They also maintained their own military forces within West Germany and embarked on substantial programmes of ideological re-education (aimed in particular at 'de-Nazification') that aimed to ground the ideational milieu of Germany firmly in liberal ideology. The alignment between Germany and the West, then, was established early on through allied-established institutional, strategic and normative ties.⁶⁹¹

West Germany also encountered the post-1945 world as a 'semi-sovereign' state. Its constitutional apparatus precluded re-militarization and aggression and politically

⁶⁹¹ Gatzke (1980)

any move towards establishing a global role would be renounced by West German citizens and Western allies alike. This liminal statehood became problematic for both the Federal Republic and its allies in the 1950s, as the West sought arrangements for containing the Soviet Union and as domestic West German demands for ‘sovereignty’ grew stronger. The solution to a politically and militarily strong Federal Republic that did not risk a return to German militarism and aggression relied on binding Germany firmly to the West through strong institutional ties. Germany’s re-emergence as a power would occur commensurate with its integration into the West, through the ECSC (later part of the EEC), the WEU, and NATO, and its renunciation of militarism.⁶⁹²

The strong ties between the Federal Republic and the West competed, however, with pressures emanating from West Germany’s geopolitical location on the fault-line between East and West and the centrality of the unification question. While West Germany’s location at the forefront of any potential attack made Cold War security remarkably salient in the Republic, it did not lead down particular strategic avenues, as advocates of neutrality, détente, and containment could each use the location of the country as justification for their favoured approach. Yet the question of unification did push in a particular direction. Those who prioritised unification sought to initiate a relaxation of tensions with the GDR and the USSR in order to achieve this goal. The counter-weight to West Germany’s strategic, institutional and normative alignment with the West, therefore, was the continual risk that West Germany had perhaps the greatest potential interest in coming to an agreement with the Soviets.

⁶⁹² Schweigler (1984), p. 7

The West German Political System

The constitutional and legal basis of the FRG was enshrined in the Basic Law, a document drafted by the allies according to a combination of Weimar-era legislative and governmental processes and elements drawn from other constitutional models. The principal differences from the Weimar-era constitution included constitutional provisions guaranteeing human dignity and basic rights, the absence of emergency powers or 'rule by decree', direct civilian control of the military in war and peace, and provisions limiting the ability of the legislature to easily remove the Chancellor. Unlike the constitutions of other countries, where amendments may be enacted by legislative 'supermajorities', the design of the Basic Law precluded constitutional change.

West Germany's political institutions consist of a bicameral federal legislature and regional legislatures in each of the West German states (the *Länder*). The lower-chamber, the *Bundestag*, is comprised of members elected directly by a hybrid system of proportional representation, whilst the upper-chamber, the *Bundesrat*, is comprised of representatives from the *Länder*. Federal elections to the *Bundestag* take place according to a mixed proportional and majoritarian system, whereby citizens are allocated one vote for a regional representative (for a single-member district) and one for a political party (allocated proportionally according to a party list). The results of the second, proportional vote determine the composition of the *Bundestag* itself, with the seats won through the first vote being deducted from the total allocated to each party. If a party wins fewer constituency seats than its proportion indicates, it will be allocated the difference in non-constituency seats,

with members drawn from the party list. If a party wins more constituency seats than its proportion indicates then it is allowed to keep these excess seats.⁶⁹³

The Chancellor is the head of the government and occupies a powerful position in West German politics (a response to the perceived instability of the Weimar years). The Chancellor is responsible for ministerial selection and for the day-to-day running of the government. They are also responsible for the conduct of foreign policy and for ultimate control of the military in times of crisis.⁶⁹⁴ The *Bundestag* elects the Chancellor after nomination by the Federal President. The President is elected by the Federal Convention comprised of the members of the *Bundestag* and an equal number of representatives from the *Länder*. The competencies of the President are limited to the nomination and investiture of candidates for the Chancellorship. The election of the Chancellor usually occurs a few weeks after the federal election, once it becomes clear which party candidate commands a majority in the legislature. Conventionally, the President nominates the candidate that commands the most seats, not the candidate whose individual party received the greatest number.

Political Parties in West German Politics

The West German party system is dominated by two broad groupings of the left and right, the social democratic *Sozialdemokratische partei deutschlands* (SPD), and the Christian Democratic union of the *Christlich demokratische union* (CDU) and the *Christlich-soziale union* (CSU). Although the five percent electoral threshold has prevented significant fractionalisation of the party system, a number of smaller

⁶⁹³ Schmidt (2003), p. 132

⁶⁹⁴ Schmidt (2003), p. 29

parties have received regular representation in the Bundestag. The most important of these has been the liberal *Freie demokratische partei* (FDP), which featured as a junior coalition partner in almost all Cold War governments and played an important role as ‘kingmaker’ in determining which of the major parties would be able to govern. In the early years of the Federal Republic the nationalist *Deutsche partei* (DP) featured in coalition governments from 1949-60 and the Green party had a significant impact on the party system after its establishment in early 1979.

In contrast to the Weimar years, the scope of partisanship in the Federal Republic is characterised by the near wholesale absence of fringe political movements of either the left or the right, principally a consequence of the significant role of the US and the allies in dictating the nature of West Germany’s political system. This has been particularly noticeable on the right, where association with the pre-1945 period has delegitimised nationalism in particular as a viable force in West German politics. Whereas anti-Americanism in the Weimar Republic was a feature of both left and right, the de-legitimation of conservative anti-Americanism in the Federal Republic resulted in a broadly left-right pattern of partisan contestation on the American connection.⁶⁹⁵ The exceptions to this rule, the DP and certain elements of the CDU/CSU, have tended to couch any anti-American views cautiously, and in less direct language than in other countries.

⁶⁹⁵ Markovits (1985), p. 13




Figure 28: Representation of fit between parties and ideologies in West Germany.

The Socialist and Green Parties

The SPD, the principal socialist party in Germany, was founded in 1875 through the amalgamation of existing socialist groupings. Whilst Marxist-reformist in its domestic outlook, the SPD (in)famously supported the German state during the First World War, in spite of its declared internationalist principles. Because the party had its popular base in the North and East of Germany, the separation of the East and West after the war resulted in a significant loss of popular support, as the party apparatus in the East was transformed into the *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands* (SED) by the Soviets.⁶⁹⁶ SPD views on West Germany's role in the world are best divided into three distinct phases: (1) from the immediate post-war

⁶⁹⁶ Hanrieder (1967), pp. 100, 128

settlement to the Bad Godesberg conference of 1959, (2) from the conference to the end of the 1970s, and (3) from the end of the 1970s to the end of the Cold War.

In the initial post-war period, in the context of the emerging Cold War, SPD foreign policy broadly approximated the socialist ideal-type. Domestically the SPD advocated full employment, a 'just' distribution of resources and worker participation in industrial governance. The party's foreign policy programme criticised Adenauer's policy of tying Germany to the West and stressed the need to maintain distance from both East and West.⁶⁹⁷ The party viewed the US as "the West's leading imperial power", a corollary of which was a relative propensity to trust the aims and motives of the Soviet Union.⁶⁹⁸ Most SPD members at the time were sceptical of NATO,⁶⁹⁹ favoured a neutral stance in the Cold War, and argued that reunification should come before rearmament.⁷⁰⁰ As with other socialist parties at the time, the SPD were also markedly sceptical of moves towards European unification, opposing both Gaullist plans for a conservative European order and US supported efforts (like the EDC) to draw the countries of Europe together under the aegis of liberal capitalism.

A series of electoral defeats during the 1950s and the growing strength of the party's moderate faction were responsible for the introduction of substantial programmatic changes at an extraordinary SPD conference in Bad Godesberg on 15 November 1959. The change in policy followed the election of Willy Brandt to replace Franz Neumann as head of the SPD in January 1958, and marked a significant departure

⁶⁹⁷ Schellenger (1968), p. 41

⁶⁹⁸ Hanrieder (1967), p. 101

⁶⁹⁹ When the failure of the EDC in 1954 led the allies to seek German membership of NATO, the SPD called instead for further negotiations with the Soviet Union, but refused to commit for or against NATO membership. The official party line was that Germany favoured collective security through the UN, but this was a compromise position designed to hide the divisions between Atlanticists and sceptics.

⁷⁰⁰ Drummond (1982), pp. 98-99, 130-131

from the immediate post-war policies of Cold War neutrality and disengagement. No longer, it stated, could West Germany “declare itself outside the East-West conflict”, adding: “In the conflict between East and West the place of the Federal Republic is irremovably on the side of the West”.⁷⁰¹ It therefore marked the end of the SPD’s neutral, Marxist ideological stance, and the culmination of moves towards social democracy and a Western Cold War alignment. The defining policy of the post-Godesberg era was *Ostpolitik*, an early forebear of détente that sought to pursue a relaxation of tensions with the Soviets and the GDR whilst making clear Germany’s commitment to the West.

Following the implementation of the key principles of *Ostpolitik* under successive SPD-FDP coalitions from 1969 to 1979, the re-emergence of Cold War tension spelled the end of US support for the SPD’s strategy and unleashed domestic forces that would move the party back towards the left during the 1980s. The leftist faction of the SPD had, in the late 1960s, removed itself from the CDU/CSU-SPD ‘grand coalition’ through the creation of the Extra-Parliamentary Opposition (EPO) in 1966. After re-joining the SPD in 1969, the faction’s strength gradually increased during the 1970s, its influence crowning under the Schmidt government in the early 1980s as the SPD grappled with missile deployments whilst attempting to head off the electoral threat from the newly founded Greens.⁷⁰² Ideologically the party distanced itself from containment policy and the US, advocating unilateral disarmament, security agreements with Moscow, and the creation of a ‘European pillar’ in NATO.⁷⁰³

⁷⁰¹ cf. Schellenger (1968), p. 173

⁷⁰² Kaltefleiter (1989), p. 23

⁷⁰³ Griffith (1989), p. 2

An alternative socialist grouping emerged with the establishment of the Green party in 1979, although it was not until the 1983 elections that the party crossed the five percent threshold for representation in the Bundestag. The Green party focused on the twin concerns of ecologism and pacifism and became intimately linked with the peace movement that grew up around the NATO decision to seek missile deployments in 1979.⁷⁰⁴ They opposed the influence of the US on West German foreign policy, believing the menace from America outweighed that from the Soviet Union, and sought a neutral Cold War policy for Germany⁷⁰⁵ (according to a poll by *Der Spiegel* in 1981, 82 percent of Green party members were in favour of neutralism).⁷⁰⁶ Although the Greens received representation in the Bundestag from 1983 onwards, the principal effect of the party's foundation was to steer the SPD leftwards, as the Greens directly threatened the core of the social democrats' electorate.⁷⁰⁷

The Free Democratic Party

The FDP, the principal liberal party in the Federal Republic, was founded in 1948 out of the remnants of the various Weimar-era centre parties. Although the party has traditionally polled far fewer seats than the SPD and CDU/CSU, it held the balance of power between the major parties at nearly every election during the period. As a result, the FDP assumed the role of 'kingmaker', featuring in the majority of governments during the period. Changes in the dominant coalition partner from CDU/CSU to SPD (in 1969) and back again (in 1982) were the product of a switch in

⁷⁰⁴ I describe this period in greater detail in the case study below.

⁷⁰⁵ Griffith (1989), p. 3

⁷⁰⁶ cf. Boutwell (1983), p. 84

⁷⁰⁷ Kaltefleiter (1989), p. 21

the FDP's allegiance from one party to the other and were accompanied both times by compromises on behalf of the larger parties on issues of security and economic policy of concern to the FDP. In this way the FDP has had significant consequences for West German politics, and the party's ideological position, and its policies, have been important determinants of the government's agenda.⁷⁰⁸

Domestically, the FDP has strongly embraced classical liberal ideology, manifest in support for *laissez faire* economic policy and the promotion of individual freedom above responsibilities derived by nation or class. Indeed, it has frequently been claimed that the FDP position was defined – above all else – by its focus on economic liberalism.⁷⁰⁹ Internationally, however, this embrace of individualism and free-market liberalism has not translated into a wholly liberal approach to foreign affairs, at least not one that conforms to the ideal-type of liberal foreign policy outlined in Chapter Two. Partly in response to the overriding importance of the unification question and, as I shall argue later, the early embrace by Adenauer's CDU/CSU of key elements of a liberal foreign policy (such as institutionalisation, collective security, and 'Atlanticism'), the FDP's foreign policy has often appeared more nationalistic and less pro-Western than that of the equivalent centrist parties in the other countries.⁷¹⁰

In the early years of the Federal Republic the FDP prioritised the independence of West Germany from the superpowers and the need to bring about German reunification through engagement with the Soviet Union. During this period the FDP endorsed the idea of a 'third force' Europe, strongly emphasised the importance of German sovereignty, and challenged the pro-European, pro-American policies of

⁷⁰⁸ Hanterman & Søre (1999), pp. 129-131; Kaarbo (1996)

⁷⁰⁹ E.g. Kolinsky (1984), p. 113

⁷¹⁰ Søre (1985), p. 126

Adenauer's CDU/CSU.⁷¹¹ One of the principal reasons for this stance was the overriding concern for the FDP of unification, the cause of which the more neutral stance was designed to serve. The greater the emphasis on negotiations, it was thought, the greater the prospects for an agreement on unification. The FDP's early foreign policy stance, as a result, more closely approximated the conservative view of the Cold War than it did the liberal one, although in the years prior to 1959 it was the SPD that remained most opposed to a Western course for West Germany.

The turnaround in the FDP's Cold War strategy came about at the party's Dusseldorf Conference in 1962 through the unconditional endorsement of West Germany's role in NATO and the need for greater defence planning in light of the Soviet threat.⁷¹² Whilst the shift in party opinion towards greater acceptance of NATO heralded the end of FDP support for neutrality and independence, the party retained its support for a more flexible and 'relaxed' Eastern strategy. From the 1960s onwards the FDP's embrace of détente and its newfound Atlanticism ensured the continuation of these two cornerstones of West German security policy. The party agreed to enter coalition with the SPD in 1969 on condition that the social democrats not seek to pursue an anti-NATO stance. It left the coalition in 1982 only after guaranteeing support for *Ostpolitik* from Helmut Kohl's Atlanticist CDU/CSU. In each case, the FDP ensured the continuation of moderate Atlanticism and détente.

FDP security policy, by and large, did not conform to the liberal archetype examined in Chapter Two, or the predicted liberal approach to Cold War strategy discussed in Chapter Three. Even though the nationalist rhetoric of independence failed to outlast the 1950s, the party retained a muted Atlanticism (relative to that of the CDU/CSU)

⁷¹¹ Hanrieder (1967), p. 98

⁷¹² Hanrieder (1967), p. 212

and a preference for détente over containment. There are two reasons why this was the case. The first was the emphasis the party placed on unification, which required cooperation with the Soviets in order to ‘free’ those in East Germany from antidemocratic tyranny. The division of Germany opened up a trade-off for liberals not present in other countries, namely, the relative value of ensuring the freedom of one’s own kin in the GDR by compromising the freedom of those in the Soviet Union more broadly. The second reason was the adoption by the CDU/CSU of a broadly liberal foreign policy as a means of re-establishing German sovereignty and power. This stance was necessitated by the de-legitimisation of traditional conservatism in post-war West Germany and by the liminal nature of West German sovereignty, and the consequence was to displace the FDP from its electoral base, pushing it instead towards a position of moderate liberal nationalism.

The Christian Democratic Union

The principal conservative movement in Germany after 1945 was the Christian Democratic CDU/CSU union. Unlike the SPD, which represented the continuation of an existing Weimar-era party, the CDU/CSU represented a new grouping drawn from conservative (and to a lesser extent, liberal) elements of West German society.⁷¹³ The CDU/CSU governed West Germany from 1949 to 1969 as head of a series of coalition governments featuring various combinations of the FDP, the German party (see below) and the SPD. The party itself comprised a near-permanent coalition of two similar regional parties groupings, the Bavarian CSU, and its national equivalent, the CDU, which stood for election everywhere but Bavaria. Although both groupings held largely similar views, specific policy disagreements,

⁷¹³ Pridham (1977), p. 21

like the divide between Atlanticists and Gaullists, did sometimes threaten intra-party unity, as did political struggles between the leaders.⁷¹⁴

The domestic elements of the CDU/CSU platform mirrored many aspects of traditional conservative thought. They opposed radical social change, sought a strong role for Christian principles and traditional morality in public life, and displayed a sceptical attitude to both excesses of government control and the immoral materialism of the free-market.⁷¹⁵ Unlike the market liberalism of the FDP, the CDU/CSU represented the interests of the small businesses, industry and agriculture, typically those that sought protection against the vicissitudes of the free market; as a result, the party promoted the concept of a 'social market economy' and continued to endorse strong labour-management relations as a fundamental principle of economic organisation.⁷¹⁶ The party also placed significant emphasis on overcoming divisions within West German society in a manner reminiscent of the 'one nation' conservatism prevalent in Britain, Canada and France at the time.

In international affairs, however, the policies of the CDU/CSU developed under Adenauer differed significantly from those pursued by conservative parties elsewhere. Adenauer's 'policy of strength' vis-à-vis the USSR, his staunch support for the US and the West and his embrace of the European institutional route to restoring West German sovereignty resembled more the liberal conception of Cold War security, with their emphasis on institutionalisation, collective security and the ideological menace from the East. The strategy, of course, had its roots in certain elements of conservative philosophy, notably the importance of national sovereignty

⁷¹⁴ In 1976, for example, Franz-Josef Strauss, then leader of the CSU, threatened to remove his grouping from the union. Strauss only backed down when the CDU leader at the time, Helmut Kohl, announced that the CDU would field candidates in Bavaria if the CSU's support was withdrawn.

⁷¹⁵ Pridham (1977), p. 29

⁷¹⁶ Hanrieder (1967), p. 97

and the utility of force, but the context of Germany's post-war situation required substantial compromise on other elements of conservative thought. Independence, for example, was simply not an option given West Germany's semi-sovereign status, its history of recent aggression, and the density of its ties to the West. Not only was the rhetoric of independence inappropriate in the West German context, it was also internationally a politically infeasible move. Paradoxically, it was only through interdependence that West German sovereignty could be restored.

This did not preclude the emergence of some within the CDU/CSU union who sought to challenge the Atlanticist path laid down by Adenauer, however. Beginning in the 1960s a strong 'Gaullist' movement developed in the party, particularly within Strauss's CSU.⁷¹⁷ The Gaullists, as with their French counterparts, sought a united Europe of states as a counterweight to West German dependence on the US. They emphasised traditional conservative values at home and sought the development of a global West German role abroad. This, they hoped, would result in a more equal, and less subordinate, relationship with the US.⁷¹⁸ Unlike Gaullism in France, however, the West German equivalent remained convinced in the need to take a hard line against the USSR, and never embraced *détente* in a way that De Gaulle's France did in the 1960s.⁷¹⁹ Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the CDU/CSU was divided between the Atlanticists and the Gaullists, although Strauss's defeat at the 1980 federal elections and his subsequent retirement from national politics served to diminish Gaullist power in the union.

Although the major party of the right did not endorse a traditionally conservative foreign policy for West Germany, there did exist at various times smaller groupings

⁷¹⁷ Risse-Kappen (1983), p. 329

⁷¹⁸ Pridham (1980), pp. 316-317

⁷¹⁹ Hanrieder (1980), p. 16

on the right that did advocate a more typically conservative stance on foreign policy. In the early years of the Federal Republic the principal nationalist element in the *Bundestag* was the DP. The party's foreign policy stance was strongly critical of the country's engagement with Europe and with the Western powers more generally, advocating for West Germany: "The role of a predominant balancer, which the DP envisaged for Germany, required independent strength and political mobility unencumbered by international integrative measures".⁷²⁰ The party's influence was marginal, however, not least because of its support among former Nazi officers and its strong emphasis on the somewhat taboo topic of German nationalism.⁷²¹ The party featured in all of Adenauer's coalition governments until November 1961, but it never held significant sway over government policy, partly owing to its inability to (credibly) threaten to switch its allegiance to the SPD.

The Politics of West German-American Relations, 1949-1990

In general anti-Americanism in West German politics increases the further one moves to the left, although the more moderate anti-Americanism of the CDU/CSU 'Gaullists' and the DP would suggest that the observed left-right pattern owes more to the diminished popularity of right-wing political values in post-war Germany than the underlying validity of the left-right model itself. Interestingly, although the FDP was never the most pro-American party, the changes of coalition responsible for bringing about an improvement in US-West German relations were all instigated by the changing priorities of the FDP, as in 1969 when the party endorsed Brandt's

⁷²⁰ Hanrieder (1967), p. 99

⁷²¹ The similarity of the DP's Cold War strategy to that of many right-wing conservatives in Britain, France and Canada, and its consequent lack of electoral success, offers further evidence to support the conjecture that pursuit of a right-wing foreign policy approach was a relative non-starter in Germany.

Ostpolitik against the CDU/CSU's inflexible 'policy of strength' inherited from Adenauer, and in 1982 when it joined the CDU/CSU in supporting the deployment of INF missiles in opposition to growing dissent within the SPD.

The CDU/CSU has historically shown the greatest support for a Western orientation and the pursuit of a hawkish line against Moscow, despite intra-party divisions in the 1960s and 1970s between Atlanticists and Gaullists. The FDP, in contrast, have tended to downplay the Western connection more than the CDU/CSU and have placed significant emphasis on achieving a relaxation of Cold War tensions through cooperation with the USSR. The SPD have generally been more critical than the FDP about Germany's Western orientation and more serious about détente, although the party's position has been subject to the most change of all. From 1949 to 1959 and from 1982 onwards the party endorsed a neutral position for West Germany, whilst in the intervening years it sought to promote détente as part of a definitively Western strategy. Finally, the Greens have been outwardly hostile to the Atlantic connection since their inception in the early 1980s, advocating the removal of all US troops and weapons from West German soil and articulating a fierce critique of US capitalism.

Although support for a Western orientation has broadly followed a simple left-right pattern, the course of US-West German relations has depended more on the fit between the Cold War policies of Bonn and Washington than it has on the governing party's image of America. In the first years of the Republic, Adenauer's 'policy of strength' resonated well with the strategies of containment pursued by the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. From 1961 onwards the move towards a more flexible policy, particularly in West Germany, led the US to oppose the inflexibility and hawkishness of Adenauer's pro-Western stance. Accordingly, US-West German relations suffered until the 1969 election of the SPD and the implementation of

Brandt's *Ostpolitik*, which fitted perfectly with the emerging emphasis on détente in the US. When the onset of the 'second Cold War' in the late 1970s began to break down détente, relations between the US and the SPD-led coalition suffered accordingly, leading to a distinct preference for the return of the more hawkish CDU/CSU, which occurred in 1982.

The Federal Republic's foreign policy developed under the watch of Konrad Adenauer, whose succession of CDU/CSU coalition governments from 1949 to 1963 established the contours of West Germany's Cold War policy for at least two decades. Adenauer, simultaneously Chancellor and Foreign Minister, sought to reintegrate Germany into the society of states by anchoring it firmly to the emerging international architecture of the West.⁷²² His 'policy of strength' combined support for rearmament and a sovereign West Germany with strong support for membership of the WEU, NATO and the ECSC. In this way, the Federal Republic could be simultaneously rehabilitated and defended against the threat from the East: Whilst the prospect of rearmament offered a means of re-establishing West German sovereignty the link to the West tied Germany to the power of the US and provided material backing to the 'policy of strength'.⁷²³ In these initial years the CDU/CSU united behind Adenauer's foreign policy, while the SPD strongly criticised its reliance on the US and rearmament, and the FDP offered muted criticism of the Atlanticist component but supported the rearmament element.⁷²⁴

Adenauer's foreign policy received the support of the US because his 'policy of strength' overlapped significantly with US containment policy at the time. Yet the Berlin and Cuban crises of the early 1960s contributed to a distinct sea-change in the

⁷²² Kaltefleiter (1989), p. 21

⁷²³ Hanrieder (1967), p. 95

⁷²⁴ Hanrieder (1967), pp. 96-99

US attitude to détente that sought ways of reducing tensions, particularly in the case of West Germany, where conflagration was thought most likely. The Kennedy administration increasingly regarded the ‘policy of strength’ as out-dated and inflexible, as a potential impediment to any move towards détente.⁷²⁵ The domestic opponents of the CDU/CSU, having always regarded as valuable any attempt to reduce East-West tension, added their criticism to that of the US. By this point, both the SPD and the FDP, in 1959 and 1962 respectively, had officially endorsed West Germany’s Atlantic orientation, meaning opposition voices from within and without the governing coalition now chimed with US policy more than that of the CDU/CSU. The FDP, emboldened by their relative success in the 1961 *Bundestag* elections, demanded Adenauer resign as Chancellor by 1963, the condition of their continued support for the governing coalition.⁷²⁶

The FDP’s demand for a change in CDU/CSU leadership led to Adenauer’s resignation and the election of Ludwig Erhard to the position of Chancellor. Erhard was also from the dominant CDU/CSU partner, but was viewed more as a moderate. Though a staunch supporter of the country’s Western ties, the new Chancellor favoured a more flexible policy towards the Soviet Union that resonated more with opposition and American demands.⁷²⁷ Under Erhard the CDU/CSU became strongly divided over security policy between Atlanticists and Gaullists: the former, which included Erhard himself, favoured stronger ties to the US and a more flexible Cold War strategy, the latter argued for greater alignment with Paris as opposed to

⁷²⁵ Schweigler (1984), p. 17

⁷²⁶ Hanrieder (1967), p. 207

⁷²⁷ Hanrieder & Auton (1980), p. 84

Washington and a harder line vis-à-vis the Soviets.⁷²⁸ The split arose because of Erhard's move away from a 'policy of strength' and was reinforced when strained Franco-American relations forced a choice between De Gaulle's 'European' policy and Atlanticism that had not existed before. Ironically, though, their emphasis on a tough Soviet policy actually placed West German 'Gaullists' at odds with their French counterparts.⁷²⁹

By the end of 1966, Walter Scheel, leader of the FDP and future Federal President, citing opposition to Erhard's interventionist budget, removed his party's support from the governing coalition.⁷³⁰ The FDP's decision to leave, although ostensibly in response to mooted tax increases, was also strongly influenced by their strong support for détente, which had not been forthcoming under Erhard (he supported the Vietnam war and made little headway in East-West relations).⁷³¹ Realising FDP support would not be forthcoming the CDU/CSU replaced Erhard with Kurt Georg Kiesinger, a compromise candidate between the Atlanticist and Gaullist members, who led a 'grand coalition' of the CDU/CSU and the SPD.⁷³² The SPD generally supported the Kiesinger era 'compromise' of rhetorical independence, a broad Atlanticist course and a moderately flexible Eastern policy. Yet disagreement between hard-liners and moderates increased in the late 1960s in response to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, which highlighted disagreements in Eastern policy, and

⁷²⁸ In-keeping with the theoretical logic outlined in Chapter Two, it was the Gaullists that initially sought out a 'grand coalition' with the SPD, believing their critical stance on Germany's Western orientation to be closer to their position than that of the CDU Atlanticists.

⁷²⁹ Hanrieder & Auton (1980), p. 87

⁷³⁰ Broughton & Kirchner (1984), p. 187

⁷³¹ Irving (1969), p. 48

⁷³² Hanrieder & Auton (1980), p. 88

political polarisation engendered by extra-parliamentary opposition to the ‘grand coalition’.⁷³³

The 1969 federal elections resulted in a marked increase in the SPD’s strength in the *Bundestag*, gaining twenty seats over its 1966 result to bring about a total of 237. Willy Brandt, the social democratic leader, began negotiations with the FDP, forming a social-liberal government to replace the outgoing ‘grand coalition’ with the CDU/CSU. The lack of headway in pursuing a flexible strategy towards Moscow was the principal reason for the change. Although the SPD and FDP held highly divergent economic philosophies, both agreed on the need to promote détente with the East.⁷³⁴ The foreign policies of the Brandt government became strongly associated with *Ostpolitik*, the SPD’s policy of Eastern rapprochement emphasising mutual recognition and the identification of common interests. Practical movement included the signing of the Treaty of Moscow in August 1970, stipulating the mutual renunciation of force and formalised the division between East and West Germany, the Treaty of Warsaw that December offering *de facto* recognition of the Oder-Neisse line, and the Basic Treaty of 1972 establishing diplomatic relations between the two Germanies.

The *Ostpolitik* of the SPD-FDP coalition marked a decisive shift away from Adenauer’s ‘policy of strength’ and the watered-down variants of this policy endorsed by Erhard and Kiesinger. As a result, the onset of the social-liberal coalition led to a distinct improvement in US-West German relations, and *Ostpolitik* “was welcomed and encouraged by the United States...since it promised to provide

⁷³³ The SPD had to contend with the ‘Extra-Parliamentary Opposition’ within its own ranks while the CDU/CSU vote was challenged by the rise of a new nationalist grouping, the National Democratic Party (NDP).

⁷³⁴ Söe (1985), p. 126

essential European support for America's global strategy of détente".⁷³⁵ The policy fit remarkably well with shift in US policy under the Nixon administration, no mere coincidence given that the *Ostpolitik* concept itself informed American thinking on East-West relations at the time. Opposition to *Ostpolitik* came principally from the CDU/CSU, especially Strauss' more right-wing CSU grouping, which criticised the SPD-FDP coalition for "selling out German interests" and opposed all the Eastern treaties signed by the government, whilst acknowledging they would be near impossible to repeal once in office.⁷³⁶

The changeover in Chancellors from Brandt to Helmut Schmidt in 1974 had little impact on the foreign policy of the Federal Republic. Schmidt, although further to the right of the SPD than his counterparts, was a strong supporter of *Ostpolitik* and Schmidt kept Brandt's foreign policy framework intact, while the CDU/CSU continued to oppose it. It was only at the end of the 1970s that the re-emergence of East-West tensions in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought about significant challenges for *Ostpolitik* and US-West German relations. Seeking to redress the perceived 'missile gap' in Europe, Schmidt pushed the NATO allies to endorse the modernization of intermediate-range nuclear forces on West German soil and pursue further arms control negotiations with the Soviets (the so-called 'double-track' decision). The deployment track, however, drew ire from the SPD left and the newly founded Green party, who coordinated parliamentary opposition and mass rallies against the move, dividing the party and the governing coalition and leading the US to question Schmidt's support for Western initiatives.

⁷³⁵ Markovits (1985), p. 6

⁷³⁶ Hanrieder & Auton (1980), p. 91

The severity of the foreign policy divisions within the SPD, coupled with the re-emergence of economic differences between the coalition partners and the CDU/CSU's rejection of Strauss as their candidate for Chancellor, promoted the FDP to switch allegiances in 1982 from the SPD to the CDU/CSU. The new coalition, under Chancellor Helmut Kohl, took the reins of power in October and worked to implement both elements of the 'double-track' decision (the new Pershing II missiles were deployed in 1983, having been ratified by the *Bundestag* earlier that year). The coalition rested on a compromise that manifested neatly in the 'double-track' concept; the FDP would support the CDU/CSU so long as they worked to keep elements of détente alive.⁷³⁷ Thus, the mid-to-late 1980s were notable for the simultaneous pursuit of strength and negotiations, an approach that fitted well with the Reagan administration's 'peace through strength' approach to the Cold War. Save for periodic US concerns about FDP 'appeasement' of the Soviets (so-called Genscherism), US-West German relations were stronger, and the governing party more cohesive, under Kohl than either had been in the latter Schmidt years.

⁷³⁷ Banchoff (1999), p. 122

Time Period	Prime Minister	Governing Parties	Dominant Ideology	Strength of Relations
1949-1957	Adenauer	CDU/CSU/FDP	Conservatism	Strong
1957-1961	Adenauer	CDU/CSU	Conservatism	Moderate
1961-1966	Adenauer/Erhard	CDU/CSU/FDP	Conservatism	Weak
1966-1969	Kiesinger	CDU/CSU/SPD	Social Liberalism/Conservatism	Moderate
1969-1976	Brandt	SPD/FDP	Social Liberalism	Strong
1976-1979	Schmidt	SPD/FDP	Social Liberalism	Moderate
1979-1982	Schmidt	SPD/FDP	Socialism/Social Liberalism	Weak
1982-1990	Kohl	CDU/CSU/FDP	Conservatism/New Right	Strong

Figure 29: Summary of West German-American relations, 1949-1990

The NATO ‘Double-Track’ Decision, 1979-1983

The ‘Double-Track’ Decision as a Case of US-West German relations

I demonstrate the effects of ideology and partisanship on the conduct of West German strategy by analysing the domestic political context surrounding NATO’s ‘double-track’ decision of 1979. Instigated by NATO leaders in 1979 as a means of modernizing the Western deterrent and assuaging West German fears of a strategic imbalance in the European theatre, the ‘double-track’ decision aimed to deploy 108 Pershing II intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe whilst simultaneously pursuing arms control negotiations with the USSR with a view to diminishing the possession of such weapons. The decision to deploy Pershing II was subject to intense political contestation in West Germany before the Bundestag endorsed the decision on 22 November 1983. It was not until four years later, on 8 December 1987, that the US and the Soviet Union signed the arms control treaty banning intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). In this case study I focus on the period from the late 1970s to the Bundestag decision of 1983.

There are three reasons why the ‘double-track’ decision offers an appropriate test of the thesis outlined in the earlier chapters. The first is the heightened salience of questions of foreign policy and Cold War strategy during the years 1979 to 1983. Security policy was the most salient issue in West German politics at the time and the relations between parties were shaped to a considerable degree by the issue of INF deployments.⁷³⁸ The second reason to focus on the ‘double-track’ is the significance of the consequences that the episode had for West German politics. Not only did the INF issue contribute significantly to the rise of the German Greens and the subsequent leftward shift of the SPD, but it also contributed to the eventual

⁷³⁸ Bertram (1983), p. 618; Risse-Kappen (1983), p. 327; Yost & Glad (1982), p. 525

downfall of Helmut Schmidt's SPD-FDP coalition and its replacement with the CDU/CSU-FDP government of Helmut Kohl. The third reason for focusing on this case is the degree of partisanship involved. Unlike the years of the Brandt government, when the SPD left was largely contained by the party elite, the early 1980s saw a marked resurgence of the German left, once again bringing questions of political ideology to the fore.

I present the case study in the following order. I begin by outlining the regional and international security context from which the NATO INF decision emanated, detailing the motives of the US and West Germany at the time. I then discuss the effects of the re-emergence of Cold War enmity and its consequences for US-West German negotiations on security policy, before addressing the domestic political environment of 1979 and outlining the positions of the major parties. I focus thereafter on the negotiations between Schmidt and Reagan and detail the rise of domestic opposition to the INF in the period leading up to the break-up of the governing coalition in 1982. Finally, I conclude by summarising the consequences, both domestic and international, of the change of government and the subsequent endorsement of the Pershing II deployment by the Bundestag.

The Cold War Environment of the 1970s

The 'double-track' decision of 1979 had its origins in a complex and interrelated set of events and processes associated with the Cold War environment of the mid-to-late 1970s. The immediate context of the decision by the US to commission the development of the Pershing II missiles was the routine need to modernize existing medium-range missile stocks, a necessity identified by NATO's Nuclear Planning

Group as early as 1973.⁷³⁹ This was coupled with the growing demands from West Germany – led since 1974 by the SPD Chancellor Helmut Schmidt – for an increase in European intermediate-range capabilities. For Schmidt the problem was that global deterrence worked almost too well. Since parity obtained between the US and USSR, neither side was likely to risk nuclear war, yet this did not preclude a conventional or regional conflict from emerging. The question, then, was whether the US would risk instigating a global nuclear war in order to prevent the onset of a limited or regional conflict.⁷⁴⁰ If not, then US containment policy did very little for West German security.

Despite leading an SPD government at a time when détente was very much still in vogue, the regional missile gap between West Germany and the USSR was a source of significant concern to Schmidt. It was well-known that Schmidt himself was on the right-wing of the SPD,⁷⁴¹ and he had little time for arguments from the left in favour of unilateral disarmament, or for the idea that the missile gap no-longer mattered after the onset of détente. Yet many in Schmidt's party did support such arguments. So, too, did Willy Brandt, who retained the position of party chairman even after Schmidt succeeded him as Chancellor in 1974. Thus, although intra-party consensus was strong during the 1970s and despite the sizable majority afforded the governing SPD-FDP coalition by the voters in the 1976 election,⁷⁴² the 'collective leadership' at the top of the SPD and the ideological differences at the popular and elite levels would gain increasing importance as events unfolded in the 1980s.⁷⁴³

⁷³⁹ Risse-Kappen (1988), p. 9

⁷⁴⁰ Risse-Kappen (1983), p. 331

⁷⁴¹ Braunthal (1985), p. 85

⁷⁴² The SPD-FDP coalition was returned to power with 253 seats to the CDU/CSU's 229, with 214 for the SPD and 39 for the FDP (Webb (1998)).

⁷⁴³ Braunthal (1985), p. 85

The defence rationale for improving the European strategic balance was given greater impetus by moves by the USSR to deploy new intermediate-range missiles (the SS-20s) from 1976 onwards, ostensibly instigated by a desire to modernize existing forces that paralleled NATO concerns of the early 1970s.⁷⁴⁴ Cognisant of the increasing gap in intermediate-range weapons between Europe and the Soviet Union and the deteriorating quality of existing missile stocks, the West German government began to pressure the Carter administration to include intermediate-range weapons in the second round of the ongoing Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II). These weapons were presently in what was termed the 'grey area', the list of forces not covered by either of the SALT rounds or contained in the MBFR negotiations.

Schmidt first brought up the problem of the European balance being consigned to the 'grey zone' in 1977, although his calls for the US to include INF in existing talks initially received short shrift from Washington.⁷⁴⁵ Aware that the European balance was not being taken seriously by the US, Schmidt attempted to bring the issue to a head by making the West German government's concerns public. This he did on 28 October 1977 in a speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, where he called for the inclusion of 'grey area' weapons in the SALT II talks and publicly highlighted the dangers for European security of strategic parity between the superpowers.⁷⁴⁶ At the SPD party conference in Hamburg the following month several resolutions recommending the extension of existing arms control arrangements to take INF into account were submitted from the floor.

As a means of getting the INF issue onto the agenda, Schmidt's public declaration was largely successful. By March 1978 the Carter administration had "reversed its

⁷⁴⁴ Risse-Kappen (1988), p. 17

⁷⁴⁵ Memorandum from Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to President Carter, 25 February 1980

⁷⁴⁶ Schmidt (1982), pp. 27-29

thinking concerning Soviet Eurostrategic weapons” and the US now called for action to remedy the imbalance in ‘grey zone’ weapons.⁷⁴⁷ By that summer there existed a consensus among the branches of the US government and the members of NATO that action needed to be taken to remedy the missile gap in Europe. At the same time, in West Germany the decision was taken to pursue a ‘double-track’ approach that combined deployments with arms control negotiations.⁷⁴⁸ The idea for a dual track approach was to remedy the armaments gap in Europe in a way that would not risk the breakdown of détente (and, more pragmatically, would therefore appeal to the left wing of the SPD).

Allied Negotiations and the 1979 INF Resolution

Negotiations between the principal NATO allies (West Germany, France, Britain and the US) began, at Carter’s suggestion, in January 1979 on the island of Guadeloupe in the French Antilles. At the summit, Schmidt outlined the basics of the West German ‘double-track’ approach, informing the allies of Germany’s intent to deploy additional intermediate-range missiles subject to the conduct of parallel arms control negotiations with the Soviets on INF. He also indicated that Germany could not be the sole recipient of an increase in European INF and that any weapons on West German soil must be under the exclusive control of the US. The allies readily agreed to Schmidt’s proposals and a consensus was reached at the summit that endorsed the basic principles of Germany’s ‘double-track’ policy.⁷⁴⁹ On 31 January, after

⁷⁴⁷ Schmidt (1990), p. 189

⁷⁴⁸ Risse-Kappen (1988), p. 34, 38

⁷⁴⁹ Schmidt (1990), p. 191

returning from the summit, Schmidt obtained SPD support for ‘double-track’ in a closed cabinet meeting, subject to the conditions outlined at Guadeloupe.⁷⁵⁰

Negotiations between the US and West Germany continued over the course of 1979. Each side was keen to test the other’s commitment to its preference ordering of the two elements of the ‘double-track’. The US responses emphasised the importance of additional INF deployments, but made little reference to negotiations.⁷⁵¹ Carter informed Schmidt at a meeting on 6 June that although he was “determined to bring about the conditions the Germans seek – deployments in other countries and a serious arms control approach...neither TNF arms control nor MBFR should stand in the way of needed deployments”.⁷⁵² This position differed from Schmidt’s in that the Chancellor’s own views indicated deployment could be precluded by negotiations, whereas Carter’s view saw deployment as prior to – or at the least, in service of – a negotiated agreement.

Party positions on INF deployment and arms control began to take shape over the course of 1979. Broadly speaking the positions followed the traditional left-right pattern associated with the perceived utility of force and the degree of trust placed in negotiations with adversaries.⁷⁵³ The SPD, particularly those on the left, were sceptical of the need to improve Europe’s intermediate-range forces and instead preferred arms reductions through negotiations with the Soviets. SPD support for deployments was purchased through the ‘double-track’ solution, which promised negotiation for deployment. While the SPD emphasised negotiation over deployment, the CDU/CSU stance was precisely the opposite, advocating

⁷⁵⁰ Thompson (1993), p. 410

⁷⁵¹ Letter from President Carter to Chancellor Schmidt, 1 June 1979

⁷⁵² Memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski to President Carter, 31 May 1979

⁷⁵³ E.g. Rathbun (2004)

deployment prior to – and not necessarily accompanied by – any arms control negotiations.⁷⁵⁴ The FDP were in the middle, supporting both elements of the ‘double-track’ policy.

By the end of the year the positions of the allies regarding the ‘double-track’ was on surer ground than it had been during the summer. Both the US and West Germans were in agreement that the deployment and negotiation tracks were necessary and a proposal by the Dutch government that would have precluded the Pershing II deployment was opposed by the other NATO allies, led by Carter and Schmidt.⁷⁵⁵ Moreover, important domestic hurdles in West Germany had been overcome. By the end of October the foreign affairs and defence committees in the Bundestag had approved the ‘double-track’ proposals⁷⁵⁶ and at the SPD conference in West Berlin on 3 December Schmidt’s decision received the support of a majority of the SPD. Although, it must be noted, the party agreed to the decision on condition that the negotiations were successful and only after Schmidt threatened to resign,⁷⁵⁷ and Schmidt had to stress the potential for non-deployment should the negotiations succeed in order to win over the party rank-and-file.⁷⁵⁸

With the domestic and international impediments to agreement overcome, at least for the time being, the NATO Council of Ministers formally approved the ‘double-track’ proposals on 12 December 1979.⁷⁵⁹ By doing so, they hoped to signal Western resolve in the face of Soviet intransigence, and to redress the perceived security gap

⁷⁵⁴ Risse-Kappen (1988), pp. 41-42

⁷⁵⁵ Letter from President Carter to Chancellor Schmidt, 1 November 1979

⁷⁵⁶ Memorandum of a telephone conversation between President Carter and Chancellor Schmidt, 30 October 1979

⁷⁵⁷ Carr (1985), p. 131

⁷⁵⁸ Risse-Kappen (1988), p. 46

⁷⁵⁹ Zadra (1990), p. 61

causing concern across the European capitals.⁷⁶⁰ As it happened, the demonstration of Western resolve proved timely given the course of events that month. On 27 December Soviet forces began the invasion (and subsequent occupation) of Afghanistan, an event that contributed significantly to the breakdown of détente and the onset of the so-called ‘second Cold War’ at the beginning of the 1980s. For the NATO INF decision, what had begun as a routine modernization of the European deterrent had now become linked to the intensification of the Cold War and the question of US (and European) resolve in the face of Soviet posturing.

The Onset of the ‘Second Cold War’

The intensification of the Cold War at the end of 1979 did no direct harm to US-West German relations. Schmidt stood firmly by the US administration in its handling of the invasion, calling for “cool ‘crisis management’ and intense consultations within NATO and with the East”.⁷⁶¹ Carter expressed his appreciation for the tough line taken by Germany at the beginning of January, noting that US-West German coordination on the issue was vital for meeting the challenge posed by Soviet actions.⁷⁶² In a meeting with the US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in February, Schmidt declared himself ‘on-side’ with NATO’s response to Afghanistan and dismissed claims he government was ‘soft’ on the Soviets or beholden to the left wing of the SPD.⁷⁶³ He also delivered a pro-US speech in the Bundestag in March that drew Soviet ire for the Chancellor’s ‘dangerous and provocative’ line.⁷⁶⁴

Schmidt’s only concern on Afghanistan was whether the language of ‘punishment’

⁷⁶⁰ Broer (2004), p. 150

⁷⁶¹ ‘Chancellor Helmut Schmidt’s declaration on the world situation’, Memorandum from the White House situation room to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 17 January 1980

⁷⁶² Telegram from President Carter to Chancellor Schmidt, 11 January 1980

⁷⁶³ Memorandum from Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to President Carter, 25 February 1980

⁷⁶⁴ Memorandum from the White House Situation Room to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 3 March 1980

was appropriate, believing it risked escalating East-West tensions and alienating the SPD left.⁷⁶⁵

Indirectly, however, the onset of the second Cold War and the increasing tendency to equate the INF decision with the breakdown of détente helped empower domestic forces that were strongly critical of West Germany's relationship with the US. Most important in this regard was the establishment of the Green party at a conference in Karlsruhe on 12 January. The twin emphases of the Greens' political platform were ecologism and pacifism; they rejected nuclear power and nuclear weapons and advocated a strongly neutral stance in the Cold War. At a second conference on 22 March they approved the party's electoral programme, advocating the dissolution of NATO, unilateral disarmament, and an end to West Germany's status as 'vassal' of the US.⁷⁶⁶

The establishment of the Green party had a major impact on the West German party system, in particular on the position of the SPD, which moved further leftwards to prevent the Greens from drawing away votes.⁷⁶⁷ The electoral threat from the Greens was also exacerbated by the procedure used for elections to the Bundestag, the proportional nature of which meant that smaller parties needed only to pass a five percent threshold to achieve representation. As a result, unlike in majoritarian systems, supporting the Greens did not lead to 'wasted votes'. The emergence of the Greens also kick-started the 'peace movement' – an alliance of activists and organisations opposed to the INF decision – that organised significant opposition to the Pershing II deployment during the period. Although the peace movement

⁷⁶⁵ Schmidt's opposition to the language of punishment was, according to Schwarz (1982), p. 59, part of a broader tendency of the left to view "East-West relations more as a rivalry between great powers than as a conflict between the Free World and communism".

⁷⁶⁶ Zimmer (2004), p. 93

⁷⁶⁷ Kaltefleiter (1989), p. 21

contained members from a diverse array of pacifist organisations, including the SPD, its activities were coordinated largely by the Green party, with which the movement was predominantly associated.⁷⁶⁸

The effects of the SPD's left wing were increasingly felt from this point on. In June the chairman of the Young Socialists, the youth-wing of the SPD, criticised Schmidt for giving in to US domination of West Germany, and Foreign Minister Genscher for his 'vassal loyalty' to the US.⁷⁶⁹ Wary of the effects the SPD left's opposition might have on West German security policy, Carter sent Schmidt a letter to the Chancellor in mid-June questioning his support for the missiles and reminding him of his prior commitment.⁷⁷⁰ Schmidt was insulted by the insinuation made in the letter and lambasted Carter at a meeting on the subject on 21 June. Carter stressed that the letter was intended to clarify that the US would not accept a 'freeze' on the deployment timescale whilst negotiations took place. Schmidt, in response, clarified that he had not intended to delay the deployment, but was "now in doubt as to whether Carter really wanted to negotiate with the Soviets on arms control on this issue".⁷⁷¹

⁷⁶⁸ Boutwell (1983), p. 80

⁷⁶⁹ Braunthal (1985), p. 95

⁷⁷⁰ Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) brief, 21 June 1980

⁷⁷¹ Memorandum of meeting between President Carter, Secretary of State Edmund Muskie, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Washington, 21 June 1980

The West German and American Elections of 1980

The principal political event of 1980 was the Bundestag election scheduled for 5 October. The elections pitted the governing SPD-FDP coalition against the CDU/CSU union, which had selected Franz-Josef Strauss as its candidate for Chancellor, a decision that had important consequences for West German politics in the early 1980s. At the time the CDU/CSU was divided between supporters Strauss, leader of the Bavarian CSU (the ‘sister party’ of the CDU), and the CDU party chairman Helmut Kohl. Strauss was a ‘German Gaullist’ who decisively rejected the *Ostpolitik* of the SPD and FDP and advocated a more nationalist stance than Kohl, who was perceived as a moderate and whose views were more in line with those of Schmidt and Genscher.⁷⁷² The selection of Strauss as leader ruled out a CDU/CSU-FDP as a coalition, with the FDP campaigning “*for* the government [of] Schmidt/Genscher...*against* single-party government [and]...*against* Strauss”.⁷⁷³

The results of the election represented a resounding victory for the SPD-FDP coalition, receiving 218 and 53 seats respectively, giving Schmidt and Genscher a total of 271 seats to the CDU/CSU’s 226. The CDU/CSU’s defeat put an end to almost a decade of intra-party rivalry after Strauss announced that he would limit his engagement in politics to Bavaria.⁷⁷⁴ From this moment forward the CDU/CSU would increasingly endorse Kohl’s strategy of seeking an alliance with the FDP, which, in turn, was more of a possibility now that Strauss had departed.⁷⁷⁵ At the end of the 1960s the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition collapsed because of disagreements over the desirability of *détente*. Yet the routinization of East-West contacts since the late

⁷⁷² Memorandum from Department of State Executive Secretary Peter Tarnoff to National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, 2 November 1977

⁷⁷³ Søre (1985), p. 141

⁷⁷⁴ Webb (1998), p. 47

⁷⁷⁵ Paterson (1985), p. 76

1960s and the (temporary) success of détente had mollified the party's once firm opposition to the policy. On economic questions, meanwhile, the CDU/CSU and the FDP were both closer to one another than either was to the SPD.⁷⁷⁶

The reasonably strong seat share of the SPD theoretically placed the party in good stead for the coming parliamentary term, but in reality served only to encourage those on the left of the party to voice their criticism of the Chancellor's INF policy, on the misguided assumption that their actions were less likely to lead to the collapse of the government.⁷⁷⁷ Although individual defections were now less likely to bring the government down, the support of the FDP remained crucial to the continuing survival of the coalition, because it continued to hold the balance of power between the SPD and the CDU/CSU. Yet the FDP, empowered by its increase in coalition seat share on the 1976 elections, began to push harder in the post-election negotiations on the coalition programme.⁷⁷⁸ This tendency was further influenced by the electoral demise of Strauss and the knowledge that the possibility of a CDU/CSU-FDP coalition could now be used to extract concessions from the SPD.

For Schmidt the problem was that the twin political pressures arising out of the 1980 election – the resurgent left and the increasingly powerful FDP – pulled him in different directions. The SPD left were increasingly opposed to INF deployments and sought greater government intervention in response to the recent economic downturn, while the FDP – aside from a notable minority – supported the 'double-track' decision and advocated reduced taxation and government spending to revitalise West Germany's economy. By 1981, the 'double-track' approach was

⁷⁷⁶ Søre (1985), p. 146

⁷⁷⁷ Carr (1985), pp. 165

⁷⁷⁸ Carr (1985), p. 165

supported by the entirety of CDU/CSU, two-thirds of the FDP, and a bare majority of the SPD (with opposition continually increasing in the latter).⁷⁷⁹

'Double-Track' Enters the Reagan Era

While the 1980 elections in West Germany returned the existing administration to power, the US presidential election of the same year resulted in the downfall of Carter's democratic administration and the arrival of the Republicans to the White House under Reagan in January 1981. Reagan's election had been on the back of intense criticism of the 'disarray' of Carter's foreign policy, and the Republicans had emphasised the importance of once again bringing the fight to the Soviets. The change of administration resulted in Washington increasingly viewing INF deployments through the lens of their rearmament strategy, rather than their negotiating strategy.⁷⁸⁰ With strong opposition for INF policy at home, Schmidt made his first official visit to the Reagan White House at the end of May 1981, with the intention of keeping the 'double-track' approach alive. Schmidt was pleased to note that Reagan had committed himself to "both elements of the NATO resolution" and by summer the Republicans offered their full support to the negotiations track.⁷⁸¹

At the same time the domestic pressures on Schmidt had increased drastically as a result of the economic problems facing the government. The second oil shock of 1979-80 had thrown West Germany into a recession that increased criticism of the government and threatened to compromise its ability to maintain its financial contributions to the NATO defence effort. West Germany's alliance commitment,

⁷⁷⁹ Schmidt (1990), p. 243

⁷⁸⁰ Broer (2004), p. 151

⁷⁸¹ Schmidt (1990), p. 243

the Americans noted, “while still basically sound, has been increasingly buffeted from the left and by budgetary stringency...[and] the government is even less inclined to be forthcoming on more German spending in support of American forces”.⁷⁸² Politically the recession introduced a significant fault-line in the government between the interventionist SPD and the *laissez-faire* FDP, on an issue that highlighted the similarity between the CDU/CSU and Schmidt’s junior coalition partner. The Minister of the Economy, Count Lambsdorff, one of four FDP ministers in the government, became increasingly convinced that the FDP had little future with Schmidt’s SPD. Meanwhile, in August, Foreign Minister Genscher claimed publicly that “a change of direction” had become necessary in the country’s economic policy.⁷⁸³

The increasing assertiveness of the FDP also occurred at a time when the SPD itself was falling apart over INF policy. Although Schmidt had been able “to face down both the left on defence issues and labour on the budget...[he] paid an enormous price in terms of SPD unity”.⁷⁸⁴ Moreover, pressure from within the party did not arise solely from the fringes; Schmidt believed Brandt in particular, though his role as party chairman, was “letting the SPD drift too close to the stance of the new young protesters against nuclear power and missiles (especially American ones)”.⁷⁸⁵ The dissent would worsen by the end of September, as the start of the academic year heralded the rejuvenation of the ‘peace movement’, which worked to keep INF deployment at the top of the parliamentary agenda throughout 1981.⁷⁸⁶

⁷⁸² Department of State report by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, William Woessner, on the political situation in Bonn, 10 September 1981

⁷⁸³ Thompson (1993), p. 431

⁷⁸⁴ Department of State report by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, William Woessner, on the political situation in Bonn, 10 September 1981

⁷⁸⁵ Carr (1985), p. 168

⁷⁸⁶ Telegram from Secretary of State Alexander Haig to President Reagan, 23 October 1981

By late 1981 Schmidt was becoming increasingly frustrated with the lack of progress made by the US on its promise to instigate East-West talks on INF reductions. In September, in a meeting with the US Ambassador Richard Allen he once again brought up the problem of West German insecurity against Soviet INF deployments.⁷⁸⁷ Later, on 6 October, he reminded Eugene Rostow of Reagan's comments the previous year and noted that he was facing a backlash after having informed the German public negotiations would be going ahead. He also noted that Germany had enough to fear from the Soviet Union as it was, without the added worry of US nuclear deployments and non-committal approach to negotiations adding to their security issues. Rostow pointed to the growing numbers of those in the US administration who regarded such ground-based missiles as obsolete (insinuating that the same may apply for arms control measures). Schmidt noted that if the US made this claim public he would respond by openly committing West Germany against the Pershing II deployment.⁷⁸⁸

The peace movement was also beginning to flex its considerable muscles by the end of the year. On 10 October a disarmament rally in Bonn was attended by upwards of 300,000 people. Marching under the banner 'disarmament and détente in Europe', the various groupings in attendance called for the end of NATO's 'double-track' policy.⁷⁸⁹ The US – well aware of the protestors' demands⁷⁹⁰ – cautioned Schmidt to stand firm on the deployments issue whilst encouraging the government to engage

⁷⁸⁷ Memorandum of meeting between National Security Advisor Richard Allen and Chancellor Schmidt, 10 September 1981

⁷⁸⁸ Memorandum of conversation between US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director, Eugene Rostow, and Chancellor Schmidt, 6 October 1981

⁷⁸⁹ Hoering (1982), p. 56

⁷⁹⁰ Ambassador Burns had met with radical students and professors in Berlin during the protest to discuss their views on foreign policy and US-German relations.

more with the demands of its younger generation.⁷⁹¹ Direct action against the government's decision only intensified as the months went on and the government maintained its commitment to deployment. The following June, a similar rally in Bonn attracted 400,000 participants, and drew ire from the US, which criticised the movement and the government's response of emphasising negotiations over deployments.⁷⁹²

The turnaround by the US on East-West negotiations came in late 1981 with the Reagan administration's decision to commit to an INF arms control agreement. At a meeting in October Schmidt indicated his satisfaction at the mention of arms control negotiations in the latest communiqué of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, adding that the West German Defence Minister Hans Apel had only been able to endorse it because of this inclusion. He then emphasised the importance to Germany of "purposeful resumption of negotiations at Geneva [and]...continuation of the constructive talks between Secretary Haig and Minister Gromyko".⁷⁹³ A month later, on 12 November, Reagan committed at a meeting of the US National Security Council to adopt as a basis for negotiations the 'global zero' option⁷⁹⁴ that had been promoted since the previous year by Apel's Defence Ministry. Reagan's decision resulted from the pressure applied by an uneasy coalition of arms control proponents (like Schmidt) and Washington 'hawks' who believed a ban on INF would shift East-

⁷⁹¹ Memorandum of meeting between Under-Secretary of State Walter Stoessel, US Ambassador Arthur Burns and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, 5 November 1981

⁷⁹² Schmidt (1990), p. 278

⁷⁹³ Memorandum of meeting between Under-Secretary of State Walter Stoessel, US Ambassador Arthur Burns and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, 5 November 1981

⁷⁹⁴ In other words, the US would seek to work towards an agreement that would renounce the use of intermediate-range nuclear missiles anywhere in the world.

West confrontation towards domains where the US held a relative advantage against the Soviets.⁷⁹⁵

Soviet Intransigence and the 'Walk in the Woods'

On 23 November the Soviets officially announced their rejection of the 'global zero' option during a visit to Bonn. The irony of the situation was that the rising power of the 'peace movement' in West Germany that spurred the development of the 'double-track' concept (and led Schmidt to pressure successive administrations to follow it) also influenced its rejection by Moscow, as the Soviets saw the protests in Germany as a sign that NATO INF deployments may never happen.⁷⁹⁶ Schmidt was undeterred by the initial Soviet refusal, arguing in early December that the US must remain committed to the talks going ahead. He also suggested it was important the US not "deal with the Russians like they are the Devil". Rather, negotiations needed to be pursued in a "calm, decisive but relaxed way".⁷⁹⁷ In February 1982 the Soviets returned with a proposal for the reduction of INF to 'staggered ceilings' (of 600 and then 300 weapons) and a moratorium on new weapons. Both the US and Germany saw this as a tactic to delay Pershing II, and countered by re-stating the 'global zero' option in a draft treaty.⁷⁹⁸

Schmidt's domestic standing improved following Reagan's public endorsement of negotiations and the perceived success – 'global zero' rejection aside – of Brezhnev's visit. The Chancellor had managed to remain firm on INF deployments

⁷⁹⁵ Risse-Kappen (1988), pp. 81-83

⁷⁹⁶ Broer (2004), p. 154

⁷⁹⁷ Memorandum of meeting between US Ambassador Arthur Burns and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, 8 December 1981

⁷⁹⁸ Risse-Kappen (1988), p. 86

while “casting himself in the role of ‘interpreter’ between the superpowers”.⁷⁹⁹ Although this stance was well received by the West German populace in general, it did not stop the criticism from the FDP or the SPD left. Brandt continued to rally against INF deployments, suggesting that the decision be postponed until late 1983 to give arms control measures the chance to work, whilst at the beginning of December an SPD congress in Bremen voted against the missile decision.⁸⁰⁰ The growing economic problems facing the country further encouraged SPD dissidents. The increasing budget deficit reinforced the view that the INF deployments were a costly waste of resources, whilst the expenditure cuts announced by the government rankled with the interventionist SPD left.⁸⁰¹

On 5 February, Schmidt was forced to call for a vote of confidence in the government in order to maintain the discipline of the coalition.⁸⁰² In the end, both the SPD and the FDP towed the government line.⁸⁰³ But the next test was not far off. At the SPD annual conference in Munich on 21 April, Schmidt had to fight to secure the party’s backing for the continuation of ‘double-track’. Almost half the party delegates voted to oppose ‘double-track’, led by Erhard Eppler, Klaus Thüsing, Oskar Lafontaine, and the other members of the party’s ‘disarmament’ faction.⁸⁰⁴ The left continued to argue that the deployment would exacerbate East-West tensions, undermine the potential for negotiations, and turn West Germany into little more than a vehicle for US militarism. In the end, Schmidt only managed to scrape

⁷⁹⁹ Background report prepared by the White House Situation Room in preparation for Chancellor Schmidt’s visit to Washington, 9 December 1981

⁸⁰⁰ Background report prepared by the White House Situation Room in preparation for Chancellor Schmidt’s visit to Washington, 9 December 1981

⁸⁰¹ Braunthal (1985), p. 93

⁸⁰² Thompson (1993), p. 430

⁸⁰³ Yost & Glad (1982), p. 528

⁸⁰⁴ Yost & Glad (1982), p. 545

together a majority of delegates by promising that the deployments would be ‘re-assessed’ in November 1953 in light of progress on the negotiation front.⁸⁰⁵

In July, unbeknownst to Schmidt, a compromise agreement in the stalled INF negotiations was reached between the US negotiator Paul Nitze and his Soviet counterpart Yuli Kvitsinski during a fabled ‘walk in the woods’ near Lake Geneva on 16 July. The arrangement called for a ceiling on intermediate-range forces (300 for the US, 225 for the Soviets) and the dismantling of a significant number of Soviet SS-20s in return for the non-deployment of Pershing II.⁸⁰⁶ Schmidt “would have accepted it at once had [he] known about it”.⁸⁰⁷ But he only found out about the agreement once Washington had already rejected it.⁸⁰⁸ Reagan administration ‘hawks’ refused to accept a deal where the US deployments did not go ahead but the Soviets kept some of their SS-20s, and it was thought that informing Schmidt might undermine the US bargaining position, as Germany would likely push harder for a compromise.⁸⁰⁹ Once this opportunity had passed by, Schmidt realised that there was little hope for an INF agreement any time soon, at least not before the end of 1983.⁸¹⁰ The course of political manoeuvrings in West Germany, however, would remove Schmidt and the SPD from power long before that date.

The Collapse of the SPD-FDP Coalition

It was clear by the end of summer 1982 that the SPD-FDP coalition government was on its last legs and most expected the FDP would leave the government that

⁸⁰⁵ Braunthal (1985), pp. 94-96

⁸⁰⁶ Canby & Dörfer (1983), p. 10

⁸⁰⁷ Schmidt (1990), p. 278

⁸⁰⁸ Schmidt (1990), p. 246

⁸⁰⁹ Carr (1985), p. 181

⁸¹⁰ Schmidt (1990), pp. 278-279

September. The immediate problems facing the SPD-FDP cohesion were economic; the SPD left advocated costly interventionist strategies to pull West Germany out of recession, while the FDP argued in favour of reduced taxation and a tighter fiscal policy. Genscher and Kohl, meanwhile, had been conducting regular negotiations over the policies of a CDU/CSU-FDP government and found much agreement on foreign and economic issues.⁸¹¹ The liberals, emboldened by the possibility of a coalition with the CDU/CSU, began pressing the government for more concessions on the budget. Schmidt, concerned about weakening support from his left wing, resisted. By the end of August, Schmidt informed his party there would be no more concessions made to the FDP on the economy, whilst asking FDP Economics Minister Labmsdorff for a clear statement of his party's demands.⁸¹²

The inability of both parties to compromise over economic policy precipitated the collapse of the governing coalition that September. On 1 September Schmidt criticised Lambsdorff in cabinet for hinting publicly that the FDP might leave the government. Ten days later, Lambsdorff made clear the FDP's terms for continued participation, including substantial cuts in welfare programmes and tax concessions for West German industry.⁸¹³ Under pressure from the SPD left, Schmidt rejected the proposals, and informed Brandt and the other party leaders of his intention to dissolve the coalition on 15 September.⁸¹⁴ After refusing an ultimatum to adhere to the original coalition agreement or face dismissal, the four FDP ministers resigned from the government on 17 September, anticipating their imminent dismissal by

⁸¹¹ Memorandum from Executive Secretary Paul Bremer to National Security Advisor William Clark, 4 September 1982

⁸¹² Braunthal (1985), p. 99

⁸¹³ Carr (1985), p. 180

⁸¹⁴ Carr (1985), p. 180

Schmidt.⁸¹⁵ Within hours the FDP agreed to open direct negotiations with the CDU/CSU on forming a new coalition government.

The collapse of the government traditionally required that new Bundestag elections be held as soon as possible, but both Kohl and Genscher were aware that the FDP would struggle to pass the five percent threshold were immediate elections held, thwarting plans for a CDU/CSU-FDP government.⁸¹⁶ While Schmidt hoped to propose a vote of no confidence against his government, which would trigger new elections, Kohl instead introduced a 'constructive vote of confidence', a qualitatively different motion that allowed the Bundestag to directly invest a new Chancellor (the candidate was Kohl) by simple majority.⁸¹⁷ Schmidt lost the ensuing vote 256 to 235 and the SPD government was replaced by a CDU/CSU-FDP coalition with Kohl as Chancellor. Fresh elections would not be held until March the following year.

Since Schmidt had been in favour of 'double-track' all along, the change of government had little immediate impact on West German security policy. Although the CDU/CSU offered greater rhetorical support for the US, on the major security issues of the day – Poland, INF deployment, East-West relations – the official government stance changed very little.⁸¹⁸ Yet the change in government was important in more subtle ways. The Kohl government placed greater emphasis than Schmidt had on the deployment side of 'double-track'.⁸¹⁹ This was noticeably the case when Eugene Rostow informed Kohl on 14 October of the formula reached during the 'walk in the woods' of the previous year. Whereas Schmidt subsequently

⁸¹⁵ Memorandum from Secretary of State George Schulz to President Reagan, 17 September 1982

⁸¹⁶ Memorandum from Executive Secretary Paul Bremer to National Security Advisor William Clark, 4 September 1982

⁸¹⁷ It consisted of a two-stage process where the first vote would indicate a lack of confidence in the existing Chancellor and a second vote would invest the new one.

⁸¹⁸ Memorandum from Secretary of State George Schulz to President Reagan, 17 September 1982

⁸¹⁹ Banchoff (1999), p. 114

indicated he would support a deal on such terms, Kohl responded to Rostow that Germany would not have agreed to any arrangement where it would have to commit itself against further INF deployments.⁸²⁰ By removing the problem of intra-government dissent on security policy, and placing centre-stage an individual more committed to deployment than negotiation, Kohl's selection reduced the possibility of delay and compromise on the deployment side of 'double-track'.

The 1983 Elections and the Vote for Deployment

Having been deliberately postponed by Kohl's strategic confidence vote the previous October, the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition government had yet to receive a mandate from the West German public by the beginning of 1983. The elections were scheduled for March, and by late January the parties had begun to formulate their various platforms. Since INF deployments was the most salient issue in West German politics at the time, the election became an informal referendum on support for Pershing II deployments, and the missile issue provided the focus of the entire campaign.⁸²¹

In their election campaign the CDU/CSU stressed the need for a strong West German commitment to NATO, a firm response to Soviet missile deployments, and support for both elements of 'double-track' (although with greater emphasis on the need for deployments than negotiations), and the need for strong US-West German relations.⁸²² The policies of the SPD, who fielded Hans-Jochen Vogel as its candidate for Chancellor, were now more in line with the left leaning stance of much of the

⁸²⁰ Risse-Kappen (1980), p. 92

⁸²¹ Braunthal (1985), p. 104

⁸²² Zimmer (2004), p. 91

party rank-and-file. Although the party remained committed to NATO, it had endorsed an anti-deployment stance at its pre-election conference in January, and Vogel actively campaigned on an anti-American platform. He justified SPD policies as being in 'the German interest' and promised to "stand up to unreasonable US demands".⁸²³ The Reagan administration, in response, declared that the election of any government unwilling to undertake INF deployment – such as the SPD – would be a 'terrible setback' for Germany.⁸²⁴

When the results of the election came in on 6 March 1983 they vindicated Kohl's endorsement of the 'double-track' and provided a strong popular mandate for the new government. The SPD received 193 seats to the CDU/CSU's 244 and the FDP's 34, a beneficial result for Kohl in several respects. For a start, the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition had a strong majority, and did not need to worry about getting its legislation through the Bundestag. The SPD's decrease in support also meant that it could not form a viable coalition with the FDP unless all other parties also joined, weakening the bargaining power of the SPD and FDP simultaneously. Finally, the CDU did not have an absolute majority in the Bundestag, meaning the FDP needed to remain in the coalition for it to continue. This allowed Kohl to balance the influence of the CSU within his party, citing the need for moderate policies to maintain FDP support.⁸²⁵ Many in the CSU were too focused on deployment at the expense of negotiations for the FDP to endorse their views, and the price of CDU/CSU coalition had been Kohl's acceptance of the framework of détente.

Seemingly unmoved by the relative unpopularity of their opposition to INF deployment amongst the West German public, the SPD continued to move further to

⁸²³ Schweigler (1984), p. 38

⁸²⁴ Braunthal (1985), p. 105

⁸²⁵ Paterson (1985), p. 77

the left on security issues after the 1983 election. Vogel deferred to pressure from the rank and file to join Brandt in opposing INF deployments.⁸²⁶ The SPD's new anti-missile stance was formalized at the special conference on the INF issue on 18 November. The conference had been arranged by Schmidt in 1982 to reconsider the missile issue in light of progress on negotiations, the price of maintaining SPD support for deployment. Now, under the new left-leaning leadership,⁸²⁷ the conference provided the perfect opportunity for a change in security policy. After Brandt and Vogel announced their opposition to deployment the conference voted 283 to 14 to oppose the deployment side of the 'double-track'.

The dramatic shift from the previous position of majority support was strongly influenced by the electoral threat of the Greens' anti-deployment and anti-American platform.⁸²⁸ From this moment until the end of the Cold War the SPD platform would echo that of the pre-Bad Godesberg period (1949-1959) when the party was strongly critical of NATO, 'capitalist militarism', and German dependence on the US. The 'second phase of *Ostpolitik*', as the new security stance became known, differed from the *Ostpolitik* of the 1970s in breaking from the traditional desire for Western unity and the harmonization of West German security policy with that of the US. The new policy sought to distance Germany from NATO and from the Reagan administration (or, indeed, any future US government) and centered on the pursuit of a West German-Soviet security compact.⁸²⁹ This would be achieved by moving towards a purely defensive security posture, renouncing unilaterally the use of

⁸²⁶ Bertram (1983), p. 625

⁸²⁷ Brandt remained leader of the party, though both he and Vogel were left of Schmidt in any case.

⁸²⁸ Hesse (1985), p. 15

⁸²⁹ Griffith (1989), p. 2

offensive weapons, intensifying existing arms control negotiations, and the establishment of a 'European pillar' within NATO.⁸³⁰

Four days after the SPD reversed its decision on 'double-track' the Bundestag voted on whether to deploy Pershing II missiles on West German soil. The vote passed in favour of the deployments by 286 to 226, with the CDU/CSU and a large majority of FDP deputies voting in favour and the SPD and a handful of FDP members voting against. In many ways it was the success of Kohl's governing coalition in the 1983 elections that ensured INF deployments would pass the Bundestag. Had Schmidt placed the vote before parliament during his tenure, significant rebellions would have likely occurred, and the CDU/CSU would have had an interest, in opposition, in voting to defeat the government. Once the Bundestag vote confirmed the decision the deployment of Pershing II proceeded swiftly; the following day the necessary logistical decisions were confirmed and by 28 November the first missiles arrived on West German soil. Two days later they were operational.⁸³¹

The Pershing II deployment put an end to the intense political contestation over the 'double-track' decision and constituted a clear statement that Germany was 'on side' with its NATO allies. The deployment served to alleviate fears of a missile gap in Eurostrategic relations whilst simultaneously increasing the fears of those on the left of the occurrence of nuclear conflict between the powers. Although the negotiations element of the 'double-track' decision had stalled by 1983, negotiations conducted between the US and its allies and the Soviets over the coming years would eventually result in the signing of the INF treaty on 8 December 1987. The treaty itself was

⁸³⁰ Griffith (1989), p. 2; Zimmer (2004), p. 92. The similarity between the SPD policy of a 'European pillar' in NATO and the Gaullist designs for Europe offered by French and German Gaullists is striking.

⁸³¹ Webb (1998), p. 49

based on the original ‘global zero’ concept promoted by the SPD and succeeded in banning all intermediate-range missiles across the globe. Whether the treaty illustrated the validity of the ‘double-track’ approach (and of ‘peace through strength’), however, or simply the success of negotiations in the context of a gradual relaxation in tension, remains an open debate.⁸³²

The party positions established during the tumultuous years of the early 1980s remained in place throughout the remainder of the decade.⁸³³ The SPD’s newly rediscovered leftist stance put the party at odds with the Reagan administration, particularly their demand for a “fundamental redefinition of West German interests within the Atlantic alliance”.⁸³⁴ At congresses in Essen in 1984 and Nuremberg in 1986 the party re-stated its aim for a security partnership between Germany and the East that would “make allowance[s] for the political and military concerns of our eastern neighbours”.⁸³⁵ The FDP continued to endorse Germany’s position within the Atlantic alliance and a continuation of *Ostpolitik*. To the extent that these worked at cross-purposes in the 1980s, however, the FDP, in promoting negotiation and engagement with the Soviets, became an irritant in US eyes. The CDU/CSU, in contrast, were very much the party of pro-Americanism and ‘peace through strength’. Elements of the union, particularly within the CSU, disagreed with the FDP’s attempt to revive *Ostpolitik* and sought to make a strong stand against the Soviets alongside the US.⁸³⁶

⁸³² Risse-Kappen (1991)

⁸³³ Weiller (1988), p. 515

⁸³⁴ Zimmer (2004), p. 92

⁸³⁵ Campbell (1989), p. 42

⁸³⁶ Zimmer (2004), p. 94

The Left-Right Model: Alive and Well?

The most noticeable aspect of party positions on the ‘double-track’ and overt support for NATO during the early 1980s is the extent to which it conforms to the traditional left-right model of partisan contestation. The primary challenges to US-West German relations during this time came from the left wing of the SPD, the pro-détente minority of the FDP, and the leftist Green party and associated peace movement. In contrast to the findings from the other cases, the liberal FDP – whilst more supportive of the US-connection than the SPD – was not as overtly pro-American as the CDU/CSU union. The same pattern is evident in the various levels of support for arms control (see Figure 30 below). The SPD left was most favourable towards the negotiation side of ‘double-track’, the SPD right and the FDP supported both elements simultaneously (as did some CDU ‘moderates’), while the majority of the CDU/CSU placed greater emphasis on deployment over negotiation.




Figure 30: Citizen perceptions of party support for arms control and disarmament in 1987 on a 1-7 scale. Data are from the *Kieler Bundestagswahlstudie* (cf. Kaltefleiter (1989), p. 27)

These positions are not period specific; as the brief overview of the politics of US-West German relations above illustrates, the politics of West German foreign policy appear to accord more with the left-right model of ideology than the horseshoe model. The question that then emerges is why this pattern appears more prevalent in West Germany than it is in Britain, France or Canada. The answer, I believe, lies in several peculiarities of the West German case that result in a qualitatively different pattern of political contestation to the other countries. As I shall argue below, the prevalence of left-right contestation in Germany does not render the assumptions of the horseshoe model invalid; rather, it results from a particular constellation of exceptional factors in West German politics that serve to partially eclipse the effects of the horseshoe model.

The first significant difference between Germany and the other countries is the relative absence in West German political discourse of a traditional conservative narrative on foreign and domestic issues. The country's engagement with Nazism under Hitler and the subsequent de-legitimisation of key concepts of the far right – reinforced by defeat and allied programmes of de-Nazification – also tarnished many of the core concepts of traditional conservatism in the process. The post-war West German taboo of nationalism, aggression, sovereigntism and balance of power politics, all key concepts of the political right, served to undercut support for parties emphasising traditional conservative values. One reason the horseshoe model appears to fit Germany poorly is that West German conservative parties have been unable and unwilling to articulate a traditionally conservative foreign policy. The CDU in particular, whilst conservative in economic, social and religious affairs, has outlined a broadly liberal foreign policy platform, emphasising the importance of international integration, strong alliance ties and collective security.

Interestingly, when one considers the position of the CDU/CSU right, primarily to be found within the Bavarian CSU, the horseshoe model of contestation starts to become more visible. The West German ‘Gaullists’ that sought to wrest control of the union in the 1960s and 1970s offered a rightist challenge to West Germany’s dependence on the US, pushing for a more independent Europe as a counterweight to American influence. Where they differed from traditional Gaullism was in the overwhelming emphasis they placed on a forceful posture vis-à-vis the USSR, in contrast to De Gaulle’s quest for détente (I explain *why* this was the case below). As with the British Conservative party, the party of the right in West Germany is divided ideologically between liberals and conservatives. Unlike the British case, however, this is not because the political system precludes the possibility of a viable ‘centre party’, but because the scope of ideological contestation is strongly truncated on the right of the spectrum. The party of the right, therefore, occupies much of the centre-ground.

A second reason for the prevalence of partisan contestation along left-right lines is the salience and geographical proximity that the Soviet threat in West Germany possessed, and the resultant emphasis on security policy during the Cold War. Perceptions of the Soviet threat in West Germany were the product of three factors resulting from the post-1945 geopolitical situation; the proximity of the Red Army, the political division of Germany between the FRG and GDR, and the extent of the West German industrial base. Each of these three factors meant that West Germany was perceived, both internally and externally, as particularly vulnerable to the Soviet threat, and – as such – as a potential ‘flashpoint’ in the Cold War.

In West Germany the result was an intense politicisation of defence and security issues that primarily concerned the means and extent of West Germany’s defence

effort, rather than the alliance arrangements it should follow. The right promoted firm, military strategies, while the left endorsed negotiations and renounced the militaristic approach. In this way, although pro- and anti-Americanism in West Germany ultimately followed a truncated variant of the horseshoe model, this was overridden in salience by the importance of issues that traditionally follow the left-right model, namely the value and perceived utility of force. (In the other country cases this hierarchy was often reversed, with questions of grand strategy taking precedence over the relative value of armaments and ‘hawkishness’).

The position of West Germany at the epicentre of the Cold War in Europe also helps to explain another curiosity of partisanship and US-West German relations; the tendency for the US to vacillate between support for the left and the right, rather than supporting the party of the centre as occurred most commonly in the other country cases. Because the West German position in the Cold War was crucial for the success of the grand strategy in vogue in Washington, the US endorsed policies that tended towards the ‘extreme’ positions as regards containment and détente, prioritising commitment to the policy above the degree of rhetorical commitment to the Western alliance.

Thus, the US favoured Adenauer despite his ‘Gaullist’ sensibilities when they desired a ‘policy of strength’ but their support cooled as successive crises highlighted the need for détente. Rapidly the US turned to endorse the *Ostpolitik* of Brandt and the SPD, before the onset of the ‘second Cold War’ undermined their support for détente policies. What sets the US attitude to West Germany aside is the extent to which Washington has relied on Bonn to *implement* its grand strategy. What it has expected from other countries, in contrast, has been predominantly focused on demonstrating alliance cohesion.

To return to the validity of the left-right model in the politics of US-West German relations, then, it is worth noting that this is largely the product of the overwhelming importance of the ‘utility of force’ question in West German politics, and the US tendency to view West Germany as a site for implementing grand strategy. Both of these factors, each of which was the product of West Germany’s position at the epicentre of the European Cold War, help us explain the prevalence of left-right partisan contestation and the vacillation of US support from one extreme to the other. The horseshoe model, whilst subordinated in some respects to issues falling on the left-right spectrum, retains its importance as a determinant of West German positions on the Atlantic connection, illustrated by the challenges offered by the SPD left and elements of the CSU to perceived West German dependence on the US. What is different in the West German case is the extent to which the history of German militarism and chauvinistic nationalism has undermined the legitimacy of core concepts associated with the foreign policy of the political right, ensuring that criticism of the US from the West German right would remain relatively moderate.

Conclusion: The Politics of West German-American Relations

In this chapter I summarised the evidence arising from the case of West German-American relations. Overall the case offers the lowest level of support for the horseshoe model of all the country cases. The evidence suggests that the politics of West German-American relations followed the traditional left-right model, with the leftist SPD evidencing the lowest levels of support for Atlanticism and the rightist CDU/CSU the highest. I have argued, however, that this finding must be understood in relation to the de-legitimisation in the post-war period of elements of the

conservative view of international relations, including independence, realism and nationalism. One reason why the CDU/CSU sought strong relations with the US was their embrace of key principles of liberal ideology, especially with regards supra-national authority. Although the case does not conform directly to the pattern of politics expected by the horseshoe model, it does continue to point to the importance of those liberal values associated with the centre.

8 / Quantitative Analysis of Euratlantic Strategy, 1948-1978

Introduction

In this chapter I conduct a quantitative analysis of Euratlantic Cold War strategy with the aim of increasing our confidence in the theory's external validity. The statistical analysis offers a useful supplement to the case studies by demonstrating the efficacy of the theory's causal claims and their ability to travel to other cases. I begin by summarising the nature of the quantitative study and the reasons for its undertaking. Next I discuss the key independent and control variables included in the models, outlining the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of each and listing the data sources from which the measures are derived. I proceed with the analysis by running OLS regression models on the level of cooperation between the Euratlantic states and both of the superpowers. I conclude by summarising the principal findings and discussing the implications for the horseshoe model.

A Quantitative Analysis of Euratlantic Strategy

Quantitative techniques increase our confidence in the theory's ability to travel to other country cases and its contribution relative to other potential determinants of cooperation. By extending the scope of the inquiry to encompass a larger sample of states we are able to utilise statistical techniques to infer the strength of the relationship between liberalism and cooperation in the broader population of US-ally relations, thereby increasing the representativeness of the study. Moreover, the properties of statistical analysis allow us to control for confounding variables by

introducing them into the equation, helping us to assess the effects of liberalism against those of competing explanations. The study offered in this chapter therefore works alongside the case studies in assessing the validity of the theory's predictions.

The study consists of OLS regression analysis of the strength of relations between the Euratlantic countries and both the US and the USSR. I use longitudinal panel data drawn from a sample of twenty-two Euratlantic states from the period 1948 to 1978. This time period is dictated by the availability of consistent data on the dependent variable, although this range does cover 70% of the Cold War period. Although the data do not extend into the 1980s, the impact of major changes during this period (particularly the rise of the 'new right' and the onset of the 'second Cold War') should be discernible from similar patterns of variation captured during the earlier period, particularly the shift to détente in the late 1960s.

The data are arranged by country for each year, giving a total of 565 separate observations. The countries, listed below in Figure 31, consist of the sum-total of identifiable Euratlantic states for which data are available.⁸³⁷ All states were at-least minimally democratic during the years included, and most were full democracies for the entire period. This should not present problems with bias because the logic of the theory applies only to democratic countries, where Western political traditions are in competition and where the end of government tenure heralds the onset of ideological change. For various reasons, data is not included for some countries in certain years.⁸³⁸

⁸³⁷ Australia, New Zealand, and Sri Lanka are included in the study because they share the many of the same characteristics of the other Western states included in the analysis and allow for a greater number of observations to be made.

⁸³⁸ French data are used from 1958 because the short tenure of governments under the Fourth Republic would make any yearly value meaningless. German and Austrian data begin from 1955 because this is the first year it is made available, and Sri Lankan data end in 1972 for the same reason. Data from

Country	Years
Australia	1948-1978
United Kingdom	1948-1978
Canada	1948-1978
France	1959-1978
West Germany	1955-1978
Italy	1948-1978
Netherlands	1948-1978
Spain	1976-1978
Belgium	1948-1978
Greece	1973-1978
Luxembourg	1949-1978
New Zealand	1948-1978
Denmark	1948-1978
Mexico	1948-1978
Norway	1948-1978
Portugal	1976-1978
Austria	1955-1978
Finland	1948-1978
Ireland	1948-1978
Sweden	1948-1978
Sri Lanka	1948-1972
Switzerland	1948-1978

Figure 31: List of countries and the years they appear in the analysis.

Greece, Portugal and Spain begin in the 1970s when these countries transitioned from authoritarian rule to democracy.

Independent and Dependent Variables

Strength of Bilateral Relations

The dependent variable here is the strength of bilateral relations pursued between the Euratlantic states and both superpowers. To measure the strength of relations I use a scale of intensity derived from events data. Here I use the COPDAB dataset, which details every major event that occurred between two countries on a given date from 1948 to 1978.⁸³⁹ This dataset is preferable to alternatives because it covers the longest time period and because it was constructed explicitly with the intention of scaling cooperation.⁸⁴⁰ (The major alternative, the World Event Interaction Survey (WEIS), only covers the period 1966-1977 and relies on categorical variables that make scaling problematic).⁸⁴¹

The intensity of each 'event' is measured by scaling each type of interaction in accordance with a schema from most to least cooperative, where outright federation is most cooperative and military conflict is least cooperative. The scale is then weighted in accordance with values derived from a consultative study of IR scholars and the consensus they reached on the relative intensity of each action. Although in some cases the 'actions' are linguistic rather than material, they provide a good measure of cooperative policies because of the performative function that language provides in international politics; because rhetoric conveys important signals of amity or enmity, it offers an appropriate means of gauging the overall strength of the underlying relationship.⁸⁴²

⁸³⁹ Azar (1993)

⁸⁴⁰ Goldstein (1992), p. 370

⁸⁴¹ McKluskie & Vincent (1999), p. 146

⁸⁴² Davies & McDaniel (1994), p. 57. On the sociolinguistic construction of international order see also Mattern (2005), Buzan *et al.* (1998) and Campbell (1992).

Scale	Classification
1	Voluntary unification into one nation
2	Major strategic alliance
3	Military, economic, or strategic support
4	Non-military, economic, technical or industrial agreement
5	Cultural or scientific agreement or support
6	Official verbal support of goals, values, or regime
7	Minor official exchanges, talks or policy expressions
8	Neutral or non-significant acts
9	Mild verbal expressions displaying discord in interaction
10	Strong verbal expressions displaying hostility in interaction
11	Diplomatic-economic hostile actions
12	Political-military hostile actions
13	Small-scale military acts
14	Limited war acts
15	Extensive war acts causing deaths or high strategic cost

Figure 32: The classification of events according to the COPDAB intensity scale (Azar 1993).

Using the intensity scale I create two dependent variables; one for the intensity of Euratlantic actions towards the US, and one for the intensity of actions towards the USSR. High values indicate conflictual actions, and low values indicate cooperative actions (both are averages). Eight is the neutral midpoint above which events are classed as conflictual and below which they are deemed cooperative.




Figure 33: Distribution of values on the COPDAB intensity scale.

I utilise monadic rather than dyadic data because the actions of one side in any relation exhibit important variation that can risk being ‘averaged out’ when combined with the score from the other side. As there are strong theoretical and empirical reasons for doubting the existence of significant ideological variation in either the US or the USSR (as discussed in Chapter Three), monadic data was deemed more appropriate for accurately capturing the effects of ideology. It is also standard practice in the statistical literature in IR to use monadic data in cases where the independent variable is not itself expressed dyadically (as is the case with ideology).⁸⁴³

⁸⁴³ Chiozza & Goemans (2003), p. 444.

Strength of Liberal Ideology

The primary theoretical claim is that the extent of cooperative policies pursued vis-à-vis the superpowers is a function of the strength of the political centre in the country concerned; in particular, relations with the US will be stronger when liberal values are a significant presence in government and weaker when they are not. Correspondingly, relations with the USSR will be stronger when liberalism is weak relative to those cases where liberalism is influential. To operationalize liberalism independent from both socialism and conservatism I derive separate measures of ideology for the two dimensions of the horseshoe model: one for egalitarianism-elitism (left-right) another for individualism-collectivism (liberalism-left/right).

I use CMP data to measure ideology.⁸⁴⁴ This provides estimates of policy positions drawn from party manifestos at each election year, where each quasi-sentence in a party's manifesto is classified according to fifty-six separate dimensions. The manifesto approach is better than relying on 'expert surveys' for two reasons: First, it is better able to account for cross-national and cross-party differences as it relies on an objective 'count' of references to particular claims, rather than abstract notions of distance between parties.⁸⁴⁵ Second, the data are available for a lengthier time-period (1945-2000) for most countries, whereas survey data only go back as far as 1984,⁸⁴⁶ six years after the COPDAB data end and six years before the end of the Cold War.

I derive two separate dimensions by allocating each of the different issue-areas in the original data to one of four possible designations: egalitarianism, elitism, individualism, and collectivism. The horizontal measure is composed of the elitist scores minus egalitarian scores, while the vertical dimension is derived from the

⁸⁴⁴ Budge *et al.* (2001)

⁸⁴⁵ Budge (2000), pp. 103-104

⁸⁴⁶ Hooghe *et al.* (2010)

individualist scores minus the collectivist scores. The allocation of the different dimensions in the CMP data to the two composite dimensions is listed in the Appendix.⁸⁴⁷ It is worth noting that the two measures are not correlated with one another.⁸⁴⁸ We can thus be reassured we are not simply tapping into the horizontal dimension of ideology by other means. The horseshoe model begins to emerge when we correlate the positions on both dimensions, confirming the theoretical supposition that the highest values on the liberalism-collectivism dimension lie near the centre of the egalitarianism-elitism dimension (see Figure 34 and below).




Figure 34: The horseshoe effect represented by a quadratic line of fit.

As the data are organised by government and year, the ideology values are imputed from the most recent election. In the election year the value used is that which informs the ideology of the government for the greatest number of days (i.e. an election in September will lead to the previous administration's score being used until the following year). For single-party governments the transposition is

⁸⁴⁷ For most issue-areas the choice of which dimension to allocate the ideal to is uncontroversial. I have excluded those few areas that do not lend themselves to easy classification.

⁸⁴⁸ The Pearson's correlation coefficient from a two-tailed test (0.26) is not significant.

straightforward because the party's and the government's ideological positions are the same. Where governments are composed from multiple parties, a collective ideology is estimated according to the formula below, where I^G is the governing coalition ideology, I_p^n indicates the ideology of each individual party in the government and S_p^n refers to the proportion of seats held by each party in the legislature. According to this measure the contribution of each party's ideology to the collective government position is a function of its seat share in the legislature.⁸⁴⁹

$$I^G = \frac{(I_{p1} \times S_{p1}) + (I_{p2} \times S_{p2}) + (I_{pn} \times S_{pn}) \dots}{(S_{p1} + S_{p2} + S_{pn} \dots)}$$

Control Variables

Structural Variables

I include several variables to control for domestic and international factors likely to affect the level of cooperation. I include dummy variables to capture the region in which each country is located, helping to control for the effects of geographical proximity. To control for the intensity of the interaction I include the average number of Euratlantic 'actions' for each year. I also control for each country's national power. For this I rely on the Correlates of War Project's Combined Index of National Capabilities (CINC) measure, which offers a composite measure of power based on material, economic and geographical resources.⁸⁵⁰

⁸⁴⁹ The data on government composition are from Woldendorp *et al.* (2000).

⁸⁵⁰ Singer *et al.* (1972)




Figure 35: National power as measured by a country's average CINC score from 1948 to 1978.

I control for the country's overall 'closeness' to the US by including an ordinal measure of a state's 'client ranking', which groups countries depending on their involvement in US wars, membership of US sponsored international organizations, and their information-sharing arrangements.⁸⁵¹




Figure 36: Average number of actions towards the US per year.

Because the ability of governments to pursue their favoured foreign policy course is in part determined by their relative power in the legislature (as discussed in Chapter Two), I use data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union database to measure the proportion of seats held by the governing party in the legislature.⁸⁵² I also control for the effects of the constitutional apparatus on foreign policy by including dummy variables to distinguish between parliamentary and presidential systems and those that require legislative ratification of treaties and approval for force. The data are from Polity IV's Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions data set.⁸⁵³

⁸⁵¹ Data are from Khong (2013), pp. 22, 43-45

⁸⁵² Inter-Parliamentary Union (2013)

⁸⁵³ Marshall *et al.* (2014)




Figure 37: Average proportion of seats in the legislature held by governing parties, 1948 to 1978. The red line marks the 50% majority threshold.

	Legislative ratification (treaties)	No legislative ratification (treaties)
Legislative approval (force)	Austria Finland West Germany Italy New Zealand Portugal Spain Sri Lanka	No examples
No legislative approval (force)	Australia Canada France Netherlands United Kingdom	Belgium Denmark Ireland Mexico Norway Sweden Switzerland

Figure 38: Institutional constraints on the governing party's conduct of foreign policy.

Variables from Competing Theories

I also include several variables based on competing theoretical explanations for cooperation in order to assess their relative causal weight and test the assumptions of these theories against the argument offered in the thesis.

The Left-Right Model: The first alternative argued that it is the horizontal dimension of political ideology – and not the vertical one – that matters most for the foreign policies of the allied states.⁸⁵⁴ To control for this claim I include into the model a variable that measures the egalitarianism-elitism dimension of ideology, derived from the CMP data. The dimensions used in this measure are listed in the Appendix.

Realism: To control for the realist claim that cooperation is a function of the imbalance of power between the Euratlantic states and the superpowers I include a measure of the power differential between the US and each country using the Correlates of War data.⁸⁵⁵ This helps model the dependency element of realist claims. A second realist claim views the sources of cooperation derived externally from the intensity of threat created by the Cold War environment.⁸⁵⁶ I incorporate this claim in two ways: First, I include the average intensity of actions in the US-USSR dyad from the COPDAB data as a proxy for the intensity of the global conflict.⁸⁵⁷ Second, I create a dummy variable to distinguish between the two distinct

⁸⁵⁴ E.g. Dobson (1990); Rathbun (2004); Thérien & Noël (2008)

⁸⁵⁵ Singer *et al.* (1972)

⁸⁵⁶ Because realism as a body of thought does not lend itself to the prediction of specific outcomes (Humphreys (2011); Legro & Morsvcsik (1999); Vasquez (1997) the analyst must flesh out the indistinct focus on power into workable hypotheses. This is why I operationalize both the ‘dependence’ and ‘threat’ elements of realist thought.

⁸⁵⁷ Andriole (1984); Howell (1983)

periods of the Cold War covered by the data: the first Cold War (1947-1968) and détente (1969-1979).⁸⁵⁸




Figure 39: Chart showing intensity of the Cold War using the average of US/USSR events scores towards each other. The red line marks the neutral mid-point.

Liberalism: I control for the liberal claim that cooperation is a function of the extent of international interdependence by including a measure of each country's exports to the US (expressed as a proportion of its total foreign exports) using data from Barbieri *et al.*'s bilateral trading data set.⁸⁵⁹ I also control for the density of the global institutional architecture by including the number of international organization (IO) memberships held by each state, using data from Pevehouse *et al.*⁸⁶⁰

⁸⁵⁸ Various authors endorse this particular periodization of the Cold War. See: M. Cox (1990); Gaddis (1982); Halliday (1984); Lebow (1999)

⁸⁵⁹ Barbieri *et al.* (2009)

⁸⁶⁰ Pevehouse *et al.* (2004)




Figure 40: Dependence on the US market, 1948 to 1978, measured as proportion of total exports.




Figure 41: Average IO membership by year, 1948 to 1978.

Marxism: I also control for Marxist accounts of cooperation as a class-based relationship of economic exploitation. Marxists view cooperation between metropole and client as an act of simultaneous inter-elite domination and the international dependency.⁸⁶¹ The ‘international dependence’ element of the Marxist argument is operationalized already in the analysis by the measure of dependence discussed above in relation to realist arguments. To test Marxist claims specifically I also include a measure of national inequality using historical GINI coefficient data from Deininger and Squire.⁸⁶² This measure assumes that elite access to policymaking is a function of their relative strength vis-à-vis other social actors, which can be measured using inequality as a proxy.




Figure 42: Average wealth inequality measured by the GINI coefficient, 1948 to 1978.

⁸⁶¹ Cardoso & Faletto (1979); Galtung (1971), p. 84

⁸⁶² Deininger & Squire (1996). Though the data have some problematic gaps (see Atkinson & Brandolini (2001), pp. 771-772), there are no alternative measures of inequality available across all countries during the period.

Economic Performance: It has been hypothesised that Euratlantic-US relations tend to suffer when the economy is performing poorly, either because of a diversionary effect or as a consequence of growing demands for domestic protection. To test for the effects of economic downturns I include a measure of economic performance based on the annual rate of GDP growth, using Maddison's historical economic statistics.⁸⁶³

American Politics: Existing works on the politics of US strategy have suggested that Democratic and Republican administrations placed differing priorities on their commitment to America's allies during the Cold War. Democrats, it is held, have generally pursued stronger relations in this regard. To control for the claim that it is political changes in the US that are of most importance I include a dummy variable for whether the US is Republican or Democrat. The partisan affiliation of successive US governments is listed in Figure 43 below.

Period	President	Party
1945-1952	Truman	Democrat
1953-1960	Eisenhower	Republican
1961-1963	Kennedy	Democrat
1963-1968	Johnson	Democrat
1969-1974	Nixon	Republican
1974-1976	Ford	Republican
1977-1980	Carter	Democrat
1981-1988	Reagan	Republican

Figure 43: List of US administrations during the Cold War.

⁸⁶³ Maddison (2003)

Individual Leadership: It is extremely difficult to measure individual-level effects in foreign policy. I include here only the number of years an individual has been in power. This allows us to control for one aspect of relations between leaders (their familiarity), although of course it says little about their personality. It was considered that the effort required to code individual-level characteristics would not be worth the additional insight it would generate, especially as the role of individuals is discussed extensively in the country cases.

Variable Type	Variable Name	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Primary Independent Variable	Allied Ideology (Individualism)	565	-32.5	50.1	13.3107	10.3808
	National Capabilities (Allies)	565	0	0.08	0.0091	0.01213
	Legislative Seatshare (Allies)	565	12.57	100	60.9664	18.04385
Standard Control Variables	Client Ranking	565	1	7	3.7858	1.83112
	Number of Yearly Interactions	565	0	133	8.5805	14.00871
	Years	565	3	33	18.5841	8.8367
	Capability Gap with US	565	0.11	0.32	0.2056	0.05466
	Annual GDP Growth (Allies)	514	-13094	49947	6623.5953	9227.51076
	IO Memberships (Allies)	563	14	100	53.6785	16.79004
	Exports to US	562	0.26	183.29	20.1067	27.4766
Variables from Competing Theories	Cold War Intensity	565	6.45	9.65	8.2879	0.73649
	Leader Tenure (Allies)	565	0	22	3.5204	3.393
	Allied Ideology (Egalitarianism)	565	-50.6	48.53	-3.2483	13.37387
	US Ideology (Egalitarianism)	561	-7.46	12	1.7288	7.09793
	National Inequality (Allies)	376	22	67	41.42	8.718
Dependent Variables	Intensity of Allied Actions to US	472	2	11	6.4295	1.4802
	Intensity of Allied Actions to USSR	421	3.6	12	7.2788	1.74468

Figure 44: Descriptive statistics for the variables.

	Allied Ideology (Individualism)	Allied Ideology (Egalitarianism)	Capability Gap	IO Memberships	Exports to US	Cold War Intensity	Leader Tenure	Annual GDP Growth	National Inequality
Allied Ideology (Individualism)	1.000	0.026	0.003	.156**	0.010	0.029	-0.022	.163**	0.086
Allied Ideology (Egalitarianism)	0.026	1.000	.190**	-.275**	.142**	.172**	-.172**	0.051	.167**
Capability Gap (US)	0.003	.190**	1.000	-.703**	0.078	.636**	-0.050	-.351**	.356**
IO Memberships	.156**	-.275**	-.703**	1.000	-.174**	-.415**	0.033	.439**	-.373**
Exports to US	0.010	.142**	0.078	-.174**	1.000	0.059	0.022	.113*	0.079
Cold War Intensity	0.029	.172**	.636**	-.415**	0.059	1.000	-0.039	-.103*	.265**
Leader Tenure	-0.022	-.172**	-0.050	0.033	0.022	-0.039	1.000	0.034	.256**
Annual GDP Growth	.163**	0.051	-.351**	.439**	.113*	-.103*	0.034	1.000	-0.087
National Inequality	0.086	.167**	.356**	-.373**	0.079	.265**	.256**	-0.087	1.000

Figure 45: Pearson's correlation coefficients for the independent variables. Statistical significance is denoted by standard symbols.

Euratlantic-American Relations

I first test the relationship between liberal ideology and Euratlantic-American relations. This constitutes the primary test of the framework elaborated in the thesis. The theory predicts that, as the strength of liberal ideology increases, the Euratlantic countries will become more cooperative with the US. To test this claim I run a series of OLS regression models with the strength of Euratlantic-American relations as the dependent variable. I report unstandardized coefficients and standard errors for each model, along with the R-Squared and Adjusted R-Squared scores to capture the model fit. I use standard symbols to denote the levels of statistical significance.

The strength of these relations is measured by the *intensity of action* of the Euratlantic countries towards the US. The higher the intensity of action, the weaker the relation has become. In accordance with the logic of the horseshoe model it is assumed that this measure can be predicted by the strength of liberal ideology. Hence, although the horseshoe model allows for cooperation on both the horizontal and vertical dimensions of ideology, in order to test its contribution above and beyond the left-right model I utilise only the vertical element as a prediction. This measures the difference between liberal individualism and socialist/conservative collectivism. It is termed here ‘the liberalism variable’.

To begin with I run several different models that compare the relative contribution of the competing theories listed above – including the liberalism variable – on the intensity of actions. I also include the control variables specified above in each of these models. The results of these first models (Figures 46/47) show that the liberalism variable is significant at the 1% level and associated with a decrease in the intensity of allied actions towards the US, as predicted by the theory. The model

containing the liberalism variable also offers the best fit compared with the others. The Cold War dummy and annual GDP growth variables are also significant at the 5% and 10% levels respectively. The variables representing the other competing theories are not significant.

The initial findings suggest the relationship between liberalism and the intensity of allied actions is a negative one, as predicted by the theory's logic. This relationship also emerges in the descriptive statistics (Figures 46/47). In order to establish the robustness of this initial finding, and to ensure that the liberalism measure does not drop out when included with particular combinations of other variables, I also run the same set of models as above, this time keeping the liberalism variable in each of them (Figures 48/49). As we can see from the results below, the liberalism variable remains significant at the 1% and 5% levels across all of the models, suggesting that the effects of liberalism do not drop out when we include variables drawn from competing theories.

I also run different combinations of all the variables found to be significant in the first models, systematically removing different combinations of one or two variables, in order to discern any potential interactions between these variables and the liberalism measure. The results (in Figures 50/51, below) show that for every combination the liberalism measure is significant at the 1% level and that the best models in terms of fit (indicated by the highest Adjusted R-Squared statistic) all include the liberalism variable, whilst the lowest all exclude it.

Model	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11
National Capabilities	3.708 <i>12.157</i>	0.985 <i>12.208</i>	9.550 <i>13.605</i>	6.841 <i>12.631</i>	1.241 <i>12.272</i>	1.979 <i>12.272</i>	3.580 <i>12.204</i>	3.888 <i>12.245</i>	-7.390 <i>13.637</i>	0.307 <i>14.554</i>	1.418 <i>12.228</i>
Client Ranking	-0.104 <i>0.098</i>	-0.128 <i>0.098</i>	-0.139 <i>0.098</i>	-0.093 <i>0.104</i>	-0.144 <i>0.102</i>	-0.135 <i>0.098</i>	-0.156 <i>0.098</i>	-0.150 <i>0.098</i>	-0.128 <i>0.103</i>	-0.222 * <i>0.123</i>	-0.135 <i>0.098</i>
Number of Yearly Interactions	0.015 ** <i>0.007</i>	0.017 ** <i>0.007</i>	0.015 ** <i>0.007</i>	0.016 ** <i>0.007</i>	0.015 ** <i>0.007</i>	0.015 ** <i>0.007</i>	0.016 ** <i>0.007</i>	0.015 ** <i>0.007</i>	0.017 ** <i>0.007</i>	0.015 ** <i>0.007</i>	0.016 ** <i>0.007</i>
Years	0.014 * <i>0.008</i>	0.013 * <i>0.008</i>	0.053 * <i>0.029</i>	0.035 ** <i>0.016</i>	0.016 ** <i>0.008</i>	0.011 <i>0.011</i>	0.037 *** <i>0.012</i>	0.014 * <i>0.008</i>	0.014 * <i>0.008</i>	0.003 <i>0.010</i>	0.015 * <i>0.008</i>
North America (Dummy)	0.172 <i>0.300</i>	0.306 <i>0.297</i>	0.332 <i>0.296</i>	0.281 <i>0.298</i>	-0.290 <i>0.632</i>	0.342 <i>0.297</i>	0.320 <i>0.295</i>	0.323 <i>0.295</i>	0.239 <i>0.308</i>	0.334 <i>0.342</i>	0.341 <i>0.297</i>
Europe (Dummy)	0.112 <i>0.312</i>	0.142 <i>0.318</i>	0.213 <i>0.312</i>	0.437 <i>0.348</i>	0.303 <i>0.315</i>	0.231 <i>0.312</i>	0.167 <i>0.312</i>	0.202 <i>0.311</i>	0.186 <i>0.321</i>	0.389 <i>0.358</i>	0.233 <i>0.312</i>
Legislative Seatshare	0.002 <i>0.006</i>	0.000 <i>0.006</i>	0.000 <i>0.006</i>	0.001 <i>0.006</i>	0.000 <i>0.006</i>	0.000 <i>0.006</i>	-0.001 <i>0.006</i>	0.000 <i>0.006</i>	0.000 <i>0.006</i>	-0.001 <i>0.007</i>	0.000 <i>0.006</i>
Legislative Ratification (Dummy)	-0.226 <i>0.272</i>	-0.265 <i>0.274</i>	-0.292 <i>0.274</i>	-0.422 <i>0.287</i>	-0.317 <i>0.282</i>	-0.283 <i>0.274</i>	-0.332 <i>0.274</i>	-0.256 <i>0.273</i>	-0.306 <i>0.290</i>	-0.478 <i>0.295</i>	-0.281 <i>0.274</i>
Legislative Approval of Force (Dummy)	-0.024 <i>0.200</i>	-0.054 <i>0.201</i>	-0.090 <i>0.200</i>	-0.163 <i>0.208</i>	-0.058 <i>0.205</i>	-0.084 <i>0.200</i>	-0.111 <i>0.199</i>	-0.038 <i>0.201</i>	-0.135 <i>0.210</i>	-0.145 <i>0.230</i>	-0.083 <i>0.200</i>
Parliamentary/Presidential (Dummy)	-0.115 <i>0.194</i>	-0.055 <i>0.194</i>	-0.032 <i>0.193</i>	-0.155 <i>0.211</i>	0.039 <i>0.198</i>	-0.022 <i>0.193</i>	-0.035 <i>0.192</i>	-0.097 <i>0.196</i>	0.035 <i>0.197</i>	0.003 <i>0.196</i>	-0.021 <i>0.193</i>

Figure 46: Models one to eleven (Euratlantic-US relations). Continued overleaf.

Model	Model 1 (ctd)	Model 2 (ctd)	Model 3 (ctd)	Model 4 (ctd)	Model 5 (ctd)	Model 6 (ctd)	Model 7 (ctd)	Model 8 (ctd)	Model 9 (ctd)	Model 10 (ctd)	Model 11 (ctd)
Allied Ideology (Individ	-0.022 *** 0.008	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Allied Ideology (Egalita	-	-0.007 0.005	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Capability Gap (US)	-	-	6.505 4.779	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
IO Memberships	-	-	-	-0.018 0.012	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Exports to US	-	-	-	-	0.009 0.008	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cold War Intensity	-	-	-	-	-	-0.073 0.127	-	-	-	-	-
Cold War Period (Dum	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.520 ** 0.234	-	-	-	-
Leader Tenure	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.040 * 0.021	-	-	-
Annual GDP Growth	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.000 * 0.000	-	-
National Inequality	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.006 0.011	-
US Governing Party (D	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.056 0.136
Observations	472	472	472	472	472	472	472	472	472	472	472
R Squared	0.063	0.051	0.051	0.052	0.049	0.048	0.058	0.055	0.056	0.063	0.048
Adjusted R Squared	0.040	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.025	0.025	0.035	0.032	0.031	0.031	0.024

Figure 47: Models one to eleven (Euratlantic-US relations). Continued from overleaf.

Model	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18	Model 19	Model 20	Model 21	Model 22
Allied Ideology (Individualism)	-0.021 *** 0.008	-0.023 *** 0.008	-0.021 *** 0.008	-0.021 *** 0.008	-0.021 *** 0.008	-0.020 ** 0.008	-0.021 *** 0.008	-0.022 *** 0.008	-0.019 ** 0.009	-0.021 *** 0.008	-0.020 *** 0.008
National Capabilities	3.322 12.150	14.102 13.579	8.319 12.559	3.316 12.216	4.219 12.211	5.408 12.155	-3.639 9.303	-13.063 10.933	-12.290 10.083	-4.385 9.283	-5.189 9.311
Client Ranking	-0.097 0.098	-0.107 0.097	-0.074 0.103	-0.108 0.102	-0.104 0.098	-0.124 0.098	0.015 ** 0.007	0.017 ** 0.007	0.015 ** 0.007	0.015 ** 0.007	0.016 ** 0.007
Number of Yearly Interactions	0.016 ** 0.007	0.014 ** 0.007	0.015 ** 0.007	0.014 ** 0.007	0.015 ** 0.007	0.015 ** 0.007	0.027 ** 0.013	0.037 *** 0.013	0.017 0.016	0.036 *** 0.013	0.022 0.015
Years	0.012 0.008	0.061 ** 0.029	0.030 * 0.016	0.014 * 0.008	0.010 0.010	0.032 *** 0.012	0.234 0.294	0.123 0.304	0.250 0.344	0.247 0.294	0.247 0.295
North America (Dummy)	0.140 0.301	0.151 0.300	0.122 0.302	-0.297 0.628	0.176 0.301	0.170 0.299	0.283 0.263	0.217 0.267	0.522 * 0.311	0.290 0.263	0.289 0.264
Europe (Dummy)	0.027 0.318	0.081 0.312	0.277 0.351	0.178 0.317	0.113 0.313	0.068 0.312	0.005 0.004	0.004 0.004	0.005 0.005	0.005 0.004	0.005 0.004
Legislative Seatshare	0.002 0.006	0.002 0.006	0.002 0.006	0.002 0.006	0.002 0.006	0.000 0.006	0.024 0.185	-0.054 0.190	-0.084 0.186	-0.023 0.183	-0.011 0.183
Legislative Ratification (Dummy)	-0.212 0.272	-0.237 0.272	-0.348 0.286	-0.248 0.281	-0.229 0.273	-0.276 0.273	-0.054 0.199	-0.129 0.208	-0.198 0.227	-0.101 0.198	-0.081 0.198
Legislative Approval of Force (Dummy)	0.004 0.201	-0.027 0.199	-0.089 0.208	-0.012 0.205	-0.025 0.200	-0.053 0.200	-0.065 0.179	0.021 0.182	0.089 0.173	-0.009 0.176	-0.012 0.177
Parliamentary/Presidential (Dummy)	-0.147 0.196	-0.135 0.194	-0.223 0.211	-0.064 0.201	-0.116 0.195	-0.119 0.194	-0.336 0.239	-0.536 ** 0.239	-0.285 0.251	-0.580 ** 0.262	-0.434 * 0.234

Figure 48: Models twelve to twenty-two (Euratlantic-US relations). Continued overleaf.

Model	Model 12 (ctd)	Model 13 (ctd)	Model 14 (ctd)	Model 15 (ctd)	Model 16 (ctd)	Model 17 (ctd)	Model 18 (ctd)	Model 19 (ctd)	Model 20 (ctd)	Model 21 (ctd)	Model 22 (ctd)
Allied Ideology (Egalitarianism)	-0.007 0.005	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Capability Gap (US)	-	8.128 * 4.771	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
IO Memberships	-	-	-0.014 0.012	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Exports to US	-	-	-	0.007 0.008	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cold War Intensity	-	-	-	-	-0.063 0.126	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cold War Period (Dummy)	-	-	-	-	-	-0.447 * 0.235	-	-	-	-	-
Leader Tenure	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.030 0.021	-	-	-	-
Annual GDP Growth	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.000 * 0.000	-	-	-
National Inequality	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.009 0.011	-	-
US Governing Party (Dummy)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.213 0.151	-
US Ideology (Individualism)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.018 0.017
Observations	472	472	472	472	472	472	472	472	472	472	472
R Squared	0.067	0.069	0.066	0.063	0.064	0.071	0.072	0.083	0.075	0.072	0.070
Adjusted R Squared	0.042	0.044	0.041	0.038	0.390	0.046	0.047	0.057	0.041	0.047	0.045

Figure 49: Models twelve to twenty-two (Euratlantic-US relations). Continued from overleaf.

Model	Model 23	Model 24	Model 25	Model 26	Model 27	Model 28	Model 29	Model 30	Model 31	Model 32	Model 33
Allied Ideology (Individualism)	-0.025 *** 0.007	-0.023 *** 0.007	-0.025 *** 0.007	-0.026 *** 0.007	-0.027 *** 0.007	-0.025 *** 0.007	-	-0.023 *** 0.007	-0.023 *** 0.007	-0.024 *** 0.007	-0.021 *** 0.007
Number of Yearly Interactions	0.011 ** 0.005	0.014 *** 0.005	0.011 ** 0.005	0.011 ** 0.005	0.010 ** 0.005	-	0.011 ** 0.005	0.014 *** 0.005	0.014 *** 0.005	0.015 *** 0.005	-
Years	0.035 *** 0.013	0.031 ** 0.012	0.037 *** 0.013	0.014 * 0.008	-	0.034 ** 0.013	0.040 *** 0.013	0.034 *** 0.012	0.014 * 0.007	-	0.033 *** 0.012
Cold War Period (Dummy)	-0.482 ** 0.239	-0.409 * 0.234	-0.537 ** 0.236	-	0.019 0.145	-0.479 ** 0.240	-0.544 ** 0.241	-0.452 * 0.231	-	0.067 0.141	-0.424 * 0.236
Leader Tenure	0.027 0.020	0.021 0.020	-	0.034 * 0.020	0.033 * 0.020	0.028 0.020	0.031 0.020	-	0.027 0.019	0.029 0.019	0.022 0.020
Annual GDP Growth	0.000 0.000	-	0.000 0.000	0.000 0.000	0.000 * 0.000	0.000 *** 0.000	0.000 0.000	-	-	-	-
Observations	565	565	565	565	565	565	565	565	565	565	565
R Squared	0.077	0.061	0.073	0.068	0.062	0.067	0.053	0.059	0.055	0.048	0.041
Adjusted R Squared	0.064	0.051	0.062	0.057	0.051	0.056	0.042	0.051	0.047	0.040	0.033

Figure 50: Models twenty-three to thirty-three (Euratlantic-US relations).

Model	Model 34	Model 35	Model 36	Model 37	Model 38	Model 39	Model 40	Model 41	Model 42	Model 43	Model 44
Allied Ideology (Individualism)	-	-0.027 *** 0.007	-0.028 *** 0.007	-0.025 *** 0.007	-	-0.027 *** 0.007	-0.026 *** 0.007	-	-0.027 *** 0.007	-	-
Number of Yearly Interactions	0.013 *** 0.005	0.011 ** 0.005	0.010 ** 0.005	-	0.011 ** 0.005	0.010 ** 0.005	-	0.011 ** 0.005	-	0.010 * 0.005	-
Years	0.035 *** 0.012	0.013 0.008	-	0.036 *** 0.013	0.043 *** 0.013	-	0.013 0.008	0.016 ** 0.008	-	-	0.039 *** 0.013
Cold War Period (Dummy)	-0.458 * 0.236	-	-0.010 0.144	-0.536 ** 0.237	-0.609 ** 0.237	-	-	-	0.005 0.145	0.036 0.147	-0.541 ** 0.242
Leader Tenure	0.024 0.020	-	-	-	-	0.033 * 0.020	0.035 * 0.020	0.039 * 0.020	0.034 * 0.020	0.039 * 0.020	0.032 0.020
Annual GDP Growth	-	0.000 0.000	0.000 * 0.000	0.000 *** 0.000	0.000 0.000	0.000 * 0.000	0.000 *** 0.000	0.000 0.000	0.000 *** 0.000	0.000 0.000	0.000 ** 0.000
Observations	565	565	565	565	565	565	565	565	565	565	565
R Squared	0.041	0.062	0.056	0.063	0.048	0.062	0.058	0.042	0.053	0.033	0.043
Adjusted R Squared	0.033	0.053	0.047	0.054	0.039	0.053	0.050	0.033	0.044	0.024	0.034

Figure 51: Models thirty-four to forty-four (Euratlantic-US relations).

Overall the results support the validity of the horseshoe model. The negative association between the liberalism variable and the intensity of allied actions holds across multiple different models and remains significant at the 1% level (see Figure 52 below). Moreover, the relationship holds when we remove potential outliers from the model (see Figures 53/54 below). This helps increase our confidence in the validity of the theoretical assumptions outlined in Chapter Two and demonstrated qualitatively in the case studies.




Figure 52: The association between the liberalism variable (X-axis) and Euratlantic-US relations (Y-axis).




Figure 53: The association between the liberalism variable (X-axis) and Euratlantic-US relations (Y-axis) with outliers depicted in red.




Figure 54: The association between the liberalism variable (X-axis) and Euratlantic-US relations (Y-axis) with the outliers removed.

For competing explanations of Euratlantic-American relations the results point to varying levels of success. The two realist variables are significant, but the direction of association does not fit with the specified theoretical logic (that dependence on the US grows alongside increases in the capability gap with the allies and the intensity of Cold War threat). The Cold War dummy is significant at the 5% and 10% levels in all models, but the results indicate that the move towards détente increased the strength of relations, most likely because the US became more open to supporting moderately leftist Euratlantic governments in these years, and because they, in turn, became less critical of the US. The capability gap, similarly, is significant at the 10% level, but the association indicates that as the gap increases the strength of relations decreases.

The variable for economic performance is associated with a decrease in the strength of relations (at the 10% level). This fails to support the hypothesis that increased protectionism or scapegoating at times of recession are responsible for diminishing the quality of relations. Instead this finding potentially indicates that strong economic performance makes independence a more attainable prospect for the Euratlantic states. The leader tenure variable is also associated with a decrease in the strength of relations (at the 10% level), suggesting that at least one facet of personal relations matters in the relationship. Other domestic political explanations are unsupported by the results; there is no significant relationship between the horizontal (left-right) dimension of ideology, or American politics, on the strength of Euratlantic-US relations.

Euratlantic-Soviet Relations

The results from the first set of models offer strong evidence that the influence of liberal ideology in Euratlantic states is positively associated with the quality of actions directed at the US. In this section I run a second series of models to determine if the relationship also holds vis-à-vis the USSR. Given the theory elaborated in Chapter Two predicts liberals will be more hawkish than their ideological opponents, and that strong relations with the US have historically been accompanied by poor relations with the USSR, there are good reasons to believe that the strength of liberalism will be a significant predictor of relations with the USSR also. I test this proposition by running a series of models with Euratlantic-Soviet relations as the dependent variable. If the hypothesis is accurate, then an increase in the strength of liberal ideology will be associated with a decrease in the quality of relations with the USSR.

Using the COPDAB scores of the intensity of Euratlantic actions vis-à-vis the Soviet Union helps us to establish the relative level of conflict in the relationship, but we must be careful here in assigning meaning to the scores. A cursory glance at Figure 55 below illustrates that the scores for allied actions to the USSR are seldom greater than those towards the US, and that in a majority of cases they are below the neutral mid-point of eight which signifies a conflictual relationship. Given that we know the countries involved were in a state of ‘Cold War’ at the time, it is likely that the surprising level of amity results from the COPDAB data expressing relationship strength relative to a pre-existing baseline. This does not mean that the data for Euratlantic actions towards the USSR are unfit for our purpose, as it is the variation within these pre-existing bounds that we are interested in, but it does mean that we must be cautious in making any cross-national comparisons (for example, it is

meaningless to infer from Figure 55 that in 1966 these states were on better terms with the USSR than the US), or in attributing any real significance to the ‘neutral’ mid-point.

The ordering of this section largely mirrors that of the previous section. I begin by running a series of models containing each of the variables drawn from competing theories and all of the standard control variables (Figures 56/57). The results indicate that the liberalism variable is significant at the 5% level and is associated with an increase in the intensity of allied actions towards the US, as predicted by the theory. I also run the same models with the liberalism variable included (Figures 58/59). The results confirm it remains significant, although it is only significant at the 10% level when we include the measure of national inequality, suggesting that the two variables are correlated to some extent. I then run a series of models that incorporate different combinations of liberalism and other statistically significant variables to see if the relationship still holds (Figures 60/61). The results of these demonstrate that the liberal variable is consistently significant at the 1% and 5% levels across all the models. The best fitting model also includes liberalism, although it is clear from comparing the R-Squared statistics that the Cold War intensity variable adds more to the model than the liberalism variable.




Figure 55: Strength of Euratlantic-American and Euratlantic-Soviet relations. The red line marks the ‘neutral’ point.

Model	Model 45	Model 46	Model 47	Model 48	Model 49	Model 50	Model 51	Model 52	Model 53	Model 54	Model 55
National Capabilities	29.110 ** 14.325	31.921 ** 14.381	51.451 *** 16.020	34.040 ** 14.966	29.743 ** 14.475	27.760 * 14.129	31.002 ** 14.442	32.767 ** 14.434	25.942 16.009	13.661 18.694	31.595 ** 14.400
Client Ranking	0.102 0.119	0.142 0.118	0.132 0.117	0.166 0.124	0.176 0.121	0.130 0.116	0.149 0.119	0.136 0.119	0.120 0.125	0.372 ** 0.159	0.144 0.118
Number of Yearly Interactions	-0.005 0.008	-0.007 0.008	-0.008 0.008	-0.006 0.008	-0.005 0.008	0.000 0.008	-0.006 0.008	-0.006 0.008	-0.006 0.008	-0.005 0.008	-0.006 0.008
Years	-0.026 *** 0.010	-0.025 ** 0.010	0.071 * 0.037	-0.016 0.020	-0.029 *** 0.010	0.008 0.013	-0.033 ** 0.016	-0.026 *** 0.010	-0.041 *** 0.011	-0.028 ** 0.013	-0.027 *** 0.010
North America (Dummy)	0.038 0.381	-0.158 0.374	-0.172 0.372	-0.191 0.378	0.059 0.568	-0.158 0.367	-0.161 0.375	-0.162 0.375	-0.322 0.389	0.015 0.438	-0.167 0.375
Europe (Dummy)	-0.806 ** 0.382	-0.889 ** 0.384	-0.993 *** 0.377	-0.849 ** 0.422	-0.920 ** 0.381	-0.982 *** 0.372	-0.947 ** 0.380	-0.965 ** 0.379	-0.980 ** 0.389	-0.555 0.446	-0.956 ** 0.380
Legislative Seatshare	-0.005 0.006	-0.003 0.006	-0.003 0.006	-0.003 0.006	-0.001 0.007	-0.004 0.006	-0.003 0.006	-0.003 0.006	-0.004 0.007	0.001 0.008	-0.003 0.006
Legislative Ratification (Dummy)	-0.120 0.335	-0.049 0.336	-0.062 0.333	-0.108 0.356	0.033 0.342	-0.029 0.329	-0.023 0.337	-0.009 0.337	-0.166 0.360	0.343 0.386	-0.035 0.336
Legislative Approval of Force (Dummy)	-0.826 *** 0.229	-0.839 *** 0.234	-0.788 *** 0.228	-0.835 *** 0.242	-0.827 *** 0.232	-0.773 *** 0.225	-0.782 *** 0.230	-0.751 *** 0.233	-0.897 *** 0.242	-0.701 ** 0.280	-0.788 *** 0.230
Parliamentary/Presidential (Dummy)	-0.038 0.227	-0.120 0.225	-0.167 0.221	-0.219 0.246	-0.161 0.226	-0.184 0.219	-0.152 0.223	-0.197 0.227	-0.132 0.228	-0.107 0.241	-0.155 0.223

Figure 56: Models forty-five to fifty-five (Euratlantic-Soviet relations). Continued overleaf.

Model	Model 45 (ctd)	Model 46 (ctd)	Model 47 (ctd)	Model 48 (ctd)	Model 49 (ctd)	Model 50 (ctd)	Model 51 (ctd)	Model 52 (ctd)	Model 53 (ctd)	Model 54 (ctd)	Model 55 (ctd)
Allied Ideology (Individualism)	0.022 ** 0.009	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Allied Ideology (Egalitarianism)	-	0.008 0.006	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Capability Gap (US)	-	-	16.915 *** 6.197	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
IO Memberships	-	-	-	-0.009 0.014	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Exports to US	-	-	-	-	-0.003 0.006	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cold War Intensity	-	-	-	-	-	0.624 *** 0.150	-	-	-	-	-
Cold War Period (Dummy)	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.148 0.288	-	-	-	-
Leader Tenure	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.025 0.025	-	-	-
Annual GDP Growth	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.000 0.000	-	-
National Inequality	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.017 0.014	-
US Governing Party (Dummy)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.062 0.164
Observations	421	421	421	421	421	421	421	421	421	421	421
R Squared	0.138	0.127	0.140	0.125	0.128	0.161	0.125	0.126	0.133	0.144	0.124
Adjusted R Squared	0.114	0.103	0.116	0.101	0.104	0.137	0.101	0.102	0.108	0.113	0.100

Figure 57: Models forty-five to fifty-five (Euratlantic-Soviet relations). Continued from overleaf.

Model	Model 56	Model 57	Model 58	Model 59	Model 60	Model 61	Model 62	Model 63	Model 64	Model 65	Model 66
Allied Ideology (Individualism)	0.022 ** 0.009	0.019 ** 0.009	0.022 ** 0.009	0.022 ** 0.009	0.021 ** 0.009	0.022 ** 0.009	0.022 ** 0.009	0.021 ** 0.009	0.019 * 0.010	0.022 ** 0.009	0.022 ** 0.009
National Capabilities	29.453 ** 14.322	47.304 *** 16.056	32.293 ** 14.880	27.054 * 14.417	25.526 * 14.078	28.924 ** 14.377	30.335 ** 14.371	23.508 15.952	8.475 18.830	29.124 ** 14.340	29.008 ** 14.358
Client Ranking	0.101 0.119	0.096 0.118	0.131 0.124	0.137 0.121	0.092 0.116	0.104 0.120	0.093 0.119	0.083 0.125	0.345 ** 0.159	0.103 0.119	0.102 0.119
Number of Yearly Interactions	-0.006 0.008	-0.007 0.008	-0.005 0.008	-0.004 0.008	0.001 0.008	-0.005 0.008	-0.005 0.008	-0.005 0.008	-0.004 0.008	-0.005 0.008	-0.005 0.008
Years	-0.024 ** 0.010	0.062 * 0.037	-0.012 0.020	-0.029 *** 0.010	0.008 0.012	-0.028 * 0.016	-0.026 *** 0.010	-0.040 *** 0.011	-0.027 ** 0.013	-0.026 *** 0.010	-0.028 * 0.014
North America (Dummy)	0.044 0.381	0.006 0.379	0.007 0.383	0.333 0.575	0.032 0.374	0.037 0.381	0.042 0.381	-0.114 0.397	0.213 0.450	0.035 0.381	0.038 0.381
Europe (Dummy)	-0.738 * 0.386	-0.855 ** 0.380	-0.657 0.425	-0.765 0.383	-0.839 ** 0.375	-0.803 ** 0.383	-0.811 ** 0.382	-0.823 ** 0.393	-0.371 0.455	-0.803 ** 0.382	-0.806 ** 0.382
Legislative Seatshare	-0.004 0.006	-0.005 0.006	-0.004 0.006	-0.003 0.007	-0.005 0.006	-0.005 0.006	-0.005 0.006	-0.005 0.007	0.001 0.008	-0.005 0.006	-0.005 0.006
Legislative Ratification (Dummy)	-0.131 0.335	-0.131 0.333	-0.215 0.356	-0.042 0.341	-0.106 0.329	-0.113 0.337	-0.090 0.336	-0.246 0.359	0.302 0.385	-0.118 0.335	-0.118 0.336
Legislative Approval of Force (Dummy)	-0.876 *** 0.233	-0.821 *** 0.227	-0.887 *** 0.242	-0.866 *** 0.231	-0.808 *** 0.224	-0.823 *** 0.230	-0.786 *** 0.232	-0.941 *** 0.242	-0.691 ** 0.279	-0.825 *** 0.229	-0.826 *** 0.229
Parliamentary/Presidential (Dummy)	-0.001 0.229	-0.061 0.225	-0.116 0.247	-0.045 0.229	-0.071 0.222	-0.037 0.227	-0.079 0.230	-0.008 0.233	-0.024 0.244	-0.035 0.227	-0.036 0.227

Figure 58: Models fifty-six to sixty-six (Euratlantic-Soviet relations). Continued overleaf.

Model	Model 56 (ctd)	Model 57 (ctd)	Model 58 (ctd)	Model 59 (ctd)	Model 60 (ctd)	Model 61 (ctd)	Model 62 (ctd)	Model 63 (ctd)	Model 64 (ctd)	Model 65 (ctd)	Model 66 (ctd)
Allied Ideology (Egalitarianism)	0.007 <i>0.006</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Capability Gap (US)	-	15.231 *** <i>6.216</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
IO Memberships	-	-	-0.011 <i>0.014</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Exports to US	-	-	-	-0.004 <i>0.006</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cold War Intensity	-	-	-	-	0.610 *** <i>0.149</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cold War Period (Dummy)	-	-	-	-	-	0.054 <i>0.289</i>	-	-	-	-	-
Leader Tenure	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.026 <i>0.025</i>	-	-	-	-
Annual GDP Growth	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.000 <i>0.000</i>	-	-	-
National Inequality	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.016 <i>0.014</i>	-	-
US Governing Party (Dummy)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.064 <i>0.163</i>	-
US Ideology (Individualism)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.003 <i>0.021</i>
Observations	421	421	421	421	421	421	421	421	421	421	421
R Squared	0.140	0.150	0.139	0.142	0.172	0.138	0.140	0.145	0.153	0.138	0.138
Adjusted R Squared	0.115	0.125	0.113	0.116	0.148	0.112	0.114	0.118	0.120	0.112	0.112

Figure 59: Models fifty-six to sixty-six (Euratlantic-Soviet relations). Continued from overleaf.

Model	Model 67	Model 68	Model 69	Model 70	Model 71	Model 72	Model 73	Model 74	Model 75	Model 76	Model 77
Allied Ideology (Individualism)	0.022 *** 0.008	-	0.027 *** 0.008	0.022 *** 0.008	0.024 *** 0.008	0.024 *** 0.008	0.019 ** 0.008	-	-	-	-
National Capabilities	35.347 *** 6.901	37.850 *** 6.898	-	34.986 *** 6.887	34.887 *** 7.039	26.252 *** 6.751	23.762 *** 6.225	-	37.486 *** 6.885	37.562 *** 7.043	28.627 *** 6.770
Years	0.011 0.012	0.011 0.012	0.007 0.013	-	-0.023 ** 0.009	0.008 0.013	0.007 0.012	0.008 0.013	-	-0.024 ** 0.009	0.008 0.013
Cold War Intensity	0.614 *** 0.147	0.633 *** 0.148	0.602 *** 0.151	0.526 *** 0.109	-	0.600 *** 0.150	0.599 *** 0.148	0.625 *** 0.153	0.543 *** 0.110	-	0.621 *** 0.151
Europe (Dummy)	-0.893 *** 0.199	-0.928 *** 0.200	-0.594 *** 0.196	-0.883 *** 0.198	-0.875 *** 0.203	-	-0.688 *** 0.193	-0.612 *** 0.198	-0.918 *** 0.200	-0.913 *** 0.204	-
Legislative Approval of Force (Dummy)	-0.748 *** 0.191	-0.689 *** 0.191	-0.305 * 0.175	-0.739 *** 0.191	-0.728 *** 0.195	-0.503 *** 0.187	-	-0.190 0.174	-0.680 *** 0.191	-0.664 *** 0.195	-0.427 ** 0.187
Observations	565	565	565	565	565	565	565	565	565	565	565
R Squared	0.159	0.143	0.104	0.157	0.123	0.117	0.131	0.079	0.141	0.104	0.097
Adjusted R Squared	0.146	0.132	0.093	0.147	0.112	0.106	0.121	0.070	0.133	0.095	0.089

Figure 60: Models sixty-seven to seventy-seven (Euratlantic-Soviet relations).

Model	Model 78	Model 79	Model 80	Model 81	Model 82	Model 83	Model 84	Model 85	Model 86	Model 87	Model 88
Allied Ideology (Individualism)	-	0.028 *** 0.008	0.029 *** 0.008	0.028 *** 0.008	0.025 *** 0.008	0.024 *** 0.008	0.024 *** 0.008	0.019 ** 0.008	0.026 *** 0.008	0.020 ** 0.008	0.022 *** 0.008
National Capabilities	26.723 *** 6.123	-	-	-	-	36.018 *** 7.069	26.065 *** 6.740	23.617 *** 6.215	25.979 *** 6.874	23.686 *** 6.339	19.717 *** 6.206
Years	0.008 0.012	-	-0.026 *** 0.010	0.006 0.013	0.005 0.013	-	-	-	-0.026 *** 0.010	-0.026 *** 0.009	0.005 0.013
Cold War Intensity	0.617 *** 0.149	0.544 *** 0.113	-	0.594 *** 0.153	0.597 *** 0.150	-	0.537 *** 0.112	0.544 *** 0.110	-	-	0.592 *** 0.150
Europe (Dummy)	-0.733 *** 0.193	-0.590 *** 0.195	-0.581 *** 0.199	-	-0.553 *** 0.193	-0.904 *** 0.204	-	-0.683 *** 0.193	-	-0.678 *** 0.197	-
Legislative Approval of Force (Dummy)	-	-0.301 ** 0.175	-0.290 0.178	-0.209 0.174	-	-0.752 *** 0.196	-0.499 *** 0.187	-	-0.488 ** 0.191	-	-
Observations	565	565	565	565	565	565	565	565	565	565	565
R Squared	0.120	0.104	0.069	0.084	0.101	0.109	0.116	0.131	0.082	0.097	0.105
Adjusted R Squared	0.112	0.095	0.060	0.075	0.092	0.100	0.107	0.122	0.073	0.088	0.096

Figure 61: Models seventy-eight to eighty-eight (Euratlantic-Soviet relations).

The results suggest that liberal ideology is a significant predictor of the strength of Euratlantic-Soviet relations. The liberalism variable is significant at the 1% level across all but one of the models. The association is a positive one, in line with the predictions of the theory; the greater the strength of liberal ideology, the greater the intensity of actions towards the USSR (see Figure 62). This relationship also holds when we remove the outliers (see Figure 63). We can be somewhat less confident about the *primacy* of liberalism in explaining Euratlantic-Soviet relations, however. Whereas in the first set of models the liberalism variable contributed most to the explanation, in this instance the realist variables of Cold War intensity and the US-ally capability gap contribute significantly more to the explanation. While liberalism does have a discernible impact upon Euratlantic-Soviet relations, it is not necessarily the most important element at play.

We can also make inferences concerning the validity of the competing theoretical explanations. The results indicate that the capability gap between the US and the Cold War intensity variable (based on realist claims) are both significant at the 1% level. Increasing Cold War intensity is associated with a decrease in Euratlantic-Soviet relations, as is an increase in the capability gap with the US (potentially indicating increased dependence on the US and the endorsement of its security agenda in consequence). The other competing explanations, including the left-right model, economic performance and exports are not significant in any of the models.




Figure 62: The association between the liberalism variable (X-axis) and Euratlantic-USSR relations (Y-axis).




Figure 63: The association between the liberalism variable (X-axis) and Euratlantic-USSR relations (Y-axis) with the outliers highlighted.

Conclusion: Statistical Evidence for the Horseshoe Model

In this chapter I presented the results of a quantitative study of Euratlantic strategy from 1948 to 1978. The results confirm the validity of the horseshoe model. Liberal ideology is associated with an increase in the strength of Euratlantic-American relations and a decrease in the strength of Euratlantic-Soviet relations. This finding is significant at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. The data show that the horizontal dimension of ideology, moreover, is unrelated to the intensity of actions in all of the models. The findings also point towards the relevance of some of the competing theoretical claims, notably confirming several realist hypotheses regarding the importance of relative power and the intensity of Cold War tension.

9 / Conclusion

Introduction

In this final chapter I summarise the results of the research and assess the validity of the horseshoe model and of the various competing explanations. I also draw out some of the implications of the argument for our understanding of Cold War alliance politics and for IR theory more generally. I begin by highlighting the evidence for the horseshoe model before discussing the findings in relation to the competing theories. I then outline several implications of the argument for our understanding of the politics of Euratlantic strategy and foreign policy.

Evidence for the Horseshoe Model

I begin by evaluating the validity of the horseshoe model in light of the qualitative and quantitative evidence presented above. To help demarcate the different kinds of evidence available, I divide my discussion of the horseshoe model, and the subsequent discussion of competing explanations, into three parts: (1) evidence from the in-depth cases, namely, the EDC treaty (France), the Suez crisis (Britain), the Diefenbaker governments (Canada), and the INF deployments (West Germany), (2) evidence from the configuration of case outcomes presented in the overview of Cold War politics in each country chapter, and (3) evidence from the quantitative analysis of Euratlantic strategy outlined in the previous chapter.

In-depth cases: The evidence from the individual cases strongly supports the contention that the politics of Euratlantic strategy has varied in accordance with the

horseshoe model of ideology. In each of the cases the primary challenges to US Cold War strategy emerged on the left and the right, while those at the centre sought to strengthen the country's relationship with the US and pursue a stronger line vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. It is also clear that, in the cases considered, they have sought to do so for the reasons predicted by the theory. Analyses of the various party positions demonstrate the cross-national similarities in the socialist, liberal and conservative positions. Liberals emphasise the importance of a united front against the communist threat and the need to demonstrate Western resolve through the strengthening of its institutional architecture and the pooling of defence resources. Socialists stress the dual threat from Soviet totalitarianism and US capitalism and endorse an independent strategy aimed at achieving a relaxation of Cold War tension and safeguarding the government's domestic agenda. Conservatives equate strength with power and advocate an independent strategy free from international constraint that can hold the balance between the US and USSR and thereby bolster the nation's influence.

The French, British and Canadian cases illustrate well the horseshoe pattern of partisanship. In the French case, the combined challenge of the anti-American communist and Gaullist parties led to the EDC Treaty's demise, against the wishes of the political centre, manifest in the MRP and the right-wing of the SFIO, who tried to save the project. In the British case, right-wing support for an independent British policy led directly to the military option in Suez that plunged Anglo-American relations into crisis. The Labour right and the Conservative moderates opposed the move, concerned about the appropriateness of force and the risk to the 'special relationship'. While the Labour left tempered their anti-Americanism during the crisis, it was very much in evidence in the run-up and the aftermath. In the

Canadian case the influence of the right wing precipitated a crisis in relations with the US. The Diefenbaker government set out to reduce Canadian strategic and economic dependence on the US that had developed under Liberal rule. In doing so they had the support of the social democratic NDP, which urged Diefenbaker's agenda on, and only reluctantly sided with the Liberals once it became clear the government had fallen apart.

Only in the West German case does the pattern of partisan contestation resemble the traditional left-right model more than the horseshoe model, with the CDU/CSU the most supportive of INF deployment and a hard-line anti-Soviet stance, the FDP moderately supportive of the former but not the latter, and the SPD largely opposed to either. Yet a closer inspection of the politics of West German-American relations suggests that the reason for this is not that those on the political right in Germany are, unlike other countries, pro-American, but because there are few vestiges of the traditional right remaining in West German society in the post-war period. As I have argued above, the memory of Nazi aggression, allied programmes of re-education and West Germany's liminal and 'semi-sovereign' state all contributed to the delegitimation of the key elements of conservatism as applied to foreign policy, such as nationalism, independence, and the use of force. Analysis of the more right-wing elements of the CDU/CSU and the *Deutsche Partei* reveals that, in accordance with the logic of the horseshoe model, individuals further to the right are more concerned about independence from the US.

Case configurations: The predictions of the horseshoe model are also borne out by the broad configurational analysis of variation between different governments in their ideological predilections and the strength of relations pursued with the US. It is clear that all periods of poor bilateral relations occur under the tenure of socialist or

conservative governments. The only case in which a nominally liberal government presides over poor relations is the Canadian Liberal party under Trudeau, although further inspection confirms that Trudeau's government moved significantly to the left during the period in order to gain parliamentary support from the NDP. It is also noteworthy that, by and large, self-styled conservative administrations only preside over strong relations with the US in the period following the sweeping emergence of the 'new right'. Noting the liberal elements of 'new right' philosophy – particularly the emphasis on individual freedom and a *laissez faire* economy – helps us to understand why this is the case, and further supports the theoretical claim that it is *liberalism* that is of fundamental importance in determining the quality of relations with the US.

Quantitative analysis: The results of the quantitative analysis also confirm the validity of the horseshoe model. By assigning the individual elements of each ideology to the vertical and horizontal dimensions of the horseshoe model, the two ideology variables constructed for the analysis allowed for a separate estimation of the effects of each dimension on relations with the US and the USSR. Importantly, only the vertical dimension (that separates liberalism from both socialism and conservatism) was found to affect the quality of Euratlantic relations with the two superpowers. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the quality of each country's relationship with the US increases as liberal elements in the governing party's programme become more pronounced, while the quality of the country's relations with the Soviet Union correspondingly decrease. The variable is statistically significant at the 1% level in the models explaining the quality of relations with the US and the 5% level in those models focused on the Soviet Union, and this remains

the case when we control for a multitude of structural factors and competing explanations.⁸⁶⁴

Temporal variation: The results of the analysis also highlight several important temporal trends that affect the role that political ideology plays in the relations between all four countries and the US. Perhaps the most important of these is the variation in the fit between ideology and party-types over time. There is, for example, a notable diminution in the scope of ideology in the four countries from 1945 to 1990. From the late 1950s and early 1960s, many socialist parties, transitioned from outwardly Marxist parties to more social democratic organisations. In West Germany this transition occurred in 1959, while in Canada it took place in 1961. In France and Britain, while factional struggles would continue to define the respective Labour movements, orthodox Marxism was clearly in decline by the 1970s. A similar trend occurred in the political right during the 1970s in response to the breakdown of the Keynesian consensus and the growing strength of ‘new right’ philosophy. By the 1980s, the ‘conservative’ parties in all four countries had adopted elements of ‘new right’ philosophy, though this was perhaps most noticeable in the British case (under Thatcher).

Spatial variation: Considerable variation in the manner in which ideological differences play out is also noticeable *between* the different countries. Of particular importance, it would appear, are the nature of the electoral system (majoritarian or

⁸⁶⁴ Although it should be noted that the variable ceases to be significant in the models predicting the quality of relations with the US when the dependent variable is lagged by one year. I have argued above that the reason for this lies in the importance of rhetorical and symbolic action in international strategy. Unlike in economic policy, say, governments do not need to implement policies nor wait for parliamentary assent before the effects of foreign policy decisions are felt; very often they are the product of executive action and changes in *language*, making their effects unsusceptible to delay.

proportional) and the scope of ideological variation (socialism to conservatism, or truncated variations thereof). Both of these factors affect the mapping between parties and ideology and therefore the pattern of politics that emerges (see Figure 64).

	Broad Scope	Truncated Scope
Majoritarian	Britain Liberal/non-liberal politics between factions	Canada Liberal/non-liberal politics between government/opposition
Proportional	France Liberal/non-liberal politics between coalition partners	West Germany Liberal/non-liberal politics between kingmaker/major party

Figure 64: Consequences of institutions for fault-line of liberal/non-liberal contestation.

In the French Fourth Republic the proportional electoral system⁸⁶⁵ and broad scope of ideological variation resulted in a significant number of parties, each with a ‘tighter’ ideological fit. The politics of Franco-American relations therefore depends on the combination of parties in government at the time and the relative strength of each in the coalition. The greater number of parties made the system less stable, but also provided for the creation of broadly centrist governments. In West Germany, in contrast, the party system has developed along lines expected under a proportional system but with a restricted scope of ideology truncated on the right. The politics of

⁸⁶⁵ At the time of the EDC Treaty the French constitution is that of the proportional Fourth Republic. It should be noted that the Fifth Republic created in 1958 featured stronger majoritarian elements. In response, the 1960s and 1970s saw French parties engage in numerous attempts at to amalgamate smaller parties into viable units.

West German-American relations, in consequence, has tended to vary between the left and the centre, at least as far as foreign policy is concerned.

In Britain the majoritarian electoral system transposes a similarly broad ideological scope into two broad parties, each of which is composed of a number of factions, each with a different ideological position. The politics of Anglo-American relations has depended upon the relative strength of each faction within the governing party itself, rather than the individual party in government. The Canadian case is also majoritarian and features similarly broad parties, but in combination with a restricted scope of ideology truncated on the left. In consequence, the two parties have mapped out the political spectrum from liberalism to conservatism; this has resulted in a situation where the divide between the parties has demarcated liberalism from conservatism, unlike the British system where it has *bifurcated* liberalism.⁸⁶⁶

Evidence for Competing Explanations

The evidence presented in the chapters above also allows us to comment on the accuracy of competing explanations for changes in the politics of Cold War strategy. In this section I evaluate the evidence surrounding alternative theoretical accounts drawn from mainstream IR theory and accounts of foreign policymaking. I structure my discussion according to the three kinds of evidence outlined above. The tables below (Figures 65-68) summarise the values for the configurational element of the case studies.

⁸⁶⁶ That is, until the ideological changes unleashed by the ‘new right’ in the 1970s.

Government Tenure	Head of Government/State	Governing Parties	Dominant Ideology†	Cold War Period	US Political Party	Economic Problems?	Relations with US	Confirming?
1945-1947	Gouin -Blum	MRP/PCF/SFIO	Socialism/ Liberalism	First Cold War	Democrat	Yes	Weak	Confirming
1947-1951	Ramadier - Bidault	MRP/SFIO/Radical	Liberalism	First Cold War	Democrat	Yes	Strong	Confirming
1951-1956	Pleven - Mendes-France	MRP/Radical/RPR	Liberalism/ Conservatism	First Cold War	Democrat/ Republican	Yes	Moderate	Confirming
1956-1958	Mollet - Pflimlin	SFIO/Radical/RPR	Socialism/ Conservatism	First Cold War	Republican	Yes	Weak	Confirming
1958-1962	De Gaulle/Debre	UNR/IR	Conservatism	First Cold War	Republican/ Democrat	No	Weak	Confirming
1962-1967	De Gaulle/Pompidou	UNR/IR	Conservatism	First Cold War	Democrat	No	Very weak	Confirming
1967-1968	De Gaulle/Pompidou	UNR/IR	Conservatism	First Cold War	Democrat	No	Weak	Confirming
1968-1973	Pompidou/Murville	UDR/IR	Conservatism	Détente	Republican	No	Weak	Confirming
1973-1978	Giscard/Chirac & Barre	UDR/IR	Liberalism	Détente	Republican	Yes	Strong	Confirming
1978-1981	Giscard/Barre	UDF/UDR	Liberalism	Détente/ Second CW	Democrat	Yes	Moderate	Disconfirming
1981-1983	Mitterrand/Mauroy	PS/PCF	Socialism	Second Cold War	Republican	Yes	Weak	Confirming
1983-1986	Mitterrand/Fabius	PS	Social Liberalism	Second Cold War	Republican	Yes	Strong	Disconfirming
1986-1988	Mitterrand/Chirac	RPR	Social Liberalism/ New Right	Second Cold War	Republican	No	Moderate	Unclear
1988-1993	Mitterrand/Rocard	PS	Social Liberalism	End of the Cold War	Republican	No	Strong	Disconfirming

Figure 65: Configurational analysis of Franco-American relations.

Government Tenure	Head of Government/State	Governing Parties	Dominant Ideology†	Cold War Period	US Political Party	Economic Problems?	Relations with US	Confirming?
1945-1951	Attlee	Labour	Socialism	First Cold War	Democrat	Yes	Moderate	Disconfirming
1951-1956	Churchill/Eden	Conservative	Conservatism	First Cold War	Democrat/Republican	Yes	Moderate	Confirming
1957-1964	Macmillan/Home	Conservative	Conservatism	First Cold War	Democrat	No	Strong	Disconfirming
1964-1966	Wilson	Labour	Socialism	First Cold War	Democrat	No	Weak	Confirming
1966-1970	Wilson	Labour	Socialism	First Cold War	Democrat/Republican	Yes	Weak	Confirming
1970-1974	Heath	Conservative	Conservatism	Détente	Republican	Yes	Weak	Confirming
1974-1979	Wilson/Callaghan	Labour	Socialism	Détente	Republican/Democrat	Yes	Moderate	Unclear
1979-1990	Thatcher	Conservative	Liberalism	Second Cold War	Democrat/Republican	Yes	Strong	Confirming

Figure 66: Configurational analysis of Anglo-American relations.

Government Tenure	Head of Government/State	Governing Parties	Dominant Ideology†	Cold War Period	US Political Party	Economic Problems?	Relations with US	Confirming ?
1945-1949	King	Liberal	Liberalism	First Cold War	Democrat	No	Strong	Confirming
1949-1953	St. Laurent	Liberal	Liberalism	First Cold War	Democrat	No	Strong	Confirming
1953-1957	St. Laurent	Liberal	Liberalism	First Cold War	Republican	No	Strong	Confirming
1957-1958	Diefenbaker	Conservative	Conservatism	First Cold War	Republican	No	Weak	Confirming
1958-1962	Diefenbaker	Conservative	Conservatism	First Cold War	Republican/ Democrat	No	Weak	Confirming
1962-1963	Diefenbaker	Conservative	Conservatism	First Cold War	Democrat	No	Weak	Confirming
1963-1965	Pearson	Liberal	Liberalism	First Cold War	Democrat	No	Strong	Confirming
1965-1968	Pearson	Liberal	Liberalism	First Cold War	Democrat	No	Strong	Confirming
1968-1972	Trudeau	Liberal	Socialism/ Liberalism	Détente	Republican	No	Weak	Confirming
1972-1974	Trudeau	Liberal	Socialism/ Liberalism	Détente	Republican	Yes	Weak	Confirming
1974-1979	Trudeau	Liberal	Socialism/ Liberalism	Détente	Republican/ Democrat	Yes	Weak	Confirming
1979-1980	Clark	Conservative	Liberalism	Second Cold War	Democrat	No	Moderate	Unclear
1980-1984	Trudeau	Liberal	Socialism/ Liberalism	Second Cold War	Republican	No	Weak	Confirming
1984-1988	Mulroney	Conservative	Liberalism	Second Cold War	Republican	No	Strong	Confirming
1988-1993	Mulroney	Conservative	Liberalism	End of the Cold War	Republican	Yes	Strong	Confirming

Figure 67: Configurational analysis of Canadian-American relations.

Government Tenure	Head of Government/State	Governing Parties	Dominant Ideology†	Cold War Period	US Political Party	Economic Problems?	Relations with US	Confirming?
1949-1953	Adenauer	CDU-FDP	Liberalism/Conservatism	First Cold War	Democrat	No	Strong	Unclear
1953-1957	Adenauer	CDU-FDP	Liberalism/Conservatism	First Cold War	Republican	No	Strong	Unclear
1957-1961	Adenauer	CDU	Liberalism/Conservatism	First Cold War	Republican	No	Strong	Unclear
1961-1963	Adenauer	CDU-FDP	Liberalism/Conservatism	Détente	Democrat	No	Weak	Confirming
1963-1966	Erhard	CDU-FDP	Liberalism/Conservatism	Détente	Democrat	No	Moderate	Unclear
1966-1969	Kiesinger	CDU-SPD	Socialism/Conservatism	Détente	Democrat	Yes	Moderate	Unclear
1969-1972	Brandt	SPD-FDP	Socialism	Détente	Republican	No	Strong	Disconfirming
1972-1976	Brandt	SPD-FDP	Socialism	Détente	Republican	Yes	Strong	Disconfirming
1976-1980	Schmidt	SPD-FDP	Socialism	Détente	Democrat	No	Strong	Unclear
1980-1983	Schmidt	SPD-FDP	Socialism	Second Cold War	Republican	No	Weak	Confirming
1983-1987	Kohl	CDU-FDP	Liberalism/Conservatism	Second Cold War	Republican	No	Strong	Unclear
1987-1990	Kohl	CDU-FDP	Liberalism/Conservatism	End of the Cold War	Republican	Yes	Strong	Unclear

Figure 68: Configurational analysis of West German-American relations.

The Left-Right Model

The left-right model offers a competing account of ideology and strategy. Along these lines it has been variously argued that leftist, or rightist, governments are more predisposed to align with the US during the Cold War. The evidence from the in-depth cases challenges both of these views. In the French, British and Canadian cases it is clear that anti-Americanism increases the further away from the political centre one goes, whilst in the West German case the seeming left-right pattern of contestation is largely explicable in terms of the relative absence of conservative elements in West German foreign policy (and the essentially liberal character of the CDU/CSU's Cold War strategy). The evidence from the configurational analysis also challenges the left-right model. Poor relations have occurred primarily at those times when both socialism and conservatism have been ascendant, and when liberalism has been correspondingly weak. The quantitative analysis also largely disconfirms the left-right model; the horizontal dimension of ideology is not a significant predictor of the quality of relations with the US or the USSR.

Realism

There are two potential realist explanations for variation in Euratlantic strategy; the first argues that the extent of Euratlantic dependence increases alongside the difference in capabilities between the US and its weaker allies (the dependency thesis), the second that it increases commensurate with the extent of threat from the Soviet Union (the protection thesis).

Both the in-depth cases and the configurational analysis highlight the extent to which the implications of each depend on the partisan character of the government.

Socialists and conservatives tended to view the capability gap between the US and its allies as a source of potential trouble, while liberals viewed it as presenting the opportunity for a strong defence of the Euratlantic region. Perceived increases in US power led not to increased dependence under leftist and rightist governments, but very often to increasing moves towards independence (De Gaulle offering the best example). The same was true of the extent of Cold War threat; while liberals viewed increasing tension as necessitating a stronger US role in their defence, socialists and conservatives tended to blame the increased threat level on US actions and argued in favour of increased disengagement.⁸⁶⁷

Yet while the findings suggest there did not exist a linear relationship between the capability gap or the level of Cold War tension and the countries' relations with the US, there is evidence to support the claim that both of these factors strongly influence each country's relationship with the Soviet Union. Leftist, rightist and centrist governments responded to both increased Cold War tension and an increase in the capability gap with a harder anti-Soviet stance. This finding is intuitively plausible and also backed up by the quantitative analysis, which finds both variables to be significant at the 1% level in the models concerning relations with the USSR, but not significant in those concerning relations with the US.

Liberalism

Liberal IR theory offers two explanations for changes in the quality of interstate relations; the first is the density of the institutional architecture within which states

⁸⁶⁷ There are, of course, exceptions to this trend, with Mitterrand's support for Reagan's increasingly hawkish stance in the early 1980s perhaps the most obvious. Nevertheless, it is evident that increasing Cold War tensions more often than not hammered-home to socialists and conservatives the dangers of the two-bloc system.

are embedded, which facilitates coordination and enhances trust, while the second is the extent of economic interdependence that exists between the countries.

The importance of IOs in facilitating cooperation is not challenged directly by the theoretical argument here. What is suggested, however, is that interdependence is a structural condition; indeed, there is no evidence from the cases or the quantitative analysis to suggest that variation in IO memberships can explain the quality of relations. As the cases show, poor quality relations occurred periodically even among allies that were locked into dense networks of international governance. Moreover, these institutions were as likely to become the site of increased contestation, as illustrated by the arguments between Canada and the US over breaches of GATT in the 1960s and 1980s. Nor does the quantitative analysis support the contention that IO membership explains variation; the number of IO memberships is not a significant predictor of the quality of the countries' relations with either the US or the USSR.

Nor is there sufficient evidence to support the claim that the degree of economic interdependence can account for the variation in inter-state relations. One problem is that the politics of interdependence create two distinct consequences; on the one hand, many liberals conceived of interdependence as a desirable outcome and treated it as a sign of positive relations, on the other hand, increased economic interdependence was interpreted, by socialists and conservatives alike, as an undesirable condition. While in the former scenario economic interdependence undergirded strong relations, in the latter scenario it provided a source of tension. As with the majority of the explanations that rely on structural attributes, the purported effects are, ultimately, a question of politics. The somewhat contradictory status of

the interdependence argument is probably the reason why it is not a significant predictor of the quality of relations in any of the statistical models.

Marxism

Many of the principal claims of the Marxist approach, particularly those concerning the role of international hierarchy in determining the strength of interstate ties, and the role of economic dependence, identify as their principal drivers similar empirical phenomena as realist and liberal approaches. Accordingly, the validity of these Marxist claims may be gleaned from the effects of the capability gap and economic interdependence discussed above. More specific to Marxism, however, is the claim that interstate relations are structured along class lines, with economic elites in the metropole and client states cooperating at the expense of non-elites in each state. The idea that class divisions buttress strong interstate relations is partially borne out by the evidence from the cases. Commercial elites in particular have been strongly supportive of strong ties with the US and have tended to support political parties advocating such an agenda.

With the exception of West Germany, it is clear that support for strong relations with the US has a discernible class element.⁸⁶⁸ The position of the moderate Conservatives, and later the Thatcherites, in the UK case offers confirming evidence, as does the existence of strong ties between the Canadian Liberals and the financial hubs of Montreal and Toronto. Although it is clear that the financial and international liberal agendas have often operated in tandem, however, it is not entirely clear whether this offers support for the Marxist hypothesis of the elite-

⁸⁶⁸ The economically liberal FDP was not the most liberal in party in international outlook.

driven nature of international relations or whether it merely points to the multiple corollaries of an individualist belief system. While it is worth noting that the variable measuring inequality is not a significant predictor of the quality of bilateral relations, the Marxist account is by far the most difficult theory to operationalize, and the lack of significance of this variable may represent in part this difficulty.

Economic Performance

One common alternative explanation for variation in inter-state relations highlights the role of periods of poor economic performance in promoting nationalist sentiment and creating incentives for leaders to conduct a ‘diversionary’, and potentially bellicose or uncooperative, foreign policy. The evidence from the thesis suggests that, whilst economic performance is linked to the strength of relations, it does not follow any simple linear path. In the British case, for example, poor economic performance is both a consequence of the bellicose foreign policy and a key factor in preventing a larger divide from emerging between the US and Britain. Britain’s economic troubles in the 1960s, on the other hand, forced Wilson to withdraw British forces ‘East of Suez’, leading to a downturn in relations with the Johnson administration.

In the West German case, poor economic performance led to indirect criticism of the US and its insistence on expensive rearmament programmes, but by contributing to a split in the SPD-FDP coalition it ultimately resulted in a beneficial outcome for West German-American relations. In other cases, too, economic performance appears entirely unrelated to the conduct of relations with the US. For example, De Gaulle presided over a rapidly growing French economy in the 1960s, while the early years

of the Thatcher administration were characterised by economic difficulties. Given this complexity, it is perhaps not surprising that the variable measuring economic performance (through annual GDP growth) is not significant in either set of models.

American Politics

It has also been claimed that Euratlantic strategy varies in accordance with the administration in power in the United States. Democrats, this account holds, tend to value close cooperation with their allies more than do Republicans. Yet the evidence presented above finds little role for US partisanship in explaining variation in strategy. The change from Democratic to Republican administrations during the EDC negotiations, for example, seemingly mattered very little. Moreover, the subsequent switch to the Democrats under Kennedy was not responsible for precipitating the crisis in US-Canadian relations of the early 1960s (the writing had been on the wall from the latter years of the Eisenhower administration). In the West German case, moreover, the switch from Democrat to Republican with Reagan's election arguably changed very little, the Carter administration having begun much in its final year to contribute to the re-emergence of tension that so angered the West German left.

The configurational analysis does slightly more to highlight the role played by US politics. It is clear, for example, that the foreign policy changes wrought on by the move towards détente in the late 1960s, and back again in 1979, had a discernible effect on the propensity of the US to tolerate leftist governments, and vice versa (it is instructive in this regard to compare the Wilson administrations before and after 1969, or the Trudeau governments before and after 1979). That said, it is not clear

whether this relates to partisanship in any meaningful way, given that both shifts in foreign policy occurred with the election of a Republican administration. The quantitative analysis also challenges the claim that US politics is important for Euratlantic strategy. Neither the party dummy nor the US ideology variables are significant in either set of models.

Individual Leadership

Perhaps the most common alternative explanation for variation in Cold War strategy is the role played by individual leaders and their personal relations with their counterparts. Historical accounts of Euratlantic strategy that rely on this claim are too numerous to mention. Whilst individual action will always be an important source of foreign policy behaviour, the evidence from the cases suggests that this is often subservient to powerful structural facilitators. Leaders' beliefs concerning the nature of the international, for example, correspond strongly with the views of the party. Indeed, this is the intention behind the activities of the party members, who (s)elect their leader, and the party organisation, which monitors candidates to minimise agency loss. Moreover, the ability of leaders to implement their foreign policy agenda is a function of their ability to gain office and their freedom of manoeuvre once installed, both of which depend upon the constellation of domestic political forces.

Although the importance of the domestic political context for leader behaviour is evident across all of the cases, some examples are particularly instructive. It is often claimed, for example, that the rejection of the EDC Treaty owed much to the presence of Pierre Mendès-France and Henri Bidault and the absence of Jean

Monnet. Yet the influence of these key individuals was a function of the constellation of domestic political forces. The investiture of Mendès-France and the selection of Bidault as foreign minister occurred in response to Gaullist demands for policymakers who would remain neutral on EDC.⁸⁶⁹ Although their agency mattered as key intervals, this explanation cannot be divorced from the structural conditions that placed them in these influential positions. The same can also be said about the role of Jean Monnet. Although his waning influence was a factor in the treaty's rejection, it was itself caused by a decline in the number of similarly minded centrists in the government, on whose support Monnet had previously relied.

The evidence from the configurational analysis also cautions against affording an overly strong role to individuals in the foreign policy process. To begin with, liberal ideology also corresponds with many ostensibly strong personal relations (e.g. King and Truman, Thatcher/Mulroney and Reagan), while socialist and conservative positions match many periods of famously weak relations (e.g. Wilson and Johnson,⁸⁷⁰ Diefenbaker and Kennedy,⁸⁷¹ Schmidt/Trudeau and Reagan). Although the choice between these competing idiographic and nomothetic explanations is a question of one's beliefs about the nature of the social world,⁸⁷² it is notable that the individualist explanation is not only *ad hoc*, but also unfalsifiable. The quantitative analysis used the duration of a leader's tenure to attempt to gain leverage over one aspect of the individualist explanation. The results indicate longer leadership tenure is associated with a decrease in the quality of relations with the US (at the 10% level), but not in relations with the USSR.

⁸⁶⁹ Telegram from David Bruce, US Observer to the Interim Committee of EDC, to the State Department, 12 March 1953

⁸⁷⁰ Ellis (2001)

⁸⁷¹ Martin (1982)

⁸⁷² Gerring (2004), p. 352

	Configurational Analysis	In-Depth Analysis	Quantitative Analysis
Horseshoe Model	Strong relations most common under liberal governments. Some notable exceptions, particularly in the West German and British cases.	Confirmed in the British, French and Canadian models. Less clear in the West German case that pattern is as predicted.	Significant at the 1% level in US models and at 5% level in USSR models. Direction of association as predicted.
Left-Right Model	Does not offer evidence of a left-right divide in Euratlantic-US relations.	Evident that left-right contestation occurs on some issues. In Euratlantic strategy it is not the primary fault line. More observable in West German case.	Not significant in either the US or USSR models.
Realism	Clear that the changing phases of the Cold War are important, but that these interact with ideology.	Security rationale varied depending on ideological commitments.	Significant in US models but direction of association contradicts theory. Performs well in USSR models.
Liberalism	Not included in configurational analysis owing to continuous nature	Importance of trade and investment mediated by partisan concerns.	Not significant in either the US or USSR models.
Marxism	Not included in configurational analysis owing to continuous nature	Evidence that there was a distinct class base to the strength of relations, mediated by ideology.	Not significant in either the US or USSR models.
Economic Performance	No clear relationship emerges between times of recession and strength of relations.	Matters in the cases as a trigger, especially in Britain and West Germany, but effects ultimately depend on political concerns.	Significant in US models but direction of association contradicts theory. Not significant in the USSR models.
American Politics	Evidence that this change was important, especially arrival of Reagan, although confounded by change in Cold War intensity.	Not clear from any of the cases that the changes in US administration make much difference.	Not significant in either the US or USSR models.
Individual Leadership	Periods of poor individual leadership often correlate with ideology (which is the less <i>ad hoc</i> of the two)	Individuals matter at key moments. Clear that individual influence often endogenous to underlying balance of political power	Longer tenure associated with a decline in US models. Not significant for relations with USSR.

Figure 69: Summary of the principal results from the case studies and statistical analysis.

Implications of the Argument

The findings presented above, in particular the validity of the horseshoe model, have several implications for our understanding of the politics of Cold War strategy and for the study of international politics more generally. In the section that follows I group these into three categories: implications for the study of Euratlantic strategy, implications for the field of IR, and further avenues for research arising from the cases.

Implications for Euratlantic Strategy

To begin with, the validity of the horseshoe model undermines the idea that Cold War strategy was characterised by consensus between the major political groupings over the importance of the need to support US containment policy. Reynolds, for example, talks of “the basic continuity in policy between Labour and Conservative governments”, arguing domestic politics has “rarely made a decisive difference to the pattern of Anglo-American relations”.⁸⁷³ Similar claims are common in studies of politics and foreign policy in the four countries (West Germany,⁸⁷⁴ France,⁸⁷⁵ Canada,⁸⁷⁶ and Britain).⁸⁷⁷ These claims arise so frequently because there is often little observable difference between the position of the left and right on issues of Cold War strategy and transatlantic relations.⁸⁷⁸ The horseshoe model shows us why this is the case, however, and suggests that there is a discernible politics of Cold War

⁸⁷³ Reynolds (1985), p. 3

⁸⁷⁴ Szabo (2004), p. 7; Techau (2010), p. 178

⁸⁷⁵ Grant (1985), p. 412; Hoffmann (1984/5); Soutou (2005), pp. 103-104; Tiersky (1995), p. 112

⁸⁷⁶ Nossal (1985), p. 218

⁸⁷⁷ Addison (1998), p. 258; Blank (1977), p. 681; Dunne (2004), p. 895; Frankel (1974), p. 575;

Frankel (1975), pp. 33-34; Hassner & Roper (1990), p. 13

⁸⁷⁸ E.g. Bow & Black (2008/9), p. 11; Dobson (1990a), p. 389; Doran (2006), pp. 396-397

strategy structured around the disagreements between liberalism and its socialist and conservative competitors.

This account of Cold War strategy also complements existing historical accounts by offering a systematic explanation for variance in Euratlantic strategy that goes beyond the politics of personality or the reliance on idiosyncratic, country-level factors. Not only does this provide a more parsimonious, and falsifiable, explanation for a broad set of empirical events, it also helps us place individual events and actions within a broader context. For example, it helps us understand the similarity of the Gaullist challenge to conservative attitudes expressed in Britain, France and, to some extent, West Germany, thereby pointing to its relatively unexceptional nature. It also helps characterise the changing nature of conservatism by stressing the liberal underpinnings of new right ideology, offering a theoretical basis for the closeness of relations during this time that moves beyond personality politics. On the left, too, the theory highlights the similarity of the Cold War positions of socialist parties across the four countries and helps us place these movements within a broader, regional context.

The argument also offers a political account of anti-Americanism that takes us beyond existing accounts, which have tended to focus mainly on cultural differences or on the roles of specific individuals in cultivating anti-American thought.⁸⁷⁹ Viewing individuals' perceptions of the US in relation to the manner in which they perceive international relations offers an alternative approach: By offering a plausible account of how deeply rooted ideological traditions determine the role played by the US in international order we are able to better understand *why* the US appears threatening. This account differs from existing cultural arguments by

⁸⁷⁹ E.g. Katzenstein & Keohane (2007); Kennedy (2009); Lacorne (1986); Nossal (2008)

suggesting that anti-Americanism is not really about America *per se*. To put it crudely, for those on the left it is about the immanent, aggressive tendencies within the capitalist mode of production, while for the right it is about the insecurity generated by substantial divergences in national capabilities under conditions of anarchy.

Implications for IR Theory

A broader consequence of the argument is the challenge it offers to existing accounts of ideology in foreign policymaking, almost all of which have relied exclusively on the left-right model to explain the predicted structure of partisanship. As I have demonstrated above, in crucial areas of international strategy partisan contestation follows a curvilinear pattern that is better represented by the horseshoe model. There is also clear evidence that this pattern applies to international relations more broadly, a claim I discuss in greater detail below. The horseshoe model helps improve our understanding of ideology without losing the content of the left-right approach, which forms the horizontal dimension of the model. Thus, the horseshoe model advances our understanding without any significant decrease in parsimony. It also highlights the existence of a greater role for ideology in international politics than has previously been acknowledged by noting that the commonality of left and right in foreign policy is not sufficient to disprove the existence of significant ideological cleavages.

It also offers a significant challenge to the status of mainstream IR theories as neutral analytical tools. From Wight's 'trilogy' to Wendt's 'cultures of anarchy', key debates in IR theory revolve around the nature of the international and the competing

accounts offered by realism, liberalism and Marxism.⁸⁸⁰ Yet the evidence suggests that the core elements of each theory's conception of the international are deeply rooted in *political* debates concerning over the direction of foreign policy. The underlying basis of socialist, liberal and conservative characterisations of international politics appear to approximate 'folk theories' of Marxism, liberalism and realism, respectively. These traditions of thought, therefore, are an important element in the very processes they attempt to explain. Indeed, it is notable that while variables derived from the internal theoretical logic of IR theory perform poorly in the models, those measuring the strength of these traditions of thought perform remarkably well. The argument contributes to the literature on the theory/ideology⁸⁸¹ nexus by illuminating the partisan base of different theoretical lenses and demonstrating the utility of approaching the question from an explanatory, rather than postmodern, perspective.

The argument also contributes to the growing literature on Comparative Politics and IR by examining the relationship between party ideology and variation in the institutional architecture of polity. Existing accounts of domestic politics in IR have often overlooked ideology in favour of institutionalist and rationalist explanations.⁸⁸² The argument offered here, however, suggests that the effects of ideology and institutions cannot easily be separated. It does so by highlighting the variation in the nature of partisan contestation in the foreign policy domain that results from various combinations of institutional arrangements and ideological scope. The findings contribute to the literature on regime-type by further disaggregating the democratic

⁸⁸⁰ Doyle (1997), pp. 18-20; Wendt (1999); Wight (1991)

⁸⁸¹ E.g. Bell (2002); Jahn (1998); Jahn (1999); Jahn (2009); Reus-Smit (2001), p. 592; Rosenberg (1990), pp. 296-297; Schindler (2014); Walker (1993)

⁸⁸² E.g. Bueno de Mesquita (2002); Caporaso (1997); Evans (1993); Milner (1998)

polity into its various sub-types and examining the different nature of the party system in each.⁸⁸³

Further Avenues for Research

One finding that emerges from the case studies concerns the relationship between the legislative seat share of the governing party and the autonomy of the executive in foreign policy. The conventional wisdom is that executive autonomy increases along with seat share because each additional seat increases the number of party members who can defect from the government without risking defeat in the legislature, thereby affording the executive additional room for manoeuvre.⁸⁸⁴ Evidence from the cases, however, suggests that this view is largely incorrect. While reaching the 50 percent legislative threshold is vital for forming and maintaining a government, the possession of surplus seats appears to undermine executive autonomy by increasing the prevalence of backbench dissent. This is noticeable in the Labour governments of Wilson and Attlee after the 1950 and 1966 elections respectively, and after Eden's success in the 1955 election. It also appears to be the case for the SPD in West Germany following the 1980 election, while anecdotal evidence from the Canadian case also indicates wariness on behalf of party leaders regarding strong majorities.

The argument also offers an explanation for the relative stability of the Euratlantic commitment to the framework of the Western alliance. Whereas existing works locate this stability in the pursuit of the 'national interest' by successive governments, the approach here highlights the role the political centre plays in

⁸⁸³ Building on Elman (2000)

⁸⁸⁴ Auerswald (1999), p. 492; Hagan (1990), p. 83; Koch & Sullivan (2010), pp. 619-620; Palmer *et al.* (2004), p. 9; Volgy & Schwarz (1991), p. 625

undergirding continuity. Despite the existence of many on the left and right willing to pursue an independent foreign policy, these groups were almost always required to govern with the consent of liberal elements, whether in their own party (as in Britain and Canada), or within the governing coalition (the case in France and West Germany). The centre is better able to ally with elements to the left and right because the differences on both the vertical and horizontal dimensions of the horseshoe are only moderate, whereas both left and right must overcome severe ideological differences on the horizontal dimension to cooperate. This helps facilitate centre-left and centre-right cooperation within and between parties and bolsters the influence of the centre. In this way, realist, liberal and constructivist accounts of the stability of the Western alliance may be complemented by an institutional explanation.

A final potentially interesting finding is the extent to which domestic opposition to the government's foreign policy agenda can undermine the very outcome being sought. Traditionally the literature on domestic constraint has emphasised the negative consequences of domestic opposition for the government's desired policy outcomes.⁸⁸⁵ A few works have, in contrast, argued the opposite; that domestic opposition may increase the government's bargaining position,⁸⁸⁶ or at least lead to the formulation of 'better' policy.⁸⁸⁷ Yet little scholarship has addressed the ability of the domestic opposition to achieve their aims through this method. The cases illustrate that opposition to the government's agenda can have adverse consequences in this regard. In the Suez case the Labour party's opposition to the government's tough agenda undermined the credibility of its commitment to deploy force and, ultimately, made this latter option more likely. In the West German case, moreover,

⁸⁸⁵ McGillivray (1998); Milner (1997); Stein (1993)

⁸⁸⁶ Putnam (1988)

⁸⁸⁷ Kaufmann (2004)

SPD opposition to INF deployment made this option appear less credible and undermined early attempts to reach a negotiated settlement with the Soviet Union prior to deployment of the missiles.

Epilogue: Beyond the Cold War

The end of the Cold War at the end of the 1980s and the collapse of the Soviet Union had profound effects for world politics. A collection of newly independent states entered the international community, Russia and the former Warsaw Pact countries began the a slow, and at times, tortuous transition to liberal democracy, while the Western search for a new *raison d'être* led to a marked broadening of the Atlantic security agenda and the emergence of a host of new enemies, some states, some not. New issues gained increasing prominence (such as environmentalism and terrorism) while others declined in prominence (like nuclear weapons and economic management). The distribution of capabilities also underwent drastic changes with the demise of the bipolar system that had characterised the international politics of the Cold War, to be replaced by the global hegemony of the US 'hyper-power'.⁸⁸⁸

What was the consequence of these changes on the relationship between ideology and foreign policy? Does the horseshoe model still capture the structure of partisan competition in international relations? As the seismic events of the early 1990s potentially affect the explanatory power of the theory it is worth reflecting on the contemporary applicability of the horseshoe model to recent international events. Clearly, ideology and party politics did not remain untouched by these seismic processes. With its global 'beacon' and sometime financial-backer absent from the

⁸⁸⁸ Layne (2002), p. 239; Lieber & Alexander (2005); Wohlforth (1999), p. 18

international stage, orthodox Marxism and variants of socialist thought declined, while liberalism experienced a surge in popular support.⁸⁸⁹ The parties of the right and left, both, continued their convergence towards the political centre, particularly at the elite level. Increasingly governments of the left turned to 'Third Way' social democracy, while those on the right labelled themselves 'social conservatives'. Both new groupings increasingly embraced liberal principles.

Yet the positions of the left and the right did not disappear. True, their influence diminished somewhat in the wake of the Cold War's end, but liberalism's triumph is far from complete. Socialist principles remain strong on the left of contemporary social democratic parties and in the new environmental parties of the 1980s and 1990s. Traditional conservatism, too, persists on the fringes of rightist parties and in the new nationalist and populist movements increasingly emerging across Europe. Moreover, the horseshoe pattern has supervened onto the issues that emerged onto the international scene in the 1990s: Economic and financial globalization, the intensification of the international legal architecture,⁸⁹⁰ the deepening of the European Union,⁸⁹¹ global free trade, humanitarian intervention, democracy promotion. All these vital issues of recent concern have pitted the political centre against the vestiges of socialism and conservatism.

This is, of course, hardly surprising. After all, support for each of these implies a belief in a more multifaceted conception of authority and a contingent notion of state sovereignty. Most also rely, at least implicitly, on economic or rationalist assumptions. And yet scholarly accounts of ideology continue to rely on the left-right

⁸⁸⁹ Fukuyama (1992) described liberalism as the 'last man standing' in the wake of the Cold War.

⁸⁹⁰ Spiro (2000), p. 9

⁸⁹¹ Hooghe *et al.* (2002)

model to understand post-Cold War foreign policy.⁸⁹² As the thesis above has argued, challenging this basic assumption is necessary in order to better understand the complex relationship between ideology and international relations.

⁸⁹² E.g. Rathbun (2004); Thérien & Noël (2008), p. 189

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Appendix: Dimensions of Ideology

CMP Code	Description	Dimension	Position
101	Foreign special relations +	Vertical	Individualism
102	Foreign special relations -	Vertical	Collectivism
103	Anti-imperialism	Horizontal	Egalitarianism
104	Militarism +	Horizontal	Elitism
105	Militarism -	Horizontal	Egalitarianism
106	Peace	Horizontal	Egalitarianism
107	Internationalism +	Vertical	Individualism
108	European integration +	Vertical	Individualism
109	Internationalism -	Vertical	Collectivism
110	European integration -	Vertical	Collectivism
201	Freedom and human rights	Vertical	Individualism
202	Democracy	?	?
203	Constitutionalism +	Vertical	Individualism
204	Constitutionalism -	Vertical	Collectivism
301	Decentralisation	Vertical	Individualism
302	Centralisation	Vertical	Collectivism
303	Governmental and administrative efficiency	Vertical	Individualism
304	Political corruption	Vertical	Individualism
305	Political authority (strong government)	Vertical	Collectivism
401	Free enterprise	Vertical	Individualism

CMP Code	Description	Dimension	Position
402	Incentives	Vertical	Individualism
403	Market regulation	Horizontal	Egalitarianism
404	Economic planning	Horizontal	Egalitarianism
405	Corporatism	Vertical	Collectivism
406	Protectionism +	Vertical	Collectivism
407	Protectionism -	Vertical	Individualism
408	Economic goals	?	?
409	Keynesian demand management	Vertical	Collectivism
410	Productivity	?	?
411	Technology and infrastructure	?	?
412	Controlled economy	Vertical	Collectivism
413	Nationalisation	Horizontal	Egalitarianism
414	Economic orthodoxy	Vertical	Individualism
415	Marxist analysis	Horizontal	Egalitarianism
416	Anti-growth economy	?	?
501	Environmental protection	?	?
502	Culture	?	?
503	Social justice	Horizontal	Egalitarianism
504	Welfare state expansion	Horizontal	Egalitarianism
505	Welfare state limitation	Vertical	Individualism
506	Education expansion	?	?
507	Education limitation	?	?

CMP Code	Description	Dimension	Position
601	National way of life +	Horizontal	Elitism
602	National way of life -	Horizontal	Egalitarianism
603	Traditional morality +	Horizontal	Elitism
604	Traditional morality -	Horizontal	Egalitarianism
605	Law and order	Horizontal	Elitism
606	Social harmony	Horizontal	Elitism
607	Multiculturalism +	Horizontal	Egalitarianism
608	Multiculturalism -	Horizontal	Elitism
701	Labour groups +	Horizontal	Egalitarianism
702	Labour groups -	Horizontal	Elitism
703	Agriculture and farmers	Horizontal	Elitism
704	Middle class and professional groups	?	?
705	Underprivileged minority groups	?	?
706	Non-economic demographic groups	?	?