The Counsel against Despair:
A Study in John Chrysostom's Ethics

by

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Christian ethics are ecclesial. The aim of this study is to sustain this conviction in the case of St John Chrysostom. The pastoral concern "The Counsel against Despair" provides the interpretative key to his ethics. The full spectrum of his works, most of which are homilies, are examined in this study. The thesis begins with an account of the wider theological issues involved. This is particularly necessary because pastoral ministry has generally been regarded as peripheral to theology proper, and homiletical material has usually been dismissed as an improper source for understanding patristic ethics.

In the main body of the thesis, the problem of despair is situated in Chrysostom's overall theological vision. The intrinsic connection of ethics to ecclesiology is explored through an analysis of the pivotal role which a community in mutual consolation and exhortation plays in the overcoming of moral impotence and moral confusion. The implications for the moral commitments of an individual are also examined. Attention is given throughout the analysis to the crucial points of departure between Chrysostom and those among his predecessors and contemporaries who maintain a more rational and volitional interpretation of ethics.

A concluding chapter reflects on Chrysostom's contribution to the understanding of the nature of pastoral ministry in the modern age. An Augustinian and a post-Vatican II Roman Catholic approach to the problem of ecclesiastical discipline are analysed and found unsatisfactory. Chrysostom's line of reasoning offers a way to situate pastoral ministry in a wider moral framework. The thesis aims to show that homiletical material and the place of the affections in theological ethics should receive more attention from patrologists and systematic theologians.
Christian ethics are ecclesial. The aim of this study is to sustain this conviction in the case of the ethics of St John Chrysostom. The pastoral concern "The Counsel against Despair" provides the interpretative key to his ethics. The full spectrum of Chrysostom's works, most of which are homilies, are examined in this study. The patristic interest in this analysis is clear. For Chrysostom has in the main been regarded as a popularizer rather than as a theologian in his own right. This thesis explores his original contribution to theological ethics. More importantly, it seeks to gain insight into a systematic theological question: how are pastoral ministry and theological work related to each other? Through the reporting and analysis of Chrysostom's ethics, we hope to provide theological distance from the contemporary scene in the Western world and thus gain a vantage point which will enable us to situate pastoral ministry within a wider moral framework than that informed by a more intellectual and volitional understanding of the gospel. The thesis begins with an account of these wider issues at stake. Specifically, it draws to attention two issues in Western Christendom. First, it tends to hold an individualistic conception of pastoral ministry. Secondly, it maintains a hermeneutical principle which biases against the use of homiletical material as a valid source for understanding the history of ethics, with the consequence of impoverishing our understanding of the theological ferment in the patristic
period and of denying that period any serious contribution to moral theology.

Chapter Two situates the problem of despair in Chrysostom's overall theological scheme. Two features stand out. First, in contrast with the way in which the problem has come to be internalised and individualised in the classical treatment of it, a communal focus is maintained by Chrysostom. Chrysostom emphasizes that it embodies a pastoral commitment of the pious to the historical community. The last judgement constitutes the only divide between members of the human community. Consideration is then given to the place of confidence in Chrysostom's ethics. Whereas a more intellectually inclined theology will regard confidence, rather than despair, as characteristic of the Christian life, Chrysostom underlines the point that the essential solidarity of the human community in its sin and redemption prevents any full expression of confidence in the present age. The second feature of Chrysostom's treatment of despair concerns its temporal focus. God's unwillingness to abandon man in the face of despair is shown first in his providential dealings in history, and secondly in the biography of each individual. The chapter concludes with a consideration of Chrysostom's distinctive use of philanthropia as the embodiment of God's patience.

The emphases on communal commitment and divine patience
in the ordering of moral life carry profound implications for the relation of ethics to ecclesiology. These implications are explored in Chapters Three and Four. Chapter Three analyses the pivotal role which a community in mutual consolation plays in the overcoming of moral impotence. It begins with an account of the particular philosophical and theological concerns which determine how ecclesiastical discipline and reconciliation are conceived in Christian antiquity. The works of 2-Clement and of Clement of Alexandria are specifically examined. What emerges from this survey is that the church has to a great extent come to be regarded as a community under the guidance of the elite. Set against this historical background, Chrysostom's distinctive approach to the problem of discipline and reconciliation becomes clear. He underlines the church as a community of friends. This argument is developed, first by analysing the concept of friendship, a central theme in Chrysostom's practical recommendations for overcoming moral weakness. The concept stresses man's essential responsiveness and communality. It is a suitable moral category for Chrysostom to express his concern that the church as a whole is the object of God's reconciliation. The argument then proceeds to identify the Christological foundations of friendship in the Ascension and in the naked Christ. The exaltation of man at Christ's Ascension inaugurates the church as the community of friends. This friendship is co-ordinated in one Body, and is exercised within a spiritual rule. The motif of the continuing
presence of the naked Christ allows Chrysostom to bring to the fore the cruciality of evangelistic and pastoral concerns within the historical community. This emphasis on the naked Christ does not minimise the ontological significance of the Christ-event. The continuing condescension of God in the naked Christ is shown to be underpinned by the two moments of Christ's presence, the Passion and the eschaton. Chrysostom's vision of the church as the community of friends sets reconciliation within the wider horizon of redemption. It reveals at the same time that the claim of justice can easily slip into inhumanity because the claim forecloses the opportunity for sinners under scrutiny to repent and drives them to excessive despair.

Chapter Four goes on to examine how a community in mutual exhortation allows for the overcoming of moral confusion. The chapter begins with an identification of various issues in early Christianity which contribute to the severing of ethics from ecclesiology. Chrysostom maintains on the other hand that ecclesiology and ethics are integral to each other. The argument is developed in three stages. First, Chrysostom emphasizes the moral self as a responding agent. The creatureliness of man's moral activity is underlined. Secondly, the predicament of man is located in his communal existence, in particular in the passion for vainglory. Social intercourse is not only corrupting for the spiritually immature. It carries with it
an essential corruption. This problem is all the more serious because communal life, as Chrysostom interprets it, is meant to be integral to the appropriation of virtue. Abstrated from the sustaining power of God, it has become a hindrance. In the final stage of the argument, Chrysostom's dispensational understanding of God's condescension is analysed. A double-standard ethic characterised moral life under the Old Covenant. For the populace, the moral world was confined to the material order. Even for the saints, their response was individualistic and internalised. The feature unique to the New Covenant lies in the content of the response now made possible. Commitment to the historical community has now become the content of man's moral activity, in accordance with the widening of the moral horizon revealed in the light of the true glory of Christ. Furthermore, Chrysostom's conception of moral life is set in contrast with that of Augustine. For the latter, his interpretation of the supreme good as transcendent and eschatological leads him to deny the primacy of the historical community in moral life.

Having attended to the primary and determining consideration of the relation of ethics to ecclesiology, Chapter Five studies the mark of regeneration in an individual. The importance given to Mt. 7:13-14 in Chrysostom's writings suggests affliction as the central characteristic of Christian life. Studies in Chrysostom's exegesis of the Psalms of Ascent and in his panegyrics on
martyrs indicate that his doctrine of suffering is influenced more by the traditions of martyr-theology than by the contemplative ideal. Furthermore, the question is raised whether it is right to regard his doctrine as Stoic, as many modern interpreters have suggested. Chrysostom's distinctive position is then brought out in relation to two issues. First, why suffering assumes precedence over good works; secondly, how suffering and joy are related to each other. The points of divergence between Chrysostom's doctrine and both the Alexandrian and Antiochene traditions emerge in the course of the examination of these two issues. A detailed examination is given of his understanding that suffering is a joyful suffering which originates in a life oriented to God, and that it is the proper response of an individual to the redemptive love of God for the whole world.

A concluding chapter offers a critique of two contemporary analyses of the nature of pastoral ministry. The first is an Augustinian formulation as proposed by O'Donovan. His aversion to romantic idealism leads him to regard pastoral ministry as a ministry of compromise which is set in relation to the truth. Pastoral ministry is set forth in terms of a truth-appearance dialectic. The second model is that of McDonagh. He defends the primacy of "person" over and against authoritarian and restrictive structures in the institutional church. His conception is undergirded by a dynamic understanding of history. The
realm of appearances is taken to be the sole measure of truth. Despite the polarization between these two positions, they occupy a shared ground in so far as both receive their heritage from the Western Christian tradition with its concern with eschatology. Chrysostom's analysis of moral life leads us to question whether a Christian moral theology can properly witness to what the end of man is, without giving at the same time some indication of what sustains moral effort. Chrysostom's line of reasoning suggests that pastoral ministry should be understood as a witness to truth in the wider soteriological context of divine patience during the present eschatological pause.

Not much attempt has been made by scholars to use homiletical material as a proper source for patristic ethics, nor has due recognition usually been given to the importance of affection in theological ethics. Our study of the relation of ethics to ecclesiology in the case of Chrysostom suggests that both issues deserve to receive more attention from patrologists and systematic theologians.
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John Henry Newman on one occasion wrote admirably of the "intimate sympathy and compassionateness" which St John Chrysostom held for the whole world, and of the "discriminating affectionateness" with which he accepted every one "for what is personal in him and unlike others". For me this warm appreciation aptly expresses my gratitude to the Rev'd Professor Maurice Wiles. I am exceedingly grateful to him both for his labour in directing this thesis and for his unfailing pastoral care over the last four years. He has also very kindly and painstakingly corrected my English in the final draft of the thesis. All awkwardness and errors which remain are my own.

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CHAPTER ONE: Chrysostom and Patristic Ethics: A Reappraisal?

Christian ethics are ecclesial. The aim of this study is to sustain this conviction in the case of the ethics of St John Chrysostom. The pastoral concern "The Counsel against Despair" provides the interpretive key to his ethics.

That Chrysostom is a pastor, exegete, and social critic is acknowledged by all scholars.¹ Newman considers "St. Chrysostom's charm to lie in his intimate sympathy and compassionateness for the whole world, not only in its strength, but in its weakness". He underlines "the discriminating affectionateness with which he accepts every one for what is personal in him and unlike others".² Nevertheless, how this "intimate sympathy and compassionateness for the whole world" "in its weakness" is related to theological ethics proper has seldom been explored. It is fashionable for patristic scholars who are more inclined towards the speculative fathers to dismiss Chrysostom as a conventional moralist "whose contribution to the history of theology was minimal".³ Great originality is not a mark of his thought, so some suggest.⁴ Others find Chrysostom's theological position puzzling. How could he insist equally on ethical holiness and pastoral love? Socrates concludes at the end of his discussion of Chrysostom: "It is most inexplicable to me, how with a zeal
so ardent for the practice of self-control and blamelessness of life, he should in his sermons appear to teach a loose view of temperance." Furthermore, while there is a general consensus that Chrysostom's ascetic rigour and outspoken sermons both inspire and edify later generations, there is an equal insistence that this forthrightness "to the point of indiscretion" makes him "ill-fitted to be bishop of an affluent city filled with gossip and intrigue". His life is regarded as a tragic one. This opinion suggests a hesitation among theologians whether or not to regard Chrysostom as an exemplar of the Christian ideal, of an ideal which can be recommended to all Christians.

A pastor and exegete, yet a mere popularizer of the profounder Cappadocian thought? a pastor who trims his sails in response to the varied exigences of the situation? and a bishop whose life could have had a better outcome, if he had been more politically wise and responsible to his flock? In the following study, we shall examine the full spectrum of Chrysostom's works, drawing from his early ascetic writings, his exegesis of the Scriptures, and the various letters, treatises, and apologies. We shall endeavour to ascertain whether or not there is a coherence in Chrysostom's presentation of ethics; and to observe the manner in which his distinctive theological position informs his pastoral ministry, so that his life is consequent upon
this profound theological understanding.

But our study should not be regarded as a modern vindication of Chrysostom in the line of Palladius' *dialogus de vita Johannis Chrysostomi*. Nor is it a matter of bringing him out of obscurity in the West, despite the relatively limited effort made towards a theological understanding of Chrysostom in the English-speaking world, or even among French scholars, whose works in the main concentrate on manuscript studies (as shown in the prolific production of Chrysostom's treatises in the *Sources chrétiennes* Series). Rather, by studying a figure who has not much place in the typical History of Doctrine, we hope to illumine "the on-going life and history of the church" at the end of the fourth century, and hence to contribute towards a more accurate understanding of the theological ferment at that time. Specifically, we wish to evaluate the theological significance of Chrysostom's ethics (and ecclesiology, as will become apparent in the course of our study), although it may not have been adopted or absorbed in the subsequent history of the church.

Nevertheless, what undergirds our patristic concern is a systematic theological interest. The question which runs through our study is this: How are pastoral ministry and theological work related to each other? Admittedly, the tension between involvement and withdrawal in fourth century
Christianity is not culturally identical with that in the contemporary world. Still, the theological questions face a contemporary Christian with no less acuteness than they face a Gregory of Nazianzus and a John Chrysostom. Can the tension between involving himself with human needs on the one hand and finding fulfilment and relief in solitude on the other be resolved? Whether or not this dilemma is a false one is dependent on our conception of the *summum bonum*, and on how it is efficacious and unitive for all those who participate in it. Especially in Chapters Three and Four, we shall argue for the internal relation of pastoral ministry to the gospel. Put differently, our query turns on the nature of regeneration. We shall endeavour to maintain the thesis that communality and affection are indispensable elements in evangelical ethics. In the course of our studies, the more intellectual approach to ethics (say, in Gregory of Nazianzus and in Augustine) will be presented at various instances as a contrast to Chrysostom's stance. Needless to say, the patristic interest in this exercise is clear. More importantly, these are pointers which carry with them a systematic significance. For we wish to indicate how Chrysostom's particular understanding of the church and pastoral ministry can help Western Christendom (specifically twentieth century Protestantism) whose conceptual framework is so indebted to Augustine, to re-examine its theological premises. Of course, the task of arbitrating between Chrysostom and Augustine falls outside
our scope of inquiry. Nor are the differences between their approaches simply a matter of historical accidents, consequent upon the emergence of various doctrinal controversies which could be superficially reconciled or dismissed. Bedrock differences in the understanding of the gospel are at stake. Some of these will become apparent in the course of our presentation. Nevertheless, through our reporting and analysis of Chrysostom's ethics, we hope to gain a theological vantage point from which to address the contemporary scene; this will enable us to situate pastoral ministry within a wider moral context than that informed by a more intellectual and volitional understanding of the gospel. Chapter Six attempts such a cross-fertilization of thought, ancient and contemporary.

Before we proceed to analyse Chrysostom's ethics, two preliminary considerations are necessary. The first is a clarification of our subject of inquiry; and the second is a note of reservation about contemporary approaches to patristic ethics. These two considerations serve also to elaborate our theological concern raised in the previous paragraph.

(i) The gravity of the problem of despair has generally been recognised in the history of the church. It is an acute concern in the age of antiquity for Christians and pagans alike. Consolatio to the bereaved is an
established literary genre; rigorism within the institutional church is a cause of despair for the mass who easily fall short of the call for moral purity and a philosophic life. Even the rich are not immune from it: so Clement of Alexandria tries to soften the harsh saying of Jesus against the rich in Mk. 19:17-31, and Basil of Caesarea consoles them by declaring that "the group which is in despair and which holds salvation difficult is called before the poor. Such is the philanthropia of the Physician to the weaker ones; he gives them a share of aid first." Subsequent to the patristic period, Aquinas discusses the problem of despair in the course of his systematic presentation of human emotionality. It is identified as one of the five contending emotions (de passionibus irascibilibus). And later in his discussion of the theological virtues, Aquinas singles it out as the greatest sin. Despair is also a prominent theme in mystical traditions, for example in François de Sales, and in Ignatius. An individual is brought to an acute awareness of his sins in the face of divine holiness. Kierkegaard names it "The Sickness unto Death", and proceeds to provide a "Christian psychological exposition" of it, as he puts it in the subtitle of his treatise on despair. There is a general recognition throughout church history that despair is a problem for the weak, who are overwhelmed by the precepts and counsels of perfection of the moralists and ascetic writers.
We have said that our concern ("The Counsel against Despair") is a pastoral one. And we have underlined the point that this problem falls under the rubric of ecclesiology proper, and that it constitutes the key to an understanding of Chrysostom's ethics. All this remains to be shown. Yet scepticism abounds from the outset. For although the problem of despair is recognised and its gravity acknowledged in the history of the church, the cure and diagnosis of it are in the main neither an issue which is assigned to a doctrine of the church, nor a concern linked with the manner in which the church as a whole gives ethical expression to the gospel. This is clear in the mystical traditions and in Kierkegaard. Despair is fundamentally a problem of the individual in relation to God. For Kierkegaard, the cure probably lies in being "a solitary individual" in order that he may have "the purity of heart" "to will one thing". As for Aquinas, despite his recognition of the role of human emotions in moral striving, they do not pose any particularly notable problem for him. His inquiry into contending emotions is undertaken for the sake of completeness within a general consideration of the passions, as an aspect of personality, rather than for any interest in points of morality. And even if despair is regarded as a pastoral problem, it is primarily a concern between the stricken individual and a spiritual director or confessor, who is called upon to help him
analyse the problem and to remind him of the mercy and power of God.\textsuperscript{20} This is also reflected in the consolatio (and παράμυθία) in the early church. Admittedly, a concession to the weak is evident from the existence of two distinct counsels for the bereaved. On the one hand, ἀπάθεια is prescribed for the spiritually elite. On the other, there lies μεταφυσικαία which is the moral counsel for the masses who are "unliberated from worldly attachments" and incapable of viewing sorrow and death as indifferentia. Nevertheless, both approaches are interpreted as "two boundaries of a more expansive theology of gradual advance and ascent", for example, in the Cappadocian scheme of salvation. The weak are called to hold "the passions within reasonable limits".\textsuperscript{21} Thus, even when the problem of despair is interpreted as a pastoral problem, it is a matter for the individual's concern. The community contributes nothing of positive significance; and affection is an entity of indifferentia to be held "within reasonable limits".

Our ensuing study will call into question this approach and analysis. We shall explore the place of affection and community in Chrysostom's theological scheme.

Before turning to our second consideration (on the contemporary treatment of patristic ethics), it is worthwhile to remark briefly on Kirk's magnum opus, The Vision of God: The Christian Doctrine of the Summum Bonum. This will illustrate the definition we have given of the
Kirk presents man's *sumnum bonum* in terms of the vision of God. The highest prerogative of the Christian is the activity of worship, and "nowhere except in this activity will be found the key to his ethical problems". For Kirk, "worship" is not interpreted strictly speaking as a corporate activity: the true line of succession from the New Testament lies in the emphasis upon contemplative prayer. So the church's aim is "to help man to see God". The Church must always and everywhere set before men the highest standard she knows in conduct, the truest forms of worship and of creed. But she must be very slow indeed to enforce them even by the threat of confining her membership to those who acquiesce. Kirk passes a negative judgement on the implementation of corporate discipline, on the codification of moral precepts, and on the organization of the monastic movement. He labels these respectively as "institutionalism", "formalism", and "rigorism"; they are intrusions into the central ethical motif of Christianity, namely worship. Under the spirit of worship, disciplinary actions would be pastoral rather than penal; external moral rules are unnecessary because "a spontaneous orderliness begins to grapple with the chaos of an individual's passions" once his thoughts are turned to God; "the progress of worship" "evolves along..."
with itself the rules of a Christian life". And rigorism would constitute a continual challenge for each individual against naturalist and pantheistic understandings of Christianity. Although rigorism is not universally recommended, it must have its permanent place "however much at the same time we set ourselves to live in the joyous fellowship of human society, and as the beneficiaries of God in things both great and small".  

Kirk's presentation of ethics as worship (understood as contemplation) is to a great extent consistent with the way in which the problem of despair has generally been diagnosed in the course of the history of the church, as we have indicated earlier. Even if we leave aside the question of how "a spontaneous orderliness" lays hold on the worshipper, so that external rules of moral conduct become unnecessary, namely in what manner this spontaneity is related to the revelation of the Holy Spirit as Christ's Spirit, we still hesitate to concur with Kirk's doctrine of the church and his solution to the problems of moral impotence and confusion. For the church is tacitly assumed to be a dispenser of God's grace. True, it must be gentle in its discipline; yet the tasks of "setting before" men and "enforcing" standards are not called into question by Kirk. In the last analysis, Kirk regards the church as standing in solidarity with God rather than with man. The church as a whole is not fundamentally the object of God's grace.
Kirk's failure to grasp the receptive character of the church renders his implementation of moral rules and discipline problematic. Instead of seeing the possibility of linking rules and discipline to God's redemptive purposes (that is, to see them as a deposit given by God to the whole church in order that it might show itself to be and might grow as a holy community), they are reduced to the status of externals and intrusions into a true worship of God. Moral impotence is overcome, so Kirk would envisage it, in the activity of contemplation. His reservation about rigorism suggests that this contemplative activity consists in an uncoerced worshipping of God within a "joyous fellowship of human society". It remains unclear whether Kirk makes a proper evaluation of the communality of man, both in its collective egocentricity and in its redemptive significance in God's providence. Correspondingly, there is unease whether or not this leads to a truncation of the scope of moral theology proper.

(ii) This digression on Kirk leads us to our second preliminary remark with regard to the present state of research in patristic ethics. Norris' article "Patristic Ethics" in A Dictionary of Christian Ethics serves as a convenient point of departure for our reflection. In this article, he insists that on the one hand in the Latin West the question of conformity to a legalistic code constitutes the major concern; the church focuses on the
doctrine of forgiveness and this leads to a development of the doctrines of baptism and of penance. On the other hand in the Greek East ascetic ethics and mysticism prevail. He states that "in the Eastern and Western Churches alike, it was understood that Christian vocation involved a rejection of the world and its ways. This attitude implied not only the separateness of the Christian community from the society in which it was set, but also a negative judgement on the individual, social and political aims of the Roman imperial world." They retained in their ethics "the traditional Christian pessimism about the character and potentialities of the secular order". 

Norris' presentation of patristic ethics is clearly too sweeping and generalised. (For example, this is evident in his conflation of the positions of Ambrose and Augustine under the rubric "Ambrosian-Augustinian analysis". This perhaps could be excused by the requirement of conciseness for a dictionary entry.) Our unease, however, lies in our doubt whether (patristic) ethics can be analysed exclusively in terms of historical development. The article leaves us with a sense that patristic ethics is essentially a matter of historical contingency. What shapes patristic ethics, according to Norris, is the occasion of the conversion of Constantine which forces the church to acclimatize to the new situation. Again, even if we leave aside the dispute whether historical causes in general sufficiently
define patristic ethics, it remains implausible that one
historical event in the fourth century should provide the
focal point in the development of Christian ethics from the
beginning of the second century to the middle of the fifth
century. Interpretations of the various doctrinal
controversies of the same period provide an illuminating
comparison. While the existence of the various
controversies is well-documented, the theological concerns
of the "heretics" remain a matter of dispute. Once these
concerns come to light, they become indicators which help us
to re-evaluate the social and theological dynamics of the
time. And these are usually more varied than had been
generally assumed. At least this much the contemporary
critical patristic scholarship has taught us. This
comparison indicates to us the danger in isolating the
historical cause in the development of patristic ethics, no
matter how significant the particular incident may appear in
retrospect. Norris' interpretation runs the risk of a
Procrustean truncation of patristic ethics.

Having said this, our disagreement with Norris also
concerns the theological issue of hermeneutics. Now Norris
does suggest that "some representatives in the Antiochene
School" do not conform to the ascetic and mystical tradition
in the East. But when we turn to his article on John
Chrysostom, we are simply told that Chrysostom is to a great
extent a moralist and social critic. Not much
contribution towards ethics proper is indicated. Why is this so? The issue turns on what constitutes the proper source material for understanding patristic ethics. A person who takes the stance that the patristic age is little more than the working out of various doctrinal controversies will tend to take philosophical treatises as cardinal and ignore the homiletical material. The latter is regarded as too occasionalist, rhetorical, and non-objective. At best, it is peripheral to the intellectual understanding of Christianity, containing some sort of moral system which is impractical, idealistic, and which could be harmonized with the general ethical maxims of the religions of the world.37

This judgement appeals to the contemporary Western world, in particular to the British analytical philosophical tradition, and to the tradition of Kantian ethics. A preoccupation with the distinction between fact and value imposes on the linguistic enterprise a concentration on the most general characteristics and connections of moral language, with the result that emotion (to which homiletical sources are prone) is pushed out of the picture. The view is taken that there are few highly general connections between moral language and emotion. And according to Kantian ethics, the source of moral thought and action must be located outside the empirically conditioned self; emotions are too capricious, they are passively experienced and are products of natural causations and fortuitously
distributed: they are not universalizable. So whether for the sake of maintaining a proper distinction between fact and value, or of insisting on "objectivity", the homiletical material in the patristic period is usually ignored by contemporary scholarship. This hermeneutic principle is maintained at the expense of a severe truncation of source material. We simply say that this principle is unsatisfactory, particularly for a believer. While objectivity has its place, subtler factors are involved which have their role where faith and the proclamation of the faith are concerned. Empathy with the author is required. On this score a believer has advantage over a non-believer in his treatment of such sources. In spite of this, the hermeneutic presupposition which we have criticised prevails in contemporary treatments of patristic ethics, with the exception of some recent dissenting voices.

When even most patristic scholars judge that the contribution of early Christian writers to ethics proper has been minimal, it is not surprising that patristic ethics is a non-entity within wider academic circles. The stance of MacIntyre, an eminent modern philosopher, is a case in point. In his earlier work A Short History of Ethics he devotes a chapter to "Christianity". Within it, patristic ethics is summarized under one short paragraph: it is a passing interest between New Testament ethics and
the Aristotelianism of Aquinas. MacIntyre's dismissal of patristic ethics is succinctly encapsulated in the opening sentence of this short paragraph: "The Platonic dichotomy between the world of sense perception and the world of Forms is Christianized by St. Augustine into a dichotomy between the world of the natural desires and the realm of divine order." When we turn to his recent celebrated work *After Virtue*, we find that his dismissal is even more thorough. Patristic ethics is not even mentioned once. Nor does New Testament ethics receive any more favourable review. MacIntyre coalesces both, and then summarily dismisses them under his criticism of Stoicism. They are of no particular significance; they are a minor incident on the journey from "Aristotle's Account of the Virtues" to "Medieval Aspects and Occasions".

In this chapter we have sought to clarify our scope of inquiry and to express our reservation about contemporary treatments of patristic ethics. We now embark on our examination of Chrysostom's ethics. The first task consists in situating the problem of despair in his theological scheme.
CHAPTER TWO: The Problem of Despair:  
Communal Life and Divine Patience

Our first task consists in situating the problem of despair in Chrysostom's theological scheme. In this chapter we shall first take a quick glance at his use of the concept of despair in the context of the classical tradition. This survey will then assist us in understanding how the problem of despair, which seems to be only a pastoral concern, could indeed be a key issue in Chrysostom's theological ethics proper. We shall then indicate some salient features in Chrysostom's theology which are fundamental in our interpretation. The main interpretative task will be delayed to subsequent chapters.

Various words are employed by Chrysostom to express the despondency of man; for example, ἀθυμεῖν, ἀπογιγνώσκειν, ἀπελπίζειν, ἀποκόμνειν, and their cognates. Among these, the first two are predominant. Even a casual reading of Chrysostom's works suggests the centrality of the problem of despair in the varied facets of life. Ἀθυμία congeals one's inner being and darkens the reasoning power (λογισμός). The same word is placed alongside κατήφεια, περίδακρος, ταραχή; and elsewhere it accompanies ὀδύνη and λύπη in expressing the state of anguish. And "the soul when once it is filled with despondency (ἀθυμία), is not apt to hear anything that may be said". "It is in our power to recover ourselves."
...Let none despair of himself. That man truly deserves to be despairs of himself (ἀπογνώσωσας), who despairs of himself (ὁ ἀπογνώσκων έσαυτοῦ); that man has no more salvation, nor any hopes.5 Despair is predicated not only of individuals, but also takes on a corporate dimension. The remedy for disunity is to "get clear of that ἀθυμία towards one another. 6

Chrysostom links despair with sin, as the last quotation indicates. Ἀθυμία is classified alongside θυμός, φθόνος, and other misplaced passions as a wild beast upon the rock of vainglory.7 While Chrysostom admits that despair is prompted by environmental factors,8 in the last analysis it is attributed to the person himself. There is an element of subjectivity in despair. To all who despair, whether this be prompted by suffering or various kinds of misfortune, Chrysostom stresses that the subject's own diagnosis of the circumstance is paramount.9 We tend to dismiss the ἀθυμία of others superficially, and attach much significance to our own.10 Man ought to know the proper season for despair; namely, that it is beneficial only in the time of sin, and not in the time of misfortune.11

It follows that Chrysostom locates the problem of despair in a soteriological context. Ἀθυμία is something that God has placed within man's nature in order that he may
reap benefit from it. Close linked to this is a prevalent theme that the overcoming of despair amounts to a defeat for Satan. Moreover, Chrysostom seems to suggest that the subject has no need of anything outside of him in order to extricate himself from despair. It is simply a matter of responding to the exhortation:

"Let us not despair (μη ἀπογιώτευκωμεν) ... knowing that it is a strong advocacy -- the coming to God one's self by one's self with much eagerness." "Persist in your effort and you shall quickly succeed." 

Contemporary interpreters of Chrysostom have also recognised the centrality of the problem of despair. A.-M. Malingrey's studies are particularly influential. In her introduction to the new critical edition of Chrysostom's epistulae to Olympias, she indicates that a crucial theme in these letters is "la lutte contre l'état dépressif où se trouve Olympias", namely ἀθυμία. Ἀθυμία is not only a sickness of the soul, but "elle joue aussi un rôle dans l'action mystérieuse que Satan exerce sur le monde". She proceeds to delineate two aspects of the cure: the uses of "intelligence" and of "volonté".

On Malingrey's line of reasoning we shall have occasion to comment in greater detail in later chapters. Here we simply observe how her analysis constitutes one way to make sense of the various aspects of despair which we have noted
at the outset. In her scheme, the problem is fundamentally a pastoral problem which is focused primarily at the individual level. The key role she attaches to reason fits in with the importance which Chrysostom attributes to the subject's own discernment of the situation. Her equal insistence on the will is also one way to interpret Chrysostom's exhortation to zeal.

This interpretation leaves many questions unresolved. Malingrey's analysis is based primarily on the letters to Olympias, written in the final years of Chrysostom's life, and addressed to one who, as Malingrey admits, is spiritually advanced. Are Malingrey's conclusions applicable to the wider span of Chrysostom's years of ministry? And is her solution to the problem of despair appropriate to the congregation as a whole, as well as to the elite? If not, Chrysostom's treatment of despair, albeit an interesting one from an individualistic perspective, does not ultimately belong to moral theology proper. Perhaps a brief digression on Kierkegaard's treatment of despair is useful in illustrating the point which we have just made. Two aspects of Kierkegaard's proposal are relevant. In the first instance, there is an emphasis on the individual. Despair (Fortvivelse) is a dis-relationship of the self; the health of the self is analysed in terms of "relating itself to its own self and by willing to be itself the self is grounded transparently in
the Power which posited it". In the second instance, the cure of this "sickness unto death", namely despair, lies exclusively in the realm of faith. In becoming an individual, one must die from the aesthetic and ethical to the religious life. That is, in choosing the absolute self, one must abandon the finite self. Admittedly, Kierkegaard's analysis issues from a protest against Hegelian idealism, and is not identical to Malingrey's presentation of Chrysostom. Nevertheless, there exists a tacit agreement between them insofar as both suppose that the problem consists exclusively in how the internal self relates to God. The communality of man does not contribute to the cure of despair; and for Kierkegaard, it is clearly adverse to it.

Leaving aside for the moment the question whether or not Malingrey's interpretation is correct, we can appreciate why her proposal makes sense when it is set against the background of the classical treatment of the problem. The two central words employed by Chrysostom, namely, ἀθυμεῖν and ἀπογιγνώσκειν, aptly illustrates the problem at hand. The first word ἀθυμεῖν is more suited to express the affective faculty of man; and the second ἀπο-γιγνώσκειν carries a more cognitive nuance with it. It is salutary to trace how the two words are used in the classical tradition. This will sharpen our understanding of the problem of despair, and lead naturally to our exposition of Chrysostom's thought.
2.1 The Classical Treatment of Despair

Despair as a shared experience in the face of catastrophe is evident in the use of ἀθυμία and its cognates. Their earliest attestations reach back to the fifth century B.C., as used by tragedians, for example Sophocles; and physicians, for example Hippocrates. Despair denotes a certain unfavourable emotional state, characterising the despondency of man in the face of conditions beyond his control.22 Xenophon uses ἀθυμία in depicting the paralysis of soldiers upon imminent and certain defeat;23 and Hippocrates uses it alongside ἄνανθρόπια in denoting the disposition of the Asiatics.24 Despair is sometimes linked to lack of confidence.25 Man is overwhelmed by a seemingly insurmountable condition, and is led to stagnation in moral growth or in pursuit of truth.26

There is nevertheless a latitude in the interpretation of the source and cure of despair. In the first instance, there is a tendency to locate the problem with the temperamental and physical aspect of man. Despair, or dispiritedness, thus understood, arises from disorder in man's innate makeup. Hence, Sophocles identifies "the force of motherhood" as the cause of a mother's despondency over the news of the death of a son.27 Aristotle also asserts that ἀθυμία is produced by excessive black bile;28 Xenophon contrasts the condition of ἀθυμία with sound
health of the body. In the second instance, the problem is loosely linked to a lack of knowledge. With some, despair might assail the διάνοια, casting out knowledge with it; with others, it is caused by false opinion (δόξα) and false discourse (λόγος). And in the third instance, there is a vague suggestion that the remedy lies in the intervention of gods. Thus, Plato declares that consolation and encouragement consist in calling the help of gods; the fainthearted will thus be uplifted. This final aspect illustrates a hesitation in identifying the problem of despair (in terms of ἀθυμία) as an intellectual problem. In the later classical period, Ps-Andronicus of Rhodes classifies ἀθυμία among the twenty-five species of passion, defining it as λύπη ἀπελπίζοντος ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ τυχεῖν. This categorisation makes way for a psychological analysis of despair. Nevertheless, the earlier loose sense of dispiritedness is not lost.

Alongside the communal aspect as indicated above, ἀπόγνωσις and its cognates emphasize the role of intentionality of the agent in despair. Both Plutarch and Philo distinguish ἀπόγνωσις from ἀθυμία; the former word associates despair with the process of clear deliberation, and the latter relates to the temperamental aspect of man. In fact the earliest attestations of ἀπόγνωσις do not relate to despair. They first appear in relation to military tactics and judicial decisions. They are prominent
in historical and biographical writings in the context of military and political manoeuvres, and of law-court defenses. For example, the man who "abandons" hope or changes his course is acting not under compulsion and reluctantly, but in accordance with a critical evaluation of the situation, which leads to concrete commitment to other orientation or action. The Greek mercenaries became resolute in fighting against Alexander's army out of extreme desperation; and despairing of ransom, a captured youth committed suicide, preferring death to a present valueless life.

This association of despair with intentionality reflects a more rigorous definition of the problem. For if the cosmos consists in a rational order of things, the intellectual faculty of man must be emphasized. The word ἀθωμία is epistemologically inadequate to locate the cure in the exercising of reason. This cure of course lies in philosophy, the training of reason to form the right judgement. So Aristotle even suggests a commendable form of despair, proper to a courageous man whose life is disciplined by rational thought and intention.

The same concern is reflected in Philo. He identifies the problem of despair (ἀπόγνωσις) as the forsaking of reason (λογισμός). He exploits the word play between ἀπόγνωσις and γνώσις. Wisdom, as embodied in the
Mosiac Law, is the cure against despair. Admittedly, he emphasizes equally that salvation is possible only because of God's lovingkindness and mercy; and faith in God is the one sure and infallible good. So also sabbath rest is instituted for servants so that they may not despair in entertaining a higher hope; and cities of refuge are similarly provided for murderers. Nevertheless, this providence of God is internalised and individualistic. Only the wise can discern and thus receive the gift from God. Salvation consists in despairing of oneself in order to know God as he really is. God has wrought the despair of all material means in order to make man put his trust in him alone. A mind perfectly cleansed and purified shall "despair" of all things pertaining to creation and know the One, the Uncreated. The lowly are exhorted not to shrink through despair of the higher hope (ἐλπίδος ἀπογνώσι) from thankful supplication to God. At least, they can give thanks according to their power for the gifts which they have already received.

The relegation of the communal aspect to the background and the corresponding focus on the cognitive faculty of man are evident also in Cicero's use of the word desperatio. Cicero does not abandon the communal aspect. In a political context desperatio conveys the sense of a shared disillusionment due to the decay of the Republic. It is a lethal disease, a symptom of old age brought about by
desperate men, who by their immorality undermine the common welfare. Cicero even regards himself as bound in this mood, in "the fits of despair" to which old men are subject. While confessing that this dispiritedness is despicable, he admits that even Hippocrates the Physician could give little relief.

This lament over the Republic results in an internalisation of the problem of despair. For besides the above analysis which predicates desperatio of the public realm, in Tusculane Disputationes Cicero locates despair within a general treatment of man's disorder. There are four disorders in man: distress, fear, pleasure, and lust. Desperatio is a species of the first; it is "distress without any prospect of amelioration". As with all other disorders, its origin arises from one principle (ratio una): judgement of will and mistaken belief (voluntario judicio et opinonis errore); and its proper cure is philosophy. The man who is "high-souled" scorns all human vicissitudes, for the chances of mortal life are not more important than his soul. Cicero is optimistic that human nature has in itself all the means for calming the soul. The problem of despair gravitates towards the individual vis-a-vis the cosmos, and in this very process the communal aspect is ignored.

Interpreted theologically, the meaning of this
development is that ecclesiology is extrinsic to soteriology. Man's present historical community is of little importance to his true end, which is properly speaking individualistic. We do not deny that this interpretation of what redemption consists in is well rooted in some traditions within Christianity. Malingrey's analysis of Chrysostom is congenial to these streams of thought. But if this were an accurate analysis of Chrysostom, the question which confronts Chrysostom, "Whether a person can be saved by himself alone, when he is not profitable to any other", would have to be answered in the positive. The gulf between the communal and individual aspects of man would remain unbridged by the gospel. The former would have to be sacrificed for the sake of one's own salvation. Chrysostom's commitment to pastoral ministry would not have issued from a theological understanding of redemption; though it might have been the result of a bad conscience. How ecclesiology is in fact internal to soteriology, and hence to ethics, will be a matter of concern for subsequent chapters. A necessary preliminary to that task is to situate the problem of despair in the context of two central themes in Chrysostom's ethics, namely communal life and God's unwillingness to abandon man in the face of his despair. In other words, we need to analyse despair in the first instance along the spatial (or communal), and then along the temporal perspective (both in history and in an individual's biography as witness to God's patience to man).
2.2 The Communal Focus of Despair

Chrysostom considers that despair is the inevitable lot of all those who partake in social life in this present age. It arises from the complexity of society. Chrysostom uses ἀθυμία to express the continual pain of those in public office, in particular, those engaging in pastoral duties. In de sacerdotio he portrays the many forms of despair which oppress and overwhelm a bishop due to the pressure of public opinion and the folly of the multitude under his charge. The high expectation on the quality of his sermons also renders a bishop despondent. The preacher as a human being, Chrysostom recognises, is also prone to ἀθυμία, ἀγωνία, φοντίς, and θυμός which may impair the effectiveness of his delivery.66

In dealing with the problem of despair as such, could not despair be alleviated by a small community of like-minded souls? For example, Chrysostom's friend Basil complains after Chrysostom has deceived him into taking the pastoral office: "With whom shall I share my ἀθυμία, ... since you stand aloof from this terrible strife?" Friendship (φιλία) alone can lessen the ἀθυμία of one who dwells in this age.67 So true is this that the severance from friends and proximate relations could become the source of despair. Thus Jesus' disciples are despondent in the upper room despite the consolation of their master.
They still seek him and his σωφροσύνη. Similarly, Chrysostom depicts the dying person despondent on his death bed at the thought of being cut off from his own family.

In the main, however, Chrysostom does not follow this solution to despair. For he understands despair to issue from man's essential bond to the wider community, the human community which as a whole is the object of God's redemptive purposes. This is evident in the following self-revelation of the inner struggle of Chrysostom as he considers the pastoral office:

I am not myself able to believe that it is possible for one who has not laboured for the salvation of his fellow to be saved. ...[Yet] it is very expedient and extremely despicable to leave one's own fault alone, and to busy one's self about the fault of one's neighbours. ...And all these things [namely, vainglory, pride, envy, avarice, incontinence, and other passions] will sorely attack me if I come forth into the world [from my reclusive life], and will tear my soul to pieces. ...It is not easy for me to become sociable, and at the same time to remain in my present security. ...[Further still] from that day which thou [Basil] didst impart to me the suspicion of the bishopric, my whole system has often been in danger of being completely unhinged, such was the fear, such the despondence which seized my soul; for on considering the glory of the Bride of Christ, ... and then reckoning up my own faults, I used not to cease bewailing both her and myself, ...and after the flood of tears, then fear again, ...disturbing, confusing, and agitating my mind.

He then proceeds to elucidate the formidable weapons of Satan against the church. We shall discuss more fully the problem of the relation between the private and public realms in Chapter Four. Here we simply note that
despondency arises not so much from the inadequacy of the self as such, but rather from seeing it in the context of the significance of the present community. The flight from communal life is interpreted as a failure to keep Satan in check, and as an evasion of responsibility towards one's neighbours. Gregory of Nazianzus' defence of his flight to Pontus away from ecclesiastical duties provides a sharp contrast. While it is true that Gregory also shares in a pastoral concern for the multitude, he nevertheless construes the priestly vocation "as that of winning people's allegiance to a true understanding of pure doctrine", and into "an ever increasing purity of life", a task to which he considers himself unequal. Gregory eventually retires from the active life. The weakness of his conception of ministry lies in the lack of seriousness concerning the theological significance of the (historical) church. It is indispensable only as a stage through which man goes to attain deification. It is contingent to redemption. Whereas for Chrysostom, despair lies in the inescapable commitment of a person to the community. The bishop is charged to safeguard the church through its struggle in history against Satan who endeavours to thwart God's purpose. Despair is not only a sign of our communal existence; an adequate participation in the community ought to give rise to it. Man is inevitably intertwined in the sins of others in the present communal life. The bishop suffers distress whenever it is necessary
for him to excommunicate someone from the church. He fears that in punishing the man too severely, he may cause the person to be swallowed up by excessive sorrow. 75

Indeed, ἀθυμία is the vocation of all the saints and just ones who are involved in communal life in this present transitory life. Chrysostom has not only the church, but the wider community in mind. In the Second and Third adhortationes ad Stagyrium, he traces out the lives of all the saints from Abel, Noah, the Patriarchs, through to Moses, Joshua, David, the prophets, and St Paul. Their lives are all characterised by ἀθυμία. His description of Moses is especially graphic. He elucidates the agony experienced by this saint from his birth until his death: the involvement in the pain and suffering of the Hebrew people in slavery, the flight from Egypt, the return and the derision of his own brethren, his subsequent trials in the desert, and "what constitutes the severest distress (ἀθυμία) is that he goes down to his own death, having revealed by God the evil which will come to the Jews, their idolatry, captivity, calamities without end. ...Trials and despondency commenced with his birth and accompanied him until his death". 76

Our analysis of the communal focus in the problem of despair can be strengthened by two other considerations. In the first instance, the community accentuates the presence
of sin in the present age. Despair characterises the human community bound in sin. Chrysostom observes that it can arise out of mutual rivalry. It also issues from an unhealthy kind of comparison of life-style: the one seeing another living in luxury, enjoying honour and blessing, while he himself seems to be in poverty and other forms of inadequacy. Chrysostom insists that those whose aspirations are confined to this world will never be extricated from the condition of despair. As the desire to outdo each other is insatiable, despondency cannot be alleviated. He is particularly critical of those benefactors who pour out large sums of money with a view to acquiring praise from the common folk. After their indulgence in lavish spectacles, αθυουία overwhelms all those who crave for vainglory.

In the second place, despair is the proper attitude towards this age, insofar as one recognises sin as sin. Chrysostom remarks: "Great is the tyranny of despondency (ἀθυουία). ...It hath somewhat useful; for when we ourselves or others sin, then only is it good to grieve; but when we fall into human vicissitudes, then despondency is useless." To be in despair is hence the proper attitude towards sin. We shall not for the moment embark on an investigation of its significance as a God-ordained remedy against sin. This will be further elucidated in Section 2.3. We simply note this connection here. Repeatedly in
de statuis Chrysostom insists that sin is the only proper object for grief: "Suppose that any one hath sinned, and is sad. He blots out the sin; he gets free from the transgression. ...Be not sad then on account of death; for it is natural to die: but grieve for sin; because it is a fault of the will (προαίρεσις)." In the same spirit, he points out to Stagirius: "It is necessary for us to grieve, not because one is tried in suffering, but that one has offended God." It follows that Christians alone can properly discern the nature of things. On the text "As sorrowful, yet always rejoicing" (2 Cor. 6:10), Chrysostom comments: "For by those that are without, indeed, we are suspected of being in despair (ἀθυμία); but we give no heed to them; yea, we have our pleasure to the full." For outsiders look on things temporal, but not on things spiritual. Where there is a spiritual and godly foundation, to be in sorrow and despondency (ἀθυμία) is truly philosophic. This is the attitude of the Psalmist and the apostles. Spiritual reality "produces real joy"; others after the fashion of the world have "the name only of joy, but they altogether consist of pain." Again, we could discern apparent traits of Stoicism in the following prescription for a philosophic consolation which mounts "above the grossness of the multitude":

Neither wealth, nor poverty, nor disgrace, nor honour counts as anything. Just for a brief time and only in words do they differ from each other. And along with this ...there is a more substantial
source of encouragement: the consideration of the things to come, both evil and good, and things which are really evil and really good.

Our stress has been on the fact that the community accentuates the presence of sin, and that despair is the proper attitude towards sin. In this context it is worth pointing out that even if (per impossibile) the godly were completely freed from sin, (that is to say, if they were undefiled by the world, and had maintained a philosophic attitude towards earthly goods,) they would still have a cause to be in despair in the present age. That despair does not strictly arise from their individual relation to the present age in its futility as such; rather, it issues from their commitment to the rest of the human community, who, as Chrysostom proceeds to say in the quotation above, "find these [philosophic] doctrines beyond their grasp". This commitment is grounded in God's redemptive purposes for the entire community. Presence of the saints within the community does not only involve them in continuing occasions for despair, it also offers provision for lightening the despair of others in it. The sufferings of the heroes of faith are ordained for our encouragement. "To those in suffering the sharing in affliction (ἡ κοινωνία τῶν παθῶν) is itself a consolation. And just as in suffering by oneself, the condition seems helpless; ...if on the contrary one finds another in similar situation, the pain is lightened."
How communal life is the very expression of redemption will be the subject of investigation in Chapters Three and Four. For the present, we need only to point out that the coming judgement of Christ alone constitutes the great divide within the human community. So Chrysostom warns concerning that day:\(^{87}\)

And though it should be Noah, or Job, or Daniel, ... he dares not succour. For even natural sympathy (ἡ τῆς φύσεως συμπάθεια) too comes then to be done away. For since it happeneth that there are righteous fathers of wicked children, and [righteous] children of [wicked] fathers; that their [the righteous'] pleasure may be unalloyed, and those who enjoy the good things may not be moved with sorrow through the constraining force of sympathy, even this sympathy ...is extinguished, and themselves indignant together with the Master against their own bowels.

The coming judgement of Christ hence becomes in Chrysostom's thought the occasion for the despair of man. For then, man is stripped naked before the Judge, under the threat of complete alienation from communal existence, even from familial bonds. Chrysostom pursues this theme in de statuis. The horror in the law-court of the day provides a vivid glimpse into the last judgement. Chrysostom depicts the anguish in these terms:\(^{88}\)

How heavy was the gloom! ...Despondency (ἀθυμία) and fear darkened your eyes. ...One saw tortures both within and without [the court of justice]. Those within the executioners were tormenting; these women, [outside were tormented by] the despotic force of nature, and the sympathy of the affections. ...These things then beholding, I cast in my mind that Dread Tribunal; and I said within myself, "If now, when men are the judges, neither mother, nor sister, nor father, nor any other person, though guiltless of the deeds which have been perpetrated, can avail to rescue the
criminals, who will stand by us when we are judged at the Dread Tribunal of Christ?"

Despair in the present age finds its meaning in the light of the threat of despair at the eschaton. On one level, the possibility of despair at the eschaton puts a question mark against man's present ordering of moral life; and on another level, because the eschaton has not yet arrived, no one should be absorbed in excessive despair. The present kairos is the season of grace and of the continuing possibility of repentance. Judas provides a case in point:

[Satan] cast in him an excessive despondency, driving him to the rope, caused him to commit suicide, and dispoiled his eagerness for repentance. For if he had lived, he would have been saved. Take the example from the executioners [of Jesus]. If Christ saved those who crucified him, and even upon the cross, he prayed to the Father and asked him to pardon their faults, how shall he not welcome the traitor back with complete favour? If Judas had shown what befits repentance [he would have to be saved]. ...But he, subdued by severe grief did not recourse to use such remedy [of repentance]. This is why Paul in fear of such reaction, exhorted the Corinthians to pull the man [i.e. the sinner] away from the throat of Satan.

The above passage aptly spreads out before us the moral horizon in which the problem of despair is situated. On the individual level, it is a matter of "eagerness". On the social level, (say, in the Church of Corinth) the problem is one which involves pastoral care. And the gravity of the problem is at once apparent when Satan's designs are unmasked. And ultimately, the problem is taken up into the redemptive love of God in Christ. The various levels are
organically related; it is only when the moral context is seen in its entirety that the problem of despair can properly be diagnosed and overcome.

Standing back from Chrysostom's analysis of despair, we may wish to ask whether or not his interpretation of moral life is an adequate representation of the gospel. One way in which we could conceive the present interim between the first and second comings of Christ is to analyse it exclusively in terms of an "already"-"not-yet" tension. Under this scheme, Christians are the first fruits of redemption; they possess the confidence in the Holy Spirit which St Paul spoke of (in Gal. 4 and Eph. 1 for example). So it would seem rather strange that Chrysostom speaks about despair rather than of confidence as the proper attitude for a Christian. What is the place of confidence in Chrysostom's theology?

Clearly, the theological concern which we have just raised is met in many traditions. For example, in Gregory of Nyssa's exposition, the term "image of God" is used -- as one modern scholar puts it -- to express "a basic and initial participation of the divine goods (attributes) which is at the same time both the foundation of and incitement to further participation". Furthermore, Bartelink's study on the use of παρθήσια in Christian antiquity reveals that
the word is akin to συνάφεια and συγγένεια in the visio Dei tradition. This does not mean that the concept of despair could find no place in this tradition. Throughout his Mystical Treatises, Isaac of Nineveh understands despair of the self to be the prerequisite to confidence, the συνάφεια with God. But generally speaking, confidence is given an atemporal and asocial interpretation; it can therefore be adequately experienced in the present. (At least, regeneration is characterised by an increasing confidence).

We find this even in Theodore of Mopsuestia, in whose doctrine of the Two Ages we might expect to find a kinship with Chrysostom's theology. Theodore uses παρηγορία to characterise the new life of the Christian, the liberty conferred on the newly baptised, and the eschatological gift present in the eucharist. There is, however, a marked absence of ethical content in his use of the word. Van Unnik admits that it is "practically restricted to the sphere of the relation between God and man and is not applied to inter-human relationships". Theodore's citation of 1 Cor. 13:12 "For now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face" in two instances in his catecheses is illuminating. The first instance is in his exposition on baptism. 1 Cor. 13:12 is combined with 2 Cor. 3:18 in the course of his explanation of the signing of the forehead of the baptizand. He then continues: "We are rightly stamped in a place that is higher than our face, so that from far we
may frighten the demon, ...and so that we may be known to possess so much confidence with God that we look at Him with an open face, and display before Him the stamp by which we are seen to be members of the household and soldiers of Christ our Lord."\textsuperscript{95} The second instance occurs in his exposition on the eucharist. 1 Cor. 13:12 is now linked to 2 Cor. 5:7-8. He then proceeds to say: "We walk by faith and not by sight because we are not yet in the reality, as we are not yet in the heavenly benefits. We wait here in faith until we ascend into heaven and set on our journey to our Lord, where we shall not see through a glass and in a riddle but shall look face to face. These things, however, we expect to receive in reality through the resurrection at the time decreed by God. ...We are ordered to perform in this world the symbols and signs of the future things so that, through the service of the Sacrament, we may be like men who enjoy symbolically the happiness of the heavenly benefits, and thus acquire a sense of possession and a strong hope of the things for which we look."\textsuperscript{96} The second passage which we have just quoted indicates the element of "not-yet" present in Theodore's theology. The present life is a venture in faith, as "in a mirror dimly". The reality of "face to face" is still to come. But Theodore at the same time shies away from giving this concrete content within the Christian life. The focus is shifted to the liturgical life, that is, in baptism and in the eucharist, where the tension between the Two Ages is (to a great extent) dissolved. Admittedly, confidence is primarily regarded by
Theodore as relational rather than psychological. Hence, confidence implies a free access of man to God. It is set in the context of a cosmic struggle against Satan. Nevertheless, as we see in the first passage, 1 Cor. 13:12 is stripped of its historical perspective. The present "glory" in 2 Cor. 3:18 is used as the interpretative key. Consequently, unrestrained confidence is possible in the liturgical life of the church.

We do not deny the presence in Chrysostom of ideas about confidence similar to those we have outlined above, especially those of Theodore. The characteristics of Theodore's view are especially discernible in Chrysostom's catecheses. Confidence is the hallmark of the honour conferred by God on the neophytes. Where as their former status was one of dishonour, shame, and lack of confidence, they are now in great confidence before God, counted among the first ranks of his friends, citizens, fellow heirs, members, sons, brothers of Christ, instruments of the Spirit. Such are the lavish biblical concepts which Chrysostom employs.97

Chrysostom also links confidence with an intimacy in the knowledge of God.98 It characterises the just ones in the Old Testament as well, inter alios Moses, Elijah, and Daniel. Their confidence is manifested in the ability to stand firm and perform miracles in front of tyrants. Chrysostom also suggests that standing firm in suffering is
connected with the shaming of Satan, and is an even greater cause of confidence for man. This theme prevails throughout the various letters and treatises written during his exile. On one occasion, Chrysostom insists in his appeal to the example of the Three Young Men in the Book of Daniel that these heroes have already erected their trophy, won their victory, put on their crown, and have been proclaimed conquerors even before their visible vindication from God.⁹⁹

Despite these similarities, there are differences between Chrysostom and his contemporaries. He insists that confidence cannot be fully expressed in the present. So the just should confront sinners only in a spirit of προσκύνησις. Their attitude must be a wholehearted integration of παρθένια and προσκύνησις in order that the offenders be not overwhelmed in excessive despair.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, because no one is completely free from passion, each must guard his present confidence against degeneration into mere insolence.¹⁰¹ On other occasions, Chrysostom suggests that confidence must be regarded within a wider framework. The confidence of Moses, gained by accomplishing many good deeds, is inferior to the greater cause of confidence in the case of Olympias because of her suffering; Elijah's confidence manifested on Mount Carmel is shadowed by his subsequent fear of death.¹⁰² Chrysostom's exposition of the confidence of Daniel in the defence against the Anomoeans is especially instructive. He insists that God's
condescension is the only basis upon which man is able to know him. He appeals to Dan. 10:8-9 on several occasions as the scriptural basis. Not even Daniel, who enjoys great confidence, is able to encounter an angel face to face; a fortiori, no one is able to face God for reason of "the weakness of nature (ἡ τῆς φύσεως ἀσθένεια)." Further still, a sinful act by one member undermines the confidence of the whole community; Chrysostom illustrates this from the account of Achan's transgression (Josh. 7). Indeed full confidence is properly predicated only of the last judgement. The present life should be ordered with a view to rendering oneself confident before the tribunal of Christ on that terrible day.

We see from these differences that Chrysostom entertains a sharper demarcation between this age and the world to come, and a greater solidarity within the human community than many of his contemporaries. This motif is of course consistent with our earlier discussion of his treatment of the problem of despair. In what follows we shall explicate this communal focus with respect to the concept of confidence.

Chrysostom's exposition on creation serves as a convenient basis for our discussion. Primeval man was in confidence and glory. This confidence is expressed in terms of the honouring of man by the philanthropic God,
who ordains man to be the governor of the entire universe. The image of God in man is that of sovereignty (ὑπὸχνί), an extrinsic rather than intrinsic image. That is to say, Chrysostom does not identify the theological import of the image as kinship with God. Rather, its significance lies in community. The man-woman relation, as well as that of man-animal and man-God, are characterised by ὑπὸχνί, which Chrysostom depicts as a natural (φυσική) rather than an elected (χειροτονητῇ) sovereignty. Here, he follows closely the Antiochene exegesis of Gn. 1:26. Social relationships are integral to the dynamics of salvation. He pursues this point in an interesting passage in sermo 2 on Genesis:

He raises the objection from 1 Cor. 11:7 that

...man and woman are of the same trait (τύπος) and mode (χαρακτήρ) and the same likeness (ὁμοίωσις). Why then is man only called the image of God and the woman is not? This is because it is not a matter of the image of resemblance (μορφή) but the image according to sovereignty (ὑπὸχνί) which is for man alone, and not for woman. Man is not subject to anyone, woman is under him, just as God said [in Gn. 3:16]. ...This is why man is the image of God, since none is above him, just as none is above the God who governs all. The woman is the glory of man since she is subject to man.

In this passage, Chrysostom agrees with his Antiochene predecessors in rejecting the understanding that man's vocation is manifested in terms of the attributes of rationality and freedom. The image of God is sought in hierarchical terms. Thus the vocation to name animals is a token of man's ordained dominion over them.
Subjection is not a servile subjection; it is the basis of glorification of the one to whom subjection is directed. The proper ordering of relationships is therefore the basis of a full manifestation of God's glory. Chrysostom is at pains to remind his congregation that this sovereignty -- the basis of society -- is bestowed by God with the intention that man may know his philanthropia towards him. Indeed man's vocation, as implicit in his likeness to God, is to be gentle and meek; namely, to imitate God in his dealing with his fellows. Sin results in the disordering of society. Given man's ordained sovereignty over the animal world, why do we fear animals at the present? Chrysostom attributes this present situation to sin. The moment we lose our confidence towards God, we tremble before our subjects. This disharmony permeates all aspects of social life: marital, filial, and civic structures. Hence, though created in equal honour to man, woman is now the dominated partner; parent-children relations are strained; and harsh magistrates arise after the fall. Coercion is introduced in the hierarchical orders.

The point of our discussion of the image of God is that confidence is essentially linked to the renewal of the ordering of the universe which is communal. Chrysostom has in view a greater glory in the world to come. Man's destiny is no longer that of paradise, but of
the kingdom of God. There not only animals (symbols of the visible realm) are subject to him; the demons also (tokens of the spiritual reality and despoilers of man's previous confidence) are under his feet. "Here, the victory is complete, the triumph is absolute, it is the entire ruin and shattering destruction of the Enemy"; so Chrysostom affirms with allusions to Rom. 16:20 and Lk. 10:19. Confidence refers then to the greater honouring of man and a more illustrious manifestation of God's glory in the world to come.

One passage, typical of Chrysostom's homilies, illustrates this ground for confidence. The moral laxity of his congregation prompts him to tremble at the prospect of the coming of Christ. With what sort of confidence will he as a teacher stand up before God? "Since fathers also, though they be not liable to be called to account for their children's sins, nevertheless have grief and vexation." He then continues:

O might you be saved, and I to give account because of you. Yes, you be saved, and I be accused of not having fulfilled my part! For not at all am I concerned that you should be saved through me (δι' ἐμοῦ) but that you should be saved, no matter by what person as the instrument (δι' ὑποστήριγμα).

He then concludes: "We are loved and we love (you): but this is not the question. But let us first love Christ."
The key question in this passage is how "Let us first love Christ" should be interpreted. One answer could take "us" to mean each individually. In this case, "let us first love Christ" is an exhortation to each individual to be devoted to Christ. Experiential ties between individuals are of no significance. The exhortation is primarily concerned with a vertical God-man relationship. This is, however, not what Chrysostom intends. For it would give no account of his concern for the welfare of others: "With what sort of confidence will he stand up before God?" Another way to interpret the exhortation would be to see "Christ" as meaning exclusively "Christ in the neighbour". In this case, it is nothing other than the mutual and reciprocal "love one another". This again falls short of what Chrysostom has in mind. "We are loved and we love (you): but this is not the question." The ground of confidence does not issue from an exclusive God-man relation; nor is it grounded in one's historical and experiential involvement in another's welfare and moral growth. ("For not at all am I concerned that you should be saved through me.") In rejecting both options, Chrysostom is moving towards a conception of redemption which holds the community itself to be the material basis for confidence; and at the same time posits this material basis in relation to the transcendent claim of Christ. Confidence is the gift properly predicated of the corporeity in Christ, rather than of individuals
abstracted from the temporal and spatial realms. The dynamics of God's redemption within the entire human community provides the reference point of confidence. So long as evangelism is a continuing task for the church (and it is until the coming of Christ), confidence is restrained. It is for the sake of the welfare of the human community as a whole that one could even be willing that others should be saved, and "I be accused of not having fulfilled my part".
2.3 The Temporal Focus of Despair

Before we proceed any further, we must summarize our argument so far. We have explored the relation of the community to the problem of despair. Despair arises within the complex nexus of a community, and is intensified for the regenerate because from their vantage point they can perceive God's redemptive purpose for the entire human community and realise the threat of an ultimate despair at the eschaton. We have also examined Chrysostom's understanding of confidence, and concluded that it is consistent with his analysis of despair. For the remainder of this chapter, we shall sketch a complementary theme in Chrysostom's thought: God's non-abandonment of man, on both the historical and biographical levels. And in doing so, we wish to draw out the significance which Chrysostom attaches to history.

We approach our task by pointing out the emphasis which Chrysostom attaches to experience (πείρα), or ἡ πείρα τῶν πραγμάτων, which he uses on many occasions. That experience does not constitute the source of morality, Chrysostom readily concedes. Adam and Cain already knew what was good (καλός) and what was contrary to it before their disobedience. What experience contributes is to render this moral order clearer (σαφέστερος), especially through chastisement after our
In the same manner, in his comment on the Prodigal Son, he remarks that the father did not prevent his son from departing to the foreign land, in order that through experience (πείρα) he might learn what is good. "For often when his speech fails to persuade, God leaves the experience of events (η πείρα τῶν πραγμάτων) to teach us."  

Clearly, what we have indicated above is consistent with the prevalent medicinal understanding of God's providence. Inexperience is excusable; it calls forth God's accommodation. The kindness and severity of God are manifestations of God's philanthropia, as Rom. 11:22-23 points out. What is meant in the Scriptural text is that [God] raises up even him in his despondency, and humbles the other in his confidence; and do not thou be faint at hearing of severity, nor thou be confident at hearing of goodness. The reason why he cut thee off in severity was, that thou mightest long to come back. The reason why he showed goodness to thee was, that thou mightest continue in his goodness, that is, if thou do things worthy of God's love toward man (φιλανθρωπία).

The end of πείρα is therefore to know what is good, a good which cannot be separated from realising God's lovingkindness to man. "Recall always the benefit which you have received in the course of your life. ...Render him thanks!" Such a refrain prevails throughout his expositiones in Psalmos quosdam.
This account of experience and of God's providence might have been given an atemporal and individualistic interpretation. That is to say, the emphasis could have been placed on the moral progress of the soul to the Divine. Two examples from Chrysostom's exegesis illustrate that he does not take this approach. The first is taken from his treatment of Gn. 4 concerning Cain and Lamech, the first two murderers recorded in the biblical narrative. The leniency which God showed Cain has a wider implication than its importance for Cain himself. God did not destroy him, in order that truth should be passed down and not forgotten. Cain became a living law (\(\nu\omega\sigma\ \varepsilon\mu\psi\chi\sigma\)), a law publicly declared to all, in order that the mishap might give rise to \textit{philosophia}.\textsuperscript{124} Hence God's punishment of Cain became a foundation of \textit{philanthropia}. It is a medicine for others (\(\tau\omega\varepsilon\ \lambda\omicron\iota\omicron\nu\omicron\omicron\iota\iota\)). Thus Lamech benefited from God's care for Cain. He declared his sin himself, confessed his action, and revealed to his wives the greatness of his faults voluntarily.\textsuperscript{125} This account of Cain and Lamech reveals hermeneutical principle in Chrysostom's exegesis. God's vindicatory purposes in history (in this instance, in the punishment of Cain and Lamech) are re-interpreted in terms of God's pedagogy for the human race. On the explicit level, the temporal realm becomes a source (and in man's weakness, an indispensable source) of ethical reflection by providing examples from the past. And implicitly, this
conception of history implies that the holy ones of God (say, Abel) could find no ultimate vindication for their suffering in history. We shall explore this last point in greater detail in Chapter Five.

Our second example comes from the interpretation of the unpardonable sin against the Holy Spirit (Mt. 12:31-32). Why does Jesus say to the Pharisees that blasphemy against the Son of Man is forgiven, while that against the Holy Spirit is not? "Because Himself indeed they knew not, who He might be, but of the Spirit they received ample experience (ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ). For the prophets also by the Spirit said whatever they said; and indeed all in the Old Testament had a very high notion of Him." 126 This is why they have no excuse. We find here a confirmation of what we have discerned in the earlier passage concerning the seriousness of "experience". Chrysostom departs from what seems to be a more natural interpretation of the text: what is unpardonable consists in the wilful disobedience of the Pharisees, for they regard the divine presence and power of Jesus as demonic. Chrysostom finds it necessary to tone down the confrontation of the kingdom of God with this present world order, and seeks to justify the harsh saying of Jesus in an historical perspective. What is unpardonable lies in the obstinacy of the Jews in spite of the continuing operation of the Holy Spirit even in the time of the Old Covenant. The miracles which Jesus
performed are interpreted as a continuation of God's providential care in history, rather than (as the Matthaean text more naturally implies) as an embodiment of the sudden coming of the kingdom of God in Jesus. The temporal realm is not cast in a dialectical relation to God's providence. Chrysostom's preference is to underline God's patience in the process of history.

This divine patience is operative in an individual's biography as much as in history. The way in which it works out can be seen in the divine purpose for the functioning of the human conscience. One might conclude from a cursory reading of Chrysostom's works that he simply gives conscience a token role within a natural law tradition. Moral principles, to know what is good and what is not, are ordained in man's very fabric at the moment of creation. The written law of Moses, and even the moral precepts of Christ are simply the vocal and visible articulation of this silent but permanent autótoótos. Chrysostom ranks it alongside the creation as a teacher in leading man to a divine manner of life. In some instances, Chrysostom suggests that conscience assists man in living morally. God "did not suffer our will (proagípcos) to undertake the whole burden of knowledge, and of right regulation; lest it should despair at the labour of virtue. But conscience suggests to it what ought to be done; and the
will contributes its own exertions for the accomplishment. Conscience is often referred to as the incorruptible judge in man's δίκαιον. It serves as a reflection of Christ's impartial judgement at the eschaton. Moreover, an evil conscience may result in faintheartedness (ἀγωγημένοις), and even impurity. A cleansed conscience can, however, enable man to open himself to spiritual desires, to invoke God with greater fervour, to embrace love more ardently, and to chant praises to God not only in words, but also in works.

This might suggest to us a static conception of conscience. But Chrysostom reveals a more dynamic understanding of it by setting it in relation to God's redemptive purposes. In the first place, Chrysostom emphasizes the continuing torture of the conscience. Sin is immediately and visibly manifested in the experience of shame, the self-attestation of wrong deeds. The painful experience of sin endures in the transgressor's own life. On one occasion, Chrysostom contrasts sin with the pains of a woman in labour. Whereas for the latter pain ceases after the child birth, the grief caused by sin persists and intensifies after the act of transgression. Man possesses, and willy nilly exercises, the power of self-reflection, striving to make his experiences coherent. This given capacity in man is expressed in the unrelenting torturing of the conscience concerning one's
sins, especially at the hour of death.¹³⁸ And this is why Chrysostom gives such an important role to the daily examination of conscience in the Christian life.¹³⁹ It is a conscious employment of this self-respective power of man. The memory of former sins, and the resultant painful consequences, serve as a goad against the inclination to further evil.¹⁴⁰ This self-examination is a corrective remedy.¹⁴¹ Without the endowment of conscience, man would be given up to the abyss.¹⁴²

Now, man’s capacity to conceptualise morally, which is embodied in the torturing of conscience, could drive him to excessive despondency. So, in the second place, Chrysostom emphasizes that man’s field of perception is necessarily limited. That is to say, except at moments of acute moral experience (e.g. in suffering), man does not attempt to strive for a coherence of life in its entirety, and is spared from doing so. He expresses this point in one instance in a passage from the Fourth homilia in Lazarum: The voice of conscience is permanent (διηνεκής) insofar as it will never grow weary in bringing to our remembrance our transgression; yet it is not continuous (ουνεκής) in order that we should be not given over to excessive despair (ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς ἀθωμίας), but that we should be able to take some rest, and revive with encouragement.¹⁴³
But there is a more relevant consideration which brings the accusation of conscience into proper perspective. This concerns the ease of confessing one's own sins. In the homily non esse ad gratiam concionandum, Chrysostom seeks to justify the apparent severe tone which he employed in a previous sermon on St Paul's injunction against unworthy reception of the sacrament. He acknowledges that a preacher should not speak in order to please the congregation, (as the title of the sermon suggests); discipline is necessary, and so is the task of exposing sin. But at the same time, Chrysostom assures his congregation that the enquiring about sin takes place in private, in οἱ λογισμοὶ τοῦ συνειδότος. Judgement is made ἀμέτρυτος. The confession is attended only by God, who would efface the sin rather than reproach the penitent. Chrysostom then proceeds to set this private confession in contrast with the possibility of a dreadful public declaration of one's sins on the day of judgement. The conscience therefore is the forum ordained by God in this season before the last judgement, where God's provisional judgement takes place. This present enquiry is intended for the effacing of one's sins. Moreover, we have noted in the previous paragraph, our perception of our sins is limited. Hence, God's patience is shown also by not requiring man to comprehend the entire catalogue of his own sins all at once.
The patience of God, as shown in his providential dealing in history and in individual biographies, finds its focus in the word *philanthropia*. We shall conclude this preliminary survey of Chrysostom's ethics by briefly outlining his use of the word.

The word *philanthropia* and its cognates appear throughout Chrysostom's sermons. When predicated of God, they express his love to man in creation and redemption. The treatise *ad eos qui scandalizati sunt*, on the providence of God, is a classic example. We read there that it is not due to any need of service, but uniquely in his *philanthropia* that God has called man into being. A little later in the same treatise Chrysostom presents God's parental care towards man by picking out key moments from God's engagement in history; for example, in giving man both the natural and written law, in sending prophets and bearing man's insults thrown at them, and in delivering even his only Son to suffer and die at the hands of our ungrateful generation. All these, he concludes, are manifestations of God's inexplicable providence and unsearchable *philanthropia*.

The example we have just given only confirms Chrysostom's adoption and exposition of the varied nuances of *philanthropia* already in existence within the
Christian tradition. Recent scholars have noted the prominence of the word in Chrysostom's corpus. We shall therefore examine it only insofar as it has a direct bearing on our immediate study. Three aspects are relevant. First, it is contrasted with the spirit of vengeance; secondly, it offers hope to the despairing; and thirdly, man's commitment is grounded in God's philanthropia. We now examine these three aspects more closely.

(i) God's philanthropia is contrasted with the spirit of vengeance:

Chrysostom understand vengeance to be the polar opposite of philanthropia, at least insofar as moral relationships are concerned. God's yearning for man stands in contrast to the human exaction of justice. This theme is clearly evident in de statuis. The calamity which faces the Antiochenes after the riot provides Chrysostom with an occasion to draw out this aspect of philanthropia. The response which one takes in the face of insults provides the criterion. While man is swift and merciless to implement punishment, God remains philanthropic despite being insulted every day. He still "offers to pardon those who have insulted Him, if only they repent". Chrysostom is at pains to disassociate God from any present implementation of punishment. The wrath visited upon Sodom was executed not by God himself,
but through his angels. Yet where "there is need of saving, God does this by Himself". And this he does supremely in the Incarnation. Philanthropia is therefore the necessary and sufficient characteristic of God's present dispensation. "God was so far from forsaking" man after the fall, "that He even opened Heaven to us instead of Paradise; and in so doing, both shewed His own lovingkindness(φιλανθρωπία) and punished the devil the more severely".

(ii) God's philanthropia offers hope to the despairing:

Chrysostom expounds Ps. 129:3ff(LXX) in this way:

If it were not for his mercy and philanthropia, he would come to judge with an exacting scrutiny, and find all absolutely liable. ...If your justice spares us, [O God,] it is due to your philanthropia. ...That which belongs to us is not sufficient to save us from the wrath to come. ...Where there is mercy, there is redemption, and not an ordinary redemption, but abundant, an immense ocean of philanthropia. Thus, even when we are delivered to sin, there is no need to lose courage or despair(ἀμαρτώλεια). For where there is mercy and philanthropia, there is no rigorous exaction for what we have committed. ...Such therefore is God, ever inclined and ready to confer mercy and forgiveness.

This is a constant theme in Chrysostom's encouragement to sinners: God does not enquire into man's transgression, so as to allow him the space to survive without having to bear the consequence of his sins at the present time. The passage above indicates a sharp demarcation between the dispensations of judgement and of mercy, a theme which will emerge throughout our presentation of Chrysostom's ethics. To him, judgement is punitive rather than
Salvific. Man's hope lies more in God's mercy than in God's present judgement on sin. Chrysostom sometimes expresses this hope as God's affection (φιλοσποργός) for man. God is always active in seeking to draw all men to respond to his love -- even if he already knows the perdition of the individual, for in that case the man is liable to heavier punishment on the day of judgement. Jesus' mourning over Jerusalem is exemplary (Mt. 23:37): he mourns in the manner of one who grieves over a lover, bemoaning her and loving her. 155

Elsewhere, Chrysostom grounds this initiative from God ontologically in God's self-sufficiency, or his impassibility. Such is the hope which Chrysostom places before Theodore. Man's transgression cannot ultimately alter the divine purpose in the world. God "created us for no other reason than His own good will, and with a view to our enjoying everlasting blessings". 156 For if the vengeance of God were due to a need for him to defend himself (that is, "for his own sake"), man would surely be in despair. But as it is, God's impassibility implies that "no harm can traverse that divine nature". Even punishment from God and man's own awareness of sin are seen exclusively in the light of the dynamics of salvation (that is, "to our advantage"). 157 This is the hope for sinners.

(iii) Communal Commitment is grounded in God's
Throughout his pastoral ministry Chrysostom devotes himself to explicating the ethical implications of God's *philanthropia*. God's *philanthropia* is prescriptive of man's moral attitude, since man is called to be an imitator of the Lord's own kindness (μιμητάς γινέσθαι τῆς τοῦ Δεσπότου φιλανθρωπίας) instead of choosing an attitude of savagery and inhumanity towards another member of the human community. "Be merciful, even as your Father is merciful" (Lk. 6:36) provides the proof text. This emphasis on the moral rather than the metaphysical becomes an interpretative principle both for "the image and likeness of God" and for "You must be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Mt. 5:48). To be like God is a matter of observing justice, to show *philanthropia*, to be kind and humble, to be merciful to one's neighbour, to be adorned with virtue; this is what Chrysostom underlines. For in these things lies the excellence of man's nature as made in the image and likeness of God. Chrysostom similarly safeguards the interpretation of Mt. 5:48 against any bias towards asceticism. Virginity and fasting may procure the kingdom of God for men; but mercy, almsgiving, and *philanthropia* place him above the kingdom, and make him like the Father in heaven. Chrysostom's conclusion to his exposition of Mt. 5 is that the pinnacle of ascent within a virtuous life is a positive commitment to, and care for, one's
fellows. This moral emphasis reveals his perception that a virtuous life consists in embracing God's redemptive purposes for the human community: namely, his sacrificial love for, and gentleness towards all men. Concretely, this involves a thorough-going non-judgemental attitude and pastoral love for all those in need.

The weakness and strength of this account of moral life can be illustrated from a passage in de eleemosyna. Four objections are raised against Chrysostom's policy to the needy. (1) There are immoral people going among the needy; (2) They are lazy and should bear the consequences; (3) We have our own family to care for; and (4) The needy are foreigners to the city. Objections (1) and (2) appeal to criteria of justice, while (3) and (4) are based on the ground of limited responsibility. Chrysostom rejoins by arguing that in spite of the insults which Christ bore, God does not scrutinise man's conduct. This should be determinative in man's moral relation to his fellows. The horror of relentless scrutiny is this: if we are to interrogate the life of each man, we shall become merciful to none. The difficulty in Chrysostom's reply lies in his evasion of the claim of reason in the ordering of man's moral life (even in the public realm). The suspension of judgement in spite of the "moral offence" of the needy (who are immoral and lazy) could subject society to
exploitation by the morally hardened. The execution of a rational (and provisional) policy of justice would seem to be a more adequate way to safeguard some order in society. Moreover, objections (3) and (4) are treated by Chrysostom primarily as excuses for not caring for the weak. In doing so, he evades the issue of "discrimination", the process of evaluating the moral claim of proximate relations in relation to that of the human race as a whole. These difficulties in Chrysostom's argument are real ones; they betray a lacuna in his theological scheme. Nevertheless, he draws our attention to the fact that consideration for justice cannot be the ultimate concern which determines men's moral relation to one another. Moral perception narrows with an increasing eagerness to execute justice, while a response to God's mercy opens up man's moral horizon. The horror of sin, in Chrysostom's eyes, is its tendency towards unfeelingness (ἀνασθησία), the retreat from involvement with God and fellow men. It is in communal involvement that one can discern, manifest, and be enabled to accomplish God's will.
At the Synod of Oaks in 403 AD, one of the principal accusations laid against Chrysostom concerns repentance: "He supplies fearlessness to sinners, teaching them 'if you sin again, yet repent again, and as often as you sin, come to me and I will heal you.'"¹ This charge reflects a leit-motiv in Chrysostom's thought; namely, his pastoral concern for the dispirited who are succumbing to moral weakness, and feel unable to persist in a life of holiness. The problem of overcoming moral weakness goes beyond a proclamation of God's (unconditional) forgiveness. What is at stake is not whether God forgives sinners or not; the problem penetrates into the nature of the ecclesia. That is to say, in the first place, whether the gospel of reconciliation ought to find ethical expression in the historical form of the church; and secondly, if so, how? The responses to both questions are far from obvious, as the Novatianist controversy in the early church indicates. In rejecting the rigorism of Novatianism, most church fathers, as we shall indicate presently, respond affirmatively to the first question. That is, the church participates actively in God's economy of salvation; it has power to forgive the penitent, even those who have committed the most heinous sins (of adultery, murder and apostasy). This insistence is
motivated, as we shall see, by theological considerations. The response to the second question, which deals with the mode of expressing reconciliation within the community, is not so straightforward. Philosophical presuppositions come into play, which may undermine the theological rationale insisted on in the former instance.² This chapter is an analysis of Chrysostom's conception of the church as a community which allows for the overcoming of moral impotence.
3.1 A Community under the Friends of God

From the outset we must situate Chrysostom's pastoral concern against a wider historical backdrop. The care for those in despair is by no means unique to Chrysostom. His predecessors and contemporaries at least take cognizance of it. Two concerns impress themselves upon the church: Firstly, the forgiveness of post-baptismal sins, and secondly, the lapses of those who previously have taken a vow for monastic life. Hence, commenting on Rom. 11:22, Origen perceives that God's kindness is needed, otherwise man would despair (ἀπογινώσκειν) in his sins. In a sermon delivered in Antioch in 353 AD, Eusebius of Emesa preaches against those who advocate no forgiveness for post-baptismal sins. "The hopelessness introduced by them urges the one who has once fallen to be bound firmly into error, but the expectation of repentance lifts up the fallen and urges him to sin no longer. ...There is hope indeed after sin, there is remedy indeed after a wound, though the scar remains." Basil of Caesarea addresses himself to the problem of whether he who has sinned after baptism should despair of his salvation (ἀπογινώσκειν τῆς ἐαυτοῦ σωτηρίας) if he be found in a multitude of sins. And in a letter to a lapsed virgin -- the form and content of which bears striking resemblance to Chrysostom's adhoratationes ad Theodorum lapsum -- he encourages her never to despair (ἀπελπίζειν) of
herself. And at the end of the period of easing of strained relations between the orthodox and Novatianist parties in Basil's era, Gregory of Nazianzus rebukes the Novatianists for "destroying improvement by despair". In the Latin West Ambrose combats Novatianism in his de poenitentia; and Jerome encourages Rusticus, who has lapsed after having made a vow of continence, against despair: "Nothing makes God so angry as when men from despair of better things cleave to those which are worse, and indeed this despair in itself is a sign of unbelief."

Even a cursory comparison of the (anti-Novatianist) treatises on repentance reveals the existence of a standard polemic based on a collection of Old and New Testament texts, such as Jeremiah 8:4, Isaiah 1:18, Matthew 9:13, the repentance of the Ninevites, of David, of Manasseh, of the Prodigal Son, and of St Peter, the Parable of the Lost Sheep, and St Paul's injunction to the Corinthian Church to forgive the sinner (2 Cor. 2:6-8). These and similar texts find expression in the writings of Eusebius of Emesa, Cyril of Jerusalem, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nazianzus, Jerome, and Chrysostom.

The common theological landscape suggested by these proof-texts can be clarified by means of a study of Eusebius' de poenitentia. Three strands of
thought are obvious. At the outset, he argues that man *qua* man does sin: "We are not angels, but human beings; we fall and rise, and often in the same hour." Even the Old Testament saints, Abraham, Moses and Enoch included, are not exempt from sin. Who is righteous before God? he asks. Secondly, the assurance of forgiveness is based upon a conviction of God's pardon to any penitent. If God is to bless the one who acknowledges his own frailty, who is to hinder? It follows, thirdly, that the church's forgiveness to the penitent is mediated by the principle of "non-hindrance". Forgiveness is *συγχώρησις*.

We need to examine these three premises more carefully in the context of the early church. The first premise is generally acknowledged within early Christian thought. A baptised person does sin. The author of 2-Clement freely admits that he too is a grave sinner, and has not yet escaped from temptation. He is still susceptible to the lures of Satan. Clement of Alexandria confesses that it is perhaps impossible all at once to cut away passions that have grown with us. Chrysostom laments his own sins, and prescribes daily examination of conscience to be the rule of life for the neophytes. Eusebius himself applies the text "the spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak" (Mt. 26:41) both to St Peter's denial of Jesus and to the lapsed during the periods of
persecution in the church. Because of weakness, even a baptised person sins, though not of his own choice.\textsuperscript{20} We see here an effort to affirm the involuntary nature of sins committed after baptism.\textsuperscript{21}

But it is important to notice that, despite the similarities between Eusebius and others, he does not elaborate on any psychological analysis of man. He simply construes the God-man relation as a moral one. All men are frail vis-a-vis God, and stand in need of his mercies ipso facto. This theme receives greater anthropological precision among the more intellectually inclined. Gregory of Nazianzus and Basil of Caesarea, for example, aptly illustrate this point. Gregory writes:\textsuperscript{22}

\begin{quote}
I confess myself to be a man, -- that is to say, an animal shifty and of a changeable nature\((ζῶν τρεντὸν καὶ ρένσιν φύσεως)\)
...and by shewing mercy make provision for mercy. ...But what sayest thou, O new Pharisee pure in title but not in intention, who dischargest upon us the sentiments of Novatus, though thou sharest the same infirmities?
\end{quote}

We see in this passage that Gregory follows Eusebius' argument insofar as he affirms the latter's theological intent; but he departs from him by casting it in terms of a Platonic metaphysic. That is to say, he gives a more rigorous definition to the problem of man's frailty: he is an animal shifty and of a changeable nature. He is more explicit in another instance:\textsuperscript{23}
Let us be assured that to do no wrong is really superhuman, and belongs to God alone. ...Our unhealed condition arises from our evil and unsubdued nature, and from the exercise of its powers. Our repentance when we sin ...[belongs] to that portion (μεσίς) which is in the way of salvation. ...The earthly tabernacle presseth down the upward flight of the soul, ...yet let the image be cleansed from filth, and raise aloft the flesh, its yokefellow, lifting it on the wings of reason (λόγος).

Basil shares Gregory's outlook. Commenting on Ps. 32:2 (LXX), he likens the body to a musical instrument which needs retuning before it is worthy to be played by reason. He writes:

We sinned in the body. ...Let us confess (ἐξομολογεῖν) with our body, using the same instrument for the destruction of sins. ...And then, after confession you are worthy to play for God on the ten-stringed psaltery. For, it is necessary, first, to correct the actions of the body, so that we perform them harmoniously with the divine Word and thus mount up to the contemplation of things intellectual.

In linking the problem of sin with a psychosomatic analysis of man, the Cappadocians prescribe also the form which a penitential system assumes. A life in askesis becomes solely the proper and normative expression. Moreover, the bodily mortifications in the practice of exomologesis are oriented to the end of restoring a harmony between soul and body.

The second tenet stresses God's mercy to the penitent; but it also lends itself to the encouraging of moral laxity. This is the substance of Tertullian's and the Novatianists' objections. Eusebius actually
recognises this both in the introduction and the conclusion of his treatise. Throughout the homily, he qualifies God's forgiveness by emphasizing equally the necessity of sincere repentance. More significantly, an ethical element enters into the discussion. Our forgiveness of brethren who have sinned against us is the basis of our forgiveness by God. This becomes the standard interpretation of the Parable of the Unforgiving Servant (Mt. 18:23-35), the Lord's Prayer, and other similar teachings of Jesus. Eusebius advocates that we should not begrudge God's pardon of others, on the ground that the same measure which we give to others will be the measure which we ourselves get from God. Forgiveness becomes intertwined with philanthropia. Gregory of Nazianzus proposes to Theodore, the Bishop of Tyana, in a letter in which he persuades the latter not to seek revenge against his enemies: "Let us consider that the great pursuit of mercifulness (φιλανθρωπία) is set before us, and let us forgive the wrongs done to us that we also may obtain forgiveness (συγχώρησις). ... Let us choose to shew ourselves merciful (φιλάνθρωποι) rather than severe, and lovers of the poor (φιλόπιστοι) rather than of abstract justice (φιλοδίκαιοι)." Care for the poor, an essential aspect of philanthropia, becomes integral to forgiveness.

Our examination of the first two premises has
introduced us to the difficulties surrounding the third tenet; namely, the relation of the church to the lapsed. Eusebius proposes no developed ecclesiology. The mandate to accommodate the penitent is based upon a recognition of God's acceptance of the same. The church assumes a non-judgemental stance. The problem of forgiveness becomes exclusively biased to the God-man relation. Communal ramifications of sin and forgiveness are ignored or simplified. The individualistic undertones are strengthened once repentance assumes the form of askesis, as we have noted in the course of our discussion of the first tenet of Eusebius. Admittedly, these are qualified, as we saw in the last paragraph by the demand for ethical expression of repentance. Nevertheless, we still need to ascertain how the church participates actively in the dynamics of reconciliation. In other words, how does the church as a body exercise its divinely invested authority to bind and to loose? How is holiness properly predicated of the church as a whole? It is these acute concerns which cast all other criticisms raised hitherto into relief. A crucial consideration in the relation of the church to the penitent concerns the self-understanding of the church itself. To this end, we shall examine two representative texts from early in the history of the church, one by the author of 2-Clement and one by Clement of Alexandria.
The first text is an early second century homily of unknown authorship, erroneously attributed to Clement of Rome. This short homily is a call to the congregation to express repentance by living a pure life before the coming day of judgement. Thus, the author comments on Jeremiah 18 with regard to the potter and the clay:

While we are on earth, then, let us repent: for we are clay under the craftsman's hand. For in like manner as the potter, if he be making a vessel, and it get twisted or crushed in his hands, reshapeth it again; but if he have once put it into the fiery oven, he shall no longer mend it: so also let us, while we are in this world, repent with our whole heart of the evil things which we have done in the flesh, that we may be saved by the Lord, while we have yet time for repentance. For after that we have departed out of the world, we can do no more make confession (ἐξολοθρεύσαντι) there, or repent (μετανοεῖν) any more.

Two comments follow. In the first place, the call to repentance and the assurance of forgiveness are not based upon any new status conferred at baptism. They are rather grounded in salvation history; viz., the present time is the kairos of grace. The distinction between life prior to and after baptism is blurred. Repentance becomes a general missionary call to the whole world. The church is a waiting church; its members need to repent and keep their flesh pure so that the heathen may have no ground to blaspheme the name of the Lord on grounds of morality. We shall remember this evangelistic element in the call to repentance when we come to examine Clement of Alexandria. In the second place, the present life is but a training ground for the next. Platonic type-antitype influence
prevails throughout the homily. The church on earth is the antitype of the spiritual reality, namely, the spiritual-Jesus. Therefore, each Christian as a member of the church should keep his flesh undefiled if he is to participate in the spiritual reality on the day of judgement. At the present time, the members are called to convert one another, and to engage in almsgiving and in prayers. Indeed, for our author, repentance of the individual can never be understood apart from the communal (though not necessarily the institutional) dimension. The sanctity of the individual is bound up with that of the church. Moreover, although he affirms the atoning power of almsgiving and prayer, he remains silent as to how God is thereby moved to forgive the sinner in return. Nor are these good works confined to, or directed towards, any specific group in the congregation. A repentant life of prayer and almsgiving is not institutionalised; nor do officials of the church regard themselves as dispensers of God's forgiveness to the mass. Rather it is caught up in the dynamics of sanctification and evangelism which is undergirded by a strong apocalyptic consciousness. The present church is a community of saints waiting for the consummation, the dawning of its reality.

The second pertinent text is the treatise quis divers salvetur of Clement of Alexandria in the early third century. It is an exhortation to rich Christians
against despair over Jesus's injunction in Mk. 10:17-31 about the Rich Young Man. Of particular importance is the account of St John and the Robber at the end of the treatise. Three observations are adequate for our purpose. Firstly, the church, as symbolised by the bishop, is the trustee of every soul deposited with her by Christ (and also the "spiritual man", namely, St John). It is a school wherein every person is to be brought up in knowledge. The carelessness of the bishop is responsible for the youth's fall. Secondly, the power of intercession lies with the spiritual man in the community. St John symbolises a friend of God who seeks out the lapsed youth, and intercedes to God on his behalf. In Stromateis Book Six, Chapter Thirteen, Clement argues that those who live perfectly and gnostically according to the gospel, rather than those elected by man, are the true overseers of the church. Thirdly, the lapsed is not merely dead to God; he is at the same time reckoned to have deserted the church. Hence, though the youth is baptised a second time with his tears upon repentance and thus purified, reconciliation is not complete until St John brings the youth back to the church, exercises pastoral oversight over him and eventually sets him over the church (ἐπιστῆσαι τὴν ἐκκλησίαν). Clement comments that this affords a great token of regeneration and example of sincere repentance, and a trophy of a resurrection that can be seen.
We see here a transformation of the themes expressed earlier by the author of 2-Clement. The relation between the sanctity of the church and that of an individual in it is more precisely defined. The leaders in the church are responsible for the welfare of its members. But, at the same time, Clement suggests that they (for example, the bishop) are unequal to their task. Nevertheless, the reconciliation of a penitent has a greater significance than simply his reconciliation to God in the light of the coming judgement; it also consists in restoring the penitent to the institution, and in setting the present historical church in order.

How then should an individual progress in holiness, and the church identify itself as a holy community, if the bishop fails in his tasks? Clement regards the church as a school for the immature rather than as a waiting community of saints. Friends of God emerge as the elite teachers of the mass, by whom intercessions to God are offered, and to whom almsgiving is to be directed. Clement uses the notion of "the friends of God" to guard against a deviant understanding of the baptismal seal. From sub-apostolic times, the baptismal seal loses its Christological reference and becomes no more than a prophylactic sign against the devil. One guards this seal in order to be able to partake of immortality in the future age. The author of 2-Clement reminds his
congregation of the need to preserve this seal if one desires to enter the kingdom of God.\textsuperscript{42} The forgiveness of post-baptismal sins therefore becomes problematic, because the seal is given only once at baptism. Now in 2-Clement the tension between the need to guard the baptismal seal, and the continuing possibility of repentance, could still be maintained because of the over-riding apocalyptic framework. The problem intensifies when the historical dimension recedes to the background in favour of an atemporal worldview.\textsuperscript{43} That is to say, with the passing of the strong apocalyptic hope, many Christian writers hold a psychological rather than a historical perspective in their interpretation of man's relation to the eschaton. Clement of Alexandria regards the friends of God, rather than the seal, as the guarantee of salvation. Since God's friends are always to be found in the church, forgiveness of sins becomes a continuing possibility. Indeed, the Father's unlimited forgiveness to the penitent son in Section 39 of \textit{quis dives salvatur} is intelligible only in the light of the important role of "God's friends". The bishop in the narrative errs in that he mistakenly assumes the baptismal seal to be the perfect guard of the youth.\textsuperscript{44} Spirit-filled men should take charge of the pastoral care; and it is to these men, consequently that confessions should be directed.

This solution leads to a grave danger, namely that
sins can only be forgiven through intermediaries. This becomes acute once the church begins to regard itself as a disciplinary body vis-a-vis the lapsed. Controversies (for example, Gnosticism and Novatianism) lead to an identification of authority with the episcopal order. It alone holds the keys to bind and to loose. So admittedly, the establishment and execution of a penitential system has in view the protection of the church from defilement.\footnote{45} However, disciplinary actions now express the re-initiation of the lapsed into the holy community, rather than the redemptive life within it. Accordingly, Gregory of Nazianzus categorises 	extit{exomologesis} as a kind of baptism alongside those of Moses, of John, of Jesus (the water baptism), of martyrdom, and of fire.\footnote{46} The burden is placed upon the individual to reconcile himself to the pure society, instead of on the 	extit{ecclesia}. The understanding of reformation in terms of mutual service within the community recedes into the background. Penitential discipline could serve both as a deterrent against sin, and as a safeguard for good order in the church; but it fails at the same time to be an expression of the gospel, which is in the words of a modern scholar "the establishment of a true relationship between God and man by means of which the problem of man's sin as a barrier to that relationship is dealt with once for all".\footnote{47} Clearly, this penitential system is open to miscarriage of justice. The church is not unaware of this; the priests
are warned of their heavy responsibility. Nevertheless, the hierarchical structure is unchallenged. Alongside this rigorist approach, a more popular practice prevails. The Spirit-filled ascetics become the de facto confessors. Basil's treatment of the subject is illuminating. Parallel to his canonical system which is enforced in the institutional church, he has in view a more charismatic ordering, where discreet confession "to those who are like-minded and have given proof of faith and understanding" becomes a regular practice for the common coenobitic life. This structure endeavours to integrate the two concerns: on the one hand, the need for discipline, and on the other the necessity of pastoral care for those who are plagued by a guilty conscience. Nevertheless, no attempt is made to connect the two divergent understandings of confession, the canonical and the charismatic. The latter remains at the fringe of the general rule and practice of the institutional church.

Loss of mutuality in the institutional church is essential rather than accidental to Clement of Alexandria's concept of friendship, in particular, to his concept of the friends of God. His theological intention to affirm a moral standard within the church is set in a world-view which identifies truth with reason. In Stromateis Book Two, Chapter Nineteen, he outlines three kinds(είδη) of
friendship (φιλία): that of a philosopher, a man, and an animal. They are based respectively upon reason, mutuality (or utility), and intimacy (or pleasure). Only that of the philosopher is firm. Clement adopts the Aristotelian concept of a friend as the second self in this respect: "the real man within us is the spiritual, philanthropy (φιλανθρωπία) is brotherly love to those who participate, in the same spirit." "An associate (εἰκός) is another self." In friendship, therefore, the agent enjoys awareness of the realisation of his self, which is in the words of a modern commentator "universal and permanent, a self at one with other agents insofar as all are working for the same end, but a self genuinely individual ... for] reason is the personality and individuality of each: it is the man's most genuine self." Perfection in the contemplation of God becomes determinative of how mutuality can find expression in the life of the church. The image and likeness of God, friend of God, perfect man, sonship are equivalent concepts which are properly predicated of a gnostic. Given this mentality, mutuality between a gnostic and the imperfect within the historical form of the church becomes impossible. This is not to say that Clement has no pastoral concern for the weak. Rather, this pastoral care, as embodied in the relation of the gnostic to the mass, is based on a benefactor-recipient model, after the pattern of the Creator's relation to his work.
The gnostics in a sense make up for the absence of the apostles; and if they experience any trials, those are more properly understood as being permitted by God for the benefit of their neighbours, rather than ordained for the sake of their own purification. This lends itself to the danger that a mature relation between "friends of God" and the mass is impossible. Because love is based on reason, the benefactor necessarily loves the benefited more than the latter loves him. The church is therefore a community under the rule of the friends of God. It is monopolised by the elite.

We must ask, therefore, whether the church may retain Clement's pastoral concern while maintaining that the sanctity of the church is a gift of God which issues from the universal missionary call to repentance, and that it is safeguarded by mutuality within the holy fellowship, as the author of 2-Clement would advocate. To anticipate the argument of the rest of this chapter, Chrysostom insists upon the church as the community of friends. His rejoinder to those who despise the present church leaders as inferior to the apostles is revealing, especially in the light of our discussion of friendship: "This we also seek of you, even love, that fervent and genuine affection (φιλία)." He proceeds to confess that there is no comparison between them and the apostles, but this fact is "rather to profit you the more". "Ye have no teacher
at all on earth; but what we have received [in the Scriptures] that also we give, and in giving we seek for nothing else from you but to be loved (φιλαγγελεῖσθαι) only."

He then concludes by listing the things that they have in common: "We have partaken of a spiritual table, let us be partakers also of spiritual love." "We have the same city, and the same house, and table, and way, and door, and root, and life, and head, and the same shepherd, and king, and teacher, and judge, and maker, and father, and to whom all things are common." The leading thought in this passage has to do not with the defence of ecclesiastical authority, but with upholding friendship -- the sharing of life -- within the church. Leaving aside the important issue of how the substance of truth can be discerned, Chrysostom maintains that this moral truth is made redemptive only insofar as each member of the community is conscious that he is a recipient of God's grace and a person who can be loved by a fellow human being. Indeed, rather than ordaining angels to preside over the church, God installs fallible men instead. A realisation of their own infirmities would safeguard them from pride; and insofar as this is recognised by others, it is an encouragement against despair in sin. Thus Chrysostom endeavours to situate the problem of ecclesiastical discipline in a wider moral context.
3.2 Friendship

_Philía_ forms the interpretative key to Chrysostom’s practical recommendations for overcoming moral weakness. The exhortation to love (φίλεῖν), the mandate to give ethical expression to friendship (φίλία), and the plea to be friends (φίλοι) of one another feature prominently in his sermons, particularly in his pastoral advice to his congregation. A sermon preached in Constantinople on Acts illustrates the specific nuances which he attaches to friendship:

As with a harp, the sounds are diverse, but not the harmony, and they all together give out one harmony and symphony. ...The musician is the might of love (ἀγάπη): it is this that strikes out the sweet melody, singing (withal) a strain in which no note is out of tune. This strain rejoices both the angels and God the Lord of angels; this strain rouses (to hear it) the whole audience that is in heaven; it even lulls evil passions. ...Among friends (φίλοι), while Love (ἀγάπη) strikes the chords, all passions are still and laid to sleep, like wild beasts charmed and unnerved. ...Let us speak of friendship (φίλία). Though thou let fall some casual hasty word, there is none to catch thee up, but all forgive thee; though thou do (some hasty thing), none puts upon it the worst construction, but all allowance is made: every one prompt to stretch out the hand to him that is falling, every one wishing him to stand. A wall impregnable it is indeed, this friendship; a wall, which not the Devil himself, much less men, can overpower. It is not possible for that man to fall into danger who has gathered many friends. (Where love is) no room is there to get matter of anger, but only for pleasantness of feeling; no room is there to get matter of envying; none to get occasion of resentment. ...In all things both spiritual and temporal, he accomplishes all with ease. ...Take
away friendship, and thou hast taken away all, thou hast confounded all.

The above passage amply conveys the significance of friendship. All that contributes to overcoming moral impotence -- forgiveness, refraining from exposure of sins, forbearance, mutual care, and peace -- is embodied in philia, a vocation to which man is summoned. Friendship -- or love (φιλία) -- binds man into mutual service in a spirit of gentleness, mildness, and peace.62 The implication is profound. Chrysostom rejects the option of construing man's morality exclusively in terms of his rational and volitional faculties. The overcoming of moral impotence is neither a mustering of the will to do good, nor an enterprise undertaken in detached dispassionate thinking. Rather, it is enabled by mutual affection.63 This affection in friendship implies a recognition of relatedness and is reinforced by a common sharing of life. To say that moral weakness can be overcome by friendship does not imply that man does good uncritically. Rather, friendship provides the justifying basis for the commitment to mutual welfare. Thus we can appreciate the logical possibility that the conception of friendship is the essential element in the overcoming of moral weaknesses. Is it however viable? Or is it only an abstract notion which bears no relation to practice?
Chrysostom sees that friendship is open to universal participation. Clearly, it is intelligible to all. Chrysostom discerns that philia arises from "causes" (προφασεῖς) which either are natural (φυσική) or arise out of relations of life (βιωτικά). To the former aspect, he ascribes matrimonial attachments and family ties; to the latter he attaches all social and commercial intercourse. The use of προφασεῖς in the above sentence is significant. For Chrysostom perceives friendship to be a necessary aspect of human life, willy-nilly. If it does not arise from innate affection due to natural kinship, the practical needs of daily life will impress it upon man. Man seeks justification for friendship. Thus Chrysostom comments: "Mark how many (inducements and pleas) for friendship the pagans have contrived; community of art or trade, neighbourhood, relationships". Though he be in sin, man is bound to reach out to his fellow whether his motive is noble or not. He is naturally biased towards communal life; and he safeguards the existence of community by keeping the rules without which community cannot subsist. Chrysostom therefore remarks that even robbers who have entered into allegiance care for each other.

This discussion gives us clues to the answer of two questions: How is friendship sustained? And what is the
scope of friendship? We will clarify these in turn. First, friendship is sustained by man's creatureliness. The content of this creatureliness is man's ability to respond to love. The homiliae in 1 Cor. give ample expression to this theme. Chrysostom regards parenthood, family and domestic life, and the intermingling of races through marriage as foundations of affection (διαθέσεως ὑπόθεσις), or the bonds of love (σύνθεμοι ἄγαπης) ordained by God for unitive ends.

Chrysostom takes man's love for his kin to be the irreducible element of life: "every living being loves its like". This tie of affection, which he sees as the basis upon which moral weakness can be overcome, is reflected in family life. Indeed God ordains family life to be the sphere in which the human race is propagated so that the recognition of parenthood can be the basis of love, that is, harmony and good order. He writes: "Why do we not all spring out of the earth? Why not full grown", as Adam was? "In order that both the birth and bringing up of children, and being born of another, may bind us mutually together." Chrysostom perceives that man is able to respond to love. Pleading to his congregation against revenge, he exhorts them: "Say not then: I am hated, and that is why I do not love (φιλεῖν). For that is why thou oughtest to love most. And besides, it is not in the nature of things for a man who loves to
be soon hated, but brute as a person may be, he loves them that love him." He then concludes by using an illustration of a lover who would endure all kinds of ill-treatment from a harlot, but only to love her even more. The point of course is that once an experiential tie is established, man commits himself naturally to mutual welfare.

The phrase καὶ ὁ φύσις gives emphasis to this point. Sirach 13:15 provides the proof-text: "Every creature loves its like, and every person his neighbour." Chrysostom defines this sentiment as a gift of nature( τὸ ἤς φύσεως ὁμοῖον); it is a sort of "family feeling" (οἰκείωσις) by nature which we have towards one another. Thus, the συμπάθεια of a mother to her child is an expression of the bond of nature(τὰ ἀπὸ ἤς φύσεως) between the two. In linking affection to φύσις, Chrysostom wants to establish that man's rejection of (those whom he recognises to be) his kin goes against what is fundamentally human; it is against nature(παρὰ φύσιν); or in other words, inhumanity(ἀμανθρωπία).

When one regards not his fellow countrymen, friends, brethren, in a word all men, this is to live against nature. The moral claim of a friend is intrinsic to man. It may be argued that by accentuating affection, Chrysostom identifies man too closely with his biological existence, an aspect of his life which does not mark off
his human existence. But in fact the contrary is the case. He argues that affective responsiveness characterises man; more precisely, it is indicative of God's unique providence towards him. He perceives that life could never hold together if mercy, compassion and philanthropia were taken away.

God hath not left them [men] to reasoning (λογισμός) only, but many parts he hath implanted by the absolute power of nature herself. ...[Thus we see parental love, and sympathy between kinsmen,] thus man pities man. For we have somewhat even from nature prone to mercy. ...We feel indignation in behalf of them that are wronged, and seeing men killed we are overcome, and beholding them as they mourn, we weep. For because it is God's will that it should be very perfectly performed, He commanded nature to contribute much hereunto, signifying that this is exceedingly the object of His care.

It follows that we should bring ourselves to the school of mercy, for "unless one hath this, one hath fallen away even from being a man". In other words, since affection is an essential aspect of man, redemption must embrace this sphere; it follows that gentleness is the essence of redemption. Chrysostom's concern indeed is soteriologically motivated. Negatively put, man's de facto rejection of his fellows constitutes a moral witness against his own sin; and positively, salvation is essentially communal.

Our discussion hitherto indicates that the possibility of friendship is sustained by man's ability
to respond to love. This leads, in the second place, to a consideration of the scope of friendship. Friendship is aroused by man's needs. 79 Chrysostom utilises the concept of "need" (χρεία) in this way: God made us to stand in need of one another, so that he can bring us together, because necessities above all create congenial intercourse. 80 Thus the outdoor labour of man, the domestic chores of women, the treasures which the rich provide, and the manual labour and the technical skill which the poor undertake are manifestations of the divine purpose to make the human race stand in need of one another, so that love might be fostered among them. 81 It is important to understand that Chrysostom is not seeking to justify the status quo; rather, he wants to underline the necessary interdependence of man and to affirm the redemptive value of all vocations. This is clear in a later sermon: "Not at all for need's sake was the class of slaves introduced, else even along with Adam had a slave been formed; but it is the penalty of sin and the punishment of disobedience" to which Christ put an end. Thus it follows that the rich should endeavour to teach his slaves trades whereby they may be able to support themselves, and then let them go free. The institution of slavery thus becomes a work of philanthropia. 82 This need which makes man acutely conscious of the necessity of communal life is sometimes construed as a curb implanted by God so that men will be
drawn into friendship rather than drift apart into dissolution.\textsuperscript{83}

The commitment to mutuality (which provides a basis for recognition of a moral community) is not only motivated by contingent needs. It is also aroused by its necessity for salvation. Hence Chrysostom rebukes those who regard themselves as above needing others in the task of moral perception:\textsuperscript{84}

\begin{quote}
If thou think that thou art not in need of him [another person], thou wilt be the most foolish and feeble of men. For a man of this sort deprives himself of all succour, and in whatever error he may run into, will not have the advantage either of correction or of pardon, but will provoke God by his recklessness, and run into many errors.
\end{quote}

He goes on to point out in the passage that just as Moses needed the advice of his father-in-law, so there are circumstances in which "a wise man does not perceive what is needful, and a man of less shrewdness hits upon something that is applicable". He clarifies what he means on another occasion: the welfare of each man is bound up with others; if only for the sake of expediency, one should pursue the neighbour's welfare, in order to be saved oneself.\textsuperscript{85} This criterion of expediency is but some form of praeparatio evangelica. The commitment due to self-interest is overshadowed by the claim of the purpose of God for the human race as a whole. Communal life is positively related (in some measure) to the nature
of the eschaton. Chrysostom proceeds to say in the same homily (Homilia 25 in 1 Cor.): "For it is not possible to be saved, ... and neglect others who are perishing, thou wilt gain no confidence (παρηγορία) towards God." Then, referring to 1 Cor. 13:3, he suggests that "God made it a law that he might bring us into the bond of love." In this manner Chrysostom answers the crucial question which he himself posed prior to assuming the sacerdotal ministry: Can a person be saved by himself alone, when he is not profitable to any other? He has come to see that the dynamic of mutual care is an integral element in redemption. This mutuality receives further explication in his comments on 1 Cor. 13:5. The commitment to another is not just a consequence of the outflowing of God's love in one's life, but it constitutes the necessary basis upon which one can be saved; this necessity is not contingent but essential. Hence he writes:

Even as one awakening a slumbering child to follow his brother, when he is of himself unwilling, places in the brother's hand that which he [the first child] desires and longs for, that through desire of obtaining it he may pursue after him that holds it, and accordingly so it takes place: thus also here, each man's own profit hath he given to his neighbour, that hence we may run after one another, and not be torn asunder.

And he uses the analogy of marriage where "we leave neither of them in his own power, but extending a chain between them, we cause the one to be holden of the other,
and the other of the one." Thus also St Paul's joy, hope, and crown are in the disciples of Thessalonica, and theirs in him (1 Thess. 2:19). So we pursue love (1 Cor. 14:1), a pursuit not undertaken in private, but engaged by the entire community. "When of ourselves we do not reach unto love, let us bid them that are near to hold her, till we come up with her." Indeed, almsgiving is taken up into this greater horizon. Chrysostom exhorts his congregation not to give without sympathy, but in condescension and pity to the needy. God could have nourished the poor without our contribution, "but that he might bind us together unto love and that we might be fervent toward each other, he commanded [the poor] to be nourished by us".

The significance of man's communal existence as the key to overcoming moral impotence cannot be over-emphasized. This is cast into relief by contrasting Chrysostom's position with other writings which lay greater emphasis upon the rational and volitional faculties of man. The Twelfth homilia Clementina, in which the relation of philanthropia and philia is explored, is a case in point. The author perceives that the moral good can only be truly appropriated through one's choice (α'ρετος) in the face of all adverse situations. History is the arena or testing ground in which man struggles and wills himself towards the good.
The communal life of man thus loses its redemptive significance. Friendship is subordinated to philanthropia because the former springs from natural persuasion (πείθων φυσικῶς). He proceeds to suggest that compassion (ἐλεημοσύνη) -- for example, mercy to the unfortunate, love of a mother to her child -- is only the female, and thus the inferior part of philanthropia. The male part, which is akin to God, is indiscriminate love to all men. This love is not based upon the common humanity which all share in, but is grounded upon a negative principle, to love in spite of all injustice one may suffer. A non-judgemental attitude towards the offender springs from a lack of sufficient knowledge (πρόγνωσις) to judge rightly; a commitment toward's him is an expression of one's resolve to endure the struggle in the present age, and a measure to secure one's own forgiveness before God on judgement day. Consequently, the gospel of reconciliation is construed as belonging exclusively in the private realm, and finds no expression in the human community as a whole.

Chrysostom defends, in contrast, the redemptive significance of the human community. His interpretation of the Parable of the Wheat and the Tares (Mt. 13:24-30) is revealing. The weeds are not to be uprooted because it is not the proper kairos to do so. "If therefore ye root them up beforehand, ye injure that which
is to become wheat, slaying some, in whom there is yet room for change and improvement. ...So long as they stand by the wheat, we must spare them, for it is possible for them even to become wheat." This renunciation of judgement is not primarily motivated by man's lack of omniscience. It issues, as we have already indicated, from a profound understanding of God's present dispensation. Gentleness is proper to this age; judgement is withheld for the sake of the salvation of all. For gentleness (ἐπισικεία), in the sense of patience, could affect a lasting change in the object whom one is seeking to reform. Thus, referring to the same parable on another occasion, he points out that "he who is become better through the fear of man will quickly return to wickedness". Judgement on the tares should be withheld.¹⁰⁰ This is a clear departure from Origen and the Cappadocians, who justify the present intermingling of wheat and tares exclusively on the ground that it will spur the soul to remain vigilant against defilement.¹⁰¹ Such an individualistic framework makes no allowance for any positive significance in the mutual engagement of men with one another in the human community in history. In fact, Chrysostom argues that even if one were to remain sinless, he should still not search out other men's sins. The judgemental attitude is an expression of inhumanity, and a departure from natural feeling (ἀστόργος).¹⁰² In contrast, gentleness (ἐπισικεία) is redemptive. That
which softens the heart is not wrath; it is ἐπισέκεια.
The former aggravates the callousness, while the latter
removes it. "If then you are desirous to reprove any
delinquent, approach him with possible mildness
(προάνων)." ¹⁰³

The conception of friendship hence allows Chrysostom
to express his concern that redemption should be the focal
point in ecclesiastical discipline. The concept of
justice is starkly absent from his discussion of
friendship. Friendship (like community), according to
him, is not sustained by justice. Once disciplinary
actions deviate from this focus, it is a matter of
inhumanity. It amounts to a rejection of the neighbour in
need, and to denying moral responsibility for one's
brethren. In particular, this inhumanity is expressed in
public exposure of sins, and in cursing one's enemies. ¹⁰⁴
It is the polar opposite of philanthropia. ¹⁰⁵ The
non-judgemental and non-abandoning attitude is neither a
retreat into passive concession, nor a mere confession of
the corruption of one's own moral perception. The concern
is that the demand for purity and good order must not be
ossified into a harsh verdict which could reduce man to
excessive despair. ¹⁰⁶ Chrysostom's criticism of the
Cathari in Constantinople is a case in point. He points
out to them that purity in this age is qualified. Man
sins by virtue of his solidarity with this life. The
Cathari have under-estimated their involvement in sin. Further, he defines purity in terms of one's commitment to benefit others. This neighbour-directed ministry is the genuine mark of one's turning from sin. In this rejoinder to the Cathari, Chrysostom not only maintains Eusebius of Emesa's contention that man sins *qua* man. He affirms, in direct contrast to the Cathari who separate themselves from the mass, that the church *is* the focal point of reconciliation. Here, he proceeds to reveal his concern that the church should be not regarded as a morally pure agent which dispenses forgiveness and purity at its own will. It must first of all recognise that it is itself the object of reconciliation from God; it is only from within this moral vision that disciplinary actions are to be *implemented*. The pastoral care for the weak and the lapsed becomes the ministry given by God in order that the church itself may receive forgiveness and manifest the grace which it has received. This pastoral commitment is integral to the dynamics of redemption. Thus his vehement attack upon the Judaisers (which could be taken as his passionate concern for doctrinal purity) culminates in a discourse on pastoral ministry directed to them.\textsuperscript{107} Tending the fallen brethren is like finding treasure; by that action, our life becomes holy and cleansed.\textsuperscript{108}

So far we have explored Chrysostom's conception of friendship as a moral category which is crucial to his
moral vision. We have insisted that gentleness is its characteristic expression in this age. The human community in all its varied forms of intercourse serves as a praeparatio evangelica to men's realisation of their kinship to one another. Before we proceed to explore its Christological focus, it is salutary to indicate briefly the difficulties to which the concept of friendship is subject as it stands.

Chrysostom is not unaware of these difficulties. He expressly indicates the issues encountered by a community which is founded primarily upon earthly goods. There are three considerations.

(i) In the first place, since the community is formed by pragmatic considerations, the bond is extrinsic. It does not rise from sincerity. The friendship which Chrysostom commends is one which "issues from the disposition, from sentiment, and sympathy (ἀπὸ διάθεσεως καὶ γνώμης καὶ τοῦ συναλγεῖν)". These qualities the friendship between robbers and murderers lacks. Indeed, a problem about friendship is that its basis of justification must be intrinsic to the relation if it is to continue. Chrysostom observes: "He whom habitual intercourse (συνήθεία) made inseparable will, when the habit (συνήθεία) is broken through, let his friendship become extinct."
(ii) In the second place, friendship requires an objective base for it to be developed properly. True doctrine stands in a critical relation towards all forms of friendship. The friendship which St Paul extols is one which is informed by truth. It comes "with judgment, with reason, with discrimination". Philia which is motivated by worldly affairs leads the community into sin. Those who love wealth often ignore nature itself, that is, kinship, companionship, friendship, or respect for their elders. Referring to Joseph's victory over seduction by Potiphar's wife in Gn. 39, Chrysostom commends Joseph's true love to her:

[The woman's] words were expressions of one who so far from loving him did not even love (φιλῶν) herself. But because he truly loved (γνησίως ἐφίλε), he sought to avert her from all these [sins]. ...It was not Joseph that she loved (φιλῶν), but she sought to fulfil her own lust.

In one instance Chrysostom employs the phrase "profitable friendship" (ἐπωφελῆς φιλία). It is one which is not based upon eating and drinking, but which involves mutual care and support.

(iii) In the third place, even a friendship which issues from sincerity and is informed by truth could dissolve. Marital or parental relations are not insulated from dissolution, Chrysostom emphasizes. The reason for this is that they are engendered from earth (γῆνων).
The only secure friendship is one which is ruled by the spiritual love (πνευματικὴ ἁγάπη) which descends from above, out of heaven. If kinship among men provides a natural basis for the overcoming of moral impotence, Chrysostom is more emphatic in underlining the point that the human community stands under the summons of God's own friendship. He gives the following illustration: If a kiss in earthly relations is a disposition implanted in nature in order that "it may be fuel unto love", then the holy kiss in the church recommended by St Paul in 2 Cor. 13:12 is implanted by grace in order that souls may be bound to each other. This spiritual friendship from above -- the perfect relationship (συγγένεια ἁκριβεσσία) -- stands in a critical relation to all earthly intercourse. Cut off from it, "though a man be father, son, or brother, ...he is no true kinsman". Chrysostom has in view a more profound sharing of life. It is one which is not based upon "birthpangs, sleep, sexual intercourse, and embracing of bodies", but framed of the Holy Spirit and water. This of course is the new birth into the ecclesia of God. The mutuality must be informed and drawn by man's true calling from above. Otherwise it remains self-frustrating in its attempt to overcome moral weakness. Chrysostom is conscious of the grief that he must bear on the day of judgement if his congregation are not saved: "We are loved and we love (you)(φιλούμεθα καὶ φιλούμεν); but this is not the
question. But let us first love Christ ( φιλήσωμεν οὖν τὸν Χριστὸν πρῶτον )."¹²⁰
3.3 The Ascended Christ and the Community of Friends

Before proceeding any further, let us briefly summarize. We have examined how Chrysostom uses the concept of friendship to provide the moral context which allows moral impotence to be overcome. Doubts are raised, however, as to whether it is merely a self-frustrating exercise. For as we have seen above, in using friendship as the essential category, one is inevitably faced with the problems of insincerity, subjectivity and corruptibility. We need to ascertain how Chrysostom faces these difficulties (as we maintain he does), by providing it with a more rigorous theological foundation. In other words, we must show how friendship occupies an essential place in God's redemptive purposes in such a way that the difficulties are only contingent.

Towards the end of the last section we alluded to the specific nature of friendship which Chrysostom has in mind for overcoming moral impotence. This friendship is not exclusively defined by pleasure and utilitarian considerations. Rather, it is formed by spiritual love: "It descendeth from above, out of heaven." In the cultivation of it, one finds genuine pleasure and engages oneself in truly fruitful pursuits. This section is devoted to an explication of this spiritual love "which descendeth from above", that is, which issues from the
Ascension of Christ. We shall first of all briefly suggest that Ascension is the exaltation of humanity as the friends of God; and then in more detail examine this exaltation as embodied in the founding of the church, the spouse of Christ. In this way we shall argue that the church is the community of friends which expresses the overcoming of man's moral weakness.

3.3.1 We have already alluded to the Ascension as the ending of hostility between God and man. Man is henceforth called a friend of God. This, of course, is effected by the glorification of human nature in Christ's own exaltation to heaven at the right hand of God. Chrysostom comments on Eph. 2:6: "Our head is there above, we who are the Body do not participate in less honour, though we stay below." Friendship (with God) is therefore included in this movement into glory. We may discern the content of this friendship in his comment on the baptismal covenant which he contrasts with that of Moses:

There, it was slave with master, here, it is friend with friend. ...[It is] a second creation. He took dust from the earth, and formed man: but now, dust no longer, but the Holy Spirit, ...not in Paradise, but "in Heaven". For deem not that, because the subject [i.e. the catechumen] is earth, it is done on earth; he is removed thither, to Heaven, there these things are transacted, in the midst of Angels: God taketh up thy soul above, above he harmonizeth it anew; He placeth thee near to the Kingly Throne. ...Thou art mingled with His
Body, thou art intermixed with that Body that lieth above, whither the devil cannot approach.

In this passage, two ideas, which are also prominent in traditions more influenced by Alexandrian theology, are recast in the context of the Ascension. The first concept involves baptism as effecting an intimacy with God. The transaction is "friend with friend". The interpretation of all believers, in particular the neophytes, as "friends of God" transforms the ethical implication of the gnostic-as-the-friend-of-God in the writings of Clement of Alexandria. For as we have indicated in Section 3.1, ὁ φίλος τοῦ θεοῦ is the highest grade of the elect. He alone is the image of God which holds the entire creation together, and is sent here on earth "as it were on a sojourn, by the high administration and suitable arrangement of the Father". To confer upon a neophyte the honour of a friend is foreign to the Alexandrian tradition, which endeavours to insist that sanctification involves a slow process of intellectual growth. The sealing with the imago Dei remains to be realised and perfected in the life of a Christian.

The second point of distinctive interpretation is that the purification of the soul, insofar as "God taketh it up above and harmonizeth it anew", is not understood in terms of catharsis. Purification is not analysed in terms of a proper reordering of the body-soul
relationship; it is rather linked to the refashioning by
the Holy Spirit,¹²⁸ which is given from heaven above at
the inauguration of the Ascension-Pentecost, as prophesied
by the Old Testament saints.¹²⁹ The new birth in the
Holy Spirit therefore is set in an historical context.
The purification unites all believers.¹³⁰ The Holy
Spirit is a sociological rather than a psychological
integrating principle.

The link between baptism and Ascension is illustrated
in Chrysostom's severance of baptism from any association
with the Resurrection. Judgement, which is implied in
Resurrection, is delayed until the eschaton. This may
have informed his exposition of Rom. 6:1-11, the locus
classicus of relating baptism to Resurrection. He
emphasizes that Rom. 6:5b does not read we shall be "in
the likeness of His Resurrection(τοῦ ὀμοίωματος τῆς
ἀναστάσεως)", but we shall "belong to the Resurrection
(καὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως)", which has not yet taken place,
but will hereafter.¹³¹

3.3.2 This exaltation (and transformation) of man at the
Ascension is embodied in the founding of the church, the
spouse of Christ. This theme is developed in depth
especially in the homiliae in Eph. and Col., and also
in his expositiones in Psalmos quosdam. The Ascension is
the basis of a spiritual marriage of Christ to the church.
Ps. 44(LXX) provides a convenient analogy by means of which he gives a full development. She was naked and rejected then; now the Bride is clothed in honour, and is taken up to a high degree of elevation. Christ not only gave her a new life, he has also taken her for His Bride; such are the terms which Chrysostom uses to describe the church. He develops this theme as follows:

What is marvellous and astounding is that, after he had adorned her in this way, he did not show forth his glory when he came, so that he might not stupefy and overwhelm her with his surpassing beauty, but he comes clothed in the same garment as his Bride. For he shares in flesh and blood just as she does. Nor does he summon her from above, but he comes beside her, observing in this the law which bids the bridegroom come to the bride.

After citing Gn. 2:24 and Eph. 5:31-32 as the Scriptural basis for the above, he continues with allusion to Ezek. 16:1-16:

Hence, after he came into her shelter and found her filthy, unwashed, and befouled with blood, he bathed her, anointed her, nourished her, and clothed her with a garment, the like of which could never be found. He himself is her garment, and thus robed he takes her and leads her up [to the nuptial chamber].

The two aspects within the dynamics of salvation are apparent in this passage: there is the downward movement which is pastoral and evangelistic, to which we have referred in earlier sections and will return in Section 3.4; and there is the upward movement which is the subject of our present enquiry.
We begin with some preliminary remarks. In associating the offering of friendship with the Bride of Christ motif, Chrysostom is able to situate true friendship not just within the framework of a shared humanity, but more acutely, in the context of the love of Christ the Bridegroom for his Bride the new humanity. This marriage of the church to Christ is not devoid of ethical content. The "garment" imagery in the above passage is taken up in the exposition of Ps. 44(LXX). The gold-woven robe of the Bride [Ps. 44:13(LXX)] is a divine prescription for the exercising of virtue. This vestment is interwoven rather than made out of a single fabric; hence, salvation not only comes by grace, but also necessitates faith and virtue. The adorning of the soul in response to the love of Christ the Bridegroom involves a radical reorientation of its natural ties. The Bride is required "to forget her people and her father's house", because the King desires her beauty [Ps. 44:10(LXX)].

Chrysostom situates the ordering of the community against the background of the union of Christ with his community. The intimacy of this union is of course made clear in Eph. 5:30-31: "the two shall become σάρξ μία; this mystery ...refers to Christ and the church." The "one-flesh" is the father, mother, and the child who is produced by the com mingling of their seeds. Each
Christian is likened to the child; he is engendered by the church and becomes one flesh by participation.\textsuperscript{136} Moreover, the one-flesh insight does have bearing on the \textit{mutual} relation between members of the body. So the love of a husband to his wife issues not so much from their participation in the same nature (i.e. the universal humanity), as from this one-flesh relation.\textsuperscript{137}

Nevertheless, Chrysostom does not envisage this intimacy as exclusively defined by the concept of mutuality. It is not so defined in the case of Christ's relation to the church, or of human relationships either. In the same homily, Chrysostom underlines the point that the Head-Body relation of Christ to the church is more properly understood in terms of the \textit{ἐν πνεῦμα} relationship. "The great mystery" in Eph. 5:32 is linked with "one spirit" in 1 Cor. 6:17. The Head is the life-principle of the Body; and the Body is sub-ordinated to and gives itself in service to the Head. Here Chrysostom edges towards a recognition of the place of rule in Christian life. It constitutes the basis of mutuality. He proceeds to explicate the authority of a husband over his wife along these lines; similarly the sharing within the apostolic community (Ac. 4:32) issues from subjection to one another under the fear of God: it is an ethical expression of this rule.\textsuperscript{138}
We now proceed to examine in greater detail this account of ethical life in which "friendship" is situated. Two aspects emerge from our preliminary discussion. First, friendship is *co-ordinated* in one Body; and secondly, it is under the *spiritual* rule.

(i) The Ascension implies that true friendship is more appropriately expressed within the context of the life of the Body of Christ, rather than in a more abstract level of a shared humanity. Καὶ ἡ φύσις no longer adequately describes the friendship which is ushered in by the transformation of humanity in Christ. At least in one instance, he seems to contrast this life of the Body with that ordered under the framework of friendship. The intimacy is "such as is between limb and limb", rather than "only as friends ought to show to friends". For the union is a "relationship of faith".\(^ {139}\) The movement of Chrysostom's thought in the same passage is noteworthy. Why should one Christian help another? He responds: "Though he be neither relation or friend, yet he is a man, who shares the same nature with thee, owns the same Lord, is thy fellow servant, and fellow sojourner, for he is born in the same world."\(^ {140}\) Here, the friendship which arises from natural relations is seen as inferior first of all to that which issues from the universal humanity ("who shares the same nature"); and then secondly to the specific relation in the Lord. Then he indicates the
relation of the claim of universal humanity to that of the
Body: the entirety of humanity is called to participate
in the Body, for each member "is born in the same world".
The claim καὶ θεότητα (either from proximate relations;
and more fundamentally from humanity itself) must be seen
in the context of the embracing and transcendent moral
claim of the Body. It is in this light that we can see
the relation between members of the Body in terms of
friendship. Chrysostom concludes by suggesting that
friendship is fulfilled in life in the Body: "No man can
possibly discover any intimacy greater than this sort of
friendship and fellowship."^141

This sort of friendship and fellowship is
understood in terms of unity in the Spirit: As in a human
body, the spirit unites all members together,^142

[So] was the Spirit given, that He might unite
those who are separated by race and by different
manners; ...and every soul become in a manner
one, and more entirely so than if there were one
body. For this spiritual relation is far higher
than the other natural one. ...The conjunction
of the union is more perfect, inasmuch as it is
both simple and uniform. ...The glow of charity
is produced [by the bond of peace]. ...[And]
not simply that we be at peace, not simply that
we love(φιλεῖτε) one another, but that all
should be only even one soul(ψυχῆ). A
glorious bond is this; with this bond let us
bind ourselves together with one another and
unto God.

The connection of this passage to Eph. 2:14-18 and to the
description of the apostolic community as "one heart and
one soul" (Ac. 4:32) is clear, although no explicit
reference is made by Chrysostom. The significant element in the passage is the profound understanding of the Holy Spirit as the basis of friendship. He unites believers from various backgrounds into one soul. This one soul relation even transcends the "mutual" goods of being at peace and of loving one another. Hence baptism no longer pertains only to the individuals' partaking of the same Spirit and having God as Father. The unifying principle implies a necessary organic co-ordination between members of the same Body.  

The gift conferred on one member, given as a consequence of the Ascension, relates essentially to another; this is how Chrysostom interprets Eph. 4. This co-ordination is vital for the descent of the Spirit from heaven to the entire Body. For it is only through the bond of love between members that it is possible for the descent not to be frustrated:

For as, in case a hand should happen to be torn from the body, the spirit which proceeds from the brain seeks the limb, and if it finds it not, does not leap forth from the body, and fly about and go to the hand, but if it finds it not in its place, does not touch it; so also will it be here, if we be not bound together in love.

...So that each must not only be united to the body, but also occupy his proper place, since if thou shalt go beyond this, thou art not united to it, neither dost thou receive the Spirit.

We must note however that this need of the believer for community and the recognition of the other as a second self, (which we have referred to earlier) are based on the understanding that Christ the Head is the ruling power of
the Body. The community is the necessary expression of redemptive love. Aristotle's theory of self-love also leads to a conclusion that an εὐδαιμονία requires friends; in fact, fellowship is a necessary condition for the ἄρειόπεια of his life. But since man's true self, for Aristotle, is the νοῦς, the content of friendship is confined to intellectual communion. Thus, for him friendship is essentially aristocratic. The emphasis in Aristotle helps us by way of contrast to appreciate the significance of the Ascension-motif. The ascent of man in Christ and the outpouring of the missionary Spirit enable the church as a whole with its varied membership to be a community of friends.

(ii) Co-ordination within the Body leads us to the consideration that friendship is exercised within a rule (ἀρχή). In the previous paragraph, our discussion focused on the organic relationship within the Body. That is important because the Ascension does not merely effect the exaltation of human nature in Christ, but also in that very exaltation a community is formed. "He hath prepared the whole race to follow Him." The Head implies not only supremacy, but also consolidation; it is the Head of the Body. Nevertheless, when that fact has been duly recognised, the rule by which the Body subsists must be delineated. An emphasis on rule accentuates the dynamics by which the Body is given life.
The pastoral love of St Paul for the church becomes a focal point for Chrysostom to speak about this spiritual rule (ἀφιλίπη πνευματική). It is the basis for the unity of the church; it allows the ministry of pastoral care not to be confined to priests, but to be extended to all members. This spiritual rule is more appropriately described as a spiritual love (πνευματική ἀγάπη): It is higher than all friendships formed naturally or out of social intercourse, "as it were some queen ruling her subjects; ... she descendeth from above, out of heaven. ... She needeth no benefits in order that she should subsist, ... neither by injuries is she overthrown". It is organically related to virtue, which is the only secure basis for peace. Now in speaking of love "as it were some queen ruling over her subject" and as descending from heaven above, Chrysostom recognises that spiritual rule (or love) is a gift. It is essentially substantive. It is not primarily a horizontal expression between a subject and an object within the human community. It is never a possession of the church, let alone of any elite sub-group within it. We are called to be a lover of love (ἐρασί̃ς τῆς ἀγάπης), and to pursue it; so Chrysostom interprets 1 Cor. 14:1. "There is need of much eagerness, she is soon out of sight, she is most rapid in her flight. ... If we follow her, she will not outstrip us and get away, but we shall speedily recover
In his account of spiritual rule (or spiritual love) as such, has Chrysostom challenged the hierarchical structure of the church? At the formal level, he has not. This is clear from his exposition on the duties of a priest in *de sacerdotio*. The congregation could still be addressed as *οἱ ἄρχωμενοι*. The keys to bind and to loose are entrusted by God to the priests; they rule with this heavenly authority.

But we must examine in greater detail what Chrysostom means by rule before we can answer the question. One way to resolve (to some extent) the ambiguity between the charismatic nature of the church and its hierarchical order is to regard an insistence on the former as primarily a stimulus towards an unquestioned acceptance of the latter. That is to say, we could leave intact the self-understanding of the church as a juridical and hierarchical body, and at the same time direct our spiritual critique exclusively at the clerics; namely, by insisting that their lives should manifest an inner spiritual quality. This option is alluded to by Chrysostom in the Fifteenth *homilia* on 2 Cor.; and to a certain extent he does not reject it. He is concerned that priests should give evidence of spiritual discernment. He understands that every rule is twofold.
One aspect relates to "the laws of the polity" (νόμοι τῆς πολιτείας), and the other pertains to the disposition of the ruler (that "it behoveth each man to control and rule himself"). The latter aspect is superior and determinative, "the parent and bond of the other".

Ruling is an art (τεχνὴ), not merely a dignity (ἀξίωμα). This evidence clearly indicates the importance which Chrysostom attaches to the rulers, i.e. the priests, in his consideration of the rule of the church.

But Chrysostom does not stop here. While accepting the form of church government as it is (as we have indicated above), his theological concerns bear upon its nature, as reflected in its ends. This is clear in his contrast between ecclesiastical and political rule in the same homily. The realm of the political rule is earthly, its means coercive, its intent judgemental, its subjects restrained through fear of their ruler. The realm of ecclesiastical order, however, is spiritual, its means gentleness, its intent remedial, and each does what is right voluntarily. Ecclesiastical rule is able, more than all others, to weld the human community together. It is a court of justice, a hospital, a school of philosophy, a nursery of the soul, and a spiritual bath. It enjoys abundant help derived from prayers and from the Spirit.
We therefore conclude that while the form of church government is left unquestioned, the theological insight of spiritual rule informs his understanding of its nature and hence the practical ordering of its life and ministry. And to a great extent, the latter are the more fundamental and important considerations. Despotism can exist in any form of church government.

This spiritual rule does not govern only the ordering of life in the church in the narrow sense. Chrysostom discerns that other kinds of rule could be regenerated by it. His discussion of social relations in Eph. 5-6 and Col. 3 is a case in point. He envisages that "love-obedience" will govern all domestic (and political) institutions. God "places the one in subjection, and the other in authority, that there may be peace. ...The ruling power must of necessity be one. ...To love therefore is the husband's part, to yield pertains to the other side. ...[God] subjected her to thee, that she may be loved the more. For this cause He hath made thee to be loved(φιλεσθέναι), 0 wife, that thou mayest bear thy subjection. ...Thou [the husband] hast then thy authority of necessity, proceeding from nature; maintain also the bond that proceedeth from love, for this alloweth the weaker to be endurable." Hence while Chrysostom maintains that St Paul has committed(ἐγχειρεῖν)
the task of love to the husband, he hastily adds that this commission is for the sake of binding and of cementing the husband (συμφιγγων αὐτὸν καὶ συγκολλῶν) to his own spouse. Neither should the commission be regarded as a divine authorization and licence for despotic rule on the husband's part, nor should the mutuality suggested by the words συν-σφίγγων and συν-κολλῶν be seen as something which could subsist on their own. Rule finds its telos in mutual commitment, and mutual devotion is underpinned by the rule of love in order that "there may be peace". This is what Chrysostom understands by the "spiritual marriage" which "takes place according to Christ". God desires that the couple be both united flesh to flesh (σῶρες τῆς σαρκίς) and spirit to spirit (πνεῦμα τῷ πνεύματι). Indeed Jn. 1:13 and 1 Cor. 6:17 provide the reference points of this Christological interpretation. Marriage becomes a "spiritual birth, not of blood, nor of travail, nor of the will of flesh. ...[The soul of each] is united to God by a union unspeakable. ...'He that is joined unto the Lord is one spirit."

"160 Under this dispensation, a house becomes a little church."
3.4 The Naked Christ and the Dynamics of Pastoral Care

The use of the Ascension of Christ as the theological underpinning of friendship could have left Chrysostom with an account of ethics which is triumphalist and evasive of the "not-yet" element in God's purpose for the world. This would leave us with an atemporal account of ethics, with the church taken out of the confines of time and space in its participation with Christ the King. But the theme of the present glory of Christ, in fact, is significantly absent from Chrysostom's homilies. What he constantly reminds his congregation is to be philanthropic to the continuing nakedness of Christ (Mt. 25:31-46). This motif allows Chrysostom to convey the continuing gentleness of God, and to bring to the fore evangelistic and pastoral concerns within the community. But has not Chrysostom undermined the ontological significance of Christ? Has not moral seriousness and commitment to this time and space led him to reject the decisiveness of the Passion? In what follows, we shall attempt to answer this question, and in doing so, we hope to understand this incarnational dimension (namely, the continuing suffering of Christ in the needy ones) in greater detail.

Rudolf Brändle sees no ontological difference between the suffering of the naked Christ and the Passion. He maintains that "pour Chrysostome les souffrances de
Jesus-Christ n'ont pas encore trouvé leur fin. Sa passion continue encore aujourd'hui. Toutes les deux, les souffrances du Christ sur la croix et les peines qu'il supporte maintenant...appartiennent à son action salvatrice. "In my flesh I complete what is lacking in Christ's afflictions for the sake of his body" (Col. 1:24) is interpreted by Chrysostom (so Brändle maintains) as God's continuing philanthropia expressed in terms of a prolongation of Christ's suffering. Insofar as "les souffrances du Christ se prolongent dans les souffrances des pauvres", man is therefore presented with a continuing opportunity to respond to God's love, namely, to his call to all men to be human, to be merciful as the Father is merciful. In Brändle's view, man's response takes on a crucial role. He leans towards the conclusion that it is only through man's proper response that Christ's sufferings (taken as a universal principle) will not be in vain. Hence, in the preface of his article, he endorses Pascal: "Jésus sera en agonie jusqu'à la fin du monde: il ne faut pas dormir pendant ce temps-là (Pascal, Penseés 736)."

Before we join issue with Brändle in a more systematic manner, it is necessary to indicate certain vital portions in Chrysostom's corpus to which he did not pay enough attention. Chrysostom is adamant in maintaining the decisiveness of the Christ-event. For
instance, the typological interpretation of the scripture in his sermons on important feast-days of the Christian calendar (in particular, the Nativity, Epiphany, Crucifixion, Ascension, and Pentecost) would suggest the uniqueness of the Christ-event. Furthermore, he maintains the Alexandrian insight about the impassibility of the Logos. The self sufficiency of God is not compromised by the equal insistence on the theme of the naked and hungry Christ in the present age. "It is not as needing that ministry [of mercy] from us", so Chrysostom insists, "but as exciting man to philanthropia". A little later in the same sermon, he likens the difference between God and man to that between men and gnats.

In the same manner, contrary to Brändle's interpretation, Chrysostom does not in his exegesis of Col. 1:24 equate the present affliction of Christ with the historical continuation of the Passion. The suffering is properly St Paul's: "It is the same as if there were a band which had its allotted leader to protect it and it should stand in battle, and then when he is gone, his lieutenant should succeed to his wounds until the battle was brought to a close."

Chrysostom's concern is that man's gratitude for St Paul's suffering for the church should properly be directed to Christ. It is in this sense that Christ "did not only die for us, but even after His death He is ready to be afflicted for your sakes". After all, the imprisoned and hungry Christ does not demand complete
relief, say, in the loosing of bonds and deliverance from infirmities; he only requires less than what is within our power, namely, to visit him in prison and to offer him a cup of cold water. What is desired is man's response and not a "satisfaction" of his need.\textsuperscript{172} We conclude from these considerations that the naked Christ motif employed by Chrysostom does not minimize the ontological significance of the Christ-event. How then is the gentleness of God in this \textit{keiros} informed by it? In what follows we shall ascertain how the continuing condescension of God in the naked Christ stands in relation to the two moments of Christ's presence, the Passion and the \textit{eschaton}.

\subsection*{3.4.1 Mt. 25:31-46 vis-a-vis the Passion}

Two theological considerations are fundamental from the outset. In the first place, the continuing presence of the naked Christ makes it possible for all men to participate in a virtuous life. Sharing one's good with the naked Christ is within the easy reach of every person.\textsuperscript{173} The Parable of the Sower provides the paradigm: where the outcome of harvest may either be an hundred; or sixty; or thirty-fold, each finds acceptance. Chrysostom here shares the traditional patristic exegesis of the passage. God is \textit{φιλάνθρωπος}: he does not require more than what a person is able to do; so he marks out not just one way of salvation, but makes it easy for
all. In the second place, Chrysostom has in his mind that personal relationship is integral to salvation. Response to the naked Christ becomes the material of moral growth towards a \textbf{confident} relation to God. Hence, though Christ is self-sufficient, he desires to be fed by man. Chrysostom remarks in the voice of Christ: I love(\textit{φιλεῖν}) man exceedingly, and "so desire to eat at your table, which is the custom of those that love a person(δὲ τοῖς \textit{φιλοῦσιν ἔθοις ἐστὶν}). ...Then at the presence of the whole world, then am I to herald you forth, and exhibit you as my supporter." Earlier in the sermon, he remarks, "I [Christ] would wish be indebted to you, that the crown may give you some measure of confidence(\textit{παρηγορία}) as well."\textsuperscript{174}

Given these preliminary points, we must ask whether the necessity of man's personal relation with God entails a rejection of the ontological significance of the Christ-event. Chrysostom in fact maintains otherwise. The Christ-event undergirds this personal relationship. First, this personal relationship is understood as a response. In other words, well-doing to the naked Christ is not intelligible in isolation. It is an expression of gratitude to the benefits conferred on man by the Christ-event. This point becomes clear from the following consideration. Earlier in this section, we have already seen that Chrysostom confirms the uniqueness of the
Christ-event. It is the source of benefits for all men: Christ opened to man the whole heaven, delivered him from a most grievous prison, and reconciled him while he was still an enemy. He is both a friend and benefactor to man. 175 A transcendental relation is thus already established between God and man (and in particular, believers). What is required is the visible expression of this bond, upon which man's confidence at the eschaton depends. Thus, the continuing condescension of God in the naked Christ is not to be understood as another redemptive event which confronts man, assuming with it the same distinctiveness as the Passion. Nor is it an item in a series within salvation history set in motion like a set of dominos by the impetus of the Christ-event. Rather, the presence of the naked Christ allows man to give ethical expression to his gratitude to God within the context of an established friendship. 176 It is a response made possible by Christ's continuing presence, but is directed to what he has already wrought in his Passion. 177 More precisely, it is a response which allows a personal relation to be fostered. For if the naked Christ is a continuing disclosure of the Passion, it is nevertheless not a full revelation of it. Chrysostom insists adamantly on this point. He has no doubt that if the disfigured and tortured Christ as the Passion were fully revealed to us, we would be overwhelmed by a desire to honour him by all means. But as he
discloses himself in the needy, we are provided with an opportunity to show our reverence by our conscious and deliberate effort. Thus, after an exposition of the Passion according to Matthew, Chrysostom remarks: 178

For it is not so much to have fed Him appearing in His own Person, which would be enough to prevail with a heart of stone, as (because of His mere word) to wait upon the poor. ...For in the former case, the look and dignity of Him who appears divides with thee that which is done; but here the reward is entire for thy benevolence (φιλανθρωπία), and there is proof of the greater reverence towards Him. ...When therefore thou seest a poor man, remember His words, ...that it is He Himself who is fed. For though that which appears be not Christ, yet in this man's form Christ Himself received and beggith.

The above paragraphs show how the "as-if" prolongation of Christ's suffering enables man to express the friendship which is established in the Christ-event. This prolongation issues more from a patient love than from any lack of decisiveness of the Passion.

The Christ-event also undergirds the personal relation in another way. Not only does it indicate the personal relation to be primarily a response of man to what Christ has achieved, it also informs the character of this response. It is most appropriately expressed in commitment to the needy. The eucharist is determinative. It vividly portrays Christ's Passion. In the celebration the remembrance of the Passion draws man to compunction. 179 But this response must seek ethical expression, Chrysostom maintains. "Wouldest thou do
honour to Christ's body? Neglect Him not when naked; do not, while here [in the Church] thou honourest Him with silken garments, neglect Him perishing without of cold and nakedness. ...Let us learn to be strict in life (ϕιλοσοφεῖν), and to honour Christ as He Himself desires. ...Do not therefore while adorning His House overlook thy brother in distress, for he is more properly a temple than the other." 180 This passage clearly elucidates the ethical implication of the eucharist. It formally recognises the needy as the naked Christ. The naked Christ, the victim who was slain for us on the altar in the church, is also the naked Christ in public squares. Furthermore, the eucharist discloses the mutual relation among the partakers. The Passion has rendered all believers brethren. They are fruits of the same birth-pangs, and members of one another. 181 In giving to the naked Christ one recognises that the humanity in Christ has now become the source of moral claim. 182 But what is the identity of "the naked Christ in public squares"? One tacit presupposition is made. In beginning with the eucharist, Chrysostom's argument depends on the identification of the naked Christ with poor believers, and not with the needy in society at large. He is explicit in the following passage: This altar in the church "is but a stone by nature, but becomes holy because it receiveth Christ's Body". In contrast, the altar of a merciful man is itself the sacrifice, and it is holy
"because it is itself Christ's Body". Chrysostom proceeds to admonish his congregation: "thou honourest indeed this altar, because it receiveth Christ's body; but him that is himself the body of Christ thou treatest with contumely.

And this latter altar (or "temple", as we have noted earlier) you may "everywhere see lying, both in lanes and in market places, and mayest sacrifice upon it every hour; for on this too is sacrifice performed". "When then thou seest a poor believer, think that thou beholdest an altar."

Chrysostom reminds his congregation that the poor believers themselves are Christ's body as well, the object of devotion. While the liturgical life provides the theological foundation of man's response, it drives the worshipper at the same time to the holier worship of honouring Christ in the public squares in the daily Christian life. The naked Christ becomes the focal point where the redeemed community in Christ expresses its renewed humanity. It is the clearest expression of humanity. This leit-motif can be elucidated by contrasting almsgiving with ascetic practices (e.g. virginity) and the performance of miracles, two areas of major concern in the early church.

(1) Chrysostom does not reject ascetic practices. Indeed he shows his appreciation of them in monastic life. Nevertheless, the Parable of the Ten Virgins (Mt. 25:1-13), especially in relation to the subsequent
judgement scene in Mt. 25:31-46, governs his attitude towards asceticism, in particular, virginity. The relation of almsgiving (to the naked Christ) to virginity is parallel to that of oil to fire; without the former a virgin is disqualified from entering into the bridal chamber. Already in his early work de virginitate, Chrysostom has envisaged that the purity of virginity lies not primarily in bodily continence but rather in the attitude of consecration to Christ. It renders a soul without blemish, and confers a purity which arises from a freedom from worldly cares. That was how he has interpreted the distinction between the two categories of virgin in the parable. His thought matures during his pastoral ministry. Homilia 20 on Acts preached in Constantinople is a case in point:

Nothing is more frigid than a Christian, who cares not for the salvation of others. ...Those virgins, chaste indeed, and decent, and modest, but profitable to none wherefore they are burned. Such are they who have not nourished Christ. For observe that none of those are charged with particular sins of their own, ...but the having been of no use to another. ...How can such a one be a Christian? ...Say not "It is impossible for me to induce others (to become Christians)" -- for if thou art a Christian, it is impossible but that it should be so. ...The thing is part of the very nature of the Christian. Do not insult God.

Chrysostom here clearly articulates the priority and the determinative significance of the neighbour directed aspect of the Christian life; in particular, almsgiving. The virgins are prevented from entering into the bridal chamber solely on the ground that they have not nourished
the naked Christ. Christian life should be evangelistic; its clearest manifestation is in good deeds, in particular, in almsgiving to the naked Christ. For this useful service to one another is redemptive. Through it the Christian community responds to Christ and opens itself to embrace the entire human community.\textsuperscript{191}

(ii) The same sense of priority is to be seen in Chrysostom's attitude to miracles. He does not attribute any redemptive significance to them. They are not characteristic of the grace ushered in by the Christ-event. They remain ambiguous.\textsuperscript{192} At worst, they can lead to superstition and schism;\textsuperscript{193} and at best they can but catch the attention of the non-believers.\textsuperscript{194} Lk. 10:20 ("Do not rejoice that the spirits are subject to you, but rejoice that your names are written in heaven"), especially when coupled with Mt. 7:21-23, and the allusions to Mt. 25:31-46 are cardinal.\textsuperscript{195}

Chrysostom's low evaluation of miracles issues directly from his conception that renewal primarily concerns the moral order. Its clearest expression is the love which is, and should be, publicly manifested in the Christian community.\textsuperscript{196} In accordance with this conception, the Ascension signifies not so much the present glorification of the church to the extent that it is something already taken out of the confines of the
present age. Rather the Ascension establishes reconciliation among men. The Christian life is a movement from present suffering to glory in the world to come. And in this movement the emphasis placed on the Resurrection is not that it provides intimations of a cosmos now freed from physical corruption and imperfection, but rather that it gives a secure hope of glory to encourage a Christian to endure in his present suffering. 197 Commitment to the material world, so Chrysostom believes, is shown in the continuing presence of the naked Christ (which focuses the sphere in which a virtuous life is to be fostered), rather than in miraculous healings (which some may see as indicators of the reversal of the curse laid on the earth at the fall). 198

Chrysostom's attitude towards miracles and asceticism reveals his concern that prodigious feats and sterile ascetic practices may be distractions which draw the Christian away from an obedient participation in God's redemptive purposes. There are probably apologetic elements in his stance. For Chrysostom seeks on the one hand to dissuade his congregation from seeking miraculous healing from Jewish synagogues, 199 and on the other to point out the error of some catechumens who withdraw themselves from the Christian community in order to practise asceticism rather than seek baptism. 200
Nevertheless, his attitude is best situated in his overall theological scheme. The Johannine criterion of friendship, revealed in passages like "If you love me, you will keep my commandments" (Jn. 14:15), "If a man loves me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him, and we will come to him and make our home with him" (Jn. 14:24), and "You are my friends if you do what I command you" (Jn. 15:14), provides the reference point. We become friends of God by conducting "an excellent course of life" rather than by displaying of miracles: this is what keeping Jesus' words consists in. He suggests that miracles are more properly predicated of the Old Covenant. They are tokens of friendship between God and the holy men of old. That sign is now superseded in the coming of Christ among us (Jn. 14:23). It is more desirable to have the King made a familiar friend (by keeping his words) than to be able to accomplish miracles. We shall analyse in greater detail in the next chapter the implication of this distinctive new possibility under the New Covenant. Suffice it to say here that ἀγάπη is the normative form of Christian life; it assumes a priority over miracles. And the entire human community whom Christ has redeemed is determinative of the scope of this ἀγάπη. It is necessarily pastoral and evangelistic. Chrysostom summarises: When, however, the one sort are careless about virtue, and those who regard it withdraw
themselves far from our ranks, how are we to subdue our enemies? For even if miracles were wrought now, who would be persuaded? ...For so it is, that our upright living seems unto many the most trustworthy argument of the two: miracles admitting of a bad construction on the part of obstinate bad men: whereas a pure life will have abundant power to stop the mouth of the devil himself.

3.4.2 Mt. 25:31-46 vis-a-vis the Parousia to come

Up to this point in this section, we have been concerned with unitive aspect of God's gentleness. The "prolongation" of suffering in the naked Christ is efficacious in allowing man to grow in a personal relation with God and his fellow man, a personal relation which is established in the Passion. The naked Christ is the focal point in man's response to the love of Christ. The obverse of this, however, is that the naked Christ is at the same time the critical test of man's allegiance. The unitive end of God's gentleness when it is embodied in the naked Christ takes on a moral seriousness and urgency in this in-between time. Its moral claim becomes a positive critique of the world's values and its consequentially perverse friendship. Chrysostom therefore relentlessly criticises those who yearn to establish friendship by holding sumptuous feasts and licentious banquets while ignoring the naked Christ. 

Man's intention in face of the knowledge of his death puts his true allegiance sharply into focus. Chrysostom laments those who would leave the naked Christ out of their wills, while making
plans for their descendants, and even allowing their slaves to be released upon their death. This is a deliberate refusal of solidarity with the poor; in other words, it is a confession that the naked Christ is ultimately unconnected with them.\footnote{208}

This critique has in view man's telos; namely, that friendship with Christ, as manifested in caring for those in need, is determinative of true humanity. The judgement day is to Chrysostom the dissolution of all forms of contingent relationship except that which is secured by a moral relation with Christ. The unitive end of God's gentleness in this in-between time is therefore always under the shadow of the disintegration of all forms of false alliances at the Parousia to come. The souls whom Christ the judge sentences to eternal fire are already past feeling\(\varepsilon\varepsilon\iota\varepsilon\chi\iota\varepsilon\)\(\sigma\varepsilon\iota\varsigma\\)os); each of these morally hardened souls possesses an attitude of hatred to one another.\footnote{209}

On another occasion Chrysostom is explicit. One might suggest that the sufferers in hell also form a community in consolation of each other's anguish, to which Chrysostom replies: "The intensity of their anguish allows not their reason any leisure for thinking of others, and so finding consolation. ...For to receive consolation from the ills of our neighbours takes place in ordinary sufferings; but when the torment is excessive, ...the soul is now come to be unable so much as to know
itself, whence shall it derive consolation?" This breakup of any moral community for the wicked at the eschaton is but the inevitable and just verdict upon their inexcusable inhumanity to the naked Christ, the Christ who when he comes in glory shall at once be witness, proof, and judge. Indeed, the present season is established only by the withholding of God's scrutiny, to the view that man be allowed the space to repent; otherwise, no one would be able to survive.

This present withholding of a full manifestation of justice is of course Christological. For as we have already seen, the naked Christ embodies this withholding of scrutiny. This explains the correlation between repentance, almsgiving, and the naked Christ. Withholding also implies a necessary renunciation of the scrutinising attitude, or of taking up the sword of justice on behalf of God. This renunciation does not stem so much from any recognition of a private aspect of a man which lies inaccessible to the public view, as from a commitment to care for his salvation, while looking forward to Christ's vindication at the Parousia. The criterion of Christ's verdict upon an individual is the latter's attitude towards the naked Christ. Chrysostom's thinking here is guided by a positive evaluation of the significance of this kairos. Christ is the subject who sustains this moment of grace; in doing
so, he suspends at the same time the judgement which is already implicit in the First Advent. In a homily on Jn. 3:17, Chrysostom explains that there are two comings of Christ: the first came to pass not that he might scrutinise our deeds, but that he might forgive; the second will be not to remit, but to scrutinise. He then proceeds to elucidate: "Yet His former coming was for judgement, according to the rule of justice"; for already prior to his coming, man's continual rejection of God's philanthropia demands a judgement. Now Christ delays this scrutiny for the sake of man's salvation. This is the expression of his philanthropia. So also in Chrysostom's exposition of St Paul's speech in Athens (Ac. 17), the Resurrection of Christ implies not so much the regeneration of the created order as a certainty of the judgement to come, a certainty that all men shall stand before the judgement seat. Again, "the times of ignorance God overlooked" (Ac. 17:30) is extended to include the present interim-age!

We have examined the relation of the naked Christ to the Passion and the Parousia to come. Is there, then, an ontological significance for Christ in Chrysostom's theology? We may conclude that there is. It provides the objective content in ethics. Its unitive aspect allows man room to manifest and respond to Christ's sacrificial love by embracing a personal relation with him. There is
also the corresponding disintegrative element -- the critique of the world -- which is revealed at the eschaton. This second aspect demands a serious response in this interim of grace, a season sustained only by Christ's withholding of absolute scrutiny.

In a homily delivered towards the end of his days in Constantinople, Chrysostom remarks that the characteristics of Christianity are best expressed as love towards one another and peace. We have analysed both aspects in this chapter. Love for one another is embodied in the downward movement; it is in the main pastoral and evangelistic. It involves mercy, forgiveness, and gentleness. The other aspect is the upward movement of Ascension; it pertains to the transformation of humanity. It is characterised by peace. The celebration of the eucharist embodies the union of heaven and earth, and the reconciliation between all social classes. It is a mystery of peace. And indeed, Chrysostom sees the two aspects as organically related in this communion. Peace in the church, the sacrificial love of God in Christ, ardent care for the brethren are integral aspects of the same reality; that is, the spiritual rule which constitutes the telos of man, concretely manifested in the church.

This understanding implies that on the basis of peace,
the church is to be united in its witness of mercy to despairing sinners.\textsuperscript{222} To stress that as the church's role is not to deny any role to the political sphere, political structures too should manifest God's gentleness, even in their God-ordained task of carrying out justice and instilling fear in man.\textsuperscript{223} But Chrysostom underlines the point that the church constitutes the only haven of consolation and sanctuary for the rejected in a world which is suffering under the moral consequences of sin, and which knows only betrayal, jealousy, and accusation in all human relations.\textsuperscript{224} It stands as a common mother which administers daily consolation to the sorrowing.\textsuperscript{225} The witness of the church, therefore, is not a disregard of the claim of justice nor a compromise of its holiness. On the contrary, it recognises that justice can easily slip into inhumane justice. The claim of justice must be set within the wider horizon of redemption for the human community which is burdened by its transgression of the moral good. The adoption of a judgemental attitude forecloses the opportunity for the sinner under scrutiny to repent insofar as it drives him to greater despair. Over against this, forgiveness is unitive; it brings between the partners an awareness of the humanity which they share, and opens up the way to participation in the transformation ushered in at the Ascension. The vision of the church as a community of friends is crucial in Chrysostom's theology. In the
church's union with Christ at the right hand of God, peace is guaranteed; and in the sympathy with the naked Christ, it incarnates love to a world which has still to experience and know what ears have not heard, eyes have not seen, heart has not discerned, the gentleness of God to the human community in a world crushed under despair.
CHAPTER FOUR: A Community in Mutual Exhortation:
The Overcoming of Moral Confusion

Up to this point our analysis has indicated the centrality of community and of the affective faculty in Chrysostom's ethics. The church, inaugurated at the Ascension, is the community of friends in mutual consolation. We suggested how this conception challenges the more prevalent ecclesiologies of the day, which tended to regard the church as a community under the tutelage of the friends of God. But we have left unanswered a more fundamental question: In what does the good consist? We have characterised the more volitional and intellectual ethics pejoratively as "elitist" and "individualistic". But they cannot be repudiated in this way without further argument. The theological concerns which undergird these positions need to be examined and shown to be inadequate. Furthermore, our exposition of the concept of friendship may have run the risk of obscuring the differences between the ordering of ethical life under the Old and the New Covenants. In the present chapter we shall demonstrate the inseparability of ecclesiology and ethics in Chrysostom's thought. That is to say, the distinctiveness of the New Covenant consists in its upholding of man's communal life. Our discussion falls into four sections. Section 4.1 is a historical survey which will serve to clarify some of the theological issues at stake. In
Section 4.2, we proceed to establish the centrality of the concept of man as a responding soul. And since we cannot delineate any positive good without at the same time specifying what stands in need of remedy, we shall analyse in Section 4.3 the predicament of man. In the final section, man's appropriation of the good is investigated in historical perspective in relation to the community as the recipient of divine condescension. Appropriation at the individual level will be the substance of Chapter Five.
4.1 The Severance of Ethics from Ecclesiology in Early Christian Thought

On the surface of Chrysostom's writings, there appears to be an ambiguity as to whether or not communality is integral to ethics. Admittedly, our study so far has suggested that it is. Nevertheless, his polemics against fatalism and his treatment of theodicy might seem to indicate otherwise. For example, he gives the repeated exhortation "to bear all things nobly" and "to glorify God in all things" during his exile. "No one can harm the man who does not injure himself": such is the theme of a treatise to his fellow sufferers near the end of his life.¹ We may be led to ask whether this is but a Stoic solution in Christian guise; specifically, whether Chrysostom sees the will, stripped of any affection, as assuming a dominant significance in ethics. Scholars writing about Chrysostom usually take this common terminology as evidence for his Stoicism.² Laws of morality then find no external reference; virtue becomes the quality of a man's free will which is independent of consequence and impervious to reward. It follows that moral struggle becomes the guarantee of virtue; for free will is not drawn by, and indeed must overcome, any natural affection in the appropriation of virtue.

When we turn to his earlier anti-Manicheaen polemics,
we find that he adopts established categories to a great extent. The soul alone bears ultimate moral responsibility for sin. The relation of the soul to the body is likened to that of a charioteer to a horse. The absurdity of fatalism is expressly revealed in the exercising of προαίρεσις. At times he follows the Aristotelian distinction between προαίρεσις and the immutable φύσις. And following Origen's argument, he infers the freedom of the will from observable moral changes -- improvements and lapses -- in man.

How are we to understand the various strands of thought which we have briefly outlined above? Of course, we could attribute these to Chrysostom's eclecticism. That is, he shifts from one stance to another in accordance with the pastoral situation. In the subsequent sections of this chapter, we shall show that there is in fact a consistent theological foundation which undergirds these varied and various thoughts. But at the outset it is salutary for us to extract some theological concerns from his predecessors and contemporaries which might explain why the doctrine of the church was generally held to be incidental to ethics.

Three intertwining concerns lend themselves to this analysis. The first two are more theologically and philosophically motivated, and the third arises from the
practical need for order in the church.

Early Christians share with their pagan counterparts the need to address themselves to the problem of determinism and related issues. Christian polemics against the Manicheaens and Gnostics try to take cognizance of two factors: the power of freedom and the goodness of God.

The first, focusing on the power of freedom, insists that man has a religious capacity (namely, freedom) which can enable him to achieve enlightenment; and that he is morally responsible for his own life. Virtue is self-taught. For our present purpose we are not concerned with how this freedom is conceived in relation to the cognitive and volitional faculties of man. Specifically, whether ἡροικία is conceived as a consequence of intellectual activity (as Aristotle would maintain), or as a separate entity which is independent of the intellect (as the Neoplatonists seem to lean towards), is of no immediate importance to our present investigation. Both these two strands are evident in early Christianity. The more volitional account can be illustrated in the description of the conversion of Justin Martyr in the seventh and eighth chapters of his dialogus cum Tryphone Judaeo. Justin asks the old man whether one should employ a teacher in order to discover
the knowledge of truth. In reply, the old man first indicates that he might find help in the writings of prophets, who were the beloved of God. But this does not imply that Justin is to adhere to the written precepts. For the prophets, so the old man continues, "did not use demonstration in their treatises, seeing that they were witnesses to the truth above all demonstration". So he counsels Justin to pray for enlightenment, for truth is perceived only "by the man to whom God and His Christ have imparted wisdom". Upon this, Justin reports how "a flame was kindled in my soul; and a love of the prophets, and of those men who are friends of Christ, possesses me; ...I found this philosophy alone to be safe and profitable". Alongside this more volitional conception, which attempts to emphasize the free initiative of God's grace, we find in such writers as Clement of Alexandria and Origen an approach which is in the main more intellectual. These writers maintain that the cosmos is a rational order of beings, in which virtue cannot be appropriated without intellectual effort. As we have indicated in Chapter Three, the (Christian) Gnostic is a novice's teacher and pastor, one from whom assistance towards enlightenment may be obtained. Nevertheless, whether a more intellectual or volitional approach is taken, the focus is placed on the individual vis-a-vis the cosmos. Even in Clement the friend of God is at best (and necessarily) an enlightened example. The individual has
to lay hold of truth by himself. And clearly the institutional church is a matter of indifference in this defence of man's freedom.

Alongside this concern for freedom is a defence of the goodness of God in anti-deterministic polemics. This defence is fashioned at the expense of overemphasizing the rational and volitional aspects of man and of glossing over the differing temperaments within the human community (as we shall indicate briefly in what follows).

How is the goodness of God evident from eternity? And how is his providence specially focused on man? Determinism tends to be undergirded by a materialist interpretation of reality. Man is relegated to the same level of reality as the rest of the creation. To meet this challenge, Christian writers in the main emphasize man's rationality. Man's reason is identified as the image of God. It is a token of God's special love to man, a capacity which allows man to discern what is good and abhor that which is evil in an ordered universe. Origen's rejoinder to Celsus is typical. Providence is not an universal principle which operates indiscriminately in relation to men and animals, still less does it favour the latter. For what seem to be the reasoned actions of animals are done in accordance with their natural constitution and not out of a process of reasoning
In contrast, man acts according to reason and deliberation; without these moral earnestness is not possible. 

Gregory of Nazianzus' anthropology generally reinforces Origen's concerns. He underlines the point that man is the focus of creation, a single living being who constitutes a bridge between the sensible and noetic realms. Man is the fullest expression of the riches of God's goodness; he is king of all upon earth, and subject only to God the king above. His end is deification, now made possible after the fall because the Word of God has come to purify the royal image that was covered with passion and to make the flesh immortal.

The defence of the goodness of God is closely related to the issue of why individuals are left to struggle in this world. The world becomes, for the Christian apologists, the arena of a cosmic struggle against the demons. We find this theme in Athenagoras, Tatian, and Justin Martyr. For instance, Justin proposes that the world has been preserved by God in order that men may stand firm against the demons, and hence become worthy of praise. Virtue is embraced through conflict. Social environment is regarded as something which is antagonistic to the appropriation of virtue. So Origen argues that the essence of virtue lies in its spontaneity (εκούσιον), or in "that which is from ourselves" (τὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ). Social spheres only serve to corrupt the morality of man.
How man's moral scope is severely truncated by this overemphasis on reason and will on the one hand, and by the hostility towards society on the other is aptly illustrated in Origen's theory of the cycles of worlds in such passages as *de principiis* Book One Chapter Eight. The question is posed: Why do angels differ in their ranks and forms of ministry? Similarly, how are the varied circumstances of man to be accounted for. Critics charge that it seems inconsistent for the same Creator, without any existing ground of merit, to bring about these diversities. In reply Origen does not challenge the simplistic connection of desert with condition. The maxim, "Variety is due to conduct", is regarded as valid. God's impartiality (Rom. 2:11) is defended by positing the existence of a cycle of worlds in which a rational being progresses or descends from one level to the other by virtue of his desert. Varied human conditions are a direct consequence of the individual's moral conduct in the past. Such is the inevitable conclusion.

So far we have sought to illustrate how the polemics against determination have resulted in a bias against the communal and affective aspects of man. The terminology we have employed is not rigorous, and perhaps risks glossing over the differences of approach in earlier classical
writers and later Neoplatonists. Nevertheless, the generalisations serve to emphasize how the different approaches to determinism converge in perceiving the problem in a cosmic rather than a communal setting.

These two considerations (concern for freedom and for the goodness of God) are more philosophically and theologico-philosophically motivated. Bound up with them is a concern for order in the church. That the church is unassailable as a sociological entity is central to Christian polemics against the pagans. Evidences of its catholicity and universality are standard arsenal against heathen critics. The providential triumph of Christian philanthropia heralds the dawning of the age of the last things; such is the claim of enthusiasts like Eusebius of Caesarea. But these positive commendations of the church do not in fact contribute towards a more communal conception of the church (and ethics). Admittedly, one may find in Irenaeus' exhortation to his congregation less a demand for obedience to the episcopal order than for adherence to truth. For him, while the presbyter is the chief exponent of truth, truth is not regarded as the possession of a priestly order, but publicly accessible in Scripture. Moral character and apostolic doctrine are the criteria of authenticity. Nevertheless, in the main, problems of schisms and heresies from (at least) the sub-apostolic period occasion the identification of the sacerdotal order
as the agency of God's redemptive purposes. The instructions of Clement of Rome, of Ignatius, and of the constitutiones apostolorum are cases in point. Wiles' verdict upon Ignatius' conception of episcopacy is applicable to this trend: It is "part and parcel of a conception of the church as a close-knit sociological entity with a strong requirement of obedience to authority on the part of its members and clearly drawn lines of division between those inside and those outside". 24

The three strands of thought which we have identified go some way toward explaining why the severance of ethics from ecclesiology is not fortuitous. The first two strands emphasize rationality and will at the expense of social life. The appropriation of virtue is extrinsic to communal life; the latter is at best indifferent to it. This implies that Christian perfection, or eschatological manifestation, is strictly speaking predicated of the contemplative individuals only rather than of the church as a whole. 25 The third strand, while demanding allegiance to ecclesiastical authority and hence maintaining the church as a viable historical institution, actually completes the break between ethics and ecclesiology. For the respective commitments to virtue and to church order operate in different spheres. The one addresses itself to man's inner being; the other is external. 26 The use of προαίρεσις is illustrative.
Gregory of Nazianzus identifies it as an attribute of the soul in view of its kinship to the divine. The exercise of προαιρέσεως is directed towards the end that the soul may without coercion lead the body through the process of catharsis back into union with God, the immutable one. Contemplative life alone can provide the proper setting for this exercise.27 Obedience to ecclesiastical authority does not fall within the realm of ethics proper.

We have sought to give some indication of how the church, in waging its particular warfare with its opponents within and without, employed a set of concepts which then biased subsequent doctrinal understanding of the relation of ethics to ecclesiology. Having set the scene in this way, we now return to Chrysostom in order to understand his alternative proposal. Our first task is to give an account of man as a responding soul.
4.2 The Responding Soul

A theological account of the creation and fall of man is especially useful, given Chrysostom's concerns, for an understanding of the moral problem of embracing virtue. Commenting on the account of creation in the opening chapters of Genesis, he suggests that God did not communicate his orders to man through angels or servants. He communicated them to Adam himself, hence honouring man with a twofold honour: in giving him the law, and in giving it himself. How then did Adam fall? By his own negligence. "He threw contempt upon his Benefactor and thought a deceiving demon more worthy of credit than God who cared for him, and who raised him to honour." 

The fall of man is "a contempt" towards his benefactor who raised him to honour. Chrysostom understands man's problem not primarily as disobedience to God's command but as an ill-response to the God who continually seeks to disclose himself to him by "giving the order to Adam himself". Though we should not polarize ethics based on obedience and ethics which find their locus in responsive relatedness -- and indeed Chrysostom sees the tree of the knowledge of good and evil as the object of command --, the special nuances inherent in the latter need to be pursued. For Chrysostom obedience issues from love called forth by the benefactor.
The question why God did not deliver the Scripture to man from the beginning leads Chrysostom to a sustained exposition of the place of natural law. We may discern his "responsive" ethics here. "It is because God was desirous of instructing the nature of man, not by letters, but by things", he insists. Otherwise, a man "who knew letters would have learnt what was written; but the illiterate man would have gone away without receiving any benefit from this source". Chrysostom then proceeds to indicate the splendour of the natural world and the harmony of the body. But God not only made the creation beautiful and vast, he also made it "weak and corruptible", "leading us on by its beauty to admiration of Him who framed it; and by its weakness leading us away from the worship of the creature". 31

Chrysostom has a twofold concern in this passage: that all men are able to respond, and that this response must be directed to the Creator-benefactor who alone can sustain the universe. In the first place, he emphasizes that God's appeal to man is universal. Man is self-taught, a natural law of good and evil is seated within him. 32 God makes his appeal to man without resorting to any intermediary. In this manner Chrysostom tries to overcome an elitist ethic, in which those who are endowed with privileged circumstances and
temperament may gain an advantage over the rest.

In the second place, we might conclude that there is nothing new in this emphasis on the equality of man. Clearly he stands within an influential tradition, as we have already indicated in the last section. But he gives his own distinctive emphasis to that tradition by insisting on an absolute demarcation between God the Creator and the created order. The created order is "weak and corruptible" as well as "beautiful and vast". The moral exemplars, for example, the apostles, were also men who were subject to infirmities like all other men "in order that they might not be thought to be gods". The response is to be directed to the one who is above nature. By this Chrysostom means that God is the sole sustainer of the universe, who is able to act on the created order for good purposes.

The significance of Chrysostom's proposal is apparent when it is set against the background of anti-Manichaean polemics. Now, as we have indicated in the last section, from the accepted premise that virtue is self-taught, some fathers proceed to emphasize the rationality of man, while others maintain a more voluntarist ethic. But for both these stances, rational or volitional, the intrinsic wholesomeness of creation is tacitly assumed. Evil is of the spiritual realm only; and the creation reflects God's
attributes: these are the standardised arguments against the Manichaeeans.

By insisting that the creation is intrinsically weak, Chrysostom is, of course, denying neither the spiritual nature of sin nor the goodness of God. He wants, however, to emphasize as a first principle in ethics the absolute dependence of the creation on the Creator. No charges of Manichaeeism could be made against him; after all, the Greek tradition always includes some suspicion in relation to the sensible world. Hence for Chrysostom, the gratitude which man owes God is a response of loving dependence to the One who seeks to establish friendship with man. This "gratitude" is far from a mere "acknowledgement" or resignation to an inevitable ordering of the cosmos personified as God. The emphasis on the transcendent God implies a possibility of moral values which are not bound to the created order, and a meaning of existence above the transitoriness of the present life, to which man is summoned to respond.

This emphasis on man as responding agent can be illustrated by Chrysostom's exegesis of Rom. 6:19. The phrase ἀνθρώπινον λέγω διὰ τὴν ἀθέτειαν τῆς σαρκὸς ὑμῶν is not taken to imply that there is some inadequacy in construing man's relation to God as a servitude. Rather Chrysostom takes St Paul to mean that in God's
condescension our response to him is acceptable, even if its earnestness is only on the same level as our former response to the prompting of the flesh. Man should re-direct his response to another (and proper) object, God. This is what Chrysostom takes St Paul mean in Rom. 6:19. Again we see his concern for the object which draws the soul's response. Of course man's rationality -- the presiding of the soul over the body -- is not rejected. But it no longer stands in the foreground of his ethics.

The grateful response to God constitutes the proper end of man, the crown of the entire creation. Chrysostom's exposition of Psalms 149 and 150 allows him to develop this theme. The Psalmist calls on the people of Israel to give thanks to God, not only because he has made them, but because he has made them to be his people; so Chrysostom explains Ps. 149:1-2. He then proceeds to elaborate on this thought in lavish terms: God wishes his people to render not only thanks, but also to give praises with pleasure (ἐὐδοκία), with good will (εὐφροσύνη) and ardent thought (διάθεσις). He seeks to lay hold on their disposition (διάθεσις), that they may be fervent in their yearning (πόθος), stirred up their affection (φίλτρος), and that they may be wholly consecrated to him whom they celebrate. Thus also the Psalmist says in another text: As a deer thirsts for living water, so my heart thirsts for
The exhortation to praise God "according to his exceeding excellence" (Ps. 150:2) prompts Chrysostom to ask how one could ever praise God in a manner equal to his excellence. That is an impossibility. Yet, he then suggests, the Psalmist exhorts man to praise God in accordance with the extent to which he can comprehend the immensity of such grandeur, and in the best measure which man can utter. The response of praise, is in the last analysis, eschatological. In exhorting "all that breathe to praise the Lord" (Ps. 150:6), the Psalmist already "casts in the seeds of the New Testament" by addressing himself to all those who are spread throughout the world. We find in Chrysostom's exposition of the Psalms not an occasion for propounding a mystical ascent of the soul, but rather the continual theme of praise. It is "our sacrifice and oblation, and the most excellent service equal to the angelic politeia. If we persevere in praising God, we shall pass the present life without offence, and shall gain the goods of the ages to come".

In accounting the moral self a responding agent, Chrysostom does not deny a role to will and reason in moral activity. But both these aspects are now undergirded by an understanding that moral activity is itself a creaturely response to a given reality (or a created order). Chrysostom's exegesis of "Let the
children come to me, and do not hinder them; for to such belongs the kingdom of heaven" (Mt. 19:13-15) is instructive: 42

For this is the limit of true wisdom; to be simple with understanding; this is angelic life; yes for the soul of a child is pure from all the passions. ...How much soever he be beaten by his mother, after her he seeks, and her doth he prefer to all. ...For he useth to distinguish what pertains to him and what is strange to him, not by poverty and wealth, but by friendship. And nothing more than necessary things doth he seek, but just to be satisfied from the breast. ...Therefore, He [Jesus] said, "of such is the Kingdom of heaven", that by choice(προαιρεσις) we should practise those things which young children have by nature.

The passage suggests two aspects of moral activity which we must clarify. In the first place, man's moral effort (expressed here by the word προαιρεσις) has the aim of recovering the affection "which young children have by nature". In the second place, it requires practice to distinguish between "what pertains to us and what is strange to us". In other words, what we mean in saying that moral activity is a creaturely response to a created order is first, that the exercise of the will is not detached from affection, and secondly, that this emphasis on relatedness sustains human reasoning.

(i) The Unity of Προαιρεσις and Affection

We have already touched on the question of the basis of ethics in the created order earlier in this section. Nature(φύσις) contains the potential for co-operation in the good. We can best begin a more detailed consideration
of the matter at hand with the help of a passage from de
statuis:43

[If God had] made everything to be of nature, we
should have departed uncrowned and destitute of
reward. ...And again He did not suffer our
will(προαίρεσις) to undertake the whole burden
of knowledge, and of right regulation; lest it
should despair at the labour of virtue. ...[He
lets] even some good dispositions exist
naturally within us. For we are all naturally
dispersed to feel indignation along with those
who are contemptuously treated, ...and to
sympathize in the pleasure of those who enjoy
assistance and protection. ...And to this
effect a certain wise man speaks significantly:
"Every animal loveth his like, and man his
neighbour."

If we ask the meaning of the word "nature" without
reference to particular context of that quotation, two
interpretations are possible. It can either signify the
realm which lies exclusively outside of man in his
psychosomatic constitution, or refer to the created order
as a whole with its given moral ends. Put differently,
depending on the perspective one holds, man can be seen
either as a spectator of, or a participant in, nature.
Chrysostom does on some occasions in his anti-Manicheaen
polemics follow the first meaning of "nature". In those
instances, "nature" is opposed to προαίρεσις. Autonomy
of the human will is set against an immutable nature.
Morality is confined to προαίρεσις, "for things natural
remain unalterable"; thus Chrysostom argues that evil
issues from the moral self rather than from "nature".44
This dichotomy drawn between προαίρεσις and "nature"
seeks to safeguard the goodness of creation and to
underline the point that man is not in a world ruled by fate.

But it is one thing to argue (against the Manicheaens) that the differing conditions of man do not impede the virtuous life, and another to conclude that the externals may be disregarded. The former does not preclude an understanding of the external situation as the very context in which man can respond to the good or in which the good can be disclosed. The latter is a reduction to Stoicism.45

Thus in the above quotation, moral activity is related to "nature" in the second sense. The moral self participates in the created order and finds that it is biased towards the good; that is, it has a telos which is congruent with man's own. In other words, man is not thrust into a basically hostile cosmos where his moral effort and affection towards his environment are mutually antagonistic. The attraction of externals does not automatically militate against the virtuous life.

This co-operation of the created order is central to Chrysostom's argument that it is easy to live a virtuous life.

But perhaps one will say, "I am willing (ελπίζω); (and no one is so void of understanding as not to be willing;) but to will is not sufficient for me." Nay, but it is sufficient,
if thou be duly willing, and do the deeds of one that is willing. ...For he that wills a thing as he ought, puts also his hands unto the means which lead to the object of his desire (ὅθελε). ...So in thirst, and cold and all other such things, thou art industrious and duly prepared to take care of the body. Now do this in respect of God's kingdom also, and surely thou shalt obtain it. For to this end God made thee a free agent (αὐτοκούσιον) that thou mightest not afterwards accuse God, as though some necessity had bound thee.

Why is it sufficient "to will to do the deeds of one that is willing"? Here we see clearly that Chrysostom finds an Aristotelian understanding of virtue more suitable to his concerns. Virtue has to do with means. Free agency is congruous to desiring. The will for virtue is a natural desire, at the same level as bodily needs, part of the non-negotiable make-up of man. Chrysostom's argument only makes sense if the desire for virtue is not frustrated but one can indeed "put his hands unto the means which lead to the object of his desire". The means, by implication, are the co-operation of nature itself. And so the objection to man's desire for vice is in its intrinsic insatiability. Satisfaction or fulfilment is not simply consequent upon the naked will. In the same homily, Chrysostom proceeds to analyse the desire for material wealth: the more one receives, the more he becomes poor, "since whoso desires more, is more truly poor. ...Now if you say that to wish (τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν) and not to obtain is pleasure (ἡδονή), you seem to me to be ignorant of the nature of pleasure".
How Chrysostom understands the connection of moral activity to the objective created order can be illustrated by his treatment of sexual temptation in the treatise contra eos qui subintroductas habent. 50 "Cohabitation" between priests and virgins had long been a cause of scandal in the church and is explicitly prohibited by the Council of Nicea (Canon III). 51 The ground upon which it was generally held to be undesirable is twofold. It is a cause of scandal for the outsiders, who might (perhaps rightly) infer it to be a pretext for immorality, and also it was an occasion by which the weaker brethren might be injured. The use of the word "undesirable" is deliberate. The act was not condemned in principle, but only due to expedient consideration for outsiders as well as for the weak. Basil of Caesarea's exhortation to Paregorius, his fellow-presbyter, who had allowed virgins into his house amply illustrates this point. In epistula 55 Basil does not question the morality of the practice; but he advises that "what is done very properly by some, naturally becomes to others an occasion for sin". Hence the church will be defamed. the argument adopted by Basil (and by the Greek fathers generally) is consistent with their understanding of virtue. The circumstances in which the subject is placed are not a matter for moral deliberation. Origen's comments on the petition "Lead us not into temptation" in the Lord's Prayer are revealing. Temptation, he says, is
a necessary condition of our present existence which is characterised by the dichotomy between body and soul. \(^{52}\)

It is in fact an occasion for the spiritual athlete to manifest what kind of person he is. \(^{53}\) The petition is therefore an appeal to the Father that we might not be **overcome** when we are tempted. \(^{54}\) Origen does not, and could not due to his philosophical premises, exhort man not to bring himself in to circumstance where he might be tempted. The more crucial concern for him is that the soul should preside over the body. **That** is the key towards overcoming temptation. Nor does the environment matter in the Christian Stoic tradition, as exemplified in the Sentences of Sextus. It is a matter of indifference. \(^{55}\)

And for those in the mystical tradition, e.g. Gregory of Nyssa, the sensible world is compared to a tempestous sea, a raging fire, or a battlefield. It is under the power of Satan -- so Gregory interprets 1 Jn. 5:19; hence it is to be avoided as a whole, and therefore no distinction is made between particular forms of it. The petition in the Lord's Prayer is a plea "that we should be separated from the things that belong to this world". \(^{56}\) Thus we can see that for those who are advanced in the contemplative life, "cohabitation" is not a moral problem. For Gregory the problem cannot exist because one is supposed to be severed from the sensible world; and for others, it is a matter of indifference or even to be welcomed in order that the excellence of the soul be manifested.
Hence it is significant to note the importance which Chrysostom attaches to the argument that "cohabitation" does not in fact lead to pleasure. (Though he does refer also to the scandalous nature of the practice and appeals against putting stumbling blocks before the weak, these arguments are subsidiary to that other over-riding theme). His central argument is that the only valid motive for a man to "cohabit" with a virgin is for the sake of pleasure rather than for mutual support in their respective single lives. This desire (ἐπιθυμία) is not intrinsically wrong, Chrysostom maintains emphatically. It is natural, established by God between men and women; otherwise, who would want to live with a woman with all the social inconveniences she brings? The continual presence of woman with a man in private quarters calls forth this desire. Man is not a stone statue. Thus single men and women should separate, and free themselves of the means to gratify the desire. For to keep virginity and to "co-habit" are contradictory, and could only be mutually frustrating. The pain is to see the object of pleasure and be unable to enjoy it. Chrysostom's argument rests on a premise that moral activity is neither exclusively volitional, nor is it subject to the dictates of the agent's interpretation of his own intention. Furthermore, "desire" (in a general sense) is not simply a matter of "losing control". Specifically, Chrysostom
emphasizes that sexual desire is not only predicated of the spiritually immature, but also of Job and of St Paul. It is a concern for all because of man's fundamental creatureliness. The factor of relatedness to a given order of existence is crucial in ethical deliberation. And for the issue under consideration, Chrysostom suggests that the continual presence of members of the opposite sex in private quarters calls forth this desire for sexual union. The desire itself is not something the persons involved can do anything about; it can only either be fulfilled in marital relationship, or otherwise be a source of frustration which impedes the pursuit of virtue. In this way, he argues that "co-habitation" between priests and virgins is wrong in principle.

(ii) Human Reasoning and the Responsiveness of Man

Chrysostom's treatment of human reasoning (λογισμός) seems varied. In some instances the word is used in a favourable sense, but predominantly it is employed in a pejorative manner. It is helpful to examine his use of the word in connection with the leading theme of the responding soul.

We shall make two points concerning Chrysostom's interpretation of λογισμός. In the first place, human reasoning is given by God to comprehend the goodness of God. Chrysostom likens it to the wings of birds given by
God so that man may avoid sin by soaring to the heights above, where Christ sits at the right hand of God (Col. 3:1,2). In his treatise on God's providence ad eos qui scandalizati sunt, the word is used of man's intuitive capacity in transcending the limitations of what words are able to express of God's goodness. The imageries of God as a parent, a husband, or an architect are only inadequate articulations of the God whose love is inexplicable and incomprehensible. The use of λογισμός allows believers to go beyond these confines in order that they may see the surpassing love of God.

But we need to explicate this comprehension of God's goodness in more precise terms. Chrysostom's exegesis of the "natural" man in 1 Cor. 2:14 reveals, in the second places, the human significance which he attributes to λογισμός.

Should any one say that [by the term 'wisdom'] Paul means the human understanding; even in this sense the fault is thine. For thou bringest a bad name upon it, who makest a bad use of it; who to the injury and thwarting of God demandest from it things which indeed it never had. ...Since thou hast abused wisdom unto the rejecting of God, and hast demanded of it more than it can do of its own strength; in order to withdraw thee from human hope, he hath shewed thee its weakness. For (to proceed) he is "a natural man", who attributes everything to reasonings of the mind and considers not that he needs help from above. ...For God bestowed it that it might learn and receive help from Him, not that it should consider itself sufficient unto itself. For eyes are beautiful and useful, but should they choose to see without light, their beauty profits them nothing; nor yet their natural force, but even
doth harm. ...[Any soul] if it choose to see without the Spirit, becomes even an impediment unto itself. "How then before this [i.e. before the giving of the Spirit]," it will be said, "did she see all things of herself?" Never at any time did she this of herself but she had creation for a book set before her in open view. But when man having left off to walk in the way which God commanded them, and by the beauty of visible objects to know the Great Artificer, ...they became weak and sank in a sea of ungodliness. 64

We see in this passage that "reasoning" remains, and can only be true to its vocation if it remains, a distinctively creaturely activity. The faculty of human reasoning is given by God in order above all that man may realize his creaturely status; that is, his dependence upon the Creator. God bestowed it that it may "learn and receive help from Him", and not imagine that it is "sufficient unto itself". Man is called to learn from "the book which is set before him in open view". 65 We see here again how an ethic of a "responding soul" shapes his interpretation of reasoning. In maintaining a sharp demarcation between the Creator and his creation, the embracing of virtue is no longer posited in terms of the metaphysical realities; rather it is set within the context of man having to rely completely upon God's power and to take cognizance of his creaturely limitation. "The reasonings of nature" are man's proper creaturely activity, and by them man is able to choose virtue and avoid vice. 66

The creatureliness of man affords the key to under-
standing Chrysostom's sharp remarks against human reasoning in his exposition on the men of faith in Heb. 11:67 "Faith needs a generous and vigorous soul, and one rising above all things of sense (τὰ αἰσθητά), and passing beyond the weakness of human reasoning"; those are the opening words of his exposition.68 In a later homily, he suggests that "faith is contrary to reasoning".69 Scriptural basis for this antagonism is provided by passages like Heb. 11:3 and 2 Cor. 10:5: reasonings can neither lead man to acknowledge the Creator, nor to embrace the knowledge of God.70

But in the context of his other sermons and other treatises we can see that he is not denying λογισμός a place in ethical deliberation; rather, since man has demanded of it "more than it can do of its own strength", God shows up its weakness in order to withdraw him from "human hope". Once λογισμός is abstracted from its dependent relation to the Creator, it becomes antagonistic to faith. Thus, Chrysostom sometimes employs the term λογισμὸι ἀνθρώπων to emphasize the futility of man in this truncated creatureliness;71 that is, of man who is engrossed in "the things of sense".72 Fallen man cannot discover true pleasure. He is left to pursue a love "that does not reach its aim", and the longer the journey he has gone, the further off the mark he is.73
As we draw this section to a close, we shall attempt to depict the plight of fallen man in lieu of a summary. The primal sin of man, then, consists in his rejection of creaturely status and in seeking independence from God his benefactor. In not honouring God, nor giving him thanks, man is unable to respond properly to the nature of things which is meant to assist him to embrace virtue. In the man–woman relationship, the ἐνίθυμα which was meant to draw them together becomes perverted. The devil "was bent on cutting through the tie, so as to destroy the race, not only by their copulating unlawfully, but also by their being stirred up to war, all in sedition against one another". The animals no longer lie in subjection to man, to be of assistance as they were in the Garden of Eden. They now rebel against the master who has denied his need of subjects. Man's declaration of autonomy has led to isolation, and to a futile quest for pleasure exclusively in the created order which is now exposed in its weakness. And if Chrysostom asserts that "no one can harm the one who does not harm himself", he is keenly aware that this is not to be taken in the sense of individual autonomy. "We hurt ourselves ...by hurting another", i.e. by doing injury to others. The awareness of sin cannot on its own extricate man from his plight; it can only enhance the accusation of his conscience, the incorruptible judge. The redemption of man began when God "walked in the garden" after the fall.
This self-disclosure of God to man not only awakens in man the consciousness of sin -- "I heard thy voice, and I was afraid"; its tender disclosure, the mark of friends, indicates that the inquiry into man's sin is meant to raise him from dejection. Before we discuss the reconciliation of man on both the historical and individual levels, we must ascertain more carefully the predicament which man now faces.
4.3 The Predicament of Man

Chrysostom finds "the sloth (παθωμία) of the sailor" giving rise to shipwreck an apt depiction of the fall of man. The condition is compared to a shipwreck in a harbour "when no sadness, or care, or labour, or toil, or countless waves of desire assaulted our nature". Man's fall occurred at the very point where his benefactor was leading him to a position of greatest honour. We need to distinguish the two contexts in which the fall is portrayed. In the first instance, Chrysostom wants to emphasize the spiritual nature of sin in his defence against the Manicheans. Injury is incurred by man because of his own sloth. In the second instance, and it is with this that we shall concern ourselves in this section, sloth carries the nuance of "contempt" towards the Creator. The focus is neither of the wilful disobedience of man, nor on his departure from reason, as a more volitional or intellectual ethic would bring out. What is emphasized is the moral condition out of which man fell. The devil tempted Adam to probe into the substance of God by his own natural reasoning; and because of this pretension he lost even what he possessed. This theme prevails in Chrysostom's sermons. In the catechese sloth and vigilance depict the two contrasting attitudes to God's initiative. And in many instances the Parable of the Vineyard (Mt. 21:33-44)
provides the paradigm of man's sloth:

We have turned aside from Him when He was calling and drawing us to Him in every way, but He hath not even upon this punished us, but hath Himself run unto us, and held us back when fleeing. ...[He] hath sent numberless messengers to call us to Him again, Prophets, Angels, Patriarchs: and we have not only not received the embassy, but have even insulted those that came.

Chrysostom proceeds to describe how God finally sent his Son, and he too was killed. "O what ὀρθομία, O what ἀγνωσία", he concludes. Sloth is akin to unfeelingness (ἀγνωσία). It is contempt (or ingratitude) towards God's incessant disclosure of goodness. This is nothing other than insensibility. So he capitalises on the phrase ὑπηληψάτος ἑαυτούς in Eph. 4:18-19: The cause of hardening is due to their way of life, and their life is the consequence of their own ὀρθομία and ἀναλγησία; blindness (i.e. darkness of their understanding) arises from no other cause than from ἀναλγησία.

How has man become so unresponsive? Chrysostom bluntly replies that vainglory (κενοδοξία) is the cause. The Anomoeans are a case in point. They err in their rejection of the self-disclosure of God as the only basis of knowledge. For man could gain knowledge only if he recognises his recipient status. As a creature he cannot know fully the economy of God, let alone his οὐσία. God's condescension is the sole basis of
knowledge. In many instances Chrysostom treats this heresy as illustrative of the fall of man. The grasping of the fruit from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil is an act of usurpation.

In positing man's plight as vainglory, we may ask whether this is merely an instance of Chrysostom's moralism and not therefore necessarily an integral part of his theological scheme. We might conclude that this was so from isolated passages in his sermons. For example, he warns that the vanity of the present age is only "powder and dust". The true glory belongs rather to the coming age. He further indicates that the love of praise could only lead to dissension and envy within a community, and foster hostility and hypocrisy. The opening sections of de educandis liberis are illustrative. Vainglory is schismatic. It brings ruin on the entire body of the church. It is also morally corrupting. A man is intoxicated by vainglory when he squanders all his wealth for the sake of display before the masses. Such a man will only be shunned by the crowd once his wealth is spent. For at the same time as they hail him, they are consumed with envy and take consolation for their own domestic troubles in thinking that the man who has been so glorious is likely to be the most dishonoured. Chrysostom then proceeds to indicate that vainglory affects all of us. We
are pleased whenever men praise us even for matters in which we are not implicated in the least degree. A poor man would clothe himself in fine raiment for no other reason than to be held in honour by the crowd. But in fact character consists not in gold raiment, but in being clad in good works. After attributing the entire nexus of human woes to vainglory, Chrysostom proceeds to identify the source of all these evils (τὸ αὕτιον πάντων τῶν κακῶν) in the improper upbringing of a child, a theme which occupies the rest of the treatise. Strangely, vainglory is not referred to even once in the remaining sections. If we were to insist that Chrysostom's exhortation against vainglory is primarily moralistic, we would be led to maintain that the juxtaposition of the two themes in de educandis liberis -- vainglory and the upbringing of children -- was artificial.

But this will not do. Chrysostom posits vainglory as the sign of man's fallenness. This can be illustrated by his linking of κενοδοξία to ἀπόνοια (departure from reason). The word ἀπόνοια conveys the suggestion of losing self-control. Vainglory is the tyrant. It is helpful to distinguish the biographical and communal perspectives in Chrysostom's analysis of this predicament. In terms of the biographical perspective, vainglory overtakes man at the height of his success.
His treatment of the life of King Uzziah in the series *homiliae in illud, Vidi dominum* (Is. 6:1), which carries a latent anti-Anomoean polemic, is instructive for our purpose. Why did Uzziah fall (in his usurpation of the priestly office)? Chrysostom locates the answer in the universal condition which faces man. He sins because "he is man, a being which slips easily into sin, and inclines easily to evil". He continues: "Temptation comes not primarily at the beginning, when we are zealous with great fervour, but when we have travelled the greater part of the way and our zeal becomes dull. ...The fall seems to be from sloth." Uzziah's heart was exalted. "This is ἀπόνοια; ἀπόνοια is the source of all evil." The plight of man is manifested not so much in conditions of scarcity as of plenteousness. In many other instances Chrysostom warns against this carelessness. Sloth arises from ἀνεξίς. Despair in sin and false security in the assurance of God's forgiveness are the twin dangers. His catecheses are representative of his warning against "carelessness".

This exhortation to vigilance and warning against sloth were already well established in the Christian tradition. In the main they were expressed in terms of man's psychological constitution, that is, the disposition of the soul. Νήσις was taken to mean contemplation and control of the passions by means of the intellect; while
ρατουμία was nothing other than irrationality -- an absorption into the anxiety (μεριμνα) of the world.  

The biography of an individual hardly enters into these considerations. There is no particular point in a person's life that he should especially be vigilant or be warned against sloth. Chrysostom shapes this tradition to emphasize the temporal element: that the increasing appropriation of virtue, as represented in an increasing manifestation of good works, carried with it an intrinsic snare.

And that is the tragedy. For the despair which comes with an awareness of sin could always be met by the continual initiative of God's encouragement; but sloth leads to insensibility and unresponsiveness to God's grace, precisely in one's very success. It follows that the self-disclosure of God, if it were exclusively a matter of an unchanging dynamic of condescending love, is bound to be self-frustrating; for it can only show up man's predicament in its most acute form, without the ability to provide a solution to it at the same time.

Chrysostom's interpretation of God's dealing with Adam and Eve after their fall (Gn. 3) lends itself to this criticism by emphasizing God's continued medicinal care at the expense of glossing over his judgement on them.  

What our discussion on the biographical perspective of man's predicament reveals is that we need to define in
more precise terms the understanding of the human community as the object of God's grace, a central theme which we have underlined in Chapter Three. We need to ascertain the manner in which God's grace is not frustrated by the very object to which it is directed. This makes a more detailed analysis of Chrysostom's understanding of redemptive history more urgent, a task which we shall undertake in Section 4.4.

Before we proceed to discuss the communal perspective of man's predicament, it is useful to outline two issues within the Christian community of the day which lie behind his treatment.

The first problem concerns the urgency of reconciliation within the church of Antioch between the parties of Evagrius and Flavian. An exposition of Eph. 4 gives him an opportunity to tackle the issue in the early 390s after the death of Evagrius. The question whether or not there should be a successor to Evagrius leads Chrysostom to deal with moral issues in the communal context. "The benefit of the Spirit which is from the Head" is meant for the whole. So "nothing provokes God's anger as the division of the church". The community becomes the focal point of conduct: "though we have accomplished ten thousand glorious acts, yet if we cut to pieces the fullness of the church, we shall suffer
punishment." The schism of the Evagrius party is all the more serious because it is not even based on doctrinal differences. He then proceeds to identify the cause of the schism in the "love of power". This is the central problem of man in society. The rift provides the pagan an opportunity to accuse the church of vainglory and hypocrisy. He concludes: "Therefore I assert and protest, that to make a schism in the church is no less an evil than to fall into heresy." If among the Cappadocians the intellectual aspect of ethical life was emphasized as was required by their apology against heresies from without; Chrysostom in a period when the church is under less pressing external threat is lead to stress practice as well as doctrine as an integral aspect of ethics. Partisanship only makes the church aware that truth is not abstracted from communal expression.

The second issue concerns the tension between withdrawal and involvement (contemplative and active life) within an individual. This tension follows directly from the doctrine of the two-lives; it is not a problem unique to Chrysostom. Nevertheless, it is fair to point out that none among his contemporaries treats the problem, or provides a response to it, as sensitively as he does. His wholehearted devotion to pastoral ministry until the very end of his life bears a sharp contrast with Gregory of Nazianzus' disillusionment with, and withdrawal from the
active ministry of the church. Chrysostom already expresses the tension in his early work *de sacerdotio:* Vainglory is the most terrible and dangerous rock upon which men in their public life suffer shipwreck. He laments: Even now as a recluse "I am taken by vainglory, but I often recover myself, and I see at a glance that I have been taken. ...But were I to come among the multitude, and to be involved in countless excitements. I should not be able to have the benefit of this warning, nor to experience reflections which take me thus to task. ...What then is the food of vainglory? Indeed it is honours and applause; of pride, abundance of authority and power; of envy", and so on. Vainglory is closely linked to public life. For Chrysostom the dilemma is this: the consideration that a reclusive life denies man's essential interdependence (as we have shown especially in Chapter Two) leads to the conclusion that community is a vital step to redemption. Man might indeed "recover" himself easily in private by using his intellect; but this would be a truncated life. The tragedy is that community itself (as we know it in its fallenness) has become a hindrance as well. For it is precisely there that man loses control of himself. Such is the madness with which fallen man is afflicted.

Having delineated these two issues we proceed to analyse the communal perspective of man's predicament.
The Matthaean, Johannine, and Corinthian treatments of vainglory provide the cardinal points in Chrysostom's criticism of pagans (especially philosophers). A brief exposition of his treatment of each will help us to understand how man's fallenness is expressed in the communal dimension.

(i) The Problem of Hypocrisy in Good Works in Mt. 6:

Chrysostom holds a pessimistic view of the possibility of good works in the unregenerate life. All the good endeavours of such people, if performed at all, are for the sake of show. The relation of vainglory to almsgiving is compared to that between a pandering nurse to a royal daughter. "Vainglory" commands "almsgiving" to despise her father, and "to deck herself to please unholy and often despicable men", displays her "to the slaves, and to the vulgar, that have not even known her". The problem for man does not consist simply in whether or not he is able to perform neighbour-directed benevolent acts.

Chrysostom continues in the same passage: "Almsgiving" is like a harlot who

...lets go heaven and runs after fugitives and menial slaves, ...them that, when she burns with love towards them, hate her, what can be more insane than this? For no one do the multitude hate so much, as those that want the glory they have to bestow. ...Consider [also] how great the sorrow that then comes upon thee, and how continual the desponding, while Christ's voice is heard in thine ears, saying, "Thou hast lost all thy reward".

This passage shows how the craving for an approval from
the mass can corrupt all good works. In one instance he depicts vainglory as "co-existent"(παρεχθεσθαι) with the virtues we exercise. Even if it is unable to rob us of these virtues it still causes us "much damage in the exercise of them, forcing [us] to undergo the toil, and depriving [us] of the fruit". Chrysostom is eager to maintain that the essential insincerity in moral effort as it seeks visible expression is a universal condition of fallen man. The pagan philosophers are attacked, not so much for their doctrinal error (though Chrysostom also takes cognizance of this) as for the fact that all they undertake is motivated by the love of praise. By this, "the heathen philosophers excite themselves, and make shipwreck in their false doctrines. ...[Vainglory] prevails even in direct contraries. Thus one man is vain of chastity, and contrariwise another of adultery; ...so of luxury, and fasting, modesty and rashness, riches and poverty. I say poverty; since some of them that were without, when it was in their power to receive, for admiration's sake forebore to receive". Here Chrysostom underlines the point that the moral good is not located in "chastity", "modesty", and "fasting" as such. They could be masks for vainglory as much as "adultery", "luxury", and "rashness".

Chrysostom's treatment of "Let your light so shine before men" (Mt. 5:16) is illustrative of this analysis of vainglory. What is important at this point is the
exegetical problem which he raises, rather than the particular solution which he provides for it. The exhortation to show forth good work so that the Father should be praised is problematic for him. For what is at stake, as he understands it, is not whether one is able to show forth "good works" in public. As we have already indicated, the vainglorious is like a harlot "who runs after even those who hate her". That is not the difficulty for fallen men. Rather, the main exegetical problem lies in how this public expression of one's faith in good works is not corrupted by vainglory.

(ii) Vainglory intoxicates Man and prevents his following Truth (Jn. 5:44; Cf. Jn. 12:42,43):

Chrysostom concludes from the Matthaean text that love of praise from the crowd corrupts the neighbour-directed benevolent acts. His critique is focused on the motivation of the neighbour-directed acts rather than on the acts in themselves. Vainglory and virtue do co-exist in these deeds of the unregenerate. To some extent, the "benevolent" acts of a vainglorious person can still provide relief for the needy, who, in Chrysostom's own terms, are the "naked Christs". Here the Johannine material accentuates the fact that the crowd actually hinders their expression. The "fear of the company of friends" is the stumbling block towards believing in Jesus as the Messiah: such is the sin of the Jews. This is
taken as the paradigm of man's plight. Vainglory severs the continuity between reason and action. The Jews of the day denied Jesus with the full knowledge of what was right. "Vainglory is a thing powerful to blind even to very evident truths the minds of those consumed by it. ...It instigates some who know and are persuaded of the truth to pretended ignorance and opposition. ...[It] is a sort of deep intoxication." This is what happens in the case of the pagan philosophers. They do not err in their judgement. They know of the perishable nature of things present; but they refuse to pursue the true glory and are unable to put this knowledge into action. "Fear of the company of friends" paralyses man and hardens public opinion in its perversity against the truth.

(iii) The Futility of the Present World Order vis-a-vis the Power of God (1, 2 Cor.; esp. 1 Cor. 1, 2):

This dichotomy between reason and action leads man to confine himself completely to the realm of speculative thinking, wasting his time about a set of idle and useless dogmas. That is to say, truth as fallen man understands it is devoid of any concrete expression. It issues from a world of vanity and never escapes from it. The opening homilies on 1 Corinthians provide Chrysostom with the opportunity to contrast the power of Christian philosophy with the futility of rhetoric and pagan philosophies. The criterion of truth is the ability to
convince even the uneducated to live aright; on this score Christianity excels over pagan thoughts.\textsuperscript{116} Chrysostom's hostility to pagan scholarship may appear surprising against the background of the more favourable attitudes of the Cappadocians. For the latter, pagan scholarship serves (at least) as praeparatio evangelica.\textsuperscript{117} Chrysostom reaches back to the apologists, and possibly also to Origen, to provide himself with the basic material for his exposition.\textsuperscript{118} His aversion to speculative thought may be shaped to a large extent by his anti-Anomoean polemics.\textsuperscript{119} For the Cappadocians, pagan philosophers may have a positive relation to the Christian faith as they contribute to a Christian ontology that is not so different in form from its Neoplatonic counterpart. For Chrysostom, however, the unity of theory and practice -- as concretely expressed in the present world -- is the arbiter of truth. Hence, he goes against the Cappadocians in denying a place for pagan thought in the education of youth. An example of his attack on rhetoric will show this: "Study not to make him an orator; but train him up to be a philosopher [i.e. Christian philosopher]. In the want of the one there will be no harm whatever; in the absence of the other, all the rhetoric in the world will be of no advantage. Tempers are wanted, not talking; character, not cleverness; deeds, not words."\textsuperscript{120} Here Chrysostom is not taking the side of philosophy in the intra-pagan rivalry between rhetoric and philosophy. The main concern is not the ordering of
passions in a recluse's contemplation of truth, but the ability to live virtuously in a society which is ridden with temptations. At one point he concedes that even the pagan philosophers recognise this: namely, that life and conduct are the test of doctrine. All the more should the power of Christ's philosophy be manifested in everyday life. The power of God breaks through the realm of speculation into articulation in the public realm. Chrysostom compares the youth in a society to a ship which "lives out at sea in the very midst of the ocean". He has a stronger temptation to sin than a recluse. But is the fact that, under the Christian philosophy, even a youth can live virtuously in the city not a sign of the power of God?

We have outlined the biblical basis of Chrysostom's analysis of vainglory. While others see κενοδοξία as just one of the many passions, he picks it out as the primary cause of man's woes. Even those who have "mastered avarice and gluttony have been, most of all men, the slaves of reputation (δόξα), and this is the cause of all evils". The following passage reveals the rationale of this analysis:

Other passions, even if they are hurtful, at least bring some pleasure with them, though it be but for a time and fleeting; those who love money, or wine, or women, have, with their hurt a pleasure, though a brief one. But those who are taken captives by this passion [i.e. vainglory], live a life continually embittered and stripped of enjoyment, for they do not
obtain what they earnestly desire, glory, I mean from the many. They think they enjoy it, but do not really, because the thing they aim at is not glory at all. And therefore their state of mind is not called glory, but a something void of glory, vaingloriousness. ...[He is] captivated by love of applause. ...If any one should ask him, What do you think of the many? he clearly would say, "that they are thoughtless, and not to be regarded." Then if any one again should ask him, "Would you choose to be like them?" I do not suppose he could possibly desire to be like them. ...Do you say that they are many and a sort of collective body? this is the very reason why you ought most to despise them. If when taken singly they are contemptible, still more will this be the case when they are many. ...He who has fallen into this disease neither knows friendship nor remembers old companionship. ...[He] is at war with every one, unstable, without natural affection. Again, the passion of anger, tyrannical though it be and hard to bear, still is not wont always to disturb, but only when it has persons that excite it; but that vainglory is ever active, ...since reason neither hinders nor restrains it, but it is always with us not only persuading us to sin, but snatching from our hands anything which we may chance to do aright, or sometimes not allowing us to do right at all.

This passage shows how vainglory stands out among other passions. It incapacitates man in two important ways.

In the first place, vainglory renders the affective faculty impotent. Now, Chrysostom understands that other passions bring some transient pleasures with them. We should not take what Chrysostom means by "pleasure" to be "some sort of sensation of elation"; for those who are consumed with vainglory also "think they enjoy" the "applause from the many". What is at stake is that one who is enslaved by avarice, wine, or sexual lust, still responds in some measure to the objective reality as given in the created order, (that is, money, wine, and
women). In contrast, the vainglorious man responds to an unreality. He seeks honour from the collective and nameless mass which when broken down into its constituent members he despises thoroughly. The disorder in man's responsiveness which is responsible for the fall is expressly manifested in the passion of vainglory. Man could not even order himself upon the basis of natural affection, the most elementary expression of his responsiveness. Insensibility towards God his benefactor leads man to respond to a completely fictitious society.

In the second place, vainglory deprives man of rational thought. Other passions are still subject (in some measure) to the dictate of reason. Anger might be a clearer instance of the violation of love. Nevertheless, one could still provide reason for it -- such and such has caused me to be angry; if not prior to the incident, at least afterwards in the form of a justification. Furthermore, action still bears a positive relation to the will -- I can express my anger. Vainglory, however, is continual, unhindered and unrestrained by reason. Man loses even the ability to express himself with any rationality and consistency.

Fallen man therefore is not in possession of his faculties, affective or rational, in his communal existence. This is all the more serious because communal
life, as Chrysostom interprets it, is meant to be integral to the appropriation of virtue. Abstracted from the sustaining power of God, it becomes a hindrance. Vainglory is not regarded as one among many passions which the individual could in theory master in solitary life. Moreover the community does not simply serve in the capacity of an acid test to demonstrate the true mettle of an "inner spiritual quality" by corrupting the "spiritually immature". Chrysostom regards the corrupting effect of the society on an individual in a strong sense. Social intercourse (as we know it) carries with it an essential corruption. Communal life for fallen men is only a formal one. It is the realm of the "many" where each individual is unable to relate purposefully to another. Each is enslaved to vainglory, and is led by it to follow what he despises, in fact, to emptiness.
4.4 The Community as the Recipient of God's Condescension

We approach our task of understanding Chrysostom's ethics of redemption by way of Louis Meyer's analysis. For him, Chrysostom's exposition of Rom. 7 in his Twelfth and Thirteenth homiliae on Romans is cardinal. Man's predicament is analysed there in terms of the non-subjection of the body to the soul. This non-subjection, likened to the lack of harmony between horse and charioteer, constitutes the obstacle which prevents man from being united to God. "La perfection chrétienne" therefore involves a removal of this obstacle and a spiritual regeneration and empowering of the soul. Man's moral progress is then set in terms of an increasing appropriation of merit, a progress which is inaugurated in baptism when the body is made spiritual and lighter. In this process of spiritual growth, one advances from an initial fear of hell, through a hope of heavenly rewards, and to the final stage of pure love. In accordance with the "générosité manifestée" in man's free will, sanctification advances from a mere obedience to precepts to wholehearted eagerness in practising counsels. This eagerness, and thus also the merit which one procures, are measured by the difficulty in the action one undertakes.

For Meyer, Chrysostom is not unaware that God has
ordained a varied expression in the vocation to perfection. One could be perfect in monastic, sacerdotal, as well as in secular callings. It remains unclear, however, how these varied expressions of perfection, for example the contemplative ideal for monks and neighbourly love for those in the secular world, are related to each other. Meyer does point out the centrality of service to the human community in Chrysostom's ethics:

"On pourrait aussi interpréter les paroles de Chrysostome en y voyant une allusion à la facilité que le désert assure à la pratique de la vertu, mais qu'il faut sacrifier à une vie remplie de plus d'obstacles lorsque l'intérêt des âmes est en jeu." But the above remark only raises more acutely the issue whether human beings have to act in the universe alone, as individuals, or as a community. Meyer has left this crucial point unconsidered. So, we are left unclear whether, on the one hand, involvement in society issues from a benevolence which echoes God's love to the universe, to be practised as long as this activity does not hinder the individual's own pursuit of virtue, or, whether, on the other hand, such involvement is intrinsic and determinative of the nature and appropriation of virtue. Meyer's analysis is an impressive itemization of the various aspects of perfection. But such comprehensiveness becomes at the same time the very obstacle towards identifying the specific nuances peculiar to Chrysostom's
ethics.

Having said this, Meyer's analysis reveals one fundamental issue. In pointing out the importance of God's pedagogical activity in motivating man in all sorts of ways and man's contribution in terms of the degree of eagerness with which he participates in salvation, Meyer does no more than affirm the heritage of Origen in Chrysostom's ethics.

Now, if our analysis of man's predicament in Section 4.3 is correct, we are required to sharpen the divergence between Chrysostom and Origen in their respective conceptions of the medicinal nature of redemption, more precisely the motif of συγκατάβασις. For the picture of redemption (i.e. συγκατάβασις) in the Origenist tradition was set to answer questions about theodicy, God's immutability, human dignity, determinism, man's frailty, and such like.130 These questions came into prominence once the cosmos rather than the community became the relevant moral environment, (as we have already mentioned in Section 4.1 above). Stripped of the attributes which belong to man's communal existence, one is inevitably left with an impoverished ethic of redemption which is internalised and individualised, as the questions felt to be in need of answering betray. Does Chrysostom share the same framework? Many instances
in his homilies may suggest so. *Condescension is accommodation.* The pedagogical ministry seems to be personal, individualised, and not properly predicated of the community as a whole.\(^{131}\) But if that were all it was, it would not be able to overcome the plight of man, as we have analysed it in the last section. It would be met by sloth. The severance between theory and practice in communal life would have remained. Further, we would also then be forced to admit that the repeated passages in his homilies where he urges his congregation to engage itself in moral reform (in breaking off bad habits, for example) are no more than instances of moralism.\(^{132}\)

That is to say, if redemption were basically a private concern, mutual exhortation would be no more than an adjunct to man's ultimate concerns.

These issues indicate the need to study Chrysostom's ethics of redemption more closely if the seeming inconsistencies are to be explained and overcome. Our examination, from the outset, is guided by his periodization of man's redemption. Mt. 5:29 is cardinal. Chrysostom interprets the verse to mean a "higher precept" enjoined on all in the present *kairos* of the New Covenant.\(^{133}\) A chariot race in the Olympic games provides a vivid metaphor:\(^{134}\)

Christ, when He came, made it [the horse, i.e. the body] more nimble for us through baptism, rousing it with wings of the Spirit. And for this reason the marks (οκαμωματα) for the race,
which they of old had to run, are not the same as ours.

After alluding to Mt. 5:21, 27, and 33, he continues:

And in all other duties, He gives us a longer ground to run over, ...and the man who does not do them is to be punished to the utmost. This is why He said, "Except your righteousness exceed the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no case enter into the kingdom of heaven." But he that does not see the kingdom, shall certainly fall into hell.

The significance of the passage becomes at once apparent when set against Clement of Alexandria's interpretation of the same text. He put it in the context of a counsel for perfection: the true Gnostic executes and understands "more than the Scribes and Pharisees". The text was of atemporal significance. "Scribes and Pharisees" referred to worldly men. Clement's emphasis was upon the words "Except your righteousness exceed" rather than on "you shall not enter the kingdom of heaven". And in some instances, the second half of the verse was left out altogether. The "kingdom of heaven" was tacitly cast within a hierarchical ordering of the good; in this way the absoluteness of "ye shall in no case enter" was glossed over. In contrast, Chrysostom's exegesis reveals his Antiochene roots. The text is set in a historical perspective. He rejects the counsel-character of the Matthaean text: the scribes and Pharisees belong to the time of the Old Covenant; and the alternative to the kingdom is hell. It might be argued that Chrysostom and Clement are addressing themselves to different issues.
For the one the text is related to anti-Marcionite polemics; and for the other it refers to spiritual growth. A comparison with Irenaeus in similar anti-Marcionite apologetics can serve to sharpen Chrysostom's position. Irenaeus did maintain a historical perspective in his use of Mt. 5:20 in the course of an argument that Christ did not abrogate the natural precepts of the Law. Nevertheless, he proceeded to identify the scribes and Pharisees in question as the Israelites -- the mass in their infirmities -- to whom God had to show indulgence. Chrysostom shows, in contrast, no hesitation in applying the term even to Moses and Elijah. Perfection assumes a dispensational dimension:

Let none suppose us to condemn Elias as imperfect; ...for indeed he was exceedingly perfect, but in his own times (καιροῖς), when the mind of men was in some degree childish. ...Since Moses too was in this respect perfect; nevertheless, these [the disciples of Jesus] have more required of them than he [Elias]. For "except your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no case enter into the kingdom of Heaven".

In accordance with this central idea of periodization in Chrysostom's ethical framework, for the rest of this chapter our inquiry deals with the historical difference in the divine purpose regarding συγκατάβασις in the Old and New Covenants. This will enable us to establish the decisive link between ecclesiology and ethics in Chrysostom's theology. In Chapter Five we shall address ourselves to the individual's appropriation of the moral
good in the present kairos of the New Covenant.

4.4.1 The Features of Condescension in the Old Covenant:

The medicinal feature is a continuing element in condescension; but in the time before Christ it had a more indispensable purpose than it now has after Christ. Man in his frailty had yet to experience regeneration in Christ.

So great was this condescension, that the written Law even required less than the law of nature. For the law of nature ordered one man to associate with one woman throughout. ...But the law of Moses neither forbade the putting away of one and the taking in of another, nor prohibited the having of two at once! ...They therefore who lived under the old dispensation had no hardship done them by so moderate a system of laws imposed upon them. ^

Chrysostom has understood "the law of nature" as nothing other than what God has implanted within man from the beginning. Man is self-taught. The content of this natural law comprises dictates "which are necessary and uphold our life". The injunctions "Thou shalt not kill; thou shalt not commit adultery; thou shalt not steal" in the Decalogue are representative. In other words, Chrysostom proposes that "the law of nature" is concerned with rules rather than ends. It might give directives to which one's actions are to conform, but remains incapable of clarifying and revealing virtue itself.

Notwithstanding, it serves the purpose of making some form of social life viable. Hence the moral claim was even more truncated when, in the passage we quoted above, the
written law required even less than the law of nature. In this manner, man suffered "no hardship" in the Old Covenant. The predicament of man -- the impasse between the private and the public -- was indeed relieved in this downward (κατά) - movement, only at the expense of a severe circumscription of man's moral horizon.

The element of compromise in the structure of condescension in the time before Christ did not mean a complete capitulation of moral standard. The moral good was still manifested to a certain extent. Chrysostom's treatment of natural relationships is illustrative. The command "Increase and multiply" is properly predicated of the period after the fall; Gn. 1:28 is taken to be prophetic of Gn. 9:1. God's command was motivated by his love. It was a consolation to man, an assurance that the human race would not face annihilation after the flood. Progeny, the fundamental element in natural relationships, constituted an incomparable good in the time when man's gross nature required that sensible things should be the basic fabric of God's blessing.142 This measure of compromise was not a total disregard of ethical norms. So Chrysostom proposes that natural relationships were also ordained to provide some order within the society.

Alongside conscience and the creation, the hierarchical relationships (fathers-children, husbands-wives, and masters-slaves) are instituted to be διδόσκαλοι for the
human race. Natural ties do not remain at the biological level; parenthood consists not only in the act of generation, but also in providing a good education. If the affection of the blood tie were denied, and love towards children were entirely based on their conduct, the society would easily be dissolved, for children fluctuate so easily in their temperament. And if the blood tie were all there was, the ensuing refusal of discipline even in the face of bad conduct would cause the human race to sink in misery.

The above account shows that the element of compromise in the time of the Old Covenant did not altogether abolish moral standards. At least the concern for a continuing welfare of the society (that it should not sink in misery) necessitates some measure of discipline. The moral good was to some extent preserved. But the tragedy which this involved is apparent from the following passage. In it Chrysostom explains the morality of Elijah's asking God to send fire from heaven to destroy his enemies (1 Ki. 1:9-16; Lk. 9:54):

For at that time not the ungodliness only, but also the ungodly themselves, they [the Israelites] were commanded to hate, in order that their friendship might not prove an occasion of transgression unto them. Therefore he [God] severed their connections [with the ungodly] both by blood and marriage, and on every side he fenced them off.

We might ask: In confining the virtuous life to the
material world (e.g. the good of procreation) in this dynamics of condescension, has Chrysostom ignored the anticipatory character of the Old Covenant, namely, that it is "a shadow of the reality to come"? Instances of such anticipation could be cited from the Scriptures. So Chrysostom takes Sirach 16:1-4 to mean that from the beginning what pleases God consists in practising virtue rather than in abundance of children. Furthermore, the miracle of the birth of Isaac to the hitherto barren Sarah was an instance of God's preparation of the human race to anticipate the Virgin Birth: "When thou hast seen the womb, disabled and bound as it is, being opened to the bearing of children from the grace of God, thou mightest not marvel at hearing that a virgin has brought forth." These responses are rather lame. For instances of God's intervention, whether supplied from isolated proof-texts or in miracles, were not intrinsic to the structure of condescension. The moral life of the human community still remained circumscribed by the material order, in which man lived and expected blessings from God. The ordering of society as such, sustained by God's condescension, did not anticipate the New Covenant. In fact, while it is true that the people of Israel was the object of God's condescension (ουγκαράβασις), the fact remains that their history was an unbroken record of ingratitude of a covenanted people to their
God, and hence was the focal point of man's tragedy. This history of ingratitude is encapsulated in the Parable of the Vineyard, as we have pointed out in the last section in our discussion of the predicament of man.

Was man, then, completely unresponsive to God's condescension? This would be so except for individuals, the heroes of faith in the Old Covenant whom Chrysostom employs extensively in his sermons. Their importance lies more in their capacity as moral exemplars than as types of Christ. The anti-deterministic motif -- man's ability to transcend the worst environment -- persists throughout the corpus. The heroes were able to withstand severe trials and even worse human conditions than their contemporaries; and they stood firm at a time when the hope of the Resurrection remained to be revealed, and when human nature was still weak. A fortiori our present succumbing to trials and suffering is inexcusable in the time of the New Covenant. 149

The above is quite banal as it stands. Chrysostom seems only to have adopted a traditional use of biblical personalities. His distinctive insight will become clear when the Old Testament figures are set in contrast with their New Testament counterparts. We will see that Chrysostom introduces the historial perspective as an hermeneutical tool in analysing the response of which the
saints before and after Christ are capable. It is salutary to note that the virtues of these Old Testament figures were less neighbour-directed than internal and individual: for example, the righteousness of Noah, the obedience of Abraham, the longsuffering of Isaac, the chastity of Joseph, the endurance of Job, and the fortitude of Jacob. Their praiseworthiness lay in their rising above the environment and the mass. In this way Chrysostom's analysis of the structure of moral life under the Old Covenant stands over against a popular notion, in, for example, twentieth century Protestantism, that the hallmark of Christianity consists in coming to Christ with an individual faith. This is usually contrasted with an assumed background that the structure of society under the Old Covenant was that of a stable community. Faith was then of a corporate nature. To this Chrysostom would perhaps rejoin that the pattern of "the righteous shall live by faith", if taken to mean an eschatological individualism, carries with it an unreconciled tension between the public and private realms. Individuality was indeed the only proper and inevitable pattern of response under the constraints of the time before Christ. The good news of the eschatological corporeity in Christ was yet to be revealed and experienced. If the double-standard ethic were ever applicable, we can only conclude that it is fundamentally predicated of the Old Covenant: the community at large lived under the grace of compromise, and it was left to individuals to transcend that pattern
in higher devotion to God. We do not deny that the double-standard theory, as expressed in the "valid" version,\textsuperscript{150} constitutes a continual reproach for those who are complacent in their mediocrity and a challenge to greater zeal. Nevertheless, this intent which is so dear within the Greek tradition was biased from the outset by the assumption that the vision of God is an individual enterprise. In this, the early Christians shared with their pagan counterparts in rejecting the polis as the moral environment. The public realm constitutes the barrier which man seeks either to overcome or to shun. This counsel of despair which leaves man's predicament unresolved affects the way in which moral progress is understood.

But we have over-reached ourselves in this discussion. Before we examine the features of condescension in the time after Christ, the task of explicating further how the Old Testament saints participate in the New Covenant still awaits us.

The saints of Old Testament times anticipated the coming of Christ in two respects.\textsuperscript{151} In the first place, anticipation is shown in their love for God. Chrysostom outlines this feature in the course of his exposition of "the same spirit of faith" (2 Cor. 4:13).
Responding to those who are perplexed by the morality in the laws in the Old Testament, he underlines the point that both dispensations are under the same God and Physician who ministers to man according to his condition. In the former days, fear and punishment were the norm of God's dealing with man. He proceeds to indicate, however, that the saints in those days, in contrast with the populace, had need neither of precepts nor of laws in following virtue and shunning vice. These men practised *philosophia* out of ardent love towards God. In the second place, they anticipated Christ's pastoral charge to Peter (Jn. 21:16) in their *care* for their brethren. They were "affectionately minded" (philosophe) towards their kin, interceding to God on their behalf.

It is clear that these two features -- love for God and care of neighbour -- point towards how man's predicament is to be overcome. But in both their form and their content, they are at best only a relief from, rather than an overcoming of, the plight; and if a relief, an unsatisfactory one. For we have seen from our earlier discussions that these were in the form of an individual and heroic pursuit in which the populace could not participate. The content of the moral life also, of love for God and for neighbour, was limited by the truncated moral world in the time before Christ in which both saints and the populace shared. There is a
decided vagueness when Chrysostom commends their love for God, for it lacks an eschatological focus. As for the care for others, Chrysostom indicates on one occasion that it was circumscribed in three respects. In the first place, their ministry was participatory rather than redemptive. For example, Moses shared in, but could not relieve the misfortunes of the Israelites. Secondly, the extent of sacrifice of which they knew at best consisted in exposure to dangers in this present life only. The wider horizon of the glory of the world to come, which St Paul was willing to forsake for the benefit of others, was still to be grasped. And thirdly, their realm of service was limited to proximate relations; it had not acquired universal scope. 156

The incest between Lot and his daughters (Gn. 19:30-38) showed how good intention (in caring) could go wrong on the assumption that progeny constituted the indispensable good. Chrysostom defends the incident only to a limited degree. The event was vindicated under God's providence; and both parties were free of moral blame because they acted in good faith. 157 He does not evade the moral problem as Irenaeus did. The latter interpreted the episode as a type of the Word of God giving birth to the Jewish and Gentile churches. 158 The moral problem for Chrysostom, arose from the restricted character of the moral world they inhabited. 159
4.4.2 The Features of Condescension in the New Covenant:

The moral world under the Old Covenant was necessarily truncated in order that social life might be viable. In a passage to which we have referred in the subsection above, Chrysostom indicates that it was even permissible to hate the ungodly so that "their friendship might not prove an occasion of transgression" for the whole community.\(^{160}\) In the same passage he goes on to say, unaware of any inconsistency, that in the present season of greater \textit{philosophia}, "if we are to hate ungodly and lawless man, we shall go on to hate also sinners", and thus we shall be cut off from all, even from other Christians. We shall be puffed up with \textit{πτυχόνων}.\(^{161}\) He then proposes that one is required to condescend (\textit{συγκατάθετον}) to the weak; that is, to those who have not yet tasted of the glory which is in us. For "love is a great teacher, and able both to withdraw men from error, and to reform the character, and to lead them by the hand unto \textit{philosophia}, and out of stones to make men".\(^{162}\)

What renders this communal widening of moral scope effective? Condescension still characterises the time after Christ as it did the Old Covenant. But the kernel of compromise (i.e. the \textit{καφτλι-}component) which so dominated it previously, though not diminished or
abolished, is now set within a new framework ushered in with the regeneration which comes from Christ. In him we have been brought "to the very summit of excellence". Condescension in the New Covenant is shaped by the conditions of "higher precepts"; the hitherto latent and restrained ων-component becomes expressly manifested in the expanded moral order in which man "has tasted the glory". Of course, Chrysostom does not suggest any radical polarization between the ministrations of the Old and New Covenants (otherwise he would be suspect of Marcionism); God remains the one who undergirds the continuing dynamics of condescension. Nevertheless, the former "was merely given by the Spirit", but the latter "even furnisheth those that receive it with the Spirit in large measure". Chrysostom elaborates on this distinction in the course of his exegesis of 2 Cor. 3:

There is no need for us to cover ourselves as Moses did; for ye are able to look upon this glory which we are encircled with, although it is far greater and brighter than the other. ...By coming unto Grace he [i.e. an individual] is able not only to see Moses, but also to stand in the very same rank with the Lawgiver ...[and] also turn unto God and enjoy this greater glory. ...Not only do we behold the glory of God, but from it also receive a sort of splendour. ..."Reflecting as a mirror we are transformed into the same image from glory", that of the Spirit, "to glory", our own, that which is generated in us; and that, of such sort, as one might expect from the Lord the Spirit.

This passage indicates that the Christ-event has inaugurated two features which point to the overcoming of man's predicament: the bridge from individuality to
communality -- "to stand in the very rank with the Lawgiver", and the participation in the glory from above, which has broken through the confines of the material world -- we are transformed "from glory" (that of the Spirit) "to glory" (our own). The heart of 2 Cor. 3, as Chrysostom interprets it, is the genesis of a community which is drawn by, and shares in, the glory of God in Christ.

(i) These two aspects of the New Covenant are foundational for his assessment of St Paul. The first line of thought which he pursues is the moral claim of the human community, and correspondingly, the universal scope of St Paul's influence. Passages like Rom. 9:3 ("For I could wish that I myself were accursed and cut off from Christ for the sake of my brethren"), 1 Cor. 9:16 ("For necessity is laid upon me; woe to me if I do not preach the gospel"), and Phil. 1:23-24 ("My desire is to depart and be with Christ, for that is far better; but to remain in the flesh is more necessary on your account") provide the basic material for his reflection. His comment on the last of these three passages is illustrative:

How great was then thy [i.e. St Paul's] grief, and still dost thou desire this perishing life? ...For tell me, what trader, whose vessel is full of untold wealth, when he may run into port, and be at rest, would prefer to be still at sea? ...And this for Christ's sake, that I [i.e. St Paul] may render more loving unto Him those whom I have made his servants. ..."For your progress", I have chosen to remain, when I was about to see Christ.

The human arena in which St Paul exercised his ministry is
what distinguished him as a minister of the New Covenant from his counterparts in the Old. This theme undergirds the opening chapter of de laudibus Pauli. St Paul's fame lay in the context -- the comprehensiveness of his influence -- rather than in any internal and spiritual quality. Job was indeed the exemplar for those in suffering; he even might have excelled the apostles in this respect. Yet Chrysostom suggests that there was an element of tragedy in his life. For admittedly, it amply manifested the inviolability of man's free will. Nevertheless, this affirmation of freedom was set against the pressing constraints within a world when the grace of Christ was still to be clearly revealed. Chrysostom is not suggesting that St Paul's suffering was diminished; it was actually intensified "by preferring to be still at sea". The fundamental pattern however is altered. Suffering is no longer endured within a framework constructed by cosmological entities. It is experienced with the community "for the sake of" the one who has reconciled it to himself. To put it in another way, if man's inability to reconcile between the public and the private lies at the heart of the tragedy, St Paul's ministry indicates the resolution of the tension. This resolution is achieved not by compromising moral standards, but by maintaining the "higher precepts" required under the New Covenant, with its widening of the moral claim "in the light of the knowledge of God in the
St Paul's ministry exemplifies the neighbour-directed life which is enjoined on all Christians. Chrysostom contrasts St Paul's aspiration with those of Uzziah, and of Korah, Dathan, and Abiram (Num. 16). The latter desired high office in order that they themselves might be distinguished; the former desired it to be of service to others.

We are now able to give a more comprehensive account of the "moral renewal" on which we commented in Chapter Three. We referred at that point to the Christ-in-the-neighbour motif which gives focus to the arena in which the virtuous life is fostered. We indicated that this arises out of a pastoral and evangelistic concern for Christ's redemptive purpose for the entire human community. Chrysostom's tendency to express the essence of the gospel in concrete and moralistic language rather than in abstract metaphysical categories should not lead us to conclude that he is a second rate thinker who is echoing the "profounder" thoughts of the Cappadocians to the populace. For the heart of the matter is that moral renewal, taken to mean the possibility and efficacy of pastoral and evangelistic ministry, is uniquely the philosophia made alive in Christ. Christian life is ecclesial. To take upon ourselves the care of the whole world is the eschatological reality for which we pray in the Lord's Prayer "Thy will be done on earth, as
it is in Heaven", "not in me or in us, but everywhere on
the earth". This thought dominates Chrysostom's
interpretation so much that he regards Jesus' warning,
"Few are the saved" (Lk. 13:23), to mean that "virtue in
ourselves suffices not for our salvation, but we must take
with us others too when we depart" from this life. The moral status of the "others" is now clarified in
Christ: no longer are they to be regarded as constituents
of the nameless mass in which man seeks for glory; they
are those "whom Christ valued at so high a price as not to
have spared even his own blood".

(ii) We have been examining the first line of thought
which Chrysostom pursues in his treatment of St Paul. The
second line along which he proceeds consists in the
quickening of communal life in the glory of the world to
come.

This should not surprise us. We have already
indicated earlier in Chapter Three Section 3.3 the
importance Chrysostom attaches in his theological ethics
to the motif of the Ascended Christ. What are the ethical
implications of the dawning of the glory from above?

Now there are instances when Chrysostom suggests that
the glory of the world to come replaces human glory. "The
first virtue, yea the whole of virtue", he insists, "is to
be a stranger to this world, and a sojourner, and to have
nothing in common with things here, but to hang loose from them, as from things strange to us".\textsuperscript{179} The Christian looks to "the other glory which is from heaven"; this is how vainglory can be overcome.\textsuperscript{180} Life is ordered not with reference to other members of the human community, but for the sake of virtue itself. "Thou hast trodden underfoot all human glory, and art freed from the grievous bondage of men, and art becomes a true worker of virtue."\textsuperscript{181}

This is indeed one solution to the exegetical problem of Mt. 5:16 to which we referred in Section 4.3 above. Mt. 5:13-15 -- "You are the salt" and "You are the light of the world" -- serves as the interpretative key. Virtue intrinsically manifests itself in public, just as light shines in the dark, and cannot be concealed.\textsuperscript{182} To be virtuous independent of man; such is the answer to the problem of vainglory. We may perhaps see this theme of otherworldliness as evidence of a reaction to the excessively optimistic view of history characteristic of Eusebius of Caesarea. The latter attached cosmological significance to the conversion of the empire under Constantine. In the Antiochene tradition at least, for example in Theodore of Mopsuestia and Theodoret of Cyrrhus, there is a growing conviction that a condition of the dawn of the kingdom of God is the total rejection of this world and its values.\textsuperscript{183}
There is, however, another line of interpretation which Chrysostom pursues by taking 1 Cor. 10:31 ("Whether you eat or drink, or whatever you do, do all to the glory of God") as the reference point for Mt. 5:16. The first solution addresses itself to the problem of how one can "Let your light shine"; this second solution pertains to the context of "shining before man" and of "giving glory to the Father". "No virtuous action can be very exalted, when it doth not distribute its benefits to others also"; so Chrysostom explains 1 Cor. 10:31-11:1. What is of importance is the caring for one's neighbours (τὸ κηδεσθαὶ τῶν πιλησίου). "For if we are 'light,' and 'leaven,' and 'luminaries,' and 'salt,' we ought to enlighten, not to darken; to bind, not to loosen; to draw to ourselves the unbelievers, not to drive them away." This care is not simply expressed by altruistic concern. It is exercised for the sake of pleasing God who has brought us into the bond of love. "Neither voluntary poverty nor martyrdom ...can testify in our favour unless we have the crowning virtue of love". 184

Here, we see how, by linking 1 Cor. 10:31 to Mt. 5:16, Chrysostom sees the problem in a new light. "The care for others" sets up the framework of virtue. This structure of κηδεμονία is quickened in the light of the glory of the world to come. It allows not merely a
consolation between sufferers, but also the enjoyment of authentic security and honour; therein lies a crucial distinction of St Paul's ministry from that of Moses. 

For "voluntary poverty and martyrdom" under the finitude imposed by the material world could not be efficacious. Solidarity with others under such conditions was at best a solidarity unto death. Its converse was a life in pursuit of vainglory. The hope of the world to come overcomes these two futile alternatives. Chrysostom suggests that this caring ministry ultimately takes its reference point from the eschaton. In this sense, virtue is exercised "independently" of man. More properly, he interprets virtue within the framework of κηδεμονία. The word κηδεμονία in fact expresses the matter more clearly than δικασία. The latter is more instrumental and task-oriented, whereas the former carries the nuance of guardianship, care and mourning within a familial setting.

In ad eos qui scandalizati sunt, Chrysostom employs it for the paternal care of God for the whole world. This conception presupposes also a spiritual nature. In contrast with Job's suffering and hospitality (which were confined to the material world), St Paul's assumed a spiritual dimension. So too with the theatre in which St Paul struggled and made his sacrifice. It was a battle against Satan; it was the present world order which he had to abandon for the love of Christ. The extent of care was similarly
deepened: to die not only once, but ten thousand times for those entrusted to him. 190

While our illustration of the two features of the ministration of the New Covenant -- the disclosure of the moral claim of the entire human community and of the world to come -- has been taken from the life of St Paul, Chrysostom beckons us not to lose sight of the fact that the form of the dynamics of κηδεμονία is essentially communal. St Paul's life is only representative, rather than the embodiment of the ministration. The imitation of St Paul is open to all by virtue of our human solidarity. We indicated earlier that natural relationships in the time before Christ were primarily intended for the maintenance of order. The community was essentially hierarchical. This is not abolished in the present dispensation. In some occasions Chrysostom suggests that κηδεμονία is superimposed upon a hierarchical social structure: Pastoral care is extended from teachers in the church to the heads of households, then from the latter to their wives, children, and servants. 191 Nevertheless, the ministry is quickened by love. (This can be compared to our earlier remarks on the spiritual rule of love in Chapter Three Section 3.3.) Before Christ came, there was the element of anxiety that our reproof might elicit
hatred. But this fear is overcome in the light of Christ. "Dost thou justly convict him, and yet fear the hatred? Convict thy brethren, incur enmity for the love's sake which thou owest to Christ, for the love's sake which thou owest to thy brother." This love which we owe "to Christ" and "to our brother" is only possible because a fundamental mutuality is now present in all relationships.

The structure of marriage provides a case in point. How are we to understand St Paul's injunction against women's assumption of the role of public teaching (1 Cor. 14:34)? Chrysostom suggests that St Paul means to hinder her "from publicly coming forward", but not "from the word of teaching". Otherwise, "how came Priscilla to instruct Apollos?" "It was not, then, to cut in sunder private converse for advantage (εὐτυχεία) that he said this"; but "in case the husband be believing and thoroughly furnished, able also to instruct her. When she is the wiser, then he does not forbid her teaching and improving him." From this we see how, though the formal structure of marriage remains unchanged, the "private converse for advantage" comes to the fore. Chrysostom understands the role of woman as an aid in spiritual things. The ability of Priscilla to instruct Apollos is an expression of the regeneration of the man-woman relationship which had turned to one of servile rule after the fall.
The fundamental mutuality in communal life becomes explicit in Chrysostom's later years in Constantinople. A community in mutual exhortation exercised in the context of leadership given by the episcopate becomes the normative structure for moral discernment and reform. This structure provides an intimacy in mutual care which the episcopal structure lacks. The person who bears the reproof now "sees both that thou heedest reproof as well, and that thou helpest him, not as one that had everything right, nor as a teacher, but as a friend and a brother". "Say to him, I have done thee a service. ...Do thou also, whatever failing thou seest me have, hold me back, set me right. ...This is friendship; thus 'brother aided by brother becomes a fortified city (Prov. 18:19)'.

Exhortation is set in the context of a human solidarity; it acknowledges the receptive character of ethical life. In understanding the life of the church in this way, Chrysostom is not, of course, dismissing the didactic element within it. He proposes that it is in fact "in the power of every one to be a teacher". For what brings conviction -- and answers the human predicament -- are deeds rather than words. Thus by his virtuous life "even a slave often benefits a whole family together with the master". In contrast, the priest is handicapped in his didactic office: the congregation usually can only hear his words, and could not see his life. Here again we
see Chrysostom's concern for the integration of theory with practice.\textsuperscript{198}

The dynamics of \(\kappa\eta\delta\varepsilon\mu\omicron\omicron\iota\alpha\) are a gift to the community in Christ. Not only is it held together by biological and proximate social ties; its common life is also fed by the Word, by participating in one religion, and by sharing in countless blessings.\textsuperscript{199} \(\kappa\eta\delta\varepsilon\mu\omicron\omicron\iota\alpha\) is a task as well: "Bear one another's burdens, and so fulfil(\(\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\pi\lambda\eta\rho\omicron\omicron\omega\omicron\omicron\varepsilon\)) the law of Christ (Gal. 6:2)." The imperative rendering of the text, adopted by most Greek fathers,\textsuperscript{200} provides Chrysostom with a convenient vantage point to explain what this mutual ministry means. The law of Christ cannot be \textit{completed} without interdependent support within the community. He labours over the distinction between \(\pi\lambda\rho\omicron\omega\sigma\alpha\tau\varepsilon\) and \(\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\pi\lambda\eta\rho\omicron\omicron\omega\omicron\omicron\varepsilon\): Paul says not "fulfil"(\(\pi\lambda\rho\omicron\omega\sigma\alpha\tau\varepsilon\)) but "complete"(\(\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\pi\lambda\eta\rho\omicron\omicron\omega\omicron\omicron\varepsilon\)), that is, "make it up all of you in common, by the things wherein ye bear with one another".\textsuperscript{201}

What then are the features of condescension in the time of the New Covenant? The life of St Paul again clarifies the pattern. We have already alluded to two Scriptural texts (1 Cor. 9:16 and 10:31) which are central to Chrysostom's elucidation of the moral claim posed by the human community and by the true glory (of the world to
These two verses are set within the context of St Paul's condescension, his subjection to all for the salvation of all (1 Cor. 9:19-23; 10:32-11:1). He does not only undertake the preaching of the gospel as he has been commissioned to; but out of his own zeal he contrives and devises numberless things besides. "He did all things of free choice and zeal and love to Christ." "Being above all in perfection, he became beneath all in condescension." The decisions to circumcise Timothy and to offer sacrifice in the temple are instances when St Paul even did things that are injurious in themselves for the profit of others. Here Chrysostom does not only regard the historical community as the object of God's grace. For this aspect of God's condescension was also apparent in the time of the Old Covenant. The feature unique to the New Covenant, and thus to St Paul's ministry, lies in the response now made possible. Under the Old Covenant, man's response was primarily and necessarily individualised and internalised; now, commitment to the historical community has become the content of man's moral activity (or his response), in accordance with the widening of moral horizon revealed in the light of Christ.

What we have just said is likely to increase the opposition of our critics (for example, those who take an Augustinian line of reasoning). For Chrysostom apparently
does not see any problem posed in the ethics of condescension by the requirements of public consistency and rationality. One may even do "things which are injurious in themselves for the profit of others", as we have just noted in the paragraph above. Is the claim of justice incompatible with that of κηδεμονία? Our study of Chrysostom has given some indications at least of how good will towards others is underpinned within the moral framework of συγ-κατάσβασις, and how the moral claim of the neighbour (i.e. the claim of κηδεμονία) is integral to the good of man. The sequence of thought in non esse ad gratiam concionandum serves to underline some main themes which we have developed in this chapter.

In this sermon Chrysostom seeks to explain his "harsh" censure against those who partake of the Holy Communion unworthily (1 Cor. 11:29). He first situates ecclesiastical discipline within the context of a medicinal understanding of ministry. It is not only a matter of censure, but there is also the need "to exhort (παρακαλεῖν) and console (παραμυθεῖσθαι)" in order that the congregation may listen to the rebuke.203 The qualification of the high priest provides the basis for understanding why God has entrusted the task of censuring to man rather than to angels. "He can deal gently with the ignorant and wayward, since he himself is beset with weakness" (Heb. 5:2). This is out of God's philanthropia. Subjection to the same human condition
of weakness would prompt man to be moderate and indulgent in disciplinary actions. The reproof is out of ἀπανθρωπία rather than ἀνθρωπία. This does not mean, however, that reproof is unnecessary. The precepts in the Scriptures are of divine origin; they are binding on the community as a whole. Like Ezekiel and other prophets, Chrysostom is called to be a watchman for the people, whose welfare God has committed to his charge (Ezek. 3:17, 18). This stern demand which God has placed upon him should motivate the congregation to show sympathy for the watchman, i.e. Chrysostom himself. "Who can be so inhuman (ἀνθρωπωτός) and unsympathetic (ἀλλομαθής) to the orator who is threatened by this warning from God?"

The passage above indicates some of the main themes in Chrysostom's ethics: the creatureliness of man, and the corresponding receptive character of ethics; and the medicinal character of providence which finds its focus in the dynamics of ἀνθρωπία within the church. But this does not mean that divine precepts are ignored, or the teaching office abandoned. But both are situated in the context of mutual consolation and exhortation in the ecclesia, and sustained by a dynamics of responsive and reciprocal sympathethic understanding. It is in this framework of mutual affection that the precepts become efficacious rather than burdensome, and teachers
παρακλήτοι rather than taskmasters.

But the most crucial aspect of our critics' case is still to be examined. Their insistence on consistency and rationality may not be motivated by a passion for servile justice, but be due to a recognition of a need for society to order itself in some provisional form of peace on this side of the eschaton. So in his discussion of the supreme good in de civitate Dei Book Nineteen, Augustine laments of the miseria of the human situation: mistaken judgement on the innocent is unavoidable due to ignorance on the part of the judge, but the exigencies of human society make judgement also unavoidable (19.6). "The Heavenly City in her pilgrimage here on earth makes use of the earthly peace and defends and seeks the compromise (compositio) between human wills in respect of the provisions relevant to the mortal nature of man, so far as may be permitted without detriment to true religion and piety (19.7)." Critics in this Augustinian tradition have no illusion that justice can be completely meted out; nevertheless, it has to be upheld as a curb against the spread of injustice. The righteousness which one could hope for in this earth consists in "the forgiveness of sins rather than in the perfection of virtues" (19.27). The irreconcilability of this predicament at the present time serves as a moral witness against man himself and points him at once to the hope of deliverance at the
eschaton (19.7 and 8).

This is Augustine's verdict: Earthly peace is ordered under "the compromise between human wills". It is important to see that this analysis of man's predicament is situated in the course of Augustine's argument against the supposition that social life in the present is integral to the supreme good. That man is destined for an eschatological community (the City of God) is clear (19.5 and 17). His polemics are directed against a classical tradition which regards the historical community as integral to the supreme good. The pilgrimage of the Heavenly City on earth is a passage from historical individuality -- the calling forth of individuals from all nations -- into an eschatological corporeity (19.17). Augustine reflects on man's earthly life on its various levels, the familial, civic, and political; and in the process he exposes the misery in each (19.5-7). Even the friendship between good men is corrupted by mortality (19.8). In this life man is "at the mercy of chance and accident" (19.4). What he should seek is the peace of the rational soul (19.14). Augustine's position is clear: The supreme good is transcendent and eschatological; the present social life (with all its tragic manifestations) is incidental to one's pursuit of the good.

This position underpins Augustine's interpretation of
the love-command. Love to a neighbour is a matter of commending the neighbour to love God (ibid.). As a modern Augustinian puts it, "the end of action is cleaving to the supreme good, and that is something one can do only on one's own behalf". This conception of man's commitment to his neighbour (as a task of "commending") is different from Chrysostom's emphasis that the historical community constitutes the content of man's moral response. Put in other words, Chrysostom implies that an active life (in pastoral care and evangelistic effort) assumes priority over a life of leisure. We are not suggesting that Augustine has failed totally to take into account the duty of love-to-neighbour. But the conclusions he reaches reveal at the same time the inadequacy of his moral framework to give a proper recognition to the claim of a neighbour. This can be illustrated by his comments on the relation between active and contemplative lives in de civitate Dei, Book Nineteen, Chapter Nineteen. The love of truth (caritas veritatis) is the end of Christian life. This transcendent claim relativises all our present pursuits. Accordingly the contemplative life is not in itself superior to an active life. "The attraction of a life of leisure ought not to be the prospect of lazy inactivity, but the chance for the investigation and discovery of truth." But Augustine proceeds to insist that an active life (in sacerdotal office, for example) should be assumed
by anyone only out of the compulsion of love (*necessitas caritatis*). Otherwise, he should employ his freedom from business in the quest for, and in the contemplation of truth (19.19).

In Chapter Six we shall analyse in greater detail the implication of this tradition for the nature of pastoral ministry. Suffice it to say here that Chrysostom's conception of pastoral ministry offers an alternative to the Augustinian stance which we have just sketched. For the latter, pastoral ministry is exercised under the framework of a truth-appearance dialectic and a severance of the historical community from the supreme good. The importance which the love-command accords to the neighbour can thus be undermined. So in the course of a discussion of this issue in Augustine's ethics, O'Donovan recognises that "according to the strictly formal demands of eudaemonism, self-love (insofar as it is equivalent to the pursuit of the *summum bonum*) should have been determinative of neighbor-love and neighbor-love justified only in terms of self-love". But he proceeds to defend the position on the ground that "there might have been no very great harm in that, provided it was clearly enough understood that self-love was only a formal and not a material category". And he equally maintains that "Augustine has sacrificed the coherence of his eudaemonism in order to speak of neighbor-love as the
equal of self-love". O'Donovan's distinction between formal and material, however, is more theoretical than real. The form epistemologically conditions the content of the Christian faith, and binds the church to a certain ethos. The public realm, of which the institutional church is a part, is then primarily ordered in juridical terms. Furthermore, it is not simply that Augustine has not made a "sacrifice" to the extent which Chrysostom has done in their respective evaluation of the historical community. Augustine's fundamental analysis in itself prevents him to endorse Chrysostom's proposal. For the former, the pursuit of the supreme good becomes individualistic and exclusively eschatologically oriented; the present reality is lived in hope (19.20).

The problem for this position becomes more acute when our Augustinian proponents wish to uphold a place for prophetic insight in the present church (in the historical realm). Having taken juridical structure to be normative in public order, they will be forced to locate prophetic ministry in dialectical relation to institutional life. This is not unlike the intrinsic tension between the sacerdotal and prophetic offices in the time of the Old Covenant, and substantially the same dilemma as the tension between ecclesiastical authority and the holy man piety in the early church. Such tension we have already indicated in Chrysostom's interpretation of the
structure of moral life in the time before Christ. Charisma was predicated of individuals rather than of the whole community. Chrysostom pays more attention to the dispensational character of moral life. The Augustinian analysis is more applicable, so Chrysostom might suggest, to the time of the Old Covenant, to which, once the bridge between the public and private realms was effected in the Christ-event, there can be no going back. The ordering of the community and the expression of prophetic insight cease to be in dialectical relation to one another. The claim of the community is integral to man's good. And what about the claim of justice? The ordering of the community by means of ecclesiastical discipline does not have to be abolished, as we have already indicated. Its justification rests not so much on marking sin as sin; its raison d'être lies rather in a shared humanity whose affection for one another and for God is made alive within the dynamics of condescension.

Pastoral ministry is hence redemptive. It is the spiritual framework of κοσμοποίησις: the awakening and enabling of one another to apprehend and complete the common task of love, the law of Christ. It is the entire ecclesia as the recipient of God's condescension engaging itself in the prophetic ministry of mutual exhortation and consolation. And what it proclaims is the true glory of Christ which finds its scope, end, and meaning in the entire human race.
CHAPTER FIVE: The Christian in Affliction:

Sign of Regeneration in an Individual

In our analysis so far, we have discerned the crucial role which Chrysostom attaches to the affective faculty of man, without the regeneration of which redemption remains incomplete. In giving prominence to man's essential responsiveness, Chrysostom's ethics provide a healthy corrective to an elitist ecclesiology which, as we have maintained, follows directly from an ethical position which takes cognizance of man's reason and will alone. In the course of our argument, we have shown how ethics and ecclesiology are essentially related. The church is the recipient of God's condescension. Within a communal life, the renewed humanity seeks to realise the overcoming of moral impotence and the clarification of the good. Having attended to this primary and determining consideration, it remains for us to examine the distinguishing mark of an individual within this community, as he responds with greater devotion to the love of God.
5.1 Introduction

The text "Enter by the narrow gate; for the gate is wide and the way is easy that leads to destruction, and those who enter by it are many. And the gate is narrow and the way is hard that leads to life, and those who find it are few" (Mt. 7:13, 14) appears frequently in Chrysostom's homilies.¹ The path towards virtue is a "narrow and hard way"; so the text is conflated to read. What does this mean? A commonplace interpretation, shared by many of Chrysostom's predecessors, takes the Matthaean text as a call to vigilance; the appropriation of virtue is a matter of much difficulty and labour. This interpretation is congruent, undoubtedly, with a generally shared premise that askesis, which necessarily involves subjection of passions, requires exertion.² The theme of vigilance does occupy an important place in Chrysostom's exhortation.³ We are required however to give this greater precision and to distinguish its context from Platonic metaphysics which we have maintained to be inconsistent with Chrysostom's theological vision.

The Psalms of Ascent [Pss. 119-133(LXX)] serve as a convenient introduction to Chrysostom's analysis of the Christian life. This series of psalms constitutes a whole, as his programmatic statements at the beginning and conclusion of his exposition indicate.⁴ It was
addressed to the Jews in captivity who were longing for a return to Jerusalem; and analogically, it finds direct application to the regenerate for whom this present life is a temporary abode on their way to heaven. These psalms are meant to lead man to the way of virtue, to the road by which a virtuous and wise man will ascend slowly to heaven.

From the outset of his exegesis, Chrysostom links the Matthaean text to the ascent theme. The ascent is along a "narrow and hard way". A clarification is called for at this point. Chrysostom does not spiritualise or internalise the ascent within a matrix of the contemplative ideal. From the latter standpoint, we would expect that internal conflict would be relieved and external affliction cease to be a matter of importance as the body becomes a more worthy yoke-fellow of the soul. In a Neoplatonic ordering of natures, virginity is the highest expression of regeneration, for it embodies the proper ordering between body and soul. Chrysostom does not follow this line of reasoning. The ascent is not interpreted mystically as the Cappadocians would probably have done. It is regarded rather as a journey (from captivity back to Jerusalem) set against the tension of present transitoriness and stability in the world to come. Suffering impinges on a Christian from the start: "[To] remove what is dissolute and frivolous, [to]
demand a painful life, and [to] abstain from earthly things" constitute the first step (πρώτη ἀνάβασις) in the ascent. And it remains a continuing element of existence in the journey along the narrow and hard way in this present age. Affliction will not be relieved as the individual advances along his pilgrimage; it is prerequisite to a response which man can savour only in the world to come.11

We shall seek to elaborate what we have said above as we go on to develop our theme. But first, it is instructive in this preliminary discussion to see how Chrysostom's treatment of martyrdom reinforces our interpretation of his position so far.

Martyrdom is a real possibility for, and a mandate to, all men. "Bear all things which befall us (τὰ συμπέρασμα) nobly: for this is martyrdom." Chrysostom continues: To suffer death rather than to sacrifice to idols is not the only thing which makes one a martyr; but also to support with patience the pain which would have us blaspheme, and refuse to allow it to do so. Job therefore serves as an exemplary figure, for he bears all things with thanksgiving.12 This understanding of martyrdom is elaborated in the panegyrics on martyrs. In one of these, he connects martyrdom to the universal implication of Christ's crucifixion. The question arises: how is death
condemned in Christ's death? Chrysostom replies that the disadvantage of death has become a gain. If there were no death, the martyrs whom the church is commemorating would not be martyrs. If death did not exist, there would be no crown. "Hence let us grieve not that we are mortal, but be thankful, for death has opened to us the course of martyrdom." Chrysostom refrains from weaving the theme of martyrdom into the matrix of asceticism. For those who maintain the contemplative ideal, suffering is necessarily tamed within a Platonic metaphysics: moral growth is expressed in terms of the emancipation of the self from bodily passions and a clearer reflection of the divine attributes; the essence of martyrdom lies in scorning the distractions which arise from the material world. This process can only be achieved through illumination from the divine Logos. Hence suffering, taken to involve the physical and psychological aspects of man, can only be incidental to moral growth.

Clement of Alexandria's exposition of martyrdom in Stromateis, Book Four, is illustrative of this position. The integration of more philosophical elements into his theology provides him with the basic moral categories for clarifying the true mark of martyrdom against the misconceptions entertained by fanatics of his day. "Through one's own spotless purification", the Gnostic beholds "the holy God holily" in an uninterrupted
Accordingly suffering, and indeed death, present a fundamental paradox. For, on the one hand, they interrupt the continuing and unforced progress in the Gnostic life which presupposes a necessity of life-long disciplining of the intellect. In particular, the givenness of death presents itself as an intrusion to this progress. On the other hand, death constitutes the severance of the soul from the body, the dissolution of the chains which have bound the soul to the body (insofar as the latter is identified with the realm of passion).\(^1\) Clement tries to resolve this tension by taming death, by bringing it under the considerations of the philosophic life. A life-long practice (\(\delta \varphi \rho' \ \omega \lambda o\nu \ \tau \omicron \nu \ \beta \omicron \nu \ \mu \varepsilon \lambda \varepsilon \iota \omicron \mu \varepsilon \nu \omicron \sigma \)) is required of the Gnostic so that he may bear "natural death" easily.\(^2\) Preparatory exercises"(\(\pi \rho \omicron \gamma \mu \mu \nu \omicron \alpha \omicron \tau \omicron \alpha \)) are required before one becomes a martyr at the close of life.\(^3\) The non-negotiability of death becomes domesticated into an occasion for man to confess his contempt for it, as well as his choice of it due to a love for God.\(^4\) But in the last analysis, suffering (and death) are incidental to moral growth, as Clement's portrayal of a Gnostic makes plain.\(^5\)

In contrast to this line of reasoning, Chrysostom locates martyrdom in an attitude of endurance within the given and inescapable human condition of the present age,
the condition which is characterised by death. "Bear all things which befall us nobly: for this is martyrdom."
The logic in "If there were no death, there would not be martyrs", and "death has opened to us the course of martyrdom" is revealing. Redemption is set forth in terms of an identification with the Passion of Christ rather than an illumination from the divine Logos. In this context, "martyrdom" is a participation in Christ's death, and in his conquest of death. And this participation, obviously, is enjoined on all; for this is what is meant by being in Christ. In concrete terms, an individual appropriates "martyrdom" through a life in daily examination of conscience, penitence, and longsuffering, rather than through intellectual activity. The promises given to those who mourn (Mt. 5:4; cf. Lk. 6:25) are only to be fulfilled in the world to come.

Evidently Chrysostom reaches back to another tradition within martyr-theology, namely the agon-motif which was popularised within Christian circles through Origen. We discern strands of this in the latter's exhortatio ad martyrium. Martyrdom is the offering of "the cup of salvation", the thanksgiving par excellence; thus he argued from Ps. 115:3, 4(LXX) and Mt. 10:20. Only after battling manfully along the narrow and hard way in this life can one receive atonement.
of sins. The voice of the Bridegroom "Lo, the winter is past, the rain is over and gone" (Cant. 2:11) is reserved for a time after the present wintry life is passed.23

Notwithstanding this dependence on the earlier tradition, Chrysostom does leave his particular imprints on it. Martyrdom bridges the gap between doctrine and practice. The power of the martyrs' relics resides in their sealing of faith, not by empty words, but by deeds.24

But this simply focuses the problem in more acute form. One needs to stand back and look at what is at stake. The central issue is how one is to understand the Christian life in a unified way. For granted that this life is characterised by suffering, it remains unclear how an attitude of "bearing all things nobly in thanksgiving" is related to "crowning" at the end of the ages, a ground of hope of which Chrysostom frequently reminds his congregation.25 We note also in this connection the continuity which he posits between "Christian affliction" and the universal weakness to which the entire human community is subject. No attempt is made to partition suffering into different kinds. The suffering which befalls Lazarus and that which befalls the more conspicuous saints are not contrasted. Rather they stand in parallel to each other in Chrysostom's exhortations.
To a great extent this can be explained by his conception of God's providence. There is no fortuitous event in life. This forms the backbone of his consolation to Stagirius near the beginning of his career and to the perplexed believers in Constantinople during his exile. God orders all things διὰ σέ. Of course the medicinal understanding of suffering, which follows directly from this, is typical of the Greek tradition. But it is important to discern the special nuances within Chrysostom's theological vision of the regenerate life. If fortitude in suffering is indeed intrinsic to moral growth, we are required to show how it is tied to the telos of man; that is, what is man suffering for? Otherwise, fortitude in suffering lacks any specific significance. The patience required of man becomes nothing other than acquiescence in an existence which is essentially unintelligible and which bears no relation to a deeper understanding of the love of God.

Our problem can be expressed in another form. What is the Christian content of suffering? What truth does suffering reveal concerning human existence which could lead man to respond in repentance, faith, and worship? For the assertion that man suffers could be interpreted as a trivial fact of fallen human existence: in his finitude and sin, man of course suffers. One may well point out that in Augustine's line of reasoning man's
mortality embodies the curse which was laid upon the created order in Adam; and that correspondingly, salvation consists precisely in its reversal. Accordingly, while it may make good sense to identify providence exclusively with propitious happenings, no positive relation can exist between man's finitude and regeneration. Hence if there is an element of suffering in the Christian life, it must arise exclusively from the Christian witness, that is, from the hostility of the world poured out against Christ, and derivatively against Christians. A sharp polarization will then be maintained between this specific and additional pressure of Christian affliction and that to which all men are subject.

The latter could not contribute towards the basis of moral claim except perhaps as part of a general attitude of man's dependence upon a powerful God whose ways remain inscrutable.

It is against this background that the task of investigating Chrysostom's position becomes more urgent. For "the general attitude" which we have so casually dismissed in the last paragraph bears a formal resemblance to two fundamental considerations in Chrysostom's ethics, namely, the creatureliness of man and the incomprehensibility of God, which we have discussed in Chapter Four. We are therefore required to indicate how the suffering to which all men are subject is cardinal in
Chrysostom's interpretation of regenerate human existence.

Contemporary scholars concerned with the study of Chrysostom may find our analysis of the problem unnecessarily complicated. They see Chrysostom's position with regard to suffering as essentially Stoic, no matter how qualified this is with Christian overtones. Our concern about how the exhortation to fortitude in suffering is related to man's telos, and hence to an ordering of the good, would seem to them nonsensical. For in their view, the will is all that matters. Is not Chrysostom's repeated maxim "No one harms the man who does not injure himself" revealing?

Nowak's position is typical. After dividing the human race into the categories of the just and the wicked, he concludes at the end of his analysis:

L'appartenance de l'homme à tel groupe se décide selon le critère de sa relation à l'ordre moral. La perspective de Jean est que la souffrance est au service de cet ordre. Pour le méchant, la souffrance est la conséquence et la punition de ses fautes. ...La punition du méchant par la souffrance tend à rétablir l'équilibre moral voulu par Dieu et perturbé par le méchant. ...

...[Aussi, Dieu] veut que le méchant après avoir satisfait à cette exigence de la justice, obtienne le rémission de ses fautes et soit réintégré de nouveau dans la communauté des justes; c'est ce que fait Jean en affirmant la valeur expiatrice de la souffrance du méchant. ...

La même fonction de la souffrance au service de l'ordre moral se retrouve aussi quand il s'agit des justes. Evidemment, il n'est plus question du rétablissement de l'équilibre troublé par l'homme. ...[La souffrance] sert à la vie et à la perfection chrétienne, elle
Our interpretation of Chrysostom's ethics leads us to regard with suspicion this alleged wholesale Stoicism in his treatment of suffering. The evidence presented by Nowak (and Malingrey) is based primarily on a similarity of terminology. It is uncertain whether the alleged Stoicism follows directly from this material similarity. Nowak himself concedes this point. Among the loose ends which he admits in his concluding chapter, he raises the following dilemma. On the one side, suffering could not arise for a Stoic philosopher. Yet, on the other side, this is inconsistent with human experience; in particular, with the suffering which Chrysostom underwent and was acutely conscious of at the end of his life. Is it not remarkable that his Stoicism found its fullest expression among his later writings which provide the main material for Nowak's analysis? Nowak seeks to reconcile the dilemma by seeing Chrysostom's attitude as an instance of his heroism.

Nowak's argument betrays an unease which is intrinsic to a Stoic doctrine of suffering. On the one hand, taking one's point of reference from the maxim that virtue lies exclusively in the will, it follows that suffering can
arise only as a misjudgement of some ordering of the universe; the individual has not made a proper judgement between the real and apparent good or evil. Suffering arises as a consequence and punishment of this fault. The just cannot suffer by definition. On the other hand, taking our start from the idea that virtue is defined by conformity to the cosmic order, suffering could be justified within a dynamics of separation and return. Suffering is related to the collective good, and linked to some unfolding of reality. This second premise, while allowing affliction to be an universal human experience, and safeguarding also the justice of God, nevertheless leaves any rationale for the suffering of the just extremely weak. "L'accroissement des forces morales, la récompense et toute l'action positive" could not be intrinsically related to one's individual moral growth, since from the first premise virtue is for its own sake and can assume no telos. "L'accroissement" cannot be made to fit within a Stoic ethic. Virtue has the structure of an either-or; moral growth of an individual is unintelligible for a Stoic.34 However the elements of reward and of moral growth, as Nowak rightly points out, are central in Chrysostom's moral framework. Hence we find Nowak's interpretation of Chrysostom inadequate. And even if there were inconsistency in Chrysostom's treatment of suffering, we would need to examine in greater detail the theological concerns which prompt the
unevenness in his presentation. Having said this, we must attempt our own account of Chrysostom's doctrine of suffering.
5.2 Suffering and Good Works

In coming to terms with Chrysostom's point of view, it is expedient for us to analyse the relation of suffering to good works (κατορθωματα) in a life oriented towards virtue. For given the strong communal overtones in his writings, it may appear at first puzzling that the regenerate life is characterised by suffering. Admittedly suffering as an incentive to compassion is a familiar communal theme; in particular, we have already indicated in Chapter Three how the naked Christ motif is an integral aspect of the theological foundation for Chrysostom's conception of friendship. Yet it remains unclear how suffering is intrinsic to a person's own moral growth unless we entertain a view that the individuality of a person is insignificant when compared to some "collective good". In contrast, good works seem to make good moral sense within a moral vision which is essentially communal, no matter how qualified they must be by the moral claim of love towards God.

The precedence of suffering over good works is developed under two headings. It is expounded first within the agon tradition, and secondly within an analysis of God's dispensations.

5.2.1 One generally accepted view, which Chrysostom
adopts, situates the relation of suffering to good works within an *agon* framework. The neighbour-directed deeds of kindness are inferior to the fortitude required in suffering, because the latter calls for greater stamina and gives a more reliable guide to a man's intention. In the course of a letter to Olympias, Chrysostom explicitly distinguishes between ἑοθήκτα and κατορθωτά as the two aspects of ἀρετή. The qualities of courage, vigour of soul, wisdom of mind, and love of God are expressly manifested in Job's suffering rather than in his previous good deeds, for example in seeking justice for the destitute. This hierarchical relation is shown also in the life of St Paul, as Chrysostom proceeds to demonstrate in the same letter. The Apostle's superiority over the false apostles lies in his suffering on behalf of the church. A good deed (ἀγαθός), be it noble and great, if done without toil and danger, cannot procure appreciable recompense.

Having said this, we must define more closely the context in which suffering is borne. What makes the sufferer illustrious lies not so much in the fortitude displayed as the willingness to bear the particular affliction without knowing that it lies within the redemptive purposes of God. In a passage to the bereaved, Chrysostom writes:
So then here is another method of martyrdom for one who bears this loss [of a child] nobly...
...when thou hast learned that by one word of thanksgiving thou shalt gain more than all thou hast lost. ...
...And so neither Job do I admire so much in setting wide his house to the needy, as I am struck with and extol his taking the spoiling of his substance thankfully. I hold the same kind of evaluation in the loss of children. For herein, also, thou shalt receive a reward no less than his who offered his son and presented him in sacrifice, if as thou seest thine die thou thank the God of love. For how shall such an one be less than Abraham?
...[Abraham] had some comfort in the prospect of a good work done, and the thought that this so excellent achievement was the work of his own fortitude, and the voice he heard came from above made him the readier. But here is no such thing. So that he has need of a soul of adamant, who can bear with calmness to see a child, his only one, ...lying upon the bier an outstretched corpse. ...[Such a one] shall stand with Abraham himself and with Job be proclaimed a victor.

In this passage Chrysostom gives greater precision to the hierarchical relation between suffering and good deeds. The commendation is not directed to the attitude of fortitude in suffering as such. As the episode of the sacrifice of Isaac illustrates, the anguish in particular situations could be considerably relieved if the agent realises that it falls within God's command. "The voice" heard from above will have "made him the readier". The suffering which Chrysostom envisages, that which befalls Job and the ordinary man, is to be borne without this epistemological vantage point. In this lies the lustre of fortitude: though one is not able to locate within God's will the particular instances of suffering, to which the whole of humanity is subject, one bears these with
thanksgiving. The same is true of Lazarus. Although he had accomplished nothing noble, but simply because he bore the misery which befell him nobly, he obtained the same reward as Abraham, one whose life was marked with good deeds. The attitude of fortitude arises out of a man's life-commitment to a God who is the unitary ground of his existence, even when signs of providence are not at all clear in particular instances; and generally it is a futile attempt to look for such identifications. To bear all things with thanksgiving is analogous to standing firm against despair.

5.2.2 In the Sixth and Seventh homiliae in Lazarum, delivered in 388 AD, Chrysostom casts additional light on the hierarchical relationship of suffering to good works. The discussion revolves around the interpretation of the text "Remember that you [the rich man] in your lifetime received your good things, and Lazarus in like manner evil things" (Lk. 16:25) in the well-known parable. What does it mean for the rich man and Lazarus to have "received"? Chrysostom's answer reveals the dispensational perspective he holds, which in its turn is crucial for an understanding of the sign of regeneration in this age.

At the outset Chrysostom distinguishes between "to accept" (τὸ λαβεῖν) and "to receive" (τὸ ἀπολαβεῖν).
"One receives what is due, and one often accepts what one has no right to possess." The latter is a matter of favour; the former is judicial, a concept more properly associated with the day of judgement. The exegetical problem of ἀπέλαβες in Lk. 16:25 amounts to the manner in which the claim of justice is satisfied for each individual on the day of judgement. We turn now to the solutions Chrysostom offers in the Sixth and Seventh homiliae.

In the Sixth homilia the claim of justice is set in reference to the problem of sin in each individual. Chrysostom underlines the point that no one in the present life is exempt from sin, and correspondingly, that the freedom which man possesses testifies to the continuing possibility of turning away from evil and doing good. Even a virtuous man will commit some wrong in his life; and a wicked man may at some point have done some good deeds. In other words, no one is so good that he has no defilement, and no one is so evil that he has not some good. The notion of justice requires that the good which a wicked man has done be rewarded, and the evil of the good man be punished. This principle is operative in the fortunes of the rich man and Lazarus in their earthly lives; the former has been rewarded for his good deeds in his earthly life, and Lazarus for his evil deeds.
Chrysostom returns to Lk. 16:25 in the Seventh homilia, this time using Mt. 7:13, 14 as an interpretative key. The rich man and Lazarus respectively tread what appear in this age as the broad and the narrow ways. The rich man passes his entire life in absolute calm; his life is in constant festivity. Lazarus on the other hand passes his life in suffering and misery. However, the former's life leads only to eternal anguish, while the latter's leads to eternal bliss. The "good things" which the rich man has received in this age, as Chrysostom interprets them, correspond to his choice of what he deems to be his good, not the true good (τὰ ἀγαθὰ τὰ ἀληθῆ) but the good in name (τὰ ἄρα ἀγαθὰ) only, which leads to hell. Here Chrysostom emphasizes that what a person "receives" is consequent upon the orientation of his life. The absolute chasm which separates Lazarus from the rich man after their earthly life represents the gulf between virtue and vice; the one follows from a life along the narrow way, the other along the broad.

In sum, the passage of an individual from the present age to the world to come forms the hermeneutical principle in the two interpretations of Lk. 16:25 in the Sixth and Seventh homiliae. The first (in the Sixth homilia) deals with the objective side of the transition. Sins of the saints have to be dealt with here on earth before they enter eternal bliss in the world to come. The second
(in the Seventh homilia) refers to the subjective aspect. The person chooses the good in the world to come; and correspondingly, he abhors the good which issues from the present age, and hence he is bound to suffer.

These two strands are clearly rooted in early Christian thought, and evidences indicate that Chrysostom has already adopted them earlier on in his ministry. The first strand is in line with a conception that suffering can be regarded as an eschatological purification. According to this view, suffering of the just is related to the breaking up of the old order and to a purification and preparation of the saints for the dawning of the messianic age. Chrysostom already employed this principle in the winter of 380-381 AD in the course of his consolation to Stagirius. He linked Lk. 16:25 to 1 Cor. 11:32 ("But when we are judged by the Lord, we are chastened so that we may not be condemned along with the world"). The same line of reasoning underpinned his interpretation of the same text as late as 387 AD in the course of his homilies de statuis: it is advantageous to have received the chastisement of our sins here on earth, and not in the world to come.

The second strand is congruent with a generally accepted assumption that the present world is transitory, and that the reality lies in some spiritual order. Again,
we can find traits of this particularly in Chrysostom's earlier works. He maintained in *ad Stagyrium* that "it is unworthy for a soul which aspires towards heaven to seek here on earth a repose and prosperity which will vanish like a dream. Vanity of vanities, all is vanity." Again, in *ad viduam juniorem* composed between 380 and 381 AD, he commented that "this body, even if it reaches a very high standard of beauty is nevertheless perishable; but the bodies of those who have been well pleasing to God, will be invested with such glory as these eyes cannot even look upon". Numerous passages such as these suggest that Chrysostom envisaged an inherent futility in the present age.

Despite these debts to earlier traditions, by the time he composes in *Lazarum* the distinction between the present age and the world to come is enhanced. This is brought about by the exegetical problem of ἀπελαθείς in Lk. 16:25, an issue which he has not dealt with in either *ad Stagyrium* or *de statuis*. In his earlier position (as informed by various traditions), suffering could be seen as advisable but not mandatory. Here, he insists that the just cannot but suffer on this earth. Furthermore, suffering is not only a form of preparation in this present transitory life for the repose to come; but because one's commitment to worldly goods is now seen in sharp conflict with that to the world to come (inasmuch
as one cannot travel along the narrow and broad ways at the same time), suffering is necessarily enjoined on all the saints. It is only in the light of the world to come -- that is, in the realm which is outside the confines of man's historical existence -- that man's pursuits, even his "good" works, can be properly evaluated. Suffering comes from a realistic recognition of the futility of the present. We can compare his insight with that to be found in Ecclesiastes: All efforts which issue from earthly existence are robbed of their false prestige and absoluteness when they are measured in relation to God, the One who is higher than wisdom.\textsuperscript{52}
5.3 Joyful Suffering

The precedence of suffering over good works has been argued in terms of its implications for moral earnestness and for the demarcation between the present age and the world to come. This may have run the risk of obscuring the pattern of suffering in the time between the Old and New Covenants; for as we have argued in Chapter Four, the Old Testament saints also displayed "moral earnestness", and to some extent looked to a good outside of the present world order.

For the rest of this chapter, we shall attempt a more Christological analysis of Chrysostom's doctrine of suffering. This will serve to answer the objection just raised. We shall see the manner in which suffering is linked with the quickening of communal life under the New Covenant, and why suffering is deepened and indeed is the particular mark of the regeneration of an individual in the time after Christ.

The issues raised in the Eighteenth homilia ad populum Antiochenum de statuis will serve as the basis of our exposition. What does the Apostle mean when he says: "Rejoice in the Lord always" (Phil. 4:4)?

"For how is it possible," says someone "that he who is but a man, can continually rejoice? To rejoice is no hard matter, but to rejoice continually, this seems to me to be impossible."
...[For there are] many circumstances of a public or private nature which could occasion us grief.

Chrysostom replies:

All love gladness, but all are not able to attain it, since they know not the way which leads to it. ...[Paul] does not simply say, "Rejoice always;" but he adds the cause of the continual pleasure, saying, "Rejoice in the Lord always." ...For all other things in which we rejoice are mutable ...[and] do not afford us a pleasure sufficient to repel and veil the sadness that comes upon us from other quarters. ...[But] the believer cannot possibly be deprived of the enjoyment of a continued pleasure. ..."What then," says some one, "used not the Saint to be in sadness? Do you not hear Paul saying, 'I have great heaviness, and continual sorrow in my heart?'" ...And this is the paradox; that not only the sadness of the world, but also its joy, contains extreme loss; but in the case of spiritual things, it is exactly the reverse; and not the joy only, but the sadness too contains a rich treasure of good things! ...[Indeed, God accuses some], saying, That in their luxury, and gluttony, and enjoyment of great security, when they beheld the Jews carried away in captivity, they did not grieve, nor partake of their sadness. ...We should call no man happy, save him only who lives according to God. These only the Scripture terms blessed. ...It is not in the nature of things, but in our disposition (συνάφεια), which is wont to make us sad or joyful. ...Pursue that spiritual wisdom which is according to God, and take hold of virtue; and then nought of the things [in this world] ...will be able to sadden thee. ...It was in God's power at once to release us from this dire evil [i.e. the calamity in Antioch], and not to suffer even the smallest part of it to remain; but in order that we may not again go back to our former negligence, He hath provided that the torrent of these evils should subside gently and little by little, holding us fast to the same pious resolutions.

This passage contains much which is germane to Chrysostom's doctrine of suffering. Suffering is a joyful suffering which originates in a life lived according to
God in Jesus Christ; it is the proper response of an individual to God's redemptive love for the entire human community. We shall examine this conclusion in greater detail.

5.3.1 In the first place, joy originates in a life lived according to God. Chrysostom rejects the proposition that joy is a trivial matter and that all would know "the way which leads to it". This rejection issues from an understanding of the mutability, changeability, variability, and conflict to which all earthly goods are subject. Any earthly good taken on its own, for example good health, is bound to this futility and frustration. It follows from this that joy cannot be found in an exemption or relief from particular aspects of the universal human finitude. Conversely, man's earthly welfare is an unreliable indicator of his genuine well-being, whose telos lies in what transcends the fragmentary goods, that is, in virtue, the life according to God.

A parallel approach is taken by Chrysostom in the course of his exposition of Jesus' command "to take up the cross and follow him" (Mt. 16:24). He warns against any suggestion of severing "suffering" from "following Christ". It is possible for one to suffer, he observes, yet not do so out of a desire to follow Christ. Robbers
often suffer grievously as well. The mere facticity of calamities is insufficient. What is required is the attitude that "for Him thou mayest undergo all things; that thou mayest possess ἡ Ἀλή ἀρετή ...so as to show forth not fortitude only ...but temperance also, and moderation, and all self-restraint. This being properly 'to follow', to give heed also to ἡ Ἀλή ἀρετή, and for His sake to suffer all."\(^{55}\) As with Chrysostom's understanding of joy, suffering should not find its reference point in itself. Fortitude in suffering is good only in so far as it is brought under the unitary desire "to follow Christ". It is not a matter of quibbling over words that he employs the phrase ἡ Ἀλή ἀρετή instead of αἱ Ἀλαὶ ἀρεταί as one would expect from what he goes on to enumerate -- the qualities of temperance, moderation, and self-restraint.\(^{56}\) Chrysostom's position does not lie in a preference for a Stoic reduction of the Platonic-Aristotelian concept of a plurality of virtues. What the context shows is his concern that man's moral worth be found in the unitary mandate "to follow Christ". The two sides of the hyphen in the structure "suffering/joy - in the Lord" are not extrinsically related as if the first item might assume any arbitrary reference point and the second merely serves as a religious justification or motivation for the first. Joy and suffering are moral goods if and only if they are informed by the transcendental claim of Christ.
5.3.2 It follows, in the second place, that suffering and joy are not polar opposites. The regenerate individual suffers in joy. The question "Why the pious suffers" provides an impetus for Chrysostom's reflection. It gains a special sharpness because of the primacy which he has attached to the suffering of the saints in his theological ethics. He avoids the temptation to construe life in terms of a balancing act between suffering and joy, with the effect of suggesting that suffering in certain areas is mitigated by a proportional increment of joy in others. The reality of suffering is affirmed, even its cruciality, and indeed intensified for the pious; for there exists the spiritual realm, the sighing for sinners, to which the unregenerate are blind. And from this spiritual perspective, Chrysostom tacitly accepts the position that joy cannot find its fruition in this life. It becomes rather a shorthand for an attitude of hope and faith -- the glorying in tribulation -- which informs our moral disposition (διάβολα) to live according to God along the narrow way. In the context of a spiritual agon, joy is the armour which enables one to withstand despair.

Having said this, the issue still remains acute: Why joyful suffering? Two crucial questions confront Chrysostom: Why do the pious suffer? And can suffering
be destructive?

(i) Chrysostom's response to the query why God allows Timothy to suffer continually from a stomach ailment (1 Tim. 5:23) is typical of his approach to the problem of the affliction of saints. He gives eight reasons; and at the end of a lengthy exposition of these, he briefly adds three more as an afterthought. These last three are not developed at all, but are put there for the sake of completeness. (They concern suffering as a process for purification, for atonement of sin, and for the increase of reward on judgement day). The first eight reasons deserve our present attention. The first three underline the absolute creator-creature distinction, an emphasis which we have already noted in Chapter Four. Suffering is permitted in order that the saints may not be exalted to ἀνώνων because of their κατορθώματα and θαύματα; that others may not take them as gods; and that God's power be manifested. The fourth and fifth reasons pertain to the attitude and nature of the good: suffering manifests man's intention and affirms the existence of a world to come, for justice (in rewarding the saints and in punishing the wicked) would otherwise not be satisfied. Thus man's good cannot be confined to this present age. The sixth, seventh, and eighth reasons revolve around the nature of the Christian witness: the saints become a παράκλησις and παραμυθία to other sufferers; men will therefore not be awestruck by the saints' κατορθώματα
and hence be impeded from imitating them; and from them a pattern for Christian life may be derived, that is, "it is not from those who are enjoying quietness (*ēveōs*), but from those who are in affliction for God's sake" that we must learn to cultivate piety. 60

We would expect to find the first two groups of reasons (one to three, and four to five) supplied by Chrysostom. They add nothing to what we have already delineated in the course of study of his ethics. The last group calls for special attention. An appreciation of it requires a more careful re-examination of the suppositions behind the initial question "Why do the pious suffer". Earlier on in the same homily, he indicates that the perplexity is threefold. 61 First, he raises the general issue of why God permits a saint who possesses confidence towards him to suffer continually. But this is not the heart of the matter for Chrysostom. He proceeds to define the issue in more precise terms: If Timothy "had been one of those who have retreated to the tops of mountains; who have fixed their cells in solitude, and who have chosen that life which is free from all business, the matter now enquired into were no such difficulty"; but that one who is invested with such responsibility in the church and in the whole world at large, should be subject to infirmity, this is the bewildering thought. And finally, one might demand to know why St Paul and Timothy, who performed so
many miracles, could not heal the sickness in this case. In short, the force of what is at stake lies in why public figures, who could contribute so much to man's welfare and could demonstrate God's power on earth, are subject to "all those evils which belong to the present life". Chrysostom refuses to entertain any utilitarian justification for suffering. The suffering of the saints could not contribute in any way by advancing man's present welfare; this is clearly true if that welfare is understood in terms of earthly good, but it is also the case even in terms of contributing to a success of the institutional church. Instead he criticises the presupposition that the evangelical proclamation might be based on the display of good works (καροθωμαία) and on earthly power, or on any theological artifice constructed on the foundation of "social success". The nature of the Christian witness, so he maintains, lies in the παράκλησις and παραμυθεία of the saints in solidarity with the community in its weakness, that is, in sharing in "all those evils which belong to the present life", while pointing at the same time to the power of God which is made perfect in man's infirmity. Chrysostom's theological vision allows him to sever decisively on this occasion any connection of suffering with retribution. It is an affirmation, rather, of involvement; for there always lies the possibility that suffering may be provisionally alleviated by a retreat from the realm of human agony.
which is intrinsic to this age, and which is brought acutely to our awareness in communal life.

(ii) This train of thought gives rise to the inevitable question concerning the possibility of destructive suffering. Chrysostom addresses himself to this issue especially in *ad Stagyrium* against the background of a suicidal tendency in his friend who is under severe depression. He returns to this issue in various treatises composed during his exile for friends who are perplexed by the seeming prosperity of the wicked. His position remains consistent over this span of some twenty-five years.

Suffering cannot be destructive. Two tenets underlie this affirmation. The first issues from a particularistic understanding of God's providence, that is, God's goodness to each individual. He finds support from texts like "God is faithful, and he will not let you be tempted beyond your strength" (1 Cor. 10:13). The second is a recognition that only sin can destroy a person. Admittedly Stoic influences are at work here. Traits are apparent in passages like "Only right actions (κατορθώματα) of the soul constitute the virtue of man, naturally when the harm is directed against ... things [such as wealth and life], human virtue itself is no wise harmed. ... Even then if a man suffers damage, the damage does not come
from another but proceeds from within (οὗκοθεν) and from the man himself". But Chrysostom is equally at pains to underline the need of human freedom not to be reduced to an optimistic doctrine of self-determination. For there lies parallel to the Stoic categories the sombre analysis of the human predicament which we have discussed in Chapter Four: Man falls when he is at ease. Correspondingly, suffering cures man's ἀπόνοια. In ad eos qui scandalizati sunt, he brings in a Christological focus when he points out that the good thing, i.e. the Cross, has become the cause of scandal. Thus the wicked actually are scandalised by the good rather than by evil things.

Nevertheless, his refusal to face up to the destructiveness of excessive suffering does betray a lacuna in his ethics. A partial relief of the problem is perhaps possible if we share his position that the question of theodicy cannot be raised other than from the sufferer's own perspective. An irreducible epistemological gap exists between the sufferer and other human observers. Thus with regard to those who have backslidden after suffering, he responds that only God knows the heart of each individual. God is at work with an individual through suffering, unmasking the false pretension of his good deeds, and revealing to him the humility required of man in the appropriation of
virtue. On another occasion, he proposes that the execution of the soldiers in the aftermath of St Peter's escape from the prison (Ac. 12:18, 19) serves as an atonement for their sins; not sin in its manifold particularities, but the uncleanliness in which every person stands vis-à-vis God. The emphasis has now been shifted from an understanding of suffering as pastoral involvement to suffering as an atoning process which is salutary for man because of his involvement in the inescapable condition of sin. This redemptive purpose prevents him from having to face up to any view which allows for the possibility of destructiveness in suffering. "To suffer evil is not an indignity (ἐντύχεια) to the sufferer!" -- even to the consequence of death! Chrysostom's approach to this crucial aspect of theodicy, for all its defects, nevertheless provides insight into man's religious dimension. In suffering, man is painfully confronted with the given moral ends by which he subsists, and the corrupted human condition to which he is inextricably bound. Suffering, therefore, brings to an individual the demand for repentance. Like the Cross, it is a proof of God's love to man. As man stumbles because of the Cross, so he does also because of suffering. But the scandal lies neither in the nature of the Cross, nor in suffering, but in his folly (ἀνοία).  

5.3.3 The suffering of the regenerate has been expounded
in the main in terms of their non-evasion of the frailty which pervades the present age. We seriously misunderstand Chrysostom unless we appreciate (as we have maintained emphatically throughout our entire study) that this "non-evasion" is not a passive acquiescence to a futile world order which can only amount to a solidarity unto death. It rests on an understanding of God's providence for the entire human community. The evangel is a call to suffering. Suffering of the saints issues from an active commitment to the communal dimension of the gospel. This is why in the passage in de statuis Chrysostom commends the saints for their sorrow over the world, and insists that their sadness too contains "a rich treasure of good things".

It is of considerable importance to notice that the argument for the universal call to suffering rests on God's redemptive purposes for the entire world. That is not the only ground on which this call could be based. There is another account to be found in the Antiochene tradition to which Chrysostom is indebted. Several marked similarities immediately emerge from a survey of this broader terrain. In the first place, there is an equal emphasis on the sharp creator-creature distinction that we have seen in Chrysostom. A passage from Theodore of Mopsuestia is illustrative of the one whose existence of similarities immediately
separated from each other, and the gulf between them is unbridgeable." "What possible resemblance and relation can exist between two things so widely separated from each other?" For Theodore, creatureliness and mutability are characteristics of man's present status; they are the material basis ordained by God on which man may exercise his choice for an immutable destiny in the Second Age. In the second place, it follows that there is a demarcation between the present world and the world to come. The ethical nuance placed upon mutability, as we have just observed, implies that repose is to be secured only in the Second Age. The present is the time of struggle and vigilance. As long as man is on this earth, he can only receive the heavenly gifts by hope through participation in the Holy Communion. Theodore goes on to warn that because man has a changeable nature, it is possible even for a Christian to fall away from a full participation in the blessings to come. In the third place, suffering is the embodiment of Christian discipleship. Philoxenus of Mabbôgh teaches that "not even when a man hath stripped himself of everything that he hath, hath he yet begun to walk in the way of His [the Lord's] doctrine"; a man launches on "the beginning of the path of the spiritual life" only when he has taken up the cross and followed the Lord. In the scale of perfection, suffering assumes priority over almsgiving and other deeds of mercy. Philoxenus' analysis is
informed by a sharp polarization between the carnal and spiritual realms. Through baptism, a person is born out of his own will from the carnal to the spiritual life. He becomes a disciple of the Lord; he is brought under the rule of the Lord which is "above nature". That is to say, the Christian life is one of discipleship, understood as a crucifixion with Christ which severs an individual completely from the earthly realms. To take up the cross and follow Christ constitutes the fulness of Christian perfection. This is why almsgiving is inferior to suffering. For almsgiving presupposes a possession of earthly goods; it is still set in reference to this world, "still in this side of the border of nature". So Philoxenus argues that Jesus' command to renounce wealth is "a natural commandment" which only those who are in subjection to passions will find difficult. "The participation in the sufferings of Christ [consisteth] not in a man giving alms, and in shewing his lovingkindness unto those who are needy, but in his dying wholly and entirely to the world, and to the body, and to the lusts, and to the passions, and in a man crucifying his old man with all the lusts thereof".

The account which we have drawn out in the paragraph above is representative in the main of later development within the Antiochene tradition from the fifth century. The afflicted Nestorians find a literal interpretation of
the imitation of Christ and participation in his suffering a powerful focus and encouragement in their own suffering. For them suffering is the lot ordained for all Christians in the present age. They resist a more allegorical interpretation of this biblical theme of suffering which could allow them to take refuge in the abstract.\textsuperscript{80} And clearly the tradition of martyrdom as "aversion sacrifice" is operative in their conviction. The martyr shares in Christ's warfare against Satan.\textsuperscript{81}

At the outset of this excursion into the wider terrain of Antiochene ethics, we said that we were giving "another" account from which the conclusion that suffering is universally recommended could be arrived at. What then is the difference between what we have just indicated and the approach of Chrysostom? Their divergence lies in the framework in which suffering is situated. The prevalent Antiochene conception puts suffering in a cosmic context. The creator-creature distinction, the dichotomy between the present age and the world to come, and the implications of Christian discipleship are all set primarily within a dualist picture.\textsuperscript{82} Specifically, suffering is seen more in the context of monastic discipline and of the moral struggle of individuals against temptation, than in a moral vision of communal welfare.\textsuperscript{83} Young draws it to our attention that the problem of post-baptismal sins and the establishment of
penitential systems provide the matrix of the development of martyr theology in the fourth century. The earlier practice of confessors could at least be regarded as providing a communal focus in expiatory suffering, inasmuch as the suffering of one could mediate forgiveness for others. But with the subsequent ecclesiastical repudiation of it, this also recedes into the background. Hence, suffering becomes more of an individual's concern within the Antiochene development, though it is never internalised or allegorised.

The communal reference in Chrysostom's analysis therefore constitutes a point of difference from the Antiochene analysis to which Chrysostom is so much indebted.

Given the communal focus in his doctrine of suffering, it is not difficult to see why Chrysostom warns repeatedly against vengeance. Man must resist the temptation, and renounce the possibility, of ushering justice into the world. Witness to the truth consists in suffering for the truth. This attitude is rooted in Chrysostom's emphasis on man's creatureliness, and consequently on the receptive character of man's moral relation to God. In suffering wrongfully without vengeance, the regenerate confess that "victory is of God". Vengeance betrays an absorption with earthly
goods. Material possession enables one to pursue punitive actions. It further severs the bond within humanity which is meant for redemptive purposes, as we have elaborated in the course of our study.

Now, in a theology which is based on the crucifixion and resurrection, suffering does embody an antagonism between the regenerate and the world. Suffering constitutes a judgement on the world and equally a rejection of the individual by the world. It is a division between allegiance to the truth (i.e. Christ) and solidarity with the world. This is however not the line of reasoning which Chrysostom follows. For him, suffering embodies an involvement and commitment to the world. It presupposes at once a measure of divine patience, and renunciation of any resort to force. Even when juridical procedures are called for, a limit should be placed both on the liability and on the scope of exaction of punishment. The maintenance of justice cannot be an exclusive concern in the present age, for it necessarily issues in antagonism within the human community. Justice is properly the prerogative of God, which is manifested only in the last judgement. Suffering however becomes foundational towards sanctification, and the avoidance of it implies a rejection of the human community whom God has redeemed in Christ Jesus.
5.3.4 It follows finally that joyful suffering is the only proper response to the redemptive love of God. Chrysostom devotes considerable attention in the Eighth and Ninth homiliae on Ephesians to the movement of St Paul's thinking from ἔγώ ὁ δέσμιος ἐν κυρίῳ (Eph. 4:1) to ἐν Τῷ συνδέσμῳ τῆς εἰρήνης (Eph. 4:3). The central theme in these two homilies concerns the meaning of "bond" (δέσμιος) or "chain" (ἀλωσις) both as the bond of affliction and as the bond of peace in the Spirit. Chrysostom's exploitation of a word-play between δέσμιος (in Eph. 4:1) and συνδέσμος (in Eph. 4:3) is not simply an overnice display of rhetorical skills. It provides us with a focal point for understanding what this response to the evangelical proclamation consists in.

On the subjective level, suffering is the highest expression of affection. Chrysostom maintains as self-evident that a person is more delighted to suffer for, than to be honoured by, those he loves. St Paul becomes a prisoner of the Lord out of his love to Christ who has suffered for him. To a person who understands "the affection (πόθος) of Christ", to suffer dishonour for his sake is esteemed of all things the most blessed. So even the reward of heaven could not serve as an incentive for suffering, for the regenerate suffers "for the sake of the Lord of Heaven". The bond of suffering is a chain of affection "which no one can loose,
for it issues from the affection of Christ".90

But the meaning of this suffering of love is not exhaust ed in terms of a psychological bond between Christ and the regenerate. It is not to be regarded primarily as a form of reciprocation. Affliction for the sake of Christ finds its scope and end in God's redemptive purposes for the entire human community. This is shown in the first instance in the dynamics of evangelism, and in the second in the friendship which is offered to the whole world in the Ascension of Christ (two central thoughts which we have already examined in Chapter Three).

In the first instance, the bond of affliction undergirds the dynamics of evangelism. In the Eighth homilia on Ephesians, Chrysostom links St Paul's imprisonment to the conversion of the jailer's family in Acts 16. The bonds of imprisonment can loose "the bonds of sin".91 "Paul's chain entered into the prison, and transformed all things there into a Church; it ...travailed with that birth, at which Angels rejoice."92 So also Philemon is one who is begotten in the bonds of St Paul (Philemon 10).93 Evangelism is seen as a ministry in bonds: the bonds of affliction break down the bonds of sin, and at the same time they are the bonds of travail in spiritual birth.
In the second instance, the bonds of suffering are sustained by the bond of peace ushered in at the Ascension of Christ. Already in his exposition of the bonds of St Paul (Eph. 4:1) in the Eighth homilia, Chrysostom suggests that St Paul's chain is like a golden lasso (φέρα) let down which draws all that are bound by it to heaven. "The wonderful thing is this, that, bound, as it is below, it draws its captives upwards." The allusions to Eph. 4:8 and Ps. 67:19(LXX) are clear. Chrysostom is more explicit when he comes to Eph. 4:3 ("the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace") in the Ninth homilia (in a passage which we have already discussed in Chapter Three Section 3.3). The Spirit was given in order that the entire human race which is separated by race and by different manners might be united into one body. Chrysostom exhorts: "With this bond let us bind ourselves together with one another and unto God." 

Thus the response of a Christian is embodied in his bond of affliction for the sake of Christ. "More glorious is it to be a prisoner for Christ's sake than to be an Apostle, than to be a Teacher, than to be an Evangelist", than to be a worker of miracles. It follows that suffering becomes intensified in this interim before the Parousia. There can be no partial relief in material goods, nor in an evasion of communal
responsibility. The "sweetest consolation" in suffering consists in the suffering for the sake of Christ itself, so Chrysostom concludes at the end of the Eighth homilia.98

Here the regenerate in the New Covenant stand apart from the Old Testament saints. Admittedly, with regard to the necessity of faith, Chrysostom is anxious to maintain that the regenerate in the New Covenant stands in solidarity with their Old Testament counterparts. Both have "the same spirit of faith" (2 Cor. 4:13) which involves a waiting period before God's promise be realised.99 However, the confinement of moral scope (due to man's weakness) under the Old Covenant meant that the saints of the day received vindication and fruition, albeit in a provisional manner, in this world.100 Even the extent of their grief for their brethren was necessarily qualified; for as we have argued in Chapter Four, each of them had to rise above the masses in order to respond to God's love. In contrast, inasmuch as the moral horizon of the New Covenant is enlarged by the hope of the world to come, the regenerate testify to that good news by taking on themselves a care for the whole world. This pastoral and evangelistic commitment consists in a ministry of deepening suffering, in accordance with a realisation that hope in Christ does not lie in the historical realm.101
What, then, is the mark of regeneration in an individual? The σωτήριος motif in Rom. 8 possibly penetrates into Chrysostom's moral thinking. Because of man's sin, the whole creation has been made subject to futility in God's providence. It groans under "the extremity of evils" and yearns for "the freedom from the ills which now pervade" it. Man is brought in suffering to a painful realisation of the given moral end which constitutes his highest good. In accepting the reality of suffering, he joins with the groaning of the universe in acknowledging this moral claim. But this sighing is not unto despair; for the confession that "our lot indeed is at present uncertainty to our last breath" is immediately the basis of the joyful hope of "the perfect glory", "the full redemption ...such that we shall never again return to our former captivity". The refusal of the regenerate to evade the moral claim made clear in Christ, painful though it is, enables him to become the leading-edge of the creation and the messenger of hope along the pilgrim way towards the eschatological renewal at Christ's glorious coming; only then sighing will be no more.
CHAPTER SIX: Conclusion: Truth, Divine Patience, and Pastoral Ministry

Our theme has been "The Counsel against Despair: A Study in John Chrysostom's Ethics". The title at once suggests the centrality of pastoral ministry (expressed as the counsel against despair) in Chrysostom's ethics. In the course of our study, we have maintained the connection not only in its weak form: that pastoral concern constitutes a convenient vantage point from which Chrysostom's theological landscape may be surveyed. We have insisted upon the stronger statement: that ethics is evangelical if and only if ecclesiology and ethics are integral to each other. Neither is pastoral theology peripheral to the gospel — to be swept under the carpet of the social sciences, hidden within church manuals and confessionals, or summarily dismissed under the strictures of ossified doctrines; nor is ethics confined to a matter of reason and will. The Antiochene theology, as exemplified in Chrysostom, with its emphasis on the dispensational character of God's dealing with man and on an incarnation-ascension christology, beckons us to give greater weight to the communal and affective aspects of man than has generally been allowed for in the Western tradition. We have dissented from the prevalent opinion that patristic ethics are little more than Stoicism and Platonism in Christian guise. And in the course of this,
we have from time to time criticised the Augustinian ethical stance. What we propose to do in this concluding chapter is in the light of our analysis of Chrysostom's ethics (and hence ecclesiology) to offer a critique of some contemporary analyses of the nature of pastoral ministry. This undertaking is exploratory rather than rigorous. Our aim is twofold. In the first instance we wish to elaborate our disagreement with Augustinian ethics in greater detail in one specific area (here we shall join issue with Oliver O'Donovan); in the second instance we seek to show our divergence from some post-Vatican II Roman Catholic moralists who seem to share in Chrysostom's concerns, namely the centrality of the responsiveness and communality of man (and here we shall examine the views of Enda McDonagh).
6.1 The Pastoral Theology of O'Donovan

O'Donovan's inaugural lecture Principles in the Public Realm: The Dilemma of Christian Moral Witness constitutes a contemporary attempt to formulate pastoral ministry in Augustinian categories.¹ His criticism is directed against the principles which underline moral theology in the Church of England in recent times, particularly its marriage discipline in the past two decades. His disquiet is twofold. In the first place, in relation to its witness in the wider public realm, the church has not given enough recognition to the role of democratic deliberation in the formulation of policies. He takes issue with the influential report Putting Asunder (1966).² "It would seem to be precisely the virtue of such a pluralist society as the authors [of Putting Asunder] take ours to be, that it could allow of extended and serious discussion between Christians and non-Christians, in which the rationality of each side would be exposed, with the possibility that there might be changes of mind."³ Again he criticises their use of the supposition that the law (on matrimony) should reflect the beliefs of the majority. The church is often too timid to argue for its distinctive position, and is satisfied to regard its responsibility to the government as primarily an advisory one. He writes:⁴

The authors see themselves as the privy counsellors of the absolute monarch. …Some
such fantasy seems to be responsible for the slightly preposterous air of noblesse oblige which clings to this argument. It would be a better service to democracy, as well as to the Word of God, if the church were ready to plead its case in those fora of public discussion where a democracy makes its mind up, rather than stand aloof in an advisory role which is surely, anyway, an illusion.

In the second place, the church has opted for a pastoral rather than juridical approach in relation to its own legislation and discipline, as reflected, for example in a later report *Marriage and the Church's Task* in 1978.\(^5\) O'Donovan's objection is that preference is given to "discretionary measures" rather than "ordered process", and "attention given to individuals' welfare rather than to the goods of the community as a whole".\(^6\) In responding to offences (in marriage for example), the church must make explicit the judgement of God upon sin -- hence it should strive for public consistency and rationality -- and also the promise of forgiveness, a gift which is given to the ecclesia as a whole.\(^7\) He pleads:\(^8\)

We cannot endow bishops with the spirit of prophets merely by relieving them of the obligations of justice. Inspiration is not the same as untrammelled discretion. Nor is a general inclination to hope for the best the same as a prophetic insight into the particular redemptive purposes of God. We should dread the thought of a bishop (or indeed a panel or a tribunal) making decisions in a vacuum of principle and precedent on the one hand and with no special illumination from on high on the other.

O'Donovan's critique turns on the supposition that the church is bearing its moral witness in this age under the
tension between truth and appearance. Accordingly, \(^9\)

Political authority is a threefold cord in which the claims of morality, power, and tradition are woven together. Although the community can make no claim on our adherence unless it makes some pretension to justice, equally it can make no authoritative claim unless it speaks for power and tradition as well. ...When the moral claim is thus bound up with amoral constraints, it cannot adequately represent the simple moral truth that one might acknowledge privately, apart from one's public tasks. The good is distorted by becoming the practical good of a community limited by sin and finitude.

He goes on to say that "the dilemma was how to act constructively for the public good without breaking faith with the transcendent good". \(^10\) It follows that pastoral ministry must be regarded as a ministry of compromise though it should be a "compromise in relation to the truth". \(^11\) In its own legislation, the church must seek to mark the presence of a compromise; and in relation to the wider realm of witness, the church is obliged to suggest courses of public action which give the "best embodiment" or the "least constraint" to the truth. He endorses Hinchliff's formulation of the dilemma: "No one has yet found a way of including the exceptions within a formal assertion of the ideal without appearing to deny it." \(^12\)

In formulating his account of pastoral ministry as such, O'Donovan tacitly endorses the philosophical tradition of political realism in Augustine, and more recently in theologians like Reinhold Niebuhr. \(^13\) The
public realm (that of politics) is inherently one of tragedy. Admittedly, O'Donovan qualifies the tension between truth and appearance -- and hence his understanding of pastoral ministry as that of compromise -- by appealing to the eschaton when the tension will ultimately be overcome. He also gives recognition to prophetic discernment as an eschatological expression, so that "there would be moments of revelation, cutting across the ambiguities of appearance, in which the whole truth would become public". In the last analysis, nevertheless, he concludes that the church is as vulnerable as the rest of the world to deception, for it also in itself contributes a public realm.

We should not leave this supposition unchallenged. We have indicated already in Chapter Four how Chrysostom understood a public manifestation of the truth to be an intrinsic aspect of the gospel. On that occasion we indicated briefly how Chrysostom's analysis offered an alternate way of understanding pastoral ministry to that of O'Donovan. Our present critique is confined to the specific understanding of pastoral ministry as "accommodation" or "compromise", a conception which is undergirded by an insistence that "the simple moral truth that one might acknowledged privately" is distorted "by becoming the practical good of a community". We approach our task by re-examining O'Donovan's twofold criticism:
first, on the advisory role of the church vis-a-vis the wider public realm, and secondly on the occasionalist character of ecclesiastical discipline. We shall ask whether or not his criticism and subsequent formulation of Christian moral witness have in fact adequately met the concerns of the authors of the reports.

(i) The first objection focuses on the advisory role of the church. In the lecture "Insight and Institution: in a Church", G. R. Dunstan (one of the authors of *Putting Asunder*) provides us with the rationale for adopting this tenet to which O'Donovan objects. His purpose in this lecture is to trace how a church, in particular the Church of England, formulates and commends its moral judgements. Dunstan regards one aspect of the moral tradition of the church as the part it plays in establishing norms and in enforcing morals throughout and on behalf of that particular political society in which it is set. This consideration is determinative of the decisions which the church takes. For the moral imperatives uttered "would certainly require governmental action for their realization", because they are situated in social and economic contexts which are governmental responsibilities. But in this task of establishing norms on behalf of the state, Dunstan far from regards himself as "a privy counsellor to an absolute monarch", as O'Donovan objects. For while Dunstan recognises that
moral imperatives uttered "would certainly require governmental action for their realization", he equally has to take into account that their "realization" ultimately depends on whether or not they will be adopted by the populace in a liberal society, who regard the political order as a human artefact which is serviceable for human purposes. The source of authority of political order is as important a consideration as the agency of government. Specifically in this "era of rapid social change", the central question for Dunstan is "What degree of empirical uncertainty is tolerable in framing a course of actions in which no known course is without ambiguity?" In other words, what is the best way forward in the midst of moral pluralism and of technological advances of a nature and dimension unknown ever before?

The concept of custom as a developing tradition provides Dunstan with the required material in this undertaking of minimising "the degree of empirical uncertainty". The method of moral reasoning "appropriate to this era" begins with the insight which "points to a certain conclusion". The function of moral reasoning is to examine it and to show that it is "not contrary to the moral tradition". What this means in practice is that the magisterium of the church formulates and ratifies "a moral judgement made by a sort
of consensus fidelium, for which a good theological justification was worked out ex post facto". In this way Dunstan transforms the advisory role of the church (in "establishing norms") which we have noted earlier. It still advises the state, now by providing theological justification ex post facto. If it continues to regard itself as the sole advisor, its resource lies no longer in esoteric knowledge (as O'Donovan assumes). Rather, it is embodied in "the ethically sensitive men in the civil society". The advisory task is now seen to be grounded in the more significant task of convening committees of ethically sensitive resource personnel. And it is this latter and fundamentally more radical understanding of the moral witness of the church to which O'Donovan has not paid enough attention.

(ii) The second point of contention concerns the occasionalist character of church discipline. But before dealing with this directly, it is salutary to digress briefly to a discussion between Plato and Aristotle on how the claim of the particular stands vis-a-vis the universal. This is particularly necessary because O'Donovan has dismissed Aristotelian ethics from the outset of his lecture. He asserts that, "with certain notable exceptions", Christians taking their stance from the crucifixion of Jesus and Platonists focusing on the death of Socrates "have stood apart from
the Aristotelian idea that ethics can be treated as an aspect of politics," for they have perceived the inevitability of tension between a transcendent moral truth and the good of any public order. Can he rightly dismissed Aristotelian ethics so easily, especially since his critique is directly against Anglican moral traditions which are at least to some extent indebted to Thomism?

The passages in Plato Politicus 293e-302b and Aristotle Ethica Nicomachea 1137a31-1138a3 are relevant. In the first passage, we can discern similarities between O'Donovan's position and that of the Young Man in his dialogue with Socrates. A sober analysis of politics is entertained. The Young Man acknowledges that law could never, by determining exactly what is noblest and most just for one and all, at the same time enjoin upon every person that which is best. The differences of men and of actions, and the fact that nothing in human life is ever at rest, forbid any science whatsoever to promulgate any simple rule for everything and for all times (294b). A "rougher method" for "the good of the majority" is all one can do (294d-e). Admittedly, the true statesman could act most truly, most in accordance with the actual perfect reality; and in comparison, the written laws and customs are only imitations (300e), the next best course (300c). Yet in the realm of appearance when the kingly art is not
open to the multitude, these laws must be protected by severe penalties. It is significant that Plato includes in this passage an allusion to the martyrdom of Socrates, the true statesman: If anyone does things contrary to the written rules, though he be the physician (and hence knows how to dispense properly for each case), he will not be called such; nothing ought to be wiser than the law, since anyone who pleases can learn from the existing written rules and ancestral customs (299b-d). Such is the tragedy in politics when the dawning of the "Republic" is yet to come. 28

Aristotle provides a more optimistic analysis by introducing the concept of equity (ἐπίεικεία) as a rectification of legal justice. He begins where Plato left off: "Law is always general statement, yet there are cases which it is not possible to cover in a general statement. ...The law takes into consideration the majority of cases, although it is not unaware of the error this involves (1137b10-20)." But he continues: "When therefore the law lays down a general rule, and thereafter a case arises which is an exception to the rule, it is their right, where the law-giver's pronouncement because of its absoluteness is defective and erroneous, to rectify the defect by deciding as the lawgiver would himself decide if he were present on the occasion." Aristotle is careful to explain what this "exception" to the rule
means. It is not a departure from justice, but in judging the particular situation rightly in the wider moral context of "absolute justice" (1137b25). The principle of equity allows for cases in which it is impossible to lay down a law; hence special ordinance becomes necessary (1137b25-30). Aristotle elaborates further in Rhetorica 1374b15-19. "It is equitable to pardon human weaknesses, and to look, not to the law but to the legislator. ...Not to what a man is now, but to what he has been, always or generally; to remember good rather than ill treatment, ...to bear injury with patience." "Exception" does not only issue in a dispensation from the law as legal justice; it also enables an acceptance of burden and the bearing of injury with patience which are not required in legal justice. Equity is therefore set in the context of the moral formation of a person, more precisely, of a person in his finitude and sinfulness. This Aristotelian insight is of course expressed in the Thomist tradition of sequitas.29

Our purpose in the above digression is to show that the discretionary and particular character of pastoral care is undergirded by a rich intellectual tradition. This does not mean that O'Donovan's criticism is wholly invalid. For we must disentangle within his unease two distinct theological concerns. The first focuses on the discretionary character of church discipline. But
interwoven with this is also an implicit criticism of a deficient ecclesiology, an erroneous notion that discipline is regarded as a possession of the priestly order. If one recognises this distinction, it is clear that a (valid) criticism of the latter does not necessarily entail the rejection of the former.

Perhaps the roots of the confusion lie in the development of the moral tradition of εἰσίκεια itself. The doctrine of epikeia was severed from its original context, that is, of giving true expression to the natural law. It became absorbed in the genesis of casuistry. So in the doctrine of equiprobabilism proposed by Alphonsus de Liguori in the seventeenth century, "epikeia means the exception of a case because of the circumstance (the situation) from which can be judged, with certainty or at least with probability, that the legislator did not intend to include it under the law." The issue at stake has become one of indemnity, of inculpability, and of non-application of a law in church manuals and confessinals.

A similar concern arose for Kirk over the issue of "invincible ignorance" in the course of his exposition of the distinctiveness of Anglicanism, which he regarded as a respect for conscience on the one hand and the insistence upon custom on the other. In the combination of these two
he saw a way of avoiding the formalism of Roman Catholicism and the danger of disruptive laxity. It falls to a minister of the church therefore to inform the souls under his charge in such a way that they can differentiate between the things which can be done "with an open mind", and those which must be under the dictates of the church. This shepherding of individual souls in the varied forms of their quest for the vision of God is "the art of arts". Ecclesiastical discipline for Kirk was not a matter of the church's confession of its norms and pronouncement of forgiveness (as O'Donovan rightly observes). It became exclusively individualistic. "During the formative period of the soul's development, they [i.e. rules and laws] are indispensable; but that in proportion as the soul reaches spiritual maturity ...they may and should be discarded little by little". Put differently, ecclesiology has become an adjunct of Christian spirituality.

Dunstan takes over this legacy substantially. He acknowledges that one aspect of the moral tradition of a church relates to the search for the vision of God by its members. Alongside this, ecclesiastical standards or canons are set up to govern the corporate life of the community, that is, to assure some "inner cohesion" of the church "as a human society". Ecclesiology is thus an "art" of church government, a necessary but subsidiary
concern to that of the individual's quest for the vision of God. The church is now understood primarily as a human artefact rather than as the embodiment of God's redemptive purposes for the world. Discretionary procedures are necessary to ensure that an individual's growth will not be stifled, and to minimise disruption in a local congregation.

What we see in this whole development is a tendency to consider church laws in the same light as positive laws. And even if they still bear a formal link to natural laws, the emphasis is shifted from "natural" to "law"; law is understood in a voluntarist way. Consequently, this contemporary understanding of discretionary measures could well seem arbitrary and esoteric, as O'Donovan points out. Nevertheless, the problems do not lie in the conception of epikeia in its original sense. They issue from the particular ecclesiologies which have shaped its passage down to the present. There needs to be a re-emphasis that ecclesiastical discipline is entrusted to the community as a whole and that it is an intrinsic aspect of the gospel, as we have underlined especially in Chapter Three. We do not deny that O'Donovan also wishes to emphasize the same point, as we shall shortly see in an ensuing paragraph.

But his recourse to put discipline within "the regulative patterns of justice" or under "the control of universal rules" cannot really solve the problem. Rather, it will lend itself to reinforce a sacerdotal conception of the church, and undermine manifestation of God's
redemptive love to particular situations which might need to be "judged rightly" in the wider moral context of "the law of liberty" (James 1:25).

We have given an all too scanty re-examination of the twofold criticism of O'Donovan against the authors of recent reports on marriage discipline in the Church of England. They attempt to overcome the dilemma which Hinchliff proposes ("No one has yet found a way of including the exceptions within a formal assertion of the ideal without appearing to deny it") by abandoning the metaphysics which O'Donovan and Hinchliff share. "The doctrine of compromise" is not misrepresented by them as "a principle of capitulation", as O'Donovan claims. For capitulation still tacitly acknowledges some absolute norm, even though they be concealed. Rather, Christian moral witness ceases for them to be a matter of compromise. The claim of particulars in the historical realm is determinative. Pastoral ministry consists in consultation and co-ordination of the pluralist society as it ventures, not without some perplexity, into the future under the guidance of epikeia. Because O'Donovan has not given enough recognition to this, we question whether the contentions of those he criticises do not after all remain unscathed despite his onslaught.

O'Donovan also seeks to meet Hinchliff's challenge by
setting compromise within a liturgical context. He suggests a "public liturgy of reconciliation" as a way to make explicit both God's judgement upon sin and the promise of forgiveness in the public context. Those who intend to marry after divorce "would first undergo a period of pastoral counselling, so that the congregation, knowing that the minister had listened to the confession and given appropriate guidance, would not need to be told any further detail". He continues to propose that such a ceremony should not discriminate between these "offenders" and other penitents, such as alcoholics who want to go straight again.\(^7\) The suggestion that the congregation should accept the verdict of the minister is probably motivated by a concern for the penitent, i.e. in safeguarding him from the trauma of public exposure of sins. But in doing so, has not O'Donovan after all removed prophetic discernment from the public realm? Has not the public liturgy become a legitimising process, rather than an authentic celebration of God's message of reconciliation to the entire congregation, a fact which O'Donovan wants to insist upon from the start? And has he not recognised that there are some areas of human life which are more appropriately dealt with in private? And surely the "compromise" in remarriage after divorce is different from the repentance of one who wants to go straight, both in the sense that the former at least involves some departure from the Christian norm, and that
the act has yet to take place. Jesus' promise "Neither do I condemn you; go, and do not sin again" (Jn. 8:11) is extended only to the latter. In this case Jesus did, as O'Donovan is keen to maintain, "confront offence and judge it, in a way uniquely appropriate to the Gospel, by pointing to the reconciliation of the offender". But this is clearly not a compromise. Hence O'Donovan's doctrine of compromise is in its final analysis extrinsic to the liturgical life; and his reluctance to distinguish between the pastoral context of a divorcée who seeks remarriage and that of an alcoholic who wants to break the habit reveals an attempt to blunt the awkwardness of conceiving pastoral ministry as a compromise.

It is not that "no one has yet found a way", but that it is an impossibility to find such a way once we formulate pastoral ministry in terms of a truth-appearance dialectic. One lives in the twilight of tragedy under the principle "Compromise! But compromise in relation to the truth!". Pastoral care as such carries no specific Christian message. It operates on the assumption that only an optimal solution can be provided within the constraints of the present tragic human existence. The dilemma that existed under the Old Covenant
-- "that of Moses" -- remains, as O'Donovan himself
concedes,\textsuperscript{41} and as we have already discussed in Chapter
Four. And from this whole position, we must dissent.
6.2 The Pastoral Theology of McDonagh

The second part of our analysis consists of a critique of the views of pastoral ministry propounded by contemporary Roman Catholic moral theologians. Their rejection of authoritarianism in the church has led them to give greater emphasis upon "pastoral" and "discretionary" rather than "juridical" and "universal". This bears at least verbal similarities to some salient features in Chrysostom's ethics. An exploration of the contemporary scene (even though in this very provisional manner) will therefore at least show any divergence between Chrysostom and these modern approaches, and help us to evaluate in greater detail the conception of pastoral ministry which O'Donovan criticises.

We approach this study by tracing the development of Enda McDonagh's exposition of the subject since Vatican II. In *Invitation and Response* (1972) he issued the following programatic statement:

Moral theology studies the human response demanded in the light of the divine self-giving. Divine revelation is seen as invitation demanding response, as gift and task (*donum et mandatum*, *Gabe und Aufgabe*), as announcement of God's favour or salvation, and instruction about the realisation of that favour in one's life (*keryma* and *didache*). He proceeded to indicate that in the light of this covenantal relationship of God to man, "every moral response will have a thanksgiving or eucharistic
character"; more specifically, in relation to God, the call to response must take the form of a return (metanoia); and since the covenant is extended to the whole of mankind, there is an essential communal and historical dimension in man's moral response.44

The above seems rather banal on the surface. At its worst, it could mean nothing more than a repetition of the classical formulation of moral theology. So McDonagh cautiously maintained that his version of moral theology was not discordant with the natural law tradition as outlined in the manuals.45 For the moment, we are not concerned whether there was a strict continuity such as he claimed. What is important is that he saw it necessary to appeal to Aquinas and the Scholastic traditions for theological justification.

And at its best, McDonagh's exposition seemed to be in line with a contemporary rejection of the restrictive implication of a hierarchical magisterium, and with a corresponding insistence that the church is a learning, rather than a teaching church. The primary teacher of the church is the Holy Spirit who works in the lives of all Christians.46 This bias against the "didactic" and toward the "responsive" was evident in McDonagh. He spoke of the Mosaic covenant in its legal form appearing "as the way of response appropriate to God's people in consequence
of his choice for them. Similarly, what is distinctively Christian in a Christian ethic is not the formulated moral teaching of Jesus in the gospel or of the rest of the New Testament; it is rather "the uncovering of the basic structure of human life and activity as a response to the Father in Jesus Christ, who constitutes in himself the criterion of whether a particular life or activity is such a response (and therefore good for man in this order) or not (and therefore bad)." One may attribute all this to some revival of a "biblical understanding" of the church. However, even if we put aside the question whether one can speak of a "biblical core" which is distinct from "philosophical influences", to be satisfied with that explanation leaves unanswered the question why this specific biblical nuance is emphasized.

We begin to appreciate the radical nature of McDonagh's proposal if we ask what the "criterion" in the passage just quoted means in concrete terms. He was clear about this. Because Christian ethics are for the building of a community,

whatever human activity then promotes this community is a correct response to God, morally good activity; whatever activity hinders or disrupts the community is a failure in response, morally bad activity. Community building becomes the criterion or norm of morality.

We must reject the temptation of an over hasty rejection of McDonagh's proposition as nothing but consequentialist.
This emphasis on the historical and the communal received fuller treatment in *Gift and Call* (1975). The subtitles of this book and the previous one succinctly express a shift (towards consistency) in his position. He understood his earlier effort as a contribution of "Essays in Christian Moral Theology". The classical sources were still regarded as normative, as we have already noted. They still enjoyed an *a priori* position in ethical reflection. Moreover, despite the centrality which communality occupied in his ethics, he had insisted that this was not the only approach to ethics at the present time. By 1975, he saw himself as contributing "Towards a Christian Theology of Morality". He meant by this that the starting point of morality should be provided by "moral experience" rather than by "Christian revelation". "It attempts to analyse this experience and then confront it with the Christian faith of the analyst." There is hence a "provisionalness" and "openendness" in morality. With regard to the conservative theologians, he criticised the way in which they

...have yielded to the temptation to use as source what other people have said and more particularly written. There is a security in being able to report that someone else (better known and more acceptable to the particular audience, and for an ecclesiastical audience preferably dead) has already made the point.

The drawback of their approach is that the sources are usually employed indiscriminately. After all their value
"derives from deeper unwritten sources in the human experience of morality".\textsuperscript{53}

Now, the more conservative approach -- be it based upon revelation or some notion of natural law -- has at least provided a unitary ground in ethics. McDonagh was not unaware of the hazards of arbitrariness, fragmentation, and individualism which come with an ethic of "moral experience". Wherein is man's unity located? Here the communality and historicity of man became essential to his argument. "The continuity of one's person and situation can be properly understood only by considering one's community and historical character."

"For experience one needs time. All experience, including moral experience, has a history. Each man has a history; he is a historical being."\textsuperscript{54} Ethical reflection therefore must receive its orientation from the social context.

McDonagh elaborated this insight further in \textit{Doing the Truth: The Quest for Moral Theology} (1979). The Christian life consists of a series of conversions, which are often the result of "very slow-burning fuses". As an autobiographical note, he revealed that\textsuperscript{55}

...this particular fuse reached its climax in many ways in my earlier book, \textit{Gift and Call}, which attempted a theology of morality rather than a moral theology. ...That fuse has set off some further explosions in my mind, leaving intact the conviction that the dialectic between
moral experience and Christian faith must continue along the earlier lines but making me much more chary of any overall system of theology of morality comparable to the systems of the past, medieval, manual or modern. This combines paradoxically with a deeper conviction about the unity of the moral life, although it is no longer so clearly the moral life of an individual but of a person-in-community and a community-of-persons. That is another aspect of conversion.

He then proceeds:

Without a unified system of morality, how can one maintain unity of moral living or offer a unified moral guidance? And surely that guidance is the only justification of the moral theologian's work. ...What the theologian is trying to do is to decipher a style of life for the contemporary Christian based on his reflection on the interaction between present-day moral demands and Christian belief. ...[And he] may provide a method or methods whereby the Christian can make his own moral decisions and establish his own pattern of life.

It is therefore not surprising that this "quest for moral theology" began with a chapter on "Theology as Autobiography" and left off with a postscript "Theology as Sociobiography". The quest "left off" rather than "concluded"; his final words in the book were "The attempts must go on. Autobiography, sociobiography and theology remain unfinished tasks".56

In tracing the development of McDonagh's moral thought, we have quoted him at some length. The presentation aims to show respect to the autobiographical nature of his thinking. We can discern three intertwining concerns within this development.
(i) In the first instance, there is an anthropological affirmation of the dignity of the human person. The controversial declaration De libertate religiosa (with the subtitle "de iure personae et communitatum ad libertatem socialis et civilis in re religiosa") of Vatican II opens with these words: 57

Contemporary man is increasingly aware of the dignity of the human individual; there is an increase in the number of those who demand that in his actions man should enjoy full use of his own judgement and responsible freedom, not under the pressure of coercion, but following his sense of duty.

The appeal to freedom is based upon "the right" (de iure) of the individual which comes with his personal consciousness, the sense of self-hood. In his commentary on this document, McDonagh observes that the terms "tolerance", implying acceptance of a necessary evil, does not occur in the subtitle. The document (which advocates freedom as a right) evidently is not intended to take freedom as a concession in fact combined with a denial in theory or in the ideal. 58 "Theory" and "ideal" in this context connote for McDonagh external and imposed structures which impede and impoverish man's genuine moral activity; any juridical concept of the church has no proper role in moral life. 59 The human person constitutes the only absolute. 60

(ii) Related to this anthropological affirmation lies a
sociological recognition of and insistence upon a pluralist society in which contemporary man lives. The twofold "recognition of" and "insistence upon" is deliberate. For on the other hand, he has to take cognizance of the de facto pluralism of the contemporary world. The divergence of issues confronted by man (and in particular by a Christian) implies that he is "no longer free to reach for his manual to find the answer to a particular problem".61

And on the other hand, McDonagh insists upon an essential pluralism in moral discussion. The rather obscure discussion on "The Search for Absolutes" in Doing the Truth illumines his concern.62 The categories "person", "needs", "values", "virtues", and "rules" are fundamental in his analysis. Of all these, the "person" -- in his communality and historicity -- constitutes the only absolute. They are related to each other as follows:63

An uneasy and frequently obscure alliance exists between needs considered to be essential to the human person, such values discerned in moral analysis as responding to these needs, and virtues cherished in moral tradition as seeking these values.

He further elaborates:64

Values must be defined in personal terms if they are to have any moral significance. The virtues which pursue them are clearly personal realities and the rules which protect them find their ultimate root in persons. In the historical world of the moral, actions, rules, values and virtues are all relative to and derived from persons.
"Persons" become the hermeneutic principle for moral deliberation.

The above reflects a complete re-evaluation of the traditional approach to ethics. For generally speaking, classical expositions of ethics shared an unchallenged premise: a recognition of man's present predicament (in his sin and finitude), some conception of his telos, and rules which allow him to grow from his present status to what he is meant to be. Ethics construed in this way recognise some given moral ends of man which relate to metaphysical realities. There was no ultimate dichotomy between teleology and deontology. The "good" and the "rules" were grounded in the same reality. But once the telos is obscured or challenged, rules become voluntarist; they are taboos rather than intelligible precepts which bear some relation to the telos. Here lies McDonagh's concern. The "search for absolutes", necessitated by his rejection of classical metaphysics, results in a reversal of the traditional structure of morality. Man as he is -- in his transitoriness and finitude -- embodies the only absolute. Virtues, rules, and values receive orientation from man. Once the problem is thus envisaged, pluralism is an affirmation of man's essential historicity and communality. It is the epistemological route to transcendence. So McDonagh writes: 65
The most threatening and rewarding aspect in human relationship is the constant re-emergence of the stranger. ...The stranger-friend is the model as well as the gateway to the totally transcendent God who is yet more intimate to me than I am to myself.

The otherness of the other provides "a continuing source for awareness of and reflection on the divine". 66

(iii) McDonagh insists, along with freedom and pluralism, on an unavoidable tragic element in this present age. A crucifixion-resurrection model undergirds this theological affirmation. In Doing the Truth he toned down his earlier enthusiasm over the achievements of Vatican II: 67

The natural law tradition of morality and the recent optimistic views of the world by the Church (cf. Gaudium et Spes, Vatican II) have tended to obscure for moralists the inherent evil in the world. ...The triumph over the evil which has been achieved in Jesus Christ does not automatically liberate us. We do not live simply by the light and power of the Resurrection. A genuine account of our moral lives will see us as candidates for crucifixion as well as for glory.

He continues: 68

This may lead to a more realistic understanding of the actual fragile and frustrating conditions in which man seeks to be moral and a more persistent commitment to overcome the evil. ...Moral theology must be pursued in both the light of the resurrection and the shadow of the Cross if it is to do justice to its human authenticity, autonomy and fragility and its divine origin, significance and fulfilment.

An interpretative key to McDonagh's analysis is revealed in this identification of "human authenticity, autonomy and fragility" with the Cross, and of "divine origin, significance and fulfilment" with the Resurrection. The
tragic, fragile and diverse elements of this present age form the basis of human authenticity — the exercising of freedom — towards the new life. The world as it is does not provide intimations of an objective and ordered reality which is greater than man himself; rather, it is essentially chaotic and stifling, something which man must overcome, and in this process man's moral activities find their authenticity. Here we begin to appreciate the nuance which McDonagh attaches to "conversion" and "response". It is creativity in the fullest meaning of the word: not in the weaker form as calling forth hidden potential within a created order, but as transformation and as "following the intention and example of the Creator" "in the harmonious acceptance and blending of the different".69

Man's response to the Father's self-giving must in its totality involve entrusting oneself completely to the God of the future, to God as he emerges in the unknown and uncontrollable future into which man has to move. For the individual's final decisive step into that absolute future (which is God), the step he takes at dying, each important moral action in his life should have prepared him as a trusting step into the unknown towards God and his fellowman.70

Man's response, as McDonagh envisages it, is posited within this dynamics of an emergence of man. We see here his divergence from Chrysostom's conception of response. For the latter it is not tied to the rise of man's historical consciousness. Nor is it linked with the criterion of freedom. Response (and moral activity) for Chrysostom are posited in relation to the givenness of the other (be this God or man) who lays claim to one's affection.
McDonagh's analysis is influenced by a dynamic conception of history and a corresponding historical ethic of hope. What then is the place of the community? Here, we detect a lacuna in his analysis. On the premise that freedom and integrity of conscience must be respected if genuine moral activity is to be possible, he denies any place for institution in this sphere of human existence. Moral direction is to be shunned; man must not live "by proxy". Of course McDonagh's concern issues from a rejection of a manual and hierarchical-magisterial approach to moral life. But in this very rejection he dismisses the classical framework (and the natural law) which originally undergirded the tradition of manual moral theology, even though often obscured by it. It remains questionable whether the concern for personal awareness and autonomy on the one hand, and a natural law ethic (when it has shed its corrupting voluntaristic and elitist elements) on the other, remain fundamentally incompatible as McDonagh's account suggests.

He has to insist not only on autonomy, but also on something to overcome the arbitrariness and fragmentation, that is, some concept of unity. He finds this unity in the communality and historicity of man.

The irreducible, inviolable and non-relative character of person essential to moral analysis is of person-in-community-in-history not of person in vacuo or on a desert island or in 'this moment of time'. ...What is proclaimed as moral value or asserted as moral rule must be in
principle accessible to the collective and historical personal understanding and capable of explanation and justification by and to reasoning human beings. To deny this is to remove moral insight from its proper human context and destroy its genuine moral character. That much the Judaeo-Christian tradition, particularly in its Catholic form, has long insisted.\cite{72}

The issue raised in this quotation hinges on what McDonagh means by "person-in-community-in-history". It could take its reference exclusively from some conception of a "concrete future" which is grounded in the promise of God.\cite{73} In that case, when pilgrimage is described in terms of "looking forward to the city which has foundations" and "not thinking of that land from which one has gone out" (Heb. 11:10, 15), those phrases would be given a literal interpretation, with no given structure of existence assumed. But McDonagh does not seem to go along with this approach unreservedly. For him, communality still receives its reference, to some extent, from the "Judaeo-Christian tradition". But how can tradition survive without some form of institution, a category which he has rejected earlier as juridical and hostile to moral growth? The rejection of a ground of moral beliefs that can be decisively known apart from man's historical activity makes a dependence on history and community absolutely necessary. The intention of natural law ethics, despite the confusion which characterises its passage down the ages, at least points to the presence of a reality greater than man, a claim greater than positive norms to
which man is ultimately answerable, and because of which he can transcend the contingencies and can dare to live as a prophet though he be outcast "on a desert island".

McDonagh's equal insistence on a radical conception of autonomy and a concept of unity issues in a re-introduction of man's essential communality and historicity. Does not the offering of a concept of unity which lacks transcendent reference lead to a truncated human existence?

In this exposition of McDonagh's moral theology, we have sought to trace the development of his thought, and have identified three intertwining elements which have guided this process. His attempt represents a contemporary effort to argue for the primacy of pastoral over juridical, and discretionary over universal. What, then, is the pastoral task in this open-ended conception of the moral life? It is autobiographical, consisting in "deciphering" and analysing one's own moral experience and struggle within a community. In exposing oneself in this manner, others may be stimulated in the task of grappling with their own experience and "in establishing their own pattern of life". McDonagh is concerned that the church should be a learning church, a community which learns from Jesus Christ. He reflects in this Chrysostom's dissatisfaction with the didactic and elitist model of the church. However, although McDonagh
identifies the threefold Word of God (in the Scripture, in the sacraments, and in the community) as the basis upon which we learn of Christ, the first two aspects receive only formal recognition. The Word of God is found chiefly in the community; by which he means not the church understood in the traditional sense, but the pluralist society at large. Any insistence that the (institutional) church possesses the truth would be a mark of arrogance. In the wider area of involvement within the world, the church’s responsibility lies in the co-ordination of human resources to deal with the world’s agenda rather than questioning the agenda by appealing to any universal norm. It is for this purpose that the apostolic college was founded by Christ. The ideal pastor is hence an enabler, an information officer and organiser; in short, a committee member who can work with others in discerning the signs of the times and can negotiate proposals of action which are acceptable to all parties.
6.3 Truth, Divine Patience, and Pastoral Ministry

O'Donovan's and McDonagh's treatment of the moral life, specifically of the nature of pastoral ministry, are irreconcilable as they stand. Each approaches his task with a specific apologetic concern: The first against romantic idealistic influences, and the latter against authoritarianism and restrictive structures in the institutional church. The first defends, or at least is sympathetic to classical metaphysics. The insistence on universality leads him to develop pastoral theology in terms of exceptions and compromises. The moral witness lies in the fact that compromise must be set in relation to the objective and non-negotiable truth. The latter's treatment takes into account the modern conception of history and of ethics as a moral process. The doctrine of creation is now affirmed, not in terms of an atemporal reality in which man's origin and being consist, but in terms of a historicist conception of crucifixion-resurrection.

Despite the polarization between the two approaches, they dwell upon a shared ground in so far as both receive their heritage from the Western Christian tradition. Their analyses presuppose a moral scheme with three elements: (1) A conception of untutored human nature; (2) a conception of ethics in terms of precepts; (3) a
conception of human-nature-as-it-could-be-if-it-realised-its-telos. 79 O'Donovan's analysis gives recognition to the tragedy of man before the eschaton, when human nature as it now is remains discordant with its telos. The tragedy arises in this tension between truth and appearance. For McDonagh, the rejection of classical metaphysics leads to the historicization of man's telos. The categories of truth and appearances can be retained. They no longer function as polar opposites. But the result is that, as O'Donovan warns, appearances become the "sole measure of belief"; 80 and that means that they are the sole measure of truth.

In the course of this study we have shown our dissatisfaction with both positions. What alternative is open to us? Chrysostom's analysis perhaps suggests an alternate route which would revitalise pastoral ministry within a broader moral context. His concerns can be used as pointers to suggest how the weaknesses of both positions may be overcome. As we have seen, Chrysostom was equally insistent upon communality and responsiveness in the moral life (Chapters Two to Four); the creator-creature distinction which he emphasised points to the receptive character of ethics, and to a solidarity within the entire human community (Chapters Three and Four); the pedagogical character of providence, especially with its distinctive Christological focus, could also
provide the material for a formulation of epikeia (Chapter Four). These concerns, which McDonagh shares to some extent, distance him from the Augustinian position. Chrysostom's line of reasoning is critical of that of O'Donovan's. What enabled him not to succumb to McDonagh's alternative with its particular shortcomings? Our study of Chrysostom's ethics revealed that the incarnational element is complemented by the theme of Christ in glory. The naked Christ motif was complemented by the Ascension motif (Chapter Three), and the accommodation ethics by the judgement at the eschaton (Chapters Four and Five). The doctrine of Ascension — the Christ in glory at the right hand of God the Father — undergirds the liturgical life of the Eastern Church, not least in the Antiochene tradition. The scanty attention this has received in theological ethics proper is probably due to its uncontroversial passage in the patristic period. It has not received the same attention as the doctrines of Incarnation and of the Trinity. And at the present time the doctrine is usually dismissed because it is either thought to have issued from an obsolete classical metaphysics, or considered to be a Lukan peculiarity which is inconsistent with the witness of the other evangelists. Thus the incarnational element of the Antiochene tradition has generally received greater attention, especially in the present age because of its greater "congeniality" towards a modern approach to
A re-emphasis upon the doctrine of Ascension would go a long way toward meeting the concerns of both O'Donovan and McDonagh, without succumbing to their pitfalls. Both moralists are concerned with eschatology. Their eschatologies are set in relation to some doctrine of creation (because of the importance which telos holds in their moral scheme). But can a Christian moral theology properly witness to what the end of man is without giving at the same time some indications concerning what sustains moral efforts? The Ascension indicates the presence of an eschatological pause in the parousia of Christ. In the Ascension God has established a time of grace in order that the world may be given time to repent and believe. Between Christ and the human community stands a veil, a veil which indicates that the presence of Christ is to be sought in the liturgical ecclesia. This means that ethics cannot be detached from ecclesiology. There is no eschatological sign other than the liturgical community itself. Correspondingly, the present moment -- with all its tragedy, inevitability, and ambiguity -- is affirmed to be the time and space in which the regenerate live and witness. The moral scheme which both O'Donovan and McDonagh adopt does not have to be abandoned. What the doctrine of Ascension bears witness to is that the course of history receives
its primary determination from the "heavenly session" of Christ (the New Man) rather than from the arena of the world. The church possesses freedom and can afford "to be patient"; it does not have to address all issues at once, as McDonagh's position might summon us to do. And the doctrine further underlines the good news that man's moral activity is sustained in this present "pause" by God's divine patience.

But an Augustinian (or Niebuhrian) might object that it is precisely his conception of pastoral ministry that really allows for divine patience, whereas an ethic of good will (such as Chrysostom seems to advocate) only invites moral anarchy and the dissolution of any human society. His line of reasoning could proceed as follows. One has to recognise the brutal facts which face the church as a collective society. Conflict is inevitable and persistent in the present society under the grip of group egocentricity. The appeal to moral good will is politically naive. Politicians (and in this case, church officials) who assume this attitude are morally irresponsible; for they would only be inviting the morally hardened to instigate complete anarchy (in the church), since the success of their activities is calculated on the basis of the church's reluctance to exercise discipline. Does not, then, a Niebuhrian proponent would ask, a rational policy in church discipline, even if it is
formulated in terms of (rational) compromises, actually safeguard the church's existence as an institution, and one within which sin can be restrained? Is not this preventive measure against the possibility that "all hell breaks loose" an expression of patience and mercy? Further, the church should welcome the critique of an idealist who insists on an ethic of good will, so long as his attitude is not adopted as a policy which is binding upon all. For the naivety of the idealist, and the tragic life which is very likely to ensue, can serve as a healthy stimulus to the official policy of the church which can too easily become complacent in its compromises.

This rejoinder from the Niebuhrian camp leads our discussion in the direction of the wider terrain of the relation between politics and ethics, and between the philosophical and theological premises in our understanding of history. These are beyond the scope of our study. Here we simply say that such a rejoinder penetrates into the heart of contention between proponents who respectively follow Chrysostom's and Augustine's lines of reasoning: How should the church give adequate embodiment to God's mercy and patience in its discipline? As we have already observed on many occasions in our study, Chrysostom clearly did not abandon disciplinary procedures. But ecclesiastical discipline, even when it is exercised in juridical form, must be
sustained within the dynamics of mercy and patience. A church which takes the juridical structure as normative can too easily slip into inhumanity, Chrysostom maintained; the original intent of mercy is forgotten because it has remained peripheral from the outset. Compromise is then dispensed by officials out of a bad conscience, rather than being seen by them as an integral aspect of the church's witness. And the ease with which one can conceive pastoral ministry as compromise is liable to blind the church to the radicalness of evangelical ethics; and so it tends to persecute the idealists in its midst while commemorating the martyrs of old on feastdays. Chrysostom's exhortation to patience and his equal insistence on ethical holiness are sustained within a consistent theological understanding of salvation. Every member of the community is bound to a ministry of bearing one another's burdens and of suffering for one another, as the whole community gives ethical expression to the gospel. Chrysostom's conception of the church expects no worldly success (Chapter Five). Chadwick describes his life as one of tragedy. He is a man of outstanding quality, but ill fitted to be bishop in a sophisticated city of political intrigues -- so the verdict runs -- and this led to his exile and death. But if our analysis of Chrysostom's ethics is correct, is not his life in fact a triumph of the gospel rather than a tragedy, and his bishopric an exemplification of the
narrow and hard path to triumph which is enjoined upon all? The issue which faces the church in its selection of leaders is whether or not it dares to appoint those like Chrysostom, or rather takes the "safer" course of settling for politicians of the temperament of Theophilus of Alexandria?

Pastoral ministry is a response to the divine gift of God for this kairos. On the one hand it issues from a dynamic of enduring rather than from any formal imposition of juridical procedures. On the other hand it allows for a genuine receptivity and openness within the community. In all its tragedy and its opportunities, the human community is affirmed as the arena where the hope of the world is expressed in the ministry of mutual consolation and exhortation (and even of receiving moral directions). Thus the church engages itself in the joyful discovery of moral insight, even in unprecedented situations in history. Pastoral ministry thus understood, neither in terms of a truth-appearance dialectic, nor of truth as appearance, but as truth in the soteriological context of divine patience, constitutes the counsel which redeems man from despair and unto hope in this eschatological pause.
EXCURSUS ONE: The Place of Affection
in Christian Antiquity

From the outset, there is a concern to represent the universe as a created order; and hence an order which shares in a single telos. Affection is a suitable moral category. It is unitive. It characterises the communal bond of the entire created order. This communal aspect is found in Clement of Alexandria's works. Two words, φιλοσοφοργία and συμμάθεια, along with their cognates, are helpful in this examination. They characterise filial relations.¹ Clement comments on the συμμάθεια between water and milk, and the stars' συμμάθεια and κοινωνία with one another.² They also constitute the bonds between those who share in the same ideals. Thus Christians who partake in the eucharist are likened to children who share in the milk and blood of the same mother;³ they are brought into "sympathy" with Christ due to this nourishment.⁴ Clement depicts the collegiality among the true gnostics in this manner: it is the φιλανθρωπία and φιλανθρωπία of those who participate in the same spirit.⁵

The unitive end of affection is developed in the context of a polemical contention for the existence and goodness of God the Creator. Nemesius of Emesa proposes that δόμη is given to irrational animals, not only for their self-preservation; more importantly, it is the bond of the whole creation.⁶ Man shares in the attributes of inferior creation in order that the whole creation should be made one and akin.⁷ Similarly, Clement of Alexandria cites the existence of a sympathy between things animate and inanimate as the universal
basis by which the Father and Maker of all things can be apprehended.

But, equally, there is a concern that the created order should be regarded as a rational order. Kinship between men, irrespective of their individual qualities, and that between man and the rest of the creation are inferior to man's proper end, kinship with God. So Clement of Alexandria underlines the point that the enjoyment of associates is rooted in the use of right reason (μετὰ λόγου ὁρθοῦ). The treatment by Basil of Caesarea is instructive. Στοργή binds animals to their offspring; the strength of affection compensates in animals for their lack of reason. He argues for the goodness of these natural tendencies, only to remind man of his kingly vocation, and of the ease in practising virtue. Just as instincts are natural to animals, for man, virtue is κατὰ φύσιν. So also St Paul's moral exhortations are not alien to man; they are only the tightening of the links of nature (τὰ ὁσεῖ τῆς φύσεως). Clearly, the underlying affirmation in Basil's argument is this: temperament properly belongs to the irrational; in contrast, reason characterises man as a moral being who is transcendent over his environment and his own animal nature.

How, then, does affection relate to the rational aspect of man? Or how can the affective faculty be understood as man's affection? There is a prevalent unease. While the fathers are generally at one in their opinion that πάθος is a movement of the irrational soul, they differ in its evaluation. Some consider it as παθὴ φύσιν. Others hold a more favourable evaluation of it. For instance, Nemesius of Emesa suggests that deeds of virtue are done κατὰ πάθος.
Gregory of Nazianzus gives it at least a neutral connotation. In the course of his poem adversus iram, he explains the origin of the passions and their misuse. χόλος, κυλός, and other passions are given by God and to be stirred under the guidance of reason. He then proposes that "affection" (πόθος) is required in order that God may be apprehended.

Nevertheless, whether the temperamental aspect of man is regarded as adverse to reason, or as something which is to be brought under its command, it is of no central importance in the theologies of many fathers. The communality of man recedes to the background as well. And with the emergence of the volitional faculty as a separate faculty in Neoplatonic thought, affection no longer occupies any significant role in ethics proper.
EXCURSUS TWO: The Place of Virginity in the Moral Life

In our study of Chrysostom's ethics, we have concluded that eschatological renewal is manifested in the vocation of suffering on the individual level, and in the structure of κηδεμοσία on the communal level. What then is the place of virginity, especially in view of its primacy in moral life within the Augustinian tradition? A proper treatment of Chrysostom's sexual ethics is outside our scope. Nevertheless, we hope in this excursus to review his early work de virginitate written in 382 AD. Our immediate interest is twofold. In the first place, scholars have generally endorsed the view that Chrysostom moderates his early rigorism in the course of his ministry. Grillet's comment on de virginitate is typical:

La virginité est ... un état préférable au mariage. ... Au cours des années de prêtrise, l'attitude de Jean sur ce point s'assouplit, sa pensée s'enrichit; il devint beaucoup plus attentif tant à la mission de la vierge dans la société qu'à la valeur sociale du mariage. C'est ainsi que l'aumône, l'amour du prochain, les œuvres de miséricorde et de charité sont considérés comme faisant partie intégrante de la virginité; le <<témoignage>> que porte une âme éprise de vertus chrétiennes est un tel signe du purité que l'intégrité physique n'est même plus nécessaire pour assurer l'esprit de virginité.

Then, after quoting Hom. 28 in Heb. (PG 63, 202), he adds: "Dans une homélie de 403, il accordera à des époux
We agree with Grillet that physical virginity on its own is an inadequate representation of true virginity. We have already in Chapter Three indicated this in our reference to Chrysostom's treatment of the Parable of the Ten Virgins. Nevertheless, we find Grillet's position inadequate. In the passage in Hom. 28 in Heb. referred to above, Chrysostom's interpretation of virginity is informed by 2 Cor. 11:2. He actually predicates virginity of "the whole body of the entire church". But Chrysostom had already expressed this view in 393 AD in the course of his exposition of 2 Cor. "The whole church is a virgin. For addressing himself [that is, Paul himself] even to all, both husbands and wives, he speaks thus." Now, in an exegesis of 1 Cor. 7 in the same year, he endorses de virginitate, citing it as the excuse for his present scanty treatment on the topic of marriage and virginity. We are led to conclude that these evidences suggest more continuity in thought than Grillet has allowed. Of course, we are not proposing that Chrysostom's position remains constant during the course of twenty one years between 382 and 403 AD. Our concern lies rather in whether the conceptual framework adopted in de virginitate is congenial to the development of his later mature thoughts. In other words, we are concerned whether to interpret the development of his views on the relation of marriage to virginity as a fundamental conceptual shift, or only a more detailed integration and a more diligent weeding out of inconsistency within the same theological vision.

Our second interest in considering de virginitate lies in the hitherto inadequate demarcation of Chrysostom's sexual ethics from those of his predecessors.
Again, Grillet has cited numerous material similarities between Chrysostom's treatise and passage from his predecessors, among whom are Clement of Alexandria, Methodius of Olympus, Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa, and Eusebius of Emesa. He suggests also that the plan of the treatise "n'est pas très rigoureux, car il s'agit beaucoup moins d'une composition méthodique que d'une pensée qui se développe guidée par le texte de saint Paul (1 Cor. 7)". We wish to investigate, perhaps in an all too scanty way, whether there is a purposeful shaping of tradition and systematic treatment behind the alleged eclecticism.

We now proceed to summarize the content of the treatise. It divides into four parts: Part I, Chapters 1 to 24; Part II, Chapters 25-48; Part III, Chapter 49 to 72; Part IV, Chapters 73 to 84. In the ensuing summary and discussion of each, we are concerned with the justification for observing bodily virginity. What prevents Chrysostom from interpreting virginity primarily as moral purity, in the sense that marriage and celibacy are to be regarded as equal alternatives towards sanctification and service to Christ?

Part I: Chrysostom sets out to answer two well-worn polarized views on sexual ethics: (a) the Manichaean contempt for marriage and the insistence on extreme asceticism on the one hand; and (b) an exclusively functional view of marriage and contempt for virginity on the other. In the course of responding to each, Chrysostom is forced to elucidate a theology of marriage.

(a) Chrysostom suggests in the main two reasons why marriage is not to be rejected. The first argument turns on the goodness of creation. If marriage is impure, all
beings, including human nature which God has brought forth, would be impure. In the second instance, Chrysostom turns to a consideration of the features of moral actions. He locates the excellence of virginity in the exercise of προσίρεσις: "If you make marriage a prohibited thing, your κατάρθωμα is no longer due to your προσίρεσις, but to a necessity enjoined by the law." This serves as the interpretative key to his remarks in Chapters 9 and 10 where the virginity-marriage correspondence is likened to that of counsel-precept and of general-soldier. The point which Chrysostom makes consists in the necessity for free will in moral action. He is not justifying any double standard theory as integral to Christian life.

(b) St Paul's words "It is well for a man not to touch a woman" (1 Cor. 7:1) lead to a fresh challenge: Why, then, is marriage instituted? How can one understand the traditional role of woman in childbearing? Would not the destruction of human race follow? Chrysostom answers by setting forth a salvation history. Adam was in virginal state prior to the fall. Marriage is instituted after the fall because of God's condescension to man. Its purpose lies in the checking of unruly passions among the immature. It therefore belongs to the material order. Citing 1 Cor. 7:33, he indicates that marriage is the consequence of disobedience. "Where death is, there is marriage." Celibacy corresponds to the shedding of childhood for the maturity made possible in Christ.

Let us examine the argument outlined so far in greater detail in order to come to a clearer appreciation of Chrysostom's position. There are two distinct elements. First, marriage is linked to the material
order; it is related to man's status after the fall. The second factor is the view that celibacy embodies the redemption in Christ. Here, the relation of marriage to celibacy is cast in a historical perspective: each corresponds respectively to the Old and the New Covenant.

The two features which we have just indicated are clearly not original to Chrysostom. With regard to the first element, Gregory of Nyssa, for example, has associated marriage with the irrational and sensible realms. It embodies the mortality -- "the sad tragedy" -- to which man is subject after the fall; in contrast, virginity constitutes man's angelic condition. Admittedly, sexuality is an integral aspect of man in his primeval state, so Gregory was at pains to maintain against the Manichaeans. Nevertheless, it was ordained by God in his foreknowledge of man's transgression.

Similarly, one version of the idea of casting virginity-marriage along a historical perspective (namely, the second feature in Chrysostom's analysis) can be found in Methodius' Symposium 1.2-4. The coming of Christ reveals the possibility and attainability of virginity, so Methodius asserts in his "history" of sex.

But Methodius is equally insistent that the revelation of Christ neither abolishes the institution of marriage, nor places a question mark against its nature. Marriage is essentially linked to procreation and the mutable order. Why this is so can be apprehended if we observe how anti-Manichaean polemic was conducted in the early church. Clement of Alexandria's position was representative. Gn. 1 and 2 were regarded as the locus classicus in defence of the goodness of marriage. In particular, procreation is a good because it is a
co-operation with the work of creation for the maintenance of the human race; it is an ordinance which is not abolished in the coming of Christ. This unquestioned assumption that the good of marriage consists in procreation was not derived from an unreflective use of Scripture, as the above might suggest. For suspicion about the material order, a view which the orthodox shared with the Manicheans, forced the church to identify procreation as the only good in marriage. In other words, given that marriage belongs to the irrational realm, procreation is the only good that can be salvaged from it. Gregory of Nyssa's position is again indicative. Marriage is not abominable, so he insisted. "While the pursuit of heavenly things should be a man's first care, yet if he can use the advantages of marriage with sobriety and moderation, he need not despise this way of serving the state." The marriage of Isaac to Rebecca was exemplary. Isaac married in his old age, so that his marriage was not a deed of passion; cohabitation was strictly for the purpose of procreation. This apologetic concern goes some way towards explaining on the one hand why virginity was hierarchically superior to marriage, as the noetic is over the sensible world; and showing on the other hand how the validity of marriage was upheld, being regarded as co-existent with virginity in an atemporal framework, and its good confined to that of procreation.

Here we can appreciate the significance of our earlier remark that Chrysostom does not derive the good of marriage from the account of the creation of man and woman in Gn. 2, nor from the mandate for procreation in Gn. 1:24. Rather, the defence is rooted in a more general consideration of the goodness of God the Creator. He severs the intrinsic tie maintained by his predecessors between procreation and marriage; God is able to people
the world quite independently of the agency of man. Marriage was instituted out of God's pastoral concern. The virginity-marriage relation corresponds to the dispensations of the Old and the New Covenant. To abide in the state of marriage is an admission of one's weakness; in particular, of one's solidarity with the Old Covenant. Correspondingly, virginity embodies the moral life under the New. (Chrysostom does not hold the same view of history in his later years, as we have shown in Chapter Four; what is important here is that he holds a dispensational understanding of redemption.)

Part II: Chrysostom proceeds to expound 1 Cor. 7:1-27a. The opening paragraphs set forth the basic tenet: Marriage is an aid for those about to fall, but for those who are (capable of) standing, it is an impediment; that is how Chrysostom interprets 1 Cor. 7:1-2. We need to distinguish two ways in which he perceives marriage to be an impediment. The first of these is expounded in the present portion; and the second in Part III. If no distinction is made we shall be puzzled by Chrysostom's seeming repetitiveness and disorganisation in his account of the woes of marriage.

Chrysostom's criticism in Part II is directed against marriage as an institution. Marriage is the most bitter servitude. This position is undergirded by 1 Cor. 7:4: "For the wife does not rule over her own body, but the husband does; likewise the husband does not rule over his own body, but the wife does." He proceeds to elucidate the following verse (v. 5) -- "Do not refuse one another except perhaps by agreement" -- as nothing other than an emphasis on the absoluteness in the bond, which pertains to all aspects of marital life rather than to conjugal rights as such. To marry or not to marry
depends on the individual; but once the person has entered into marriage, the mutual responsibility is obligatory and is to be endured even if the spouse proves incorrigible. In fact, so severe is this bond that its true nature is revealed only in the New Testament (in St Paul's words in 1 Cor. 7); the full extent was not disclosed in the time of the Old Covenant -- thus divorce was allowed, otherwise human society could not have survived. St Paul's severe tone (thus interpreted) is intended to serve as an encouragement towards celibacy. In contrast with the strictures intrinsic to marriage, celibacy allows an unfettered contribution of one's effort in the struggle against Satan.

Part III: Chrysostom confronts fresh exegetical problems in 1 Cor. 7:28b at the end of Part II. Verse 28b reads as follows: "Yet those who marry will have worldly tribulations, and I would spare you that." Is that -- the ridding of present tribulation -- the only benefit one reaps in celibate life. Who would embrace celibacy from such a trivial incentive? Part III opens with a threefold response. First, the audience to whom St Paul writes is still weak. As a wise physician, he adapts himself to their level, and hence does not elaborate on the heavenly rewards. Secondly, it is particular to the keeping of virginity that rewards are reaped in this world as well in terms of deliverance from labour and worry. And thirdly, it is in fact easier to remain celibate than to marry. The intrinsic ease of virginity recommends itself.

The critic then directs his charges against the truth of 1 Cor. 7:28b: the warning against tribulation is inconsistent with the sensual pleasure available within social life. After a brief remark on the prohibition of
sensual pleasure, Chrysostom proceeds to outline the tribulation in the social aspect of marriage, interspersing this with a delineation of the spiritual joy available to the celibate even in suffering for Christ.

Chrysostom demonstrates an uncompromising attitude in the preference for virginity as he has done in Part II. Here the consideration focuses on marriage in its solidarity with the material order; there his reflection centres on marriage as an institution. The celibate life is universally recommended. Intimations of this have already been indicated in Part I, and reinforced in Part II, when we remarked that celibacy and marriage correspond to the two dispensations of salvation history. Our case is strengthened by Chrysostom's answer to the query concerning whether the freedom from present tribulation constitutes a sufficient incentive towards celibate life. The first and third answers he gives indicate that he envisages celibacy to be recommended even to the weak. There is no necessary interdependence between the states of marriage and celibacy, since the former takes its reference exclusively from the human condition under the Old Covenant (from the fall to the coming of Christ). His treatment of Mt. 19:10-12 is illustrative. The Matthaean text, as it stands, clearly suggests that on the one hand, both virginity and marriage are open to the Christian v. 12b); and on the other hand, only virginity is properly regarded as a calling (v. 11). The text seems to support the "invalid" version of a double standard ethic. Chrysostom however sees that the import of the text lies in v. 12b ("He who is able to receive this, let him receive it"): celibacy is a challenge open to all. V. 11 ("Not all men can receive this saying, but only those to whom it is given") is deliberately glossed over in what is supposed to be a full citation of the passage.
in Chapter 13 of the treatise; in other words, for Chrysostom, the challenge in v. 12b is the answer given to the remark: ("It is not expedient to marry") of Jesus' disciples.

The point to which we are leading is this: a consideration of the social ills in marital life, as Chrysostom has made here, could not on its own lead to an unreserved endorsement of virginity over marriage. For on the one hand, there lies a tradition of contemplative life, which regards virginity as the more perfect state. Those who embrace it are "the helpers of Christ" for the yet imperfect. There is, however, another tradition informed by the agonal spirit at least from the time of Origen, which insists that marriage should be embraced by the spiritually advanced. Only they, and no one else, could stand firm amidst the cares of the material world. Virginity is therefore a haven for the weak. This vacillation even within a single work of Gregory of Nyssa is indicative of the unresolved dilemma. We have suggested earlier in our discussion on Part I that the fundamental obstacle lies in an atemporal interpretation of marriage and virginity. Put differently, the dispute with the Manichaeans had forces the orthodox to derive sexual ethics from Gn. 1 and 2 without any (necessary) Christological reflection (say, in tying Eph. 5 to Gn. 1). Once this was superimposed onto a Neoplatonic noetic-sensible ordering of nature, marriage became ontologically grounded in the material world. And the Stoic option to regard marriage as a superior state on the ground that it constitutes an heroic endurance in the material realm became valid. The vacillation which we have observed in Chrysostom's predecessors was not accidental; it was intrinsic to the theoretical framework in which they operated. The view that marriage could be
regarded as a challenge for the spiritually advanced is never proposed by Chrysostom. This silence is significant; for in analysing a topic which has been so well treated in the tradition as the woes of domestic life, not so much what he says as what he has left unsaid is of consequence. For him, virginity put negatively is a deliverance from the woes which arise from the material world; nevertheless, it is never understood as a refuge. The spiritual agon is entrusted exclusively to the celibate; it is the vocation characteristic of the New Covenant to which all are called.

Part IV: Chrysostom completes his exegesis of 1 Cor. 7 in Part IV. In these remaining chapters, his deliberations are guided in the main by eschatological ordering of moral life indicated in verses 29 to 31. It is salutary to remind ourselves of Chrysostom's position hitherto advanced. He regards virginity not just as a higher good, but as the good. For marriage is not a creation ordinance; in terms of later theological distinction, it is a post-lapsarian institution which operates within a circumscribed moral world. The pedagogical function of marriage, predicated even of the time before Christ, which we have noted several times in the course of our study, is conspicuously absent in this early work.

Notwithstanding, two considerations present themselves to us. First, the "old world order" has constituted the reference point from which virginity is praised and marriage criticised. In advancing the good of virginity, Chrysostom does not situate it in terms of metaphysical realities, for example, impassibility of the angelic life. Its praiseworthiness lies rather in the exercising of the free will -- the responsiveness to spiritual realities open in Christ -- which is embodied in
the celibate state. But once the element and centrality of free will is accentuated, Chrysostom is forced to locate the essence of virginity in the "undivided devotion to the Lord without any imposition of restraint" (1 Cor. 7:35). Chastity of the soul and consecration to Christ are integral aspects of virginity.

Our second consideration pertains to the ordering of the moral life vis-a-vis the eschaton, which Chrysostom has left untreated until the present portion of the treatise. In Chapters 74 and 75, he devotes himself to this question: "How could those who have wives live as though they had none?" The seriousness which he attaches to this question reflects an agitation about the possibility of ordering marital life in relation to the eschaton. "Do not refuse one another (v. 5)" does not pertain to all aspects within marriage. Thus he contradicts his earlier position in Chapter 29. It refers now only to conjugal rights. A marriage in accordance with St Paul's injunction in 1 Cor. 7:29 is this:

We are required to refuse the unnecessary worry which arise from the prudery and indulgence of woman; nevertheless, to take up those additional cares which come naturally in the course of association with one soul; indeed, with a soul which has chosen to live wisely (φιλοσοφώσ) and simply. ...For those who do not rejoice no longer preoccupy themselves in their fortune and those who weep not would neither be burdened by poverty nor have an aversion to frugality. Such is how one is to have a wife and yet have not, such is how to use (κεχρησθαί) the world yet not to abuse (κατακεχρησθαί) it.
The spiritual discernment "in using" rather than "abusing" and the possibility of a discriminating service in "refusing" and yet "taking up": such are the possibilities of vitalisation in marital life under the New Covenant. Chrysostom does not elaborate these thoughts any further in this treatise. But the seeds that will lead to perceiving the redemptive significance of mutual care available in marriage are already there. The treatise ends with an affirmation of the higher precepts revealed and enjoined to all in the time after Christ. The impossibility of reverting to an Old Testament concept of marriage, the centrality of receptivity to spiritual reality, the opportunity to serve Christ in marriage: these are the roots which develop later on to a profounder understanding of what perfection consists in.

As a postscript, the new features of marriage under the New Covenant which we saw above are elaborated in de laude Maximi et quales ducendae uxores. This is delivered in Constantinople as the final one of a series of three sermons on marriage. The first two are on 1 Cor. 7:2 and 7:39. The indissolubility of marriage (in Mt. 5:32) forms the point of departure of the third sermon. A person contemplating marriage should take note of its seriousness, Chrysostom warns. For the wife's imperfections should never be the ground for divorce. Matrimony is different from commercial trade. The inconveniences are to be endured, the imperfections to be reformed. A detailed exegesis of Eph. 5:25-32 then follows. The care of a husband for his wife is likened to Christ's redemptive love for the church; to St Paul's pastoral love for the churches of Galatia and Corinth despite their weakness; and to the care among members of the same body. The redemptive focus of marriage is further sharpened by linking the creation of Eve to the
outpouring of blood from the wound of Christ on the Cross (Jn. 19:34). The μυστήριον μέγα (Eph. 5:32) in fact is shown in the love of Christ for the church. This love is rehearsed in the love between the bride and the bridegroom who, although they have not met each other before the wedding, prefer each other to their own parents. This reveals that the love between the spouses is sown by God rather than something which issues from man. Marriage is the sharing of life (κοινωνία βίου). Husband and wife complement each other in their different social responsibilities. Marriage is ordained in order that we may flee from fornication, suppress concupiscence, and so live together in chastity and in a manner well-pleasing to God. In sum, it is ordained to help those who enter it towards σωφροσύνη.

A comparison of this account of marriage with that of Augustine is outside the scope of this study. We simply note that in Chrysostom's writing there is a startling absence of any reference to procreation as a good of marriage. Nor does Chrysostom suggest a continent relation to be the ideal for marriage. Marriage is developed in terms of pastoral care (as Christ to the church, St Paul to the local congregations, and mutual care within the Body) in order that the spouses may live in σωφροσύνη. Of course, there is an element of "fleeing from fornication". But this care against sexual temptation is developed within the wider context of the sharing of life which embraces the entire spectrum of human existence. The indissolubility of marriage is grounded objectively in Christ's redemptive love for the church, the μυστήριον μέγα; this is the foundation for the union between the lover and the beloved on the subjective level.
Abbreviations

For the editions and full titles of works by Chrysostom and other ancient Christian writers abbreviated in the Notes, the reader is referred to the Bibliography. For works of pagan writers we have adopted the abbreviations used in Liddell, Scott and Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, and Lewis and Short, *A Latin Dictionary*. Apart from these, the following abbreviations are used:

- **BA** Bibliothèque Augustinienne: Oeuvres de Saint Augustin (Paris, 1933-).
- **CCSL** Corpus christianorum series latina (Turnhout, 1953-)
- **CSEL** Corpus *scriptorum* ecclesiasticorum latinorum (Wien, 1866-).
- **DS** *Dictionnaire de spiritualité*, edd. M. Viller *et al.* (Paris, 1937-).
- **FC** The Fathers of the Church (Washington, D.C., 1947-).
- **GCS** Die griechischen christlichen *Schriftsteller* (Berlin, 1897-).
- **LCC** Library of Christian Classics (London, 1953-).
- **Mansi** J.D. Mansi, *Sacrorum conciliorum noua et amplissima collectio* (Florence, 1759-1798).


SC  Sources chrétiennes (Paris, 1941-).

ST  Summa Theologiae.


NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE


4. Carter, ibid., p. 136; such seems even to be the verdict of F.M. Young despite her sensitive treatment of Chrysostom in her From Nicaea to Chalcedon (London: SCM, 1983), p. 159. She suggests that in dogmatics Chrysostom popularised rather than contributed.

5. Socrates, HE 6.21 [NPNF-II 2, 152].


7. Young, op. cit., p. 123.


12. Clement of Alexandria, ods; Basil of Caesarea, hom. in Ps. 48.1.


15. See Robert Vernay, "Découragement," DS 3, c. 64; see also E. Dublanchy, "Désespoir," DTC 4, cc. 620-622, esp. c. 622.


17. See Dublanchy, op. cit., c. 621.

18. Such is the title of another of Kierkegaard's treatises, Purity of Heart is to will One Thing, trans. D. Steere (Revised ed.; New York: Harper and Brother, 1948). It is dedicated by the author to "that solitary individual".


20. See Dublanchy, op. cit.


23. Ibid., pp. x-xi.

24. Ibid., p. 468.

25. Ibid., p. 469 (italics mine).

26. Ibid., p. xi.

27. Ibid., pp. 468-471.

28. So in the New Testament we see the importance of the ministry of παράκλησις and of παραμυθία. On the former, see Ac. 14:22, 20:2; Rom. 12:1, 15:30, 16:17; Eph. 4:1; 1 Thess. 4:1; on the latter, see 2 Cor. 1:3ff; Col. 2:2; 1 Thess. 5:11, 14. Παράκλησις and παραμυθία are integral to the life of the church and evangelism: see 1 Cor. 14:3;
1 Thess. 2:11; Phil. 2:1. Cf. Gustav Stählin, TDNT 5, 821: "In the secular world consolation only too often takes the form of moral exhortation. ...In the NT, however, admonition becomes genuine comfort and vice versa, so that it is hard to separate between the two. ...The unity of admonition and consolation is rooted in the Gospel itself, which is both gift and task."

29. It is important to circumscribe the scope of our criticism. Our comments are more relevant to a "Western" approach to patristic ethics, and its formulation of the relation of the church to the individual. A proper evaluation of the doctrine of personalism and the ethics of sobornost in the Eastern Church fall outside our scope. We simply note the treatment of Lossky in his book The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church. He underlines the final goal of orthodox theology as that of union with God. This seeming verbal similarity with Kirk should not blind us to their divergent ecclesiologies. Lossky declares that "the eastern tradition has never made a sharp distinction between mysticism and theology; between personal experience of the divine mysteries and the dogma affirmed by the Church. ...There is, therefore, no Christian mysticism without theology; but above all, there is no theology without mysticism" (ibid., pp. 8-9). Lossky advocates an apophatic theology. Ethics are essentially religious, the constant repentance and transformation of the human person before the face of the living God (ibid., p. 238). He equally emphasizes the pneumatological aspect of the church. Without the Holy Spirit, "dogmas would be kept abstract truths, external authorities imposed from without upon a blind faith, reasons contrary to reason, received by obedience and afterwards adapted to our mode of understanding" (ibid., p. 239). We are in full agreement with Lossky in this evaluation. See also his exposition of the Christological and Pneumatological aspects of the church in ibid., pp. 183-195. But we question whether this freedom in the Spirit (in the liturgical life) is not maintained by Lossky at the expense of a proper recognition of the spatio-temporal dimensions of the church. On the Orthodox doctrine of the church, see also Timothy Ware, The Orthodox Church (Revised ed.; Harmondsworth; Penguin, 1980), pp. 203-303.

30. R.A. Norris, Jr., op. cit., 244-245.

31. Ibid., 245.
32. Ibid.

33. Ibid., 244-245.


35. Norris, op. cit., 245.


37. So e.g. G.W. Forell claims in his History of Christian Ethics Vol I: From the New Testament to Augustine (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1979), p. 132: "Chrysostom's general philosophical and moral context is very similar to that of his teacher Libanius and the would-be reformer of Greek paganism, emperor Julian".


39. Even a cursory survey of "Authors and Works" in PGL, ix-xlili will at once reveal the abundance of homiletical material which has not usually been studied under the discipline of theology proper. And perhaps the sheer volume of this material presents an obstacle. It demands more than all else an unwearied patience from the student.


41. So at the Ninth International Patristic Conference (Oxford, September 5-10, 1983), in her paper "John Chrysostom on II Corinthians", F.M. Young underlines the empathy and interplay between Chrysostom, St Paul, and their respective audiences. Empathy allows Chrysostom to ask the right questions of the text, and to discern what St Paul is saying and why.

43. Ibid., p. 117.


45. MacIntyre, After Virtue, Chapter 12: "Aristotle's Account of the Virtues" (pp. 137-153), and Chapter 13: "Medieval Aspects and Occasions" (pp. 154-168). The discussion on the New Testament appears at the beginning of Chapter 13.
NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

1. E.g. ἀθυμεῖν: hom. 78 in Jn. (419); ἀπογιγνώσκειν: see index in SC 117; ἀποκάμειν: poenit. 8 (338); ἀπελπίζειν: hom. 16 in Ac. (130). 

2. Incomprehens. 5 (310). 

3. Sac. 1.3 (76); stat. 4 (59): ψυχήν ὀδυνωμένην is coupled with νέφει κατεχομένην ἀθυμίας. See also the numerous references to ἀθυμία and λύπη as the lot of a sufferer in epp. Olym. 8 and 10. 


5. Hom. 24 in Ac. (188). 

6. Hom. 28 in Rom. (650) [rev.]. 

7. Sac. 3.9 (162). 

8. Hence Chrysostom depicts the despair of widows due to poverty in sac. 3.12 (206); the horror of those who despair under intense physical pain is described in Stag. 3 (490-491). 

9. See diab. 1-3; epp. Olym. esp. 8 and 10; laed.; Stag. 1-3; Thdr. L and T. 

10. Stag. 3 (491). 

11. Ibid. 

12. Ibid.: τὴν γὰρ ἀθυμίαν ἐνέθηκεν ἡμῶν ὁ θεὸς τῇ φύσει. 


14. Hom. in Phil. 1:18 (320). 

15. Stag. 3 (492): Μὴ παυέσθω σπουδάζου, καὶ ταχέως διυνησται. 


17. Ibid., p. 49. 

18. Ibid., pp. 49-53. 

19. Ibid., pp. 51-52. 

21. See ibid., p. 143; see also his Either/Or.
22. See e.g. Sophocles, Ant. 237; OT 747; Tr. 666.
23. Xenophon, An. 5.4.19; Cyr. 4.1.8; HG 6.2.24.
24. Hipprocrates, Aër. 16.3-4.
26. Aristotle, Metaph. 1009b37; Plato, Sph. 264b9; Xenophon, Oec. 8.21.
27. Sophocles, El. 769-770.
28. Aristotle, Pr. 954a23.
29. Xenophon, Mem. 3.12.6.
30. Ibid.
34. See e.g. Philo, de Iosepho 181, 247; de spec. leg. 2.87: de vita Mosis 1.40.
35. Philo, de vita Mosis 1.192; Plutarch, Per. 13.8.
36. Demosthenes, or. 4.42, 15.9, 19.54; Plutarch, Ant. 34.2, Nic. 21.2, Thea. 6.3; Polybius, Historia 1.29.5; 5.1.5; Xenophon, An. 1.7.19, HG 7.5.7.
37. Demosthenes, or. 3.33, 22.39, 34.21, 40.39, 58.17; Philo, quod deus sit imm. 180; de fuga et invent. 89; leg. alleg. 2.51; leg. ad Gaium 249.
38. Demosthenes, or. 6.16; cf. Philo, de ebrietate 46.
39. Philo, In Flaccum 75; Plutarch, Per. 13.8; Polybius, Historia 2.35.1, 21.26.14, 30.8.3.
40. Plutarch, Alex. 16.7.

41. Philo, quod omnis probus liber est 114.

42. Aristotle, EN 1115b2; cf. ibid. 1115a30. A courageous man may fear the storm at sea, depairing in the hope of safety, because disaster at sea is beyond one's control, beyond one's endurance, and is a proper object of fear.

43. Philo, de spec. leg. 3.99.

44. E.g. in de Abrahamo 268: κακοδαυμονίας ἀπόγνωσις, γνώσις εὐσεβείας; cf. de plantatione 64, 66.

45. De spec. leg. 3.6.

46. De Abrahamo 268; de cherubim 29; de sacrif. Abelis et Caini 71: "God is the only Saviour in despair."

47. De spec. leg. 2.67, 3.128.

48. De mut. nom. 218.

49. Ibid. 8; de somniis 1.60.

50. De Abrahamo 175.

51. De plantatione 64.

52. De mut. nom. 222.

53. Cicero, Att. 8.11.6; Fam. 2.5.2, 4.3.2, 10.21.3.

54. Att. 16.15.5; Cat. 2.5; Fam. 2.16.6.

55. Cat. 2.10; Sull. 76.

56. Fam. 2.26.6.

57. See supra, n. 54.

58. See also Cicero, Clu. 68; Mur. 42, 43; Fam. 7.3.2., 12.14.3.

59. Tusc. 4.1-18.

60. Ibid. 4.18.

61. Ibid. 3.76ff, 4.81-82.
62. Ibid. 4.61.
63. Ibid. 4.62.

64. See Excursus One: The Place of Affection in Christian Antiquity.

65. Chrysostom, sac. 6.10(338)[rev.].
66. Ibid. 3.14, 5.5(220-222, 292).
67. Ibid. 1.4(84-86).
68. Hom. 75 in Jn. (405).
69. Hom. 1 in Ac. (26).
70. Sac. 6.10, 12(338-348).
71. Gregory of Nazianzus, or. 2.


73. Or. 2.7, 22, 71, 112.
74. See sac. 6.12(344-362).

75. Sac. 3.14(222); cf. 2 Cor. 2:7. See also hom. 44 in Ac. (312) where Chrysostom, now as a pastor, reveals his own anguish for the welfare of his people. Cf. his description of Bishop Flavian's despondency after the riot in Antioch in stat. 21(213-214).

76. Stag. 3(478), commenting on Deut. 4:21ff. Cf. his description of St Paul's ἀθυμία for the churches and sympathy for the weak in sac. 4.6(266): τὰς ἀδιάλειπτους ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν ἀθυμίας, τὸ πρὸς τοὺς ἄσθενεῖς συμπαθεῖς. Cf. 2 Cor. 11:28.

77. E.g. hom. 31 in 1 Cor. (257); ibid. 38(330-332).
78. See e.g. educ. lib. 4-7(74-82); hom. 5 in Ac. (54-55).

79. Hom. 78 in Jn. (419). See also poenit. 4(300): Despair proceeds from either the circumstance of sin or from the attack of mishaps.
80. Stat. 5 and 6(74, 86).

81. Stag. 3(493).

82. Hom. 12 in 2 Cor.(485).

83. Hom. 16 in Ac.(131-132). Cf. Chrysostom's exegesis of Ac. 2:47: "Two things there were which might deject them: their abstemious living, and the loss of their property. Yet on both accounts did they rejoice." See hom. 7 in Ac.(66).

84. Hom. 38 in 1 Cor.(332)[rev.]

85. Ibid.[rev.]

86. Poenit. 4(301); cf. stat. 5(69): the counsels of Job are a consolation for all άδουλαί.

87. Hom. 10 in 2 Cor.(471-472); cf. hom. 43 in Mt.(462-463); ibid. 61(589); hom. 18 in Rom.(582-584); hom. 1 in 2 Cor. 4:13(280-282).


89. Hence in ep. Olym. 8(166-170), he depicts the horror in the last judgement. It is to be the only object of fear. All other forms of grief are vain and exaggerated. This present life vis-à-vis the world to come is likened to dream and shadow in the face of reality. See virg. 58(318). See also Stag. 3(471): the present life is a brief stay in a dismal inn prior to our possession of a kingdom in the future. For this reason, despair is proper for all the saints in this present age. Cf. the motif of this age as a woman in travail in Jn. 16:21 and Rom. 8:18-25. See Chrysostom's comments in hom. 79 in Jn.(427) and hom. 14 in Rom.(531-532). See infra, Chapter Five.

90. Poenit. 1(282).


92. See G.J.M. Bartelink, "Quelques Observations sur


95. Catech. 13.18[WS 6, 47].

96. Ibid. 15.18[WS 6, 82].

97. Chrysostom, catech. 1.17, 2.29, 3.5(117-118, 150, 153). Cf. hom. 4 in Col.(325); hom. 9 in Rom.(471).

98. Scand. 2.12; 3.5(66, 76).


100. E.g. see Chrysostom's account of Azariah, the priest rebuking Uzziah in hom. 5.2 in Is. 6:1(184-192).


102. Epp. Olym. 8.7, 10.3(184, 252).

103. Hom. 2.2 in Is. 6:1(92); incomprehens. 3(202-208); ibid. 4(230-232).

104. Hom. 1.5 in Is. 6:1(70-74). See also ibid. 1.6(76); poenit 1 and 8(281, 338).

105. See e.g. incomprehens. 5(322); catech. 7.3(230-231); epp. Olym. 8.3, 10.9(170, 278); hom. 1 in Col.(308); virg. 49(274).

Louis Meyer also points out the different line of approach which Chrysostom follows in comparison with his more ascetic contemporaries (even Basil of Caesarea). See his Saint Jean Chrysostome: Maître de perfection chrétienne (Paris: Beauchesne, 1933), p. 183. Meyer categorises ἅπαντα along with joy and peace as the marks of man's union with God, union which is already manifested in the souls of those who are advanced in virtue. Nevertheless, he does not
attribute any special significance to this concept of παρηγορία. He ends his brief study on παρηγορία with this note: "Il nous est impossible de pousser bien lien l'étude de cet état. Son caractère surnaturel et peut-être mystique mériterait d'être établi sur base plus large que les œuvres de Chrysostome" (p. 182 n. 6). A.-M. Malingrey indicates the rich and diverse usages of παρηγορία and cites examples from its frequent occurrences in Chrysostom's works. See SC 79, p. 66 n. 2. Her classification is primarily lexicographical and lacks a systematic theological understanding of παρηγορία in Chrysostom's ethics.

106. Stat. 7(95).
107. Serm. 3 in Gn. (591); stat. 7(93).
108. Stat. 7(93).
109. See Diodorus of Tarsus, frag. 9 in Gn.
110. Serm. 2 in Gn. (589).
111. E.g. Gregory of Nyssa, hom. opif. 4.
112. Serm. 3 in Gn. (592).
113. See e.g. stat. 7(93-94).
114. Serm. 3 in Gn. (591).
115. Ibid. (592); hom. 9 in Gn. (79); stat. 11(125).
116. Serm. 4 in Gn. (595-596).
117. Serm. 5 in Gn. (602).
118. Hom. 44 in Ac. (312-314)[rev.].
119. Serm. 7 in Gn. (610).
120. Poenit. 1(283).
121. See e.g. hom. 84 in Mt. (751).
122. Hom. 19 in Rom. (590).
123. E.g. exp. in Ps. 41(162).
125. Hom. 20 in Gn. (168-169).
126. Hom. 41 in Mt. (449).

127. Ibid.

128. Christian tradition antecedent to Chrysostom generally does not attribute a major theological role to conscience (συνείδησις, συνείδητος). E.g. in Clement of Alexandria, it constitutes the moral self's own inviolability (in the context of 1 Cor. 8). See str. 4.7 and 15; cf. str. 1.1. It is God-given rather than socially conditioned. See str. 2.6: Both faith and conscience are not inferior to reason. Both are God-given. Clement also connects genuine repentance with a conscience in shame. See str. 4.6. A good conscience prepares one upon death to meet Christ, "to possess by a process of blending the power of God communicated by Him". See str. 7.12. The most significant use in relation to ethics is found in str. 7.7 in the course of a discussion of the prayer of a Gnostic. He links conscience to instinctive desire (θυμος), and refers to the volition (προαιρετικόν) as "speaking to God via the conscience". That is to say, an integration of the self, in its moral resolve and desire, is the hallmark of a gnostic prayer. Nevertheless, in all these contexts, the reference to conscience is no more than an incidental allusion in the course of Clement's exposition of a logos-theology.

129. E.g. Anna 1.3 (636); exp. in Ps. 147 (482); hom. 17 in Gn. (135).

130. Exp. in Ps. 147 (482); hom. 52 in Gn. (462).

131. Exp. in Ps. 147 (482).


133. Hom. 2 in Col. (317-318); cf. Laz. 4 (1011); stat. 8 (99).

134. Exp. in Ps. 41 (163); hom. 7 in Heb. (64); Thdr. L 3 (64-66).

135. Exp. in Ps. 41 (163).

136. See hom. 51 in Ac. (357-358); hom. 19 in Heb. (139).

137. Laz. 4 (1012).

138. See e.g. hom. 15 in Ac. (124); Laz. 2.2 (984-985).
139. E.g. catech. 7.16-18(256-258); exp. in Ps. 4(52).

140. E.g. Thdr. T 7 and 17(110, 186).

141. Exp. in Ps. 4(52); cf. stat. 12(127): Chrysostom addresses the congregation after the crisis: "If the memory of these terrors abide with us, we shall never be overtaken by the actual experience(πείρα) of such terrors."

142. Cf. hom. 17 in Gn.(135): "If Adam though aided by conscience, goaded by such an implacable accuser ...nevertheless succumbs to sloth, to what disorder he would be led if deprived... of such aid." Chrysostom sees the salvific value of even negative experiences. Man is able to see the consequences of his evil deeds, and hence (at least) he himself can be taught by self-reflection. The experience of despair becomes in the hand of the wise Physician a rigorous and corrosive remedy for the freeing of man from his sin. See Stag. 3(491-492).

143. Laz. 4(1013). Cf. Chrysostom's exposition on Ps. 129: 3-4(LXX) in exp. in Ps. 41(162).

144. Grat. (658).

145. Ibid.

146. Scand. 7.39(130).

147. Ibid. 8.1-12(132-140).

148. See GPL, 1476.


150. See e.g. laed. 7 and 10(94, 106). The power of
vengeance is diametrically opposed to philanthropia. See also ep. Olym. 7.4(150): the cruelty of the Jews to Christ reveals their lack of philanthropia.

151. Stat. 3(56-57)[rev.].

152. Hom. 43 in Ac. (307-308).


154. Exp. in Ps. 129(375-376).

155. Hom. 74 in Mt. (682-683).


157. Ibid. 4(94-96).

158. See e.g. hom. 18 in Mt. (283); see the exposition of the Lord's Prayer in hom. 39 in Mt. (437); hom. in Mt. 7:14(44); hom. 30 in Gn. (273-274). In the last passage just cited, Chrysostom observes that even law courts are closed during Holy Week. Note that philanthropia is already employed within the Christian tradition to characterise man's proper disposition to his fellows. See e.g. hom. Clem. 12.25-33; Clement of Alexandria, str. 7.3. See Downey, op. cit. for details.

159. Hom. in Jer. 10:23(158-159); cf. ascens. 3(447); hom. 78 in Mt. (716); pecc. 11(363).

160. See hom. 18 in Mt. (269); hom. 1 in 2 Cor. 4:13(277-278).

161. See e.g. hom. 2 in 2 Cor. 4:13(287-288); hom. in Phil. 1:18(315).

162. Eleem. 6(269-272).

163. See e.g. hom. 32 in 1 Cor. (268): ἀναισθησία is akin to lifelessness(ἀψυχός) and lovelessness; hom. 2 in 2 Cor. (397); hom. 5 in Rom. (430-431): it depicts insensitivity towards God's mercy; pecc. 12(363-364): it is unkindness(ἀυθυγοούν) towards one's fellows; hom. 72 in Jn. (341): it leads to shamelessness; hom. 13 in Eph. (93-94): it is the condition of an unregenerate man.
NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE


2. See infra, pp. 78-80 on Clement of Alexandria.


4. Origen, hom. 4.4 in Jer.

5. Eusebius, poenit. 2 and 16.


7. Ep. 46.

8. Gregory, or. 39.18[NPNF-II 7, 359].


11. See e.g. Eusebius, poenit.; Cyril of Jerusalem, catech. 2; Basil, ep. 46.2; reg. br. 13; Gregory, or. 39.18-19; Jerome, ep. 122; Chrysostom, poenit. 1-6, 8.


13. Eusebius, poenit. 16.


15. Ibid. 14; cf. ibid. 2.

16. Ibid. 4.

17. 2 Clem. 18.


21. See Telfer, *op. cit.*, esp. Chapter IV: "Progress by Penitence," with respect to the beginning of the distinction made between sins committed voluntarily or involuntarily. Telfer attributes this to Platonic influences.


23. *Or.* 16.15[NPNF-II 7, 252].

24. Basil, *hom.* in *Ps.* 32[FC 46, 229-230(rev.)].

25. See e.g. Tertullian, *pud.* 12.

26. See esp. Eusebius, *poenit.* 1-2, and 17. Cf. Gregory of Nazianzus, *or.* 39.18: "Both are alike evil: indulgence not regulated by prudence, and condemnation that will never forgive; the one because it relaxes all reins, the other because it strangles by its severity." See also *or.* 18.25.

27. See Eusebius' allusion to Jonah 4; Mt. 6:12; 7:2 and similar texts in *poenit.* 6 and 11.


29. See e.g. *or.* 40.31. A detailed treatment of Gregory's use of *philanthropia*, esp. in relation to *askesis*, can be found in D.F. Winslow, *The Dynamics of Salvation*, pp. 151-170.

30. On the exhortation to repentance, see 2 Clem. 9, 12, 13, 16, 17, 20. On the coming kingdom of God, see *ibid.* 12.


33. See *ibid.* 13. In the same section, 2-Clement writes: "We must repent and be vigilant for the good.

34. See *infra*, p. 75.


36. On *εἰμισπέρειν*, see e.g. *ibid.* 16-17, 19; on almsgiving and prayer, see esp. *ibid.* 16.
37. Clement of Alexandria, qds 42. See also Chrysostom, Thdr. T(202).

38. Qds 42. Cf. ibid. 36: The friend of God is one who is sent here on a kind of foreign service by the Father's high dispensation and suitable choice. See also the phrases ἄγγελος τοῦ θεοῦ and ἄγγελος τῆς μετανοίας in ibid. 41, 42.

39. Ibid. 42.

40. Ibid. 30-36, 41.


42. 2 Clem. 6-8.

43. So Gregory of Nazianzus vacillates as to whether there can be complete restoration of the penitent. Scars remain and tarnish the original lustre conferred at baptism. See or. 40.8-9. The mistake of regarding the efficacy of baptism in terms of forgiveness rather than (the more Pauline understanding of) justification has been elaborated by M.F. Wiles in "One Baptism for the Remission of Sins," Church Quarterly Review, 165(1964), 59-66.

44. Clement, qds 42.

45. See Basil of Caesarea epp. 188, 199 and 217. Theodore of Mopsuestia also expounds on the practice of (private) confession to priests. They are identified as the vehicle of God's providence. Regulations for penitence were laid down from the beginning, and the priests and the experts, who heal and care for the sinners, bring medicine to the mind of the penitents who are in need, according to the ecclesiastical ordinance and wisdom which is regulated in accordance with the measure of the sins. ...Because God greatly cares for us gave us penitence and showed us the medicine of repentance, and established some men, who are the priests, as physicians of sins, so that if we receive in this world through them healing and forgiveness of sins, we shall be delivered from the judgement to come." See Theodore, catech. 16.39 and 44[WS 6, 120 and 123].

46. Gregory, or. 39.17 and 19.

47. Wiles, op. cit., p. 65.


51. Hans von Campenhausen's study on church office and authority in the time of Origen is illuminating. See *op. cit.*, pp. 238-264. Origen has a more charismatic understanding of the church than that proposed in *constitutiones apostolorum*. It is regarded as "a living, free cosmos of spiritual gifts in which every Christian can have his share even without the help of official mediators" (p. 249). "Even though the formal and sacramental acts of penance may still be left to the official holders of the power of the keys, yet as regards the pastoral care which must accompany them, and by which alone they can be made meaningful in a deeper sense, the person in need of help cannot be expected to confine himself to the officials of the Church alone (pp. 260-61)." Nevertheless, these concerns remain exclusively on the intellectual level. The hierarchical system is left unquestioned. Origen's criticisms are "one-sidedly moralist and individualist, and lack an ecclesiastical or dogmatic reference" (p. 264). Because of this, while these pietistic critiques may have "a stimulating or liberating effect in detail", a more authoritarian concept of the church could fit into the Origenist tradition, and in fact this was the case (p. 264). Do we not detect in the above a Lutheran trait in von Campenhausen's analysis?


54. Clement, *str.* 7.11. See also *str.* 4.3; *ibid.* 4.13; *ibid.* 6.14.

55. Clement gives this theme a full treatment in *str.*
7. A key concept is benefit (ὡφέλεια). The gnostic is beneficial to the church. See str. 7.9, 12. Earlier in str. 6.17, he outlines the content of this benefit: in discipline, exhortation, and command.

56. Str. 2.19.

57. Ibid. 7.12.


59. Chrysostom, hom. 32 in Mt. (386) [rev.].

60. Chrysostom, hom. div. 1.2-6 (462-468). He utilises the theme of weakness in Heb. 5:1-3. See Hom. 8 in Heb. (67-68) for his comments on this passage. Weakness provides a basis for knowing the necessity of humility, the disposition in which one receives benefits from others. See infra, Chapters Four and Five.

61. Hom. 40 in Ac. (286-287) [rev.].

62. Chrysostom makes no distinction between φιλία and ἰγνώμων. Both terms are used interchangeably. To the Christian community whose members are at war with one another, Chrysostom pleads for mutually-expressed pastoral care among the congregation. Friendship implies tolerance and support. See e.g. hom. 7 in 2 Tim. (640): "No envy, no calumny is there, where there is genuine love (φιλία). We not only do not slander our friends, but we stop the mouth of slanderers. All is gentleness and mildness. ...Everything breathes peace." He goes on to extol the friendship between David and Jonathan.

63. See infra, pp. 91-95.

64. Hence, with respect to the features of friendship which we have delineated above, he pleads to his congregation: "Ye know this, all you that have friends, friends, I mean, in reality ...who is really linked to another. And let those who are ignorant of it learn from those who know." See hom. 7 in 2 Tim. (640).

65. See hom. 1 in Col. (302-303).

66. Hom. 40 in Ac. (286) [rev.].

67. Hom. 27 in 2 Cor. (587): "For nothing is more useless than a man that knows not to love (φιλεῖν). This law even robbers have often times respected."
68. See hom. 32-34 in 1 Cor.(263-296).

69. Hom. 34 in 1 Cor.(289-290).

70. Hom. 34 in 1 Cor.(290): πάν γὰρ ζῶν ζώνα τὸ δύοιόν αὐτῶ. See also hom. 43 in Ac.(306): "Nothing so marks to us the stamp of human nature as the showing mercy and philanthropia." Cf. Sentences of Sextus, s.443: φίλον ἡγοῦ τὸ ὄμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ. See also Aristotle EN 1155a34, 1165b17: τὸ ὄμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον.

71. Hom. 34 in 1 Cor.(289)[rev.].

72. Hom. 27 in Rom.(647-48)[rev.]. The implication of this passage, the love towards a harlot, will be taken up in the course of this chapter. One obvious difficulty is the question of what constitutes a "proper" friendship.

73. Cf. also his use of Prov. 20:6(LXX): "For a man is a great thing, and a merciful man a precious thing." See e.g. hom. 52 in Mt.(524).

74. Hom. 5 in Rom.(422).

75. Hom. 76 in Mt.(694).

76. Ibid. 80(728). Cf. hom. 39 in Ac.(281).

77. Hom. 52 in Mt.(524).

78. Ibid.

79. Chrysostom also pays much attention to the concept of ζῆλος which he identifies as one's inclination to outshine another. It opens up one's field of perception in recognising the existence of the other. It could provide a powerful impetus towards well-doing. See e.g. hom. 30 in Rom.(661); eleem. 3(264). Nevertheless, it is qualified in two important ways. In the first place, it is a concession. Commenting on St Paul's plea to the Corinthians to give alms, he points out that the example of the Lord ought to have had the power to draw them into almsgiving, but because of their weakness, St Paul appeals to the example of the Macedonians as well in order that their zeal might be aroused. See hom. 19 in 2 Cor.(529). In the second place, only the biblical heroes of faith are worthy of emulation, for zeal must be properly channelled. The problem of the zeal of the Jews is that it is for the sake of the earthly power. See
hom. 63 in Mt. (608-609); hom. 27 in 2 Cor. (586); hom. 17 in Rom. (565).

80. Hom. 34 in 1 Cor. (291).

81. Ibid. (291-292).

82. Hom. 40 in 1 Cor. (354).

83. Hom. 17 in 2 Cor. (521).

84. Hom. 22 in Rom. (611)[rev.].

85. Chrysostom employs a favourite theme in comparing man's present state to a house on fire, or a shipwreck. See e.g. hom. 25 in 1 Cor. (211). "For since men would not otherwise make up their mind to seek the things of their neighbour, except they were reduced to this necessity; therefore God hath thus joined things together, and suffers them not to arrive at their own profit except they first travel through the profit of others."

86. Ibid. (212).

87. Sac. 6.10 (338).

88. Hom. 33 in 1 Cor. (280-281).

89. Ibid.

90. Ibid. 35 (295).

91. Ibid. 32 (270-271).


93. Ibid. 12.29-30.

94. Ibid. 12.25.

95. Ibid. 12.26; 12.30-31.

96. Ibid. 12.27.

97. Ibid. 12.29-31.

98. Ibid. 12.32-33.

99. Chrysostom, hom. 46 in Mt. (477).

100. Ibid. 29 (361-362).

101. Origen, comm. in Mt. 10.2; Gregory of Nazianzus,
or. 40.34.

102. Chrysostom, hom. 35 in Mt. (411-412).

103. Hom. 7 in Ac. (63).

104. See e.g. non. desp. 2 (366); pecc. 3-4; 10-11 (356-357, 362-363). For a contrast of this inhumanity with pastoral care and love: see hom. in Mt. 7:14 (46-48); Jud. 8 (927-942); prod. Jud. 1.1 and 3 (373-374, 376-378).

105. Hom. 19 in Mt. (275); ibid. 35 (412); ibid. 40 (439); ibid. 52 (524); ibid. 66 (630); hom. 7 in Jn. (419-420); hom. 9 in 1 Cor. (80-82); ibid. 11 (95); ibid. 44 (379).

106. On the theme "excessive despair", see supra, Chapter Two. See also Thdr. T. 16 (180-182); hom. 7 in Rom. (443-444); ibid. 10 (481-482); hom. 7 in Heb. (64).

107. Jud. 8 (927-942).

108. Ibid. 8.4 (932-933).

109. Hom. 2 in 1 Tim. (509).

110. Hom. 1 in Col. (303).

111. Hom. 2 in Phil. (190).

112. Hom. 87 in Jn. (477).

113. Hom. 32 in 1 Cor. (273, 275).


115. Hom. 1 in Col. (303).

116. Ibid.

117. Hom. 30 in 2 Cor. (606).

118. Hom. 25 in Jn. (151-152).

119. Ibid. 26 (153).

120. Hom. 44 in Ac. (314).

121. Hom. 1 in Col. (303-308); Cf. Aristotle, EN Book Eight on the three kinds of friendships based respectively upon virtue, pleasure, and utility.
122. Ascens. (444-449).

123. Exp. in Ps. 44(199).

124. Hom. 6 in Col. (342).

125. See the decisive link of baptism to friendship in hom. 11 in 2 Cor. (476): Commenting on 2 Cor. 5:17-18, he writes: "A new soul ... and a new body, and a new worship, and promises new. ... He that made us friends is Himself also the cause of the other things which God hath given to His friends. For He rendered not these things unto us, allowing us to continue enemies, but having made us friends unto Himself." See also hom. 23 in Ac. (181): "God made thee a friend and vouchsafed thee all His good things, that thou mayest act the part of a friend." In his earlier catecheses, he also referred to the neophytes as friends of God. Nevertheless, the crucial link with the Ascension was not yet made. See catech. 2.19, 29 (144, 149-50).

126. Clement, qds 35[ANF 2, 601]; see also ibid. 33-36; prot. 12.

127. Cf. Lampe, op. cit., p. 260. Gregory of Nazianzus is illustrative at this point. He sees purification as illumination. See or. 40.3-6, 37. The Christian life is a growth into a deeper participation in God the Great Light. For man's composition of body and soul implies the continual possibility of sinning (or. 40.7). This discord between body and soul results from the fall, and is the root of sin (or. 38.12). The now coarser flesh becomes both "mortal and contradictory" after the fall; and man sins because he is changeable (or. 39.17). Because of this anthropological analysis, salvation consists of a dynamic and continual process of purification, effected by the soul acting as the leading edge which takes up its yoke fellow, the body, in its contemplation of God. Life is hence a progress in repentance. (Hence, the baptisms of Moses, of John the Baptist, of Jesus, of martyrdom, and of fire). Winslow (op. cit., p. 137) left out the very important baptism by fire which takes place in the last judgement.

128. Hom. 16 in Rom. (553-554); hom. 40 in 1 Cor. (349): "His grace touches the very soul ... the soul of the baptised no longer [impure], but purer than the very sun beam, ... for it is blessed with a Spirit, on every side enkindling it and making its holiness intense. ... So the Holy Spirit ... recasting the soul in baptism as in a furnace and consuming its
sins, causes it to glisten with more purity than all pure gold"; see also Eutrop. 2.11(406); hom. 10 in 2 Cor.(468); hom. 7 in Col.(346); ibid. 8(351).

129. Exp. in Ps. 44(186): the whole world enters into a common participation in the Spirit as the grace of baptism spreads over the earth.

130. Hom. 29 in 1 Cor.(243-244); ibid. 30(250-251).

131. Hom. 11 in Rom.(484, 489). There are admittedly a few instances, e.g. hom. 10 in Rom.(486) and catech. 2.29(149-150), where he connects baptism with a foretaste of the Resurrection on judgement day.

132. See Eutrop. 2.14-15(408-411); exp. in Ps. 44(183-203); hom. 1 in Eph.(14); ibid. 20(137-138). The theme of baptism as a spiritual marriage was already exploited in the catecheses. See catech. 1.1-10; 6.24(108-114, 227). Ps. 44(LXX) was alluded to in one instance [catech. 1.1-18(108-118)]. But no link with the Ascension was made then.

133. Exp. In Ps. 5(63).

134. Ibid. 44(199).

135. Ibid.(200-202); cf. Chrysostom's exposition of Abraham's offering of Isaac. Hom. 3 in 2 Cor.(412-418); ibid. 5(432-433); see also catech. 8. 7-10(251-253). Abraham's right disposition of things involves the abandonment of his natural sympathy and parental love.

136. Hom. 20 in Eph.(139-140).

137. Ibid.(140); cf. hom. 2 in 1 Thess.(406): a friend is another self(αλλος εαυτου).

138. Hom. 20 in Eph.(141).

139. Hom. 15 in Jn.(101-102).

140. Ibid.(101).

141. Ibid. (italics mine).

142. Hom. 9 in Eph.(72-73).

143. Ibid. 3(26).
144. Ibid. 11(79-81).

145. Ibid. (84).

146. Aristotle, 

147. Hom. 3 in Eph. (26).

148. Hom. 18 in 2 Cor. (527-528).

149. Hom. 1 in Col. (303).

150. Hom. 9 in Eph. (73): "Virtue springs from love, and love from virtue." See also ibid.: Virtue is the criterion for genuine peace.

151. Ibid. (74); cf. hom. 32 in Heb. (223-224).

152. Sac. 1.4(80).


154. Hom. 15 in 2 Cor. (507-508).

155. Ibid. (507).

156. Ibid. (506).


158. Ibid. (509-510).

159. Hom. 20 in Eph. and hom. 10 in Col. conflated (141, 366) (italics mine).

160. Hom. 20 in Eph. (141-142)[rev.].

161. Ibid. (143); cf. Clement of Alexandria, str. 3.10; Origen, comm. in Mt. 14.2.

the first article, which bears immediate relevance to
our subject.


164. Ibid. p. 49.

165. Ibid. pp. 50-51.

166. Ibid. p. 47.

167. See nativ., bapt., coemet., cruc. 1-2, res. mort., ascen., pent. 1-2. The figure of Eve, the Tree of Knowledge, the punishment of death are set against the figure of Mary, the Cross, and Christ's victory over death. "The Death assures us of immortality, such is the merit of the Cross! (coemet 2(396)). The Ascension established the reconciliation between God and man. Man is now henceforth God's friend instead of his enemy. Christ is the First Fruit; in him human nature is taken up to heaven in glory (ascens. 2 and 4(444-445, 448)). The Holy Spirit is the sign of reconciliation. It is sent from God to man indicating the end of a long period of hostility (pent. 1.3 and 1.5(457-458, 460-461).

168. Clement of Alexandria is careful not to predicate suffering to God in all his references to the naked Christ in Mt. 25. The "nakedness" properly belongs to man, especially to the friends of God. Man honours God by obeying the Lord's command to give relief to those in need. See esp. str. 2.16 [ANF 2, 364]: "God is nourished, though not personally, by the nourishing of one whom he wishes nourished"; str. 7.9: The Gnostic who considers the benefits of his neighbours as his salvation may be called a living image of the Lord. Origen is equally insistent. His comments on whether Elijah suffers in John the Baptist are revealing. He maintains a distinction between moral kinship and individuality. On the one hand, the spirit of Elijah suffered what was suffered in John, insofar as the things which assist do, because of love, suffer along with those that are assisted. Origen then alludes to the naked Christ as a support: "Jesus indeed says, 'Because of the weak, I am weak..."' On the other hand, the soul of John is surely not that of Elijah. Thus Origen also maintains an ontological distinction between the suffering of Christ and that of the naked, while at the same time conceding a sympathetic relation between the two. This bond is due to love, a moral category. See comm. in Mt. 13.2 [ANF 10,
169. Horn. 30 in 2 Cor. (609) [rev.]; cf. horn. 32 in 1 Cor. (270–271): "God enjoins man to give alms not because he is unable to feed the poor, but that he might bind man together in love."


171. Ibid.

172. Horn. 79 in Mt. (719); cf. hom. 15 in Rom. (548): "For I [Christ] do not say so much as put an end to My poverty, or give Me riches, ... and if I be thrown into prison, I do not insist upon thee loosening My bonds and setting Me free. ... Though I am able to support Myself, I come about begging ... since My wish is to be supported by Thee, for I love thee exceedingly." See also hom. 60 in Jn. (333).

173. See e.g. hom. 45 in Mt. (474): "Art thou unable to practise virginity? Be chaste in marriage. Art thou unable to strip thyself of thy possessions? Give of thy substance. Canst thou not bear that burden? Share thy goods with Christ. Art thou unwilling to yield Him up all? Give Him but the half, but the third part." Cf. similarities in Athanasius, ep. 10.4.

174. Horn. 15 in Rom. (548) [rev.].

175. Horn. 45 in Mt. (474–476). See also ibid. 79(720): Christ is a friend, benefactor, and Lord to believers.

176. See e.g. hom. 17 in 2 Cor. (522): Christ "emptied Himself of so great glory for thy sake, but thou dost not count Him deserving even of a loaf; but thy dog is fed to fulness whilst Christ wastes with hunger. ... How are these the deeds of friends?"

177. Hence, in hom. 15 in Rom. (547–548), Chrysostom again appeals in the voice of Christ: "If thou wilt not requite Me ... as having suffered for Thee, show mercy on Me for My poverty ... and for My imprisonment be softened. ... [At least] for very nature's sake be softened at seeing Me naked, and remember that nakedness wherewith I was naked on the Cross for thee; or, if not this, yet that wherewith I am now naked through the poor. ... I was athirst when hanging on the Cross, I am athirst also through the poor, that by the former as also by the latter I may draw thee to Myself, and make thee charitable (φιλανθρωπος) to thine own salvation."
178. Hom. 88 in Mt. (778). See also ibid. 87 (770); hom. 84 in Jn. (458); hom. 21 in Rom. (607); hom. 27 in 1 Cor. (229). Chrysostom exhorts his congregation to keep the account of the Passion fresh in their mind. This would soften their heart against pride and revenge. Cf. cruc. 1.4 (404-405) and bapt. (365-366). The revelation of the Cross at the Parousia shall render man's sin inexcusable.

179. See e.g. hom. 27 in 1 Cor. (228-230).

180. Hom. 50 in Mt. (508-509).

181. See e.g. hom. 8 in Rom. (466).

182. See e.g. hom. 79 in Mt. (718); hom. 59 in Jn. (326-327); hom. 10 in 1 Cor. (86).

183. Hom. 20 in 2 Cor. (540).

184. Note the identification of the naked Christ in Mt. 25 with the needy believer is present already in other church fathers. Cyprian is a major exponent. See esp. ep. 59; opera 23-24. Irenaeus also uses Mt. 6:3, 25:35-36, Lk. 3:11 to justify the sharing of material things within the human community. See haer. 4.30. See also Boniface Ramsey, "Almsgiving in the Latin Church: The Late Fourth and Early Fifth Centuries," Theological Studies 43 (1982), 226-259.

185. See e.g. hom. 35 in Mt. (409); ibid. 88 (779); hom. 31 in Heb. (217).

186. The ability to practise virginity is characteristic of the grace ushered in by Christ. It institutes a sign of moral renewal vis-à-vis the Old Testament times. See hom. 78 in Mt. (711); poenit. 3.3 (296); its excellence is ὑπὲρ τὴν φύσιν; hom. 1 in 2 Cor. 4:13 (277); on Chrysostom's praise of the holy men, see e.g. hom. 14 in 1 Tim. (575-580).

187. Hom. 47 in Mt. (486); ibid. 50 (509-510); hom. 73 in Jn. (398-400); hom. 1 in 2 Cor. 4:13 (277-278); poenit. 3.2-3 (293-295).

188. See Bernard Grillet's Introduction in SC 125, esp. pp. 24 n.1; 49-53; 67 n.1.

189. Virg. 77 (366-368).

191. See hom. 6 in Tit.(698): Almsgiving "makes men like God. Yet virginity and fasting, and lying on the ground, are more difficult than this, ...[and their effect] is confined to those who practise them, and no other is saved thereby. But almsgiving extends to all, and embraces the members of Christ, and actions that extend their effects to many are far greater than those which are confined to one. For almsgiving is the mother of love ...which is the characteristic of Christianity, which is greater than all miracles, by which the disciples of Christ are manifested". Note that this theme is already present in his sermons in Antioch. See e.g. hom. 77 in Mt.(708-710); hom. 6 in 1 Cor.(52-54). On the evangelistic dimension of Christian life, Chrysostom also exhorts the monks to take up a missionary concern for foreigners. See e.g. ep. 54(638-639). See J.-M. Leroux, "Saint Jean Chrysostome et le monachisme," Jean Chrysostome et Augustin, ed. Charles Kannengiesser, pp. 130-135; I. auf der Maur, Mönchtum und Glaubensverkündigung in den Schriften des hl. Johannes Chrysostomus (Freiberg: Univ.-Verlag, 1959), pp. 180-182.

192. Miracles are not the signs of true apostleship. See hom. 3 in 2 Cor. 4:13(294-295).

193. Hom. 32 in Mt.(387-388); "If we all lived as we ought, workers of miracles would not be admired so much as we by the children of the heathen. For as to the signs they often carry with them either a notion of mere fancy, or another evil suspicion. ...But a pure life cannot admit of any much reproach; yea, all men's mouths are stopped by the acquisition of virtue. ...Miracles while they profited another, [oftentimes] have injured them who had the power, by lifting him up to pride and vainglory." See infra, Chapter Four, Section 4.3 on the theme of vainglory.

194. See e.g. hom. 21 in Ac.(165-166); ibid. 36(260). Note that St Paul uses miracles only in emergency situations: hom. 54 in Ac.(373). The Ethiopian in Ac. 7 is commended because he believed only by diligent reading of the Scriptures, rather than by miracles. See hom. 19 in Ac.(154). The Ninevites also repented without any need of miracles. See hom. 43 in Mt.(461).

195. This theme is particularly prominent in the homiliae in Mt. See e.g. hom. 24 in Mt.(321-322); ibid. 32(387-388); cf. ibid. 38(430). See also hom. 72 in Jn.(394-396); hom. 31 in Ac.(229); ibid. 41(292-293); hom. 18 in Heb.(138).
196. See e.g. hom. 32 in 1 Cor. (272): "What is indeed the marvellous part of love (αγάπη); all the other good things (ἀγαθά) have their evils yoked with them: as he that gives up his possessions is oftentimes puffed up on this account. ...But love is free from every such mischief. ...If thou wilt, first suppose one single person beloved, the one loving; loving, however, as it is meet to love (φιλούντα μεντοι, ὡς φιλεῖν ἀξίον). Why, he will so live on earth as if it were heaven. ...But he that works miracles and hath knowledge, without this [i.e. love], ...will not be much profited, broken off as he is from all and not enduring to mix himself up with any of his fellow servants. ...The sign of perfect love towards Him [Christ] is the loving one's neighbours." See also hom. 40 in Ac. (285-286).

197. See e.g. hom. 39-42 in 1 Cor. (331-368) on Chrysostom’s exposition of 1 Cor.15; see also res. mort. and res. Chr. (417-442).

198. Hence, we see the divergence between Chrysostom and Augustine. Contrast with Augustine, CD 22.5, 8 and 9.


201. See e.g. hom. 24 in Heb. (171); ibid. 27 (188-189).

202. Ibid. 24 (171).

203. Ibid. 27 (188).

204. Ibid. (189).

205. See e.g. hom. 24 in Mt. (321); ibid. 46 (479-482); see also NPNF-I 17, p. 83 n. 4.

206. Hom. 6 in 1 Cor. (54).

207. Hom. 1 in Col. (305-310). "Nothing is colder than
men who are made friends by these things, by the table, and surfeiting. The friendships of parasites
are born only from that source. "...But those other tables [which entertain those in need] produce friendship, not with man, but with God." See ibid. (308).

208. Hom. 7 in Rom. (450-454); ibid. 18 (581-584).

209. Hom. 81 in Mt. (736-737).

210. Ibid. 43 (462). As a correlate, the attitude of philanthropia which binds the human community together in this age will undergo a radical reorientation on judgement day. Chrysostom insists to Olympias that those who now persecute her will want to invoke her philanthropia then, but to no purpose. See ep. Olym. 8.10 (200-202).

211. E.g. hom. 56 in Mt. (554-555); ibid. 79 (718); ibid. 85 (762); hom. 77 in Jn. (419).

212. E.g. hom. 3 in 2 Tim. (616-617).

213. See supra, pp. 121-122.

214. This theme is very prominent in his homilies. See e.g. hom. 30 in Gn. (276); hom. 81 in Jn. (441-442); hom. 45 in Ac. (318-320).

215. This last point is pursued in detail in de David et Saul. David's pardon of Saul is taken to be the example par excellence of kindness to one's enemy. A typical passage is found in ibid. 3 (699).

216. See e.g. hom. 11 in Rom. (492-494).


220. Hom. 1.1 in Is. 6:1 (42-47); hom. 50 in Mt. (508); res. Chr. 3 (436-438).

221. See e.g. hom. 32 in Mt. (384-386); ibid. 50 (507-510); ibid. 83 (743-746); hom. 24 in 1 Cor. (200-201); ibid. 27 (227-228); prod. jud. 1.6 (380-382).

222. On the importance of a united witness, see Chrysostom's reconciliation with Severian, lest the Church of Constantinople be torn apart. The ministry
of a priest is that of peace. He goes on to say in recip. sev.(426): "What the church has already suffered is enough. Now let us have an end of it [bitterness]. ...So receive our brother Bishop Severian with full hearts and open arms. ...Let us pray that God will give peace to his church, and indeed a firm and enduring peace." See also his plea in Antioch for unity between the parties of Paulinus and Meletius: To make a schism in the church is no less an evil than to fall into heresy. See hom. 11 in Eph.(85-87).

223. Political structures are ordained by God, so Chrysostom maintains, to administer justice, with the intention that vice be driven away, and love and concord be affirmed. See hom. 34 in 1 Cor.(291). The essential characteristic of good sovereignty is clemency towards the subjects. See e.g. Eutrop. 1.5(396); stat. 21(215-222).

224. Eutrop. 1.3-4(393-395); hom. 1.1 in Is. 6:1(46); hom. 58 in Mt.(572). Cf. Jud. 5.2(886): Chrysostom defends the church against the charge that it derives its security from the emperor. He reminds his critics of the persecution under which the church suffered. Security is from the power of God.

225. Stat. 6(81-83).
NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

1. See his quod nemo laeditur nisi a seipso.


3. See e.g. hom. in Mt. 7:14(41); hom. 27 in Ac. (209-210); poenit. 2.2(286).

4. See e.g. hom. 29 in Mt. (362); ibid. 45(471-473); ibid. 46(476); ibid. 59(573-584); hom. 76 in Jn. (409-410).

5. E.g. hom. 76 in Jn. (409-410); hom. 12 in Rom. (503); cf. Aristotle EN 1103a15-b25.

6. E.g. hom. 76 in Jn. (409-410); hom. 41 in Ac. (291-292); cf. Origen, princ. 3.1.5: The term which Origen uses is οὐκεξοῦσις. While in the main we shall discuss the term προαίροις, other terms like γύνη are employed by Chrysostom in similar context. See e.g. hom. 45 in Mt. (471-473); ibid. 52(523). No distinction is made. Stylistic variation in sermon delivery could account for this. Moreover, Chrysostom makes little attempt to depict man's plight in terms of divisions within the soul and their relation to the body. His sermons on Rom. 5-8 (esp. Rom. 7) are revealing. See hom. 10-15 in Rom. (473-548).

7. Cf. Origen's use of both the standardised arguments of the Academics and Stoics in debate with Celsus. If Celsus takes one side, he will take the other primarily for the sake of debate. See Henry Chadwick, "Origen, Celsus, and the Stoa," Journal of Theological Studies, 48(1947), 34-39.


10. Justin, dial. 7[ANF 1, 198].

11. Ibid. 8[ANF 1, 198]. Cf. Plato's Meno, and in the Chaldean Oracles in later Platonism. The conception of the complete separation of the Supreme
Being as outside the realm of being (ἐπικτέαν τῆς οὐσίας), and the conservatism and rigidity of later Platonism contribute to the understanding that virtue comes from a vision coming from the Divine rather than through intellectual activity.


13. Origen, Cels. 4.74; 4.81-83.


15. Athenagoras, leg. 24-25; Justin, 2 apol. 5 and 7; Tatian, orat. 17-12; On the wider issues in God's providence, see H.-D. Simonin, "La Providence selon les pères grecs," DTC 13, 941-960.


17. Princ. 1.8.1 and 3.

18. Ibid. 1.8.2.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid. 1.8.4.

21. See Dihle, op. cit. for further details.

22. See Wallace-Hadrill, op. cit., pp. 52-56.

23. See Irenaeus, haer. 4.26; 5.18.


25. Cf. Augustine's sexual ethics in e.g. de sancta virginitate an de bono coniugali. The practice of virginal chastity allows man to partake of the angelic life or of perpetual incorruptibility. In treating virginity as the eschatological sign, he limits the manifestation of the eschaton to one section of the community.

27. Gregory, or. 2.15-17; 16.15; 40.34. Cf. Epiphanius, exp. fid. 21: a clear distinction is made between προφήτης and προφήτης. The former is concerned with counsel, the latter with precepts.

28. Serm. 8.2 in Gn. (618-619).

29. Stat. 11(121).


31. Stat. 9 and 11 (105-106, 120).

32. Ibid. 12 (132); ibid. 13 (139-140).

33. Ibid. 10 (115).

34. E.g. ibid. 9 (108).

35. He recognises this danger near the end of his exposition of the splendour and weakness of creation. He then insists (against the Manichaeans) that man at the beginning was not "corruptible and mortal". But he equally underlines the fact that the present "weakness" is ordained by the command of God for pedagogical purposes; namely, to lead him to acknowledge his dependence. Cf. ibid. 10(117-118) on Chrysostom's exposition on Rom. 8:20.

36. E.g. hom. 23 in Rom. (619-622); see also supra, Chapter Three.

37. Hom. 12 in Rom. (494-495); see also exp. in Ps. 111 (291).

38. Exp. in Ps. 149 (493).

39. Ibid. 150 (496).

40. Ibid. (498).

41. Ibid.

42. Hom. 62 in Mt. (601).

43. Stat. 13 (140-141); cf. hom. 52 in Mt. (524): "God hath not at all left them to reasoning only, but many parts thereof He hath implanted by the absolute power of nature itself." See also hom. 22 in 1 Cor. (186).

44. See hom. 29 in Mt. (362); Ibid. 45 (471-472);
ibid. 46(476); ibid. 59(573-577); hom. 76 in Jn. (409-410); hom. 12 in Rom. (503).

45. See Epictetus, Diss. 2.6.24; 3.9.1-2.

46. Hom. 14 in 1 Cor. (117).


48. See hom. 74 in Jn. (403): Commenting on Col. 3:5 Chrysostom insists that wicked desires could be done away with. "It is enough to have willed, and all are quenched. ...For of desires (εἰθῇμαί) some are necessary, some natural, some neither the one nor the other. For example, those which if not gratified destroy the creature are both natural and necessary, as the desire of meat and drink and sleep." On the distinction between desires, cf. Clement of Alexandria, str. 3.1. Note that Chrysostom does not use εἰθῇμα in the pejorative sense, nor does he make a distinction between πρατερποίς and θέλημα.

49. Hom. 14 in 1 Cor. (120).

50. See also E.A. Clark's discussion on this treatise in "John Chrysostom and the Subintroductae," Church History, 46(1977), pp. 178-184. The reader will notice our differences in interpretation.

51. See Irenaeus, haer. 1.6.3; Cyprian, ep. 4; Basil, ep. 55; Gregory of Nyssa, virg. 23.

52. Origen, or. 29.2.

53. Ibid. 29.17.

54. Ibid. 29.9.

55. For the demarcation between virtue and pleasure, see e.g. ss. 70, 139b, 232, 272, 276, 342, 411; cf. ss. 15-18, 50, 91b, 92, 98, 118, 128, 130, 264, 302, 318, 334, 363, 364, 387. See also Henry Chadwick, "The Moral Teaching of Sextus," in The Sentences of Sextus (Cambridge: U.P., 1959), pp. 95-106.

56. Gregory, or. dom. 5[ACW 18, 83].

57. Subintri. 12(86-87); cf. ibid 5.(62).

58. Ibid. 5(59-63); cf. hom. 17 in Mt. (256): Ἐκθέτημα is naturally implanted for the sake of procreation.

59. Subintri. 1(50); cf. hom. 17 in Mt. (256-257):
"Greater is the struggle on beholding, and not possessing the object of fondness; nor is the pleasure so great which we reap from the sight, as the mischief we undergo from increasing this desire", thus Chrysostom interprets Mt. 5:27-28 on adultery.

60. Subintr. 3(52-56). Clement of Alexandria's analysis of (the control of) sexual desire in str. 3.5 provides a contrast. To abide in continence is a matter of using the free and sovereign power (ἐξουσία ἐλεύθερα καὶ κυρία) which God has given us. We can live in accordance with our choice (ὁδος) and not be bound by necessity. Clement's moral vocabulary lends itself to a different analysis of sexual temptation.

61. See the comments by A.-M. Malingrey in SC 79, p. 55 n. 3; SC 188, p. 110 n. 1, and p. 164 n. 2. A Platonic anthropology is employed in Chrysostom's discussion of moral education of youth in educ. lib. See SC 188, p. 163 n. 5. Cf. hom. in Mt. 7:14(41); hom. 27 in Ac. (209-210); hom. 12 in Rom(499); hom. 5 in Eph. (41-42); poenit. 2.2(286).


63. Scand. 8.12; 6.2 and 6.8(94-96, 98, 140).

64. Hom. 7 in 1 Cor.(60).

65. We recall here that the weakness of the creation as well as its beauty is ordained by God, so that man would not idolise it. See e.g. stat. 10(115). Cf. hom. 3 in Rom.(414-415): "Some conceptions they ought to have had about Him, as, for instance, that He is God, that He is Lord of all, that He made them, which were not, that He exercised a Providence, that He careth for them. ...He set before them for a form of doctrine, the world; He gave them reason ( νοῦς), and an understanding (διάνοια) capable of perceiving what was needful."

66. Thus Chrysostom argues in the context of Rom. 2:15. See hom. 5 in Rom.(428). Cf. ibid.(427); ibid. 6(439). This interpretation of λογίσμος as essentially a creaturely and "answering" activity helps us to solve a problem in Chrysostom's ethics: whether he assigns to διάνοια the role of presiding over the nobler activities, while λογίσμος is responsible for the lower ones. A.-M. Malingrey made this distinction. See SC 188, p. 110 n. 1. Examples can be cited in her favour. See e.g. Anna 3.4(657-658); exp. in Ps. 9(129-130). Moreover
Chrysostom also uses λογισμός in a pejorative sense in his exegesis of Heb. 11, the contrast between faith and reasoning. After a vehement criticism of reasoning, he uses the example of a bird soaring up to the sky, as a summons to man to transcend the temptations in the present life. We met this analogy earlier in his stat. 15(157). He replaces λογισμός with δίάνοια this time [hom. 22 in Heb. (158)]. These evidences nevertheless are inconclusive. Notice in scand. which he composed towards the end of his life, λογισμός is not used exclusively in a pejorative manner. Instead of trying to render a coherent picture, it is more in line with his thinking to see the two terms as interchangeable. Man's reasoning is upheld precisely within the limitations imposed by its creatureliness. It becomes futile once it attempts to deny its necessary dependence upon God.


69. Hom. 33 in Heb. (229); cf. ibid. 22(153); ibid. 25(171, 173); cf. hom. 53 in Ac. (372):
"Hearken to [Paul] rather than the pilot that is in us, that is, our own λογισμός."

70. See e.g. exp. in Ps. 143(459-460).

71. Hom. 22 in Heb. (153); ibid. 25(173).

72. Cf. hom. 34 in Heb. (236). Referring to 1 Cor. 2:14, he remarks: "As the webs of spiders could not receive a blast of wind,...[so neither] the natural man ever be able to receive the grace of the Spirit; for our reasonings differ nothing from them [i.e. cobwebs], preserving a connection in appearances only but destitute of all power." Carnal mindedness in Rom. 8:7 refers to λογισμός that is intent upon the things of this life and its wicked doings. See hom. 13 in Rom. (516); cf. ibid. 3(411-416) on Chrysostom's exegesis of Rom. 1:18ff.

73. Hom. 12 in Rom. (505); see also ibid. 4(417)[rev.]: "That which is contrary to nature hath in it an irksomeness and displeasingness, so that they [i.e. men in their fallenness] could not fairly claim to be pursuing pleasure. For genuine pleasure is that which is according to nature."

74. Hom. 4 in Rom. (418).

75. Stat. 11(125-126).
76. Horn. 51 in Ac. (356-357).
77. Stat. 7 (95-96); ibid. 8 (98-99); ibid. 12 (132).
78. Diab. 1.2 (247).
79. Ibid. (246-247).
80. See e.g. exp. in Ps. 129 (374); hom. 45 in Mt. (472-473); ibid. 59 (573-576); hom. 7 in Ac. (68-70); ibid. 14 (119-129); laed. 4 (74); hence sloth is contrary to nature: e.g. hom. 38 in Mt. (432); ibid. 80 (728); hom. 34 in Ac. (251-252); hom. 5 in Rom. (422).
81. Exp. in Ps. 143 (459); cf. hom. 65 in Mt. (626): "For indeed out of arrogance (μεγεων) did the first man sin, looking for an equality with God. Therefore, not even what things he had, did he continue to possess, but lost even these."
82. Both words are correlated to ὀμορφότης. See e.g. catech. 2.8; 2.19; 5.15-18; 5.21; 5.23; 7.28; 8.15-18. See also ibid. 5.17; 5.18; 6.1: a slothful and ungrateful person is dead in his feelings; he squanders and repudiates God's grace.
83. Hom. 5 in Rom. (430-431) [rev.]; see also hom. 68 in Mt. (639-648) on his direct exposition of Mt. 21:33-44.
84. See hom. 68 in Mt. (639-648). The Jewish nation is disposed to an unthankful attitude (ἡ ἁγιασμός γυνών). In contrast, the monks reflect Adam's primeval disposition. Theirs is a life of continual thanksgiving. Cf. hom. 6 in Rom. (437-438); hom. 33 in Heb. (228); prod. Jud. 1.5 (379-380) on the ingratitude of the Jews.
85. Hom. 13 in Eph. (93-94). See also hom. 61 in Mt. (589-590): In the course of a few short paragraphs, he employs the words sloth, wickedness, want of feeling (ἀναλυγιασμός), insensibility (ἀναιδησία), and unthankfulness to emphasize the extent of man's contempt for God's benefits. Cf. David 3.1 (695); hom. 77 in Mt. (704); hom. 32 in 1 Cor. (268) which depicts man's falleness as insensibility.
86. In what follows, κενόδοξα will be translated as "vainglory". See also Francis Leduc's analysis of vainglory. It is a leit-motiv in Chrysostom's works. See his "La thème de la vaine gloire chez
saint Jean Chrysostome," Le Proche-Orient chrétien, 19(1969), 3-32. He concludes: "L'opposition entre la gloire humaine et celle qui vient de Dieu, et la relation mise entre la gloire authentique et l'intimité divine qui se traduit par la tension vers la ciel et l'action de grâce dès cette terre, montrent bien que Chrysostome voit dans la vaine gloire non pas seulement un obstacle à une vie morale honnête, mais une attitude qui mine la vocation religieuse de l'homme. Et, à ce propos, fort significative nous semble l'insistance égale qu'il met à dénoncer la gloire humaine et à rappeler le devoir de l'action de grâce (p. 31)."

87. See e.g. Jean Daniélou's preface to Chrysostom's de incomprehensiibili dei natura, SC 28', pp. 9-39 on the background of Anomoeanism in Antioch and Constantinople at the end of the fourth century, as well as on Chrysostom's debt to Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa in his polemics against the heresy. Daniélou explains the distinction between Chrysostom and the Cappadocians in their approaches to the problem as follows: "Les deux Cappadociens s'adressaient à des théologiens. Chrysostome s'adresse au peuple chrétien. Il insiste donc moins sur l'argumentation savante et davantage sur l'attitude concrète. En outre moins mystique que Grégoire de Nyssa, il n'aborde pas le problème de la transcendance de Dieu au niveau de l'expérience des mystiques, mais au plan du sens religieux commun (pp. 16-17)." The reader will note that we disagree about attributing the cause of distinction merely to differences of temperament and audience.

88. See the extended treatment in incomprehens. 1-5; hom. 2-5 in Is. 6:1.

89. See e.g. exp. in Ps. 143(459-460).

90. See educ. lib. 5 and 9(80, 84); hom. 30 in Mt.(369); hom. 50 in Jn.(282); Hom. 9 in Heb.(82); laud Paul. 1(476); scand. 7(128); cf. educ. lib. 3(74).

91. See e.g. exp. in Ps. 48(232); ibid. 119(342-343); hom. 31 in Mt.(376); comm. 1 in Gal.(614); hom. 9 in 1 Thess.(450); hom. 24 in Heb.(165).

92. See e.g. hom. 37 in Gn.(348-349); hom. 4 in Mt.(51-52); ibid. 32(377-378); ibid. 58(567-568); ibid. 62(602-604); ibid. 65(623-624); ibid. 70(659-660); ibid. 71(665-666); hom. 3 in Jn.(45); hom. 13 in 2
Cor. (495); hom. 34 in Heb. (233); sac. 3.9 (160-162).

93. Educ. lib. 1; 6; 7; 13; 14 (64, 66, 80, 82, 90, 94).

94. See the sharp break between Chapters 1-15 and 16-90.

95. Cf. Stag. 1.2; 1.5 (428, 435) in the description of the fall. Ἀπόνοια is contrasted with humility in in comprehens. 5 (312-316); cf. hom. 25 in Mt. (332). See also the juxtaposition of κενοδοξία to ἀπόνοια in ibid. 58 (570). Cf. ibid. 40 (443); hom. 11 in 1 Cor. (88-89).

96. Thus κενοδοξία and ἡ ἀπόνοια depict man drunken in his passions in catech. 5.4 and 5.6 (202-203). See SC 50, p. 202 n. 3.

97. See e.g. hom. 46 in Mt. (476); ibid. 67 (636); ibid. 71 (664); ibid. 72 (669); ibid. 73 (675); hom. 8 in Jn. (65-66); ibid. 28 (166); hom. 35 in 1 Cor. (302).

98. Hom. 3.2 and 3.3 in Is. 6.1 (112, 114, 122). See also hom. 3.1 in Is. 6:1 (106, 108); "Ἀπόνοια seduces us to misjudge ourselves, and leaves empty, after much labour, all the treasures of ἑαυτή. Other evils follow naturally when we are slothful, but such evil grafts itself upon our good works." See also hom. in Phil. 1:18 (312).

99. Hom. 86 in Mt. (767); hom. 35 in Ac. (255-256); hom. 26 in 1 Cor. (579); hom. 29 in Heb. (206).

100. E.g. David 3.9 (707-708); exp. in Ps. 114 (316-317); ibid. 129 (374-377); hom. 26 in Mt. (340-344); ibid. 27 (349); ibid. 45 (471); ibid. 64 (610); ibid. 67 (637); ibid. 77 (703-704); ibid. 83 (748); ibid. 86 (768); hom. 29 in Heb. (203); non desp. 3 (366-367); prod. Jud. 1.2 (375).

101. See how sloth is contrasted with νησύς. See his employment of νησύ in catech. 4.30; 5.12, 20; 28; 6.24; 7.2, 6, 28, 29; νησύς in catech. 7.11; 8.18; βαθμοίν in catech. 1.10; 2.15, 16; 5.20, 23, 26; 6.10; βαθμία in catech. 2.19; 3.7; 5.2, 9, 15, 21, 26; 6.1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 15, 20; 8.24; βαθμοί in catech. 1.38; 3.23; βαθμία in catech. 1.38, 44; 5.3. See also hom. 10 in Hom. (480); ibid. 19 (590); hom. 4 in Col. (325-326).

102. Hence, for Clement of Alexandria, a sober person acts
according to reason: he is in continual contemplation of God and is undisturbed by the affections of the body (paed. 2.9); he entertains no base concept of God (str. 7.4); his marriage is governed by rationality (str. 2.23). In contrast, sloth depicts a soul which has fallen from contemplation. See prot. 12; str. 7.7; and paed 1.5. Pleasure and sloth are closely related, in contrast with temperance (σωματικός) in prot. 12; paed. 2.8; ibid. 3.4. Cf. ibid. 2.10; ibid. 2.2; str. 4.6 for the use of ἁγιασμός. In fact, both pagans and Christians shared the view that vigilance is a virtue. Celsus charged the Christians for their drunkenness and lack of sobriety, and Origen refuted the charge. See Origen, Cels. 3.76.

103. See e.g. stat. 12(132).

104. On the schism, see e.g. R. Devreesse, Le Patriarcat d'Antioche depuis la paix de l'Eglise jusqu'à la conquête arabe (Paris: Gabalda, 1945); F. Cavallera, Le Schisme d'Antioche (Paris: Picard et Fils, 1905). Cf. hom. 88 in Mt. (779-780) on the hindrance in evangelism caused by inconsistency in life within the Christian community in Antioch.

105. Hom. 11 in Eph. (85-87) [rev.]; cf. ibid. 10 (77-79).

106. Sac. 3.9 (160-164).

107. Ibid. 6.12 (342-346).

108. Hom. 71 in Mt. (665); cf. hom. 28 in Jn. (165) [rev.]: "Do not tell me that a man is temperate, and does not rob; these things by themselves are not virtue. For what advantageth it, if a man has these things, and yet is the slave of empty glory (δοῦλος δόξης κενώσῃ)."


110. Hom. 35 in 1 Cor. (301); see also hom. 15 in Mt. (235); hom. 72 in Eph. (89); hom. 35 in 1 Cor. (302). On the same criticism against Plato and Socrates, see e.g. hom. 4 in Ac. (45-50); ibid. 36 (260-261). Chrysostom is uncompromising in this instance. To those who dissent, he rejoins: "Let us grant that there are right livers among the heathen; for neither doth this go against my argument, since I spoke of that which occurs in general, not of what happens rarely." See hom. 28 in Jn. (164). He in some instances refers to those "rare" occasions in Thdr. T. (170-172);
virgil. 55(304); hom. 34 in Ac.(251); hom. 11 in Rom.(493-494); hom. 26 in 1 Cor.(224). And in one isolated instance in his early work oppugn. 2(339 and 340) he speaks favourably of the pagan philosophers. Nevertheless, those instances are meant only to goad Christians into good works and to illustrate from among the pagans those aspire to the higher φιλοσοφία. See Malingrey, Philosophia, p. 267 for further discussion.

111. See e.g. hom. 15 in Mt.(233). See also ibid. 20(228-289); catech. 4.17-21; 6.10-11(191-193, 220-221); exp. in Ps. 133(387).

112. See the treatment of Jn. 5:44 in hom. 3 in Jn.(43-46); ibid. 8(65-66); ibid. 28(165); ibid. 38(218-220); ibid. 57(313); ibid. 69(377); cf. hom. 12 in 2 Cor.(485).

113. Hom. 3 in Jn.(43).

114. Hom. 29 in 1 Cor.(248); see also hom. 1 in 2 Thess.(471-472).

115. Hom. 4 in Ac.(48).

116. See esp. hom. 4 and 7 in 1 Cor.(29-40, 53-68); cf. stat. 19(189) on a comparison between the monks and philosophers: "The pagan philosophers are in character no wise better than those who are engaged on the stage. ...[The monks] confirm the credibility of [their] doctrine by their actions." See also Malingrey, Philosophia, pp. 265-269 for an analysis of Chrysostom's attitude toward pagan philosophia. Cf. P.R. Coleman-Norton, "St Chrysostom and the greek philosophers," Classical Philosophy, 25(1930), 305-317.

117. See e.g. Basil of Caesarea, leg. lib. gent.; Gregory of Nyssa, v. Mos.

118. See Malingrey, op. cit., p. 268, cf. ibid., pp. 110-114; 167-169. Cf. Chrysostom's criticism of pagan philosophers in the opening homilies in Matthew. E.g. hom. 1 in Mt.(18ff); ibid. 10(188). See also pan. Bab. 2(533-535).

to pagan philosophy. "La seule philosophie parfaite...est la doctrine chrétienne et la manière de vivre en chrétien (p. 488)."

120. Hom. 21 in Eph. (152); see also educ. lib. (102).

121. Hom. 4 in Tit. (685).


123. See GPL, 741-742.


125. Hom. 3 in Jn. (44-45).


127. Ibid., pp. 140-174.

128. Ibid., pp. 229-297.

129. Ibid., p. 258.

In identifying the non-subjection of the body to the soul as man's predicament, Meyer seems to suggest that the cosmos rather than the community is the relevant moral environment in Chrysostom's theological scheme. Whether this is a correct interpretation of Chrysostom depends on how his exegesis of Rom. 7 in horn. 12-13 in Rom. should be understood. Meyer regards the plight of man as the central issue in Rom. 7 for Chrysostom. We maintain however that this is only a subsidiary consideration. For Chrysostom sees the exegetical problem in the passage as the threat of Manichaeism. His comments on Rom. 7: 15 (ο γὰρ κατεργάζομαι οὐ γινώσκω) is illustrative. He insists that St Paul's words are not meant to deny man's free will. By οὐ γινώσκω he means "I get dizzy, ...I feel carried away. I find a violence done to me, I get tripped up without knowing how". See horn. 13 in Rom. (508).

131. See e.g. incomprehens. 3(200); also anom. 7.4; 10.2(760-761, 785-787); hom. 2 and 3 in Gn.(26-39); hom. 3 in Tit.(678).

132. See e.g. hom. 17 in Mt.(263-264); ibid. 30(368-370); ibid. 77(709-710); hom. 10 in Ac.(91-94); ibid. 15(126-128); ibid. 24(189-190); hom. 29 in Rom.(660); ibid. 31(669); hom. 26 in 1 Cor.(220-224); hom. 5 in 2 Thess.(498-500); hom. 30 in Heb.(210-212).

Meyer also pointed out that home life is one of the ways in which one may receive spiritual directions. See Meyer, op. cit., pp.344-345.

133. Hom. 16 in Mt.(244).

134. Hom. 12 in Rom.(499). See also exp. in Ps. 136(407); hom. 17 in Mt.(263); ibid. 56(551); ibid. 64(675); virg. 83(386-388); cf. hom. 36 in Mt.(418); hom. 13 in Rom.(512).

135. See Clement, str. 3.4; 4.15, 18; 7.10.

136. Cf. Theodore of Mopseustia's doctrine of Two-Ages, see e.g. R.A. Greer, Theodore of Mopsuestia: Exegete and Theologian, pp. 16-17, 71-76, 148-50. See also Wallace-Hadrill, op. cit., pp.52-66.

137. Irenaeus, haer. 4.13.

138. Ibid. 4.15.

139. Hom. 56 in Mt.(551).

140. Hom. 13 in Rom.(512).


142. Exp. in Ps. 113(312). See also Anna 2.1(644): In Sam. 1, Anna was fully justified within her perception of the good to entreat God for a son.

143. Stat. 13(141); see also serm. 4 in Gn.(595-596); hom. 16 in Mt.(246-247).

144. Anna 1.3(636-637).

145. Hom. 33 in 1 Cor.(282).

146. Exp. in Ps. 113(312).

147. Pecc. 7(359-69).
148. It is worth noting by way of contrast that in Augustine's view of salvation history the whole human community before Christ at least formally looked forward to the Child in the act of conjugal intercourse. See e.g. Augustine, de bono viduitatis 9-11.

149. See e.g. on Abraham, hom. 3 in 1 Cor. (412-416); hom. 5 in 2 Cor. (432-433); hom. 2 in Rom. (409-410); on Joseph, educ. lib. 61 (158); ep. Olym. 10.11 (282-288); hom. 62 in Gn. (537); hom. 84 in Mt. (756-758); hom. 71 in Jn. (388-390); hom. 32 in 1 Cor. (273-275); hom. 10 in Col. (372); Stag. 2.2 (470); on the Three Children, laud. 15-17 (281-284); hom. 8 in Eph. (66-70); hom. 18 in 1 Cor. (149-152); on Job, diab. 1.6 (252-253); 3.5-7 (270-276); ep. Olym. 8.8; 10.6-8; 11.1; 17.2-3 (186-195, 262-271, 306-307, 372-381); hom. 23 in Gn. (202); hom. 13 in Mt. (213-214); hom. 28 in 1 Cor. (235-240); ibid. 34 (295); hom. 1 in 2 Cor. (389-392); hom. 3 in Phil. (204); laud 3 (70-75); scand. 13.11-21; 21.5 (194-201, 254). See also laud. Paul. 1.3-14 (116-136). Cf. Jean Daniélou, Les saints "palens" de l'Ancien Testament (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1956), esp. pp. 159-169. Joseph is taken as a type of Christ in hom. 61 in Gn. (528-529). This remains a rare occasion. J.R. Baskin's remark in his "Job as Moral Exemplar in Ambrose," Vigiliae christianne, 35 (1981), 223 that "Ambrose is unique among patristic writers in that he interprets Job solely as a moral exemplar" is too hasty.


151. The birth of the twins Perez and Zerah (Gn. 38:27-30) suggests how the Old Testament saints prefigured the eschatological community in Christ. They were represented in Zerah who stretched out his hand only to retrieve it in order to appear later after Perez, the personification of the Old Dispensation, had run its course. See hom. 62 in Gn. (535).

152. Hom. 2 in 2 Cor. 4:13 (286-287); see also exp. in Ps. 111 (290-292).

153. Hom. 29 in Rom. (658-659). Cf. David 1.1; 3.3 (677-678, 698-699); hom. in Rom. 12:30 (183-186). Forgiveness of an enemy was a matter of astonishment under the Old Covenant because it was only revealed in Christ.
154. Cf. also hom. 28 in 2 Cor. (590): Abraham confined to himself the refusal to accept gifts from the King of Sodom. He did not ask his followers to share in this good deed. Chrysostom constrasts this episode with the corporate sacrifice by Paul and his companions.

155. See e.g. hom. 56 in Mt. (551-552).

156. Hom. 25 in 1 Cor. (209-210).


158. Irenaeus, haer. 4.31.

159. See also his comments on Judah and Tamar in hom. 62 in Gn. (533-534).


161. Ibid. (282-283).

162. Ibid. (284).

163. E.g. hom. 12 in Jn. (83).


165. Hom. 7 in 2 Cor. (444, 447-478).

166. Hom. 4 in Phil. (205-207).

167. Laud. Paul. 1.3-15 (116-140); see also hom. 29 in Rom. (657-662).

168. See e.g. hom. 33 in Mt. (397).

169. See also laud Paul. 1.10-12 (126-132).

170. See also hom. 32 in Rom. (678-682).

171. See Chrysostom's comments on 2 Cor. 4:4-6 in hom. 8 in 2 Cor. (455-457).

172. See e.g. hom. 21 in 2 Cor. (544-548); hom. 6 in Eph. (46-47); sac. 4 (262-280). The ecclesial context becomes the norm of virtue in the time after Christ. This theme is equally expressed in his panegyrics. The excellence of martyrdom lies in its ecclesial implications. Ignatius is praised for presiding over the church nobly. He displayed this by his deeds to the extent of laying down his life for the sheep. His journey to Rome for the sake of
martyrdom is an occasion for praise. Through it he brought the intellectual light of doctrine to the souls of the people. See pan. Ign. (588 and 593). See also his praise for Melitius in pan. Bab. 1 (533).

174. See supra, pp. 126-128.

175. See also Malingrey, Philosophia, pp. 280-283 on the close connection Chrysostom makes between philosophia and the moral life. See hom. in Mt. 26:29(37-40) and hom. in Rom. 12:20(178-179) on the integration of teaching and deeds in Christ's own ministry. On the witness of moral renewal to the pagans, see e.g. catech. 4.17-21(191-193); diab. 3.2(266); hom. 49 in Gn. (374); hom. 32 in Mt. (387); ibid. 43(463-464); and on the efficacy of the care for others, see e.g. in the case of St Paul, laud. Paul. 1.5 and 7(120, 122-124).

176. Hom. 19 in Mt. (280).
177. Ibid. 59(581).
178. Hom. in Phil. 1:18(314-315).
180. Hom. 28 in Jn. (165-166).
181. Hom. 20 in Mt. (288-289).
182. Ibid. 15(233).
184. Hom. 25 in 1 Cor. (208-209, 212); see also catech. 6.10-13(220-222).
185. Hom. 25 in 1 Cor. (210).
186. LSJ, 398 and 946.
187. See esp. scand. 6(94-106).
189. Ibid. 1.6 and 1.8-9(120-122, 124-126); hom. 25 in 2 Cor. (572-574); see also hom. 56 in Mt. (551-552).
190. See hom. 15 in Rom. (544) for his comments on Rom. 8:36; see also ibid. 29 (660); hom. 25 in 2 Cor. (574).

191. Hom. 29 in Rom. (661).

192. Horn. 18 in Eph. (l26).

193. Hom. 31 in Rom. (669) [rev.].

194. Virg. 46 and 47 (256-270).

195. Chrysostom has mistakenly substituted Apollos for Aquila, and understands this ministry of woman to be confined within the marital relationship. This is a safeguard against the practice and scandal of subintroductae. See virg. 47 (264).

196. Horn. 30 in Heb. (212).

197. Horn. 5 in 2 Thess. (498-499). Cf. horn. 71 in Jn. (388); horn 40 in 1 Cor. (353-354); hom. 19 in Eph. (134-135).

198. We need to point out that Chrysostom's concern for an integration of theory and practice is not unique in the late fourth century. Basil of Caesarea's conception of the church offers various points of similarity. He is equally distressed by the divisions in the church due to the eremitic type of asceticism. (See e.g. his jud. 1 and 2.) External threats posed by Julian's reforms also necessitate the strengthening of the internal organization and self-sufficiency of the church as a society of its own. [See Paul Fedwick, The Church and the Charisma of Leadership in Basil of Caesarea (Toronto, PIMS, 1979), pp. 13-14.] Thus he underlines the charismatic nature of the church. The various groups within the church should exist in harmony with each other. Gifts are ordained by God for the upbuilding of the house of God, namely the institutional church. (See hom. 3 and 11; hom. in Ps. 11, 29, and 44,) Basil also insists on the importance of love. The love commandments in Jn. 14 are taken as the criterion for perfection. (Reg. fus. 2 and 3; cf. supra, pp. 128-129 for Chrysostom's stance.)

However, Basil's emphasis on communality is undergirded by a centralization of authority in the episcopate. The institutional church is the focal point of the Christian life. The unity of the church is maintained by means of ecclesiastical discipline and episcopacy. The church is credited
"with the authority(ἐξουσία) to discern(διακρίνειν) between what is good and viable and what is evil and objectionable". (Fedwick, op. cit., p. 11.) In his hom. in Ps. 44.9, the scene of the last judgement in Mt. 25 (and Ezek. 34) takes place in the present church: it admits to the right hand of Christ those who are conspicuous by their good works, discerning them from the evil ones, as a shepherd discerns the sheep from the goats. Admittedly, Basil's ideal for the church is the first apostolic community which is united in its life and good works (Ac. 2:44; 4:32). [See E. Amand de Mendieta, L'ascèse monastique de saint Basile. Essai historique (Maredsous: Editions de Maredsous, 1949), p. 129 n. 88.] And the church should not be physically separated from the world. Nevertheless, a sharp demarcation is entertained between the Christians and the outsiders(οἱ ξωθεν): no φιλία is possible between the two. (See hom. in Ps. 44.2.) All Christians are urged to bring their possessions to the local bishops in order that the latter may dispense alms to the needy. [Hom. 11.5; contrast with Chrysostom, hom. 21 in 1 Cor. (179-180).] Frances Young's comment is to the point: "Basil's organization in fact breeds subservience rather than imaginative venture in the service of others. The community was necessary not only to nurture love, but also to provide a specific context in which obedience and humility could be fostered." (See her From Nicaea to Chalcedon, p. 108.)

199. Hom. 11 in Rom. (492).
201. Comm. 6 in Gal. (675); see also hom. 30 in Heb. (212).
202. Hom. 22 and 25 in 1 Cor. (183-184, 208-209) [conflated].
204. Ibid. (654).
205. Ibid. (655).
206. Ibid.
207. Ibid. (656).
208. In the following discussion, Henry Bettensen's


211. See Peter Brown, "The Rise and Function of the Holy Man in Late Antiquity," *Journal of Roman Studies*, 61(1971), 80-101. Brown seems to see the tension in spiritual power dialectically. The attempt of "man to rule men under a distant God" in the institutional church is set against "the victory of men over the institutions" in the holy man tradition (p. 100). The latter consists of the "informal, unarticulate relationships ... on the edge of the hierarchical structure of the Byzantine church ... where the bishops might wield the *mysterium tremendum* of the Eucharistic sacrifice" (p. 95). The holy man rises to prominence due to the quest for certainty and objectivity in a crisis of freedom (p. 97). In an age when God's transcendence is taken to be absolute, the holy man reveals God's sympathy; he embodies the perfect contrition which man could make to the holy God; he allays man's guilty conscience invoked by the penitential system; and he is the *décisionnaire universel* of the locality (pp. 97-98). Brown interprets the Christian piety of the day as shaped by the victory of monotheism at the expense of regarding God as distant. The holy man is an attempt to answer the need which arises from this (pp. 97, 101). Brown's analysis of the piety in the early church only confirms the radical nature of Chrysostom's proposal.
NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

1. E.g. exp. in Ps. 119(339-340, 341); hom. 24 in Mt.(325); ibid. 26(340); ibid. 39(438); hom. 14 in 1 Cor.(148); hom. 1 in 2 Cor.(387); ibid. 26(580); hom. 9 in 1 Thess.(453); hom. 29 in Heb.(204); ibid. 33(230); scand. 4.17(90); Stag. 1.3(479); ibid. 2.4(453); virg. 64(330).

We shall not delve into the textual problem of this verse except to point out that Chrysostom in the main introduced v. 14 with καί, though at least in one passage [hom. 9 in 1 Thess.(453)] he replaces it with τι, a remark of wonder emphasizing the intense difficulty of the Christian life.

2. E.g. Clement of Alexandria, str. 4.2; 4.4.

3. E.g. hom. 9 in 1 Thess.(452-454).

4. Exp. in Ps. 119(338-339); ibid. 133(386).

5. Ibid. 119(341).


8. See Excursus Two: The Place of Virginity in the Moral Life.

9. E.g. ibid. 119(342-343); ibid. 120(345-346, 347); ibid. 127(370-371).

10. Ibid. 119(340).

11. Ibid. 125(361).

12. Ibid. 127(369). The exhortation "to bear all things nobly" appears frequently in epp. Olym. See also David 3.4(701); hom. 48 in Mt.(491-492); ibid. 84(755-757); hom. 42 in Ac.(302); ibid. 50(348-349); ibid. 54(379); hom. 3 in Rom.(416); hom. 16 in 1 Cor.(136-140); hom 12 in 2 Cor.(486); ibid. 25(552); hom. 30 in Heb.(210).

13. Pan. mart. 3(707).

14. Clement of Alexandria, str. 4.23[ANF 2, 437].

15. Ibid. 4.3. Cf. his lame response to those who are
puzzled by the suffering of the pious. The worst that can happen is death! "What wrong is done us, as far as we are concerned, in being released by death to go to the Lord, and so undergoing a change of life, as if a change from one time of life to another?" See ibid. 4.11[ANF 2, 423]. Death is the gate which leads to the beginning of true life. See ibid. 4.7. Cf. also Basil of Caesarea, ep. 101.

16. Clement, str. 4.3.

17. Ibid. 4.21.


19. E.g. str. 4.21-26.

20. E.g. pan. mart. 1(647, 650); ibid. 2(664-665); ibid. 3(711-712); exp. in Ps. 127(368-369).


22. Origen, mart. 28.

23. Ibid. 30-31.


25. On the theme of crowning vis-a-vis suffering, see e.g. David 3.3(699); diab. 1.8(256); hom. 84 in Mt.(756); hom. 77 in Jn.(418-420); hom. 14 in Ac.(119-120); ibid. 15(124-125).

26. This constant refrain is found in ad eos qui scandalizati sunt; see also Stag. 1. Not surprisingly, Job's experiences are cases in point. The seeming misfortunes happen only because they have been allowed by God whose redemptive purposes operate not only at the collective, but also at the individual level. If Stagirius suffered only after he had consecrated himself to God, the reason was that God had shielded him from it while he was still in weakness. See Stag. 1.9-10(446-448).


Of course, in a Neoplatonic metaphysics, suffering arises internally from the alienation of man from the cosmic order. In this sense, suffering stems from the finitude to which all men are subject. There is
however an intrinsic ambiguity in the Neoplatonic (and Stoic) doctrine of suffering. See the ensuing discussion in this section.

28. This last point is of course adopted by Kierkegaard; among modern theologians, see e.g. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, edd. and trans. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance (4 vols.; Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1965—1975), IV/3, 615.

29. See A.-M. Malingrey, "Le problème de la souffrance" in SC 13³, pp. 53-64, esp. pp. 56. See also Nowak, Le Chrétien devant la souffrance, esp. pp. 222-226. Nowak's study is heavily dependent upon Malingrey, as his acknowledgement on p. 7 and the numerous references to her in the Index (p. 235) indicate. Michel Spannent's Le stoïcisme des Pères de l'Eglise de Clément de Rome à Clément d'Alexandrie is equally influential.

30. See e.g. laed.; see also hom. 9 in Mt. (177).


32. See ibid., pp. 222-223. Hom. 8 in 2 Tim. (647-648), for example, would serve as an example of Chrysostom's "Stoicism".

33. Nowak, op. cit., p. 223.

34. R. C. Gregg and D. E. Groh alluded to a notion of moral progress held by the later Stoics in their Early Arianism — A View of Salvation, pp. 16-18. The evidence cited however does not bear this out. Cf. Rist, Stoic Philosophy, pp. 90-91; MacIntyre, After Virtue, pp. 157-158. Classicists may find our definition of Stoicism too vague. For our present analysis, we have neither discriminated between early Stoicism and Neoplatonism, nor defined whether or not the will is an independent entity apart from the intellect. The eclecticism in late Hellenistic thought makes these distinctions unnecessary for our purposes. By Stoicism, we mean the "Neoplatonic" Weltanschauung common to the fourth century with its particular prevalent moral vocabulary. MacIntyre's interpretation of Stoicism is more applicable to that of Neoplatonism. See also Dihle, The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity, pp. 113-116.

35. Texts on suffering as a trial are numerous. See e.g. diab. 2.1-2 (257-260); ibid. 3.1 (263-286); hom. 35 in Act. (255-56); ibid. 49 (341-343); hom. 15 in Rom. (540-541); hom. 3 in 2 Cor. (416); laed.

37. Ep. Olym. 10(262-270). Cf. hom. 8 in Rom.(455) [rev.]: "He that boasts of his works has his own labour to put forward; but he that finds his pride in having faith in God, has a much greater ground of boasting to show, in that it is the Lord that he gives glory and magnifies. ...[This] requires a soul of no mean stature, and earnestly affected towards Him."


39. Hom. 1 in 2 Cor.(389-390)[rev.].


41. Lk. 16:25: ὁτι ἀπέλαβες τὰ ἁγαθά σου ἐν τῇ ζωῇ σου, καὶ Λάζαρος ὁμοίως τὰ κακά.

42. Laz. 6.8(1040).

43. Ibid. 6.9(1041-1042).

44. Ibid. (1042).

45. Ibid. 7.3-4(1048-1052).

46. Ibid. 7.5(1052).

47. Ibid. (1053).

48. Stag. 1.3(431-432). On suffering as efficacious in absolving sins, see also hom. in Rom. 8:28(172); hom. 16 in 1 Cor.(138-140); hom. 23 in 2 Cor.(561); paralyt.(58).

49. Stat. 6(87).

50. Stag. 2.12(472).

51. Vid. 1(130).


54. Ibid. (181-187).

55. Hom. 55 in Mt. (542) [rev.].

56. We differ from G. Prevost's interpretation in NPNF-I 10, p. 340. He translated ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετή by "the other virtues".

57. Examples are numerous. See e.g. Stag. 2 and 3 (447-494).

58. This last point is made clear in the course of an exposition on affliction in 2 Cor. 1. See hom. 1 in 2 Cor. (388): "Such then was the spring of Paul's continual joy: because in whatever was of God he was full of hope; and did not so much as take count of ills so great. ...So too was that Patriarch encompassed with joy in the midst of much painful suffering. ...As then he who is gladdened with this joy cannot be a prey to despair; so he who maketh not this his own is easily overcome of all. ...Truly stouter than any armour is joy in God. ...So nothing can be harder to bear than bodily pain; nevertheless, because of this joy in God, what even to hear of is intolerable, becomes both tolerable and longed for; and if thou take from the cross or from the gridiron the martyr yet just breathing, thou wilt find such a treasure of joy within him as admits not of being told."


60. Ibid. (23-24, 28).

61. Ibid. (18-18, 23).


63. See Stag. 1.6(440); cf. scand. 5-8(92-142).

64. Laed. 5(82). See A.-M. Malingrey's comments on this passage in SC 103, p. 82 n. 1.

65. See also Stag. 1.5(435-437); scand. 18(232).

66. Ibid. 15(214-218). In the same treatise, Chrysostom also insists that to be scandalised about the injustice of suffering betrays an attitude of ἁπόνοια; it is a futile attempt "to waste one's labour" (περιεργάζομαι) and "to be overbusy and inquisitive" (πολυπραγμονένιον) rather than to submit
oneself under God's goodness and incomprehensibility. See SC 79, p. 285 on citations of the numerous references to περιεργάζεσθαι and πολυπαραγονταί especially in the first part of Scand. (Chapters 1 to 11).

67. Stag. 1.9(445-446).

68. Hom. 9 in Mt. (178); see also ibid. (177-178).

69. Scand. 15(216); see also ibid. 15 and 17(214-218, 224-230).

70. Theodore, catech. 4.6.

71. See e.g. Theodore, frag. in Gn. (633A-B); see also Greer, Theodore of Mopsuestia, pp. 16-18.

72. Catech. 1.6.

73. Philoxenus, hom. 9(I, 349) [II, 333-334]. We refer to the text and translation by volume and page number in Budge, The Discourses of Philoxenus. These are indicated respectively in parenthesis and square brackets in nn. 73-79. See Bibliography 3 for further details.

74. Ibid. (I, 334-335).

75. Ibid. (I, 342).

76. Ibid. (I, 340) [II, 325].

77. Ibid. (I, 335).

78. Ibid. (I, 340-341) [II, 325-326].

79. Ibid. (I, 347) [II, 331-332].

80. On this interpretation of religious life, see Wallace-Hadrill, Christian Antioch, pp. 151-164.


82. Cf. Young, ibid., p. 228.

83. See e.g. Young, ibid., pp. 229-239; Wallace-Hadrill, op. cit. pp. 155, 161-162.


86. *Laed.* 10(106).


90. *Ibid.* (59)[rev.].


95. *Ibid.* 9(73): τούτῳ τῷ δέσμῳ καὶ ἀλλήλοις καὶ πρὸς τὸν θεόν συνοδήσωμεν ξαυτούς. See also the frequent occurrences of δέσμος, προσδέχοι, and συνόδοις in the passage immediately preceding this exhortation [*ibid.* (72-73)].


99. See e.g. *scand.* 9-10(144-176); *Stag.* 2.5-12 (454-472). *Hom.* 3 in *2 Cor.* 4:13(296-297).

100. *Scand.* 9.6(148); *Stag.* 2.12(471-472); *hom.* 3 in *2 Cor.* 4:13(298).

101. What we have said sheds some light on an unevenness in Chrysostom's treatment of suffering. His theological (and Christological) premise leans towards a contrast between the Old and the New Covenants. It is significant that he ignores the text "not having received what was promised" (Heb. 11:13) predicated of Abraham in the course of his exposition of Heb. 11. He shifts the weight to the pilgrim character of a virtuous life. The patriarch is a stranger to the worldly goods which he possesses. [*Hom.* 14 in *Heb.* (165-172)]. Standing against this is an equal emphasis on the continuity between the two Covenants. This is undoubtedly motivated by his anti-Marcionite
concerns, and more relevantly, by didactic considerations: Because of their love for us, all the saints in the entire course of history have still to receive their rewards, in order that we may be crowned together. No Christological consideration is operative here. The thought that one would be crowned together with all the saints, provided one stands firm in suffering, serves as a powerful psychological impetus to a sufferer. Accordingly, Chrysostom regards οἵτινες in Heb. 11:39 as embracing both Paul and Abraham, representatives of the two Covenants. [Ibid. 28(192-193); see also hom. 2 in 2 Cor. 4:13(298-299).]


103. Ibid. (531); cf. Ibid. (529); hom. in Rom. 5:3(157, 159).
NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX


4. Ibid. p. 11.


6. O'Donovan, Principles, p. 7; see also ibid. pp. 16-17.

7. See ibid., pp. 6-7, 19.

8. Ibid., pp. 18-19.

9. Ibid., p. 4 (italics mine).

10. Ibid., p. 9.


12. Ibid., pp. 17 and 20. See Peter Hinchliff, Holiness and Politics (London: DLT, 1982), p. 186. O'Donovan gives this fuller elaboration in another discussion involving para-marital relationships, in particular, marriage between homosexuals and between transsexuals. "A policy of institutionalizing para-marital relationships will involve the church in the promotion of some kind of 'public doctrine' which is at variance with its own theological convictions but which is judged necessary for pastoral flexibility. ...It allows the church more room to maneuver in handling difficult pastoral cases. ...Plato envisaged that his useful myth would be in the hands of a governing elite which would enjoy the consciousness of a better esoteric wisdom. Christian theories of accommodation tend to assume the same, sometimes casting bishops and theologians in that role. ...The doctrine of accommodation, in conceding a certain autonomy to the public realm of
appearances, presupposes that there is another esoteric realm accessible to the community, in which it can keep a firm hold upon its knowledge." See "Transsexuality and Christian Marriage," Journal of Religious Ethics, 11(1983), 157-158.


15. Ibid., pp. 6-7.


17. Ibid., pp. 31-32.

18. Ibid., p. 49.

19. Ibid., p. 49 (italics mine). We note in passing that a guiding thought in K.E. Kirk's moral theology consists in a respect for an individual's conscience in his search for the vision of God. "The history of moral theology in the West is in the main a history of successive attempts to adjust the claims of conscience to the claims of law", declares Kirk in the first sentence of his book Ignorance, Faith, and Conformity (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1925). p. 1. The controlling category in this via media is "uncertainty".


21. See Kirk, Ignorance, pp. 146-162 on the significance of "custom" in Anglican traditions.

22. Dunstan, Artifice, pp. 47, 53.

23. Ibid., p. 48.

24. Ibid., p. 53.

25. This is illustrated in the respective compositions of the Joint Committees of the Convocations of Canterbury and York which put the report The Church and Marriage (London: SPCK, 1935) and of the group appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury in 1964 which produced the report Putting Asunder. The former was comprised exclusively of clergy. The latter was made up of "ethically sensitive" people from all walks of life: bishops, professors,
lawyers, ethicists, representatives of interest groups and of the Houses of Parliament. See The Church and Marriage, pp. ix-x; and Putting Asunder, p. 1. This point of difference is particularly significant in view of our present discussion. O'Donovan's unease with the authors of Putting Asunder lies in the distinction they made between what the church requires of its members and what it should propose in secular legislation. See Principles, pp. 8-9. But these authors had explicitly acknowledged the fact that they are only following the same distinction made in the earlier report in 1935. See Putting Asunder, p. 3; The Church and Marriage, pp. 16-17. It appears that, for the contemporary church, how decisions are reached is a concern as significant as what principles are held.

26. O'Donovan, Principles, p. 4. We should note that he proceeds to qualify the Platonic traits in the tension between truth and appearance as well. See ibid., pp. 4, 6.

27. On Thomist influences, see e.g. A.R. Vidler, "Church and State," DCE, 58; Thomas Wood, "Caroline Moral Theology," ibid., 46. An examination of the wider ramifications of the political philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, and within Christian circles between Augustine and Aquinas, falls outside our scope. See e.g. R.A. Markus, "Two Conceptions of Political Authority: Augustine, de civitate Dei, XIX. 14-15 and some Thirteenth-century Interpretations." Journal of Theological Studies, NS, 16(1965), 68-100.


29. See e.g. Aquinas, ST II-II 120; I-II 104, 3 ad 3; II-II 80, 1 ad 4 and 5; cf. I-II 100, 8 ad 3.

30. Or aequitas; hereafter written as "epikeia", the English form usually found in contemporary ethical discussion.

31. Alphonsus de Liguori, Theologia Moralis I, n. 201 (italics mine).


34. *Some Principles*, p. 1, 7-22. See also supra, pp. 8-11. Cf. Hooker, *The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, 5.8.1: "The Church being a body which dieth not hath always power, as occasion requireth, no less to ordain that which never was, than to ratify what hath been before. To prescribe the order of doing in all things, is a peculiar prerogative which Wisdom hath. ...To devise any certain form for the outward administration of public duties in the service of God ...and to find out the most convenient for that use, is a point of wisdom Ecclesiastical." We note here that by Hooker's time, the concept of episkeia has taken up a decisive ecclesiastical context. The problem he faced was how customs could change vis-a-vis new situations. See Dunstan's exposition of Hooker in *Artifice*, pp. 39-45.


36. Dunstan, *Artifice*, p. 32: He explains that an aspect of the moral tradition of a church "is seen as standards or canons governing the corporate life of the community, the church: that which is believed to manifest its theological character as the Body of Christ and to provide for its inner cohesion as a body, as human society". One suspects however that this recognition of its "theological character" is only a formal one. His concern lies rather in assuring some "inner cohesion" of the church as a social entity. His later strictures on the encyclical *Humanae Vitae* are revealing. The theological validity of the encyclical is not the crucial issue. Where the document errs, for Dunstan, is in its inexpediency: it issues in a "resultant loss of priests and teachers to the ministry of the church" and in a "continuing confusion about its authority among many remaining in it". See *ibid.*, p. 54 (italics mine). In other words, the church is no longer able to command the allegiance of its members.


41. Ibid., p. 4.

42. To a great extent, his effort is representative of the progressive wing in contemporary Roman Catholicism. We shall draw primarily upon his three major collections of essays within this period: Invitation and Response: Essays in Christian Moral Theology (Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, 1972); Gift and Call: Towards a Christian Theology of Morality (Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, 1975); Doing the Truth: The Quest for Moral Theology (Notre Dame: U.P., 1979). In subsequent footnotes, they are referred respectivey as IR, GC, and DT.

43. IR, p. 23.

44. Ibid., pp. 25-28; see also ibid., pp. 190-191.

45. Ibid., pp. 32-37.


47. Ibid., pp. 23-24.

48. Ibid., p. 38.

49. Ibid., p. 53.

50. IR, p. 41.

51. GC, p. vii.

52. Ibid., p. 15.

53. Ibid., p. 4.

54. Ibid., pp. 6-7.

55. DT, pp. 6-7 (italics mine).

56. Ibid., p. 207.


XXIII's Pacem in Terris. It constitutes a reversal of the Roman Catholic stance as articulated in Gregory XVI's Mirari Vos (1832), Pius IX's Quanta Cura (1867), and Leo XIII's Libertas (1888). Cf. McDonagh, *ibid.*, pp. 7-12.

59. GC, pp. 8-9; DT, p. 194.
60. DT, pp. 23-24.
66. *Ibid.* See also *ibid.*, p. 73: Tolerance of the other allows for a creative interchange; by "intolerantly excluding the different, one is impoverishing access to the divine images of the mystery of God and ultimately reducing that mystery to the sole image one can accept."

On the discussion of this paragraph, see also MacIntyre's analysis and proposal in his *After Virtue*. In the first half of the book (Chapters 1-9), he suggests that the failure of the "Enlightenment Project" accounts for the fragmented substance of morality in the contemporary scene. In the second half (Chapters 10-18), he seeks to re-introduce the unity of human life with the concept of "tradition". This proposal issues from a re-interpretation of Aristotelian ethics.

67. DT, p. 4.
70. IR, p. 29.
71. DT, p. 24.
72. *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24. It is significant in this passage that "person in vacuo" and "reasoning human beings" are given pejorative and favourable interpretations respectively. Because of the importance which McDonagh attaches to communality, we suspect that the accent of the phrase "reasoning human
beings" lies on "beings" rather than on "reasoning".


74. See supra, p. 291. See also GC, pp. 11-13.

75. GC, pp. 98-106.

76. Ibid., p. 104.

77. IR, pp. 50-51.


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79. On this moral scheme, see MacIntyre, After Virtue, pp. 50-53.


82. See Torrance, ibid., pp. 135-139, 145-155.

NOTES TO EXCURSUS ONE


2. Paed. 1.6; str. 1.25.

3. Paed. 1.6.

4. Ibid.

5. Str. 2.9.

6. Nemesius, nat. hom. 2(PG 40, 585B-C). Reference to Migne edition is also given for easier location of the citation.

7. Ibid. 1(PG 40, 508A).


10. Clement, str. 2.10.


14. On the importance of this defence against the pagans, see Henry Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition, pp. 106-107. See also Clement of Alexandria, paed. 2.9; str. 6.16; Basil, hex. 9.3-4; hom. in Ps. 48.

15. See Nemesius of Emesa, nat. hom. 16(PG 40, 673A-676A). He reports its various interpretations.

16. See ibid. The Stoics maintain πάθος as παρὰ φόσον, a disease of the one ἡγεμονικόν; in particular, to Zeno, it is ὁμή ἀλονάζουσα. (Diog. Laert., vit. 7.110.) Note however that the consideration for the psychosomatic unity of human

17. Nemesius, *nat. hom.* 32(PG 40, 729B). Cf. *ibid.* 28(PG 40, 709B): the concern for the psychosomatic unity of man prompts Nemesius to suggest that even in the "instinctive" action of respiration the soul remains as the subject.


NOTES TO EXCURSUS TWO


2. *Hom.* 23 in 2 Cor. (554).

3. *Hom.* 19 in 1 Cor. (160).

4. Thus, on the concept of continence (ἐγκράτεια), in *de virginitate* Chrysostom understands it in the main to mean the absence of sexual intercourse. In the twenty occurrence of the word, perhaps only once in the treatise does he depart from this interpretation. There, in *virg.* 40.3(234), he refers to the refusal of conjugal right due to wrath rather than from a desire for holiness as a sterile continence. By 393 AD, Heb. 12:14 provides him with a wider outlook. He indicates that all must follow continence, "whether we be in virginity or in the first marriage or in the second". Following continence corresponds to following after peace. See *hom.* 19 in 1 Cor. (160). This position is substantially repeated in *hom.* 30 in Heb. (210) delivered at the end of his episcopate.

5. SC 125, pp. 35-37. See also BA 49, 517-519. P. Agaësse and A. Solignac suggest that Chrysostom's understanding on the topic is substantially taken from Gregory of Nyssa! We also differ from G.W. Ashby's evaluation of Chrysostom in his "Theodoret of Cyrrhus on Marriage," *Theology*, 72 (1969), 482-491. Chrysostom's possible debt to Eusebius of Emesa in sexual ethics is suggested by E. Amanda de Mendieta, "La virginité chez Eusèbe d'Emesse et l'ascétisme familial dans la première moitié du IVe siècle," *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique*, 50 (1955), 777-820.


7. A more descriptive account is provided by Grillet in SC 125, pp. 26-30. Our arrangement of divisions differs slightly from his.


9. Ibid. 8.3(116).

10. Ibid. 9.2; 10.2(120, 124).

11. Ibid. 14(136-138).

12. Ibid. 14.3(140).
13. Ibid. 16 and 17(146-154).
14. Ibid. 14.6(142).
15. Ibid. 16.1(146).
17. Ibid. 17.3; 22.4.
18. Methodius, symp. 1.4-5; 2.1-2.
19. See e.g. Clement of Alexandria, str. 3.9; Methodius, symp. 2.1.
21. Chrysostom, virg. 15 and 19(144-146, 156-158). Procreation is therefore an integral aspect in the dynamics of condescension. See ibid. 17.4 and 19.1(154, 156-158). Sexual intercourse within marriage is for containing passions, and it is only within this consideration that procreation is used by God to furnish the earth with the human race.
22. Ibid. 25-26(174-176).
23. Ibid. 28.1(182).
24. Ibid. 28.1-2; 33; 41.3(182-184, 188, 196-198, 238).
25. Ibid. 29(184-188).
26. Ibid. 40.1; 41.2; 41.3(232, 236, 238).
27. Ibid. 41.1(236).
28. Ibid. 28-29(182-188).
29. Ibid. 27; 34; 36; 38(176-182, 198-298, 212-216, 224-226).
30. Ibid. 48.2(272).
31. Ibid. 49(274-284).
32. Ibid. 51-72(288-350).
33. Ibid. 59; 60; 64; 65(318-322, 330-332).
34. See Kirk, The Vision of God, p. 243.
35. Virg. 2.2; 13.3-4; 17.3; 36.2(100, 134-136, 152,
19:10-12. The difficulty presented by v. 11 is again evaded. Chrysostom takes it as a challenge; v. 12 exegetically replaces v. 11.


38. E.g. Sentences of Sextus, ss. 230a, b.


42. *Ibid.* 75.2(360).


44. *Ibid.* (228).


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In the Notes we refer to the works of Chrysostom by the abbreviated Latin title and subdivision of the work. Books and chapters are indicated by arabic numerals. All references are to the Greek text either of PG 47-64 quoted by column numbers in parenthesis, or, if available, to the modern partial editions, for example in SC quoted by page number in parenthesis. When available, English translation is from NPNF-I 9-14. Otherwise, translations are my own. Although the translation in the Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers is antiquated, we have decided to follow it because the series is easily accessible in the English speaking world. We have revised those sections where translation is unduly awkward. All such revisions are signalled by the abbreviation "rev." in square brackets.

In the list below, translation in the Nicene Post Nicene Fathers First Series is indicated by volume and page number in square brackets.

Anna 1-5 sermones de Anna, PG 54, 631-676.
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Stag. 1-3 adhortationes ad Stagyrium a daemone vexatum, PG 47, 423-494.
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ads
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