- Abstract:
-
This article investigates variation in the governing strategies of wealth-seeking autocrats. Why do some kleptocrats grant political opponents significant leeway to organize, while others enforce strict limits on such activities? Through detailed analysis of post-Soviet Georgia and Kazakhstan, I trace variation in the intensity of repression back to differences in the sources of rulers' illegal wealth. I argue that where rulers' wealth is accumulated from society, they are constrained in thei...
Expand abstract - Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
- Version:
- Accepted Manuscript
- Publisher:
- City University of New York Publisher's website
- Journal:
- Comparative Politics Journal website
- Volume:
- 50
- Issue:
- 1
- Pages:
- 83-102
- Publication date:
- 2017-10-01
- Acceptance date:
- 2016-11-23
- DOI:
- EISSN:
-
2151-6227
- ISSN:
-
0010-4159
- Pubs id:
-
pubs:680203
- URN:
-
uri:57c26b01-2f5f-4977-8b7f-ede929084be6
- UUID:
-
uuid:57c26b01-2f5f-4977-8b7f-ede929084be6
- Local pid:
- pubs:680203
- Copyright holder:
- J LaPorte
- Copyright date:
- 2017
- Notes:
-
This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from City University of New York at: https://doi.org/10.5129/001041517821864417
Journal article
Foreign versus domestic bribery: explaining repression in kleptocratic regimes
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