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Foreign versus domestic bribery: explaining repression in kleptocratic regimes

Abstract:

This article investigates variation in the governing strategies of wealth-seeking autocrats. Why do some kleptocrats grant political opponents significant leeway to organize, while others enforce strict limits on such activities? Through detailed analysis of post-Soviet Georgia and Kazakhstan, I trace variation in the intensity of repression back to differences in the sources of rulers' illegal wealth. I argue that where rulers' wealth is accumulated from society, they are constrained in thei...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed
Version:
Accepted Manuscript

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Publisher copy:
10.5129/001041517821864417

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Department:
Jesus College
Publisher:
City University of New York Publisher's website
Journal:
Comparative Politics Journal website
Volume:
50
Issue:
1
Pages:
83-102
Publication date:
2017-10-01
Acceptance date:
2016-11-23
DOI:
EISSN:
2151-6227
ISSN:
0010-4159
Pubs id:
pubs:680203
URN:
uri:57c26b01-2f5f-4977-8b7f-ede929084be6
UUID:
uuid:57c26b01-2f5f-4977-8b7f-ede929084be6
Local pid:
pubs:680203

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