Campaigning to a Polarised Electorate: Emotions and Information in Real Election Campaigns
Short Title: Campaigning to a Polarised Electorate*

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Abstract

Political polarisation has reshaped electoral competition in many democracies, presenting traditional programmatic political parties with a dual challenge: finding ways to make policy-based campaigning resonate with voters without exacerbating partisan divisions. We partner with a mainstream opposition party to implement a field experiment during the 2019 Philippine Senatorial election to compare two common campaign strategies—direct policy-focused canvassing and an emotional engagement component—to assess both their electoral effects and their implications for polarisation. We find that, even in polarised contexts, in-person engagement providing policy information increases votes for the party. Both strategies increase learning, and importantly, neither strategy produces backlash among pro-incumbent voters; if anything, evidence suggests cross-cutting moderating effects. These results suggest that mainstream parties can communicate policy effectively even in highly polarised contexts, and that direct policy and emotional engagement need not exacerbate partisan divides.

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1 Introduction

Political polarisation has increasingly defined electoral competition in democracies around the world (Gentzkow *et al.*, 2019; Larreguy and Raffler, 2025). As partisan divisions deepen, voters are less willing to engage with opposing views, and partisans experience growing animosity toward the opposing camp—a process known as affective polarisation (Iyengar *et al.*, 2019; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Reiljan *et al.*, 2024). In these contexts, political campaigns often exploit emotional responses to reinforce existing cleavages or to reshape voter perceptions (Brader, 2006; Widmann, 2021). For mainstream programmatic parties, this creates a dual challenge. First, their traditional messaging using policy-based appeals may be less effective when affective polarisation dominates political discourse. Second, in such environments, attempts to persuade risks backfiring: campaign outreach may mobilise supporters while provoking backlash among opponents, worsening partisan divides.

These concerns speak to a broader literature about campaign messaging, especially in polarised environments. Voters often discount or dismiss cross-cutting information (Kalla and Broockman, 2018), and that strong partisan attachments make it more difficult for voters to reconsider their choices (DellaVigna, 2009). In addition, while research in political psychology demonstrates that emotional appeals can shape voter behaviour (Brader, 2006; Valentino *et al.*, 2011; Marcus *et al.*, 2000), there is less evidence on their interaction with policy-based messaging.

Taken together, these debates and mixed findings point to a central question for parties operating under polarisation: can programmatic outreach be delivered in ways that inform and persuade without deepening partisan divisions? In increasingly polarised settings, how can mainstream parties successfully reach out to voters? Can policy-based in-person appeals counter the populist narrative that established parties are "elitist" or "out of touch" with voters? Can the emotional messaging that has contributed to increased polarisation be used to support policy-based campaigns as well?

We use a field experiment during the 2019 Senatorial elections in the Philippines to assess voter responses to these two approaches to campaign messaging: policy-focused door-to-door visits and emotional appeals. Senate is elected at-large and voters can select up to twelve candidates, allowing us to conduct the experiment in a limited geographic area without affecting the overall election results. Furthermore, the lack of a concurrent presidential election helps minimises the possibility of broader political effects.

We partnered with the Liberal Party of the Philippines, a mainstream national political organisation and the main opposition party in the 2019 elections against a coalition supported by the populist president Rodrigo Duterte, to explore both the effect of their door-to-door policy campaigning and the addition of emotional appeals to the policy messaging.[1] The 2019 Senatorial elections were widely perceived to be a referendum on Duterte's first three years in office. The campaign featured strategies common in populist campaigns: an anti-elite narrative and strong emotional connections to voters, maintained through shrewd use of social media as well as mass rallies and in-person events (Teehankee and Kasuya, 2020).

The Liberal Party put together a slate of eight candidates under the banner *Otso Diretso*. None of them were elected in 2019, with the highest performing *Otso Diretso* candidate finishing in thirteenth place.

In polarised political contexts, voter decision-making is influenced by both informational and emotional factors. While policy information can serve to clarify candidate positions and influence voter choice through learning and persuasion channels (DellaVigna, 2009; Pons, 2018), emotional appeals operate through psychological mechanisms that heighten affective attachment or aversion (Brader, 2006; Valentino *et al.*, 2011). Emotional messaging, particularly when linked to identity-based politics, has been shown to amplify in-group/out-group dynamics (Salmela and Von Scheve, 2017; Rico *et al.*, 2017). However, it remains less understood how emotional appeals interact with policy information when both are presented in tandem.

First, we test whether policy-focused door-to-door visits can be effective to counter against the narrative that established parties are elitist or out of touch with voters. The base treatment consisted of an in-person, door-to-door campaign introducing the party's candidates and communicating details about their platforms. Voters were also provided with a calendar listing the candidates and their proposed policies. While there is strong evidence of the effectiveness of door-to-door canvassing for turnout in U.S. elections (Green *et al.*, 2003), citizens' preferences (Broockman and Kalla, 2016) and voting in consolidated democracies (Pons, 2018), the evidence from consolidating democracies is more scarce (an important exception is Baysan (2022)). Understanding the effect of door-to-door policy campaigning is especially important in clientelistic countries, given that policy content is not a common feature of campaigns, and may be less effective in a context where voters are more accustomed to vote buying and patronage.

[1]While both the literature and the party operatives suggest that negative emotions may provide stronger treatment effects, for ethical reasons our intervention was designed to induce only positive emotions, and to be as similar to actual campaign materials as possible. The design was registered on the AEA RCT Registry on April 26, 2019. Details are available at: https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4137

Second, we explore the interaction between policy information and emotional appeals by estimating the effects of adding a short interaction designed to trigger positive emotions prior to the delivery of the policy information.

Emotions in elections involve a variety of physiological, behavioural, and cognitive factors, with implications for the way that individuals engage in politics (Brader, 2006; Brader and Marcus, 2013). While research has shown a variety of effects of different types of emotions on political behaviour, there is less consensus on *how* emotions matter;[2] in particular, how emotions interact with political learning and decision-making processes. We explore not only the effects of emotional messaging in political campaigns, but also how they interact with other dimensions of political behaviour in the context of a real world campaign.

Our field experiment shows that door-to-door campaigns to inform voters about policies and platforms are highly effective, even in a largely clientelistic context like the Philippines where policy content in campaigns is rare (Cruz *et al.*, 2024). Voters targeted by the door-to-door campaign are 7 percentage-points more likely to vote for at least one *Otso Diretso* candidate, increasing their baseline willingness from 65 percent to 72 percent. They also voted for 0.26 additional *Otso Diretso* candidates, for a total of 1.56 candidates, an increase of about 20 percent from the control group mean of 1.30. We further show that the effects on vote choice operate through learning and persuasion: treated voters are more knowledgeable about the political party, rate the party candidates as being of higher quality and are more likely to believe that the party candidates will support laws on things that matter to them and their family. Voters targeted by the door-to-door campaign are 8 percentage-points more likely to know the *Otso Diretso* slate and know 0.3 additional candidate, from an average of 3.1 candidates in the control group. Treated voters also positively update their beliefs about the party and the candidate's quality and policy platforms. Even though the intervention involved only a short visit by party volunteers, our results show that the treatments were effective at countering the populist narrative that mainstream parties are disconnected from voters' concerns.

Our research design also allows us to explore the effectiveness of adding emotional appeals to information campaigns. While both treatments are significantly more effective than the control condition, the added emotional appeals increase engagement in the short term and outperforms the information-only treatment in terms of increasing vote intention at the point of the intervention. However, over the course of the campaign and by the time of the elections, information-only messaging is more effective.

[2]For example, in much of the economic literature on emotions and decision making, it is not obvious whether the effect of emotions operates through a change in preferences or whether subjects project emotions onto learning about economic fundamentals (DellaVigna, 2009).

Furthermore, we show that emotional messaging neither supports nor hinders policy learning, suggesting that policy learning can occur even in the context of emotional appeals in campaigns.

The polarised nature of Philippine politics under Duterte allows us to explore heterogeneity along baseline political preferences. We classify voters into three mutually exclusive groups determined pre-treatment: (i) voters who do not know candidates aligned with Duterte (low information or uncertain), and, conditional on knowing them, (ii) voters negatively inclined towards them and, (iii) voters positively inclined towards them. The first group of voters responds equally to both treatments: the door-to-door visits increased the number of votes for *Otso Diretso* by 0.39 additional candidates. Anti-Duterte voters responded strongly to the simple door-to-door visits, but do not respond to the treatments including the emotional appeals. Pro-Duterte voters respond positively to both treatments and update about the party's quality and policy platforms, but from a much lower baseline that does not translate into additional votes for the party's candidates. Overall, these results suggest that partisan alignment conditions how voters respond to different messages, with a potentially important role for providing information about opposition candidates, as even pro-Duterte voters were responsive to information. Furthermore, the results for the Pro-Duterte and Anti-Duterte voters are consistent with a general moderation of views, suggesting a role for these interventions in potentially reducing polarisation.

Our findings contribute to three strands of literature. First, we extend research on door-to-door campaigning to a context characterised by both clientelism and polarisation—settings in which programmatic appeals are relatively uncommon and often viewed with skepticism. Field experiments conducted in partnership with political parties during live electoral campaigns remain rare, especially in environments where voters may distrust the messenger or dismiss information. While much of the literature on canvassing comes from consolidated democracies and emphasises turnout or engagement, we examine whether brief, policy-based visits can also shift vote choice and candidate evaluations. We show that direct contact from a mainstream opposition party influenced political perceptions and behaviour, even among voters predisposed to dismiss the message.

Second, we build on work in political psychology and economics examining the role of emotion in politics. We test whether emotional engagement enhances or interferes with the processing of policy information in a campaign context. In contrast to much of the existing literature—which often relies on hypothetical stimuli or laboratory settings—our study takes place in a real-time electoral campaign, with randomised exposure and both immediate and longer-term behavioural outcomes. We are able to

assess not only the effect of emotional appeals on engagement and vote intention, but also how emotional priming interacts with informational content in shaping learning and persuasion.

Third, we contribute to a growing literature on political polarisation by examining how partisan identity conditions responsiveness to campaign appeals. We focus on affective polarisation as a mechanism through which voters interpret both emotional and informational messages. Rather than treating polarisation solely as background context, we analyse how baseline alignment with pro- and anti-Duterte candidates structures responsiveness to the interventions. Emotional appeals may resonate when identity-congruent but provoke backlash when incongruent. Similarly, cross-cutting information is more likely to be accepted when it reduces perceived identity threat. These findings offer new evidence on how campaign interventions can either reinforce or moderate partisan divides in polarised settings.

2 Context, Experiment and Data

This field experiment tests the effect of informational and emotional messaging in the context of a real-world political campaign in the Philippines. In particular, we test the effectiveness of (i) delivering policy content in an actual door-to-door campaign by a traditional political party and of (ii) triggering positive emotions at the beginning of those interactions. The design was registered on the AEA RCT Registry on April 26, 2019.[3] To do this, we partnered with the Liberal Party of the Philippines, a well-established national political party and the primary opposition party in the 2019 Senatorial elections. The party randomised, at the village-level, both the targeting and the content of their signature door-to-door campaign for the Senatorial elections, allowing us to test the effect of emotions in political messaging. Indeed, their door-to-door campaign was designed as a potential response to Duterte's populist campaign. Apart from its role in the design and implementation of the interventions, the party played no part in any of the surveys and had no control over the way the data were analysed and the results were written up and shared.

2.1 Senatorial Elections and the 2019 Campaign

Senatorial races in the Philippines tend to be closely contested and 2019 was no exception. The Senate is often perceived to be an important stepping stone to the presidency

[3]Documents are available at https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4137

in the Philippines: since 1998, four out of five presidents had been senator before holding presidential office. Additionally, the 2019 Senatorial election was widely perceived to be a referendum on the first three years of the populist Duterte presidency (Atienza, 2020; Teehankee and Kasuya, 2020).

The Senate is the upper house of the Philippine legislature and Senators are elected at-large, in a single national district. This allowed us to conduct the experiment in a limited geographic area and to establish causal effects of our treatments, while minimising the possibility of influencing the overall election results.[4]

Under the 1987 Constitution, elections are staggered with twelve Senators elected every three years for six year-terms. Voters can select up to twelve candidates. Importantly, while candidates often form pre-election alliances, there is no straight-ticket voting option on the ballot and voters need to vote for each candidate individually (cf. sample ballot in Figure A.3). To help their supporters, parties often distribute what they term a "*kodigo*" (literally, "code," but in this context is understood as a "key" or "guideline") with the list of names of the candidates on their slate. These *kodigos* are permitted inside the voting precincts and are distributed by parties on election day and in the days leading up to the vote to help citizens remember the names of the slate's candidates once inside the polling station (cf. Figure A.4).

Sixty-two candidates, including seven incumbents, competed for the 12 available seats in the May 13, 2019 elections. The main alliances were the Hugpong ng Pagbabago/PDP-Laban, *Otso Diretso*, and the United Nationalist Alliance. The Hugpong ng Pagbabago/PDP-Laban alliance was started by Sara Duterte, Rodrigo Duterte's daughter, to support her father's government. From now on we refer to it as the administration slate.

The administration slate included two successful candidates closely linked to Rodrigo Duterte: Bato dela Rosa and Bong Go. Dela Rosa was the head of the Davao city police when Duterte was mayor. He was appointed head of the Philippine National Police on Duterte's first day in office and was in charge of implementing a contentious zero-tolerance anti-drug policy, referred to as "the drug war". On the day of filling his candidacy, dela Rosa reported that he had been instructed by president Duterte to run for Senate. Displaying a similar loyalist profile, Bong Go was Duterte's personal assistant in the period between 1998 and 2018.

The main opposition slate, *Otso Diretso*, was made up of six Liberal Party (LP) candidates and two independent candidates, including former presidential candidate Mar

[4] In the 2016 senatorial elections, 1.3 million votes separated the candidates ranked 12 and 13 (the relevant cutoff between successful and unsuccessful candidates). In comparison, the experiment treated fewer than 20,000 voters (about 100-150 voters in 130 villages).

Roxas and incumbent Senator Bam Aquino. The other candidates were less well known. In a noticeable break with traditional, more clientelistic, campaigning methods in the Philippines, the *Otso Diretso* alliance launched *Project Makinig* at the end of 2018. The project was a nationwide door-to-door campaign to listen to what voters had to say about the state of the country and what they expected from politicians. Almost 10,000 volunteers generated about 120,000 conversations with voters. Information collected from the campaign was then used to identify, shape, and communicate the party platforms ahead of the May 2019 elections. In addition, shortly before the elections, party volunteers went on an extensive door-to-door campaign across the country to introduce the party's candidates and platforms in detail.

2.2 The Experiment

The field experiment was designed to coincide with *Otso Diretso*'s nationwide door-to-door campaign ahead of the May 2019 elections. *Otso Diretso*'s existing door-to-door campaign consisted of delivering a detailed script introducing their slate of candidates and communicating information about their party platforms. Trained volunteers also provided voters with a list of candidates called a *kodigo* with the eight candidates along with their numbers on the ballot (cf. Figure A.4). The party did not implement similar door-to-door visits in the control group, although we expect that they would still be exposed to posters and ads throughout the campaign to the same extent as other voters, including those in the treatment group.

We requested that the party volunteers also provide a calendar (cf. Figure 1) as a giveaway that would be given to voters in both treatment groups to keep. The calendar provided information on the party candidates, with their photos and key policy platforms (cf. Figure 1). These types of giveaways (often called "leave-behinds" in the Philippines) are common practice in Filipino electoral campaigning. Calendars are particularly common. Other examples of similar giveaways include posters, buttons, paper fans, bracelets, stickers, and other paraphernalia featuring the party branding. Higher value items include t-shirts and hats, which are usually reserved for volunteers or important local supporters.

The first treatment arm consists of the original door-to-door policy message and the calendar. Each of the eight *Otso Diretso* candidates are associated with a policy issue area, and the party volunteers were instructed to briefly introduced each candidate and their policy area or programs. For example, Bam Aquino's policy area was education and he advocated for free college tuition, Mar Roxas focused on economic policies, Samira Gutoc focused on conflict resolution and peace processes in Mindanao, etc. A

Figure 1: The Calendar

brief version of their biography and their policies and programs are displayed on the calendar (cf. Figure 1).

The second treatment arm provided the same policy information but began with an additional activity designed to induce positive emotions. Drawing on the psychology literature on affective priming (Siedlecka and Denson, 2018; Klauer and Musch, 2003), we adapted techniques commonly used in laboratory settings to a campaign environment. Volunteers presented the Otso Diretso calendar along with heart-shaped stickers and invited voters to mark dates associated with happy or anticipated events–such as birthdays, anniversaries, holidays, or upcoming reunions. Voters were encouraged to personalise the calendar with up to five such events, to serve as positive emotional reminders. After this activity, they were asked to similarly place a heart sticker on election day, and encouraged to choose candidates whose policies and programs will lead to more happy moments for them and their families.

This intervention was designed with two reinforcing components. First, the act of recalling positive events was intended to induce an immediate emotional uplift, consistent with lab-based priming studies (Klauer and Musch, 2003). Second, the customised calendar served as a visual and emotional reinforcement in the days and weeks leading up to the election. The daily exposure to both the policy messaging and the symbolic associations was intended to simulate the repeated emotional cues common in real-world campaigns (Cacioppo and Petty, 1979).

While we characterise this second arm as an "emotional" treatment, we emphasise that all political communication evokes some degree of emotional response, even when

unintended. However, few field experiments attempt to directly induce emotion in a controlled and measurable way. We chose this particular design to balance the need for consistency, ethical considerations, and contextual fit with the campaign's tone. Stylised hearts and positive imagery–while perhaps more unusual in the U.S. or Europe–are a common feature of political materials in the Philippines and similar electoral settings (see Appendix Figures A.2 and A.1).

At the same time, while the use of a calendar activity aligned with Philippine campaign practices is specific to the local context, the treatment is designed to elicit a more general behavioural response: combining policy information with a positive, self-reflective emotional cue. The emotional component is widely used in psychological studies and increasingly used for experiments on polarisation, even as the specific mode of delivery is adapted to the local context. For example, recent field experiments in Mexico employ emotional nudges to show that prompting voters *not* to react emotionally can reduce motivated reasoning (Larreguy and Tiburcio, 2025) and mitigate potential backlash from the provision of counter-attitudinal information (Enríquez *et al.*, 2025). These studies differ in implementation yet share a common underlying approach. Along the same lines, our intervention can be reproduced in other settings using alternative delivery techniques: policy information may be conveyed through flyers, videos, or other forms of messaging, while activities such as personal reflection, journaling, or digital engagement can elicit a similar positive emotional cue. In this sense, the calendar activity is a culturally familiar version of a more general approach that can be extended to different contexts.

We considered and ruled out two alternative treatment designs during the planning process. First, we rejected a treatment arm involving personal visits without policy content. Although such a design could isolate the effects of interpersonal contact, we expected that many voters would raise policy questions during the conversation, making it difficult to ensure consistent implementation. Moreover, the campaign was unwilling to deploy volunteers without substantive materials, and all voters were expected to receive the calendar regardless of treatment assignment.

Second, we considered framing the policy content itself in emotionally evocative ways—for example, by highlighting how proposed reforms would improve family life or community well-being. However, doing so would have blurred the distinction between informational content and emotional appeal, making it difficult to disentangle the independent effects of each. It also risked inconsistent emotional reactions, especially if voters viewed such framings as overly strategic or incongruent with their own priorities. In contrast, our final design allowed voters to supply the emotional content themselves—drawing on personally meaningful events - which enabled a more

uniform and scalable affective response. This approach minimised politicisation, fit naturally within the tone of the campaign, and proved more feasible to implement across diverse voter interactions.

While working with a political party provides the advantage of understanding how direct engagement and emotional messaging affects voter behaviour in a real election, it also imposes some constraints. First, we were limited in our ability to directly measure emotional response at the point of the intervention. Administering even brief emotion surveys during campaign interactions would have been unusual. At the same time, our intervention builds on a large literature on psychology on how to induce positive emotions, and we piloted our intervention extensively to ensure that it translated well to our context. Furthermore, our results on engagement (discussed in Section 5.3) from data collected by campaign volunteers also suggest positive emotional response to the treatment.

Second, while other studies have explored the effects of negative emotions such as anger or fear, we chose to focus on positive emotions due to ethical considerations and the broader political climate in the Philippines. The treatment was also designed to align with the tone and messaging of the Otso Diretso campaign, which emphasised hope, optimism, and personal connection–an approach that resonated with local cultural and political norms.

Operationally, the sample of 195 villages in thirteen municipalities (cf. Table A.1) was divided into three equally-sized groups using a pairwise matching algorithm.[5] Within each triplet, a village was randomly selected to be allocated to T1 (information about Otso policy platforms only), a village was randomly selected to be allocated to T2 (information + emotions); the other one serving as control, for a total sample of 65 T1 villages, 65 T2 villages and 65 control villages. The groups are well balanced (Tables A.2 and A.3).

The experiment was implemented by *Otso Diresto* volunteers in 130 villages in the province of Laguna (south of Metro Manila). The door-to-door visits took place between Monday April 29 and Monday May 6, 2019.

In each village, party volunteers were instructed to first target the 10 baseline respondents and then to treat between 100-150 individuals. In total, the volunteers treated 14,483 individuals, including 1,175 out of the 1,300 baseline respondents in the treatment groups. This implies that about 90 percent of baseline respondents in our

[5]First, for all potential triplets of villages (within municipalities), the Mahalanobis distance was computed using 2010 village population, an urban/rural dummy, LP vote share in 2010 and LP vote share in 2016. Second, the partition that minimized the total sum of Mahalanobis distance between villages in the same triplets was selected.

treatment group were actually treated. At the village level, the intervention reached about 10 percent of voters on average. As explained in more details in footnote 8, we are thus unable to estimate the effects of the treatments using village-level results from the COMELEC due to limited statistical power.

2.3 Data and Measurement

Our analysis relies on four main sources of data. We implemented two detailed individual-level surveys, the first baseline in early April 2019 before the intervention and, given heightened political sensitivity in the post-election period, an endline survey a few weeks after the elections in late May/early June. In addition, the *Otso Diretso* campaign collected additional data for their campaign at the time of treatment in between the baseline and the endline survey. Finally, we also used official results to check the reliability of our survey-based measures of voting (COMELEC, 2019).

The baseline survey was carried out within a month from the election, during April 2019, on a sample of 1,950 individuals in 195 villages. The data include: knowledge of 20 Senatorial candidates (including the 8 *Otso Diretso*), voting intentions, first and second moments of beliefs about candidate quality and policies and first and second moments of beliefs about party quality and policies. The questions capturing policy beliefs measured whether the respondent thought that the candidate will support making laws and spending the government budget on things that matter to the respondent and their family.

We elicited first and second moments of beliefs through the use of specifically designed sliding rulers of different sizes, intended to display a range of values. Trained enumerators explained the different rulers and that individual respondents could select the ruler that they wanted to use, depending on how certain they were of their answers. Rulers could have either a larger (i.e. more dispersed beliefs) or smaller (i.e. tighter beliefs) opening, which respondents could slide to indicate the possible scores, and centered around the mean of the beliefs distribution. Specifically, for each candidate and quality/policy dimension, respondents were provided with a sheet listing values 1 to 10 and three sliding rulers (one of length 1, one of the length 3, and one of length 5). Respondents were asked to pick the grade they wanted to give. Voters who felt they were certain were asked to also pick the short ruler and position on their elicited mean. If voters were somewhat uncertain, they were asked to pick the medium ruler and, if they were even more uncertain, they were asked to pick the large ruler. Voters who did not know the candidate had the option of not responding to further questions and were allocated a ruler of length 10 to reflect their complete uncertainty and unin-

formative priors. The ruler picked by the voter helped visualise the variance of beliefs for the respondent and thus it is a measure of uncertainty of beliefs. An increase in this variable is associated with an increase in uncertainty (i.e. a longer ruler).

The endline survey was carried out in May/June 2019 and managed to re-interview 1,642 baseline respondents.[6] The data include vote choice in the May 13 elections and the same belief measures as those collected at baseline. As vote choice is a particularly sensitive outcome and in order to reduce the tendency of respondents to claim they voted for the winning candidates when they did not, we follow Cruz *et al.* (2024, 2021) and use a secret ballot protocol.[7] The vote choice data collected using this module appear reliable and unaffected by the treatments. The correlation between official candidate vote share at the village level and vote share computed from our sample is 0.80 and it is stable across our control and treatment groups (between .78 and .82). In addition, the likelihood of answering the secret ballot question is high - about 90 percent - and it is also unaffected by either treatment.

In addition, the endline survey collected data on (i) home visits by party volunteers in the month prior to the elections; (ii) whether respondents received materials from political parties; (iii) whether they received a calendar. Enumerators were also asked to check if they could see the calendar in the house and check if there were heart-shaped stickers on it.

Finally, we employ campaigning information obtained through *Otso Diretso* to assess immediate (short-term) voter response. As part of the door-to-door activities, the volunteers asked and recorded the respondent phone number (if they agreed to be contacted by the campaign, an indicator of engagement), and voting intentions for each of the eight *Otso Diretso* candidates. We can thus compare the two treatments in terms of engagement and voting intention right after the treatment for about 14,000 treated voters. For the T2 group we also collected data on how many stickers voters agreed to place on their calendars, as an additional indicator of the degree of engagement with the campaign.

A timeline of the experiment and associated surveys is available in Figure 2.

[6] Attrition and its determinants are stable across treatment and control.

[7] As in Cruz *et al.* (2024), the protocol was implemented as follows. Respondents were given ballots with only ID codes corresponding to their survey instrument. The ballots contained the names of 20 Senatorial candidates as they appeared on the actual ballot. The respondents were instructed to select the candidates that they voted for, place the ballot in the envelope, and seal the envelope. Enumerators could not see the contents of these envelopes at any point and respondents were told that the envelopes remained sealed until they were brought to the survey firm to be encoded with the rest of the survey.



Figure 2: Timeline

3 Effects of the door-to-door visits

We start by evaluating the pooled effects of the door-to-door visits by estimating equations of the form:

$$Y_{ivl} = \beta T_{vl} + \eta_l + \epsilon_{ivl} \tag{1}$$

where Y_{ivl} is the relevant outcome for respondent i in village v in triplet l, T is a dummy capturing whether the village was treated with door-to-door visits (either T1 or T2). η_l are a full set of triplet fixed effects (generated by the pairwise matching algorithm described in Section 3.2). As the treatment was allocated at the village level, standard errors are clustered at that level. We use data from the endline survey where we can compare the effects of door-to-door visits to the control group.[8] We also restrict the sample to the treatment villages and estimate the additional effects of the emotional treatment.

The main results are robust to alternative specifications and ways of computing the standard errors. In particular, we obtain similar results if we estimate versions of equation (1) where we control for the baseline value of the outcome variables (ANCOVA). We also follow Young (2019)'s approach and show that our results are consistent with randomisation inference.[9]

[8] We considered estimating the effects of the treatments on vote shares using the official results but are unable to do due to severe statistical power limitations. The individual-level ATE on the number of votes for OTSO candidates is 0.26. Given that party volunteers treated 10% of registered voters per village on average, without spillovers, we would expect a village-level ATE of 0.026 in the official data. As the standard deviation of the number of votes for Otso candidates at the village-level is 0.234, with 130 treatment villages and 65 control villages, we have a power of 11%. Including strata fixed effects in the regressions only increases power to 30%, well below the commonly accepted 80%.

[9] We generate 1,000 potential random allocations, estimate equation (1) and compare our results with the true allocation to the distribution of point estimates obtained with the 1,000 allocations.

3.1 Door-to-door policy messaging increases the number of votes for *Otso Diretso*

Our results show that the door-to-door campaign increased the number of votes for *Otso Diretso*, even in a political context where direct engagement is generally associated with vote buying and other clientelistic practices. Voters receiving an in-person visit are more likely to report: (i) voting for at least one *Otso Diretso* candidate; and (ii) voting for more *Otso Diretso* candidates in total.

On the intensive margin, the door-to-door visit increases the likelihood of voting for at least one *Otso Diretso* candidate by 7 percentage-points from a baseline of 65 percent. On the extensive margin, treated voters reported voting for an additional .26 *Otso Diretso* candidates over the control group mean of 1.30 (Table 1).[10]

Table 1: Door-to-door visits increase the party vote share.

	Vote for Otso Candidates:	
	At least one	Number
Door-to-door visits	0.07***	0.26***
	(0.02)	(0.09)
Control Mean	0.65	1.30
Control Std. Dev.	0.48	1.57
Observations	1,473	1,473
R-squared	0.048	0.069

Notes: The table reports results from individual-level regressions with triplet fixed effects. Each Column corresponds to a different outcome variable. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by village. * p < .10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01

These effect sizes are substantial. Back-of-the-envelope calculations show that the door-to-door visits could have materially changed the electoral results. Even if implemented at a relatively modest scale of reaching 10 percent of the electorate,[11] it would have been enough to elect one of the *Otso* candidates. Bam Aquino, who was the best performing *Otso* candidate, finished just 360,000 votes away from being elected to the Senate. Candidate-by-candidate results (Table A.5) suggest that each additional visit yielded 0.08 additional votes for Aquino and so, given a turnout of 47.3 million people, reaching 10 percent of the electorate would have been enough for him to be elected.

In order to benchmark our results with other approaches, we now compute persuasion

[10] Importantly, those two outcomes are the primary outcomes the party was interested in and the associated p-values are 0.001 (at least one vote) and 0.003 (number of votes) and so are robust to using Bonferonni corrections.

[11] For reference, the experiment reported in Pons (2018) reached 15 percent of French dwellings.

rates for our interventions. The share of individuals who did not vote for any *Otso* candidates went from 35 percent in the control group to 28 percent in the treatment group, for an average persuasion rate of 20 percent (0.07/0.35). This is slightly higher than persuasion rates in the literature. Pons (2018) reports persuasion rates of between 10 and 15 percent and Get-Out-The-Vote campaigns have persuasion rates in the range of 11.5-15.6 percent (Gerber and Green, 2000; Green and Gerber, 2019). The slightly higher persuasion rates of our intervention could be partly explained by differences in voting rules. Indeed, in most contexts voters have only one vote (say supporting candidate A vs. candidate B) and so in order to persuade A voters to start voting for B, one needs to convince them that B delivers a higher expected utility than A. In Philippine senatorial elections, the average voter uses only 8 of their 12 possible votes and so, among voters who did not plan to vote for any *Otso* candidate, the campaign "only needs" to convince them that one *Otso* candidate is better than not using one of their remaining votes. While it is not clear why voters do not use all their allotted votes, in this context higher persuasion rates appear plausible.

We can exclude that our treatment has an additional unintended effects, by showing that the door-to-door visits do not increase the number of votes for administration candidates. Recall that while voters in our setting vote for 8 candidates on average, the electoral rules allow them to vote for up to 12 candidates. As a result, more votes for *Otso Diretso* candidates do not necessarily translate into better electoral performance for the opposition slate compared to the administration candidates. At minimum, the treatment effects could be driven by an increase in the total number of candidates voters support, while at maximum, the treatments could have mobilised administration voters in response to the opposition's campaign activity. Results in Table A.4 do not support this view, however. The treatments had no effects on the number of votes for non-Otso candidates and administration candidates. They also did not affect votes for the two candidates most closely associated with Duterte, Bato dela Rosa and Bong Go. It is important to note that those results are precisely estimated zeroes.

Furthermore, the analysis of the administration slate candidates also reduces concerns about experimenter demand effects. Indeed, if our main results on vote for *Otso Diretso* candidates were driven by experimenter demand effects, we would also expect respondents to declare fewer votes for the administration slate.

3.2 Mechanisms: Learning and Persuasion Effects

First, consistent with learning effects, our results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 show that door-to-door policy messaging improves voter awareness of the party and the

party's candidates. On average, 58 percent of control voters are aware of the *Otso Diretso* slate, and the door-to-door visit increases awareness by 8 percentage-points. Similarly, while voters in the control group can identify 3.10 *Otso Diretso* candidates on average, treated voters can identify an additional .30 candidates.[12]

Second, consistent with persuasion effects, our results in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 show that the treatment improves voters' rating of the party's quality and whether they think the party will support laws and budget spending on things that matter for the voters' family. In addition to the changes in beliefs, we also observe a tightening of beliefs: columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 are also more certain of their beliefs about the party (as elicited through the choice of a less wide sliding ruler by voters in evaluating quality and policy position of *Otso* candidates). Taken together, these results suggest that door-to-door policy messaging can be effective for countering a common populist narrative that mainstream parties are disconnected from voters' concerns.

Table 2: Treatments increase voter knowledge and candidate ratings on policy and quality

	Knowledge:		Beliefs :		Uncertainty:	
	Otso	No. Candidates	Quality	Policy	Quality	Policy
Door-to-door visits	0.08***	0.30**	0.29***	0.30***	-0.70***	-0.74***
	(0.02)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Control Mean	0.58	3.10	6.08	5.99	5.14	5.24
Control Std. Dev.	0.49	2.25	1.93	1.87	4.32	4.31
Observations	1,625	1,634	1,572	1,554	1,572	1,554
R-squared	0.053	0.053	0.066	0.057	0.059	0.059

Notes: The table reports results from individual-level regressions with triplet fixed effects. Each Column corresponds to a different outcome variable. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by village. * p < .10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01

Additionally, there is some evidence that the treatments reduce self-reported voter reliance on outside influences as a determinant of vote choice (Table A.7). In particular, reductions in the importance of the opinions of family and friends. But there is no effect in the importance of vote-buying. These outcome variables were taken from a module on the determinants of vote choice, where respondents were able to select flashcards corresponding to various potential outside influences on their vote.

[12]Candidate-by-candidate results are available in Table A.6.

3.3 Addressing Alternative Mechanisms

In addition to demonstrating potential mechanisms for the treatment effects, it is similarly important to explore and rule out alternative explanations that may be driving or mediating our results. First, the estimated effects could be mediated by an increase in political engagement, either in terms of discussions with friends and relatives or in terms of further participation in the campaign. We collected data on a series of measures of engagement during the campaign and none of them are affected by the door-to-door visits (Table A.8).

Another potential concern is that the effects are mediated by subsequent political discussions spurred by the visits. To address this possibility, we show that treated voters are no more likely to engage in political discussions than voters in the control areas (Table A.9).

Third, another alternative explanation is that treatments were changing voters' underlying preferences for candidate or party traits. To assuage these concerns, we show that there are no differential effects on the stated importance of various candidate traits when deciding who to vote for (Table A.10).

Last, given that we conduct our experiment in the context of an actual electoral campaign where both *Otso Diretso* and opposition politicians are engaged in other campaign activities, we rule out differential politician response to our door-to-door visits. There is no evidence that other candidates revised their campaign strategy in response to our treatments. Treated voters were no more likely to receive handouts or from the campaigns, with the exception of the calendar provided as part of the door-to-door visits (Table A.11). Treated voters are also not more likely to be targeted for vote buying (Table A.12).

To recap, the door-to-door visits conducted by the party led to an increase in the number of votes for the party candidates, an effect that operates through a learning and persuasion channel. Treated voters are both more knowledgeable about the party and its candidates and have more positive opinions about the party and its proposed policies. We can rule out that the effects operate through an increase in political engagement and discussions on the part of treated voters or that administration candidates reacted by campaigning more in treated villages.

4 Effects of the Additional Positive Emotional Content

4.1 Emotions are more powerful immediately. In the long-run, information is more effective

Our research design also allows us to test the effect of positive emotions in campaign messaging, by comparing the standard door-to-door treatment with the door-to-door treatment including the additional activity to engage positive emotions. First, we find that the emotions treatment is more powerful immediately. Using the data from the intervention, we can show that while T1 (information-only) voters planned to vote for 2.58 Otso candidates, T2 (information+emotion) voters planned to vote for 0.12 additional Otso candidates (Table 3).

At the same time, once we look at the post-elections data, the information only treatment appears to dominate the emotions treatment, especially when we look at the number of *Otso Diretso* candidates they vote for. On the intensive margin, compared to T1, T2 decreases the likelihood of voting for at least one *Otso Diretso* candidate by 4 percentage-points from a base of 73 percent. On the extensive margin, voters in T1 villages reported voting for 1.68 *Otso Diretso* candidates and T2 has a treatment effect of -0.22.

Table 3: Emotions are more powerful immediately. In the long-run, information is more effective.

	Vote for Otso Candidates:			
	At least one	Number	At least one	Number
	Intervention Data		Post-Election Data	
Emotional treatment	0.00	0.12*	-0.04*	-0.22***
	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.08)
T1 Mean	0.82	2.59	0.73	1.68
T1 Std. Dev.	0.39	2.42	0.44	1.81
Observations	14,310	14,310	973	973
R-squared	0.030	0.027	0.072	0.118

Notes: The table reports results from individual-level regressions with triplet fixed effects. Each Column corresponds to a different outcome variable. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by village. * p < .10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01

4.2 Emotions do not hinder policy learning

A possible explanation for the lower effectiveness of the emotional treatment in terms of vote is that the emotional messaging affected policy learning. Indeed, the effects of emotional appeals in learning could have been potentially distracting (lowering learning and maintaining relatively higher uncertainty) or complementary (increasing the propensity of voters to assimilate information and reducing uncertainty above and beyond what achievable with information alone).

Interestingly, we are unable to reject the null that the two treatments are equally effective in terms of learning (Table 4). This suggests that, in this context, using emotional appeals in addition to policy information neither supports nor hinders learning on the part of voters. We do not believe this was an established conclusion before this study. In Table 4, none of the experimental effects on political knowledge about *Otso Diretso* candidates and voter beliefs in their first and second moments of policy and platform quality are statistically different at standard significance levels.

Table 4: No differential effects on knowledge

	Knowledge:		Beliefs :		Uncertainty:	
	Otso	No. Candidates	Quality	Policy	Quality	Policy
Emotional treatment	-0.01	-0.07	-0.11	-0.10	0.21	0.19
	(0.03)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.24)	(0.24)
T1 Mean	0.66	3.41	6.42	6.35	4.38	4.43
T1 Std. Dev.	0.47	2.39	1.96	1.92	4.18	4.17
Observations	1,071	1,077	1,036	1,027	1,036	1,027
R-squared	0.071	0.096	0.084	0.074	0.079	0.077

Notes: The table reports results from individual-level regressions with triplet fixed effects. Each Column corresponds to a different outcome variable. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by village. * p < .10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01

4.3 Emotions increase engagement with the campaign in the short-run

One clear effect of emotional messaging is in the increase in voter engagement with the *Otso Diretso* campaign at the point of the door-to-door interaction, as reported in Table 5. The table shows that during the campaign, voters in T2 were more likely to provide their phone numbers to the volunteers, consistent with the idea that the

emotional activity heightened attention and willingness to interact at the point of the intervention.

At endline, T2 voters were also more likely to remember being visited by *Otso Diretso* volunteers and to report having received a calendar. Similarly, enumerators were more likely to observe seeing the calendar in T2 households.[13] Taken together, the results suggest that the additional emotional component to the door-to-door interactions increases engagement wtih the campaign at the point of the intervention, even if these effects did not translate into differences in political knowledge or behaviour at endline.

Table 5: Emotions increase engagement in both the short and medium term

	Provided Phone No.	Self-Report : Visit	Self-Report : Calendar	Enumerator Saw: Calendar	Enumerator Saw: Stickers
	Intervention Data	Post-Election Data			
Emotional treatment	0.03**	0.06**	0.06**	0.06***	0.09***
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)
T1 Mean	0.43	0.18	0.24	0.06	0.01
T1 Std. Dev.	0.49	0.39	0.43	0.25	0.10
Observations	14,310	1,071	1,048	1,077	1,077
R-squared	0.043	0.155	0.128	0.103	0.141

Notes: The table reports results from individual-level regressions with triplet fixed effects. Each Column corresponds to a different outcome variable. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by village. * p < .10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01

5 Polarisation and Heterogeneity

While the overall treatment effects are important for understanding how voters react to the interventions, given the polarised nature of Filipino politics ahead of the elections, it is equally important to understand whether this polarisation leads to heterogeneous effects along baseline political preferences.

[13]Note that while the endline measures reinforce the engagement patterns observed during the campaign, they do not necessarily imply that the increased engagement persisted throughout the campaign period. The recall measure refers to the visit itself rather than to specific policies, and the calendars were often placed on the wall during the visits.

5.1 Identifying the relevant groups

One challenge is identifying different groups of voters, given that asking directly about support for President Duterte would have been exceedingly sensitive in 2019, in addition to potential concerns about how answering questions about their support for Duterte would interact with the variables of interest. Instead, we proxy for political alignment with Duterte using support for salient Senate candidates Bato dela Rosa and Bong Go, who were closely aligned with the president.

This allows us to split our sample into three mutually exclusive groups. First, we take the quality rating that respondents gave to Bato dela Rosa at baseline.[14] We then classify individuals who declare not to know or are uncertain about dela Rosa (and subsequently use a medium/large sliding ruler to report their rating for dela Rosa) as "Low Information". This set of voters represents 42 percent of our sample.

We then split the remaining individuals into two groups. The first includes individuals who give dela Rosa a quality rating above 5 at baseline. We call these individuals "Pro-Duterte". They represent 35 percent of our sample. The second includes individuals who give dela Rosa a quality rating below 5 at baseline. We call these individuals "Anti-Duterte". They represent 22 percent of our sample.

This allows us to compare the effect of the information-only and the information+emotion treatments on voters with a relatively low level of information about the election (for whom we expect the additional learning about Otso to be substantial), versus voters that are more informed, but with different partisan views regarding the administration. For these voters with stronger existing political alignments we generally expect information to play a smaller role, given the fairly tight priors that we can infer from their precise evaluation of dela Rosa or Go.

We estimate equations of the form:

$$Y_{ivl} = \sum \gamma_k Z^k_{ivl} + \sum \beta_{1k} Z^k_{ivl} T1_{vl} + \sum \beta_{2k} Z^k_{ivl} T2_{vl} + \eta_l + \epsilon_{ivl} \quad (2)$$

where Z^k_{ivl} are the indicators for whether respondent i in village v in triplet l is Low Information, Pro-Duterte, and Anti-Duterte.

Tables A.13 and A.14 compare the three groups along baseline characteristics. Low information individuals appear to be slightly older, less educated, and less knowledgeable about politics than the other two groups. Consistent with our main argument,

[14] Results are substantively similar if we use the rating given to Bong Go, who was Duterte's personal assistant between 1998 and 2018.

pro-Duterte individuals are planning to vote for fewer *Otso Diretso* candidates and more administration candidates (especially dela Rosa and Go) than individuals classified as anti-Duterte.

5.2 Treatment effects vary by baseline political preferences

We find that treatment effects differ across the groups of voters. Table 6 reports the results concerning voter choice and electoral support both at the time of the Otso visits (short term effects) and at the endline (long term effects). Table A.15 presents different evidence on learning by the three groups.

The interventions had unambiguously positive effects for low information voters (Table 6). They voted for .39 additional *Otso Diretso* candidates compared to those in the control group. For those voters, we cannot reject the null that the treatment effects for information-only and information+emotion are the same for both voting behaviour and learning.

The information-only treatment was more effective for increasing support for Otso than the information+emotion treatment for voters classified as being Anti-Duterte (Table 6) both during the intervention and at endline. By contrast, we find no significant effects for voters classified as Pro-Duterte, either during the campaign or at endline.

The results in Table A.15 also support the findings that both treatments were effective for low information voters, showing effects on both increased knowledge and reduced policy and quality uncertainty about *Otso* for this set of voters.

Similar changes in the beliefs of voters are also evident for Anti-Duterte voters, but only for T1. The explanation for the difference in voting effect between T1 and T2 for Anti-Duterte voters seems to be that T2 had no effect on the ratings given to *Otso Diretso* on policy and quality (Table A.15). Indeed, T2 was not effective at persuading Anti-Duterte voters that the *Otso Diretso* slate and its candidates were of higher quality and will support laws and budget spending on things that matter for the voters' family.

Importantly, the results on the sample of Pro-Duterte voters are consistent with a general moderation of views, suggesting a role for the emotions treatment in decreasing polarisation. Pro-Duterte voters positively update about Otso candidates quality and about the party platform (Table A.15). While the increase is not sufficient to translate into additional votes for Otso candidates, Pro-Duterte voter preferences nonetheless move towards the center.

An important take-away from those findings is that the emotional treatment appears

Table 6: Treatment Effects by Political Alignment

	Vote for Otso Candidates:		
	Intervention Data		Post-Election Data
T1*Low Information			0.39**
			(0.18)
T1*Pro-Duterte			-0.03
			(0.16)
T1*Anti-Duterte			0.69***
			(0.22)
T2*Low Information	0.34	0.03	0.39**
	(0.23)	(0.19)	(0.19)
T2*Pro-Duterte	0.42	0.16	0.09
	(0.26)	(0.18)	(0.16)
T2*Anti-Duterte	-0.99***	-0.79***	-0.08
	(0.35)	(0.26)	(0.21)
Observations	813	813	1,454
R-squared	0.15	0.16	0.098
Low Information: p-value (T1=T2)			0.99
Pro-Duterte: p-value (T1=T2)			0.44
Anti-Duterte: p-value (T1=T2)			0.00

Notes: The table reports results from individual-level regressions with triplet fixed effects. All regressions control for the pro-Duterte and the anti-Duterte dummies (not reported). Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by village. * p < .10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01.

to have more heterogeneous effects, and in particular are less likely to be effective for some groups, a concern in polarised political settings such as the Philippines. For policy-oriented parties and campaigns, the use of emotional messaging requires careful testing and targeting to avoid backlash or other negative consequences. At the same time, our results highlight an important possible use of such campaigns for moderating partisan views and fostering depolarisation.

6 Conclusion

Established political parties face significant challenges when campaigning in polarised political settings, where their opponents have been able to leverage direct connections with voters and emotional appeals to widespread electoral success (Guriev, 2018; Grzymala-Busse, 2019). In particular, established parties often struggle to articulate policy platforms in campaigns when political discourse centers on issues of social identity, cleavages, and grievances (Rooduijn *et al.*, 2021; Dipoppa *et al.*, 2021; Galasso

et al., 2022).

How can mainstream political parties effectively campaign in these challenging political contexts? They need to find ways to make policy-based campaigning resonate with voters without exacerbating partisan divisions. We partner with a mainstream opposition political party in the Philippines to test the effectiveness of adapting direct outreach and emotional appeals for policy-based campaigns.

We find that direct outreach–in the form of door-to-door visits by campaign volunteers to introduce the party's platform and candidates–are very effective at increasing vote share for the party. In terms of the intensive margin, the visits increase the likelihood of voting for at least one Otso Diretso candidate by 7 percentage-points from a base of 65 percent. On the extensive margin, control group voters reported voting for 1.3 Otso Diretso candidates (out of 8) and the associated treatment effect of the visits is .26.

Importantly, we are able to show that these large effects operate through learning and persuasion: treated voters are more likely to report familiarity with the party and its candidates, and rate the party and its policies higher than non-treated voters. These mechanisms suggest a potential role for direct policy outreach in countering the characterisation of traditional politicians as elitist and out-of-touch, even in a campaign against a dominant populist incumbent.

These effects are also substantively important: back-of-the-envelope calculations show that implementing the door-to-door visits even at a slightly larger scale could have changed the electoral results. Specifically, if party volunteers had conducted the door-to-door visits even in only 10% of the electorate, the best performing *Otso* candidate, Bam Aquino, would have been elected, giving the slate one representative in the Senate.[15] More broadly, these results also represent an important contribution to the literature on in-person policy appeals, which has mostly identified effects on turnout, but less often on vote shares.

Our field experiment also allows us to explore the interactions between policy information and emotional content. This is especially important in the context of new modes of political communication, such as social media and in-person rallies, which incentivise shorter and simpler political messaging that tends to be more conducive to emotional appeals than policy platforms. We show that while the additional emotional activity increased excitement and engagement during the campaign, these effects did not translate to improved vote shares at the time of the election.

It is important to note that for ethical reasons, we chose to work only with positive

[15]Furthermore, we do not account for the potential spillovers through family and friends and through media coverage and, as a result, these calculations likely represent a lower bound.

emotional messaging. Much of the emotional messaging discussed in the literature and associated with populist parties and candidates are negative emotions such as anger, fear, and resentment. It is possible that a stronger treatment or one that leverages negative emotions would have different effects, and these are important caveats to this study.

Last, our work contributes to our understanding of the effects of direct outreach and emotional appeals in polarised political settings. Importantly, our results indicate significant heterogeneity by baseline political information and preferences. While low information voters respond equally to the two treatments in terms of both vote share and learning, opposition voters respond much more strongly to the simple door-to-door visits. Pro-Duterte voters update their view of the opposition party, even if that does not translate into increased votes for the party. Those results suggest that these approaches can be effective avenues for moderating views and fostering depolarisation.

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7 Supplementary data

The data and codes for this paper are available on the Journal repository. They were checked for their ability to reproduce the results presented in the paper. The replication package for this paper is available at the following address: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19743938.

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