
"STRANGE USURPED POTENTATES":

ELIZABETH I, THE PAPACY AND

THE INDIAN SUMMER OF THE

MEDIEVAL DEPOSING POWER



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(MAGDALEN COLLEGE)

Submitted for the

degree of DPhil

Trinity Term 1992 [or 1993]

ABSTRACT

"STRANGE USURPED POTENTATES": ELIZABETH I, THE PAPACY AND THE INDIAN SUMMER OF THE MEDIEVAL DEPOSING POWER

This thesis centres on a pivotal event in the development of religious antagonism in England - the papal excommunication and deposition of Elizabeth I - considering its origins and consequences, especially its effect on Protestant thought and writing (since the political thought of Elizabethan Catholics has undergone more recent study).

The event appears as a revival of a claim not so antiquated as it is sometimes seen. I survey the medieval precedents for the papal claim to depose secular princes, which have lacked an overall survey, and the (often exaggerated) sixteenth-century views as to its past influence. There was indeed an exceptionally acute sense of this aspect of history during the early English Reformation.

The effect of this was that the actual deposition in 1570 served only to confirm Protestants' preconceptions. In their views of history, they tended towards a conspiracy theory whereby the influence of Pope and prelates lay behind most, if not all, opposition to English and European monarchies. In their views of contemporary foreign affairs, they had, since the beginning of Elizabeth's reign, constantly suspected the machinations of a (fictional) Catholic League, whereby Catholic powers, probably in conjunction with an internal rising, would combine to destroy Protestant England. This would be heralded by the constantly predicted papal sentence against Elizabeth.

Demonstrably, this was not the case. Disagreements among Catholic potentates precluded any such agreement in the early part of Elizabeth's reign; and ensured that, when Pius V did issue his sentence, it proved a dangerous embarrassment (in no way mitigated by Gregory XIII's qualification of it). It did serve a pivotal role in actual Catholic plans, which however were unable to overcome conflicting interests; the result was notoriety without efficacy. Nevertheless, a paranoid and pessimistic view predominated in Protestant England, diminishing only slowly even when overt confrontation late in the reign began to be crowned with success. Constant alertness for conflict had proved something of a self-fulfilling prophecy.

NOTE

Non-English quotations are generally translated, for ease of reading. The main exceptions are when the original phrase is technically significant. To save space, the original is given in footnotes only when it comes from a MS, not when from a printed source. All policies concerning foreign names are bound to be arbitrary. I can plead no particular justification for calling rulers François but not Felipe or Friedrich, except that French versions are probably more familiar. And it is at least consistent with writing Louis rather than Lewis.

English quotations found in original spelling are left so; therefore, they may be in revised spelling if quoted from a modern edition which has adopted that policy. I have adopted a minimum of tacit amendments concerning punctuation, capitalisation, Us and Vs, and Ys and Ths (since after all, the Thorn is not really a Y, just printed that way). Early modern practice is anyway contradictory and arbitrary in all these respects. Emendation beyond this point however tends to shade into alteration of sense.

Reference is made in chapter 1 only to printed works; in chapter 3, also to calendared documents; in the Elizabethan chapters proper, to MSS, and where these are so cited, originals as well as calendars have been consulted.

Dates have been revised to New Style and italics added, unless otherwise specified.

Books are published at London unless otherwise specified.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AHR	*American Historical Review*
ANG	*Acta Nuntiaturae Galliae*
Ann. Eccl.	Annales Ecclesiastici
APC	*Acts of the Privy Council*
BIHR	*Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*
BL	British Library
-Add. MS	Additional MS
-Cott. MS	Cottonian MS
(Cal, Vesp)	(Caligula, Vespasian)
-Harl. MS	Harleian MS
-Lans. MS	Lansdowne MS
-Sl. MS	Sloane MS
-Yelv. MS	Yelverton MS
BOD	Bodleian Library
-Rawl. MS	-Rawlinson MS
Cal. Carew	*Calendar of Carew Papers*
Cal. Scot.	*Calendar of State Papers Relating to Scotland & Mary Queen of Scots*
CDIE	*Colección de Documentos Ineditos para la Historia del España*
CDIF	*Collection de Documents Inédits sur l'Histoire de la France*
CIC	*Corpus Iuris Canonici*, ed. E Friedberg
CP	Cecil Papers, Hatfield House (microfilms in BL)
CRS	*Catholic Record Society*
CSP Dom.	*Calendar of State Papers Domestic*
CSP Dom. Add.	*Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Addenda*
CSP For.	*Calendar of State Papers Foreign*
CSP Rome	*Calendar of State Papers Rome*
CSP Sp.	*Calendar of State Papers Spanish*
CSP Ven.	*Calendar of State Papers Venetian*
DA	*Deutsches Archiv für die Erforschung des Mittelalters*
EHR	*English Historical Review*
ERL	English Recusant Literature (facs. reprints)
Harl. Misc.	*Harleian Miscellany*, ed. W Oldys
H & L	Hughes, HP & JF Larkin, *Tudor Royal Proclamations*
HMC	Historical Manuscripts Commission Report
JEH	*Journal of Ecclesiastical History*
J.Mod.H.	*Journal of Modern History*
KL	Kervyn de Lettenhove, J, *Relations Politiques d'entre l'Angleterre et les Pays-Bas sous le règne de Philippe II*
LP	*Letters & Papers of Henry VIII*
LPL	Lambeth Palace Library
MGH	Monumenta Germaniae Historiae

-LL	*-Libelli de Lite*
MIOG	*Mitteilungen des Instituts für oesterreichische Geschichtsforschung*
NBD	*Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland*
P & P	*Past & Present*
PL	Patrologia Latina, ed. JP Migne
PRO	Public Records Office
-KB	-King's Bench
-SP	-State Papers
PS	Parker Society
Reg.	Register
RIS	*Rerum Italicarum Scriptores,* 2nd series, edd. G Carducci & V Fiorini
RS	Rolls Series
16 CJ	*Sixteenth Century Journal*
SP	*State Papers of Henry VIII*
SR	*Statutes of the Realm*
STC	*Short-Title Catalogue of Books Printed in England before 1640* (2nd edn)
T-D	MA Tierney, *Dodd's Church History of England*
TRHS	*Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*
WCA	Westminster Cathedral Archives

FOREWORD

This started as an over-ambitious project to survey the entire Elizabethan and Jacobean controversy over the papal claim to depose secular princes. James I's reign (curiously, since no sentence was actually issued against him) saw the culmination of theoretical debate - which has however been amply covered by recent work, notably the Cambridge theses of J Sommerville and A Milton. Therefore, I took as pivotal point Pope Pius V's excommunication and deposition of 1570 - an event that is often passed over rather cursorily, but which was seen as being of great significance at the time, and indeed for long after. Nothing quite comparable ever occurred again; the papal attempt to exclude Henri of Navarre from future succession to the French throne was slightly different. Pius' action then served as a key historiographical reference for a Protestant posterity - especially for instance in the 1680s. In the Elizabethan period itself, there had also been acute consciousness of the weight of precedent concerning this papal authority.

Some words of explanation are perhaps necessary concerning the rather peculiar structure of this thesis. The importance that I argue attached to the medieval theory and practice of the deposing power - for Catholics as emblematic of the order they wished to maintain; for Protestants, as that from which they must escape - is responsible for the substantial introductory chapter on it (there having been no overall survey of that sort). Chapter 2 concerns the historiographical significance this matter acquired, starting with the Henrician Reformation but flowering particularly during Elizabeth's reign. The Bull published against her encouraged this resort to history - but I argue that it served mainly

to confirm extent interpretations.

From historical views, I move to the political conditions of the mid-sixteenth century. The theme of chapter 3 is why there was not such a public sentence, so much debated, against Elizabeth's father as against her; the theme of chapter 5 is why it did not occur until she had reigned over eleven years. Chapter 4 however comes before chapter 5 for a reason - I argue that contemporary political reality was incapable of displacing the preconception of early Elizabethan Protestants that all Catholic Europe awaited only a good opprtunity to destroy them and all they stood for. This view arose from the alarmist interpretation of history which emerged in chapter 2. There was some degree of truth in it - but it was taken to paranoid extremes, reducing the (more comfortable) complexities of reality to a logic of apocalyptic simplicity.

Chapters 6 and 7 concern the confirmation of Elizabethan Protestants' worst fears - in the first, why Elizabeth was actually deposed and why it happened then; in the second, the consequences of Pius V's action. Under the second head, I argue that the Pope's Bull did play a significant role in producing the troubles of Elizabeth's reign. The secular aspects of England's rivalry with Spain have too often been allowed to overshadow it. Indeed, it was due to the prevalence of a simplistic view of religious confrontation that England forced Spain into war in the first place. Domestically, the Bull succeeded in setting the Protestant paranoid view into a rock-hard mould, and establishing an equation between Catholicism and treason in English political discourse that could arose echoes even as late as the nineteenth-century debates on the removal of the anti-Catholic laws it itself had brought.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PAPAL DEPOSING POWER:

A STUDY IN BATHOS

"It is one thing to judge justly of secular matters, another to become entangled in them."

Gerhoh von Reichersberg, c 1135[1]

"*Pope:* Is not all power on earth bestowed on us ?
And therefore, though we would, we cannot err...
Then he and thou, and all the world shall stoop,
Or be assured of our dreadful curse
To light as heavy as the pains of Hell."

Marlowe, *Doctor Faustus,* III. iii

The idea of deposition of a secular ruler by the Church was the supreme medieval assertion of the hegemony of the spiritual hierarchy in the Christian polity. It reached its apogee in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, but its effective origin lay no further back than the late eleventh century, in the pontificate of Gregory VII. It was, as his opponents alleged, "something new... and unheard of in previous centuries."[2] That Pope, as in most of his innovations, claimed to be following ancient precedent. He and his followers therefore took every case of a previous Pope

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[1] MGH LL III. 453.

[2] Wenrich of Trier, *Epistola:* MGH LL I. 289; cf Otto of Freising, *Chronica* VI. 35 , ed. A Hofmeister (MGH 1912), p 304. See JC Murray, "St. Robert Bellarmine on the Indirect Power", *Theological Studies* 9 (1948), pp 522ff; JP Sommerville, "Jacobean Political Thought & the Controversy over the Oath of Allegiance" (Cambridge PhD thesis 1981), pp 303ff.

speaking harshly to a monarch - preferably an Eastern Emperor, as that was especially telling in his dispute with a would-be Western Emperor - to constitute a threat of deposition.

Gregory VII also first used as a fundamental precedent for papal depositions of princes the allegation that in 751, the last Merovingian Childeric III had been deposed and Pepin the Short made King of the Franks by authority of Pope Zacharias. To add insult to injury, papalists often stressed that Childeric's deposition was not because of his sins, but simply because he was *inutilis.*[3] It was not disputed that an embassy did seek recognition from Rome of Pepin's *coup,* and that Pepin, anointed by St Boniface, had a more clerically-influenced coronation than had been the Merovingian tradition. The fact is however that the papal role was not definitely seen as constitutive, rather than merely consultative, until under the priest-ridden Louis the Pious, over sixty years later; and

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[3] Eg Gregory VII, Reg. VIII. 21 (cf IV. 2), ed. E Caspar, MGH, p 553 (cf p 294); cf Boniface VIII, P Dupuy, *Histoire du Différend d'entre le Pape Boniface VIII et Philippe le Bel: Preuves* (Paris 1655), pp 166/8. Gratian, *Decretum* D 96 c , C 15 q 6 c in CIC I. cols 340/1, 756 and many commentators (see W Ullmann, *Medieval Papalism* (1949),pp 179, 213) were concerned to stress that Childeric was excommunicated and thus deposed *per consequentiam,* although, unusually, the contemporary sources make Gregory's view (implying more than just jurisdiction *ratione peccati,* more plausible), in that they do not mention excommunication at all. By the fourteenth century, defenders of royal authority were adopting the most convincing interpretation of all - that Zacharias consented to what he did not initiate: eg John of Paris, *De Potestate Regali et Papali* XIV-XV, ed. J Leclercq, in *Jean de Paris et l'Ecclesiologie du XIIIe siecle* (Paris 1942), pp 218/21; MGH *Constitutiones* IV. 1312. Cf E Peters, *The Shadow King; Rex Inutilis in Medieval Law & Literature 751-1327* (New Haven, Conn. 1970); Azor, *Institutes* II (Lyon 1607), II. 489/91.

even then, the basic perception, as shown in more condensed annalistic records, was of a change dictated by tribal election rather than apostolic instruction.[4]

Louis the Pious himself suffered a deposition - his second, in 833 - that *was* explicitly justified, by an array of bishops including the Pope, in terms of the coercive power of the Church over a royal sinner. Such justifications could however be produced without papal participation, as they were against Lothar I by the Frankish bishops in 842.[5] At this stage, the Pope was not acting as an independent initiator of events; he was merely one of a number of bishops, individually dispensable, employed to rubber-stamp the outcome of sordid family squabbles. It was dubious whether support for Louis the Pious' sons in revolt against their carnal father would render them more obedient to their spiritual father.

Ninth century Popes sometimes implied that the excommunication of rulers was a matter only for themselves,

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[4] See the increasing role ascribed to Zacharias as time passes in: Continuator of Fredegar, MGH *Scriptores Rerum Merovingicarum,* II. 182; *Annales Regni Francorum,* ed. GH Pertz, rev. F Kurze (MGH, repr. 1950), p 8; Einhard, *Vita Karoli,* ed. L Halphen (Paris 1938, repr. 1981). Cf MGH *Scriptores* I. 219, 292, II. 240, XIII. 42, 228, 702. But the Pope is ignored in: MGH *Scriptores* I. 10-11, 26/7, 63/4, 67, 102, II. 212, 221, V. 1290, XIII. 35, XV. 1294.

[5] 833: MGH *Capitularia* I. 51/5; *Annales Fuldenses,*ed. G Pertz, rev. F Kurze (MGH 1891), p 27; *Annales Bertiniani,*ed. G Waitz (MGH 1883), pp 6-7 (the role this last source ascribes to the Papacy is greatly overstated by Ullmann, *The Growth of Papal Government* (1955), p 167). 842: Nithard, *De Dissensionibus Filiorum Ludowici Pii* ,ed. P Lauer (Paris 1926), pp 102, 118. Cf J Wallace-Hadrill, *The Frankish Church* (Oxford 1983), pp 232ff.

(though this was not as yet canonically justifiable), by objecting to such sentences even when issued by metropolitans.[6] This early attempt at reservation was unsustainable during the tenth century Papacy's decline into disreputable impotence. In later centuries, it began to make undeniable sense; for lesser bishops were not capable of protecting themselves from the growing coercive abilities of secular monarchs. Thus the Council of Winchester in 1139 thought it unwise to proceed against King Stephen, "for two reasons, both that it would be rash to excommunicate a prince without apostolic consent, and that they heard and saw swords drawn around them".[7] The Fourth Lateran Council therefore ascribed the crucial role in sentencing heretical rulers to the Pope.[8]

Submission to the Church and Justification of Dominion

The tradition of the early Christian Church tended to regard askance the business of secular government, originally pagan, that all too often seemed like an institutionalisation of murder and theft, and certainly was an inferior distraction

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6 Eg Leo IV against Hincmar of Reims: MGH *Epistolae Karoli Aevi*, IV. 605.

7 William of Malmesbury, *Historia Novella*, ed. KR Potter (1955), p 34.

8 X V. vii. 3, CIC II. cols 787/8.

from the spiritual life. This did not entirely change following the Christianisation of the Roman Empire from Constantine's time. The authority of Augustine of Hippo, in his celebrated statement that kingdoms without justice were but robbery writ large ("magna latrocinia") and Isidore of Seville, with his view that only kings who were just could properly be given that name,[9] were used to imply that an essentially ungodly authority was only redeemable through subordination to a Christian standard of justice, dictated by the Church. In the ninth century for example, Nicholas I was inspired by Isidore in his vehement broadsides against Lothar II for his matrimonial irregularities (his actions were lower-key, to the point where it is uncertain whether he did ever excommunicate the king, who eventually submitted): "See whether those kings and princes, to whom you say you are subjected, really are kings and princes... See if they rule justly, otherwise they are rather to be believed tyrants than accepted as kings, whom we must rather resist and rise against than obey".[10] Gregory VII similarly by 1081 was making violent declarations, following the most anti-royalist interpretation of Augustine: "Who does not know that kings and princes have their origin from men ignorant of God, blind with greed and intolerable in their

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[9] See H-X Arquillière, *L'Augustinisme Politique* (2nd edn, Paris 1955), pp 59ff, 101ff, 117ff; YM-J Congar, *L'Ecclésiologie du Haut Moyen Age* (Paris 1968), pp 298ff; W Sturner, *Peccatum und Potestas* (Sigmarigen 1987), chs 2-3

[10] MGH *Epistolae Karoli Aevi*, IV. 299; cf 284. Nicholas I was cited as a precedent by Boniface VIII: Dupuy, *Histoire du Différend*, p 168.

presumption, who raised themselves to lord it over others, through pride, plunder, perfidy, slaughter - in short through crimes of every sort - at the instigation of the Devil, the Prince of the World ?" Any good Christian could more justly be called a king than could such a man. Gregory's contemporary Manegold of Lautenbach followed Isidore in making royalty dependent upon virtue.[11]

Giles of Rome, at the beginning of the fourteenth century, declared that nobody could "justly have *dominium* over anything unless he is spiritually regenerated by the Church". He did not blush to compare Christians to slaves, in that all they had belonged to another.[12] Thus he repudiated the example of Sinibaldus (later Pope Innocent IV) and Aquinas, who had both acknowledged that pagans could, according to

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[11] Gregory VII, Reg. I. 35, IV. 1 (cf 2), VIII. 21, ed. E Caspar (MGH, Berlin 1920/3, repr. 1967), pp 56, 290/1 (cf 295), 552, 557/8; Manegold of Lautenbach, *Epistola ad Gebehardum,* MGH LL I. 365/6. Gregory VII believed "that those kings only were divinely ordained... who were obedient to papal directives" - IS Robinson, *Authority and Resistance in the Investiture Contest* (Manchester 1978), p 123. Cf John of Salisbury, *Policraticus* VIII. 17, ed. CCJ Webb (Oxford 1909), II. 346ff; Innocent III, *Regesta de Negotio Imperii,* No 18, pp 46-52; James of Viterbo, *De Regimine Christiano* II.7, ed. H-X Arquillière (Paris 1926), p 243, & latter's *Augustinisme Politique,* pp 30/4, 45/6. Also the radical conciliarist John of Segovia who, however, included papal monarchy among the irresponsible and usurped authorities established in prejudice of the rights of the community: AJ Black, *Monarchy and Community: Political Ideas in the Later Conciliar Controversy 1430/50* (Cambridge 1970), pp 32, 153.

[12] Giles of Rome, *De Ecclesiastica Potestate*ll. 7-12, ed. R Scholz (Weimar 1929), pp 74-96. James of Viterbo agreed that infidels had no real rights, though the Church might choose to tolerate them - *De Regimine Christiano* II. 10, ed. Arquillière, p 286; cf W Affeldt, *Die weltliche Gewalt in der Paulus-Exegese* (Goettingen 1969), pp 121ff; Koelmel, *Regimen Christianum,* pp 226/8, 415/21.

natural law, justly enjoy property and secular rule (both contained within the word *dominium*). Such rights did not however apply to heretics, who were bound by Christian law but tried to escape it. He followed however the great canonist Hostiensis.[13]

Giles had followers during the pontificate of John XXII, like Guillelmus de Amidanis, who declared "Nobody justly and legitimately possesses anything, unless he subjects himself in this possession to the spiritual power"; "in the papal power is contained all powers, priestly and royal, heavenly and earthly".[14] These extreme statements were both increasingly hysterically defensive and an introverted affair of the regular orders, a protest against practical contemporary trends demonstrating a disregard for the laity and all its works to a degree now rather antiquated.[15]

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[13] Aquinas, *Summa Theologica* II-II q 10 a 10, q 12 a 2, in *Opera Omnia,* ed. R Busa (Stuttgart 1980), II. 538/9, 541. On Sinibaldus and Hostiensis, see J Muldoon, *Popes, Lawyers and Infidels*(Liverpool 1979), pp 6-16, 165/6; & "Boniface VIII as Defender of Royal Power: *Unam Sanctam* as Basis for the Spanish Conquest of the Americas", in JR Sweeney & S Chodorow, *Popes, Teachers & Canon Law in the Middle Ages* (Cornell 1989); FH Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge 1975),pp 199-201. But as Pope, Innocent IV sometimes implicitly contadicted what he had earlier taught, as for instance by extreme statements in *Eger cui lenia.* For later views, cf P Prodi, *The Papal Prince - One Body & Two Souls: The Papal Monarchy in Early Modern Europe,* tr. S Haskins (Cambridge 1987), pp 24/7; Skinner, *Foundations,*II. 169-71.

[14] Guilelmus de Amidanis, *Reprobatio Errorum,* ed. R Scholz in *Unbekannte kirchenpolitische Streitschriften 1327-54* (Rome 1911/4), II. 18, 25; cf Andreas of Perugia (II. 72), *Contra Edictum Bavarii:* "All temporal things, to be directed to their [proper] end, should pertain... *principaliter*" to the Pope.

Such hard-liners scorned reliance on the Donation of Constantine to justify papal temporal authority in Italy, insisting that pre-Christian (and contemporary non-Christian) temporal authority was wholly unjust (Augustine's "magna latrocinia"), and could only now be sanctified, by its receipt from the Church.[16] The Donation was more prominent in the jeremiads of those who opposed papal secular power.[17]

Wyclif essentially followed Giles of Rome's *dominium* theory, in his notorious statement, "no one is a secular lord, no one a prelate, no one a bishop, so long as he is in mortal sin"[18] - later in his career he was concerned almost exclusively with the implications of this for the clergy rather

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[15] Aegidius Spiritalis tended to denounce even most former papalist writers as secret Ghibellines because he considered them insufficiently sweeping in their view of papal power - *Libellus, Ibid,* ll. 111.

[16] Cf Stickler, "Alanus als Verteidiger des monarchischen Papsttums", *Salesianum* 21 (1959), pp 361/7; Laurentius Hispanus, quoted by O Hagender, "Der päpstliche Recht der Fürstenabsetzung", *Archivum Historiae Pontificiae* 1 (1963), p 81; Ullmann, *Medieval Papalism,* p 120; B Tierney, "The Continuity of Papal Theory in the 13th Century", *Medieval Studies* 27 (1965), pp 239/40; WD McCready, "The Problem of the Empire in Augustinus Triumphus & Late Medieval Hierocratic Theory', *Traditio* 30 (1974), pp 335ff, 347..

[17] Eg Dante, *Inferno* XIX. 115/7; *Purgatorio* XXXII. 124/8; *Paradiso* XX. 55/7; *Monarchia* II. 10-2, III. 10-11, pp 360/2, 373/5 in *Opere,*Testo Critico della Societa Dantesca Italiana (2nd edn., Florence 1960); Wyclif, *De Civili Dominio,* edd. RL Poole & J Loserth (Oxford 1885-1903), II. 22; *De Officio Regis,* edd. AW Pollard & C Sayle (Oxford 1887), pp 210/3; *De Simonia,* ed. MH Dziewicki (Oxford 1898), pp 31/4. It was also used by civil lawyers to stress the voluntary nature of the Empire's resignation of rights: JR Canning, *The Political Thought of Baldus de Ubaldis* (Cambridge 1987), pp 45-55, & "Ideas of the State in 13th & 14th Century Commentators on Roman Law", *TRHS* V.33 (1983), pp 19-20; D Maffei, *La Donazione di Costantino nei giuristi medievali* (Milan 1964), pp 136/45, 185/90.

[18] Wyclif, *De Civili Dominio* I. 21/2, cf 139, 212/4, 437.

than the laity. He also ensured that thereafter such doctrines were regarded as heretical. Radical Augustinianism became too disreputable for the supporters of papal monarchy; especially in the aftermath of the Conciliar Movement, there was too great a danger it would be applied to Popes themselves by radicals. Moderate papalists could however concur with moderate conciliarists that entitlement to *dominium* was not necessarily dependent on spiritual grace, though they continued to differ on the extent to which papal power *in casibus* could supersede natural rights.[19] Jean Gerson stressed Augustine's definition of temporal government as a remedy for sin (hitherto somewhat neglected in favour of the denunciation of *unjust* government); he considered it ridiculous to insist on spiritual perfection from such a postlapsarian institution, whose utility should make believers give it the benefit of the doubt, whenever possible. William of Ockham, whom he admired so much, wrote vehemently that even infidels damned to eternal perdition enjoyed full rights in this life.[20]

This might render the position of non-Christian rulers less theologically tenuous, but was not in itself sufficient to

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[19] See Muldoon, *Popes, Lawyers and Infidels,* pp 112ff.

[20] JB Morrall, *Gerson and the Great Schism* (Manchester 1960), pp 53, 102; Ockham, *Breviloquium* III. 6, ed. Scholz in *Wilhelm von Ockham als politischer Denker* (Leipzig 1944, repr. Stuttgart 1952), p 124. Gerson unwittingly followed Wyclif too: *De Civili Dominio* II. 73, 117, 161.

secure that of Christian rulers who departed from their religious obligations, though a somewhat milder attitude even towards them was implied. If the secular ruler *was* accepted as a member of the Christian community, he was necessarily subject to its discipline. Gregory VII insisted, quoting the Petrine commission, "kings are nowhere here excepted, unless they are not of the sheep which the Son of God committed to St Peter".[21] The *cause célèbre* of the first millenium of the Christian Church was that of Ambrose (not even the incumbent of one of Christendom's five patriarchal sees) and the repentant Theodosius. Until the later eleventh century, however, the episode was regarded as exemplifying the voluntary humility of a pious ruler, rather than the coercive power of the priesthood.[22] Thereafter however the spiritual accountability of even the greatest laymen to the priesthood was difficult to refute. Henry IV's partisan Sigebert of Gembloux had to wait half a millenium to gain large-scale support for his claim "that Christ the King of Kings reserved to himself the judgement of those whom He has made His deputies on earth", and restriction of resistance to tyrants to the realm of prayer.[23] The injunction to obey superior powers

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[21] Gregory VII, Reg. VIII. 21, Caspar p 548 (cf p 553). Cf Bellarmine, *De Translatione Romani Imperii* XII, in *Opera* (Naples 1856), IV. 2, p 78.

[22] See R Schieffer, 'Von Mailand nach Canossa: Christliche Herrscherbusse von Theodosius der Grosse bis zu Heinrich IV', *DA* 28 (1972). For the Gregorians' contrasting treatment, see also C Mirbt, *Die Publizistik im Zeitalter Gregors VII* (Leipzig 1894, repr. 1965), pp 164ff.

in Romans xiii, far from being used as later as an unconditional demand for passive obedience, was habitually glossed from the twelfth century onwards to the effect that resistance to injustice did not infringe God's ordinance, which had established those powers only in order to act justly (though this was applied far more willingly to secular than to ecclesiatical powers).[24] From the fourteenth century onwards, however, it was increasingly remarked that the Apostles had not resisted Nero, though no doubt a tyrant greater than those contemporary Christians had to deal with.[25]

If this were so, the verdict of the Church only formalised Christians' rejection of a ruler breaking divine law. Gregory IX wrote of Frederick II: "Who does not obey God and His Church, and scorns God's Law, ought not to be obeyed

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[23] Sigebert of Gembloux, *Apologia,* MGH LL II. 459, 462; cf Wenrich of Trier, *Epistola, Ibid,* I. 291ff; Wido of Ferrara, *De Scismate Hildebrandi, Ibid,* I. 562; Hugh of Fleury, *Tractatus, Ibid,* II. 469/71, 493; Honorius Augustodunensis, *Summa Gloria, Ibid,* III. 69-71, 77/8; *Tractatus Eboracenses, Ibid,* III. 656ff, 665ff, 680ff. Even more activist authors paid at least lip service to the idea of prayer as first resort: eg John of Salisbury, *Policraticus* VIII. 20, Webb II. 378.

[24] Eg Peter Abelard, *Opera Theologica,* ed. EM Buytaert (Brepols 1969) I. 286; Hugh of St Victor, PL 175 col 505; Robert Melun, *Questiones de Epistolas Pauli,* ed. RM Martin, in *Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense* 18 (1938), pp 152/4, 188/9; cf Affeldt, *Weltliche Gewalt in der Paulus-Exegese,* pp 129/30 John of Salisbury did not agree: *Policraticus,* IV. 1, VIII. 18, 20, Webb I. 236/7, II. 359, 374ff. Hus did apply the limitation to the clergy - an extension of the idea they disliked: P de Vooght, *L'Hérésie de Jean Huss* (2nd edn, Louvain 1975), pp 218, 558/60.

[25] Eg Dietrich of Niem, *De Modo Uniendi et Reformandi Ecclesiam,* ed. H Heimpel (Berlin & Leipzig 1933), p 46; De Vooght, *L'Hérésie de Jean Huss,* p 218.

himself, *especially* if excommunicate". Gregory VII wrote of disobedient bishops what applied equally to princes - "nobody should obey any against their Creator, who is to be put before all, but we should resist any waxing proud against God that, at least by compulsion, he may return to the path of righteousness" - and of Henry IV in 1076, "it is fitting that whoso strives to reduce the honour of your {St Peter's} Church, should lose the honour he himself *seems* to have".[26]

Contagion of Excommunication and Interdiction of Rule

According to the strict practice of the early Church, any excommunicate should be shunned by the faithful; this obviously would make it *de facto* impossible for a ruler to govern. Gregory VII took this view, and was the first to apply it unequivocally to kings as to ordinary laymen. Both in 1074 and 1076, he pronounced that Henry IV had suffered "the contagion of excommunication" by association with excommunicates, and would in turn transmit this to his subjects unless they avoided him.[27] Excommunication

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[26] MGH *Epistolae Pontificarum XIII seculi,* I. 731; *Epistolae Vagantes of Gregory VII,* ed. HEJ Cowdrey (Oxford 1972), pp 24/5, & Reg. III. 10a, Caspar p 270.

[27] Gregory VII, Reg. I. 85, III. 10a; Caspar pp 121, 270. Cf Nicholas I 's and John VIII's views: MGH *Epistolae Karoli Aevi,* IV. 225, V. 280. Also E Vodola, *Excommunication in the Middle Ages* (Berkeley & Los Angeles 1986), pp 14-18. The analogy to what was then believed to be the most infectious of diseases, leprosy,

suffered an inflationary spiral, that was in due course to require a distinction (never made altogether satisfactorily) between different forms of intensity. Excessive incidence threatened, even by the eleventh century, to make the theory of avoidance impracticable. Thus the Gregorian Gebhard of Salzburg insisted that it was obligatory in the case of a papal excommunication, even if not necessarily so in that of one pronounced by a lesser cleric; as the *Dictatus Papae* claimed, "we must not stay in the same house" with those excommunicated by the Pope.[28] This aspiration survived. Innocent III ordered English churchmen to proceed against John's foes after the King's submission to Rome: "denounce them throughout England as excommunicate *by apostolic authority* and to be *more strictly avoided* by all".[29]

Innocent III and Innocent IV, respectively deposing the Emperors Otto IV in 1212 and Frederick II in 1245 and requiring some positive disincentive for their subjects to obey them besides saying they *need* not, substituted for reliance

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is specific in Alexander III, *Epistolae,* No 768; PL 200 col 707; cf RI Moore, *The Formation of a Persecuting Society* (Oxford 1987), pp 62/3, 76; 53ff on the segregation of lepers, and the policy's erratic application to rulers like Baldwin IV of Jerusalem; 25/6 on the intervention of Bernard of Clairvaux to organise a boycott of Toulousain heretics (since normal procedure did not work); &"Heresy as Disease", in *The Concept of Heresy in the Middle Ages,* edd. DW Lourdaux & D Verhelst (Louvain 1970), pp 1-11.

[28] Gebhard of Salzburg, MGH LL I. 5; *Dictatus Papae,*c 6; Caspar p 203. Cf Bernold of St Blasien, *Epistola Apologetica,* MGH LL II. 101/6.

[29] *Selected Letters of Innocent III concerning England,* ed. CR Cheney & WH Semple (1953), p 223.

on the theory of contagion of excommunication, a specific decree that any who continued to acknowledge the Emperor was thereby excommunicate. Even Gregory VII had said the same sometimes, but his main reliance had been upon contagion. Boniface VIII intended to issue the same sentence against Philip IV of France.[30] By the time of Hostiensis, contagion theory really confined itself to assisting the excommunicate to hear divine service in defiance of the ban, rather than dealing with them in secular matters.[31]

If the ideal was that excommunication should shut off the sinner from daily "communion" with Christians, as well as from the communion of the altar, this was rapidly becoming a dead letter, just as the ancient requirement of a lifelong penance after absolution, that amounted to civil death, had already done (though it was restored from the thirteenth century for grave cases of heresy). In Carolingian times, Church Councils still tried to exclude excommunicates from public office while they were under the ban (of any sort), even if they might hope to regain them upon absolution.[32] Gregory

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30 Matthew Paris, *Chronica Majora,* ed. HR Luard, RS (1872-83), IV. 445/55 = Innocent IV, Reg. No. 1367 (ed. E Berger, 1884-1911) = VI II. xiv. 2, CIC II cols 1008/11; Gregory VII, Reg. II. 18, III. 10a, VIII. 14a, Caspar pp 151/2, 271, 485/6; Boniface VIII: Dupuy, *Histoire du Différend,* pp 182/6. Cf *Ann. Eccl.* 1467 no 2 for Paul II's sentence against supporters of George Podebrady of Bohemia; he was being condemned for specified heresy.

31 See A Haidacher, "Über den Zeitpunkt des Exkommunikations Ottos IV", *Roemische Historische Mitteilungen* 3-4 (1958-60), I. 140.

32 Vodola, *Excommunication,* pp 9-13; Council of Pavia (850), MGH

VII himself in 1078 bowed to the pressures of realism by exempting family, dependents and *curiales* (a significant group in the case of a king), from the obligation of avoidance to avoid contagion, at least in the case of simple excommunication. This measure, *Quoniam Multos,* was overturned in 1139 by the Second Lateran Council; though it was soon apparent that the stricter line was unenforceable.[33] Nonetheless, in 1324 John XXII tried to command that Louis IV "be avoided by all without exception", when he had only sentenced him as yet to simple excommunication.[34]

In the early fifteenth century, the inefficacy of contagion doctrine as it stood was recognised in Martin V's decree *Ad Evitanda Multa Scandala* (confirmed by the Councils of Constance and Lateran V). This stated that only minor excommunication could be caught from a major excommunicate - and at that, only from one whose position had been published without possibility of doubt, or concerning whom a specific health warning had been issued.[35]

Capitularia, II. 120.

[33] Gregory VII, Reg. V. 14 c 6, Caspar pp 372/3; cf Vodola, *Excommunication,* pp 24/7, 60ff. Gregory's opponents accused him, somewhat disingenuously, of being soft on excommunicates - Robinson, *Authority and Resistance,* p 47.

[34] MGH *Constitutiones* V. 693-700, 817. Cf, on Urban VI & Charles III of Naples: H Simonsfeld, "Analekten zur Papst- und Konziliensgeschichte im vierzehnten und funfzehnten Jahrhunderte", *Abhandlungen der koeniglichen bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* 20 (1891), p 40.

[35] See Sylvestro Mazzolini's *Summa Summarum* (Antwerp 1581), "Excommunicatio" III. 6, V. 4, 7, 18, & the very influential Martin de Azipulcueta

Gregory VII implied a greater obligation to avoidance than normal, possibly associated with the intensification of simple excommunication by anathema, such as the sentence he pronounced against Henry IV at the Lateran synod of Lent 1076. For then he declared, "I nullify his government of all Germany and Italy, I absolve all Christians from the obligation of any oath they have made or will make to him, and I forbid anyone to serve him as king". He had already threatened Philip I of France in similar terms two years before: "certainly the French, unless they desire to reject the Christian Faith, will, when struck by the sword of a general anathema, refuse to obey him further"; if Philip remained obstinate, "we will try by every means, with God's help, to deprive him of the French kingdom he holds". In both cases there is a certain ambiguity, as besides issuing this *solvendum fidelitatis*, Gregory made more direct claims to deprive the kings concerned, which might have been by this means or otherwise.[36] The indirect

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(Navarrus)'s *Enchiridion* (Antwerp 1585), ch 27 nos 4, 26/7, 33/6, as against Bartolommeo Granchi, *Summa de Casibus Conscientiae* (Paris c 1475), "Excommunicatio" I, VI, *et al.* Navarrus regarded heretics condemned by the anathema *In Coena Domini* as "notorie" rather than "occulti excommunicati", and so automatically to be avoided - which was unhelpful in the case of individuals not specifically sentenced. On the other hand (to spite the Spanish Inquisition), he maintained that excommunicates ordinarily retained rights "sub juribus naturalis, gentium et civilis". Cf Paul IV's bull *Cum ex Apostolatus Officio*, on which see FW Maitland, "Queen Elizabeth & Paul IV", *EHR* 15 (1900), pp 327/9; & PJ Holmes, "The Political Thought of Elizabethan Catholics" (Cambridge PhD thesis 1975), pp 102-129 for later influence.

[36] Gregory VII, Reg. III. 10a (cf IV. 3), I. 35 (cf II. 5, 18), Caspar pp 270/1 (cf 298/9), 56 (cf 130/2, 151). See also the 1080 sentence against Henry IV: VII.

extension of his spiritual power was however sufficient - as he interpreted it, it allowed him to do anything he liked. This had a certain attraction for his successors in the office.

Indirect and Direct Deposing Powers: the Logically Cogent and the Irrelevantly Rhetorical

The dissolution of fealty was and continued to be the basis for papal deposition decrees; the "indirect" power, commanding the faithful by virtue of their spiritual obedience to the Supreme Pontiff to cease to obey an anathematised secular monarch. Five centuries after Gregory, Cardinal Bellarmine wrote, "The fact that there is in the Papacy a power in regard of temporal affairs is not a matter of opinion among Catholics, although there is no lack of disputes over what kind and manner of power it is." He was quite correct in considering the indirect power, rather than rarer and often purely rhetorical assertions of a universal temporal supremacy of the Papacy, allowing a "direct" power of deposition, as fundamental. To some extent the distinction was merely semantic, as the consequences drawn were very similar, but the "indirect" power was easier to justify.[37]

14a, pp 485/6.

[37] Bellarmine, *De Potestate Summi Pontificis in Rebus Temporalibus* III, in *Opera* IV. 2, p 270. See Murray, "Bellarmine on the Indirect Power", pp 491ff, 500: "Bellarmine's indirect power seems to be simply a direct power restricted to

There can be no doubt that the principal justification behind Gregory VII's depositions of Henry IV was simply a logical extension of the universal spiritual power he claimed for himself. The anathema of 1076 began by invoking the "the God-given power of binding and loosing in Heaven and Earth".[38] Innocent IV, justifying his deposition decree against Frederick II, went so far as to claim that Christ "established in the Apostolic See not only a pontifical but a royal monarchy", but the more firmly founded base for his argument was the papal right to denounce "any Christian... as a heathen and a publican", so that he would be "*per consequens* deprived of any power of temporal rule he might have, which cannot be enjoyed outside the Church, since there, where all things are ordained for Hell, there can be no power ordained by God". As a canonist, he expatiated upon the Pope's double authority enjoyed *de jure, non de facto.* As Pope, he had to take some

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exceptional use". There was little reason behind Sixtus V's wish to Index Bellarmine and Vitoria as only acknowledging indirect papal power in temporals. Clement VIII however *did* Index Carerius, a partisan of the direct power. Cf T Clancy, "English Catholics & the Papal Deposing Power 1570-1640", *Recusant History* 6-8 (1961/4), I. 121/2, III. 4-5; J Brodrick, *Cardinal Bellarmine SJ* (2 vols, 1928), I, ch 12; FX Arnold, *Die Staatslehre Kardinals Bellarmin* (Munich 1934), pp 296ff, 352; Sommerville, "Jacobean Political Thought", pp 47ff, 248ff, 259ff, 271ff, as against Skinner, *Foundations,*II. 179 &R Wilenius, "The Social & Political Theory of Francisco Suarez", *Acta Philosophica Fennica* 1963, p 113; Holmes, "Political Thought of Elizabethan Catholics", pp 184/9; & Francisco Suarez, *Defensio Fidei Catholicae* III. 5 (Coimbra 1613), pp 237ff; authorities cited by Leonard Lessius, *Defensio Summi Pontificis* (Coimbra 1613), pp 140/3.

[38] *Ibid,* III. 10a, p 270.

account of circumstances *de facto*.[39]

Gregory VII was little concerned to claim temporal supremacy for himself, since he and his party were actively engaged in a consistent denigration of *temporalia* in general, compared to *spiritualia*; though the authority he attributed to the latter was so extensive that the distinction begins to become meaningless. The same applied to Innocent III, Innocent IV and Boniface VIII. It is not surprising that James of Viterbo concluded that papal power could not be measured; Augustinus Triumphus, that the Pope could never know all he could do.[40] This applied equally to direct or indirect power. Gregory VII apostrophised his apostolic predecessors: "If you may bind and loose in Heaven, you may on Earth take empires, kingdoms... and any property from, or give them to, anyone, as they may deserve... If you can judge even of spiritual things, what may we believe of your power over secular things ?". Extrapolating from this, his supporter Bernold of St Blasien insisted, "if the Roman Pontiffs may depose even the greatest prelates, so may they inferiors like secular princes".[41] The soul "animated" the

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[39] F Kempf, "Die Absetzung Friedrichs II im Lichte der Kanonistik", in *Probleme um Friedrich II,* ed. J Fleckenstein (Sigmarigen 1974), pp 348, 352/3. On the dual monarchy, see an increasing number of theorists in the fourteenth century (just as papal temporal jurisdiction was becoming less and less effectual in practice): Guilelmus de Amidanis, *Reprobatio Errorum,* ed. Scholz in *Unbekannte Streitschriften,* II. 25.

[40] James of Viterbo, *De Regimine Christiano* II. 9, ed. Arquillière, p 274; Augustinus, quoted MJ Wilks, *The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge 1963), p 170.

[41] Gregory VII, Reg. VII. 14a (cf IV. 2), Caspar p 487 (cf p 295); Bernold of St

body; thus authority in spiritual matters naturally extended into corporal.[42] The latter, after all, were so very much inferior. St Bernard demanded, "which seems to you the greater and nobler power, to remit sins or to divide booty?", and made telling use of diminutives in talking of jurisdiction over "possessincula hominum".[43] Ockham reversed the normal trend of this argument by alleging the baseness of temporal jurisdiction as a reason for churchmen not even to supervise it; concerned more than anything with "judgements of blood", it should be left entirely to laymen.[44]

Ambitious Popes sometimes made sweeping rhetorical claims, particularly when talking to a distant or unimportant audience. Such could be justified by the theoretical formulations of the academic canonists that most of them (but not Gregory VII) had been. Boniface VIII overreached himself however when, in *Ausculta Filii,* he told Philip IV, without qualification that he was "subject to the head of the ecclesiastical hierarchy", a claim reported to general French outrage as entailing subjection *in spiritualibus et in*

Blasien, *Libellus,* MGH LL II. 147. Cf Francesco Toti, *Contra Bavarum,* ed. Scholz in *Unbekannte Streitschriften,* II. 78/9, and Egidius Spiritalis, *Libellus,* II. 107.

[42] Hugh of St Victor, *De Officia Ecclesiae,* PL 177 col 418; John of Salisbury, *Policraticus* V. 2, Webb I. 283; Innocent III, *Regesta de Negotio Imperii,* No 18.

[43] Bernard of Clairvaux, *De Consideratione* I. 6, in *Opera,* ed. J Leclercq & H Rochais (Rome 1957-77), III. 402.

[44] William of Ockham, *Octo Quaestiones* III. 8, in *Opera Politica,* edd. JG Sikes, RF Bennett & HS Offler (Manchester 1940-61), I. 113.

temporalibus, which Boniface denied having intended.[45] As practising politicians, Popes were usually more circumspect when dealing with major negotiations with Western monarchies, and when controversy arose, they fell back from tendentious claims about the universal spiritual and temporal lordship bequeathed by Christ to St Peter (a claim definitely made by Innocent IV, if not by Innocent III) to the fundamental principle of papal jurisdiction *ratione peccati.* At most, they retained the former, heavily supported by the latter, which suggested they did not have much confidence in its ability to stand alone.

And references, from Innocent IV onwards, to the unique papal combination of spiritual and temporal authority, were most often diplomatically equivocal as to whether they referred to imperially-granted temporal lordship in the Papal States (which was different from other episcopal temporalities in being independent of all lay superiors), or to the putative universal temporal authority.[46] The early fourteenth-century German papalist Peter de Lutra suggested that talk of the Pope's universal temporal authority be

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[45] Dupuy, *Histoire du Différend,* pp 44, 48-52, 77/9.

[46] See Ullmann, *Medieval Papalism,* pp 118, 158, 187; J Watt, *The Theory of Papal Monarchy in the 13th Century* (1965), pp 66/7. In *Eger cui lenia,* Innocent IV clearly enough claimed universal temporal authority. Ambiguity however abounds elsewhere: eg Aquinas - see IT Eschmann, "St Thomas Aquinas on the Two Powers", *Medieval Studies* 20 (1958), p 179; James of Viterbo, *De Regimine Christiano* II. 9, ed. Arquillière, p 268.

dropped, as it only caused "scandal" and was unnecessary anyway - both of which points were true. In the mid-fifteenth century, Domenico de Dominic, still claiming that the Pope was "lord of the world", conceded "it is not expedient" for him generally to put this principle into practice.[47]

Even the specific lordship over the Empire, which could be maintained by restricted arguments from the Donation of Constantine or the *translatio imperii* to Charlemagne, was never upheld again in the pure form Innocent III had used, intervening in the election dispute of 1198. Clement V quashed the Emperor Henry VII's trial of King Robert of Naples after the former's sudden death (on the threshold of excommunication) on the grounds of his own overlordship of Naples, and "as much from the superiority which there can be no doubt that we have over the Emperor, as from the power by which we succeed to the Emperor *vacante imperio*, and not less from the plenitude of power which Christ... conceded to us". Even John XXII soon departed from pursuing Innocent's example when he intervened in the disputed election of 1314, finding his pretensions to quash their election at will bitterly resented by all the German electors, not just Louis IV's supporters, and increasingly stressed his right to intervene in elections that were "in discordia" rather than generally, and also Louis' implication in

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[47] *Tractatus contra Michaelem de Cesena:* Scholz, *Unbekannte Streitschriften,* II. 30; Prodi, *Papal Prince,* pp 15-16.

heresy.[48] This change did not divert a vehement diatribe against papal pretensions from the Diet of Rhens in 1338, and their tacit rejection by omission from the recognition of *electoral* rights in the Golden Bull of 1356, issued by Charles IV, who had begun his career as a papalist anti-king to Louis IV.[49] Thereafter, little was heard of papal temporal authority over the Empire until it was revived in the mid-sixteenth century as an anti-Protestant measure.

By extreme assertion of their own supervisory role, some churchmen reduced kings to glorified hangmen. John of Salisbury described the prince as "in a sense, the minister of the priesthood, and one that exercises that part of the sacred functions which seems unworthy of the power of the priesthood", notably that of judgements of blood. Some fourteenth-century extremists like Guido Vernani and Augustinus Triumphus declared that, besides the Papacy, "no other power is necessary among men". Giles of Rome might have agreed, but hardly anybody else.[50]

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[48] Clement V: MGH *Constitutiones* IV. 1212/3 = *Clementinae* II. 9. ii, CIC II. cols 1153/4. John XXII: *Constitutiones* V. 340/1 (cf 462/3, 613/22) = *Extravagantes Joannis* V. 1, CIC II. cols1211/2. But for his changing emphases, see *Constitutiones* V. 617, 653, 691, 703, 707/9, 756 on action "in discordia"; on heresy, see n 128 below. Cf Innocent III: *Regesta de Negotio Imperii,* Nos 18, 29-31, 47, 62, 79. No Pope explicitly accepted the claims of theorists like Augustinus Triumphus that he could appoint an Emperor himself, without election by the German princes (Wilks, *Problem of Sovereignty,* pp 249/52).

[49] EE Stengel, *Avignon und Rhens* (Weimar 1930), pp 157/8, 211.

[50] John of Salisbury, *Policraticus* IV. 3, Webb I. 239ff; Wilks, *Problem of Sovereignty,* pp 269/70; 31/2, 257. Cf Giles of Rome, *De Ecclesiastica Potestate* II. 13-14, ed. Scholz, p 115; Alvarus Pelagius, quoted by Ullmann, *Medieval*

This trend went so far as to describe kings as menial servants of the Church. The claim was made unabashedly by some followers of Gregory VII; later it became a favourite example of priestly arrogance employed by monarchists, and rather embarrassing to papalists. It went back to Gregory the Great's employment of the verb *famulor* to describe the relationship of the earthly to the heavenly kingdom.[51]

Less outrageous, if similar in tendency, was the metaphor of the *corpus fidelium,* popularised by the mid-twelfth century theologian Hugh of St Victor. The Church could have but one head (the Pope) without being monstrous, to control both hands - the right, which was the clergy; and the left (and inferior, though not, Hugh remarked dryly, *necessarily* damnable as in Matthew xxv), which was the laity. The fourteenth-century canonist Johannes Andreae believed on similar grounds, "There should be one [supreme] power, to which all may have recourse". Hugh prohibited secular rule to clerics, as well as ecclesiastical rule to laymen; but his crucial statement was "as much worthier as is the spiritual life than the earthly, and the spirit than the body, so much

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Papalism, p 87.

[51] Gregory I, Reg. III. 61; MGH, I. 221. Papalist use: Manegold of Lautenbach, *Epistola ad Gebehardum,* MGH LL I. 365/6; Boniface VIII, Dupuy, *Histoire du Différend,* pp 77/9; Giles of Rome, *De Ecclesiastica Potestate* II. 13-14, ed. Scholz, p 115. Anti-papalist: Wenrich of Trier, *Epistola,* MGH LL I. 289; Wyclif, *De Simonia,* p 57.

does the spiritual power precede the earthly or secular power in honour and dignity. For the spiritual power must institute the earthly power, and judge it, if it is not good".[52] St Bernard declared about the same time, "both the spiritual and the material sword are the Church's, the one to be used *for* the Church, the other *by* the Church; the one by the hand of the soldier, the other by that of the priest". Like Hugh, he was concerned to emphasise that priests should not become too directly involved in physical coercion, even if they ordered it.[53] This attitude was already being superseded by the development of Crusade ideology.

The text on the two swords (Luke xxii. 38) that papalists claimed showed both temporal and spiritual authority in the apostles' hands, could equally well be glossed to show the rightful separation of powers. The medieval infatuation with allegory was however such that for centuries

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[52] Hugh of St Victor, *De Sacramentis,* PL 176 cols 416/20; cf Stickler, "Alanus", pp 361/7; Innocent IV, in MGH *Epistolae Pontificarum XIII seculi* II. 224, 476; Hostiensis, Johannes Andreae and Panormitanus, quoted by Ullmann, *Medieval Papalism,* pp 89, 159, 188; Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* IV. 76, *Opera Omnia,* ed. Busa, II. 145; Boniface VIII, *Unam Sanctam,* Dupuy, *Histoire du Différend,* pp 54/6; Torquemada, quoted by Black, *Monarchy and Community,* pp 76/8, 162/72. Jean Gerson, on the other hand, accused the papal head of unnaturally attempting to *perform,* not just control, all the bodily functions itself: quoted by Morrall, *Gerson and the Great Schism,* pp 66, 80, 86.

[53] Bernard of Clairvaux, *De Consideratione* IV. 7, *Epistolae* 244, 255/6, in *Opera,* ed. J Leclercq & H Rochais (Rome 1957-77), III. 454, VIII. 134/6, 161/3. On the two swords, cf Nicholas I, MGH *Epistolae Karoli Aevi,* IV. 305, 641; M Pacaut, *Alexandre III* (Paris 1956), pp 358ff on the Decretists; Boniface VIII, *Unam Sanctam,* Dupuy, *Histoire du Différend,* pp 54/6; in John of Paris, *De Potestate Regali et Papali* Prol, X, XIX, ed. Leclercq, pp 174, 197/8, 237.

nobody would accept that the text proved nothing; this was indeed still too much for Catholics to admit in the sixteenth century. Controversial Popes from Gregory VII onwards were accused of usurping both swords, when they should have been content with one. Most however followed Bernard in claiming only to regulate the exercise of the temporal sword, not to wield it habitually themselves. Certainly it could not be held without their approval. Innocent IV declared in *Eger cui lenia,*"the exercise of both swords is reserved to the fold of the Church, whence any who is outside it, has neither".[54]

Pro-papal theorists often went further than Popes themselves. Giles of Rome followed Hugh of St Victor, and then declared with much greater emphasis that, on his showing, "the temporal sword as inferior must be led by the spiritual sword as superior"; "if kings and princes were subject to the Church only in temporal things, sword would not be under sword, temporal things would not be under spiritual; there would be no order amongst the powers... Kingdoms must be under the Vicar of Christ, and *de jure* - though some may contradict this *de facto* - the Vicar of Christ must have lordship over spiritual things". His contemporary James of Viterbo declared (slightly) less sweepingly - that, "perfective et formaliter", temporal power "has its being from the

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[54] Hagender, "Päpstliche Recht", p 86. Cf H Wieruszowski, *Vom Imperium zum Nationalen Koenigtum* (Munich & Berlin 1933), p 17; H Hoffmann, "Die beiden Schwerter im hohen Mittelalter", *DA* 20 (1964), pp 83ff.

spiritual power, which is derived in a special way from God", and so was subject to it "secundum imperium et directionem".[55]

Innocent III produced the definitive canonistic explanation of the "indirect" power in the decretals *Per Venerabilem* and *Novit ille.* The first stated that the Pope could, strictly, legitimise only *in spiritualibus,* but that this entailed legitimisation *in temporalibus, indirecte et per quandam consequentiam.* Decretalist commentators followed their own inclinations in responding to this - Bernardus Parmiensis was sceptical even of "indirect" influence on temporal affairs; Alanus Anglicus, typically, went further than Innocent and insisted that the Pope *did* have a "direct" power; Tancred followed Innocent's own potentially infinitely extendable *caveat,* added when he was temporarily overcome by his usually repressed craving to imitate Deuteronomic theocracy, "that when anything is difficult or uncertain, recourse is to be had to the Apostolic See", in producing a list of reasons to appeal to Rome in secular cases, including default by the lay judge.[56]

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[55] Giles of Rome, *De Ecclesiastica Potestate* ll. 4, 13, ed. Scholz, pp 114, 122/5; James of Viterbo, *De Regimine Christiano* ll. 7, 10 ed. Arquillière, pp 231/2, 289; cf Boniface VIII, *Unam Sanctam,* Dupuy, *Histoire du Différend,* pp 54/6; Guido Vernani and Augustinus Triumphus, quoted by Wilks, *Problem of Sovereignty,* pp 31/2, 271. But cf Clement V (not a successful practitioner of the theory), in MGH *Constitutiones* IV. 80.

[56] Innocent III, Reg. V. 128, PL 214 cols 1130/3 = X IV xvii. 13, CIC II. cols

Novit ille emerged from (ineffectual) intervention by Innocent in the feudal dispute between Philip II of France and John of England: "We do not intend to judge a feudal case, but a question of sin... to judge which is indubitably our function, and which we can and should exercise against anyone... to correct any Christian for any mortal sin and, if he spurns such correction, to coerce him with ecclesiastical censures". Innocent claimed that peace-breaking and perjury gave the Pope an indubitable interest in the case; but made no assertion of temporal superiority - "when we are incapable of fully exercising our own jurisdiction, why should we wish to usurp another's ?" A good question, when his indirect power was so large, and only self-limiting.[57]

Ideally, Innocent perhaps believed in the subordination in temporals of lay to papal monarchy; but it was not a principle he felt it satisfactory to advance on its own. Despite his strong collection of arguments for direct jurisdiction in the Empire, he also justified intervention in the 1198 disputed

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714/6. Cf Stickler, "Sacerdozio e regno nei decretisti e decretalisti", *Miscellanea Historiae Pontificiae* 18 (1953), p 23; Watt, *Theory of Papal Monarchy,* pp 98/9, & "Hostiensis on *Per Venerabilem*", in B Tierney & P Linehan, *Authority & Power: Studies on Medieval Law & Government Presented to W Ullmann* (Cambridge 1980); C Gallagher, *Canon Law & the Christian Community* (Rome 1978), pp 104/5, on Hostiensis; Tierney,"Tria Quippe Distinguit Iudicia: A Note on Innocent III's Decretal *Per Venerabilem*", *Speculum* 37 (1962), pp 52/3; also Giles of Rome, *De Ecclesiastica Potestate* l. 8, ed. Scholz, pp 28-30.

[57] *Selected Letters of Innocent III,* pp 63/8 = X II i. 13, CIC II. cols 243/4; also pp 57/9, 184; cf Reg. I. 249, PL 214 col 214.

election on the same grounds of indirect jurisdiction as in *Novit ille* - the spiritual evils of war and of disputed oaths.[58] Innocent used his spiritual authority, rather than that of overlord, to invalidate Magna Carta, despite receiving John's feudal homage for England, an event that prompted him to rejoice that "in the single person of Christ's Vicar, as body and soul, kingdom and priesthood should be united to their great mutual commodity and increase... that in those lands in which the Holy Roman Church has long exercised spiritual rule, she will now also have a particular temporal lordship". Otherwise "secular kings... do not believe themselves to be ruling justly unless they take care to serve devotedly" the Pope, but he did not say definitely that they were not.[59]

Boniface VIII imitated Innocent III closely in justifying interference in a dispute between the French King and the English (as vassal for continental lands), *ratione peccati.* He evoked however a more violent response from Philip Augustus' namesake, Philip the Fair. It was unsurprising however that so authoritarian a monarch should object to the Pope intervening whenever his recalcitrant vassals should "assert that you have sinned against them".[60] The theory of papal jurisdiction in temporals *ratione peccati* was capable of indefinite application. Well might the civil lawyer Cynus of

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58 *Regesta de Negotio Imperii,* Nos 2, 21, 31/3, 62, 141.

59 *Selected Letters of Innocent III,* pp 177/8. On Magna Carta: pp 212/9.

60 Dupuy, *Histoire du Différend,* pp 15-19.

Pistoia complain of the tendency of his canonist colleagues: "the Church arrogates to itself all jurisdiction *ratione peccati*". After all, as Aquinas as well as Giles of Rome had considered, all crimes were also sins.[61]

Excommunication and Deposition: Procedure and Permanency

The connection between theoretical vindication of ecclesiastical superiority over the secular power and justification of actual dismissal of the latter was complex. The idea that *any* excommunication, at least papal (or for heresy), should suspend a prince's rule over the faithful survived residually.[62] The canonistic *Summa Et est Sciendum* of the 1180s considered that papal depositions of kings occurred *per consequentiam* as a result of excommunication, since "nobody ought to obey an excommunicated lord", and that was then the consensus. John's enemies alleged that nobody was obliged to render military service to an excommunicate, before they began to rumour him

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[61] Ullmann, *Medieval Papalism,* pp 103, 140/1; cf John of Paris, *De Potestate Regali et Papali* XVI, ed. Leclercq, p 223. Aquinas, STh I-II q 18 a 9, q 98 a 1, *Opera Omnia,* ed. Busa, II. 380/1, 484; Giles of Rome, *De Ecclesiastica Potestate* II. 10, III. 5, ed. Scholz, pp 92, 170/1.

[62] Bellarmine, *De Potestate Summi Pontificis in Rebus Temporalibus* XXXVI, in *Opera* IV. 2, p 335.

to have been deposed.[63]

This was likely to apply to *excommunicatio ferendae sententiae* (ie a declaration against named individuals with immediate effect), rather than to *excommunicatio latae sententiae* (originally resulting from breach of an individually-addressed prohibition, but coming to mean one incurred by contagion, or by infringement of the regular synodal anathemas against heresy and sacrilege - anyway, one not naming individuals), the latter being difficult to determine until confirmed by the former. Philip of Swabia conceded the possibility that, at the time of his imperial election in 1198, he might have been "bound by some secret sentence". Innocent III admitted the impossible vagueness of the doctrines of contagion and *excommunicatio latae sententiae* by insisting instead that Philip had been excommunicated *sollempniter* in 1194.[64] That such a sentence disqualified him as a candidate for the crown did not however necessarily mean that, had he worn it already, it would have sufficed to depose him

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[63] *Summa* quoted by Hagender, "Exkommunikation und Thronfolgeverlust bei Innocenz III", *Roemische Historische Mitteilungen* 2 (1957/8), pp 24/5; cf C 15 q 6 cc 4-5, CIC I. 756; Rufinus, *Summa Decretorum,* ed. H Singer (Paderborn 1912), p 350; & authorities cited by Mazzolini, *Summa Summarum,* "Excommunicatio" V. 18. On the canonists, cf Russell, *Just War in the Middle Ages,* p 104. Theologians were however increasingly equivocal (*Ibid,* pp 231/2); as just war theory developed, the view was propagated that even an excommunicate (though presumably not someone actually deposed by the Pope) might wage a just war in which he should be supported; the issue should be judged on its own merits. On John, see Roger of Wendover, *Flores Historiarum,* ed. HG Hewlett (RS), II. 82.

[64] *Regesta de Negotio Imperii,* Nos 136 (also MGH *Constitutiones* II. 13), 29, cf 21, 33, 62, 92.

permanently.

In 1210/1, Innocent III successively decided that Philip's replacement Otto IV had rendered himself *excommunicatus latae sententiae* by ignoring various of his bulls (a conclusion that had no public repercussions, though the Pope considered it adequate reason to resume negotiations with Frederick II as a possible alternative candidate); issued a public *denunciatio* of this fact when he found this sentence contumaciously ignored, after which he seemed to consider the "dictus imperator"as suspended (if not legally deposed) from his office; and then absolved Otto's vassals from their allegiance, in a separate bull.[65] Gregory IX went through a similar sequence with Frederick II in 1227, though he seemed to consider the third step as a mere reiteration of the second.[66] It became increasingly obvious that *excommunicatio latae sententiae* was a concept devoid of practical utility - by the fourteenth century, the English government refused to invoke the statute *De Excommunicato Capiendo* where it alone was involved.[67]

Its futility alone was not enough to make Popes abandon the idea. They persisted (usually as pretexts for procedural short-cuts) in claiming excommunication and

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[65] See Haidacher,"Zeitpunkt des Exkommunikations Ottos IV", pp 132/85, 26-36.

[66] Matthew Paris, *Chronica Majora*, III. 594.

[67] Vodola, *Excommunication*, p 182.

dissolution of fealty to be only publications of sanctions already incurred *latae sententiae.* Innocent III wrote of Otto IV in 1212, "we absolve all, *or rather declare them absolved,* from allegiance to him". He took the line that the excommunicate *latae sententiae* "is not further bound by denunciation". Innocent IV in 1245 covered all possible constructions of his sentence against Frederick II: "we demonstrate and proclaim him to be bound by sin and deprived of all honour and dignity by God, and *nonetheless* we deprive him judicially". The deposition bull of Boniface VIII against Philip IV whose promulgation was forestalled by the Anagni outrage, *Super Petri Solio,* was but the publication of an excommunication *latae sententiae* incurred for preventing his bishops travelling to Rome. It was however not final, for it exhorted the king to return to obedience, or "we should be compelled to punish him by [further] judgement".[68]

The view that extreme measures should remain as an aggravation of excommunication became dominant. Thus, in addition to the canonical three warnings before excommunication, more delay was necessary for the excommunicate to show himself contumacious, and for further steps to be taken. Gregory VII was reproached with some

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[68] Hagender, "Päpstliche Recht", p 86; Innocent III, Reg. VIII. 84, PL 215 cols 653/4; Dupuy, *Histoire du Différend,* pp 182/6; cf pp 81, 92, 96/9, 183. The practice was to refer to a prince as "dictus/a", "pretensus/a" or "olim" in the instrument of deposition itself.

justice for canonical irregularities in his haste.[69] On this principle, it could be argued that deposition was not like excommunication, reversible by absolution - at least it could be so argued, if politically convenient for the Papacy. In principle, there was no particular reason for it. Like the British Parliament, the Papacy has a plenitude of power which precludes legislative entrenchment. Some agility is of course required to square this with the infallibility of dogmatic pronouncements *ex cathedra,* but since even the First Vatican Council's version of infallibility does not apply to judgements of cases, only the fear of ridicule could prevent the reversal of the most "irreversible" sentences.

Even Gregory VII's first deposition of Henry IV in 1076 had a very final ring, especially when compared with his simultaneous sentences against Henry's episcopal supporters - excommunicated but not anathematised; suspended but not deposed. In his urge to assert himself over lay princes, Gregory was perhaps guilty of some inconsistency here. He declared that "the authority of divine and human laws witnessed and decreed that [Henry] should not only be excommunicated until [he had made] due satisfaction, but deprived of all his kingship's dignity *without hope of recovery.*". However, the feeling that he had acted precipitately was so strong that he

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[69] See Robinson, *Authority and Resistance*, pp 105ff.

felt it best to change from judge to defence counsel and advise Christians to show him "not *justice, that would prohibit him from ruling,* but mercy, that expunges many crimes"; though he advised them to replace him if he failed to reform.[70] The equivocal nature of the 1076 sentence was such that the polemical literature spawned after 1080 mostly ignored it, and treated the second as the only sentence.[71]

It was however the German princes rather than the Pope who decided that the 1076 sentence was definitely not final. At the Diet of Tribur they decided to elect a new king if Henry were not absolved within a year and a day - an application in reverse of the traditional period after which a lord could seize the fief of an excommunicate vassal.[72] Awkwardly, Henry's submission at Canossa morally compelled Gregory to absolve him. According to Lampert of Hersfeld, a partisan of the German dissidents, Gregory still made Henry's restoration to kingship contingent upon his defence against the princes' allegations against him; this stipulation, convenient for Henry's enemies but canonically unjustifiable (since it was

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[70] *Epistolae Vagantes of Gregory VII,* ed. Cowdrey, pp 38/9; Reg IV. 3; Caspar pp 298/9. See opposing articles by A Fliche & H-X Arquillière, "Grégoire VII: a-t-il réintegré Henri IV dans sa fonction royale ?", *Studi Gregoriani* 1 (1947), pp 373ff, 381/2; 4 (1952), pp 3ff; also Arquillière's *Grégoire VII* (Paris 1934), pp 172ff; IS Robinson, "Pope Gregory VII, the Princes & the Pactum 1077-80", *EHR 94* (1979), pp 724ff. Arquillière is perhaps following Gregory's contemporary partisans who sought to credit him retrospectively with consistency.

[71] See Mirbt, *Publizistik im Zeitalter Gregors VII,* pp 132/3, 159, 195-201.

[72] Bonizo of Sutri, *Liber ad Amicum,* MGH LL I. 609. On feudal practice, see Vodola, *Excommunication,* pp 12-13, 18-19, 22.

not because of these charges that he had first been excommunicated), is not borne out by Gregory's register.[73] Notwithstanding this absolution, Gregory's German allies (abetted by his own legates) embarrassed him by electing Rudolf of Rheinfelden as anti-king. When he excommunicated Henry again in 1080, purportedly for obstructing papal mediation between him and Rudolf (whom Gregory claimed to treat on an equal footing), the Pope did now claim that he had only given personal absolution in 1077, not restored Henry to kingship. This was the first time in three years he had clearly said this. His second decree reassured his German allies of his firm commitment to Rudolf's victory, wishing in the name of the apostles that "Henry and his accomplices may never in their lives win any victory in battle". It was an unlucky commitment, since it was Rudolf, not Henry, who was defeated and killed later that year.[74]

In the twelfth century, Gregory VII's claim that the Pope could permanently depose a secular ruler languished. Most canonists only admitted a possible papal power over the Emperor, rather than kings in general; Benencasa of Arezzo said this specifically. Sicard of Cremona insisted that

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[73] Lampert of Hersfeld, *Chronicon*, ed. O Holder-Egger (MGH 1894, repr. 1956), pp 291/3; Gregory VII, Reg. IV. 12a, Caspar p 314.

[74] Gregory VII, Reg. VII. 14a (cf IV. 23/4, V. 15), Caspar pp 485/6 (cf 334/6, 374/5); cf also *Epistolae Vagantes*, ed. Cowdrey, pp 52/3; Robinson, " Gregory VII, the Princes & the Pactum".

absolution of subjects from fealty was reversible upon a ruler's reconciliation with the Church, "quia cessante causa cessat effectus". Rufinus, Huguccio (Innocent III's master), Laurentius Hispanus and Johannes Teutonicus all regarded the consent - indeed probably the initiative - of the imperial princes as necessary for the Pope to depose an Emperor.[75] This was also the practice of the noted canonist Pope Alexander III, who lifted all obligation to obey Frederick Barbarossa, "dictus imperator", "until he shall return to catholic unity", which he eventually did. He never considered promoting an anti-king; and intentionally avoided exacerbating the dispute by accusing Barbarossa of heresy, though some of his supporters, such as John of Salisbury, were not so cautious.[76] Huguccio however tended to consider that solemn public excommunication (approximately what Gregory VII had called anathema) entailed irreversible deprivation of authority. Vincentius Hispanus, writing under Innocent III, confirmed that the Pope could permanently deprive the Emperor and other secular princes.[77] Huguccio's view

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[75] Benencasa quoted by Stickler, "Sacerdozio e regno", p 9; Sicard by Stickler, "Imperator vicarius Papae", in *MIOG* 62 (1954), p 198; Rufinus, *Summa Decretorum,* ed. H Singer (Paderborn 1912), p 350; others quoted by Hagender, "Päpstliche Recht", p 64, and Watt, *Theory of Papal Monarchy,* pp 17, 25.

[76] Pacaut, *Alexandre III,* pp 176/8; John of Salisbury, *Letters,* Nos 168, 184, edd. WJ Sillor, SJ & HE Butler, rev. CNL Brooke (2nd edn, Oxford 1979-86), II. 102/3, 112/3, 216/7.

[77] Hagender, "Exkommunikation und Thronfolgeverlust", pp 36/7; "Päpstliche Recht", p 73.

conformed to trends in the treatment of insubordinate clergy. Innocent III in 1215 excommunicated and suspended those who opposed his new vassal John, and threatened them, in the event of contumacy, with anathema and permanent deprivation.[78] Unfortunately, at no time from the Carolingian period on, was there a consistent distinction made between excommunication and anathema, the latter being treated often as a subsequent aggravation of the former, "foriter", "publice", "sollempniter", "with bells and candles",[79] but sometimes employed simultaneously to emphasise it.

Innocent III - though he appeared on the point of backtracking on his deposition of Philip of Swabia before the latter died[80] - threatened John, "if you do not accept peace when you may, you will not be able to when you shall wish it; repentance will be too late after your ruin".[81] Gregory IX in 1227 absolved Frederick II's vassals from their fealty for the extraordinary reason that Frederick had gone on a papally-approved Crusade while under sentence of excommunication for not having set out earlier. The Pope was seizing on any excuse to assert his suzerainty over Sicily, and incidentally breaching all his predecessors' canons about the protection of Crusaders' lands and rights. When Frederick actually recovered Jerusalem

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78 *Selected Letters of Innocent III*, pp 212/9.

79 See Haidacher, "Zeitpunkt des Exkommunikations Ottos IV", pp 144/5, 179/80.

80 *Regesta de Negotio Imperii*, No 143, p 337.

81 *Selected Letters of Innocent III*, p 132, cf pp 128/9.

- but by treaty with the infidel rather than war - Gregory seemed to consider this an aggravation of the offence.[82] The Pope's actions were widely regarded as outrageous, and indeed led the Roman populace to expel him from the city.

Failing to gather the support to depose Frederick, Gregory had to conclude a settlement with him in 1230. But he issued another excommunication and dissolution of fealty in 1239, that was still unrevoked at the Pope's death, though it showed no signs of having decisive effect. Innocent IV did offer to revoke this, on impossible conditions,[83] but in 1245 issued a formal deposition, in the impressive setting of the First General Council of Lyons, that he clearly regarded as a further step, though he professed to be repeating a sentence already incurred by Frederick. In this, the dissolution of fealty was explicitly perpetual. Louis IX, pious king that he was, had allegedly doubted the power of the Pope alone to depose Frederick; it was best to take account of such sentiments by stressing the charge of heresy, abhorred by the French King, and by involving the Council - though the decree was issued "sacro praesente concilio", when "sacro approbante concilio" would have been more usual, and Innocent, as a canonist, insisted that papal power was not in need of conciliar

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[82] MGH *Epistolae Pontificarum XIII seculi* I. 315/7, 731.

[83] MGH *Constitutiones* II. 334/7 (also Matthew Paris, *Chronica Majora*, IV. 332/6).

assistance ("even without the Council, the sentence of the Pope alone would have sufficed to condemn the Emperor").

Even Gregory VII had both publicised and reinforced his 1076 sentence by synodic promulgation, and Fourth Lateran had confirmed the deprivation of Raymond of Toulouse. By the mid-sixteenth century there was a widespread, if canonically unsubstantiated, Catholic sentiment that Trent was the most suitable forum for action against Protestant rulers. This of course followed the assertion of the conciliarists of Basle that consultation was obligatory for Popes to legislate, at least in important matters; fifteenth-century papalists acknowledged only that conciliar involvement enhanced the Pope's "authority of repute", his personal authority being in fact adequate to act alone.[84] Bellarmine however considered that Innocent IV's Council, and even Gregory VII's synod, had served to buttress the deposing power with infallibility.[85]

Julius II, aggressive though he was, had enlisted the support of the Fifth Lateran Council before proceeding against Louis XII of France - and even then with some caution. On his own authority he had deprived Louis of his claims to papal fiefs like Naples and had decreed *excommunicatio latae*

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[84] Nicholas of Cusa, *De Concordantia Catholica*, ed. G Kallen (Hamburg 1959-65), II. 140, III. 376; John of Segovia, quoted by Black, *Monarchy and Community*, p 44/8. On "authority of repute": *Ibid*, pp 48, 70, for Torquemada and Pierre de Versailles.

[85] Bellarmine, *Examen*, in *Opera* VI, p 367.

sententiae against supporters of the rival Council of Pisa. He involved the Council however in excommunicating Louis and placing an interdict on France - and only actually deposed the easier target of Jean d'Albret King of Navarre, who had already been largely evicted *de facto* by Spain.[86]

Julius II did in 1512 prepare a declaration of deposition against Louis XII, noting not only the latter's crimes but the rival English claim to the French Crown. With this deposition went an investiture of Henry VIII as king of France, and the document was to be sent to Henry for publication at a later stage in his French campaign. It claimed to be recognising God's judgement in bestowing victories on Henry - another way of saying it was only to apply if Henry was sufficiently successful. When Henry's campaign faltered, Julius prevaricated about publication. After his death in 1513, his successor Leo X repudiated the policy entirely. Henry VIII complained of Rome's neglect to depose an open enemy of the Church. Two decades later, he took a rather different view.[87]

Philip IV of France began the habit of appealing from the Pope's judgement to that of a future General Council, in which he was soon imitated by the Emperor Louis IV, and over

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[86] *Ann. Eccl.* 1510 nos 24/8; 1511 nos 9-15; 1512 nos 63, 77/8, 97; Pastor 6, pp 364ff.

[87] "Un Breve Inedito di Giulio II per la Investitura del Regno di Francia ad Enrico VIII d'Inghilterra", ed. A Ferrajoli, *Archivio della Reale Società Romana di Storia Patria* 19 (1896), pp 425/7, 430/1, 438/40. Cf *LP I*, No 1769: Henry VIII to Cardinal Bainbridge, 1513.

a century and a half later, in the aftermath of Constance and Basle's self-assertion over the Papacy, by George Podebrady, the Hussite King of Bohemia.[88] Conciliar involvement in promulgating a sentence did not necessarily make the doubtful accept more than they otherwise would. St Louis continued to recognise Frederick as Emperor even after the most solemn sentence of 1245, preferring monarchical fellow feeling before obedience to the Apostolic See, and deprecating the Crusades Innocent IV preached against Frederick as distractions from the true Crusade against the Saracens.[89]

One definite advantage of conciliar sentences was that they helped overcome the problems even public excommunication often had in achieving wide circulation. By

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[88] Dupuy, *Histoire du Differend,* pp 101, 106/7, 112, 124; MGH *Constitutiones* V. 659, 743/4, 827/8 (Louis IV); cf H-X Arquillière, "L'appel au Concile sous Philippe le Bel et la genèse des theories conciliares", in *Revue des Questions Historiques* 89 (1911), pp 23-55; FG Heymann, *George of Bohemia: King of Heretics* (Princeton 1965), pp 409, 414/8, & Pastor 4, pp 137/42. John XXII's penitentiary however claimed that Louis was disqualified from such an appeal since he was already "excommunicated with many excommunications" (though they had not actually been published yet): N Iung, *Alvaro Pelayo: un Franciscain Théologien du Pouvoir Pontificale au 14e siècle* (Paris 1931), p 83.

[89] Matthew Paris, *Chronica Majora,* III. 624/6, IV. 445/55 = Innocent IV, Reg. No. 1367 = VI II. xiv. 2, CIC II cols 1008/11; cf Kempf, "Absetzung Friedrichs II", pp 345/6; Watt, *Theory of Papal Monarchy,* p 63; TC Van Cleve, *The Emperor Frederick II* (Oxford 1972), p 503; E Siberry, *Criticism of Crusading 1095-1274* (Oxford 1985), pp 17-82; N Housley, *The Italian Crusades: The Papal-Angevin Alliance and the Crusades against Christian Lay Powers 1254-1343* (Oxford 1982),pp 81/2. On the last point, cf also the complaints of the English baronial reformers: Matthew Paris, *Chronica Majora,* V. 521/2 (cf IV. 39); *Documents of the Baronial Movement of Reform and Rebellion 1258-65,* edd. RF Treharne & IJ Sanders (Oxford 1973), p 278; Burton Annals, in *Annales Monastici,* ed. HR Luard (RS 1864/9), I. 360 (cf 265).

driving the bishops from England, John prevented the promulgation of his excommunication there, though creating an atmosphere of uncertainty in which his enemies could circulate rumours that he had been deposed, when he in fact had not been.[90] By the later thirteenth century, Popes were so pessimistic about the chances of their sentences being ignored or suppressed as to neglect the basic canonical forms. Martin IV never troubled to cite Pedro III of Aragon properly to Rome before excommunicating him for non-appearance, as the king and his supporters complained bitterly - not that he would have gone if cited. Faced with Philip IV's obstructions to his bulls, Boniface VIII issued a constitution, *Rem non Novam,* declaring them valid even if their delivery was prevented. John XXII used this as an excuse not to send Louis IV a copy of the bull commanding his appearance at Avignon within three months, leaving it to rumour (crossing the Alps in winter) to notify him if it would, a proceeding against which Louis complained at length.[91]

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[90] Burton Annals, in *Annales Monastici,* I. 215/6; Walter of Coventry, ed. W Stubbs (RS 1873), II. 207; *Chronica de Melsa,* ed. EA Bond (RS 1866), I. 388/9; Roger of Wendover, *Flores Historiarum,* II. 359ff. Cf CR Cheney, "The Alleged Deposition of King John", in *Studies in Medieval History Presented to FM Powicke* (Oxford 1948), pp 100/16.

[91] AF Grau, "Actitud de Pedro III de Aragón ante la propria deposición fulminada por el Papa Martin IV", *Miscellanea Historiae Pontificiae* 18 (1953), pp 165/6; Boniface VIII, Dupuy, *Histoire du Différend,* pp 161/2; MGH *Constitutiones* V. 616/22, 642/3, 651/3, 725/31, 749; cf F Bock, "Die Appellationsschriften Koenig Ludwigs IV in den Jahren 1323/4", *DA* 4 (1940/1), pp 181/3.

Execution of Sentence: Problems of Compromise

From the beginning, there was awkward tension between the nature of a deposition decree as spiritual sentence and the intentions of the secular arm in enforcing it. The latter was a powerful influence towards irreversibility of deposition; for clearly no alternative king would be willing to attack an incumbent if he was liable to lose his ideological backing as soon as his opponent got himself absolved. When this did happen, the pretender, like Rudolf of Rheinfelden, was liable to proceed regardless. Philip Augustus' son Louis attacked John Lackland notwithstanding his absolution; French exploitation of his spiritual backsliding had always been more opportunistic than devout, and it was English rebels, not Innocent III, who had proposed Louis as anti-king. In the new circumstances, however, Philip felt it best purportedly to repudiate his son's action.

Nor was it always easy to find a hopeful anti-king. The Papacy hawked the crown of Sicily around Europe for twelve years after Frederick II's son before it got a firm offer to oust Frederick's bastard son Manfred, from Louis IX's brother Charles of Anjou. Charles' brother-in -law Richard of Cornwall had spurned the offer with the remark that the Pope might as well offer the moon to the man who could bring it down from the sky.[92] Henry III was less realistic, but his

subjects' lack of enthusiasm for the infamous "Sicilian Business" aborted his project to gain a throne for his younger son. Charles of Anjou was the first pretender (except for Frederick II, who had electoral as well as papal support) to receive a papally-authorised coronation (Rudolf of Rheinfelden's had not been) during an incumbent's lifetime - an indisputable commitment by the Holy See to support the rival claim to the end. This commitment was partly explicable by the special papal role in Sicily, was probably dictated by Charles, and was too final for most future Popes' taste.

Without feudal leverage, Popes were even more liable to lose control of their secular allies. In 1466, Paul II's charges of heresy against George Podebrady of Bohemia did not even convince the Margrave of Brandenburg to refrain from a marriage alliance with him. George's deposition did induce the land-hungry Matthias Corvinus of Hungary to attack Bohemia; but only after Paul had recognised *him* as king, which the Pope did not really want to do. Casimir IV of Poland however denied the Pope's power to depose his neighbour. Concluding that he had become simply a pawn for Hungarian ambition, Paul was considering reconciliation with Podebrady when both died.[93]

It was only rarely (as at the end of the Emperor Henry

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92 Matthew Paris, *Chronica Majora,* V. 346/7.

93 Heymann, *George of Bohemia,* pp 420/3, 438, 445, 462/3, 467, 526/9, 561, 575.

IV's life) that a prince's own son was available as anti-king. Support for an outsider therefore raised the dreaded spectre of disinheritance; few palates could stomach John of Salisbury's claim that the right to princely succession was dependent on paternal good conduct.[94] Pedro II of Aragon protested on behalf of the son of Raymond VI of Toulouse against his exclusion; eventually, the heir managed to regain most of his father's lands through submission to the King of France and the Pope in 1229.[95] Innocent III, architect of the Toulousain exclusion, also threatened shortly before John of England's submission to him, to prohibit the coronation of his heirs.[96]

As regards the Empire, the Papacy was doubtful about the heredibility of the Empire *per se.* Innocent III claimed to disqualify candidates (potentially, even unanimously elected as well as eristic ones) - such as the infant Frederick II - who lacked suitability (*idoneitas*) for the imperial office. To confuse the issue, his quasi-feudal claims were still supplemented by religious reasons for his preferences - the successive excommunications of Philip of Swabia and Otto IV, the fact that Frederick was still unbaptised when elected.[97]

But he also considered that the record of the Staufen family

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94 John of Salisbury, *Policraticus* IV. 1, V. 6, ed. Webb I. 269ff, 299ff.

95 AP Evans, "The Albigensian Crusade", in *History of the Crusades,* ed. KM Setton (Madison, Wis. 1969-85), II. 298, 319/21.

96 *Selected Letters of Innocent III,* p 142.

97 *Regesta de Negotio Imperii,* Nos 18, 29, cf Nos 30, 47, 62, 79.

was likely to make any member unsuitable for the office.[98]

By the time of Innocent IV, Popes were beginning to maintain that no member of the Staufen dynasty might ever again become king of either Sicily or Germany.[99] They were not however confident enough to exclude absolutely Conrad IV's son Conradin who at the age of two could not possibly be implicated yet in his father's crimes. The elective principle was well-established enough by now to rule him out as a suitable Emperor. The Papacy only gradually and almost imperceptibly eased him out of any claim to Sicily. Conveniently, it could blame his exclusion on another (illegitimate) Staufen, Manfred (just as Innocent III had maintained intermittently that Frederick II's childhood election to the Empire had been overturned more by the usurpation of his uncle Philip of Swabia than by the Pope himself). Conradin's rights were effectively jettisoned by the adoption of Charles of Anjou as papal candidate to oust the usurper Manfred.[100] Clement IV only then alleged and four decades later, when the Papacy had long been committed to

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98 *Regesta de Negotio Imperii,* Nos 21, 29, 33/4, 62.

99 MGH *Epistolae Pontificarum XIII seculi* II. 208, 413ff. Cf, on that "stirps viperarum", "damnata progenies": III. 586/8, 599-601; also Urban IV, Reg. (ed. J Guiraud, Paris 1901-58), Nos 804, 633; Clement IV, Reg. (ed. E Jordan, Paris 1945), No 689.

100 They were still reserved for future consideration, after Manfred's expulsion, by Innocent IV (MGH *Epistolae Pontificarum XIII seculi* III. 290; Matthew Paris, *Chronica Majora,* V. 410), Alexander IV (see the Chronicle of the Tarvisian March, RIS VIII. 3, p 45). Cf K Hampe, *Geschichte Konradins von Hohenstaufen* (Innsbruck 1894), pp 13-14, 25, 45/6, 58-61.

Angevin efforts to supplant Manfred and the Aragonese (claiming in right of Manfred's daughter), Clement V confirmed (agreeing to meet the Angevins' war debts as incurred in the Papacy's cause) that Frederick had been deposed in 1245 with all his descendants.[101] Clement IV in 1267 therefore deprived Conradin of "any right he might have had" to Sicily (and to the titular kingship of Jerusalem), and absolved all from "any allegiance they might have owed to him", after he had rendered himself *excommunicatus latae sententiae* by crossing into Italy in defiance of the Pope's threats.[102]

On the grounds of feudal suzerainty over the Sicilies, papal depositions began explicitly to extend to more than one individual. Pedro III's wife (Manfred's daughter) and their sons all suffered excommunications of their own, and disqualifications from the Sicilian Crown; Popes were very indignant when successive Aragonese continued to have themselves crowned kings of Sicily - this was "non coronatio sed profanatio".[103] James II was sufficiently apprehensive of

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[101] Clement IV, Reg. Nos 427, 601/2, 689/90, 699, 705; GM Monti, *Da Carlo I a Roberto di Angiò* (Trani 1936), p 125. Cf Housley, *Italian Crusades*, p 33. Charles of Anjou used this view as a reason to resume all Sicilian land grants since 1245 (EG Leonard, *Les Angevins de Naples* (Paris 1954), pp 72/3, 80/2).

[102] Clement IV, Reg. Nos 601, 689/90; cf 427.

[103] Honorius IV, Reg. (ed. M Prou, Paris 1888), No 807; Nicholas IV, Reg. (ed. E Langlois, Paris 1905), Nos 1132/52, 6703, 6839; Boniface VIII, Reg., edd. G Digard, M Faucon, A Thomas & R Fawtier (Paris 1907/39), Nos 1575, 2375/6, 2383, 2878, 3072, 3868/73, 3879/81. Even after the settlement of 1303, the Papacy failed to make Frederick (II) stick to his promise not to invest his heirs with

these censures to specify, when negotiating for reconciliation, that he should enjoy the "senyoria et dominium" (in both Catalan and Latin, for emphasis) that his father had before offending the Papacy in 1282.[104] When Charles III of Naples, having overthrown Joanna I with Urban VI's support (she conveneiently expired), proved as unwilling as she to provide free lands for papal nephews, both he and his wife (who had an independent claim to the Crown) were deposed, and their descendants for four generations deprived of any right to the throne. Charles' son Ladislas, King for all Urban's fulminations, had the same sentence directed against his (non-existent) posterity by John XXIII.[105] Nearly a century and a half later, Paul IV deprived both Charles V and Philip II of the Kingdom of Naples, and threatened to proceed later "to further sentences, censures and penalties", including deprivation of what Philip did not hold from the Holy See (already referring to him as "that son of iniquity who claims to be King of Spain").[106]

Popes most often deposed or threatened to depose

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the island, or even to recognise his coronation while excommunicate as invalid and have it done again - see Benedict XI, Reg. (ed. C Grandjean, Paris 1905), No 1112.

[104] *Acta Aragonensia,* ed. H Finke (Berlin & Leipzig 1905-22), I. 3-6, III. 16-20; Honorius IV, Reg. No 814.

[105] See M Rothbarth, *Urban VI und Neapel* (Berlin & Leipzig 1913), pp 71/2; De Vooght, *L'Hérésie de Jean Huss,* pp 829/31. Cf *Ann. Eccl.* 1467 nos 1-2, & Pastor 4, pp 140/1, on Podebrady.

[106] Bull *In Supereminenti Justicie Throno,* in JJT von Doellinger, *Dokumente zur Geschichte Karls V, Philipps II und ihrer Zeit* (Regensburg 1862), pp 218/26. Philip however referred (p 217) to a general move "to deprive me of my kingdoms".

those rulers over whom they had a fairly definite secular power - Emperors or would-be Emperors, who could only receive their office at pontifical hands (though it was hotly disputed whether this dependence constituted vassalage); and Kings of Sicily, undisputed vassals of the Holy See (Frederick II was both at once, despite repeated promises to resign one or other title to one of his sons). As it happened, these rulers were also those most likely to encroach on the Papacy's temporal interests in Italy. Even in these cases, real or alleged religious failings (justifying the exercise of the "indirect" deposition power) were at least as prominent as failings in secular duty to Rome. This was understandable in the imperial case, where the dispute over the feudal relationship was ultimately insoluble and spiritual authority provided a stronger argument; but it is notable that even the definite vassalage of Sicilian rulers was not always deemed to provide a sufficient argument to act against them, without accusations of heresy in support. But following the case of Conradin, executed by Charles of Anjou (rather than the Pope) for *lese majestatis et ecclesie* in trying to seize Sicily (though in his case he was either *king* or nothing; certainly no subject of Charles capable of *lese majestatis,* and *lese ecclesie* was an offence unknown to civil law), civil law was invoked to buttress canon law. Joanna I of Naples in 1380, her supplanter Charles III five years later and the latter's son

Ladislas in 1411/2 were both accused of treason for opposing the Pope, and schism and heresy to boot. Charles, having "rendered himself unworthy of any honour", was deprived by Urban VI's "definitive sentence", which was immediately abandoned by the next Pope. John XXIII, soon to be deposed himself, issued two "definitive sentences" in two years against Ladislas, when he thought he could beat him militarily; and, in between, recognised him after a success of his.[107] Such things happened in quarrels between overlords and vassals - but the entanglement was not an edifying one for universal spiritual authority.

Denunciation of Heresy and the Crusade: the Acceptable Face of the Deposing Power

The imperative to justify irreversible deposition and to generate maximum lay support, as well as theological and canonistic, played its part in the increasing stress upon heresy as a motive for papal sentences. The Pope's right to denounce heresy was more generally admitted than that to depose for any other reason; it was tendentious of Alanus Anglicus, a

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[107] Hampe, *Geschichte Konradins,* p 364; Leonard, *Angevins de Naples,* p 464; de Vooght, *L'Hérésie de Jean Huss,* pp 829/31; M Bouard, *Les Origines des Guerres d'Italie, Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome* 139 (1936), pp 104, 356, 375/6, 388/90; WStC Baddeley, *Charles III of Naples & Urban VI* (1894), pp 40/1.

canonist admirer of Innocent III, to declare that he could depose a prince persistent in any sort of crime, that caused "scandalum in ecclesia". However, some of his more moderate contemporaries concurred: Johannes Teutonicus, with some reluctance, that the Pope "could *transfer* kingdoms by reason of heresy, and even other crimes, if incorrigible".[108]

Henry IV himself declared he could not be deposed except for heresy.[109] Obligingly, Gregory VII accused him of heresy; but this Pope's concept of heresy was regrettably vague, including simony *per se* and, without qualification, that "non concordat Romane Ecclesie".[110] His best argument was - following St Cyprian - that, the unity of the Church being an article of faith, any schism was *ipso facto* also heresy. He could himself be accused of destroying unity.[111] By 1108, however, Henry was to Pope Paschal II "haereticorum caput". In the thirteenth century, the great canonist Hostiensis

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108 Stickler, "Alanus", pp 361/7; Hagender, "Päpstliche Recht", pp 73/5; cf Vincentius Hispanus, quoted Ullmann, *Medieval Papalism,* p 185.

109 *Epistolae Henrici IV,* ed. C Erdmann, MGH, p 16; cf Hugh of Fleury, *Tractatus,* MGH LL II. 476, 487.

110 Simony: *Epistolae Vagantes of Gregory VII,* ed. Cowdrey, pp 14-15, 18-23, 74; Reg. I. 11, II. 34, IV. 1, Caspar pp 18, 170, 291, etc. Disagreement with Rome: *Propriae Auctoritates Apostolicae Sedis,* c 6, ed. H Mordek, *DA* 28 (1972), pp 126/7; Deusdedit, *Collectio Canonum,* ed. V Wolf von Glanvell (Paderborn 1905, repr. Aalen 1967), pp 8, 106; cf D 22 c 1, CIC I. col 339. These intensify the *Dictatus Papae* c 26 (Caspar p 207): "catholicus non habeatur". Cf Gregory VII, Reg. VII. 24, VIII. 21, Caspar pp 504/5, 548; Robinson, " *'Periculosus Homo'*: Pope Gregory VII & Episcopal Authority", *Viator* 8 (1978), pp 111ff.

111 *De Unitate Ecclesiae Conservanda,* MGH LL II. 185, 237; Wido of Ferrara, *De Scismate Hildebrandi,* MGH LL I. 560.

agreed: "there is no schism which does not lead to heresy".[112]

The equation of schism and heresy was consolidated by the necessity of justifying *post facto* the aggression of the Fourth Crusade against simple schismatics. It was certainly accepted once the Greeks had gone on to the counter-attack, by Urban IV in his bulls against Michael Palaeologus, "qui Grecorum imperator vocari se facit". Even more so, after an interlude of *rapprochement* due to hopes of Church reunion, was it adopted by Martin IV, who approved Charles of Anjou's scheme, aborted by the Sicilian Vespers, to attack Constantinople.[113] It was later made by the Popes of the Great Schism in attacking their enemies.[114] They had to revise their attitude when the conciliarists turned this argument against them, arguing that the generally accepted deposability of the Pope for heresy extended also to inveterate schism. Papal partisans belatedly began to distinguish the two crimes,[115] though Julius II's abortive deposition of the schismatic Louis XII would still have depicted him not only as "a monstrous

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[112] PL 163 col 105; Hostiensis, *Summa Aurea* (Rome 1574).

[113] Siberry, *Criticism of Crusading,* pp 174/5; Urban IV, Reg. No 131; Martin IV, Reg. (Paris 1901), No 269.

[114] Eg Urban VI against Joanna I: Leonard, *Angevins de Naples,* p 464; John XXIII against Ladislas: de Vooght, *L'Hérésie de Jean Huss,* pp 829/31.

[115] On the conciliarist attack, see G Sommerfeldt, "Johann Falkenbergs Stellung zur Papstfrage", in *MIOG* 31 (1910), pp 433/4; RN Swanson, *Universities, Academics and the Great Schism* (Cambridge 1979), pp 121, 144 (Simon de Cramaud), 151/3 (Zabarella), etc. - defending the Roman Papacy against these assertions, Johannes de Imola (p 161); the Avignonese, Sancho Mulier (pp 100/1) and Raoul d'Oulmont (p 118).

debilitator of the Universal Church" but as "a son of iniquity and of ingratitude, and nourisher of heretical depravity".[116]

By the end of the twelfth century, ecclesiatical and auxiliary physical action against heresy was becoming a more viable prospect. It became actuality in the case of Raymond VI of Toulouse, excommunicated for failing to suppress heresy in his lands and threatened with their loss, and then actually deprived of them in 1208 for failing to avenge the murder of a papal legate ("terram exponat catholicis occupandam") and with that sentence confirmed in perpetuity by the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215. The Council decreed as a general principle that a year's contumacy under excommunication for fautorship (abetment) of heresy was grounds for permanent deprival of lands and rights; and that no fealty was owed to one excommunicated for failing to suppress a heresy he did not share (though the canon, as distinct from the glosses on it, did not explicitly close the door against a possible reversal of the latter sentence). This, like the Diet of Tribur's decision against Henry IV, extended to rulers a principle already accepted in the case of vassals.[117]

Failure by a ruler to suppress heresy in his lands was grounds for suspicion that he shared it, and in any case

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116 "Un Breve Inedito di Giulio II", ed. Ferrajoli, pp 426/7.

117 X V. vii. 3, CIC II. cols 787/8; cf Vodola, *Excommunication*, pp 166/7; Moore, *Formation of a Persecuting Society*, pp 6-9.

demonstrated his *inutilitas* as defender of the Church, an adequate reason, the Church considered, to deprive him.[118] Innocent III tentatively suggested a similar principle with regard to Philip of Swabia's excommunication; though no fautorship of heresy was involved, the argument was that contumacy *ipso facto* demonstrated a heretical contempt for the God-given power of the keys. As Johannes Teutonicus wrote, "Contumacia dicitur heresis". This was restated later by Hostiensis and Durandus, and by the practice of the Languedoc Inquisition, though it was not canonically accepted until the Council of Trent. It was presumably the reasoning behind the thirteenth century canonical commentator William of Rennes' opinion, making no mention of heresy, that a contumaciously excommunicate prince could licitly be warred upon.[119] One of the reasons cited for Frederick II's definitive deposition in 1245 was that previous excommunications had shown that he despised that sanction (ironically, for an alleged apostate, by continuing to attend Mass despite it).[120]

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[118] Eg Goffredus of Trano, quoted by Ullmann, *Medieval Papalism,* p 177; Raymond of Peñafort, *Summa de Poenitentia* II.1.10 (Rome 1603, repr. Farnborough 1967), p 157.

[119] Innocent III, Reg. VIII. 84, PL 215 cols 653/4; Hagender, "Päpstliche Recht", p 70; Durandus, quoted by Ullmann, *Medieval Papalism,* p 123; cf Vodola, *Excommunication,* pp 32/3, 69; Hostiensis, *Summa Aurea,* p 1142; and William of Rennes, quoted by Russell, *Just War in the Middle Ages,* pp 143/4: "Papa posset regem excommunicare, et crescente contumacia dare auctoritatem movendi arma contra eum".

[120] MGH *Constitutiones* II. 511: "claves ecclesie contempserit et contempnat". The same accusation was made against Frederick's son Conrad IV (Matthew Paris,

Particularly in the great papal-imperial struggles of the thirteenth century, the imputation of heresy was stretched to the point of depicting the adversaries of Rome as veritably diabolical in nature. Innocent III in 1212 compared Otto IV to the Dragon of the Apocalypse and the Devil walking about seeking whom he might devour. Gregory IX enlarged at length on the former comparison's application to Frederick II, the forerunner of Antichrist, though the latter retorted by calling the Pope an insane infidel and a roaring lion.[121] The sentences of 1239 and 1245 against Frederick fortified the accusation of failing in his feudal duty to the Roman Church with allegations of apostasy and of improbable blasphemies. The two forms of grievance moved closer together. Three centuries later, Paul IV declared that to attack papal property "gives no small grounds for suspicion of heresy".[122]

The perpetual deprivation for heresy or fautorship thereof decreed in 1215 became the pattern. Innocent III observed that "whoso fails in works" might be restored to

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Chronica Majora, VI. 300), his early rival Otto IV (Innocent III, Reg. VIII. 84, PL 215 cols 653/4), and later against the Visconti of Milan (Housley, *Italian Crusades*, p 59).

[121] MGH *Epistolae Pontificarum XIII seculi* I. 646-53, cf II. 328; MGH *Constitutiones* II. 290ff (also Matthew Paris, *Chronica Majora*, IV. 16-18). Francesco Toti (*Contra Bavarum*, in Scholz, *Unbekannte kirchenpolitische Streitschriften*, II. 84/5) called Louis IV Antichrist - in retaliation for the abuse directed against John XXII by Louis' Spiritual Franciscan allies.

[122] Doellinger, *Dokumente zur Geschichte Karls V, Philipps II und ihrer Zeit*, pp 223/4; cf Goffredus of Trani, cited by Hagender, "Häresiebegriff bei den Juristen", in Lourdaux & Verhelst, *Concept of Heresy*, p 47.

office upon repentance and absolution, but "whoso fails in the Faith, becoming a heretic or apostate, may perhaps recover grace, but will recover rank with difficulty, as he remains a scar" in the body of the Church.[123] Gregory IX in 1234, with the temporary cooperation of Frederick II, deposed the latter's insubordinate son Henry as German sub-king for allegedly defending the heretical assassins of the deranged inquisitor Conrad of Marburg.[124]

Allied with the charge of heresy was that of hindering the Crusade, and thus of unconscious or intentional aid to the infidel, that became standard from the time of Gregory IX's second excommunication of Frederick II in 1239.[125] It had already been employed by Innocent III against the Magna Carta barons, since John had, when things became difficult, taken the Cross.[126] Thereafter the charge degenerated into a reflex action, without regard to the facts of the position. Frederick II had recovered Jerusalem (if not by force of arms), which was more than his papal opponents had, and allegedly offered to end his life in Palestine in return for peace. Manfred was best

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[123] Innocent III, *Sermo IV in Consecratione Pontificis Maximi,* PL 217 col 670.

[124] MGH *Epistolae Pontificarum XIII seculi* I. 515/7.

[125] Gregory IX, Reg, ed. L Auvray (Paris 1896-1907), No 5092, cf Nos 350/1; Matthew Paris, *Chronica Majora,* III. 552-62, 569-73; cf bulls against the Aragonese: Martin IV, Reg, Nos 276, 302, 310, 455/7, 482, 570, 573, 583, 587, Boniface VIII, Reg, Nos 809, 2310, 2321, 2663, 3868-73, 3879/81, 3917, 4127.

[126] *Selected Letters of Innocent III concerning England,* pp 207/8, 215/9, 226/7.

placed to regain Constantinople after the Greeks had recaptured it from the Latin Emperor in 1261, and repeatedly offered to do so.[127] The Aragonese kings had a Crusading pedigree, and repeatedly offered to lead a Crusade if granted peace during the war of the Sicilian Vespers.[128] Even Raymond VI, Louis IV and the latter's Milanese ally Matteo Visconti made similar gestures; as did the Hussite king George Podebrady in the fifteenth century.[129] More than any other, Philip IV took the Crusade propaganda card out of papal hands, thanks to the incomparable Capetian tradition - the last three generations of kings having died on Crusades of one sort or another - though in the end, "nihil fecit".[130]

Despite opposition, most often self-interested,[131]

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[127] Matthew Paris, *Chronica Majora,* IV. 523/4; KM Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant* (Philadelphia 1976-84), I. 99; Housley, *Italian Crusades,* pp 67/8, 82/3.

[128] *Acta Aragonensia,* I. 3-6, III. 1-2, 9-10, 16-20; Bartolomeo of Neocastra, *Historia Sicula,* RIS XIII.3, pp 108/9, 114/8; Ramon Muntaner, *Cronica,* cc 57, 104 (various edns); cf Housley, *Italian Crusades,* pp 77/9, 92/4.

[129] Housley, *Italian Crusades,* pp 80, 84; Evans, "Albigensian Crusade", ed. Setton, II. 298; Heymann, *George of Bohemia: King of Heretics,* pp 299-313.

[130] See JR Strayer, "France: the Holy Land, the Chosen People and the Most Christian King", in *Medieval Statecraft and the Perspectives of History* (Princeton 1971), pp 303-12.

[131] Eg Housley, *Italian Crusades,* pp 77-80, 106/7, 170/2; Siberry, *Criticism of Crusading,* pp 178-87. Much of the opposition was directed against the practice rather than the principle of papal wars against delinquent Christians. Even Hus admitted that the Pope *could* declare war against notorious sinners (*Tractatus de Ecclesia,* ed. SH Thomson, Boulder, Colorado 1956 p 166), but he denied that John XXIII's Crusade against Ladislas was properly motivated, and denounced vehemently the sweeping claims of its indulgence salesmen (see de Vooght, *L'Hérésie de Jean Huss,*esp. pp 212/7, 832-47).

Popes came to make available the spiritual benefits of Crusading - the nature of which was still somewhat confused in the thirteenth century - at least as readily to those who fought false Christians as those who fought Moslems. Indeed Gregory VII's offer to Rudolf of Rheinfelden's partisans in 1080 of "absolutionem omnium peccatorum" and "benedictionem in hac vita et in futuro" was *more* unequivocal than Urban II's initial offers to the First Crusade fifteen years later.[132] Innocent III in 1215 offered "remissio peccatorum" to those who supported John against the rebels, "worse than Saracens".[133] Gregory IX extended in 1228/9 to those fighting against Frederick II, slightly tentatively, "remissio peccatorum", not specifically equated with the indulgence for the Holy Land; in 1240, he gave the Western Crusade priority over the Eastern - a step precipitated by Frederick's advance on Rome itself.[134] Innocent IV, embarrassed by Louis IX's concurrent Eastern Crusade, wavered on this issue, but clearly allowed some diversion of effort from East to West. He offered indulgences equivalent to Palestine, as had already been done in the more clearly anti-heretical Albigensian Crusade. Innocent's successors in his Sicilian *vendetta* did so too.[135]

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[132] Gregory VII, Reg. VII. 14a, Caspar p 486; cf Robinson, *Authority & Resistance,* pp 98-100; JA Brundage, "Holy War and the Medieval Lawyers", in *Holy War,* ed. TP Murphy (Columbus, Ohio, 1976), pp 119, 136.

[133] *Selected Letters of Innocent III,*pp 208/9, 227. Cf Reg. I. 608, II. 221, PL 214 cols 513/4, 779-82 against Markwald von Anweiler.

[134] Housley, *Italian Crusades,* pp 46.

Urban IV sounded as if he was preaching a new Eastern Crusade when he opened a bull in 1264: "Mother Church has been accustomed, moved by a maternal feeling of compassion for the Holy Land, and in order to free from hostile hands that country where Our Saviour submitted to bear the Cross and die for the redemption of the human race, to raise the standard of the Cross against the enemies of the Faith, to arouse the minds of the faithful by loud exclaims and to encourage them with diligent homilies". In reality, the Crusade he was preaching was against "that son of iniquity and foster-child of perdition, Manfred former Prince of Taranto, who although he seems to bear the name of Christian, differs in life and habits from the Christian Faith and shows himself in all things foreign to it". All the potent ideology of the Crusade was here deployed against the enemy within, on the strength of his favour to Neapolitan Moslems and vague hints at an international heretical-Saracenical conspiracy.[136] The overthrow of Manfred became a panacea for the ills of Christendom, entailing "not only the relief of the Roman and Universal Church, but also the

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[135] *Ibid,* pp 128/9; JR Strayer, "Political Crusades of the Thirteenth Century" & Evans, "Albigensian Crusade", in Setton, *History of the Crusades,* II. 348-57, 284/6.

[136] Urban IV, Reg., No 633; cf Nos 778, 804, 809, 859/60, 870; also Clement IV, Reg. Nos 161, 164, 168, 240, 297. Conradin, once he had crossed into Italy in defiance of papal prohibitions, similarly became "a fosterling of perdition, who like a pestilent shoot derives his malice from the root of the evil tree": Clement IV, Reg. No 689.

exaltation and promotion of the Faith, the salvation of souls, the strengthening of the standing of the faithful, the weakening of that of the unfaithful, and the expansion of divine worship".[137]

Hostiensis considered the purging of heresy within Europe - the *crux cismarina* - as *more* necessary and meritorious even than the Crusade to the East - the *crux transmarina* - though he admitted that many did not agree.[138] Innocent IV somewhat shamefacedly, and Urban IV, Clement IV, Martin IV and their successors openly, gave their Italian Crusades priority in raising men and money. By the 1320s, John XXII was telling Charles IV of France that it was much more urgent to crush Louis IV and his heretical allies than to attempt to regain the Holy Land, now lost.[139]

Martin IV preached a Crusade against Pedro III of Aragon simply for his occupation of Sicily in 1282, without condemning him for heresy. His successors presumably were doubtful about the justification for this step, in that this Crusade was not proclaimed again until 1291, when Nicholas IV authorised it in the very month that Acre fell to the Moslems, providing a free symbolic gift to those who claimed that western Crusades prejudiced the defence of the Holy

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137 Urban IV, Reg., No 804; Housley, *Italian Crusades,* p 69, cf pp 17-19.

138 Russell, *Just War in the Middle Ages,* pp 205/6; cf pp 251/6; Housley, *Italian Crusades,* pp 36/7, 63.

139 Housley, *Italian Crusades,* pp 81/6, 98-106; cf p 75.

Land.[140] John XXII, realising that the multiplication of Crusades was destroying their effect, was more sparing of his efforts, sticking to targets properly condemned for heresy. John found it more effective to condemn Louis IV for heresy than to insist upon his own temporal superiority over him.[141] His next namesake, ninety years later, however reverted to the bad habits of Martin IV by preaching a Crusade against Ladislas of Naples without sufficient evidence of heresy. Ladislas had already been included, as an infant, among the targets of various Crusades against his parents Charles III and Queen Margaret. The accusations of heresy in these had been perfunctory, so that in effect Crusade indulgences were on offer against a mere rebellious vassal. Charles had the distinction, in fact, of being denounced as a schismatic and declared a target for Crusade by both Roman and Avignonese Popes, since he was doing his best to support Urban VI when that pontiff picked a quarrel with him.[142]

In the case of the Emperor, the Papacy could make further-reaching claims than in that of most other lay potentates (though even so accusations of heresy became a

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[140] *Ibid,* pp 20/3; 25/7, 36, 66, 75, 99-100, 145/6.

[141] Eg MGH *Constitutiones* V. 615/9, 622/5, 708/9, 756, 788, 818; cf Giovanni Villani, *Cronica Fiorentina* IX. 227, 264 (Florence 1823 edn, repr. Rome 1980), IV. 202/3, 232.

[142] Bouard, *Origines des Guerres d'Italie,* pp 102/5; Simonsfeld, "Analekten zur Papst- & Konziliensgeschichte", pp 38-43; Baddeley, *Charles III & Urban VI,* pp 88/9; *Ann. Eccl.* 1411 no 5.

common supplement). The Pope's role in crowning western Emperors derived from Leo III's coronation of Charlemagne in 800, which according to later theory entailed a *translatio imperii* from East to West. There was however a difference of opinion as to whether the Pope had deprived Constantinople of the imperial office, or as to whether it had become *ipso facto* vacant due to the usurpation of Irene. Papal concentration on forcing the Emperor, particularly, to obedience was such that more general claims were only intermittently ventilated - an omission unfortunate for Boniface VIII's confrontation with the King of France. Boniface belatedly attempted to persuade the emperor Albert, whom he had hitherto been harassing, that he should exercise supremacy over Philip IV.[143]

So ambitious a pontiff as Innocent IV conceded even in *Eger cui lenia* that his apparently sweeping claims applied more to the Emperor, who "bound himself with the chain of obedience and subjection" towards Rome.[144] Under John XXII, whose theorists were the most extreme of all, despite the general caution of the Pope himself, Egidius Spiritalis of Perugia observed in passing that the English, French and other kings who did not acknowledge papal temporal authority "are not in a state of Grace", but his real fire was reserved for the Emperor Louis IV.[145] Nonetheless, John's successors decided

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[143] MGH *Constitutiones* IV. 139-40; cf Wieruszowski, *Vom Imperium zum Nationalen Koenigtum*, pp 160/2.

[144] Hagender, "Päpstliche Recht", p 86.

that the pretension to confirm imperial elections did not justify starting such long conflicts, though the eccentric and splenetic Pope Paul IV revived it in the mid-sixteenth century in order to annoy Ferdinand I.

Martin IV however, by his sanctions against Pedro III of Aragon for invading Sicily after the Vespers revolt, had extended (if unsuccessfully, and perhaps with limited influence) the principle of action against princes other than the Emperor for reasons other than heresy. Pedro's vassalage to the Papacy for Aragon was disputed, and barely hinted at by Martin; though he had occupied an indubitable papal fief by force. Martin's accusations against Pedro also only included a few little-exploited hints at heresy, but he imitated the wording of the sentence against Raymond of Toulouse in declaring Pedro's lands open "cuilibet catholico viro" to seize.[146] He was presumably influenced by the Fourth Lateran canons in declaring this one year after the Sicilian Vespers - somewhat short measure as a warning period, since it did not allow for the delays before Pedro intervened, and before Martin's first bulls could have been expected to reach him, so that he could react contumaciously (it is fairly clear that

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[145] Egidius Spiritalis, *Libellus,* ed. Scholz in *Unbekannte kirchenpolitische Streitschriften,* II. 109. Cf Canning, *Baldus de Ubaldis,* pp 28-30, 64/8. One of Philip IV's propaganda tracts allowed the Pope to be "dominus temporalis" over the Empire, but not over France: *Rex Pacificus;* Dupuy, *Histoire du Différend,* p 678.

[146] Martin IV, Reg, Nos 276, 310, 455/7, 570, 587.

nobody was willing actually to deliver them). Martin used up all possible sanctions very quickly. In the first two years after the Sicilian Vespers, he issued at least eight separate bulls of excommunication against Pedro; like the Pharisees, he seemed to think he would be heard for his many words. His next recourse, having failed to expel Pedro from Sicily, was to open a new front in Aragon - which he did with spectacular failure.

Martin broadened the principle of the *translatio imperii* to claim a papal right to "transfer a kingdom from people to people on account of injustices, injuries, wrongs and sundry griefs"; this while only exploiting to a limited degree the obvious grounds for fortifying papal jurisdiction - vassalage and heresy - was a radical proceeding. The *translatio* was fairly extreme, in that the French Pope offered Aragon to Charles of Valois, younger son of the French King Philip III (to be held as a papal fief), luring the latter into military disaster in 1285. The Pope tried to assert the rather moribund apostolic suzerainty over Aragon by making the abortive grant on the same harsh conditions agreed to by Charles of Anjou before his investure with Sicily in 1262 - notably, the proposed king had to admit that he could be deposed if he failed to satisfy a pontifical complaint within three months (less generous than the year's grace to abandon heresy), though his reaction in practice would have been

another matter. Allegiance was to be sworn to him only for a decade at a time, the Papacy retaining overriding rights in the kingdom. Charles' brother Louis IX had protested that the conditions were more fitting for an infidel or perjurer than a Christian prince. Charles accepted them, knowing very well that the Papacy's desperation to dispose of Manfred would soon allow him to overturn most of them, as indeed it did.[147]

Urban VI still retained some notion of the year's delay before finalisation of sentence in dealing with Joanna I of Naples, even though he was charging her with feudal default as well as heresy. Though his first sentence deprived her of all possessions, this was not explicitly perpetual, and he did not invest Charles III for a year (with whom he quarrelled in turn, despite hedging him about with even more conditions).[148]

The Intrusions of Reality

Deposition of princes involved damaging compromises with the secular world, in that Popes increasingly found themselves supporting their maledictions by rather dubious means. They had to counter a persistent belief that they should rely on supernatural support, and not necessarily arrange for

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147 Martin IV, Reg, Nos 455, 580/1; Urban IV, Reg, Nos 269/70; E Jordan, *Les Origines de la Domination Angevine en Italie* (Paris 1909), pp 420/7, 458-80, 492.

148 *Ann. Eccl.* 1381 no 2; 138 nos 1, 3ff; cf Bouard, *Origines des Guerres d'Italie,* pp 43-50.

mundane aid. John of Salisbury havered between the two positions: "Malice is always punished by God; but sometimes it is His own, sometimes a human hand which He employs to administer punishment to the unrighteous".[149] The Papacy's claims to wield a power directly authorised by God were especially compromised whenever Divine Providence failed to support the result. In Gregory VII's time, Manegold of Lautenbach had expounded an early contractarian theory of resistance stressing execution (by subjects) rather than justification. Though the Pope was peripheral, revolt was given a spiritual justification (if successful). If a king was overthrown, it demonstrated conclusively God's disfavour towards him.[150] On this basis, however, Henry IV still had more credit in Heaven than his opponents would allow.

The Aragonese in the War of the Sicilian Vespers concluded with some logic that their success demonstrated God's favour, whatever the Pope might say. Martin IV denounced a proposal to settle it by judicial combat, as bypassing the proper channels for appealing to the Almighty (himself); but even in the larger arena, his judgement was not supported by events.[151] The abruptness of Charles of Anjou's downfall

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[149] John of Salisbury, *Policraticus* VIII. 21, Webb II. 379ff. Cf Bernard of Clairvaux, *Epistolae* 221, 226, *Opera,* VIII. 84/6, 95/6.

[150] Manegold of Lautenbach, *Epistola ad Gebehardum,* MGH LL I. 365/6.

[151] Eg Bartolomeo of Neocastro, *Historia Sicula,* RIS XIII.3, pp 26/7, 97/8; Ramon Muntaner, *Cronica,* cc 104, 113. Against the trial by combat, Martin IV, Reg, Nos

produced a widespread feeling that he suffered Divine retribution for his unjust execution of Conradin, an event in which the Papacy was also implicated.[152]

By the fifteenth century, defenders of the Papacy against the usurpation of ecclesiastical jurisdiction by princes, like Piero da Monte, had to fall back on Providence alone, warning that who undermined the authority of God's Vicar would, in justice, be punished by his own subjects' disobedience. He mentioned no earthly catalyst for such retribution; God Himself, rather than the Pope, was the agent.[153]

The opponents of Popes made great play with their unsuitably bellicose behaviour - the shepherds of men inciting wolves to rend their own sheep, a *topos* that lost none of its power through frequent use.[154] This reaction was unaffected

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302, 452/4.

[152] Eg Muntaner, *Cronica,* cc 35, 114; *Annales Placentini Gibellini,* MGH *Scriptores* XVIII. 529; John of Victring, *Liber Certarum Historiarum,* ed. T Schneider (MGH 1909-10), I. 99, 137, 164/5, 206; Bartolomeo of Neocastro, *Historia Sicula,* RIS XIII.3, pp 8-9; Marco Battaglia da Rimini, *Marcha,* RIS XVII.3, p 17. Even some Guelfs concurred in this view: eg the Bolognese vernacular chronicle, RIS XVIII.1, p 176; Villani, *Cronica Fiorentina* VII. 29 (Florence 1823, repr. Rome 1980), II. 191.

[153] Quoted by Black, *Monarchy and Community,* p 128.

[154] Eg Wido of Ferrara, *De Scismate Hildebrandini;* Sigebert of Gembloux, *Apologia,* MGH LL I. 545, 566/7; II. 438; Arnold of Brescia, quoted by John of Salisbury, *Historia Pontificalis,* ed. M Chibnall (1956), p 64; Frederick II, MGH *Constitutiones* II. 290ff (also Matthew Paris, *Chronica Majora,* IV. 16-18) and Louis IV, V. 646, 723/7, 742-50; Dante, *Paradiso* XXVII. 46-57, cf IX. 131/2; John Gower, *Vox Clamantis* III. 343/8, ed. GC Macaulay (Oxford 1899-1902).

by the gradual conformity, between the mid-twelfth and the mid-thirteenth centuries, of canonical theory to papal practice by removing the traditional prohibitions on clerical initiation of war.[155]

In practice, the Papacy's excursions into secular political opposition to kings generally brought it discredit without success. Henry IV drove out Gregory VII, rather than *vice versa,* and maintained himself against his lay and clerical opponents until just before he died. Innocent III's intervention in the Empire offered a lamentable spectacle. He deposed Philip of Swabia in favour of Otto IV; realised the former was too strong and accorded him absolution and possible recognition in 1207, only for him to be murdered a year later in a petty feud, so that the Pope had hurriedly to switch back to Otto; quarrelled with and deposed *him,* and finally helped to install Frederick II, who turned out to be the most anti-papal of the three. Frederick more or less decisively ousted Otto, but the latter had enjoyed little non-papal support in the first place. Frederick survived both his excommunication by Gregory IX and his deposition by Innocent IV in 1245; and his son Conrad IV would probably have maintained his position against weak papalist anti-kings but for his premature death. Even the line of the Counts of Toulouse survived the

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155 See Brundage, "Holy War and the Medieval Lawyers", pp 110/2, 129/31; Russell, *Just War in the Middle Ages,* pp 106ff, 187ff.

Albigensian Crusade, if in diminished state, until a natural default of male heirs. Despite the vacillations and failures of Louis IV (notably his laughable anti-Papacy), and despite imperial politics' inherent factionalism, he retained the majority support of the lay princes for over two decades. Until Louis' death, his rival Charles IV could only be "der Pfaffenkoenig".

The Papacy's conclusive successes in putting its sentences into practice (which involved their targets being killed) occurred in its vassal kingdoms of the Sicilies, where its right to regrant was somewhat more accepted and support for its opponents might be adversely affected. Even there, the destruction by its minions - who proved insubordinate in turn once successful, but had to be tolerated for fear of worse - of Manfred (a usurper), Conradin (a pretender rather than an incumbent) and Joanna I (a childless Queen in a weak position) was offset by the failure of its efforts to oust the Staufen Frederick II [I of Sicily] and Conrad IV, the Aragonese Pedro III, Alfonso II, James II and Frederick [II], and the Neapolitan Angevins Charles III and Ladislas. To these successes may be added cases in which deposition was more effective as a deterrent not actually invoked than as an actuality liable to poison relations irretrievably, without any guarantee of further result. This could still be the case between Innocent III and John, thanks to the latter's concurrent troubles with his

barons and with France. Later, familiarity with over-frequent actual and ineffectual use of the deterrent bred contempt for its potential.

It was not surprising that deposed princes often reacted by denying Popes' right to issue such a sentence. They generally depicted the papal justification as being an assertion of supreme temporal power, as it was much easier for them to refute than a justification *ratione peccati.* And it was true that apostolic pronouncements were usually ambiguous enough for that interpretation to be not unreasonable.[156] This was most striking in the case of Louis IV. He admitted, that as a result of the unprovoked aggression of John XXII, he had fallen into schism and perhaps heresy. He offered to accept penance for these sins from John's successors - even to resign the Empire if the Pope would then restore him (a fond hope, after his crimes) - but stoutly refused to admit that John had originally been entitled to quash his election.[157]

Even in the fourteenth century, few theorists went so far as to challenge the natural superiority of the spiritual

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156 Eg *Epistolae Henrici IV,* MGH, p 16; MGH *Constitutiones* I. 361/2 (Frederick II).

157 On these lengthy negotiations, abortive due to papal intransigence, see R Moeller, *Louis der Bayer und die Kurie im Kampf um das Reich* (Berlin 1914), pp 63/7, 81-95; Stengel, *Avignon und Rhens,* pp 193/7; HJ Becker, "Das Mandat *Fidem Catholicam* Ludwigs des Bayern von 1338", *DA* 26 (1970), pp 459-60.

power, and the idea of indirect jurisdiction. Indeed Italian civil lawyers - increasingly in papal rather than imperial employ - began to accept the *ratione peccati* theories of their canonist brethren. Nicholas of Cusa thought direct papal power "doubtful and novel", but accepted the indirect.[158] John of Paris, Dante and Ockham all maintained the viability of secular government founded upon human reason and natural law, without creation by or subordination to Faith and divine law. But Dante virtually wrecked *Monarchia's* assertion of imperial autonomy by concluding, "that felicity which is subject to mortality, in a sense is ordered with a view to the felicity that will not taste of death". According to John of Paris, a Pope could not direct a king "*essentialiter,* inasmuch as he is a king, but only *per accidens* inasmuch as it is fitting for the king to be a believer", and a papal sentence could *per accidens* to popular deposition. John's main concern was to make the relationship reciprocal, by allowing the king to use physical power - as Philip IV did against Boniface VIII - to make the Pope answer for any grievous crime *he* might have committed. Ockham's approach was very similar, though he emphasised the popular role rather than the papal in deposition of kings.[159]

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[158] See Canning, *Baldus de Ubaldis,* pp 38-40, 157, 259; Cusa, *De Concordantia Catholica,* ed. G Kallen (Hamburg 1959-65), III. 362. Cf Gerson, *Oeuvres Complètes,* ed. P Glorieux (Tournai 1960-73), VI. 216/8; Vitoria, *De Potestate Ecclesiae,* in *Relecciones,* ed. Getino, II. 64.

[159] Dante, *Monarchia* III. 16, p 381 in *Opere,* Testo Critico della Società Dantesca Italiana (2nd edn., Florence 1960); John of Paris, *De Potestate Regali et Papali*

Dissidents were so far definite heretics, like Marsilio of Padua or Wyclif. The latter insisted that Christ "deposes incapable Kings by His secret Providence... And when the Pope or Antichrist attempts anything temporally without Christ's permission against Kings, [all] should prudently shun this diabolical tyranny and uphold the ordinance of God."[160]

The Great Schism decisively marked the end of the period of political thought dominated by primarily canonistically-based assertions of papal sovereignty - impugning it as regarded *spiritualia,* and forcing it altogether into limbo as regarded *temporalia.* A *revanche* of the theologians, heralded by Ockham and Wyclif and represented in different ways by the conciliarists of Constance and Hus, even though the one burned the other, utterly spurned the entire canonistic tradition in favour of the Scriptures and the Church Fathers; and with it, they threw out most of papal

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XIII, XV-XVI, ed. Leclercq, pp 214/6, 222/3; Ockham, *Octo Quaestiones* II. 2, 9, IV. 8, *Opus Nonaginta Dierum* c 93, in *Opera Politica,* I. 73, 87, 152, II. 688; *De Imperatorum et Pontificum Potestate,* ed. Scholz in *Unbekannte kirchenpolitische Streitschriften,* II. 455; *Breviloquium* VI. 2, ed. Scholz, pp 200/1. On reciprocity, see *Octo Quaestiones* VIII. 6, *Opera Politica,* I. 204; John of Paris, *De Potestate Regali et Papali* XXII, XXIV, pp 249, 245. V (pp 183/5) recognises the spiritual power as greater "sed non in omnibus"; cf *Rex Pacificus,* supporting Philip IV: Dupuy, *Histoire du Différend,* p 677. This was the view even of Wyclif in his more orthodox days: *De Civili Dominio* I. 291, II. 33/4, 137, III. 390/1.

[160] Marsilio, *Defensor Pacis* II. vi. 12; x. 3, 7, 9, xxvi. 4, 8; Wyclif, *De Officio Regis,* p 200; cf *De Potestate Papae,* ed. J Loserth (Oxford 1907), pp 101/2; *De Blasphemia,* ed. MH Dziewicki (Oxford 1893), p 17, etc. Wyclif's later thought became so centred on clerical disendowment that most other things were left to "God's secret Providence" or "a special revelation".

authority.[161] The Schism was a sign of whither extreme insistence on the unbounded rights of the Pope could lead, and inspired a feeling that the long-quoted principle that God entrusted the Church to the Pope "in aedificationem, non in destructionem" should actually mean something. The Conciliar Movement propagated the doctrine of public utility against strict legalistic tendencies.[162] This trend of thought was inimical, *inter alia,* to the papal deposing power, which did not serve public utility - since it generally failed.

Difficult period though the fifteenth century was for secular monarchs, particularly in the Empire, England and Castile, the religious element was no longer especially prominent in motivating or justifying resistance to them - except in Bohemia, where the Hussites repudiated the rule of Sigismund for his alleged spiritual failings as well as out of xenophobia, and where their sympathetic native king, George Podebrady, was ineffectually deposed in 1466 by Pope Paul II. It was notable that Sigismund's predecessor as King of Bohemia and Emperor, Wenzel, was deposed from the latter

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161 Eg Ockham, *Breviloquium* I. 7-8, II. 13, ed. Scholz, pp 48/9, 80/1; Wyclif, *De Potestate Papae,* pp 34/5, 259, 377; *De Blasphemia,* pp 8, 46, 98/9, 162, 276; Hus,*Tractatus de Ecclesia,* pp 90/3, 106/7, 159-60, 188/9, etc.; Dietrich of Niem, *De Modo Uniendi et Reformandi Ecclesiam,* pp 19-20, 23/7; Gerson, quoted by Morrall, *Gerson and the Great Schism,* pp 46-51, 103.

162 G Sommerfeldt, "Johann Falkenbergs Stellung zur Papstfrage", in *MiOG*31 (1910), pp 430/3; Gerson, *Oeuvres,* VII. 533. On utility, cf Morrall, *Gerson and the Great Schism,* pp 80, 121; JJ Ryan, *The Nature, Structure & Function of the Church in William of Ockham* (Missoula, Montana 1976), pp 22ff.

office for avowedly secular reasons - though he had given an obvious provocation to the Papacy (had a stronger united Papacy emerged) by having the Archbishop of Prague murdered. Admittedly, these secular reasons had a canonical basis, in that (as in the case of Adolf of Nassau over a century earlier), they were ultimately derived from a Merovingian-type idea of *inutilitas,* now fused with the populist notions of subjects' right of resistance,[163] a right self-determined rather than operative at the behest of an external ecclesiastical authority, that had usurped the papalists' ideological hegemony. It was this synthesis indeed that threatened the Papacy itself at the Council of Basle. Gerson and other earlier conciliarists had plagiarised papalist statements on the deposability of princes for *incorrigibilitas* or *inutilitas,* and applied them to the Papacy.[164] In 1439, Basle deposed Eugenius IV for alleged tyranny and *inutilitas,* citing subjects' right of resistance to a secular ruler of this type as an established analogy.[165]

The fifteenth-century Papacy had to pay a heavy price in Concordats and *de facto* concessions to ensure against the danger of further royal support for the Conciliar Movement. It

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[163] Peters, *Shadow King,* ch 6.

[164] Eg Gerson, *Oeuvres,* VI. 3, 11; Morrall, *Gerson and the Great Schism,* pp 81, 92, 98; F Bliemetzrieder, "Traktat des... Nikolaus de Fakenham" (pt 2), *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 2 (1908), p 84.

[165] Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini, *De Gestis Concilii Basiliensis,* edd. D Hay & W Smith (Oxford 1967), pp 32/4; cf Black, *Monarchy and Community,* pp 49, 103/4, 111.

had to struggle to maintain any vestige of its pre-schismatic control over the clergy, and had little effort to spare for self-assertion over the laity. Princes were wooed as allies against the demon of democracy, rather than threatened. The contrast between Eugenius IV's and Nicholas V's statements on the "special divine grace" bestowed upon lay monarchs, and earlier unflattering Gregorian statements, is striking. The fifteenth-century papalists, sometimes grudgingly but enforced by circumstances, gave kings a virtually similar status to Popes, arguing that both were threatened by the conciliar principle of responsibility to the collectivity of their subjects.[166]

During the Schism, the deposing power had been over-used to the point of ridicule. Thereafter, some caution set in, as exemplified by the limitations of Julius II's actions against Louis XII (and even Paul IV's against Philip II - both acting most decisively over the papal fief of Naples, and less so as concerned their opponents' larger kingdoms). Only the growth of a more ambitious sense of mission in the Holy See in the mid-sixteenth century would inspire an attempt to revive it. The heretical monarchy of England aggressively proclaimed itself to have no earthly superior. It therefore was the centre for the last and greatest dispute over the ultimate power of the Papacy, failure in which effectively symbolised the death of the ideal of united Christendom.

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166 Black, *Monarchy and Community*, pp 71/2; cf pp 82-129.

A MYSTERY OF MALEVOLENCE: THE ENGLISH PROTESTANT VIEW OF THE MEDIEVAL PAPACY AND SECULAR MONARCHY

"By the serche of ernest chronycles... Antichrist and hys mynysters are lyke to be the better knowne and their tyrannouse usurpacyons perceyved, how shamefullye they have abused the dygnyte of kyngs."

John Bale[1]

"*John:* What earthy name to interrogatories
Can task the free breath of a sacred king ?...
But as we, under God, are supreme head,
So under Him that great supremacy
Where we do reign, we will alone uphold
Without th'assistance of a mortal hand;
So tell the Pope, all reverence set apart
To him and his usurped authority...
Though you and all the kings of Christendom
Are led so grossly by this meddling priest...
Pandulf: Then by the lawful power that I have
Thou shalt stand curst and excommunicate;
And blessed shall he be that doth revolt
From his allegiance to an heretic;
And meritorious shall that hand be called,
Canonised and worshipped as a saint,
That takes away by any secret course
Thy hateful life..."

King John, III. i

"*Bastard:* And doth the Pope, a man of pride
Give charters for the lives of lawful kings ?
What can he blesse, or who regards his cursse,
But such as gives to man, and takes from God ?"

Troublesome Raigne of King John[2]

Early English Protestants had an acute awareness of the papal claims and practices described in chapter 1. This was

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[1] *The Laboryouse Journey and Serche of Johan Leylande for Englande's Antiquitees*, STC 15445 (1549), sigs C5v/6r, quoted K Firth, *Apocalyptic Tradition in Reformation Britain*(Oxford 1979), p 59.

[2] G Bullough, *Narrative & Dramatic Sources of Shakespeare* (7 vols, 1958-73), IV. 132.

somewhat less apparent in the Henrician Reformation, when the questions of the Divorce and the Supremacy were more to the fore; and the government did not feel as threatened by the Papacy as Elizabeth's later did. The international situation, if portentous, merely extended one which Henry had already managed to juggle for twenty years, rather than being perilously novel as in 1559; Henry had those twenty years behind him, was not a young woman, and had not suffered attacks on his right all his life. Edward VI's foreign and hereditary circumstances were also more assured, and the novelty of sacramentarianism tended to monopolise religious controversy during his brief span. As I hope to demonstrate respectively in this chapter, and chapters 4 and 5, the early Elizabethan period saw a new dialectic between antagonism fuelled from the past and imminent fears rooted in the present, though both had some degree of Henrician connection.

The Problems of Apocalypticism

Catholics failed to demonstrate their harmlessness, even before the permanent sabotage of any such attempt by Pius V. It would have required some positive renunciation to neutralise the Protestant legend of the papal deposing power (see chapter 5). The history involved in this, viewed always with an eye to the present, naturally underwent modifications. Even so, there were necessary

inconsistencies which rendered the Protestant view considerably more fractured than the Catholic. There were many different views as to the point of Rome's divergence from apostolic spirituality (the "kingdom not of this world") to meddle in secular business; to the cosmic significance of this trend, related to the rise of Antichrist; also as to the degree to which other churches, especially the English, had forsworn the Roman darkness before the Reformation, and to the view taken of Rome's royal opponents in the Middle Ages who were, after all, lost in this same darkness.

There was moreover an unresolved tension between assurance of Antichrist's overthrow and anxiety about his power and the extent of his rage against the elect in the last days,[3] parallel to the tension between assurance and despair of personal election, and reflected in historical treatment between one tendency to maximise the ill effects of papal political interference (which after all, as the work of the Great Antichrist, ought to be titanic), and another to stress instead its defeats by divine providence, in the hope of deriving a guarantee that the same grace would be vouchsafed to Elizabeth.

Providentialism, to the ill-disposed, could seem dangerously like Machiavellianism; God would approve any *coup*,

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[3] Cf P Lake, "Significance of the Elizabethan Identification of the Pope as Antichrist", *JEH* 31(1980), pp 168/9; R Bauckham, *Tudor Apocalypse* (Abingdon 1978), p 146. RB Wernham, *The Making of Elizabethan Foreign Policy* (Berkeley & Los Angeles 1980), p 45, sees a "new-found confidence from c 1572", "tinged with those forebodings of disaster that so often afflicted men who believed themselves to be the Lord's Elect."

right or wrong, executed with sufficient vigour to succeed.[4] Bishop Jewel in the *Defence of the Apologie* attacked his opponent Thomas Harding's papalist conclusions from the case of Childeric III, especially his indication of Carolingian prosperity as a sign of divine favour. As Harding himself had finally to admit, the Pope's role in Childeric's deposition had only been consultative. Whatever his role, divine approval could not be deduced. As "Prince of the world", the Devil was at least as likely to engineer the overthrow of kings as God. Jewel referred to counter-examples of Emperors deposing Popes: "Now, M. Harding, if you, with your rhetorical furniture, may cry out 'O what a divine power had the Pope that thus could depose a King !', why may not we likewise say, 'O what a divine power had the Emperor that thus could depose so many Popes !'" Jewel denied that the results of Zacharias' action had been propitious; the Carolingian dynasty had suffered many vicissitudes (it had after all later received another power illegitimately transferred by the Papacy, that of the Eastern Empire). Anyway, on these grounds the Turk could claim the approbation of Providence, "for he hath both longer continued and much increased his estate, than ever did the house of Pipine".[5]

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[4] Cf G Bowler, "Marian Protestants & the Idea of Violent Resistance to Tyranny", in P Lake & M Dowling, *Protestantism & the National Church* (1987), p 125, for Edwin Sandys on Wyatt's Rebellion: "If this rising be of God, it will take place; if not, it will fail."

[5] Jewel, *Defence of the Apologie*, STC 14601 (2nd edn, 1570), *Works*, PS, IV.

Both sides however could however cite instances of providential favour. And a protagonist of either side failing to make headway with the argument of providential approbation might at any moment cite the Turk as an example of worldly success (not to demonstrate the truth of Islam), or write of such (temporary) worldly success as the mark of Antichrist.[6]

One of Jewel's successors, Thomas Bilson, Warden of Winchester College (later Bishop) decisively disclaimed providentialism: "Wee measure not the right of causes neither by the sequele nor the successe (outcome) of thinges, for then the Saintes of God from the first beginning of the worlde have had an evill cause, since their successe hath alwayes beene to loose their lives for bearing witnes unto the trueth."[7]

A triumphalist view was not easy for most Protestant historians immediately to adopt, given their habit of stressing the

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681/3; answering Harding, *A Confutation of a Booke Intituled An Apologie of the Church of England*, STC 12762 (Antwerp 1565 / ERL 310), ff 181/2; cf ch 5. Cf Bale, *Image of Both Churches*, STC 1297, ed. H Christmas (PS 1849), p 562.

[6] See the Jesuit Leonard Lessius on the sudden deaths of obstreporous kings - *Defensio Summi Pontificis* (St. Omer 1613), pp 283/6. Robert Persons, *Conference about the Next Succession to the Crowne of England*, STC 19398 (Antwerp 1595 / ERL 104), I. 33, cf 174/5, had more dangerous arguments on the providential benefits of Childeric III's and other depositions; cf William Rainolds, *De Justa Republicae in Reges Impios et Hereticos... Authoritate* (Paris 1592). The Louvainist Rastell finally admitted that long continuance and wide extent, cited by most Catholic writers as arguments for the truth of their Faith, applied to non-Christian religions too and so were less than conclusive - *A Reply against An Answer*, STC 20728 (Antwerp 1565 / ERL 14), f 178v.

[7] *The True Difference between Christian Subjection & Unchristian Rebellion*, STC 3071 (Oxford 1585), p 426.

worldly success of Antichrist's legions for centuries past and the true Church's reduction to a persecuted "remnant" - any more than it was easy for Catholics to adapt quickly to the political dominance of a heresy long dismissed as socially negligible and politically subversive. Antichrist was expected "to be totally overthrown, but only by the Hand of the Lord Himself at the Second Coming."[8] Except for the (so far) eccentric believers in a millenial reign of the Saints before the Second Coming, none could feel confident in the temporal security of any particular Church. The True Church, after all, was "not bound to any certain place or person." More prevalent was belief in the worsening of the Saints' tribulations until near the End. The Marian persecutions might have fulfilled this condition; but more likely not. Indeed, a reasonable deduction from Bale and Foxe was that persecution was necessary to define the True Church, the "kingdom not of this world."[9]

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[8] Bauckham, *Tudor Apocalypse*,p 126; cf pp 12-13, 71/3, 86-90, 157, 177/80; Firth, *Apocalyptic Tradition*, pp 106/9; VN Olsen, *Foxe & the Elizabethan Church* (Berkeley & Los Angeles 1973), Prol, for the general inapplicability to the Elizabethan period (at least pre-1588) of the theses of W Haller, *Foxe's Book of Martyrs & the Elect Nation* (1963) - both as to England's special status as an Elect Nation, and as to any cosmic optimism to be derived thereby. They might nonetheless apply to mid-seventeenth century Puritanism, which was, after all, Haller's point of departure. Similar to Haller is WM Lamont, *Godly Rule: Politics & Religion 1603-60* (1969), pp 13-15. CZ Wiener, "Popular anti-Catholicism in Elizabethan & Early Jacobean England", *P & P* 51 (1971), pp 27/9, 46-62, accepts Haller's dubious identification of Foxean influence with cosmic optimism, but nonetheless sees it as unable to prevail against gloomy trends.

[9] Foxe, *A & M*. ed. Pratt, I. 8, cf 118. Cf Bradford, *Meditation on the Kingdom of Christ*, STC 3481 (c 1564), in *Writings*, ed. A Townsend (PS 1848), II. 361; Whitaker, *Ad Nicolai Sanderi Demonstrationes... Responsio*, STC 25357 (1583), p 48.

It was accepted that "whom the Lord loveth, he chasteneth"; or, as the most approved (if unmanageably long) early Elizabethan catechism put it: "The dearlier that any man is beloved of God, he is commonly the more burdened with adversities or is wont the sooner to remove out of this life, as he were delivered by God and let out of prison."[10] A general application of this principle to an Elect Nation could hardly reassure. Antichrist, who "is famouse in victories and shineth with the ornamentes of this worlde,"[11] might well enjoy temporal success. Laurence Humphrey lamented in 1578: "Antichrist is resorting to every extreme that he may with wolf-like ferocity devour the sheep of Christ... [England] by the favour of God is yet safe; but how long can she be secure from human malignity ?"[12]

Even in 1589, Elizabeth's Chamber Sewer, Anthony Marten, produced a millenarian pamphlet by no means optimistic, though recently "the proud & lustie mindes of mightie Monarchs are abated". He did have some sense perhaps of an Elect Nation "delivered from Pharao", but election was still defined by persecution in his sense of identification with former periods in Church History: "Who were preserved in the great and horrible persecutions of the Primitive Church, from being utterly consumed

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[10] *Nowell's Catechism*, tr. Thomas Norton, STC 18708 (1570), ed. GE Corrie (PS 1853), p 132. On its Calvinistic provenance, see CM Dent, *Protestant Reformers in Elizabethan Oxford* (Oxford 1983), pp 88-90.

[11] Bullinger, *Hundred Sermons upon the Apocalyps*, tr. John Daus, STC 4061 (1561), p 374.

[12] *Zurich Letters*, PS, I. 325.

of tyrants, but we ?" He doubted "whether there bee anie nation of the worlde more unthankfull for God's benefites, more forgetfull of His promises, more disobedient to His commaundements... and finally more desperate to all kinde of mischiefe then commonly the people of this kingdome be." He still had an embattled air. "Antichrist for the saving of his dominion hath made all these commotions and troubles in the world which cannot bee decided till Christ in His own person come to trie His own cause in judgement." Marten regretted that "the worlde shall perceive so great troubles to arise by the preaching of the Gospel and that no temporall benefite commeth thereby... that God's displeasure is more greevous than ever... that the Pope for all the preaching against him can no more be removed out of his seate than ever."[13]

Sir Francis Hastings' *Watchword* too was, according to Robert Persons (refuting it), "but a timerous abodement of infinite ruines that doe beset the realme at this day."[14]

Tyndale, albeit in days when Protestantism lacked royal support in England, had no doubt about the balance of power: "though all Kings Christened had sworn to depose one Pope out of

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[13] Marten, *Second Sound or Warning of the Trumpet unto Judgement*, STC 17491 (1589), ff 23v, 33r, 37; 5-7. His *Exhortation to Stirre up the Minds of all Her Majesty's Faithfull Subjectes to Defend their Countrey*, STC 17489 (1588), actually post-Armada, had also insisted (*Harl. Misc.* I. 167): "Though the Dragon be driven into his den, yet is his sting and poison still in force; though they be chased and repelled for a time, yet their malice and fury abideth; though the Lord now defated their purpose, yet their device and practice continueth; though some of their ships and men be sunk in the sea, yet the sinews of their commonwealth remain."

[14] Persons, *A Temperate Wardword to the Turbulent and Seditious Wachword of Sir Francis Hastinges*, STC 19415 (1599 / ERL 31), p 2.

his seat, if they had not the favour of other prelates thereto, they might haply, by the secret practice of them, be put out of their own seats in the meantime." But Elizabethans like Bishop Horne of Winchester agreed. "The wealthy pride, the fierce power and the trayterous treachery [!] of the Pope and his prelates was so mighty, violent and subtile that there was no earthly power able to withstand or match with them."[15]

William Fulke, a devoted spier-out of Antichrist, was also in two minds. In 1570, in a sermon that was frankly crisis propaganda, he announced the imminent fall of the Romish Babylon. But earlier (in a work translated only in 1573), he acknowledged, "the Romish monster.... hath oftentimes such successe in warring against the true professours of the Gospell... that it might seeme to be a just quarill which he mainteyneth." The defeat of the Armada finally converted him to a view of national assurance.[16]

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[15] Tyndale, *Practice of Prelates*, STC 24465 (Antwerp 1530), ed. H Walker (PS 1849), p 299. Admittedly, historical cases of papal deposition made this view inconsistent with his picture of prelates as a firm and serried league against all laymen. Robert Horne, *An Answere Made to a Booke Entituled The Declaration of such Scruples* [by John Feckenham], STC 13818 (1566), ff 75v/6r.

[16] *Sermon proving Babylon to be Rome*, STC 11449.5, sig F2r, prin. in Bauckham, *Tudor Apocalypse*. App. 7, p 331; *Preelections*, tr. George Gifford, STC 11443 (1573; Lat. 1569), sig *3v. On Fulke's eschatology, see Bauckham pp 100, 133, 146, 173 ; & his thesis, "The Career & Thought of Dr William Fulke 1537/89" (Cambridge PhD 1973), ch 6.

The question of the point of papal corruption was intimately connected with apocalyptic speculation. Obscurity and ambiguity abounded. Persons reproached John Foxe: "This beinge his devise and resolution for the present to have no longer patience with our Church but wholy to deny the same, his greatest difficulty seemeth to be about the tyme and causes."[17] In an earlier controversy, Harding accused Jewel with reason of vagueness: "Councils ye admitte as your phansie and pleasure leadeth; sometimes three, sometimes four, sometimes five or six, but all ye would never admitte."[18] William Whitaker, one of the less historically-minded of Elizabethan theologians, was exasperated by such quibbles: "Doth it followe that the Church of Rome is not corrupt, because wee cannot tell the moment of time when it began to bee corrupt ? But being so manifest as it was, what need we search the histories to show the beginning ?"[19]

Chronological coincidence was often the determinant basis for many Protestant ecclesiological theories. The medieval

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[17] *Treatise of Three Conversions* (3 vols,1603/4; ERL 304/6), I. 439.

[18] *Confutation*, f 9r. The Protestants had problems with General Councils. The anti-papalism of Constance and Basle was welcome - but not their anti-Hussite measures; and unfortunately they came after Fourth Lateran, which had to be totally rejected. Of course, Catholics' problems with Constance and Basle, papally-convoked Councils that ran out of control, were even worse.

[19] *Answere to the Ten Reasons of Campion*, STC 25360, tr. Richard Stocke (1606), p 171.

pattern of anti-papal obsession with the Donation of Constantine (far greater than papalists' attachment to it had ever been) continued, barely checked by Cusa's and Valla's demonstrations of its inauthenticity. In Henry VIII's reign, there was "a certain hedging of bets"[20] as to whether the Donation was genuine (and the Papacy had received some temporal power, but from the Empire) or a cover for mere usurpation. Bale retailed the story of the voice crying "Today is poison poured out into the Church of God" - though the medieval source he used identified this voice as "the old enemy's", he validated it by re-ascribing it to an angel.[21]

Knox and Napier still credited the Donation. Its occurrence at a distance of 1260 years (the next favourite apocalyptic period after 1000) before the Scottish (and Elizabethan) Reformation was too inviting to resist (if inaccurate, since the Donation was dated after 312).[22] A certain insularity was present here - whatever Constantine's character, he had been born at York, and must therefore be crucial; and the refutations of the Donation had been

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[20] GD Nicholson, "The Nature & Function of Historical Argument in the Henrician Reformation" (Cambridge PhD thesis 1977), pp 222ff.

[21] Bale, *Image*, pp 503, 562/3, & *Pageant of Popes*, ed. JS, STC 1304 (1574), f 23; Firth, *Apocalyptic Tradition*, pp 48/9. Bale impugned the historicity of the Donation as such, but kept the essential feature of a temporal endowment of the Church. Tyndale did not believe in it either - *Practice of Prelates*, pp 279/80. It only demonstrated, Matthew Sutcliffe maintained, Rome's readiness to employ falsehood for purposes of "latrocinium" (a neat reversal of the latter term's use by papalist Augustinians against insubordinate monarchies) - *De Pontifice Romano*, STC 23457 (1599), pp 429/31.

[22] AH Williams, *Scottish National Consciousness in the Age of James VI: the Apocalypse, the Union & the Shaping of Scotland's Public Culture* (Edinburgh 1979), pp 22/4, 154/7; RG Clouse, "John Napier & Apocalyptic Thought", *16 CJ* 5 (1974), pp 110/1.

written by Papistical (if anti-papalist) foreigners. François Hotman on the other hand denied the Donation but denounced papal shamelessness in still republishing it (even under Gregory XIII).[23]

The Dantean dilemma between different views of Constantine himself survived in association with the Donation problem. Foxe still insisted that Constantine was "meek and religious", "a spectacle to all princes to follow", despite the "poison in the Church" view.[24] Elizabeth's status as "the new Constantine" complicated matters.[25] Once she was dead,

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[23] Hotman, *The Brutish Thunderbolt or Rather Feeble Fierflash of Pope Sixtus the Fift against Henrie King of Navarre* (*Brutum Fulmen*), tr. Christopher Featherstone, STC 13843.5 (1586), pp 173ff, 196/9; cf 290/1, undermining Boniface VIII's proceedings against Philippe IV by founding them on the Donation. Cf Bullinger, *Confutation of the Pope's Bull*, tr. Arthur Golding, STC 4044 (1572), ff 19-20; *Hundred Sermons*, sigs A8-B: prin. in Bauckham, *Tudor Apocalypse*, pp 307/10; *Decades*, tr. HI, STC 4056 (1577), ed. T Harding (PS 1849/52), IV. 123/5; Alberico Gentili, "De Papatu Romano Antichristo Assertiones" (1582/5): Bod. D'Orville MS 607, ff 6-9r.

[24] Foxe, *A & M*, ed. Pratt, I. 291/2, 298; cf FA Yates, *Astraea: the Imperial Theme in the Sixteenth Century* (2nd edn, 1985), pp 42/3. Presbyterians did not however necessarily have anything good to say for Constantine - GJR Parry, *A Protestant Vision: William Harrison & the Reformation of Elizabethan England* (Cambridge 1987), pp 235/6.

[25] Michael Reniger expatiated on the comparison, especially since Constantine faced Licinius, a pagan Devil-worshipper, and he was convinced that the Catholic opposition to Elizabeth was under the direct influence of Satanic forces. The polarity between David and Saul (because of the latter's resort to the Witch of Endor) also fitted this picture. *A Treatise conteining two Partes - an Exhortation to true Loyaltie to Her Majestie: & a Treatise against Treasons, Rebellions & suchlike Disloyalties*, STC 20888 (1587), sigs D5-E3, cf A3v, N6v; *De Pii V & Gregorii XIII... Furoribus contra... Elizabetham*, STC 20886 (1582), sig ***5. On witchcraft, cf Laurence Humphrey, *View of the Romish Hydra & Monster, Traison against the Lord's Annointed*, STC 13966 (Oxford 1588), sig *5v: "As he [the Pope] wil co[n]secrat, so hee can inchaunt..."

apocalyptic commentators like Forbes and Brightman were freed to take further Napier's rehabilitation of the Donation's historicity, and to convict the donor of criminal negligence. Brightman's view was that "the Beast was borne together with Constantine." Thence could run concurrently the periods of 1000 years (of covert working, until the revelation of the Beast with two horns, in the shape of Boniface VIII's claim to the two swords) and 1260 years (until the Beast's overthrow in Britain).[26] The identification of Boniface VIII as the two-horned Beast was natural enough for those most concerned with the Donation, inclined to date the Millenium from it.

There could at least be general agreement on the crimes of Pope Boniface III, receiving in 607 a confirmatory cession of the Eastern Empire's authority in Italy from the (usurping) Emperor Phocas, and also adopting the title of Universal Bishop, which Gregory I had described as an Antichristian pretension. It was worth admitting Gregory's authority if only to use this papal pronouncement against the Papacy, and innumerable Protestants did so. "The defection hath continued openly to be seen of all men from the time of Phocas."[27] Following Jewel, with his "five or six

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[26] Firth, *Apocalyptic Tradition*, pp 145, 169; Williams, *Scottish National Consciousness*, p 95; Bauckham, *Tudor Apocalypse*, pp 222/4; Olsen, *Foxe & the Elizabethan Church*, pp 71/7; on Boniface VIII, cf Bullinger, *Confutation of the Pope's Bull*, ff 37/8; Foxe, *A & M*, ed. Pratt, I. 6-7, 25. Hooper ascribed the two swords innovation to "that monster Gregory VII", implying 1000 years starting with Revelation itself (perfectly possible): *Exposition of the 23rd Psalm*, STC 13743 (2nd edn, 1580), in *Later Writings*, ed. C Nevison (PS 1852), pp 239-40.

[27] Thomas Tymme, *The Figure of Antichrist with the Tokens of the End of the*

hundred years" of sound religion, many set the borderline of probity between Gregory and Boniface III.[28] But so pretentious a Pope as Gregory was himself suspect. Whitaker allowed only: "Gregory the Great was the last good and first ill Bishop of Rome. He was no better than he should be, and all that succeeded him were starke nought."[29]

Phocas and Boniface were (nearly) contemporary with the opening of Satan's second (Islamic) front (representing the second horn of the Beast, if both were not assigned to Boniface VIII), and the seventh-century dates tantalisingly recalled the Number of the Beast - though accurate correspondence required bizarre

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World, STC 24417 (1586), sig F6v; cf Leonard Wright, *The Hunting of Antichrist with a Caveat to the Contentious*, STC 21603 (1589), p 2; Bauckham, *Tudor Apocalypse*, pp 102/4, & "Career & Thought of Fulke", p 242; M Murrin, "Revelation & two Seventeenth-Century Commentators", in CA Patrides & J Wittreich, *The Apocalypse in English Renaissance Thought & Literature* (Manchester 1984), p 132; CH & G Williams, *Reformation Views of Church History* (1970), pp 27ff, etc. Also, repeatedly, Hotman, *Brutish Thunderbolt*, pp 77, 194, 257/8; at length, Hooper's *Exposition of the 23rd Psalm*, in *Later Writings*, PS, pp 234/6; Bullinger, *Confutation of the Pope's Bull*, ff 34v/6; George Ackworth, *De Visibili Romarchia*, STC 99 (1573), pp 27/8; Whitaker, *Ad Sanderi Demonstrationes... Responsio*, p 88; Gentili, "De Papatu Romano Antichristo": Bod. D'Orville MS 607, ff 25/6, 30, 83, etc. Earlier: Bernardino Ochino, tr. John Ponet, *A Tragedie or Dialoge of the Unjuste Usurped Primacie of the Bishop of Rome*, STC 18770 (1549), sigs C2-D. Cf PC's instructions for refutation of Campion, 1581, on the pernicious innovations of Phocas, "the traytor and the murderer of his lorde": Petyt MS 538/47, f 18r.

[28] Jewel, *Copy of a Sermon Preached at Paul's Cross*("the Challenge") (1559), in *Works*, PS, I. 5; cf Bilson, *True Difference*, pp 11-13; J Booty, *John Jewel as Apologist of the Church of England* (1963), pp 29-32, 131ff; Olsen, *Foxe & the Elizabethan Church*, pp 67/9.

[29] *Answere to the Ten Reasons*, p 177. In 1581, the Privy Council ordered several divines to refute Campion referring to the apostles and "*iiii* C yeres after, when doctrine & religion were moste pure": Petyt MS 538/47, f 18r.

contortions.[30]

However, most important of all during Elizabeth's reign was the old Lollard theory that Satan had been bound by Christ, and loosed about the year 1000. Bale adopted this view, after an initially futurist view of the Millenium, and (also in the Lollard tradition) identified the looser as Pope Sylvester II, long supposed a necromancer.[31] Apart from the fact that he had been Pope in the year 1000, Sylvester's importance was rather artificial. There had long been a feeling that Gregory VII (also now made a necromancer, in a divergence from the usual source Platina) would be a more satisfactory looser of the Beast, rather than merely

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[30] Bale, *Image*, pp 319, 562/3; Andreas Osiander, *Conjectures of the Ende of the Worlde*, tr. G Joye, STC 18877 (Antwerp 1548), sig B6; Hugh Broughton, *Concent of Scripture*, STC 3951 (2nd edn, 1590), sig H3r; cf Firth, *Apocalyptic Tradition*, pp 166/9, 209 for Brightman's & Alsted's consideration of this possibility additional to their main themes. Cf Tyndale, *Practice of Prelates*, pp 257ff; Reniger, *Exhortation to true Loyaltie*, sigs D8-E. Bale found that Boniface III came 666 years after Pompey's conquest of Judaea, while Archbishop Theodore came to England from Rome in AD 666 (actually 668): *Pageant of Popes*, f 37; cf LP Fairfield, *John Bale: Mythmaker for the English Reformation* (West Lafayette, Ind. 1976), pp 95, 204. An anonymous commentator added Catiline's conspiracy, though the latter's relation to the Book of Revelation was obscure: Bod. Rawl. MS 1349, f 44. Alberico Gentili wrestled desperately with the number 666. He concluded after repeated deletions that, if Boniface III had not obtained his grant in 666 AD, Benedict II had got it confirmed then; that Pepin took the throne 666 years after Revelation; and that King Alfred had accepted papal suzerainty 666 years before Henry VIII threw it off -"De Papatu Romano Antichristo": D'Orville MS 607, ff 84v/5r. Cf Parry, *Protestant Vision*, pp 72/4, 108.

[31] Bauckham, *Tudor Apocalypse*, pp 27/8, 32, 216; Firth, *Apocalyptic Tradition*, pp 43, 47, 51/2; cf Parry, *Protestant Vision*, pp 70, 173.. According to Robert Barnes, Bale's predecessor as defamatory papal biographer, Sylvester "gave himself entirely to Satan" - *De Vitis Pontificum Romanorum*, ed. (with Bale's *Vitae Pontificum*) Johannes Martinus Lydius (Leiden 1615), pp 149/51; cf Horne, *Answere Made*, ff 69-75.

supporting Sylvester.[32] In order to stretch the 1000 years to him, some felt compelled to start the clock at the definitive end of the Old Law, Titus' destruction of the Temple of Jerusalem in AD 79.[33] The drawback to this was that it was really the coming of Christ which had ended the Old Law.

Foxe, like Bale, changed his mind about the Millenium. Initially, he followed Bale's late view, of Christ having bound Satan until 1000 (or possibly 1033). "The Church and See of Rome was not altogether void and clear from all corruption, during the whole time of the first thousand years after Christ." After Phocas and Boniface however, there was a particular "declining time"; by Gregory VII's time, "both doctrine and sincerity of life were utterly, almost, extinguished." Another necromancer, Gregory "presumed to occupy both regiments, to challenge all the whole dominion of the West, yea and to encroach all power to himself alone... derogating from others and arrogating to himself their due right and honour, setting at light Caesars, Kings and Emperors, as who thus reigned by his own God-a-Mercy." However, Foxe later

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[32] Platina, ed. Patavinus, pp 163/4, 180/2. For Gregorian elaborations, cf Foxe, *A & M*, ed. Pratt, I. 94/5, 121; Reniger, *Treatise conteining two Partes*, sigs Ev, J4/6r; Edward Dering, *A Sparing Restraint of Many Lavishe Untruthes... in M. Harding's Epistle & Rejoinder*, STC 6725 (1568), p 27; Jewel, *Defence, Works*, III. 345/6 & Harding's *Detection of Sundrie Foule Errours, Lies, Sclaunders, Corruptions & other False Dealinges... by M. Jewel*, STC 12763 (Louvain 1568 / ERL 202), ff 256/7; Anon, *A Spectacle for a Blinde Papist*, STC 23030 (1582), sigs A8v-Bv; Williams, *Scottish National Consciousness*,ch 1, n 167.

[33] Bale, *Pageant of Popes*, f 83r; cf Bernard Garter, *A New Yeare's Gifte Dedicated to His Holinesse*, STC 11629 (1579), sig D4; Murrin, "Revelation & two Seventeenth-Century Commentators", p 132.

came to consider the Millenium as the period during which the Mystery of Iniquity had remained unidentified, and the True Church underground. Constantine, "bridling and snaffling the power of the old serpent", and forcing him to more subtle methods than Diocletian's persecution, had inaugurated this period, concluding in 1324 (not quite the age of Wyclif, but the year of the *Defensor Pacis*). These two views coexisted uneasily in his later career.[34]

If it was Gregory VII who loosed the Beast, this was confirmed by his claim to depose princes. Stress on the novelty of this was more important than to antedate the onset of corruption. Bilson declared: "The Popes' censuring and depriving princes of their crownes, I shew to be nothing else but a wicked and un-Christian pride & contumelie *not long since* devised by Antichrist to frustrate the Word and ordinance of Almighty God and to make himself great." There was "neither Scripture, Councell nor Father for a thousande yeares that ever allowed, mentioned or imagined anie power in Popes to depose princes"; until 1000, "Antichrist neither was nor durst be so bold". When Gregory VII opposed Henry IV however, "the Mysterie of Iniquitie sheweth itselfe."[35]

François Hotman put it further back, writing in 1585: "the Papacie *for the space of these four hundred yeers* hath so proudly

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[34] Foxe, *A & M*, ed. Pratt, I. 4-5; II. 117. Cf, on the superimposed theories in the later edns, Olsen, *Foxe & the Elizabethan Church*, pp 54ff, 67ff.

[35] Bilson, *True Difference*. sigs ar, A5v, A8r (To the Christian Reader), p 434, cf pp 313/4, 368, 408, 422, 488, 509, & 399-400 for an inadvertent lapse into the 600-year scheme. Also Sutcliffe, *De Pontefice Romano*, p 407.

contemned all, both Emperors & Kings, and potentates of Europe, that it accounted them not only vassals and feudataries, but also most base bondslaves," and showed "an envious mind to overthrow the state of all commonwealths that are in Christendome."[36]

Childeric III remained a problem. Jewel preferred to use him as a genuine example of the Papacy's appalling post-Phocian pretensions; and Ackworth described it as underwriting Pepin's "perfidiam et latrociniu[m]".[37] Later Elizabethan Protestants however tended to prefer Hotman's claim that Childeric's deposition was a constitutional popular initiative; to neutralise Zacharias, they were willing to flirt with doctrines as dangerous in their way as the papal deposing power (as Persons and the French Catholic *Ligueurs* were to show, even without the help of

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[36] *Brutish Thunderbolt*, pp 113, 144, cf 299-300; on bondslaves, cf ch 1, n Cf Beale to Burghley, 1595: BL Add. (Yelv.) MS 48101, f 318; Dr Hammond's notes on excommunication of princes (1590s ?): Bod. Rawl. MS D1344, f 7; John Bishop, *A Courteous Conference with the English Catholickes Romane*, STC 3092 (1598), pp 35-40.

[37] Jewel, *Apology*, *Works*, PS, III. 75/6; *Defence*, III. 172; Ackworth, *De Visibili Romarchia*, p 29. Cf Horne, *Answere Made*, ff 57/8; John Bridges, *the Supremacie of Christian Princes*, STC 3737 (1573), pp 74, 931; John Kettridge, *Two Godlie & Learned Sermons*, STC 14921 (1581), ff 17v-18r; Sir William Harbert's draft refutation of Campion's *Decem Rationes* (1581): BL Lans. MS 97, f 125v; Humphrey, *View of the Romish Hydra*, sig *4; Bishop, *Courteous Conference*, pp 32/3. Tyndale, *Practice of Prelates*, pp 260/1, also stressed Zacharias' substantive intervention, beginning an eight-hundred year period in which the Papacy, he said, had started wars that slew four million Christians. Bale, *Pageant of Popes*, f 48: Zacharias "was the firste that attempted to release the subjectes of their allegeance, taking upon him the power of God after a sort". By James I's reign, royalist opposition to any deposition was so strong that Pepin had to be denounced unequivocally for usurpation, though this might destabilise eight centuries of French history - John Hayward, *Answere to the First Part of... [Persons'] Conference*, STC 12988 (1603), sig J2.

Protestant extremists). Archdeacon Reniger of Winchester hedged his bets in his first book (like many Carolingian sources) by describing Pepin's accession with the Pope's "gratia & authoritate interposita"; and Bilson said Zacharias "might make a packe for the deposition of Childerike, but his keyes were then of no such power as to depose princes".[38] The ghost of Childeric was again invoked in the French Wars of Religion, when Navarre's propaganda accused the Guises of founding a claim to the French throne (six hundred years late) on the grounds of an irrevocable papal settlement of the title in the Carolingian line. This was echoed in England.[39]

Gregory VII's employment of precedents before Childeric was strained enough for them to be easy to dismiss. The most popular case was St Ambrose and the Emperor Theodosius. Ambrose, being early enough to be sound, was generally considered - using "admonishment" without political implications - to have shown how a prince should be censured.[40] He was, Robert Barnes

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[38] Dr Hammond and Gentili denied Childeric's deposition by the Pope, citing Hotman's *Franco-Gallia*- Bod. Rawl. MS D1344, f 5; D'Orville MS 607, ff 6v-7r. Cf. pre-Hotman, Barnes' *De Vitis Pontificum*, ed. Lydius, pp 82/3; also Reniger, *De Pii V & Gregorii XIII... Furoribus*, f 5r; Bilson, *True Difference*, p 418.

[39] *The Whole & True Discourse of the Enterprises & Secret Conspiracies... against... Henry de Valois* (1589), in *Harl. Misc.* IV. 230.

[40] Eg Edwin Sandys, *Sermons*, STC 21713 (1585), ed. J Ayre (PS 1842), p 72; Thomas Becon's *Certayne Articles of Christen Religion*, ed. Ayre in *Prayers & other Pieces* (PS 1844), pp 478/80; Sutcliffe, *De Pontefice Romano*, pp 396, 403; Dr Hammond's notes on excommunication of princes: Bod. Rawl. MS D1344, ff 3-7. Hammond however did believe there was, *ipso facto*, no obligation to obey an excommunicate prince - he could only advise restraint when "it maie prove fruitles or drawe wt. it apparant and inevitable daunger" (f 2), and that sentence could not be entrusted to a foreigner (f 9). Archbishop Grindal's assumption of Ambrose's

wrote sarcastically, "a simple foole & knew not what the liberties of the Church ment", because he did not take the opportunity to depose an Emperor. Jesuits, Bilson added, sought to "make S. Ambrose a sturdie rebell."[41] In fact, many Elizabethan Catholic commentaries on Ambrose were barely distinguishable from the Protestant. Not being a Pope, he was peripheral to the issue.[42]

Another variant on the Gregorian theory put the innovation back one pontificate, to Alexander II's support for William the Conqueror. Tyndale concluded: "the Pope preacheth forgiveness of sins to all that will slay their brethren, bought with Christ's Blood, to subdue them unto his tyranny... Neither should Duke William have been able to conquer the land at that time, except the spirituality had wrought on his side. What blood did that Conquest cost England." This flattered English self-importance; but even Hotman recalled it in one of his books published in England.[43]

Criticism of the Norman Conquest could however impugn the English political order of centuries. If more respectable in the

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admonitory mantle was not however taken well by Elizabeth - P Collinson, "If Constantine, then also Theodosius: St Ambrose & the Integrity of the Elizabethan *Ecclesia Anglicana*", *JEH* 30 (1979), pp 205/29; *The Religion of Protestants* (Cambridge 1982), pp 10, 24-34.

[41] Barnes' *Supplycacion unto Henry VIII*, in *The Whole Workes of W. Tyndall, J Frith & Doct. Barnes*, ed. Foxe, STC 24436 (1573), p 190; Bilson, *True Difference*, p 373; cf 173/8; Bridges, *Supremacie of Christian Princes*, p 1077.

[42] Eg Bod. Tanner MS 302, ff 1-13; Persons, *Temperate Wardword*, p 23.

[43] Tyndale, *Practice of Prelates*, p 294 (the Conquest was allegedly revenge for the exile of archbishop Robert of Jumieges); Hotman, *Brutish Thunderbolt*,pp 128/30; cf 299-300, though that accidentally says Alexander excommunicated William rather than Harold.

seventeenth century, for the moment this was more suited to writers of subversive tendencies, such indeed as Tyndale and Hotman. It was safer to concentrate, at least for England, on less successful instances. The ideal compromise was a major threat that nonetheless suffered a semi-miraculous foil.

Perhaps the most determined argument of providential approval for his side, shown in the fortunes of history, was advanced by Reniger, a writer who is an interesting archetype, though virtually ignored at the time and since.[44] He noted that the Emperor Henry IV, excommunicated by Gregory VII and Urban II, "sawe the corses of two of the foresaid Popes, notwithstanding their curses"; and, switching without preamble to the cases of Elizabeth, Pius V and Gregory XIII, that "two of the cursing Popes already have had their pasportes, and Her Majestie liveth and reigneth."[45] Indeed, Reniger actively exaggerated the successes of embattled secular monarchies in God's actuarial table. He had Frederick Barbarossa "cursed" not only by Alexander III (as was the case) but by Adrian IV, Lucius III and Urban III so that he could outlive them all;[46] and Frederick II by Honorius III as well as by

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[44] Neither *De Pii V & Gregorii XIII... Furoribus* nor *A Treatise conteining two Partes* was reprinted.

[45] *Treatise against Treasons*, sigs H5/7r, cf K4r, N6r. Even Louis IV, not the most inspiring example, outlived two papal opponents (sig J). Cf Humphrey, *View of the Romish Hydra*, pp 146/7.

[46] For the story of Adrian IV being bribed by Sicily to excommunicate Barbarossa, also Barnes' *De Vitis Pontificum*, ed. Lydius, pp 250/1; Bale, *Pageant of Popes*, f 97r; Bilson, *True Difference*, pp 446/9; Harbert's refutation of *Decem Rationes*: BL Lans. MS 97, f 125v. Cf Humphrey, *View of the Romish Hydra*, p 95.

Gregory IX and Innocent IV.[47]

The manner of demise was also significant. Of Reniger's supernumerary adversaries for Barbarossa, he had Adrian IV choked to death by a flea, and "Turbanus" III also dying suddenly. He stressed the "miserable" death of Gregory VII, harried from Rome to die in self-confessed exile, and of Boniface VIII, coming in like a fox, ruling like a lion and dying like a dog, as indeed had their foes immediately after the event.[48] The Emperor Henry V, he remarked alliteratively, successfully expelled from Rome Pope Paschal II, "puffed up in pride and pompe above the principalities and powers of the earth." He also made much of the end of Gregory VII's anti-king Rudolf of Rheinfelden, his perjury avenged by Providence when his right hand was severed in battle.[49]

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[47] *Treatise against Treasons*, sigs H5v-Jv, N5v/6r. Innocent IV of course outlived Frederick II, but the myth that the latter had been poisoned by his bastard son Manfred made the papal triumph depend on treachery among the Ghibellines. Cf Bale, *Pageant of Popes*, ff 108/9; Bullinger, *Confutation of the Pope's Bull*, f 77; Hotman, *Brutish Thunderbolt*, pp 299-300; Bilson, *True Difference*, pp 468/9 .

[48] *Exhortation to true Loyaltie*, sig B6v; *Treatise against Treasons*, sigs H5, K5/6, L3/5; cf *De Pii V & Gregorii XIII... Furoribus*, sigs **3v/4r. Cf Humphrey, *View of the Romish Hydra*, pp 96, 124; Thomas Morton, *An Exact Discoverie of the Romish Doctrine in the Case of Conspiracie & Rebellion*, STC 18184 (1605), p 29.

[49] *Treatise against Treasons*, sigs K5/6r; cf *De Pii V & Gregorii XIII... Furoribus*, ff 18-20. Henry V was an equivocal figure, due to his earlier papally-supported rebellion against his father; his own troubles appeared as a judgement upon him. Cf Foxe, *A & M*, ed. Pratt, II. 133 on Rudolf's hand; 129 concerned to implicate Gregory, as well as his legates, in Rudolf's election as anti-king, despite Canossa - following Barnes' *De Vitis Pontificum*, ed. Lydius, pp 190, 182/3; Bale (*Pageant of Popes*, f 84); & Hooper's *Exposition of the 23rd Psalm*, in *Later Writings*, PS, p 239 (rather than Joannes Aventinus Thurmair, *Annali Boiorum Libri VII* (Ingolstadt 1554), pp 576/80). Also Bullinger, *Confutation of the Pope's Bull*, ff 71/2 (with a story of Gregory VII praying that God would strike him at the altar if he were not in the right - which God promptly did), cf 75v (on

The Medieval Empire: the Ultimate Warning

There was dispute among Protestants as to whether to regard the Holy Roman Empire as genuinely Roman, if not Holy, or as purely German. The Melanchthonite tendency was to the first alternative, a view which could seem to legitimise papal theories of the *Translatio Imperii,* and also undermined a usual condition, based on Daniel's vision, for the revelation of Antichrist (the end of the Roman Empire).[50] Others however saw this as a dubious German pretension designed to claim universal monarchy. Luther himself anticipated Hobbes: "The tyrannye of the Pope dyd begynne after that Imperye of Rome began to decay.... and is sucedyd and entered in the stede of the Imperye." Bullinger wrote that "the Bishop of Rome was not ashamed in strange wise to vex, trouble, excommunicate, depose and to substitute others in their place and to stir up wars in many realms at once and to set them together by the ears.... *and he himself at length took upon him the Empire* and... boasted himself to be the monarch or sole ruler of the world"; Fulke that, of the Empire, "little besides a name remaineth at this

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Rudolf's replacement, Hermann of Salm, dying like Abimelech, "by a stone that a silie woman cast downe from the wall"); Bilson, *True Difference,* pp 440ff; Humphrey, *View of the Romish Hydra,* pp 84ff; William Lightfoot, *The Complaint of England,* STC 15595 (1587), sigs F2v/3r.

50 Sleidan, *A Briefe Chronicle of the Foure Principall Empyres,* tr. S Wythers, STC 19849 (1536), ff 102/4; *Carion's Chronicle,* tr. G Lynne, STC 4626 (1550), f 7; Francis Lambert, *Exegesos im Apocalypsim* (Basle 1539), in Bauckham, *Tudor Apocalypse,*App. 2, p 261.

day, the Pope claiming authority of both the swords."[51]

Protestant support for the Western Empire was general, despite certain problems. The equivocal reputations of some Emperors could be dismissed as Popish propaganda. According to Foxe, in Henry IV "some vice might perchance be noted, yet none such wherefore any prelate or minister of Christ ought to excite his subjects to rebellion against public authority by God appointed." Frederick II had his faults, but he had also been grossly libelled, and Foxe considered him to be one of God's Elect (his anti-heresy laws of Melfi were not mentioned), ambitiously enlarging his persecuted "remnant."[52]

Horne praised, besides Philippe IV of France (who, having won his propaganda battle, had a posthumous reputation for piety unaffected by any of the unpleasantness with which he had been associated), Henry IV, first western victim of "the seditious, traiterous and tragicall feates and practises of the Pope against the Emperour" - and also Frederick II, "out of doubt another Charles the Great and without all controversie most profitable for

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[51] Luther, *Revelation of Antichrist*, tr. R Brightwell (=John Frith), STC 11394 (Antwerp 1529), f 13v, quoted by Firth, *Apocalyptic Tradition*, p 28, cf p 37 for the views of Calvin; Bullinger, *Hundred Sermons*, sig A8r, App. 6 in Bauckham, *Tudor Apocalypse*, p 308, cf p 120; Fulke, *A Discovery of the Dangerous Rock of the Popish Church by Nicholas Sanders*, STC 11449 (1580), ed. R Gibbings (PS 1848), p 368; cf *Preelections*, ff 83/7, 114/5; cf Koebner, "'Imperial Crown of this Realm'", p 33n. Also Bale's *Image*, pp 387/99; Williams, *Scottish National Consciousness*, pp 10, 25; Barrow (not perhaps a comfortable supporter for the orthodox), quoted by C Hill, *Antichrist in Seventeenth-Century England* (Oxford 1971), p 18; Bilson, *True Difference*, p 415.

[52] Foxe, *A & M*, ed. Pratt, II. 154/5, 505.

the Christian commonwealth" and Louis IV[53], both of whom Jewel, perhaps because of their more equivocal reputation, ignored. Horne often became so involved in his efforts to demonstrate princely authority at work in all spheres of Church affairs even in the Papacy's greatest era (a period which was normatively valueless, according to the six hundred year rule) and to justify the rulers who thus clashed with the Papacy, that he forgot that they, as much as the Popes, were propagating "superstitious" doctrines. Lay rights rather than reformed theology were what he was really trying to validate.

Both the later Eastern Empire and the *Translatio Imperii* presented however greater difficulties. At its baldest, the complete fall of the Eastern Empire indicated a loss of divine support some time after the generally lauded Constantine. The extent to which the Eastern Church was a pure Church, and the Empire a godly monarchy, was vexed. Jewel preferred the Greek to the Roman Church; the former had a tradition of domination by secular authority, and, though they "have many things corrupted among them, yet they still hold a great number of things which they received from the apostles." Foxe inclined to agree.[54] It

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[53] Horne, *Answere Made*, ff 72v-81r. The comment on Frederick is a trn. from a popular source on papal-imperial conflicts: Aventinus, *Annali Boiorum*, pp 670/1. Cf Burghley's "Antidote to Jesuitism", justifying "that excellent Emperor" Frederick II for using Saracens to fight the Pope: Petyt MS 538/37, f 175r.

[54] Jewel, *Apology*, *Works*, III. 90/1; also *Defence*, III. 190; IV. 667; cf Foxe, *A & M*, ed. Pratt, II. 150/1; Hooper's *Exposition of the 23rd Psalm*, in *Later Writings*, PS, pp 232/3; Whitaker, *Answere to the Ten Reasons*, p 172.

could be claimed that papal machinations had weakened Constantinople and betrayed it to Islam; but it was unclear whether it was desirable for these to appear so effective. The fall of the "Roman" Empire in the East might also refute the Catholic contention that there could be no Antichrist while the Western Empire still stood. The question was however so difficult that many preferred simply to deny the medieval Antichrist Legend.

It was perhaps convenient that Pope Gregory III had broken with the Emperor Leo III over the latter's iconoclasm; the latter could therefore enjoy general Protestant support. It was less convenient that Charlemagne's coronation had been justified by Pope Leo III on the grounds of the Eastern Empire's usurpation by Irene. *Prima facie*, it might seem best for Protestants to reject the *Translatio Imperii* as a typically presumptuous papal abuse of authority; but there was a risk of this imperilling the legal status of the Western Empire.[55] Moreover, even Rome thought Irene went too far in rejecting iconoclasm - to near idolatry rather than iconodulism, or acceptable "veneration" of images - and she was not therefore a comfortable figure for Protestants. But no more, under Elizabeth, was it comfortable to accept the traditional stigmatisation of Irene as a heretical usurper, usually a pretext for criticism of female government in general.[56]

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[55] As Harding pointed out: *Confutation*, f 8r. Bilson ascribed the *Divisio Imperii* (not *Translatio*), like Childeric's deposition, to "the publike decree of the state", not papal action - *True Difference*, pp 412ff.

[56] Eg Harding, *Confutation*, f 181r; cf f 17r for a quibble that Protestant claims to have converted many kings were inaccurate because they included queens; this

Reniger's solution to the *Translatio Imperii* problem was to relocate it in time, affiliating it to Gregory III's rejection of Leo the Iconoclast's authority in Italy, so that the Pope could be unequivocally denounced for "preferring dead images before the Emperor... the livelie image of God" and for "feathering his nest out of the Empire, and by the fal therof mou[n]ting himself in Italie". He ignored his attitude's implications for the Western Empire, and did not mention the troublesome Irene at all. He also contradicted even himself, first saying Pope Gregory "so weakened the Empire of Consta[n]tinople that it became a pray to Turkes and Infidels", and then insisting the real cause was "divine judgement for the sinnes of the Emperors stirryng up princes and people against them, and that the Bishop of Rome doth but take it on, as if hee by cursinges did cut of Emperors & Princes from their estates, and carved out kingdomes at his pleasure".[57]

Reniger's confusion was because he was barely catching up with the polemical times. Broadly, before 1570 - perhaps to encourage Protestant readiness for the censure expected but not yet manifest - the stress was on the devastating effect (especially on both Eastern and Western Empires) of papal

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despite his strictures against Knox and Goodman for impugning the regiment of women. Horne, *Answere Made*, f 56r, used Irene as an example of Supreme Governor of the Church, "although but an ignoraunt and very superstitious woman; I will say no more". Cf Bilson, *True Difference*, pp 547/50: & Harrison, even more anti-Irene: Parry, *Protestant Vision*, p 237.

[57] *Treatise against Treasons*, sigs K2/3. Cf Tyndale, *Practice of Prelates*, pp 262/3; Sutcliffe, *De Pontefice Romano*, p 403.

depositions and general secular meddling, that, as Jewel put it, the Pope "to feed his ambition and greediness of rule... hath pulled in pieces the Empire of Rome, and vexed and rent whole Christendom asunder".[58] After 1570 it began to be more on the providential defeat of Rome's Antichristian and unnatural attempts. Presumably, the need for alertness having been adequately demonstrated, encouragement was now more important.

Jewel himself shifted his ground to proclaim two decades later:

> "The Pope stirreth and striveth at this day all that he can. He excommunicateth and curseth; he sendeth out his Bulls; he bloweth up seditions; he breedeth treasons; he raiseth subjects against their princes... But all in vain... The Man of Sin and his errors are revealed... The people forsake him over and over the world."[59]

This heartening aim may appear from the rare occurrence, in the *corpus* of historical examples of the papal deposing power in Protestant use, of the majority of those in which it had actually worked, *viz.* the Neapolitan cases. There was however another reason for this. Joanna I, the alleged accomplice of her husband's killers, was early recognised as an excellent type for Mary Stewart. When mentioned, therefore, it had to appear that she deserved death. Even Conradin, hereditary heir of the Staufen, appeared rather as the independent prince (like Mary), not subject to King Charles' (Elizabeth's) ordinary jurisdiction whom the latter, having in his power, nonetheless had a right to execute if

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[58] Jewel, *Apology*, *Works*, PS, III. 75/6.

[59] *Ibid.* II. 920: *Exposition upon Second Thessalonians*, STC 14603 (1583).

necessary for the security of the nation (or his own).[60]

The Clerk of the Privy Council, Robert Beale, undertaking some historical researches for Burghley in 1595, achieved a fine balance writing on medieval Emperors' excommunications, "which they all made little accompt of, allthough the said excommunicacons were a cause of greate mischiefes and divisions in the Empire."[61] In print, he might not have stressed the latter point so much at this date. But Beale did manage to stress the existence of a sufficiently anti-papal (and maybe even Protestant) pedigree among royalty as well as lowly sectarians.

Bilson too sought a modified balance. "Howso by warres, conspiracies and treasons hee {the Pope} tyred some of them {Kings}, (God giving princes for the neglect of His trueth and the number of their sinnes into the handes and power of Antichrist), yet others bridled and kirbed your Holy Father himself in such sort that he had small joy of his enterprise." Papal successes were often due only to "the dissension & ambitio[n] of princes" like Ferdinand of Spain, conqueror of Navarre - "when he could devise no better title he took hold of the Pope's Bul, colouring his injurious ambitio[n] with sembla[n]ce of Romish devotion."[62]

Near the end of Elizabeth's reign, the bridling of the Pope

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[60] Eg petition against Mary, 26th May 1572: TE Hartley, *Proceedings in the Parliaments of Elizabeth I 1559-81* (Leicester 1981), pp 287, 290. But cf, in Ghibelline tradition, Bale, *Pageant of Popes*, f 119v; Bridges, *Supremacie of Christian Princes*, pp 74/5; Bishop, *Courteous Conference*, p 42; list of papally-approved assassinations: BL Lans. MS 94, f 194.

[61] Beale: BL Add. (Yelv.) MS 48101, f 319.

[62] *True Difference*, pp 368, 478, 482.

(notably by the Gallican Church) was stressed more. "All good and pious citizens always detested the Papists' madness against Kings and Emperors." "These madde Bulles [of deposition] have killed many and hurt more of the Pope's friendes and favorers, but not done one half-pennyworth of harme unto them against whome they were sent." An Appellant Catholic agreed: "There was never yet Pope that did excommunicate any king or soveraigne prince but that afterward he sawe cause... to repent him of it."[63]

It is not clear that self-confidence (even reinforced by bluster) predominated until after 1588[64]; or, in some degree, until after 1587. Reniger, generally, belonged to the school of pre-Armada optimists. He seemed to rely on the Babington principle "that by divine light fro[m] Heaven, treasons against princes & plats of murders, even before the atte[m]pt & practise of them, wonderfully are discovered." It was Mary Stewart's execution that emboldened Laurence Humphrey to declare:

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[63] Sutcliffe, *De Pontefice Romano*, p 396; cf Thomas Bell, *Anatomie of Popish Tyrannie*. STC 1814 (1603), p 65. Bishop, *Courteous Conference*, pp 51/2; William Watson, *A Decacordon*. STC 25123 (1602 / ERL 197), p 260.

[64] Bauckham, *Tudor Apocalypse*,pp 129/32, 173ff; Firth, *Apocalyptic Tradition*, p 228; Lake, "Significance of Identification of Antichrist", pp 163/6; B Capp, "The Political Dimension of Apocalyptic Thought", in Patrides & Wittreich, *Apocalypse in English Renaissance Thought & Literature*, pp 97/8. Some examples: Whitaker, *Disputatio Sacrae Scripturae*. STC 25366 (1588), tr. W Fitzgerald (PS 1849), p 5; George Gifford, *A Revelation of the Revelation*, STC 11866 (1596), pp 346/7, 380/4; Arthur Dent, *The Ruine of Rome or an Exposition upon the Whole Revelation*. STC 6640 (1603), pp 211/8, 234/9, 253/6. Wiener, "Anti-Catholicism", pp 52/3, does perhaps minimise excessively optimistic tendencies after 1588. Cf, however, n 13 above for another instance conformable to her view.

> "If wee deale thus duetifully towardes God and obediently towardes our prince... no divelish witchcraft, no ruffian's dag or dagger, no invasion of forreiners, no craft or art of any enemies, no, nor that seven-headed Beast will annoy Prince, Peers or People. He can, He wil send twelve legions of Angels... It may be for our sinnes that the great ships of Tharsis may come; but upon our repe[n]tance, God will send Remoram, even a little fishe, that shall stay the shippes."[65]

Such providence was the theme of a great deal of doggerel; encouragement was the business of its writers.[66] Nonetheless, for Reniger there was always a fear that "the great and greevous sinnes of England are readie to conspire to pluck our gracious & deare mother out of the royall throne, because for the sinnes of the people God taketh away a godlie Prince and giveth them a Prince in His wrath."[67]

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[65] Reniger, *Exhortation to true Loyaltie*, sigs C4, cf A4; & *Treatise against Treasons*, sig P6v: "They that travaile with treasons are like the blind moles which walk in trenches under the earth; and yet at certain ventes and breaches of their own making, they are descried and taken". Middleton used an identical metaphor for Catholic intrigue in *A Game at Chess* (IV. iv). Cf Reniger, *De Pii V & Gregorii XIII... Furoribus*, sigs **5-7, on God's overthrow of the papal Irish expedition. Humphrey, *View of the Romish Hydra*, sigs *7v-8r.

[66] Eg R Harrington, *A Famouse Dittie of the Joyful Receaving of the Queen's Most Excellent Majestie by the Worthy Citizens of London*, STC 12798 (1584), No 52 in J Lilly, *A Collection of 79 Blackletter Ballads & Broadsides 1559-97* (1867); WM, *England's Lamentation for the Late Treasons conspired against the Queene's Majestie by Frances Throgmorton*, STC 17155.5 (1584), & Anon, *A Warning to all False Traitors by the Example of 14*, STC 25089.5 (1586; on the Babington Plot), in J Payne Collier, *Broadside Blackletter Ballads Printed in the 16th & 17th Centuries* (1868), pp 23/5, 59-61.

[67] *Exhortation to true Loyaltie*, sig E4v. The *Treatise conteining two Partes* was published in 1587, OS. The Stationers' licence for the first part was however dated 10th Dec. 1586 (E Arber, *A Transcript of the Registers of the Company of Stationers of London* (1875/94), II. 461). Thus the obvious possible prince given in God's wrath, and beneficiary of any further "plats for murders", had not yet met her doom. 1553 was a fearful precedent; cf J Shakespeare, "Plague & Punishment", in Lake & Dowling, *Protestantism & the National Church*, pp 106/10.

It was Reniger's view that "the Bishop of Rome is *the great patron and practiser* of treasons, rebellions and suchlike disloyalty against Christian princes and countries, with his adherents, followers and practisers for him and by colour of authoritie from him"; he described (succumbing to an unfortunate weakness for puns) how "feralium bullarum & bellorum immanita[te] a Pontificibus Romanis Christianum orbem depopulata est."[68] Norton, as ever the extremist, wrote:

> "The renting and destruction of the Empire, all the victories and successes of the Saracens & the Turkes agaynst Christendome, all the tearyng away of most noble and large kingdomes and provinces from the body of Christianitie, all the subduing and thrallyng of infinite Christian soules to Mahomete and the Devill, *all* the deposinges, murderynges, turmoyllinges, civile warres, debates between Christian princes, sheddinges of Christian bloud... for these VC yeares and above, are chiefly or wholly to be imputed to the treasons of Popes and Papistes..."[69]

Even the Western Empire, however, was not near enough to home.

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[68] *Treatise against Treasons*, sig H3r, cf sigs L7-M; *De Pii V & Gregorii XIII... Furoribus*, f 15. Cf H Brinkelow, *Lamentation of a Christen against the Cytie of London*, STC 3766 (3rd edn, 1548), in J Payne Collier, *Illustrations of Old English Literature* (1866), l. i, pp 30/1.

[69] *A Warning against the Dangerous Practises of the Papistes*, STC 18686 (1570), sigs D3/4; cf L2r: "Treason and Poperie are unseparable while they be kept under, even as crueltie and Poperie are unseperable when they are gotten above." Also his 1574 Instructions (as Recorder) to the Lord Mayor of London: "the heresie of Poperie... hathe been and is not onelie the damnable subverter of soules but also the universall enemye and supplanter of all just Crownes and kingedomes, and of all lawfull, civill, politic states and jurisdictions... the verie meanes of betraying Christians to the tyrannie of the Turke" - Payne Collier, *Illustrations of Old English Literature*, III. viii, p 8.

"Kinges of England", Norton continued, "have beene poisoned, whipped, beaten with roddes (Henry II), murdered, deposed..." Even the depositions and murders of Edward II and Richard II were ascribed primarily to the influence of Popish bishops.

Jewel agreed:

> "As for us, *we of all others most justly have left him.* For our Kings, yea, even they which with greatest reverence did follow and obey the authority and faith of the bishops of Rome, have long since found and felt well enough the yoke and tyranny of the Pope's kingdom. For the bishops of Rome took the crown off from the head of our King Henry II, and compelled him to put aside all majesty, and like a mere private man to come unto their legate with great submission and humility, so as all his subjects might laugh him to scorn. More than this, they caused bishops and monks, and some part of the nobility (something of an afterthought), to be in the field against our King John, and set all the people at liberty from their oath whereby they ought allegiance to their King; and at last, wickedly and most abominably, they bereaved the King not only of his kingdom but also of his life. Besides this, they excommunicated and cursed King Henry VIII the most famous Prince, and stirred up against him sometime the Emperor, sometime the French king; and, as much as in them was, put in adventure our Realm to have been a very prey and spoil. Yet were they but fools and mad, to think that either so mighty a prince could be scared with bugs and rattles; or else, that so noble and great a kingdom might so easily, even at a morsel, be devoured and swallowed up."[70]

Jewel might seem a calmer personality than Norton; but he found it necessary to postulate untraced dispensations from Pius V as explanations of the murders of Darnley and Don Carlos.[71] No poliical crime was complete without papal involvement. "This

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[70] Jewel, *Apology*, in *Works*, III. 105. Cf 75, for the charge of poisoning John.

[71] *View of a Seditious Bull* (1582), in *Works*, IV. 1157. Cf Humphrey, *View of the Romish Hydra*, sig *4v, grouping Darnley with Moray, Orange and numerous Huguenots as cases of Popish murder; & Bilson, *True Difference*, p 118. On Philip II's alleged dispensation for Carlos' death, cf Beale: BL Add. (Yelv.) MS 48101, f 322

reputed Vicar of Christ hath been the whippe of Princes, the scourge of all Christendome."[72]

Tyndale had set the trend for this view of "the Pope and his chaplains". "There is no mischief or disorder, whether it be in temporal regiment or else in spiritual, whereof they are not the chief causes, and even the very fount and springs." They had reduced Kings and Emperors to "but shadows; vain names and things idle, having nothing to do in the world but when our Holy Father needeth their help."[73]

Tyndale's view of the Catholic Church was that of a classic conspiracy theorist. "Their treason is so secret that the world cannot perceive it. They dissimule those things which they are only cause of, and simule discord among themselves when they are most agreed." He argued too that not only was Archbishop Arundel responsible for Richard II's deposition, but that prelates *must* have fomented the initial Irish rising, for no such event *could* occur "without the invisible inspiration of them that rule both in the court and also in the consciences of all men. They be one kingdom, sworn together to help one another, scattered abroad in all realms..." (like the Elders of Zion); "they can inspire privily into the breasts of the people what mischief they list, and no man knows whence it cometh" (or the subliminal advertisers ?); "their

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[72] Humphrey, *View of the Romish Hydra*, sig *2v.

[73] *Obedience of a Christian Man*, STC 24446 (Antwerp 1528), ed. H Walter (PS 1848), pp 337, 186.

letters go secretly from one to another throughout all kingdoms"; "all that be shaven are sworn together."[74]

On Richard II's Irish revolt, Sir Christopher Hatton produced a slightly more subtle syllogism - Richard is known to have passed anti-clerical laws (like *praemunire*); he suffered deposition; the latter must necessarily have been retaliation for the former.[75] Bilson produced a very similar argument on Henry II's war of 1173/4 with Louis VII (which precipitated the former's penance for Becket's murder): "What packing there was betweene the French King and the Pope, though the stories in this place do not confesse {doubtless because written by monks}, yet we may soone conjecture by the generall drift of your Holy Father & his blessed adherents in those daies."[76] Similarly, Bale, in his last unpublished work (in which, unfortunately, invective totally engulfs argument), insisted "yow Papistes were never yet true to your Prynces sens the Conqueste."[77]

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[74] *Obedience of a Christian Man*, pp 340/1, cf p 191; *Practice of Prelates*, pp 295/6, 320. Cf R Pineas, *Thomas More & Tudor Polemics* (Bloomington, Ind. 1968), pp 58-64; M Aston, "Richard II & the Wars of the Roses", in FRH Du Boulay & CM Barron, *The Reign of Richard II: Essays in Honour of M McKisack* (1971), pp 292/4. Wiener, "Anti-Catholicism", p 33, compares this view to that of modern post-colonial states; everything wrong is the fault of the discredited and foreign former authority.

[75] Commons speech, Feb. 1589: LPL MS 178, f 75v.

[76] Bilson, *True Difference*, pp 101/2.

[77] "A Retourne of James Canceller's Rayling Boke upon hys owne Heade, called *The Pathe of Obedience*" (1561): LPL MS 2001, f 19v; cf Barnes' *Supplycacion unto Henry VIII*, in his *Whole Workes*, ed. Foxe, pp 192. Bridges, *Supremacie of Christian Princes*, pp 919/20 - "If any will attempt rebellion, Popish priests, I see, are readiest", invoking "Robin Hoode's lawe or Jack Strawe's lawe."

The English Case: Keeping up with the Continent

It was usually acknowledged that St Augustine of Canterbury had reduced England to recognition of Roman supremacy. Nonetheless, many from Archbishop Parker downwards enthused over the virtues of "the Celtic Church", unfortunately suppressed by the Synod of Whitby, with the object of rendering it an autonomous foundation for the Church of England.[78] Here was reintroduced a letter, forged in John's reign, from Pope Eleutherius to the allegedly Christian King Lucius, sending him two missionaries but also expatiating on Lucius' own authority over his Church. Like so much in the controversy between Rome and its opponents, it could be used by either side. Henrician propagandists used it as a precedent for the Royal Supremacy (if, alas, dependent on the Pope's word). So did Sir Nicholas Bacon.[79] Later English churchmen however found it rather difficult to defend, though Beale still cited it to Burghley in 1595.[80]

In the 1559 Parliament, Archbishop Heath and Abbot

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[78] VJK Brook, *A Life of Archbishop Parker* (Oxford 1962), p 324; Stow's *Annales of England*, STC 23334 (1592), pp 36/7, 64/6, on pre-Augustinian Christianity, and Augustine's pride as a sign that he did not come from God; Parry, *Protestant Vision*, pp 72ff, 91/2, on William Harrison's arguments to the same effect, but with added Presbyterian vehemence.

[79] Nicholson, "Nature & Function of Historical Argument", p 183. Bacon's speech of 2nd April 1571; & in Hooker's Diary: Hartley, *Parliaments of Elizabeth 1559-81*, pp 198, 244. Cf FA Yates, *Astraea: the Imperial Theme in the Sixteenth Century* (2nd edn, 1985), p 75.

[80] Bishop Piers of Salisbury in his 1585 Theses does not refute the papalist construction: Bod. Rawl. MS C167, f 12v. Beale: BL Add. (Yelv.) MS 48101, ff 304/5; cf Bilson, *True Difference*, pp 41, 250.

Feckenham however cited Eleutherius to demonstrate the subordination of England to Rome from long before the alleged period of Celtic autonomy.[81] On the other hand, it was not hard to reject Lucius as inauthentic (since he was), and to throw all the credit for the conversion of England on to Gregory and Augustine.[82] Lucius remained however more popular than Joseph of Arimathaea, who generally provided at most a subtext, as in Dering's rather vague contention that "Augustine marred and not made our religion. It is *verie probable* that we never received our Faith from Rome but from the Eastern Church." Jewel wrote similarly (but was, if anything, vaguer still about his favoured alternative source of Christianity): "As touching this Augustine, we are not bound to all his doings... The Church in his time was grown to much corruption."[83] Horne, opposing Feckenham, turned to "superstitious" hagiolatry in an attempt to prove the exercise of the Royal Supremacy between Christ and Constantine by various

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[81] Hartley, *Parliaments of Elizabeth 1559-81*, pp 15-16, 28. Cf Allen, *Apologie & True Declaration of the Institution & Endeavours of the Two English Colleges*, STC 369 (1581 / ERL 68), pp 3-4; *Campian Englished*, pp 68-71, 182/3; Richard Broughton, *Apologeticall Epistle*, STC 3893 (1601), pp 59-67, 83/4, 107/10; Persons, *Treatise of Three Conversions*, I. 31ff, 76/9, 94/9; & *Manifestation of the Great Folly & Bad Spirit of Certain... Secular Priests*, STC 19411 (1602 / ERL 169), f 65v; Azor, *Institutes*, II. 1226.

[82] Treatise arguing reconciliation to Rome not to be treason (1590s): WCA A.VII, p 508.

[83] Dering, *Sparing Restraint*, p 29; Jewel, *Defence*, *Works*, III. 163/5. Cf, however, Camden and Cotton's dispute about the historicity of Joseph: K Sharpe, *Sir Robert Cotton 1586-1631: History & Politics in Early Modern England* (Oxford 1979), pp 31/2, 225/6.

(non-existent) Christian potentates besides Lucius; the self-contradictions he perpetrated did not encourage imitation.[84]

There was considerable Protestant agreement on the political malevolence of the Church after the Conquest, even if it was sometimes pictured as supporting assertions of royal authority against the Papacy - "the most of the clergie of this realme sett themselves against Thomas Beckett."[85] The wish to claim a tradition of autonomy for the *Ecclesia Anglicana* here conflicted with the wish to maximise polemic against papal usurpation of royal rights. Horne, the most inventive of the Royal Supremacy's defenders, compromised by declaring that "Kynges of this Realme hadde not altogeather leafte of their dealinge in Churche matters, but continued in parte their jurisdiction aboute ecclesiastical causes, although not without some trouble."[86]

Nonetheless, the death of William II as well as of John and Richard II was sometimes laid at prelatial doors.[87] The Papacy

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[84] Horne, *Answere Made*, ff 91v/5r.

[85] Piers' Theses: Bod. Rawl. MS C167, f 13r. Cf Foxe, *A & M*, ed. Pratt, II. 523/34 on Robert Grosseteste and the Pope; & J Facey, "John Foxe & the Defence of the English Church", in Lake & Dowling, *Protestantism & the National Church*, pp 176, 190.

[86] Horne, *Answere Made*, f 76v.

[87] RM, *A Newe Ballade against the Hostile Designs of the Spirituality*, STC 17147 (1560 ?), No 9 in J Lilly, *A Collection of 79 Blackletter Ballads & Broadsides 1559/97* (1867); Tyndale, *Practice of Prelates*, pp 294/5. Persons as usual was unhelpful to his own cause, by citing the fates of Edward II, Richard II and Henry VI, apparently with approval, as examples of the vindication of residual popular sovereignty against unsatisfactory kings - *Conference*, p 62. According to Lewis Evans, a recent convert from Catholicism, Lambert Simnel was "a wielie prieste" (which accounted for him so troubling Henry VII) - *The Hatefull Hypocrisie & Rebellion of the Romishe Prelacie*, STC 10591 (1570), sig E6v. Cf Cf Humphrey,

might even be blamed for precipitating the Barons' War, by absolving Henry III from his oath to the Provisions of Oxford (and Bishop Peter des Roches was certainly a very evil counsellor of his), though this had tricky anti-royalist implications.[88]

Shakespeare diverged from this pattern, since his Bishop of Carlisle and Abbot of Westminster are far more loyal to *Richard II* than is most of the lay nobility - if therefore disloyal to Henry IV; but that was always a problem with the principle that "the powers that be are of God", and Henry himself recognises "high marks of honour" in his episcopal foe. Seven succeeding history plays refuted the Parsonical contention that such depositions had prosperous outcomes.[89] Shakespeare plays down Archbishop Arundel's role compared with Holinshed; it is Northumberland, no longer joined with Arundel, who negotiates Richard's deposition, and is alone compared by him to Pilate.[90]

View of the Romish Hydra, pp 117/8.

[88] Notes on royal & papal authority (1590s ?): Petyt MS 538/38, f 115. This was a time when (f 113) "the authoritye of the Kinge was so obscured" that "subjects, destitute of succour by their naturall Prince, [were] left to a most miserable spoyle and raven of the Pope & such as it pleased him to give them in praye."

[89] The Abbot is not so distinguished. Raphael Holinshed, *Chronicles*, STC 13569 (1587), III. 514, for his motivation by fear of Henry's attitude to Church property; III. 529 for Archbishop Scrope and the Yorkshire rising against Henry - marginal note: "the Archbishop in armor"; also Stow's *Annales of England* (1592), pp 529/30; *II Henry IV*, IV.ii: Lancaster on Scrope as "an iron man", "turning the Word to Sword, and Life to Death". Cf Stow's stress on "stoute friers" (*Summarie of Englyshe Chronicles*, STC 23326, 1587, p 171; *Annales*, p 520), in a revolt against Henry that had been a lay one in his 1565 *Summarie* (STC 23319, f 132). Cf Barnes' *Supplycacion unto Henry VIII*, in his *Whole Workes*, ed. Foxe, p 188.

[90] Cf Holinshed, *Chronicles* (1587), III. 497; Foxe, *A & M*, ed. Pratt, III. 216/21; Bale's"Retourne of James Canceller's Rayling Boke": LPL MS 2001, f 19v;

Marlowe's *Edward II* is more victimised by prelates, with the Archbishop of Canterbury threatening to depose him early on (an exaggerated extremity), and the Bishop of Winchester negotiating his "abdication", but his downfall is a secular affair.[91]

Shakespeare's other history plays however reflect the post-Tyndale view to a greater extent. His Beaufort in *Henry VI* is essentially Tyndale's murderous schemer,[92] and *Henry V*'s French war is contrived by prelates (with unconvincing archiepiscopal assurances of its justice in the notorious Pharamond speech) as a diversion from clerical expropriation. *King John* is very much a Henry VIII *manqué* (even if the facile Balean anti-Catholicism of the source or bad quarto, *The Troublesome Raigne*, and Cibber's anti-Jacobite version, *Papal Tyranny in the Reign of King John*, is avoided), as in the quotation at the beginning of the chapter; or (given the disputed succession) an Elizabeth.[93] This is certainly more so than in Holinshed, who

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Jewel, *Defence*, *Works*, III. 171; Anthony Munday, *Watchwoord to Englande to Beware of Traytours*, STC 18282 (1584), f 40; Grafton's *Abridgement of English Chronicles*, STC 12152 (1570), f 97; STC 12153 (1572), ff 105v/6r. Stow, *Summarie* (1565), f 131, lacks Arundel. By the 1587 edn (p 168), he looms larger. By 1592 (*Annales*, pp 506/16), he not only negotiates Richard's "abdication" but procures Bolingbroke's recognition and produces a Bull of Indulgence for his supporters.

[91] I. iv, V. i. EMW Tillyard's comment that "the political sentiments remain impecable" in the play, followed by a warning from the Archbishop against violence offered to Edward, could be misleading - *Shakespeare's History Plays* (2nd edn, Harmondsworth 1962), p 108. Cf Stow's *Annales*, pp 340/4, which Marlowe's version closely resembles.

[92] Cf *Practice of Prelates*, pp 297ff, & *Answer to More's Dialogue*, ed. H Walter (PS 1850), p 212.

stresses rather John's failure to free himself from medieval chains - "What happinesse could the King arrogate to himselfe by his imperiall title, which was *through his owne default* so imbezzled that a small remanent became his in right, when by open hostilitie and accurssed Papassie the greater portion was pluckt out of his hands ?" Whatever the root, Holinshed regarded it as "a perfect view of the perplexed state of princes, chiefly when they are *overswayed with foreign and profane power* and not able to assure themselves of their subjects' allegiance and loyalty."

Shakespeare's version is more Tyndalean than Holinshed's in failing to mention that, after John's absolution, Louis was excommunicated for attacking him (thereby exaggerating the Papacy's alignment with France), and in adopting the story of his monkish poisoning, which was for Holinshed only an alternative to the probable surfeit ("there be which have written..."). But

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[93] On John as Elizabeth & Arthur as Mary, see LB Campbell, *Shakespeare's Histories* (1947), p 142. Leslie already made the comparison - *Treatise touching the Right of Mary Queen of Scotland*, STC 15506 (Louvain 1571), f 40. It is difficult however to see such an unflattering comparison as being so overt, even though Elizabeth did her best to adopt John's solution to her problem. In *The Troublesome Raigne* (Bullough, *Narrative & Dramatic Sources*, IV. 127), John reflects:

"Thy sins are farre too great to be the man
T'abolish Pope and Poperie from thy Realme;
But in thy seat, if I may gesse at all,
A King shall raigne that shall suppresse them all."

(148) "Since John did yeeld unto the Priest of Rome,
Nor he nor his have prospered on the earth;
Curst is his blessings and his curse is blisse."

For Shakespeare, though, it is surely his usurpation that dooms him - cf M Axton, *The Queen's Two Bodies: Drama & the Elizabethan Succession* (1977), pp 108/10.

Holinshed claimed Crusade indulgences were issued against John (in fact they were only to support him against the rebels).[94]

This exaggerated picture of Innocent's stance against John was unaffected by the translation of Hotman's incompatible complaints on behalf of Philippe II - that Innocent had "prowdly and furiously" opposed his conquest of Normandy from John, and had supported John and Otto IV against him (an extraordinary distortion, considering that John was still excommunicate and threatened with deposition, and that Otto *had* been deposed).[95] Internationalisation of anti-Popery did not eliminate competing claims to have been treated worst.

Some Henrician Protestants had altered the motive for John's quarrel with Innocent III to make it a more obvious question

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[94] Holinshed, *Chronicles* (1587), III. 175, 190/4. Cf Munday, *Watchwoord to Englande*. sig L4 on the "giving the land to the French Kinge's sonne" & the poisoning; "all the mischeefes that fell in all this whyle, were they not the good workes (always useful for satire) of Popes and Papistes ?" *The Troublesome Raigne* followed Holinshed more closely, having Philippe's indulgences (Bullough, *Narrative & Dramatic Sources*, IV. 103) and Louis' excommunication (IV. 137). The advance absolution for John's poisoner (IV. 143/4) came however from Foxe, *A & M*, ed. Pratt, II. 340/2; cf Tyndale, *Obedience of a Christian Man*, p 339. Foxe advanced this tale as his primary account, but he too admitted the existence of others. The tale of papal incitement to assassination reflected in Holinshed and both plays demanded fulfilment (II. 330 marginal note: "The Pope found a murderer"). Foxe stressed the excommunication of John's opponents and that they "laughed it to scorn"; his sympathies perhaps changed sides after John's craven submission to Rome (II. 336/8). Bishop, *Courteous Conference*, pp 48/9, attacked "the unjust, perverse, passionate Pope" for backing John against the supporters "of the auncient lawes of the land". Bilson could not resist remarking that, after his submission, the barons "chose them another King & chased King John, the Pope's farmour, from place to place in despite of all th[at] his new landlord could do or devise" - *True Difference*, pp 102/3, cf 474/9, 490/1.

[95] Hotman, *Brutish Thunderbolt*, pp 154/6.

of national security. Robert Barnes claimed John was excommunicated for seeking Irish war taxation from the Church (rather than seizing property for this purpose *after* the interdict had been promulgated). Simon Fish had him excommunicated for punishing clerical traitors plotting with France (which had elements of truth, inasmuch as John refused Stephen Langton's nomination to Canterbury for alleged Francophilia).[96]

This particular distortion attracted few followers, but Elizabethan accounts of John's reign inherited a legacy of obfuscation, as appears in the curious instance of Stow. Through what appears to be genuine chronological muddle in the early editions of his *Summarie of Englyshe Chronicles,* he put the papal censures against John before Philippe's conquest of Normandy, and seemed to imply that they were the pretext for it. On the other hand, he also put John's absolution too early, thus detaching the dispute from the baronial revolt (and indicating that John might have succumbed to something other than *force majeure*). Even when he repaired his chronology, he remained resolutely un-Tyndalean, stressing the later papal excommunications in John's support, and tending to adopt the early monastic chronicles' view

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[96] Barnes' *Supplycacion unto Henry VIII*, in his *Whole Workes*, ed. Foxe, STC 24436 (1573), pp 189, 194; Fish, *The Very Beggars' Petition against Popery* (1538), in *Harl. Misc.* II. 519; cf Bale, *Pageant of Popes*, f 105v; Foxe, *A & M*, ed. Pratt, II. 324. On tax, cf notes on royal & papal authority (1590s?): Petyt MS 538/38, ff 113/4. Also C Levin, *Propaganda in the English Reformation: Heroic & Villainous Images of King John* (Lewiston, NY, & Queenston, Ont. 1988), ch 3.

of John as an inordinate tyrant, not a would-be reformer.[97]

John's feudal submission to Innocent III was not emphasised very much by Protestants, partly due to considerable historiographical confusion between it and Henry II's submission to Alexander III after Becket's murder. Norton and Jewel have been seen citing the cases together. Stow confused the issue by propagating a notion that *Henry* had accepted "that no man should be accompted as Kynge untyll such tyme as he was confirmed by the Romayn Byshop."[98] Ultimately, English Protestants saw papal political pretensions as too general and gigantic a threat for the feudal bond to be more than an offensive detail.

It was always easiest to represent the papal deposing

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[97] 1565 edn, ff 75-81; 1573 abridged edn (STC 23325.6), sigs J4/K1; 1587 edn, ff 86-94. As might be expected, the defence of Innocent III was most vestigial in the last. However, this also omitted the monastic poisoning story, which previous versions had only ever allowed as a secondary possibility (cf *Annales*, pp 255/6); some more orthodox Elizabethan felt impelled to add it to the margin of the BL copy. Grafton's *Abridgement* showed the plagiarism alleged by Stow in reproducing his early errors in the 1570 edn; these were partly repaired in 1571, when Grafton also moved to minimise the effect of papal censures by adding that John only submitted "being overset in warre by Philip Kinge of Fraunce", not because of the Pope's own power. Respectively ff 54/5; 58/9.

[98] Stow, *Summarie* (1565), f 67r; cf Grafton's *Abridgement*(1570), f 47; (1572), f 51. However, Stow later removed this, reducing the space devoted to Becket in favour of amplification of Henry's assumption of lordship of Ireland. Incidentally, he first redates the papal grant to follow, rather than precede, Henry's expedition and acceptance of homages, and then eliminates it altogether - *Summarie* (1573), sig H4; (1587), p 71. The *Annales*,though much longer, barely mention Becket's death and give Henry no penance at all - pp 215/6. Cf Humphrey, *View of the Romish Hydra*, pp 84/5; John Cowell, *Antisanderus*, STC 5898 (1593), ff 164/7. Hooper also had some idea that Henry II had become a papal vassal - *Exposition of the 23rd Psalm*, in *Later Writings*, PS, p 240. For Catholic usage: Stapleton, *Counterblast*, f 312; Allen, *Admonition to the Nobility & People of England*, STC 368 (1588 / ERL 74), pp 8-10; Holmes, "Political Thought", p 241.

power as direct in attacking it. According to Humphrey, the Romish Hydra's first head "is a temporal sword", embodying the Pope's wish to have "in his hande the wheele of fortune to make kings goe up and goe downe at his pleasure"; if that failed, civil war, excommunication, deposition, "prince-murdering", Jesuit perjury and witchcraft (not an especially logical order) might be tried.[99] And for Catholic Appellants, to distort the deposing power into a direct temporal power was the easiest way to reject it.[100]

The indirect power could not be ruled out so easily. It was only with qualms that those zealous Protestants who extolled excommunication (if necessary of most of the population) as a panacea for all ills could admit that it should have no temporal effects, at least on princes. Reciprocity of powers was generally extended so far as to allow the clergy, in theory, to excommunicate the prince (while he could certainly depose *them*); what happened then was not at all clear.[101]

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[99] *View of the Romish Hydra*, sigs *3-5. Humphrey repeated the view of Philippe IV's own propagandists that "Boniface the Eighth excommunicated Philip King of France, because he would not honour & worship him, nor acknowledge him to be his landlord in the kingdom of France", and was even willing to reduce Edward I of England to a papal lackey by ascribing his war with Philippe to support for Boniface. Cf Sutcliffe, *De Pontefice Romano*, p 401. Another story was Boniface's apocryphal grant of France to the Emperor Albert (the Pope, who had previously deposed *Albert*, simply made inconclusive overtures in the hope of getting him as an ally against Philippe) - eg Bishop, *Courteous Conference*, p 42, cf p 27; cf Azor, *Institutes*, II. 1229-30. Bale for once was more accurate, and denied this *translatio* - *Pageant of Popes*, f 126v; cf Bilson, *True Difference*, p 486.

[100] Eg Thomas Bluet, *Important Considerations*, STC 25125 (1601 / ERL 31), pp 37/8. Cf J Bossy, "Elizabethan Catholicism: the Link with France" (Cambridge PhD thesis 1960), pp 260ff; Sommerville, "Jacobean Political Thought", ch 7.

Catholics had a legalistic (albeit archaic) doctrine of contagion of excommunication; Protestants, while asserting the advisability of eschewing the society of known sinners, were judiciously vague about politically sensitive issues of contagion and enforcement, so as to avoid a clearly Antichristian course - "Excommunication hath been a great many years nought else with the Bishops of Rome but fire and sword."[102] "The feare of God and not the practises of Popes must keepe princes from doing evill... Excommunication [is] made a wrest to lift princes out of their seates... You shall finde a great difference between not delivering them the sacred mysteries of God except they repent and beleeve the Gospell and your divelish conspiracie to deny them all obedience & with armed violence to take their swords from them."[103] Indeed, much of the point of historical argument for Protestants' polemic was that concentration on what was certainly wrong (because papal) avoided some tricky questions of what *they* considered right. If details varied, there could be a consensus on the malevolent history of Rome.

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[101] Eg Nowell, *Reproufe of a Booke Entitled A Proufe of Certayne Articles* [by Thomas Dorman], STC 18740 (1565), pp 23/4; Jewel, *Works, Defence*, IV. 674. And this was among those relatively dedicated to the Royal Supremacy.

[102] Bullinger, *Decades*, PS, IV. 40/1; cf Foxe, *De Censura sive Excommunicatione Ecclesiastica*, STC 11233 (1571), sigs C4, D5, E3. Cf Davies, "Poor Persecuted Little Flock", in Lake & Dowling, *Protestantism & the National Church*, pp 90/3; H Hopf, *The Christian Polity of John Calvin* (Cambridge 1982), pp 41/2, 60-70.

[103] Bilson, *True Difference*, pp 218, 221; cf Bridges, *Supremacie of Christian Princes*, p 1095. Tyndale, *Practice of Prelates*, p 252: "We have no remedy but patiently to abide what God will do."

THE EXCOMMUNICATION OF HENRY VIII:

PROLOGUE TO FAILURE

"*Sejanus:* The way to put
A prince in blood, is to present the shapes
Of dangers, greater than they are, like late
Or early shadows, and sometimes to feign,
Where they are none, only to make him fear."

Jonson, *Sejanus,* II.ii

"*King:* I may perceive
These Cardinals trifle with me. I do abhor
This dilatory sloth and tricks of Rome."

Henry VIII, II.iv

The ultimately decisive separation of England from Rome arose from an unusual turn of events. It was not unreasonable for Henry VIII to expect the Apostolic See to be accomodating over his "great matter". Recent cases such as those of Louis XII of France and the Duke of Suffolk suggested it would consent readily enough to dubious divorces when they seemed politically appropriate. Monarchs at least were rarely threatened with excommunication over such matters; and deposition was unlikely to come into question except when the material interests of the Church were threatened, or heresy alleged (these often went together). With a lesser issue involved, it is less surprising that Rome's censures against Henry were dilatory and half-hearted.

There had been some signs that matters might go

unusually far. Cardinal Wolsey, before his fall, had warned Clement VII that denial of Henry's wishes would lead to schism.[1] But such warnings were significant only in retrospect. They surely did not seem so at the time, given (for instance) the Gallican melodramatics which the Most Christian Kings produced at any rift with Rome over a clerical tax or a North Italian border.

The logic of Henry's position led him to a fundamental attack on papal power, intermittently even from 1527.[2] Equally however, Henry continued for some time to appeal for the Pope's dispensing power to be used in his favour, even as he began to deny its existence.[3] His desire to dabble in theology was stronger than any instinct to coherence.

The fatality was that Henry did not get the Divorce while the Pope was fighting Charles V. Wolsey warned that the Fall of Rome may "not a little hinder Your Grace's affairs".[4] Indeed, there was never, once Rome became forcibly incorporated into the Habsburg sphere of influence, a real prospect of a decision against their family interest. On the other hand, it remained true after 1527 that "the Pope and the Emperor place little trust in each other",[5] so the former would oblige the latter only so far

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[1] Feb. 1528 - to Clement & to envoys Gardiner & Fox: *LP IV.2*, Nos 3912/3.

[2] VM Murphy's introduction to *Divorce Tracts of Henry VIII*, edd. E Surtz & Murphy (Angers 1988), p xvii.

[3] Eg Henry to Clement VII, 30th Sept. 1529: S Ehses, *Roemische Dokumente zur Geschichte der Ehescheidung Heinrichs VIII von England 1528/34* (Paderborn 1893), p 130.

[4] Wolsey to Henry, 2nd June 1527: *SP*, I. 189 (*LP IV.2*, No 3147).

as he must. There was a scheme to provide the Pope with an Anglo-French force to protect him against Charles (and exert undue influence of their own), but it remained theoretical.[6]

The most to be expected from Clement, "the most vacillating of Popes and the most inept of Machiavelli's disciples", was a resolution continually "to protract matters".[7] He was quite successful at that, fobbing off both sides for years with documents supporting them which turned out, on close examination, to be so phrased as to be useless. He responded to pressure for action from all directions by claiming that he could not persuade his Cardinals[8] - not however a very dignified pose.

Clement did not dare act against Charles V's wishes; but hoped to avoid having even to act against Henry VIII's. He was, he lamented, between the hammer and the anvil.[9] He presumably hoped that one or other of Catherine,[10] Henry and Anne Boleyn

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[5] *CSP Ven. IV,* No 931: Giustinian (Ambassador in France), 30th June 1533.

[6] Cardinal Campeggio to Jacopo Salviati (papal secretary), 19th Oct. 1528: Ehses, *Roemische Dokumente zur.. Ehescheidung,* pp 50/1; V-L Bourrilly & P de Vaissière, *Première Ambassade en Angleterre du Jean du Bellay 1527/9* (Paris 1905), pp 488/9, 504: Du Bellay to Montmorency, 16th Feb. & Dec. (former *LP IV.2,* No 5028). Wolsey also said that Charles V deserved to be excommunicated and deposed; but it was rather late for that after he had won - Du Bellay to François I, 2nd Jan. & 14th Dec: *Ibid,* pp 81, 495 (*LP IV.2,* No 3757; *IV.3,* App, No 223).

[7] MJ Fraikin, "La Nonciature de France 1527/34", in *Mélanges d'Archéologie et d'Histoire de l'École Française de Rome* (Paris 1906), pp 557, 524/5.

[8] Eg *Correspondance du Cardinal François du Tournon,* ed. M François (Paris 1946), p 94: to François I, 27th Sept. 1533; cf same to same, 17th Aug: N C[amusat], *Meslanges Historiques... 1390-1580* (4 pts, Troyes 1619), II. 126 (*LP VI,* No 996).

[9] William Benet, Gregorio da Casale & Peter Vannes to Wolsey, 9th July 1529: *LP IV.2,* No 5761.

would die, or at least that Henry would tire of Anne.[11] Even Clement was not however able to delay matters long enough. It was too obvious what he was at. In early 1529, Cardinal Campeggio, delegated to (pretend to) judge the case in England, wrote: "I do not see how His Holiness can satisfy [Henry], considering the greatness of the Emperor that will not suffer anything to be done to injure him in a matter concerning... his honour". Campeggio's task then could only be "to drag matters out as much as I can". Continual attacks of gout, if unpleasant in themselves, helped him in this.[12]

Still in 1532, a Habsburg agent reported that Clement, as befitted his new alliance, was primarily concerned with trying to bring François I "to a better frame of mind", less hostile to Charles V. The Pope hoped Henry could be brought to accept some compromise and to detach himself from France - perhaps Henry would accept a dispensation to live with a mistress rather than his wife. A few weeks later, this informant remarked sardonically of a consistory that "in the English case... nearly the whole day was taken up in arguments, from which nothing came except greater confusion and dithering".[13]

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[10] This was Charles V's charge against the Pope - Campeggio to Salviati, 11th May 1532: Ehses, *Roemische Dokumente zur.. Ehescheidung,* p 199.

[11] Campeggio believed in mid-1530 that Henry was abandoning the Divorce - to Salviati, 4th May & 26th June; reply, 14th June; cf 24th Oct. 1531: Ehses, *Roemische Dokumente zur.. Ehescheidung,* pp 145, 149/51, 185.

[12] Campeggio to Salviati, 9th Jan. & 21st June 1529, cf 12th May: Ehses, *Roemische Dokumente zur.. Ehescheidung,* pp 69-70, 109; 79-80.

"The Pope is so timid" as to encourage the English, Charles' Ambassador, Eustace Chapuys, lamented. Cardinal Sigüenza wrote to Charles' minister, the Commendador de Cobos, "the chief obstacles are the continued threats of the King to renounce obedience to the Holy See, the coming of the Turk and the Pope's cowardice." Another Spanish agent, Miguel Mai, was told by Cardinal Accolti in 1531 that the best thing to do would be to delay the case for another two years. It seemed as if "these people think that the best way for each of them to preserve his friends is to remain stationary".[14] Catherine insisted to her proctor, Dr. Ortiz, that "the medicine which is to cure this wound must be stronger". By 1535, she was so infuriated as to say she did not know whether to blame the Pope or her husband more.[15]

"We await a remedy from God and from Your Holiness. It must come speedily or the time will be past."[16]

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[13] Andreas de Burgo to Cardinal of Trent, 15th Feb. & 6th Mar. 1532: FB von Bucholtz, *Geschichte der Regierung Ferdinand des Ersten,* IX (Vienna 1838), pp 105, 17. Some form of bigamy had been proposed for some time - eg William Knight to Henry, 13th Sept. 1527: *SP,* VII. 3 (*LP IV.2,* No 3422); cf G de C Parmiter, *King's Great Matter* (1967), pp 21/3; Benet to Henry, 27th Oct. 1530: N Pocock, *Records of the Reformation: the Divorce* (Oxford 1870), I. 448/60 (*LP,* No 6705). But by 1531, the official Henrician line was to cite dispensation for bigamy as a measure of impossibility for marriage to a brother's widow: *Determinations of the Universities,* edd. Surtz & Murphy, *Divorce Tracts of Henry VIII,* pp 256/7.

[14] Chapuys, 21st Feb. 1531; cf Cardinal Loaysa to Cobos, 16th Feb: *CSP Sp. IV,* Nos 641; 637; Sigüenza, 22nd June 1532; Mai to Cobos, 28th Mar. & 22nd June: *LP V,* Nos 1112; 158; *CSP Sp,* No 965.

[15] Catherine to Ortiz, 14th April 1530: *LP IV.2,* No 6337; same to same, 10th Oct. 1535: *CSP Sp. V,* No 211.

[16] G Mattingly, *Catherine of Aragon* (3rd edn, 1961), p 302. She sought a papal sentence but did not favour violent enforcement (pp 261/2).

The question of Henry VIII's possible excommunication first arose in the summer of 1529, when Clement terminated Campeggio's commission and "avoked" the case to Rome. As a standard measure, all who obstructed this were threatened with excommunication. Henry complained bitterly, and the Pope assured him this did not apply to him.[17] Henry also alleged that it was an affront to his dignity to be summoned to a foreign court; if he came, he would do so with "an army royal" (by what route is obscure).[18] For the moment, he caused confusion by sending a succession of insufficiently empowered proctors.

Thus Henry did not in fact break off negotiations. The "avocation" caused him first to instruct his agents to appeal to "the true Vicar of Christ" (on the pretext that Clement was a simoniac) and/or to a future General Council, thereby incurring automatic excommunication under bulls of Pius II and Julius II. This instruction was countermanded before it could be executed,[19] in favour of a cautious policy of continued prevarication. Probably Henry in turn hoped Clement might die (it had recently been rumoured that he had), and that his successor would be more amenable. Or Catherine herself might die.[20]

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[17] Clement to Henry, 29th Aug. 1529: Ehses, *Roemische Dokumente zur.. Ehescheidung,* pp 125/6. On 7th Mar. 1530, however, he apparently went back on this: Pocock, *Records of the Reformation,* II. 372/6.

[18] Wolsey to Benet, Casale & Vannes, 27th July 1529; cf Henry to same, 7th Oct. 1530: *SP,* VII. 194, 261 (*LP IV.2,* Nos 5797, 6667).

[19] Casale & Vannes to Henry, 6th June 1529; Gardiner to Casale & Vannes, 25th June: *SP,* VII. 184, 190 (*LP IV.2,* Nos 5650, 5715).

Though he delayed as long as possible due to (well-founded) fear of "some evil decision" or "some inconvenience" in England, the Habsburgs finally pushed Clement into issuing *monitoria* forbidding Henry to contract a new marriage on pain of excommunication.[21] Dr. Ortiz hoped to have got sterner measures in 1532 in view of Henry's contumacious concubinage. A bull was drawn up, but "the Enemy of Mankind prevented its completion in a way known only to God" (or the Curia). Three years later, still held up at the monitory stage, Ortiz exclaimed that so notorious an evildoer was (or should be) deprived *ipso facto.*[22]

Clement was apprehensive about Henry's reaction. Cardinal Campeggio sounded Charles V's views; the latter agreed it was possible "that His Holiness would be forced to proceed against that King and kingdom to defend the authority and freedom of the Church, which however would have little effect unless execution [of the sentence] were provided for". There was no hint that Charles was prepared to provide for it.[23]

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[20] The main substantive argument in Crabites' apology for Clement's vacillations (*Clement VII & Henry VIII,*1936, pp 211/5, 249, 270/2) is that Henry was himself vacillating enough for there to be hope that he might reform if not provoked. His vacillations were however over tactics rather than over his final aim.

[21] Salviati to Campeggio, 21st & 26th Oct, 26th Nov. 1530: Ehses, *Roemische Dokumente zur.. Ehescheidung,* pp 165/7. *Monitoria* of 7th Mar. 1530 & 5th Jan. 1531: Pocock, *Records of the Reformation,* ll. 372/6; 104/8. *Ibid,* ll. 166, 378 for (less formal) briefs of 25th Jan. & 23rd Dec.1532, giving fifteen and thirty days respectively for compliance to avoid excommunication - but nothing happened.

[22] To Charles V, May 1532, & 4th Nov. 1535: *CSP Sp. IV,* No 947; *V.1,* No 223.

[23] Campeggio to Salviati, 25th Nov. 1531: Ehses, *Roemische Dokumente zur.. Ehescheidung,* p 189.

In July 1533, Clement finally drew up a bull of excommunication against Henry, already *excommunicatus latae sententiae* by defying the prohibition of marriage. Clement protested (with reason) that "the said King of England had constrained and almost forced him to do so".[24] When however he met François I in person at Marseilles, the King's opposition was so vociferous as to provoke papal apprehension "that not only England but France would be divided from the Church", and succeeded in obtaining a delay in the bull's promulgation. François also made specious claims about his envoys' success in persuading Henry to greater moderation.[25] He was indeed less than frank as a middleman, for he (or his Ambassador in Rome, Cardinal de Tournon) was even in mid-1533 fabricating claims that Clement was prepared to grant Henry's Divorce, after some further show of reluctance.[26] It is hard to believe he really thought this; but François too wished to delay a confrontation that would leave him allied with an excommunicate.

Henry optimistically thought he could persuade France to

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[24] 11th July 1533: Pocock, *Records of the Reformation,* II. 677/8. *Correspondance du Cardinal du Tournon,* pp 87/8: to François I, 17th Aug.

[25] Sanchez' information, 20th Dec. 1533: Bucholtz, *Regierung Ferdinand des Ersten,* IX. 123; 31st Oct. Consistory: Ehses, *Roemische Dokumente zur... Ehescheidung,* p 214; Vergerio to Canesecchi, 15th April 1534: *NBD 1533/59,* I. 216; cf *CSP Ven. IV,* No 945: Marco Venier (in France), 13th July 1533.

[26] *Correspondance du Cardinal du Tournon,* p 85: to François I, May 1533; cf François to Dinteville (envoy in London), 5th May & 16th July: Camusat, *Meslanges Historiques,* II. 126, 134 (*LP VI,* Nos 444, 846). Cf Cardinal du Bellay even in Mar. 1534: *LP VII,* App, No 12.

join him in open defiance of Rome, but was met with the perennial argument of hedgers of diplomatic bets, that such a move would leave Charles V as the sole influence upon the Pope.[27] François claimed he would have been able to win more at Marseilles, had Henry's envoys not chosen that juncture finally to blunder in with their appeal to a future General Council (whose meeting however they were trying to persuade François to obstruct). "I go about to bring the Pope from the Emperor, and you to drive him to him... Ye have clearly marred all".[28]

Charles considered that Henry had been emboldened to defy the papal prohibition by "the delays, subterfuges and maneouvres... that the Holy Father has employed" in the Divorce case. Strong measures might seem called for; but "the other affairs of Christendom are in such a position... that for now it is best only to pursue the matter judicially".[29] He was not however above delays and subterfuges himself - since, while he wanted a decision against Henry's Divorce, he did not want a prematurely severe sentence. In 1535, his Ambassador in Rome reported proudly that the "execution" of Henry's excommunication had "been detained and impeded for upwards of a year and a half, without the least appearance that the delay really proceeded from us, but

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[27] Dinteville to Montmorency, 7th Nov. 1533: Camusat, *Meslanges Historiques,* II. 143; cf Norfolk's instructions, June, to warn François of the danger posed by the Pope to all princes: *SP,* VII. 473/5 (*LP VI,* Nos 1404, 641).

[28] Bonner's account, Nov. 1533: *LP VI,* No 1425.

[29] Charles to Ferdinand I, 23rd May 1533: K Lanz, *Correspondenz des Kaisers Karl V* (Leipzig 1844/6), II. 66/7 (in pt, *LP VI,* No 523).

on the contrary, of our disappointment and sorrow".[30]

By the beginning of 1534, it seemed that in England "things could not become worse or more desperate than they are already". But Clement wanted, as the Pope's secretary wrote to the Nuncio in Prague, "to be well assured, before he proceeded to a further sentence, that it would be executed, which could not be done without the support of the Emperor, and pertained to him" because of his own involvement. The Habsburgs agreed in principle that such a precaution was necessary to avoid "a great loss of reputation for Holy Church, and also for the Emperor and the King {Ferdinand}", but the required guarantee proved elusive.[31] The assurance that "the Emperor will not fail to adopt any measures considered *expedient or possible* for the execution and observance of the said sentence, as a good Christian prince", was unsurprisingly considered inadequate; but it was the most that was offered.[32]

Cardinal du Tournon informed his King in 1533 that surely "there will be war between the Emperor and the King of England; or the said Emperor will be the most infamous prince in the world, given what he has said". The following year, the University of Salamanca held in a disputation before Charles that

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[30] Cifuentes to Charles, 8th Oct. 1535: *CSP Sp. V,* No 209.

[31] Carnesecchi to Pier Paolo Vergerio, 14th Feb. 1534; reply,13th April; cf 18th Mar: *NBD 1533/59,* l. 180/1, 214; 199.

[32] Council's Consulta, April 1533; cf Cifuentes to Charles, 7th & 10th May, 24th Oct: *CSP Sp. IV,* Nos 1064, 1069, 1071, 1143.

"it was lawful for a Christian prince to avenge by war injustice to a friend {=relative ?}".[33] Years back, Giovanni Antonio Muxetula, one of Charles V's many (perpetually quarrelling) representatives at Rome, had threatened ominously that the Divorce would cause "wars between Christian princes". Charles intimated as much to his brother, but he feared that France would join any war; and "if the affairs of Germany required my presence, I should abandon everything to go thither".[34]

In the event, however, the first effects of Henry's alienation from Rome were felt *within* his dominions. It was in Ireland, far more than in England, that it came to imply a threat to Henry's sovereignty. Inhibition against rebellion was vestigial there at the best of times. Even in 1534, the FitzGerald heir to Kildare (influenced, in Cromwell's view, by "spiritual persons") was said to have collected "diverse oold munymentes and presidentes, which shuld prove that the Kinge holde this land of the See of Rome; alledging the King and his realme to be heretiques, digressed from th'obedience of the same and the Faith Catholique, wherfore his desire and request to the Emperor and the Bishop of Rome, that they will aide him in the defence of the Faithe Catholique against the King, promising that he will hoolde

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[33] Tournon, 4th May 1533: Camusat, *Meslanges Historiques,* ll. 8v (*LP VI,* No 440). John Mason to Thomas Starkey, 3rd July 1534: H Ellis, *Original Letters Illustrative of English History,* 2nd series (1827), ll. 54.

[34] 20th Aug. 1528: J Gairdner, "New Lights on the Divorce", *EHR* 12 (1897), pp 111/4 (*LP IV.2,* No 4535); Charles to Ferdinand I, 11th Jan. 1530: Lanz, *Correspondenz des Kaisers Karl V,* I. 368/70 (*CSP Sp. IV,* No 245).

the saide lande of them, and paie tribute for the same yerelie". The Archbishop of Dublin complained that his colleague of Armagh credited "that this is, as it is in their Irish chronicles, *Insula Sacra,* and belongs to none but the Bishop of Rome".[35] FitzGerald wrote to Rome, according to Catherine's procurator Dr. Ortiz, to record his astonishment "at His Holiness' negligence in permitting so many souls to perish and not concluding the process against so wicked a King" with a sentence of deposition. Again, he pointed to Henry's outright heresy, as well as schism, though the main stress was still on his marital scandal.[36] He saw the Pope as dragging his feet, even if FitzGerald did not, like the prophetic Maid of Kent, Elizabeth Barton (in Cranmer's account) threaten the Pope with "the great stroke of God" if he did not more actively "stoppe and lett the said mariege" with Anne Boleyn.[37]

By the end of the decade, the government of Ireland faced a FitzGerald-O'Neill-O'Donnell coalition, in the face of which Lord Deputy Grey behaved equivocally enough to be executed for treason in 1541. The rebels were said to claim "that the Kinge's

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[35] Lord Justice Allen to Cromwell, 26th Dec. 1534: *SP,* II. 222; Archbishop Allen to Cromwell, 28th Nov. 1535: quoted *Cal. Carew II,* p xix (as Archbishop Brown, then dead). Cf SG Ellis, "The Kildare Rebellion & the Early Henrician Reformation", *HJ*19 (1976), pp 813ff; also on secular grievances. He "dressed his motives in religious rags" - GR Elton, *Reform & Reformation* (1977), p 207.

[36] Ortiz to Empress Isabella, 21st May 1535: *LP VIII,* No 746, & to Charles V, 27th May; *CSP Sp. V.1,* No 164. FitzGerald, Earl of Offaly (later of Kildare), also wanted absolution for murdering the Archbishop of Dublin - an unfortunate act perhaps for a champion of the Faith, but the prelate, he explained, favoured Henry.

[37] 20th Dec. 1534: Ellis, *Original Letters,* 3rd series (1846), II. 317.

Highnes is an heritik against the Feith, bycause he obeyith not and belevith not the Bysshop of Rome's usurpid prymacy... that the Kinge's Majestie hath no right or title to this lande but usurpacion, and that they woll have all, or lose all". Not only FitzGerald but the O'Neill had a mind "to be Kinge of Ireland", regarding Henry as "the most heretique and the worst man in the worlde". Indeed, the O'Brien, claiming descent from the High Kings of Tara, had approached Charles V as long ago as 1534 for help to reclaim his kingdom (with a mere 4000 men); he also claimed, conveniently, to be ultimately of Spanish stock.[38] This proliferation of claims however did not encourage foreign support. Ultimately successful pressure from the administration for Henry to claim the Parliamentary title of King of Ireland, not just Lord, was to combat the Irishry's "folisshe opinyon amonges them that the Bisshoppe of Rome shulde be king of the same".[39]

If Ireland had been annexed to the English Crown by papal grant, England itself had been offered as a fief to the Papacy only forty-five years after that. The implications of the latter fact were not however fully explored immediately. Even the Irish issue was broached locally rather than by Rome, and the pool of

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[38] Robert Cowley to Cromwell, 8th Sept. 1539; confession of Connor Mor O'Connor, July, cf Allen to Cromwell, 10th July: *SP,* III. 147, 139/40; 136/7. Connor O'Brien, 21st July 1534: Lanz, *Correspondenz des Kaisers Karl V,* II. 99-100 (*LP VII,* No 999).

[39] Lord Deputy St. Leger & Council to Henry, 30th Dec. 1540; cf Bishop Staples of Meath to St. Leger, 17th June (*Cal. Carew I,* No 123); Archbishop Allen of Dublin's information for royal commissioners, 1537: *SP,* III. 278, 30; II. 480.

discontent in England was clearly smaller. There, Henry VIII's severe measures were far more a spontaneous aggression, and far less a reaction to a perceived threat than was to be the case under Elizabeth. Charges of treason could be derived from his Succession legislation alone. It might have seemed obvious to attempt to incriminate Fisher, particularly, on the question of the Pope's power over the King; but that of the King's power over the English Church was quite sufficient to decide the case. The provisions of the 1534 Treasons Act[40] against those accusing the King of being a heretic, schismatic, tyrant, infidel or usurper therefore remained in reserve.

Moreover, the Carthusian John Hale was in 1535 accused of remarks highly treasonous even without new legislation - calling the King "the most cruellest capital heretic, defacer and treader underfoot of Christ and His Church, continually applying and minding to extinct the same", "whose death I beseech God may be like to the death of wicked John, sometime King of this realm or rather to be called a great tyrant than a king, and... like to the end of this manqueller Richard, sometime usurper of this imperial realm". He allegedly continued, "until the King and the rulers of this realm be plucked by the pates and brought, as we say, to the pot, shall we never live merrily in England; which I pray God may... shortly come to pass", and predicted an Irish and Welsh attack: "doubt ye not but they shall have aid and strength enough in

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[40] 26 Henry VIII c 13; *SR* III. 508/9. Cf Elton, *Policy & Police* (Cambridge 1972), pp 282/92.

England, for this is truth - three parts of England are against the King, as he shall find if he need".[41] This treasonous talk was in a fifteenth-century tradition, without citation of the Pope and his plots.

Paul III took some time to adopt such a condemnatory view of Henry VIII. The English government harboured various delusions about the new Pope well into 1535, encouraged by Henry's procurator at Rome, Gregorio da Casale. One was the hope of forming an open Anglo-Franco-Papal alliance to check Charles V.[42] Another was the possibility that Paul might actually consent to the Divorce, especially if France became interested in Elizabeth's marriage, and hence her legitimacy. There were even approaches to persuade the Emperor to recognise the Boleyn marriage (to keep England out of the arms of France), and call off the Pope, who was certainly unlikely to champion mere legality against general opposition from secular powers.[43] Anyway, Paul was said to be "one who is long in deliberating. Since he was made Pope, he has not done one of the things he meditated..."[44]

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[41] Testimony of Robert Feron, 29th April 1535: *LP VIII,* No 609. Chapuys agreed Henry might fall as easily as Richard III - to Charles, 18th May 1533: *VI,* No 608. Cf Elton, *Policy & Police,* pp 24, 100, 278, for some early cases of talk treasonable enough without new legislation.

[42] Casale to Henry, 20th Feb.1535: *LP VIII,* No 251.

[43] Cromwell to Casale, 10th April 1535: *LP VIII,* No 523 (orig. *SP,* VII. 591/2); Chapuys to Charles V, 9th & 25th Feb: *LP,* Nos 189 (Cromwell there claiming that Clement's sentence had been only intended to cause Anglo-Imperial strife, to France's benefit), 263 (believing that Paul had offered, if Henry's objectionable legislation was abandoned, to arrange "other things").

The Nuncio in France, Rodolfo Pio di Carpi Bishop of Faenza, was quite explicit that the factional division between Admiral Chabot and the Grand Master Montmorency was reflected in the advocacy of soft and hard lines respectively towards England.[45] Chabot, then dominant in France, claimed in early 1535 that "the position in England is not so desperate as perhaps is generally believed", that Valois-Tudor marriage negotiations might produce favourable consequences, but that a papal sentence against Henry could only entail disastrous ones. The French government however then admitted it could do little to save Cardinal Fisher; and, when the negotiations for Angouleme's betrothal to Elizabeth collapsed, claimed to have abandoned them out of respect for Rome, Henry having shown himself "most hostile to the Church". French condemnation of Fisher's execution prompted the Nuncio to hope that, the Most Christian King having "always been active to subdue and extirpate enemies of God", he would act for the Pope not only against the Turk but against "that King so contrary and openly hostile to the Apostolic See". It was however far too optimistic to expect actions as well as words. The Cardinals of Tournon and Lorraine encouraged Rome, verbally, to incite secular powers against Henry; but were not willing for their remarks to be attributable, presumably because of the

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[44] Casale to Cromwell, 14th May 1535; cf 1st June: *LP VIII*, Nos 712; 807.

[45] Carpi to Ambrogio Ricalcati (papal secretary), 12th April 1535: PG Baroni, *La Nunziatura in Francia di Rodolfo Pio 1535/7* (Bologna 1962), p 146 (*LP VIII*, No 537).

attitude of their own monarch.[46] The French very soon began inquiring about the possibility of a papal-imperial reconciliation, and it was apparent that such a danger would enhance the French preference for allying with infidels and schismatics rather than fighting them. Habsburg adherents continued to blame failure to proceed further against Henry on French obstruction.[47]

Paul wrote to François I claiming to have refrained for three years (though he had only been Pope for one) at his request, and hoping for Henry's amendment. The latter had now added to adultery, heresy, schism, sacrilege and the *crimen laesae majestatis.* It was this last, in the form of the execution of a Cardinal (even if not yet invested) by a papal vassal, upon which he placed greatest stress. He asked François to bear calmly the sentence Henry had deserved, and only as an afterthought to help. Writing to Ferdinand of Austria (whom he seemed to consider more sympathetic than his brother Charles), he displayed greater hopes of aid. He also, to the Habsburg, accused Henry of being "a despiser of censures" (and did not mention them to François).[48]

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[46] Carpi to Ricalcati, 19th Mar, 6th & 26th June, 4th, 18th & 31st July 1535: *Nunziatura di Pio,* pp 128, 181/3, 192/3, 205, 218/9, 226 (*LP VIII,* Nos 399, 837, 909, 985, 1060, 1141). Far from championing the papal view of Henry's matrimonial affairs however, Chabot had apparently pressed for the more total disinheritance of Mary to render Elizabeth a more eligible bride, and to reduce Habsburg influence - Palamede Gontier to Chabot, 5th Feb: Michel de Castelnau, *Mémoires* (Brussels 1731), I. 405 (*LP,* No 174). Chabot later confessed Henry to be "the greatest heretic and miscreant in the world", but he did not seem put off by this - Carpi to Ricalcati, 27th Jan. 1536: *Nunziatura di Pio,* p 369 (*LP X,* No 190)

[47] Sanchez' information, 30th Mar. 1534 & 25th Aug. 1535: Bucholtz, *Regierung Ferdinand des Ersten,* IX. 124, 128.

The execution of More too further spurred on the Pope to urge the deposition and "destruction" of "that impious King of England" ("impious" but not "pretended", not being heretical enough to be deemed deprived *ipso facto*).[49] François I, "commending His Holiness for the spirit he showed", remarked that "the King of England was in his own kingdom, and he could not give him orders". For the moment he would only undertake "as his friend, to lead him back to the true way, if possible". Only if Charles V, who after all had his aunt's cause to consider, would take steps - at least, banning Anglo-Flemish trade - would he himself be "most ready to do his duty" actively. The Pope drafted a bull appealing to Charles as foremost secular "distributor of justice".[50] Ferdinand, on Charles' behalf, while also calling Paul's response "fully worthy of the pontifical dignity", insisted, in a vein perfected by his nephew Philip II, "this matter is of such

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[48] Paul III to François I, 26th July 1535; & to Ferdinand: Bucholtz, *Regierung Ferdinand des Ersten,* IX. 15-16 (*LP VIII,* Nos 1116/7).

[49] Ricalcati to Carpi, 3rd Aug. 1535; cf 9th Jan. 1536: *Nunziatura di Pio,* pp 231, 350; cf to Vergerio, 31st July & 5th Aug. 1535: *NBD 1533/59,* l. 464/6. References to Henry remained frequently abusive, without impugning his actual regality. Carpi to Ricalcati, 21st Aug. 1535: "iniquo Re"; & 12th April 1537: "impio Re" - *Ibid,* pp 241, 628 (*LP IX,* No 148; *XII.1,* No 923). But there was not necessarily any epithet, and mostly Henry was still referred to like any other king. By 1538, however, the trend was to refer to him as "Re Anglo" rather than "Re d'Inghilterra" - eg Ferrerio to Cardinal Farnese, 24th Feb, 26th Dec, etc: *ANG I,* pp 350, 427. This might have meant he was considered only as a king *de facto;* or not.

[50] Carpi to Ricalcati, 21st Aug. 1535: *Nunziatura di Pio,* p 243 (*LP IX,* No 148); cf 19th Sept. (p 254; No 397), in which François said frankly that he had no expectation of Charles doing any such thing. Draft Bull of 30th Aug: *LP,* No 207. Cf Cifuentes (Spanish ambassador in Rome) to Charles, 3rd Sept: *CSP Sp. V,* No 199.

moment that one must act with caution".[51] The Cardinal of Liege told the Nuncio Vergerio that Paul "would put the reputation of the Apostolic See in great danger by issuing censures against that king at this time".[52]

Even François' limited undertaking soon appeared to exclude active steps by Charles; for if he subdued England, it would "make the Emperor so great that the Church, and everyone else, would soon rue it". Always hinting at the memory of the Sack of Rome, François described Charles as "a man against whom one must always be on guard"; he himself did not "wish to defend [Henry] against any judgement of His Holiness, but rather to defend himself strongly against the Emperor". Condemnation of Henry's impiety and expatiation on the invariable willingness of French Kings to spend their blood in the service of the Church were subordinate to the declaration that France would assist "not only the King of England, but any other whom His Imperial Majesty sought to conquer" - including, apparently, Lutherans and Moslems - "so that he does not become greater than he is". Consent was however implied to methods, like blockade, that did not threaten such an effect, which would be "the ruin of the world". And it was hinted that France might reconsider in case of concessions to her, for instance Milan.[53] There was a widespread rumour that

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[51] Ferdinand to Paul, 3rd Sept: Bucholtz, *Regierung Ferdinand des Ersten,* IX. 17.

[52] Vergerio to Ricalcati, 6th Oct. 1535: *NBD 1533/59,* I. 521. Cf Ottonello Vida (Vergerio's auditor) to same, 2nd Oct (I. 519/21) on the difficulties of enforcing an embargo in Flanders, let alone more active measures.

Charles V had offered to cede Milan if France abandoned her English alliance. Charles denied it indignantly, and accused the French of deliberately inventing it.[54] The Papacy did adopt this doomed proposal, if with more stress on forestalling another Habsburg-Valois war than on specifically anti-English action.[55]

It was only in subordination to geopolitical concerns that there came hints at a more ideological opposition from France, that it seemed "that His Holiness would arrogate too much [authority] to the Apostolic See", which might have "some sinister consequence", in that he claimed to issue a sentence "quanto al temporale". Carpi replied vaguely, "if this authority... did belong in any way to His Holiness... he would not wish to lose it".[56]

Rome remained defiant at first, claiming that the cause pertained to the Faith, not to the Emperor, even if the latter, "as the one most concerned", might play a large part in it. Whoso opposed it would not only increase Charles' influence by default, but attract "the hatred of all other Christian princes", as well as

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[53] Carpi to Ricalcati, 3rd, 15th & 21st Nov, 8th Dec. 1535, 1st & 9th Feb. 1536: *Nunziatura di Pio,* pp 280, 291, 300/1, 317, 374, 381 (*LP IX,* Nos 758, 826, 868, 947; *X,* Nos 228, 279).

[54] Charles V to Chapuys, 5th Jan. 1535: Weiss, *Papiers d'État de Granvelle, CDIF* (Paris 1841/52), II. 264 (*LP VIII,* No 19); reply, 9th Feb: *LP,*No 189.

[55] Carpi to Ricalcati, 10th Jan. 1536: *Nunziatura di Pio,* pp 352/6 (*LP X,* No 71).

[56] Carpi to Ricalcati, 9th & 20th Dec. 1535: *Nunziatura di Pio,* pp 322, 329 (*LP IX,* Nos 941, 1000). In 1546, the Sorbonne embarked on one of the more enthusiastic of its periodic offensives against the more extreme theoreticians of papal monarchy (and, incidentally, a principal opponent of Henry's Divorce), by moving to condemn the works of Cajetan - Nuncio Alessandro Guidiccione to Cardinal Farnese, 10th Mar. & 2nd April: *ANG III,* pp 428, 431.

perhaps sharing the providential punishment of Henry's impiety. It was unworthy of the Most Christian King to protect a schismatic (the accusation of heresy became rarer after Paul's first and angriest briefs). "There is no further use in debate, because His Holiness is resolved to prefer the honour of God and of this Holy See in this matter to any other particular interest". François retorted that Charles' only motive in assisting would be "to lord it over the whole world". The French emphasis on fear of Charles was countered by implied offers of papal mediation to gain concessions from the latter, if François abandoned England.[57]

In fact, Charles V was not in favour of Henry's deposition either. His Spanish Council stressed the harm it could do to Queen Catherine and Princess Mary. A sentence founded on the matrimonial cause alone (somewhat unprecedented) might endanger their lives. One founded on heresy or the *crimen laesae majestatis* would prejudice Mary's succession rights. "Every one of the means proposed has its danger"; therefore, Henry could either be "simply deprived", with no reason given (except, perhaps, feudal right) or left alone. A public excommunication not enforced would imply a prohibition of Anglo-Flemish trade, which the Council (unlike Chapuys, the Ambassador in London) considered as more damaging to their side. Henry was abetted by France in the "most damnable practices without any regard to

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[57] Ricalcati to Carpi, 6th & 21st Dec. 1535, 9th, 18th & 27th Jan. 1536; replies, 20th Dec. 1535 & 6th Jan. 1536: *Nunziatura di Pio,* pp 313, 333, 350, 360, 367/8; 327, 342/3 (last two *LP IX,* No 1000; *X,* No 35).

conscience or honesty", and "force and violence... is not to be thought of for the present". It would only disturb Christendom and prevent the General Council.[58]

As for enforcement of the sentence, Charles was not likely to make such commitments with a major war in train with Islam - one against France (with German Lutherans intervening) also seeming imminent - any more than France would abandon a possible ally against him. Rome being less eager than hitherto to issue unenforceable depositions, deadlock was inevitable.

Chapuys' constant theme was the discontent of the English nobility, and that "the least effort on the part of Your Majesty would be the means of working the King's perdition and ruin". "Words at this time will be of no avail and a stronger remedy is needed". He reported the English fear of an embargo, followed by more active measures, as showing their weakness.[59] "Mild treatment only hardens these people, but severity softens them".[60] A papal sentence might work alone, "but unless the Pope acts at once, he will be deprived little by little of his authority here, and finally his censures will go unheeded."[61]

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[58] "Memorial sobre las cosas de Anglaterra", July 1535; Consulta of 31st May: *CSP Sp. V.1*, Nos 187, 173 ; cf *CSP Ven. V*, No 68: to Antonio Surian (Rome), 7th Aug.

[59] Chapuys to Charles V, 1st Jan. 1535; to Nicholas de Granvelle, 23rd May: *CSP Sp. V.1*, Nos 122 (incidentally, casting doubt on the idea that a mere embargo could override Flemish vested interests), 166; cf to Granvelle, 30th June & 25th Sept; to Charles, 14th Jan, 25th April, 5th May: *CSP*, Nos 179, 206; 127, 151, 156.

[60] Chapuys to Charles V, 4th Dec. 1530; cf 2nd May: *CSP Sp. IV*, Nos 522, 948.

[61] Mattingly, *Catherine of Aragon*, p 255.

Chapuys lamented to Antoine de Granvelle the lack of an imperial decision: "Please God to dispose matters in such a way that the Emperor's tardiness may not be the cause of our losing the Princess {Mary}... His Majesty ought to treat and negotiate, no matter with whom, to revenge the injury which these people have committed against God, and against His Majesty and all his relatives". He stressed to Charles his belief that a forceful policy was less likely to endanger Catherine and Mary than the current one, which left Cromwell continually hinting the desirability of their demise. Unfortunately, Chapuys was unable to devise any scheme to guarantee their safety.[62] Charles' reply was to deplore the situation, but say that he was too committed elsewhere to do anything, and they must trust in God.[63]

Ireland could be, as Philip II was to show, a useful theatre for a limited effort. Geraldine propaganda claimed that Charles V would send an army from Spain (not Flanders) - 7 or 10,000 men in the few instances that were specific - even if its arrival had to be put back from May 1535 to March 1536, and then until later that year. English intelligence from Spain claimed that Charles V "dowtis not to have Erlonde *and* England".[64] This had

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[62] Chapuys to Antoine de Granvelle, 20th Jan. 1535: *CSP Sp. V.1,* No 128; cf to Charles, 4th, 7th & 23rd Mar, 17th April, 5th & 8th May; reply, 10th May: *CSP,* Nos 138/9, 142, 150/1, 156/7, 159; Chapuys to Charles, 9th & 25th Feb; Nicholas de Granvelle, 23rd Mar: *LP VIII,* Nos 189, 263, 431.

[63] Charles to Chapuys, 26th Feb. 1535: *CSP Sp. V.1,* No 135.

[64] Lord Justice Allen to Cromwell, 26th Dec. 1534; Archbishop Allen to same, 16th Feb. 1535 (*Cal. Carew I,* No 48); Ossory to Grey, 17th Jan; John Cheyton to

however no basis beyond the wishes and talk of Ambassador Chapuys. The FitzGeralds got only "prayers and promises".[65]

With Catherine of Aragon finally dying, the French began again to trumpet marriage projects as a method of accomplishing reconciliation quietly. Anne's definitive fall brought the brief conviction, apparently fostered by Wallop the Ambassador in Paris, that "that strayed soul" would return to Rome. Rival Tudor-Habsburg marriage proposals went into circulation.[66] But both Valois and Habsburgs wanted a statutory legitimisation of Mary for this end. Upon this depended a singular trilateral plan for Mary to marry François' second son, and Charles to provide his niece's dowry, in the form of the Duchy of Milan, long coveted by France.

The Nuncio at Venice had already heard rumours that Henry had sent his submission to the Pope.[67] And even the papal Secretary seemed to regard Catherine's death as a possible occasion for the turning of a new leaf.[68] François I by contrast openly doubted this.[69] The eclipse of Chabot's influence by

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Cromwell (from Cadiz), 16th July; examination of John Dyrrham, May 1536: *SP,* III. 221, 227, 230, 237, 247, 317.

[65] Ellis, "Kildare Rebellion", p 825. See Spanish Council's Consulta, 31st Oct. 1534: *LP VII,* No 1336.

[66] Carpi to Ricalcati, 27th Mar, 8th, 10th & 24th May,17th & 26th June 1536: *Nunziatura di Pio,* pp 423, 454/5, 460, 469, 472 (*LPX,* Nos 570, 813, 830, 956, 1162, 1212). Cf *Correspondance du Cardinal du Tournon,* p 103: to Cardinal du Bellay, 12th Feb.

[67] Girolamo Verallo to Ricalcati, 8th Mar. 1536: *Nunziatura di Venezia II,* p 54.

[68] Ricalcati to Carpi, 13th Feb. 1536: *Nunziatura di Pio,* p 388. There were echoes of this view even when Ferrerio became Nuncio in France - to Ricalcati, 2nd Aug. 1537: *ANG I,* p 306. Cf Paul to Casale, 27th May 1536: *LP X,* No 977.

[69] Carpi to Ricalcati, 10th July 1536: *Nunziatura di Pio,* p 486.

Montmorency's had caused a distinctly more Anglophobic stance in Paris. Anyway, with Catherine dead, Henry no longer had a running dispute with Charles. François understood the latter to have besought Henry, if so far unsuccessfully, to "forget what occurred between them by occasion of his late aunt, *estant apres cessee l'occasion...* moreover, to remove and banish all suspicion and root of enmity and dissension, to renew the old treaties of amity and alliance between them".[70] This was despite the widespread and inevitable belief that Catherine had been poisoned. Ferdinand I complained only "a little of the King, in measured terms".[71]

Then came the Pilgrimage of Grace. Early reports to Rome were excessively optimistic, if unsure (with reason) that Henry would honour the concessions promised.[72] Rome sent Pio di Carpi, who was slightly more sceptical about the opportunities offered, five copies of the Bull against Henry "issued... many days ago", to be published as he saw fit. Reginald Pole had offered "to execute {=publish} the censures against the King and to do anything else His Holiness deems necessary to return that King to sanity". The Curia also placed great hopes in James V. But, ultimately, it left everything to the Nuncio's discretion, and

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[70] Instructions for Dinteville & Castelnau, 19th April: *Correspondance Politique de MM de Castillon & Marillac,* ed. J Kaulek (Paris 1885), pp 1-2 (*LP X,* No 759).

[71] *CSP Ven. V,* No 90: Francesco Contarini, 3rd Feb. 1536.

[72] Moroni to Paul III, 28th Dec. 1536: *NBD 1533/59,* ll. 93/4; cf *CSP Ven. V,* Nos 125/6, 130: Lorenzo Bragadino (Ambassador in Vienna), 27th & 30th Nov; 22nd Dec.

stressed the importance of keeping the Bull secret if it were not in fact published. What mattered was whether Carpi succeeded in inducing the Most Christian King publicly to justify his title.[73]

Carpi did believe circumstances were favourable in late 1536 "to set the King of England again on the right path, one way or the other". The Montmorency faction had convinced him James V would be able to lead 140,000 troops to join 40,000 rebels. The Bull would render Henry "unworthy and impossible to be aided by anybody, at least openly", but Carpi concluded that the Bull was inappropriate "cessante causa" - presumably because Catherine was dead.[74] He deferred its publication until "a more auspicious time", though the French continued to urge it. He was finally persuaded to entrust a copy to the Scots, who were supposed to publish it within England.[75] The expectation of another Franco-Imperial war rendered its importation across the Channel impracticable. The French were backtracking now, and expressed a willingness only to have the Bull published "with discretion, so that that King could not complain to them". The rather oxymoronic idea of secret publication was not really helpful.[76] All they could suggest was to print the Bull in France with a false Flemish

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[73] Ricalcati to Carpi, 10th Nov. 1536: *Nunziatura di Pio,* pp 536/40; cf Moroni to Ricalcati, 7th Jan. 1537: *NBD 1533/59,* ll. 100. Cf *Correspondance du Cardinal du Tournon,* p 171 (22nd Mar), assuring François I that Pole was to follow his dictates.

[74] Carpi to Ricalcati, 26th Nov. 1536: *Nunziatura di Pio,* pp 542/6 (*LP XI,* No 1173). Cf "cessée l'occasion", in Dinteville & Castelnau's instructions.

[75] Carpi to Ricalcati, 6th Jan, 2nd & 18th Feb, 3rd & 5th Mar. 1537: *Nunziatura di Pio,* pp 572, 590, 595/6, 604/5 (*LP XII.1,* Nos 34, 326, 463, 563, 580).

[76] Carpi to Ricalcati, 28th Feb: *Nunziatura di Pio,* p 602 (*LP XII.1,* No 525).

flymark - a transparent attempt to embroil Henry and Charles.[77]

Pole had thought it best to start his mission in imperial territory, though there was, as usual, no stomach in the Netherlands for a quarrel with Henry.[78] The consequence was that France was unwilling to admit him; being willing enough however to cause Henry some "inconvenience", they suggested Pole might go to Scotland.[79] James was keenest on the use of the Bull, and said he would annex "a certain area" of northern England where Catholicism could be restored.[80]

In any case, the Pilgrimage of Grace, that enigmatic and rather incoherent amalgam of grievances, had great defects as a vehicle for foreign Catholic plans. The later, 1537, rising (which was all Cardinal Pole could conceivably have arrived in time for) was led by a definite Protestant, Sir Francis Bigod. Even the Lincolnshire part of the original rising had been willing to recognise the King as Supreme Head of the Church.[81] And if conservative religious sentiment was dominant in the most important, Yorkshire, rising, there was also under Aske's

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[77] C Hoellger, "Reginald Pole & the Legations of 1537 & 1539: Diplomacy & Polemical Responses to the Break with Rome" (Oxford DPhil thesis 1989), pp 28/9.

[78] Moroni to Ricalcati, 8th Jan. 1537: *NBD 1533/59*, ll. 103.

[79] Pole to Carpi, 27th Feb. 1537; Carpi to Ricalcati, 13th & 17th Mar: *Nunziatura di Pio*, pp 601, 610, 617 (last two *LP XII.1*, Nos 647, 675).

[80] Carpi to Ricalcati, 12th & 13th April 1537: *Nunziatura di Pio*, pp 628/9 (*LP XII.1*, Nos 923, 931).

[81] *LP XI*, No 853. Cf Elton, "Politics & the Pilgrimage of Grace", in *Studies in Tudor & Stuart Politics & Government* (Cambridge 1974/83), III. 202/4; also *Policy & Police*, pp 6ff.

leadership a fatal loyalism which could only lead to failure; even if another leader, probably Sir Thomas Tempest, insisted that counsellors should "regarde the communwelthe abuffe their princey's [mere will ?]", and made sinister allusions to the fates of Edward II and Richard II. And it does not seem to have struck the advocates of Scottish aid that the Percy connection, and Borderers generally, were not habitually pro-Scottish. In fact, the Pontefract Articles' most pressing argument for Mary's legitimation was "the danger of the title that myght incurre to the Crown of Scotland".[82]

Rumours were common that the Pope intended to give "the kingdom of England to the first who could take it", like Navarre;[83] also that the Pilgrimage was encouraged by"some copies' of the papal sentence "secretly sent to England".[84] The First Succession Act had already denounced, as a primary cause of succession disputes, the tendency of "the Bishop of Rome" (abetted by "foreign princes and potentates of sundry degrees") "contrary to the great and inviolable grants of jurisdiction given by God immediately to the Emperors, Kings and Princes in succession to their heirs... to invest who should please them to inherit in other men's kingdoms and dominions".[85]

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[82] *LP XI*, Nos 1244; 1246.

[83] Carpi to Ricalcati, 27th Nov. 1536: *Nunziatura di Pio*, p 547 (*LP XI*, No 1183). The Queen of Navarre cited the precedent as a reason why she opposed active measures against Henry - Ferrerio to Paul III, 22nd Mar. 1540: *ANG I*, p 550.

[84] Ortiz to Isabella, 24th Nov. 1536: *CSP Sp. V.2*, No 121.

In fact, it appears that in 1537 Rome still had not decided definitely to replace Henry, even with Mary. Pole still claimed to be working "to the security and honour of the King and the peace of the kingdom". His biographers attributed to him "much more zeal to return the King to the Catholic religion than to make war".[86] Montmorency however cheerfully predicted Henry's assassination. By 1537, the Nuncio, under his influence, envisaged the conversion of "the kingdom, if not the King".[87]

Rumblings were heard as usual from Ireland. The disgraced Lord Deputy Grey was later accused of having "lefte in effecte all the Kinge's artillerie in Irland in Galwey, whych was and is more redie there for the Bishop of Rome or Spanyardes, if thei had landed in thois parties, then for the King; as the reporte was that Cardynall Pole with an armye shuld have landed about this tyme, being the begynnyng of the somer aftir the insurrection of the Northe of England".[88]

The prospects for foreign intervention had not however brightened much. The French, after a breathing-space during 1536, were again feeling threatened by Charles V, against whom

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[85] 25 Henry VIII c 22; *SR* III. 471/4.

[86] Pole to Carpi, 21st April 1537: *Nunziatura di Pio,* pp 637/8 (*CSP Ven. V,* No 143). TF Mayer, "If Martyrs are to be exchanged with Martyrs: the kidnappings of William Tyndale & Reginald Pole", *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte* 81 (1990), p 307, quoting Ludovico Beccadelli's *Vita,* published in 1561. Andras Dudic's later trn. omitted the possibility of war. Cf Hoellger, "Pole & the Legations", pp 21ff.

[87] Carpi to Ricalcati, 4th Dec. 1536 & 19th Jan. 1537: *Nunziatura di Pio,* pp 555, 583 (*LP XI,* No 1250; *XII.1,* No 165).

[88] Irish Council's charges against Grey, Oct. 1540: *SP,* III. 251.

they declared themselves ready to employ not only the Turk but the Devil himself.[89] Castillon, the French Ambassador in London, who had a habit of sending more anti-English reports to Montmorency besides those to the King, told even the latter that Henry had been unhappy to rely on France alone and, pleased by imperial overtures, now sought to play the two powers off against each other (marriage offers being received from both after Jane Seymour's death). He did his best to persuade France of the fruitlessness of offers from Charles; but claimed with satisfaction that the latter had denied to him any intention of defending the authority of "the Bishop of Rome".[90] This was not however altogether true. The most Charles would offer was that, the Papacy's supremacy having been recognised in theory, its powers should be devolved to a perpetual legate (probably the Archbishop of Canterbury). Henry, irritated, offered again to ally against Charles with François, if the latter would in turn become a declared foe of the Pope.[91]

The mooting of a Farnese-Habsburg marriage alliance abruptly destroyed all possibility of French cooperation against England. The Nuncio Carpi, by now thoroughly indoctrinated by his

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[89] Carpi to Ricalcati, 30th Jan. 1537, cf 26th Jan: *Nunziatura di Pio,* pp 587; 584/5 (*LP XII.1,* Nos 296; 249).

[90] Castillon to François, 30th Dec. 1537, 10th Jan. & 2nd Feb. 1538; cf 25th July, & to Montmorency, 2nd Aug: *Correspondance Politique,* pp 9-10, 14-15, 19-22; 73/7 (*LP XII.2,* No 1285; *XIII.1,* Nos 56, 204, 1451; *XIII.2,* No 23).

[91] Castillon to Montmorency, 8th April 1538; to François, 19th June: *Correspondance Politique,* pp 37, 61/2 (*LP XIII.1,* Nos 713, 1215).

host court, lamented that this development would end with France "alienated from obedience to the Apostolic See and joined with England", and an eruption of war and schism to the ruin of the Church and the world; it would entail "perpetual disgrace to the Pope and irreparable damage to the Apostolic See".[92] From regarding Pole with disfavour, the French now went so far as to cooperate with English plans to assassinate or kidnap him (these alternatives would probably come to the same thing in the end).[93] The claims of 1536/7 on the "incredible ease" with which James V could overthrow Henry, given only a little French support, however continued to be made, while Rome made new plans to publish Henry's excommunication in Scotland.[94]

In late 1538, after the violation of St Thomas Becket's tomb, the Pope, having "much to heart... the great impiety and fury of the English tyrant", tried to persuade François and Charles "to observe and have observed" his Bull of Excommunication; though the absolution of Henry's subjects from fealty was mentioned, the main stress was on the proposed economic embargo. But the Pope himself abetted a distraction by recommending simultaneously

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[92] Carpi to Ricalcati, 25th April & 2nd June 1537: *Nunziatura di Pio*, pp 642/4, 651 (latter *LP XII.2*, No 16).

[93] Carpi to Ricalcati, 21st April 1537: *Nunziatura di Pio*, p 602 (*LP XII.1*, No 996); Pole to Carpi: *Ibid*, pp 634/5 . Cf Mayer, "A Diet for Henry VIII: the Failure of Reginald Pole's 1537 Legation", *J. of British Studies* 26 (1987), pp 309/10; Hoellger, "Pole & the Legations", pt. 3.

[94] Cardinal Carpi to Cardinal Farnese, 26th Mar. 1538; Ferrerio to same, 20th Dec. 1538 & 8th Jan. 1539: *ANG I*, pp 357, 420, 431/2.

"the Turkish enterprise". The effort quickly lapsed.[95]

The French Ambassador in England, Castillon, urged, in his correspondence with Montmorency, if not the King, the promotion of a policy employing papal excommunications and interdicts to justify a commercial embargo, "which without further expense would stir up the people of England, and compel their King to be reconciled with the Church, and do other things which would be useful to hinder him". Most often, however, Castillon referred to this policy as intended to force Henry "to do what we wish", the Pope being merely a useful pawn.[96] "Once things are quietened [here], he will not leave you... in peace and will not forget the arrears of his pension." This pension indeed occupied a somewhat disproportionate place in Anglo-French relations; and it seemed that renunciation of it, and perhaps of the title of King of France, was all the French aimed at. Possibly all that was needed to achieve this was mere ostentation of French friendship with Pope and Emperor to feed English fears.[97]

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[95] Farnese to Verallo, 27th Dec. 1538, cf 30th Dec: *Nunziatura di Venezia II,* pp 214/6. Reference to Henry as "quel tiranno" was an increasing trend - eg Aleander to Durante (papal secretary), 14th June 1539: *NBD 1533/59,* IV. 95; Dandino to Farnese, 21st June, 5th & 18th Dec. 1543: *ANG III,* pp 234, 292, 300; same to Santa Fiora, 14th Aug & 4th Oct. 1546; to Farnese, 20th Jan, 8th, 11th & 19th Feb. 1547: *VI,* pp 73, 89, 134, 141/4, 153. Hoellger, "Pole & the Legations", p 222 - Pole to Granvelle, 11th April 1539: "Re, se Re si deve chiamare..."

[96] Castillon to Montmorency, 2nd & 14th Feb, 12th Aug 1538: *Correspondance Politique,* pp 22/3, 25, 83 (*LP XIII. 1,* Nos 204, 274; *XIII.2,* No 78). This was not a new proposal - cf Ottonello Vida (Vergerio's auditor) to Ricalcati, 2nd Oct. 1535; Vergerio himself to same, 15th Oct: *NBD 1533/59,* I. 519, 524; now, Farnese to Aleander, 17th Dec. 1538: III. 304.

[97] Castillon to Montmorency, 1st Mar. 1538; cf 8th & 18th July: *Correspondance Politique,* pp 30, 67/8, 72/3 (*LP XIII.1,* Nos 390, 1337, 1451); & 31st Dec,

By late 1538, Castillon had become more ambitious. If a collaborative boycott with Charles were possible, it would then be easy to partition England between Valois, Habsburg and Stewart: "the business could not last more than a month or six weeks". He labelled England "cruel and heretical", and concluded: "so that our Holy Father *should not be forgotten in this,* [England] will all return to his obedience". But the Pope had almost been forgotten, because the aim on which he harped far more consistently was "to annihilate and destroy for ever the source and root of all the evils which have formerly occurred in France".[98] But it soon appeared that François refused to take any such steps unless Charles did so first. According to the Nuncio Ferrerio, Castillon himself later had second thoughts about the embargo, as possibly hurting the Continent more than England.[99] Reginald Pole, again waiting on the spot, was left in "a farcical situation". Apparently, Catholic princes "truckle to that tyrant and do not wish to withdraw their ambassadors from him".[100]

The same scheme was advocated by Latino Giovenale, the Pope's Scottish envoy. François and Charles were both to break off diplomatic relations, blockade the country and, when this

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with Castelnau (then Ambassador to Spain) to same, 26th Nov: G Ribier, *Lettres et Mémoires d'Estat* (Paris 1666), I. 350/1, 261/3 (*LP XIII.2,* Nos 915, 1163).

[98] Castillon to Montmorency, 30th Dec. 1538: Ribier, *Lettres et Mémoires d' Estat,* I. 342/3 (*LP XIII.2,* No 1163).

[99] Ferrerio to Farnese, 9th Feb. & 4th Mar. 1539: *ANG I,* pp 443, 448/9.

[100] Hoellger, "Pole & the Legations", pp 172ff; Farnese to Aleander, 1st May 1539; *NBD 1533/59,* IV. 36/7.

seemed to have weakened it sufficiently, invade. James V would assist (though with only 60,000 men rather than the 140,000 attributed to him earlier), and Henry would be helpless. A southern-eastern-northern partition between the three allies was a possibility, but it might seem wiser, considering English natural enmities, simply to replace "that tyrant" with another native king, by the authority of the Pope and by the agreed choice (if possible !) of François, Charles and "the people".[101]

Neither François nor Charles however betrayed enthusiasm for the plan. Even the letters of the French Ambassador became less bellicose, when a replacement for Castillon arrived after a delay that prompted the English to fear a rupture of relations. Marillac, though equally devoted to Montmorency, proposed only that France should play on English fears of a combination with Pope and Emperor to exact concessions (perhaps his previous posting, in Constantinople, had accustomed him to regarding objectionable *régimes* with greater equanimity).[102] By early 1540, he reported that sinister "bruits" were fewer once Cardinal Farnese's legation in France ended.[103]

Paul III wished Charles V would concentrate on England

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[101] Latino to Farnese, 21st Jan. 1539: *ANG I*, pp 438/40.

[102] Marillac to Montmorency, 2nd April 1539; to François I, 13th July: *Correspondance Politique*, pp 88, 112/4 (*LP XIV.1*, Nos 670, 1260). Montmorency replied (7th July) that the Pope was pressing France to fight Henry, but without effect: *Ibid*, pp 110/1 (*LP*, No 1230).

[103] Marillac to François I, 3rd Feb. 1540; to Montmorency, 26th Mar: *Correspondance Politique*, pp 167, 173/4 (*LP XV*, Nos 289, 401).

rather than the German Lutherans, believing that the latter might well fall into line if only Henry was dealt with.[104] He blamed Charles for "our losing England, as had he not promised to attack King Henry, Clement would not have published the sentence" (insofar as he had published it).[105] The Emperor however had opposite priorities, and had no time for the English projects of Cardinal Pole as tending only to antagonise Henry and force him into alliance with the Germans.[106] It appeared, as one Nuncio to France wrote, that the inertia of Catholic princes would allow Henry "to live more easily than he deserves".[107]

Irish dissidents did their best "to excite th'Emperor, the Frenche King and other forreyn Princes to take their partes. Which, thoughe it apperith to men of wisedom to be a vayne ymaginacion, yet therby their corrupt malicious hartes doth appere". The latest information was however that this unachievable coalition would invade England, and only the Scots intervene in Ireland directly. "The Friers and preestes of all the Yrishtree... do preache dayly that every man ought for the salvacion of his sowle, [to] fight and make warr ayenste Our

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[104] Eg Vergerio to Ricalcati, 13th Nov. 1535: *NBD 1533/59,* l. 543; Ferrerio to Farnese, 9th Dec. 1538: *ANG I,* p 416; A von Druffel, "Kaiser Karl V und die Roemische Curie, 1544/6: IV", in *Abhandlungen der historischen Classe der koeniglichen bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* 19 (1889/91), p 489.

[105] *CSP Ven. V,* No 132: Bragadino, 3rd Jan. 1537.

[106] Marques de Aguilar's instructions for Frankfurt Diet, 15th Sept. 1539: Doellinger, *Dokumente zur Geschichte Karls V, Philipps II und ihrer Zeit,* pp 26/8.

[107] Hieronimo Dandino to Farnese, 31st Dec. 1540: *ANG III,* p 15.

Soverayne Lord the Kinge's Majestie and his trewe subjectes, and if any... dy in the quarrell, his sowle... shall goo to Heven, as the sowle[s] of Saynt Peter, Pawle and others, which soffered death and marterdom for Gode's sake".[108]

Cromwell's fall and the abandonment of the Lutheran alliance policy virtually eliminated any imperial interest in anti-English moves. It also, like Anne Boleyn's fall, gave rise to over-optimistic Catholic hopes of spontaneous reconciliation.[109] Papal policy however remained to promote active measures, in theory. But this effort was so obviously forlorn that little effort was put into it, compared to the always pressing Franco-Imperial questions. The Nuncio in France wrote to Cardinal Farnese in 1541, "If the Emperor's and King of France's affairs were not in the state they are, you could reasonably have resurrected the practice for the enterprise against England, but the time is not propitious; the more so since Your Eminence has sent me no report of your [last] conversation with the King".[110]

The Boulogne war spawned a succession of Irish "bruits", if "not so likely in all partes to us, as we judge the same to be

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[108] Examinations of Connor Mor O'Connor & Thomas Lynch, July 1539: *SP,* III. 139/41. Cf *SP,* X. 231 on papal efforts to achieve Franco-Imperial cooperation. Marillac to Montmorency, 21st May 1540, for "bruits" of James V's aim to seize Ireland as a papal escheat - *Correspondance Politique,* pp 185/6 (*LP XV,* No 697).

[109] Eg Ferrerio to Farnese, 30th June 1540: *ANG I,* pp 571/2. Cf Marillac to François I, 10th June, on the dependence of the "innovations" on Cromwell: *Correspondance Politique,* pp189/90 (*LP XV,* No 766).

[110] Capodiferro, 6th Aug. 1541; cf 27th Dec. for François on his "irons in the fire": *ANG III,* pp 70/1, 97/8.

true", of FitzGerald being about to sail from Brittany with 9, 10 or 15,000 Frenchmen to various possible points, even as far north as Derry.[111] François I also suddenly found himself in need of papal absolution for his previous English alliance; association with heretics had not troubled him while it had still been useful.[112] It seemed that he might finally become a means "to punish, with God's help, that wicked man the King of England".[113] To this end, the Pope proposed to make a military contribution to this war, which he considered of greater importance even than the Turkish. This proposal was received equivocally by the French. Though Rome tried to persuade them to insist on English reconciliation to the Church as a condition of peace, it soon became apparent that, predictably, they were only pursuing their own interests.[114] When he was at war with Henry, François I developed a sudden interest in a General Council proceeding "to condemn that tyrant and force the Emperor to abandon him". When he made peace, he promptly abandoned this idea and instead spread rumours encouraged by the increasing religious conservatism of Henry's last year that he intended reconciliation

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[111] Lord Justice Brabazon to Henry, 20th May & 13th June 1544; cf St. Leger to Wriothesley, 26th Feb. 1545; to PC, 11th May: *SP*, III. 501/6; 521/2.

[112] *SP*, IX. 582.

[113] Dandino to Farnese, 1st July 1543; cf 5th Dec: *ANG III*, pp 235, 290.

[114] Guidiccione to Farnese, 30th April 1545; Cardinal Santa Fiora to Guidiccione, 19th April: *ANG III*, pp 342/5, 337/8; Dandino to Santa Fiora, 26th July 1546: *VI*, p 65; cf Druffel, "Kaiser Karl V und die Roemische Curie, 1544/6: IV", Beilage No 1, p 491: St Mauris to Charles, 12th Aug. 1545.

negotiations with the Council or with "the Bishop of Rome".[115]

Rome heard that the French obsequies of "that damned soul" had been attended by three Cardinals, notwithstanding "the declaration and sentence given against the said King of England, and the condition in which he died". In the Empire, it was determined to omit such a ceremony, "both so as not to annoy His Holiness and because it could not be done in conscience", especially as Charles had acted to obtain the original sentence against Henry. The Regent of the Netherlands, Mary of Hungary, however went her own way, citing the "ancient amity" with England and claiming Henry had repented *in articulo mortis.*[116]

The question of recognition of Henry's Protestant successor now arose. Edward VI was not obviously open to the same imputation of illegitimacy as Elizabeth, since all other possible wives were dead by the time Henry married Jane Seymour. To deny the validity of the dispensation for affinity would be an arid technicality not arousing the same passions as the Aragon-Boleyn question; in practice, nobody seems explicitly to have bothered with it. The sacrament itself would be valid, if irregular, in schism; it was however arguable that a public excommunicate was excluded from it. Yet papal representatives,

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[115] Dandino to Santa Fiora,14th Aug. 1546; cf 23rd & 28th Aug, 16th Sept, 4th & 8th Oct, 14th Nov: *ANG VI,* pp 73; 77, 81/4, 89-92, 101.

[116] Mortier to François I, 31st Mar. 1547: Ribier, *Lettres et Mémoires d'Estat,* I. 638; Dandino to Farnese, 6th & 23rd Mar: *ANG VI,* pp 166, 169/70; Weiss, *Papiers d'État de Granvelle,* III. 249; cf A von Druffel, "Die Sendung des Cardinals Sfondrato an den Hof Karls V, 1547/8", in *Abhandlungen der historischen Classe der koeniglichen bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* 20 (1891/3), p 315.

inadvertently or otherwise, sometimes called Jane Queen.[117]

In 1547 however, legates were directed to represent to Charles V, François I (soon dead) and James V that Henry had forfeited his kingdom for himself and his heirs through heresy and breach of fealty. Because of the former, "the boy now called King" "could not be legitimate or have a right to succeed"; because of the latter, England was a feudal escheat. The proposal was that Mary should, rather than inheriting the crown, be invested with it by Rome, and Edward be cut out. Alternatively, the Pole claim could be advanced if Habsburg aggrandisement seemed too dangerous.[118] Neither option however aroused enthusiasm. The marital and political excesses of Henry VIII had made it reasonable to represent him as an enemy of the Church, and his infringements of Habsburg honour had added an insult without which even such injuries would probably have been disregarded in most of Europe. But an attack on the basic rights of his apparently legitimate heir had sinister implications which were too much for most laymen. Reported statements at Rome that Edward was disqualified from kingship by excessive youth recalled Innocent

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[117] Eg Carpi to Ricalcati, 6th Jan. 1537: *Nunziatura di Pio,* p 571 (*LP XII.1,* No 34). Cf *CSP Ven. V,* No 109 (Bragadino, 5th July 1536), on the new "legitimate wife". Venice however had failed officially to reject Anne as "the Concubine".

[118] A "Discorso sopra le cose d'Inghilterra" was perverse in advocating the use of Charles V's power to instal, "without war or expense", Pole, not Mary - Druffel, "Sendung des Cardinals Sfondrato", Beilage No 5, pp 360/2. Quotation also there, from letter of Bonifazio Ruggieri to Duke of Ferrara, 19th Feb. 1547. Cf Dandino to Farnese, 8th Feb: *ANG VI,* p 142.

Ill's subversive doctrine of *idoneitas regalis*, and impugned centuries of acceptance of hereditary principle. Charles V, content for Mary to be recognised as heir presumptive and already beginning to consider a marriage alliance, had no further spur to his tepid family loyalty, though he deliberately proclaimed his friendship for the kingdom of England rather than Edward VI personally (so as not to prejudice Mary's rights, he said).[119] He also had the Schmalkaldic League to fight; and his career had shown him the Papacy as at best an occasional ally, as he told Cardinal Sfondrato. "We assured him that we should not fail to do our duty as a Christian prince in the English matter; but as to taking up arms, not only would we not do so against the King of England for the Pope, but we would not do so at his instance against the worst man alive. We understood his maneouvres too well, for he had drawn us into this enterprise in Germany, but left us in the lurch at the most critical point... In future, we intended to respect St Peter and not Pope Paul."[120]

The French were no more enthusiastic. The first reaction of the Nuncio Dandino was to describe Edward as "born outside all Christian wedlock". The influence of his host court caused him later to modify this to "born of a marriage *extra communionem*

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[119] Charles V to Van der Delft (his Ambassador in London), 22nd Feb. 1547: *CSP Sp. IX*, p 37. Van der Delft commented on the English fear that the Pope would incite Charles to action against them - 12th Feb. & 18th Mar: *CSP*, pp 32, 58.

[120] Charles V to Diego Hurtado de Mendoza (his Ambassador in Rome), 17th Mar. 1547: *CSP Sp. IX*, pp 54/5. Cf reply, 2nd May: Doellinger, *Dokumente zur Geschichte Karls V, Philipps II und ihrer Zeit*, pp 56/7 (*CSP*, App, p 502).

ecclesiae", which implied it might still be valid, and asked for a ruling on this. He accorded Edward in passing the title of King, even if he later thought it better to call him "the little tyrant".[121] This token demonstration was not pursued.

Roman Catholicism had failed lamentably to respond to the beginning of the English schism. Government propagandists warned, "who is the occasion and stirring up of war and strife in Christendome but the Pope and Papistis ?", and proclaimed the need for resolution "to withstande and resyste valiantly the Pope allthoughe he wolde threten them by M cursynges and excommunications".[122] Reality was an anticlimax, but still served to prepare Protestant consciousness to expect greater activity under Elizabeth - if also to indicate that such activity would not be easy to achieve. Specifically, it had been shown that the spirit of medieval Crusades against heretics (if not yet altogether that of Crusades against Moslems) was moribund, at least among Catholic princes. Their commitment to suppress heresy was, unless fortified by self-interest, mostly rhetorical.

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[121] Dandino to Farnese, 8th, 11th & 14th Feb. & 6th Mar. 1547: *ANG VI,* pp 142/5, 148, 165. The *extra communionem ecclesiae* formula was however taken to imply illegitimacy by Charles V's Ambassador in Paris, St Mauris - to Mary of Hungary, 6th Mar: *CSP Sp. IX,* App, pp 495/8. He accused the French of deliberately feeding the scare to alienate the English from Charles.

[122] *A Litel Treatise ageynste the Mutterynge of some Papistis in Corners* (1534), in Pocock, *Records of the Reformation,* II. 549/50; *Determinations of the Universities* (1531), in *Divorce Tracts of Henry VIII,* edd. Surtz & Murphy, pp 266/7.

EXCOMMUNICATION AND THE CATHOLIC LEAGUE:

THE PARANOID MYTHOS OF EARLY ELIZABETHAN ENGLAND

"*Kent:* ...There is division,
Although as yet the face of it is cover'd
With mutual cunning, 'twixt Albany and Cornwall;
Who have - as who have not, that their great stars
Thron'd and set high ? - servants, who seem no less,
Which are to France the spies and speculations
Intelligent of our state...
...From France there comes a power
Into this scatter'd kingdom; who already,
Wise in our negligence, have secret feet
In some of our best ports, and are at point
To show their open banner..."

King Lear, III.i.

"*Duke:* He turn conspirator ? Oh, the fate of princes !
But stay, this paper speaks of no particular;
He does not mention what design, what plot.
*Alonso:*More providence is necessary."

Shirley, *The Traitor,* I.ii.

"Trust not a civil foe
Which under coulour wisheth good.
For ere thyself doost knowe,
By craft he seeks to have thy blood."

Ralph Norris, *A Warning to London by the Fall of Antwerp* (1576/7)[1]

"Ever feare the worst, which discrete suspectt is the surest meanes under God of your defence"

Sir William Wentworth's advice to his son[2]

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[1] STC 18656, reprin. J Payne Collier, *Old Ballads from Early Printed Copies of the Utmost Rarity* (Percy Soc. 1840), p 90.

[2] *Wentworth Papers 1597-1628,* ed. JP Cooper, Camden Soc. IV.12 (1973),

The beginning of Elizabeth's reign was for English Protestants a time as much for apprehension as for rejoicing. Threatening international developments were aggravated by the possible consequences of religious change. Faced with the might of France and Spain, Elizabeth sought to avoid her half-sister's former dependence on the latter, while still maintaining friendship enough (or the ability to appeal to self-interest) for protection against the former. "To make a lewde comparason", one of Secretary Cecil's spies wrote, "I may lyken Inglande to a bone throwne betwyxt too dogges."[3] Italy was an awful precedent for loss of independence and reduction to a Habsburg-Valois battleground.[4]

Armagill Wade's "Distresses of the Comonwelth with the Meanes to remedy them" warned of the dangers of "the Ffrench King bestryding the Realme having one foote in Callais and thother in Scotland". The Spanish alliance was no compensation: "Stedfast enemys but no stedfast friendship abroade"; "So would I wyshe that you would procede to the riformacion havyng respect to quyet at home, th'affaires you have in hand wt. foreyn princes, the greatnes of the Pope, and howe daungerous it is to make

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pp 13-14.

3 "Alpha" (Robert Hogan) to Cecil, 1st Oct. 1559: KL II. 27 (*CSP For. IV,* No 3).

4 Christopher Mundt to Elizabeth, 31st May 1559: PRO SP 70/4, f 150v; Sir Nicholas Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 23rd Sept; to Cecil, 25th Oct: P Forbes, *A Full View of the Public Transactions of the Reign of Queen Elizabeth* (1740), I. 237, 253 (*CSP For. III,* Nos 794; 1360; *IV,* No 134); Paget to Cecil, 20th Feb. 1559: Haynes, *Burghley SP* , p 209 (HMC 9: *Hatfield MSS,* I, No 568).

alteracion in religion, sp[ec]ially in the begynnyng of a prince's reign. Glasses with small necks if you powre into them any li[q]o[ur] sudenly or violently will not be so fylled, but rifuse to receive that same that [you] powre into them; howbeit if you instill water into them by a littill and littill, they are sone replenisshed."

Another policy paper of November 1558, ascribed to Richard Goodrich, after a stout declaration of the English Church's independence from Rome, descended to pessimistic pragmatism, advising only the adoption of Henrician doctrine and caution with regard to any total break with the Pope. "It semyth very necessary well to consider of this matter ffor his weight and for the danger that may ensue before it be medlyd either by Parliament or otherwyse. Besydes many other examples King John off this Realme sometyme Kyng may be warnyng, who ffor his kyckyng att his {the Pope's} authoritie and dealing with the State of the Clergy was brought into the perill you know, to the danger off his State." This document did not mention secular powers, being concerned with ecclesiastical questions; but, despite a disquisition on the invalidity of papal excommunication in England, this still seemed to be "the perill" feared. It suggested Rome be fobbed off with talk of a forthcoming embassy.[5] The

[5] "The Distresses of the Commonwealth" & "Divers Points of Religion": PRO SP 12/1/66, 68. It *was* briefly proposed to send to Rome: Cecil's memo, 17th Nov. 1558: SP 12/1/2.

Catholic Viscount Montague, opposing the Supremacy Bill, similarly warned of the consequences "if the Pope, hearing us by schisme devided from the Churche, do proceede to the excommunication of the Realme... Uppon such a case our own countrymen {*sic*} and kynge of this Realme, King John, to what extremitie was he dryven by the like attempt in religion ?"[6]

The "Device for the Alteration of Religion" predicted that the Pope "will excommunicate the Queen's Highness, interdict the realm and give it to prey to all princes that will enter upon it; and incite them thereto by all manner of means. The French King will be encouraged more to the war and make his people more ready to fight against us..." If peace with France could be achieved however, the Pope could be virtually ignored; from him "nothing is to be feared but evil will, cursing and practising".[7] This did however assume that the peace would be stable; in the event, distrust of papally-supported French aggression continued strong after Cateau-Cambrésis.

Dean Wotton warned, even while negotiating the Treaty

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[6] 13th Mar. 1559: Hartley, *Proceedings in Parliament,* p 10. Montague also referred to the history of the Kingdom of Naples. Nicholas Heath, the Catholic Archbishop of York, also pointedly concluded his speech by noting the ecclesiastical authority of "excommunication and spirituall punishment of all suche as shall prove themselves not obedient children to the Churche of Christ" - *Ibid,* p 17. This followed reference to St Paul on the necessity of female silence in the Church. Both admonitions derive greater rhetorical stress from their final position than the "fairly conventional protestations of loyalty to the Queen", which is all PJ Holmes notes in the speech - *Resistance & Compromise: The Political Thought of Elizabethan Catholics* (Cambridge 1982), p 12 (cf ch 5 n 3).

[7] Dec. 1558: T-D II. 230/1, App. 33.

with the French, that treaties were "commenlye... deludidde and frustratidde that ar made with theym"; even more so when "the Scottishe Queene's faynidde tytle to the Crowne of England" provided such a tempting justification. In fact, even had French adherence to Cateau-Cambrésis been considered reliable, it would have provided no guarantee against this last, since under it, conflicting claims not specifically abandoned were reserved.[8] The Queen herself later adopted the same view, describing the French to Philip II as "utterly wt.out faith where their gayn may take place". When accused of unjustified suspicions about French proceedings in Scotland, she retorted, "they wch. have gyven the occacon of mystrust must not be offended, though they be not alwayes trusted". "We cannot but looke certe[n]ly for the contynualle mallice of the French."[9] Sir Nicholas Bacon warned eight months after the Treaty that the French King was about to attack England, and "the Bishopp of Rome, for the recov[er]y of such proffit as he by usurpacion, for Peter Pence and such lyke attaineth heere, will both w.th men and muney, and other Romishe practises, assist him and further his cause to the uttermost".[10]

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[8] Wotton to Boxall, 18th Nov. 1558: PRO SP 70/1, ff 8 (*CSP For. III,* No 7); Bacon to the Justices, Hilary 1559: BL Harl. MS 253, f 96v, etc; cf Cecil's "Short Discussion of the Weighty Matter of Scotland", Aug. 1559: R Keith, *History of the Affairs of Church & State in Scotland* (Edinburgh 1844/50), I. 370 (*Cal. Sc. I,* No 537).

[9] Draft instructions for Montague & Chamberlain, 23rd Jan. 1560: PRO SP 70/10, f 93; BL Cott. MS Vesp. Cvii, f 111r (*CSP For. III,* No 630); statement to the Bishop of Valence, 2nd April; Elizabeth to Montague & Chamberlain, 18th April: SP 70/13, ff 5v, 121 (*CSP For. VII,* No 1428; *CSP For. IV,* No 1020).

That the Elizabethan Settlement was accepted with extraordinarily little serious internal opposition was irrelevant. Though Bishop White of Winchester indulged in his sermon at Mary's funeral only in vague attacks on heresy, John Jewel, soon to be the Protestant incumbent of the neighbouring see of Salisbury, alleged that he had incited Catholics to kill the returning exiles. White and his colleague Watson of Lincoln were imprisoned and "their studyes and writyinges" searched for evidence that they were seeking Elizabeth's excommunication.[11]

The threat from the Papacy was symbiotic with the menace of the most plausible (and, potentially, powerfully-backed) alternative claim that an incumbent of the English throne had to face in the sixteenth century - that of Mary Stewart, Queen of Scotland and first "Dauphiness" and then Queen Consort of France. It was indeed Rome's attitude over Henry VIII's divorce that rendered Elizabeth's position unsure. It had been difficult to abandon a long tradition of acquiescence in pontifical authority over royal marriages; so that Henry himself had deemed it expedient to re-bastardise Elizabeth. A public papal declaration in favour of the Stewart claim was likely to be dangerously influential. A decade later, Cecil noted that "though King Henry

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[10] Bacon's PC speech, 23rd Dec. 1559: BL Harl. MS 253, f 88r (& other copies).

[11] Jewel to Peter Martyr, 26th Jan. 1559: *Zurich Letters,* PS, I, No 7; *APC VII,* p 78. On retrospective claims that the English bishops considered excommunicating Elizabeth, see JH Pollen, *The English Catholics in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth 1558/80* (1920), pp 45/6. He is surely right in concluding that mere build-up of rumour proved too hard for later writers to disregard.

the VIIIth and King Edward VIth had cause to dredd the fautors of Roome, who {*sic*} nevertheless had not so proudly displayed ther banners in this quarrell, as now the two monarchees {France and Spain; but a phrase with apocalyptic undertones} have and doo; yet nether King Henry nor King Edward had any person that pretnded any title to the Crown".[12]

A possible solution might have been for Elizabeth to seek legitimation by the Holy See. Her view of her regal dignity presumably forbade this move, that would leave her position dangerously dependent upon the will of a "foreign potentate", and condemn both her parents, the one as a schismatic, the other as a disgraced concubine. Moreover, Pope Paul IV was considered to be "all French", and therefore liable to favour Mary's claim anyway.[13] The legitimacy question would have been of itself conclusive in compelling Elizabeth to appeal to a Protestant constituency to secure her monarchy.

Men like Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, her Ambassador in France, exhorted Elizabeth to remember Mary's rival claim and "of

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12 "A Short Memoryall of the State of the Realme": Haynes, *Burghley SP,* p 585 (HMC 9: *Hatfield MSS,* I, No 1455). Cf Walsingham, warning Elizabeth in Sept. 1581 that a positive policy was necessary to balance the dangers of James VI's long-projected marriage to a Spanish Infanta - "If... a King of Scots, pretending title to the Crown of England, were like... to have wrought that peril to Your Majestie's father as he is towards you, he {Henry} would not then have stood upon generality as Your Majestie doth now": D Digges, *Compleat Ambassador* (1655), p 427. Walsingham was a great user of the phrase "two monarchies".

13 Sir Thomas Challoner (Ambassador to Philip II) to Cecil, 20th Dec. 1558: PRO SP 70/1, f 79v (*CSP For. III,* No 103); cf Paolo Tiepolo (Venetian envoy to Philip), 1st Feb. 1559 : *CSP Ven. VII,* No 16.

what relygion hyr kyn, hyr frends, her old & new alies gotten & sowght for, be & must be also"; she herself, then, could not "make any good accoumpt to hir suretye and proffict uppon the Papistes' welfare or smothe wordes... in them bitterness is desguysed wt. a barke of swetenes". A convinced Protestant like Throckmorton felt it best to continue to appeal to Elizabeth's political self-interest, warning her that it was too dangerous to alter even a purely "politic" religion, like that established by the Roman king Numa Pompilius, once it had been established in the state. Despite his protestations, this was implicitly unflattering to Elizabeth's own view of religion - and was the sort of thing that kept preventing Throckmorton's long-awaited (but never accomplished) appointment to the Privy Council.[14] It was this latter body which warned similarly on the occasion of Mary's marriage to Lord Darnley that "the mayntenance of the title stood in furthering of the religion of Rome within this realme, and in like manner the furtherance of the same religion stood by the title, for otherwise the title had no foundation".[15]

There were persistent rumours, early in Elizabeth's reign, of the French trying to persuade Paul IV to declare her ineligible for the throne, which resurfaced during her

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[14] Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 29th April 1561; to Dudley, 8th May 1562: PRO SP 70/25, ff 118/9 (also BL Add. MS 35830, ff 91/2); 70/37, f 56r (*CSP For. VI,* No 151;*VII,* No 31).

[15] PC paper, 4th June 1565: PRO SP 12/36/65.

confrontation with France over Scottish hegemony. Most of these rumours ascribed her ineligibility to illegitimacy, rather than to a more contentious papal power to deprive for heresy.[16] Such would perhaps be less provocative, as implying a less sweeping papal power; England had after all seen a royal deposition on the pretext of bastardy in 1483 (even if this had been denounced by the Tudors), without this involving a fundamental attack on the status of the Crown. Elizabeth later thanked Philip II for counteracting "the French practises at Rome".[17] France on the other hand was castigated regularly thereafter for the malevolence she had supposedly shown from the outset.[18]

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[16] Eg Cobham to Elizabeth, 13th Dec. 1558; Piero Paolo Vergerio to Sir Henry Killigrew, 1st Feb. 1559; Mundt to Cecil, 26th April 1559, & to Elizabeth, 31st May: PRO SP 70/1, f 63; 2, f 91r; 3, f 162v; 4, f 150v: Sir Edward Carne (Mary's Ambassador in Rome) to Elizabeth, 31st Dec. 1558: BL Cott. MS Cal. Bix, f 208 (synopsis of burnt Cal. Ev, f 81)(*CSP For. III,* Nos 82, 297, 569, 794; 160/1); Piero Pelido to Cosimo de Medici, 25th Jan. 1559: A Desjardins, *Négotiations Diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane, CDIF* (5 vols,1854/75), III. 396; GC Bayne, *Anglo-Roman Relations 1558/65* (Oxford 1913), pp 235/6, 247 (Apps. 2, 11); 23. Rumours heard by the Venetian Ambassador with Philip II, Michiel Surian, spoke of the grounds of both illegitimacy and heresy being employed - 10th Dec. 1558: *CSP Ven.VI,* No 1293.

[17] Elizabeth to Challoner, 25th Dec. 1559 (for a statement to Margaret of Parma): KL II. 145 (*CSP For. IV,* No 495); instructions for Montague and Chamberlain's embassy, 23rd Jan. 1560: BL Cott. MS Galba Ci, ff 31v, 35v & Vesp. Cvii, f 109v, & PRO SP 70/10, ff 81/3; Elizabeth to Montague & Chamberlain, 18th April: Vesp. Cvii, f 148; SP 70/13, f 126; complaints against French, 20th April: SP 70/13, f 143 (*CSP For. IV,* Nos 629, 1020, 1040).

[18] Eg Cecil's "Breff Notes to Prove the French Evill Meaning towardes England", Aug. 1559: PRO SP 12/6/34 (including their "practise at Roome for bulles" and "practise... at Chasteau in Cambresy"), & " Short Discussion of the Weighty Matter of Scotland", Aug. 1559: Keith, *Affairs of Church & State in Scotland,* I. 370 (*Cal. Sc. I,* No 537); Sir Thomas Smith to Elizabeth, 31st Mar. 1563: SP 70/53, f 153 (*CSP For. VIII,* No 548: unluckily misreading "pursuit at Rouen" for "Rome").

Rather than rushing into confrontation, the Papacy in fact resorted to diplomatic approaches. This did not neutralise English suspicions. Pius IV's despatch of the Nuncio Parpaglia in 1560 was easy to consider as sinister, coming as it did at the brink of open war over Scotland with Catholic France (to which Parpaglia was known as over-favourable), and with the possibility of it with Spain as well. Parpaglia was not considered, by either English or Spanish, to come "with the gentlest of exhortations and most attractive of bribes to return to the bosom of the Church".[19]

The Bishop of Ely's view of the confrontation with France was that "the perfidy and ambition of the French [King], *at the instigation of the Antichrist of the Church,* are threatening to occasion us some trouble".[20] It was reported to Cecil from Italy, that Parpaglia was to work in conjunction with France and Spain "to diswade the Quenys Ma[jes]te frome th'ayde of the Scots... Yne case Herre Ma[jes]te wyll not yelde, the Pope's comisary will have authoryte to procyde further wt. the sensurs or cursis of the church, and denounse Herre Ma[jes]te a rebell to the same; and that likewise forthwth... France and Spayne will thretyn Herre Ma[jes]te... wth. wars and the temporall swerde." Sir Thomas Gresham, English financial agent in Flanders, thought that Parpaglia was sent "wythe the conssent of the Emperor, the King

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[19] AF Pollard, *History of England from the Accession of Edward VI to the Death of Elizabeth* (1910), p 236.

[20] Cox to Peter Martyr, Jan. 1560 (?): *Zurich Letters,* I, No 28.

of Spayne and the Frenche King, to come into Inglande to p[er]ssawde wth. the Quene's Ma[jes]te for the subverssione of the pressent state of Religione". At the beginning of that year, he had heard rumours "that the bysshope of Rome haythe excom[m]onocatyd Ingland and Scoteland".[21] Elizabeth was alarmed into reimprisoning the deprived Catholic bishops, allegedly to prevent "secrette practises entended amonge them".[22]

Another nuncio, Martinengo, was despatched the following year to invite Elizabeth to send to the Council of Trent, and again got no further than Flanders. Cecil made a timely discovery of an illegal Mass network in Essex "to the breache of good order and religion"[23], based on the Wharton and Waldegrave families, a dubious cult of a miraculous arboreal Cross in Glamorgan, and another (secretly-entered) papal emissary, David Wolfe, in Ireland. These sufficed to convince the Privy Council that Martinengo could not be admitted without "great perill and

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[21] John Shers to Cecil, 18th May 1560, cf 11th & 25th May, 28th Sept: PRO SP 70/14, ff 91r; cf 68v/9; 120r; 18, f 172v; Sir Thomas Gresham to Parry, 16th June: SP 70/15, f 44r (*CSP For. V,* Nos 108, 74, 128, 569; 194); same to Cecil, 22nd Jan: SP 70/10, f 69r (*CSP For. IV,* No 617). Philip II's ambassador De Quadra reported such rumours on 7th Mar: *CDIE* 87, p 285 (*CSP Sp.I,* No 92).

[22] Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 10th Oct. 1560: PRO SP 70/19, f 16r (*CSP For. V,* No 619).

[23] Oxford to PC, 19th April 1561: PRO SP 12/16/50. Though, "besides the [Mass] trompery", he could not "fynde any cause or presumpcon wherby [Wharton's] faithe and allegiaunce to the State were any whit impayred" - see E Rose, *Cases of Conscience: Alternatives open to Recusants & Puritans under Elizabeth I & James I* (Cambridge 1975), p 34.

inconven[ien]cy". If only the Irish affair had immediate political implications, all were regarded as subversive of the civil order, since "nothing doth more damage to the Comonweal then either changes against law or opinions, or hopes of changes". "Only the noise or sounde of the coming of a nuncio hath wrought in sundry evill disposed p[er]sons such a boldness and courage as they have not let both to breake the laws with great audacitie and to disp[er]se abroad false and slanderous reports, of the Queen's Ma[jes]ty's disposition to change her religion..." Hints rather than definite statements were added concerning the intention of Parpaglia "to have stirred a rebellion in this realme by collour of religion", and "the travaill th[a]t Her Ma[jes]ty's adversaries have made and doe make to disprove Her Ma[jes]ty's right and title by collour of the Pope's laws". Bacon allegedly went so far as to say that anyone advocating Martinengo's admission was guilty of high treason.[24]

Cecil wrote to Throckmorton: "whan I sawe that Romish influe[n]ce towardes, about one mo[n]th past, I thought necessary to dull the Papistes' expectatio[n] by discoveryng of certen massmo[n]gers and punishy[n]g of them... I take God to record I

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[24] PC papers, May 1561: PRO SP 12/17/1-3; Roman newsletter, June: ed. Bayne, *Anglo-Roman Relations,* App. 32, p 272. Even the crypto-Catholics Arundel, Derby and Mason signed the Council's rejection of Martinengo. WP Haugaard, *Elizabeth & the English Reformation* (Cambridge 1964), pp 300/1, believes that Elizabeth was only diverted at the last minute from admitting him. Cf Wiener, "Popular anti-Catholicism", *P & P* 1971, p 51. De Quadra's claimed this to defend earlier hopes: to Philip, 5th May & 3rd June: *CDIE* 87, p 285 (*CSP Sp. I,* Nos 128, 132).

meane no evill to any of the[m], but onely for the rebatyng of the Papistes' humors, which by the Q. Ma[jes]ty's lenyte grow to rank. I fynd it hath done much good."[25] Bishop Jewel of Salisbury concluded from the episode that "the Pope both in public and private is plotting mischief to the utmost of his power". He had heard that Martinengo was "still loitering in Flanders. They still hope that something may be done; for all their roots of folly are not yet plucked up, and there are still remaining some persons whom they doubt not to belong to their party."[26] Wharton, Waldegrave and the other Catholics arrested were asked "whatt ordre thouyght you wold be divysed and put in use ffor the reformacion off such as wolde not cume and send to the Cunsaill, nor obey the ordres and decrees th[er]off ?"[27]

The Mass incidents grew in the telling to become "some treason that the Catholics plotted against the Queen's own person". Another European account however said simply, "Her Majesty of England, through lack of good counsel rather than ill will, was persuaded not to receive M. Martinengo, the Pope's Nuncio."[28] The English government complained to Philip II of "the dooble and suspicious dealing and proceadyng of the Pope, in

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[25] 8th May 1561: PRO SP 70/26, f 61r (*CSP For. VI,* No 187).

[26] To Bullinger, 9th Feb. 1562: *Zurich Letters,* PS, I, No 44.

[27] April 1561: PRO SP 12/15/66.

[28] "...Alguna traicion q[ue] los catholicos ordinacian contra la propria persona della [Reyna]"; "la ser[re]n[issim]a Regina d'Inghilterra, per difetto di buon consiglio più che per mala volonta s'è lasciata persuadere di non dover accettare Monsr. Martinengo, nuntio del Papa" - Spanish & Italian newsletters, 14th June 1561: PRO SP 70/27, ff 22r, 26r (*CSP For. VI,* Nos 246/7).

sending a message to Yor Ma[jes]tie one waye, whilest by another he... sought to stir yor subjectes to rebellion" (the same problem was to arise even more acutely in 1580, when Campion's and Persons' English pastoral expedition coincided with Sanders' armed Irish one). Philip was however as sceptical as he diplomatically could be about this alleged Irish incitement, and did not consider the whole an adequate reason for spurning the conciliar summons.[29]

A statute of 1563 reinforced the Act of Supremacy of four years before, and increased the penalties for its breach, for first offences, to the penalty of *praemunire* (ie life and goods lying at the monarch's mercy, though in practice it was only the latter which were likely to suffer). Catholic strength in the House of Lords produced an amendment, establishing that while hitherto it had been "doubtfull whether... ther bee any punishement for such as kill or slea any p[er]son... attaynted... upon a Preminire", such unauthorised killing now certainly *was* illegal. There was one exception to this. "Any p[er]son... that shall sende or bring into this Realme... or wth.in the same shall execute any so[m]mons, sentence, exco[mun]icacon or other proces against any p[er]son... from the Bushoppe of Rome" could claim no protection from English law whatsoever. It was evident enough who was the person who must urgently needed protection from such

[29] Chamberlain to Elizabeth & to Cecil, 14th July 1561; cf same to Throckmorton, 31st July: PRO SP 70/28, ff 46, 49; cf 105 (*CSP For. VI,* Nos 314/5; 356).

summonses and sentences.[30]

The Catholic League: a Panoptic View of Europe

In the event, the Catholic threat to Elizabethan England developed only as a result of a coincidence of interests other than pure confessional antagonism. There were important secular political elements even in those exaggerated fears which ran ahead of the reality. These elements however varied greatly in intensity even during the first quarter to third of Elizabeth's reign. If fear of France, fear of Spain, fear of the Stewart claim and fear of internal rebellion featured in successive sequences and combinations, coherence was still possible if all were placed under an umbrella of papal intrigue. The menace of Rome was indeed an almost comforting constant in a succession of bewildering political fluctuations, particularly in the period 1568/72 - at the end of which, one Parliamentarian saw "no enemie to all Christendome more to be feared then the Pope".[31] And if a priority of nationalistic antipathies might be hard to establish when France, Spain and a nebulous Anglo-Scottish Stewart faction jostled confusingly for the position of principal

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[30] 5 Eliz. I, c 1, § 18 (*SR* IV. 1, p 405); Bacon's speech, 10th April 1563: Hartley, *Proceedings in Parliament,* p 111; cf GR Elton, *The Elizabethan Parliament 1559/81* (Cambridge 1986), pp 180/1.

[31] Thomas Atkins: Hartley, *Proceedings in Parliament,* p 377 (Cromwell's Journal, 23rd May 1572).

threat, all could be comprehended by the umbrella concept of the Catholic League.[32]

If this was originally a German Lutheran invention, it is very misleading to depict it, as does the most detailed investigator of the major 1580 scare, as then novel in England - even writing "the only one of these multifarious rumours with which the historian of the English Catholics need concern himself is that which was current during the year 1580".[33] On the contrary, the myth had fundamentally affected English Catholics' position for the previous twenty years. In 1580 itself, it was clear the League was undergoing a renaissance, and was not new-born. "What may we looke for then but that the Pope with Spayne and France will yoke themselves in all ireful revenge, according to their solemn combination, *so long ago concluded on against us*?"[34]

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[32] MR Thorp, "Catholic Conspiracy in Early Elizabethan Foreign Policy", *16 CJ* 15 (1984), does recognise the importance of the fabled League in this period, but underplays the function of the Papacy as unifying force. The citation at p 440, for Cecil's view of the Pope as "a weak, rather pathetic character", really shows no such thing; it is in fact a vehement attack on papal abuse of power, not a claim that the power is negligible. Wiener, "Popular anti-Catholicism", pp 41/4, is more convincing in this respect.

[33] Pollen, *English Catholics,* p 234. Cf p 236: that early in 1580, "as the object of the alleged leagues and confederacies is not specified, [Sir Henry] Cobham {Ambassador in Paris} probably did not expect that they would refer to England." Rather, by then it went without saying. At pp 155/6, however, he does seem to concede the existence of substantive earlier League rumours in England.

[34] Hatton to Walsingham, 26th April 1580: T Wright, *Queen Elizabeth & her Times* (2 vols, London 1838), II. 108; cf Paulet to same & Wilson, 24th Jan. 1578: PRO SP 78/2/5 (*CSP For. XIV,* No 607), etc.

It is also wrong to imply that certain forgeries of League documents mean that Protestants in general were indulging in conscious cultivation of collective hysteria. In fact, League rumours were often originated by Catholics - both because the predominantly Italianate international news trade needed, as a professional necessity, to generate striking matter, true or false; and probably because some Catholics sought to intimidate Protestant opinion, from their own fear of a formal and formidable Protestant League, the complementary (equally fictitious) pendant to the Catholic.[35]

The unreliability of sixteenth-century "advertisers" is very apparent. Even their grossest fictions or errors could take months to be sufficiently contradicted, if they ever were. Let it

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[35] This can best be illustrated, as a general point on the generation of such rumours, from the build-up of the 1580 scare. Pollen, *English Catholics,* pp 235/7, describes various rumours of a Spanish-Papal-Tuscan League emerging in Paris, followed by forged League articles. English correspondents ascribed the early reports to the papal Nuncio, but Pollen "can find no reference whatever to this League in Mgr. Dandino's dispatches". See, however, preceding Pollen's own citations - Dandino to Galli, 22nd Feb. 1580; also 22nd Jan. & 1st Mar: *ANG VIII,* p 608; PRO 31/9/77, pp 47, 53/4 . Also note that these rumours followed a scare about Flanders succumbing to a gigantic Protestant League (or even Italy, if the Turk joined in) - Dandino to Galli, 11th,15th & 21st Mar, 7th & 16th Sept, 5th & 11th Oct. 1579: *ANG VIII,* pp 342/4, 352/3, 495, 504, 514/8 (one peculiar variant had Philip II and the Duke of Savoy supporting the Huguenots against Henri III: 28th July, *Ibid,* p 460). The groundwork for a renaissance of League belief in England had been laid by various correspondents who insisted that first Sebastian of Portugal's fatal African expedition and then Philip II's preparations to secure the reversion of the Portuguese crown were really blinds for Armadas to the British Isles - eg Henry Gilpin's report, 24th Jan. 1577: SP 70/142, f 102 (*CSP For. XIII,*No 1201); Roman newsletters, 12th July & 9th Aug. 1578: PRO 31/10/1, pp 228, 231 (*CSP Rome II,* Nos 897, 925); Antwerp newsletters, 20th & 27th Feb, 6th-7th Mar. 1580: *Ibid,* pp 252/5; Dandino to Galli, 22nd Feb: *ANG VIII,* p 608.

suffice to cite the English Ambassador in France in 1584 - "Some newes is come that the King of Spaine is dead, but he hath beene so often dead that I will never beleeve that he be dead tyll he be rotten"[36] - and, more credulously, that King's Secretary, Idiáquez, to the Nuncio in Spain four years later - "It is unfitting to doubt any longer the certainty of our Armada's victory, as it has been affirmed from so many different sources that it must necessarily be true."[37]

Elizabeth's government was bombarded from the outset with reports of sinister Catholic combinations. The idea of a Catholic League existed as a Protestant nightmare long before there was any obvious sign of such a body; initially associated with the Council of Trent and intended to destroy those who would not accept it. The Pope, Philip II and the Duke of Savoy were almost invariably said to be involved; the King of France, Ferrara, Venice and Florence might or might not be. Rome and Spain's membership in the overt Holy League, when it was formed, served to confirm their position in its fictitious subsidiary, but the last two, also Holy Leaguers, did not always feature as anti-Protestants.[38] Though the Holy League purportedly opposed the

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[36] Stafford to Walsingham, 21st June 1584: M Murdin, *Burghley SP 1572/96* (1759), p 410 (HMC *Hatfield MSS,* III, No 88).

[37] Bishop of Novara to Cardinal Montalto (Sixtus V's Cardinal-Secretary), 17th Sept. 1588: PRO 31/9/83, p 44: "che quanto alla certezza della vittoria della nostra Armata, era inconveniente a dubitarne più, poichè ne sono tanti incontri da diverse bande, che è necessario che sia vera".

[38] Eg Adam Thraciger to Cecil, 17th Dec. 1558; Mundt to Elizabeth, 10th May 1559: PRO SP 70/1, f 74 (also BL Cott. MS Galba Bxi, f 258); 4, f 53r (*CSP For.*

Turk, Protestants regarded it as intended "to extyrpe all infidells *and heretykes*".[39]

Like the Elders of Sion, this body naturally had its Protocols, which were said to have arrived in Scotland in 1566 for Mary to subscribe.[40] By then, as Sir Ralph Sadler said in Parliament:

> "We have harde and we here daylie of secret conspiracies and grete confederacies betwen the Pope, the French King and other prynces of the Popish confederacie ayenst all Princes Protestauntes and professors of the Ghospell, of which the Quene's Majeste is chief patronesse and protectrix... These... as sone as they can settle and establish the Romishe Religion within their own territories and domynyons, will forthwith converte and employ all their forces to restore the same in Englande, where they may be sure to fynde a grete ayde of our owne nacyon, of our English Papistes here at home... Indede Englonde, the Quene's

III, Nos 92/3; 643); Killigrew & Jones to Cecil, 6th Jan. 1560; Guido Gianetti to same, 3rd Aug; Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 10th Oct; Chamberlain to Elizabeth & to Throckmorton, 7th Dec; Throckmorton to same & to Cecil, 21st May, with enclosures: Forbes, *Full View,* I. 296; SP 70/17, f 15; 19, ff 15v, 20; 21, ff 32, 40; 26, ff 99-102, 122 (*CSP For. IV,* No 552; *V,* Nos 386, 619, 777 & 780; *VI,* Nos 208 & 211); Bernardino Ferrario to Giovanni Battista Castiglione, 23rd Jan. 1563: BL Add. MS 35831, f 119r; Sir Thomas Smith's journal, 15th June; Ferrario to Mason & to Cecil, 14th Jan. 1564: SP 70/58, f 111r; 67, ff 75r/6r (*CSP For. VIII,* No 896; *IX,* Nos 42/3); Cockburn to Cecil, 4th Sept. & 8th Dec. 1566, 9th June 1567; Hugh Fitzwilliams to same, 6th Dec. 1566; Norris to same, 2nd Feb, 25th Nov. & 15th Dec. 1567, to Throckmorton, 19th May; Mundt to Cecil, 8th July: SP 70/86, f 10; 87, f 95r; 91, ff 30/1; 87, f 92r; 88, f 56r; 95, ff 83r, 143r; 90, f 76; 92, f 31 (*CSP For. X,* Nos 701, 844, 1280; 843; 928, 1223, 1230, 1836, 1864; 1418).

[39] Cecil's memo, 9th Feb. 1571: BL Cott. MS Cal. Cii, f 94r. Cf *Discourse touching the Pretended Matche betwene the Duke of Norfolke & the Quene of Scottes,* STC 13869 (1570), printed in C Read, *Mr. Secretary Walsingham & the Policy of Queen Elizabeth* (3 vols, Oxford 1925), I. 69; Spanish intelligence, June 1570: SP 70/112, f 141 (*CSP For. XI,* No 1057).

[40] Randolph to Cecil, 7th Feb. 1566: PRO SP 52/12/9 (*Cal. Scot. II,* No 335).

> Majeste is the onelie and greatest marke which the adversaries of Godde's Gospell do shote at."[41]

It was in Scotland too that the articles of the Catholic League were published during the Earl of Morton's Regency.[42] Morton was indeed perhaps the most enthusiastic League publicist in the British Isles. In 1573, he sought not only Elizabeth's aid for the reduction of Edinburgh Castle, but "to enter into contract with Hir Ma[jes]tie and the realme of England for the maintenaunce and defence of the trewe religion... against the persecution of the cruell Counsaill of Trent and personis quhatsoever beinge in the societye of that League".[43] In 1578, after surviving the first *coup* against his regime, he sent the Commendator of Dunfermline south to warn of "the pr[e]tenses of the Pope and his fautors manifest... in respect of the tyrann[i]e intendit be execucon of the decres of the bloodie Counsell of Trent agains the professors of God's true relligion over all Christendom".[44]

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41 Oct. 1566: Hartley, *Proceedings in Parliament,* p 142. Cf Walsingham's "Discourse on Flanders", 1575: PRO SP 70/136, f 214r (*CSP For. XIII,* No 642) - "Sondrye wayes ther hathe ben certeyn intellygence geven of a confederacye made at the last Cownsell of Trent... for rootyng owt by vyolen[ce] of all soche as professe the Gospell."

42 *A Proclamatioun... for ane Conventioun of the Professuris of the Trew Religion for to Consult upon the Conspiracies of the Papistis,* STC 21940 (St. Andrews, 3rd Oct. 1572); copy PRO SP 52/23/95. Cf the proclamation of the Scottish Secret Council, 8th May 1570: SP 52/18/9 (*Cal. Scot. III,* No 221); League articles in BL Lans. MS 97, f 146.

43 Morton to Burghley, 26th June 1573; cf 5th Aug. to Henry Killigrew: PRO SP 52/25/76, 84 (latter also BL Cott. MS Cal. Civ, f 129v & Add. MS 33531, f 117) (*Cal. Scot. IV,* Nos 702, 712).

44 30th July 1578: PRO SP 52/27/49 (also BL Add. MS 33531, f 173) (*Cal. Scot. V,* No 366).

However, he never succeeded in getting from Elizabeth any commitment involving expenditure, and so in 1580 was left exposed to his foes' malice.

After the resumption of the French Wars of Religion, Cecil considered it "manifest that the princes and states of Chr[ist]endome which do admitt the Bishop of Roome to have such supreme authority in their dominions as [by] him is challenged {claimed} will continew their violent procedinges as they have begon in their owne countreys, to force all other nations in Chr[ist]endome that have refused the said authority to co[n]vert and re[ac]knowledge the same". "England is the monarchy of Chr[ist]endome of whose departure from Roome, the Chirch of Roome hath most greved"; it was therefore necessary to join with Protestants internationally "to defend themselves against only the Pope's tyrannous, bloody and poysoning persequtors".[45]

These reports were never discouraged by the failure of their predecessors to be fulfilled; though as the first Spanish Ambassador of Elizabeth's reign, the Count of Feria, remarked of reports of Franco-Spanish cooperation against England, "yow should have hard of them before this *yf* my m[aste]r wold have geven assent". Philip II attempted to counteract reports there and in Germany of the League, "which is something so far from the truth that, on the contrary, I have never wished and do wish

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[45] "A Necessary Consideration of the Perillous State of this Tyme", 7th June 1569: PRO SP 12/51/6-7.

nothing more than to live in good neighbourliness with these [Protestant] princes".[46] Unfortunately, Feria and his successor Alvarez de Quadra had on occasion tried to intimidate Elizabeth by themselves talking of Catholic Leagues.[47] The Emperor Maximilian II went so far as to issue an official denial at the end of 1567 that he was or had ever been a member of any Catholic League; like most such denials, it only fed speculation. Maximilian appealed to all Christian rulers, regardless of confession, to help him against the Turk; Elizabeth however told him that her expenses as a result of being "injuriously attemptid by indue forrayn practises of parsons of no small force and powre" - renewal of which, moreover, appeared imminent - had been too great for this to be possible.[48]

As with any good conspiracy theory, there was always an explanation for the failure of the enemy's secret master-plan

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[46] Conversation reported by Challoner, 3rd Aug. 1559: PRO SP 70/6, f 31(*CSP For. III,* No 1116); Philip to Margaret of Parma, 8th June 1562 & 17th Dec. 1567; cf Margaret to Philip, 6th July 1562: *Correspondance de Marguerite de Parme avec Philippe II,* ed. LP Gachard (Brussels 1867/81), Nos 161, 569; 173; Guzmán de Silva (then Ambassador in London) to Philip, 11th May 1568, & reply, 27th June: *CDIE* 90 pp 62/3, 90/1 (*CSP Sp. II,* Nos 20, 35).

[47] Eg Feria to Philip, 29th April 1559; De Quadra to Feria, 29th Oct: KL I. 512, II. 72, & *CDIE* 87, pp 179, 252/3 (*CSP Sp. I,* Nos 29, 70).

[48] Statement to Electors, 11th Nov. 1567; French intelligence, 26th Dec; Elizabeth's statements to Count Stolberg, June: PRO SP 70/95, ff 38, 185; 91, ff 56r, cf 93v (*CSP For. X,* Nos 1814, 1882; 1298, 1335); cf Maximilian to Philip II, 30th Sept: V Bibl, *Das Korrespondenz Maximilians II* (Vienna 1921), II. 230/3. The 1566 Subsidy Act preamble had spoken in similar terms: 8 Eliz. I, c 18 (published, 1681, in *The Honour and Courage of our English Parliaments in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth... in Defending of her and the Protestant Religion;* in *Harl. Misc.* VIII. 18).

visibly to unfold. Throckmorton had heard that, but for Philip II's disastrous defeat at Tripoli, in the summer of 1560, "th'Emperor, the Ffrenche K. & the King of Spayne wolde have, by a Councell, gone aboute to have overthrowen the Protestantes in all places, and were determyned to begine wth. England, where they loked for a good partye". According to Elizabeth's Italian informant Guido Gianetti, the plan was once again aborted, three years later, by the murder of its coordinator, the Duke of Guise.[49]

Sir Thomas Smith in the summer of 1564 considered that Philip II had postponed his designs awhile, when most of the Spanish ciphers unfortunately became compromised. The Protestant Scotch Guardsman Captain Cockburn thought that sinister developments based on Scotland in 1566 had been forestalled only by the murder of the supposed papal go-between Rizzio. In 1569, Cecil looked back on the past decade to see a long succession of events postponing the execution of a design that had, of course, been decided on from the first - most recently the Moorish revolt in Granada, which he stressed to the French Ambassador La Mothe Fénélon when the latter tried to convince him that the League's dilatoriness was attributable to its non-existence.[50]

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[49] Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 24th June 1560: PRO SP 70/15, f 79r (*CSP For. V*, No 232); Gianetti to same, 13th Mar. 1563: SP 70/52, ff 122/3r (*CSP For. VIII*, No 444). Gianetti's views on the providential deliverance represented by Guise's death (and also that of the Scottish Catholic Earl of Huntly, who was seen as a coadjutor) were shared by the Bishop of Norwich - Parkhurst to Bullinger, 26th April 1563: *Zurich Letters*, PS, I, No 57.

An English Hispanophobe argued that "wheras the Queene's Ma[jes]tie was condemned by the Councell of Trent {*sic*} to be but *p[re]tensa Regina...* it is certayne that the Kinge of Spayne had the execution of the sayd condemnation", and this had been postponed only due to Philip's Moorish, Turkish and Dutch problems. In 1571, "after the victorie obtayned against the Turcke, he especially thought to sett uppo[n] Englande, had he not bene kept occupied otherwyse", presumably by the renewal of the Dutch revolt.[51] This had long been Walsingham's view of the Spanish: "how evilly they rest satisfied with us in respect of the injuries received, it is well known; how naturally they are inclined to revenge, the world hath sufficient trial of. If presently they forbear, it is not for lack of good will, but in respect of incommodity of time."[52] Later, he warned against complacency following the death of the most notorious plotter in Europe. Had he not a secret master-plan ? "Though the Cardinall of Loraigne be dead, yet the perill is not paste. He hathe leafte

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50 Smith to Cecil, 12th July 1564; Cockburn to same & Bedford, 16th June 1566: SP 70/73, f 19; 70/84, f 190 (*CSP For. IX,* No 553; *X,* No 496); "A Short Memoryall of the State of the Realme": S Haynes, *Burghley SP 1542/70* (1740), p 585 (HMC 9: *Hatfield MSS,* I, No 1455), p 581; *Correspondance de Fénélon,* ed. A Teulet (Paris 1838/40), II. 47/8, 105/7 (21st June & 27th July 1569); cf I. 229/30 (8th Mar.) on the general belief in the "League formed at Trent and confirmed at Bayonne".

51 "Argumentes Provinge that the Kinge of Spaine is rather an Enemy then a Favorer unto the Welfare of Her Ma[jes]tie and the Realme", June 1577: PRO SP 70/147, f 570 (not in *CSP For.*).

52 Walsingham to Leicester, 3rd Aug. 1571; cf 28th June 1572: Digges, *Compleat Ambassador,* pp 120/1, 216; similarly to Burghley, 30th June 1571: PRO SP 70/118, f 131 (*CSP For.XI,* No 1832).

successors enowe of his malice to execute such plats as he hath in his lyfetyme set done, tendynge to Yor Ma[jes]te's perill and disquiet."[53]

A new outpouring of paranoia had been provoked by the Franco-Spanish conference at Bayonne, despite its total lack of political result. Sir Thomas Smith opined: "Yt was time for the Protestantes to loke about them. The Pope and Papistes are driven, as ap[er]ith, to adventure som desperate attempt"; according to the Huguenots, "there hath been at this tyme of meetinge at Baione, som complot betwixt the Pope, the Kinge of Spain and the Sc[ottish] Quene... and som say also the Papistes of England; but this is privilier handled then I can p[er]ceive".[54] It seemed to fulfil the story that Philip II had got the formation of the anti-Protestant league postponed until after the end of the Council of Trent, saying he could understand Pius IV wishing to punish Elizabeth after the Nuncio Martinengo's repulse; but advising delay: "*after the Council*", he would mobilise "not only against her, but also against any other not submitting to it".[55]

The failure of the alleged Bayonne plan to proceed was,

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[53] To Elizabeth, 16th Jan. 1575: PRO SP 52/26/66 (*Cal. Scot. V,* No 76).

[54] Smith to Cecil, 10th Feb. & 21st July 1565: PRO SP 70/76, f 108v; 70/79, f 70v (*CSP For. IX,* Nos 980, 1280). On English suspicions, cf Paul de Foix to Catherine de Medici, 3rd Mar. & 18th June: in PRO 31/3/25-6.

[55] Newsletter, 9th Aug. 1561: PRO SP 70/29, f 38r (*CSP For. VI,* No 394); cf intelligence from Rome, 18th Sept. 1563; Cuerton to Challoner, 17th Dec, Smith to Cecil, 30th Dec: SP 70/63, f 61v; 66, ff 82r, 215r (*CSP For. VIII,* Nos 1229; 1487, 1557).

thought Sir Henry Norris (then Ambassador to France), due to French backtracking; certainly not to its non-existence. He gave a pithy summary of his embassy to the 1572 Commons - the French were "wholly bent, given and imployed to devisinge, practisinge and raysinge of some mischeefe, quarrell or hurt to Her Majestie or the State".[56] When rumours in 1570 of a Franco-Spanish invasion of Ireland were found to be unfounded, the Lord Deputy, Sir Henry Sidney, believed that they would have been fulfilled "if the state of the worlde, oth[e]rwise occupied, were not more in o[u]r favor then any good will of the practisers".[57]

When the English helped take Edinburgh Castle in 1573, no evidence could be found for the alleged Franco-Spanish plan to intervene in Scotland. Sir Henry Killigrew told Burghley that the proof must have been among the papers Maitland of Lethington burned the night before the surrender. Morton had informed Killigrew "that the Pope, th'Emperor, the French K, the Venetians, the Duc of Savoy and the Duc of Florence... had determined to restore the Q. of Scottys home... and to depose the Q. my soverayne from h[er] Crowne".[58]

Later, Don John of Austria passing through France *en route* to assume the governorship of the Netherlands, was

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[56] Norris to Cecil, 10th June 1567: PRO SP 70/91, f 34 (*CSP For. X,* No 1282); anonymous Commons Journal, 9th April 1572: Hartley, *Proceedings in Parliament,* p 204.

[57] Sidney to Cecil, 24th June 1570: PRO SP 63/30/56.

[58] 13th June 1573: Wright, *Queen Elizabeth & her Times,* I. 481/2; 7th April: PRO SP 52/26/66 (*Cal. Scot. IV,* Nos 692, 609).

reported to have "renewed" "the Holy League of Trent" with Catherine de Medici.[59] The victor of Lepanto was the obvious spearhead of the Holy League in its anti-Protestant manifestation, and also much touted as a suitor to Mary Stewart.[60]

These reports often went on to advocate the formation of a Protestant counter-league. Some obviously had their own particular reasons for underlining threats, real or supposed, to Elizabeth herself. The Scottish Protestants, seeking aid against the Regent Mary of Guise in 1559, claimed: "although we murn and smart first, England will not eschape wt.out worse truble in the end".[61] The German mercenary contractor, the Count of Mansfeld, informed Elizabeth of dangerous Catholic combinations against her, and suggested that money paid to himself would be a useful move to counteract them.[62]

Also seeking Elizabeth's military support, the Huguenots

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[59] French newsletter, 8th Dec. 1576; Laurence Jonson to Daniel Rogers, 17th Dec; Wilson to Walsingham, 10th & 17th Mar. 1577 (though he could not actually confirm that the two had even met; cf 30th Dec. 1576); Paulet to Elizabeth, 31st Jan: PRO SP 70/141, ff 33v, 57v; 144, ff 46, 68; 141, f 95; 142, f 143v (*CSP For. XIII,* Nos 1064, 1076; 1097; *XIV,* Nos 1326, 1335; 1213). Cf PO von Toerne, *Don Juan d'Autriche et les Projets d'Invasion de l'Angleterre 1568/78* (2 vols, Helsingfors 1918/28), II. 44-6.

[60] Von Toerne, *Don Juan d'Autriche,* I. 59-61, 104/5, 144/8, II. 13, 51-3, etc.

[61] Knox to Sir Henry Percy, 1st July 1559; cf Balnaves of Halhill to Cecil, 19th July, Knox to same, 15th Aug: PRO SP 52/1/49, 64, 97 (*Cal. Scot. I,* Nos 481, 495, 526).

[62] Mansfeld to Elizabeth, 5th May & 2nd Aug. 1560: PRO SP 70/14, ff 34/6, 70/16, ff 5-6 (*CSP For. V,* Nos 33, 379); cf Otto Duke of Brunswick to same, 18th Jan. 1564: SP 70/67, ff 109/11 (*CSP For. IX,* No 63).

warned of the dangers to her if she let the Guises crush them. In mid-1562, they alleged that the latter awaited only "the opportunity of rebellion, to put over 10,000 men into England to favour the Papists".[63] Five years later, a Huguenot envoy once again seeking help from England just happened (he said) to meet two Spaniards on the boat across, who boasted of how their master would, once he had suppressed French Protestantism, accomplish in England "something great". At any rate, Condé argued "that, just as those princes professing the false religion spare not to join together to exterminate the true religion, it is necessary and most just that sovereigns and princes professing the true religion, should join with one accord and a common intent to aid each other against the violence of our enemies".[64]

In 1568/9, the French Catholics also predicted another English intervention in support of the Huguenots (and to recover Calais), and adopted a threatening pose in anticipation, talking of

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63 Intelligence forwarded by Throckmorton, 11th May 1562: PRO SP 70/37, f 83r (*CSP For. VII,* No 51).

64 "...Que, tout ainsin que ces princes faissant profession de la faulce religion ne s'espargnent à se liguer ensemble pour exterminer la vraye religion, il est nécessaire & trop juste que les Roys et princes faissans profession de ladicte vraye religion, se joignent en ung consentement & union de volontés pour secourir l'ung l'aultre contre la violence de nos ennemies" - intelligence, Dec. 1567: PRO SP 70/95, f 204v (*CSP For. X,* No 1891); cf 29th Nov: *Ibid,* f 104r (*CSP,* No 1845) - "apprès avoir reduit la France... {ils} mettront en pillage et sac la ville de Londres". Condé's instructions to De Cavaignes, 6th Oct. 1568: Haynes, *Burghley SP,* pp 474/5 (HMC 9: *Hatfield MSS,* I, No 1190). Norris reported a Catholic exile looking forward "to the firing of Dover" - to Leicester, 18th Feb. 1567: HMC 70: *Pepys MSS,* p 97. Cf Cardinal Chatillon to Cecil, 9th Mar. 1570: H de la Ferrière-Percy, *Le XVIe siècle et les Valois* (Paris 1879), pp 255/6.

Spanish aid to intimidate opponents, though in practice national antagonism tended to stand in the way of concrete proposals. And Killigrew reported that the Cardinal of Lorraine claimed that if Elizabeth "did medel in theise troubles, he was sure the Papiste lordes ther {in England} and others had promised to rebel and to erect a Catholike Kynge".[65] English belief therefore increased in the "conspyratio[n] of the Pope, King Phillipp, the French Kyng and sondry potentates of Italy, to imploy all ther forcees for the subv[e]rsion of the professors of the Gospell", which were "to be extended ageynst England immediatly after the subduyng of the P[ri]nce of Condee". Thus he could not "be left; for it is so universal a cause, as none of the religion can separate themselves one from another; we must all pray together and stand fast together".[66] As before, it was only prudent for Protestants to counter their enemies' "old stratageme, to breake the shefte

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65 Killigrew to Cecil, 2nd April 1569: CP 4 f 122 (HMC 9: *Hatfield MSS,* I, No 1287; this has "elect" for "erect", wrongly). In Killigrew's cipher, the Cardinal, aptly enough, was "Moloch". Ambassador Norris however ascribed these mutterings merely to frustrated "cruel spite", and was right - to Leicester, 18th Sept. 1568: HMC 70: *Pepys MSS,* p 134. Cf Lorraine to Alba, Feb. 1569: J de Croze, *Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II* (Paris 1866, 2 vols), I. 338/40, App. 5.

66 "The Perills of the Kingdom & the Remedies", 1569: BL Lans. MS 102, f 145r; cf Norris to Cecil, 28th April, 30th June, 23rd Sept 1569, 9th Feb. 1570; to Elizabeth, 20th June: PRO SP 70/106, f 140r; 107, f 108r; 108, f 91r; 110, f 58r; 112, f 115r (*CSP For. XI,* Nos 238, 313, 376, 681; 1021). Cecil to Norris, 13th July 1568: *Cabala sive scrinia sacra* (3rd edn, London 1691), p 138. Cf Mundt to Elizabeth, 10th May 1559: SP 70/4 f 53 (*CSP For. III,* No 643): "necessitie shall cause all those whiche love the trew religion to stande togitttther". For some later examples, see SL Adams, "The Protestant Cause: Religious Alliance with Western European Calvinist Communities as a Political Issue in England 1585-1630" (Oxford DPhil thesis 1972), pp 44, 104, etc.

pesemeale, therby to com to an end off the hole".[67]

The fire-eating Vice-Admiral of the West, Sir Arthur Champernowne (who had displayed militant anti-Hispanicism at the time of the payship seizures in 1568/9, and now wanted to be allowed to take a squadron to La Rochelle) opined after the Massacre of St. Bartholomew: "if we had been all in one place, we shuld have ben all in one case wth. the rest. We see these same harts, wch. neyther heythen nor savage may matche, roving at us; these same bluddy handes pointing to us; the swerdes, the fyres whetting and kindled against us. Shuld we think that ther long beating pretences be satissfied wth. this one deede; may we suppose that the full of ther menyng is now come to the high marke ?" In his nautical vein, he continued that Protestants "be embarked all in one ship; shall we lye still whyle they stryve against the stormes of this common tempest? Or if they, the whiles, make a wrack, may we be safe ?"[68]

After St. Bartholomew's, Catherine de Medici tried to reassure Walsingham (then Ambassador) that the incident had no external implications, citing her father-in-law's friendship for

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67 Throckmorton to Cecil, 18th Sept. 1568: Haynes, *Burghley SP,* p 471 (HMC 9: *Hatfield MSS,* I, No 1187).

68 Champernowne to Burghley, 8th Oct. 1572: BL Lans. MS 15, ff 198v-200r. Cf Grey of Wilton to same, 19th Sept: Wright, *Queen Elizabeth & her Times,* I. 443; anon. notes on St. Bartholomew's (BL Lans. MS 109, f 72r): "seing Christe's glorious Ghospell and the whole state of Christendome to be sett affyer and shaken by conspiracie and crueltie..."; & Archbishop Parker's fear of a universal cutting of throats, 6th Oct. 1571: *Correspondence,* edd. J Bruce & TT Perowne (PS 1853), pp 400/1; also Wright, *Queen Elizabeth & her Times,* I. 440/1.

Henry VIII in defiance of the Pope. Walsingham replied simply: "as for the friendship of King Francis and King Henry, it had been made before the days of Trent and Bayonne". Soon afterwards, he demanded:

> "Can we think that the fire kindled here in France will extend itself no further ? That which was agreed on at Bayonne (things not unknown) for the rooting out of the professors of the Gospel, may in reason induce us to think the contrary. Let us not deceive ourselves, but assuredly think that the two great monarchs of Europe together with the rest of the Papists do mean shortly to put in execution that which in the aforesaid assemblies was concluded."[69]

Even so uncertain a Catholic *régime* as Anjou's in Poland could inspire apprehensions.[70] Alençon's associates sent warnings to England, as if they were needed, "that the Queen of Scotland is making great practices to bring about such a Matins as in Paris".[71] It was axiomatic that the French massacre was "devysit at Trent".[72] In the Armada year, St. Bartholomew's was bracketed with it: "Al these experimentes {experiences} fal out in

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[69] Walsingham to Smith, 14th Sept. 1572: Digges, *Compleat Ambassador,* p 240; to Morton, 7th Oct: BL Add. MS 33531, f 111; quoted Read, *Mr. Secretary Walsingham,* I. 239.

[70] "De Rebus quas Moliebantur Plurimi Principes adversus... Regnu[m] Angliae et de Modo quem Cogitabant ad id Invadendu[m] ex Omni Parte", 11th Aug. 1573: BL Lans. MS 17, f 10. Cf, retrospectively, Beale's "Treatise of the Office of a Councellor to Her Ma[jes]tie" (1592), in Read, *Mr. Secretary Walsingham,* I. 435.

[71] Du Plessis to Burghley, 31st Aug. 1573: Ferrière-Percy, *Le XVIe siècle et les Valois,* p 373.

[72] Robert Sempill, *Ane New Ballet set out by ane Fugitive Scottish Man that Fled out of Paris at the Late Murder,* STC 22203 (St. Andrews 1572); No 12 in Lilly, *Collection of 79 Blackletter Ballads & Broadsides,* pp 37/8. Cf RM Kingdon, *Myths about the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacres 1572/6* (Cambridge, Mass. 1988), chs 2 & 7.

our time by a Catholick co[n]sent in the Councel of Trent, that all Catholicke princes should prepare against England and others of reformed religion."[73]

Even before these bloody "proofs", the League myth served as an argument against any compromise or flirtation with the Council of Trent, cast as the centre of the world conspiracy.

In 1562, the Earl of Sussex, Lord Deputy of Ireland, wrote:

> "The good successe of Guyse & the Papystes wyll, I fere, roote up Condye & all P[ro]testantes in Fraunce; which aft[e]r is lyk to be stretched ferther by alyance betwen K. Phyllip, the French, the Pope & others. I dowt muche some ayde owt of France to helpe the Scottyshe Quene to subverte relygyon there, & aft[e]r some enterp[r]yse age[n]st us under collor of relygyon, to renewe the Scottysh tytell, all which maye p[er]haps be furtherd with auth[o]ryte of a Generall Cuncell".[74]

Cecil himself came to fear that suppression of the Huguenots would be followed by a marriage between Mary and the Infante Carlos and a Franco-Spanish effort to establish them in England, while "the Generall Counsell shall condemn all the Protestants and gyve the kingdoms and dominions thereof to any other prynce that shall invade them".[75] Rumours spread by the Huguenots made Sir Thomas Smith, then Ambassador in Paris, fear this fabled project. "This is the drift of the Cardinal of Lor[raine], the Pope and the fathers of the Cownsell of Tredent,

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[73] Humphrey, *View of the Romish Hydra,* sig *3v.

[74] Sussex to Cecil, 22nd July 1562: PRO SP 63/6/57.

[75] Cecil's "Perils upon the Overthrow of the Prince [of Condé]", 1562: Forbes, *Full View,* ll. 2 (*CSP For. VII,* No 337).

with certaine pactions, to gyve in dowry the realme of England to them for reducing of the same to the Romishe Churche... perswading themselfes that they have in Scotland and also in Engla[n]d enough of their faction withe whome also they have delt to bring the matter to passe." Only very late in 1564, did he conclude that the marriage was merely the Guises' "talke and brute".[76]

Pre-emption of Catholic League and Stewart Claim: Paranoia's Debate with Parsimony

Any English intervention in the cause of international Protestantism was an implicit victory for the paranoid view of international Catholic conspiracy, and a testimony to its power to overcome even Elizabeth's aversion to the consequent expense. Intervention served to secure what Sir Thomas Smith called, referring to the Huguenots, "a greate & large hedg betwixt yow & the Papistes, yf thei wold ones againe { ! } enter into any league for the reducing by force to the Pope's Churche & authoritie those wch. have refused it".[77] Sir Francis Knollys wrote in Pauline

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[76] Smith to Elizabeth, 20th Aug. 1563; to Cecil, 4th Oct. 1564: PRO SP 70/62, f 171r; 74, f 125; cf Smith to PC, 13th & 14th Oct, 12th Nov; Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 1st & 26th Nov: SP 70/64, ff 39r, 48r; 65, ff 41r; 3v, 89 (*CSP For. VIII,* No 1165; cf Nos 1291, 1297; 1391, 1356, 1427; *IX,* No 714); earlier, Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 29th April 1561; cf 4th May & 23rd June: SP 70/25, f 115; 26, f 24; 27, f 48v (last also BL Add. MS 35830, f 88r; *CSP For. VI,* Nos 151, 166, 265).

[77] Smith to Cecil, 27th May 1563: PRO SP 70/57, f 112v (*CSP For. VIII,* No

vein: "There remayneth vygylance, foresyght and prevention; but the cheefe of these is prevention."[78] Equally, since the Catholic powers viewed Protestantism as an international conspiracy, in which England was certain to be involved, Challoner thought Elizabeth might as well aid the Huguenots, as the Catholics "as well without cause as wt. cause... impute it unto us", and might retaliate on that assumption.[79]

The Scottish intervention of 1560 turned out very well, if more by luck - the Tumult of Amboise, Mary of Guise's death, Spanish preoccupations, the shipwreck of French reinforcements - than by judgement. Cecil, who had had to threaten resignation to get a definite commitment from Elizabeth, urged its necessity with talk of the threat not only from France but from Spain, the Emperor, Savoy and "potentates of Italy".[80] For a time, as Elizabeth's erstwhile Spanish ally threatened to support France against the Protestant rebels whom she was backing, it really did seem as if England would become face a general conflict with European Catholicism. One of the riskiest undertakings of Elizabeth's reign, it came before her government was firmly established; but it was motivated by fear that Catholic threats to

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[78] Knollys to Wilson, 9th Jan. 1578: Wright, *Queen Elizabeth & her Times,* II. 74.

[79] Challoner to Cecil, 10th Nov. 1559: KL II. 85 (*CSP For. IV,* No 225); cf Norris to Cecil, 7th Dec. 1567: SP 70/95, f 120r (*CSP For. X,* No 1852).

[80] "A Short Discussion of the Weighty Matter of Scotland", Aug. 1559: Keith, *Affairs of Church & State in Scotland,* I. 370 (*Cal. Sc. I,* No 537). The resignation threat, of Dec, is in Wright, *Queen Elizabeth & her Times,* I. 24.

its stability would increase unless preempted.

A positive obsession had developed with Francis II's and Mary Stuart's adoption of the English royal style and heraldic quarterings. The developments "in their cappells, in their plates and vessells, in their tapesseries, in their clothes of Estates, in their solemn entries into their townes, in their inscriptions uppon gates, yea in their seales graven taken" were "preparatyn to their furder p[ro]cedinges" and proof of their "ambitiose and inimiose intent".[81] Other countries tended to consider Elizabeth's complaints exaggerated, since after all she continued to claim the titles and arms of France.[82] Accused by Mary of Guise of supporting rebels, Elizabeth retorted that the Scottish Regent's family had initiated aggression, by "as it were seking to bereve us of our kingdom by using our armes and our stile, tytle and segle, and consequently pursueng th'apparent conquest of this realme, and the greate hostile preparacone made... to the apparant danger of this our kingdom". The "innovacions and injuries" that the arms constituted were considered pretext enough for English warships to fire on French vessels bearing them, without

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81 Elizabeth to Challoner, 25th Dec. 1559 (for a statement to Margaret of Parma): KL II. 145 (*CSP For. IV,* No 495); PC papers, 27th Dec. 1559 & 23rd Mar. 1560: PRO SP 12/7/73; 11/31. Cf MH Merriman, "Mary Queen of France", in M Lynch: *Mary Stewart: Queen in Three Kingdoms* (Oxford 1988), pp 45/8.

82 Repudiating this comparison: Throckmorton to PC, 21st June 1559: Forbes, *Full View,* I. 138/9 (*CSP For. III,* No 868); instructions for Montague and Chamberlain's Spanish embassy, 23rd Jan. 1560; Challoner to Cecil, 29th Jan: PRO SP 70/10, ff 81/3, 123r (*CSP For. IV,* Nos 629, 664; Smith to Elizabeth, 3rd June & 19th Dec. 1563: SP 70/58, ff 16-20; 70/66, f 111 (*CSP For. VIII,* Nos 840, 1505).

declaration of war.[83]

The notion of preternatural duplicity as an inevitable characteristic of French diplomacy, prevented Elizabeth accepting a virtually complete French capitulation to English demands and made her determine to send troops into Scotland. The offers could be written off as typical French deception.[84] Such fears were not totally unjustified, in that the Guises *did* repudiate the offers to abandon the offensive arms and style made on their behalf.[85] The negotiators of the Treaty of Edinburgh had reported great difficulties in making the French "acknowledg your undouted right, which they wer very hardly brought to doo in oppen treaty" (which they then refused to ratify), and having to warn them that "thereby the world should see manifestly there injuriosse purposees, which in words they had excused and coverid".[86]

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[83] Elizabeth to Mary of Guise, 6th Mar. 1560; Norfolk & his Council to Cecil, 29th Mar: PRO SP 52/2/70, 98 (*Cal. Scot. I,* Nos 672, 700); cf Elizabeth's proclamation of 24th Mar: Haynes, *Burghley SP,* p 269 (*CSP For. IV,* No 894; HMC 9: *Hatfield MSS,* I, No 646); statement to the Bishop of Valence, 2nd April; Elizabeth to Montague & Chamberlain, 18th April: SP 70/13, ff 5v; 125/6 (*CSP For. VII,* No 1428; *III,* No 1020; latteralso BL Cott. MS Vesp. Cvii, f 147); Chamberlain to Elizabeth, 23rd Dec: SP 70/21, f 97 (*CSP For. V,* No 817).

[84] Norfolk to Cecil and to PC, 10th April 1560: PRO SP 52/3/18-19 (*Cal. Scot. I,* Nos 723/4; also Haynes, *Burghley SP,* p 284; HMC 9: *Hatfield MSS,* Nos 662/3); Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 20th Feb & 6th April: SP 70/11, ff 61/3; 13, f 29v; to Cecil, 27th Mar: SP 70/12, f 115r; Elizabeth to Montague & Chamberlain, 18th April: SP 70/13, f 126 (*CSP For. IV,* Nos 750, 953; 905, 1020); Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 26th May; same to PC & Cecil, 7th June: SP 70/14, f 124; 15, ff 19, 22 (*CSP For. V,* Nos 131, 167/8).

[85] Montagu & Chamberlain to PC, 10th April 1560: Haynes, *Burghley SP,* pp 285/6 (HMC 9: *Hatfield MSS,* I, No 661); Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 17th Nov: *Hardwicke SP 1501-1726* (1778), I. 132 (*CSP For. IV,* No 716).

Robert Hogan derived from the Count of Feria's talk in Flanders apprehensions of a vast fleet to assist the French, "that England is not able to make the third part so many"; "There is all the world against England".[87] The timid diplomatist Dean Wotton sent Cecil a long jeremiad, concluding that England probably could not deal with the Spaniards if they came - he believed they were "nere yn a redynesse" - that if she could, this would make Philip "falle to open warre... wherunto he shall lacke no counsell yn Spayne"; and that even a seizure of English goods at Antwerp "alone withowte eny sending of men[n]e ynto Scotland, wolde p[er]ave[n]ture... make the Q. H[ighness] to revoke her forces owte of Scotland"; therefore, the Scots proving unsatisfactory allies, they should be abandoned.[88]

Spanish purposes might extend further than Scotland, as those of the French were supposed to. The Lord Chief Justice of Ireland, Sir William Fitzwilliams, in April 1560 reported disquieting rumours there about joint French-Spanish action in support of Catholic rebels.[89] Thomas Challoner came to fear that

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[86] Wotton & Cecil to Elizabeth, 6th July 1560: Haynes, *Burghley SP,* p 351 (HMC 9: *Hatfield MSS,* I, No 775).

[87] "Middleton" (Hogan) to Cecil, 24th Mar. 1560; cf 29th Dec. 1559: CP 201 f 133; 2 f 19 (HMC 9: *Hatfield MSS,* I, Nos 645, 585); also Bacon's PC speech, 23rd Dec. 1559: BL Harl. MS 253, ff 84r, 88r.

[88] Wotton to Cecil, 20th April 1560: PRO SP 52/3/36 (*Cal. Scot. I,* No 741). Wotton, along with Winchester, Bacon, Petre and Mason, had opposed the Scottish expedition at the outset: PC paper, 27th Dec. 1559: SP 12/7/73. On fears of a Flemish embargo, cf Elizabeth to Gresham, 18th May: KL II. 413/4 (*CSP For. V,* No 105); also GD Ramsay, *The City of London in International Politics at the Accession of Elizabeth Tudor* (Manchester 1975), pp 123/4.

Spanish auxiliaries were "not so much ment for Scotlande, as for discent somwhere in Ingland".[90] Elizabeth was sufficiently worried about the threat from the Spanish Netherlands actually to pay Mansfeld and other Protestant mercenaries some of the money they sought, to secure a force capable of providing a continental distraction; and to bestir herself temporarily in the desultory negotiations with the princes of the Confession of Augsburg, warning them that "the very purpoose of the French, and others also, is under other pr[e]tences to extinguish the hole knolledg of the Gospel in all co[n]trees".[91]

Thomas Gresham, also in the Low Countries but in touch with military and financial practicalities rather than with diplomatic rhetoric, was much more encouraging. "It ys but a bracke of Kinge Phillipe to ffere the Quene's Ma[jes]te, to macke here hightnes to call here armye backe agayen owght of Scoteland".[92] Lord Grey of Pyrgo insisted that Philip's bluff could be called: "the Queene maye (an she wyll not slepe her

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89 Fitzwilliams to Cecil, 11th April 1560: PRO SP 63/2/11. For earlier fears of French plots in Ireland, cf Killigrew & Jones to Elizabeth, 29th Nov. 1559: Forbes, *Full View,* I. 270; Throckmorton to Cecil, 20th Feb 1560: SP 70/11, f 63r (*CSP For. IV,* Nos 337, 750); PC to Cecil & Wotton, 15th June: SP 52/4/14 (*Cal. Scot. I,* No 817).

90 Challoner to Cecil, 5th Feb. 1560: KL II. 220/1, & Haynes, *Burghley SP,* p 236 (HMC 9: *Hatfield MSS,* I, No 610; *CSP For. IV,* No 694); cf same to same, 15th Dec. 1559: KL II. 135/6 (*CSP,* No 427); intelligence paper, 23rd May 1560: PRO SP 70/14, f 112v (*CSP For. V,* No 120).

91 Elizabeth to John Brigantine & Hans Keck, 8th May 1560: PRO SP 70/14, ff 47/8 (*CSP For. V,* Nos 53/4).

92 Gresham to Cecil, 19th April: KL II. 333/4 (*CSP For. IV,* Nos 1036).

matters) wynne Lythe and put the cuntre in sume good staye, before he shaull be able to levey a man." Maitland of Lethington agreed: "for the Kyng off Spayne, I rather thinke th[a]t he meaneth by threattning to wt.drawe the Q. Ma[jes]te's forces then otherwayes ernestly to enter in the mater. And althowgh he wold, if the Ffrenche wer anes clearly removed (wch. wil be sone bro[ch]t to pas if the matte[r] be stoutely followed), he shall more hurt hy[m]sellf then us."[93]

This view was fortified by news of Philip's military disaster at Tripoli. Bacon, initially in two minds about Scottish intervention, urged Cecil to exploit "the hard happ happenyd to Kyng Phylypp" in negotiating a settlement with the French. Throckmorton believed that Philip, having formerly promised help to the French, now "excused hymselfe throughe his greate debtes... and his great charges". "This discomfyture will well abase the courages of the hollowe hartes in England & dasshe quite the papisticall practises."[94] Spanish policy belatedly resolved itself into a declaration that their troops would aid the French against the Scottish rebels (and against Elizabeth, if she supported them), but would defend England if the feared French attack

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[93] Grey of Pyrgo to Cecil, 20th April 1560: Haynes, *Burghley SP,* p 295 (HMC 9: *Hatfield MSS,* I, No 679); Lethington to Cecil, 17th April: PRO SP 52/3/31(*Cal. Scot. I,* No 736).

[94] Bacon to Cecil, 17th June 1560: PRO SP 52/4/15 (*Cal. Scot. I,* No 819); Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 25th April; to Cecil, 7th June: SP 70/13, f 212v; 15, f 23 (*CSP For. IV,* No 1066; *V,* No 168). Cf R Tittler, *Nicholas Bacon: the Making of a Tudor Statesman* (1976), pp 95-7.

materialised.[95] The change of tone did not come in time to repair Anglo-Spanish relations. Wotton concluded: "By lykelihode K. Ph. wold be redye ynnough to mayntayne a godde cause against us, that is so redye to pyke this querell with us".[96]

Even as the Treaty of Edinburgh was concluded, the English remained apprehensive that Spanish troops embarking in the Netherlands might go not back to Spain but to Scotland; Vice-Admiral Winter was ordered to be ready, in the latter case, "to mete wth. this matter and disapoynt these men of theyr purpose." That officer, having already been ordered to engage French ships "as of his own courage" without a declaration of war, was now apparently also authorised to commence hostilities against Spain at discretion.[97] The land commander, the Duke of Norfolk, wondered worriedly "whether, if King Phillip woll nedes land ony men in Scotlande, we shall use him as an enemye or not. The matter is of greate importaunce, and yet I knowe not the Quene's Majestie's pleasure".[98] Fortunately, the problem did not arise.

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[95] Cecil to Throckmorton, 4th May1560; Montague & Chamberlain to Elizabeth, 19th May: PRO SP 70/14, ff 29v, 93r/4r (*CSP For. V,* Nos 26, 109; latter also BL Cott. MS Vesp. Cvii, ff 210r/1r).

[96] Wotton to Cecil, 20th April 1560; cf Petre to same, 19th-20th July: PRO SP 52/3/37; 4/86 (*Cal. Scot. I,* Nos 742; 869); also Elizabeth to Throckmorton, 18th April 1560; Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 24th June: SP 70/13, f 108; 15, f 77r (*CSP For. IV,* No 1018; *V,* No 232).

[97] PC to Cecil & Wotton (at Edinburgh), 4th July 1560: PRO SP 52/4/37 (*Cal. Scot. I,* No 842); cf Winter's instructions, 16th Dec. 1559: Keith, *Affairs of Church & State in Scotland,* I. 408; Elizabeth to Norfolk, 29th Dec; Norfolk to Cecil, 10th Jan. 1560: Haynes, *Burghley SP,* pp 217, 220 (HMC 9: *Hatfield MSS,* I, Nos 586, 592). Continued apprehensions about the Spanish led to alerts along the South Coast in late Oct: SP 12/14/28-30.

The case of the Le Havre campaign of 1563, ending with Elizabeth abandoned by the Huguenots who had sought her help as soon as the French Crown offered them reasonable terms, was a tangible counter-argument against the vague scaremongering of the interventionists. Cecil had long considered it necessary to support the Huguenots covertly so "that the band of Papistes growe not by victoryes in Fra[n]ce so strong and hardy as to putt us here in danger for our relligion... [and] that the howse of Guise buyld not there castells so high, as to overlooke the Q[ueen's] Ma[jes]ty for hir estate in this Crowne".[99] The results however poisoned Elizabeth's relations with the Huguenots, caused her to stay out of France for three decades, and made her sceptical of similar enterprises elsewhere.[100] It also demonstrated the limits of her personal susceptibility to the paranoid argument.

During the Scottish rising of 1565, the Earl of Bedford, Lieutenant of the North, urged support for it, as an opportunity to preempt the designs of Mary Stewart. Elizabeth prevaricated until it was too late. As the Earl of Moray complained to the sympathetic Bedford, the "secrete and couweryt procedingis of the Quene's Majestie... sall nevir putt this cause to such end as we

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98 Norfolk to Cecil, 29th April 1560: PRO SP 52/3/54; also Haynes, *Burghley SP,* p 301 (HMC 9: *Hatfield MSS,* I, No 688).

99 Cecil to Randolph, 30th Jan. 1561: BL Harl. MS 6990, f 15r.

100 J Shimizu, *Conflict of Loyalties: Politics & Religion in the Career of Gaspard de Coligny* (Geneva 1970), ch 6, is the best account of the episode; if, like previous biographies, allowing ample leeway to the sainted Admiral, who displayed at least a Protean vagueness in his commitments.

boyth wische, but oppin declaration culd apperandly bring with it no doubt".[101] This continued to be Elizabeth's method in dealing with the Scottish Protestants, which restricted the intimacy of the alliance she could form with them; if not so severely as in France. In 1567, they complained of having "observed suche things in Her Majestie's doings, as have tended to the danger of suche as she hath dealt withall, to the overthrowe of your owne dessignments and lyttle to the suerty of any partye". Sir Francis Knollys exhorted Elizabeth the following year: "if Her Hyghnes thynk any prynces and potentates, or that any factious subjects may conspyre agaynst her", let her take counter-action in Scotland, "roundlye and playnly to assist her own cause, withowt colours and cloakes that hydeth no men's eyes".[102]

Still, Elizabeth did in 1573, after Burghley also joined in advocating "proceeding roundly and openly" rather than "prolonging and mincing matters", consent to help take Edinburgh Castle from Mary's partisans - a move that Mildmay alleged to be "for the quiet of that country and this", and which the Earl of Huntingdon hoped would "breke the necke of all Popyshe practisys".[103] Walsingham however still complained Elizabeth

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[101] Moray to Bedford, 21st Sept. 1565; cf same to Leicester, 14th Oct: in PRO SP 52/10 (*Cal. Scot. II,* Nos 262; 281).

[102] Throckmorton to Cecil, 12th July 1567; Knollys to same, 11th June 1568: Wright, *Queen Elizabeth & her Times,* I. 252/3, 280/1 (*Cal. Scot. II,* Nos 558, 697).

[103] Burghley's "Certain Matters wherein the Queen's Majesty's Forbearing & Delays hath Produced Dangers": BL Cott. MS Cal. Ciii, f 449; Mildmay's Commons speech,

was "not disposed to redeem her peril otherwise than necessity shall lead her... Though dealing underhand heretofore hath accidentally (in respect of the weakness of the princes her neighbours) continued Her Majesty in a peaceable kind of government", this *was* accidental, and without some definite policy to forestall it, "Her Majesty is to look for another kind of reckoning".[104] Though not all the dangers the Secretary foresaw were especially probable, it was truly only remarkable luck that allowed Elizabeth to survive by constantly juggling numerous problems and never taking a decision unless compelled.

To outward appearances, the successful outcome of the Scottish intervention in 1560 had greatly reduced the immediate threat to Elizabeth. The French were removed from Scotland; while by the Treaty of Edinburgh, unlike Cateau-Cambrésis, Mary Stewart explicitly abandoned her rival claim to the English Crown. Unfortunately, Mary refused to ratify it, strangely alleging, while in other respects she emphasised her subservience to her then husband in the matters treated, that by agreeing she and Francis II would no longer claim the English Crown as rivals to Elizabeth, she would forfeit any right to claim it *ever,* even after Elizabeth's death, and be made "as it wer a strangeor from it". Because of this pedantry, she failed to resign even her prior

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10th Feb. 1576: Hartley, *Proceedings in Parliament,* p 443; Huntingdon to Burghley, 5th July 1573: Lans. MS 17, f 31r.

[104] To Burghley, 12th Sept. 1581: Digges, *Compleat Ambassador,* p 435.

claim, the great bone of contention.[105]

In Mary's refusal of ratification, it has been said that "political reality waited upon empty gesture".[106] If the gesture had been wholly empty, it would have been better for her. To Elizabeth's government, it was however full of sinister significance. The suspicions it created were never dispelled; but instead increasingly fanned. Mary's half-brother realised this within the year: "I wishe to God the Quene my souveraine lady hayth never by any advis taken in head to pretend interest or acclayme any titill to that Your Ma[jes]te's Realme, for then I am fully persuaded you suld haif bene and continewed als dear freindis as you be tender cusines... I feare that onles that rote may be removed, it sall ever bread unkindnes betwixt you."[107] The root remained however, confirming English belief that Mary's partisans "will nev[er] whylest she lyveth... prete[r[mitt any occasio[n] th[a]t they maye fynd to ava[n]ce there prete[n]ced title ageynst Yor Ma[jes]ty and yor issue" - a problem to be solved only in 1587.[108] Ambassador Randolph opined in 1563 "that wyll

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105 Mary to Elizabeth, 5th Jan. 1562: A Labanoff, *Lettres de Marie Stuart* (Paris 1844), I. 125/6; Haynes, *Burghley SP,* p 377 (*Cal. Scot. I,* No 1060; also HMC 9: *Hatfield MSS,* I, No 844); cf Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 26th July 1561: *Cabala,* I. 345/6.

106 J Wormald, *Mary Queen of Scots: A Study in Failure* (1988), p 103.

107 James Stewart to Elizabeth, 6th Aug. 1561: PRO SP 52/6/52 (*Cal. Scot. I,* No 999).

108 PC paper, 27th Dec. 1559; cf 23rd Mar. 1560: PRO SP 12/7/73; 11/31. Also "A Short Discussion of the Weighty Matter of Scotland", Aug. 1559: Keith, *Affairs of Church & State in Scotland,* I. 370 (*Cal. Scot. I,* No 537). Cf Walsingham to Burghley, 31st Jan. 1572: SP 70/122 f 148r (*CSP For. XII,* No 93) - "So long as

burste owte in tyme, which wyll manifeste that some unkyndenes hathe passed betwene them that will not be easlye forgotten". By 1565, he was writing home, "Yf ther be livinge a more mortall ennemie to the Q. my mestres then this woman, I desyre to be reputed but the vileste villayne that lyvethe".[109]

Some of Mary's consequent behaviour was almost incredible if her aim was to seek Elizabeth's friendship, but her fatal determination to turn to her sister Queen for help in 1568 demonstrates that she nonetheless laboured under the delusion that she had it. Despite the real danger that Mary did come to pose to Elizabeth, there were compensations for the latter in her rival having only a tenuous grasp of political reality. Truly, "all efforts to see Mary as a great stateswoman must founder eventually {if not before} on consideration of the folly she committed in 1568", in coming to England; "nor is her conduct once she was in England inconsistent with the view that she was politically inept".[110]

Elizabeth told Maitland of Lethington, Mary's Secretary of State, as early as 1561, with unusual frankness: "Think zow I culd

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that develyshe woman lyveth, neyther Her Ma[jes]tye must make accoumpte to contynewe in quyet possessyon of her crowne, nor her faythefull servantes assure themselves of savetye of their lyves"; Parker, 16th Sept: *Correspondence,* pp 398/9 - "If that only desperate person were away, as by justice soon it might be, the Queen's Majesty's good subjects would be in better hope and the Papists' daily expectation vanquished".

[109] Randolph to Cecil, 10th April 1563; same to Leicester, 8th Nov. 1565; cf same to Cecil, 4th Sept: PRO SP 52/8/31; 11/84A; 35 (*Cal. Scot. II,* Nos 3, 300; 246).

[110] Holmes, "Mary Stewart in England", in Lynch: *Mary Stewart,* p 197; cf pp 202/4; & Wormald, *Mary Queen of Scots,* pp 187/8.

luife my awin windynscheit ?... I know the inconstancie of the people of Ingland, how thay ewer mislyke the present governement and hes thair eyes fixit upone that persone that is nixt to succede... I have gud experience of myself in my sisteris tyme, how desirous men war that I suld be in place and ernist to set me up; and gif I wald haw consentit I knaw qwhat interprysis wald hawe beene attemptit to bring it to pas..."

Lethington hardly helped matters by retorting, "althought Zour Heines takis zourself to be lauchfull, zit ar ze not alwayis sa takin abrod in the world... The impressioun of it belike is depar rooted in hir {Mary's} hede, then scho vill be easelie perswadit to forgo it, and speciallie gif sche persave that difficultie be maid to assuire hir that {reversionary} title, qwhilk not onelie in the jugment of forayne nationis is without all controversy, bot alswa Zour Heines upoun zour conscience nor the vyssest of zour subjectes can nawise disalow."[111] Mary's position did not make even subdued threats politic.

The possibility of exchanging Mary's nomination as heir for an innocuous marriage remained abortive, since neither Queen was willing to be the first to fulfil her part of the implied bargain - a circumstance revealing more of their real relationship than all their protestations of amity. When Mary had concluded the Darnley marriage, Elizabeth declined an offer to forswear

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[111] Lethington's account of negotiations Sept-Oct 1561: ed. JH Pollen, *A Letter from Mary Queen of Scots to the Duke of Guise* (Edinburgh 1904), App 1, pp 41-4

anything "directly or indirectly prejudiciall" to her "owne title or the laufull issue of her body", in return for recognition as next in the line of succession.[112] She might have supposed that Mary's professedly amicable correspondence with her as Queen had already implied the resignation of any immediate claim to supplant her. Nonetheless, Mary seemed to revive it whenever the mood took her. Upon the birth of Prince James, the "lewde and evill writing of Adamson the Scot", his "audacious rashe attempt", in composing a celebratory poem hailing him as Prince of Scotland, England and Ireland, provoked an apparently disproportionate outcry.[113]

The degree of insistence by Mary even on the recognition of her title to succeed Elizabeth, only nine years her senior and apparently healthier, when she admitted the English Queen was "as feete, as apte to marrie and to have succession" as herself, and then claimed "it is not England that is looked for, but only the honour and name of heir apparente",[114] was either merely eccentric, or sinister. Lethington, realised that Elizabeth "doth conceave off onkyndnes off my maistres by reason off our demande, that she doth looke for her death";[115] but there was

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[112] PRO SP 52/11/11-12 (*Cal. Scot. II,* No 230); cf M Levine, *Early Elizabethan Succession Question* (Stanford 1966), pp 192/3.

[113] Elizabeth to Bedford, 13th Nov. 1566; Bedford to Cecil, 30th Nov; Robert Melville to same, 10th Dec; Elizabeth to Mary, 12th Dec: PRO SP 52/12/113/4, 123/5 (*Cal. Scot. II,* Nos 439, 448, 455/6); cf Levine, *Early Elizabethan Succession Question,* pp 188/91.

[114] Randolph to Cecil, 21st Feb. 1564: PRO SP 52/9/15 (*Cal. Scot. II,* No 60).

[115] Lethington to Cecil, 25th Dec. 1564; cf Randolph to same, 24th Dec: PRO SP

little he could say to palliate the matter. "The wisest policy for Mary would have bee to let sleeping dogs lie",[116] both to enhance her chances of eventually achieving her desire, and to retain the goodwill of her more powerful neighbour; but she would not.

Even after putting herself in Elizabeth's power, Mary still showed an unrealistic obstinacy in dealing with English proposals to regularise her position. Admittedly, these proposals were habitually made in bad faith, but Mary's attitude made the fault seem hers, habitually drawing her cousin's attention to the very issues which made her obnoxious. She offered ratification of Edinburgh as a favour, thereby stressing her possibly sinister refusal hitherto expressly to renounce even her immediate claim in opposition to Elizabeth's. She denied having ceded to the Duke of Anjou, as was rumoured, any English right "after our said gud sister or uthirwayes".[117] At the point when negotiations were furthest advanced, she indulged in offensive quibbles, even insisting (as in 1565) that her claim should be subordinated only to that of Elizabeth's "leefull" issue.[118] And Elizabeth found that

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52/9/81; 80 (*Cal. Scot. II,* Nos 128/9).

[116] Levine, *Early Elizabethan Succession Question,* p 33.

[117] Mary to PC, 15th May 1569: BL Cott. MS Cal. Ci, f 419r. Cf Leslie's interrogation, 13th Oct: Haynes, *Burghley SP,* p 544 (HMC *Hatfield MSS,* I, No 1375), on Mary's offer to resign any English title except the reversionary one; which was the only one she was supposed to have anyway. Also Sussex to Lethington, 5th July 1570: PRO SP 52/18/79.i.

[118] Mary's reply to articles, 5th Oct. 1570: BL Cott. MS Cal. Cii, ff 49r; cf Herries to Huntly, 31st July 1568: Add. MS 33531 f 39v (*Cal. Scot. III,* No 507; *II,* No 750). 13 Eliz. I c 1 talked of the Queen's "natural" issue. A nineteenth-century controversy developed as to whether this could mean illegitimate - see H Hallam,

similar quibbles about an undertaking not to harbour English exiles "gyveth us great cause to suspect hir well meaning to us and our estate"; they "might be meanes to coullor any subtile devise that might bee practised underhande to the troble of us and our realme".[119] The collapse of negotiations meant that Mary still had not renounced her immediate claim to the English Crown; which seemed to show "the contynua[n]ce of hir malyce". Any adoption even of her reversionary claim was to support "a title which is thought to gape for Her Ma[jes]ty's dispossession".[120]

More recent events served to reinforce the grudge against Mary dating back to 1559, when she had assumed the English royal arms and title - a grudge that once again surfaced at every opportunity. Elizabeth claimed to Charles IX to have "utterly secluded and sett apart all such just causes as she had given us before tyme of sundry offences.... such as in no age hath ben betwixt any princes remitted, touching the right of our Crowne"; her vehemence suggested that in fact she had not done so.[121] Mary had "hytherto... nev[er] madde satisfactio[n] for th[a]t

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Constitutional History (1867) I. 149 - when it is far more likely to mean native-born. Thus the statute, besides reinforcing Mary's exclusion on the grounds of foreign birth, intended to encourage issue of an Anjou marriage to be born in England, not France.

[119] Elizabeth's instructions, 13th Oct. 1570: BL Cott. MS Cal. Cii, f 59v ((*Cal. Scot. III*, No 523).

[120] Cecil's memo, 9th Feb. 1571: BL Cott. MS Cal. Cii, f 93; PC to Norfolk, 2nd Aug. 1570: PRO SP 15/19/1 .

[121] Instructions for Norris, 26th Oct. 1569: BL Cott. MS Cal. Ci, ff 466/7: "We never yelded to mistrust hir, though we lacked not occasions". Also 23rd Feb. 1570:

wro[n]g", Cecil wrote; and should not be allowed to leave England until she had.[122] He had increasing doubts as to whether it was possible to obtain an adequate renunciation to which Mary would stick, given that she had gone back first on the Edinburgh ratification and then on her Scottish abdication. As with the latter, she would cry duress as soon as she was released, and if necessary obtain a papal absolution in support of this. "No assura[n]ce can be devised for the Q. Ma[jes]ty but she may co[n]tynew hir challe[n]dg {claim}".[123] Cecil's ultimate hope was: "Hir Ma[jes]ty might in justice kepe hir as p[er]petuall pr[i]soner in England, being her capitall enemy in claymi[n]g hir Crowne, or might do th[a]t whic in other tymes, as seene by many historyes, kynges & p[ri]nces have done, th[a]t is by justice to take hir liff from hir". "The Q. of Scottes indede is and shall allweise be a dau[n]gerooss p[er]so[n] to your estate..."[124]

Digges, *Compleat Ambassador,* pp 12-13 (*Cal. Scot. II,* No 1186; *CSP For. XI,* No 704). Cf charges against Mary in 1572 Parliament: Hartley, *Proceedings in Parliament,* pp 270, 302, 319/20, 345/6, & C Read, *Bardon Papers,* Camden Soc. III.17 (1909), pp 1-2, 113/4; 1586 charges: *Ibid,* pp 67, 83, 91; Cecil's "Diary": Murdin, *Burghley SP,* p 749.

[122] Cecil's memo, 22nd Dec. 1568: BL Cott. MS Cal. Ci, ff 386v/9r (*Cal. Scot. II,* No 931).

[123] Cecil's memo, 20th Feb. 1571: BL Cott. MS Cal. Cii, f 97r; cf Oct. 1568; 22nd Dec: Cal. Ci, ff 277r, 369r; Elizabeth to Mary, 20th Feb. 1570 (*Ibid,* f 517): "I might not hereafter trust to any your treaties". Norton, according to anonymous Commons Journal, 15th May 1572: "No lawe of this realme is able to binde that Scottish woman... It is knowen how Poperie dispenseth with othes" - Hartley, *Proceedings in Parliament,* p 325, cf p 352 (Cromwell's Journal).

[124] Memo, 6th Oct. 1569: BL Cott. MS Cal. Ci, ff 456/63. & on f 459v: "If any other p[ri]nces shall... make warr for hir... whylest hir p[er]so[n] wer in England, the Q. Ma[jes]ty might justly [later insertion: "if she wer therto provoked"] make an end

The Privy Council adopted a calculated pessimism. Maybe Mary "wold now assent to yeld to any assura[n]ce th[a]t might be devised, yet if she were at lib[er]ty and shall have oportunite to renew hir clayme, and power of frendes to attayne it, all ma[n]ner of assura[n]ces th[a]t shall be devised, shall not be hable to stey hir and hir confederates f[rom] attempty[n]g to possess the Crowne... if she shall be at lib[er]ty, it is probable th[a]t she shall have more frendes to obteyne the Crowne of England than the Q[ueen's] Ma[jes]ty shall have to wt.stand hir", for conspiracy would flourish "if the gov[er]nme[n]t of the realme be not better regarded" (ie greater severity used). Since moreover, "all the p[ri]ncees of Chr[ist]endo[m] and potentates th[a]t favor the Sea of Roome, ar taught by the sayd Sea to allow better hir title than of the Q. Ma[jes]ty", the outlook was ominous indeed.[125] Walsingham later wrote that, while the mutual suspicion of Spain and France prevented either moving against Elizabeth, "they both may consent to advance a third person, who pretendeth the right to the crown (especially being provoked thereto by the Pope), which is

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of the matter, by usy[n]g extremite to hir." Cf PC paper, 29th April 1570: Cal. Cii, f 64v (*Cal. Scot. III*, No 198); "A Short Memoryall of the State of the Realme", 1569: Haynes, *Burghley SP*, p 580 (HMC 9: *Hatfield MSS*, I, No 1455).

[125] PC paper, 29th April 1570: BL Cott. MS Cal. Cii, f 64 (*Cal. Scot. III*, No 198). Cf "The Dau[n]gers by the Q. of Scottes to the Q. Ma[jes]ty and to the Realme": Cal. Cii, ff 82, 84/5. A later hand (followed by the old catalogue) has dated this Dec. 1570, which seems improbable, in view of a fairly clear reference to St. Bartholomew on f 82v, and an attached list of prisoners including Southampton (released in June 1570, and reimprisoned 1571/3) and Cobham (not imprisoned at all 1569/70, but only in connection with the Ridolfi Plot).

my chief fear".[126]

Mary's continental connections were a particular source of baseless apprehension. Her mother's family, the Guises, were admittedly the most militant face of Catholicism; but French crises continued to be a full-time occupation for them, and Mary had, ever since returning to Scotland, consistently favoured her own ideas to their suggestions. "Guise influence on Mary was probably more important for the fear it provoked in English policy-makers than for tangible influence it had on Mary's own policy and actions".[127] From Mary's return to Scotland, Cecil tended to apprehend, as he wrote to his Scottish counterpart, "the devisees and determinations of the Cardinall of Lorrayn, conceyved in a congregation of Antichriste's soldyars, being professedly gathered to distroye the Gospell of Christ" and "the reiteration or recidivation of the purpose intended by the Guisees in mariadg of y[ou]r Quene to the French Kyng to disturb this realme". Even five years later, Knollys would "not take uppon me to judge" "whether the tirannous subtletie of the Cardinall of Lorayne and the ambitious heddes of the howse of Guyse may call hyr back to peryllous enterpryses"; but he implied it was likely.[128]

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[126] Walsingham to Smith, 8th Oct. 1572: Digges, *Compleat Ambassador,* p 267.

[127] Lynch's introduction in *idem, Mary Stewart,* p 7. Cf SL Adams, "The Release of Lord Darnley & the Failure of the Amity", in *ibid,* p 143.

[128] Cecil to Lethington, 20th Aug. 1563, BL Add. MS 32091, f 199v; Knollys to Cecil, 28th July 1568: J Anderson, *Collections relating to Mary Queen of Scotland* (4 vols, 1728), IV. 109 (*Cal. Scot. II,* No 743); cf Grindal to Jerome Zanchius, 1563: *Remains of Archbishop Grindal,* ed. W Nicholson (PS 1843), pp 279/80.

The 1566 Commons was inspired to claim that "the French and Scots, the auntient enemies of this realm... doe dailie expect a time of revenge of their old cankered and malitious heartes".[129] This was in response to Mary's eventual marriage to Lord Darnley which, though it conformed to former English dissuasions from a great foreign marriage,[130] aroused new, and even more chimerical, fears. Sir Thomas Smith saw the matter as more far-reaching: he did not think it was the Scottish "Crown that the you[n]g King and Q. doth loke for, but a further and bigger... Both the Pope & the K. of Spain['s] handes be in that dish further and deep[er] then I thincke you do yet know".[131] William Phayre was sceptical when told "that dyvers of ower noblemen in Ynglande hathe & do" ask Mary and Darnley "to come to Yngland, promisyng them all theyre ayd & favor"; he thought, "Lord Darli had neyther any suche frynds in Yngland that cold or wold offerr hime any suche favor, nor parentage that were to any porposse". Still, it was persistently alleged that the Scottish royal pair had such support. Thomas Randolph found Mary in negotiation

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[129] Hartley, *Proceedings in Parliament,* pp 133/4.

[130] Cecil to Challoner, 18th Aug. 1563; Challoner to Elizabeth, 27th Aug. 1564: PRO SP 70/62, f 162r; 73, f 216 (*CSP For. VIII,* No 1156; *IX,* No 635); instructions for Randolph (x2), 16th Nov. 1563; Randolph's report, 31st Dec; Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 21st May 1565: SP 52/8/53, 70, 79; 10/52 (*Cal. Scot. II,* Nos 23, 37, 45, 183). Cf Adams, "Release of Lord Darnley", in Lynch, *Mary Stewart.*

[131] Smith to Cecil, 22nd Mar. 1566; cf 3rd July 1565: PRO SP 70/83, f 63r; cf 79, f 9r (*CSP For. X,* No 208; *IX,* No 1285); cf William Rogers to Cecil, 5th July 1566: SP 52/12/82 (*Cal. Scot. II,* No 407).

"marvelous stowte", he thought "rather of the good advertysementes receaved owte of Englande then of anye good will or suertie she hathe at home"; it would be necessary to disabuse her.[132]

The Privy Council warned Mary her marriage was "directly prejudiciall to the sincere amity betwixt bothe the Quenes".[133] It submitted a very alarmist assessment to Elizabeth, warning that any marriage (but particularly an English one) might extend Mary's English support, if only because it offered hope of a continued peaceful succession that an unwed queen could not. That this succession was assumed to be Catholic made matters worse. The Council considered

> "that a great number in this realm might be alienated in there myndes from there naturall dutyes to Hir Majestie to depend upon the succession of this marriadge... and would (for the furtherance of their faction in religion) devise all meanes and practyses that could be within this realme to disturbe the estate of the Queen's Majestie and the peace of the Realme... to achieve there purpose by fforce rather than fayle.... to further the pretensed title of the Queen [of] Scottes not onlie to succeed the Queen's Majestie, as in her best Amitie she professed,

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[132] Phayre to Cecil, 12th Oct. 1565: PRO SP 70/80, f 128r (*CSP For. IX,* No 1583); Randolph to Cecil, 2nd & 10th Aug. 1565; cf Bedford & Randolph to same, 24th Oct. 1564: SP 52/11/2, 6; 9/62 (*Cal. Scot. II,* Nos 222, 226; 110); Cecil to Smith, 3rd June 1565: H Ellis, *Original Letters Illustrative of English History,* 2nd series (1827), II. 296. By potential foreign supporters as well as by the Scots however, Darnley soon became "merveilouslie misliked for his waveringe and unstaied deedes" - Hoby to Cecil, 4th May 1566; cf 16th May: SP 70/84, ff 8r, 57r (*CSP For. X,* Nos 346, 387).

[133] 1st May 1565: Keith, *Affairs of Church & State in Scotland,* II. 276 (*Cal. Scot. II,* No 172). Cf Throckmorton's instructions, 2nd May: PRO SP 52/10/41 (*Cal,* No 173) - "a vehement occasion to move us (not wt.out greif) to wt.drawe and alter our inward satled affection from hir our good sistar".

but to occupye the Queen's estate, as when shee was in power {ie as Queen of France} shee dyd manefestlie declare".[134]

It is not surprising that the Council painted an alarming picture, since all led up to the recommendation of three courses of action abhorrent to Elizabeth - that she "should marry with no long delay... that the good subiectes of the Realme might staye there hartes to depend uppon Hir Majestie and ysseu of hir bodie"; that she should deal less "straightlye with some persons of good religion, because they had forborne to weare certayne apparell, and such like things being more of fforms and of accydentes then of anye substance", as this tended "to comfort the adversaries"; and "that some remission of the Queen's displeasure to the Lady Catherine [Grey] and to the Earl of Hertford be shewed", so as at least to make Mary's supporters fear the recognition of their line of succession.[135] That the Queen did none of these things suggests that she was not quite so alarmed as her Councillors wished her to be.

After marrying Darnley, finding Catherine de Medici unsympathetic and worried by the possibility that Charles IX of France might wed Elizabeth, Mary began exploring the possibility

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[134] Cf the fear that with the help "of some pryncees abrode, and fro[m] Roome also uppo[n] pretence of refor[m] of Relligion, and having no lett at home in hir owne Realme, she maye whan she shall see tyme, attempt the same th[a]t she did whan she was marryed to Fra[n]ce, wt. whom also it is most lykly that she will now renew the au[n]cient leage offensyve and defensyve" - instructions for John Thomworth (cancelled), 1st Aug. 1565: PRO SP 52/11/1 (*Cal. Scot. II*, No 221).

[135] PC paper, 4th June 1565: PRO SP 12/36/65.

of Spanish sponsorship instead. In apprehension of English intervention in the Chaseabout Raid of 1565 (for which Bedford, then President of the Council of the North, pushed vigorously but unavailingly), Francis Yaxley was despatched to Philip II. The latter expressed his belief that Elizabeth would know better than to help rebels; if she did so, he would "do more then any oth[e]r pr[ince]" to help Mary - a promise easy to fulfil in view of French lack of interest, and which Phayre was probably right in believing meant little or nothing. The English government heard of no response to Mary's offer, if made as reported, to "remitt all hir titles to the Realme of England and man[n]er of prosequutio[n] therof to the judgement and direction of the King of Spayne".[136] She blustered, "We ar assurit and nocht sua disprovidit bot utheris princes that will heir of our estate, considdering the samin, will favour us sa meikle as to help and support us (if neid be is) to defend us and our realme"; but, fundamentally, she was that disprovided.[137]

Yaxley was indeed given some money in Flanders, but promptly lost it, and his life, in a Northumberland shipwreck. On very limited grounds, Darnley and his father, when Elizabeth's

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[136] Phayre to Cecil, 17th Nov. & 6th Dec. 1565: PRO SP 70/81, ff 34/5, 77v (*CSP For. IX,* Nos 1677, 1722); intelligence, 15th Sept: SP 52/11/44 (*Cal. Scot. II,* No 260). Mary's formal letter to Philip (10th Sept) requests help to avoid the "dangier de perdre notre Couronne, et... *le droit que pretendons ailleurs*": Labanoff, *Lettres de Marie Stuart,* I. 281/2.

[137] Mary to Elizabeth, 15th Mar. 1566: PRO SP 52/12/38 (*Cal. Scot. II,* No 361).

displeasure became threatening, indulged in rodomontades on the support they would have from both France and Spain; and claimed "that yf ther was warre tomorrowe betwene Engl[and] and Scotland, thys Q. {Mary} sholde fynde mo frendes in Engl[and] then the Q. {Elizabeth} self".[138] It was reported that Darnley was plotting to take either the Scilly Islands or (surely more usefully, and following the example of Thomas Stafford in 1557, whose doomed enterprise precipitated war with France) Scarborough, if Elizabeth died heirless, or if she invaded Scotland.[139]

Neither of the great Catholic powers had any very active motive for helping Mary to replace Elizabeth, unless the latter broke with them irrevocably. If the French might initially have had some ambitions to achieve a hegemony in Great Britain by her means, these had always been less than whole-hearted, and had been ended by the Wars of Religion, even if English fears might persist for decades, especially as regarded a French *revanche* in Scotland. The problem with France during the 1560s was that official policy might well change from one day to the next. Sir Thomas Smith wrote in exasperation, "Ffraunce ys enough to vex any man... Yt is so unstable, uncertaigne, untrue, impudent, unfaithfull and ever enclyning to the worst, and lik the disease

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[138] Randolph to Cecil, 3rd June 1565; cf same to same, 3rd May & 20th Sept; same to Leicester; & Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 21st May; Grange to Leicester (?), 31st Oct: PRO SP 52/10/60; 42, 52, 54; 11/45, 79 (*Cal. Scot. II,* Nos 192; 174, 261; 183, 186, 294).

[139] Rogers to Cecil, 5th July1566: PRO SP 52/12/82; cf Randolph to Leicester, 4th Oct. 1565: SP 52/11/59 (*Cal. Scot. II,* Nos 407; 274).

that hath the name of them, grieving itself and easely rubbing a peace of the same upon hir next neighbor to make him share parte of hir mischief".[140]

By mid-1561 however, even Throckmorton, his paranoia about the French moderated by their descent into political turmoil, concluded that "the Fr[ench]men be nether wyllyng nor yn case to do you harme"; but "yn my oppinion the Spanysshe state ys at this day to grett & therefore intolerable, and by hys puyssance he ys become a monstrous member off Europe... A fether or too plukked yn hys brode wynges wyll make hym prove a better frend & alie wheare he ought to be." A year later, he said again that "ther ys no prynce at thys day off whom Hyr Ma[jes]tie ought to be so suspicius as off" Philip II.[141]

Nonetheless, after the crisis of 1560 and the removal of a Spanish standing army from the Netherlands, Spain did not seem such an immediate physical threat as France. There was some apprehension from 1563 over the constant rumours that Philip II would go in person to deal with the Flemish troubles.[142] Action

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[140] Smith to Cecil, 16th May 1563: PRO SP 70/57, f 1v (*CSP For. VIII,* No 750). Cf same to same, 27th May, on how difficult "the naturall lightnes of the French" made agreements with them: *Ibid,* f 113r (*CSP,* No 805). After St. Bartholomew's, of course, it was even worse; how could there be trust, "where dissimulation taketh so deep root" ? - Walsingham to Burghley, 1st April 1573; cf same to Smith, 8th Oct. 1572: Digges, *Compleat Ambassador,* pp 343, 267.

[141] Throckmorton to Cecil, 1st May 1561: PRO SP 70/26, f 8r (*CSP For. VI,* No 159); 2nd May 1562, SP 70/37, f 15v (*CSP For. VII,* No 8). Cf Middlemore's interview with Coligny, 10th June 1572: AW Whitehead, *Gaspard de Coligny: Admiral of France* (1904), pp 242/4.

[142] Challoner to Elizabeth, 14th Aug. 1563; Smith to PC, 13th Oct: PRO SP 70/62,

seemed more possible if he was on the spot, thus eliminating the interminable delays in communication that bedevilled Spanish policy in Northern Europe. Philip never came; but the arrival of the Duke of Alba in 1567 with his formidable army, taken to be anti-heretical rather than anti-rebel, was the greatest trauma yet to Protestant sensibilities.[143] When Alba embargoed English goods at the beginning of 1569, despite the fact that Elizabeth had provoked him by seizing his treasure-ships, Knollys wrote that he "expones himself the chief champion of the Pope's conspiracy".[144]

On the other hand, Cecil as Secretary of State was deluged from the beginning of the reign with reports of *French* "practices" and "devices" to take some English outpost by surprise. Apart from the peripheral and exposed Channel Islands, Berwick and the Isle of Wight were the favourite candidates.[145]

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f 75r; 64, f 39r (*CSP For. VIII,* Nos 1132, 1291); Phayre to Cecil, 24th Sept. 1565; Hugh Fitzwilliams to same, 6th Dec. 1566: SP 70/80, f 85; 87, f 91r; Norris to Elizabeth, 23rd July 1567: Wright, *Queen Elizabeth & her Times,* I. 256 (*CSP For. IX,* No 1525; *X,* Nos 843, 1502).

[143] See Cecil to Sidney, 10th Aug. 1568: PRO SP 63/25/63; cf GD Ramsay, *The Queen's Merchants & the Revolt of the Netherlands* (Manchester 1986), pp 52/6.

[144] To Cecil, 17th Jan. 1569: PRO SP 53/3/14 (*Cal. Scot. II,* No 954); cf Viscount Hunsdon to same, 14th Jan: Haynes, *Burghley SP,* p 502 (HMC 9: *Hatfield MSS,* I, No 1252).

[145] Both mentioned as possibilities: Challoner to Cecil, 7th Jan. 1560: KL II. 177 (also Newcastle; *CSP For. IV,* No 564). Berwick: Throckmorton to Cecil, 21st June 1559; to Elizabeth, 15th Aug: Forbes, *Full View,* I. 137, 204 (*CSP For. III,* Nos 870, 1190); Alexander Clark to Cecil, 1st Jan. 1561: SP 52/6/3 (*Cal. Scot. I,* No 943). Portsmouth & Wight: Cecil's "Breff Notes to Prove the French Evill Meaning towardes England", Aug. 1559; Elizabeth to Arundel, 15th Oct. 1559 & 20th April 1560; Cecil's memos, 25th Mar, 6th April, 1st & 22nd May 1560: SP 12/6/34;

More invasion scares naturally began as a result of the Le Havre intervention. The Archbishop of Canterbury became concerned about the vulnerability of the Cinque Ports or, even more dangerous, Sheppey, seizure of which by the French would trap the Thames and Medway squadrons.[146] The Secretary's job was naturally calculated to make him "nervous and jumpy";[147] a reduced inflow of alarmist reports, as much as increasing age, probably accounted for Cecil's increased placidity after his elevation to the Treasury. Walsingham however inherited a touch of his condition.[148]

The extraordinary degree of dread of such a surprise attack was a legacy of the fall of Calais and the attempt on

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7/9; 12/10; 11/35; 12/2, 14, 32; Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 23rd & 30th Sept. 1559: Forbes, *Full View,* I. 236, 240/1 (*CSP For. III,* Nos 1360, 1408); to PC, 8th July 1560; to Cecil, 8th Sept: SP 70/16, f 26; 70/18, f 24v (*CSP For. IV,* Nos 317, 502); Challoner to Cecil, 6th Dec 1559 & 5th Feb. 1560: KL II. 121/3, 220/1, & Haynes, *Burghley SP,* pp 212, 236 (HMC 9: *Hatfield MSS,* I, Nos 581, 610; *CSP For. IV,* Nos 387, 694). Dover was the next favourite candidate - eg John Marsh to Cecil, 25th Sept. 1559, & Challoner, 27th Sept. (also Dartmouth): SP 70/7, ff 85, 93/4 (*CSP For. III,* Nos 1375, 1385); Challoner, 6th Dec, *ut sup;* Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 22nd Oct. 1560: SP 70/19, f 103r (also Scarborough or Tynemouth; *CSP For. V,* No 665). Hartlepool was an outsider: Norfolk to Cecil, 23rd May: Haynes, *Burghley SP,* p 314 (HMC 9: *Hatfield MSS,* I, No 714).

[146] Parker to Cecil, 20th Jan. & 6th Feb. 1564: *Correspondence,* pp 202/4. Cf Gresham to Cecil, 22nd-24th Jan. 1564: PRO SP 70/67, ff 127r, 160 (*CSP For. IX,* Nos 74, 90); also, recycling the perennial fears about the safety of Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight: Smith to Elizabeth, 17th Mar. 1563: SP 70/52, f 148r (*CSP For. VIII,* No 459; with the addition of Plymouth); Randolph to PC, 17th Feb. 1564: SP 52/9/12 (*Cal. Scot. II,* No 57); and those about Berwick: Thomas Hedley to Randolph, 24th Oct: SP 52/9/61 (*Cal,* No 61).

[147] Wernham, *Making of Elizabethan Foreign Policy,*p 21.

[148] Cf MMD Leimon, "Sir Francis Walsingham & the Anjou Marriage Plan 1574/81" (Cambridge PhD thesis 1989), pp 7-15.

Scarborough under Mary Tudor. Early Elizabethans were reluctant, in view of these precedents, to discount even the most outlandish rumours. Sir Thomas Challoner, reporting an alleged French scheme to seize Dover, noted "thoughe p[er]chance the dyscoverer herof maye be estemed of some a light p[er]sonne, meet for no credit, as rather contriving this tale in hope of a rewarde then upon one just matter... nevertheless, considering how in theise cases menne canne not be to vigilant and feare to much, having respect wth. whome we dealle, whose entreprises stand most apon surprises - witnes of Calais, of wich attempt a like notice aforhand was geven, the discoverer then dispised, wth. over late repentance."[149]

Before he became official watchdog against "practises", Walsingham forwarded to Cecil a warning of an unspecified practice in the Stewart interest; "ffor that this his advertycement is so generall and dascendethe to no pertycularytes, I thowght to have forborne to have trobled your honor wth.all", but he reconsidered in view of "the mallyce of this

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[149] Challoner to Cecil, 27th Sept. 1559; cf Throckmorton to same, 23rd Sept: PRO SP 70/7, f 93v; Forbes, *Full View,* I. 238 (*CSP For. III,* Nos 1385; 1362). Cf Maitland of Lethington, 20th Jan. 1560: "Remember how covertly yor peces about Boulogne wer assailzeit and... how the enterprise off Calais was fynely dissembled... Beware off a third. Prevent theyr policy by prudence" - BL Cott. MS Cal. Bix, f 104r. Similarly, Thomas Lancaster Bishop of Kildare to Elizabeth, 24th May 1566: HMC 70: *Pepys MSS,* p 87; & Walsingham to same, 8th Feb. 1571: Digges, *Compleat Ambassador,* p 38 (*CSP For. XI,* No 1546) - beware "lest Ireland through too much security be neglected, as Calais was." Sir Henry Cobham remarked of the Spanish also, that they "delight to doo suddain enterprices wth. subtilty" - to Cecil, Sept. 1570: SP 70/114, f 4r (*CSP,* No 1232).

pr[e]sent tyme... and the daynger that myght growe unto me by concealynge therof, yf any soche thing (wch. God defende) hereafter shoold happen... There is lesse daynger in fearinge to myche then to lyttle... There is nothinge more dayngerouse then securyte."[150] Similarly, some years later, the spy William Herle seemed to think he made a useful contribution by writing a letter marked "wth. all spede, post haste, haste, haste, haste", to tell Burghley that the French Ambassador Fénélon was "uttering certain dowtfull speches, as though som prodigious thing was to happen shortly... there is sum grett conspiracye in hand & som present executio[n] to be don"; with no more details.[151]

Challoner's was a typical verdict on the French: "Argus had need to watche them, for they slepe nat at all." He could "nat put of feare, that confidence and securite may be begyled"; and complained: "Who ever sawe an Ambassad[o]r allowed no spiall money ?... Wth.out sure and manyfold advertisement, a prince is disarmed of remedy in tyme against secrete practises."[152]

In fact, Cecil and later Walsingham agreed with this principle sufficiently for Challoner and his ilk to have less reason

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[150] Walsingham to Cecil, 20th Dec. 1568: PRO SP 12/48/61.

[151] 26th Feb. 1573: BL Lans. MS 16, ff 98/9.

[152] Challoner to Cecil, 24th Jan. 1560, 10th Nov, 6th Dec (draft only; cancelled) 1559: PRO SP 70/10, f 106r; 70/8, f 124r; 70/9, ff 55v/6r (*CSP For. IV,* Nos 640, 225, 386). Cf Lord Cobham (Warden of the Cinque Ports; another professionally nervous position) to Leicester, 3rd Aug. 1568: HMC 70: *Pepys MSS,* p 126 - "Neither the Frenchman nor the Fleming sleeps. What their meaning is, to double the garrisons at Calais, Boulogne and Dieppe, I dare not judge."

to complain than their predecessors - though, at least in Elizabeth's early years, the "advertisement" garnered was more "manyfold" than "sure". Too much of it was provided by informants like Captain Cockburn, an indefatigable correspondent obsessed with the sinister designs of papal nuncios in Scotland, who threatened that he would write even more often if he had a secretary to help. He was, the Paris envoy of the time observed, "honest and frendly; but he never tolde me anything of consequence that fell out as he affirmed".[153] It was necessary however to match what was believed to be great French and Spanish espionage efforts in England.[154]

Secret "advertisements" from spies involved even more problems than those of the overt international news trade. Both had incentives to invent, if it were otherwise lacking, matter of notable interest and conforming to the prejudices of the customer. But spies were worse; they necessarily "practised" with the enemy, and their ultimate loyalties were obscure. Confusion (in all parties) as to whose side he was really on, rather than a cynical calculation of his expendability, may have

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[153] Hugh Fitzwilliam to Cecil, 28th Sept. 1566: SP 70/86, f 51r (*CSP For. X,* No 733). Cockburn however represented Fitzwilliam as suspiciously intimate with Catholic ambassadors, and so unreliable - 14th Sept: *Ibid,* f 30r (*CSP,* No 715). Cf Cecil's weary account of Cockburn to Norris, 10th Feb. 1567 : *Cabala,* I. 124.

[154] Eg Challoner to Elizabeth, 3rd Aug. 1559; Throckmorton to same, 25th Aug: KL I. 580; Forbes, *Full View,* I. 214 (*CSP For. III,* Nos 1116, 1244), etc. Perhaps they were not yet however up to the standard of Antonio Guaras (the Spanish *chargé* between the embattled embassies of Gueraud de Spes and Bernardino de Mendoza), who was said to receive up to forty spies a night "without candellight" - Recorder Fleetwood to Burghley, Jan. 1578: Wright, *Queen Elizabeth & her Times,* II. 72.

accounted for the fate of William Parry.[155] Thomas Copley, attempting less spectacularly to play both sides against each other, found his reports to the English ambassador in Paris scorned - because he did not provide lurid information about the machinations of the Catholic League, to which (according to competing agents), he should have had access, he was suspected of "doubling". He protested, vainly:

> "Yt were an easy matter for me to forge suche as shoulde answer yor imaginacon. What I saye is true, & the rest wch. Yor L[ordship] will needes p[er]swade yorselfe I knowe are but mere imaginacons proceeding of causeles feare, wch. sume man hath put in yor headd wth.out ony goud ground undoubtedly. And... they are much to blame th[a]t bicaus they will seeme to bring you sumwhat, tell Yor L[ordship] untruthes & tales of their own forging. For apon my life, there is yet no daunger or blowe towarde o[u]r coontrey half so neer as is imagined."[156]

The Enemy Within: A Sure and Certain Expectation

Early Elizabethan England housed the most nervous sort of cold warriors; inclined moreover to see not only enemies without who might attack at any time, but accomplices within.

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[155] When the Babington plotters were arrested, the double agent Gilbert Gifford disappeared to France rather than testify, for fear of a similar fate.

[156] Copley to Wilson, 18th April 1577; cf covering letter to Walsingham on the inadequacy of the report: PRO SP 70/144, ff 187r; 180 (*CSP For. XIII,* No 1382). Wilson however classified him with "these disguised Papists and fugitives who under color to wynne credite in these forged matters wil compasse greater thynges for their purpose... A Papist wil be a Papist still and vowethe no less in his harte, hopynge for a change every daie" - to Walsingham, 11th May; cf to Leicester, 18th May: SP 70/145, f 35; CP 9, ff 67v/8r (*CSP,* No 1429; HMC 9: *Hatfield MSS,* II, No 458).

Subversion and invasion were not mutually exclusive; in fact they were considered to be linked more often than not. During the early months of the reign, leading up to Cateau-Cambrésis, the French-backed plots of Mary's reign were in everyone's minds. Lord Cobham reported that the French negotiators "shew themselfs very hault and do make great bragges th[a]t they have assured frendes in England, to use when the time and occasion shall be offred".[157] Under Mary, however these French friends had been mostly Protestant; for this reason, attempts in Henri II's reign were reported to induce the King of Navarre, rather than a convinced Catholic, to lead an invasion.[158] The natural opposition to the monarch was however now Catholic; and this tended to look to the former King Consort of England, Philip II of Spain. Mundt, warning of the opposition to the Elizabethan Settlement of "certene noblemen of Engelland", said these had "moer affection" to Philip than to Henri II; they besought the former to "adsiste and provide for remedie"; otherwise, "they will sieke remedie by other wayes".[159] Throckmorton warned that, potentially, "the Spanierds do well assure themselffes off a verie goode partie wth.yn your realme when they se occasion".[160]

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[157] Cobham to Elizabeth, 13th Dec. 1558: KL I. 333 (*CSP For. III,* No 82).

[158] Laurence Holinshed's report, 30th April 1559: PRO SP 70/3, f 170 (*CSP For. III,* No 579); proposal of 30th June 1561: in 31/9/105.

[159] Mundt to Elizabeth, 7th June 1559: PRO SP 70/5, f 12 (*CSP For. III,* No 824)

[160] Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 29th April 1561: PRO SP 70/ 25, f 118 (also BL Add. MS 35830, f 91r; *CSP For. VI,* No 151); cf same to same, 24th & 30th June 1560: SP 70/15, ff 79r, 105r (*CSP For. V,* Nos 232, 254).

The 1563 Parliament was the forum for governmentally-orchestrated scaremongering which associated the designs of "old cancred enemyes" that Elizabeth had defeated in 1560 with the more recent "divelish conspiracy wt.in ourselves tending to the aydinge of the forreyne enemye, and by their own confession to have raysed a rebellion wt.in this Realme".[161] This implied French support for the conspiracy of Arthur Pole and his friends, of which there was somewhat more evidence than of Spanish; but the plot was used mainly as a stick with which to beat the Spanish Ambassador De Quadra, who was accused of having admitted "the Quen's Ma[jes]te's subjects... to yor privat Masse, mainteyning them therby to lyve in disobediance of the lawes of the Realm, and as it war to enioye by yor d[e]fence an exemption from obedyence... Certayn traytours, having of late conspyred against the Quene, her Crown and this Realme... had their comfort at yor handes, and by folowing of yor counsells, as they co[n]fesse, have entred into their treasons... under pretence and cloke of religion, you ar the cause that a great nombre of the Quene's subjectes in this Realme ar disposed to be sedicious and disobedient".[162] Much of the object of the entire exercise was to

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[161] Elizabeth's opening speech, 12th Jan. 1563; cf Bacon's: Hartley, *Proceedings in Parliament,* pp 71, 84.

[162] Charges against De Quadra, 7th Jan. 1563; cf Elizabeth to Philip II, 9th Jan: PRO SP 70/48, ff 104v, 107r; cf f 146r (*CSP For. VIII,* Nos 45; 60). Also De Quadra's own account - to Philip, 7th, 10th & 27th Jan: *CDIE* 87, pp 454/62, 472/4. "There is no end to their suspicions", he wrote to Cardinal Granvelle on 10th Jan: *Ibid,* pp 469/70 (*CSP Sp. I,* Nos 202/3, 210; 207).

induce Parliament to vote funds to cover Elizabeth's "great charges" in repelling Catholic malice.

The Act of Supremacy had indeed made a third offence of maintaining "the aucthorite, power, preheminence or jurisdiccon" of any "forreine prince, prelate, p[er]son, state or potentate" equivalent to high treason; the new Act "for th'Assurance of the Quene's Ma[jes]te's Royall power over all Estates and Subjectes wt.in Her Highnes' Dominions", besides extending this to a second offence, did so also for a second refusal of the Oath of Supremacy, and made the latter obligatory for the clerical, educational and legal professions, and for the House of Commons. The second change - had it been effective - would have made death the penalty even for passive Catholicism (unless compounded by perjury) in a wide area, not just for positive attacks on the Royal Supremacy. Robert Atkinson, opposing it in the Commons, complained that though a man "intend to live under a law and keepe his conscience to himselfe, yet will we grope him and se what secretly lyeth in his breast"; "if he were rebellious before, now will his heart become more rebellious."[163]

The government however found grounds for suspicion. It was true that there had been no Catholic rebellion so far; but then

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[163] 5 Eliz. I, c 1, § 1; 4-11; cf 1 Eliz. I, c 1, § 14 (*SR* IV. 1, pp 402/5; 353); Hartley, *Proceedings in Parliament*, pp 98-101. Atkinson also said that *if* "men thought to take the Crowne from the King and give it to the Pope, then... pitty it were that even for the first offence it were not made death". However, his speech was condemned and he had to answer at the Bar of the House. Cf p 91 for the Commons' fear of "perillous intermedlinges of forreyne princes with seditious, ambicious and factious subjectes at home" (petition, 28th Jan. 1563).

a sufficiently favourable opportunity had not presented itself.

Cecil believed that, while the Catholic League prepared:

> "all the Papists in England shall be sollicited *not* to styrr, but to confirme there faction with comefort... and to be redy to styrr at one instant when some forrayn force shall be ready to assayle this realme or Irland. When the matter is brought to these terms that the Papists shall have the upper hand, then will it be to late to seke to withstand it; for then the matter shall be lyke a great rock of stone that is fallyng downe from the toppe of a mountayne, which when it is comyng no force can stey".

Walsingham's view was similar:

> "Yor Ma[jes]tie shall see howe hardly the twoe great Princes yor neighbors are affected towards you, as also what unsound subjectes you have at home... Whensoev[e]r the forrayne troobles... be at an end, unles Yor Ma[jes]tie shall by prevention put in execution such remedies as good policie and the necessitie of yor estate requireth... the hidden sparckes of treason that nowe lye covered will (no doubt of it) breake owt into *an unquenchable fyer.* Ffor the love of God, Madame, let not the cure of yor diseased estate hange any longer in delyberation. Diseased States are no more cured by consultation when nothyng resolved is put in execution, than unsound and diseased bodies by only conference with physitians wth.oute receavyng the remeadies by them pr[e]scribed."[164]

There is little indication that England's Protestant government really held the view of English Catholics ascribed to them, that it was "clear that theirs was a passive resistance, resting on a traditional and nostalgic loyalty. There was no disposition to raise active opposition to the new order; it seemed probable that once death removed the ministrations of the

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[164] Cecil's "Perils upon the Overthrow of the Prince [of Condé]", 1562: Forbes, *Full View,* ll. 2 (*CSP For. VII,* No 337); Walsingham to Elizabeth, 16th Jan. 1575: PRO SP 52/26/66 (*Cal. Scot. V,* No 76).

disaffected Marian clergy, the remnants of Roman Catholicism would quietly fade away"; that "the leaders of the new regime believed, especially after the peaceful transitions of 1559/60, that what faced them was a tractable problem, the nostalgic adherence of aging worshippers to a familiar faith, with no power of resistance other than that of sheer inertia".[165] These views seem more influenced by English Protestants' retrospective judgements in the 1580s, when the stress was on the new dangers posed by seminarian activity, than by what they had really thought earlier.[166]

This argument might have reduced the Privy Council's perception of "sundry conventicles of evill disposed subjectes, which notwt.standing the co[n]tinuall teaching and great clemency used by Hir Ma[jes]ty to the reducing of them to live in more uniformity of religion, so obstinatly not only refuse to obey the

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165 WT McCaffrey, *Queen Elizabeth & the Making of Policy 1572/88* (Princeton 1981), pp 33, 122; cf 126/8, 150/1, etc; cf P Williams, *The Tudor Regime* (Oxford 1979), pp 270, 275.

166 The theory of the seminarian revolution has, thanks to their self-publicity, long been influential: eg WR Trimble, *The Catholic Laity in Elizabethan England* (Cambridge, Mass, 1964), p 36; P McGrath, *Papists & Puritans under Elizabeth I* (1967), pp 57/8, 113; JCH Aveling, *The Handle & the Axe* (1976), p 52; J Bossy, *The English Catholic Community 1570-1850* (1975), whose chosen period epitomises the idea of a clean break. *Contra:* C Haigh, "The Continuity of Catholicism in the English Reformation", in *P & P* 93 (1981), repr. in *The English Reformation Revised* (Cambridge 1987), pp 177/90: Holmes, *Resistance & Compromise,* p 6. Quantification is not helpful. Vast and ephemeral increases in official recusancy figures in 1588 indicate how inadequate the civil detection measures generally were; in fact neither the Assizes nor the Exchequer ever approached the detection figures in a (very hurried) survey of the bishops as far back as 1577. See Ryan, CRS *Misc. XII* (1921).

lawes of the realme provided for the mayntena[n]ce of order in religion... but also do make secret collections of money, w[hi]ch they send out of the realme to the may[n]tena[n]ce of such as are notoriously knowen enemyes to the authority of the Q. and hir Crowne"; or relieved Lord Keeper Bacon's mind, as he denounced in Star Chamber a deluge of seditious books from Louvain that, through support for papal supremacy, entailed "the disturbance and utter ruin of this realme".[167] But it is questionable that they would have credited it. If there was a landmark, it was the refusal of the Council of Trent to excuse *any* conformity with the heretical Church; confirmed more forcefully by the papal excommunication of Elizabeth - which certainly stimulated detection and consequently visibility.[168] In any case, to paraphrase Hobbes, the known disposition to Papistry was as significant as the open show.

With or without reason, many early Elizabethan

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[167] PC to Grindal, 1st Mar. 1568; Bacon' s speech, 28th Nov. 1567: PRO SP 12/46/44; 44/52. Cf Cox to Cecil, 27th Dec. 1563 (BL Lans. MS 6, f 202r); Pilkington of Durham in "A Collection of Original Letters from the Bishops to the Privy Council, 1564", ed. M Bateson, in *Camden Miscellany IX,* Camden Soc. NS 53 (1845), p 67, & Scory of Hereford to Parker, 17th Feb. 1565 (BL Harl. MS 6990 f 64) on Louvainist books; & the proclamation of 1st Mar. 1569 against them: STC 8014; H & L, No 561.

[168] See D McCulloch, *Suffolk & the Tudors* (Oxford 1986), p 192 & Haigh, *Reformation & Resistance in Tudor Lancashire* (Cambridge 1975), p 259 on developments in their very different regions of study. Lancashire developments were certainly dependent on the publicisation of the Tridentine attitude by Lawrence Vaux, the deposed Warden of Manchester College: *Vaux' Catechism,* ed. TG Law (Manchester 1885), pp 33/4. Some other areas remained more conformist, but nonetheless with strong Catholic sympathies: eg H Birt, *The Elizabethan Religious Settlement* (1913), pp 347/52, 394 on Wales and the diocese of Lincoln.

churchmen were at least as gloomy as those later facing the growth of Protestant separatism and known recusancy. Passive conservatism was not the implication of admittedly rhetorical comparisons to wild beasts or to Turks.[169] The Bishop of Ely lamented in 1562 that "there is everywhere an immense number of Papists, though for the most part concealed", and actually claimed in 1564 that "true religion is daungerously *declyning* in the most parte of the churches in this realme".[170] Cecil too wrote in 1569 that "the service of God and the syncere profession of Christian relligion is much of late *decayed* and in place therof, partly Papacy and partly paganism and irrelligion ar crept in... and herby is the strength of Hir Majestie's enemyes more increased than wer convenient to be made open to the world".[171]

The consensus was much the same as in any other area of Tudor governance - that a naturally fragile effort to control man's natural depravity through "awe" and "fear" was continually vulnerable to a disastrous collapse. The Bishop of Hereford lived "in this cowntre a meare straunger, abhorred of the most part for religion... not w[i]t[h]out daunger".[172] The Bishop of Carlisle

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[169] Pilkington to Cecil, 13th Oct. 1561; Adrian Saravius, schoolmaster of Guernsey, to same, 26th Feb. 1565: PRO SP 12/20/5; 15/12/45. The latter correspondent was also afraid that his neighbours' religious attitude would result in their intriguing with the French.

[170] Cox to Peter Martyr, 5th Aug. 1562: *Zurich Letters,* PS, I, No 49; *Camden Misc. IX,* pp 23/4.

[171] "A Short Memoryall of the State of the Realme": Haynes, *Burghley SP,* p 585 (HMC 9: *Hatfield MSS,* I, No 1455), p 583.

concluded that in the North, "onlie feare maketh them obedient".[173] His colleague in Chichester, reporting on the attitudes of Sussex JPs (far too Catholic for comfort), wrote that the county was "fre from all violent attemptes eyther to afflite the godlye or to distourbe the stablisshed good orders of this realme. Notwithstandinge I doubte of secrett practises which perhappes myght breake oute into open violence, were yt not for feare of Your Lordshippes' vigilant aucthoritie".[174]

The Earl of Bedford, as Warden of the Northern Marches, reported in 1564 that "the Poperie rooted among them will bring furthe evill fruyte without some magistrate come among them to restraine them with authoritie".[175] Sir Thomas Gargrave, Vice-President of the Council of the North, wished that "the Papystes were mayd affryd to speke & conspyre as they doo; ther wold be some meines usyd to make yt knowne to the people that thyr absence frome s[er]vyce & sacramentes ys wyckyd & not to be borne wth.all"; he had little doubt that recusancy was already established in the North. "Wiched & cruell enemyes wyll herdly by gentylnes or other meanes become assuryd frendes, but at the

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[172] Scory to Cecil, 17th Aug. 1561: PRO SP 12/19/24.

[173] Best to Cecil, 19th July 1561: PRO SP 12/18/21. Cf Pilkington to same, 14th Nov: SP 12/20/25; Archbishop Young, 29th April 1565: SP 15/12/58.

[174] Bishop Barlow, *Camden Misc. IX,* pp 8/9.

[175] PRO SP 59/7 f 228; cf Archbishop Young to Cecil, 30th June 1564: SP 59/8 f 135 (*CSP For. IX,* Nos 208, 450). De Quadra claimed that Young "dares not visit his diocese or punish any Papist" - 27th Nov. 1561: *CDIE* 87 pp 374/5 (*CSP Sp. I,* No 144). Archbishop Grindal found Yorkshire "another Church rather than a member of the rest" - to Cecil, 29th Aug. 1570: *Remains,* pp 325/6.

most wyll dyssemble & reache when the tyme s[er]vyth... I do fere that wth.out sharp lawes, priestes wyll not kepe q[u]ett." He claimed not to "wyshe blody lawes nor dethe in matters of consyence", but noted how much more effective the laws of Henry VIII had been.[176] Jewel wrote of the deposed Catholic bishops: "If the laws were but as rigorous now as in the time of Henry, they would submit themselves without difficulty. They are an obstinate and untamed set of men, but are nevertheless subdued by terror and the sword."[177]

The complaint of most Protestant officials, lay and clerical, was that the Queen would not allow them to do enough to put Catholics in "awe", and that they could not answer for the consequences. The Dean of St. Paul's noted that "the Queen's Majesty of her own nature is wholly given to clemency and mercy, as full well appeareth hitherto... Those which hitherto will not be reformed but are obstinate, and can skill of no clemency or courtesy, ought otherwise to be used." This was part of a Parliamentary movement for new measures to check the supporters of the "usurped power {of Rome}, at this tyme growen to marvelous outrage and lycentyous boldeness, and nowe requyring more sharpe restraynt and correcyon of lawes then hitherto in the tyme of the Quenes Ma[jes]te's most milde and

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[176] Gargrave to Cecil, 10th Mar, 21st & 17th June 1570; cf 18th Sept. 1572: PRO SP 15/18/5, 75/6; 21/86.II.

[177] Jewel to Peter Martyr, 7th Feb. 1562: *Zurich Letters,* PS, I, No 43.

mercyfull reigne have been had, used or establysshed".[178] Even the more moderate Archbishop Parker lamented Elizabeth's obstruction of harsher measures, and declared himself no "patron for the easing of such evil-hearted subjects"; while Bishop Cox hinted at evil results if "Goddys adv[er]saries & the Quene's may be thus tolerated agay[n]st God and the Quene".[179] After the Northern Rising, Bishop Horne of Winchester noted "what troubles & charges overmoche forbearing of the Pap[ists] hathe wroughte". The Privy Council collectively tried to use the spectre of the Stewart claim to frighten Elizabeth into greater severity.[180]

In Lancashire, expectations that Alba's arrival in Flanders would be followed by a Spanish landing in England allegedly prompted Catholic gentry to take "a solempne othe amongest theymselves that they will not come at the communyon nor receyve the sacrament during the Quene's Ma[jes]tie's reyne"; moreover, they were "able to leade the greatest p[ar]t of the people in Lancashire to whatsoever might further there said purpose".[181] By 1570 Sir John Atherton reported "howe in Lanc.

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[178] Parliament sermon, 11th Jan. 1563, App. to *Nowell's Catechism,* ed. GE Corrie (PS 1853), pp 225/6; 5 Eliz. I, c 1, § 1 (*SR* IV. 1, p 402). Nowell thought "maintainers of false religion ought to die by the sword" (and Sabbath-breakers, if it came to that).

[179] Parker, *Correspondence,* pp 174/5. Cox to Cecil, 27th Dec. 1563: BL Lans. MS 6, f 202r. On the pressure for capital laws by the 1563 Convocation, and Elizabeth's rejection of it, see Haugaard, *Elizabeth & the English Reformation,* pp 317/20, 352.

[180] Horne to Cecil, 21st Jan. 1570: BL Lans. MS 12, f 74r; PC paper, 29th April: Cott. MS Cal. Cii, f 64 (*Cal. Scot. III,* No 198).

[181] Richard Hurleston to Pembroke, Dec. 1567: PRO SP 12/44/56. There followed royal orders to the county notables to check seductions "under the coule of religion...

all thinges savored of open rebellion... what open talke of invasion by Spaniardes; howe in most places the people fell from theire obedience, utterlie refusyng to come at anie divine s[er]vice said in the Englisshe tongue..."[182]

The difficulty of procuring Protestant peace commissions was a bad sign. In theory, the judiciary should have been reduced to supporters of the Elizabethan Settlement. In practice, returns of those taking the Oaths of Supremacy and Uniformity were often mendacious or simply non-existent; those that refused them were often not reported and subjected to the statutory penalties, on the pretext that the proffer had not been a formal one.[183] Several years on, the Oaths were "a straunge thing unto the Justices of Peace in Yorkeshier".[184] The Bishop of Durham lamented the unreliability of the area's legal officials,

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f[rom] their duty of allegiance & all good conformitie", and a severe rebuke to Bishop Downham of Chester for slackness: SP 12/46/19, 33 (3rd & 21st Feb. 1568) - most of the latter printed in KR Wark, *Elizabethan Recusancy in Cheshire* (Manchester 1971), pp 9-10. Sustained pressure from Northern High Commission and the Privy Council was necessary to move him to any action: see Haigh, *Reformation & Resistance in Tudor Lancashire,* pp 223/4. Cf "The Perills of the Kingdom & the Remedies", 1569: BL Lans. MS 102, f 145r; Grindal to Leicester, 16th July 1571: Add. MS 32091, f 242. Earlier, Bishop Best of Carlisle had written of the "rumors & tales of Spanyardes & Frenchemen to come into Scotland & England upo[n] the West Marches for the reformacon" of religion, which encouraged disobedience - to Cecil, 14th Jan. 1562: SP 12/21/13.

[182] Oct. 1570: PRO SP 15/19/16.I. To reject these statements "because Lancashire did not join in the Northern Rebellion" (Trimble, *Catholic Laity in Elizabethan England,* p 45), is to be as simplistic as contemporary Protestants.

[183] Manning, *Religion & Society in Elizabethan Sussex,* pp 223, 241/2.

[184] Archbishop Young to Cecil, 25th Jan. 1562: PRO SP 12/21/27.

epitomised by Serjeant Mennell. "If Mr. Menel & other refusing the othe of their allegea[n]ce {ie of Supremacy} mai be on the Cou[n]cel [of the North], in authorite still, & have their doi[n]ges [held] for gudd, it will e[n]courage other to the like". Such men obstructed any effort to deal with Catholicism. "I am afraid to thi[n]k what mai folow, iff it be not foresene".[185] During the Northern Rising, Sir Ralph Sadler suspected the attitude even of Yorkshire loyalists, claiming there were "not ten gentilmen in all this countrey that do favor and allowe of Her Majestie's p[ro]ceedings in the cause of religion".[186]

Such reports prompted the 1564 survey of JPs' religious attitudes. Slightly under half were deemed "favourable to religion"; a third "unfavourable" or worse; the balance "neuter". The fullest secondary account of the survey has suggested that the Protestant figures were understated; this seems doubtful.[187]

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[185] Bishop Pilkington of Durham to Cecil, 13th Oct. 1561; cf 14th Nov & 2nd Aug: PRO SP 12/20/5; 25; SP 59/4 (*CSP For. VI,* No 295). The obnoxious Mennell remained on the Council until his death eighteen months later: RR Reid, *The King's Council of the North* (1921), p 492. Cf Best to Cecil, 14th Jan. 1562 (SP 12/21/13) - "the rulers & Justices of Peace wynke at all thynges & looke throughe the fyngeres".

[186] Sadler to Cecil, 6th Dec. 1569; cf Best to same, 20th Feb. 1570: PRO SP 15/15/77; 17/36.

[187] Trimble, *Catholic Laity in Elizabethan England,* p 26. The only reason for this seems to be a presupposition about the moribund nature of pre-missionary Catholicism, combined with a rigid definition requiring open recusancy (p 5), when a covert sympathiser, less distrusted by the government, could in fact do more to protect his fellows. If anything, understatement of the Catholic presence is more likely. Parkhurst of Norwich's report was definitely over-optimistic, thanks to his consultation with the Duke of Norfolk, a protector of doubtful Justices. Pilkington's unconvincing claim of a Protestant majority in Durham was calculated by including Catholic, if temporarily conformist, families like the Nevilles and Tempests

The Privy Council certainly understated them, probably deliberately, claiming as part of its effort to scare Elizabeth into a nuptial *riposte* to Mary's Darnley marriage, that "scantlie a third part was found fullie assured to be trusted in the matter of religion".[188] Bishop Sandys recommended that "all such as mislike and contemne true religion... were put out of auctoritie and publique office", but this was still not practicable. His colleagues at Exeter and Coventry had to recommend the retention of some Catholics, for lack of any others.[189] In the North, an early effort to supplant the Catholic establishment in favour of "unknown" Protestants was undergoing partial reversal in the later 1560s. Richard Norton, dismissed even as a Yorkshire JP in 1559, was still appointed sheriff, which office he held when he became one of the leaders of the 1569 revolt.[190]

There were certainly shires and dioceses where greater optimism was possible; but with most of the tracts north of the Trent and west of the Severn and the Exe, plus Sussex and, to a lesser extent, Hampshire and the northern areas of East Anglia

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(*Camden Misc. IX,* pp 58/9; 66/7). In the dioceses of Worcester and Hereford also, some were classed as "indifferent" who were really "adverse": Birt, *Elizabethan Religious Settlement,* pp 356/7, 366/7.

[188] PC paper, 4th June 1565: PRO SP 12/36/65. Cf the view of the *Discourse touching the Pretended Matche* that "the realme [is] devided into three partes, two of them inclined to Papistrie and Atheisme": Read, *Mr. Secretary Walsingham,* I. 71.

[189] *Camden Misc. IX,* p 2; cf Alley & Bentham: pp 69, 40/2.

[190] SE Taylor, "The Crown & the North of England 1559/70" (Manchester PhD thesis 1981), pp 18-22, 52, 122/3. The number of JPs and royal officials involved in the Rising was deplored, and they were excepted from the pardon of 4th Mar. 1570: STC 8026; H & L, No 570.

inclined to conservatism, this added up to something more than the corners of the land. The Welsh bishops themselves were unusual in distinguishing their dioceses' admitted religious backwardness from any political disloyalty.[191] This did not however prevent Englishmen from concluding that, in a crisis, "Wales with the Borderers therof is veheme[n]tly to be suspected".[192]

A great obstacle was the attitude of much of the nobility, whose clientage networks often dominated both secular and ecclesiastical administration. Such nobles did not even have to be Catholic. The (approximately) Protestant Duke of Norfolk maintained Catholic JPs in East Anglia against efforts to dismiss them. It was also partly due to his influence that Bishop Parkhurst experienced the difficulty of proceeding against Catholics, using an archidiaconal body that itself consisted of "Popish lawyers or unlearned Papists".[193] At Chichester, his

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[191] Eg, writing to Cecil, Robinson of Bangor, 7th Oct. 1567; Richard Davies of St David's, 25th Jan. 1570; Thomas Davies of St Asaph, 17th Nov: PRO SP 12/44/27; 66/26.i; 74/37.

[192] Sandys to Cecil, 12th Nov. 1569: BL Lans. MS 11, f 156r. Cf the moral Sandys drew from St. Bartholomew: "the Gospell earnestlie to be promoted, and the Church not burdened with unnecessarie ceremonies. The Protestantes, *wch. onlie are faithfull subjectes,* are to be comforted, preferred and placed in autoritie; the Papistes to be displaced": to same, 5th Sept. 1572: Lans. MS 15, ff 79/80.

[193] McCulloch, *Suffolk & the Tudors,* pp 84/6, 239/40; 186/8; A Hassell Smith, *County & Court: Government & Politics in Norfolk 1558-1603* (Oxford 1974), p 34. Cf Manning, *Religion & Society in Elizabethan Sussex,* pp 244, 249 for the collaboration of the Protestant Baron Buckhurst with the Catholic Viscount Montague to "maintain" a Justice refusing subscription to the 1569 Uniformity declaration. FF Foster, in *The Politics of Stability: A Portrait of the Rulers in Elizabethan London*

colleague had to deal with a lay society dominated by an exceptional concentration of Catholic peers, and with ecclesiastical offices also permeated with "retinue or alliance".[194]

The peculiar administrative status of Lancashire made it particularly awkward. The 1564 survey, found three Catholic JPs to each Protestant; little change could be made until the Catholic (if largely conformist) Earl of Derby, Edward Stanley was replaced by the Protestant Henry. The notorious Catholic Sir John Southworth was even on the Ecclesiastical Commission itself until 1568.[195] To make matters worse, Bishop Downham was disinclined to any action that might "trouble the country".[196]

(1971), pp 121/7, concluded that even in such a thoroughly reformed area, solidarity among "rulers" of all persuasions was more powerful than anti-Catholicism. This of course implies limitations to the spread of Protestant paranoia; but for Protestants who *were* paranoid, the complacent indifference of co-religionists would aggravate the problem.

[194] Manning, *Religion & Society in Elizabethan Sussex,* pp 221, 238, 259; 41/2, 68/9. Bishop Barlow's efforts were so limited that Curtis, his successor, still in 1569 found blatant Catholics in the cathedral chapter itself. Cf Ecclesiastical Commission report, 1561: PRO SP 15/11/45; Scory of Hereford to Cecil, 17th Aug. 1561, on "the hinderaunce of religion in this cowntre by Popish Justices" (SP 12/19/24), and also on his chapter-full of "dissemblers and rancke Papistes", letter to same, 21st June (SP 12/17/32), and (1564) in *Camden Misc. IX,* pp 19-21; similarly Horne of Winchester to Cecil, 8th July & 29th Aug. 1561: SP 12/17/23, 19/36; Best of Carlisle to same, 19th July (SP 12/18/21) & in *Camden Misc. IX,* p 49; Sandys of Worcester in *ibid,* p 3, etc.

[195] *Camden Misc. IX,* pp 77/8; Haigh, *Reformation & Resistance in Tudor Lancashire,* p 213, & RA Marchant, *The Church under the Law: Justice, Administration & Discipline in the Diocese of York 1560-1640* (Cambridge 1969), p 209.

[196] Pilkington to Parker, 1564, *Parker's Correspondence,* p 222. When Downham's authority was inhibited and Barnes of Carlisle made a visitation in 1571,

Anti-Catholic action by the Bishop of Norwich, even in the ecclesiastical courts, was only practicable after the fall from grace of the Duke of Norfolk. The failure of the Northern Rising, and the flight of the Earls, provided a greater incentive but also a greater opportunity than before to action in their power-bases. These developments also stimulated the central government to make some effort against the Earl of Arundel's influence in Sussex; even if it abandoned Bishop Curtis when he alienated too many people of importance, and refused him the special ecclesiastical commission which he saw as the only way to bypass entrenched interests.[197]

As for the peers, contemporaries (less absorbed with the role of the Commons than later commentators) might have recalled the difficulty in getting the Supremacy Bill through the Lords, even if only Viscount Montague joined the bishops in opposing the final draft.[198] Peers were exempt even from the

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the official recusancy figures suddenly quadrupled; when Downham died in 1577, they virtually sextupled as more active administrators arrived: Haigh, *Reformation & Resistance in Tudor Lancashire,* pp 253/4, 263/4.

[197] McCulloch, *Suffolk & the Tudors,* p 192; Manning, *Religion & Society in Elizabethan Sussex,* pp 222/3; 84/9. Several other bishops, like Curtis, sought extraordinary powers; Thomas Davies of St Asaph noted that the paralysis of ordinary channels caused by Popish sympathisers allowed "wilful and incorrigible persons of evil life and corrupt religion to remain and escape my hands" - to Cecil, 16th Nov. 1570; cf Richard Davies of St David's: PRO SP 12/74/37; 66/19.

[198] NL Jones, *Faith by Statute* (1982), pp 99-103, 114/7, 141/4. This was already stressed by Birt, *Elizabethan Religious Settlement,* pp 75-90, following the reports of the Count of Feria, 10th May 1559 (*CDIE* 87, p 186, & KL I. 519; *CSP Sp. I,* No 31) and the Mantuan Il Schifanoya, 14th Mar. (*CSP Ven. VII,* No 40). The Act of Uniformity, according to the former, passed the Lords by only three votes.

1563 extended requirement for the Oath of Supremacy, since "the Quene's Ma[jes]tie ys otherwise sufficiently assured of the faithe and loyaltie of the Temporall Lordes" - an assurance worthless enough by 1569.[199] The lack of official action against recusancy in the 1560s was probably due not so much to its non-existence, as to the difficulty of tackling it without a collision with the natural leaders of society. Action therefore increased after the collision of 1569/71 occurred anyway; but greater effort was delayed until the later 1570s and early 1580s, when political developments were increasingly threatening as well as recusancy genuinely on the increase.

Mary Stewart's go-between, Francis Yaxley, claimed to have a list "of sundry nobleme[n] and gentleme[n] in sundry partes of England that were of good power, that wold be redy to follow such directio[n] as the King of Spayne shuld appoint them for the alteratio[n] of religion". After Yaxley was drowned, another Northern exile, Christopher Rokesby, sought to investigate these matters in Scotland; in fact on behalf of Cecil. He warned alarmingly of a coalition of Earls favouring Mary - Northumberland, Westmorland, Norfolk, Cumberland, Derby and Shrewsbury.[200] Cecil suspected that the Catholic exiles had made "registers, acco[m]pty[n]g in ev[er]y shyre and gret town of the

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199 5 Eliz. I, c 1, §17: *SR* IV. 1, p 405.

200 Intelligence, 15th Sept. 1565: PRO SP 52/11/44 (*Cal. Scot. II,* No 260); Rokesby to Cecil, July 1566: Haynes, *Burghley SP,* pp 445/6 (HMC 9: *Hatfield MSS,* I, No 1116).

realm, who is assured to the Roman Relligion, maky[n]g ther estymat of more than the best hallf of noblemen and gentillmen to be thers". In 1569, he drew up an early draft (abruptly abandoned) for a Protestant Association in response, which was to make a "speciall secret booke" in every county of those ready "to wt.stand any foreyn or domesticall attempt against Hir Ma[jes]ty for the chau[n]g of hir estate, or alteratio[n] of the lawes established for relligion", attempted "by practise or force"; and also to note those who refused to subscribe.[201] Later that year, there developed a movement, initiated immediately before the Northern Rising actually began,[202] among peace commissions in counties away from the centres of revolt, to issue declarations of support for the Act of Uniformity, as an indication of *political* loyalty. It is fairly clear that, for this reason, basically Catholic individuals subscribed.[203] Even so, in Hampshire, Sussex, Cheshire, Devon, Suffolk, Herefordshire, Cornwall and Glamorgan - and also, less predictably, Kent, Hertfordshire, Essex and Berkshire - national emergency failed to produce the expected

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201 "The Perills of the Kingdom & the Remedies", 1569: BL Lans. MS 102, f 145r; "A Necessary Consideration of the Perillous State of this Tyme", 7th June: PRO SP 12/51/6-7. The particular advantage from the Queen's point of view was that subscribers were to produce a benevolence equal to their subsidy assessment (double for clergy) for these ends.

202 Trimble, *Catholic Laity in Elizabethan England,* p 52.

203 Examples in McCulloch, *Suffolk & the Tudors,* p 97, & Manning, *Religion & Society in Elizabethan Sussex,* p 244; others, from Northamptonshire and Worcestershire, in JH Gleason, *Justices of the Peace in England 1558-1640* (Oxford 1969), pp 71, 209.

unanimity. That many of the dissidents stressed their political loyalty, pleading only scruples of conscience, was a distinction lost on most Protestants.[204]

The fundamental reason why it was impossible for Protestants to see English Catholicism as a passive, non-threatening force was their intense consciousness of the fragility of their own political advantage. The 1563 Commons complained that "contentious and malicious Papistes... laye in wayte to advaunce some title under which they may renue their late unspeakable cruelty, to the destruction of goodes, possessions and bodies, and thrawldome of the soules and consciences of your faithfull and Christian subjectes. we see nothing to withstand their desire but only your life".[205] Nearly a decade later, Cecil, in the significantly entitled "Perills growing by forbeary[n]g to do Justice", noted that "the whole now dependeth uppo[n] Her Ma[jes]ty's bre[th]".[206]

The 1563 Commons believed that Elizabeth's enemies were not content to wait, but plotted "dayly most dangerous

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[204] These declarations are scattered through PRO SP 12/59-60, 66-7. In Derbyshire, Worcestershire, Gloucestershire, Warwickshire and Nottinghamshire, unanimity was achieved, because doubtful individuals contrived to be absent.

[205] Commons petition, 28th Jan. 1563: Hartley, *Proceedings in Parliament*, p 91. They and Elizabeth however disagreed fundamentally as to whether this danger would be decreased or increased by nomination of a successor.

[206] BL Cott. MS Caligula Cii, f 87r. Cf notes on St. Bartholomew's: Lans. MS 109, f 72v; Thomas Digges' Discourse on the Oath of Association, 1584: Lans. MS 98, f 16r: "Thes helhoundes... suppose Hir Ma[jes]ti's lyfe is the onely lett why Romayn tyrranye is not agayne reduced into England."

practises against your life". Throckmorton accused the Guises in early 1560 of a "pestilent and horryble devise", employing an Italian (inevitably) to poison her: "named Stephano, a borly man; black bearde". A year and a half later, Giovanni Battista Beltrano reported that a Greek with "a redd bearde" in Martinengo's train meant to poison the Queen, had the nuncio been admitted.[207] There were persistent rumours that if Elizabeth were to marry Dudley, some of the English nobility meant to kill them both.[208]

Not only did the few amateurish intriguers who were really at work in England during the 1560s deny such intentions, they also claimed that their negotiations with various claimants to the English throne were simply contingency plans in case of Elizabeth's death. The Pole plotters, Cecil wrote, "seke theire

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[207] Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 25th April 1560 & 26th Sept. 1561: PRO SP 70/13, f 211v; 30, ff 102/3v (*CSP For. IV,* No 1066; *CSP For. VI,* No 538). Cf De Quadra to Philip, 27th Nov. 1561, on the confusion caused by Beltrano's baseless allegations: *CDIE* 87 pp 374/5 (*CSP Sp. I,* No 144). Walsingham's informant Franchiotto warned him of the number of ways Elizabeth might be poisoned, without being too sure of who would do it: CP 1, f 21 (20th Aug. 1568; HMC 9: *Hatfield MSS,* I, No 1184). Cf information of "trente trahisons" sent by "a frantike Frenchman": BL Lans. MS 99, ff 54/6.

[208] De Quadra to Margaret of Parma, 7th Sept. 1559; to Philip, 13th & 18th Nov: KL II. 18-22; *CDIE* 87, pp 260/4 (*CSP Sp. I,* Nos 60; 74/5); Montague's report of a conversation with Von Helfenstein, the imperial envoy; Dec: Haynes, *Burghley SP,* pp 233/4 (HMC 9: *Hatfield MSS,* I, No 586a); Montague & Chamberlain to Elizabeth, 29th April 1560: PRO SP 70/13, f 238 (*CSP For. IV,* No 1090). If Elizabeth married Dudley or any Englishman, "in less than a month both the Queen and the new King would be slain", according to the Austrian envoys - Pollweiler to Ferdinand, 11th June 1559; cf Brenner to same, 6th Aug. & 5th Dec, & De Quadra, 2nd Oct: V Klarwill, *Queen Elizabeth & Some Foreigners* (1928), pp 93; 114/5, 156/62; 132/6 (*CSP Sp. I,* No 64; also *CDIE* 87, pp 240/1); pp 171/2 are another letter, not in *CSP Sp,* despairing of both the Austrian marriage negotiation and Elizabeth's chances of survival - De Quadra to same, 11th Mar. 1560.

defence by saying that they ment it not before the Quene our Soveraign shuld die"; though their deriving assurance of the imminence of this event from divination was barely less heinous than open rebellion. They were indicted for seeking "not only her deposition, but her death and final destruction".[209] The actual conjuration was performed by John Prestall, a colourful villain who engaged in an unrelated conspiracy to murder for his own ends; fled to Flanders in 1563; turned up in Scotland in 1569, indulging in alchemy and allegedly plotting with the Northern Earls. Then he returned to Flanders, where he was said (typically without going into detail) to have expounded to Dr Story (the second official Elizabethan Catholic martyr) plans "to poyson... farre of" Elizabeth and James VI, and "devices" to invade England, which were probably used to underlie the treason charges against Story, when he was kidnapped and returned to England (though no actual indictment or trial record survives).[210]

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[209] Cecil to Smith, 27th Mar. 1563: Wright, *Queen Elizabeth & her Times,* I. 127; PRO KB 8/40. On the traditional equation between predicting and seeking the monarch's death, see S Rezneck, "Constructive Treason by Words in the 15th Century", *AHR* 33 (1928), p 551; J Bellamy, *The Tudor Law of Treason* (1979), pp 23/9, 52. 3 & 4 Edward VI c. 15 however, recapitulated by 5 Elizabeth I c. 15, seemed to reduce prophecy from high treason to misprison - see *SR* IV. 114, 445.

[210] *Copie of a Letter concerning D. Story,* STC 23296 (1571), reprinted in *Harl. Misc.* VIII. 586/8. There is however a draft for the indictment, which charges him, on the basis of aiding exiled survivors of the Northern Rising in Flanders, with "compassing the Queen's death"; and also with conspiring with "straungiers to invade this realme of England and to levy war against the Queene" - PRO SP 12/77/64; cf *Declaration of the Lyfe & Death of John Story,* STC 23297 (1571), reprinted in *Somers Tracts* (2nd edn, ed. W Scott, 1809), I. 482. As for Prestall, by 1570 he had become an informer for Cecil, but it is not clear that this role was considered to predominate over that of "practiser" until late 1571 - John Marsh (Governor of the

The Countess of Lennox was said to have ascertained from Nostradamus' prophecies that her son Darnley "should be boetht King of Englande and Scotlande"; and, seven years later, supporters of her marriage to Norfolk to have "concluded by astronomy" that Mary was sure of the English throne.[211] The charges against John Throckmorton's Norwich conspiracy in Norfolk's favour included "predestinating the now magestrate's ov[er]throwe" - which, although it implied magic, apparently referred to predictions in normally indiscreet conversation - and, in the case of Thomas Broke, "imagination of the Quene's violent deathe", for saying "th[a]t the Scottes shold conquer us".[212]

By 1570, alleged assassination plots against Elizabeth were becoming more prominent. This was partly due to the conclusion that the Excommunication implied absolution for such a killing; partly probably as a reflection of French rumours, to the effect that Catherine de Medici, as was only natural for an Italian woman, was continually trying to poison the Huguenot leaders.

Merchant Venturers) to Cecil, 11th April 1570: SP 70/111 f 70 (*CSP For. XI*, No 811); John Lee to same, 9th Nov. 1571: SP 15/20/91. On Story's kidnapping, see R Pollitt, "The Abduction of Dr John Story & the Evolution of Elizabethan Intelligence Operations", in *16 CJ* 14 (1983), pp 131/56. He is probably correct about its official inspiration, but there is insufficient evidence to support his degree of conviction.

[211] Thomas Bishop's charges against the Lennoxes, 7th May 1562; William Forbes' deposition, 9th May: PRO SP 12/23/6, 14; Wentworth to Cecil, 30th Sept. 1569: Haynes, *Burghley SP,* p 538 (HMC 9: *Hatfield MSS,* I, No 1353). Such divinations were also one of the alleged subversive manifestations accompanying Martinengo's arrival: PC paper, 1st May 1561: PRO SP 12/17/1; De Quadra to Philip II, 30th June: *CDIE* 87, pp 359/60 (*CSP Sp. I,* No 134).

[212] PRO SP 12/71/61(July 1570).

She was believed to have been successful in the case of D'Andelot, whose death prompted Dean Nowell to fear that such policy would spread to England. The death of the exiled Cardinal Chatillon made it appear that it had.[213] Catholics would "never omitt ether impoysonyng or other treasons to bring ther designes to desyryd effect".[214] As far as cruder methods went, the shooting of the Earl of Moray was a threatening sign, automatically assumed to be part of a wider plot.[215]

After the Northern Rising, Cecil was sent a paranoid effusion on the theme that "novissima erunt longe p[er]iculiosora et peiora prioribus":

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[213] Nowell to Grindal, 6th June 1569: BL Lans. MS 11, f 198r; cf Norris to Cecil, 27th May, 18th July, 23rd Sept: PRO SP 70/107, ff 50v, 59; 108, f 91v; Hunsdon to Cecil, 13th June: SP 59/16, f 57r (*CSP For. XI,* Nos 272, 327, 443; 298); Smith to Walsingham, 13th Jan. 1573: BL Harl. MS 260, f 403v. *Correspondance de Fénélon,* ed. Teulet, II. 8, 16-17 (3rd & 10th June 1569), noting (to Catherine !) panics about Italians. On French rumours, see J-H Mariejol, *Cathérine de Médicis* (Paris 1920), pp 172/3, 253; NM Sutherland, *The Massacre of St. Bartholomew & the European Conflict* (1973), pp 96, 100/2, 127 (swallowing them all); AW Whitehead, *Gaspard de Coligny: Admiral of France* (1904), pp 41, 211/2, who seems nearer the mark in seeing as policy "When in doubt, say poison."

[214] Norris to Leicester, 9th Aug. 1570: PRO SP 70/112, f 83v (*CSP For. XI,* No 1158); cf same to same, 29th July 1568: HMC 70: *Pepys MSS,* p 123; Smith to Elizabeth, 8th Feb. 1572, & to Wilson, 11th April: SP 70/146.xiii, ff 42/4, 66r (*CSP For. XVIII.2,* Add, Nos 429, 460).

[215] Eg Randolph to Cecil, 14th April 1570: PRO SP 52/17/48 (*Cal. Scot. III,* No 175); Norris to same, 25th Feb. & 1st Mar: SP 70/110, f 89; 111, f 3r (*CSP For. XI,* Nos 712, 725). As usual, Norris blamed the Cardinal of Lorraine. Later his fears became focused on a sinister man (aptly called Villenus) disfigured by a powder explosion - 9th Mar: SP 70/111, ff 14-16 (*CSP,* Nos 740/1). In bloodthirsty vein, the English bishops cited Moray as a victim of his own clemency and warned Elizabeth against this fate - petition, 26th May 1572; cf 31st (reasons for Norfolk's execution): Hartley, *Proceedings in Parliament,* pp 276, 297/8.

"I feare Her Highnes goethe dailie in great daunger. O Lord pres[er]ve her from privie conspiracie, poison, shotte and all papisticall trecheries.... O good Mr. Secretarie, have an eye to yourselfe; beware whom you truste; you knowe the world; all are not faithfull frendes that shewe fairest faces... The Papistes practize daye and nighte. Judas no[n] dormit" ![216]

Actual Catholic rebellion was at first confined to Ireland. So far however the Elizabethan government explained its problems there by the Irishness rather than the Catholicism of those involved. Negotiations with the notorious Sean O'Neill laid more stress on inducing him to wear "civil" dress than on ensuring his religious conformity. Even in a speech explicitly emphasising the Catholic League, Sir Ralph Sadler passed on to the problem of quelling Irish trouble by making the natives live "civilly" without making an explicit connection.[217] As Sir Thomas Smith wrote on hints of a new Irish rising: "When did they not so?... Wild & rebellious men will never lack occasion to fly from obedience."[218]

Catholic intrigue was however blamed for the troubles

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[216] 6th Feb. 1570: PRO SP 15/17/72. John Man, when Ambassador in Spain, also opined with reference to Sir Francis Englefield that "Judas non dormit" - to Cecil, 19th Dec. 1566: HMC 70: *Pepys MSS*, p 93. Cf Parker, finding holes drilled in his barge - to Cecil, 6th Feb. 1564: *Correspondence*, pp 203/4.

[217] Eg Cecil's memo & articles for O'Neill, Mar. 1562; Lord Justice Fitzwilliams to Cecil, 14th April; PC to O'Neill, Oct. 1563 & 18th Jan. 1564: PRO SP 63/5/43, 47-8, 83; 9/51; 10/10. Sadler, Oct. 1566: Hartley, *Proceedings in Parliament*, p 142.

[218] Smith to Burghley, 10th April 1572: PRO SP 70/146.xiii, f 64r (*CSP For. XVIII.2*, Add, No 457). His son died later in an abortive "plantation" project. Cf Mildmay's Commons speech, 10th Feb. 1576, on "the evill disposition of the people" (& indeed virtually every English reference to Ireland): Hartley, *Proceedings in Parliament*, p 443.

when convenient. The Nuncio Wolfe, the following year, was said to be "occupied in stirring a rebellion, having already by open acte deprived the Q.'s Majesty of her right and title there, as much as in him lyeth". Encouragement of O'Neill in actual rebellion was merely assumed; but Wolfe had certainly abetted him in the support of Catholic bishops in Irish cathedrals in defiance of the Royal Supremacy. During the great attack on De Quadra, the Privy Council claimed that he had given O'Neill "very evill counsell and comefort to be a rebell still".[219] The Catholic claimant to the archbishopric of Armagh, Richard Creagh, was charged with "attempting to disturbe the state of the realme of Ireland by practises from Rome".[220] The double-dealing Rokesby, his alarming report delayed by his sojourn in Scottish prisons, claimed when he emerged that Mary planned to start an Irish revolt before invading England, helped by Catholics there.[221]

The surprising thing about the first decade of Elizabeth's reign is the *lack* of Catholic challenge to her position - in actuality, at least. This consideration must however be balanced

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219 PRO SP 12/17/1; cf Sir Nicholas Arnold to Cecil, 23rd Sept. 1562: SP 63/7/17. Charges against De Quadra, 7th Jan. 1563: SP 70/48, f 106r (*CSP For. VIII*, No 45).

220 *APC VII*, pp 198 (22nd Feb. 1565); cf Creagh's examinations of that date, & 22nd Dec. 1567 & 8th Jan. 1568; Adam Loftus (Protestant) Archbishop of Armagh to Cecil, 16th May 1565: PRO SP 63/12/33, 22/50, 23/7-8; 13/40.

221 Proposal of 5th Sept. 1561: JH Pollen, *Papal Negotiations with Mary Queen of Scots 1561/7* (Edinburgh 1901), p 63 (*CSP Rome I*, No 102). Rokesby to Cecil, June 1566: Haynes, *Burghley SP*, p 446 (HMC 9: *Hatfield MSS*, I, No 1116). Hartley, *Proceedings in Parliament*, pp 320, 346 for references to Rokesby's claims in 1572.

by realisation of the acute and constant fear of such a challenge that afflicted the English Protestant establishment. This was genuine enough, even if sometimes probably fed with conscious exaggeration, by foreign Protestants seeking English support, or Elizabeth's councillors trying to nudge her into activity. However various the motives behind the allegations, the cumulative effect of their repetition is clear. It affected even relatively cool and cerebral men like Cecil and Smith, as well as such as Throckmorton, whose correspondence seems to show an advanced and generalised paranoia, relating to his supposed "unfriends" and "backbiters" at home, as well as to the dubious foreigners by whom he found himself surrounded. It could even affect Elizabeth herself - mainly when her royal title was impugned, as by Mary Stewart.[222] There is justice in Cardinal Allen's later picture (drawn even while he himself worked to produce reality in these

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[222] Cf the increasing conviction during the 1570s of Archbishops Parker and Sandys, and Bishop Aylmer, that they were assailed not only by the disobedient of both religious extremes, but by "secret foes" in authority: VJK Brook, *Archbishop Parker* (Oxford 1962), pp 336/7; P Collinson, *Archbishop Grindal: the Struggle for a Reformed Church* (1979), p 285. More generally: LB Smith, *Treason in Tudor England: Politics & Paranoia* (1986), ch 2; P Zagorin, *Ways of Lying: Dissimulation, Persecution & Conformity in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, Mass, 1990), pp 255/7. I would add to Smith's remarks on "foes" that they seem to be an essential part of Elizabethan self-esteem. Anyone ambitious would, at least unconsciously, aspire to have "mighty foes"; if their enmity was not readily visible, it must be "hidden". The passages earlier on England as the chief threat seen from Rome are in some sense equivalent to this; if not all of Haller's Elect Nation argument is valid, there was perhaps a view that Antichrist might fear that England was an Elect Nation. Like aspiring Elizabethan politicians, England flattered (as well as scared) herself about her "mighty foes"; as will be seen in the next chapter, she was not the highest priority for their enmity.

fears) of "such extraordinary fears as is a wonder to behold... There is not a poor priest can enter to say Mass but they imagine he bringeth their destruction. There cannot a ship appear on any coast, nor any prince's preparation for his own affairs but it is for the invasion of the realm." More than one foreign envoy characterised Elizabethans as afraid of their own shadows.[223]

It became almost a fortieth article of the Anglican faith that the powers of Antichrist, led by the Pope, whoever it might be, were constantly working to accomplish the downfall of England's godly princess. With varying justification, the malevolence of the Guise family, Mary Queen of Scots and Philip II became subsidiary principles. As with most conspiracy theories, cooperation was assumed where none existed; "differences went almost unrecognised in the very country whch would have been overjoyed to see them."[224] Whether or not English Catholics' treason was the main fear, the obvious inference was that they, by reason of their faith, were untrustworthy. All that was needed was more reality to underpin this structure of paranoia - and that the next few years were to provide.

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[223] Allen, *Defence of English Catholics,* ed. Kingdon, p 236. Antonio de Guaras to Secretary Zayas, 30th June 1570: *CSP Sp. II,* No 194; Castelnau de la Mauvissière, 1st Jan. 1584: quoted Pollen, *Mary Queen of Scots & the Babington Plot* (Edinburgh 1922), p xxiv.

[224] Wiener, "Popular anti-Catholicism", p 30; quoting Sir Robert Cotton on the belief Catholics were "a united party, resolved and advised beforehand how to turn their faces with assurance unto all dangers".

EXCOMMUNICATION AND THE CATHOLIC LEAGUE:

ANATOMY OF A NON-EVENT

"Mildness... is a very base course; and there is only one thing worse, which is to make threats which one cannot fulfil."[1]

"One is driven to the conclusion that all princes are intent [only] upon the interests of their states, especially when they feel the pinch of need."[2]

"Let my death come from Spain, for then it will be sure to come slowly."

Bacon, *Essay 25: Of Dispatch*

Protestant England had reason enough to fear an immediate confrontation with the Papacy. By the letter of canon law, one was inevitable. Former Roman Catholic theory and practice seemed conducive to it; and present theory did little to reassure those whom the kaleidoscopic changes of the last decade had wrought to a nervous pitch. There was rhetoric enough in the diplomatic arena too to feed the state of mind described in chapter 4. Reality was less intimidating; but the Elizabethan mind's fascination with rhetoric was such that it often ceased to be able to distinguish it from reality.

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[1] Luis de Requesens (Spanish Ambassador in Rome) to Francisco de Alava (Spanish Ambassador in Paris), 11th April 1564: *Pio IV y Felipe II,* edd. F Ramirez de Arellano & JS Rayon (Madrid 1891), p 297.

[2] Ormanetto (Nuncio in Spain) to Galli (Gregory XIII's Cardinal-Secretary) , 8th May 1573: *CSP Rome II,* No 194 (orig. PRO 31/9/72, p153).

Louvainist Books: A Dagger and a Velvet Glove ?

The most comprehensive historian of English Catholic political writing has described that of the 1560s as "indicative of a non-resistant frame of mind." There were notable exceptions to this, however - which, if limited in scope, represent significant aspects of the thinking of two of the three most important Catholic controversialists of the 1560s (Thomas Harding and Nicholas Sanders; Thomas Stapleton *was* more discreet). When Harding declared "that we condemne and defie al such attemptes, I meane, that any subjecte or subjectes whatsoever, *of their own private authoritie,* should take armes against their prince for matters of religion", he thereby ruled out Protestant resistance, not Catholic resistance authorised by the Pope.[3] Even without active paranoia in the reader's mind, they are not calculated to provide assurance that the papal deposing

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[3] Holmes, *Resistance and Compromise,* p 19; p 16 quotes Harding, *Detection,* f 87r. Holmes' periodisation of "non-resistance" and "resistance" seems far too neat, and therefore the dichotomy betwen political theory and political action not so puzzling as it seems (pp 63/4). To make it work at all, Sanders' *Rocke of the Churche* (see below) has to be displaced to his next chapter. And the label "non-resistant" is remarkably elastic when it is used to describe the writings in the 1580s of the exile Richard Hall, urging "Catholics in the Netherlands to obey Philip II and to murder William of Orange" (p 67), even if the former was the actual king. Cf Carrafiello, "Politics of Popery", pp 152/3, for complaint about Holmes' "stark dichotomies"; A Pritchard, *Catholic Loyalism in Elizabethan England* (1979), pp 10, 210, commenting on Holmes' thesis: "Holmes may tend to overrate the importance of the occasional signs of loyalty from Allen and Parsons", which "seem to be of very little importance", and are often examples of "the 'Brutus is an honourable man' trick".

power was a mere historical curiosity.

If due allowance be made for his usual bigoted hyperbole, there was something in the complaint of Thomas Norton, Puritan Parliamentarian and polemicist, that the exiles at Louvain

> "thinke themselves cunning fellowes and their bookes well warranted in England, if they do not call the Quene in plaine speache a tirant, infidel, Arrian and suchlike, when undirectly they implie it and do applie to her cause the examples of pagane, Arrian, tiran[n]ous and wicked Kinges and Emperours.... her right is impugned, her faith is defamed; her governement is discredited; her honour is touched; her majestie is many wayes violated and abated... and her subjectes' hartes alienated and perswaded to grudge against her."[4]

Bishop Horne of Winchester accused the deposed Abbot Feckenham of seeking, by cavils at the Oath of Supremacy, to

> "bring her subjectes to a heretical misliking of her royal power, whiche is a preparation to rebellion against her persone. How much prosperitie you wishe to Her Majestie appeareth when that with diepe sighes and grones you looke daily for a chaunge therof, and th'arche heretique of Rome, your God in earthe, to reigne in her place."[5]

Horne's episcopal neighbour, Jewel of Salisbury, author of the *Apology of the Church of England,* anticipated the complaints given substance later in Elizabeth's reign, and seemed unconcerned by the possibility of reminding Catholics of precedents that it might have been more prudent to ignore; though it was in the later editions of the *Defence of the Apology,*

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[4] *An Addition Declaratorie to the Bulles, with a Searching of the Maze,* STC 18678a (1570), sigs A3v/4r. Cf Bilson, *True Difference,* sig A3; Humphrey, *View of the Romish Hydra,* sig *5.

[5] *Answere Made,* f 3v; cf f 130r: "you and your complices daily labour to subvert" "the Queen's Majestie's lawfull and due authoritie". To brand Catholics bluntly as "heretics" was so far quite unusual, though Norton did it too.

when the threat had become a reality, that he challenged his main adversary (with hindsight):

> "How then if the Pope this day to recover his losses would release the natural subjects of this realm from their oath and allegiance to the Queen's Majesty, as he hath often done as well here {*sic*} as in other countries, and saith he may justly do by the right of his office? What would you then do yourself, M. Harding?... You would do even as your fathers have done before you."[6]

Harding, in fact, unabashedly upheld the papal deposing power, a direct power at that:

> "If the Pope Zacharias deposed Childerike... the King of Fraunce, only upon his own pleasure or displeasure as ye saye, and placed Pipine for him, can ye tell that storye, and not see what a strength of auctoritie is in that See, which is able with a word to place and displace the mightiest King in Europe ? With a word, I saye. For I am sure ye can shewe us of no armie, that he sent to execute that his will. Is that the power of a man trowe ye, to appoint kingdomes ? Can the Devill himselfe at his pleasure set up and depose Kings ? No, surely. And much lesse can any member of his do the same... Beware ye synne not against the Holy Ghost, who confesse that the Pope hath pulled downe and set up Kinges. Which thing undoubtedly he could not do profitably and peaceably, but by the great power of God. And yet did that line of Pipine and Charles the Great, which the Pope did set up, florish above any other stocke, that ye can name sense the inclination {=rise} of the Romaine Empire. Which in that transposed state of so great a kingdome, maketh no obscure argument of heavenly approbation and divine providence."

That papal intervention produce "profitable and peaceable" results was an implied criterion for its justification. Harding got all possible mileage out of the case before mentioning that the Pope's accusation was not just *proprio motu* but at "the most

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[6] *Works,* PS, III. 172.

earnest request and sute of all the nobilitie and communaltie of the whole realme of Fraunce".[7]

As for the Emperor Henry IV, cited by Jewel, "the Pope... only excommunicated him as he had just cause to do. For contempt whereof it may be thought he sped never the better."[8] Harding denied that Boniface VIII had deposed Philip IV, but "if the Pope so did why may he not seme to have done it rather to feare him, and to reclaime his mynde from disobedience ?"[9] Whatever his general claims, Harding's stance was rather defensive in these two *causes celebres* which had generated so much anti-papal polemic; the deposition of Childeric, generally remembered only as *inutilis* was easier to justify. Moreover, neither Henry nor Philip had been deposed "profitably and peaceably"; Philip's deposition in fact had failed to amount to anything at all. Harding, doctrinally compelled to justify papal conduct, did have his doubts about the prudence of doing so in some detailed instances. In principle however, "it appereth by God's good pleasure great power to be geven to a priest in some cases touching the disposition of kingdomes." He did not however limit himself to

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7 Harding, *Confutation,* ff 181/2; cf Sanders, *The Rocke of the Churche,* STC 21692 (Louvain 1567 / ERL 328), p 412.

8 Harding, *Confutation,* f 187v.

9 *Ibid,* f 182. Harding was using a highly garbled version of events, which by confusing the sees of Pamiers, in the Languedoc, and Apamea, in Syria, made out the bishop imprisoned by Philip to be a legate whose Crusade preaching had proved unwelcome instead of a subject of his own accused of treason. Cf Platina, *De Vitis Pontificum,* ed. Panvinius, pp 247/8.

the indirect power: "if all the right of all Kinges depends of Christ, who is Kinge of Kinges, as long as the Pope truly hath Christe's name... so long he shall have as a minister in earth that right which Christ had in earth", and Christ "neded no kinges, being no lesse able to rule alone in thinges temporall then in spirituall." This was the Louvainist's exalted view of pontifical power in temporal affairs, which he was not willing to play down, as "it is a great eye sore to the ministers of Antichrist to see the Vicare of Christ above the lordes and kinges of this world".[10]

In the *Detection* of 1568 Harding did qualify somewhat these passages in the *Confutation.* The papal role in Childeric's deposition was reduced, and the previous sweeping conclusions replaced by yet another counter-attack on Protestants. "You that finde so great fault with Pope Zacharias for *consenting after a sort* to the deposition of Childerike a beastly man, an unprofitable and unworthy king of Fraunce, why do ye allow, cherish and commend so much Christopher Godman and John Knoxe with their felowes and helpers that were... doing what in their power did lye to depose the most noble and lawful Quenes of England and Scotland"? He now affirmed positively that Philip IV's deposition was only "to fraie him and to reclaime his minde from disobedience"; and seemed to imply, without a word of the Anagni *coup,* that Boniface VIII had then reinstated him.

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[10] Harding, *Confutation,* ff 180v; cf Rastell, *A Confutation of a Sermon Pronounced by M. Juell,* STC 20726 (Antwerp 1564 / ERL 13), f 110r.

"Whensoever any Prince at other times revoked his evil purpose and confourmed himselfe to right, such giftes of [their] titles [to others] were also eftsones by the Popes revoked. Indeede certaine Popes used that practise as a meane only to drawe Princes from wicked attemptes, and most commonly the same tooke good effecte. I denie not but sometimes by such practise Princes were removed from their estate and other enjoyed their roumes, but the same were such as persevered incorrigible."[11]

In view of his statements elsewhere, Harding certainly was resorting to diplomatic evasion when he professed uncertainty about the rights and wrongs of papal treatment of English kings, Henry II, John and Henry VIII. If these "did well, and the bishops evil, they have their rewarde; the other, their punishment." He quickly passed on to demand, "Is this a good cause why ye (who have nothing to do with Princes' matters now ended and buried) should forsake the Church, change the whole order of religion, and condemne all before your time for a thousand yeres...?" English Protestants, it became increasingly clear, did not however consider these matters "ended and buried", any more than were the beginnings of the Church, and they were to recur for decades. "Because the Popes did wrong to Princes, will ye do wrong to yourselves ?... Because they excommunicated them, will you excommunicate yourselves ?... Verely your Apostasie and departing from the Catholicke Church is to weighty a matter, to be defended with so light a reason." Jewel claimed "by your doctrine whosoever dare speak in his prince's right is a fool and killeth himself, as though there were no life or salvation

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[11] Harding, *Detection,* ff 12v-13r, 16r.

but under the frantic government of the Pope."[12]

Sanders was less delicate. He dismissed kings who came into conflict with Rome as those also "most licentious, most geven to extorsion, to tyrannie, or to robling of Churches". Such disobedience was usually attended by worldly disasters, such as had befallen the Greeks at the hands of the Moslems. Harding too in the *Detection,* where paradoxically he was qualifying somewhat the objectionable nature of his statements on foreign kings embroiled with former Popes, ceased to handle English ones with kid gloves. He declared that when Jewel could show

> "that King Henrie the Eight did wel and according either to the Holy Scriptures or the doctrine of the auncient and learned Fathers when he tooke upon him to be Supreme Head in earth of the Churche of England, immediately under Christe, whiche no temporal prince ever tooke upon him before, and likewise when for maintenance of the same title, he hanged, headded and quartered so many holy and learned men of al degrees, now blessed Sainctes and crowned Martyrs in Heaven... then wil we say with them, O worthy Kinges, O naughty Popes, yea then wil we saie too, O the crowe is white. Nevertheless I doo not here justifie al the deedes of the Popes. But whatsoever they did, that is no sufficient cause why menne should forsake their Faith and departe from the felowship of the Churche."[13]

This was certainly a step in the direction of a more consistent doctrine; but the reduction in tact seems also to indicate a decreasing hope that anything could be gained by conciliation of Henry's daughter.

Sanders considered it "against the law of Nature (which

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[12] Harding, *Confutation,* ff 339/40; Jewel, *Defence, Works,* IV. 1077.

[13] Sanders, *Rocke,* pp 416/9; Harding, *Detection,* f 18.

can never be wholie changed) for a shepe to rule his shepheard"; the attempt showed any layman to be "a member of Antichrist", "the abomination of desolation".[14] Already in the *Rocke of the Churche,* he displayed signs of the radical Augustinianism, in the tradition of Giles of Rome and Augustinus Triumphus, that was later to become infamous in the eyes of the Elizabethan government. "We reade not, that the making of kings over Gods owne people at first came of God by the way of His mercifull grace and election, but by way of his angrie permission and just judgement, in suffering thereby the paine of their great synnes to fall upon them." "The princely state... of al states came last to the Faith." At best, royal rule was a lesser evil, "made either by the necessitie of wor[l]dly calamities to kepe away greater evil from the common weale, or els by wanton and proud affection of earthly men, ambitiously affecting tyrannical power."

A bad priest could "never be so hurtful and slaunderouse to eternal salvation as a king may be". Even when admitting that kingship might be rational and useful, not just arbitrary and tyrannical, Sanders kept it firmly in its place. "Who douteth but that it may be soner abused which men by good reason ordeined, then that which God, above al course of reason, instituted by grace only ?" Sanders protested, belatedly, "Let no man thinck that I despise the authoritie of kings (God forbid) but thei are a good thing brought in mercifully sumwhere to staye violent

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[14] Sanders, *Rocke,* pp 70, 502, 511/2, cf 515/8.

injuries and robberies, and otherwise permitted of God for our just punishment, and not any like thing to that divine order of pastours, which Christ ordeined purposely for our reconciliation to God the Father and for the avoiding of al just punishment otherwise deserved." They were certainly, in his eyes, more God's scourges than His vicars. "The most part of Princes are prone to the worst." He did however (since really he *did* despise kingship), eschew arguments about the kingship of Christ, and hence of the Pope, and insisted on the indirect nature of papal power, in contrast to Harding.[15]

The Catholic polemicists of the 1560s may have proved their point about Protestants' rebellious behaviour towards princes they considered ungodly.[16] Addressed however to Elizabeth, whom all sorts of Protestants so far recognised as being, if not the perfect godly prince, at any rate godlier than any contemporary or likely successor, this demonstration was of limited value. The onus was on the Catholics to prove instead that they did not display the same tendencies if *they* considered a prince ungodly. They could not do this without prejudicing the papal plenitude of power. As John Rastell, a lesser writer, concluded, the Pope had power over "a Christian Emperor that hath

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15 *Ibid,* pp 51/3, 60, 57/8, 49; 81/3, cf 412 on Childeric's "indirect" deposition. Cf *De Visibili Monarchia,* p 77: a king "ought only to be tolerated in the government of the kingdom" if he acted according to Christ's law.

16 This is more pragmatic polemicism than fundamental and unconditional adoption of "non-resistance" as Holmes has it: *Resistance & Compromise,* ch 1.

submitted hymselfe by promysse unto God and the Church"; "for the commoditie of the whole Church (if cause so requyre) he may as well forbead (concernyng the Emperor's owne person) that no man salute hym or regarde hym as he may excommunicate the basest man in a whole citie, for a fault which deserveth it."[17]

Many Catholic writers, forced on to the defensive, felt compelled to issue some disclaimer of the papal abuses that filled their opponents' books. Sanders insisted, "We speake not now of workes or maners, that is to say whether a man love the world more then God or whether the Pope be more gredy of his temporal jurisdiction then of his spirituall dutie. We speake not, I say, of these abuses (lette him that hath them yea though he be Pope, looke well to himself in that behalf) but we speake of doctrine". While Harding conceded "some Popes have in sundrie their actes and deedes lacked the direction of the Spirite of God, as menne", "must this now needes be made a good argument, some of their lives were sinneful, ergo their doctrine was false" ?[18]

The Louvainists insisted that pontifical infallibility was independent of individual merit, even more strongly than the Protestants maintained the same of justification. Indeed, on this point, Catholics tended to uphold the importance of faith, and Protestants, of works.

"The Pope although he maie erre by personal errour in his owne private judgement as a man and as a particular doctour in his

[17] Rastell, *Confutation of a Sermon,* ff 107r, 110.

[18] Sanders, *Rocke,* p 501; Harding, *Detection,* ff 7v, ******2r; cf **1r.

owne opinion: yet as he is Pope, the successour of Peter, the Vicare of Christe in earth, the shepeherd of the universal Churche, in publike judgement, in deliberation and definitive sentence, he never erreth nor never erred. For whensoever he ordeineth or determineth anything by his holy bishoply auctoritie, intending to binde Christen menne to performe or beleeve the same, he is alwaies governed and holpen with the grace and favour of the Holy Ghoste."

(This use of "auctoritie... to binde Christen menne to performe... the same" verged perilously on an assertion of particular judicial infallibility).[19]

All Catholics could do to show the innocuousness of their creed was that none of its exponents had so far rebelled (at least in the few years of this reign yet elapsed), not that they were forbidden to do so by their faith. By the end of the decade, even the former claim was no longer valid. However well Catholics might perform in other areas of doctrinal debate - and in many they did convict Protestantism of being "newfangled" rather than "apostolic" - this central problem precluded their building on the substantial common ground with the Queen they still possessed.

There was substantial common ground too in the field of international politics. As shown in the last chapter, from

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19 Harding, *Detection,* f 6, cf 204v, *An Answere to M. Juelle's Chalenge* (2nd edn, Antwerp 1565 / ERL 229), f 114r, *Confutation,* f 334v; Jewel, *Defence, Works,* III. 119, IV. 1068, ridiculing the notion that "the Pope walking in his gallery is one man, and sitting in his consistory or in judgement, another". Harding had retreated somewhat from his more aggressive position in the *Confutation,* where he had accused the Protestants of displaying, in their attitude to the Papacy, a Wycliffite *dominium* theory also subversive of secular monarchies (eg ff 52v, 300v). He at least avoided the problems of Thomas Stapleton, who was so devoted to the infallibility of the visible head of the Church that he tried to defend Caiaphas as such: *Fortresse of the Faith,* STC 23232 (1565), f 44r.

Elizabeth's succession, the dominant Protestant grouping felt itself to be threatened by a vast hostile organisation. In reality, this was very far from being the case; and insomuch as inimical demonstrations did occur, this was to a great extent actually a reaction to the attitude of confrontation that England had adopted (though this was not as aggressive as it would have been, had Elizabeth's ministers been able to direct her more effectively).

Cateau-Cambrésis: Occasion for Inertia

England had stayed out of most of the Habsburg-Valois Wars, though her loss of Calais, when she did enter them, was always remembered against Philip II. Philip himself had come out best (appreciably better than Henri II or his ally Pope Paul IV), if with an empty treasury. But he laboured under the memory not only of French wars, but of his father Charles V's exhausting and ultimately unsuccessful anti-Lutheran commitment.

For at least half of Elizabeth's first decade, the policy of the Papacy (and, even more so, of the Catholic secular powers) was still influenced by hopes that the Queen could be won back to Rome, either by theological and political persuasion, or by way of the marriage that she surely had to make soon, for which the most eligible candidates were Catholic. Even as these hopes receded, there remained the problems, if Elizabeth was to be

supplanted, of determining a replacement and of marshalling the support, English, foreign or both, necessary to overthrow heresy.

There was in this period, genealogically, only one likely Catholic candidate for the English throne; but unfortunately she was not then ideally suited to gather domestic or foreign support. It seemed likely that both forms would be necessary. Previous English Catholic risings, lacking foreign aid, in 1536 and 1549 were not encouraging precedents; their eventual successor, in 1569, was planned conditionally upon provision of such aid, but began prematurely, in panic. Decisive conquest even of a second-rate power by a first-rate one was rarely possible, given contemporary military limitations, without factional support. This assisted Spain's conquest of Portugal in 1580; which was also much facilitated by having a common border. The geographical problems England posed were greater. Only at the very beginning of Elizabeth's reign did France's presence in Scotland offer an immediate chance of circumventing these; and invasion that way was the English government's greatest fear until the French were forced out in 1560.

Mary Stewart, the Catholic alternative, was at the outset of Elizabeth's reign, the wife of the French Dauphin, and there were persistent rumours of the French trying to persuade Paul IV to advance her claim over Elizabeth's, resurfacing during the latter's armed confrontation with France over Scottish hegemony. At Cateau-Cambrésis, the French employed Mary's claim as a

tactical device to sabotage discussion of the return of Calais - "to whome shall we redelyver Callais ?... Is not the Queene of Scottes true Queene of England ?" - a statement that was long remembered against France, but which was more or less abandoned once the treaty was concluded. The French commissioners did not even consider these remarks significant enough to report them specifically to their King, mentioning only "various recriminations and disputes about rights and possessions". It did however make more credible the Spanish claim "that the Ffrenche labour at Roome to the Pope, for the disablinge of Your Highnesse to the Crowne, and the intytling of the Queene of Scottes therunto".[20] Besides helping to keep England suspicious of France, the Spanish genuinely suspected, and feared, that Paul IV might make "some pronouncement... against the said Queen to the advantage of the King of France".[21]

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[20] English commissioners to Elizabeth, 2nd Mar. 1559: KL I. 450 (*CSP For. III,* No 373); French commissioners to Henri II, 3rd Mar: in PRO 31/3/24. The Spanish commissioners mentioned these remarks to Philip II in passing: *Papiers d'État de Granvelle,* ed. Weiss, V. 523/4. The English also did not at first respond to them sufficiently forcefully, and received a scolding from the Queen that threw Dean Wotton "into an agew" and left the others "merveillously overthrowen" - Elizabeth to commissioners, 7th Mar; Mason to Cecil, 18th Mar: SP 70/3, ff 32, 59 (*CSP,* Nos 391, 422).

[21] Giovanni Francesco Canobio to Paul IV, 24th April 1559: tr. *CSP Rome I,* No 17 (orig. PRO 31/9/69, p 197). These reports, according to the French, were "false and villainously fabricated... a thing so unhappily contrived as there was never any news of it": De Seurre's statement, late April 1560: A Teulet, *Relations Politiques de la France et de l'Espagne avec l'Écosse au 16e siècle* (Paris 1862), II. 49-50; cf Coligny to Constable, 1st Mar: L Paris, *Négotiations... relatives au règne de François II, CDIF* (Paris 1841), pp 319/20.

Ferdinand I remarked, with regard to negotiations to induce Paul IV to recognise him belatedly as Emperor, that "the nature of the Pope must be considered and how furious he is in his actions".[22]

The Count de Feria, the first Spanish Ambassador of Elizabeth's reign (and an unusually important one, who had been Philip's main representative in England during Mary's last days), immediately suggested that Philip should ascertain how the Pope would act "if the Queen do not send her obedience to the Pope or delay doing so, or if he should take into his head to recall matters concerning the Divorce of King Henry". Within a month, he (like the English)[23] came to believe that the French had already ensured that the Pope would "declare this Queen to be a bastard and to proceed against her, giving the right to the Crown to the Queen of Scots"; "in spite of the good offices Your Majesty may perform with the Pope, it will be impossible to stop... but in any case the other woman already has many adherents in the kingdom, and every day will have more."[24] Feria, once Elizabeth's innovatory spirit could no longer be ignored, seemed to favour excommunication, or at least to think it inevitable, and wanted Catholics to be exempted from its penalties.[25] "Whenever the

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[22] Ferdinand to Philip, 17th May 1559: *CDIE* 2, p 530. This referred to Paul's refusal to crown him Emperor, which (like the putative action against Elizabeth) was believed to be French-instigated - Mundt to Cecil, 15th Feb; to Elizabeth, 5th & 21st Mar: PRO SP 70/2, f 132; 3, ff 49, 63v (*CSP For. III,* Nos 327, 409, 435).

[23] See ch 4 n 16.

[24] Feria to Philip, 25th Nov. & 29th Dec. 1558: tr. *CSP Sp. I,* Nos 2, 6 (origs. *CDIE* 87, pp 88, 107 & KL I. 307/8, 365).

[25] Feria to Philip, 24th Mar. & 10th May 1559: *CDIE* 87, pp 150, 187 & KL I.

King of France finds means in Rome to get this woman declared a heretic together with her bastardy", rather than just a bastard as he had originally feared, "and advances her own claim, Your Majesty will be more perplexed what to do than at present, because I do not see how Your Majesty could in such a case go against God and justice, and against the Catholics who will doubtless join him if he comes with the voice of the Church behind him. To let him take the country, which he would do with so much ease that I dread to think of it, would be to my mind the total ruin of Your Majesty and all your states". Feria therefore advised that Philip take the initiative in the inevitable process, disdaining as he did all the English but his wife's family, and believing that "this country is more fit to be dealt with sword in hand than by cajolery".[26]

Sir Edward Carne, Mary's ambassador at Rome, reported however (partly in an attempt to get permission to stay on there) "that the French heere can obteyne nothinge at His Holines' hands ageinst Your Majestie; and that His Holines hathe suche respecte to Your Majestie and to your Realmes, that he will attempte nothinge ageinst you or your Realmes, unless thoccasion be

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484, 520/1 (*CSP Sp. I,* Nos 21, 31).

[26] Feria to Philip, 11th April 1559 & 21st Nov. 1558; cf to De Quadra, Mar. 1559: tr. *CSP Sp. I,* Nos 24, 1; 17 (orig. *CDIE* 87, pp 160, 84; 132 & KL I. 496, 297; 465). Cf also advice to Philip, 11th July 1559, in *Epistolario del III Duque de Alba,* ed. Duque de Berwick y de Alba (Madrid 1952), I. 508/9, & *Negociaciones con Francia 1559/67* (Madrid 1952), I. 21/3.

geaven furst therhence" - though he hinted that this attitude was partly created by hope that Elizabeth would marry Philip II.[27]

The French however feared, and tried to sabotage, a perpetuation of the Tudor-Habsburg alliance by such a marriage. Giovanni Michiel, the Venetian ambassador to France, reported Henri II telling him "that were right of any avail that kingdom ought doubtless to be" Mary Stewart's; breaking into cipher, he continued, "but as he spoke to me very coldly on the subject, my belief in what had been told me previously by a person who has the means of knowing is confirmed, viz. that for the present not only will no act be attempted on account of the said claim, there being no other mode of enforcing it than by words and writings; but on the contrary, to avoid raising greater difficulties and impediments to peace, the King will dissemble as much as he can, at least until he has means of making some effective demonstration... Should she [Elizabeth] keep quiet about the affairs of Calais, His Majesty likewise will be quiet about his daughter-in-law's interest in the succession; and that, provided she persist in her determination not to marry out of the kingdom {most importantly to France, not to marry a Habsburg}, not only will he never molest nor disturb her, but on the contrary will preserve and maintain her in security as mistress of her possession."[28] Henri's efforts at Rome were also simply to

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[27] Carne to Elizabeth, 16th Feb. 1559: Haynes, *Burghley SP*, pp 245/6, where misdated 1560 (HMC 9: *Hatfield MSS,* I, No 619).

[28] 4th Dec. 1558: *CSP Ven. VI. 2,* No 1290, cf No 1296 (23rd Dec). Paolo Tiepolo,

prevent a Habsburg match, "to tickle the Pope where he itches" and confirm his established disinclination to grant a dispensation for Philip. Even in this he wanted to act cautiously, "for I still do not know how I shall have to live with that Queen, and before being assured of it I have no wish to become further embroiled with her." His Ambassador at Rome, the Bishop of Angoulême, certainly undertook no more than this; as for any effort at deposition, the Bishop insisted, "it is an invention of the Spanish to anger that Queen against you".[29] Nonetheless, the Spanish seemed genuinely to believe it.

Philip, in reply to Feria's lamentations about the religious changes, told him "to smooth matters down as much as possible" to "deprive the French of any excuse for putting their foot in the country, *which is the thing principally to be avoided.*" He did postpone his departure for Spain, and begin military preparations to move into England "in case of necessity" (presumably action by the French).[30] Philip finally warned, if

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Ambassador to Philip, did however believe (influenced by Spanish fears) that Henri seriously intended to advance the Stewart claim - 9th Mar. & 23rd April 1559, *CSP Ven. VII,* Nos 57, 63; cf L Romier, *Origines Politiques des Guerres de Religion* (Paris 1913/4), II. 359. On the other hand, it was rumoured that Henri had offered to return Calais if Elizabeth would marry to *his* liking - eg *ANG XI,*pp 178: Trivultio to Cardinal Caraffa, 13th Feb. 1559 (*CSP Rome,* No 6).

[29] Henri II to Babou de la Bourdaisière, 10th Dec. 1558; reply, 7th Jan. 1559: Bayne, *Anglo-Roman Relations,*Apps 1-2, pp 232/6. Bourdaisière and Cardinal de Tournon both reassured Henri that Paul was unlikely to grant the dispensation: respectively 25th Dec. 1558 & 9th Jan. 1559: Ribier, *Lettres et Mémoires d'Estat,* II. 777. Cf Tournon to Duc de Guise, 16th Dec. 1558: *Correspondance du Cardinal de Tournon,* p 380.

[30] Philip to Feria, 23rd Mar. 1559: tr. *CSP Sp. I,* No 20 (orig. *CDIE* 87, pp

"without any appearance of roughness or threat", "that the danger which will arise to me from her proceedings, if she do not change her ways very shortly, will force me to take counsel as to my action to avoid harm to my own dominions."[31] But Philip really wanted to reassure Elizabeth that he would "try to bind us closer by all the kindness and good offices I can show, and also for my own interests, which would be greatly injured if her kingdom were to fall into other hands than hers, which God forbid", while stressing "that they shall be ruined unless I succour and defend them". Unfortunately, this had seemed to emerge, in Feria's delivery, as over-threatening: "I tried to frighten her all I could... for a schism less grave than heresy, a King of Navarre had been deprived of his kingdom by a sentence of the Pope, and remained without it to this day."[32]

All this was initially predicated on the survival of Henri II, and his sudden death reduced the immediacy of the French threat to England for a few months. Bishop De Quadra wrote later

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[31] Philip to De Quadra, 9th July 1559: tr. *CSP Sp. I,* No 43 (orig. *CDIE* 87, p 214, & KL I. 556; cf 557, the version of this for Philip's special envoy Ayala. According to the negotiators for the Austrian marriage, Ayala's sterner message was an attempt to revitalise this matter by judicious intimidation - Brenner to Ferdinand I, 6th Aug. & 5th Dec: Klarwill, *Queen Elizabeth & Some Foreigners,* pp 114/5, 164/6.

[32] Philip to Feria, 24th April 1559; Feria to Philip, 29th: tr. *CSP Sp. I,* Nos 28/9 (origs. *CDIE* 87, pp 175, 179 & KL I. 508, 512). Cf Tiepolo, 5th Mar. 1559: *CSP Ven. VII,* No 36: the English could be "in one moment's time driven out, not only from Calais but from all of England likewise, were the assistance of King Philip to fail them".

that English Catholics "at one time expected the remedy from Your Majesty's hand, but had recently turned towards the King of France for it... it seems that all must fall on Your Majesty's shoulders again." By the Bishop's own confession, though, the main incentive for Philip to bestir himself - fear of French pre-emption - had receded; and it was ineffective simply to remark: "I cannot help telling Your Majesty how greatly many of the godly {*buenos*} here and persons well versed in public affairs are astonished to see that this Queen is allowed to proceed with her designs to the manifest peril of the Faith and the neighbouring kingdoms." Privately he lamented, "the harvest is ripe if there were someone to come and reap it, but I can see no hope of that except from Heaven"; "this is the time to do what ought to be done, but if we are to be always on the defensive and to continue to palliate such things, I can only say patience ! although I well know we shall never have such an opportunity again."[33]

Philip II, fearing a declaration of illegitimacy, "thought it time to approach His Holiness, and... delay the matter, as was in all respects to be desired"; and as was his customary expedient.[34] There was the difficulty that Pope Paul "would never of his own will do anything that could redound to the repute

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[33] De Quadra to Philip, 12th July 1559; to Feria, 29th Oct. 1559 & 7th Mar. 1560: tr. *CSP Sp. I,* Nos 45, 70, 91 (origs. KL I. 559, II. 72 (also *CDIE* 87, pp 216, 252/3), II. 251/2); also Feria to Philip, 31st Jan. 1559; to De Quadra, 14th Oct: *CSP,* Nos 13, 67 (*CDIE,* pp 120, 449/50, & KL I. 414, II. 61/2).

[34] Philip to Feria, 24th April 1559: tr. *CSP Sp. I,* No 28 (orig. *CDIE* 87, p 176 & KL I. 508).

and advantage of Spain",[35] but the unfortunate outcome of the recent war had at least taught him the dangers of outright opposition to the neighbouring colossus. The Pope now hoped that France and Spain could be induced to cooperate in the reconquest of England for the Faith. Unfortunately, the one would always oppose any move by the other to obtain strategic advantage, and he underestimated the difficulties of reconciling their interests - the Spanish having better bases to invade, and better contacts within England; but the French having the natural Catholic pretender. In July 1559, Paul proposed vaguely that Philip should take over England, "which would be easy from Flanders and with the help of the [English] Catholics... The King of France would remain quiet so long as he was left Scotland in peace" (this last being dubious, since with England, Ireland and the Netherlands joined under Philip, the French foothold in Scotland would be left hostage to his whim). Philip had however already determined to return to Spain, so the Pope could only regret his neglect to "acquire a power that would make the world tremble".[36]

Pope Paul's perception was influenced by over-optimistic reports from Philip II. Possibly Philip himself believed them, from deap-seated reluctance to credit the awful alternative, which might require action on his part. If Paul had hearkened to

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[35] Tiepolo, 1st Feb. 1559: *CSP Ven. VII,* No 16.

[36] Bayne, *Anglo-Roman Relations,* pp 247/8 (Apps. 11, 12; Ascanio Caracciolo & Gonzalo Chacon to Philip, 16th July & 1st Aug.).

French representations in late 1558 as rumoured, a few months later he was reliant on Spanish claims that Elizabeth was not obstinately heretical, and could be influenced beneficially. The only reports Paul got not deriving from Philip's government, from Giovanni Francesco Canobio, tended to recycle those same sentiments prevalent in Brussels, whence he wrote.[37]

Philip delayed the matter during 1559 with very vague reports of promising negotiations he had in train; Paul IV thanked him (apparently without irony) for having him "so well advised". Tiepolo, the Venetian Ambassador, commented on Philip's reports to Rome of the negotiation to marry an Austrian Archduke to Elizabeth, "there is very little hoped [from it], but King Philip willingly avails himself of any opportunity to gain time".[38] Eventually, in a letter to Cardinal Pacheco, chief of the Spanish party in the Sacred College, Philip admitted that offers of "most suitable marriages with several Catholic princes, by whose means great improvement could be expected" seemed to have been rejected; but this was not necessarily final. However, he repeated the belief of his Ambassadors in England that internal Catholic opposition would probably overturn the moves to Protestantism, and (as he was to do for years) stressed the danger of disrupting

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[37] Canobio to Paul IV, 24th April & 10th May 1559: PRO 31/9/69, pp 196/8 (*CSP Rome I*, Nos 17-18).

[38] Philip II to Paul IV, 24th April, 22nd & 26th May 1559; to Ascanio Caracciolo, 27th May & 3rd July; Caracciolo to Philip, 16th July: Bayne, *Anglo-Roman Relations*, Apps 5-8, 10-11, pp 239/47; Tiepolo, 11th June: *CSP Ven. VII*, No 79.

the hard-won "peace of Christendom". He was not totally confident of his arguments' success with the Pope, however, and therefore instructed Pacheco to advance Feria's suggestion that Catholics should be exempted from any spiritual sentence against Elizabeth, and to ensure at all costs that the latter should not uphold the Franco-Scottish claim.[39] But by the time this epistle arrived, Paul IV had died. This opportune occurrence - coming within two months of Henri II's demise - was easy to see as a special providence vouchsafed to Protestant England; which was perhaps why Cecil noted its exact date in his atavistic "Memoria Mortuorum". No other Pope was so distinguished.[40] For once, Philip II's delaying tactics had actually outlasted a problem.

There were fundamental reasons for Philip II's restraint. Practically, military confrontation with England was seriously discouraged by Philip's constant financial crisis and the grave Mediterranean position during the 1560s, and soon by increasing trouble (whether or not fanned by England) in the Netherlands. The Venetian Ambassador Tiepolo reported that after Cateau-Cambrésis, there was talk of "where war may next break out" - England, Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean being suggested - "but all this is talk, and at the present time the debts are very heavy and the means of finding money, most especially for an

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39 FA Mignet, *Histoire de Marie Stuart* (Paris 1851), App. A, ll. 464/6 / tr. AR Scoble (London 1851), ll. 418/20.

40 Murdin, *Burghley SP*, pp 745, 749.

unnecessary and aggressive war, is so difficult, that it ought to incline the most restless spirits towards peace and repose".[41]

Proposals for Franco-Spanish cooperation against foreign as well as domestic Protestantism had achieved some circulation. The Duke of Alba was consulted about them by Philip II shortly before Henri II's death. "The whole practice is that Your Majesty and the King of France should join together to lay down the law for Christendom... and that, Your Majesty helping the King of France in the enterprise of England, he could help Your Majesty to be lord of Italy". It was however perverse, "having obtained a peace, to seek to plunge the rest of Christendom into strife"; Alba drew moreover upon "the wide experience of so many years of what troublesome and evil companions the French are" in anything; he cited the extensive disputes with them over Naples. Without involving them, he claimed, "if Your Majesty appeared in that kingdom with a great force, you could force the party of the heretics to reason and truth, and dispose the government as seemed good for the service of God and your own affairs".[42] This was also what Feria seemed to favour; though the latter had a greater commitment to the idea than Alba, who seemed to urge it

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[41] Tiepolo, 14th April 1559: *CSP Ven. VII,* No 59.

[42] *Epistolario de Alba,* I. 504/9, & *Negociaciones con Francia,* I. 16, 20/3: to Philip, June & 11th July 1559. The Austrian Pollweiler also predicted a new Neapolitan conflict if Philip "and the French come to an agreement and occupy a part of the kingdom... for both parties are itching to do so, being thereto incited, entreated and tempted by many Englishmen" - to Ferdinand I, 11th June: Klarwill, *Queen Elizabeth & Some Foreigners,* pp 93/4.

only as preferable to cooperation with the French. These opinions were produced together with Ruy Gomez (later Prince of Eboli), rather than being strictly Alba's own. In sum, "it is necessary to defend her, until Your Majesty has a convenient opportunity of offending her".[43] There was little to impel Philip's English policy towards resolution, when he referred it collectively to Alba, Ruy Gomez and Bishop Granvelle,[44] none of whom willingly agreed with either of the others. At other times, as the Secretary Gonzalo Peréz complained in 1565: "His Majesty makes mistakes and will continue to make mistakes in many matters because he discusses them with different people, sometimes with one, at other times with another, concealing something from one minister and revealing it to another. It is therefore small wonder that different and even contradictory decisions are issued".[45]

Philip had written to Feria while the latter was still in England, "It grieves me to see what is happening over here and to be unable to take the steps to stop it that I want, while the steps I can take seem far milder than such a great evil deserves... At the moment I lack the resources to do anything...". It is however to go too far to conclude from one letter that he "had thus decided upon confrontation with Elizabeth from an early point in his reign, however long that confrontation might, on the grounds of

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[43] Tr. in Pollen, *English Catholics,* p 63; orig. App. 2 in *idem, Papal Negotiations with Mary,* p 458.

[44] Philip to Feria, 12th Feb: *CDIE* 87, p 121 & KL I. 416 (*CSP Sp. I,* No 14).

[45] Quoted by G Parker, *Philip II* (Harmondsworth 1977), pp 28/9.

practical expediency, have to be delayed". Even Philip II did not wait two and a half decades to execute key policy decisions; this sounds more like another of his array of pretexts for indefinitely postponing such a decision.[46] He gave no sign of believing even in the long-term inevitability of a final confrontation.

Feria complained of the King to his successor as Ambassador in England that "it is only with great trouble that he can be got to decide anything"; "do not be astonished or angry at anything you may see until we have tired the King out as he expects to be tired out before he does anything, great or small... I cannot speak of other English affairs and do not want even to think of them, seeing the way His Majesty is treating them."[47] Philip's policy is epitomised in his letter to De Quadra, telling him that "if your letters have not been answered, and the present does not deal with them as you desire, it is from no want of will on our part, but because we have not as yet been able to come to a resolution as to the steps to be taken to remedy the evils, which must be attacked at their roots; and as the matter is so grave and weighty, and full of difficulty, it must be deeply considered, jointly with the state of our own affairs." The most positive suggestion he could offer was for De Quadra to encourage "the Catholics all you can, until God shall open a way by which the evil

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[46] Quotation & comment from C Martin & G Parker, *The Spanish Armada* (Harmondsworth 1988), p 84.

[47] Feria to De Quadra, 7th July 1559; cf 18th: tr. *CSP Sp. I*, Nos 42, 51 (orig. *CDIE* 87, pp 212 (& KL I. 554), 225/6).

which has befallen the country may be radically amended".[48]

Feria stressed that opposition to Elizabeth's Protestant legislation was much more general than to her father's. "The Catholics are in a great majority in the country and if the leading men in it were not of so small account things would have turned out differently. It is quite impossible that the present state of affairs can last". At one point he specified that "the Catholic party is two-thirds larger than the other". The policy of Elizabeth's government would "end in their coming to grief; and Your Majesty must get the affair in your grasp. We must begin at once to see that the King of France does not get in or spoil the crop that Your Majesty has sown here"; but he stressed that English Catholics much preferred Philip to the French. They believed that "the welfare and preservation of their religion depends only on His Majesty's assistance".[49] De Quadra similarly opined that, between Catholics and Dudley-haters, "her house will be in a blaze before she knows it". The Duke of Norfolk was "a great friend of ours... he occupies the principal place in the country"; later, that "everything here is an incredible state; everyone sad and discontented with what is going on". This was

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[48] 9th Feb. 1562 & 17th Mar. 1561: tr. *CSP Sp. I,* Nos 151, 124 (origs *CDIE* 87, p 323; BL Add. MS 26056A, p 162).

[49] Feria to Philip, 10th May& 19th Mar. 1559; 29th Dec. 1558; to De Quadra, Mar. 1559: tr. *CSP Sp. I,* Nos 31, 18; 6, 17 (origs. *CDIE* 87, pp 186, 140; 110/2, 131 & KL I. 519, 477; 367/8, 463). The Dec. letter besought Philip "to have my letters answered more promptly, as the delay may cause much harm to Your Majesty's service".

somewhat sweeping; but, naturally, it was primarily the discontented who confided in him. Elizabeth's only escape from her "great necessity" - the French threat and internal pressure - would be to consent to the Austrian marriage.[50]

Continental Catholics and exiled lobbyists continued to insist on the strength of English Catholics. The Mantuan intelligencer Il Schifanoya wrote that they "comprise all the chief personages of the kingdom, with very great command in their estates {*paesi*}, having also many followers; and the greater part of the common people out of London, in several provinces, are much attached to the Roman Catholic religion". Nicholas Sanders claimed that not one in a hundred Englishmen was "infected". In 1564, the Spanish Ambassador Guzmán de Silva put the figure at under one in six among the upper classes; Stewart intriguers talked to him of only one in ten. A contrast was frequently drawn between the valiant few, notably More and Fisher, who had opposed Henry VIII's Supremacy; and the much greater number who opposed Elizabeth's. One explanation for this was that the results in the latter case were not so dire; it was argued however that a supposed inability of the government (until

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[50] De Quadra to Philip, 6th June 1559 & 19th Feb. 1560; to Ferdinand I, 16th Oct. 1559, cf 13th Aug; to Feria, 27th Jan. 1560, cf 27th Dec. 1559: *CDIE* 2, p 542; 87, pp 281/2, 250/1; BL Add. MS 26056A, pp 47, 77; *CDIE* 87, p 269 & KL II. 159 (first paraphrase only, not in *CSP;* others *CSP Sp. I,* Nos 89; 68, 55; 84, 81); & to Margaret of Parma, 15th & 29th Oct, 13th Dec 1559: KL II. 63/4, 69-71, 199 (second is *CSP,* No 69). Cf Francisco Commendone (papal nuncio in Northern Germany) to Cardinal Borromeo (Pius IV's Secretary of State), Sept. 1561: Pollen, *Papal Negotiations with Mary,* pp 68/9 (*CSP Rome I,* No 100).

1563) to get capital penalties through Parliament was itself a sign of Catholic strength. The Papacy was often assured that "the nobles will easily be induced to eject her from the kingdom".[51]

Spain's intelligence of the religious allegiances of English nobles and Privy Counsellors posited approximately equal numbers of committed Catholics and Protestants - though with more peers of the former persuasion - with the balance held by neutrals. Rome was more optimistic; and, inevitably, Ridolfi and the "practisers" of 1571 even more so, being reluctant to believe that any noblemen would actively oppose the overthrow of Elizabeth's "base" and "new" counsellors.[52]

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[51] 21st Mar. 1559: *CSP Ven. VII,* No 45; Sanders' report for Cardinal-Protector Morone, late 1561, CRS *Misc. I,* pp 1-56; Silva to Philip, 21st Nov. 1564 & 28th July 1565: *CDIE* 89 pp 56/7, 157 (*CSP Sp. I,* Nos 275, 311); Richard Shelley to Pius IV, late 1561: PRO 31/9/69, p 132 (*CSP Rome I,* No 130); "Rimedii per le cose d'Inghilterra": in M Creighton, "The Excommunication of Queen Elizabeth", *EHR* 7 (1892), pp 82/3 (cf n 170).

[52] The Spanish list is given by JE Straukamp, "Anglo-Spanish Relations 1558/63" (London PhD thesis 1965), pp 128/30; he implies Rome agreed closely with the assessment. Its numbers were however distorted by the optimistic inclusion among the Catholics of Pembroke, Derby's and Norfolk's heirs in their own rights as Lords Strange and Surrey (the latter, born in 1557, was hardly old enough yet to differ from his "neuter" father; though admittedly Oxford, included among the active Protestants, was only seven years older) and Effingham, in one guise (as William Howard the Lord Chamberlain, he was accounted neutral; though even that was probably to underestimate his commitment to the regime). Straukamp does not try to date the list. In fact, assuming its names are accurate - debatable, in view of Effingham's split personality - it falls outside Straukamp's period and is from the second half of 1567, or 1568: the period after Robert Lord Rich's accession to his title, but before John Lord Sheffield's death. The *terminus a quo* is reinforced by reference to Edward Lord Stafford, succeeding only in 1566; and it is certainly pre-1569. The Roman list is more optimistic - PRO 31/9/70, pp 334/6 (*CSP Rome I,* No 506; 1567 ?). It takes Catholics to be nearly as numerous as the few Protestants combined with neutrals, and tendentiously re-classifies the last group - including

There were a few dissenters to the general assumption that a Catholic party could automatically be mobilised by a foreign power. An Englishman (presumably) warned that "the English are of such a nature that they will be easily won over by prudent clemency, but will not suffer compulsion by arms or violence. Thus there would be a general agreement of the Catholics with the heretics to resist a foreigner seeking to invade by force".[53] Moreover, many Catholic plans relied on the expected oecumenical uprising when Elizabeth married Dudley.[54] In this worst case, the fruit would drop easily, probably into Spanish hands. Nonetheless, hope remained of a more satisfactory negotiated solution. Either way, there was nothing to encourage initiative from abroad - which was in any case something that nobody in Europe was prepared to take.

Sussex, Leicester and Rutland - as "well-affected" but uncommitted. The 1571 list similarly defines men like Sussex, Leicester, Warwick, Northampton, Rutland and even Hunsdon as simply "neutral" - PRO 31/9/71, p 408 (*CSP,* No 754).

[53] "Angli ejus sunt naturae, ut lenitate cum prudentia conjuncta facile persuaderi possint, armis vero aut violentia compelli non patiantur. Hinc fit ut contra externum militem qui vim adferre conarentur, Catholicarum cum hereticis ad resistendum in hoc summus foret consensus" - "Modus per quem Anglia reduci potest": PRO 31/9/41, p 102; cf Richard Shelley to Pius IV, late 1561: 31/9/69, p 133 (*CSP Rome I,* No 130).

[54] Eg proposal of 5th Sept. 1561; Cardinal Borromeo to Cardinal d'Este, Mar. 1562: Pollen, *Papal Negotiations with Mary,* pp 63, 59-60 (*CSP Rome I,* Nos 102, 149); Granvelle to Trent legates, 27th June 1563: E Poullet, *Correspondance du Cardinal de Granvelle* (Brussels 1877), I. 553 (*CSP,* Nos 177, 248). Cf Throckmorton's fears: letters to PC & Northampton, 10th Oct. 1560: SP 70/19, ff 31/2; 39r (*CSP For. IV,* Nos 620, 623); De Quadra to Philip II, 13th & 18th Nov. 1559: *CDIE* 87, pp 258/66 (*CSP Sp. I,* Nos 74/5).

The Crisis of 1560: A Nexus of Cross-Purposes

The crisis of 1559/60 was the formative experience at the beginning of Elizabeth's reign, in which her government came to suspect the concerted hostility of France, Spain and the Papacy. The attitudes it produced proved very durable. The limitations of surviving French documentation make it impossible to be sure of the extent of the hostile designs of the Guisian regime in France, though successive repudiations of the concessions offered by De Seurre in London in early 1560 and of the Treaty of Edinburgh do not indicate great good faith.

The retiring French Ambassador in London, De Noailles, admitted that Elizabeth's arguments, though certainly specious, "are not without apparent foundation". His successor De Seurre, according to his Spanish counterparts, said that "both the late King Henry and the present king have given occasion to the Queen to suspect that they wished to invade and occupy her realm". Nor was his assurance "*that for the moment,* nobody gave further thought to such practices", much help.[55] When his ambassador in France, Chantonnay, reminded the Maréchal St. André that "you have passed a treaty with her as Queen of England", the Frenchman could only reply incoherently that Elizabeth was not the true

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[55] De Noailles to D'Oysel, 22nd Dec. 1559: Forbes, *Full View*, I. 284; De Glajon & De Quadra to Margaret of Parma, 27th April 1560: Teulet, *Relations Politiques,* II. 117 & KL II. 362.

Queen, but that France had no intention of quarrelling with her.[56]

De Noailles' opinion was that the only sensible response to Elizabeth's obsession with the usurpation of her royal arms and style, was "to shut her mouth" by abandoning them. "Even the Catholic King could well become somewhat suspicious about this and seek to favour underhand the enterprises which it appears this Queen is preparing."[57] When the French government argued simultaneously that the arms had been assumed as an act of war and had now been abandoned, that they had now been borne so long (about a year) that it would derogate from Valois dignity to abandon them, and that they were only adopting the view of several English Acts of Parliament (that Elizabeth was illegitimate),[58] it was not surprising if its own servants might become confused. The idea of restricting pretensions to those not counter-productive did not seem to have gained acceptance. A policy of provocation for its own sake, undermining the hallowed Cateau-Cambrésis, gave Philip II an excuse to temporise, when called to support France against an obvious rebellion against legitimate authority, and a heretical rebellion at that.

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[56] Chantonnay told all this to Killigrew & Jones, who reported it to Elizabeth: Forbes, *Full View,* I. 293/4 (6th Jan. 1560; *CSP For. IV,* No 552).

[57] "Le Roy Catholique mesme en pourroit bien estre entre en quelque jalousie, et qu'il tascheroit de favoriser soubz main les entreprinses ausquelles il s̃mble que ceste Royne s'appreste" - to François II, 12th Jan. 1560; cf to Lorraine, 30th July 1559: in PRO 31/3/24.

[58] De Noailles' message for De la Mothe Fénélon (later Ambassador himself), 20th Dec. 1559; De Seurre's statement, late April 1560: Teulet, *Relations Politiques,* I. 389/90, II. 44/5.

French policy was however almost coherent compared to Spanish. The impulse to supplant by any means necessary a dangerously unstable government in a key satellite state, in order to get a more reliable one, is common enough among superpowers. That it was the proper policy for Spain to adopt towards England, the successive ambassadors Feria and De Quadra tended to believe, especially as the year 1559 produced the Scottish religious disturbances and the menace of an Anglo-French war in the North, to complicate the deposition danger. Feria allegedly threatened after his return to Flanders, "seing she {Elizabeth} will not be advised, she must be orderyd... such counsellors will be put there as will better looke to the Realme"; Spain "wold have a care of England and wold not suffer the Ffrenche to reste there".[59] Otherwise, he expected to see "the Queen and her councillors turned out and treated as they deserve; and that God will strike for His own cause"; pleasant though this prospect was in itself, "the Devil himself may fly away with us if this be brought about". He complained of Philip's slowness to give directions in the matter after going to Spain, that he "holds these States {the Netherlands} in so small account that he cares not

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[59] Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 28th April 1560: PRO SP 70/13, f 226r (*CSP For. IV*, No 1082); cf Feria, in conversation reported by Challoner, 3rd Aug. 1559: SP 70/6, ff 30v/1r (*CSP For. III*, No 1116); & John Middleton to Cecil, 29th Dec: CP 2, ff 19-20 (HMC 9: *Hatfield MSS*, I, No 585); Alba, reported by Chamberlain to Elizabeth, 23rd Dec: SP 70/21, f 96r (*CSP*, No 817); Don Antonio de Toledo, as reported by Throckmorton to Elizabeth, 10th Oct: SP 70/19, f 16r (*CSP*, No 619).

whether they be lost or not".[60]

Bishop (later Cardinal) Granvelle implied the same when, during the 1559/60 Scottish crisis, he scathingly dismissed England's ability to fight France, agreed that "vicinitie should put us {the Netherlands} in remembrance of our owne cause" but threatened that English unreliability would force Philip to "pourveoir à ses affaires" by other means than the old alliance.[61] He later wrote to Philip predicting that a Catholic rising against Elizabeth was imminent, "which the French will make use of to put foot in England, which, without any remedy, would be our ultimate ruin". The implication was that Philip might be well advised to take advantage of the Catholic opposition himself. The Regent Margaret of the Netherlands expatiated on the effects if the French occupied both sides of the Channel and cut them off from Spain. "One must fight for England and to avoid the French putting foot there as if for the city of Brussels... for upon the one depends so manifestly and inevitably the loss of the other." She was more explicit than her minister, advising Philip that, with Elizabeth, his "gentle and courteous remonstrances make her the more insolent"; that she was totally untrustworthy; and concluding with great stress on the strength of Catholic feeling in England, and even more in Ireland, and on "the service which it

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[60] Feria to De Quadra, 25th June 1559; cf 7th July, 14th Oct & 9th Nov: tr. *CSP Sp. I,* Nos 38, 42, 67, 72 (origs. KL I. 543; 554, II. 61/2, 78 (& *CDIE* 87, pp 212, 248/50, 256)).

[61] Challoner to Cecil, 6th Dec. 1559: KL I. 117 (*CSP For. IV,* No 385).

would be to God to support them and to re-establish the Faith in that kingdom". Most importantly, however, as Sir Thomas Challoner, then Ambassador in Flanders, wrote, "theis men, as yll as they love us, ar gelous over Fraunce and us". Margaret, having lamented at some length Elizabeth's attacks on the Faith, concluded, "*the worst* is that there is little sign that she can maintain herself against France".[62]

The Netherlands, both because of a tradition of commercial and diplomatic ties, - that were stressed by the English habits of speaking of their "Burgundian", rather than Spanish, alliance and of maintaining regular diplomatic representation there but not, initially, in Spain - and (to some degree) because of the spread of Protestantism there, were habitually pro-English. Challoner found that, "though thee Spanards doe somewhat mislik us, y[e]t in this lowe p[ar]te, the gentlemen in all conferences tak our p[ar]te". A Dominican at Antwerp who called Elizabeth "Jesabell and the daughter of Sathane" barely escaped lynching.[63] Sir Thomas Smith noted, "sith we have had such trade and trafique in the Lowe Contreys,

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[62] Granvelle to Philip II, 20th May 1560: *Papiers d'État de Granvelle,* ed. Weiss, VI. 93; Margaret of Parma to same, 8th Dec. 1559, cf 6th Jan. & 29th May 1560: *Correspondance... avec Philippe II,* ed. Gachard, Nos 15, 20 (also Teulet, *Relations Politiques,* II. 54/8, 62/7), 47; Challoner to Elizabeth, 3rd Aug. 1559: PRO SP 70/6, f 33r (*CSP For. III,* No 1116). Cf F Braudel, *The Mediterranean & the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (1975), II. 947/9.

[63] Challoner, 3rd Aug. 1559: PRO SP 70/6, f 33 (*CSP For. III,* No 1116). On "the villayne knave Fryer": Gresham to Cecil, 12th & 16th April 1560: SP 70/13, ff 86, 99 (*CSP For. IV,* Nos 999, 1011); newsletter: BL Harl. MS 253, f 83r.

the House of Burgundie could by no p[ro]vocacon be brought to have warre with us vi moneths togither... Thei... will not be so mad as to put out ther owen eye, bicause therby thei might hurte another man's eye a litle."[64] Differing conclusions could be drawn however from the generally acknowledged fact that England and the Netherlands "have allwaies beene, and shal be by nature whilest the world lasteth, so knit and associat together that nothing can be by the French devised hurtfull to the one but the other must also take hurte thereof".[65]

De Quadra continued to advocate a more active policy than Philip would accept. He avowed: "I do not think the Queen or anyone else can say that a word has come from me against Your Majesty's wish and intention to keep her in a good humour, although... I have not been able to refrain from speaking out and showing discontent of her words and actions. My zeal for religion and Your Majesty's service will never cause me to contravene Your Majesty's orders... but I cannot refrain from remarking that for the attainment of Your Majesty's present aim, which is the preservation of the actual {or present} state of things, I do not think that anything would be less conducive than to let them drift loose as they are doing now."[66] In particular, De Quadra sought

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[64] Smith to Cecil, 6th July 1564: PRO SP 70/73, f 10 (*CSP For. IX,* No 546).

[65] Instructions for Montague and Chamberlain's Spanish embassy, 23rd Jan. 1560, BL Cott. MS Galba Ci, f 33v - similarly, Vesp. Cvii, f 114r, & PRO SP 70/10, f 83v (*CSP For. IV,* No 629); cf Margaret of Parma to Philip II, 12th Aug. 1563: *Correspondance... avec Philippe II,* No 244.

[66] De Quadra to Philip, 3rd Feb. 1560: tr. *CSP Sp. I,* No 85 (orig. *CDIE* 87, pp

to obtain support for Irish Catholics to oppose the imposition of Protestantism. He was however instructed to postpone any reply, so that "they marvel at the delay in the resolution of this business"; and finally warned by Margaret of Parma to avoid compromising practices and to abandon any "unfounded hope".[67] Such was the frustrating pattern of De Quadra's mission until his death in 1563.

In exasperation when, during the promisingly fraught time of the 1560 Scottish intervention, Philip decided only to send a special mission under De Glajon, De Quadra wrote to Feria that it "will do more harm than good if they are only coming to talk, as the Catholics expect much more than this; but in any case they will be too late as the good or ill will be done before they arrive".[68] De Quadra warned that if English support for the Scottish Reformation "is carried forward, the new religion will be a means of destroying all the neighbouring states, and no-one will be safe".[69] Pius IV's Secretary of State, Cardinal Borromeo,

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273/4 & KL II. 213n).

[67] Granvelle to De Quadra, 5th & 27th Sept. 1559; reply, 15th Oct; Margaret to De Quadra, 22nd Jan. 1560: KL II. 17-18, 41, 64, 149. This correspondence is ignored by *CSP Sp.* De Quadra's successor was instructed "to give no cause for suspicion to the Queen or her advisers" (as the Bishop, despite admonitions to the contrary, certainly had); and "with regard to the negotiations opened by the Irish Catholics, you will cut them short gently... They have tried the same thing before, with the same result {none}" - Philip to Silva, 19th Jan. & 6th Aug. 1565: tr. *CSP Sp. I,* Nos 244, 259 (origs *CDIE* 89 p 9; 26 pp 518/9).

[68] De Quadra to Feria, 7th Mar. 1560: tr. *CSP Sp. I,* No 91 (orig. KL II. 250/1).

[69] De Quadra to Margaret of Parma, 21st Jan. 1560; cf to Philip, 28th Mar; to Feria, 18th Dec. 1559: tr. *CSP Sp. I,* Nos 82; 95, 80 (origs. KL II. 194/5; *CDIE*

similarly described England as "the nurse of heresies and rebellions in all neighbouring states", and feared that she would sponsor an invasion of the Netherlands by Protestant exiles.[70]

But certainly the English exaggerated the sympathy for France of Philip II himself and his closest advisers; recent accounts have tended to follow them in this.[71] It is true that the Spanish attached somewhat less significance to Mary's and Elizabeth's claims to each other's titles, and thought the latter to be exaggerating her grievances.[72] After all, during the bitter Franco-Spanish precedence dispute at Rome, each monarch advanced nonsensical claims to the other's crown.[73] Philip's real attitude can however be deduced. He said that he would send special envoys to both Paris and London to mediate. De Glajon arrived in England from Flanders in early April. It was not until

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87, p 295; BL Add. MS 26056A, p 68). Also Margaret of Parma to Philip II, 6th Jan. & 2nd Nov. 1560: *Correspondance... avec Philippe II,* Nos 20, 77; "Discorso a S[ua] S[anti]tà", May 1563: PRO SP 70/57, f 42 (*CSP For. VIII,* No 767).

[70] Cardinal Borromeo to Cardinal d'Este (draft instructions for his French legation), Mar. 1562; same to Crivelli (Nuncio in Spain), 15th Dec: Pollen, *Papal Negotiations with Mary,* p 58; PRO 31/9/69, p 524 (*CSP Rome I,* Nos 149, 204). On the alleged plan to invade Flanders, cf Philip II to Margaret of Parma, 25th Feb. 1563: *Correspondance de Marguerite... de Parme avec Philippe II,* No 219. The German Nuncio Commendone took an interest in the "reduction" of England because he expected it to cure "the disorders of Germany" - to Borromeo, Sept. 1561: Pollen, pp 68/9; cf Delfino to same, 27th Mar. 1564: *NBD 1559/72,* IV. 79 (*CSP*, Nos 102, 300).

[71] Eg Straukamp, "Anglo-Spanish Relations 1558/63", ch. 4; JE Neale, *Queen Elizabeth I* (2nd edn, 1938), pp 101/2; & Read, *Mr. Secretary Cecil,* p 180.

[72] Eg Chantonnay to Philip, 19th Mar. 1560: *Negociaciones con Francia,* I. 212; De Glajon to Philip, 9th April: KL II. 300/1n (*CSP Sp. I,* No 99).

[73] Fourquevaux to Catherine de Medici, 11th Feb. 1566: *Dépêches,* I. 53/4.

after that, that Philip even gave De la Vega his instructions for Paris. Since De la Vega was coming from Spain, not Flanders, his mission ended up over a month behind De Glajon's (and open conflict had begun even before De Glajon's arrival). Thus, Philip had read De Glajon's statement of the English point of view before the French side of his "mediation" had begun. The awkward French request for aid was stalled throughout this period. Then Chantonnay and De la Vega claimed to have heard that Elizabeth had agreed to compromise; and it was five or six weeks before they received Philip's assurance that this was untrue (in the meantime, the Treaty of Edinburgh - if hardly a compromise - *had* been concluded).[74]

De Glajon was far more sympathetic to the English point of view than De Quadra had been. Elizabeth complimented him as "a true Burgignon", ie supporter of an Anglo-Flemish *entente.* Cecil recorded: "M. de Glason came and joyned with the Bishop of Aquila to move the revocation of the army out of Scotland; but Glason, privately to my Lord Admiral and me the Secretary, counselled us to the contrary". De Quadra wrote, "M. de Glajon is so little a friend of the French that, despite seeing the disorder and insolence which he notes in these here {the English}, they always seem preferable to the others".[75] François II on the other

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[74] Chantonnay & De la Vega to Philip, 1st June 1560; reply, 23rd June: *Negociaciones con Francia,* I. 294, 303/4. It was, incidentally, in April 1560 that Peréz complained to Granvelle that "decisions are taken so slowly that even a cripple could keep up with them" - quoted by G Parker, *Philip II,* p 28.

[75] Elizabeth to Throckmorton, 18th April: PRO SP 70/13, f 108 (*CSP For. IV,* No

hand claimed that if Philip had sent a Spaniard instead, all would quickly have been settled (presumably to Elizabeth's disadvantage). Moreover, he had "little cause for satisfaction" with Chantonnay, whom he accused of "evil offices".[76] Chantonnay, another Fleming and less anti-English than his brother Granvelle, certainly seemed to believe, despite all denials, that the French had a "design against England", and that prevention was reasonable.[77] He told Throckmorton that Philip "wold never mak warr wt. the Quene's Ma[jes]te, whatsoever were saide, in confessing the Kinge's inhabilitie to it" and also that he "wyll procede no further wth. his overtures to ayde the Frenche for chastising the rebeles in Scotlande, since the matter is growen to opene hostilitye betwext England and Fraunce" (which was not the official line, though it was effectively what Philip's prevarication implied).[78]

To complicate matters further, the Count of Feria arrived in Paris from Flanders to join Chantonnay and De la Vega. He was far

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1018); Cecil's "Diary", 10th April 1560: Murdin, *Burghley SP,* p 750; De Quadra to Granvelle, 27th April: KL II. 365 (not in *CSP Sp.*).

[76] François to Sebastien L'Aubespine, 21st May 1560; cf Catherine de Medici to Élisabeth de Valois, mid-1561: Paris, *Négotiations... relatives au règne de François II,*pp 382/4, 873; also Philip to Chantonnay & De la Vega, 6th June: *Negociaciones con Francia,* I. 299.

[77] Chantonnay to Philip, 10th & 24th April 1560: *Negociaciones con Francia,* I. 247, 271.

[78] Throckmorton to PC, 7th June 1560; to Elizabeth, 24th June: PRO SP 70/15, ff 19v, 77r (*CSP For. V,* Nos 167, 232); cf same to same, 19th Sept. 1559: Forbes, *Full View,* I. 231 (*CSP For. III,* No 1355); to Cecil, 20th Feb. 1560 & to Elizabeth, 29th Mar: SP 70/11, f 63r; 12, f 125 (*CSP For. IV,* Nos 750, 919).

more anti-English, if scarcely pro-French. Lorraine therefore, "who was well acquainted with his humour", proposed that "it would be better, to avoid threatening Your Majesty's dominions, that Your Majesty should be lord of England, on condition that it come to the first son of the Queen our lady {ie not descend to Carlos with the rest}, who should marry a daughter of the King of France". He suggested that Alba or Feria himself might be viceroy in the meantime. Chantonnay thought that Lorraine was intending either merely to sow confusion, or to involve England and Flanders in a mutually debilitating war.[79] This was, according to De Quadra and De Glajon, the ulterior motive of the French request for aid which they did not really want.[80] It was, either way, the sort of wild talk (neither of the royal personages he mentioned ever existing) which gave him such a bad reputation.

Philip's mouthpiece for dealings with the French Ambassador in Spain continued to be the Duke of Alba. The Duke was deputed to consider, while the English were actively assaulting Leith, whether Elizabeth could be said to be the aggressor. His tendency to accept her protestations had however already become clear.[81] Elizabeth's contention that the first

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[79] Chantonnay to Philip, 29th April 1560: *Negociaciones con Francia,* I. 276.

[80] De Quadra & De Glajon to Margaret of Parma, 23rd April, 23rd & 27th May 1560: KL II. 355/6, 419, 425/6 (*CSP Sp. I,* Nos 101, 105, 107).

[81] Philip to De la Vega, 11th May 1560; cf L'Aubespine's negotiations with Alba: *Negociaciones con Francia,* I. 289; 139/41; & *Epistolario de Alba,* I. 519/20; to Granvelle; Tiepolo, 26th May: *CSP Ven. VII,* No 163.

resort to arms could nonetheless be counted as self-defence, if the opponent had given clear indications of imminent hostility, was analogous to his own justification for invading the Papal States in 1556. Her claims also appealed to his deep Francophobia. If Alba deemed Elizabeth to be exaggerating her grievances about the royal arms and title, François II's attitude could "serve no other purpose but to anger that Queen without any advantage to him", and was quite senseless if he really had no aggressive intentions, as he professed.[82] It was also possible that the French had committed a more definite breach of the treaty by refortifying Eyemouth (the Spanish attached more importance to this pretext; the English preferred to concentrate on the arms and title).[83]

Whatever the rights and wrongs, Alba and even Feria were very insistent that the French could "in no manner" be permitted to "set foot" in England.[84] English fear of a French landing on the Isle of Wight had spread to the Spanish. The latter, with the experience of their recent joint war confirmed by Grey of Wilton's failures before Leith, regarded the English army as useless and offering a dangerous temptation to the French.[85] It

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[82] Philip to Chantonnay & De la Vega, 24th June 1560; cf 23rd June: *Negociaciones con Francia,* I. 310; 304/5.

[83] Chantonnay to Philip, 2nd Jan. 1560; De la Vega's instructions, 16th April : *Negociaciones con Francia,* I. 149, 263; cf Margaret of Parma to De Quadra, 26th Dec. 1559: KL II.149 (not in *CSP Sp.*).

[84] Philip to Chantonnay & De la Vega, 24th June 1560: *Negociaciones con Francia,* I. 310. On Feria, Chantonnay to Philip, 29th April; cf 11th July: *Ibid,* I. 275, 325/6; cf Tiepolo, 30th Jan: *CSP Ven. VII,* No 127.

is therefore credible enough that Alba should, as the English envoys in Spain claimed, have glossed the offer of aid to the French as an application of an old Spanish principle. "If th'ennemy be in the water to the girdelstede, lend him thy hand to help him out; if he be in to the shulders, set holds on him and kepe him down; as though he ment, if Your Ma[jes]te wer able to dryve the French out of Scotland, in avoydying perill to yourself, to do it without asking further counsaill or ayd."[86] Nor was it irrelevant to his attitude that concurrently, Philip was denouncing the proposal "so damaging and prejudicial to all Christendom", of his "brother" of France to hold a National Council in default of a General. Due to this project, the Cardinal of Lorraine, unofficial ruler of France, was described by the papal Nuncio as inspired by the Devil, and by Philip as a damnable heretic.[87]

When the French sought a definite commitment to help, Philip and Alba replied with much talk about the necessity of maintaining the peace of Christendom, their certainty that

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[85] Eg Chantonnay to Philip, 19th Mar. 1560: *Negociaciones con Francia,* I. 212; Margaret of Parma to De Quadra & De Glajon, 22nd April; Granvelle to De Quadra, 15th & 22nd April: KL II. 341, 351 (not in *CSP Sp.*); *Papiers d'État de Granvelle,* ed. Weiss, VI. 93: to Philip II, 20th May.

[86] Montague & Chamberlain to Elizabeth, 19th May 1560: PRO SP 70/14, ff 95/6 (*CSP For. V,* No 109; also BL Cott. MS Vesp. Cvii, ff 213/4).

[87] Philip to Chantonnay & De la Vega, 23rd June 1560; cf to Antonio de Toledo, Sept (x2), to Chantonnay, 4th Nov: *Negociaciones con Francia,* I. 306/8; 385/6, 414/7, 462. On Lorraine: *ANG XIV,* pp 301 (Gualterio to Borromeo, 8th Jan. 1561); Doellinger, *Dokumente zur Geschichte Karls V, Philipp II & ihrer Zeit,* p 349; cf HO Evennett, *The Cardinal of Lorraine & the Council of Trent* (Cambridge 1930), pp 93-107, 167/8, 206/10.

Elizabeth could be induced to agree to a peaceful compromise (even when she had been pursuing active hostilities for over two months) and the imprudence of destroying their influence to this end by threatening her openly.[88] Philip felt compelled to deny that he was encouraging Elizabeth to be obstinate.[89] But it was with some reason that the French besought him for "a prompt reply", and "that the dilatoriness and duplicity {*connivence*} of your ministers" (they might have added, of the King himself) "be not the cause of some inconvenience".[90] The French tried to compensate unilaterally for the defects in Philip's offers to them. Throckmorton wrote: "the Frenche have grete hope of King Philip's ayde, and yet I am credibly informed that they have bruted here of him diverse thinges untruely" - informed by Philip's ambassador Chantonnay, unless he "hath greatly disembled w.th me".[91]

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[88] Philip to Chantonnay & De la Vega, 6th June 1560; cf L'Aubespine's negotiations with Alba; Philip to Catherine de Medici, to Chantonnay &to de la Vega, 15th/16th April; Chantonnay to Philip, 29th April: *Negociaciones con Francia,* I. 298-300; 141/3, 253, 258/9, 263/7, 280.

[89] Philip to Chantonnay & De la Vega, 24th June 1560: *Negociaciones con Francia,* I. 312.

[90] L'Aubespine to Philip, 8th April 1560: *Negociaciones con Francia,* I. 243. Curiously enough, the Spanish were simultaneously exploring the possibility of borrowing the French Mediterranean squadron to rescue the marooned remnants of their Tripoli expedition, and were encountering parallel dilatoriness: Braudel, *Mediterranean World,* II. 982/3.

[91] Throckmorton to Elizabeth & to Cecil, 27th Mar. 1560; to Elizabeth, 12th April: PRO SP 70/12, ff 113r, 115v/6r; 13, f 77r (*CSP For. IV,* Nos 904/5, 992); cf Chantonnay to Philip, 19th Mar: *Negociaciones con Francia,* I. 206. Letters from France to Scotland, mostly intercepted and deciphered by the English, finally admitted that Spanish aid would not come for several months: Lethington to Cecil, 8th April; Francis II to Mary of Guise, 11th April: SP 52/3/13, 22 (*Cal. Scot. I,* Nos 718, 726). Cf Giovanni Michiel (in France), 26th April, 6th & 21st

There was perhaps some genuine misunderstanding about the Spanish offer. Sebastien L'Aubespine reported by February that it included ships and troops from Flanders; according to the Spanish, "ships, victuals and munitions" were offered. They remained vague about all else.[92] Margaret of Parma reported that it was impossible to raise any troops in Flanders who might have to fight England. Moreover, since the Protestant League was as fearful a prospect to the Spanish as the Catholic to the English, it seemed likely that in the event of any quarrel with Elizabeth, all troops available in Flanders would be needed to guard the German frontier.[93]

The Spanish position finally appeared to be that any reinforcement of French forces in Scotland above 4000 would be viewed most seriously, as indicating a desire to invade England. If this force proved inadequate to suppress the Scottish rebels (ie

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May: *CSP Ven. VII,* Nos 155, 157, 161.

92 L'Aubespine to François, 23rd Feb. 1560; cf Coligny to Constable, 1st Mar: Paris, *Négotiations... relatives au règne de François II,* pp 275/8, 319/20; Spanish account of his negotiations with Alba; same of 5th April, & L'Aubespine to Philip, 8th April: *Negociaciones con Francia,* I. 140/1; 238/9, 242. It is true that L'Aubespine noted Alba as being "full of difficulties and obstructions which he proposes in all negotiations" (at least with the French). There had been vague talk of Philip paying some troops, but it was unclear whose (German mercenaries perhaps) - *Ibid,* I. 143. Even on 6th June, Philip's only definite proposal was of ships: Philip to De la Vega & Chantonnay; cf to De la Vega, 16th April: *Ibid,* I. 300, 267.

93 Margaret of Parma to Philip, 2nd April & 2nd July 1560: *Correspondance... avec Philippe II,* Nos 36, 56; Chantonnay to same, 9th May: *Negociaciones con Francia,* I. 282/4; cf Philip to Granvelle, 12th May: *Papiers d'État de Granvelle,* ed. Weiss, VI. 80; Alba, according to L'Aubespine, 23rd Feb: Paris, *Négotiations... relatives au règne de François II,* p 278.

after waiting several weeks at least), the Spanish would provide up to 3000 more, at least some of whom would have to come from Spain rather than Flanders (ie take even longer, especially if the winds were too westerly and not enough southerly, as they had been when earlier French expeditions had come to grief).[94] As a serious commitment, this left something to be desired; and prior to its fulfilment, the Spanish adopted a veto on further French reinforcements (not that these were available anyway). Alba, in retrospect, thought Spain had nearly gone to war in 1560 - against France, not England. The Nuncio in France reported that Lorraine blamed Philip for the loss of Scotland.[95]

Philip apparently did not want to encourage Elizabeth to new excesses by being too openly supportive of her. But it is clear that he was, behind the scenes. Margaret of Parma told De Quadra that he should be more pro-English to the French, and more pro-English to the French. She soon concluded however that she could see no way in which the honest brokerage Philip professed could work;[96] Alba, in more direct contact with his sovereign, seemed clearly to have decided already to take sides. That the English derived a contrary impression was partly due to the confusions and ambiguities of Spanish policy. But if one individual was to

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[94] De la Vega's instructions, 16th April 1560; Philip to same & Chantonnay, 6th June: *Negociaciones con Francia,* I. 267, 300.

[95] Alba to Philip, 21st Oct. 1563: *Epistolario de Alba,* I. 559/60, & *Papiers d'État de Granvelle,* ed. Weiss, VII. 225/6. *ANG XIV,* pp 250: Gualterio to Borromeo, 19th Aug. 1560.

[96] Margaret to De Quadra, 15th Dec. 1559; to same & De Glajon, 2nd June 1560: KL II. 130, 431 (not in *CSP Sp.*).

blame, it was De Quadra. His intent corresponded most closely to what Throckmorton complained of to Chantonnay: that for Philip "to wish to keep her {Elizabeth} as if in wardship and to dismiss her councillors was the next thing to declaring himself her enemy".[97] The Bishop doubtless "realised that his office required him to implement, not to make policy"; but it is inadequate to conclude that he "studiously carried out Philip's instructions", when his manner of doing so, at such a critical moment, virtually vitiated the effect his master was trying to achieve.[98]

While the Scottish crisis was in progress, Pope Pius IV stepped into English affairs by despatching the nuncio Parpaglia to Elizabeth. This Pope had been elected to be untroublesome. Many candidates had attracted strong support in the course of a long deadlocked conclave, but he had never been one of them until the Spanish and French factions and Paul IV's "creatures" finally agreed that he was the only option that all could live with. Philip II had written to the conclave, pointedly recommendingit to choose a Pope conducive to the peace of the Church (this partly just because factionalism within his own faction had rendered it impossible to get through a definite nomination). The Spanish Ambassador Francisco de Vargas wrote that after four months'

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[97] Chantonnay to Philip, 9th May: *Negociaciones con Francia,* I. 281.
Throckmorton claimed that De Quadra had been bribed by the French - to Elizabeth, 28th April: PRO SP 70/13 ff 225/9 (*CSP For. IV*, No 1082).

[98] Straukamp, "Anglo-Spanish Relations 1558/63", pp 400/1.

confinement, the Cardinals would have elected a block of wood to conclude matters.[99] Pius IV was perhaps the nearest they could find. He was however also a Milanese, patronised by Charles V and an opponent of Paul IV's anti-Spanish war. This appeared in his English policy; initial independence of Spain proved short-lived.

> It was believed at the Curia that Elizabeth "would be... sooner won back by benevolence than by force". Both approaches were options, though. Pius' Secretary of State, Cardinal Borromeo, wrote that the Pope, to woo Elizabeth back into the fold, would use "all gentle and loving methods... all satisfactions that she could desire from a conscientious pontiff and a loving father"; however if she "will remain obstinate, he will seek by way of the Council and with every other means to punish her"; the French Ambassador, "if she will not listen, His Holiness, having done his duty, will not fail to use the power God gave him". Parpaglia's mission was intended to take advantage of her present troubles.[100] Margaret of Parma believed that he had in reserve a "rigorous" brief, procured from the Pope by French interests.[101]

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99 Vargas to Philip, 20th Dec. 1559: Doellinger, *Dokumente zur Geschichte Karls V, Philipp II & ihrer Zeit,* p 317. On the conclave generally: P Herre, *Papsttum und Papstwahl im Zeitalter Philipps II* (Leipzig 1907), ch. 3; Pastor XV, ch 1; on Philip's message, p 44 in each.

100 "Sopra li negotii d'Inghilterra": tr. *CSP Rome I,* No 27 (orig. AO Meyer, *England & the Catholic Church under Elizabeth,* tr. JR McKee (1916), App. 1, p 466); Cardinal Borromeo to Bishop Gualtieri of Viterbo (Nuncio in France), 15th May 1560; cf to Bishop Rovere of Terracina (Nuncio in Spain), 4th May: Bayne, *Anglo-Roman Relations,* App. 16, p 253 (also *ANG XIV,* pp 238); App. 14, pp 250/1 (*CSP,* Nos 51(too abbreviated), 43); & to Hosius, 18th May: *NBD 1559/72,* l. 32/3; Babou to François II, 27th May: Pollen, *Papal Negotiations with Mary,* pp 46/7.

De Quadra noted in early 1560 that Elizabeth had again become apprehensive of excommunication, and began making Catholic conciliarist statements, "which if I did not know her character might perhaps convince me". The French Ambassador De Seurre "told me that if they did not come to terms with the Queen, they would probably get the Pope to proceed against her; and he wanted to know what Your Majesty would do in such a case. I evaded the subject, although I said that the King of Spain had never failed to obey the Apostolic See in things that were just."[102]

This was however all in the future. Parpaglia's "rigorous" brief was not employed, and was anyway only a rumour. The retiring French Nuncio had expressed the belief that only a little pressure would be needed to accomplish Elizabeth's conversion, and that she would probably welcome a mission; Borromeo later asked the new Nuncio in puzzlement why nothing had followed from this. He also warned him "not to involve His Holiness in any engagement to succour [François] at His Holiness' own cost, more especially because that kingdom is not declared to be schismatic, so that His Holiness has no cause to move". It would not seem then that such a declaration was envisaged immediately, even as

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[101] Margaret of Parma to Philip II, 20th June 1560: *Correspondance... avec Philippe II,* No 53; cf Vargas to same, 6th May: Bayne, *Anglo-Roman Relations,* App. 19, pp 254/5.

[102] De Quadra to Philip, 7th Mar. 1560: tr. *CSP Sp. I,* No 92 (orig. *CDIE* 87, pp 287/8). Cf Alba to Philip, 21st Oct. 1563: *Epistolario de Alba,* I. 560, & *Papiers d'État de Granvelle,* ed. Weiss, VII. 226.

a contingency.[103] In Vienna, Bishop Hosius heard rumours that Elizabeth *had* agreed to return to the Roman obedience.[104]

Parpaglia was more likely to be working in the interest and with the consent of France, as he was hardly acceptable to Philip II, having earlier been expelled from Flanders as a French spy. Philip complained to Pius that the Pope had not consulted him, as Paul IV had (eventually) been accustomed to do on English affairs. Such a partisan choice might moreover upset the negotiations to stop an Anglo-French war.[105] He got Parpaglia stopped in Flanders and instructed to act only in cooperation with Philip's representatives. Finally, Parpaglia was recalled, leaving, "for the present, the management of the whole affair in His Majesty's hands". Philip, "taking steps which might some time or other have some good result" "would let His Holiness know all when it should be ripe for disclosure".[106] Theoretically, this did not put Elizabeth in the position of refusing entry; however, Cardinal Borromeo wrote of "the Queen's obstinate refusal to suffer him to make the passage".[107]

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[103] Lenzi to Borromeo, 15th June 1560; Borromeo to Gualterio, 2nd Sept; 15th May: *ANG XIV*, pp 233/4; 256, 238 (not in *CSP Rome*).

[104] Hosius to Borromeo, 2nd May 1560: *NBD 1559/72,* l. 18 (*CSP Rome I,* No 42).

[105] Philip II to Margaret of Parma, 6th June 1560, & copy of letter to Vargas, 1st June: *Correspondance de Marguerite de Parme avec Philippe II,* No 48; cf Vargas to Philip, 6th May: Bayne, *Anglo-Roman Relations,* App. 19, pp 255/6 .

[106] Borromeo to Bishop Rovere of Terracina, 29th June 1560; same to Santa Croce, 5th Oct: tr. *CSP Rome I,* Nos 56, 62; 60 (origs PRO 31/9/69, pp 545, 548; Santa Croce to Borromeo, 5th Sept: GB Adriani, *Della Vita... di Prosper Santa Croce* (Turin 1869)).

Obscurantism and Confusion: Elizabeth and the Catholic Diplomatists

The complexities and ambiguities of early Elizabethan politics could still confuse even seasoned spectators like De Quadra. "They are so prone to crooked courses" that he confessed perplexity. And the Austrian envoy Baron Brenner could conclude only: "inside their heads is a *perpetuum mobile*."[108] Elizabeth's religious gestures towards Catholicism were of limited efficacy initially. Philip initially considered that refusal of the title "Supreme Head of the Church" offered "some hopes of salvation".[109] De Quadra however considered it a purely verbal difference. The Venetian Ambassador to Philip wrote that Elizabeth had decided "to act like the Princes of Germany, who use the power but not the title".[110] And as Catholics despaired of her, they came to denounce the claimed Headship as one of her worst presumpions, even though it was not a claim she expressly made.[111] Feria had already concluded by mid-1559 that he was

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[107] Borromeo to Rovere & to Santa Croce, 19th Aug. 1560: tr. *CSP Rome I,* No 61 (orig. PRO 31/9/69, p 547).

[108] De Quadra to Philip, 23rd Feb. 1561; cf Feria to same, 29th April 1559: tr. *CSP Sp. I,* Nos 123; 29 (origs *CDIE* 87, pp 321, 180 (& KL I. 513)); Brenner to Ferdinand, 5th Dec, in Klarwill, *Queen Elizabeth & Some Foreigners,* p 159.

[109] Philip to Feria, 24th April 1559; reply, 29th April: tr. *CSP Sp. I,* Nos 28/9 (origs. *CDIE* 87, pp 175; 177/9 & KL I. 508; 511/2).

[110] De Quadra to Feria, 10th May 1559: BL Add. MS 26056A, p 32 (*CSP Sp. I,* No 32; mistakenly directing it to Alba); Tiepolo, 9th Mar. 1559: *CSP Ven. VII,* No 57.

[111] Eg newsletter, 25th Mar. 1563; Zacharias Delfino (Nuncio to the Emperor) to Trent legates, 17th June: PRO 31/9/69, p 616; *NBD 1559/72,* III. 351 (*CSP*

dealing with "a daughter of the devil"; his successor that heresy was "implanted in her very bones", and that "with her all is falsehood and vanity"; even that she was possessed by "a hundred thousand devils". If Catholic gestures were made, like the infamous candles in the chapel, it was "out of sheer fear".[112]

Elizabeth's stance on Church ceremonial was widely lamented as heartening Papists and discouraging Protestants throughout Europe. The former effect became more pronounced in the course of the 1560s - implying some willingness to clutch at straws. There were persistent rumours in France and Spain in 1565/7, inspired by Elizabeth's vestiarian stand against radical Calvinism, "th[a]t all yor bishopis th[a]t were in the Tour ar set at libertie" and that she had "com[m]andit them to set up the Messe and ald Religion agane". In France too, the enforcement of Anglican ritual, it was thought, "must needes argue a chaunge shortly wt.in your Realme".[113] Catholic writers still

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Rome I, Nos 224, 243).

[112] Feria to Philip, 10th May 1559; De Quadra to same, 28th June & 27th July; to Feria, 27th Dec; to Perrenot, 9th Oct: tr. *CSP Sp. I,* Nos 31, 40, 53, 81, 66 (origs. KL I. 519, 547 (also *CDIE* 87, pp 185, 209), 574, II. 157/8 (also *CDIE* 87, p 268); BL Add. MS 26056A, p 57).

[113] Cockburn to Cecil, 6th Aug. 1567 (France): PRO SP 70/93, f 22r (*CSP For. X,* No 1561); cf William Phayre to same, 22nd June 1565 (Spain); Hoby to same, 19th June 1566 (France); Man to same, 3rd May 1567 (Spain); Norris to Elizabeth, 7th Aug (France): SP 70/78, ff 173v/4r; 84, f 203; 89, f 17; 93, f 24 (*CSP For. IX,* No 1262; *X,* Nos 506, 989, 1562); cf same to Leicester, 18th Feb: HMC 70: *Pepys MSS,* p 97. Cf Irish rumours, reported by the Protestant Bishop of Kildare: SP 63/14/1 (2nd July 1565); reports from Flanders to Rome, June 1565: PRO 31/9/69, pp 386, 389.

optimistically refused to consider Elizabeth's commitment to religious change as decisive.[114]

Even Pius IV's Secretary of State thought Elizabeth "gives some indication of not hating so much as at first things Catholic, having issued an order in that kingdom that clerics should wear their old garb, and having silenced that preacher {Dean Nowell} preaching against images and saints". Guzmán de Silva commented with justice, "So strong is the hope born of desires that insignificant events elate and depress men thus".[115] The French Ambassador in Spain heard rumours in late 1567 that the Pope had been encouraged to send yet another envoy to England, who had however been refused admission.[116]

On the question of the Queen's marriage, however, Elizabeth's obfuscation was outstandingly successful. Especially in the first six or seven years of her reign, it was perhaps the strongest single factor dissuading other governments from adopting a decisive attitude towards her. A French agent of the Duke of Savoy opined at the outset that Elizabeth's value in the marriage market would discourage Catholic princes from strictures on her birth - "I do not know a better instrument of

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[114] Eg Harding, *Confutation,* sigs *2-3, ff 280, 302, 313; Hieronimo Osorio da Fonseca, *Epistle to Elizabeth,* tr. Richard Shacklock ("the Portingale Pearle") (Antwerp 1565 / ERL 329), Pref. & ff 74/8.

[115] Cardinal Borromeo to Cardinal Santa Croce, 21st April 1565: PRO 31/9/69, p 500 (*CSP Rome I,* No 319); Silva to Philip, 26th April, cf 12th Mar: *CSP Sp. I,* Nos 296, 286 (origs. *CDIE* 89, pp 109 (also 26, pp 539/40), 89.

[116] Fourquevaux (French Ambassador in Spain) to Charles IX, 21st Aug. 1567: *Dépêches de M. de Fourquevaux,* ed. C Douais (Paris 1896), I. 248/9.

legitimation than the kingdom of England".[117]

And Elizabeth used this value to excellent effect. The wrong marriage would doubtless have cemented Spanish hostility earlier; but because they lived in hope of the right marriage, their patience remained fairly elastic. And Elizabeth with the right husband would be far preferable to Mary Stewart, with all her undesirable connections. Spanish intervention in the 1560s would probably have had to settle for keeping Elizabeth, but changing her councillors, and possibly foisting the Archduke Charles on her willy-nilly. And for years, they simply waited. According to Challoner, many judged "the balance of the warres between Flanders and France to depend upon" Elizabeth's marriage. Another in 1559 judged, "there be at thys day many eyes over Inglande; and as Hyr Grace dothe matche hyrselffe in marryage, so will she see thinges fall out which as yet ar hyden". Chantonnay, Philip's Ambassador in Paris, thought "it shuld be well done, the same were knowne and ended, for then shuld Your Majestie know your friends and your fooes, and how to order your affaires".[118]

The Spanish for years regarded the policies of the Virgin Queen, fluctuating as they were, as essentially a temporary nuisance, even if they did not necessarily go so far as the English

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[117] 18th Nov. 1558: quoted Romier, *Origines Politiques des Guerres de Religion,* II. 317.

[118] Challoner to Cecil, 2nd Jan. 1559: PRO SP 70/2, f 4r (*CSP For. III,* No 194); Hogan to Cecil, 1st Oct: SP 70/8, ff 5-6 (*CSP For. IV,* No 3); Killigrew & Jones to Elizabeth, 6th Jan. 1560: Forbes, *Full View,* I. 294 (*CSP,* No 552).

Hospitaller Sir Richard Shelley, and ascribe them merely to "the stupidity of girlish years".[119] Everything would become clearer and more definite with a man - preferably the Archduke Charles - in charge. Similar reasoning underlay the Venetian delay to send an embassy to Elizabeth (extended throughout her reign), allegedly because they thought they might as well wait until they could congratulate her on her marriage.[120] Philip warned Elizabeth during the 1559/60 crisis of "ill and the increase of great inconveniences, unless Your Majesty soon... resigns to a Consort... those things which are only fitting for men". Alba considered that "if the Quene... wer maryd, all theis thinges {the alleged French threats, and the problems ensuing} had not cum in question"; Feria, that "after all, everything depends on the husband she chooses, for the *King's* wish is paramount in all things"; Granvelle, that "in the end, though she may be the wisest woman in the world, she is [only] a woman".[121]

After the crisis of 1559/60, the Spanish used Elizabeth's own arguments about the French "pretext and pretensed interest unto yor estate" to warn her that to stay single was "contynuallie

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[119] Richard Shelley (English Prior of St. John) to Pius IV, late 1561: PRO 31/9/69, p 13 (*CSP Rome I,* No 130, but too abbreviated).

[120] Guido Cavalcanti to Dudley, c 1562: HMC 70: *Pepys MSS,* p 8.

[121] Philip, 24th Dec. 1559: Haynes, *Burghley SP,* p 215 (HMC 9: *Hatfield MSS,* I, No 584; *CSP For. IV,* No 482); Montague & Chamberlain to Elizabeth, 19th May 1560: SP 70/14, ff 95v/6v (*CSP For. V,* No 109; also BL Cott. MS Vesp. Cvii, ff 213/4); Feria to Philip, 31st Jan. 1559; cf 20th Feb: tr. *CSP Sp. I,* Nos 13, 15 (origs. *CDIE* 87, pp 119, 129; KL I. 413, 441); Granvelle to De Quadra, 15th Dec: KL II. 133 (not in *CSP Sp.*).

to ronne p[er]ill and daunger". In 1563, with England at undeclared war with France, the Rheingraf believed Elizabeth "must nedes marie, and that verie shortely, for there is no Prince in Christendome that is now so weake and so smallie allied as she is". With Mary Stewart expected to marry the Infante Carlos, she must necessarily take the Austrian Archduke.[122] After all, as one Austrian envoy said firmly, "that she should wish to remain a maid and never marry is inconceivable". Another was assured by Sir Thomas Challoner "that in his lifetime the religion had been changed four times in this realm, and yet the change was not now so great... The Queen is such a sensible woman that if she obtained such a husband, she would certainly not prescribe to him in religious questions, but follow him along all paths".[123]

The project for Elizabeth and Philip's marriage, though seeming serious to outsiders, foundering rapidly due to a complete lack of interest from both principal parties, Feria recommended at first support in the Habsburg interest for the Archduke Ferdinand - if he proved reliable, he would be able "though the Queen may die, to keep the country in his fist; and if anything besides God's cause has led me to hope that Your Majesty

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[122] Chamberlain to Elizabeth, 7th Dec. 1560; cf to Cecil, 3rd Dec: PRO SP 70/21, ff 9, 31 (*CSP For. V,* Nos 762, 777); to same & to Throckmorton, 31st July: SP 70/28, ff 103, 105 (*CSP For. VI,* Nos 355/6); Smith to Elizabeth, 12th Oct. 1563; cf Gurone Bertano (?) to Antonio Bruschetto, 16th Oct: SP 70/64, ff 30r, 32r; 73v (*CSP For. VIII,* Nos 1284, 1312).

[123] Pollweiler to Ferdinand I, 11th June 1559; Helfenstein to same, 26th Feb: Klarwill, *Queen Elizabeth & Some Foreigners,* pp 94, 45.

might again get a footing here it was this".[124] Ferdinand however proved unsuitable, because secretly married already; his younger brother Charles emerged as a replacement. De Quadra suggested that, with Elizabeth's overthrow imminent, the Archduke Charles might instead wed Catherine Grey, "who would be much more desirable than this one".[125] She too was secretly married, unluckily.

The extremely durable Austrian negotiation continued to offer the enticing prospect of trouble-free conversion. In 1565, Pius IV still considered it a reason not to despair of the English position.[126] His successor was however somewhat sceptical of Spanish arguments as to its utility as a means for Elizabeth's

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[124] Feria to Philip, 18th April 1559; cf 29th: tr. *CSP Sp. I,* Nos 27; 29 (origs. *CDIE* 87, pp 170/2; 180 & KL I. 503/5; 513). Helfenstein's secretary Neumetzger wrote on 25th April that Feria claimed the matter was virtually settled. Helfenstein, now negotiating for Charles, was instructed to try to ensure he would retain"power and administration" if Elizabeth died childless: Klarwill, *Queen Elizabeth & Some Foreigners,* pp 52, 139/43.

[125] De Quadra to Philip, 18th Nov. 1559; cf 13th Nov: tr. *CSP Sp. I,* Nos 75, 74 (orig. *CDIE* 87, pp 265/6; cf 261/2). Feria had begun to hint at this option: to Philip, 24th Mar: *CDIE,* p 150 & KL I. 484 (*CSP Sp. I,* No 21). Robert Hogan reported Feria's views to Cecil, and claimed that the Sussex Catholics Arundel and Montague were prepared to convey Catherine overseas: 1st Oct, KL II. 24/7 (*CSP For. IV,* No 3); cf 24th Mar. 1560, CP 201, f 134 (HMC 9; *Hatfield MSS,* I, No 645); cf Levine, *Early Elizabethan Succession Question,* pp 13-15. De Quadra named Montague as a possible Catholic leader for the exploitation of the Scottish crisis - to Philip, 3rd Feb. 1560; cf to Feria, 7th Mar: tr. *CSP Sp. I,* Nos 85, 91 (origs KL II. 213/4n (& *CDIE* 87, pp 274/5), 254/5).

[126] Meyer, *England & the Catholic Church,* p 56; Bayne, *Anglo-Roman Relations,* pp 213/4. Cf Roman pamphlet, 13th Oct. 1565: PRO SP 70/80, f 135r (*CSP For. IX,* No 1897); Delfino to Borromeo, 1st June 1564, & to Cardinal Altemps, 14th & 22nd Sept. 1565: *NBD 1559/72,* IV. 151/2; 460, 467/8 (first is *CSP Rome I,* No 304).

reconversion; true to his distrust of "the considerations involved in affairs of state", he objected on principle to a Catholic marrying a heretic.[127] All hope did not die immediately even after Elizabeth uncompromisingly stated in 1566 that she would "never have any husband wt.out knowledg of his co[n]formity in Relligio[n] with her", and even a request that her prospective bridegroom might "sum tymes secretly use the relygion th[a]t all hys lyfe long he had onely knowen" was turned down because of "the greatnes of the dawnger". A correspondent of Alava, the Spanish Ambassador in Paris, still assured him in early 1567 that the marriage prospects were "certain".[128]

Apart from the Archduke, the most persistent possibility was that Elizabeth would finally marry her favourite Dudley. The latter, or the Sidney family on his behalf, opened negotiations with Philip in 1561, offering to procure a reconversion if the king supported this marriage.[129] De Quadra had earlier concluded that

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[127] Zúniga to Philip, 27th Jan. 1568: L Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica entre España y la Santa Sede durante el pontificado di Pio V* (Madrid 1914), II. 295. Silva had in fact long been sceptical about the negotiation, but Philip saw no reason to pass his assessment on to Rome - eg Silva to Philip, 5th May, 16th June & 13th Aug. 1565; Philip to Silva, 6th June: *CDIE* 89 pp 116/7, 125/8, 171; 123 (*CSP Sp. I,* Nos 298, 303, 314; 300).

[128] Sir Thomas Dannett's instructions, 30th April 1566; Dannett to Cecil, 30th May; cf same to same & to Elizabeth, 4th July: PRO SP 70/83, f 254r; 84, f 118; 85, ff 8, 6 (*CSP For. X,* Nos 333, 437, 546/7); Friedrich von Schwartz of Ruissingen to Alava, 11th & 26th Jan. 1567: *Negociaciones con Francia,* IX. 108, 119; cf Giovanni Correr, 23rd Jan: *CSP Ven. VII,* No 378. Reports from the Spanish Embassy in Vienna (presumably better-informed) were not however optimistic - Luis de Vanegas to Philip, 30th Sept. 1567; Chantonnay to same, 16th Aug. & 16th Oct. 1567, 10th Jan. 1568: *CDIE* 101, pp 260/1, 298-301, 351.

[129] De Quadra to Philip, 22nd Jan. & 25th Mar. 1561: *CDIE* 87, pp 314/9,

Dudley was "the worst and most procrastinating young man I ever saw in my life", and that negotiations with him were all "chimeras".[130] Nonetheless, De Quadra was lured by the Dudleyite proposals into believing that the papal nuncio Martinengo probably *would* be admitted; and was abashed by his repulse in May.[131]

In 1563, Parpaglia the former Nuncio for England, who continued to take an unwelcome interest in English affairs, still hoped that a Dudley marriage would lead to reconversion - though he had his doubts about this equation in view of the loathing of the definitely Catholic "old nobility" for Dudley. Even in 1565, Pius IV still encouraged indirect approaches - as an alternative to his Austrian hopes - *via* Gurone Bertano, to the Earl of Leicester (as he had become), offering cash, the nomination of Cardinals and troops in case of trouble, if he would help restore Catholicism, before or after any marriage with the Queen.[132]

330/3 (*CSP Sp. I,* Nos 122, 125); cf Bayne, *Anglo-Roman Relations,* pp 85/7.

[130] De Quadra to Feria, 7th Mar. 1560: tr. *CSP Sp. I,* No 91 (orig. KL II. 254/5); & 12th Feb: KL II. 228 (not in *CSP Sp.*).

[131] De Quadra to Philip, 25th Mar, 12th April & 5th May 1561; to Dudley, 12th April: *CDIE* 87, pp 330/41, 346/51; 342/5 (*CSP Sp. I,* Nos 125/8).

[132] Parpaglia to Cardinal Morone, 27th Oct. 1563: PRO 31/9/69, p 308 (*CSP Rome I,* No 285); Bertano to Requesens, 26th Jan. & 2nd Nov. 1565: Bayne, *Anglo-Roman Relations,* Apps 62, 68; pp 313/6, 322/3.

Pius IV continued to seek to encourage Spain "to unite with France to compel the Queen of England to return to the unity of the Church or at least not to persecute the Catholics"; though he recognised the limitation that the French would not be permitted by Spain "to set foot in that realm".[133] The mission of the nuncio Martinengo in 1561 to propose English attendance at the Council of Trent (in contrast to Parpaglia's) was represented from the outset as the product of Spanish initiative, encouraged by the earlier statements, diplomatic or sincere, of English ambassadors, and by De Quadra's reports.[134] Beforehand, Pius IV had consulted Philip II as "one better informed as to the affairs of that realm than the Pope can be" and promised to do nothing "without first communicating with His Catholic Majesty".[135] Philip however quickly had second thoughts about it, being nearly as apprehensive as the English themselves that a rebuff to pontifical dignity would inevitably entail serious consequences. He wrote to his envoy in Rome that if "the Queen would not receive His Holiness' message, or would reply unsuitably (or,

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[133] Gualterio to Borromeo, 15th Nov. 1560: *ANG XIV,* pp 280 (not in *CSP Rome*).

[134] Throckmorton to PC, 31st Dec. 1560; Bedford & Throckmorton to PC, 26th Feb. 1561: PRO SP 70/21, f 135; 23, ff 136/7 (*CSP For. V,* Nos 833, 1030); Chamberlain to Cecil, 14th July 1561: SP 70/28, f 49 (*CSP For. VI,* No 315).

[135] Instructions for Bishop of Ischia, Dec. 1560; cf Morone to Martinengo, Mar. 1561: tr. *CSP Rome I,* Nos 65, 70 (origs Pollen, *Papal Negotiations with Mary,* pp 50/1; PRO 31/9/41, p 108).

perhaps, disrespectfully), there would be at present very little opportunity to proceed against her by force, and that would be to plunge Christendom into new troubles that would be very disadvantageous, given the position of the Faith in France." After the rebuff occurred, he repeated that "in no manner" could excommunication and deposition of Elizabeth be recommended; if this were "not executed, it would be discreditable, infuriate her, make her harder and more desperate without result." The enterprise would naturally pertain to him "as the most obedient son of His Holiness", and he was not ready for it. The French and Germans would oppose him; thus it would "disturb the peace and tranquillity that all Christendom now enjoys and... thwart the holding of the Council... the only remedy in what concerns the Faith at present". Any papal doubts about his motives were met with the insistence, "nobody in the world has desired and sought the succour of the Faith in that realm more than I".[136]

In the interim, Philip had sent instructions to Flanders to fob Martinengo off with talk of what might be accomplished by his own "negotiations in favour of the Faith, without giving him any details about them..."[137] Once more, this pressure was successful. Pius IV was by now so resigned to the veto Philip held on his actions, that he made towards the end of 1561 a series of

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[136] Philip II to Vargas, 9th Feb. 1561: Bayne, *Anglo-Roman Relations,* App. 25, p 262; 16th July: Mignet, *Marie Stuart,* App. B, French edn: II. 467/9, English: II. 421/2.

[137] Philip II to Granvelle, 17th Mar; cf to Vargas, 19th Mar: *Papiers d'État de Granvelle,* ed. Weiss, VI. 300; Bayne, *Anglo-Roman Relations,* App. 28, pp 266/7

extraordinary, if unrealistic, secret proposals, offering Philip the chance of acquiring England, France *and* the Empire if he would deal with heresy more effectively than their present rulers.[138]

Martinengo was said to have published "the bull for the Council in Flanders and the other places closest to England, so that none might pretend ignorance",[139] an ominous phrase used for canonical warnings prior to excommunication that could not actually be delivered. Philip, though deploring the rebuff to the Pope, was deeply opposed to excommunication. The Pope concluded from Elizabeth's double repulse of his nuncios "that no sort of persuasion will ever avail to bring her back to the unity of Holy Church". He rejected Catherine de Medici's attempt to delay the reopening of Trent, as late as the summer of 1562, on the pretext that Elizabeth was on the point of sending a delegation - "We put no faith in her because she would not listen to our nuncios."[140] This view had not however developed immediately, even after Martinengo's repulse. Projects continued for the introduction of a nuncio into England, in the belief that this would be more successful if less trumpeted in advance. One of the

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[138] Bayne, *Anglo-Roman Relations,* App. 37, pp 280/2.

[139] "... la bulla del Concilio en las tierras de Flandés & otros lugares mas visinos d'Anglatierra, por q[ue] ella no pueda pretender ignorancia" - Spanish newsletter, 14th June 1561: PRO SP 70/27, f 22r (*CSP For. VI,* No 246).

[140] Cardinal Borromeo to Cardinal d'Este, Mar. 1562: Pollen, *Papal Negotiations with Mary,* p 58; Pius IV to Catherine de Medici, 1st June; cf Borromeo to d'Este, 3rd & 28th Jan, 15th Mar, 31st May; to Trent legates, 27th May; to Bishop of Cariati, 15th Feb. 1563: tr. *CSP Rome I,* Nos 149, 171; 135, 139, 148, 168; 167, 213 (origs PRO 31/9/69, pp 193; 553, 559, 562, 571/2; 290/1, 526).

entourage of the French Legate, Cardinal d'Este, might slip across; or Commendone, the Nuncio in northern Germany, might sail with Eric XIV of Sweden on his (chimerical) wooing expedition.[141]

Hope sprang eternal in Catholic breasts, assisted by continued misleading statements from England. Even in the summer of 1562, Cardinal d'Este was still optimistic, and Bishop Santa Croce, now Nuncio in France, hoped "that the affairs of England will turn out well, for the Queen has nearly decided to send to the Council". Paul de Foix, French ambassador in England, had also "heard that the Queen of England has decided to send to the Council of Trent, but I do not know under what conditions".[142] The Spanish Ambassador in France recognised the prevalence of these reports there; but regarded De Foix as "a very great heretic", who might therefore be seeking deliberately to mislead.[143] If true, it would have been very convenient for France, as serving to detach Elizabeth from the Huguenots; as

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[141] Borromeo to Gualterio, 6th June 1561: *ANG XIV,* pp 344; Commendone to Borromeo, 1st Sept: F Gioanni, "Lettere nella Nunziatura di Germania del Cardinale Commendone", in *Miscellanea di Storia Italiana* 6 (Turin 1865), pp 231/2 (latter *CSP Rome I,* No 99).

[142] D'Este to Borromeo, 6th April 1562: PRO 31/9/69 (*CSP Rome I,* No 153); Santa Croce to same, 31st Mar: quoted by Straukamp, "Anglo-Spanish Relations 1559/63", p 304; cf Bishop Delfino to Borromeo, 25th May: 31/9/69, pp 286/7 (*CSP,* No 166); De Foix to Catherine de Medici, 6th June, in PRO 31/3/25; cf Marc-Antonio Barbaro (in Paris), 16th April: *CSP Ven. VII,* No 283. De Quadra had done his best to dispel this impression - to Chantonnay, 23rd Nov. 1561: *Negociaciones con Francia,* III. 143. He could not stop wishful thinking.

[143] Chantonnay to Philip, 18th April 1562; cf 14th June, 3rd & 27th Aug: *Negociaciones con Francia,* III. 501, IV. 124/5, 224, 291.

Trent resumed, the French Crown's representative there, De Lansac, continued to claim that Elizabeth was on the point of sending (and possibly the German Lutherans also).[144]

In fact, Elizabeth's government was increasingly retreating from its earlier professions, demanding "a generall and free Counsell... by consent of all Chr[ist]ian prynces wt.out admitty[n]g of th[a]t supreme authorite which the Pope claymeth to have", without admitting the earlier Tridentine decrees, and indeed with judgement in general according to Scripture rather than canon law - demands very similar to the German Lutherans'.[145] A Privy Council committee (quite conservative in composition) concluded in March 1562 that "it cold not be expedient for this realme to send to the Counsell, at the lest not to send in any other sort than the pryncees Protestantes of Germanie"; the Diet of Naumburg had already decided the previous year that this would be in no sort at all. In case of repercussions, the committee again advocated forming "a league and confederacy betwixt the Protesta[n]ts."[146]

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[144] Bishop of Cavorli to Duke of Parma; Trent legates to Cardinal Borromeo, 21st May 1562: PRO 31/9/69, pp 269/70, 393 (*CSP Rome I,* Nos 163/4); cf Bayne, *Anglo-Roman Relations,* pp 148/58.

[145] Canonical treatise, 2nd June 1559: PRO SP 12/4/41; instructions for Mundt, 30th Dec. 1560; instructions for Bedford, 20th Jan. 1561; cf Bedford to Elizabeth, 12th Feb: SP 70/21, f 109r; 22, ff 90/1, 97r; 23, ff 69 (*CSP For. V,* Nos 827, 898; 988); Shers to Cecil, 8th Mar; Elizabeth to Throckmorton, 6th May: SP 70/24, f 21r; 26, ff 47/8 (*CSP For. VI,* Nos 21, 180).

[146] Cecil to Throckmorton, 24th March 1562: Bayne, *Anglo-Roman Relations,* App. 42, pp 287/8. Arundel, Mason, Petre and Pembroke, besides Cecil and Bacon, agreed on this.

Protestant paranoia about Trent had a basis in fact in that it was while the Council was actually sitting that there came, at the initiative of the English Catholic exiles of Louvain, Elizabeth's nearest approach to a papal sentence of deposition before 1570. It does not appear to have been a French initiative, though, as in 1559/60, Spain tried to convince her that this was the case.[147] The French in fact sought a blanket ban on the excommunication of Protestant potentates, though they had difficulty in defending Jeanne d'Albret Queen of Navarre, because Spanish interests were in this instance inimical (Spain having competing claims to her lands and title). She was condemned for heresy, and given six months' notice of her deprivation of her residual lands and claims. The French protested: "This behaviour of the Pope has been found strange and scarcely tolerable; she being the only Princess in all Christendom against whom he has pronounced, never having dared to do the same against the Protestants or other Princes - it appears that this has only been done to cause trouble."[148] They managed to get further proceedings suspended; even this understudy for Elizabeth had

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[147] Meyer (*England & the Catholic Church,* p 53) believing that it was, perhaps followed the unreliable Bertano. The French government, as usual, blamed the Cardinal of Lorraine - Catherine de Medici to St. Sulpice, 24th Aug. 1563: *Ambassade en Espagne de St. Sulpice 1562/6,* ed. E Cabié (Albi 1903), p 149.

[148] Lansac's instructions, Jan. 1564: Cabié, *Ambassade en Espagne,* p 224. Cf L Crété, *Coligny* (Paris 1985), pp 268/9; N Roelker, *Jeanne d'Albret Queen of Navarre 1528/72* (Cambridge, Mass, 1968), pp 216/23, for Jeanne's response to threats from Philip II - "If he threatens me because I am his neighbour, why does he not do the same to the Queen of England ?" The charges included conspiracy with Elizabeth against French Catholics - *Ann. Eccl.* 1563, no 133.

proved a target not quite easy enough.

Also, as in 1559/60, there was a sinister coincidence of Roman developments with a complex *imbroglio* involving England, France and Spain - this time created by Elizabeth's intervention in the 1562/3 French War of Religion. She was however a lesser component in the French government's overall problem than she had been in 1560; which was in any case brought more rapidly under control. Philip continued to believe that "as regards the Queen of England, the time requires more temporising and dissimulation than might be ideal".[149] Even according to English reports, he had agreed to help against the Huguenots, but returned "a very colde answeare" when asked to help against England also; this would be "to the destructione of these Lowe Countres of his hollye".[150] Catherine de Medici confided to her Ambassador in Spain that she had "little hope... of having help from that quarter in matters concerning England".[151] Her requests were

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[149] Philip II to Margaret of Parma, 17th July 1562: *Correspondance de Marguerite de Parme avec Philippe II,* No 176. The Netherlands nobility, partly as in 1560 from fear of the reaction of the Protestant League in Germany, partly from unwillingness to provide resouces for this cause, in fact blocked the sending of troops even to fight the Huguenots, let alone the English, so Philip's eventual military contribution had to come from France's more distant southern frontier - Philip to Chantonnay, 1st Sept. & 8th Oct: *Negociaciones con Francia,* IV. 309/10, 334/5.

[150] Middlemore to Cecil, 17th May 1563; John Conyers to same, 20th May: PRO SP 70/57, ff 9v, 56r (*CSP For. VIII,* Nos 753, 774). Cf St. Sulpice to Lansac (in Rome), 15th Dec. 1562: Cabié, *Ambassade en Espagne,* p 103.

[151] Catherine to St. Sulpice, Dec. 1562: *Lettres de Cathérine de Médicis, CDIF,* edd. H de la Ferrière & B de Puchesse (Paris 1830-1909), I. 451. The Ambassador seemed to consider his country lucky that Spain had not joined England against her - St. Sulpice to Catherine, 7th Oct. 1564: Cabié, *Ambassade en Espagne,* p 305.

consistently met with dissertations on the ancient Anglo-Flemish friendship.[152] Spain professed to accept Elizabeth's re-definition of her objectives in seizing Le Havre from intervention in the religious war to enforcing the restoration of Calais; and, far from insisting on unconditional withdrawal, at one point - in fact, after the English had surrendered the town - offered to hold Le Havre themselves as security for this purpose.[153] Nonetheless, there were talk at Rome of Philip and Elizabeth going to war.[154]

At Trent, there were various opinions as to whether the middle or the end of the Council was the more appropriate time for the anathematisation of heretical princes. Indeed, there was a feeling that heretics *must* be condemned when the Council closed. Alava considered this in late 1563 and feared lest "the {German} Protestant Princes be angered and provoked to arms, it stir strife in the Empire - which now enjoys peace and tranquillity in Germany - and the Queen of England and the Swiss princes {*sic*} conspire with them"; he therefore preferred an indefinite recess to a formal closure of the Council.[155]

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[152] Philip to Chantonnay, 1st Sept, 8th Oct. & 10th Nov. 1562; reply, 29th Nov: *Negociaciones con Francia,* IV. 308, 336, 379, 418; St. Sulpice to Charles IX, 12th Nov: Cabié, *Ambassade en Espagne,* pp 92/3.

[153] St. Sulpice to Catherine, 27th Aug. 1563; cf 12th Nov. & 17th Dec. 1562: Cabié, *Ambassade en Espagne,* pp 151; 94, 103. Cf Smith to Elizabeth, 12th Mar. 1563: Forbes, *Full View,* II. 356/9 (*CSP For. VIII,* No 437); Chantonnay to Philip, 24th Sept. & 26th Oct. 1562: *Negociaciones con Francia,* IV. 322/3, 354.

[154] Newsletter, 26th Mar. 1563: *Pio IV y Felipe II,* edd. Rámirez de Arellano & Rayon, pp 5-6; cf Marc-Antonio Barbaro (Venetian Ambassador in France), 29th Aug. 1562: *CSP Ven. VII,* No 293.

The Louvainist deposition proposal was one that had shifted from foundation on her illegitimacy, with Franco-Scottish support, to foundation on her heresy (or at least schism), with what might seem a potential greater versatility of appeal to Catholic powers. It had however some unfortunate weaknesses. It wanted an immediate excommunication, "although the execution of that excommunication could be deferred to some opportune time to be designated by the Supreme Pontiff *or by his successors* (!)". This was due to an implicit recognition that the only thing opportune about the present time was that a General Council was in session; which accounted for the re-separation of excommunication and deposition. "It is of greater importance that the Queen be excommunicated than that she be deposed, that the people be absolved from their obedience and that holy war be declared against the Queen; for we cannot treat of these matters unless secular princes are willing". The proposed excommunication would however have had the effect (as the actual one in 1570 did) of discouraging Catholic semi-conformity with the Church of England, a condemnation of which the Louvainists did obtain from Trent.

Danger from this action to English co-religionists who

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155 "... Ne principes Protestantes irritabuntur et ad arma provocabuntur, Imperium - quod nunc est in Germania pacatum et tranquillum - bello flagrabit, et conjurabunt cum illis Regina Angliae et Helveticarum Principes" - PRO 31/9/69, pp 103/6; cf Cardinal Borromeo to Trent legates, 2nd June 1563: *Ibid,* p 337 (latter is *CSP Rome I,* No 240).

had not fled abroad, on the other hand, was dismissed with airy alliteration - General Councils were above "private, politic and particular considerations". The objection that Elizabeth was only one among a number of schismatic princes was countered by saying that only she claimed "the title of Supremacy of the Church" (a slightly ambiguous formulation, tending however to confirm the myth about her claiming the Supreme Headship), and that the Oath of Supremacy was a peculiar iniquity.[156]

A supporting proposal (for restricted circulation) descended to "private, politic and particular considerations" by claiming that if a sentence "in the cause of religion only" was believed to be so popular, one upholding the rights of the true heir Mary would be even more so. This proposal unfortunately played into Habsburg hands by advocating as a precondition that Mary marry the Archduke Charles; since the Infante Carlos being much less popular, more foreign force would be required in his case.

Both Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs would have no truck with either proposal. "It was decided in the Council not to excommunicate your Queen... fearing inconvenience by reason of her relations with many princes."[157] Pius stressed that the

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[156] This, and the next document referred to, are in FB von Bucholtz, *Geschichte der Regierung Ferdinand des Ersten,* IX (Vienna 1838), pp 700/2.

[157] "Nel detto Concilio s'era rissoluto di non scom[m]unicare... la ser[e]n[issim]a Regina vostra... dubitando di quales inconveniente per l'intelligenza che sua M[aes]tà tiene con molte Prencipe" - advices sent to Shers (English agent at Venice), 15th Aug. 1563; cf Bertano to Antonio Bruschetto (?), 13th Nov: PRO SP 70/62, f 119r; 65, f 55r (*CSP For. VIII,* Nos 1146, 1400).

Emperor's opinion had influenced him more than those of "a host of others".[158] Philip II himself had reacted too slowly to affect the decision so much, but his ministers continued professedly to hope for results by negotiation with England. Cardinal Granvelle advised the Council that, as Philip "is ever anxiously pondering some method of bringing that kingdom back into a better way, it may be that such a decision on the part of His Holiness, unknown to the King, would frustrate some design of the King; though what it is, remote as I am from him, I cannot say".[159] Philip considered his inability to reply in time providential; though the proposal itself entailed "very great inconveniences", over-obvious obstruction of it would not suit his public image. "Both to assist or resist it would entail inconveniences, especially if our name and authority were involved."[160]

Granvelle's extraordinary demand for *carte blanche* for Philip with no obvious obligation to report progress was successful, with the aid of the Emperor, who dreaded the reaction of his own Protestants (believers as they were in the existence

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[158] Borromeo to Trent legates, 6th July 1563; cf to same, 10th July; to Delfino, 10th July; Delfino to Morone, 17th June: tr. *CSP Rome I,* Nos 252, 255, 254, 244 (origs Meyer, *England & the Catholic Church,* Apps 8, 10; pp 473/4; *NBD 1559/72,* III. 363; Bayne, *Anglo-Roman Relations,* App. 50, p 298); Roman newsletter, 16th July: *Pio IV y Felipe II,* edd. Rámirez de Arellano & Rayon, p 32.

[159] Granvelle to Trent legates, 27th June 1563: tr. *CSP Rome I,* No 248 (orig. *Correspondance de Granvelle,* ed. Poullet, I. 553); cf same to Gonzalo Perez (Spanish Secretary of State), 27th June: *Papiers d'État de Granvelle,* ed. Weiss, VII. 111; Philip to Vargas, 9th June, quoted Bayne, *Anglo-Roman Relations,* p 182; Morone to Borromeo, 7th July, & Borromeo to legates, 17th July: Meyer, *England & the Catholic Church,* Apps 9, 11; pp 473/4 (*CSP,* Nos 253, 259).

[160] Philip to Luna, 8th Aug. & 22nd Sept. 1563: *CDIE* 98, pp 481/2, 505.

of the Catholic League, which would attack them next) to aggression against England; and also still had hopes of annexing the country to his own family. He was, the Nuncio reported from Vienna, "persuaded that it is necessary to proceed with caution and not rashly to provoke... or drive them to desperation with anathemas..."[161] From the first, Ferdinand had warned that if the former Council of Trent, with its anathemas against Protestant doctrines, were "resumed, wars will break out in Germany and in England".[162] Deposition proposals would be even worse. The Pope yielded to this pressure, even if two years later he was regretting it, and grumbling in consistory that Catholic princes had taken no action at all, when his restraint had been on the understanding they would.[163]

Even a suggestion that Catholic powers should threaten to break off diplomatic relations with Elizabeth unless she released the Catholic bishops she had imprisoned, bore no fruit.[164] Besides the difficulty of gathering the lay Catholic support necessary to act effectively against Elizabeth, the fear of doing the English faithful more harm than good was a powerful

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[161] Delfino to Trent legates, 10th Aug. 1562; cf same to Borromeo, 25th May; also Trent legates to same, 28th June 1563: tr. *CSP Rome I,* Nos 184, 166, 249 (origs *NBD 1559/72,* III. 105/6, 56/7; PRO 31/9/69, p 301).

[162] Ferdinand to Philip, 27th June 1560: *CDIE* 2, p 560; cf to Arco (his Ambassador in Rome), 31st Oct. & 14th Nov: copies in *Negociaciones con Francia,* I. 446/8, 476/8.

[163] Arco to Maximilian II, 19th May 1565: *NBD 1559/72,* IV. 368.

[164] Imperial envoys & papal legates at Trent to Ferdinand I, 6th April 1563: Bayne, *Anglo-Roman Relations,* Apps 51/2, pp 299-301.

disincentive to extremity. Another address to Pius IV in 1563 recommended that he excommunicate Elizabeth and orchestrate a Franco-Spanish invasion, on the grounds that she "never ceases to slaughter Catholics... and gives all Christian Princes a devilish example to take the title of Primacy and of Pope in their kingdoms". Since the second count was exaggerated and the first completely untrue, the argument rather fell down.[165]

An ingratiating curialist, Gurone Bertano, warned "there is no lack of accursed men to counsel the Pope at the end of the Council to declare the Queen of England ... lapsed *ab omni iure* to her kingdom, for being disobedient to the Council and the Faith, and claim that if this is done, the kingdom's Catholics will rise." Bertano claimed to have got the proposals of this "diabolical discourse written by a sycophant of the French" disregarded (at least while the Council was still sitting). Bertano was not certain that papal quiescence could be indefinitely guaranteed however, and advised Cecil to send to Trent.[166]

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165 "...Non cessa mai d'amazzar huomini Catholici... con mostrar la via diabolica a tutti i Prencipi Christiani di pigliar il nome di Primario et di Papa ne'suoi Regni" - "Discorso a S[ua] S[anti]tà", May 1563: PRO SP 70/57, f 42 (*CSP For. VIII,* No 767). The author is anonymous - he appears to be a subject of Philip II, claims intimacy with the Emperor and with Cardinal Borromeo, and is particularly concerned with the affairs of Tuscany. Bertano however (see next n) alleged it was "fatto per gratificarsi con Francesi".

166 "Non mancano huomini maledici, i quali consegliano il Papa nel finire del Concilio che faccia a dichiarare la Regina d'Inghilterra esser decaduta ab omni jure del Regno per essere stata disubidiente al Concilio et alla Relligione, et soggiongono che se ciò si fara, i Catholici del Regno... si sullevariano" - Bertano to Bruschetto, 5th Sept. 1563 & 22nd Jan. 1564; to Cecil, 19th Sept. 1564 & 18th Nov. 1563:

Whatever the "Discorso"'s author claimed, a more accurate writer reported that "the Pope myendid som processe against the Quene's Ma[jes]tie; but for certain cawses, & sp[ec]ially because Hir Highnes had as yet put to death none of his complices & apostles, the busshops who refuseth to acknowledge Hir Ma[jes]tie for the supreame gov[er]nor of the Churche of England, he did surcease for a tyme." Granvelle warned that Catholic extremity might end this moderation, and "throw her into a rage".[167] The enactment of the death penalty for two refusals of the Oath of Supremacy provoked a major scare about the prisoners' safety (which would indeed have been imperilled, had Elizabeth permitted second proffers of the Oath); both Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs made active representations in favour of clemency. Excommunication of Elizabeth, the Emperor warned Pope and Council, "would mean the total ruin... of what little religion yet remains in that kingdom, and the certain death of those poor bishops".[168]

PRO SP 70/63, ff 20/3; 67, f 133r; 74, f 85v; 65, f 57 (*CSP For. VIII,* Nos 1200, 1407; *IX,* Nos 77, 683); cf Bayne, *Anglo-Roman Relations,* pp 209/10.

[167] French intelligence, 26th Nov. 1563: PRO SP 70/66, f 3r (*CSP For. VIII,* No 1445); Granvelle to Trent legates, 27th June: tr. *CSP Rome I,* No 248 (orig. *Correspondance de Granvelle,* ed. Poullet, I. 553). Cf, earlier, "Sopra li negotii d'Inghilterra": "*non obstante* la sua perversa religione, non ha... voluto usare severità alcuna contra la persona di quei... li quali non hanno voluto fargli il giuramento" (Meyer, *England & the Catholic Church,* App. 1, p 465; *CSP,* No 27)

[168] Trent legates to Cardinal Borromeo, 28th June 1563; cf Bishop Foscarari of Modena to Cardinal Morone, 1st Feb; Granvelle to Cardinal Gonzaga, 7th Feb: tr. *CSP Rome I,* Nos 249; 210/1 (origs Meyer, *England & the Catholic Church,* App. 6, p 472; PRO 31/9/69, pp 305; 267); Delfino to legates, 17th June; to Cardinal Moroni, 14th April: *NBD 1559/72,* III. 351, 264 (latter *CSP,* No 226);

The position of the imprisoned bishops was indeed crucial. Their welfare had been a more acceptable explanation than Spanish pressure for Parpaglia's recall; he said himself it had been because his mission seemed "rather prejudicial than conducive to their liberation". The same argument had been employed in Martinengo's case, even though the prisoners wrote to Rome begging that justice should not be compromised on their account (their letters anyway arrived too late to affect the issue).[169] In some ways, it would have been easier had they been martyred. Some lobbyists however claimed that in effect they *were* being, since "they are sickening and dying every day in prison"; therefore the argument of restraint on the prisoners' behalf was irrelevant. Nonetheless, one cold-bloodedly continued that "just punishment ought not to be withheld because of some particular fear or other", and "there is no doubt that it is of great benefit for the whole Church for a few men to die for Christ".[170]

Ferdinand I to Elizabeth,12th April; Philip II to same, 15th June; Elizabeth to Ferdinand, 3rd Nov: Bayne, *Anglo-Roman Relations,* Apps 53/5, pp 302/5.

[169] Parpaglia to Cardinal Morone, 13th Oct. 1560; Maurice Clynog to same, Nov. 1561: Bayne, *Anglo-Roman Relations,* Apps 21, 37/8, pp 258, 276/80 (*CSP Rome I,* Nos 63, 127 though latter brief note).

[170] "Rimedii per le cose d'Inghilterra": in M Creighton, "The Excommunication of Queen Elizabeth", *EHR* 7 (1892), pp 82/3. It surely does not belong with the documents of 1579 with which it is grouped there. The PRO transcriber dates it "1569 ?"; it seems far more likely to belong to about 1562, since it insists that "Angli *in Concilio Oecumenico* declarari debeant absoluti ab Elizabethae obedientia, et... ipsa debeat excommunicari"; and it claims that she had no legal power to execute the Catholic bishops, which was not so after 1563 (and was technically not so before, if they persistently affirmed papal supremacy). The argument on martyrdom by imprisonment was also used by Nicholas Sanders, who wrote an English Catholic

Even after Trent, Rome did not despair of negotiation. Cecil's later strictures on Italian travel may have been reinforced by the tendency of curialists to waylay the sons of Privy Counsellors. Thomas Sackville in 1564 was the messenger for a potentially generous offer, in the case of reunion, to "confirm whatever measures the Queen's Majesty, Parliament and the community of the realm consider most necessary for the peaceful establishment of the Crown, and seem pious and just". This seemed to assume however that Henry VIII's divorce was the only real problem, and that an offer of legitimisation would satisfy Elizabeth.[171] Desultory negotiations through Bertano also offered the prospect of a further dispensation, besides that given to Mary, for the retention of expropriated ecclesiastical property. The Spanish however attacked this, which would "be more to support their heresies than to reconcile that kingdom".[172]

As for the advancement of the Stewart claim, however, Philip's standing instructions for his Tridentine representative on the vexed question of diplomatic precedence presumably applied

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martyrology about the end of 1561, but awkwardly lacked actual executions: "De iis quae alii episcopi et clericis in Anglia pro fide gesta sunt": PRO 31/9/41, pp 213/75 (*CSP Rome I,* No 131).

[171] Proposal of 3rd May 1564: PRO 31/9/41, pp 112/4; cf Bayne, *Anglo-Roman Relations,* pp 205/8. The equivocal inducement of papal legitimisation had also been implied in the brief sent with Martinengo (*Ibid,* App. 30, p 271; 4th Mar. 1561). Cf Silva to Philip, 4th Nov. 1564: *CDIE* 89 p 53 (*CSP Sp. I,* No 273); Sir Edward Warner to Cecil, 10th Aug. 1565: KL IV. 232.

[172] Requesens to Philip, 30th April 1564: *Pio IV y Felipe II,* edd. Ramirez de Arelano & Rayon, p 339; cf same to same, 2nd June; Bertano to Requesens, 26th Jan. 1565: Bayne, *Anglo-Roman Relations,* Apps 59, 62, pp 309/10, 313/6.

with even greater force: "were it sought in the Council to advance or consider anything concerning any difference or pretension between princes.. this, being an improper and unsuitable thing to consider there, it would give rise to discords, disturbances and scandals, *and* be ineffectual."[173] Moreover, "we must avoid any military action for any such, however minor, would be sufficient to disturb the Council of which Christendom has such need."[174] Anyway, the chequered marital history of Catholic monarchies did not necessarily dictate such a strictly canonical attitude as the Papacy's. An envoy of Philip, who feared pressure to marry his deceased wife's sister Marguerite de Valois, lectured Pius V on "the inconveniences that followed from King Henry of England's marriage to two sisters" (a curious misstatement of the case, unless referring to Anne Boleyn rather than Catherine of Aragon), and suggested there might be something in the view that some of Pius' "predecessors had claimed for themselves more power {to dispense} in this case than God had granted them".[175]

Pius IV hoped for Mary Stewart's marriage to "some Catholic and powerful prince, and the consequent settlement of the succession to the throne of England, which of right comes to

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[173] Luna's instructions, Nov. 1562: *CDIE* 2, p 573; cf Juan de Ayala's, 13th Mar. 1561: Doellinger, *Dokumente zur Geschichte Karls V, Philipps II & ihrer Zeit,* p 358.

[174] Luna to Philip, 11th Mar. 1561; cf 19th Jan. 1562: *CDIE* 98, pp 201, 275.

[175] Requesens to Philip, 7th Nov. 1568: Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* II. 501.

the Queen of Scots *after* the death of Queen Elizabeth". Though this proposal superficially carried no immediate threat to Elizabeth's position, there followed a declaration of intent to support Mary's claim "all such means as shall be deemed necessary to the end that the Catholic religion may be re-established in that kingdom", and an exhortation to pursue "such an enterprise", since "His Holiness is advised from many quarters that the greater part of the nobles of that island mislike the match which the Queen designs to make with my Lord Robert Dudley... It is also to be feared that the Catholic peoples, who are quite ready enough to temporise, would grow lukewarm in religion, more especially if there should be issue of the marriage produces sons, and the succession to the Crown should be established in the present heretical Queen." There was a definite implication of positive action to preclude this. All was however contingent on a Habsburg marriage and was referred to the judgement of Philip II (though Pius created a further difficulty by wanting French agreement too); thus nothing came of it. The German Nuncio Commendone had earlier expounded the advantages of marrying Mary to a prince who could, "should occasion serve", take England and Ireland by virtue of a feudal grant from Rome; but by whom (and this might be all that was possible) there would "at least be a curb set upon Queen Elizabeth that she should no longer coerce her people into heresy".[176]

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[176] Borromeo to Cardinal d'Este, Mar. 1562; Commendone to Borromeo, 5th Nov.

Mary's eventual marriage to Darnley was only made possible by the failure of foreign marriage options. Philip II had entertained negotiations for her marriage to his son Carlos, then attempted to transfer them to the less (politically) eligible Archduke Charles - who was, however, still intended, if possible, for Elizabeth. Therefore his policy in the matter was marked by more than usual dilatoriness and vagueness, as he admitted himself.[177] But Catherine de Medici was consistently alarmed about the Carlos option more even than the English (indeed she was the ultimate source for most of the Carlos scares).[178]

The Welsh Catholic exile Maurice Clynog in 1561 relied for the reconquest of England on "Philip, the most earnest defender of the Catholic Faith, nearest to us, more formidable to heretics and more welcome to Catholics than any other". Alas, his proposals relied on marrying Don Carlos, whom he described as a youth of great promise (be that as it may, France had not even such a candidate to offer), to Mary Stewart: "if the Catholic King

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1561: tr. *CSP Rome I,* Nos 149, 102 (origs Pollen, *Papal Negotiations with Mary,* pp 58, 63/9); cf Cardinal Morone, "Pro Anglis", 21st Jan. 1561, & pro-Stewart project attached: Bayne, *Anglo-Roman Relations,* Apps 35/6, pp 274/6 (also Pollen, *op. cit,* pp 31/2); cf pp 123/4.

[177] Philip to Silva, 6th Aug. 1564: *CDIE* 26, p 521 (*CSP Sp. I,* No 259).

[178] Catherine to Sebastien L'Aubespine, 3rd Mar. & 1st April 1561; Élisabeth de Valois to Catherine, & reply: Paris, *Négotiations... relatives au règne de François II,* pp 818/21, 844; 847, 862/3; *Lettres de Cathérine de Médicis,* I. 188/90, 597: to L'Aubespine, 21st April; to Élisabeth, May; Chantonnay to Philip, 12th & 13th Jan, 26th May: *Negociaciones con Francia,* II. 33/8, 230. Montmorency, if not Catherine herself, had been well enough disposed to the Austrian proposal, as excluding the Spanish (12th Jan).

takes this matter in hand seriously together with the Queen of Scots, to whom the kingdom rightly belongs, Elizabeth and all the heresiarchs will not be able to withstand them."[179]

The Count de Luna, Philip's ambassador to Vienna and then to Trent, suggested that since "it is held as certain that the English Queen cannot have children, that she is in ill health and that the Scottish [Queen] is heir presumptive to that kingdom", and since marrying into the Guise family could not be considered as welcome to the present French government (which, naturally, should be opposed whenever feasible), he should make greater efforts to arrange a Habsburg match for Mary.[180] But by 1564, Philip had decided that Carlos' "natural disposition" was such "that I should not derive from this marriage those advantages which I hoped to gain - namely the recovery of the kingdoms of Scotland and England to the Catholic Religion, for which alone I would expose myself to all that might result therefrom."[181]

The scheme had not anyway been pursued with great enthusiasm. Its agent suffered from distractions. One of De Quadra's more eccentric political judgements was credence in the stentorian intrigues and ill-founded self-advertisement of the Lennox family; though this equally illustrated the lengths to

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[179] Clynog to Morone, 6th Dec: PRO 31/9/41, pp 35/8 (*CSP Rome I,* No 127).

[180] Luna to Philip, 19th Jan. 1562: Doellinger, *Dokumente zur Geschichte Karls V, Philipps II & ihrer Zeit,* p 375.

[181] Philip to Granvelle, 6th Aug. 1564: Mignet, *Marie Stuart,* French edn: I. 159, English: I. 141.

which he would go to avoid Mary Stewart. Somehow he became convinced that not only would Lord Darnley "be universally accepted if the Queen were to die without issue, but... that at the first opportunity, even now, many Catholic lords {*señores;* not necessarily peers} would proclaim him King [with the adherence of all the Catholic provinces and people]".[182]

De Quadra concluded, in the last letters he wrote before his death (which also finally killed the negotiation conducted through him, since his replacement Guzmán de Silva took the better part of a year to reach London), that Philip intended "only to stop the French project" (the even vaguer hints that Charles IX might seek a dispensation to marry Mary) and "to please the English, if necessary at the expense of the Scots".[183] Such was the counsel of the Duke of Alba, when Philip consulted him in uncertainty as to whether to proceed after De Quadra's death.[184] The French project was itself only a spoiling device to block Spanish proposals, the French like the Austrians always retaining Elizabeth as a preferable option. Mary would (and did) - so long as

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[182] De Quadra to Margaret of Parma, 15th Mar. 1560; cf to same, 4th July 1562; to Philip, 7th Mar. 1560 & 14th Jan. 1562: tr. *CSP Sp. I,* Nos 93 (lacking passage in square brackets); 173, 92, 149 (origs KL II. 265; BL Add. MS 28173A, ff 510/1; *CDIE* 87, p 286; BL Add. MS 26056A, ff 164/5).

[183] De Quadra to Alba and to De Luna, 17th July 1563: *CDIE* 26, pp 453/8.

[184] Philip to Alba, 12th Oct. 1563; reply, 21st Oct: *Papiers d'État de Granvelle,* ed. Weiss, VII. 225/6, 235/42, & *CDIE* 26, pp 485/6, 491/6. When the Scots sought to revive the negotiation *via* Paris, Philip instructed his Ambassador to reply "with generalities, as if devised by yourself"; the latter still complained however that he was being pestered on the subject - Philip to Alava, 15th Oct. 1564; reply, 23rd Jan. 1565: *Negociaciones con Francia,* VI. 447, VII. 85.

neither side went too far - remain in the dilemma of Birenus' ass and safely unmatched in the high-stakes matrimonial game. She was reduced to an internationally insignificant alternative.

It was true that one Roman intelligencer did consider after the Darnley marriage "that by this means the Queen of England could be given the punishment she deserves, the Earl being a particular enemy of hers, or at least the relief of English Catholics from their slavery be facilitated." Pius IV however, though he saw it as an opportunity to secure a Catholic succession to Elizabeth, said nothing about using it to supplant her during her lifetime. He seemed to consider it as winning less support for Mary than the abortive foreign marriage projects favoured earlier.[185] The French interest in the Darnley match was mainly as a means to scare Elizabeth into marrying Charles IX.[186]

Philip II characteristically replied to representations from the Curia on Mary's behalf that this "is a business of such great difficulty and inconvenience that it must be deeply considered... to enter upon it without due consideration would be greatly to imperil its success." On Mary's English claims, he recommended that she act so that Elizabeth could not "think that the matter would be pursued during her lifetime", even if Mary's

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185 "...Che per questa strada si potria dar degno castigo alla Regina d'Inghilterra, alla quale il Conte è particolar inimico, o almeno facilitar la stradar di uscir i Catholici di servitù in quel regno" - Roman advertisement, 21st July 1565; Consistory report, 1st Sept: PRO 31/9/69, pp 388, 511 (*CSP Rome I*, Nos 328, 333).

186 Eg De Foix, 26th May 1565: Teulet, *Relations Politiques*, II. 202/4.

real intentions were otherwise. It is true that he did not sound altogether unsympathetic to such dissimulated intentions; but his main aim, as always, was to discourage immediate confrontation, by whatever argument seemed suitable. All he was willing to offer to "favour and support this most Christian and virtuous Princess" was some money; and that only if it came ostensibly from the Pope, so that Elizabeth would not take offence.[187]

It was to take a long time for the Papacy to conclude that, irrespective of the possibilities for enforcement, "first what can be done, should be; that is, her subjects be absolved {from their allegiance} and the Queen excommunicated".[188] According to Granvelle, the Louvainists agitating at Trent in 1563 for Elizabeth's excommunication, "imagined that if this occurred, the faithful would rise against her, and it might be enforced whenever God pleased". Philip II however had notified the Pope earlier, on the occasion of Parpaglia's mission, that it could "result in great shame to His Holiness and the Holy See... if they {English Catholics} saw that this action was fruitless; if its execution did not follow immediately, it would discourage them entirely"; on the occasion of Martinengo's, that "if he declares her

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[187] Philip II to Cardinal Morone, 16th Oct. 1565: PRO 31/9/41, pp 65/9; also 31/9/69, pp 152/3; to Cardinal Pacheco, 18th Oct: Mignet, *Marie Stuart,* App. E, French edn: II. 485/6, English: II. 436/7 (latter *CSP Rome I,* No 348).

[188] "Id quam primum fiat quod potest, id est ut subditi absolvantur et Regina excommunicetur" - "Rimedii per le cose d'Inghilterra": in M Creighton, "The Excommunication of Queen Elizabeth", *EHR* 7 (1892), p 82. This document has the interesting argument that God's patience (in not striking Elizabeth dead) can only be a hint to the faithful "quod eadem vellet manifeste in hoc seculo puniri", by them.

[schismatic] and proceeds to deprivation and it is not executed, it would be discreditable, infuriate her, make her harder and more desperate without result." He was himself definitely *not* prepared to execute such a sentence. His uncle Ferdinand agreed: "How absurd and unworthy of a General Council it would be to frame a decree that could not be executed, needs no proof."[189] Pius IV at any rate followed the policy of attempting to assure himself of the support necessary for likely success in any confrontation before he embarked upon it. The previous history of the papal deposing power strongly suggested that the omission of this precaution was conducive to pontifical humiliation.

Pius V and Philip II: Irresistible Force and Immoveable Object

While Philip II may have been a devoted son of the Catholic Church, he was continually embroiled in disputes with the Papacy, whether about the vexed question of the relative precedence of Spain's and France's ambassadors at Rome; the two countries' rights to Navarre; the Spanish Inquisition's jurisdiction

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[189] Cardinal Granvelle to Trent legates, 27th June 1563: tr. *CSP Rome I,* No 248 (orig. *Correspondance de Granvelle,* ed. Poullet, I. 553); Philip II to Margaret of Parma, 6th June 1560, & copy of letter to Vargas, 1st June: *Correspondance de Marguerite de Parme avec Philippe II,* No 48; Philip II to Vargas, 16th July 1561: Mignet, *Marie Stuart,* App. B, French edn: II. 467/9, English: II. 421/2; Ferdinand quoted by Meyer, *England & the Catholic Church,* p 53; cf Granvelle to Gonzalo Perez , 27th June 1563: *Papiers d'État de Granvelle,* ed. Weiss, VII. 111.

over Archbishop Carranza of Toledo; or the grant of the profitable *cruzada* for fighting the Turk (Philip's overriding military commitment). Even under Pius IV, these sufficed to disqualify him as an obvious champion of the Pope, if the latter *had* been inclined to start an anti-Protestant Crusade.[190] Under Pius V, more inclined that way - though still considering defence against the Turk as his first priority - but also more pugnacious even with Catholic monarchs, relations deteriorated considerably.

Pius V was elected partly because this was understood to be Philip II's wish (though he had not got around to saying so). Certainly he wanted somebody who would not flirt with the possibility of clerical marriage, as Pius IV had. Cardinal Francisco Pacheco congratulated Philip on the election of "a vassal and servant of Your Majesty" (another Milanese).[191] Philip however soon found the Pope very troublesome. The latter had no inhibition about offending even his friends, and accused Philip of acting like Henry VIII or the German Lutherans in his attitude to his national Church. Pius' nephew and Cardinal-Secretary, Bonelli, claimed that in the Two Sicilies and Milan, "ecclesiastical persons are treated even worse than in Germany", and that the

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[190] Eg Shers to Cecil, 19th April 1561: "the Kyng of Spayne (albeyt not for religion's sake) beryth agenst the Pope" - PRO SP 70/25, f 66r (*CSP For. VI,* No 121); William Phayre to same, 12th May 1565: "every daye more & more yt growethe to lyght, the small & yll intelygence th[a]t ys betwyxt the Poope" and Philip; cf 6th Aug. - SP 70/78, f 43r; 79, f 104v (*CSP For. IX,* Nos 1168, 1363).

[191] Herre, *Papsttum und Papstwahl,* pp 107ff, 123/8.

hostility of those governments to ecclesiastical jurisdiction was "not much different from heresies condemned in several General Councils". The Spanish Inquisition, strangely enough, was more disobedient to Rome than anyone in France or Germany.[192] Attacking the latter in the Carranza case, the Pope threatened severe measures against the King who opposed his intervention - but Philip decided to give way, possibly in the hope of being granted the *cruzada*.[193] Pius revised the regular Lenten anathematisation of heretics, *In Coena Domini,* to extend the penalty to all secular officials impugning ecclesiastical jurisdiction; which quite clearly, for a start, rendered Philip's Neapolitan Viceroy, the Duke of Alcalà, *excommunicatus latae sententiae.*[194] Cardinal Borromeo began, initially independently but then with papal support, to bombard royal officials in his archdiocese of Milan with excommunications.

Pius V seemed to seek every opportunity to repudiate any suspicion of Spanish dominance, even to the point of seeking to ban bullfights. By late 1568, he was beginning to make sinister remarks about the conditions of vassalage for Naples.[195] Early

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[192] Cardinal Reomano to Castagna, 18th Mar. 1566; Requesens to Philip, 17th Oct; Bonelli to Castagna, 20th Dec. 1568 & Jan. 1569; Zúniga to Philip, 9th Aug. 1569: Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* I. 150, 366, II. 523, III. 20, 122/3.

[193] Pius V to Castagna, 3rd Aug. 1566; Castagna to Pius, 12th Aug; Requesens to Philip, 27th Dec: Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* I. 298, 303, 432.

[194] Bonelli to Castagna, 8th & 17th Jan. 1567: Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* II. 11-13, 26/7.

[195] Zúniga to Philip, 29th Oct. & 10th Dec. 1568, 24th Feb. 1569: Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* II. 497, 510/1; III. 43/4.

the following year, he threatened public excommunication of the Neapolitan government and a general interdict. Bonelli expressed the hope that "the wrath of God grow not any further against" Philip. Concurrently, a seizure of papal alum at Cadiz brought "under the excommunication contained in the bull *In Coena Domini,* not only the King's ministers, but also the King himself, if it was done with his consent".[196] By mid-1569, Pius was threatening to declare Naples escheated to the Holy See. Philip's ambassador apprehended such a quarrel "that Christendom be ruined" and, despite the claims of Granada and Flanders, suggested that more troops be sent to Italy, to induce a proper frame of mind in the Pope. He also complained that Philip was treated much more harshly than other princes; such as Charles IX were allowed to get away with "terrible things".[197] Pius' attitude to Philip (as well as to Elizabeth) was epitomised by his reaction to the news of seizure of Alba's payships - that it was a judgement on Philip for dissuading Mary from cutting Elizabeth's head off while she had the chance.[198] In the circumstances, it would have been surprising if Philip had evinced great interest in supporting Pius' fulminations against Elizabeth.

Nor were Pius V's relations with other possible actors in

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[196] Bonelli to Castagna, 10th Jan. & 28th May 1569: Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* III. 30, 85/7.

[197] Zúniga to Philip, 1st July & 14th Oct. 1569: Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* III. 98-100, 164/6.

[198] Zúniga to Philip, 1st Feb. 1569: Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* III. 36.

an anti-Elizabethan drama especially close. He got on best perhaps with the French government, once it had resumed the Religious Wars in 1567 (which however in themselves disqualified them from over-strenuous international activity); but Catholic conviction was not sufficiently established in Paris for relations to be exactly cordial. Papal pressure for rigour made Catherine de Medici "greatly afraid that this good Pope will end up troubling all Christendom by his actions".[199]

In view of the vagaries of Mary Stewart, Pius eventually refused "to have any further communication with her, unless... he shall see some better signs of her life and religion than he has witnessed in the past." "All the goodwill that the Pope had for the Queen of Scotland has disappeared." In 1568, he found difficulty in finding anything to choose between her and Elizabeth. This was confirmed by Zúniga early the following year, when Mary's envoy in Paris, Beaton, succeeded in inducing the Spanish Ambassador, Francisco de Alava, to suggest representations in her favour. However, by then, claims concerning Mary's supposed spiritual regeneration inspired by the experience of temporal affliction were beginning to bear more weight with the Pope.[200] Alava, like

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[199] To Duchess of Savoy, 1st Jan. 1571: *Lettres de Cathérine de Médicis*, edd. De la Ferrière & De Puchesse, IV. 22.

[200] Cardinal Bonelli (Pius V's Secretary of State) to Lauri (Nuncio in Savoy), 2nd July 1567: Pollen, *Papal Negotiations with Mary*, pp 396/7; cf cxxvii/xxx (*CSP Rome I*, No 467); Requesens to Philip, 31st May 1567; Bonelli to Castagna, 17th Aug. 1568; Zúniga to Philip, 1st Feb. 1569: Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica*, II. 122, 444, III. 37.

many of Philip's ambassadors, diverged somewhat from the official line. In France, he had acquired a view of the Protestant League as a better-organised and more immediately threatening body than Philip considered it to be.[201] He also became increasingly obnoxious to the French government, for his vehement warnings about its dubious religious position, and it eventually insisted on his recall.[202] He had however reservations about Beaton's claims on Mary's behalf, "that if the English Queen broke with the Scottish [Queen], that there would be in her own kingdom a war among her vassals which would make a noise in the world. Pressing him, to see if he could produce any particular, he would never say more than to promise me with heat and with French mannerisms" (ie bombast ?), that this was so.[203]

Philip's Ambassador reported that Pius was "a man with whom it is very difficult to negotiate, and greatly addicted to his own opinion". Indeed, "his opinion is that whoso appeals to human prudence and the considerations involved in affairs of state has been inspired by the Devil; and that in matters concerning God's service, he has only to act, shutting his eyes and stopping for no obstacle". After a year of the pontificate, he elaborated: "Your Majesty must accept that we have as Pope a holy man of fine life

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201 Eg Alava's views reported by Zúniga to Philip, 5th Nov. 1568: Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* II. 499.

202 *Lettres de Charles IX à M. de Fourquevaux,* ed. C Douais (Paris 1897), pp 340, 356/8, 363/4 (28th Feb, 2nd Aug. & 14th Oct. 1571); cf *Dépêches de Fourquevaux,* I. 228: 30th June 1567.

203 Alava to Philip, 24th July 1567: *Negociaciones con Francia,* IX. 402.

and example, but without any experience of business (except that of the Friary and the Inquisition) as it is treated here; and that he has no secretary or minister who can give proper instructions... But Your Majesty may be assured that what he does is not with injurious or ulterior motives, but is done with a holy zeal, without knowledge how to employ suitable measures, especially concerning princes as Your Majesty." This, in more obviously biting terms, was pretty much what Alba was to say on the occasion of the Bull against Elizabeth - which was indeed the ultimate demonstration of the oddities which made Pius the first Pope since the even more politically inept Celestine V to be fully canonised. A Venetian Ambassador agreed - Pius wanted "all princes to bring everything down to the spiritual rather than the temporal... having the opinion that his authority extends over all states and that he can command in almost everything."[204]

Pius V *does* seem to have desired the formation of a Catholic League in the sense feared by the Protestants, even if his prime purpose was anti-Turkish, and the anti-heretical aspect

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[204] Requesens to Philip, 1st May, 4th July & 27th Dec. 1566: Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* I. 212/3, 289, 432. The following year, Requesens was sounding the same note - Pius' proposal for a Holy League "springs from goodly zeal, if with lack of prudence"; his refusal to grant Philip the *cruzada* was done not "with malice, only with goodly zeal": 13th & 16th Sept. 1567: *Ibid,* II. 190/1, 201; cf to his successor Zúniga ("Dealing with business in the time of a holy Pope is as bad, or even worse than [doing so] in the time of those Popes who were devils"): *CDIE* 97, p 319. Paolo Tiepolo, 1569: quoted Prodi, *Papal Prince,* p 178. Cf Braudel, *Mediterranean World,* II. 1029 for a German opinion that Pius "was not of this world"; and the sooner he went to the next, the better.

of the League was generally consigned to a somewhat indefinite future.[205] The Spanish government's refusal to enter even an anti-Turkish League was initially on the pretext that "evil men" would convince the Protestants that it was directed against them, leading them to combine. Thus the proposal, though inspired by holy zeal, would in practice be "so prejudicial and dangerous to Christendom" as anything that could be imagined.[206] The relapse of France into religious war gave rise to intermittent proposals that Charles IX would join a league "against the heretics *and* against the Turks", if assured of effective support against the former - but nobody placed much credence in this possibility. There had been talk of this for years; and from the first, Philip II had refused to participate in projects that would at worst cause "uproar in Christendom" by alarming all Protestants; at best, constitute "an empty show" (moreover, he had no faith in French sincerity).[207] The Cardinal of Lorraine was a prime source of schemes instantly dismissed by Philip as tending "to do great harm and stir up humours very troublesome to Christendom".[208]

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205 Cf Girolamo Catena, *Vita del Gloriosissimo Papa Pio Quinto* (Rome 1582), p 45

206 Philip to Requesens, 16th Feb. 1567; cf same to same, 11th Jan. & 12th July; Castagna to Bonelli, 7th Jan: Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* II. 44; 15-16, 164; 3-4. Cf *Dépêches de Fourquevaux,* I. 290, 327: 13th Nov; 18th Feb. 1568.

207 Philip to Chantonnay,12th June 1561 & 30th Mar. 1562; cf 14th Aug. 1562; Chantonnay to Philip, 28th Feb: *Negociaciones con Francia,* I I. 255, III. 439; IV. 278, III. 390. The Spanish had long regarded both Catherine and Charles as severely contaminated with Protestantism - eg Chantonnay to Philip, 28th April, 11th & 19th May, 1st Aug. 1562: *Ibid,* III. 515/9, IV. 27, 34/5, 218.

208 Zúniga to Philip, 19th Mar. 1568; Philip to Zúniga, 12th Oct; cf reply, 23rd Nov: Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* II. 327, 480; 507/9.

The Protestant League could be as fearsome a spectre as the Catholic, and Philip's policy was devoted to avoiding any provocation of it - for instance, declining to give Alba's expedition to Flanders the character of a Catholic Crusade, despite papal pressure in that direction. For the Pope, Flanders was a priority nearly equal to the Turk; a matter in which "is involved the ruin or security of all Christian princes". English Protestantism was a minor problem in comparison; and Bonelli claimed that Elizabeth was too insecure and too tired of wasting money to intervene on the Continent again - thus abandoning the main argument for moving her up the target list.[209]

The commoner argument at this stage was that England could be recovered (possibly without positive action) by securing Flanders (and France, as they seemed to go together); not that the neutralisation of adjacent Protestant bases (England, or as was sometimes preferred later, France) was a prerequisite for the recovery of Flanders. The latter view was however beginning to become more influential at Philip's court, once the most influential exponent of the former view - the Duke of Alba - had departed on his ultimately unsuccessful attempt to address the problem from Flanders outward. The coalescence by the end of the

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209 Bonelli to Castagna, 6th Mar; cf Castagna to Bonelli, 17th Feb. 1567: Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* II. 52/7; 45/6. On the competing ideologies for Alba's expedition, see L van der Essen, "Croisade contre hérétiques ou guerre contre des rebelles ?", in *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique* 51 (1956), pp 55/8; cf *Dépêches de Fourquevaux,* I. 147: 9th Dec. 1566.

1560s of Espinosa (now Cardinal and President of the Council of State), the Council's Secretary Antonio Peréz, and the Duke of Feria as at least semi-attached members of the *Ebolista* faction enabled it to outweigh the residue of the *Toledana.*

Of these, Feria had the most interest in England. He had the reputation of an Anglophile, but this tendency seemed to manifest itself with regard only to his wife and her family; otherwise, rather the opposite was apparent. The English government believed that, when their fairly conservative Ambassador in Spain, Sir Thomas Chamberlain, had been "molested with the Inquisition" in 1560, it had been "by means of the Count of Feria".[210] According to Dr. Man, his expulsion in 1568 was due to Feria, now a Duke; and he claimed that it was useless to send any other Ambassador to Spain who was not prepared to conform to Feria's "humour". Feria was not necessarily an ally of the English Catholic nobility either. He had blamed the passage of the 1559 legislation on their leaders being "of small account", he abominated Church Papists - and during 1567 began to bombard with long-distance insults the Earl of Arundel, whom he understood to have slighted his brother-in-law. Feria's recipe from the beginning had been for unilateral Habsburg action to deal with England "sword in hand", or to get it "in their fist". He despised the Irish too as "a beggarly people", and had little interest in alliance with them.[211]

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[210] Cecil's "Diary", Nov. 1560: Murdin, *Burghley SP,* p 751.

Alba's expedition, in Rome's view, was "to remedy not only the religion of those, but also of neighbouring states"; and the Pope regretted Philip's failure to go to Flanders in person and "remedy what concerns the religion of France and England". Bonelli noted the "importance... to Italy, Spain, England, Scotland and the Low Countries of the kingdom of France being Catholic or heretical".[212] This last statement was part of a sudden papal initiative, reducing to specifics hitherto vague anti-Protestant proposals, to divert Alba to help the Duke of Savoy take Geneva, before going to Flanders. It was this that was Rome's favourite sideshow at the time; encountering naturally the standard Spanish reply that "the time is inopportune". "Flanders eclipses everything", Castagna wrote.[213] When an informal anti-Protestant agreement involving Philip, Pius and various Italian princes was reached briefly in 1568, it was defensive in nature, a scare having developed about a German march on Rome.[214] When

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[211] Dr. Man to Leicester, 18th Feb. 1567: HMC 70: *Pepys MSS,* p 97; cf JG Retamal-Favereau, "Anglo-Spanish Relations 1566/72" (Oxford DPhil thesis 1972) / *Diplomacia Anglo-Española durante la Contrariforma* (Santiago de Chile 1981), ch. 1.

[212] Requesens to Philip, 16th May & 29th Sept. 1567; Bonelli to Castagna, 29th April: Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* ll. 106, 218; 95/6. Cf F Goubau, *Epistolarum Pii V* (Antwerp 1640), pp 196/7, 304: to Cardinal de Bourbon, 1st Aug. 1569; to Philip II, 8th Mar. 1570.

[213] Castagna to Bonelli, 2nd May 1567; to Lauri, 23rd Sept; cf same to Bonelli, 15th & 30th May, 8th June & 18th Dec; Philip to Requesens, 12th July; Pius to Philip, 11th June: Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* ll. 100, 211; 101/2, 119/20, 130/1, 278; 166/7, 133.

[214] Zúniga to Alba, 10th April 1568: *CDIE* 97, p 427; to Philip, 7th April; Philip to Pius & to Zúniga, 2nd June: Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* ll. 337/41,

Pius attempted to extend this success, Philip told him that he completely lacked the resources to combat foreign as well as domestic heretics - certainly so long as the Pope refused to allow the Spanish Church to pay him the *cruzada,* when he was also having to fight the Turk. The *cruzada,* however, was a point on which the Pope was "so awkward" that he would not give way even to induce Philip to go to Flanders as he had long urged.[215]

The Holy League against the Turk was eventually accomplished, because it omitted the French (and also because Pius finally granted Philip the *cruzada*). The impossibility of any League combining France and Spain, such as the mythical anti-heretical League, was clear to those with eyes to see - like the Spanish Nuncio, Castagna, whose ciphered conclusion on the question was "that there will never be genuine trust between these two princes". The geopolitical consequences of either power invading England made that an even trickier issue; as Alba was to stress "how impossible it would be for Your Majesty {Philip} and the King of France to agree" on the joint operation proposed by Pius in 1569.[216]

Throughout the 1560s, Elizabeth's tendency to vacillation and the over-optimism of various parties combined to suggest

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374/81.

[215] Zúniga to Philip, 17th Aug: Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* II. 444.

[216] Castagna to Bonelli, 17th Feb. 1567; Zúniga to Philip, 13th June 1569: Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* II. 49, III. 91. Cf Braudel, *Mediterranean World,* II. 1096, quoting Alba to Alava, 11th July 1571: "The French would be happy to lose an eye so long as we lost one too."

that the return of England to Catholicism might possibly be accomplished by diplomatic means. Critical however was the Papacy's inability to enlist Spain as its right arm (France being effectively disabled), while Philip II languished in a virtual policy vacuum with regard to England. That in 1569 Elizabeth's behaviour over Alba's treasure-ships drove him (almost) to emerge from this state - and aroused expectations that he might do so definitively - was the first pre-condition for the pyrotechnics that ensued. The second was that in the same year, the English support for Mary Stewart's claims of which there had been so much made - but which had failed to carry universal conviction - actually produced practical (if ineffectual) manifestations (also the Pope's attitude towards Mary had softened somewhat). The third, and crucial one, was that Pius V should come to one of his hasty decisions. He was the only Catholic potentate who had shown much inclination to make any.

"A PAPER THUNDERBOLT": THE PRODIGIOUS BIRTH OF THE DEPOSITION BULL *REGNANS IN EXCELSIS*

"This terrible thunderbolt shot among us from Rome, in paper".[1]

"The Pope's curse may well be compared to Domitian's thunder; if a man give ear to the noise and crack, it seemeth a terrible thing; but if you consider the causes and effects thereof, it is a most vain ridicule".

Foxe, *Actes & Monumentes*[2]

"He maketh kinges and gives the crownes to such as serve him best,
Whereby he gets him trustie men still readie at his hest -
Who if they waxe unruly ones, or happen to rebell
He plucks them from their kingdome straite & casts them downe to Hell."

Barnaby Googe[3]

The surprisingly pacific nature hitherto of the relations of Elizabeth's government with the Catholic King of Spain, her great Catholic subjects and the Papacy was transformed (in that order) by successive crises, in the course of fifteen months. The seizure of the Duke of Alba's treasure ships, refugees from piracy and weather, in Dec. 1568 was a major blunder by the English government, explicable only by an assumption either that Spain's policy during the last decade demonstrated an indefinite capacity

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[1] Jewel's *View of a Seditious Bull*, in *Works*, PS, IV. 1152.

[2] Ed. Pratt, II. 99.

[3] *The Popish Kingdome or the Reigne of Antichrist*, STC 15011 (1570, facs. 1880 ed. RC Hope), f 4r; trn. of work by Thomas Kirchmeyer.

to swallow English affronts, or that established covert hostility on Spain's part made efforts to placate her otiose. There had indeed been enough doubts, even official, about Alba's future plans for his army to make it logical to deprive it of the sinews of war when an opportunity offered, with moreover a technical justification in that the money had not yet been transferred to Spanish ownership. Antagonism had been increased by the recent Spanish expulsion of the English Ambassador, John Man (news of John Hawkins' clash with the Spanish at San Juan de Ulloa, often mentioned as a motive, was not really prompt enough to affect the issue).[4] Man's offensive Protestantism had helped stimulate the replacement of Guzman de Silva by the harder-line Gueraud de Spes as Spanish Ambassador in England, an appointment that was to proliferate contention between the two countries.

Though the English initially blamed only De Spes and Alba for the "strange procedyngs" of the Flemish embargo against

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[4] Vice-Admiral Champernowne justified the seizures as pre-empting the anti-Protestant campaign for which the money was intended - to Cecil, 1st Jan. 1569: PRO SP 12/49/1; cf *Correspondance de Fénélon,* ed. Teulet, III. 423/4 (29th Dec. 1570); Camden, *Queen Elizabeth,* pp 119/21; Wernham, *Making of Elizabethan Foreign Policy,* pp 37/8. Also C Read, "Queen Elizabeth's Seizure of the Duke of Alva's Pay Ships", *J.Mod.H.* 5 (1933); GM Bell, "John Man: the Last Elizabethan Resident Ambassador in Spain", *16 CJ 7* (1976). On San Juan de Ulloa: Pollard, *History of England,* pp 284/5; GR Elton, *England under the Tudors* (1955), p 297; cf J Guy, *Tudor England* (2nd edn, Oxford 1990), p 276. On its irrelevance: JG Retamal-Favereau, "El incidente de San Juan de Ulloa y la pugna anglo-española de fines del siglo XVI", *Historia* 5 (1966), pp 187/8; "Anglo-Spanish Relations 1566/72" (Oxford DPhil thesis 1972), pp 104/5 */Diplomacia Anglo-Española durante la Contrarreforma* (Santiago de Chile 1981), pp 77/8. GD Ramsay, *The Queen's Merchants & the Revolt of the Netherlands* (Manchester 1986), ch 5, argues plausibly that Elizabeth had not actually *decided* to seize the money, but was characteristically vacillating when De Spes acted characteristically rashly.

them,[5] Philip supported his ministers, and thereby laid "his goodwyll open too Ingland"; or his lack of it.[6] De Spes' actions within the first four months of his embassy, according to the Privy Council, were such as should not be committed "by a person sent into this realm as a minister of amity, or by anyone who would be considered wise, prudent or honest... We consider you to be a seditious person and slanderer of princes."[7] It took however another two years until he got himself expelled. To make matters worse, Anglo-French relations were also deteriorating due to the renewal of the Wars of Religion, and a French policy of threats and "brags" to deter another English intervention in support of the Huguenots (and to recover Calais).

English perception of a critical Catholic threat, active during the 1560s with limited justification, had however been increased ever since Mary Stewart's arrival in the country. Initially, Cecil envisaged Mary remaining in captivity only "untill matters in forraine contryes be made in quyett". Until that unlikely event came about, he was already beginning to recognise the utility of holding Elizabeth's possible rival as a hostage.

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[5] Statement to De Spes, 8th Jan. 1569: Haynes, *Burghley SP*, p 501 (HMC 9: *Hatfield* I, No 1247); Elizabeth to Philip, 18th Jan; statement to D'Assonleville (Alba's special envoy), 26th Feb: PRO SP 70/105, ff 113/5, 236 (*CSP For. XI*, Nos 58/9, 136); Cecil to Henry Norris (Ambassador in Paris), 7th Mar: *Cabala sive Scrinia Sacra*, I. 149 (not in *CSP*).

[6] Hunsdon to Cecil, 15th Jan. 1569: Haynes, *Burghley SP*, p 502 (HMC 9: *Hatfield* I, No 1252).

[7] PC to De Spes, 14th Jan. 1569; cf Fitzwilliam's complaints to Alba against him, 12th July 1570: KL V. 242/4; 675/6 (origs. French; former *CSP For. XI*, No 49).

"Whilest she is here, neyther the Scottes nor the Ffrenche shall dare to attempt anyethyng on hir behalfe, least the same might be perillous to hirselfe, wch. when shee is farr from hence, they will not fayle to doo".[8]

The Duke of Norfolk claimed that his aspirations to marry Mary, which precipitated the crisis of 1569/70, were only (virtually in a spirit of self-sacrifice) so that "no Papist prince shoulde obtaine her, which I judged to be the greatest perill", and failed to understand the government view that of *any* marriage by Mary "can[n]ot but isue dau[n]ger to England". Indeed one polemicist claimed that a French or Spanish marriage would do less harm, because of the two countries' counterbalancing suspicion of each other and because "hardly is an Englishman brought to lyke of a straunger or a foraine governor", and so Norfolk's project was worse, as actually bringing Mary substantial English support.[9]

There had been much planning for the Northern Rising (though it had not produced agreement); but, as it occurred, it "was a hurried, ill-prepared defensive affair", "the product of weeks of discussion, vacillation and dissension".[10] Sussex, now

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[8] Cecil's memo, Oct. 1568: BL Cott. MS Cal. Ci, f 276r; cf 6th Oct. 1569, & 9th Feb. 1571: Cal. Cii, ff 459v, 463v; 94r.

[9] Norfolk to Cecil, 15th Dec: Haynes, *Burghley SP,* p 572 (HMC 9: *Hatfield* I, No 1444); Cecil's memo, 9th Feb. 1571: BL Cott. MS Cal. Cii, f 94v; *Discourse touching the Pretended Matche,* in Read, *Mr. Secretary Walsingham,* I. 73. Cf examination of Edward Clere, 27th Oct. 1569; Pembroke to PC, 6th Dec: CP 5, ff 17r, 27r (HMC 9: *Hatfield* I, Nos 1395, 1434); Norfolk's submission, 23rd June 1570: PRO SP 15/18/77.

President of the Council of the North, gave his opinion shortly before Elizabeth's summons to Northumberland and Westmorland that drove them into rebellion, "that they entend not to sturr p[rese]nt rebellion, but rather for fear to withdrawe themselfes for theire defence if anie force be offered against them"; and later, that his fellow (if "symple") Earls had been deceived by evil counsel to begin plotting, and then "by feare drawen on by degrees to ther present unhappie state".[11]

The rebel Christopher Norton had hoped for the support of Viscount Montagu and other southern Catholics, though these had agreed only to peaceful pressure for Norfolk's marriage. The Earls claimed Arundel and Pembroke as supporters.[12] They also "made accompt" (in vain) of the Earl of Cumberland.[13] Indeed Sussex himself had shown some favour towards Norfolk's ambitions, and

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[10] SE Taylor, "The Crown & the North of England: A Study of the Rebellion of the Northern Earls 1569/70 & its Causes" (Manchester PhD thesis 1981), pp 190/1.

[11] Sussex to Elizabeth, 8th & 15th Nov. 1569: PRO SP 15/15/14, 25. Cf "A Declaration of the Queenes Proceedings", 1570 (see n 50): BL Cott. MS Cal. Cii, f 234r; instructions for Norris, 5th Jan. 1570: SP 70/110, ff 10v-11r (*CSP For. XI*, No 607). The rebel Thomas Bishop of Pocklington told the PC that they only rose "uppon a mistrust of p[ar]don" - 22nd May 1570: CP 5, f 54 (HMC 9: *Hatfield* I, No 1490). Cf ME James, "The Concept of Order and the Northern Rising of 1569", *P & P* 60 (1973), p 83.

[12] PRO SP 12/67/59; 15/18/34; BL Harl. MS 6990, f 89r. The already imprisoned noblemen however proclaimed they "did detest ther doynges" - Norfolk's statement, 14th Dec. 1569: BL Cott. MS Cal. Ci, f 482; cf 3rd Dec; & Pembroke's, 5th & 6th Dec: Haynes, *Burghley SP*, pp 567/8; CP 5, f 27r (HMC 9: *Hatfield* I, Nos 1429, 1432, 1434); & Sussex to Cecil, 6th Dec: PRO SP 15/15/81.

[13] Thomas Bishop's examination, 10th Jan. 1570: CP 4, ff 86/7 (HMC 9: *Hatfield* I, No 1463). So does Sutherland, *Massacre of St. Bartholomew*, pp 110/1, assigning him to the revolt.

had therefore to battle with distrust at court. It did not help that his half-brother Egremont Ratcliffe joined the rebels.[14] Distrusted in London, he distrusted his local subordinates at York. Most of them had connections with the rebels, and he did not believe he could rely on them to fight.[15] This impression was reinforced by Sir George Bowes' loss of Barnard Castle; his garrison indulged in "continuall mutenyes, seakyng not only... to leape the walles and run to the rebells, but also by all menes to betraye the pece".[16] This was reported abroad as indicative of the general lack of support for the *régime.*[17]

The government made military appointments for other parts of the realm than the North, such as Bedford in the South-West, where indeed the Northerners at one stage believed there had been a sympathetic rising; similar rumours concerned Sussex and Wales.[18] The nature of the government's fears was indicated

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[14] Sussex to Cecil, 11th Sept. 1569; 26th & 28th Nov: Wright, *Queen Elizabeth & her Times,* I. 326/7; PRO SP 15/15/42, 52.I. Cf, defending Sussex: Sadler to Elizabeth & to PC, & Hunsdon to Cecil, 26th Nov; Sadler to Cecil, 15th Dec; Hunsdon to same, 13th Jan. 1570: SP 15/15/46-7, 49 (last printed C Sharp, *Memorials of the Northern Rebellion of 1569* (1840), p 75), 100; 17/26; Huntingdon to same, 6th Dec. 1569: Haynes, *Burghley SP,* p 569 (HMC 9: *Hatfield* I, No 1435); Cecil to Norris, 7th Feb. 1570: *Cabala,* I. 161. One Gianbattista sent Cecil a long diatribe (which he filed with his crank mail) accusing Sussex and Leicester, among others, of being tools of the Cardinal of Lorraine - BL Lans. MS 99, ff 96-117.

[15] Sussex to Cecil, 20th Nov. 1569; cf Sadler to same, 30th Nov & 6th Dec; Thomas Cecil to same, 2nd Dec: PRO SP 15/15/32; 54, 77; 70.

[16] Bowes to Cecil, 14th Dec. 1569: Sharp, *Memorials,* p 100.

[17] Facchinetti (Nuncio in Venice) to Cardinal-Secretary Bonelli, 21st Jan. 1570: *Nunziatura di Venezia IX,* ed. A Stella (1972) (*CSP Rome I,*No 639).

[18] Sir Francis Leek to Cecil, 1st Dec. 1569; Sussex to same, 6th Dec: PRO SP 15/15/64, 81.

by its levying forces six times the size of the rebel army at its ephemeral maximum, and keeping most of them in the south, while Sussex begged for less effort more quickly: "If I might have ben supplied wth. VC horsemen and CCC shott *in tyme,* it wolde have ended these matters wth.out further chardge".[19] In London, double assurance was preferred; and "it can hardly be supposed that the thrifty Elizabeth went to the expense of raising an army of 30,000 men merely to provide a military pageant".[20] Moreover, the usually clement Elizabeth had somewhere between 500 and 800 men executed - and still accused Sussex of going easy - for a revolt in which there is no hard evidence of any casualties on the loyalist side.[21] This was also done summarily, by martial law and attainder, when Kett's rebels, Jane Grey's supporters and Wyatt and his associates had all been convicted by a closer approximation of legal process, albeit extraordinary commissions of *oyer et terminer.* This had been accorded even to some of the more important Pilgrims of Grace, even if most had been executed by martial law, as in 1569/70 (but, in 1536/7, probably under a third as many).[22] This all indicates a greater degree of apprehension than events themselves justified, an apprehension derived more from potential than from actuality. Of

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19 Sussex to Cecil, 3rd Dec. 1569: PRO SP 15/15/76.

20 Read, *Mr. Secretary Cecil & Queen Elizabeth,* p 461; cf *Mr. Secretary Walsingham,* I. 80.

21 Taylor, "Crown & the North", pp 330/40.

22 PRO KB 8/10, 17, 21-2, 26ff.

the two motives for repression propounded by Sir Henry Ratcliffe, "terror and example of that which {=against what} may come" was at least as important as "punishment of that which is past".[23]

The most urgent fear was that the rebel force would move into Lancashire and gain new support (though it was not a good time of year for crossing the Pennines); while the Earl of Derby was finally acknowledged as reliable, it was "dowtfull that all the keyes of Lankeshyer do not p[re]sentlye hange att th'Earle of Derbyes owlde gyrdell".[24] Grindal feared that the Rising would have spread but for "the severity of the winter" (hindering Alba too) and "the passes being preoccupied". He feared the people were "panting for renewed disturbances".[25]

After the Earls' flight to avoid the relief army for the beleaguered Sussex, Viscount Hunsdon opined that others "had rysen wt. them.... yf yt had nott burst oyt byfor the tyme... Thohe they be overthrowne, othars wyll take theyr tyme yn better sort so as thes trobles ar nott yett att an end." Hunsdon's opinion was strengthened when, in the New Year, Leonard Dacre's rising made him fight a field engagement, which was more than the Earls' had

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[23] To Sussex, 4th Jan. 1570: Wright, *Queen Elizabeth & her Times,* I. 348.

[24] Leek to Cecil, 20th Dec. 1569: PRO SP 15/15/113. Derby had given Norfolk a more positive refusal to support his marriage than Sussex: William Cantrell's examination, 12th Oct: Haynes, *Burghley SP,* p 549 (HMC 9: *Hatfield* I, No 1374). Cf Huntingdon to Cecil, 24th Aug. 1570: *Ibid,* p 603.

[25] To Bullinger, 18th Feb. & 31st July 1570; cf Pilkington to same, 17th July: *Zurich Letters,* PS, I. 217, 224/6; 223. Cf Horne to Cecil, 21st Jan. 1570: BL Lans. MS 12, f 74r.

done - though Dacre's action was hardly "yn better sort", being likewise due to desperation provoked by an ominous summons from the Crown. Here again, Hunsdon considered that the government had been lucky opposition had not been greater, "consyderynge the grete confederace that he was interd ynto".[26] Cecil himself first sent to France the confident claim that "the Queen's Majesty hath had a notable tryal of her whole realm and subjects in this time, wherein she hath had service readily of all sorts, without respect of religion", but then began "to think that rebellion had more branches, both of our own and strangers, than did appear".[27]

The exile Sir Francis Englefield believed: "thys was the fyrste blouddy byckeryng, but yt ys not lyke to be the laste." Rokesby chimed in with warnings "that ther ar dyvers practyses mayd by the Quene of Scots' meynes wt. forren prynces, wch. I doute may torne this land to furder trouble.... yett ther remayneth mayne holow hartes th[a]t loketh for a chaynge notwt.standyng this sharp execution that hath beene." Hunsdon maintained that "if ye do not take heade of {heed of/head off ?} that Scottishe Quene, she will putt you in perill; and that or {ere} hitt be longe, for there are manie practises abrode".[28]

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[26] Hunsdon to Cecil, 29th Dec. 1569 & 3rd Mar. 1570: PRO SP 15/15/134; 18/3; cf 30th Dec. 1569: Sharp, *Memorials,* p 125. Cf Huntingdon to Cecil, 9th Dec. 1569, fearing "sharper stormes, even from the Northe perhappes or some other couste then dothe yet blowe": CP 5, ff 29-31 (HMC 9: *Hatfield* I, No 1439).

[27] To Norris: 24th Dec. 1569, 7th Jan. 1570: *Cabala,* I. 159/60 (not *CSP For.*)

[28] Englefield to Duchess of Feria, 30th April 1570; Rokesby to Cecil, 24th Jan:

The limited support for the 1569 Rising might seem in some ways surprising. But even granted more leisure for preparation, a united Catholic front would have been difficult to achieve. Norfolk (partly because he was not really a Catholic) was regarded with deep suspicion by Northumberland and the Dacres, plotters of longer standing.[29] Their plans coincided on little besides Mary's release; each told her not to trust the others. While Norfolk was cultivating Moray to help him marry Mary, the Dacres wanted to assassinate the Scottish Regent.[30] In fact, they regarded Norfolk with loathing, since he claimed the Barony of Dacre in the right of the heir general against Leonard Dacre the heir male. Probably because it appeared a vehicle for Norfolk's ambition, the Dacres opted out of the 1569 Rising - though it embodied their wish to free Mary - and rose in the New Year, out of fear in their turn, when their previous intrigues started to come to light. Westmorland, on the other hand, Norfolk's brother-in-law (and of somewhat less defined religion), was more favourable towards his interests.

Norfolk's capitulation may have indicated that he had

PRO SP 15/18/45; 17/43; Hunsdon to Elizabeth, 30th Jan: Sharp, *Memorials,* p 170.

[29] Northumberland, at his interrogation at Berwick, said he and Dacre "wished her bestowed on a sound Catholique, yea and if it were wth. some other foreyn prince": BL Cott. MS Cal. Ci, f 528r. Cf Englefield to Duchess of Feria, 30th April 1570: PRO SP 15/18/45: "As for Norfolke's marryage... [the Catholics] thynke hyt not meete her {Mary} to consent to".

[30] See Taylor, "Crown & the North", pp 136/50.

planned to defy Elizabeth but lost his nerve; possibly however he had harboured the delusion that she could be persuaded to agree to his marriage with Mary, which most of the northerners, excluded in any case from any influence at court, did not. Not even Northumberland and Westmorland were in harmony; the latter was far more friendly towards Norfolk, and initially refused to participate in any "quarell... for religion", wanting instead (in Norfolk's interest) to champion a settled succession, seeking thus to avoid the "blot" of rebellion.[31]

Those reports that believed that Alba was on the point of sailing to aid the Earls were also most insistent that their combined object was to replace Elizabeth by Mary.[32] Afterwards, Northumberland asserted: "for any matter for advauncement of the Queene of Scottes' title wth. the invasion of straungers or any other thing to the perilling of the Queenes Ma[jest]yes estate, that herd I nothing.... I doe not remember I hard it opened or moved at any man's handes to proclayme her {Mary} Queene of England". His object regarding her was only to ensure "the preservation of the second p[er]son" of the realm, who was endangered, he implied, by the malevolence of the Cecilian clique.[33] Even at the beginning of the year, Mary herself had

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[31] Sharp, *Memorials,* p 196. Thomas Norton believed "that relygion was the onely cause of theyr rysyng" - examination of 10th May 1570: CP 5, f 56r (HMC 9: *Hatfield* I, No 1487).

[32] Eg "GA" to John Marsh (Governor of Merchant Venturers), 8th Dec. 1569: CP 5, f 28 (HMC 9: *Hatfield* I, No 1438).

[33] Northumberland's interrogation at Berwick: BL Cott. MS Cal. Ci, ff 527/30.

circulated a proclamation in Scotland, asking: "being out of my subjectis handis, qwhat can I haip for but lamentable tragedie ?" - an imputation much resented by the English government, even if she complained mainly of the enmity of the Earls of Hertford and Huntingdon, with their rival claims to the succession.[34] Alba had similar apprehensions, but considered them a good reason for doing nothing to provoke a crisis.[35]

Nonetheless, the undeniable fact of the negotiations of Mary and her Ambassador Leslie with the future rebels, designed to change Elizabeth's policy by one means or another, was provocative enough; even if Mary had, too late, advised the Earls "to stey *for a tyme* from rysyng".[36] Elizabeth's first reaction was to describe Mary as "the principal hydden cause of these troobles". She then accused her personally of "dealings by your ministers to ingendre and nourish trobles in my realme, to bolden my subjectes to become rebells, to instruct and ayde them how to continew in the same, and in the end to make invasions into my

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[34] Hunsdon to Cecil, 19th Jan. 1569, enclosure: Haynes, *Burghley SP,* p 504 (HMC 9: *Hatfield* I, No 1254). According to Nicholas White, however, who visited her at Tutbury on the way back to Ireland, she also feared that Cecil "would cause hir to be made away": 26th Feb, *Ibid,* p 511 (HMC No 1279).

[35] Alba to Francisco de Alava (Spanish Ambassador to France), 14th & 20th Oct. 1569: *Epistolario del Duque de Alba,* II. 267/9; cf De Spes to Philip, 27th & 30th Sept: *CDIE* 90, pp 287/90 (*CSP Sp. II,* Nos 145/6).

[36] Examination of John Hamlyn, 18th April 1570: Haynes, *Burghley SP,* pp 595/6 (HMC 9: *Hatfield* I, No 1482). This messenger between Mary and Northumberland admitted a belief that the Rising's eventual object *was* "to make hir Quene of England". Cf Thomas Bishop's examination, 10th May, cf 10th Jan: CP 5, f 49r; 4, f 99v (HMC Nos 1488, 1463).

realme". The Captain of Berwick, naturally suspicious of Scots, blamed Leslie. "The Byshoppe of Rosse, I take it, be not ignorante of this commotion... I can but wyshe the Byshopp of Rosse had not come in England". In France, Elizabeth accused Mary of having "styrred" the Earls.[37] Cecil told her, "if the rebells had pr[e]vayled, it is manifest the sayd Q. of Scottes had obteyned hir formar atte[m]pt to the Crown"; her cousin Hunsdon that the rebels' "onlie pretence was the setting uppe of the Scottishe Quene in Your Majestie's seate".[38]

The "bruit", at least in the North, was that if Norfolk married Mary, a return to Catholicism would follow; whether by immediate replacement of Elizabeth or as part of a succession settlement more or less forced upon her, was obscure (though loyalists assumed the worst). Sinister hints also emanated from the Council of the North that the leading Catholics "have receyved

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[37] Elizabeth to Shrewsbury, 26th Nov. 1569: Haynes, *Burghley SP,* p 561 (HMC 9: *Hatfield* I, No 1418); to Mary, 20th Feb. 1570: BL Cott. MS Cal. Ci, f 519v; Drury to Cecil, 23rd Dec. 1569: Wright, *Queen Elizabeth & her Times,* I. 344; Cecil's memo, Sept. 1570: Cott. MS Cal. Cii, f 39v. When pressed by France for Mary's release, Elizabeth retorted by accusing her of trying to take over England: Norris' instructions, 23rd Feb. 1570; cf Walsingham's, 11th Aug: PRO SP 70/110, ff 81/2 (& Cott. MS Cal Evi, f 75); 113, ff 88/9 (*CSP For. XI,* Nos 704, 1168).

[38] Cecil's memo, 9th Feb. 1571: BL Cott. MS Cal. Cii, f 93v; Hunsdon to Elizabeth, 30th Dec. 1569: Sharp, *Memorials,* p 125. Cf Norris to Cecil, 22nd Dec. 1569, 2nd & 27th Jan, 5th & 25th Feb.1570, on the supposed projects of the Cardinal of Lorraine: PRO SP 70/109, f 56; 110, ff 2r, 26v/7r, 45v, 89 (*CSP For. XI,* Nos 550, 596, 643, 674, 712). Cf Parliamentary charges against Mary, June 1572: with the support of "the Pope and other forraine potentates", "it was intended that shee shold have bene proclaimed Queene of England and Ireland" - Hartley, *Proceedings in Parliament,* pp 270, 320, 346, & *Bardon Papers,* ed. Read, pp 2, 115/6; cf pp 15 (instructions for Shrewsbury & Beale 6th April 1583), 68/9 (charges 1586).

p[ar]don frome the Pope for all there offences heretofore past agaynst hym, and that they be p[ro]fessed & confederate to stand to the Pope's olde service & religion"; later that "the rebelles hyd an openyon monges them that Her Ma[jes]tie was not lawfull Q[ue]ne & that for thes matter of religyn, the Busshope of Rome had autoryte to do muche".[39]

It was true that faculties for absolution from schism (on condition of strict avoidance of Anglican services in future) were now in circulation in the North as in Ireland. As in Ireland, they were directly equated by Elizabeth's government with preparation for political rebellion. The logic was both that such rejection of the Royal Supremacy directly impugned the Crown's prerogative, and that the contention that the kingdom was in schism was tantamount to declarating its government illegitimate.

Cecil wanted the officials in the North to make "a speciall note of such as ar knowe[n] to have beene busy in the setty[n]g furth of Popery". "Such as may be knowen obstinat & open contem[n]ers of the Christian and true relligion wold receave no favor like to others". In cases not meriting harsher sanctions, the government insisted on the administration of the Oath of Supremacy "for removey[n]g of all furray[n] authorite", even for those not obliged to take it by virtue of their offices under

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[39] Sir Thomas Gargrave to PC & to Cecil, with intelligence enclosed, 2nd Nov. 1569; to Cecil, 21st June 1570: PRO SP 15/15/3-4; 18/75. Cf enquiries after the Ridolfi Plot whether Norfolk had been reconciled to Rome - Bannister's examination, 17th Oct. 1571: CP 6, f 42r (HMC 9: *Hatfield* I, No 1667).

existing legislation. This indicated a conviction that foreign authority had much to do with the revolt.[40]

The government's position after the Rising, then, was to blame it to a large extent on the growth of recusancy in the North, fostered as it was by the circulation of papal absolutions from schism, under a bull of 1567, on condition of future abstinence from Anglican services; the temporal sequence led to an inferred causal connection. No proof of the circulation of more directly noxious messages from Rome *before* the Rising seemed necessary. It was in the Rising's wake that a direct connection between recusancy and subversion was firmly made, even before it was confirmed by the actions of Pius V.

This equation resulted indeed in a comprehensive delusion that the deposition preceded the Rising. The vicious polemics of Thomas Norton - the Bedfordshire Parliamentarian, certainly not to be confused with the Yorkshire rebel of the same name - expounded this equation most forcibly. In the course of 1570, he wrote *A Bull Graunted by the Pope to Dr. Harding &c... by Reconcilement and Assoiling of Englishe Papistes to Undermine Faith and Allegeance to the Queene; A Disclosing of the Great Bull & Certaine Calves that he hath Gotten, and Specially the Monster Bull that Roared at my Lord Bishop's Gate;* and finally

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[40] 13th Mar. 1570: PRO SP 15/18/7-8 (10th Mar. draft: BL Add. MS 35831, ff 288/9r). On preferential executions, see Gargrave to Cecil, 4th Feb: Sharp, *Memorials,* p 173.

An Addition Declaratorie to the Bulles with a Searching of the Maze. These works indicate a considerable degree of confusion, genuine or feigned, between the bulls of reconciliation and of excommunication.

The *Bull Graunted* blamed the Northern Rising on the absolution bull alone. "The very principall end... appeareth by... the successes {consequences} that have happened, by the convenience {concurrence} of time and matter with the late most traiterous devises..." Besides absolving Catholics from schism, it served "to purge them cleane of all honest loyaltie, faith and allegeance"; it "reached a great deale further... to the encombring of their consciences with necessitie of grudging at her and revolting from her, and to the assaulting of Her Majestie's person (whom God long preserve), her royall Crowne and dignitie, and particularly and specially to the procuring, raising, advauncing and strengthening this late most vile and horrible rebellion, *beside the rest that is daily to be looked for with wise, jelous and circumspect expectation"* (Norton missed no chance to warn Protestants that they had seen nothing yet). In the sinister secrecy of the confessional, "many traiterous devises are agreed upon", and an obligation to rebel was the penance decreed. Even without the temporal sequence of Bull and Rising, Norton's prejudice would have tended to the same conclusion. "Full true it is that Papistrie hath no looking beyond this world, and is

determined within worldly hopes; and therefore their devises must be thought to tend to worldly politike endes, and so these pardons are not propounded for soules' health, but for hazarding of body and soule to serve a worldly fetch of treason..." In the *Bull Graunted,*the only hint at rumours of the second bull's arrival is a cryptic reference to "this baggage and all other of like sort, yea and far worse".[41]

The next book, the *Disclosing of the Great Bull* (a convoluted allegory of the Minotaur legend), describes the bull nailed by John Felton to the Bishop of London's palace gate as "the same bull" that has been begetting seditious "calves" since 1567, ie the bull of reconciliation.[42] *Regnans* might seem a more appropriate target for the claim that "the intermedling of the Popish usurpation of Rome with a temporall prince" constituted unnatural lust akin to Pasiphae's, and for the peroration: "... fatall semeth their sleepinesse that for... so leude & loude roaring of so rude and terrible a Bull, cannot be wakened or made to arme and bestirre them, till... the groning of wounded men dying on every side of them, treason, force and hostilitie triumphing in their lustiest rage... yea till the very enemies' weapon in theyr owne budy awake them. Such may happe so to sleepe as they may never wake."[43] These flights are less surprising however in view of

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[41] STC 18678: sigs B1v-B3v. On this trend generally, cf Wiener, "Popular anti-Catholicism", pp 31/3, not however noting the genuine confusion between the two bulls. JK Lowers, *Mirrors for Rebels: A Study of Polemical Literature Relating to the Northern Rebellion of 1569* (Berkeley & Los Angeles 1953), p 39, does.

[42] STC 18679, sigs A2v/3r.

the strained construction already placed by Norton on the earlier bull in his first treatise.

At the beginning of his third treatise, Norton admitted that he might have given the impression that the previous two had spoken of the same bull; but in fact there were two. Belatedly, he altered his theory; awkwardly, since his earlier contention had been more adapted to the attribution of the Rising to orders from Rome. The first bull had "bene gathering of rebelles ever since the yeare 1567"; the second had been issued "in the ende of Februarie 1569, when the late rebellion was redy layed and in hatching".[44] This was of course the date *Regnans* bore, old style (1570, new style); but Norton meant nine months before the rising (a period more apt for his gestatory metaphor for humans than for cattle). "*It seemeth by all probabilitie,*and no dout upon examination it will so fall out, that the originall of this Bull sealed was among our rebelles... and kept close among them ready to be published so sone as they should have bene able to get into their company such hed as they desired to set up after our Queene, or such strength as that they durst avow it. God so prevented them that they never came so far."[45] This argument - the Rising must have been inspired by the Bull, and therefore must have been predated by it - was later influential even among Catholics.[46] Norton however

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[43] Sigs B1v, C1. Cf Jewel's *View of a Seditious Bull,* in *Works,* PS, IV. 1133 on the Pandora's Box of ills opened by the Pope.

[44] *Addition Declaratorie,* STC 18678a, sig A2.

[45] Sig A3, cf sig A4v.

only twisted it at the last moment to apply to *Regnans;* his first two books, with his original thesis, had probably already had their effect. It was this earlier version that was echoed in the *Homilie agaynst Disobedience and wylful Rebellion,* which ascribed the Rising to the Pope's "disguised chaplains, creeping in laymen's apparel into the houses and whispering in the ears of certain Northern Borderers".[47] The homily was printed a month after Felton nailed up the Bull of Excommunication, but it was not considered necessary to insert any reference to it.

Norton was rare in distinguishing, even belatedly, between the bull that absolved from schism and the one that absolved from fealty. The 1571 Act against the importation of bulls did not.[48] At New Year 1570, Elizabeth complained (prematurely) to the French Ambassador Fénélon "that the Pope declares the states of those he holds to be schismatics or heretics vacant; she considers that [thus] all the courts in Christendom are endangered". Then she claimed to have already

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[46] See citations by Pollen, *English Catholics in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth* (1920), p 159; *Ann. Eccl.* 1570, no 365.

[47] STC 13679 (1570), ed. J Griffiths, *Two Books of Homilies Appointed to be Read in Churches* (Oxford 1859), p 595. Cf Fulke's *Sermon proving Babylon to be Rome,* in Bauckham, *Tudor Apocalypse,* p 331: "rogues and vagabonds to stir up tumults among the rude people"; Jewel's *View of a Seditious Bull,* in *Works,* PS, IV. 1158: "It is likely he hath used secret conference with them some long time... There is no treason without conference... The master of all this mischief sitteth at Rome... The coals were kindled here, but the bellows were there... We saw the poppets, but the juggler that drew the strings kept himself close."

[48] 13 Eliz. I c 2: *SR* IV. 528/31.

intercepted briefs absolving her subjects from their fealty to her (being schismatic *and illegitimate*) in favour of Mary Stewart. Fénélon considered this, with justice, to be "chose supposée".[49]

A draft for "A Declaration of the Queene's Proceedings" (in its direct response to the Northern Rising likely to be earlier in 1570 than May, when the Bull reached England), concluded with a defiance of the censures of "any potentate in XP{=Christen}dome, challenginge {claiming} any universall and sole superioritye over the whole Chirch of Christe... injuriously wth.out the univ[er]sall consent of princes for their private dominions" and of any religion "obtruded & forced to be receayved onely by threatnings of bloodshed, motion of warres or rebellions, by curses, fulminacions or other such worldly tirannous violences and cruell practises, things unfit to be used for establishing or reforminge of anything belonging to Christian Relligion, altogether contrary to XP{=Christ}ian charitye, & to be rather contemned by sov[er]aine princes, havinge [t]heir seates and thrones established by Almighty God, and not subject to deprivac[i]ons, contrary changes or alterations at the sensuall appetite & vaine imaginacions of unordinate prelates".[50]

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[49] 4th & 21st Jan. 1570: *Correspondance de Fénélon,* ed. Teulet, III. 4-5, 29. PO von Toerne, *Don Juan d'Autriche et les Projets de Conquête de l'Angleterre 1568-78* (Helsinki 1915-28), I. 94, takes this too seriously.

[50] "A Declaration of the Queene's Proceedings", 1570: BL Cott. MS Cal. Cii, f 237. A shorter version (Haynes, *Burghley SP,* p 592; HMC 9: *Hatfield* I, No 1450; also ed. WE Collins, Church History Soc. 1899, p 48) ends "not subject to the willis of forrayn and strang usurped potentats". I annexed the last phrase for my title.

Bishop Pilkington informed Bullinger (after *Regnans* had become well-known) that "our Louvaine friends obtained bulls from the Pope that they might absolve the people from the allegiance due to the Queen's Majesty; those who would no longer attend our Church and liturgy were to be reconciled to their synagogue".[51] If Pilkington amalgamated the effects of bulls in the plural, Jewel believed only in one, *Regnans,* which "was for some months carried about in obscurity and confined to a few"; now the Pope's "secret counsels" were "perceived even by children".[52] Or as Fulke put it, Rome's "proctors and privy practisers, though they change themselves like Proteus into never so many unlikely shapes, are spied in every corner" - indeed even those where they were not.[53]

In Ireland too, when there was talk of dangerous bulls in circulation, the argument was not much affected by which they were. James FitzMaurice put up a bull "at Lymbruke gattes, wherby he ahow[e]th his traitoruse mynd w.che... he wold accomplishe if his habilitie servid him".[54] It does not seem

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[51] 17th July 1570: *Zurich Letters,* PS, I. 222/3.

[52] To Bullinger, 7th Aug. 1570; cf 2nd Mar. 1571: *Zurich Letters,* PS, I. 229. Cf Jewel's *View of a Seditious Bull,* in *Works,* PS, IV. 1157/8.

[53] Fulke's *Sermon proving Babylon to be Rome,* in Bauckham, *Tudor Apocalypse,* p 331.

[54] Ormonde to Sidney, 11th Jan. 1571: PRO SP 63/32/57.I. *Homilie agaynst Disobedience,* ed. Griffiths, p 595: "the Bishop of Rome of late attempted by his Irish patriarchs and bishops sent from Rome with his bulls (whereof some were deprehended) to break down the bars and hedges of public peace in Ireland". Cf TW Moody, FX Martin & FJ Byrne, *New History of Ireland, III: Early Modern Ireland 1534-1691* (3rd edn, Oxford 1991), pp 90/2.

possible to establish that this was *Regnans in Excelsis,* since all definite references to FitzMaurice publishing it in fact refer to his later revolt, in 1579. It is however quite possible that it appeared in Ireland, since according to De Spes it was two Irish clerics who brought it to London.[55]

Bullinger in 1571, wrote *AConfutation of the Bull Published more than two years since...*He expected a welcome for it, having received the complaints of half a dozen English churchmen about the Bull's presumption. But Archbishop Grindal wondered whether it would be better not to "have the multitude to know that any such vile railing Bull had passed from that See". It was however decided to translate the book, and it was then safer to congratulate the original author.[56]

The translator, Arthur Golding, had no doubts about the continued need for Bullinger's *Confutation.* Dedicating the translation to Leicester, he wrote: "There is no wise man but he trembleth with the dreadfull remembraunce, or simple & godly-minded man but he wondreth at the marveilous disappointing of the daungers, which were sundry times ready to have

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[55] To Philip II, 13th May 1570: *CDIE* 90 p 352 (*CSP Sp. II,* No 188).

[56] *Remains of Archbishop Grindal,* PS, p 328: to Parker, 28th Aug. 1571. Cf Bullinger to Cox, 25th Feb. 1571; reply, 5th July: LPL MS 2010, ff 47, 50r; Parkhurst to Bullinger, 10th Mar. 1572; Cox to same, 6th June: *Zurich Letters,* PS, I. 266/9. Grindal later reported that Burghley wished Bullinger's book confined to the decent obscurity of a learned tongue. Sir Nicholas Arnold deplored the citation of specific slanders against Elizabeth in the 1571 Bill for the Preservation of the Queen's Majesty, thus "left to posteritie" - anonymous journal, 9th April: Hartley, *Proceedings in Parliament,* p 204.

overwhelmed us even in one moment, had not God reached out His mercifull Hand from Heaven in the open face of the world to defend us". This providential defence was no grounds however for future over-confidence: "is it not a straunge case that a Romishe Bull (or to speake more rightly, a childishe bable) should be able to worke such inconveniences even where the Gospell shineth most lightsomely ?"[57]

Pro-government polemic generally however did not need to make much of *Regnans* (in the event, it made surprisingly little), since its anti-papal theses had been sufficiently derived without it, in the immediate aftermath of the Rising, with reference to an earlier Bull, whose significance was amplified by rumour and innuendo. Even as an object for vituperation, *Regnans,* in the short term, missed the boat. Apprehension at its possible influence in more apposite circumstances, as much as triumph at its practical inefficacy, restricted the emphasis upon it.

The rebels too anticipated the excommunication before it arrived. Supposedly, the clandestine priest Dr. Nicholas Morton had threatened them with a national anathema and a Spanish invasion, unless English Catholics took steps to put their house in order.[58] The Earls' first proclamation, at Durham, warned that

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[57] Sig *ii. The qualification "childishe babel", apart from being a more reflex, did not necessarily detract from the overall impression of peril. A childish populace might be led dangerously astray by childish things. Cf *Homilie agaynst Disobedience,* ed. Griffiths, p 587 on the Rising as a punishment for the sins of England, that might be repeated and intensified.

[58] Francis Norton to Leicester & Burghley, 2nd April 1572: Sharp, *Memorials,*pp

government policy was likely to lead to foreign intervention "to the great hassarde of the state of this countrey, wherunto we are all bounde".[59] Sussex retorted that the rebels should know, having "practised wth. fforen princes to aide them in this wicked enterprice, and therby sought not only the manifest p[er]ill of o[u]r most gracious sov[er]aign Ladie's p[er]son, state and dignitie roiall, but also to bringe the whole realme to p[er]petuall th[r]auldom and miserie under the subjection and slaverie of forren powers and potentates". Privately, however, he suggested even after the Earls had taken the field, that "to avoide... the p[er]ill of sekinge foreyn aide and combynacons at home", it might be as well to offer them a pardon.[60]

As things were, the Earls did not bid open defiance to the Queen, because of her heresy or for any other reason, but adopted the time-honoured technique of blaming evil counsellors instead - "disordered and ill-disposed persons", "diverse newe sett upp nobles" - and claiming to champion the ancient nobility of the Realm, the Queen's true natural counsellors.[61] De Spes in his

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[59] 14th Nov. 1569: Sharp, *Memorials,* pp 36/7.

[60] Sussex's proclamation, 13th Nov. 1569; same to Elizabeth, 15th Nov; cf same to PC, 17th Nov: PRO SP 15/15/21, 25; 29. Cf Elizabeth to Sussex, 18th Nov - Haynes, *Burghley SP,* p 556 (HMC 9: *Hatfield* I, No 1407) - "these rebells have nothing so much to hart... as the subduing of this realme under the yoke of foraine princis... under colour of religion". Also *Homilie agaynst Disobedience,* ed. Griffiths, pp 576ff; Cox to Bullinger, 10th July 1570: *Zurich Letters,* PS, I. 221.

[61] Durham proclamation, 14th Nov; Darlington, 15th Nov: Sharp, *Memorials,* pp 36/7, 42/3n & Haynes, *Burghley SP,* pp 564/5 (HMC 9: *Hatfield* I, No 1419).

more public pronouncements had similarly claimed that the embargo "was not done by the Quene's consent, but rather by the advice of some p[er]sons that have not the zeale and respect that is necessary".[62]

The conspirators' consensus had been that rebellion could only be justified against a monarch who had already been formally excommunicated; even an approach to the exiled theologians at Louvain, recounted later by Sanders, produced a similar conclusion. Morton's claim that the rebuff to Martinengo and the summons to Trent rendered Elizabeth excommunicate *ipso facto* was considered "rather his owne imagination to advance the matter than otherwise".[63] More canonical warnings, strictly, were requisite (it was doubtful whether Parpaglia's mission counted, as Spain had stopped him actually requesting entry to England). William Smith of Esh, a follower of Westmorland and sharing the Earl's reservations about religious rebellion, still thought: "the Pope hais summoned this land once, and if he summon it agane, it is lawfull to rise againste the Quene."[64]

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[62] De Spes' manifesto of 10th Jan. 1569 (English version): PRO SP 70/105, f 65r (*CSP For. XI*, No 31). At the same time however he wrote an offensive letter about Elizabeth to Jeronimo de Curiel, Treasurer of the Netherlands - and a noted Anglophobe (see WS Maltby, *Alba* (Berkeley & Los Angeles 1983), p 199) - which he seemed to intend to be read by the Privy Council: KL V. 234/5 (*CSP*, No 41).

[63] Northumberland's interrogation at Berwick: BL Cott. MS Cal. Ci, f 530v. He said that he "never *p[er]fectly* understood of any Bull that came from Rome against the Q. Ma[jes]ty" until he was imprisoned in Lochleven; how early he began to anticipate one is ambiguous. Sanders: Pastor18, App. 7, pp 468/9.

[64] Lord Eure to PC, 8th Nov. 1569: PRO SP 15/15/16. But Camden insisted the

As early as June 1569, the Catholic Lord Windsor travelling in Italy said he had been told (by a Frenchman) that "our soveraigne Lady & mistris was no Quene... for that the Pope in consistory had denounced her to be [not] any more Quene... It is lawful for all forrein princes to do what in them lieth for the attaining of this kingdom, & therby [the Pope] doth give licence & pardon unto al men, who shal seeme to worke any treason towardes Her Majestie's person."[65]

Pius V's eventual excommunication and deposition of Elizabeth on 25th Feb. 1570, by the bull *Regnans in Excelsis,* was intended to support the Northern Rising. Nicholas Morton, having failed to convince the Northerners that Elizabeth was excommunicate *ipso facto,* had reported to Rome that "they would rise against her more eagerly", if assisted by some definite papal sentence. Nicholas Sanders wrote from Louvain to a similar effect in early 1570; his letter crossed with the Bull.[66] The week before issuing the Bull, the Pope had, after a delay of three months, received a request from Northumberland and Westmorland for his approval in their project (vaguely described) to restore the Faith. In reply, Pius congratulated them on their efforts to

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Pope acted "without any previous admonition or citation" - *Queen Elizabeth,* p 145.

[65] Windsor to Cecil, 15th June 1569: Wright, *Elizabeth & her Times,* I. 318.

[66] *Ann. Eccl.* 1570, no 321: "in ipsam acrius insurgerent". Sanders: Pastor18, App. 7, pp 468/9; cf *De Visibili Monarchia,* pp 706, 730. Morton was, according to Bishop Leslie (informative once arrested), "the pryncypall meane of the sentence geven agaynst the Quene's Majesty" - examination, 29th Nov. 1571: Murdin, *Burghley SP,* p 60. Cf Camden, *Queen Elizabeth,* p 134.

free England "from the vile servitude to... the lust of an abandoned woman", language so strong as to constitute a proclamation of his intention to challenge her directly, as he did within a few days.[67] When Philip II demanded Pius' reasons for issuing the Bull, the Pope said that it was to "hearten" and "remove the scruples" of English Catholics, "about taking arms against her before His Holiness had declared her [excommunicate] and deprived her of her kingdom"; indeed it had been requested by "a letter signed by many English Catholics" (ie two ?).[68]

It has been shown that Elizabeth was not excommunicated on the false assumption that she claimed to be Supreme Head of the English Church, but for assuming (falsely) the authority of that position.[69] The delusion that she was declared deposed because illegitimate (and thus Mary implicitly advanced) is more persistent.[70] The issue was however obfuscated from the first.

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[67] 20th Feb: *CSP Rome I*,No 647 (orig. Goubau, *Epistolae Pii V,* pp 291/2).

[68] Zúniga to Philip, 10th & 28th April, 11th Aug: Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* III. 291, 308, 499. Cf the Imperial Ambassador, Count Arco: WE Schwarz, *Briefwechsel des Kaisers Maximilian II mit Papst Pius V* (Paderborn 1889), p 160.

[69] Pastor18, p 213, refuting Meyer, *England & the Catholic Church,* p 83. In fact her title was quoted quite accurately: *Ann. Eccl.* 1570, nos 322, 332, 344, 365.

[70] Eg Meyer, *England & the Catholic Church,* pp 81/2; JB Black, *Age of Elizabeth* (Oxford 1936), p 136. Also references in many books dealing with contemporary European history, eg JH Mariejol's & I Cloulas' respective *Cathérines de Médicis* (Paris 1920; 1979), p 181; p 262. Cf P Johnson, *Queen Elizabeth I* (pbk edn 1976), p 180; "The Bull implied that the Papacy had never recognised Elizabeth's title, whereas in fact both Paul IV and Pius IV had done so without qualification." *Contra:* Pollen, *English Catholics,* p 151.

Burghley asked rhetorically "what scruple soever wold all obstyna[n]t Papis[ts] of the realme make, to depose the Q[ueen's] Ma[jes]ty in favor of the Scottes' Quene ? The Pope hath by his bulls and decrees p[ro]nou[n]ced the Q[ueen's] Ma[jesty] an usurper". This was not in fact what he had done; but it was a useful argument against Mary to affiliate her cause precisely with that of Pius V. Again, he referred to the Catholics' "opinion in conscie[n]ce th[a]t the Q[ueen] of Scottes is by right Q[ueen] of England, and th[a]t our soveray[n] Lady is justly dep[ri]ved un[der] the Pope's sente[n]ce".[71] The Bull was simply fitted into an established conviction of his, expressed in 1569, that the Pope desired "the eviction of the Crown of England from the Quenes' Majesty, to sett it uppon the head of the Quene of Scotts". Bishop Jewel, equally, believed that "Pope Pius not only freely promises Scotland but England likewise" to Mary.[72]

Though the government knew well enough what was in the Bull, it did not know the details of the process prompting it, and so imagined what fitted its preconceptions. Such a coalescence of enmities was too compelling for the protestations of Mary's ambassador, Bishop Leslie, to be credible: "Although

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[71] "The Perrills growing by Forbeary[n]g to do Justice" (probably early 1572); "The Dau[n]gers by the Q. of Scottes to the Q. Ma[jes]ty and to the Realme" (probably late 1572): BL Cott. MS Cal. Cii, ff 86r; 84r.

[72] "A Short Memoryall of the State of the Realme", 1569: Haynes, *Burghley SP*, p 580 (HMC 9: *Hatfield* I, No 1455); Jewel to Bullinger, 7th Aug. 1570: *Zurich Letters*, PS, I. 229.

they are advertised... that the Pope was soliciting other princes to invade this country, and also to stir a rebellion by the subjects within this realm by means of the Catholics... if any such matter were in hand, it was not for the Queen my mistress' cause but rather proceeded of the Pope himself, whom they knew by experience to have an ardent desire to bring this country to his obedience, and without any doubt he will seek by all means possible to this effect."[73]

In this connection, there are hints of the Bull checking the possibility of an agreement between Elizabeth and Mary, phantom though this prospect probably was. According to a correspondent of Shrewsbury's, "there was great hope of some good conclusions betwixt the Quene's Ma[jes]tie and the Q[ueen] of Scottes, and the settinge up of the Bull upon the Bishop of London his gate" and the suspicious behaviour this prompted in the Catholics Morley and Southampton hindered it. Elizabeth herself claimed to have just changed her mind (long after Mary had been saddled with guilt for the Northern Rising), as she had "discovered and do see such indirect practise and dealy[n]g to our danger by the Q[ueen] of Scottes' ministers". It was at this juncture, long after Moray's assassination, that she determined to impose Lennox as a replacement Anglophile Scottish Regent.[74]

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[73] Examination, 8th Aug. 1571: PRO SP 53/7, ff 6-7 (*Cal. Scot. III*, No 857).

[74] John Knyveton to Shrewsbury, 15th June 1570: LPL MS 697, f 131; Elizabeth to Sussex, 11th June: PRO SP 59/17, f 32 (*CSP For. XI*, No 993). SE Lehmberg, *Sir Walter Mildmay & Tudor Government* (Austin, Tx. 1964), pp 88/9 (opposing Read, *Lord Burghley & Queen Elizabeth*, pp 24/6), wishes to deny that these new

The exact nature of the treason charges against John Felton for sticking up the Bull on the Bishop of London's gate must, without surviving records of his actual trial, remain speculative. However, probably he was condemned for imagining Elizabeth's death by denying her regality; immmediately before his execution, he allegedly called her explicitly "the pretended Queen".[75] His indictment alleged *Regnans* to declare "among other false and impious matter... that the Queen had *never* been true Queen of England, but only pretended Queen".[76] He would have to have upheld Roman jurisdiction not once but twice to be guilty of treason even under the 1563 tightening of the Act of Supremacy, this statement could have allowed his conviction under other 1559 legislation, which made it high treason to "directly esay, publish, maintaine, declare or holde openyon that the Quene's Ma[jes]tie that nowe ys, during her lyef, ys not or ought not to bee Quene of this realme... to affirme that the Quene's Ma[jes]tie that nowe ys ought not to have and enjoy the stile, honour and kingly name of this realme", the second time if

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practices related to the Bull, but can suggest no alternative. Of course Elizabeth's sincerity in these negotiations was always doubtful, but it should be noted that her Councillors saw an inclination to return Mary to Scotland - Mildmay's "Considerations as to whether Queen Mary should be Returned to Scotland or Retained", 26th Oct. 1569: HMC 70: *Pepys MSS,* p 167; Cecil to Norris, 22nd Mar. 1570: *Cabala,* p 162 (not in *CSP For.*).

[75] Dom B Camm OSB & Fr. ES Keogh, *Lives of the English Martyrs* (1905), II. 10-11. So did Dr Story, the second Martyr, but only apparently after being sentenced: *Ibid,* pp 82, 91/2.

[76] PRO KB 8/41.

in words; immediately if in writing or by deed (Felton's position). This statute was not particularly confessionally biased, since these clauses were copied from Mary's.[77]

It is quite untrue to say that "nothing was discovered which would enable Elizabeth's government to treat our Martyr as a merely political offender. We can see that from the pamphlets published under their inspiration, which show that the motives for condemning him to death were mainly religious"; even if from his own viewpoint, he died to uphold the Pope's spiritual authority.[78] The point of the pamphlet literature was that Rome automatically canonised traitors.[79]

"He had before denide Her Grace
Our lawfull Quene to bee,
And of her Supreme power (he said),
She ought not have it, shee.
Oh traiterous hart, oh Martyr vile !
Such Martyrs nowadayes
Would fain be made to[o] mortar-thin
To stop the hollow wayes".[80]

Stephen Peele suggested to Pius V:

"Let him be shryned then,
According to his merits due,

[77] 1 Eliz. I c 5; cf c 1, & 5 Eliz. I c 1; 1 & 2 Philip & Mary c 10: *SR* IV. 365; 353, 403; 255/6.

[78] *Lives of the English Martyrs,* ed. Camm, II. 6-7.

[79] Cf Horne to Bullinger, 8th Aug. 1571: Story "being convicted of treason, hung and quartered, was made an ill-favoured Martyr of the Roman Church, and enrolled in the Popish catalogue of Saints, next to Felton": *Zurich Letters,* PS, I, No 98.

[80] Thomas Knell, *A Piththy Note to Papists all, and some That joye in Felton's Martirdome,* STC 15034 (1570) reprinted in J Payne Collier, *Illustrations of Early English Popular Literature* (2 vols, 1863/4), I.i. Cf FG, *The End and Confession of John Felton,* STC 11493 (1570).

As you have others doen,
That prove unto their Prince untrue.
For those (Sir Pope) you love of lyfe,
That with their Princes fall at stryfe...."[81]

It was alleged that Pius V had promised indulgences to Catholics who rose against Elizabeth.[82] In fact, he had simply threatened with anathemas those who continued to obey her, without positive incentives to the contrary. Alba and Zúniga (the Spanish Ambassador in Rome) both complained of the harshness of this.[83] Pius took an uncompromising view even of temporary lapses; though Thomas Stukeley made great offers to invade Ireland, he was for some time refused absolution from the sin of schism.[84]

At Rome itself, it was also rumoured, inaccurately, that the Pope had granted "to every Christian Prince licence to invade

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[81] *A Letter to Rome to declare to the Pope, John Felton his freend is hang'd in a Rope,* STC 19549 (1570), reprinted in Payne Collier, *Old Ballads from Early Printed Copies* (1840), p 66.

[82] Eg Norton, *Bull Graunted... to Dr. Harding,* sig B1; *Addition Declaratorie,* sig A2. Pius' first biographer, Girolamo Catena, wrote that "the Bull was granted in such form that any might move against her", and that "hence" the Northern Rising occurred - *Vita del Gloriosissimo Papa Pio Quinto,* p 115. This jarred slightly with Gregory XIII's policy then, and was more fitted to Sixtus V's, when the book was reprinted in 1586. Catena in turn was cited in England as confirmation of this sequence - Beale's notes on excommunication of princes, 1595: BL Add. (Yelv.) MS 48101, f 321r; Camden, *Queen Elizabeth,* pp 118/9. Fr Edwards ascribes Catena's "story, garbled, exaggerated and nightmarishly incomplete" to Ridolfi, but his special talent for distortion was not essential in this case - *The Marvellous Chance: Thomas Howard 4th Duke of Norfolk & the Ridolphi Plot* (1968), p 375.

[83] Alba to Zúniga, 3rd May 1570: *Epistolario del Duque de Alba,* II. 382; Zúniga to Philip, 10th June & 11th Aug: Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* III. 397, 500.

[84] Castagna to Cardinal Rusticucci, 24th Sept. 1570; Rusticucci to Castagna, 31st Oct: PRO 31/9/70, pp 55/6, 70 (*CSP Rome I,* Nos 707, 727).

and occupy the said realm".[85] John Fitzwilliam heard it reported at Antwerp in early June (though Alba had suppressed the Bull itself) that the Pope "hath putt into his co[u]rosse {curse} the Quenis Ma[jes]te and all that be of Her Ma[jes]te's Religion, and allso all nassyons that had any traffyck wt. any Eyngleshemen sithens {since} the last resstraynt... He hath given pardon & remissyon of sins to all rebelles that hath ben & yet be agenst the Ma[jes]ty of Eyngland... He hath given the Reallme of Eyngland frely to any that will give enterpryes for it by any meens."[86]

The automatic assumption that Pius intended a Crusade of some sort against Elizabeth launched from abroad was also incorrect. To some extent, his eventual action conformed to the papal pragmatism displayed since Elizabeth's accession - postponement of sentence until the ability to execute it appeared guaranteed. When he issued *Regnans in Excelsis,* Pius believed that a general English Catholic rising was flourishing; that his intervention might serve to induce waverers to commit themselves; and that the possibility of Philip II agreeing to help had increased (somewhat). Greater assurance on this latter point

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[85] Roman newsletter, 13th May 1570: *CSP Rome I,* No 668 (orig. PRO 31/10/1, p 138); cf Cox to Bullinger, 10th July: *Zurich Letters,* PS, I. 221.

[86] Fitzwilliam to Leicester & to Cecil, 5th June 1570: PRO SP 70/112, f 69v (*CSP For. XI,* No 981). Cf Ridolfi's actual plan for an international embargo "justifying themselves by the force of the Bull and the obedience sworn to the Holy See" - to Pius, 1st July 1570: *CSP Rome I,* No 678 (orig. PRO 31/9/70, p 409); cf also document in Jesuit Central Archives, seeing a miracle in the spontaneous Spanish and French ruptures of trade, in Edwards, *Marvellous Chance,* p 405.

might have been desirable, but bitter experience suggested that waiting for Philip would involve losing the immediate opportunity. The genesis of the Old Man of the Sea that was to encumber English Catholics for decades, indeed in its long-term effect for centuries, is a notable case of the effect of dilatory communications on political crisis. Philip pointed out Pius' communications problems (though he himself suffered only slightly less) and hinted that the Pope should therefore eschew interventions in English affairs, at least when he did not consult those better-informed.[87] It is however unclear that Pius' ideas for executing his censures had become that much more definite since the occasion when he was supposed to have told Maximilian II that if the Emperor compromised with the German Lutherans, though the Pope could send no soldiers against him, he would be hurled from his throne by an angel.[88]

Any support for the Stewart claim afforded by the Pope's action was only implicit, insomuch as the northern rebels favoured it. Pius' Cardinal-Secretary later envisaged (admittedly at a time of rumour that Elizabeth had executed Mary, or was about to) *Regnans* as a judicial basis for the grant of the kingdom (Elizabeth being "already deprived of title to it") to the Duke of Anjou, married to Philip II's sister or daughter - yet another forlorn attempt to induce France and Spain to agree on an

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87 Castagna, 4th & 16th Aug. 1570: PRO 31/9/70, pp 47-50 (*CSP Rome I*, Nos 684, 690).

88 *NBD 1559/72*, VI, ed IP Dengel (Vienna 1939), p 261.

anti-English policy.[89]

Elizabeth was condemned by the testimony of twelve English exiles on nineteen counts, seven relating to the Royal Supremacy, three to her persecution of Catholics, five to her sacramental beliefs, and three to her attendance at heretical sermons. *Regnans in Excelsis* condemned Elizabeth not for usurpation, but as "a heretic and a fautor of heretics"; indeed who has become "the refuge of all runneagates and naughtipackes" (if not as often as these latter hoped). She had ignored the pious admonitions of Catholic princes, had refused to admit papal nuncios (by receptivity to neither of which could her claim have been validated, if that had been at issue). After these warnings (not really conformable to good canonical practice, but Pius had to do his best), he reluctantly had to turn from mercy to justice. He declared Elizabeth's vassals "*perpetuos* absolutos" from their

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89 Bonelli to Castagna, 4th Jan. 1572: PRO 31/9/71, p 142 (*CSP Rome II,* No 1): "...di dar' la principessa di Portogallo, sorella di Re Catholico, a Monsur con titulo di Re e Regina d'Inghilterra, e per questa strada di Francia e di Spagna privar del possesso, piochè è gia privata di titolo, quella impia Hiezabel del regno." This project was quite popular with Rome, even if it started as a spoiling operation against Anjou's courtship of Elizabeth. Cf Ormanetto (Castagna's replacement) to Galli (Gregory XIII's Cardinal-Secretary), 18th Sept,15th Nov, 5th & 15th Dec; & reply, 11th Oct; Cardinal Orsini (legate in France) to Galli, 22nd Sept: *Ibid,* pp 177, 184/5, 190/2; 159/62, 234 (*CSP,* Nos 81, 114, 124, 130; 98, 85). The Valois however insisted on one of Philip II's current possessions as dowry and that "such as think that the dowry state should be acquired *de novo*" be ignored - *ANG XII,* pp 273/5; 339/43: Salviati to Galli, 11th Oct, cf 7th Dec. (*CSP,* Nos 97, 125). At one stage, the Nuncio Ormanetto found himself urging on Philip II the English doctrine of exclusion of aliens as a reason to set Mary aside in favour of Anjou and his bride (more alien still); the King demurred - to Galli, 18th & 20th Nov: PRO 31/9/71, pp 187/9 (*CSP,* Nos 117, 119).

fealty, and her "privata" of all rights to the Crown (a verb which implied she did have them initially), and otherwise. The issue is unfortunately obscured by calling her "pretensa Regina" and describing her right also as "pretensa", and talking of her "succedente Maria *Regina legitima"* (but not "usurpante Maria"). This last is a last-minute addition for the Bull, not in the commission's sentence.[90]

The commission's sentence also called her "pretensa Regina". But that document had no hint of illegitimacy. Elizabeth was "pretensa" because she was already *excommunicata latae sententiae* for heresy - the only grounds indeed upon which Rome could now precede to deposition. Possibly, if a heretic at her succession, she could never justly have received the Crown. However, all this was inexplicit, and the substitution of rhetoric for strict legal procedure (disguised by assertions of the "notoriety" of crimes), as had often been done in the Papacy's decrees against the Staufen, was revealed by a phrase exactly recalling these - "the pretended Queen, daughter of iniquity, raising up her horns against apostolic authority". It too showed however that heresy was the reason for Elizabeth not being a true Queen.[91] Pius, sending the Bull to Alba for publication in Flanders, exhorted him, "to tear England from the impudent

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[90] Text (with trn.) GR Elton, *Tudor Constitution* (Cambridge 1960), pp 414/8. Arthur Golding's version before his trn of Bullinger's *Confutation of the Pope's Bull*, sig. *iiir, is however more picturesque.

[91] *Ann. Eccl.* 1570, no 344.

domination of a *heretical* woman"; and her heresy was the explanation for his impugning Elizabeth's title before issuing his Bull (in fact also before receiving the Earls' appeal), urging action against "her who plays the part of the Queen of England" - at least, "if this may be done with the approval and to the advantage of our dearest son in Christ, the Catholic King".[92]

*Regnans,*particularly its "perpetual" deprivation when it was the first explicit sentence against Elizabeth, was legally dubious. It was not however positively uncanonical (and anyway, the Pope could always exempt himself from the letter of the law for the good of the Church). Though Elizabeth had not really had the three customary warnings, she was probably *excommunicata latae sententiae* at least a dozen times since her relapse, between Tridentine anathemas and the annual bull *In Coena Domini.* Influential recent opinion held that this eliminated the need for warnings.[93] The trouble was that few besides professional theologians seemed interested any more in *excommunicatio latae sententiae.*

Apparently unconvinced however, the Bull's apologists began justifying its hastiness by claiming that Elizabeth was illegitimate.[94] At the proceedings leading up to it, Sir Richard

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[92] 30th Mar. 1570: *Ann. Eccl.* 1570, no 377 (*CSP Rome I,*No 657). 4th Feb: *CSP Rome I,*No 643 (orig. Goubau, *Epistolae Pii V,* pp 363/4). "...Quae se pro Angliae Regina gerit".

[93] Navarrus, *Enchiridion,* ch 27 nos 10-11; Mazzolini, *Summa Summarum: Excommunicatio,* l. 13: "ipsa prohibitio est monitio."

Shelley, head of the English Hospitallers, said in his testimony that "filia *putatur* Henrici VIII et Annae Bolenae *Reginae*", therefore appearing to impugn Elizabeth's legitimacy, irrespective of the validity of Anne's marriage. Thomas Goldwell, deposed Bishop of St Asaph, described her as "filia naturalis Henrici VIII". These statements do not seem to have been solicited by the commission, and were not imitated by other witnesses.[95] Nor was there mention after all of the Pope's feudal rights. *Regnans* was simply an old-fashioned deposition for heresy.

Elizabeth was, in passing, accused of favouring heretical upstarts over her natural noble counsellors, which might reflect Ridolfi's first project communicated earlier in the year, which intended international encouragement to the English Catholic nobles in their intention to remove evil counsellors about Elizabeth. Ridolfi believed that papal exhortations could play a great part in forwarding this; though he gave no sign of expecting what he got.[96]

If Pius was intending to react to the situation in England, he was acting on intelligence whose standard is apparent from the occasional tendency to turn Norfolk into an Earl of Suffolk,

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[94] *Ann. Eccl.* 1570, no 370. This started within three months: see Roman newsletter, 13th May: PRO 31/10/1, p 138 (*CSP Rome I,* o 668).

[95] *Ann. Eccl.* 1570, no 326, 332.

[96] Ridolfi to Pius V, 18th April 1569: PRO 31/9/70, p 254 (*CSP Rome I,* No 583).

possessed of an independent claim to the English throne, as well as to credit him with more radical plans for the disposition of the English Crown than he really possessed. This done, it was not such a long step to believe in Oct. 1569, as Bishop Facchinetti of Nicastro the Venetian Nuncio did, that "all the realm was in arms to make him king".[97] This report was not only distorted as to aim but premature, and it was not the only one. Such anticipation of events should have given Rome and Madrid longer to react.

The week between arrival of the Earls' letter and *Regnans* was not long enough for any hint of the consequent *débâcle* to arrive, at the laggardly rate indicated so far; due not only to the usual difficulties of winter, but to the embargo on English-Flemish traffic, and the closure of English ports that preceded the actual Rising. Misapprehensions were rife in Europe not only as to the revolt's longevity, but as to the extent of its

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97 Facchinetti to Bonelli, 26th Oct. 1569: *Nunziatura di Venezia IX,* p 147 (*CSP Rome I,* No 615): "questo Conte di Sofloch" is optimistically described as "Cattolichiss[im]o". This bulletin was relayed by Bonelli to Castagna, 3rd Nov, and by Zúniga to Philip, 4th Nov: Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* III. 186/8. Also with Suffolk for Norfolk: Castagna to Bonelli, 22nd Dec: *Ibid,* III. 208 (*CSP,* No 625; generally more accurate, in that "qualch[e] tumultuatione" is regarded as imminent rather than accomplished, and Norfolk/Suffolk is known to be in prison; but overstating the case in describing him as "adherito alla Regina di Scotia contra quella d'Inghilterra"). Facchinetti's information later became rather more accurate: to Bonelli, 31st Dec. Same to same, 21st Jan. 1570, on Elizabeth's fear that Mary be declared "Regina da commun consento de' popoli". *Nunziatura di Venezia IX,* pp 180, 187. De Spes on one occasion confused the Earls of Northumberland and Cumberland throughout a letter: to Philip, 15th June 1569: *CDIE* 90, p 248 (*CSP Sp. II,* No 107). Even on 6th Jan. 1572, a French newsletter, while giving Norfolk his correct title, still ascribed to him a personal claim "to the succession to the Crown of England": *CSP Rome II,* No 3 (orig. PRO 31/10/1, p 163).

progress. These made foreign intervention seem easier than it would have been. Sussex feared that the rebel-held port of Hartlepool could serve as a bridgehead for the Spanish, and wanted warships sent to blockade it and the garrison of the more important port of Hull to be reinforced.[98] At Christmas 1569 at Augsburg, not only was the rebel strength over-estimated by a factor of four or five (they were said to have 22,000 men), but they were believed to have taken Hull and Newcastle, and to be on the point of receiving Welsh reinforcements. The Nuncio at Venice, a month later, similarly believed that the rebels had taken three ports, unspecified.[99] The Venetian Ambassador in France, despite having had news from the English government of its victory a month before, still preferred to believe in Feb. 1570 that "the insurgents in England are becoming more powerful every day", a delusion confirmed by the arrival, after a good five weeks, of positive intelligence of Dacre's rising (in fact crushed even before his earlier report).[100]

Zúniga, in Rome, heard news at the beginning of November of an "alteración" in England. He implied this might not be

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[98] Sussex to Cecil, 1st Dec. 1569; Sussex, Hunsdon & Sadler to same, 6th Dec; cf Sadler & Darcy to same, 2nd Dec; Hunsdon to same, 29th Dec: PRO SP 15/15/65, 86; 66, 71; 134.

[99] Augsburg newsletter, 25th Dec. 1569; Facchinetti to Cardinal Alessandrino, 21st Jan. 1570: PRO 31/10/1, p 118; *Nunziatura di Venezia IX,* p 187 (*CSP Rome I,* Nos 626; 639).

[100] Alvise Contarini, 12th Feb. 1570; cf 17th Jan, 6th & 23rd Mar: *CSP Ven. VII,* Nos 470; 466, 477, 479. Cf also French newsletters, 4th & 5th Jan: PRO 31/10/1, p 124 (*CSP Rome I,* Nos 629/30). The latter claimed Sussex had joined the rebels.

uninfluenced by recent over-optimism stemming from the year's second field victory for the French Catholics, Moncontour. To the Spanish Cardinal Pacheco "it seemed that that movement should receive aid from Your Majesty so that that Queen should be punished as she deserved"; nonetheless, he joined with Cardinal Granvelle in advising the Pope to wait for further information on the subject. Moroni (Cardinal-Protector of England) counselled Pius to apply immediately to Philip. It was not however clear that Moroni's advice would carry weight, since Pius considered him a heretic.[101]

Pius V had been endeavouring, like his predecessors for the last eleven years, to push Philip II into a commitment to act against Elizabeth, before he ended by challenging her unilaterally. He got much the same response, *via* the Nuncio Castagna, that Philip had given regularly: in principle, the King would back Catholics against heretics; in practice, he was too short of money to do anything.[102] This was in fact a demand for money from the Pope. Zúniga, from the very first reports of the Northern Rising, had been clear enough that the grant of the *cruzada,* deferred for

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[101] Zúniga to Philip, 2nd Nov: Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* III. 183/4. Cf Michiel Surian, 5th Nov: *CSP Ven. VII,* No 463.

[102] Castagna to Bonelli, 22nd Dec. 1569; cf July 1570: PRO 31/9/70, pp 38; 377 (*CSP Rome I,* Nos 625, 682): "Il Card[ina]le mi disse ch[e] S[ua] M[aes]tà darà sempre ogni aiuto et favore a la parte Cat[oli]ca in ogni loco ch[e] sia; ma ch[e], per dire il vero, non puo resistere a le spese". Cf Alba to Zúniga, 22nd Feb. 1570: *Epistolario del Duque de Alba,* II. 325/6; to Philip, 10th Mar. 1569: *CDIE* 37, p 571 (*CSP Sp. II,* No 87).

years, was Philip's price for "entering into this business". He gave no guarantee of Spain going very far - his main argument was that the campaigns against the Turk and the Granada Moors justified the grant; England was an extra.[103]

Hearing premature news of the Rising, Pius expressed an inclination to invest with the kingdom of England (by his feudal authority) any English Catholic who would marry Mary. Either he was unsure who Norfolk *alias* Suffolk really was, or he was not enthusiastic about his candidacy. Alba had suggested beforehand that if the Pope *must* act against Elizabeth, "that enterprise must proceed in his name, because His Holiness has a certain feudal right over that kingdom, about which he {Alba} is not sufficiently informed to pronounce; and I {Zúniga} had not otherwise heard of it".[104]

Pius began to apply to Alba directly, realising that any initiative he proposed would languish indefinitely amid committees in Madrid. The Venetian envoy at Rome realised that if anything was to be done, it was Alba who would have to do it.[105] Philip suspected the Pope of trying to circumvent his

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[103] Zúniga to Philip, 2nd & 4th Nov. 1569, cf 7th & 14th Mar. 1570: Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* III. 184, 188/9; 249/51, 268. By 16th May however (*Ibid,* III. 335), he was concentrating on entry to the Holy League against the Turk as the lone *quid pro quo.* This piece of blackmail, generally overlooked, was a critical reason for Philip being so slow even to *sound* cooperative.

[104] Zúniga to Philip, 4th Nov. & 13th June 1569: Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* III. 188, 91. This vague (and not very hopeful) suggestion was another sign of how stoutly Alba rejected a religiously-motivated move against Elizabeth.

[105] Michiel Surian, 5th Nov. 1569: *CSP Ven. VII,* No 463.

blackmail over the *cruzada.*[106] For this reason, or out of general principle, he threw a fit of pique - about Alba being addressed "with scarce any mention therein of His Majesty... as if the Duke were Lord of Flanders" - which lasted over a month; then, with mutterings about Pius' "indirect" methods, finally authorised Alba to act for him after all. Alba's views expressed earlier made it clear enough that any action by him would be minimal. When reminded of Elizabeth's ingratitude to him, Philip agreed that the Consejo del Estado should consider "seriously" measures against her. The Northern Rebellion had collapsed by the time that Philip agreed to send (a little) money to Alba, for disbursement in England at the latter's discretion; he recommended Pius to confine himself to this course.[107]

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[106] Philip to Zúniga, 18th Dec. 1569 & 20th Jan. 1570: Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* III. 205, 225.

[107] Castagna to Bonelli, 14th Jan. 1570; cf 18th Jan, for Philip's agreement to send 12,000 ducats; 200,000 in the (indefinite) future. Castagna hoped he could be induced to send military advisers, since the rebels doubtless shared the general English military incompetence; but this was not concluded. Philip seemed to want "more light" before he took any further action. Bonelli to Castagna, 8th Mar, for apologies for addressing Alba ("to save time in a matter of such importance"). Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* III. 218/9, 225, 258/9 (*CSP Rome I,* Nos 632, 638, 652). *Ibid,* III. 225, 246: Philip to Zúniga, 20th Jan; reply, 28th Feb. The Spanish, who would presumably know, reported Philip's maximum commitment as 100,000 ducats - Zúniga to Philip, 7th Mar: *Ibid,* III. 249; De Spes to same, 13th May; cf *Correspondance de Fénélon,* II. 352 (25th Oct. 1569) for De Spes apparently making this offer prematurely. The English took this for a papal subsidy for Mary to seize the throne- Hartley, *Proceedings in Parliament,* pp 305, 321, 346: bill against Mary, 25th June 1572, & anon. Journal & Thomas Cromwell's, 14th May; *Bardon Papers,* ed. Read, pp 69, 73: charges against Mary, 1586. Walsingham's informant Franchiotto claimed that Pius had granted the Spanish *cruzada* to Mary for practices; this was a similar fantasy - 20th Aug. 1568: CP 4, f 20v (HMC 9: *Hatfield* I, No 1184).

Philip pointed out (in a letter in his own hand) how much better informed Alba would be about developments; also that it was necessary in this matter "to proceed with great deliberation and using the most appropriate methods; for the more good and holy the end, the more it is incumbent to direct and execute it [only] with a sound basis and a consensus".[108] Rome had heard all this from him before, and inaction always followed.

Philip would not agree to send troops, and insisted that even his subsidy should be transported by Englishmen, to distance himself from the business. Even this much commitment was clearly provoked by Philip's own grievances about his money more than by Catholic spirit. In early 1569, he replied to De Spes: "if what you say about taking the Crown away from the Queen were successful, it would certainly be of great moment, and I would assist it most willingly in order to redress religion, and shelter and console the good Catholics, who I am persuaded are very numerous" (not an unambiguous undertaking to act at an early stage in this process). Prudently desiring a check on De Spes' reports, he told Alba to investigate the matter, and authorised him to proceed appropriately. Later, Philip decided to delay a positive answer to the approaches of Irish exiles, but to bear them in hand: "if the Queen should be shameless enough to *force* us to break with her, I think it would be well to seize Ireland, as

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[108] Philip to Pius, 20th Jan: Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* III. 226/7.

they are constantly begging me to do... It would give her something to think about." These statements followed immediately ones on the failure of negotiations for the restitution of Spanish goods.[109] There was some justice in the later complaint of the Hispanophobe Catholic Thomas Wright: "You will say, he {Philip} was not ready. But you would better have said, he *would* not be ready. For to defend his money he could presently be ready; but to defend his religion, he could not be ready."[110]

The Nuncio was told, "if she abandon not the course she has taken and restore not the goods she has seized, the King... knows not how he can avoid making war upon her".[111] On the other hand, Philip refused, at the time the Northern Rising was beginning, to give the Earls any assurances until he got a report on the latest restitution negotiations from Chiappino Vitelli. As soon as there appeared hope of the money's restoration by negotiation, Philip backtracked on his earlier statements to Rome, on the grounds of changing circumstances, insisting also "that no reliance can be placed on the insurgents".[112] Philip had

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[109] Philip to De Spes, 18th Feb. 1569; also to Alba: *CSP Sp. II,* Nos 79-80 (origs. *CDIE* 90, pp 186/7; 37, pp 558/9). Same to same, 18th Nov: *CSP,* No 158 (orig. *CDIE* 38, p 239); cf to Alava, 25th June: Teulet, *Relations Politiques,* V. 48/9.

[110] "An licitum sit Catholicis in Anglia arma sumere et aliis modis Reginam et Regnum defendere contra Hispanos": Strype, *Annals,* III. ii. 586; tr. Pritchard, *Catholic Loyalism in Elizabethan England,* p 64.

[111] Castagna to Bonelli, 23rd May 1569: *CSP Rome I,* No 592 (orig. Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* III. 79-80).

[112] Philip to De Spes, 18th Nov. 1569: *CDIE* 90, p 304 (*CSP Sp. II,* No 157). Castagna to Bonelli, 25th April 1570: PRO 31/9/70, p 44 (fuller than Serrano,

been told by Spanish merchants that English retention of their moneys was losing Spain an extra 300,000 ducats per month. No doubt, this exaggerated figure threw the King, as all financial documents tended to do, into a state of confusion and alarm.[113] In effect, it was England which had the economic stranglehold on Spain.

Even later in 1570, Philip II's reconsideration of active intervention in England had nothing to do with the Catholic Church's harsher attitude with Elizabeth; but corresponded rather to the failure to date of negotiations over the seizures. Castagna reported that now, as he had not earlier in the year, Philip talked of a commitment of men as well as money. Some of his earlier stipulations remained however. He declared that he was not willing to make "a vain demonstration", and warned of the ill outcome of enterprises entered upon without due forethought, like the revolt of the Earls, who were "in too great a hurry to discover themselves", something of which he could never be accused (though he conceded that they had feared imminent

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Correspondencia diplomatica, III. 304; *CSP Rome I,* No 665): "mi faceva intendere ch[e] le cose d'Inghilterra non stanno più in quelli termini ch[e] erano alhora quando gliene parlai in Madrid, et secondo li successi ch'accorderebbono, li si sarebbo governato"; "nissun fondamento si possi mettere nelli detti sollevati".

[113] Castagna to Rusticucci, 7th Sept. 1570: PRO 31/9/70, p 52; cf English letter,1st Sept; to Rusticucci, 2nd Sept. & 28th Oct. 1570: *Ibid,* pp 248; 244, 251/2. Alba to Zúniga, 3rd May 1570: *Epistolario del Duque de Alba,* II. 384; to Philip, 10th May & 11th Dec.1569; Philip to Alba, 15th May: *CDIE* 38, pp 77/8, 248/55; 88; merchants to Philip, 28th April: *CDIE* 90, pp 225/6 (*CSP Sp. II,* Nos 96, 163; 97; 94).

arrest). "In a grave discourse", delivered to Castagna in person (a rare event), Philip insisted that his orders to Alba to be ready to help them "had not been given lightly, and as little more than a matter of form" (which he seemed to think Rome believed), "but with much deliberation, and in his own royal handwriting". But the rebels had not waited to arrange his help, and now he could do nothing.[114] The phrase he had used to Alba, given the Duke's earlier statements, was however virtually a guarantee of inactivity (even if the Rising had not collapsed before the letter was written, yet alone delivered): "with your *great prudence* and a full consideration of the state of affairs in general, you may ponder what is best to be done".[115]

The Venetian Ambassador wrote that "because such an expedition was difficult in itself, and might perhaps promote the Germans, and possibly even the French, to defend the Queen, it appeared to His Majesty, who is by nature cautious and who has to look many ways, expedient that the project should be deferred to some other season".[116] This reflected the insistent warnings of the Duke of Alba, who had gone so far as to warn that an invasion of England might cause the loss of Flanders.[117]

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[114] Castagna to Bonelli, 4th Aug. 1570: PRO 31/9/70, p 48 (fuller than Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* III. 493/4); cf to Cardinal Rusticucci, 24th Dec. (*Ibid,* p 57): "é materia di tanto peso et di tanto moto, ch[e] bisogna molto ben pensare, et caminare con molte considerationi" (*CSP Rome I,*Nos 684, 739).

[115] Philip to Alba, 16th Dec. 1569: *CSP Sp. II,* No 165 (orig. *CDIE* 38 p 165).

[116] Leonardo Donado, 24th June 1571: *CSP Ven. VII,* No 511.

[117] Alba to Zúniga, 22nd Feb. 1570; to Philip, 24th Feb. & 23rd Feb. 1571: *Epistolario del Duque de Alba,* II. 326, 343/4; 523/4, 527 ("que en lugar de

The captured rebel Thomas Bishop claimed that De Spes had promised Northumberland that 3000 men would arrive at Hartlepool within a week of his rising. Such an undertaking was not impossible from De Spes, but Alba neither could nor would live up to it. Or is the real explanation for the claim, that Bishop was described as "weak-brained" (not that this procured him a reprieve) ?[118] Some deluded themselves or others into believing that Alba might still aid the Earls after their flight to Scotland if they could successfully "breke the Bordars", as Leslie was supposed to have maintained[119] - but he was even less likely to move in support of a mere irritant than of a serious revolt.

De Spes does seem to have made extravagant promises before the Rising, based on the assumption that it did not matter whether or not they were fulfilled, since he regarded Elizabeth as so unpopular that her overthrow (or Cecil's; the present order's, at any rate) as inevitable through internal pressure alone, with perhaps some moral support from abroad. He claimed to have been told at the beginning of 1569 by Mary (*via* Leslie, who was quite capable of inventing the message; as indeed was De Spes) that with Philip's help, "I shall be Queen of England in three months, and Mass will be said all over the country". As implied by this, De

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conquistar el uno, no se perdiese el otro"). Cf Philip to De Spes, 29th Feb. 1569: *CDIE* 90, p 209 (*CSP Sp. II*, No 85).

[118] Examination, 10th Jan. 1570; cf to PC, 22nd May: CP 4, ff 86/7, 99; 5 f 52 (HMC 9: *Hatfield* I, Nos 1463, 1490).

[119] Hunsdon to Cecil, 30th Jan. 1570: Sharp, *Memorials*, p 170.

Spes hoped to see Elizabeth replaced; though he sometimes talked only in terms of getting rid of Cecil. "They will give way on the slightest pressure", he claimed.[120]

English Catholics considered that Philip had let them down. A lobbyist for English representation in the Sacred College considered it "truly appalling" that English Catholics' efforts should "lack the support and countenance of these most Christian princes", in spite of the harm the latter were themselves suffering at Elizabeth's hands.[121] Geoffrey Chamberlain wrote from Louvain to the highest-placed English person in Spain, the Duchess of Feria:

> "O[u]r rulers ar not ydle at court but dayly execute, empryson and vexe all good affected Catholiques. And more ar like even as they threaten to redd the contrey of them all, seing now they be owt of feare as well at home; as that forrayne princes will anything regard or endever for o[u]r bettering in God's cause, or respect redresse of these injuries done them by us...[122] The King's Majestie of Spayne dothe beyond the expectacion... entre into newe frendshippe and acord... Ther could nothing have more dismayed o[u]r well-affected Catholikes ther then this manyfest shewe of the Kinge's careless regarde to be a partie to reduce us to conformytie in religion, when bothe the tyme at home and the helpe of other Catholique princes semed rype and redy to have putt in practyse something for the good of Christe's cawse and Churche, wherby semeth

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[120] De Spes to Philip, 8th Jan. & 9th May 1569; cf 9th Oct. 1568, 5th Aug. 1569: *CDIE* 90, pp 171, 230/3; 139/40, 275 (*CSP Sp. II*, Nos 70, 95; 52, 130). He was more cautious writing to Alba, presumably knowing the Duke's dislike for an interventionist policy: *Ibid*, pp 190/1 (*CSP*, No 82).

[121] *CSP Rome I*, No 742 (orig. PRO 31/9/70, pp 405/6).

[122] *CSP Dom. Add*, saying "our injuries", implies that Chamberlain means the English Catholics'; really, he means those done by Elizabeth to Spain. His confused use of "our" both for Elizabeth's government and its opponents is typical for English Catholics in this period.

that Almighty God dothe playnely teache us not to putt o[u]r trust in man's power or pollecy, but only in Him".[123]

Lord Windsor's premature report of a papal deposition of Elizabeth stressed action by foreign princes; in particular, that if Philip II "be once settled, then have at England on al handes".[124] The condition was however of great significance in 1569/71, with Philip facing a serious Moorish revolt in Granada and the advance of the Turk in the Mediterranean. Sir Francis Englefield wrote: "Of our Kyng {Philip} nor of thys Duke here {Alba}, they {the English government} have no feare at all, theyre carte beyng already... more than fully looden wythe Moores at home and wythe Turckes abroade; and veryly by the doynges here at thys present, hyt seemythe that they say very trew". Robert Hogan, in Spain, wrote - "here ys great talk, and Ingland in woords ys halffe wonne; many a fowle brag ys made agaynst yt" - but then concluded that the danger was not immediate: "the King, having so many irerons in the fyer... ys forced to decemble wt. many thinges untyll tyme shall better s[er]ve hym".[125] The Pope himself

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[123] Chamberlain to Duchess of Feria, 5th April 1570: PRO SP 15/18/29. On Louvainist approaches to Philip, cf John Lee to Burghley, 23rd July 1571: SP 15/20/55.

[124] Windsor to Cecil, 15th June 1569: Wright, *Elizabeth & her Times,* I. 318.

[125] Englefield to Duchess of Feria, 30th April 1570: PRO SP 15/18/45; Hogan to Leicester & to Norris, 25th & 27th July 1569; cf same to same, 8th & 28th Mar. 1570; Robert Hogan to Norris, 12th Aug: SP 70/107, ff 147v, 142r; 111, ff 8r, 44r; 113, ff 101/2 (*CSP For. XI,* Nos 346, 34; 736, 779, 1173). Cf Killigrew to Cecil, 20th May 1569: Haynes, *Burghley SP,* pp 515/6 (HMC 9: *Hatfield* I, No 1302). Philip II tended, when asked by the Nuncio to do something about England, to bewail the Granada position: eg Castagna to Bonelli, 17th July1570: PRO 31/9/70, p 377 (fuller than Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* III. 464/5; *CSP Rome*

confused the issue. Concurrently with broaching the English question, he agitated more strongly for Spain to cooperate against the Turk, "the greatest enemy we have".[126]

If Philip was not in fact actively responsive to representations in favour of the English rebels, Alba was even less so. Asked by the Pope to help them, he wrote sarcastically to Zúniga, "His Holiness, whose zeal for the service of God is so great and whose intentions are so holy that we could rightly judge them to be more of Heaven than of earth, rambles [in his letter]. If our sins did not impede God's work, no one could doubt that without thinking of any human means we could set forth on an enterprise of this quality. But as the world has such a part in us, His Holiness ought not to marvel that we wish to avail ourselves of human means."[127]

There were various reasons for this attitude; but fundamentally, Alba was taking the same line that he had been doing in 1559: Spain's great enemy (besides Moslems) was France, and nothing England did should disguise this. Despite Elizabeth's outrageous behaviour over the seizures, "we need to woo her,

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I, No 682). De Spes complained the English were rejoicing at it: eg to Philip, 9th May 1569; to Alba, 3rd July 1570: *CDIE* 90, pp 233/4; KL V. 673 (*CSP Sp. II,* Nos 95, 196).

[126] Bonelli to Castagna, 11th Mar. 1570; cf Luis de Torres (special papal representative for the Holy League) to same, 20th May: Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* III. 261, 373 (neither in *CSP Rome*).

[127] 4th Dec. 1569: *CDIE* 4, pp 516/7; tr. Maltby, *Alba,* p 194. Cf Alba to Philip, 19th Mar. 1570: *Epistolario del Duque de Alba,* II. 352: the Pope plans "with such holy zeal, but this was insufficient, lacking many other things that are necessary".

ignoring the offences which she has done to the King our master, because now is not the time to revenge them, because if we do she will put herself into the arms of the French". The Anjou negotiation showed how imminent the danger of this was anyway (though he seemed rather uncertain as to whether it would be worse if Elizabeth married Anjou, or Mary did and she then attacked England). As for any alliance with France, whether to invade England or simply to aid the Marian party in Scotland, long experience had shown that only loss for Spain could result.[128] To very tentative approaches from France for an anti-English alliance, Alba replied firmly that he would have nothing to do with it. Zúniga warned the Pope, as the Spanish had always done, against entertaining any schemes which would involve the French "setting foot" in England.[129]

Zúniga made the same point repeatedly to the Pope. The only extenuating circumstance he could find about *Regnans in Excelsis* was that it did not encourage the French to "set foot". Fortunately, while the Spanish themselves complained of the

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[128] Alba to Alava, 18th Jan. 1570, cf same to same, 31st Jan; to Philip, 23rd Feb. 1571: *Epistolario del Duque de Alba,* II. 320/2, 525/7.

[129] 19th Feb. 1569: *CDIE* 37, p 566: "en ninguna mañera le quiso admitir la platica" (*CSP Sp. II,* No 81; unfortunately omitting this reply). This is probably a reply to something like Lorraine's letter in J de Croze, *Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II* (Paris 1866), I. 338/40, App. 5 (which is however primarily defensive in tone, fearing renewed active support for the Huguenots from England). Zúniga to Philip, 4th Nov; cf 13th June: Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* III. 189; 91. Inevitably however Lorraine and Alba were reported to have agreed on a joint English expedition - German advertisements, 3rd June: BL Lans. MS 94, f 163.

French lack of religious rigour, it served advantageously to disincline Pius to favour them. Philip however complained that, since *he* was not mentioned expressly in the Bull as its prospective enforcer (though he had little inclination to play this part), "suspicion" could arise that it was intended to encourage French pretensions.[130] Rumours about French influence returned to Fénélon in London, though accompanied by the old one about the Franco-Spanish league - without both sovereigns' consent, "the Pope, they say, would never have dared send so rigorous a bull".[131] They did not know Pius V.

Arco, the Ambassador of Philip's cousin Maximilian II, thought he saw the hand of the Cardinal of Lorraine behind the Bull (as many people in Europe did behind every sinister event; even when, as now, it was not there).[132] Lorraine however, as well as Catherine de Medici, dissociated himself from the Bull's unauthorised posting in Paris, blaming the Nuncio (also the supplier of the copy posted in London).[133] Walsingham, replacing Norris in Paris, was told that it was "some Spanish practise".[134]

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130 Zúniga to Philip, 28th April, 10th June & 11th Aug. 1570, cf 7th Mar; Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* III. 308, 397, 499; 250; Philip to Alava, 26th June: Teulet, *Relations Politiques,* V. 59-60.

131 25th July 1570: *Correspondance de Fénélon,* ed. Teulet, III. 250/5.

132 Schwarz, *Briefwechsel des Kaisers... mit Pius V,* p 160. Sutherland, *St. Bartholomew,* chs 5-6, gives more importance to Lorraine's (alleged) plots than they deserve, through taking uncorroborated outpourings of Protestant paranoia as objective evidence. Similarly, she ascribes to Philip II a settled intent to fight Elizabeth which he did not have.

133 C Hirschauer, *Politique de Pie V en France* (Paris 1922), pp 45, 74.

134 Walsingham to Cecil, 5th Mar. 1571: Digges, *Compleat Ambassador,* p 49

The untimeliness of Pius' action was apparent almost immediately. Other monarchs might not accept Thomas Norton's contention that "Papistrie is a universall and common treason to all kinges & states",[135] but they had a certain ideological suspicion of Pius V's action, especially since it did not serve the current political purposes of Philip II, or Charles IX, or Maximilian II. Tactful as ever, Pius V not only excommunicated Elizabeth but also crowned the Duke of Florence Grand Duke of Tuscany to the fury of Maximilian - who won over Philip to support his disapprobation of papal policy.[136]

That Pius himself did not believe Philip had really been won over to the enterprise of England, and pinned his hopes to the Northern Rebellion (with at best limited support from Alba), is shown by his apparent wish to disguise his action from Spain. Six weeks after the event, Pius mentioned to Philip's Ambassador for the first time that "it had been decided to declare the Queen of England a heretic and deprive her of her kingdom", as if that had not already been done. Zúniga remonstrated, "this declaration would only serve to anger the Queen, so she would slaughter the Catholics in her kingdom, who are what we should seek to preserve". Later, he wrote that the Bull had nonetheless been sent

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(*CSP For. XI*, No 1590).

135 *Bull Graunted... to Dr. Harding*, sig C1v, cf B1v.

136 Protonotario Biglio (Nuncio at Vienna) to Cardinal Rusticucci, 19th & 28th Oct. 1570: PRO 31/9/70, pp 233, 238 (*CSP Rome I*, Nos 719, 726); cf SP 70/112, ff 124, 126/7 (*CSP For. XI*, Nos 1050/1).

to Paris and Brussels for publication. Philip commented in the second letter's margin, "This is very bad, and could end up causing even more trouble than the Florentine business". His regrets about that applied again, "that His Holiness had proceeded to such an action without first informing himself that no prejudice or displeasure could arise to any Christian prince, especially considering that this matter could in fact offend everyone".[137]

Philip resented the fact that, despite his expertise as former King Consort of England, he had neither been consulted beforehand, nor notified afterwards. He eventually got a copy of the Bull that had passed *via* the Nuncio in France to Ridolfi, thence to De Spes, and finally back to Philip. Acknowledging its receipt, he told De Spes that the Pope had "allowed himself to be carried away by his zeal; he no doubt thought that what he did was the only thing requisite for all to turn out as he wished..."[138]

In Spain, the Nuncio Castagna had no definite knowledge of the Bull (which he believed to be a mere brief) as late as July 1570; though he said defensively to Philip he was sure the Pope would have done nothing that was not well-considered, and wholly directed to the good of Christendom, the encouragement of English Catholics, and the incitement to action of Catholic

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[137] Zúniga to Philip, 10th & 28th April 1570: Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* III. 291, 307/8; cf 28th Feb (III. 245) - the Pope had mentioned receiving the Earls' letter, but not his own response.

[138] Philip to De Spes, 30th June: *CSP Sp. II,* No 193 (orig. *CDIE* 90, pp 367/8). Cf Philip to Alava, 26th June: Teulet, *Relations Politiques,* V. 59-60.

princes.[139]

Alba sent to Rome a long attack on the harmful remedies applied by Pius to England's ailments, which "would be of great effect at the right time; at any other, they will do irreparable harm", indeed cause "complete ruin and destruction". He expressed grave doubts about the possibility of any alliance between English rebels and himself; the Spanish knew well enough how suspicious all Englishmen were of foreigners. He assumed the Bull must be intended to justify a foreign invasion, not just to support a revolt which had already failed. Though he considered the Bull ill-advised, he did not seem able fully to appreciate the depth of pontifical ignorance that had prompted it. The Englishmen who had advised the Pope to issue it were "gente de mucho discurso". He took it seriously enough to envisage a breach of diplomatic and commercial relations, to avoid contagion of excommunication, as necessitated by its publication; but the undesirability of this (ending efforts to recover Elizabeth's ill-gotten gains) buttressed his refusal to publish it.[140]

According to Zúniga, this broadside, relayed by himself,

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[139] Castagna, 17th July: PRO 31/9/70, pp 377/8 (fuller than Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* III. 464/5; *CSP Rome I,* No 682) : "che Sua Santità non averà fatta cosa, che non sia ben considerata, e tutta a fine del bene della Cristianità, e per dar animo alli Cattolici di quel Regno, e per eccitare li Prencipi Cattolici..."

[140] Alba to Zúniga, 3rd May 1570; cf to Philip, 23rd Mar. 1571, & 7th July, describing Ridolfi as "ligero": *Epistolario del Duque de Alba,* II. 380/4; 537. Zúniga similarly blamed "discursos de gente vana" - to Philip, 11th Aug. 1570: Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* III. 499-501. Pius "comes precipitately to such resolutions without the participation of those who could elucidate matters".

caused the Pope to admit he had made a mistake, and to consent (to avoid harm to English Catholics) that Alba and the French could "suspend" publication - which neither had shown any inclination anyway to undertake. He seemed resistant to actual revocation; he would consult with Monsignor Ormanetto, but the latter was "rigid" and unlikely to support Zúniga's hopes.[141]

Pius' circumvention of Philip had served to render even temporary suppression impossible. Even Alba's warning to De Spes not to meddle with it had come too late. Ridolfi and De Spes, a pair calculated to make any bad situation worse, had conveyed a copy to Felton, who had rendered the harm to English Catholics irreparable - though Ridolfi himself confessed soon afterwards, with uncharacteristic realism, "failing any other demonstration even by the neighbouring princes, the result might be a severe blow to Your Holiness' authority".[142] Alava, instigated by Alba, blamed De Spes and stressed that the Bull had come from the Nuncio in France without Spanish sanction. This protestation scandalised Fénélon, but did not convince the English.[143] "Was

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[141] Zúniga to Philip, 10th June 1570, cf 11th Aug: Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica,* III. 391/2, 499-500.

[142] To Pius V, 1st July 1570: *CSP Rome I,* No 678 (orig. PRO 31/9/70, p 408).

[143] Alba to De Spes, 25th May: KL V. 657; *Correspondance de Fénélon,* ed. Teulet, III. 250/5: 25th July 1570. Alba probably had not realised before that copies had reached London *via* Paris, despite his own obstructive efforts. On his campaign against De Spes, see Retamal-Favereau, "Anglo-Spanish Relations 1566/72", pp 156, 165, 261/2 /*Diplomacia Anglo-Española,* pp 110, 116, 176/7. Retamal-Favereau attempts to salvage the reputation of the much-maligned De Spes; clearly everybody used him as a whipping-boy, but not without genuine reason. The English ignored the differences between Alba and De Spes; Cecil described the latter as

nott the Bull latlye sett upe in derogation of Her Majestyes soverayntye printed at Lovayne, so vayne a thing tryed owte by the printers of Paris upon the setting upe of the Bull there in Marche laste ?"[144]

Copies were also sent to Poland, probably for distribution to the Hanse.[145] Besides the adverse Spanish reaction, Maximilian II repeated, with added emphasis, the consistent imperial line of the last decade - that any papal action against Elizabeth was likely to precipitate a general religious war in Germany. He declined to publish the Bull himself, and wanted it revoked or at least suspended for the sake of "the fostering and cherishing of public peace"; otherwise "scandals" would arise in the Church, a fear which was considered, in Catholic tradition, as a strong justification for the employment

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"Alba's creature" - "A Short Memoryall of the State of the Realme", 1569: Haynes, *Burghley SP,* p 580 (HMC 9: *Hatfield* I, No 1455).

[144] Discussion whether Elizabeth should aid the Low Countries: CP 7, f 75; BL Cott. MS Galba Cvii, ff 99v-100r. The dating of this is vexed - the first copy has hitherto been dated 1572; the second, 1580/1. The former date is more correct (if slightly late):
(a) due to the timing of the Paris Bull-posting; cf Walsingham to Cecil, 5th Mar. 1571: Digges, *Compleat Ambassador,* p 49 (*CSP For. XI,* No 1590);
(b) because the Northern Rising is (in the Cott. copy) blamed on "the Ambassadore of Spayne nowe resydente in Englande";
(c) because Alba's conduct is deplored "sythence his repayre to Flaunderes", as if he were still there.
The rhetorical question here quoted is probably another instance of conflation of bulls, since it was only the earlier reconciliation bull which was printed at Louvain. Cf 1586 list of grievances against Philip II (BL Lans. MS 51, f 61r): "The Bull of Pius Quintus prynted wth.in his dominions".

[145] Rusticucci to Vincente dal Portico (Polish Nuncio), 29th April 1570: PRO 31/9/70, p 230 (*CSP Rome I,* No 666). Cardinal Hosius, an East Prussian, had a particular interest in the English problem from earlier controversy.

of *raison d'eglise* rather than the letter of the law.[146]

With the Grand Duke's coronation fresh in his mind, Maximilian did not dissent when Sir Henry Cobham, on Elizabeth's behalf, treated him to a diatribe "against the insolent pride of the Busshoppe of Roome, wch. had geven owt sotche a writing against a Christian princess, she being lawfully dessended to her Crowne and by God establisshed in her state; wch. presumpcio[n]... being tolerated, his detestable pride might asspier to trouble wth. his poysoon the state of the greatest potentate in Christendoome". The Emperor himself used "sharp wordes against the Pope", and also said he was "advertised that the Pope will call it {the Bull} in againe".[147]

Pius later replied to Maximilian rather defensively, if fortified by Ormanetto's rigidity into a tactical depreciation of his own plenitude of power:

> "As long as the said pretended Queen shall persist in her separation, wrought by her own act, from the body of the Catholic Church and the communion of this Holy See, we seem to be unable in any way to revoke the sentence [of deposition] and excommunication which, at the instance of many good and Catholic men, we have pronounced against her... Your Majesty knows that what has already been done cannot be revoked and cancelled, and as to preventing further publication, that is altogether beyond our power."[148]

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[146] Maximilian II to Pius V, 28th Sept: Schwarz, *Briefwechsel des Kaisers... mit Pius V*, pp 159/60 (*CSP Rome I*, No 708). For other gloomy predictions of war in Germany, see Zúniga to Philip, 28th April: Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica*, III. 307/8; Alba to Zúniga, 3rd May: *Epistolario del Duque de Alba*, II. 382.

[147] Cobham to Cecil, 17th Sept. 1570: PRO SP 70/114, f 21r (*CSP For. XI*, No 1267); abridged version Wright, *Queen Elizabeth & her Times*, I. 379.

[148] 5th Jan. 1571: *CSP Rome I*, No 746 (orig. PRO 31/9/71, pp 327/8).

Walsingham "shewed [Charles IX] that if he did not take order in this, the like measure might be measured to himself. He answered that he did perceive that very well, and whosoever he was that should seem to touch in honour any of his confederates, he would make account of them accordingly."[149] Because of the threats Pius V regularly uttered against both Maximilian and Charles whenever they were too soft on their Protestants, this argument might be telling.

Whatever its failures, the papal Bull of excommunication was at least an explicit direction to English Catholics to eschew any tacit countenance of the Elizabethan regime. Norton might consider it a misbegotten Minotaur, whose "syre the great Bull {the Papacy}, hys damme the prostitute cowe {leading traitors in England}, hys children the foolish calves {traitors' dupes} were more ashamed of hym than the noble Lion {Elizabeth} was afraide of him"; so that, he claimed, some Catholics, finding it "came not to so politike end as they loked for", alleged it to be a Protestant forgery.[150]

Contrast Pius' insistence on his right to abrogate *any* former papal act when his predecessors' privileges to the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies were quoted at him: Catena, *Vita del Gloriosissimo Papa Pio Quinto,* p 102.

[149] To Cecil, 5th Mar. 1571: Digges, *Compleat Ambassador,* p 49 (*CSP For. XI,* No 1590).

[150] *Disclosing of the Great Bull,* sig B3v; *Addition Declaratorie,* sig B1. Much of the popular literature on the Northern Rising and the Excommunication was largely inspired by the scope for bovine puns even feebler than Norton's, especially since the Earl of Westmorland's heraldic device was also a bull (alone enough surely to show, if there was cosmic order in the world, that the Pope's Bull caused the Rising). Cf Knell, *Braineles Blessing of the Bull,* STC 19974.1 (1570), reprinted in J

"Leave of, you rebels, for to rave
And curse your dad the Pope;
Which makes you oft such crowes to pul,
Then leaves you in the mire,
In sending you to such a Bull;
This is but symple hire".[151]

The most rapid effect of the Bull indeed was that Elizabeth was finally persuaded to execute a few Catholics by normal judicial procedure, as she had long been urged but as she had not done until subjected to provocation from Rome. Hagiographers, with generalised talk of bloody persecution, have always done their best to obscure this issue; the suppression of the Northern Rising, harsh even by Tudor standards - outside Ireland - is another matter. It should also be noted that the harshest legislation of 1571 did concentrate on the importation of bulls, whose noxiousness had been shown; more general capital measures awaited the further provocation of the 1580 Irish invasion.[152] Already however balladeers rejoiced that Elizabeth had finally been persuaded to execute someone:

"God be thanked that our Queene begins to look about,
To draw the sword out of the shethe, to weed such
traitors out.

Therfore you Popish traitors all, forsake your Romish sects;

Lilly, *A Collection of 79 Blackletter Ballads & Broadsides* (1867), as No 68; John Barker, *Plagues of Northomberland,* STC 1421 (1570), No 16 in Lilly; William Kirkham, *Joyfull newes for true subjectes to God and the Crowne,* STC 15015 (1570), No 71 in Lilly; William Gibson, *Discription of Norton's Falcehod of Yorkeshyre,* STC 11843 (1570).

[151] GB (William Birch), *A Free Admonition without any fees To warne the Papistes to beware of three trees,* STC 3077, reprinted in Payne Collier, *Old Ballads from Early Printed Copies,* p 88.

[152] See how 23 Eliz. I c 1 extends 13 Eliz. I c 2: *SR* IV. 528/31, 657/8.

Obey your Queene like subjects true, or els beware your necks".[153]

At least the Bull reinforced the trend towards active recusancy initiated in the later 1560s; even if there remained great room for improvement until the missions of the 1580s. It is however at best a half-truth to explain Catholic revival "not because *Regnans in Excelsis* put fresh heart into them and halted the drift towards the established Church, but because missionary priests from Douai and the other seminaries brought the Counter-Reformation to England for the first time".[154] For a start, the Bull probably was responsible for many, like Thomas Ford and Robert Johnson, finally abandoning efforts to accomodate themselves to the English position and going to the seminaries. Sometimes its influence was indirect; the religious indiscretions of Cuthbert Mayne and Edmund Campion were only then taken serious note of, causing them to go abroad.[155]

Spiritually, Rome could consider this a success - even if it had its drawbacks, as pro-government commentators were swift to point out in retospect. "It seems the Pope had then his

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[153] John Cornet, *Admonition to Dr Story*, STC 5772 (1571); cf Gibson, *Discription of Norton's Falcehod:*

"And bountie of our curteous Queene
Too long hath spared her foe...
Although shee flowe in pitifull zeale,
And loveth to sucke no blood:
Yet God a *caveat* wyll her lend
T'appease these vipers' moode."

[154] P McGrath, *Papists & Puritans under Elizabeth I* (1967), p 72.

[155] Camm, *Lives of the English Martyrs*, II. 444, 474; 209, 281.

aims to take a true number of his children; but the Queen had the greater advantage, for she likewise took tale of her opposite subjects, their strength and how many they were." "The most part of the moderate sort of Papists secretly misliked this Bull, because there had been no admonition preceded according to law, and foreseeing also that thereby a great heap of mischiefs hung over their heads, who before had the private exercise of their religion within their own houses quietly enough... The Bull was slighted as a vain crack of words that made a noise onely."[156]

More aggressive proferring of the Oath of Supremacy and fear of greater "extremityes" were also the causes Lord Morley offered for his unlicensed departure to Flanders.[157] According to Leslie, the Earl of Southampton regarded this departure as from conscience, and planned to follow suit, due primarily to the dilemma of action created by the Bull. Leslie (he said when later trying to ingratiate himself with the government) argued that "so long as the Q. Ma[jes]tie's parte was the stronger, he ought to obaye [her]; for this was but a threatnyng", a (not really reassuring) position Gregory XIII was to formalise.[158]

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[156] Naunton, *Fragmenta Regalia* (1641), in *Harl. Misc.* II. 81; Camden, *Queen Elizabeth,* p 148.

[157] To Elizabeth, 31st Aug. 1570: PRO SP 12/73/42. If he later stressed his debts instead as a motive, this was probably a tactical argument to allow him to keep his property and pay them off - to Cecil, 20th May 1574: CP 8, ff 29-30 (HMC 9: *Hatfield* II, No 247). Cf Antonio de Guaras to Secretary Zayas, June 1570: *CSP Sp. II,* No 191 (orig. *CDIE* 90 pp 362/3): "some people of position passing over to avoid the Pope's censures".

[158] 26th Oct. & 3rd Nov. 1571: Murdin, *Burghley SP,* pp 28/9, 45. Southampton

Sir John Atherton claimed that in Lancashire "*sythince Ffelton sett uppe the Bull,* the gretest there never come at anie s[er]vice... but have openly entertyned sondrie renegate Lovaniste Massers wth. their Bulles". The Earl of Derby certainly turned recusant for the first time. In 1577, seven years was the period during which Bishop Downham of Chester lamented (rather over-artistically) 7000 defections to Popery in his diocese.[159] At the same time, the refugee Countess of Northumberland wrote to Alba to a similar effect: "...after they heard of the excommunication of the Queen of England".[160] A Protestant preacher at East Grinstead declared that Catholics used to be "conformable in al respects and content to do anything that beseemed good Christians to do; but since they sucked that mad bull, they are become even as brainsick calves, froward, stubborn, disobedient in word and deed, not to be led nor ordered by any reason".[161]

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denied this account on 31st Oct, but substantially confirmed it on 3rd Nov: CP 7, f 89; 6, f 117r (HMC 9: *Hatfield* I, Nos 1701, 1715).

[159] Oct. 1570: PRO SP 15/19/16.I; Haigh, *Reformation & Resistance in Tudor Lancashire,* p 253; *CRS Misc. XII,* p 3. Cf Bishop Barnes of Carlisle, 27th Oct. 1570: SP 12/74/22.

[160] Oct. 1570: KL VI. 8 (French orig).

[161] Dr Overton, quoted by Black, *Age of Elizabeth,* pp 138/9. Cf Commons petition, 2nd Mar. 1576, against "the increase of obstinate Papistes which, ever since Your Majestie's sworne enemye the Pope did by his bulles pronounce deffinitive sentence against Your Highnes' person and prosedinges, have given evident testimonie of theire corrupte affection to him... in that they forbeare to participate with Your Majestie's faithful subjectes in prayer and administracion of sacramentes" - Hartley, *Proceedings in Parliament,* p 446.

"*Rosalind:*
Never so much as in a thought unborn
Did I offend Your Highness.
Duke: Thus do all traitors;
If their purgation did consist in words,
They are as innocent as Grace itself -
Let it suffice thee that I trust thee not."

As You Like It, I. iii

"*Rogero:* Hold yourself contented, my Lord; he that is brought to the bar in case of treason, must look to have more objected than he can answer, or any man is able to justify....
I defy all the world that will hear a traitor speak for himself; 'tis against the law, which provides that no man will defend treason, and he that speaks for himself - being a traitor - doth defend treason."

Shirley, *The Traitor,* III. i

"*Henry:* What irreligious pagans are these,
Of such as hold them of the Holy Church !....
Agent for England, send thy mistress word
What this detested Jacobin hath done...
Navarre, give me thy hand; I here do swear
To ruinate that wicked Church of Rome,
That hatcheth up such bloody practices;
And here protest eternal love to thee,
And to the Queen of England specially,
Whom God hath blessed for hating Popery."

Marlowe, *The Massacre at Paris,* V. v
(the death of Henri III)

Regnans in Excelsis failed to support an English rising (which had already collapsed). It failed to inspire a Spanish invasion (which was never intended). It failed to isolate Elizabeth

diplomatically, or even from potential Catholic marriages. It is unsurprising that people began to wonder quite what the purpose of the Bull was, other than to compromise English Catholics both spiritually and politically.

Even most curialists continued to describe Elizabeth, after *Regnans,* as "Regina d'Inghilterra", rather than as "pretensa Regina", as medieval precedent, and the Bull itself, suggested.[1] Initially the commonest compromise was "quella d'Inghilterra", perhaps slightly uncomplimentary, but nearly as common before the Bull as after it.[2] In France, Nuncio Frangipani went further, and talked of "quella mala femina" and "q[ue]lla tirana"; but still envisaged that Elizabeth could be absolved and the proposed embargo lifted if she freed Mary and restored Catholicism.[3] It was also he who was said to have tried to persuade Catholic countries to break off diplomatic relations with the excommunicate; with a total lack of success.[4]

Frangipani's successor Antonio-Maria Salviati dropped

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[1] Eg Castagna to Bonelli, 25th April 1570: PRO 31/9/70, p 44 (fuller than Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica.* III. 304; *CSP Rome I*, No 665). There are only a few early examples of modification of terminology - eg Castagna to Rusticucci, 7th Sept; to Bonelli, 5th Feb. 1571: 31/9/70, p 52; 71, pp 115/6 : "la nominata Regina" (latter *CSP*, No 749).

[2] Before: Castagna to Cardinal Borromeo, 26th Nov. 1569; Bonelli to Castagna, 15th Jan. 1570 : PRO 31/9/70, p 36; Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomatica.* III. 222 (latter *CSP Rome I.*No 637).

[3] To Rusticucci, 28th Oct. 1570; cf to same, 2nd Sept. 1570; to Galli, 20th June 1572 (& 13th Feb. 1576: "q[uella] mala Regina") : PRO 31/9/70, pp 249/52, 244; 71, p 213; 73, p 97 (*CSP Rome I.* Nos 725; 700; *II.* Nos 37, 486).

[4] Alvise Contarini (Venetian Ambassador in France), 11th April 1571: *CSP Ven. VII*, No 506.

this practice. He drew the line however at attending the baptism of Charles IX's daughter, where Elizabeth was represented as godmother by proxy. The Cardinal of Lorraine (of all people) tried to overcome this scruple, but Salviati contracted a diplomatic cold. After this incident, he felt impelled for the first time to ask for guidance in principle as to meeting the English Ambassador. His predecessors (especially the unreliable d'Este) had not minded; but the Queen had not then been actually "denounced and excommunicated".[5] Salviati's boycott was not that unusual, since Ambassadors of France and Spain, of England and Portugal, and of Florence and Ferrara also had to avoid each other in public, because any meeting would produce bitter wrangles over their precedence. Salviati was succeeded in turn by

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[5] Salviati to Galli, 2nd Feb. & 12th Mar. 1573: *ANG XII*, pp 397/8, 438 (*CSP Rome II*, Nos 150, 162; the latter again describes her as "declarata" by Pius V - formalising *excommunicatio latae sententiae* - though *CSP* renders this 'deprived'). Salviati however omitted to qualify "Regina" with "pretensa" - eg to Cardinal Buoncompagni (Gregory's nephew), 21st July 1572: *Ibid*, I. 161/3 (*CSP*, Nos 58). Galli wrote referring to Elizabeth as "quella mala femina"; nonetheless, the Nuncio persisted in calling her "Regina d'Inghilterra" - Galli to Salviati, 8th Sept. 1572; replies, 1st & 11th Oct: *Ibid*, I. 224/5; 255, 269/70 (*CSP*, Nos 77; 93, 96). Galli in turn relapsed into this habit - eg 22nd Sept. to Salviati; 11th Oct. to Ormanetto (though that stresses her unworthiness): *Ibid*, I. 248/9; PRO 31/9/71, p 162 (*CSP*, Nos 86, 98). Cf Galli, on the same day, to the Nuncio in Spain on Elizabeth as "quella rea femina" and to the Nuncio in France, simply as "la Regina d'Inghilterra" (a matter of conformity of vocabulary to the sensibilities of host courts) - to Taberna & to Castelli, 1st Oct. 1582: J Kretzschmar, *Die Invasionsprojekte der katholischen Mächte gegen England zur Zeit Elizabeths* (Leipzig 1892), Apps. 15-16, pp 153/4. Bishop Sega, while Nuncio in Flanders (before he went to Spain) suffered the embarrassment of a surprise visit from Elizabeth's envoy Dr. Wilson, though with "a sort of half protest that he came... without any commission from his Queen" - to Galli, 11th May 1577: *CSP*, No 602 (orig. PRO 31/9/73, p 237).

Anselmo Dandino, who *never* qualified his references to Elizabeth as Queen, and was also quite *blasé* about contact with her Ambassador, Sir Amyas Paulet.

It is notable that Catholics most often referred to the Bull as an excommunication only. As had occurred previously, an initially irreversible deprivation might have to be glossed as reversible, if political realities proved too adverse to the full effect.[6] Anyway, Rome seemed to receive calmly enough the news of a brief renewal of Austrian negotiations for a marriage alliance with the excommunicate.[7] In 1572, Philip II made more of the Most Christian King's conclusion of the Treaty of Blois (a clear threat to Spain) with "a declared and manifest heretic" than did Gregory XIII, who was still trying to build bridges to Paris.[8]

The virtual collapse of Anglo-Spanish diplomatic relations, which was no doing of Pius V, allowed Philip to claim motives of religious conviction. These were tested by Henry Cobham's 1575 mission to Madrid. Rome tried to dissuade Philip from "taking the snake to his bosom", but was unable to stop

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[6] In 1605 however, Pius' biographer Gabutius expatiated on Elizabeth's deprivation of any possible honour - *De Vita et Rebus Gestis*, p 104. This was an addition to his habitual translation from Catena's Italian *Vita*, which was written soon after Gregory XIII's "mitigation".

[7] Protonotario Biglio to Rusticucci, 5th, 7th & 28th Oct. 1570: PRO 31/9/70, pp 234/5, 238 (*CSP Rome I*, Nos 711, 713, 726).

[8] Castagna to Galli, 28th June 1572: PRO 31/9/71, p 196 (*CSP Rome II*, No 41; its 'avowed heretic" is not however the best translation of "manifestata heretica", which also (especially as a Latin phrase used amid Italian) has the sense of judicial 'notoriety", prior to Pius V's "declaration").

either the King or Catholic ambassadors from meeting Cobham, and could only console itself with the brevity of his stay.[9] The Nuncio Ormanetto was not altogether confident that Spain was not entertaining a rumoured offer of the marriage of Elizabeth's thirteen-year-old daughter. He was perhaps somewhat surprised to receive the reply from Rome that "were it true that the pretended Queen had that daughter, His Holiness deems that it would enable His Majesty to dispense with war... and think of some accord by way of a marriage, which in the end might bring the realm back to the Catholic Faith".[10] Not only in Madrid did refusal to compromise with the excommunicate Queen falter.

Elizabeth's excommunication was also alleged as an obstacle to Anglo-Venetian relations between 1575 and 1578. Rome hoped to be able to dissuade Venice from receiving her Ambassador, as it had not dissuaded Spain - but special efforts were called for, and doubt expressed until the last minute about the result. The real obstacles were English piracy and Venetian misogyny; as Elizabeth told one embassy, ever "since I became Queen, I have been held in small account" by the Republic.[11]

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[9] Galli to Ormanetto, 25th Nov. 1575; cf newsletter, 21st June; Ormanetto to Galli, 30th Oct. & 10th Dec: PRO 31/9/72, pp 234; 250, 215, 221 (*CSP Rome II*, Nos 452; 411, 442, 459); but same to same, 18th Jan. 1576, saying that Philip undertook to receive no more envoys from "quella mala femina": PRO 31/9/73, pp 1-3 (*CSP*, No 475).

[10] Ormanetto to Galli, 9th Dec. 1575; reply, 29th Jan. 1576: PRO 31/9/72, pp 219/20; 73, p 70 (*CSP Rome II*, Nos 458, 483). The mythical daughter, and a possible sister, cropped up again at the time of the renewed French marriage negotiation - see Read, *Mr. Secretary Walsingham*, II. 90. Cf Dandino to Galli, 11th Oct. 1579: *ANG VIII*, pp 516/7.

Elizabeth could not even be isolated diplomatically. As for the possibility of more active steps from abroad, the distractions of the 1560s persisted. If only for motives of self-preservation, Gregory XIII's priority, like Pius V's, remained the Turkish threat in the Mediterranean. When the Nuncio Ormanetto in Spain waxed enthusiastic about "the enterprise" of England, Cardinal-Secretary Galli told him "...this would please the Holy Father infinitely, *so long as* that through awaiting this enterprise, there is no loss of energy in pursuing that against the Turk. Rather, Your Reverence should be very careful, in recommending to His Majesty help in English affairs, not to injure those of the [Holy] League which are Your Reverence's principal duty." According to Ormanetto's successor Sega, his "principal concern was to induce the King to [re]join the League... against the Turk... The second was the enterprise of England."[12]

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[11] *CSP Ven. VII*, Introduction, pp xii-xxi; No 617: 25th Feb. 1576; cf Meyer, *England & the Catholic Church under Elizabeth*, pp 265/6. In fact, Cardinal-Secretary Galli was willing to compromise on a Venetian embassy in England, but not on the entry of heretics to "infect" Italy - to Nuncio Castagna, 24th Mar: *Nunziatura di Venezia XI*, ed. A Buffardi (1972), pp 513/4 (*CSP Rome II*,No 498). It was not primarily ecclesiastical pressure that blocked the former.

[12] Galli to Ormanetto, 18th Mar. 1573; cf 13th Mar. 1574: Von Toerne, *Don Juan et les Projets de Conquête*, I. 322, App. 2 (this pt not in *CSP Rome II*, No 159); 329, App. 8 (*CSP*, No 289, rather misleadingly); cf 24th Dec. 1575: *Ibid*, II. 77. Sega's *Relatione*, 1583: Kretzschmar, *Invasionsprojekte der katholischen Mächte*, App. 48, p 213. Cf L Karttunen, *Grégoire XIII comme politicien et souverain*, Annales Academiae Scientiarim Fennicae B.2 (Helsinki 1911), pp 2-6; Von Toerne,

Unsurprisingly, uncomplimentary (if canonically apt) references to Elizabeth tended to arise in connection with schemes actually to enforce the deposition, starting with Cardinal Bonelli's description of her, at the end of his uncle's pontificate, as "that impious Jezebel".[13] Pius V's "rigid" canonist Ormanetto became Nuncio in Spain under Gregory XIII and a clearing-house for anti-Elizabethan projects. The first of these he described as directed against "la Regina". It was apparently Beaton, a Marian partisan, who reminded him that this should be "pretensa Regina". Thereafter, he was more conscientious about this than any of his colleagues or Rome itself.[14]

It was optimistic reports from Ormanetto of the feasibility of "the enterprise" that worked Cardinal-Secretary Galli up again to talking of "la pretensa Regina", "quella rea et malvagia femina". Ormanetto still referred to "la pretensa Regina" while, *la via di forza* having faltered, expressing a hope that she might be reconciled by *la via di negotiatione,* though this might require a miracle. Galli on the other hand softened his epithet to "la Donna d'Inghilterra", while discussing this possibility.[15]

Ptolomée Gallio: Cardinal de Come (Paris & Helsingfors 1907), ch 3.

[13] Bonelli to Castagna, 4th Jan. 1572: PRO 31/9/71, p 142 (*CSP Rome II*, No 1).

[14] Ormanetto to Galli, 18th Sept. 1572, 24th Jan. 1573: PRO 31/9/71, p 177; 72, p139 (*CSP Rome II*, Nos 81, 145). Post-Beaton examples - 19th Feb,7th May & 9th Aug. 1573, 1st Mar. & 22nd May 1574, etc: 31/9/72, pp 145, 152, 162, 190, 197/8 (*CSP*, Nos 154, 193, 233, 285, 311).

[15] Galli to Ormanetto, 18th Mar. & 14th Apr. 1573: Von Toerne, *Don Juan et les Projets de Conquête*. I. 322 (App. 2), 179 (*CSP Rome II*, Nos 159, 182); reply, 17th June: PRO 31/9/72, p 156 (*CSP*, No 200 - inaccurate however in saying

Ormanetto's predecessor Castagna (now at Venice), after his experiences of Philip II, had despaired of *la via di forza.* "Though English affairs should never be given up, they should be handled... so as to give that Lady as little reason as possible for more ill will, because it is impossible to take energetic action, and I believe that any methods but the foresaid would at present but put us upon a false track." He later expressed the hope that, "the Queen" favouring only "that religion which may best serve her purpose", Puritan "malcontents" might well drive her back to Rome.[16] However, by 1577, Rome had determined on action against "quella rea femina", unilaterally if still unable to "persuade His [Catholic] Majesty to put off the mask in his dealings with that she-devil and give her bread for flour".[17]

The adventurer Sir Thomas Stukeley (self-styled Marquis or Duke of Leinster or Ireland, according to his fancy), as befitted a great agitator for action against Elizabeth, referred to her as "la pretensa Regina", "quella maledetta femina" - but to Mary as

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"there was no human reason for giving up the case as desperate"; Ormanetto meant "no worldly consideration justified giving up the case as desperate", but thought that, without divine intervention, it was). Galli to Ormanetto, 28th June & 17th July: *Ibid*, pp 173, 175 (*CSP*, Nos 212, 223).

[16] To Galli, 12th Feb. & 11th June 1575: *CSP Rome II*, Nos 377, 406 (origs. PRO 31/9/72, pp 273/4; *Nunziatura di Venezia XI*, pp 381/2). Cf 13th Aug. (*Nunziatura di Venezia XI*, p 398; *CSP*, No 418), announcing "she has begun to liberate some of the imprisoned Catholics on the sole condition that they acknowledge her as Queen". The Polish Nuncio was similarly optimistic - Hosius to Galli, 5th Aug: PRO 31/9/72, pp 288/9 (*CSP*, No 416).

[17] Galli to Ormanetto, 27th Oct. 1577; 2nd July: Von Toerne, *Don Juan et les Projets de Conquête*, II. 169n, 149n (*CSP Rome II*, Nos 678, 619).

"n[ost]ra Regina".[18] Fr. David Wolf SJ, one of the earlier supporters of Don John of Austria as an agent for extending the Holy League from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, produced a long report on the practicability of an "enterprise" against Ireland. He explained that, born a subject of the English Crown, he felt free to write this only because of *Regnans in Excelsis,* which "excommunicated the Lady Elizabeth pretended Queen of England and deprived her of the title to the realm... and excommunicated all who obeyed her". He stressed this motive in the FitzGerald opposition to Elizabeth, and their reluctance to make peace with an excommunicate - a course forced upon them by the failure of foreign aid.[19]

Philip II was able to respond to Ormanetto's pressure by citing "the mischief done by the publication of the Bull of Pius V against the pretensions of the pretended Queen and the consequent commotion", and stressing the need for future

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[18] Proposal of ?1573: PRO 31/9/72, pp 241/4 ; cf that of Feb. 1571: PRO 31/9/71, pp 385/6 (*CSP Rome II*, No 265; *I*, No 750). He also referred to Burghley as "Secretary Cecil". Cf Ormanetto to Galli, 1st Mar. & 1st Apr.1574 (*Ibid.* pp190/2; *CSP*, Nos 285, 298) on a rumour of his death; also distinguishing him as "diligentissimus filius tenebrarum". Possibly, this represents a view of the invalidity of Elizabeth's promotions after her deposition. This was why Thomas Woodhouse, plunging into statutory treason in 1572, refused to call him Lord Burghley: Camm, *Lives of the English Martyrs*, II. 191/5. However, a reluctance in Europe to rename Cecil "Burghley" extended beyond circles opposed to Elizabeth; and it was at least a decade before Leicester's 1565 peerage began to make any impact on the custom of calling him "Milord Robert". The simplest explanation is that Latins were conservative about outlandish English names.

[19] Wolf's "Description of Ireland", 24th Mar. 1574: PRO 31/9/72, pp 414, 422 (*CSP Rome II*, No 293; outline only).

application of "human prudence" (ie delay).[20]

Philip did however come to accept in principle a limited intervention in Ireland (equivalent retaliation for English activities in Flanders). He claimed (nonsensically) that Pius V had deprived Elizabeth of England but not of Ireland; stressed that Ireland was a papal fief (ignoring the Nuncio's reply that so was England); and proposed that Gregory XIII issue a deposition Bull for Ireland, which should however be kept secret until the moment was right. Ormanetto agreed that "Pius V... kept his own counsel as to his doings; so that it is no marvel if, being perchance ill informed of these matters, he omitted the deprivation of the realm of Ireland", and that his Bull "ought never to have been published until an army was on its way to England... for the publication of the Bull of Deposition, unaccompanied by the conquest of that kingdom, has done much harm, causing the death of many Catholics and making that Lady much more hostile to the Apostolic See".[21]

Very gradually, it became apparent whither Philip II's animadversions were tending. He did not wish "to discover himself", but insisted any Irish invasion occur "under the name of His Holiness", as overlord of the island. Iago-like, he had shifted

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[20] Ormanetto to Galli, 26th Nov. 1573: *CSP Rome II*, No 260 (orig. PRO 31/9/72, p 167). "The consequent commotion" is however a tendentious trn. of "li moti che si scoprirono in quel tempo". I doubt Philip adopted the myth that the Bull caused, or preceded, the Northern Rising.

[21] Ormanetto to Galli, 25th Oct. 1574; cf 29th Mar. 1576: *CSP Rome II*, Nos 358, 499 (origs. PRO 31/9/72, pp 201/4; 73, pp 8-9).

his argument from his purse to his good name; failure in an overt commitment would endanger his "reputation" - and there was a considerable danger of failure, unless he would make a greater commitment. He even became solicitous for Gregory's "reputation", if he hearkened to the assurances of Catholic exiles: "There is not much basis upon which to risk His Holiness' authority. Compared to this and the reputation which would be lost, all the rest is of much less importance."[22]

Ormanetto wrote in a fury: "One might as well say that it is never to be accomplished, and is to end in smoke... Procrastination here was the ruin of the same business in the time of Pius V... These are but dilatory tactics and methods of evading an answer... His Majesty's affairs are being ruined by delays..." After three years of discussing the reduced Irish project, which required only limited and covert Spanish participation, Ormanetto died, without having achieved concrete progress in the matter he declared especially close to his heart. His successor, Bishop Sega of Piacenza (who, like Ormanetto, was

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[22] Galli to Ormanetto, 9th Oct. 1575: Von Toerne, *Don Juan et les Projets de Conquête*. II. 74n (*CSP Rome II*, No 435); Philip to Zúniga, 16th Apr. 1576: *Ibid*. II. 90n. The first suggestion had come from Ormanetto (18th Mar. 1575), in order to circumvent some of Philip's reservations; but it still relied on getting money from him, which was nearly as hard (with more reason) as getting it from Elizabeth: *Ibid*. II. 71n. Cf *Ibid*. II.101, 107, for Philip's instructions to Zúniga later in 1576 to argue against Don John of Austria's invasion plan, though he himself claimed to support it. It seems probable that Philip confined himself to a theoretical enthusiasm, for papal consumption, *after* the project had collapsed. Evidence for any real commitment on his part is entangled with the obscure mendacities of Antonio Perez. Cf Von Toerne, *Ptolomée Gallio*. pp 157ff.

sometimes more enthusiastic for the English enterprise than was Rome itself), arrived to find Philip still "pondering and discussing it in conference", and offering only "a fair answer" that "amounted to nothing in particular".[23]

Englefield and Allen, the leading English Catholic exiles, conferred with Zuniga, Philip's Ambassador in Rome. They saw it being best for their hopes to stress the prominence of "the Pope's name" which Philip had favoured. But earlier ill-fated plots had also provided a precedent. Stukeley and his friends had long urged that landing in Ireland and having "displayed his holy standard, he will have to publish Your Holiness' Excommunication and without bloodshed all the island will go over to your devotion... It is necessary that all these operations and holy enterprises be made in the name of Your Holiness and of no-one else... Catholics and heretics alike... would suspend their particular quarrels rather than suffer themselves to become subjects of a foreign prince."[24]

So the Roman group concluded: "As a pretext for the war, there is the execution of the Excommunication that Pius V issued

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[23] Ormanetto to Galli, 17th Apr. 1576; Sega to same, 13th Sept. 1577: *CSP Rome II*. Nos 507, 659 (origs. PRO 31/9/73, pp 12-15; 133/6); cf Sega, May & 12th Oct. (*CSP*, Nos 603, 666; origs. Von Toerne, *Don Juan et les Projets de Conquête*, II. 229/32, Apps. 8-9): "All matters would be set right if the Catholic King would make up his mind"; "The more pressing is the necessity and the more urgent the request... for a definite answer, the more conspicuous is the lack of decision".

[24] Alessandro Fidel to Pius V, 1571; cf Ridolfi's manifestos: *CSP Rome I*, Nos 754, 780/1 (origs PRO 31/9/71, pp 402/6; 1-3, 30). Ridolfi however, due to the nature of his Plot, wanted the Stewart claim also to be to the fore.

against the Queen, and there should go together with the Captain-General a papal legate or nuncio... with edicts he would publish against the Queen and all the heretics.... All the Catholics will flock to this enterprise, being in the name of His Holiness and seeing the standard of the Church and no involvement of a secular prince", talk of the Stewart title also being suppressed until Mary was freed. They still argued, hopelessly if accurately, that Philip might as well make a proper commitment since "the Queen will never believe that the Pope has moved without the agreement and aid of Your Majesty" - but this was subsidiary. Again, "the immediate pretext of the war should be the execution of the Excommunication issued against the Lady Elizabeth, aiming at the reform of religion; however there should be silence on the question of restoring the Queen of Scotland and her right until her person is safely in the hands of the Catholic army..."; *Regnans in Excelsis* should be republished, with individual excommunications of the "pseudo-bishops" and principal heretics, lay and ecclesiastical. The Stewart claim was rather subsidiary, since there was a general idea that there was available, if anything unfortunate happened to Mary, a "very Catholic" Hastings claimant - though there was some confusion as to whether this was the Earl of Huntingdon himself (before it was appreciated that he was "a very great heretic") or his brother.[25]

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[25] Zúniga to Philip, 29th Feb. 1576; "De Facilitate Speditionis pro Recuperanda Anglia": Von Toerne, *Don Juan et les Projets de Conquête*, II. 215/21, Apps. 3-4. On

The policy of a prior invasion of Ireland was adopted *faute de mieux*. The only period in the 1570s after the Ridolfi plot in which *la impresa generale* seemed at all promising was that of Don John of Austria's Pacification attempts in Flanders during 1576/7. Don John, encouraged by his secretary Escovedo, nourished a hope that he would be able to ship the Army of Flanders home and divert to England to claim Mary's hand and a consort's crown. The Flemish Estates, prompted by the habitual English alarm at any Spanish maritime troop movement (this time with some basis), refused to allow the army to leave by sea.[26] *La impresa generale* had then to be shelved in favour of limited military action in Ireland and limited peaceful action in England.

Contingent Deposition: An Unhelpful "Mitigation"

In April 1580, Gregory XIII added to the faculties of the Jesuits Edmund Campion and Robert Persons, about to depart for England, the "explanation" that *Regnans in Excelsis* did not oblige Catholics to refuse to recognise Elizabeth, "as matters stand, but not once public execution of the Bull shall be possible."[27] This

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the Hastings question, cf Galli to Ormanetto, ? 29th Feb: *Ibid*, II. 223, App. 5 (not in *CSP Rome II*); reply, 17th Apr; cf Philip to Zúniga: *CSP*, Nos 507/8 (origs. PRO 31/9/73, pp 14-15, 20/1). Madrid however regarded a legation as a cause for "suspicion" that Rome was seeking to enlarge its prerogatives in the reconquered kingdoms (which was indeed a bait Catholic exiles constantly extended),and preferred a nunciature: Von Toerne, *op. cit*, II. 91/2.

[26] Von Toerne, *Don Juan et les Projets de Conquête*, II, ch 3.

[27] "...Rebus sic stantibus, sed tum demum, quando publica eiusdem bullae executio

ruling is also known as Gregory's "mitigation"; but it was a mitigation only of the implied excommunication of loyal Catholics, that even Pius V had finally confessed to be harsh.

The theologian Antonio Possevino had already given an informal opinion that Catholics were not obliged to rebel - but that Elizabeth remained condemned *ipso facto* "setting aside the Bull" as "a public enemy of the Church" (which alone would justify rebellion, "data opportunitate"), and moreover "not just a heretic but a tyrant" (ie usurper ?) - so they were not obliged to obey either (and at best only in "things that [they decide] are just"). A rebellion would doubtless be meritorious, if it worked (it was not recommended without "sure and apparent hope of victory"). "The Bull was issued to aid Catholics and the Faith, and that great harm should occur to Catholics and the Faith by the observation of this Bull was not the intention of its promulgator"; "cessante fine legis cessat et ipsius legis observatio."[28] This had enough in.

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fieri poterit." Meyer, *England & the Catholic Church under Elizabeth*, App. 17, p 487.

[28] Creighton, "Excommunication of Elizabeth I", pp 84/7. Possevino rejected the view that "defective publication" invalidated the Bull; his casuistry left this particular quibble redundant. He was not however that useful for avoiding the Bloody Questions and, in particular, forbade Catholics to support Elizabeth against any who "attacked her by virtue of the Bull or from care for the Faith". Nor was he unequivocally opposed to tyrannicide - rejecting action by "private persons" but leaving doors open for that by some form of public authority. His retention of *excommunicatio latae sententiae* is notable - he quotes *Ad Evitanda Multa Scandala,* but insists that Elizabeth was "denuntiata" before 1570. Holmes concedes that Possevino's advice "throws papal and English Catholic motives into an even worse light" than the ethical mutability of Persons - *Resistance & Compromise*, p 42, cf pp 58, 69.

common with Gregory's mitigation to illuminate the rather sinister moral relativism that the latter too might imply.

Pragmatism, abetted by casuistry, already inclined to answer the question "Is it lawful for Catholics in England to obey the Queen in all political matters after the Bull of Pius V in the same way as they did before ?": "Although they are perhaps not bound to do so, Catholics may lawfully obey her in everything of a purely political nature which does not involve persecution of Catholics, at least to avoid worse evils befalling them. The Bull of Pius V did not withdraw from Catholics permission to obey the Queen since it did not properly achieve its purpose." This discussion concludes mysteriously: "There is a further comment on this case which must be given in secret."[29]

Why "Elizabeth's government ought to have been thankful"[30] for the mitigation, is unclear. It was explicit that Elizabeth, and all her Protestant subjects, remained excommunicate. The most that could be said was that the pressure to immediate Catholic rebellion was somewhat reduced.

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[29] Holmes, *Elizabethan Casuistry*, CRS 67 (1981), p 121 (trn. from LPL MS 565). It is not altogether clear whether this was written before or after the "mitigation" (certainly close to it) - it does not mention it, but then did it change much ? Cf p 53, & Bod. MS Rawl. D1351, ff 13v-14r, for uncertainty in another manual. To the question "May the Quene be deposed for any facte by any authority hereaft[e]r ?", one MS (Bod.) answers (in an addition), "we say for no fact and by non authority"; the other MS is evasive.

[30] R Simpson, *Campion* (1867), p 100. Pollen takes a similar view, but does confess that "the mitigation of the Bull was also a restatement of its principle": *English Catholics under Elizabeth*, p 298. Contrast Meyer, *England & the Catholic Church under Elizabeth*, pp 138, 144, 158, 161, 177; Neale, *Elizabeth I*, p 251.

But then recent years had been quiet in that respect anyway. Really much more important was the threat of the time when English Catholics would say, with Plowden, that "the case is altered". It was not even obvious that a new papal declaration was necessary to permit them a rebellion of supererogation, even if the obligation had been withdrawn. And the conclusion was almost irresistible that the Jesuits bringing this peculiar declaration would attempt to alter the case - more overt methods having failed, to work in a fashion "more secreat and more insinuative into conscience... a treason caried in the clowds."[31]

In his writings of 1588, Allen "dealethe plainlie"; otherwise he and his cohorts would

> "...fraudulentlie teache the subjectes of any King that is a Protestant that it is lawful for them being Papistes, the rather to procure favour for the time, being opportunitie to work the greater mischieffe, to professe and perfourme theire obedience unto him in all temporall causes as fully and francklie as any Protestant, but with this restraint (to be kepte as secrete to themselves as they can) that they may doe the same noe longer, under payne of mortall synne, then untill they shal be able by force to beare armes against him..."[32]

This view was broadcast more publicly; but it was not

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[31] Francis Bacon, "Certain Observations upon a Libell... (by ~~Persons~~ Verstegan) Intituled A Declaration of the True Causes of the Great Troubles" (1592): Petyt MS 538/39, p 29. Cf p 30, claiming that Ballard confessed "that all priestes... generally were made acquainted w.th the invasion then intended" and were to exact a "vowe and p[ro]mise in Christ to adhere to the forrennor."

[32] "That Popishe priestes are not proceeded wth. ... because they tooke orders... but for that... they are practisers of sedition and trayterous designements" (1605): LPL MS 2012, f 22r. It belonged to (or was by ?) Bancroft; which is interesting in view of his contacts with the Appellants, whom this work sees as really no better than the Jesuits.

necessarily a merely propagandist tendency which formed it. It was not so very illogical to assume that the mitigation was intended "the better to cover th[ei]r strategies and to avoide the daungers wch. otherwise thei might have incurred" (a scarcely successful effort); "it shoulde be laufull for them to acknowlege Hir Ma[jes]tie in verie large termes to be the laufull Soveraigne... *rebus sic stantibus*, th[a]t is untill they shoulde be able by force to depose hir"; "to execute the Pope's sentence, it shal be laufull for them to playe the wilie ffoxes, to confesse allegeance unto hir in all temporall matters, so as it is most manifeste what we maie expecte at these men's handes." "They knowe that the wante of a sufficient number that woulde rise against Hir Majestie was the cause why the Bull was not executed. They did confesse that they themselves were sent over to increase that number, and that therein they had laboured greatlie", "to reconcile such againe to His Holines as had neglected th[ei]r duties in not assistinge of the [Northern and Irish] rebellions."[33]

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[33] Hatton's Commons speech, Feb. 1589: LPL MS 178, ff 76r, 79r. Like the last writer, he regarded the mitigation as "a farther mischeif" than the Bull (f 77r), a peculiar view presumably related to its alleged greater insidiousness. Notes in defence of the 1581 executions: ff 20/1 – the Pope had "agreed like a fox to winke at the Bull" "*rebus sic stantibus*... untill the Catholickes by competent forces shal be able to resiste". Cf Hatton's invective, 25th Feb. 1585, against Parry when the latter retracted his confession – he had already confessed "howe thou wert *by reconciliation* become one of that wicked sort that helde Her Majestie for neyther lawfull Quene nor Christian, and th[a]t it was meritorious to kill her": CB, *True & Plaine Declaration of the Horrible Treasons Practised by William Parry the Traitor against the Queene's Majestie*. STC 19342a (1585), p 33. On vulpine Catholicism, cf J B[axter], *A Toile for Two-Legged Foxes*, STC 1596 (1600), p 109: "A foxe

"The very causes final... have been to depose Her Majesty from her Crown. The causes instrumental are these kind of seminaries and seedmen of sedition."[34] How could Elizabeth "suffer him that hath alreadie cursed hir person, removed hir crowne, discharged hir subjectes [from allegiance], invaded hir dominions (whose seedmen and sworn legates ye be), to steale from hir the people's harts under a clowde of Catholike religion" ? They "by the verie sequence {consequence} of their Romish Faith and absolution were tied to obie the Pope" depriving her of the crown, "& bound to assist him, or whom he should send to take the same by force of armes". "Your late Jesuites were sent hither as pioners to make ready the way for the Pope's Bull that should disherite the Prince and give her Crowne to another", bringing "a dispensation to dissimulate" "untill the Bull of Pius the Fifth might *safely* be executed" - "even so the snake being frozen lyeth quiet and still, waxing once warme hee useth not onely to stirre but also to sting."[35]

"This is the Pope's common guise, when he doubteth his faction shall be overmatched, then to injoyne obedience, but it is onely in policie to gaine his souldiers a breathing."[36] By the end

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will show himselfe a foxe, when time serves his turne."

[34] Burghley, *Execution of Justice*. p 37, ed. Kingdon.

[35] Bilson, *True Difference*. p 26; sig A4 (Dedication); pp 2, 8. On the thawing snake, cf Copley, *Answere to a Letter of a Jesuited Gentleman*, pp 36/7; Oliver Ormerod, *The Picture of a Papist*, STC 18850 (1606), p 180, continuing: "The reason why you doe not take armes against your countrey is only because you have not the power sufficient to match us, for had you sufficient power... your Romish Doctours would hold you inexcusable if you did it not".

of the reign, an Appellant Catholic might agree: "What could any King or Prince in Christendome, being persuaded in religion as Her Majestie is, do otherwise, if he ment not to have the crowne plucked from his head ?... When the Catholickes are in number sufficient they must rebell, and the innocent priests are sent over to increase that number. Into what perplexities are they thereby cast ? How can they expect any favor when they are taken?"[37]

Nor, it must be said, was Protestant assessment of Rome's motives altogether wrong. For years of plotting before the 1580 expedition (quite well known to English agents), the basic plan had been for the conquest of Ireland, followed by a landing near Liverpool to free Mary from Sheffield Castle and a general English Catholic rising. Allen was relied on to ensure that missionaries warned English Catholics to be ready to respond. He had subscribed to the 1576 proposal "De Facilitate Speditionis pro Recuperanda Anglia", which envisaged that "the priests who cross to England from Flanders secretly will prepare certain noblemen in England useful for this business..."[38] "If the Irish enterprise should be crowned with success, we may also have good hopes of the English enterprise."[39] Reports of the former,

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[36] Morton, *Exact Discoverie*, p 35.

[37] Watson, *Decacordon*, p 304.

[38] Von Toerne, *Don Juan et les Projets de Conquête*. II. 221, App. 4; cf 95n (Galli to Ormanetto, 17th May 1576; *CSP Rome II*, No 520).

[39] Sega to Galli, 28th Nov. 1577; cf reply, 10th Jan. 1578: Von Toerne, *Don Juan*

when it occurred, were as dangerously misleading as those on the Nortern Rising had been ten years earlier. Speculative "advertisements", if they came to English attention, could only feed official alarm. The fact that (a few) Spanish troops landed in Ireland, and the old consensus that an Irish rising could easily be transferred to Wales or Lancashire, prompted a report at Rome that Parma would cross with the Army of Flanders as soon as he had "news that the Catholics [in England] have got control of a city near Ireland".[40]

Some years later, as a Guise-backed plan for the reconquest of Scotland and the North of England developed, it was envisaged that "in due course the principal English Catholics should be informed of the business by way of the priests". Allen himself had been assigned an auxiliary role in the expedition, carried over into later planning for the Spanish Armada - Bishop-designate of Durham, his presence "would weigh more with the English than several thousand soldiers".[41] It was not, then, out of the blue that the double agent Gilbert Gifford convinced Anthony Babington that "some of our nacion, most reverent unto us both for learning and vocation, shal be sent over, to enforme

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et les Projets de Conquête, II. 169/70n; also Gregory XIII to Don John, 2nd Apr. 1577: PRO 31/9/73, pp 113/5 (*CSP Rome II*, Nos 696, 718; 518).

[40] Newsletter, 24th Oct. 1579: PRO 31/10/1, p 248. Cf Thomas Bawdewyn to Shrewsbury, 11th Sept. 1580 - HMC 58: *Longleat* V. 29-30.

[41] Castelli (Nuncio in France) to Galli, 22nd May 1582: Kretzschmar, *Invasionsprojekte der katholischen Mächte*, App. 7, p 133.

under confession the chefest of our nacion, such as are able to sway the mindes and abilities of the rest, of the disposition of the Pope concerning the same [enterprise], and perhaps to move something to be don against Her Majestie's person".[42]

It was only seven months after the "mitigation" that Bishop Sega of Piacenza, Nuncio in Spain, informed Cardinal Galli, Gregory's Secretary, that he had received an enquiry from anonymous Englishmen (curiously enough *via* Humphrey Ely, a future Appellant) about their moral position in removing Elizabeth. Sega had replied: "By the words of the sentence of Pius V of holy memory, it appears that these gentlemen may reassure themselves, since the sentence gives all vassals leave to take up arms against that wicked Queen." In case of doubts, he applied to Galli for "such absolutions and declarations as will be necessary". Nobody seemed to think a new Bull would be necessary; "nudum verbum" would suffice.[43]

Galli's reply to Sega is quite celebrated:

> "Since that guilty woman of England rules over { or "has occupied" } two such noble kingdoms of Christendom, and is the cause of so much injury to the Catholic Faith and the loss of so many million souls, there is no doubt that whosoever sends her out of the world with the pious intention of doing God service, not only does not sin but gains merit, especially having regard to the sentence pronounced against her by Pius V..."

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[42] Babington's confession, Aug. 1586: Pollen, *Mary Queen of Scots & the Babington Plot* (Edinburgh 1922), pp 85/6.

[43] Orig. Meyer, *England & the Catholic Church under Elizabeth*, App. 18, pp 490/1; tr. P Hughes, *Rome & the Counter-Reformation in England* (1942), p 213.

Like Possevino, Galli seemed to rely largely on *excommunicatio ipso facto* as a basis for this opinion, at most confirmed by *Regnans in Excelsis.*[44]

To this may be added Sega's opinion of 1585, when he was a Cardinal, Visitor of the English College in Rome, and a keen supporter of the Jesuits in the complex turmoils there. "Every day... these priests by private discussion and exhortations reconcile some [Church Papists] who, if the state of things in England should change at all [ie "rebus non sic stantibus"], would defend the public cause of the True Faith with arms and every endeavour."[45] If he could not distinguish between missionary and political functions, it is unclear how the Protestant establishment - which had suffered severely enough from paranoia when there had been less to fear - was supposed to.

Defenders of the seminarian martyrs claimed, as a debating point, that their spiritual aims were detached from

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[44] Orig. Meyer, *England & the Catholic Church under Elizabeth,* App. 18, p 491, & trn. p 271. Cf Castelli to Galli, 2nd May 1583; reply, 23rd May: Kretzschmar, *Invasionsprojekte der katholischen Mächte*, Apps 24/5, pp 162/3. The French Nuncio relayed from the Guises a scheme to assassinate Elizabeth, with the comment that this would be desirable, but was not the sort of thing in which the Holy See could become directly involved. The Cardinal-Secretary replied: "His Holiness could not but be pleased, if the oppression of that kingdom were ended and it were restored to God and our Holy Faith by any means whatsoever." This had very much been the attitude of Admiral Coligny to the removal of the previous Duke of Guise twenty years before, and since St Bartholomew's had become a virtual commonplace in French politics.

[45] Orig. Meyer, *England & the Catholic Church under Elizabeth,* App. 19, p 497. Cf Hatton's claim, n 31 *ut sup*; & Allen's views: G Mattingly, "William Allen & Catholic Propaganda in England", in E Droz, *Aspects de la Propagande Religieuse* (Geneva 1957), pp 328, 336/7.

politics. Even by Elizabethan controversial standards, however, consistency was not the *forte* of these defences. "The very book which claims that none of Allen's students ever discussed the papal right to depose rulers, presented an eloquent defence of that right."[46] Princes might reign without interference "so long as the temporal state is no hindrance to eternal felicity", but "should count themselves no longer to stand or reign rightfully than they stand and reign for the advancement of God's truth and kingdom on earth, which is His Church." As for Popes, "though their spiritual power immediately and directly concerneth not our temporal affairs, yet indirectly (and as by accident) it doth not only concern our souls but our bodies and goods, so far as is requisite to our souls' health... and the Church's utility." It was not obvious how the less pertinaciously pursued claim that Gregory XIII had "suffered the sentence *after a sort* to die", fitted in with this.[47] In 1588, Allen was franker about this "sort" - *Regnans* had "not beene openly pursued, partely by reason

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[46] Kingdon's introduction to Allen's *Defence*, in edn. with Burghley's *Execution*, p xxxvi; cf xxxvii: "No matter what the missionary priests were themselves informed, their leaders intended to use them for a subversive political purpose at the appropriate time." Cf Bilson, *True Difference*, sig A5r, claiming there was in the *Defence* "nothing attempted or intended to bee prooved save onelie the Pope's power to deprive Princes"; articles for Richard Shelley, 1585: BL Lans. MS 45, f 176r.

[47] Allen's *Defence*, pp 130, 195/6; 125. Allen's essential grievance appeared to be that his pupils were hanged rather than burned (which would have indicated religious sincerity at least, if erroneous). As he stressed so much the worldly nature of Protestantism however, there was no reason for him to be surprised at a preference to prosecute for worldly crimes; cf *An Apology & True Declaration... of the Two English Colleges*, STC 396 (1581/ERL 68), f 4.

of the decease of Pius Vus the publisher... and partely for that the usurper's forces, rage and crueltie wer so great that they could hardly be resisted by onely the inhabitans of the realme without evident daunger... in which case the Church's censures, so farr as they concerne onely temporall matters, by the meaninge of him that gave the sentence, dothe not binde". The Armada however rendered the Bull fully operative.[48]

According to the confession of William Parry (whoever really devised it), there was a predominantly anti-tyrannicidal view with which "many English priestes did agree as I have heard, if it be not altered since the booke was made in answere of the *Execution of English Justice* was published, which I must confesse hath taken hard hold in me." Having himself decided to kill Elizabeth, "Dr. Allen's booke was sent me out of Fraunce. It redoubled my former conceites; every word in it was a warrant to a prepared mind. It taught that kings may be exco[m]municated, deposed and violently handled; it proveth that al warres, civill or forraine, undertaken for religion are honourable." An observer commented on Parry and Allen: "See how the smoothe words of that Catholique booke are enterpreted and conceived. One spirite occupieth the Catholique reader with the Catholique writer... And yet doeth the hypocrite writer, that traitour Catholique, dissemble and proteste otherwise."[49] And it did not help to

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[48] Allen, *Admonition*, p 47.

[49] CB, *True & Plaine Declaration of the Horrible Treasons*, pp 14, 17; & attached *Fewe Observations Gathered out of the Very Wordes & Writings of William Parry*

distinguish the new martyrs from traitors when the rebels of 1569 were also accepted as martyrs for the Faith.[50]

These opinions did not issue into immediate actions in England. The latter however were blatant enough in Elizabeth's other kingdom. If the proceedings of Pius IV in 1561, sending both Martinengo, to open direct approaches to Elizabeth in England, and Wolf, to engage in obscure but allegedly nefarious activities in Ireland, had been condemned as "double", what was to be made of Gregory's, sending a professedly peaceful mission into England and an invasion force into Ireland, "arryving as yt semeth of purpose at the same tyme..." ?[51]

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the Traytour, p 50. The Scottish Jesuit Crichton claimed to have told Parry he could not kill Elizabeth "without legitimate authority" nor "in hope of ratification by the Pope", but could get authorisation in advance from "the Pope, who can separate an infected sheep from the flock" - Pollen, *Mary Queen of Scots & the Babington Plot*, pp 157/8, 165/6. Cardinal Galli's blessing was in fact the centrepiece of the Elizabethan propaganda effort in the Parry case. The Appellants later blamed Parry on the Jesuits - Christopher Bagshaw, *A Sparing Discovery of our English Jesuits*, STC 25126 (1601 / ERL 39), pp 50/1; William Clarke, *A Reply unto a Certain Libel lately set forth by Fa. Parsons*, STC 4321 (1603 / ERL 115), ff 60/1. See also Bancroft's "That Popish priests...", LPL 2012, ff 2r, 8r, on the connection between Boucher's *De Justa Abdicatione Henrici III* and the King's murder. But Jacques Clement was also "foretolde by the prophete Alane" (f 26). Such actions were, according to Matthew Sutcliffe, "no rash attempts but a determined resolution out of firm grounds of Romish religion": Carrafiello, "Politics of Popery", p 221.

[50] Sanders, *De Visibili Monarchia*, pp 730/2. Cf T-D III. App, pp 7-8 for the occurrence of these passages in the "Bloody Questions"; Knollys' notes for these: BL Lans. MS 97, ff 141/2; Burghley, *Execution of Justice*, pp 16-17, 30/1; Reniger, *De Pii V & Gregorii XIII... Furoribus*, ff 103/8. Cf P McGrath, "The Bloody Questions Reconsidered", in *Recusant History* 20 (1991).

[51] Mildmay, Star Chamber speech against Campion's harbourers, 15th Nov. 1581: BL Sloane MS 326, f 45; cf f 75: Commons speech, 28th Nov. 1584 (Mildmay had one basic anti-Catholic speech; he simply altered the order of its parts on different occasions). Cf Reniger, *De Pii V & Gregorii XIII... Furoribus*, ff 66/9.

"It is well knowen how as well by the Bulls of the Pope as otherwise by his commaundement open warre under the Pope's banner hath been made against Her Ma[jes]tie. Sondrie treaterous persons... have in this realme under pretence of religion sought to persuade hir subjectes to allowe of the Pope's actions therein tending to the depriving of Hir Ma[jes]tie's crowne, whoe thearein are notorious enemies to Hir Ma[jes]tie and the realme."[52]

The Irish rebels were insistent that the deposition was still in force. "If the pretensed Queene invite us to warre shall we goe, and if Gode's Vicar invite us, shall we not goe ?" Desmond demanded. Elizabeth was a bastard, "deprived by the Vicar of Christ, her and your lawful judge; forsake[n] of God who justifieth the sentence of His Vicar; forsake[n] of all Catholike princes, whome she hath injured intolerably, forsaken of diverse lords, knights and genlme[n] of England, who ten yeres past toke the sword against her *and yet sta[n]d in the same quarel.*"

> "See you not th[a]t she is without a lawful heire of her own bodie, who may either reward her friends or revenge her enemies ? See you not that she is such a shamefull reproche to the royal Crowne, th[a]t whoso is a frende to the Crown, shuld so much the more hasten to dispossesse her of the same ? See you not th[a]t the next Catholike heire to the Crowne (for the Pope will take order by God's Grace th[a]t it shall rest in none other but Catholikes) must acco[m]pt all them for traytors th[a]t spe[n]d their goods in mainteini[n]g a heretical praetensed Queen against the *publike* {orig. stress} se[n]tence of Christe's Vicar ?"[53]

FitzMaurice, the trailblazer for Geraldine rebellion, had argued very similarly:

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[52] Burghley's "Reflections on the Dangerous State of the Realm": BL Lans. MS 104, f 132.

[53] Desmond's "knavish l[ett]re" to an unnamed recipient: BL Lans. MS 96, ff 93/6.

> "We fight not against the Crowne of England but onely against the usurper therof... We doubt not but that a greate (and that the better) p[ar]te of England will rather helpe forward oure good intent then by any means hinder the same ... Is not the most p[ar]te of England desirous to enjoy the Catholick Faithe ?"

He also pointed to the prudence of favouring the reversionary interest over a childless incumbent "spent in yeares & worne wth. diseases", and claimed the fabled Catholic League as his supporter. Altogether, his pronouncements were calculated to fan Protestant paranoia rather than mitigate it.[54]

The only thing surprising in the extension of the reaction of Elizabeth's government to England as well as to Ireland, is that anybody has found it surprising. Even adepts of the fiction of the Queen's two bodies could not have adapted overnight - even if they had wished to - to the theory of the Pope's two faces.[55]

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[54] Proclamation, 1579: LPL MS 607, ff 35/6. Both Todd's catalogue and *Cal. Carew MSS* (I, Nos 267/8) perversely date it 1569, following an ignorant annotation. Cf Sanders to Alec Burke, 27th Oct: MS 597, f 84 (*Cal*, II, No 134).

[55] Even Pollen chooses to follow in that hagiographical tradition which, for some reason, insists on its martyrs having been the victims of deep and deliberate hypocrisy. Nearer the mark seem M Creighton, *Queen Elizabeth* (1899), p 196: "It was too much to expect that the Pope should be understood to be acting in his temporal capacity in one case and in his spiritual capacity in another"; Meyer, *England & the Catholic Church under Elizabeth*, p 264 (cf p 273): "The English Catholics had to do heavy penance for the indiscretions of their spiritual head"; Hughes, *Rome & the Counter-Reformation in England*, p 259: "That the English government refused to be impressed by the famous Mitigation is not surprising"; RB Wernham, *Before the Armada: the Growth of English Foreign Policy 1485-1588* (1966), pp 338/9: "Their tragedy was that the action of their Church's leaders and the reactions of the English government made it impossible to keep religion and politics apart... [The Irish expedition] made nonsense of the pretence that the missionaries were only winning religious converts and not making potential traitors as well."

They did not see the Irish expedition as an anomaly; the only anomaly was in the superficially peaceable intention of the English mission. "Neither their attempt upon Ireland nor the mischeif intended against England will cease thus, but if they fynd as (*sic*) negligent, they will be revived with greater forces then have byn yett seene."[56]

For once, diplomatic considerations dictated that Philip II should not receive the main blame for what had not been his initiative. While peace lasted, the Papacy had to bear most of the odium of the Irish expedition; though Spanish involvement was implied by its identification as an overt manifestation of the mythical Tridentine League. The immediate policy however was ascription to Rome. The intervention was after all more apparently in her interest. What part Philip had played might be ascribed to clerical brainwashing rather than his own ambition. "Though the Kinge of Spaine of himself be a peaceable Prince", a correspondent of Burghley's wrote, "yet Your Honor knows how he maye be ledde by those withall, who, indeede, will not lette to hazarde the kingdome of Spayne to mayntayne theirs."[57]

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[56] Mildmay's Commons speech, 25th Jan. 1581: Hartley, *Parliaments*, p 505.

[57] Roger Bodenham to Burghley, 11th June 1582: Wright, *Queen Elizabeth & her Times*, II. 175. Earlier, Geoffrey Chamberlain had noted, on his Spanish mission, Philip's "inclination naturall to peax & quietnes", but "Yor Ma[jes]te well knowethe what he is in matter of religion and consciens, and what mynistres he hath able to leade him in this trade" - to Elizabeth, 7th Dec. 1560; cf William Phayre to Cecil, 17th Nov. 1565: PRO SP 70/21, f 32r; 81, f 35r (*CSP For. V*, No 777; *IX*, No 1677).

Grey of Wilton justified his massacre of the Smerwick garrison by stating that they had no legitimate military commission from a "naturall & absolute prince" like Philip, but were acting piratically on behalf of "one th[a]t nether from God nor man could clayme any princely powre or empire, but indeed a detestable shaveling, the right Antichriste and generall ambitious tyrant over all right principalities, & patron of *la diabolica fede*."[58] Admiral Winter was assured that the expedition had been "p[ro]cured, as yt is credibly informed, by the Pope, Her Ma[jes]te's naturall enemie, allbeit in consideracon of such tearmes & apparences of good frendshippe and amity as Her Ma[jes]tie presently standeth with the Kinge of Spaine, there is good occasion to thinke" no more troops would be sent.[59]

The Earl of Desmond was denounced as having "practised with forraine princes to bringe in powre of strangers to invade this land" - but, save the Pope, these princes were anonymous.[60] The government's Parliamentary draftsmen in 1581 went slightly further, attributing the Irish troubles to "the procurement of the Bishop of Rome, enemy to God, Your Majesty and to all this your Realm; not without the countenance and help of some other great and mighty potentates, his adherents" - unspecified, even if

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[58] To Elizabeth, 12th Nov. 1580: PRO SP 63/88/29.

[59] Instructions, 17th Mar. 1580: LPL MS 600, f 40r (*Cal. Carew MSS*, II, No 346).

[60] Proclamation, 28th Oct. 1579: LPL MS 597, f 93 (*Cal. Carew MSS*, II, No 146). Cf Mildmay's Commons speech, 25th Jan. 1581: it was "said to be done by the Pope and in his name, yet who seeth not that they be mayntayned underhand by some other princes his confederates ?" - Hartley, *Parliaments*, p 503.

everybody knew who they were. They also gave a nod to League fever - "advertisements and forewarnings... from all parts of Christendom, of an intended invasion, not only against your said Realm of Ireland, but against the rest of Your Majesty's Realms and Dominions." Six years later, the latter danger was more imminent, thanks to "that capital enemy unto God and Your Majesty who, for maintenance of his usurped authority and to suppress the true Christian Religion professed within Your Majesty's Realms of England and Ireland hath, by all means to him possible, provoked and stirred up others of great power."[61] The initiative lay very much with the Pope.

However, this emphasis was somewhat revised once England had gone to war with Spain. To justify the Netherlands intervention in 1585, Philip was accused of having already sent an "army into Ireland wth. baner displayed" (but it was a papal banner), "challenging the realme to himselfe by the gifte of the Pope". Sanders' letters showed "proofe also of the Kinge of Spaine's intent to have conquered Ingland from the Queene['s] Ma[jes]ty".[62]

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[61] Subsidy Act preambles, 23 E1 c 15, 29 E1 c 8, in *Harl. Misc.* VIII. 18-20.

[62] Offences by Spain, 1585: BL Cott. MS Galba Cvii, ff 314v/5r; similarly Lans. MS 94, ff 49v, 80v (1585, not 1578), where the Pope was even omitted at first, then reinserted. Cf Beale's "Collection of the Kinge of Spaine's Injuries Offered to the Queene of England" (1591): Harl. MS 253, ff 43v/4r; Bacon's "Certain Observations upon a Libell" (1592): Petyt MS 538/39, pp 42/4; Hastings, *watchword*, pp 68/9. Elizabeth complained to France in 1584 of plots by "the Pope, the King of Spain and the Jesuits" in that order - Castelnau de Mauvissière to Henri III, 25th Nov, in A Chéruel, *Marie Stuart et Cathérine de Médicis* (Paris

During the era of Marian plots, the Pope served a pivotal notional, if not actual, function as a coordinator for the otherwise (and actually) incompatible aspirations of Guises and Habsburgs, English and Scots. Both deluded conspirators and official polemicists needed to see him in this position, in order to impose unity upon what was indeed very confused without this fiction. An experienced spy alleged of the Throckmorton Plot: "The Duke of Guyse is director of the actyon, and the Pope is to conferre the kingdom by his gyfte, uppon suche a on as is to mary with the Scottish Q. so as she shall nott be stemed Q. by her own right and pretensyons, butt meerly by the Pope's collacion, wherby the fere of the yong Scottish K's religion is provyded for."[63] The Pope could also provide the only ideological defence for assassination halfway convincing to English Catholics, especially as the potential beneficiary, Mary, was reluctant to give explicit approval, leaving it "to God and the Churches to settle".[64]

In the final major Catholic plot, its "great practitioner" Fr. Ballard, with his disastrous lack of realism again envisaging

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1858), p 351.

[63] Herle to Burghley, 15th Nov. 1583: J Bossy, *Giordano Bruno & the Embassy Affair* (1991), App. 5, p 202.

[64] Mary to Mendoza, 23rd Nov. 1586: Labanoff, *Lettres de Marie Stuart*, VI. 459; tr. Pollen, *Mary Queen of Scots & the Babington Plot*, p cxcvii.

Franco-Spanish cooperation, claimed "it was resolved by the Catholique League to seeke redresse and satisfaction... The Pope was chiefe disposer". Babington nerved himself to "the dispatch of the usurper, from obedience of whome wee are by th'Excommunication of her made free"; he held Catholics' assistance to an invasion likely to be "small, notwithstandinge the Excommunication (which either was or should be revived), so longe as Her Majestie dothe live." His accomplices had argued about this. Ballard "helde expresslye that the Excommunication did not neede to be revived, standinge in sufficient force." Savage believed (in another revealing interpretation of Gregory XIII's "mitigation") "her former Excommunicacion [was] never revoked but onlie tolerated for a tyme in regarde of the subjects, who otherwise could not obaye her without mortall sinne." An anonymous French theologian had told him their project "was verie lawfull and meritorious, that the Excommunicacion could not be revoked by the canon lawe without the submission of the partye." Appeal was also made to "the opinion of the best of our nation {ie Allen, and perhaps Persons and Englefield} on the other side" of the sea. But Babington wanted Gilbert Gifford (an unreliable choice) to "assure us from beyonde the seaes by authoritie that this action was directly lawfull in every pointe".[65]

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[65] Babington to Mary, 6th July 1586; his confessions, 18th-20th Aug: Pollen, *Mary Queen of Scots & the Babington Plot*, pp 21, 52/3, 61, 68. Gilbert Gifford

Persons, involved in planning for the invasion of England even as he insisted on the innocuousness of his associates' activities, had tended to see *Regnans in Excelsis* as substantially valid but needing reinforcement. His rejection of Elizabeth's authority was however derived from an unhesitating acceptance of the Stewart claim as well as the Bull, even if this led to inconsistencies requiring purely pragmatic resolution:

> "Once in England, we might declare... the execution of the Pope's Excommunication against the Queen (*sic*), declaring her not to be Queen - and rather that all who fight for her are guilty of high treason (!)... if they do not join the army of the Queen of Scotland and England... It would also be very necessary that His Holiness should publish again the Bull of the Queen of England's Excommunication in his own name, and declare that, while His Holiness had tolerated her so long in the hope of amendment, now - seeing her tyranny ever growing - he declares her no longer to be considered Queen or obeyed, but commands all to fight against her under pain of excommunication if they do not and with plenary indulgence... [if they do]. This would also satisfy those Catholic priests in England who have alleged that she is Queen, because *this* Pope has not yet declared the contrary."[66]

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claimed that Mendoza, a bellicose ambassador in Paris after having been expelled from London, contributed the instruction "Ammazate la Bastarda excommunicata heretica" - Jan. 1587: PRO SP 53/20/45. I cannot agree with Pollen (p xix) that "the Ban against the Prince of Orange" "had much greater influence on the Babington Plot than the Bull *Regnans in Excelsis*." It is true that the former justified assassination and the latter did not - but the former merely encouraged the latter's perusal through a particular filter. Sega's and Castelli's proposals preceded the ban, and so were not dependent on it. The Ban serves, for Pollen, to explain a lack of "political morality", that was rather deeper rooted and of which it was merely a symptom. It was, after all, only an imitation of traditional Imperial outlawry. And from the Protestant viewpoint, it was certainly peripheral. Orange's "lyffe... was not their finall scope"; the real danger was teaching that encouraged Catholics "to murther scismatyke & exco[m]municate prynces" - Thomas Digges, Discourse on the Oath of Association, 1584: BL Lans. MS 98, f 17.

[66] Proposal of May 1582: Kretzschmar, *Invasionsprojekte der katholischen*

However, foreigners' plans for external invasion, in the 1580s as in the 1570s, tended to lay more stress on the need for new papal declarations. James VI's favourite and the Guises' associate, D'Aubigny *alias* Lennox, had an ambitious plan to secure all the British Isles with 20,000 foreign troops (compared to the mere 5000 or even 2-3000 which had been talked of, in the hope of reconciling Philip II to the expenditure, before the 1580 *debacle*). He required, "to take away from English Catholics any conscientious objection to revolt against their Princess, that the Queen of England {he never uses "pretended"} be excommunicated *de novo* and her subjects absolved from obedience and enjoined by His Holiness to support the army for this enterprise."[67]

Pius' nephew, Cardinal Bonelli, was reported in early 1580 to have "caused many copies of the Excommunicatione to be prynted to dysperse them amonge the Ambassadors & others at Rome" (later specified as 500), apparently in preparation for a broadside against the Anjou marriage negotiation.[68] Rome's

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Mächte, App. 8, pp 144/5. Persons sees the Stewart cause as the most effective initial pretext, with religious ends to be declared later. Earlier plans passing through Ormanetto's hands had advocated the opposite sequence; but now the sponsors were the Guises rather than Philip II.

[67] Lennox to Gregory XIII, 7th Mar. 1582: Kretzschmar, *Invasionsprojekte der katholischen Mächte*, App. 3, p 127. Cf De Croze, *Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II*, I. 267/8.

[68] Cobham to Walsingham, 29th Feb. 1580: PRO SP 78/4/22 (*CSP For. XVI*, No 185); cf 8th April, on Catholic reports of the imminent punishment of "the usurper of authority, the puddle of lasciviousness, the very Antichrist" in England: SP 78/4/43 (*CSP*, No 252). Cf Gualter to Grindal, 8th Mar: BL Lans. MS 31, f 97r; Meyer, *England & the Catholic Church under Elizabeth*, p 285; Pastor 19 p 389.

direct dissuasions to Anjou however relied, rather than Elizabeth being excommunicated, on the general principle that "the evil life of that Lady is so notorious in the entire world, that you cannot without grievous sin deal with her at all", and that the marriage was "barely honourable, less useful to France and of great disservice to God" (the last two objections being put in order of weight for their audience).[69]

The generalised Hispanophobia generated by the Armada crisis has been noted.[70] This was, however, generally ultimately subordinate to an anti-papalism more active than could be justified simply by Sixtus V's limited, contingent contribution (never forthcoming in the event) to the *Empresa* to end all *Empresas*- though Sixtus' Nuncio in Spain did slip (at least until its failure became indisputable) into the habit of referring to it as "nostra Armata".[71]

Archbishop Whitgift described it as a "foreign invasion by the procurement of the Pope and of his adherents". According to Lord Chancellor Hatton, Sixtus had "sollicited divers Kings and Princes accordinge to their oathes in the Holie League" to undertake it.[72] Burghley himself (impersonating an English

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[69] Instructions for Castelli, April 1581: *ANG VII*, p 93.

[70] WS Maltby, *The Black Legend in England: the Development of Anti-Spanish Sentiment 1558-1660* (Durham, NC. 1971), ch 6.

[71] Bishop of Novara to Cardinal Montalto, 4th & 25th June, 1st, 17th & 26th Sept. & 15th Oct. 1588: PRO 31/9/83, pp 24, 27, 43/4, 47/8, 56/7.

[72] Whitgift to suffragans, 29th May 1588: S Usherwood, *The Great Enterprise: The History of the Spanish Armada as Revealed in Contemporary Documents* (2nd edn, 1982), p 50; Hatton's Commons speech, Feb. 1589: LPL MS 178, f 76v.

Catholic) denounced the Pope's decision "to take the temporal sword and put it into a monarch's hand to invade this realm with force and arms."[73]

Anthony Marten, rather than denouncing Spain on purely nationalistic grounds, urged his readers to fight "against that horrible Beast who hath received power from the Dragon, against the Princes of the Nations which have entered into league with the Whore of Babylon"; Philip (compared to Charles of Anjou in Naples) was "but deputy therein to the Pope, and should have taken possession but of that which he gave unto him and have held the same of him"; "it is the Romish Antichrist which hath blown the trumpet of that cruel sedition," as the ultimate ploy of his "Hellish League with great and mighty princes of his religion to devour and consume us." Marten diverted into an attack on the papal deposing power, which he seemed to think more relevant than Spanish ambition:

> "Was not Peter... greater than any Pope on earth ? And yet, so far from deposing of princes, he himself of all other was most obedient to the secular power, and gave the same lesson unto others ? But was not Christ Himself prince of all princes, and yet seeing his kingdom was spiritual, was He not obedient to all government ?"[74]

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[73] [Burghley], *Copie of a Letter Sent out of England to Don Bernadino Mendoza*, STC 15412 (1588), in *Harl. Misc.* I. 144.

[74] Marten, *Exhortation to Stirre up the Mindes of all Her Majesty's Faithfull Subjectes to Defend their Countrey*, STC 17489 (1588), in *Harl. Misc.* I. 161/4. Cf Wiener, "Anti-Catholicism", p 35, & pp 49-50, citing Hastings' *Watchword* (STC 12927, 1598, pp 68/9): "That bloudye monster of Rome... having alreadie stirred up Spaine to set upon us both in Ireland and in England, doth still whet them on by his unholy provocations to invade, and Spain.. will not disobey his Holy Father

Spain might still appear merely as Rome's dupe: "Spaine loveth that Whore and Spaine is abused. Shee sitteth on the Kinge's right hand; shee taketh his Crowne with her right hand and puts it on her own hed, and with her left hand she strikes him on the face..."[75] "Philip King of Spaine [is] made drunke and deceived with the superstitious cup of Romish abomination", employing "golde rakte out of wretched Indiaes wombe... onelie to satisfie the ravenous appetites of their woolvish Inquisitours, who submit forthwith at the feete of their papall God, the travailes both of Prince & people making them vassals to an unworthie Priest."[76]

Sixtus V had made a greater ideological than material contribution. Besides Allen's *Admonition to the Nobility and People of England,* the Pope himself had issued a new deposition of Elizabeth. He took the view that *both* his predecessors had concurred on this point (and this time alleged illegitimacy as well as heresy as a grounds).[77] Walsingham apprehended there to be "printed at Antwerpe 12 thousand Bulles",[78] even if most

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at Rome"; & Lord Howard of Effingham himself describing the Armada's defeat as "an overthrow of there Pop's credit" (to Walsingham, 8th Aug; PRO SP 12/214/50).

[75] Thomas Rogers, *Historical Dialogue touching Antichrist & Poperie,* STC 21237 (1589), sig A4r (Dedication to Hatton). By pp 70/1, however, there was more stress on Spain's own ambition.

[76] J[ohn] L[ea], *The Birth, Purpose & Mortall Wound of the Romish Holie League,* STC 15106 (1589), sigs A2v, A3.

[77] T-D III, App, pp 44/8.

[78] Walsingham to Whitgift, 25th June 1588: LPL MS 2009, f 17r. Two days later, he sent the Archbishop one he had procured (f 19r), strangely surreptitiously considering the flood expected to follow - "praying therewithall, that uppon your L[ordship]'s perusall, you would returne the same unto mee wth.out co[m]mitting yt

were quickly destroyed when they proved to be an embarrassment.

From Apocalypticism to National Antagonism

The immediate response to the Armada was still as much apocalyptic as nationalistic. Spain did however begin to gain ground over Rome as a propaganda target in the 1590s. This was partly because, as suggested in chapter 2, the apocalyptic view was becoming somewhat (not radically) more optimistic after 1588, "the Wonderful Year" which, as a focus of prophecy, was never quite repeatable - even if the mundane Spanish war effort continued unabated. Also, no Pope after Sixtus V - flinging anathemas at both England and France, and high-handed even in dealing with Spain - made such a suitable and autonomous villain. In fact it was hard even to keep track of them, since Sixtus' three successors lasted only two years between them. Philip II, growing older in malice despite all rumours of his demise, inevitably overshadowed them. So he did politically, since Henri III's death left no Most Christian King as a counterweight to Spain - only the Huguenot Navarre and unconvincing Catholic pretenders who were themselves gradually engulfed by Spain. Even the infamous Persons shifted from the subject of papal power to the succession debate.[79] On Innocent IX's election in 1591, Elizabeth

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to the viewe of anie about Your L[ordship]." Cf advertisements, 23rd June - HMC 58: *Longleat* V. 211.

[79] He was indeed considered to have gone too far in his *Conference*, so added more

declared that Philip "hath of late (to fortify these strange violent attempts with some new colour) procured a Milanese, a vassal of his own, to be exalted into the Papacy of Rome."[80]

The decisive factor in this change was surely the emergence of overt Spanish designs on the French (and to some extent, the English) throne; the long-suspected ambition for "universal monarchy" had burst through its religious *façade*. Navarrist propaganda (whose interest, to recover Catholic support, was to smooth over religious quarrels and stress nationalistic ones) set the trend in denouncing this secular tyranny more than the old papal bugbear. Allied with Spain and the *Ligue,* the Pope "is the brawlingest, the most seditious of all and yet the weakest notwithstanding."[81] The English began to follow suit in this view. Moreover, while negotiations for a settlement with Spain continued until immediately before the Armada, they did not resume seriously until Philip III's accession in 1598.[82]

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on the papal deposing power in a Latin version - see Holmes, "Political Thought", pp 240ff. The published version, however, was notoriously populist - see Carrafiello, "Politics of Popery", ch 2.

[80] Proclamation against seminarians, 18th Oct. 1591: STC 8207; H & L III, No 738. Cf that of 5th Nov. 1602 (STC 8295, No 817), accusing Tyrone's clerical supporters of being "men altogether alienated from us and devoted with all their might to the King of Spain", if also seeking "to steale away the hearts... of subjects from us their sovereign... and to unite and knit them to our mortal enemie the Pope". Cf Burghley's Lords speech, 1593, on how Philip "hath also the Pope so addicted to him" as to back him even against good Catholics in France: Strype, *Annals,* IV. 110.

[81] Trn. of Michel Hurault, *Discourse upon the Present State of France,* STC 14003 (1588), p 66. Note the new optimism about the international situation of Bacon, "Certain Observations upon a Libell" (1592): Petyt MS 538/39, pp 18-21.

[82] See WT MacCaffrey, *Elizabeth I: War & Politics 1588-1603* (Princeton

In the meantime, an ideology of total war with Spain (rather than concentrating on Rome) was more appropriate.

In 1588, godly Englishmen prayed for deliverance from the designs of "men of another devotion then we (men bewitched by the Romish Antichrist)" who "were confederate and imagined mischief against Thy people, O Lord God." The next year, the first troops sent to France recalled "how they that fight against us have entered into a League and combigned themselves never to desist untill they have destroyed all such as professe Thy Gospell and laid the Glory of Sion in the dust."[83] However by 1594, even in this devotional context it was stressed that the mischiefs flowing "from that citie of seven hilles, the See of Rome and the Seate of the Beaste" were "mightily seconded by certaine who doe nothing els but serve themselves of this idolatrous Romish religion as of a maske and stalking horse, therewith to cover the unsatiable ambition wherewith they are possessed of usurping the kingdoms of other princes."[84]

1992), ch 12.

[83] *A Psalme & Collect of Thankesgiving Not Unmeet for the Present Time*, STC 16520 (1588), sig A2r (in case anyone missed the point of this psalmic application, "The Counsell of Trent and the Holy League" was printed in the margin); *A Forme of Prayer Thought Fitte to be Dayly Used in the English Armie in France*, STC 16521 (1589), sig B3v. Cf *Certaine Prayers & Godly Exercises for the 17th of November* (Succession Day), STC 16481 (1585 rather than 1580 ?), sig B4; *An Order of Prayer & Thankesgiving for the Preservation of Her Majestie & the Realme from the Bloodie Practises of the Pope*, STC 16517 (1586), sig A4; *A Fourme of Prayer Necessarie for the Present Time & State*, STC 16522 (1590), sigs C3, D2.

[84] *An Order for Prayer & Thankesgiving (Necessary to be Used in these Dangerous*

The Spanish bogey had emancipated himself from the Roman bogey - indeed sometimes seemed to have taken over the latter, even its most Italianate functions. In 1589, it was still the Pope who was to send perfumers to poison Elizabeth.[85] But that function was by 1595 devolved to the Sephardi Dr. Lopez, allegedly corrupted by Spanish gold.[86] The Pope could now be at best an equal partner. The Kinsale expedition in 1601 was still ascribed jointly to "the Kinge of Spayne and the Pope... pretending both to restore there superstitions of Rome and to reduce that realme under Spanish tyrannie and servitude."[87] The 1597 Commons Speaker also bracketed them together as equals: "The pride of Rome and the ambition of Spaine have been the two whirlwindes of all mischiefes in Christendome."[88]

The loyal demonstrations of Viscount Montague and lesser Catholics at the time of the Armada did palliate to some

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Times) for the Safetie & Preservation of Her Majesty & this Realme, STC 16525.7 (1594), sig A3. Spanish and Guisian ambition already looms as large as papal in *A Form of Prayer for the Protection of Elizabeth of England & Henry of France against the Catholic Leagues*, STC 16520.5 (1589 ? I think probably late enough to refer to Henri IV, not III). However, a proposal of 1594 to James VI to ally with England still founded Philip II's hostility on "the decree of the Councel of Trent" - HMC 77: *Penshurst* II. 149.

[85] Stephen Powle to Burghley, 16th Feb. 1589: PRO SP 12/222/77.

[86] Eg Hastings, *Watchword*, p 59. The view of the Papal-Spanish alliance in this book is still transitional (or incoherent). P 68: "this bloudye monster of Rome... [hath] stirred up Spaine to set upon us both in England and Ireland"; p 93 (cf p 100): "under this colourable name of Catholicke religion was hidden the ambitious humor of a most proud usurping tyrant" - Philip II.

[87] Elizabeth to Whitgift, 7th Oct. 1601: LPL MS 2009, f 141r.

[88] Christopher Yelverton's closing speech: BL Add. (Yelv.) MS 48109, f 27.

extent the fears of Elizabeth's government - but not entirely so, given the insidious doubts propagated by the phrase "rebus sic stantibus". "By the plaine profession of them that are fleddde the realme and have... showed themselves in their colours, wee may justly doubt the affection of those that remayne with us, how demurely soever they will shewe to behave themselves."[89]

As in 1580, Ireland provided a dreadful example of what might happen in England, had Catholicism such open strength there. Even given the assumed greater natural perversity of the Irish, the parallel could not be wholly discounted. The government there was, after a decade and a half's respite, troubled by Bulls and rumours of Bulls.

Tyrone's rebellion benefited from an equation between it and Rome's cause which activists of both sides made, greatly overstating the actual papal commitment. Even in 1595, the Protestant Bishop of Limerick depicted Tyrone as dependent on "direction from Rome"; "when they are satisfied from Rome", "the whole Irishry" would "participate with him".[90] By 1598, there were reports of a proliferation of "solemn meetings under a supposed and most ridiculous authority from the Pope, by virtue

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[89] Hastings, *Watchword*, p 81. Cf citation in FX Walker, "The Implementation of the Elizabethan Statutes against Recusants 1581-1603" (London PhD thesis 1961), p 284: "such as should attempt to invade the realm would never attempt the same but upon hope which the fugitives and rebels offer to give, and assure them of those bad members already known to be recusants".

[90] John Thornburgh to Robert Cecil, Nov. 1595; cf John Lyon Bishop of Cork & Ross to Burghley, 23rd Sept: PRO SP 63/184/41; 183/47.

whereof they conspire factions and partialities against Her Majesty and her government".[91]

A beleaguered commander in Cork wrote that in the remoter areas of Munster, "they have proclaimed... the Bull of Pius V"; but not yet nearer at hand.[92] It was also reported in 1598 that a papal Bull had arrived, excommunicating all Elizabeth's supporters in Ireland.[93] By 1600, this Bull was widely rumoured;[94] and Dermot Creagh (Catholic Bishop of Cork) and Eugene Hogan (Vicar Apostolic) wrote to royalist Catholics in Munster to threaten them with it.[95] Sir George Carew, in Limerick, feared its imminent arrival: "Many of them, wch.... fayne would be subjects, yet dare not for feare of the Bull of Excommunication latelye brought into this land from Rome, wch. threatens damnation to all those that even submit themselves unto Her Ma[jes]tie... It lies in the wills of these priests to lay the censure of the Bull uppon them; which, when he shall roare in

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[91] Sir Geoffrey Fenton to Robert Cecil, 22nd Dec. 1598: PRO SP 63/202.iv/40. On 6th Mar. he wrote to Burghley that the Pope, in default of Spanish action in Ireland, was reported to have sent 4000 troops of his own; but this had been postponed: SP 63/202.i/76.

[92] Sir Thomas Norris to PC, 9th Dec. 1598: PRO SP 63/202.iv/15.

[93] Willliam Weaver's discourse, Oct.1598: PRO SP 63/202.iii/138. This placated those, like Onie McRory, who "would have no Spaniards come into Ireland".

[94] Teig Doyne's statement, 30th Jan. 1600; William Jones & Sir Henry Power to Robert Cecil, 17th Feb: PRO SP 63/207.i/63, 116, 118. Cf charges against Florence McCarthy, 1600; confession of James FitzThomas, 3rd June 1601: LPL MSS 632, f 218; 617, f 314 (*Cal. Carew MSS.* III, No 523; IV, No 80). There seems little doubt that the rebels did *seek* such a bull.

[95] To Viscount Barry, 12th Feb. 1600, forwarded by him to Robert Cecil; cf Bishop Lyon to same, April: PRO SP 63/207.i/123.ii (also LPL MS 615, f 2; *Cal. Carew MSS.* III, No 346); 207.ii/154.

there streets, farewel there obedience."[96] Yet this Bull was always published *just* beyond the view of the English officials who wrote of it, so they could not verify its presence.

In 1601, it emerged that the Bull itself had not yet reached Ireland; the Jesuit Archer (vying with Tyrone for the title "Archtraitor") would bring it any day.[97] A propaganda piece now cast doubt on Tyrone's Bulls: "We can hardly think that these Bulls which he pretendeth (if any he have) are other than some remnant of the first (*Regnans in Excelsis*), which was once suspended". As it was drafted for an audience of undecided Catholics in the English Pale, it took the line that any new Bulls emanating from Clement VIII were merely the produce of the Pope misinformed by Tyrone's "notorious lies".[98]

This was more or less true, and was the reason why the new Bull had proved so elusive. All that the priests dedicated to Tyrone's cause had been granted, in "a typically Clementine compromise",[99] was an indulgence for his supporters, but no

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[96] Carew to Robert Cecil, 17th June 1600; cf James Gold to same, 21st June: PRO SP 63/207.iii/114, 125. Also Carew to PC, 29th Sept (LPL MS 620, f 31; *Cal. Carew MSS*. III, No 464) - "the best *reputed* subjects among them" (whom he did not consider in fact very good) had sent to Rome to "pray a dispensation from overt action... to be permitted in outward temporal obedience to remain Her Majesty's subjects; whereof, if they be denied, how they will decree to endure the thundering censures of that diabolical Church is to be doubted".

[97] Intelligence sent to Robert Cecil by Bishop Jones of Meath & Sir Robert Gardener, 23rd April 1601: PRO SP 63/208.ii/20.

[98] A reply to Tyrone's "libel", Dec. 1600: PRO SP 63/207.iv/141.

[99] JJ Silke, *Kinsale: the Spanish Intervention in Ireland at the End of the Elizabethan Wars* (Liverpool 1970), pp 68-70. Indulgence, 18th April 1600: LPL

excommunication of his opponents (though conceivably they did have old copies of *Regnans*, associated with the *debacle* of 1580/1) - so they operated on the basis that if one did not exist, it would have to be invented.[100] This affair curiously balances 1570 - first, fewer Bulls in general belief than in fact; later, more. Always reality was deeply submerged beneath both sides' myths.

The fictitious Bull should not anyway have been necessary, since everything it was alleged to have done, *Regnans* had done already. *Regnans* had been published in Ireland and the "mitigation" never had been - the latter thus presented no theoretical obstacle (not that it would have done anyway, since "an opportunity for execution" had now arrived). Nonetheless, thirty years of *Regnans'* tribulations had shown how much canonically definitive sentences had become subject to political circumstances. Previous excommunications and depositions had often proved ineffective, had necessarily been revoked and had been sometimes repudiated for technical errors - but none had such a long and involved history of disputed and conditional validity. Even in a casuistic age, such treatment could leave little force in the theory of the papal deposing power; practically, the

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MS 608, f 84 (*Cal. Carew MSS*, III, App. 5), & PRO SP 63/207.ii/95. Cf RD Edwards, *Ireland in the Age of the Tudors: the Destruction of Hiberno-Norman Civilisation* (London & New York 1977), p 165. Indulgences in the Jubilee Year were not hard to come by.

[100] Salamanca University declared it a mortal sin to fight for Elizabeth against Tyrone: Holmes, "Political Thought", p 338; Broughton, *Aplogetical Epistle*, sig H2.

latter had clearly proved inadequate. The position had become increasingly common (without legal foundation) that one Pope's judicial declaration, however solemn, could be ignored once he died; and that only what the present Pope said, mattered. With curial factionalism entailing a tendency to react against the last Pope in selecting another, this was potentially lethal for any sort of dignified institutional continuity. There was more coherence in the English mythical Rome than in the real one. Myth was altogether too powerful in England, so it was elsewhere that papal vagueness was proved to be greater than ever.

The French Dimension to *Regnans in Excelsis'* Legacy

From Sixtus V's pontificate onwards, political intervention in England was symbiotic with that in France. The effects of each failure reacted with the other in a geometrical progression of discredit. It was probably to England that Henri III referred, at the beginning of Sixtus' interference, when he threatened "to have recourse to extreme and desperate measures to revenge myself of the injury done to me... like that inflicted on other princes, the consequence of which was known too late, and when it could not be remedied."[101] Nonetheless, Sixtus was

[101] Henri III to Cardinal d'Este, 2nd April 1585: JA von Hubner, *Sixte-Quint* (2 vols, Paris 1870), I. 342 / tr. HEH Jerningham (2 vols, 1872), I. 362. Sixtus later recalled that Henry VIII had been excommunicated "for another end than for the Glory of God" (ie Spanish pride) - report of Venetian Ambassador Badoer, 3rd June

stampeded by the Spanish and the French *Ligueurs* into the excommunication and exclusion from the royal succession of Navarre and Conde, "a mistake which he soon regretted... and which he actually admitted [to be such] while trying to excuse it" - especially dangerous as no alternative succession had been agreed upon, which offered opportunity for the Spanish aggrandisement he always feared. Confronting this dilemma, "the Pope spoke much, too much in fact, but did nothing".[102]

The Bull against the Bourbons, *Ab Immensa Aeterna Regis Potentia,* was as grandiose as usual, depriving them of lands and titles, and of the right to succeed to them "for ever",

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1585: *Ibid*, App. 19 (Fr. edn. only), II. 484. *Ligue* propaganda made much of Elizabeth's enormities, warning that Navarre would surely imitate them: Louis d'Orleans, *Advertissement des Catholiques Anglois aux François Catholiques du Danger où ils sont de Perdre leur Religion* (Paris 1586), in Cimber & Danjou, *Archives Curieuses de l'Histoire de France*.XI (Paris 1836); also *La Vie et Condition des Politiques & Atheistes de ce Temps* (Paris 1589), p 12; *La Testamente de Henry de Valois* (Paris 1589), pp 10-12.

[102] Hubner, *Sixte-Quint*, II. 159, 166 / Eng. trn, II. 169, 176. He was reluctant to make the same mistake twice. Even Philip II accused Sixtus of dilatoriness in responding to Henri III's murder of Cardinal Guise. He finally consented to proclaim the King *excommunicatus latae sententiae*, and to threaten "other sentences, and spiritual and temporal punishments", including *solvendum fidelitatis* - as well as vengeance by the Hand of God (which, with Jacques Clement as intermediary, in fact came first, to the Pope's notorious satisfaction): *Ibid*, II. 196-234 / Eng. trn, II. 208/47; *Bulle de NSP Pape Sixte V contre Henry de Valois* (Paris 1589). Cf, conflating this with Navarre's actual deprivation, *Advertissement aux Catholiques sur la Bulle de Nostre Sainct Pere touchant l'Excommunication de Henry de Valois, avec Plusieurs Exemples des Punitions Estranges & Merveilleux Jugements de Dieu sur les Excommuniez* (Paris 1589); [Jean Boucher], *Effects Espouvantables de l'Excommunication de Henry de Valois & de Henry de Navarre* (Paris 1589; Lat. reprint 1611); *Les Sorceleries de Henry de Valois et les Oblations qu'il Faisoit au Diable* (Paris 1589), in Cimber & Danjou, *Archives Curieuses*, XII. 487.

and claiming to be one of the Holy See's "irrevocable decisions" against heretics, "hurling them from their thrones, no matter how lofty, and laying them low like the ministers of Satan they are". Irrevocability notwithstanding however, it itself abandoned Julius II's sentence awarding the kingdom of Navarre to Spain; apart from a token reference to Henri's "supposed kingdom of Navarre", it recognised him (conforming to papal policy since the 1560s) as "former King of Navarre", only now deposed.[103]

Before long, Philip II had to write to Rome in admonishment: "There are people who hope to shake the determination of the Pope and to bring him to revoke his Bull against Henry of Bearn (Spain did not recognise him as ever having been King of Navarre), and to believe in the sincerity of his conversion, which cannot but be feigned... The Church and Inquisition declare relapse into heresy to be deserving of capital punishment... Warn His Holiness that, rather than consent to expose my subjects to the danger of heresy by assenting to the proposed revocation, I would take upon myself to favour and protect the Catholics of France..."[104] After Henri III's murder, Sixtus entertained approaches from Navarre, though he avoided

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[103] Tr. R Mousnier, *The Assassination of Henry IV: the Tyrannicide Problem & the Consolidation of the French Absolute Monarchy in the Early Seventeenth Century*, tr. J Spencer (1973), pp 158, 297/8. Cf *Bulle d'Excommunication... de Nostre Sainct Père Gregoire XIVème contre les Ecclésiastiques... qui Suivent le Party d'Henry de Bourbon* (Toulouse 1591): "jadis Roy", "autrefois Roy".

[104] Philip II to Olivares, 15th Sept. 1586: Hubner, *Sixte-Quint*, II. 162/4 / Eng. trn, II. 172/4.

giving him the royal title and drew the line (under strong Spanish pressure) at a Venetian proposal to accept his Resident Ambassador:

> "Acting with haste, [they] wish to receive a resident envoy from a heretic who has been excommunicated... which no prince, great or small, has ever done (*sic*)... It is said that Christian princes had negotiated with the Queen of England without incurring ecclesiastical censure; but Elizabeth was crowned a Catholic, and though she has been declared to be deprived of her kingdom, *she has never lost possession of it.*"[105]

Sixtus himself thus helped cause his "definitive sentence" to be regarded as a very malleable commodity. He was faced with demands from the one side for exemption from excommunication for Catholics supporting Navarre; from the other, for their public excommunication and a new (even more definitive ?) exclusion from the succession, now Henri III was actually dead - even though his original Bull, if anyone cared to regard it, had done both. He refused all these demands, and spurned *Ligue* claims about *excommunicatio ipso facto* - insisting on the need for monitories preceding public sentence, and then refusing to issue them. Before his death (an occasion for Spanish satisfaction), he was obviously inclining towards reconciliation with Navarre - increasingly peremptory Spanish pressure causing him "to howl with rage" and threaten to excommunicate and depose Philip II instead.[106]

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[105] Badoer's report, 24th Oct. 1589: *Ibid*, II. 254/5 / Eng. trn, II. 269/70. Cf II. 272/3 / II. 285/7 (same, 20th Jan. 1590) for Sixtus' outburst against continued reproaches from "blind and impudent men". "Not only shall we listen to Navarre but... to the Devil himself if he come here."

Such independence could not survive under Sixtus' ephemeral successors. Gregory XIV took it upon himself to issue a public excommunication at least of Catholic prelates supporting Navarre; "his sole accomplishment was to widen the chasm between the Catholics of the League and those of the King's party."[107] Clement VIII began to detach himself from this doomed cause. But even Henri IV's return to the Catholic faith involved a slight to the papal right of reservation.[108]

The irreconciliable *Ligueurs* fired a last volley of their own. Taking the Inquisition's procedure as equivalent to immutable divine law, they claimed nobody (even the Pope) might absolve a relapsed heretic like Henri IV.[109] Rome clearly had no

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[106] *Ibid.* II. 282-321 / Eng. trn, II. 298-338; cf AG Williams, "The Abjuration of Henry of Navarre", *J.Mod.H.* 5 (1933), pp 152/7, on the seduction of Sixtus' legate Cardinal Caetani by Spain and the *Ligue*, and the Pope's repudiation of him.

[107] Williams, "Abjuration of Henry", p 157; cf *Bulle d'Excommunication... de Nostre Sainct Père Gregoire XIVème*: on its condemnation by Parlement, see Mousnier, *Assassination of Henry IV*, p 162; G Weill, *Les Theories sur le Pouvoir Royal en France pendant les Guerres de Religion* (Paris 1892), pp 204, 254/5.

[108] Mousnier, *Assassination of Henry IV*, pp 162ff. Clement finally sent his own absolution which nullified the "pretended absolution" (and also carefully avoided the sentence's political implications): EA Segretain, *Sixte-Quint et Henri IV* (Paris 1861), pp 359/60, cf 406/7; Pastor 23, pp 73ff.

[109] Boucher, *Sermons de la Simulée Conversion et Nullité de la Prétendue Absolution de Henri de Bourbon* (Paris 1594), pp 234/9; Porthaise, *V Sermons* (Paris 1594), II. 3ff. Also Boucher's *Apologia pro Johanne Castello* (Paris 1594), pp 73ff in the reprint of 1611 (after Henri's assassination) as *Jesuita Sicarius* (though Boucher was no Jesuit) - it is a strange contention in a work mainly devoted to the Papacy's political power. However, he also makes the papal power so indirect (if as strong as ever, in a negative sense) that he can argue that if Henri *could* be absolved, this would not necessarily restore his temporal rights. Boucher was following Louis d'Orleans - *Advertissement des Catholiques Anglois*, in Cimber & Danjou, *Archives Curieuses*, XI. 148ff.

interest in this contention - and little in the drift into radical populism by which both *Ligueurs* and some English exiles under their influence, notably Persons, tried to substitute for lack of apostolic fervour. This group was willing, in truth, sometimes to "excite the people to rebellion by the Pope's authoritie, and sometimes they tell them that they must take armes for libertie of their consciences. And when neither of these will serve, then they seeke to puffe them up with a vayne opinion of their own pr[e]heminence and soveraigne dignitie." It seemed indeed that such writers "take uppon them to justifie *all* the principall treasons and rebellions that have been raysed and comytted", as if rebellion was a good in itself - scarcely a route to intellectual respectability in the seventeenth century.[110]

Following simultaneous failures against Elizabeth and against Henri IV (even if the latter returned to Catholicism, he remained basically antagonistic to the Papacy), the papal deposing power faded in practice, though still stoutly defended in theory. The retreat of mainstream Catholic theoreticians left behind not only Bouchers but Chastels and Ravaillacs, Fawkeses and Catesbys - whom the theologians found increasingly worrying bedfellows. When they did not exist, an Oates could credibly invent them. Historical presupposition had been fortified to produce this effect by the erratic behaviour of the Holy See during Elizabeth's reign.

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[110] Bancroft's "That Popish priests...", LPL, MS 2012, ff 9, 18r.

CONCLUSION

"Does [the Pope] not know how much times have changed ? Does he take me for a Louis the Pious, or does he imagine that his excommunications will make the weapons drop from the hands of my soldiers ?"

Napoleon, 1807[1]

By the time of the Reformation, the papal deposing power was asleep rather than dead. The "indirect" power (which was the crucial one) was indeed too much bound up with the Papacy's claim to spiritual monarchy in the Church for its last gasp to be possible while the latter was still asserted. Its revival was natural in view of the challenge posed by the Reformation - and its adoption by an autonomous monarchy like England's. To be sure, its use in the Middle Ages had shown more failure than success. However, it had gained more general acceptance in cases of heresy or genuine schism than when Popes merely made unconvincing assertions of such. It was then still worth trying against the Anglican schism. Unfort[illegible]edieval experience had shown that success (or even failure) generally implied the sacrifice of the Papacy's freedom of action before the interests of the necessary lay allies charged with "execution". The failure of Henry VIII's excommunication only confirmed this, the Catholic powers being unwilling to serve the temporal aims of their spiritual authority with more than rhetoric.

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[1] JJ Dwyer, "Cardinal Pacca & Napoleon", Lingard Papers NS No 7 (1826), p 16.

The Elizabethan *régime* was considered to be insecure by itself, its supporters, its domestic opponents and foreign powers, for at least the first thirteen years of its existence. The outcome of the crises of 1569-71 did something to dispel this impression, but not as much as it might have, since both Protestants and Catholics were convinced that the incoherent maneouvres of the latter had come much closer to success than they really had. English Protestant ideology had strong tendencies towards pessimism - having long been that of a persecuted minority in the state, and still, in the apocalyptic view, being that of an elect few beleaguered by the hordes of Antichrist, whose worldly success only God Himself could end. It was slow too to take a more positive view (*faute de mieux*) of another factor conducive to instability - the Regiment of Women, with qualification via a consort (and underpinning through a definite heir) indefinitely postponed. There can be no doubt that this was considered deficient in the quality of "awe", which Tudor government considered its crucial defence in what, internally and internationally, was a state of nature at least as savage as Hobbes'. Elizabeth's supporters continually urged her to enhance her attribute of "awe", whether by severity towards domestic opposition or by military activity abroad. Her slowness in granting either wish is well-known, and few found it reassuring.

This consciousness of weakness left the early

Elizabethan *régime* in the grip of paranoia - the Queen less than any of her ministers, who had therefore to adopt a policy of influence through alarm; probably however becoming habituated even to their own hyperbole, and consequently increasingly paranoid themselves. The process had its own momentum. It might seem that the fear was a primarily political one, of powerful neighbours and discontented subjects, who just happened to be Catholic. This is not so, however. What united various fluctuating perceptions of possible threats was the umbrella concept of the papally-orchestrated Catholic League, whose appearance about 1580 has been often remarked but which was (if anything) more significant in the 1560s, and also more purely fictitious. This fiction was fuelled by an excessive consciousness of the past activities of the Papacy against secular princes.

The sinister appearance of present prospects established a dialectic with an exaggerated assessment of the past effects of the papal deposing power. Moreover, the first writings of the English Catholic exiles did not tend to disarm suspicion. However much they decried Protestant rebellion and subversion, this did not render them intrinsically politically innocuous since they themselves defended papal political power, sometimes in extreme terms. That these same authors were not infrequently involved in agitation for Catholic confrontation with Elizabeth could not be altogether disguised.

Only the papal Antichrist had the cosmic significance to underpin an entire theory of history. It was a conspiracy theory, to which unity was therefore essential; and a dominant tradition, derived from Tyndale (but generally shedding the latter's own somewhat subversive views of monarchy), affiliated treason to the Papacy and its minions *ipso facto*.There could be no papal authority without treason; moreover, it was alleged (with increasingly tortuous logic) that for centuries past there had been no treason without papal authority. The early part of Elizabeth's reign already saw English Protestant views of Rome and its political influence, past and present, sufficiently detached from reality to preclude compromise with the government's opponents. The most striking example of this was an assumption of the enmity of Spain - as a keystone of the fictitious Catholic League - that produced English policies which (albeit not without difficulty) eventually succeeded in remoulding European politics in the shape of the original paranoid idea, with Spain and England championing warring confessional blocs.

Papal excommunication and deposition had long been expected by many on both sides. Elizabeth's unexpected immunity from this in the 1560s was even more striking than her father's - and was due to the same secular interests, with the Popes (until Pius V) increasingly appreciative of them and consequently cautious. Pius V's action of 1570 was a misinformed attempt to bypass Spanish obstructionism and to assist the English Catholic

opposition. For English Protestants, it served only to reinforce extant presuppositions. They had expected it; the historical and polemical tradition against it spans the event itself. Symptomatic of this is the general belief that Pius V's Bull had inspired the Rising of 1569 (as the *expectation* had, to some extent), rather than being a belated reaction to it. No active falsification was needed; and the theory was logical enough for Catholics to adopt it too.

These various misapprehensions about the Bull were generally held *bona fide*. In some respects the Papacy seemed to do its best to justify Protestant suspicions. The belief that Gregory XIII's "mitigation" of Elizabeth's excommunication in 1580 represented no real concession to the legitimacy of her government was accurate enough. Its contingent and temporary permission to English Catholics to be obedient merely gave an impression of unscupulous opportunism, associated with the reputation that "Jesuit equivocation" had acquired by the end of the century. The "mitigation"'s unfortunate coincidence with the papal-sponsored military expedition to Ireland underlined that. This last *débâcle* was more significant than is sometimes realised. As the reign's first actual foreign aggression, it focused hatred on its Roman perpetrator. Throughout the 1570s, Rome had been incited, not only by English Catholic exiles, but by Philip II and the Guisian faction, to adopt the most prominent role in

coordinating opposition to Elizabeth, to avoid becoming too committed themselves. In Ireland, the Pope did prove an effective stalking-horse. Spanish aggression was, for the moment, less of an issue; and even by the time of the Armada, when anti-Spanish propaganda was also increasing, papal support was still a much more significant theme in English eyes than mere questions of material force could justify.

The combination of open war with Spain and the execution of Mary (reducing the Catholic claim to a Spanish one), the negligibility of Sixtus V's successors and the propagandist influence of Elizabeth's ally Henri IV (playing the patriotic card against Spain, but seeking to win back Catholic support) did perhaps lead to a temporary eclipse of Rome as perceived chief practiser against Elizabeth. This was not very apparent into some way into the 1590s, and was approximately parallel to an upsurge in apocalyptic optimism - Spain now being the primary foe; but a merely material one rather than a miasmatic cosmic force, and so easier to beat. Eventual peace with Spain however assisted the process whereby the Papacy, ably supported by the Jesuits, returned to prominence as leading opponent with the Gunpowder Treason and the ensuing Oath of Allegiance controversy.

The cosmic theological evil ultimately subsumed the foreign political threat; and in the seventeenth century, belief in its menace was able to exist independently of actual political

threats, or to invent them by a slanted interpretation of circumstances. This has been long recognised as happening by the later seventeenth century. The trend however had been already established in the early Elizabethan period. For the whole history of the perceived papal threat to Protestant England, myth was more important than reality.

Catholic theorists continued to uphold the deposing power, partly because it was not readily separable from the Pope's spiritual *plenitudo potestatis,* partly for political reasons with less relation than before to England. These foreign broils, in the form of Henri IV's assassination, finally checked overt advocacy of the deposing power. Catholic polemical energies were in any case in something of a natural decline. Not only Henri but Robert Persons died in 1610; Bellarmine, in 1611. In view of recent developments, successors were not encouraged.

Actual Catholic repudiation of the deposing power however was another matter - and was something upon which English Catholics could never agree, even to influence generally sympathetic Stuart kings, for whom the deposing power was a great obstacle to *rapprochement* with Rome (for Charles I, one of very few). The deposing power remained therefore, for English Protestants to denounce as "damnable" in agitations to impose the Oath of Allegiance and ultimately in the Bill of Rights.[2]

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[2] See Sommerville, "Jacobean Political Thought", chs 1-2; Clancy, "English Catholics & the Papal Deposing Power 1570-1640", *Recusant History* 6-8 (1961/4); CM Hibbard, *Charles I & the Popish Plot* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1983), pp

Catholic polemical retreat (only tactical anyway) could not be the end of the matter. Recent work has illuminated an unsettling tendency within the Church of England from the second half of James' reign to question the Elizabethan orthodoxy of the Papacy's supreme wickedness. This followed the decline of the political controversy with the Catholics; but those tendencies later gathered under the wings of Archbishop Laud succeeded in provoking a violent reaction from those still holding to the Elizabethan anti-papal tradition - increasingly Nonconformists, by the latter half of the century. The flirtations with Rome common at the courts of both Charleses served to convince an increasingly vociferous grouping that abandonment of the Tyndalean-Foxean outlook led only to the bottomless pit. As a Jacobean divine demanded early on in this process: "Is this a time to make doubt whether the Pope be Antichrist or no, seing his hornes and markes are so apparently discovered ?"[3]

The equation between the papal deposing power - and the Jesuits as its particular upholders - and subversion was indelibly engraved in the Protestant political mythology of the later seventeenth century (for the more Whiggish, this was very necessary, to palliate their own opposition to the Crown). In

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64/9; J Miller, *Politics & Popery 1660-88* (Cambridge 1973).

[3] James Prideaux, *Ephesus Backsliding* (1614), p 36, quoted by A Milton, "The Laudians & the Church of Rome" (Cambridge PhD thesis 1989), p 20; cf p 34 on Gabriel Powell, professedly as certain that the Pope was Antichrist as that Christ was the Son of God.

defiance of all logic but the paranoid, even the Civil War and Charles I's execution could fit into this pattern. "The Jesuits can never sit it out, when such great transactions as rebellions and regicide are going forward; and however the Papist and the Fanatick are of contrary factions, interests and inclinations, yet... they may both conspire, though with different intent, to promote and carry on the same design." An imaginary Pope might condescendingly tell Cromwell: "You were only the executors of Roman contrivances.... Your King's death, that you brag so much of, was first resolved on at Rome, before it came into your noddles; and so far you were only the blind ministers of our resolutions." And was not the Popish Plot founded upon a vow: "I... in my heart believe the Pope, Christ's Vicar-General, to be the one and only Head of Christ's Church here on Earth; and that, by virtue of the keys of binding and loosing given His Holiness by our Saviour Christ, he hath power to depose all heretical Kings and Princes, and cause them to be killed" ?[4]

The English myth of the papal deposing power by then existed independently - further m[illegible]ations were not necessary to confirm it. Echoes of the theory continued in Europe, even if it had been finally demonstrated that the practice was

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[4] *The Grand Designs of the Papists in the Reign of our Late Sovereign Charles I, and now carried on against His Present Majesty, his Government and the Protestant Religion* (1678); *Cromwell's Complaint of Injustice or his Dispute with Pope Alexander VI for Precedency in Hell*; *The Papists' Bloody Oath of Secrecy... with the Manner of Taking an Oath upon entering into any Grand Conspiracy against the Protestants* (1680): *Harl. Misc.* VIII. 266; VII. 356, 272.

ineffective or, at best, uncontrollably anarchic. After 1610 there was silence rather than repudiation. The deposing power was, after all, not some foreign graft, but a natural offshoot of the *plenitudo potestatis*. For those devoted to some transcendent religious end, the proposition that it should influence mundane political questions is natural; the denial, contrived. Even in the modern Catholic Church, sporadic concentration on the spiritual misdeeds of governments can occur. It is doubtful that President Perón would have acknowledged the complete disappearance of the indirect deposing power, given the chronological connection between his excommunication and the 1955 Argentinian *coup*.[5]

It was unfortunate for English Catholics that greater efforts were not made sooner to detach them from the burden of this tradition; though it is questionable whether these could ever have been made soon enough. It was this omission, rather than any purely gratuitous enmity of their opponents, which, in the words of their greatest Elizabethan representative - who cannot, ultimately, be said to have done them much service - "turneth all the laws made by godly Popes and Princes for the punishment of heretics and malefactors to the spoil and destruction of innocent men and Catholics for whose defence they were made."[6]

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[5] See RA Potash, *The Army & Politics in Argentina 1945-62* (1982), ch 6. Perón was however diverted into laying much of the blame for his overthrow on to Freemasons - whose connection with the Catholic Church, naturally, was at most covert.

[6] Allen, *Defence*, ed. Kingdon, p 77.

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