

# **SOCIAL MOBILISATION AND THE PURE PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACIES OF LATIN AMERICA**

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## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis seeks for an explanation of social mobilisation by examining the nuts and bolts of the institutional design of democracies. Since the nature of executive-legislative relations in democracy is an important influence on the distribution of policy outcomes between actors in society, and consequently on the extent of support (or inclusion) of citizens to the way power is exercised, the present work investigates how pure presidentialism (and the whole range of institutional accessories that can be combined with this particular executive) affects the opportunities and constraints for social mobilisation. This is done by conducting a within-format comparison across pure presidential regimes in Latin America, where most pure presidential regimes are located.

The thesis is grounded in both quantitative and qualitative methods of research. Quantitatively, protest events are measured across time and space and the parameters are estimated through pooled cross-sectional time-series models for count data. Qualitatively, three case studies are examined: Bolivia (electoral rules), Ecuador (non-legislative and legislative presidential power) and Venezuela (party system).

The main findings of this study are: Within presidential systems social mobilisation is more likely to occur whenever: (1) presidents are selected in runoff elections in the assembly, and (2) constitutions allow the immediate re-election of the president. However, the prospects for social mobilisation are not significantly affected by the extent to which electoral formulae promote the entry of parties to the assembly.

As regards to the relative powers of the presidency and the legislature, the extent of the decree and veto powers of the president do not affect the occurrence of social

mobilisation. Instead, the probability of contentious action is greater whenever (3) the capacity of legislatures to censure and sanction the members of the executive is low; and (4) legislatures have weak authority over public spending.

Lastly, it is shown that the probability of social mobilisation does not vary across majoritarian and minority governments; neither is social mobilisation susceptible to the levels of electoral volatility in the legislature. Rather, (5) social mobilisation is highest whenever the pro-presidential contingent in the legislature is dominated by one large political party.

The thesis thus concludes by strongly advocating for the inclusion of the format of the executive as an important variable in the comparative study of social mobilisation and of the substantive outputs of a democracy, in general.

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# 1. INTRODUCTION

Social movements are groups who regard themselves as marginalised from the political system, and express their frustration at state authorities through disruptive action (Tilly, 1978; Tarrow, 1998).<sup>1</sup> Exclusion – and therefore social mobilisation – is inherent to all regimes (March & Olsen, 2008, pp. 6, 15; Holden Jr., 2008, p. 163), given that institutions necessarily disadvantage those who do not identify with the values that they embody. Of all political regimes, democracies are the most inclusionary (Dahl, 1989; Lijphart, 1984). In their most minimalist form, they envision the right of every citizen to political contestation and participation (Dahl, 1971, pp. 6-7). That said, the extent to which citizen's interests are aggregated and ultimately processed into public policy and thereby the distribution of policy outcomes varies with the institutional architecture of a democracy.<sup>2</sup>

A crucial dimension in the institutional design of democracies is the formal relationship established between the executive and the legislative in terms of both the way each is constituted and the powers that each has over the other (Carey & Shugart, 1992, p. 272). The type of executive-legislative relations – alongside the rules used for selecting the executive and the legislature and the policy-making powers of each branch of government – influence relevant aspects of democratic regimes, such as: the structure of political competition, the degree of executive support in the assembly, the extent of cooperation (or conflict) between branches of government, and thereby the ability of those elected to

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<sup>1</sup> Charles Tilly (1978, p. 12) describes social movements as a “sustained series of interactions between national power-holders and persons successfully claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency lacking formal representation, in the course of which those persons make publicly-visible demands for change in the distribution or exercise of power, and back those demands with public demonstrations of support.”

<sup>2</sup> In reality, democratic regimes have historically operated on restricted notions of the *demos* (Foweraker, 2005, p. 15; Schumpeter, 1962), with different proportions and identities of society being – either explicitly or tacitly – denied meaningful participation in the policy process over time.

influence policy outcomes in favour of their constituencies. The nature of executive-legislative relations in democracy is thus an important influence on the distribution of policy outcomes between actors in society, and consequently on the extent of support (or inclusion) of citizens to the way power is exercised. This thesis seeks for an explanation of social mobilisation by examining the nuts and bolts of the institutional design of democracies (Kitschelt, 1993, p. 17).<sup>3</sup> Social mobilisation is herein seen as a function of the degree to which salient actors in society are disadvantaged by the institutional design as members of the political community.

According to Arendt Lijphart (1977, pp. 25-47; 1969, p. 216), social mobilisation should be the least likely to occur in a consociational democracy, where democratic inclusiveness is supposedly the highest. In this model of democracy, decision-making is not taken by majority, but by the accommodation of different interests in society. The idea of consociationalism is based on elite bargain and compromise. It is characterised by four elements: a grand coalition, proportionality (in the distribution of seats in the assembly and of cabinet positions), minority veto power and segmental autonomy. Consociationalism is mostly a prescription for elite behaviour. However, it is more likely to occur in a consensus democracy (Lijphart, 1989, p. 41; Lijphart, 1969, p. 213).

Consensus institutions are defined in structural terms and in opposition to majoritarian institutions. Consensus institutions include: parliamentarism and proportional representation for the election of legislatures, whereas majoritarian institutions encompass: presidentialism and majoritarian electoral systems (also known as plurality, first-past-the-post, or single-

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<sup>3</sup> Given the protection of their political rights already in place, some have argued that it is precisely in a democracy where those groups in society who feel marginalised can organise and mobilise (Tilly, 2006; Tarrow, 1998; Gurr, 1993).

member district).<sup>4</sup> Consensus institutions allegedly fragment and share political power by allowing the representation and inclusion of all salient interests in society; whereas majoritarian institutions have the opposite effect (Lijphart, 1999, p. 147). Since consensus institutions allow for various groups and interests in society achieving representation in the party system, they provide political elites with a number of incentives to bargain and compromise with each other. Negotiation – the argument goes on – is likely to result in turn in the formation of inclusive (oversized) coalitions and cabinets, ultimately leading to more distributive policy outcomes and in the participation of minorities in the decision-making process. As a result, a large number of citizens will have a greater sense of participation in the decision-making process – or at least ensure their compliance with its results. In so doing, consensus institutions are supposed to reduce the prospects for social conflict in a democracy (Lijphart, 1999, pp. 266-267; Wilkinson, 2004).<sup>5</sup> Overall, it is argued, consensual democracies are better than majoritarian democracies.<sup>6</sup>

Empirical evidence however has increasingly contradicted the supposed impact of consensus (and majoritarian) institutions on the incidence of contentious action and other policy results (Horowitz, 1990; Selway & Templeman, 2012).<sup>7</sup> To a large extent, it is herein argued, this is due because the type of executive-legislative relations – whether parliamentary, semipresidential or pure presidential – has not been properly (and sufficiently)

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<sup>4</sup> The type of executive-legislative relations and the electoral system for the legislature form part of Lijphart's (1999) executive-parties dimension. A second dimension in Lijphart's classification is the federal-unity structure, which includes bicameralism/unicameralism, federalism/unitarism, judicial review, a rigid constitution, and an independent central bank.

<sup>5</sup> These assumptions about consensus and majoritarian models of democracy have also been used to explain not only social mobilisation, but also other public policy results, like economic performance, welfare outcomes, human development, violence, and so on and so forth.

<sup>6</sup> Whilst Arend Lijphart (1999) uses the terms "consensus" and "majoritarian", Pippa Norris (2008) and Bingham Powell (2000) describe these same concepts as "power-sharing" and "power-concentrating", and "proportional" and "majoritarian", respectively.

<sup>7</sup> In fact, Lijphart (1999, pp. 258-274) finds himself no significant difference in the performance of consensus and majoritarian democracies (based on the executives-parties dimension) with regard to strike activity and political violence as well as other performance indicators such as economic growth, inflation, unemployment, and the budget deficit.

considered (Norris, 2002; Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Giugni, 1995; Ruch, 1996; Roeder & Chapman, 2007; Lijphart, 1977; 1999). Electoral rules, for instance, can have variegated effects under different types of executive. Plurality rules in parliamentary systems can actually encourage winner-take-all politics, with one group controlling the coalition and cabinet at the expense of the participation of other groups in society (Horowitz, 1990); whereas proportional representation (PR) rules under presidentialism can increase the likelihood of conflict and ideological polarisation between the executive and the legislature by fragmenting the party arena (Mainwaring, 1993). Moreover, in presidential systems, the composition of the coalition in the assembly and the cabinets depend on the system used for electing the presidency. However, the winner-take-all effects of the presidential election vary with the formula used for electing the presidency (plurality or run-off) and the concurrence of the elections for the president and for the legislature (Jones, 1993). The electoral system for the presidency thus affects the size of the presidential contingent in the assembly, the likelihood for coalition formation, the degree of cooperation among the executive and the legislature, and overall the extent to which salient interests in society have representation and participation in the policymaking. Besides the number and size of political parties with representation in the assembly, the possibility of negotiation also depends on the powers of the president: whether the executive has the faculty to unilaterally legislate or appoint the cabinet members.

In effect, even within the same format of executive-legislative relations, there can be important variations in democratic practices (Carey & Shugart, 1992). Of course, for the democratic process to be inclusive, no salient group in society should be excluded from having formal representation in the assembly. Nonetheless, the type of executive-legislative relations seems to play a greater and somewhat different role than it had been commonly theorised by consensus models of democracy. However, the question should not be whether

multiple institutions add to the inclusiveness of a democracy. But, the influence of institutions like electoral rules or other institutional accessories should be seen as *conditional* on the type of executive-legislative arrangements (Selway & Templeman, 2012). The institutional prescriptions for achieving a consociational democracy should thus be revised.

This thesis relates the character of executive-legislative relations in a democracy to the occurrence of social mobilisation. It does so by doing a sustained and comparative assessment of the pure presidential form of government, which has been claimed to be the closest approximation of a “majoritarian” or “winner-take-all” format in democratic institutional design. This is done in two ways: first, by comparing pure presidentialism with semipresidential and parliamentary forms of government (across-format comparison), and second, by looking at variations inside a sub-sample of pure presidential regimes (within format comparison), such as the electoral system of the presidency and the legislature, and the extent of the legislative and non-legislative powers of the president, the characteristics of the presidential contingent in the assembly (Figure 1.1).

It aims to address some of the following questions: Are pure presidential systems the most prone to experience social mobilisation? Is the combination of a pure presidential regime with a proportional electoral system the most conducive to social mobilisation? Is social mobilisation more likely to occur when presidents are elected in run-off contests? How does the consecutive re-election of the president affect the incidence of social mobilisation? Are the legislative powers of the presidency negatively related to the occurrence of social mobilisation? Is the probability of contentious action reduced when legislatures have strong sanction and censure powers over the members of the president? How does the character of the presidential contingent in the legislature impact the occurrence of social mobilisation?

The dependent variable is social mobilisation, that is, acts of resistance against the government. It is assumed here that social mobilisation is a function of the degree to which

salient political actors are disadvantaged by the formal institutional design. Contentious action from below should therefore be higher whenever societal actors experience systematic exclusion – whenever they perceive arbitrary, unilateral decision making, or whenever they are unable to hold elected authorities to account via vertical or horizontal accountability.

The sub-sample is 17 electoral democracies between 1978 and 2009 in Latin America. The politics of the region is rooted in a shared history and culture, powerfully influenced by similar influences from the global economy and international actors. To begin with, Latin America is a good setting for exploring the validity of consociationalism, whose societies are not only ethnically and racially heterogeneous but are featured by the most acute patterns of wealth and land inequality in the world.<sup>8</sup> Most importantly, all democracies in Latin America are pure presidential. These democracies are multiparty, by virtue of (semi-) PR rules for the election of legislators – a consensus institution which promotes pluralism into the party arena. At the same time, however, they are characterised by strong presidential powers to promote policy change, a majoritarian power-concentrating feature (Negretto, 2013, pp. 40-42). That said, there are important differences in the institutional design of executive-legislative relations. Since the beginning of the third wave of democratisation in 1978, there have been continuous changes in these countries in regards to the formulas used for selecting the presidency and the legislature, term limits, the powers of the president, oversight capacities of the legislature, and so on and so forth (Negretto, 2013).<sup>9</sup> Indeed, the patterns of political cooperation and accommodation have been quite diverse across time and space the region.<sup>10</sup> Given these commonalities and variations (within the same pure presidential format), Latin

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<sup>8</sup> In 2009, the wealthiest 20 per cent of the population in Latin America owned 35 per cent of the national income, whereas the poorest 40 per cent of the population earned only 15 per cent of the national income (ECLAC, 2010).

<sup>9</sup> Gabriel Negretto (2013, p. 23) reports that only for the period between the years of 1978 and 2008, 140 amendments were made to constitutions in Latin America; of these, 34 were related to the rules used for selecting the president and the legislature and the relative powers between these two branches of government.

<sup>10</sup> Other differences are accrued to the capacity and autonomy of the judiciary, the degree of political decentralisation, and the existence of additional oversight institutions.

America constitutes a good sample for exploring the influence of the nature of executive-legislative relations on social mobilisation from a comparative perspective.

A focus on the Latin American region can also shed light on the influence of executive-legislative arrangements on social mobilisation in developing democracies. Not only has the format of the executive been overlooked in the comparative study of social mobilisation, but most accounts have been based on the experience of a limited sample of advanced democracies, with the United States being the sole example of pure presidentialism. The United States is however an exceptional case (Cheibub, Elkins, & Ginsburg, 2011, pp. 1719-1720). Only in the United States are legislators elected in single-member districts by plurality voting, and presidents lack decree authority as well as the capacity to convoke for referenda.<sup>11</sup> With the spread of democratic rule, and of different pure and mixed forms of presidentialism, to a large number of countries in Latin America, Asia, Eastern Europe and Africa over the past decades (Figure 1.2), no longer can the type of executive-legislative relations (and its institutional sub-variants) be underestimated in the comparative study of social mobilisation and the substantive outputs of a democracy, in general.<sup>12</sup>


The claims herein advanced are tested using both quantitative and qualitative methods. The quantitative analysis is based on the number of protest events registered by the *Latin America Weekly Report* (LAWR), 1978-2009. Pooled cross-sectional time-series

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<sup>11</sup> Although much of the literature on social movements has analysed the case of the United States, the pattern of social mobilisation set by the nature of the American pure presidential system in comparison to other types of executive-legislative arrangements (particularly in Western Europe) has been neglected by the majority of experts. Herbert Kitschelt (1986), for instance, assesses the role of political institutions on social mobilisation by comparing four advanced democracies with different forms of government: France, West Germany, Sweden and the United States. A crucial variable in his analysis is the ability of legislatures to develop and control policies independently of the Executive (Kitschelt, *Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies*, 1986, p. 63). When legislatures are strong, he argues, the opportunities for successful mobilisation are greater. Despite this observation, Kitschelt does not relate the capacity of the legislature to the type of executive – being this presidential, semi-presidential or parliamentary.

<sup>12</sup> The only study examining the relationship between the nature of the executive and the incidence of social protest was that of G. Powell (1982). He concluded that presidential systems were not a strong variable accounting for the occurrence of riots and political violence. However, his results were based on an extremely limited dataset of protest events, covering 29 democracies from 1958 to 1976 (of which, nine suffered severe interruptions to democracy over the period under study).


**Figure 1.1** *A general model of social mobilisation*



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**Figure 1.2** *Types of executive over time*

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*Sources: Banks (2010), Robert Elgie (2011), José Antonio Cheibub (2010) and David Samuels and Matthew Shugart (2010, pp. 33-34).*

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models for count data are used for testing the influence of institutional variables on social mobilisation, whilst controlling for alternative (or omitted) factors. Although models are subjected to appropriate diagnostics, the results of the statistical exercise are complemented with qualitative evidence from three case studies: Bolivia (electoral rules), Ecuador (presidential powers) and Venezuela (presidential contingent).

In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I will briefly discuss the existing literature on social mobilisation and executive-legislative relations.

### **1.1 Literature Review**

This thesis aims to contribute and reconcile two separate bodies of literature: theories of social mobilisation and the type of executive-legislative relations.

### Theories of Social Mobilisation

The main theories that explain why social mobilisation arises can be divided between the micro, or individual level, and the macro, or system level. Among the micro-political theories of social mobilisation are the relative deprivation and the rational choice theories. The relative deprivation theory is, at its core, a psychological theory. It contends that individuals are likely to feel aggrieved and are therefore more prone to engage in contentious action whenever their current situation does not match their hopes and aspirations. These grievances are based on the amount of important goods and conditions of life to which people feel rightfully entitled (Gurr, 1970, p. 13; Muller & Weede, 1994, p. 41). The extent to which individuals might feel frustrated varies with the perceived gap between their hopes and actual achievements, which in turn is proportional to the intensity of contentious action (Gurr, 1970, pp. 36-37).

It has been noted however that grievances are not a sufficient condition for social movements to emerge. Rational choice models contend that aggrieved individuals will organise themselves into social movements only if the benefits of organising collective action are higher than the costs (Olson, 1965). Since groups tend to mobilise for the provision of a common good or cause, it is rational for a specific individual to enjoy the common benefits without incurring in the cost of participating. Only in the presence of selective rewards and punishments for their involvement will individuals mobilise (Olson, 1965, p. 51). But, given the high fixed costs and always uncertain benefits of participating in social movements, contentious action tends to be the exception rather than the rule (Lichbach, 1998, pp. 12, 16-19, 283).

Along these lines, resource mobilisation models posit that social movements will emerge and develop when external and internal resources are vast and coordination

mechanisms among participants are good (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001, p. 15; McCarthy & Zald, 1977, p. 1216). Like resource mobilisation models, the political opportunity structure (POS) approach of social mobilisation considers grievances as a constant. However, it attributes the emergence and development of social movements not only to the organisational capacity of collective actors but to changes in the broad political environment (Tarrow, 1998; Kitschelt, 1986). Sidney Tarrow (1998, pp. 76-77) singles out five dimensions of the POS: 1) the multiplicity of independent centres of powers within the regime, 2) the regime's openness to new actors, 3) the instability of current political alignments, 4) the availability of influential allies or supporters for challengers, and 5) the extent to which the regime represses or facilitates collective claim-making. Changes in any of these dimensions are supposed to either facilitate or constrain the development of social movements.

The POS approach relates the likelihood of social mobilisation to the degree of competition in a political system. Accordingly, citizens should be more prone to protest when there are checks and balances between powers and/or electoral rules fragmenting the party arena. It predicts that systems in which power is dispersed (among multiple number of competing players) open greater opportunities for social mobilisation, by offering social movements actors a greater number of target points and consequently a greater likelihood of success. By contrast, systems in which the decision-making arena is closed or centralised in a handful of interests offer fewer incentives to aggrieved individuals for advancing their goals through social mobilisation (Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Giugni, 1995, p. 42; Amenta, 1999; Kitschelt, 1986). The predictions of the POS thus differ from those of the model of consensus (and consociational) democracy (outlined above), which relates social mobilisation with elite bargain and compromise and thereby power-sharing institutions (Lijphart, 1999; Norris, 2008). Nonetheless, the assumptions of the POS are questionable like those of consensus models of democracy, insofar as neither of them does properly consider the effects

of the different types of executive (and the whole range of institutional accessories that could be combined with each). Clearly, the effects of political institutions on social mobilisation are not clear yet and therefore deserve further investigation.<sup>13</sup>

### ***1.1 Types of Executive-Legislative Relations***

According to the process of formation, and the relative powers, of the executive and legislative branches, democracies can be classified into: (1) parliamentary, (2) semi-presidential, and (3) pure presidential.

In parliamentary systems, voters elect a single agent: the legislature. After being popularly elected, these popular representatives form a coalition in the assembly, which in turn forms a government, consisting of a prime minister and a cabinet. The government thus depends on the confidence of the majority coalition in the legislature for their survival. This is not the case in presidential systems; in which voters directly select, in separate ballots and for a fixed term, two agents: the legislature and the presidency. In pure presidential systems, presidents are both the head of the state and the government. As such, they have the exclusive capacity to appoint or dismiss cabinet members. The government is thereby answerable to the president only. Presidents have no formal power to dissolve the legislature. Similarly, legislators cannot remove the president (and other cabinet members) unless a procedure of impeachment is initiated. In semi-presidential systems, however, in addition to an elected

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<sup>13</sup> Critics of the POS approach have argued that the perception of political opportunities is not so much related to institutional structures as they are to the strategies and calculations of actors in the elite and society. Political opportunities are rather subjective and mutable. As a result, not only can the concept of (perceived) political opportunities for mobilisation cannot travel well across cases, but the POS approach can lead to contradictory inferences about the effect of the political environment in which social movements operate (Gamson & Meyer, 1996). Others blame this notion for conceptual stretching, since every aspect of the political environment in which social movements emerge can affect the perceived existence of a mobilising opportunity. Before this, David Meyer and Debra Minkoff (2004) suggest distinguishing between the “signal” and the “structural” dimensions of the POS. In structural models of the POS, opportunities for social mobilisation are driven by changes in the institutional make-up of a regime, whereas in signal models, social mobilisation is contingent on changes in the political context.

president, there is a prime minister and a cabinet. The government is always responsible to the assembly, although some presidents can appoint and/or dismiss the prime minister as well as other cabinet members. In some cases, presidents can even dissolve the assembly. Thus, in semi-presidential systems the president and the legislature have a mutual (albeit contested) control over the government.

In a seminal work, Juan Linz (1990) considers pure presidentialism as the most inimical to democratic politics. Given the separation of purpose and origin of the legislature and the executive, there is competition between these agents. Moreover, the argument goes on, the selection of the president in direct and nationwide elections can lead the executive to arrogate herself a false mandate and consequently dismiss the different interests that are represented in the assembly (O'Donnell, 1994). Thereby the potential for cooperation and conciliation is very low. Thus, in line with consensus models of democracy, Linz argues that the presence of an elected president promotes winner-take-all politics. Nonetheless, various studies have demonstrated that winner-take-all tendencies are not inherent to pure presidentialism. Coalition governments have actually been common in presidential democracies (Chasquetti, 2001; Deheza, 1997; Foweraker, 1998). Moreover, in some societies, parliamentarism has been associated with winner-take-all politics (Tsebelis, 1995; Horowitz, 1990). This has led some commentators, like George Tsebelis (1995), to argue that the distinction between presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary systems is less important than the preferences and number of veto players in the policy process.

Certainly, within every format of executive-legislative relations, there is significant variation in the ways the legislature and the executive relate to one another, and to their constituencies (Shugart & Carey, 1992; Mainwaring, 1993). These variations are accrued to other institutional variables such as: the electoral system, the decision-making powers of the executive, the oversight capacities of the legislature, and so on and so forth (Shugart &

Carey, 1992).<sup>14</sup> Nonetheless, as argued above, the effect of these institutional accessories on various aspects of democratic politics should be seen as *conditional* not *additional* on the type of executive-legislative relations. The format of the executive is crucial.

To date, however, most of the literature on executive-legislative relations has concentrated on the question of democratic survival and policy effectiveness. Little scholarly attention has been paid to the influence of the type of executive-legislative relations and their institutional accessories on distributive policy outcomes, such as economic performance, fiscal deficits, welfare provision, human development, and so on and so forth (Persson, 2005; Persson & Tabellini, 2003; Shugart, 1999). If the incidence of social mobilisation is related to the extent to which policy outcomes benefit some actors over others, this study of social mobilisation and institutional correlates hopes to contribute to this new research agenda.

## **1.2     *Structure of the argument***

The present enquiry proceeds as follows.

Chapter 2 examines the influence of the type of executive-legislative relations on the prospects of protest events, by distinguishing democracies into parliamentary, semi-presidential, and pure presidential categories. Such a causal relationship is tested across time and space using data on protest events and political institutions for 100 electoral democracies around the world for the period 1900-2009. Since the dependent variable is discrete, pooled cross-sectional time series models for count data are developed. This chapter demonstrates that the probability of social mobilisation is lowest when the government can be composed

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<sup>14</sup> According to the powers presidents have to influence government survival, semi-presidential regimes have been classified in turn into premier-presidential and president-parliamentary. In premier-presidential systems, only the assembly has the power to dismiss the cabinet. In president-parliamentary democracies, the survival of the prime minister and cabinet depends on both the president and the parties in the legislature (Shugart, 2005; Shugart & Carey, 1992).

and terminated by both a directly elected executive and the assembly in the legislature. When this is not the case, as it is in pure presidential and parliamentary systems, cabinets are more likely to be single party or non-partisan. These results thus confirm that the type of executive-legislative relations has a significant and strong influence on the odds of social mobilisation. However, the effect of electoral rules for the legislature on social mobilisation is irrelevant.

Whilst the system used for selecting legislators might account for the presence of winner-take-all politics in parliamentary systems, within the pure presidential type of regimes, other institutional arrangements should be taken into account, such as: the electoral rules used for selecting the president, the term limits of presidents, the powers of the presidency, amongst others. Then, the analysis proceeds in an inductive manner, moving from the general to the specific aspects of pure presidentialism.

It investigates how the different institutional accessories that can be combined with the pure presidential format influence the nature and distribution of policy outcomes, and therefore the likelihood of social mobilisation in a democracy. Its empirical focus is on 17 pure presidential democracies in Latin America between the years of 1978 and 2009.

Chapter 3 explores the similarities and differences in the trajectory of social mobilisation across this family of pure presidential systems. This descriptive account is based on a dataset of protest events as recorded by the Latin American Weekly Report (LAWR).

Chapter 4 and 5, in turn, investigate the variation in the rules for the selection of the presidency and the legislature rules, and the presidential powers and oversight functions of the legislature, respectively, and explore the influence of these institutional elements on social mobilisation in Latin America. The claims advanced in these chapters are tested combining quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis.

Chapter 4 demonstrates that, contrary to the consensus model, protest is unaffected by the degree to which electoral formulae promote the access of parties to the legislature, albeit marginal variations in electoral disproportionality do have the expected effects. Instead, contentious action is more likely when presidents are selected in runoff elections in the assembly, and constitutions allow the immediate re-election of presidents.

As regards to presidential powers, Chapter 5 shows that the decree and veto powers of the president (which may allow the president to bypass the legislature) do not affect the likelihood of protest. Instead, the incidence of protest is more likely to occur when legislatures have little authority to censure or remove presidents and legislatures have weak authority over public spending.

Whilst the influence of institutions might be significant, the functioning of political institutions might be affected by country-specific factors, like past events, political leadership, national idiosyncrasies, and so on and so forth. These factors can account for variations even within the same institutional design and even within the same polity over time. With this in mind, Chapter 6 examines the nature of party systems (and the partisan powers of the president) across Latin American countries and investigates the influence of these variables on the incidence of social mobilisation. It demonstrates that social mobilisation is not susceptible to the extent of fragmentation of the party arena or to levels of electoral volatility in the legislature. Neither does the probability of social mobilisation vary across majoritarian and minority governments. That said, social mobilisation is highest whenever the pro-presidential contingent in the legislature is dominated by one large political party (independent of its size).

The picture outlined by statistical findings is enriched by the analysis of the cases of Bolivia (Chapter 4), Ecuador (Chapter 5), and Venezuela (Chapter 6).

Lastly, Chapter 7 summarises the main findings of the thesis and its contributions to understanding social mobilisation and pure presidentialism from a comparative perspective. It concludes by suggesting new avenues of research for the comparative study of social mobilisation and executive-legislative relations.

## **2. TYPES OF EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS AND SOCIAL MOBILISATION**

This chapter examines the influence of different types of executive-legislative relations on the incidence of social mobilisation. This relationship is examined through pooled cross-sectional time-series models for count data. The sample includes all electoral democracies in the world between the years of 1900 and 2009. The dependent variable is measured as the annual number of anti-government protest events in a country. The main finding of this chapter is that social mobilisation is related to the extent to which governments can be composed and terminated by a directly elected executive. Social mobilisation is the lowest when both the elected presidency and the legislature are co-responsible in the process of government formation and/or termination. This result is robust after a series of control variables.

The chapter is organised as follows. The first section advances a series of hypotheses on the effect of the different types of executive-legislative arrangements on the likelihood of social mobilisation. The second part lays out the methods and the data used for testing these claims. The third section presents the results drawn by statistical models. The fourth part concludes.

### **2.1 *Hypotheses***

Assuming that collective action problems are solved and that the rights that allow collective organisation and mobilisation are already in place, social mobilisation is herein conceived as a function of the degree to which salient actors in society are excluded by the institutional design as members of the political community. In a democracy, every citizen has equal rights

for contesting power and participating in collective decisions.<sup>15</sup> Contentious action from below should therefore be higher whenever salient actors in society are denied these rights – whenever they are denied representation in the system, whenever they perceive arbitrary or unilateral decision making, or whenever they are unable to hold elected authorities to account via vertical or horizontal accountability. The prospects for social mobilisation are thus negatively related to the inclusiveness of a democracy, which it is hypothesised herein as a function of the institutional design of a democracy.

According to Lijphart (1999, p. 34), the prime indicator of the inclusiveness of a democracy is the partisan composition of cabinets.<sup>16</sup> Cabinet partisanship is supposed to reflect the extent of accommodation and compromise among elites. Certainly, in parliamentary democracies, since the executive is entirely answerable to the assembly, cabinets are (if not) always composed by party members and therefore tend to reflect faithfully and proportionally the composition of the coalition in the assembly (Austen-Smith & Banks, 1990). In parliamentary systems therefore the extent of partisanship of the cabinet depends on the degree of fragmentation the party arena and consequently of the institutional factors affecting it, like the electoral system. Nonetheless, the same (Lijphartian) argument cannot be extended to other types of executive-legislative relations. It is herein argued that the partisan composition of cabinets does not automatically follow from the number of parties forming the coalition and/or the number of effective number of parties in the assembly. But,

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<sup>15</sup> The idea of rights is inherent to that of citizenship, which involves membership of a community – itself an increasingly contested concept (Marshall, 1950, pp. 28-29). Although social movements always form around particular and concrete demands, inevitably the struggle for rights becomes part of their discourse (Foweraker & Landman, 1997, pp. 26-38). In this light, Joe Foweraker and Todd Landman (1997, pp. 26-38) consider social mobilisation as a means for closing the gap between the rights citizens have “in principle” and the rights they have “in practice”; social movements and the idea and practice of citizenship as dynamic interrelated processes, along which rights are continuously contested and redefined (1997, pp. 17-19, 32-38).

<sup>16</sup> Certainly, being included in the executive gives parties a greater say on policy than merely being included in the legislative coalition.

all else equal, the composition of cabinets is influenced by the type of executive-legislative relations (Amorim Neto & Samuels, 2010).

Recent studies have shown that the incentives to appoint partisan members to the cabinet and/or distribute portfolios in a proportional manner across the coalition parties in the assembly vary with the extent to which an executive needs the support of the parties in the assembly for its performance and survival (Amorim Neto & Samuels, 2010; Martinez-Gallardo, 2011). In pure presidential systems, for instance, the legislature is formally excluded from the process of cabinet formation, but presidents appoint and dismiss cabinet members at will. Thus, governments can be formed and survive without the participation of the parties in the assembly. In fact, given the personalisation of the executive office, presidents can be elected without the support of parties in the national legislature. In the event, whilst cabinets may be composed by technocrats promoting policies in the name of the common interest, the different interests in society that are represented in the assembly have no actual participation in the policy process. This is more likely to be the case when presidents have ample (formal and informal) powers to implement legislation without any check (Amorim Neto, 2006).

In practice, however, executives in pure presidential democracies have usually been backed by majoritarian contingents in the assembly (Chasquetti, 2001; Deheza, 1997; Foweraker, 1998). In fact, coalitions in pure presidential regimes have been as common as in other types of executive-legislative relations (Cheibub, Przeworski, & Saiegh, 2004). Moreover, the majority of cabinets under pure presidentialism have been partisan. The distribution of cabinet portfolios to the parties in the assembly has allowed presidents to secure support in the assembly, and therefore advance their agenda even if the cabinet is not formally appointed by the legislature (Foweraker, 1998; Deheza, 1997; Chasquetti, 2001).

Nonetheless, rarely have cabinets in pure presidential systems reflected in a proportional way the partisan composition of the coalition in the assembly (Amorim Neto & Samuels, 2010).

As a result, in pure presidential systems, there is no guarantee that the representation of different parties in the cabinet will be consistent over time. Rather, since presidents can unilaterally remove ministers for any reason at any time, cabinet membership tends to be more unstable than in other executive-legislative relations formats (Martinez-Gallardo, 2011; Camerlo & Pereira, 2010). Consequently, the opportunities for the different parties in the assembly to have real influence on government are limited and/or short-termed, at best. Indeed, existing research has demonstrated that the rates of cabinet coalescence – that is, the gap between the inclusiveness of cabinets and the inclusiveness of the coalition in the assembly – are the lowest in pure presidential systems (Amorim Neto & Samuels, 2010).

In semi-presidential democracies, both the president and the coalition in the assembly are entitled to participate in the process of government formation and/or termination, even if to differing degrees. Even where either the coalition in the assembly or the president had primacy in the control of government formation, the preferences of the other, while restricted, cannot be entirely neglected (Schleiter & Elgie, 2010). Thereafter, it is more likely that the cabinets (and thereby policy outcomes) reflect in a more consistent and proportional manner the interests of the parties represented in the assembly in semi-presidentialism than in pure presidentialism. Nonetheless, cabinet partisanship tends to be lower in semi-presidential systems than in parliamentary ones.

That said, a partisan cabinet is not a guarantee that policy outcomes will be inclusive. For Shugart (1999, p. 84), strong presidencies can allow for a better provision of national collective goods, particularly in societies with deep and acute cleavages. In those settings – the argument goes on – a presidency with strong reactive and proactive powers can counteract the tendency to serve targeted narrow constituencies more effectively. They can

also solve collective action problems, in extremely fragmented and/or weakly institutionalised party arenas. Allegedly, this is one of the reasons why parliamentarism has been rejected (or abandoned) in favour of presidential systems in the developing world (Shugart, 1999, pp. 78-83). However, the risk of exclusion is also latent when presidents have the exclusive faculty of appointing cabinet members. When presidents govern as they fit bypassing the assembly (O'Donnell, 1994, pp. 59-60), cabinets might not be necessarily composed by technocrats promoting policies in the name of the common interest, but by presidential cronies, with presidents promoting (rather than inhibiting) particularistic politics.

Given the above considerations, it is questionable to see cabinet partisanship as a good indicator of the inclusiveness of a democracy. Rather, it is herein contended that the inclusiveness of a democracy is related to the extent to which both the executive and the legislature can oversee the actions of each other in the process of government formation and termination. Thus, assuming that social mobilisation is positively related to the inclusiveness of a democracy, the following hypotheses could be developed:

*H1: The prospects for social mobilisation differ across presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary systems.*

*H2: The prospects for social mobilisation are the lowest in semi-presidential systems.*

## **2.2 Data and Methods**

### Dependent Variable

Because political identities are socially constructed, and therefore mutable, social movements can only be compared across time and space in terms of their activity (Foweraker &

Landman, 1997, pp. 39-41; Tarrow, 1998, pp. 8-9). Social movement activity is herein measured as the number of anti-government demonstrations, riots and strikes occurring in a country in a given year. Aggregate data on protest events is drawn from the Arthur Banks Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (2010).<sup>17</sup> This data source has the broadest coverage of these protest events across time and countries. Only those country-year observations with a Polity IV score above 3 during the years between 1900 and 2009 are included in the model.<sup>18</sup> A list of countries that are included in the regression analysis can be found in the Appendix.

### Independent Variable

The key independent variable in the analysis is the type of executive-legislative relations of a democracy. Democracies are therefore categorised into pure presidential, semi-presidential and pure parliamentary types (Shugart & Carey, 1992; Shugart, 2005). Data for these variables was drawn from Banks (2010), as well as information compiled by Robert Elgie (2011), José Antonio Cheibub (2010) and David Samuels and Matthew Shugart (2010, pp. 33-34). The different types of executive-legislative arrangements are included in the statistical specifications as binary variables, with pure presidentialism taken as the reference category.

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<sup>17</sup> In the Banks (2009) dataset, protest events are defined as follows. Anti-government demonstrations: “any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature;” general strikes: “any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that involves more than one employer and that is aimed at national government policies and authority;” riots: “any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force.

<sup>18</sup> In the Polity IV scale, political regimes are ranged from -10 (fully authoritarian) to +10 (fully democratic), according to constraints on the executive, institutionalised competition, and open participation by citizens and civic associations. Although there is no current consensus on the threshold for electoral democracy using Polity scores, the most commonly used threshold for consolidated democracies is a score of +6. Nevertheless, such a threshold can be set at a lower threshold of +3. This allows the broadening of the sample and inclusion of emerging but unconsolidated democracies which, nevertheless, meet the minimal definition of democracy.

## Control Variables

Also considered are binary measures for other institutional arrangements that according to past research are likely to affect protest activity (Lijphart, 1977; 1999; Kriesi, Koopmans, & et. al., 1995; Roeder & Chapman, 2007; Ruch, 1996). These include the system used for the election of the lower house (majoritarian, semi-PR or proportional),<sup>19</sup> and the degree of dispersion of the decision-making process among the national and subnational levels (unitarism or federalism).<sup>20</sup>

In addition, models include variables for levels of democracy, the GDP per capita, the inflation rate,<sup>21</sup> the size of the population,<sup>22</sup> Western democracies,<sup>23</sup> geographical region,<sup>24</sup> and time periods (waves of democracy and the Cold War).<sup>25</sup> Data measurement and sources for some of these variables can be found in the Appendix.

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<sup>19</sup> Majoritarian rules for the election of legislators include formulas like First-Past-the-Post, Second Ballot, the Block Vote, the Single Non-Transferable Vote, and the Alternative Vote. PR rules refer to formulas such as Party List and Single Transferable Vote systems. Semi-PR include those systems where both PR and majoritarian rules are used in the same electoral contest.

<sup>20</sup> Constitutions are classified as federal if the subnational units have separate constitutional powers, and unitary otherwise. In federal systems, national issues are more likely to be central for legislators. Presidents may have greater ability to build coalitions on the basis of national issues. In unitary systems, however, subnational issues are likely to be more important for legislators. As a result, the party leadership is less able to speak for the entire party and to deliver its legislative support (Jones & Mainwaring, 2003).

<sup>21</sup> There is much debate in the literature about the ways in which economic development and growth affect social mobilisation. The resource mobilisation theory contends that those people suffering from economic hardship and greater income inequality have fewer incentives to engage in contention action as they lack the time and material resources needed for the organisation of social movements (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). This approach is also in line with the rational choice literature on collective action (Olson, 1965). However, according to the modernisation school of thought, social mobilisation is non-linearly related to the level of economic development (Huntington, 1965; Reenock, Bernhard, & Sobek, 2007).

<sup>22</sup> In general, larger population sizes have been linked with higher odds of social mobilisation.

<sup>23</sup> Given their long and established culture of associationalism, it is argued that citizens in Western countries are more prone to organise and pressure authorities to change course when they find their interests have been misrepresented (Almond & Verba, 1963). Implicit in this argument is a historically path-dependent discourse, insofar as citizens in countries with shorter traditions of social associationalism and lower levels of democratic development are less likely to use social mobilisation as an accountability mechanism.

<sup>24</sup> To a large extent, the adoption of, and persistence of, particular institutions is influenced by colonial past and cultural proximity as well as learning across national borders (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000, p. 49).

<sup>25</sup> Democratic transitions tend to occur in waves (Huntington, 1991), with constitutions written in particular periods of time sharing various characteristics (Elster, 1995; Go, 2003; Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*, 1991, p. 99).

### *Model Specification*

Because the number of protest events can only take integer and non-negative values, the variable of interest cannot be estimated using linear models.<sup>26</sup> The standard method for analysing discrete count data is the Poisson model. This model assumes that observations are independent of each other, with the variance of the dependent variable being much greater than its mean. That is, not only are count variables discrete, but their distribution is highly skewed. Consequently, it violates the fundamental assumption of OLS regression, in particular the normality of the residuals. In sum, due to intrinsic heteroskedasticity, overdispersion is common in count data structures.<sup>27</sup>

Over-dispersion tends to be particularly high in pooled cross-sectional time series data,<sup>28</sup> characterised by having a fixed set of units observed over a larger number of periods in time (Beck & Katz, 1995, p. 634; Stimson, 1985). In pooled cross-sectional time series structures, not only do the errors differ from country to country (heteroskedasticity), but the error of one country may be associated with the errors for other countries in the same year (contemporaneous correlation of the error) or the errors of each may be correlated across time periods (Beck & Katz, 1995, p. 634). In dealing with these problems, political scientists have developed a series of quantitative models for time dominant data (Beck & Katz, 1995; Plümper, Troeger, & Manow, 2005). However, at present, most of the proposed solutions

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<sup>26</sup> This has been a serious drawback in the majority of studies on protest, which have been based on linear models. Although the number of protest activities could be transformed by taking the natural logarithm or square root of another variable (say the size of the population) the use of transformed variables is not recommended. Not only may coefficients be difficult to interpret, but also estimates are inadequately modelled and therefore inconsistent (Cameron & Trivedi, 1998; Long, 1997). In drawing robust conclusions on the causes of social mobilisation, models that deal specifically with the non-normality on the dependent variable should be used.

<sup>27</sup> The effects of overdispersion are similar to those of unobserved heteroskedasticity in linear regression models. When not controlled, overdispersion leads to inconsistency problems by deflating the standard errors and inflating the t-statistics.

<sup>28</sup> TSCS data is similar to panel data insofar as a number of units are observed over repeated waves. However, in panel data, the number of units is larger than the number of periods of time. For this reason, the issues that may arise in panel data, and the statistical techniques designed to address them, may not be valid for TSCS data (Beck & Katz, 1995, p. 634).

have focused largely on binary or continuous outcome variables. To the best of my knowledge, only a limited number of political science-related articles have dealt with the issues raised for pooled cross-sectional time series models for count data.

Longitudinal and cross-sectional models for count data have been more common in other areas of social sciences, particularly in health economics and management. In these fields, cluster effects have usually been corrected using fixed effects (FE) and/or random effects (RE), whereas pooled or population averaged (PA) specifications have been developed to correct for time effects. These specifications can be applied to either Poisson or negative binomial distributions (Hilbe, 2007). Nevertheless, the majority of these models have been based on panel data rather than on pooled cross-sectional time-series structures. For this reason, these models assumptions may not hold when making comparisons across countries or subnational units over long periods of time on the basis of discrete data.

Since there is no “incidental parameter problem” in pooled cross-sectional time series, it might be argued that fixed effects models for count data could provide reliable estimates. In fact, in political science, including lagged correlations or simply ignoring time effects has been the standard technique for when dealing with count data (Arce & Bellinger, 2007; 2010; Arce & Kim, 2011; Hendrix, Haggard, & Magaloni, 2009; Arce M. , 2010). However, as noted above, this estimation technique is not only inadequate in a pooled cross-sectional time series setting, but the performance of the fixed effects for count data is minimise when lagged dependent variables are included alongside other covariates (Trivedi & Munkin, 2010, pp. 25-40).

Very few models have accounted for different correlations over time for discrete data. One of the main reasons is that, unlike in the linear case, serial correlations for count data is influenced by time-dependent covariates. In contrast to linear models, when covariates are time-dependent, covariance structures must follow a non-stationary pattern. Since

modelling these correlations is not an easy task, serial correlation has commonly been addressed by using time-specific random effects in the conditional mean functions of each cluster. Yet, time effects are inadequately modelled because lagged correlations and other type of Gaussian autocorrelations cannot be included (Sutradhar, 2011, pp. 189-190). Overall, this has not posed a problem in panel data, where the number of time periods is small and serial correlation is not significant. However, time effects cannot be ignored in pooled cross-sectional time-series.

Among the techniques available for count data that could be applied in a pooled cross-sectional time-series context are the so-called “linear feedback models” (LFM) (Blundell, Griffith, & Windmeijer, 2002).<sup>29</sup> The LFM includes an integer-valued autoregressive (INAR) process,<sup>30</sup> similar to the autoregressive (AR) specifications.<sup>31</sup> It should be noted that this classic dynamic Poisson fixed effects model is not a true effects model because its estimation requires “weak exogeneity” to be assumed. However it appears to be the most appropriate statistical dynamic specification for pooled cross-sectional time series

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<sup>29</sup> In the LFM the lagged dependent variable (LDV) is linearly related with the dependent variable, whereas the other covariates influence the outcome variable by an exponential function. Such a model provides a better fit than exponential feedback models (EFM), which include lagged dependent variables alongside other covariates in the same exponential function. By introducing discontinuities, EFM cannot account for wide variation in data values (Blundell, Griffith, & Windmeijer, 2002; Trivedi & Munkin, 2010).

<sup>30</sup> Recent studies have shown that INAR processes correct for serial correlation over time better than other tools used in count data, such as autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) (Quddus, 2008). This is because, unlike ARIMA, INAR processes do not assume normality of the errors but hold the properties of Poisson regression.

<sup>31</sup> In solving the problem of autocorrelation of residuals, most political scientists have included period dummies and a LDV in the set of independent variables (Beck & Katz, What to do (and not to do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data, 1995; Garrett & Mitchell, 2001, p. 163). The coefficient of the LDV has been interpreted as a measure of time persistence in the dependent variable (Garrett & Mitchell, 2001, p. 62). However, when a LDV is included, the effects of the independent variables are minimised because of the high correlation between the dependent variable and the lagged dependent variable (Huber & Stephens, 2001, p. 62; Plümper, Troeger, & Manow, Panel data analysis in comparative politics: Linking method to theory, 2005, p. 335). In count data models, the LDV is also a source of bias because it is correlated to the unit-specific effects. For these reasons, LDV is not appropriate to correct for time in count data models, albeit the majority of studies of protest have based their conclusions on Poisson or negative binomial models with LDV for controlling for time effects. Serial correlation can be better corrected using auto-regressive processes (AR). AR has often been criticised because the autoregressive term acquires a large statistically significant coefficient and, consequently, many of the coefficients are significantly reduced (Podestà, 2003, p. 7). Still, in the presence of slowly time-variant variables, these models have proved to lead to more consistent estimates (Huber & Stephens, 2001, p. 65; Plümper, Troeger, & Manow, Panel data analysis in comparative politics: Linking method to theory, 2005, pp. 342-343). The closest versions for modelling AR processes in TSCS count data are the INAR processes.

for count data available at this time. Furthermore, this assumption allows one to estimate the effect of the type of executive, given that some countries have not altered their constitutional arrangements for many decades.

In formal terms, let  $y_{it}$  be the number of contentious events that occurred in the  $i$ th  $i = 1, \dots, K$  country in the year  $t = 1, \dots, T$ .  $y_{it}$  is influenced by a  $p$ -dimensional vector of factors  $x_{it} = (x_{it1}, \dots, x_{itp})'$ , with a magnitude of  $\beta_{it} = (\beta_1, \dots, \beta_j, \dots, \beta_p)'$ , as well as by  $i$ th-country's specific characteristics  $\alpha_i$ . Since social movement activity tends to unfold in trends and cycles over time according to the presence of unaddressed grievances by the political system, the records of protest events occurring in the same country are likely to be correlated over time. This dynamic relationship can be expressed as follows:

$$E[y_{it} | x_{it}, y_{it-1}, u_{it}] = \rho * y_{it-1} + \exp(x'_{it}\beta + u_{it}) \text{ for } t = 2, \dots, T$$

$$u_{it} = \alpha_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where  $\varepsilon_{it}$  is the error for country  $i$  in year  $t$ .

This statistical model is employed in the following chapters in order to assess the effect of the type of executive on social mobilisation.

Because of the presence of lagged variables, the estimation was done through instrumental variables in order to obtain consistent figures. Model parameters are estimated using the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator and alternative quasi-differencing (Wooldridge, 2010, pp. 764-766; Trivedi & Munkin, 2010).<sup>32</sup> GMM uses differencing transformations that eliminate correlated heterogeneity. So far as I am aware, such estimators have not seen much use in previous pooled cross-sectional time series

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<sup>32</sup> Because the functional form of the model does not belong to the exponential family, estimation via Maximum Likelihood Estimates (MLE) is not feasible.

studies of protest. Further over-dispersion is controlled using robust standard errors. All estimations and tests are conducted using Stata 12, requiring special programming.

Since the LFM has not received much attention in the literature, model diagnostics are not well developed yet. In this study, model specifications are assessed via the J-statistic. The J-statistic is the most common test statistic in GMM estimation. It tests the model's over-identification – that is, it tests the endogeneity of regressors. A model is said to be over-identified if the instruments are uncorrelated with the errors; in the event, the J-statistic is large and significant. The common critical p-value of J-statistic is 0.10. Nonetheless, the J-statistic does not, by itself, give any information about how the model is mis-specified. This has led some to consider the J statistic as an unreliable test. An alternative criterion of goodness of fit would be to compare the empirical frequency distribution with the fitted probability distribution, but the semi-parametric approach of the models avoids specifying the full distribution which means this approach cannot be taken.

For further robustness tests, however, models were run using alternative cross-sectional and time-series models for count data – namely pooled population averaged model (with adjustment for correlation over time), and fixed effects including a LDV.

Also, a series of linear models correcting for heteroskedasticity across units and time effects using AR(1) structure was specified by standardising the dependent variable by the size of the population. These models were estimated using feasible generalised squares (FGLS), which tend to produce good standard errors estimates when  $N < T$ . Although, as noted above, it is not appropriate to use linear models for count data, as these may lead to inefficient, inconsistent and biased estimates (Cameron & Trivedi, 1998; Long, 1997).

### 2.3 *Results*

Parameter estimates are reported as incident ratios. It should be noted that the interpretation of coefficient estimates in count data models is not straightforward. For a one-unit change in the independent variable, the difference in the logs of expected counts of the dependent variable is expected to change by the regression coefficient, assuming that the other independent variables in the model are held constant. Also, as in other maximum likelihood estimations like logit, the magnitude of the marginal effect is contingent on the values of all independent variables of interest. Ratios of less than 1 mean that a one-unit increase in the covariate lowers the odds that a protest event occurs, whereas ratios above 1 imply that a one-unit increase in the regressor increases the odds of a protest event occurring.

Table 2.1 reports the regressor estimates, taking into account pure presidential systems as the reference category. In all these specifications, the type of executive-legislative relations has a significant and strong influence on the odds of social mobilisation. As expected, semi-presidential regimes are 50-55 per cent less prone to experience social mobilisation than pure presidential democracies (Model 1). Of the two variants of semi-presidentialism, the odds of social mobilisation are 50 per cent lower in premier-presidentialism (Model 2). There is no statistical significance in the incidence of social mobilisation between pure presidential systems and pure parliamentary democracies in Models 1 – 5. However, when controlling for Western democracies, parliamentary systems are 40 percent less likely to experience social mobilisation (Model 6). This suggests that in countries with acute patterns economic inequality and other marked societal cleavages, pure presidential regimes are the least conducive to inclusive patterns of elite accommodation and distributional outcomes, even after controlling for electoral rules. It should be noted that although the effect of plurality and semi-PR rules for the election of legislators is consistent across the statistical specifications, only when controlling for Western democracies, are

plurality rules statistically relevant. This finding seems to go in line with those arguments relating winner-take-all politics with the combination of parliamentary systems and plurality rules in the legislature. On the other hand, in most cases the effect of the territorial structure of a government is insignificant and inconsistent.

These results are robust after controlling for GDP per capita (Models 1 and 2) and the level of democratic development (Model 3).<sup>33</sup> They hold even after considering different time periods, such as the Cold War (Model 4) and the third wave of democratisation (Model 5). Only the dummy variable for the Cold War period is significant, highlighting the influences of international factors on social protest. As for the remaining control variables, the coefficient on the size of the population is positive and significant, meaning that larger countries have a greater probability of experiencing protest events. Moreover, models do support the literature on economic grievances. In most specifications, inflation has a significant effect on the prospects for contentious action.

All models presented in this section were run in unreported versions with different time correlation structures. Despite the loss of some observations in models with second- and third- correlation structures, the type of executive-relations kept the expected sign and remained statistically significant (models not presented). Also, pooled population averaged (AR1), as well as fixed and random effects with LDV were specified in both Poisson and Negative Binomial forms. Results were fairly similar when using PA models, but not when using fixed and random effects models with LDV. In addition, pooled cross-sectional time-series linear models with an AR(1) structure were run by standardising the dependent variable by the size of the population. Although, as noted above, it is not appropriate to use

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<sup>33</sup> In unreported versions of the models, the sample was split into various thresholds for the level of democratic development along the Polity scale (+3, +6, +9), yielding similar results. Likewise, models were run in samples split into Western and non-Western democracies, with both parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism having a lower probability of social mobilisation than pure presidential systems.

linear models for count data, as these may lead to inefficient, inconsistent and biased estimates (Cameron & Trivedi, 1998; Long, 1997), relevant variables remained significant. The magnitude and *p*-value of the J-statistic suggest that the models moment conditions match the data well.

**Table 2.1 The effect of different types of executive-legislative relations on social mobilisation – LFM**

|                                                                                                                                              | 1                   | 2                   | 3                   | 4                   | 5                   | 6                   |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Parliamentarism                                                                                                                              | 0.707<br>(0.267)    | 0.610<br>(0.312)    | 0.607<br>(0.309)    | 0.687<br>(0.257)    | 0.705<br>(0.262)    | 0.604+<br>(0.259)   |
| Semipresidentialism                                                                                                                          | 0.441**<br>(0.289)  |                     | 0.500*<br>(0.298)   | 0.435**<br>(0.281)  | 0.441**<br>(0.290)  | 0.449**<br>(0.283)  |
| Premier-Presidential                                                                                                                         |                     | 0.520*<br>(0.328)   |                     |                     |                     |                     |
| Presidential-Parliamentary                                                                                                                   |                     | 0.454*<br>(0.482)   |                     |                     |                     |                     |
| Plurality                                                                                                                                    | 1.349<br>(0.234)    | 1.551<br>(0.262)    | 1.553<br>(0.262)    | 1.323<br>(0.230)    | 1.350<br>(0.235)    | 1.435+<br>(0.248)   |
| Semi – PR rules                                                                                                                              | 0.760<br>(0.332)    | 0.830<br>(0.330)    | 0.827<br>(0.330)    | 0.777<br>(0.331)    | 0.763<br>(0.334)    | 0.830<br>(0.324)    |
| Unitarism                                                                                                                                    | 1.401+<br>(0.204)   | 1.183<br>(0.238)    | 1.195<br>(0.242)    | 1.413+<br>(0.199)   | 1.404+<br>(0.204)   | 1.210<br>(0.252)    |
| Inflation (log)                                                                                                                              | 1.198*<br>(0.082)   | 1.183***<br>(0.035) | 1.179***<br>(0.029) | 1.181*<br>(0.081)   | 1.194*<br>(0.077)   | 1.179***<br>(0.030) |
| Population (log)                                                                                                                             | 1.806***<br>(0.063) | 1.689***<br>(0.065) | 1.692***<br>(0.065) | 1.793***<br>(0.062) | 1.808***<br>(0.063) | 1.742***<br>(0.062) |
| GDP per capita (log)                                                                                                                         | 1.057<br>(0.054)    | 1.064<br>(0.050)    |                     | 1.038<br>(0.055)    | 1.055<br>(0.058)    |                     |
| Polity2                                                                                                                                      |                     |                     | 1.065<br>(0.050)    |                     |                     |                     |
| Cold War                                                                                                                                     |                     |                     |                     | 1.626*<br>(0.243)   |                     |                     |
| 1978-2009                                                                                                                                    |                     |                     |                     |                     | 1.089<br>(0.480)    |                     |
| Western countries                                                                                                                            |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     | 1.429<br>(0.220)    |
| Time Effects                                                                                                                                 | YES                 | YES                 | YES                 | YES                 | YES                 | YES                 |
| Number of observations                                                                                                                       | 3101                | 3101                | 3121                | 3101                | 3101                | 3409                |
| Number of countries                                                                                                                          | 110                 | 110                 | 102                 | 110                 | 110                 | 111                 |
| J                                                                                                                                            | 8.88E-17            | 6.41E-19            | 1.78E-19            | 8.36E-18            | 6.22E-17            | 1.44E-19            |
| Rho                                                                                                                                          | 1.697***            | 1.730***            | 1.730***            | 1.685***            | 1.697***            | 1.726***            |
| Error correction                                                                                                                             | INAR(1)             | INAR(1)             | INAR(1)             | INAR(1)             | INAR(1)             | INAR(1)             |
| Note: Coefficient reported as incidence ratios; standard errors in parentheses. + $p < 0.1$ , * $p < 0.05$ , ** $p < 0.01$ , *** $p < 0.001$ |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |

In sum, findings suggest that the probability of social mobilisation is the lowest when a democracy, whether consolidated or not, or economically advanced or not, has a semi-presidential design. In other words, the likelihood of social mobilisation decreases when both a directly elected executive and the coalition in the legislature are co-responsible for the process of government formation and termination. The risk for social mobilisation is greater when this is not the case, as it is in pure presidential and parliamentary systems. That said, in societies with unresolved and/or marked societal cleavages, the likelihood for social mobilisation appears to be greater in pure presidential systems. Thus, the results confirm that the type of executive-legislative relations has a significant and strong influence on the odds of social mobilisation.

Electoral rules for the legislature might account for the presence of winner-take-all politics but only in parliamentary systems. In semi and pure presidential systems, other institutional accessories should be taken into account. In these systems, in addition to the formula used for the selection of legislators, other relevant institutions include: the type of rules used for selecting the presidency, the timing and concurrence of presidential and legislative elections, the possibility of presidential re-election, the extent of the president's legislative power, the powers of the legislature to censure and remove the executive, and so on and so forth. Nonetheless, as argued above, the effect of these institutional accessories on various aspects of democratic politics should be seen as *conditional* not *additional* on the type of executive-legislative relations. Subsequent chapters of the thesis will investigate how the different institutional accessories that could be combined with the pure presidential form of government can affect the probability of contentious action.

## **2.4    *Conclusions***

This chapter has related the incidence of social movement activity in a democracy with the extent to which governments can be composed and terminated by a directly elected executive. It was hypothesised that the prospects for contentious action should be the lowest when both the coalition in the assembly and a directly elected executive participate in the composition and termination of the government. In order to test this claim, aggregate data on protest events for democracies around the world in the years between 1900 and 2009 was used. According to the estimates drawn by a series of a pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis, it is confirmed that the type of executive-legislative arrangements is a powerful and relevant factor affecting the odds of social movement activity in a democracy.

The likelihood of social mobilisation is related to the presence of an elected presidency and its degree of responsibility in the process of cabinet formation and termination. According to models, the odds of contentious action are the lowest when a democracy has a semi-presidential design, in which both a directly elected executive and the coalition in the legislature are co-responsible for the process of government formation and termination. This result is consistent across all specifications and holds even when considering the level of economic and democratic development. Only in non-Western democracies, which are tend to be featured by acute inequality and other societal cleavages, the likelihood for social mobilisation is the greatest in pure presidential systems. In order to test the robustness of these findings, models were run using different correlation structures and estimation strategies, yielding almost similar results. Thus it can be concluded with a good degree of confidence that the nature of the executive is an important variable influencing the likelihood of social mobilisation in a democracy.

In light of these findings, it is thus worth investigating: Which of the institutional accessories that could be combined with the pure presidential format of executive-legislative

relations have the largest bearing on the odds of contentious action? Electoral rules for the legislature might account for the presence of winner-take-all politics but only in parliamentary systems. However, within the pure presidential type of regimes, there is great institutional variation related to the presidential figure – in terms of the electoral rules used for selecting the president, the term limits of presidents, the powers of the presidency, amongst others. Subsequent chapters of this thesis will analyse how the pure presidential form of government (and the different institutional accessories that can be combined with this executive format) influence the nature and distribution of policy outcomes, and therefore the likelihood of social mobilisation in a democracy. The focus from now on will be on the pure presidential democracies of Latin America.

### **3. PATTERNS OF SOCIAL MOBILISATION IN LATIN AMERICA**

Based on the findings of the previous chapter, this study proceeds inductively, moving from the general to the specific aspects of the type of executive-legislative relations. From now on, it will concentrate on the pure presidential democracies of Latin America. Not only do these countries share national histories, cultures and trajectories, allowing us to control for other factors, but out of the 30 pure presidential regimes in the world, 17 are located in this region (Cheibub, 2007; Siaroff, 2003). In spite of political, social and economic transformations, pure presidentialism has demonstrated considerable resilience and strength in the region. Ever since their independence in the nineteenth century, all Latin American countries have maintained this executive-legislative format.<sup>34</sup> Despite their similarities, however, Latin American pure presidential democracies have exhibited important differences in the design of institutions and the trajectory of social mobilisation both across space and over time. Therefore the democracies of Latin America offer a good laboratory for examining how pure presidentialism (as a type of executive-legislative arrangement), and the formal arrangements that may accompany this executive format, can shape the prospects for social mobilisation from a comparative perspective.

Before proceeding with the analysis, it is first necessary to examine the extent of variation (if any) in the levels of social mobilisation across these breed of pure presidential democracies. The purpose of this chapter is to discern the main trends in the trajectory of social mobilisation across time and space in Latin American third-wave democracies. In

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<sup>34</sup> The exception was Brazil, which was ruled by a parliamentary constitution from 1824 to 1891 (Cheibub, Elkins, & Ginsburg, 2011, p. 1709).

order to discern the patterns of social mobilisation in the region, and thereby draw accurate inferences about the relationship between the variables of interest, an original dataset of protest events in contemporary pure presidential democracies in the region was compiled. Given data limitations, the panorama offered by this account is likely to be partial. Nevertheless, while much has been written about social movements in the region, to the best of my knowledge there have been few comprehensive and comparative accounts of social movement activity across Latin American countries, and over time based on quantitative data (Hochstetler, 2009; Marsteintredet, 2009; Almeida, 2007). Rather, most arguments on social mobilisation have been based on case-studies, focusing particularly on highly contentious countries. As a result, much less is known about social mobilisation in Latin America in a comparative fashion. This chapter thus aims to contribute to the comparative study of social mobilisation in Latin American democracies.

The chapter is organised into three sections. The first section discusses the methodological considerations behind, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of, this original dataset in relation to other indicators of social mobilisation currently available for Latin America. The second section discerns the basic trends outlined by the across time and space in the electoral democracies of Latin America between the years of 1978 and 2009. In order to improve our understanding of social mobilisation in Latin America, the activity of the labour movement is distinguished from that of other forms of social mobilisation. Throughout this descriptive account, a discussion of the existing literature on the causes of social mobilisation in Latin America is provided. The third part concludes.

### **3.1     *Measuring of Social Mobilisation***

The majority of cross-national comparisons of social mobilisation have been based on the number of protest events recorded by Banks (2009). However, this source may not mirror in a representative way the protests that actually take place in a country. This is because the Banks dataset records the protest events that have been salient enough to appear in the *New York Times*. Therefore it is very likely that it covers all very large and violent protests, but ignores small and moderate protests. Also, countries with large economies may receive disproportionate coverage, whilst smaller poor countries may be virtually uncovered by this dataset. An alternative indicator may be the number of strikes registered by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and government agencies. While correcting one of the flaws of the Banks dataset, the number of strikes reported excludes those strikes that are considered illegal by authorities. But, more importantly, this dataset cannot account for forms of mobilisation other than labour strike and stoppages, such as marches, demonstrations and riots, which have become more salient over recent decades in democracies in Latin America and elsewhere.

In minimising the biases and limitations of these aggregate sources, a more accurate picture of social mobilisation can be obtained by counting protest events themselves. This method, known as Protest Event Analysis (PEA), allows the quantifying of many properties of protest ignored in aggregate datasets, such as the participants, claims, sizes, forms, targets, frequency, duration, and location (Koopmans & Rucht, Protest Event Analysis, 2002). Despite these advantages, very few PEAs have been conducted across countries and levels of government, and covering a long span of time. This is largely due to problems in the standardisation of procedures for selecting the sources and coding information, as well as the cost in time and material resources in processing this data for a large number of countries for a considerable period.

In recent years, however, electronic full-text searches of annual registers have eased this task. Among these online data sources are the Reuters Textline service and the Keesing's Record of World Events. Recent datasets of protest events in Latin America have been based on full-text searches of the London-based weekly newsletter, *Latin American Weekly Report* (LAWR) (Hochstetler, 2006; Marsteintredet, 2009; Morgenstern, Negri, & Pérez-Liñán, 2008). The LAWR is a publication providing investors and businessmen with regular information on the major economic and political developments in the region. It has been available since 1979, and it is aimed at providing consistent and proportionate coverage across countries and regions.<sup>35</sup>

Given the characteristics of this news source, and for comparability purposes with other scholars' accounts on social mobilisation in Latin America and elsewhere, an original dataset of protest activity was constructed based on the news covered by the LAWR. Only those countries in Latin America with a Polity2 score above 3 in the years between 1978 and 2009 were considered. The number of protest events registered by the LAWR was counted from electronic full-text searches, differentiating protest events into those labelled as "strikes", "stoppages" or "lockouts"; and those labelled as "marches" or "demonstrations" or "riots". Following Tilly's (1978, p. 12) classic definition of a social movement, events are included in the dataset only if protests were against government authorities. If (in the same news) it is reported that labour strikes coincided with demonstrations and riots, these events are counted separately. The activity of armed groups in society – like guerrillas or terrorist attacks – is not taken into account. The number of events registered in a country is then grouped in years. Because of the method used in building this original dataset on protest events in Latin America, it is very likely that large and violent episodes of contention are

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<sup>35</sup> Nevertheless, there are gaps in the coverage of the LAWR for the Central America region in the 1980s. For these missing years, linear interpolation has been used in the study.

over-represented. Also, because it is based on only one source of information,<sup>36</sup> data may be limited by the ideological and subjective biases in the news coverage of the LAWR (Koopmans & Rucht, Protest Event Analysis, 2002).<sup>37</sup>

Tables 3.1 and 3.2 present the bivariate covariance matrixes between this aggregate source and the alternative indicators of social mobilisation in Latin America that are currently available. These indicators are classified into those measuring the activity of the labour movement (i.e. the number of strikes, lockouts and stoppages) (LMA) and those quantifying other contentious strategies (i.e. the number of demonstrations and riots) (SMA).

| <i><b>Table 3.1 Matrix of correlation between measures of labour movement activity</b></i> |        |        |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|
|                                                                                            | BANKS  | ILO    |
| LAWR                                                                                       | .144** | .668** |
| BANKS                                                                                      |        | .125*  |
| * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001                                                           |        |        |

| <i><b>Table 3.2 Matrix of correlation between measures of social movement activity</b></i> |        |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|                                                                                            | BANKS  |
| LAWR                                                                                       | .339** |
| * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001                                                           |        |

<sup>36</sup> For robustness purposes, this dataset was compared with those compiled by Kathryn Hochstetler (2006) and Leiv Marsteintredet (2009), respectively. Whilst based on LAWR (2009), the dataset assembled by Kathryn Hochstetler (2006) is limited to events occurring in South American countries and from 1980 to 2003. The data gathered by Leiv Marsteintredet (2009) has a broader coverage, including the 17 democracies under study from 1980 to 2006. But, more importantly, these datasets vary in the coding of protest events. The dataset compiled by Hochstetler lumps together protest events conducted in favour and against government authorities into the same category. Therefore, it cannot account for the incidence of social movement activity in Latin America, if the Tillean definition of a social movement is followed. Also, it does not distinguish events organised by the labour movement and other groups in society. Although these distinctions are made in the data gathered by Marsteintredet (2009), events are only included if their purpose was the removal of presidents.

<sup>37</sup> However, as far as I am aware, this is currently the most complete and reliable dataset on protest events in Latin America in terms of the countries and the period covered. Alternative sources of cross-national information about protest events in Latin America are the annual reports issued by the Latin American Social Observatory (OSAL) at the Latin American Council of Social Sciences (CLACSO) in Argentina. OSAL's reports are conducted by academic researchers throughout the region, with information collected from at least four newspapers, as well as ethnographic and fieldwork research in each country in the region. For these reasons, OSAL can provide more reliable and in-depth information on social contention in Latin America. However, it has been noted that the reporting of events is by no means impartial in the use of different national newspapers. Neither is the counting of events standardised across countries and years. Furthermore, while including the 17 countries under study, its coverage is limited to the 2000s.

As shown in Table 3.1, there is no strong correlation between the number of demonstrations and riots registered by Banks with those reported by the LAWR. Nonetheless, as seen in Table 3.2, levels of labour movement activity reported by the LAWR are strongly and significantly correlated with those registered by the ILO.<sup>38</sup> However, the correlation between these indicators and the levels of labour movement activity registered by Banks is weak. Since the number of strikes reported by ILO is a more representative measure of the activity of the labour movement in Latin America, the concurrence between measures of labour movement activity registered by the LAWR and the ILO confirms the validity and reliability of the dataset on protest events that was built for this study using electronic full-text searches.

Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the evolution of these indicators over five-year periods from 1978 to 2009 by type of movement activity. As seen, available indicators coincide in the main trajectories of labour and social movement activity until the early 2000s. Following all measures, labour movement activity peaked in the 1980s, and remained at low levels throughout the 1990s. In the 2000s, reported patterns in social and labour movement activity diverge. Banks registers a decrease in the number of demonstrations and riots, and the magnitude of labour movement activity. However, as stated above, Banks is the most unreliable data on protest. Rather, the concurrence between measures of labour movement activity registered by the LAWR the ILO confirms the validity and reliability of the dataset on protest events built for this study.

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
<sup>38</sup> For the years and countries not covered by ILO reports, information was compiled from government agencies and research institutes. The years covered in, and the sources used for, each country are: Argentina, 1983-2009 (Nueva Mayoria, 2010; 2006; 2004; 2002); Bolivia, 1980-2008 (Laserna, 2008); Brazil, 1986-2009 (DIEESE, 2009; ILO, 2010); Chile, 1989-2009 (MTPS, 2010; ILO, 2010); Colombia, 1978-2009 (ENS, 2010); Costa Rica 1978-1997 (ILO, 2010); Ecuador, 1978-2008 (ILO, 2010); El Salvador, 1985-2008 (ILO, 2010); Guatemala, 1978-1981, 1986-1987, 1989-1990, 1992-1996 (ILO, 2010); Honduras, 1981, 1984-1988 (ILO, 2010); Mexico 1982-2009 (STPS, 2010); Nicaragua, 1990-2008 (ILO, 2010); Panama, 1992, 1994-2008 (ILO, 2010); Peru, 1978-2009 (MTPE, 2010; ILO, 2010); Uruguay, 1996-2009 (IRL, 2010); Venezuela, 1978-1985; 1988-1990 (ILO, 2010). Data was not found for Paraguay.

Figures 3.3-3.4 depict the trajectories of labour movement activity and social movement activity over the years, as indicated by these different indicators.

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*Figure 3.1 Anti-government demonstrations and riots in Latin America 1980-2009*  
*Comparison of means*

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


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
**Figure 3.2 Strikes and Lockouts in Latin America 1980-2009**  
**Comparison of means**

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
*LAWR, 2009*



*ILO, 2009*




*BANKS, 2009*



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**Figure 3.3 Number of protest events in Latin America over time**

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
Source: LAWR (2009)

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**Figure 3.4 Number of protest events in Latin America over time by type of movement activity**

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Source: LAWR (2009)

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Table 3.3 lists the descriptive statistics of the measure of social mobilisation based on the LAWR.

| <i>Table 3.3 Descriptive statistics - Number of protest events in Latin America</i> |         |      |                |       |       |              |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|------|----------------|-------|-------|--------------|
|                                                                                     |         | Mean | Std. Deviation | Min   | Max   | Observations |
| LAWR                                                                                | Overall | 3.88 | 5.31           | 0.00  | 36.00 | N = 430      |
|                                                                                     | Between |      | 2.98           | 0.63  | 9.61  | n = 17       |
|                                                                                     | Within  |      | 4.40           | -5.35 | 32.52 | T = 25.29    |
| <i>Source: LAWR (2009)</i>                                                          |         |      |                |       |       |              |

### **3.2 Cross-national and Temporal Patterns of Social Mobilisation in Latin America**

Figure 3.3 show the trajectory of social movement activity in Latin American democracies during the period between 1978 and 2009, as reported by the LAWR. As seen, as democratic rule has proceeded in the region, levels of social mobilisation have increased. Figure 3.4 distinguishes the patterns of social mobilisation in Latin America over time by type of movement activity. This distinction is made since scholars on Latin American politics have usually emphasised the role the labour movement played in the struggle for civil and political rights in Latin America (Collier, 1999, pp. 110-164; Foweraker & Landman, 1997, pp. 166-193). Accordingly, the labour movement was the initial (if not the main) organiser of contentious action against elitist or authoritarian policies (Foweraker & Landman, 1997).

As shown in Figure 3.4, the level of activity of the labour movement does diverge from that of other movements. Labour mobilisation was the most intense throughout the 1980s, upon the adoption of democratic rule in most countries. During these years, however, the region was undergoing a series of economic crises and the subsequent implementation of draconian structural adjustments. For various authors, the transition to a market economy would inevitably lead to the demobilisation of civil society (Kurtz, 2004; Oxhorn, Is the

Century of Corporatism Over? Neoliberalism and the Rise of Neopluralism, 1998; Portés & Hoffman, 2003; Roberts, 2002; Weyland, 2004). Market reforms resulted in higher unemployment in the formal sector, and widespread poverty and economic inequality for much of the 1990s. The workforce continued to increase, but membership in labour unions fell (Portés & Hoffman, 2003). In this scenario, it was expected that the incentives to engage in strikes would be fewer. Indeed, labour unions and labour-based parties declined altogether; otherwise labour-based parties adopted pro-market policy choices in detriment to the interests of their core constituencies.<sup>39</sup> In either case, the organised labour had lost its political voice (Roberts, 2002; Weyland, 2004, p. 137). In effect, as shown in Figure 3.4, by the late 1990s and the early 2000s, strikes had decreased significantly.

As seen in Figure 3.4, like labour, the activity of other social movements increased in the first years of transition from authoritarianism, and declined in the early 1990s. With the demobilisation of the “main agent of contentious action”, it was expected that other popular sectors would have fewer incentives to engage in protest. First and foremost, the argument goes on, collective action would be particularly difficult in the growing informal economy (Roberts, 2002, p. 22). But even if the lower sectors managed to organise, market reforms would have weakened the state in such a way that it could no longer be the target of social mobilisation (Kurtz, 2004, p. 271). In the event, economic hardship was expected to create further divisions among the poor. Citizens were now more focused on immediate survival than on political questions (Weyland, 2004, p. 148). Consequently, analysts predicted that social movements would be fragmented and unable to organise beyond the very local level (Oxhorn, Is the Century of Corporatism Over? Neoliberalism and the Rise of Neopluralism, 1998, pp. 205-207). Also, scholars expected that parties would become the central actors in

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<sup>39</sup> In some cases, the co-optation of labour leadership was central to the implementation of market policies. Such a compliance further weakened traditional labour unions, like the *Confederacion de Trabajadores de Mexico* (CTM) in Mexico, the *Confederacion General de Trabajadores* (CGT) in Argentina, and the *Confederacion de Trabajadores de Venezuela* (CTV) in Venezuela.

politics. Therefore, any social conflict had to be mediated through these institutionalised channels (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986). However, nowhere in Latin America did parties incorporate popular associations in a way comparable to the labour sector subordination to the PRI in Mexico, the PJ in Argentina, or AD in Venezuela. Citizen dissatisfaction with economic performance could result in populists and other outsiders taking power, or political apathy (Weyland, 2004; O'Donnell, 1994). But most probably poor democratic performance would not encourage organised mobilisation, for the reasons already outlined.

Nonetheless, as seen in Figure 3.4, in the second half of the decade social movement activity climbed up, against scholarly predictions. In contrast to labour mobilisation, the magnitude of demonstrations and riots quickly mounted up in the mid-1990s and remained on the rise in subsequent periods. Thus, aggregate data does not support the idea that organised actors (other than labour) would have little motivation to engage in contentious action in open-market democracies. In fact, the rise of anti-government demonstrations and riots coincided with the macroeconomic crises of 1994 and 1997.<sup>40</sup>

Based on the experience of the 1990s, some authors have contended that the combination of economic liberalisation and democratic politics has had a positive effect on the occurrence of social conflict in the region (Arce & Bellinger, 2007; Arce M. , 2008; Arce & Rice, 2009; Stahler-Sholk, Vanden, & Kuecker, 2008; Almeida, 2010). Accordingly, protest rose because of the economic grievances generated by neoliberalism, and the expectations of redistribution raised by democratic rule. However, throughout the 2000s, the majority of Latin American economies grew steadily and recovered from the deepest and most severe economic crises in their histories. Economies in the region mainly benefited from

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<sup>40</sup> Indeed, throughout the 1990s it was the unemployed, informal workers, urban associations, debtor groups, and students who played leading roles in contentious action. Demonstrations and riots were also part of the repertoire of contention of rurally grounded groups, engaged in land conflicts with local elites. Peasant groups included the MST in Brazil, the EZLN in Mexico, the cocaleros in Bolivia, and CONAIE in Ecuador. Similar processes of peasant mobilisations took place in Paraguay, Colombia and El Salvador.

the primary commodities boom, with significant increases in government revenues.<sup>41</sup> Also, during these years, politicians that were backed by social movements in the previous years, were elected throughout the region. Some of them overturned market reforms and implemented redistributive politics. Despite this, social mobilisation did not recede.

In the late 2000s, in fact, the region experienced the highest levels of demonstrations and riots reported during the period under study. Although from the mid-2000s onwards, levels of strikes and stoppages resurged, the labour movement was no longer the main organiser of contentious action in democracies in the region. The level of activity of other social movements has surpassed by far than that of the labour movement. Labour activism has not disappeared, but at best it has played a supplementary role.<sup>42</sup> Although labour activism continued after the economic and political transitions, it took forms other than strikes and work stoppages. Workers engaging in other contentious strategies, like marches and demonstrations, were led by other groups in society.<sup>43</sup> Not only did the main actors leading contentious action in Latin America changed with the development of democratic politics.

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<sup>41</sup> Since colonial times, economic growth in the region has been driven by trends in international trade. Specifically, Latin American economies have predominantly relied on the extraction of raw materials and mineral resources, irrespective of the predominant development strategies. The reliance of commodity exports has made Latin American economies vulnerable to temporary changes in international prices, with booms sooner than later followed by busts, with the poor being hurt the most. But, it has also introduced more permanent distortions in the patterns of production, consumption and investment as well. The result has been the underdevelopment of higher value-added sectors in relation to the exploitation of natural resources, a phenomenon better known as “Dutch Disease”.

<sup>42</sup> While aggregate data suggests an overall decrease in strike activity, it is widely known that workers did not vanish from the social movement arena. Much of labour activism in the 1990s came from new (but small) unions created in opposition to traditional corporatist unions. These include the Union Nacional Trabajadores and the Sindicato Mexicano de Electricistas (SME) in Mexico, the CTA in Argentina, the Bloque Popular in Honduras, and the Movimiento Indígena, Campesino, Popular and Sindical in Guatemala.

<sup>43</sup> In the mid- and late-1990s, cross-sectoral and national organisation was common in the majority of countries. For instance, indigenous coca-growing activists in Bolivia were regularly joined in national mobilisations by the COB. In many instances, the new peasants were former workers, particularly, in the case of Bolivia, miners, displaced because of plant or mine closures. In a similar vein, the Brazilian CUT and the MST regularly take to the streets together starting in 1997. Likewise in Argentina, the activism of teachers’ unions in the form of strikes was mutually reinforced by the mobilisation of other urban actors during the 1990s (Murillo & Ronconi, 2004, p. 78).

But, also, there was a transformation of collective identity referents. Movements from the upper and the lower class, as well as the right and the left side of the ideological spectrum have developed (García-Guadilla, *Social Movements in a Polarized Setting: Myths of Venezuelan Civil Society*, 2007; Eaton, 2007). What seems to unite these disparate movements is their claim for the enforcement of their citizenship rights now envisioned in national democratic constitutions. Indeed, as democratic politics has proceeded, protest campaigns have drawn broad cross-sections of the population.<sup>44</sup> In some instances, labour mobilisations have even merged with those by pro-market forces, as the case of Venezuela illustrates.<sup>45</sup> Democratic constitutions had transformed the relationship between the state and social movements by changing old grievances into universal rights to which the elected authorities must be held accountable. Yet, the demands of Latin American social movements have gone further, including the recognition of gender, cultural, regional and environmental rights. Demands for (both existing and new) rights might have facilitated national coordination and secondary collective action, and thereby account for the rise in social movement activity in a democratic setting.<sup>46</sup>

Indeed, beginning in the 1990s, a series of legal reforms aimed at improving the performance of democratic regimes were enacted throughout the region (Negretto, 2013, p. 17). At present, the range of citizenship rights is broadest in Latin American democracies. Current constitutional texts in the region recognise political, civil, economic, social and collective rights, and they consider gender and sexual diversity and the environment as subjects for legal protection. Indeed, the notion of citizenship in Latin American democracies

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<sup>44</sup> Examples include the campaigns organised by Resistencia Ciudadana in Paraguay, and the Diálogo Nacional and Movimiento Nacional por la Soberanía Alimentaria y Energética, los Derechos de los Trabajadores y las Libertades Democráticas in Mexico.

<sup>45</sup> In Venezuela, despite an attempted coup in 2002 and successive elections, not only have elites reacted against President Chávez, but also the labour sector, especially oil workers, and increasingly the student movement. However, Chávez still got ample support in the urban and rural areas.

<sup>46</sup> Urban and rural sectors organised in powerful federations, like CONAIE in Ecuador and the piqueteros in Argentina (Wolff, 2007).

is more far-reaching and extensive than that held in Western countries. Throughout the region, however, citizenship rights have remained mostly fragile.


Certainly, over the past decades, the protection of political rights in Latin America has advanced to a remarkable degree, a large proportion of Latin American citizens are deprived of the freedoms of association, expression, and assembly; they suffer from the recurrent use of violence and other forms of coercion by state and non-state actors; they are afflicted by poor access to basic welfare services, hunger and malnourishment; and/or they suffer discrimination because of their ethnic allegiance, gender and/or sexual preference. The faltering condition of citizenship rights protection is one of greatest limitations for successful democratic governance in Latin America. It is herein argued that, to a large extent, citizenship rights are faltering, because of the institutional make-up of these democracies. The upward trend of social movement activity in Latin American democracies can this be attributed to the extent to which pure presidentialism has been able to produce stable governments, provide public goods, guarantee political participation and representation of the citizens, and overall retain citizen support.

That said, as seen in Figure 3.5, despite regional trends, there are significant variations in the levels of social mobilisation across Latin American democracies over time. Whilst Peru was the most contentious democracy in the early 1980s, social movement activity was the highest in Brazil by the mid- and late- years of that decade. Ecuador was the most contentious democracy in the 1990s; however, by the turn of the century, social movement activity was the highest in Bolivia.

In light of this, several questions arise: To what extent can these trends in social movement activity across time and space in Latin America be attributed to the pure presidential type of executive-legislative relations? What changes in the institutional format of pure presidential regimes have driven the trajectory of social mobilisation in Latin

America over time? What particular institutional accessories does pure presidentialism have in the most contentious democracies in the region? These questions are addressed in the subsequent chapters.

**Figure 3.5 Number of protest event in Latin America by country**  
(Number of protest events / Log of population size)



Source: LAWR (2009)

### **3.3 Conclusion**

Based on aggregate measures of social movement activity, this chapter has examined the trajectory of social mobilisation across Latin America over the past three decades. It has shown that the identity of the actors leading social protest have changed over the past three decades in Latin America. Whilst labour unions were the most contentious actors in the 1980s, from the 1990s onwards, the number of strikes and stoppages has declined and most importantly it has been surpassed by the activity of other mobilising actors. Labour activism has not disappeared, but at best played a supplementary role. In contrast to labour mobilisation, the magnitude of demonstrations and riots quickly mounted up since the mid-1990s and remained on the rise in subsequent periods. Thereafter, it has been argued the labour movement has no longer been the main organiser of contentious action in Latin America.

Without minimising previous literature on neoliberalism and social mobilisation in Latin America, it has been suggested that social movements have not responded to macroeconomic variables as much as they have to the performance of democratic performance. Increasingly, protest has been undertaken by heterogeneous groups, from the upper and the lower class, as well as the right and the left side of the ideological spectrum. These disparate groups have mobilised for the enforcement of their rights for political participation and contestation, now envisioned in democratic constitutions. This has led us to advance the claim that the rising trajectory of social mobilisation in Latin American democracies might be rather accrued to the extent to which pure presidentialism has been able to produce stable governments, provide public goods, guarantee political participation and representation of the citizens, and overall retain citizen support.

Despite the regional trend of social mobilisation described in this chapter, there have been important variations in the level of contentious action across time and space in Latin

American democracies. In effect, although Latin American countries have preserved the same pure presidential format since the 19<sup>th</sup> century, since the 1990s they have undergone important changes in terms of electoral rules for the legislature and the presidency, the powers of the presidency, the oversight capacities of the legislature, and so on and so forth. Therefore the region offers an ideal setting for exploring the influence of presidential institutions on social mobilisation from a comparative perspective. Subsequent chapters thus explore the extent to which variations in the patterns of social mobilisation can be attributed to the institutional differences across the Latin American breed of pure presidential regimes.

## **4. ELECTORAL RULES AND SOCIAL MOBILISATION IN LATIN AMERICA**

As seen in Chapter 2, the type of executive-legislative relations has an important bearing on the odds of social mobilisation in a democracy. Nonetheless, as illustrated in Chapter 3, within similar pure presidential regimes, the trajectory of social mobilisation can vary substantially across time and space. Then it is then worth investigating the ways which specific aspects of pure presidentialism affect the most the prospects for social mobilisation in a democracy. One dimension in which similar forms of government vary is their electoral systems. In pure presidential democracies, the formula used for selecting the presidency, its simultaneity with legislative contests and the term limits of presidential incumbents are crucial (Jones, 1995; 1999). These arrangements have an important bearing on the size of the presidential contingent, the incentives for coalition formation, alternation in power, and overall ability to which salient interests in society can participate in the decision making process. Whilst there is a vast literature on electoral rules in presidential democracies, to the best of my knowledge, the implications of these procedures for the inclusiveness of a democracy and the incidence of social mobilisation have yet to be explored.

This chapter examines the effects of the different electoral systems for pure presidential systems on the prospects for social mobilisation. The focus is on 17 democracies in Latin America for the period between the years of 1978 and 2009. All these countries are characterised for having (semi-) PR rules for the election of legislatures; however, they vary in the degree of proportionality of the electoral system for the assembly, the formula used for the election of the presidency, the concurrence of presidential and legislative contests, and the rules for presidential re-election. Using both quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis,

this chapter demonstrates that likelihood of social mobilisation in these pure presidential systems is not affected by the degree to which electoral formulae promote the access of parties to the legislature, albeit variations in electoral disproportionality do have the expected effects. Instead, social mobilisation is more likely when presidents are selected in runoff elections in the assembly, and constitutions have permissive rules for presidential re-election.

The chapter is organised as follows. The first part differentiates the rules that have governed presidential and legislative elections across time and space in Latin America. The second section advances a series of hypotheses on the influence of different types of electoral rules on the prospects for social mobilisation. The third part lays out the data and methods used to test these claims. The fourth section presents the results drawn by a series of pooled cross-sectional time-series count models, based on data on electoral systems and protest events for 17 democracies in the region for the period 1900-2009. The fifth part supports the statistical findings with evidence from Bolivia. The sixth section provides a conclusion.

#### ***4.1 Overview of Electoral Rules in Latin America***

Before examining the opportunities and restrictions for social mobilisation provided by different electoral rules under pure presidential regimes, it is necessary to first understand the electoral methods and procedures available in this type of system. This section describes the rules used for the selection of the legislature and the presidency across contemporary democracies in Latin America, as well as their variations over time.

## Rules for the Election of the Presidency

In presidential democracies, the head of state can be elected by a plurality, or in a runoff election. In plurality contests, the candidate with the greatest number of votes wins. In runoff systems, if no candidate obtains a certain percentage of votes, a second round of elections takes place involving only the two highest-scoring candidates. Runoff elections can take place either among voters or the parties in the legislature.<sup>47</sup> Other variations in the system used for executive selection concern the timing of presidential and legislative contests. Elections are simultaneous when the contests for president and the legislature are always held on the same day; intermittent, when only a portion of the legislative body is elected alongside the president; and non-concurrent, when elections are staggered (Jones, 1995).<sup>48</sup> In addition, systems for selecting the president differ in terms of the possibility of re-election. Presidential re-election may be banned, or permitted either after a period of time has passed, or immediately for a particular number of terms.

At present, the majority of Latin American democracies elect their presidents in runoff contests. A plurality rule is only in place in Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay and Venezuela. As regards the runoff systems, a second round of popular voting is held in

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<sup>47</sup> The formula used for selecting the president has a direct impact on the effective number of presidential candidates (Jones, 1999). All other equal, plurality systems tend to concentrate the party arena into one or two large parties, whereas presidential runoff rules promote the fragmentation of the party system (Jones, 1995; Foweraker, 1995; Negretto, 2006). In plurality systems, presidential candidates from small parties know that they are not likely to obtain enough votes to win the election. Therefore, minor parties tend to coalesce behind the front-runner or the principal challenger. After the election, their support is exchanged for pork or cabinet posts. By contrast, in runoff systems, relatively small parties have more incentives to run alone in the first round, expecting to move on to the second round and win with the support of first-round losers. Thereby, runoff elections prevent the coalescence of political forces. This incentive is obviously stronger the lower the threshold for calling a second round of elections. However, when they are eliminated from the race, parties have more leverage than in plurality systems to exchange their support in the second round for political favours after the election (Foweraker, 1995; Taagepera & Shugart, 1989).

<sup>48</sup> When elections are concurrent, the legislative candidates from the same party as popular presidential candidates are likely to benefit from riding the candidate's coattails (Jones, 1995; Shugart, 1995; Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997; Richie, 2004; Golder, 2006). Consequently, the number of parties is reduced and presidential contingents in the legislature tend to be more cohesive. Such an effect intensifies whenever there is a fused vote, that is, when a vote for president is an automatic vote for a party in the legislative body. In this case, the percentage of the votes received by presidential candidates is used to distribute the number of seats in the assembly.

Bolivia,<sup>49</sup> Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru and Uruguay, where no candidate obtains more than 50 per cent of votes. In Argentina, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Ecuador, the threshold for calling a second round is lower – 40 and 30 per cent respectively. In all countries, except El Salvador, Paraguay and Venezuela, presidents are elected simultaneously with the legislature. In Argentina and Mexico, however, half of the lower house and a portion of the upper house are elected in mid-term elections. The vote for president and the legislators is cast in separate ballots in all countries save Bolivia. Even there, with the adoption of a semi-proportional system in 1997, Bolivian voters now cast one ballot for their uninominal representative and the other for president. Presidential re-election is currently banned in Mexico, Paraguay, Guatemala and Honduras. However, presidents can be re-elected after a single presidential term has passed in Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Panama, Peru and Uruguay. Incumbents can be immediately re-elected for one consecutive term in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Nicaragua, and for two successive terms in Bolivia and Ecuador. Only in Venezuela can the president be re-elected for an indefinite number of terms.

### Rules for the Election of the Legislature

Legislators can be elected via majoritarian or proportional representation (PR) formulas. Under majoritarian rules, all (or at least the majority) of legislative seats in a district are given to the candidate with the most votes. As a result, these systems tend to produce few and large

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<sup>49</sup> For long time, Bolivia was a peculiar case in the region in that the president was selected by the legislature from among the frontrunners of the first round of elections, if neither of them obtained more than 50 per cent of the votes. Because of this, some denominated the Bolivian system as “parliamentised presidentialism” (Mayorga, 1997). However, while the legitimacy of presidents was linked to the legislature, the executive was still expected to serve full terms and had not power to dissolve the legislature. Neither was the legislature entitled to call for a non-confidence vote. The provision on the selection of the executive by the assembly was overruled in the latest constituent assembly in 2006 however. In the present, Bolivian presidents are appointed via majority runoff elections and can be immediately re-elected for one term.

parties. PR systems, by contrast, distribute seats in the assembly, and then to individual candidates, based on vote percentage. Thus PR systems tend to feature a greater number of parties (Duverger, 1954; Cox, 1997). Nonetheless, these classifications are not exhaustive. In fact, several combinations of PR and majority rules exist. In mixed or semi-PR systems, for instance, a fraction of the legislature is elected in multimember districts by PR, and the rest are chosen in single-member districts (SMD) by plurality.

Within PR systems, however, there are important variations in the degree of proportionality. These differences are mainly due to the size of electoral districts (i.e. the number of legislators selected in a district) and the formula used to convert the votes into seats in the legislature. At very low district magnitudes, PR systems tend to result in a handful of parties dominating the political arena, to the detriment of other forces competing to be represented in the system (Gallagher, 1992; Lijphart, 1994). This is because, in order to win a seat, a party must obtain double the number of votes of its nearest competitor. Although these effects are very similar to SMD rules, PR systems make it easier for third parties to gain seats in the assembly, although the distribution of seats may not necessarily be even. Large district magnitudes, by contrast, are associated with a fairer distribution of seats in the legislature. Nonetheless, the effect of district magnitudes on the degree of proportionality is not straightforward (Coppedge, 1997; Jones, 1993), being conditioned always by the formula used for allocating seats in the assembly (Pachón & Shugart, 2010).<sup>50</sup>

Among these, the Hare quotient is the most proportional, in that at least one seat is granted to each party contesting an election.<sup>51</sup> Hare is followed by the largest remainder and

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<sup>50</sup> Although the district magnitude has usually been considered the most important factor of proportionality (Taagepera & Shugart, 1989), it has been recently shown that the formula used for seat allocation has effects that are as significant as those accrued to the size of electoral districts (Benoit, 2001).

<sup>51</sup> The Hare system is based on district quotients, which are obtained by dividing the votes by the magnitude of the electoral district. That is, the number of seats given to a party is determined by the number of times the district quotient goes into the votes received by the party. The seats that remain unallocated after this operation are then distributed to the parties with the largest remainder resulting from dividing the party's valid votes by

St Laguë methods, and finally by the D'Hondt divisor, which is the most unfair in that it awards large parties proportionally more seats than their share of votes (Taagepera & Shugart, 1989, pp. 29-35).<sup>52</sup> However, the effect of any allocation formula on the fairness of representation will also differ according to the vote percentage that parties need to obtain at least one seat in the legislature. When the legal threshold for representation is low, the degree of proportionality of the political system is reduced (Taagepera & Shugart, 1989, p. 133). Other differences within PR systems arise from the degree to which voters can select individual candidates. When party lists are open, voters can order their preferences within a party list, and, where lists are unblocked, for individual candidates within any list as well. By contrast, when lists are closed, electors can only vote for those candidates on the party list, and, if the list is also blocked, votes have to be cast for the party rather than for individual candidates.

At present, all Latin American democracies have PR systems. Only in Bolivia, Venezuela, and Mexico are a fraction of seats in the lower house selected through elections in SMD. Although the size of electoral districts varies between countries (Payne, Zovatto, & Mateo Díaz, 2006, pp. 59-60), districts in the region tend on average to be medium-sized.<sup>53</sup> The exceptions are Peru, Brazil and Uruguay,<sup>54</sup> where districts are relatively large, as well as Chile and Panama, where very small districts are found.<sup>55</sup> As to the formula for distributing

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the quotient. This allows parties that may have obtained a vote percentage well below the single Hare quota to gain seats in the legislature (Payne, Zovatto, & Mateo Díaz, 2006, pp. 60-62; Taagepera, 2007, pp. 85-89).

<sup>52</sup> The D'Hondt system relies on a series of successive divisors (1, 2, 3, ...), which are applied to the votes received by each party in an electoral district. Seats are assigned according to the size of the quotients resulting from these divisions (Payne, Zovatto, & Mateo Díaz, 2006, pp. 60-62).

<sup>53</sup> In medium-sized districts, like those in Latin America, it is argued that the effects of the formula used for distributing seats in the assembly on the degree of disproportionality are the strongest (Payne, Zovatto, & Mateo Díaz, 2006, p. 44).

<sup>54</sup> Although Uruguay is divided into electoral districts of varying size, the formula used for allocating seats in the lower chamber takes percentages of the aggregate national vote instead. This makes the system function, in practice, as if it were a single national district (Payne, Zovatto, & Mateo Díaz, 2006, p. 43). In Latin America, only the lower house in Peru has a single-nationwide district.

<sup>55</sup> In Chile, there are two members elected per district. The two available seats are won by a party only if the winning party receives at least twice the total votes of the list that obtains the second-most votes. Given the

seats in the legislature, D'Hondt systems are currently employed in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay; and the Hare quotient is used in the remaining countries. There are no thresholds for parties to achieve representation in Latin American legislatures other than the Argentine, Bolivian, Mexican and Nicaraguan congresses, where parties must receive a certain percentage (3-4 %) of the national vote in order to avoid disqualification. As for party lists, they are currently open and unblocked in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Panama, Peru and Uruguay. Closed and blocked lists are in use in all other countries.

Overall, there is significant variation across the electoral systems for the legislature and the executive in contemporary Latin America. The following section takes a closer look at the evolution of electoral rules over time in these countries. A comparative analysis in time may reveal other important variations, as well as their likely effects of electoral reforms on the waves of social mobilisation the region has experienced over the past decades.

#### Evolution of electoral rules in Latin American democracies

Electoral engineering has been very common in Latin America, particularly during the third wave of democratisation (Remmer, 2008; Wills-Otero, 2009; Negretto, 2009; 2011; 2013). To this extent Latin American democracies distinguish themselves from other pure presidential systems, such as that of the United States, where electoral rules have been relatively static. In just the period 1978-2009, for instance, 57 electoral amendment processes took place in Latin America. Of these, 29 and 38 were modifications to the rules governing

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fragmentation of the Chilean party system, these rules have provided incentives to parties to coalesce on two fronts. Thus, unlike in the rest of Latin America, Chile operates as a de facto two-party presidential system. Moreover, the system promotes legislative discipline, insofar as defections from the coalition entail substantial risks. That said, whilst governability may be certainly enhanced, smaller parties are virtually excluded from participating in the system (Siavelis & Valenzuela, 1996).

the selection of presidents and legislatures respectively. However, the rate and nature of these institutional reforms have differed across the region (Negretto, 2009). Reform of the electoral formulae for both presidencies and legislatures has been greatest in the Andean countries, particularly in Ecuador and Bolivia. Whilst the rules for selecting the president have undergone major changes in the Southern Cone, those governing the election of legislators have tended to remain the same. In Mexico and Central America (excepting Nicaragua), however, it is the system used for electing the president that has been rather static, with the majority of electoral changes having concerned the legislative arena (See Table 4.1). In spite of these cross-national variations, some common trends in the rules for selecting political representatives can be discerned over time (Negretto, 2009; 2011).

| <i>Table 4.1 Electoral Reforms in Latin America 1978-2009</i> |                          |                                        |                                       |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| <b>Country</b>                                                | <b>Number of Reforms</b> | <b>Changes to Presidential Formula</b> | <b>Changes to Legislative Formula</b> |
| Argentina                                                     | 1                        | 1                                      | 1                                     |
| Brazil                                                        | 3                        | 2                                      | 0                                     |
| Chile                                                         | 3                        | 3                                      | 0                                     |
| Paraguay                                                      | 2                        | 1                                      | 1                                     |
| Peru                                                          | 2                        | 2                                      | 2                                     |
| Uruguay                                                       | 1                        | 1                                      | 0                                     |
| <i>Southern Cone</i>                                          | <i>12</i>                | <i>10</i>                              | <i>4</i>                              |
| Costa Rica                                                    | 1                        | 1                                      | 0                                     |
| El Salvador                                                   | 1                        | 0                                      | 1                                     |
| Guatemala                                                     | 4                        | 1                                      | 3                                     |
| Honduras                                                      | 6                        | 1                                      | 5                                     |
| Mexico                                                        | 5                        | 0                                      | 4                                     |
| Nicaragua                                                     | 8                        | 4                                      | 5                                     |
| Panama                                                        | 2                        | 1                                      | 1                                     |
| <i>Central America</i>                                        | <i>27</i>                | <i>8</i>                               | <i>19</i>                             |
| Venezuela                                                     | 7                        | 3                                      | 7                                     |
| Bolivia                                                       | 5                        | 3                                      | 4                                     |
| Colombia                                                      | 3                        | 2                                      | 2                                     |
| Ecuador                                                       | 3                        | 2                                      | 2                                     |
| <i>Andean Region</i>                                          | <i>18</i>                | <i>10</i>                              | <i>15</i>                             |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                                                  | <b>57</b>                | <b>28</b>                              | <b>38</b>                             |

Over time, the party arena in Latin American presidential democracies has become more plural. By 1992, all Latin American countries had adopted some form of PR for the election of the legislature. PR systems were first (re)introduced as a way of guaranteeing the political representation of formerly authoritarian and/or traditional interests in the new democratic setting (Negretto, 2006, p. 225).<sup>56</sup> However, as democratic politics has unfolded in the contemporary period, other electoral reforms have been geared towards lowering the barriers for party entry, resulting in a considerable rise in the number of political parties with representation in the legislatures of the region (Figure 4.1). The inclusion of new interests has been promoted through the expansion of assemblies, the elimination of thresholds for legal representation, as well as the adoption of runoff rules for presidential elections (Negretto, 2006, p. 422; Negretto, 2011, pp. 1782-1783).

Whilst in previous democratic periods most Latin American presidents were elected by either popular pluralities, or two rounds of voting in Congress, the number of countries

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<sup>56</sup> During the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Latin American legislators were elected by majoritarian rules – often, however, in combination with restrictions on the vote and candidate eligibility that favoured the oligarchies (Wills-Otero, 2009, pp. 38-39). At the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, as urbanisation progressed, a growing number of workers started to cast their demands in distributional terms. In reaction, political elites lifted restrictions on the vote (Collier & Collier, 1991), and introduced PR systems and large-sized districts for the selection of legislators in the lower houses (Wills-Otero, 2009). PR rules were first introduced in the region in Costa Rica (1913), Uruguay (1918) and Chile (1925). However, by the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century, assemblies were being elected under pure PR systems in all Latin America countries except Cuba, Mexico and Paraguay, where indirect elections had given way to mixed or plurality systems. Although electoral reforms nominally opened up the political game to those previously marginalised, the implementation of these electoral rules was erratic, at best (Negretto, 2006, p. 423). A common reaction to the sudden incorporation of the masses to the political system, and their redistributional demands, was the establishment of populist regimes and, subsequently, authoritarian solutions. The sole exception to the pattern just described was Costa Rica, where democratic rule thrived with the inclusion of new actors via PR elections. Some countries – namely, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and Paraguay – avoided such military tendencies, but instead consolidated the choice into just one or two party alternatives. In three of these countries (Venezuela was the exception), party dominance was underpinned by semi-proportional rules. Semi-proportional systems in early 20<sup>th</sup>-century Latin America, however, were closer to majoritarian than to PR systems (Wills-Otero, 2009, p. 39; Molinar & Weldon, 2000; Moreno, 2005). In Mexico, for instance, up until 1994, the electoral system was designed in such a way that the hegemonic party, the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI), had a majority of seats even if it won less than a majority of votes (Klesner, 1997). Therefore, the system, while nominally mixed, operated as if it were majoritarian (Molinar & Weldon, 2000). Reforms expanding the size of both the lower and upper house and the proportion of legislators elected via PR were gradually introduced in reaction to significant waves of mobilisation – namely, the student movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the urban movement in the 1980s, and the peasant rebellion in Chiapas and the debtors' movements in the 1990s (Foweraker & Craig, 1993; Cadena-Roa, 2003). In Venezuela, PR rules remained in place, but the electoral system favoured the incumbent elites thanks to the manipulation of the district magnitude and particular mathematical formulas (Crisp & Rey, 2003).

using “runoff-among-voters” for selecting the president has increased during the third wave of democratisation (Figure 4.2).<sup>57</sup> Chile (1980), El Salvador (1983), Guatemala (1985) and Peru (1979) shifted from runoff in Congress to majority runoff; Brazil (1988), Colombia (1991), the Dominican Republic (1994), Ecuador (1978) and Uruguay (1996) from plurality to majority run-off; and Argentina (1994) and Nicaragua (1995) from plurality to qualified runoff. The last country where the system of two rounds in the legislature gave way to runoff popular elections was Bolivia (2009). Thus, the formulae used for electing presidents throughout the region have become more permissive over time (Negretto, 2013, pp. 26-28).<sup>58</sup> Many organised groups in society have taken advantage of these more permissive rules, by increasingly turning themselves into, or allying with, new political parties (Van Cott, 2000; 2005). Formerly unrepresented constituents such as women, ethnic groups, informal workers, landless peasants, human rights victims and leftist groups have attained seats in Congress and/or introduced new issues like abortion rights, gay rights, gender and ethnic quotas, onto the political agenda.

Furthermore, electoral institutions have been reformed, providing legislators with greater incentives to cultivate closer links with their constituencies (Figure 4.3).<sup>59</sup> For that purpose, the type of lists and the size of the electoral districts have been amended; elsewhere, mixed systems have been put into place. Personalisation (implemented by virtue of open/flexible lists and/or mixed systems) allows voters having a greater influence in the process of candidate selection. Whilst in 1978 legislative members were elected in single-closed lists in fourteen democracies in the region, in the present, this provision is only in

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<sup>57</sup> In the period prior to 1978, only Costa Rica had adopted runoff among voters for presidential elections (Pérez-Liñán, 2006).

<sup>58</sup> The exceptions to this trend are Ecuador (1998), where the majority runoff system gave way to a qualified runoff, and Nicaragua (2000) where the threshold for runoff elections was reduced (Payne, Zovatto, & Mateo Díaz, 2006, p. 23).

<sup>59</sup> It should be noticed, however, that the enactment of these combinations of rules has paralleled advances in the decentralisation process, a central demand of some social movements in the region.

place in Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay and Nicaragua (Negretto, 2013, p. 30). In addition, Mexico, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela have established semi-PR rules for the assembly.

Although the party arena has become more plural, and voters should have a greater say in the candidate selection of legislators, democracies have not necessarily become more inclusive. During the third wave, electoral engineering in third-wave Latin America has been aimed at concentrating power (Negretto, 2013, p. 32). In order for presidential legislative support to be larger, there have been numerous minor adjustments to the mathematical formula used for allocating seats in the assembly. In most countries, Hare and other quotient formulas have given way to D'Hondt systems; in other instances, mixed electoral systems have been introduced. These electoral changes have affected the extent to which the preferences of different groups in society are weighted in the policy-making process. Biases in the distribution of seats in Latin American legislatures have ebbed and flowed over the contemporary democratic period (Figure 4.4). Levels of disproportionality in the lower house of the legislature were already high in the aftermath of regime change, as conservative landed elites and former military actors guaranteed their participation in the new democratic scenario by imposing restrictions on electoral systems. While decreasing in the 1990s, they returned to high levels during the 2000s. At present, Latin American legislatures, like those in Africa, have the world's greatest levels of malapportionment and disproportionality in the lower house of the assembly (Samuels & Snyder, 2001, p. 146).<sup>60</sup>

Similarly, during the third wave of democratisation, bans on presidential re-election have been lifted throughout the region (Negretto, 2013, pp. 33-34). Although term limits

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<sup>60</sup> Malapportionment refers to the "discrepancy between the share of legislative seats and the share of population held by electoral districts" (Samuels & Snyder, 2001, p. 652). In general, levels of malapportionment tend to be higher in bicameral systems, especially in the upper house. In Argentina, for instance, smaller provinces are overrepresented in the senate.

were the norm in 19th and early 20th century Latin America,<sup>61</sup> the rules for the re-election of presidents have become more permissive (Figure 4.5). Immediate re-election has now been legalised in a number of countries, namely Argentina (1994), Bolivia (2009), Brazil (1998), Colombia (2005), Ecuador (2008), Nicaragua (2009) and Venezuela (1998, 2009). While the majority of these countries allow presidential re-election for one term, re-election for more than two consecutive periods has been implemented in Venezuela, and there have been repeated attempts by presidents in Peru (2000),<sup>62</sup> Argentina (1999 and 2012), and Colombia (2010) to seek a third term in office. In Argentina (1994) and Brazil (1998), however, presidential terms have consequently been shortened. It should be noted at this point that incumbents in the region have only rarely been defeated when seeking re-election (Corrales & Penfold, 2011, pp. 155-157).<sup>63</sup> Hence changes in electoral rules have tacitly, and significantly, extended the tenure of Latin America presidents. The exceptions to this rule are: Paraguay (1992), which has shifted from immediate re-election to prohibition of re-election; Nicaragua (1995), from immediate to no consecutive re-election; Panama (1994), from re-election after one presidential term to re-election after two periods in office have passed; Peru (2000), from immediate re-election to non-immediate re-election.

Overall, electoral systems in third-wave Latin America have been reformed in order to expand the opportunities of different interests in society for achieving political representation, they have in the event become more even restrictive in terms of the effective participation of different groups in the policy process, by concentrating power in the presidency and the ruling party. The fundamental question is, therefore: in what ways, and to what extent, have the cross-national variations and temporal trends just outlined in the

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<sup>61</sup> Re-election has been legalised in the US Constitution since 1952.

<sup>62</sup> In Peru, the attempt by President Alberto Fujimori to be re-elected for a third term succeeded. However, a corruption scandal forced him to resign from office shortly after being elected for the third time.

<sup>63</sup> In Latin America, the only incumbent who has failed to be re-elected is Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua in 1990. Still, he returned to power in 2007 and was sworn in as president for the third time in 2011.

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**Figure 4.1 Effective Number of Legislative Parties in Latin America**

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
Sources: Payne, Zovatto & Mateo Díaz (2006), the Georgetown University's "Political Database of the Americas" (2011); the Fundación Miguel de Cervantes's "Hispano-American Constitutions" project (2011).

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**Figure 4.2 Presidential Run-Off Elections in Latin America**

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
Source: Payne, Zovatto & Mateo Díaz (2006), the Georgetown University's "Political Database of the Americas" (2011), the Fundación Miguel de Cervantes's "Hispano-American Constitutions" project (2011).

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**Figure 4.3 Incentives to Cultivate Personal Vote in Latin America (Index)**

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Sources: Payne, Zovatto & Mateo Díaz (2006), the Georgetown University's "Political Database of the Americas" (2011); the Fundación Miguel de Cervantes's "Hispano-American Constitutions" project (2011).

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**Figure 4.4 Disproportionality of legislative results in Latin America**

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


Source: Payne, Zovatto & Mateo Díaz (2006), the Georgetown University's "Political Database of the Americas" (2011), the Fundación Miguel de Cervantes's "Hispano-American Constitutions" project (2011).

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**Figure 4.5 Presidential immediate re-election in Latin America**



*Sources: Payne, Zovatto & Mateo Díaz (2006), the Georgetown University's "Political Database of the Americas" (2011); the Fundación Miguel de Cervantes's "Hispano-American Constitutions" project (2011).*

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electoral systems of Latin America affected the inclusiveness of democracies, and prospects for social mobilisation in the region?

## **4.2 Hypotheses**

This section advances a series of hypotheses about the impact of the different methods for the selection of the executive and the legislature on the degree of inclusiveness and thereafter the prospects for contentious action in pure presidential democracies.

### Systems for electing the legislature

Of all electoral systems for the legislature, PR rules offer the greatest opportunities for achieving political representation in the assembly, in that they assure that nearly every voter is represented by a candidate of their choice. In SMD systems, by contrast, minorities are unlikely to have representatives in the legislature. In these systems, a fewer number of interests in society are less likely to achieve representation, particularly if constituencies within a district are heterogeneous (and people's identity is defined in other than geographical or local terms).<sup>64</sup>

Within PR systems, however, there are important differences in the degree of proportionality and therefore the extent to which the political forces that have formal representation in the legislature can participate in the policy process. These variations are largely due to the extent to which the seats in the assembly are distributed according to the proportion of votes received by each party (or legislator). When seats are allocated in a disproportional manner, some groups are over- (or under-) represented in the legislative body, irrespective of the effective number of parties in the assembly. When levels of disproportionality are high, a handful of parties tend to dominate the policy process to the detriment of a number of political forces. Consequently, those underrepresented citizens are likely to feel aggrieved, since, even though they have the same political rights for participating in the policy process as any other group in society, their political representatives face greater limitations than do others in voicing their interests, even when obtaining larger shares of vote.

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<sup>64</sup> Despite PR can promote achieving political representation in the assembly, they can reduce the likelihood of elected agents to voice the demands of their constituents in the policy process. For Scott Mainwaring (1993), PR rules are more likely to increase the risk of deadlock situations and delegative presidents by fragmenting the party arena. SMD systems lower the likelihood of conflict and ideological polarisation between the executive and the legislature in pure presidential systems. Nonetheless, in practice, coalitions have been the norm rather than the exception in multiparty pure presidential systems (Chasquetti, 2001; Deheza, 1997; Foweraker, 1998).

This leads to the following hypothesis:

*H1: The prospects for social mobilisation increase with the degree of disproportionality of the electoral system for the legislature.*

### Candidate-centred systems for legislative elections

When legislators are elected in open and unblocked lists, different interests in society have greater opportunities to influence the process of candidate selection and therefore the identity and programmes of parties (at least at the local level). In addition to the presence and type of party lists, the degree of personalisation of the electoral system is influenced by the number of candidates from the same party competing with one another, which is determined by the size of electoral districts. Therefore, these systems should offer voters greater opportunities to have a say in the policy process. This possibility is lower when legislators are elected in closed and blocked party lists and/or low district-magnitude districts. Since party elites determine who runs, as well as the ranking of candidates within the party list; some interests in society are prioritised over others. In some cases, party leaders can perpetuate their hold on power, without any link between them and electors.<sup>65</sup> Overall, the more candidate-driven the electoral system for the legislature is, the greater the likelihood for voters to influence the process of candidate selection and intra-party competition. Personalised systems also provide incentives to individual legislators to engage in ad-hoc bargains with the president in exchange of special benefits from their constituencies.<sup>66</sup> The following hypothesis is thus developed:

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<sup>65</sup> In mixed proportional systems, party lists are absent from the election of legislators in uninominal districts. Therefore, this portion of candidates is encouraged to cultivate direct links with electors, while the rest – those elected under PR rules – are more likely to follow party lines.

<sup>66</sup> That said, it is questionable the extent to which the benefits distributed to individual legislators benefits the general public or serve specific (particularistic) constituencies. In other words, it is debatable whether candidate-

*H2: The prospects for social mobilisation in a pure presidential democracy decreases with the degree of personalisation of the legislative electoral system*

#### Formula used for presidential election

By promoting the fragmentation of the party arena, runoff systems for presidential elections facilitate the representation of a number of interests in the assembly. In runoff-among-voters systems, it is to be expected that parties specialise, as some of them know that they have no chance of winning the first round. Since the median candidate is more likely to win when a second round of election takes place among voters, popular runoff systems tend to prevent candidates with anti-establishment tendencies or ideologically extremist views from coming to power. Presidents are likely to gain office with a smaller share of the vote. Moreover, a second-round of elections can promote coalition building among the front-runners of the election and other smaller parties, for both winning the electoral contest and advancing the presidential agenda in a multiparty scenario. As a result, presidents are more prone to adopt more moderate and conciliatory positions, which can be reflected in partisan and oversized cabinets and/or coalitions in the assembly.<sup>67</sup> In plurality systems, by contrast, an inflated sense of mandate may encourage presidents to adopt extreme ideological positions, or undermine or bypass interests represented in the assembly.<sup>68</sup> It could thus be argued that the extent of inclusiveness is lower in democracies in which the president is elected in plurality elections. This leads to the following hypothesis:

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centre system for legislative elections can lead to distributive policy outcomes, albeit they contribute to coalition building.

<sup>67</sup> It has been noted that the legitimacy of presidents elected in a second round cannot be compared to that achieved by presidents elected by an absolute majority in the first round or in plurality systems (Jones, 1995, pp. 90, 182-183).

<sup>68</sup> The popular mandate of legislators on national matters is also contingent on the timing of presidential and legislative elections. When elections are not held concurrently, the electoral bases of the president and the legislature are likely to diverge, with legislators being more likely to focus on local and specific, rather than national matters.

*H3: The prospects for social mobilisation are lower when presidents are elected in popular run-off rather than in plurality contests.*

That said, bargaining among political forces might not necessarily lead to inclusive governments and distribute policy outcomes. In systems, in which presidents are elected in a second round of elections in the assembly, a minority candidate can be sworn. In the event, the executive might be compelled not to serve the national interest but those of the parties that elected her in the assembly. In the event, despite elite compromise, elected presidents can adopt policies that benefit only a small portion of the electorate. Although gridlock may be overcome, public goods are seldom delivered at the national level. Then, the following hypothesis is developed:

*H4: The prospects for social mobilisation are higher when presidents are elected in run-off in Congress than in popular run-off.*

### Presidential re-election

The re-election of the incumbent (and the expansion of presidential terms) lowers the probability of rotation in the executive office. As presidents prolong their stay in office, they tend to develop formal and informal advantages over their possible competitors, such as abuse of state resources, unequal access to media, and unequal access to the law (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Levitsky & Loxton, 2013, p. 108).<sup>69</sup> As a result, when the consecutive re-election

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<sup>69</sup> For instance, presidents (who have been elected with a large mandate or who command a majority contingent in the assembly) may reform the electoral system in order for them and their party to remain in office, or at least protect themselves against future disadvantages in terms of electoral competitiveness. Thus, not only may presidential re-election bias the electoral playing-field, it can also involve other disadvantages for dissident groups in society, as other institutions can be reformed to their detriment (Corrales & Penfold, 2011, pp. 156-157).

of the president is allowed, the probability of other groups to contest and access power is decreased (Corrales & Penfold, 2011, pp. 154-155).<sup>70</sup> This leads to the following hypothesis:

*H6: The prospects for social mobilisation in a pure presidential democracy are higher in systems allowing for the consecutive re-election of presidents.*

### **4.3 Data and Methods**

The above hypotheses are tested here using aggregate data for social movement activity and electoral institutions for 17 Latin American democracies during the period 1978-2009. Only those democracies with a Polity2 score above 3 are included in the sample. For comparative purposes, the analysis only considers rules for the selection of members of the lower house, or of the national assembly in the case of unicameral congresses.

#### *Dependent Variable*

##### Social movement activity

This is measured as the number of antigovernment demonstrations, riots and strikes occurring in a country in a given year. Data for this variable was collected from the *Latin American Weekly Report* (2009) (see Chapter 3).

#### *Independent Variables*

The main independent variables are the rules of the selection of the legislature and the presidency. Information for these variables was mainly gathered from: Payne, Zovatto &

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<sup>70</sup> That said, re-election rules for the presidency increase the partisan powers of the president, and therefore its capacity to bargain with legislators (Negretto, 2013, p. 32).

Mateo Díaz (2006), the Georgetown University's "Political Database of the Americas" (2011), and the Fundación Miguel de Cervantes's "Hispano-American Constitutions" project (2011).

#### Formula for selecting the president

This is measured as a series of binary variables, according to the selection of the president by plurality, congressional run-off, qualified run-off or majority run-off elections.

#### Permissiveness of the formula used for presidential elections

This measures the degree to which the formula for presidential election restricts the entry of new parties to the system. It takes into account the method for presidential selection, alongside the concurrence of presidential and legislative contests. The measure ranges from 1, being the most restrictive, to 3, being the most inclusive. 1 corresponds to plurality rule with concurrent elections; 2, plurality rule with intermittent and non-concurrent elections, and qualified runoff systems; and 3, runoff elections with non-concurrent elections. This ordered ranking was developed by Gabriel Negretto (2006).

#### Consecutive re-election of the president

This is measured as a binary variable, coded 1, if the presidential incumbent can be immediately re-elected; and 0 for otherwise.

#### Presidential re-election rule

This is measured as an ordinal variable that ranges from 1 to 3, where 1 refers no re-election; 2, re-election after certain amount of terms; and 3, consecutive re-election.

#### Length of presidential term

This is registered as the number of years of the presidential term.

### Disproportionality index

This is measured as the difference between the percentage of votes received and the percentage of seats a party gets in the resulting legislature. Only results for the lower house of the assembly are considered. It is computed using the Least Squares Index defined by Michael Gallagher (1992):

$$LSq = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n (v_i - s_i)^2}$$

where  $n$  is the number of parties, and  $v$  and  $s$  the proportion of votes and seats of party  $i$ , respectively.<sup>71</sup> Low values of the index indicate low levels of disproportionality in the electoral outcome. Such value is weighted for mixed systems, based on the percentage of seats allocated via PR and SMD.

### Institutional incentives to cultivate a personal vote

This is measured using the ordinal ranking developed by Carey & Shugart (1995), which takes into account the proportion of votes pooled among candidates from the same party, the degree of control by parties over ballot access, and whether voters cast their votes for candidates or parties. Such an index is weighted according to the mean size of electoral districts. For mixed systems, the district magnitude is weighted according to the percentage of seats allocated via PR. The index ranges from 0 (the most “party-centred”) to 2 (the “most candidate-centred”).

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<sup>71</sup> Other measures of disproportionality are the Loosemore-Hanby and the Rae indexes. However, these measures are not considered here as they tend to overestimate and underestimate the level of disproportionality as the number of parties increase, respectively. These errors are corrected by the Gallagher index. Thereby, it appears as a more appropriate measure of disproportionality, especially when comparing countries with different levels of party system fragmentation, such as those in Latin America (Taagepera & Grofman, 2003).

### *Control Variables*

Also considered are measures for the presence of bicameral legislatures,<sup>72</sup> and waves of democratisation. All specifications control for the rate of inflation, GDP per capita, and the size of the population. Data measurement and sources for these variables can be found in the Appendix.

### *Model Specification*

See the LFM model developed in Chapter 2.

## **4.4 Statistical results**

Results are reported as incident ratios. As reported in Table 4.2, the likelihood of social mobilisation is substantially and significantly greater in systems in which presidents are selected in a second round in the legislature (Model 1). However, there is no significant

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<sup>72</sup> In general, levels of disproportionality and malapportionment tend to be higher in bicameral than in unicameral systems (Lijphart, 1994, pp. 146-147; Samuels & Snyder, 2001). This is largely owed to differences in the popular mandates of legislators between the lower and the upper houses of the assembly. For instance, in Colombia, Paraguay, and Uruguay, senators have the mandate to represent the interests of the electorate at large. However, in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico (prior to 1997), Bolivia (until 2009), and Chile, senators have the mandate to represent the interests of specific territorial units. When there are variations in the popular mandates of legislators across houses, different methods for electing legislatures can be present within the same system. In Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, for example, all members of the upper house are elected in uninominal districts. In other instances, members of the upper house are selected via methods other than popular contests. Until the mid-2000s, for instance, former presidents in Chile and Paraguay became, by default, members of the upper house. In Chile, 20 per cent of the Senate was not popularly elected, but appointed by the President, Supreme Court, and the National Security Council (Nolte & Sánchez, 2005). It could be then expected that bicameral arrangements – and the system used for electing legislators in the upper house – have important implications for the extent to which political agents are accountable to their constituencies, and consequently, for the prospects of social mobilisation.

It should be mentioned that bicameral legislatures tend to be common in federal democracies. However, in order to avoid problems of multicollinearity, federalism was not included in the statistical specifications. The omission of this variable also owes to the high dependence of local governments in Latin America on the national state, despite the process of decentralisation which has progressed significantly in the past decades. Only in Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil do subnational units have authority over legislating, raising taxes and spending. But, even in Latin American federal democracies, the central government receives the majority of all tax revenue, leaving departments or states dependent on federal appropriations. Thus, in most countries, the solution to the demands of social movements is still largely contingent upon developments in the national political arena.

difference in the odds of protest events between systems with plurality and popular runoff methods for presidential elections, even after distinguishing among run-off systems (Model 2) and observations for the case of Bolivia are excluded from the sample (Model 3). Moreover, the extent to which the presidential electoral system promotes the entry of parties into the legislature – considering the formula for, and the concurrence of, presidential elections – have no significant relevant impact on the odds of social mobilisation (Model 4). Nevertheless, the odds of protest activity are indeed affected by the restrictions on the re-election of the presidential incumbent (Models 5 and 6). Accordingly, systems allowing for the consecutive re-election of the president are (at around 92 per cent) more likely to suffer from social mobilisation than other systems (Model 6). This finding holds after considering the length of the presidential term, which is positively and significantly related to the odds of social mobilisation. All these results hold after controlling for the presence of bicameral legislatures and time effects (year).

On the other hand, as reported in Table 4.3, the odds of contentious action are greater when legislators are selected via semi-PR rules (Model 7). Along these lines, as hypothesised, the odds of protest events increases at a significant level with the degree of disproportionality in the allocation of seats in the lower assembly. Each additional point in the Gallagher index of disproportionality in the electoral results for the lower house raises the odds of contentious action by approximately 13 per cent (Model 8). However, contrary to our expectations, the personalisation of the system used for electing legislators in the lower house has no significant effect on the probability of social mobilisation (Model 9).

For further robustness checks, all models in this section were run using data second-order time correlation structures (models not presented). Findings hold despite the loss of some observations in these models.

**Table 4.2 The effect of the electoral system for the presidency on social movement activity in Latin America**

|                                                                                                                              | 1        | 2        | 3        | 4        | 5        | 6        |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Runoff in the legislature                                                                                                    | 8.134*** | 7.599*** |          |          |          |          |
|                                                                                                                              | (0.587)  | (0.538)  |          |          |          |          |
| Runoff among voters                                                                                                          | 1.176    |          |          |          |          |          |
|                                                                                                                              | (0.321)  |          |          |          |          |          |
| Majority runoff among voters                                                                                                 |          | 0.856    | 0.744    |          |          |          |
|                                                                                                                              |          | (0.340)  | (0.289)  |          |          |          |
| Threshold runoff among voters                                                                                                |          | 2.018    | 1.970    |          |          |          |
|                                                                                                                              |          | (0.402)  | (0.388)  |          |          |          |
| Permissiveness of the presidential formula (index)                                                                           |          |          |          | 0.939    |          |          |
|                                                                                                                              |          |          |          | (0.206)  |          |          |
| Re-election formula                                                                                                          |          |          |          |          | 1.662*   |          |
|                                                                                                                              |          |          |          |          | (0.183)  |          |
| Consecutive re-election                                                                                                      |          |          |          |          |          | 1.921*   |
|                                                                                                                              |          |          |          |          |          | (0.457)  |
| Length of presidential term                                                                                                  |          |          |          |          | 1.398    | 1.420    |
|                                                                                                                              |          |          |          |          | (0.278)  | (0.262)  |
| Bicameralism                                                                                                                 | 0.658    | 0.642    | 0.660    | 1.520    | 1.461    | 1.660    |
|                                                                                                                              | (0.437)  | (0.389)  | (0.396)  | (0.588)  | (0.497)  | (0.569)  |
| Inflation (log)                                                                                                              | 0.866+   | 0.905    | 0.907    | 0.736+   | 0.795+   | 0.799    |
|                                                                                                                              | (0.081)  | (0.112)  | (0.140)  | (0.186)  | (0.1270) | (0.156)  |
| GDP per capita (log)                                                                                                         | 1.328    | 1.141    | 1.096    | 0.760    | 0.653*   | 0.660+   |
|                                                                                                                              | (0.253)  | (0.212)  | (0.195)  | (0.258)  | (0.213)  | (0.234)  |
| Population (log)                                                                                                             | 1.471**  | 1.672*** | 1.634*** | 1.288    | 1.351**  | 1.297+   |
|                                                                                                                              | (0.131)  | (0.143)  | (0.145)  | (0.166)  | (0.096)  | (0.146)  |
| Time Effects                                                                                                                 | YES      | YES      | YES      | YES      | YES      | YES      |
| N                                                                                                                            | 408      | 408      | 378      | 408      | 410      | 410      |
| Number of countries                                                                                                          | 17       | 17       | 16       | 17       | 17       | 17       |
| J                                                                                                                            | 0.324    | 0.733    | 0.578    | 0.726    | 0.127    | 0.658    |
| Rho                                                                                                                          | 2.040*** | 1.984*** | 1.733*** | 2.149*** | 2.117*** | 2.132*** |
| Error correction                                                                                                             | INAR(1)  | INAR(1)  | INAR(1)  | INAR(1)  | INAR(1)  | INAR(1)  |
| Notes: Coefficient reported as incidence ratios; standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 |          |          |          |          |          |          |

Nonetheless, nearly all results obtained were substantively similar regardless of the time-correction or estimation strategy employed. In no LFM specification is the J-test large or significant, suggesting that the models are well-specified.

**Table 4.3 The effect of the electoral system for the legislature on social movement activity in Latin America**

|                                                                                                                              | 7        | 8        | 9        |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|
| Semi-PR                                                                                                                      | 2.026+   |          |          |
|                                                                                                                              | (0.406)  |          |          |
| Disproportionality in the legislature (index)                                                                                |          | 1.129*** |          |
|                                                                                                                              |          | (0.029)  |          |
| Candidate-centred legislative electoral formula (index)                                                                      |          |          | 0.997    |
|                                                                                                                              |          |          | (0.082)  |
| Bicameralism                                                                                                                 | 1.319    | 2.028    | 1.451    |
|                                                                                                                              | (0.411)  | (0.509)  | (0.480)  |
| Inflation (log)                                                                                                              | 0.796**  | 0.780    | 0.770+   |
|                                                                                                                              | (0.085)  | (0.173)  | (0.154)  |
| GDP per capita (log)                                                                                                         | 0.748    | 0.618+   | 0.739    |
|                                                                                                                              | (0.196)  | (0.261)  | (0.221)  |
| Population (log)                                                                                                             | 1.353*   | 1.404**  | 1.392+   |
|                                                                                                                              | (0.130)  | (0.121)  | (0.171)  |
| Time Effects                                                                                                                 | YES      | YES      | YES      |
| N                                                                                                                            | 410      | 412      | 412      |
| Number of countries                                                                                                          | 17       | 17       | 17       |
| J                                                                                                                            | 0.155    | 0.051    | 0.432    |
| Rho                                                                                                                          | 2.132*** | 2.069*** | 2.171*** |
| Error correction                                                                                                             | INAR(1)  | INAR(1)  | INAR(1)  |
| Notes: Coefficient reported as incidence ratios; standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 |          |          |          |

These statistical findings thus support the main claim of this study. That is, the formula used for electing the presidency and therefore the type of executive-legislative relations has an important bearing on the prospects for social mobilisation. This finding is robust after a series of control variables. That said, the likelihood of protest events is not affected by the extent to which the formulae used for selecting the presidency fragmenting the party system. Rather, the likelihood of social mobilisation in pure presidential systems is determined by the extent to which electoral institutions concentrate the policy process in a handful of parties and/or the president. Social mobilisation – at least, in Latin American pure presidential democracies – appears to be driven by the removal of bans for the immediate re-election of presidential incumbents. In these multiparty democracies the occurrence of social mobilisation is related to the degree of disproportionality in the distribution of seats in the

lower house, but not to the extent of fragmentation in the party arena. The power-concentrating aspects of the electoral systems of these multiparty regimes counteract the effect of power-sharing and proportional institutions on democratic inclusiveness. In sum, social mobilisation in multiparty pure presidential democracies is more likely to occur when: 1) the formula for distributing the seats in the lower house is disproportional; 2) there are no bans for the immediate re-election of presidential incumbents, and 3) the president is elected in a runoff in the assembly.

As described above, in the majority of countries in the region, legislatures have remained highly disproportional, and the restrictions for the consecutive re-election of presidents have been lifted throughout the region. The only country where the president has been elected in run-off in the assembly has been Bolivia, which is one of the most ethnically divided societies in the regions. It is worth exploring in what ways this particular formula for the election of the president (which was long praised for providing incentives to the executive and the parties in the ability to negotiate) in interaction with other electoral institutions has affected democratic inclusiveness and the prospects for social mobilisation in this country.

#### **4.4 Country Case: Bolivia**

For a long time, Bolivia had been portrayed as a success story of pure presidentialism (Carey & Shugart, 1992, p. 85). Much of its exceptionality had been attributed to the nature of its electoral system, under which, until 2006, presidents were elected from among the highest-scoring candidates by the assembly (Mayorga, 2001). This institutional feature, introduced in 1834, provided political actors with numerous incentives to build coalitions in the assembly. The possibility that presidents would be leading coalition governments further increased with the adoption of a single ballot for presidential and legislative elections in the wake of the

1952 Revolution. The electoral reform of that year also introduced closed and blocked party lists for legislative elections, which induced greater discipline within parties (Muñoz-Pogossian, 2008, pp. 17-18). The presence of cohesive majorities in the legislature, in turn, promoted policy effectiveness for almost two decades, leading some to argue that electoral rules were the most important element underpinning the dominance of the *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario* (MNR) and the *Central Obrera Boliviana* (COB) (Gamarra & Malloy, 1988, p. 34).

Whilst guaranteeing governability, the system operated detrimentally for the electoral fortunes of other groups in society. Although PR rules were introduced after the Revolution in order to give indigenous and mestizo groups formal access to the political system, the participation of these sectors in the policy process remained for long time marginal. Among other factors, this was the result of the D'Hondt formulae for the allocation of seats in the lower house of the assembly, which favoured the largest parties. In addition, closed and blocked lists made the president and legislators accountable to party bosses rather than to their electors. Consequently, not only were minority groups underrepresented, but most political representatives and therefore parties' platforms remained distant from their electors. As a result, the interests of a large proportion of citizens were excluded from government decisions. This electoral configuration eventually led to social and political instability, which was followed by repressive dictatorships in the 1970s. Military rule, however, was forcefully contested by a series of strikes and anti-government demonstrations organised by mine-workers and their womenfolk. As protest events escalated over time, the military junta was compelled to call general elections in 1979.

In the aftermath of regime change, the electoral system of 1956 was resurrected, albeit with some modifications. Party lists were now open and unblocked, and seats in the legislature were to be distributed using the Hare quotient method of highest remainders, the

most impartial formula (Deheza, 2000, p. 141). Nonetheless, this fairer allocation of seats in the assembly, and the greater incentives for parties and legislators to represent the interests of their constituents, created serious problems of workability in the assembly. Agreements were extremely difficult to make, even for the election of the president. After several rounds of unsuccessful votes in the legislature and two years of political instability, President Hernán Siles Zuazo (1982-1985) from the MNR was elected, but without the support of a governing coalition. An obstructive legislature aggrieved the already dire economic situation, leading to a series of massive strikes organised by the COB.

The governability problems faced by the Siles Zuazo administration led politicians to reform the system for electing legislators in 1986. Changes included the reintroduction of closed and blocked party lists, and the distribution of seats via the D'Hondt formula (simple quotient) (Muñoz-Pogossian, 2008, pp. 31-40). Once again, the electoral system biased the policy process in favour of the largest parties. These were: the MNR, *Acción Democrática Nacionalista* (ADN), and *Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria* (MIR). With a more concentrated party arena, the formula for executive selection promoted electoral and governing alliances between these three parties. Coalition building was further eased by these parties' ideological affinity, in that they all promoted neoliberal economic reforms. As a result, structural adjustment policies were rapidly and successfully implemented in Bolivia, by stark contrast with other countries in Latin America. Nevertheless, such draconian economic measures were not supported by the Bolivian median voter. Thus, they promoted the organisation and mobilisation of various groups in society. Mine-workers went on strikes, and peasants, teachers and coca-leaf growers staged several demonstrations against the governments of Paz Estenssoro (1985-1989) and Paz Zamora (1989-1993).

In the midst of rising social opposition to neoliberal policies, another electoral reform was implemented in 1989. The purpose of the new electoral regime, however, was not

to appease social discontent, but rather to advance the implementation of economic reforms. For that purpose, a double quotient was introduced to the D'Hondt formula for legislative selection.<sup>73</sup> This method restricted the entry of new parties into Congress, as it eliminated from the distribution of seats any that did not obtain a certain minimum percentage (Deheza, 2000, pp. 141-143).<sup>74</sup> Indeed, by the early 1990s the effective number of political parties in the lower house of the assembly had decreased to five, whereas in the 1980s the average figure was ten. A less inclusive and more disproportional system imposed greater limitations on a larger number of citizens in terms of participating in the decision-making process. As a result, citizens felt increasingly alienated from the political process. Moreover, because the double quotient system made the calculation of seats twice, not only were the votes of smaller parties underestimated but, in the process, there were accusations of manipulation of the votes in favour of the largest parties (Muñoz-Pogossian, 2008, pp. 63-64).

In short, the whole electoral process was biased towards the largest parties. Even when enjoying formal representation in the assembly, diverse interests were denied meaningful participation in the policy process. This disproportionality of the electoral system for legislators was certainly good for enabling alliance-building, but, not for the enactment of moderate and inclusive policies. Coalitions were also underpinned by the formula for electing the president. However, rarely was the candidate who was ultimately sworn in as head of state the person actually chosen by the majority of voters. This is because presidents were selected by a disproportional assembly. Therefore, presidents were more likely to follow the dictates of a minority of interests, rather than the will of most Bolivians. In addition,

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
<sup>73</sup> Under this formula, those parties that obtained at least the same number of votes as the participation quotient would take part in the seat assignment. Once the participation quotient was calculated, the votes of all parties that participated in the distribution of seats were added, and this total was divided by the number of seats to be distributed in a department. With this quotient, seats were distributed only among the parties that qualified for the distribution.

<sup>74</sup> In the previous election, parties that failed to meet the participation quota were allowed to obtain a seat, provided that their vote total was not less than the lowest remainder that earned a seat in the district.

coalitions were not negotiated by elected representatives, but by party bosses, who had enormous power because party lists were closed and blocked. These party chiefs, who were not accountable to voters, monopolised the selection of the president, the composition of the government coalition, and the overall decision-making process. While inducing party discipline, this type of list alienated parties' platforms from the needs of the electorate. In sum, despite easing cooperation among political actors, the electoral system for the presidency in combination with that of the legislature precluded that the interests of different groups in society were considered in the policy process. This particular configuration promoted the mobilisation of those excluded.


As the process of institutional and economic reform unfolded, the number of protest events increased in Bolivia (Figure 4.6). However, in the process, the identity, tactics and discourse of social movements shifted. Certainly, structural adjustment policies had weakened the power of traditional labour unions: principally, the COB. However, other identities emerged in Bolivian society, each with different demands and collective action repertoires. According to data from LAWR (2009), whilst strikes were the main form of disruption in the country throughout the 1980s, it was marches, takeovers and riots that prevailed in the 1990s (Figure 4.7). Most of these contentious actions were undertaken by peasants and indigenous peoples, formerly passive actors, who casted their demands not so much in economic terms, but rather in terms of their environmental and cultural rights and, eventually, their right to participate in the system.

*Figure 4.6 Social Mobilisation in Bolivia*



Source: LAWR (2009)

*Figure 4.7 Social Mobilisation in Bolivia by type of activity*



Source: LAWR (2009)

By the early 1990s, popular discontent with the political system was already noticeable. In order to restore citizens' confidence, a series of electoral reforms was implemented. In 1991, the legal threshold for representation in the legislature was eliminated, giving parties the opportunity to access the legislature by winning only 1 to 1.5 per cent of the popular vote.<sup>75</sup> Also, the D'Hondt formula was replaced by the St Laguë odds divisor method (Muñoz-Pogossian, 2008, p. 86). In 1993, the Law on Popular Participation created 300 municipalities throughout the country, each with the autonomy and capacity to administer local funds, and a mayor and council directly elected by voters. This was the first time in history that Bolivian citizens had been entitled to elect subnational authorities. In 1994, a mixed electoral system was introduced in the lower house, but with a legal threshold for political representation of 3 per cent for the PR portion.<sup>76</sup> Because the legislative vote could be split across parties in different constituencies, smaller parties became able to participate in legislative contests without necessarily running a presidential campaign. In addition, the formula for the selection of the president was modified so that the head of state was selected from between the two — and not the three — highest-scoring candidates, in case none of these obtained more than 50 per cent of the popular vote. At the same time, the 1994 constitutional reform acknowledged, for the first time, the collective rights of the indigenous peoples. Gender equality was also legislated for – by introducing gender quotas of at least one third in party lists, among other measures – as were the political rights of those living abroad and a lowering of the voting age to 18.

All these institutional changes allowed new groups (particularly peasant and indigenous ones) to organise themselves into political parties, by which means they soon

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<sup>75</sup> In addition, in order to quell accusations of electoral malfeasance, the National Electoral Court (CNE) was disassociated from political parties. Whilst its members would be elected by a qualified majority in the assembly, they would not have any partisan membership.

<sup>76</sup> Accordingly, 68 deputies out of the 130 members of the lower house would be elected in SMD districts, and the remaining 62 would be elected via PR.

gained representation at both the local and national levels. In effect, there was a sharp increase in the number of political parties in the assembly throughout the 1990s, in comparison to the concentration of the party arena in the 1980s. Nevertheless, and despite these changes, the participation of these groups in the policy process remained restricted. The change in the mathematical formula for allocating seats did not increase the fairness of the system, as both D'Hondt and St Laguë tend to yield identical results in practice. On the contrary, the system became more disproportional, as now a portion of legislators was elected in SMD. Uninominal districts electorally benefited the traditional parties, except in the coca-leaf producing regions, where *Izquierda Unida* (IU), led by Evo Morales, arose as a strong political force (Muñoz-Pogossian, 2008, p. 114). Even though the SMD fraction of the system was intended to make parties more responsive to citizens' needs, most legislators continued to be loyal to party bosses. The PR portion of the mixed system was dominated by party cadres and members. In fact, very few of the uninominal deputies have been re-elected since the adoption of the mixed system (Muñoz-Pogossian, 2008, pp. 110-117). Thus, while the reforms of the 1990s opened the political arena to different sectors in society, they did not establish a more equitable framework for participating in policy-making (Whitehead, 2001, p. 14). Instead, disproportional institutional arrangements, coupled with the executive electoral system, still favoured governing coalitions comprising the traditional parties, and, consequently, supported the on-going implementation of unpopular policies.

The governments of Hugo Banzer (1997-2001) and Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (2002-2005), for instance, privatised the water and the hydrocarbons sectors, and militarised coca eradication programmes. These policies were praised by international financial organisations and the United States. Furthermore, they were approved by more than two-thirds of the members of the legislative body. However, these policies were condemned by the general public in Bolivia, whose most immediate demands, such as the provision of basic

services like water, could not even find expression in government. As the demands of the Bolivian electorate remained unsatisfied, social confrontations became inevitable. Despite the expansion of political representativeness, social protest did not abate because of the rules for selecting the presidency and the formula used for distributing seats in the assembly continued concentrating the policy process in a handful of interest.

During the late 1990s and early 2000s, Bolivia entered a period of even more heightened social conflict (Figure 4.6). According to data from the LAWR (2009), the number of anti-government demonstrations and riots escalated dramatically, particularly from 1998 onwards. Furthermore, although labour unions remained inactive during the 1990s, the number of strikes increased considerably from 2002 until the end of the period under study (Figure 4.8).<sup>77</sup> By the mid-2000s, numerous and variegated sectors of Bolivian society were engaged in protest. Indeed, students and teachers, neighbourhood groups, peasant organisations, coca union leaders, indigenous people and workers formed confederations and mobilised against the governments of Hugo Banzer and Sánchez de Lozada. In the cities, objections were initially raised to the privatisation of basic services and state-owned companies, as well as changes to the pension scheme, whereas in the countryside protests concerned the implementation of coca eradication programmes, and the state management of natural resources. Although all these groups were originally organised around material and immediate concerns, eventually they contested the whole legitimacy and implementation of public policy. Thereafter, the defence of their rights from political participation became part of their discourse. For their rights to be effectively upheld, movements demanded the refounding of democratic institutions. Constitutional reform became their core demand.

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<sup>77</sup> These trends are similar to those registered in the database of social conflict in Bolivia collected by Roberto Laserna at CERES-Bolivia (2008).

Growing waves of protest compelled the government to institutionalise referenda and allow social movements and civic associations to run candidates without party support. Yet these legal instruments were not enough to curb social discontent. In the elections of 2002, the *Movimiento al Socialismo* (MAS), with strong links to peasant organisations and coca unions, rose to become the second political force in the assembly, conditioning any political agreement on the satisfaction of social movements' demands. Also prominent was the *Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti* (MIP), rooted in peasant and indigenous organisations. In a more plural arena such as this, however, no political bargain was feasible, especially when the political forces were now ideologically opposed. Consequently, confrontation in the assembly and the streets intensified. This created problems within the governing coalition, which as social unrest increased demanded greater pork and barrel pay-offs in order to be sustainable. As corruption was more evident to the public eye, the model of alliances became exhausted. No longer did political coalitions suffice to guarantee governability and political stability. In 2003 and 2005, President Sánchez de Lozada and his successor, Vice-President Carlos Mesa, were both forced to resign in the face of massive mobilisations.

General elections were called in 2005. The traditional party system now collapsed. The ADN and the MIR split into two new parties: the *Poder Democrático Social* (Podemos) and the *Unidad Nacional*; only the MNR remained as before. However, the MAS became the predominant force in the legislature, with 72 out of the 130 seats in the lower house and 12 seats in the Senate. Paradoxically, the collapse of the traditional party system was the result of the electoral reforms implemented throughout the 1990s, inasmuch as the majority of legislators from the MAS were elected in uninominal districts (Muñoz-Pogossian, 2008, pp. 186-188, 206-208). More importantly, Evo Morales, leader of the MAS, became the first Bolivian president elected with more than 50 per cent of the popular vote. Not only did

peasant and indigenous voters support both Morales and the MAS but also a considerable part of the wider electorate did also.

Despite being a majority in the lower house of the legislature, the MAS controlled neither the senate nor the judiciary. Unlike in the past, Morales did not respond to divided government by negotiating with the opposition. Rather, his unprecedented victory at the presidential elections allowed the promotion of the “refounding” of democracy in Bolivia on a socially inclusive basis (Gamarra, 2008, p. 129). Thus, upon taking power, the judiciary was purged; and a Constituent Assembly was convoked in 2006. The majority of Bolivian citizens embraced the enactment of a new constitution as necessary to solve the country’s economic and political stagnation. The constitution raised the expectations of many citizens to participate in, and benefit from, the collective decision-making process (Gamarra, 2008, p. 139). Indeed, several leaders from indigenous and peasant movement organisations were elected as constituents. Although more than 60 per cent of the constituent members supported Morales and the MAS, they did not have the qualified majority necessary to approve the new constitution. Traditional elites opposed the new legal project. Most of them were business groups from eastern provinces, which, while weakened, still had enough representation in the senate to block the enactment of the new constitution as well as other presidential initiatives.<sup>78</sup>

In the end, the constitution was approved by the assembly, but with some modifications. It was ratified by more than 60 per cent of Bolivian citizens in a referendum in 2009, and introduced various instruments of direct democracy, most of them based on indigenous traditions, as well as broadening the conception of citizenship rights. Legal protection was offered to motherhood and gender-based groups, indigenous people and the

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<sup>78</sup> Additional opposition came from governors, who were democratically elected for the first time in 2005. Although prefects had no party allegiance, conflicts between subnational governments and the executive office became an additional scenario of political polarisation.

environment. Electoral quotas were also established to guarantee indigenous people representation in the assembly. In so doing, the constitution formalised the demands of traditional marginalised sectors. Indeed, the new legal text was embraced by peasant and indigenous movements.<sup>79</sup> At the same time, although citizens' expectations for participating in the policy process expanded, the access of opposition forces to the decision-making process became even more restricted by virtue of a new electoral law.

This electoral reform was passed in response to the confrontation and polarisation that Morales faced during his first years in office. Some elements of the previous institutional system were maintained, such as closed and party lists for election of legislative candidates and the D'Hondt formula for seat allocation in the lower house of the assembly (which already favoured the largest parties). However, the proportion of legislators elected in uninomial districts increased at the expense of those selected in plurinomial districts. Whilst previously 50 per cent of the seats in the lower house were allocated by SMD, and 50 per cent by PR, with the new electoral law the ratio was 60 and 40 per cent respectively.<sup>80</sup> This meant that smaller parties now needed more votes to win a smaller number of seats in the assembly, as compared to other forces. Opposition from the prefectures was also minimised, by substituting uninomial districts for PR rules in the election of members of the upper house.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> In addition, many movement leaders were incorporated into the government through ministerial positions and/or consultation bodies.

<sup>80</sup> This excludes the seats allocated to indigenous groups, which currently account for 5 per cent of the national assembly.

<sup>81</sup> It should be noticed that Morales' government unsuccessfully attempted to eliminate the upper chamber of the legislative body, where elites from the eastern provinces had important representation. However, in some other countries – namely, Peru (1993) and Venezuela (1999) – the upper house has been successfully abolished in order to eliminate veto points against presidential proposals. In both Peru and Venezuela, the house that was eliminated was the one that had the constituency least congruent with the presidential agenda. Likewise, in Colombia, during Alvaro Uribe's government, a single nationwide constituency was put in place in the senate in order to reduce the influence of opposition forces in the decision-making process.

Additionally, a second round of presidential elections among voters was introduced, for when no candidate obtained more than 50 per cent of the popular vote. In fact, all branches of government, even the members of the Supreme National Court, were made subject to popular election. Furthermore, the president was allowed to be immediately re-elected for one more term, whereas previously he/she could only run for office again after at least one further presidential term had elapsed. It was also made possible for presidential mandates to be terminated by plebiscites. Certainly, the links between the president and her constituency had been strengthened. Nonetheless, by allowing the immediate re-election of the incumbent, the prospects for alternation in the presidency had been reduced. Overall, the new electoral design was aimed at concentrating the policy process in the hands of the ruling party and the president. Thus, the inclusiveness of the decision-making process continued to be limited. Upon these laws coming into effect, Morales was re-elected and the MAS gained full control of the legislative body.

Nonetheless, as various groups in society have been denied institutional opportunities to influence policy, they have been more prone to resort to contentious action. As early as 2005, groups from the four departments located in the east of the country – the so-called “half-moon” – organised massive marches and road blockades against the economic policies of Morales. The “half-moon” centred on the city and province of Santa Cruz, which is the economic engine of Bolivia, and the source of many of its natural resources such as natural gas. In addition, it is the most industrialised region in the country, with the lowest proportion of indigenous population. Initial opposition was targeted at state intervention and nationalisation in the economy, but eventually morphed into calls for political decentralisation, regional autonomy, and control over Bolivians' own natural resources. Although these were the claims of labour unions, and peasant and indigenous groups in the

late 1990s and early 2000s, however, they were now part of the discourse of urban upper and middle-class sectors, which had not resorted to disruptive action in the past.

That said, as the government of Morales has proceeded, many of his former supporters, such as lowland indigenous, have recently engaged in protests against his government, denouncing the personalisation of the government and demanding greater participation in the policy process. The involvement of different sectors in contentious action has increased while Morales has been in power. During his government, the number of anti-government demonstrations and riots has dramatically increased, reaching its highest levels in the period under study (Figure 4.6). Similarly, during these years there has been a notable expansion in the activity of labour unions (see Figure 4.7). Thus, rather than decreasing, social mobilisation has increased as electoral reforms have been implemented in Bolivia.

In sum, Bolivia, electoral reforms have successfully opened the party arena to formerly marginalised groups. However, as the party arena had become more inclusive, greater restrictions on the participation of different groups in the policy-making process, irrespective of their identity, have been imposed by other power-concentrating aspects of the electoral system. The formula for allocating seats in the assembly has become more disproportional over time. However, restrictions for different groups in society to participate in the policy making process have been imposed by the electoral system for the presidency. Run-off elections for the presidency in the assembly and the consecutive re-election of the incumbent were adopted in the country (albeit at different times) in order to promote governability before multipartism and a heterogenous society. Indeed, policy effectiveness has long distinguished this pure presidential democracy. Despite elite accommodation and pluralism in the legislature, policy outcomes have not been distributive. Before this, a large proportion of Bolivian citizens have been compelled to express their frustration and defend

their rights to both equally contest power and participate in the decision making process in the form of social mobilisation.

#### **4.5 Conclusion**

This chapter has sought to explore the ways the electoral rules that could be adopted in a pure presidential democracy can affect the prospects for social mobilisation. For that purpose, quantitative and qualitative evidence from the pure presidential democracies of Latin America has been analysed. According to statistical findings, protest events in a pure presidential democracy are more likely to occur whenever: 1) presidents are selected in runoff elections in the assembly; 2) immediate presidential re-election is allowed; and/or 3) the distribution of seats in the assembly favours larger parties at the expense of the electoral fortunes of smaller forces. These results are valid after considering a series of control variables, different time-correction correlations and estimation strategies. Thus, it could be argued with a considerable degree of confidence that the rules used for selecting the presidency (and therefore the type of executive) have an important bearing on the prospects for social mobilisation. This is a correction to the consensus/majoritarian models of democracy and an important contribution to the comparative study of social mobilisation, which has neglected the influence of the system used for selecting the presidency.

During the third wave, the party arena in Latin America has certainly become more inclusive by virtue of the enactment of permissive electoral rules. Plurality rules for the election of presidents, for instance, have given way to runoff formulae. The result has been a greater average effective number of parties in the legislature. This has offered more citizens opportunities to achieve representation in the political system. As the political arena has been opened up to a greater number of interests, other electoral changes have precluded the

preferences of all groups in society being weighted evenly in the policy process. Not only have formulae over-representing the interests of some groups to the detriment of those of others in the legislature have been implemented. Also, over the past decades restrictions on the immediate re-election of presidents have been lifted. Although these reforms have been undertaken in order to promote large and stable majorities in the assembly (Remmer, 2008; Negretto, 2011), they have resulted in a concentration of the policy process in a handful of groups.

Nonetheless, elite bargaining and pluralism in the legislature are not sufficient conditions for democratic inclusiveness. This claim is illustrated by the case of Bolivia, where a series of electoral reforms were undertaken in order to promote negotiation among political elites, and therefore, policy effectiveness. Governability in Bolivia has been underpinned not only by a disproportional formula for the distribution of seats assembly, but also by the system used for electing the presidency. Cabinets and policy outcomes were not representatives of the society at large. Behind these patterns in electoral engineering may lay the very character of Latin American pure presidential regimes, in which the need for political pluralism counters the ever-present need for governability, which demands power-concentration.

But, overall, the evidence in this chapter supports the main claim of this study, that is, the type of executive-legislative (and the institutional accessories that can be combined with this format) is a relevant influence on the prospects for social mobilisation in a democracy. Scholars should therefore include the rules for the selection of presidents, and their interaction with the type of executive-legislative format, as an important variable in the comparative study of social mobilisation. The following chapter will advance the present enquiry by assessing the influence of the agenda-setting powers of the presidency and the

oversight functions of the legislature on the prospects for social mobilisation in pure presidential regimes.

## **5. PRESIDENTIAL POWERS AND SOCIAL MOBILISATION IN LATIN AMERICA**

In pure presidential systems, both the presidency and the legislature are vested with a series of law-making powers. Since the selection and survival is independent of one another, the faculties exercised by each branch of authority tend to go against those of the other. These counterbalancing tendencies can be proactive, when one agent is able to establish a new policy outcome without the consent of the other, or reactive, when one of the agents can preclude (or overturn) changes to the political situation made by the other. By preventing one political agent from stepping on the interests of the other, ideally, policy outcomes should benefit the interests of the electorate at large. Rarely, however, has this been the case largely because of asymmetries in the faculties of the presidency and the legislature which counterbalance each other's actions.

This chapter examines in what ways, and to what extent, the different law-making powers of presidents, and, conversely, the different capacities of legislature to sanction and censure presidential actions affect the prospects for social mobilisation in pure presidential systems. The focus is on third-wave democracies in Latin America. Pure presidential constitutions in the region have been characterised by vesting presidents with strong legislative powers and granting the legislature with weak faculties to censure the executive. Over time, however, there have been substantial changes in the faculties granted to each branch of government across time. This chapter demonstrates that the existence of decree authority (which can allow presidents to bypass the interests represented in the legislature) does not affect the probability of protests. Instead, protest is more likely to occur when legislatures have weak authority to censure or remove presidents and to influence public spending.

The chapter is structured as follows. The first section provides a brief overview of the law-making powers of presidents and the strength of legislatures to sanction and censure presidential actions across time and space in contemporary Latin America. The second part advances a series of hypotheses on the influence of these institutions on the prospects for social mobilisation. The third section lays out the data and methods used to test these claims and the fourth presents the results of pooled cross-sectional time-series count models based on data on constitutions and protest events for 17 Latin American democracies for the period of 1900-2009. The fifth part tests the validity of statistical claims by examining the case of Ecuador while the sixth and final section concludes by summarising the findings, and assessing the implications for the prospects for social mobilisation, and democratic inclusiveness, in general.

## ***5.1 Strength of the Presidency and the Legislature in Latin America***

### **Presidential Law-Making Powers in Latin America**

Presidents are selected by a nationwide constituency with the explicit mandate to contribute to the provision of common goods and policies, or, at least, prevent policy outcomes to be biased in favour of localised interests (Shugart, 1999; Shugart & Haggard, 2001). In order to fulfil their mandates, not only do presidents have the exclusive right to assemble the cabinet, but, also, they are vested with a series of law making faculties. Executives can influence policy outcomes in their favour by: 1) vetoing the enactment of bills that have already been approved by the legislature; 2) introducing bills in specific policy areas, which then need to be voted in the assembly within a time limit;<sup>82</sup> 3) issuing laws without (previous) deliberation

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<sup>82</sup> Among these areas are: the budget, the armed forces, public administration, and constitutional reforms and assemblies.

in the legislative body through decrees (Carey & Shugart, 1992, pp. 9-12); and/or 4) submitting bills to popular consultations (Breuer, 2008; 2009).

In comparison with other pure presidential systems, presidents in Latin America have strong and vast law-making faculties (Cheibub, Elkins, & Ginsburg, 2011, pp. 1709, 1713-1715, 1718-1720). Since independence, presidents in the region have been vested with extensive veto and decree powers.<sup>83</sup> Not only have Latin American executives historically been the most powerful in the world, but the scope of their agenda-setting faculties has increased with the passage of time (Cheibub, Elkins, & Ginsburg, 2011, p. 1718; Negretto, 2009, pp. 48-50; Negretto, 2013, pp. 38-39). Furthermore, during the third wave of democratisation, an increasing number of presidents in the region have been given the capacity to enact legislation through popular referenda (Breuer, 2009). Despite these commonalities, the terms of the clauses upon which executives in the region can exercise these law-making faculties do vary significantly across countries. This section differentiates the institutional tools available to presidents for influencing policy outcomes across time and space in Latin America.

### *Veto*

Veto powers are intended to prevent the enactment of legislation that deviates from the general interest. Presidential vetoes can be partial, when only a portion of a bill is rejected, or absolute, when the complete bill is invalidated. All Latin American heads of state have the capacity to reject bills that have already been approved by the legislature in their entirety. However, unlike in the United States, presidents can also reject individual items of bills approved by the legislature (Alemán & Schwartz, 2006). Still, if the veto is overridden by the

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<sup>83</sup> In comparison, presidents in the U.S. have modest emergency powers, and lack the formal ability to initiate legislation and enact decrees.

legislature, the president is required to sign the bill, and it becomes law. Nonetheless, the conditions in which presidential vetoes can be overturned by the opposition in the legislature differ across countries. In Ecuador (2008), vetoed legislation cannot be rejected by the legislature. In the constitutions of El Salvador (1983), Guatemala (1985), Panama (1994), Argentina (1994), Bolivia (2009), Chile (1980), Mexico (1917) and Uruguay (1997), a qualified majority of (either the full membership or present members) of the legislative body is required for overriding vetoes. In Brazil (1988), Colombia (1991), Costa Rica (1949), Nicaragua (1987), Paraguay (1992), Peru (1993) and Venezuela (1999), a simple majority suffices (Payne, Zovatto, & Mateo Díaz, 2006, pp. 87-89).

### *Decree*

Executive decrees not only give the president the power to legislate immediately and without congressional approval, but they also give her influence over the legislative agenda (Pereira, Rennó, & Power, 2005). All Latin American presidents can enact decrees on particular policy matters during states of siege.<sup>84</sup> However, some executives have the ability to unilaterally legislate in less pressing circumstances. In Brazil (1988), for instance, presidents can issue decrees in times of “relevance and urgency”; in Colombia (1991), in periods of “economic emergency” or “internal commotion”; and in Argentina (1994), Guatemala (1985), and Honduras (1982), in “exceptional” or “emergency circumstances”. Still, these special situations are vaguely defined in constitutional texts, which has allowed presidents to enact decrees with relative ease (Power, 1998, pp. 197, 202; Schmidt, 1998, pp. 104, 116). That said, the clauses upon which decrees enter into effect do differ across countries.

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<sup>84</sup> In all Latin American constitutions, the president is the only actor entitled to declare a state of siege. These situations can be invoked in case of natural disasters, external threats, or internal security concerns. Nevertheless, various presidents in the region, particularly in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, have abused these provisions, strategically declaring states of emergency before imagined or perceived security threats, and consequently have usurped legislative authority and restricted citizenship rights (Cheibub, Elkins, & Ginsburg, 2011, p. 1723).

Presidential decrees can become law immediately in Chile (1980) and Peru (1993). In Argentina (1994), legislation is not clear, but, in practice, presidents have issued bills unilaterally with immediate effects (Negretto, 2004, pp. 551-553). Although presidential decrees are not typified in the constitutional texts of Ecuador (2008), Paraguay (1992) and Uruguay (1997), presidents can introduce bills in various policy matters as “urgent”; in which case, the legislature must act within a certain time period, or else the proposed legislation becomes law automatically. In Brazil (1988) and Colombia (1991), presidential decrees can be dismissed, but only if the legislature does not take any action. Still, presidents in both countries can renew these provisional measures once.<sup>85</sup> In addition, decree authority varies in terms of the applicable policy arena. In Argentina (1994), Brazil (1988), Colombia (1991), and Uruguay (1997) presidents can issue decrees in any policy area, whereas in Ecuador (2008) and Peru (1993), decrees are limited to economic and fiscal matters, respectively.

In other circumstances, the legislature can explicitly delegate power to the president to issue decrees. Delegated decree authority (DDA), however, cannot be considered as a tool that presidents have for influencing directly the lawmaking process because a majority of legislators must define the scope, areas, and limits of decrees before they are delegated to the president (Carey & Shugart, 1998, p. 13; Negretto, 2004, pp. 535-536). Furthermore, the assembly can rescind these powers at any time, if they consider that the enacted legislation goes against their interests. Usually, legislators delegate decree authority to the president as a means to increase the effectiveness of the policy process (Figueiredo & Limongi, 2000; Carey J. , 2009, p. 173; Mainwaring & Scully, 1995, pp. 174-193; Pereira, Rennó, & Power, 2005, pp. 178-181, 186). This tends to be the case in extremely fragmented party systems,

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<sup>85</sup> Whilst in Ecuador (1998) and Brazil (1988) there are no restrictions in the number of bills that the president can designate as urgent, in Uruguay (1997) only one bill at one time can be considered as such (Payne, Zovatto, & Mateo Díaz, 2006, pp. 89-91).

whereby collective action problems are commonplace.<sup>86</sup> At the time of writing, DDA exists in Brazil (1988), Chile (1980), Colombia (1991), Mexico (1917), Panama (1972), Peru (1993), and Venezuela (1999). Under no circumstances, however, are presidents able to enact decrees in times other than states of siege in Bolivia (2009), Costa Rica (1949), El Salvador (1983), Guatemala (1985), Nicaragua (1987), and Paraguay (1992) (Payne, Zovatto, & Mateo Díaz, 2006, pp. 89-90).

### *Referenda*

Presidents can also affect policy outcomes by convoking popular consultations. Referenda powers allow presidents to block the passage of bills that have been already approved in the legislature, as well as impose their policy proposals, even after these have been rejected by the assembly (Breuer, 2009, pp. 29-30). More importantly, this type of direct democracy instrument allows presidents to popularly legitimise their agenda, even before fierce opposition in the congress. In Latin America, referenda have been convoked since the early 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>87</sup> However, it was not until the third wave of democratisation that these mechanisms were typified in the constitutions.<sup>88</sup> At present, in all Latin American countries apart from Mexico, elected authorities have the formal power to convoke referenda or

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<sup>86</sup> High levels of legislative success in Brazil, for instance, have been attributed to the extension and regular use of delegated decree powers (Figueiredo & Limongi, 2000, pp. 151-152, 155, 158).

<sup>87</sup> Referenda have been in place in various countries of the region, and under different types of regimes, since the early 1930s. During authoritarianism, referenda were often used as a tool of political legitimisation. Examples of this include the referenda held in Bolivia (1931), Chile (1978, 1988, 1989), Colombia (1957), Guatemala (1935, 1954), Paraguay (1940), Venezuela (1957) and Uruguay (1934, 1938, 1980). The results were not always favourable to authoritarian elites, but, as the cases of Uruguay in 1980 and Chile in 1989 illustrate, these mechanisms could provide the legal framework of processes of democratic transition.

<sup>88</sup> During this period, other mechanisms for direct citizen participation have been introduced, like the popular initiative and the recall (Breuer, 2008, p. 3). The recall gives voters the ability to remove an elected representative from office; the popular initiative allows citizens to introduce bills for discussion in the legislature. At present, presidential recalls are only institutionalised in Venezuela (1999) and Ecuador (2008). Likewise, citizen initiatives are binding in a handful of countries – namely Bolivia (2009), Venezuela (1999), Colombia (1991), Costa Rica (1949), and Uruguay (1967). In the rest of democracies, these mechanisms are filtered by the legislature, which decides whether or not to proceed with the initiative (Altman, 2011, p. 113).

plebiscites. Whilst referenda are not held in a routine basis, as in Western democracies, the use of these instruments has become more frequent as democratic politics has proceeded in Latin America. Since 1978, 100 referenda have been held throughout the region, but in Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua and Paraguay. However, the majority of referenda have taken place in the Andean region (Welp, 2010, pp. 26-29).

Government-initiated referenda account for 85 per cent of all the direct democracy initiatives launched since 1978 in Latin America (Altman, 2011, p. 115). While in Western democracies specific policy issues are often put to popular consultation by citizens, more than 60 per cent of the referenda held in the region have been initiated by elected agents in relation to constitutional reforms (Breuer, 2009, p. 23; Breuer, 2008, p. 60; Altman, 2011, p. 115).<sup>89</sup> Of these, 75 per cent have been convoked by the president in order to retain, and/or increase, her power (Altman, 2011, p. 115). The exception to this regional trend is Uruguay, where most referenda have been related to the enactment of specific policy areas and where consultations initiated by citizens are a common occurrence (Altman, 2011, p. 113). Nonetheless, there are important variations in the design of government-initiated referenda across Latin American countries.

Referenda differ in terms of the branch of government entitled to initiate them (Breuer, 2009). The call for referenda is currently an exclusive prerogative of the presidents in Ecuador (2008), Chile (1980), and Colombia (1991), whereas in Argentina (1994), Brazil (1988), El Salvador (1983), Paraguay (1992), Peru (1993) and Uruguay (1967), referenda can only be convoked by a majority in the legislature.<sup>90</sup> In Bolivia (2009), Costa Rica (1949), Guatemala (1985), Honduras (1982), Panama (1972), Nicaragua (2000), and Venezuela

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<sup>89</sup> Referenda can also be convoked by citizens in order to block the passage of a bill, as it is currently stipulated in the constitutions of Bolivia (2009), Colombia (1991), Costa Rica (1949), Ecuador (2008), Guatemala (1985), Nicaragua (1987), Peru (1993), Uruguay (1967) and Venezuela (1999). However, except for Uruguay (1967), citizen-initiated referenda have been a rare occurrence in the region.

<sup>90</sup> Although in these countries, presidents can also call for referenda, the results of these consultations are always non-binding.

(1999), referenda can be initiated by either the president or the majority in the assembly.<sup>91</sup> In practice, legislative-initiated referenda have actually been uncommon. The exception is Uruguay, where the executive is not entitled to convoke referenda and the majority of popular consultations have been convoked by the legislature. Of all the countries, however, Ecuador has had the greatest number of president-initiated referenda.

However, referenda can be either unilaterally implemented by the political agent formulating the ballot proposal or they need the authorisation of the other agent before being submitted to popular vote (Breuer, 2008, pp. 60-62). Currently, the legislature and the presidency must agree on the terms and conditions of popular consultations in all countries, except in Argentina (1994), Bolivia (2009), Chile (1980), Ecuador (2008) and Peru (1994). In the latter three cases, the president can unilaterally convoke referenda. Additionally, referenda vary in the minimum percentage of the popular vote the ballot bill must receive in order to be enacted (Breuer, 2008, pp. 67-68). In Bolivia (2009), Honduras (1982) and Peru (1993), the minimum turnout is 50 per cent of registered voters; in Venezuela (1999), 45 per cent; in Argentina (1994) and Uruguay (1967), 35 per cent, and in Colombia (1991), 33 per cent. In the rest of the countries, this percentage is not specified.

### *Budgetary Powers*

In relation to other pure presidential systems, Latin American legislatures have historically had a limited role in budget policy making (Cheibub, Elkins, & Ginsburg, 2011, p. 1726). Whilst, in the US, the legislature is entitled to initiate and enact the national budget, in Latin

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<sup>91</sup> In exceptional situations, explicitly defined in the constitutions, referenda can be held without being initiated by any agent. This is the case in El Salvador (1983), Panama (1972) and Guatemala (1985), where referenda are automatically launched in matters regarding national security (Breuer, 2008, p. 4). In Peru (1993), this mechanism is activated for the approval of constitutional reforms. In Chile (1980), referenda are only held if the presidency and the legislature cannot agree on constitutional reforms (Payne, Zovatto, & Mateo Díaz, 2006, pp. 223-225).

America the president has the exclusive right to propose the budget bill. Not only do Latin American legislatures lack participation in the budget formulation, but they face severe constraints to amending the executive's budget proposal (Santiso, 2004, pp. 56-57). Nonetheless, these conditions vary throughout the region. In Bolivia (2009), Costa Rica (1949), Guatemala (1985), Honduras (1982), and Paraguay (1992), the legislature can modify the budget without any restrictions. In Argentina (1992) and Mexico (1917) the legislature can increase the overall level of spending. In Brazil (1988), Colombia (1991), Nicaragua (1995), Panama (1972), Uruguay (1997) and Venezuela (1999), the legislature can switch spending between different items, although it cannot raise the overall level of spending. However, in Chile (1980), Ecuador (1998) and Peru (1993), the legislative body cannot increase the overall level of spending or modify (and create new) budgetary categories (Payne, Zovatto, & Mateo Díaz, 2006, pp. 93-95).

Furthermore, if the budget is not approved by legislature by the deadline, the presidential proposal enters automatically into effect in Bolivia (2009), Chile (1980), and Peru (1993). In Argentina (1994), Colombia (1991), Costa Rica (1949), Guatemala (1985), Panama (1972), Paraguay (1992), Uruguay (1967), and Venezuela (1999), the budget of the previous year remains in place until a new budget is approved. If no agreement in the legislature is reached by the deadline, the president has to elaborate another budget proposal in Brazil (1988), Honduras (1982), and El Salvador (1983). In Mexico (1917), however, no spending can be made until legislators make an agreement. Still, in countries, like Peru (1993), Brazil (1988), and Argentina (1994), urgency decrees have been used when the

approved budget is not favourable to the president (Santiso, 2004, p. 68).<sup>92</sup> All over the region, perceptions of budget transparency are poor (Santiso, 2004, p. 62).

### *Comparison and evolution of presidential powers in Latin America*

The above classifications have shown that there are important differences in the law-making faculties of presidents across Latin American countries. Table 5.1 ranks Latin American countries according to the strength of presidential law-making faculties. As seen, presidents have the greatest ability to veto legislation in Uruguay (1967) and Argentina (1994), but the smallest in Peru (1993), Guatemala (1985) and Honduras (1982). The power of presidents to implement decrees is the strongest in Colombia (1991) and Ecuador (2008), but the weakest in Mexico (1917) and Costa Rica (1949). However, considering the interaction between their veto and decree prerogatives, presidents have been the most powerful in Colombia (1991), Ecuador (2008), Uruguay (1967) and Argentina (1994), but the weakest in Honduras (1982), Nicaragua (1987), Mexico (1917), and Costa Rica (1949). As for their capacity to enact legislation via popular referenda, presidents have the amplest capacity in Chile (1980) and Ecuador (2008), but none in Argentina (1994) and Uruguay (1967). With regards to budgetary powers, presidents have the greatest ability to impose their proposal in Ecuador (2008) and Peru (1993). However, the presidential initiative is most likely to be amended in Honduras (1982), Paraguay (1992) and Brazil (1988). Overall, at present, the legislative powers of presidents are the greatest in Ecuador (2008), Colombia (1991) and Peru (2000); however, they are the weakest in Mexico (1917), El Salvador (1983) and Costa Rica (1949).

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<sup>92</sup> In Brazil, for instance, since the budget process and execution is controlled by the president, the participation of legislators in the budget process depends on the parties' relations with the president (Pereira and Mueller, 2002).

As seen in Figure 5.1, the strength of presidential veto and decree authority has increased throughout 20<sup>th</sup> century Latin America, with presidents having been the most powerful during the third wave of democratisation. Since 1978, however, veto and decree prerogatives have increased but remained relatively stable. The exceptions to this trend are: Uruguay (1996) and El Salvador (1983) where presidential veto powers increased; and Brazil (1967 to 1988), Colombia (1886 to 1991), Peru (1979 to 1993) and Argentina (1886 to 1994), whereby executives were granted the ability to implement decrees in urgency situations. As for budget powers, the strength of budget powers have been only modified in Brazil (1946 to 1988), where the powers of the legislature in public budgeting were restored upon democratic transition, and Ecuador (1979 to 1994-1995, 1995 to 1998) and Peru (1979 to 1991, 1991 to 1999), where the ability of legislators to participate in the budget policy was eliminated. The expansion of presidential prerogatives in the third-wave of democratisation has been mostly due to the ability of presidents to introduce legislation via popular referenda (Figure 5.1).


### Strength of Latin American Legislatures

#### *Censure and sanction powers*

Legislatures can be vested with powers to censure and remove cabinet members and even impeach the president for corruption or malfeasance. The faculties of Latin American legislatures to censure and sanction the executive have been traditionally ample (Cheibub, Elkins, & Ginsburg, 2011, p. 1718). Nonetheless, these overseeing faculties differ across the region. In Argentina (1994), Bolivia (2009), Brazil (1988), Costa Rica (1949), Ecuador (2008), Guatemala (1985), Nicaragua (2000), Panama (1972), and Paraguay (1992), a qualified majority of either the full membership or present members of the legislature is

| <b>Table 5.1 Law-Making Faculties of Latin American Presidents (2009)</b>                                                                                                   |               |             |                      |                                      |                                   |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|-------------|----------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| <b>Country</b>                                                                                                                                                              | <b>Decree</b> | <b>Veto</b> | <b>Decree * Veto</b> | <b>Executive-initiated referenda</b> | <b>Overall Legislative Powers</b> |
| Argentina                                                                                                                                                                   | 1.47          | 2.00        | 2.94                 | 0.00                                 | 2.94                              |
| Bolivia                                                                                                                                                                     | 1.25          | 1.53        | 1.91                 | 2.00                                 | 3.91                              |
| Brazil                                                                                                                                                                      | 1.72          | 1.56        | 2.68                 | 0.00                                 | 2.68                              |
| Colombia                                                                                                                                                                    | 2.00          | 1.67        | 3.34                 | 1.00                                 | 4.34                              |
| Costa Rica                                                                                                                                                                  | 1.03          | 1.54        | 1.59                 | 1.00                                 | 2.59                              |
| Ecuador                                                                                                                                                                     | 1.82          | 1.81        | 3.29                 | 2.00                                 | 5.29                              |
| El Salvador                                                                                                                                                                 | 1.14          | 1.53        | 1.74                 | 0.00                                 | 1.74                              |
| Guatemala                                                                                                                                                                   | 1.30          | 1.43        | 1.86                 | 1.00                                 | 2.86                              |
| Honduras                                                                                                                                                                    | 1.12          | 1.33        | 1.49                 | 1.00                                 | 2.49                              |
| Mexico                                                                                                                                                                      | 1.03          | 1.54        | 1.59                 | 0.00                                 | 1.59                              |
| Nicaragua                                                                                                                                                                   | 1.35          | 1.47        | 1.51                 | 1.00                                 | 2.51                              |
| Panama                                                                                                                                                                      | 1.26          | 1.64        | 2.06                 | 1.00                                 | 3.06                              |
| Paraguay                                                                                                                                                                    | 1.28          | 1.58        | 2.02                 | 0.00                                 | 2.02                              |
| Peru                                                                                                                                                                        | 1.76          | 1.43        | 2.59                 | 2.00                                 | 4.59                              |
| Uruguay                                                                                                                                                                     | 1.49          | 2.00        | 2.98                 | 0.00                                 | 2.98                              |
| Venezuela                                                                                                                                                                   | 1.28          | 1.47        | 1.80                 | 1.00                                 | 2.80                              |
| <p><i>Note: Weighted averages</i><br/> <i>Sources: Georgetown University's "Political Database of the Americas" (2009) and Constituciones Hispanoamericanas (2009).</i></p> |               |             |                      |                                      |                                   |

**Figure 5.1 Evolution of Presidential Law-Making Faculties in Latin America**



*Sources: Georgetown University's "Political Database of the Americas" (2009), Constituciones Hispanoamericanas (2009) and Payne, Zovatto, & Mateo Díaz (2006).*

required for convicting the president. However, a trial can be initiated by a simple majority in Chile (1980), Colombia (1991), Honduras (1982), Mexico (1917), Peru (1993), Uruguay (1967), and Venezuela (1999) (Pérez Liñán, 2007, pp. 140-141). In some countries, presidents can also be removed on the basis of mental or physical incapacity. For that purpose, a qualified majority of the members of the legislature is necessary in El Salvador (1984), Guatemala (1985), and Nicaragua (2000). In Chile (1980), Colombia (1991), Costa Rica (1949), Ecuador (2008), Peru (1993) and Uruguay (1967), a simple majority suffices. In cases of bicameralism, the senate must provide a two-thirds majority to convict and remove the president either by impeachment or declaration of incapacity.

In Chile (2005), El Salvador (1983), Mexico (1917), Nicaragua (1995) and Paraguay (1992), the legislature has the powers of summons over cabinet members, demanding ministers to provide a detailed account of their policies, and undertake the changes suggested by the majority in the assembly in their respective policy areas. In addition, some constitutions in the region entitle the legislature to censure and/or remove cabinet members. This is the case in Argentina (1994), Bolivia (2009), Colombia (1991), Ecuador (2008), Guatemala (1985), Panama (1972), Peru (1993), Uruguay (1967), and Venezuela (1999). In Venezuela (1999), the legislature has, in addition, the power to censure the vice-president.<sup>93</sup> Nevertheless, save for Ecuador, this power has rarely been put into practice (Payne, Zovatto, & Mateo Díaz, 2006, pp. 93-94, 99-100). This is because the motion of censure must be supported by a qualified majority in the legislature, and even if a minister is removed, the president can immediately appoint a replacement who might be equally objectionable to the legislature. Still, the ability of the legislature to censure may still constrain the president's

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<sup>93</sup> In Peru (1991), Uruguay (1967) and Venezuela (1999), the president has the power to dissolve the legislature, but only after the assembly has censured one or more cabinet members.

control over the composition of his cabinet. If the assembly has censured one or more cabinet members, the president has the power to dissolve the legislature in Ecuador (2008), Peru (1993), Uruguay (1967) and Venezuela (1999). Additionally, the strength of legislatures to sanction the actions of presidents and ministers depends on the political agency acting as a jury, once the accusation has taken place. In Brazil (1988) and Colombia (1991), presidents can be judged by either the congress or the Supreme Court, according to the type of crime committed. However, in Bolivia (2009), Costa Rica (1949), El Salvador (1983), Honduras (1982), and Venezuela (1999), presidents can only be judged by the judiciary.

### *Comparison and evolution of the strength of legislatures in Latin America*


Table 5.2 classifies Latin American countries according to their oversight capacity. Considering their capacity to sanction and judge the president and cabinet members, legislatures are the most powerful in Chile (2005), Colombia (1991), Peru (1993), Uruguay (1996) and Venezuela (1999), but the weakest in Honduras (1982) and Brazil (1988). Throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century, this capacity has increased steadily in Latin America (Negretto, 2013, p. 35). In the present, legislative bodies in the region have the greatest ability in history to sanction and judge members of the executive (Figure 5.2). The largest rises have occurred in Uruguay (1967 to 1996) and Bolivia (1967 to 1996). However, there are exceptions to this trend, where congressional controls over the executive have decreased. In Ecuador (1998 to 2008), Peru (1979 to 1993) and Venezuela (1949 to 1999), contemporary presidents were given the ability to dissolve the assembly if the legislature impeach or sanction two or more cabinet members.<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>94</sup> Obviously, the actual ability of legislatures to oversight the executive depends on factors other than amendment powers, such as the professionalisation of legislators, the structure and organisation of committees, research capacities, among others (Saiegh, 2010; Santiso, 2004, p. 61). Unfortunately, data on these characteristics is not available for the countries and years covered in this study. However, country case studies

| <b>Table 5.2 Strength of Latin American Legislatures (2009)</b>                                                                  |                                    |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| <b>Country</b>                                                                                                                   | <b>Censure and sanction powers</b> |
| Argentina                                                                                                                        | 4                                  |
| Bolivia                                                                                                                          | 4                                  |
| Brazil                                                                                                                           | 2                                  |
| Chile                                                                                                                            | 6                                  |
| Colombia                                                                                                                         | 7                                  |
| Costa Rica                                                                                                                       | 4                                  |
| Ecuador                                                                                                                          | 5                                  |
| El Salvador                                                                                                                      | 4                                  |
| Guatemala                                                                                                                        | 5                                  |
| Honduras                                                                                                                         | 3                                  |
| Mexico                                                                                                                           | 4                                  |
| Nicaragua                                                                                                                        | 4                                  |
| Panama                                                                                                                           | 4                                  |
| Paraguay                                                                                                                         | 4                                  |
| Peru                                                                                                                             | 6                                  |
| Uruguay                                                                                                                          | 6                                  |
| Venezuela                                                                                                                        | 6                                  |
| <i>Sources: Georgetown University's "Political Database of the Americas" (2009) and Constituciones Hispanoamericanas (2009).</i> |                                    |

**Figure 5.2 Evolution of Legislatures' Strength in Latin America**



*Sources: Georgetown University's "Political Database of the Americas" (2009), Constituciones Hispanoamericanas (2009), and Payne, Zovatto, & Mateo Díaz (2006).*

suggest that the capacity of legislatures to oversight the executive is the strongest in Brazil, Chile and Colombia, but the weakest in Argentina (Leany 2010).

Hence, the extent to which policies can be formulated and implemented without the support and check of the parties represented in the legislature does vary greatly across time and space in Latin America. Over time, however, both the agenda-setting powers of the presidency and the oversight capacities of the legislature have increased. The question is: In what ways, and to what extent, have variations in the relative strength of the president and the legislature to affect the policy process and the composition of the cabinet has affected (the inclusiveness and) the occurrence of social mobilisation in Latin American pure presidential democracies?

## **5.2 Hypotheses**

This section advances a series of hypotheses on how variations in the strength of both presidential and legislative powers may affect the inclusiveness, and therefore, the prospects for social mobilisation in pure presidential democracies. It is herein assumed that, all other things being equal, agents would prefer to advance their agenda without the consent of the other (Neto, Cox, & McCubbins, 2003, p. 560).

### Presidential Powers

#### *Decree and Veto Powers*

When presidential decrees enter into effect immediately the decision-making process is the most exclusive, insofar as policies are formulated and implemented without the participation of the parties in the assembly (Negretto, 2004, pp. 533-538; Crisp, Desposato, & Kanthak, 2011, pp. 433-434). However, when decrees need to be validated in the assembly, the likelihood that different interests represented in society participate in the policy process is greater. In the event, since deliberation in the assembly must take place, policy outcomes are

more likely to gravitate around the preferences of the median voter. Nonetheless, this possibility varies with the interaction of presidential decree and veto powers, as overturned decrees can be vetoed by presidents, particularly, when decrees can be invalidated by the assembly by means of a new law.

When decrees enter into effect immediately and vetoes cannot be easily overridden in the assembly, the parties in the assembly are most constrained to influence the policy process (Carey & Shugart, 1998, p. 8). Rather, presidents have virtual power to rule as they see fit, with non-partisan cabinets and no checks on government policies (O'Donnell, 1994, p. 49; Amorim Neto, 2006). The lack of scrutiny and consensus on the policy process is most likely to result in questionable and biased policy outcomes. Even if policies are executed in a technocratic fashion and/or collective goods are effectively provided, those in the opposition are excluded from participating in the policy making process. In the event, different groups in society are likely to question the legitimacy of the laws enacted by the executive.

These considerations lead to the following hypothesis:

*H1: The prospects for social mobilisation are positively related to the interaction of the decree and veto powers of the president.*

#### *Government-initiated Referenda*

Referenda provide different groups in society the opportunity to directly participate in the policy process, by approving or rejecting the bills proposed by either the parties in legislature or the president. When the legislature has the formal power to define whether or not it is convenient to convoke for a referendum, the parties in the assembly have the opportunity to modify, or even call off, the presidential proposal. Moreover, the legitimacy of the proposals is boosted by their approval through referenda. Nevertheless, when legislation is not clear

about the minimum turnout requirements and provided that the prior consent of the legislators is not required, presidents may impose their agenda through referenda (Breuer, 2008, pp. 66-68), particularly in the midst of fierce opposition in the legislature. In the event, not only the interests of the parties in the legislature are bypassed, but policies are likely to serve the interests of only a minority.

Thus the following hypothesis is developed:

*H2: The prospects for social mobilisation increase with the ability of presidents to implement referenda without the consent of the other branch of government.*

### Budgetary Powers

When the legislature has a marginal role in the formulation of the budget, the president has no restriction in setting and allocating the budget according to her preferences. Although presidents are responsible to the electorate at large, this does not guarantee that the government spending will consider the different groups in society and that it will be fairly distributed among them. Because of the lack of oversight in the budget process, there is the risk that presidents misuse and abuse of their discretion in the management of state resources (Santiso, 2004, p. 51). Control and discretion over government spending could be used to favour the president and her cronies, rather than the general public. When legislatures have the formal power to modify the budget, legislators will certainly try to channel as many resources as possible to their particular constituencies. All else equal, because of the participation and scrutiny of the different parties in the assembly, government spending is likely to be more transparent and more equitably distributed across different groups in society with representation. As a result, the interests of larger number of citizens are likely to be considered (and served) by the allocation of budget. This leads to the following hypothesis:

*H3: The prospects for social mobilisation decrease with the capacity of the legislature to participate in the formulation of budget.*

### Censure and Sanction Powers

When the requirements in the assembly for sanctioning and judging the president and the cabinet members are low, government policies are more likely to be under close scrutiny by legislators. Before this, presidents may feel compelled to advise ministers to adjust their conduct and law proposals according to the demands of the parties of the assembly. As a result, the enacted policies would be more likely to be inclusive and representative of the parties in the legislature (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, pp. 120-122). Then, the following hypothesis is developed:

*H4: The prospects for social mobilisation are negatively related to the strength of the legislature for sanctioning and judging the president (and cabinet members).*

### **5.3 Data and Methods**

The hypotheses outlined above are tested using data on protest events, and legislative and presidential powers, for 17 Latin American electoral democracies for the period 1978-2009. Only democracies with a Polity2 score greater than 3 are included in the sample.

### *Dependent variable*

#### Social mobilisation

This is measured as the number of protest events which occurred in a country in a given year.

Data for this variable comes from LAWR (2009) (See Chapter 3).

### *Independent variables*

All institutional variables are operationalised using common indexes in the literature. When information was not available, data was gathered from the constitutions themselves and secondary sources, like Georgetown University's "Political Database of the Americas" (2009) and *Constituciones Hispanoamericanas* (2009).<sup>95</sup>

## PRESIDENTIAL AGENDA POWERS

Veto powers: Measured in a scale from 0 to 2. Coded 0 if presidential vetoes can be overturned by a simple majority in the assembly; 1, if vetoes are subject to a qualified majority override; and 2, if there is no override.

Decree powers: Measured as a variable ranging from 0 to 2. Coded 0 if there is no explicit decree authority in the constitution; 1, if a decree needs the approval (or omission) of the assembly in a certain period of time; and 2, if decrees enter into effect immediately without any action by the legislature.<sup>96</sup>

Interaction between veto and decree powers: Registered as the product of the measures for decree and veto powers. Ranges from 0 to 4.

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<sup>95</sup> The sample includes the following constitutional texts: Argentina 1949, 1994; Bolivia 1961, 1995, 2009; Brazil 1946, 1988, 1994; Chile 1980, 1997; Colombia 1910, 1936, 1945, 1968, 1991; Costa Rica 1926, 1936, 1949; Dominican Republic 1963, 1966, 1994; Ecuador 1946, 1983, 1998, 2008; El Salvador 1983; Guatemala 1965, 1985; Honduras 1957, 1965, 1982; Mexico 1917; Nicaragua 1987, 1995, 2000; Panama 1946, 1994; Paraguay 1992; Peru 1979, 1993; Uruguay 1917, 1942, 1952, 1967, 1997; and Venezuela 1947, 1961 and 1999.

<sup>96</sup> This does not include the cases where the legislature formally delegates decree power to the presidency.

Referenda powers: Coded 0, if the president lacks formal power to initiate referenda; 1, if the proposal of the president needs the approval of the legislature before being submitted to popular consultation; 2 if the president can unilaterally convoke and implement referenda.

Budgetary powers: Measured as the sum of the measures for the participation of the legislature in public budgeting. Ranges from 0 to 4.

Amendment: Coded 0, if the legislature can modify the budget without any restrictions; 1, if the legislature can increase the overall level of spending or switch spending between different items; and 2, if the legislative body cannot make any modification to the budget.

Approval: Registered as 2, if the presidential proposal enters automatically into effect; 1, if no spending can be made, or the budget of the previous year remains in place until a new budget is approved; 0, if the president has to elaborate another budget proposal.

## STRENGTH OF THE LEGISLATURE

### Censure and sanction powers

Operationalised as the sum of the measures for the power of the legislature to judge and sanction the president and/or cabinet members. Ranges from 0 to 8.

Impeachment: Measured in a scale from 0 to 2. Coded 0, if the president cannot be impeached by the legislature under any circumstance; 1, if the president can be convicted by a qualified majority in the lower house of the assembly; 2, if the

president can be impeached by a simple majority of the members of the lower house of the assembly.

Declaration of incapacity: Measured as a variable ranging from 0 to 2. Coded 0, if the president cannot be declared physically or mentally fit to continue in office; 1, if the president can be removed under such grounds by a qualified majority of the assembly; and 2, if the president's removal takes place by the action of a simple majority in the legislative body.

Cabinet censure: Operationalised in a scale from 0 to 2. Registered as 0, if the legislature has no explicit power to summon or censure cabinet members; 1, if the legislature can summon cabinet members; and 2 if the legislature can judge ministers.

Judgement: Measured as a dichotomous variable; coded 0 if the president and cabinet members can only be judged by the judiciary; 1, if both the legislative and the judicial branch are entitled to act as jury; and 2, if the members of the executive can be only judged by the legislature alone.

Dissolution of assembly: Operationalised as a dichotomous variable; coded 1, if the legislature is immune from been dissolved by the executive; and 0 otherwise.

### *Control Variables*

#### Bicameralism

A second chamber in the legislature may act as an additional veto to presidential actions. Bicameralism is coded 1, if there is an upper house in the legislative body; and 0, otherwise.

### Independence of the Supreme Court

Through constitutional review, judges and courts can overturn enacted legislation, if considered that it goes against the rights enshrined in the constitution or that the elected agents have overstepped their legal authority. In so doing, the judiciary ensures the policy outcomes do not deviate from the general interest. However, the possibility that the judiciary's power overrules legislation depends on how autonomous it is from other branches of government. This variable is measured using the Cingranelli-Richards (2010) index of judicial independence. It ranges from zero (least powerful) to one (most powerful).<sup>97</sup>

Additional control variables include measures for time factors (year and waves of democratisation), size of the population, GDP per capita, and the rate of inflation.

### *Model Specification*

See the LFM model developed in Chapter 2.

## **5.4 Results**

This section presents the results drawn by a series of LFMs estimating the effect of presidential agenda setting powers and the oversight capacities of the legislature upon the prospects for social mobilisation. Results are reported as incident ratios. As reported in Table 5.3, the likelihood of social mobilisation is negatively, but insignificantly, related to the interaction of presidential decree and veto powers (Models 10 & 11). Although the ability of the president to unilaterally implement referenda has a consistent and positive effect on the

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<sup>97</sup> According to this index, judicial independence is the highest in Chile, Colombia, and Costa Rica, whereas the least impartial courts are found in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, and Venezuela. Although the presence of other institutions – such as public prosecutors and accountability agencies – plays an important role in the balance between the executive and legislative relations, aggregate data for this variable is not available for the years and countries under study.

odds of contentious action, such impact does not achieve statistical significance either. None of these results go in line with our hypotheses. Across statistical specifications, however, the ability of the president to control the budget process has a positive, strong and relevant influence on the odds of protest activity. In no model reported in Table 5.3 does the coefficient of the budgetary powers of the president drop below the 0.1 p-value level.<sup>98</sup> On the other hand, the ability of the legislature to censure and sanction the executive is negatively, and significantly, related to the prospects of social mobilisation. However, such an effect is not substantial. These findings hold after controlling for the independence of the judiciary, the presence of bicameral legislatures, and time effects (year and period of democratisation).<sup>99</sup> For robustness purposes, all models presented in this section were run in unreported versions with different time correlation structures. Results hold albeit some observations were lost. In general, the *p*-value and magnitude of the *J*-statistic suggest that the models' moment conditions match the data well.

In sum, statistical models suggest that the probability of contentious action in a pure presidential democracy is not so much related to the ability of presidents to influence legislation through decree and veto powers or referenda (which can enable presidents to bypass legislature). Instead, the occurrence of social mobilisation is influenced by the extent to which legislators can influence the distribution of the national budget (an important

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<sup>98</sup> For additional robustness checks, unreported versions of the model included two measures of the strength of the legislature by the Parliamentary Powers Index (PPI) and then developed by Steven Fish and Matthew Kroenig (2009). The PPI is composed of 32 items measuring the ability of the legislature's ability to monitor the president. It ranges from zero (least powerful) to one (most powerful). Whilst this measure is cross-sectional only, pooled negative binomial models (models not presented) confirm that the strength of legislatures is negatively and significantly related to the likelihood of contentious action.

<sup>99</sup> Similar results were obtained in unreported versions of the models including political contextual variables, namely the size of the presidential contingent in the lower chamber, the effective number of legislative parties, the degree of ideological polarisation in the assembly, the margin of victory in presidential elections and electoral cycles. In order to avoid problems of multicollinearity, however, these contextual variables when included in separate models, interactions between contextual factors and measures for presidential and legislative faculties was considered, but no relationship was found to be significant.

element in coalition-building in pure presidential democracies) and the extent to which legislatures can oversight the actions of the president and the cabinet members.

**Table 5.3 The effect of presidential and legislative powers on social movement activity in Latin America**

|                                | 10                  | 11                  |
|--------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Decree * Veto                  | 0.657<br>(0.360)    | 0.658<br>(0.365)    |
| Government-initiated referenda | 1.557<br>(0.311)    | 1.567<br>(0.304)    |
| Budgetary powers               | 1.408***<br>(0.150) | 1.412***<br>(0.148) |
| Censure and sanction           | 0.901+<br>(0.119)   | 0.898+<br>(0.118)   |
| Independence of the judiciary  |                     | 0.940<br>(0.195)    |
| Bicameralism                   | 2.452*<br>(0.446)   | 2.472*<br>(0.433)   |
| Inflation (log)                | 0.845**<br>(0.062)  | 0.850**<br>(0.052)  |
| GDP per capita (log)           | 0.709+<br>(0.191)   | 0.713+<br>(0.186)   |
| Population (log)               | 1.422**<br>(0.111)  | 1.428**<br>(0.112)  |
| Time Effects                   | YES                 | YES                 |
| Number of observations         | 408                 | 405                 |
| Number of countries            | 17                  | 17                  |
| Error correction               | INAR(1)             | INAR(1)             |
| Rho                            | 2.063***            | 2.054***            |
| Q                              | 0.00536             | 0.00511             |
| J                              | 2.188               | 2.07                |
| See notes to Table 2.1         |                     |                     |

In order to test the validity of these statistical claims, the following section examines the case of Ecuador. Alongside Peru, Ecuador is the only country in the region where the strength of the legislature to influence the budget process has decreased multiple times over time. Also, the country exhibits a significant variation over time in the ability of the legislature to censure and sanction the executive. Moreover, Ecuador, alongside Brazil, is one of the most fragmented party systems in the region with the most personalised and permissive

electoral systems for the legislature. Like Bolivia, the Ecuadorean society is divided along ethnic lines. Therefore, it is worth investigating how the incidence of social mobilisation in this multiparty democracy responded to changes in the powers of the presidency and strength of the legislature over the past thirty years.

### 5.5 *Country Case: Ecuador*

Ecuador was the first country to experience the third-wave of democratisation in Latin America. Despite having more than 30 years of continuous democratic rule, institutions have undergone a continuous process of reform with not only electoral rules for the legislature and the presidency having been frequently overhauled, but also those regulating the relative ability of the executive and legislative to participate in the policymaking process. Only in the period between the years of 1978 and 2008, Ecuador has had eight constitutions (Negretto, 2013, p. 196). Since 1978, however, Ecuadorean presidents have been among the most powerful in Latin America. They have exclusive authority to initiate legislation in budgetary and administrative areas and they are vested with vast decree and veto powers. The president could veto a bill for one-year, after the legislature could overturn the veto by a qualified majority. The president could also veto portion of bills, which could only be overridden by a qualified majority of the legislature. Furthermore, presidential-initiated referenda (with binding effects) were typified in the constitution of 1978.<sup>100</sup> Whilst presidential powers have remained relatively stable (but at high levels), the ability of the legislature to counterbalance

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<sup>100</sup> In fact, Ecuador, alongside Uruguay, is the country with the greatest experience with government-initiated referenda in Latin America (Welp, 2010, p. 141; Altman, 2011, p. 117). However, whilst in Uruguay the call for referenda is an exclusive capacity of the legislature, in Ecuador these consultations can only be convoked and implemented by the president. Since democratic transition, seven referenda have been held in the country (1986, 1994, 1995, 1997, 2006, 2007, and 2011). The majority of these consultations have concerned the reform of political institutions.

and oversight the executive has varied over time. Until 1994, the Ecuadorean legislature had been one of the strongest in the region. Not only did it have ample powers to freely modify the presidential budget bill, but it also had the right to depose both the presidents and cabinet members. Indeed, Ecuador has had the greatest number of presidential interruptions in Latin America, with three presidents removed by the legislature. From 1994 onwards, however, the power of the assembly to censure and judge the executive has decreased. Also, the ability of the legislature to participate and oversee the budget process has weakened over time.

Upon transition from authoritarianism in 1978, Ecuador adopted permissive electoral rules for the legislature, featured by run-off elections for president, PR open-lists and Hare formula for electing legislators and mid-term elections (Negretto, 2013, pp. 196-197). Minority presidents were therefore be a regular occurrence in the country (up until 2008). That said, majoritarian contingents in the assembly alongside partisan cabinets were crafted at least until 1996 with remarkable levels of party unity (Mejía Acosta, 2006). These patterns of cooperation in an extremely multiparty system largely owed to the oversight capacity of the legislature. Although presidents could appoint and dismiss cabinet members at will, the legislature could dismiss cabinet members by simple majority vote. The reasons for censuring cabinet members were sufficiently ample and vague in the legislature (Negretto, 2013, p. 200). Until 1992, neither was there a qualified majority required for impeaching the president. Moreover, the legislature had the exclusive faculty of appointing members of the Supreme Court and overturning the rulings of the judiciary on constitutional grounds by majority vote (Negretto, 2013, p. 200). In addition, whilst the president could propose the budget, legislators could freely change the allocation of the national income and spending, such modifications could not however be vetoed by the president (Negretto, 2013, p. 201).

Thus, presidents, while powerful, constantly faced threats of blockades and/or censure by the legislature. If concessions (either in the form of cabinet positions, seats in the Supreme

Court, policy concessions, or pork barrel spending) were not allocated to legislators, either the president or ministers would be judged and therefore dismissed (Mejía Acosta & Polga-Hecimovich, 2011, p. 92). From 1979 to 1996, each government faced on average the censure of three ministers per presidential period, and the initiation of nine censure motions (Negretto, 2013, p. 200). Else, the legislation proposed and/or enacted by the president could be overridden by the legislature, which had the final say on the constitutional validity of laws and the allocation of budget. In this way, opposition parties managed not only to influence the policy process to their benefit, but also foster discipline in their ranks (Mejía Acosta & Polga-Hecimovich, 2011, p. 91).<sup>101</sup>

By virtue of these arrangements between the executive and the legislature, a series of liberal economic measures were implemented by the governments of León Febres Cordero (1984-1988), Rodrigo Borja (1988-1992) and Sixto Durán Ballén (1992-1996). These included the protection of private property, the entry of foreign investment into the hydrocarbon sector, and other financial and banking reforms.<sup>102</sup> However, coalitions were short-lived, because of the presence of mid-term congressional elections. Corruption scandals followed the breakup of coalitions. Citizen distrust towards the policy process intensified as this series of corruption deals were disclosed accompanied by interbranch conflict and legislative gridlock. In the face of growing citizen discontent and harassment of opposition parties in the legislature, a series of institutional reforms were introduced. The reform of 1992 granted the president the faculty to appoint members of the Supreme Court; it also typified

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<sup>101</sup> However, these transactions were “clandestine” – with allied parties presenting themselves as opposition before the public (Mejía Acosta, 2006).

<sup>102</sup> Various Ecuadorean groups in society opposed the implementation of neoliberal reforms, including labour unions, women’s groups, students, teachers, and environmental associations. However, it was the indigenous movement the main leader of contentious action. In defence for their communal land, traditionally marginalised indigenous mobilised groups organised themselves into the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE) in 1990. The CONAIE demanded a greater participation of indigenous people in the policy process, as well as the legal recognition of the plurinational, intercultural and multi-ethnic nature of the country.

that magistrates were ratified by a qualified majority in the legislature and that the Supreme Court had independence to decide on the constitutionality of laws (Negretto, p. 201).

In 1994 President Durán Ballén unilaterally convoked for a referendum questioning the public on four main issues: 1) limiting legislators' ability to demand and channel budgetary allocations to their provinces; 2) reducing the presidential use of discretionary budget spending; 3) allowing the consecutive re-election of legislators; and 4) permitting the nomination of independent candidates. The consultation was approved by nearly 55 per cent, with a participation of 62 per cent of the national electorate. Given this success, Durán Ballén convoked a second referendum in 1995. Among others, the executive proposal included shifting the allocation of budget from territorial provinces to programmatic sectors and giving the president the ability to dissolve the assembly. Around 59 per cent of Ecuadorean registered voters participated in this referendum. The former clause was approved, but the latter was rejected by more than 60 per cent. These institutional changes were portrayed by the president as necessary for the delivery of public goods in a scenario in which the assembly was controlled by a handful of (if not corrupt) interests in society. That said, just after the increase in the budgetary powers of the presidents, overall levels of social mobilisation in the country climbed up in the mid-1990s (Figure 5.3).<sup>103</sup> Protests were not only undertaken by those economically disadvantaged, but increasingly by middle and upper class groups (Lucero, 2008, p. 128).

In the midst of growing social unrest, opposition parties organised themselves and remove President Abdalá Bucaram from power in 1997. Despite the rise in the budgetary powers of the president, Bucaram failed to assemble a majority contingent in the legislature; he only had the support of 23 per cent of the members of the assembly (Negretto, 2013, p.

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<sup>103</sup> In fact, despite the legalisation of legislative re-election (which was supposed to bring members of the assembly closer to their electors), the rate of re-election has remained at very low levels (Pereira & Mejía Acosta, 2010, p. 653).

202). Moreover, just after one year in power, Bucaram was deposed by a simple majority in the legislature on the grounds of mental incapacity, even though there was no compelling evidence for it (Freidenberg, 2003).<sup>104</sup> After Bucaram's dismissal, the leader of the assembly, Fabián Alarcón, took over as caretaker president. Upon taking office, Alarcón convoked a referendum surveying the electorate on both the deposition of President Bucaram and on the call for a Constituent Assembly. These proposals were not only welcomed by former social movements, particularly indigenous groups, to whom rewriting the constitution had long been a key issue (León, 1997, p. 100). But also the idea of a constitutional assembly was supported by the disenchanted Ecuadorean electorate at large, for whom a constitution was necessary for ending up with the spiral of political corruption and instability in the country.

The constitution was approved by more than 75 per cent of the Ecuadorean electorate. The new legal text was one of most progressive in the region insofar as the rights of indigenous peoples, women and Afro-descendants were recognised for the first time (Andolina, 2003). Nevertheless, it was conservative in character as because of the disproportionality of the electoral system for the legislature, traditional right-wing parties managed to leave out of the political agenda questions such as agrarian reform and the predominant economic mode (Segura & Bejarano, 2004, p. 222). As for institutional design, the new constitution reduced the ability of legislators to judge and demise cabinet members and to impeach the president. Even when a motion of censure had been approved in the legislature, it would not be binding on the executive. The constitution also lowered the capacity of the legislature to amend the presidential budget bill.<sup>105</sup> These power-concentrating changes were adopted in order to promote governability (Negretto, 2013, p. 215). However,

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<sup>104</sup> Although it is commonly argued that Bucaram was ousted by protests against neoliberal economic policies, in reality, he was deposed because of his inability to build pacts with the legislature (De la Torre, 2000, pp. 98-108).

<sup>105</sup> Other changes included: a lower threshold for the election of president, the prohibition of presidential re-election, the elimination of mid-term elections, and the introduction of open and unblocked lists for the election of legislators.

not only did the ability of the opposition in the assembly to influence the budget and to oversee the actions of the executive were undercut, but as the benefits offered by presidents to legislators were now limited, or simply not in the interest of their constituencies, the incentives for building alliances between the president and the legislators were further reduced (Mejía Acosta & Polga-Hecimovich, 2011, pp. 94-96; Pereira & Mejía Acosta, 2010, p. 659). By tipping the balance in favour of the president, policy effectiveness stalled. The economy was on the brink of default, and investment rates kept on plummeting. As a result, social unrest grew. In these conditions, President Jamil Mahuad (1998-2000) was forced to resign. Vice President Gustavo Noboa was then appointed as interim president.

Presidential elections were called in 2003. Lucio Gutiérrez was sworn as president by a majority of votes.<sup>106</sup> His promise on refunding the country led indigenous peoples and other sectors grouped in the CONAIE to support his candidacy (Beck & Mijeski, 2006). In government, however, Gutiérrez betrayed his allies by signing an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and, consequently, privatising the hydrocarbons, electricity and telecommunication sectors. Subsequently, the coalition dissipated. Having lost the support of the *Pachakutik* and MPD, and with few currencies to exchange, Gutiérrez found himself with barely any allies that he could rely on. Faced by this lack of support, and the scarcity of currencies to assemble a majoritarian contingent, Gutiérrez adopted an anti-party stance. Not only did he neglect parties in the assembly, but also he illegally sacked all the ministers of the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, and the Electoral Tribunal, and replaced them with presidential cronies. This move was presented as a moral crusade against the corruption of the *partidocracia* (Levitsky & Loxton, 2013, p. 120). With these actions, however, Gutiérrez's government became even more unpopular. Not only did the sectors

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<sup>106</sup> Gutiérrez's party – *Sociedad Patriótica* – was mostly composed of the military and policemen, who felt great contempt for traditional politicians (García, 2005). During his campaign, the military was portrayed as the only guard of the national interest, and therefore the only party capable of refunding the country.

grouped into CONAIE, alongside urban groups and student associations, protest against the government's economic policies, but also those who benefited from neoliberal economic reforms (but who were nevertheless ignored in the assembly) took the streets. In an extraordinary session, opposition parties organised and managed to depose the president for abandoning office, although he was actually held captive in the Presidential Palace by the military.

As institutional reforms concentrating power in the presidency (at the expense of the legislature) were adopted, the incidence of social mobilisation increased, albeit pluralism in the party arena. By the mid-2000s, the country was experiencing the highest levels of social movement activity since the return of democracy in 1979 (Figures 5.3 and 5.4). By then, contentious activity had become generalised in the Ecuadorean population, irrespective of class, region or ethnic identity (Larrea, 2007). Protests were equally organised by indigenous peoples, the popular urban sector and middle and upper class groups (Ramírez Gallegos, 2005). All these disparate groups, however, were protesting against their tacit exclusion from the policymaking process. Citizen dissatisfaction was capitalised upon by Rafael Correa in the 2006 presidential elections.

Correa ran as an outsider candidate from *Alianza País*. He won the elections in a second round (56.7 per cent versus 43.3 per cent), after coming in second in the first round (with 22.9 per cent of the votes). Upon taking power, President Correa convoked for a referendum on the suspension of the assembly and the call for a constitutional assembly. These institutional reforms were deemed as indispensable for returning power to the citizenry, so they could fully exercise their right to participate in the political process. The referendum was approved by 70 per cent, with the participation of 80 per cent of registered voters. Upon its approval, members of AP obtained an overwhelming majority in the Constituent Assembly. The new constitution was ratified in another referendum held the year

after, with 65 per cent of approval and the participation of 76 per cent of the national electorate (Conaghan, 2008, p. 57).


In general, the 2008 legal text expanded the content of citizenship rights.<sup>107</sup> For those rights to be fulfilled, however, constitutional drafters further reduced the strength of the legislature to act as a check on the executive. Although the powers of the legislature to impeach and remove cabinet members were restored, the constitution granted the president the ability to dissolve the assembly, if two or more ministers had been ousted. Therefore, in the present, the Ecuadorean president is free to dissolve the assembly at her will. In the event of this happening, she is entitled to remain in office and govern unilaterally by decree. What is more, although the president may be unseated by a qualified majority in the legislature via impeachment or declaration of incapacity, if this took place the assembly would be automatically dissolved, and elections for both the president and the legislature should be called. The new constitution thus concentrates even more power in the presidency, at the expense of the oversight capacities of the legislature. Additionally, the constitution allowed for the immediate re-election of the presidential incumbent for two periods and introduced electoral rules biasing the proportionality in the allocation of seats.

In light of these reforms, upon the new constitution was approved, Correa was re-elected with 52 per cent of votes, and his party obtained 45.8 per cent of seats in the assembly. The policy process became concentrated in one single party, and in particular, in the presidential figure. Because of this, Correa has not had incentives to resort to unilateral powers to enact legislation. That said, governability has been achieved at the expense of

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
<sup>107</sup> It defined Ecuador as an intercultural and plurinational democracy. However, unlike in the 1998 constitution, where property rights and neoliberal policies were protected, the state was given the role to regulate, and intervene in, the economy whenever required (Ramírez Gallegos & Minteguiaga, 2007). By reasserting the control of the state over the economy and the extraction of natural resources, the constitution fulfilled the demand of many mobilised groups, including indigenous peoples, peasant confederations, environmental organisations, labour unions, and women's associations.

**Figure 5.3 Social Mobilisation in Ecuador**



Source: LAWR (2009)

**Figure 5.4 Social Mobilisation in Ecuador by type of activity**



Source: LAWR (2009)

political representation and elite compromise and negotiation, and more importantly detriment to democratic inclusiveness.

Policy outcomes have benefited targeted constituencies only, in particular, unorganised urban middle and low classes (Becker, 2013, p. 11; Conaghan, 2008, p. 59). Other groups like the business community and the media, alongside indigenous peoples, environmental groups, labour unions, students and peasants, have been excluded from participating in the decision-making process. For these constituencies, protest is the only way to voice their demands (Becker, 2013, pp. 14-15). In the present, groups from both the left and right of the ideological spectrum are engaged in contentious action. Contentious action has become more generalised as institutional reforms curtailed the power of the legislature to both influence the budget process and monitor and sanction the actions of the executive has decreased. As seen in Figures 5.3 and 5.4, levels of social mobilisation have increased in the country since these power-concentrating reforms were first enacted in the mid-1990s (Figures 5.3 and 5.4).

In sum, the case of Ecuador illustrates that when the oversight capacities of the legislature are weak, presidents have fewer incentives to bargain with the parties in the assembly. The degree to which legislatures can influence the national budget also promotes cooperation between the executive and the legislature. Without these currencies, elite accommodation and compromise is unlikely to occur in pure presidential democracies. Democratic inclusiveness is thus affected by these institutional arrangements promoting coalition building, rather than by the extent of the policymaking powers of the executive.

## 5.6 *Conclusion*

This chapter has examined to what extent the agenda powers of the president and the capacity of the legislature to oversight and punish the actions of the executive affect the prospects for social mobilisation in pure presidential democracies. The analysis is based on evidence from 17 Latin American countries. Within the universe of pure presidentialism, democracies in the region are distinctive for having strong presidents and strong legislatures. Mainstream literature argues that presidents vested with strong agenda-powers are more likely to govern as they see fit, claiming to represent the nation as a whole, and consequently bypassing any opposition from the judiciary and the legislature (O'Donnell, 1994). Certainly, when presidents govern as they fit, not only the interests of salient groups are ignored. But, biased, questionable, and therefore unsustainable policies are likely to be enacted. There is no doubt that delegative presidencies are at odds with the extent of inclusiveness of a democracy.

This chapter lends support to the argument that democratic inclusiveness is limited by the lack of horizontal accountability – understood as the faculty of the branches of government to routinely oversight, sanction or judge the actions or omissions of the other (O'Donnell, 1998, p. 117). Nonetheless, the evidence herein presented does suggest that the likelihood of social mobilisation is not so much influenced by the ability of presidents to legislate unilaterally via decrees and vetoes. Rather, the likelihood of social mobilisation is affected by the extent to the legislatures can participate in the budget process, and censure and sanction the executive. This finding is robust when using different measures for the strength of the legislature, as well as various time-correlation structures and estimation strategies.

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between the executive and the legislature. Without these currencies, accommodation and compromise between the president and the parties in the legislature is unlikely to occur in pure presidential democracies. In sum, democratic inclusiveness is thus affected by these institutional arrangements promoting coalition building, rather than by the extent of the policymaking powers of the executive.

The case of Ecuador, however, is peculiar. In the rest of Latin American countries, although the degree of participation of legislature in the budget process is low, they have been no major reductions in the extent of this prerogative over time. Further, the capacity of the legislature to censure and sanction the executive has expanded with the passage of time in most democracies. In fact, majoritarian contingents dominate the politics of the region. That said, patterns of cooperation between the executive and the legislature do vary significantly across this same family of pure presidential democracies. Coalition-building and the nature of policy outcomes might not be necessarily the product of institutions, but it could be endogenous to the trajectory of politics in a country. With this in mind, the following chapter examines: In what ways and to what extent variations in the party system (and the partisan powers of the president) affect the inclusiveness of a democracy and therefore the incidence of social mobilisation?

## **6. PARTY SYSTEMS AND SOCIAL MOBILISATION IN LATIN AMERICA**

Whilst the capacity of institutions is significant, other factors can account for variations in policy outcomes, even within the same institutional design and even within the same polity over time. The patterns of cooperation and completion of political agents, the ability of agents to participate in the policy process and the distribution of policy outcomes is also contingent on country-specific variables, such as national idiosyncrasies and traditions, past experiences, political leadership, and so on and so forth. Thus, any comprehensive evaluation of the impact of institutions on social mobilisation should consider the specific context in which institutions operate.

This chapter examines the impact of the party system (and the partisan powers of the presidents) on the incidence of social mobilisation in pure presidential democracies. The empirical focus is on Latin America. This chapter demonstrates that the probability of social mobilisation does not vary across majoritarian and minority governments; neither is social mobilisation susceptible to the extent of fragmentation of the party arena or to levels of electoral volatility in the legislature. Instead, social mobilisation is highest whenever the pro-presidential contingent in the legislature is dominated by one large political party.

The argument is structured as follows. The first section examines the influence of both institutional and non-institutional factors on party systems. The second part differentiates party systems in Latin America across time and space and along two dimensions: 1) the size and the partisan composition of the presidential contingents in the assembly; and 2) the instability of interparty competition at legislative and presidential elections. The third section advances a series of hypotheses about the influence of these

variables on the prospects for social mobilisation while the third lays out the data and methods used to test these claims. The fourth part presents the results of pooled cross-sectional time series models for count data based on data on electoral results and protest events for 17 Latin American democracies for the period between the years of 1980-2009. The fifth section tests the validity of statistical claims by examining the case of Venezuela and the argument is concluded in the sixth section.

### ***6.1 Party systems and executive-legislative relations***

A party system is defined by the interactions that result from inter-party competition (Sartori, 1976, pp. 43-4). When policy outcomes tend to be consistent with party proposals over time, partisanship develops (Mainwaring, 2006). When party labels fail to provide voters with reliable information on the preferences and the behaviour of their elected agents, citizens are likely to change their allegiance from one party to another. As parties are unable to represent the interests of their constituents, it is difficult for citizens to effectively exercise their rights for political contestation and participation. Therefore the likelihood of contentious action has been associated with the character of party systems (Finkel & Opp, 1991).<sup>108</sup> Institutionalised party systems are supposed to reduce social mobilisation, whereas non-institutionalised or inchoate party systems should have the opposite effect (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995).

Most recently, it has been argued that the character of the party system (the degree to which parties fulfil their representation and accountability functions) largely owes to the type of executive-legislative relations – whether parliamentary, semipresidential or pure

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<sup>108</sup> Although social movements may successfully articulate the interests of those marginalised, they could never replace parties as the main vehicle of political competition and participation in a democracy. In fact, in order for their demands to be addressed, mobilised groups must inevitably become institutionalised into political parties (Foweraker, 1995). In Latin America, various social movements have transformed themselves into successful electoral options, like *Movimiento al Socialismo* (MAS) in Bolivia, *Pachakutik* in Ecuador, and the *Partido dos Trabalhadores* in Brazil.

presidential (Samuels & Shugart, 2010). In pure presidential systems, presidents must have a working majority in the assembly in order to enact their agenda. Presidents are more capable to amass majority contingents in the legislature when parties in the assembly are undisciplined and/or have vague ideological stances. The imperative of winning the presidential office drive parties to focus on campaigning rather than on policy proposals (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, pp. 41-46). However, because of the separation of origin, however, presidents can take positions independent of parties in the assembly, including their own, without risking their tenure in office. Even when parties might have been initially programmatic, the presidential mandate will drive the executive to move policy outcomes away from the preferences of the legislators from her own party, but eventually dragging with her the ideological stance of her party (Wiesehomeier & Benoit, 2009; Samuels & Shugart, 2003; 2010). Indeed, given the coat-tails of the presidential elections, the reputation and electoral fortunes of parties depend on the popularity of presidents (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, pp. 35-50).<sup>109</sup>

Thus, the argument goes on, compared to other forms of government, in pure presidential systems, there are fewer ideological differences across parties. Rather, most parties in pure presidentialism tend to have vague and malleable (if not catch-all) positions on most policy issues (Samuels & Shugart, 2010; Zucco, 2009), with presidents always tempted to make policy switches (Stokes S. C., 2001). Eventually, existing parties become discredited. In such scenario, votes are transferred not only among existing parties, but also from established to new contenders (Mainwaring, Gervasoni, & España-Nájera, 2010). Parties, however tend to be underdeveloped, as consistency over time is critical to the establishment of a strong party reputation. In sum, the weakness of party labels and the winner-take-all

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<sup>109</sup> This effect tends to be greater when presidents can be immediately re-elected.

election of the executive accounts for the higher levels of volatility in pure presidential democracies (Mainwaring, 2006; Mainwaring, 1999; Jones, 2005).

In effect, a social cleavage approach to party systems and social mobilisation does not seem to apply to Latin American pure presidential democracies, insofar as parties in the region have never structured the electorate along ideological lines as in Western democracies (Mainwaring, 2006; Mainwaring, 1999).<sup>110</sup> Certainly, levels of volatility in Latin American legislatures are higher than those in advanced democracies (Roberts & Wibbels, 1999, pp. 575-576; Mainwaring & Zoco, 2007).<sup>111</sup> Also, levels of trust in, and satisfaction with, political parties in the region are overall significantly low (LAPOP, 2008; Latinobarometro, 2010). Nonetheless, this might not necessarily be the product of the institutional design of these democracies, but on factors specific to the countries in the region. Indeed, within this same family of pure presidential systems, there is great variation in terms of fragmentation, longevity, roots in society, programmatic coherence and electoral stability of party systems, albeit they all are pure presidential democracies.

On one hand, variations in the nature of party systems across Latin America can be attributed to differences in the system used for electing the presidency and the legislature. In general, electoral systems that centre competition among candidates make it more difficult

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<sup>110</sup> In Western democracies, for instance, long cycles of social mobilisation have been associated with major shifts in the party system (Mair, 1997; Mayhew, 2000; Boix C. , 1999; Tarrow, 1998; Kitschelt, 1993; 1994). Party (re) de-alignments have usually been attributed to structural changes, giving rise to new identities and therefore challenging the representational capacity of established parties (Dalton, 2000; Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* , 1997).

<sup>111</sup> Arguably, levels of electoral volatility in Latin America are higher not only because of the pure presidential structure of these democracies, but because of the presence of proportional representation (PR) rules fragmenting legislatures (Roberts & Wibbels, 1999, p. 578). As the number of parties grows, their ability to distinguish themselves ideologically and programmatically before the electorate is reduced. Furthermore, in a fragmented party arena, voters are less constrained to switch between parties over consecutive elections (Bartolini & Mair, 1990). Nonetheless, recent studies have shown that the number of parties in the legislature has no consistent or significant effect on electoral volatility (Roberts & Wibbels, *Party Systems and Electoral Volatility in Latin America: A Test of Economic, Institutional, and Structural Explanations*, 1999; Epperly, 2011). However, compared to plurality systems, PR systems have higher levels of electoral volatility (Epperly, 2011, p. 847). Within PR systems, variations in electoral volatility could be accrued to the presence of permissive and candidate-centred rules (Epperly, 2011, p. 840).

for voters to know about party labels. This is particularly true where rules drive candidates from the same party to compete with each other. In office, these individual legislators may be tempted to go against their party lines, shifting from one party organisation to another. Since voters are prone to develop direct relationships of favour and exchange with legislators, party labels are less likely to be stable in these settings. However, candidate-driven rules can promote cooperation between the executive and the legislature.

Not only are party systems influenced by structural and institutional factors, but also by country-specific variables, such as past experience, political leadership, among others (Evans & Whitefield, 1998; Miller, 1991). Analysing the variations in the trajectory of party systems (and the level of party support that presidents command in the legislature) across time and space in Latin America might therefore allow us capturing the influence of these other non-institutional variables, and consequently assess the relative importance of the type of executive (and its institutional accessories) on the incidence of social mobilisation. The character of the party system has not only a strong influence on the extent to which elected agents are accountable to their constituencies, but it also has a strong influence on the cooperation patterns in the assembly, the composition of cabinets, and consequently on the nature of policy outcomes. It is thus an important factor affecting the inclusiveness of a democracy.

## ***6.2 Party systems in Latin America***

This section distinguishes party systems in contemporary Latin America along two lines: 1) the size, and the partisan composition, of the presidential contingents in the assembly; and 2) the stability of interparty competition in legislative and presidential elections.

### Size of the presidential contingent in the legislature

In pure presidential systems, effective policymaking requires a working majority in the assembly. The larger the presidential contingent in the assembly is, it is argued, the lower the probability of gridlock. Large presidential contingents have in turn associated with oversized cabinets. Despite variations in the extent of the fragmentation of the party arena, most often, Latin American presidents have commanded majorities or near majorities in the legislature (see Table 6.1). In no country has the average size of the legislative contingent in the lower house been under 45 per cent, the minimum threshold for achieving governability (Jones, 2005). In fact, as Table 6.1 illustrates, there is little variation in the amount of support presidents have enjoyed in the lower chamber of the assembly across Latin American countries over the past thirty years.

That said, the patterns of cooperation between the executive and the legislature do vary significantly across the same family of pure presidential democracies. As seen in Table 6.1, there are substantial differences in terms in the partisan composition of the congressional delegation. In Mexico, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Peru, for instance, single-party contingents have predominated. By contrast, multiparty coalition governments have been the most recurrent in Brazil, Chile, Panama, Venezuela, and Bolivia. In most cases the presidential party has dominated the congressional delegation. The exceptions are Brazil and Chile where the fraction of seats held by the presidential party has accounted for a small fraction of the congressional delegation. It is thus worth examining how these different patterns of majoritarian presidentialism can affect the incidence of social mobilisation.

| <b>Table 6.1 Presidential contingents in Latin American democracies (1978-2009)</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |                                         |                                                    |                                                  |                                                                      |                         |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| <b>Lower house of the legislature – Mean values</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |                                         |                                                    |                                                  |                                                                      |                         |
| Country                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | Effective number of legislative parties | Fraction of seats held by the government coalition | Fraction of seats held by the presidential party | Relative size of the presidential party in the legislative coalition | Frequency of coalitions |
| Argentina                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | 3.05                                    | .54                                                | .48                                              | .93                                                                  | .74                     |
| Bolivia                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | 4.14                                    | .55                                                | .34                                              | .67                                                                  | .71                     |
| Brazil                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | 7.45                                    | .52                                                | .21                                              | .38                                                                  | .96                     |
| Chile                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | 5.33                                    | .55                                                | .28                                              | .51                                                                  | 1.0                     |
| Colombia                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | 3.72                                    | .67                                                | .42                                              | .69                                                                  | .63                     |
| Costa Rica                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | 2.63                                    | .49                                                | .48                                              | .98                                                                  | .25                     |
| Ecuador                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | 5.84                                    | .25                                                | .20                                              | .82                                                                  | .61                     |
| El Salvador                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | 3.08                                    | .45                                                | .41                                              | .96                                                                  | .48                     |
| Guatemala                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | 3.77                                    | .51                                                | .41                                              | .84                                                                  | .29                     |
| Honduras                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | 2.19                                    | .56                                                | .49                                              | .91                                                                  | .41                     |
| Mexico                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | 2.86                                    | .45                                                | .43                                              | 1.00                                                                 | 0                       |
| Nicaragua                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | 2.50                                    | .51                                                | .50                                              | .99                                                                  | .25                     |
| Panama                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | 3.59                                    | .53                                                | .40                                              | .78                                                                  | .95                     |
| Paraguay                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | 2.67                                    | .51                                                | .29                                              | .57                                                                  | .67                     |
| Peru                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | 3.30                                    | .46                                                | .45                                              | .98                                                                  | .22                     |
| Uruguay                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | 3.00                                    | .51                                                | .40                                              | .81                                                                  | .40                     |
| Venezuela                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | 3.27                                    | .53                                                | .43                                              | .79                                                                  | .84                     |
| <p><i>Notes: The effective number of political parties in the lower house of the legislature across Latin American countries is measured using the Laakso-Taagepera Index for 1978-2009</i></p> <p><i>Sources: Payne, Zovatto &amp; Mateo Díaz (2006) and the Georgetown University's "Political Database of the Americas" (2011).</i></p> |                                         |                                                    |                                                  |                                                                      |                         |

### Stability in Patterns of Intraparty Competition

Most parties in Latin America do not mobilise people around political platforms or projects (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995; Foweraker, Landman, & Harvey, 2003, pp. 95-109). Rather, parties are most known for their pervasive corruption, personalism, and clientelism (Hagopian, 1998; 2005; Van Cott, 2005; Sánchez, 2008). Moreover, various leaders have won the presidency running without the support of political organisations. Among these are: Fernando Collor de Mello of Brazil (1990-92), Alberto Fujimori of Peru (1990-2000), Hugo Chávez of Venezuela (1999-2013), Alejandro Toledo of Peru (2001-2006), Álvaro Uribe of

Colombia (2003-2010), Lucio Gutiérrez (2003-2005) and Rafael Correa of Ecuador (2007-present). Despite this, party systems in the region have, in reality, been relatively stable at least during the latest wave of democratisation (Carreras, 2012, pp. 138-140). In a stable party system, the majority of voters identify with a party and vote with it most of the time (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995; Mainwaring & Torcal, 2006).

As seen in Table 6.2, volatility scores for both the presidency and the legislature rose notably during the 1990s; however, since the 2000s, they have remained relatively stable. For instance, mean volatility in legislative elections was 7 per cent in the 1980s, but 14.6 per cent in the 1990s, and 15 per cent in the 2000s. Likewise, mean volatility in presidential races was 17 per cent in the 1980s, 24.7 per cent in the 1990s, and 26.1 per cent in the 2000s. On average, the percentage obtained by new parties in the legislature was 6.5 in the 1980s, 14.6 in the 1990s and 15.0 in the 2000s. At the presidential level, mean extra-system volatility was 5.5 per cent in the 1980s, 18.63 per cent in the 1990s, and 19.9 per cent in the 2000s.<sup>112</sup> Even in some Latin American countries – namely, Brazil, El Salvador and Panama – there have been marked declines in volatility scores for legislative elections as well as a steep increase in the age of party systems over the past decade (Zucco, 2009).<sup>113</sup>

Indeed, the age of party systems in Latin America has not decreased over time. In effect, in most of the region, party systems are older than the current period of democratic

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<sup>112</sup> Mainwaring, Gervasoni, & España-Nájera (2010) distinguish between the transfer of votes between existing parties as “within-system volatility” and the vote share capture by new parties as “extra-system volatility”.

<sup>113</sup> Declining volatility levels in Brazil have puzzled scholars, given the high fragmentation of its party arena, and the country’s open list PR system, which encourages voters to focus on the personal characteristics of candidates rather than on partisan identities. The legislative vote has been transferred among the same existing parties rather than moving to new political organisations. The PSDB and the PT have established themselves as the dominant parties in the assembly. The PMDB and the rest of parties have aligned themselves with one of the major forces. Although levels of volatility are higher in presidential elections, since the election of outsider Collor de Mello as president in 1990 presidential volatility levels have also declined over time, and have remained at very low levels since the 1990s (Zucco, 2009, pp. 7-15). That said, parties in Brazil are not ideologically well-defined, but unrooted from society. Even the identity of the leftist PT has changed as it has held the presidency since 2002 (Carreras, Morgenstern, & Su, 2013, pp. 30-33).

politics. In some countries, the party system dates even back as far from the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>114</sup> This means that the age of parties in the assembly (sometimes used as a measured of party system institutionalisation) is not related to the risk of volatility in presidential elections (Roberts & Wibbels, 1999, p. 581).

| <i>Table 6.2 Electoral volatility in Latin American democracies over time (1978-2009)</i>                                           |                   |            |                                |            |                                        |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|------------|--------------------------------|------------|----------------------------------------|
|                                                                                                                                     | <b>Volatility</b> |            | <b>Extra-system volatility</b> |            | <b>Average age of the party system</b> |
| <b>Decade</b>                                                                                                                       | Lower House       | Presidency | Lower House                    | Presidency | Lower House                            |
| 1978-1989                                                                                                                           | 6.5               | 17.0       | 6.5                            | 5.5        | 49.67                                  |
| 1990-1999                                                                                                                           | 14.6              | 24.7       | 14.6                           | 18.6       | 40.89                                  |
| 2000-2009                                                                                                                           | 15.0              | 26.1       | 15.0                           | 19.9       | 42.08                                  |
| Total                                                                                                                               | 12.8              | 23.4       | 12.8                           | 15.9       | 43.51                                  |
| <i>Sources: Payne, Zovatto &amp; Mateo Díaz (2006) and the Georgetown University's "Political Database of the Americas" (2011).</i> |                   |            |                                |            |                                        |

The stability and durability of Latin American party systems challenges the common perception that party systems in pure presidential democracies are volatile or short-lived.<sup>115</sup> The collapse of party systems in the region has gone hand in hand with the rise of outsider leaders to the presidency. Most often, outsider leaders have undertaken institutional overhauls or threatened to dissolve the legislative body by taking advantage of their high approval rating and/or of the lack of popular support for the legislative body. But, even when established party systems have decayed (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995; 1999; Mainwaring, 2006; Roberts & Wibbels, 1999), like in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, levels of electoral volatility in the legislature have quickly stabilised (Carreras, 2012, pp. 137-138).

<sup>114</sup> For instance, the Colorado party of Uruguay and the Liberal party of Colombia are among the oldest party organizations in the world.

<sup>115</sup> In fact, semi-presidential regimes in Eastern Europe have far higher levels of volatility for legislative elections than pure presidential systems in Latin America.

Nonetheless, there are substantial variations in the patterns of interparty competition across Latin American countries. Table 6.3 reports the mean scores for total volatility and extra-system volatility in elections for the lower house of the legislature, on the one hand, and the presidency, on the other, for 17 Latin American democracies for the period 1978-2008. As reported, volatility scores in the lower house in Honduras, Chile and Uruguay are comparable to those seen in Western European countries. However, in Nicaragua, Paraguay and Bolivia, the transfers of seats across parties in the legislature reach extremely high levels. That said, rarely have established parties in the assembly in Honduras, Uruguay and Chile faced the competition of new political actors. But, outsider parties have obtained the greatest percentage of seats in the assembly in Guatemala, Peru and Panama. At the presidential level, volatility scores have been the lowest in Honduras, Uruguay and Brazil; the highest in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru. Outsider candidates have obtained the greatest percentage of votes in Peru, Guatemala, and Bolivia, but not in Honduras, Mexico and Uruguay, where the presidential office has always been occupied by aged parties.

The question is, therefore: in what ways, and to what extent, do these cross-national variations and temporal trends in the party systems of Latin America affect democratic inclusiveness and the prospects for social mobilisation?

### ***6.3 Hypotheses***

#### **Size and partisan composition of the presidential contingent in the legislature**

Much of the literature on pure presidential systems in Latin America has focused on the need and potential for coalition building. Majoritarian contingents, however, have been the norm in this type of systems (Deheza, 1997; Chasqueti, 2001). Even in Brazil, the most

| <i>Table 6.3 Average volatility scores in Latin American democracies 1978-2009</i>                                                  |                             |            |                                |            |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------|--------------------------------|------------|
|                                                                                                                                     | <b>Electoral volatility</b> |            | <b>Extra-system volatility</b> |            |
| <b>Country</b>                                                                                                                      | Lower House                 | Presidency | Lower House                    | Presidency |
| Argentina                                                                                                                           | 23.81                       | 6.88       | 12.77                          | 17.79      |
| Bolivia                                                                                                                             | 39.98                       | 13.39      | 19.03                          | 27.50      |
| Brazil                                                                                                                              | 16.40                       | 1.72       | 5.69                           | 4.77       |
| Chile                                                                                                                               | 11.16                       | 0.81       | 2.61                           | 4.64       |
| Colombia                                                                                                                            | 25.28                       | 6.81       | 18.47                          | 16.65      |
| Costa Rica                                                                                                                          | 22.61                       | 1.62       | 9.09                           | 5.57       |
| Ecuador                                                                                                                             | 33.60                       | 11.78      | 15.61                          | 24.75      |
| El Salvador                                                                                                                         | 14.26                       | 2.37       | 8.66                           | 5.66       |
| Guatemala                                                                                                                           | 45.61                       | 22.53      | 28.51                          | 38.44      |
| Honduras                                                                                                                            | 6.45                        | 0.01       | .24                            | .14        |
| Mexico                                                                                                                              | 21.12                       | 0.82       | 3.30                           | 4.00       |
| Nicaragua                                                                                                                           | 56.49                       | 13.41      | 10.50                          | 23.19      |
| Panama                                                                                                                              | 37.66                       | 10.65      | 20.65                          | 20.31      |
| Paraguay                                                                                                                            | 41.72                       | 9.36       | 17.70                          | 20.86      |
| Peru                                                                                                                                | 35.54                       | 16.00      | 24.37                          | 32.77      |
| Uruguay                                                                                                                             | 12.36                       | 0.33       | 2.08                           | 2.09       |
| Venezuela                                                                                                                           | 30.92                       | 9.98       | 15.90                          | 22.01      |
| <i>Sources: Payne, Zovatto &amp; Mateo Díaz (2006) and the Georgetown University's "Political Database of the Americas" (2011).</i> |                             |            |                                |            |

fragmented party system in the region, presidents have been supported by majoritarian contingents in the legislature (Power T. J., 2010). Whilst a majority in the assembly can promote governability, the partisan composition of the presidential contingent in the assembly has important implications for democratic inclusiveness. When a single party dominates the legislative contingent, it is less likely that different interests in society (particularly those in the minority) achieve representation in the cabinet and therefore that they influence the policy making – irrespective of whether the presidential contingent is majoritarian or minoritarian. Also, policy outcomes are less likely to be the product of the deliberation between various interests in society. Furthermore, the possibility that the legislature actually acts a check on the actions of the presidency is dramatically reduced.<sup>116</sup>

<sup>116</sup> Indeed, whilst multiparty coalitions are more prone to adopt power sharing designs, when a single party dominates the majority in the assembly, constitutional changes aimed at promoting winner-take-all politics are

As the size of the presidential party decreases, legislators from other parties have a greater leverage to bargain with the president, and therefore exert influence so as to build oversized coalitions and propose and implement policies for the benefit of those who got them elected. Else, they can threaten to defect from the coalition. In the event, presidents have to assemble oversized coalitions and cabinet to advance their agenda. Thus, it could be argued that the degree of democratic inclusiveness in a pure presidential democracy is the lowest when party systems are dominated by a single party.

These considerations lead to the following hypotheses:

*H1: The prospects for social mobilisation are greater when the presidential party dominates the contingent in the assembly.*

#### Stability in Patterns of Intraparty Competition

In pure presidential systems, it is argued, the presence of malleable party labels tends to facilitate coalition building (Foweraker, 1998). Over time, however, weak party labels create manifold problems for citizens to effectively exercise their political rights, such as those of hidden information, when voters are uncertain about the preferences of candidates, and adverse selection, when voters systematically select flawed and unrepresentative candidates. Furthermore, the loss of legitimacy by existing political parties may open the way for claims for authority based on personal qualities (O'Donnell, 1994). Not only are outsiders more likely to emerge in volatile party systems (Mainwaring & Zoco, 2007, pp. 169-170), but they have a greater chance to take office under pure presidentialism, since presidential candidates

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more likely to be undertaken (Remmer, 2008; Negretto, 2009; 2013, p. 8). As the incumbent extends her power and/or prolongs her time in office, however, her partisan powers increase, but the prospects of other parties to contest power are reduced, and so are their opportunities to participate in the policymaking process.

do not have to rely on political parties to get elected (Mainwaring & Zoco, 2007; Mainwaring & Torcal, 2006, p. 5; Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 47).

Because of the discredit of strong party organisations supporting them, outsider leaders usually fail to translate their electoral victories into oversized partisan contingents in the legislature. Since negotiating and sharing power with established parties would be a betrayal of their broad popular mandate, outsiders have an incentive to pursue their agenda unilaterally, via decrees or popular referenda. They tend to claim to represent the will of the people and subsequently they often dismantle existing regime institutions, associated with exclusion and corruption, such as courts and political parties in the assembly. In this scenario, it is more likely that the different parties in the assembly are denied from participation in the cabinet and/or participation in the formulation of public policy. Therefore, the inclusiveness of the system is reduced. With unchecked control over the executive, however, policy outcomes are more likely to be biased towards particular groups, and therefore be seen as questionable by diverse sectors in society.

In light of the above, the following hypotheses are developed:

*H2. The prospects for social mobilisation increase with the transfers of votes among parties in the legislature.*

*H3. The prospects for social mobilisation rise with the transfers of votes among parties in the presidency.*

*H4. The prospects for social mobilisation increase with the share of votes obtained by new parties in the legislature.*

*H5. The prospects for social mobilisation are positively related to the share of votes obtained by new parties in the presidency.*

#### ***6.4 Data and Methods***

The above claims are tested using data on protest events, and results for legislative and presidential elections, for 17 Latin American electoral democracies for the period 1978-2009. Only democracies with a Polity2 score greater than 3 are included in the sample.

##### *Dependent variable*

##### Social Movement Activity

Measured as the number of protest events occurring in a country in a given year. Data for this variable comes from Banks (2009) and LAWR (2009) (See Chapter 3).

##### *Independent Variables*

Data for these variables was gathered from Payne, Zovatto & Mateo Díaz (2006), Georgetown University's "Political Database of the Americas" (2009), the World Bank's Database of Political Institutions (DPI) (2009), Mainwaring & Scully (1995), Alcántara Sáez (2004), Alcántara Sáez & Freidenberg (2001), Keesing's Record of World Events (2009), and reports from electoral authorities of the countries in question.

##### Size of the presidential party

Measured by the share of seats held by the presidential party in the lower house. If a president is not affiliated with any party, the size of the presidential party is 0.

##### Size of the presidential contingent in the legislature

Measured by the share of seats in the lower house held by the president's party and the parties holding cabinet portfolios. In testing the non-linear effect of this variable, it is included along its quadratic term in the statistical specifications.

#### Coalition governments

Coalition governments are denoted with a dummy variable, coded 1 when more than one party is represented in the cabinet, and 0 otherwise.

#### Relative size of the presidential party

Measured by the ratio between the seats held by the presidential party in the lower house and the total proportion of seats controlled by the parties in the governing coalition. This ratio varies from 0 to 1, and declines as the number of parties in the coalition grows (Morgenstern, Negri, & Pérez-Liñán, 2008).

#### Total Electoral Volatility

Measured using the transfers in the percentage of votes in the first round of presidential elections, and seats in the case of lower house elections. It is computed using the index developed by Mogens N. Pedersen (1979):

$$V_t = \frac{\sum_{i=1} |\Delta p_{i,t}|}{2}$$

where  $p_{i,t}$  is the percentage of the vote, which was obtained by party  $i$  at election  $t$ . High levels indicate higher levels of volatility, and *vice versa*. In each country, the first volatility

score corresponds to the second national election after transition from authoritarianism. The first election in each country serves as the baseline for calculation. Party mergers, splits, and name changes were calculated according to the method followed by Bartolini and Mair (1990, pp. 311-2).

#### Extra-system volatility

Measured by the vote (and seat) share of new parties in an election (Mainwaring, Gervasoni, & España-Nájera, 2010). Only parties obtaining 5 per cent or more of the vote share are considered. New parties lose their status as “new” after the second election in which they participate. Registered after the second election after transition from authoritarianism.

#### *Control Variables*

##### Time of the president in office

Presidents who have been in power for longer will exhibit greater differences in policy positions from their parties, as they are more likely to develop an independent power base. Also they develop advantages over their competitors, thereby reducing the electoral prospects of other political forces. The time in office of the president is measured as the number of years the presidential incumbent has been in office.

Additional control variables include measures for: bicameralism, formula for presidential election, time factors, size of the population, GDP per capita, and the rate of

inflation.<sup>117</sup> Data measurement and sources for some of these variables can be found in the Appendix.

### *Model Specification*

The dependent variable was estimated following the LFM model for pooled cross-sectional time series for count data developed in Chapter 2.

## **6.5 Results**

This section presents the results drawn by a series of LFM's estimating the effect of party system variables on the prospects for social mobilisation. Results are reported as incident ratios. Table 6.4 reports the coefficients measuring the size and composition of the presidential contingent in the assembly on levels of social movement activity in Latin American democracies from 1978 to 2009. In line with our hypotheses, but against mainstream accounts on social mobilisation in Latin America (Hochstetler, 2006; Marsteintredet, 2009; Pérez Liñán, 2008), there is no statistically significant difference in the odds of social mobilisation across minority and majoritarian contingents in the assembly (Model 12). Neither is the probability of contentious action is affected by the presence of coalition governments (Model 13). The likelihood of contentious action is however related to the size of the presidential party in the lower house of the assembly (Model 14). However, such a relationship is linear, as the squared term of this variable does not achieve statistical relevance (Model 15). More specifically, the likelihood of contentious action is significantly related to the fraction of seats held by the presidential party in the contingent in the

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<sup>117</sup> Although the state of the economy has been related to variables of interest, in particular, electoral volatility, various studies have shown that these effects are at best negligible and inconsistent in developing democracies (Roberts & Wibbels, 1999; Tavits, 2005; Epperly, 2011). Therefore, they are included in the specifications.

legislature (Models 16 and 17). This relationship holds after excluding observations for single party governments from the sample (Model 17). These results are robust after controlling for the number of years the presidential incumbent has been in office, the presence of bicameral legislatures, and time effects (year).

Table 6.5, on the other hand, reports the estimates of the variables measuring the stability of interparty competition on social movement activity in Latin American democracies from 1978 to 2009. Contrary to our hypotheses, total volatility scores for legislative elections are not significantly related to the probability of social mobilisation (Model 18). Neither does the vote share obtained by new parties in the lower house of the legislature achieve statistical significance (Model 19). This finding goes against mainstream literature relating the incidence of social mobilisation to the collapse and decay of party systems in Latin America (Hochstetler & Friedman, 2008; Arce M. , 2010). Nonetheless, the total level of volatility in presidential elections has a positive and relevant influence on the odds of contentious action (Model 20). Also, the share of votes obtained by new parties in presidential elections significantly raises the probability of social movement activity (Model 21). These findings hold after including measures for the system used for electing the president, the executive margin of victory, bicameralism, and time effects. All models are well-specified, as suggested by the magnitude and *p*-value of the J statistic. However, for additional robustness checks, all models in this section were run using data second-order time correlation structures. Despite the loss of observations, similar findings were obtained.

Hence, it can be argued with a significant level of confidence that the probability of contentious action is greater when the presidential party dominates the legislative contingent, irrespective of the presence of coalitions or majorities in the assembly. The odds of contentious activity are greater when outsiders are elected presidents. A single party dominating the assembly and outsider presidents are related to the lack of oversized

**Table 6.4 The effect of the presidential contingent in the assembly on social movement activity in Latin America 1978-2009**

|                                                                    | 12       | 13       | 14       | 15       | 16       | 17       |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Majority (dummy)                                                   | 0.839    |          |          |          |          |          |
|                                                                    | (0.347)  |          |          |          |          |          |
| Coalition (dummy)                                                  |          | 0.480**  |          |          | 0.743+   |          |
|                                                                    |          | (0.281)  |          |          | (0.398)  |          |
| Presidential party<br>(% of seats in the lower house)              |          |          | 5.918*** | 3.723+   |          |          |
|                                                                    |          |          | (0.506)  | (0.117)  |          |          |
| Presidential party <sup>2</sup><br>(% of seats in the lower house) |          |          |          | 0.039    |          |          |
|                                                                    |          |          |          | (2.359)  |          |          |
| Presidential party<br>(% of seats in the legislative contingent)   |          |          |          |          | 3.736+   | 6.129**  |
|                                                                    |          |          |          |          | (0.714)  | (0.626)  |
| Incumbent years in office                                          | 0.885    | 0.916    | 0.912    | 0.895    | 0.922    | 0.861    |
|                                                                    | (0.102)  | (0.116)  | (0.088)  | (0.082)  | (0.105)  | (0.102)  |
| Bicameralism                                                       | 0.754    | 0.850    | 0.718    | 0.572    | 0.820    | 0.339**  |
|                                                                    | (0.481)  | (0.471)  | (0.404)  | (0.428)  | (0.483)  | (0.378)  |
| Inflation (log)                                                    | 0.781+   | 0.796*   | 0.776*   | 0.780*   | 0.791*   | 0.899*   |
|                                                                    | (0.127)  | (0.111)  | (0.107)  | (0.112)  | (0.114)  | (0.043)  |
| GDP per capita                                                     | 0.835    | 0.870    | 0.830    | 0.804    | 0.763    | 0.576*   |
|                                                                    | (0.210)  | (0.211)  | (0.195)  | (0.254)  | (0.248)  | (0.231)  |
| Population size (log)                                              | 1.281+   | 1.280+   | 1.405*   | 1.379    | 1.347    | 1.379**  |
|                                                                    | (0.129)  | (0.141)  | (0.151)  | (0.186)  | (0.188)  | (0.109)  |
| Time Effects                                                       | YES      | YES      | YES      | YES      | YES      | YES      |
|                                                                    |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Number of observations                                             | 412      | 412      | 412      | 412      | 412      | 213      |
| Number of countries                                                | 17       | 17       | 17       | 17       | 17       | 17       |
| Error correction                                                   | INAR(1)  | INAR(1)  | INAR(1)  | INAR(1)  | INAR(1)  | INAR(1)  |
| Rho                                                                | 2.125*** | 2.081*** | 2.077*** | 2.059*** | 2.054*** | 1.768*** |
| J                                                                  | 4.49     | 3.152    | 4.87E+00 | 7.42E+00 | 6.015    | 5.438    |
| <i>See notes to Table 2.1</i>                                      |          |          |          |          |          |          |

**Table 6.5 The effect of the stability of interparty competition on social movement activity in Latin America 1978-2009**

|                                        | 18       | 19       | 20       | 21       |
|----------------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Total volatility<br>Legislature        | 0.994    |          |          |          |
|                                        | (0.011)  |          |          |          |
| Extra-system volatility<br>Legislature |          | 0.994    |          |          |
|                                        |          | (0.011)  |          |          |
| Total volatility<br>Presidency         |          |          | 1.016**  |          |
|                                        |          |          | (0.688)  |          |
| Extra-system volatility<br>Presidency  |          |          |          | 1.013**  |
|                                        |          |          |          | (0.005)  |
| Plurality elections for president      |          |          | 0.807    | 0.786    |
|                                        |          |          | (0.229)  | (0.237)  |
| Bicameralism                           | 0.766    | 1.018    | 0.766    | 0.802    |
|                                        | (0.431)  | (0.309)  | (0.431)  | (0.402)  |
| Southern Cone                          | 3.747*   | 2.915    | 3.747*   | 3.725*   |
|                                        | (0.625)  | (0.665)  | (0.625)  | (0.630)  |
| Andean Region                          | 3.983**  | 4.067**  | 3.983**  | 3.912**  |
|                                        | (0.420)  | (0.445)  | (0.420)  | (0.470)  |
| Inflation (log)                        | 0.767*   | 0.791**  | 0.767*   | 0.766*   |
|                                        | (0.128)  | (0.072)  | (0.128)  | (0.136)  |
| GDP per capita                         | 0.742    | 0.795    | 0.742    | 0.736    |
|                                        | (0.192)  | (0.186)  | (0.192)  | (0.189)  |
| Population size (log)                  | 1.292*   | 1.293*   | 1.292*   | 1.287*   |
|                                        | (0.121)  | (0.112)  | (0.121)  | (0.125)  |
| Year                                   | 1.001    | 1.001    | 1.001    | 1.001    |
|                                        | (0.001)  | (0.001)  | (0.001)  | (0.001)  |
| Number of observations                 | 412      | 412      | 412      | 409      |
| Number of countries                    | 17       | 17       | 17       | 17       |
| Error correction                       | INAR(1)  | INAR(1)  | INAR(1)  | INAR(1)  |
| Rho                                    | 2.119*** | 2.056*** | 2.119*** | 2.125*** |
| Q                                      | 0.0124   | 0.0113   | 0.0124   | 0.00958  |
| J                                      | 5.117    | 4.67     | 5.117    | 3.917    |
| <i>See notes to Table 2.1</i>          |          |          |          |          |

multiparty coalitions (and cabinets). Findings therefore go in line with consociational models of democracy. In order to test the validity of statistical claims, the following section analyses how these variables interact and affect social mobilisation in practice, by examining the case of Venezuela.<sup>118</sup>

### ***6.6 Country Case: Venezuela***

The case of Venezuela is chosen as it is perhaps the democracy in Latin America which has undergone through the most numerous and dramatic changes in the character of the party system. From the 1950s to the 1980s, the country was considered as an exception of coalitional presidentialism in a region plagued by instability and dictatorship. During this period, Venezuela was ruled by a stable series of coalition governments, with almost perfect rates of cabinet coalescence. In the 1990s, nonetheless, the country experienced one of the region's most profound cases of party system decay and collapse. Despite this, the political arena stabilised afterwards although it had been almost dominated by the governing party. An outsider leader won the presidency in the late 1990s, concentrating power in his figure and governing at his will. Constitutionally, however, the Venezuelan president is currently vested with weak decision-making powers, and the legislature has strong oversight capacities. The Venezuelan case is also distinctive insofar as much of the social mobilisation has been the response to the peculiar and deliberate political style of leadership of former President Hugo

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<sup>118</sup> An alternative interpretation of this finding is based on the degree to which individuals can identify specific targets to blame for their grievances. When identifiability is high the likelihood of protest participation tend to increase (Javeline, 2003). Along these lines, when there is no cooperation across branches, voters can identify which agents are most deserving of blame or credit for the nature of policy outcomes (Samuels & Shugart, 2003, pp. 40-42). In this view, blame attribution reduces the costs and therefore encourage protest participation. When individuals are unable to attribute the responsibility for their grievances to specific individuals, the costs and benefits of their participation in collective action are uncertain. However, when the responsible subjects are easily identifiable, the costs for participating in protest are lower. Following this, it could be expected that protest participation would be higher when there is no cooperation across branches of government. In coalition settings, however, it would be more difficult to identify who to blame for policy outcomes.

Chávez (Corrales, 2011). Moreover, unlike the cases analysed in previous chapters, Venezuela allows the testing of the effects of the variables of interest in a society without major ethnic group cleavages. Revisiting the Venezuelan case thus offers an opportunity to assess the role of institutions and examine the impact of the party system (and the partisan powers of the president) in the incidence of social movement activity.

Despite the fact that presidents were vested with the power to suspend constitutional rights and unilaterally govern by decree, coalition governments and high rates of cabinet coalescence featured in the multiparty democracy of Venezuela for almost five decades.<sup>119</sup> The so-called Venezuelan exceptionalism was based on the Pact of *Punto Fijo*, a power-sharing arrangement subscribed to by *Acción Democrática* (AD) and the *Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente* (COPEI). The Pact of *Punto Fijo* was designed to prevent single-party hegemony; parties agree not to monopolise the government, and consider the interests of other political parties when forming the cabinet and enacting government policies. Thus, from 1947 to 1993, in Venezuela not only were cabinets representative of the coalition in the assembly, but government policies were enacted by consultation with other parties (Myers, 2004, pp. 17-19). This does not mean that policies were inclusive, but concentrated in only two political forces.

AD was a Social Democratic party occupying the centre-left, whereas COPEI was a Social Christian organisation on the centre-right. COPEI was supported by the church, the landowners, and the military, whereas AD was linked to organisations of business people, peasants, workers, teachers, and professionals. These included: the *Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela* (CTV), the *Federación de Cámaras y Asociaciones de Comercio y Producción de Venezuela* (FEDECAMARAS), and the *Federación Campesina de*

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<sup>119</sup> In addition, presidents had the right to appoint all governors.

Venezuela (FCV).<sup>120</sup> Party labels were meaningless to most voters. Indeed, in practice, there were no significant programmatic differences between AD and COPEI.

Although the Pact of *Punto Fijo* was mostly an informal agreement, the political duopoly was also supported by the electoral system. In 1947, PR rules were introduced in the country. However, legislators were selected in closed and blocked lists in small-sized districts, and seats were allocated via the D'Hondt formula. In addition, there were fused ballots and concurrent elections for the legislature and the presidency. Consequently, party discipline was remarkably strong and policy efficiency was high, despite the presence of various forces in the assembly. Nonetheless, representation in the legislative body was biased in favour of the two largest parties: AD and COPEI (Crisp & Rey, 2003, pp. 175-178). In particular, the system operated in detriment of leftist parties and their electoral constituencies. Moreover, the electoral system induced political agents to be accountable to party bosses rather than to voters. Consequently, not only were the largest parties non-programmatic, but also they were uprooted from society, albeit the presence of coalition governments, majoritarian and disciplined contingents in the legislature, and high rates of cabinet coalescence. Indeed, governments were not representative of salient interests in society.

In effect, from the very beginning, independent unions, the urban poor and university students did not sympathise with AD and COPEI, and thereby with the policies enacted by the government. Although these constituencies had representation in parties like the *Unión Republicana Democrática* (URD), *Fuerza Democrática Popular* (FDP), *Movimiento al Socialismo* (MAS), *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria* (MIR), and the *Partido Comunista Venezolano* (PCV), these political forces were unable to have any

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<sup>120</sup> While encompassing important sectors in society, only associations linked to political parties had access to public decision making. The top government positions were reserved for leaders of AD and COPEI and affiliated organisations (Crisp, 2000) and the popular vote was induced by the distribution of material benefits to the rank-and-file.

meaningful influence in the policymaking process given the duopoly of AD and COPEI. Eventually, these parties waned over time, and rates of partisan membership among the urban poor and students became the lowest in all sectors of Venezuelan society (Canache, 2004, p. 34). In order to meet their most immediate needs, urban sectors organised into self-help associations. As urbanisation developed, the number of slum dwellers swelled, giving rise to a number of organised groups. Particularly notable was the cooperative movement. By the 1970s, many of these mobilised groups had coalesced into regional associations and federations. Eventually, they questioned the deliberate delivery of goods towards particular groups in society, and framed their demands in terms of political rights. Also they mobilised for their social rights, demanding the inclusion of land reform and wealth redistribution in the 1961 Constitution (Myers, 2004, pp. 27-28)

Although the urban poor was the main challenger to the Venezuelan partyarchy for two decades (López Sánchez, 2006, pp. 71-73; Salamanca, 2004, p. 96), when oil prices plummeted in the 1980s an increasing number of citizens perceived themselves as being alienated from the political system. The ranks of the poor swelled. Draconian adjustment policies were subsequently implemented. As the economic situation deteriorated, political elites were unable to retain party loyalties through the clientelistic distribution of goods. As a result, the partyarchy and its affiliated associations lost legitimacy in the eyes of society. For many Venezuelans, not only did the channels for political representation and participation narrow, but they were shut down (Canache, 2004, p. 37). By the mid-1980s, demands for social rights and political reform were generalised among Venezuelan society (Crisp & Rey, 2003, p. 181). Social movements started to proliferate in the country's largest cities. Massive demonstrations and riots were undertaken by the urban poor, students, workers and members of the middle class (Romero, 1996, pp. 393-403). The most notable of them was the so-called *Caracazo* in 1989 (Canache, 2004, p. 33). Coalitions, partisan cabinets and rotation in office

could not guarantee the delivery of distributive policy outcomes, because they were only concentrated into two forces in the detriment to other interests in society.

In order to re-legitimise themselves before society, the two traditional parties promoted a series of electoral reforms in the early 1990s. Elections for governors, which were formerly appointed and removed at the discretion of the president, were instituted, with the possibility of being re-elected for one consecutive period. Also, ballots for the presidency and the legislature were separated. As a result of lower restrictions for party entry, new political options emerged – particularly at the subnational level and on the left side of the ideological spectrum. Whilst in the period of 1973-88, the effective number of political parties in the legislature averaged 3.3, by 1993 and 1998 this figure had risen to 5.6 and 6.1 respectively. Electoral reforms, however, included the adoption of a mixed member electoral system for the lower house (Crisp & Rey, 2003, p. 190). This institutional amendment was not so much geared at promoting the accountability of legislators towards their constituencies, but at continuing supporting the two-party rule. Indeed, despite the surge in the number of political parties, AD and COPEI remained the two largest parties in both chambers. Rather, the SMD portion of the system alongside small-sized districts was intended to support the predominance of party elites in selecting candidates (Crisp & Rey, 2003, pp. 192-193). Thus, like in Bolivia, electoral reforms promote pluralism in the party arena, but on a disproportional basis. Not surprisingly, social unrest did not decrease, but intensified, accompanied by deep anti-party sentiments among voters.

As social discontent towards the political system swelled, conflicts among, and factionalism within, the two main political parties rose (Di John, 2009, pp. 214-215). In 1989, Carlos Andrés Pérez split from AD and ran as an independent candidate. He won the presidency by promising to return the country to the days of the *petrobonanza*. Nonetheless, these adjustments could not be implemented. His agenda faced the stiff opposition of the

traditional parties, AD and COPEI, which still dominated the assembly by virtue of the reformed electoral system. As a self-portrayed outsider, Pérez was reluctant to build any coalition with AD and COPEI. In fact, his cabinet was mostly composed of technocrats, who advised him to pursue a series of draconian measures. As a result, not only did policy stagnation follow, but also increased citizen dissatisfaction. In 1992, a majority of Venezuelans supported the coup attempt orchestrated by Hugo Chávez against Pérez's policy agenda (Hawkins K. A., 2010, p. 17). Fierce opposition in both the streets and congress led to Pérez's impeachment in 1993. Protests were mainly organised by rural inhabitants, informal workers, the unemployed and slum dwellers.

In 1993, Rafael Caldera, a founding leader of COPEI, positioned again himself against the partyarchy and ran independently for the presidency. His candidacy was supported by a coalition of small left-wing parties, including *Convergencia*, *La Causa R*, and *Movimiento al Socialismo* (MAS). During his campaign, Caldera promised to intervene in the economy, disbursing subsidies for the poorest and most disadvantaged, and to break the AD-COPEI stranglehold on power. Although the popular vote received by both AD-COPEI fell under 50 per cent for the first time since 1958 (Dietz & Myers, 2007, pp. 65-66), these parties still dominated the legislature by virtue of the electoral system. Nonetheless, now as an outsider, Caldera appointed a non-partisan cabinet. In order to quell the opposition of traditional parties in the assembly, he attempted to rule declaring a state of siege, threatening the Supreme Court to turn to the will of the people if it did not rule in his favour (Crisp, 1997, pp. 195-197). However, the lack of cooperation across the branches resulted in stalemate. Consequently, Caldera was unable to restore state capitalism and import substitution industrialisation, as he had promised during his electoral campaign. In order to avoid impeachment, he sought the support of AD, but excluded COPEI from government. In exchange, Caldera would provide AD cadres with the resources they needed to restore the

party infrastructure (Dietz & Myers, 2007, p. 72). In fact, Caldera supported an electoral reform, geared at preserving the predominance of the traditional parties in the midst of growing social discontent and the rise of political outsiders. In order to prevent the decay of partyarchy before the ascendance of independent and outsider leaders, presidential and legislative elections became non-concurrent so the coat-tails effects of presidential elections were minimised (Molina, 2002, pp. 226-28).

Nonetheless, social discontent with party politics was still widespread. In 1998, Chávez won the presidency with an anti-party discourse. He attracted all the disaffected sectors from the traditional parties, who were not only the members from the urban poor, but from all income categories (Canache, 2004, pp. 38-39, 46; Lupu, 2010). In fact, he was sworn in as president with the largest margin of victory in the history of the country. Despite this, his party – *Movimiento V Republica* – lacked a majority in the assembly. AD and COPEI together held 89 out of 188 seats in the lower house, and 46 out of 100 seats in the upper chamber. When coupled with the other parties that were against Chávez, the opposition held more than 50 per cent of the members in both houses, enough to block much of the presidential agenda (Ellner, 2008, p. 179). Therefore, upon coming to power, Chávez called for a referendum to elect a constitutional assembly. The constitutional process was portrayed as the refounding of Venezuela's democracy. The referendum passed with 85 per cent of the vote. A new constitution was eagerly welcomed by many sectors in society, particularly those traditionally marginalised, like the urban poor. In fact, various organised groups in society participated in the assembly's discussions by submitting proposals and holding seminars and workshops on the constitutional text (García-Guadilla, 2003, p. 179; Salamanca, 2004, p. 101).

In the present, the Venezuelan constitution is considered one of the most progressive in the world in terms of citizen rights. The text conferred a broad series of rights to citizens,

including social rights (such as free and universal education and health), as well as gender, indigenous, and environmental rights. Also, the constitution favoured the direct participation of the people in the decision-making process through referenda and recalls, and the creation of a new branch of government composed by citizens – the Ombudsman’s Office, the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Comptroller General’s Office (Myers, 2008, p. 285). In addition, electoral authorities were declared autonomous from party alignments and presidential prerogatives were reduced (insofar as presidents were no longer able to rule unilaterally by decree in some areas, but the assembly had to explicitly delegate power to the president to issue decrees).<sup>121</sup> The faculties of the Venezuelan legislature continued to be strong.

Despite this, a series of electoral laws were enacted in parallel to the constitutional process in benefit of the incumbent forces (Maingón, Baralt, & Sonntag, 2000, pp. 102, 118).<sup>122</sup> Previously 50 per cent of seats in the lower house were allocated by SMD, and 50 per cent by PR. This ratio was modified in 2000 to be 60 and 40 per cent, and in 2009, to 70 and 30 per cent, respectively. At present, the system prevents opposition candidates from obtaining more than 40 per cent of the seats (Corrales & Penfold, 2011, p. 159). Overall, the result has been a marked increase in the disproportionality of the system, in that smaller parties need more votes to win a lesser number of seats in the assembly. In the 1999 elections, for instance, Chávez’s party won only 60 per cent of the vote but took 95 per cent of the seats, leaving the opposition with virtually no voice. The opposition parties were so disorganised, often running no candidates for a given seat or running multiple candidates, that

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<sup>121</sup> Nonetheless, presidential powers during states of siege were expanded, and no limits to the duration of states of siege were established. Also the president was granted the power to dissolve the assembly, provided that the legislature had censured a cabinet member three times.

<sup>122</sup> It should be noted that the delegates to the Constituent Assembly were elected via a majoritarian nominal system that overrepresented the incumbent forces in the constitutional process (Corrales, 2011, p. 70). With only 60 per cent of votes, the parties supporting Chávez – the *Polo Patriótico* – obtained 90 per cent of seats in the constituent assembly. Opposition and independent candidates obtained 30 per cent of the total votes; however, they obtained less than 5 per cent of the seats in the assembly (Corrales, 2009, pp. 13-14).

they thereby splintered votes and compounded the effects of the majoritarian electoral system (Coppedge, 2003, p. 179).

Also, the constitution legalised the re-election of the president for two consecutive periods, whereas previously re-election was only allowed ten years after the end of the latest presidential term. In addition, the tenure of presidents in office was extended from five to six years. That is, the maximum number of years Venezuelans could stay in power increased from 5 to 18 years. The number of points of entry to the policy making was further reduced by the suppression of the senate, where the opposition had a significant presence. Additionally, the 1999 Constitution reversed the process of decentralisation which had been underway since 1989, by giving the executive greater powers to intervene in subnational affairs. Nonetheless, the constitution was approved in 1999 via referendum by 72 per cent of voters. Of the 26 constitutions that had been enacted in Venezuela, it was the first text to be approved by voters.

However, institutions were deliberately re-designed to bolster the predominance of the president and the government party, *Movimiento V República* (MVR). The reforms significantly limited the degree of participation and contestation of opposition forces in the policymaking process (Maingón, Baralt, & Sonntag, 2000; Coppedge, 2003; Corrales, 2011). As the points of access to system significantly narrowed, so did the likelihood of negotiation among salient groups in society. Therefore the inclusiveness of the Venezuelan democracy further declined. The coalition in the assembly and the cabinets were monopolised by the single party. Although the Venezuelan president was constitutionally weak, he could in practice govern at will. Indeed, upon the approval of the constitution, the judiciary and electoral authorities – previously dominated by members of the two traditional parties – were purged. The legislature was closed, and elections for the legislature and the presidency were called. Chávez was re-elected, but this time with a majority in the legislature. AD and COPEI

together won barely one-fifth of the total seats in the assembly.<sup>123</sup> Consequently, Chávez was able to clean out the opposition by virtue of new electoral rules. Not only had traditional parties become decayed, but rules allowing for the unlimited re-election of the executive, and biasing the allocation of seats in the legislature, made it virtually impossible for emerging forces to defeat the incumbent through voting (Corrales & Penfold, 2007, p. 106).

From 2000 onwards, a super majoritarian contingent in the legislature allowed Chávez to entirely dominate the policymaking process.<sup>124</sup> Unlike in Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Uruguay and Peru, in Venezuela presidents do not have the power to rule unilaterally by decree in some areas. They need to obtain legislative authority to rule by decree. Most legislation during Chávez's government however was enacted by DDA. DDA laws were approved by the legislature in favour of the president in 1999, 2000 and 2007. In 2007, DDA was granted to the president for a period of 18 months. Certainly, the rate of policy effectiveness was high. But since the legislature was controlled by the governing party, the president had virtual freedom to enact legislation on a wide range of issues according to his preferences. Nevertheless, policy outcomes were not distributive at all. Instead, policies were formulated implemented without any scrutiny or deliberation of any kind from the opposition (Corrales, 2011, p. 85).

Cabinet positions and state were disbursed to those loyal to the government, but denied to those dissenting. Supporters were rewarded, but critics punished, through corruption, exclusion from clientelism, targeted spending and government jobs. Economic benefits were channelled to only those organisations loyal to the government, such as the *Frente Constituyente de Trabajadores* (FCT), the *Fuerza Bolivariana de Trabajadores*, the

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<sup>123</sup> Additionally, Chávez and his allies also won the most important governorships, and a majority of the mayoralties. Otherwise only AD won any governorships, but in small states (Dietz & Myers, 2007, p. 76).

<sup>124</sup> On top of it, the opposition boycotted the legislative election of 2005, leaving the entire legislature in Chavista hands.

*Misiones*, and the *Círculos Bolivarianos* (Hawkins & Hansen, 2006). These constituencies benefited from their access to state resources as in no other previous government. That said, social spending did not targeted the neediest, but resources were distributed in an opportunistic and particularistic manner. In some instances, government policies infringed the political rights and other guarantees of various sectors in society (Corrales & Penfold, 2007, p. 139).<sup>125</sup> The criminal code, for instance, was reformed in order to ban acts of protest against public officials, and participants of protests were also prosecuted. Media content was regulated by the government. Also, many traditional unions were dissolved, the elections of labour union leaders and authorities in universities were intervened in, and hundreds of private properties were expropriated (Corrales, 2011, p. 70). Furthermore, state employment and benefits were disbursed according to citizens' vote preferences and behaviour (Corrales & Penfold, 2011, pp. 77-78).

But, even when a majority of Venezuelans rejected a constitutional referendum in 2007, which included the unlimited re-election of the president, institutions were nonetheless amended via DDA. Consecutive re-election further increased the partisan powers of Chavez. All this provides yet further proof that a president could be able to impose his agenda in a dominant party system, even when he lacked strong law-making powers and before a legislature with strong oversight capacities. Chávez justified his perpetuation in power and the neglect of opposition forces in the policy-making as indispensable for the refounding of democratic politics in Venezuela. In the process, however, the rights of citizens became even more restricted. As various groups in society were denied the opportunity to contest power and influence the policy process, levels of social mobilisation escalated.

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<sup>125</sup> In effect, the rates of crime and corruption exponentially increased in Venezuela under Chávez (Corrales & Penfold, 2011, p. 140)

As seen in Figure 6.1, levels of social movement activity grew exponentially in the aftermath of the enactment of the Constitution of 1999, which gave full control of the assembly to incumbent forces, and continued to be at high levels until the end of the period of study. In 2001, for instance, traditional labour unions (such as CTV) and the business sector (grouped in FEDECAMARAS), supported by the mass media, organised a number of national labour strikes and stoppages (Salamanca, 2004, p. 108). In 2002, these sectors even orchestrated a short-lived coup against Chávez. In 2004, they organised massive signature-collection campaigns in demand for a recall referendum. In 2007, after the closure of RCTV, a private media station, students started mobilising in favour of freedoms of speech and association. Although social movements organised in demand on a wide range of issues (such as land, property, freedom of education, and freedom of speech and so on and so), the majority of protests that have occurred in Venezuela since 2000 have been undertaken against the ways the laws have approved unilaterally and directly by the president under DDA. A series of protests organised by university students raised the awareness of other sectors in society about the constitutional reform proposed by Chávez in 2007 – which included the indefinite re-election of the president, the suppression of property rights and the appointment of regional and local authorities by the president. Student mobilisations promoted the proliferation of other movements in society (Corrales, 2011, p. 85). Of these, the human rights movement gained particular salience.<sup>126</sup>


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<sup>126</sup> There were allegations that a number of opposition figures had been arrested, and that journalists and activists had been prosecuted (Levitsky & Loxton, 2013, pp. 124-125; Corrales & Penfold, 2011).

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**Figure 6.1 Social Mobilisation in Venezuela**

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
Source: LAWR (2009)

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**Figure 6.2 Social mobilisation in Venezuela by type of activity**

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Source: LAWR (2009)

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As Chávez prolonged his hold on power, an important number of the middle class and the urban poor (which initially supported Chávez's candidacy) joined the ranks of the opposition (Canache, 2004, pp. 46-48; Corrales & Penfold, 2011, p. 146; Corrales, 2003).<sup>127</sup> Opposition to the Chávez government increased as enacted policies started to affect the majority of citizens. The country began suffering from the inefficiency of public services, deficits in housing, rampant insecurity as well as the poor quality of health and education services. Therefore, claims in the delivery of public goods joined the mobilisations in demand of civil, political and social rights.

In the present, groups from all social strata are engaged in social mobilisation in the country (Corrales & Penfold, 2011, p. 148). Minority, ideological and/or class-based explanations cannot therefore account for social mobilisation in contemporary Venezuela. As seen in Figure 6.2, since 2000s, the majority of social movement activity has consisted of anti-government demonstrations and riots rather than of labour strikes and stoppages. The dissidents are those actors without ties to the incumbent, and those who were affected by the growing crime and corruption. Only supporters of the government are the recipients of social programs, state jobs and contracts, which, however, came from different income groups – including the most privileged (Lupu, 2010).<sup>128</sup> In fact, in no previous period has Venezuelan society been so politically polarised and mobilised (Corrales, 2011, pp. 82-83).

In the present, social movements in Venezuela are variegated, composed of diverse income groups, and sectors from different ideological currents, including leftist sectors and even members of the military (Corrales, 2003). Overall, these heterogeneous citizens groups contested the legitimacy of the laws enacted by the president through the de facto powers delegated to him by a single-party assembly, and questioned the notion of public good and

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<sup>127</sup> Defections also occurred within the cabinet, allied parties, and the military (Corrales, 2011, pp. 72-74).

<sup>128</sup> Indeed, class was not a reliable predictor of votes for Chávez in Venezuela (Lupu, 2010).

the common interest that supposedly Chávez had defended. For many of them, the policy results of the Chávez's government were not that different from those of previous administrations. For them, Chávez replicated, even perpetuated, the practice of arbitrary state favouritism (Corrales, 2003). Instead, restrictions to political contestation and participation have become even further limited.

In sum, the Venezuelan political regime from 1958 to 1998 was dominated by accommodation between COPEI and AD. That said, these forces acted as a party cartel, insofar as the two main parties tended to act as catch-all parties and to propose very similar centrist programmes. They did not seek the participation of other forces in the legislature. Cabinets were dominated by this duopoly and exclude the interests of other parties. Like in other countries in the region, the predominance of these parties was underpinned by disproportional rules in the assembly, which muted the voice of various sectors in the policymaking process. As a result, large sectors of the population (i.e. the working classes and the informal sectors in urban areas) enjoyed no real political rights, leading them to engage into social mobilisation.

As parties became discredited, citizens started to cast their votes on the traits and characteristics of the individual candidates. As outsider presidents were reluctant to negotiate with political parties and non-partisan cabinets were therefore established, social mobilisation grew. Certainly, the rise of a populist president (Chávez) allowed those excluded groups to have their citizenship rights legally recognised. However, like in previous periods, governability was ensured by the establishment of rules underpinning the predominance of a handful of forces in the assembly. During Chávez' government, the presidential party gained full control of the presidential contingent and the assembly. Therefore, patterns of cooperation among party elites became obsolete and unnecessary. Since 2000s, a sequence of single-party cabinets has been in charge on implementing the president's desires. Chávez

virtually governed as he saw fit. The lack of scrutiny on legislation, alongside narrower opportunities to influence policymaking, led citizens to question and therefore mobilise against a biased decision-making process and its outcomes (Corrales, 2011, p. 85). As checks and balances on the Venezuelan executive were eroded, not only did the costs and obstacles of being in the opposition rise, but even the citizenship rights of former supporters were undermined. Protest activity has climbed to unprecedented levels in the country. Social movement activity remained at high levels despite the stabilisation of the party arena into one party.

This evidence dismisses existing arguments linking the incidence of social mobilisation to the collapse and decay of party systems in Latin America (Hochstetler & Friedman, 2008; Arce M. , 2010). On the contrary, delegative presidencies can thrive and even be supported by stable party systems. Moreover, the case of Venezuela supports the consociational view that relates the occurrence of social mobilisation with the enactment of policies that have not been previously deliberated among the president and the opposition parties in the legislature. That is, oversized and plural coalitions and cabinets decrease the likelihood of social mobilisation. The experience of Venezuela, on the other hand, also suggests that a delegative presidency can take hold albeit the formal powers of the presidency are weak and legislatures strong. In this case, the president was able to dominate the assembly and the entire policy-making process at will by virtue of electoral rules. Again, this confirms the important influence that electoral rules play on the partisan powers of the president and overall the occurrence of social mobilisation in pure presidential democracies.

## ***6.7 Conclusion***

In every democracy, political parties are the main vehicles for channelling and processing societal demands, regulating socio-political conflict, defining public policy alternatives, and holding government officials accountable to the citizenry (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995; Rueschmeyer, Stephens, & Stephens, 1992). Parties field candidates and compete for public office, and thereby give structure to coalitions and government. Certainly, party systems are strongly affected by formal institutions, like the type of executive-legislative relations. But they are also influenced by country-specific factors. In order to assess the influence of both institutional and non-institutional factors on social mobilisation, this chapter has attempted to examine the impact party systems have on the prospects for social mobilisation in pure presidential systems using cross-sectional time-series data from 17 Latin American democracies beginning with the third wave of democratisation in 1978.

Against scholarly predictions, party competition in Latin America has become stable, with the same parties dominating the political arena. The age of political parties has not decreased and the legitimacy of parties has not varied significantly either. Even when party systems have collapsed, the party arena has stabilised afterwards. Moreover, despite the presence of multiple parties, majoritarian contingents in the legislature have become a regular occurrence. Certainly, working majorities in the assembly alongside stable patterns of interparty competition have averted governability problems. Presidential democracies are governable provided that parties are not programmatic; as a result, they are limited in delivering accountability in any sense that implies a strong notion of representation (Samuels & Shugart, 2010). Within Latin American presidential democracies, however, there are substantial variations in the character of party systems, particularly in terms of the partisan composition of coalitions (and cabinet) and overall the partisan powers of the president.

The statistical results presented in this chapter suggest that the prospects for social mobilisation do not vary across minority and majoritarian governments. Rather, it has been shown that social mobilisation is related to the size of the presidential party in the congressional delegation. Contentious action is more likely to occur in the presence of single-party contingents in the assembly. When a single party dominates the legislature, the ability of salient groups in society to influence the policy process, participate in government and oversee the actions of the executive is reduced. Rather, in dominant party systems, the legislature is subordinated to the executive. When this is the case, the president virtually governs as she sees fit, without any check. Democratic inclusiveness is reduced as a consequence. Thus, results go in line with the consociational model of democracy, insofar as inclusive and oversized coalitions tend to reduce the likelihood of social mobilisation. The ability of presidents to govern as they fit is not necessarily a consequence of the strength of the legislature and the formal powers of the presidents (see Chapter 5). However, as seen in Chapter 4, the concentration of the party arena in the president's hands is the result of both disproportional rules for the election of legislatures and the consecutive re-election of the executive. Therefore, whilst country specificities are important, these results reinforce the claim that the system for electing the executive and the presidency is important.

Along these lines, the chapter also demonstrates that the prospects for social mobilisation increase alongside the share of votes obtained by new parties, but only at the presidential level. Indeed, major institutional reforms biasing political competition and participation have been undertaken upon the arrival of outsider leaders to the presidency, claiming to represent the will of the people (Levitsky & Loxton, 2013). Against common perceptions in the existing literature, however, social mobilisation is not necessarily linked to the collapse of party systems in the legislature. Like in Ecuador and Bolivia, social mobilisation in Venezuela has continued to be on the rise, even though the party arena has

stabilised. In other words, social movement activity is not related to the instability of the party arena in the legislature as it is to the partisan composition of the presidential contingent in the assembly, which in turn influence the composition of cabinet. When one party controls the presidential contingent in the assembly, the decision-making process and the outcomes derived from it are less likely to be inclusive. Overall, this chapter demonstrates that the prospects for social mobilisation are affected by inclusiveness of coalitions and cabinets, and consequently the partisan powers of the executive, which as seen above is joint result of both non-institutional and institutional factors.

## 7. CONCLUSIONS

This thesis has aimed to fill a lacuna in the literature by relating the occurrence of social mobilisation with the type of executive-legislative relations in a democracy. It has been assumed here that social mobilisation is a function of the degree to which salient political actors are disadvantaged by the formal institutional design. This claim has been tested by doing a comparative analysis of the pure presidential type of executive-legislative-relations, which is supposedly the institutional format more conducive to winner-take-all politics. The analysis proceeded as follows. First, a comparison of pure presidentialism with semipresidential and parliamentary forms of government (across-format comparison) was conducted. Second, variations inside a sub-sample of pure presidential regimes (within format comparison) were examined. The enquiry thus moved from the general to the specific aspects of pure presidentialism. Its focus has been on democracies in Latin America, where the pure presidential type of executive-legislative relations is concentrated. Despite the commonalities of these systems, as it has been shown, there are substantial cross-national variations in the trajectories of social mobilisation, as well as in the institutional design of these pure presidential democracies.

The relationship between the variables of interest was explored using mixed methods of analysis. A sequence of quantitative analyses using aggregate data on social movement activity and democratic institutions was firstly conducted. Social movement activity was measured as the number of disruptive acts against the government. Given the nature of the dependent variable, pooled cross-sectional time-series models for count data were used. This type of model is a methodological innovation in comparative politics, a field in which most statistical tools for pooled cross-sectional time-series have been devised for binary or

continuous outcome variables. For robustness purposes, a series of control variables, different time-correction correlations and estimation strategies were included in the statistical specification. In order to test and add a further, in-depth dimension to the results drawn by the statistical analyses, qualitative evidence from three country cases in the region (Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela) was in turn analysed.

This study has drawn the following findings. (1) In line with consociational models of democracy, the probability of social mobilisation is lowest when both the executive and legislature are co-responsible for the process of cabinet formation and termination (that is, in semi-presidential systems). However, this is not the case in parliamentary and pure presidential systems. Whilst in parliamentary systems, electoral rules for the legislature can account for the presence of winner-take-all politics, in pure presidentialism, other institutional accessories (like electoral rules for the presidency, decision-making powers of the president, and the strength of legislature) should be taken into account.

(2) In pure presidential democracies the likelihood of social mobilisation is greater in the presence of disproportional formulae for the distribution of seats in the assembly. Against mainstream literature, however, in the pure presidential type of executive-legislative relations the odds of social mobilisation are not affected by the extent to which electoral formulae promote the entry of parties to the assembly. Rather, it is the system used for selecting the presidency the main electoral variable affecting the likelihood of social mobilisation. More specifically, the odds for social mobilisation are higher whenever the immediate presidential re-election is allowed and/or presidents are selected in runoff elections in the assembly. This is an important contribution to the comparative study of social mobilisation, which has neglected the influence of the system used for selecting the presidency. Both disproportional rules for the assembly and permissive rules for the re-election of the president increase the partisan powers of the legislature.

(3) The likelihood of social mobilisation in a pure presidential democracy is not affected by the powers of the president to influence legislation via decrees, veto or referenda. Instead, the likelihood of social mobilisation in a pure presidential democracy is largely affected by the ability of the legislature to censure and sanction the executive. When these powers of the legislature are strong, presidents are more compelled to negotiate with the parties in the assembly, rather than enact unilaterally legislation, even when they may have the formal ability to do so. But, even in the presence of strong presidential powers and strong legislatures, oversized inclusive coalitions (and cabinet) are not necessarily crafted

(5) The likelihood for social mobilisation tends to increase with the size of the presidential party in the legislative contingent. Contentious action from below is the most likely to occur in the presence of single-party contingents (and cabinets). When the president dominates the assembly, she can govern as she fits, irrespective of her formal decision-making powers. The incidence of social mobilisation is positively related to the partisan powers of the presidents, which can be a product of institutional factors (namely the electoral rules for the selection of the president and the legislature) but also of country-specific factors (like the rise of outsiders).

Overall, the thesis suggests that the likelihood of social mobilisation is linked to the extent of bargaining and compromise between the executive and the parties in the assembly. That is, social mobilisation is more likely to occur when presidents have the ability to enact policies without significant opposition or check from opposition parties in the legislature. The concentration of power in the executive through both formal and informal means has inhibited the effective protection of citizenship rights and weakened oversight institutions. The more inclusive and oversized coalitions are, the lower the probability of social mobilisation. Coalitions can be promoted (or inhibited) by institutional arrangements like the budgetary powers of the president and the oversight capacities of the legislature and the

electoral system for the legislature. However, they are also endogenous to the experience of democratic politics in a country (the rise of outsider leaders, for instance).

Although the main findings of this study go in line with the assumptions of consociational models of democracy, the present work advocates for a revision of the institutional prescriptions for achieving a consociational democracy. The influence of institutions like electoral rules or other institutional accessories should be seen as *conditional* on the type of executive-legislative arrangements. Based on this evidence, this thesis concludes by strongly advocating for the inclusion of the different types of executive-legislative arrangements, and the institutions that could be combined with these particular formats, as an important variable in the institutional study of contentious action across democracies. In specific, it suggests paying more attention to the ways formal arrangements affect the extent to which the president relates with opposition parties in the assembly.

I believe the thesis improves our understanding of the institutional causes of social mobilisation in a democracy. The conclusions drawn by this study may hopefully be appealing not only to scholars, but also to practitioners defending particular institutional choices over others. These findings are not only important for many Latin American democracies, where political reforms are in the current agenda. They may be also important for other democracies, particularly those newly inaugurated, such as contemporary Northern Africa and the Middle East, where the advantages and disadvantages of the presidential type of executive-legislative relations (and its whole range of institutional accessories) are currently being discussed.

Nonetheless, this study has offered one side of the puzzle. This study is limited to pure presidentialism. Future studies can further analyse how social mobilisation is restricted by other types of executive-legislative relations and the institutions that could be combined with them. The present enquiry can be extended to hybrid forms of parliamentarism and

presidentialism – which have proliferated in the past in Eastern Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. Also, comparisons of the role played by electoral systems on the prospects for social mobilisation can be conducted across different types of executive-legislative formats. Like in pure presidential systems in Latin America, for instance, legislatures are malapportioned, unlimited presidential terms are also fairly common, and the consecutive re-election of the presidential incumbent is high in the semi-presidential systems of Sub-Saharan Africa.

Further studies can undertake comparisons across countries in the region in order to the validity of the claims of this study. They could re-examine the relationship between the variables of interest with more detailed data on protest events in Latin America and elsewhere (distinguishing, for instance, the number of participants, their identity, core demands, and so on and so forth). Also, they can examine variations in social mobilisation across pure presidential regimes using data on cabinet composition, coalition formation, and legislative success over time. Similarly, the links between social mobilisation and the type of executive-legislative relations can be assessed using aggregate data on institutions alongside longitudinal multi-wave survey data, as it becomes available for various countries and time periods. Such a multilevel analysis could provide a more complete account on the influence on social mobilisation and democratic politics. Moreover, the ways in which the interaction of veto players in pure presidential systems affects the costs and benefits that citizens face when deciding to engage in contentious action can be expressed in formal terms. In sum, the inclusion of the type of executive-legislative relations opens then a fruitful line of research. The results of these future undertakings will certainly provide a clearer theoretical and empirical understanding of the ways in which the different types of executive-legislative formats and their institutional accessories can affect the prospects of social mobilisation in a

democracy. There is therefore a large research agenda in the study of social mobilisation in comparative politics.

# APPENDIX

## CHAPTER 2

| <i>List of countries included in regression analysis</i> |                         |                          |
|----------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| Albania                                                  | German Federal Republic | New Zealand              |
| Argentina                                                | Ghana                   | Nicaragua                |
| Armenia                                                  | Greece                  | Niger                    |
| Australia                                                | Guatemala               | Nigeria                  |
| Austria                                                  | Guinea-Bissau           | Norway                   |
| Bahamas                                                  | Honduras                | Pakistan                 |
| Bangladesh                                               | Hungary                 | Panama                   |
| Barbados                                                 | Iceland                 | Papua New Guinea         |
| Belarus                                                  | India                   | Paraguay                 |
| Belgium                                                  | Indonesia               | Peru                     |
| Belize                                                   | Ireland                 | Philippines              |
| Benin                                                    | Italy/Sardinia          | Poland                   |
| Bhutan                                                   | Jamaica                 | Portugal                 |
| Bolivia                                                  | Japan                   | Romania                  |
| Brazil                                                   | Kenya                   | Senegal                  |
| Bulgaria                                                 | Korea, Republic of      | Sierra Leone             |
| Burkina Faso                                             | Kyrgyz Republic         | Slovakia                 |
| Burundi                                                  | Latvia                  | Slovenia                 |
| Canada                                                   | Liberia                 | Solomon Islands          |
| Cape Verde                                               | Lithuania               | South Africa             |
| Central African Republic                                 | Luxembourg              | Spain                    |
| Chile                                                    | Madagascar              | Sri Lanka (Ceylon)       |
| Colombia                                                 | Malawi                  | Surinam                  |
| Comoros                                                  | Maldives                | Sweden                   |
| Congo                                                    | Mali                    | Switzerland              |
| Costa Rica                                               | Malta                   | Taiwan                   |
| Croatia                                                  | Mauritania              | Thailand                 |
| Czech Republic                                           | Mauritius               | Trinidad and Tobago      |
| Denmark                                                  | Mexico                  | Uganda                   |
| Dominican Republic                                       | Moldova                 | Ukraine                  |
| Ecuador                                                  | Mongolia                | United Kingdom           |
| El Salvador                                              | Mozambique              | United States of America |
| Fiji                                                     | Myanmar (Burma)         | Uruguay                  |
| Finland                                                  | Namibia                 | Venezuela                |
| France                                                   | Nepal                   | Djibouti                 |
| Georgia                                                  | Netherlands             | Equatorial Guinea        |


| <i>Additional data sources and measures</i> |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
|---------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Subnational structure of the government     | Measured as a series of binary variables, according to the federal, hybrid or unitary structure of the government. Data for this variable was compiled from Schjolset (2008) and the World Banks' Database of Political Institutions (DPI, 2010).                                                                      |
| Rules for the election of legislators       | Measured as a series of binary variables, according to the electoral system used for electing legislators (plurality, proportional representation and semi-proportional representation.) Data for this variable was compiled from Schjolset (2008) and the World Banks' Database of Political Institutions (DPI, 2010) |
| Population                                  | Measured as the log of the number of every 10,000 inhabitants. Data comes from Banks (2010) and WDI (2010)                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| Inflation                                   | Measured as the log of the percentual inflation rate. Data comes from Reinard & Rogoff (2009) and WDI (2010).                                                                                                                                                                                                          |

| <i>Proportion of observations by form of government</i> |                 |
|---------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|
| <i>Form of government</i>                               | <i>Per cent</i> |
| Parliamentarism                                         | 53.57           |
| Semipresidentialism                                     | 20.6            |
| Premier-presidentialism                                 | 9.89            |
| President-parliamentary                                 | 9.48            |
| Pure-presidentialism                                    | 27.06           |
| <b>Total</b>                                            | <b>100</b>      |
| <i>Note: Polity2 &gt;= 3</i>                            |                 |

| <i>Proportion of observations by electoral formula for the lower house</i> |                 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|
| <i>Regime type</i>                                                         | <i>Per cent</i> |
| Majoritarian                                                               | 38.52           |
| Semi-PR                                                                    | 11.13           |
| PR                                                                         | 50.35           |
| <b>Total</b>                                                               | <b>100.0</b>    |
| <i>Note: Polity2 &gt;= 3</i>                                               |                 |

| <i>Proportion of observations by territorial structure of government</i> |                 |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|
| <i>Regime type</i>                                                       | <i>Per cent</i> |
| Unitary                                                                  | 74.84           |
| <b>Total</b>                                                             | <b>100.0</b>    |
| <i>Note: Polity2 &gt;= 3</i>                                             |                 |

| <i>Average Number of Protest Events by Form of Government (Polity +3)</i>                                                                                                                                                                       |                                                    |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|
| <i>Form of Government</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | <i>Number of Protest Events / Population (log)</i> |
| Parliamentarism                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | 0.25                                               |
| Semipresidentialism                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | 0.18                                               |
| <i>Premier-presidentialism</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | <i>0.16</i>                                        |
| <i>Presidential- parliamentarism</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                            | <i>0.20</i>                                        |
| Pure presidentialism                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | 0.33                                               |
| <p><i>Notes: Polity2 &gt;= 3</i></p> <p><i>T-Tests comparing the number of protest events in pure presidentialism versus other forms of government confirm a significant difference at a <math>p &lt; 0.01</math> for these categories.</i></p> |                                                    |




## CHAPTER 2

| <p><i>The effect of the type of executive on social mobilisation</i></p> <p><i>Poisson and Negative Binomial Standard Models</i></p>                                                                            |                     |                    |                    |                     |                     |                     |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | Poisson             |                    |                    | Negative Binomial   |                     |                     |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | PA                  | Random             | Fixed              | PA                  | Random              | Fixed               |
| Parliamentary                                                                                                                                                                                                   | 0.77<br>(0.262)     | 0.83<br>(0.190)    | 0.951<br>(0.262)   | 0.862<br>(0.266)    | 0.988<br>(0.155)    | 1.094<br>(0.206)    |
| Semipresidential                                                                                                                                                                                                | 0.448*<br>(0.179)   | 0.65<br>(0.192)    | 0.862<br>(0.211)   | 0.458*<br>(0.177)   | 0.595<br>(0.221)    | 0.728<br>(0.258)    |
| Inflation (log)                                                                                                                                                                                                 | 1.232***<br>(0.058) | 1.146**<br>(0.053) | 1.147**<br>(0.052) | 1.243***<br>(0.080) | 1.167***<br>(0.045) | 1.162***<br>(0.039) |
| Population (log)                                                                                                                                                                                                | 1.632***<br>(0.101) | 1.223+<br>(0.132)  | 1.157<br>(0.119)   | 1.724***<br>(0.106) | 1.174**<br>(0.066)  | 1.086+<br>(0.049)   |
| GDP per capita (log)                                                                                                                                                                                            | 0.929<br>(0.060)    | 0.839*<br>(0.065)  | 0.848*<br>(0.061)  | 0.883<br>(0.069)    | 0.896*<br>(0.040)   | 0.908*<br>(0.039)   |
| Time effects                                                                                                                                                                                                    | AR(1)               | LDV                | LDV                | AR(1)               | LDV                 | LDV                 |
| Number of observations                                                                                                                                                                                          | 2247                | 3272               | 3113               | 2247                | 3272                | 3113                |
| Number of countries                                                                                                                                                                                             | 84                  | 117                | 99                 | 84                  | 117                 | 99                  |
| $\chi^2$                                                                                                                                                                                                        | 184.4               | 72.2               | 402.5              | 179.2               | 41.08               | 43.8                |
| Error correction                                                                                                                                                                                                | Robust              | Bootstrap          | Robust             | Semirobust          | Bootstrap           | Bootstrap           |
| <p><i>Note: Coefficient reported as incidence ratios; standard errors in parentheses. + <math>p &lt; 0.1</math>, * <math>p &lt; 0.05</math>, ** <math>p &lt; 0.01</math>, *** <math>p &lt; 0.001</math></i></p> |                     |                    |                    |                     |                     |                     |

| <p><i>The effect of the type of executive on social mobilisation</i><br/> <i>Linear Models (FGLS)</i></p>                                                             |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
|                                                                                                                                                                       | 1                    | 2                    | 3                    | 4                    | 5                    | 6                    |
| Parliamentarism                                                                                                                                                       | -0.044*<br>(0.021)   | -0.039+<br>(0.022)   | -0.039+<br>(0.02)    | -0.045*<br>(0.022)   | -0.046+<br>(0.024)   | -0.041+<br>(0.023)   |
| Semipresidentialism                                                                                                                                                   | -0.095***<br>(0.019) | -0.080***<br>(0.019) |                      | -0.083***<br>(0.020) | -0.081***<br>(0.022) | -0.087***<br>(0.020) |
| Premier-presidential                                                                                                                                                  |                      |                      | -0.079***<br>(0.020) |                      |                      |                      |
| Presidential-parliamentary                                                                                                                                            |                      |                      | -0.082***<br>(0.020) |                      |                      |                      |
| Plurality                                                                                                                                                             |                      | 0.014<br>(0.014)     | 0.014<br>(0.014)     | 0.017<br>(0.016)     | 0.032+<br>(0.019)    | 0.014<br>(0.015)     |
| Semi – PR rules                                                                                                                                                       |                      | -0.008<br>(0.017)    | -0.008<br>(0.017)    | -0.007<br>(0.017)    | -0.005<br>(0.018)    | -0.011<br>(0.017)    |
| Unitarism                                                                                                                                                             |                      | 0.005<br>(0.016)     | 0.004<br>(0.017)     | 0.007<br>(0.019)     | 0.015<br>(0.019)     | 0.003<br>(0.018)     |
| Inflation (log)                                                                                                                                                       | 0.009*<br>(0.004)    | 0.010*<br>(0.004)    | 0.010*<br>(0.004)    | 0.011*<br>(0.004)    | 0.011*<br>(0.004)    | 0.011**<br>(0.004)   |
| Population (log)                                                                                                                                                      | 0.023***<br>(0.003)  | 0.031***<br>(0.004)  | 0.031***<br>(0.004)  | 0.033***<br>(0.005)  | 0.039***<br>(0.006)  | 0.032***<br>(0.005)  |
| GDP per capita (log)                                                                                                                                                  | -0.007*<br>(0.003)   | -0.006+<br>(0.003)   | -0.006+<br>(0.003)   | -0.002<br>(0.003)    | -0.003<br>(0.004)    | -0.004<br>(0.004)    |
| Cold War                                                                                                                                                              |                      |                      |                      | 0.020<br>(0.013)     |                      |                      |
| Polity2                                                                                                                                                               |                      |                      |                      |                      | -0.002<br>(0.003)    |                      |
| 1978-2009                                                                                                                                                             |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      | 0.003<br>(0.013)     |
| Number of observations                                                                                                                                                | 3348                 | 3167                 | 3167                 | 3167                 | 2874                 | 3167                 |
| Number of countries                                                                                                                                                   | 117                  | 109                  | 109                  | 109                  | 101                  | 109                  |
| Error correction                                                                                                                                                      | AR(1)                | AR(1)                | AR(1)                | AR(1)                | AR(1)                | AR(1)                |
| $\chi^2$                                                                                                                                                              | 131.394              | 132.83               | 132.871              | 123.683              | 119.322              | 126.684              |
| <p><i>Note: Standard errors in parentheses. + <math>p &lt; 0.1</math>, * <math>p &lt; 0.05</math>, ** <math>p &lt; 0.01</math>, *** <math>p &lt; 0.001</math></i></p> |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |

## CHAPTERS 4, 5

| <i>Additional data sources and measures</i> |                                                                                                                                                           |
|---------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Bicameralism                                | Data for this variable was compiled from Georgetown University's "Political Database of the Americas" (2009) and Constituciones Hispanoamericanas (2009). |
| GDP per capita                              | Measured as the log of the GDP per capita Data for this variable was compiled from Banks (2010) and WDI (2010)                                            |
| Population                                  | Measured as the log of the number of every 10,000 inhabitants. Data comes from                                                                            |
| Inflation                                   | Measured as the log of the percentual inflation rate. Data comes from Reinard & Rogoff (2009) and WDI (2010).                                             |



## CHAPTER 4

| <i>The effect of the presidential electoral formula on social mobilisation</i><br><i>Poisson and Negative Binomial Standard Models</i> |          |           |          |                   |           |           |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-----------|----------|-------------------|-----------|-----------|
|                                                                                                                                        | Poisson  |           |          | Negative Binomial |           |           |
|                                                                                                                                        | PA       | Random    | Fixed    | PA                | Random    | Fixed     |
| Presidential Re-election formula                                                                                                       | 1.218*   | 1.182     | 1.059    | 1.202             | 1.097     | 1.009     |
|                                                                                                                                        | (0.110)  | (0.201)   | (0.133)  | (0.145)           | (0.143)   | (0.165)   |
| Length of presidential term                                                                                                            | 1.367*** | 1.173     | 1.05     | 1.541**           | 1.237     | 1.132     |
|                                                                                                                                        | (0.127)  | (0.205)   | (0.161)  | (0.210)           | (0.200)   | (0.196)   |
| Bicameralism                                                                                                                           | 1.728+   | 0.988     | 0.600*** | 1.607+            | 1.218     | 0.908     |
|                                                                                                                                        | (0.490)  | (0.325)   | (0.087)  | (0.441)           | (0.346)   | (0.236)   |
| 1978-2009                                                                                                                              | 7.967*** | 1.058     | 1.009    | 7.283***          | 1.616     | 1.397     |
|                                                                                                                                        | (1.733)  | (0.334)   | (0.285)  | (1.654)           | (0.515)   | (0.538)   |
| Inflation (log)                                                                                                                        | 1.132*** | 1.050     | 1.053    | 1.189**           | 1.046     | 1.055     |
|                                                                                                                                        | (0.031)  | (0.088)   | (0.057)  | (0.075)           | (0.060)   | (0.080)   |
| GDP per capita (log)                                                                                                                   | 0.645*** | 0.852*    | 0.838*   | 0.627**           | 0.773**   | 0.757*    |
|                                                                                                                                        | (0.084)  | (0.068)   | (0.061)  | (0.091)           | (0.067)   | (0.099)   |
| Population (log)                                                                                                                       | 1.242    | 1.071     | 0.944    | 1.168             | 1.117     | 1.122     |
|                                                                                                                                        | (0.180)  | (0.108)   | (0.094)  | (0.156)           | (0.084)   | (0.128)   |
| Time effects                                                                                                                           | AR(1)    | LDV       | LDV      | AR(1)             | LDV       | LDV       |
| Number of observations                                                                                                                 | 271      | 515       | 515      | 271               | 515       | 515       |
| Number of countries                                                                                                                    | 10       | 17        | 17       | 10                | 17        | 17        |
| $\chi^2$                                                                                                                               | 16771.8  | 47.38     | 321.5    | 43987.7           | 40.25     | 27.01     |
| Error correction                                                                                                                       | Robust   | Bootstrap | Robust   | Semirobust        | Bootstrap | Bootstrap |
| Note: Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001                                                      |          |           |          |                   |           |           |

***The effect of electoral institutions on social movement activity in Latin America 1900-2009***

***Number of protest events as reported in Banks (2009)***

|                                                                                                                             | <i>1</i> | <i>2</i> | <i>3</i> | <i>4</i> | <i>5</i> | <i>6</i> |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| PR                                                                                                                          | 0.676    |          |          |          |          |          |
|                                                                                                                             | (0.275)  |          |          |          |          |          |
| Runoff in the legislature                                                                                                   |          | 1.564*   | 1.560*   |          |          |          |
|                                                                                                                             |          | (0.217)  | (0.214)  |          |          |          |
| Runoff among voters                                                                                                         |          | 0.758    |          |          |          |          |
|                                                                                                                             |          | (0.249)  |          |          |          |          |
| Majority runoff among voters                                                                                                |          |          | 0.730    | 0.762    |          |          |
|                                                                                                                             |          |          | (0.182)  | (0.158)  |          |          |
| Threshold runoff among voters                                                                                               |          |          | 0.822    | 0.807    |          |          |
|                                                                                                                             |          |          | (0.472)  | (0.665)  |          |          |
| Re-election formula                                                                                                         |          |          |          |          | 1.290*   |          |
|                                                                                                                             |          |          |          |          | (0.135)  |          |
| Consecutive re-election                                                                                                     |          |          |          |          |          | 1.640*   |
|                                                                                                                             |          |          |          |          |          | (0.225)  |
| Length of presidential term                                                                                                 |          |          |          |          | 1.343*   | 1.323*   |
|                                                                                                                             |          |          |          |          | (0.119)  | (0.123)  |
| Bicameralism                                                                                                                | 1.307    | 1.077    | 1.095    | 1.034    | 1.465    | 1.335    |
|                                                                                                                             | (0.279)  | (0.313)  | (0.335)  | (0.334)  | (0.316)  | (0.298)  |
| 1978-2009                                                                                                                   | 1.196    | 1.261    | 1.287    | 1.251    | 1.505    | 1.507    |
|                                                                                                                             | (0.287)  | (0.259)  | (0.230)  | (0.284)  | (0.356)  | (0.339)  |
| Inflation (log)                                                                                                             | 1.106    | 1.104    | 1.106    | 1.074    | 1.084    | 1.063    |
|                                                                                                                             | (0.081)  | (0.075)  | (0.070)  | (0.089)  | (0.071)  | (0.077)  |
| GDP per capita (log)                                                                                                        | 0.956    | 1.017    | 1.013    | 0.926    | 0.865    | 0.860    |
|                                                                                                                             | (0.140)  | (0.158)  | (0.152)  | (0.142)  | (0.113)  | (0.114)  |
| Population (log)                                                                                                            | 1.076    | 1.172**  | 1.179*** | 1.229*** | 1.020    | 1.062    |
|                                                                                                                             | (0.065)  | (0.052)  | (0.045)  | (0.056)  | (0.063)  | (0.062)  |
| Time Effects                                                                                                                | YES      | YES      | YES      | YES      | YES      | YES      |
|                                                                                                                             |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Number of observations                                                                                                      | 568      | 566      | 566      | 503      | 515      | 515      |
| Number of countries                                                                                                         | 17       | 17       | 17       | 16       | 17       | 17       |
| Error correction                                                                                                            | INAR(1)  | INAR(1)  | INAR(1)  | INAR(1)  | INAR(1)  | INAR(1)  |
| Rho                                                                                                                         | 1.285*** | 1.283*** | 1.281*** | 1.319*** | 1.289*** | 1.297*** |
| J                                                                                                                           | 0.0318   | 0.0209   | 0.0237   | 0.481    | 0.419    | 0.462    |
| Note: Coefficient reported as incidence ratios; standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 |          |          |          |          |          |          |

## CHAPTER 5

| <i>The effect of presidential and legislative powers on social movement activity in Latin America - LFM (INAR(2))</i>                                          |          |          |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|----------|
| Decree * Veto                                                                                                                                                  | 0.576    | 0.596    |
|                                                                                                                                                                | (0.478)  | (0.425)  |
| Government-initiated referenda                                                                                                                                 | 1.879    | 1.855    |
|                                                                                                                                                                | (0.415)  | (0.379)  |
| Budgetary powers                                                                                                                                               | 0.568**  | 0.558**  |
|                                                                                                                                                                | (0.213)  | (0.222)  |
| Censure and sanction                                                                                                                                           | 0.906    | 0.907    |
|                                                                                                                                                                | (0.132)  | (0.126)  |
| Bicameralism                                                                                                                                                   | 2.512    | 2.599    |
|                                                                                                                                                                | (0.668)  | (0.645)  |
| Independence of the judiciary                                                                                                                                  |          | 0.834    |
|                                                                                                                                                                |          | (0.283)  |
| Inflation (log)                                                                                                                                                | 0.752    | 0.778+   |
|                                                                                                                                                                | (0.179)  | (0.140)  |
| GDP per capita (log)                                                                                                                                           | 1.130    | 1.166    |
|                                                                                                                                                                | (0.159)  | (0.179)  |
| Population (log)                                                                                                                                               | 1.303+   | 1.262    |
|                                                                                                                                                                | (0.153)  | (0.169)  |
| N                                                                                                                                                              | 391      | 391      |
| Q                                                                                                                                                              | 17       | 17       |
| J                                                                                                                                                              | 1.444    | 1.456    |
| Error correction                                                                                                                                               | INAR(2)  | INAR(2)  |
| Rho1                                                                                                                                                           | 1.840*** | 1.833*** |
| Rho2                                                                                                                                                           | 1.245    | 1.239    |
| <i>Note: Standard errors in parentheses. + <math>p &lt; 0.1</math>, * <math>p &lt; 0.05</math>, ** <math>p &lt; 0.01</math>, *** <math>p &lt; 0.001</math></i> |          |          |

***The effect of presidential and legislative powers on social movement activity in Latin America 1978-2009***

***Number of protest events as reported in Banks (2009)***

|                                                                                                                          | <i>1</i> | <i>2</i> | <i>3</i> |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|
| Decree * Veto                                                                                                            | 0.862    | 0.824    | 0.871    |
|                                                                                                                          | (0.231)  | (0.234)  | (0.222)  |
| Government-initiated referenda                                                                                           | 1.085    | 1.085    | 1.084    |
|                                                                                                                          | (0.223)  | (0.232)  | (0.222)  |
| Budgetary powers                                                                                                         | 1.099    | 1.127    | 1.110    |
|                                                                                                                          | (0.081)  | (0.089)  | (0.086)  |
| Censure and sanction                                                                                                     | 1.001    | 0.976    | 0.988    |
|                                                                                                                          | (0.067)  | (0.074)  | (0.075)  |
| Independence of the judiciary                                                                                            |          | 0.918    |          |
|                                                                                                                          |          | (0.106)  |          |
| Bicameralism                                                                                                             | 1.340    | 1.476    | 1.395    |
|                                                                                                                          | (0.301)  | (0.265)  | (0.302)  |
| 1978-2009                                                                                                                |          |          | 1.474    |
|                                                                                                                          |          |          | (0.309)  |
| Inflation (log)                                                                                                          | 1.047    | 1.026    | 1.040    |
|                                                                                                                          | (0.085)  | (0.071)  | (0.084)  |
| GDP per capita (log)                                                                                                     | 0.880    | 0.843    | 0.857    |
|                                                                                                                          | (0.126)  | (0.160)  | (0.131)  |
| Population (log)                                                                                                         | 1.168*   | 1.139+   | 1.151+   |
|                                                                                                                          | (0.077)  | (0.077)  | (0.084)  |
| Time Effects                                                                                                             | YES      | YES      | YES      |
|                                                                                                                          |          |          |          |
| Number of observations                                                                                                   | 430      | 405      | 430      |
| Number of countries                                                                                                      | 17       | 17       | 17       |
| Error correction                                                                                                         | INAR(1)  | INAR(1)  | INAR(1)  |
| Rho                                                                                                                      | 1.311*** | 1.297*** | 1.306*** |
| J                                                                                                                        | 0.009    | 1.602    | 0.210    |
| Coefficient reported as incidence ratios; standard errors in parentheses.<br>+ p < 0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 |          |          |          |

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