

# The consequences of nationalism: A scholarly exchange

Matthias vom Hau<sup>1</sup> | Marc Helbling<sup>2</sup> | Maya Tudor<sup>3</sup> |  
Andreas Wimmer<sup>4</sup> | Daphne Halikiopoulou<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals, Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, Barcelona 08005, Spain

<sup>2</sup>University of Mannheim, A5, 6, Mannheim 68159, Germany

<sup>3</sup>University of Oxford, Oxford, Oxfordshire, UK

<sup>4</sup>Sociology, Columbia University, 606 West 122 Street, New York, New York 10027, USA

<sup>5</sup>Politics, Derwent College, University of York, York YO10 5DD, UK

## Correspondence

Marc Helbling, University of Mannheim, A5, 6, Mannheim 68159, Germany.

Email: [helbling@uni-mannheim.de](mailto:helbling@uni-mannheim.de)

## Abstract

The main thrust of the scholarship on nationalism has so far been concerned with its origins. But nationalism also has effects. Whether it underpins the nation-building efforts of states, is mobilised by counter-state forces or is used in everyday life, nationalism might implicate a wide range of substantive outcomes, including political regimes, public goods provision, citizenship and immigration laws, and different patterns of conflict. Yet—with a few notable exceptions—the consequences of nationalism have received significantly less scholarly attention. In response, the aim of this Exchange is to create a new dialogue between different strands of scholarship around what we know and do not know about the consequences of nationalism. We organise this Exchange around the following questions: (1) What is nationalism? (2) How can we measure nationalism? (3) What are the consequences of nationalism? (4) What are new research frontiers?

## KEYWORDS

citizenship and immigration laws, conflict, nationalism, political regimes, public goods provision

This is an open access article under the terms of the [Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.

© 2023 The Authors. *Nations and Nationalism* published by Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

## 1 | INTRODUCTION: DAPHNE HALIKIOPOULOU (UNIVERSITY OF YORK)

Nationalism is central to our understanding of some of the most important political developments in the modern world. It is often criticised as an irrational doctrine and pathological phenomenon associated with the emergence of violent extreme right-wing movements. Pundits and commentators often refer to nationalism to describe events such as the spread of social and political polarisation, 'red wall' politics, the rise of populism, ethnic violence and mass protests. While sometimes nationalism is used as a synonym to political instability, irredentism, division and aggression, other times, it is understood as a democratising force facilitated by successful mass mobilisation. Despite the significant consequences, however, that nationalism has for political stability and democracy, academic research has yet to systematise these consequences, both theoretically and empirically. While most established works in the field focus on the origins of nationalism, or in other words how and when it arises, we know less about how and why nationalism matters in contemporary politics.

The aim of this Exchange is to start a new dialogue between different strands of scholarship around what we know, what we do not know and what we should know about the consequences of nationalism. To reflect on these issues, the contributors have been asked to address four related questions: (1) What is nationalism? (2) How can we measure nationalism? (3) What are the consequences of nationalism? (4) What are new research frontiers? Each contributor addresses these questions from a different sub-disciplinary perspective: Wimmer takes a macro-comparative approach; Helbling focuses specifically on immigration policies; Vom Hau centres on economic and social development; and finally, Tudor adopts a democratisation approach. Our goal is to illustrate the multi-dimensionality of nationalism and discuss its wide-ranging consequences for scholars of a variety of sub-disciplines.

The first question asks contributors to explain how they understand nationalism. It speaks to debates about the malleability of nationalism, its origins and its 'sticky', 'thin' or 'chameleon-like' nature (Freeden, 1998; Hall, 2011). All contributors commence from the premise that nationalism is *political*. Wimmer defines it as a political ideology, governed by two principles of political legitimacy: States should be governed by members of the nation, and rulers should care about the interests of the national majority. While polysemantic and flexible, nationalism is effectively poorly elaborated, and as such able to attach itself to most contemporary political ideologies. Helbling concurs with Wimmer's emphasis on the political nature of nationalism, defining it, in line with Gellner (1983), as a modern, politicised version of ethnicity which seeks the congruence of the political and national units. He also focuses on the question of inclusion and exclusion in his definition, suggesting that one direct implication of the key principle of nationalism is that it ties institutions of inclusion such as citizenship, democracy and welfare to national forms of exclusion. An understanding of how these boundaries are set and how they change—for example, the ethnic/civic distinction in the study of nationalism—can help us distinguish between different immigration policies.

Vom Hau also draws on Gellner (1983) to define nationalism as a political principle which holds that the world is divided into nations, which should be self-governed. He proceeds to distinguish between three distinct perspectives that may help us understand the ontology of nationalism: (1) the *behavioural* approach which treats nationalism as a particular form of collective action; (2) the *affective* approach which refers to nationalism as a collective sentiment; (3) the *cognitive* approach which treats nationalism as a discursive formation. Each approach offers important nuance, by allowing us to capture theoretically meaningful aspects of nationalism. Finally, Tudor, who also defines nationalism as a political ideology, focuses on the parallels between nationalism and democracy: both invoke 'the people', a concept of 'acrimonious contestation'. As Wimmer also argues, nationalism offers a solution to democracy's 'boundary problem', which suggests the two are often conceptually and empirically linked.

The second question asks contributors to reflect on issues of measurement and operationalisation. This is an important question given not only the interdisciplinary nature of nationalism but also the difficulties involved in operationalising and empirically quantifying the concept. To address research questions pertaining to the relevance and consequences of nationalism, scholars face difficult classification and operationalisation decisions. Can we, and if so how, empirically distinguish between nationalist and non-nationalist actors and attitudes, or ethnic and civic nations? Here, the different contributors focus on the ways in which we can measure nationalism from their different sub-disciplinary perspectives. They all agree, however, about the difficult methodological challenges that scholars

of nationalism face and that more systematic measurement would advance the field, especially empirical research, significantly. Wimmer opens the discussion by distinguishing between three levels of analysis, that is, the state, the aggregate and the individual, which may be measured with the use of different types of data. Helbling turns to the distinction between the ideational and policy models. The former focus on measuring the dominant understanding of nationhood and/or rely on quantitative expert interviews to measure how scholars see the elite's view. The latter tend to be investigated by means of qualitative case studies and, only more recently, comparisons of a larger number of countries.

Vom Hau elaborates further on the distinction between the behavioural, affective and cognitive approaches to nationalism, and the different dimensions each approach might allow us to measure. He argues that while the behavioural and affective approaches are useful tools for analysing the *intensity* of nationalism, the cognitive approach is better suited for identifying differences in the *content* of nationalism. Research explaining variations in the intensity of nationalism tends to use individual-level survey data, for example, using questions about national identifications and pride, or focuses on specific state policies to capture variations of nation-building. Research on cognition, on the other hand, traces the ways in which nationalism is articulated in rhetoric and political claims, expressed in public culture and enacted in private conversations, and thus helps to differentiate nationalism as a frame of reference and pattern of discourse from political behaviour.

Tudor centres the question of measurement on the relationship between nationalism and democracy. Given that both concepts invoke 'the people', it is surprising that their empirical relationship has not been more systematically interrogated in existing literature. The study of nationalism often suffers from a lack of conceptual clarity, given the breadth of the concept and its 'sticky' or 'thin' nature (Freeden, 1998; Hall, 2011). Existing scholarship has primarily conceptualised and measured nationalism along five dimensions, Tudor notes, all of which are difficult to measure empirically. The first two, that is, *elite fragmentation* and *popular fragmentation*, examine the cohesiveness of national narratives, which are tricky to operationalise; the third, that is, *ascriptiveness*, relates to the ethnic-civic distinction which scholars tend to agree is blurry and difficult to establish empirically. The fourth dimension refers to the 'thickness' of nations, or in other words the extent to which symbols, narratives and policies positively define the nation. Thickness has rarely been empirically assessed by systematic comparisons. Finally, the fifth dimension, *salience*, or the extent to which individuals consider national identities to be important relative to other identities is usually measured with cross-country and cross-temporal levels, but questions of operationalisation of 'national identity' remain undressed. In sum, all contributions point to the significance but also challenges in developing accurate measurement tools that will allow for robust and generalisable conclusions across cases and across time.

The third question prompts contributors to delve into the consequences of nationalism and, in doing so, highlight gaps in existing nationalism research with regard to these consequences. The aim is to start a dialogue about the ways in which we may theorise and empirically substantiate more systematic accounts of the consequences of nationalism. Wimmer sets the ground for this from his macro-political perspective. He presents the big picture by identifying eight distinct, but interconnected, consequences: (1) *the delegitimisation of ethnic and racial hierarchies*; (2) *the revolutionisation of state power*; (3) *the attempt to offer a solution to the boundary problem of democracy* by formalising the stipulation that only members of the nation should be allowed to vote; (4) *the consolidation of the idea of equality before the law* by stipulating that all members of the 'national family' are equal; (5) the provision of an *ideological basis for a massive increase in taxation*; (6) *the ideological underpinning of universal military conscription*; (7) *the development of welfare systems* by popularising the idea of mutual solidarity between all members of the nation; and (8) *shaping the ethnic composition of the population*. This conceptualisation suggests that nationalism has important, structural and far-reaching consequences and has in many ways shaped the economic, social and political make-up of states in the modern world. To understand them more systematically, we need broad perspectives that allow us to study nationalism from both demand and supply-side approaches across different disciplines.

Helbling adopts one such perspective, focusing specifically on the consequences of nationalism for citizenship policies. His argument is that different understandings of nationhood affect naturalisation criteria. For example, republican and assimilationist models have had different consequences, resulting in different citizenship models in

countries such as France and Germany. Indeed, we have some understanding of the ways in which nationalist governments implement more restrictive immigration policies. But the presence of, often puzzling, cross-national variations suggests that is much scope for future research on the topic.

Vom Hau's contribution focuses on the consequences of nationalism for economic and social development, which he suggests remain surprisingly undertheorised. Like Wimmer, Vom Hau argues that the understanding of the nation as a community of equals facilitated the emergence of free labour markets and new social stratification systems. Nationalism, therefore, is a potential explanatory factor for variations in social development as well as public service provision social policy and welfare outcomes. Although many, if not most, social security, public education and health care systems are organised at the national level and sustained through cross-class solidarity, we know little—and should know more—about the motivational forces behind sustained economic growth.

Tudor concludes by addressing the varied consequences of nationalism for democracy. She notes that while there is much scholarship on individual case studies, the field lacks systematic comparative research examining the modalities of the relationship between nationalism and democracy. This is an important gap as the impact of nationalism on democracy is significant: Already the few existing comparative studies which have engaged in explicitly comparative examinations of the ways in which nationalism affects democracy reveal significant variation. The effective harnessing of strong ethnic nationalism may serve as a crucial driver of democracy in some circumstances; post-Soviet eastern Europe is an illustrative example. Similarly, the Indian nationalist movement's ability to engage in mass mobilisation was key to India's success in establishing democracy and India's civic rather than ethnic nature mattered for India's post-independence establishment of democracy. Elsewhere, however, nationalism did not result in democratic rule. While nationalism's mobilising potential renders it an important force for democracy, much more research is needed on the specific mechanisms that underpin this relationship.

The final question is forward-looking. A renewed, systematic focus on the consequences of nationalism calls for new research frontiers that will advance methodological rigour and theoretical innovation. All contributors agree that the consequences of nationalism are far-reaching and point to avenues for future research that will move the field forward in these respects. Wimmer's suggestions are threefold: We need to make methodological advancements, for example, through the employment of controlled comparisons, event history models and quasi-experiments, in order to address issues of endogeneity in the study of nationalism; we need to develop new typologies that allow for heterogeneity within elite and citizen groups to reflect the changing nature of nationalism overtime; and finally, we need to develop more dynamic theories and modelling techniques in order to identify the conditions under which actor coalitions holding on to certain types of nationalist ideologies gain power over others.

Helbling identifies avenues for future research specifically in the field of nationalism and immigration. His focus is also on empirical and methodological advancements. He argues that we need more systematic ways of empirically observing and measuring nationalism in order to move the debate forward in this area. We also need to move on from the current Eurocentricism in the study of nationalism: The development of appropriate and comparable measures of nationalist discourses across a larger number of countries will allow for the establishment of broad patterns covering countries outside the Western world.

Vom Hau recommends using the distinction between behavioural, affective and cognitive approaches as a starting point for studying the effects of nationalism for economic and social development. He also emphasises the need for more accurate operationalisation and measurement tools to further develop and test plausible explanatory propositions and causal mechanisms. Finally, Tudor encourages the development of new research that (1) engages in comparative historical research around moments when new nations emerged to establish how nationalism had impacted on democracy; (2) uses comparative, time-series survey data to identify the ways in which the different dimensions of nationalism may change around key historical events; and (3) employs field experiments to identify when, whether and how the use of nationalist symbols matters for individual attitudes and behaviours. While all contributions acknowledge the challenges involved in developing new approaches, for example, data limitations, they stress that these challenges constitute opportunities rather than constraints because they open up exciting opportunities for future research. This, as Wimmer argues, is ultimately good news for the study of nationalism.

## 2 | A MACRO-COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: ANDREAS WIMMER (COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY)

### 2.1 | What is nationalism?

Today, nationalism is associated with the populist, anti-immigrant right or even with 'white nationalism', a euphemism for racist and supremacist ideologies. In the eyes of liberals, such 'bad' nationalism stands in opposition to 'good' patriotism (especially in the USA). But from a historical and comparative point of view, both represent different variants of nationalism. Only after WWII did 'bad' nationalism (tarred by the 'national socialism' of the Nazis) become conceptually distinguished from 'good' patriotism, and a 'bad' ethnic version of nationalism as similarly opposed to its 'good' civic cousin.

From an analytic point of view, patriotism and nationalism, both in their ethnic and civic incarnations, are variants of the same political ideology. It is characterised by two principles of political legitimacy that contrast with other principles such as theocracy or dynasticism. The *first is the like-over-like principle*: States should be governed by members of the nation, not by foreigners (e.g., the Manchus of Qing China or the Ottomans in pre-independence Greece). The *second, related principle is that of the primacy of the people's interest*: Rulers should care about and pursue the interests of the national majority, rather than their own (e.g., those of the Manchu elite or the Ottoman dynasty). The first principle tends towards ethnic closure (since there are boundaries to who belongs and who does not belong to a specific nation), and the second tends towards progressivism (governments are tasked with improving the life of citizens) as well as populism (pitting the interest of the majority against those of globally oriented elites).

Nationalism is a poorly elaborated ideology. There is no Adam Smith or Karl Marx of nationalism, for example. Herder and Fichte (the German precursors to modern nationalist doctrine) are unwieldy and unsystematic thinkers. Nationalism is therefore polysemantic and flexible. Historically, it has been fused with a range of very different political ideologies (Freeden, 1998): with liberalism in the 19th century (e.g., during the 1848 revolutions), with fascism in the first half of the 20th century, with communism ever since Lenin and Stalin attempted to reconcile the two and with right wing, anti-immigrant populism today. Nationalism is therefore highly diffuse, and all of today's major ideological currents (conservatism, social democracy, liberalism, communitarianism, etc.) contain nationalist elements, with the exception of some anarchist and libertarian strands of thinking.

### 2.2 | How can we measure nationalism?

Nationalism as a political ideology can be measured both at the aggregate, state level as well as at the level of individuals. At the state level, states that are grounded on the political principles of nationalism (and are thus considered nation-states) can be differentiated from dynastic, theocratic or imperial regimes, for example, by exploring whether the constitution states that the state is ruled in the name of a specific, nationally defined people (as do Wimmer & Min, 2006).

At the individual level, most existing measurements refer to national identities: how individuals relate to the national communities of which they are a member. No one asks about the principles of political legitimacy referenced above since these are now so universally accepted that there is little variation left to explore (with the possible exception of the Middle East or Afghanistan where theocracy or dynasticism represent real alternatives). We should distinguish between levels of identification with the nation and the valence of that identification (in line with Bollen & Medrano, 1998). Regarding the former, many questions ask if an individual considers its membership in the imagined community of the nation more important than membership in an ethnic (sub-national) community, province, town/village, religious community and so forth. Regarding the latter, many surveys routinely ask how 'proud' respondents are of their nation, indicating a positive identification (see, among many others, Wimmer, 2017; a negative form of identification would be to be ashamed of one's nation). Also commonly asked are questions that are

supposed to measure chauvinism, that is, the believe that the respondent's nation is superior to all other nations, thus a hyper-positive form of national identification.<sup>1</sup> More recently, researchers have moved away from survey questions and have begun to use natural language processing techniques to discover nationalist rhetoric, including simple counts of references to the nation, national history, national culture and so forth, for example, in party platforms or the speeches of politicians (see most recently Bonikowski et al., 2022 [forthcoming]).

### 2.3 | What are the consequences of nationalism?

What do we know about the *consequences* of nationalism? I limit myself here to the macro-political domain, while others have summarised findings regarding everyday forms of national identification (Bonikowski, 2016a) or its behavioural consequences (Mylonas & Tudor, 2021).

*First, nationalism delegitimised ethnic and racial hierarchies, most importantly in the form of imperial rule.* 'Foreign rule' was historically justified by ideologies of civilisational progress and just government. Once nationalism spread into local political arenas, motivations for going to war changed as well. Wars of conquest, typical of imperial polities, have largely been replaced by ethno-nationalist wars for national self-determination (before the transition to the nation-state) or over the ethno-political balance of power in newly independent nation-states (Wimmer, 2012). *Second, nationalism has revolutionised the nature of state power.* At the beginning of the 19th century, the globe was populated by empires or dynastic, theocratic and tribal states. Today, all but a handful of absolutist dynasties in the Middle East are nation-states (Wimmer & Feinstein, 2010).

*Third, nationalism provided the answer to the boundary problem of democracy* (e.g., Nodia, 1992). Nationalism stipulated that only members of the nation (as identified and certified through citizenship laws) should be allowed to vote. Attempts at creating transnational democratic polities failed, as the history of Gran Colombia, the various Republics of Central America, French Africa or the United Arab Republic show (the EU seems to be a notable exception to that trend). *Fourth, nationalism prepared the ground for the idea of equality before the law.* According to nationalist doctrine, all members of the 'national family' are equal. Distinctions between nobles and commoners, poor and rich, serfs or slaves and free people are problematic in the eyes of nationalist ideologies, who define the nation as a community of individuals with equal status and political standing. To be sure, the boundaries of national membership were often hotly contested and only gradually expanded over the 19th and 20th centuries. But nationalism was a major ideological force in pushing for such expansion. All anti-colonial struggles were inspired by the egalitarianism of nationalist doctrine (cf. Lawrence, 2013), and its strength influenced how far democratic egalitarianism prevailed after independence (Tudor, 2013).

*Fifth, nationalism provided the ideological basis for a massive increase in taxation.* Nationalism delegitimised tax rebellions, which largely disappear, for example, after the French (Kiser & Linton, 2002) or American revolutions. Nationalism legitimised increased taxation because taxes were now used not only to wage war but to provide citizens with public goods (Kroneberg & Wimmer, 2012). Nationalist ideas about sharing of the burden of war also motivated the introduction of progressive income taxation (Scheve & Stasavage, 2010). *Sixth, nationalism provided the ideological underpinning of universal military conscription.* Once the state ruled in the name of and in the interest of the nation, every male was called upon to defend its independence and political power viz-a-viz other such states (cf. Hur, 2020). There is some evidence that soldiers motivated by national interest are more effective, as modern nation-states almost always won against the armies of dynastic states or empires (Hiers & Wimmer, 2013). Armies without institutionalised ethnic or racial hierarchies win wars against the armies of more unequal countries (Layall, 2020) because of reduced desertion rates and better batter field performance.

*Seventh, nationalism motivated the development of welfare systems.* By popularising the idea of mutual solidarity between all members of the nation, the horizon of solidarity previously restricted to guilds, villages, churches and mosques or a clan was enlarged to include all of the imagined community. Most modern welfare systems developed after mass wars to reward the loyalty of soldiers and their families (Skocpol; Cowen, 2008; Kasza, 2002;

Klausen, 1998; Lewis, 2000; Obinger & Schmitt, 2011). Nationalism also drove the expansion of public goods provision by the state. Since the state now acted in the interest of the people, it became more appropriate to expand its domains so that it could provide its citizens with education, policing, public health services and so forth (cf. Miguel, 2004). This is, obviously, the flip side of the massive increase in taxation mentioned above.

Finally, nationalism often shaped the ethnic composition of the population. School systems (Darden & Grzymala-Busse, 2006) and cultural machines controlled by nationalist elites (vom Hau, 2008) educated the citizenry in a particular nationalist doctrine and identity, leading to massive assimilation and re-identification processes. Nationalist governments sometimes also pursued projects of ethno-demographic engineering beyond assimilation, preserving minority languages and cultures or cleansing minority individuals from the national territory through violence or organised population transfers (Mylonas, 2012). In short, the institutional consequences of nationalism are massive and pervasive (Wimmer, 2002).

## 2.4 | What are new research frontiers?

The first research frontier is to apply creative methods to unpack questions of endogeneity in the macro-political processes outlined above. For example, effective public goods provision by the state is demanded by nationalist doctrine but on the other hand also increases the chances that the population will find a nationalist ideology attractive (Wimmer, 2018). How can we disentangle what is cause and what is consequence in the relationships depicted in the following figure?



Several research designs come to mind. For example, we could compare the development of nation-states and non-nation-states that are otherwise maximally similar, observing how institutional outcomes diverge. Alternatively, we could use event history models or process tracing to observe if major institutional innovations happened before or after nationalism became the ruling ideology of a polity. We may also use quasi-experiments wherein regions of an empire with different types and levels of nationalist mobilisation are set on different institutional tracks (Tudor, 2013) or identify how previously similar levels of nationalism change in the wake of major institutional developments. Instrumental variable approaches might also help in disentangling some of these endogenous processes (Wimmer, 2018, pp. 279–283).

A second research frontier is to develop a meaningful and empirically grounded typology of nationalisms. Many such typologies have been offered, including the famed distinction between civic and ethnic nationalisms mentioned above. Other scholars have pointed out that the nation can be defined in more or less inclusionary ways, including

or excluding ethnic minorities. Nationalism can also be more or less contested by its citizens. It can be more or less politically activated (Billig, 1995). National communities may be defined by different markers—including language (Germany), religion (Israel) or citizenship (France). Fifth, national identities might be more or less positively evaluated in terms of morality and pride (Giesen, 2004).

Yet much existing scholarship created types that are too heterogenous to make much sense (for the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism, see Brubaker, 1999), and citizens of individual countries might embrace very different variants of the same national identity (Bonikowski, 2016b). Moreover, nationalisms change over time (Bloemraad, 2017; Zubrzycki, 2016), making the identification of the consequences of different types of nationalism more complicated. Another obstacle is that we lack reliable data on the nature and intensity of nationalist identifications. Future work should also distinguish between elite and popular forms of national identification all the while allowing for heterogeneity within groups of elites and citizens, thus avoiding slotting entire countries and their populations into one box. Bonikowski et al. (2022 [forthcoming]) may serve as a model in terms of identifying different kinds of elite nationalisms while Wimmer (2017) shows how to employ questions about popular national identification in surveys from around the world.

A third research frontier involves linking these distinct varieties of nationalism to its political consequences. Perhaps we will find, contrary to the expectations held by many researchers, that taken for granted (banal), exclusionary but assimilationist nationalisms (perhaps à la Suisse) are the most conducive to peace, democratic stability and public goods provision. Finally, once we know which varieties are associated with which consequences, future scholarship would need to explain where and why such varieties are prevailing as well as why and how they shift over time. Why did the famously civic nationalisms of France, the USA or India lose their hegemonic grip over public discourse, making space for long marginalised and suppressed ethnic versions of defining the national community? A historical institutionalist, power distributional or actor coalitional approach might show the way forward (Greif & Laitin, 2004; Lachmann, 1989; Wimmer & Feinstein, 2010). We could focus on the type of nationalist doctrines embraced and internalised by certain types of political actors at certain periods of time. Political actors would thus form the units of observation, and we could then map out their evolving alliances, their relationship of opposition and conflict and how their nationalist discourse adapts and changes endogenously with these evolving configurations of alliances.

Using dynamic theories and modelling techniques, we might then identify the conditions under which actor coalitions holding on to certain types of nationalist ideologies gain power over others. Are there certain patterns in the rise to government power of certain types of nationalist doctrines? Is ideological appeal among the population at large part of that pattern and how do we explain such appeal? Or is it a matter of coalition size? Or are diffusion mechanisms at work as well—the adoption of ideological schemas by actors with entirely different positions in the configuration of power and/or operating in different polities?

As this long list of questions as well as data and modelling challenges suggest, we are far away from solving any of them. This is good news for the future of nationalism research: While we may have exhausted the interest in the origins of nationalism, we are just beginning to understand nationalism's variegated consequences.

### 3 | THE CONSEQUENCES OF NATIONALISM ON IMMIGRATION POLICIES: MARC HELBLING (UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM)

#### 3.1 | What is nationalism?<sup>2</sup>

Nationalism is a modern version of ethnicity, which Jenkins (1997) defines as a form of cultural understanding and social organisation. What distinguishes nationalism from ethnicity is its political basis, which strives for political autonomy. This leads to Gellner's (1983, p. 1) famous definition of nationalism, according to which the political and the national unit are congruent. A direct implication of this principle is that it ties institutions of inclusion such as citizenship, democracy and welfare to national forms of exclusion (Wimmer, 2002, pp. 4–5). Nation-states are constantly

confronted with the question of who belongs to them and who can become one of their members. This question is especially debated in the context of the three entry gates of immigration, integration and citizenship policies (Hammar, 1990).<sup>3</sup> It is often hypothesised that the functioning of these three entry gates is influenced by the specific form of nationalism, or the understanding of nationhood, that is dominant in a country.

'Civic-territorial' and 'ethnic' have become the central forms of nationalism. While the former stands for a voluntary association, the latter represents an organism with a fixed and indelible character, imprinted on its members at birth (Kohn (1967 [1944]). Brubaker (1992) investigated these two forms in his seminal book on France and Germany and thereby started a new research field on the role of national models in the field of immigration policies. Koopmans et al. (2005, 2012) build on this research and propose a two-dimensional space that distinguishes not only between ethnic and civic-territorial cases but also how extensively cultural group rights are granted in a nation-state. Accordingly, nation-states can be grouped into three categories: The assimilationist model applies *jus sanguinis* naturalisation rules, and cultural assimilation is required. The multicultural model follows more generous citizenship policies (*jus soli*), and a variety of cultural group rights are granted. Finally, in the universalist model, a civic-territorial conception of citizenship also prevails whereas a high degree of assimilation is required.

While all these understandings of nationhood help us distinguish different immigration policies, according to some authors, there are also forms of nationalism that announce the arrival of a post-national age (Soysal, 1994): Liberal and civic nationalisms are considered the result or the context of liberal practice (Mouritsen et al., 2019, p. 603). Consequently, we should observe a convergence of immigration policies, as liberal values stand in contrast to cultural boundary drawing and therefore cannot shape national particularities (Joppke, 2005).

### 3.2 | How can we measure nationalism?

Jensen (2019) distinguishes between ideational and policy models to separate the shared understandings of nationhood from concrete regulations. This differentiation allows us to investigate two forms of consequences, namely how certain ideas of nationhood lead to certain policies (output) and whether these regulations lead to the intended policy outcomes. At least implicitly, such a differentiation is made in most works in this field, as some studies are interested in the interrelationship between political discourses/ideas and regulations, while others study the effectiveness of policies.

Ideational nationalism models are typically measured through interviews with the political and bureaucratic elite, and we can speak of an existing ideational national model when we observe a relatively high degree of agreement among national actors (Brochmann & Midtbøen, 2021). The idea is to measure the dominant understanding of nationhood or more generally the 'philosophies of integration' (Favell, 1998) that reflect the societal consensus of how to draw national boundaries.

Another approach is to rely on quantitative expert interviews to measure how scholars see the elite's view. Ko and Choi (2022), for example, exploited a question from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project (Coppedge et al., 2022) that asked to what extent the government promotes nationalism to justify the regime in place. Some have also investigated data from the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) (Volkens et al., 2021) that allows for measuring the positions of political parties towards issues concerning cultural heterogeneity and national identity (Helbling et al., 2016; see also Hutchins & Halikiopoulou, 2020) or immigration policies (Dancygier & Margalit, 2020). Other studies take the government's position on a left-right scale into consideration, assuming that these positions reflect different understandings of nationhood (Natter et al., 2020).

In contrast to an ideational model, a national policy model exists in the real world when we observe a relatively coherent set of regulations. For a long time, policy models have been investigated by means of qualitative case studies (Brochmann & Midtbøen, 2021; Brubaker, 1992; Favell, 1998). More recently, various studies have built policy indices that allow for the comparison of a larger number of countries (for overviews, see Bjerre et al., 2015; Helbling, 2013; Solano & Huddleston, 2021). The quantification of policies can also be seen as a response to the

discussion initiated by Brubaker himself about the ambiguity and limitations of distinguishing different national models (1999, pp. 59–63). A differentiation between ethnic and civic-territorial forms of nationalism seems to imply that 'culture' and 'will' are mutually exclusive. However, most often nationalism consists of a combination of these two principles, and policy indices allow for taking such more fine-grained differentiations into account. Some of the index studies have completely abandoned the differentiation between national models and mostly distinguish between more or less restrictive immigration policies (e.g., Howard, 2009). Koopmans et al. (2005, 2012) and Goodman (2010) are the only ones who propose to combine index research with a model approach by proposing quantitative measures to group countries into different categories.

### 3.3 | What are the consequences of nationalism?

Brubaker (1992) has shown that the republican and assimilationist model in France has led to liberal naturalisation regulations that also allow dual citizenship, while Germany, which defines citizenry as a community of descent, has adopted very restrictive naturalisation criteria that do not allow dual citizenship. Favell (1998) investigates how ideas and political arguments have affected the shift in policy focus from socioeconomic integration to political integration in France and to a multiculturalism model in Great Britain. Taking up Favell's approach, which looks at the consensual ideas of the elite, Brochmann and Midtbøen (2021) study how different understandings of nationhood have affected citizenship policies in Denmark, Norway and Sweden.

Koopmans et al. (2012) as well as Koopmans and Michalowski (2017) follow Brubaker's path dependency argument. They show that policy changes between 1980 and 2002 were rather small, thereby reproducing pre-existing cross-national differences. Investigating Denmark, Germany and Great Britain, Mouritsen (2013) also shows that national models remain relatively stable and reflect different understandings of nationhood.

More recently, quantitative studies have appeared that examine how party or government positions affect immigration regulations. Lutz (2019) and Natter et al. (2020) show that the moderate or populist right has an impact on integration policies but hardly on immigration policies. Ko and Choi (2022) conclude that countries with more nationalist governments implement more restrictive immigration policies.

Some studies have investigated to what extent policies have converged between countries, which might be a sign of the increasing irrelevance of national models or nationalism altogether (Goodman, 2014; Helbling & Kalkum, 2018). Especially since the civic turn in integration policies (Entzinger, 2003; Joppke, 2007) and more generally the proliferation of universal liberal values, it has been discussed time and again that nationalism no longer shapes national regulations. According to Joppke (2005), cultural norms cannot be implemented, as universal liberal norms constrain immigration regulations. However, Jensen and Mouritsen (2019) argue that this development does not question the existence of national models, because states prioritise different liberal values, interpret them differently or have institutionalised them in different ways.

### 3.4 | What are new research frontiers?

To explore the impact of nationalism on immigration policies in the future, we need a better understanding of where we observe nationalism, how we measure it and how we deal with the potential fact that understandings of nationhood vary between the different spheres of a nation-state. The distinction between ideational and policy models already allows us to study forms of nationalism in political ideologies and policy regulations (Jensen, 2019). Critics of a national model approach have argued that a closer look at policy processes is necessary to see whether understandings of nationhood play the same role in political debates, policy decisions, policy implementation and policy outcomes (Bertossi & Duyvendak, 2012; Finotelli & Michalowski, 2012). Even if regulations reflect a certain understanding of nationhood, their implementation may vary widely across the different regions of a nation-state, for example, and

migrant integration or naturalisation rates may not be strongly influenced by policies. Various quantitative studies have investigated how policies affect migrant integration (e.g., Fleischmann & Dronkers, 2010), immigration rates (e.g., Czaika & de Haas, 2014) and natives' attitudes towards migrants (e.g., Schlueter et al., 2013) and have come to different conclusions as to whether policies matter. A differential approach also implies that a specific understanding of nationalism is not necessarily observed everywhere in a nation-state. Already Brubaker (1992, pp. 184 and 242) emphasised that understandings might differ between a nation-state's elite and its population.

For all these different spheres, we need appropriate and comparable measures. Over the last two decades, important advances have been made in the measurement of immigration policies (see Bjerre et al., 2015; Helbling, 2013; Solano & Huddleston, 2021, for overviews) and individual national identities (Bochsler et al., 2021). Where and how to measure nationalist discourses or understandings of nationhood remains less clear. Do we find it in written documents such as constitutions and party programs or in the heads of the political elite? A final challenge constitutes the comparability of such measures across a larger number of countries and especially countries outside the Western world, in which the impact of nationalism on immigration policies has hardly been studied so far.

## 4 | THE CONSEQUENCES OF NATIONALISM FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: MATTHIAS VOM HAU (IBEI)

### 4.1 | What is nationalism?

At the most abstract level, nationalism constitutes a political principle which holds that the world is divided into nations, each an authentic entity with its peculiar history and culture; that political loyalty is primarily structured around nations; and that nations are or ought to be self-governed (Gellner, 1983; Smith, 2008). This root conceptualisation has been applied in multifaceted ways. Scholars use nationalism to describe aspects of political, social and cultural life as different as movements, regimes, policies, ideologies, rhetorical styles, collective emotions and patterns of self-identification.

Nonetheless, upon closer inspection, three distinct perspectives can be identified that make different ontological assumptions about the fundamental properties of nationalism, with far-reaching consequences for how conceptual boundaries are drawn, what kinds of theoretically relevant variations of nationalism can be identified and how to align conceptualisation and measurement strategies:

1. The *behavioural* approach treats nationalism as a particular form of collective action, focusing on political movements or state policies that claim to advance the interests or speak in the name of a community of nationals (e.g., Beissinger, 2002; Breuilly, 1982; Hechter, 2000);
2. The *affective* approach refers to nationalism as a collective sentiment that generates identifications with and a sense of belonging to a national community (e.g., Centeno, 2002; Guibernau, 1999; Marx, 2003);
3. The *cognitive* approach treats nationalism as a discursive formation that establishes specific ways of seeing and thinking about the social world in terms of national identifications and communalities (e.g., Billig, 1995; Brubaker, 1996; Calhoun, 1997).

These three different conceptualisations have particular strengths and weaknesses when it comes to capturing theoretically meaningful aspects of nationalism. The behavioural approach constitutes an adequate perspective for scholars interested in the *political orientation* of nationalism. The emphasis on collective action allows to identify nationalist political projects and distinguish whether they are aimed at the legitimisation or the contestation of state power. Both the behavioural and affective approaches are useful tools for analysing the *intensity* of nationalism, given that the prevalence of nationalist mobilisation and national sentiments might vary dramatically across different social and institutional domains. In turn, the cognitive approach is particularly well-attuned to identify differences in the *content*

of nationalism. The dominant distinction remains the civic versus ethnic dichotomy and its contrasting principles of national inclusion. But scholars also differentiate between assimilation, accommodation and exclusion (Aktürk, 2012; Mylonas, 2012), inclusionary and exclusionary nationalism (Tudor & Slater, 2020) and liberal-elitist and popular nationalism (vom Hau, 2008, 2009). Either way, the usefulness of the different approaches varies, depending on what particular aspect of nationalism—its political orientation, intensity, or content—is doing the main explanatory work.

## 4.2 | How can we measure nationalism?

All three conceptual approaches have, in various combinations, found their way into the arguably (still) small and scattered scholarship on the socioeconomic consequences of nationalism. As will be discussed in greater detail below, Kohli's (2020) comparative historical analysis of the developing world draws on a behavioural approach to nationalism. He emphasises on the presence of a strong and cohesive nationalist movement that controls the state as a crucial factor in preventing British and later US imperialism and opening up the path towards state-led industrial transformation. Taking a cognitive approach, Greenfeld (2001) argues that the presence of national consciousness, first in England and then in other countries around the world, motivated the pursuit of sustained economic growth. Among the works concerned with social development, Singh (2015) builds on an affective approach and emphasises the intensity of subnational attachments in Indian states to explain variations in social policies and public welfare, while Singh and vom Hau (2016) are primarily concerned with differences in historical modes of nation-building to account for subsequent variations in public goods provision. The measurement strategies employed by these studies are obviously reflective of their methodological assumptions and choices, but they are also indicative of broader trends and common problems in the operationalisation of nationalism.

Scholarship on contemporary variations in the intensity of nationalism tends to use individual-level survey data. There is a long tradition in both sociology and political science of inferring the intensity of national attachments from attitudinal surveys about national identifications and pride (e.g., Wimmer, 2018). This becomes more difficult for studies that cannot rely on this kind of data, as powerfully illustrated by Singh (2015) who combines evidence on language use, voting behaviour and separatist mobilisation to assess the strength of (sub)nationalism in Indian states. This use of behavioural measures to capture national attachments and sentiments is in fact common for historical research on the intensity of nationalism (e.g., Marx, 2003). It also bears emphasis that the use of attitudinal surveys to measure the intensity of nationalism is fraught with problems, including that the question wording often presupposes a certain degree of national identification.

At a first glance, the measurement of nationalism as collective action is more straightforward, both for contemporary and historical cases. Some scholars focus on specific state policies to capture variations of nation-building (Aktürk, 2012) or treat contentious events as basic units of analysis to identify state-challenging nationalist mobilisation (Beissinger, 2002). Other scholars pursuing a behavioural approach, including Kohli (2020), draw on the relevant historiography and compare the organisational structure and political power of nationalist movements. But upon closer scrutiny, important methodological challenges remain as well. As Hechter (2000) and Mylonas (2012) observe, without tracing the claims made by social movements or political parties, or the framings embraced by state elites, it is largely impossible to discern empirically what distinguishes nationalist from non-nationalist collective action.

In turn, a focus on cognition allows for tracing nationalism as being articulated in rhetoric and political claims, expressed in public culture and enacted in private conversations, and thus helps to differentiate nationalism as a frame of reference and pattern of discourse from political behaviour. Moreover, the cognitive perspective is particularly well-suited for studying the contents or prevalence of nationalism through the lens of social texts (i.e., both talk and written text) and thus lends itself to the application of a variety of well-established methodological tools, including content analysis, discourse analysis and frame analysis. A point in case is Greenfeld (2001) who draws on major works in the history of economic thought in England, the Netherlands, France, Germany and Japan to infer variations in national consciousness. Her almost exclusive reliance on the publications of renowned thinkers, however, also

points to important limitations and reinforces an ongoing debate around what particular kinds and combinations of social texts are most suitable to study the prevalence of nationalism between and within countries (Brubaker et al., 2006; Kyriazi & vom Hau, 2020).

### 4.3 | What are the consequences of nationalism?

Our current understanding of the potential consequences of nationalism for economic and social development remains limited. Most of the existing literature focuses on the role of economic development in shaping various facets of nationalism (e.g., Gellner, 1983; Nairn, 1977). Only a scattered and small body of work exists that has sought to reverse the causal arrow and explore the implications of nationalist discourses, movements and identities on economic growth and industrial transformation. Similarly, nationalism remains largely absent from the study of social development. The field is dominated by structural, institutionalist, power resources and coalition-centric explanations (Amenta, 2003; Mares & Carnes, 2009). This is surprising, given that many, if not most social security, public education and health care systems are organised at the national level and sustained through cross-class solidarity.

Greenfeld (2001) is one of the rare works on the consequences of nationalism for economic development. Closely following Max Weber's footsteps, her main interest is in explaining the motivational forces behind sustained economic growth—or why in certain places, starting with England, individuals became inclined to seek ever-increasing profits. Her answer (not uncontroversially, as a cursory check of her book's reviews suggests) is nationalism. She maintains that the formation of a national consciousness made the overcoming of status differences and social mobility imaginable, thereby facilitating mass participation in the economy. The understanding of the nation as a community of equals facilitated the emergence of free labour markets and new social stratification systems, which explains the possible connection between nationalism and economic growth. Moreover, nationalism instigated international competition: Concerns about the prestige of one's own nation vis-à-vis others fostered dedication to constant growth. Kohli's (2020) work is more tangentially concerned with nationalism but nonetheless provides valuable insights into its developmental consequences. States supported by a strong nationalist movement were better able to fend off Britain's and later the United States' imperial ambitions and pursue state-led industrialisation, a crucial precondition for sustained economic growth.

Echoing the incipient scholarly attention to the role of nationalism in economic development, only a small number of studies explore the role of nationalism as a potential explanatory factor for variations in social policy and welfare outcomes. Singh (2015) is one of them. By weaving together insights from social psychology, sociology and political theory, she suggests that the attachment to an overarching national identity engenders in-group favouritism and a sense of obligation to other members of the nation and, as a result, support for the provision of public services to the national community as a whole. By contrast, in the absence of a shared national identity individuals are more likely to feel a sense of solidarity to other subgroups (e.g., based on social class or ethnicity) and less likely to provide (or push political elites to provide) collective goods across the state. This argument has so far been applied subnationally and holds significant explanatory leverage to explain differences in social development across Indian states. Its conceptual approach to nationalism is affective, with the main analytical focus being the relative strength of national identification.

Starting from a behavioural conceptualisation of nationalism, Singh and vom Hau (2016) are equally concerned with its consequences for public service provision and, ultimately, social development. Their argument is built around three major modes of historical nation-building—or distinct sets of state policies aimed at governing ethnic differences and engendering national loyalties: *assimilation*, *accommodation* and *exclusion* (Aktürk, 2012; Mylonas, 2012). Both assimilationist and accommodationist nation-building are—*ceteris paribus*—expected to entail higher aggregate levels of public goods provision over time. This is because policies that aspire to provide public goods to all citizens tend to facilitate the rise of a political consensus in support of these services, with cumulative effects on long-run trajectories of public goods provision.<sup>4</sup> On the contrary, exclusionary nation-building brings about lower aggregate

levels of public goods provision over time. Differential policies lead the dominant ethnic group to be identified as the ultimate target of public services and hinder the emergence of a political consensus around universal provision. Moreover, excluded groups are more likely to understand social interactions along ethnic lines, fostering the emergence of distributional conflicts over state resources.

#### 4.4 | What are new research frontiers?

Even though the studies discussed above provide some promising insights, work on the developmental consequences of nationalism remains relatively rare and thus constitutes a wide-open research frontier. One crucial step to further invigorate knowledge accumulation is to delimitate more clearly which particular aspect of nationalism does the main theoretical work in its expected effects on economic or social development. The distinction between behavioural, affective and cognitive approaches to conceptualise nationalism provides a useful starting point in this regard, as each of them comes with different strengths and weaknesses for tracing key variations of nationalism, including differences in national identification, policy contents and political orientation. Another step is to further develop and test plausible explanatory propositions and causal mechanisms for a variety of developmental processes and outcomes. For example, to what extent does the claim that national consciousness fosters economic growth also apply to public service provision? And if indeed so, are the same causal mechanisms of mass participation and international competition at work?

All these endeavours require the close alignment between conceptual choices and their operationalisation. Significant progress has been made in the measurement of individual-level national identifications as a proxy for the varying intensity of nationalism across and within countries, even for studies with a global reach (e.g., Wimmer, 2018). Scholars have also made advances in the construction of cross-national measures of nationalist mobilisation (e.g., Beissinger, 2002) and nation-building (Mylonas, 2012) for particular regions during specific time periods. But similar to other fields that study the wider impact of nationalism, what remains a major challenge is the relative scarcity of cross-national, longitudinal datasets that provide comparable measures of a particular (or various) aspect(s) of nationalism such as the intensity of national attachments, the content of nation-building policies or the presence of nationalist movements.

## 5 | THE CONSEQUENCES OF NATIONALISM FOR DEMOCRACY: MAYA TUDOR (UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD)

### 5.1 | What is nationalism?

Nationalism is a political ideology consisting of two primary beliefs: *first*, that distinct peoples called nations exist and *second*, that nations should be the organising basis of sovereign political power. This second aspect of nationalism—its definitional drive for some sovereignty—is what makes nations distinct from ethnic groups.

Nationalism celebrates nations—alternatively defined as an ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson, 1983), an ‘invented tradition’ (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983), or ‘lies that bind’ (Appiah, 2018). Sociologists, historians and political scientists alike recognise that nations are fundamentally new political units historically speaking, emerging around the 1700s and still being created today. Constructed as they are, however, nations remain immensely consequential political actors because their invocation is intimately bound up in the legitimisation of state power.

Popular discussions of nationalism often draw distinctions between patriotism, denoting a positive and self-regarding love of country and nationalism, denoting an inherently other-denigrating celebration of the nation. Yet much scholarly research on nationalism suggests there is little stable distinction between the two. Not only are nationalist attitudes highly correlated with patriotic attitudes (Blank & Schmidt, 2003; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989),

but the distinctions between nationalist and patriotic attitudes can be primed away under circumstances of threat (Li & Brewer, 2004). The pronounced difference between the normative approaches to nationalism in pre- and post-WWII scholarship, as well as the difference in normative approaches to Russian and Ukrainian nationalism today, bears witness to the difficulty in drawing firm and durable distinctions between nationalism and patriotism.

Nationalisms exhibit tremendous variation, not least because nations are constructed using a range of building blocks. Nations sometimes have natural geographical borders, a shared language, a dominant religion or ethnicity, civic principles, a shared reading of history and/or a set of cultural symbols. The wide range of possible building blocks which can define the nation means that our definitions of nationalism are necessarily broad—to encompass the great variation we observe.

Democracy too involves the invocation of a people, for it is definitionally a system of government that is, in Abraham Lincoln's words, 'of the people, for the people, by the people'. Institutionally instantiating both the nation and the government in the name of the nation first requires defining the people, or solving the 'boundary problem' (Wimmer, 2013). If democracy is government in the service of a people, one must first define the people. It is perhaps unsurprising that the nature of 'we the people' is typically the subject of acrimonious contestation. Institutionally, democracy is understood as a cluster concept, involving broad civil and political rights (inclusiveness) and open competition between alternative views for executive power (competition and elections). More expansive definitions of democracy often including uncensored media platforms, effective checks on executive power and the rule of law.

Especially because nationalism and democracy both crucially invoke a 'we the people', it is surprising that the empirical relationship between nationalism and democracy has not been more systematically interrogated (Helbling, 2009). It is also surprising because there are time-bound normative leanings to our scholarship: Our earliest writings on nationalism reveal pro-democratic leanings while post-World War II writings on nationalism reveal anti-democratic leanings. For example, Alexis de Tocqueville felt that nationalism, along with, was one of two available identities which could glue together large, diverse societies for collective action: 'there is in this world only patriotism, or religion, which can make all citizens walk for long towards a common goal' (1835, p. 159) while Albert Einstein famously called nationalism the measles of mankind. These opposing perspectives pose an important and relevant question for contemporary politics—not just *if* nationalism hinders or helps democracy, but much more likely, *when* and *how*.

## 5.2 | How can we measure nationalism?

Scholars have both conceptualised and measured democracy and nationalism differently. Democracy scholars now habitually articulate their definition of democracy, choosing from a range of attributes that can be as slim as elections and competition (Przeworski, 1991; Schumpeter, 1976) and as broad as elections, competition, rights of expression, organisation and assembly and press freedoms to guarantee vertical chains of accountability as well as civilian control over the military and horizontal accountability of the executive to other branches of government and rule of law (Schmitter & Karl, 1991).

Just as articulating a definition is standard practice for democracy scholars, so too should nationalism scholars provide conceptual clarity on their conceptual approaches to and measurement of nationalism. As Mylonas and Tudor (2023) show, existing scholarship has primarily conceptualised and measured nationalism along five dimensions.

The first two dimensions, *elite fragmentation* and *popular fragmentation*, denote the extent of elite and popular agreement over what defines the nation—and in doing so interrogate to what degree a cohesive national narrative exists. Scholars across a range of countries have shown that both elites (Smith, 1997) and populations (Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016) can fundamentally disagree on the definition of the nation. Scholarship in this vein typically uses comparative historical work to establish the historical basis of the nation or survey research to instantiate the ways in which national narratives critically differ across population segments (Balcells, 2013; Darden & Mylonas, 2016; vom Hau, 2009). Research zooming out to evidence dominant national narratives typically uses a broader range of methodological approaches, including archival work, historical process tracing, survey research and even experiments

to empirically instantiate differences in understandings of the nation. Scholarship across space and time has also shown how different levels of elite and popular fragmentation can explain diverse outcomes such as state capacity (Lieberman, 2003), genocide (Straus, 2015) and the ability of parties to stay in power (Darden & Gryzmala-Busse, 2006).

A third dimension along which nationalisms can be measured is *ascriptiveness*, or the extent to which nationalisms are defined by relatively immutable social identities such as race, religion or ethnicity, or instead centralise principles or ideals that are equally open to all citizens. While classic scholarship posited that ethnic versus civic understandings of nationhood were dichotomous, scholars today largely agree that the conceptual distinctions between ethnic and civic nationalism are more nuanced (Tamir, 2019). In the words of David Miller, a clear-cut distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism is not useful 'except to denote two ends of a spectrum that could "bring out the qualitative differences between different kinds of nationalism"' (Miller, 1995, p. 131).

A fourth dimension along which nationalisms can be measured is their *thickness*, or the extent to which symbols, narratives and even broad policies positively define the nation in terms of who and what it represents, and not just who and what it does not represent. All nations are partly defined by who they are not. Yet aside from a negation of other nations, what positively bonds the nation together? Political theorists have long argued that ethnic nationalism is, in virtue of rigidly defining outsiders and absorbing the cultural repertoire of ethnic building blocks, much likely to be thicker. Yet this supposition has rarely been empirically assessed by systematic comparisons.

A fifth dimension along which nationalisms differ is their *salience*, or the extent to which individuals consider national identities to be important relative to other identities. The salience of a national identity typically rises in times of war (through the well-known rally around the flag effect) and major social or political events such as national football victories. Research in this tradition typically uses data across time to evidence changes in the salience of a national identity.

### 5.3 | What are the consequences of nationalism?

While the relationship between nationalism and democracy has been the subject of much normatively driven public and scholarly discussion, there is a significant dearth of empirically driven comparative scholarship examining the relationship between democracy and nationalism. Aside from broad statements that nationalism arises when the modern state arises (Breuille, 1982) and is needed for democracy (Nodia, 1992), little comparative research has specifically examined the modalities of this relationship. Much scholarship investigating the relationship between nationalism and democracy has mined the histories of particular nationalisms and traced its impact upon the possibilities of democracy. In one recent example, Meyer Resende and Hennig (2021) argue that the struggle over Poland's national identity and the country's re-embrace of an ethnic national identity by segments of the political and religious elite has driven the ascendance of autocratising policies.

Those studies which have engaged in explicitly comparative examinations of nationalism's impacts upon democracy have produced intriguing and possibly contradictory findings. For example, in examining where democracy thrived in post-Soviet eastern Europe, Beissinger (2002) and Bunce (2005) argue that an effective harnessing of strong ethnic nationalism was a crucial driver of democracy's emergence because it was able to generate the mass mobilisation to motivate regime change. Tudor (2013) argues that the Indian nationalist movement's ability to engage in mass mobilisation was key to India's success in establishing democracy relative to Pakistan but also argues that India's civic rather than ethnic nature mattered for India's post-independence establishment of democracy. Taken together, these works concur that nationalism's mobilising potential renders it an important force for democracy but much more research is needed to excavate modalities and mechanisms.

### 5.4 | What are new research frontiers?

The dearth of established comparative work on nationalism and democracy creates exciting new frontiers for scholarship. Three particular avenues look promising. The *first* approach would be to engage in comparative historical

research around moments when new nations first emerged to establish how the dimensions of fragmentation and ascriptiveness impacted democracy. Because narratives of nation were articulated before national politics formally adopted democratic forms of government, in order to legitimate the bid for national independence, a close process-tracing of chronology could effectively help minimise perennial questions of endogeneity. A *second* approach would be to use comparative, time-series survey data to trace how nationalism's dimensions, but especially salience and thickness of nationalism, change around key historical events. And a *third* approach would be to engage in a series of coordinated experimental field research into nationalism across a range of contexts (e.g., Blair et al., 2021) in order to generate robust insights into when, whether and how the use of nationalist symbols matters for individual attitudes and behaviours. Living in a time when nationalism's relevance to contemporary politics has rarely been clearer, better understanding of how varieties of nationalism map onto aspects of democracy has never been more important.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL.

## ENDNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Unfortunately, many researchers believe that chauvinism is not an aspect of nationalism, but a distinct phenomenon altogether. Many identify 'pride in democracy' etc. questions as referring to 'constructive patriotism' and oppose it to 'chauvinism' (Davidov, 2009; the national superiority questions are sometimes also understood to measure 'nationalism', making the terminological confusion complete that often comes with normatively loaded definitions and measurements).
- <sup>2</sup> I would like to thank Ines Michalowski for very helpful comments.
- <sup>3</sup> For the sake of simplicity, the discussion in this contribution always refers to 'immigration policies', which include all three policy fields—immigration, integration and naturalisation—unless otherwise stated.
- <sup>4</sup> The difference between assimilation and accommodation lies in how they relate to diversity. While the former disregards ethnicity, the latter is open to provide distinct kinds of public goods to different ethnic groups, in line with their preferences.

## REFERENCES

- Aktürk, Ş. (2012). *Regimes of ethnicity and nationhood in Germany, Russia, and Turkey*. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139108898>
- Amenta, E. (2003). What we know about the development of social policy. In J. Mahoney & D. Rueschemeyer (Eds.), *Comparative historical analysis in the social sciences* (pp. 91–130). Cambridge University Press.
- Anderson, B. (1983). *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. Verso.
- Appiah, A. (2018). *The lies that bind: Rethinking identity, creed, country, colour, class, culture*. Profile Books.
- Balcells, L. (2013). Mass schooling and Catalan nationalism. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 19(4), 467–486. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13537113.2013.847602>
- Beissinger, M. (2002). *Nationalist mobilization and the collapse of the Soviet State*. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511613593>
- Bertossi, C., & Duyvendak, J. W. (2012). National models of immigrant integration: The costs for comparative research. *Comparative European Politics*, 10(3), 237–247. <https://doi.org/10.1057/cep.2012.10>
- Billig, M. (1995). *Banal nationalism*. Sage.
- Bjerre, L., Helbling, M., Römer, F., & Zobel, M. (2015). Conceptualizing and measuring immigration policies. A comparative perspective. *International Migration Review*, 49(3), 555–600. <https://doi.org/10.1111/imre.12100>
- Blair, G., Weinstein, J. M., Christia, F., Arias, E., Badran, E., Blair, R. A., Cheema, A., Fetzer, T., Grossman, G., Haim, D., Hanson, R., Hasanain, A., Kachero, B., Kronick, D., Morse, B., Muggah, R., Nanes, M., Slough, T., Ravanilla, N., ... Wilke, A. (2021). Community policing does not build citizen trust in police or reduce crime in the Global South. *Science*, 374(6571). <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abd344>
- Blank, T., & Schmidt, P. (2003). National identity in a United Germany: Nationalism or patriotism? An empirical test with representative data. *Political Psychology*, 24(2), 289–312. <https://doi.org/10.1111/0162-895X.00329>
- Bloemraad, I. (2017). Re-imagining the nation in a world of migration: Legitimacy, political claims-making and membership in comparative perspective. In N. Foner & P. Simon (Eds.), *Fear and anxiety over national identity* (pp. 59–80). Russell Sage Foundation Press.

- Bochsler, D., Green, E., Jenne, E., Mylonas, H., & Wimmer, A. (2021). Exchange on the quantitative measurement of ethnic and national identity. *Nations and Nationalism*, 27, 22–40. <https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12688>
- Bollen, K., & Medrano, J. D. (1998). Who are the Spaniards? Nationalism and identification in Spain. *Social Forces*, 77(2), 587–621. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3005540>
- Bonikowski, B. (2016a). Nationalism in settled times. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 42(1), 427–449. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-081715-074412>
- Bonikowski, B. (2016b). *Schemas of the nation in modern democracies*. Department of Sociology, Harvard University.
- Bonikowski, B., & DiMaggio, P. (2016). Varieties of American popular nationalism. *American Sociological Review*, 81(5), 949–980. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122416663683>
- Bonikowski, B., Luo, Y., & Stuhler, O. (2022). Politics as usual? Measuring populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism in U.S. presidential campaigns (1952–2020) with deep neural language models. *Sociological Methods and Research*. forthcoming, 51(4), 1721–1787. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00491241221122317>
- Breuilly, J. (1982). *Nationalism and the state*. St. Martin's Press.
- Brochmann, G., & Midtbøen, A. H. (2021). Philosophies of integration? Elite views on citizenship policies in Scandinavia. *Ethnicities*, 21(1), 146–164. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796820950453>
- Brubaker, R. (1992). *Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany*. Harvard University Press. <https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674028944>
- Brubaker, R. (1996). *Nationalism reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the new Europe*. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511558764>
- Brubaker, R. (1999). The Manichean myth: Rethinking the distinction between “civic” and “ethnic” nationalism. In H. Kriesi, K. Armingeon, H. Siegrist, & A. Wimmer (Eds.), *Nation and national identity: The European experience in perspective* (pp. 55–73). Verlag Rüdiger.
- Brubaker, R., Feischmidt, M., Fox, J., & Grancea, L. (2006). *Nationalist politics and everyday ethnicity in a Transylvanian town*. Princeton University Press.
- Bunce, V. (2005). The national idea: Imperial legacies and post-communist pathways in Eastern Europe. *East European Politics and Societies*, 19(3), 406–442. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325405277963>
- Calhoun, C. (1997). *Nationalism*. University of Minnesota Press.
- Centeno, M. A. (2002). *Blood and debt: War and the nation-state in Latin America*. Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Knutsen, C. H., Lindberg, S. I., Teorell, J., Altman, D., Bernhard, M., Cornell, A., Fish, S. M., Gastaldi, L., Gjerløw, H., Glynn, A., Grahn, S., Hicken, A., Kinzelbach, K., Marquardt, K. L., McMann, K., Mechkova, V., Paxton, P., Pemstein, D., von Römer, J., Seim, B., Sigman, R., Skaaning, S. E., Staton, J., Tzelgov, E., Uberti, L., Wang, Y., Wig, T., & Ziblatt, D. (2022). V-Dem codebook v12. Varieties of democracy (V-Dem) project.
- Cowen, D. (2008). *Military workfare: The soldier and social citizenship in Canada*. University of Toronto Press.
- Czaika, M., & de Haas, H. (2014). *The effect of visa policy on international migration dynamics*. IMI Working Paper 89. International Migration Institute.
- Dancygier, R., & Margalit, Y. (2020). The evolution of the immigration debate: Evidence from a new dataset of party positions over the last half-century. *Comparative Political Studies*, 53(5), 734–774. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414019858936>
- Darden, K., & Grzymala-Busse, A. (2006). The great divide: Literacy, nationalism, and the communist collapse. *World Politics*, 59(1), 83–115. <https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2007.0015>
- Darden, K., & Mylonas, H. (2016). Threats to territorial integrity, national mass schooling, and linguistic commonality. *Comparative Political Studies*, 49(11), 1446–1479. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414015606735>
- Davidov, E. (2009). Measurement equivalence of nationalism and constructive patriotism in the ISSP: 34 countries in a comparative perspective. *Political Analysis*, 17(1), 64–82. <https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpn014>
- De Tocqueville, A. (1835) [1945]. Democracy in America. In H. Reeve, F. Bowen, & P. Bradley (Eds.), tr. *H Reeve 1945*. Vintage.
- Entzinger, H. (2003). The rise and fall of multiculturalism: The case of the Netherlands. In C. Joppke & E. Morawska (Eds.), *Toward assimilation and citizenship: Immigrants in liberal nation-states* (pp. 59–86). Palgrave-Macmillan.
- Favell, A. (1998). *Philosophies of integration: Immigration and the idea of citizenship in France and Britain*. Macmillan Press.
- Finotelli, C., & Michalowski, I. (2012). The heuristic potential of models of citizenship and immigrant integration reviewed. *Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies*, 10(3), 231–240. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15562948.2012.693033>
- Fleischmann, F., & Dronkers, J. (2010). Unemployment among immigrants in European labour markets: An analysis of origin and destination effects. *Work, Employment and Society*, 24(2), 337–354. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0950017010362153>
- Freeden, M. (1998). Is nationalism a distinct ideology? *Political Studies*, 46(4), 748–765. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00165>
- Gellner, E. (1983). *Nations and nationalism*. Basil Blackwell.
- Giesen, B. (2004). The trauma of perpetrators. The Holocaust as the traumatic reference of German national identity. In J. C. Alexander (Ed.), *Cultural trauma and collective identity* (pp. 112–154). University of California Press. <https://doi.org/10.1525/california/9780520235946.003.0004>
- Goodman, S. (2014). *Immigration and membership politics in Western Europe*. Cambridge University Press.

- Goodman, S. W. (2010). Integration requirements for integration's sake? Identifying, categorising and comparing civic integration policies. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 36(5), 753–772. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13691831003764300>
- Greenfeld, L. (2001). *The spirit of capitalism: Nationalism and economic growth*. Harvard University Press.
- Greif, A., & Laitin, D. (2004). A theory of endogenous institutional change. *American Political Science Review*, 98, 633–652. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055404041395>
- Guibernau, M. (1999). *Nations without states. Political communities in a global age*. Polity Press.
- Hall, J. (2011). Nationalism might change its character, again. In D. Halikiopoulou & S. Vasilopoulou (Eds.), *Nationalism and globalisation: Conflicting or complementary?* Routledge.
- Hammar, T. (1990). *Democracy and the nation state. Aliens, denizens and citizens in a world of international migration*. Avbury.
- Hechter, M. (2000). *Containing nationalism*. Oxford University Press.
- Helbling, M. (2009). Nationalism and democracy: Competing or complementary logics? *Living Reviews in Democracy*, 1, 1–14.
- Helbling, M. (2013). Validating integration and citizenship policy indices. *Comparative European Politics*, 11(5), 555–576. <https://doi.org/10.1057/cep.2013.11>
- Helbling, M., & Kalkum, D. (2018). Migration policy trends in OECD countries. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 25(12), 1779–1797.
- Helbling, M., Reeskens, T., & Wright, M. (2016). The mobilization of identities. A study on the relationship between elite rhetoric and public opinion on national identity in developed democracies. *Nations and Nationalism*, 22(4), 744–767. <https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12235>
- Hiers, W., & Wimmer, A. (2013). Is nationalism the cause or consequence of the end of empire? In J. Hall & S. Malešević (Eds.), *Nationalism and war* (pp. 212–254). Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139540964.013>
- Hobsbawm, E., & Ranger, T. (Eds.). (1983). *The invention of tradition*. Cambridge University.
- Howard, M. M. (2009). *The politics of citizenship in Europe*. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511819124>
- Hur, A. (2020). Citizen duty and the ethical power of communities: Mixed-method evidence from East Asia. *British Journal of Political Science*, 50(3), 1047–1065. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123418000066>
- Hutchins, R. D., & Halikiopoulou, D. (2020). Enemies of liberty? Nationalism, immigration, and the framing of terrorism in the agenda of the Front National. *Nations and Nationalism*, 26, 67–84.
- Jenkins, R. (1997). *Rethinking ethnicity. Arguments and explorations*. Sage.
- Jensen, K. (2019). Theorizing national models of integration: An ideational perspective. *Ethnicities*, 19(4), 614–631.
- Jensen, K., & Mouritsen, P. (2019). Nationalism in a Liberal Register: Beyond the 'Paradox of Universalism' in Immigrant Integration Politics. *British Journal of Political Science*, 49(3), 837–856.
- Joppke, C. (2005). Exclusion in the liberal state: The case of immigration and citizenship policy. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 8(1), 43–61. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1368431005049327>
- Joppke, C. (2007). Beyond national models: Civic integration policies for immigrants in Western Europe. *West European Politics*, 20(1), 1–22. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380601019613>
- Kasza, G. J. (2002). War and welfare policy in Japan. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 61(2), 417–435.
- Kiser, E., & Linton, A. (2002). The hinges of history: State-making and revolt in early modern France. *American Sociological Review*, 67, 889–910. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3088975>
- Klausen, J. (1998). *War and welfare: Europe and the United States*. Palgrave.
- Ko, J., & Choi, S.-W. (2022). Nationalism and immigration control. *Nations and Nationalism*, 28(1), 12–30. <https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12801>
- Kohli, A. (2020). *Imperialism and the developing world: How Britain and the US shaped the global periphery*. Oxford University Press.
- Kohn, H. (1967 [1944]). *The idea of nationalism*. Collier-Macmillan.
- Koopmans, R., & Michalowski, I. (2017). Why do states extend rights to immigrants? Institutional settings and historical legacies across 44 countries worldwide. *Comparative Political Studies*, 50(1), 41–74. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414016655533>
- Koopmans, R., Michalowski, I., & Waibel, S. (2012). Citizenship rights for immigrants: National political processes and cross-national convergence in Western Europe, 1980–2008. *American Journal of Sociology*, 117(4), 1202–1245. <https://doi.org/10.1086/662707>
- Koopmans, R., Statham, P., Giugni, M., & Passy, F. (2005). *Contested citizenship: Immigration and cultural diversity in Europe*. University of Minnesota Press.
- Kosterman, R., & Feshbach, S. (1989). Toward a measure of patriotic and nationalistic attitudes. *Political Psychology*, 10(2), 257–274. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3791647>
- Kroneberg, C., & Wimmer, A. (2012). Struggling over the boundaries of belonging: A formal model of nation building, ethnic closure and populism. *American Journal of Sociology*, 118(1), 176–230. <https://doi.org/10.1086/666671>
- Kyriazi, A., & vom Hau, M. (2020). Textbooks, postcards, and the public consolidation of nationalism in Latin America. *Qualitative Sociology*, 43(4), 515–542. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11133-020-09467-8>

- Lachmann, R. (1989). Elite conflict and state formation in 16<sup>th</sup>- and 17<sup>th</sup>-century England and France. *American Sociological Review*, 54(2), 141–162. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2095787>
- Lawrence, A. (2013). *Imperial rule and the politics of nationalism: Anti-colonial protest in the French empire*. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139583732>
- Layall, J. (2020). *Divided armies: Inequality and battlefield performance in modern war*. Princeton University Press.
- Lewis, J. (2000). *Empire state-building: War and welfare in Kenya, 1925–52*. James Currey.
- Li, Q., & Brewer, M. B. (2004). What does it mean to be an American? Patriotism, nationalism, and American identity after 9/11. *Political Psychology*, 25(5), 727–739. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.00395.x>
- Lieberman, E. (2003). *Race and regionalism in the politics of taxation in Brazil and South Africa*. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511615658>
- Lutz, P. (2019). Variation in policy success: Radical right populism and migration policy. *West European Politics*, 42(3), 517–544. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2018.1504509>
- Mares, I., & Carnes, M. E. (2009). Social policy in developing countries. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 12, 93–113.
- Marx, A. (2003). *Faith in nation: Exclusionary origins of nationalism*. Oxford University Press.
- Meyer Resende, M., & Hennig, A. (2021). Polish Catholic bishops, nationalism and liberal democracy. *Religions*, 12(2), 94. <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12020094>
- Miguel, E. (2004). Tribe or nation? Nation building and public goods in Kenya versus Tanzania. *World Politics*, 56(3), 327–362.
- Miller, D. (1995). *On nationality*. Clarendon Press.
- Mouritsen, P. (2013). The resilience of citizenship traditions: Civic integration in Germany, Great Britain and Denmark. *Ethnicities*, 13(1), 86–109. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796812451220>
- Mouritsen, P., Kriegbaum, J. K., & Larin, S. J. (2019). Introduction: Theorizing the civic turn in European integration policies. *Ethnicities*, 19(4), 595–613.
- Mylonas, H. (2012). *The politics of nation-building: Making co-nationals, refugees, and minorities*. Cambridge University Press.
- Mylonas, H., & Tudor, M. (2021). Nationalism: What we know and what we still need to know. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 24, 109–132. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-041719-101841>
- Mylonas, H., & Tudor, M. (2023). *Varieties of nationalism*. Cambridge University Press. (forthcoming).
- Nairn, T. (1977). *The break-up of Britain*. New Left Books.
- Natter, K., Czaika, M., & de Haas, H. (2020). Political party ideology and immigration policy reform: An empirical enquiry. *Political Research Exchange*, 2(1), 1735255. <https://doi.org/10.1080/2474736X.2020.1735255>
- Nodia, G. (1992). Nationalism and democracy. *Journal of Democracy*, 3(4), 3–22. <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1992.0053>
- Obinger, H., & Schmitt, C. (2011). Guns and butter? Regime competition and the welfare state during the Cold War. *World Politics*, 63(2), 246–270.
- Przeworski, A. (1991). *Democracy and the market: Political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139172493>
- Scheve, K., & Stasavage, D. (2010). The conscription of wealth: Mass warfare and the demand for progressive taxation. *International Organization*, 64(4), 529–561. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818310000226>
- Schlueter, E., Meulemann, B., & Davidov, E. (2013). Immigrant integration policies and perceived group threat: A multilevel study of 27 western and eastern European countries. *Social Science Research*, 42(3), 670–682. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2012.12.001>
- Schmitter, P. C., & Karl, T. L. (1991). What democracy is... and is not. *Journal of Democracy*, 2(3), 75–88. <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1991.0033>
- Schumpeter, J. (1976). *Capitalism, socialism and democracy*. Routledge.
- Singh, P. (2015). *How solidarity works for welfare: Subnationalism and social development in India*. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107707177>
- Singh, P., & vom Hau, M. (2016). Ethnicity in time: Politics, history, and the relationship between ethnic diversity and public goods provision. *Comparative Political Studies*, 49(10), 1303–1340. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414016633231>
- Smith, A. D. (2008). *The cultural foundations of nations: Hierarchy, covenant, and republic*. John Wiley & Sons.
- Smith, R. (1997). *Civic ideals: Conflicting visions of citizenship in U.S. history*. Yale University Press.
- Solano, G., & Huddleston, T. (2021). Beyond immigration: Moving from Western to global indexes of migration policy. *Global Policy*, 12(3), 327–337. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12930>
- Soysal, Y. (1994). *Limits of citizenship*. University of Chicago Press.
- Straus, S. (2015). *Making and unmaking nations: War, leadership, and genocide in modern Africa*. Cornell University Press. <https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801455681>
- Tamir, Y. (2019). Not so civic: Is there a difference between ethnic and civic nationalism? *Annual Review of Political Science*, 22(1), 419–434. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-022018-024059>
- Tudor, M. (2013). *The promise of power: The origins of democracy in India and autocracy in Pakistan*. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139519076>

- Tudor, M., & Slater, D. (2020). Nationalism, authoritarianism, and democracy: Historical lessons from South and Southeast Asia. *Perspectives on Politics*, 19(3), 706–722. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759272000078X>
- Volkens, A., Burst, T., Krause, W., Lehmann, P., Matthieß, T., Regel, S., Weßels, B., & Zehnter, L. (2021). *The manifesto data collection. Manifesto project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Version 2021a*. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB).
- vom Hau, M. (2008). State infrastructural power and nationalism: Comparative lessons from Mexico and Argentina. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 43(3–4), 334–354. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-008-9024-x>
- vom Hau, M. (2009). Unpacking the school: Textbooks, teachers, and the construction of nationhood in Mexico, Argentina, and Peru. *Latin American Research Review*, 44(3), 127–154. <https://doi.org/10.1353/lar.0.0105>
- Wimmer, A. (2002). *Nationalist exclusion and ethnic conflict. Shadows of modernity*. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511490415>
- Wimmer, A. (2012). *Waves of war. Nationalism, state-formation, and ethnic exclusion in the modern world*. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139198318>
- Wimmer, A. (2013). *Ethnic boundary making: Institutions, power, networks*. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199927371.001.0001>
- Wimmer, A. (2017). Power and pride. National identity and ethno-political inequality around the world. *World Politics*, 69(4), 605–639. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887117000120>
- Wimmer, A. (2018). *Nation building. Why some countries come together while others fall apart*. Princeton University Press.
- Wimmer, A., & Feinstein, Y. (2010). The rise of the nation-state across the world, 1816 to 2001. *American Sociological Review*, 75(5), 764–790. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122410382639>
- Wimmer, A., & Min, B. (2006). From empire to nation-state. Explaining wars in the modern world, 1816–2001. *American Sociological Review*, 71(6), 867–897. <https://doi.org/10.1177/000312240607100601>
- Zubrzycki, G. (2016). *Beheading the saint: Nationalism, religion, and secularism in Quebec*. University of Chicago Press. <https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226391717.001.0001>

**How to cite this article:** vom Hau, M., Helbling, M., Tudor, M., Wimmer, A., & Halikiopoulou, D. (2023). The consequences of nationalism: A scholarly exchange. *Nations and Nationalism*, 29(3), 810–830. <https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12947>