Journal article icon

Journal article

Optimal Corporate Governance and Compensation in a Dynamic World

Abstract:

We model long-run firm performance, management compensation, and corporate governance in a dynamic, nonstationary world. Many features of governance and compensation that have caused consternation among commentators arise naturally in this dynamic setting, even though boards are rational and managers are powerless. Compensation changes depend on changes in the evolution of a latent state variable outside the manager's control. Board passivity is positively correlated with both the value of ma...

Expand abstract

Actions


Authors


Publication date:
2012-01-01
URN:
uuid:56a4afd6-1ecb-4358-baf1-179529daaabf
Local pid:
oai:eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk:2517

Terms of use


Metrics


Views and Downloads






If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP