BOON, BANE, OR BUSINESS AS USUAL:
Perceptions of the Economic Consequences of Peacekeeping Withdrawal from Liberia

John Gledhill (Oxford University) & Sabrina Karim (Cornell University)

Abstract: Existing studies show that the deployment of a peacekeeping operation (PKO) can provide an economic boost to the host state and its population. Some of those studies also suggest that such a boost is unsustainable and that peacekeeping exit may trigger economic downturn within host states. If that is the case, however, do some locals feel the adverse economic effects of PKO exit more than others? In this article, we argue that individuals who come to directly or indirectly depend on economic opportunities that emerge following the deployment of peacekeepers are particularly likely to experience negative economic effects after PKO exit. However, those effects may be partly mitigated through individuals' economic actions and/or their access to new sources of outside support after the exit of peacekeepers. We test our argument on original data gathered through a large-scale household survey of Monrovia, Liberia, conducted in early 2020. We also draw on qualitative interview data. After noting an overall downturn in Liberia's economy after 2018 (when the UN Mission in Liberia closed), we find broad support for our claims in the survey data, albeit qualified by nuances in a secondary, disaggregated analysis. We conclude by highlighting implications of our study for the planning and management of peacekeeping withdrawal.

Keywords: Peacekeeping; peacekeeping economies; United Nations; Liberia.

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The deployment of a large-scale peacekeeping operation (PKO) can provide a sharp and sudden stimulus to the economy of a host state and its population (Beber et al., 2019; Carnahan et al., 2007). That stimulus is, in part, a product of deliberate efforts from PKOs to assure a stable and secure environment, which is conducive to production, commerce, and economic development (Scott/OECD, 2020, 12-13; Bove et al., 2022). Another -- less intentional -- source of economic growth can come through the development of a 'peacekeeping economy', which is an economic bubble that forms when a peacekeeping mission and thousands of (relatively well-resourced) international peacekeepers and civilian staff deploy to the host state, boosting demand for labor, accommodation, services, and goods (see Edu-Afful & Aning, 2015; Coleman, 2020). Within post-conflict contexts, such boosts can provide much-needed economic opportunities for local residents. But what happens when peacekeeping missions close and peacekeepers leave? Is the boom sustainable and, if not, who is particularly likely to feel the effects of an economic downturn?

In this article, we examine the impact of peacekeeping *withdrawal* on the economic experiences of individuals who live in regions that have previously hosted large-scale (United Nations) peacekeeping missions. More specifically, we consider which groups of people are particularly likely to report a downturn in their economic situations after peacekeepers leave. Beyond academic merit, understanding the micro-level economic impacts of PKO exit, and perceptions thereof, is important for international and domestic efforts to sustain peace in formerly 'peacekept' states -- in two ways. First, since unemployment, poverty, economic inequality, and perceptions of relative economic deprivation are associated with conflict onset and recidivism (Collier et al., 2008; World Bank, 2011), it is important that peacebuilding actors know whether the exit of a peacekeeping mission might generate or exacerbate perceived inequalities in a way that could threaten the sustainability of negative peace after peacekeepers leave. Second, given that employment opportunities and an "equitable distribution of resources" are seen as central components of positive peace (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2018, 7-8), it is important for stakeholders to understand whether some groups in society are particularly likely to experience a contraction of their economic and employment opportunities after the closure of a peacekeeping operation. Where there is such a contraction, counter measures may be needed for those who are hit hardest by the economic effects of PKO withdrawal.

Our analysis starts from the assumption that the deployment of a peacekeeping mission can indeed stimulate a local economy and so the withdrawal of peacekeepers can, equally, contribute to aggregate economic downturn. However, the adverse effects of such a downturn may not be felt equally across the population; rather, some individuals could be hit hard, while others will continue to get by as they did prior to PKO exit. Where there is such variation, we argue, two factors combine to inform who will be particularly likely to perceive negative economic effects from peacekeeping withdrawal. First, individuals whose livelihoods have come to depend on economic opportunities generated by the peacekeeping presence will be particularly vulnerable in the face of PKO exit and, thus, more likely to report a decline in their own economic conditions after a peacekeeping mission leaves. At the same time, some individuals may be partly firewalled from the negative economic impacts of PKO exit because they have access to particular mitigation measures, such as diverse sources of employment and/or assistance from external actors (e.g. friends and family, civil society organizations) whose support can substitute for some of the economic benefits that accompanied the peacekeeping deployment. Bringing these logics together, our core claim is that individuals who develop *dependency* on the peacekeeping economy but lack access to effective *mitigation measures* after PKO exit will be particularly likely to perceive negative economic impacts from peacekeeping withdrawal.

We test this argument by examining original data gathered from a large-scale, representative survey of Monrovia, Liberia (N = 1325). The survey was run in early 2020 -- almost two years after closure of the long-standing United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). This household-level data is complemented with qualitative interview materials gathered in-country in 2019 and 2020. Drawing on these sources, we first provide background on the aggregate-level economic downturn that followed UNMIL's withdrawal. Turning to our survey data, we find that a clear majority of respondents reported an overall drop in their household economic situation following UNMIL's exit, but this view was not universally shared. We then investigate variation and find that individuals who showed a higher level of indexed economic *dependency* on the peacekeeping mission were indeed more likely to report a decline in their personal situation after mission closure. We also find that the negative impact of dependency decreases when individuals have access to selected *mitigation measures* after exit. Thus, we find overall support for our core argument. In a secondary analysis, however, we then disaggregate the indices of our two key explanatory variables and find that only certain forms of dependency are associated with perceptions of household economic decline after PKO exit, and only certain types of mitigation measure seem to shield individuals from decline.

The article proceeds in five steps. We first give an overview of existing literature that addresses the economic impacts of PKO deployment and withdrawal, highlighting the limitations of those works for addressing the question at hand. Next, we expand on the argument sketched above. We then outline how we go about testing that argument and our sources of data. When presenting our findings, we open with an overview of aggregate-level economic trends in Liberia after UNMIL's exit, before moving on to an analysis of our survey data. We conclude by summarizing our claims and highlighting the implications of our study for refining the practice of peacekeeping drawdown and mission closure.

The Economic Impacts of Peacekeeping and Withdrawal: Existing Understandings

While the economic impacts of peacekeeping have been studied previously, there have been few focused investigations of the economic consequences of PKO withdrawal. This may reflect a broad 'short-termism' in the study of peacekeeping, which has seen most evaluations of PKOs look at the immediate impacts of peacekeeping interventions on security, governance, and/or the economy while peacekeepers remain present, rather than conditions on the ground and the experiences of local populations 'after exit' (Gledhill, 2020). Despite this tendency, three sets of literature provide a basis upon which to build a study of the impact of PKO exit on household economies.

One set of studies documents ways in which the interventions and deliberate actions of peacekeeping missions -- while deployed -- can foster economic growth and development within host states. Analysts point to three main mechanisms of influence. First, since PKOs ordinarily contribute to security within a host state, they can help create the kind of stability that is conducive to economic production, exchange, and growth (Scott/OECD, 2020; Bove et al., 2022; also see Mkvukiyehe and Samii, 2021, 370). Second, multidimensional PKOs regularly fund or realize local-level development projects that aim to deliver immediate economic dividends of peace for the host state population (Gledhill et al. 2021; United Nations Peacekeeping, n.d.). Third, peacekeeping missions sometimes cooperate with international organizations, such as the World Bank, to reform the financial institutions of host states and, thus, encourage long-term economic stability and growth (Caplan, 2005, Ch. 6; Del Castillo, 2010). At present, it remains unclear whether this suite of interventions, and beyond, ordinarily contributes to net economic growth; Bove et al. (2022) and Hoeffler et al. (2010, 26) find that some activities of multidimensional peacekeeping are associated with growth, while Mkvukiyehe and Samii (2021) and Bove and Elia (2018) find limited evidence of a positive economic impact from peacekeeping deployment. None of these studies, however, offers

specific insight into how the end of peacekeeping interventions and the *exit* of peacekeepers might impact economic conditions and individuals' economic experiences in former host states.

A second set of relevant studies focuses on the unintended consequences of peacekeeping deployments for the economies of host states and households therein, while missions remain deployed (Ammitzboell, 2007; Jennings & Bøås, 2015). Broadly speaking, those unintended consequences flow from an increase in demand for goods, services, and labor alongside the arrival of thousands of peacekeeping troops and civilian staff, most of whom are well-paid relative to the local population. That influx triggers a rise in demand for international-standard supermarkets and stores that sell 'luxury' goods. Spending similarly increases in the service sector as the arrival of international clientele boosts demand for hospitality, domestic services, and beyond (Aning & Edu-Afful, 2013; Edu-Afful & Aning, 2015; Hull & et al., 2009). Mission deployment also creates employment opportunities with the peacekeeping mission itself and other international organizations, which look to hire national staff for a range of consultative, administrative, and logistical roles (Carnahan et al., 2007; Jennings, 2015). Such employment, along with the increase in consumer demand and spending, can combine to create a bubble economy, which provides an aggregate-level economic boost for host states and their residents (Beber et al., 2019; Carnahan et al., 2007). While a number of studies have suggested that the bubble may burst upon the exit of peacekeepers (Aning & Edu-Afful, 2013, 28; Jennings, 2015, 296-97; Pugh, 2012, 283), there have only been preliminary investigations of that intuition (Beber et al., 2019). Thus, at present, we have limited empirical evidence concerning the economic effects of peacekeeping withdrawal and how the dissolution of a peacekeeping economy might impact local populations.

A third body of relevant literature has focused on processes and impacts of PKO withdrawal, although only limited attention has been given to economic dimensions thereof. These works, which have largely been produced by policy-focused organizations,[1] have emerged alongside a growing recognition within the UN itself that peacekeeping 'transitions' need to be carefully planned in advance and they should, where possible, minimize any disruptive effects of mission drawdown and closure (see Day, 2019; United Nations, 2013). To that end, these studies have explored: factors that inform decisions to close missions; transition and exit planning; the timing and speed of PKO withdrawals; and the structure of any residual international presence after PKO exit (Day, 2019; Forti & Connolly, 2019; Price & Titulaer,

[1] With the notable exception of contributions to Caplan (2012).

2013; Caplan et al., 2022). Where economic issues associated with transition have been considered, discussions have tended to focus on financing international peacebuilding after the closure of PKOs, rather than the economic consequences of exit for host states and their populations (Day, 2019, 18-19; Forti & Connolly, 2019, 10-11). One partial exception is a recent report produced for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (Scott/OECD, 2020). While the report's consideration of some post-exit economic trends in former host states is certainly a valuable contribution, it concentrates on aggregate-level economic outcomes, observed at the national level. As such, it offers only limited insights into (variation in) the micro-level economic impact of PKO withdrawal at the household level, which is where any negative consequences of exit will be felt, in practice.

Bringing these three sets of literature together, it becomes possible to identify what we know about the economic impacts of PKO deployments, what we assume or expect to observe when peacekeeping missions leave, and what we do not currently know about the economic consequences of PKO exit. First, scholars broadly agree that the deployment of a peacekeeping mission will provide a stimulus to the local economy while peacekeepers remain on the ground. Second, scholars and policy actors alike have preliminary evidence to suggest that PKO exit can trigger an aggregate-level downturn in the economy of a former host state. Third, we do not currently know how any aggregate-level downturn might affect individuals in formerly peacekept states; specifically, we do not know if there is variation in the degree to which individuals experience adverse economic consequences from PKO withdrawal and, if so, how such variation can be explained. This gap in our collective understanding motivates the study that follows, as we investigate the question: *Under what conditions are individuals likely to perceive adverse economic effects from the withdrawal of a multidimensional peacekeeping mission?*

Theorizing Variation in the Economic Impacts of Peacekeeping Withdrawal

Our starting point for addressing the question at hand is the assumption that PKO exit can lead to aggregate economic downturn because resources and demand that were fed into the economy with PKO deployment are taken out with peacekeeping withdrawal (Beber et al., 2019). Thus, just as the arrival of a peacekeeping mission and thousands of international staff can generate markets for real estate, services, and consumables, so too can PKO exit dissolve those markets. Furthermore, just as the peacekeeping mission creates employment posts for national staff and contractors, so too can PKO exit lead to redundancies. Alongside these direct economic challenges, there may also be indirect negative economic effects, such as a

weakening of domestic and international investor confidence due to uncertainty surrounding the local political and security climate after PKO exit; a degradation of infrastructure that supports economic activity, such as roads, bridges, and ports that the PKO had previously helped to maintain; and inflation / currency fluctuations as foreign exchange leaves the country with peacekeepers. All of the above can compound unemployment, contribute to a drop in consumer spending, and reduce production, thus giving rise to an economic 'shock' at the aggregate level.

Such a shock, we argue, can be similar in function -- though not ordinarily in severity -- to systemic economic shocks that are triggered by other crises, such as natural disasters (see Mustafa, 1998), the onset of regional instability and conflict (Stewart & Fitzgerald, 2000), health crises (Gondwe, 2020), or global financial crises (Ali, 2009). These crises all share a number of commonalities with one another and, we argue, with peacekeeping exit. First, their causes and/or origins are (at least partly) external to the regions or systems that are affected. Second, the crises in question all ordinarily generate negative aggregate-level economic effects for the affected regions. Third, a large cross-section of a given population is potentially affected by the crises in question. Thus, in sum, these crises -- including PKO exit -- can all be seen as system-level shocks that generate adverse effects for local populations. To be sure, certain features of PKO exit also distinguish it from the other crises; peacekeeping withdrawal is rarely unpredictable and, accordingly, international and domestic actors can take steps to soften the intensity of any shock that is expected to be associated with withdrawal (see Caplan et al., 2022). While such measures may break the fall, however, the final closure of a large-scale peacekeeping mission will still involve a sharp and swift change to the institutional environment, the likes of which can produce aggregate-level negative consequences for local populations.

Although systemic crises expose large cross-sections of a population to hazards (i.e. whole regions, countries, or towns), we know from the literature on disasters that the effects of those hazards are often not felt uniformly. Rather, there can be significant variation in the degree to which subsections of a population -- communities, households, or individuals -- experience adverse effects of aggregate-level crises. That variation, in turn, is seen to be related to the distribution of resource endowments, which renders some individuals particularly *vulnerable* in the face of adverse events. At the same time, resources can also allow some groups or individuals to show greater *resilience* in the face of system-level shocks (see Eakin & Luers, 2006; Manyena, 2006; Mustafa, 1998).

An individual's vulnerability broadly refers to their susceptibility to harm through exposure to a given hazard. That susceptibility, in turn, is informed by socio-political, cultural, and/or economic factors that influence the degree to which an individual will be exposed to the hazard in question and, if exposed, the likelihood that exposure will cause harm (Brklacich et al., 2010; Gallopín, 2006; Manyena, 2006; Naudé et al., 2009). Poorer farmers, for example, may only be able to afford low-lying land and, as such, they will be particularly vulnerable to the effects of flooding (Mustafa, 1998). Resilience, by contrast, refers to the capacity of a group or an individual to "anticipate, absorb, accommodate, or recover from the effects of a shock or stress in a timely and efficient manner" (Mitchell & Harris, 2012, 2). In other words, resilience refers to the capacity to limit, and cope with, the negative impacts of exposure to harm (see discussion in Manyena, 2006). This, again, is shaped by resource endowments. Returning to flood-affected farmers, those who have their own financial reserves or access to sources of external support will be relatively well-placed to manage the costs of any flood damage that they may experience (Mustafa, 1998).

Taken together, vulnerability and resilience shape the likelihood that an actor will experience negative effects from a system-level shock. Those who are unable to limit their exposure to a hazard and have little or no recourse to coping mechanisms will be particularly likely to suffer adverse consequences. By contrast, those who can limit their exposure and/or have access to resources that will allow them to recover -- if exposed -- will experience fewer challenges.

Individual-level Experiences of PKO Exit: Dependency and Mitigation

Given functional similarity between the impact of external shocks caused by disasters and the exit of large-scale peacekeeping operations, the broad logic of vulnerability and resilience can be adapted to help explain individual-level variation in experiences of economic hardship that are associated with an aggregate-level downturn in the economy following PKO exit. Our adapted argument is built around the concepts of *dependency* (derived from vulnerability) and *mitigation measures* (derived from resilience).

The first factor that we propose will inform the micro-level economic impact of peacekeeping withdrawal is whether an individual develops dependency on economic opportunities that arise alongside the presence of the peacekeeping mission and, if so, in what ways. While we recognize that individuals could become economically reliant on peacekeepers in manifold ways, we see merit in distinguishing between two broad types of dependency and associated vulnerabilities: *direct*- and *indirect*.

Direct dependency can develop for individuals whose main sources of income come from working with, or working for, the peacekeeping mission and/or international staff who deploy with the mission. This will include host state nationals who are employed by the peacekeeping mission, either as national- or contract staff (Coleman, 2020; Jennings, 2015). Locals who sell goods and services to international actors may also develop direct dependency, as they come to rely on regular business from the peacekeeping mission, from other international organizations, and/or from the many thousands of individuals who work for those organizations. Although such business or employment can prove profitable while the peacekeeping mission remains on the ground, reliance on such opportunities is ultimately a tenuous arrangement since peacekeeping is, by design, temporary; when missions close, they take with them the jobs, customers, and opportunities that they had generated. Direct dependency on such jobs and opportunities, therefore, can mean equally direct exposure to some of the most detrimental economic effects of peacekeeping withdrawal.

Alongside (the relatively finite) group of individuals whose sources of livelihood are directly tied to the peacekeeping presence, there is also a potentially much larger group of individuals who become *indirectly* economically dependent on a peacekeeping presence. This can include any individuals who benefit from the economic stimulus that accompanies a peacekeeping deployment, even if they do not derive income directly from transactions with the peacekeeping mission or its staff. Instead, they may benefit from the range of economic activities that become possible when peacekeepers establish security, build infrastructure, support state institutions, and bring in large quantities of foreign exchange, thereby creating an environment that is conducive to local investment, production, and exchange (see Scott/OECD 2020; Bove et al., 2022; Danielak, 2022). Although large numbers of local residents may potentially benefit from such a stimulus to the local economy, those same individuals will also be somewhat vulnerable in the face of peacekeeping exit because the withdrawal of protection and infrastructural support that had previously been provided by peacekeepers could contribute to economic contraction in sectors that had developed under the watch of the peacekeeping presence. Where that is indeed the case, individuals working in those sectors will be exposed to the effects of economic downturn.

While direct and/or indirect dependency may leave individuals economically vulnerable in the face of peacekeeping withdrawal, we argue that such vulnerability can be attenuated for those who have access to *mitigation measures* that may help them cope with any aggregate economic downturn. We again note that such measures can be diverse in form;

however, we propose that two sets of mitigation dynamics can be particularly important for resilience in the face of economic decline after PKO exit: *diversification* and *substitution*.

Diversification involves individuals (deliberately or inadvertently) reducing their level of level of economic risk by identifying, and then availing of, varied sources of income -- including in sectors that sit outside of the peacekeeping economy and which, as such, will be less affected by peacekeeping withdrawal. In practice, *diversification* may see those who have worked for the peacekeeping mission or related service industries take on multiple jobs, across diverse sectors. That way, if one post should become redundant with the withdrawal of the peacekeeping mission, an individual may still have access to an alternate source of employment and income. Individuals may also diversify by setting aside savings during the peacekeeping boom time and then using those savings -- after PKO exit -- to set up businesses in sectors of the economy that were not deeply intertwined with the peacekeeping mission, thereby providing them with streams of income that will prove robust in the face of peacekeeping withdrawal. Where an individual succeeds in diversifying their income in one of these ways, they may be able to reduce their exposure to the economic hazards of PKO exit and, in so doing, boost their capacity to cope with any aggregate level downturn.

A second form of mitigation is *substitution* -- an arrangement in which external actors step in after a peacekeeping mission leaves and provide some of the economic and social support that the PKO offered while it was deployed. Such a substitution dynamic may involve a 'like for like' exchange; for example, a follow-on UN political mission may be deployed after exit, which will create ongoing employment opportunities for some nationals who were previously employed by the UN's peacekeeping operation (see Caplan et al., 2022). Other forms of substitution may be less direct; family, friends, and community organizations, for instance, may offer financial or social support that replaces sources of income and support that dry up with the exit of the peacekeeping mission (Aning & Edu-Afful, 2013, 28). No matter the form, however, where some kind of substitution arrangement is in place, an economic void that would otherwise accompany PKO withdrawal will be (partly) filled by external actors and, as such, beneficiaries of that arrangement will be (partly) shielded from the effects of any aggregate level economic downturn after exit.

Bringing the logic of the above claims together, our overarching argument is that dependency increases susceptibility to the negative economic effects of peacekeeping withdrawal, while mitigation measures can offset that dependency and otherwise boost economic resilience in the face of aggregate-level economic downturn. Thus, an individual's overall likelihood of reporting economic decline after PKO exit will be a function of the

interaction between their degree of dependency on the peacekeeping mission, while deployed, and their access to mitigation measures, after PKO exit.

Hypotheses

The arguments outlined above point to finite claims about the impact of (a) dependency (b) mitigation measures and (c) the interaction between those two factors in shaping the overall likelihood that an individual will perceive economic downturn after PKO exit. In the sections that follow, we assess the merits of each of these claims by testing a series of hypotheses that explore (forms of) dependency, (forms of) mitigation, and the combination thereof.

We first consider the impact of dependency, which we expect will increase an individual's economic vulnerability in the face of peacekeeping exit. We assume that the more ways in which an individual is economically dependent on the peacekeeping mission, the greater their potential to be exposed to the kinds of economic challenges that can arise when a mission leaves and, thus, the greater the likelihood that they will experience some degree of economic decline after PKO exit. Thus, we hypothesize that:

> ***H1***: *The greater an individual's scope of economic dependency on a peacekeeping mission, the more likely they will be to perceive a decline in their own economic situation after peacekeeping withdrawal.*

While we distinguish between direct and indirect forms of dependency, we expect that both could increase an individual's vulnerability to any negative economic impacts of PKO exit. To gauge whether that expectation is valid, we examine the discrete impact of each form of dependency, hypothesizing that:

> ***H1a***: *Where an individual develops* ***direct*** *economic dependency on a peacekeeping mission, they will be more likely to perceive a decline in their own economic situation after peacekeeping withdrawal.*
>
> ***H1b***: *Where an individual develops* ***indirect*** *economic dependency on a peacekeeping mission, they will be more likely to perceive a decline in their own economic situation after peacekeeping withdrawal.*

A second set of hypotheses seeks to isolate the tempering effect of mitigation measures. Thus, we explore the argument that mitigation allows an individual to better cope with adverse effects of aggregate economic downturn after peacekeeping exit. Here, we assume that the more forms of mitigation to which an individual has access, the greater the likelihood that the

individual will be able to show a degree of economic resilience in the face of aggregate level economic challenges after PKO exit. Thus, we hypothesize that:

> ***H2***: *The greater an individual's access to mitigation measures, the less likely they will be to perceive a decline in their own economic situation after peacekeeping withdrawal.*

While we distinguish between diversification and substitution as two forms of mitigation, we also expect that each could increase an individual's capacity to cope, albeit through different mechanisms. To test that expectation, we hypothesize that:

> ***H2a***: *Where an individual has access to* ***diversification*** *measures, they will be less likely to perceive a decline in their own economic situation after peacekeeping withdrawal.*
>
> ***H2b***: *Where an individual has access to* ***substitution*** *measures, they will be less likely to perceive a decline in their own economic situation after peacekeeping withdrawal.*

Finally, we combine the logic of the above claims and explore the argument that an individual's overall likelihood of reporting economic decline after PKO exit will be a function of the interaction between their scope of *dependency* and access to *mitigation measures*. Thus, we hypothesize:

> ***H3****: The greater the scope of an individual's economic dependency on a peacekeeping mission, and the lesser their access to mitigation measures after peacekeeping exit, the more likely they will be to perceive a decline in their own economic situation.*

Methods and Parameters

We now test our hypotheses by analyzing original survey data collected in early 2020 in Monrovia (N = 1325), following withdrawal of the long-standing UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL, 2003-2018). That survey data is complemented by elite and expert interview data that we gathered in-country in mid-2019 and early-2020.

The case of Liberia lends itself to analysis for a combination of theoretical and practical reasons. On the theoretical side, our outcome of interest is variation in the household-level economic impact of PKO withdrawal and so there is merit in examining a region in which we know that peacekeeping deployment had a substantial impact on the local economy and, as such, we could expect that the withdrawal of peacekeepers might also have a (variable) effect on the economies of households in the country. Liberia is a suitable case because a

number of studies have documented the size and scope of the intended and unintended economic impacts of UNMIL's deployment (e.g. Andersen, 2010; Aning & Edu-Aful, 2013; Beber et al., 2019; Edu-Afful & Aning, 2015; Jennings, 2015, 2016; Scott/OECD, 2020). Since the largest deployment of peacekeepers was in Monrovia (the capital), and the largest economic impact of the peacekeeping economy was felt there, there is also logic to sampling the capital, in particular.

On the practical side, the case of Liberia lent itself to analysis because UNMIL closed at the end of March 2018 (after a 15-year deployment) and so, by surveying in early 2020, we were able to gauge the perceptions of individuals after sufficient time for economic effects of PKO exit to be felt but also within sufficient time to limit the range of intervening factors that may have shaped respondents' views of their household economies after PKO exit. In eventuality, this would have included the onset of the Covid pandemic which, although largely contained in Liberia throughout 2020 and 2021, still had consequences for the local economy. For the study at hand, enumerators were able to complete our survey of Monrovia during the same week as cases of Covid were first reported in Liberia and, as such, our findings are not informed by the Covid crisis.

Qualitative interviews, which provide case background, were run on the ground in Liberia by John Gledhill in May 2019 and January 2020. Respondents were purposively selected with a view to gathering the views of: (a) international and local experts who had broad analytic insights into trends in Liberia after UNMIL's exit and; (b) local actors -- such as businesspeople and state actors -- who had direct experience of living and working in Liberia in recent years. More than 40 individuals were interviewed about their views and experiences related to the impact of UNMIL's exit on a range of outcomes, although only a subset of interviews focused primarily on economic consequences of withdrawal (other interviews explored issues of security, governance etc., after PKO exit). All citations have been pseudonymized or anonymized in a form that was agreed with the participants.

For our quantitative data, we conducted a representative survey of Monrovia based on the sample frame used by Beber et al. for a 2012 survey (2019).[2] Their frame started with enumeration areas (EAs) based on the 2008 census. They then drew geographic grids within each EA, using GPS and satellite imagery-based data to estimate the total number of dwellings in each EA and the average number of adults in each household. For our study, we then determined the number of individuals to sample from each EA. During fielding, enumerators

[2] For further details on the survey, see Appendix.

engaged in a random walk procedure to select a dwelling for respondent selection. Once a dwelling was identified, the enumerator selected a random adult to interview using a Kish selection grid. Our sample included 1325 respondents, with nine respondents later withdrawing.[3] Overall, non-response was not an issue and enumerators were ordinarily able to survey or return to survey the randomly selected individual for the survey. Descriptive analysis of the demographic characteristics of our sample can be found in the Appendix, as well as a comparison of our sample with results from the 2012 Beber et al. survey (2019).

We received institutional review board (IRB) approval for our research from our home institutions.[4] We also sought to minimize the gap between the ethical guidelines to which academic institutions adhere in the 'Global North' and those in place in other regions of the world (where there is particular contextual knowledge) by obtaining in-country IRB approval for the survey.[5]

Case Background and Aggregate Economic Trends since UNMIL's Exit

In October of 2003, after 14 years of civil war(s) in Liberia, UNMIL was deployed to replace and absorb a regional (ECOWAS) peacekeeping mission that had been providing security on the ground following the signing of peace accords. UNMIL soon grew into the largest peacekeeping operation deployed at the time, with over 15,000 military at peak, 1,000 civilian police, and some 700 international civilian staff (Farrall, 2012, 321). UNMIL was not just large in size, but also in the scope of its mandate, which included 'regular' security activities such as monitoring the cease fire, ensuring civilian protection, and organizing security sector reform, alongside a range of activities that were designed to foster human security and economic development, such as demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, election assistance, human rights monitoring, and developing state capacity (United Nations Security Council, 2003). To realize this mandate, UNMIL was given a sizable budget, which peaked in excess of USD$800 million per annum during the early years of the mission, although it declined from there over the decade that followed, before the mission finally closed at the end of March 2018 (Global Peace Operations Review, n.d.).

[3] These responses were removed from the sample.
[4]Cornell University IRB approval is filed under IRB1911009186; Oxford University approval is filed under CUREC R57153 and C1A19033.
[5] University of Liberia – Pacific Institute for Research & Evaluation, Institutional Review Board, Protocol # 19-12-192.

During the 15 years of UNMIL's deployment, there was broad economic growth, due to a combination of stability provided by the peacekeeping mission (Scott/OECD, 2020), reforms to financial institutions (World Bank, 2019), and economic stimulus that came with the large-scale international presence (World Bank and UNMIL, 2013; Beber at al., 2019). This growth pattern was temporarily reversed by the Ebola crisis of 2014-15 and a concurrent drop in global commodity prices, both of which hit the Liberian economy hard (BTI Project, 2018, 19-20; Primson Management Services, 2018, 1). While growth had returned when time came for UNMIL to close in March 2018, there was another sharp and swift downturn in economic indicators from that time.

Following UNMIL's exit, Liberia fell back into recession amidst the onset of a wider set of economic crises. Inflation and currency devaluation proved particularly problematic, with inflation peaking at around 27% in 2019 and the Liberian dollar (formally) losing almost one third of its value (relative to USD) (World Bank, 2020, 10-11). While causality is difficult to isolate, interviewees pointed to the withdrawal of USD from circulation alongside UNMIL's exit as a contributing factor to currency instability (also see Forti & Connolly, 2018, 37), and some highlighted the challenges of exchange rate depreciation for imports, production costs, and consumer prices.[6] Anecdotal reports also suggested a visible weakening of sectors that had previously sold goods, services, or labor to actors from the international community, such as hospitality, real estate, entertainment, retail and beyond (Rouse, 2019; Thompson, n.d. [2018]).[7] Unsurprisingly, unemployment reportedly increased in these sectors, and certainly among individuals who were previously employed by the peacekeeping mission itself.[8] Businesspeople and experts interviewed also reported a drop in consumer and investor confidence amidst a climate of uncertainty that prevailed after UNMIL's exit.[9]

Liberia's economic downturn from 2018 cannot be solely attributed to PKO exit; the economy was already on weak footing following the Ebola crisis and concurrent global commodity crash, and these challenges were compounded by uncertainty that accompanied the installation of a new government under George Weah, immediately before UNMIL's

[6] Interviews with an economist with an international organization (IO), an executive of a Liberian owned business, representatives of a leading civil society organization, and anonymous interviewees.
[7] Also, interviews with an embassy official, and anonymous interviewees.
[8] According to an interview with a UN national staff member (in mid-2019), around 40-45% of UN national staff who had been employed by UNMIL were unemployed. High unemployment was also recognized in another interview with UN officials.
[9] Interviews with Liberian business executives, an economist with an IO, and anonymous interviewees.

withdrawal.[10] Nevertheless, UNMIL's exit does seem to have deepened the country's ready-existing economic woes.[11] In the next section, we explore variation in the degree to which individuals perceived that their own economic situation worsened after UNMIL's exit and, in particular, whether those perceptions were associated with the scope of their *dependency* on the peacekeeping economy while the mission was deployed and the extent of their access to *mitigation measures* in the face of economic downturn after UNMIL's exit.

Variable Specification and Survey Models

Dependent Variable

The main dependent variable that we use for our analysis is drawn from responses to a survey question: "Overall, has the economic situation of your household improved, declined, or remained unchanged since UNMIL left in March 2018?" (using responses for "declined" as a dichotomous outcome variable). A sizable majority reported a downturn in their household economy, which suggests that most Monrovians felt effects of the overall decline in Liberia's economy after UNMIL's exit. Specifically, 71% of respondents thought that their economic conditions at home had worsened, 19% thought that they had remained unchanged, and only 9% of respondents thought that conditions had improved. Thus, while most respondents reported a decline in their household economic conditions after UNMIL's exit, there was variation on that front. Our models sought to identify correlates of that variation within our survey data.

Independent Variables

We first wanted to measure the impact of an individual's level of *dependency* on their perceptions of household economic decline, after PKO exit. To do this, we created an additive index,[12] based on responses to several survey questions. The first three measures in the index can be understood as indicators of *direct dependency*. As outlined in the conceptual discussion above, this is an arrangement in which an individual's livelihood is substantially derived from direct interactions and transactions with the peacekeeping mission or peacekeepers. To capture this arrangement, we included responses to a question that asked "While UNMIL was

[10] Interviews with an economist with an IO, and anonymous interviewees.

[11] Interviews with an economist with an IO, a UN official, a Liberian business executive, and anonymous interviewees.

[12] While we did not pre-specify our indices when developing the survey, they were developed and revised prior to running the final analyses reported.

in Liberia, did you sell goods or services to UNMIL or other UN workers?" (using 'yes', which was reported by 10% of respondents). We also included responses to questions concerning the nature of respondents' interactions with UN peacekeepers; where individuals reported interactions that related to their livelihoods -- economic, health-related, or community-based engagements -- we assumed they may have come to directly rely on social and economic support that was provided by UNMIL.[13] And as a final measure of *direct dependency*, we drew on responses to the open-ended question "What do you miss about UNMIL?";[14] here, we included respondents who reported missing economic growth, development, job creation, and services, on the assumption that individuals who missed these economic aspects of peacekeeping did so because they had come to rely on them.

A fourth measure of *dependency* in our additive index can be seen to capture *indirect* forms of economic dependency; that is, reliance on the economic boost provided by peacekeeping, even if an individual did not have regular, direct transactions with the mission or peacekeepers. Here, we drew on responses to a question that asked "While UNMIL was in Liberia, did you use US Dollars (USD) or Liberian Dollars (LRD) more often when buying and selling goods and services?". While we recognize that direct transactions with foreign clients were typically in USD, since "rents for luxury apartments and supermarkets where the expatriate community shop[ped], [were] transacted in US dollars" (Mulbah 2018, 175), the vast majority of our respondents who reported using USD during UNMIL's time did not also report directly selling goods or services to UNMIL or UN workers. Indeed only 68 of the 566 individuals who used USD also stated that they sold goods and services to UNMIL. This would suggest that many who engaged with the USD-based economy during UNMIL's time were not deriving income directly from UNMIL or its staff, even if they were benefitting from transactions in (and facilitated by) USD -- the supply and use of which increased with UNMIL's presence.[15] As such, we take use of USD as an indicator of *indirect dependency*.

Bringing these questions and responses together, we produced an additive index to measure individual *dependency* on the mission. Around 35% of the respondents did not rely on UNMIL on any of our measures of economic *dependency*; around 40% relied on UNMIL

[13] Around 7.5% reported economic interactions, about 5.5% interacted with UNMIL for their healthcare, and just over 5% relied on UNMIL for community support.

[14] We coded open-ended answers according to whether respondents reported missing themes related to security; economic livelihood; community support/human rights; and positive peacebuilding.

[15] Interviews with representatives of a leading civil society organization, and a representative of an IO.

in one of these ways; 18% in two ways; 6% in three ways; and 1% were dependent on UNMIL in four or more ways.

To measure *mitigation measures*, we created another additive index. Our indicators reflect the two logics of mitigation that were discussed in the conceptual section above. First, we included questions and responses relating to actions that could have diversified individuals' economic portfolios and, in so doing, reduced the economic risk to which they were exposed alongside PKO exit and associated economic downturn. To capture such *diversification*, we started with a question asking whether an individual was able to put aside savings while UNMIL was present. Where that was the case (64%), we included responses to a subsequent question which asked what respondents had done with those savings after UNMIL left Liberia in 2018. Where they had retained their savings (6%), put the savings into a business (15%), property (9%), or education and other diversification measures (2%), we included those responses in our index.[16]

Our additive index of *mitigation measures* also included indicators of the second form of mitigation discussed above, which is *substitution* by a third party for some of the social/economic support that UNMIL offered while it was deployed. Here, we first focused on remittances, which are known to be a large source of external support for many Liberians. To do so, we drew on responses to the question, "Has there been an increase, decrease, or no change in the level of financial support you receive from friends/family abroad since UNMIL left in March 2018?". Around 27% of respondents said they had received an increase or no change, and we took this as an indication that these respondents had access to outside financial resources that could soften the household-level impact of any national-level economic downturn. We also asked about NGO support, as an indicator of *substitution*: "Has there been an increase, decrease, or no change in the level of support that you receive from NGOs since UNMIL left Liberia in March 2018?". About 15% of respondents said they had received increased support or that support had stayed the same, and we took this as an indication that NGOs may have partly shielded respondents from the negative impact otherwise associated with a withdrawal of UNMIL-provided services.[17] Based on data we used for our index of *mitigation measures*, around 46% of the respondents did not have any access to mitigation,

[16] The responses 'Saved it' and 'Put it in a business' were closed-ended. The responses relating to putting savings into property, education, or other diversification measures were open-ended responses, which were then coded by the authors.

[17] Because the response 'Stayed the same' could mean that the individuals never experienced remittances or NGO support, in the Appendix, we run the analysis without these responses.

39% had one way to mitigate economic challenges, 14% had two ways, and 1.5% had three ways to mitigate.

There could be several concerns with these measures. One may be that *dependency* and *mitigation* are not independent from one another. To address this, we looked at the correlation coefficients of the measures, which stands at -0.08, and we regressed *dependency* on *mitigation* (see Appendix). This analysis shows that those who were more reliant on the peacekeeping economy were actually less likely to adopt mitigation strategies. Another concern may relate to the creation of an additive index, whereby each component is dichotomous and the components are added together. The assumption behind such indices is that each question is equally weighted compared to all other questions used to create the index. In reality, however, some indicators may be more important than others for the index. However, instead of including an arbitrary weighting system, we have opted for an additive index because we did not make any advance assumptions about whether one type of dependency or mitigation measure is more important than another. To address concerns over the additive approach, we also ran our analyses with the indexed variables disaggregated into their constituent parts, and the results are reported below. We also conducted correlation matrices and we provide a description of PCA analysis in the Appendix, which reveals that the measures are not highly correlated with one another and that the underlying components that explain the most variance are consistent with our statistical findings when we disaggregate the variables.

We present logit models with, and without, clustered standard errors at the enumeration area level.[18] We add standard controls including the level of respondents' interactions with UNMIL,[19] sex, age, income level, land ownership, whether they are heads of household, crime victimization, whether they live in a war-affected neighborhood, were born in Montserrado County (in and around the capital), education, political party affiliation, knowledge of the law, whether they are looking for a job, and whether they value the informal sector (the latter two are proxies for economic vulnerability). Some of these co-variates may be considered "post-treatment" (e.g. knowledge of the law, looking for a job, informal sector); they may have occurred after the individual experienced *dependency* and/or *mitigation.*[20] However, because we are assessing people's perceptions in the present, we believe that these are important, confounding variables that affect people's current perceptions, and thus should

[18] A model with enumeration fixed effects is in the Appendix.
[19] This is not included as a part of the index because the interaction does not signify dependency.
[20] See for example, Cinelli et al. (2022).

be included in the main model presented. Nevertheless, in the Appendix, we only include "pre-treatment" variables as a robustness test, and also include post-treatment co-variates in a step-wise way.

Finally, to understand the conditional effect of *mitigation* on *dependency*, we use an interaction term. Specifically, we interact the two indices on the dichotomous variable that asked whether or not respondents perceived a decrease in household economic conditions.[21] We present marginal effects to demonstrate the substantive effects of our interactive findings.

Importantly, there is no way to causally identify our model. Neither *dependency* nor *mitigation measures* are randomly distributed among our sample. Instead, our approach is descriptive and correlative, to show whether or not measures of *dependency* and *mitigation* are associated with a perceived decline in household economies. In so doing, our study follows other recent studies in development that look at economic decline in households (e.g. Yoo and Sou 2023; Jung et al. 2022).

Survey Results and Analysis

We now move on to testing our hypothesis through analysis of our 2020 survey data.[22] Models 1 and 2, which are reported in Table 1, show that if people were more economically dependent on UNMIL, they were significantly more likely to say that they experienced economic decline in the household after UNMIL's exit. Looking at predicted probabilities, if they did not show any *dependency*, they were 64% likely to state that they experienced decline, but if they had the higher levels of *dependency*, they were 80% likely to report the same. This offers support for H1.

In Table 1, Models 1 and 2 also show that, if individuals had ways to mitigate the economic effects of UNMIL's exit, they were less likely to say that they faced economic decline in the household, although we note that the relationship is not statistically significant in the model with interaction terms. Using this model, and calculating predicted probabilities, we find that those with access to none of the mitigation measures in our index were 75% likely to say they experienced economic decline in their household, whereas those who had access to the highest number of mitigation measures were only 42% likely to say that they

[21] The Appendix presents results if *dependency* and *mitigation* are measured in a dichotomous way, and also disaggregates each component of the index and interacts them with each other.
[22] The Appendix provides further descriptive statistics and a comparison of our results with those of the Beber et al. (2019) survey, conducted in Liberia in 2012.

experienced household economic decline. A further table in the Appendix also shows that *mitigation* continues to be significant in models without an interaction term.

[ADD Table 1]

While these results provide initial support for H1 and H2, we were most interested in the interactive effect of *mitigation measures* on *dependency*. Table 1, Models 3 and 4 show that the interaction effect is significant, which demonstrates support for H3. Figure 1, below, shows the interaction effect from this model graphically. It reveals that the probability of reporting a decline in the household economy among those who show *dependency* becomes negative as respondents have more ways to offset the challenges that are associated with economic reliance on the peacekeeping presence. Among those who have access to no *mitigation measures*, the difference in predicted probability of stating a decline in household economy between those who have *dependency* and those who do not is 8%, but this probability could turn negative (-3%) when three levels of mitigation can be accessed. In other words, *dependency* effectively becomes irrelevant as individuals have access to more *mitigation measures*, and those with *dependency* could even net benefit from access to *mitigation measures*.

Taken together, the survey results offer support for our argument that, the greater the scope of *dependency* of an individual on the peacekeeping economy, and the lower an individual's access to *mitigation measures*, the more likely they are to perceive adverse economic impacts from peacekeeping withdrawal (H3).

[INSERT FIGURE 1]

Disaggregated Analysis

Thus far, our additive indices have allowed us to show the impacts of aggregated measures of *dependency* and *mitigation measures* on perceptions of household economic decline, post-UNMIL. As a next step, we disaggregated each of our two indices in order to 'look inside' them and, in so doing, establish whether particular forms thereof (i.e. *direct/indirect* dependency, *diversification/substitution* mitigation) had differential effects on perceptions of household economic conditions after UNMIL left.[23]

[23] In a further analysis provided in the Appendix, we analyze determinants of *dependency* and *mitigation measures*.

Table 2 shows the disaggregated components of the *dependency* index: selling goods and services to UNMIL (column 1); interactions with peacekeepers that involved economic/health/community services (column 2); use of US Dollars (column 3); missing the economic benefits of the mission (column 4). The results show that our measure of *indirect dependency* (i.e. use of USD) has the strongest relationship with perceptions of household decline. Thus, there is support for H1b. At the same time, we see mixed effects in relation to our measures of *direct dependency* (H1a). These differential findings may reflect the fact that some of those who worked directly with the international community had a diverse skillset that could be repurposed relatively easily and productively after the exit of peacekeepers, which would have limited their household economic decline. By contrast, some who did not work directly with, or for, peacekeepers but who still benefitted from economic opportunities that came with UNMIL's stabilizing presence may have had fewer transferable skills and, as such, they may have suffered as the economy contracted alongside PKO exit.

[INSERT Table 2]

Table 3 shows the disaggregated components of the *mitigation measures* index: access to remittances (column 1); access to assistance from NGOs (column 2); using savings (column 3). This disaggregation reveals that mechanisms of *substitution* (H2b) (i.e. remittances, NGO support) drive our overall finding that mitigation reduces perceptions of household economic decline, while our measure of *diversification* (H2a) (i.e. retention or use of savings for new endeavors) is in fact associated with an increased likelihood of perceptions of economic decline at home. These varied findings may reflect the fact that *substitution* effectively shields individuals from some of the effects of aggregate economic decline; that is, when external actors fill some of the economic void that is left by the absence of the peacekeeping mission, certain negative economic effects of PKO withdrawal are never even experienced by those who benefit from *substitution*. By contrast, when individuals use their savings for *diversification* into new areas of business after peacekeeping exit, they are investing within a context of economic instability and downturn. This, in turn, may translate into an individual experiencing and perceiving economic decline (relative to their economic standing during peacekeeping boom times). While this latter interpretation is speculative, we note that it resonates with reports we heard from businesspeople interviewed for our project.[24]

[24] Interviews with two Liberian business executives.

[INSERT Table 3]

In the Appendix , we provide further disaggregated analyses of individual components of *dependency* and *mitigation* interacted with each other. We show that savings and remittances help offset *direct dependency*, in the form of UNMIL services. We also show that remittances and NGO support offset *indirect dependency*, reflected by the use of US Dollars. Combined, these results suggest that remittances, in particular, could be helpful for thwarting the negative (perceptional) effects of both *indirect* and *direct* economic dependence on the mission. The results also suggest that savings and NGO support could have differential effects on mitigating *direct* and *indirect* forms of dependency, respectively. We note, however, that these results are preliminary and we urge more research on different components of *mitigation* and *dependency*.

We finally note that, in the Appendix, we report on several robustness checks, including fixed effects models, controls for beliefs about UNMIL leaving too early, dichotomous measures of *dependency* and *mitigation*, alternative construction of indices, and models with different sets of control variables, including the removal of, and stepwise introduction of, 'pre-treatment' co-variates

Conclusion

In this paper, we have argued that the withdrawal of a large-scale peacekeeping mission can be associated with aggregate economic downturn and, when that is the case, some individuals will feel the effects of that downturn more than others. Specifically, those whose economic activities and livelihoods come to (at least partly) depend on the presence of a peacekeeping mission and its associated economic benefits are more likely to feel the adverse effects of PKO exit than those who are less connected to a peacekeeping economy. While dependent individuals may be particularly susceptible to negative economic consequences of PKO exit, however, that susceptibility can be attenuated through access to particular mitigation measures, which can partly shield an individual from the effects of aggregate-level economic downturn.

This argument finds broad support in data gathered through our large-scale survey of Monrovia, Liberia, where there was aggregate-level economic downturn after PKO exit in 2018 but the micro-level impact of that downturn varied across households within the city. Table 4 summarizes our results based on our hypotheses. Overall, dependent individuals were

indeed more likely to perceive economic decline after UNMIL's exit (H1), particularly those who were engaged with the internationalized and expanding economy overall, without necessarily working directly for, or with, the peacekeeping mission or peacekeepers (H1b). We also found that, while dependent individuals may be susceptible to negative economic consequences of PKO exit, that susceptibility can be offset through mitigation measures (H2 and H3) -- particularly arrangements in which various external actors effectively substitute (H2b) for some of the support that UNMIL previously provided, thereby partly shielding individuals from the effects of aggregate economic downturn. By contrast, we do not find that diversification consistently helps offset dependency (H2a).

Table 4: Summary of Results

Hypotheses	**Results**
H1: Dependency index	Support
H1a: *Direct* dependency	Mixed Support
H2b: *Indirect* dependency	Support
H2: Mitigation index	Mixed Support
H2a: Mitigation - *diversification*	No support
H3b: Mitigation – *substitution*	Support
H3: Interaction of dependency and mitigation	Support

By way of conclusion, it is worth reflecting on whether our study might have implications for the way that international peacekeeping organizations -- and particularly the UN -- think about the process of peacekeeping transitions and economic dimensions thereof. While the UN itself has become increasingly aware of, and concerned with, the need to avoid a 'financial cliff' when UN PKOs leave (Day, 2019), limited attention has been given to the question of how to minimize any micro-level economic harm that may accompany the end of a PKO. By identifying who is particularly likely to perceive adverse economic consequences of withdrawal, and steps that may reduce those adverse effects, our study offers potential paths to addressing economic vulnerability alongside peacekeeping transitions.

In terms of dependency, the UN is aware of the challenges that 'dependents' face when peacekeeping missions close, and so it has taken steps in recent years to address direct dependency by offering training and support for national staff who face redundancy with closure of the mission. For example, UNMIL ran job fairs and entrepreneur fairs (essentially, business information sessions) for its national staff over the years leading up to exit, with the latter being particularly appreciated.[25] While these efforts are welcome, our study suggests that peacekeeping missions in transition should not only focus on those who have become directly dependent on the mission but also on the much larger and more heterogenous group of individuals who become indirectly economically reliant on the peacekeeping presence. This could start with information campaigns that advertise the widespread economic challenges that can accompany PKO exit, but it could also include efforts from peacekeeping missions to encourage economic and employment opportunities in sectors of the economy that are not deeply intertwined with the peacekeeping mission and which, as such, will not be strongly negatively affected by the withdrawal of the mission.

In terms of mitigation, our research suggests that the most important coping mechanisms were those that relied on a dynamic of substitution, which saw friends, family, and NGOs offer protection from national level economic downturn by partly filling the economic and welfare void that was left with the departure of peacekeepers. Noting the efficacy of this mechanism, the UN could give further attention to bridging their social welfare programming with NGOs and international organizations (such as regional organizations, the World Bank, and UN development agencies) that plan to stay on after PKO exit, so that there is continuity in programs and support. Steps of this kind could ensure that individuals who are able to enjoy the benefits of the mini-boom that comes with PKO deployment can continue to enjoy sources of support in the wake of PKO exit. Otherwise, as one set of interviewees concluded, in the absence of sufficient efforts from development actors to mitigate the negative economic effects of peacekeeping withdrawal, there is a danger that a formerly 'peacekept' state "might slip again into the same things that caused the peacekeeping [mission] to arrive."[26]

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[25] Interview with a UN national staff.

[26] Interview with anonymous interviewees.

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